ARISTOTLES POLITIQVES, OR DISCOVRSES OF GOVERNMENT.  
TRANSLATED out OF greek into French, with Expositions taken out of the best authors, specially out of Aristotle himself, and out of Plato, conferred together where occasion of matter treated of by them both doth offer itself: The observations and reasons whereof are illustrated and confirmed by innumerable Examples, both old and new, gathered out of the most renowned Empires, kingdoms, Seignories, and Commonweals that ever haue been, and whereof the knowledge could be had in writing, or by faithful report,  
Concerning the beginning, proceeding, and excellency of civil government.  
By joys LE ROY, called REGIVS.  
Translated out of French into English.  

QVIBVS RESPVBLICA CONSERVETVR  At London printed by Adam Islip. Anno Dom. 1598.   

TO THE RIGHT NOBLE AND renowned GENTLEMAN, SIR ROBERT SIDNEY KNIGHT, LORD GOVERNOVR OF THE CAVTIONARIE town OF VLISSING AND CASTLE OF RAMAKINS.  
SIth that most barbarous and Gothish opinion( right noble Sir) of the contrariety of Learning and arms, and the impossibility of their concurring in the same person to any perfection, is largely confuted by the many examples of those worthy Grecians and Romans who did not only flourish in both, but did therfore far excel all others in martiall glory, because they had sacrificed unto the Muses: I hope there is none so grossly ignorant, or so perversely envious, that will condemn my want of iudgement for choosing a patron whose profession may seem contrary to the nature of this subject: in which hope I am the more confirmed, because sundry of your Lordships public employments, besides your private studies, do amply witness, that as your noble brother( the true knight of Minerua) hath to his eternal honor augmented the number of those few who in this last age of the declining and degenerating world, haue honourably emulated those ancient Worthies: so yourself treading the same path of virtue, haue by like desert purchased to your name& house, a second eternity. And as I doubt not that all indifferent persons will forbear unfriendly carping, so likewise when I consider either the subject, or the first and chiefest author thereof, I presume of your Lordships acceptance. For what more excellent matter or more worthy of a Philosophers pen can be treated of, then that which is he bond of human society, and the perfector of our reasons use, which while men wanted they seemed not men, because wholly resembling beasts? Or what Philosopher can in depth of knowledge equal Aristotle, whose works may be justly tearmd, The treasury of human wisdom? all which as they savour of diuinenesse, so amongst them all, these his Discourses of government haue not the meanest relish thereof; especially where he handleth the changes and destructions of every commonweal, with their causes, and sets down several precepts for the upholding and preserving of each: which whosoever doth advisedly red, can do no other than say of him as Cornelius Nepos in the life of Atticus doth say of Tully, Prudentiam esse quodammodo diuinationem: for what he so many years since did write, hath been in all points exactly verified by Examples of following times, descending even to our present age. I will therefore refer the further consideration of his general worth and this particular work, unto your Lordships wisdom, humbly suing that if his French attire become him better than his English fashion, wherein my pen hath for the most part suited, you will vouchsafe the harshness of the style for the hardness of the matter, and deign to shadow the disgraces of my defects by the grace of your protection: in which desire and hope I stay my pen, beseeching the Almighty to multiply in you all earthly and heavenly blessings.  
Your Lordships most humble at command I. D.   

¶ To the courteous Reader.  
LVcilius( gentle Reader) was wont to wish that his Writings might escape the sight and censure both of the Learnedst,& of the most unlearned; least the one seeing too much should discover some defects,& the other understanding nothing, or very little, condemn all. But as in every other thing wishes do but argue want, and yield no warrant for the accomplishing of mens desires: so in this especially, because the fortune of books published resembleth that of Ships at sea, the one subject to all sorts of Readers as the other to all kinds of Weather. By the sorts of Readers I mean not only as Lucilius did, who distinguished them by learning, ignorance, and mean knowledge; but there is yet a farther difference no less to be respected: for oft where Learning discovers faults, courtesy doth shadow them: but far more oft where no faults are, discourtesy( I use too gentle a term) doth impute them: so mightily are the most mens minds infected with the bitter humour of Zoilisme, a thing not greatly to be merueild, sith that which is easiest is still most usual. It were folly in me to wish with Lucilius for things impossible, and mere madness to hope for them. It shall suffice briefly to acquaint you with some things which being absolutely considered and the truth thereof unknown, may seem to yield large and just occasion of reproof: as first, the harshness of the phrase and rough conveyance of the style, which if any doth dislike, as doubtless some will, I entreat them to remember( for I can hardly think they know not) that no translation is capable of Elegance as the original, because the one hath full liberty of invention,& the other is by necessity tied to observation: next I desire them to consider Aristotles maner of writing, the obscurity, compacting and unusual composing of his style, which if they weigh uprightly, they needs must grant that though Tullies honourable Encomium which he doth generally give it, calling it Aureum flumen orationis, be in respect of the purity thereof, and of the excellency of the matter most true, yet that they cannot with any reason look for a fluent and flourishing style in the translation of such a subject, either out of the original or any other language whereinto it hath ben since translated. I wish them farther to consider that many places of the Comment( wherein are set down whole discourses touching astrology, cosmography, and other deep points of the mathematical sciences, lightly touched by Aristotle) are more obscure than the text itself. Touching the diversity that may be found in the translation, it is not to be meruelled at, sith some part of the book was performed by another, before I undertook the rest. But I hope, that though wee differ in the manner, yet that we serve not from the truth of the matter, howsoever the Compositors mistaking hath therein somewhat wronged us, and the oft& thick enterlining of the copy, hastily written, deceived him; but the chiefest of those oversights are noted in the end. As for the difference of the English in some places from the French, I answer, that when vpon any obscurity I resorted to the Greek, and found the rendering therof in French not so significant as might be, I haue been bold to follow the original, unless it did so depend on the Comment, that I could not alter it. And touching the difference of it from the Latin, I hope none will accuse me for not following that whereto I was not bound, and besides if they confer the latin with the French, and both with the greek, they shall( I doubt not) find that the French doth approach far nearer to Aristotle. Lastly, touching the extraordinary harshness that may in some places be found, I say thus much only, that the difficulty of the thing, wherein even learned men themselves haue sometimes failed, with the small time and leisure which I had both to do and review it may suffice if not to excuse me, yet at least to purchase pardon. But sith my present hast allows me not sufficient time to touch every particular, I will commit unto your courtesies the further consideration both of this& whatsoever else may be objected, humbly entreating you to measure my labour not by itself, for it is worthless, but by my good will and earnest desire to please, which is therefore the greater, because I fear that my former toys haue displeasd, which were they again to pen and publish, should rather sleep in silence, than I through them be accused of time misspent.   

TO THE MOST CHRISTIAN King, henry king of france and Poleland, the third of that name.  
SIr, the books of government and commonweal matters which I haue set forth heretofore under your authority, do now return to your majesty reviewed and amended, for the good account you made of them, and for the pleasure you take sometimes in looking vpon them, and in causing them to be red unto you. And soothly although your Highnesse being brought up and exercised from your tender age in affairs of Peace and war, and other matters of state, can skill by experience of the chief things that are requisite to the government of your realm, and do ordinarily retain men about you of your counsel, a great number of wise and skilful personages: yet notwithstanding, the reading of books that treat of government, may greatly delight you at times of recreation, when as you shall see in them many goodly and profitable advertisements, concerning the government of Princes. Many Kings and Emperours set their whole felicity on war, and in conquering new countries, but if they look well hereinto, they shall find it better for a Prince to govern wisely, and to order their estate conveniently, than to invade and conquer another Princes realm; considering that the chief cause why he is set up of God, and why God is so gracious to him, as to put innumerable persons in subiection to him, is that he should hold them together in the knowledge and observation of the true Religion, rule them with good laws, defend them by force of arms, and in all cases be so careful of their welfare, as they may regard him as their father and shepherd. It is not for him to apply himself alonly to the preparing of great and puissant Armies, to cover the Sea with Ships, Gallies, and other vessels furnished for the warres, to give battle, to make conquests, to win cities, to subdue new kingdoms, and to set up his flags and banners of arms in the uttermost bounds of the World: but to provide for the welfare of his Subiects, to remedy their harms, to relieve their wrongful oppressions, to yield and show himself meeld and gentle in hearing the requests and complaints of the inferior sort, modest and upright in answering them, ready to minister iustice to every man, as well by appointing reward for virtue, as punishment for 'vice, and finally so to behave himself as he may be loved, feared, and praised of all men. Most true it is Sir, that whereas at your coming to the crown, you found this your realm of france long forworne with the civil broils which were at that instant far greater than ever they had been afore, and sore impouer●shed by the former calamities; you could not then fully show to your subiects the good dealing which you were desirous to show towards them, because you were letted by the wickedness of the time. But now that the troubles are laid asleep by the peace which you haue accorded of desire to relieve your afflicted people; all men look for all manner of happiness hereafter by means of your clemency, and that God pittieng this realm, as one whereof he hath shewed himself to haue a singular regard above all others, will by your means rid it from al former dangers, turning the miserable discord wherewith it hath been infinitely disquieted, into sure concord; and the horrible tempest of civil war, into perpetual calmness of Peace. Howbeit letting that matter alone, I return to Aristotles matters of government, whereunto I hope to ad Platos also, at leastwise if I may haue opportunity to do it, and that my health will give me leave: not only translating them both out of greek into French, but also moreover enlightening them with expositions, that the work may be the more delightful to your majesty, and the easier to be understood of others which shall look into it under your protection. And forasmuch as the skill of the governing of Commonweals consisteth chiefly in the practise, I haue where need requireth, alleged diuers examples, both old and new, gathered out of the famousest states of the world, especially of the nearest v●to us to our knowledge; assaying to set down the causes and reasons of their events, according to the observations of the Philosophers, and other means devised afterterward by long experience,& put in practise by the space of two thousand yeres or thereabouts: Surely it hath ●ene no small travel to be the setter forth of so high and grave discourses in French, and especially to express the elegancy of the one, and the propriety of the other. But I will never count it painful to undertake the thing that may benefit my country, or which I think may please your majesty, to whom I dedicat and consecrat this whole work of government, a matter of as great importance as ever any hath hitherto been done in French; whether it be in respect of the worthiness of the master itself, which is the goodliest and profitablest that can be, or in respect of the excellency of the authors thereof, who were of the skilfullest that ever lived among men. Sir, I beseech God long to preserve your majesty, and to give you a happy reign in good peace, both at home and abroad, to his honour and your contentment, to the welfare of France, and the benefit of al Christendom. At Paris in the month of july, Anno. 1596.  
Your majesties most humble and obedient subject and seruant joys LE ROY.   

¶ Interpres ad Lectorem.  
Est sua laus illis qui summa perotia scribunt:  
Otia amant Musae, nec inani Fabula sensu  
Virgineo semota choro sacrauit amoena:  
Otia amant artes, nec frustra Pallas oliuam  
( Sit licèt armipotens) pacis tutatur amore,  
Pacis amore dedit, celebri certamine victrix.  
At neque turbati transmittunt lumina fontes,  
Nec restant medijs Typhi sua iura procellis,  
Sit sua laus illis qui summa per otia scribunt;  
Sit venia& nobis queis sors nulla otia praestat.   

OF GOVERNMENT AND OF THE MOST renowned LAWMAKERS THAT HAVE PVT IT IN proof, AND of the most famous authors that haue written thereof, specially of PLATO and ARISTOTLE; together with a sum and comparison of their commonweals.  
WHo so vouchsafeth to consider the restitution of good learning which hath happened in this age, and the ornament which all Arts and Sciences haue recovered by the diligence of diuers men of skill: shall haue cause to wonder to see, how almost the meanest sciences are set again in their perfection; and the skill of government, being the worthiest, the behoofullest, and the needfullest of all others, is left alone behind: without the which, men who naturally be companiable, cannot in any wise maintain their companying and society together. grammar, poetry, rhetoric and logic, haue been handled by infinite persons, and enlightened with innumerable expositions, annotations, corrections, and translations. The mathematical sciences were never better known, neither were Astrology and Cosmography ever better understood. What is more to be wondered at at this day than to see the whole world discovered, whereof the most part hath continued so long unknown? And to see the uttermost coasts of East& West, North and South, intercommune together, and men that are separated with so many seas, and so far distant one from another, to meet together by the means of sailing, made safer and easier by many new inventions? As for natural Philosophy and physic, I may well uphold that they were never in greater perfection among the ancient Greekes and Arabians, then they be at this time, wherein a great number of beasts, roots, herbs, trees● gums, liquours, fruits, minerals and other simples haue ben brought to light, whereof men haue made many wholesome remedies that were not put in practise aforetimes. Who knoweth not the change that is befallen in the Art of chivalry, as well by Sea as by Land, and that the manner both of besieging and of defending Fortresses, is far differing from that which hath been of old time? Yet notwithstanding the Cannons, Harquebushes, Pistolets, and other artillery of firework being brought to such perfection as they bee, are no impediment, but that there bee as brave soldiers and valiant captaines as ever there were. Building, painting, and music are set again welneere in their first state: and men haue taken so great pains in eloquence of pleading, and knowledge of Law, that it is not possible to attain to more. But as for government, which deserved to bee more laboured in than they all, as which comprehendeth and ruleth them all, it hath been let alone, without receiving any light of learning unto this day. The cause hereof in mine opinion is, that the men of skill which could haue beautified it with their writings, haue utterly forborn the dealing with matters of State, to give themselves wonderfully to the searching out of the truth, setting their sovereign felicity in contemplation: and that those which haue ben called to public charge and offices, haue commonly had no great skill, or if they haue had any, they haue wanted leisure to write. Insomuch, that by the forbearing of the learned to practise, and by the forbearing of the practisers to study, this science( which is unperfect without skill and experience joined together) hath come behind hand as I said afore.  
As for myself, although I be not of any excellent skill, nor of any great experience: yet notwithstanding, foras●uch as I haue spent my whole life in study to the least disauantage that I possibly could, and long time frequented the courts of great Princes, abiding ordinarily about such persons as haue had the charge and managing of matters of State, to the intent, to match my mean knowledge of learning with some experience of practise: I haue applied my mind chiefly to this science, attempting to further it to the uttermost of my power. Therfore having determined to treat thereof, I thought it not to be from the matter, to show first of all the dignity, profit, and antiquity thereof. Secondly, I will speak of the Law-makers that haue put it in practise, and finally, of the Authors that haue written therof; specially of Plato& Aristotle, repeating briefly the substance of their commonweals, the which I will compare together, to show the fruit that may be reaped by matching thē together. The which matters being high, weighty, very profitable,& hitherto not treated of in French, I will lay forth as easily, briefly,& fitly as I possibly can: praying the readers of thē to give themselves attentively to the understanding of so goodly& profitable a matter.  
First of all therfore to come to the worthinesse& profitableness of government, it is the science which teacheth how to govern mankind aright, according to the nature of each country and people,& according to the diversity of the times: how states are to be founded, maintained and reformed when need requireth: how commonweals, kingdoms& Empires are to be ordered to the benefit of the subiects, and to the honor of the Magistrates. It is the science which hath the understanding of all affairs, directing all men what to do or leave undone, which ouerlooketh all estates, beholding the means of their changes, ruins and preservations: which maintaineth all other arts and trades, as well the liberal Sciences as handicrafts, setting down whether they bee to bee received or no; commanding even the most honourable of them, as the professions of chivalry, of oratory, of Iustice, and of housekeeping; and in at one end( which is the sovereign welfare of man) comprehending the ends of all the others. That is it which hath first shewed unto us the form of Law both natural and civil, human and divine, private and public, written and unwritten; which hath invited us to live friendly together for the remedy of common commandments: which hath taught us both the beginning and the end of human society, and that there was an universal and everlasting Law printed in mens hearts, and sown in their breasts long time afore there was any ordinances written, or any city founded; upon the which Lawe all other particular, local, and temporal laws ought to be grounded, and by the same also ruled, moderated& expounded. It hath derived equity from nature, to the intent to apply it to all cases that happen from day to day, and hath made us truly to understand, that Law& Iustice consist not in opinion, but are naturally graffed in human creatures. By this Science we know the duty of Princes towards their Subiects, of Magistrates towards their Princes, and also towards private persons: What Offices are most necessary and most honourable: what obedience honor and reverence the inferiors owe to their superiors: how men ought to behave themselves in buying, in selling, in exchanging, in prising, in giuing, in receiving, in promising, in bargaining, and in pleading. In great disorder should we be, if it had not knit us together by marriages, kindreds, alliances, and households, divided inheritances, established successions, and ordained seats of Iustice. For otherwise we could not haue known our own from other mens, or kinsman from a stranger, or the seruant from the master. To bee short, without this science it were not possible to live either publicly or privately, nor in any wise to deal well with men or mens matters. For by the honouring and rewarding of virtue, by the discommending and punishing of 'vice, and by the reducing of all our doings to an uprightness, it hath procured us a mean to live happily in quietness and concord with contentation. And it is the more perfect, in that it procureth the welfare, not of some particular persons or companies onely, as other trades do, but also universally of all mankind, and of the whole world, which according to the opinion of the stoics, is the true city, and as you would say, the commonweal of all men living.  
Thus haue you heard the excellency and profitableness of government: consider ye now the antiquity thereof, and by the same means consider also the law-giuers, which did first put it in practise, and afterward the Authors that haue written thereof. Aristotle( who thought the world to be eternal) doth in the seventh book of his commonweal, deem this science to haue ben invented long ago, and also many or rather infinite times since to haue been foregone and lost. Plato in his third and sixth books of laws, affirmeth that it began when towns and ordinances of towns first began, at such time as men were multiplied vpon the earth. And he supposeth, that in vnaccountable and almost infinite length of time, innumerable cities haue been builded and also destroyed, and become one while of small, great; and another while of great, small; one while evil of good, and another while good of evil: which change hath befallen not onely in Cities and towns, but also in Nations and Countries, yea and even in mighty kingdoms and Empires, founded at the beginning with great prowess of the first lords of them,& afterward marred by the laziness of their successors, or else diminished by little and little through the long continuance of time which maketh an end of all things. Plato in his Timeus and in his commonweal, Aristotle in his Meteores, and Seneca in his natural Questions, think it to haue come to pass through the fatal Law of the World, as well by the moving of the first heaven, whereupon all other thanksgivings and the whole course of nature dependeth, as by the meetings and goings asunder of the planets, to whom the Elements and all things compounded of the elements, are obedient. And peremptorily they father the destructions vpon them: imputing the most general sort of them unto excessive waterfloods and burnings by fire, and the lesser sort to wars, plagues, famines, and earthquakes, of purpose to cleanse countries from wicked inhabitants, when the naughtiness of them is grown up to the highest pitch. After which riddances, the men that come up next, were very simplo and ignorant. Then some one or two being found among them to be of greater wit then the rest, did purchase great reputation by teaching thē good behaviour with some show of Religion, as Mercury and Sesostris did in old time in egypt, Saturne in Italy,& Orpheus and Amphion in Greece. On the other side, need taught them by little and little things necessary, after the which followed the things that serve for honor and pomp, until at length, the former superfluity succeeded again. Those excellent personages stayed vpon the having of such interchangeable intercourse of Arts, states, and other inferior things: With whom the most renowmed Astrologers agree; insomuch, that they will needs determine not onely the lives and fortunes of men, but also the prosperities and adversities of cities and Nations, as Ptolomie hath done in his Quadripartite according to the ancient Chaldees and egyptians, and after him the Arabians and also some Christians: adding thereunto the continuance of sects, as did Peter Ally a divine of Paris and cardinal of Cambray, in his concordance of divinity and astrology: against whom did set themselves John earl of Mirandula in his fift book against Astrologers, and vives in his second book of Christian truth. But to return again to our matter. If we look thoroughly into all antiquity, whereof any remembrance remaineth unto us, we shall find, that the people which inhabited in old time the country where we dwell now, were as rude and uncivil three thousand yeares ago, as are savages that haue lately been discovered by the Spaniards and Portingales towards the West and South parts of the world. They dwelled scattered here and there in caues of mountaines, and in Forrests under cabins, without law, without Iustice, without counsel, without Magistrate, without Religion, and without any form of marriage. Afterward being increased by little and little, they communicated one with another, and began to draw into companies, whereupon ensued Hamlets, Villages, towns, and finally Cities; the good men being not onely induced to such meeting for friendships sake, but also enforced by the necessities and adversities that pinched them, which drove them to help one another. At the beginning they lived together in a certain natural simplicity, as yet uncorrupted by ambition or covetousness, and vnmarred of false opinions. every company obeyed the eldest among them, using his will for their Law, and demeaning themselves simply according to use and custom. Afterward, as leaudnesse did increase, it stood them on hand to make laws, and for the obeying of them to create Magistrates with authority, that they might repress the ouer-lustinesse and malapartnesse of the wicked. For although man be naturally civil, and more companiable than any other mortal nought, and to that purpose is endued with reason and speech, that he might communicate with others: yet notwithstanding forasmuch as he is subject to passions which oftentimes do trouble him, and to lewd lusts which incessantly restrain him from the good, it was needful to set him down some commandments, whereby to bridle such affections, and to set them again in the right way of Iustice. Whereunto some excellent personages having the skill of government haue strained themselves to provide a remedy by appointing trades of living and laws to folk in diuers countries at diuers times; and for that cause they were called Law-makers. And these haue always furthered that invention of theirs vpon God, the first cause and original fountain of all goodness: as who would say, it is not possible to restrain ignorant& froward folk, without Religion and the fear of God, which is the foundation, establishment, and maintenance of all Commonweales. The famousest lawgiver that we know of, was Moyses the Prophet of God, who by Gods commandement gave the Law to the hebrews at their departure out of egypt. There haue been other Law-giuers in other places, who likewise haue fathered their laws vpon God under diuers names, according to the diuers opinions of the Countries where they were: As for example, Zoroastres the Law-maker of the Bactrians and Persians, fathered his laws vpon Oromases: Trismegist the Law-giuer of the egyptians vpon mercury: Zamolxis the Law-giuer of the Scythians vpon Vesi: Charondas the Chalcidian vpon Saturne: Minos the Candian vpon jupiter: Lycurgus the Lacedemonian vpon Apollo: Draco and Solon the Law-giuers of Athens vpon Minerua: And Numa the Law-giuer of the romans vpon Egeria: all of them mingling their temporal government with Religion, which in old time was accounted the onely wisdom; and none other were taken for wise, but such as delivered forth Religion, and interpnted it unto men. A good while after the decease of Numa, because his laws and the laws of other men, as well afore him as after him, were found unperfect; ten men were appointed in Rome with absolute authority for the time, to overlook them and amend them, and to add unto them such other laws as they knew to bee needful for the government of their State. And to that end they sent to Athens, lacedaemon, and other places, where they heard there was any good State of good government: From which places they took many constitutions which they mingled with their own, and brought them all into twelve Tables, wherein they comprised the whole body of the roman Lawe, and the whole order of civil government. Cicero in his first book of his Orator, affirmeth that they far passed all the books of the Philosophers both in authority and profit. And Titus livius in his third book of the first Decade, complaining of the excessive multitude of the laws that were in Rome in his time, receiveth that the fountain of all Iustice both public and private, was contained in the twelve Tables.  
After the making, publishing, and receiving of those laws, there came up lawyers, who understanding the laws and customs that were used particularly in the city, and the forms of pleading, gave counsel in every several matter, and shewed men how they should bring their actions, as well in criminal cases, as in matters of trespass. They shewed the order of commencing their actions, of taking exceptions, of seeking delays, of giuing warnings, and taking defaults, of making inquisitions and informations, of pronouncing sentences, of putting in and drawing back of appeals, and of giuing definitive iudgement: wherethrough their authority grew so great, specially at room, that no Testament or last Will, no Stipulation or suretyship, no Obligation or bond, no covenant, no composition, no bargain, no contract of Marriage, nor any other matter of importance passed without their privity. And men resorted unto them, not onely in cases concerning the civil Law, but also for all their other affairs and dealings. They were of counsel with the Emperours, with the senators, with the assemblies of the people, and with the cases of their friends: They were called to counsel both in peace and war. By reason whereof, they were called men of skill, and their profession was called the skill of Law; because that that profession could not be demeaned without very great skill and discretion; nor without much seeing, hearing, reading, and understanding, nor without the growing of things done in old time, nor without the knowledge of the common disposition of mankind, and the nature of right and equity, nor without marking the manners and customs of diuers Nations, specially of their own. These Lawyers had their chief scope and sway in italy, and wrote infinite books concerning that matter; as severus, Sulpicius, Scaeuola, Papinian, ulpian, Modestine and others. Their very Office was to expound the true meaning of the praetorian proclamation, of the constitution of the Senate, of the decrees of the people, of the ordinances of Princes, and of all other laws: to show the reason of every of them, to inform men which of them were to bee kept, or renewed, or abrogated, according to place, time, person, and other circumstances, after the same maner that the Thesmothets did in Athens. The Historiographers wrote the warres, and registered the other public doings, as Herodotus, thucydides, Polybius, sallust, Titus livius, Tacitus, and innumerable others did in all Languages. Some Orators governed States, and were assistants in consultaions of public affairs, whereof they wrote Orations, as did Demosthenes and Cicero.  
Other some being more given to contemplation, applied not themselves so much to dealing with the people and with the city matters, as the former sort did, who commonly meddled in all things: But forasmuch as they were endued with great wit, and had attained to great skill, by mean of the great rest and leisure which they had, they sought out the truth of all things concerning God and man. And as touching commonweals, they conferred them one with another, and by so doing, endeavoured to yield causes and reasons of their continuances and decay, and to show by what means every of them was established, why some were better governed and some worse; which was the best commonweal, who was the perfect Common-wealeman, and who is the true Prince and Magistrate. Such were Plato, Aristotle, Heraclides of Pont, Theophrastus, Dicaerchus, and plutarch.  
The first professors of philosophy, wondering at the heauens and the stars, and at their revolutions and effects; and beholding the earth, the waters fresh and salt, the air variable, the burning fire, and all things as well simplo as compounded contained within the compass of the whole world, in multitude innumerable, and in beauty unsuccessful: bent their wits to the finding out of their properties, agreeings, and disagreeings, to know whereof they were made or engendered, how long they continued, where they became, when and how they perished, and what in them was mortal and corruptible, and what divine and everlasting. They marked the moouings of the stars, their meetings, their oppositions, their distances, their appearings, their hidings of themselves, their greatness, their swiftness, their flownesse, their colours, and the marvelous accidents both general and particular which they cause, according to the answereablenesse of the parts of heaven and Earth one to another, the disposition of the matter which they meet withal, and the diversities of the seasons wherein they reign and work. The Bramines and Gymnosophists in India, the Magies in Persia, the D●uids in Gallond and in great Brittaigne, and the wise men among the AEthiopians, Chaldeans, and egyptians followed all that manner of philosophy. Afterward the Greekes, as Pythagoras, Thales, Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Parmenides, Melissus, Xenophanes, Eudoxus, and Anaxagoras, employed their wits about the searching out of the secrets of the world. nevertheless, forasmuch as they thought it odious both to God and nature, to blaze abroad those things differently to all men, for fear least the making of them too common, might cause them to bee despised of the rascall sort, some of them did darken them expressly, with numbers and figures of geometry: and other some wrapped them up in coverts of fables, and set them down in measured verses, to the intent, to make their works the more durable through the delightfulness of the fables and the sweetness of the verse. Plato changet●●his fabling into making of Dialogues, retaining still the using of fables also in many places. Aristotle left both versifying and fabling, and choose rather to writ in whole continued Oration, than in dialogue wise, at leastwise for ought of his that is come unto us to this day. But as touching natural Philosophy and astrology, Socrates maketh very small reckoning of them, but giveth himself chiefly to reasoning of manners, of virtue, of 'vice, and altogether of good and evil. He was the first of all the Greek Philosophers, that drew Philosophy from gazing vpon the Heauens and vpon Nature, to apply it to the government of Housesholds and commonweals, as Xenophon reporteth, who in the first book of his Commentaries, writeth thus of him.  
Socrates( saieth he) spake not of the matter or stuff of all things, ass many Philosophers do, neither occupied he his wits in considering how the world was created, and by what necessity the heavenly things are made: but shewed, that such as gave themselves to such kind of gazing or contemplation, were fools. First he demanded of them whether they thought themselves so sufficiently skilful in human things already, as to proceed from them to the speculation of the other: if not, then whether they thought themselves to do well, in leaving human matters to gaze vpon the heauens. He wondered that they perceived it not to bee unpossible for them to attain to the knowledge of those things, considering how those which seem most skilful in them, agree not among themselves, but behave themselves like mad men one towards another. For as of fools, some fear not the things that are to bee feared, and some are afraid where no cause is, some are not ashamed to do and say openly whatsoever cometh in their head, and other some dare not disclose themselves in company, some yield no reverence at all neither to Temple nor to Altar, nor to any divine thing, and other some worship both blocks and stones and brute beasts: so among them which busy themselves about the searching out of the nature of all things, some think there is but onely one being or Beeer, and some think there are infinite multitudes of thē without number. Some think that all things are moved,& some that nothing is moved: some that all things are created and do perish, and other some that nothing was created, nor any thing doth perish. He demanded of them yet further after this manner; namely, whether that as they that haue the knowledge of things belonging to men, can skill to do them themselves, and to teach them unto others; so whether the searchers of the heavenly things do think, that by their knowing by what necessity each thing is ordained, can when they list make the wind to blow, and the showers to rain, or alter the seasonableness of the year when need is: or whether they had no such hope, but restend within their only bare knowledge how every thing was made. After that manner spake he to such as did set their minds vpon such curiosities. unto other men he disputed ordinarily of things pertaining to man, discussing what was godliness, and what was ungodliness; what was honest, and what unhonest; what was right and what begging; what wisdom, and what folly; what manliness, and what cowardlinesse; what was a Common-weale, and who is a commonweal man; what it is to reign, and what manner of one he ought to be that should command. many other things also did he discourse, knowledge the knowledge might( in his iudgement) make men good and honest: esteeming them favourably the name of slaves, which were ignorant of them. And in the fourth book of the same his Commentaries, Xenophon saith of him again: He deemed those men to haue a good understanding, which soon conceived of the thing which they studied,& bare well away the things which they learned, and were desirous of those Sciences which teach us how to live well in a house and in a commonweal, and generally to use all men and all things as becometh vs. For he was of opinion, that if those persons were well instructed, they would not only be happy men in their private behaviour, and in the well ordering of their own houses, but also make the whole cities and commonweals happy where they dwell. Notwithstanding, Aulus Gellius witnesseth, that even unto his daies the men of Athens had opinion, that Xenophon( of hatred to Plato) wrote the aforesaid words purposely against Plato, because that in his books he brought in Socrates, discoursing of natural Philosophy, Geometry, and music. But in very dead Plato himself maketh him to speak well nigh the like things in his Phedon. When I was young( saith Socrates) I had a marvelous desire to learn the Science which is called the history of Nature: For I thought it to be a very excellent thing to understand the causes why all things are done, wherefore they perish, and by what means they be maintained. Oftentimes tossed I myself up and down in considering such doings from the beginning: as for example, to know whether that after heat& could haue received some putrefaction, thereupon( as some haue said) living creatures are engendered and sustained. And again, whether the cause of wisdom in us bee blood, or air, or fire, or none of them all: but rather that our hearing, seeing, and smelling do come of the brain: of the which sences spring memory and opinion, and likewise of memory and opinion taking their rest, do spring up skill by the same means. again in considering the corrupting of those things, and the inconveniences that happen in the skies and earth, I was utterly graveled in the end, because I was fain still to vnlearne the same things, which I thought I had learned afore. Also plutarch receiveth of him in Solons life, that he loved chiefly that part of moral Philosophy which treateth of the government of commonweals, as the most part of the wise men of that time did, who sought to haue no further insight than of the things that are in common use among men, wherethrough they purchased the renown of wisdom, by being well seen alonely in matters of state and government.  
As for Socrates, although he was of excellent skill, wisdom, and sharpness of wit, and very eloquent, yet did he not write any thing. But Plato, Xenophon, and other of his Disciples convyed into their books the discourses which he had made at diuers times, or rather for the reverence which they bare unto him, they published the most part of their own inventions under his name, to give the more authority unto them. The Greekes affirm Plato to haue been the first among them that wrote any books of Common-weale matters. He imagining that we cannot know any thing ce●tainely by the bodily sences, because they fill us with many errors and false imaginations, but only by the understanding and reason of the mind, held opinion, that there were certain universal forms, shapes, or patterns of all nature and artificial things, which he termed idea, whereof the things themselves took their beings, upholding that they abode everlastingly severed from the matter or stuff, always in the very singleness and pureness of the godhead itself, and are conceiuable only by understanding: and that the other shapes which were produced of them, were but shadowes and Images of them, subject to continual alteration, ever breeding, ever dying, ever increasing, ever diminishing, ever gliding, ever falling, ever beginning, and ever ending. According to this opinion, he did cast in his imagination a certain idea of a perfect Commonwealth, and rather divine then human: for that perceiving mankind to be always traveled and troubled with dissension, that those whom in times past by innumerable laws and ordinances invented to remedy& redress the same, had nothing profited therein, but to the contrary, all things rather seemed to impair: he esteemed that to pluck up and extirp the hatreds and partialities of men, there could be nothing more expedient then to set before their eyes a community, not only of all good things, but also of things namely which Nature itself hath made and framed proper to every man, as of eyes, ears, and hands, to the end, that whosoever should see, hear, or do any things should employ all his actions whatsoever unto the use and common profit of all men, thinking also that both women and children ought likewise to be common, thereby to breed and entertain love among the citizens: who by that means having nothing in particular, should thereby bee touched with one like ioy and grief, according to the occurrence, and effect of their affairs. Not that in any sort he esteemeth it an easy thing to be done( as he himself affirmeth in the beginning of his first book of the Common-wealth, as also about the end of the ninth) but rather for the novelty therof, that it should be found a thing most strange& admirable, as not being used or once allowed of in any place whatsoever, but that the example and form of politic perfection, whereupon in argument and word he had framed this Common-wealth, peradventure being in heaven, and visible onely to those that would attentiuelie behold the same with the eyes of good intelligence, to the end, that having seen and beholded it, they should by imitation assay all means to conform themselves unto it. Representing therefore this form of a Common-wealth, framed and devised according to the patron by him conceived within his high and divine spirit, he was much more pleased and satisfied therewith then in all his other works, as it well appeareth by the beginning of Timee, wherein having collected the principal points of all his politic discourse, he sheweth his great and singular affection unto the work, withall wishing to find some excellent Ora●●r or learned Poet, to give it the true praise and commendation which it worthily deserveth. For that therein there is such gravity of sentences, eloquence of words, and variety of exquisite proposition, that it is impossible to find a thing more artificially wrought. Now having purposed to represent unto us the image of a most perfect, true, and just Common-wealth, he hath entitled his work by the name of policy or Iustice, principally enforcing himself to show that it is Iustice, because he esteemed it to be the true and only rule of politic institution, whereunto all human actions ought wholly to be referred. The Heauens by their continual moving, running and compassing about this earthly mould, stirreth up& quickeneth the seeds of all things whatsoever that are enclosed& cast into the superficial part thereof, which being and remaining within the earth, are nourished by the water, brought forth and sprung up by the force of air and fire, and then to make them ripe, are quickened by the natural influences of the celestial planets, specially the sun and moon: who by their admirable and strange virtues do still disperse& cast forth in every place a perpetual and continual desire of natural production, thereby at all times and seasons to fill and to replenish the world with new creatures, plants, herbs, trees, stones, and metals, and to continue them in their kinds for the use of man, for whom only all things on earth are made and created. Who notwithstanding their reasonable and politic production, cannot receive or reap any fruit thereof without Iustice, Law, and Magistrates, who by good reason are rightly termed the Ministers of God, ordained and appointed for the government and conservation of mankind, in due and reasonable proportion to distribute and divide among them those goods and things which daily by the most divine providence of God are given and sent unto them: seeing then that Iustice is of such force and efficary, there can be no better nor more necessary work done nor procured unto man, then by all means to move and stir him up unto the same, without the which, they neither can nor may live either solitary or in company whatsoever. Therefore doth Plato deserve great praise among all such as haue either established commonweals or written of the form of government; specially, for that he groundeth not the principles of his commonweal vpon richesse, power of men, or conquests, as most men do; but vpon Iustice, the which he prefereth before all things: in consideration, that in whatsoever countries and States of government it is duly known, and sincerely observed, with true Religion and the pure serving of God, it maketh all troubles, suits in Law, and dissensions to cease, and procureth great happiness to the persons that follow it. Socrates disputing with Thrasymachus, Glaucus, and Adimant, doth in his first book and in a part of his second, examine certain definitions of Iustice, and compare it with unjustice by laying them together, to the intent, that being the better known, the one may bee the more reuenced, and the other the more misliked and hated. The which manner of teaching by contra●●●s, is observed in many Sciences, and is of unsuccessful force. As for example, physic speaketh not onely of health, but also of sickness: and music speaketh not onely of Concords, but also of Discords: to the intent, to do the contraries the better: namely, to maintain health, and to keep good tune. Likewise, moral Philosopie giveth us knowledge, not onely of the things that are delightful and profitable in very dead, but also of the things that are unhonest, unpleasant, and hurtful. For the good cannot bee perfectly perceived, no● worthilie esteemed, but by conferring it with the evil: neither can the evil bee well eschewed and subdued, without the help of the known good.  
Therefore Socrates treating of the Iustice that is to bee in a Commonweale, and in man, seeketh it first in the commonweal where it is most apparent, as in the greater thing, and afterward in man, where it is less apparent, as in the lesser thing. And vpon that occasion, he declareth the original of commonweals, kindreds. Degrees, States, Trades, and exercises of people, in what sort they may maintain Iustice amoug them, and wherein consisteth the commodity of a commonweal, by comparing a well ordered commonweal with a corrupt one. And because the government of all commonweals dependeth vpon the bringing up of the commoners: throughout his whole third book, and in a good part of his fourth, he traineth them up from their very infancy, according to their natural inclinations& dispositions: but specially the keepers, that is to say, the magistrates and men of war, whom above all men he will haue to be well instructed in true religion, without corruption of poetical fables. Then returneth he again to his discourse of Iustice, affirming it to be the union of the four principal virtues, wisdom, stoutness, temperance, and particular Iustice.  
And that the commonweal is just or rightful, where every virtue doth his proper duty, as well towards the commanders as towards the obeyers, of what sort or quality soever they be: and likewise that the man is just where the like consent of the foresaid virtues is found, because there is the selfsame behaviour required in every several person, which is to be required in a whole commonweal. That in the soul of man there are three parts, Reason, Wrath, and Lust: that wisdom serveth to guide Reason, stoutness to restrain Wrath, and Temperance to bridle Lust. That in a commonweal the Gouernours do represent the image of Reason and wisdom: the defenders resemble Wrath and stoutness, and the handicrafts and merchants are like to Lust and Temperance. And therefore the commonweal or the Man is then just, when in the commonweal the virtues, and in the Man the partes of the soul, do their duties duly without encroaching one vpon another: and that the commonweal and the Man are unjust where the contrary befalleth, forasmuch as unjustice is nothing else but the transgressing of the said duties and offices: like as the sickness of the body is the disorder and disagreement of the four humours, and the health of the body is their good agreement in due proportion together.  
In the fift book he treateth of the community of goods, wives, and children. having set his commonweal in that order, in his sixth book he describeth the office of the Princes which are to rule it. The which he continueth on withall in the seventh book, rehearsing particularly what sciences they ought to learn,& in what order. And forasmuch as he considered that there be many sorts of commonweals differing from his, he compareth them with it, in the eight and ninth books, declaring very cunningly the changes of the one sort unto the other, and therewithal also their vices and discommodities. Finally, because most men are so bent to their own profit, that they forget all duty and conscience, to the intent to induce ●ll men to do well, in his tenth and last book he declareth that rewards are appointed for the righteous, and punishments for the unrighteous, not onely in this present life, but also in the life to come. At the first he did put forth no more but the first two books, against the whichh Xenophon( beating him a little grudge) did set himself, and wrote the Institution or bringing up of Cyrus, wherein he expressed the image of a rightful kingdom and a martiall King, of purpose to set forth the kingly government, differing from that which Plato did set down in his commonweal. Whereat Plato was so sore offended, that afterward taking occasion in his third book to treat of the kingdom of the Persians, and coming of purpose to Cyrus, to the intent to pick a quarrel to Xenophons work, he acknowledged Cyrus to be a hardy and valiant Prince, howbeit that he never had any honourable bringing up. After that Plato had finished his commonweal, he made also twelve books of laws, wherein he speaketh himself under the name of his host of Athens. And in pretending to give laws to the Greekes, he examineth three commonweals, which flourished at that time in Greece: namely, the Candian, the Lacedemonian, and the Athenian; abating, adding, and altering many points in them, to make one better of them all. moreover, to the same purpose, he wrote two other Treatises, the one entitled Minos, wherein he defineth and divideth Law; and the other government, as wherein consisteth the skill of governing, and how the same ought to be used. Cicero affirming himself to be a follower of Plato, and glorying of himself for his matching of eloquence with Philosophy, made six books of Common-weale in dialogue wise in the roman tongue, applied chiefly to the roman State, which books are lost by the injury of time: and as many of laws, conformable to the twelve Tables, of which there remain but only three, and those unperfect and corrupted.  
Now then, whereas the first Sages gave themselves wonderfully to the beholding of the heauens, and of nature; and Socrates and Plato bent themselves chiefly to moral philosophy, Aristotle succeeding them, comprised all the parts of philosophy most happily. I will not at this present meddle with any other of his writings, but reserve my treating of them to some more convenient time. I will speak but only of those which serve my present turn. First of all he gathereth the institutions of two hundred and fifty Common-weales, as well strangers as Greekes. Then receiveth he to Alexander the great, concerning reigning: Afterward he made eight books of government full of great Learning and wisdom, in the which he hath brought all the skill of governing into form of Art. In his first book he sheweth from whence civil society proceedeth, wherein it consisteth, and to what end it is to bee referred; beginning at the first and singlest parts thereof. Next he treateth of the means whereby to get goods, which serve to maintain both housholds and Common-weales, and fetcheth the true causes of governments from Nature. In the second place, afore he enter into the principal matter, he examineth the most Renowmed Common-weales of his time, and bewraieth the commandments of them all. Then coming to the third point, which is the right beginning of his government, he prophesieth what a city is, who is a Citizen, and what a Common-weale is, how many sorts of Commonweales there are, how every of them is established, and how men be disposed to be governed by some one sort rather than by another, which things he goeth through withal in his fourth book. In the fifth book are set down the alterations, decay, and preservations of States. In the sixth he speaketh interchangeably of the government by a few, and of government by the multitude; of either of their vnderkinds, resemblances, proprieties, and communicatings: of the Magistrates needful for either state, and of their charges. In the seventh, which absolutely is the perfect commonweal, and wherein consisteth the happiness of cities: he treateth of the situation, commodity, and ornament of a city: of the condition of the territory about it: of the number and quantities of the inhabitants, of marriage, and of procreation and bringing up of children: the training of whom he toucheth in the eight and last book which is unperfect, where he discourseth particularly in what exercises and what trades they ought to be entred at the first.  
Now that I haue briefly rehearsed the principal matters set down in the commonweals of Plato and Aristotle, I am to tell you wherefore I determined to join them together, and to show you the importance and profit of that joining. certain it is that there was never any man fully and wholly perfect in this world, how great grace soever God bestowed vpon him, but that with notable virtues, always some notable vices haue been matched. Therefore no marvel though Plato and Aristotle being excellent personages, and such as had gained the prise of knowledge among men, haue now and then erred, specially in this matter of government. Out of doubt Plato had done the better if he had contented himself with the order, elegancy, and gravity which he kept in the description of his Common-weale, and not meddled with the community of goods, wives, and children, nor taken vpon him to appoint men& women their several charges and offices. For doing whereof he is blamed, not onely by them of his own time, but also by all those that haue come after him, of what religion soever they haue held, who with one consent haue rejected that fashion as too too strange and impossible. Likewise Aristotle had avoided many rebukes if he had showed himself more careful of religion, whereof he seemeth to haue small regard, and not served mens turns more to profit and ease than to godliness, whereof Plato hath great care in all his books. For every well ordered State or Commonweale hath such need of religion to be matched with civil government, that they seem too unseparable. Religion printeth and setteth the fear of God and the love of their neighbours in mens heartes, ruling the exposition of the holy Scriptures, and the offices of the persons that are appointed to the service of God. And civil government directeth the affairs of peace and war, wherein there would be neither uprightness nor faithfulness, without the fear of God and the love of man, which are chiefly enjoined in all religions. And therefore it shall be very requisite to red both Plato and Aristotle, that we may learn of the one the things that pertain to God and godliness( I mean next unto the holy Scriptures:) and of the other the things that belong to the governing of men and mens affairs.  
If it be objected, that many excellent personages haue been forward in times past, and are to be found still at this present, who being destitute of schoole●learning, haue by the onely natural drift of experience, fitly ordered public affairs, and happily governed their dominions. I answer, that if this natural good gift and experience of theirs had been matched with learning, they had b●●n more cleer-sighted and better assured of their doings. Soothly in all Artes three things are necessary to the purchasing of perfection: namely, Nature, Learning, and Experience. Nature is an inclination and forwardness; Learning quickeneth up nature, and being aided with order and method, guideth it by general precepts and universal grounds; and Experience assisted with imitation, confirmeth both the other by the continual holding on of many particular actions. Any one of them alone hath very small force: Nature of itself is unsufficient, Learning without nature is fondness, and without Experience unprofitable: like water that stands sodding in a marrish, or like herbs and fruits that are always overshadowed. But when all three of them do meet together, then bring they forth the excellency which we so greatly commend and wonder at in all things. In Leachcraft although the bare practitioner do by his experience sometimes hit well vpon the healing of some disease, yet is it evident, that having Art and cunning matched with his experience, so as he discern the nature and cause of the disease, marking the complexion, age, and manner of living of his patient, and thereunto considering the quality and quantity of his medicines, and applying them in due time, he shall the better perform the duty of his science, and commonly the rather attain to the end thereof. Also in like case, the pilot that can skill of the Art of sailing, and knoweth the diversities of the seasons of the year, the nature of the Sea and of the winds, the alterations of the air, and the moouings of the heauens, shall ordinarily perform his voyage better and more sa●ely than he that goes to it but by root, and can no further skill than of the mariners carded, floating which way soever the tide and fortune drives him. Also that the General of a field shall the more wisely govern an army, give or receive battle, besiege fortresses,& such other things, which matcheth the skill of martiall learning with the experience of war. So likewise whosoever taketh vpon him to found a new State, to restore a decayed, to preserve a long continued, to reform a corrupted, or to govern a established, if he be a politic fellow by nature, and moreover well instructed and experienced in the case, so as he haue iudgement to consider advisedly the natures of every of them, and to discern their beginnings, increasings, strengths, decay, changes, and instants of ending one in another, he shall fare much the better by being so schooled and prepared aforehand. Nay( which more is) I say that otherwise he shall see nothing at all in that behalf for the most part of his time, but shall go groping like a blind man, and commit many worse errors than the ignorant physician and pilot, because the case which he undertaketh is of far greater importance and concerneth more folk, as namely the tranquilitie, welfare, and honour of a whole country or Nation, or of a State sore attainted with the diseases of excess and covetousness, or laid open to the great torments and perilous storms of warres both at home and abroad, or tired with infinite floods and waues of troubles beating vpon it uncessantly: by means whereof it hath need of great wisdom and continual watchfulness to provide for the safety thereof.  
I think I haue now performed almost that I promised, for ye haue here the excellency and profitableness of civil government, and therewithal ye haue ben certified what men of old time haue set up states of government or written of them, and ye haue seen the commonweals of Plato and Aristotle compared together: By which means I think ye be become very well affectioned towards this noble science, so as I shall not need to exho●t you any further thereunto. For if ye haue respect to honor, what science is there that behighteth greater honor than civil government doth, which calleth you to the ruling of cities, lordships, and kingdoms, wherein the sovereign authority among men consisteth? If ye be desirous of profit& riches, it is the way to get great goods,& to increase the wealth of good houses. If ye covet to bee mighty, how may a man bee more advanced or come to greater credit and authority, than by the managing of public affairs? If ye like of knowledge and skill, what other faculty shall ye find that hath more excellent grounds, or which aimeth at a more commendable end? If ye desire pleasure and contentment of mind, what can be more pleasant to a man that is well born, or what can more become him, then to know the manners, laws, customs, ordinances, alliances, confederations, forces, revenues,& antiquities of his own country? If ye would purchase endless praise by well doing,& continue your name euerlastlingly to posterity, where shall ye meet with fitter and goodlier matter to work it on, than to give laws to Nations; considering the glory that Minos, Licurgus, and other Law-makers haue obtained, who were canonised for gods after their deaths, and honoured with Temples, prayers, and yearly feasts? grammar, rhetoric, and logic, serve but onely to speak well and to reason well. Poetry serveth but for pleasure, the searching of Antiquities, the knowledge of Languages, and the conferring and correcting of copies, are more curious than profitable, and carry a man but a little beyond the training of youth and the custom of schools. The schoolmasters of histories are oft reproved of untruth, and agree not together. Eloquence hath evermore ben suspected: insomuch, that even in Athens where it flourished most, they were forbidden to move affections, and to use Proems& Perorations. The contemplation of the Mathematical sciences,& the considering of the natural thanksgivings, are for themselves,& not for others. The judgements of Astrology be uncertain. In the iudgement of plutarch, the metaphysics do small good. physic serveth the turn of the rich rather then of the poor, who be not able to buy the strange droogs, or to pay the Apothecary. The civil law hath an eye but to particular cases, and if it be not well handled, it doth more harm then good, feeding men with formalities and long processes. But as for government, it is the principal rule of all liberal sciences and handicraftes, the orderer of all worldly exercises, the mother of discipline, the mistress of manners; behoveful for schools, behoveful for occupations; beneficial to the field, beneficial to the town; needful on sea, needful on land; profitable for war and profitable for peace. There is not that house, that floating ship, that city, that Nation, or that people be it never so rude and barbarous, which consisteth not of commanders and obeyers, and consequently retaineth not some form of government. It is to be found even in the whole world, and in every particular person, so as the superior commmaundeth the inferior, and the soul the body. It traineth up children after a free manner in good manners and sciences, it quickeneth the courages of young men with hope of offices and promotions in time to come, it assuageth the griefs even of the most aged, with the authority and reputation of their counsel and experience: it relieveth the poor, maintaineth the rich, pleaseth the good, contenteth the wise, guideth Magistrates, directeth Kings and Emperours, ruleth States, linketh the inferiors and superiors together with uprightness, adorneth prosperity, comforteth adversity, promising everlasting praise to true Gouernours in recompense of their extreme pains, and of the griefs and displeasures which they receive by underminers of their state and envious persons. It maintaineth iustice, defendeth right, observeth laws, appeaseth suits and quarrels, bringeth in gentleness, driveth away rudeness, upholdeth good will, putteth away ill will, quickeneth up diligence, blameth idleness, banisheth superfluity, riddeth away covetousness, honoureth virtue, punisheth 'vice, is mild in deeds, grave in words, easy to harken, discrete in giuing answer, wary in execution, stout in public dealings, constant in perils, vnflexible to favour, vnflexible to partiality, uncorruptible by money, invincible against force and fear, the holder of human fellowship in mutual concord, amiable conversation, and quiet safety: the ground of public peace, the welspring of equity, and the very life, order, counsel, and quickener of commonweals: in respect whereof it ought to be learned, practised, and honoured in all places, and of all persons. receive therefore, receive this noble Science, which is offered unto you at this day: study, wake, and take pains to compass it, to know it, and to understand it, that by applying it to the right use, ye may become profitable to your country, helpful to your friends, and serviceable to your rulers, whose good and loyal subiects you be.   

THE argument OR CONTENTS OF THE FIRST book OF GOVERNMENT.  
THe direct manner of proceeding in all Sciences, is to begin at their firct principles and grounds, and to proce●d on from the most single to the composed, because we may then be well said to know a thing, when we know the first causes and the first principles thereof, even to the very bottom and ground thereof, as is written in the beginning of his natural philosophy. Forasmuch therefore as the duty of him that dealeth with matters of State, is to treat of civil society and to seek out the causes thereof, from Nature; Aristotle purposing to writ thereof, sheweth first of all from whence this society proceedeth, wherein it consisteth, and to what end it is ordained: beginning at the first and simplest partes thereof, that is to wit, the company of man and wife, master and seruant, father and children: of which companies a household is compacted. Afterward by increasing many housholds into a street or hamlet, and many streets into a city, Corporation, or commonweal: he sheweth the same to haue a natural constitution, and to be the most perfect company, and the end thereof to be of the best sort, as which comprehendeth all the other ends, and whereunto they be all referred. Then forasmuch as no company can maintain themselves without goods, he treateth of the manner of getting them, serving to the maintenance as well of household as of commonweal, of which manners of getting he setteth down diuers sorts both natural and artificial: among the which he utterly discommendeth interest and usury. moreover, because no company can continue unless it be held together by some government, he fetcheth the first causes of governments from out of nature, beginning at the governments of household, and affirming that the husbands commanding of the wife, is Citie-like or Commonweale-like: the fathers commanding of his children, is Kinglike or Princelike: and the masters commanding of his seruants and slaves is tyrant-like: disputing there at large whether there be any slavery or bondage by nature or no. Insomuch that from these first three governments of household, he deriveth all sorts of public government, as well voluntary as violent, resembling their first original to man, who is composed of body, soul, and mind: the soul having masterlike authority over the body, and the mind having Commonweale-like and Kinglike sovereignty over the soul. And therefore he affirmeth that the ordinance of governments, and of obedience unto magistrates, is no less natural than is the beginning and maintaining of civil society. Howbeit as the Philosophers of old time spake of matters more stately and cunningly than the common people, so did they use many words and phrases far differing from the common use of speech. But yet of all others Aristotle laboured to show himself most obscure, using short speeches, and most commonly doubtful, which maketh him very hard to be understood, and more hard to be translated. nevertheless, for the great profit that is to be received by the reading of him, he hath been translated into latin, arabic, Hebrew, and many other Tongues: a sure token that for knowledge and cunning, he holdeth the chief room in common reputation, and by universal consent of all men. The which thing hath moved me likewise to translate this work of his into French, which I take to be very profitable and agreeable to the manner of our country. And if this my translation be not found to be so smooth and elegant as many other mens are, let them which shall look vpon it, vouchsafe to consider, that in Aristotle not eloquence but substance is to be looked for: and that it is not possible to deliver him other than he is in his own original greek: and yet that it were very much to haue delivered him as he is there, and to haue set down his meaning faithfully, keeping the propriety of both the Languages. Notwithstanding to the intent he might be the better understood and the easier to be dealt with, I haue added expositions taken out of the best authors, and interlaced them throughout where need was, with examples of things done within mans remembrance, specially such as were nearest to our present age, and to mine own country, in hope to make this work of civil government the more perfect by comparing things of old time with the things of late time in every sort of government.   

THE FIRST book OF THE GOVERNMENT OF A commonweal.  

THE FIRST CHAPTER. Of a city or Common-wealth, and the parts thereof.  
FOrasmuch as wee see that every city or commonweal is a company, and every company is ordained to some good:( for all men attempt and do all things for that end and purpose, which in their opinion is good:) It is certain that all companies tend unto some good, and most chiefly and specially that the principal and most excellent company of all companies, and comprehending all other societies, namely, the city or civil society; doth tend and endeavour to attain unto the principal and most excellent good of all others.  
In this entrance is shewed the excellency and original of a commonweal, of what parts it consisteth, and to what end it is naturally ordained.  
forasmuch as we see that every commonweal is a company.] Aristotle proveth the excellency of a commonweal by the sovereign good which it purposeth, and by the ends thereof, which comprehendeth the ends of all human things. His reason is this: every company is ordained for some good; and every commonweal is a company: therefore every commonweal is ordained for some good. And if all companies be ordained to some good; the better that the company is, the greater good is it ordained for: But a commonweal is the best of all companies; therefore of all companies it hath the greatest and chiefest good: and that is the sovereign felicity or welfare, consisting both in the public and in the private fruition of all kind of goods both of soul and body, and also of fortune. For that commonweal is counted happy, which enjoyeth all the three sorts of goods together; the which to maintain itself long time in prosperity and safety, it behoveth to be wise, mildred, rich, just, mighty, friendly to itself, and religious: wherein consist the common commodity, sufficiency, discipline and honour of a commonweal; as is affirmed by Aristotle himself in his first book of Morals,& in his seventh book of government or Matters of State: and by Plato in his fourth book of his commonweal, and in his third book of laws. Now the linking in and communicating of men together in a commonweal, is to diuers ends according to the government thereof. If the government be under one Monarch or sovereign, it is to be defended against Strangers, and to live lawfully and peaceably among themselves. If under a Senate or certain number of Magistrates, it is to be regarded according to their riches, nobility, and virtue. If under popular government, it is to enjoy liberty and equality; and the better that any commonweal is ordered, the more welfare and good do men hope for therein.  
every company is ordained for some good.] A company, society, or fellowship, is a knitting of many persons together in consent, tending to some good or to some evil, carrying an outward show or resemblance of good. For there is a good which is good in very dead; and there is a good which beareth but a likelihood of good,& is not good in truth. Of this latter sort are evil gotten riches, and 'vice covered with virtue: as craft and subtlety vaunting itself for wisdom, and prodigality for liberality. Now as there be three sorts of good, namely honest, profitable, and pleasant; so be there likewise three sorts of companies: one for profit, as Merchants; another for pleasure, as young folkes; a third for honesty, as the virtuous and skilful. Aristotle speaketh here of the good company, which is a consenting of many in the things that are good in truth, where right and order are to be found. As for the evil companies, they be made under pretence of good in show, wherethrough men are deceived by taking the pretenced good for the true good indeed. That is to wit, by taking those things for profitable, pleasant, or honest, which in truth are not profitable, pleasant, nor honest, but hurtful, tedious, and loathsome. Of this sort are the companies of murtherers and theeues, which lye in wait to bereave men of their goods and lives. Of the same sort are the routs of Ruffians, which follow shameful delights: of the same sort also be the seditious and the conspirers against States and Princes, under some gay pretence of public liberty or of reformation of government, albeit that they seek nothing but their own peculiar advantage.  
AND most chief●y and specially that the principal and most excellent company of all companies doth tend to the principal and chief good of all others.] Forasmuch( saith Aristotle in the eight Chapter of the third book of his matters of State) as the end of all Artes and Sciences, is some good; and the greatest and principalest good is in the science of government, as in the chiefest of all sciences. And again, forasmuch as in all Artes and Sciences the end that they aim at is some good or other, and the greatest and chiefest good is aimed at by the chiefest of all Sciences, that is to say, the welfare of the public state. The nature of things is known chiefly by the end whereto they be ordained. Now then, if the good for the which and the end whereunto a commonweal is ordained, contain the ends of all other companies, and haue them comprehended under it; it followeth consequently that a commonweal is the best company, as saith Aristotle in the first chapter of his first book of Morals to Nichomachus. For the more common that a good thing is, the more excellent also is it; like as it is more honourable and worthy of love to provide for whole Nations and commonweals, than for peculiar persons.  
NAMELY the city or civil society.] That is to say, a multitude of people of unlike sorts,( for so doth he himself say in the first chapter of his matters of State, and in the third chapter of his third book) as rich and poor, free and bond, gentlemen and commoners, learned and unlearned, handicrafts men and labourers, obeyers and commanders, communicating their Artes, trades, mysteries, and exercises one to another in one place, to the end to live the better and to haue the more sufficiency. And also which obey the selfsame laws, Magistrates, and sovereign council, called( by Plato in his twelfth book of laws) the anchor, the head, and the soul of a commonweal. After this manner all the Venetians make one commonweal, the people of Geneua another, and the people of Bern in switzerland another. And it makes no matter whether they dwell all within walls or without, for a city or commonweal is not to be accounted of by the walls, as Aristotle saith in the second chapter of his third book of Matters of State. After the same manner all the natural subiects of the French king, which aclowledge him for their sovereign lord and obey his commandements and the ordinances of his council, do represent one commonweal or body politic by diuers towns, Cities, and provinces, of diuers Prouostships, Bailyships, Stewardships, Lieutenantships, governments,& Parliaments: of sundry Baronies, Earldoms, Marquiships, and dukedoms: and of sundry Curatships, bishoprics, and Archbishoprickes, sufficiently furnished in and by itself of all things needful, as well in things necessary as honest, not onely wherewith to live well according to virtue, but also wherewith to live commodiously and bountifully, having little or nothing to do with others. Wherein no stranger may hold any office or bnfice, or dispose of his own goods, but that they shall become excheated after his decease, unless he be made a free denizen afore, and his letters patents ratified by the Iudges of accounts. On the contrary part, there is not so mean a Frenchman born of how base degree soever he be, but he may be advanced to worship and honour for his valiantness, or be preferred to the chiefest ecclesiastical dignities, or to the highest offices of Iustice, and of the princes revenues, by his skilfulness and uncorrupt behaviour.  
THEY therefore think not aright, which think that the governor of a city or commonweal, and a King, a householder, and a lord or master over seruants are all one thing, esteeming them to differ one from another but onely in respect of more or fewer in number( but not in kind and scope of government) so as if a man haue the commanding of few folk, he shall bee but a Master; if of more, an householder; and if yet of a greater number, the governor of a city or commonweal, or a King: as though a great house differed nothing at all from a little city or commonweal, nor a governor of a commonweal from a King: and that a man were a King when he ruleth alone; and a governor of a commonweal, when he both commandeth and also obeyeth by turns, according to the Reasons and Rules of that Science: which things are not true.  
ARISTOTLE having shewed the civil company( which is called a city or commonweal) to be better than all other particular societies of peculiar houses, hamlets, borrows, and other inferior companies: all which, the civil society or company of a city or commonweal comprehendeth, being perfecter than all the rest, for that it is more common and referred to a better end. He findeth fault with such as confounded the public and private governments together, and affirm that they are both one& haue none other difference at all, saving that the public governments haue authority over greater numbers of people than the private haue. Wherein he noteth Plato, who in his Dialogue entitled The civil Magistrate, or as concerning Reigning, holdeth this opinion which Aristotle reproveth. For Aristotle affirmeth that those governments differ one from another in kind, not in respect of the persons that command and obey, which are both of one selfe same kind, but in respect that the governments themselves are diuers. The two private ones, that is to wit, that government which the householder useth, and that which the lord or master useth, do serve for the house, and do differ both between themselves and from the public. For the houshelder useth another manner of commanding towards his free folkes, that is to wit, his wife and children, than the Master doth towards his bondfolkes and seruants. The two public governments are the regal and kingly government, and the government of a city or commonweal, which likewise differ one from another, and also from the other afore-mentioned. For the governor of a city or commonweal commandeth his citizens and countrymen but for a time and by turns, according to the laws and customs of his commonweal: But the King commandeth his subiects continually and according to his own discretion, specially the King that is called an absolute King, 
Aristot. 3. Polit. ca. 12.  who resembleth the householder in this, that he procureth the profit, liberty, and welfare of his subiects, 
Plato in his commonweal. lib. 1.& Arist. Polit. 3. cap. 5.  as the father doth of his children: 
Arist. Pol. 1. cap. ult.& Lib. 3. cap. 4.  and also so far forth as concerneth the commanding of his wife, he resembleth the governor of the city or commonweal, in which there is a certain interchangeable course of obeying and of comma●nding by turns. 
Arist lib. 1. cap. ult.  The lordly or masterly commmanding pricketh very near unto tyranny, unless the master and the seruant be naturally disposed to the same: that is to say, vnless● the one be born to command and the other to obey, so as the one can not be without the other. 
Arist. lib. 1. cap. 3.   
THE thing that I speak of will manifestly appear, if we consider the method going afore: for as in other things it is needful to de●ide the thing that is compounded into the simplo and vncompounded, because they be the smallest parts of the whole; So shall we know a city by considering the things whereof it consisteth, and we shall see the more clearly wherein they differ one from another, if we can reduce the matter by any means into Art.  
HERE the Philosopher sheweth the method or manner of handling which he intendeth to use in treating of this matter of government: that is to wit, his own ordinary, which is to begin his books at the first grounds and principles of the things which he undertaketh to speak of: as for example, intending in natural philosophy to speak of Nature, he beginneth at substance and shape: and in his book of Wights, he speaketh first of the soul, and afterward of the parts of the wights. Likewise having taken in hand to treat of common society, he beginneth at the first and most single partes thereof, which are the companies of man and wife, of master and seruants, of father and children.  
SO SHALL wee know a Common weal by considering the parts whereof it is composed.] Like as a Wight may be divided into head, breast, arms, feet, legs, heart, liver, lights, and kidneys; and these again into other parts till a man come even to the first grounds which are the smallest and simplest parts of all: Likewise a city is divided into streets, streets into houses, houses into sorts of companies, and so forth to several persons, which are the least vncompounded parts thereof, howbeit not simply as things natural, but onely as in respect that they be parts of a city or of a commonweal: for the arm or foot of a man is not a citizen, nor to be termed a part of a commonweal.  
THEN if a man consider from the beginning how things are produced by nature, the order of proceeding in this behalf will be very good, as it is in all other cases. First it is requisite to join these partes together, which can not be one without the other, as the man and the woman for procrcation: and that not by way of choice, but in such sort as that there is a certain natural desire in all other living wights, and even in the very plants, to leave a like of their own kind behind them.  
HITHERTO hath continued the Preface of the book, whereby we haue understood the excellency of a commonweal, and the order which the Philosopher intendeth to keep in treating of government. Now to declare the better what a commonweal is, he entereth into the matter, and showing that men are carried by a certain natural instinct to gather themselves together into one place and into one company, for the mutual succouring one of another in their necessities: he treateth first of the principal parts of a commonweal: that is to wit, of a house, and of a street, lane, or hamlet; declaring that those haue a being by nature, and therefore that in all reason, a city or commonweal being ●ompounded of them, and being the end of all assemblies or drawings of men together into one place, hath the beginning thereof by nature.  
IT IS requisite to join those partes together which can not be one without another.] The first assembly necessary for the constitution of a house or family, is the company of the man and woman, for the continual and perpetual continuance of mankind by the mean of generation: for else there could be no mo families nor cities for want of men and women.  
AND that not by way of choice.] Not through reason and counsel which join not man and wife together, but natural desire. Plato in his Banquet saith thus: See ye not with what great fervency all living things as well those that fly in the air as the rest that go vpon the ground, are moved and stirred when they enter into love, and are desirous of generation? First of all they are very earnest to come together, and then to provide food for their little ones, for whom they are ready to fight, yea the weakest against the strongest, and to loose their lives in their behalf: also they abide the extremity of hunger to bring their young ones up, and all other things to the same effect. A man would think that these things were done by men through reason: but can ye yield any reason of the great desire in bruit beasts?  
but in such sort as there is a natural desire in all other living wights, and even in the very plants to lea●e a like of their own kind behind them.] Plato in the fourth book of his laws faith thus much: every man ought to take a wife from the thirtieth till the five and thirtieth year of his age, in consideration that through a certain nature, mankind in some sort obtaineth immortality( a thing that all men by nature are greatly desirous of) insomuch that there is no man living but desireth the continuance of his name for ever to the posterity which cometh after him. Thus mankind being in this manner immortal, persevereth to haue everlasting being and continuance, in that by leaving children of children, the selfsame party getteth immortality by way of pro-creation. Now it is not lawful for any man voluntarily to deprive himself of the benefit of immortality, whereof he frustrateth himself witting that neglecteth wife and children. Aristotle in his second book of the soul, and the fourth Chapter, writeth thus: The act of generation is very natural to all living creatures, I mean such as be perfect, and not lame or defective in their members, and come not without seed: for from every one of them issueth his like, as the living creature issueth and cometh of one that hath life, and one plant cometh of another, to the end that in this sort they may be for ever, and as much as in them lieth, attain to some divine condition: whereof they are all very desirous, and for the same effect do all whatsoever they do according to nature. Forasmuch therefore as living wights can not remain always, nor by continuance achieve to any divine estate( by reason that frail and mortal things contain not always the selfsame and one in number) every one goeth about and endeavoureth as much as he can by any possible means, to attain to the participation of eternity& divine condition, some more, some less,& continueth not always the selfsame, but rather such as he is, not in number, but in kind. The same Author in his second book of the generation of living Wig●ts in the first Chapter, writeth after this sort: Wher●s the Wight engendered can not continue for ever, he is eternal in such sort as he may; which in number he can not be, for the substance of all things is in the undivided ones, the which if they were such they should be eternal: but in kind he may well be eternal: therefore the kind of men, beasts, and plants lasteth always. Also in the second book of the heaven and in the third chapter he writeth: There must of necessity be generation, forasmuch as nothing lasteth always: for contraries come together, suffer one another, and are corrupted. He sheweth in his first book of Generation and Corruption, how generation lasteth for ever without any want thereof in the whole world. And in the tenth Chapter of the second book, he attributeth the cause of the same continuance, to the moving of the heaven and the obliquity of the zodiac. For when the sun draweth near, it stirreth up the springing and growth of all things, and when it withdraweth itself a far off, it is the cause of their death and ruin. And withall that the life of all things and the times, are bounded and limited by numbers, some shorter, some longer, according to the disposition and aptness o● the matter or stuff. Galen in the fourteenth book of the use of the parts of mans body, writeth in this sort: Nature( saith he) would most willingly haue made her creature immortal, if by any means it had been possible for her: but the matter or stuff would not suffer it: for the composition of the arteries, veins, sinews, and flesh could not be free from corruption. Therefore she gave it as much forwardness and help toward im●ortality as she could: according to the discretion and manner of a wise founder of a to●ne, who first of all doth not make provision only for habitation, but also for lasting and continuance, desiring and seeking the mean how to make it such a one as may continue for ever, or at least for a great number of yeeres. Notwithstanding there i● not any city so ●ortunately established, that it can continue for ever. But yet the wor●e● of Nature haue already lasted infinite yeeres, and still continue by means that Nature hath so provided through marvelous skill, in substituting continually one new wight in stead of another already dead or perished. What manner of skill then is this, as well in all living wights as in man, that no kind of them fadeth away, and lasteth ever perfect and immortal? Nature hath given to all living creatures apt instruments with special delight to conceive, for generations sake: and to the soul marvelous and unspeakable desire to use the same: By which all creatures are stirred and pricked on, as well sots and fools, as young folk and those that be voided of reason: providing thereby for the continuance of their kind, as though they were endowed with wit and discretion. For( in mine opinion) when Nature perceived that the substance whereof she had created them, received not perfect wisdom, shee gave them in stead thereof delight, and as it were a certain kind of bait, which they might receive for the welfare, preservation, and keeping of their kind, joining a vehement delight to the use and exercise of those parts.  
NEXT of all it is expedient to join together, one that commandeth by nature, and another that obeyeth, for their mutual preservation. For he that is able by reason and the forecasting of his mind to foresee and provide aptly in affairs, commandeth by nature, and beareth the mastership by nature: and whosoever i● able by the strength of his body to put those commandements in execution, is a subject and ser●ant by nature. Therfore one and the selfsame thing, is behoveful for the master and seruant.  
THE second assembly necessary for the constitution of a house or family proceeding from nature, as the former; is that of the master and seruant naturally affencted one to another: which the Philosopher termeth, Lordly or masterly. For even as natural desire is that that joineth the man and the woman together, so doth that unite the master by nature, and the seruant by nature, for their interchangeable succour and aid, and to provide for their mutual preservation; the one by commanding, that hath most understanding: the other by obeying, who is most mighty and stronger of body. Hereafter in t●e fourth Chapter of this first book, he will show by many and most certain reasons, that there is mastership and bondage by nature.  
THEREFORE the wi●e and seruant differ by nature: for nature worketh not like to cutlers, who fashion the knife of Delphos fit for many purposes: but appointeth every thing to a proper office and exercise for the same. In this sort every tool is the better, when it serveth not for many uses, but for one alone. Notwithstanding the barbarous people haue the wife and seruant in equal estimation: the occasion whereof is, because they haue no man amongst them, commanding by nature, but their society consisteth of the bondman, and bondwoman: Therefore the Poets affirm, that the Grecians should haue dominion over the Barbarians: accounting the Barbarians the selfsame by nature that a bondman is.  
HAVING set down the two first assemblies of man and wife, and of the master and seruant, necessary by nature for the est●blishment of a house, he sheweth what difference is naturally b●tweene the wife and seruant: The wife is for the most part tender and weak, and the seruant strong and sturdy.  
THE knife of Delphos fit for many purposes.] It was a kind of knife fit for many uses, as to cut, file, and cleave, like those that in these daies are made with edge, point, and file, which the grafters occupy. The poor folkes of Greece bought them in the Isle of Delphos, where there was a mart and great concourse, by reason of the Temple and Oracle of Apollo, who was had in great reverence. Strabo in the nineteenth book of his geography or description of the earth writeth, that this place called Delphos was almost in the midst of all Greece, terming it, The navel of the earth: and that by reaso● of the commodious situation thereof, they gladly resorted thither from all parts of the world. There was great treasure in this temple, and plenty of rich offerings, whereof mention is made at large in the greek Histories.  
but appoint●th every thing to a proper office and exercise for the same.] Plato in the second book of his commonweal: first of all, saith Socrates, I consider that we are not born one altogether like another, but differing in nature, every one being fit for his own work. And a little forward: It followeth( saith he) that all things are done best, with most ease, and in greatest quantity, when according to nature and in convenient time, one person followeth but one trade and occupation, laying all others aside, 〈◇〉 B as Aristotle saith.  
NOTWITHSTANDING the barbarous people.] Plato in Menexenus writeth, that in Greece they called all other people Barbarous, that had no communion of living or language with the Grecians, and that they accounted them for slaves. Plutarch in his small treatise of Alexanders fortune and virtue witnesseth, that Aristotle counseled Alexander to show himself a guide and conductor of the Grecians, and Lord and Master of the Barbarians; and to honour and respect the Grecians as his friends, and to bear himself toward the others as beasts and plants. To the contrary whereof, Strabo in the first book of his geography, maketh mention of a certain man, who complained of all them that not only divided all men into Grecians and Barbarians, but also couns●iled Alexander the Great to use the Grecians as his friends,& the Barbarians as enemies: which party affirmed, that it was more seemly and meet to make a difference between them according to their virtue and 'vice; for that there were many wicked Grecians, and a great number of good and civil Barbarians: As for example, the romans and people of Carthage, who used a very good kind of government in their commonweals.  
HAVE the wife and seruant in equal estimation.] The Barbarians not rightly observing the order and providence of nature, employ their wives as much in all respects as their slaves, laying as great burdens vpon them as vpon their seruants. As in these dayes the Lan●quenets going a warfare, cause their wives to carry their necessaries with them. The Turkes and Africans suffer not their wives to go abroad with their faces vncouered, nor to frequent temples, markets, and other places where the people use to make their assemblies, but keep them close in their houses, without acquainting them with any common affairs whatsoever: for that by the religion which they follow, they may lawfully take diuers wives, and put them away for a small cause: which causeth them to love& esteem their wives the less. They that haue written of the Muscou●tes( a Northern people, and Christians after the greek manne●) affirm, that the wives in those parts are accounted but as cornfields, and are neither called to feasts, nor suffered to go to Church, or walk abroad openly: but contrariwise they are otherwise honoured as goddesses, and do what pleaseth them, without gainsaying of their husbands.  
THE occasion whereof is, because they haue no man amongst them commanding by nature.] The Barbarians know not how to put such difference as is convenient between the wife and the slave, because they are brutish and voided of ciuilit●e, having no man of understanding amongst them apt by nature to command: but commonly choose for their superiors the sturdiest and strongest of body, neglecting those that be better& wiser.  
THEREFORE the Poets affirm, that the Grecians ought to haue dominion over the Barbarians.] If the case so stand, that the wisest and clearest sighted ought to rule over the blockish and and ig●orant sort, then the Grecians, who are learned and wise, ought to rule over the Barbarians: by which reason they maintained, that t●e Empire over others was theirs. All men naturally love and commend their own country: therefore Aristotle in this place, and in the seventh book of this work and the seventh Chapter, commendeth the G●eeke Nation, affirming the same to be valiant, courageous,& witty withall, as inhabiting a convenient ●oile between the North and South● by reason whereof shee continueth in her liberty and is well governed: and that she might rule the whole world if shee had but one kind of government. Also Plato in Menexenus and Isocrates in his P●negyricall oration, greatly commendeth this Nation, which then flourished in learning and feats of arms, and in all liberal sciences and handy occupations: but after, their chance turned clean contrary, in as much as they were brought in subiection, first by the Macedonians, next by the romans a long time, so far, that they changed their name after the translating of the Empire to Constantinople, and in stead of Grecians were called romans, and the country of Greece was name ROMANIA, and at this day they remain under the dominion of the northern Turkes of Asia, who are a very barbarous kind of people. Plutarch in his book of the Defection of Oracles, complaineth that in his time there could not be found three thousand men of war in all the land of Greece: so far at that time was it gone out of kind.  
ACCOVNTING the Barbarian the self same by nature that a bondman is.] As though the Barbarian were not born with reason and understanding, but only strong and sturdy like him which naturally is a slave.  
OF these two assemblies, a house or family is first compacted: and rightly said Hesiodus the Poet, how it was expedient before any other kind of work, to haue a house, a wife, and an ox to till the ground: for an ox serveth poor folk in stead of a seruant. So then the assembly made and ordained by nature for to communicate and reign together every day, is the family or house. Charondas calleth them that are assembled {αβγδ}, living together by one and the self same provision: and Epimenides of Candia termeth them {αβγδ}, using one and the self same hearth or chimney.  
OF the societies of man and wife, of the master and seruant, a household or family is naturally compact, to communicate in necessities daily happening: as to eat, drink, warm, rest, and sleep: {αβγδ} in greek, and Domus in Latin, and also the French word Maison, signify not onely the walls and covering of a building, but also must be taken for a family. Cic. de Senectute. Tantam domum Appius regebat& senex& caecus. Virg. 4. AEneid. Miserere domus labentis.  
but the first assembly consisting of many houses, not for things daily necessary, is called a street or company of neighbours dwelling together in one precinct or place, which also according to nature seemeth to proceed from the house, and of such persons as some men call {αβγδ}, that is to say, nourced with the self same milk, both childrens, and nephews, and others descending from them.  
AS the house is by nature made of the two assemblies afore-declared, so is the Borough, street, Village, or Parish, according to natural order framed of many houses or families, which by reason they are so greatly increased in number, can not any longer communicate together in their daily necessities of taking their food and rest together, which must be done every day: but being separated by reason of their multitude, must follow merchandise, contract, go to law, and confer together of the Commonwealth, which be no matters that are done every day, but at certain times prefixed or convenient, as we see fairs and markets, terms for pleading, and assizes.  
WHICH also according to nature seemeth to proceed from the house, and such persons as are nourced with the self same milk.] Cicero in the first book of his Offices, writeth after this sort: As the desire of procreation is by nature common to all living wightes● the first society is in marriage, the next in children, then a house where all is common, which is the beginning of a town, and as it were, the seed of the commonwealth: the linkings together of brethren follow, then cousen germans and such as are further off in kindred: who when they can dwell no longer together in one house, sever themselves into other houses, as Colonies or men flitting into other towns. Marriages and affinities ensue, whereof kindreds do spring: which multiplication and augmentation of lineages, is the original and foundation of commonweals. He hath the like speech in his fift book of Ends, and first book of laws.  
THEREFORE at the first, cities were governed by Kings, and so still at this day are such Nations as descended of men accustomend to the Kingly government: For every household is governed by the eldest as it were by a King, and so consequently are the Colonies or companies multiplied from thence, governed in like sort for kindreds sake. And this is the selfsame that Homer saith, every man of right governeth his wife and children: for that in old time they lived thus dispersed here and there. By occasion whereof, as men of ancient time lived, and yet till this present time live under the government of Kings, so did they all suppose that the gods had a King: for as they judge the shape of th● gods like to theirs, so did they their manner of living.  
As the house or family is ordinarily governed by the most ancient of the race, which it reverenceth as a King, even so is the Borough or Village, and consequently the city, by reason they took their beginning from men accustomend to such kind of government as the Kingly one is. Therefore Aristotle in the fift Chapter of this first book calleth Oeconomie or House-gouernment, The kingdom of the house: and in the third book and the eleventh Chapter, he calleth Oeconomie, royalty of the house.  
THEREFORE at first, cities were governed by Kings.] Cicero in his third book of laws writeth in this sort: All nations in ancient time, were obedient to Kings, which kind of Empire was first transferred to most upright and just men: And this hath greatly profited in our commonweal, that it was at the beginning under kingly government. And in his second book of Offices. Good Kings( saieth he) seem to haue been ordained of old time, not onely amongst the Medes, as Herodotus affirmeth, but also amongst our ancestors, that iustice might bee ministered and enjoyed. sallust in his Preamble of the conspiracy of Catiline, saieth: In the beginning Kings( which was the first name of empery known vpon the earth) exercised, some their mindes, others their bodies: At that time also men lived free from covetousness, every one holding himself well content with that which was his own: but afterward Cyrus in Asia, the Lacedemonians and Athenians in Greece, began to subdue towns and Nations, taking pleasure in having rule and dominion for warrefares sake, and accounting the enlargement and great circuit of their Empire for a great glory and renown, &c. Trogus Pompeius, and justine in the beginning of the brief history: The Empire and sovereign government( saieth he) was in the hands and power of Kings; when all people, Nations, and things were and began first: which Kings were not exalted to that high degree of majesty through popular ambition, but in respect of their modesty, approved and well known of the better sort. Then were not the people kept and ordered by laws, but the Princes pleasure stood for lawe: The custom in those dayes was rather to keep the frontiers of their Empire, then to seek means to augment and increase them: kingdoms were bounded and limited by the country of him th●t reigned. Ninus king of the Assyrians was the first that through the greedy desire to bear rule, changed the ancient customs of Nations, and was likewise the first that began to make war vpon his neighbours: who finding the people at that time vnskilfull of means how to make resistance, brought them all in subiection unto him, even from his own realm unto the furthest partes of all the country of Lybia. Vexores king of Egypt, and Tanais king of Scithia were ancients: the one of them conquered as far as the country of Pont, the other even into Egypt: Howbeit they made wa●re far from their own territories, and not near, and sought not Empire and sovereignty for themselves, but the glory of their people: and holding themselves content with the victory, let the signiory alone. But Minus established the large and ample dominions that he had gotten, for a continual possession; in such sort, that having tamed and overcome his neighbours: waxing the stronger thereby to assail others, and making every victory an instrument to get another after, he subdued all the people of the East to his rule and dominion.  
AND so still at this day are such Nations.] In a manner all the ancient, most famous and renowned Nations, lived under royal government: as the scythians, Ethiopians, Indians, Assyrians, Medes, egyptians, Bactrians, Armenians, Macedonians, Iewes● and romans, when they were vexed and wearied with other sorts of government. Also the most notable in these daies, live in the like sort, as the Frenchmen, Spaniards, Englishmen, Polanders, Danes, Moscouites, Tartarians, Turkes, Abyssines, Moores, Agiamesquians, Zagatynes and Cathaians. The wild and savage people themselves newly discovered, are in a manner all under Kings: And they that live in a commonweal, as the Venetians, retain the outward show and apparance of a King, whom they name Duke, being eligible and continuing in that degree from his election during his life. In other places they haue Confalonners, as at Luke, and were accustomend to haue a● Florence and Sienna: or Aduoyers and Burgemaisters as in the Cantons of Suessia, and enfranchised Cities of Germany, which acknowledged one Emperour for their sovereign. In time past the Carthaginians and Lacedemonians( esteemed the best managed Common-wealths) use in time of peace an oligarchical government, that is to say, the government of some few of greatest note amongst them in regard of credite, riches, and nobility: and in time of war remitted all the superintendance of the army into the hands of one alone. In like manner the Athenians who held the name of kings in great detestation, and did vaunt themselves in this, to be esteemed popular, yet notwithstanding had one above the rest, whom they called their {αβγδ}, that is, their President or praetor, in whose name they styled all their public decrees. Thus we see that almost all nations do level and aim at the monarchical and royal government: and that those which continue long in that form, prove at length very puissant and mighty: and further, that the best polliced cities haue been constrained in affairs of importance to elect certain officers in stead of kings, to whom for a season they committed all authority.  
FOR every family is governed by him that is most aged in yeeres, as if it were by a King, and also the towns which proceed therefrom.] even as a house or family is ordinarily governed by the most ancient of the kindred: so also are hamlets, villages, and towns, by reason of their affinity: for the children and offspring of one family being multiplied, dispearse themselnes abroad, and of one create many families. From thence( they augmenting also as in the former) are derived little hamlets into some neighbour and adjoining places: where living scattered here and there they grow into incorporations, and from thence by succession of time arise cities: now in all these particular degrees they aclowledge the most ancient for their king. This cometh to pass so often as a land having been long vnhabited, beginneth to repeople itself, as Plato gravely and learnedly reporteth in the third book De Legibus.  
THEY all supposed that the gods had a King.] Isocrates in his Oration to Nicocles or Symmachus saith: If wee search antiquity, we shall find that it is held, that the gods are governed by jupiter: The which opinion if it be true, wee must be persuaded that the gods themselves preferred this estate of government before all others: But if it be a matter altogether uncertain and doubtful, depending only vpon opinion grounded vpon hearsay, yet it is a great argument for the pre-eminence of a monarchy, seeing that they would never haue ascribed it to the gods if they had not esteemed it the best.  
FOR as they imagined the shapes of their gods to be like unto theirs.] Aristotle in the twelfth book of his metaphysics and the eight Chapter saith, that our predecessors and ancestors in a fabulous manner, conveyed certain traditions to their posterity of the essence of gods, and that the deity should comprehend in it the universality of nature: and that other such like fabulous devises were devised for the persuasion of the people and for the opportunity of laws and common good: for they conceived them to be shaped either like men or other living creatures, with other consequences and similitudes as their fantastical brains excogitated. This said Aristotle: from the which if wee shall separate the former only conceit touching the first essences and being of the gods, surely we may account this to be a divine saying: and that philosophy, as it is likely, often times found out as far as it was possible( though afterwards lost them again) such excellent opinions, which as rare relics it preserved until our age. Cicero in his first book. De Legib: declareth the similitude which man hath with God: and in his first book De natur. dear. he saith thus: You haue no want of reasons to demonstrate that the forms of the gods are like to men, because we are so fore-enformed and forestalled in our minds, that as soon as we think of God, presently the shape and figure of a man cometh into our mindes. moreover, because that the divine nature surpasseth in excellency all other things: therefore the form of it ought to bee most beautiful and excellent. Now, than the form of man what is more excellent? You may annex a third reason, and that is, that the dwelling place of understanding can settle and remain in no other form nor subject, then in it. Moses in the first Chapter of Genesis saith: God created man after his own Image, after the image of God created he him, male and female created he them. And in the fift Chapter: This is the book of the Generation of Adam in the day wherein God created man, after the sim●●itude of God created he him. Plato in Thaeetet. saith thus: wisdom, iustice, and holinesse, conform us like unto God. And a little after: God is at no time nor in no respect unjust, but most just, containing in him all the power of iustice: neither is there any thing which more resembleth him, than a most just man. Wherefore we must understand this similitude betwixt God and man to consist onely in spirit and goodness, and not in any outward proportion: for what likeness in this respect can there be betwixt the Creator and the creature, betwixt a human and divine nature, betwixt corruption and eternity, visibility and inuisibilitie, betwixt a finite small thing contained within the compass of a little room, and him that is infinite, incomprehensible, and containing all things? Lactantius Lib. 2. cap. 11. entreateth of the Creation of man, and how he was made after the image of God. So Mercurius Tresmegistus also, who not only saith so, but also goeth about to render a reason why and for what cause every member of the body was made.   

CHAP. II. What is a city: and that it consisteth by nature: and that man is naturally a sociable and civil creature.  
A city is a perfect and absolute assembly or communion of many towns or streets in one, having already attained to the highest pitch of perfection and selfe-●ufficiencie, and being ordained not onely to this end to live, but also to live well: And seeing that the former simpler societies haue their beginning from nature, therefore also a city doth subsist by nature, this being unto them their end and scope, as nature is to this. For as is each thing, the generation thereof being perfected, such say wee the nature thereof to be, as of a man, a horse, or a house. moreover, that for which cause other things are done,& which is the end, is good; now self-sufficiency is the end,& therfore exceeding good. Out of all which it appeareth, that a city is by nature: and that by nature also a man is a civil and sociable creature: and also that he which naturally and not by accident or chance is cittilesse and vnsociable, is to be esteemed either a wicked wretch, or more then a man, as he on whom Homer raileth saying: That he was both tribelesse, lawless, and houselesse. For as soon as a man findeth himself by nature to be such, forthwith he hunteth after war, as being not restrained by the yoke of marriage, even as it falleth out among ●oules of the air.  
A city is an assembly of many towns sufficiently furnished of all things requisite, as well necessary as honest, to this end to live well, not onely in regard of virtue, but also of commodity and profit, having very little or no need at all of the aid of others. The which is a thing natural, because it consisteth of natural partes, to wit, a family and a town, whereof it is the end and accomplishment: because they are subordained unto it, and naturally tend unto it as unto their chiefest perfection: considering that the nature of every thing is most known and discerned in the end. moreover, forasmuch as it is composed of men naturally civil and public, that is to say, by their natural disposition, inclining to live in society: as it appeareth by Speech, which was in vain bestowed vpon them if they should live solitarily without company and conversation. And if by chance there be any such monster extant, which by a particular inclination should shun and avoid civil society, he ought to be reputed as most wicked, a lover and stirrer up of warres and seditions, and a most bloody and cruel tyrant. Wherefore all men that are well and liberally born, are naturally incited to desire and love it: and he amongst the rest whi●● first instituted and ordained society, deserveth most high commendations, as the author of great good.  
A city.] When many dwell together, and by the mutual communicating of their several labours, works, and goods, live sufficiently and use the same laws and customs, they are called Citizens, and their place of habitation a city: but when they reach not unto that sufficiency which I haue spoken of, then they violate their society and loose the title of a city and Citizens: which is a most evident argument, that the very essence of a City consisteth in that. Plato in his fourth book De Legib. complaineth of many commonwealths that were not Cities, but certain habitations in villages where the weaker yielded service to the stronger, and the whole government was denominated of the part that overruled. Aristotle Lib. 3. Polit. restraineth the name of a Citizen to those onely that partake public honours and offices, as those which haue right to enter into the council and to give iudgement, excluding all mechanical artificers from that title.  
AS nature is to this.] Nature sometimes signifieth the principles and beginnings of natural substances, as in natural philosophy: sometimes also the perfection and consummation of them. Arist. de generat. Animal. Lib. 2. cap. 1.  
FOR such as is each thing, the generation thereof being perfected, such say we the nature thereof to be.] He declareth that which he propounded before, to wit, that nature is the end, because the nature of every thing is principally perceived in the end, and the end is to come unto a generality and perfection. Also the generation of things is not perfect, before they be come to that pass that they grow no more: so that the form is the perfection of every thing, having then it nature in possession, when it getteth unto itself perfection: as, albeit an infant be a creature partaking of reason, yet is not in his natural perfection, until it haue the full vigour of body and soul accomplished.  
MOREOVER, that for which cause other things are done, and which is the end, is good.] The End and Good are but one and the selfsame thing. Arist. Polit. Lib. 3. Cap. 8. In all Artes and Sciences their Good is their end, and in the greatest and principalest of them, which is the faculty of policy, is the greatest and principalest good: and this is by good right called the political good: which is nothing else but the public and common utility. The same Aristotle Ethic. Lib. 1. Cap. 182. saith, that the end political compriseth in it all other ends, and is the chief and sovereign good of man.  
self-sufficiency is the end.] To haue all things, and to want or desire nothing, is self-sufficiency, Aristot. Polit. Lib. 7. Cap. 5. This autarchie or self-sufficiency, is the end and the good contained in the form of a city, and consequently is the end of all other societies.  
out of all which it appeareth that a city is by nature.] A city is yet further by nature, because that it is compounded of men naturally civil and politic.  
MAN therefore is more sociable then any Bee, or other creature whatsoever that desires society: which is manifest by this, that Nature who hath bestowed the power of Speech vpon man, maketh nothing in vain. Voice which is the signifier of ioy and sadness, is bestowed for this cause vpon other creatures, for even Nature proceedeth so far in them, that shee giveth them a feeling of ioy and grief, and a power to declare the same unto others. But Speech is given unto us to signify what is profitable and what unprofitable, and consequently what is just and what unjust. For this is a propriety belonging unto man above all other living creatures, that he onely hath a sense and feeling of good and evil, and of just and unjust. The communion of which things begetteth and establisheth a house and a city.  
NATVRALLY all living creatures terrestrial, Aquaticall, Aëriall, or winged, both domestical and savage, tame and wild, desire to live together in companies and assemblies of their own kind. Thus we see flocks of sheep, herds of cattle, Hartes and Deere to feed by troops; Horses, Asses, and Mules by droves: crows, stars, and Cranes by flights: Fishes both of salt and fresh water by skulls: Bees to dwell in hives, Pigeons in dovehouses, Pismiers in hollow places: But men adorned more singularly with an immortal soul, with Reason and Speech, and by those prerogatives more communicable then all other creatures, as born to honour God, love one another, to live in civil government, under laws, Magistrates, and judgements, having alone the sense and understanding of that which is good and bad, honest and dishonest, just and unjust: knowing the original and causes of things, their progressions, antecedents, and consequences, their likenesses and repugnances, do more commodiously and prosperously led their lives together, doing that by law, which other creatures do onely by natural instinct. The first society of mankind is of the husband and his wife: the second of parents and their children, where seruants haue their place as ioynt-helpers: then the companies of brethren, cousen-germanes, and cousens removed, who growing into great numbe●s, can no longer haue their food and lodging together, but by occasion of their multitude are constrained to sever themselves into sundry families: who nevertheless meet together at certain daies and places, and can not one be without another: as in the Temple, to make their prayers unto God vpon festival dayes; to traffic, buy, and sell in markets and fairs, to discuss their controversies in Courts and places appointed for administration of iustice, to confer together of the Common-wealth in Towne-houses: which multiplication, is the original of Parishes, boroughs, towns, and cities, in all the temperate partes of the inhabitable earth, reckoning the length thereof from the West to the East, as spain, France, italy, Greece, Anatolia, Persia, Narsingnia, the triple India, and the breadth of the same from the South to the North, from the third climate to the seventh. For in those countries that are extreme hote or could, men ●ave neither houses, boroughs, nor towns, neither sow nor plant, help themselves little or nothing at all with Arts and occupations, nor use any kind of money at all: but desiring to help one another in their mutual wants, they use the exchange of one thing for another: they wander continually in huge companies like great walking cities, under the guiding and conduction of diuers heads and lords: taking with them their small lodgings or sillie coats covered with leather, mats, reedes, or course wool, to save themselves from heat, could, and showers: and without long stay in any place pursue and follow the commodity of grass, herbs, and fresh water to feed their cattle, which they haue innumerable of all sorts, as horses, camels, sheep, and kine, wherewith together with venison they sustain themselves, being destitute of all manner of corn, pulse, and fruits. Such in ancient time were the scythians and Sarmatians or Sauromatians, dwelling in most large and spacious fields, vncouered, without either wood, trees, or bushes, having neither high ways nor limits, carrying their little houses vpon closets, wherein they placed and bestowed their wives and children, and were therefore called NOMADIANS and AMAXOVIANS: being utterly ignorant of tillage: their food was flesh and milk, by reason the plain and smooth land was fit to yield such kind of victuals, being furthered therein by diuers great riuers, which passing overthwart, made the same fertile and well stored with fresh water. Herodotus in the fourth book, justine in the second, Diodorus the Sicilian in the second, and Hippocrates in his little work of the air, of Waters, and Places. To these scythians succeeded the Tartarians, divided by swarms of Zauoglians, Cosanians, Nogatians, Precopians, and other most uncivil companies, always wandring up and down, ignorant of riches and pleasure, by reason they live in small closets with two wheels covered with poor feltes, and go for the most part clad in skins against their continual frosts and snow: They possess huge droves and flocks of cattle, eat flesh either raw or half baked or sudden, specially the flesh of horses, cats, and dogges, and are abhorred of all other men: they drink mares milk which of purpose they make sour first: They go in a manner always on horseback, swarming as thick as Antes, and with all their baggage pass over great, deep, and rough riuers, by swimming, without either bridges, boats, or any other kind of vessel. They haue the reputation to be good archers and valiant men, though commonly they be but of a mean stature, very foul, sallowe coloured, flat nosed, hollow eyed, and either smally or not at all bearded: They were utterly unknown in all ancient time, and shewed themselves openly about the year of our Lord and saviour Christ 1211. vpon the appearing of a great blazing star by the space of six moneths before, and under the conduction of Cynkys their Prophet and first Emperour, and of his successors, occupied in short time the greatest part of the North, East, and South, whence came the great Tamerlane, in the year 1400. who led an army of twelve hundred thousand fighting men, terrifying all the whole earth that is inhabited, with this incredible multitude, and the fear of his own valiancy. At this day they hold all the countries which reach from the river of Tanais and the seas of Pontus and Bachu, unto Cathaia and China, most rich and mighty provinces in the East. They be great theeues, of●en molesting their neighbours with sudden incursions, as well in Asia as Europe. Paulus divinus in his thirteenth book of Histories, and in his Treatise of the Mo●couites: Hayton Armenian in his book of the Tartarians: mathias Mychau, of Sarmatia, Europe, and Asia: josaphat Barba●o Venetian, in his voyage of Tana and embassage of Persia: Sebastian Erbestine in his Moscouian embassage: Sabellicus in his sixth book of Enneades. On the other side toward the South, in old time were the Numidians, who lived abroad in the air without houses, continually labouring and travailing, using for drink no wine, and for meate very simplo and poor fare, to relieve natural necessity onely, and not to serve to pleasures: who by occasion thereof were most active, mighty, healthful, and of long life, as writeth Appian in the Lybian war, and sallust in that of jugurth. The Arabians live at this present after the same sort since the coming of Mahomet, carrying about with them their houses, villages,& towns; which they draw vpon closets or camels backs, seeking for good pastures in the mountains& deserts, from Arabia and the river of Euphrates unto the sea of Atlantus, being very harmful to the plain fields of Syria, Egypt, and all hither Africa that lye next unto them, specially in the harvest and fruit times: for then descend they in great and huge troops; as close and thick as stars amongst the vine trees: and after they haue got and spoiled what they can, retire themselves again so swiftly, that they rather seem to fly then to run: insomuch, that it is altogether both unpossible to overtake them, or follow after them in places destitute of waters. They be a Nation vagabondish and innumerable, howbeit divided into people and lords called SCHETZ, agreeing not well together, and having no stable habitation: they ordinarily dwell in tents and pauillions made of poor and the worst wool that is: they eat flesh& milk, specially of Camels, using thereto a little quantity of Rice, hony, dates, raisins, dry figs, oliues, and venison when they can catch it, going often a hunting with hounds and hawks for Stagges, Buckes, Does, Ostriges, and after all other kind of wild beasts and fowls. Commonly they be in person deformed, in visage lean and evil favoured, of a small stature● tawny and dark coloured, black eyed, with a shrill and womanish voice, wearing no apparel but their shirts, unless it bee those that are the chiefest amongst them: They ride for the most part without any saddles, spurs,& horseshoes: Their weapons are great reeds of India, ten or twelve fathom long, with a little Taffata in manner of a banner. Notwithstanding this poverty and misery wherein they lead their lives, they boast themselves for the chief and peerless men of the world, because they never were mingled with other Nations, and haue entirely preserved the nobility of their blood. John lion in his first book of the description of Africa joys Bartheme in the first book of the Voyages. Paulus divinus in his 18. and 33. book of Histories.  
THE voice which is the signifier of sadness and ioy, was bestowed for this cause vpon other creatures: But speech was given to us to signify what is profitable, what unprofitable.] There is a diffe●ence between the Voice and Speech: For the beast● haue a voice wherewith they can express their sadness and ioy one to another, and proceed no furthe●●●●t man with his Speech uttereth what is profitable, what hurtful; what just, what 〈◇〉 the cause is, for that the beasts haue a sensitive soul, which stretcheth with the 〈◇〉 thereof to such effects, as proceed from brut●●● and sen●●●ll app●●ite: But man hath a reasonable soul, which discoursing with the faculties thereof, is able to consider of virtue and manners; as is at large entreated of in the Ethiques.  
HOWBEIT the city is before the house and every one of us: for of necessity the 〈◇〉 is before the part: for of the whole perish, there will remain neither foot nor han●, saving in name onely: as for example, if one should call that a hand which is made of sto●e, because a dead hand would be like unto it. All things are defined by their operation and power, insomuch that when they c●●se to be such, they must no longer be called such in substance, but in name onely. Therefore is it clear and manifest without all doubt, that a city is by nature and before any one of us: For if every man severed and set alone, is nor sufficient for himself, he will be so affencted toward the whole, namely the city, as other partes that are sundered from their whole. But he that can not abide to live in company, or through sufficiency hath need of nothing, is not esteemed a part or member of a city, but is either a beast or a God.  
A city not only consisteth by nature, as hath been declared, but also by nature is before a house and the parts thereof: that is to say, more worthy; for the perfect is by nature before the unperfect, as Aristotle affirmeth in his first book of heaven. Therefore a city( being a perfect company) is by nature before( to wit, in exce●lencie and dignity) a house,( which is an unperfect company) and also every particular man. As, when any piece of work is to bee taken in hand, consideration is rather had of the whole as the end and perfection, than of the partes; although the work must begin at the partes: For that which is latter in generation is former in nature, a● 〈◇〉 down in the eight book of natural philosophy, and in the first book of supernatural philosophy. add hereunto, that when the whole perisheth, the partes perish and loose their use, and so consequently their right name: As for example, when a man is dead, there remaineth no longer in him neither eye, foot, nor hand, because their operation and power( saving in name onely) is gone: I mean, the eye wherewith we see, and wherein lieth the power of seeing; the foot wherewith we walk,& wherein lieth the power of walking; the hand wherewith we handle, and wherein lieth the power of handling: which members when they cease to be such, must be no more taken for the same, saving unproperly, by retaining the common name onely and not the reason of the name, which is called equivocation. In like case, if every of us separated and put asunder, can not enjoy sufficiency, there is the self same reason of him toward a city, as other parts are accustomend to haue to their whole. nevertheless as concerning time, a house is before a city, being composed of the assembly of houses, the house being part of the same, as is declared in the first book of the Oeconomickes or household affairs in the first Chapter: as a sheep is in nature before a flock, compounded of many sheep. But howsoever the whole is thus made by partes, yet nevertheless before the full accomplishment of the whole, the partes remain unperfect; but the whole being perfected, they become also perfect, by obtaining their perfect use.  
but is either a beast or a God.] {αβγδ}. Aristotle in his ethics, Lib. 7. cap. 1. mentioneth, {αβγδ}: that is, a certain heroical and divine virtue, surpassing the ordinary virtue of men in excellency and perfection of goodness: to the which he opposeth {αβγδ}, that is, brutishnes or sauagenes, a 'vice that exceedeth the common malice and naughtiness of men.  
WHEREFORE all men desire such society, and he which first invented and instituted it, was the cause of much good: for even as man in perfection is the best of all living creatures; so being voided of lawe and iustice is the worst, for armed improbitie is vntollerable: for man is from his birth armed by nature with the armor of wisdom and virtue, which he may abuse to contrary effects: and by that means forsaking virtue, he becometh most wicked and cruel, given over to all manner of lust and unsatiable pleasure of gluttony: but iustice is a thing belonging to policy, sith the order of a civil society is the lawe, and iudgement is nothing else but the decision of that which is just.  
A city being proved to be a thing natural by the fore-alleged reasons, all men are naturally enflamed to desire it: and he which first ordained it, deserveth high commendation, as the author of great good: the which praise is ascribed by virgil AEnead. lib. 8. to Saturne: by Horace in his Art of poetry to Orpheus and Amphion: and in his Odes to mercury: by Cicero lib. 1. de Oratore to Eloquence and eloquent men: who also in his 6. book de Repub. or dream of Scipio, saith thus: To the end you may be more affectioned to defend the commonweal, know, that there is a certain place in heaven designed to those which shall preserve, relieve, or amplify their country, where they shall enjoy everlasting happiness: For there is nothing here below more agreeable unto the great God that governeth the world, than the societies and assemblies of men covnited together by lawful equity, which men call, Cities: The gouernours and preservers of them, as they first descended from heaven, so shall they return thither again. And in his Oration for P. Se●tius: Who knoweth not( saith he) that the nature and condition of man hath heretofore been such, that they, not having either the law natural or civil prescribed, wandered up and down dispersed in the wide fields, and possessed nothing save that which by violence they could despoil others of, and being thus gotten, retain by force, even by murder and blows? For which cause there arose up some excellent persons both in regard of valour and wisdom, who knowing the excellent docility& understanding of mankind, assembled together these dispersed wights into one place, and transformed them from their rude and savage disposition, to mildness and iustice. Then they established those things which contained in them any common commodity, which we call public; and ordained societies, which after were called Cities; and encompassed about with walls their conjoined houses, which we call, walled Cities: the divine and human law being found out. Plato lib. 3.& 6. de Leg. rehearseth the beginning and proceeding of policy. Arist. Pol. Lib. 7. Cap. 10. is of opinion, that matters belonging to policy haue ben long time since devised,& after lost again many times, as they shal be hereafter in like sor●, as it hath happened in all Arts.  
FOR even as man in perfection is the best of all living creatures.] A man well shaped, well born, well brought up and instructed, and withall, persevering all his life long in virtuous actions, is not onely the best of all other creatures, but more, even the best and most excellent thing which is to be found in this inferior world. Abdala, one of the wise saracens or Arabians, being at a time demanded, What was the most admirable thing in the habitable earth, answered: That there was nothing in the world to be seen more admirable& wonderful then Man: with whom conspireth Mercurius Trismegist, who calleth Man, a great miracle. And most certain it is, that Man is begotten of an excellent quality and condition, even after the image and similitude of God, and as it were, of the stock and lineage of God, to celebrate his honour and imitate his goodness, to the end he may view the order of celestial bodies, and keep and defend the habitation of this middle terrestrial globe. He is adorned with a divine understanding, together with knowledge able to discern betwixt truth and falsehood, and put a difference betwixt good and evil; and with wisdom to consider the principles and causes of things, with their consequences and repugnances; and with memory to call to mind things past, and combine that which is to come with the time present. He is partaker of reason, by means whereof men are associated to each other in the communion of speech and life. The shape of his body is proportioned agreeable to his understanding, together with many commodities and fitnesses of exterior and interior members, accompanied with senses and affections: he is sharp, provident, subtle, born to contemplation and action: amongst all creatures( over whom he is placed as prince and ruler) he onely hath the knowledge of God his Creator: And whereas other creatures do either look downward to their food, or creep on the earth, or live covered with water, he is of stature strait erected towards the aspect of heaven, the original place of his true pedigree, beholding both that which is aloft and below, first, last, and midst, because the inquisition and search of truth belongeth properly unto him: and contemplating the heaven, stars, earth, water, living creatures, plants, stones, and metals, and the natures of all things; he cometh at last to know God the moderator and governor of all: to whom also in his ordinary affairs and continual afflictions, he hath recourse by prayer, imploring his aid: and serving him sincerely by a true religion, aspireth at length to eternal felicity. By man all laws and customs were appointed, equity justly prescribed, and a certain discipline of living invented, the better& more happily to conduct our lives. What should I reckon the innumerable Arts, inventions, and excellent sciences found out by him, to furnish life with things necessary and honest? wherefore it seemeth that by good reason he holdeth the chief room of dignity in this world, being also called of many, A little world; in as much as the same things which are in the great world, are also found to haue place in him: the fire, the air, the water, and the earth, mingled and tempered together, are really& substantially in his compound body: within the walls whereof dwelleth a spirit more pure and divine then the elements, answering proportionably to heaven,& coupling( as Aristotle saith) the soul to the body. In him is the life of plants, performing the same offices, namely, to engender, nourish, and grow, as in them. In him is the sense of bruit beasts, both interior and exterior. In him inhabits a soul full of reason, an understanding divinely added thereunto, bodiles, passionles, and immortal: and lastly, a convenience and agreement of all these natures together, in such sort, that no substance disdaineth to minister aid and succour unto him: the superior essences are favourable unto him, and the inferior, obedient: The earth, with the other elements and their creatures, are his servitors: heaven laboureth for his good by continual motion, and Angels procure his safety by their ministry; almighty God that governeth all by his divine providence, hath care over him, even to his least members. So that being endowed with so many favours, he might enjoy all things comprised within the circled of the world, which are innumerable in multitude, wonderful in beauty, and besides mount up even unto heaven, by retiring himself in contemplation from this world to Godward: from darkness to light, from corruption to eternity, from ignorance to wisdom and knowledge of that true iustice, which in times past was constrained to forsake the fellowships of men, because of their perverse and obst●nate malice.  
SO being voided of law and iustice, is the worst.] As a man absolutely just, is the best of all; so the unjust m●n is most wicked and pernicious, what good soever he otherwise hath. Plato de Legib. Lib. 2. saith thus: To enjoy health, to see, hear, and perceive sensibly all things, and to live long, even to the attaining of immortality, is a thing utterly evil, if a man be withall deprived of iustice and other virtues: and that to live a little while is a less evil to him that is so disposed. And yet lower: It may be I shall not persuade you, that the unjust and reproachful man is so far from happiness, that he is rather miserable, albeit he possess health, riches, and a perpetnall tyranny in government, huge strength of body, invincible courage of mind, immortality of both, and doth not endure any thing which in vulgar estimation is deemed evil. And a little after: Although he be puissant, faire, rich, and at liberty all his life time to do what he list, yet if he be unjust, for this onely, his life is dishonest, sorrowful, and incommodious.  
FOR armed improbitie is unsupportable.] As if you should say, a licentious tyrannicall liberty, or a witty fitness and ability applying itself to commit evil. According to that which he saith afterwards, That a man is naturally armed with understanding and virtue: that is to say, with such natural aptitudes, as may be applied as well to evil as good, and which without discretion and reason, do much hurt: as he sheweth in his ethics, Lib. 6. Cap. ult.  
FOR man is from his birth armed by nature with the armor of wisdom and virtue, which he may use to contrary effects.] To wit, to good and evil, designing that virtue and wisdom which is natural, or certain habits acquired, like unto them: which may be used both towares 'vice and virtue: as for example, craftiness in stead of wisdom, rashness in stead of fortitude, rigor in stead of iustice, softness and cowardliness in stead of temperance. To understand the better this place, it is to be observed, that virtue is taken in a double sense, the one properly, as it is defined in the 2. book of ethics, namely to be an elective habit consisting in mediocrity, referred unto us, and limited by reason. In this signification virtue is not severed from a right reason, neither can any abuse it to 'vice or dishonesty. In the other sense it signifieth improperly, a certain ability or readiness, wherewith some can easily perform that which good men accomplish by true and sound virtue, as to abstain from whoredom, prodigality, and rashness, although they do it with an evil will and intent. Such virtue as this a wicked man may easily abuse to ill and dishonesty, for he that doth just, is not forthwith a just man, as it is declared in the 2. book of ethics: nor a temperate man that performeth temperate acts: but he that doth them, their ci●cumstances observed, justly and temperately. The same reason is of Prudence or wisdom, the which if it be taken properly, to wit, for a habit of governing ourselves by reason in things that are good or hurtful to man( as it is defined in the sixth book of ethics) no man can in this sense abuse it to an evil end, because it is as it were the Architect and builder of other virtues, by prescribing unto them what is most meet and convenient for them. For even as it is written in the first book of the great Morals: Prudence or wisdom is nothing else but to desire good things, and to do them well being desired: but sometimes it is taken improperly for a certain ability in dispatching affairs, and bringing them to the end which is propounded: of the which ability called in greek {αβγδ} is spoken in the 6. book of ethics, and in the first of the great Morals. In this sense an unjust man may right well abuse this Prudence improperly taken, which is indeed nothing else but craft and subtlety. Cicero Lib. 3. De natur. dear. saith thus: Sure it had been far better for mankind if this quick and prompt motion of thinking, together with that subtlety and ability which is called Reason, had never in some sort been given unto man, because it is hurtful unto so many and helpful unto so few, then to haue been bestowed by the gods so liberally and bountifully: for what inordinate desire, what avarice, what wickedness could there be without a settled purpose, or a perceiving understanding, or without thinking, that is to say, without reason? what seeds of injustice, intemperance, and timiditie could there be, if Reason had not a hand in these vices? We spake not long since of Medea and Atreus, heroical persons, how they consulted with discourse of reason about their horrible villainies. What shall we say of the comical harlots? use they think you but little reason, or deal they without subtlety? what of those cousenings, devises, deceits, and fallacies, can they be without reason? Let us come from the Theatre, and survey the place of iustice where causes are pleaded& decided: I pray you go sit down: why? you will say: to the end that he which burned the Charters and rolls of the Empire, may be arraigned: What wickedness more secret! and yet Q. Socius, a magnifical roman knight, confesseth that he had done it. Or he which copied out the public letters: This also did L● Alenius in counterfeiting the seals of the six principals. You are not ignorant of other criminal causes touching the gold of Tholossa, and the conspiracy of Iugurtha. Rehearse the presidents against Tubullus, who took a bribe to give iudgement: the subsequents of incest, by the law Peducia: and after the ordinaries of stabbings, poisonings, robbing the common treasury, and of suborning testaments. From what spring proceeded such actions? I answer, that the robbery was committed by your aduise and counsel. moreover, so many suits by breach of faith in wardships, commandements, fellowships, redemptions of sold lands, and such other things of like nature which are done against faith, in buying, selling, giuing or taking to hire: besides the public iudgement of private affairs by the lawe Lectoria: and again, the iudgement of Dolus malus, guileful dealing; in a word of all wickednesses, which hath been not long since propounded by our friend C. Aquilius, who affirmeth, That such kind of deceit consisteth in feigning one thing and doing another. think wee then that such store of hurtful seeds came from the gods immortal? for if it be they that haue granted Reason to men, then haue they in like sort granted malice, since malice is a cunning and deceitful Reason to do harm. The selfsame also haue given fraud, wickedness, and other like things that neither can be taken in hand nor executed without reason: Therefore the gods should not haue given this subtlety to men, which few of them use rightly, and these few also are often oppressed by those that abuse it to evil. Now there be innumerable that use it evil, so that this divine gift of reason and counsel seeme●h to haue been bestowed on men for fraud, and not for goodness.  
AND by that means forsaking virtue, he becometh wicked and cruel.] Plato De Legib. Lib. 7. saieth thus: The child that as yet hath not attained to the fountain of perfect prudence, is the most deceitful and wanton creature that is, and therefore should be kept under as it were with a bridle. The same author in his sixth book of the same work: In all things living, the first branches that haue a good beginning according to the propriety of their nature, do easily attain to their ordained end, as it cometh to pass not only in plants and beasts both wild and tame, but also in men: for we affirm, that man is a mild and cou●teous creature, who obtaining together with a happy nature good bringing up, useth to make himself of a most divine and gentle disposition: But if he haue not sufficient and good education he becometh the most cruel of all creatures that are born vpon the earth. In the 6. book of his commonweal: Wee know that the seed of plants and living creatures, which in due time and place receiveth not such kind of nourishment as is meet and convenient for it, in that it is a thing both noble and vehement in operation, doth loose the greatest part of the powers thereof: for evil is more contrary to good then that which is not good. So that if a good nature meet with such manner of education as is contrary unto it, then proveth it in the end to be more vile then that which is cowardly and naughty. Therefore affirm wee, that if mindes endowed with a noble understanding, lack good bringing up, they become most wicked. think you that great mischiefs and extreme enormities proceed rather from a dull and lumpish mind, then from one that is courageous and hardy, marred with evil education: and that a weak nature may now and then be cause of great good or great harm? Therefore if mans nature meet with convenient instruction and education, it must needs by continual profiting and going forward, attain to all kind of virtue. But in case it want good bringing up, it can not choose but fall into all manner of contrary vices, unless some god lay his helping hand thereto. With this brand of beastly cruelty in old time were specially noted Diomedes, who killed his guests, and made them meate and provender for his horses. Mezentius, whom virgil in his 8. book of AEneades reporteth to haue coupled dead carcases with living bodies of men, joining hand to hand, and face to face, and so tormenting them to death in that most inhuman and barbarous manner: Nero, who killed his own natural mother: Busiris, Phalaris, Atreus, and Thyestes.  
GIVEN over to all manner of lust.] Abusing indifferently all sorts of women contrary to the law of God and man, and committing that most detestable 'vice of buggery against nature.  
AND unsatiable pleasure of gluttony.] Seneca writeth thus of the abominable prodigality of the roman Emperour Caligula, who succeeded Tiberius: It seemeth unto me that nature had brought forth this Prince, to show what extreme vices are able to do when they fall into a sovereign fortune; who was so exceedingly depraved, that he would needs spend an hundred sesterces at one banquet: but albeit that he used the help of the spirits, and inventions of all gluttons and prodigal wretches, yet could he scarcely find means how to wast and consume the whole tribute of three provinces vpon one supper. Cicero in the 5. book of Tusculans Questions, maketh recital of Xerxes King of Persia, how he wallowing in all kind of wealth and gifts of fortune, holding himself content neither with his innumerable forces, as well of footmen and horsemen and power vpon the sea, nor with the infinite treasure of gold which he had in his possession, promised great reward to whomsoever could find out any kind of pleasure: and yet when the same was found, he could not be so content. anthony and Cleopatra passed so far in desired superfluity, that they contended who should spend most in making excessive feasts and banquets, erecting the company of a joyful and merry band, whereof themselves were chief, and termed them persons leading such a kind of life, as neither could be imitated neither was frequented by any other. Apicius consumed in luxury and gluttony nine hundred sesterces, and when he saw how his great riches had passed through his paunch, for fear least he should lack food ere he dyed, killed himself with poison, even as though his purpose was to punish himself for the dainty and dear morsels which he had devoured. Plinie in his tenth book calleth him, The prince of all gluttons.  
but iustice is a thing belonging to policy.] For as much as the maintenance of States dependeth principally on the observation of iustice, there is no doubt but iustice is a thing worthy to be had in chief regard in a Commonwealth, and to bee esteemed as the sinew and chain of the whole city or Common-wealth, retaining the Citizens( who are unlike in condition) in unity and friendship through a due proportion which she useth as well in things as in persons.  
SITH the order of civil society is the law.] That iustice is fit for a Common-wealth, and appertaining to the government of a city, it appeareth by that, that law is the order of civil society; for wee usually say, that that is lawfully and rightfully done, which is performed fittely according to the order and constitution of policy. And when judgements are exercised by Magistrates, and the will of iustice declared by exposition of law and right, then is the order of the city preserved.  
AND iudgement is nothing else but the discussing of that which is just.] And in his fift book of moral philosophy he saith, Iudgement is the deciding of that which is just and that which is unjust, to wit, that the efficacy of iudgement consisteth in the exposition of right, and discerning of just from unjust: Iustice therefore is a virtue yielding to every man his own: Iudgement is as it were the jurisdiction that proceedeth according to received laws or customs, and the disposition of the written lawe.   

CHAP. III. Of a family and the partes thereof, specially of the Master and Seruant.  
NOW for as much as it hath been declared of what partes a city consisteth of necessity, wee will first speak of the government of a family: for every city is composed of families, and the partes of a family be those whereof it is immediately compacted. But for that the nature of every thing is to bee considered in the best partes thereof, and forasmuch as the first and best partes of a family are the master and seruant, the husband and wife, the father and children, wee will entreat of these three, what each of them is, and what they ought to be, to wit, of the masterly, husbandly, and fatherly society. There is yet another part which some men think to be Oeconomie, and others take to be the principal part of a family: concerning the which, wee will also entreat what it is, I mean, that which consisteth in acquiring and getting of goods and possessions both movable and immovable. But let us first of all deal with the master and seruant, that wee may know what appertaineth to necessary use, and whether wee can attain to any better knowledge therein then is now in the common opinion of men: for some hold opinion, that the government of a master is a kind of science, and that the authority of a master and Oeconomie, or ordering a family; and the government of a city or Common-wealth, and the kingly state and government are all one and of the self same kind and nature: as wee haue already touched at the beginning. Others think that the authority and government of a master and his bondman is against nature, sith it is the force of lawe that maketh one a bondman and another a free man, who notwithstanding differ nothing in nature: and therefore conclude they that it is not just, but a thing maintained by violence. Now for as much as goods and possessions are partes of a family, doubtless the skill to get goods shall be a part of the Oeconomie: forasmuch as it is not possible to live, much less to live well, without necessary provision: for as in Artes definite it is expedient and needful to haue instruments and tools fit and convenient for the performance of their work; So must it be in the O●conomie of a famile: Now of instruments there be some that haue life, and others that are without life: as for example, in a ship the stern is a lifeless instrument, and the master that hath charge of the foreship is living: because that in artificial affairs the master or seruant supplieth the place of an instrument. In like manner goods are instruments serving to the use of mans life: and to possess goods, is nothing else but to possess a multitude of instruments, and a seruant is a living possession, and every Minister an instrument over instruments: for if instruments could at their maisters beck and commandement, or by any precedent sense of their own, perform their work, as it is reported of the statues of Dedalus, or Treuets of Vulcan, which the Poet affirmeth to haue come of themselves to the battle of the gods: and so also of the weavers shuttles, and of the quill or bow of a viol, that they woue and played of their own accord: I say, if it were thus, then chief builders should haue no need of seruants, nor lord● of slaves. They therefore which are called instruments, are operative and working instruments, but the possession of goods is an active instrument: for by a weavers shittle a certain thing is made and left besides the use of it: but of a garment or a bed wee haue nothing but the use. moreover, sith that operation differeth from action in kind, and sith either of them hath need of instruments, it is necessary that these instruments also of either kind haue the same difference. As therefore life is an action, not an operation; so a seruant is a Minister unto that which concerneth action: besides a possession is called to bee as it were a part, for a part is not onely the part of another thing, but wholly and absolutely of another thing, and so likewise is a possession: and therefore a lord or master is the master of a bondslave or seruant onely, and not in the power of the seruant or bondslave: but the bondslave is not onely the bondslave of his master, but wholly and entirely in his power. By all which it is easy to bee known what is the nature and condition of a bondslave: for he that is not his own by nature, but another mans, and yet a man, the same is by nature a bondslave. Now he is another mans, who so ever being a man is possessed of another, and a thing possessed is nothing else but an active and separate instrument.  
BEFORE he wadeth any deeper into the discourse of a city or Common-wealth, the Philosopher inserteth here a disputation touching Oeconomie and the parts thereof, which continueth to the end of this first book: the which parts are evidently set down by him in express terms, called a Husbandly, Fatherly, and masterly society. This last is expounded and declared from the third Chapter to the end of the fourth: where, vpon good occasion, is handled most learnedly the manner of commanding and obeying: and after having defined what it is to serve and to bee a bondslave; he resolveth vpon this, that some are born in that estate and condition to serve and obey: showing that by nature they are properly slaves, which are dull and gross of understanding, but puissant and strong of bided, to exercise necessairie works and labours: and that on the other side they are by nature Maisters and Lords born to command, which are endued with iudgement and wisdom of mind, but feeble of body, and that the same is profitable to two purposes, both that the wise may command, and the strong obey. Besides these three parts of Oeconomie fore-expressed, a fourth is adjoined, called acquisitive, that is to say, a faculty of gett●ng and obtaining goods serving for the maintenance and entertainment of the family and of the city: the which faculty notwithstanding doth not properly appertain to Oeconomie, the office whereof is rather to use goods, then to seek to get them, and therefore ought to bee placed among the parts of Oeconomie. Of this is spoken at large in the fift, sixth, and seventh Chapters: of the fatherly and husbandly society, is entreated in the eight and last Chapter. Where again he discourseth of commanding and obeying, and of those qualities which are respectively requisite in each of them.  
ARTS defined.] That is, which consist in some certain thing, and haue their nature as it were defined and determined.  
OF Instruments some haue life, and some are without.] Instruments living, as seruants, slaves, Oxen, Horses, and camels: Instruments without life, as Chariots, Carts, Forks, scythes, Sickles, and saddles, &c.  
AS it is reported of the statues of Dedalus.] The Greekes call such Instruments {αβγδ}, that is, which by certain sly and privy engines move themselves. Plato in his books called Menon and Eutiphron, maketh mention of Dedalus and his works.  
THESE therefore which are called instruments are operative and working instruments, but the possession of goods is an active instrument, {αβγδ}.] Instruments operative, and active: these are Philosophers terms little understood, and less used of the Vulgar sort. Instruments whereby besides the use ariseth a certain work wrought, are called operative: As from the shittle ariseth the web, from the Aule, shoes, from the needle and the scizers, a coat or a shirt: but those whereof nothing redoundeth but the bare use, are called active, as the Virginals, the vial, and the Lute, which after they once leave sounding, there remaineth nothing behind to be seen. This profession of goods is an active instrument: because there is nothing required in it but use onely: as in putting on a gown or a shirt, or sitting in a chair, there is nothing left after the use of them.  
MOREOVER sith that operation differeth from action in kind, {αβγδ}.] The difference of working and doing consisteth in the end, as the famed Author declareth in the first book of his great Morrals: for the end of working is a thing beyond the operation; as the end of building, besides the working, is a house. But of singing with voice, or of playing on an instrument of music, there is no other end of such an action, save onely the song and the melody. Besides to work, appertaineth properly to manual and mechanical Arts: but to do, belongeth to wisdom and other moral virtues. It is very hard& difficult to represent in our English the true difference of these two words {αβγδ}, the which even in the common ancient phrase of Greece, were not distinguished, save only in the schools by the Philosophers, the better and more properly to express the nature of things, which indeed may be better understood by them, then by any forced or constrained terms of any other language: but yet they which shall survey and read this work, must think, that wee are Translators, and that wee shall do very much, if in communicating this matter unto our Nation, wee make Aristotle somewhat intelligible without going astray from his own sense and method.  
AN active and separate instrument, {αβγδ}.] Some instruments may be separated from their possessors, as a hatchet, ●cizers, plainer: others are inseparable, as the eyes wherewith wee see, ears wherewith wee hear, and the tongue wherewith we speak and taste.  
but whether there be any bondslave by nature or no, or whether it bee better and juster for some to serve or no, or whether all bondage bee against Nature, it is now to bee discussed. Now it will not bee difficult to perceive the truth of this question, as well by reason as common experience. For to command and obey are things not only necessary, but also profitable, yea and some things haue this difference engrafted in them, that some are born to obey, others to command● and of them that command and obey there are many and diverse kinds: besides, that commanding is always best, which is over the best subiects: as it is better to command over men, than over beasts, forasmuch as that work is ever the better which is performed by the best. Therefore where one commandeth, and another obeyeth, there is a certain work done, for in all things which are compounded of many, and are reduced to one in common, whether conjoined or severed, there is ever one that commands, and another that obaies● and this also is to bee seen in all the nature of creatures that haue life: yea also in things voided of life, there is a certain Empire and predominance, as we see in musical harmony: but this it may be, doth not belong so fitly to our present purpose.  
but whether there be any bondslave by nature or no.] The Philosopher here entereth into a most grave discourse touching authority and obedience: Fetching their first and chiefest cause from the spring-head of nature and the principal parts of every living creature well compounded, to wit, of soul and body: In which composition the soul as the better must command, and the body as the worse, be in subiection: which is the most excellent and most profitable Treatise of this first book.  
AND of them that command and obey, there are many and diverse kinds.] Plato de legib. lib. 3. hath this Dialogue. ATHENIEN, Ought there not be authority& obedience in a city? CLINIAS, Yea. ATH. And I pray you what reasons and how many are there for this authority and obedience, as well in great and small Cities, as in private and particular houses? Is not this the first and true reason of authority, that the father and the mother, and simply those that beget and engender, do command and rule over their children? CLI. certain. ATH. And is not this the second, that Noble-men command ignoble? and the third, that the most ancient command the younger? and the fourth, that Masters their bondslaves? CLI. It is most true. ATH. The fift, that the most mighty command the weak? CLI. Thou hast hitherto spoken of a superiority most necessary. ATH. Yea most common and natural to all living creatures, as reporteth Pindarus the Theban. But the greatest dignity is in the sixth, by the which the ignorant are enjoined to follow and obey, and the wise to led and command: The which kind of superiority( O wise Pindarus) I would not say that it is contrary to nature, but according to the nature of Law, and that it is not violent but voluntary. CLI. Thou sayest well. ATH. Wee will reduce the seventh kind of superiority unto a certain lot, affirming it to come to pass by some especial grace of God, or some principal good hope, in such sort, that he which shall bee thus chosen by lot, commandeth: and he that is thus rejected, obeyeth. CLI. It is even so. And in the fourth book he proceedeth. ATHENIEN, This is one of the iniquities which happeneth in superiority. CLINIAS, Of what iniquities? ATH. Of those which we haue before recited in expounding. Who they bee that ought, and over whom they ought to command. Now wee haue said, that fathers ought to command their children, and those that descend from their loins, that ancient men ought to command the younger sort, Noble, the ignoble, and other such like forms of dignities, if you remember them which are hindrances and lets to each other. And wee added also the opinion of Pindarus, who esteemed government to bee a thing agreeable to Nature and Iustice, and that the most mighty, should command the most weak. CLI. All this is true.  
FOR in all things which are compounded of many, and are reduced to one in common, whether conjoined or severed, there is one ever that commands, and another that obeys.] All things consisting of many parts, and combined in one common mean, whether they bee conjoined as a living creature, consisting of a soul and a body united, in one common band by the participation of the soul and the body together, or whether they bee divided as a society betwixt the male and female, I say in all these things there appeareth to bee a commander and an obeyer by nature: for in those that enjoy life, it is certain that the mind commandeth, and the body obeyeth. In other things which want life, there is nevertheless an appearance of an Empire, as among the Elements the fire seemeth to possess a kind of superiority, and the earth seemeth to be subjecteth to the rest.  
YEA also in things voided of life there is a certain Empire and predominance.] To command and to obey, are things so natural in all things, compounded of matter and form, that even things voided of life, do carry in them a certain show thereof, as in musical harmonye, consisting of voices or sounds, the triple seemeth to command the Base. First of all, wee see that all this inferior world obeyeth the superior, and is governed by it, and that a certain virtuous influence accompanied with light and heat( called by some the spirit of the world) descending from the celestial nature, and dispersing itself through the mass of this great body, pierceth, quickeneth, nourisheth and governeth all things under the moon, called Sublunar, variable and inconstant: and that of this virtue the sun is the chief minister, which we aclowledge as a king among the stars, enlightening the whole world with his rayes● We see that the moon like a queen doth reign and rule over humidities and moist things, declaring amongst other wonders, her manifest pvissance in the miraculous ebbing and flowing of the waves of the sea: we see that amongst the elements, the fire and the air by their first qualities are active, and the water and the earth as more materious, passive: we see that amongst fowls, the Eagle, amongst Beasts the Lion, to haue the cheefeship: and in Waters both fresh and salt, the fishes is of most strength, as the Whale in the sea, and the Pike in the pond: and above all creatures, man. And we see in man compounded of a body, a soul, and understanding; that the soul commandeth the body, and the understanding the appetite or will. Then proceeding from a particular man to a family compact of many persons, wee see howe the father as a king naturally hath authority over his children, the master as a tyrant ruleth his bondslave with more violence, and the husband commandeth his wife after a civil manner. From thence ascending to a city, we shall find, that every civil and politic society ought necessary to be contained within the bounds of government, consisting in commanding and obeying.  
A LIVING Creature first of all is compounded of a body and a soul, whereof the one by nature ruleth, the other obeyeth: Now, we must consider the reason of nature, not in things corrupted and depraved, but in things of the most perfect and entire constitution. Wherefore it is behoof●full to consider man being well disposed both in body and soul, in whom this most manifestly appeareth. And forasmuch as in vicious& naughty persons, because they are naughtily& unnaturally disposed, oftentimes the body seemeth to overrule the soul. Therefore, first as I said, there appeareth in man both these governments, the masterly, and politic: for the soul ruleth the body like a master: and understanding, the will after a King like and politic manner. Whereby it is manifest, that by the direction of nature, the body is subject to the soul: And the part encumbered with perturbations, to the understanding or part endowed with reason: and that equality and interchange of government is hurtful to all, as well men as brute beasts. For tame and mansuet beasts are better by nature, then wild and savage: and yet it is most expedient for all, both tame and wild to be in subiection to man: sith therein consisteth their safety. moreover, if we compare together the male and the female, we shall find, that by natures law the male as better commandeth, and the female as inferior obeyeth, and is subject: And the like reason is also necessary to bee had in all men.  
FIRST as I said, there appeareth in man both these governments, the masterly and politic: for the soul ruleth the body,& c●] By the two principal parts of man, it is evident that superiority and obedience, are things natural. For even as in a man the soul, which is the better part, sits as president and governor; and the body as the worse, waiteth and obeyeth as a seruant: so in like manner in every human society or assembly, the wisest ought to sit in the chair of authority, and the unadvised to stand and attend at their beckes: having need of the conduct, counsel, and protection of another. The first kind of government, which is observed in man, is the Lordly, or masterly, after which sort the soul commandeth the body: for the body is constrained to obey the soul, because it quickeneth and moveth it, neither hath any proper or peculiar motion of it own, without the help and assistance of the soul; and therefore must yield such obedience unto it, as a bondslave yeeldeth unto his master: who is so far from being his own man, that he is wholly in the power and jurisdiction of another, no less then beasts that are chained are in the power of their leader to follow him, nill they will they whether he list: for which cause the Greekes said, that the word {αβγδ}, which signifieth a master or a Lord, came from the word {αβγδ}, which signifieth a hinder. From this kind of private commanding, sprung up a most rigorous form of public government, in the which the Lord hath a most absolute and vncontrouleable authority, having full power over the life and death of his subiects, as in old time the authority of the King of Persia was, as witnesseth Plato De Legib. lib. 3. and Isocrates in his Panegerick, and as is at this day the authority of the great turk, who doth all things at his pleasure without the controlment of Lawe or counsel, and whose subiects are constrained to obey him like brute beasts, and to do whatsoever he commandeth. The muscovite and Prester John haue also the same form of Regiment. The other kind of commanding, is politic and regal, by the which the understanding part, or mind, ruleth the desiring faculty or appetite, by a certain law, tending to common profit: and not by violence, constraining it to obey. For foreseing that which would bee either hurtful or profitable unto it, it governeth and bridleth it to the especial defence and safety of the whole body: from which manner of natural government haue issued all just and lawful forms of Empires. Now we must note, whereas he saith, that the mind exerciseth a politic and regal government over the appetite, that this is to be understood of the reasonable appetite, for sometimes it happeneth, that the will and reasonable appetite commandeth the mind in matters of faith, and in those things which surpass the common capacity of understanding: and sometimes again the mind commands the will in things which it appr●hendeth by certain demonstration: and thus the understanding and the appetite, or will, interchaungeably command each other by course, which is nothing else but a politic government: but in things which do not exceed capacity, the understanding always commandeth the will, either to avoid them as pernicious, or to pursue them as being good: and thus the mind holdeth a Monarchy in the soul, which is nothing else but the regal government. As for the sensual appetite, it never exerciseth authority over the understanding: but contrariwise, the understanding always ought to govern and rule it: the which kind of government is not political, but rather masterly, I mean in those, whose affections are slavish and rebellious against reason: but in those that are well born by nature, and well qualified by education, it useth a regal and paternal form of government. And in those that haue attained almost to the consumate perfection of virtue, in whom there is no sedition in reason, nor discord in sense, it practiseth that which is called Oeconomical● but the flesh obeyeth the spirit in such sort, as a good wife obeyeth a good husband: to this end, to procure and procreate a holy generation of good works, which result& redound from virtue, and are commanded by holy Scripture. Galen Therap. lib. 13. calleth this principality of the soul {αβγδ}, as also doth Plutarch in his fourth book of philosophical Decrees. Cicero mentioneth the same in the nature of gods, lib. 2 and De fi●ibus. lib. 5. so also Themistius, De Anima, lib. 3. understanding thereby the common sense, which as judge and Arbitrator moderateth the other sences, and they as seruants obey it: according to Budeus in his Annotations vpon the Pandects. Plato de Repub. lib. 4. 8. and 9. compareth a Common-wealth to a man, and the parts thereof to the faculties and powers of the soul. And first as he placeth in the soul five faculties, the nutritive, vegetative, motive, sensitive, and Rationatiue: So in like manner in a Commonwealth, he propoundeth five forms of governments; regal, aristocratical, oligarchical, democratical, and Tyrannicall. And whereas as well in his book called Timeus, as in the forealleged, he setteth down three parts of a human soul, differing in substance, place, and action: Reason in the brain, which is the highest place of the body; to the which he ascribeth the principality and cheefedome: Anger in the heart, as in the midst, to serve for defence and succour; all strength and choler consisting therein: And concupiscence in the liver, which procureth the universal nourishment of the whole body. he applieth to these three parts of the soul, three sorts of people, necessary for the establishment of a Common-wealth: To Reason he compareth the gouernours and rulers; to Anger, the soldiers and men of war; to Concupiscence the Labourers, Artificers and merchants. Also that each of these parts are guided and conducted by their peculiar virtue: Reason by wisdom, Anger by Fortitude, and Concupiscence by Temperance: and that when these three parts of the soul within us, and those three sorts of people in Common-wealths, execute their just duties and offices, according to the prescription of those three aforesaid virtues, without meddling or encroaching with one another; then wee may justly avouch, that that man is well ordered, and that Common-wealth well governed: and contrarily, when those Offices and duties are transgressed.  
understanding.] This is the most divine& excellent part of the soul, by the which it knoweth and discerneth: called in greek {αβγδ}, and in latin Mens or Animus, and of us, either understanding or mind. But even as the soul doth far excel the body in dignity, so the mind doth excel the soul, and is more noble, and therefore hath authority over it. Plato in Timeo saith thus: Almighty God considered, that in things visible, that which was naturally voided of understanding, were not at all, nor in any respect so perfect as that which was partaker thereof: and that of the understanding or mind, none could bee partakers without a soul, therefore gave he the mind to the soul, and the soul to the body. The same Author De leg. lib. 10. saith, The soul taking hold of the mind, which is always divine, governeth itself in all things lawfully and prosperously: but if it bee matched with ignorance, then doth it clean contrary. The mind is that in the soul, that the sight is in the body. Ethick. lib. 1. cap. 6. The soul by the mind, seeth God, and the intelligences or Angels, Metaphis. lib. 2. cap. 9. Considereth principles and first causes of the essences, vniuersalities, eternities, and abstract forms of things. Ethiq. Lib. 6. chap. 1.& 6. True it is, that in this human infirmity our mind cannot well attain unto the truth, but demeaneth itself in things that bee most evident in nature, as the Bats eyes do at the day light. Metaphisiq. lib. 2. cap. 1. And often it befalleth to men, who study too deeply of nature, as it doth to them which consider the sun eclipsed, whose eyes dazzle at the sight therof, Plato in Phedon. Now as the sense discerneth things sensible, so doth the mind things intelligible: sensible things are the Accidents& affections of things; things intelligible are their forms and natures. Certain of the which come to the soul by natural instinct without learning: As for example, that the whole is greater then his part, that two contraries cannot stand together in one subject, and diverse like principles: others of them come by reasonable discourse and demonstrative knowledge: As for example, such be the considerations of logic, Philosophy, natural and supernatural: others come by divine inspiration and infusion, as the revelations of the Prophets, the understanding of the holy Scripture, the knowledge of the sovereign providence, and of the celestial spirits: the which understandings come rather by the grace of God and the Holy-ghost, then through any gotten skill or natural discourse. Auicen in his book of the soul, chap. 8. Aristot. Metaphis. lib. 12. cap. 5. writeth, that every intellectual science, or that any wise pertaketh of understanding, is directed toward the causes and beginnings; which bee either most certain, or most simplo. In the 6. book. chap. 1. 8. In the 11. book, chap 6. he layeth forth three sciences belonging to speculation, to wit, natural Philosophy, the mathematical Science, and divinity: whereunto Ptolomeus agreeth in the beginning of the book called the Great composition. Aristotle De Annimal. lib. 1. cap. 2. reporteth that Plato thought certain things to bee discerned by the mind, others by knowledge or Science, some by opinion, and the rest by the sences. Notwithstanding Plato in the first question of Timeus, confoundeth the mind with science or knowledge, and the sense with opinion: declaring howe everlasting things may bee comprehended by the mind with the help of reason, and how of them scienc●s are ordained, as himself affirmeth in Th●letus, Parmenides, and Phedon, and how corruptible things are comprehended by the sense, with the help of opinion: whereof the Philosopher is not to haue regard, for that he cannot draw from thence any Science, De Repub. lib. 5.6.& 7. Aristotle Posterior lib. 1. cap. 26. &c. Considering that the truth is drawn from things which are always alike,& receive no change. Metaph. lib. 11. cap. 5. In this maner is the difference between the mind and the sense: for the one is corporal or united to the body, the other simplo without mixture, and may be without the body. Further, the sense is in all living creatures, but the mind or understanding onely in those which are endued with reason, and yet not in all them neither, as is affirmed by Anaxagoras and Plato, who in his Timeus writeth thus: The understanding and opinion are two several things, forasmuch as they were made severally,& are altogether unlike: for the one is derived unto us by learning, the other by persuasion: the one is always matched with right reason, the other without reason: the one constant, the other fickle: that all men are partakers of true opinion, but the gods only, or at most very few men of understanding. As touching Anaxagoras, It was he that first affirmed howe the mind was simplo and impassable, and that it was the cause of the world and of all order. Metaphi. lib. 1. cap. 3. plutarch, of philosophical sentences, Lib. 1. cap. 3. and in the life of Pericles. Galen in the philosophical history. Cicero Academ. quest. Lib. 2. and De natura dear. Lib. 1. Aristo. in his Ethicke, lib. 10. cap. 7. recommendeth the mind and contemplation in such maner as ensueth: If felicity be an operation by virtue, it standeth with reason that it be by the most excellent and noble virtue, which pertaineth to that thing which is the best of all: whether that be the mind or some other thing, which by nature seemeth to rule and govern, and to haue the knowledge of human and divine matters, or whether it be a divine thing itself, or the most divine of all things that are in us, the operation thereof will bee by it own virtue, perfit felicity: that the same is contemplative, it hath been already affirmed, and agreeth with the speech aforegoing, and with the truth: for that operation is most perfect, by reason that the mind is the most excellent thing in us, and things intelligible, whereabout the mind is occupied, are the best of all things. Further, it is most permanent and continual, seeing that we may more easily continue to consider of things, then put them in execution: and we are of opinion, that pleasure is to be mixed with felicity: and doubtless amongst all virtuous operations, that which cometh from wisdom is the pleasauntest: Therefore wisdom seemeth to enjoy wonderful pleasures, excellent both in sincerity and steadfastness. The same author De Animal. lib. 1. cap. 4. proveth the immorta●ity of the soul by the mind. The mind( saith he) seemeth to come into man as being some substance divine, and not subject to perish or decay: For if it were, that would perish chiefly, through the imbecility or weakness of old age. now, this imbecility is onely as it were in the Organ or Instrument: and therefore if an old man could recoue● such an eye as a young man, he would see as well as he: in so much, that old age cometh vpon us, not that the soul suffereth, but onely that wherein it dwelleth, as in drunkenness and sickness: and then it faileth to understand and contemplate when it is within some Organ or member that is corrupted, but the mind itself is always impassiple. To reason, to love, and to hate, bee not passions of the mind, but of him rather which possesseth them so far forth as he possesseth them: Therefore the possessor being dead, it neither can remember, nor love any longer, sith they belonged not to it, but to the common thing which is now dead. But peradventure the mind is a more divine and impassable thing. In the second book, chap. 2. He saieth thus: As touching the mind and faculty of contemplation, there is nothing as yet fully decided, but it may seem to bee some other kind of soul, and that the same onely may bee separated as an everlasting thing, from one that is subject to corruption: in the 3. book, chap. 4. Thus, that which men call the mind or understanding of the soul, I mean the mind whereby the soul reasoneth ●nd iudgeth, is nothing actually before it actually understand. Therefore it is not meet it should be intermixed with the body, for so would it assume some quality waxing hote or could; or stand in need of some instrument, as the sensitive part doth, which can not be. In the same Chapter: That which is sensible can not be without a body, but the mind may be stirred. Metaphis. Lib. 12. That every soul suruiueth not his body, but the intellectual mind doth survive, and that mindes abstracted are coeternal with God. In the second book De Generat. Animal. having disputed of the other faculties of the soul conjoined with the body, he concludeth, that the mind only cometh from without and alone is divine, because the bodily action hath nothing common with the action of the mind: For every virtue and power of the soul seemeth to haue participation with some other and more divine body then that which is compounded of elements: whereof Cicero maketh mention in his 1. book of Tusculan Questions. again, every intellectual mind either is active, Factiue, or speculative. Metaph. Lib● 6. Cap. 1. Otherwise thus: every intellectual mind, is either active or contemplative: active, is that which is applied to Consultation and Action: That which wee call contemplative, is sufficiently known by the name, and by that which hath been already spoken touching the same: It is divided into a Possible or potential power, called by Arist. {αβγδ}:& into the Agent or actual, called {αβγδ}. The potential mind hath nothing as yet of that which it is ordained to understand, being like an ignorant man, that knoweth neither Art nor Science: in which state we are at our birth and coming into the world. The mind Agent or Doing bringeth the same possibility or power into act, and as it were, produceth it from darkness into light. The mind potential is afore the actual, as flowers before fruit, or brightness before light. For Nature hath put into all things, first a certain power or possibility and aptness; secondly act and perfection: and nothing is found perfect at the beginning, but always there precedeth a beginning, and then cometh the perfection. To these two are adjoined {αβγδ}, the mind passive or Suffering, so called, for that it suffereth and death when the soul departeth from the body, and for that the passions of the soul, as anger, gentleness, fear, mercy, confidence, ioy, love, and hatred, do belong v●●o it. Ari●●o●le De Anim. Lib. 3. Cap. 5. As there is in every nature some one thing serving for ●●tter to every kind, which containeth all by a power or possibility: The other effective or Causat●●e, to do all the same reason that Art hath in respect of the matter: the like differences are necessary found in the soul: The one mind is such, that it retains all: the other such, that it doth all: which is as it were, a certain ability resembling light, which after a sort bringeth colours from power into act. The which mind is ●eparable and not mixed, impatible, being by the very substance thereof an act: for the doer must always be preferred before the sufferer, the beginning before the matter: and when it is severed, then is it onely that which it is indeed, and onely immortal and perpetual. Wee remember not then because it is impassable, and the ●nder●ta●ding Pa●●●ble is corruptible: without which, it understandeth nothing. Theoph●●●● maintain●●●, that Aristotle hereby meant, that this whole compound of the actual and potential vnder●●●nding, is separated from the body, and as incorruptible, ●o vnbego●●●n● and that the mind passive was not severed from the body, but is corruptible. Themistius in his Paraphrases vpon the third book of the soul, and in the 34. 38. and 39. Chapters. Some, as Theophrastus, Themistius, Simplicius, Auicenna, and Ave●roes, haue ●houg●t, that the mind was one and the same in all men, assisting them as the light of the sun assisteth all the world, in lighting and perfecting it. The which mind they supposed to be everlasting, not beginning with birth, but preexisting from ete●nit●e; taking hold of all such as are born, and causing that there being visours in the fan●asie, they are able to contemplate: even as the light of the sun is not then fir●● engendered when man beginneth to see, but being before illuminate, first openeth his eyes and affordeth him mean whereby to see as long as they be open. If the mind( saieth Themistius) were not one and the same in all men, as common unto them, from whence should it come to pass, that the conceptions of all men are common and alike? from whence should the notice of the first common principles arise, which are imprinted in our understanding, without both reason and learning by nature? How could wee understand naturally one another? how could sciences be transferred from masters to their scholle●s? Picus of Mirandula seemeth to favour this opinion in his fourth book of Theptaple: The mind( saieth he) which is in us, is enlightened by a mind which is greater and more divine, whether it bee God himself( as some men think) or an Intelligence or angel near to man( as almost all the Grecians and Arabians suppose, and even the most of the Hebrewes consent:) calling this substance, The spirit of God. Plotin in his book De Anima& Idaeis, specially in the sixth Chapter. Cicero in his Dialogue De Senectute,& 1. de Legib. Manilius the Poet in the 4. book of astronomy: Galen in the 17● book Of the use of mans body. The vilest part of the world is that, which is nearest to the earth, and yet the mind seemeth to descend even so low from the superior bodies, by the sight whereof wee are compelled to extol the beauty of their substance: first and principally of the sun, and secondly of the moon and stars: and because the substance of their bodies is more pure, it is meet that the mind which dwelleth in them should be better and more certain then that which is in earthly bodies: for if in mire, filth, slime, and in ponds, plants, and rotten fruits, there breed small creatures, having a wonderful show of the superior mind their Maker, what may wee think to bee in the superior bodies● themselves? Also wee may behold the intellectual nature in men, if wee consider Plato, Aristotle, Hipparchus, Archimedes, and diuers other excellent men like unto them. If then the mind which is so noble come into filth and slime( for how can wee better point out that which is composed of flesh, blood, phlegm, and choler, both yellow and black) how great must wee think the excellency thereof to bee in the sun, moon, and other planets and stars? verily when I think of this, it seemeth unto me that there is no small portion of the mind dispersed through the all-compassing air: otherwise wee co●ld not participate of the beams or shining of the sun, nor of the virtue and power of the brightness thereof.  
THEY therefore in whom the like difference is to be found as there is between the soul and the body, between a man and a beast( as wee see in them all whose work consisteth in the bare use of their body, and no better thing can be driven from them) are servants by nature, for whom it is best to be governed under this kind of government, as it is for the others of whom wee spake before: for he is a seruant by nature, which may belong to another man, and therefore is another mans, and which so f●rre partaketh of reason, that he understandeth it, and yet hath it not in himsel●e. Verily other creatures understand not reason, but serve their own af●ection; and the use of seruants and bruit beasts hath but small diversity: for we are holpen of each of them by their bodies,( to wit, by seruants and tame beasts) in our necessary business: it is the will and purpose of Nature to put a difference between the bodies of free men and bondmen, by making the one sort strong for necessary uses, and the other strait and unprofitable for such works, howbeit fit and behoveful for the civil life which is divided into affairs of peace and war: albeit the contrary often happeneth, in that some haue only the bodies of free men, and the others are endued with wit and understanding: nevertheless, if there could be found any as excellent men in the body onely, as are the images of the gods, all men would confess that they were worthy to be served by others which are inferior unto them in beauty. If this bee true in the body, with much better reason must it bee so in the soul: but it is nothing so easy to see the beauty of the soul, as the fairness of the body. Therefore may wee conclude, that some men are born to liberty, and other to bondage, to whom it is profitable and just to serve.  
THEY therefore in whom the like difference is to be found, that there is between the soul and the body.] Those men which excel others as far as the soul excelleth the body, and man excelleth beasts; to wit, in understanding, reason, and witte● are naturally free, and right worthy to bear rule as well privately as publicly.  
WHICH may belong to another man.] whosoever willingly submitteth himself to the power and government of another man for his own good and welfare, that he may live by the dexterity and wit of the other, and not through his own labour; by reason thereof he belongeth to that other party, as born to be in an another mans power.  
understandeth reason.] perceiveth and understandeth what he is commanded to do by him that is of more wit and discretion then himself, which is not so in beasts: howbeit he wanteth sufficiency of reason to be able to order and govern himself conuenien●ly.  
THE contrary happeneth.] Nature doth not always bring to pass what she would and pretendeth, having impediment in the vna●●nesse of the matter and other difficulties, as sometimes when she would bring forth a man, it proveth a monster.  
SOME haue the bodies.] Some haue onely a body and not a ●oule, fit for a freeman, which is neither apt to govern, nor yet to serve.  
OTHERS are endued with understanding.] Prudence and understanding matched with a deformed body.  
AS excellent in the body onely as are the images of the gods.] Which the painters and Image-makers make the fairest and best proportioned to the uttermost of their cunning. Aristotle in the fourth and seventh books of this work writeth: That the Ethiopians and Indians were wont when they made election of their Kings and Magistrates, to haue regard unto the beauty and ta●●●●● of the persons.  
THEREFORE may we conclude, that some men are born to liberty, and others to bondage, to whom it is prrfitable and just to serve.] There be not onely particular men disposed to servitude, by reason of the rudeness of their wit and small understanding, unable to do any service but by the strength of their bodies: but also there be whole Nations naturally more servile then others: as Aristotle in his 3. book of government, Chap. 10. and Hippocrates in his book of the air, of Waters, and Difference of places, do report of the people of Asia to be.   

CHAP. IIII. Of a Bondman, and Bondage, by Nature and by Lawe.  
but there be some men that speak against this, whose opinion is not without some reason, as wee will easily give you to understand. For, to serve, and to be a bond-seruant, is understood two manner of ways: The one is a bond seruant by force of Law: for the law is a certain confession or consent, by virtue whereof it is agreed vpon, that those things which are taken in the warres, do belong to the takers. Many accuse this Lawe, as they do an orator that persuadeth unjust decrees: as if it were a thing unreasonable, that he which is vanquished by force, should become seruant and subject to him, who by force can vanquish him and is more strong: There are diuers opinions of this matter even among the wisest themselves. The cause of such doubting and variety is, because that virtue( accompanied with ability and means) is able very much to constrain: and also the vanquisher is always in some pre-eminence of goodness, in such sort, that strength seemeth not to be without virtue: So that the question is now only of the equity. Therefore some account that to be equity and right, which is wrought by love: Others, that which he that is most mighty, commandeth. Amongst these so different and jarring opinions, one containeth nothing that is any thing worth, either for validity or credite●● namely, that he which excelleth in virtue, should not command and bear sway. Some again in taking equity( as they think good) for lawe( seeing that lawe is a kind of equity) suppose that servitude arising from war, is just: albeit generally they do not confess it to be just, because it is not impossible that the beginning of warres was unjust. And also, that no man ought to call him a bondslave or seruant, that it vnwor●hie to serve. Otherwise it would come to pass, that those which seem most noble, should become bondslaves and sons of bondmen, if by chance they were taken captive and sold in war: for which cause they would not haue them termed bondslaues● but barbarous people● And yet nevertheless in affirming this, they seek out nothing but a bondslave by nature, as wee haue touched in the beginning. For necessary wee must say, that some are altogether bondslaves, ●●her● not at all. They avouch the same of nobility, namely, that some are not onely noble amongst them, but wholly and altogether noble: but the Barbarians are onely noble, as if there were a certain nobility and liberty which is absolute and perfect, and another that is not: even as helen in Theodectus saieth of herself: I being derived from the gods on both sides, who would call me a bondslave? In saying this they put no difference between a bondman and a freeman, save onely in regard of virtue and 'vice: for they think, as a man begetteth a man, and a beast a beast; so good men to beget good children● and ●●re it i●, that Nature ●ymeth at that, but often times shee misseth the mark. Thus wee see, that there is some reason in this ambiguity, and that some are naturally bondslaves, other● na●urally freemen● and that it is determined as a thing expedient and just for one ●● serve, and for another to command: and that it is necessary that some should obey, and some bear rule, and consequently exercise the authority of a master, even by the lawe of Nature, which hath ordained such kind of government: and lastly, that an unlawful form of government is unprofitable to both: for the same thing which is profitable to the part, is also available to the whole; and that which helpeth the body helpeth the soul. Now a seruant is a certain part of his master, as a living part of a body, and yet separated, not conjoined: wherefore there is a kind of mutual utility and friendship between that seruant and his master, which are by nature disposed to those places: and the contrary ●appeneth in those which are not so by nature, but by lawe and compulsion. Out of all which it appeareth, that the Masterly government and political, are not all one, neither yet that other governments between themselves are confounded, as some affirm: for the one is over freemen by nature, the other over bondmen; and domestical government is a monarchy: for every family is governed by one, but political government is over those that are both free and equal. A master then hath not that denomination by reason of any particular Science or Arte belonging unto him in his place, but simply because he is so: and so likewise is to be deemed of the bondman and freeman. Albeit indeed there is a certain Science appertaining to a Master, and also to a seruant; as that which was taught at Siracusa, where a certain fellow for money taught children to serve. But so wee may find disciplines and sciences in many other things; as in Cookerie, and such like services: whereof some are more honest, some more necessary, according to the proverb: One seruant before another, and one master before another. All such artes then as these, are servile and slavish: but the masterly science is that which instructeth how to use servants aright: for a master is not he that possesseth seruants, but he which useth seruants. The which sure is no great nor glorious matter, for it is sufficient, if he be able to command that, which the seruant ought to execute. Therefore many, when they can well rid their hands of such trouble, they commit that charge unto their steward, whilst they addict themselves mean while, either to the Common-wealth or study of philosophy: Now the acquisitive faculty or Art of getting and providing goods, differeth from these forenamed faculties: as that which is a certain lawful discipline of war, and hunting. But of a Master and a Seruant it is enough discussed.  
To serve, is taken in a double sense; either by nature, or by law. It hath been already declared both who is a seruant by nature, and that this kind of bondage is lawful. Here he entreateth of the other kind of servitude that cometh by lawe, which alloweth that the captive in war serve the Taker, and that the body and goods of the vanquished belong unto the vanquisher. Which kind of bondage seemeth unjust, by reason that equity can not proceed from force and violence,( things contrary unto it) but rather from the voluntariness and good will of them, who for their commodity, security, and repose, submit themselves willingly to the power of those that are more excellent in virtue. nevertheless this law is defended by others, avouching that the conqueror doth always excel in some virtue, and that it is agreeable to reason and nature, that the more virtuous haue rule over the less virtuous: The which is a weak and feeble reason, because war may grow and begin from unjust causes, so that the bondage arising from thence, shall be also unjust: and also because the conqueror excelling( it may be) in one military virtue, which is Fortitude, yet may be surpassed in other better virtues; as by Iustice and wisdom in men far more worthy to bear rule then they.  
but there be some that sp●ake against this.] Aristotle here confuteth those that contend, that bondage is a thing against nature and unjust; saying, that to be a seruant or to serve, is understood after two manners: that is to say, either by nature, or by lawe. As touching a seruant by nature, it is no doubt, but that i● is both better for him, and more just in reason to serve his natural master. The seruant by the civil lawe, that is to say, he which is overcome and captivated in war, serveth justly and lawfully, as some think, esteeming it to be just that the mightier reign over the weaker: but unjustly, as others suppose, who think that all men are born free, and that it is against reason that he which is constrained by force, should become bondslave unto the constrainer. The roman civil lawyers make this division of Law: There is( say they) the law of Nature, and the law of Nations; all men by the former of these are born free from the beginning: and bondage is contrary to nature, brought in by the law of Nations, which sprung up after the law of Nature: insinuating thereby a certain state of bondage, in the which in time of war the conqueror retaineth his captive. But Aristotle here entreateth of the first cause of bondage, derived from the imbecility of understanding, having need of the conduct and guidance of the counsel of another. And if such as these will not suffer themselves to be governed, they ought to be compelled by force, and oppressed by strength, to the end, that the residue of human kind may be preserved. even as Surgeons use to cut off those members which are either putrefied by a Gangrene, or enflamed with S●. Anthonies fire, to the end that the whole body may not perish. In this manner they that excel in wisdom and power, may lawfully by way of constraint keep in subiection the weaker and under sort: Nature herself teaching us by the proposed partes of a man, that it is a most just thing, that the better should always haue pre-eminence and dominion over the worse. Wherefore not without good cause they are reprehended, that through an immoderate desire of liberty, do absolutely condemn that form of bondage, which is brought in by the lawe of Nations: it being a thing necessary for the kerbing and bridling of wicked ones, to haue a certain policy of estates and form of bondage.  
THAT those things that are taken in the warres, belong to the takers.] Alexander the Great, after he had obtained a great victory against Darius, and taken possession of his camp, he entred into the royal palace, and after came to the kings bath, saying: Let us go and bathe ourselves in Darius own bath: Then one of his Minions replied, Nay rather Alexanders own bath; for the goods of the conquered appertain by good right to the conquerors, and ought to bee denominated by them. Plutarch in the life of Alexander.  
MANY accuse this law.] Ordaining that the vanquished in war, should be bondslave to the conqueror; because it may so fall out, that the war may be unjustly undertaken, and so consequently the servitude proceeding from it, must needs be unjust: or it may be that the conqueror which excelleth in one virtue, to wit, Fortitude, may be surmounted in many other more excellent virtues; as iustice, wisdom, and temperance: which indeed are both more befiting Empire and government, and more convenient for him that should command.  
AS they do an orator that persuadeth unjust decrees.] At that time the orators throughout all Greece, and specially at Athens, were of great credite and authority in the government of the Commonwealth, so far forth as no statutes nor ordinances were made but by their aduise. now sometimes it fell out that they persuaded decrees that were unlawful and repugnant to good manners, and to the ancient laws and customs justly instituted and ordained; for which cause afterwards they were reproved. even so may we accuse that lawe which was first author, that the conquered and captive in warfare, should become bondslave to the conqueror and taker.  
EVEN among the wisest themselves.] As Pindarus alleged by Plato in his books De Legib. Lib. 3. Cap. 4. using these verses: That Empire is agreeable to nature, and that it is iustice, that the most puissant command the weak and feeble. Thrasimachus de Repub. Lib. 1. affirming, that that which is most commodious to the most mighty in power, is always just. And Callicles allegeth by the same Plato in his book called G●rgias; where he discourseth on this manner that followeth: It is said, that it is an unjust and filthy thing, by lawe for one to haue more then others; which the common people vulgarly call injury: nevertheless, as I suppose, nature declareth that it is both lawful and just, that the most mighty and most excellent haue a superiority in every thing: the which shee manifesteth diuers ways, as well in other living creatures as in all cities and Nations of men, where it is held for equity, that the most mighty haue not only dominion over the weak, but also possess more goods then they: for by what right did Xerxes wage war against the Greekes,& his father against the scythians, and innumerable other which would be too long for me to rehearse? Surely in mine opinion, in these actions they follow the nature of equity, and the example of jupiter, who is the law of nature: and yet it may be not according to our written and made laws, whereby wee restrain and enchaine like lions young men of a valiant and noble disposition from their cradle upwards, and bewitch them as it were, with certain magical charms, servilely to subject themselves to these laws, admonishing them to observe equity, and how goodly and commendable a thing it is so to do. But if there should spring up some one of a more excelling nature, that would despise and tear in pieces your writings, charms, and enchantments, and utterly abolishing all laws that go astray from nature, should enterprise to reign and rule over others, then would the lawe of nature shine forth most clearly in this man. Pindarus in a certain Ode seemeth to me to be of the same mind, where he saith: That Lawe is queen of mortal and immortal things, and that shee ececuteth iustice violently with a strong hand: the which conjecture, he saieth he gathered by the exploits of Hercules, who drove away Gerions kine, not having either bought or received them by gift, but taken them away violently by strength of hand. So that by the lawe of nature, both kine and all other possessions of men belong to him that is most puissant and excellent.  
THEREFORE some account that to be equity and right which is wrought by love.] When as Kings or other inferior Magistrates are elected, and men through an opinion of their excellent virtue, which of itself is most amiable, do voluntary submit themselves under their obedience: or when as a dullard or a slave by nature doth subject himself willingly to him that is more wise. This voluntariness of men seemeth to make equity: because, What is equity? But that which is acceptable to men and people by a certain common and general consent: proceeding often from Nature her self.  
OTHERS, that which he that is most mighty, commandeth.] Cyrus in Xenophon, De Institut. Lib. 8. speaking to his Captaines and friends saith thus: You must not think that ye do wrong or injury to any, or retain by force other mens goods; for this is a durable and perpetual Lawe amongst men, That in a city taken or surprised by right of war, all the treasures, goods, houses, and persons, belong unto the conquerors: so that if you will bee Lords and Owners of all, your possession is not unjust, for it appertaineth unto you as your own: and if you leave them any thing for their necessity, it is of your courtesy, and not of any lawful claim of theirs.  
suppose that servitude arising from war is just.] They which affirm that bondage or servitude arising from war is just, do build vpon a certain ground of equity, and vpon a certain virtue name Fortitude. Notwithstanding, that equity is not universally, nor absolutely just, but must bee reputed just, onely in regard it is brought in by the lawe of war, not being otherwise just of itself, and that for two regards: the one, because it may so fall out, that the war itself is unjust, and so consequently, the bondage arising thereof: the other, because it is against right, that he which is by disposition of nature born to command, should bee brought under subiection by force.  
SO good men to beget good children.] even as from a good and well dressed three proceed good fruits, so commonly of good Parents, are begotten good children: and Nature always tendeth to this drift, although shee misseth often therein, being hindered by the naughty complexion, and indisposition, or unfitness of Parents, or by superfluity or defect of matter, and after by the evil education and instruction adjoined. Aristotle in his second book De Rhethor. saith: That witty and wise men degenerate into mad and furious: and modest and sober, into lazy naughty packs. And in his problems, he propounded this Question: Wherefore it is, that wise and learned men beget commonly dull and blockish children. Epaminondas the Theb●n would not marry, for fear least he should beget naughty children unlike himself. Augustus Caesar wished he had li●ed wiuelesse, and died childless, seeing his daughters and nieces so dissolute.  
Thus we see.] Here he resolveth and decideth the present contro●●rsi●, reducing into a brief sum the pr●cedent reasons alleged on both sides, and concludeth, That to command naughtily, is unprofitable both for master and Seruant: And likewise, to serve naughtily, is also unprofitable to both, by the analogy of the whole and the part, or of the soul and the body: for if the soul do not govern well the body, it is hurtful to the whole person: and so likewise, if the body do not yield good obedience to the soul. That which profiteth the whole, profiteth the part: and that which is profitable to the part, is also profitable for the whole. Contrariw●se, that which is not good for the part, is not good for the whole. now, the servant or bondslave, is as it were a certain part of the body of his lord and master, yet separated from him: and the Lord is as it were the whole, and as it were the soul. Wherefore to command well, and to obey well, is good for both: and there is a certain natural amity betwixt the master and seruant, which are so by nature, as is betwixt the soul and the body: but betwixt the lord by lawe and his bondslave by compulsion and violence, there is no love, but perpetual discord and disagreement.  
out of all whic● it appeareth, that the masterly government and political, are not all one.] he draweth further from the former reasons a difference of governments, touched before in the first and third Chapters of this first book, and signally of the masterly and political, saying political government to bee in regard of them onely which are free and equal by nature, amongst whom there is certain mutual intercourse of commanding and obeying: but masterly, to be over seruants by nature.  
A master then hath not that denomination by reason of any particular science belonging unto him, but simply because he is so.] A master or Lord is not so termed by reason of any Science required to the right use of seruants, as Plato said, but only in regard of using them actually: neither in like manner ought he to bee termed a servant, that knows how to serve, if so bee he do not withall really and actually serve. Albeit, there be a certain belonging to master, and another belonging to a servant: As to prepare victuals for meate, to brush and keep clean garments, to trim Gardens, to oversee Labourers, and other like Offices: whereof some are less slavish and servile then others.  
NOW the acquisitive faculty, {αβγδ}.] The Art of acquiring and getting goods both movable and immovable: whereof shall be spoken in the Chapter following. It is necessary, that in handli●g and translating such ancient authors, wee forge and stamp new words, which may bee, as it were tamed and familiarized according to the measure of understanding and use, as this word perspective, in Geometry.  
AS that which is a certain lawful discipline of war.] Otherwise, he that getteth goods and booties by unjust and unlawful war, ought not to be called a warrior, but a Robber.   

CHAP. V. Of possession, and of the natural acquisition of goods necessary for life: withall of the variety of livings and trades of men: and of true riches.  
IT follows now that we consider generally of every kind of possession, and manner of getting of goods, according to our first intent and purpose: Seeing that a bondslave is a part and parcel of this possession, First therefore it may be doubted, whether the faculty of getting goods, is the sa●e with the disposition of a family, or a part of it only, or at least an attendant vpon it: and if it be attendant; whether, as the art of spinning is to the art of weaving, or as the art of founding to the art of engrauing: which are not used after the same maner, but the one ministereth instruments, the other matter. I call that the matter, which is the subject whereupon the work is wrought and absolved; as wool is to the weaver, and brass to the engrauer. That therfore Oeconomie and the acquisitive faculty, are not all one, it may hence appear, because it belongeth to the one to fur●ish with goods, and the other to use them: for to what art pertaineth it to use goods in a family, but unto the art of Oeconomie? But it is controuer●ed whether it bee a part of it or no, or a several kind from it, for if it appertain to him that hath that office of providing goods, to consider and cast from whe●ce goods and riches are drawn; and if riches and goods comprehend many parts, we ought first to aduise of Agriculture and land tillage, and generally of all provision and preparation of victuals, whether they be portions of this faculty acquisitive, yea or no: but there are many sorts of victuals and nourishments, and consequently many kinds of diets both in brute beasts and in men: for seeing it is not possible to live without nourishment, the varieties of victuals make the manners of living also diuers. Therefore of brute beasts, some live together in flocks and herds, other dispersed up and down singly according as is most commodious for them for the purchase of their nourishment and food, because some feed on living creatures, others on fruits: some again on that which cometh next to hand, wha●soeuer it bee: so that nature hath distinguished their manners of living according to the commodity and facility of these things. But forasmuch as naturally every one is not delighted with the same pleasure, but one with this, and another with that: for the cause and the livings of brute beasts, both of those that feed vpon living things, and of those that eat fruit, differ from each other: as also in like manner do the lives of men. But of all, those that give themselves to the trade of grazing of cattle, are the most sluggish and stouthfull, for their living cometh in unto them whilst they sleep and loiter, from these t●me beasts, without travell or sweat. But because it is necessary to change the pasture and feed of their cattle by translating them from place to place, they are constrained to follow their dro●es, exercising as it were a kind of living husbandry. Others live by prey and spoil, but after diuers sorts, as some by robbery, others by fishing: who for that purpose dwell near unto Lakes, pounds, floods, and the Sea, most fit for that trade: others by fouling and hunting wild beasts: yet the greatest part of mankind live by the earth, and by domestical fruits: Therefore the kinds of lives wh●●h dep●nd vpon natural provision, and do not get their victuals by exchange or mart, are these: Pastu●●e, Tillage, Robbery, Fishing, Hunting, and Hawking: some by intermingling these or some of ●●●se together, live more at ease, supplying the want of the one by provision from the other, to the end, they may attain unto some sufficiency of life most desired: as some mingle pasturage and robbery; others Tillage, and Hunting or Hawking, and such like, according as necessity compelleth them thereunto. This manner of getting of things seemeth to bee naturally graffed in all living creatures, immediately from their first coming into the world, and also when they bee at their perfect growth. For some kind of creatures, even from the very beginning of their issue do bring forth so much food withall as sufficeth the thing brought forth, till it be able to provide for itself: as for example, it is so in them which bring forth worms and eggs: but such as bring forth living off-spring, haue food in themselves, namely, the nature of that which is called milk to feed their young ones for a certain time. We must deem the like of them which are come to their full growth: namely, that plants are ordained for living creatures, and that all other living things are ordained for men, in such sort, that tame beasts serve them as well for use as for food: and wild beasts though not all, yet the greatest part of them serve for food, and other necessary uses, as for the making of clothes and such like instruments of life: wherefore if nature either make any thing unperfect nor in vain, it necessary followeth, that she hath made all things for mens behoof. Therefore the military discipline shal be in some respect an Art of Acquiring& getting, because hunting is part of the same, which must he practised, not only against be●sts, but also against such men as by their nativity ought to live in subiection, and yet seek to shake off the yoke of their obedience: for that kind of war is gounded vpon just and lawful cause. Therefore is there one kind of getting according to nature, which is a part of this economy, which must always either make competent provision in store afore●and, or prepare it when need requireth, that there may be plenty of all such things as be either, needful or profitable for the society both of a city or commonweal, and also of a family; wherein it seemeth that true riches consisteth: for the sufficiency of such manner of getting, tending to the attainment of a happy life, is not endless, though Solon Poetizing, affirm, that men haue no certain measure or end of richesse: nevertheless, it is contained within certain limits as other sciences are, for there is not any kind of instrument or tool of any art or science whatsoever that is infinite or endless, either in multitude or greatness: and riches is a multitude of instruments pertaining to a family and to a city or commonweal. That therefore there is a certain natural faculty of getting goods, that serveth as well for Housekeepers, as for gouernours of Cities and commonweals, and for what cause, it is clear and manifest.  
forasmuch as neither private nor public society can live without goods and possessors, there is a mean how to get them, serving to Housekeeping and government, which mean is eit●er natural or artificial. First of all, here is speech of the natural mean, which is ordained by nature, for the preparation of things needful, for food, clothing, and other uses pertaining to the body: and consisteth in breeding of cattle, Tillage, Fishing, Hunting, Hawking, which trades men use diversly, according to the difference and situations of the Countries wherein they live: for in some Regions which are most commodious, they mingle them altogether, as in france. In other Count●ies they use onely the breedings of cattle, as in Tartaria, where they live with flesh and milk. In other places they use Fishing, as in diverse coasts of the Sea, and near unto brooks, pounds, and Riuers, where commonly they live of fish. Others live with Venison, as the inhabitants near, or within Forrests, and in the Mountaines. Also the taking of preys seemeth to bee agreeable to Nature, so that it bee exercised in lawful Warres.  
IT followeth.] After that Aristotle hath ●eckoned up the parts of a family, and disputed first of a master and Seruant, wh●●e as ●ca●●on was offered, the manner of governing and obeying was entreat 〈◇〉 at large: now he reasoneth about the getting of goods, which a●e seruicea●●● as well for the family, as for the city or commonweal. Therefore he setteth down two kinds of getting, the one natural, the other artificial. The natural kind consisteth in pasturing· or feeding of cattle, in Tillage, in Hunting, in Hawking, in Fishing: whereunto he addeth the taking of preys, which is honest and agreeable to Nature, if it bee exercised in lawful Warres. Also thereunto is referred, the sale of goods which grow and come of a mans own ground and soil: to the end, that by the sale of such commodities as we haue plenty of, we may provide elsewhere such other sorts of wears as we want: he calleth that the merchandise per●aining to House-keeping, and recommendeth it as necessary for mans life: which was exercised in time past, by exchange of goods or labour, before money was inuen●ed, and is also honest and permitted to honour●ble and Noble personages, who might not else lawfully use Trade of merchandise. The artificial kind lie●h in works and Trades, that ought to be freely communicated. Regrating and forestalling, when men buy up commodities to sell again for gain, the end whereof is not use, but profit of money; he blameth, because that which hath been brought in for necessity, and for mens more commodious living, is through craft and subtlety turned to another end, and applied to gain only: This kind of craft is hateful and prejudicial to such as buy for their necessary use. Interest or usury consisting in multiplying and increasing of money from month to month, or year to year, is likewise comprehended under the artificial getting of goods, and reproved amongst all other means of getting, as contrary to the right use of money, which was onely invented for the furtherance of traffic, and according to the Nature thereof: and being a thing without life, neither ought nor lawfully may engender other money, but should be employed to that purpose whereunto it was ordained: Though many men wholly employ themselves to hoard up money without end, deeming that therein consisteth the principal and chief richesse.  
AND maner of getting household goods and possessions, {αβγδ}.] Pecunia in latin, and {αβγδ} in greek, do signify all kind of goods both movable and vnmoueable. {αβγδ} pertaining to household goods, that is to say, the industry to get, and the order in spending it conveniently, {αβγδ} signifieth getting, and {αβγδ} the spending in necessary use, {αβγδ}.  
ACCORDING to our first intent and purpose.] As in the first Chapter of this first book, which he hath also used in former books, by proceeding from the single to the compound: therefore after he hath treated of the seruant, which is as it were a part, according to his accustomend manner of teaching, he speaketh of housekeeping concerning getting and spending, because it is like a total.  
NOW there bee diuers sorts of victuals.] The natural skill of getting consisting in providing of things needful for meat and drink and other necessaries for the body, is part of housekeeping, as he sheweth by the diverse manners of other creatures livings, before he cometh to speak of mens lives: which do much differ, according to the commodity of the countries where they inhabit, and the nourishment which they are acquainted with from their youth upward.  
AND also in like sort do the lives of men.] At the beginning men were in all things very rude and simplo, not much differing from beasts. They dwelled in caues of the earth, or under cabins, using the like meat and drink that oxen and horse used, as Hippocrates writeth in his book of ancient physic. At that time as they were most strong, they did feed of most strong meats, so did they then live longest: but after waxing weaker, they could not digest the same, but died quickly; so as they were constrained by little and little to search out a more tender and convenient maner of living, by making it fit for their complexions, strength& health, as at this day the most temperate& best ordered countries do use the same, which bring forth al kind of things needful for mans life, as France, Italy, Greece, and Anatolie. For in the uttermost coasts of the world which exceed in could and heat, they keep from day to day their first wildnes& rudeness, eating raw flesh and drinking nothing but milk. Others in the high and long mountains, live of acorns and mast. Another sort in the sea coasts, eat nothing saving fish, either fresh or dried, whereof they make meal,& then lay it in water,& so knead and bake it. The chief and most convenient nourishment in these quarters, is found to be wheat, barley, millet, pannike, rye, and other corn well known they haue found out the skill to sow it, to reap it, to thrash it, to winnow it, to pre●erue ●t, to grinned it, to bolt it, to lay it in leaven, to knead it, to make it into loaves,& so to bake ●● in ovens. They haue added unto the same, pease, beans,& all other kind of pulse both old& new, for the making of pottage: also salt& herbs for the giuing of taste& savour, and butter& oils: also the fruits of all such trees as are set& planted, as cherries, pruine●, apple, pears, peaches, raisins, figs, olive, citrons& Oranges. And not contenting themselves with corn, herbs,& fruits, they began fi●st to eat the flesh of themselves, which after they left off through horror:& then put in ure the eating of the flesh of all other living Creatures, both tame and wild, living on the earth, swimming in the water, or flying in the air, using the mean of roasting& ●eething them,& then to season the same with sauces& other infinite daintiness of pastry& cookery. Further, forasmuch as it liked them not to drink water alone, they found out the use of Wine, Cider, beer, Ale, Metheglin, and diuers other artificial drinks. And thus much as touching the maner of living used heretofore most usually amongst civil men. Let us see now what he saith of the difference of others.  
but of all, those that give themselves to the trade of grazing of cattle, are most sluggish.] M. Varro following Decaearchus affirmeth, that the pastoral life is most ancient,& to haue ben long before tillage, and that the nations of most antiquity lived in that trade from the beginning,& drew their names from it, as the Hebrews& Italians, which is as much to say, if we search the signification of the words, as Pastours: now at this day the Tarrarians towards the North, and the Arabians towards the South, vagabond and wandring Nations, live after this manner; being wholly ignorant of all Tillage or manuring the ground, of whom mention hath ben made heretofore.  
OTHERS live by prey and spoil, but after diverse sorts.] under the name of prey& spoil, are comprehended Hunting, Hawking; Fishing& robbing,& pillage by sea& land. plate. de Leg. li. 7. saith: That this preying( so I translate that which he& Aristotle calleth {αβγδ}) which verbally signifieth Hunting, because this word doth not express the generalnesse of the term, he saith: That this preying is a large and ample matter comprised in a short word: It is either vpon fishes or vpon fowls, or vpon land creatures: and not onely brute beasts, but also vpon men: and that not in warfare, but in time of peace, by way of amity; the one commendable, and the other blame-worthy: also the pillage of theeues, and booting of armies. Paul. Venet. lib. 1. cap. 60. writeth of the Medites, that they are a savage and clownish people, that live by beasts which they catching by Hunting, namely by Harts, whereof their country aboundeth, which they know so well how to tame and bring to hand, that they make their flesh serve for meat to eat, and use their back to ride on, as other do on Horses and Asses: They haue neither corn nor Wine, wherefore in Summer they take great store of birds by fouling, whereof they make all their provision against Winter. And in some Countries of India, they make biscuit of dried fishes, and sliced in small pieces, which they beate and pound in meal, and then soak it in water, and knead it, and make of it loaves of bread, which being baked in the sun, serves for their food all they are long.  

The diversity of livings according to the several Countries.  Before I oue●passe this passage, in my opinion it will not be impertinent, to collect briefly the diuers& different manners of livings of men, such as I could either by private reading or mutual conference and hearsay come to the knowledge of, to the end, this discourse may be both more pleasing to the Reader;& also more fit for the understanding of this present matter. every Country hath certain peculiar nourishments& proper fashions of dressing their food, differing in seasonings, sausings,& boilings, from each other:& for every season of the year nature hath administered sundry& several sorts of meats both by sea and land. The Cannibals even at this day eat mans flesh roasted: so also other savage people when they take any of their enemies in war, they devour them at their Tables. The Tartarians feed on raw flesh, whether it bee of Dogs, Cats, Horses, Snakes, and such other beasts, they care not: which flesh they onely crush betwixt two stones to wring out the blood, or mortify it vpon the back of a horse, a man sitting thereon. They drink Mares milk, which they so prepar●, that it resembleth White Wine, neither is very vnsaury, or of evil taste. The Ala●bian● eat camels and Ostriges, and bread made of Millet and Tu●nepseed powned. The Inhabitants of Cathai eat also raw flesh, which they shred first very small, and then soak it in sweet oil with good Spices, and being so dressed, it is their food: Their drink is made of Rice, and diverse Spices, having a taste more excellent and delicious then any Wine, and wherewith, they that drink overmuch are sooner drunk, then with Wine. The inhabitants of calicut live by Rice, Fishes, Spices, and Fruits, altogether different from ours. Their drink is Wine of Palm and Date Trees, mingled with Rice and Sugar. Throughout all the West Indies, they use bread made of a certain grain called Mahiz, and of a root called Yuca, which is the common and usual food, as well in the Islands, as in the firm land. They eat their Mahiz in the grain roasted at the fire, and sometimes also vnrosted when as it is tender and yoong● Others grinned it within certain hollow stones, vpon the which they hold other round and long stones in their hands, which being rolled about by strength of arm, as Painters grind their colours and then pouring in water, they intermit by fits their labour, not ceasing nevertheless still to grinned, until it be fully finished: Of it thus prepared they make a certain kind of past, whereof taking a little mor●ell, they compose of it a roll as broad as ones hand, and two or three fingers thick, which wraping in a leaf of the Cane of the said Mahiz, or some other grain, they bake, and being well baked, draw ou● again. Otherwhiles they roast this roll by the hote embers, so that it waxeth hard, and becometh like white Manchet, crusted on the outside, and tender and soft within. After they disrobe it of the leaf wherein it was wrapped to be baked or roasted, and eat it betwixt hote and could, as it were luke warm. For when it is could, it is not of so pleasant a taste, nor so easy to be chewed, because then it is drier and rougher then otherwise. For which cause they never store it, being baked or roasted above two or three daies, for if they do, it presently moulds and putrefies, and is neither good for meate nor wholesome for teeth: and for this cause, the teeth of this people is commonly more rotten, filthy, and naughty, then of any Nation in the world besides. This kind of bread is called Tascalpachon. Besides, of the same past of Mahiz they make also tarts and cakes: and when they sail in the South seas, they carry with them for provision of victual, the meal of Mahiz roasted, which being mingled with water and stirred well together, serveth them for drink, being like unto a ●leare● panade, and for nourishment also; having nothing else to satisfy hunger: for it is both bread and water, both meate and drink, altogether: Yea over and above, it hath this quality, t●●t if the water bee corrupt and stink, it taketh from it the evil odour, so that it tasteth of nothing but of Mahiz. In the province of Cueva their wine is made also of Mahiz. The other kind of bread which they use, is of the roote Yuca, which is in colou● white within, and in bigness as thick as a turnip: the which though it be wholesome being well prepared, yet is a deadly and mortal poison before the juice bee crushed out of it: with the grain of this they make great tarts, which they call Lacabi, ●and is their ordinary and usual bread, for it keepeth a year or more without put ●●saction or moulding, so that it take no wet nor moisture in the mean time: and this ferueth them for food and provision vpon the sea througho●t all the I●lands, and vpon the coasts of the Continent or firm land. This is the principalest, the commonest, the best, and most necessary food that they haue in those quarters. They make their drink of the juice of Pineapples, which they call Yayama, which truly is wholesome, but because it is too sweet, is not so pleasant and toothsome as that of this country. It would be too long and troublesone to propound h●re and to recite in particular the varieties of livings, received of men either by necessity, or superfluity and delicious luxury. Wherefore these that I haue already name shall suffice at this present, as the most strange and memorable that are to be found amongst vs. Now further besides all these commodities and discommodities of livings and manners of diet which are incident to mankind in their several countries; There be some that abstain from certain meats, either through opinion, as Pythagorians from the Cow and Booues: or through religion, and this either for some certain time; as from flesh in Lon● and fasting daies, among Christians; or continually, as Contrariwise, 
less Chartreux.  the ancient Priestes of Egypt esteemed it a heinous sin to taste fish, as Herodotus reporteth, Lib. 2. The Egyptians abstained from Swines flesh, as also the Iewes and the Mahumetists doe● and also from all manner of wine. The Malha●bians and Guzeratz eat nothing that hath in it blood, neither kill they any thing which hath life: for which cause they abstain from green herbs and all young fruit, supposing that there is life in them; which to deprive them of, they account a sinful act. They adore and worship Oxen, as the ancient egyptians did, and abhor swines flesh after the manner of the Iewes. Others less scrupulous in opinion, and less superstitious in religion, use indifferently all manner of meats which they can any ways come by, fresh, salt, roasted, boiled, raw, di●guised after many devises of Cookerie and pastrie; as flesh, fish, grain, pulse, fruit new and old, green and dry, and drinks of all sorts: nay there is not a part of a beast within or without, which they haue not found out means to season and dress severally and with a several sauce, ears, feet, snowtes, tongues, tripes, bowels, so gluttonous and almost insatiable is proved the belly and appetite of man.  
IN them which bring forth worms and eggs.] {αβγδ}. In living creatures engendered in the form of worms and eggs. For a worm engendered groweth until it come into the form of an egg, and as the superior or vpper part is first formed, so nourishment is ministered unto it by the inferior& nether part, which afterward is also articulated and fashioned by the residue of the nourishment. Arist. De Gen. Anim. Lib. 3. Cap. 1. For the chicken hath her beginning of being, from the white of the egg,& is nourished with the yolk by the navel. Arist. De Hist. Anim. Lib. 6. Cap. 3.  
WHICH is called milk.] Plutarch in his book entitled, De amore Parentum erga Liberos, that is, The natural love of parents towards their children, saith thus: The ordaining and dispensation of milk in the breasts, is sufficient to demonstrate the providence and care of nature, for all which is superfluous blood in women, through the own heaviness and the small quantity of spirit that swimmeth in the top, wandereth up and down and aggravateth the body: whereupon it is accustomend monthly at certain just revolutions and periods, to distil downewardes; Nature opening unto it conduits and pores for issue: By this means it not onely refresheth and purgeth the residue of the body, but also provoketh in the matrice a desire of engendering; even as we use to prepare the ground by the plough to receive seed: The seed being once reaped, the matrice forthwith closeth and foldeth up itself most fast. First the navel( as saith Democritus) serveth for an anchor to the matrice, to the end it be not too much shaken and disturbed: then the foundation, and as it were, the first branch of this fruit, beginneth to be laid: afterward Nature stoppeth up the menstruall and purgative conduits: and taking the blood which iss●ed by them, converteth it into nourishment, and bedeweth therewith the al●eadie formed and engendered infant, until such time as the number of daies of the inward growth being accomplished, it stand in need of other nourishment and place. Then lo, the blood( more careful and provident then any gardener or waterer) turning and changing itself from one purpose to another, hath certain vessels made ready like fountains of running water, wherewith it is received, not altogether too slowly and without sense, but so, that with a sweet heat of spirit and delicate tenderness of the woman, it may bee drawn out and changed into milk: surely the dug is of this disposition and temperature within: for the milk is not violently thrust out by the conduits or pipes, but di●tilling out by drops in a soft and moist flesh, and by little and little through the narrow and slender pores, leaveth prettily a gracious and amiable taste, ye sparing, in the mouth of the little infant, whereby it is alured to long after it.  
THAT plants are ordained for living creatures.] Whereas there are four Elements; to wit, the Fire, the Earth, the Water, and the air, whereof all things are engendered: all are of opinion, that the Water and the Earth are most material: that is, most full of matter and substance: but that the Fire and the air are of greater virtue and efficacy in living creatures. Now the body which is governed by them, receiveth incessantly certain evacuations, not only apparent, but also secret and hidden from sense, as inspirations and effluctions: wherefore the body standeth in continual need of nourishment, to fulfil and restore that which is decayed of it substance. Therfore the almighty to make provision of this bodily nourishment, hath created plants, herbs, trees, and seeds, sown and brought in subiection by Art, which were before savage and wild. plate. in Timeo.  
ORDAIN●D for men.] Plants, beasts, and all other inferior creatures, are subjecteth under mans dominion, and made for his provision. Cicero De Natur. dear. Lib. 2. declareth this most elegantly.  
TAME beasts serve as well for use as for food.] As oxen and kine to plough the earth, to bring forth calves, to yield milk and butter: after, when they be fat, they are killed and eaten, and of their hides tanned, are made shoes and boots,& in like sort of other beasts.  
THE Science military shall be in some respect an Art of getting.] It is certain, that by the skill of chivalry or military discipline, are gotten the chiefest things of this world; as great kingdoms, Empires, and other states: subiects are retained in due obedience, and strangers driven back if they enterprise to do harm: and the war is permitted as just and lawful, when it is justly and lawfully undertaken; as, to the intent to subdue such persons as are born to obey and be ruled.  
THEREFORE is there one kind of getting agreeable to nature, which is a part of the skill of housekeeping.] Here is the resolution of the question before propounded, whether purchasing be a part of housekeeping, he answereth: that natural purchasing being the preparing of goods necessary for the maintenance of the family and of the commonweal, is not properly any part of housekeeping, which useth only the goods prepared: Notwithstanding, it ought to be carefully procured by the householder, or some deputy under him, to whom he committeth the charge thereof, and at whose hands he receiveth things in such measure as his need requireth.  
MEN haue no certain measure or end of riches,] Solon did affirm in his verses, according to the opinion of the common people, that there was no end of gathering goods vpon goods. Notwithstanding, sith the possessing of goods, is as it were an instrument of housekeeping, and of government, there is no doubt but it hath some end as well as other instruments, which are each of them appointed and directed to their own end. Plinie woondring at and much dispraising mens covetousness and unsatiable desire to heap richesse vpon richesse, which never findeth end, and by means whereof man can never enjoy blessedness and felicity, which consisteth in a contented and settled mind: Well( saith he) Let us take a man that hath heaped together so much gold and silver, as that he may be said to haue innumerable richesse, yet shall he be nothing in comparison of a man that I will tell you of, who was neither any king, nor had any princedom that might countervail a kingdom: It was that Ptolomeus who was at so great charge to aid Pompey when he subdued jury, that he entertained vpon his own wages and costs eight thousand horsemen, and at the same time made a feast, whereat were a thousand men sitting at his table, who had every one their cup of gold, and vpon the serving of every mess, he changed their cups of gold into other golden cups of a new fashion. Howbeit( saieth he) his richesse is but a small portion in comparison of the richesse of Pythius of Bithinia, who gave to Darius king of Persia a plain three of gold with a Vine of gold, whereof there went so great famed, and is still kept in so great remembrance. And after the same Pythius through his liberal hospitality and housekeeping, received king Xerxes, son of the said Darius, at such time as he made his expedition against Greece in hostile manner, and led his army with him, amounting to the number of seven hundred thousand men: this Pythius feasted them for one day in a banquet. And for that the same Pythius had five sons, and the king had made proclamation, that all men who were able and fit to wear armor, should pass with him into Greece; he offered the king to pay his army for the space of five moneths, and to provide it corn during that time, in the name of his children: and in recompense thereof, onely demanded resp it for his eldest son to stay at home and not go into the Warres: to the end, that in the absence of the other four, he might govern his fathers age. And although this Pythius was thus rich, yet for all that, Plinie affirmeth, that he was not to bee compared with Cresus king of Lydia, who had an infinite number of gold. Therefore it is want of wisdom in a man to set his heart so far vpon covetousness, the end whereof is nothing else but to possess great revenues: and there haue been diverse bondmen which haue been of greater ability in richesse, then the most famous kings. now, amongst all the kings that haue had such great abundance of possessions, there cannot one bee found, that thought he had hoardward v● enough, as the same Plinie affirmeth. Pallas was the Emperour Neroes slave, and got so much under him after he was set at liberty, that he was owner of three thousand sexterces, as Cornelius Tacitus affirmeth, which in value amount to seven millions, and five hundred thousand Crownes. Pliny affirmeth, that the same Pallas was richer then Crassus, though Crassus had in lands and inheritances the value of five millions of gold: and though he was called the rich man of his time, and the richest of all the romans next to Silla; nevertheless, in the time of Claudius the Emperour, there were three villains or bondslaves, namely, Pallas, Callistus, and Narcissus, who were every one richer then he. Wee may therefore conclude by the parable of King Salomon, who was the richest and wisest of all men; that the blessedness and felicity of this world, and of this life, consisteth in the getting and possessing of wisdom. For( as he saith) wisdom holdeth in her right hand the length of life, and yeares that wee must live, and in her left hand shee carrieth wea●th and glory. And whosoever can excel others in the getting of this good, and grow famous in that glory and renown, which is got by honour, virtue, and the goods of the mind, he is the true owner and possessor of the goods of this world, which are proper to him, and are not left by succession to any heires.   

CHAP. VI. Of artificial getting by way of exchange: and of the invention of money.  
THere is another kind of acquiring and getting, which is exercised in the trade of exchaunging ● by means whereof there seemeth to bee no end in richesse and gathering of goods: which diverse men deem to bee the same that vee haue before spoken of ● by reason of their likeness and affinity; though indeed it bee not the same, and yet not much discrepant from it. The one is natural, the other not, but rather artificial and practised by use and industry: of the which wee are now to begin to speak. Of every thing that is prepared and possessed, there is a twofold use: both which is of itself and simplo, but yet not alike: for the one is proper and fit for the matter, and the other improper and unfit. For examples sake, to wear a shoe, and to exchange a shoe, are both uses of a show: For he that exchaungeth his shoe for money or for victuals with him that standeth in need of a shoe, useth a shoe, as it is a shoe: but yet not properly, for a shoe was made to wear, and not to exchange. The same reason there is of all other things, for the use of exchange i● insident in all things, and it drew the first beginning from that which was agreeable to nature, because men of some things had more then they needed, and some less: whereby it appeareth, that that same base kind of merchandise, which they profess and practise, that buy of some that they might sell it dearer to others, called Huxtrie or engrossing up of commodities, doth not by nature belong to this Art of domestical acquisition: because exchange ought onely to bee made in this regard, to help and relieve necessity: and therefore in that first society of a family, it is clear, that exchange was not needful, but became necessary a●terward in the greater societies: for the coinhabitants of one house had all things in common, but after they came to bee scattered and divided, then they possessed many goods separately, which they were constrained to ex●hange, that by intercourse their necessities might bee relieved. even now at this day many barbarous Nations use the same, exchanging profits for profits, and no more, as by giuing and receiving Wine for corn, and such like: the which manner of exchange is not contrary to Nature, neither yet any branch of the Art acquisitive, but onely serving for the accomplishing of Natures sufficiency in matters of need: and yet it seemeth agreeable to reason, that that other proceeded from this: for when men were constrained to relieve and succour one another mutually, not onely near at hand, but also far off, as well by the bringing in of those things which they needed; as carrying out of superfluities, necessary they found out the use of money, because every thing necessary to the use of life, is not by nature transportable from one place to another, and therefore they condescend to give and take mutually from each other, some one thing in stead of many, which was both profitable for life, and easy to bee transported: as either iron, silver, or such like, which at the first was simply defined either by quantity or weight: but at last they set a stamp or a mark vpon it, that the trouble of weight might cease: for the stamp serveth for this purpose to signify the quantity. After that money was thus found out and invented for exchange, presently another kind of acquisition intruded: to wit, Huxtrie or Resaile of wears for lucre sake: a base trade, and yet exercised( it may bee) at the first simply without fraud, though in continuance of time it grew more artificial and cunning, after men began to inquire from whence and how greater gain might be gotten by this exchange. Wherefore it seemeth, that this acquisition and trade of getting consisteth principally in money, and that this is the special office thereof, to search and find out the means how to gain and come by most store of money: for which cause it is called the efficient cause of money and riches: for they suppose that riches is nothing else, but heaps and plenty of money: and that both the act of getting and resailing consist in that. again on the other side, mon● seemeth to some, to be but a trifle and foolish thing, brought in onely by Lawe and not by Nature, because when mens mindes alter and varie which possess it, then it is nothing worth, not serving to any necessary use of life. And also it may happen that he which aboundeth and swimmeth in superfluity of money, yet may want things necessary for maintenance of his life, and for nourishment for his body: and therefore it is to no purpose to haue such richesse, ●s notwithstanding the which a man may die for hunger: as in the Fables is reported of Mida●, to whom for his unsatiable wish, it fell out, that whatsoever was set before him to 〈◇〉, tur●●● into gold. For this cause wise men seek out some other kind of richesse and manner of g●●ting money: for there is another manner of getting, and another manner of richesse, which is agreeable to nature: the one pertaineth to housekeeping, the other to engr●ssing and selling again, which engendereth money; not every way, but by exchange, and seemeth to consist in money, in as much as money is the beginning and end of such ch●pping and changing; and the riches gotten that way are infinite: for as physic tendeth infinitely to health, and every Arte desireth the proper end thereof without measure, aspiring thereto as fast as they can, although the means appointed to led to the end, are not infinite: for in all Artes, the end is the term and uttermost part: so is there not in this skill of getting any determinate end, by reason it tendeth always to the heaping up of riches of the s●me kind, and gathering of goods together: but the skill of housekeeping hath a scope and end, whose office is not always to get m●ny. Therefore it seemeth that there ought to be a measure in all riches, though I see the contrary happen: for all they that endeavour to get money, do infinitely increase their money. The cause whereof i●, that these two faculties are like and near one to the other, and by reason their practise consisteth in one kind of thing, the one is taken for the other: For the getting of goods pertaineth to the sa●e use, howbeit not by the same manner, but the 〈◇〉 tendeth to a diuers end, the other always a●gmenteth. Insomuch, that it seemeth to so●● men that this is the office of the skill of housekeeping, who pers●●●re in this opinion, that money is infinitely to bee saved or increased. The cause of this affection is, that they are carried with the care of living, but not of well living. Therefore whereas such desire is endl●sse, they endless coue● such things as it engendereth. And also, whosoever are desirous to live well, they seek to e●●●y the pleasures of the body, and by reason they think the same consists in richesse, therefore use they all their endeavour about the getting thereof: from whence hath proceeded another kind of getting of money: for whereas the enjoying of pleasure is excessive, they seek the mean of enjoying the sa●e, excessively: and if they can not attain thereto this may, then attempt they another course, practising other faculties not agreeable to nature. For stoutness and valiancy of courage, is not ordained to get goods, but to procure boldness; nor likewise the skill of chivalry, or physic; but the intent of the one is victory, and of the other health: albeit that all of them be made gainful, as though gain were their end,& that all things ought to be referred to lucre. Thus haue we spoken of that manner of getting which is not necessary, and shewed what it is, and wherefore wee stand in need of it: and in like sort of necessary getting, which differeth from the other, and of the natural skill and provision of housekeeping consisting in the preparation of victuals: which is not endless as the other, but hath an end and bound whereat it stayeth.  
THE other manner of getting is exercised in Exchanging: first of ware for ware; as, of wheat for wool, wine for oil: which way being plainly used for the remedy of mens wants, is agreeable to nature. Secondly of wears for money, which might also be said to be agreeable to nature, in case it were practised for none other purpose, but for the necessary and plentiful provision of mans life. But when it is put in ure for the getting of needless gain; as, engrossing up of commodities to utter them again at high prizes, then is it no longer natural but artificial: far distant from the right use of housekeeping, and from the office and duty of a housekeeper, which consisteth in the right use of such commodities as naturally are fit and allowable for the maintenance of life.  
THERE is another kind of acquiring and getting.] There be two sorts of getting and preparing of goods: the one altogether natural, which hath been largely entreated of in the Chapter going before: as Tillage, Hunting, Fishing: The other consisteth in Exchange, and is practised by aptness and Experience, and might well be called natural, if it were practised for none other purpose but for needful and bountiful provision for the maintenance of life. But forasmuch as ordinarily it is referred to the gain and profit of money, passing beyond the necessary use of life; therefore is it not natural but artificial, and differeth from the skill of housekeeping, which consisteth in the right use of such things as are convenient for the sustenance of life.  
ALL things possessed haue a double use.] The trade of Exchanging is practised two manner of ways: either by exchange of ware for ware, as a show for bread; or ware for money, as a shoe for money: which two kindes of exchanging appertain not to the proper use of a show, which is to be worn, and for that purpose is it made, and not to be exchanged, though the shoemaker abuse it to exchange, to the end he may by that mean get what he lacketh with the recompense of his labour.  
IT drew the beginnings from that which was agreeable to nature.] Of natural necessity: whereby the trade of exchanging of commodious and profitable things was brought up.  
HVXTRIE and engrossing up of commodities to sell again, doth not appertain to that skill of getting which agreeth with nature.] The trade of Merchandise that is used for the getting of money and richesse sake and not for the relieving of mans need, or for the furtherance of honest living, is to be called artificial or crafty getting, and not natural, as he will prove hereafter.  
THIS exchange was not needful in the first assembly.] The husband and wife, master and seruant, parents and children, use not amongst themselves such exchanging, but when they are multiplied dwelling in hamlets, villages, boroughs, towns, and cities; then do they use it through necessity, for the getting of such commodities as they lack and haue need of, by delivering to other men such commodities, as they haue plenty of.  
AS at this day many barbarous nations do.] As the Tartarians and Arabians and the wild people which haue been of late discovered, who are vnskilfull of all manner of occupations, and change ware for ware in their traffics.  
FROM this proceeded the other, by reason.] After he hath reasoned about that kind of exchanging, which is made of ware for ware plainly and naturally for the remedy of mens wants, he speaketh of that exchange which is made of ware for money, wherein consisteth the Trade of merchandise, and is wholly artificial: which maner of exchange proceeded from the other.  
BY reason.] By industry and dexterity, not through natural necessity: for merchandise respecteth gain onely, and thereabout employeth all manner of diligence.  
OF necessity they invented the use of money.] Here is declared the invention and right use of money: gold, silver, and metals were in use from time out of mind. For as Pliny affirmeth in his 33. book, the 3. chapter, king Seruius was the first that stamped and coined money of brass, as Timeus writeth. Notwithstanding, before his time money was in use at Rome, howbeit not fully come to perfection at that time. The first print or mark of the same, was Pecus, 
That is the Image of a sheep or ox.  and therefore all money made and marked with any stamp, was called Pecunia. It is reported that one Phidon in the iceland of Egina, first coined silver money, and that Saturnus after his arrival in Italy, made brass money, and stamped it with the Image of the hinder part of a ship. The people of Rome used brass money, till the time of king Pyrrhus, and from thence forward began to make silver money: and after the overcoming of Carthage, made gold moneys. God in the 25 Chapter of Exodus, commanded Moyses to take gold and silver of the children of Israel for the building of the Tabernacle. joseph in Egypt commanding his brethrens sacks to be filled with corn, caused silver to be put into every sacks mouth, and his silver cup in his yoongest brothers sack, and afore that time joseph had been sold for thirty pence. At this day in diverse Countries they use no kind of money stamped in mettall, As in the kingdoms of Prester John, in the lands of the Mores, and of the Gentiles their neighbours, salt goeth for money. Likewise, in the Empire of Cathaia, the money is neither made of silver nor gold, nor of any other mettall, but of the bark of mulberry Trees, which they gather and bring together, and then divide and cut it into diuers small round pieces, some great, some small, finally they print thereon the 〈◇〉 of the Empire, rating the value of each piece according to the difference of the● smallness 〈◇〉 greatness: it being not lawful for any natural subject of the country or stranger whatsoever, vpon pain of death, to make or employ any other money. paul Ve●●●●●; and Hayton Armenian. Let us see what Plato 〈◇〉 concerning money in his 〈◇〉 book of laws: We affirm( saieth he) that in a city there should bee no gold● nor silver, nor excessive gain in handicrafts: in buying and selling, or in vsury●● or dishonest gain in cattle; but rather the profit which Tillage offered and yeeldeth: least gain should cause the neglecting and despising of that for which money is required, namely, both soul and body. And in another place: There is not too much gai●● in this City, where no man should bee tolerated to bestow his time about dishonest●iere, and seeking of vile and infamous gain, which marreth good manners; wee must not think that money should bee raled together by mean of vile and unhonest Tra●es. Also in the same book: Forasmuch as money is needful for the help● of that d●ily exchange and ●●●●●●on which is requisite amongst artificers to pay the wages of han●●crafts men, Ser●●nts and Labourers, therefore do we tolerate such money as is of value amongst them, with whom it is currant, and despised of all others. And sith men must often go a warfare, and travell long journeys when they be sent for ambassadors and messengers to strange people, there should of necessity be always kept in a readiness of the 〈◇〉 and furnishing of the Common-weale● some common treasure of 〈◇〉.  
SOME profitable thing ●●sie to be tra●●●●●●ed.] As Iron, Gold, silver, brass and Copper, wherewith men make money diversly, and in diuers prices according to the d●uersity of Countries: which metals may ●erue for other purpose●, ●pan● Swords, armor, looks, keys, Ploughshares, Cart-yrons, and 〈…〉 Gold and silver to make cups, Ba●●is, and other Vtensilles, which in our 〈◇〉 country of Pe●ou hath been found to haue in use.  
AFTER the inventing of money for the necessary exchanging of commodities, there came up another kind of getting of money.] The first kind of exchanging commodities for money, is in some respect agreeable to nature, namely, for the obtaining of such things as are necessary for mans life,& uneasy to be transported: which the Philosopher thinketh to stand with reason. From thence issued the other kind of exchange by money, which Marchants and Brokers use for gains sake only, and differeth from the former, as being against Nature and endless, and therefore blame-worthy.  
FOR this cause wise men seek out some other kind of richesse.] The best husbands stay not themselves onely vpon getting of money, but besides that, purchase a safer wealth, wherewith in time of need they may be relieved, as houses, lands arable, fruit trees, meadows, woods, pastures, sheep, Oxen, Kine, horses, Mules, and other like movable and vnmoueable goods.  
IN as much as money is the beginning and the end of such chopping and changing.] At the beginning money was coined to serve for an instrument in trades of merchandise; but now it seemeth to be the mark whereat these trades do shoot: for Marchants aim at no other thing, but only the getting of great store of money.  
FOR as physic tendeth infinitely to health.] physic desireth without end to procure health, and is not only content with setting the patient again in his former health, but also desireth and endeavoureth to assure his health, and make it last long: and when it can attain thereto by medicine or diet, it is so satisfied, without searching further means. The selfsame and like reason is found in all other sciences.  
but the skill of housekeeping hath a certain scope and end.] The skill of housekeeping hath certain means of Acquiring and getting, which it doth not exceed. So hath not the skill of getting money, which continually hoordeth up without measure.  
AND by reason their practise consisteth in one kind of thing, the one is taken for the other. {αβγδ}, &c.] Whereas there be two faculties concerning money; the one which the housekeeper useth, the other belonging to the merchant: the office of either of them consisteth in one kind of thing, namely in getting money: and for that cause seem they to bee all one, yet tend they not to one kind of end. For the housekeeper useth money for the obtaining of such commodities as are necessary for the maintenance of life: but the merchant useth it for the increasing of his treasure, and to the end he may attiane to great and infinite richesse.  
PLEASVRES of the body.] The enjoying whereof is taken with some sense, as touching smelling, seeing, hearing, whereby the body is as much recreated, as the soul is by understanding, learning, and contemplation .2. of ethics.  
FROM whence hath proceeded another kind of getting of money.] This third kind of getting of money differeth from the other two afo●egoing, as well in regard of the mean of getting, as in respect of the end& purpose; consisting in the enjoying of pleasures,& being the worst of the three, for that it abuseth natu●all virtues, and also both sciences and faculties, which it maketh mercenary and ministers to get money: as though such were their end, to wit, bodily pleasure, and the enjoining thereof.   

CHAP. VII. That the skill of acquiring and getting is seruant to the skill of housekeeping, called Oeconomie, and to the skill of political governing: and how it ought to bee used.  
HEreby is resolved the doubt put forth in the beginning, namely, Whether Art acquisitive, or the skill of getting money, do belong to the governor of a family, and to the governor of a commonweal, or not. But this must be first prepared: For as the skill of political government doth not make men, but taking them from Nature doth use them: so must Nature furnish us with nourishment, either from the Earth, the Sea, or some other thing. But it is the office of the governor of the family to oversee the ordering and bestowing of these things: For it is not the weavers Occupation to make wool, but to use the same, and to discern and judge which is good and meet to make cloth, and which nought and unprofitable. For a question might bee asked, Wherefore this skill of getting should bee parcel of the household government, and not physic: Yet must the health of all the household bee provided for as well as their victuals and other necessary maintenance. For in some respect it is the office and charge, as well of the governor of a house, as the governor of a commonweal, to provide for the health of those whom they haue under them, and in some respect not, but the Phisions: even so the charge and oversight of the furnishing of money in one respect belongeth to the governor of the house, and in another respect not, but to the skill and faculty which serveth thereunto. Notwithstanding( as it hath been already alleged) it is most necessary to haue goods prepared by Nature, whose duty it is to provide food for all things that are engendered: For that which resteth and remaineth of that whereof every thing is engendered, is the food unto it. Therefore the mean of getting of money, as well by fruits, as by living Creatures, is in all things agreeable to Nature. And whereas the same is double( as wee haue alleged) the one consisting in engrossing and selling again of commodities, the other pertaining to the defence of the household wealth: and this last necessary and commendable: but the other which engroseth and selleth commodities, worthtly blamed, because it is not agreeable to Nature, but rather to the end one might gain and encroach vpon another. above all the rest, Vs●rie deserveth to bee hated, for that by it men gain and profit by money, not for that intent and purpose for which it was ordained, namely, for the exchaunging of commodities; b●t for the augmenting of itself: which hath procured i● the name of {αβγδ}, to wit, issue or eng●ndring: because things engendered, are like the engendrers; and usury is nought else but money begotten of money: in so much, that amongst all the means of getting, this is most contrary to Nature. now, forasmuch as wee haue sufficiently decided what concerneth knowledge of these things: now let us come to the practise. All such things haue their knowledge and contemplation free, but their practise and experience necessary. The chief and principal point of Acquisition of money, is to bee expert and skilful in knowing where and howe such wears and commodities as are to bee acquired and gotten, are best and most profitable: as to understand the nature of Horses, of Oxen, of sheep, and of all other Creatures. For it is requisite that a man haue skill in comparing every sort and kind one with another, to know which is the best, and to discern and judge of them according to the places and soils where they bee bred, because the breed of one country is better then another. Next of all, it is behoo●efull to haue skill in the manuring of ground, as well unplanted as planted, in the manner of breeding and hiuing of Bees, and in the nature of other creatures, as well of the Water as of the air, which may serve to many uses. These bee the chief partes of the skill and mean of true getting of money. As concerning that way and mean which consisteth in exchange, the principal part thereof is merchandise, whereof there bee three kindes; navigation by Sea, Portation by Land, and utterance of commodities in those places where they grow, called in greek {αβγδ}, and in English it may bee called a standing merchandise: which differ among themselves, in that some bee safer, and others are more profitable. The second part of this Arte acquisitive is usury: the third part is laborious working for money and wages, which consisteth in handicrafts, and in artificial Trades which are behoveful for the body onely. The fourth part is a mean between this last and the first, for it containeth part of that which is agreeable to Nature, and the Art of that which consisteth in exchanging, and comprehendeth all those commodities which grow in the earth or depend of the same, being fruitless, and yet profitable, as the felling of Timber and vnderwoods, and all the industry and skill that is ●mployed about mines and minerals, which contain diverse kindes according to the variety of such metals as are digged and gotten out of the earth: wee haue generally touched these things: and for the putting of them in ure and practise, it would avail to make particular examination of the same with diligence, but it were too tedious to stay any longer thereabout. Amongst Occupations, those are most artificial where fortune hath least place: those most noisome whereby mens bodies are most defiled and polluted: those most slavish wherein there is most use of bodily strength: and those most vile wherein the least virtue is required. But forasmuch as diverse men haue written of these matters, as Charetides the Parian, and Apollodorus the Lemnean, of the manuring of grounds both unplanted and planted, and diverse other authors haue treated of like matters: whosoever listeth to haue further knowledge therein, let him red their books. moreover, it were very good to gather further means by such reports as go abroad of men that haue been rich: for such kind of speeches are behoveful unto them that make account of richesse: as that which Thales the Milesian practised, serving for an invention to get money, which is fathered vpon him in respect of his excellent skill, though it may fall out generally: for when this man was reproached and upbraided with his poverty, as though philosophy were unprofitable, it is reported, that before the end of Winter, he foresaw by his skill in astrology, that there would bee plenty of Oliues the Summer following, and that he got a small portion of money, and gave earnest to the husbandmen, the owners of those places where the Oliues grew, and so procured and bought good cheap all the Oliues that were about millet and Chio, by reason there was no man at that time that offered more. now, when the time of their gathering was come, and many men standing in need thereof, he sold them quickly for as much as he listed, and by that means got together a great sum of money: showing that it was an easy matter for Philosophers to wax rich when they listed, but that it was not their study nor profession. Thales is reported to haue made this trial of his wisdom. This manner of getting of money is universal,( as wee haue before alleged) when any one man doth obtain unto himself the monopoly and wholesale of any kind of commodity. Therefore diverse Cities, when they stand in need of money to bee employed in the affairs of their commonweals, do ordain and appoint this manner of getting of money, by reserving to themselves alone the liberty to sell certain commodities. In sicily there was a man that had certain money delivered unto him to keep, who with the same bought up all the iron in the iron Forges: and vpon the arrival of merchants from other Countries, he alone sold it without any great enchauncement of the price: Howbet with fifty Talents, he gained a hundred Talents. Dionise the Tyrant understanding thereof, gave him licence to carry away his goods, but forbade him to dwell any longer in Syracusa, because he had invented such means to get money, as was not behoveful to his affairs. Thales and this man aimed at one mark, which was to find out a mane to haue the Monopoly and sole utterance of commodities. The knowledge of which means is also behoveful for gouernours of commonweals: because many Cities and commonweals haue as great, yea and more need of goods and revenues, then any private family: Insomuch, that some persons, that haue public charges and Offices, are employed onely about the treasury and oversight of these matters.  
THE resolution of the whole discourse touching the Art acquisitive, of getting& providing money and goods is, that it properly doth not belong to the Oeconomicall skill of housekeeping, and to the political faculty of government but ought to proceed and serve unto each of them, to the end, that victuals and necessary goods want not in houses and Cities, which are there to be distributed by householders and Gouernours: who if by chance they busy themselves about the getting thereof, do it as good husbands. The skill of getting, which is agreeable to nature, is honestly exercised, in cattle, in corn, and in the fruits of Trees. The artificial and crafty mean of getting of money by engrosing up of commodities, and uttering them again for gain, is blamed. And amongst all kinds of gain, usury is most reproved, which begetteth money of money against Nature, and the intent wherefore money at the beginning was ordained: which was of purpose for the exchanging of such commodities, as were hard to bee transported. There is another manner of getting which holdeth a mean between these two, and consisteth in the employment of such natural commodities as serve not for victuals and clothing, and are ruled and exchanged for the obtaining of whatsoever is needful for the maintenance of mankind. After the knowledge and contemplation of the science of getting of money, the practise thereof is briefly touched in general terms, as far as the matter of government, whereunto this work is subordained, could suffer, by the way. Then occupations are distinguished, and certain means to wax rich rehearsed, specially by Monopolies, according to the example of Thales.  
NAMELY, whether the skill of providing money do belong to the governor of a family or not.] Although this present question had been decided before, yet neuetthelesse, here the Philosopher maketh a final resolution of the same: concluding that this skill is no part of house government and governing of a city or commonweal, but rather a seruant or Minister to each of them, as the Spurriours, smiths, and Sadlers occupations, serve to the use of horses; melting and casting of mettall, making of gun powder, and carriage, to artillery: and that this art of getting must bee in time afore the Art of governing, furnishing them with means of their maintenance, which they may use according as occasion serveth.  
THE skill of government doth not make men.] Aristotle in his peacocks, Lib. 7. cap. 4. writeth thus: As weavers, Carpenters, and other workmen are to haue convenient stuff for their work, and the better the stuff prepared is, the fairer and better will the workmanship necessary be: so the governor and Law maker is to haue fit stuff, conveniently prepared.  
IT is the office of the governor of the family to oversee the orderings and bestowings of these things.] The Purueyour or provider in a family, prepareth victuals either by sea or by land, or elsewhere for the housekeeper, who distributeth the same in his family, either in great or small quantity, as he knoweth to bee needful; as a captain at any place besieged, or ready to bee besieged, distributeth armor and Munition to his soldiers.  
FOR a question might be asked: wherefore the skill to get money should be parcel of the household government, and not physic?] Because a family cannot be maintained without victuals and health, it should seem, that the skill of getting, and physic, should bee parcels of housekeeping: nevertheless, each of them do but onely serve thereto.  
ABOE all the rest, usury deserveth to be hated.] usury is reproved in the old and new Testament, and by all human laws that haue been made according to wisdom and equity, as plutarch declareth in his little Treatise touching the shunning of usury. Appian in his first book of the civil warres, the 7. Chapter, saith: there was an old lawe at Rome that forbade lending vpon usury, vpon pain, that the offender should forfeit as much as the usury amounted unto, for the old romans abhorred usury, as the Grecians did, and accounted this maner of gain, Lucre; and engrosers of commodities, to be grievous and intolerable to poor people, and the occasion of much envy and fallings out. By reason whereof, the Persians accounted lending vpon usury, to bee a tradefull of deceit and lying. Aristotle blameth the same, affirming it to be a thing contrary to Nature, that money which was invented for the furtherance and more convenient dealing in the trade of merchandise, should be converted to usury, to be multiplied by drawing of continual profit, vpon the use of the principal stock from month to month, or year to year, by the loan of money, till it bee repaid. Men haue now invented interest in stead of usury, which is of diuers sorts, according to diuers places: for they limit in some places five for a hundred, in other places ten or twelve vpon the hundred. The banquers or Marchants set it as high as they can.  
but for the augmentation of itself, which hath the name of {αβγδ}.] {αβγδ}, to engender: from which word, {αβγδ} is deriued● signifying issue: because money by usury begetteth other money, and causeth the increase thereof.  
because things engendered are like the engendrers.] As plants bring forth like plants, and living creatures other living creatures, every one in his kind, commonly like their Parents, as a man, a horse, and a bull do: so in usury, the engendrer, and the thing, is money: which notwithstanding seemeth contrary to nature, that a dead thing, as money, should engender.  
forasmuch as wee haue sufficiently decided what concerneth the knowledge, now let us come to the practise.] The reasons hitherto set down touching the matter of house government, do properly appertain to the knowledge of the science: the discourse that followeth, concerneth the practise: For in Sciences ordained to be practised and put in ure, as moral Philosophy, civil government, ordering of families, building, and the Art of war, there bee many poin●s handled and examined, which appertain not to the practise and action of life, but to skill onely, and the knowledge of the mind: As in the matter of housekeeping, Whether the art of providing goods, be a part of seruant to the science of housekeeping. In the matter of civil government, which is the perfect Common-wealth, Whether it be better to be governed by the Law than by man: Whether it be expedient to change the laws of a state: how many kinds of government there bee: and diverse other like questions discussed by Aristotle in his work. In the which questions( saith he in the third book; the fift Chapter,) The truth must bee set out, without having regard only to action.  
THE principal point in this art.) The first natural richesse doth consist in the breeding and feeding of cattle, in corn, and in fruits of Trees. The chief point in such matters, is to know what places are best and fittest for them.  
because the breed of one Country is better than another.) every Country hath a particular grace and singularity given unto it by Nature, 
Particular graces and singularities of coun●ries.  who regardeth the Commonwealth of the whole world, which cannot continue in perfection, without such variety: and that to the end, that they having need each of other, should entercommune together, and maintain the society of mankind by mutual and interchangeable succour and help. In one place corn groweth best, in another Vines are best, and in another cattle. The air is so temperate in calicut, that there is never no plague in that country: where also they haue continually both green herbs and green Trees, and new fruits every month, wholly differing from ours, howbeit good and wonderful pleasant. The country of Syria, specially about Damascus, aboundeth with all kind of corn, Flesh, and fruits, specially with raisins all the year long, and also with Pomgranets, Quinces, Almonds, and most goodly and sweet Roses of diverse colours: but the apple, pears, and Peaches there, haue an evil taste. In the West Indies, both in the Islands and in the firm Land, are wild Vines that bear good raisins without husbanding, but the kernels of Peaches, Pruines, and Cherries, being set in piuerse places in those parts, will take no roote. olive Trees planted there, will bear nothing but leaves without fruit. Babylon is most fertile in wheat, but vines and fig-trees grow not well there. In Muscouic there is great plenty of honey and wax, 
L●zarnes are certain wolves somewhat like Harts, having a sweet savour, and faire skins. Gesner. in latin called Lupi ●er●●●●● ● in French Loup● c●r●ier●, and in English L●zarnes.  Luzarnes, Wildcats, Martens with vntined horns, and other like beasts, which yield rich and exquisite hides: but there groweth no fruit any thing worth. The Tartarians and Alarbians, haue nothing but cattle. The Countries of Mouluques, yield Pepper, cloves, cinnamon, and diuers other kindes of Spicery, and yet are in all other respects barren. In other places grow Emeraudes, Rubies, Turkazes, and pearls: in others coral, and Amber. Dioscorides in the preface of his book, speaking of herbs and trees: Wee must( saith he) respect the places where they grow. For those that grow in such places as are pendant or steepie, could, dry, and open to the wind, are better and haue more force in them then others. On the contrary side, those that grow in even and level grounds, and in such places as are shadowed or watery, and where the wind hath no power, are the soonest marred, and are not so good, nor haue such strength as the others: and that most specially, when they are not gathered in due time and season, or when through weakness of their nature, they whither away. We haue also to note, that the soil or weather often furthereth or hindereth the herbs. Trees are seen to be goodlier, better leafed, and to bear greater plenty of fruit in one place than in another. Also there is no kind of three that prospereth not better in one soil than in another. Wee see the Trees that prosper in the mountaines, are very great and goodly Trees, as the Cedar Trees, the fir-tree, Pinetrees, and Beechtrees, and Box-trees. In forrests, even grounds, hills, and Hillocks, oaks, Beeches, Corke-trees, Seruice-trees, elms, Maplet●ees, Ashes, and Hazels, grow best. The Plane-trees, Elder-trees, Med●er-trees, white Po●la●-trees, willows, and Rose-trees, by the river sides in watery grounds. The like difference is there in herbs and shrubs: for some grow in mar●ish grounds, others prosper in standing waters. Others grow by the sea side, and on the banks of Riuers, and some there bee that are ordinarily found in moist places, and now and than in dry places. Others come up best in the plain fields, others speed best amongst the vines. Others in the meadows, some prosper better in valleys then in hilly grounds. Some prove well in all such places as are on high grounds and open to the wind. Some there bee that grow vpon the walls of towns and villages, and among the old walls and ruinous parts of houses. Theophrastus setteth down diuers sorts of Wheat, which haue taken their names of the places where they grow, and do all differ in colour, thickness, kind, and property: some die quickly, some slowly, some yield much, some little. Plinie esteemeth the wheat of italy above all other, both for whiteness and weight, which are the right marks of good wheat; saying that Nature hath shewed herself so friendly to the Italians, that shee hath not onely made them excellent in laws, government, Trade of living, and fashions of life: but also hath given them both corn and diuers other singular commodities, in greater plenty than to any other Regions and Countries.  
AS concerning that way and mean of getting of money which consisteth in exchange.] The second kind of riches consisteth in exchange, and is exercised either by merchandise in giuing goods for goods, or goods for money: or else by usury, when profit is got by money from time to time: or by letting or hiring, when men take pai●e for wages by the day, or by the year, or by task: whereunto the saleable works of diverse occupations are to bee referred. The fourth kind is a mean between natural riches, and the riches which ariseth of exchange: and is furthered with such natural commodities as serve neither for victuals nor clothing: as are Mines, Quarries, Vnderwoods, and great Timber, which are sold or exchanged of purpose to get whatsoever is requis●te for the maintenance of mankind.  
AMONGST occupations.] Cicero in his first book of Offices toward the end, doth show what occupations and gains ought to bee accounted honest, and what vile and dishonest. First( saith he) those gains bee reproached and disallowed which are hated of men, as the lu●re of tole-gatherers and usurers, also all Mercenary Trades, and generally of all them whose labours( not whose Art and Science) bee bought; for in them, their wages is the reward and obligation of servitude. They also bee reputed vile, that buy of Marchants that they may sell again out of hand, for they can get nothing without expressiue lying, and there is nothing viler then vanity and untruth. Further, all artificers bee of this vile sort, neither can any shope haue any thing in it that becometh a Gentleman: neither likewise are to bee allowed such Trades as bee ministers of pleasures: as Fishmongers, Butchers, Cookes, Pudding makers, and Fishers, whereto Perfumers, dancers, Dicers, and Carders are to bee joined. But those Artes wherein there is most wisdom, or no small profit: as physic, Architecture, and the knowledge of honest things, are honest to such as conveniently exercise them according to their state. merchandise in case it bee slender and poor is to bee esteemed as vile, but if it bee great and abundant, conveying many commodities from all coasts, and communicating them to many without deceit, it is not greatly to bee blamed, and being satisfied and filled with gain, or rather contented( as often it befalleth) if then it bee conveyed from the Sea to the haven, and from the haven into the country, it seemeth then to deserve commendations. But amongst all things whereout any gain is picked, there is nothing better then husbandry and Tillage, nothing more plentiful, nothing pleasaunter, nor any thing metre or worthier for an honest man.  
THOSE most noisome, {αβγδ}.] The latins call those vile trades, which the Grecians call {αβγδ}, which word properly doth signify those occupations which use the furnace, as the name noteth. Notwithstanding, use transferreth and applieth it to all handy occupations: So doth Lucian use it in his dream, and Xenophon in his book of housekeeping, Who speaking of these Sciences, saith: That {αβγδ} are vile and foul, and that vpon good cause they are out of estimation, for that they weaken and mar the bodies of the exercisers of the same, by constraining them to sit and remain close, and to bee always by the fire side: and when the bodies are weakened, the souls become more lazy and weak: insomuch, that the exercisers of the same occupations, haue no leisure to do any pleasure to their friends, nor service to their city. Wherefore in well ordered commonweals where chivalry is in estimation, the citizens are not tolerated to exercise them.  
CHARETIDES and Apollodorus.] Likewise diverse haue written in latin of Tillage, as Cato, Varro, Palladius, Columella, Plinie in his natural history, virgil in his Georgikes, and Mago in the Punike tongue.  
OF the manuring of grounds both unplanted and planted.] Of fields that are fit for tillage, and of planting and graffing of fruit trees, trimming of vines, and making gardens of good and pleasant herbs.  
IT were very good to gather further means.] whosoever desireth to get good, must not onely read books set forth concerning such matters, but also mark the doings and sayings of good husbands.  
AS the doing of Thales.] Cicero in his first book of divination, rehearseth this notable providence of Thales, to get unto himself the sale of oil: which Plinie fathereth vpon Democritus in the eight and twenty Chapter of the eighteen book of his natural history. They were both great Phisitians, and might with their wonderful skill haue the same devise.  
ONE man doth obtain unto himself the monopoly and whole sale.] {αβγδ}, &c. The word monopoly is used& meant in French, when any particular man, or any company, obtaineth a privilege or licence to haue the only sale of any necessary merchandise, compelling them that haue need thereof, to buy it at his own tax or price: which is an evil thing, and prejudicial to the Common-wealth, and not meet to bee permitted or put in ure, except it bee by public States, and that not at all times, but vpon urgent necessity of warres, or in evident danger of destruction, for their safety and preservation.  
THEREFORE diverse Cities when they stand in public need of money.] There is extant a book entitled, The public Oeconomie or House government, under the name of Aristotle( although it bee none of his) which containeth many inventions of Princes or commonweals, for the levying of Subsidies, and procuring of money: Of which matter there need no books to bee written, for that both in kings Courts, and in the managing of other governments, there bee always a sufficient number of such inventors, yea more very often then are requisite, to the great damage and oppression of the subiects, and small profit to the lords and gouernours, who scant grow rich by that means, but spend as fast as it cometh in: for the easiness of getting causeth readines●e and forwardness in spending.   

CHAP. VIII. Of the other parts of house government which belong to the husband and the father: also of such virtues as are respectively requisite for gouernours and obeyers.  
NOw forasmuch as wee haue alleged before, that there bee three parts whereof the government of a family consisteth; and haue already spoken of the Maisters part: here will wee entreat of those parts which severally belong to the father and the husband: For the good man of the house governeth his wife and children, each of them as free folk, howbeit not with the selfsame manner of government, but his wife civilly, and his children regally: for the male by Nature hath more authority then the female, unless it befall otherwise in some place contrary to Nature: and the elder and perfecter, then the younger and vnperfecter. In the most governments of cities and commonweals, the ruler and obeyer do change by turns, because they will bee equal according to Nature, and not differ in any respect: Howbeit, when the one governeth and the other obeyeth, there is a difference sought both in apparel, in speech, and in honours: as Amasis answered concerning the Basin wherein he used to wash his feet: But the male is always disposed toward the female in this manner. The government over children is regal, because the engendrer governeth both in respect of friendship, and by the prerogative of his age: which is a kind of kingly government. Therefore doth Homer rightly term jupiter, Father both of men and gods: who is the King of all. For a King must excel in Nature, and bee of the same kind, as it befalleth to the elder compared with the younger, and the engendrer with his child: whereby it appeareth, that the household government ought to haue greater care and regard of men, than of the possessing of such things as haue no life: and of mens virtues, then of the commodity and force of things possessed; which wee call riches: and of free folk, than of bondslaves. But first as concerning these villains and bondmen, it may bee doubted, Whether besides that they serve for instruments and ministers, there bee any other virtues in them honourabler then these; as modesty, manhood, iustice, and other such habits: Or whether they bee destitute of all other virtues, saving those that pertain to the body and slavery. For it may bee a doubt on both sides, as if they haue, howe much they differ from free men? And it were altogether absurd to say they haue them not, sith they be men and partakers of reason. In a manner the same doubt may bee moved touching the woman and the child, Whether there be any virtues in them: and whether the woman should bee temperate, womanly, and just: and the child intemperate, or temperate, or not. And universally, the like may bee considered in the obeyer by Nature and the governor, Whether there bee in them selfsame selfsame or a diverse virtue: if each of them participate of one and the selfsame virtue, wherefore should the one rule, and the other obey continually? They cannot differ according to more or less: because obeying and governing differ in kind, and not in respect of more or less. On the other side, it were a wonder that virtue should bee desired in the one, and not in the other. For except the governor bee temperate and just, h●w will he govern well? or if the subject bee not, howe shall bee well obey? Verily, being intemperate and fearful, he will do nothing that is comely and meet. Therefore it appeareth, that it is necessary for each of them to participate of virtue, in such difference nevertheless as is found in those things that are in subiection by Nature: This is straightway perceived in the soul where the one part commandeth by Nature, and the other obeyeth: The virtue of which partes wee affirm to differ, as the virtue of that part which is endued with reason; and the unreasonable part. It is certain that the like is observed in other things, insomuch, that by Nature there bee diuers sorts of rulers and obeyers: For the free man governeth the bondman one way, the male the female another way, and the man the child after another sort: and in all them are the parts of the soul, howbeit with difference: The bondman is altogether deprived of that part which belongeth to deliberation: The wife hath it, howbeit weak: The child hath it also, but imperfect. The like is to bee deemed of the moral virtues. And wee must suppose, that they ought to haue them: howbeit, not after the same maner and measure, but in such measure as is convenient for the office and exercise of every one. Therefore it is expedient for a governor to haue perfect moral virtue: for his office is simply and absolutely to command and give order for the execution of affairs, and reason beareth the sway in commanding and appointing: But it sufficeth every of the other persons to haue such portion of the same, as is needful ●or their own exercise. Let us conclude therefore, that all the persons afore mentioned haue moral virtue: and that the modesty of the husband and wife are not the self same, nor their Fortitude, nor Iustice, as Socrates held opinion: but the one hath Fortitude apt to govern, the other to serve: and likewise in other virtues, as more plainly may appear by the particular consideration of the same. For they that speak universally, do deceive themselves, who affirm that the having of the soul well disposed, or well doing, or any other like thing, is virtue: But they which number the virtues( as Gorgias did) say far better then the others, that thus define it. Therefore it is behoveful so to deem of all virtues, as a certain Poet did of a womans silence, saying that silence was an ornament to her, but not to the man in like sort. Sith therefore the child is unperfect, doubtless his virtue ought not to bee imputed to himself, but to the perfecter, and him that is his guardian and governor: and likewise to the master, the virtue of the Seruant, who is behoveful to his master in necessary affairs; and yet for that purpose hath need but of small virtue, namely of so much as may s●rue his turn, in such sort, that through intemperancy or slothfulness, he fail not in doing of his duty. If this that wee haue affirmed bee true, it may bee further doubted, whether artificers should haue virtue, because they often make default in their exercises, by means of intemperancy. But there is a great vnlikelihood between these: for the bondman liveth with us, but the artificer is ●arther of. Who hath need of as much virtue as he hath servitude: for the vile craftsman doth serve a certain kind of servitude which is compassed within limits and bounds. moreover, a servant is one of those things that consist by Nature, but not the shoemaker nor any other crafts-man. Therefore the master is the cause that the seruant hath such virtue, and not every one that hath a certain masterly skill to teach servile exercises. Therefore are they deceived that would deprive seruants of reason, alleging that they should onely execute that which is given them in commandement: Rather it is convenient to admonish and instruct them more then children. Wee haue for this peesent sufficiently spoken of these matters. But as concerning the husband and wife, the father and children, and of every of their virtues and mutual conservation: and by what means they follow good and fly evil, wee shall necessary treat thereof in our discourse of the forms of government. For sith every house is parcel of the city, and all the matters above spoken of are parts of the house, and the virtue of the part is to bee imputed to the whole, it is necessary to refer the instruction and ordering of women and children to such Magistrates as haue the oversight of the States of Cities; if it bee convenient for the making of a virtuous city to haue virtuous women and children: which is most requisite, for that women are the moiety of free men, and of children do come the partakers and fellowes of the Common-wealth, and of the government of the city: insomuch, that sith wee haue already spoken of these matters, and are to treat of the rest else-where, leaving this disputation as perfect and brought to an end, wee will begin with another matter, and first examine the opinions of other men concerning the establishment of the best sort of government of a city or commonweal.  
THERE were three parties of household government propounded: the first of the master, the second of the Father, the third of the Husband. Vpon the discussing of the Maisters part with the skill of getting which was added unto them, now those parts which belong to the Father and the Husband are laid forth. In that part which belongeth to the Father, the children are governed by the Father regally, as well through friendship and prerogative of perfect age, as with the good will of the children, who willingly obey their Fathers. In that part which belongeth to the Husband, The Husband hath civil government over his wife, not in respect of the equalness of the man and the wife, and governing by turns, which neither are nor ought to bee in them, but in regard of the courage, strength, authority, gravity and wisdom both in words and deeds, which commonly Nature affordeth in greater quantity to the man than to the woman: and for that as he is the perfecter and better, so is he the honourabler. even as the civil Magistrate, during his Office excelleth all private persons in apparel, in countenance, in manner of speech and in honours. After are declared those moral virtues, which bee interchangeably requisite in gouernours and obayers, and in what difference they ought to haue them, accordingly as is meet for their Offices and exercises: taking a similitude from the parts of mans soul, where the part endowed with reason, as superior, governeth; and the unreasonable part, his inferior, obeyeth: having difference in their virtues.  
NOW forasmuch as wee haue alleged, that there bee three parts whereof the government of a family consisteth.] From the first Chapter to the last of this present book, he speaketh almost of no kind of matter but the skill of housekeeping, as far as it may serve to the government of the city: where at his beginning to reason thereof, he had propounded three societies of persons, necessary for the establishment of a perfect family, namely, that of the master and Seruant, called masterly or Signiorall, which he hath discussed, and the other two, which are of the Husband and the Wife, and of the Father and the Children, of the which he speaketh here.  
THE good man of the house governeth his wife and children, but his wife civilly, and his children regally.] That the likenesses of three governments do appear in the ordering of a family, Aristotle doth show in his eight book of moral philosophy to Nicomachus. The similitudes( saith he) and as ye would say, the examples of governments, may be taken out of familes: for the assembly of the father& his children is like a kingdom, forasmuch as the father hath a care of his chidrē: Vpon the which occasion Homer calleth jupiter Father, for that the fathers government will be a kingdom. but amongst the Persians the fathers government is Tyrant-like, in that they use their children as slaves. The maisters government over his slaves is tyrannicall, whereby all things are conveyed to the maisters profit: so that the one government is lawful, and the other which is after the Persian manner faulty. The government of the man and the woman resembleth the aristocraty: for the man in respect of his dignity, governeth in such matters as touch him; and the wife doth the like in whatsoever is mee●e for her. But the man in taking the whole authority to himself, declineth to the oligarchy, doing against dignity, that which is not best. Sometimes, the women that are the richer do govern, but they do not so in respect of their virtue, but by occasion of their wealth and power, as it happeneth in Oligarchies. The brethren dwelling together, are like a democraty, being equal amongst themselves, saving in as much as they differ in age. But where the difference of ages is great, there is no more brotherly amity and fellowship. The democraty appeareth in such houses as are destitute of a lord and master, wherein all are equal, and where the weakest ruleth, and every one is at liberty to live as he list.  
AS Amasis answered concerning the basin wherein he used to wash his feet.] Amasis as Herodotus writeth in the third book of his history, having overthrown Apries in battle, made himself king of egypt: but in the beginning of his reign the egyptians made small account of him by reason he had been but a simplo citizen, and issued of a base house. After he drew them to like well of him, by the manner ensuing. Amongst other his infinite movables, he had a golden tub wherein himself, and they that resorted to his own Table, had accustomend from day to day to wash their feet: he caused this tub to be melted, and an Image to bee made of the same, which he set up in a fit and convenient place of the city, where it might best bee seen. The egyptians ran thether straightway, and began to worship the Image with great honour and reverence. Amasis being advertised thereof, caused the people to bee called together, and then declared unto them howe the Image was made of a tub that was wont to serve to wash feet and to vomit and piss in, and now was greatly worshipped and reverenced by them. After he said unto them, matters are so come to pass, that you haue behaved yourselves towards me, as toward the tub: for though heretofore I were but of a mean calling, yet now I am your king: And therefore I purpose, that you shall yield me all manner of honour, and haue me in such respect as shall stand with reason.    

THE argument OR CONTENTS OF THE SECOND book OF ARISTOLES GOVERNMENT.  
IN all matters that Aristotle taketh in hand to treat of, his custom is in the beginning, to rehearse what opinions other men haue had therein, who aforetime had spoken of the same to; the intent, after the examination thereof, to take what is good,& refuse that is bad, as himself witnesseth in his first book of the soul: because as Isocrates affirmeth in Euagoras, Arts and Sciences receive their perfection, not by relying vpon the sayings and opinions of men of former ages, of how great authority soever they were, but by correcting of the same, and changing in them whatsoever is found not to bee good. So for the more certain discovery of the high secrets of nature, he confuteth in his natural and supernatural philosophy, the errors of Democritus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Anaximander, Thales, Melissus, Parmenides, and Heraclitus, being all excellent personages: And more, when occasion was offered, hath not spared his own master Plato, of whom he made so great account, judging( as himself affirmeth in the first book of his ethics) the honour of truth whereunto he had wholly vowed himself, worthy to bee preferred before all other duties and Offices. Likewise, at his beginning to treat of the institution and government of a city or commonweal, he first setteth down the most renowned commonweals of his time, as well those that were in use, as the Candian, Lacedemonian, Athenian, Carthaginian, and Milesian commonweals; as those that were written of, as Platoes, both the first and second: finding in every of them somewhat requiring correction. Those authors that had entreated or written of public governments, of whom Aristotle here maketh mention, are Socrates, Plato, Phaleas, Phidon, Hippodamus, Lycurgus, Minos, Solon, Draco, Zaleucus, Charondas, Onomacrites, Philolas, Diocles, Pittacus, and Androdamas. many others wrote of the same matters after them: but the chief commendation remained to Plato and Aristotle, as the most skilful and diligent Writers. now forasmuch as Aristotle doth here allege none but certain commonweals of Greece, which were very small ones, and neither toucheth any strange commonweals, saving that of Carthage,( the roman commonweal at that time remaining unknown unto the Grecians) nor speaketh of the great kingdoms and Empires, wherein notwithstanding, the dexterity and skill of government doth most appear: Therefore I haue gathered a history of government, or a register of all sorts of States, both old and new, whereof I could haue knowledge by reading, or by any other search or inquiry: beginning at the kingdoms of Assyria, egypt, and Persia, which are the most ancient and most renowned. Then haue I followed the times and Countries, conferring their likenesses and differences together, with observation of their ordinances, disciplines, laws, and customs, laying forth their beginnings, proceedings, encreasings, diminishings, changes, and decay; and endeavouring to yield the causes and reasons of such accidents, according to the rules and precepts of this Science● all the which I haue collected, to the intent to add the same to the governments of Plato and Aristotle, as a thing most necessary for the understanding of their books, and for the knowledge of the faculty of government, which is not all so manifest in their observations, how learned and elegant soever they be, but there doth and will remain many precepts and observations behind for learned men to join thereunto, and that without losing their labour. Truth prophesieth herself to all such as will seek for her, and are of capacity to receive her: She is not yet all taken up and engrosed, great things come slackly forward, and new not themselves manifestly together at one instant, but are from time to time augmented or brought to better order and elegancy. And so may it fall out in this Science, after the help that we receive by the observations of the ancients, after so many examples wherewith we are instructed by them that haue ben before us, after so long experience and practise of two thousands years or thereabouts, which haue passed since the time wherein our authors wrote till this present.   

THE SECOND book OF ARISTOTLES GOVERNMENT, TRANSLATED out OF greek latin AND FRENCH INTO ENGLISH. With an exposition of the hard places: Wherein he examineth the principal commonweals of his time.  

CHAP. I. That all the Common-weales of his time deserved correction: and first of all Platoes, reproving that community of things which Socrates devised in it.  
because our intent and purpose is to consider of civil society, which is the best of all, for them specially that are furnished with means and commodities to live according to their own wish and desire: We must examine the other forms of commonweals that haue ben received by diverse Cities, which are deemed to bee ordered and furnished with good laws: and whether there be any other forms of commonweals set down by the Sages, that are well described: to the end, that we may see what in them is good and profitable. In the handling whereof, though wee seek for somewhat besides the former, it should not bee imputed un●o us for curiosity or ostentation, but rather this estimation ought to be had of us, that we haue taken this labour in hand to discover the defaults and imperfections which remain in the states and governments of this age.  
IN this second book are exam●ned the principal commonweals, that were in that time found either in writing, or in practise: every one of them deserving correction. First of all Platoes commonweal is found fault-worthie, for that it did bring in the community of goods, wives, and children, for the better uniting of the city, and for the better maintenance of natural love amongst citizens: Which course is not only unfit and inconvenient, but also unreasonable, for that it is not possible by the reasons there laid forth, to attain to the effect which it pretendeth: But contrariwise, it decayeth the City by uniting it too much: and by the community of wives, and Children, the friendship of citizens is rather diminished: and by the community of goods, hatred and quarrels engendered.  
because our intent and purpose is to consider.] Aristotle purposing to examine those commonweals that were in his time, or had been written off before, being a matter of itself odious: for the avoiding of the dislike and evil will of his auditors, doth modestly excuse himself unto them, affirming that he doth it not through unprofitable curiosity or vainglory,( being vices that a true Philosopher should greatly eschew) but rather for the onely discovery of other mens errors, and thereby to attain the easilier to the knowledge of some better form of Common-wealth.  
WHICH is the best of all for them, specially that are furnished with the means and commodities to live according to their own wish and desire.] That form of commonweal that is simply and absolutely good, is not good for all cities, but rather onely for those that haue the means to live at their ease and pleasure. Which means diverse cities want, insomuch, that they are driven to take some other manner of government, not as the best, but as the most fit for them. For as Aristotle sheweth in the first Chapter of the fourth book of this work, The office of the Law-maker and true governor is, to consider not onely which is simply a good form of Common-wealth, but also which is a good form for them to whom he giveth laws: which men call good by supposition, that is to say, according to the nature of the inhabitants, and regard had of their commodities.  
THE other forms of commonweals.] As that of the Candeans, Lacedemonians, and Carthaginians, which he accounteth the best in the tenth Chap. of this book, though he find not one of them entirely and wholly perfect.  
THE seeking for somewhat besides the former, should not be imputed unto us for curiosity or ostentation.] Lactantius in the eight Chapter of his second book: God( saith he) hath given to all men wisdom, to the end, that every of them according to his own faculty and capacity may inquire of those things that he hath not heard, and examine those that he heareth. And wee must not think, that they which haue gone before us in yeares haue also gone beyond us in wisdom: The which forasmuch as it is equally given to all men, cannot be forestalled by our predecessors: it is not a thing to be occupied or possessed, but is free for all men, as the light and brighnesse of the sun: For as the sun is the light of the eyes, so is wisdom the light of mens hearts. Sith therefore wisdom, namely, the searching out of the truth, is engrafted in all men, they rob and deprive themselves of it, who without iudgement allow and approve the inventions of the elders, and suffer themselves like sheep to bee led by the others directions. But they are deceived, in that when they hear the name of ancients or elders, they think presently that it is not possible either for themselves to know more, for that they are called young men: or for the others to err, for that they are called Elders. What impediment is there then for us to take example by them: And as they haue left to the posterity that which they had found false; why should not wee that haue found out the truth, leave our better things to them that shall come after us?  

Platoes commonweal.  
NOW let us begin and enter on this discourse, in such sort as shall bee most convenient for this consideration: It is necessary for Citizens to haue either all things, or none at all, in common: or else some common, and some not. That they should haue nothing in common, it is unpossible; sith the commonweal is a community, and that first of all the place where the city standeth must bee enjoined in common, there being but one place alleged both for city and citizens, who are all parteners and fellow-sharers in the same: nevertheless, it is doubtful, Whether for the good ordering and government of a city, it be better, that as many things as are possible, should be had in common: or that some should be in common, and some not. For it may fall out, that Citizens among themselves will haue their children, wives, goods, and possessions in common: as in Platoes commonweal, where Socrates upholdeth, that children, wives, and possessions should be in common.  
SITH the city is some community, the question is, Whether all things therein ought to be common, as they are limited to be in that form of Commonwealth which Plato hath described, or only some: as streets, Market places, Hauls, Churches, Church-yards, and auditories or places appointed for the administration of Iustice; and the rest proper and private to every man, according to the manner and course which hath ben received and allowed in all Countries, where they live civilly and orderly.  
IN Platoes commonweal.] Forasmuch as Plato saw mankind continually encumbered with dissensions, and that they which in former ages had attempted to remedy it by innumerable laws, had done no good at all; but contrariwise, all waxed worse and worse: it seemed unto him, that for the rooting out of all hatred and partialities amongst men, there was not a more ready and expedient way, than to present them with a community, not only of all goods and possessions, but also even of the selfsame things which Nature hath made proper and peculiar to every man, as of the eyes, ears,& hands: as he writeth in the fift book of his laws: so that whatsoever a man saw, heard, or did, he should employ it wholly to the use and behoof of all in common; insomuch, that for the better maintaining of mutual love among citizens, he thought that even wives and children ought to bee common among them. Because that having nothing peculiar to themselves, they should by that means bee glad or sorry all at once, accordingly as the case fel out or required: not that he thought it an easy thing to be brought to pass, but rather that it would be found very strange and wonderful in respect of the novelty thereof, sith it had not been received or used afore vpon earth. Howbeit, that the perfect pattern of government whereby he had shaped this his commonweal in word, being peradventure in heaven, was to bee seen onely of such as would ●●oke vpon it earnestly with the eyes of their understanding, as he himself affirmeth in the beginning of his fifth book of the commonweal, and about the end of the ninth book, and in the preamble of Timeus. Many other learned men besides Aristotle haue reproved this community, as Eusebius in the 12 Chapter of his 13 book De prepar. evangel. Epiphanius in the 1. and 3. books of his second tome. chrysostom in his first homily vpon Saint Matthew, and the second Chapter of the acts of the Apostles. Lactantius in the 21 and 22 Chapters of his 3. book. Saint Ambrose speaking of Platoes commonweal and laws, affirmetth that he did not describe a true Commonwealth indeed, but one that was feigned and devised in his own brain. polybius in the sixth book of his history, reasoning about commonweals, giveth this iudgement of Platoes: peradventure( saith he) All the skill and reason of government hath been more cunningly and subtly considered of and examined by Plato and other Philosophers touching the natural conversion and alteration of commonweals: Notwithstanding their disputations are known and manifest to few, because they are debated with too great variety of matter, and almost with too many words. Lower in the same book he saith: Further, except some practise of Platoes commonweal were seen, it standeth with no reason, thus to compare it with such commonweals as haue ben, or at this present are in use and experience, as the Lacedemonian, the Carthaginian, and roman commonweals: for that w●re as much as to compare a dead image with men that haue life. For though in respect of the skill and artificial handling thereof, it deserve commendation: yet for all that the comparing of dead and living things together, doth make a poor and dark show to the eye. Cato the younger, his nature and conditions were not fit for a people, nor convenient to procure him the love and good will of a commonalty: Also he came not in credite by flattering the people. Therefore Cicero saith of him: That through the demeaning of himself in all respects, as though he had lived in Platoes city and commonweal, and not vpon the lighes and grounds of that of Romulus, he was repulsed and failed in obtaining the Consulship. Plutarch in the life of Cato, and also in his book of the fortune of Alexander and of the romans, writeth as followeth concerning Platoes commonweal: Plato when he had ordained a form of commonweal, could persuade no man to receive it, for that it was too severe: But Alexander having builded above seuentie cities amongst the barbarous people, and planted many great vines in Asia, procured them to leave the rude and uncivil life which they lead before. Finally, peradventure two or three red Platoes laws, but innumerable men haue used Alexanders laws.  
but whether it be best to bee as it is used at this present, or according to the lawe there written. There bee many difficulties in this matter of community of wives: 
He meaneth that it doth not ●ollow, that therefore wives ought to be common, because Cittize●s ought to rejoice and ●●●●ue for the same things: and because concord is the bo●d of Cōm●̄ wealths,& because it ●s to be wishe● that al should say with one voice of all things. This is mine and thine.  and the cause itself wherefore Socrates upholdeth that a law to that effect should bee established, seemeth not to redound of his reasons. again if we look unto the end wherefore he maintaineth that such order ought to be taken in a city or commonweal, as is there disputed, it will bee found impossible. Also it is not there determined and set down after what manner it should bee done and brought to pass, I mean how a city or commonweal should be made one, as the greatest goods that can happen unto it: For Socrates doth take that supposition, yet is it clear, that by proceeding further, and becoming more and more one, it will at length no longer be a city: for a city is a multitude consisting by Nature, and by drawing more& more unto unity, it will become of a city a family, and of a family a man: and we call a house or family rather one, than a city or commonweal: and a man rather one, than a house or family. Insomuch, that although that might be brought to pass, yet ought it not so to be, because it would destroy& overthrow the City: for a City or commonweal is not onely founded of many men, but also of such as differ in kind, and are not alike to each other.  
ARISTOTLE with four reasons reproveth that community propounded by Socrates in Platoes commonweal. The first reason is taken from the difficulty arising of that constitution: the second from the end that moved Socrates to ordain it, which is not reasonable: the third, that the contrary resulteth and redoundeth vpon Socrates by his suppositions: the fourth, that it is altogether insufficient.  
I mean that a city or commonweal should bee one, as the greatest good that can happen unto it.] SOCRATES in the fifth book of Platoes Common-wealth, reasoning with GLAVCVS, endeavoureth to prove, that the greatest good which can come to a city or commonweal is unity: and the greatest harm, is division: that is, of one to make it diverse. SOCRA. Is there any more dangerous evil in a city than that which divideth it, and of one maketh many: or any thing better than that which knitteth it together, and doth make it one? GLAVC. None at all. SOCR. doth not the community of pleasure and sorrow unite, when all the Citizens rejoice or mourn for the coming or departing of the selfsame things? GLAVC. Yes verily. SOCR. The diversity of these things, doth dissolve it, when for the selfsame accidents and chances of a city and the citizens thereof, some persons greatly mourn, and other some rejoice. GLAVC. Why not? SOCR. That cometh to pass, when these words are not published together, namely, Mine and Thine, and likewise other mens. GLAVC. It is so doubtless. SOCR. Therefore all those cities are well governed, where many regarding one selfsame thing, according to the selfsame means, do say, Mine, and not Mine. GLAVC. I grant it. SOCR. And whatsoever city or commonweal is well affencted and disposed, as a man: for when any one of our fingers is hurt, the whole communion of the body, in regard of the soul, by the ordinance of that which ruleth therein, doth feel it straightway, and mourneth altogether for that part which is hurt: And therefore wee say, a man hath a sore finger. The like reason is there in all other parts and passions of man, I mean as concerning sorrow, when any part mourneth: and as touching pleasure, when any part is delighted in itself. GLAVC. The reasons bee like. SOCR. And touching your demand, A city governed, is very like to this. For in mine opinion, as often as either good or harm chanceth to any citizen or Commoner, that city shall out of hand call( his) the party that shall bee in such case: and therefore, the whole city shall either rejoice or mourn. GLAVC. Of necessity it must bee so in a city governed by good laws. Aristotle condemneth this uniting of a city, affirming it to bee contrary to the Nature of a city, for that the same should bee composed of many persons, differing in sundry respects, and not alike: and that by too much uniting of the same, it will continue no longer a city, but by little and little goody reduced into one house, and after into one man. The King of egypt sent to the Athenians, requiring them to enter into league with him, and to sand him aid for his delivery from the yoke and bondage of the Persians. The Athenians deeming that it was expedient for them to abate and weaken the power of the Persians to the uttermost of their power, and to bind the egyptians to them for remedy in such sudden and unexpected chances of Fortune as might fall unto them, decreed in their council to aid the egyptians with three hundred Gallies. On the other side, the King of Persia sent certain ambassadors with a great sum of money to Lacedemonia, requiring the Lacedemonians in his favour to make war against the Athenians, in hope that they which ouer-matched his men in egypt, by that occasion should bee driven to return home to their own houses to defend their native country. Diod. Sicilian in the 15. Chapter of his 11. book.  
FOR there is a difference between a league or confederacie in war, and a city of peace: for a league is profitable in quantity or multitude, though it consist of one and the selfsame sort and kind, and is naturally ordained for interchangeable aid in the warres: Like as if the weight and number did draw and carry away more. By the like reason a city doth differ from a Nation, where men dwell not in streets and boroughs, but dispersed like the Arcadians.  
THERE bee three assemblies or societies of men, which are diverse and differing one from another: namely, a city, a League, and a Nation: A city is compact of many men differing in their Vocations, degrees and Trades, assembled together in one place, and within the selfsame walls, of purpose to live commodiously and happily, as is affirmed in the first book of this work, the first Chapter: and in the fourth book, the second, third, and fourth Chapter: and in the sixth book, the fourth Chapter: and in the seventh book, the eight Chapter: and in his books of household guuernment. A league is ordained to the end that many people confederated together, should help one another in their Warres, as is affirmed in the sixth Chapter of the third book of government: the which howe much the greater number of men it compriseth, so much the better and stronger it is, though they bee all of one estate and degree, as for example, all Martiall. And this is it that he meaneth by saying, A league is profitable in quantity or multitude, though it consist of one and the selfsame sort and kind, and is naturally ordained for interchangeable aid in the Warres: Like as if the weight did draw and carry away more, that is to say; that like as metals and diverse other kindes of merchandises being weighed and tried in the balance, are commonly the more they weigh, the more esteemed and set by: even so in the league or martiall aid, the multitude of men is to bee considered; the which howe much the greater it is, so much the profitabler it is, without any regard whether they bee all of one degree and calling, or not. Howbeit, the contrary thereof is to bee considered in the city, wherein diverse vocations and exercises are to bee required. I find, that there bee two sorts of leagues: The one, where diverse cities confederated together, are not one above another in authority, and whose conquests and victories redound to the benefit of them all in common. The other, where one great city is confederated with other smaller cities, but reserveth to herself the authority of ruling and commanding, together with the seat of the Empire, the title of all enterprises, and chief profit of all conquests and victories. The thirteen cities of the Suissers allied together, and using a popular government, being called Cantons, are to bee referred to the first sort of league: The which bee thus name according to the order of their sittings in their di●●s or assemblies; Zuriche, barn, Lucerne, uri, Scuuitz, Vuderwalden, Appentzel, Tug, Glaris, Basil, Fribourgh, Saleure, and Schaffause: Of the which, eleven onely are within the right limits of the country of switzerland: for Basil is not in switzerland, but in that country which in old time did bear the name of the Sequanians: and Schaffause is in germany. again, five of these thirteen, namely uri, Scuuitz, Vuderwalden, Glaris, and Appentzel, are not Cities, but assemblies of people, where all men enjoy equal liberty: and of these, specially of uri, Scuuitz, and Vuderwalden, began the liberty of the Suissers, as Glarean allegeth in his Annotations vpon the first book of Caesars Commentaries. It is supposed, that if all these thirteen Cantons did join their forces together, they are able to arm a hundred thousand footmen, being excellent Pikemen, very skilful in keeping order, and holding their ranks together, who will rather die in battle then run away: for they haue a Lawe that appointeth punishment of death, to all such as flee from the battle. The men of Zuriche haue the chief place in common assemblies, in regard of the auncientnesse and nobility of their city, which aforetime was an earldom, as Munster affirmeth in the third book of his Cosmography: but the men of barn are the richest and mightiest. They haue not in their confederacie any determined place for their assemblies and meetings, nor common Magistrates: but when any business ariseth concerning the public State and commonweal, every Canton sendeth his Deputies, who commonly meet and assemble at Baden, a very faire and rich city, situate wel-neere in the midst of the leagues: by occasion whereof, they hold in that city almost all their Parliaments or Counsels, wherein they consult of common and public affairs with equal liberty, saving that they of Zuriche are the first, as is afore alleged. whatsoever is there resolved and agreed vpon, is followed and ratified by all the Cantons. These thirteen Cantons haue certain confederates common to them all: and some of them particularly haue their proper and peculiar confederates. Also they haue subiects in common, over whom they haue all of them government by order and course: one fort is governed by one Canton or more. The Rhetians or Grisans are their allies, consisting of three leagues governed by commonalties, whose Language is partly high Dutch, and partly of the lombard tongue. Also the Valesians and Geneuans, are their confederates. Further, the Swissers are in league with the kingdom of france, which is renewed at every new kings coming to the crown, and haue also another league, which they call hereditary, with the House of burgundy and Austryche. In time past, there were twelve cities of the Tuscanes, thus confederated in Hetruria: who held their common counsel in Vulturnes Temple. Those twelve peoples were the Veians, Ceritians, Falischians, Vulsinians, Clusines, Perusines, Aretines, Rusellans, Volaterans, Populonians, Pisans, and Fesulans: as Sigonius affirmeth in his first book of the ancient law of Italy and the ninth Chapter. In like sort were there in the lesser Asia, now called Anatolia, and in certain Islands of the sea near thereto, twelve cities of the jonians confederated together: namely, millet, Mys, Pydne, Ephesus, Colophon, Abide, Teos● Clazomene, Phocee, Samos, Chio, and Erythres: who had a common Temple called Panionion, where they assembled and met together, and would receive no more into their league, as Herodotus writeth in his first book. Also the AEolians league consisted of these twelve Cities; Cymes, Clarisses, Neouthicos, Tenus, Cille, Notion, Egiroesse, Pitaue, Egea, Myrine, and Grinie: the twelfth was Smyrna, which was taken from them by the jonians. All the which twelve cities stood in the firm Land, and in a far better country than the jonians Country, though the seasons of the year were not so temperate there, as the same Herodotus writeth in the same book. moreover, there were in Peloponesus, now called Morea, twelve cities of the Achaians confederated together; namely, Palena, Egira, Eges, Bura, Elice, Egion, Rapes, Patres, Phares, Olena, Drima, and the Triteas, which alone are Midlandish, as the same author saith in the same first book. Polybyus who lived long after Herodo●us, rehearseth them in this manner: Patres, Dymes, Phares, Tritea, Leonce, Egire, Pallene, Bure, Geunire, Carynies, Olene, and Elix: affirming, that whereas these people aforetime had been governed by lords, some they constrained to give over their dominions, and others they persuaded willingly to leave it, and by that mean entered into a common confederacie: using one kind of lawe, one kind of weights, one measure, one kind of money: like Magistrates, like counsel, and like Iudges: so as there wanted nothing in the country of Morea to make a corporation or freedom, saving that they dwelled not altogether in one city, all the rest was the selfsame thing or very like: which willingly suffered not onely to bee under the Achaians, but also of them to take their name, by occasion of the equality and common liberty which they maintained amongst themselves, as a certain badge of a right commonweal, as Polybius reciteth in his third and fourth books. plutarch in the life of Aratus, who was governor of the Achaians, writeth thus of their league: Thus( saith he) did these cities which were every one by themselves severally weak, preserve one another by being knit together by the chain of the Common-wealth. Like as in the bodies of living creatures, the parts do live, nourish themselves, and take spirit of life by the mutual linking and bond which they haue one with another: and as soon as there chanceth any separation amongst them, they take no more sustenance, but mar and putrifie: so these cities perished by means of them that broken their society: And contrariwise, prospered when they tasted of the common providence, by making themselves members one of anothers corporation. These leagues for ought that can bee found out within the compass of any memory, did scarcely exceed twelve or thirteen cities. For when they attain to such number, as that they are able to defend themselves, they seek no further to bee augmented: as well for that necessity doth not drive them to seek more power, as also for that by reason their conquests are common unto them all, they make not so great account of them: and also for that by increasing in societies and confederacies, the multitude thereof might grow unto some confusion. Therefore when they perceive themselves to bee as many in number as will suffice for their living in safety, then do they bend themselves to two things, the one either to receive other people into their protection, and by that means to get money or some other profit that is easy to be partend amongst thē, as the Swissers do of the inhabitants of the free country of Burgundy: the other, to take mercenary arms,& fight in the pay of some Prince tha● will retain them for pay in his enterprises, as in this age the same Suissers do for the French king, and as in old time the Achaians and AEtolians did, of whom Titus livius speaketh at large in the Warres of Macedonia. The greatest league that ever hath been, was that of the Swetians, which consisted of a hundred Cantons or cities, whereof Caesar maketh mention in his commentary of the French Warres. There is one other manner of league which a great city hath with other small cities, reserving unto herself the authority of commanding, and the imperial seat, with the title of all enterprises and chief profit of all conquests: Which kind of league the romans in old time observed, who drew diverse people of italy into the society of their commonweal, and admitted them as citizens into their city, by making them partakers of the Offices and dignities of the same, and allowing them in sundry things to use equal laws. Howbeit, they would not mingle them amongst the other Tribes of the city, which amounted to five and thirty in all: doubting least in number they should exceed the ancient citizens, and by that means, at the creation of Offices and Officers haue the most voices. But by taking the tenth part of them, they made other new Tribes of them, which were the last that gave their voices. By means whereof their opinion almost served to no purpose, by reason the other five and thirty Tribes exceeded them more than a moiety. Such were the Mars●●ns, the Pelines, the Vestines, the Pycentines, the Ferentines, the Hirpins, Pompeians, Venusines, Apulians, Lucaynes, Samnites, etrurians, and others, received by the people of Rome, as citizens in several Tribes.  
BY the like reason a city doth differ from a Nation, where men dwell not in streets and boroughs, but dispersed.] A city is less one, than a league or Nation compacted of one sort of men. A Nation which is not distributed into castles and boroughs, but dispersed in Hamlets here and there in the fields, and having onely certain Magistrates in common, doth differ from a city by the like difference, that is to say, in multitude, as a city is properly taken: for now and then such a Nation is called a city by some authors, as for example, by Iulius Caesar in his first commentary of the French Warres: Where speaking of the city of Heluetia, he saith it is divided into four Cantons.  
LIKE the Arcadians.] In old time the Arcadians dwelled in the land of Morea, or Peloponesus, dispersed in fields, in Mountaines, and Forrests, by Hamlets, being accounted for most honest people, as Polybius writeth in the fourth book of his history, as well for their honest behaviour and peaceable manner of living toward all men, as for their honour and reverence to the gods. In their commonweal music was had in so great estimation, 
music in Arcadia.  that they caused it to bee taught, not onely to their children, but also to young folk, until they came to the age of thirty yeares, who by nature being sturdy and rude persons, did by that means moderate and temperate their manners. They accustomend to sing songs and hymmes of the praise of God, of Noblemen, and virtuous personages, making yearly sights and shows with such songs and dances, at the charge of the commonweal: a thing most wisely ordained by their ancestors, not for pleasure sake, but for the assuaging of the continual labour which the people took in tilling the earth, with rudeness and brutishness of life: and to temperate their severe manner of living proceeding of the coldness and hardn●sse of the air, like to the which, men are necessary born. For it is well known, that the Regions and Climates of the heaven, do make Nations differ between themselves in maner of living, in fashion and shape of countenance, and in many skills and exercises. Therefore the Arcadians minding to make their nature mild and tractable, which of itself was fierce and rude, did set forth the things afore-specified, and afterwards common assemblies and meetings with diverse sacrifices, whereat both men and women met together: and last of all, the dances of young maides and children, doing all to the intent to make that mild and courteous through custom, which was sturdy and rude in mens hearts by Nature.  
NOW those things whereof the union is to bee made, do differ in diuers respects: insomuch, that recompense or mutual preferment equally bestowed, doth preserve and descend Citi●s, as afore hath been shewed in the ethics: which reward or mutual preferment necessary ought to bee observed amongst them that bee free and equal, because they cannot all command and haue Magistrateships together: but are to govern by yeares, or some other order and course of time: whereby it cometh to pass, that all do bear rule: in like sort as if Shooemakers and Carpenters did alter and change, and were not always the same Shooemakers and Carpenters: Howbeit, forasmuch as in a civil society, it is better that things always continue as they bee, it were more expedient, that the selfsame men should always govern, if it were so possible. Notwithstanding, where that is not possible, by reason all men are equal by Nature, it is good reason that all should haue part in ruling, whether it bee good or bad: imitating herein a course by turns, one after another: to the end, that they which bee equal should give place one to another, as the former Magistrates did give place unto them. So some bear rule, and othersome obey interchangeably, like as if there were a diversity and difference between them: by which means, diverse rulers do obtain diverse Magistrateships. Hereby know w●e how it is contrary to the nature of a city, that it should bee so united as some men set down: and how that which they uphold for the greatest welfare of cities, doth overthrow them: for every thing is preserved by the goodness thereof. Also there is another reason to prove, that it is not best to procure the uniting of a city too much: for a house hath more sufficiency than a man, and a city than a house. And then commonly do men think there is a city properly, when it hath there within a sufficient company of Inhabitants: Wherefore, if the most sufficient is most to bee wished: then is that which is least one, to bee preferred before that which is most one.  
HE proveth here by another reason, that there may bee no such union in a city as Socrates hath set down, because a city doth necessary consist of commanders and obeyers interchangeably, and of others differing in sundry respects: as Gentlemen, Commoners, poor, Rich, Crafts-men, Marchants, labourers, and soldiers: who sufficiently bewray that variety and diversity bee very necessary therein, which notwithstanding are contrary to that manner of union. For as natural things are made of elements, and a family of things differing in sundry respects: so ought a city to bee composed of diverse kinds and orders of men. Howbeit, there is no doubt, but that it is maintained by unity and good agreement, and overthrown by dissension and discord.  
recompense or mutual preferment equally bestowed, doth preserve and defend Cities.] All societies of men are directed and maintained by the due communicating of things, and by order of persons. Therefore bee there two kindes of Iustice, the one commutative, the other distributive: Iustice commutative, executed by arithmetical proportion; and that which pertaineth to distribution, is exercised by geometrical proportion. The arithmetical equality is requisite in contracts and dealings, as well voluntary as violent, to the end, that the communicating of commodities may bee everlasting. The geometrical equality ought to bee observed in distributing of rewards and punishments, and bestowing of honors and Magistrateships, in giuing every man his place, and handling him according to his quality and deserts. Which things haue been treated of at large in two places of the first book of Platoes commonweal.  
WHICH reward or mutual preferring, necessary ought to bee observed among them that be free and equal, because they cannot all command and haue Magistrateships together, but are to govern by yeares or some other order of time.] A perrillouser and hurtfuller pestilence cannot creep into a commonweal, then if any part of the same grow stronger than the rest. For it is unpossible for society and unity to continue amongst citizens, if uprightness be not equally observed therein; as a mixed and compounded body doth decay, if any element whereof it is compact, do exceed the rest: And every tune goeth out of tune, if the string stretch or the voice rise more then is convenient. So to the end the commonweal may remain in safety, there ought not any one part of the same grow stronger than the rest: but it behoveth that all, if it were possible, should haue part in the public authority and power. Therfore in dominions& commonweals, where lords and citizens are all equal, the distributing of honours and Magistrateships ought to be observed in such sort, that all may bear rule by turns, accordingly as their turn shall fall, some three yeares, other some one year, and others eight months, as the Venetian Gentlemen do, who haue the whole government and power of the commonweal reserved to them and their counsel, so as no Magistrate of himself hath any authority of importance, neither is perpetual, saving the Duke, who continueth during his life, and Saint marks proctors, who haue no prefixed time, but continue in those rooms till their deaths.  
IT were more expedient that the selfsame men should always govern.] Like as in a city there bee always the same Shoemakers or Carpenters, who in their youth learn their occupations and Trades, and exercise the same as long as they can, so if there might be continually the same Magistrates, that were the best course in the Philosophers opinion. For where( as Isocrates affirmeth in his Oration to Symachus) they continue but for a year or some other prefixed time, for the most part they go out of office before they begin to haue any skill in public affairs, or haue gotten any experience therein. But where they continue in office during their lives, as in the greatest part of Monarchies they do: though the Officers haue the less understanding and wit: yet through continual exercise and long experience, they may become skilful and discreet.  
AS the former Magistrates did give place unto them.] As at the beginning other men gave over their Magistrateships unto them, so ought they give them over to others, sith all together cannot possess them, but one after another by turns.  
LIKE as if there were a diversity and difference between them.] They that of private persons become Magistrates, and of Magistrates private persons, seem to bee diverse and differing. For as he writeth in the last Chapter of the former book: In many civil governments, the rulers and obeyers alter by turns, because they will bee equal according to the course of Nature, and differ in nothing, although that when the one commandeth and the other obeyeth, they seek a difference in apparel, in speech, and in honours: as Amasis answered concerning the tub that served to wash feet in, which after it was converted into an Image, was worshipped. The tale is written by Herodotus in Euterpes.  
BY which means diverse rulers do obtain diverse Magistrateships.] By giuing place one to another by turns, every man as his turn falleth, doth exercise some Magistrateship differing from another: As at Rome, one was the AEdile, another Pretour, and another consul: At Venice, one is the Dukes counsellor, another Commissioner for victuals, another of counsel with the Sages and Prouiders, another chief iustice, anoanother ambassador, another captain of the Sea, another conserver or maintainer: the rest be Captaines of the Watch, or Tribunes of the city, Auditors, receivers, Iudges, and overseers.  
ALSO there is another reason proving that it is not best to procure the uniting of a City too much.] This is the reason: Sith the happiness of a city consisteth in sufficiency, and where most diversity of things is, there is most sufficiency; therefore diversity is more to bee desired in a city than that to great platonical union.  
THEN commonly do men think there is a city properly.] In the second Chapter of the former book he writeth, that the perfect assembly of boroughs or streets, is a city already welneere attained to the end of all sufficiency, founded not onely for living, but to the end to live well: or as he defineth in his books of household government, a multitude of houses sufficiently furnished with territories, and money for the maintenance of living.    

CHAP. II. The reproof of the community of wives and children, brought in by Socrates in Platoes commonweal.  
but now put case it were a very great good thing to unite a city as much as might bee, yet seemeth not that to bee proved by this reason, if all men together say, mine, and not mine: which Socrates supposeth to bee a manifest sign and argument, that a City is perfectly united. For why, this word All, hath a double meaning, if it be taken distributively for every one: peradventure the thing which he pretendeth might the sooner bee brought to pass: And then might every man say of his sons and wives that they bee his, and so of his goods and all other things which belong to men. But now, they that should haue their wives and children in common, would not say so: but would say All, collectively and not distributively, as every one: whereby there manifestly appeareth, that there is a fallacian or deceitful speech in this word All: because these words All and Both, are even and odd, in that they haue a double signification: and in disputations do breed fallacious& contentious reasons. Therefore it would not bee amiss, if all men should call the selfsame thing their own, in one sense of All, that is, distributively: But that is not possible,& being understood in the other, to wit, collectively; it is in all respects unfit to breed concord. Further, that discourse of Socrates containeth another inconvenience: for men smally regard any thing that is common to many, but make good account of that which every man hath particular to himself. And if some one man bee careful of that which is in common, other men therefore will make smaller account and care of it: as it falleth out in household affairs, where often many seruants do worse service than a fewer number. whereas then by that way propounded by Socrates, every Citizen may haue a thousand sons, which shall not be proper to himself, but common to every other man, all men will indifferently neglect them● By the same mean also every Citizen will call any person in the city his, that doth well or evil, how many soever they be: as for example, This is my son, or this is his son, and speak in like sort of every one of a thousand Citizens, or howe many soever a City doth contain: and that doubtfully, because it is not certain who is the childs father, and for whom it is brought up. But whether is it better for every man so to call( his) any one of two thousand or ten thousand, or rather as men at this day in Cities, say this is mine, where one selfe same party is called by one man his son, by another his brother, by another his nephew, or by some either name of kindred, or of Parentage, alliance, or affinity, of himself first, and next of those that be his: and further, by one fellow or brother of a fraternity, by another companion of the selfsame Tribe? It is a great deal better to be a right and proper nephew, than the other way a son. Neither can this possibly be avoided in that community, but that some men will rest doubtful, who be their own brethren, children, fathers and mothers: for by the likeness of children to their parents, they must necessary make trial one of another, as diverse Cosmographers do affirm to bee used in certain countries of the higher Affrica, where women are common, and that children are there discerned by their likenesses and shapes. Also of beasts, there be diverse females found, as Mares and kine, that bring forth yoeng ones, like their dams: as for example, the mere of Pharsalia, which therefore was termed just. again, it is not possible for the setters down of that community to avoid diverse inconveniences: as for example, affraies and slaughters made sometimes wilful, and sometime against will: and also riots, brawling, and quarreling, the committing whereof against father and mother, and other near kinsfolk, is worse and more intolerable, than if they were done against strangers: which kinds of wickedness will of necessity sooner happen where kindred is unknown, then when it is known. How●eit, amongst them that bee known, if any such offences should happen, they might bee reconciled and purged with accustomend rites and ceremonies, when parents and kindred be known, and else not. Also the pretenders to make children common, do commit a great absurdity, in that they only forbid the mutual company of louers, and prohibit not love itself: and such other fashions as are most unseemly to pass between father and son, and brother and brother: considering that such manner of love is of itself dishonest, and that it is impertinent and to no purpose to enjoin them from that kind of company, for no other reason, then onely for that there is too great pleasure therein: without any regard had whether they be father or son, or brethren and sisters among themselves. It seemeth that the community of wives and children is more meet to be established amongst husbandmen, than keepers and governors of Cities& commonweals: because the community of children& wives would breed the less friendship amongst them: and subiects ought to bee kept in such terms, as that they may be holden under obedience, and not seek after novelties. doubtless, that law of Socrates would work, not only quiter contrary to that which all laws duly ordained, should perform, but also directly against that cause which moved Socrates to hold opinion, that such order should be taken concerning children and wives: for wee judge, that amity and friendship is the greatest of all goods and commodities that any City or commonweal can attain and come unto,& the most apt thing to defend them from sedition and uproars. And Socrates doth highly extol the uniting of a City, which in his opinion seemeth to be the work of friendship, as we know how Aristophanes in the dialogue or treatise of love setteth down, that louers through the fervent love they bear one to another, do come together, and of two make themselves one, but that is fondness: for by making one of two, of necessity either both or one of them must perish. wherefore, that kind of community proposed by Socrates, will much diminish friendship in a City and commonweal, and bring to pass, that no son can certainly say this is my father; nor any father, this is my son. But admit old men should call the younger sort sons, and young men should term the elder sort fathers, yet would that serve to little purpose: for as a small quantity of sweetness mingled with a great deal of water, maketh a strange and insensible mixture, even after the selfsame sort doth it fall out, in that kindred and familiarity, which springeth from such manner of names and terms: so as in that kind of commonweal, it is not necessary either for the Father to haue care of his sons, or the sons of the father, nor for brethren to take care one of another. Soothly, there bee two things which greatly move men to care and love: Namely, that commodity which is every mans own and proper to himself, and affection or good will, neither of the which can bee amongst men subject to such kind of government. again, the transporting of children from husbandmen and artificers to keepers, and from keepers to husbandmen and craf●smen, cannot be without great disorder and confusion, and the maner of the execution therof, very hard: besides, it is necessary for the glovers and transporters of them, to know whom, and to what persons they give them. By which means, will the inconveniences afore touched, the sooner happen: namely, murders, unlawful louings, and man-slaughters. For neither such persons as are transferred and convyed to other citizens, do any longer call their keepers, brethren and sons, fathers and mothers: nor likewise, they that abide with keepers, do use those names to others to whom they are put over, whereby the reverence or regard of kindred, should restrain them from committing such enormities. Thus much haue we set down hitherto concerning the community of wives and children.  
ARISTOTLE having already declared, that too great unity is not good for a city: doth go on with reproving of those reasons wherewith Socrates supposed to unite it greatly, and upholdeth that they are rather the cause of the disuniting of the same: and peremptorily he condemneth that which concerneth the community of wives and children. Notwithstanding, the opinion of Plato in the fift book of his commonweal, as appeareth by his reasoning, there at large set down, and by his repetition of the same commonweal in the beginning of his Timeus, was not, that women should be absolutely common, prostitute to the company of all men without difference,& so by means therof children should be in a maner illegitimate and incestuous bastards, a thing reproved by all laws both of God and men: But for the clear rooting out of the apprehension and conceit of[ mine, and not mine] out of mens minds, because they are the occasions of all suits, partialities, and seditions; he pretended, that young virgines when they were of age to mary, should by certain Magistrates thereunto authorized, be matched in marriage to young men of their own complexion and quality, with certain ceremonies; lots, and songs, that is to say, good maids to good men, and strong maids to strong men, the more conveniently to bring forth children like themselves:& that when they were with child, they should be retired a part from their husbands, and bee well kept and entertained else-where till the time of their deliveries. And that then the children which came of those marriages should be noursed and brought up together in one meet place at the charge of the commonweal: so that young folk of like age, having ben brought up after one fashion, should account themselves for the commonweals children, and for brethren, and aclowledge the eldest sort for their fathers and grandfathers. This he thought was meet to bee observed in the children of the keepers, and all such as in time to come should bee keepers, that is to say, Magistrates and men of war. Plato straineth himself to show howe that fashion is not onely possible, but also very good and behoveful. But Aristotle and all others that came after, haue spoken against it.  
THIS word All hath a double understanding.] This reason with the other that followeth, do smell more of Aristotles cunning and subtlety, than of any politic grauytie. Therefore Alexander the great, now and than smiling at certain of Aristotles like speeches, said {αβγδ}. 
That is, Aristotle is well seen in Sophistry.  Therfore this is a dark word, and is taken and understood sometimes by way of collection, comprising all those that bee of a multitude together: and sometimes by way of distribution, signifying every one of the multitude severally by itself. Now Socrates imagined that he had established unity in a city, when all men might say of one selfsame woman, child, or house, This is mine, and that is not mine: Which were well said, taking the word All for every one, that is to say, by way of distribution, where every man speaketh of any thing that particularly belongeth to himself: but when it is taken by way of collection, it is both impossible and absurd, that all men together speaking of one s selfsame thing that is common, should say, This is mine, and this is not mine: and besides the unity intended by Socrates could not follow of it.  
ALL and Both, are even and odd, because they haue a double signification.] In latin, Omnes, & utraque, vel ambo, the English cannot so well express them, yet wee will show the meaning of them as wee may. All and Both are taken two manner of ways, and in the selfsame meaning: saving that Ambo or utraque is understood only of two, and Omnes signifieth many. Therfore All and Both are sometimes even and odd in number: as for example, twelve persons divided into four three, are the selfsame even and odd: for being taken together, and collectively, they are even in number, for that they are twelve: but being taken severally by three, they are all odd. Likewise, six taken together, is even, and severally odd. This is alleged by Aristotle, to show that this word All hath a double and doubtful understanding, and now and then may be drawn to such significations as are directly opposite one against another.  
BY one, fellow or brother of a fraternity, by another companion of the same tribe.] The people of Athens being divided into sundry parts, the greatest of them were called {αβγδ}, which in latin signifieth Tribus: of the which, every one divided into three parts, did make {αβγδ}, called also {αβγδ}, which signifieth a pit; the which the same neighbours, to wit, they of the selfsame brotherhood, used in common. Harpocration and Pollux in the eight book.  
OF the higher Africa.] Namely, the farthest from the sea, for a country is deemed low because it lieth next to the sea. In the same signification wee say low almain, low normandy and brittany, low Poytou and Languadocke. The sea is contained in the co●caue and hollow superficies of the earth, being lower than the land that is dry and vncouered, as the running downward of the waters proveth, which naturally slide downward, as is affirmed by Aristotle in his second book of Meteors. So that as the sea is higher than the under superficies of the earth, so is it lower than the shore, and consequently lower than the countries that are farthest from it, the riuers whereof go downward by natural course.  
AND that children are there discerned by their likenesses and shapes.] There is a great disputation between natural Philosophers and Phisitians, from whence the likeness of children to their Parents proceedeth. Some hold opinion, that the seed descending from all parts of the body, and specially from the head and brain, is the cause thereof. Some children are like their Grandfather, some twins are, one like the father, and the other like the mother, some always like their father, and others ever like their mother, and diverse neither like father nor mother.  
THE mere of Pharsalia, who therefore was termed just.] Pharsalia is a town of thessaly, well known by reason of the civil Warres between Caesar and Pompey. The Country adjoining unto it, did breed very good horses, from whence came Bucephale, Alexander the great his horse, and the mere so much spoken of, whereof Aristotle maketh mention in this place, that brought colts like their sires,& peradventure was therefore called just.  
HOWBEIT amongst them that be known, if any such offences should happen, they might be reconciled and purged with accustomend rites and ceremonies.] The Gentiles of old time used sacrifices of reconciliation or purgations( whereof wee haue spoken in the second book of Platoes commonweal) when any man had injuried, beaten, or slain, either his father or mother, or any other of his near kindred, much like the secret confessions and penances, which the penitentiaries and other Priestes, were wont to limit and assign.  
AND subiects ought to be kept in such terms, as that they may be holden under obedience, and not seek after novelties.] It were more tolerable, that the wives and children of subiects should bee rather common, than of Lords and Gouernours: because that course would diminish the friendship and affinity that groweth amongst them by reason of marriages, and maketh them the readiar to stir up sedition and rebellion. now the means to keep States in safety, and restrain subiects from sedition, are set down by Aristotle in his fifth book of his Pollitickes, cap. 11. in manner ensuing: The first mean is to keep down and cut short by all possible means those personages which are highest in degree and authority, and to rid away and destroy such as be courageous and high minded. The second is to permit no banquets, assemblies, intelligencies, nor any like thing. The third, to take heed of all things that haue accustomend to breed these two things, namely, stoutness of stomach, and confidence. The fourth, to forbid schools and all other idle companies. The fift, to provide by all means that the subiects know not one another, because acquaintance is an occasion whereby they trust one another the better. The sixth, that friends quarrel and fall at contention and controversies one with another● the meaner sort with the Gentlemen, and the richer sort with themselves. The seventh, to impoverish and keep them occupied from day to day, to the intent, they may want leisure to conspire. The eight, to undertake Warres to keep them occupied. The ninth, to attempt to make them faint-heard cowards, and men of small skill. The tenth, to stir up distrustfulness amongst them, and to bereave them of all manner of ability and power to rebel.  
FOR wee judge that amity and friendship is the greatest good that any City can attain unto.] Plato in his third book of laws, by many good reasons, and by the example of the Persians and Athenians, sheweth that no state can bee well governed, unless it bee free, and both wise, and friendly to itself.  
IN the first Dialogue or Treatise of love.] We haue translated this book out of Greek into French, and enlightened it with Commentaries lately published.  
AND of two make themselves one.] Aristophanes in the fourth Oration of the Treatise of love, in the fable of Androgines, setteth down this manner of making one of two by love. The curious sort may see the place set down at large.  
AS a small quantity of sweetness mingled with a great deal of water.] As ye would say, a little honey or Wine mingled with a great deal of water, is scant tasted at all: even so the making of parentage and kindred too common, and familiarity and acquaintance in spending, serveth to no good purpose or effect.  
again the transporting of children from husbandmen and artificers to keepers.] Platoes mind was, that if any Gouernours children were found of a rude and untowardly disposition, they should bee put to Husbandmen and men of Occupation. On the contrary side, if any Crafts-mens children seemed towardly and fit to serve the commonweal in public and martiall charges and offices, they should bee bestowed amongst the Gouernours children, and trained up with them all after one sort and manner of education. Although this kind of alteration and conveying of children from one sort to another, carry a great outward show, yet doth not Aristotle like of the same, because it maintaineth disorder in the manner of the proceeding thereof.   

CHAP. III. The reproving of the community of goods and possessions.  
NOw it followeth, that we treat after what maner, goods, and possessions are to be ordered in a good commonweal, namely, whether they ought to be common or not. This question may severally bee considered by itself by that which hath been decided touching children and wives. I mean as concerning possessions, Whether it were more expedient that they continue in such seueralty and propriety as they remain in at this day, and that the use of them should be common, as for example, the lands and grounds to be proper, and the fruits therof to remain in common, as is used amongst diverse Nations: Or contrariwise, whether the soil and territory should be common, and tillage in common also, b●t the crop and fr●its to bee divided and partend to proper and peculiar uses: which manner of community is found amongst certain strangers and Barbarians: or rather whether both soil and fruits should bee in common. If any other than the Citizens should till the ground, there would bee another and a more easy course: but if the Citizens take pains for themselves, there must needs many difficulties and controversies grow about possessions: for if they bee not equal, as well in reaping of profit, as in taking of pains, it cannot otherwise fall out, but tha● they who reap little and labour much, will complain of them that enjoy and take a great deal, and yet put themselves but to small labour. doubtless, it is a hard matter to live together and haue all things in common, and chiefly amongst those men of whom some take great pains in labouring, and others little or none at all, as is manifestly bewrayed by the companies of travelers, who often fall at variance amongst themselves for matters of little or no value: and wee ourselves haue many times controversies between those seruants and overseers which wee use ordinarily in our household affairs. Therefore these difficulties and diverse others do arise by the community of goods and possessions. But that manner and course which is now used, being established and adorned with good customs and upright laws, will bee more convenient, for that it hath both the commodities: retaining as well that benefit which may come by the community of possessions, as that which may grow by the propriety of them. It is expedient that possessions be enjoyed in propriety, and yet common after a certain manner. For where they be proper, the labours and cares that are distributed, bee not any occasion that one man should quarrel with another: nay, rather they do much good, in that all men do continually apply themselves severally about that which is their own in seueraltie: Howbeit, for virtues sake they will according to the proverb, make the use of commodities common amongst friends. That fashion of living, to the end it should not be judged to bee unpossible, is already represented in diverse Cities, specially in those that be well governed: some of the which haue received this fashion, and the rest may receive it. For every man that hath any possession proper to himself, doth yield certain commodities to the benefit of his friends, and useth diverse other commodities as common, according to the custom of the Lacedemonians, who use as their own one anothers slaves, Horses, Dogges, and victuals, if they stand in need of the same when they travail into the country or fields. Therefore it appeareth, that it is best that possessions should remain particular, and yet be made common by the use and bestowing of them: but howe that may be brought to pass, it is the Lawmakers work and office to provide in that behalf. Furthermore, the pleasure cannot bee expressed that men conceive in thinking that they haue some goods proper to themselves. For that friendship which every man beareth to himself, is not vain but natural. And though self-love be found fault withall, the meaning is not that a man should not love himself at all, but no more than is expedient: and in like manner concerning the love of money, sith all men love such commodities. Also it is a great contentation and pleasure to gratify and help friends, strangers, and such as bee of our acquaintance, as they may very well do, that are owners of any goods or possessions in private: which thing can never befall to them that unite a city too much, who also besides in so doing, lose all exercise of two virtues: First of Temperance and Abstinence from women; for it is a goodly work to abstain from other mens wives through the gift of temperatenesse: and next, of Liberality, which consisteth in the employing& bestowing of goods: For no man can be accounted liberal, unless he haue goods of his own to distribute, as his office requireth. Therefore the constitution of such a law carrieth a good outward show with it, and seemeth a courteo●s and gentle law in outward appearance: insomuch, that the auditor therof would willingly receive it, deeming that it would breed a wonderful friendship of e●ery sort of men towards others, cheef●y when any man findeth fault with the abuses and discommodities that are now in commonweals: as happening by reason that goods are not common, I mean, the actions and suits that one man bringeth against another vpon their bargains and contracts, and the judgements growing vpon false witnessing and other flatteries which are usual in the behal●e of the richer sort. Notwithstanding, those inconveniences do not happen, for that goods are not commou, but rather through mens lewdness, considering wee haue experience, that they who possess any thing in common, and use community, do sooner fall at variance amongst themselves, then they who haue their goods in seueralty: and for the most part it cometh to pass, that there ariseth more dissension amongst a few that live in common, then amongst a great many who enjoy their possessions particularly and in seueralty. moreover, it were good reason to express, not onely from what evils the livers in common should bee delivered, but also of what commodities they shall bee deprived: Soothly, that kind of life seemeth altogether unpossible. Wee m●st deem, that Socrates conceived this error, by supposing that to bee right and lawful which is not. For a house and city must each of them bee one after a certain sort, but not wholly: For a city may grow so far into one, that it can bee no longer a city: or if it shall draw to the point of lacking but a little of being no city, it will bee worse, like as if a tune were brought to one note, or a verse to one foot. But sithence a city is a multitude, it is to bee made common and one, through good manners and stablishing of convenient laws, as wee haue afore affirmed: and whosoever shall pretend to bring in that manner of institution and ordinance, supposing by means thereof to make the city virtuous, shall deceive himself, if he think to establish it by such means, and not as the Law-maker in Lacedemonia and Crete did: who by good manners, philosophy, and laws, did communicate possessions for the benefit of public life. Wee must look well into the long continuance of time, and remembrance of many yeares: wherein those means tending to establish community, had not lain hidden, if they had been good and behoveful. For welneere, all things haue been invented: Howbeit, some haue not been rece●ued, and other some haue been rejected and clearly forsaken, after men haue had experience of them. These things might bee more evidently perceived, by putting such a manner of commonweal in ure: which no man can bring to pass, without dividing and parting those things into public assemblies for eating, and into fraternities, or parts of Tribes, and whole Tribes. Insomuch, that a man shall find nothing well ordered in that commonweal: saving that the Gouernours are not put to the tillage of the ground, as the Lacedemonians do already begin to practise. Notwithstanding, Socrates hath not specified at all, what form of commonweal and government should bee assigned to them that live in common, neither is it an easy matter to set down. Though the multitude of a city doth almost consist of diverse Citizens and townsmen, yet doth bee determine nothing for them: to wit, whether Husbandmen ought to haue their possessions in common, or every man his own in particular: nor whether their wives and children should bee in propriety or community. If Husbandmen in one like sort shall haue all things in common, what difference shall wee haue between them and the Gouernours? Or what reward shall bee left for the rulers of the commonweal? Or wherefore should they take Magistrateships and Offices vpon them? unless they deal as the Candians did, Who permitting all other things to their slaves, onely forbade them the use of public exercises and wearing of armor. And if their af●aires shall bee ordered as the affairs of other commonweals bee, what manner a one shall their community be? Of necessity wee shall then find two Cities in one, of the which, the one shall bee contrary to the other. For he ordai●eth the rulers, as it were for tuition and defence; and the Husbandmen, Artificers, and the rest, as Citizens: who will ne●er live without suits in lawe and judgements, nor without all those other evils wherewith( he saith) Cities are continually vexed. Howbeit, he affirmeth that there is scant any need of laws for their training and directions, as namely, of none such as concern city matters, merchandises, and other like things: because he onely appointeth and attributeth discipline and the correction of things amiss, to the rulers. again, he suffereth Husbandmen to bee owners of possessions, so that they pay their Tributes: who notwithstanding( as is most likely) will be more tedious, froward, and prouder than those that elsewhere are called ●l●tians, Penestians, and other sorts of villains. But he doth not determine, whether those things which are a little before spoken of, and others thereupon depending, are all after one like sort necessary to Rulers, Husbandmen, Artificers, and other Citizens or not: nor what kind of government, discipline, and laws i● f●t for them: which is no ●asie matter to find out, neither is it a thing of any small importance, how Husbandmen, Artificers, and other Citizens should demean themselves to descend and preser●e socie●ie and community with the rulers. Neither doth he declare, if Husbandmens wives are to bee common, and their possessions proper: or if both common, that the wives shall haue the care of household matters, as their husbands haue of the fields. Besides, forasmuch as br●te beasts are not fit for, nor capable for the ordering of household affairs, it is impertinent and against all reason to draw a comparison from them whereby to appoint both to men and wives one manner of exercise. Further, Socrates his manner of ordaining and stablishing of Magistrates, is dangerous, in that he keepeth the selfsame men always in office and authority: which is an occasion, that they who come to no promotion and dignity, and others who are stout and warlike fellowes, fall unto mutinies and seditions. Notwithstanding, Socrates by means of his own supposion is constrained so to appoint: For that gold is not mingled by Gods grace, one while in one mind, and another while in another, but always in the selfsame. he saith that gold is mingled in some immediately at their birth, silver to others: and then copper and iron to such as are to bee artificers and Husbandmen. And bereaving the rulers of all felicity, he upholdeth, that the Lawmaker ought to make the whole city happy. Howbeit, it is unpossible to make all the city happy, for evermore many, or all, or some parts thereof shall not enjoy happiness. For it is not all one to bee happy and even, for a whole number may bee even, and yet diverse parts thereof odd: the like whereof befalleth not in happiness and felicity. But if the rulers bee not happy, what other persons shall bee? Truly neither artificers nor the meaner sort. Therefore that commonweal brought in by Socrates, doth contain these difficulties, and diverse others as great as these.  
PLATO his mind and intent was as himself writeth in the third and seventh books of his commonweal, and at the beginning of his Timeus, that the keepers and rulers of cities and commonweals should possess nothing in propriety: as for example, neither houses, gold, silver, nor any other kind of movables: but should haue all those commodities in common, and as servants and Ministers of the commonweal receive their sustenance of other men for their yearly anuitie and wages. Aristotle having already declared those inconveniencies which proceed from the community of wives and children, doth here show by many excellent reasons, that there is no less discommodity in the community of possessions, whether they bee wholly made common, or the lands onely, and not the crop and fruits: or contrariwise, whether the soil bee made proper to every man, and the fruits common: and that it is a great deal better that they remain as they do at this present possessed by every man, in particular and seueraltie, for the avoiding of many controversies and debates, and for the making of them in some sort common, by the use and bestowing of the same, through the honesty and liberality of the owners.  
IF any other then the citizens should till the ground.] As in france, the peasants and clowns till the Gentlemens lands, reap their corn, and mow down their Hey, which they carry home to their barns: and these be called Coru●●s. In Lacedemonia, in Candia, in thessaly, and in diverse other places, they had slaves and bondmen appointed to such business, of whom mention shall bee made hereafter.  
FOR that friendship which every man beareth to himself, is not vain, but natural.] Plato in his fift book De Legibus, saith: There is a great evil engrafted in diverse mens mindes, for the remedy whereof they take no regard, but flatter themselves: namely this,( as it is commonly said) that every man is by nature a friend to himself, and that it is good reason he should so bee. But in truth, m●ns too great love toward himself is the occasion of all inconveniences to all persons: for the lover is blind toward the party loved: therefore whosoever loveth himself, supposing that he ought to be more honoured than in truth he deserveth, doth judge amiss of that which is upright, good, and excellent. now he that mindeth to bee a man of great calling, should not love himself and his own affairs, but evermore such matters as are just: whether they bee performed by himself, or by any other men. This error is the cause that all men think their own ignorance to bee wisdom: insomuch, that though wee haue skill of nothing, yet wee think wee know all things: and whereas wee will not suffer other men to execute that whereof wee are ignorant, but undertake the doing thereof ourselves, wee are constrained to do amiss. For which cause all men should avoid too much self-love, and follow the better ways without any blushing therefore for shamefastness. And in another place he saith: that {αβγδ}: he that loveth himself too much shall haue no friend. Aristotle in his Eihicks, Lib. 9. Cap. 8. declareth what lover of himself deserveth rebuk, and which is to be commended, and after what manner.  
FOR welneare all things haue been invented, howbeit, some haue not been received, and othersome haue been left off after experience had of them.] Aristotle in his seventh book of this Pollitickes, and the tenth Chapter: peradventure( saith he) it is credible, that many other things haue ben long ago, diverse times, or rather infinitely found out: and it is likely, that need first taught the use of necessary things, and that afterwards those commodities which serve to honour and pomp were increased. Wee must suppose, that the like hath befallen in commonweals. Therefore it is meet and convenient to take the use of those things that haue been well invented, and to endeavour the supplying of that which wanteth in that behalf. And in the twelfth book of his metaphysics the eight Chapter, he sayth● philosophy hath been often lost and foregone, and found out again. The like affirmeth Plato in Timeus, and in his third and sixth books De Legibus, and plutarch at the beginning of Sertorius his life.  
without dividing and parting those things into public feasts, and into pieces of Tribes, and whole Tribes.] The Lacedemonians and Candians in old time used such manner of assemblies, which in their own tongues they called Si●syties, Phidities, and Andryes, whereof-mention is often made in these books of government. Also Xenophon in the Lacedemonians commonweal, and plutarch in Lycurgus his life, speaketh of the same. Forasmuch therefore, as the often meeting together of citizens is very fit for the maintenance of mutual friendship amongst them: Lycurgus and Minos establishing commonweals, would and ordained that citizens should eat together of one sort of victuals in diverse companies, expressly forbidding them to eat apart privately: but they were to meet together by fifteens, or a few more, or a few less, in every hall at set times. Contarine in his second book of the Venetian commonweal witnesseth, That the same old custom was transported to Venice in four banquets which their Duke doth yearly make to his citizens, at the charges of the commonweal. Aristotle in his seventh book of Pollitickes, and the tenth Chapter writeth: That the fashion of meeting together to eat, was very ancient, and that it hath been observed in Candia from the reign of Mynos, and long afore that brought into italy by Italus king of that country, who of shepherds, made the Italians Husbandmen, and amongst other laws, established that manner of banqueting together.  
unless they deal as the Candians did● who permitting all other things to their slaves, onely forbade them from public exercises and the wearing of armor.] The Candians in their Language called that manner of people {αβγδ}, as ye would say, Inhabitants of the country adjoining, who were not properly bondmen, but peasants or men of the country, Vassals, and Tributaries to their Landlords, and tilers of their grounds, as the peasants of france do for their Gentlemen, who commonly take from them their armor and Weapons, and are an impediment that they shall not exercise them, of purpose to make them the more obedient and tractable.  
THAT there is scant any need of laws for their training and direction.] Plato deemed, that there should scant need any laws in his commonweal by reason of the good bringing up and discipline wherein his citizens should bee trained, as he saith in the fourth book of his commonweal, as they that of their own accords without any laws, will govern themselves as becometh them.  
THOSE that elsewhere are called Ilotians, Penestians, and other sorts of villains.] The Ilotes in Lacedemonia, were men brought into bondage and slavery by right of war, who ploughed and tilled the ground of the Lacedemonians, and made a yearly revenue to arise therefrom. These because they oftentimes revolted against their Maisters, are here by Aristotle called proud, and also for the same cause they were kept as low under subiection as might bee, and constrained to labour and travail continually.  
PENESTS, or Penestians.] These as their name notifieth, were poor Husbandmen and labourers, that served the Thessalians to till their land. even as the Periaeces in candy did, of whom it hath already been spoken. Plato in the sixth book De Legib. speaketh of this Ilotie and Penestie, showing how men ought to behave themselves towards such kind of people.  
BESIDES, forasmuch as brute beasts are not fit for, nor capable of house government, it is impertinent and against all reason to draw a comparison from them, whereby to appoint both to men and women one manner of exercise.] Like as Bitches naturally are lead to do the same things which dogs do, to safeguard the flocks of sheep from wolves; and other noisome beasts, to defend with equal affection their maisters houses, and to hunt or course the Hare the one as well as the other: so likewise, Plato in the fift book of his Commonwealth goeth about to prove, that all discipline of government ought to bee common to men and women, and also all exercises both of peace and war, saving that men ought to be used as the stronger,& women as weaker and more tender and delicate. The which reason Aristotle utterly rejecteth, because brute beasts are not economical, as men are: whereupon it cometh to pass, that women as the weaker sex, abide ordinarily within doors, having care of the household expenses, and of the education of her children: the which thing the females among beasts cannot do, but are constrained to live without in the air without houses, and to range up and down for prey and provision of victuals, as well as the males. See that which is noted hereof in the first chapter of this first book, and that which Xenophon writeth touching the same in his economics, cap. 12. and Aristotle economics, cap. 2.  
SOCRATES his maner of ordaining and establishing of Magistrates is dangerous, in that he keepeth the selfsame men always in office and authority.] He said before, that in a Common-wealth where the Citizens and subiects are equal and free, there ought be a mutual intercourse of commanding and obeying, to the end, that all in their course and turn may haue their part in honours and public Offices: otherwise it would happen, that men of courage, and exercised in chivalry, being debarred and excluded, would grow discontented, and so stir up rebellions and seditions, which is a most dangerous thing in a state.  
FOR that gold is not mingled by Gods grace, one while in one mind, and another while in another, but always in the selfsame.] Plato following the steps of Hesiodus in his book De operibus& diebus( works and daies:) saith towards the end of his third book De Repub. in fable wise by comparison of metals, that men were so created by God, that he mingled gold in the generation of them that should be fit to command and rule, which maketh them most honourable: silver in them which should assist and succour the Rulers: and iron and brass into Labourers and other Artificers: out of which reason Aristotle concludeth, that it must needs follow; that always the same men should bear rule, to wit, those that shall haue gold in their birth, seeing that the nature of gold doth not change nor pass from one to another.  
AND bereaving the rulers of all felicity.] Reducing and bringing them into such an estate and condition, that they cannot by any means be happy.  
FOR it is not all one to be happy and even.] An even number is that which is divided into two equal parts, All a whole number may bee even, and yet never a part thereof but odd, as six divided into two thirds. The which disparity cannot happen in a city betwixt the whole and the parts: for the whole city cannot bee happy, except all the parts into which it is divided, be happy also.   

CHAP. IIII. Of the insufficiency of the second form of Common-wealth, propounded by Plato in his fift book De Legibus.  
NOw for as much as the like imperfection is near band found in the laws described by him afterward, it shall not be amiss to consider a little of that form of Common-wealth also: For Socrates in his first Common-wealth hath but slightly touched a few things, to wit, the community of women and children, howe it ought to bee, and the community of goods together with the ordering of a Common-wealth. He divided the whole multitude of inhabitants into two parts, namely Husbandmen and men of arms, of which he compoundeth a third, which consulteth and exerciseth authority in the City. As touching Husbandmen and Artificers, whether they are to bee received into any Office, or whether they may bear arms, or go on warfare or no, Socrates hath not a whit determined: but he esteemed that women ought to go on warfare, and bee partakers of the same discipline and institution, as men in authority are. As concerning the book of laws, the greatest part thereof is touching laws, and little or nothing touching policy or government: the which also studying to make common to other cities, by litile and little he falleth again into another form of Common-wealth: For( except onely the community of wives and goods) he ascribeth the selfsame things to both kindes, setting forth the same Discipline, the same exemption from necessary businesses, and the same manner of eating together, except that here he addeth the assembly of women to that same end: and in the one he would haue a thousand men at arms, and in the other five thousand: Wherefore the whole speech of Socrates carries indeed a show of bravery, but is superfluous, ambitious, vainglorious, and full of novelty and doubtful questions: and peradventure it is a hard matter, that all should go well therein, especially in regard of the multitude whereof wee spake of late; which being so great, surely there would want necessaries, as in the land of Babylon, or any other ample and large country, to furnish with victuals so many idle men as five thousand, with a far greater company of women and seruants: Let him therefore devise suppositions in his brain, so that they bee such as are not impossible. moreover, he saith: That a lawgiver when he maketh laws, ought to haue regard to these two things, to the place and to the men: to the which, it will not be amiss to add the regard of neighbour adjoining places, to the end, the city may haue a politic kind of life: for it is necessary that it bee provided of Weapons and arms that are profitable, not onely for itself, but also which may serve for another country. And put the case then, that such a life of the City is not approved neither in particular nor in public: yet notwithstanding the citizens ought to bee fearful to their enemies, not onely when they i●●ade their borders, but also when they are retired. Besides, regard ought to bee had to possessions, whether the quantity of them might not bee better, that is to say, more plainly and manifestly defined and set down: for he affirmeth that there ought to bee so much goods in this city, as might suffice every one to l●●e temperately, as if he would say, to live well: which is too general a speech, because that a man may live temperately, and yet notwithstanding miserable. Wherefore it were better to say, Temperately, and Liberally together: both which separately taken, a luxurious life doth follow the one, and a laborious the other, considering that these virtuous habits do onely consist in the use of goods: for wee are not accustomend to say that a man doth use goods gently or valiantly, but moderately and liberally: so that it is necessary, that the use of them consist in that. Further, it is impertinent and absurd, when as he bringeth in an equality of goods and possessions, to determine nothing concerning the multitude of citizens, and to leave at large the measure of procreation of children: as if it would necessary come to pass, that howe many soever were born, yet there would bee a sufficient equality by reason of the barrenness of some, as wee see it happen at this present in cities. But nevertheless, that could not bee so exactly observed then, as now; the reason is, because now adays none are poor, by reason that the goods and possessions are distributed among the multitude: but then they being not distributed, necessarily such persons as exceed the ranted number, or bee extraordinary, must haue nothing whether they were more or few in number: and therefore it were more needful rather to limit the generation of children, then the quantity of possessions: that men might not beget more children then was ordained and prescribed. And in this limitation of children regard must bee had to the diverse chances of death, and to the barrenness of men and women: for that being not regarded, as wee see in many places, is the cause that citizens become poor, and then poverty engendereth sedition and wickedness. Phidon the Corinthian one of the most ancient Law-giuers in memory of man, was of this mind, that the number of houses and of citizens ought always to be equal: albeit, at the first unequal proportions had by lot fallen unto all; but the contrary is to bee found in these laws: of which matter wee will entreat hereafter, and declare what wee think is fittest to bee ordained. Furthermore, he hath omitted to show howe Magistrates and they which are in authority, differ from private men. For he saith, onely as the warp is made of another kind of thread then the Wo●e, so ought Magistrates to differ from subiects. again, whereas he permitteth the increase and multiplication of possessions unto five fold: wherefore doth he not allow the same in lands and territories unto a certain limitation? Also the division of houses which he maketh, is not very commodious nor fit for household affairs: for he assigneth to every man two distinct several houses, but it is a hard matter for one man to inhabit two houses. Besides all this, all the whole description of his Common-wealth seemeth neither to bee a popular power, which they call a democraty, nor the power of a few, called an oligarchy: but a form of government betwixt both, which they call a policy, consisting of men that bear armor. If therefore he hath propounded this form of Common-wealth, as the most usual in Cities; it may bee he hath said well: but if as the best next unto the first, he is out of the way: for so the Lacedemonian form, or some other, where the best men Aristocratically bear rule, is more commended. Some are of opinion, that a good commonweal ought to bee compounded of all the ●ormes of government together: and in that respect they commend the Lacedemonians, because it consisteth of an oligarchy, a monarchy, and a democraty, that is, the dominion of the people: Their Kingly State is a monarchy, their Senate an oligarchy, and their Ephorie a democraty: because the Magistrates or Tribunes of the people called Ephori, are taken out of the people. Others think, that this Ephorian Office is a plain tyranny, and that democraty consisteth rather in their common assemblies, and joint banquetings, and their other ordinary manners of life. And more in these laws of Socrates it is declared, that a good Common-wealth must be compounded of these two forms, a democraty and a tyranny: which are either no forms at all of government, or if they bee, yet are they the worst of all. Therefore they that mingle more forms together, are rather to bee followed, because a Common-wealth compact of the most forms of government, is the best. And yet if a man would consider Socrates Common-wealth advisedly, he shall find little or nothing therein that belongs to a monarchy, but all to an oligarchy or a democraty, although it incline naturally most to an oligarchy, as it may appear by the creation of Magistrates: for to create them being elect by lot, is common to both: but to bee necessary that the most rich bee assistant and present at their public consultations, and the creation of Magistrates, and the execution of other civil offices, whereas the rest are exempted therefrom, is proper to an oligarchy: As this also, to procure that the greatest part of those that bear rule in the Common-wealth bee of the richer sort; and that the greatest Offices bee put on them that haue greatest riches. Also the election of the Senate is oligarchical: for all choose necessary, but the first choice is out of them of the first rank of men of greatest revenue, then as many out of the second, and so of the third: except that they of the third& fourth rank are not necessary to choose: as for the fourth, only they of the first& second rank of revenue, in all the four are constrained to choose them. Then he saith after this, that they must cull out of each rank so many, that they all may be of an equal number: so that they of the greatest revenue must exceed in number and goodness, for as much as there are some of the populacie that choose not at all, and that because they are not compelled to choose. Therefore that this Common-wealth cannot consist of a democraty and a monarchy, it is clear by this that hath been spoken, and will be more clear by that which we shall speak hereafter, when occasion shall be offered. Also there ariseth a danger in that maner of creation of Magistrates, in choosing some out of them that be chosen: For if certain should conspire together, though they were but a few, yet would the election be compassed by undermining, according to their own desires. And this is that form of Common-wealth which Plato in his laws hath described.  
PLATO after his ten books of commonweal matters, wrote twelve of Laws: Of the which twelve, he hath made the four first in form of a Proeme, before he enter into the principal matter, which he beginneth to treat of in the fift: wherein he first setteth down such laws as pertain to the state in general, and to the charges of Magigrates: after that cometh he in order to such laws as concern the particular actions of the citizens, in the doing whereof, he hath described such a form of commonweal as doth differ from the other. He calleth the one the first, wherein he will haue all things common: the other, the second, being less common: against the which Aristotle continueth to dispute as he did against the former: alleging that there is small difference between them, saving in the community afore specified.  
FOR Socrates in his first commonweal, hath but slightly touched a few matters.] Here is as it were a sum or brief repetition of the matters contained in Platoes first commonweal.  
As for his book of laws.] Although this book bee enriched with many goodly and grave discourses of the original and beginning of laws and cities, of music, of the bringing up and training of mankind, of Gods providence, of the conferring together of the chief commonweals of his time, namely, the Candian, Lacedemonian, and Athenian, and of the Persian monarchy, of the situation and power of Towns, and of diverse other like matters: yet notwithstanding, the greatest part of the work is spent in penning of laws, with their Proemes, without any other speech concerning the commonweal, or specifying what maner of form and quality it should bee of.  
THE which also endeavouring to make it common to other cities.] To make it fitter for the common use of cities than the first, so that many cities may haue the use thereof.  
THE exemption from necessary works.] As for example, from tillage of the ground, and other mean occupations necessary for mens use. He useth this word in the like signification in the third book, and third Chapter.  
AND will haue in the one commonweal a thousand men at arms, and in the other five thousand.] Aristotle hath ouerskipped forty, for Plato in his fift book of laws, supposeth a great commodity in the number of 5040, both in Warres and peace, and also in leagues and succours: because it containeth in it diverse divisions or distributions of parts disposed in order.  
THEREFORE the whole speech of Socrates.] Plato bringing in Socrates in his writings causeth him to dispute in Dialogue-wise, confuting other mens opinions, without declaring his own: and using diverse inductions, and other arguments cunningly handled, which make the understanding thereof very hard, as having in some places apparent ambiguities, and in others superfluity: and in some other he seemeth curious of new and wonderful matters, as in treating of the Ideas of the community of wives, Children, and Goods, and likewise of other strange and unusual things. Notwithstanding, all affection and parciality laid aside, if they be red with iudgement, and that men do come unto him prepared aforehand with other Sciences, and some experience withall, they shall find in him great profit, as well in knowledge of sundry matters, as in eloquence, whereof he hath shewed himself so curious, as that men used to say, he painted his writings, that is to say, that he looked them over, and corrected them most curiously.  
THE Land of babylon.] A Region near unto the great and famous city of Babylon, very large and fertile, containing a part of Assyria and Mesopotomia. Aristotle maketh mention of Babylon in the third book of this work, and the second Chapter.  
TEMPERATELY and liberally together.] Forasmuch as the society of a city is not only to live, but to live well, that is to say, happily with sufficiency: in the second Chapter of the first book, and fift Chapter of the seventh book of this work, he saith: That it should haue the territories and goods sufficient for the temperate and bountiful maintenance thereof, that is to say, moderate and delightful.  
ALSO it is impertinent and absurd in that where he bringeth in equality of goods.] Plato in his fift and sixth books of laws doth not make inheritances so equal, that one shall not possess more than another: For he appointeth four degrees or orders according to the difference of revenues. Notwithstanding, in his first institution of a city, and in his division of lands and goods, he will haue even portions delivered to all his citizens. This Aristotle calleth equalness of goods. Then permitteth he that principal portion to be increased to a double, triple, and fourfold quantity, so as a man shall possess no less than is comprised in the first stock, nor any more than is contained in the fourth.  
but when they remain undivided, of necessity, such persons as exceed the ranted number, or be extraordinary, shall haue nothing, {αβγδ}.] Socrates would not haue every mans goods and patrimony divided amongst all his children: but that the father might dispose and leave it wholly to any one of them whom he liked or loved best. Whereby it would come to pass, that they which were born above the appointed number of 5040 should haue nothing. For the avoiding of which poverty, the number of children to bee engendered, should bee prescribed and limited, without staying vpon this, that there die as many of those that bee born, as that the multitude of citizens may always bee reduced to their first equal number: or by the barrenness of some women to requited the fruitfulness of others.  
poverty engendereth sedition.] Plato in his fift book of laws, by the word poverty, doth not so much mean, the want or deminishment of goods and possessions, as the unsatiable desire of getting and purchasing. And in the fourth book of his commonweal, he no less discommendeth and detesteth riches than poverty, affirming, that delightfulness, idleness, sedition, and desire of novelties, do proceed from the one: and that the other is the cause of vnbountifulnesse and wickedness, with like desire of novelty. Therefore in a well ordered city that should be free from all parcialities, he will haue no excessive riches or poverty in any of the citizens: as appeareth in the same sixth book De Legibus.  
again he hath omitted to set down how Magistrates shal differ from private persons.] Plato in his sixth book De Legib. discourseth concerning Magistrates● what manner of men they ought to be, how and by whom they shall bee chosen, and that every of them shall yield account of his charge and Office: except those, that after the maner of kings appoint the end of all affairs. now fetching a comparison from the weaver, who maketh not the Woue and the warp of like yearn, but putteth the strongest in the warp, and the slendrest in the Woue, that it may be the apt for workmanship: he saith that after the like sort, they which shall bee Magistrates, ought to bee discerned from others, that there may be authority on the one side, and obedience on the other, as appeareth in the fift book De Legib.  
further the whole form of this State seemeth neither a popular government, nor the authority and power of a few, but a mean between both, called a commonweal.] every city is governed by one or many: if by one, it is called a monarchy: if by many, a commonweal. again, where it is governed by one, either that one doth all alone after his own pleasure, or else useth good mens counsel and exercise: if he do all alone, it is tyranny: if with others, a kingdom. Further, every city is governed by one, or many, or a few folk, and that either well or evil: if well by one, it is a kingdom: if evil, a tyranny: if by a few men well, an aristocraty: if evil, an oligarchy: if by many well, a mixed commonweal: if evil, a democraty. Plato at the end of the fourth book of his commonweal, setteth down five sorts of commonweals, the kingly state, an aristocraty, an oligarchy, a democraty, and a tyranny. In his peacocks or Treatise of reigning, he assigneth three good, and three bad, affirming, that the kingly state is the best. In his fift book of laws he saith how that is the best commonweal where all things are common, which he calleth the first: and the second, that which he describeth in the said laws which is mixed with the democraty and oligarchy. Therefore Plato and Aristotle do differ in this, that Plato mingleth the oligarchy with the democraty: Aristotle doth separate them, and maketh one several kind, which he calleth a commonweal that is mixed: but they agree in some sort in the mixture of these forms. For tyranny by itself is not good, neither an absolute kingdom, nor a democraty, not an oligarchy: but for the attainment of a just and good commonweal, they must bee all mingled together, and thereof one compounded form made and established.  
IF then he haue pretended this form of commonweal, as that which is most common to Cities.] Which may be convenient or applied to more cities than the first, as not the furthest from mens common custom and manner of living.  
SOME hold opinion, that a good commonweal should be mingled of all sorts.] every sort of commonweal established alone and singly by itself, doth quickly go out of kind into his next 'vice, except it be guided and holden together by the others. As for example, the kingly state: though it be the best of all resembling the divinity, wherein all men aclowledge that one God onely doth rule and govern, yet by means of mans unconstant mind, being easily marred in so high power and liberty, it quickly changeth into tyranny. So the aristocraty, that is to say, the signiory or state, wherein the wisest and honest personages ought to govern, doth convert into the oligarchy: When diverse of the mightiest men conspiring together, do take vpon them the managing of all public affairs, and dispose of all matters of state according to their own pleasures. again, the democraty wherein the common people govern modestly by the ancient law and custom of the country, doth swell into a disorder of egalnesse and liberty: where every one pretendeth to haue authority to do and say what he list. Therefore a commonweal founded to haue long continuance, ought not to be single, nor of one kind alone, but must haue all the virtues and proprieties of the others assembled into it, to the end, that no disproportionablenesse take root and increase therein, which may cause it to go out of kind to the next 'vice to it, and so destroy and overthrow it. This did Lycurgus first observe: who in ordaining and founding  
The Lacedemonian commonweal, mingled therein these three kinds of States, so aptly that it continued about seven hundred yeares after one manner, always keeping the integrity and perfection of the first institution thereof: Wherein the kings, the ephors, and the Senat, had their pre-eminences and authorities so entermingled and balanced together, that it could not well be discerned under what kind of government it was established.  
The commonweal of Carthage was thus ordained at the beginning: It had kings, and the Aristocratical power of Senators, and the commonalty, which had also their prerogative in matters that concerned them: so that as far as toucheth the assembling of the three estates, it was like the Lacedemonian.  
The commonweal of Rome had these three parts so evenly and fitly entermixed that a man cannot tell whether it were all an aristocraty, or a Democraty, or a monarchy: if one consider the power and authority of the Consuls, he might judge it for a monarchy and kingly estate: and having an eye to the Senators, he might deem it for an aristocraty: or a popular democraty.  
The Venetians establishing their commonweal, haue so ordered the three estates, that it setteth our the kingly dominion, the government of aristocraty, and the authority of the people. Their high or great counsel having the sovereign authority, whereupon the Senate and the authority of all the Magistrates dependeth, doth represent the popular state. The Duke who ruleth during his life, sheweth the royal authority, in that chiefly he retaineth the gravity and dignity thereof: as the Senate of ten men, and the college of the ancients commonly called wise men, resembleth the aristocraty, as appeareth in Contarine his book of the Venetian commonweal.  
Forasmuch as in the kingdom of france, the Possessions, Honours, and Offices of the commonweal are divided and partend amongst all the Estates proportionably unto their degrees, and every of them kept in his pre-eminence and calling, there ensueth of the same such a consent and agreement, as hath been the occasion of the continuance and prosperity thereof by so long tract of time amongst all kingdoms, whereof there is any remembrance or knowledge: for taking it aright, it partaketh of the three States. First it hath a King, who is a monarch, loved, obeied, and feared withall: Who though he haue full power and authority to command and do what he list, yet is this high and sovereign liberty ruled and limited by good laws and Ordinances, and by the great multitude and authority of Officers which are so near about his person, that in sundry places of the realm, scant can the king do any thing, that should bee either too violent or too prejudicial to his subiects. The twelve peers, the secret and privy Counsels, the Parliaments and great council, the Chambers of Accounts, the Treasuries and Generalities of charges are pertaining to the aristocraty. The Estates holden every year in the provinces, the Mairalties of towns, Shrieualties, Consulships, Chapterships, Wardens and keepers of towns, are democratical: as appeareth in Siessel his French monarchy, and in the preface of Appian of Alexandria, by him translated into French.  
AND therefore do they commend the form of the Lacedemonians commonweal, which they say doth consist of the oligarchy, monarchy, and democraty.] The seventh Chapter of this book is wholly assigned for the Lacedemonian commonweal: whereof also there is mention in diverse places of this work, as for example, in the third book and tenth Chapter: and in the fourth book and ninth Chapter: and in the seventh book and fourteenth Chapter: and also in the first, third, and fourth books of Platoes laws: in the life of Lycurgus written by plutarch: in the sixth and seventh books of Polybius histories: Xenophon hath written a Treatise thereof: Cicero hath commended it in diverse places.  
THEIR Kingly state being the monarchy.] Aristotle in his third book of politics, cap. 10. saieth: The Lacedemonian commonweal seemeth a very lawful kingdome● yet hath not the king there absolute authority, saving when he maketh Warres out of the country, at what time he hath sovereign authority: also he governeth as chief in the sacrifices of the gods.  
THE Senate, the oligarchy, and the Ephori or Tribunes, the democraty, for that the Magistrates or Tribunes of the people called Ephori, are created by the people.] Aristotle in the fourth book of his peacocks, cap. 9. hath these words: Many men uphold, that the commonweal of the Lacedemonians is a democraty, because their institution hath many things of the democraty: as for example, First, the training up of children, sith the rich mens children are brought up as the poor mens, and instructed and trained in the selfsame sort the poor bee. Also in their ages ensuing, and when they come to mans estate, they live after the same order: For the rich are no more made of there, than the poor: They are served in public feasts with one kind of meate: and the rich wear such apparel as the poorest sort may come by. again, for that the two highest Magistrates are in the hands of the people: whereof they choose one, and haue part in the other, sith they choose the senators, and haue part in the Ephorie. Others affirm howe it is an oligarchy, because it hath diverse things of the oligarchy, as all the Magistrates by election, and none by lots: and for that a few haue power to condemn to death, or to banish, and diverse other like matters.  
OTHERS are of opinion, that the Tribuneship or Ephorian authority, is tyranny.] Plato in his fourth book De Legibus saith: When I consider the Lacedemonian commonweal, I cannot well tell how I should call it: for the power of the Magistrates there called ephors, is Tyrannicall. Sometimes it seemeth above all other cities, most like the democraty. now, it were altogether impertinent to deny, that it is no aristocraty: also that the kingdom which is perpetual therein, is as well by others, as by ourselves deemed the ancientest of all others. Therefore being thus vpon the sudden asked the question( as I said) I cannot presently answer you distinctly, which of these Commonweals the Lacedemonian is. The word {αβγδ}, signifieth as much as overseeing, or controling; which was a high Office in Lacedemonia, having authority even over the kings themselves, against whom they were set, as the Tribunes were against the Consuls at Rome: as Cicero writeth in his third book De Legibus. King Theopompus devised this Magistrate to bridle the liberty of the kings, as Aristotle writeth in the fift book of his peacocks, cap. II. They were two Kings continuing perpetually, and five ephors remaining in Office for a year, who were chosen by the people, yea of the meanest and basest sort, and appeals might bee made from the kings unto them.  
THE best commonweal, which is compact of the most sorts.] Namely, that which is the most entermingled, as hath been declared. Aristotle in the fourth book of his peacocks, cap. II. supposeth it the best commonweal which containeth much people of mean calling, who are neither too rich nor too poor: and so doth Plato in his fift book of laws, and in the fourth book of his commonweal.  
WHICH is the mean that the greatest part of the rich men do obtain the Magistrateships, and that the highest offices are distributed according to the greatness of richesse.] diverse men haue thought, that they could orderly frame a commonweal, so that the right and power of government might bee limited according to the revenues and plenty of goods and possessions: yet haue they fallen into most great inconveniencies. For it most often falleth out, that men of very base and mean calling attain to great richesse, insomuch, that for the gathering of richesse, and increasing their substance by the gain of their mean exercises and vile occupations, they spare not themselves, but beguile their own nature, as well in victuals, as in taking their rest: to the end, to rak the more wealth together. On the contrary side, some that be well born, and haue ben brought up Gentlemen-like, fall into poverty, either by misfortune, as often as it chanceth, or else by means they give themselves to learning and virtue, and take no care for getting of richesse. Therefore those manner of persons who taste of nothing but covetousness, and are destitute of good learning, by little and little lay hold on the government. And they that haue been well brought up, when their riches fail, lose their Cittizenships right, which is an occasion of the breeding of great seditions to trouble the civil unity. Wherefore, the old Venetians establishing their commonweal, for the avoiding of all such perplexities, haue thought it much better to limit their government by nobility of blood, then by great revenues, as appeareth in Contarine his first book of the Venetian commonweal.  
ALSO he maketh the election of the Senate and Co●nsell answereably to the authority of a few.] Plato( as he writeth in his sixth book De Legibus) would in his commonweal haue the senators chosen in such manner, that yearly, three hundred and three score should bee elected out of all the Orders, which were four, by taking four score and ten out of every Order. And that first of all, there should bee chosen foure●core and ten of them out of the first Order, by the voices of all them of the other Orders, with a fine set vpon his head, that should not give his voice. And next of all, as many out of the second Order in the selfsame manner: consequently, out of the third, other fourscore and ten: howbeit, with this caution, that in this third election, they of the last Order were at liberty whether they would give their voices or not. Last of all, that there should likewise fourscore and ten bee taken out of the fourth Order, where all they of the first and second Order were bound to give voices; and of the third and fourth Orders, who listed: afterward these three hundred and threescore after the same manner, were with the voices of every Order reduced to the one half, to wit, to a hundred and fourscore. And at last by lots, to fourscore and ten senators or counsellors. The Venetians use lots and elections in the distribution of their Magistrateships, taking lots of cloth of gold or silver, which they cast into two white earthen pots, according to the order written by Sabellicus in his Treatise of the Magistrates of Venice, and by Contarine in his first book of the Venetian commonweal.   

CHAP. V. Of Phaleas his commonweal: and of the Chalcedonian commonweal. CHAP. V.  
THere haue been other forms of commonweals brought in, some by men of no learning, others by Philosophers, and men of experience in government. All the which forms draw nearer than the two former afore spoken of, to those that in time past haue been established, and to such also as are in use and practise in this age. For there hath not any other man invented the like novelty concerning the community of wives and children, nor touching the assembly and meeting of women at meat and meales: But rather they begin with those things that are necessary, diuers of them holding opinion that the chief and principal point lieth in ordering goods and possessions aright, from whence they say all civil discord and dissension ariseth. Vpon which occasion, Phaleas the Calcedonian hath first set forth this consideration, upholding that the goods and possessions of Citizens ought to be equal: supposing it no hard matter to make them equal, if it be foreseen and provided for at the first stablishing of a city: howbeit a hard matter to be brought to pass after a city is already founded, and yet withall a thing that may be done, so that rich men give dowries and portions in marriage with their daughters and receive none themselves: and that on the contrary side, the poor do take them and give none. Plato writing his laws, allowed the augmentation of possessessions unto a certain stint and limitation, howbeit in such sort, that it was not lawful for any Citizen of what state degree or condition soever he were, to possess above fourfold as much as the smallest possession of the meanest sort amounted unto, as hath been in this work already declared. again, the ordainers of those laws ought not to be ignorant of one thing, whereunto they haue no regard at this day, namely, that when they ordain and limit the greatness of possessions, it were also expedient to prescribe and make a law for the stinting of the number of children: For if the number and multitude of children surmount the greatness of the revenues and possessions, the Law must needs be dissolved and abrogated: and besides that abrogation, will rise up an inconvenience, in that many shall of Rich become poor, whom it will bee hard to k●epe from attempting some novelties and alterations. That therefore the equalness of possessions is of some effect in a civil society, some men of old time seem to haue had understanding: as for example, Solon made a law in that behalf, and likewise other lawmakers haue enacted and ordained laws that forbid the possessing of so much land as every man list. In like fort the laws forbid the sale of goods and possessions, as there is a statute in Locres restraining the sale of patrimonies, without evident proof of some misfortune happened: and commanding the preservation of ancient inheritaunces. The neglecting of which ordinance in Leucades, made their commonweal too popular: because, that according to the stint of their revenues, they came no more to the Magistrateships. But there may bee an equality of possessions, yet will it bee such, as that either they will bee in too great plenty and abundance; and so the cause of lauishnesse and riotous living: or else so scarce and so little, that there will bee great want and scarcity. Therefore a Law-maker doth not deal sufficiently in making possessions equal, except he reduce them to a mediocrity: and yet the reducing of them to a mediocrity, will not do any good, unless the greedy desires of men bee rather made equal and limited, than possessions: which is unpossible to bee brought to pass, if the Citizens be not sufficiently trained and ordered by laws. But it may bee that Phaleas would answer, that he pretended to declare, that in cities there ought to bee equality of these two things: namely of possessions, and of discipline and instruction. Notwithstanding, he ought to haue  told us what manner of discipline and instruction this should bee: which can do no good if it bee one and the selfsame. For it may bee one and the same, and yet such as may make men ouer-couetous of money and honour, or of both together. Further, seditions do happen by reason of the inequality, not onely of goods, but also of honours: howbeit, after a diverse and contrary manner about both of them. for the common people doth become malcontent with the vnequalnesse of goods: and men of reputation conceive displeasure at equality of honours: whence came this saying, Wee are equal in honour both good and bad. Now men are not provoked to do evil, onely in regard of things needful when they want them: the remedy whereof he supposeth to come by the equality of goods, to the end, there be no robberies committed through constraint of hunger or could: but also for the enjoying of their pleasures, and satisfying of their covetous desires. For if their greedy desires pass their necessity, then will they fall to doing of michiefe for the remedy and help thereof: neither will they do injury onely for the fulfilling of their pleasures, but also when they desire to enjoy pleasures without sorrow. What remedy then for these three? Soothly, that the first sort haue small wealth, and take pain for their living: that the second, use temperatenesse and moderation: the third remedy, if any be minded to attain to pleasure of themselves, let them seek it by no other means then by Philosophy: for other pleasures cannot be gotten without the help of many folk. Now men do not use to attempt any great vices or enormities for the remedy and relief of necessities, but for the satisfaction of their excessive and immoderate desires: as for example, some use tyranny,& oppress people with ungodly dominion: not for the avoiding of could, but to the end, they may fulfil their unruly desires without controlment. Therefore great honours and rewards are decreed and assigned: not to him that killeth a thief, but to him that bereaveth a Tyrant of his life. Therefore that manner of commonweal invented by Phaleas, is apt only to redress small injuries. again, he setteth down many means tending to the good government and behaviours of Citizens and subiects amongst themselves, yet should he haue had no less consideration of neighbours and all strangers. For of necessity this law and order ought to bee in a commonweal, that it be always ready furnished with warlike and martiall force and furniture: whereof he hath not spoken so much as one word, nor likewise of goods sufficient to serve the turn, as well in civil uses and necessities, as also against foreign dangers. Which goods ought not to bee so great, that they should bee coveted by neighbours and borderers, and by stronger and mightier men: against whose invasions, the owners should not bee able to make resistance: nor so small, that they could not suffice to maintain war when it should bee made against them, by their equals in number, and even matches. he hath determined nothing herein: yet should it not bee left unknown what quantities of goods are sufficient for Cities: whereof perchance that manner of limitation is best, whereby the strongest and mightiest men of power are not provoked to invade and make war, in hope of reaping great profit through the excessive plenty of richesse, there being: but rather in undertaking of warres, shall consider, how their labour and charges will bee greater then the profit which they may expect by winning the victory: as Eubulus counseled Antophradates when he meant to besiege Atarnee: that he should consider in what time he might win the place, and reckon what charge he should bee at about the same: with which speech he brought Antophradates to yield to his opinion, and caused him to leave the siege. Wherefore the equality of goods doth carry with it some profit, and yet not much. For men of worship and reputation will take great disdain thereat, as thinking themselves worthy of greater wealth and honour than others, which is the cause that they often rise and stir up rebellion: for the malice and naughtiness of men is unsatiable. At the first, they say onely two half pence are sufficient: but when they haue once got them, then do they always covet more and more, being pushed on by the bottomless and infinite desire of having. For the nature of covetousness is endless and infinite: toward the satisfaction and fulfilling whereof, most men chiefly apply all their industry and skill. Therefore the fittest remedy herein is not to make equality of goods, but to procure that good men bee such by nature, as that they will not desire more then they ought, and that bad men shall not bee able to get more then they should, as it will come to pass, if the bad bee least in number, and suffer no wrong. Further, bee hath not taken good order in the equaling of goods, by reason he onely maketh lands equal. For there is a richesse also of slaves, and of cattle, and money, and other movables. An equality therefore should bee sought for all those commodities, or some moderate order assigned in them: or else all should bee let alone. he seemeth also by the establishment of such laws to make the City small, if all Craftsmen shall bee public seruants, and not comprised within the corporation of the city. But if they that do the public works of Cities ought to be public, they should be so after the fashion of Epidamne, and as Diophantes sometimes ordained in Athens. Hereby may ye know, whether Phaleas his commonweal be rightly ordained or not.  
CHALCEDON a sea town of Bythinia, situate right over against Constantinople, still retaining the same name to this day.  
MANY shall of rich become poor.] For if one rich father haue many sons, and the eldest be preferred to all the inheritance, the rest must needs be poor.  
AS for example, Solon made a law in that behalf.] Solon appointed not possessions to bee equal, but ordained a certain limitation in revenues, and that the greatest should not amount to above five hundred bushels, as shall appear at the end of this book, when we come to speak of the commonweal of Athens.  
THAT forbid the possessing of so much land as every man list.] As for example, at Rome the Agrarian law forbade that no man should possess above five hundred Acres of land: and that children while their fathers were alive, might haue half that quantity: as is written by Appian in his first book of the civil Warres, and the ninth Chapter: and by Titus livius in the first Decade, Lib. 2.& 6. This Agrarian lawe was first published in the year of the city 267. And was never after set forth without great broils.  
THE neglecting of which law in Leucadia.] Forasmuch as in Leucadia, the alienation of possessions was tolerated, by means whereof, they were distributed into a great many mens hands: the Lawe that limitteth and stinteth revenues, whereby the citizens might attain to the honours and Magistrateships of the commonweal, was violated and broken, and their commonweal marred withall, in that it became too popular, by means that very poor men were admitted to bear office.  
MEN of reputation, {αβγδ}.] Aristotle often useth this word, meaning thereby such personages● as either for virtue, or skill, or any other laud●ble quality, do excel and pass others.  
FOR things needful.] Men do not fall to committing of unlawful acts, as to tobbe, steal, fight, and kill, only to save themselves from could, hunger, and thirst, but rather to live lavishly and daintily as tyrants do.  
PLEASVRES without sorrow.] Which come without any greedy desire going afore, which causeth irksomenesse before the enjoying of the pleasure: as the pleasure that is received by reading, hearing, seeing, and smelling. As for those pleasures that are taken in tasting and touching, hunger and thirst come before them: and vehement love accompanied of diverse anguishes and cares, doth come before fornication.  
remedy for these three.] He meaneth by these three, the desires of necessary things, pleasures with sorrow, and pleasures without sorrow.  
further, he hath not taken good order in the equalities of goods, by reason he onely maketh lands equal: for there is a richesse of thralls and ●la●es, and of cattle and money.] Appian in the second chapter of his first book of the civil warres, saith: That by the deliberation of the Tribunes, there was an edict and law set forth, that it should not bee lawful for any man to possess above five hundred Acres of land: nor of the greater sort of cattle, above a hundred head: and of the lesser sort not above five hu●dred: and so was there a certain number of freemen appointed to every man: who were enjoined to inform the Senat wherein the ordinance was broken. And at the publishing of the lawe they added an oath, and set a penalty for the better observance thereof, hoping that such lands and other goods as should remain above that quantity and measure, would by those means by little and little fall to the share of the poor: but notwithstanding this law and this oath, all was to no effect, which was the occasion of great broils and murder between the poor and the rich: the one side, for that they would not yield for any thing in the world, that the law should stand in force, and the other for the contrary.  
IF Artificers be public.] Namely slaves or thralls of the commonweal, and not any members of the communality of the city, nor accounted for citizens. This would make the city a very small one.  
Epidamne.] A town lying on the right hand as ye come by sea from Candia to Ionia, and bordering vpon the Talancians a barbarous people of the Country of Ilyria, as thucydides saith in the first book of his history, at the beginning of his declaration of the war of Peloponesus, which from thence took the original. First, the Corcyrians without the licence of the Corinthians their metropolitans and superiors, peopled it with their men. The romans having conquered it a great while after that, placed therein a new colony of Italians, and name it Dyrachum, for that the former name had an evil sound in the latin, by reason that Damnum signifieth damage.   

CHAP. VI. Of the several commonweals of Hippodamus, and of the Milesians.  
HIpppodamus the Milesian, Euriphones son, who found out the division of Cities, and separated Pyre●s with a wall from the City of Athens, and in the rest of his life was accounted for an ambitions person: insomuch, that he was thought to live too curiously, by reason of his long heir, and of his costly and sumptuous apparel, which he accustomend to wear, being furred and very hot, not only in winter, but also in summer: and desirous to show himself skilful in every kind of nature, he, first of all them that haue not had the administration and managing of commonweal affairs, undertook to set down somewhat touching a perfect commonweal. He framed his City of ten thousand men, dividing it into three parts, the one of Artificers, another of Land-tillers or Husbandmen, the third of men of war and such as wear armor. Also he divided the Country into three parts, the one sacred, the other public, the third private: calling that sacred, from whence the solemn sacrifices should bee furnished and made to the gods: that public, from whence the men of war should be sustained: and that private which was assigned to the Husbandmen. Further, he supposed there were but onely three sorts of laws, and likewise three things whereon judgements were given: namely injury, damage, and death. Besides, he ordained one sovereign court, whereinto all causes that seemed not rightfully judged, might bee brought by way of appeal: and established it of certain picked and chosen men of good yeares. He decreed that judgements should not bee given in courts, by little counters in way of lot, but every judge to haue a Tablet, therein to writ the sentence, if he absolutelye condemned: but if he absolved, then to leave it voided and unwritten on: or if he partly condemned and partly absolved, then to declare it in writing: For he thought that no good order which is now in use and practise, because the parties that judge this or that, are driven to perjury. he made a lawe for the honouring of them that invent any thing to the benefit of the commonweal: and for the bringing up of those children at the charges and cost of the commonweal, whose fathers died in the wars, as though the like law had never ben made afore. There is at this present a law to that effect in Athens, and in sundry other Cities. And permitting the election of all the Magistrates to the people that he hath ordained of the three parts of hi● City, he decreed that the Magistrates elected, should haue the care and charge of things common to the whole City, and also of those that concern strangers and Orphans. These bee the chief Articles and points most worthy to be noted and remembered in Hippodamus his plot of a commonweal.  
Hippodamus framed his city and commonweal in such sort, that it being ordained of ten thousand men, was divided into three parts: the one of artificers, the other of land-tillers, the third of soldiers. In like sort he partend the country into three parts: n●mely, into the sacred, furnishing things needful for the service of God: the public, whereof soldiers should be sustained: the private, proper to husbandmen. Further, he ordained three sorts of judgements, to wit, of injury, damage, and death, and a high and sovereign court over all those for the hearing and determining of appeals to bee brought thither. he would haue sentences given, not by counters and ●ots, but in Tablets, wherein every judge should writ his opinion: and the Iudges to bee chosen by the people: and they so chosen, to haue care of public matters, and of Orphans, and also of strangers: and the children of such as were shine in the Warres, to bee brought up at the charge of the commonweal. The most of those Articles are reproved, and fi●st of all that which conce●neth the dividing of the multitude of the citizens. Because Hippodamus making the Artificer and Husbandman parts of the city, tieth them to such a condition, as that they can never come to any Magistrateship or Office: wherein a citizen is properly discerned from him that is no citizen: as is declared in the third book of this work. And this mean being taken from them it cannot bee but they will hate the commonweal: from whence seditions do spring. Secondly, his division of territories is not good, because the soldiers who are put to be til●ers themselves of the public part, differ not from Husbandmen: Or if the Husbandmen be put to till both the private part, and also the public part withall, then shall they be so charged with sustaining the soldiers and Artificers, that nothing will be left for their own living and maintenance. And if the Husbandmen and the soldiers till not the gro●nd, but some other folk differing from them, then shall they add a fourth part to the city, which part shall be shut out of the corporation of the commonweal, which evermore turneth to one selfsame inconueniency and danger of sedition. Thirdly, his maner of dividing of judgements is blamed, and the common and accustomend form and course allowed for the best. As concerning the decree that Hippodamus hath set forth for the rewarding and honouring of them that invent any thing to the benefit of the commonweal Aristotle taking occasion thereby, hath here inserted the most notable disputation of all the book, namely, whether it be expedient or not to al●er the old laws that haue ben received and allowed in any state. And after he hath debated e●h part of the question with most apt reasons, he resolveth vpon the alteration of those laws that are evidently vnbehoofefull and barbarous; and that without apparent benefit, no alteration or innovation ought to be made, for fear of losing the authority and obedience of the law, which is not got but by length of time: so that it is bet●er to to●lerate some imperfections in laws, and wants in Magistrates, if they be not too prejudicial& hurtful; then by supposing to amend them, to overthrow a state.  
Hippodamus. He was not only a Lawmaker, but also a builder, and invented a fashion of building surnamed Hippodamie, or Hippodamicall, whereof mention is made in the eleventh chapter of the seventh book of this work.  
separated Pyreus.] Pyreus was the principal haven of the city of Athens, well known by our Annotations vpon the beginning of Platoes commonweal. It was about a mile from the city, wherewith it was joined with a long wall that was of a good height and breadth. The commodity of this port was by experience found so great, as it could not well be judged whether it were tied to the city, or the city to it.  
BY reason of his long heir and of his costly and sumptuous apparel.] he was curious in trimming his head and beard, and full of pomp in his garments. thucydides in the first book of his history writeth, that of all the Grecians, the Athenians were the first that began to led a more civil& delicate life then the rest: and telleth how it was not long ago since the ancients of that country, yea and the honestest sort did wear linen clothes, and trinkets and small things of gold work, with their hairs curled at the ends, and trimmed in-curious manner.  
HE decreed that judgements should not be given in courts by lots.] The Venetians to the contrary, haue an ordinance in all criminal and civil judgements, that the Iudges shal not by word of mouth decla●e or openly speak their minds before all men, but deliver their sentences in lots of fine cloth, which they cast into pots of diuers colours, to the end, they may judge the more freely, and not bee turned out of the right way of equity and iustice, either for ambition or for fear of displeasing their friends, or of falling into the evil will of them at whose hands they haue received any good turn, or into the hatred of the mightier sort: and also to the end, that by the observation of this course, every judge may only follow his own opinion, and not depend vpon the authority of another judge, which they might easily do, if the first speaker were accounted the wisest. In judgements concerning life and death, they use three pots, the one, for the condemnation of the party accused: another for absolution from all punishment and forfeits: the third, when it yet appeareth not to the Iudges what they ought to ordain. The first pot for condemnation is white: the second for absolution is green: the third is red. In civil judgements, the green serveth for the disannulling of the sentences of the vnderiudges: the white one is for the allowance of them: the read, for them that are not yet thoroughly resolved, but will haue the matter in controversy delayed, wherein nothing can be said to be determined, unless above one half of the Iudges haue allowed or disannulled it.  
but every judge to haue a tablet therein to writ his sentence.] To the end, the Iudges should not speak when they judged, but give their opinion in Tablets of wax, or other st●ffe noted with letters, signifying either Absolution, or Condemnation, or Delay. After that manner did the Areopagites in Athens, and the romans in public judgements and matters of great importance give iudgement, writing their opinions in the said Tablets, which they did afterwa●ds cast into a pot, so that none of them knew anothers opinion, neither did they all know the opinion of the whole company. The mark or note of condemnation at Rome was this letter C. That of Absolution, this letter A. And the note of delay, were these letters, N.L. which signified Non liquere, that is to say, the cause is not clear and ready to be judged: and three such Tablets were delivered to every judge, as Asconius affirmeth in his commentary or Annotations vpon Ciceroes Oration touching divination. Which Orator in his Oration for Nilo, observing this custom, calleth the one the Tablet of safety, the other of sadness, which in greek was {αβγδ} signifying {αβγδ}, that ●s to say, death. As C. in latin, is for condemnation, as Budeus noteth in his Annotations vpon the Pandects of the civil law.  
THERE is at this present a law to that effect in Athens.] The Athenians did publicly bury those that died in their warres with pomp and funeral Orations, and brought up the children of them that were slain, at the charges of the commonweal. This was the manner of their funerals: Three daies aforehand they made a great pavilion, wherein they laid the bones of such as were dead, and their kinsfolk and f●iendes might lay what they thought good vpon them. Then every lineage or tribe of the town had a great cypress coffer wherein they la●d the bones of the dead of that tribe, which coffer they carried in a waggon, and after all those coffers a great faire empty bed was carried vpon another waggon, which signified them that were dead in the Warres, whose bodies could not bee found. These Wagons were conducted and accompanied by all sorts of people, as well citizens as others that would go, even to the grave, where the wives or kindred of the dead were making great mourning, weeping, and lamentation: After, all those coffers were laid into a public tomb made for that purpose in the fairest suberbe of the City. This place was called Ceramicon, wherein the custom was to bury all such as died in the Warres, saving them that were slain in Marahone, for whom in remembrance of their singular virtue, they decreed a particular sepulchre in the same place: and immediately vpon the burial of the corpes, the custom was, that some notable parsonage of the city being both learned and honourable, according to the degree of the deceased, made a Sermon or Oration in their commendation before the people: which being ended, every man went his way. thucydides writeth all this in the second book of his history of the Peloponesian Warres, where the funeral Oration of Pericles is inserted. This funeral pomp was afterwards yearly continued, whether they had Warres or not, with many ceremonial combats a horseback, and diverse exercises and playing vpon Instruments of music, as Plato testifieth in his Menexemus, where likewise there is a funeral Oration under the name of a learned and eloquent Gentlewoman name Aspasia.  
OF Orphans.] Such bee Saint marks Proctors at Venice, whose Office and duty is, to vnde●take the wardship and tuition of such Orphans, as in their Minorities haue no Tutors and guardians a●●igned unto them by their fathers last will. The estimation of this Magistrate in time past was so great, not onely among the Venetians themselves, but also with other Nations, that diverse strangers by their Testaments and last Wils bequeathed unto them the tuition of their heires, and oversight of their patrimonies.  
FIRST of all a man may move a doubt as touching the division of the multitude of citizens, for that his commonweal is communicated to Artificers and to Hu●bandmen, and to soldiers, and generally to all sorts of folk: namely, to Husbandmen, having no Weapons, and to Cr●f●smen having neither Lands nor Weapons, so that they shall bee in a manner bound and thrall to the soldiers. Therefore is it not possible that all sorts of honours should bee communicated unto them: For all the chief●tai●es and heads of the Warres, and the keepers and defenders of the Citizens, and welneere all the principal Magistrates must be chosen out of the men of war: also if Husbandmen and Craftsmen haue no part in the commonweal, how can they bear good will unto it? And yet must the soldiers needs be mightier and of greater strength than both the other parts● but that is no easy matter to be done except they bee a great number: if they be so, to what purpose is it to communicate the commonweal to others, and to haue power to create Magistrates? again, in what things are Husbandmen behoveful for a city? As for Craftsman they are necessary therein: because every city hath need of them, and they may get their livings with their occupations, as they do in other Cities: But if the Husbandmen furnish victuals to the men of war, then are they by good reason to bee reckoned for part of the City and commonweal. Now haue they a private part, and till their ground privately again, if the public part allotted to the sustenance of the soldiers, were tilled by themselves, then should the soldiers nothing differ from Husbandmen, as this Law-maker pretendeth: or if there be any other persons employed in that behalf differing both from Husbandmen and soldiers, then will those make a fourth part of the city, which shall haue no interest in any thing whatsoever, but be as it were foreigners in their commonweal Notwithstanding, whosoever shal drive the tilers of the private part to manure and till the public part, then shall not the multitude haue such crop and fruits as will serve for every of them to furnish and make pr●●●sion for two houses: and wherefore shall they not straightway out of the selfsame land, and out of the same allotted territories both take food and sustenance for themselves, and furnish the soldiers thereof? All these things are not free from a great many disorders and troubles. Neither is that his law allowable which concerneth judgements: and appointeth, that vpon the simplo prosecution of a cause, the judge shall divide the sentence, and of a judge become an arbitrator. For although that course might be observed in arbitrements, where diverse may confer amongst themselves of the iudgement which is to be given, yet for all that is it not to be allowed in courts and tribunal seats, but rather sundry Law-makers do expressly forbid the Iudges from all manner of communication between themselves about the giuing of sentence. again, shall not this bee a troublesone and confused manner of judging, when the judge thinketh there is somewhat due to the plaintiff, and yet not so much as the plaintiff affirmeth to be owing unto him? He demandeth twenty pounds, yet doth the judge pronounce ten pounds onely to be due unto him: or this judge more, or that judge less; another five pounds, and another four: and in thus dividing their sentences, some of the Iudges give sentence wholly against the plaintiff, and others not at all. After what manner then shall these voices or opinions bee discerned and reckoned? again, no man doth constrain the judge to forswear himself, which shall plainly condemn or absolve, if the suit be simply and orderly commenced and prosecuted in law: for he that absolveth the defendant, doth not judge that he oweth nothing, but that twenty pounds are not due. That judge is perjured, who thinketh that twenty pounds are not due, and yet condemneth the defendant to pay the same.  
ARISTOTLE having first recited the principal articles contained in Hippodamus the Milesian his commonweal, doth confute diverse of them, as the dividing of the citizens, and partition of lands, and form of judging: showing that they were not well ordained, and what inconveniences might happen thereby.  
AS for the rewarding and honouring of them that invent any thing to the benefit of the commonweal: it carrieth a faire show in words, and yet very dangerous to be put in execution, for that it causeth quarrels, and ministereth occasions of some stir and alteration in the State. For it is a question and doubt whether it be good or evil for Cities, to change their old and ancient laws, if any better be devised. Therefore is it not easy to consent strait way to the decree touching the honouring of the inventors of any thing to the public profit, if it bee not expedient to change the laws: For it may so fall out, that some men will persuade either the repealing and abrogation of the laws, or alteration of the form of government of the commonweal, as a common good. But forasmuch as we are by the way fallen into this matter, it shall not be amiss to stay a little about it. For it containeth a doubt, as wee haue before alleged: and in soothe it seemeth that it should be better to change. For in other sciences it hath done good, as in physic, and in the feats which concern the exercise of bodies, and generally in all Arts and faculties, which haue ben amended and bettered by changing their old decrees. Forasmuch therefore as the skill of civil government is to be reckoned amongst these, ●he like must needs be determined in it: as may be proved and confirmed by deeds& events of the same, because the old& ancient laws be very simplo and barbarous. For in those daies the Grecians ordinarily went armed with swords and weapons, and sold we●es one to another: and the other old and ancient ordinances and constitutions bee very ●ond and gross: as for example, there was a lawe at comes touching manslaughter, that if the accuser produced witnesses of his own kindred, the party accused should be condemned to death. now, all men wholly bend themselves to secke, not for those things which haue ben left by their ancestors, but for those which are good. And it is very likely, that those first men, whether they were engendered of the earth, or left behind of some great corr●ption or destruction, were like the vulgar and ignorant sort, as it commonly accustomend to bee said of them that are born of the earth. So that it standeth with no reason, that we should satisfy and rest ourselves vpon their decrees. again, it shall bee best, not to leave the written laws unaltered. For in the skill of government( like as in other arts) it is unpossible to describe all thi●ges perfectly. But they must needs bee written universally, and actions consist in particular things: whereby it appeareth, that some laws may bee changed, and that now and then they may be altered. On the contrary side, if wee aduise ourselves well in that behalf, it seemeth that we ●ust took thoroughly into it, and take great heed therein. For where there ariseth small benefit by alteration of laws, and the wonting and accustoming of Citizens to change their laws slightly, is an evil thing: doubtless, it is better to bear with the wants and faults of the Law-makers and Magistrates: for the alteration of them will not do so much good as har●e, by accustoming men to disobey. And that example fetched from Arts and Sciences, is deceitful and false, because it is not all one to change an Art, and a Lawe: For a Lawe hath no force to procure obedience to itself, saving custom, which getteth not strength and confirmation, but in great length of time: so that the easy and ready changing of present laws into new ones, weakeneth the virtue and power of the Lawe. again, if wee grant that laws are to bee changed, Whether shall all in every commonweal or not: and whether is it lawful for every body to change them, or to certain personages: for there is a great difference in this point. Therefore for this present will wee lay aside this question, as not properly belonging to this place.  
AS for the rewarding and honouring of them that invent any thing to the benefit of the commonweal.] The men of old time living in great rudeness and want of things needful for life, did so highly esteem the finders out of profitable inventions, that diverse of them were cannonized for gods after their deceases: as for example, Ceres, Triptolemus, Bacchus, Vulcan, Aesculapius, Lycurgus, and diverse others, as is witnessed by polydore Virgil in his book of the inventors of new things. In these daies there is a custom in cairo among Artificers, that if any of them invent any skilful new devise of his own industry touching the Art which he professeth, they put a cassock of cloth of gold vpon him, and all the fellowes and brethren of his own compa●y and occupation, led him from shop to shop with much minstrelsy, in the manner of a triumph: and then every man giveth him a piece of silver: as John Lion reporteth in his eight book of th● description of Affrica.  
IT causeth quarrels, and ministereth occasion of some stir and alteration in the State.] Although novelty be well liked of by the curious sort, yet is the bringing in thereof of dangerous, speciaily in matters of state& religion, which cannot possibly be touched without troubles and dissensions, that often stretch so far, that they are the causes of the ruin and destruction of Countries and dominions. Therefore all they that haue intruded and thrust in themselves to invent and stablish new ●●wes and fashions, haue seized and laid hold on force and sovereign authority, as knowing that such alteration cannot be achieved and compassed without violence.  
FOR it is a question and doubt whether it be good or evil to change the laws of the country.] Plato De Legib. Lib. 7. writeth thus: I say that alteration and change in all things,( saving those that be lewd) is most dangerous at all times and seasons, as well in the diet of bodies, as in the manners and customs of souls, and absolute●y in all cases( saving the bad) as I said afore. First of all, bodies are somewhat troubled when they use any new meats and drinks and labours: After, when they haue grown in custom therewith, then wax they strong and fat, liking well with such manner of living, as already being drawn into custom, acquaintance and friendship therewith, and so remain in good health and plight: But if any occasion drive them to another diet, then are they straightway troubled, and fall into diseases until they be acquainted with this new manner of living. We must deem the like of mens thoughts, and of the natures of their minds: for all men reverence and honour laws, and fear to innovate and alter those wherein they haue ben trained and brought up, if the same haue by any divine fortune long endured, so as it cannot be remembered or known whether ever before there were any other than they. Herodotus in his third book calleth them fools and mad folk that despise the laws of their Country, for that natually all men do love the same, insomuch, that if all men living in this transitory world were put to the choice of such fashions of living as they should think to bee best and honestest, without all doubt, when they had si●ted all as well as they could, they would choose the fashions and laws of their own Countries. This may bee tried and examined by many examples, specially by one that he rehearseth to this effect. At such time as King Darius reigned, he demanded of the Grecians that were in the train of his Court, how much money they would ●ake to eat the bodies of their fathers that were deceased: They answered, they would not do it for any worldly good. Then called he for certain Indians, name Callatians whose custom was to eat their fathers, and asked them in the presence of the Grecians, for how much they would consent to the burning of their fathers in a fire, they cried out and said: Sir, God grant you a long and prosperous life, but wee beseech you to speak of some better matter. Thus doubtless are old customs esteemed and set by. And as for myself, I am of this opinion, that Pindarus the Poet hath said very well, affirming that custom is like a king reigning over all men. Demosthenes in his Oration against Timocrates, witnesseth: That the citizens of Locres were such diligent observers of their old laws: that if any man did intrude and put forward himself amongst them to make any new law, as he was propounding and persuading the same, he was driven to stand with a halter about his neck: and in case the law were liked of, he went his way safe with the halter loosed& taken away: if it were not liked, he was straightway strangled. By occasion of which rigor, there was not in the space of two hundred yeares any law made in that city.  
forasmuch as we are by the way fallen into this matter.] Aristotle taking occasion at that decree of Hippodamus, which appointeth reward to the inventors of any thing to the commonweals benefit, doth put forth a goodly and grave question, which he debateth with contrary reasons, as well affirmatively as negatively: namely, whether it be behoveful or not, to alter the old allowed laws of a state: resolving that those are to bee changed which are apparently barbarous and good for nothing: but that without manifest benefit, there ought no change or innovation to be made therein, for fear of losing the authority and obedience of the law, which is not purchased but by length of time: so that it is more expedient to bear with some imperfections in laws, and with some wants in Magistrates, if they bee not too prejudicial, then in supposing the amendment thereof, to overturn a whole state: according to the ancient proverb, admonishing {αβγδ}, not to stir an evil that resteth well: and another latin proverb usurped 〈◇〉 Titus livius, M●l●m notum,& cvi iam assueueris, tolerabile maximae, that is to say, A known evil, and wherein a man is already accustomend, is most tolerable.  
IN other sciences it hath done good.] First of all he defendeth one of the parts of the question, to wit, that it is expedient to change laws after the example of Artes and Sciences, which through corrections and additions haue in continuance of time ben amended and brought to perfection.  
forasmuch as the skill of civil government is to be reckoned amongst these.] Aristotle politic. 7. chap. 10. writeth thus: It is credible, that a great many things haue been invented long ago, diverse times or rather infinite times: and it is very likely, that need first taught necessary things, and that afterwards those commodities that serve for honour and pomp were augmented. Therefore are wee to think, that the like hath befallen in forms of government. Let us therefore use those things that haue been well invented in the matter of government, and assay the supplying of that which wee shall find wanting therein. And in the third Chapter of this book: We must look far backward, and into the records of many years, wherein such means had not restend unknown if they had ben found good and profitable. For almost all things haue ben invented, but some haue ben received, and the rest refused after they haue ben experimented. The beginning and progression of government is shewed by Plato in his third book De Legibus, and how it hath been often invented, and lost and foregone again: and in Polybius, Lib. ●.  
FOR in those daies the Grecians ordinarily went armed with swords and weapons.] thucydides saith in his first book: That the custom of going armed, was general throughout all the land of Greece, because they had no safety in their houses, nor yet in the highways. Therefore were they constrained for the defence of their persons to go always armed, as the Barbarians do. And whereas that manner of living is yet observed in diverse Countries in Greece at this present day: it may bee presumed, that it was the old general custom of all the Grecians. Of whom the Athenians were the first that began to relinquish this custom of going armed: and from that manner of life thus forsaken, they betook themselves to a more civil and courteouser kind of life.  
THE other old and ancient ordinances be very fond and gross.] Plato in Minos saith: You haue hard what laws we observed of old time in the burial and service of the dead, killing the sacrifices before the carcase was carried forth towards the grave, and calling women to weep: also how the men of old time before them, butted their dead at home in their houses, which fashions we use not at this day.  
NOW all men do wholly bend themselves to seek, not for those things which haue ben left by their ancestors, but for those which are good.] Socrates in Euagoras saith: That Arts and Sciences came to their perfection, not by staying only vpon the sayings of our predecessors, but by correcting and altering what was not aright in them. And in his panegyrical Oration, I think( saieth he) that by this means both other Arts, and also eloquence would receive greatest increase, if not they who were the authors, but they who were the perfectours of them, might bee honoured and had in reputation.  
THE first men.] The Iewes, Christians, and saracens, do beleeue, that accordingly as Moyses setteth down at the beginning of his book of Genesis, there was but one man at the first, and that the world was created. But Aristotle in the eight book of his natural philosophy, and in diverse other places affirmeth, that the world in all kinds of creatures is everlasting, that they were without beginning,& never shal haue end. Plato in his third and sixth books of laws, doubteth of the world and of mankind, whether they haue been everlasting or not, saying thus: Either the generation of men had never beginning, or else it began in vnaccountable length of time before vs. In Timeus he assigneth a beginning unto it, but saith it shall never haue an end. Diodorus the Sicilian in his first book telleth us howe he hath not seen nor found in any manner of place whatsoever, what people or Nation was the first, by what space of time, or howe many yeares it was before others. justine writeth in his second book, that there was a great strife about antiquity between the Scythians and egyptians.  
AND it is very likely, that those first men were engendered of the earth, or of some corruption.] {αβγδ}, &c. Plato in his politic, or De Regno, saith thus: {αβγδ}, &c. that is, It is manifest, O Socrates, that in those times this kind did bring forth nothing by propagation: and whereas it is said, that sometimes creatures sprung out of the earth, this was at that time when they returned again into the earth. These things were delivered unto us by tradition from our first forefathers, who arose presently after the first revolution of time, and were the witnesses and preachers of these speeches: to whom, notwithstanding, credite was not given as it ought to be. The same Plato in his Protagoras saith thus, {αβγδ}, &c. that is, Time once was when the gods only were, and no kinds of mortal creatures: but when the fatal time of generation came, the gods framed them in the bowels of the earth of fire and earth, and of those things that are interposed between those two. In his Menexemus or funeral Oration thus, The first commendation of their stock is, in that the original of their ancestors was not from strange countries, neither left they here their successors, as foreigners or new come inhabitants born of strangers, but in-dwellers and true inhabitants of their own countries, and nourished not of a stepdame as others, but of their natural mother country: In the which also they that die are laid up, that is to say, into the bowels of her which brought them forth, nourished and maintained them. Socrates also in his Panegericke to the same effect, {αβγδ}, &c. that is, We inhabit this land, as not having dispossessed others, nor finding it empty and voided, nor yet being mingled of diverse Nations, but wee were born liberally and honestly: for we are home-bred dwellers, that wee should possess that land continually which brought us forth,& may call one another by those names that are of most affinity: for to us onely of all the Grecians, it is permitted to call the same land our nurse, our country, and our mother. The Grecians in their fables reported, that Vulcan being in love with Minerua, spilled his seed one day vpon the land of Attica, whereof sprung the Athenians, who therefore vaunted themselves to be {αβγδ}, that is to say, Come of the earth; without taking their beginning elsewhere. Proclus in his Commentaries vpon Timeus, allegorizing, by the earth understandeth every matter or stuff, and by Vulcan the fire that moveth the earth and quickeneth it. Wee beleeue with moses that God created the first man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into him the spirit of life. Aristotle De Generat. Animal. lib. 3. towards the end of the book sheweth: that by the opinion of some persons, men might bee engendered of the earth. Cicero De Legibus, lib. 1. saith thus: When the nature of all things is looked into, then these things are wont to bee so discussed as they are now: that by the continual courses and revolutions of the heauens, there came at length a certain maturity of sowing the seed of mankind: which being scattered and sowed on the earth, was increased and inspired with the divine blessing of souls: and whereas men derive those other things whereof they are compact, out of a mortal stock, they being mortal also and frail, yet that the soul was engendered by God. Not much unlike to this is that of Lactantius, lib. 2. cap. 12. where he saith thus: They say that by certain conversions and motions of the stars, there arose a certain ripe and fit seede-time of men: therefore, that the new earth retaining in it the procreatiue seed, brought forth certain hollow bladders or bags, like bellies in form: which waxing ripe( nature compelling) burst in sunder, and so poured forth young and tender creatures: then that the earth abounding with a certain humour or moisture like to milk, nourished therewith these new-bred creatures. Eusebius in his Treatise of the preparation of the gospel, maketh mention thereof: and Diodorus the Sicilian in the first book of his Library, writing thus: At the beginning of all things( saith he) the heaven and earth had one onely being and shape; But afterward vpon the separation of the elements one from another, the world took that order, shape, and disposition, wherein wee see it at this present: amongst the which elements, that continual moving which the air hath, fell to his share: and those places which be above the air to the fire by reason of the lightness thereof:& after the selfsame reason those courses which the sun and stars enjoy, fel to them for their shares: And that which was mingled with moisture, stayed by reason of the heaviness thereof, in one mass or lump; of the moistest part whereof came the sea, and of the hardest the earth, being in itself soft and miry: which, as soon as it had been first dried and made tougher with the heat of the sun, and after by the force of the same heat, swollen and puffed up in the vpper part, there forthwith bread and sprung up in many and diverse parts, certain humours engendering rottennesses and putrifactions, covered and hidden with small thin skins. Whereas then, the generation is wrought in moist things by putting heat thereto, and that by night the air spread abroad, yeeldeth moisture to the same, which taketh strength in the day by the virtue and power of the sun: At last, those rottennesses and putrifactions being guided to their uttermost course, did procreate( like as if the time of their delivery had ben come) the shapes and forms of all sorts of creatures and living things, after that those small skins wherein they were enclosed, were broken: of which living things, they that had received most store of heat, were made fowls,& flew up into the higher region: they that had most store of earth, remained serpents and other like beasts: they that held the nature of the water, were carried and put into the element of their own complexion and called Fishes. And the earth from thence forward being made drier, as well with the heat of the sun● as by the drought of the winds, left off from bringing forth such great beasts. But those that were already made, engendered other like unto themselves with continual commixtion& copulation. Men being thus shaped& brought forth, sought their food in the fields,& lived a savage life without al order& government, to whom the herbs& trees of themselves furnished those things which were necessary for their living: but the wild beasts became their enemies, insomuch, that for the resistance of them,& for their own commom behoof and safety they began through fear to conjoin themselves in companies, helping one another,& seeking here& there safe places for their dwelling& abode. Then was the sound of their voice and speech, such as was disordered and could not be understood: but afterward by little and little they made division and distinction in their speech, and name all things by their names. And forasmuch as they then abode in many parts of the world, they used not all one maner of language, whereby it came to pass, that they had also diuers forms of letters differing one from another. These first companies were the true beginnings of every people& nation. Notwithstanding, these first men having no aid nor succour from any place, did led a hard life, by means they were naked,& without the use of houses& fire, seeking their victuals from day to day, as they that had not the knowledge to keep their wild fruits for their use to come, nor to lay them up against time of need: whereby it came to pass, that in winter many of thē died either of hunger or could: but at last when experience had informed& taught thē, they began to seek trenches or caues to avoid& prevent the sharpness of could weather,& to keep their fruits therein to withstand famine:& when they had got the knowledge of fire& of certain other necessary& profitable things, they found out shortly after the other commodities for mans life, which in the end, necessity her self, the finder out of al things, maketh particularly known to the understandings of mortal men; to whom, hands, speech,& excellency of mind, were given for helps.  
OR left behind of some corruption.] Plato in his Timeus, Critias, Menexemus,& politic, is of opinion, that through long continuance of time, the vigour& quickness of minds & fruitfulness of bodies decay by little& little, in such sort, that the minds are found as it were deprived of the divinity,& the bodies emptied of their wonted fertility. Then God minding to restore mankind to it former dignity, moisteneth or burneth the earth by mingling the heavenly motions( himself being their mover) in such wise, that the heavenly destiny doth alway agree and run even with the providence of God: That so the earth being watered with the new and plentiful moisture, and made fruitful with the heat ensuing, thereupon doth bring forth: whereunto showers descending down more largely after an excessive drought, and long heats: thereof are engendered or regenerated, not only small creatures, such as there bee now adays, but also consequently great ones do breed out of the earth, as it were, their mother. Of this mind many men haue ben else, as egyptians, Grecians, and Arabians, and specially Algazel and Auicenna, with whom Aristotle agreeth in his problems, where he saith: As in little changings of time small creatures are born and bread, so are in greater changings greater creatures, and in the greatest changings the greatest creatures of all.  
WERE like the vulgar& ignorant sort.] Being rude and wild,& little di●fering from brute beasts: like the men a while since discovered in the new found lands toward the West& South parts of the world by the Spaniards and Portingales; without learning, without schools, without counsel, without Magistrates,& without religion: as vives reporteth in his first book of Christian truth, without arts, without tools,& without movables. Plato De Leg. lib. 3. reasoning of the beginning and proceeding of civil government or reigning, doth most elegantly set out the state& condition of the world renewed, and the neediness, simplicity, rudeness, and ignorance of the men of that time. In Timeus, vpon occasion he toucheth the same matters, and in his dialogue of government or of reign.  
SO that it standeth with no reason that we should satisfy ourselves with their decrees.] As fond, gross, blockish, and barbarous, the most part being unjust& unlawful through the ignorance of the makers.  
again, it is best not to leave the written laws unaltered.] It were a most goodly, a most behoveful, and a most commodious thing to use always one kind of laws. But sith manners, opinions, customs, and affections are variable, of necessity men are driven to make incessantly here and there new laws, to repeal the old, to amend the eui●l; and with dispensations to mitigate those that are too rigorous and severe. It was never otherwise, nor never will be, as long as mankind endureth. Plato in his dealogue of policy or of reigning, setteth down a long disputation about this matter, which is both goodly to behold, and profitable to understand.  
FOR in the skill of government( like as in other Arts) it is impossible to describe all things perfectly.] Plato in his peacocks or Dialogue of reigning: The unlikeness( saith he) of men, and of doings, and the unstable condition of worldly things, are the causes that no single Art can ordain any thing universally for all affairs, and that will be available at all times. For it is impossible to set down any certain order plain and simplo in things that always varie and change, and never continue in one state. Yet in Minos, he resolveth, that the right and true law( if any such could be found out) should bee everlasting and unchangeable, and always one, of the selfsame things toward all things. And in the fourth book of his commonweal, he sharply rebuketh those Law-makers, that through ambition do nothing but make and vnmake laws, supposing to remedy those frauds that are committed in worldly traffic and other doings, not knowing that in truth they cut off the head of that serpent Hydra, that is to say, in stead of remedying or redressing mischiefs, they augment and multiply the same. Plato affirming that such alteration and changing proceeded through mens evil bringing up and nurture, for which few Lawmakers haue had care to provide: and that the multitude of Laws is unprofitable for two causes; the one, because they are not necessary in a good commonweal, and vnbehoofefull in one that is naught● the other, for that every man by instinct of nature doth easily perceive what is just and unjust.  
but they must needs be written universally, and doings consist in particular things.] Plato in his Dialogue of reigning writeth thus: They think it not possible to ordain what is convenient for every man particularly and severally: Therefore suppose they, how that ought to be ordained which they think most common,& very fit for most. So the Lawmaker governing his societies, and ministering right concerning just actions, and mutual bargains, cannot when he provideth for al together, regard the commodity& right of every particular person, but ordaineth that which may profit many,& that very greatly: and propoundeth such laws both written and unwritten, as he bringeth into the country: for how can he all his life time ouerview every several man,& diligently help and provide for his private commodity? Aristotle in the third book of this work, cap. 11. reasoning whether it be more expedient to be governed by one good man, than by good laws: They( saith he) that prefer the kingly government, suppose that those laws which speak only in general terms, do not provide for particular cases: so that it is fondness in any art whatsoever to command according to the prescript rules. And in the 12 chapter of the same book, he saith: that in many places there be Magistrates which haue full authority to determine, as Iudges, those cases wherein the law cannot provide redress. And a little after: for that certain things are comprised within the laws,& others cannot be comprehended therein, it maketh a doubt and question whether it be most convenient, that a good law or a good man should command and govern. Therfore forasmuch as the whole cannot be comprised within the law, it is needful to commit it to the arbitrement of man, and to establish some one as keeper and ministrer of the laws, who by the tenor and disposition of them, shall govern the commonweal.  
WHEREBY it appeareth, that some laws are to bee changed, and that now and then they may be altered.] This is not the final conclusion, but of one part of the question only, affirming that laws may be altered. Those laws that wholly repugn the iudgement and sense of nature, or that corrupt nature,& contain manifest iniquity, ought to be changed or rather abrogated.  
ON the contrary side, if we do aduise ourselves well in that behalf, it seemeth that we ought to look well unto it.] Here is the other part of the question, that those laws which haue ben allowed, and by custom established, should not vpon light cause be altered, though they contain in them some discommodity or imperfection. Aristotle, ethics, lib. 5: sheweth how the faults of laws ought to be dissembled and winked at.  
FOR the alteration of them will not do so much good.] ulpian a Roman Lawyer saith: that there ought to be apparent benefit in the ordaining of new laws.  
AS harm, by accustoming men to disobey.] There doth nothing more debase& weaken the authority of laws, than the too often making of them, without having sufficient care of their observation and maintenance. Vpon which occasion, it is written in the second law of the beginning of right, in the old digests, That it is to small purpose to haue laws in a city, except there bee some body authorized to put them in execution. To such effect in old time were ordained the Nomophilaces in Grecia, and the Censors at Rome.  
THE example fetched from Arts, is false.] He hath the same saying in the third book of this work and cap. 12. These examples of Arts are set down by Plato in his Dialogue of reigning, and in Minos.  
FOR the law hath no force to procure obedience to itself, saving custom.] The chief authority of laws dependeth of antiquity. True it is also, that the power of the Law-makers doth help much to cause men to yield their obedience thereunto. wherefore Minos, Lycurgus, Solon, and welneere all other Law-makers took and seized into their hands the absolute force and power of the Countries wherein they gave laws. Others that meddled therein without force and power, haue lost their time in vain, or been recompensed with death or hanishment for their labours.  
WEAKENETH the virtue and power of the law.] Often changing of laws decayeth their authority, and taketh away the respect and reverence that men bear unto them. And when those two things are gone, there is no further obedience to law.  
WHETHER laws are to bee changed, and whether all in every commonweal, or not.] It were too great violence and tyranny to change them all at once, yea though it were by strangers conquering new countries: but the discreeter sort do it in time, by little and little. And yet is it not possible to make any such great alteration, but there must always remain diverse prints of the former laws and customs.  
AND whether is it lawful for every body to change them, or to certain personages.] They ought to bee changed by the Magistrates called to that Office, to the end, that the business may be executed with the less stir and tumult: or else if every man bee allowed to haue an oar therein, and that such ceremonies as are needful for the making and publishing of laws, be not observed in the same, it would be nothing but confusion& disorder, with the continual toil and pain of evermore beginning again, through misliking, ambition, or curiosity and desire of novelties, which of custom reigneth in the most part of men. Plato in his first book De Legibus, forbiddeth all persons under the age of forty yeares, to inquire whether the laws be well or evil ordained.  
THEREFORE for this present wee will lay aside this question, as not properly belonging to this place.] Aristotles drift and meaning in this second brook, is to examine the commonweals of his own time, as well those that were used in Countries and cities, as those that were written by any Philosophers or Lawgiuers: and not to deal with laws, but incidently and by occasion, as he hath done in this place, putting over that question to another more convenient place.   

CHAP. VII. Of the commonweal of the Lacedemonians.  
IN the Lacedemonians commonweal, and also in the Cretane, and almost in all others, two things are to be considered: the one, whether there be any thing well or ill ordained, according to the right form and description of a commonweal: the other, whether there bee any thing contrary to that supposition and form of policy which they propounded to themselves. Now it is fully resolved and concluded amongst all, that in a well governed state, the principals and chief rulers ought not to give themselves to necessary works: but yet how this ought to bee done, is not easy to bee comprehended. For oftentimes the bondslaves of Thessaly,( called the Penestie) haue rebelled against the Thessalonians: and the Ilotians conspired against the Lacedemonians: watching and spying out ordinarily the time of their adversities: the which thing hath not hither to happened unto the Cretans: the cause whereof peradventure may be this, in that it is not expedient nor profitable ●or the neighbour cities,( albeit they make war vpon each other) to assist such rebels against their maisters, least they should be likewise dealt withall by their neighbours. But all the borderers of the Lacedemonians, as the argives, the Messenians, and Arcadians, were deadly enemies unto them: And then did the Penestians of thessaly begin first to revolt, whilst the Thessalians made war with their neighbours the Athenians, Perraebians, and Magnesians. Now suppose there were no other thing but this, yet it seemeth to be a matter of great care and trouble, how to converse with such kind of people: for if one give them too much liberty, they grow proud and insolent, and equal themselves with their maisters: and if on the contrary, they be roughly and sharply handled, they rebel and conspire. Seeing therefore that they are so disturbed with this Ilotie, it is certain, that they haue not found a good form of government.  
There were in Greece three notable commonweals, the Cretane, the Lacedemonian, and the Athenian; ordained by three notable Lawgiuers, Minos, Lycurgus,& Solon: of which three he beginneth to entreat, and first of the Lacedemonian, which surpassed the rest, as well in regard of the firm establishment thereof( the like whereof was never seen) for it continued about seven hundred years, as also in regard of the glory of the marshal deeds thereof, having a great while possessed the Empire of Greece. Aristotle, a severe and strict examiner of all things, findeth fault with certain notable articles in the same, to wit, the conversation and demeanour of the Ilotians, the liberty of women, and election of Magistrates for term of life, the authority of the ephors or Tribunes, the ordering of taxes and treasure,& the end and mark whereat it shot, which was to haue dominion. Which points it is not possible to understand, without taking a view of the maner& form of government, in such state as Lycurgus delivered it:& as we could gather out of Plato, Xenophon, plutarch, Polybius, Strabo, and other good authors. Lycurgus therefore, the eleventh, descending in the right line from Hercules, being the younger brother of Polydecte king of the Lacedemonians, governed the kingdom after the decease of this Polydecte, first as king, and after( when there was a man child born of the wife of the same Polydecte, whom at his decease he had left great with child) as protector of the orphan being born after his fathers decease. And forasmuch as, if the young prince should die, the succession of the kingdom appertained to Lycurgus, as uncle& next of kin unto him: fearing least if it should so fall out, the fault therof would be laid vpon him, as some of his enemies had already reproached him: and fearing that suspicion, he withdrew himself fro Lacedemonia,& went into Crete: where falling in acquaintance with Thales the musician& Lawmaker, he learned of him the laws of the country, and how Radamanthus& Minos had received them from jupiter, and delivered them unto men. From thence he passed into egypt, where he learnt the laws of that nation. Then came he into Chio, where he had conference with Homer. Thence returning into his own country, he found his nephew Charilaus reigning:& meaning to apply himself about the making of laws, he asked counsel of the god Apollo in Delphos. Then began he to publish them, being for the most part like to those of Minos, but fathered vpon Apollo, as the other were vpon jupiter. By such manner of proceeding, Lycurgus brought to light such a form& pattern of government, as no man before him had invented, and as none other after him could imitate, and hath presented to the sight of thē that think the definition of a perfect wise man to bee a matter onely imagined in the air, and that none such can be really and effectually in this world, one whole city living and governing it ●elfe philosophically, that is to say, according to the precepts and rules of perfect wisdom. By means whereof, he hath in glory rightfully surmounted all them that ever took vpon them to writ or stablish the government of any civil or politic state● And thereupon( saith Aristotle) after his death they yielded him less honor in Lacedemonia then he had deserved, though they yielded unto him as much as was possible: for they erected a temple unto him, and ordained an yearly solemn sacrifice for him, as it had ben a god. After this maner vndertook Lycurgus to alter the government of the commonweal, and wholly to change all the form of the state: supposing that the only making of certain particular laws& ordinances would not serve to any purpose, no more than to a body all marred and full of all sorts of diseases, the appointing of some slight medson; except he would first give order for the purging, losing, and consuming of all evil humours, to the end, to appoint unto it afterwards a new form and rule of life. When he had taken this resolution in his mind, he went( before any putting in ure therof) unto the City of Delphos, where, after he had sacrificed unto Apollo, he asked counsel of him touching his affairs, and received that so greatly renowned Oracle, whereby the prophetess Pythia, called him, beloved of the gods, and rather a god then a man. And as touching his request for grace to establish good laws in his country, shee answered that Apollo did grant it unto him, and that he should ordain the best and perfectest form of commonweal that ever was in the world. This answer encouraged him more then before: so that he began to reveal his secret purpose to certain of the principal persons of the town, praying and exhorting them secretly to yield their furtherance and assistance therein: trying them first whom he knew for his friends, and by little& little evermore winning some others to his side that joined with him in his enterprise. After this, when opportunity served, on a certain morning he caused an assembly in the market place of thirty of the chief men of the town in armor, to fray and restrain those that should withstand that which they had determined to do. whereby it appeareth, that Lycurgus shewed in effect, that it was a hard matter to alter the government of a commonweal without open force and apparent fear. And thus almost all founders or reformers of commonweals and kingdoms haue accustomend to do: who had not ben else heard, obeyed, nor followed, as witnesseth this, that Lycurgus himself had one of his eyes plucked out by setting up the equality of possessions. now in this change and alteration of the state by Lycurgus, there were many novelties brought in: but the chiefest and greatest of all, was the founding and institution of the Senate, which being mingled with the power of the kings, and made equal to them, as touching the authority of matters of importance, was as Plato saith, a counterpoise or balance of welfare to the whole body of the commonweal, which aforetime was evermore wavering, inclining one while to tyranny when the kings had too much power, and another while to confusion and disorder of the people, when the common people took too much authority vpon them. And Lycurgus did place between them both this council of senators, which was, as it were, a strong bar, keeping the two extremities in even balance, and giuing steadfast and sure footing to the state of the commonweal, by reason the eight and twenty senators, of whom the body of the Senate consisted, sometimes took part with the kings, as far as was needful for the resistance of the malapertness and rashness of the people: and contrariwise, now and then strengthened the part of the people against the kings, to keep them from usurping any tyrannical power. He made choice of this number of senators, to the end, that the entire body of the counsel should consist of thirty persons in the whole, by putting the two kings unto them: Which establishment was authorized by the very Oracle of the god Apollo, called Retra: which is as much to say; as decree or sentence. The tenor whereof was thus: After thou shalt haue builded a Temple to jupiter Syllanvan, and to Minerua Syllanyan, and divided the people into Tribe●, thou shalt establish a Senate of thirty counsellors, comprehending therein the two kings: and shalt assemble the people together, according to the occasion of times, in the place that is situate between the bridge and the river of Gracyon: where the senators shall propound matters, and break off the assemblies, and it shall not be lawful for the people to make any Oration there. Afterwards the kings Polydore and Theopompe added thereunto, that where the people would in any wise alter the aduise propounded to the counsel by the Senate, it should be lawful for the kings and the Sena●ours to break of the council, and disannul the decree thereof: as having altered, disguised, and changed to worse, the sentences and propositions set forth by the Senate: and persuading the people, that this addition, as well as the principal, came from the Oracle of Apollo. Then Lycurgus having thus temperated the form of government, it seemed nevertheless to them that came after him, that this small number of thirty persons who made up the Senate, was yet too mighty, and had too much authority. By means whereof, for the bridling of them, they gave them( as Plato saith) a bit, which was the power and authority of the ephors, that is to say, controllers, who were created about one hundred and thirty yeares after the death of Lycurgus. The second novelty that Lycurgus made, and was the hardiest ente●prise of all, consisted in causing a new division of lands. For whereas there was in the country of Lacedemonia most great odds and inequality between the inhabitants, because some, and the greatest part were so poor, that they had not so much as an inch of land, and others, and that a very small number so rich, that they possessed all: he considered, that for the banishing and hunting out of his city, ouerlustinesse, envy, covetousness and delights; and also richesse and poverty, which are also great pestilences in cities and commonweals: there was no readier way then to persuade his Citizens to set again in common all the lands, possessions, and heritages of their Country, and to divide them new again equally between themselves, to the intent, to live altogether from thence forward as brethren: so that one should not haue more in possessions then another, and that they should not seek one to excel another in any other thing than virtue onely: deeming that there ought to bee no other odds or inequality between the inhabitants of one selfsame city, saving that which proceedeth from the blame of dishonesty, and the commendation of virtue and honesty. According to this imagination, he effectually executed the division of lands. For he divided all the rest of the country of Laconie wholly into thirty thousand equal parts, which he distributed to the inhabitants about Sparta: and of the lands nearer to the very City of Sparta itself, he made nine thousand other parts, which he divided amongst ●he natural burgesses of Sparta, who be they that properly are called S●artans. every one of these portions was such, that yearly it yielded to the owner, seuentie bushels of barley for a man, and twelve for a woman: and of wine and other liquid commodities in like proportion, esteeming this quantity to be sufficient to maintain and preserve a mans body sound, nimble, and lusty, and that nothing else was needful and requisite. He went about also to bring into one, all their movables, and then to divide them equally, to the end, that all manner of inequality might bee taken away. But when he perceived, that the people took it impatiently to haue their goods thus openly taken from them: he proceeded therein closely and underhand, and so deluded craftily their avarice and covetousness, for first of all he disclaimed all kind of money made of gold or silver, and ordained that iron money should onely bee used, whereof also a great and heavy mass was valued at a small rate, in such sort, that a piece of a hundred crownes, would trouble and hinder a whole room in a house, and ask a yoke of Oxen to draw it up and down. Now by this means gold and silver being thus banished out of Laconia, it was necessary that many vices and enormities went out with them: for who would be willing to rob, steal, receive or retain a thing which he could no ways hid and conceal, and which he had no great reason to desire, nor profit to possess, the case being so that he could not translate it to any other use: because that when the iron which they purposed to coin, was fire hote, they quenched it with vinegar, and so extinguished the strength and hardness thereof, in such sort as it lost all fitness for other services and works ever after, being become so sharp and so brittle, that it could not abide the hammer or the fire any more. Next after this, he banished all superfluous and unprofitable trades, and albeit he had not banished them by express edict, yet had they all, or at least the most part, of themselves together with the use of money, when they had not found any more means of gain, and riddance of their works to others: by reason that their iron coin was not currant in other Cities of Greece, but rather mocked and laughed at in all places: And by this means, the Lacedemonians could not buy any strange merchandises, neither did there any ship of traffic haunt their ports; no affecting Rhetorician came into their country to teach the art of subtle pleading; no Southsaier to forecalculate good fortunes; no bawd to maintain stews and houses of brodelrie; no Goldsmith or jeweller to make or sell trinkets of gold or silver to adorn ladies: because all these things tend onely to this end, to gain and hoard up money, whereof there was no use in that place: and so delights being destituted of those things which nourish and maintain them, began to whither and vanish by little and little, and at last to fall of themselves, when as the rich could haue no more than the poor, and riches and wealth could haue no means of ostentation and public show, but remained idle within doors, without being able to serve their maisters in any stead. But further he being desirous to persecute yet more the superfluity and delicious pleasures of his Citizens, to the end to exterminat and roote out on all sides this greedy desire of having and enriching: he made another third ordinance, new and most excellent, which was, that concerning banquets: by the which he willed and ordained that they should eat together by companies, and that al of the same meats,& those none but such as were namely specified by his decree: by the which also it was expressly forbidden to eat apart privately vpon rich tables and sumptuous beds, abusing thus the labours of excellent workmen, and dainty Cookes, to fat and feed themselves in secret, and in the dark as it were, as men use to fat ravenous and greedy beasts: which thing spoileth and corrupteth not onely the conditions of the mind, but also the complexions of the body, when the bridle of liberty is thus let loose to all sensuality and luxurious gluttony: whereupon it followeth, that much sleep must afterward be had, to boil and digest that overplus of meat which is ingested: and also the help of hote baths, long rest, and set diet must needs bee used, like as if he were sick of some grievous disease. It was not lawful for them to eat privately in their houses, before they came into the common walls, and so prevent by secret farcing themselves, the public banquet in the place appointed: for every man had his eye ready to note expressly those which did not eat and drink with a good appetite in the assembly: and not onely so, but also his tongue ready to blame and reprove them as gluttons, or at least as men disdaining in a certain daintiness, to eat in public with the rest. The Cretans called these public banquets Andria, and the Lacedemonians Phiditia: and this last, either because these were such places wherein a man might learn to live soberly and thriftily( for thrift or sparing, in the greek tongue is called Phido) or because in those places mutual amities and friendships were engendered, as if they would haue called them Philitia( i.) places or feasts of love, putting a d for an l. It might also bee, that the first letter was ouer-added as superfluous, and then it should bee Editia: because men assembled together in these places to eat and take their repast. Thus they assembled together by fifteens or thereabouts in every hall, and every one of them brought at the beginning of each month, a bushel of meal, eight gallons of Wine, five pound of cheese, and two pound and a half of figs: and over and above, a little piece of their money to buy their meat. But besides all this, when any of them sacrificed in his house, he sent the first fruits of his sacrifice into the public hall. Likewise, if any had taken any Venison in Hunting, he sent one piece thereof thither: for in these two cases onely it was lawful for them to eat privately, to wit, when they had sacrificed beasts to their gods, and when they returned late home from hunting: otherwise, they were constrained to bee continually present in the halls at the common meetings, if they would eat. Which custom they observed a long while most strictly. Their children also frequented these meate-assemblies no less than schools of honour and temperance, where they heard many good and grave sentences and devises touching the government of the Commonwealth under maisters that were not mercenary: and where they learnt also to play vpon one another in speeches, and to quip and mock each other pleasantly, and yet without all sharp girding, or dishonest jesting, and being thus mocked, not to bee angry or discontented. It was an ordinary custom, that when they entered into the common hall, the eldest among them pointing to the door, said: Let no speech here spoken, go out of these doors or over this threshold. Also whosoever would be received into any of those meat-assemblies, must be first approved and allowed of by all the residue. The most exquisite and dainty meate which they had, was that which they called black broth: so that when that was served in, the old men would eat no flesh, but left it to the younger, and they by themselves fed vpon the broth onely. After they had thus soberly eat and drunk together, they returned without light every one to his home: for it was not permitted to walk either thither or elsewhere with a Candle, to the end, they might accustom themselves to march boldly every where by night and in the dark as well as in the light. This was the order and form of their Phiditia, or meate assemblies, or love feasts, as we may fitly term them. As concerning other light matters, touching contracts and bargains betwixt man and man, being things which often change& alter, sometimes on this, sometimes on that fashion, as necessity requireth; he thought best not to tie or reduce them under any written edicts or constraints, nor yet to establish in them any settled custom not to bee changed: but rather to leave them to the discretion& arbitrement of men which had ben well instructed& brought up, to the end, to take from or add unto them, according as the occurrence and occasion of time required. Supposing( to be brief) that the chief scope and drift of a good establisher or reformer of a commonweal ought to bee this, to cause that men might bee well instructed& brought up in virtue. Lycurgus as hath been said, called these his ordinances Retres, which is as much to say, as grave sentences, or Oracles given by the god Apollo: neither would he ever suffer that any of these should be put in writing: but it is expressly mentioned in one place, that his meaning was not that any of his decrees should be committed to writing. For as touching that which is of principal power and force to make a City happy& virtuous, he thought that it ought to be imprinted in the hearts by education, and in the manners of men by custom, that it might there remain unchangeable. Good willingness of mind is the strongest bond which can bee knit and made to constrain men to live well:& the bent which they get by good instruction from their first infancy, is it which maketh every man to serve in stead of a law unto himself. plutarch esteemed this to be one of the most happy& excellentest things which Lycurgus brought into his commonweal, namely, the great leisure& idleness which he bestowed vpon his Citizens, when as he suffered thē not to employ themselves to any base or mechanical trade:& that it was not needful to travel& toil for the heaping up of riches in such a place, where wealth and opulency was neither profitable, nor esteemed. There were amongst thē nothing but dancing, feasts, sports, banquets, pastimes in hunting, or exercises of their bodies, and such like, all the while that they were not busied in War. Solon on the other side ordained great punishments for idleness, and would that every one should give an account of his life and exercise. And at this day in the lawe of Mahomet every one is bound to be skilful in some trade, even from the highest Bassa and his children, who all learn some Art or other, to the lowest and basest drudge. But it is time to return to Aristotle, and to the exposition of our text, having forealleadged this discourse, to the end, to haue the better understanding thereof.  
NOW it is fully resolved and concluded amongst all● that in a well governed state● the principals and chief rulers ought not to give themselves to necessary works.] Plato& Aristotle are both of this opinion, that the chief men of a country ought not to exercise any vile or base Trade, nor any craft of hands, as mercenary hirelings. And so Lycurgus also ordained in Sparta or Lacedemonia. Of which matter Plutarch in the life of Solon writeth thus: Lycurgus( saith he) who inhabited a city, wherein there was no resort nor arrival of any strangers, and which had so large territories that might sufficiently furnish twice as many people as there were resident, and which besides was environed on all sides with a great multitude of Ilotians: whom it was very much expedient to keep from idleness, and always to hold them in low subiection, constraining them continually to travel and labour both for themselves& others: this was a most wise decree, whereby to keep his citizens always occupied in the exercise of arms, without the learning or practise of any other trade of life, discharging them from all other painful occupations and handicrafts.  
THE Ilotians conspired against the Lacedemonians.] These Ilotians were men enthralled by the law of arms, who tilled the grounds of the Lacedemonians, and yielded unto them thereout a certain rent and revenue every year. And by reason that they often rebelled against their lords, Plutarch reporteth, that there was in Lacedemonia a certain secret decree, that the governors which had the oversight of the youth, at certain periodes of times, should select out some whom they judged best advised, and sand them into the country here and there, carrying with them dags only, and that which was necessary for their living and sustenance. Now these young men dispersed up and down in the country, hide themselves in the day time in some covert and secret places, where they restend and refreshed themselves: but in the night beset and lay in wait in the high ways, and there slay every Ilote that they could find: and sometimes also in the broad day they ranged through the fields, killing and slaying the mightiest and strongest that they could come by( as thucydides in his history of the Peloponesian war recordeth: where he saith further, that certain Ilotes, a good number at a certain time were by a public decree of the spartans crwoned, as being enfranchised and made free, and so lead through all the Temples of the gods, in reward of their good services which they had exploited most valiantly for the Commonwealth:) and thus in short time it could not be perceived what was become of them, although the number of them amounted to two thousand: in such sort, that never any man heard it spoken, neither then nor after, after what maner they died or were made away. And Aristotle besides that which al others affirm, saieth: That the Ephories or Tribunes as soon as they were installed in their offices, denounced war against the Ilotes to that purpose, that it might bee lawful to kill them howsoever. Well, it is most certain, that amongst other things they handled them most roughly; for sometimes they compelled them to drink Wine unmixed with water, in such quantity, till they were stark drunk therewith: after they lead them thus drunk into the common halls of their meat assemblies, to show unto their children what a villainy and ugly thing it was to bee drunk: and then caused them to dance filthy dances, unbeseeming honest persons,& full of derision and mockery, forbid●ing them expressly those which were comely and honest. plutarch thinketh, that the Lacedemonians begun to use this notable cruelty and roughness, long after the death of Lycurgus, and namely after that great earthquake which happened in Sparta: at what time the Ilotes rebelling against them, took part with the Messenians, and committed many outrages in their country, and put their city into the greatest danger that it ever was in. Plato De Legibus, lib. 6. speaking of bondslaves, mentioneth these Ilotes, Penests, and Periaeces of the Cretans.  
MOREOVER, the liberty which was given unto women, is hurtful and incommodious, both for the purpose of their commonweal, and also for the happy estate thereof. For even as the man and woman are parts and members of a family, so likewise a city may be divided into two equal parts, one consisting of men and the other of women: so that in any city where the ordering& discipline of women is not good, there the one half or moiety of the city is thought to be out of order, as it is in that: for the lawgiver desiring to make all the city temperate and able to sustain labours, hath attained his purpose in regard of men, but not of women, who are permitted to live in all licentiousness and dissolute intemperancy: in such sort, that necessary riches are honoured and esteemed in such a Commonwealth, especially where men are in subiection to women, as for the most part it is amongst warlike and military Natione, except the Celts or some other which openly approve the unnatural fellowship with their own sex. And therefore it seemeth that he which first devised fables, did not without cause couple Mars and Venus together: for all such kind of people are given either to sodomy against nature, or to the hunting of harlots and strumpets. The which mischief was amongst the Lacedemonians, where the most part of their affairs were ordered by the direction of women. For what difference is there, whether women command in their own persons, or that the commanders be commanded by women, doth it not all come to one pass? Further, whereas audacity and boldness is nothing available in ordinary businesses, except only in matters of war: the women of Lacedemonia were in this respect most hurtful to their commonweal, as they evidently made proof of at the invasion of the thebans, for they were so far from being profitable, as women of other Cities were, that they rather raised up more trouble and tumult in the city, then the enemies themselves. But it seemeth that such liberty was permitted to the Lacedemonian women not without just cause: for the men were often abroad from their homes, by reason of the continual war which they waged; first with the argives, after with the Arcadians and Messenians. And when they enjoyed any peace, they yielded themselves to their Law-giuers discretion to be prepared and made fit against war: in which kind of life, all most excellent virtues were to bee found. Some say that Lycurgus attempted to bring women in subiection to his laws: but when he saw that they made head against him to withstand them, he surceassed from his enterprise: and this was the cause which threw them into those inconveniences, and consequently into this error. But our purpose is not to inquire what deserveth excuse, and what not, but what is well or ill ordained: for if the discipline of women be not well ordered, it seemeth( as it hath been said before) not onely to cause an vndecencie and indecorum in the commonweal, but also to engender avarice and covetousness.  
The Lacedemonians haue ever affied and ascribed very much unto their women, suffering them to look into and to meddle more with the affairs of the commonweal, then they themselves did with the affairs of the house. Plutarch in the life of Agis ●nd Cleomene. And because the greatest part of their riches was under the hands and custody of women, therefore they gave them much honour, and withall much power and authority.  
SO that in any city where the ordering and discipline of women is not good.] Aristotle in his first book of Rhethoricke affirmeth, that in all cities where the estate and affairs of women is not well ordered and governed, as among the Lacedemonians, the one half of their felicity and happiness seemeth to be wanting.  
FOR the lawgiver desiring to make all the city temperate and able to sustain labour, hath attained his purpose in regard of men, but not of women.] Of the education and nurture of men hath been spoken before, that of women was such as followeth: First, the lawgiver willed and commanded, that the young women should harden and enure their bodies to labour, by exercising running, wrestling, throwing the bar, and whirling the dart: to the end, that both the fruit of their wombs which they should conceive, taking deep root in a lusty and strong body, might burnish and grow the better: and also that they themselves being enabled& made strong by such exercises, might with more courage and ease endure the travails of childbed. And that he might deprive them of all delicacy and effeminate tenderness, he accustomend the young maids as well as the young men to labour and to dance naked at certain feasts and solemn sacrifices, and to sing in the presence of young gallants, to whom oftentimes they would give bitter cuts, touching them to the quick, which had forgotten their duty in any respect. And sometimes also they rehearsed in their songs the praises and commendations of them which deserved the same: whereby they engraved in the hearts of young men an exceeding great emulation and contention of honour. For he that had been commended by them for his valour and prowess, was presently lifted up in courage to attempt greater matters afterward: and the bitings and quippes which they gave unto others, were no less stinging and sharp, then the most severe admonitions& chastisements that could come unto them, considering that it was done in the presence of the kings, Senators, and whole people, who came always together to see and hear their contention. But as touching that, that the maids shewed themselves naked in public; Plutarch striveth to excuse it, saying that thereupon arose amongst them no naughtiness nor uncleanness at all: but that their strife and contention was accompanied with al honesty and modesty, and voided of immodesty and lechery: yea rather on the contrary, that it carried with it an accustoming and enuring them to the discipline of their country, and an emulation amongst themselves, who should haue the strongest and lustiest body. And which is more, it lifted up in some sort their heart with courage, and made them more valiant and magnanimous, by making known that it was no less seemly for them to exercise and profess prowess, and to contend among themselves who should haue the prise, than for men. Whence it proceeded, that the Lacedemonian women had the heart to speak and think of themselves, that which Gorgon the wife of king Leonidas one day answered a strange lady devising with her, and saying: That there were no women in the world save the Lacedemonian, that overruled and commanded men. No more( replied she) are there any women in the world that bring forth men, save they. moreover, this was a bait to 'allure young men to mary them, I mean these sports, dances, and contentions which young maids practised in the presence of young men. And yet besides these allurements, he appointed a note of infamy and discredit against those which refused to marry: and they that would mary also, must first ravish by force those maids whom they would espouse, who after had their hair shaven off unto their bare skin, and then were attired with mens garments, and breeches of the same, and placed in beds alone vpon certain pallets, where the new married came to lye with them. Plato De Republib. 5. alloweth in his commonweal such public exercise of young maids naked with young men, attributing the same works to both of them, willing also that the old men and women should exercise themselves together after the same manner.  
ESPECIALLY where men are in subiection to women, as for the most part amongst warlike and military nations.] Great warriors are ordinarily great whorehunters, and Nations most warlike, are commonly most given over to most licentious luxuriousness, whence arose that fable, which feigned that the god Mars lay with the goddesse Venus,& that they were enwrapped and entangled in a chain by Vulcan her husband, as is recorded by Homer and ovid.  
EXCEPT the Cel●es, {αβγδ}.] Budeus in his first Annotations vpon the Pand●cts hath translated this vltra Celtas, that is to say, beyond the Celtes. Philip Mel●ncthon in his Chronicles, li. 2. is of opinion, that in ancient Greece the Galatians and these Celtians were the people that inhabited on each side of the river Rhine. Other suppose, that the name of the Celtians contained all the western people, as at this day the Asians, africans, Moores, Turkes, saracens, abyssines, Agiamesquians, and Indians, call us western people by the name of France: because that the first that ever visited them with armies, and overcame them, were the free French men, who always haue made the greatest expeditions towards the eastern countries. Therfore, from the chief captaines which were French, they haue translated the name to all other Christians of Europe, on this side the Mediteranian sea, the name remaining as a monument of the ancient virtue and renown of the French Nations. The hardiness and furiousness of this people hath always been feared and held in awe, especially in the affairs of chivalry.  
OR some other which openly approve the unnatural fellowship with their own sex.] The Celtians in old time were noted of the horrible sin of buggery, wherewith at this day they are not infected. Amongst the Turkes and the Mores, and even among the Persians also, this detestable and horrible 'vice is not punished by the fire, as with us it is, but is permitted and tolerated to the great scandal of mankind, and reproach to their law. Howbeit Plato De Legib. 8. severely forbiddeth men to abuse males in stead of females, calling to witness the nature of brute beasts, amongst whom the males do not commit such filthiness with each other, because it is a thing contrary to nature. he detesteth also this same 'vice in his book of the same work, alleging the fabulous story of Ganimedes, devised by the wicked Cretans, to the end, to cloak the villainy whereunto they were then( and with them all ancient Greece) inclined.  
AMONGST the Lacedemonians, where the most part of their affairs were ordered by the direction of women.] For which cause they were name in Greek {αβγδ}, that is, Men governed by women, like as Plinie also in his sixth book calleth certain people, which being neighbours to the amazons, were vanquished by them in war, and yielded obedience to their conqueresses, to the end, to beget children of them. There are also to bee found many husbands so besotted and addicted to their wives, that they wholly yield and submit themselves unto them, in such sort, as being despoiled of all authority in their private house, yet they think themselves worthy to command others in public,& to bear the greatest Offices in a city, a thing very strange and undecent.  
AS they evidently made proof off at the invasion of the thebans.] At the battle of Leuctres, wherein the Lacedemonians were conquered by Epaminondas, and lost their king Cleombrotus, with the valiantest of their men. After which battle, Epaminondas entred enemie-like with a puissant army into the country of Lacedemonia, and marched even to the walls of their city, wherein abode Agesilaus one of their kings who defended it valiantly against the enemy. During this siege, the old men and the women were amazed with wonderful fear, and did nothing but run up and down crying and lamenting which thing was as great a trouble and vexation to Agesilaus, as were the threats and reproaches of his enemies, wherewith notwithstanding he was sore troubled.  
IT seemeth that such liberty was permitted to the Lacedemonian women not without just cause.] The Lacedemonians abode ten yeares obstinately at the siege of Messenia, having sworn a solemn oath, never to depart from thence until such time as they had taken the city. Wherefore in this their absence, they choose out a certain number of young men, which came into the army after the oath, and sent them back to dwell with their wives, and to repeople the city, permitting them( as reporteth justine) indifferently to enjoy the company of them all. Which dead, though done vpon necessity, yet caused them to be whores ever after.  
SOME say, that Lycurgus attempted to bring women in subiection to his laws: but when he saw that they made head against him to withstand them, he surceassed from his enterprise.] Plutarch in the life of Lycurgus: As touching that( saith he) which Aristotle reporteth that Lycurgns went about to reform women, and surceassed presently, when he perceived that he could not attain his purpose, because of the too great liberty, which in the absence of their husbands they had usurped: who were constrained often to bee at the warres: during which time, they were left as mistresses and rulers at home: and their husbands also when they were at home, honoured and pampe●ed them above measure, calling them Ladies and mistresses. plutarch affirmeth all this to be false.  
BESIDES the matters already alleged, a man may reprehend the inequality of possessions also: for it cometh to pass, that some possess great store of goods, and others again very little, so that the whole country of Sparta is grown into few mens hands: which thing was not well provided and looked unto by their laws: For albeit, the lawgiver ordained it to be a dishonest part, and that well, to buy or sell a mans patrimony: nevertheless, he hath given liberty to give it away, or to be bequeath it by Testament, although it m●st needs be, that the same discommodity will arise by this means, as well as by that. Now, the whole country being distributed into five parts, two of them five are come into womens hands, by the means of the great inheritances which fall unto some, and of the great dowries which are bestowed vpon others: but it were better that either there were no dowries at all, or that they were limited with small and mean bounds. Now it is lawful for any to bequeath that which is their own, by testament, to whom they list: and albeit a father die intestate without appointing an heir to succeed him, yet may he bequeath his own to whom he list. Whence it cometh to pass, that that country which could nourish a thousand and five hundred horsemen,& thirty thousand footmen, can scarce now nourish a thousand. And so by experience, it is clearly perceived, that this was not well provided in their law: For their City reduced to so small a number of men, hath not sustained one blow of misfort●ne alone, but even hath ben utterly ruinated for want of men. They say, that in the time of their first kings, they received many strangers into their City, to the end, to redress this i●conuenience, in such sort, that in their long war which they made, they never wanted men, but could haue ministered& set forth ten thousand men at any need: but whether this be true or no, it skilleth not. It were far better to haue their City replenished with men by the e●en proportion and equality of goods. now that law which concerneth the procreation of children, bindereth the amendment of this default: for the lawgiver desiro●s to increase& multiply the Lacedemonia●s, invited and enticed them to beget many children by exempting him from keeping watch which had begotten three children,& him that had four, from al other puplike charges. And yet it is manifest, that where many be born, there must needs be many poor, when their ossessions are so divided.  
Aristotle declareth, that the great inequality of possessions which was amongst the Athenians so noisome& hurtful to their state, grew through the default of the lawgiver, who having interdicted the sale of patrimonies, yet neue●thelesse granted thē leave to give away& to bequeath them by testament to whom they would: whence sprung up the same inconveniences, as if they had ben permitted to make sale of them. The which vnequality and vneuennesse is so much the more blame-worthy, in that near hand the one half of goods is grown into womens hands, as well by the means of successions, as excessive dowries, which ought to be either none at all, or very small, or at most but reasonable. For by this disorder the Lacedemonians were brought into poverty& want of men. To remedy the which mischief, the way is not to beget many children, for that hurteth more then helpeth, because the more children there are, the more the number of the poor is increased. The Oracles of the gods being demanded, made this answer in old time to the Lacedemonians, that they should carefully beware of covetousness& avarice, which one day would prove the plague& ruin of their estate● which by experience proved most true: for after that a greedy desire of heaping and hording up gold and silver, was  shed abroad in the city of Sparta, and that the possession of richess● was accompanied with covetousness and niggardise, and the use with pleasures and delights, presently Sparta was destitute and deprived of many great and honourable preheminenc●s. Which corruption began to take hold of the Lacedemonians, after their great victory over the Athenians, when they glutted themselves with gold and silver by the spoil. But yet the number of the parts and portions of inheritances ordained by Lycurgus, remaining still firm, and fathers always leaving to their sons their goods by succession, I say this order& equality being in some sort maintained, preserved their commonweal from many faults and errors a long time, until that there arose up one Epitadeus, a man of office and authority, by nature perverse, sturdy and proud, who being one of the Ephories or Tribunes, was at controversy and debate with his own son●e, and that so eagerly, that in hate of him, he put forth and caused to bee enacted a law and ordinance, whereby it was made lawful for a man to bestow his patrimony and other goods by Will and Testament either in his life time, or after his death, to whom and would. This man propounded this law to satisfy his own particular anger,& others accepted of it to furnish and satisfy their covetousness, which was the cause of the abrogating and abolishing of a most excellent ordinance, for riches then began to bee hunted after by all means, and on all sides, and true heires to bee thrust out of their patrimonies by head and shoulders. And by this means all the wealth being in short time ●ongested into few mens clutches, there ensued forthwith an extreme poverty in the city of Sparta, which caused all honest and liberal exercises to bee laid aside, and in ●●ead of them mechanical and base occupations to come in request, together with envy and hatred towards them which possessed the goods, in such sort, that there remained in all not above seven hundred natural spartans in the city, and of them not above one hundred that possessed lands and patrimonies. All the rest was nothing but a rude Chaos of needy beggarly people, which kept in the city without having any degree of honour: who in time of war, were most cowardly and awkward, not willing to go into fight: and in time of peace factious and seditious, not desiring any thing, but occasion of change and alteration.  
WHENCE it cometh to pass, that that country which could nourish a thousand and five hundred horsemen, and thirty thousand footmen, can scarce now nourish a thousand.] Strabo in his geography, lib. 8. speaking of the Lacedemonians, saith thus: Wee shall bee to prolix in the description of this Country, if wee pursue many things that are mentioned in histories, and leave others, the country being long ago desolate and unpeopled in comparison of that ancient estate wherein it flourished of old time with a great multitude of noble people: for besides Sparta, there remain now no more then thirty villages, whereas in ancient time by commanding over a hundred cities, it was called {αβγδ}, from whence every year were sent a hundred beeves to that great solemn sacrifice, called {αβγδ}. plutarch in his book of the ceasing of Oracles, complaineth, that the roman pvissance prevailing so much every where, at his time all Greece was not able to make three thousand men at arms. Xenophon in his book touching the affairs of Greece, lib. 6. describeth the virtue and magnanimity of the Lacedemonians: Seneca in his S●asories, 2. writeth thus: every thing hath his ornament: Athens was renowned for eloquence, Thebes for sacrifices, Sparta for arms, because the river Eurotas runneth fast by it, which hardeneth and emboldeneth youth to the exercise of future warfare.  
RECEIVED many strangers into the City.] Contrary to the first institution of Lycurgus, who was so careful of the integrity of his discipline, that he would not suffer any strangers to be admitted or received in his city, but onely vpon certain prefixed daies, calling this rigor against strangers {αβγδ}, as reco●deth Pausanias in his tract of the Lacedemonian affairs, and is observed also by Coel. Rhodiginus de lect. Antiq. lib. 10. cap. 5. Neither only that, but more, he allowed not his citizens to frequent the company of ●●●angers abroad. He permitteth not( saith Plutarch) every one that list to go out of their country, and range up and down through the world, for fear least they which should thus wander at their pleasures, should bring home with them strange manners and conditions, and patterns of a wicked and corrupt life, which by little and little would bring in an alteration and change of their state. And that which is yet more, he banished out of Sparta all strangers, except those which had there some necessary business to discharge, or which were arrived for some good and profitable purpose: not that he feared that they should learn any thing there, which might procure them to love virtue( as saith thucydides) nor that they should bee stirred up to imitate the form of his policy, but rather for fear least they should teach and infect his citizens with some naughty and vicious quality: for it is necessary, that when strangers enter into a City, there enter also together with them new and strange languages, and these new languages must beget new conceits, and new conceits new affections: which oftentimes are as iar●ing and repugnant to the laws and form of government already established, as discords to a a well tuned harmony of music. For which cause, he reputed it a thing as necessary to preserve his city pure and clean from strange manners and fashions, as from persons infected with contagious diseases. moses giuing the law to the Iewes, by the commandement of God, saith all as much: There shall bee( saith he) between thee and the stranger that liveth with thee but one law and one maner of life. wherefore they abho●red strangers, not daring to converse nor contract any affinities with them, as they themselves also were mocked and rejected of strangers. Solon on the other side set open the gate of Athens to all commers● so that strangers there were as well entertained as the natural& original inhabitants.  
MOREOVER, the office of the Ephorie or the Tribuneship, is not well ordained: for albeit that these Ephories haue a sup●rindance o●er the chiefest affairs of the commonweal, yet are they always elected out of the people, in such sort, that o●tentimes men that are exceeding poor, are promoted to that office, who by reason of their poverty and need become vendible and easy to be bought and sold, as it hath often been seen beretofore, and is yet evidently to be perceived in their meat assemblies, called Andries: for some of these ephors being corrupted with bri●e●, haue as much as in them lay ruinated and subverted the City. And by reason that their authority was very great, even equal with a tyranny, the kings themselves were constrained to s●eke their favour and countenance, in such sort, that thereby ●●e commonweal sustained great detriment, being changed from an aristocraty into a democraty. It is true indeed, that their commonweal is maintained& upholden by this office, the people being content and quiet, in that they are partakers of the sovereign Magistrateship, which, whether it was brought in by the providence of the lawgiver, or by fortune, is most behoveful for their affairs: for to cause a commonweal to end●re long safe& sound, it is requisite that all the parts of the City do desire to preserve the whole, & do persevere in the same estate. Here therfore the kings content themselves with their ●onour: good men with their Senatoriall dignity, for that is the stipend& wages o● their virtue: and the common people with their Ephoreship or Tribuneship, which is taken ou● from amongst them all● which Magistrate in very dead ought to bee chosen out from amongst the people, as he is, but yet not after that maner which they use, for it is too childish. moreover, although they bee m●n of no reputation and worth, yet are the sovereign judgements committed unto th●m: and therefore it were more expedient, that they should not define and judge according to their own wiss, bu● rather by the prescript of the written law and rule of equity. Also the manner of living of the Epheries doth not agree with the intention of the City, being very dissolute& unbridled, howbeit, against others they be so rigorous and cruel, that they are almost intolerable,& yet s●cretly themselves transgressing the laws, give ever their minds to all sensual and corporal delights.  
MOREOVER, the office of the Ephorie.] Ephorie ●ignifies as much as controling, taken from the Greek verb {αβγδ}, which signifieth to overlook or oversee. This was in Lacedemonia an annual Magistrateship of great authority made by election,& opposed to the kingly power, to controule& bridle the same: as the Tribunes in Rome were opposed to the Consuls, as hath ben said. There were but ● of these Ephories every year, who had a peculiar precinct and place of audience, where they were informed of the chiefest affairs of the Commonwealth, yea even had authority to call the kings before them. By succession of time, they grew in this their sovereignty so insupportable, that at the last they were slain, and their office suppressed. Wee red, that King Agis king of Lacedemonia, when he perceived that the ancient virtue of the Lacedemonians was decayed, and consequently the strength of their government greatly impaired, began to bethink himself what remedy was fittest for their reformation, and for bringing them to the first orders of Lycurgus, from the which they were far gone astray. Whereat the ephors being discontent, murdered him at the preparation of this enterprise, saying that he aimed at no other end, but to bring in tyranny into their city. After him Cleomenes succeeded, who had no less desire to bring it to pass, then his predecessor had: he found out the records of Agis, whereby he understood his plot and pretence, and perceived that his miss and error was, in that he undertook such an enterprise of weight, before that he was in full and quiet possession of all the Lacedemonian power. Therefore he went another way to work, he slay the ephors, and all other that might any wise withstand him: and so by this means restored easily the ancient laws of Lycurgus. Whereby he won unto himself great renown, yea as great, or more, then Lycurgus himself: and sure he had revived halfe-dead Lacedemonia, but for the unhappy coming of the Macedonians, whose furious onset he could not possibly resist, his own force alone being too weak, and the rest of the Grecians refusing to succour him, therfore he was overcome, and all his excellent purposes and designs amnihilated and broken. Polybius. Lib. 4. writeth: That Cleomones being dead, the Lacedemonians choose two kings, the one, Agesipolus, the other called Licurgus● extract from a lineage whence there was never hope that ever king should proceed. This man made men beleeue, that he was of the race of Hercules, and caused himself to be created king, by giuing to every one of the officers six hundred crownes.  
THEIR authority was very great and even equal to a tyranny.] Plato hath the like saying in his fourth book De Legibus, discoursing of the Lacedemonian commonweal.  
BEING changed from an aristocraty to a democraty.] If the ephors had demeaned themselves according to their duties, the Lacedemonian form of government was an aristocraty, directed by the counsel of the kings, and the Senate. Such was the government of Rome, before the erection of the Tribuneship, which made the power of the people greater then the power of the Senate: as Cicero writeth in his third book of laws, and sallust in his histories.  
THE which whether it were brought in by the providence of the lawgiver or by fortune.] Here Aristotle seemeth to doubt, whether the ephors were ordained by the Lawe of Lycurgus, or by chance: yet in the fift book of this work, and the tenth chapter, he affirmeth, that they were added to the kings by Theopompus, to cut their power shorter. Howbeit, Herodotus in his book entitled Clio, saith: That they were ordained by Lycurgus. Xenophon in his Treatise of the Lacedemonian commonweal, saith it is very likely, that they were brought in by the chief of the city, yet he affirmeth nothing. Cleomenes, who overthrew them, in his information which he gave to the Lacedemonians touching their affairs, rehearseth another original of the ephors, as plutarch writeth in his life, namely, that when the kings were long occupied in the warres of Messena, they did choose certain of their friends to minister law and iustice in their absence to the Lacedemonians, which were called ephors.  
EPHORIE being taken out from amongst them all.] The Ephories were chosen out of all the Orders or Estates of the city, namely, out of the senators, Gentlemen, and Commoners. When Cleomenes had slain the Ephories, and thrown down their seats and chairs, he for the proclaiming of the suppression of their state and office, caused an assembly to bee made of the people, to sh●we a reason of his doing, saying: Lycurgus did rightly entermingle the senators with the kings, and that the city had been so governed a long time without need of any other Magistrate, but that afterward when the warres against the Messenians had long continued, and that they could not themselves haue leisure to hear and determine matters and controversies between party and party, they made choice of certain of their friends, whom they left in the town to hear and judge matters in their stead: who were called ephors, and continued a great while in being onely the kings Ministers. Howbeit by little and little they attributed the sovereign power, and usurped a several jurisdiction to themselves, and if they would haue demeaned themselves gently and moderately, he could peradventure haue the better born with them: But to purpose, through an usurped liberty, to suppress the Magistrates lawfully ordained of old time, even to the banishment of some of the kings, and putting others of them to death, without any form of Lawe or order of iustice, and to threaten them which yet desire to see again in Sparta the most goodly and sacred government which was wont to bee there in old time; This( saith he) is a matter that ought not to bee born withall. If it had been possible to haue rooted out of Sparta without murder, these pestilences of the commonweal which haue been brought thither from other places, I mean delights, superfluities, abundance of wealth, debts, usury, and also others more ancient, as poverty and richesse: he would haue thought himself the happiest king that ever had reigned, as a physician, that without causing any sorrow had healed the diseases of his country: but if he had been constrained to set his hand to blood, he had followed the example of Lycurgus, who ought to excuse him: for he being neither king nor other Magistrate, but onely a private citizen, taking kingly authority vpon him, was so hardy and bold as to come into the market place in atmour, so that the king for fear, fled unto the franchises and liberties of the Temples, and of the gods. But forasmuch as he loved the welfare and honour of his country, he quickly joined himself to Lycurgus his side, helping him in the execution of his enterprise, and allowed of the exchange of the government of the commonweal.  
but yet not after the same manner that is used now adays.] Like the election of the senators, whereof shall be spoken hereafter.  
IT were better they should not judge after their own wils, but according to the tenor of written ordinances and prescript laws.] The Courts of Parliament in France, do judge almost as the ephors did, after their own wils, without tying themselves to the Lawe written, or to any ordinances: but there is some difference between them: For the ephors were men of no skill, but the counsellors and Presidents haue studied, and are well seen in the laws.  
THE manner of living of the ephors doth not agree with the intention of the city.] The ephors during the time of their Magistrateships, lived very pompeously, contrary to the sobriety prescribed by Lycurgus, which was so strict, that scant could it bee observed by other citizens, toward whom, those ephors used severe rigour, to cause the same to bee performed and kept, so that if any were disposed to make good cheer, and to be merry, they were driven to hid themselves.  
IN like sort the estate of their Senate is not rightly ordained. For admit, they were well conditioned and sufficiently inclined to virtue, and that therefore it should seem to bee for the benefit of the city to commit the high judgements to them: yet it is doubtful whether it were good to yield unto them such continual power for term of life: Sith there is an oldness, as well of the mind, as of the body. But sith they bee trained in no such sort, as the lawgiver himself doth distrust their uprightness and honesty, sure it is no sure thing. now, of them that are promoted to this degree, some yield to bee corrupted with bribes, and prodigally misspend the common Treasure: Therefore it were better they should not bee exempted from correction as now they bee, but that they should yield an account of their doings. The Eph●rian Magistrate seemeth to bee a corrector of all others, which is on the other side too great a prerogative to the Ephorie. Neither are we of this mind, that accounts ought to bee given in that manner. Also the election of the senators which they make by suffrages and voices, is very child●sh: neither is it good, that he which is to be called to the Magistrateship, should as capable thereof, demand it himself at their hands: For he that deserveth the Magistrateship, will he, will he, ought to be Magistrate. N●w the lawgiver seemeth to deal herein, as he hath done in the rest of the commonweal, having set down this manner of choosing the senators, to the end, to make the citizens ambitious, sith no man would ever demand a Magistrateship, except he were ambitious. And the most part of offences and crimes which men do willingly commit, spring from ambition or covetousness.  
BESIDES the former points, Aristotle in the commonweal of the Lacedemonians doth find fault with the ordaining of their senators, who had too great perpetual power, hearing and determining matters of life and death, and of infamy, as plutarch reciteth, without being subject to yield account of their doings. And therefore the election which they made of them, was childish and ambitious.  
Senate, {αβγδ}.] The Senate was welneere the very same thing at Rome, that {αβγδ} was in Sparta, so termed of the ancients called in greek {αβγδ}. Of which matter Cicero writeth thus in his Dialogue of old age: If counsel, reason, and aduise, were not in old men, our ancestors would never haue called their sovereign counsel, a Senate. Of the Lacedemonians, they that exercise the amplest Magistrateship are rightly called ancients, as in truth such they bee.  
To yield unto them such perpetual power, and for term of life.] It is a question that in all ages hath been debated amongst wise men, whether the principal Magistrates ought to remain in office during a certain prefixed time, or for term of their lives. And there is an inconvenience either way: For if they be for a time prefixed, they are not so much respected: and it falleth out, that they go out of office before they haue learned their charge. On the other side, if they abide perpetual, and for term of life, they wax proud, and often wicked, when they perceive that they cannot bee deposed, nor any man dare accuse them.  
SITH there is an oldness, as well of the mind as of the body. {αβγδ}, &c.] In very old age, not onely the force of the body, but also the quickness of the understanding and ripeness and integrity of iudgement do decay; and when a man is come to his doting daies, he is no more fit to exercise any Magistracy.  
IT were better they should not be exempted from correction as now they be, {αβγδ}.] Not subject to yield a reason of their doings. It is allowed by the customs of france, contrary to Aristotles authority, that the Iudges of the sovereign courts are perpetual, and not subject to give account of their charges, as well in general as in particular, as Budeus affirmeth in his first Annotations vpon the Pandects.  
THE Magistrates of the ephors seemeth to be a correcter of all others.] Such manner of correction is made two manner of ways, to wit, either by appeal when a higher court, or the prince, or people doth amend the sentences of the vnderiudges, or else when a reckoning is required of him that is gone out of office: and after that maner, it seemeth that Aristotle would haue Iudges corrected. In old time they used this manner at Rome, as they do still at this day in diverse places of Italy, toward diverse vnderlegates and potestates.  
ALSO the election of the Senators which they make by suffrages and voices, is childish.] Lycurgus at the first, established the Senate of those personages that were adherents to him in his enterprise: But he ordained, that when any of their rooms should fall voided from time to time afterwards, he should be preferred thereinto that was found to be the honestest man,& of best report in all the town; so that he were above threescore yeares old. It was doubtless, the most honourablest strife that could bee among men, where he carried away the best game, not that was most just amongst them that be just, nor the strongest amongst them that be strong, but the most virtuous and honestest, of the virtuous and honest sort: having for the reward of his virtue full power( as ye would say) and sovereign authority in the government of the commonweal, and holding the life and goods of all his citizens at his direction. The election was thus made: The people first assembled& met together in the market place, where there were certain Deputies shut up into a house, out of which they could neither see nor be seen of them that were there assembled, but onely did hear their noise. For the people by their clamour declared him whom they accepted or refused, of the pretenders: As also in other cases they declared their minds after the same manner. The pretenders were not brought in nor presented altogether, but one after another in order, which was by drawing of lots. That party to whom the lot fell, passed overthwart the assembly of the people, without speaking one word: and the Deputies that were shut in the house, had little tables, wherein they noted the greatn●sse of the noise, and of the clamour of the people: so as every of the pursuers passed by unknown to them who it was, noting only that it was the first, the second, the third, or the thirtieth; which was found in the order of them that were presented:& he, at whose passage the clamour of the people was greatest, was by them declared and elected senator. Who thereupon wearing a garland of flowers vpon his head, went unto all the Temples of the gods, to give thankes unto them, being waited on by a great number of young men, who went highly commending and magnifying his virtue, and also with a great company of women, who went singing songs to his praise, blessing him for that he had so honestly lived: then every one of his kinsfolk prepared a banquet for him at his house, and as he entered into the house, one said: The city honoureth thee with this banquet. This done, he returned to the appointed place of his feast: where he did in all other things according to custom, saving that at the table there was served& set before him a double portion, whereof he kept one: and after supper all his kinswomen stood at the entry of the hall of the feast where he had supped: and he called unto him her that he thought best of, to whom he gave the second portion, and said to her: This hath been given to me in testimony, that this day I haue born away the prise of virtue, and I give it unto thee. Then was sh● brought home to her own house by all the other Gentlewomen, in the very same sort that the men conducted him home to his mansion place.  
How Lysander attempted by all means to procure the abolishing of the privilege of Hercules his stock: which was that none might be chosen king, except he were of the race of them that descended from Hercules, Diod Sicilian in the fourteenth book, cap. 4.  
As touching the kingly state, whether it be best or not for Cities to be governed by kings, we will speak thereof in another place: but soothly, it were better to judge the worthiness of every king● by his life and virtuous and honest actions, then as they do in these daies, by their razes. Also that the lawgiver himself hath not thought that he could make them perfect in bounty& goodness, it appeareth in that he disinherited them as not being good enough. Therefore they used to sand such ambassadors together with the king, which bore evil will one to another, and thought that the discord of the kings served for the preservation of the commonweal.  
THE kingly state in lacedaemon, was hereditary, in the race of them that descended from Hercules, serving for the ordering of the warres, and having the pre-eminence in the sacrifices. Two kings reigned and governed there together, not after their own wils, but according to the laws of the Country: saving that in the Warres they had absolute power. Aristotle, Polit. lib. 3. cap. 10. saith thus: The kingdom in the Lacedemonian commonweal seemeth to be most just: yet hath not the king absolute power there in all matters, but when he warreth abroad, then hath he sovereign authority. And in the eleventh Chapter of the fift book, he writeth: That this state continued a great while, because it was at the beginning divided into two parts, and that afterward king Theopompus did moderate it, as well in other things, as by adding unto it the Magistrateship of the ephors. In time of peace, they not much honor them above others, of purpose to restrain them from conceiving a tyrannicall pride, or from giuing occasion to others to affect the royal majesty: but after their deceasses, they honoured them not as men, but as heroical personages. The kings and the ephors, did monthly take an interchangeable oath one to another, the kings in their own names, and the ephors in the name of the city. The kings did swear to reign according to the laws of the city, The ephors swore, that if the kings inviolably kept their oaths, then would they maintain and keep the kingdom stable unto them: as Xenophon writeth in his treatise of the Lacedemonian commonweal, it seemeth that the two Consuls at Rome were created in imitation of these two kings, with whom they had as many things common: as also are in the Cantons of the Swissers, and in diuers free cities of high Germany, the borough-maisters and the Auoyez of barn. The difference between them is, that the kings of lacedaemon were perpetual, and could not bee but of a certain race: The Consuls of Rome were annual, and chosen by election. The Auoyez are perpetual and eligible.  
MOREOVER, their assemblies at meales, which they call Phidities, haue not been well ordained at the beginning: for it had been better to haue assembled at the public charges, as they do in Candia: but amongst the Lacedemonians, every man is bound to bring his portion to the feast: notwithstanding, that there bee some so poor, that they are not able to furnish this charge, insomuch, that the contrary to that which the lawgiver intended, resulteth and happeneth unto him, who would haue the institution of such feasts democratical: howbeit, as it is ordained, it is in no wise democratical, because it is not easy for very poor folk to bee there. Also there is an ancient law which admitteth no man into the commonweal, that is not able to bear this contribution.  
THIS manner of assembling at meat, hath been already declared, every man furnished a certain quantity of victuals in these assemblies consisting of fifteens. And whosoever could not furnish his rate, was excluded from the honours and Offices of the commonweal. This course Aristotle blameth, affirming it better to haue made those feasts at the charge of the commonweal.  
SOME men also haue justly blamed the law touching their admirals, as a law that is the cause of sedition: for by adding to the kings, who are the heads in the warres, the perpetual authority and power of the sea, it is in a manner the ordaining of another kingdom.  
forasmuch as they haue sought in this commonweal to abase the kingly state, and to moderate it by diverse means, they forgot themselves when they added unto it the perpetual authority of the sea, which was in a manner, to double the authority and power by sea and by land.  
YET further, the Law-makers invention may be blamed, as also Plato hath found fault with it in his laws. For the institution of all his laws tendeth to one virtue, namely, warlike fortitude, which serveth for victory. Therefore they preserved themselves by warring, and after they had conquered and gotten to themselves the Empire, then were they presently undone, for that they could not live at rest, nor do any better exercise then the exercises of war: Neither is the error any less, in that they think the goods for which they fight, ought rather to bee gotten by virtue then by 'vice: far though it bee well said, yet err they in esteeming them worthier then virtue.  
PLATO in his first book De Legibus, Aristotle in the seventh book of his politics, chap. 2. 3. and 14. and Polybye of his history, lib. 6. do blame the commonweal of Lycurgus, as too warlike, saying, that all his laws were well ordained to make men valiant, but not to make them just nor upright. Notwithstanding, plutarch answering them, saith: That Lycurgus shot at no such mark, as to leave his City commanding over many, but rather deeming, that the felicity as well of a city as of a particular man, doth chiefly consist in the exercise of virtue, and in the unity and concord of the inhabitants: he hath composed and framed his form of government, to the end, that his citizens should wax free hearted, content with their own, and temperate in all their deeds, for the most long maintenance and conservation of their state. That the selfsame intention also Plato, Diogenes, and Zenon, haue had in writing their books, wherein they haue reasoned of the government of commonweals: and likewise all other great and skilful personages that haue undertaken to writ of the same matter: but that they haue left nothing behind them but writing and bare words only. Xenophon, who matched learning with chivalry, and was a great captain in his time, in his Treatise of the Lacedemonian commonweal, doth wonderfullly commend this institution of Lycurgus: And he being a martiall man, and returning from that so famous expedition of Asia, withdrew himself into the jurisdiction of the Lacedemonians, where he lived a great while, being banished out of the city of Athens, whereof he was a natural subject.  
THEREFORE they preserved themselves by warring, and after they had conquered and gotten to themselves the Empire, thē were they presently undone, for that they could not live at rest.] Aristotle, Polit. lib. 7. cap. 14. writeth thus: That the lawgiver ought rather to bend his wit to refer the affairs of war, and all other laws, to rest and peace, the events agreeing with the reasons, do sufficiently witness: Sith diverse such cities by making warres, haue been preserved, and after they haue conquered and gotten the Empire, do perish and decay, for they rust in time of peace like iron: whereof their lawgiver is the cause, who hath not taught them how to live in peace as well as in war. Sith therefore in these daies the Lacedemonians haue no more dominion, it is certain they are no more happy, nor their Lawmaker good. For it is a mockery, that persisting still in his laws,& having no hindrance in the use thereof, they haue lost notwithstanding their happy life. So from the time that the Lacedemonians began to take their ease, they not only diminished, but also by little and little, destroyed their noble and famous commonweal. The like whereof, vpon the selfsame occasion, afterwards befe●● to the romans, as also some of the chief senators foresaw it would come to pass. Amongst whom, Scipio Nasica was one, 
Scipio Nasica.  who was of opinion, that Carthage( albeit it was envious of the renown and name of Rome, and a perpetual enemy thereto) should not bee razed and destroyed, to the end, they might always haue an enemy against whom to fight and show themselves in arms. For all enemies and envious persons being wholly overthrown and destroyed, it were a danger that the commonweal of Rome being instructed and furnished for the Warres, and the roman youth brought up in martiall affairs, would turn their weapons against themselves, and work their own decay. Which counsel although it was refused by the Senate, yet the disposition of matters that fell out after, shewed well that it was wise and discreet counsel. For after the destruction of Carthage, the civil warres began welneere presently to be kindled, whereby the most flourishing and most mighty commonweal that ever was, was in the end overthrown, and that city which was the richest of all others, and the lady and mistress of the world, became a prey to the barbarous nations.  
neither is the error less.] The Lacedemonians err also, in that they esteem not virtue but for victories sake, whereunto they refer all their doings, as to a last and chief end: saying concerning other matters, except victory, for the getting whereof pains ought to bee taken, that they should be sought for rather by virtue, then by craft or lewdness.  
again, the public treasures and taxes are not well ordered in Sparta, where they are constrained to maintain great warres, without having a common stock, and do also contribute with evil wils: For whereas the most part of the country doth appertain to the Lacedemonians, they do not exact subsidies one of another with care and diligence. By means whereof, the lawgiver hath not attained to that commodity which he pretended: but clean contrary, hath made the city p●ore, and particular persons covetous. Thus wee haue spoken sufficiently of the commonweal of the Lacedemonians, sith the principal points that could bee blamed therein, haue ben touched by vs.  
THE commonweal of lacedaemon as Polybius writeth in his sixth book, was well ordained, to retain the citizens in concord and modesty, and to preserve their liberty a long time, insomuch, that they that publicly aim at that mark, cannot possibly find a better order. For the equalities of possessions and their plain and common manner of living, made their conversation modest privately, and the commonweal peaceable. Also their continual exercise in travail, and custom to endure great labour from their infancy, made them hardy and courageous, and suffered no lewdness to breed amongst them, or to bee drawn thither from other places: but for the making of them maisters over their neighbours, and for the undertaking of warres out of their country it was altogether unsufficient. While they warred with their neighbours for the domion of Morea, they could furnish the famed, by reason they had their necessary provisions ready at a beck, and quick return: But afterward, when they aspired to the Empire of Greece, and began to spread their armies vpon the sea, and to make voyages out of Morea with armies by land, they put their liberty forthwith in danger. For their iron moneys, and exchange of yearly fruits, could not suffice their necessities, observing the ordinance of Lycurgus. For such manner of enterprises required currant money, and victuals out of foreign countries. Therefore were they forced to haue recourse to the Persians, to set tributes vpon the Iland●rs, and levy money vpon all the Grecians, knowing now that it was unpossible by observation of the laws of Lycurgus to maintain and keep, not only the principality over the Grecians, but much less their own commonweal.  
HATH made the City poor and particular persons covetous. {αβγδ}, &c.] Although it was the intent of Lycurgus, to keep the Lacedemonians as far as he could from ambition and covetousness: yet notwithstanding did they in continuance of time wax so covetous and ambitious, that through a vain hope of getting the dominion over all other of the Grecians, they submitted themselves to the yoke of the Persians, whom they had before overcome, by yielding into their hands certain cities of Greece, from whence they had driven them, to the end, to get money and aid at their hands, to strengthen themselves against the other Grecians. At which time, the establishment of their laws began first to decay, as Polybius writeth in the sixth book of his history.   

CHAP. VIII. Of the commonweal of Crete ordained by Minos.  
THe commonweal of Crete is somewhat like the former, and hath certain things that are no worse ordained, and in diverse others again, it is less adorned and polished: for the Lacedemonian commonweal( as it seemeth, and is reported) hath in many points imitated the commonweal of Crete. Also the most part of old ancient things, are less corrected, then those that be new. For the report goeth, that Lycurgus yielding up the Protectorship of king Charilas, departed out of his country; and abode a long time in Crete, by occasion of kindred: For the Lictrans did issue and come from the Lacedemonians. And they that came in this colony from Lac●demon, had received those laws which the ancient inhabitants of the country of Crete did use: the which laws the Perioecians do still use to this day in the very same order that Minos first delivered the same unto them. Now this iceland doth seem to haue such a situation as is natural and fit to rule all Greece. For it abutteth to the sea every way, and they be welneere all Grecians that dwell over the sea coasts: and at one part it is not far srom Peloponese, and in another part is near to Asia, shooting toward Triope and Rhodes. By reason whereof, Minos obtained the Empire of the sea, and brought certain islands under his obedience, and made other apt to be inhabited. At last he died in an enterprise in Sicily, near unto Camica. Therfore the description& ordaining of the commonweal of Crete, is in a certain proportion answerable to the Lacedemonian: For as the Ilotians till the ground for the Lacedemonians, so do the Perioecians for the Cretans. And both the Lacedemonians and Cretans, haue assemblies ordained for their diet, which the Lacedemonians in ancient time did not call Phidities, but Andries, as the Cretans did: insomuch, that the custom seemeth to haue come from thence. So they agree in the order of the commonweal: for the ephors haue the selfsame power, which they that are called Cosmi, haue in Crete; saving that there be five ephors, and ten Cosmi. In like sort, the senators are equal to the Senators, whom they call the counsel. The Cretans aforetime had a kingdom, which they did afterwards rid away: and the Cosmi haue ouerfight and authority in all matters concerning the Warres. All men are admitted into the public assemblies, where nothing is done, saving the ratifying of the decrees of the Senators and of the Cosmi. Further, the feasts amongst the Cretans, are better ordained then amongst the Lacedemonians: For in lacedaemon, every man contributeth by head his ranted share, for default of performance whereof, the lawe disfranchiseth him of his degree and freedom in the commonweal, as hath ben before declared. The fashion of the Cretans is more sociable, for of all their public fruits and breed of cattle, and of the customs and rents yielded by the Perioecians, one part is appointed for the service of the gods, and for the common charges, and the other part for the banquets: so that all men, women, and children haue their food of the common charge and provision: so the lawgiver hath devised many things wisely& cunningly concerning sobriety, as a thing very behoveful: and touching divorces, to the end, there should not be too many children, and allowing buggery: wherein, whether he hath done well or evil, we will dispute that in another place. That therefore the feasts and meate assemblies are better ordained in Crete then in lacedaemon, it is manifest and clear: but the establishment of the Cosmi, is worse then that of the ephors. For the evil that is sound in the ephors, is also in them, being either of them created alike out of the common people. But that commodity which is found in the one commonweal, wanteth in the other. For ●n lacedaemon, the people having part in the sovereign Magistrateship, by the election of the ephors, who are taken out of all sorts of men, doth desire the conservation of the state: but here in Crete they choose not the Cosmi out of all degrees, but out of certain families and stocks, and the Senators out of them that haue ben Cosmies: of whom the same may bee said which is spoken of them of lacedaemon, to wit, that the immunity a●d freedom from yielding account, and to bee in the office of Magistrates for term of life, is a greater pre-eminence then they are worthy of: and it is a dangerous venture, least they exercise their office, not according to the written law, but according to their own wils and discretions. Though the people being despoiled of this prerogative of having any part in the sovereign Magistrateship, do keep themselves quiet, yet is that no token that the Law in that behalf is good, for the Cosmi haue no such means to gain as the ephors: but by reason they dwell in an iceland, are far from such aduersaries, as might suborn them with bribes. Also the remedy that they apply to this inconvenience is absurd, and not civil, but rather savouring of the power or authority of one or of a few, which is called a Dinastie or Potentateship. For the Cosmi are often driven away by their companions and fellowes in office, or some particular persons rebelling. Also they are at liberty to give over their offices before the expiration of their terms. All these things might be better done according to Law then after mens wils, which is no sure rule. But the greatest mischief therein, is the disorder often committed by the mightiest, when they will not submit themselves to the order& correction of iustice. Whereby it may be understood, that this disorder hath I know not what of a commonweal, and yet is not a commonweal, but rather a Dinastie or Potentateship. They haue accustomend when they see the people in an uproar, and friends divided to commit the authority to one alone, and so to stir sedition and fight one with another: Which is nothing else, but in time to bring to pass, that such a City shall bee no City, and that the civil society shall bee dissolved and taken clean away. During which tumults, the whole estate is in danger, if there were any that could or would invade the same. But it is preserved( as wee haue said) by the situation of the place, which defendeth strangers from approaching thereunto. Therfore the Perioecians are obedient, and contrariwise the Ilotians often revolt. For the Cretans do not command and rule out of the Isle: and of fresh remembrance foreign war hath entered in there, which hath plainly bewrayed the weakness of their Laws. Thus much shall suffice for this commonweal.  
Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, calisthenes, Ephorus, and diuers other Greek Authors in conferring the commonweal of Crete with the Lacedemonian, haue written, that they were welneere both alike. Which Polybius refuteth in the sixth book of his history, showing their difference. First, in that amongst the Lacedemonians it was not lawful for one to bee a greater landed man then another, but every one was to haue an equal portion of lands of the signory. Contrary thereto, in Crete, every man was allowed by the law to possess as much of the Country as he could come by, without any manner of limitation. For by the amplenesse of possessions, excellency was esteemed and discerned amongst them. So that the greatest and amplest possession, howsoever it was gotten, was in great estimation: and they deemed no manner of getting whatsoever, to be blame-worthy. Secondly, in lacedaemon, the kings enjoyed their state for ever, and they whom they called elders, were for term of life, by whom and with whom all the affairs of the commonweal were managed. In Crete, their manner of government was annual and democratical. Thirdly, as there be two means needful for the conservation of every commonweal, namely, power and force against the enemies, and mutual agreement between cities and countrymen: Lycurgus in lacedaemon had provided for both together, by ridding away covetousness, that causeth all civil discord and sedition. But there were no people in all the whole world that lived in greater mutinies, murders, and civil warres, then the Cretans, by reason of their natural covetousness. Further, there is no such crafty living privately to bee found, nor so many for so many, more unjust enterprises, as among the Cretans: wherefore Polybius concludeth, That their commonweal was not like the Lacedemonian commonweal, nor worthy to be compared with it, or imitated of others: For( saith he) it may be easily judged when a commonweal is wholly out of order and depraved, as well by the laws, as by the manners of living, and by seeing the inhabitants and subiects of the same, given without measure to covetousness, and their public actions unjust.  
FOR the report goeth, that Lycurgus.] It hath been already recited, how Lycurgus before he gave laws to the Lacedemonians, dwelled a great while in Crete, where he learned that manner of government in the iceland which was ordained by Minos, whence he borrowed many articles, using correction in some, and moderation in other some, by which means he made his commonweal perfecter then that of Minos. Strabo in the tenth book of his geography hath the like speech.  
THE Lictians.] Licte was a town of Crete,& the Lictians inhabitants of the same, who had ben sent thither by the Lacedemonians to dwell there as a colony, as the old custom was, which Lyctians in continuance of time became Cretans, and took laws of Minos.  
Perioecians, {αβγδ}.] A word affencted in the country of Crete, signifying husbandmen that tilled the lands, as the Ilotians did to the Lacedemonians: notwithstanding, the Perioecians were not thralls& slaves as the Ilotians, but farmers or tribute payers: the word according to the greek propriety signifieth as much as dwellers about, or neighbours adjoining.  
Minos.] Plato reasoning of the nature and definition of the lawe, hath entitled that Dialogue by the name of Minos, where he reciteth certain places of Homer in his commendation, wherein he is called the son and familiar of jupiter, as having learned& received his laws of him. In this Dialogue and in the first of his laws, Plato affirmeth, that Minos and Radamanthus were the eldest Lawgiuers of the Grecians, and right pastours of mankind. thucydides in the first book of his history writeth of Minos, that he was the most ancient of the Greek lawgiuers that had ben heard spoken of, and that he assembled a great number of ships, wherewith he possessed& kept a great part of the sea, called the greek sea, and was the first that occupied the Cycladian Islands, which he peopled with his own subiects, after he had driven the Carians out of the same, and that after his death he left thē to his children: and also that he drove Pirates out of those quarters to the uttermost of his power, to the end, to levy the revenues thereof the better.  
THIS iceland hath such a situation as is natural and fit to rule.] The situation of the iceland of Crete was very fit to command all Greece, as the situation of Italy is to possess the Empire of the world, being environed with the vpper& nether sea, with many other commodities recited by Pliny in the 6. chapter of his 3. book,& by Virgil in the 2. book of his Georgikes. Also the situation of Constantinople, is most apt to rule Asia and Europe, as being builded in the uttermost coasts of both of them, and vpon the sea shore with a very good haven,& in a fruitful and temperate country for the sustaining of valiant& wise men. Hippocrates doth treat of the situation of countries in his book of the air, of waters,& of places. Galen saith, That the manners of the soul do imitate the temperature of the body, according to that which had ben before set down in that behalf by Plato in his Timeus: in his 5. book of laws: and in the Epinomide●:& by Aristotle in his 7. book of politics, cap. 7. Likewise Cicero hath spoken therof in his 2. book of the nature of gods,& in his treatise of destiny: and also Varro in his first book of husbandry according to Eratosthenes● Philip de Comines in his history of king Lewis the eleventh, doth show the aptness and commodity of the situation of France, and the nature of Frenchmen in the 71 chapter. How the French king ought to demean himself toward strange nations that are round about him, it appeareth in the book of the French monarchy, the 1. chapter written by Seissell.  
THE description and ordaining of the commonweal of Crete.] Here are declared certain like points of the Cretan and Lacedemonian commonweals, as of the Perioecians and Ilotians, of the feasts, of the Cosmi, of the ephors,& of the Senators: howbeit, without omitting the differences that might be in the same, as it is a hard matter for civil affairs& Magistrateships, to answer directly in all points one to another in diuers places, and at diuers seasons. Strabo in his tenth book of the description of the earth, imitating Ephorus the Hystoriographer, who had written of the commonweals of Europe, reciteth some principal points of the commonweal of Crete: The first, that liberty is a great welfare and commodity to cities,& that they ought to be wholly employed about the maintenance therof, because it onely maketh goods proper to the owners and possessors,& that the goods of the thralls and bondmen do not belong to the obeiers, but to the commanders. That for the keeping of this liberty, concord was needful, which is contrary to sedition, that springeth from delicious living and covetousness: and therefore, that if all the Citizens live modestly and soberly; envy, reproach,& hatred should not hurt them. For this cause were children incontinently sent to the assemblies of their equals, called bands or troops, marching day by day, band against band, with Flute and with harp, and fighting according to the pattern of very warres: The eldest went to the feasts, where the rich were entreated like the poor, and all served with one kind of meat. That for the keeping of them from faintheartednesse in travel, and in feats of arms, they were accustomend from their youth to exercises& battels made for pleasure, that they might learn to care little for heat and could, for sharpness& hardness of life, and for blows and wounds. They do exercise shooting and leaping in armor, after the Perichian fashion, wearing a coat of armour, and shoes used in the wars, with measured pacing, melody,& tuning, insomuch, that their plays& pastimes brought a certain marshal commodity. Strabo who was a Cretan,& lived under Augustus Caesar, wrote that a few of these things continued in his time, wherein all was governed by the statutes and edicts of the Romans, as it is at this day by the ordinance of the Venetians.  
savouring of his Dynastie.] That is to say, extreme& wicked oligarchy, so called of the verb {αβγδ}, which signifieth to be able, and therefore {αβγδ} is as much to say, as Potentateship: but Potentate in Italian is taken in good part,& {αβγδ} in Greek in evil part. Whereof there is mention in the fift chapter of the fourth of these books.  
MIGHT be better done according to law, then after mens wils, which is no sure rule.] Aristotle disputeth very gravely in the eleventh and twelfth Chapters of the third of these books, Whether it bee more expedient for cities to bee governed by good written laws, then according to the will of honest men: Concluding thus, whosoever will haue the law command and rule, he will haue God and the laws to command together: but whosoever wisheth a man to rule, he also addeth a beast unto him. For such is the lust and wrath of the Magistrate, that turneth the best men out of the right way: But the law is an understanding without affection and lust. And in the book of the World directed to Alexander under the name of Aristotle, the author affirmeth, that he had found nothing whereto he could liken God, saving to the old law of a city well governed, as who would say: That God in this university of causes, was nothing else but that which the ancient law in a civil society is: whereby wee may learn, that it is good and behoveful, that some thing more divine then man, do bear a stroke in the ordering and moderation of the assemblies and companies of men. For when this charge is committed to man, the business goeth forward with very great danger, because there are few men to be found which are adorned with wisdom, goodness and valour, who very often through force and violence of affections, do err in giuing iudgement, and serve a great deal from reason. It is better therefore to commit such authority to the laws, then to men. But forasmuch as laws are generally written, and cannot provide for all particular cases, it is needful to haue recourse to men, and to establish some of them as keepers and ministers of the laws. This is the resolution which hath been made in this grave matter by many wise personages that haue been instructed by the experience of many things, and by the invention of others, and haue conferred diverse copies and patterns together.  
but is preserved by the situation of the place, which defendeth strangers from approaching thereunto.] In all countries compassed about with the sea, as Crete or candy is, the access and entrance is uncertain and dangerous, which hindereth strangers from coming thither with their armies, and therefore doth serve for safety& defence. We may say that by the like reason Venice hath ben preserved to this day above the space of eleven hundred yeares since it was first founded, without falling into the hands of strangers, or changing the fo●me of their commonweal, or religion. The like whereof wee do not red to haue happened to any other cities: notwithstanding, that she abounding in all wealth,& being full of gold and silver& all other kinds of riches, might haue provoked the farthest barbarous nations of the world to come to the sacking& s●oil of her. The situation of Venice is described by Contarine lib. 1. of the Venetian Commonweal.  
THEREFORE the Perioecians obey.] The Paizants or countrymen in Crete being enclosed with the sea, were more peaceable then they of lacedaemon, who dwelling in the main land, did often rebel, being favoured and aided by those neighbors and borderers that were enemies to the Lacedemonians.   

CHAP. IX. Of the commonweal of Carthage.  
THe Carthaginians seem also to haue a good form of commonweal, and to excel others in many things, and in diverse points to come near the Lacedemonians: for these three commonweals d● resemble one another, and are far better then the rest, to wit, the Cretan, the Lacedemonian, and the third which is of the Carthaginians, wherein there be many things well ordained. That this commonweal is duly and rightly instituted, it appeareth by the continual perseverance of the people in their order and form of government, without the access of any notable sedition or tyranny there: it answere●● to the Lacedemonian commonweal in these things, namely, in b●nquets, and in the authority of the hundred and four, and in the ephors, saving that it is better directed: For the ephors amongst them are taken out of the common sort,& these are chos●● of them that excel in virtue and worthiness. Their kings& S●nat do agree with the Kings and Senators of lacedaemon: But they do better in this also, in no● choosing the kings always of o●●●ace as they do, or in differently out of ●●●vocations, but out of the best sort,& therein they regard virtue more thē age. For when they ha●● great authority,& be of no wisdom nor valour, they do great h●●●,& haue already greatly endomaged the City of Carthage. The greatest part of error●●& fault● deserving blame and reprehension for declining from a right commonweal are common to all the commonweals whereof we haue made mention. But as for those commonweals that carry 〈◇〉 outward show of 〈◇〉 aristocraty or of a commonweal as it is properly termed, the one sort of them doth more incline to the power of the people, called a Democrati●,& the other sort to the dominion or power of a few, called an oligarchy: for it lieth in the power of the kings& Senators to refer or n●● refer to the people, those matters whereof they haue consulted& agreed vpon. The which ●atter a●● 〈◇〉& ●●creed, if the kings& Senators be all of one mind and opinion: but if they disagree in anything, then is it referred to the people, who haue power& authority, not only to hear what is referred 〈◇〉 thē, but also to determine the same, so as it is lawful for every man● to speak agai●●● the ●atter so referred. This is too great a prerogative for the people, and not allowed in other Commonweales● Now, whereas the five Magistrates of the Quinquevirateship, who haue p●wer& au●ho●it● 〈◇〉 many matters of great importance, are chosen by themselves, and haue the electi●● of the ●●nd●●d Magistrates of the Centumvirateship, being a magistracy of most ample a●thoritie, in their hands; and whereas they govern l●●ger than the other, to wit, before they enter into that offic●● and after they are gone out of it: This ●asteth of an oligarchy. And whereas they 〈…〉 Magistrateships without ●eess, and are not created by casting of lots or any other like de●i●e, and all causes are judged by all the Magistrates, and not certain causes by certain M●gistrates, and other causes by others, as in Lacedemonia. This is a part of the aristocratical government. Further, the state of Carth●ge doth chiefly decline from an aristocraty to an oligarchy, by following one opinion which many men hold, that Magistrates should not be chosen, only in respect of their virtue, but also according to their richesse; as a matter unpossible, that a needy man should be a good Magistrate, and apply the business of his office. If then the election that is made according to richesse, pertain to the oligarchy, and that which is made in respect of virtue, belong to the aristocraty: this should be a third kind or form of government which the Carthaginians use in their commonweal. For with these two respects do they choose their Magistrates, yea the highest that they haue, as their kings and the generals of their armies. Which breach or transgression of the aristocraty or government by the best sort, is to be laid to their lawgiuers charge, who at the first ought to haue provided and taken order for this, as a most necessary point, that good men might live in peace, without committing any undecent thing in the state, as well of Magistrateship, as of a private life. For though a care must be had of riches for rest and quietness sake, yet is it a bad thing, that the greatest offices, as the kingly state, and the authority of the warres, should be saleable and bought for money: For this law procureth richesse to be more esteemed then virtue,& maketh the whole City covetous, by reason that whatsoever is in estimation of the chief personages of a country, the same is necessary followed by others: Then where virtue is not chiefly honoured, there can be no assuredness of the government of the best sort. It is probable, that the buyers of offices do accustom to make a gain of them, sith they come to them with ●harge: so is it not credible, that a poor and honest man would seek after gain, and a dishonest and worse man that had disbursed money for his office, would not gain it again with advantage. Therefore should they onely desire Magistrateships that can exercise them with virtue and vprightness●. And though the lawgiver despised the poverty of good men, yet notwithstanding he ought to haue provided for the quietness of the Magistrates. again, that one man should exercise many offices, it seemeth a disordered and vnconuenient thing, and yet is accounted honourable& glorious amongst the Carthaginians. For one work is best done by one man: wherein the lawgiver should haue set an order, and prohibited that one man should be both a minstrel and a shoemaker. Therfore where the City is not small, it is more Citie-like and commonweal like, and more agreeable to the people to communicate the Magistrateships to many. This is more political, as we haue affirmed, and every work is this may the better and sooner brought to perfection, as appeareth in warlike affairs and seamatters. In which two charges almost all persons do observe one t●rne and course of commanding and obeying. Furthermore, whereas the form of their commonweal doth resemble the oligarchy, yet notwithstanding they do very aptly avoid this inconvenience; when evermore some part of the people is enriched whilst they sand others to inhabit their smaller towns. By which mean they redress this evil,& establish the state of their commonweal: which notwithstanding is the work of fortune, but the occasions of sedition ought to be prevented and rid away by the providence and foresight of the lawgiver. Now, if through any evil misfortune or adversity, the subiects revolt, there is no remedy in their laws to retain them in peace& tranquillity. Therfore, as concerning the commonweals of the Lacedemonians, Cretans, and Carthaginians, which deservedly are liked and do flourish in the good estimation of all men the case th●s standeth with them.  
Forasmuch as Carthage hath ben one of the most triumphant cities that ever was, as well in respect of the commodious situation of the place& fair buildings therein, as in regard of the large Empire& good government, we will set down these excellencies as briefly as we can. Therfore one part of the City of Carthage stood in a great gulf of the sea, for the most part being environed& compa●●ed about with water, almost like an iceland: the neck& point whereof that entred into the main land, as it ascended& went upward contained in breadth about five and twenty furlongs. From this point issued a piece of land which was long and narrow, shooting toward the West, of the breadth of half a furlong or above. The sea lay on the one side of this piece, and a great pond of standing seawater called mere mort●●m on the other side. And the same was enclosed with a single wall which was scited and joined by many rocks, stretching from one to another. On the other side, in the main land shooting toward the South, higher then the point, stood the castle called Byrsa,& the greatest part of the town enclosed with three walls, containing every of them thirty cubits in height, not comprising therein the turrets and galleries that were in the top. These walls stood about two acres one from another, within every of which spaces, there were four streets a piece, and the same walls went thirty foot deep into the ground. The first loft whereof, was at the bottom within the ground, and contained roumth for three hundred Elephants, besides garners for the stoage of necessaries for their keeping. over them were the horsestables, containing roumth for four thousand horses,& garners to keep their provision in besides:& further, there were chambers for the lodging of twenty thousand footmen,& four thousand horsemen. All this provision in time of wat was bestowed in that place between the three walls: 
The Arsenal of Carthage.  But at the end of the said long& narrow piece of land whereof we haue spoken that lieth between the sea and the pond, there was for want of a wall a point that turned toward the haven which was very low& weak, by reason there had ben no account made of it at the beginning. now the pounds on the land side were navigable from one to another,& had the entry of the sea about threescore and ten footes broad, which was shut up with chains of iron. The Merchants ships lay chiefly in this place,& therefore there were a great number of cables& great ropes kept there to tie their ships. Within these pounds there was a very great hall, that was severed from the pounds,& builded vpon certain rocks, standing high among their pounds, between the which there were many harbours& places of receipt for ships, like an arsenal, that sufficed to hold& hid above two hundred ships,& over the same were garners& lofts to lay the ships munition& furniture in: the whole being like a porch or hall standing vpon pillars of marble ston, to wit, every several harbour or place of receipt for the ships vpon four pillars, so that the water was underneath like a pond,& building over, all of one height in form of an Arsenal:& also more forward in the top of all the building was the captains lodging, which had at the door a cabin, out of which he might see the whole Arsenal on al sides, and to the sea,& might from thence command all the mariners, as seemed good to himself:& yet they that were on the sea could not see what was done within the Arsenal, how quickesighted soever they were, nor the Marchants that arrived in the haven, for it was enclosed with two walls of such height, as that they hide it al, and there were certain gates which lead all incommers, from the end of the haven into the City,& not toward the arsenal. This City was builded& founded in Lybia by the Phoenicians, fifty years before the destruction of Troy, and Chorus and Carchedon did lay the foundation of it, or else queen Dido, as the romans& Carthaginians themselves affirm. This Dido( after the tyrant Pigmaleon who reigned in the city of tyre, had by treason murdered her husband Sichee) departed from thence, being admonished thereto by certain visions in dreams, together with many burgesses of the city who could not endure Pigmaleons tyranny, and carried with her as much gold and silver as she could gather together, and so arrived in Libia, in the place where Carthage was after builded,& perceiving that the people of the country would drive her away, she entreated thē to give her as much land to dwell in as an ox hid would compass, whereat the men of the country took up a laughter at the first, by reason of the smallness of the thing which she required. Notwithstanding, being curious to learn by what subtlety the Tyrians meant to build a city within so small a piece of ground, they granted her request. Then these Tyrians did cut an ox hid into so many small thongs, as that it compassed about that place wherein the castle of Carthage after stood, 
The beginning and increase of the Empire of Carthage.  which by reason thereof was called Byrsa. Afterwards in continuance of time these Tyrians having exercised themselves in trade of merchandise every where, being more painful and diligent then their neighbors, did prepare many ships,& by that mean builded the city:& having subdued the country of Lybia, held a great part of the sea in their subiection, and then warring with their neighbours, one after another, conquered sicily, Sardinia, with al the other Islands in that sea,& sent part of their people to inhabit in spain: By which means, of a small beginning, there grew an Empire& princedom, that for power might be compared to the Empire of the Grecians, and for riches to that of the Persians. They had kings, and the aristocratical power of senators, and gave to the communality their pre-eminences in matters to them pertaininge wherein their commonweal resembled the Lacedemonian state. Their exercise was chiefly in sea matters, wherefore they cared for no footmen, but gave some order for horsemen, because they were served with strangers and hirelings. now, when they had lived in this sort about seven hundred yeares, the romans warred vpon them, and took from them in the first punicall warres, the Islands of sicily and Sardinia, and after in the second, all spain. By reason whereof, the Carthaginians assembled a great army under the conduct of Hanniball their captain general, and occupied and spoiled the greatest part of italy by the space of sixteen yeares. On the other side, the romans under the conduct of Cornelius Scipio the first, spoiled and occupied all the Country of Libia even to the city of Carthage, took their ships and elephants, and brought them to such extremity, as that they were constrained to pay them a yearly tribute. Whereupon they made truce the second time, which continued about fifty yeares, until such time as it was broken: at what time the third warres began, wherein under the conduct of Scipio the younger, Carthage was wholly destroyed by the romans. It is reported of this Scipio, that beholding this city, which for the space of seven hundred yeares from the building thereof, had so flourished and excelled in all things, and had the dominion of so many seas, lands, and Islands: which in ships, riches, and armor, was comparable to any other, and in boldness and hardiness passed all others, and had so valiantly defended her liberty by the space of three yeares after shee had yielded up all her weapons and defences, and was at the last through famine and warres come to this extreme necessity, he wept and  shed tears for very pitty: whereby he gave sufficient notice, that he well knew how all cities, Countries, and kingdoms, were subject to change of fortune, even as every particular man is. So the city of Troy which sometime was so great and mighty, came to ruin: and likewi●e the kingdoms of the Assyrians, of the Medes, and Persians, after they were risen up to t●e highest pitch of felicity. The like play of fortune is yet more clearly shewed in the Empire of the Macedonians. Therefore when Scipio had weighed these things, he uttered that verse of Homer, which is thus in effect, The time shall come, that great T●oy shall fall, and king Priamus with all his power and valiant family: Mean●ng Rome, whereof he greatly doubted least she were subject to human casualty. polybius endeavoureth to show some reasons of so strange a ruin: For though the commonweals of Carthage and Rome had some likeness in their several institutions and ordinances, yet Carthage when she began to make wars against Rome, was in her decaying daies● and Rome then in her growing vigour and force. For all commonweals haue a certain natural augmentation and quickening, and consequently a decay and diminishing. For then did Rome flourish in the form of her commonweal. The people in Carthage had usurped too great authority in their counsels. At Rome the Senate had the direction of the most part of matters of state, which prospered the better, for that they were governed by the wisest sort: and by that direction, at last they overcame the Carthaginians. add also, that the Italians were endued with a more excellent nature then the Lybians, as well in force of body, as in hardiness of courage; And that the romans serve their turns with their own Nation, whom they train and bring up in warlike skill, in the best sort that is used in all the whole world: The Carthaginians used none but strangers and hirelings, in whom they reposed all their confidence. Whereof they were evil paid in the end: And at their first warres with the romans, they ruled over the people of Affrica with too great tyranny and covetousness, because they thought they had good cause so to do, insomuch, that they yearly levied the one half of their fruits. Further, they doubled their tribute, and shewed no mercy to them that had offended through ignorance. They bestowed the Magistrateships, not vpon them that were gentle and merciful persons, but vpon them that augmented the public treasures, though they played the Tyrants with the people. Which cruelty and rigour was the cause that in their civil warres with Matho and Speudons, not onely the men, but also the women of every city did conspire, who had afore seen their children and husbands lead into thraldom, because they had not payed the tribute; which women were content to sell their jewels to furnish the payment of the soldiers.   

CHAP. X. Of the commonweal of Athens, ordained by Solon.  
OF them that haue entreated of commonweals, some never had the managing and guiding of public affairs, but evermore did led a private life: and wee haue spoken almost of as many of them as haue set down any thing worthy the remembering. Others haue ben Lawgiuers, some in their own Cities, others in strange Cities. Of these, some haue ben only authors of laws, others founders of commonweals: as for example, Lycurgus and Solon, who established both laws and commonweals. The commonweal of the Lacedemonians hath been spoken of. As for Solon, some think he was a virtuous lawgiver, and abrogated the oligarchy( being then very immoderate and unreasonable) and delivered the people from thraldom, and established the democraty or popular state according to the old manner, by temperating and ordering the commonweal aright. For the counsel in the Areopage pertaineth to the oligarchy; and the election of the Magistrates to the aristocraty: and the form of the judgements is popular. Now it seemeth that Solon did not take away these two things which were afore time, to wit, the counsel and the election of the Magistrates, but made the people lord by creating them Iudges of all things. Therefore some men find fault with him for that he overthrew the other part of the commonweal by committing the authority of all things to Iudges, which were made by casting of lots. For since that course was taken, they that carried favour with the people as a Tyrant, haue brought the state into such a democraty, as it remaineth in at this present. Ephialties and Pericles broke the lims of the counsel of Areopage. The same Pericles also ordained fees for the iudges: so every one that sought favour and credite at the peoples hands, haue augmented the authority of the people so far, that they haue brought the commonweal into that form of democraty, or gouernmnt by the multitude, wherein it now remaineth. Notwithstanding, that seemeth not to haue been Solons meaning, but rather to haue happened by chance and accident. For when the people had been the occasion of the sea victory in the warres against the Medes, they waxed haughtie-minded, and took to themselves lewd orators in stead of good gouernours. For Solon had given authority to the people to create, correct, and reform the Magistrates, as a most necessary thing: which authority being taken out of their hands, they must needs become thralls, and enemies to the state. He ordained, that none should bear office, but such noble and rich men, as could levy yearly five hundred bushels out of their lands and revenues, and of the Zeugites, and of them of the third order called knights. The Citizens of the fourth order, were the hirelings and workmen,& they might not be admitted to any Magistrateship.  
THE city of Athens was long vexed with civil dissension about the government of the commonweal, and divided into as many factions and pa●tialities, as there were sundry sorts of lands within the Country of Attica For there were the mountain folk, the inhabitants in the plain country, and the sea men. They of the mountain led a popular life: Contrariwise, they of the plain, wished that a small number of the greatest burgesses should haue all the authority in matters of state: and the sea-faring men wishing a mean and mixed government of both, were an impediment, that none of the contrary sides could ouercrow the other. again, at the same time the controversy between the poor and the rich proceeding from vnequality, was at the hottest point. By which means, the city was in most eminent danger, insomuch, that there was no likelihood howe these controversies could bee compounded and pacified, unless some Tyrant rose up, took possession of the monarchy, and made himself sovereign lord. For all the common people were so far in debt to the richer sort, that either they tilled their lands, and payed them a sixth part of the profits, or borrowed money of them for usury vpon the pawn of their proper persons, and when they wanted ability to pay, were adiudged and condemned to their creditors, who possessed and used them as thralls and slaves in their houses, or else sold them into strange Countries. There were many that through poverty were constrained to sell their own children, having no lawe to the contrary, or else to forsake both city and country by reason of the hardness and cruelty of the creditors that were usurers: till at the last diverse of the actiuest& strongest persons joined themselves together, and encouraged one another to suffer this no longer, but rather to choose some captain among them, being an upright and faithful man, not onely to deliver them from captivity that were condemned to thraldom and slavery for want of payment of their debts at the daies appointed, but also to divide all the ●erritory new again, and to alter the wholest●te of government. Then the wisest sort of the city considering that only Solon was blameless, as he that took no part with the iniquity and violence of the rich, nor with the need of the poor, entreated him to undertake the dealing in the affairs of the commonweal, for the appeasing and ending of all these partialities. he at the first was very doubtful to take the matter vpon him, fearing the covetousness of the one sort, and the pride and arrogancy of the other. Notwithstanding, at last he was chosen provost, and withall, mediator and reformer of the laws, and of the whole state of the commonweal, by the good liking and consent of both parties: for the rich liked him well because he was not needy, and the poor allowed of him because he was honest and upright. In which matters he after guided and behaved himself so constantly, that he neither yielded for fear of the mightier, nor framed his laws to the liking and will of them that had chosen him reformer. Also he did not cut off the wound at the quick, nor altered the state in such sort as had been most expedient. Fearing least if he had attempted to haue altered and turned the whole government of the city upside down, he should after haue lacked sufficient power to settle and stablish it in the best form. Therefore did he onely alter what he hoped either by reason to persuade, or by force to make the citizens to accept, by matching force and iustice together: yet when they elected him general reformer of the whole state of the commonweal, they had not limited his power and authority, but indifferently committed all things to his discretion, as the Magistrateships, the public assemblies in counsel, the voices and suffrages in election of Officers: the judgements, the body of the Senate, with authority and power to determine and limit what possessions every of them ought to haue, what number they should bee, and howe long they should stay in office, and to retain, confirm, or cancel what he thought good in the old laws and customs which were in use and practise. After the establishing of his laws, he authorized them to stand in force for the space of a hundred yeares, and wrote them in rolls of wood, which turned within certain Tables●, more long then broad, wherein they were kept. Then did he cause the whole body of the counsel to take a corporal oath, that they should observe and cause to bee observed all his laws from point to point: but particularly also he caused every of the Thesmothetes( who were certain Officers of the body of the counsel, that had the keeping of the laws in special charge) to take a solemn oath in the great market place, near the ston where the public proclamations are usually made, with a promise and vow, that if any of them should transgress one note of the same laws, he should forfeit and pay to the Temple of Apollo in the city of Delphos, and Image of massy gold, weighing as much as himself.  
THE counsel in the Areopage, pertaineth to the oligarchy.] The most part of Authors hold opinion, that Solon established the court of the Areopages, whereof there seemeth a great testimony, in that Draco in his laws maketh no mention of the Areopages in any place, but always where he speaketh of murders and death of men, he directeth his speech to the Ephetes, who were criminal Iudges. Notwithstanding, the eight lawe of Solons thirteenth table, saith thus in these proper terms: They that were banished or noted of infamy before Solon established his laws, shall bee restored to their goods and good name, except those that were condemned by sentence of the court of Areopage, or by the Ephetes, or by the kings, in the place of audience of the palace, and in the towne-house, for murder and death of men, or for aspiring to usurp tyranny. These words seem to prove, that the court of Areopage was erected before Solon was chosen reformer of the laws. For how could any offenders haue been condemned by sentence of the court of Areopage before Solons time, if Solon were the first that gave it authority to judge of matters? Except they will say, that the letter of the law which is dark must be holpen, and somewhat supplied therein that wanteth, by giuing such interpretation as followeth unto it, to wit, They that shall bee attainted and convict of any matter whereof the court of Areopage, the Ephetes, or gouernours of the city haue the hearing and determination, vpon the publishing of this lawe, shall remain condemned, and all others shall bee released and restored. This Court and counsel of Areopage was composed of them that are yearly chosen provosts of the city: Of the which number, Solon himself was. But when he perceived how the people were fierce and bold, by reason they felt themselves discharged of their debts, he erected another second counsel for matters of state, choosing a hundred men of every tribe, four of the which had the charge to consult and debate of matters, before they were delivered to the people, to the end, that vpon the assembly of the great counsel, there should no matter be put forth that had not been first well debated and considered in this counsel of four hundred. Further, he ordained that the sovereign court should haue an eye and oversight in all things, specially concerning the maintenance, observation, and keeping of the laws: ●eeming that the commonweal being stayed with these two courts, as it were with two strong ancres, should bee less beaten vpon and less tormented, and that the common people would thereby, bee the more peaceable and quiet.  
EPHIALTES and Perycles broke the lims of the counsel of Areopage.] When Perycles had in short space won the good will of the common people, with distributing unto them the money of the commonweal, as well to haue place to see the plays, as for salary to assist in judgements: and by other like corruptions, he afterwards served his turn with them against the court of Areopage, of the body whereof he was never any member: because the lot had fallen at no time unto him, to bee neither yearly provost nor Guardant of the laws, nor King of the sacrifices, nor master of the Warres: which were Officers, that of old time were created by lots, and they ●o whom the lot fell, and which behaved themselves uprightly in the execution of their Offices, were preferred by course to be of the body of the Areopages. Then Pericles having by this means purchased great credite and authority with the common people, so encumbered this court of Areopage, that he caused the hearing and determination of many matters to be taken from them, and through the help and intermeddling of Ephialtes, procured the banishment of Cymon, as favouring the Lacedemonians, and contrarying the welfare and authority of the people, although he were one of the richest and noblest men of all the city, and had gotten many glorious victories, and filled the city of Athens with the spoil of their enemies. plutarch in the life of Pericles, who writeth in that same place of Ephialtes as ensueth: The Orator Ephialtes being feared and stood in awe of by that side which took part with the nobility, because he pardonned none that in any matter whatsoever had offended the authority of the people, but pursued& persecuted them to the uttermost with all rigour, his enemies lay in wait for him by the help and setting on of Aristodice the Tanagrian, and slay him by treason.  
SO far, that they haue brought the commonweal into that form of democraty wherein it now remaineth.] plutarch in the life of Cymon writeth, That as long as he was in the city, he always bridled and kept under the ouerlustinesse of the people, that invaded the authority of the honest and upright men, and drew into their hands the sovereignty of power and rule: But as soon as he was gone into the warres, the common sort having no body to gainsay their doings, overturned the whole government of the town, and confounded all the ancient laws and customs which they had used at all times, and that by the provocation and practise of Ephialtes. For they took the hearing and determination welneere of all causes away from the court of Areopage: and by committing all the authority of the judgements into the hands of the people, brought the state of the city into a very democraty, when Perycles was grown into great cre●ite who favoured the commonalties side.  
HE ordained, that none should bear office, but such noble and rich men as could levy yearly five hundred bushels.] Solon determining that Offices and Magistrateships should remain in the ●ands of rich citizens, as they were, and to mingle the authority of government in such sort, that the common people should be interested to a part therein, which prerogative they had not aforetime, he made a general valuation of the possessions of every particular citizen, and of them that were found to haue yearly revenue to the value of five hundred bushels and above, as well in corn, as liquid fruits, he made the first order or degree: and them that had to the value of three hundred bushels yearly, and were able to find and maintain a horse of service, he placed in the second rank or degree, and called them knights: and they that had but the value of two hundred bushels yearly, were placed in the third order, and called Zeugites. All the rest that were under these rates, were called Thetes, as a man would say, hirelings or handicrafts men, living of the sweat of their brows, who were not admitted to haue or exercise any public office, nor to enjoy the right of burges●ie or freedom, saving in having voices in elections and assemblies of the town, and in judgements, wherein the people had the sovereign judgements. This at the first seemed nothing, but after it was found by experience to bee a great matter, for that the most part of suits and controversies between particular parties came in the end before the people: For in all matters the hearing and determination whereof appertained to the Officers, he allowed all men that found themselves grieved with their judgements, to make their appeals before the people. And that more is, for that his laws were darkly written, so as they might bee wrested to diverse fences, it greatly augmented the authority and power of the judgements, and of them that were to give sentence: because that when their controversies could not bee ended and accorded by the express deciding of the Lawe, recourse must needs bee had to the Iudges, before whom welneere all questions were debated: so that the Iudges by those means came to bee after a ●ort above the laws, by reason they used such interpretation in them as they pleased.  
SO Zaleucus to the Locrians and Epizephyriens, and Charondas of Catania to his Citizens and other towns of Chalcis, which are in Italy and sicily, were Lawgiuers. Some men affirm, that Onomacritus was the first that had skill to make laws, and that he being of Locres, and dwelling in Crete, exercised himself in this faculty, at what time he professed soothsaying: Thales had been his scholar, Lycurgus and Zaleucus were hearers of Thales: and Charondas, of Zaleucus. But the affirmers hereof make no right computation of the times. Likewise, Philolas the Corinthian was lawgiver to the Thebans. This Philolas was of the race of the Bacchians, and fell in love with Diocles, that won the best game at the plays of Olimpus. And forasmuch as this Diocles, abhorring and detesting the love of Alcione his own mother, had ●orsaken his own town, he followed him to Thebes, where they both died. At this day their sepulchers are to bee shewed in the view one of another: Howbeit, in such sort, that the one may be seen of Corinth, and the other not. And they report, that this burial was thus foreappointed by them, to wit, by Diocles, because he would not be seen of Corinth, in despite of his misfortune, and by Philolas to the contrary, for that he would bee seen. Well, they dwelled vpon this occasion amongst the thebans, to whom Philolas gave laws in diverse things, and specially concerning the generation of children. Which laws they called positive laws, and provided specially, that the number of inheritances should bee maintained. Charondas hath limited nothing specially, but judgements against false witnesses, and was the first that made a law in that behalf. Further, he is more diligent and more exquisite in his laws, then the lawgiuers of this age. Philolas hath proper to himself the inequality of possessions: Plato to himself the community of women, children, and goods, and the meetings of women at meat and meales: And further, the lawe touching drunkenness, and that maisters of feasts should be sober: Also martiall exercises, and the practise to do good with both hands, as if it were an unseemly thing, that one hand should bee profitable, and the other unprofitable. moreover, there bee certain laws of Draco found, that he made for the commonweal after it was established: and hath nothing proper to himself that is greatly worth the remembering, saving rigour in the greatness of punishment. Pyttacus was a Law-maker, but no founder of a commonweal: and there is one law proper unto him, That if drunkards fight, they shall bee condemned to greater punishment then if they were sober: For sith they offend more when they bee drunk then when they bee sober, he hath not so much regarded the giuing of pardon to the drunkard, as the doing of good. Further, Androdamas of Rhegium gave laws to the people of Chalcis in Thrace touching manslaughter, and Damosels that were Orphans and heires to their parents: But nothing can bee alleged as proper to him. It shall therefore suffice to haue thus discoursed of the chief commonweals, and those that haue been put in writing by diverse men.  
Caele Rodigin, de Antiq. lectionibus, lib. 10. cap. 19. maketh mention of many old Lawgiuers.  
Zaleucus.] he was so severe a lawgiver, that when his own son had offended a law that he had made concerning adultery, of such effect, that whosoever should bee convict thereof, should lose both his eyes: for the maintenance of the authority of the Lawe, caused one of his own eyes, and another of his sons to bee plucked out.  
CHARONDE or Charondas.] Valerius the great in his 6. book and 5. chapter, and Diodorus the Sicilian, in the 12. book of his library, make mention of Zaleucus& Charondas, and Cicero in his 2. book of laws, affirming that they haue not written laws for pleasure as Plato did, but for the commonweals sake. Stobeus the greek gatherer of common places, rehearseth certain proemes of the laws of Zaleucus.  
OF the race of the Bacchians.] It was a most noble race in corinth, fetching their pedigree from Bacchus, whereof it had the name, as the Heraclyans of Hercules,  
WHICH laws, they called positive laws, {αβγδ}.] As being the principal grounds of the commonweal. For {αβγδ} sometime signifieth a foundation. The Lawyers call a positive law, the civil law, which is altered and changed according to countries: contrary to the law of nature, which evermore continueth the selfsame; and the laws positive, which vary according to circumstances.  
THAT the number of inheritances should be maintained.] That they should not bee divided amongst Coheres, but remain wholly to the eldest, or best liked or dutifullest of the children, for that the number of the said inheritances doth not increase by the dividing of the same.  
Draco.] This man, a great while after the establishing of the commonweal of Athens, gave to the Athenians most rigorous laws, punishing all offences, yea even the least with death, so that an orator of Athens name Demadas, said: That Draco had written his laws with blood, and not with ink. Vpon which occasion of severity and sharpness, Solon repealed and abolished them all, saving those that concern murders.  
Pyttacus.] Was of Methelin in the Isle of Lesbos, reckoned for one of the seven wise men of Greece. Who after he had possessed the dominion of his city by the space of ten yeares( his citizens offering and yielding it into his hands) and had given them laws, gave it up of his own accord and good will, contenting himself with a little, saying that, half was more then the whole: as is alleged by Diogenes Laertius in his book of the lives of Philosophers.  
AS the doing of good.] To terrify other persons from drunkenness, through the sharpness of the punishment.  
OF Rhegium.] Rhegium a city of Italy, situate in the straits of Scicilie, over against Messana. It is a very ancient town, retaining her old name at this day.  
CHALCIS in Thrace.] Chalcis a city builded vpon the hill of Athos in Thrace, according to the old extent of the country. For by others it is attributed to Macedonia. Pomponius Mela appointeth Thrace to stretch from the sea of Pontus, even to Ilyria or Sclauonia.    

THE THIRD book OF ARISTOTLES CIVIL GOVERNMENT, TRANSLATED out OF greek, AND FRENCH, INTO ENGLISH. The Argument.  
SIth the Commonweale is the life of the city, and the city a multitude of citizens, the reason of the Commonweale cannot be understood without growing what a city is: nor can the reason of the city be learned, without having learned aforehand, who is a citizen or Commonwealeman. Therfore for the attaining of the right knowledge of the Commonweale, Aristotle in his third book prophesieth first who is a citizen, what is his office, and what manner of inhabitants of the city are to be accounted Citizens. After that, he layeth forth what a Commonweale is, and how many sorts of Commonweales there be: what be their definitions and transgressions, what is the law of every Commonweale, what is the end and purpose of policy, who ought to govern in a City, whether one, or the people, or the richest, or the best sort: What behaviour is to be showed toward the most puissant, and toward any parsonage endowed with great excellency. Then entreateth he of the kingdom, and how many sorts of kingdoms there be, who is an absolute king, and whether it bee more expedient to be governed by a good man, or by good laws.  

CHAP. I. Of a city, and of a Citizen.  
WHo so undertaketh to treat of a commonweal, and to show what every commonweal is, and of what quality and sort; ought first to haue consideration of a city, to the end, it may be understood what a city is: for in these daies there riseth a doubt thereabouts. When diverse men say the city hath done some act, and others say, not the city, but the oligarchy, or the Tyrant hath done it. now wee see that the whole charge and business of a politic man, or of a lawgiver, doth consist in a city, and that the form of government of a city, is the order of the inhabitants of the same. Sith therefore a city is a thing compounded, and consisting of diverse parts, as any other whole thing; we will first speak of a Citizen. For whereas a city is a multitude of Citizens, it is expedient to learn, who ought to bee called a Citizen, and who is a right Citizen, for as much as often that matter cometh into question, by reason all men do not understand it after one sort. For many times he that is a Citizen in the Democrati●, or popular state, is not a Citizen in the oligarchy. Wherefore for bearing to speak of them that otherwise purchase this name, of which number are those that be made denizens, or obtain their admission by way of redemption: The Citizen is not called a Citizen in respect of habitation, which is common to strangers, and bondslaves: neither ought they to be taken for Citizens, which haue liberty to pled their causes, so as they may sue, and bee sued, as all they may that bargain and traffic with Citizens: yet in some places, that liberty is not wholly granted to strangers, but they are driven to retain a patron or assistant. Where therefore that kind of liberty is not perfectly granted unto them, they ought not to bee called Citizens absolutely, but after a certain sort: as children, who by reason of their age are not yet enrolled, and old men exempted from public charges and offices, whom wee call not Citizens simply, but with some addition, tear●ing the one sort unperfect, and the other passed their time, or dismissed, or else do give unto thē some such other term. It is not material how, so it be understood what wee say: For wee seek for the right and true Citizen, that may not bee rejected or put off by means of any such exception, because it is an easy matter to make the like objections and reputations, touching infamous and banished persons. But the true and right Citizen, cannot bee defined more properly than by having interest and participating in the public power and authority of judging, and of bearing the office of Magistrateship in his City. Of Magistrateships, some bee limited and defined by time, insomuch, that it is not lawful for one man to obtain them twice, at least, except there bee some space limited and passed between both times. The others bee without limitation, as the judge and counsellor: peradventure it will be objected, that they are no Magistrates, though it bee ridiculous, and contrary to reason to say they haue no interest in the Magistrateship, who bee of most authority. But let us not stand on this, sith the question is but about the bare name. For the charge which is common to the judge and counselor hath no name, neither is there any word fit ●or them both. Therefore for distinctions sake, wee will call it the indefinite Magistrateship. hereupon wee ordain and limit them for Citizens that haue this interest and participation: wherefore that definition of a Citizen, which may most fitly bee applied to all them that are called Citizens, is almost of this sort: notwithstanding, we should not bee ignorant, that in those things wherein subiects differ in part or degree, and the one is first, the other second, another after, there is little or no community or fellowship at all amongst them, as they be of that kind& sort. As for commonweals, they also differ in kind from each other● for some be later,& othersome former: because those that be corrupted and marred, and haue transgressed and turned out of the right way, ought necessary to be later then those that do remain in their perfection, and haue not transgressed: wee will declare hereafter what wee mean by them that haue transgressed. Forasmuch therefore as the Citizen differeth according to every commonweal, it followeth that the Citizen aforelimitted is chiefly in the democraty, or popular state: yet may he bee also in other commonweals, but that is not of necessity: for in some of them, the people hath no such authority, neither is there any use of public assemblies: but the senators serve the turn, and decide causes severally. As in lacedaemon, the ephors or controullers do hear and determine contracts and bargains, and other Magistrates other matters: the senators manslaughters, and peradventure every Magistrate some several matter. The like order is in Carthage, where certain Magistrates decide all causes. But the definition of a Citizen doth receive correction, because in other commonweals the authority of the judge and counselor, is not indefinite and without limitation, but definite and limited according to the Magistrateship. For it is granted to all or some of them, to deliberate, to counsel, and to judge, either of all, or certain affairs. It appeareth now by the premises, who is a Citizen: For who so hath mean to come to the authority of counseling and judging: him say wee to bee already a Citizen of this city: and a city, to speak simply; I call such a multitude of those Citizens, as is sufficient to live of itself. Some men having an eye to custom, do define him for a Citizen that is born of father and mother, that be Citizens; and not of one Citizen alone, as of the father, or of the mother, othersome seek higher, as to two or three Grandfathers, or mo degrees. Vpon the deciding of these things in this manner politicly and brie●ely, some men doubt of this third and fourth kind, how they shall be called a Citizen. Gorgias the Leontine, partly doubting and partly scoffing, said, that like as mortars be made by their workmen, so the Laryssyans were made by their ingendrers, and that there were some makers of Laryssyans. But this is too fond and grossly spoken, for if they communicated of the commonweal in the manner a●orementioned, they should be Citizens. But they being born of a father that is a Citizen, or of a mother, cannot be applied to the first inhabitants or founders of a city: but the greatest doubt is about them that haue been admitted by reason of any alteration and change that hath happened in a city: as Clisthenes did at Athens, after he had driven out the gangrenes. For he received many strangers and bondmen into the tribes, of whom it may be doub●ed, not which of them is a citizen, but whether they be made citizens unjustly. Wherein it may also be doubted, whether who so is not justly a citizen, be not a citizen, as if unjust and false were all one. But forasmuch as we see some personages behave themselves unjustly in Magistrateships, whom nevertheless we call Magistrates, and yet not justly: and for that a Citizen is defined in regard of some Magistrateship( sith he to whom the Magistrateship may be imparted, is called a citizen as hath been declared) doubtless these men also ought to be called citizens, whether it be justly or unjustly, that is to be referred to the former question, where it is demanded whether a city hath done or not done any thing, as when it is changed from an oligarchy or tyranny into a Democra●ye: for then will not some men keep the former covenants, as though they were not made by the city, but by a Tyrant, nor observe diuers other matters, as though some commonweals consisted rather by force and violence, than by the public benefit and commodity. If then some men do thus demean themselves in the popular state, it must needs be said that the acts of such a city are no otherwise public, than if they were of an oligarchy and a tyranny.  
here is the very entrance and beginning of the discourse touching the matter of government. For the attaining whereof, it is needful to know aforehand, what a policy or commonweal is: And sith that is the order and very life of a city, we must also learn what a city is. And sith a city is a multitude of Citizens, and it is m●eter to speak of the parts rather than the whole, he first of all entreateth of a Citizen, who though he differ according to the diversities of commonweals, yet taking him properly, it is he that hath right to judge in his city, and a voice in deliberations in the general or common counsel of the same. Aristotle calleth each charge an indefinite city magist●ateship: and a city, the multitude of men, to whom the commonweal is thus communicated, having plenty of all things as well necessary as commodious. Which definition of a citizen cannot well be applied to all the citizens of all cities, but to those that haue a popular government, wherein they being equal, are governed by assemblies, where every of them hath liberty to say his opinion. Two other definitions of a citizen are rejected: the one, that a citizen is who so is born both of father and mother that be citizens: the other that a citizen is who so is engendered of father and mother being citizens, whose grandfather, great grandfather, and other ancestors haue been citizens. Also two doubts are resolved, the one touching them that are newly admitted and made citizens at any alteration in a state, whether they be justly or unjustly created. The other whether who so is unjustly made a citizen, ought to be accounted a citizen. The whole conclusion is, that who soever in any maner of government whatsoever may bear office& exercise any Magistrateship, is accounted a Citizen, as the natural Frenchmen be in the realm of France, of whom there is none so mean, of how base degree soever he be, but he may be advanced to worship and honor for his valliancy, or be preferred to the chiefest ecclesiastical dignities, or to the highest offices of iustice or of the princes revenues by his lukewarmness& uncorrupt behaviour, as hath ben declared in the first book. In truth the●e be no citizens at Venice, but the lords or signiours, who onely enjoy the Magistrateships of the commonweal, and a●e admitted into the high counsel at the age of five and twenty yeares, the common people being not admitted to any matter concerning the government, saving Secretariships, and Chauncellorships, as appeareth in Contarines first book of the Venetian commonweal. As Rome was not always governed after one sort, so was not the name of a citizen always taken in one sense: For while the first kings had the dominion, the common people were clearly shut out from all honours and Magistrateships; but after the kingly State was once changed into a commonweal, the people were admitted to the Magistrateships, and ordering of public affairs, and to bee assistant in the public assemblies that were made in the field of Mars, and in Tribes, Courts, Orders, and Censuries, for the deliberating and consulting of the affairs of the commonweal by voices and suffrages, for the creating of Magistrates, and for the ordaining of new laws; where he was accounted for a right citizen that was free, having a family and tribe, with power to attain to any degree of worship and honour, and enjoying many privileges and prerogatives. But after the dominion was once usurped by the Emperours, those public assemblies were onely continued under Iulius Caesar, and Octauius Augustus, and after abrogated by Tyberias, who took from the people the authority of intermeddling in public affairs, and transferred it to the Senate, and to the absolute power of the Prince, as appeareth in Sigonius his book of the ancient law of the citizens of Rome, and in Gruchius his book of the public assemblies of the romans.  
AS children, who by reason of their age, are not yet enroulled.] This was the order at Rome, that every one of the citizens children within three daies after their births and namings, were carried to the Temple of Saturne, where the treasure and receipt of the revenues of the commonweal was kept: At which place the childrens names were registered in the records of the maisters and disposers of the treasure, by which means, every childs age, and the number of children was known, and this was called the profession of children. No child was accounted for a man, until he came to the age of seventeen yeares, that he left wearing a childs gown, and took on him mans garment. At Venice all the young men descending from the order of the senators and Noblemen, and being above the age of twenty yeares, use to resort to the Magistrates called the Aduocators, to whom the guardiance and defence of the laws is chiefly committed: before which Magistrates, they must come with their father or mother: if the father be dead, then with the next of their kin: if the father and mother be deceased, then with two witnesses of good credite, and prove that they are born of lawful marriage, and of a mother both godly and honest. The witnesses take an oath, that they know it to be so by the testimony of many folk, whom they know. This being done, the father or mother, or next of kin( if the young man haue neither father nor mother) declare vpon their oaths, that the young man is above the age of twenty yeares. All this being written in a common book by the secretary of the Magistrate, they stay for the fourth day of December, at which day the names of all these young men that through the benefit of the lot haue not obtained the right of a Citizen, nor exceed the age of 25 years, are cast into an earthen pot, or some other like thing, and so brought before the prince& counsellors, where the same pot is set by another pot, wherein there be as many lots, as names written in little bills in the other: The fift part of the lots are guilded,& all the rest of silver. The Prince taketh a bill out of the first pot, and straightways a lot out of the other: whereby if it be one of the gilded lots, the young man, whose name is come out, straightway hath the right of public authority,& thence forward is received into the high counsel. But if it happen to be a silver lot, he loseth his right for that time,& must tarry another year, except in the mean space he exceed his age of 25 years. For all they that descend of the order of the Senators& noblemen( whom according to the vulgar Italian tongue, wee may call Patricians) as soon as they attain to that age, haue a citizens right, and are partakers of the public power, as appeareth in Contarines first book of the Venetian commonweal.  
AS Clisthenes did at Athens, after he had driven out the gangrenes.] After the Athenians were overcome by the Lacedemonians, in a great batai●e, they could by no means obtain peace at their hands, but by receiving into their city thirty gouernours, who should after bear the name of Athenians: to the end, the commonweal should of a popular state, become an oligarchy, as the Lacedemonians endeavoured to bring to pass in all places. Those thirty gouernours, after they had possession of the state, played the gangrenes, and for that cause were driven away and banished by Thrasibulus, who in their steads appointed ten gouernours of the commonweal, which ten, for that they followed the gangrenes steps in cruelty, were in like sort banished. Forasmuch therefore as by reason of the former warres and rigour of the Tyranor, the Athenians were brought to a small number, they by the counsel and persuasion of Clisthenes, received many strangers and bondmen into the franchises and liberties of their city, who were distributed into Tribes, to the intent, to replenish their city with new citizens, in stead of them that were wanting.   

CHAP. II. When any alteration happeneth in a city, in what case the city shall bee said to remain: the same that it was before, or otherwise.  
IT seemeth also a matter pertaining to this question, to consider in wha● case a city is to be called, the same, or not the same, but another: that is, whether he may be changed or no. The chief resolution of this doubt consisteth in the place, and in the men. For the place may be severed, and the men also,& some may dwell in one place,& others in another, which is but a slight doubt: for in as much as a City is taken and understood diverse ways, this question is easy. Likewise, where as men do inhabit one place, how long and how far a City is to be deemed the same: which is not to bee measured by the walls, for a wall might be made round, about all Pelops Isle. Such peradventure is babylon, and every other City that is liker a Nation then a town. For when babylon was taken by the enemies, it is reported, that one part thereof knew nothing of the taking till the third day after. Wee will reason hereof in another place more conveniently. For who so is apt to govern a City, ought not to be ignorant concerning the greatness of the City, both how great it should bee, and whether it be expedient to haue one Nation or more therein: and whether while the same inhabitants dwell in one place, it is to bee called the same as long as the same kind of government shall last, though one sort incessantly die, and another continually succeed: as we haue accustomend to call floods and riuers the same, and fountains and springs the same, notwithstanding that evermore one water cometh and another goeth: or whether shall we call the men the same for such cause, and the town diuers: for if a City bee a certain society, and this society is made of Citizens: when the commonweal falleth into another form or shape, and becometh of another stamp, it should seem necessary, that the city were no more to bee called the same, as wee say, that the quire or Chorus being one while comical, and another while tragical, are diuers, though it often consist of the selfsame persons, and so of every other fellowship and composition: as wee say, a harmony of the same voice is another, when sometimes it goeth after the Dorian manner, and now and then after the Phrygyan fashion. If it bee thus, it appeareth that a city is to be called the same, in respect of the commonweal, and that it may bee called by another name, or the same, whilst the same inhabitants remain in it, or altogether others that are diverse from them: but whether it bee lawful and meet or no, when the form of a City is wholly changed, to pay or not to pay our debts, it belongeth to another place to discuss of.  
Aristotle taking occasion vpon the propounded question,( to wit, whether the form of government being changed, a man is bound to observe the bargains and covenants which were contracted before) discourseth howe a city when any change or alteration happeneth unto it ought to be esteemed, one and the same, or another and diverse: for if the change be made onely of the place and situation, the town indeed becometh diverse, but the city remaineth the same. As Pompey at the beginning of the civil war, being retired out of Italy, said that there was Rome, where the Senate was, and not where the walls were. And during the time that Camillus dwelled at Veyes, it was generally said, that Rome was there also; as if there had not been any change, but of the place onely and habitation, which is changed oftentimes for many and sundry causes: as wee see how Rome and Lions are now built by the riuers sides, which in old time stood vpon high places, and jerusalem stands in another place now, then it was wont to do. If the change bee made of men alone, who all in a hundred yeares space die and pass away: nevertheless, seeing that some thus dying, others still are born to succeed in their places, the town retaining the same form of government, the city also remaineth one and the same: as the kingdom of france, and signory of Venice haue continued already eleven hundred yeares in the same state of policy, albeit the French and Venetian citizens haue in this long space ben infinitely changed: after the similitude of riuers, which are always the same riuers, although the water is never the same, but one runneth away, and other succeedeth in the room. But when the form of policy and government of a commonweal is changed, then becometh the city another then it was, as not long ago the signory of Florence is changed into a duchy, the kingdom of Rome into a commonweal, properly called, and this again into an Empire. And thus a city may continue one, and the same, though the town bee removed, ruined, or subverted: as the Empire of Rome was the same Empire still, even then when the seat of it was translated from Rome to Constantinople, or when the city of houses and walls was destroyed by the goths and vandals. On the contrary, a town may be called by the same name, and be the same indeed, though the citizens be changed, and the form of government quiter altered: as may bee said of Constantinople, out of which the Grecians were driven and banished by the Turkes, who also haue changed the form of the Empire. Censorius the roman consul declaring to the Carthaginians the decree of the roman Senat concerning the pulling down and euerting their city, and that they should build and erect another in some place eighty furlongs from the sea, said unto them: That he did not think that the place where the city stood was Carthage, but the people: as reporteth Appian Alexander in his book entitled Libic. cap. 9.  
FOR in as much as a city is taken and understood diverse ways, {αβγδ}.] This word {αβγδ} in greek signifieth sometimes the place, walls, and buildings of a city, sometimes a city itself, that is to say, A company of men associated and gathered together by right and equity. plutarch in his Treatise of the three forms of government: from whence is derived {αβγδ}, that is, a policy or commonweal. Cicero de Deuinat. lib. 1. look what Socrates saith in the politic of Plato, {αβγδ}, that is, politic, or belonging to a city. Cicero De finibus, lib. 5. saith thus: As a man hath engrafted in him by nature, I know not what seed of civility and popularity, which the Greekes call political. In his book De Oratore, lib. 3. thus: In time past Philosophers for their excellent knowledge in great matters, were called by the Greekes Politicians, comprehending universally in that word, all manner of commonweals In his familiar Epistles thus: Your books touching policy, are in all mens hands. And Atticus thus: Would I were able to make some politic work in this calamity of the commonweal, {αβγδ}, that is, to be conversant& occupied in commonweals, or to govern cities. Demosthenes in his Oration De corona, or of the crown, useth it so, {αβγδ}. And Aristotle in his Pol. lib. 7. {αβγδ}. And in the fourth Chapter of this third book. {αβγδ}. This word Policy is derived from those greek words, which in French is most usually taken for feasting of victuals,& ordering of trades& occupations by the Iudges or sheriffs of the city, confounding in one the name of policy and public dispensation. In like manner, the latin word civitas, is not onely taken for a town or city, wherein some Arch-bishop or Bishop keep their seat, as ecclesiastical persons usurp the same, but for signory or public government, or for an assembly of men, subject to the same laws and Magistrates. Cicero De somnio Scipiones, or Scipioes dream, hath this saying: Nihil est illi principi deo, &c. That is, Nothing that is done vpon earth, is more acceptable and pleasant to the chiefest God, then companies and societies of men coupled together by law, which are called Cities. And in his Oration for P. Sestius: Quis ignorat ita naturam rerum tulisse, vt quodam tempore, &c. Who doth not know( saith he) that such was sometimes the necessity of nature, that men in former times did wander up and down scattered and dispersed in the fields, no natural nor civil lawe being as then described: and that they possessed no more as their own, but that which they could take away and keep by strength and violence, or by slaughter and wounds? They therefore which first excelled in any eminent wisdom and virtue, perceiving the docility and capacity of mans nature, gathered together these scattered people, and from that incivility and sauagenesse, translated to a kind of iustice, and civil courtesy. Then having found out both the divine and human laws, did they first environ with walls both those things which contained any common commodity, and also the conventicles of men, and houses that were joined together. All which they called by the name of Cities. Caesar in his French Commentaries, lib. 1. saith thus: every city of the helvetians is divided into four boroughs. Also in the beginning of the fourth book he saith: That the Nations of the Swissers had a hundred boroughs or towns. Also in the seventh, That there was one city of the Hedurans which prolonged and hindered the certain victory of all france, and that by the authority of it the other cities were upholden in authority, being derived unto them, there would remain no footing for the romans in france. Also in his book of civil warres, Lib. 1. Principes vero, &c. Cn Pompey, and Iulius Caesar were the chiefest Captaines of those factions, being both patrons of the city, one of whom had publicly granted unto it the possessions of the Volcans, Atrecomians, and Iluans: the other had bestowed on it the French Nation, being conquered: and augmented their tributes. Titus livius Lib. 10. decade. 3. Nulla magna, &c. No great city can endure long in quiet and tranquillity: if it haue no enemy abroad, it shall find some at home.  
babylon.] This beautiful city was in old time reckoned amongst the seven miracles and wonders of the world, the beauty, bigness, and mightiness whereof, is described by Herodotus, lib. 1. Diodor. sicily. lib. 2. justine lib. 2. Quintus Curtius. lib. 5. Plinius, lib. 6. cap. 26. Strabor, lib. 6. Paul. Orosius, lib. 2. and is much renowned in many places of the old Testament.  
AS we say, that the quire or chorus, being one while comical, and another while tragical.] The word Chorus, which we translate quire, signifieth a company of many persons talking, singing, or dancing together, which the ancient Poets used when they represented to the people comedies or tragedies at every pause and change of persons, and hereof remained a certain similitude in temples, whereupon the place where men use to sing and also the company of singing men, is called in latin Chorus, and in English a quire. Now even as a tragedy and a comedy did differ, the one being more stately, and the other more light: so also did tragical and comical quires, which might notwithstanding be sung by one and the same persons: the form notwithstanding which giveth perfection unto things, being diverse and different.   

CHAP. III. Whether the virtue that belongeth to a good man, be the same with that which belongeth to a good Citizen.  
AFter the things before mentioned, it followeth consequently that we consider, whether the virtue of a good man and a good Citizen bee one, and the same or no: that is, whether to be a good man is to bee a good Citizen: for the understanding whereof, it is meet first to consider summarily what is the virtue that belongeth to a Citizen. Therefore as a master is one of the fellowship and society of nauigatours, so a Citizen is one of the fellowship and society of civil government. Now, albeit that Mariners haue unlike offices and charges, one drawing at the oar, another holding the stern, and another governing the foredecke, or doing some such like work: yet it is manifest, that the perfect definition of every of them, is to be proper and peculiar to his own virtue: and in like manner, there must bee a common definition fitting to them all: for the safety and surety of sailing, is that which belongeth to them all: For this every master aimeth at, as the chief end. In like manner, though the offices of Citizens be unlike and diverse, yet the preservation of civil community, belongeth to all. And this community is a commonweal: wherefore the virtue of a Citizen must needs be referred to the commonweal. If therefore there bee many kinds of commonweals, then surely there cannot be one perfect virtue of a good Citizen, but a good man is he that is endowed with perfect virtue, whence it appeareth evidently, that there may be a good Citizen, in whom is not found that virtue which is required in a good man. Notwithstanding, a man may in doubting manner, otherwise apply this reason, taken from a perfect commonweal. For if it be impossible that a City should consist of all good men, and if every one ought to do his duty in his place virtuously,( for that is virtue to do ones duty) and again, if all Citizens cannot bee alike; then it followeth, that the virtue of a good Citizen and of a good man cannot be all one: for the virtue of a good Citizen must be in every one, for so the reason of a good and perfect City requireth: but the virtue of a good man cannot bee in every one, except it bee necessary, that all the Citizens of a city be good, which can no wise bee. moreover, seeing that a city consisteth of unlike persons: for example, as a living creature, of a body and a soul; and the soul, of reason and appetite: and as a family consisteth of a man and a woman, and possession of a master and a seruant, after the same manner a City is compounded both of all these, and also of many other unlike kinds: it is impossible that the same virtue should appertain to all Citizens, no more then in dancing, the same virtue belongeth to him that leadeth the dance, and him that followeth. Therefore simply that the same virtue is not of every good Citizen and good man, it is evident by this: but whether it may be in some particular Citizen and man, let us now consider. We use to say in common speech, that a good ruler and commander is a good and wise man: and some hold that the institution of a prince and ruler● ought to differ from that of private men, as it is to bee seen in kings children, which are brought up and exercised in the art of horse-manship& warfare: and Euripides saieth: give not to me these glorious things, but those which the City hath need of: as if there were a peculiar discipline for the Prince. But if there the virtue of a good Prince or Magistrate, and of a good man bee the same; and he which is a subject, is a Citizen also as well as they, it shall not simply be the same of every one, but of some onely, because the virtue of a Magistrate and a Citizen do differ. And therfore it may be, Iason said that he was vexed when and reigned not, as if he knew not how to led a private life: and yet nevertheless it is commendable to bee able both to rule and to obey well, and it is a virtue in a good Citizen also: If therefore we consider the virtue of a good commander alone, and the virtue of him that knoweth both to command& obey together, surely both these cannot deserve equal commendation. But because sometimes it seemeth that both these ought to bee, namely, that the commander and obeyer ought not to learn both the same ver●ues, and that the Citizen ought to know both howe to command and obey,& to enjoy them in common, we shall understand concerning this, by that which followeth, what is requisite: for there is a signoriall or masterly government, and it is not needful for him which holdeth the same, to know howe to do things which are called necessary, but rather how to use them. Another thing also belongeth to the bondslaves, namely to perform servile works,& to be a minister of base trades. Now we say that there are many sorts of slaves, as there are many kinds of servile works: in which rank, all handicraft men are reckoned, that is to say, such as labour with their hands to get their living as their name importeth, and with these all base and illiberal artificers. Wherefore in ancient times these kind of people were not partakers of bearing any public office, before that licentious democraty and sway of the people began to prevail. Therefore a good man or a good Citizen ought not to learn nor meddle with such kind of trades of people so much in subiection, except for their own particular use and practise: for if they should, then there would be no difference between the master and the slave. again, there is another kind of government, by the which, he that is in authority commandeth over his like in nature, and over free men: which government we call political, which a man ought to learn by obeying: even as a soldier learneth to led a troupe of horsemen, by serving under a gen●rall of horsemen, and to be a Centurion or a corporal, by serving a captain of footmen. For which cause it is well said, that he can never command well, which hath not first learnt to obey well: but the virtue belonging to both these, is diverse, and a good Citizen must know and bee able both to obey and to command: and it is the virtue of a Citizen to know well to demean himself in both: consequently also both these belong unto a good man, although I confess the iustice and temperance of him that commandeth, is of another stamp then the iustice and temperance of him that obeyeth: for the virtue of a subject being free, cannot be the same with the virtue of a good man, as iustice for example, but must needs be of two sorts, one of commanding, the other of obeying. even as the temperance and fortitude of a man and women do differ: for a man would be accounted a coward, if he were but so valiant, as the valiantest woman is, and a woman would be accounted a prattler, if shee were but so modest, as an honest and the modestest man may be. Considerng also that the husbandry and ●uswifery of man and woman are not all one, for it is his office to get and bring in, and hers to keep and lay up. So also wisdom is a virtue proper to the commander, all other virtues are common both to commanders and obeyers: but wisdom belongeth not to an obeyer, but only a true opinion: for he that is in subiection, is like unto a maker of pipes, and he that is in authority, like unto him that playeth on the pipes. By this which hath ben delivered, it is easy to know whether the virtue of a good Citizen be all one and the same:& also how they agree& how they differ: but concerning a Citizen, there remaineth one scruple to be discussed, that is, whether in truth he only be to be reputed a Citizen, which is capable of public office and Magistracy, or whither artificers and mercenary tradesman be Citizens also: for if we call them Citizens which are not capable of any office, it cannot be, that the virtue of commanding should belong to all Citizens: but if none of them be Citizens, in what number or rank are they to bee placed: not in the number of strangers conversing with us, nor of enemies fighting against us, or it may be no absurdity will arise hereof, seeing that bondslaves,& enfranchised persons, are not counted amongst them which I mentioned: for this is true, that all those are not to be reckoned in the account of Citizens, without which a City cannot consist, for even children are not Citizens after the same maner as men, for these are simply so, those conditionally& by supposition: Citizens indeed they are, but yet imperfect ones. Therfore also in time past in some places, the mercenary artificers& strangers were accounted bondmen,& therefore now many of the common people are so also, howbeit, a good City will never admit a mercenary& base artificer into the fre●dom of it: but if so he be numbered amongst Citizens, sure the virtue which we spake off before, cannot belong to all, nor to a free man only, but to thē that abstain from necessary works: now of these, they that minister to one in private, are seruants, but they that minister to al in publick● are mercenary artificers: but as concerning these things, we shal plainly perceive how they are, by that which followeth,& it is also manifest by that which hath ben spoken already: for seeing that there are many kinds of commonweals, there must needs be also many kinds of Citizens, especially of obeying Citizens, so that necessary the mechanical artificer& mercenary tradesman must be accounted citizens in some commonweal,& yet no Citizens in others: as for example, in an aristocraty if there be any such, or in that kind wherein honors& offices are distributed according to virtue& dignity: for it is impossible for him to exercise the works of virtue, that occupieth a mechanical& mercenary trade. In Oligarchies also a mercenary cannot be a citizen, because men are there admitted to Magistracies in regard of their great and large revenues, albeit that the mechanical artificer may attain thereunto, by reason that many such grow very rich. There was a law in Thebes, that no man might be received into any office of honor, who had not forsaken the traffic of merchandise for the space of 10 yeares. In some commonweals the law admitteth& allureth strangers into the society of citizens: for in some cities where the people bear rule, he that is born of a mother citixen, is accounted a citizen,& the same reason is of bastards in many places, but this is for want of legitimated citizens, that they make such as these are, for the scarcity of men was the occasion of all such laws. But as soon as the city is abundantly peopled, they by& by drive out& cut off by little& little: first, those that are born of both parents seruants, next those that haue their fathers slaves but their mothers citizens, and at last admit none into that society, but those that are freemen by both parents. We may therfore hereby perceive, both that there are many sorts of citizens●& also that he principally is to be reputed a citizen, that is capable of public honors and offices: as Homer brings in a certain stranger despised of Achilles, as a man not partaker of public honors. Now if such a thing as this be in any respect hidden and concealed, it is to this end, to delude the inhabitants. Whether therefore the same virtue belongeth to a good man& a good citizen, it is plain by this which is said, as also that in some city it is all one, in others not:& that not in every citizen, but in a politic citizen, who can alone or together with other govern the commonweal.  
Here a question is propounded whether the virtue of a good citizen& a good man be one& the same or no:& it is answered that it cannot be the same. First, because there being many forms of commonweals, it is necessary to fit the virtue of a Citizen to the kind of commonweal wherein he liveth: so that there cannot be one& the same virtue of all citizens in all commonweals. Secondly as a city cannot consist of all good men, and yet all good citizens must be endued with the civil virtue, it seemeth in this respect, that the virtue of a good man& of a good citizen cannot be the same. Further, seeing that a city consisteth of unlike persons, even as the virtues of those that are thus unlike must needs be diuers, so it followeth, that the virtue of all cannot be al alike, notwithstanding, in a good commonweal only, the virtue of thē is but one: for albeit there be a double virtue required in this also, one to teach men to obey well, the other to command well, which latter is greater& more perfect thē the former, for to obey well, are required fortitude& temperance, even so the same are necessary to command well, but yet these differing from the other in kind& nature, though the same in name● nevertheless, a good citizen& a good man ought to haue the both, although each of thē is called properly good, because of that virtue which is most perfect: but amongst all virtues, wisdom is most fit for a commander, which is not necessary in an obeyer. This question being thus decided, he returneth to consider of a citizen:& declareth that there are many sorts& kinds therof, where he affirmeth that in well governed cities, mechanical Artsmen& mercenary persons, being unfit to exercise the works of virtue, ought not to bee placed and received into the rank and order of true citizens: but that only they are to bee so esteemed which are free and honestly brought up, capable of offices and public honours. Contarin de Repub. Ve●et. lib. 1. sallust in his second Oration to Iulius Caesar, touching the ruling and reformation of the roman commonwealth, Haec igitur multitudo primum malis moribus, &c. that is, Therefore this rude multitude first infected with corrupt manners and conditions, and after dispersed into diuers arts and trades of life, and in no respect agreeable and at unity together, doth not seem unto me any thing fit for the rule of the Commonwealth. Herod. lib. 2. affirmeth that the Thracians, Scythians, Persians, and Lydians, and almost all barbarous nations do hold Artificers for the vilest and basest sort of people in the world, yea and also their children and whole race: and do repute them most noble and generous, which are farthest from all mechanical arts, and especially those which make profession of Arms. All the grecians are of the same mind and above all the Lacedemonians, also the Corinthians make small account of Artificers. In france Gentlemen are in most account and estimation, who by the ancient ordinance of the country are forbidden all commerce of merchandise, and of every other gainful Art, under pain of being deprived of their gentility, and of paying tax and custom like a common clown or Carter. Plato also in his 2& 8 book de Repub● and in the beginning of Timeus, writeth that Gentlemen and privy-councillors abstain from husbandry and mechanical trades, and such other gainful occupations. In old time lands and revenues were designed and set out in egypt for the maintenance of soldiers, to the end that they might wholly addict themselves to the exercise of Arms, without practising any base Art or Trade. The Alarbians greatly detest mechanical arts.  
again, there is another kind of government by the which he that is in authority commandeth over his like in nature, and over free men: which government we call political.] Aristotle in the first and fourth chapters of the first book of this work saith, that political government is amongst free men and equals: amongst whom every one that is capable and fit to govern, is by lot or election called to the public honors and Magistratships of his commonweal, for longer or lesser continuance, according to the quality of the offices, governing and obeying in his place, and by turns, as the ancient manner was at Athens and at Rome, and now is at Venice, Raguse, Genes, Luke, the free cities of Germany, the Cantons of switzerland, the Grisian league, and at Geneua. In like sort also is the Shrieuewicke of Paris, with the provostship of the Merchants. The which officers or administrations are changed from 2 years to 2 years by election amongst such as be Parisiens born by father& mother that be Parisiens also. In the university amongst the students, the Rector or governor, who is changed 4. times a year,& the 4. Proctors of nations, & other like eligible officers, retain some form of the government of a commonweal. The same author in the last chap. lib. 1. Amongst very many governments of commonweals, the governor and obeier are changed by turns, because they will be equal according to nature,& differ in nothing. Albeit, that when the one governs& the other obeies, there is a difference sought, in apparel, words,& honors. In the 1. chap. of the 2. book, Those things whereof an union is made, must differ in kind, in sort, that the recompense which is equally made, may preserve the Cities& commonweals, as it hath been before declared in the books of manners: the which recompensing of necessity must be kept amongst such as be free and equal, for that they cannot all govern together, but rather they must govern by yeares, or some other order of time. By which course it falleth out, that all govern, like as if the tailors and carpenters did change, and were not always the selfsame. But because in the commonweal government, it is best that things continue as they are, it would be most expedient, that the selfsame men should always govern. Notwithstanding, where that cannot bee, because all are equal by nature, it standeth with reason, that all should haue part in governing, be it good or bad: following therein an interchangeable course by turns, that such as bee equal, may yield place one to another, as those that went afore, gave place unto them. Thus some govern,& some are subject still interchangeably, as if they were of a diverse nature and quality, the●e being ever diverse commanders and Magistrates. In the fourth chap. of this book he saith: That when civil offices are distributed according to the equality and parity of the Citizens, then they look to manage them by turn: First, as nature requireth, every one willing in his turn to govern and look unto the profit of another, as another being in authority, is careful over the good and profit of him. And in the twelf●h chap. of the same book, he saith: That it seemeth to some to be a thing contrary to nature, that one should hold the principality over all, where the body of the city standeth of equals. For it is necessary, that those which are alike by nature, haue the same honor and dignity according to nature. If then it be pernicious and hurtful to the body, that men of unlike disposition use the selfsame kind of nourishment and attire, so is it in honors, for unequal honours are not to be given to those that are equal. Wherefore none ought more to command then to obey, but there must be an intercourse of both: which truly is lawe, seeing that order is law. At the end of the same chapter, he saith thus: it may bee well enough understood by that which hath been spoken, that it is neither commodious nor just, that amongst equals one should haue rule and authority over all: neither if there be no laws, but he himself stand for the law, neither if there be, neither for a good man over them that are good, neither for an evil man over men of his condition, except in some respect only. In the 7. book and 14. chap. thus: Seeing that every society consisteth of commanders and obeyers, let us see whether they ought to change, or always to remain in one state. If therefore they did so excel one another as we suppose the gods& Heroes to excel men, and that they do declare this their excellency first by their bodies next by their minds, so that it might be evident and apparent: surely it would be better, that the same men should ever command, and the same always obey: But seeing this is hard to find, it is necessary for many causes, that the right of commanding and authority be indifferently communicated to all. For amongst men of like condition, there should be the like equality.   

CHAP. IIII. What is a commonweal, and how many kinds thereof there be.  
THese things being thus declared, it followeth that we consider whether there ought to be but one form of policy, or more:& if more, what they are and how many, and how they differ one from another. Policy therefore is the order and description, as of other offices in a city, so of that which hath the greatest and most sovereign authority for the rule and administration of a commonweal, hath evermore power and authority joined with it: which administration is called policy in greek, and in English a commonweal: for example sake, as in a democraty the authority is in the hands of the people, in an oligarchy in the hands of a few. Now we call a policy a state diverse from both these, and also from all other forms of government. First, we must suppose wherefore a City was ordained, and how many kinds of governments there bee amongst men, and in the society of life: wee haue somewhat touched this point already in the forefront of this work, where we entreated of Oeconomie and masterly authority, How a man by nature was a civil and political creature, whence it ariseth, that albeit they should not stand in need of mutual succour and help, yet they would nevertheless desire to live together in civil society: yet notwithstanding common profit and vtily gathereth them together, in as much as it is behoveful for each party to live well. This therfore is the principal end, propounded to al in general,& to every one in particular, to li●e well:& yet men assemble& come together also to this end to li●e only( for even in that perchance appeareth some sparkle of honesty)& do maintain civil society, in that respect only that they may live, except excessive& most bitter miseries ouerpester their life. We see how much evil,& what great calamity many men endure, for this cause only that they might live; as if there consisted in that a certain natural pleasure& delight. Now it is no difficult matter to discern& distinguish the forms of government aforenamed, for we haue elsewhere in other of our books most clearly& plainly defined& determined thereof. For the masterly& signiorall gouer●ment, although indeed it be profitable both to the natural seruant& master, yet nevertheless it aimeth directly at the profit of the master& not of the seruant, but by accident: for it cannot be, that the seruant perishing& sailing, but that the authority of the master do fail also. The regiment of wife& children,& of a family, which we call economy, tendeth either to the good of thē that are in obedience, or of both together. Simply& in itself it respecteth the good of the obeyers, as we see in all other Arts, as physic,& the art of exercising the body: by accident it respecteth the good of the commanders also, for nothing hinders the master of the Art of exercise, but that he himself may be one of thē that do exercise, even as a Pilot in a ship is always one of the mariners. Therfore the master of exercise& the Pilot regard the good of thē that are under their authority: but when they themselves become one of that number, they are partakers accidentally, the one of the safety of the ship, as he is a master, the other of the exercise of the body, as he is an exerciser. Therfore when civil offices are determined& distributed according to the equality of men, they desire to manage thē by turns: first( as Nature directeth) every one desiring to govern in his course,& to provide in his turn for the good of others, as others in their course of government provide for him. Now in regard of the commodity which grows from the commonweal& government, they would always be Magistrates, as if it should come to pass, that those that are sick& diseased, by bearing rule& authority, should always be sound, after which maner Magistratships& offices, would peradventure be sought for and hunted after. Therfore it is manifest, that all commonweals which tend to the common good, are simply right and just, and that those which regard only the profit of superiors, are all corrupt and transgressions of the right forms.  
Policy is the order& disposition of the city in regard of magistrates,& specially in regard of him that hath the sovereign authority over al, in whose government the whole commonweal consisteth. The which government, if it be in the hands of the people, is called popular, as in the Cantons of the Swissers, in the Grisian leagues,& in many of the free cities of almain,& was in old time at Athens: If it be in the hands of certain persons, as at this day it is amongst the gentlemen in Venice,& in certain families in Genes, then is it called a signory: if it depend wholly vpon one mans authority, it is called a monarchy, as in France, spain, Portugal, &c. Now the cause that moveth men to assemble together in cities, is not only to help one another in their mutual needs, but also to the end to live together, because that by nature they be companiable& civil. And nature hath put a great pleasantness in life, which makes it to be greatly desired, unless folk be brought into extreme misery of sickness, poverty, or furiousnes, which drive them into despair,& cause thē to wish for death by means of their adversities& discontentments. The diversity of governments of cities depends vpon their ends: for if they tend to a good end, thē are they good governments, if to an evil end; thē are they evil governments: as for example, those commonweals that tend to the common profit, are good& just,& those that respect only the particular profit of the governors are bad& unjust: as it fals out in the government of families, where the father govern the children,& also the wife, respecting the welfare of the obeiers,& the common profit of both the commanders& obeiers,& therfore is good. But the government of the master over the seruant, regarding the masters commodity,& not the seruants, is nought,& that is most commonly imitated in al disordered commonweals.   

CHAP. V. Of the division& definition of Commonweals,& of their transgressions.  
VPon the determining of these matters, next of all we are to examine how many commonweals there be in number, and which be they. First of all we will speak of those that be right and perfect commonweals, because their transgressions and contraries will be known by them. Now sith the commonweal and the politic or civil government is but all one,& the civil government is it that hath the sovereign authority in cities: either one man severally by himself, or a few men, or else many, must needs haue this a●thority. Therfore, when one, or a few, or many, in time of his or their go●●rnment, tend to the profit of the commonweal; necessary, these commonweals are indifferent and right commonweals: and those commonweals which seek the particular profit, either of one, or of a few, or of a multitude, are transgressions and contrarieties of the same: for those that be copartners of the commonweal, either ought not to bee called Citizens, or else should haue part in the common profit. We are accustomend to call that commonweal a kingdom, where one governeth, with respect of the common profit:& that an aristocraty where a few men, and yet above one, haue the government; either for that good& honest men are in authority, or for that they pro●ide for the welfare of the city, or of those that be partakers therof: and when the multitude governeth, tending to the common profit, it is called a commonweal, by the common name of all commonweals. The which cometh to pass, not without good reason, for a few men may excel in virtue, but it is a hard matter for many to be exactly perfect in every virtue, except it bee in the warlike valiantness which is exercised by the multitude. Therefore the principal part of this commonweal consisteth in men of war,& those that possess the munition& arms, are members thereof Now these be the transgressions above specified, that is to say, Tyranny is the transgression of the kingdom: The oligarchy is the transgression of the aristocraty: and the democraty or popular state, is the transgression of the commonweal: for tyranny is a monarchy or sole reign, having respect only to the profit of the monarch or party that reigneth: The Oligarchy regardeth the profit of the rich only: and the democraty or popular state ●endeth to the commodity of the poor only: nay there is not any of all these that provideth for the benefit of the commonweal. It is behoveful to declare a little more at large what every commonweal is, because there remain some doubts touching the same. For he that reasoneth as a Philosopher in every method,& hath not an eye to action only, but also to contemplation, ought not to neglect or admit any thing, but is to declare the truth in every point. now then tyranny is a monarchy, or governing by one alone( as hath been above declared) that usurpeth masterlike and lordlike authority and government over th● civil society. The oligarchy, is when rich men haue the sovereign government in their hands. Contrariwise, the democraty or popular state, is when the poor haue the government in their power, and not those which haue great riches. The first doubt is in the former definition or distinction: for if many rich men govern the City, and the democraty or popular state is when the multitude is chief governor: In like sort, if it happened that there were fewer poor then rich,& yet those poor the stronger party& masters of the government: sith that is called an oligarchy where the lesser number hath the dominion, those commonweals should not seem to bee rightly defined and distinguished. But if paucity be added to riches, and multitude to poverty, and that the oligarchy wherein the rich being few in number do govern, and the democraty wherein the poor being a great multitude rule& command, should be called commonweals, there would yet remain another hard point: for what should those commonweals afore mentioned be, to wit, that where many rich men haue the government,& that where fewer poor men haue the sovereign authority, if there be none other commonweal besides those whereof we haue made mention? It seemeth by this reason, that the paucity or multiplicity of gouernours is an accident, the one of the oligarchy,& the other of the democraty; Forasmuch as in all places there are few rich, and many poor. Therfore these causes make no difference, but the democraty and oligarchy do differ in poverty& riches: and there must needs be an oligarchy wheresoever the government is limited by riches, whether there be few or many in number:& wheresoever the poor haue the so●erain● authority in thē, there must needs be a democraty. Howbeit, it falleth out as we haue alleged before, that the one consisteth often of a small number,& the other of a great multitude: for the rich are but f●w in number,& the free men a great many. By which occasion they both fall together at variance for the chief government of the commonweal.  
There are three good and indifferent commonweals, and three bad ones. The good be those where the governors and superiors haue respect to the common profit of every one. The bad are those where the governors and superiors regard their own particular profit: for the government always consisteth in the superiors of the state, as hath ben alleged, and of them taketh the appellation. The government of one, is called a monarchy: and if it be applied to the profit of the commonweal, it is termed a kingdom: if it tend to the particular profit of one alone that governeth, it is called a Tyranny. The government of a certain number of Lords or Gentlemen providing for the welfare of the state is called an aristocraty: And if any of thē seek their own ambition and covetousness, and by conspiracy dispose of all affairs of the commonweal according to their own pleasure, it is called an oligarchy. The government of many where the communality is directed by the laws, is termed& that rightly, a commonweal, according to Aristotles opinion: and on the contrary side, a Democraty or popular state is that where there is nothing but liberty and disorder in the people. Such as Plato in his 3 book of laws, and Zenophon haue described to haue ben the democraty of Athens, when the people exceeded and overflowed in all liberty without fear of Magistrates or observance of laws, whereof Demosthenes complaineth in certain of his Orations. Now every one of these commonweals haue certain vnder-kinds and sub-diuisions, as shall hereafter appear by the laying forth of this matter. The Oligarchies are properly where the rich govern, and are only admitted to Magistrateships and Offices, according to the quantity of their wealth, and stint of their yearly revenues. The democracies are where poor and free men rule without any respect had of riches, nobility, or virtue, to the attaining of public Offices, but rather of liberty onely, and it makes no matter what number there be of either of them: Albeit, the oligarchy is so termed, for that there are commonly in it a few rich men, and many poor men. Also Aristotle treateth of the number of commonweals, of their forms, ends, and customs: In the first book of his rhetoric, the eight chapter, and in the eight of his books of ethics and tenth chap. he entreateth of three forms of commonweals& of their transgressions, together with that likeness& similitude of commonweals, which is found in private families.   

CHAP. VI. Of the right and law of the democraty and oligarchy.  
LEt us first see what end and bounds they appoint and limit to the oligarchy, and to the democraty, and what is just and rightful in them both, for all speak of a kind of right and equity, but they reach not to that which is perfect: as for example, That which is equal, seemeth rightful and just, and is so indeed, howbeit not to all persons, but to those onely that bee equal: and that which is unequal, seemeth to bee rightf●ll and just, and is so indeed, howbeit, not to all persons, but to those that be unequal: some men take away this point, to wit, to whom equality belongeth, and so judge amiss: the cause whereof is, for that the iudgement concerneth themselves: for most commonly men are evil Iudges in their own affairs. Wherefore sith that which is just, is just to some persons,& all one division and distinction is to be used, as well in matters, as in persons, as we haue before declared in our Ethikes: they agree in the equality of things, and not in the equality of persons, most specially for that cause which we rehearsed even now, namely, that they are not indifferent iudges in matters concerning themselves. Further, whereas both parties aclowledge in some sort a kind of right, they suppose that they speak of right absolutely& simply, for if the one party be unequal in any kind of thing, as in richesse, then think they themselves altogether unequal:& if the other party be equal in any other thing, as in liberty, thē think they themselves altogether equal: but neither party reacheth that which is the very perfect and principal right indeed: for if they haue begun their society,& assembled themselves together into one place for possessions& wealth sake, every of thē should haue as great part& interest in the city& Comonweale, as he should possess of wealth. Therfore the reason of those that favour the oligarchy or government of a ●ew, may seem to be effectual, whereby they uphold that it is no indifferent& rightful equality, that any party which to the furnishing& making up of a stock of a 100 pounds, had disbursed& laid down but one pound, should reap as great a share& portion as he that disbursed& finished all the rest, as well in the principal stock, as in al supplies, profits,& increase therof. But the cause of mens assembling& drawing together into corporations& cities, is not only to live, but rather to live well: for if the cause of their assembly and joining in society, were to live only, the city should consist of slaves,& of other creatures: but now it is not so, because they are neither partakers of felicity, nor live according to their own choice& will: neither do they assemble in cities for warlike confederacies sake, to the intent, to defend thē that are comprehended in the league from outrage& injury at other mens hands, nor for traffic or increase of merchandise, for so should the Tuscans& the Carthaginians, and al others that use mutual intercourse& traffic one with another, be as Citizens of one city, for they make covenants between themselves for safe intercourse& trafficking together,& set down contracts and articles of agreement in writing, touching the not iniur●ing nor hurting one of another, as they pass and repass about their assaires, and yet for all that they use not in these dealings common Magistrates, but differing according to those places where each party dwelleth and is subject, neither care they one for another what maner of persons they ought to be, or whether thē that be comprehended in the society, be unhonest or unjust, or spotted with any other kind of 'vice, but respect this only that they be assured from iniurying and hurting one another. But if those that intend to stablish good laws, haue a principal care of the virtue and of the 'vice of the citizens, it is without all doubt, that the city which is a true& right city in very dead, and not in name only, ought before all other things to haue a special care of virtue& uprightness: for lay this care aside, and thē the society of citizens waxeth a confederacy of warfare, differing in place only from others with whom they be in league, though they remain one far from another. Now the law is a covenant& warrant amongst thē( as Lycophon the Sophister said) to hold& keep them together within the compass of mutual duty& uprightness one toward another, but cannot make the citizens good& just: that so it is, it is a clear case, for if places far distant and remote, were assembled in one, in such sort, that the cities of the Megarians& of the Corinthians should touch one another, yet for al that would they not be one city, nor if they should contract marriages one with another, though this be one of the most fit& proper alliances& communicatings that are amongst citizens. Likewise if any did dwell asunder,& yet not so far asunder, but that they might communicat together,& enjoy laws for the not iniurying one of another in their trades, as for example, if one were a carpenter, another a husbandman, another a shoemaker,& another some other artificers,& were in this sort to the number of 2000, and yet had community of nothing but only of traffic and of warlike confederacy, for al that it should not be a city, and why not? Not for that there wanteth vicinity and neighbourhood of society: for though those that so communicate, did assemble themselves together, and should every one use his own house after the fashion of a city, and help one another as confederates only against those that offer them any injury, yet should it seem no city to them that precisely consider the matter, unless they should use another maner of communicating in their assemblies then they do when they remain thus asunder. wherefore a city is not a community of place, neither was it ordained to the end that they should be safeguarded from injury, nor yet ●or traffickes sake, but those things must be provided for before it be a city, and though they be already provided, yet shal it not be a city: but a city is a society ordained to live well in houses and families; and to this end, to led a perfect and sufficient life: which indeed cannot be unless they inhabit one place, and haue the use of marriages: wherefore there haue ben brought in into Cities, both affinities, cobrotherhoods, sacrifices, and other manners and customs of living together, which is the work of friendship, for friendship is nothing but an election of living orderly together, therfore the purpose and end of cities is to live well, and a city is a society of families and boroughs in a perfect and sufficient life, which is, as we haue already affirmed, to live in al felicity and wealth. Now then a city is ordained for honest actions, and not for living together onely. Wherefore they that further most in that society, haue a greater interest in the city then those that are equal in liberty or in race, or those that are the mightiest, but unequal in the civil virtue, or they that exceed in richesse, and are excelled in virtue by others. That thero●ore all those that contend about commonweals, do speak of some part of that which is perfect, just, and right, it appeareth by the reasons here set down.  
It is alleged that there is a certain right in the oligarchy and democraty, being corrupted commonweals, and in some respects contrary one to another. Vpon which right, they first ground themselves, that favour and maintain the Oligarchies, who for that they are the superiors, and chief both in riches& nobility, do account themselves for the superiors absolutely in all respects, and challenge as proper to themselves the greatest part of the government, as reasonable in their opinions, that unequal preferment should bee given to unequal persons, and the people as equal in liberty with the rich& noblemen do uphold that the government of the commonweal should be equally communicated to thē, affirming that equal rewards belong to equal folk, but neither of thē are to be allo●ed: for the superiors in riches or nobility, are not absolutely superiors, nor the equal in liberty are not perfectly equal, but those only are to be accounted superiors, who are superiors in virtue, and those which are perfectly equal in virtue, ought to be accounted equal. And forasmuch as men do not assemble together in cities to the intent to live only, but also to live well& orderly, whereunto they are great furtherers that be good& virtuous men: therfore to them ought the greatest part of the government to be imparted. Amongst these matters is inserted a brave discourse, showing what a city properly is. wherein is declared, that for the constitution of a city, it sufficeth not that many men gather together in one place, or be allied by marriages, do aid one another against those which offer them injury, and that they possess goods and traffic together, unless all these things be ordained, to the end, to live well& happily, which is nothing else but the exercise of moral and intellectual virtues, to the which end, those cities can never attain, which haue for their ends& scopes the right of the Oligarchies and democracies, and not the true and absolute right, consisting chiefly in iustice distributive, which yeeldeth to every man according to his deserts, and hath respect as well to persons as to things, as hath ben declared at large in the fift book of ethics.  
further, whereas both parties aclowledge in some sort a kind of right, they suppose that they speak of right absolutely& simply.] Right& equity is not well understood in democracies and Oligarchies: for in democracies the populacy being all free alike, think that they may equally haue part in the government, without any regard at al either of riches or nobility, only in regard of freedom:& contrariwise in Oligarchies, they regard nothing but riches and nobility, the lords and great men supposing, that all the commodities, offices,& dignities appertain to thē alone, without any respect had to the common people, what sufficiency soever there be in any of thē. The which di●ference and contrariety between the populacy& nobility, happeneth not only in these two kinds of policy, but also in every other form,& that for want of understanding of the true politic right and equity, whence haue sprung up in time past,& do spring up from day to day at this present,& will also hereafter, many seditions and civil wars, threatening strange alterations& changes,& often the very destructions of commonweals. The peasant or countrymen of Swessia going about to establish their democraty, partly drove out,& partly slue the nobility of that country. It is not long since in Germany they made head& rebelled against the nobility there, under the pretext& colour of the liberty of the gospel, but indeed to be freed from grievous taxes& impositions which were laid vpon them. At Florence since the first foundation of the city, until it was reduced into a dukedom, troubles& contentions never ceased between the people& the nobility for the pre-eminence of the coumsel,& the distribution of offices. No less was the discord at Genes, betwixt the people& the nobility, which was divided into four principal families: of which four, two namely, the Spinulians& Aurians were Gibelines,& the other two, to wit, the Flisquians and Grimaldians were guelphs. The Athenian people was so disordered and let loose to all unbridled liberty, that they were almost past all shane and obedience to their laws or Magistrates and consequently deprived of all mutual amity and familiarity, which men living under one state should haue. In Carthage, at that time when it was destroyed by Scipio in the third punic war, the people had the greatest power and pre-eminence. In Lacedemonia when as the Nobles roughly handled their ploughmen called Ilotians, they constrained them to rebel often against them, and to conspire with their enemies, whereupon many evils arose, even to the bringing of the city into the greatest danger that ever it was in. The like inconvenience almost befell all italy by the bondslaves, and Spartacus the fencer their captain, who raised up a most dangerous and wretched war, called the servile war. The common and base sort of people among the ancient Gaules, were reputed for slaves, not possessing any thiug of their own, nor being called to any consultation or management of affairs, but many of them either being injured by the mighty ones, or burdened with debts, or eaten up with exactions, yielded themselves to the nobles, and by this means bec●me their bondmen. French men better instructed, do altogether reject all manner of slavish servitude, yea and bondslaves coming out of other Countries into France, are presently enfranchised and set free as soon as they inter into that kingdom, their patrons not having power to sell them any more. At Venice, the signiours which haue all the authority in their hands, divide amongst themselves all the offices, benefice, and public charges, wherein either honour or profit consisteth, except the Secretariships, without participating the people with any of them, whom by all means they debase and keep under, least they should mutiny and rebel against them. In England the populacy is stronger then the nobility, and easier to bee stirred up, being armed by a public decree. The Turkes that inhabit Anatolia and Greece, and other regions, haue either rooted out, and banished all the nobility, or at least wise left them naked of their goods. The Muscouites left the Lords and Barons no castles nor fortresses at all to bee under their obeisance. At Rome there never ceased continual strife between the nobility and the people for their rights and privileges, whence also the ciui●l wars took their beginnings: by the which all military discipline was corrupted, all obedience to the Senate amnihilated, and finally the whole state changed, w●th a great m●ssacre of the chiefest of both factions. Howbeit, in France the nobility and the people are so well governed, that they haue no occasion either to be discontented with their king, or yet to contend with each other. The nobility enjoy many great prerogatives and privileges, because they def●nd the Count●ies and dwelling places of the people, with the dange● of their lives: They are exempt from all tributes, to●es, taxes, customs, impositions,& subsidies: they possess the chiefest dignities of the kingdom, as Constableships, Marshalships, great Masterships, Admiralties, governments of provinces, Bailywickes, Stewardships, Captaineships of cities and castles, and such like. T●e principal of these, are the Princes, as well of the blood royal, as others in high reverence and honour, which are collateral in kin unto the king, having under their obedience and execution of iustice, whole countries and provinces, depending notwithstanding on the king, and rendering an account of their proceedings in the highest jurisdiction to his sovereign courts. Amongst these, there are some which are called peers, who in regard of their places, assist as first and chiefest in the ceremonies and consecrations of kings, attired after the old fashion. These haue thei● causes committed at the first instance of the parliament of Paris, whereof they themselves are members. In that which concerneth their Peereships, neither can they be judged or censured, but by the peers their brethren. All which privileges the Princes of the blood royal enjoy, and many more, being born counsellors to the ro●all majesty. Next after the Princes of blood and the peers, succeed in honour, the Dukes, Marquesses, earls, Barons, and others in order, endowed with fees, lordships, offices, and cha●ges, as well in actions of war, which is their principal exercises, as also in actions of peace and policy: on whom the Kings lay so much trust and affiance, that all of them seem to be as it were their domestical friends, it being lawful for them to haue access unto them without all suspicion, yea and to wear their weapons in their privy chamber, which is not permitted unto others. Further, the Princes of the blood, and other great Lords, haue pensions of the King, and many Gentlemen which wait vpon diuers offices, by quarters receive wages of him also. And besides all this, there is an ordinary army of souldiers greater and better payed and maintained then in any other kingdom whatsoever: Which order was brought in as well for the defence of the country, that there might always be in readiness a sufficient number of men of war, well mounted, furnished, and practised in feats of arms; as also to maintain Gentlemen, amongst whom the offices are so distributed, that many of them may entertain their calling with honesty and credit, albeit there be no war: some having companies of lances either greater or lesser, according to their qualities: others being Lieutenants, Ancients, Standerd-bearers, men of arms, and Archers: the younger ones are brought up as Pages under the rest: also great Lords and those that are richest, entertain the lesser, every one according to their faculty: and this is the condition of the Nobility as honourable and favourable as may possibly be. As for the common people they haue occasion to content themselves with their estate, exercising freely all things meet and agreeable to their conditions: they till the ground, tra●fick in Merchandise, and exercise many mechanical trades: they possess farms, which is not lawful for the Nobility: are partakers of many honours and common commodities with the Gentlemen, as benefice of all quantities, great, small, and mean; offices of judgements, treasures, accounts, Secretariships, which is very aduantageous to them as well in regard of the authority which they bear, as the profit which they reap: for in as much as they apply themselves more commonly to the study of Learning then the Nobility, they become more fit to discharge such places: yea and also they may by favour and especial privilege, in performing some notable piece of service for the commonwealth, attain unto the estate of Nobility, to the which they aspire continually, as being the most worthy. And thus they haue no occasion to be discontented in their estates, or to practise any thing against the Nobility, knowing that by good and lawful means they may attain unto the same degree of honour. The estates of the Nobility and of the popularity being thus managed and directed, and each of them enjoying their several rights and liberties, it is hard either for one to oppress the other, or for both together to conspire against their head and monarch. If the Nobility, with whom is the possession of arms, go about to outrage the people, the sword of iustice defendeth them, and chastiseth the other, which hath authority( so that the King give leave) to lay hands vpon the rebellious by force, so that be he never so great, whether Prince or other, he is compelled to obey thereunto: and this iustice is so respected, that when any of what quality or condition soever they be, are condemned, they endure the stroke of execution, will they, nill they. In like manner if the populacy which is in number far greater, go about to rebel, or be tumultuous, the Nobility is so strong together with iustice, and the common people so weak in deeds of arms, that they may very easily be repulsed, and brought in subiection, by means whereof they think of nothing but how to live in good civil, policy and unity together, and above all in loyal obedience to their King, whom they hold in exceeding love and singular reverence, the Nobles being always ready to put on armor when it is requisite, and the people to contribute to taxes and necessary subsidies: so that in all matters the King is served and obeied with good will, and without contradiction, better and more readily then any Prince in the world. Now our predecessors considering the ambition and insolency of the Nobility, which seemed to them to stand in need of a bridle to curb and refrain it: and perceiving on the other side the hatred of the common people against the nobles, proceeding from a natural fear which they haue of them: which fear they desiring to deliver and discharge the commonalty of, and yet not to lay the trouble vpon the king, to the end, to exempt him from the evil will which the Nobles would bear him, if he should seem to uphold the populacy, and also which the people would bear him if he should seem to favour the Nobles, they advised to establish a third iudgement betwixt both, divided into many parliaments, and placed in diverse provinces of the realm, representing all of them in several jurisdictions, as it were the majesty of a Senate, yielding succour and refuge to those that are good, and being fearful to the wicked, and taking knowledge of all civil and criminal causes, without appeal to any higher court: In these Parliaments are a great number of learned and notable persons, who without either charge or reproof of their king, refrain the mighty ones by their authority, and keep under the common sort in obedience. There could not bee devised by any means a better and more commodious way, for the rest of the king and tranquillity of the realm. And thus, to the end that none might violate this league and agreement, the king doth most charily preserve and maintain his sovereignty over all his subiects, of what degree or condition soever, not losing an inch of it, nor suffering any to usurp or encroach vpon it, to the end that all might aclowledge him as their natural lord and sovereign, in all reasonable and accustomable matters, using notwithstanding all manner of courtesy, and humanity, and familiarity towards them in their several deserts. Also he doth carefully provide, that one estate do not above measure surmount the other, to wit, that the nobility do not devour the commonalty, nor the commonalty by their merchandise, judgements, and treasuries, encroach vpon the lands and goods of the nobility, who being impoverished by long suits, great expenses in war, and other braveries and sumptuous superfluieties cannot serve the king: Also the people being eaten up with exactions, and trampled v●der foot by soldiers could not bee able to pay their taxes and subsidies, both inconue●iences of each side to be shunned, as very prejudicial to the quiet& good of a commonweal.   

CHAP. VII. Who ought to bear rule in a city.  
IT is doubted of some, who it is that ought to bear rule and dominion in a City, whether the multitude, or the richest sort, or the best men, or him that is best among the best, or a Tyrant. And every one of these seemeth to carry some doubt and scruple with it: for what if the poor being more in number, do divide amongst them the goods and possessions of the rich, Is it not unjust? Albeit, it be accounted just by the populacy● having the chief authority and rule in the City. By what name or title then shall we call extreme injustice, If this be not? again, if the greater number usurp the goods of the fewer, is it not certain that they destroy and spoil the commonweal? And yet virtue is not pernicious and hurtful to him that hath it, nor right ever the cause of ruin in the city: wherefore it appeareth, that this law cannot be just. moreover, if this were so, then necessary all the acts of a Tyrant should be just and lawful, for being in authority he of●ereth violence to the commonweal, no less then the multitude to the rich. Whether therefore is it lawful that a few and those the richer sort do bear rule, or no? If they commit the like acts, robbing and despoiling the multitude of their goods, can we think their dominion just? Sure, if the one be just, the other is also: but without all question, they are both unlawful and wicked. But what if good men govern, and haue the authority over all things? Why then all other remain without honour, and are noted with discredit, in that they are not adorned with civil offices: for wee call Magistrateships and offices, honors. Now if the same persons be alwaie● in authority, it followeth necessary, that all the rest be deprived of honor. But what if one which excelleth in virtue, haue the government, is not that better? This savoureth more of an oligarchy then the former, for here are more that are deprived of honors, then were before. But it may be some man will say, that it is not meet at all for a man that is subject to affections and perturbations of the mind, to bear rule in a commonweal, but that the law should haue the pre-eminence. But for answer, if it bee a law appertaining to an oligarchy or a Democraty, what doth it concern these doubts which are propounded? For the same inconveniences will still arise from hence, as did be●ore. As concerning other doubts, more shal be spoken elsewhere. But that the multitude ought to haue the government and rule in their hands rather then a few good men, it may seem to bee plainly resolved, and yet to haue some doubt in it,& peradventure the truth also. For it is possible, that a great multitude, whereof every one severally is not good, yet being assembled together may be better thē the other ●ewe, being not compared one to one, but all to all: as a supper or banquet made by many mens provision and charge, is better and more costly then that which is prepared at one mans expense: For when they are many, every one hath his portion of virtue and wisdom, and being united together, the multitude becometh as it were one man, endued with many feet, many hands, many sences, and many manners& understandings. wherefore many judge better then few, both of music and Po●sie, for one marketh one part; and another, another part; and all, all parts. Howbeit, I confess that good men do far differ from the common sort, when one is compared with one; as we say, that faire doth differ from foul, and artificial pictures from true substances: because those excellencies which were divided before, are collected and combined into one. For if the members of every man bee compared with the parts of the picture, the eye of the one will appear more beautiful then the eye of the other, and so of any other part. nevertheless, whither this difference between many,& few good men, be to be admitted concerning every multitude of people, it is uncertain: yea rather it seemeth impossible in some, for it would then as well agree unto brute beasts. For do we not see that many men do nothing at al in a maner differ from brute beasts? And yet all this letteth not, but that in some multitude of people, that which I haue said may bee proved true, wherefore a man might resolve by this that hath been spoken, both the former precedent doubt,& also the subsequent which follows, that is, what things ought to be committed to the discretion& government of freemen& the common people, that is, such as neither haue any abundance of riches, nor reputation of virtue: for it is not a safe course to commit unto thē great charges& dignities, by reason that by their unjustice& unskilfulness, they would do much injury,& commit many errors: on the other side to exclude thē altogether from bearing offices, is also dangerous: for where there are so many debarred from honors,& such a multitude of poor, there the city must needs be stuffed full of enemies. It remaineth therefore that they be admitted to the participation of judgements and consultations: for which cause Solon, and some other Lawgiuers, make them to bee overseers of the election of Magistrates, and give them power to call to account and to correct those that haue been in the magistracy, but for them alone to bear rule and office, and to govern, they no ways allow of: for all being assembled together, haue sufficient understanding,& being mingled with the better sort, are profitable& commodious to the commonweal; as unpure& gross food mingled with pure& fine, is more profitable for the nourishment of the body, being much together, thē a little alone: for every one apart is unperfect& unfit to judge, whereas all together are most fit& perfect. nevertheless, in this form of government, there arise 2. doubts: the first is, that it seemeth to appertain to him that can cure a sickness,& rid a man from a present disease, to censure of another, whether he hath done the part of a physician or no:& this not only in physic& a physician, but also in all other arts and faculties. As therefore a physician ought to give an account of his practise to other physicians, and be by them reprehended if need be, so ought other artificers to do also. Now a physician is both he which practiseth by anothers direction,& he which directeth others,& also a third, which by bare experience attaineth unto the art: for these three are almost to be found in al arts: so we ascribe the authority of judging no less to those that haue gotten that skill by experience, thē to those that haue it by knowledge:& so also concerning election for to choose well is the office of thē that haue knowledge: as for example, none can choose a good Geometrician but those that haue knowledge in Geometry, none a good pilot but those that haue knowledge in navigation: For albeit, that many idiots and vnskilfull persons do intrude themselves, and presume to give iudgement of works and Arts, yet they do it not better then those that haue knowledge. So that by this reason it seemeth, that neither the election nor correction of Magistrates ought to be committed unto the common people. But per adventure all these arguments are not rightly alleged, especially for that reason which was before declared, namely, except the people be too servile. For every one a part, must needs be a worse judge then they that haue skill, but all together, cannot choose but be either better, or as good: and also because in some things the workman doth neither judge alone, nor better of his own work then others that know the work, and yet haue no skill in the Art; as it doth not belong only to an architect to know and judge of a house, but he that useth the house, which is the master of it, doth both know and judge of it better then the builder: also a pilot is better able to judge of the stern of a ship then a Carpenter: and of a banquet those that eat it, better than the cook that dressed it. And thus this first doubt, though difficult and intricate, may be resolved. The second doubt dependeth vpon the first, for it seemeth very absurd, that the authority and guidance of greater matters, should rather bee in the power of naughty and wicked persons, then of those that are good and virtuous. now the election and correction of Magistrates, are matters of greatest moment, the which in some places( as hath been said) are committed to the people, the popular assembly having sovereign authority over all such things: for to assemble together popularly, to deliberate and to judge, is allowed to men of small revenue, and of all ages: but the Treasurorships and Captainships, and all other principal charges, are given to them only that are of great revenues and possessions. This doubt might bee resolved by the like reason, for per adventure this institution is not to be found fault withall: for neither a judge, nor a counsellor, nor he that deliberateth in an assembly, hath any rule or government, but the iudgement itself: the Senate and the people, are those that govern and bear rule, these( to wit, the counselor, the Deliberatour, and the judge) being but particles a●d portions of the other: wherefore not without great reason the greatest matters are committed to the multitude, the people, the counsel, and the Senate, consisting of many, whose revenue all together, is far greater then the revenue either of one, or a few which manage great offices and estates. And let this suffice to haue been spoken, concerning these matters. But as concerning the first doubt, this especially resulteth thereof, that nothing ought to govern so much, or haue such power in a City, as just and wholesome laws: and that where and when the laws cannot exactly determine of a cause, but are dumb, because it is not easy to comprehend all accidental cases in so general terms; then that the governor or governors, be they one or more, haue power and authority to determine and decide. Albeit it be not yet declared in what manner good and profitable laws are to be esteemed, and so still the former doubt remaineth vndiscussed: notwithstanding, it must needs be, that the laws be always like unto the commonweal whereunto they are annexed, that is to say, either good or bad, just or unjust: for it is evident, that they must be fitted and applied to the commonweal. And if this be true, it appeareth that in good commonweals, the laws must n●cessarily be good and just, and in corrupt and bad commonweals, corrupt and unjust.  
It having been declared, that the difference and variety of governments doth accrue from that part which is of greatest sovereignty and power in a city, and which commandeth the rest: also how all cities are necessary governed, either by one sole man, or by a few together, or by the multitude, whence arise six kinds of policies, three good and three bad: Here in this chapter he discourseth after what manner estates are best ordered: for there are many difficulties, whether the government bee in the hands of some few, or in the power of the communality: for if it bee said, that it ought to bee committed to good men, then the rest being debarred from Offices and honours, will stir up seditions through discontent: or if it be pretended, that the law which is without affection should absolutely command, he answereth that this also is not to bee fully admitted, because the law is always fitted and applied to the estate wherein it is, as being made at the will and for the commodity of the most mighty; so that for this cause, there is no less discommodity in the law, then in a man: also whether it be better to be governed by many, of which there is not one good and prudent man, or by a few good men. Whereunto it may bee answered, that if these many bee all naughty, unwise, and servile persons, then it is better to be governed by a few good ones: but if they bee in a mediocrity that is reasonable good, the administration seemeth to bee far more commodious in their hands, then in a few good mens. And therfore that it is convenient to commit unto good men offices of greatest weight and moment, which are executed either by particular persons or by a few: but those offices that are administered by many together, ought to be committed to the multitude, as namely to elect and correct Magistrates, and to take an account of their charges. Finally it behoveth, that as much as is possible, the laws do bear sway in cities without giuing any other liberty to the rulers, saving in particular cases, which cannot be comprehended nor expressed by the general laws.   

CHAP. VIII. Of the end of a policy, which is the public good, and civil iustice, and that it is the noblest end of all other faculties.  
NOw forasmuch as in all Arts and Sciences, the end whereunto they tend, is a certain good: therefore the greatest and principalest good, is the end of the greatest and principalest Art, which is the faculty of policy: Now, this political good is right and equity, consisting in the common profit of all. Now, all men think, that this right is a certain equality: and therein in some sort they agree with the philosophical reasons alleged in our ethics: for they say that there ought to bee a certain right, and that amongst some men, and that it ought to bee also equal amongst equals. Wherefore it is behoveful to consider in what things equality and inequality consisteth, because this is not voided of doubt, nor beside the purpose and intent of civil philosophy: for it may bee some man will say, that Offices and Magistracies ought equally to be distributed, according to the excellency of all goodness: albeit, the men differ not in other matters, but are alike: and that to them that differ from each other, there must be a diuers equity, which ariseth unto them of their diverse dignity and worth. Notwithstanding, if this bee true, then must more political right bee attributed to them that excel most in regard of their beauty, or of their t●lne●se of stature, and such like good things: the which is apparently false, as we may see in other faculties and sciences. For among musicians, in regard of that Art, to them that are cunning and expert alike, wee must not give more or better instruments, because they are more noble, for that would not make them play any whit the better: but it is meet to give the best instruments to those that are most excellent in the Art. If this bee not yet plain enough, it shall be made more plain by that which followeth: for if any excel in the Art of music, and yet is far inferior in nobility and beauty, though both these bee far greater goods then the other, and excel them in proportion, yet the best instruments must be given to the former: for it is meet to give the pre-eminence to the work, without having regard either to riches, nobility, or any thing else, which help nothing in that respect. again, by the same reason every good might bee compared with every good: for if that excel which excelleth in quantity certainly greatness of quantity shall deserve wholly to bee compared with riches and liberty: wherefore if this man excel more in bigness, then that man in virtue, and if greatness be a●●●ge●her more excellent then virtue, then may all things bee compared with all things: For if such a quantity is greater then such a quantity, surely such shal be the equality● But seeing tha●●his is impossible, there is no cause to contend in civil affairs, about equality in honours and Magistracies, as because some are heavy and others light, therfore more is not to be given to one and less to the other. I confess indeed, that in the exercises of the body, some honour is due to such things: but in things belonging to a city, it is doubtful and in contro●ersie. Wherefore those that are noble, free, and rich, haue good reason to assume unto themselves this honour: for it is necessary, that Citizens be free, and rich, able to support public charge, and pay tributes: for a City cannot possibly stand of all poor men and seruants. now if a City stand in need of such things as these, it must also necessary stand in need of iustice and warlike virtue, which are full as necessary, except that a city cannot bee, nor consist without the former, but it cannot well bee, nor consist without the latter: It should seem therefore, that all these things, or some of them do contend with equity in the establishing of a City: and that discipline and virtue contend in the leading of a happy life, as it hath been declared before. But forasmuch as those that are equal in one thing onely, ought not to ascribe unto themselves equality in all: nor those that are unequal in one, inequality in all, therefore it is necessary, that all such forms of commonweals bee faulty, and far from the right. It hath already been declared, that all do contend justly after a sort, and yet not all simply justly ● rich men, because they haue more lands and territories, which lands are common: besides, in contracts and bargains, more credite is given unto them. Free men and Nobles, as neighbours, seeing that those which haue more Nobility, haue more right in a City then the ignoble. And every one esteemeth nobility in his country, as a thing very honourable, seeing it is likely, that the best Parents should beget the best children: for Nobility is nothing else but the virtue of the stock and race. In like manner, wee may say that virtue doth contend rightfully: for wee call iustice a sociable and civil virtue, which draweth on with it all other virtues necessary: yea and many contend also with few, and that not without cause: for they are even more mighty, richer, and better, if many be compared with few. Therefore if all these were in one City, I mean good men, rich men, and Nobles, and withall another civil multitude, whether would there bee any contention between these or no, Which of them should administer the commonweal? Therefore in every one of these commonweals before specified, that iudgement is vndoubtfull and without controversy, who ought to command and bear rule therein. For the difference of States ariseth by the difference of those that bear rule and authority in the states, as one in that state which is governed by the rich, another in that which is governed by good men, and so of the rest in like manner. nevertheless, let us consider if these things should happen at one and the same time, howe they are to bee determined. If the virtuous bee a very small number, howe should we then proceed? Must wee haue regard to the work, if by reason of their paucity they cannot govern the City? Or if their number bee great enough, so that a City may consist of them, yet is there a question and doubt concerning all those that strive for civil honours: for they that seek to govern for their wealth sake, or for the Nobility of their stock, do seem to allege no lawful cause: because if any one should bee the richest amongst all, by this reason, that one man should command and govern all: in like manner also, if any one should excel all others in Nobility, the same also should excel in authority those, which being free men, contend about the government. The same inconvenience will happen in an aristocraty, in regard of virtue: for if any one were better then the rest which haue any thing to do with the public government, the same one ought to bee superior in authority to the rest by that reason. Also if the multitude ought therefore to govern, because many are stronger then few; then it follows if one, or some more number then one, but yet fewer then the multitude, were stronger the● the rest of the multitude, that that o●e or they few, should rather command and bear rule then the multitude: All which speeches give us to know, that none of these are just causes, why some should affect the government and desire that others should bee subject unto them: for the common people might oppose a certain right against those which would govern by cause of virtue, or by riches: For nothing letteth, but that a muititude may bee better and richer the●● so●e, not respecting them severally a part, but as it were all together: wherefore that doubt which is objected by some, may bee resolved after this manner: for some make a question whether a lawgiver going about to e●act good laws, ought to respect the profit and commodity of the best, rather then of the most, when as that which wee haue mentioned d●th happen. peradventure also he ought to follow that which is right, without any other respect, for that ought to bee esteemed right which is available for the profit of the whole city, and the common good of the Citizens. And he is called a Citizen commonly, that participateth of the office of commanding, and the duty of obeying: and yet this is not all one in every commonweal, but in a good commonweal, he is a Citizen which can and will obey and command according to a virtuous life.  
Forasmuch as the end of civil policy is Iustice, respecting that which concerneth public commodity, and also that equity is nothing else but a certain equality and excellency: wee must consider such an equality and excellency, not that consisteth in all thngs, but onely in those which appertain to the work, and to the politic end, and so to distribute the offices and honours of the commonweal. In which regard men are often deceived in every estate, in supposing that if they excel in riches and nobility, or some such like thing, therfore the chief dignities belong unto them. Now if such a prerogative should take place, or be of force, it were as meet also to consider the excellency of the complexion, of beauty, or of strength, of them that should bear rule, as they used to do in old time in Asia and India: which is a thing most impertinent& absurd. Wherefore it is not convenient in the communion of the commonweal, and in the bestowing of offices and dignities, to haue regard to the equality or excellency of al things, but onely of those which concern the common good. Forasmuch therefore, as the end of a good commonweal is to live well according to virtue, the equality and excellency in virtue ought principally therein to bee observed. For which cause in the state of Venice, the signiors which are true citizens, to the end to prevent all such competitorie quarrels and contentions, haue this institution amongst them, to distribute their public offices in such sort, that as far as may possibly bee, all the families may be partakers of those common dignities: And yet with such advisement and consideration, that onely those that are renowned for wisdom, bounty, and virtue, do govern and manage their affairs: mingling thus together the democraty and aristocratical oligarchy, when they use partly casting of lots, which is democratical, as in the creation of electors: and partly election which is aristocratical in the distribution of honours, committing the same to the estimate and censure of the citizens. For to choose Magistrates by lot, is proper to a democraty, and they which proceed so, do measure and balance equity by an arithmetical equality, which would haue all men to enjoy the like privilege of right and profit, and the like ability to obtain Magistracies, because they are all citizens and freemen, and therefore equal privileges are due to equal persons. But in an oligarchy they proceed after another sort, for it would haue the greatest and highest dignities to bee conferred vpon those that are in greatest and highest esteem in regard of riches and nobility, because that unequal privileges do appertain to unequal persons. But these two opinions do err in this, that the former measureth equality onely by number, that is, in that they are all citizens; and the latter esteemeth equality only by riches and nobility: for seeing that the body politic was first ordained to this end, that men might live well and happily, onely virtue ought to make this difference: of which matter, more shall bee spoken hereafter in the first Chapter of the fift book of this work.   

CHAP. IX. When a man doth greatly excel in virtue, how they ought to behave themselves: and of ostracism.  
IF any one, or more then one, and yet not so many as may bee able to make a full compliment of a city, do excel others so much, according to the excellency of virtue, that the virtue of all other, nor their civil power, be equally comparable with theirs, if they be many; if they be one, with one: yet these are not to be numbered to the parts of a City: for they should bee prejudiced which are so unequal, according to virtue and civil power, if they shall not bee thought worthy to obtain things equal. Therfore it is likely such a man to be as a god amongst men: from whence it appeareth, both the constitution of laws to be necessary amongst equals; both in kind and power: but according to such there is no law, for they themselves are a law unto themselves: and he were ridiculous which should go about to decree laws against thē. They would allege perchance that which Antisthenes said the Lions to haue spoken when as Hares did confer in an assembly, and every one requested that they might haue al things equal. Therfore the popular cities do constitute an ostracism for such a cause, for they seem to prosecute equality above al things: so that they did Ostracise,& until some definite times remove them from the city who did seem to excel in power of riches, of manifold friendship, or any other political force. It is reported the Argonauts to haue relinquished Hercules for this cause, they would not therfore bring him to Argo with others, as excelling much the Mariners: therfore they are not thought simply to reprehend aright, those that do dispraise the tyranny, & that counsel of Periander to Thrasibulus. They say Periander to haue answered nothing to him that sent a legate for counsel, but to haue made even the corn, in taking away the most eminent ears of corn: whence the legate not knowing the cause of the thing done, declaring the accident, Thrasibulus conceived that it was behoveful to take away the most excellent men: for this doth not onely agree with tyrants, neither do tyrants onely these things, but it is thus likewise in Oligarchies& democracies: but ostracism hath the same power after a maner, to cut off the most excellent,& to repul●e thē: the same do the Potentates in Cities& nations: as the Athenians did amongst the Samians, the Chians, and the Lesbians; after they had more mightily confirmed to themselves their Empire, they humbled thē against their covenants. The king of the Persians did oftentimes cut short& abase those Medes& babylonians,& other insolent men, which had born the government. This problem generally doth concern all commonweals,& those that are good: for these disordered commonweals which are only respective of their private good, do this,& not they alone, but those which intend the common good, are like affencted: this is manifest by other arts and sciences. The painter will not permit any living creature pictured, to haue a greater foot thē is proportionable, not although it doth excel in beauty; nor a shipwright the hinder part of the ship, or any other part to be larger then it should be: neither the master of a choir will admit him to sing in the choir which hath a louder or a better voice thē the whole choir. Wherefore, for this cause nothing doth hinder the Monarchs, that they should not consent unto the cities in this, if they respect their private security,& the profit of their subiects. Thus according to the confessed excellencies, the treatise concerning ostracism, hath something that is just and politic: but it is better certainly, that the lawmaker should compass his commonweal at the beginning, that it may not need this medicine. The second mean is, if it so happen, to endeavour with some such discipline to correct it; which was not done in the cities: for they did not look to the profit of a private Commonweale, but they used these Ostracismes mutinously. In troublesone& disordered Commonweals, that it is privately commodious& just, it is manifest; perchance not that it is simply just. But in the best governed commonweals it hath some doubt, not according to the excellency of some good things, as power, riches,& much friendship; But if any man excel in virtue: what is meet to bee done then? For they ought not to banish such a man, nor so much as overrule him. This hath a resemblance with those which dividing kingdoms amongst themselves, do seek to govern jupiter himself. It remaineth therfore( which seemeth a thing natural) that all obey such a one dutifully, so that kings should be such as may be perpetual in cities.  
If either one or a few persons do so much excel in virtue in cities, that none other are to be compared with them, it is just and requisite that they do always command over the rest; but the like is not to be used amongst them that excel in riches, nobility, or plurality of friends: for where regard is had to such goods in the distribution of honours, there the state of commonweal is corrupted and depraved. But yet in every commonweal, bee it good or bad, it is best that there bee not amongst the citizens too great inequality, and it is meet to prevent this by laws and constitutions.  
THEREFORE it is likely, such a one to bee as a god amongst men.] The prophetess Pythia being inspired with the fury of her god, called Lycurgus the spartan lawgiver, a man beloved of the gods, and a god rather then a man: And whereas he required grace to be able to establish good laws in his country, shee told him that Apollo granted him his desire, and that he should erect and ordain such a form of commonweal, as should bee esteemed the best and perfectest that ever was in the world. Plutarch in the life of Licurgus. There is nothing here below more acceptable unto God, nor more approaching to his divinity, then to reign well in iustice and equity. Wherefore every good King and Monarch ought rather to seek for praise and reputation from goodness and virtue, then that which proceedeth from might and pvissance: for as the divine essence, to the which kings so much desire to conform and equalize themselves, doth excel all other essences and natures, in three things principally, to wit, in immortality, power, and bounty, certainly of the three, bounty and virtue is most venerable, and that wherein most of the divinity appeareth: for, as for incorruptibility& immortality, the four elements and the voided place, are so as well as God, as the natural Philosophers hold: and as for force and power, the earthquakes, the thunders, the violent tempests of winds, the streams and inundations of waters, haue that also; but as touching iustice, uprightness, and equity, there is nothing in the world that can partake thereof, except it bee a divine thing, by the means of reason and understanding. And therefore albeit that men ordinarily carry three different affections towards the gods; one, in that they esteem them happy, another wherewith they fear them, and the third whereby they honour them: it seemeth that they account them happy, because of the eternity and immortality of their essence; that they fear them and stand in awe of them, because of their sovereignty and almightiness; and that they love, honour, and worship them because of their iustice: and yet notwithstanding, of these three qualities, those which men most desire, are immortality, whereof human nature is not capable: and power, the greatest part whereof dependeth vpon fortune: and in the mean while, they leave virtue behind, which is the only good thing of the goods, and whereof wee may bee partakers: wherein they deceive and abuse themselves greatly, because virtue and iustice doth make their life, who are placed in high hegree of fortune, full of power and of divine and heavenly authority, and injustice maketh it brutish& sauage● Plutarch in the life of Aristides.  
but according to such, there is no lawe.] Xenophon in the eight book of his Paedia reporteth of cyrus, that he accounted a good Prince to bee a living and seeing lawe, who might command and punish, as the laws, those which do not their duty. And that in regard of his life, he used such temperance and modesty, that he gave example unto others to live after his pattern, judging that the common people would endeavour themselves so much the more to led a temperate life, if they did behold abstinency in him, who had more power and liberty to do evil. And in very truth, there is no lawe more convenient for the good ordering of a commonweal, then the example of the king, showing first in himself the way that he would haue others to walk in, and representing in his own person, that which he giveth in charge unto others, in commending some things, and blaming others, and always disgracing those which are disobedient: for such as are the rulers and Princes, such is the estate for the most part, the subiects comforming themselves naturally after the manners of their superiors, and imitating that which they see to bee acceptable and pleasing to them. Plato De Legibus, lib. 4. Cicero, lib. 2. Plutarch in his work entitled, That learning is requisite in a Prince.  
THEREFORE the popular Cities do constitute an ostracism for such a cause, for they seem to prosecute equality above all things.] Plutarch in the life of Themistocles, saith thus: At last the Athenians banished and expelled him out of their city for the space of five yeares, with an intention to rebate and weaken his too great authority and credite, as they were accustomend to do to all those, whose power seemed to them excessive and unmeasurable, because of that equality which ought to bee amongst citizens in a popular state: for this kind of banishment for a season, which was called an ostracism, was not the punishment of any offence, but rather was as it were a restraint and alle●ation of the envy of the common people, which delighted to abate and humble those persons which seemed to exceed in too much greatness, and by this means did let out and give vent, as it were, to the venom of their malice, by this diminution of honour. The same author in the life of Aristides saith: That at the first the surname of just, gained to Aristides great love and favour of the people, but afterwards it stirred up and engendered envy unto him, and that by the devises of Themistocles: who went about reporting every where, that Aristides had abolished and disannulled all the judgements, forasmuch as by the good liking and consent of parties, he was always chosen an Arbitrator, to take knowledge and give iudgement of all controversies, and that by this means he went about secretly to acquire unto himself a sovereign pvissance of a Monarch, without having need either of guards or attendants meet for such a place. moreover, the people being grown mighty since the victory at Marathon, and being desirous that all things should wholly and entirely depend vpon them and their authority, took it ill, and was displeased when any one in private surpassed the rest in good renown and reputation. By means whereof, they flocked together from all quarters of the country of Attica into the city, and banished Aristides with the banishment called ostracism, disguising and cloaking the envy which they bore unto his glory, under the name of fear of tyranny: for this kind of banishment called ostracism, or Exostracisme, was not a punishment ordained for any crime or offence, but as some say, to give unto it an honest vizard, it was invented onely for an abating and weakening of too great authority, and power too excessive for a popular state: but in very deed, it was no other thing but a devise to content and assuage gently and favourably the envy which the people conceived against some particular person: which envy did not disgorge itself in any unrecoverable evil against him whose greatness displeased them, but onely in this, that it banished and constrained him to absent himself for ten yeares. But after that by practices and devises they began to punish after this sort base fellowes, and sometimes wicked persons, as Hiperbolus who was the last that was banished, the Athenians desisted altogether from the use thereof. It will not bee amiss to declare in this place how and for what cause this Hiperbolus was banished. Alcibiades and Nicias were the chiefest men of authority of their time in Athens, who having stung and wrenched one another, as it ordinarily happeneth betwixt equals, and perceiving that the people in a certain assembly were about to proceed to this iudgement of ostracism, they doubted much that it was to this end to banish one of them two, whereupon they conferred together, and agreed themselves& their adherents and followers, and so coupled them all in one league, in such sort, that when they came to collect the voices of the people, to see by the plurality of suffr●ges who should be● banished, and who not, it came to pass that it was neither of them, but one Hiperbolus, with whom the people we●e so discontented. They therefore seeing that order of ostracism so embased and dishonoured, would never more use it, but utterly abolished the use thereof. But to make it known summarily what this was, and how it was used: It is to bee observed, that vpon a certain set and prefixed day, every citizen brought a shell, whereon he wrote the name of him whom he would haue to be banished, and brought it into a certain sure place enclosed with a wall of wood, which was there made for that purpose: after, when every one had brought thither his shell, the Magistrates and Officers of the City came to reckon all the shells together: for if the number of citizens, that brought shells thus written, was less then six thousand, then the ostracism was imperfect. This being done, they divided and put apart all the shells that had the same names written in them, and he that was found written in the most shells, was by the sound of the trumpet proclaimed banished for ten years, during the which, he enjoyed nevertheless all his goods. Therfore as every man thus wrote vpon his shell his name whom he would haue banished, it is reported that there was a certain peasant so blockish and ignorant, that he could neither writ nor red, who came to Aristides, meeting him first,& gave to him his shell, desiring him that he would writ thereon the name of Aristides, whereat Aristides wondering, asked him whither Aristides had done him any displeasure or no: no answered the peasant, and that which is more, I do not know the man, but it displeaseth me to hear him so called every where by the name of just. Aristides having heard this answer, replied not a word, but wrote himself his own name vpon the shell, and so gave it him again.  
AND that counsel of Periander to Thrasibulus.] Aristotle in this work, lip. 5. ca. 10. saith: That tyranny draweth this evil from a democraty, to make war vpon the nobles, and to destroy them either coue●tly or openly, and to banish them as enemies to the state, seeing that from thence spring up conspiracies& treasons, when as some desire to govern, and others are not willing to obey: wherefore Periander advised Thrasibulus, that he should lop off the most eminent ears of corn, as if he should always cut off the most apparent& renowned Citizens. Herodotus in his first book entitled Terpsichore, writeth that Thrasibulus gave this counsel to Periander, and not Periander to Thrasibulus, as Aristotle here reporteth in these two places. But howsoever it was, the story is stil of the same substance. After( saith Herodotus) that Periander trafficked by ambassage with Thrasibulus a potentate of Militum, he beeame more cruel and bloody then ever was his father Cypselus, he sent to the same Thrasibulus to know by what means after he had confirmed his estate, he might best govern his city. Thrasibulus lead his ambassador out of Miletum into a large corn field, and there began to walk, questioning with the ambassador about his journey, and of the accidents which had befallen him since his coming from Corinth, in the mean while striking down the ears of corn which were higher then the rest, and casting them to the ground, thus spoiling a whole field of goodly thick corn. When he had thus walked sufficiently, without giuing any other answer to the ambassador, he sent him away: who returning to Corinth, Periander was very desirous to hear some news of his ambassage, but he told him, that Thrasibulus had nothing at all advised him touching his demand,& that he marveled why he had sent him to such a foolish and senseless fellow, which spoiled his own good; & thereupon recounted all that which Thrasibulus had done: but Periander understood right well that Thrasibulus meaning was, that he should put to death all the chiefest men of Corinth,& thereupon practised all the cruelty in the world towards his subiects, finishing the murders of his fathers Cypselus, by putting to death all that were left by him.  
wherefore for this cause nothing doth hinder the monarchs, that they should not consent unto cities in this, if they respect their pri●●te security,& the profit of their subiects.] Aristotle Polit. lib. 7. cap. 3. saith: That the changes of commonweals do happen by an vnproportionable growth: For even as the body is composed of parts& members, and ought to grow by proportion, to the end, that there may bee a commensuration in all parts, otherwise it perisheth, when the foot is four cubits long, and the rest of the body but two handbreadths, yea and oftentimes it might bee transformed into the shape of another beast, if it should not onely in quantity, but also in quality increase above just proportion: so a city is constituted of many parts, amongst the which, oftentimes some one groweth more largely then the rest. In the same book, cap. 8. This is a common rule in a democraty, oligarchy, monarchy, and every kind of policy, not to make any too great above measure; but rather to distribute small Offices, and of long continuance, then great, and short: for men are quickly depraved, and it is not in every one to support the prosperity of fortune: or at least when much power is given to any, not to take it from them again all at once, but by little and little: and especially to provide by laws, that no man do advance himself too much in friends and riches; but that if there bee any such, they be commanded to absent themselves out of the City: and if any member of the city becometh through prosperity too insolent and haughty, there ought regard to be had thereunto by the same means. In the same book cap. 9. As a nose passing the just proportion, is notwithstanding faire and well favoured, but if it bee stretched out excessively, then first the member is deprived of mediocrity, and at last it cometh to that pass, that it hath not any more the shape of a nose, by reason of the excess or defect of contraries: and the same is to be thought of the rest of the members. The like happeneth in commonweals, for an oligarchy or a democraty might be tolerable, albeit they were somewhat declining from their right institution: but if either the one or the other be extended too far, then first the commonweal is but hurt and made worse, but at last it becometh no commonweal at all. In the same book, cap. 11. moreover, there is a general caveat for the safety and preservation of every monarchy, not to suffer any one to grow too mighty, or if it must be so, then to make more then one, because they will observe and haue an eye to each other: or if by chance it be necessary to advance some one, not to take such a one as is of stout and proud conditions, for such are in all actions great undertakers and enterprisers. And again, if it seemeth meet to abase and put down the credite and authority of any great man, it behoveth that it be done by little and little, and not at one clap. This advertisement hath ben ill understood, and worse practised by many Kings, Emperors, and Monarchs, who having exalted too high some of their friends and servitors, haue been afterwards either themselves or their children ruinated and destroyed by them: or sometimes when they haue smelled out their faults, haue ben constrained to put them to death, as Tiberius served sejanus, into whose hands he had before committed the whole government of the roman Empire. Sultan soliman put to death in like manner Hibrahim Bassa, whom he had almost made equal to himself a little before in authority, in such sort, that they called him king of the Gardiners, and the Bassa the king of the soldiers: And notwithstanding, vpon a certain night having invited him to supper, and forced him to lye in the palace, he caused him to be slain, and his body to be cast into the sea, and the next morrow all his goods to be seized and transported as things confiscate, no man ever knowing the true cause of his death, save that he was grown too great, and consequently suspected of his Lord, and hated of others. Paulus divinus discourseth hereof at large at the end of the 32. book of his histories: Who also in the 14. book saith, That the Turkish Empire is principally governed by the counsel& prowess of slaves, who can easily without danger to the prince be advanced to great honours and offices, and without tumult and envy of the people, bee abased, thrust down, and murdered. The crown of France was translated from the race of Clouis unto the stock of Charles Martel, by giuing too much authority to the Maires of the palace, and the Constables of France: and by the same means was again transplanted from this lineage to another. Paulus AEmilius, lib. 1. & 2.& 3. of the French history: who also writing of Dagobert speaketh thus, The kings at that time did enjoy onely the name of kings, but the authority of kings, and absolute government of the kingdom, was in the Constables hands: for they were so slo●thfull and so much addicted to their pleasure, that no account was made of them. And thus the gallant house of Clouis degenerated, and came to nothing. And as much as their predecessors made it their chiefest glory to increase their kingdoms and signories: So much these their successors placed all their felicity and happiness in idleness and voluptuous pleasure: They shewed themselves onely abroad in public, the first day of May, when they received those presents which were given them, not intermeddling with any other affairs of the commonweal. On the other side, the Constables received the Embassages of foreign Kings and Emperours, and gave them their answers, making at their discretions, leagues and truces, war and peace, ordinances& laws for the whole kingdom: and by howe much the more the kings did reject and cast off all such care, as being a thing too painful, by so much the more did the Constables augment and increase their power and authority. See howe the mind of man is never content with the favours of fortune, and never satiate. The Constables which came up of so low a degree, being at the first called but Maires of the palace, grew so in short time, that they quickly attained to that high and great authority, that they made no reckoning not of the kings themselves, being so idle and slothful: who if they had gone about to refrain and bridle this boldness, seeing that they could do nothing of themselves, could hardly haue undone that which they had done and suffered so long, because it was thought that these Constables had had this great power from all conti●uance of time, and that the absolute command and rule of the kingdom was due unto them. Therefore those that are elected to any kingdom, ought diligently to haue care to overturn and prevent the too great boldness of their subiects, at the very birth and beginning of it: for after that it is once engrafted and hath taken roote, it is impossible to pull it out again, without the full destruction of the parties, and often also with their damage and destruction, that seek to quench the same. This therefore may serve in stead of an example for Kings, Emperors, and other Princes, for the history should be written to no end and purpose, if they should not learn thereby to reign well, and virtuously to govern the commonweal. In regard of this, almost all commonweals both ancient and modern, haue ben by succession of times filthily beguiled, except the Venetian onely: which besides that the Nobles and Lords who haue the rule and managing thereof, are not ambitious, hath by certain constitutions moderated the authority of Magistrates, depriving them in the greatest affairs, of sovereign power; and creating them almost all of short continuance, together with this proviso, that three of one lineage may never bee lawful senators, or other Magistrates at one time, to the end, that one part of the commonalty should not become stronger then the other, but that all should be partakers of the public power and authority. moreover, ten men were appointed whose charge and office was principally to foresee and provide that no sedition or civil quarrel might rise amongst the Citizens, whence any faction might grow, and that no treason or surprise might be attempted against the city by any wicked Citizen desirous of reign, or overladen with debts or crimes: and that if perchauncc any such mischief should secretly happen, they had sovereign power in their hands to punish and correct them, and to procure that the weal public sustain no detriment. Also to the end, that no Citizen might make himself too mighty in deeds of arms, and attendance of men,& so get means to attempt ought against the signory; they use in their land wars strange soldiers, even to the general of the army, who ordinarily is some Prince or Lord of Italy well experimented and reported of in feats of war, to whom they give good and honourable entertainment, who nevertheless dareth not decern or determine any thing without the counsel of them which are conjoined with him in commission by the signory. Contarin, lib. 3.& 5. of the commonweal.   

CHAP. X. Of a kingdom, and the several kinds thereof.  
THese thus manifested, it is expedient peradventure to discourse otherwise, and to consider of a kingdom: for this form of government wee say is to bee reckoned in the number of those that bee good. But wee are to consider whether it bee expedient for a city and Country wherein men are to live well and happily, that men obey the rule of a king, or follow some other course or government: or whether it bee convenient to some to bee subject to the regal Empire, and to some others, not so conducible. But first wee are to divide and distinguish of governments, and to see whether the government of one or of many bee best. And this is easy to bee known, that there be many kindes of governments, and that the order of government is not alike in all men. For the form of the commonweal amongst the Lacedemonians seemeth to bee the most perfect commonweal of all approved commonweals, and yet one King enjoyeth not sovereignty: but when he is out of the Lacedemonian bounds, he is but captain and principal of warlike affairs. Further, all divine matters concerning the service of the gods are committed unto them. This kingdom therefore is like to a walike Empire, which captaines in war ●btaine in their chief and perpetual government: For he hath not authority to put to death, but in a certain kingdom onely, and in warlike affairs, as it is amongst the ancient, by a certain Lawe which consisteth in blows and arms. The which Homer declareth: For Agamemnon heard patiently reviling speeches and taunts in public assemblies, but out of an assembly had free and entire power of putting to death, for so he saith: whom I shall see to depart from the battle to the navy, let not him think that he hath so escaped the fowls and the dogges: and in another place, I haue sentence and chief power of death in my hands. This therefore is one kingdom, the Empire of war in the whole course of life. And of these kind of kingdoms, some are hereditary, and appertaining to a lineage, othersome by election, and the choice and suffrages of the people. There is another kind of monarchy besides this, as are kingdoms amongst certain Barbarians. All these haue force and power like unto a Tyrannicall Empire, notwithstanding, they are agreeable to the lawe, and hereditary: For, because that the Barbarians are of more servile manners then the Grecians, and Asians, and Europians, they bear a Maisterlike sway, neither do they this any way against their wils: These kingdoms are therefore tyrannous for this cause, notwithstanding sure and steadfast, both because they are so ordered by the countries, as also because they are so by discent of auncestrie, and also legitimate. And the custody is regal, not tyrannicall, for the same cause; for Kings are beset and guarded with the weapons of Citizens, but tyrants with foreign power: for these rule by Lawe, and men obey them willingly: but those against lawe reign over men in despite of them. So these haue the custody of Citizens offered them, these other haue it gotten by strength. These are two kind of Monarchies therefore. There is another furthermore, that flourished amongst the ancient Grecians, which they call AEsynnetas: And this kind of monarchy is altogether affencted of Tyrants, whether it bee by voice or consent of the people offered, which differeth from a barbarous tyranny, not in that it is not agreeable to the lawe, but in that they descend not by auncestrie nor kindred. And this kind of Empire, some obtained all their life, some others until someset times, and to do some certain things: for example sake, the Mitylenaei delivered and gathered in times past one Pyttacus against certain exiles, whose leaders were Antimenides and Alceus the Poet. And Alceus the Poet declareth in a certain railing verse, that Pyttacus the Tyrant was taken of the Mitylanians: for he findeth fault with them, that they created Pyttacus( a man born in a base and miserable country) Tyrant over a mean and an unfortunate city: and being gathered together, extolled him to heaven with praises. These Monarchies therefore both are and were( because they were tyrannous) maisterlike and proper to lords: but in that they were elective and offered by consent of the people, and also in that they are used over voluntaries, they are regal. now the fourth kind of regal monarchy comprehendeth the same which flourished in those heroical times, in the which the people obeied of their own accord; and those which were by succession and legitimate. For because that the first men deserved well of the multitude, either by inventing the Arts; or making warres, or because they gathered together the dispersed, or because they afforded them ground and land, they were not onely created kings of the voluntaries themselves, but also they yielded up their kingdom obtained, to their children and posterity: And they had in their power the disposition of the warlike Empire, and those sacrifices, which belonged not to the Priests, and besides they decided controversies. And this did diuers of them, being sworn, and diuers others vnsworne: And this oath was made by the taking up of the sceptre. Kings therefore which were in ancient times, did always moderate and govern civil and rural affairs, and those things which stretched themselves beyond the bounds of the Empire. And lastly, Kings dismissing partly of their own accord these things, and the people partly detracting in other Cities, sacrifices were left onely for kings: but in those parts which worthily merited the name of a kingdom, they onely held the principality of martiall discipline out of the limits of the kingdom.  
AFTER he hath entreated of policy in general, he now cometh particularly to handle the ●euerall kindes thereof. And first the kingdom or regal power, which is the best form and most absolute, whereof there are found four kinds: the first practised of old in Lacedemonia, and now in Arragon, according as Sepulueda testifieth. The second like unto the Barbarian kingdoms, which albeit they are legitimate, and hereditary, yet notwithstanding they observe a signiorall and masterly government: as is the state of the turk, of the muscovite, and of Prester John. Such was in time past the kingdom of Persia, according as Plato De Legibus, lib. 5. And Socrates in his Panegericke bear witness. The third is elective, not Hereditarie● in some places for term of life, as the Empire of Germany, the kingdom of Polonia, and of Bo●emia, of denmark, and hungary: in other place for term of time, as was the Dictatorship in Rome. The fourth proper to the heroic times, which was not at the beginning usurped by violence and force, but collated voluntarily by the people, and after lawfully derived to their successors who had in time of war sovereign power, and were chief over the most solemn ceremonies belonging to the gods.  
AND this is easy to bee known, that there bee many kindes of governments, and that the order of government is not alike in all kingdoms.] Some kingdoms are Hereditary, and others elective. Hereditary kingdoms are either by succession from male to male onely, as the kingdom of france, which the French men wisely ordained at the first by the Salicke law, their kingdom continuing by that providence in the same form of government these twelve hundred yeares, the crown never departing out of their Nation, and the royal lineage being never changed but thrice in so long continuance: The like whereof hath never happened in any other monarchy, signory, or popularity, that is in mind of man, where the issue male failing, females haue succeeded: as in spain, England, and Scotland. Further, in Hereditary kingdoms where the males onely succeed, in some places that honour is onely kept for the first born, honest portions being allotted to the younger brethren, as in France: or else without regard had to the birthright, he is preferred of the sons, which is found most fit and able to govern, or he that is most warlike disposed, and most favoured of the soldiers, as in turkey, Selimus the first, being the third and last son of Baiazeth the second, usurped by the help of the Ianissaries, the Empire from his father himself, whom he caused to bee poisoned, and his two elder brethren, Achmat and Corcuth to bee slain, with all their nephews and lineage of Ottoman: saying that nothing was more sweet then to reign without the fear of kindred. In other places they do not put to death their brethen and kindred, but pin them up close in some sure guard, as they do in AEthiopia, where he onely remaineth, that must reign, the rest are all sent into a high and strong mountain, called the Mountain of the Israelites: whence it is not lawful for any male ever to issue, except it fall out, that Prester John die without heir of his body to succeed in the crown: for then one is taken out who is nearest in blood, or thought most worthy in reputation. By this means a kingdom so great, hath continued a long while without the disturbance of civil warres and murders, the stalk of the royal race remaining thus vnspoiled, and the branches thereof having not stained their hands in each others blood. A wonderful happiness, and such as seemeth rather to betid by some divine power, then by any human prudence: the like order not having been observed in any other realm, ancient or modern. In Calecuth when the king death, although he haue sons of his own, and nephews by his brothers side, yet neither the one nor the other succeedeth in the kingdom, but onely his sisters son: and when he wants, the next unto him of the blood royal cometh to the crown: The which so strange and unused custom is only observed in this state, the reason therof being founded vpon a certain foolish superstition which they haue, namely, because the young queen is deflowered first by some young Priest called a Bramin, and that when the king goeth abroad, the Bramins haue the continual guard and oversight over her. Therefore they suppo●e, that the children born of such a dame, smell more of the Bramin, then of the king. Other kingdoms are elective, as the Empire of germany, the kingdom of Polonia, of Bohemia, and lately of hungary, before the usurpation of the turk: which states are not ordinarily so assured and so durable, as Hereditaries are. In elective kingdoms, the election is either made out of such persons as please the electors to propound, as in Germany, where the Emperours are chosen, not onely out of the families of the german Princes, but also sometimes out of strange Nations, as Alphon●us king of spain, and Richard king of England: or else the election is out of some certain persons, or some inferior states, as the Pope out of the Cardinals: and not long since the Maxmilian of Cai●e out of the Mamelucs, into the which order, none could be admitted, except he had been a slave first, and one that denied the Christian faith. In all ages and memory of man, there was never found such an estate wherein bondslaves which are subject in all places, do command so proudly and covetously, as they do in egypt& Siria. Peter Martyr of Millan in his ambassage to babylon or cairo. The which state having continued about three hundred yeares, was utterly ruined together with the order of the Mamelucs, in the year of our Lord 1517. and the last Maxmilian taken and drawn backward on an ass along the City cairo, and after hanged at one of the gates of the said city. The great master of Malta is elected out of the principal Priors of his religion: as also was he of Pru●sia, before the agreement made with the king of Polonia, by which accord his state was converted into a dukedom subject unto the crown of Polonia: and made of elective, Hereditary. Furthermore, as kings do differ in succession and election, so do they also in authority: for some command more absolutely, of whom we will entreat afterward: others haue their sovereign power ruled and moderated, as the king of france: who in the first place commandeth nothing that cometh to effect, which is not signed by his Secretaries, and sealed with his great seal, that is to say, seen and allowed by the chancellor, a most severe controller of all dispatches. And it is necessary, that all the royal rescripts or answers bee approved by the Iudges, to whom they are directed, who examine them not onely concerning things gotten by false suggestions, and by secret and cunning devises, but also touching the civility& incivility of them. Also in criminal matters, the restorements to office●, or things lost or forfeited, the repeals of outlawries and banishment, pardons and remissions, are debated by them with such severity, that the procurers thereof are constrained to present themselves bare headed on their knees, and to yield themselves prisoners, of what estate soever they be: yea and some of them also are condemned and executed oftentimes together with their favours. As touching gifts and expenses, whether ordinary or extraordinary, the chamber of accou●ts doth examine them curiously, and oftentimes doth cut off those which haue no good ground nor foundation: the Officers of that chamber being sworn not to suffer any thing to pass to the detriment of the realm, whatsoever letters of commandement they haue. Amongst other things the king cannot alienate any of his crown revenue, before the cause be heard and allowed by the same chamber of counts, and by the Parliaments. And that which is yet more, no public treaties with neighbour states, no edicts nor ordinances, haue any authority, except they be published openly in the sovereign courts. By the which moderation, his power is nothing lessened and abated, but made more assured and constant. The king of spain having reduced under the obedience of one Crown, the kingdoms of Castile, arragon, Granada, Leon, Toledo, Galicia, Catalognia, and others, doth govern them according to the ancient customs of the countries, it being not lawful for him to augment the tributes, or to impose new exactions, without the consent of the estates. The king or Emperor of Germany, cannot by his own authority levy subsidies, nor muster soldiers, without the aduise and accord of the Princes and estates of the Empire: which maketh him both to be so ill obeyed of his own subiects, and so weak to resist the turk& muscovite his neighbour puissant enemies. And more, if he do not manage the Empire well, or if he show himself unworthy of that honour, he may be deposed by the Princes electors, as it hath oftentimes come to pass. Munster lib. 3. jul Pflug. de Repub. German. The Duke of Venice possesseth the honour, dignity, and representation of a king, but yet he can do nothing alone, and being joined with other magistrates, hath no more power then one of them: who also are of so small authority, albeit they bee so great, that they can decern nothing which is of any moment, but by the sentence of the counsel. Contarin. lib. 2. de Repub. Venet. In some realms there are nobles& gentlemen that haue under their jurisdiction subiects peculiar unto themselves, as in France, spain, Germany, Naples, and Persia. In others the Prince holdeth in his own hands all the fees, as it was wont to be in France, before the time of Hugh Capet: and is now in turkey, where the great turk distributeth them to his men of war, with this charge, to maintained therewith a number of armed men and horses, answerable to the revenue: and when it pleaseth him, he reuoketh them again to himself. Neither is there in all his dominions, any which possesseth Cities, Castles, or towns, after the maner of the Persians: or that dwell in strange houses, or that dare build above one story, or higher thē a dove house. In England the nobility doth not possess houses entrenched or fortified, neither hath any jurisdiction over men, it being all in the hands of the king, whether it be high, low, or betwixt both. The dignities, as dukedoms, Marqueships, and Earleships, are only titles bestowed at the pleasure of the king: for they that enjoy thē, do not for the most part possess any thing in those places whereof they bear the names, but a certain annual pension is paid thē out of the Kings treasures. There is yet another kind of kingdom confounded& mingled with the Priestdome, as was in egypt, where it was not lawful( as Plato saith in his politic) for a king to rule being not chief Priest also. The royalty in a Lacedemonia was a superintendancie in war, and a pre-eminence in sacrifices. politic, 5. cap. 10. Also the first kings of Rome were the high priests, and afterwards the Emperours called themselves by the name of Pontifices Maximi, chief Priests: and the Emperours of Constantinople were consecrated, as are the kings of France after their imitation. In like maner the Caliphes of the saracens were both kings and high Priests in their religion, one of them in Bagadet, another in cairo. Paulus AEmilius De historia Gal. lib. 4.& 5. The King of Calecuth is chief in his religion, and for that cause excelleth in dignity all the other kings of India,& is called SAMORY, that is, a god on earth. The Pope commandeth and ruleth the temporality of the church, called Saint Peters patrimony, as a king: and is reverenced of the rest of latin christendom, as the head of religion, I mean in those places where he is so acknowledged. The Princes of England entitle themselves of late times both kings of the commonweal, and chief heads of the Church. Virgil avoucheth the like of one Helenus.  
Rex Helenus, rex idem hominum, Phaebique sacerdos.  
THOSE which are called AEsymnetes.] Aristotle useth this word in the Chapter following, and in the tenth Chapter of the fourth book, which some expound King. Dionysius Halycarnasseus translateth it, dictatory: it signifieth also {αβγδ}, " that is, An instructor or orderer of an army, or an arbitrator in feats of chivalry.  
FOR seeing that the former deserved well of the multitude.] Aristotle, politic, lib. 5. cap. 10. saith: For all those that either haue been, or may bee benefactors to cities or Countries, attained to this regal honour: some by procuring that the city might not fall into servitude and slavery, as Codrus: others delivering it out of servitude into liberty, as Cyrus: others for edifying some city, or enlarging the confines of the country, as the kings of Lacedemonia, Macedonia, and Molosse.   

CHAP. XI. Of the fift kind of government, whether it be more expedient for a city to be governed by a good man, or by good laws.  
THese are the kinds of governments, four in number, the first which flourished in the heroic times, over such as voluntarily subjecteth themselves in certain definite matters, for the king himself was both general of the war, judge, and high Priest: the second, barbarous successive by lineage, wherein the subiects were governed according to the laws of servants: the third, which they call AEsymnetia, that is, tyranny by election of voices: the fourth laconical, that is to say in one word, a perpetual military intendencie by tribe: these kingdoms differ thus among themselves. The fift kind of administration, when one is sole lord of all: as every Nation and every city hath power over common things, and followeth the example of the Oeconomie, for as the Oeconomie is a kind of household government, so is the government of a city, and the Oeconomie of one or more Nations. now there are almost two kindes of government, whereof wee are to speak, this, and the laconical. The others, or the greater part of them, are a mean betwixt these two. For either the Kings haue less authority then in an absolute commonweal, or more then in the laconical: wherefore the whole matter consisteth in two points: the one is, whether it bee profitable to the city to haue in it a continual governor and general of the warres, and that he bee created by succession in stock and lineage, or whether he bee elected by suffrages according to the virtue and dignity of the person, or whether this bee not so profitable: the other is, whether it bee profitable to haue the kingdom governed by one solely, although the consideration of such a captain pertaineth rather to the laws, then to the commonweal, as a thing that cannot happen in every commonweal. leaving therefore the first manner of government, let us come to the other, which is the form of a commonweal, and let us briefly resolve the doubts therein.  
The beginning of this question is; Whether it bee more expedient for a commonweal to bee administered by a good man, or by a good laws? They which think it more expedient for Cities to bee governed by a King; do suppose, that the laws do speak onely in general terms, and not to provide for particular cases, and therefore that it would be absurd and foolish to command in any Art, according to the prescript rules and laws of the same. And in egypt the physicians are not permitted to meddle with any disease before the fourth day being past: and if they do minister before that time, it is at their peril and hazard. Wherefore it is apparent, that that is not the best form of regiment, which followeth the letters of the Lawe. And yet it is necessary, that this universal reason bee in all Gouernours: For that must needs bee better which is void of passion and perturbation of the mind, then that which naturally is affencted therewith. now, the Lawe is without all passion, but the mind of man is necessary subject unto perturbations.  
But peradventure some may object, that a good man will recompense the having of affections, by being able to judge in particular cases, which the Lawe cannot do, and therefore that it is necessary that he bee the Lawe-disposer: and also that there bee laws written, yet not fully confirmed and vnuiolable, in regard that they may differ and varie from the truth, namely in those things which are not within the compass of the laws,( albeit in other things they must bee ratified) as in this question, Whether one good man solely, or many together ought to govern? For now adays many assembled together, do discuss, consult, and judge of matters; and all these judgements are of particular cases: Therefore one, whatsoever he bee, compared to many, is far inferior( for a city consisteth of many) even as a banquet prepared and furnished by many, is more exquisite then a simplo Table: And therefore a multitude iudgeth better then any one is able to do. Further, a multitude is less subject to corruption then one, like as water, the more plentiful it is, the less it putrefieth. But when as one judge is overcome with choler, or any other passion, then must the iudgement needs bee depraved: Whereas in a multitude, all of them cannot bee choleric or deceived. But let us suppose a multitude, which do nothing contrary to the Lawe, but that which they needs must: or if that bee hard to bee found amongst many, yet at least, if they were many good men and good citizens, the question is, whether these many good, bee more or less subject to corruption then one? if it bee replied that they will bee seditio●s, which one cannot bee: I answer, that being good and virtuous in mind, they are indeed but as one, though many. If therefore wee determine the government of many good men to bee an aristocraty; and of one, a regality or Monarchie● sure an aristocraty will bee more welcome to cities; then a monarchy, whether the estate bee joined with authority, or without: For as much as there are to bee found many of like quality. And therefore in times past they suffered themselves to bee governed by kings, because many excellent and worthy persons were not then extant, especially when as they inhabited small cities. Furthermore, kings were created onely for their bountifulness, which bountifulness is the proper office of good men: but when as plenty of these virtuous and good men began to abound, then they could not any longer endure the dominion of one, but sought for a c●rtaine community, and so ordained a commonweal. Afterwards when these began again to decline and wax worse, enriching themselves by the common good, it is likely, that from thence arose Oligarchies, where riches are held in so high honour and account. again, from these they grew first to Tyrannies, and then from tyrannies to Democrati●s: for when through a greedy desire of gain, they contracted the government to fewer and fewer, by this means they fortified the multitude, in such sort, that they invading and spoiling the Tyrant of his power, set up a democratical government. And then Cities growing great, it was not easy to change by bringing in any other. moreover, if it were more expedient for Cities to bee governed by Kings, what should become of their children? must they also reign in their fathers steades? But what if they degenerate from their fathers virtues, would not their regiment bee dangerous? But some will say, that the father having all in his own power, will not bequeath the kingdom to his children? I but this is not credible, and besides it is a virtue that human Nature is not capable of: Besides, there is a diffic●lt question concerning the power of the King, whether he ought to bee guarded with any power continually about him, whereby to constrain to subiection the disobedient: or by what other means he should deal in keeping them in obedience. For albeit that he bee a legitimate and absolute lord, not attempting any thing contrary to the lawe, yet it is necessary for him to haue a power, whereby to preserve and maintain the sacred laws. But it may bee it is no hard matter to decide this doubt in regard of such a King: for he must needs haue a power always in readiness, but such a power that may bee stronger then every one in particular, or many together, and yet weaker then the whole multitude. Such guards did the ancients give to him whom they created their AEsymnete, as they termed him, that is to say, their Tyrant. And Dionysius demanding of the Syracusians a guard for his defence, a certain man counseled them to appoint him one of that quantity.  
To the four former kindes of kingdoms is adjoined a fift, which is properly called a kingdom, where the weal public is administered at the Princes will, with regard had to the general profit and commodity of the subiects. Which kind of kingdom is like unto an Oeconomie: for albeit that a governor of a family ordereth his house at his own will and pleasure, yet nevertheless he hath respect to the commodity of the whole family. now, all these sorts of kingdoms are reduced to two extremes, to wit, the Lacedemonian, and the absolute. After, vpon the occasion of the Lacedemonian royalty, which was nothing else but a commission, or military superintendance over the armies, he taketh occasion to dispute whether it bee behoveful or no for Cities to haue a perpetual captain. Also whether it bee better to choose him for his virtues, or to take him always out of the same stock and lineage by the right of succession. But relinquishing such a form of kingdom which may bee in every state, the Philosopher resteth himself principally vpon the perfect and absolute royalty, disputing whether it is better to bee governed by good laws, or by a good man. They which prefer a good man before good laws, do lay the cause vpon this, because it is impossible to ordain by laws that which is principally just, but onely that which is usually so, the affairs and common dealing of men being so inconstant and so changeable, that it cannot bee otherwise: albeit that the universal reason of the law ought to be well understood of the gouernours of a commonweal. They again which prefer good laws before a good man, say that the Lawe is without affections, wherewith the mind of man is sore disturbed; as anger, fear, ambition, avarice, hatred, and such like, which pervert men placed in seat of iustice and authority, yea even the best of them. Therefore he that would haue the law to comm●nd, would haue God to command, and an intelligence without affection: but he that would haue a man, admitteth therewith a beast, for so is mans nature ouerswaied with affections: for this cause it seemeth more expedient to bee governed by laws. But because both of these parts bee true, he proceedeth to dispute, whether it be better to be governed by one good man, or by a multitude? Which question is interdebated, pro& contra, affirmatively and negatively, as well in this Chapter, as in the next, where it is resolved and discussed. Herodotus in his third book, called Thalia, handeleth the same controversy: and so also doth Dionysius Halicarnasseus in the twelfth book of the Roman antiquities. And Socrates in his Oration to Symachus.  
THE first which flourished in the heroic times over such as voluntarily subjecteth themselves in certain definite matters.] Such were the kings of egypt at the beginning, who lived not disordinately, as others that exercised Lordship and dominion, whose onely will served them instead of a lawe, but followed the constitutions of the laws, both in collecting their duties and tributes, and also in the manner and frame of their living. And they which served and ministered unto them, were not slaves, or of a servile condition, whether they were born and brought up in the house, or brought from elsewhere: but onely the sons of Nobles and Princes, of the age of twenty yeares, instructed in all Sciences of learning, were deputed for the service of the kings, to the end that the king being stirred 〈◇〉 by the view of those that were about him, might keep himself from committing any thing worthy of reproach: And surely it happeneth not seldom, that great Lords become wicked and corrupt, especially when they haue seruants and ministers to flatter and applaud, and set forward their sensual desires and affections. There were certain appointed and set houres both by night and day, wherein the king was bound to do that which the lawe permitted. The king rising in the morning, the first thing that he was to do, was to receive all the letters and petitions which were presented unto him, to the end, that by giuing answer to necessary matters, all his affairs might bee marshaled in good order, and by discretion. This done, after that he had washed his body before the Princes of his kingdom, attiring himself with rich and costly robes, he went to the Temple, to offer sacrifice to the gods. And there this was the custom of the Arch-prelate or chief Priest, that after the oblations and sacrifices offered vpon the Altar, the king being present, to pray with a loud voice in the hearing of the people, for the health, prosperity, and good fortune of the said king, who observed and executed iustice amongst his subiects. And then the Arch-priest recounted severally the virtues of their king, both howe he used observance, and religion in the service of the gods, and gentleness and courtesy towards men: and further that he was a continent, just, magnanimous, true, and liberal Prince, refraining his lusts, punishing malefactors with a more easy and remiss punishment then the greatness of their offence and misdeeds required, and recompensing his subiects with greater rewards and favours, then their virtues merited. And then after all this thus spoken, he pronounced a bitter curse and malediction against all wicked ones, excusing and purging the king from all blame, and laying the fault if there were any, vpon his servants, that counseled and persuaded him to such unreasonable things. This done, the said Arch-prelate exhorted the king to a happy life, conformable to the gods, and likewise to virtue and good conditions, and to practise not that which wicked men counseled him, but that which appertained to honour and virtue. And finally, the king having sacrificed a Bull to the gods, the Priest did read out of a certain holy book, certain noble exploits and enterprises of great and excellent personages, to the end, that after their example, the king by imitation might learn to use his authority and domination justly and virtuously. Neither was the time onely prescribed by the ancient laws, wherein the King should exercise himself about the matters of his own treasures and revenue, and the controversies of his subiects, but also the time to walk and to bath, to lie with his wife, and of all other exercises. These kings lived vpon a very simplo diet, as of veal, and goose, for all their messes. As touching Wine, there was a certain measure expressly appointed them, which they might not pass, to glut and make themselves drunk withall: yea and the whole order and course of their diet was so limited and moderated, that it seemed rather to haue been ordained by some expert physician, then by any wise lawgiver. And sure this is a thing deserving admiration, that the kings of egypt lived not at their pleasures like other Kings, but onely according to the ordinance of the lawe: but this is more strange and admirable, that they had no power nor authority to judge, to collect subsidies, or to punish any man through anger or any other unjust occasion, but were altogether like private persons, subject to the laws: and yet they endured it patiently, esteeming it the chiefest happiness that could betid, to bee obedient to such ordinances and constitutions: for those that did otherwise, and lived at their own pleasure, they thought them miserable, by being subject to so much danger and hurt, as usually accompanieth such actions. And in truth, they which often offend willingly, are overcome either with friendship, or evil will, or some other passion of the mind, or do stray of set purpose out of the right path: but othe●● that order and guide their lives by counsel and good aduise, do offend in few things. Therefore the kings of egypt exercising such bounty and lenity towards their subiects, gained so much their love and obedience, that not onely the egyptian Priests, but also the whole multitude of common people, had more care and regard of the safety and person of the king, then of their own wives and children, yea then of all the rest of the Princes of the land. And certainly the most part of their kings, having followed the common ordinances and customs of their Countrey● died after they had reigned a happy reign, whilst this observance of the laws continued amongst them: and besides, haue brought under their subiection many strange nations, and thereby heaped up great treasures, by the means whereof, the country hath been enriched with many excellent buildings, and sumptuous works, and the cities beautified and endowed with many gifts and largesses. Also those costly buildings which the egyptian people erected to their kings after their deaths, are ample witnesses of the good will and love which they bore unto them; insomuch, that they honoured them not onely whilst they lived, but also when they were dead: for whensoever any of their kings came to the point of death, all the people with one eye and voice wailed and lamented exceedingly, they tore their garments, and the Temples being shut, they neither frequented the markets, nor any public places, nor celebrated any feasts or solemnities, but besmearing their heads with dirt for the space of threescore and twelve dayes, being girded about, both men and women with sheets, of whom, to the number of two or three hundred, environed the kings corpes twice a day, reiterating their grief, and recounting his virtues in epitaphs and songs. They abstained also all that while from eating any living thing, from hot meats, from Wine, from all costly apparel, from service at the Table, from washings, oyntings, and gorgeous beds, and all other matters of pleasure and delight, and only gave themselves to weeping and lamenting, as if their own children had been dead. And after that in this time of mourning, all things requisite for the obsequies and funerals were prepared: the last day they put the dead body into a coffer close shut, at the entry of the sepulchre, and there recited summarily after their accustomend manner, all the worthy deeds which the king acheeued whilst he lived: Also he that would, was allowed to accuse death. The Priests being present, commended with a loud voice the kings good deeds, and the people which stood about the obsequies, rejoiced at the true commendations,& contradicted the false, with a tumultuous noise. Whereupon it hath come to pass, that many kings of egypt( by reason of the resistance of the multitude) haue been deprived of the honor and magnificence due unto their funerals, the fear whereof hath compelled these kings to live justly, least after their death they should incur the everlasting indignation& hatred of their subiects. This was the ancient manner of living of the kings of egypt, Diod● Sicilian Biblioth, lib. 1. cap. 8.  
THE beginning of the question is, Whether it bee more expedient for a commonweal to bee administered by a good man, or by good laws.] Many are of this mind, that the government of men ought not to bee committed to one alone, but that it is necessary to search out a more divine thing, to take charge of men, as is easy to conjecture by the example of many sorts of brute beasts. For amongst sheep, one sheep doth not govern the whole flock; and amongst Horses and Oxen, one Horse or ox do not govern the whole Heard: but man is he, that excelling and being more Noble then all other creatures, hath the conduct and guidance of brute beasts: whose worth, how much it surpasseth all other unreasonable creatures, is notoriously known. By the like reason( if wee desire to haue matters succeed according to our wils) it is meet that some thing more excellent then man do govern the societies of men. But because in all the world there is not a governor to bee found, more noble or better then man, and that also man is a creature of great variety, composed of diverse parts, forasmuch as by the inferior faculties of the mind, he hath a certain communion with brute beasts, and by the superior powers approacheth in some sort unto the immortal gods: That part therfore of man which is divine and immortal, ought to hold the raynes of government amongst men, which according to the iudgement and opinion of all, is the understanding, which is nothing else but a certain beam of the heavenly light infused into the natures of mens mindes. Therefore it cannot bee that a commonweal should bee well provided for, if the government thereof bee committed to a man, who by the brutall faculties of his mind, is often disturbed and diverted out of the right way of reason: but it must bee committed to this pure understanding, which is free from all disquietness and perturbations of the mind. The which( when as by other means it could not bee done) seemeth to bee attained unto through the providence of God, by the invention of good laws: which is nothing else but to haue the charge of government laid vpon the understanding and reason, which are not subject to the tempests of perturbations. To the which benefit and gift of the gods, I know not whither( if wee weigh the commodities and profit of them) any other bee equal, or any ways comparable: for first many wise men having conferred together the examples of ancient times, concluded and determined after long consideration, that which seemed best in their iudgement for the enacting of laws, without all fear of being diverted from the truth, either by evil will, by friendship, or any other perturbation of mind: seeing that in the constitution and making of laws, they do not handle the particular cause of any one, as it often happeneth in the deciding of controversies, but of all in general. Then the laws being thus enacted if any man bee found to offend, and constrained to endure the punishment or penalty of his offence, he cannot bear any grudge against the lawgiver, because he knoweth he aimed not at him, but at all: and thus consequently, there is no cause to fear any sedition or rancour, which is the most perilous stain and blot of a commonweal that can be. As also on the contrary side, it cometh to pass, when any is punished without the disposition of the law, many grievous jars and dissensions do arise: for it is almost impossible but that wee should bear evil will unto those, by whom we haue received hurt and damage. Wherefore I know not whether Nature, the mother of all, hath bestowed a greater benefit vpon mankind, then the invention of the laws, which from all antiquity hath always ben ascribed and consecrated to the immortal gods. To this purpose Aristotle before alleged, saith in his book of the World, dedicated to Alexander, That he could find nothing in the world to the which he might resemble God more fitly then to an ancient law in a well ordered city. By the which sentence it appeareth, that in this universality of causes, God is nothing else, but that which is an ancient law in a civil society. he saith further in the same book and next Chapter, that Law is a shining and bright intelligence, not infected with any spots of affection: whereby we may easily perceive that to be true& commodious which wee said before, that is, that some thing more divine then man, sitteth at the stern of human societies to guide& direct thē in the right course. But if we prefer man before the laws, to this charge of government, then the case stands in far greater danger, because it is hard to find many adorned and enabled with wisdom, bounty, and honesty, fit for so great a place, but for the most part they all err in iudgement, and go astray from the truth, through the violent outrage of affections. And if it were possible to find out a man so wise, good, and constant, that he would by no blast of perturbation bee turned aside from his duty, yet notwithstanding( for this excellency) it would not bee convenient to prefer the rule of a man before the principality of the laws, considering that in regard of his frail and mortal nature, he could not long persevere in his duty without offence: whereas on the other side, the only laws are able to join him to eternity. By this which hath been spoken, it seemeth that the sovereignty of government ought to be recommended rather to the determination of the laws, then to the discretion of man. But forasmuch as every thing cannot be comprehended within the laws, it is necessary to commit some cases to the arbitrement of man, and to establish some one as a guardant, vicar and executioner of the laws, who by the disposition and direction of them, may take vpon him the government of the commonweal. But seeing that all cannot bee comprised by the laws, and that it is needful to haue a supreme judge for such causes as come in question: the same doubt ariseth again, which seemed to haue been resolved by the establishment of the laws, to wit, Whether it be better to haue one alone, or a few, or rather the commonalty to be preferred to the tuition of the laws, and to give iudgement in cases which are without the compass of the laws. Albeit that by many mens judgements, the royal and regal government is esteemed the most excellent of all others, and the cheefedome of one alone, of greatest account for worth: Notwithstanding, because of the unconstant mind of man,& proneness to incline to that side which is either not good, or the worse, and because of the brevity of his life, some suppose that the good estate of all ought not to bee reposed vpon such a government, but rather that the chief rule should appertain to the commonalty, because there hath been scarce any regal government, which hath not been soon transformed into a tyranny. On the contrary, wee read that many commonweals or popular governments, haue continued a long time in a flourishing and triumphing estate both in peace and war. But yet sure the multitude of it own nature is very unfit for government, wherefore civil society maintained by concord and unity, will be quiter defaced and broken, except it bee by some devise reduced into an uniform estate: whereupon it cometh to pass, that the wisest which haue learnedly written of civil institutions, determine that a commonweal ought to bee tempered and mixed as it were of a monarchy, an aristocraty, and a democraty, to the end, that by this mixture the discommodities of simplo governments may bee avoided, as it hath been manifested by reasons and examples in the Annotations vpon the second book of this work, and fourth Chapter. Also that question is touched in the eight Chapter of the same book, Whether the Law, or the will of man, be the best rule for policies.   

CHAP. XII. Of an absolute king, and howe people are more disposed to be governed by one sort of government, then by another.  
NOw, whereas we haue discoursed of such a king as governeth all things at his own beck and pleasure, we are to consider further of this matter. For he which is called to be a king lawfully, he doth not as we say, make a show of a kingdom. For in all cities it may come to pass, that the Empire of war may be perpetual as it is in democraty or popular estate, and in aristocraty, that is in the power of the Nobles, and many defer to one the power of administering and moderating the commonweal: for such an Empire is that of the Dyrrachij, and is in some part more strict then that of Opus. But wee are to speak of that kingdom, which in all respects is absolute and entire in itself. But it seemeth to be a thing against Nature that one should bear the whole sway of the Citizens, where the City consisteth of all equals. For they which bee like of Nature, it is necessary naturally that they should haue the same law& dignity: wherefore as to give meate and equal apparel to unequal men, hurteth the bodies: so is it to be reputed of honours. In like sort, it is dangerous to distribute unequal honours to men of equality. Wherefore it is no less just, that these men rule then that they bee subject to rule. And again, it is just that these men rule and obey alike. But this thing is the law: for the law is the description of order. It is therefore more to bee wished, that the lawe bear the whole sway then any particular Citizen. Furthermore, by this sel●esame reason, when some rule, these that rule, are only the keepers and executioners of the laws: for it is necessary that there should be some Magistrates; but one man to rule, they deny to be just, especially where all are equal. And now whatsoever it seemeth the law cannot determine, that also falleth not into the knowledge of man: but after that the lawe hath accurately and diligently instructed men in, it delivereth and committeth the rest to magistrates to be judged and decided by a most just sentence and conscience. But furthermore whatsoever seemeth better to men that haue made trial, then that which the laws written contain, it is permitted to amend. He therfore that would haue conscience or the mind to bee chief and bear rule, he seemeth to will that God and the laws bear sway: but he that would haue a man, addeth also a wild beast. For the cupidity& desire of man is brutish, and anger corrupteth Magistrates, yea every man of the best sort. wherefore the lawe is an intelligence devoid of affection. Further, that example taken from the Arts, seemeth to be false, to wit, to cure such men by precepts and books which are written of the Art of physic, they help nothing, nor hurt any thing. But on the contrary side, it is more fit to use those that are artificers and learned men, and to use their counsel and help: for these do nothing that abhorreth from reason for friendship sake, but having made men whole, receive their reward: But those which are advanced to civil Magistracies, are wont to do many things vpon spite, and also vpon favor, for if so be, the physicians should be suspected that they were brought in by enemies, not to heal, but to kill for lucre sake, then had they rather bee cured by precepts of Art and books, then at the physicians pleasure. And physicians themselves when they are sick, sand for and use other physicians: and the maisters of childrens exercises, when they are exercised themselves, use other maisters of exercises: as though they could not judge and examine the truth, as also because they cannot judge of their own matter: and because they being troubled, should come to judge. Therefore it is manifest, that they that seek the law, seek the mean betwixt both: for the law is the mean. Further, they haue greater authority, and the laws consisting in manners, are of greater moment, then written laws. wherefore a man which governeth a commonweal, less faileth, and is less deceived, then laws written: but not so as laws gotten and confirmed by customs. And now truly it is not easy for one to see many things. It shall be therfore behooveful to appoint many Magistrates. Wherefore what skilleth it whether this thing bee done straightway from the beginning, or whether one may place many after this sort over government: furthermore, if a good man, as it is said before, because he is better then others, is worthy to rule, then shall two good men be better to rule then one good man. For this is it that Diomedes saith in Homer: For when two go together one way. And that which Agamemnon wisheth in the same author: O if I had twice five such counsellors. And there are now Magistrates, who haue the arbitrement and authority of judging, as hath the judge of those things which the law cannot comprehend and define, because the law cannot command and judge after the best sort. For in regard of those things which the lawe cannot determine, no man doubteth of them, but his authority ought to prevail very much. But because some things may bee comprised within the laws, and other things cannot: these things make it doubtful and questionable, whether it bee better that the best lawe or the best man bear sway: for of those things that men consult, there can be no law made. No man therfore pleadeth a cause, but that it is necessary that there bee a man which is to judge of causes: but they will not haue one alone but many, for every Magistrate iudgeth well which is instructed in the lawe. But it may seem per adventure absurd, that any should see more accutely with two eyes, and hear more attentively with two ears him that iudgeth, and deal better, endeavouring with two feet and two hands, then many with many hands and feet. For now those Princes which rule alone, which the Grecians call Monarchs, labour to haue many eyes about them, many ears, many hands,& many feet: for they that favour their dominion and them, these they make their fellowes in the kingdom. If therefore they be not friends, their actions shall not bee approved by the counsel of the Monarch. If they bee friends to him, then are they friends also to his Empire. And a friend is one that is equal and alike. Wherefore, if he thinketh them meet to rule, then bee thinketh that peers and equals equally ought to reign. Those things therefore, which certain dissenting from others dispute against a kingdom are in a maner these. But these things perhaps are true in some cases, though not so in other: for there is a certain kind of men, apt by Nature to bear maisterlike authority, another to royal authority, another to civil society, and to every one of these, one thing is a law, another thing profitable. But the tyrannicall government is against Nature, and so is every other form of governing a commonweal, which swerveth from the right: for these things are done against Nature. But by those things which are spoken, it is manifest, that it is neither expedient nor just, that amongst men of like condition and equals, one should haue the government of all the rest: and if there be not laws, that he should be as a law; neither yet if there be laws. Neither that one good man should sway over many good men, nor one bad man over many bad men: neither if he excel in virtue, but after a certain manner. But what manner this is, must be expounded, although we haue in a manner discoursed of the same hereto●ore. But first we are to define what it is to be fit for a royal Empire, what for aristocratical, and what for civil. Such a multitude therefore is fit to undergo a royal Empire, which is so framed of nature, that it can brook a stock excelling in virtue, to bear civil principality. A multitude therefore is aristocratical, that is, fit to bear sway over free men: such as may be governed by free power of them that excel in virtue: referring their counsels to civil authority:& that is a civil multitude, in the which there is wont to be by nature one military multitude and warlike, which can obey and rule according to law, for dignity and deserts de●erring to rich men Empires and offices. When therefore it shall happen, that either a whole kindred or any one person shal arise, so exceeding the rest in virtue, that his virtue excelleth the virtue of all others, thē is it just, that this be the royal lineage, and that this person haue power over all, and bee an absolute king. For as it is said before, the matter is not only so by the course of law, the which they propound which instruct commonweals, both aristocratical, oligarchical, and democratical: for all do judge, that according to the rate of excellency, honours and offices should bee deferred:( but all esteem not excellency to be one and the same, but some prefer this, and some that) and by that lawe which is before spoken of. For; forsooth it is not meet to desire the death of such a man, or his exilement, or his absence ten yeares out of the city, nor that he bee subject to authority: for Nature will not haue it that the part should excel the whole. But to him whose excellency is so great, this happeneth. Wherefore it remaineth onely, that such a Citizen to whom the rest are to yield obeisance, haue the iudgement and government of all things, not for his own part, or by course, but simply. Of a kingdom therefore, howe many differencies there are, and whether it bee expedient for Cities or no, and to what Cities it is expedient, and after what sort, let it be thus defined and declared by vs. And because wee say there are three forms of governing a commonweal, of these it is necessary that this is the best, which is governed by the best men: and that is such a one wherein it happeneth that some one excelleth all, or a whole kindred or ●●ltitude excelleth in virtue: of which multitude, some are to obey, some to command; in this respect● that they may live well. And in the former books it is shewed of us, that the same virtue ought necessary to be in a good man, that is in a good Citizen in a good city, it is manifest after the same order, and by the same Arts, that there may be a good man and a city appointed, whether it be of a few Noblemen and famous for virtue governed, or whether it bee governed by the Empire of one king. Wherefore there shall bee the same institution, and the same conditions which shall make a good man and a politic man, and one fit to reign. These things thus defined and declared, wee are to endeavour to speak of the best form of administering a commonweal, and after what manner the nature thereof may arise, and be by a certain means ordained: for it is necessary to comment and dispute thereof conveniently, and as the matter requireth.  
All sorts of kingdoms, where the king doth not absolutely command, are not properly kingdoms, neither in very truth is any a kingdom, but that wherein the king hath absolute authority: concerning the which, it is here disputed whether it be just and lawful or no, and after many reasons alleged on both sides, concluded, that considering the nature of people, whereof some are naturally inclined to bee governed after this manner of government, rather then another, where the subiects are fit for a royal government, there it may justly and lawfully bee exercised: in like manner, when there is any man fit for government, who decideth this authority amongst certain chosen friends, making them partakers of the public charges, being men virtuous,( and yet his virtue doth surmount all theirs) that then it is reason that all should obey him, and he being thus qualified, he should bear sway over all, not by course, but absolutely: otherwise, that it is not onely unlawful, but also unprofitable for an equal to reign amongst equals, and for one to bee a lord over all. In like manner Darius in Herodotus, and Amulius in Dyonisius Halicarnasseus, the forealleged books, conclude, touching a King and a Monarch, as also do Socrates in his Oration to Symachus, and Plato in his politic, all of them dignifying Royalty, as a thing ordained of God, who governeth the whole world as a king: and appointed also by nature, which hath engrafted the first ●imilitude of a regal government, not onely in every reasonable person( where the understanding, the purest and divinest part of the soul, commandeth like a king over the appetite and desire; representing in this microcosm or little world, a little interior kingdom) but also in the companies of many brute beasts, as of Bees, which a●knowledge a king amongst themselves: received from all antiquity by the primitive and most ancient Nations, practised at this day amongst the most renowned and warlike people, in the greatest part of the habitable earth. Wherein the Frenchmen ought to be so much the more careful& provident, in that they haue ben from all time commended singularly for the love, obedience, and fidelity, which they bear unto their king, as unto the first, the noblest and most ancient not only of christendom, but also of all the rest of the world.  
but let us speak of that kingdom which is called absolute, where the king doth every thing at his pleasure.] {αβγδ}, That is, an absolute kingdom, where the kings pleasure serveth in stead of law, his word in stead of iudgement, and his life an exemplar discipline of doing well or evil. After this manner haue many of the roman Emperours commanded, usurping full authority over the life and death, goods and honors of their subiects Such is at this day the rule of the great Knes, or Duke of Muscouie, who surpasseth in the severity and rigour of commanding, all the Monarchs of the world; having obtained such authority over his subiects ecclesiastical and ●ecular, that he can dispose both of their lives and goods at his pleasure, no man daring to contradict him. They confess openly that the kings will is Gods will, and that all which he doth, he doth it by the will and direction of God. Prester John createth and advanceth to kingdoms and lordships, such persons as pleaseth him, installing them when he will, and degrading thē again when and as often as it liketh him, having neither regard to right nor wrong, and they that are thus dealt withall, not daring to show any sign of sadness, nor in a maner to take knowledge of it: this opinion being generally engrafted in their hearts, that all that succeedeth well or ill with them, cometh to pass by the unchangeable decree of God. The ancient estate of Persia became like to these under cambyses, Xerxes,& other kings, even until the last Darius, who reduced it into extreme bondage and slavery, more near to a tyranny thē a kingdom, depriving it of that mutual amity which ought to be amongst Princes and subiects, and that politic communion which is requisite to the preservation of every commonweal: in such sort, that though he bore rule over an infinite multitude of men, yet he could put no confidence in them, having made thē unfit for warfare, but was constrained in time of war to use the help of mercenary soldiers and strangers. Plato De Legibus, lib. 3. Aristotle politic, lib. 5. For as Socrates in his Panegericke speaking of the Persians, saieth: That it cannot bee, they being so brought up, and so governing their affairs, that they should either be endowed with any vert●e, or triumph over their enemies: for how can there be amongst them of such conditions, either a good Emperor or a valiant soldier? When the greatest number of thē are a confused multitude, and ignorant of warfare, and as dissolute in war, so more prove to bondage then our seruants. And as for the most honourable and famous of them, they never lived a civil, popular, or politic life, but ever so behaved themselves, that they insulted over some like lords, and served others as bondmen, being men of most corrupt dispositions: their bodies they deck and adorn for riches sake, but in their minds they tremble by reason of authority, for even they wait at the palace gate of the Prince, and lie down and humble themselves most basely at his feet, &c. This corrupt discipline and manner of the Persians, is found fault withall by Xenophon in the end of his Paedia, and noted by Q. Curtius, and Plutarch, and Herodotus, in diverse places. And it is most certain, that the king of Persia, who for a time was the greatest potentate in the world, by usurping a more absolute authority, then was meet, spoiled his estate, by tyrannizing too much over his subiects, whom he esteemed no better then bondslaves, as Plutarch reporteth: and at last utterly ruinated it, even then when he supposed that he had aspired to the top of worldly prosperity, the spring of pride and arrogance. Such is the estate of turkey at this day, resembling much in many things the kingdoms of Persia and Parthia, and the Empire of Rome: over which the great turk reigneth as sole Lord, using his subiects rigorously, as well the Musulmans, as Christians or Iewes, and serving himself in his principal affairs both of war and peace,& matters of government, of abjured slaves that had renounced their faith, whom( as it hath been said before in the ninth chapter) he placeth or displaceth, changeth, or deposeth, as it pleaseth him, without all danger or envy, yea he causeth them to be strangled vpon the least suspicion or discontentment that can arise, not sparing his own children and kindred of blood, if they anger him. But the king of France is set in the midst of an ancient nobility and company of Princes, earls, and Barons, and other Lords, who serving him, and yet having under them subiects also proper unto themselves that respect and reverence them, cannot be deprived of their pre-eminences, without manifest fear of sedition and tumult.  
CONSIDERING that Monarchs make unto themselves many eyes, ears, hands, and feet.] Xenophon in his eight book of his Paedia saith: That Cyrus never got unto himself the true eyes and ears of a king, but by his great liberality: for by rewarding diversly those that had brought him tidings of any thing that was profitable, he brought to pass within a short space, that every one strove to see and hear out many things, the report whereof might benefit the king. From thence it arose, that men attribute unto kings many eyes and ears, which are the two necessary parts of defence for a man. And he is greatly deceived, that requireth in a king but one eye and one ear, for one can hear and see but few things. And if a king should commit the charge of all his affairs to one alone, others would become careless and negligent thereof, and all the world would look at him onely which was reputed to bee the Princes eye. But it behoveth a king to listen to the reports of all such which say they haue seen or heard any thing worthy to be observed. For this cause it is thought that kings haue many eyes and ears, because in all places every one feareth to do or say any thing against the king, as if he continually stood by to hear and see them. By means whereof, there was never any heard of, that spake evil of Cyrus, but all were so affencted to speak well of him, as if his eyes and ears had been present in all places. And hereof I can render no better a reason, but that for small services he rendered always great benefits.  
WHEN therefore it shall happen, that either a whole kindred, or any one person shall arise so, exceeding the rest in virtue, that he surpasseth all others, then is it just, that this bee the royal lineage, and that this person haue power over all, and be an absolute king.] Aristotle politic lib. 7. cap. 3. saith thus: peradventure men esteem it an excellent thing to bear rule over all, forasmuch as by this means a man may be able to perform many honest& just exploits: so that he that is able to govern, ought not to lay the burden of government vpon anothers shoulders, but rather take it from another, without regard had on the fathers part of his children, or on the childrens part of their father, or of one friend to another: for that which is good, is most desirable, and to do well is good. now they that speak thus, possibly say true, if that which is most desirable, could happen to spoilers& destroyers of Countries, which cannot indeed happen unto them, and therefore they presuppose a false ground: for such a one cannot perform virtuous and honest acts, if so bee he do not so far excel all others, as a man doth a woman, or a father his children. Wherefore an offender cannot succeed so well in well doing, because he is already far from virtue. For there is an intercourse of honesty and iustice betwixt equals in bearing rule by turns, for this is inequality; but an inequality amongst equals, and a dissimilitude amongst those that are like, is contrary to nature: and that which is contrary to nature cannot bee honest. If therefore any other bee found excelling the rest in virtue, and ability to perform good deeds, it is an honest thing to yield unto him, and a just thing to obey him, for he ought to haue not onely virtue to work, but also power wherewith to work. Therefore such persons that so much excel others in generosity, vigour of mind and body, as the soul doth the body, or a man doth the brute beasts, are by reason of their excellency worthy to command as kings, and to haue absolute dominion over all. Such were Cyrus, Alexander, Iulius Caesar, octavian, charlemagne, and others like unto them, who far surpassed the virtue, felicity, and common reputation of other Princes, whom wee must not think to haue been sent by chance into this world, but by the will of God, who adorned them with so many rare and excellent virtues, and exalted them to so high a pitch of honour and authority, to the end, to give order to human affairs, to correct the abuses of men, to found Monarchies and Empires, and to bring in good ordinances and laws, to promote Arts and learning, and to cause the name of God to bee feared and reverenced, whose births and deaths were long before foreseen and foretold by Oracle, Prophesies, and signs, in heaven and earth.  
FOR all do judge, that according to the rate of excellency, honours and offices should bee deferred.] The Medes laid the sway of government vpon one Deioces, because of his sufficiency in giuing iudgement, and of that good iustice which he practised amongst them, according to the report of Herodotus in his first book, which I thought good to transcribe into this place, as very fit for this present matter touching a king and a kingdom. The Medes( saith he) inhabiting towns and villages, amongst them there was found one Deioces, a man highly reputed of in his territory, and who applying his heart to iustice, executed the same most carefully: And albeit, that throughout all the country of Medea, the bridle was let loose to all licentiousness and liberty, yet he well knowing that iustice was an enemy unto 'vice, behaved himself so notwithstanding: which the inhabitants of his Town understanding, choose him for their judge. In which estate( as one that longed after dominion) he demeaned himself so justly and uprightly, and gained to himself so great reputation, that the other towns began to understand howe that Deioces was the onely man in the country, that gave iudgement according to right and equity. Wherefore they flocked unto him to haue iustice on all sides, because of the unjust sentences and wrongs which they had before sustained: and at last it came to that pass, that they came to none but him, yea that every day a great multitude flocked to him in regard of his upright dealing. But when he perceived that all the country relied vpon him, then he would no longer keep Court in his accustomend place, nor exercise the office of a judge, alleging that by employing himself to distribute iustice unto others● he neglected his own affairs, and so endamaged himself. Then again, robberies, riots, and insolences rebudded amongst the Medes more then before. To prevent the which mischiefs, they assembled together, and disputed of the provision of offices: at what time, in mine opinion the friends of Deioces spake most bravely. For, maisters( said they) if wee will always live in that kind of life which wee now led, it is impossible for us to remain any longer in this country: Wherefore wee aduise to establish a king amongst us, which is the onely means to provide, that our country may bee justly and uprightly governed, and to return us back to the discharge of our charges: and so it will come to pass, that wee shall not bee any more destroyed and ruined by our perverse conditions. With these speeches, they stirred up this persuasion, that a king was needful. This door being opened, presently every one bethought them of Deioces, and extolled him so greatly, until by one consent he was chosen and established for their king. This done, he commanded them that they should help to build him a house fit for a king, and design him a guard for his safety. The Medes presently laid to their industrious hands, and erected for him a great and strong castle in the place which he had marked out, and suffered him to choose whom he would to bee of his guard. he perceiving himself thus confirmed king, constrained the Medes moreover to build him a city, and to furnish it royally with all things necessary. They obey, and builded at his direction high and strong walls, enclosed within each other, which at this day are called Ecbatanes. The description of the building is on this manner, one of the walls is not higher then the other, except in the prospects or Turrets: The situation of the place helpeth much, being found vpon a little hill: but that which most sheweth their industry is this, that there are seven enclosures of walls, environed one within another. Within the last and least of them is the kings palace, where all the treasures are preserved, the widest of them is as large as the whole city of Athens. The Turrets of the first enclosure, are enameled with white, of the second with black, of the third with carnation, of the fourth with azure, of the fift with Orange tawny, of the sixth and seventh, the one with silver, and the other with gold. Deioces( all things being thus performed) commanded the people to lodge round about the city:& afterwards he was the first that ordained, that none should date to present himself before the King, but by his huishers and messengers, also that none should bee so bold, as to look the King on the face, and that it should bee accounted a base and dishonest part, either to laugh or spit before the King. The Medes do most willingly observe all these laws, to the end, that those which are of the same age with the King, and haue been brought up with him as men of worth, in looking vpon him, should not bee discontented, and so conspire against him. These decrees thus decerned by Deioces, thinking that now his state was most sure and settled, he began to be very rigorous in iustice, and commanded, that from that time forward, they should sand him their suits in writing, to give iudgement vpon them so, and then return them to the parties again, and so he administered iustice. To conclude, he ordained, that if any should enterprise any thing against his majesty, he should bee called before him, to receive punishment answerable to the quality of his offence: and to the end he might bee still advertised of such dealings, he had his spies and intelligencers in every corner of his kingdom, to give him notice thereof. After this manner, Deioces brought under subiection the Nation of the Medes, and made himself their King and Lord.    

THE fourth book OF ARISTOTLES CIVIL GOVERNMENT, TRANSLATED out OF greek, AND FRENCH, INTO ENGLISH. The Argument.  
THe Philosopher setteth down in the beginning, what consideration a lawgiver or a Politician ought to haue in the establishing of a Commonweale: then continuing the intent of the former book, he resumeth the division of commonweals, rendering a reason why there are many sorts thereof. And as he had before divided a kingdom into many kinds, so here he divideth the democraty, and oligarchy, aristocraty, and Tyranny, into their kinds also: declaring in like maner why there are many kinds of them: not that this latter deserveth to be numbered among Common-weales, but to the end that this politic discourse may be more accomplished. After he entreateth of that government which is properly called a commonweal, which is compounded of a democraty and an oligarchy, showing what commonweal is the best and the stablest, and what is most fit for what people. After he propoundeth three principal parts in them all, to wit, the counsel, the magistrates& the judgements; discoursing of their reasons, forms, and manners, according to the diversity of estates.  

CHAP. I. What a Politician or a lawgiver ought to consider in the establishing of a commonweal.  
IN all Arts and Sciences which are not handled in part, but are in some one kind perfect and accomplished, it is the same mans part to consider what is fit for every kind: as for example, what exercise is most meet for every body, and which is the best( for it is requisite that the best should be applied to him that is by nature best informed and furnished with the best qualities) and which to all for the most part is alike: For this is the office of the Art of exercising the bodies. moreover, if any do not desire a right habit or seat in the highest degree of perfection, neither doth covet a perfect knowledge of those things which do appertain to the labour of exercise: Notwithstanding, it is the part of him that hath government over the exercise of children, and of him which doo●● profess to teach the Art of the exercise of the body, to bee able to deliver even this same faculty. And this likewise, both in the Art of healing, and in the Art of building ships, and in that Art which pertaineth to apparel, and in every other Art also, we see to fall out. Wherefore it is manifest, that it is belonging to the same science, both to consider which is the best form of governing a commonweal, and which and what manner were most to bee wished, and according to our mind, no outward thing hindering the same, and which were fit and convenient for all: For many to attain the best, is peradventure hurtful. Wher●fore a lawgiver, and he which is very cunning in the ruling of a city, and as the Grecians ●earme him, a Politician, ought not to bee ignorant in that which is simply the most excellent, neither in that, which for the subject thereof, is the best of all: finally, he ought not to bee ignorant of that which consisteth of condition, or as I may so term it, of supposition, that is, which is agreeable to any end proposed: For he ought also to bee able to see that which by chance is offered: both howe from the beginning it was ordained, and howe being once ordained, it might bee longest conserved. But for example sake I say, if it happen to any city that it neither use the best form of government, neither bee furnished with things necessary, neither yet do yield such administration of a commonweal as the nature of things which are present doth require, but some far worse: As for example sake, above all these things, he ought to know which is most fit for all cities: for many of those which haue set forth and written somewhat of the administration of a city, albeit they speak many things excellently, yet do they err from the utility thereof: for wee must not weigh the best onely, but even that same which may bee the best, and that also which is the more easy and more common to all. But nowe● some onely seek the form of government of the commonweal placed in the highest degree of dignity and excellency, and wanting much furniture and provision, and great expense: others rather remembering some vulgar commonweal, disallowing and condemning all other forms of government of a commonweal which are usually received, do allow and commend the Laconike, or some other. But that description and ordination of the government of a commonweal is to bee commended and persuaded unto men, which they may easily, despising and rejecting their present laws, both approve and transfer to the common use and practise in the exercise of a civil life. For it is no less labour and business to change the form of the government of a commonweal, then to institute any new from the beginning: As it is harder to forget what is learned, then to learn at the beginning. Wherefore, besides this which is already said, as politic man ought to heal and assist those forms of the government of a commonweal which were usually received, as is aforesaid: But he cannot excel herein, that is ignorant how many kinds of governing a commonweal there are. But now, some think there is one democraty, and one oligarchy, but it is not so: wherefore he ought not to bee ignorant, howe many differences of forms of the government of a commonweal there bee, and by howe many means they are coupled and combined: with this same wisdom also the best laws and forms of the government of a commonweal which are agreeable, must bee known and considered: For the laws are to bee made for the government of the commonweal, and so a●● 〈◇〉 of all; and not the commonweal for the laws. For the commonweal is a description of order in cities pertaining to Magistracies and Empires, howe they are divided, and what it is, that in the commonweal should bear the chiefest sway and authority ● and finally, what is the end of every society. But the laws, by which they should restrain the Magistrates, and those which offend against the laws, are separated from those which declare the form of government of the commonweal. Wherefore it is evident, th●● i●●● requisite in setting forth of laws, to observe both the differencies and number of the form of the government of the commonweal: for it is impossible that the same lawe●s should bee fit for all Oligarchies and democracies, if there bee many kindes of each of them, and 〈◇〉 onely democraty, and one onely oligarchy.  
Because Aristotle in the former book divided policies into three goo● and three bad: he declareth by the example of other Arts and Sciences, as of the Art of exercise, of physic, of Building ships, and making apparel, that it is necessary for the perfection and understanding of a good Politician to declare, not only which is the best and most to bee desired form of government, but also which is a good one, not simply, but in regard of the commodities thereof, such as they bee: and thirdly, that also which is supposed to bee good, although it bee not. And then every form of policy being propounded, to know howe it was first established: and next, how and by what laws it is governed: also to bee able to judge what form is most common and usual, that is to say, fit for most cities: and lastly, howe many parts and branches every policy hath, and what laws are most agreeable to every kind.   

CHAP. II. he resumeth the division of commonweals, propounded in the former book: and declareth how bad ones are opposed unto the good.  
SInce wee haue declared in handling of the forms of commonweals, that there are three right forms, to wit, the kingdom, the aristocraty, and that which wee properly call a commonweal: and three transgressions answerable unto them, to wit, a tyranny to a kingdom, the oligarchy to the aristocraty, and the democraty to the commonweal. And that wee haue already entreated of the aristocraty and the kingdom( f●r to speak of the best form of commonweal, is nothing else but to dispute about those names, because both of them must bee framed according to virtue, and furnished with necessary and commodious things) and also since wee haue expounded how an aristocraty and a kingdom do differ, and howe a kingdom is to bee esteemed, it remaineth that we now began to speak of a commonweal, rightly taken, and of other forms of government, namely the oligarchy, democraty, and Tyranny. For it is necessary that that which declineth from the chiefest and most divine, bee the very worst. But a kingdom of necessity either hath the name of a kingdom onely, when it is indeed no kingdom: or for the great excellency of him which beareth rule, it is manifest. Wherefore a Tyranny, which is the worst, is farthest differing from this form of government of a commonweal. In the second place of badness is an oligarchy, from which the aristocraty far dif●ereth: but the democraty is the most moderate and tolerable. moreover, a certain one of those which haue written before us, hath been of the same opinion, and yet not regarding the same which we do: For he supposed, of all the forms of commonweals which are good, of which sort is the right and laudable oligarchy or aristocraty, and such others; that a democraty is the worst amongst them, and the best amongst the bad● f●r wee do call those onely depraved and estranged from the right, and that it is neither meet, nor right to say that our oligarchy is better then another, but less evil, but of such opinion, let use spare at this present to speak. First of all, wee must distinguish howe many differences of forms of commonweals there bee, Whether there are many kindes both of democraty and oligarchy: then, which is most common and most to bee wished and desired, next after the best: And whether any other government of a commonweal bee aristocratical, and from the beginning well instituted, and apt for very many Cities, as it is: then, which of the other it is, and by what men it ought to be desired. For peradu●nture to some the democraty seemeth more necessary than the oligarchy, and to others the contrary. moreover, by what means it were requisite for him that would undertake this, to ordain these forms of commonweals, namely, every kind of democraty, and likewise of oligarchy. Lastly, when wee haue briefly entreated of all these, so as the matter requireth, wee must endeavour to pursue, both what things are hurtful and pestiferous to these forms of governments, and which are wholesome, both commonly and separatelie to each, and for which causes chiefly they are wont to decay, or bee conserved by Nature.  
having repeated those things which were handled in the former book, the Philosopher propoundeth briefly those whereof he intendeth to speak in this fourth and fift books, affirming, that of all naughty forms of commonweals, a tyranny is the worst, being a transgression of a kingdom: which of good forms, is the best. Next to a tyranny, that an oligarchy is most vicious, as being contrary to an aristocraty:& that a democraty amongst them that are bad, is least bad, and most tolerable, seeing it is opposed to a commonweal properly taken, which holdeth the last place amongst those that are good.  
MOREOVER, a certain one of those which haue written before us, hath ben of the same opinion, and yet not regarding the same which we do.] This certain one is Plato, who in his Dialogue iutituled the Politician, or, De Regno, writeh thus of a democraty, {αβγδ}, &c.   

CHAP. III. Why there are diuers forms of governments.  
THat therefore there are many kindes of commonweals, the cause is, in that there are many parts of every city. First, wee see all cities to consist of faculties, and then in this multitude, it is necessary that some bee poor, and some rich, and some betwixt both: and again, amongst rich and poor men, that some be addicted to arms, others to peace: and of the people, that some bee Husbandmen, others merchants, and others Artificers. There is also a difference among the Nobles, both in regard of their riches, and largeness of their possessions, ●● to keep stables of horses, which cannot bee done without riches. Wherefore in such cities which in time past had their force consisting in Horsemanship, Oligarchies were in use. They used horses against their neighbour enemies, as the Etrerians, Chalcidians, and Magnesians, dwelling near to Meander, and many other people of Asia. Besides the difference of riches, there is another in regard of race, and another in regard of virtue, and what other thing else of like sort, which wee haue made a part of a city, when as we entreated of an aristocraty, where wee declared howe many parts were necessary in a city. Sometimes all these parts are in a commonweal: sometimes more of them, sometimes fe●er. Whence i● is manifest, that necessary there are many commonweals differing from each other i● kind: forasmuch as the parts of them differ after the same manner. For a commonweal is the order and disposition of Magistrates which are distributed, either according to the power of them who are partakers of it, or according to some other common equality belonging to poor and rich, or some other thing common to both. It is therfore necessary that there be so many commonweals, as there are orders, according to the excellencies and differences of parts. But it seemeth, that principally there are but two, as we say of the winds, that some are northern,& some southern,& the rest the excesses of these: so in commonweals there are but two chief kinds, the democraty and the oligarchy: for they make the aristocraty a branch of oligarchy, as if it were a kind of oligarchy; and that other which is properly a commonweal, to bee a branch of the democraty, as in the winds they refer the south-west and Southeast, all to the South. The like is to be observed in harmonies of music, as some say, whereof they make two kinds, the Dorian, and the phrygian, and call all other consorts, compounds of these two. So they are wont to esteem of commonweals, but it is both truer and better, as we haue said, that there being two right forms, or one, that all the other be transgressions, as in music of good harmony, so here of a good commonweal: and that those be oligarchical, which are more severe and lordly: and those democratical, which are more gentle and remiss.  
The cause why there are many forms of commonweals, and many branches of every form, is, because in every city there are many parts, by the diversity whereof, the governments also are made diverse, so that they are sometimes held by one part,& sometimes by another, it being not possible through human inconstancy, that they should remain always in one stay: for some are rich, others poor, a third sort in a mean estate: again, some are armed, others disarmed, others tilers of the ground, Artificers and Merchants. In like manner, Noblemen are distinguished according to the diversity of Countries, by stock, wealth, virtue, and learning. Notwithstanding, all these parts whereof the total is composed, do not make this diversity, but only those parts which belong to the form and essence of the state: as Artificers, and other such base persons do not properly diuersifie the government, but those which appertain to the form and essence thereof, as poor and rich, noble and virtuous, a●d such like. Seeing therefore that a commonweal is the order of Magistrateships, and that such parts do communicate the estate in greater or lesser number: necessary, there must needs be so many kinds and sorts of commonweals, as there are differences in that order. All which kinds may be reduced into two, to wit, an oligarchy, and a democraty, as all the winds are reduced to two chief, Boreas and Auster, called now adays by mariners, the North and the South; and all the harmonies of music are reduced to the Dorian& the phrygian: so that as all other tunes are transgressions of these two, so all other commonweals do seem to be transgressions of a kingdom& an aristocraty, the most severe& lordly, resembling Oligarchies,& the most licentious and mildred, democracies.   

CHAP. IIII. That a democraty and an oligarchy are not simplo forms: and that there are many sorts and kinds of democracies.  
NOw we must not frame our democraty so simplo as some haue accustomend to do, to be onely where the multitude commandeth: forasmuch as in Oligarchies, and every where, the greatest part beareth rule: nor an oligarchy to bee where a few govern. For if all were a thousand and thr●e hundred, and amongst them there were a thousand rich men, and these did not communicate the government to the three hundred poor and free men equal to them in other things, their estate should never bee judged to be Demo●raticall. In like manner, if the poor were few, and could do more then many rich; this should not bee called an oligarchy: nor if there were any other kind where the honours were not conferred vpon rich men. Therefore then the estate is rather to be ●●armed Popular, when free men govern: and then oligarchical, when rich men govern. But it happeneth, that the number of the one is small, and of the other great, there being many fre●, and few rich: for if offices should be bestowed according to the greatness of stature, as some say was wont to bee done in AEthiopia, or according to beauty, it would bee an oligarchy: forasmuch as there are but few faire and great: Notwithstanding, it is not sufficient to limit commonweals by such things, but seeing there are many kinds of people and Oligarchies, wee must set down this, that it is not a Popular estate, if a few free men command over many that are not free, as in Auellone vpon the Ionicke sea, and in There: because that in these two Cities the honours and offices were in the hands of the most noble, and the first inhabitants, which were but a handful among many. Neither should it bee a Popular estate, if the rich should surmount in multitude, as it was in time past at Colophon: where the elders of the City possessed great inheritances before that war which they waged with the Lydians. But this is a democraty, when free men being poor, and of a greater number, are lords of the estate: and this is an oligarchy when the rich and Nobles being few in number, haue the rule. Therefore that there are diverse sorts of commonweals, and why, it hath been thus declared. Now it followeth, that wee unfold why there are more kindes yet then haue ben name, and what they are, returning to our former beginning: for wee confess, that every City hath not one onely part but many: as if wee would set down the sorts of living creatures, wee should divide first all that which necessary belongeth to a living creature in general, as the sensitive Organs, and the pla●es of digesting and receiving nourishment, I mean the mouth and the belly; and withal, the parts whereby every living thing is moved. If therefore there bee so many kinds of necessary members onely, and they all differing from each other, as for example, many kinds of mouths and bellies, and moving members: the number of their coniunction must needs make diverse kinds of li●ing creatures: For it is not possible, that the same living creature should haue many differences of mouths, and likewise of ears: so that taking the conjunctions of these parts which may bee taken, wee shall make as many kinds of living creatures, as there are conjunctions of necessary parts. The like to this is found in the forenamed commonweals: for Cities do not consist of one part, but of many, as it hath often been said. Therefore one part is that multitude which is busied in providing victuals, which are called Husbandmen: A second is a multitude of Artificers, exercising their trades, without whom a city cannot be inhabited: A third, of those that frequent markets, occupying themselves in buying and selling, and trafficking, and retailing: A fourth, of mercenary hirelings: A ●if●, of men of war and soldiers, which kind is no whit less necessary then the others, if they would not be slaves unto their enemy. For peradventure it cannot bee, that a city that serveth naturally, should deserve the name of a city, seeing that a city is sufficient of itself: and if it serve it cannot haue that sufficiency. The which is elegantly disputed by Plato in his commonweal, though not sufficiently: For Socrates saith, that a city is compounded of four necessary kindes of people, which are the weaver, the Husbandman, the Tailor and the Builder. Afterwards, as if these were not sufficient, he addeth thereunto the Smith, and the feeders of all necessary cattle: after, the Merchant, and engrosser or retailer: all which things do per●it and accomplish t●e first city, as if a city was ordained for necessity sake only, and not rather for a happy and perfect life, and that it standeth in as much need of Taylors, as of Husbandmen. As touching men of war, he doth not attribute their part unto the city, before that the territories thereof being enlarged,& already extended unto their neighbors, they undertake war. nevertheless, it behoveth that in all these four parts, and all others, there bee always some one to divide the law, and decide controversies. If therefore the soul ought rather to bee esteemed a part of the creature, then the body; sure such as these are rather to bee reckoned parts of a city, then those that belong to necessary use, I mean the military and judging part, and those of the counsel, which is a work of civil wisdom: neither maketh it any matter in regard of this speech, whether these be separately in some men, or jointly in the same: for oftentimes it falleth out, that the same men are soldiers and ploughmen. Wherefore if both these and those are parts of a City, it is no doubt, but that soldiers are necessary parts thereof. The seventh part is of those who help and sustain the commonweal with their wealth, called rich men. The eight, of those that manage the public charges, and exercise the offices, forasmuch as a city cannot bee without Magistrates. Therefore it is requisite that there be four which are capable of government, to discharge this office in the City, either continually, or by course: and also such as we spake of but lately, to wit, Counsellors and Iudges. If therefore these things are required in cities well and justly administered, there must needs also bee required some that are partakers of virtue, concerning matters of state. now, some are of opinion, that diverse faculties may be in the same persons, as the same men to be soldiers, ploughmen, and Artificers, yea and also Counsellors and Iudges. All these do ascribe virtue unto themselves, and think themselves worthy to bear many offices, but it is impossible that the same persons should bee both rich and poor: Wherefore the poor and rich seem to be principally the parts of a city. moreover, because that commonly the one of these are few in number, the other many, they seem to bee parts that are contrary to the parts of a city, so that they do frame and erect commonweals according to their excess; and so seem to be double, a democraty and an oligarchy. That therefore there are many commonweals, and for what causes there are so, it hath been already declared. Let us now also make manifest, that there are many sorts of democracies& Oligarchies, which nevertheless is manifest already by that which went before, for there are many sorts of people,& many kinds of Nobles. The Husbandmen make one sort of people, Artificers another, merchants that occupy buying and selling, a third; those that frequent the seas, a fourth; of whom some also follow the war, others seek for lucre, some are posts and carriers, others fishers: for in many places there is a great multitude of such people, as in Tarentum and Bizance of fishers, in Athens of galley slaves, in AEginum and Chio of Merchants, in Tenedos of Carriers: also handicraftmen, and those that possess so little goods, that they are not allowed to bee idle, the fift: and lastly, those which are not free men by both sides, and any other such like multitude of people. That kinds of noblemen are distinguished by riches, lineage, virtue, learning, and other such like things of the same difference. Therefore the first democraty is that which consisteth principally in equality, for the law of such a democraty noteth equality, forbidding that the rich, and that neither the one nor the other exercise any lordship, but that the condition of both be alike: for if liberty and equality be principally in a democraty, as some think, it shall bee then especially, when as all partake of the commonweal alike. But because the people is superior in number, and that that which pleaseth the most, is always ratified, it must needs be, that this must be a popular estate: this then is one kind of democraty. Another, is where Magistracies are conferred according to riches, although they be but small, so that it may be lawful to the possessor of riches to accept of them, and not to him that shal be without them. Another kind of democraty is, when as every citizen without reproach may partake of the government, the law notwithstanding bearing chief authority. Another is, when as every one may become a Magistrat, so that he be a citizen, and that the lawe haue the chief pre-eminence. Another is, where all other things abiding in the same stay, the multitude ruleth, and not the law● which is done when the decrees of the multitude prevail, and not the law, by means of the guiders of the people: for in democracies which are governed by law, there is no chief guider and conductor of the people, but the best Citizens hold there the chiefest place; but where the laws do not bear rule, there they make unto themselves guiders and captains. For when one is set up out of many, then the people becometh a monarch, because many are lords, not as it were separately, but rather altogether as one. When as Homer saith, that it is not good that many should govern: whether he means this government, or some other, where many govern a part every one by himself, it is uncertain. Therfore such a people, as if it were a Monarch, seeks to bear rule alone, refusing to be subject to the law, and so becometh a lordly form of government, in such sort, that flatterers are there in great estimation,& such a people is in government most like a Tyrant, because in both, there reign the like comditions,& both command their betters:& the popular decrees are like unto the tyrants commandements,& the ringleader of the people,& flatterer& fa●●rer of a tyrant, are of the same nature,& in the same credit, the one towards tyrants, the other towards the people. They are causers& procurers, that decrees are preferred before laws: reducing by this means al unto the will of the people,& so exalting themselves, by reason that the people being chief lord●, they haue their wils at their directions, they being obedient unto them. Further, rejecting all lawful magistrates, they affirm, that only the people ought to sit in iudgement, who listen to their exhortation, so that all the offices are quiter perverted. he therefore, that termeth this estate a democraty, and not a commonweal, seemeth to reprove it most worthily: for where the law beareth no sway, there is no commonweal: seeing that the lawe o●ght to rule in all general causes, and the Magistrate and commonweal decide particular cases. Wherefore, if a democraty is one form of commonweal, without doubt such a constitution where all is governed by decrees and not by laws, is not properly a democraty, forasmuch as no decree can be universal. And thus much concerning the kinds of a democraty.  
A democraty is a form of commonweal, where free men and those that are poor, being more in number, are Lords of the estate: An oligarchy, where rich and noble men being few in number, haue the government. Now, as diverse kinds of living creatures are distinguished by the coniunction of diverse parts, as of mouths, throats, bills, bellies, feet, paws, talons, wings, hands, eyes, ears, noses. So by the assembling together of diverse parties in cities, arise diverse forms of commonweals. now, the parts of cities are eight, to wit, Husbandmen, Artificers, merchants, Hirelings, Sou●diors, Counsellors, Iudges, and Magistrates. But the rich and poor do seem to be the principal members o● a city, of whom the said Oligarchies and democracies are constituted. again, the Populacie is distributed into many parts, as into Husbandmen, Artificers, Merchants, mariners, soldiers, Porters, Carriers, Fishers, handicraftmen, and such like: and the nobility into four, distinguished by riches, lineage, virtue, and knowledge. Therefore of these diverse different parts assembled together, are made diverse different commonweals, in such fort, that in a democraty, there are five several distinct kinds. The first, where the commonweal is equally communicated to all: the second, where regard is had to goods, though they be but small: the third, where the law bearing sway, all the citizens partake of the government: the fourth, where every one may aspire to the Magist●acies, so that he bee a citizen, and that the law bear rule: the fift, where other things abiding the same, the multitude commandeth, and not the law: that is to say, where the people onely governeth after their own fancy, by dec●ees and statutes daily enacted by them: which kind indeed ought not to bee accounted a commonweal, because that is not a commonweal, wherein the law doth not sway and rule, but rather as a tyranny, not worthy to be reckoned in that rank.  
THE which is elegantly disputed by Plato in his commonweal, though not sufficiently: for Socrates saith: That a city is compounded of fo●re necessary kinds of people, which are the weaver, the Husbandman, the Tailor,& the Builder, afterwards as if these were not sufficient, he addeth thereunto, &c. SOCRATES. Go to thē, let us frame a city in our speech, beginning from the first cradle thereof, and let us grant, that want was the first cause therof. ADIM. Be it so. SOC. The first and chiefest want is the prepara●ion of no●rishment; to the end, we may both be and live. ADIM. Without doubt. SOC. The second of habitation, the third of apparel, and such like things. ADIM. It is so. SOC. How shall a city be able to furnish this preparation? Must there not be one a Husbandman, another an Architect, another a weaver? And what if wee add unto these a tailor, or any other that prepareth things fit for the body? ADIM. Yea. SOC. Therefore a city may consist of four or five men. ADIM. So I think. SOC. What, and is it necessary that each of these do comm●nicate his labours unto the rest? As the Husbandman being but one, must he prepare food for four, and spend his time in tillage and fourfold labour, and communicate it to others? Or rather neglecting them, provide only for himself the fourth part of his no●rishment in the fourth part of his time, and employ the other three parts, one in building, the second in appareling, the third in making shoes, without curious communicating their ●●bours to each other? ADIM. It may be it would be easier, if thus then otherwise. SOC. No by jupiter it would be impertinent: for in your speech I observed first, howe wee are not born very like to each other, but differing by nature, everyone being fit for his own work: are not you of that mind? ADIM. Yea. SOC. Could one practise all occupations together, better then if one should profess but one? ADIM. When one professeth but one. SOC. In like manner it is manifest, that in ouerslipping the opportunity of any work, the work itself decayeth. ADIM It is manifest. SOC. For the work that is in doing, will not tarry vpon the leisure of the workman, but it is needful that the workman follow his work, and observe always the opportunity of working. ADIM. It is needful. SOC. It followeth then that one may discharge better, with greater ease, and in greater quantity, a piece of worke● when according to Nature, and the opportunity of time, he exerciseth but one trade, lea●ing the rest. ADIM. Most true. SOC. Therefore there is need of more then four citizens to provide these necessaries whereof wee haue spoken: for in my iudgement a Husbandman cannot make for himself a Cart, fit for his use, or a Spade, or other instruments needful for tillage: nor an Architect, who also hath need of many tools: nor the weaver nor Turner. ADIM. True. SOC. Wherefore Carpenters and Smiths, and many other Artificers received into the city, do make it more peopled. ADIM. It is so. SOC. And yet it will not be great enough, except there be adjoined herdmen, shepherds, and other keepers of cattle, to the end, the Husbandman may haue oxen to till withall; Builders, horses to carry their stuff; weavers their wool, Tanners, Curriers, and Tawyers their skins. ADIM. It would be no small city where all these are to be found. SOC. Besides, it is almost impossible to build a city in such a place, where there would be no need of Carriers. ADIM. Impossible. SOC. Therefore it must needs stand in need of others, that may convey from other cities, things necessary. ADIM. Yea. SOC. That seruant, should goody not bee unprofitable, that bringeth no necessary thing to the place, whence and fetcheth that which setteth his citizens awork, for he should return empty? ADIM. I think so. SOC. Now it is meet to provide, not only sufficient for the city, but also for the inhabitants, such things whereof they stand in need. ADIM. It is meet. SOC. They stand in need of many Husbandmen and Artificers. ADIM. True. SOC. And of many that export and report, which are called merchants, is it not so? ADIM. Yea. SOC. Therefore we must also stand in need of Merchants. ADIM. I confess. SOC. And if this traffic is to bee made by sea, there is need also of many that are expert in navigation. ADIM. Sure it must needs be so. SOC. And howe shall they partake in the city the labours of each other, for which cause wee haue called together this assembly, and erected our city? ADIM. Sure in buying and selling. SOC. So that there must be also a market, and there must be needs money coined to serve for traffic. ADIM. That is true also. SOC. If the Husbandman bringing to the market his fruits, or any other Artificer his work, do not come at the same hour when others are ready and willing to mart, shall he remain idle there? ADIM. No, but some when they see their wears, will offer themselves to bargain: for in well pollicied cities, there are many feeble of body, and unfit for other uses, deputed to this purpose, to bide in the market, and to pay money to those that are desirous to sell, or deliver to others which are desirous to buy wears for money. SOC. This necessity hath ben the cause of bri●ging into cities, engrossers, and retailers: do wee not so call them which remain ordinarily in the market to buy and sell, or traffic? and others that go and come into cities, merchants? ADIM. even so. SOC. There are also other kind of seruants, which help little with their mind in this assembly, but haue strong bodies for travell and labour. These selling this strength of their bodies, and calling the price thereof their hire, are name mercenaries. ADIM. Yea. SOC. Therefore these also serve to the accomplishment of a city. ADIM. It seemeth so. SOC. &c. Aristotle in the seventh of his peacocks, chap. eight, writeth thus of the true parts of a city: First( saith he) a city must haue victuals, next arts, and trades, because our life standeth in need of many instruments: thirdly weapons, things necessary for citizens, as well to preserve their estate, and chastise rebels, as to resist strangers, if they enterprise ought against them: Then a certain competent quantity of money, to furnish both civil and warlike affairs: the fift and most principal thing is the observance of religion, which is called the clergy, or Priesthood: the sixth in number and most necessary of all, is the decision and iudgement of controversies in rights and titles. These are the works which are requisite in all cities: for a city is a multitude, and yet not every multitude, but such a multitude as is of itself sufficient for the maintenance of life: and if any of these things be wanting, such a company cannot haue this sufficiency. Seeing then that a City is grounded vpon these trades, there must needs bee a multitude of Husbandmen to furnish it with victuals, and of Artificers, soldiers, rich men, Priests, and Iudges to discern of ne●essary and profitable matters, and betwixt right and wrong.  
THEREFORE the first democraty is that which is said principally to consist i● equality.] The beginning, form, and imperfection of a democraty, is set down by Plato in the eight book of his commonweal, as it followeth. SOCRATES. Consequently it is 〈◇〉 to entreat of a democraty, how it is framed, and what men it hath: to the end, that knowing the quality thereof, wee may represent it in iudgement. GLAV●VS. So wee shall continue in our old course. SOC. Therefore the government of a city is after a ●ort changed from an oligarchy into a democraty, where the lords are never glu●te● with goods, but propound this as their chiefest happiness, to be rich. GLA●●. How. SOC. Because that the Gouernours ruling therein by their great wealth, will not prohib●●● by law the younger unruly sort from lavishing and spending prodigally their goods, to the end, they may usurp over them by contracts and usuries, and so increase their own wealth and honour. GLAVC. above all. SOC. It is impossible in one and the same Ci●●y to honour riches, and to possess temperance withall; but either the one or the other must be neglected. GLAVC. Without doubt. SOC. Therefore when the education and government of youth is neglected in Oligarchies, and the reins of intempera●ce let loose, then men of a generous& gentle disposition sometimes become poor. G●AVC. It is so. SOC. In my opinion, these men thus wronged& pricked, must ●e●ds sit discontented in the city, some being indebted, others dishonoured, and some again oppressed with both, so that hating and seeking to hurt the with-holders of their goods and others, always gape after novelties and alterations. GLAVC. It is most ●●ue. SOC. Yet the covetous in the mean while greedy vpon gain, and seeming not to see their miseries, but still lending money to others, so that every one is ready to yield unto them,& thus heaping up great usuries, they replenish the city with many drones and begge●s. GLAVC. Sure with very many. SOC. Neither go they about to quench this evil already kindled, but suffer every man to dispose of his own goods at his pleasure: such customs and practices not being interdicted by any other law. GLAVC. By what law● SOC. I mean that law which is the second, and enjoineth citizens to haue care of virtue: for if there were propounded greater danger in these voluntary tra●●●● ki●gs, they would not enrich themselves so impudently in the city, neither would there be such a multitude of such enormities, as we lately spake of. GLAVC. It is true. SOC. Now, Lords use to dispose of their subiects in cities, after all these means: yea and make both them and their youth such wantons and idle drones, that they are not able to sustain any labour either of body or mind, but ready to yield and to be overcome of plea●●res and greefs. G●AVC. I confess. SOC. Not regarding anything but gain and p●ofi●e, n●● resp●●●ng virtue more then the poorest and base●● persons. GLAVC. Sure. SOC. Therefore being 〈◇〉 qualified● when the Lords and the subiects 〈…〉 as●●mblies, or at public spec●●●les, or 〈◇〉, ●ith●● by land 〈◇〉 or in any other dangers, then the poor are not any whit despised of the rich, for oftentimes a poor man, lean, and weather beaten, opposed against a rich man, that is brought up in the shadow, and loaden with superfluous fat, short breathed, and full of care, he will then think that such men get their riches by wicked means, so that one talking privately with another, will not stick to say, that their Lords riches are of no value. GLAVC. I know that they are accustomend thus to do. SOCR. As therefore a weak and sickly body with any little outward alteration falleth soon into sickness, and sometimes without any outward cause, is at discord in itself: so an evil disposed city, vpon every light occasion falleth sick, and is at variance in itself, when as the people of a city that is ruled by an oligarchy, or by a democraty, seek for help abroad from others: yea also sometimes without foreign aid it entereth into sedition. GLAVC. Most certain. SOCR. I think that the democraty or popular state hath his beginning when the poorer sort prevailing, kill or expulse one part of the rich, and do equally communicate with the rest the honours and charges of the weal public, and the offices are there commonly disposed of by lot. GLAVC. Such is the beginning of a democraty, whether it be through force of arms, or fear, the other giuing place. SOCR. Howe then shall those citizens live, and of what manner shall their government be? Certes, such a man will show himself democratical. GLAVC. he will doubtless. SOCR. First they will all bee free, and their city full of liberty and boldness, so as they may without controlment do what they li●t. GLAVC. Men say so. SOCR. But where this absolute liberty is, every one leads such a life as likes him best. GLAVC. That is manifest. SOCR. There are in such a commonweal all sorts of people. GLAVC. Why not? SOCR. It seemeth likewise to bee the best and goodliest commonweal of all: Fo● as a garment decked with choice of flowers, makes a very faire show, so doth such a State, having in it variety of all kinds of manners and dispositions. GLAVC. Yea. SOCR. And peradventure, as children and women take delight to see such pieces of work as are full of diversity, so many men will deem this an excellent commonweal, sith it is fraught with such variety. GLAVC. For that cause principally. SOCR. now it is easy to find in this City a form of government. GLAVC. Why so? SOCR. Because that by reason of such absolute liberty, there are contained therein three kindes of governments, and it seemeth necessary for him that undertaketh the constituting and ordering of a State, as wee not long since did, to repair unto some city, the government whereof is democratical or Popular, there to make choice of such a form as best shall please him, as if he were come to a faire of commonweals: and after choice so made, to order and establish it. GLAVC. Perhaps there will bee no want of people there. SOCR. Tell me, will not such a life seem at the first blushy divine and sweet, when you are not enforced either to govern, though you bee thereto fit and sufficient; or to obey, unless it please you● or to serve in the warres when others are in arms; or to live in peace when others embrace quietness, unless yourself affect peace; or if any lawe bar you from the authority of governing or judging, yet both to govern and judge never a whit the less, when you think good? GLAVC. It will perhaps seem so at the first. SOCR. Tell me again, think you not clemency towards some condemned persons to bee a goodly thing? Haue not you seen in such a city certain men condemned to death or banished, who haue notwithstanding remained there stil, shewed themselves abroad, and oftentimes, as if no man had any thought or care therof, walked up& down the city like demi-gods? GLAVC. I haue seen many such. SOCR. The cause hereof is the too much sufferance therein used, with the want of all regard, and the neglect of those things which we recounted in constituting and ordering a city, viz. that if any bee endowed with an excellent natural conceit, he will never prove a good man, unless even presently from his infancy, he be accustomend and enured to honest recreations, and continue such exercises, wholly supplanting all the rest. Now by reason of this former neglect, it cometh to pass, that in such a city none doth consider by what means men attain to places of authority in the commonweal, but respecteth those onely who are most in favour with the people. GLAVC. You propound unto us a very excellent form. SOCR. The democraty will haue these and other like things, and shall be as it appeareth, a plausible government, full of disorder and diversity, distributing some equality as well to those that are equal as unequal in estate. GLAVC. This that yond ●ay, is very clear. SOCR. Aduise you next what manner of man the democratical or Popular person is in private, or if you will, let us fi●st consider, as we did when we discoursed o● government, by what means he becometh so. GLAVC. That will bee a very good order. SOCR. Doth it not so come to pass, that the son of a covetous father, and one that affecteth the oligarchy, is trained up by him in such manners? GLAVC. What else. SOCR. And he forcibly restraineth his pleasures, that provoke him to spend, and not to get, which are called unnecessary pleasures. GLAVC. It is evident. SOCR. Will it not( think you) be good for the avoiding of obscurity, that we do first distinguish the necessary desires from the vnnessary? GLAVC. I like it well. SOCR. Those desires are called necessary, which we cannot remove or take away, and which being used, do help and profit us, for our nature doth of necessity require these two. GLAVC. Yea. SOCR. We may by very good right call these necessary. GLAVC. By very good right indeed. SOCR. And those unnecessary, which may bee removed, if men bee so accustomend from their youth, and which being used, do us no good, but oft great hurt● GLAVC. You say very well. SOCR. Let us take an example out of them both, that wee may the more evidently see and know them. GLAVC. Let us do so. SOCR. The desire of eating meate and diet for the preserving of our health and good disposition of body, is it not necessary? GLAVC. I think yes. SOCR. doubtless the use of meate is good for two respects, both because it is profitable, and because without it our life cannot continue. GLAVC. It is certain. SOCR. So is also the use of diet necessary, in that it furthers the good disposition of the body. GLAVC. It is so. SOCR. But if the excessive desire of these feedings and other like, being hurtful both to the body and mind, may bee restrained in us from our youth, and wholly, as it were, quenched by discipline, for our better attaining of Prudence and Temperance, may it bee justly called necessary? GLAVC. In no sort. SOCR. Wee will then call the one sumptuous, the other profitable, because they help us in our life and actions. GLAVC. What else? SOCR. Wee will say as much of venereal and other pleasures. GLAVC. Altogether as much. SOCR. now he whom wee erewhile called a drone, was full( wee said) of these pleasures and desires, and subject to the unnecessary, sparing, and Oligarchical. GLAVC. Yea without doubt. SOCR. Let us likewise show after what manner he doth of an oligarchical person become democratical, or Popular: And it seemeth to me, that he becomes so in this manner. GLAVC. In what manner I pray you. SOCR. After that the young man, whom wee said erewhile to bee poorly and hardly brought up, tasteth the honey of these drones, and approacheth to those burning and fierce beasts which can afford him many and sundry pleasures, resolve yourself, that from thence proceedeth the change which is made in him of the oligarchical into a democratical disposition. GLAVC. It must necessary bee so. SOCR. As then the state of the city was changed when any foreign succour gave aid to one of the parts, the like unto his like; so also is the young man changed when any kind of strange desire being of the same nature, doth further and set forward that which is in him. GLAVC It is wholly so. SOCR. And if on the other side any furtherance bee given to the oligarchical disposition being in him, either by his father, or by others of the house, who warn or chide him, there is there bread in him against himself, a sedition, contradiction,& combat. GLAVC. What else? SOCR. Sometimes also the democratical disposition giveth place to the oligarchical, and some desires or passions fail or fade, when any shane surpriseth the youthful mind, whereby it is reclaimed. GLAVC. This thing doth happen SOCR. Othertimes in stead of the desires which are departed, there come other like,& as vehement, and that through the unfit education used by the father. GLAVC. That doth also oft times happen. SOCR. Which new desires breed customs, and do largely grow in great number. GLAVC. It is even so. SOCR. Lastly, they do possess the high fortress of his youthful mind, finding it void of honest disciplines and institutions, and of true reason, which do notably defend and guard the minds of men that are religious. GLAVC. Notably indeed. SOCR. Then false, evil, and proud conceits, succeeding in s●eade of the other, possess the same place in such a kind of man. GLAVC. Yea certes. SOCR. now when he goeth again towards those Lotophagi, will he not manifestly dwell there? And if any furtherance bee given by his friends to the sparing or moderate inclination of his mind, these evil conceits shu● the gates of the royal ●●l that is therein, and receive no such succours, nor admit the admonitions of pri●ate old men, who are as it were sent ambassadors thither: But rather, coming to the combat, they prevail against them, and calling shamefastness folly, do in vile sort banish it: Temperance they term cowardliness,& reproaching it, drive it thence: making him beleeue that mediocrity and moderation in expenses is a clownish and miserly thing, they gather more force by drawing to them many other unprofitable desires. GLAVC. It is true. SOCR. having thus emptied and purged his mind, pos●essed by them, and long accustomend to great and wasteful spending, they bring in wantonness, prodigality, and impudence, all brave and crwoned, in great number, praising and making much of them, calling wantonness, honourable education; licentiousness, liberty; prodigality, magnificence; and impudence, valiantness: Will not then this young man change himself by this means from the education, which he hath had in pleasures that are necessary, and fall to a dissolute and licentious life, following unnecessary and unprofitable pleasures? GLAVC. He will doubtless SOCR. Such a kind of person doth live afterwards as it seemeth to me, not so much for necessary, as unnecessary pleasures, employing thereon his goods, labours, and exercises. But if he bee so happy, as not to abandon himself too much, and that growing more in yeares when these pleasures do in great number present themselves unto him, he take a part therof,& mean while leave the rest, and though he wholly addict himself to those that he hath taken, yet live in such sort, that he doth equally use them all, ever submitting himself to the first that shall subdue him, until he bee therewith glutted; then to take another, not setting light by any, but cherishing all alike. GLAVC. It may so happen. SOCR He doth not admit nor receive true reason into his fort●●sse, when any doth show him that there are some pleasures of honest and good desires, and some of bad desires, and that he must exercise and honour the one, moderate and bridle the other: but he agreeth to all those points, affirming that these pleasures are all alike, and equally to bee honoured. GLAVC. The man that is thus addicted, doth so. SOCR. Thus lives he secure, gratifying and embracing the first desire that presenteth itself, sometimes being drunk,& playing on musical instruments, other times he drinking water, and using abstinence, sometimes exercising himself inactiuitie, he is also often idle: and regardeth nothing: now he will play the Philosopher, then deal in the commonweal, and going out of his house, doth speak& do that which he doth by chance first light on; if he meet with soldiers, he will arrange himself with them, if with Merchants, he will do the like; to bee short, there is neither order nor necessity in his life: But he calling and accounting such a kind of life, pleasant, honourable, and happy, doth continually use it. GLAVC. You haue declared the life of a popular man full of equality. SOCR. I suppose that such a kind of man hath sundry and different conditions, and that he is gallant, and full of diversities, like to the city which many think is happily governed, because it hath in itself many examples of government and manners. GLAVC It is so. SOCR. Such a manner of man then is like to the democraty, and may justly be called democratical.   

CHAP. V. Of the kinds of oligarchy.  
AMong the kinds of oligarchy, one is, wherein public offices are disposed according to a certain quantity of goods● but such a quantity, a● that the poor who are more in number, are not thereto admitted: and that he which hath attained to such a determinate proportion of riches, be able to go●erne the commonweal. The second kind is, wherein the Magistrates are created by the smallness of their revenues, and take others in the place of such as fail: which if they were taken or chosen by all: this State should seem Aristocratical: if by some certain and appointed men, oligarchical. The third kind is, when the son succeedeth the father. The fourth, when that cometh to pass which hath now been spoken off, and the lawe ruleth not, but the Magistrates● which kind is the same amongst the Oligarchies, as the Tyrannicall State amongst the Mon●●chies: and a● the last kind of democracies, and it is called a Dynastie or Potentacie. Such are the kindes of oligarchy and democraty. But we must know that it chanceth in many places, that the commonweal is not popular in respect of the laws, but that it is ruled like a popul●r 〈◇〉, by reason of the manners and government. Contrariwise, in other places in respect of the laws, 〈◇〉 ●●clines more to the popular, and by reason of the government and manners to the oligarchical. Which thing doth happen chiefly a●ter the changes of commonweals: for ●en are not presently changed, but are content at the beginning, to exceed the rest a little, so the former laws remain in force, but the stronger do change the commonweal.  
The right of governing the commonweal, is limited in Oligarchies, by the valuation of every particular citizens wealth. And as in ancient times were used four kinds of valuations of goods, so are there also four kindes of Oligarchies, as the wealth doth by degrees increase. The first is, where public offices are given to rich men, enjoying such a proportion of wealth, that they may exclud● the poor from government, and because they are many in number, the Lawe bears rule amongst them. In the second kind there are fewer rich men, but such as possess greater wealth, and being in office, may of themselves choose successors, or place new officers in the rooms of those that die, or otherwise fail. But if the rich do farther decrease in number, and increase in wealth, then ariseth the third kind of oligarchy, wherein the children succeed their fathers in public offices. Lastly, when the rich do mightily increase in wealth and friendships, then beginneth the fourth kind of oligarchy, the government whereof is not according to the laws, but all is there ordered by the will and pleasure of those that are wealthiest. And this fourth kind is called a Dynastie, resembling the Tyrannicall State, and the last kind of democraty. This order of four hundred hath been observed by Plato in his sixth book of laws in the election of counsellors or Senators, and by Solon in the establishing of the Athenian commonweal, as Plutarch writeth in his life: and by the romans in disposing the honours of their state, though not in the same order as Aristotle doth here set it down, but it hath been diversly used by all these, according to the laws and ordinances of their country. Plinie saith in the Preface of his 14 book. Posteris laxitas mundi& rerum amplitudo d●●no fuit, post quam Senator censu legs coeptus, index fieri censu, Magistratum ducemque nile magis ex●●●●re quam census. Seneca in the 10 book of the Declamations saith, The tax& proportion of wealth, advanceth the Senators order: it discerns the knight from the Plebeian: in armies it giveth promotion, Iudges are thereby chosen: The tax of a roman Gentleman, or Knight, amounted to four hundred thousand Sestertians, and if they were worth so much, they might sit to behold the sports in fourteen degrees. The senators revenue did first amount to eight hundred thousand Sestertians, which was afterward raised by Augustus to twelve hundred thousand, to the end, that they might with more honour maintain their estates. And as none might bee chosen Knights or senators, if they had not that proportion of yearly revenues which was required, so also if they lost it, they were no longer reputed for Knights and senators: which institution or ordinance was oligarchical. At this day every cardinal must haue twelve hundred Crownes of yearly revenue at the least, and if he fail of that proportion, the Pope alloweth him so much pension.   

CHAP. VI. For what cause there are many sorts of democraty and oligarchy.  
IT is then manifest by the discourse going before, that there are so many sorts of democraty and oligarchy: for it must needs bee that either all the aforesaid parts of the people participate in the commonweal, or that some do, and some do not. When as then the Artificers, and others, that are meanly rich, govern the commonweal, the government thereof is according to the laws: For they must live by their labour, and cannot bee idle; so that the lawe being made, they assemble not but for necessary causes: and it is lawful for others to bee admitted into the commonweal, if they enjoy so large a revenue, as is prefixed and appointed by the laws, whereas otherwise, if this were not lawful, this sort democraty should be oligarchical: this is for such respects one sort of popular government, and it is impossible to live idly without revenues. The other is by the election of Magistrates, for it may be, that all are admitted into the commonweal, if they bee not excluded by reason of their birth, and that notwithstanding, they onely participate in the public offices which haue sufficient maintenance for their estate without labour, and therefore the laws bear rule in such a kind of democraty. The third sort, is when all that are free, may bee admitted into the commonweal, who nevertheless haue no authority of government for the cause aforesaid: so as it is necessary that the law do bear rule there also. The fourth sort of democraty is that which hath lately ben invented in cities. For by reason that cities are waxed greater then they were at the beginning, and for that there is in the same plenty of revenues, all men are partakers of the commonweal, by occasion that the multitude excelleth, who communicate and govern, because the poor will be idle, when they receive wages or ●●ipend. The which multitude is indeed very idle, for the care of their private affairs doth let them never a whit, which so greatly turneth the rich aside, that often they come not into the assemblies nor seats of iudgement. By this means the commonweal is brought under the government of the poor, and not in the power of the laws. So many and such be the kinds of the Popular state through these causes. As for the oligarchy, when many men haue goods, howbeit in smaller quantity, and not very great, it is a kind of the first oligarchy, for they give leave to the possessor to be a governor there. And for that there is a multitude of those that participate in the government, the law and not the men must rule. For sith they be farthest from the monarchy or rule of one man alone, and haue not such ability, as that they can live idly without care, nor so small substance, that they must haue relief of the commonweal, they will rather haue the lawe to govern then themselves. But if there bee fewer that posses●● wealth the● they before mentioned, and yet haue greater abundance thereof, it is the kind of the second oligarchy: for when they haue the more power, they will bear the more authority, and therefore take other companions to help them in the government. And as yet not s●rong y●●●gh to govern without lawe, they constitute such law. If they come to this point, that assisteth. ADIMAN. You say well. SOCR. Such a Timocratical young man resembleth that kind of city. GLAVC. Yea certes. SOCR. And he doth sometimes become so in this manner: When any body is son to a rich father,( dwelling in a city not well governed) who shuneth Honours, Offices, judgements, and all such troublesomenesse and doth willingly submit himself to others, that he may so bee rid from business. GLAVC. Howe then becometh he so? SOCR. When this boy I say, heareth his mother complain, that her husband is no Magistrate, and that therfore she is not accounted off among other women; and when he sees her offended with his father, because he is little given to the getting of wealth, using no dealings either in private or public, whereby to enrich himself, but neglecting all such courses, and following onely his own humour, without making any great account of his wife, yet not despising her; who conceiving thereat great indignation, tells the boy that his father is not worthy to haue the name of a man, but that he is too lazy and cowardly, with other such tales as women are wont to tattle. ADIMAN. Without question such women are wont to babble so. SOCR. You know also, that the seruants and they of the house, such I mean as are more affectionate to the mistress part, do privily buzz such tales into childrens ears: And if they see that any one hath wronged the father, who for quietness sake seeks not to redress it by lawe, they counsel the boy to reuenge himself of such persons, when he shall grow more in yeares, and to show himself more like a man then his father. Besides, he going abroad, hears other like speeches, and sees that they who trouble not themselves in the city with ought else save their own private business, are called sots, and had in no account, whereas those of contrary humours are prais●d and honoured. Then the boy having heard and seen all this, and on the other side, harkening to the instructions given him by his father; and noting his exercises in comparison of others, he is drawn by both: on the one side, the reasonable part of his soul being exercised and augmented, and on the other side, the concupiscible and irascible, that is, moving desire and anger, whereby, although he haue no evil inclination, yet by reason that he useth bad company, and is drawn hereby into the same opinions, he yeeldeth himself to some mean power prove to contention and anger, and becometh a magnanimous and ambitious man. GLAVC. You seem to haue sufficiently declared the manner of his growing into such an humour.   

CHAP. VIII. Of the government generally called a commonweal.  
IT remaineth that wee speak of the commonweal, so called generally, and of the Tyrannicall state. Now we haue thus ordained it, though it bee no transgression, nor yet the Aristocraties lately mentioned. nevertheless in very dead, they do all serve from the right form of a commonweal: afterward they are reckoned amongst those which are their corruptions and blemishes, as was said in the beginning. But wee haue with good reason referred our intended discourse of the Tyrannicall State, to the last place, because that of all the rest, it is least a Commonweale● And sith wee purpose to treat of the Commonweale● wee haue therefore observed such an order. now then it is meet to treat thereof, and wee ma● the more easili● know the force of it, after wee haue declared such things as concern the oligarchy and democraty. For a commonweal, to speak simply, is a mixture of the Oligarchi● and democraty. Those States that enc●●●e more to the democraty, are 〈◇〉 called 〈◇〉, and those that hold more of the oligarchy, are rather called Aristocraties, because discipline and nobility do for the most part accompany the rich. Besides, the rich seem to haue that whereby men are invited or alured to commit evil, and in this respect they are called virtuous and noble. Sith then the aristocraty will impart superiority to good Citizens, and sith it is said that Oligarchies do for the most part consist of good and honest men, it seemeth impossible, that a city ruled by good, and not by e●ill men, should not be governed by good laws, as also that being governed by good laws, it should not bee governed by good men. Likewise the administration of laws is not good, though they bee well ordained, unless they be obeied. wherefore this is one good point in the ordinance of laws, that men obey them, being ordained: Another is, that the laws bee well ordained and obeied, because men may obey those laws also that are not well ordained: which cometh to pass in two manners, either when they are conditionally good, or simply good. Now that seemeth chiefly to be an aristocraty, wherein honours are bestowed for virtue, sith the end of the aristocraty is virtue; of the oligarchy, riches, and of the democraty, liberty: and this is common to them all, that the greater number of opinions prevaileth. For in the oligarchy and aristocraty and democraty, that which seemeth best to the most part of those that gouerne● is ratified. For which cause, in many Cities this manner of government is called a kind of commonweal. For the mixture of rich and poor men, hath regard onely to riches and liberty, sith for the most part men seem to haue the place and reputation of virtuous men. Now as there are three things in the commonweal which contend for equality, to wit, liberty, riches, and virtue( for the fourth which is called nobility, followeth or dependeth on the two last, because nobility, is ancient riches and virtue) it is certain, that the mixture of these two, that is, of rich and poor men, is to bee called a commonweal; and the mixture of three, an aristocraty, I mean that kind of aristocraty which followeth the true and first kind. Thus it hath been shewed by us, that there are other sorts of commonweals besides the monarchy, the democraty and oligarchy. We haue likewise declared what sorts they are, and how the Aristocraties differ among themselves, as also those forms of government which incline or bend to an aristocraty, and that they are not much unlike.  
The commonweal so termed by the general name, is a government compounded of the oligarchy and the democraty: which composition, when it inclineth to the democraty, is called a commonweal: and when it bendeth more towards the oligarchy, it is called an aristocraty: because virtue and riches do commonly accompany Nobility, which is defined to be ancient riches and virtue. There are three things( saith he) which contend for equality in commonweals; liberty, riches,& virtue: but the mixture of rich and poor men, is called a commonweal, and that mixture of three an aristocraty, not the true and first sort, but the second.   

CHAP. IX. How the commonweal so called generally, is made of the democraty and oligarchy.  
WE will now declare, howe that form of government which is generally called a commonweal, is made of the democraty& oligarchy. And it will also plainly appear, how the democraty and oligarchy are defined. For when wee haue distinguished them, we will then form this kind of commonweal, by taking from either of both some part, as it were a rule. There are three ends of this composition 〈…〉 The one, in taking the ordinances of both, as in judgements, because that in Oligarchies there is a penalty set down and appointed for the rich, if they judge not, and for the poor no see. In democracies there is a fee for the poor, and no penalty for the rich. The common and mean of these, which therefore belongeth to this form of commonweal is● that both goody therein observed, sith it 〈◇〉 ●●m●ered or composed of both kinds. Thi● i● one maner of conjoining them. The other is, by taking the mean of those things that are commanded by both: as to bee present at public assemblies, the one having no yearly revenues, or very s●all● the other, a great deal; neither the one nor the other is common, but the mean between both proportions of reue●●es. The third is compounded of two ordinances, the one oligarchical, the other democratical. As it seemeth to bee democratical, that the Magistrates bee created by lot: and oligarchical, that they bee chosen: it seemeth again to be democratical, that they bee not taken by their riches, or thereto preferred for their yearly revenues: and oligarchical, that they bee therefore taken and preferred. It shall therefore bee aristocratical, and fi● for such a commonweal to borrow somewhat of both: of the oligarchy, the election of Magistrates: of the democraty, not taking them by and for their yearly revenues. This is the way to entermixe them: and the end of well per●ourming this mixture is, that the same commonweal may bee called both a democraty, and an oligarchy. And there is no doubt that it is so called, because it well tempered or composed: which thing also happeneth to the mean, for both the extremes do appear therein. As may bee seen in the Lacedemonian commonweal: For many hold opinion, that it is a democraty, sith there are many things in their ordinances, proper to the democraty. As first the education of children: For rich mens children, are brought up in the same manner as the childre● of poor men, and in like sort as they are taught, so may the other bee. Likewise, being pa●● their childhood, and when they are grown men, they live after the same order, for the rich make no greater a show then the poor: they are served with the same meats at public feasts, and the rich wear no costlier apparel, then the poor also may bee able to buy. Besides, because the two greatest offices are in the peoples hands, whereof they choose the one, and administer the other: for they elect the senators, and participate in the state or office of the Ephori. Others think that it is an oligarchy; because it hath many things proper to the oligarchical manner of government, as this, that all offices are disposed by election, and not by lot: and that a few haue power to condemn to death, or to banish: and sundry other such things. Now it is requisite, that in a commonweal well composed, there bee both these, yet neither of them seeming to bee there, and that of itself it do maintain and uphold itself, not outwardly of itself, not by having many outwardly, who wish it well( for that may happen also to a corrupt commonweal) but by having no part wholly in the city which desireth another form of commonweal. Wee haue declared after what manner a commonweal should bee established, as also those forms of government, that are called Aristocraties.  
That form of government called by the general name of commonweal, is made of the democraty and oligarchy in three sorts. First, in taking the laws and ordinances of both: then taking the mean of those things that are commanded in both: thirdly, in following or observing the institutions, partly of the one, and partly of the other. And then the mixture or temperature shall bee good, when the same commonweal shall seem both a democraty and an oligarchy.  
AS may be seen in the Lacedemonian commonweal, which many hold to be a democraty, others an oligarchy.] Aristotle in the 2. book of his peacocks, chap. 4. Some hold opinion, that a good commonweal should bee a mixture of all the forms of goue●●ement, and therefore they praise the Lacedemonian commonweal, which they say, consisteth of the oligarchy, the monarchy, and the democraty: their royal estate to bee a monarchy; the Senate, an oligarchy; and the State of the Ephori, Popular. Plato in the fourteenth of his laws, When I consider the Lacedemonian commonweal, I cannot well tell howe it should bee called● For the power which the Ephori haue there, is very tyrannicall: Sometimes it seemeth above all other cities to bee very like to a democraty, and it should bee very absurd to deny that it is aristocratical. Also the kingdom, which is there perpetual, is accounted the ancientest State of all. Let him that would know more herein, ●●●de tha● which is noted touching this point in the fourth Chapter of the sec●nd book, and the seventh, which treateth altogether of the Lacedemonian commonweal.   

CHAP. X. Of the Tyrannicall State, and the kinds thereof.  
WE will speak now of the tyranny, not for that it deserveth a long discourse, but that it may haue a place in this treatise, sith wee haue set it in the number of commonweals. Wee haue in the former book spoken of a kingdom, where wee discoursed touching that State which is chee●ely called so, to wit, whether it bee unprofitable or profitable for cities, as also when, whereof, and howe it should bee established. In which place wee propounded two kinds of tyranny, because their power and the kingdom are in some sort taken one for another, sith they are both lawful: for some Barbarians choose Monarchs with absolute power: and in times past there were among the ancient Grecians certain Monarchs called AEsymnetae. These estates haue some differences among themselves, and they were royal and resembling the state of a kingdom, both because they were lawful, and because they signiorized over voluntary subiects: and Tyrannicall, because they exercised their Kingly authority at their own pleasure without control. The third kind of tyranny which seemeth to bee principally a tyranny, and is opposed to the State of a kingdom, must necessary bee a monarchy, and doth absolutely command and reign over such as are equal, and all that are better; respecting his own, and not the subiects profit, and therefore is not voluntary: for no person that is free, doth willingly endure such a state. There are then so many and such kinds of tyranny, for the causes aforesaid.  
Although the Tyrannicall State should not bee called a commonweal, as it was said before, because the laws haue therein no authority, but all things are ordered at the will and pleasure of the tyrant: nevertheless, it hath been accustomend to be numbered among the corrupt commonweals. now there is not one onely kind of tyranny, but there are many sorts thereof. For although the kingdoms of the Barbarians, and the AEsymnetae of the Greeks, signorize over voluntary subiects, and lawfully; therein imitating the state of a kingdom: yet they are tyrannies, because they exercise lordly rule over good men, or better then themselves. Notwithstanding, that is properly a tyranny which doth forcibly reign ouerfree men.  
THE third kind of tyranny, which seemeth to bee principally a tyranny, and is opposed to the state of a kingdom.] Aristotle in the fift of his peacocks, chap. 10. Almost the same accidents do grow in kingdoms and tyrannies, as we said, did chance in commonweals: For the kingly state doth imitate the aristocraty, and the Tyranny is made of the extremest sort of the oligarchy, and of the democraty, and is therefore very hurtful to the subiects, for it is compounded of two corrupt commonweals, retaining the transgressions and blemishes of them both. moreover, it will easily appear, that the beginning of Monarchies hath proceeded of contraries, for the Kingly State was first ordained for the defence of good men against the multitude: and the King was created out of the number of good men, according to the excellence of his virtue, or virtuous deeds, or of the stock from whence he came. The tyrant was created by the multitude, against the Noblemen, to the end, that they should not oppress them, as is manifest by the events and issues of things. For almost all gangrenes haue become so, through being Captaines and leaders of the people, having gotten credite by forging accusations against the nobility. Then one sort of Tyrannies hath sprung up in this manner, the cities being already grown great. Others, of those that having been kings before, haue violated the ancient customs of the country, desiring to command more absolutely. Others, of such as haue been chosen to the chiefest Offices: for in ancient times the people allowed long time to Magistracies and public charges. And others of Oligarchies, where they had chosen and preferred some one to great Offices, for to hold them in manner of sovereignty: for in all these manners they might easily usurp a tyranny, if they were but willing thereunto, because some had already the power of a Kingly estate, and others the honour, as Phidon in Argos, and others which made themselves gangrenes, having before kingly authority, and those of Ionia and Phalaris, the honour. Panecius among the Leontines, and Cypselus at Corinth, and Pisistratus at Athens, and Dyonisius at Syracusa, and others in the same sort, of Captaines of the people haue become gangrenes. So the Kingly State doth resemble the aristocraty, in that it is given according to the persons dignity, or through his virtue, or birth, or honourable deeds, or through all these things together, and through power. For all those that haue well deserved, or might well deserve of cities and Countries, haue attained to this honour; some in defending them from bondage, as Codrus; others in setting them at liberty, as Cyrus; some for building a city, or conquering a country, as the Kings of the Lacedemonians and Molossians. The office of a King, is to see that the rich bee no way injuried, nor the multitude outraged. The Tyrannicall State( as hath been often said) hath no respect to the public commodity, unless it bee for his own peculiar profit: and the onely end or aim of a tyrant, is pleasure; of a king, honesty. Wherefore the desire to exceed in money, is Tyrannicall; and to excel in honour, more kingly. The kings guard is of citizens, the gangrenes of strangers. That the tyranny hath the vices and corruptions of the democraty and oligarchy, it is manifest: of the oligarchy, in that it chooseth riches for the onely end whereat it aimeth: otherwise the guard and magnificence thereto requisite, could not be maintained: likewise, in that it doth in no sort trust the multitude, and therefore takes their weapons from them. Item, the oppression of the people, the driving them out of the citadel, and forcing them to disperse themselves, is common to them both, as well to the oligarchy, as to the tyranny. It taketh likewise of the democraty, the making of war against the Nobles, the destroying of them by covert, or open means, and banishing them as aduersaries and enemies to that state, because they are the authors of conspiracies: when some will seek to rule themselves, others refuse to endure subiection. For which cause, ●eriander counseled Thrasibulus to lop off the highest ears of corn; as if it were necessary always to make away the chiefest citizens.  

A discourse touching the beginning, form, and vices of the tyranny: taken out of the eight and ninth book of Platoes commonweal.  
SOCRATES. There remaineth yet to speak of that goodly government, and goodly Lord, called a tyranny, and a tyrant. GLAVCVS. It is true. SOCR. Well then my friend, what is the form and manner of a tyranny, sith it is almost manifest that it springeth from the democraty? GLAVC. very manifest SOCR. Doth not the democraty spring from the oligarchy in the same sort, that the Tyranny springs from the democraty. GLAVC. As how? SOCR. That good which is cheeflie proposed and aimed at in the oligarchy, and by which it was established, was it not excessive riches? GLAVC Yes. SOCR. Then the insatiable covetousness of wealth, and the neglect of all other things, through the desire of private gain, do overthrow it. GLAVC. Yea verily. SOCR. In like sort, the insatiable coveting of that good which is most sought and set by in the democraty, doth destroy it. GLAVC. What good is therein most set by? SOCR. liberty, for you shall hear nothing so much extolled and esteemed in a city, whose government is populat: for which cause, that onely is the fittest place for a man to dwell in, who is naturally freeminded. GLAVC. indeed liberty is there highly prized and much spoken of. SOCR. now, as I was about to say, doth not the insatiable coveting thereof, and the neglect of other things, change this form of government, and constrain it to haue need of a Tyrannicall state. GLAVC. As howe? SOCR. In mine opinion, when such a city doth thirst too much after liberty, and lighteth on bad rulers, which give her a deeper draft thereof then is expedient, shee is drunk therewith, and accusing the Gouernours, as if then they were too rigorous, and oligarchical, doth punish them, if they bee not very gentle and permit great licentiousness. GLAVC. It doth so come to pass. GLAVC. And it blameth those who are obedient to the rule of Lords, as servile people, and of no worth: But it praiseth and honoureth both publicly and privately those states, wherein the lords are equal to the subiects, and the subiects to the Lords. Is it not necessary to attain in such a city to all liberty? GLAVC. Yes doubtless. SOC●. And tha● such licentiousness budding, doth secretly enter into private houses, until in the end the very beasts haue a sent thereof. GLAVC. Howe mean you that? SOCR. As if a father use to make himself no better then his child, and to stand in awe of his sons, and the sons to make themselves as good as their father, not reverencing or fearing their Parents, to the end they may bee free, the Hireling doth equal himself to the citizen, the citizen to the Hireling: and in like ●ort the stranger. GLAVC. It falleth out so. SOCR. These things are done, and such other of l●sse reckoning. Certes, in such a city the master doth fear and flatter his Schollers, the Shollers despise their Maisters and Tutors. briefly, young men account themselves equal to old men, and cross them both in words and deeds: old men sitting together with those of the younger sort, tell them many pleasant and factious ieastes, thereby seeking to bee like them, to the end, they may not seem severe and imperious. GLAVC. It is certainly so. SOCR. The liberty of the common people is extreme in such a city, for the slaves that are bought, are as free as they that buy them. And I had almost forgotten to note howe great an equality and liberty is there of women with men, and of men with women. GLAVC. May wee not say with AEschylus, that it is come up to the mouth? SOCR. It is well said, but I say farther, that he who had not known it by experience, would never beleeue howe much the very beasts that are kept in such a city, bee freer then in other places. For the Bitches( as it is in the proverb) are there like jolly Dames and Maistresses, and the Horses and Asses are wont to let on their way so freely and bravely, that they assail him whom they meet first, whosoever, if he do not give them the wall. To bee short, all other things full of liberty and licentiousness are there done. GLAVC. You tell me mine own dream, for oftentimes as I haue walked in the fields, I haue been served so. SOC. Nowe● that wee may briefly understand whereto those things do tend, which wee before recited, wee must note, that such a manner of life and state, maketh the citizens mindes so dainty and queasy, that if th●re bee never so little a smack of servitude in their talk, they presently take snuff, and can in no wise away with it. Finally, they contemn all laws, as well written, as unwritten, that they may in no sort aclowledge any Lord. GLAVC. I know it well. SOC. This( my friend) is that brave and goodly beginning, from which the tyranny doth spring, as it seemeth to me. GLAVC. A very brave beginning doubtless, but what follows? SOC. The same disease that was entered into the oligarchy, and had destroyed it, budding up, and growing here of excessive liberty, bringeth the democraty into slavish subiection. briefly, the too much exceeding of the mean, is wont to cause great change in things to the contrary, in seasons, in plants, in bodies, and also in commonweals. GLAVC. Not without good cause. SOC. For extreme liberty seemeth not to bee changed into ought else, save extreme slavery, as well in private as public matters. GLAVC. It seemeth so indeed. SOC. Therefore I said not without cause, that the tyranny was not made of any other form of government, then of the democraty, to wit, most grievous and str●ight bondage, of excessive liberty. GLAVC. It standeth with good reason. SOC. Yet in mine opinion, this is not it that you demanded, but what the same disease is in the oligarchy and democraty, which brings them into slavish subiection. GLAVC. You say truly. SOC. I said, that the idle and prodigal sort of people, was partly stronger and more manly, and partly more cowardly; and that the one led, and the other followed, whom wee compared before to drones; the one to such as had stings, the other to such as had no stings. GLAVC. You did compare them so with good reason. SOC. This sort of people, in what city soever they are, doth trouble it, as phlegm and choler doth our bodies, and it behoveth the good physician and lawgiver of a city to haue as watchful an eye thereto, and to take as good heed as a thrifty and careful man hath of his Bees: first, that none of these d●ones bee bred in the city, or if they bee, that they may bee presently cut off, with their beams of false credite. GLAVC. That is very requisite. SOC. Let us take it so then, that wee may clearly see that which wee seek for. GLAVC. In what manner? SOC. Let us divide the city, whose government is popular, into three parts, as it is in very deed. The one of these kindes is bred therein, through too much liberty, even as it is in the oligarchical State. GLAVC. It is so. SOC. But it is here more sharp and rough then in the oligarchy, for there because it hath no honour nor advancement to public Offices, it hath also no exercise, and is thereby weak: But in the democraty such kindes of people do bear sway, some onely excepted, and the stoutest and most unquiet among them do publicly both speak and deal: The others go with great cries and noise about the iudgement seats, and suffer none to contradict them, so that in this form of commonweal, almost all is governed by this kind. GLAVC. Yea certes. SOC. Then there is another kind always separated from the multitude. GLAVC. What kind is that? SOC. As all do addict themselves to gain, so they which are of prompter conceit, do commonly grow richest. GLAVC. It is very likely. SOCR. From whence the drones suck most honey and that most easily. GLAVC. Howe is it possible to suck any from them that haue little? SOC. Such kindes of rich men, are called the herb and flower, whence these drones do draw their stolen sweetness. GLAVC. It may well bee so. SOC. The third kind shall be the people, that is, those which meddle onely with their own affairs, and trouble not themselves with other mens matters, having little money, and being many in number, so they are the chief in the democraty, when they publicly assemble themselves. GLAVC. It is so, but they will not do it often, unless they haue a part in the honey. SOCR. Haue they not always a part therein, sith the Gouernours may take away the wealth from such as haue it, and divide it among the people, reserving the great●r part for themselves? GLAVC. indeed by this means they haue a part. SOCR. But hereupon, they that are in this sort spoiled and depraved of their goods, bee of necessity forced to resist, saying and doing all that possibly they can against the people. GLAVC. Wherefore should they not? SOCR. The others haue given them occasion, although they would not, to attempt an innovation, thereby to endamage the people, and aspire to an oligarchy. GLAVC. Yea certes. SOCR. Lastly, when they see that the people being deceived by their Sycophants, doth seek to wrong them, though not of their own accord, but through ignorance, then will they, nill they, they become altogether oligarchical, not willingly, I say, but because the pricking and stinging drone, doth cause this evil and mischief unto them. GLAVC. It is verily so. SOCR. Then there arise amongst them accusations, judgements, and debates. GLAVC. It is most true. SOCR. For which cause the people are wont to choose some one for their protector, whom they cherish and make great. GLAC. They are indeed wont to do so. SOCR. Hereby it appeareth howe gangrenes rise, and that they spring no otherwise then from this roote. GLAVC. It is certain. SOCR. What is then the beginning of the change of a protector into a Tyrant? Is it not when the protector attempteth to do that which is said to happen in Arcadia, near the temple of jupiter Lycian, That whosoever shall taste mans flesh, mingled with other oblations, doth of necessity become a wolf: Haue you never heard of it? GLAVC. Yes mary haue I. SOCR. In like sort, this protector of the people finding the multitude very obsequious, spares not his own blood, but doth by false accusations bring to the bar those whom he feareth, and glutteth himself with their unjust deaths, shortening the lives of many men, and sucking with his tongue and unpure mouth, the blood of his near kindred. Some he drives out, others he kills, and he persuades the releasing of debts, and the division of lands. Wherefore, it is necessary, that afterwards either he bee killed by his enemies, or that he play the Tyrant, that is, of a man, become a wolf. GLAVC. It followeth necessary. SOCR. This man is seditious against the rich. GLAVC. he is indeed. SOCR. If he bee expulsed, he returns again maugre his enemies, and then makes himself a tyrant. GLAVC. Yea certes. SOCR. But his enemies, if by accusing him to the citizens, they cannot expulse him, or bring him to his end, then they secretly practise to dispatch him by violent death. GLAVC. Such is their custom. SOCR. Hereon ariseth the ordinary request and demand of Tyrants: For all they that are mounted thither, require of the people a certain guard for their defence, to the end( forsooth) that the peoples protector may bee assured from danger. GLAVC. It is very true. SOCR. Then they grant him his request, being very careful of him, and assured of themselves. GLAVC. Yea certes. SOCR. The rich men seeing this, and perceiving that their wealth makes them hated of the people, then according to the Oracle given to Craesus, they fly towards Herma the stony,& dwell no longer there, not caring if others account them fearful. GLAVC. For hereby they shall bee free from a second fear. SOCR. whosoever then is taken in the city, dies for it. GLAVC. Of necessity. SOCR. Then sir, this brave defender of the people, doth not as yet carry himself with any state or magnificence, but veiling the plumes of many others, remaines alone in the chariot, or as it were, at the helm of the city, and then, of a Protector becomes a tyrant. GLAVC. Who should hinder them? SOCR. Will you that I show the happiness of this man, and of that city, wherein such a person is born? GLAVC. show it I pray you. SOCR. At the beginning, for some few dayes, he doth salute, vail his bonnet, and look cheerfully on those that he meets, not arrogating to himself as yet the title of Lord: he promiseth many things privately and publicly, he releaseth debts, divideth lands, and maketh show of great mildness and assabilitie towards the people, and those that are near his person,& generally towards all. GLAVC. It is necessary that he do so. SOC. Now when he hath reconciled part of his enemies, and made away the rest, his estate being thus assured, first and chiefly he sets abroach, and hath always in hand some war, to the end, that the people may stand in need of a leader. GLAVC. It is likely. SOCR. Besides, that by contributing of their goods, they may grow poor, and by this means conspire the less against him, sith their chief care and thought must bee howe to get their daily maintenance. GLAVC. It is manifest. SOCR. Farther, if he perceive any that are free-minded, and such as refuse to obey him, he takes occasion by reason of the war to set them packing on some desperate enterprise, and so makes the enemy serve for an executioner. For all these causes, it is necessary for him to bee always in war. GLAVC. Very necessary. SOCR. Whereby he shall the more offend and incite the citizens. GLAVC. he shal indeed. SOCR. It is not unlikely, that some even of those which haue holpen him to establish his Tyrannicall state, and are in credite with him do boldly reprove him, discoursing touching these his proceedings both with him and others; especially those that are of great courage. GLAVC. It is likely. SOCR. he must of necessity dispatch all these, if he will reign in safety, and never cease, till there remain none either of his friends or enemies, that is in any account. GLAVC. Yea certes. SOCR. he must mark then who is valiant, who magnanimous, who wise, and who rich, for he is so happy( forsooth) that he must p●rforce bee enemy to them all, and persecute them, till he haue whom purged the city of them. GLAVC. You speak of a goodly kind of purgation. SOCR. Certes, it is contrary to those purgations that Phisitians do prescribe: for they in purging the body, take away the worse, and leave the better: but the tyrant takes away the better, and leaves the wo●se. GLAVC● he is constrained to do so, that he may reign quietly. SOCR. Then he is bound to an happy necessity, which enforceth him either to live with many vile and wicked men that do hate him, or not to live at all. GLAVC. Such is his estate. SOCR. And because that for such bad deeds he shall be the more hated of the people, shall he not( think you) haue need of a greater and more faithful guard? GLAVC. Certes he shall. SOCR. But what guard will bee faithful unto him, and from whence shal he haue it? GLAVC. They will of their own accords offer themselves, if he will pay them well. SOCR. You seem to speak of some drones that come to him from other Countreys. GLAVC. I speak the truth. SOCR. Will he then haue none of his own countrymen? GLAVC. In what sort? SOCR. By removing his slaves, then enfranchising some citizens, and mingling them with his Archers. GLAVC. Yes certes, so that they bee very faithful unto him. SOCR. You tell me of an happy advantage for a tyrant, if he use and take such for friends and faithful attendaunts, when he hath made away the rest. SOCR. Yet he serves his turn with such. SOCR. indeed such haue him in admiration, and the new citizens converse with him, but the good do hate and shun him. GLAVC. It is very true. SOCR. Tell me, are not Tragedies a learned kind of poesy, and doth not Euripides in your iudgement excel therein? GLAVC. For what cause? SOCR. Because he hath sung with a deep conceit, that gangrenes are wise through the company of wise men, and saith that they are wise with whom they converse, and doth moreover extol the Tyrannicall state, as a divine thing, with sundry other like points that he and the other Poets haue 〈◇〉 Certes, the tragical Poets, as being wise men, shall pardon us, if us and the rest that do thus ordain and constitute any form of government, if wee receive them not into our commonweal, because they praise the Tyrannicall state. GLAVC. I beleeue, that the better and more elegant sort of them will pardon vs. SOCR. These fellowes going into other Cities,& drawing together troops of people, with gay, great,& probable speeches, do change well ordered states into Tyrannies& democracies. GLAVC. Without doubt. SOCR. Haue they not( think you) a fee for doing so, and are they not greatly honoured as it is meet, first by the gangrenes, and then by the democracies? But when they pass farther, and mount to the highest points of government, then their honour decreaseth, as if they were not able to go on still for want of breath. GLAVC. It is even so. SOCR. But let us return to that matter from which wee haue digressed, and show how the tyrant will maintain his goodly and great army, which consisteth always of sundry sorts of men. GLAVC. It is most certain, that if there be any consecrated things in the city, he will spend and sell them while they last, exacting in the mean while so much the less of the people. SOCR. But when they are gone. GLAVC. he will then maintain himself and his associates with all his train, as well men as women with his fathers goods. SOCR. I suppose, that the people being the father and begetter of the tyrant, will maintain him and his. GLAVC. They must perforce. SOCR. Howe if the people grow angry with him, and say it is no reason that the son, when he is great, should bee kept by the father, but contrariwise, the father by the son, and that they haue not therefore begotten and established him, to serve him when he should bee great, and to bee subject to his servants, and that by means of his protection, they might bee delivered from the rich, who bear too great a sway in the Citttie. And how if they command him and his train to depart the city, like a father driving out of the doors his son, with his lewd companions? GLAVC. Then shall they soon know what he is, and howe dangerous a beast they haue begotten, nourished, and advanced, and that being the weaker, they attempt to drive out the stronger. SOCR. What say you? Dares the tyrant force his father, and beat him if he obey him not? GLAVC. Yea, by taking away his weapons. SOCR. Then you say he is a Parricide, and deals hardly with his fathers age. Indeed this seemeth already a right Tyrannicall state, and as the saying is, the people flying the smoke of the subiection of free men, is fallen into the servile flamme of tyranny; suffering in lieu of their great and vnmeet liberty, most grievous and strait bondage of slaves. GLAVC. This thing cometh so to pass. SOCR. But may I say that I haue sufficiently shewed in what sort the Tyrannicall state springs from the democraty, and of what maner it is? GLAVC. Very sufficiently. SOCR. It remaineth now that we consider the Tyrannicall person, howe he becometh so of a democratical man, and what manner of person he is, and whether he led a miserable or happy life. GLAVC. This indeed doth yet remain SOCR. Know you what I do farther desire? GLAVC. What is it? SOCR. Wee haue not yet sufficiently set down what and how many desires there are, which being not thoroughly declared, the search of that which wee seek for, will bee the more obscure. GLAVC. Indeed it is very pertinent to our purpose, that this point be thoroughly opened. SOCR. Yea certes: lo then what I desire to know farther herein. Among the unnecessary desires and pleasures, some seem to me to bee repugnant to the laws, which are in all men, but that being restrained by th● laws and by better desires with reason, they are wholly extinguished in some, or remain in them small and weak: and in others they grow more vehement and common. GLAVC. What desires and pleasures are they? SOCR. Those that move themselves in our sleep, when the reasonable part of our soul, which is quiet and beareth rule therein, is at rest: and the brutish and rude part being drunken and glutted with meat, doth stir, which breaking sleep, seeks to enjoy her accustomend pleasures. Assure yourself, that there is nothing which it dares not then attempt, as b●ing unbound and void of all shane and wisdom, so that in such a case a man doth sometimes think that he carnally useth his mother, or some other person, or God, or beast● or that he murders some one, and refrains not from any kind of meat whatsoever, and to comprise all in a word, he omits no folly or impudence. GLAVC. You speak truth. SOCR. But when a man being of good temperature and inclination, goes to his rest, stirring up the reasonable part which is in him, and feeding it with sound reasons& speculations, begins to contemplate within himself, not having his repose disturbed by any concupiscence through want or abundance, nor his better part troubled with ioy or sorrow, but leaving it pure apart to contemplate and search out things yet unknown, both present, past, and to come: and having his passion of anger so appeased, that he lays him down, not feeling his mind moved with wrath against any man: but these two parts being moderated, he lifts up the third wherein wisdom doth harbour, and so betakes him to his rest: be you assured that he doth attain to the truth, and that when he dreams, no bad visions or fancies present themselves unto him. GLAVC. I do likewise think so. SOCR: I haue stood the longer on this point, that you might the better conceive that which I purpose to declare, to wit, that there is in every one some vehement, rude, and unlawful kind of desires, yea even in those who seem to be very moderate, which appeareth in sleeping. But consider whether I say well, and whether you grant it. GLAVC● I do grant it. SOCR. Remember what manner of man I said the democratical person was: if it were not he which was brought up from his youth under a covetous father, esteeming onely the desire of gain, and not caring for the unnecessary desires which tend to pleasure and jollity, Is it not so? GLAVC. Certes even so. SOCR. But conversing afterward with braver fellowes, full of those desires whereof we lately spake, and falling into all wantonness, and into the humour of their manners, he hates his fathers sparing mind: yet is he of a better nature then they that do corrupt him with bad counsel, and being distracted on either side, he keeps the mean between both the●e kinds of life, using them both moderately, as seemeth good unto him. Thus he lives neither like a miser, nor yet too dissolutely, becoming of an oligarchical, a democratical person. GLAVC. Such was and yet is the opinion that is held of him. SOCR. Suppose, that sometimes this man being well in yeares, hath a son, whom he hath trained up from the beginning in such manners. GLAVC. Be it so. SOCR. Suppose also that the same chanceth to him that chanced to his father, and that he is drawn to all lewdness& licentiousness, which his seducing leaders call perfect liberty. Suppose also that his father and others of the house, do further and set forward his mean desires. Now when those vehement enchanters& nourishers of tyranny haue no other hope left of holding this young man, they will assay to put into his mind some humour of love, which is the president of idle affections serving his pleasure. This is a great& winged drone, unless you think that the love of such things is of another nature. GLAVC. I think not so. SOCR. now, when the other desires that rufle in his thoughts, full of perfumes, ointments, crownes, wines, and other pleasures usual in such a kind of life, being already come to their highest pitch, or extremity, arm the drone with the sting of inordinate desire, then this president of the mind is beset with madness and enraged; and if he feel in himself any stayed and frugal opinions, which yet retain some spark of modesty, he doth extinguish and expel them, till he haue rooted out of his mind all temperance, and be full of new-come follies. GLAVC. You do very well declare the beginning of a Tyrannicall person. SOCR. Tell me if love haue not for this cause been called a tyrant. GLAVC. It seemeth yes. SOCR. And hath not the drunkard a Tyrannicall mind? GLAVC. Yea certes. SOCR. moreover, the man that is furious and out of his right mind, doth he not take vpon him to command not men only, but the gods also, and hopes to compass his desire? CLAVC. Yes doubtless. SOCR. Thus doth a man become altogether Tyrannicall, when as by nature, or exercise, or both together, he imitates the fashions of the amorous, the drunken, and the melancholic person. GLAVC. It is altogether so. SOC●. Such a kind of man, as it seemeth, doth in this sort become so, but after what manner lives he? GLAVC. Tell me I pray you, as the common phrase is. SOCR. I will do so. These men give themselves afterward to making of feasts and banquets, to hearing of music, to whoredom, and all such other things, having love playing the tyrant within them, who governeth all the actions of their mind. GLAVC. It is necessary. SOCR. Wherefore many inordinate and vehement desires spring up day and night, which haue need of many things. GLAVC. Very many. SOC. So then their lands, if they haue any, are soon converted into ready coin, and that as soon spent. GLAVC. What else? SOCR. Then follows biting usury, and the wasting of their patrimony. GLAVC. Yea certes. SOCR. But when all is gone, it must needs be, that many vehement desires harboured in his mind, will cry out, and that these men being pricked with the stings, as well of other desires, as of love( which is the leader, and those other passions, as it were his guard) bee enforced by necessity to spy if any haue ought worth the taking, that they may get it from them by craft or violence. GLAVC. Yea without doubt. SOCR. They are constrained to hunt for it on all sides, or to bee vexed with extreme trouble, and discontent of mind. GLAVC. It is necessary. SOCR. Now when the new-bred pleasures haue surmounted the old, and usurped their place and power: such a kind of person will then deem it meet and just, that he being younger, should haue more then his Parents haue, and when he hath wasted his own portion of substance, he will spend theirs also. GLAVC. Yea certes. SOCR. But if his Parents will not suffer him, then will he rob and deceive them. GLAVC. Out of question. SOCR. If he cannot compass this, then he will spoil them by force. GLAVC. I beleeue it. And if they resist his outrage, think you he will fear them, and therefore abstain from any tyrannical action? GLAVC. I am not therof assured. SOCR. Tell me Adimantus, I hearty pray you, if you think that he will abandon and forsake his mother, being his ancient and necessary friend, for a new-affected and unnecessary dame; or that he will cast off his old father, being now deformed, yet a necessary friend unto him, and the ancientest that he hath for the unnecessary affection he beareth to some fine boy, whom he lately fancied? Or do you not rather think that he will beate both father and mother, and make them subject to these other, if he bring them into the same house? ADIM. By jupiter he will do so. SOC. lo what good hap it is to haue begotten a Tyrannicall son ADIM. Not very great good hap. SOCR. But to proceed, when his Parents wealth is likewise wasted, and there is still a thick swarm of inordinate pleasures, first he will break the wall of some house, or snatch away some mans garment that walks late in the night, then perhaps he will rob a church: and in all these acts the opinions lately freed from subiection, enuironning the passion of love as a guard, will overmatch those which he had since his infancy, touching honesty and filthiness, as certain bounds to discern them: which opinions were before at liberty in his dreams only, while he was as yet popularly trained up under the laws and precepts of his father, but being brought by love into this Tyrannicall humour, he will become the same, even being awake, as he was seldom before when he slept; he will not refrain from murder, gluttony, nor whatsoever vicious actions: for love, which doth Tyrannically live and reign in him with all licentiousness, as a Monarch will draw him being thus subject,( even as in like case a whole city) into all desperate boldness, whereby he will nourish himself and the whole troupe of his attendaunts, which are come partly outwardly of evil custom, and partly inwardly of the same manners, being now loosed and enfranchised by him. Is not this the order of such a mans life? ADIM. It is. SOC. But if there be in the city few such as they, and the rest of the people moderate, then will they pack thence to serve in the guard of some other tyrant, and being waged by him, will aid him in his warres, if h●e haue any, but if they live in peace, they will commit many petty evils in the city. ADIM. What evils mean you? SOC. They will pilfre, break walls, cut purses, steal mens garments, rifle churches, oppress men, and sometimes also falsely accus● them, if they haue any grace in speaking openly: they will likewise serve for false witnesses and corrupters of indgements. ADIM. Call you these petty euils● though there be few such persons? SOCR. I call them so in comparison of greater evils, for in respect of the evils committed by gangrenes through the f●lly and misery of the city, they touch not the mark, as the saying is. When there are many such in a city, and they backed and followed by others, then will they knowing their own strength and number, make him their tyrant( abusing so the peoples ignorance) which hath the greatest& strongest Tyrannies in his mind. ADIM. This is very likely, because he will best play the tyrant. SOCR. Shall it not be an easy matter, when all give place? But if the city stand against him, then as he did before outrage his father and mother, so will he serve his country now, bringing in other young gallants of the same humour, to whom he will enthrall both Patria and Matria, as the Cretanes call it. And this is the end of such a mans desire. ADIM. Altogether. SOCR. Are they not likewise so addicted in private before their aduancement? First they converse with those that flatter them, and are ready to please them in al things, who if they haue any important business, they fail not to dispatch it ●o thē, abasing& applying themselves by al means to their humors, but when they haue attained their purpose, they seem strange ADIM. Yea certes. SOCR. Thus spend they their whole life, not being friends to any, commanding in lordly sort over some,& obeying others: whereupon wee may well conclude, that a Tyrannicall nature doth never taste of true liberty and friendship. ADIM. It is very true. SOCR. May wee not rightly call such persons disloyal? ADIM. What else? SOCR. And herewithal the vniustest men that may be, if we haue well determined in the former discourses what iustice is. ADIM. We haue well determined it. SOCR. Let us then conclude, that he is a very wicked person: That is he that is such a one waking, as we before described asleep and dreaming. ADIM. He is so indeed. SOCR. Such a ki●d of man is he, who being by nature very Tyrannicall, doth reign alone, and how much the longer he lives in that estate, so much the more that humour increaseth in him. It is necessary( quoth Glaucon) beginning again to speak. SOCR. Now, whomsoever wee see very wicked, wee shall also see him very miserable, and he is doubtless the longer both wicked and wretched, that doth the longer, and with greater violence tyramnize: but all men are not of the same opinion. GLAVC. This must needs be so. SOCR. The man that is tyrannically minded, resembles the city, whose Lord is a tyrant: and he whose humour is Democratical, in like sort resembleth the Popular state, and so wee may say of the rest. GLAVC. What else? SOCR. Then as one city is in respect of another, touching virtue and happiness, so is also one man in respect of another. GLAVC. He is so. SOCR. Tell me then what is the state of a city oppressed by a tyrant, in respect of that which is ruled by a King? Is it such as we haue described that to be? GLAVC. clean contrary, for the one is very good, the other very bad. SOCR. I will not ask which of them you mean. GLAVC. It is of itself manifest enough. SOCR. But do you judge according to the same maner of happiness and misery, or according to some other? We must not be astonished at the only sight of a tyrant,& some few about him, but it were requisite to enter& pass through all the City, and having well considered every thing, then to deliver our opinion therof. GLAVC. Your counsel is good. And certes no City is more unhappy than that which is in bondage to a tyrant, and none more happy then the city governed by a King. SOCR. Say I were of aduise, that wee ought to observe like order in the discovering of mans humours, should I do amiss, requiring that he might judge of them, who could with his thoughts pierce into the mind of a tyrant, and fully perceive his conditions, not being astonished as a child, when he views the pomp that gangrenes show a far off to the beholders, but could sufficiently discern. Say I were of opinion, that wee ought all to hear this man, who could judge thereof, as having long dwelled with a tyrant, and assisted him in his private actions, knowing howe he demeans himself towards all his familiars, and what the place is wherein he may be seen disrobed of all his tragical furniture, and subject to public dangers: if it were my desire, that he who had seen all this, should declare unto us what the state of a tyrant is in respect of others, should I do well? GLAVC. Very well. SOCR. Will you then that wee fain ourselves to bee of the number of those that c●n judge hereof, as having being near to gangrenes, to the end, we may haue some one to answer to our demands? GLAVC. It is my desire. SOCR. Well then consider thus, recalling to your memory the likeness of the city and of the man of whom we lately spake, thē noting diligently and each after other, the passions of both? GLAVC. What passions? SOCR. Tel me first, will you call the state of that city free or servile, whose Lord is a tyrant? GLAVC. The most servile state that possibly may be. SOCR. You see many lords& free men there. GLAVC. I see many there, but few free men: for the whole& the better part doth endure ignominious& unhappy bondage. SOCR. Then if that resemblance between the man& the city do hold stil, there must be the like order in both,& his mind full of slavery& baseness, the better part serving the less the worse& more furious, which beareth rule therein. GLAVC. It is necessary. SOCR. But will you call the state of such a mind servile or free? GLAVC. servile. SOCR. Can the city which is in bondage to a tyrant, do what it listeth? GLAVC. In no wise. SOCR. No more can the mind enthralled to Tyrannicall passions, do what it will, if wee speak of the whole mind, but always being pricked with some violent sting, it will be full of trouble and repentance. GLAVC. What else? SOCR. Is it necessary that such a city be rich or poor? GLAVC. poor. SOCR. It is therefore necessary that the Tyrannicall mind be always needy and insatiable. GLAVC. It is so. SOCR. Shall not such a man be ever in fear? GLAVC In very great fear. SOCR. think you to find in any other city, more lamentations, sighs, weepings, and sorrows? GLAVC. No certes. SOCR. Neither shal you find such miseries in any other man, as you shall in him which is Tyrannicall, whose mind is enraged with inordinate desires, and chiefly love. GLAVC. It is true. SOCR. Then for these and other like respects you haue judged that the most miserable city of all, which is in bondage to a tyrant. GLAVC. Haue I not reason to judge so? SOCR. doubtless you haue. But what say you of the Tyrannicall man, when you consider the same things. GLAVC. I say he is the most miserable of all other men. SOCR. But therein you say not well. GLAVC. For what cause? SOCR. This man is not altogether so as yet. GLAVC. Who then? SOCR. He whom you may truly judge to exceed him in misery. GLAVC. And who I pray, or what kind of man is that? SOCR. It is he, who being by nature Tyrannicall, doth not led a private life, but is so unhappy, that by some ill fortune he becometh a tyrant. GLAVC. I conjecture by the former discourses, that you speak the truth. SOCR. Certes, nevertheless you must not barely suppose these things, but diligently consider them by such reason; for the consideration is of no small importance, to know which is the good or bad state of life. GLAVC. You say well. SOCR. Then I pray you mark my words, for me thinks wee must consider of him by these. GLAVC. By whom? SOCR. By those private men in cities, who are rich, and haue many slaves, for they do thus far resembled gangrenes, in that they bear rule over many. But there is a difference in this, that the tyrant commands a greater number. GLAVC. That is the difference indeed. SOCR. You know that these live ●afely there with their families, and fear not their seruants. GLAVC. What should they fear? SOCR. Nothing, but know you the cause thereof? GLAVC. Yea, it is because the whole city will in this behalf, aid every particular citizen. SOCR. You say right: but if some disaster hap draw any of them out of the city, having with him some fifty slaves or more, with his wife and children, and set him with the rest of his goods and seruants in some desert place where no free man is at hand to succour him, in how great fear think you he would be, as well for himself, as for his wife and children, least they should be murdered by the slaves? GLAVC. he would doub●● less be in great fear. SOCR. Should he not then be constrained to flatter some of them and set them at liberty, becoming by these means a flatterer of his own servants? GLAVC. He must perforce do so, or die. SOCR. But how if he were environed with such neighbours as would not suffer one to reign thus over another, and meeting such a man, would put him to death? GLAVC. His estate were worse, then if he were round beset with enemies. SOCR. Is not the tyrant shut up in a like prison, being of such a nature as we haue declared, full of many and diuers terrors, and lewd fancies? And though he haue a very covetous humour, yet dares not he alone in all the city, go forth any way, nor view the things which freemen may, but remaines most commonly mewed up in his chamber like a woman, repining at the other Citizens, if any of them go abroad and view ought worth the seeing. GLAVC. It is so. SOCR. This man being of evil government in himself, whom you lately called very miserable, falleth from such evils to other far worse, if he led not a private life, but be enforced by some fortune to play the tyrant, and being unable to command himself, undertaketh to command others, as if a man, whose body were sickelie,& not able to bear itself, could not live in quiet, but must needs spend his life in continual quarreling and fighting with other bodies. GLAVC. You speak very likely and very true things. SOCR. Tell me then friend Glaucon is not the estate of a tyrant altogether miserable, and worse thē the life which you did before deem very bad? GLAVC. Yes certes. SOCR. For which cause a tyrant( though he seem not so to all men) is subject to gross flatteries and seruilenesse, a great fauorour of many wicked men, and one that never saciates his desires, but wants many things, and is in very dead poor, if wee consider his whole mind, vexed with fear during all his life, and full of cares and discontents: therein resembling the city whereof he is Lord. Doth he resemble it or not? GLAVC. very much. SOCR. Wee will farther attribute unto him the qualities before recited, that it is necessary for him at the first, but more after he hath gotten authority, to be envious, disloial, unjust, without amity, irreligious, a favourer and maintainer of all evil, and by reason of these vices very miserable, and that he makes al the rest of his adherents, as bad as himself. GLAVC. No man that is well advised, will gainsay you.    

CHAP. XI. That the best commonweal, and of longest continuance, is that wherein there are many men of mean substance, neither too rich, nor too poor.  
THey do not measure the best commonweal and best state of life for many Cities and many men, by excellent virtue, nor by knowledge, both which haue need of Nature and Fortune, nor by that kind of commonweal which they would wish, but according to that state of life which is common to the greatest part of men, and that form of government, whereof many Cities are capable. For the Aristocraties whereof we spake ●●e● now, are either not fit for many cities, or resemble much the commonweal, so generally called● so that we shall speak of both, as of one. The deciding of these questions, dependeth on the same principles. For if it were well said in the ethics, that the happy life is according to virtue, not impeached, and that virtue is mediocrity; then it must bee, that the mean is the best of that mediocrity, which most men attain. We must determine in like sort of a Cities virtue, 'vice, and commonweal, sith the commonweal is the life of the City. There are in all cities three sorts of inhabitants: the one very rich, the other very poor, the third in a mean between both. Sith then it is granted, that the mean is the best, it follows that mean wealth is likewise the best of all, as that which easily obeyeth reason. But excessi●● beauty, or strength, or nobility, or riches, and their contraries, poverty, or weakness; or ignorance, do with great difficulty obey reason: for the one become contumelious and offending openly in great matters; the other deceivers, and too malicious in small matters. Now injuries are sometimes o●●ered by contumely, other times by cozenage. moreover, these men are unfit for public offices and counsel, the want whereof is very hurtful to Cities. Likewise they that are too happy, or strong, or rich, or greatly favoured, and such like, will not or cannot obey, with which evil they are infected from their infancy, disdaining even in the very school to obey their Maisters or teachers, through their cockering and licentious education. The other through want of these things, are too abjectly minded and base. So that the one cannot bear rule, but do servilely obey: the others cannot obey, but in lordly manner bear rule. Wherefore the City consisteth of slaves and lords, not of free men: and of these the one part is envious, and the other disdaineful, which things are much repugnant to amity& civil conversation, that proceedeth from society& good will: For we will not so much as walk with our enemies. A city therfore must be principally of men, whose estates are equal& alike, as are they whose substance is mean. For which cause it is necessary, that that City be well governed, which consisteth of those things whereof we say the natural constitution of a city is, and that those Citizens enjoy more safety then any other, for they desire not other mens goods, as the poor do, neither are their goods desired by others, as the poor do co●et the rich mens wealth: and sith by reason hereof they seek not to hurt each other, they therefore live without danger. For this cause Ph●cilides prayed well, that much good might befall men of mean calling, himself desiring to be a mean man in the City. Thus we see that of all civil societies, that is the best which consisteth of men whose estate is mean; and that those Cities are well governed, wherein there are many such inhabitants, which may haue more power then the other two parts, or at the least then either of them alone. For being adjoined, they cause the city to incline; and prevent contrary excesses. It is then great good hap, that they who govern the commonweal, haue mean and sufficient substance: For where the one are too rich, and the others haue nothing, there followeth an extreme democraty, or an intolerable oligarchy, or a tyranny, through both excesses: for of too haughty a democraty and an oligarchy, is made a Tyrannie● which thing chanceth far more seldom amongst men of mean and equal estate: the cause whereof wee will show afterwards in discoursing of the changes of commonweals. Then the mean form of government is the best, because that onely is without sedition: for where there is great mediocrity, there arise no seditions nor divisions of commonweals: and for this reason great Cities are less seditious, because they haue many inhabitants of mean estate. As for small Cities, they may easily be divided into two parts, so that there is no mean: for almost althere, are poor or rich. Likewise, the democracies are surer, and of longer continuance then Oligarchies, by reason of the inhabitants of mean estate which are there in greater number, and haue more part in the honours of the commonweal, then in Oligarchies: for when the poor do without them grow to great power and multitude, the state of the City becometh miserable,& is forthwith ruinated. That this is so, there is a manifest sign, viz. that the best Law-giuers haue been mean Citizens, for so was Solon, as it appeareth by his verses; and Lyc●rgus, who was no King; and Charonda●, and almost all the rest. We may hereby know the cause why the greater part of commonweals are democratical or oligarchical: For by reason that oft times there is small mediocrity in them, whensoever the one or the other exceed, viz. the rich men, or the people, and transgress the mean, they draw the commonweal unto them, whereon follows a democraty or an oligarchy. moreover, when there happen seditions and fightings between the people and the rich men, they which prevail, do not establish the commonweal in common, or equal sort, but esteem it the guerdon of their victory to excel or bear most sway in the commonweal: and so the one make a democraty, the other an oligarchy. Besides, they who haue obtained the principality of Greece, each regarding the form of their own commonweals, haue established in Cities, some of them democracies, others. Oligarchies, not considering the profit of those cities but their own private commodity. For these causes there is never or seldom, and amongst few men, a mean commonweal: for of all the Princes of former times one onely would haue established such a manner of commonweal. But the custom of rejecting equality, and seeking to bear sway, is long since grown old in Cities, wherein if the attempers be foiled, they obey. Hereby it appeareth which is the best commonweal, and for what cause. As for the other commonweals, whereas we say that there are many democracies, and many Oligarchies, the perfect Commonweal being set down, it shall be no hard matter to know which is to be accounted the first, which the second, and so of the rest; because one is worse, and another better: For that is of necessity the better which is nearest, and that the worst which is farthest from the mean: unless we judge by supposition, I mean by supposition, because oft times though one form of commonweal be more agreeable to mens desires, yet there is no let to the contrary● but that another may bee more profitable and meet ●or some.  
That is the best commonweal which consisteth of Citizens possessing mean substance for neither they which are too rich, nor they that are extremely poor, be fit for the mainte●ance of civil society, the one being too proud, the other too base and abjectly minded; the one contumelious and insolent, the other envious and deceitful; the one commanding as lords, the other obeying as slaves. But a city should consist of those who are equal and like, as they bee whose estates are mean. Wherefore, that is the best city which consisteth of such, and being as it were exempted from seditions, doth thereby long uphold itself, but where many are exceedingly rich and poor, there doth easily grow an intolerable oligarchy or tyranny, if the rich prevail; or an extreme democraty, if the multitude of poor men get the vpper hand. Plato in the fourth book of his Commonw●ale, and in the ninth of his Laws, maketh an excellent discourse touching riches and poverty, which Aristotle seems to haue followed, for the conformity of the matter. There must great heed bee taken( saith Plato) that riches and poverty enter not into the city, for the one engendereth effeminate daintiness, sloth, seditions, curious after novelties; the other, baseness and malicious practices, together with desire of innovation. Also that man who covets to bee happy, must not get riches, but by just dealing and temperance.   

CHAP. XII. Of that which doth generally concern the preservation of Cities, and what manner of multitude is fit for a democraty or an oligarchy.  
WE will consequently show for what sorts of men what kinds of commonweals are fit or behoofull, but first we will set down that which generally concerneth all. For that part of the city which desireth the safety and preservation thereof, must haue more power then the other which desireth it not. Now every city consisteth of quality and quantity: by quality I mean liberty, riches, knowledge, nobility; by quantity, the excessive multitude of the people. It may so come to pass, that in one of the parts whereof a city consisteth, there is quality, and in the other, quantity: As to haue more vn●oble Citizens then noble, more poor then rich, but in such sort, that they exceed not so much in quantity, as they fail in quality: for which cause they should bee compared together. Then where the multitude of poor men doth exceed the aforesaid proportion, there springeth a democraty, and so every kind of democraty, according to the excessive number of every sort of people● as if the multitude of Husbandmen prevail, the first kind of Democratie● if of mechanical and mercenary men, the last: and in like manner the other sorts which are in the mean between these two. But where the rich and Noblemen exceed more in quality then they fail in quantity, there springs an oligarchy, and every kind of oligarchy after the same manner, according to the excess of the oligarchical multitude. therefore he that maketh laws in the commonweal, must always haue regard to those men which are of mean calling, whether he make oligarchical or Democr●ticall laws, and ever respect them. When the number of mean men is greater then both the extremes, or than either of thē alone, then the commonweal may be firm and stable; for none needs to fear, that the rich men will at any time agree and confederate with the poor against these men, because the one will never endure to serve the other. And if they seek a more common form, they shal not find it; for they will never serve by turns by reason of their mutual diffidence. But an umpire is every where to be trusted, and the umpire is the mean, and by how much the more the commonweal is thus tempered, so much the more firmness and stability it hath. Many men err, who suppose that they can establish aristocratical commonweals, not only by attributing too much to the rich, but by excluding the people out of them, for of things which haue a false appearance or show of good, there doth in ●ime, and that not seldom, of necessity spring true hurt and evil. For the commonweal is sooner destroyed and overthrown by the superiori●y of the rich, then of the poor.  
IT is necessary for the preservation of every commonweal, that that part of the city which desires the safety thereof, bee of more power then the other which doth not desire it. And there are two things to bee considered in the parts of a city, to wit, Quality and Quantity: Quality, as Richesse, Liberty, Learning, virtue, Nobility: by Quantity is understood the number of citizens, of whom the parts of a city consist. By the collation and mixture of which things, there grow many kindes of commonweals: for where the poor do exceed in quantity, and are exceeded in quality, there springeth a democraty: contrariwise, an oligarchy, where the rich exceed in quality● and are exceeded in quantity. wherefore a Law-giue● or Politician must haue great regard to men of mean estate, and ever respect them, whether he make oligarchical or democratical laws, to the end, he may avoid the evil of the one or other extremity. For where the mean citizens haue more power then both the rich and poor together, or then the rich alone, or the poor by themselves, it is easy to ordain there a firm and stable commonweal: but to give more pre-eminence to the whole degree of rich men, then to all the multitude of the poor, it is dangerous; because the rich are more prove to offer injuries then the poor, and the commonweal is sooner destroyed by the superiority of them, then of the poor.  
FOR that part of the City which desireth the safety and preservation thereof ought to haue more power.] Aristotle in the Chapter following● it is very profitable to ordain the valuation of Citizens goods after such a rate or proportion, that they who participate in the commonweal, be more in number then they who do not participate: for the poor and such as haue no part in the public honours, seek to live in quiet if they be not outraged, nor their goods taken from them. In the fift book and ninth chapter: The principal foundation is that which wee haue touched sundry times before. viz. to see that that part which is content with the present state, haue more power then the other which is not therewith content. And in the eleventh chapter of the same book: Sith Cities do consist of two parts, to wit, of poor men and rich men, it must bee so provided that both of them think that their safety and preservation dependeth of the state, and it must be carefully looked unto, that they wrong not each other in anything, that he haue the stronger on his side, to the end, that when need requireth, he be not enforced to set slaves a● liberty, or to take the citizens weapons from them, because either of the parties being adjoined to his strength, will bee sufficient to resist the other part that might assail him.   

CHAP. XIII. Of the sleights and subtle devises by the rich against the poor, and by the poor against the rich, to purchase to themselves the government of the state, and how the lawgiver should take order for it.  
THere are five sorts of sleights and subtle devises used and practised to cirumvent the people: The Assembly, the Magistracies, judgements, arms, and Exercises. The Assembly, that it bee lawf●ll for all to bee present and assistant therein, and that there be a fine set on the rich mens heads, if they bee not assistant there, either onely, or in greater number. The Magistracies, that they which haue yearly revenue, may not refuse them, but that the poor may. The Iudgeme●●s, that there be a fine set on the rich mens heads if they judge not, and on the poor none; or a great fine on the one, and little on the other, as in Charondas his laws. In some places all they that are enrolled, must be assistant at assemblies and judgements, and if they be not assistant, they are subject to great penalties, to the end, that for fear of the penalty, they cause themselves not to be enrolled, and that being not enrolled, they assist not at judgements, nor at assemblies. There is the same ordinance touching arms and Exercises, for the poor are per●itted to haue no arms, and there is a penalty set down for the rich, if they haue none: and if they do not exercise themselves, the one are p●nished, and the other are not: so the one do exercise themselves for fear of the penalty, and the other do not, because they fear nothing. These are the oligarchical devises, used by Lawgiuers. As for the democracies, they use these counter sleights and devises, setting down a fee for poor men which are assistant at assemblies and judgements, and imposing no penalty on the rich. Then whosoever will justly temper these, he must entermixe the ordinances of both, setting down a goody for the one, and a penalty for the other: for by this means the commonweal shall be communicable to all, which should else remain in the hands of one part alone. Now such a kind of commonweal ought to consist of those only who bear arms. The quantity of the valuation or revenue cannot be simply defined and determined, but the quality being considered, it is very profitable to ordain it after such a rate or proportion, that they who participate in the commonweal, and more in number then they who do not participate: for the poor, and such as haue no part in public honours, seek to live in quiet, if they be not outraged, nor their goods taken from them. But this is not easy, because the Gouernours of the states are not always modest and courteous, and the poor, if there arise any war, will not ●erue therein, unless they bee maintai●ed by the common charges o● the State, but being so maintained, they serve willingly. In some places the commonweal consisteth, not only of those which do bear arms, but of those also which haue b●rne them. Such was the commonweal of the Mallians, which created their Magistrates out of the number of those who were in the war. The first commonweal among the Grecians after the kingdoms, did consist of warriors, and first of horsemen, because the force& excellence of the war consisted in thē, sith the footmen without order were unprofitable: For the ancient Grecians had as thē no discipline or order in these things, so that the horsemen had all the power, but when cities grew great,& the footmen became stronger, the commonweal was communicable to all● Therfore those states which we do now call Commonweals, were in former times called democracies:& the governments were by good reason Oligarchical& royal, because in regard of the s●●l 〈◇〉 of menthe●e were not many of mean estate, so that being few in number,& failing in order, they ●●l● the more endure to be governed. We haue shewed for what cause there are many commonweals, and why there are others besides those whereof we spake before,( for there is not one kind of democraty nor of the other forms in like sort) moreover, what differences there are, and wherefore it happens. Also which is commonly the best commonweal: and for what sorts of people, which among the other commonweals is fit or behoveful.  
six democratical, and as many oligarchical laws, subtly and maliciously devised to uphold, and cause the one estate to prevail against the other in five things: which are, the public assembly, Magistracies, judgements, Arms,& Exercises, which things may be justly or equally moderated, in being well entermixed.   

CHAP. XIIII. That there are three parts of all commonweals, the counsel, the Magistrates, and judgements: and first of the authority of the counsel, and the manners thereof.  
WE will speak again of all commonweals in general, and of every one severally in the discourse following, beginning where it is requisite. Then there are three parts in all commonweals, wherein an advised lawgiver must diligently consider and regard what is fit or behoveful for every one. For where such parts are duly ordained, the commonweals do of necessity prosper well, and differ only according to the difference which is in every one of them. One of these three parts consisteth in public counsel: the second in the Magistrates, what power they haue,& how they ought to be created: The third in the Iudges. It belonging to the counsel to haue the directing and ordering of the affairs both of peace and war, to make leagues, or to break thē, to ordain laws, and to abrogate them, to condemn, to banish, to confiscate, and to call the Magistrates to account. The consultations of all such matters ought to be committed to all the Citizens, or all the same to certain, as to some Magistrate, or to many; or diuers of the same consultations to some, or some to all, or certain of them to certain: when all do consult, and of all things, that is Popular, for the people seek for such equality. All the Citizens may consult many ways, as one way by turns, and not altogether; as in the commonweal of Tele●les the Milesian. In other commonweals the Magistrates assemble together, and consult; but all men as their turns fall, attain and come unto the public offices, and are taken out of the Tribes and smallest par●s of the city, until all the Citizens by turns, haue exercised the same offices: Assembling themselves together only to make laws, or to provide for the commonweal, and to hear what the Magistrates would signify. Another way is, when all the citizens do consult together, assembling onely about the creation of Magistrates, and the stablishing of laws,& when there is any question about matters of peace, or of war, or of the calling of the Magistrates to account. The other matters do remain in the deliberation of the Magistrates, being every one appointed to his charge, and created out of all the Citizens, and either by election or by lots. Another way is, when the citizens do assemble together about the creation of magistrates,& calling thē to account:& when deliberation is to be had of the wars, or of the making of any marshal association: the other affairs being administered by the Magistrates which are eligible, as those are, which ought of necessity to be exercised by men of skill. The fourth way is, when all the citizens asse●ble together,& consult of all matters: and when the magistrates decide nothing, but propo●●d matters only, and ask aduise. After which manner the last democraty is now governed, which we haue affirmed to be correspondent to that oligarchy which is called a Dinastie, or Potentatie, and to the gangrenes monarchy: All these ways are Popular. But where a certain number do consult of all affairs, it is an oligarchy, wherein there bee also many differencies. For when they bee created in respect of small substance, and are the greater number, by means of the meanness of their goods, and enterprise not against the Lawe, but obey it: And when it is lawful for whosoever hath that proportion of goods limited by the Lawe, to attain to the government; that kind of government is an oligarchy: ●owbeit civil and tolerable in respect of the mediocrity that reigneth in it. But where all Citizens are not admitted to deliberate, but those onely that are elected do govern according to lawe, as afore, that pertains to the oligarchy. Also when those that haue authority to deliberate, do choose themselves, and the son succeedeth in the room of his father, and are Maisters of the laws; of necessity this order is oligarchical. When the offices are divided, as for example, if the deliberating of peace and warres; and the calling of Magistrates to account, bee permitted to all the Citizens, and the other affairs to those Magistrates that are created by election, or by lots, it is an aristocraty, or a commonweal. If Magistrates bee chosen by voices for any special cause, and created by lots for other causes, either absolutely out of all them that afore haue been elected, or are taken by election and by lot, it is partly an aristocraty, and partly a commonweal. Thus the counsel is divided, according to the nature of commonweals; and every commonweal is administered according to such determination and means as wee haue here set down. But it is behoveful for that kind of democraty; which at this day seemeth to bee chiefly a democraty, to wit, where the people is master of the laws, for better and more fit order in consultations, to do in assemblies as is practised in Oligarchies, where they set fines vpon their heads that will not bee Iudges, to the end, that by this mean they may bee constrained to judge. But in democracies, they appoint a ●●e to the needy, the which should seem a good course in the assemblies, wherein all should determine better in common, to wit, the common people with the nobility, and the nobility with the multitude. moreover, it availeth, that the consulters bee taken by election, or by lot, equally out of all parts of the city. Also, it is behoveful that the vulgar people should be more in number then the men apt to govern, or not to give fees to all, but to so many as shall bee correspond●●t to the number of the Noblemen, or to exclude the greatest part of them by lots. As touching the Oligarchies, it is behoveful for them either to choose certain of the multitude, or to ordain such Magistrates as are in some commonweals, whom they call forecounsellours, or foreseers, or keepers of the laws, and then to consult of those matters whereabout they had before deliberated. So shall the people be present and assistant at the consultations, and will not enterprise to alter any thing in the commonweal:& will decree the very selfsame things, or nothing contrary to that which shal be referred unto them. Or else that all the Citizens should be received to the counsel, howbeit in such sort, as that the Magistrates onely shall haue authority to consult. And it is expedient to do quiter contrary to that which is practised in commonweals, that the authority and sentence of the people may take place in absolving& discharging, and not in condemning, but rather that their sentences of condemnation be referred to the Magistrates. For the contrary is practised in those commonweals where the authority and sentence of a ●ew when they discharge or acquit any man, is firm and observed: And if they condemn, then is their i●dgement not firm& stable, but is always referred to many. Thus much haue we se● down concerning the counselor and governor of the commonweal.  
There are three parts in all commonweals, the counsel, the Magistrates, and the judgements, and accordingly as they be ordained the commonweals go well or evil, receiving differences according to the difference which is seen in every of the same parts. The sovereign counsel is ordained to determine and consider of the affairs both of peace& war, of leagues& treaties● to make new laws, or to abrogate the old, to comdemn to banish, to confiscate,& to correct the magistrates. The deliberation of which things may be committed al to al men, or al of thē to a certain number, or some of thē to some men, or some to al men. If al determine of al things, it is Popular,& is done in many 〈◇〉: if a certain number do determine of al things, it is Oligarchical: but if the determinations & judgements be divided, they pertain to the aristocraty,& to the commonweal.  
IT belongeth to the counsel to deal in the affairs of peace and of war, to make leagues, or to break them, to ordain laws, and to abrogate them, to condemn, to banish, to confiscate, and to call the Magistrates to account.] Here Aristotle speaketh of the first and sovereign counsel of a state, whereon dependeth all the rest of the government, and by means whereof many and diverse necessary parts for the establishment of a commonweal, are tied together and united, even as in the round world, many unlike thanksgivings are held together by one heavenly and durable moving, and all causes by the first cause of al. In every living creature many and diverse members differing in office, are comprehended and drawn into unity and accord by the soul and the heart. From this counsel proceedeth the directing and ordering of matters of Religion, of Iustice, of arms, of Treasure, of laws, of Magistrates, and of Manners. Plato in the twelfth book of his laws, calleth it the anchor of the whole city, whereby it is set sure, and stayed as the ship is in the water. moreover, in the same book he saith, That this counsel hath such place in the city, as the soul and the head haue in living creatures: for the understanding is infused into the soul; and in the head, the sight and hearing are placed, insomuch, that the mind being joined to two goodly sences, and reduced into one, doth preserve everything. This counsel therefore whereof wee speak, is diversly ordained, according to the diversity of governments. In france, first of all the King hath all power and authority in all causes touching peace and war, he calleth together and holdeth the Estates of the kingdom, according to the ancient observation and custom of the same, whensoever he seeth any need requireth: he provideth for all offices and benefice that are elective, and for Captaineships: he disposeth of the moneys, and employeth them where the public affairs do require it: he alone maketh laws himself, and expoundeth them: sendeth ambassadors into strange Countries to be there ordinarily resident, or to discuss some controversy, to treat of peace or truce, to show his right and claim, and to summon any city or country to yield unto him, whereof he delivereth instructions signed with his own hand, and the hand of one of his Secretaries of Estate: to mone for the death of a Prince, and to congratulate the new coming of another to the kingdom, as is accustomend amongst friends: He ordaineth that which is necessary to be done to strange ambassadors, answereth them from his own mouth, and giveth them their dispatch. Besides this, as every state is maintained by rewarding of well doing, and punishing of evil, the one being favourable, the other odious: he himself distributeth the Honours, granteth the recompenses, and punisheth by Iustice, which is a great advantage and furtherance unto him to be loved, obeied, and honoured. The first counsel about the King, is the secret counsel, which is called the counsel of affairs, and is commonly holden in the morning after his uprising, whereto he calleth a certain small number of those whom he accounteth the wisest, and of greatest experience, and most faithful unto him, with whom he secretly communicateth his principal affairs, as they happen and fall out. There the letters which come from ambassadors, from Gouernours and Captains of the Frontiers, are read, dispatches are resolved vpon, and commanded to the Secretaries being there present, every one according to his Office: gifts and benefits are there agreed vpon; and the rolls of the same, and all the principal matters there determined, are signed by the kings hand. The number is greater in the privy counsel, whereinto men are called in respect of the nobility of their blood, and by the highnesse of their house, or dignity, wisdom, Knowledge, and Experience. The King himself is present therein now and then when any great matter is deba●ed: In his absence the first Prince of the blood is President. The Constable and chancellor being two chief officers of the crown, are of great authority: the one is chief for matters of war, and the other for Iustice; and being placed on several sides in equal degree, do always sit one right against the other. This counsel is held either for the kings treasures, and other matters concerning the affairs of the state of the realm, and then there enter none save only the secretary of Estate, and the Treasurer, De ●espargne( as they call him) overseers of the treasures, whose charge it is to understand how they are levied and employed; and the Secretaries appointed for the said treasures: or else this Counsel is assembled for the parties, that is, for matters of iustice depending on the sovereignty or royal prerogative; then there enter the Maisters of the requests, waiting by quarters, who report requests, informations, appeals, and other affairs of consequence whereof the king hath reserved to himself the knowledge, or which cannot be decided in any other place. Sometimes also the parties themselves haue audience, or speak by advocates. This counsel being ordained for the complaints of private men in such affairs as concern the state, and for the reports of cities and provinces, doth judge the appeals of Parliaments, looks to the Mercurials touching their order& discipline how it is kept, adviseth on the treaties of grain and wines,& on the merchandises brought into the realm, or carried out, and the imposts set therein: It taketh order for the course and value of money, and hath care of the demeins of the crown, of taxes, subsidies, and other revenues of the king: and of the principal farms, in prolonging the time, it makes abatements to farmers, or dischargeth them with knowledge of the cause and informations going before, joined to the aduise of the Treasurers and Generals of the charges. Furthermore, whatsoever is agreed on and ordained to take effect, must be signed by one secretary at the least, and sometimes by one secretary and master of the Requests, or by some person that is qualified, according to the nature of the cause, before it be sealed by the chancellor, who is a severe examiner, and as it were, a controller of all things, which maketh his Office very great, and sometimes hateful. Besides, all public treaties, edicts and ordinances must be certified in sovereign courts, and all the kings rescripts allowed by the Iudges, to whom they are directed. In turkey the Grand signor doth never or very seldom give audience to any private man, but onely admitteth into his presence the ambassadors of strange Princes sent to him with presents, and after he hath given them his hand to kiss, and understood the cause of their coming, not dealing farther with them, he referreth them to his Bassas, which hold a counsel called Diuan, wherein is open audience four daies in the week, Saturday, Sunday, monday, Tuesday, in that place where the Prince doth sojourn; if in time of peace, at Constantinople, or some other city in his Serrail; if in war, in his pavilion. The Bassas are called to this honour by degrees from lower estates, rising always, and giuing good example and opinion of themselves. Being assembled in counsel, they consult touching the affairs of the said ambassadors, and the answers which must be given them, touching matters of estate and sovereignty, touching means to be provided for the strengthening of provinces which begin to decay, touching murders and condemnations. The suppliant, plaintiff, or defendant, doth speak there without an advocate, and then is constrained to make full satisfaction to his adversary, if he● be present, or to prove his own allegation by witnesses: Whereupon there is forthwith made a definitive& irrevocable decree. When the Counsel hath held seven or eight houres, the Bassa-visir goes to acquaint the Prince with all that hath been treated of, according to the truth of every thing; for in this case the lye is present death: For the Prince doth oft times harken at a window called the Dangerous window, which is right over the Diuan, made in such sort, that he may hear& see not being perceived,& although he never be there, yet they think always that he is there. When he hath heard the report and aduise of the counsel, he doth seldom gainsay it, but doth confirm or moderate it. The things that are thus ordered and determined as edicts, sentences, 〈◇〉, privileges, safeconducts, and other like dispaches, are set down in writing by the Tesqueregibassa, who is as a secretary of Estate or of the Commandements, and by th● Zazgilars, who do record and register it. Touching the treasures, the Bassas meddle not with them, but there are two called Defterderler, who are overseers thereof, as it were Treasurers general, the one of Romania, the other of Natolia. The Cadilesquers are Presidents in civil causes, and sit in the Diuan with the Bassas. The Muphtie is chief for religion, and hath charge of matters of conscience. At Rome, while the commonweal lasted, the Consuls being present, had the government of all public affairs, with as great authority almost as Kings, whom all the other Magistrates obeied, the Tribunes of the people excepted, who were opposed against them, to the end, to bridle their authority, and control their doings. They assembled the elections to create their Consuls, or Pretours, or Censors, and to establish new laws: they took order for warlike preparations, and all matters for the camp. In governing their provinces, they commanded over their confederates as seemed good unto them: they made Captaines of thousands, levied soldiers, and choose the fittest: they might punish all their subiects wheresoever they dwelled, and employ the public treasure as they would, being for this purpose followed by the quaestor, who forthwith obeied their commandement. The Senate disposed the revenue of the Empire& the common charges; it was not lawful for the Questors to bestow one penny without their order, unless it were for the Consuls: to thē belonged the punishing of all offences through italy, which merited open punishment, as treason, conspiracy, poisoning, murders, &c. If any private person, or any city had need of favours, or reproof, or of aid and defence, the Senate had the whole charge thereof. If ambassadors were to bee sent to any Prince or State out of italy to reconcile, or intimate, to command ought, to possess, or to denounce war, the Senate took order for it. If any strange ambassadors came to Rome, it belonged to the Senate likewise to take order for their entertainment, and for the answers that should bee made them. The people alone had the authority of rewarding and punishment, wherein consisteth all government, and the whole life of man: they alone condemned to death, bestowed Magistracies, honours, and public charges, and ratified the laws: Peace and war was at their choice and appointment: they determined of sending succour, of union and agreements with their allies, they confirmed and approved these things, or disannulled them. At Venice, the general assembly of the Lords, which is held every eight day, is called the great counsel, having the sovereign power of the State, whereon dependeth the Senate, and the authority of the Magistrates, and doth represent in this commonweal the Popular State. The Duke hath royal authority and power, chiefly in that he retains such gravity and dignity. For all the citizens do honour him as a king, and in his name all the decrees, ordinances, and public Letters are written. The counsel of the ten men called Sign●ri Cai, and the college of the ancients, or of the counsellors, called Sa●ij, represent the aristocraty, who foresee and consult between themselves touching the affairs about which the Senate is to be assembled. They contin●e but six months, and are distinguished into three degrees or orders. In the first there are six, which surpass the rest in experience and good reputation, who haue the principal charge of governing the commonweal, and other affairs of importance; touching which, they give aduise to the Senate, that there may be order taken for thē. In the second degree are five inferior to the other in account, which haue charge of the Souldiers that are in the pay of the signory, following arms under the leading of th●ir captain general. In the third degree are five others, who haue charge of the Se● affairs, not being bound to refer to the Senate any thing whatsoever. At Raguse th●y create ● President from month to month, who dwelleth in the palace and hath twelve Cou●sellors, whose assembly is name the little counsel. Then there is another counsel, called of the Pregadi, whereinto an hundreth of the most ancient Cittizen● may enter: After these there is the great counsel, wherein all those of No●le● families, past the age of twenty years, are assistant. At Genoa the whole commonweal is governed by them that are born of the eight and twenty families, and none is called to any charge whatsoever if he be not of this number, which they call an aggregation. Thence are taken the four hundreth, of whom the great counsel consisteth, having the whole power and authority of the State, and they are chosen from year to year, out of whom is made another counsel, which is likewise annual, called the little Counsel;& this is assembled more often than the great counsel, and therein the affairs are commonly treated of. For the great counsel is never held, but for the creation of the Duke and the eight Gouernours of the commonweal, which are renewed every two yeares, or to consult of peace and war●e, and other matters of great consequence. All the Magistrates there, what authority soever they haue, are Syndiquez so soon as their charge is expired, that is, they may be accused and called to account. In Switzerland every Canton hath a double counsel, the little and the great. But vpon any weigthy cause that concerneth all the Cantons, they hold their general counsel called a journey or Diet, the most times at Baden: as in like case the jonians and AEtolians did in ancient times, calling such assemblies {αβγδ} and {αβγδ}, whereof Herodotus maketh mention in the first book of his history, and Titus livius in the first book of the war of Macedon. There was besides in Greece a public counsel of all the States, called the Amphictionicall counsel, because it was first ordained and instituted by Amphiction the son of Deucalion: Plinie in his 35. book, calleth it Publicum Graeciae Concilium. Those people that from the beginning sent thether their Agents called Pylagorae, and had voices therein, where the jonians, Dorians, Perhaebeans, Beotians, Magnesians, Achaians, Pthiotes, Melians, Dolopians, AEnians, Delphians, and Phocians: afterward there came many others also. Strabo in his ninth book of cosmography writeth, That this counsel was kept at Delphos in the Temple of Apollo, by reason of the commodious situation of the place, which is as it were in the midst of Greece, as well of that part within Isthmus, as that without: and he calleth it {αβγδ}, the navel of the earth. This counsel of the Amphictions was held twice a year, in the Spring, and in autumn: That the authority thereof was great, it appeareth by Diodorus Siculus in his sixteenth book De Bibliotheca Historica, cap. 8. where he saith, that the Thebans not contented with the battle of Leuctra, wherein they had overthrown the Lacedemonians, did besides frame a complaint against them in the assembly of the States of Greece, which is called the counsel of the Amphictions, and did prosecute it in such sort, that the Lacedemonians were there condemned in a great sum of money, because they had taken by stealth in time of peace the Castle of Thebes, which was called Cadmaea. In like manner the Phocians also having profaned and tilled a great part of the ground consecrated to the gods, called Cyrrhaea, were therefore condemned also by the Amphictions in a great sum of money, which because they refused to pay, the said counsel of the Amphictions declared, If the Phocians did not pay the fine wherein they were condemned for offence to the gods, that then their country should bee confiscate and consecrated to the gods. And they farther decreed, at what times all the others which had been condemned, should be enforced likewise to pay their fines, of which number the Lacedemonians were, and if any of them refused to obey the decrees of the counsel, that they should be reputed excommunicate, and ●et vpon by all the other Greekes as wicked men: which sentence was authorized and confirmed by all the other Grecians. And in the seventeenth Chapter he writeth, That Philip king of Macedon having waged and finished this holy war, resolved and agreed with the Boeotians and Thessalians, that the Parliament of the Amphictions should be assembled, and the whole ordering of those affairs altogether referred to them. Whereupon the Agents or Deputies were sent from al parts, and being assembled, they decreed, that from thenceforth King Philip and his successors ●hould haue a place in the counsel of the Amphictions, and the two voices that the Phocian● had before, who were lately vanquished by him: that the three cities of the Phocians should pull down their walls: that they might in no sort come to the Temple of Apollo in Delphos, nor enter, or haue a voice in the counsel of the Amphictions: that they might haue no horses nor weapons, until they had made restitution of all the gold and silver which they had taken away. Furthermore, that all they who had in any sort been accessary to this sacrilege, or which had fled out of the country, should bee held for excommunicated persons, and that it should bee lawful to lay hands on them, and led them away wheresoever they might be found: that all the good towns of the country of Phocis should be pulled down, and made small villages, so as none of them might contain more then fifty houses, yet that the lands should bee left unto them, paying yearly sixty Talents, which amount to six and thirty thousand Crowns, for tribute to Apollo, until they had fully repaid all the gold and silver that they had taken out of the Temple of Apollo. That Philip and his successors should from thenceforth haue the government and jurisdiction of the Pythian games, together with the Boeotians and Thessalians, because the Corinthians had been accessary to the sacrilege committed by the Phocians against the gods: That the Amphictions, and King Philip should burn and break to pieces the armours of the Phocians and of the strangers which had been waged by them, and that afterwards they should burn the remainder of them, and that their horses should bee sold. The Amphictions did likewise make a decree for the defence of the Oracle, and for all other things concerning religion and reverence towards the gods, as also for peace and union between the Greekes. Budeus is of opinion, that the summoning and general assembly of the three Estates of france may bee called by a greek name {αβγδ}, as the other were called {αβγδ}, and {αβγδ}. The ancient Kings of france were wont to hold Estates very often, which was an assembly of all their subiects, or of some deputed for them. And the holding of Estates is nothing else then when the King acquainteth his subiects with his greatest affairs, and taketh their aduise and counsel: likewise he heareth their complaints and grievances, and giveth order touching them, as reason requireth. This was anciently called the holding of a Parliament, which name it hath yet retained in England and Scotland. But because that by this means the Kings had knowledge, as well of general complaints which concern the whole Estate, as of private, which concern particular causes: the name of Parliament hath remained in private, and touching particulars, which are held by a certain number of Iudges appointed by the King, which are called a Parliament. The public and general audiences which the King hath reserved to himself, haue taken the name of Estates. The Estates were assembled for diverse causes, and according to the occurrences and occasions, either to demand aid of men and money, or to take order for civil causes& matters of war, or for the portions or allowances of the kings younger sons, as it chanced in the time of Lewis the eleventh, or to determine touching the government of the realm, or other causes. In which assemblies the Kings did sit, and were President, save onely over the Estates, wherein was handled the noblest cause that ever was, to wit, to whom the kingdom of france should belong, after the decease of Charles the faire, whether to Philip de valois his cousin, or to Edward King of England his brother in Lawe. Philip was not President there, for he was not as then king, and besides, was a party therein. It is doubtless, that the people receive great furtherance by the said Estates, for they haue thereby the good hap to come near the person of their King, to make their complaints unto him, present their petitions, and receive the necessary remedies and redresses. Messire Michel de l' hospital chancellor of france, in the first Oration he made to the Estates held at orleans, Anno, 1559. Wherein he doth at large confute those which say that the king doth in some sort diminish his sovereign power, by taking aduise and counsel of his subiects, sith he is not bound thereunto, and that he maketh himself too familiar with them, which engendereth a contempt and abasing of the kingly dignity. Touching the Parliament of England, polydore Virgil doth thus writ thereof in the life and acts of king Henry the third: The kings of England( saith he) were not wont to assemble their subiects for to consult with them touching the affairs of the realm, or if they did, it was very seldom; so that we may by good right ascribe the order and manner thereof to this king Henry, which hath taken such roote, that since his time no matter of importance hath ever been done, concerning the government of the kingdom and safety thereof, unless it hath been first referred to this counsel: and whatsoever things are decreed and done by the commandment of the king and people, unless they bee ratified by the authority of this counsel, they are accounted of no force. But least there should any impeachment go through the iudgement of the ignorant multitude, such of the clergy and people as shal be present and assistant there, haue by a certain lawe been noted and declared from the beginning. It is called a Parliament after the manner of france, and every king doth usually call or summon it at his coming to the crown, to change or abrogate old laws, and to make new if need require, by the aduise of the counsel, after which time he may so oft as he will call the said Court of Parliament, according to the exigence of present occasions: the manner which they observe in consultation, is this, The counsel being assembled for the good of the Prince and people, to the end that every one there assistant, may freely speak in his degree and turn, they are separated the one from the other, for the king, Prelates, Princes, and other Lords are withdrawn into one place, and the Deputies of the people, whom they call Burgesses, into another, where they confer together touching public affairs, and choose out of their own assembly some one man of account, whom they call their Speaker, who propoundeth those matters whereon they are to deliberate, and demandeth each mans opinion, then makes report unto the king, and there is nothing enacted, unless it pass by the ad●●se of the greatest part, both of the vpper and lower house, and be confirmed by the King, who signifies his pleasure last of all, being demanded by the Chancellor of the realm, who is the speaker and as it were the mouth of the rest, to the Kings. The Prelates on their part observe like order: and when their speaker hath advertised them of the greatest number of opinions, the Archbishop there present gives assent thereto, and joins with the rest in the establishing of laws. The proper Lawe of England dependeth on the decrees of the Prince and people, approved and ratified by the authority of this high Court; and they call it the chiefest Lawe of all: neither doth that country receive or admit any other civil Lawe. In Almaigne, the Emperour can decree nothing touching the weal public of Germany, or the authority, or safety of the Empire, without the aduise and consent of all the Estates, especially the seven Electors; neither can he alone at his own pleasure undertake war, impose taxes, levy soldiers of the same country, or ent●rtaine strangers. This counsel and assembly of the Estates is called a Diet, or journey. Melancthon in the first book of his Chronicles doth much extol the authority of the Electors, calling it the sovereign Senate on earth, and the synowes of the Empire: he compareth their power to that of the Ephori in Lacedemonia, and of the seven Princes in Persia. Iulius Pflug in his treatise of the commonweal of Germany, complaineth, That the Emperours authority is much abased, and that every one of the electors hath more power in his own province, then the Emperour hath throughout all germany: For besides other prerogatives, it is lawful for the Electo●s, when urgent necessity requireth it, to assemble themselves apart, and consult touching the weal public, neither may the Emperour in any wise prohibit or disturb them, as Sleidan maketh mention in the first book of his history. When the Emperour doth summon the Estates, he is President, and doth by his chancellor propound those matters whereof he will haue them to deliberate. If he chance to die, then the Archbishop of Magunce assigns the other electors to meet at Franquefort, there to proceed to the election of a new Emperor, in such maner as is described by the said Sleidan in the same book, and by Omphrius Veronensis in the discourse which he hath written touching the state of the Empire. The counsel established at Spires, which is called the Chamber of the Empire, is as it were a Parliament of Almaigns for the administering of iustice among them. Frixius Polonius in his second book of Laws, chap. 16. wisheth, that there were in Polonia such a counsel as that of Spire for Germany, and that of Paris for France, and as the Counsel of the Amphictions was for Greece, and of the Areopage for Athens, in which counsel there might bee assistant, honest, learned, and wise men, chosen out of all the Estates, which might judge by the laws without further appeal the causes brought thither by appeals of inferior Magistrates, from all the provinces of the whole realm of Polonia all the year long, having the same power and authority over all the subiects of the crown. Neque vero illorum tantum munus judicandi esset, said& reconciliando discords,& tumultuantes compescendi,& litium causas praecidendi: ac nisi res aliter componi possint, tum vero pro tribunals sedendo, causas cognoscendi, ac vnicuique ius suum reddendi. Hac ratione& querelis de iudiciorum prorogatione obuiam iretur,& causidicorum artibus munimum, loci relinqueretur. Haec ille. The assemblies of the states is held in Polonia every year,& that chiefly for two causes, the one for administering of iustice in sovereignty, for there are appeals made thither from all the Iudges of the country in great number, which breedeth confusion: The other cause is to take order for defence of the country against the bordering enemies, as the Tartars which make many inroads.   

CHAP. XV. Of the ordinance and authority of Magistracies, and of their distinction.  
WE will now come to the distinction of Magistracies, for this part also of the commonweal hath many differences. For it must bee considered how many Magistracies there ought to be, and what authority they are to haue,& how long every one is to continue, because some allow them half a year, others lesse● some again a whole year, and others longer time. It must likewise bee considered whether the Magistracies ought to be perpetual, or of long continuance, or neither, but that the same persons may often execute them: or whether it bee better that one man do not bear office twice, but once onely. moreover, touching the ordinance of Magistracies, it must be considered out of what estate or quality of men, and by whom, and in what manner they ought to be created. For it must be known in how many sorts these things may be done, and for what commonweals what kinds of Magistrates are fit. Neither is it an easy thing to determine which may properly bee called Magistracies, sith civil society hath need of many Presidents or Gouernours. Wherefore it is not meet to call all those Magistrates who are created by election, or taken by lot, as first the Priests, whose function differs from the charge of civil Magistrates, then the overseers and orderers of public feasts, the Heralds and Embassadour● are chosen. Of public offices and charges some are civil, either of all the Citizens for one action, as the general of the army; or of one part of the Citizens, as the overseers of women and children, or Oeconomicall, as many times there are some chosen to measure and distribute corn, or inferior and servile, whereto if rich men bee chosen, they substitute their slaves. But to speak simply, they are chiefly to be called magistrates which haue authority to deliberate, judge, command;& that especially, for it is more imperious. But touching the use, it skills not how they are called, sith there is as yet no controversy touching the name, but a certain speculative consideration. It may farther be doubted what Magistracies, and how many are necessary for the government of a city,& which not necessary, yet profitable for good government, aswell in every commonweal, as chiefly in small cities: for in great cities one Magistrat may& ought to be appointed to one office, because that by reason of the great number of citizens, many may attain to offices, so as they be chosen again to some after long time,& bear others but once in their life. Now every thing is better done, when men attend and follow one thing only, then when they are distracted with the charge of many things: but in small cities necessity enforceth to bestow many offices on few persons, for by reason of the small quantity of inhabitants many cannot haue charge, for who should after succeed thē? sometimes also small cities haue need of the same kinds of Magistracies, and the same laws that the great cities haue, but the difference is this, that the one haue often need of the same,& the other after long time. wherefore nothing hinders, but that many offices may be committed together to one man, because they do not hinder each other, it being necessary by reason of the small number of citizens to create Magistrates, as instruments serving to diverse uses. Then if we can declare how many Magistrates are necessary for every city, and how many not necessary, yet meet; this point being explained, we may easily know what Magistracies may be conveniently bestowed in one. It will likewise be expedient not to be ignorant to what kinds of Magistrates, many offices may be committed by the laws,& of what offices a Magistrate may every where haue the executing and authority: as the discipline of modesty, if in the market place it pertaineth to the AEdile,& in another place to some other officer, or every where to the same: as also whether the distinction is to be made in respect of the affairs, or of the persons; I mean, as if one had charge of the discipline of modesty, to know whether such a charge ought to be committed to one man over children,& to another over women. Likewise in commonweals to know whether the kinds of Magistracies do differ in e●●ry one or not: as in the democraty, oligarchy, Aristocraty,& Monarchy, whether there be the same chief magistrates, yet not chosen out of those who are equal& like, but being diverse in diverse forms of commonweals, as in Aristocraties, of learned men; in Oligarchies● of rich men; in democracies, of free men; or whether there bee some according to the differences of the Magistracies; in some places the same& alike, in others diverse: for it is necessary that the same be in some places great,& in others small. nevertheless, there are some offices proper, as is theirs who are called Preconsulters, which is no popular office, although the Counsel be popular: for there must be certain persons to consult& deliberate before the people, least they should hinder their private business, which Preconsulters if they be few in number, it is Oligarchical. Now it is necessary that they be few, therfore their office is Oligarchical. But where both these offices are, the Preconsulters are ordained against the public counsellors: for to consult is popular, & to preconsult Oligarchichal: but the authority of coumsel is lost in democracies, where the people assembling, doth determine of al things; as it usually cometh to pass, where there is great profit or fees appointed for those that are assistant in assemblies: for being idle, they do oft assemble, and meddle in al matters themselves. As for the overseer of women& children, or if there be any other officer having such charge, it is Aristocratical, not Democratical. For how should they bar poor mens wives from going out of their houses? Neither is this Oligarchical, sith the wives of Oligarchical persons live deliciously. But we haue for this time spoken enough of these things. Let us return thē to the ordaining of Magistracies,& finish that discourse. The differences consist in three points which comprise al the other sorts● the first, who they are that create magistrates; the second, out of what estate of men; the third, in what manner. Each of these three hath three differences: for either the Magistrates are created by all the citizens, or by some of thē, or out of all, or out of some certain& appointed persons, as for their revenues, birth, virtue, or other like respect: as in Megara they created their magistrates out of the number of those that conspired and made war together against the people,& the●by election or by lot. again, these things are coupled, so that some magistrates are created by some, others by all, others out of all, others out of some o●e● by election or by lot. So every difference is of four sorts: for either all are created out of all by election, or all out of all by lot: again, either out of all being gathered together, or out of all a● by tribes, ●● out of certain companies& fellowships until they haue passed over al the citizens, or always out of all,& sometimes in one manner, sometimes in another. Likewise they are created either some out of all by election, or out of all by lot: or out of some by election, or out of some by lot: or some after one manner, some after another. I say some out of all by lot, some by election: so that beside the two couplings there are twelve sorts, of which ordinances two are popular, viz. that the magistrates be created by all out of all by election or by lot: or both these two together, partly by election, partly by lot: but not to ordain them by all together, but out of all: or out of some by lot or by election, or in both sorts: or some out of all, some out of certain, in both sorts, yet partly by lot, partly by election, this is commonweal like: but when as all are created out of all, some by election, others by lot, or in both sorts, partly by lot, partly by election, it is oligarchical:& yet more Oligarchical, when it is in both sorts. But when as some are created out of all, or some out of some, partly by election, partly by lot, it is Aristocratical;& when some out of some, it is Oligarchical. Likewise by some out of some not in like sort, or by some out of some in both sorts; but as by some out of all, it is not Oligarchical: but of some by al by way of election, it is Aristocratical. There are so many sorts or manners of ordaining Magistracies, which are divided according to the forms of commonweals: but for which of thē which are fit and behooveful, and how the Magistracies should be ordained with power& authority, and what they are, it may easily be understood, by the power& authority of the Magistracy, I mean an overseeing of the taxes& subsidies, or of the prison. There is another kind of power, as of the general in war,& of him that hath charge of civil contracts and suits.  
The second part of commonweals consisteth in Magistrates, which are properly those that haue power to deliberate, judge, and command, but chiefly to command. Some Magistracies are necessary in every City, others not necessary, yet profitable; which great and rich Cities use: for small Cities having few sufficient men, are constrained to commit many offices to one man. Then all kinds of Magistracies are not fit or behoveful for all commonweals, but some are profitable for some commonweals, and other for others: neither are all created in the same manner, but some by lot, others by election, wherein there are three points to bee considered. The first, to know who they are which create Magistrates: the second, out of what estate of men: the third, in what sort: as whether all ought to be chosen out of all, or some out of all, or some out of some; by election or by lot, according to the diuer●ity of commonweals. Aristotle doth again treat of Magistracies in the 6. book of this work, chap. 8. and Plato doth the like in his 6. book of laws. Aristotle in the 5. book of this work, chap. 5. sa●th, That there ought to be three things in them that exercise the chief Magistracies. First a love to the present state; Secondly, ability to execute the functions and charges required in the Office; Thirdly, virtue and iustice fit for every commonweal. And in the 8. chapter of the same book he affirmeth, that there is no greater rule to bee observed in every commonweal, then to provide by the laws that the public ●ffices bee not gainful. In the second book, chap. 7. he doth not like that the power of the Senators was perpetual and during life; and that they were exempted from controlment, not being bound to give account of their dealings. plate. De Legibus, lib. 12. sheweth the necessity and importance of the suit De repetundis, called in greek {αβγδ}, whereof the Nomophylaces in Greece, and the C●nsors in Rome, had commonly the charge: but sometimes the people being assembled, was judge thereof. Budeus in his former Annotations on the Pandects, complains that the Syndicate( which is an accusing or calling to account of those that haue ben magistrates or officers) hath no force over the Magistracies of France, especially over the Parliaments:& that the said Magistracies are perpetual. For although the king takes order for al,& in his letters to that effect, causeth to be set down so much as pleaseth him, yet none of thē are wont to be suspended or deposed, if it be not by forfeiture& order of law. The same Budeus in his Annotations makes an excellent discourse of the Magistracies of France,& to what persons they should be committed●& in what ●ort they should be executed. Vincent de la Lo●pe hath gathered the Magistracies of France in three books, Fenestella& Pomponius Laetus haue written of the roman Magistracies: Perion of the greek and roman: Postell of the Athenian& Turkish: Contarin● of the Venetian.   

CHAP. XVI. Of judgements, and of the kinds and manners thereof.  
IT remaineth that we speak of the third part, which is of judgements: whereof we will by the same way show the several manners. The difference then of judgements consisteth in three points, viz. out of whom, whereupon,& in what maner. I say, out of whom, that is, whether out of al or out of some: whereupon, that is, how many kinds of judgements there are: in what manner they ought to be created, whether by lot, or by election. We will first distinguish how many kinds of judgements there are: they are eight in number; One for calling of the magistrates to account: the other against those that publicly offend: the third belongeth to the commonweal: the fourth is of differences rising between the Magistrates& private men, concerning fines& penalties: the fift is of particular contracts or bargains of importance, and of criminal causes,& strange matters,[ the kinds of criminal causes are either among the same iudges, or among others, whether done of purpose or by constraint;& when the case is confessed, yet some doubt whether it hath ben justly done:] The sixth is, when they who are accused of homicide, be in prison under the earth, as in Athens that which they call the iudgement of a Well; but few such crimes are ever committed, even in great cities. Touching the iudgement of strangers, it is of two sorts, the one is of strangers between themselves, the other of strangers with citizens. moreover, there is another kind of iudgement for small causes, as from one Drachma to five& a little more; For iustice must also be done in these cases, which neue●thelesse is not by many iudges. But lea●ing the judgements of criminal causes& strangers matters, let us speak of civil causes, which if they be not well administered, there ensue seditions, and changes of commonweals. Now it is necessary either that al do judge of all the aforesaid matters by lot, or by election: or that all do● judge of all partly by lot, partly by election: or of the same matters, the one by election, the others by lot. These are the four manners of creating or ordaining iudges,& there are a● many other in part: for sometimes some Iudges are created by election, who judge o● all causes: others by lot, who judge likewise of all causes: or part by lot, or part by election: or there are certain judgements on the same causes, consisting of iudges created by lot, or by election: wherefore these manners of judging are the same that the other are which were before:& they will also be the same, if they be counted so, that some be out of all, others out of some,& others again out of two: as if in the same auditory some were chosen out of all, and some out of some, by lot or by election, or in both forts. We haue declared of how many sorts the judgements do consist, whereof the first are popular, which are out of al, or over al; the second oligarchical, which are out of some, over all; the third aristocratical and civil, which are partly out of all, and partly out of some.  
The third part of commonweals consists in judgements, which part hath three differences in like sort, as the Magistracies haue; the first is, of what Citizens Iudges are to be chosen: the second, of what causes they are to judge: the third, how they are to be created or ordained by voices or by lot. And there are eight sorts of judgements according to the diuer●ity of causes, which may bee easily understood by the reading of the text. Plato speaketh of Iudges in the sixth and twelfth of his Laws. Aristotle also treating of Iustice in the fift of the ethics, discourseth of Law and judgements.  
IT remaineth that we speak of the third part, which is of Iudgement.] Plot. De Leg. lib. 6. saith, No city may be truly called a city, if it haue not the judgements well ordained. Some judgements are private, others public;& some criminal, others civil. private judgements are of seruitudes, prescriptions, guardianships, bargains, testaments, successions, marriages; whereof the said Plato hath treated in his 6.& 8. book of laws. public judgements are of treasons, sacrileges, extortions, falsehood, thefts, murders, whether wilful or enforced, whereof Plato speaketh in the 9. book of his said laws. Then he treateth of public& private judgements together,& of such things as are necessary for both, in the 12. book: how Iudges are to be ordained in the 6. book: what they ought to know& do, in the said 12. book,& what manner of men they ought to be, in the 3. of his commonweal. Among the ancient Greekes and romans the office of judging was imposed by necessity on those that judged, yielding thē honor with small profit,& of great hurt, to those that would well acquit themselves of their charge: as it appeareth by the 3. Oration of Demosthenes in favor of the Olynthians,& by that Oration of Cicero, Pro Praetura vrbana. Vos inquit, quod ad vestram famam, existimationem, salutemque communem pertinet, judices, prospicite atque consulite. splendour vester facit, vt peccare sine summo reipublicae detrimento ac periculo non possitis. Non enim potest sperare populus Romanus, alios esse in Senatu qui rectè possint indicare. Vos si non potueritis, necesse est cum de toto ordine desperarit, aliud genus hominum, atque aliam rationem iudiciorum requira●. Hoc si vobis ideo levius videtur, quod putatis onus, esse grave& incommodum, indicare: intelligere debetis primum interest, vtrum id on●s vosmetipsi reieceritis: an quod probare populo Romano fidem vestram& religionem non potueritis, ideo vobis judicandi potestas excepta sit. &c. At this cay in Switzerland the taking of any thing for iudgement either directly or indirectly, is forbidden on pain of death. In England likewise the Iudges place is little profitable unto thē, for after that they are chosen to the number of 12. in what cause soever it be, civil or criminal, and that they haue taken a solemn oath to judge uprightly according to the laws, they are shut without victuals into a place, out of which they cannot come forth, until they haue agreed on the iudgement of that cause for which they were chosen: as Polidor Virgil writeth in the 9. of the English History. But to return to the maner of the roman judgements, although they were appointed to three degrees or estates of Senators, Knights, and officers of the treasury, called Tribuni aerarij, yet the same persons did not judge always, but the fervours being annual Iudges, were therein President, and choose by lot out of the aforesaid 3. estates, a certain number of Iudges, but if they whom they had chosen, were refused by either of the parties, thē they proceeded again to the choice of others, took their oths,& distributed thē by tens. The Senators were for a time the only Iudges of all causes, but Tiberius and Caius Gracchi, who were altogether popular, to diminish the Senates authority& increase the peoples, added 300 Roman knights, being as many as there were Senators,& they caused the judgements of al causes to be committed to these 600. But Silla, to diminish the authority of the knights& people, took from thē this power of judging& knowing, as well criminal as civil causes,& restored it wholly to the Senate. Afterward Pompey in his second Consulship, gave it to the order of knights, and then the authority of judgements was equally communicated to the 3. estates: but Caesar being dictatory, reduced it to two only, viz. to Senators& Knights, as Suetonius& Dion writ. Paulus Manutius in his book of Laws, doth diligently treat of the manners which was observed in the election of Iudges. Budeus in his former& latter annotations on the Pandects, hath observed many notable points touching the maner of the roman judgements, which they that are desirous to know farther thereof, may red. As also that which Gruchius hath gathered in the first book of the Roman elections, declaring principally what were the kinds of the Roman judgements in the time of Cicero. And Sigonius in his second book of the ancient law of the roman Citizens, chap. 18: who following the custom of the romans, puts such difference between the Magistrates and the iudges, that the Magistrates appointed the iudges, or interposed an edict: the Iudges having understood the cause, gave iudgement: the one assembled the Iudges, the other came to sit in iudgement at their appointment. The Magistrates were created by the voices of the people, the Iudges by lot, the one taken out of all the people, the other commonly out of a certain degree● Men observed what every Magistrate propounded, and regarded what many Iudges decided: finally, the Iudges gave sentence, and the Magistrates pronounced it. To be short, all the Magistracies at Rome were given by the voices of the people, the degrees established by the Censors choice: the judgements committed or referred to the religion, or to the Praetors lot. Plato in his 6. book of laws, speaking of Iudges, doth not call thē magistrates, but as it were magistrates.  
WHICH if they be not well administered, there ensue seditions& changes of Commonweals.] In ancient times judgements were so well ordered& administered in France, that strangers also came to submit themselves thereto, but at this present they are brought to such a delaying length,& so wrapped& entangled with formalities, that it is great pity to see the noble realm thus infected therewith, as with a general contagious sickness: for there live innumerable people on the miserable exercise of pleading, which they call Practise● Plato in the 3. book of his commonweal, affirms it to be an evident sign of a corrupt estate, when we see therein many Iudges& Phisitians, because the multitude of Iudges is maintained by mens falsehood& contention;& the number of Phisitians by their idleness, fifteens& gluttony. Paulus AEmilius in his 8. book of the history of France, writeth, that the Frenchmen were at the first governed more simply in the course of judgements, contenting themselves with the sentences given by the bailiffs& Seneschals( who had almost the whole authority in administration of iustice)& thinking it unseemly to seek law,& sue for their right a far off, by releefes of appeal. But when scandalous vexations were sprung up amongst thē,& suits of law multiplied, then the sovereign administration of iustice began to be exercised once a year,& on few daies; then twice, in removing still the places. At the last it was thought best to keep the courts for judgements, in one certain place,& to build an hall for that purpose at Paris, being the chief city of the realm, whereupon in the time of Philip the faire, or of Lewis Hurin( as Gaguin thinketh) the palace was founded by Enguerran de Marigny earl of longueville, high Treasurer of France, in that greatness& stately magnificence as we see it now with halls& chambers, wherein the iudges of civil& criminal causes without further appeal, were disposed& distributed by certain companies. In the great chamber& first appeal of pleas, the causes of peers,& such as concern the crown;& ordinarily the verbal appeals on the advocates pleas are judged at the first propounding: where if they cannot be speedily& readily decided, they are referred to the counsel, for which there is a chamber appointed. Behind, there are three chambers of inquests, wherein the suits are decided& examined by writing. moreover, there is the court called la Tournelle, wherein criminal causes are judged: and the Exchequer chamber for such causes as concern the domains of the crown. The court of requests, where are judged at the first propounding, the causes of those that are of the kings train, or others who are privileged. The auditory of the maisters of requests of the household, who judge of the titles of offices. The chambers of the generals of the taxes,& the Chancery. On the other side is the chamber of accounts,& another of the generals of the moneys. The Counsellors are some married, some clergy men, being disposed or distributed in the chambers in greater or less number, according as the Court is furnished. In the great chamber there are most commonly four Presidents, to whom by reason of the necessity of the time two other haue been adjoined, who are during pleasure: in the other chambers there are two Presidents only. There is besides, the kings Attorney& two advocates, who look to the rights of the crown,& to al that is done there: two registrers, to gather, record& deliver the acts, the civil& the criminal: with four notaries& secretaries to ease thē;& a great number of clerks. Budeus a man of great knowledge, and a diligent searcher of all antiquity, hath observed in his former annotations on the Pandects, that in the reign of Philip the Long, there were three sorts of Iudges in the first seat, which is properly called the Parliament, viz. the Prelates, of whom it took the name; and the Barons; who were assisted by certain Lawyers, or men that were otherwise learned, called clerk and lay men. That 3. Prelates and 3. Barons were president there, who did not so much confirm judgements by the greater number of opinions, as by the sufficiency of those which gave their opinions. And that the lay Counsellors were chosen out of Gentlemen& others, who were enjoined to be graduates in the law: but it sufficed if they were meanly seen in other learning, as we see some of the short rob. They studied not then, as they haue done since, the roman laws; having now erected in the best cities, schools of law: from whence many suppose, that the multitude of suits hath sprung, sith men haue thereby learned the faculty of pleading, as Messire Michel de l' hospital declared in his second Oration which he made to the Estates at orleans. Besides, they had in those daies few statutes and edicts, for they thought that the true laws were good and honest manners; and natural reason assisted by an upright conscience, joined with due experience, the true r●●le of right iudgement: But when men became thus skilful in points of law, and the offices concerning iudgement, having had before a time limited and small profit, were now become perpetual, gainful, and exempted from the Syndicate,( which is as before I noted, an accusing or calling to account of those that haue been Magistrates or Officers) when they had gleande great sums of money, leaving the ancient honesty of friendship, and found it no small profit to clear causes, and to decide suits by Commissioners: When Presidents and Counsellors took delight to be followed, solicited, and flattered by those that pleaded, against the custom of the Areopagites, who sat in iudgement by night& in the dark, {αβγδ}, that is, that they might not look on them which spake, but respect that which was spoken;& against the opinion of Cato, Qui dictitabat, judicem nec de obtinendo jure orari oportere, nec de iniuria exorari: After that the advocates did slightly rid away their causes, taking small aduise on them, nor having the patience to attend the finishing of one, for the hast they made to run to another: After that they were accustomend to writ by rolls six lines in one side of a leaf, and to disguise matters by bills of griefs, and answers, by contradictions, exceptions and advertisements: After that the Proctors, who had before no fee, and were but in certain causes only, became mercenary and perpetual: Finally after that there haue been suffered to creep in amongst them solicitors, as it were scummers of suits, to devour the substance of poor men, as drones do suck up the honey from the Bees: And after that the chancery permitted all sorts of dispatches, and would teach the Iudges: By these means wee are fallen into this unhappy trouble of tedious length in suits of law, which is very profitable for crafty and ill minded fugitives, but most prejudicial and hurtful for good and well meaning men, who had rather lose their right, then undo themselves by suing so long for iustice; for they see that oft times a right is wrested by appeals or remouings of causes at their pleasures that haue most favour, besides infinite other sleights; and sometimes they see many decrees made in one cause, yet nothing executed; or if there be any definitive sentence, that it is presently suspended by the least objection that may be, or brought a gain into controversy by a civil request( as they term it) a writ of error. It had ben great good hap for us to haue continued in our ancient and natural simplicity, rather then to enwrap and entangle ourselves in so many kinds of suits and captious subtleties, which have corrupted and almost extinguished the light of iustice, imprinted in the hearts and understandings of all men that are well born. Thus we see, that suits being heaped one vpon another, are become immortal, nothing so certain, which proves not uncertain; no difference so clear, which may not be darkened; and no bargain so sure, which may not be canceled; no sentence or decree made with such aduise, which may not be frustrated; all mens actions exposed to scandalous vexations, subtleties, malicious dealing, fines,& extortions of these practioners, the majesty and integrity of the ancient law clean lost, and in mens conversations now adays no more appearance of true iustice found, but onely a shadow therof remaining. It is not possible, but that this evil being come to so high a pitch and extremity, is near to destruction, according to the course of earthly things, or that it do shortly receive some notable change.    

THE FIFTH book OF ARISTOTLES CIVIL GOVERNMENT, TRANSLATED out OF greek, AND FRENCH, INTO ENGLISH. The Argument.  
ARistotle having spoken of a city and the parts thereof, and handled all the kinds of government, with the manners of their establishing and ordaining, what is the best and of longest continuance,& for what people what kinds of government are fit: in this book he sets down the springs of sedition, and the causes of the changes that proceed thereof: showing generally and particularly how Commonweales haue ben destroyed and preserved. It is certain, that as all things having a beginning, must likewise haue an end; and having grown and increased, must likewise diminish and waxe old; some quickly, and some late, according to the nature and disposition of the matter whereof they are compounded, and through the influence of the bodies from whence this continual course and turns of generation and corruption do proceed. In like sort public states are established, increased, maintained, brought low, changed, destroyed, converted, and restored, one by another, through the order of Nature: the power of those states being the more assured, and of longer continuance, which are the better grounded on Religion and Iustice: yet are they not perpetual, how good soever a form of government be there established, for we see that all do wast in process of time, and finally perish by their own proper and natural corruptions which do follow and accompany them, in like sort, as diseases come to beasts, blasting to corn, rottenness to wood, rust to brass and iron; each thing having his proper and inward evil, which doth consume it, though it escape all other outward hurts. Now, sith the knowledge of government consisteth more in practise then in speculation, and is not capable of an exact method; and sith in mens affairs being so variable, examples do profit more then precepts: The Philosopher hath cited here among so many exquisite discourses, infinite examples taken out of the Estates and others both of his time and before him, showing in this book especially ( wherein the whole sprite of the knowledge of government is comprised) his admirable memory and incredible diligence, more then in any other. But because that since his time there haue risen greater Estates, and more notable changes, I purpose by imitating him, to insert where it shall seem convenient, examples taken out of all Countries, ages and sects, until these present times: and chiefly those examples that are nearest to us, and to our knowledge: adding other reasons which haue ben since discovered by long experience, as Nature doth by little and little manifest her secrets, correcting the oversights and failings of ancient schoolmasters, who could not see and understand all; but haue left a great part thereof to be preached out by those that should come after them; yet every one to the uttermost of their power, advancing and setting forward the knowledge of Arts, and discovering of the truth, as we are likewise bound to do: not so much for respect of men, who do oft times show themselves unthankful towards those that endeavour to do them most good, nor for the attaining of credite and reputation amongst them, or leaving to our posterity the memory of our name, which thing all men that are of great courage and spirit do desire; not so much I say for these causes, as for the honour of God, whose will it is, that as we haue received such treasures of our ancestors, so we do carefully keep them, and faithfully deliver them from hand to hand to our successors, endeavouring always to amend them according to our power, and according to the gifts which are bestowed on men in diverse professions.  

CHAP. I. Of the changes happening in public Estates.  
WE will consider here which and how many, and what are the causes of these changes which happen in commonweals: and what are the destructions of every one, out of what forms into what forms they are changed, and therewithal what their remedies are, both in general, and in particular, and by what means they may bee chiefly preserved.  
The Philosophers purpose is to treat in this book of the changes of Estates, and to show the causes thereof: and by what means every form of commonweal is preserved& destroyed. Which changes he will afterward divide into four sorts, or thereabout. Plato assayeth to do the like in the eight and ninth book of his commonweal.  
Our beginning herein shall be, that many forms of commonweals, haue been established, in which all men confess, that there should be a certain right and equality, according to proportion, wherein nevertheless they err, as in the democraty, where all the Citizens being in some sort equal, do think themselves absolutely equal: and because they haue all like liberty, they think themselves altogether like. In the oligarchy, when they who are unequal in some things, will be unequal in all things; as if because they are unequal in riches, they think themselves altogether unequal. Whereby it happeneth, that some as being equal, repute themselves worthy to haue all things in equal manner; others, as being unequal.  
The most seditions do happen, because that( as all men confess) in the distributing of honours, equality must bee proportionally observed in every commonweal; yet some being equal in one thing only, as the poor men in democracies are equally free, will be absolutely equal in all things. Others being unequal in one thing, will bee unequal in all things, as the rich men and Noblemen in the oligarchy feeke to be absolutely preferred before those whom they exceed in riches or Nobility, although they bee inferior to them in virtue. Wherefore both these sorts of Citizens, having that part in government which they think doth by right belong un●o them, raise seditions, whereby Estates are changed from one form into another clean different● as from a democraty into an oligarchy: or else the same being still kept, are governed by other Lords, or made more or less democratical, oligarchical, and regal: or altered in some part, as in the ordaining or suppressing of some principal Offices touching the counsel, the revenues of the State, of Religion, and war. For the avoiding of which inconveniences and preventing of the grudges and discontents of such persons, it is requisite to entermixe the arithmetical and geometrical equality: the Arithmetical being of itself evil, distributing by Lot the public honors& commodities to all alike; and the Geometrical impossible to be observed, though it be good of itself, having respect always to every mans desert and worth. Wherefore the Venetians who seem to haue ordained and established the form of their commonweal with great wisdom, do use both lot and election. They use lot in the creation of the Electors, or choosers of Magistrates, and herein all the Citizens, even they that are vicious persons, may participate with the better sort, without any hurt to the commonweal. But in the attaining of honours, all consisteth in the iudgement, and estimation of the Citizens, as it hath ben already noted in the eight chapter of the third book, according to that which Conta●ine hath written thereof in his first book of the Venetian commonweal. Aristotle both here and in his third and sixth books, ●●●●deth most on the democracies and Oligarchies, because in his time all Greece was full of these troubles and discords, by reason that there were few other forms of governments than oligarchical and democratical, which are commonly unquiet, and subject to envies, discontents and enmities.  
MANY forms of commonweals haue ben ordained.] As well principal as subalternal; third book, chap. 5.& fourth book, chap. 2. 3.  
WHEREIN all men confess, that there should bee a certain right and equality.] The end of government is civil iustice; and Right is the publlcke good, or common utility, 3. of the peacocks, chap. 8. Likewise right or iustice is called in the first book, chap. 2. The order or rule of civil society: because that is said to be done by right, which is done conveniently according to the order and institution of civil society, and according to the form of every commonweal, as the democratical, oligarchical, and aristocratical right, which is measured according to their particular ends: 3. of the peacocks, chap. 6. and 6. booke● chap. 2. All men confess( saith he) in the fift of the ethics, chap. 3. That in distributing to every man that which belongs unto him, Right or iustice must be observed, according to a certain dignity, which is not accounted the same by al men● for the democratical persons do place it in liberty, the oligarchical in riches or in nobility, and the aristocratical in virtue. Then all men do affirm that right is equality. 3. book, chap. 8. and that in the distributing thereof, it is requisite to keep a proportion● not onely in goods and honours, but also in persons, chap. 6. For look what proportion there is between the dignities and deserts of persons, to whom distribution is made, the same proportion ought to bee between the things that are distributed, although men do not agree therein, by reason of the diversity of governments, and of their unbridled desires, as Plato doth very well discourse in the eight and ninth books of his commonweal.  
ACCORDING to proportion.] Wee will afterward show what this proportion and proportionalitie is● and how many the kinds thereof be Right( saith Aristotle in the fift of his ethics, chap. 3.) consisteth in proportion; and proportion is not onely of the number numerant, or that doth number, but also of the number numberable, or that may be numbered. For proportion is the equality of reason, and consisteth in four terms at the least, not onely the divided proportion, but also the continued, repeating one twice: In like sort Right consisteth in four terms at the least, and there is the same reason And in the same place he saith, Right must consist in four terms at the least, for those in whom right is are two, and the things wherein it consisteth, are likewise two. And there must bee the ●ame equality of the persons, as there is of the things, wherein right consisteth; which things are so proportioned one towards another, as they are between whom the right is; who shall not haue equal things, if themselves be not equal: whence debates and quar●els do spring, when they that are equal, do not receive equal things; or they that are not equal, unequal things.  
WHEREIN nevertheless they err.] In taking that which is in some sort just, for that which is properly and simply just: and they judge ill, because they judge of themselves, and of their own affairs, 3. of the peacocks, chap. 6. agreeing in the equality of things, and not of persons. They err in speaking of equality, because they adjoin not them to the number of equal persons, nor account them equal, who are so in very dead. We haue already touched this point in the said sixth chapter of the third book.  
As in the democraty, where all the Citizens being in some sort equal, and because they haue all like liberty, they think themselves altogether like.] he yeeldeth an example of his saying in two corrupt commonweals somewhat contrary, viz. in the democraty and the oligarchy, wherein Right is evil understood. First in the democraty, where the democratical persons, having all like freedom, think that they should all equally participate in the government, without any respect to bee had to ●●●ches or nobility; so that in such an estate the poor are superior in all things, a● attribute to themselves the public commodities and honours, which they distribute equally among themselves: for the end of the democraty is liberty, and the democratical right is that every one may haue equality according to the number, and not to the dignity, as it hath ben shewed in the third book, chap. 6. 8. and we will speak thereof again in the 6. book, chap. 2. and● 3. Plato in the eight of his commonweal, and the third of his laws.  
IN the oligarchy, when they who are unequal in some things, will bee unequal in all things, as if because they are unequal in riches, they think themselves altogether unequal.] The other example of right, ill understood, is taken from the oligarchy, whose end is riches, and wherein public commodities and honours are distributed, according to the valuation of mens wealth, without having respect to the poor, although they bee more virtuous or more learned, and therefore more capable of offices: so that in such an Estate, rich men and riches, onely are esteemed. Plato in the eight of his commonweal. Aristotle in the 3. of the peacocks, chap. 8. And 4. book, chap. 4.5.& 6. And 6. book, chap. 6.  
WHEREBY it happeneth, that some as being equal, repute themselves worthy to haue all things in equal manner.] poor men having equal freedom in the democraty, will be absolutely equal in all things.  
OTHERS as being unequal, seek to haue more.] In the oligarchy, the rich& Noblemen will bee absolutely preferred by reason of their riches, although they be inferior in virtue to those whom they exceed in wealth.  
WHICH is unequal.] As more honour is greater reward: for inequality consisteth in more or less. Aristotle in his book of the Predicaments.  
Then all these Estates haue in themselves a certain right, wherein nevertheless they do simply err. Hereupon, when either of them haue not such a part in the government of the commonweal, as they think that they ought to haue, they raise sedition. But such as excel in virtue, might haue juster cause to mutiny, as those which should by reason he absolutely and onely unequal, and preferred before others; although they do it not. There are some of higher birth, and in regard of this inequality will bee preferred and advanced above the rest: because men do account those noble who flourish through the virtue and riches of their ancestors.  
THEN all these Estates haue in themselves a certain right, wherein ●●●erthelesse they do err.] The democraty and oligarchy are grounded on some part of right, or rather some show of right. Aristotle in the third of his peacocks, chapter eight. Because they who are equal in some one certain thing, must not attribute to themselves an equal part of all things; nor they a greater part, who do exceed in one thing. For they that are superior in richesse, or in nobility, are not simply superior, neither they that haue like liberty, are absolutely alike: because no man is absolutely superior, and to be preferred, save onely the virtuous; nor any simply equal, save only they that are equal in virtue. The reason is, because men assemble themselves into a city, not to live only, but rather to live well. Whereto, sith the good and virtuous men do yield greatest furtherance, it is meet, that the greatest part of government in the City bee assigned to virtue: the third of the peacocks, Chap. 6.  
hereupon, when either of them haue not such a part in the government of the commonweal, as they think that they ought to haue.] As at Rome the Senate and Nobles in ordaining the popular Estate and government, after the expulsion of the Kings, assumed to themselves so much authority, and allowed so little to the common people, that they mutinied and separated themselves from them with great dissension. Whereupon to appease them, the said Senate and Nobles were enforced to grant them greater authority, then in reason they should haue had: from whence sprung all their discords and civil dissensions that happened afterwards. At Venice the Gentlemen who are Lords, haue the whole rule, and divide among themselves all the offices and charges wherein there is any honour and profit: whereat the other Citizens, among whom there are many both wise, rich, and of great courage, do marvelously repined, and are mightily discontented. Likewise in the Cities and territories subject unto them, those that are Noblemen and of power, are very much kept down, by reason of the fear which that signory hath always had, least by giuing credite and authority to the people, they should raise any mutiny.  
but such as excel in virtue, might haue juster cause to mutiny, as those which by reason should bee absolutely and onely unequal.] The virtuous being less esteemed, or ill used, might haue greater occasion to mutiny: as Cato, being repulsed when he sued for the Praetorship, or rather( as most authors writ) the Consulship: Aristides the just when he was banished from Athens: Scipio, Rutilius, and Cicero, from Rome. nevertheless, they raise no commotion, because they haue more regard of the public good, then of their own peculiar commodity.  
THERE are some of higher birth,& in regard of this inequality will be preferred and advanced above the rest.] As the Princes of the blood in France, and the Lords at Venice, and the Gentlemen of the best houses through all Christian realms, and in Persia and in India, and wheresoever Nobility is respected.  
because men do account those noble, who flourish through the virtue and riches of their ancestors.] Aristotle in the 3. of the peacocks, chap. 8. every mans Nobility( saith he) is honoured in his country, because it is a probable thing, that of the better Parents the better children are born: for Nobility is virtue by descent. And in the fourth book, chap. 4. Riches, credite of birth, virtue and learning,& other like, do by the same difference constitute the kinds of Noblemen. And in the eight chapter of the same book, There are three things which strive for equality in the commonweal, to wit, liberty, riches, and virtue, for the fourth which is called Nobility, follows the two latter, sith Nobility is ancient riches and virtue. Osorius a Portugall hath lately written a book of Nobility, which is translated into the French tongue. now adays they are called Gentlemen who live on their lands without taking any pains, or using any Trade, whereby to get their living: They haue Castles and fortresses, and a certain number of subiects and vassals which yield them fealty and homage, as in France, spain, Germany, in the kingdom of Naples, and in Lumbardie. At Venice the Gentlemen haue not much lands and possessions, but their substance consisteth in movables and Merchandise, neither haue they any Castle or jurisdiction: so that such manner of Nobility is accounted but a title of pre-eminence to distinguish them from the people, and those of base estate.  
These are, as I may say, the beginnings and fountains of seditions, which cause the changes of Estates in two sorts: Sometimes from the present form into another diverse, as from a democraty into an oligarchy; or from an oligarchy into a democraty, or into a commonweal; and from any of those forms into an aristocraty, or from these forms into those. Sometimes, they seek not to change the present form of government, but maintaining still the same Estate, they will haue it governed by themselves, as the oligarchy or monarchy being still continued. moreover, they contend for the respect of more or less, as to augment or diminish the authority of the oligarchy or the democraty, and in like sort of other commonweals, to the end, to enlarge or restrain them. Besides, in changing some part of the commonweal, as if they should ord●ine or put down some magistracy, as it is said that Lysander, attemp●ed to haue changed the Kingly state at lacedaemon; and king Pausanias, to haue abolished the state of the Ephori. And at Epidamnus the commonweal was changed in one part, by the ordaining of a Senate in stead of the Prou●sts of the Tribes: and in the Court of Athens called Heliae●, when they proceed to the election of any one to bee received thereinto, they must take him even out of those that haue authority or employment in the commonweal, and that hear other offices. And an Archon or President that hath supreme authority in this commonweal, is a remnant of the old oligarchy.  
THESE are the beginnings and fountains of seditions.) civil commotions are raised in these two sorts of commonweals, and commonly in all, through the unequal usage of men, viz. when such as are equal, are not equally used among their equals, and some of them more advanced; or when such as are unequal, are unequally used among them who are likewise unequal; but the superiors are equal to their inferiors, or else less set by and despised.  
WHICH cause the changes of Estates in two sorts.) he doth first set down two sorts or manners of changing Estates, whereto he will afterward add two other, which make four. Estates are changed by seditions, and there is never any immutation in the principal parts of a commonweal without violence and force, as in civil government, and in Religion: sith Plato saith, That even in persuading, there is some violence.  
SOMETIMES from the present form into another diverse.) The first manner of changing Estates, is when they are altered from one form of government into another clean different, as at Rome there was a change from the Monarchy of Kings to the government of ten men, called Decemuiri; and afterward to a popular Estate, wherein the romans were long time governed by the Consuls and Senate, under the authority of the people; then again to a monarchy. Not long since the commonweal of Florence was changed into a duchy. And the swissers, who had at the first been under the Kings of france, and after that, under the Empire of germany, by reason of the insolence, cruelty, and avarice of the Gouernours which were set over them, rebelled and confederated themselves chiefly against the Dukes of Austria who annoyed them, and they established this democraty wherein they live now, divided by Cantons. Machiauel in the second of his discourses, chap. 9. writeth so of them and of the free cities of Germany.  
When the roman Empire declined, and the title thereof was reduced into Germany, the chief cities of that country did one after another ●edeeme themselves of the Emperors, according to their stubborness and necessity, and so became free, allowing to the said Emperours some yearly tribute. Thus by little and little all the cities which were immeadiately subject to the Emperours, acknowledging no duty to any inferior Prince, haue in like sort redeemed themselves. It chanced at the same time that certain commonalties who were subject to the Dukes of Austria rebelled against them, amongst whom were they of Friburg, the swissers, and others, which prospering from the beginning, did by little and little grow to such strength, that they haue not onely not returned under the yoke of Austria, but do also keep all their neighbours in awe; and are they whom wee call by the general name of swissers.  
As from a democraty into ân oligarchy, or from an oligarchy into a Democra●●e, and from those forms into an aristocraty, or from these into those.] The natural conversions of commonweals are very exactly considered and discussed by Plato in the eight book of his commonweal, and no less diligently set forth by polybius in the sixth of his history, which placeth the monarchy as the first government of all, springing naturally amongst men without any industry, whereof the Kingly state is bread, which being turned into a tyranny, he saith that by the suppressiion thereof, the aristocraty riseth, which changing likewise into an oligarchy, and afterward into a democraty, doth in process of time become an Ochlocratie, that is, a troublesone, and uncertain government of an ignorant multitude. Aristotle treateth of the changes of commonweals, in the eight of his ethics, chapter 10: and fourth of his Politiques.  
SOMETIMES they seek not to change the present form of government, but maintaining still the same Estate, they will haue it governed by themselves.] The second manner of changing is rather in the Estate, then of the Estate: to wit, when the form of government being nothing altered, there is onely a change of Lords. As in England the houses of Lancaster and york, surnamed the white rose, and the read, fought together not to destroy the kingdom, but to try whether of them should rule it. Likewise, the controversy which was between Philip de valois, and Edward the third King of England, which of them had most right unto the crown of France.  
As the oligarchy and monarchy being still continued.] With their laws, or the same form of government remaining. For the oligarchy, wee will city that commotion or civil tumult which was at Florence in the time of Pope Sixtus between the houses of Medici and Paci, who sought not to alter the form of their commonweal, which changed every three months, but either of them to obtain for themselves the chief authority in the city, or rather to suppress the power of the Medici. Touching the monarchy, it doth oft remain, changing onely from one lineage to another, or from one city or province to another; and that by marriage, adoption, conquest, force, and usurpation, wher● onely the manner which is used in obtaining the Estate, is changed. Wee haue examples hereof, first of the change from one lineage to another, the two changes that happened in france, the kingdom still remaining, to wit, from the line of Pharamond, which possessed the said kingdom three hundred and thirty yeares, to the line of Pipine, which bare rule two hundred thirty and three yeares: and from that to the line of Hugh Capet, which hath held the crown since the year 984. until this present. From one city to another, as the Empire from Rome to Constantinople, the seat of the Turkish Empire, from Bursia to Andrinople and Constantinople: From one province to another, the kingdom of Assyria into Media, and from Media into Persia. The roman Empire out of italy, first into Greece, where it continued until the year 1453: Then into france, when the Eagle began to haue two heads; and into germany, where of hereditary, it is bacome elective: the electors, who are seven, must all bee germans, and of certain families, and chief ecclesiastical Estates, in whom only this privilege resteth. By marriage, as the duchy of Burgoine, and kingdom of spain into Austria. By adoption, Augustus adopted Tiberius; and Adrian, Antonius pus. The kingdoms of Norway, Sweathland, and denmark, came from queen Margaret to the D●●●● Pomerania, whom she adopted. And the kingdom of England was conquered by ●●●liam Duke of Normandy, surnamed in the English Chronicles, the Conqueror, 〈◇〉 progeny doth yet continue.  
MOREOVER, they contend for the respect of more or less, as to augment or 〈◇〉 the authority of the oligarchy, or of the democraty, and in like sort of other Common●●●●● to the end, to enlarge or restrain them.] The third manner of changing Estates, is 〈◇〉 the forms are not altered, but do somewhat varie in regard of more or less, as 〈◇〉 oligarchy becoming more oligarchical, and the democraty more Democrat●●●● as it hath been shewed in the 4. of the peacocks: or the Kingly State more absolu●● as they say of King Lewis the eleventh, that he set the Kings of france out of th● page.; thereby meaning that he made their authority more absolute then it had been before. And Theopompus diminished the authority of the Lacedemonian Kings, as shall afterward bee shewed, ●when as we do come to speak of Monarchies.  
BESIDES, in changing some part of the commonweal.) The fourth maner is, when the Estate is not wholly changed, but in one part, as in the chief Magistracies, or in the maner of counsel, ordering of the Treasure, Religion, and military Discipline. In ancient time, the holding of a Parliament in france was nothing else then the assembling of the Estates of the realm, wherein the King did communicate and confer with his subiects, or some amongst them deputed for the rest, touching his greatest affairs; taking their aduise and counsel, hearing likewise their complaints and grievances, and redressing them: the name whereof doth yet continue in England and Scotland. But because that by this means the Kings had knowledge, as well of general complaints which concerned the whole Estate, as of private causes concerning particular persons, the name of Parliament remaineth still in private courts or audiences, which are held by a certain number of Presidents& Counsellors, ordained by the king, at Paris, rouen, Tolouse, and other places. The public audiences reserved by the King, haue taken the name of Estates, which haue been left for the space of eighty yeares, or thereabouts. And the Parliament which had been held once every year, became ordinary; and from being ordinary, to bee held every half year; and from that became ordinary again. But the ordaining of the Presidents hath diminished it. In like sort, the charge& ordering of the moneys hath had many changes of sundry Offices therein from time to time. In Military discipline the regiment of the men of arms, instituted by king Charles the seventh, and the Legions by king Francis the first.  
As if they should ordain or put down some magistracy.) The Dictatorship at Rome was ordained with absolute power for a time to take order for the weighty and urgent affairs of the State. And it was afterward abolished, because first of all Silla had held it above the prefixed time, and after him Iulius Caesar had made it perpetual. Silla did not wholly put down the Tribuneship, but diminished the authority thereof, forbidding any appeals to bee made to the Tribunes, or that they should make new laws, and granting them power onely to oppose themselves, and to assemble the Senate. But Pompey did wholly rest●re this their authority. Cicero in the third of his laws. And finally, Augustus Caesar abolished it ret●●ning the name onely, that by right thereof, he might when he would, assemble the Senate. The Mayor of the palace hath been altogether suppressed. And in the time of Lewis the eleventh, the Cons●able had in his ordinary re●●●ue 〈◇〉 hundred men of arms, whereof himself was Commissary, which number is now brought to an hundreth.  
As it is said that Lysander attempted to haue changed the Kingly st●●● a● L●ced●●●●.) There were two kings at Lacedemon● who were overawed and bridled by 17. Senators and five Ephori, and could not bee of any other stock then of the Heraclid●e, as Plato writeth in the fourth of his laws, and in Alcibiades the first. But Lysander( as Plutarch writeth in his life) attempted to bring it so to pass, that the kingdom should not go by succession, but that being voided, it should bee given to the most valiant and virtuous persons.  
AND King Pausanias to haue abolished the State of the Ephori.] The two principal degrees at lacedaemon, were the kingdom and the State of the Ephori, opposed each against other, as the Tribuneship and Consulship at Rome. Cicero in his 2. book of laws. Then as Lysander attempted to change the kingdom, so did Pausanias to abolish the State of the Ephori, because their authority was too Tyrannicall, as Plato writeth in the 4. of his laws, and Aristotle in the 2. of his peacocks, chap. 7: and it was very odious, especially to the Kings, of whom they were controllers. {αβγδ} signifieth as it were an overseeing or superintendence, and it was a yearly Office, whereto was committed the understanding and ordering of all their principal affairs, and the correction of all other Magistrates, yea even of the Kings themselves, from whom men might appeal to the said Ephori, who were five onely in number.  
AND in Epidamnus the commonweal was changed in one part, by the ordaining of a Senat instead of the provosts of the Tribes.] Epidamnus, otherwise called Dyrrhachium, thucydides maketh mention thereof in the first book of his history. The romans changed the name of it in process of time. It is situated in Illyricum, or Sclauonie. At the first they choose there from time to time a certain number of provosts by the tribes or lineages, for the ordering of all affairs, which was afterward changed into a Senate or ordinary counsel.  
AND in the Court of Athens called Heliaea, when they proceed to the election of any one to be received thereinto, they must take him even out of those that haue authority or employment in the commonweal, or that bear other offices.] The Philosopher speaking of the change which is made in one part of the city, doth beside the former example, allege one out of the Estate of Athens, which being changed from an oligarchy into a democraty, retained still many oligarchical customs: as the election of the Heliastae, who were not indifferently taken out of all kindes of men by lot, as was ordinarily done in democracies, but out of the worshipfullest sort, especially out of them that had already other Magistracies: which was an oligarchical fashion. Heli●a was in Athens a sovereign Court, consisting of a thousand Iudges, who were called Heliastae, and were kept at the charges of the commonweal.  
AND an Archon or President that hath supreme authority in this commonweal, is a remnant of the old oligarchy.] The dignity of the Archon in Athens, was likewise oligarchical, and given at the first for term of life, after for ten yeares, and at last was yearly. This Archon was called Hegemon, and Prytanis, and his name was entered in the public decrees, as at this day the Dukes name is at Venice.  
THEREFORE sedition happeneth in all places, because of inequality, when that is not given to them that bee equal, which is due unto them by proportion, so that the Kingly state itself being perpetual, is found unequal, if it bee over equal persons. For men, by seeking wholly for eq●●lity, do enter into sedition. Surely equality is double, the one in number, the other in dignity: I mean in number, that which is all one and squall by multitude or greatness: and in dignity, by proportion. As three exceed two 〈◇〉 in like number, as two exceed one. By proport●on four, two; and two, one: for two are an eqall part of four, and one of two, ●ith each of them is a moiety. And whereas men confess that to bee absolutely right, which is equal according to dignity, they fall into dissension, as hath ben before affirmed: The one sort, for that they being in some respect equal, account themselves equal in all respe●ts● The other sort, for that they being unequal in somethings, will be vn●quall and superior in all things. From whence proceed two chief forms of commonweals; namely; the democraty, and the oligarchy, considering that virtue and nobleness are in few men; but these other qualities are ●ound in many men: for there are not in any place scene a hundred men together that be noble and good; but there be many poor men every where.  
THERFORE sedition happeneth in all places, because of inequality, when that is not given to them that be equal, which is due unto them by proportion.] As equality, when it is well kept in all things and persons, breedeth friendship: so vnequalitie causeth evil will and dissension, chiefly when a due proportion is not kept amongst unequal persons, by giuing unto every one that which pertaineth unto him, according to his calling and degree. The unequal persons which be seen commonly in countries, are Princes, gentlemen, villains, poor, rich, learned, unlearned, merchants, privy-councillors, husbandmen, and artificers: who in a well ordered State, should and ought to be entreated and handled according to their callings, without giuing that to the one which pertaineth to the other. But above al things rewards must be yeelded-according to virtue, and punishments according to offences: else cannot public unity and concord be maintained, nor the commonweal preserved. For as the world is not composed of semblant and like elements, but of those that are differing one from another, and yet agreeing by proportion ( as Galen saith in his book of Mixtures, and Hippocrates in his book of Mans nature, and Plato in the same Timeus and in his Phoedon, the not natural excess and want whereof and changing from one place into another that is not agreeable, breedeth inward sedition and sickness) so the city is not constituted of men equal alike, but differing in kind, as is set down in the second book of the politics the first chapter: and the third book, the first chapter: who are united by proportional handling, and disunited by vnequalitie. Wherefore Aristotle saith very well in his great Morals, that proportion holdeth the city together, for that all persons are knit together therein by proportion, which is the cause of mutual concord and good will amongst them. The breach of proportion filleth a State with hatreds, dissensions, mislikings, and grudges, whereof seditions and civil wars do grow. In the time of king Lewis the eleventh, many French princes and lords conspired against him, as malcontent for that he called them not neither used their counsel in the directing of the great affairs and important matters of the kingdom, but was counseled and governed by mean men: and they rose up in arms together, under colour that they would take order in matters concerning the commonweal: as Philip de Comines reporteth in the first book of his remembrances.  
SO that the kingly state itself being perpetual, is found unequal, if it be over equal persons.] Although the kingly state be good and lawful of itself, as appeareth in the third book of the Politiques, the first chapped. yet for all that if it come to pass that one would make himself king amongst his equals, and such as bee as free and noble as himself, and take such perpetual authority as Iulius Caesar enterprised at Rome; he should make it unequal, and therefore odious and unsupportable. For when they are all equal and free by nature, they ought all to haue part in the government, whether it be good or bad, and to govern one after another as their turns fall, and for a certain time, as is set down in the second book of Politiques the first chapter: as they do at Venice, a few States excepted: and Genoa, Noremberg, augsburg, Strasburgh, Lubec, and commonly in al Signories& commonalties. He meaneth by this word Kingly estate, the whole sovereign authority of one alone, which amongst equals is more tolerable to be yearly, as the Aduowership of barn, and the Consulship of Rome, divided between two: and the Archon of Athens: or from two months to two months, as the Confalonnier of Lucca: or from 2 years to 2 years, as the duke of Genoa: or during great affairs, as the dictatory. The reason is, because the other citizens in time may attain thereunto: And in Magistracies of short continuance less may be enterprised: as appeareth in the second and third books of the Politiques.  
FOR men by seeking wholly for equality, do enter into sedition.] When some intrude themselves to take too much vpon them, others that seek to maintain equality, do conspire to pull them down, and reduce them to equality; which agreeth with mens nature, and nourisheth peace amongst them, entertaining friends with friends, towns with towns, kingdoms with kingdoms, and confederates with confederates, as Euripides saith. If therefore some enterprise to take it away, it is no marvell, if for the withstanding of their purpose, men make war against them.  
SVRELY equality is double.] Because men are often deceived in the understanding of equality, He sheweth that it is double, to the end men should not be deceived by taking one for another, and by confounding them, and that they should know the way to use the same well, in public and private affairs, as well in ordering of men, as of their contracts and bargains.  
THE one in number.] arithmetic, as 321, when there is equality in multitude, or greatness in quantity, that standeth of severed parts, or of contuued and joined parts, as might be said amongst so many hundred crownes, or acres of land.  
THE other in dignity.] By proportion, as 421, wherein double proportion is found. For as much as the knowledge of this matter is most profitable and necessary, and not understood by all men, we will stand a little vpon it, and rehearse it more amply for the better interpretation of this place, and the fift book of manners. First we will presuppose ( as is written in the Predicaments, and the sixth chapter of the second book of moral philosophy) that equality or vnequality is the property of quantity, in as much as all things comparable in equalness, or vnequalnesse, are comprised under the joined or severed quantity, and haue between them proportion of numbers, or of greatness. Therefore Proportion, as jordan affirmeth in his second book, is a certain reference or comparison of two things, all of one kind between themselves: or as saith euclid in his fift book, a certain habitude or comparison of quantities, all of one kind, which in greek he calleth {αβγδ}. Boetius in his first book of arithmetic, the seventeenth and eighteen chapter, nameth the proportion of numbers, Arithmetical proportion; for that the Arithmetritians consider onely the kind of quantity which consisteth of severed parts, and the proportion of number, which is from equal to equal, as from two to two; or from a bigger to a lesser number, as 4. to 2. or from a lesser to a greater, as from 2. to 4. and extending infinitely, retaineth always the selfsame difference of excess, as 1.2.3,4.5.6.7.8. where always the next number exceedeth it, which is next unto it by an unity, or 3.6.9.12.15. by three. But the Geometrician doth further consider the habitude or comparison of all bignesses, and therefore the proportion of bignesses, is properly called geometrical, as he compareth line to line, outside to outside, and body to body. now, as one number may bee compared to another, being equal, bigger, or lesser: Such comparison of proportions, is called by euclid in his fift book {αβγδ}: By Boetius in his second book of arithmetic, and by jordan in his tenth book, proportionality and proportion of proportions: yet the Geometrician applieth it particularly to equal or semblant proportions, that is to say, such as haue semblant and like denomination, which is name sole, or only proportionality, to wit, similitude or likeness of proportions, and equality, and mediety. The one of them is called arithmetical, and the other geometrical. Arithmetical proportionality is an habitude or comparison of quantities, surmounting one another by equal exceedings, as 10,6.8,4. For as ten exceedeth six by four, so eight exceedeth four by four, and so is it of all other numbers, disposed by natural order; which when they be infinitely extended, do always keep all one, and the selfsame difference. geometrical proportionality is a comparison of quantities that haue semblant and like geometrical proportion, as 8,4.6,3. bee: For there is a double proportion of the first to the second, and of the third to the fourth,& as 8. be to 4. so are 6. to 3. And the other way, as 3. are to 6. so be 4. to 8. which is subdouble proportion. every of those proportionalties, may be of joined and fastened parts, or of severed and vncoupled parts. They call it joined or fastened, where there is such proportion of the first term or bounder to the second, as there is of the second to the third, and of the third to the fourth, as 8,4.2,1. do declare it in geometrical proportion, and 8,6,4,2. in arithmetical proportion. The which joined or fastened mediety may be made in four or more terms, and if there be but three, the middle serveth to both. The severed or vncoupled mediety, is set and constituted amongst terms that haue some interruption or breaking off from their proportion, as 10,5,4,2. and 12,8,6, 2. And it must haue four terms or bounders at the least. Therefore jordan saith very well, that the means of severed proportionality are vnioined, and the means of fastened proportionality joined together. Aristotle in the fift book of his moral Philosophy, the fourth and fift Chapters, requireth the form of arithmetical equality, in iustice that pertaineth to the communicating and exchaunging of things; wherein the equalness of things, and not of persons is necessary: and where one thing must be given for another, as price for Merchandise, and recompense for damage, without any respect of persons. Otherwise, if men take always on the one side, and give nothing on the other: as out of a merchants shop without paying or exchanging any thing at all, the shop at last will be empty, and the trade of exchaunging will ●ease. Therefore this arithmetical equality is required in contracts, as well voluntary as constrained: To the end, that the communicating of things, may last for ever in the societies of men. It is also used in Communalities of people, in the bestowing and distributing of Offices, where every one will be as high a master as another, for the keeping of equality amongst them. In the fift book of his ethics he applieth the geometrical mediety to the degrees of vocations, and of men, that there may bee equality, not of things, but of proportions; and that the degrees may bee kept. As, although the divine, the Lawyer, the captain, the Senator, and the Treasurer do differ, yet for all that they ought to haue necessary correspondence, and to be made equal, not in their vocation, but by semblance and likeness of proportions, in such sort, that every one shall exercise his Office without letting the others. Wherefore Plato affirms the public state to bee good, if it be instituted according ●o the Geometrical proportion, and that all the welfare thereof dependeth vpon the same. The King giveth the Office of Chancellorship to a wise and learned man, that loveth uprightness and public peace: and the Office of the Constableship to a good captain, well experienced in matters of state: The government of the Church to a divine, that is skilful in the ecclesiastical government: the Office of a judge to a Lawyer: the Treas●rorship to one that hath skill in the ordering of the moneys. Then every one keepeth his place,& exerciseth his Office, without incrochment and hindrance one of another, to the end that the public concord bee not troubled. This order causeth equality amongst such as be unlike and dissemblant. Plato in the sixth book of his laws saith: The old saying is true and very well used, that equality breedeth friendship: But for as much as the equality that can work this, is scarcesly known, it troubleth vs. For whereas there bee two equalities, called by all one and the selfsame name, but in effect almost contrary in many things, every City and every Law giver may use the one by lots in the distributing of honours, to wit, the equality in number, weight, and measure. But it is not easy for all men to know the true and good equality, for it is the iudgement of God, and happeneth seldom amongst men. But as far as it happeneth to Cities and to particular persons, it causeth all welfare, it giveth more to men of great calling, and less to them that are of low degree, ordering all things according to their nature. Truly it giveth the most excellent men in virtue, the greatest honours; and to the underlings in virtue and lukewarmness, the lesser preferments: distributing to the one and the other that which by reason appertaineth unto them. Which is the very political right that wee ought to desire, and we should observe such equality in establishing and ordering this new City, as also whosoever buildeth another, ought to do and frame his laws according to the same, not respecting some small number of Tyrants, or one, or the power of the people, but always having regard to right, which wee lately affirmed to distribute always that which is equal by nature amongst them that bee unequal. And in Gorgias he saith: You are not ignorant that the geometrical equality is of much effect, both amongst the gods and men: And think that the most ought to be had in all things, because you despise Geometry. geometrical proportion is particularly used in Oligarchies and Aristocraties, in distributing the public honours and offices onely to the rich, according to their riches, and to the good according to virtue.  
AND whereas men confess that to be absolutely right, which is equal according to dignity, they fall into dissension.] Although all men confess, that the manner of distributing honours and offices according to desert and worth, is simply just( the fift of the ethics, chap. 3.) yet commonly they fall to strife and debate, because some men measure worth after one sort, and some after another.  
THE one sort, for that they being in some respect equal, account themselves equal in all respects.] The poor sort in democracies haue equal freedom, and because they are equal in liberty onely, they will bee absolutely equal in all things, thinking it to bee against reason, that any one should haue greater privilege, or bee preferred for riches or for Nobility, but will that all do alike participate in their degrees and turns, in public honors, the 4. of the peacocks, chap. 4. and 6. book, chap. 2.  
THE other sort, for that they being unequal in some things, will be vn●quall and superior in all things.] The richer and nobler sort in Oligarchies, think that the whole government of the State should belong to them by reason of their richesse or nobility, and they divide among themselves all the public offices, not admitting the poor to any part thereof, though many of them be both wise and virtuous.  
FROM whence proceed two chief forms of commonweal, namely, the democraty and oligarchy.] poverty and Riches are the differences whereby the democraty and oligarchy are distinguished. That State wherein public Offices are distributed to the rich by reason of their wealth, is of necessity an oligarchy: and that wherein the poor do govern, a democraty: 3. book of the peacocks, cha. 5. and 6: and 4. book, cha. 5. Sedition then ariseth in these two commonweals, namely in the democraty, when the poor who bear sway, do assume all unto themselves; and the rich being despised or outraged, do conspire: and in the oligarchy, when the poor, because there is no account made of them. 3. book of the peacocks, chap. 7. And Plato in the 8. of his Commonweale.  
CONSIDERING that virtue and nobleness are in few men.] he sheweth a reason why there are more democracies and Oligarchies then Aristocraties; wherein all is referred to the goodness and virtue of them that bear rule, and to the public good of the State. And because that few men being both noble and virtuous together, are found in any place, therefore there are few Aristocraties, for as he writeth in the 3. of the peacocks, chap. 5. One onely, or very few men can excel in virtue, but it is impossible that many can perfectly excel in all virtue.  
but these other qualities are found in many men.] Namely, poverty, Liberty, and Riches, which are the differences of the democraty and oligarchy.  
FOR there are not in any place seen an hundred together that be noble and good.] At the least, which may be in sufficient number, and sufficiently qualified for the establishing of an aristocraty.  
but there be many poor men every where.] Who if they bear the greatest sway, they grow insolent, and oppress the rich, whence spring the seditions in democracies: or if they bee wholly deprived of all authority in the commonweal, they rebel against the rich in Oligarchies, and by such disorders, cause the changes of Estates.  
AND to ordain a commonweal simply in all respects, according to the one or the other, equality it is not good, as appeareth by the issue thereof, sith no such commonweal can be of continuance. The reason is, because it is impossible, that from an error committed at the first,& from a bad beginning, there proceed not a bad end. Wherefore it behoveth to use partly the equality of number, and partly that equality, which is according to dignity. Yet the democraty is surer& less subject to mutiny, then the oligarchy: for in Oligarchies there arise two kinds of seditions, namely between the governors, and with the people. But in democracies they are with the oligarchy only, and not of the people with the people; at the least, whereof any reckoning is to be made. moreover, the commonweal which consisteth of mean men, being the surest or safest of all such commonweals, doth approach nearer to the democraty then to the oligarchy.  
AND to ordain a commonweal simply in all respects, according to the one, or the other equality, it is not good.] The arithmetical equality is of itself bad, and the geometrical alone cannot be altogether observed without mutinies, but they must be mixed for the preventing of mens discontents. Socrates in his Areopagiticall Oration, This( saith he) did much help and profit them in the government of the City, that whereas there are two sorts of equality, of which the one giveth alike to all; the other, that only which is meet; they were not ignorant whether of the two was most profitable. For they left that equality which giveth alike both to the good and bad, and observed in their aforesaid government that other equality which distributeth honours and punishments according to deserts, not choosing Magistrates indifferently out of the people, but out of the better sort. He doth wholly mislike the arithmetical equality, which is sought only by democratical persons,& commendeth the geometrical. Which notwithstanding must not bee observed alone, even in those commonweals that are thereby ordered, viz. in Oligarchies and Aristocraties: For Riches of itself, or Nobility, can give no absolute right or authority to govern, in such sort, that none may bear rule save they who are rich or Noble: neither can virtue alone do it, if the good and virtuous man be not in many Estates noble or rich. Likewise in a well ordered commonweal, all Offices are not to be given to good men, but the principal: wherein consisteth the authority of the State, which are administered by sole persons, or in small number, to the end, that the rest who are not honoured but excluded from government in the commonweal, grow not discontented, or use practices tending to innovation.  
SITH no such commonweal can be of continuance.] No democraty which doth simply in all points observe the right before mentioned, according to the Arithmetical equality, is of continuance, by reason of the seditions that spring therein; nor any oligarchy which hath respect only to the geometrical equality.  
THE reason is, because it is impossible that from an error committed at the first, and from a bad beginning, there proceed not a bad end.] The beginning is of such force in all things, that things well begun, are accounted half done; but things ill begun, haue seldom good event. Wherefore it is no marvel, if these two forms of commonweals do not prosper, but soon decay, sith that from their beginning they are not grounded on the true and equal right, but on an outward appearance only.  
WHEREFORE it behoveth to use partly the equality of number, and partly that equality which is according to dignity.) For the well establishing of a commonweal, and preserving it from seditions, it is requisite to mix and temper these two equalities together. Plato in the sixth of his laws: It is necessary for every city which would be altogether exempted from sedition, to use these two equalities, having like denomination. For this commendable equity, and equal discerning of that which is perfect and absolute, is violated, if it be not done with right iudgement. Wherefore it is expedient to use the equality of Lots, thereby to avoid the giuing of offence to many. And in this behalf God and good Fortune are to bee prayed unto, that the lot may bee directed to fall on the best and justest. So then both these sorts of equality must bee used of necessity, but that sort the less, which hath need of Fortune. For this cause therefore this order must bee thus observed by that city which desireth continuance& safety. And in another place of the same book: Amongst the Magistrates which are chosen by the proportion of their wealth or reueuues, the one half should bee created by lot, and bee senators for a year; which kind of creation will bee a middle form between the monarchical and democratical: of which two forms the commonweal ought always to keep the mean. For otherwise the lords and slaves will never agree, nor the good and bad citizens, if they do not equally participate in public honors. For amongst men that are unequal, equal things do become unequal, if they receive not a prescribed measure. It doth therefore hereby appear, and Experience the mistress& teacher of things, doth sufficiently show, that these two sorts of equality must be mixed in a well ordered commonweal. For wee see that all human society, both in private and public, consisteth in the due communication or commutation of things, and in the order or degrees of persons. The communication of things is made by contracts or bargains, wherein great equality must bee observed by arithmetical proportion, which doth simply retain an equal difference among many numbers. For this cause the penalty of like for like called P●ena talionis was in ancient times ordained for the restoring of that equality which was before. Touching persons and Offices, they are ordered and appointed by degrees in cities and in private families. In Cities there are chief, mean, and inferior Magistracies: in families there are diverse degrees, as of Parents, Children, Brethren and Sisters, Lords and slaves: which order of persons must bee established by geometrical proportion, retaining the equality of proportions, to wit, in giuing every man his place, and using him according to his quality and desert.  
YET the democraty is surer and less subject to mutiny then the oligarchy.] Although both bee corrupt, yet there is less evil and danger in the democraty then in the oligarchy, and it is less troubled with sedition, because it approacheth nearer to the mean.  
FOR in Oligarchies there arise two kinds of seditions, namely between the governors,& with the people.] The oligarchical persons, who are the richest or the noblest, do not agree well together, but oft times destroy or expulse each other. And because they afford no part or authority of government to the poorer sort, which are many in number, or do besides oppress them, it is necessary that they become enemies unto them,( the 3. book of the peacocks. chap. 7) and conspire against them, as shall afterward bee shewed. Plato in the eight of his commonweal, the fourth of his laws, and in the governor.  
but in democracies they are with the oligarchy only, not of the people with the people; at the least, whereof any reckoning is to be made.] In the democraty sedition is raised by the poor only against the rich. But the poor do never or very seldom contend amongst themselves, for there is nothing thereby to bee gotten, or if they do at any time, it is some small sedition, and of no consequence.  
MOREOVER, the commonweal which consisteth of mean men.] That is to say, having mean substance, who are neither very rich nor very poor.  
BEING the surest of all such commonweals.] The fourth book of the peacocks chap. 11: to wit, of corrupt commonweals, and which haue already swerved from the perfection of a commonweal.  
DOTH approach nearer to the democraty, then to the oligarchy.] The mean form of commonweal hath more affinity with the democraty, then with the oligarchy: for which cause the democraty is surer or safer, and less corrupt. Likewise in the 8. of his ethics, chap. 10. he saieth, That the democraty is not bad, because it doth but little transgress or exceed the right form of commonweal: and in the 4. of the politics chap. 11. he saith that democracies are surer, and of longer continuance, by reason of those of mean estate who are there in greater number, and haue more interest in public honours. There are commonly in all Cities three sorts of people, of whom some are very rich, as in Oligarchies: some very poor, as in democracies: the third sort are mean between both, neither very poor, nor very rich. And where many such haue authority of government, without doubt the state of that city is more assured and less troubled with sedition. For those citizens who are very rich, or very poor, are not fit for the maintaining of human society. The rich are proud, disdainful, and prove to offer injuries: the poor malicious and envious, and they cannot long remain together without tumults and factions. So that they which are the stronger falling to quarrels, and having the advantage on their enemies, do always cause the state of the commonweal to incline on their side. If they bee poor, they establish a democraty: if they be rich, an oligarchy. And because the most part of men are such, and there are few of mean estate, this is the reason why we see more democracies and Oligarchies then other forms of commonweals. But the mean sort of citizens do neither desire other mens goods as the poor do, neither are they insolent, as the rich are: and by this means they maintain public amity, and eschew seditions. Wherefore that commonweal which is governed by men of mean substance, is the best and of longest continuance. Neither can there happen any greater good to all Estates for their safety, then to haue those for their Gouernours, who are meanly rich, otherwise they fall presently into monarchical or Popular Tyrannies, or( which is worse) are utterly destroyed.   

CHAP. II. From whence seditions spring, and of their causes.  
SIth we are come to consider from whence seditions and changes in commonweals do spring, we will first touch in general the beginnings and causes thereof, which are about three in number, and wee will briefly discourse them each severally by itself. First of all we must know howe men are disposed or made prove to sedition: next, wherefore they raise it: Thirdly, wh●t are the beginnings of civil troubles, and of the mutinies or tumults which arise amongst them. The cause by which they are disposed to the desire of a change, is that in general, whereof we haue lately spoken, viz. that some in seeking equality do mutiny, if they think that they haue less, being themselves equal to those that haue more. Others seeking inequality and pre-eminence do likewise mutiny, if being unequal, they persuade themselves that they haue not more, but alike or less. now, these things may sometimes bee justly desired, and sometimes unjustly. The reason is, because being inferior, they contend for equality; and being equal, for superiority. Hereby it appeareth, how they are disposed to sedition, and desire of innovation. The things for which they contend, are profit, and honour, and their contraries. For in seeking to shun dishonour, or danger, either of themselves, or of their friends, they trouble Cities and Estates with sedition. The causes and beginnings of the motives which dispose them in the aforesaid manner, and for the things by us mentioned, may bee seven in number, and somewhat more; two whereof are the same that the former are, but not in the same manner. For profit and honour do provoke them to quarrel, and contend together, not thereby to purchase them for themselves, as we said before, but because they see others more advanced, some justly and some unjustly. They are likewise provoked by reason of injuries, fear, prepotence, contempt, excessive increase, and otherwise of shane, negligence, pusillanimity, and unlikeness.  
In every sedition there are three points to be considered. The first, how men are disposed or made prove to the raising of it: The second, to what end they mutiny: The third, what the motive cause thereof is. Equality or inequality in democracies or Oligarchies, do dispose and incline men to discord. The ends or final causes thereof are profit and honour; and their contraries, damage and dishonour. The motives which provoke them to sedition, are set down to the number of seven, namely, honor and profit, enjoyed by some above their deserts, for which cause the rest repined at them: injuries, fear, prepotence, contempt, excessive and disproportionall increase of some part of the city, or of some per●on: to which motives there are added four other, viz. shane, negligence, pusillanimity, and unlikeness.  
WE will first touch in general the beginnings and causes thereof.] There are four kinds of causes set down by Philosophers, the efficient, material, formal, and final cause. The efficient cause of seditions is double, the one a near, the other, a remote cause. The near cause are the authors thereof, by whose counsel, direction, and aid they are raised and performed. By the remote cause we understand those things, for, and through which they are provoked thereunto: and these are set down by Aristotle to the number of eleven. The Authors of seditions are either magistrates, as were at Rome Tiberius, and Caius Gracchus brethren, Sylla, Marius, Apuleius, Caesar, Antonius, Lepidus: or private men, as Catiline and Manlius. In the roman histories we may find, that certain slaves haue ben the authors of seditions, as Herdonius Sabinus, which raised the war called Bellum servile; and one name Eunus a Syrian, who gathered a power of more then forty thousand slaves in Sicile, and having put on Kingly attire, ranged through the iceland, wasting and spoiling it. There was also another born in Cilicia, who did as much mischief. Spartacus a sword-player rising against the State of Rome, fought many times with the roman Consuls, whom he discomfited in battle, but afterward was vanquished by L. Crassus. The material cause of seditions are they against whom they are raised, of whom some are superiors, as Princes and Magistrates; and some inferiors, who are subject unto them. The end or final cause of seditions, is that thing for which they are raised. Aristotle setteth down four ends thereof, namely, profit, and honour; and their contraries, damage and dishonour: for men are commonly stirred thereunto through hope of profit and honour, or through fear of damage and infamy, as well of themselves as of their friends, desiring the one, and shunning the other. To profit, we refer riches: to honour, Magistracies, Offices, and public charges: to damage, poverty: to dishonour, continual injuries, contempt, and such like, which although they are numbered among the motive and efficient causes of seditions, because they provoke men, yet they may likewise bee the ends thereof, because that for the obtaining or shunning of them, men do conspire. The form or manner of a sedition, is a commotion of the people, noise, cries, beatings, murders, civil war, surprising of towns, burnings, banishments. If it bee of subiects toward their superiors and lords, it is called rebellion: if between subiects or men of equal estate, faction. Titus livius in the second book of his first Decade doth elegantly describe the form of a sedition which happened at Rome for debts, in this manner: Magno natu quidam cum omnium maiorum svorum insignibus se in forum proiecit, obsita erat squalore vestis, foedior corporus habitus pallore ac macie perempti: adhoc promissa barba& capilli esfer●●erant speciem oris: noscitabatur tamen in tanta deformitate,& ordines duxisse aiebant, aliáque mititiae decora vulgo miserantes eum, iactabant: ipse testes honestarum aliquot locis pugn●rum cicatrices aduersopectore ●stentabat. Sciscitantibus vnde esset ille habitus, vnde deformitas, quum circunsusa turba esset propè in concionis modum: Sabino bello ait se militantem, quta propter populationes agri non fructu modò car●erit, said villa incensa fuerit, dirrepta omnia, pecora abacta, tributum iniquo suo tempore imperatum, aes alienum secisse: id cum●latum usuris, primò se agro paterno auitòque exuisse, deinde fortunis aliis, postremò velut tabem pervenisse ad corpus: ductum se ab creditore non in seruitium, said in ergastulum& carnificinam esse: ind ostentare tergum foedum recentibus ves●igijs verberum. Ad haec visa auditàque clamour ingens oritur: non iam foro se tumultus continet, said passim totam vrbem peruadit: nexu vincti, solutíque, se undique in publicum proripiunt, implorant Quiritium fidem: nullo loco dost seditionis volontarius comes: multis passim agminibus per omnes viat cum clamore in forum curritur. Magno cum periculo suo, qui fortè patrum in foro erant, in eam turbam inciderunt: nec temperatum manibus foret, ni properè Coss. P. servilius& Appius Claudius ad comprimendam seditionem interuenissent. At in eos multitudo versa, ostentare vincula sua, deformitatémque aliam: haec se meritos dicere, exprobrantes suam quisque alius alibi militiam, postulare minaciter magis quàm suppliciter vt Senatum vocarent, curi●mque ipsi futuri arbitri moderatorésque publici consilij circumsistunt.  
There is also another description not much unlike to this, made by the same author in the third book of the same Decade, of a sedition raised in this manner, for the outrage committed by Appius on the daughter of Virginius: Repraesentatur mactaturus iam pater filiam abrepto ab lanio cultro: Hoc te uno quo possum( ait) modofilia inlibertatem vendico. Pectus deinde pvellae transfigit, respectánsque ad tribunal: Te( inquit) Appi, tuúmque caput sanguine hoc consecro. Clamore ad tam atrox facinus orto, excitus Appius, comprehendi Virginium jubet: ille ferro quacunque ibat, viam facere, donec multitudine etiam prosequentium iuuenum ruente ad portam perrexit. Icilius Numitoriúsque exangue corpus sublatum ostentant populo, scelus Appij, pvellae infelicem fortunam, necessitatem patris deplorant. Sequentes clamitant matronae, eám ne procreandorum liberorum conditionem? ea pudicitiae praemia esse? Concitatur multitudo, clamatur ad arma.  
Cicero in his Oration pro T.A. Milone compareth the people being incensed, to a tempest: Et quidem, inquit, caeteras tempestates& procellas in illis duntaxat fluctibus concionum& seditionum. The same author in his first book De Oratore: Hoc tempus post consulatum obiecimus his fluctibus, qui per nos à communi pest● depulsi, in nosmetipsos redundarunt.  
So doth Virgil likewise in the first book of the AEneide: 
Ac quoddle magno in populo cum sepe coorta est  
Seditio, saeuítque animis ignobile vulgus:  
Iámque face●& saxa volant, furor arma ministrat.  
Tum pietate grauem at meritis si fort● virum quem  
Conspexere, silent: arrectisque auribus astant.  
Ille regit dictis animos,& pectora mulcet.  
Sic cunctus pelagi cecidit fragor, aequora postquam  
Prospiciens Genitor, coelóque inuectus aperto  
Flectit equos, currúque volans dat lora secundo.   
unlikeness.] Plato in the eight of his commonweal saith, That wheresoever there is unlikeness, and discordant inequality, there men are always troubled with seditions. he did well to add discordant inequality, because all unlikeness is not to bee reproved, but that only which hath in itself a discordant inequality, and thereby may cause sedition. For the preventing of which evil this inequality must bee( so much as is possible) reduced to an equality. So wee see that the world being compounded of contrary Elements, namely, Earth, Water, air, and Fire is maintained and preserved by this analogy and proportion which they haue together, and that the bodies of creatures consisting of heat, cold, dryness, and moisture, are by the same means and manner preserved. In the main body of Nature, there is matter, form, privation, simplicity, mixture, substance, quantity, quality, action, passion: In mans body the head, hands, feet, eyes, nose, and ears: In the Oeconomicall body, the Husband, Wife, Children, Lords, slaves, servants: In the political or civil body, Magistrates, Noblemen, and Plebeians, Husbandmen; Artificers, merchants. Then to prevent the seditions which proceed from unlikeness, wee must not remove the vnlikenesses themselves, without which no commonweal can stand, but rather the disorder growing between unlike persons, and reduce them to a due agreement, such as the several parts haue, which are seen in the constitution of the world, and of man. That unlikeness which breedeth sedition, whereof Aristotle speaketh, consisteth in diversity of beginning, of place, of birth, offices, professions, trades, and religions. They are unlike in beginning and place, who are born and brought up in diverse places, as an Almaigne, a Spaniard, an Englishman, a Frenchman, and an Italian. Philip de Comines writing of the interview which Lewys the eleventh King of france, and henry King of Castile made, being the nearest allied Princes in christendom,( for they were auncientlie confederate, not onely King with King, but realm with realm, and bound vpon great and deep curses to observe their league) saith that the Frenchmen and Spaniards by reason of the diversity of attire and manners, both in their Princes and themselves, ceased not during the time that they were together to mock, quarrel, and in the end to beate each other thoroughly, little regarding their solemn league. The Noblemen and Plebeians are unlike in birth: in Offices, they which haue diverse charges; as Iudges, Treasurors, soldiers, Priestes, of which point wee haue spoken in the former Chapter. In professions; as a Lawyer, a physician, a divine, a Philosopher, and their followers being again of diverse sorts, as were amongst the greek Philosophers, the Academiques, the Perepatetiques, the Stoiques, and the Epicureans. In Schoole●diuinitie the Thomists and Scotists. Among the Iewes, the Pharisees, saducees, and Esseys. Lucian doth in sundry places facetiouslie show the differences and controversies of the greek Philosophers, but chiefly in the banquet of the Iapites. Among Artificers which use diverse Trades; as Bakers, Butchers, Shooemakers, Painters, Smiths, Carpenters. In religion; as Iewes, Christians, Mahumetists, Caphars, Lutherans, zwinglians, Caluinists, Anabaptists, Armenians, Greekes, latins, jacobites, abyssines.  
BESIDES the causes here alleged which dispose men to sedition, wee may add some other, as the nature of the places wherein men are born: so Ammianus Marcellinus in his eleventh book saith, That Alexandria in egypt was fatallie subject to sedition. And Socrates in his Tripartite history writeth: That the people of Alexandria were much more inclined to sedition then all the other Nations of the world. Many hold opinion, that Rome hath been seditious even from the first foundation, this proneness to dissension beginning in the quarrel of R●mulus and Rem●s, and descending to their posterity, whereof Horace in the seventh Ode of his Epode complaineth, the people and noblemen being at perpetual discord. Machiauel in the first book of his discourses, chap. 4. 5. and 6. doth assay to prove that the contrariety of the Senate and people hath caused the liberty and greatness of Rome. Wee may say that Genoa and Florence haue had like nature, as it appeareth by the histories which haue been written of both those States. moreover, men are disposed or made prove to sedition through abundance of wealth, and too much ease. salustius in Bello Iugurthin●: Caeterum mos partium popularium& Senatus factionum, ac deinde omnium malarum artium, paucis antè annis Romae ortus est, otio atque abundantia earum rerum quae prima mortales ducunt. Likewise extreme poverty doth much incite men to this evil. Horace in the four and twentieth Ode of his third book.  
Magnum pauperies opprobrium, jubet,  
Quid vis& facere,& pati,  
Virtutisque viam deserit arduae.  
Plato in his fift book of laws saith thus: There must bee neither extreme poverty, nor excessive riches among the Citizens of that city which would be exempted from the grievous disease called dissension, or sedition. sallust in the conspiracy of Catiline, speaketh thus of the poor men. Nam semper in civitate quibus opes nullae sunt, bonis inuident, males extollunt, vetera odere, noua exoptant: odio suarum rerum mutari omnia student, turba atque seditionibus sine cura aluntur, quoniam egestas facile sine damno habetur. many Countries haue been much troubled with sedition, because they could not endure the excessive multitude of inhabitants, and thereon haue grown many transmigrations or remouings of people out of one region into another. Likewise an Estate is inclined to sedition when it hath no enemy: as Hanniball  told the Carthaginians, speaking thus in the tenth book of the third Decade of livy. Nulla magna civitas quiescere potest: si foris hostem non habet, domi invenit: vt praeualida corpora ab externis causis tuta videntur, said suis ipsa viribus onerantur. That is, No great city can remain quiet; if it haue no enemy abroad, it findeth one at home: even as great bodies, which seem to bee safe and assured against all outward dangers, yet are surcharged and overladen with their own force. For this cause Scipio Nasica was of opinion, after the victory which the romans had of the Carthaginians, that Carthage should not bee razed, least the romans having no enemies, should turn their weapons against themselves, and so destroy each other; as soon after it happened: sallust in the conspiracy of Catiline. After that through labour and iustice the commonweal was grown flourishing, great Kings subdued by war, fierce Nations and mighty people vanquished by force, Carthage the emulous riual of the Roman Empire destroyed from the very ground, all Seas and Countries opened: then Fortune began to show her cruelty, and to trouble all: Ease, and Riches, which should bee wished to others, haue been a trouble and misery to those who before did easily endure pain, danger, doubtful and sharp chances. Wherefore God in the book of Iudges, the third chapter, ordained that the Philistines, Canaanites, Sidonians and Hiuites should bee left and opposed against the Israelites to try them, saying: Therefore will I no more cast out before them any of the Nations which Iosua left when he died. That through them I may prove Israell, whether they will keep the way of the Lord to walk therein as their Fathers kept it, or not. Likewise the imposing of new subsidies doth move men to sedition, as it hath often happened in France, and late time yet fresh in memory, in the beginning of King Henry the seconds reign, all the Country of Gu●en rose by reason of the excessive taxes. Likewise, the changing of Princes, laws, and coins, breed great troubles in commonweals. Omnes rerum mutationes( saith sallust in his preface on the war of jugurth) caedem, ●ugam aliaque hostilia portendunt. Presently vpon Augustus Caesars death, the roman legions which were in Pannonia and in germany, raised strange seditions: described by Cornelius Tacitus in his first book of the history of the Caesars. Immediately after the decease of Salomon, the Iewes rebelling against Roboam by reason of the taxes which he would not moderate, divided themselves into two realms, namely, of Iuda and Israell: the first book of the Kings, chapter twelve. All spain being governed by Flemmings, revolted against them by reason of the exactions that they used: which commotion is described by Paulus divinus in the life of Pope Adrian the fixed. whensoever any king of france hath been in his minority, there haue sprung up seditions in the realm, as hath been said. The division of lands propounded at Rome in the law called Lex agraria, was the beginning of the seditions among the romans, and caused the death of the two Gracchi, brethren, who were the Authors thereof. Besides, the changing of coins being not used in due time, and vpon just cause and urgent necessity, is wonderfully dangerous, causing great discontent and occasion of mutiny. So also doth the bad administration of iustice, and impunity proposed to offenders, which emboldeneth them to plot and attempt innovations.   

CHAP. III. A declaration of the causes of seditions.  
AMongst which causes we may clearly see what source injury and profit haue, and what evils they breed. For if the Gouernours bee injurious and covetous, they prou●ke the Citizens not onely to grow discontented, but also to rebel against those Estates, wherein such licence is granted them. avarice is committed sometimes in extorting the goods of particular men, and sometimes in robbing the public Treasure.  
The beginnings and motive causes of seditions, which were simply set down before, are now declared, with examples answering to each several cause, that the evils which thereby happen, may bee the better known, and the remedies fit for them.  
AMONGST which causes.] The first cause of sedition is the avarice of the Magistrates and Gouernours of a commonweal, which thing is very pernicious, and greatly to be shunned. For if commonweals were therefore ordained at the first, that under the protection and government of good Magistrates men might quietly possess their own, then doubtless they which rule Estates ought chiefly to haue care, that not onely the public treasure be disposed and employed according to the necessity and profit of the commonweal, but also that particular men may quietly enjoy their goods.  
AVARICE is committed sometimes in extorting the goods of particular men,& sometimes in robbing the public Treasure.] avarice is the injurious coveting of that which is anothers: and it is committed publicly or privately. The public Treasure is the revenue of Signories, kingdoms and Empires; demeines, taxes, confiscations, appropriations of deceased strangers goods, impositions, subsidies invented and used for public necessity. A●● avarice is herein committed, when the money thereby levied, is converted by those that haue the charge thereof, rather to their own private, then to the public use: which crime was by the romans called Peculatus, and the iudgement used thereon, De repetundis: when such goods are either unprofitably, or wastefully spent, Princes and Magistrates use immoderate and unaccustomed exactions on their subiects. avarice is privately committed, when the poorer and weaker sort are spoiled of their goods by those that haue power, which is a very detestable crime, especially in Magistrates and governors of Commonweals: For as ꝯtinence and abstinence doth purchase them the praise of all men, so avarice doth make them generally hated.  
It is likewise manifest, what force Honour hath, and in what sort it is the cause of sedition. For men which are not honoured, seeing others honoured, do mutiny; which things are unjustly divided, when any are honoured above their desert and dignity: and justly, when every one is honoured, according to his dignity.  
In the distributing of honours it is requisite that especial ragard bee had to the quality and sufficience of the persons, to the end, that public charges be committed to those who are worthy thereof. Next, i● is expedient that men arise by degrees from small Offices ●o greater, even as their experience en●reaseth: and that they bee displaced who are uncapable, as bad and infamous persons, and such as are not lawfully born. moreover, that men attain thereto by virtue and industry, not by money and favours. Else when unworthy men are advanced, or insufficient persons preferred before those that are sufficient; or they who haue done no service to the commonweal, obtain the reward due to those that haue done good service; or when vicious persons are honoured, then men of worth judging this to bee done in contempt of them, do sometimes raise sedition, thereby to avenge themselves.  
SEDITION ariseth by reason of Praep●t●nce, when one or many haue more power then the state of the commonweal can support or endure: whereof doth ordinarily proceed the monarchy, or Potentacie. Wherefore there is a custom in some places to banish such persons for a time; which kind of banishment is called an Ostracism●, as at Argos and Athens. But it were better to take order at the first, that they grow not so great, then to seek remedies afterward, when they haue suffered them to mount so high.  
excessive authority and power through riches and friends, is daungerous in every kind of government: it must therefore bee hindered from the beginning, or abridged and diminished with all possible speed, because that through too much Praepotence in such things, commonweals are changed into Monarchies, and kingdoms and Empires usurped by new lords. This matter hath been discoursed at large in the third book, and the ninth Chapter, and the manner of the ostracism expounded according to Plutarch. When any men burning with desire of glory and praise, seek to bear overgreat sway in an Estate, and others do resist this their attempt, then spring there seditions between them, and oft civil warres.  
By reason of fear mutinies are raised, as well by those that haue committed some offences, for which they fear to bee punished, as by those that desire to prevent the injuries that are intended against them; ●● at Rhodes the Noblemen conspired against the people, for fear of the judgements which they prepared against them.  
fear is a perturbation of the mind for some imminent or future danger. That also which is done by force or violence, seemeth to bee done by fear. They raise seditions for fear, who dread imminent and future perils, and seek to avoid them. So Catiline knowing himself to bee culpable and guilty of many acts, did for fear of iudgement conspire against his country, being assisted by Lentulus, Antonius, Cethegus, with many sacrilegious persons, murtherers, adulterers, ruffians, men that were far indebted, and others which by reason of their vile offences, stood in fear of punishment: He was likewise assisted by all those whom either the hand or tongue maintained by perjury, or effusion of citizens blood; and other like persons who were oppressed with forfeits, want, or crimes. sallust in the conspiracy of Catiline, and Cicero in his Orations against Catiline.  
By reason of contempt likewise seditions are ●aised, and conspiracies made, namely in Oligarchies, when they who are excluded from authority of government, are more in number, and do therefore assure themselves that they are the stronger: and in democracies, when the rich men do conte●ne the disorder and negligence of the governors, as at Thebes after the battle fought at Oenophytes, because they governed ill, the Democratic was destroyed. As also it was at Megar●, when through their disorder and want of government, they were overthrown. And at Syracusa before the Tyranny of Cel●n: and at Rhodes the authority of the people decayed before the insurrection of the Noblemen.  
Commonly those men are contemned, who haue neither virtue, courage, nor power, being therefore unable to help themselves or others, and who haue no industry nor care. Where contempt is, there can bee no obedience, the son disobeyeth his father, whom he contemneth, the wife her husband, the scholar his teacher, the servant his master. even beasts haue some feeling of the quality of those whom they must serve, as wee may read of the horses of Alexander the great, and Iulius Caesar, who would not suffer any other to sit on them. Wherefore it is no marvell; that amongst men the opinion of Prudence, Iustice, constancy, Knowledge, Bounty, modesty, and other virtues doth nourish and maintain obedience towards them, and the contrary vices provoke subiects to rebel against their Lords. Then as States do prosper, being governed by wise, just, constant, valiant, and temperate persons, so they are troubled with seditions through the imprudence, cowardice, and intemperance of their rulers: or when they are too familiar with inferior persons, or are come from base estate, and suddenly advanced, or seem too young, old, poor, unfortunate, all which things breed contempt. Cicero doth elegantly and excellently teach in his second book of Offices howe the honour and dignity of those that govern commonweals, and the obedience of their subiects, towards them, may be maintained. But sedition doth not spring in commonweals then onely when inferiors contemn their superiors, but also when one degree contemneth another: as in the oligarchy, the poor making no account of the rich, because themselves are more in number, and stronger then they, do conspire against them. Likewise in the Democratic, the rich contemning the disorder of the poor which govern, do easily attempt to suppress and put them down.  
The changes of commonweals do happen also by reason of excessive increase. For as the body consisteth of parts, and must grow by proportion, to the end, that the due measure may still remain: whereas otherwise it perishe●h, if the foot be four ●ubit●s long, and the rest of the body but two spannes: and it might likewise bee changed into the shape of some other living creature, if it should grow beyond do proportion, not onely in quantity, but in quality also. even so a City consisteth of parts, amongst which oft times some one doth privily grow up, as the multitude of poor men in democracies and commonweals. Sometimes also this doth happen by chance, as at Tarentum the greater part of the Nobility being vanquished and destroyed by the Iapigians not long after the war of the Medes, that State did of a commonweal become a democraty. And at Argos after the slaughter of their people at He●doma by Cleomenes of lacedaemon, they were constrained to receive some of the bordering strangers,& make them members of their city. And at Athens when they had sought unhappily in the battle by land against the Lacedemonians, their Noblemen decreased, because they sent them to this war, according to the catalogue of the city. The like doth happen in democracies also but more seldome● For many men growing rich there, or their wealth being increased, they are changed into Oligarchies or Potentacies.  
every commonweal is composed of degrees or Estates, as it were parts, which Estates must bee kept and held in concord by a due proportion of each to other, even as the harmony in music consisteth of unequal voices or sounds, which are equally accorded. For when any of those Estates doth rise too much above the other, there doth forwith ensue dissension in the City, like a discord in a song, when one tune is too low, another too high. The roman commonweal was composed of three degrees or orders, namely, the Patricians, Knights, and Plebeians; and while these Estates were kept within proportion, all things went well, but when one of then rose against the other through envy, ambition,& avarice, then began divisions and dangerous factions. The ij. Gracchi to abridge the senators authority, took from that order the exercise of judgements, and gave it to the Knights, whose power thereby was so increased, V●fata fortunásque patrum vitásque principum in manu haberent, qui& interceptis vectigalibus jure suo rempublicam peculati sun●. For when both the romans, Italians, and Senators themselves were of necessity to appear in iudgement before the Knights, touching what cause soever they had in controversy, were it for money, honour, or offences; the knights were by this means exalted above the mas their Princes, and the senators made subject and bound to them; so that they assisting the Tribunes at the creation of Officers, and taking whom themselves listed( by a conspiracy made between them) had put the Senate in great fear; and there wanted not much more to change the government of the commonweal, sith the Senate had onely the name, and the knights all the authority and power: Appian in his first book of the civil warres, chap. four. Neither is a commonweal disturbed by the excessive increase onely, of degrees or Estates, but also by the weakening& impoverishing of them. For there can be no proportion where the stronger haue all, and the weaker little or none; nor any concord, where some are deprived not onely of the common and public commodities, but also spoiled of their own private goods, as were the people at Rome: for whom Tiberius Grac●hus spake thus, That the savage beasts in Italy had at the least their holes, caues and dens, wherein to shrowd themselves; where as men who fought and died for the defence thereof, enjoyed nothing save onely air and light, but were constrained to wander up and down with their wives and children, having no place nor house whereinto to put their heads so that( quoth he) the Captaines do commonly lye, when to encourage their soldiers, they require and admonish them to fight valiantly for the graues, the temples, and the altars of themselves, and of their ancestors: For among so many poor roman citizens, there is not any that can show one domestic altar or grave of his ancestors, but the silly wretches fight and die for the effeminate pleasures, richesse and superfluity of others; yet are they falsely called Lords and commanders of all the habitable world, whereas they haue not one foot of ground that is their own. Plutarch in the life of the ij. Gracchi. In france, the two principal degrees or orders, are the nobility and people: whereto that of the Church, although it participate of both, was adjoined as a third, for the reverence of religion, and by reason of the great revenues of the clergy in lands, houses, fees,& other exceeding profits, amounting yearly to four millions of pounds; whereto add the authority that it hath long time had in iudgement both in the Parliaments, and near the Kings, in counsel. There is no doubt, that the agreement of these Estates hath caused the realm to continue and prosper so long amongst all other ancient and modern kingdoms; the public commodities, honours, and charges being ordinarily divided according to the condition of every Estate, without abridging their rights and pre-eminences, especially in taking diligent heed, that neither of them do above measure exceed the other, viz. that the Nobility do not too much oppress the people, and thereby drive them to despair,( the ommitting of which diligent heed, hath oft caused the people to rise, whereof hath ensued great mischief) or that the people by means of Merchandise, judgements, and disposing of the public revenues, together with the gainful privileges by them possessed, should not ouer-greatly enrich themselves to the prejudice of the nobility, and purchase the Noblemens lands, who being impoverished, could not be able to sustain the charges of the war, nor serve the King in his armies, whereto it is most necessary to haue always special regard for the safety and quiet of the French dominions.  
commonweals are likewise changed by reason of shane, as it happened at Heraea, where the Magistrates which before were chosen by election, were afterwards created by lot, because that while the manner of election was observed, they bestowed the public offices on men of no worth.  
Heraea was a city of Arcadia, whose government was popular, wherein men of no worth were chosen Magistrates by such as were like themselves; for which the Heraeans being derided, changed their custom of election into the use of lots, thereby to shun like derision. There was not long since in the counsel of france an excessive number of maisters of requests, extraordinary; and Secretaries for the Office of the treasury, which were afterward for very shane caused to withdraw themselves, it being unseemly and vnmeet to treat of high and weighty affairs, which should be kept secret, in such a multitude.  
And by reason of negligence, when they suffer those to attain to sovereign Offices, who are not friends to the commonweal, as at Oreum, the oligarchy was destroyed by Heracleodorus, who being become a Magistrate, changed the said oligarchy into a commonweal, and a democraty.  
There is herein double negligence, first of those which do call, elect, and admit into any great Office unworthy persons,& such as take no pleasure in the executing therof: or which suffer those men to attain to sovereign Magistracies, who dislike the present manner of government. As if the Lords of barn should choose an Auoyer, or the Venetians a Duke, whose disposition and desire were contrary to the form of their commonweal: or the Cardinals a Pope, who were not of their religion● or if the king of France should create a Constable or chancellor, who affencted not the royal and monarchical Estate. The second negligence is of those, who being called to any dignity or office, show themselves slack and careless in the administration and exercise thereof, as we see that the most part of the Bishops and Prelates, regard not the duty of their ecclesiastical charges, that they may more freely follow secular affairs, and for this cause they are contemned: From which disorder there haue risen great scandals and marvelous troubles, which may more easily be lamented then removed or reformed, because abuses haue through long time taken deep root.  
furthermore, the changes of Estates do grow by little and little: I say, by little& little, because many times there happeneth a great change both of manners and laws, without being perceived, through the neglecting of some small thing: as in Ambracia where they advanced to offices men of small revenues, and in the end they admitted those that had none at all: as if nothing and little were near in nature, or not any whit different.  
Changes, unless they be very violent, do seldom happen all at once, but are ordinarily bread by little and little, even as the seasons of the year do by degrees pass from excessive heat to excessive could, and from Winters sharpness to Summers extremity. Wherefore it is far more difficult to remedy or prevent them, because commonly men take no heed to evils and dangers, until they be grown great: as Aristotle saith in the 6. book of the peacocks, chap. 4. whosoever will consider the change that hath happened in france within these thirty yeares, shall find it to be very great, as well in religion, as in manners and laws; yet hath it not chanced all at one time, but by little and little, as it grew on by continuance.  
Likewise, when the inhabitants of one place are not all native there, this breedeth sedition among them, until they grow to a general accord. For as a City is not composed of every multitude, so also it is not constituted in every time. Wherefore, all they that haue hitherto received strangers into their cities to dwell therein with them, haue for the most part been troubled with seditions. As the Achaians dwelled with the Troezenians in the City of Sybaris, and afterward being grown stronger then they, drove them out: which thing caused great evil to the Sybarites, who did the like among the Thurians to those that dwelled with them: for seeking to appropriate to themselves the greater part of that territory, as if it had been their own, they were discomfited and exp●lsed. The Byzantines, when the practise and intended enterprise of the strangers against them was discovered, drove them by force of arms out of their city. And the Antissaeans having received the banished Chians, did afterward expulse them likewise by plain force. The Zanchaeans also having received the Samians, were overcome by them and driven out of their City. The Apollonian● which dwell near the sea of Pontus, by receiving strangers, were troubled with seditions. And when the Syracusans being freed from their gangrenes, had made many strangers and hired souldiers, fellow Citizens with them; they were so troubled likewise with seditions, that in the end they fell to fighting. And the Amphipolites by taking into their city the Chalcidians were almost all driven out by them.  
It is commonly seen, that the natural inhabitants of a city do seldom agree with strangers dwelling amongst them: and of such differences there do oft spring seditions, as it appeareth by the examples which Aristotle allegeth, for confirmation whereof, we may add that of Geneua, whether many strangers repairing, as well Frenchmen as others, for religion, they were always maligned and repined at by the natural Citizens, although they had done great good unto their city, which by reason of their repair thether grew rich and populous, whereas before it was poor and small:& there haue been many conspiracies made against them, to expulse or kill them, especially that which Perin plotted in the year 1556. which was begun to bee effected and executed when calvin thrust himself between the naked swords to appease the tumult: as Beza reporteth in his life. But touching this receiving of strangers, great regard is to bee had to their number, whether it be small or great: for if being few, they quarrel with the natural inhabitants, there is less danger; but if they exceed them in number and power, then through confidence in their own strength, they will soon raise seditions. Likewise men that are of different manners, do hardly agree at the beginning, but when they haue long remained and dwelled together, they do in kind and quiet sort converse each with other. sallust speaking of the Troians and Aborigines; that is, the ancient inhabitants who had not descended from any strange people) writeth thus: Hi postquam in vna moenia conuenere, dispari genere, aissimili lingua, alius alio more viuentes, incredibile memoratu est quam facile coal●erint. At the first the Gaules and Frenchmen being of a diverse Nation, Language, and Religion, could not well agree, but after that the Frenchmen were baptized, and had together with the religion accustomend themselves unto the manners and language of the Gaules, these two people were forthwith reduced into one body, and did marvelously prosper. The Lacedemonians permitted no strangers to dwell amongst them. At this day in China and Cathay all access and entrance is denied them, for the Merchants remaining in the havens, make show of those wears that they will sell, and haue such commodities as they ask for brought unto them, which being done, the inhabitants do presently withdraw themselves without any conference or farther traffic. But the romans were herein more courteous, who did not only receive strangers into their city, granting them the right and freedom thereof, but did also advance them to public honours and Offices, to which purpose there is an excellent Oration made by the Emperour Claudius to the Senate, recorded by Cornelius Tacitus in the eleventh book of his history of the Caesars: Nam cum( inquit Tacitus) de supplendo Senatu ageretur, ac primores Galliae qui foedera& civitatem Romanam pridem assecuti● ius adipiscendorum honorum in urbe expetissent, ac multus supper ea revariúsque rumour,& studijs diversis apud principem certaretur: asseuerantium non ita aegram Italiam, vt Senatum urbi suae suppeditare nequiret, suffecisse olim indigenas consanguineis populis, nec poenitere veteris Reipublicae: Princeps contrà disseruit,& vocato Senatu ita exorsus est. Maiores mei, quorum antiquissimus Clausus origine Sabina, simul in civitatem Romanam& in familiam patritioram ascitus est, hortantur uti paribus consilijs Rempublicam capessam, transferendo huc quod vsquam egregium fuerit. Neque enim ignoro Iulios Alba, Coruncanos Camerio, Porcios Tusculo:& ne vetera scrutemur, Etruria Lucaniáque& omni Italia in Senatum accitos. Postremo ipsam ad Alpes promotam, vt non modò singuli viritim, said terrae gentésque in nomen nostrum coalescerent. Tunc solida domi quies,& aduersus externa floruimus: cum Transpadani in civitatem recepti, cúm specie deductarum per orbem terrae legionum, additis prouincialium validissimis fesso imperio subuentum est. Num poenitet Balbos ex Hispania, nec minus insignes viros è Gallia Narbonensi transiuisse? manent posteri eorum, nec amore in hanc patriam nobis concedunt. Quid aliud exitio Lacedemonijs& Atheniensibus fuit, quanquam armis pollerent, nisi quòd victos pro alienigenis arcebant? At conditur nostri Romulus tantum sapientiae valuit, vt plerosque populus eodem die hostes, dein cives habuerit. Aduenae in nos regnauerunt: libertinorum filijs magistratus mandati: non vt plerique falluntur, recens, said priori populo factum est. At cum Senonibus pugnauimus: scilicet Volsci& AEqui: nunquam aduersam nobis aciem instruxere? Capti à Gallis sumus, said& Tuscis obsides dedimus,& Samnitum jugum subiuimus: attamen si cuncta bella recenseas, nullum breuiore spacio quàm aduersus Gallos consectum: continua ind ac fida pax. I am moribus, artibus, affinitatibus nostris mixti, aurum& opes suas inferant potius, quàm separati habeant. Omnia P.C. quae nunc vetustissima creduntur, noua fuere. Plebeij magistratus post patritios. Latini post plebeios, caeterarum Italiae gentium, post Latinos. Inueterascet hoc quoque:& quod hody exemplis tuenur, inter exempla erit. Haec Claudius princeps. Quam sententiam secuto Senatu, mox Heduis Senatorum ius in urbe datum est.  
In Oligarchies many men do raise sedition, as if they were injured, because being equal, as we said before, they haue not an equal part in government: and in democracies the Noblemen grow discontented, when they haue but an equal part, although they bee not equal, but superior.  
These quarrels springing from inequality in democracies and Oligarchies between the Noblemen and the people, haue been at large discoursed of in the third book, and in the beginning of this fift book. In every Estate, they that are not esteemed and used according to their desert and quality, repute themselves injuried, and oft times they seek redress by raising mutinies.  
Sometimes Cities are troubled with seditions, by reason of the places wherein they are situated, when the nature of the country is not fit for the constituting of a city: as at Clazomene they that dwelled in Chitrum, bore grudge and hatred against those of the iceland; and the Colophonians against the Notians. And at Athens they are not all inclined alike: but they of Piceum are more popular then those of the City. For as in warres the passing of trenches, although they bee small, doth break the soldiers array, and disorber the battailes, in like sort, every difference in a City doth seem to breed dissension.  
The separations which are in cities, do oft breed quarrels amongst them that inhabit diverse parts thereof: as at Paris during the factions of orleans and Burgoine, they that dwelled in the city, especially towards the halls, held stiffly together against those of the university: as Enguerrant of Monstrellet writeth in his first book. At another time they were constrained to build in the city the fortress de petit Po●t, that is, of the little bridge, against the tumults which the schollers made: as Gaguin writeth in his ninth book. Philip de Comines likewise in his fifth book, the fifteenth Chapter, saith, That in Arras there were walls and trenches between the town and the city, and gates to shut against the said city while the Burgonians were maisters thereof, but afterward when the Frenchmen held it, the city was shut against the town, because the city took part with France, and the town with Burgoine. One part of the city of Trent speaketh Italian, and liveth after the Italian manner, the other part speaketh the german tongue, and liveth after the manner of that country. At Athens they that dwelled in the haven Piraeum, which was joined to the city by a long& thick wall( as we haue noted in the beginning of Platoes commonweal) did more affect the democraty. moreover, Plutarch in the life of Solon writeth( as wee haue already shewed in the last chapter of the second book) that in the country of Attica there were as many factions as there were diverse sorts of the territory: for the Mountainers were democratical; those of the champion country, Oligarchical; and they that dwelled near the sea, desired a middle kind of government, consisting of both forms, whereby wee may know, that Plato in the beginning of Timeus, and in the end of his fift book of laws, hath written most truly, that there is great difference of places for the disposing and fashioning of mens manners, which point is gravely handled by Hippocrates in that little treatise that he wrote of the air, of waters, and of places; as also by Galen, showing that the affections of the mind follow the temperature of the body. We haue also noted in the former chapter that some places are naturally, and as it were by some destiny, seditious. Likewise, when a place is unfit for habitation by reason of barrenness or any other like cause, the city therein situated, is prove to sedition.  
peradventure the greatest dissension is between virtue and 'vice, and next to that, between richesse and poverty; and so of the rest, one more then another.  
Sith 'vice and virtue are contrary, there must needs be dissension between them, yet they who excel in virtue( as Aristotle saith in the beginning of this book) do never use to raise sedition when they are repulsed, or others of little or no worth preferred before them, as at Rome it happened to Cato: although they haue just occasion of anger, because that by reason they ought to bee absolutely and onely unequal, and preferred before all others. Touching the Noble and rich men, this is their common fault, that they are almost all proud and disdainers of the poor and vulgar sort, so that it is a very difficult matter to keep these two degrees of people in quiet, in whatsoever form of government they live: as we haue shewed at large by reasons and examples, as well ancient as modern, in the sixth chapter of the third book.   

CHAP. IIII. The issue of the occasions whereby commonweals are changed.  
SEditions then are not raised for small matters, but from small they grow to great. And being small, they take exceeding force when they arise between the chief and principal persons of a country. As in ancient times it happened at Syracusa by the means of two young men, who being magistrates, sell to dissension about a love matter: For while one of them was absent, the other who was his companion, enticed a young boy whom he loved, whereat he conceiving great despite and indignation, at his return found means to haue his pleasure of the others wife: and hereupon each seeking to win on his side the other governors, they set the whole City at dissension. Wherefore such evils must bee looked unto when they begin, and the discords that grow between the principal lords, presently apyeased; sith this fault is in the beginning, and sith also men say that the beginning is the half of all; so that a small oversight chauncing then, doth answer by proportion to all the faults that are afterward committed. Bree●ely, the discords of Noblemen divide the whole City into factions, as it chanced at Estiae● after the war of the Medes by reason of the controversy between two brethren for their portions: for he that was the poorer, complaining that the other did not show him all the goods in the house, and bid from him the treasure which their father had found, drew all the vulgar sort to his side: the other being wealthier, wan the rich men to take part with him. And at Delphos a certain quarrel being raised about a marriage, was the beginning of all the seditions that rose afterward in that city: For the spouse having had some sign of ill lucke, at his return to hir unto whom he was betrothed, refused to mary her; whereupon the maids friends, as being herein despised and wronged, conveyed on him while he was sacrificing, some of the consecrated things of the Temple, and afterward caused him to be slain, as one guilty of sacrilege. And at Mitilene a certain controversy arising about the inheritance of two maidens that were orphans, was the occasion of much hurt, and of the war between the Mitilenians and the Athenians, wherein Paches took their City. For Timophanes a wealthy man deceasing, left behind him two daughters coheirs: Doxander who had demanded them in marriage for his sons, being denied, raised sedition, and incited the Athenians( who coming to Mitilene, were always lodged at his hous●) to make war on the city. Amongst the Phocians likewise there grew dissension about an inheritance between Mnaseas the father of Mneson, and Euthycrates the father of Onomarchus, from which dissension the holy war arose. At Epidamnus also the Estate was changed, by reason of a marriage: For when one who had betrothed his daughter to a young man, was condemned in a sum of money by the same young mans father, being then in office, he to avenge himself for this disgrace and injury, caused al those to rebel that were without the City.  
Aristotle having rehearsed and declared the causes of seditions, setteth down the evils and changes that grow thereby. First he saith that seditions arising between the chief men of a country, are dangerous, and must bee appeased with al possible speed, without suffering them to take root and to increase in any wise.  
SEDITIONS are not raised for small matters.] Seditions do spring from small beginnings, but if they bee not speedily quenched, they will suddenly grow infinitely, and not onely infect houses, towns, and cities, but also whole provinces and great estates. They must therefore be looked unto at the beginning, or rather if it be possible, hindered from growing at all, and by cutting off their causes through politic foresight and wisdom. As in physic, besides the Therapeuticall part, which was invented for the healing of sick persons, there is also the Prophylacticall, which doth by exercise and diet, prevent diseases; or by purging, remove the causes thereof.  
AND being small, they take exceeding force, when they arise between the chief and principal persons of a country.] As were those factions and partakings in france in the reign of Charles the sixth, between the Dukes of orleans and Burgoine: or in England in the reign of Henry the sixth, between the houses of Yo●ke and Lancaster: which by reason of their discords, filled both thofe realms with dangerous dissensions, and had thereby almost utterly ruinated them. The quarrel between Pompey and Caesar, troubled not Rome and Italy only, but Greece, Asia, egypt and spain; nor those Countries alone which were subject to the roman Empire, but also the bordering provinces, and confederate Estates, which followed the one or other part.  
WHEREFORE such evils must bee looked unto when they begin.] Wise Princes or Gouernours of commonweals haue regard not onely to the present state of things, but also to that which followeth, providing and taking order even then by wise and good direction for future accidents, because dangers which are a far o●f foreseen, may bee easily remedied: but by tarrying till they draw near, the medicines that are then applied, bee out of season, the disease being grown incurable. And herein it cometh to pass, even as physicians haue observed it in the fever called Febris hectica, which at the first coming thereof, is easily cured, and hardly known; but if it bee not known nor cured at the beginning, it groweth easy to bee known, and impossible to bee holpen. even so it happeneth in commonweals and Estates, for the evils and inconveniences which do daily grow, being long foreseen, may bee easily remedied; but when through want of being known, in time they are suffered to grow on till every one may clearly see them, there is not then any hope of remedy. Plutarch writeth, That Cato alone, as being therein the wiser man and of de●per iudgement then any other in Rome, foresaw and prophesied the destruction of the commonweal, which should bee wrought by the practices of Iulius Caesar; and he did thereof sundry times advertise the people, the Senate, and Pompey himself apart: but at the first he was accounted a troublesone and importunate man, until the end being such as he had foretold, proved him to be more wise then happy in the counsels. For( as the same Plutarch writeth) Caesar abused and deceived the whole world, except Cato, in the reconciling of Pompey and Crassus, who were for power the chiefest persons of the city; and before, utter enemies. now, when Caesar had made them friends, and by this means gotten to himself the whole power of them both, men had not so deep an insight into his dealings, as to think that under an act, having the goodliest show and the most honest pretext that might bee, he had turned upside down, and laid a plot for the utter overthrow of all the roman Commonwe●le: for it was not the dissension of Pompey and Caesar which raised the civil war, as men do commonly suppose, but rather their agreement and union, because they did ally and join themselves together, first to overthrow the authority of the Senate and the nobility, and afterw●●d falling to mortal en●●ie, they ●ought to destroy each other. And in another place the same author saith, That Cato greatly suspecting this alliance of Caesar and Pompey, as not being made for any good intent, said that he feared not so much this distribution of lands, as he did the recompense which they would therefore demand, who by such cunning devises alured and fed the common people. And in another place he saith, Cato stepping forth did with a loud voice before all the assembly foretell( as if he had been inspired by some divine prophetical spirit) all that which would happen through these practices to the commonweal: a little after he saith thus; When the edict was propounded touching the provinces and armies which Caesar required, Cato addressed not himself unto the people for the hindering thereof, but to Pompey, denouncing& protesting unto him that he did put on his own neck Caesars yoke, which as then he perceived not, but that soon after he would feel the weight thereof, and find himself therewith surcharged and taken, and that then when he could no longer endure it, nor find any means to shake it off, he would cast both himself and his burden on the commonweal, and too late remember Catoes warnings, which were no less profitable to him in particular, then just and reasonable in themselves. Cato did sundry times use like speeches unto him, but Pompey made no account thereof, for he could not beleeue that Caesar would change, and besides, he trusted too much in his own prosperity, and in the greatness of his power. Thus having strengthened and advanced Caesar against himself and the commonweal, he did deservedly feel the smart of his folly therein committed. Caesar on the other side having from the beginning aimed at Pompeys overthrow, and to make himself greater; like a skilful wrestler, whose onely study is how to trip and foil his adversary, got himself far from Rome, and to exercise himself in the warres of Gaule, where he trained his army, and did so much augment his own glory by his admirable deeds of arms, that he did equal Pompeys explots, so that there restend nothing else for executing& effecting of his purpose, save onely some coloured occasions, which partly Pompey, and partly the time did afford and offer him: and all this grew through the bad government which was then in the commonweal of Rome. Plutarch in the lives of Pompey, Caesar, Crassus, and Cato.  
SITH this fault is in the beginning.] Aristotle in this same book, chapter eight, especial regard and heed must be had to the evil when it begins, how little soever it be, for men mark not corruption when it groweth by little and little, no more then they do small charges, which being oft used, consume a mans whole substance. This change is ●●t noted, because it happeneth not all together, and the conceit is therein deceived: as in sophistry by inferring, that if each several part bee little, then the whole is little, which is somewhat true, and yet is not so, for the whole and all are not small, but do consist of small things. And in the seventh Chapter he saieth, When men haue neglected some point belonging to government, they do more lightly and easily change another that is somewhat greater, until they haue finally corrupted both order and ornament. And in the 6. book, chap. 4. A small evil is not perceived, but growing on, it is better known.  
AND sith also men say that the beginning is the half of all.] Hesiodus {αβγδ}. Plato in the second of his commonweal, {αβγδ}.  
So that a small oversight chauncing then, doth answer by proportion to all the faults that are afterward committed.] A small fault at the beginning, breedeth a mean evil in the other parts, and a greater fault doth by proportion breed a greater evil; so that the proportion of the evil doth always depend on the occasion and beginning of the fault which breedeth it.  
BR●EFELY, the discords of Noblemen 〈◇〉 the whole City into factions.] Aristotle in this same book, the eight chapter: Great care and endeavour is to bee used for the ordaining of such laws, whereby the growing of contentions and sedseditions between great persons, may be hindered, and the oth●rs prevented, who haue not yet taken part with either side, before they enter into any ●action: because every man cannot know an evil when it begins, but onely the good, which is understood in matters of government.  
moreover, there do happen changes both in the oligarchy and in the democraty, and in the commonweal, when any Magistrate or part of the city gets reputation or increaseth in power: as the counsel of Areopagus, having won great estimation in the war of the Medes, seemed to reduce the commonweal to a more severe form of government. again, the Mariners and those that had fought in the gallies, by whom the victory was obtained as Salamis, by reason of the sovereignty and power by sea which the City had hereby gotten, did strengthen more the democraty. And at Argos the Noblemen having won great honour in the batta●le of mantinaea against the Lacedemonians, did thereupon attempt to overthrow the Popular estate. At Siracusa also the people being cause of the victory which they had in the war against the Athenians, changed the commonweal into a democraty. And at Chalcis after that the people had expulsed the tyrant and the Nobility, they did forthwith undertake to rule the commonweal themselves. Likewise, at Ambracia, having driven out the tyrant Periander, and those of his faction, they took on themselves the government of the state. To bee short, we must not bee ignorant, that all they by whose means the power of any state hath ben augmented, whether they be private men or Magistrates, or some tribe and lineage, or some parts of the City, or whatsoever multitude, do raise sedition: For either they who envy their honor, do mutiny, or else themselves by reason of the power which they haue gotten, will not be content with an estate equal to the rest.  
Changes do sometimes happen in commonweals through the discords between the chief men of a country: sometimes also when any private men, or Magistrates, or some tribe and lineage, or some other part of the City, or whatsoever multitude is the occasion of augmenting the Cities strength; and thereby increaseth in reputation: because then either they who envy their honour, do begin sedition, or else themselves by reason of the power which they haue gotten, will not be content with an estate equal to the rest, and thereby change the form of government.  
AS the counsel of Areopagus, having won great estimation in the war of the Medes.] When Xerxes King of Persia invaded Greece with an incredible army, bending his power chiefly against the city of Athens, with full purpose to destroy it utterly; Themistocles counseled the Athenians to leave their city, and commit the fortune of their defence unto their sea forces: But because the Athenians had not any public treasury, the Senate of the Areopagites allowed to every soldier eight Drachmae, and was hereby the chief cause that the gallies were armed and furnished, whereon followed that famous victory which the Grecians won on the Barbarians. The Areopagites by reason of the credit that they had gotten through this liberality, took on thē greater authority in government then they had done before, and sought to reduce it to a more severe form. Plutarch in the life of Themistocles. Aristotle doth here confounded the name of Medes and Persians, using one for another, as also in another place speaking of this war, he calleth it the Median war. Herodotus also doth sometimes use it in like sense, namely in the seventh book, where he saith, that a great part of the Grecians would not feed on the war, but was ready to follow the Medes.  
again, the Mariners and those that ●ad fought in the gallies, by whom the victory was obtained at Salamis, did strengthen more the democraty.] The battle was won at Salamis, chiefly by the Me●elotes, Galio●es, pilots,& others who dwelled near the sea cost, was the cause that increased the peoples power against the Nobleman, and made the inferior multitude more audacious.  
AND at Sirucusa.] The war which the Athenians made against the City of Siracusa where they were finally discomfited and destroyed, is described by thucydides in the sixth, seventh, and eight books of his history.  
Furthermore, commonweals are changed, when the parts of the City which seem contrary, are made equal; as the rich men, and the inferior multitude; and when the middle or mean part is little or none at all. For if one of the parts do much exceed, the other part will hazard nothing against that which is manifestly the stronger. Wherefore they who excel in virtue, do seldom raise sedition, because they are few in number in respect of the rest. Then the beginnings and causes of seditions and changes do happen generally in all sorts of commonweals, after this manner.  
Thirdly, changes do happen in commonweals, when the parts of the city that seem contrary, are made equal, and the middle or mean part is little or none at all; as are the rich and the poor, the Noblemen and the people, of which point wee haue oft spoken in the former discourses, and will handle it again in the chapters following: wherein Aristotles especial purpose is to treat of the changes of democracies& Oligarchies.  
Besides, they are changed by force, and by subtlety. By force, in constraining the Citizens to such a change, either presently vpon the beginning, or afterward. The subtlety likewise which may be herein used, is double: For sometimes they do craftily induce them to a voluntary change of the commonweal, and do afterward continue it by violence, as at Athens in the time of the four hundred, they deceived the people, promising them that the king of Persia would aid them in their war against the Lacedemonians, and by means of this lye they attempted to usurp the government of the commonweal. Sometimes they deceive them at the first with faire words,& keep them afterward with their own good wils, in such obedience and subiection as they will themselves. Then to speak generally, the changes of all commonweals do spring from the aforesaid causes.  
Fourthly, commonweals are changed by force, or subtlety. By force, as the roman commonweal oppressed by Caesar, was changed into a Monarchy: the realm of egypt into a province by Augustus: and not long since, that of Hungary by the turk: and the States of Florence and Si●●a ●nt● a Duchy. By subtlety, as that change which happened at Athens through Alcibiades means, mentioned in the text, whereof justine in his fift book writeth thus: While the Athenians and Lacedemonians warred together, Alcibiades being banished from Athens, came to Tisfaphernes the King of Persia his lieutenant, who favoured the Lacedemonians, to whom Alcibiades shewed that it were no good policy to minister overgreat aid to the Lacedemonians( for their victory would be nothing to his profit) but only to furnish them so far, that they might not for want of money be enforced to give over the war: For causing it by this means to continue, the king of Persia should haue in his choice both peace and war, and subdue the Grecians with their own forces, whom he could never vanquish with all his power. Whereas if the war should bee finished, they who had the victory, would forthwith set on him. That therefore it was necessary that Greece should bee weakened by civil dissensions, thereby to keep it from making war abroad; and that he should so consider the power of both parts, as to aid always the weaker side: for without doubt the Lacedemonians, if they got the victory, would not rest so, reputing themselves the preferuers& protectors of the liberty of Greece. These speeches did greatly please Tissaphernes, who began to furnish the Lacedemonians very coldly with victuals and other necessaries, & sent them not all the kings ships, because he would not give them an absolute victory, but keep them still in war. Meanewhile Alcibiades advertised the Athenians what he did for them. Whereupon they sent unto him their ambassadors, to whom he promised that he would make the King of Persia their friend, if they would take away the authority from the people, and give it to the Senate and counsel: thinking that by this means, either the city if it grew to a general agreement, would choose him captain, or if it were divided by sedition, that one of the parts would call him to their aid. But the Athenians seeing the danger whereinto this war had brought them, had more care of their safety then of their honour, and gave the whole authority of the people to the Senate and the public Officers, who by reason of their natural pride, began to oppress the rest: for every one of thē would usurp Tyrannicall power over the people, as if he were their Lord. For which cause, the souldiers sent for Alcibiades recalling him from exile, and making him their chief commander by sea, who went forthwith towards Athens, and being landed, sent to the Gouernours and Senate, willing them to restore the peoples authority, which if they refused to do, he threatened to come vpon them with his soldiers, and enforce them thereunto. The Gouernours were herewith so terrified and astonished, that they resolved to betray the city to the Lacedemonians, but failing of their purpose, they went into voluntary banishment.   

CHAP. V. Of the changes that happen in democracies.  
WE will now severally and particularly consider these things in every kind of commonweal. democracies then are for the most part changed through the per●idiousnesse of those that are the guides and leaders of the people, or( as wee may call thē) their fauourits, who by forging false accusations against the rich, enforce thē to conspire together; for a common fear doth reconcile the greatest enemies: or else by incensing the people openly against them, as we see it hath come to pass in many places. In the Isle of Cos, the democraty was changed through their bad dealing which guided and lead the people, at such time as the Nobility conspired. And at Rhodes, because they kept to themselves the money appointed for the soldiers paiment● and would not permit that it should be delivered to the Captaines of the Gallies to whom it was due: Whereupon the Captains being likewise further urged, and fearing iudgement, were enforced to conspire against the popular estate, which they destroyed. At Heraclea likewi●e the democraty was for the same cause overthrown, for some that had great credit and authority with the people, drove out the Noblemen by the intolerable injuries which they offered them: but they conspiring and assembling themselves together, returned into the City, and overcame the people. At Megara also the popular estate was in like sort destroyed; for these guides and leaders of the people, banished many Noblemen, to the end, that by confiscating their goods, they might fill their own purses: but these banished Noblemen who were many in number, joining together, overcame the people, and established an oligarchy. The like happened at Cumae touching their democraty, which was destroyed by Thrasimachus. And whosoever doth well consider it, shall find, that the changes of commonweals do happen in other places almost in the same manner, when those persons to please the people, do vex and oppress the rich men; as by the division of lands and goods, thereby to equal the Citizens wealth: or by paying the Magistrates pensions out of the public reuenues● or in forging false accusations against them, to the end, they may confiscate their goods: so that by such courses they enforce them to conspire. In ancient times when the same person that guided and lead the people, was also general of the army, then the democracies were changed into tyrannies. And ce●t●● the greater part of ancient gangrenes haue by this means become so. But the reason why this doth not happen now so much as it hath done is, because in those times men were not so expert and skilful in the Art of fine speech. At this day that rhetoric is mounted to the top of perfection. The eloquent men govern the people, but because they are not skilful in war, they dare not enterprise against the sta●e, or if they do attempt ought in 〈◇〉 part, their enterprise hath been to small purpose: Li●wise, Tyrannicall States haue risen more ofter in times past then now: because they gave to some citizens offices of great authority, as was at Miletum, the Pritany or praetorship, which hath the ordering and government of great matters: and besides, because then cities were not great, and the people dwelled in the country, busied in following their Husbandry, if the governors were warriors, they usurped a Tyranny. Their chief means to attain thereunto, was the trust which the people reposed in them, proceeding from the hatred they bare to the rich: as at Athens Pisistratus taking a quarrel against the Pediaci, and Theagenes at Megara having killed all the rich mens beasts, as he found them feeding near the river; and dionysius, by accusing Daphneus and the rich men, obtained the Tyranny for the grudge and enmity which he shewed to bear against them, and for that he was accounted one that held on the peoples side. Likewise, the democraty is changed from the ancient and accustomend into the last form: For where the Magistrates are chosen by the people without respect had to their revenues, then these guides and favourites, of whom we spake even now, desirous to bear rule, bring the State to such a point, that they submit the laws to the peoples will. The remedy against this thing, either that it happen not all, or not so much as ●ls it would, is that the Magistrates be elected by the tribes or lineages, and not by all the people. Then all the changes of democracies do happen for these causes.  
The Philosopher having spoken of the public charges in general, doth now particularly consider them in every kind of commonweal, beginning with the democraty, which he saith is for the most part destroyed or changed in two manners, through the bad dealing of those that are the guiders and leaders of the people. The one is, when they vex and oppress the rich men, by equalling the citizens wealth, or paying the Magistrates pensions out of the public remedies, or by forging false accusations against the nobler and better sort, to the end, to confiscate their goods, so that hereby they incense and enforce them to conspire, by which means the democraty is oft changed into an oligarchy, or a tyranny. The second maner is, when the magistrates are chosen by the people, without respect had to their wealth. For then these guides& favourites; desirous to bear rule, reduce the democraty from a mean or middle form wherein the laws haue greatest force, into an extreme kind, wherein all is done according to the peoples pleasure, and by popular decrees, without any respect or regard of the laws.  
THROVGH the bad dealing of those that are the guides& leaders of the people.] {αβγδ}. Aristotle treating in these two chapters of democracies and Oligarchies, doth oft make mention of these {αβγδ}, whom we following the etymology of the greek word, translate guides and leaders of the people. These men in such forms of governments did always both do and say to please the people, all that they could for a time, thereby to get their favour, and to increase their own authority and wealth. The democracies and Oligarchies of Greece were commonly full of such gallants, who did with the people what they listed, and committed infinite evils: as al●o Rome was much given to this folly, especially after that it had received eloquence, and the custom of making Orations in public assemblies after the manner of the Grecians: the two Gracchi were such. Likewise Marius and Caesar shewed themselves very popular, and hereby got great favour: in like sort as sundry others, who of guides and leaders of the people, as Aristotle saieth, haue made themselves gangrenes, if they were warriors.  
WHO by forging false accusations.] After that Eloquence took place in Commonwea●es, th●se guides and leaders of the people were commonly Orators, who took vpon them to accuse others in judgements and assemblies, where they were gladly seen and heard, because they spake things pleasing to the hearers eares● Diodorus Siculus in his thirteenth book, the two and thirtieth chapter, speaking of the five Athenian Captaines, who had wo●n the most famous battle by sea that ever had been fought between Grecians, and had every way else behaved themselves well, saith that the people of Athens was so besotted and incensed against them through the smooth speeches of the wicked orators, that they wreaked the fury of their wrath on these valiant men, who deserved no punishment at all, but rather great honour and praise. Demosthenes in his Olynthian and Philippicke Orations doth very much complain of such Orators who disguised the truth of things, and flattered the people.  
WHEN these persons to please the people, do vex and oppress the rich men.] So did the two Gracchi at Rome, propounding the Law called Lex agraria, whereat the rich men made great complaints, being grieved to give unto the poor their houses, woods, and lands which they had long possessed and manured. Appianus Alexandrinus in his first book of the civil warres, chap. 2. and 3.  
IN ancient times, when the same person that guided and lead the people, was general of the army.] When they who were in credite and favour with the people, attained to the government and conduct of the army, they did easily usurp on the commonweal,& change it into a Tyranny, being skilful and expert in feats of war, and having in their own hands the forces of the country, as Pisistratus did at Athens, Gelon, Hieron, dionysius, and Agathocles at Syracusa, and infinite others haue in other places done the like.  
AT this day that rhetoric is mounted to the top of perfection.] rhetoric, as all other Arts, came to great perfection& excellence whilst Aristotle lived, at what time there flourished in Athens ten Orators together, of the which Demosthenes deserved the chief commendation, insomuch, that Cicero himself affirmeth, that he was in a maner perfect, and in whom there wanted but little. Socrates was at the same time a great teacher of rhetoric, according to whose example for emulation and envy, Aristotle began to teach this science, and wrote books of the same, as those which he hath dedicated to Theodectus and Alexander the great.  
THE eloquent men govern the people, but because they are not skil●ull in warfare, they dare not enterprise against the state.] Demosthenes and Cicero most excellent Orators, were in great credite in their commonweals, but neither of them were warriors. Plutarch writeth of Demosthenes, that he fled most cowardly from the battle of Che●onea● and performed not so much as any one act of virtue, or that was answerable to his goodly Orations made before the people, for he forsook his rank, and cowardly cast away his armor, that he might with the more ease fly away. The same author in the life of Cicero saith, that he was not only fearful in fight, but also in pleading.  
THE Pritany.] {αβγδ} among other things signifieth to rule, to govern, to administer & ordain. Demosthenes in his oration touching the Crown, {αβγδ}, charge or public administration. {αβγδ}, a governor or Steward. Plato in the laws calleth the gods {αβγδ}, rulers or Gouernours of the world. thucydides in his sixth book saith, {αβγδ}. Aristotle in his sixth book of government, putteth {αβγδ} as Bishops above other Priests.  
AS at Athens Pisistratus taking a quarrel against the Pediaci.] That is to say, against the inhabitants of the plain country, who favoured the oligarchy: And entering into league with the inhabitants of the mountaines, who favoured the democraty( as hath been before affirmed) obtained the Tyranny, of whom Herodotus in his first book writeth in this manner: Pisistratus perceiving that the inhabitants of the sea coasts under the conduction of Megacles son of Alcmeon, were at controversy with the inhabitants of the plain country of Athens, whose head Lycurgus the son of Aristol●s was● determined to make himself lord, as the others: and to that end devised a third league, for the guiding whereof● he l●uied and assembled men together, and under colour of defending the inhabitants of the high country, used this slight: He● wounded himself, and with his sword hurt certain mules, which nevertheless he● caused to draw him into Athens into the town hou●e, as though he had saved himself by flying from the enemies that would haue killed him as he went into the field: Therefore he required the people to grant him certain men for the guard of his person, considering especially that he had been already well thought off in the warres, wherein he was general against the Megarians, and that he had taken the town of nice, and performed many other acts of great prowess. The people hereupon were deceived, and granted him to choose such citizens as he liked, vpon condition they should carry neither Iauel●nes, nor Halberts, but only clubs, as they attended him. These chosen men made an insurrection with him against the city, insomuch, that they took possession of the castle: and from thenceforth Pisistratus began to haue dominion over the Athenians. Yet troubled he not the states and offices there, neither changed the laws of the commonweal, but continued the accustomend statutes and ordinances, governing the city well and happily. It was not long deferred, but Megacles and Lycurgus with their partakers by common consent set vpon him, and cast him out of his dominion. This Pisistratus was the first that took vpon him to haue the dominion of the Athenians, and that lost his weak and ill settled dominion, as Herodotus affirmeth in his first book.  
Dionisivs by accusing the rich men, obtained the Tyranny, for the grudge and enmity which he shewed to bear against them, and for that he was accounted one that held on the peoples side.] dionysius being before a private man and of low degree, obtained the Tyranny of Siracusa by this means: whereas the Siracusians sent him to Gelle, he finding the mightiest men of the town at controversy with the common people, began to charge them before the high Court or assembly, and so wrought by his reasons, that they were straightway condemned to death, and their lands& goods confiscated; with the benefit of which confiscation he paid the wages of the ordinary garrison of Gelle, and promised them that came with him from Siracusa twice as much wages as the City had appointed for them: whereby he got the good wils, as well of the keepers of Gelle, as of them that he brought thether with him, and so was commended by the common people of Gelle, who reported how it was he onely that had set them at liberty: forbye reason of the envy which they bore to the richest and mightiest citizens, they called their power tyranny. Also at his return from Gelle to Siracusa, he came home on a day, wherein by chance there had been certain plays, and entered into the town at the same instant that the people came from the Thea●●es, whereupon all the people ran presently about him, with great thrusting, asking him where the Carthaginians were, and what they did. dionysius gave them answer, that they considered not howe they had greater and more dangerous enemies at home then abroad, which were( said he) those that had in thei● hands the direction and government of the commonweal, in whom the Siracusians put their trust, and spent their time at plays and feasts, while they stolen and wasted the money of the commonweal, and paid not the soldiers wages, especially in so dangerous a time, when the Carthaginians made incredible preparation for war, and had determined to bring all their power before the City of Syracusa, whereof these goodly Gouernours made not any account, neither took any order for the remedying thereof: and the occasion knew I well( saith he) before, but now I know it more certainly, for Himileo sent me a Trumpeter under colour of parley about certain pri●oners, and privily hath given me to understand, that he would yield me more then to any one of my companions, vpon condition that I would not spy or inquire what his intent was to do, and though I would not help him, yet at leastwise that I should not hinder him. Therefore( said dionysius) that he would no longer haue the office of a captain, and that he was purpo●ely come to give it over, because that he thought it not reasonable, that he, whilst others ●old the commonweal to the enemies, should go alone with other citizens to adventure his person in all the peril of the war, and be in danger to make them think that he himself was consenting, and partaker of their treason. The people were very much moved at these words, which were presently spread abroad in the ears of all the common people, and especially of the men of war. But for the present time every man went home to his house in great heaviness. The next day dionysius assembled the people in counsel, and openly accused the other Captaines his companions: And had attentive audience, with great commendations at all the peoples hands, whom he had greatly moved, so that at the last there was some one in the company who spake aloud, That it was needful to choose him alone captain general, with full authority and sovereign power: And that it was not exp●dient to stay until the enemies should batter the walls of the town: and that the great importance of this war, required such a captain as was a man fit to find some ready way therein, and to give good order in their affairs. And as touching the Traitors, they would consider at more leisure what was to be done to them, but as then the time served not: and that in ti●es past their predecessors had vanquished and overthrown in battle before the City of Himera, three hundred thousand fighting Carthaginians, under the conduct of Gelon their onely chief captain. At the hearing of these things, the people according to their custom, inclining sooner to evil then to good, made present choice of dionysius for their captain general, and gave him full power, and sovereign authority. Hereupon passing into the fields, and lodging in his tent, he feigned one night that his enemies went about to kill him, and that they were come to assail him in his tent, and so made a rumour and outcry by his friends and seruants, and withall fled into the castle of the Leontines town, where he passed the rest of the night, causing fires to bee made in all places, and sent for such men of war as he trusted best, as a man that had great cause to doubt of his safety, and perceived his life to be laid for by his enemies. The next day in the morning having assembled a certain number of the Syracusans in this city of the Leontines, he declared in open assembly many feigned matters, carrying some outward show of truth, howbeit, tending only to induce the people to credite him; that his enemies came and assaulted him traitorously to kill him, and he told his tale so cunningly, that the people by their decree granted him a guard of six hundred persons of his own nomination and choice. This brought he to pass by the example of Pisistratus the Athenian, who as the report goeth, wounded himself in many places of his body, and all bloody as he was, ran into the market place, where, vpon the present assembly of the people, he informed the audience, that his enemies and evil willers came and assaulted him, with intention to murder him, and had thus pitifully mangled him; vpon occasion whereof, the people granted him a guard of soldiers, by which means he usurped Tyranny, and became lord of Athens. In like sort dionysius by abusing the people of Siracusa by a like deceit established his tyrannous dominion. Diodorus Siculus reporteth this in his 13. book, chapter 29 and 30. Who also( speaking of Agathocles, that used the like craft and subtlety which Pisistratus and dionysius did, for the abolishing of the democraty, and usurping of the monarchy) discourseth as followeth, in the beginning of his nineteenth book: It is an old proverb( saith he) that the popular states are not destroyed and abolished by all manner of men, but by those that excel others in virtue; vpon which occasion, many Cities that lived in liberty, vpon suspicion of their citizens that haue greatest power, use their endeavours to restrain& depress their authority; because they think the continuance of their authority& pre-eminence, might easily bring the state of the city into subiection& bondage. And because it is a hard matter for them that excel others, to refrain from aspiring to the monarchy. For it is a very natural thing to them that desire great matters, to b●e covetous of wealth and honour: which covetousness hath neither limits nor bounds. Therefore Solon in his speech condemning the Tyranny of Pisistratus, uttered two verses to this effect: The great citizens are the occasion of the destruction of the city; and the people through their own ●olly fall into the bondage of the Tyrant. But above all other Countries whereof there is any remembrance or record, the Isle of sicily hath been under the dominion of Tyrants, until it came to the obedience of the romans, by reason that the cities thereof being deceived and abused by liberality and courtesies, gave so great authority to inferior persons, that they made themselves lords. And above all others, that of private Citizens, and from a low degree haue become gangrenes, Agatho●les who governed in the City of Siracusa, is the most notable: for he from a very base estate, attaining thereunto, committed innumerable mischiefs, not only in the city of Siracusa, but also in the whole Isle of sicily, and in the country of Libia. For from the degree of a potter, he came to so great authority and cruelty through whoredom and wickedness, that he brought into his subiection and bondage the largest and goodliest of all the graecian Islands, as also for a time the greatest part of Libia, with certain Countries of italy, and filled all the Cities of sicily with murders and outrages, for all they that were before him, came nothing near him in cruelty and insolence, to avenge himself on some particular person, he would cause al his kindred to be slain; and for the offence of some few citizens, he would put to death all the inhabitants of a city that were of age. The means and practices which he used, thereby to attain unto the Tyranny, are recited by the same author in the chapter following● and examined by Machiauel in his Prince, chap. 8. Plato in the eight and ninth books of his commonweal doth elegantly and learnedly show in what maner a Tyrannicall state is made of a Democratic, and how a Democratical person becomes Tyrannicall: which places are cited and set down at large in the former book.  

The changes and troubles which happened in the Athenian democraty, taken out of thucydides eight book of the Peloponesian war.  
FOr the lively representing of the changes whereto the democraty is subject, it shal suffice to report& set down those which haue happened in the Athenian democraty, being one of the most famous that ever were. Then the government of Athens was for the most part democratical or Popular, as it hath been said in the end of the second book, and suffered many changes through the disorder of the Athenian people, whom Polybius in his sixth book compares to ships wanting Pilots. For when the souldiers fall into an humour of agreement and obedience to the master of the ship, either for fear of enemies, or danger of a tempest, they use extreme endeavour, and perform much: but when through arrogance they begin to disdain those that guide and govern the ship, and to quarrel one with another, because they are no longer all of one mind, but some will put to sea, others enforce the pilot to strike into the haven, some again take the oars in hand● and make show to set sail, there is then an unseemly sight for those that look on them, by reason of this mutual discord. Likewise, the mariners fancies haue never any stay or certainty, who shunning the vast depth of the main sea, and the dangerous tempests which are wont to arise there, sail along the shore. And the like in effect hath oft happened to the Athenian commonweal. For when it hath sometimes by the valure● as well of the people as of the chief commanders avoided many grievous calamities, it hath nevertheless committed marvelous oversights through extreme rashness, and to no end, having( as wee say) the wind in the Poupe, and fortune at will. At one time the people seeing themselves in great distress, did voluntarily surrender their sovereign authority, and gave it to twenty chief and chosen personages, to whom they committed the charge and administration of public affairs, supposing that the government of a few would be more seemly and expedient, in regard of the extremities whereinto their State was brought, then the rule of a whole multitude, as saieth Diodorus Siculus in his 13 book, chap. 11. and 12. At another time being constrained by the Lacedemonians, they did absolutely submit themselves to thirty, and afterward to four hundred. Sometimes the Senate, and sometimes the people had most authority there: to be short, there was not any durable form in that commonweal. But from whence may we haue fuller and more certain knowledge of the affairs of Athens, then from thucydides, who was himself an Athenian, a man of great knowledge, experience, and authority, and the chiefest graecian Historiographer; who writeth thus thereof in the eight book of his history, the fourteenth chapter. The Athenians fell to debate, because the popular estate and government of their city had been taken from the people, and given to a small number. For Pisander and his fellowes being returned to Samos, won the ●●mie that was there to their obedience, and a great part of the Samians exhorted the chief of the City to take the government into their own hands, although there were many others who sought to uphold and continue the popular Estate: from whence there arose great contention& mutinies among them. The Athenians also who were in the army, having consulted together, and seeing that Alcibiades liked not the matter, resolved to leave him, and not to repeal the sentence of his banishment, because it seemed unto them, that when he should return into the city, he would not be a fit person to bee employed under the command of a small number, but that it was expedient, that they who were of the Estate, whereof there was question, should bethink themselves how to handle and work this matter, and nevertheless prosecute the war, whereto each of them did readily and willingly offer to contribute of his own money, and whatsoever else was necessary, knowing that they laboured not any more for the public service of the state, nor for other men, but for themselves. So they sent Pisander, and the one half of the ambassadors that should haue gone to Tissaphernes, back to Athens, to take order there for the eff●cting of their purpose, and gave them in charge, that as they passed through any city subject to the Athenians, they should commit the government therof to some few of the chiefest: and the other half of the said ambassadors departed and went each of them for the same purpose into several places. They did farther decree, that Diatrephes who was then at the siege of Chio, should go into the province of Thrace, whereof he had ben appointed governor; who at his departure from the said siege, passing by Thassus, abolished the popular estate, and put the government into the hands of a small number of Citizens: but when he was gone from thence, the most part of the Thassians, having enclosed their City with a wall, about a month after his departure, persuaded themselves that they needed no longer bee governed by those whom the Athenians had placed in authority, and thereby to bee in their subiection, but to the contrary, hoping by the Lacedemonians aid to recover within small time absolute liberty, because their fellow Citizens who had been expulsed by the Athenians, were gone to lacedaemon, where they made great suit that ships might be sent to Thassus, and that the City might revolt. Which thing fell out even according to their own desires, for the Cities former liberty was without danger restored, and the people which was bent against the authority and rule of a small number, was without scandal deprived of the government: but they who held with the Athenians, and whom Diotrephes had made Gouernours, found themselves greatly deceived in the issue of their thoughts and expectations. The like was done in many other Cities subject to the state of Athens, which considering( as it seems to me) that they need no longer to fear the Athenians, and that this manner of living in subiection to them, under the colour of government, was nothing else in very dead than a disguised and shadowed kind of bondage, did all seek for true liberty. Touching Pi●ander, and those that went with him, they did at their own pleasure commit the government of those Cities through which they passed, to a small number, and out of some of the said Cities they took souldiers, whom they lead with them to Athens, where they found that their complices and friends had already done many things tending to the accomplishment of their purpose for the abolishing of the Popular estate. For one Androcles, who was in great authority and credite with the people, and had been one of the chief procurers of Alcibiades banishment, was slain through a privy conspiracy of certain young men of the City, for two causes; the one, because he had too great authority and credite with the people, the other, to get hereby the good will and favour of Alcibiades, who as they thought should return, and recover his former authority, hoping that he would make Tissaphernes their friend, and for the same causes they had by like means slain some others of whom they doubted: they had also besotted the people with artificial and smooth speeches, telling them that it was not meet to give longer pay, save only to those who served in ●he war, and that for the administration of public affairs, there ought not to assemble and be employed more then five hundred, and namely such as were able to serve the commonweal, both with their persons and purses. Which thing did generally seem honourable, and even they who had caused the restoring of the Popular estate, hoped by this change to haue authority. For as yet the ancient manner continues of assembling the people and the counsel for all causes, and of hearing all mens opinions, and following the greater part. But nothing might bee propounded without the deliberation of the little counsel, whereto this authority was assigned, in which there were some that conferred apart touching al those matters that were to bee propounded for the furtherance of their intent, and when they had delivered their opinion, none durst contradict it for fear, seeing the great number and authority of the said Gouernours. For when any did gainsay them, they found means to make him away, not observing any form of iustice, nor making inquisition touching murders, wherewith the people were so amazed and terrified, that none of them durst speak a word, but thought that he sped well by holding his peace, if he felt no further hurt nor violence: and their fear was by so much the more, because they doubted that there was a far greater number in that conspiracy, neither had they any desire to know who they were, as well for the greatness of the City and people, as because no man knew anothers mind, nor durst complain or reveal his secrets unto him, or talk of means howe to bee avenged: for the fear and mutual distrust was so great among them, that they stood in doubt even of their acquaintance and very friends, fearing least they were of that conspiracy, because there were some thereof, of whom no man had ever any such opinion. For which cause, they knew not whom they might safely trust, so that the conspirators estate was greatly strengthened and assured,& that chiefly by reason of the common diffidence. Pisander therefore and his fellowes being arrived in this trouble, did easily and in small time achieve their purpose. And first of all having assembled the people, they caused them to consent to the election of ten clerk and Secretaries, who might haue full authority and power to pronounce or red unto the people whatsoever should vpon due aduise be thought meet to bee consulted of for the good of the City, on a certain day that was nominated. Which day being come, and the people assembled in a great field, wherein stood the Temple of Neptune ten furlongs from the City, there was nothing else publicly pronounced by the said Notaries, save only that it might bee lawful to relate and report the Athenians decree in what part they would. And that whosoever did charge the relater or reporter thereof, that he had therein done against the laws, or did otherwise outrage& hinder him, should be grievously punished. Then was the decree pronounced, the tenor whereof was this, That all the Officers then being, who had received their charge and authority from the people, should be deposed, and that no stipend should bee allowed unto them; that there should be chosen five Presidents, who might afterward nominate an hundred persons, and each of them choose three others, which should be in al four hundred, who when thy sate in the Court, should haue full and ample authority and power to ordain and execute whatsoever they should think good and profitable for the commonweal, and besides, to summon and assemble five thousand Citizens so oft as should seem good unto them. This decree was pronounced by Pisander, who both therein and in all other things did willingly undertake whatsoever he thought served to the abrogating and abolishing of the popular Estate. But the said decree had been before precogitated and devised by Antiphon, who was in great account and estimation: For to speak the truth, not any man at that time in the whole City did surpass him in virtue, he was withall very advised and wise in giuing counsel touching public affairs, and had besides an excellent grace in declaring and propounding them: notwithstanding, he never came to the common assemblies, nor to any other contentious meeting, unless he were sent for: but although he were thus wary, yet the people had him in suspicion, for the efficacy and elegance of his speech: and albeit he lead a private life, nor would not intermeddle in the Estate, yet every one that had any cause or matter either in iudgement or to the people, accounted it a great favour if he might haue Antiphons counsel. And after that this Tyrannicall Estate of the four hundred was destroyed, and that they proceeded by form of lawe against the principal authors thereof, he being accused with the rest, did in mine opinion far better defend and answer for himself then ever any man within the compass of my remembrance. Phrynichus likewise shewed himself a great fauouror of this Estate, for fear of Alcibiades, to whom he was well assured that all his practices were known, whereof he had secretly treated with Astiochus, being at Samos. But he thought that he would never return during this government of the four hundred, for he was generally accounted a man both constant and valiant in extreme distress and great adversities, because the high courage of his mind was never known to fail in whatsoever danger. Theramenes also the son of Agnon, was a principal dealer in the abolishing of the Popular Estate, being a man of known sufficiency both in word and dead. It is therfore no marvell that this enterprise which was plotted and prosecuted by so many men of wisdom and authority, had such success; although it seemed and were indeed a matter of exceeding difficulty to deprive the people of that liberty which they had enjoyed and held about an hundred yeares since the expulsion of the tyrant, and had not onely been exempted from subiection to any, but had also for more then half the same time, commanded other Countries. The assembly of the people being broken up, when they had approved the said decree, the four hundred were afterward brought into the Court in this manner: The Athenians were continually in arms by reason of the enemies that were at Decelea; to wit, some of them guarded the walls, some the gates, and other places, according as they were appointed. And when the day came that was assigned for the making of the act, they suffered all those who were not of the conspiracy to go home to their houses as the custom was, but the rest were commanded to stay, not in the places wherein they were to watch, and where their weapons lay, but somewhat near thereto; with charge, that if they saw any offer to resist or hinder their purpose, they should if need required, set vpon them. Now, they who were hereunto deputed and appointed, were the Andrians, the Thenians, with three hundred of the Caristians, and those of the city of AEgina, whom the Athenians had caused to come and dwell there. When every thing was thus ordered, the four hundred that were chosen to this new form of government, carrying each of them a dagger closely under his attire, and ●●uing with them six score young men to assist and aid them, as occasion should se●●● entered all together into the palace where the Court was kept: and enuironning the senators who sate in counsel, and( according to the custom) delivered their opinions by white and black beans, they  told them that they should take their stipends for the time that they had served in that Office, and depart: which stipend those four hundred had brought them, and as they went out of the counsel chamber, they gave every man his due: who by this means departed without making any resistance, neither did the people stir at all. Then the said four hundred entering, choose out of their own number certain Treasurers& receivers: which done, they offered a solemn sacrifice for the creation of the said new offices,& hereby the form of the Popular government was wholly changed,& a great part of things that had ben before decreed and done by the people, was revoked& canceled, save only the restoring of the banished men, least by virtue therof Alcibiades should return. To proceed, these new gouernours did what they listed, and among other things they put to death certain Citizens, doubting least they should be substituted in their places, because they seemed not agreeable to their Tyrannical humours; some they imprisoned, others they banished. having thus done, they sent an herald to Agis king of lacedaemon, who was then at Decelea, signifying unto him that they were desirous to reconcile themselves to the Lacedemonians; and that he might haue greater assurance, and repose more trust in them, then in a wavering and inconstant multitude of ignorant people. But Agis thinking that the city must needs bee full of great discontent and trouble, and that the people would not so easily give over their authority, especially if they should see a great army come before the City, and supposing withall, that the Estate of the four hundred, could not yet be so established, but that it might be shaken; made them no answer touching the agreement that they desired, but within few daies after levied a great number of souldiers in the country of Peloponesus, whom together with those that he had already at Decelea, he brought to the very walls of Athens, hoping that the Athenians would yield themselves unto him, as well in regard of their discontent and trouble both within& without the city, as of their fear at the sight of so mighty a power, marching even to their gates: and although his hope should therein fail him, yet seemed it likely that he might easily take the great walls by force, both because they were abandoned,& by reason of their exceeding length, could not bee furnished with a sufficient number of defendants. But the event was clean contrary to his expectation, for the Athenians raised no tumult at his approach, but sent out their horsemen,& part of their footmen, both thoroughly& lightly armed, who did forthwith drive back those that came nearest to the walls, and slay part of them, carrying their spoils into the City. Then Agis seeing that his enterprise had not such issue as he expected, returned to Decelea, and within some few daies after, sent back, and discharged the foreign soldiers whom he had levied for that purpose, keeping onely those whom he had before in pay. But the four hundred sent to him again to treat of agreement, whereto he seemed in outward show so far to incline, that he persuaded them to sand ambassadors to lacedaemon for the treating of that peace which they desired. On the other side the said four hundred, sent ten Citizens to them that were at Samos, who besides others things that they had in charge, were commanded to declare unto them that whatsoever had been done in changing the Popular Estate, tended not to the hurt of the city, but to the good and safety therof; and that the authority was not in the hands of the four hundred onely, but onely of five thousand; and that by this means the people did govern, as well then as before, sith during the Popular state there were never present in any assembly so great a number as five thousand persons at the deliberating and determining of whatsoever cause, whether domestical or foreign. And this ambassage was sent to Samos by the four hundred, presently on the beginning of their usurpation, because they feared that they of the fleet and army, would not allow this change, not obey their government, but that the discord& mischief arising there, would spread from thence into the city, as indeed it did. For from the time that the said change was made at Athens, there was for the same cause a mutiny and sedition raised in the said City of Samos in this manner: Certain Samians, who in favor of the Popular estate which was then in the City, and for defence thereof had risen in arms against the chief citizens, who would haue usurped the government, did afterward revolt& change their opinions, through the persuasion which Pisander at his coming thither, and other Athenians his sectaries& complices had used unto thē. Whereupon they purposing to overthrow the Popular Estate assembled themselves to the number of four hundred or thereabout, fully resolving to set vpon all those that maintained or favoured that form of government, and pretending that they represented the whole body of the people. At the first brunt they slew an Athenian name Hiperbolus, a wicked person, and of bad life, who had been banished from Athens, not for any suspicion or fear that they had of his power or authority, but for his foul offences, and because he dishonoured the City; they slew also one of the Athenian Captaines, called Charminus, and certain other Athenians who were in his company, by whose counsel he was lead. And they determined to proceed farther in favour of this new oligarchy: but the other Citizens who held with the Popular Estate, hearing of this conspiracy, discovered it, namely to certain of the captaines, who were under the charge of Diomedon and Leon, two Athenian commanders, who because they had receuied this charge and other honors of the people, were not content that the authority of the State should be in a few mens hands,& therfore did in like sort reveal it to Thrasibulus and Thrasillu●,( of whom the one was master of a ship, and the other captain o● the soldiers that were therein) as also to those soldiers whom they knew to bee affectioned to the said Popular estate, earnestly praying and entreating them not to suffer themselves to be besotted and circumvented by those conspirators, whose purpose was to kill thē, nor to abandon the city of Samos at such an exigent, least by changing that form of government which the said city had till then observed, they should loose the good will that it had always born unto the Athenians. This thing being thus declared to the chief persons and captains, they spake severally to the souldiers, persuading to hinder this conspiracy from taking effect. And first they used these speeches to that band or company of the Athenians that was called Parali, and afterward to all the free men which were in that Athenianship; who both at that time and always before, had shewed themselves utter enemies to the rule of a small number, and had so good ●n opinion of Diomedes and Leon, that when they made any voyage by sea, they willingly gave them the charge of some ships. These then joining with those of the city who stood for the Poplar estate, discomfited the four hundred conspirators that had risen in arms; of whom they slay thirty,& banished three of the chiefest authors, pardoning the rest, and restoring from that time forward the same authority of government to the Popular estate that it had before. This being done, the Samians and the Athenian souldiers that were there, sent that ship of the Parali, as also the captain and master thereof, name Chereas the son of Archestrates, who had been very forward in that action, to advertise the Athenians howe all things had past at Samos, not knowing as yet that the government of the City of Athens had ben committed to four hundred: who being informed of the said ships arrival, caused two or three of the said Parali to bee taken and imprisoned, and the rest they put into sundry ships, sending them into several parts of Eubaea to be surely kept there, save only Chereas, who having understood what they intended to do, did hid and save himself, returning with al speed possible to Samos, where he reported to the Athenian army, all that had been done at Athens, making every thing greater then it was: for he said that all they who held with the people were oppressed and outraged, not daring to speak one word against the governors; and that they did not injure& outrage the men only, but their wives and children also. Besides, they had determined to do the like to all those in the army at Samos, which should withstand them, and to take their wi●es, children, and near kinsfolks, and put them to death if they would not yield obedien●e unto thē. Sundry other things did the said Chereas report, which were all lies, wherewith the souldiers were so incensed, that they had purposed to kill not onely those that had set up the Estate of a small number of Gouernours at Samos, but all those also that had consented thereunto. But when they had been  told by some that sought to appease them, that by doing so, they should put the city in danger of falling into the enemies hands, who were on the sea in great number, coming to assail, they gave over that bloody resolution: yet purposing to restore openly the Popular Estate in that City, Thrasibulus and Thrasillus who were the chief dealers herein, constrained all the Athenians in the army, and even those also that held with the government of a few, to defend to the uttermost of their power the Popular estate, and to follow in that behalf such order as those Captaines should give, and withall to defend the said City of Samos against the peloponnesians, and to repute as enemies the four hundred new Gouernours, nor to make any agreement with them. The like oath took all the Samians that were of age to bear armor, to whom also the soldiers swore, that they would live and die with them in like fortune; assuring themselves that there was no other means of safety, neither for them, nor the Samians, but that they were all cast away, if the Estate of the four hundred should prevail and continue at Athens, or if the peloponnesians should take the City of Samos by force. Herein was much time employed and spent, while the Athenian soldiers that were in the army at Samos, sought to restore the Popular Estate at Athens, and they who had the government of Athens to constrain the Samians to do as they had done. But the soldiers being assembled for this cause, deposed all the Cap●aines of the said army, who were suspected to favour the Estate of the four hundred, and in their places they choose others, among whom were Thrasibulus and Thrasyllus, who exhorted the soldiers one with another to be constant in that their resolution for sundry reasons that they shewed them, although the City had yielded to the government of the said four hundred. And amongst other things they shewed them that they in the army were far more in number then they that remained in the City, and were better furnished with all things then they; because having in their hands the ships, and all the sea forces, they might enforce the subject and confederate Cities to contribute money. And although they should be utterly excluded from Athens, yet had they the City of Samos, which was neither small nor weak: and besides, the City of Athens being thus deprived of power by sea, wherein it pretended to exceed all other Cities, they were strong enough to foil the peloponnesians if they came to assail them at Samos, as they had done at other times, as also to resist those that were at Athens, and to prevail against them, having the ships in their hands: by means whereof, they might always bee stored with victuals, whereas the Athenians should feel great want thereof. For all the victuals that had until that time been brought unto them, and unladen in the haven of Pyreum, came through the help and favour of the army at Samos, which would now bar them from the same, unless they would restore unto the people the government of the City: and that by this means they of the said army might better as it were shut up the sea, and wholly deprive the use thereof from tho●e that remained at Athens, than they of Athens could do the like to them. For whatsoever that City could afford or furnish of itself, was the least part of that which they were to hope for, thereby to resist the enemies; so that by losing that, they lost nothing: for the said city had no more money left, because the soldiers were enforced to serve on their own charges: and the governors had no good counsel, which is the only thing whereby the City might keep in obedience the armies that were abroad: but they had herein greatly failed, in that they had violated and corrupted their ancient laws, which they at Samos would maintain and enforce others to observe them. Wherefore it was not a thing to be believed, that such among them as had been the authors of better counsel and opinion herein, then those of the City, should in other things be inferior, and less advised. And on the other side, that if they would offer to Alcibiades his restitution and repeal from banishment, he would willingly make alliance and amity between them and the king of Persia. But if these and all other things should fail them, yet they having so great an army by sea, might go to whatsoever place they would to find Cities and lands wherein to inhabit. By such reasons and persuasions they exhorted each other, and notwithstanding used great diligence in preparing all things necessary for the war: which when the ten ambassadors, who had ben sent thither by the four hundred, understood to be published and spread abroad among the people, they kept silence, and declared not what they had in charge. And in the twelfth chapter of the same book he writeth thus: Meanwhile the ambassadors whom the four hundred had sent to S●mos, being returned to Athens, reported what Alcibiades had given thē in charge, viz. that they should look to the keeping of the city,& to the defending of themselves against the enemies,& that he hoped to reconcile them to those that were in the army at Samos;& likewise to vanquish the peloponnesians. Which words did greatly encourage many of the said four hundred, who were already weary of that form of government, and would willingly haue given it over, if they had thought that they might haue done it without danger: so that al with one accord vndertook the ordering of these matters, having for their guides& leaders therein, the two principal men& of greatest power in the city, namely, Theramenes the son of Agnon,& Aristocrates the son of Sicellius, and besides them, sundry other of the most notable persons that were among the four hundred: who excused themselves touching the sending of ambassadors to the Lacedemonians, saying that they had done it for the fear that they had of Alcibiades and the others that were at Samos, to the end, the city might sustain no harm;& it seemed unto thē that they might keep the government from coming into the hands of a small number, if they caused the five thousand who had ben nominated by the said four hundred to haue authority in very dead,& not in word only,& by this means they thonght that the Estate might be in other sort reformed to the good& profit of the city: whereof although they always made mention in all their assemblies& consultations, yet the greatest part of them aimed at their own peculiar profit,& did ambitiously thirst for authority, hoping that if the said government of the four hundred were put down, they should not be not only equal to the rest, but also superior: And besides, in the popular estate every man doth better brook a repulse, because the public offices are given by the election of the people, thē in the estate or government of particular persons, for he thought not that he was rejected by his equals, when it is done by all the people. And to say the truth, the authority which Alcibiades had with those that were at Samos, did greatly encourage these men; who did withall perceive, that the estate of the 400 could not long continue. Wherefore each of thē used all endeavour possible to win credit& favour with the people, that by means therof he might haue highest authority. But they who we●e the chief of the four hundred, did to the uttermost of their power labour to the contrary, and namely Phrynicus, who at such time as he was chiefetaine of the army at Samos, had ben enemy to Alcibiades; as also Aristarcus, who had always ben against the popular estate; and likewise Pisander, Antiphon,& the rest which had the greatest power in the city; who from the time that they had taken in hand the government of the state,& also since the revolt& mutiny at Samos, had sent ambassadors of their own proper body or assembly, to lacedaemon, doing all that they could to uphold this their Oligarchy,& causing the wall of Etiona to be repaired& raised higher. After the return of their ambassadors whom they had sent to Samos, seeing that many even of their own faction changed their minds, whom they had accounted very constant& resolute therein, they speedily sent again Antiphon& Phrynichus, with ten others of their company to the Lacedemonians, giuing thē in charge to appoint& conclude with thē to the least disadvantage& evil that th●● might, provided that the appointment were tolerable. And this they did for the fear that they had, as well of those that were at Athens, as of those at Samos. And touching the wall that they repaired& raised higher at Etiona, they did it not( as said Theramenes,& they that held with him) so much to hinder thē who were at Samos from entering into the haven of Pyreum, as to receive the enemies army by sea& land when they would: because Etiona stands at the entrance of the haven of Pyreum, in maner of a cressant. wherefore the wall that they built on the land side, did so strengthen the place, that they had it in their own power by placing there a few men; either to permit the ships that came, to enter, or keep them out, because that place joins to the other Tower that hath entrance very narrow. And besides those reparations which they bestowed at Etiona, they did likewise repair the old wall that was without Pyreum on the sea side, and raised a new wall within on the land side: and between both they made great halls and storehouses, whether they enforced every citizen to bring all his provision of corn that he had in his house: and likewise whatsoever corn was brought in by sea, was by their commandement unladen there, and they that wanted corn, were to buy it there. These things( namely, that the four hundred made the said reparations and provisions, to the end, to receive the enemies) were spread abroad by Theramenes a good while before the last ambassadors were sent by the four hundred to lacedaemon, but after that they were returned, having done nothing in their said ambassage, Theremenes did speak more openly, that the wall which they had made should cause great danger unto the City. For at the same time came thither two and forty sail of the enemies, part whereof were Italians and Sicilians, who came from Peloponesus, to wit, those that were sent into Eubaea, and some of the rest were part of those who had been left at the haven of Ye in the country of Laconia, whose captain was Agesandridas the son of Agesander a Lacedemonian. Whereupon Theramenes said that they fell not so much with that cost to prosecute their voyage of Eubaea, as to aid those that made the said wall at Etiona; and that if good watch were not kept, it were greatly to bee feared that they would surprise Pyreum: and these speeches of Theramenes and of those that held with him, were not altogether false nor spoken of malice. For in very truth, they that held the oligarchy at Athens, would fain( if they might haue done it) govern the City with liberty, and under their authority haue power to command the subiects in the Cities name, as representing the body of the commonweal: but if they could not maintain and defend their authority, they had resolved, having the haven, the Ships, and the fortress of Pyreum in their hands, to live in safety: because they feared, that if the people should ●ecouer their former Estate in government, they should be the first that were destroyed. Be●ides, if they should not be able to defend themselves there, rather then they would come into the peoples hands, they purposed to receive the enemies into Pyreum, yet not to deliver them the ships and fortresses, but to agree with them touching the Estate of the City in the best sort that they could, provided always that their persons should bee safe. For these causes they kept good watch on the walls and at the gates, and withall used great diligence in fortifying the places where the enemies might enter, for they feared to be surprised and prevented: which enterprises and deliberations were made and communicated among few persons. But afterward Phrynichus being returned from lacedaemon, was hurt in the midst of the market place by one of those that warded, whereof he died soon after, as he returned thence to the palace, and he that had hurt him fled: but one Arginus who had assisted him, was by commandement of the four hundred taken, and being demanded when he was on the rock, who had persuaded him thereunto, he could name none, but said that he knew nothing, save only that in the captain of the watch his house, as also in sundry other Citizens houses, there were oft great meetings. By reason of which discovery, Theramenes, Aristocrates, and the rest of their faction, as well they who were of the number of the four hundred, as others, were more incited to their enterprise, and so much the rathe●, because the Fleet that was at Ye having arrived that day at Epidaurus, made ma●y excursions, and did much harm in the territority of AEgina. Whereupon Theramenes said, that it was not likely, that if the said Fleet were bound for Eubaea, it would make excursions into the gulf of AEgina, and return thence to Epidaurus, if it had not ben sent for by those that held Pyreum, as he had always said before. Vpon occasion hereof, after many informations given to the people to rise against them, at last it was determined that Ye should be taken by force. According to which determination, the soldiers that were occupied about the fortification of Etiona, whose captain was Aristocrates, took one of the four hundred,( that nevertheless secretly held of the contrary side) whose name was Alexicles, and committed him to ward in his own house under the custody of a guard, and after apprehended many of them, and amongst others, one of the Captaines that had the keeping of Munichie, whose name was Herman. And this was done by the consent of the greatest part of the soldiers. Vpon the signifying of these things to the four hundred, who then kept themselves within the palace of the town,( except they whom the government pleased not) they determined to put themselves in arms, and to set vpon Theramenes, and them that were with him. Who excusing himself, said he was ready to go to Ye to apprehended them that made these innovations. And in dead he took with him one of the Captaines that was of his own mind, and went to Pyrea, whom Aristarcus and the Horsemen aided, whereupon there rose forthwith a great and horrible tumult. For they that were within the city, said plainly& openly, that Pyrea was taken,& all they slain that were found in it: and on the other side, they that were within Pyrea, supposed that all they that were in the city came against thē: insomuch, that the ancients of the city had much ado to keep the citizens from putting themselves in Arms. And herein thucydides the Pharsalian took great pains with them, who having great friendship& acquaintance with many of thē, went to pacify thē with gentle speeches, requiring& counseling thē that they should not put their City in danger of destruction, sith they had the enemies so near at hand, who lay in wait for them. By which counsel the people were pacified, and every man went home to his own house. In the mean space Theramenes( who was one of the Gouernours) being arrived at Pyreum, made a show in words only, to bee angry with the footmen that were well armed. But Aristarcus, and they of his band, being of the contrary faction, were indeed much offended with them. Who for all that ceased not to labour in their work, so far, that some of them asked Theramenes, whether he thought it best to finish the wall, or pluck it down. And when he answered them that he cared not if they plucked it down, straightway all they that wrought, and many of the rest that were in Pyreum, got vpon the wall, and in less then an hour laid it flat with the earth. And in the doing hereof, for the exhortating and winning of the people to their purpose, they spake thus aloud to the standards by: whosoever had rather the five thousand should govern then the four hundred, ought to yield his help to do as we do. And these speeches used they, because they would not haue it known that they meant to restore the Popular Estate, but rather they shewed themselves content and willing that the five thousand should govern: for they feared least some of them that pretended to haue some government in the Popular Estate, would let some speech thereof escape from him unawares, as they talked one with another. Whereupon, the four hundred were greatly amazed, as being in no sort content, but utterly disliking that the five thousand should haue the authority, yet meant they not that they should be deposed: For by so doing, the Popular state must needs come up again; and on the other side by giuing authority unto them, it was in a manner all one, sith the power of the state should be in so many mens hands: and therefore this devise of not declaring the thing, kept men in fear and suspicion, as well on the one side, as on the other. The next day the four hundred( notwithstanding, they were in great trouble) assembled in the palace. On the other side, they that were in arms at Pyreum, having thrown down the wall, and released Alexicles, whom they had before apprehended, went to the Theatre of Bacchus, which is before Munichium within the haven of Pyreum: There held they their counsel, and having thoroughly debated every point, they concluded to go to the City, and there to set up their armor in the accustomend place. This accomplished they, and vpon their vnarmings came many Citizens sent secretly from the four hundred, who addressed themselves to those among them whom they knew to bee most tractable, praying them to demean themselves peaceably, and make no trouble or tumult in the City, and also to keep others from it, telling them that they might name altogether the five thousand that ought to haue the government, and put in this number the four hundred, with such Office and authority as they thought meet, to the intent, that the city might not be put in danger of falling into the enemies hands. By these advertisements and requests that were made by sundry men in diverse places, and to several personages, the people that were in armor, were well pacified, fearing least their controversy would turn to the destruction of the City: insomuch, that it was agreed vpon by all men, that a general assembly should at a certain day be held in the Temple of Bacchus. And in the thirteenth chapter of the same b●ok he writeth thus: The Athenians vpon the understanding of these news, in what fear and necessity soever they were, armed notwithstanding twenty ships, and presently assembled in the same place of Pyreum, and then in a place that they call Pycue, wherein they had other times accustomend to assemble. In these assemblies it was concluded, that the four hundred should be deposed, and that the authority should remain in the hands of the five thousand, of the which number all they might bee that could bear armor, and that would serve in Offices without wages. And whosoever should do otherwise, should be accursed. Many other assemblies followed after, where in diverse laws and ordinances were made touching the government of the Gommonweale,& at this beginning in mine opinion they effectually performed many things for the direction of common affairs to the welfare of the city, by reducing the controversy, that by occasion of the Popular and particular government was amongst them, to a good mediocrity: which caused both the surceassing of many naughty things that were committed in the city,& also of the maintenance of the said city& commonweal. Thus you may see what thucydides hath truly& gravely written concerning the troubles and alterations of the government of Athens, which I thought good to insert in this place, though it were somewhat long, as well to give the reader a greater light for the understanding of Aristotles observations, which of themselves be short& dark; as to show the use of the skill of government, specially by so excellent an Historiographer,& in a commonweal, the glory and renown whereof of is spread through the whole world; to the intent also that the readers by considering the truth of old things, may thereby judge those things to be such like, that now are,& hereafter shall be. Which cause hath moved me likewise briefly to touch the tumults& seditions that haue happened vpon like occasisions in the commonweals of Florence, Siena, and Genoa,& confer the union& tranquillity of the Venetian aristocraty, sith those things that be nearest to our country, age, and memory do move us most. And I hope thus to make the work more perfect, by conferring old things with new in every kind of government.   

Seditions and changes in the government of Florence Genoa, and of Siena, famous cities, and also the union, concord, stabiltie, and lasting of the Athenian aristocraty.  
THerfore whereas in laying of the foundation of the popular authority at Florence at the beginning, those mixtures and temperatures were not used therein, that should warrant and settle their liberty; with gentle and reasonable means, and keep the government from falling into disorder through the ignorance and licentiousness of the multitude: The commonweal hath always been full of confusion,& out of order, because on the one side the citizens of greatest calling, thought themselves less esteemed thē they supposed was meet,& on the other side, their ambition was suspected to the people,& withal because diuers came often to counsels of importance that were very unfit for it,& for that the sovereign Magistrate, unto whom the chief and hardest matters were referred, was changed every two months. When the Noblemen intruded themselves into the authority of government, the people by reason they could not endure their great pride, did soon take arms against them, and took the government out of their hands, which they made altogether Popular, so that sometimes, in such a broil, a wollecarder, wearing the cognisance of iustice, was created Confalonier and Prince of the City: So great was the hatred between the people and the nobility, that that part which got the victory, did always thrust the other that was overcome out of the government, with ransacking, burning, banishing, and murders, and made laws and judgements for their own advantage, not regarding the public benefit of the state. In the assemblies of the City, they were most commonly one against another, and made it no matter of conscience to hinder the commonweal, to the intent, to gainsay or resist their aduersaries. And the people did not resist the Nobility only, but also the Popular sort were divided from the commoners. They called the Noblemen by an odious name, mighty fellowes: and had divided the people into two orders, placing in the one the rich men that might attain to the Magistracies; and in the other, the poor, that exercised base occupations and were excluded from the government. The distributing of the people, consisted of two and twenty companies of occupations, whereof seven were called the greater, and might bee admitted to the government, as being the most honest and worshipful: the other fifteen stood for a ciphre in the public government, who notwithstanding for that they were the greatest number,& sorry to see themselves deprived of honour, attempted oft to obtain that by force of arms, which was denied unto them by the laws and statutes of the commonweal. And joining themselves with the Popular sort, as nearest to their order, were for the most part superiors and maisters in the creation and election of the public offices, whereto they advanced their partakers, and thrust out the Noblemen, many of whom to attain thereunto, put themselves in the rank of the Popular sort, changing the arms and titles of their families. By means whereof, the city was divided into Neri, and Bianchi, and into guelphs, and Gibelines. There was a congregation called the Parliament, that was held by all the Citizens in the market place before the Townehouse, where every man consulted of those matters that the chief Magistrate propounded. In this Parliament there was established a kind of government, that under the name of popular government, tended more to the power of a few persons, then of all men in general. And though there came not any great number of Citizens to the same, yet the aduise and counsel that inclined to a form of government not so large and Popular; had taken effect, had it not been for friar jerome Sauonarola, a Iacobite, who having gotten the name& authority of a Prophet, openly detested and found fault with that form of deliberating in the parliament; and affirmed that it was the will of God that there should be ordained a government altogethes Popular, so as it should not rest in the power of a few Citizens to change the liberty and safety of others. Therefore when the matter had been often debated, it was at last determined, that a counsel should be created of all the Citizens, whereinto the scum of the people should not be received, but onely they that by the ancient laws of the City, might be admitted to the government. In which counsel nothing should bee treated off or disposed, saving the election of all the Magistrates for the City, and the possessions and revenues, and the confirmation and provision of money, and all laws aforetime ordained by the Magistrates, and other straighter counsels. now, as consultation was had one day about the form of the said government between the chief Magistrates and persons of greatest reputation, two contrary Orations were made, the one by paul Anthony Soderin, who spake for the democraty; the other by Guy anthony Vespucci, who upheld the oligarchy: which because they are most fit for the understanding of the present matter, shall bee here set down. Therefore paul anthony Soderin began in this maner: Although the Popular state be less esteemed then that wherein all matters bee referred to one alone, or governed according to the aduise of upright and honest men, yet notwithstanding for that the desire of liberty is an ancient thing, and welneere natural in this City, and for that the condition of our Citizens is proportioned to equality, which is a very necessary foundation of popular governments, I could easily show, that without any manner of doubt, we ought to prefer it before al others, were it not that such kind of disputation should be superfluous, forasmuch as in all the latter assemblies it hath always ben determined by general consent that the city should be governed in the name, and by the authority of the people. But hence came the diversity of opinions, that some in the matters ordained by the parliament haue voluntarily condescended to that form of commonweal, whereby this city was governed, before the liberty of the same was oppressed by the house of Medici. And others( of whose number I confess myself to bee one) by reason they judge that kind of government thus ordained to contain in many matters, rather the name then the effect of a Popular government, and are afraid by knowing the accidents which haue often grown of such kinds of government, do desire a perfecter form, whereby the concord and safety of the Citizens may be preserved: a thing that cannot be hoped for in this city by any reason or experience of the time past, except it be under a government, wholly depending on the peoples authority, so that it be well and duly ordained and ruled, which chiefly is grounded on two foundations: The first whereof is, that all the Magistracies and Offices as well in the city, as in all the territory, be given for a certain time, by an universal counsel of all them that by our laws may be gouernours: without the allowance of which counsel, it shall not be lawful to make new laws. By means hereof, when it shall not rest in the power of private Citizens, nor of any particular conspiracy or confederacie to distribute the dignities and authorities, no man shall bee barred from the same for another mans fancy, but they shall be distributed according to mens virtues and deserts:& therfore every man must endeavour to prepare his way to honour with virtues and good manners, by aiding the public state, and all men privately. It shall then be necessary for every man to abstain from 'vice, from hurting other men, and finally from all things that be hateful in a well ordered city. Neither shall it lye in the power of one or a few, to bring in any other government, by new laws, or by the authority of a Magistrate, when as this government cannot be altered without the consent of an universal counsel. The second foundation is, that consultations and determinations touching matters of importance, namely, those that concern peace and warres, the examining of new laws, and generally all things necessary for the government of such a city and dominion as this is, be ordered and directed by Magistrates, especially authorized to that charge and office, and by a priu●er counsel of wise and experienced Citizens that shall be appointed by the counsel of the people, because every man is not fit for the hearing and determining of those matters, but they that are capable of the same ought to haue the governing thereof; and sith they often require diligence or secrecy, they may not be consulted of, nor determined with the multitude● For it is not necessary for the preservation of liberty, that such matters should be treated of in a very great company, it being sufficient for the assuring of the Cities liberty, that the distributing of the Magistracies, and the determining of new laws depend on universal consent. When these matters be provided for, the government which is perfectly Popular, remaineth ordained; the liberty of the city founded, and a commendable and durable form of commonweal confirmed. diverse other matters to the bettering of this government( whereof wee speak) shall bee reserved for a fitter time, because at this beginning we will not trouble the minds of men who are suspicious and doubtful, through remembrance of the tyranny past, who because they are not acquainted with the ordering of free governments, cannot perfectly perceive what is necessary to be ordained for the preservation of liberty: which matters because they are not of so great importance, may without danger be referred till a a fitter time and better occasion. Our Citizens will daily grow more in liking with this form of government, and when through practise they are become more capable, they will be desirous continually to amend, and bring it to full perfection which in the mean time shalbe upheld by the ij. foundations before mentioned, which are easy to be ordained, by showing the fruits that will come therof, not only by reasons, but also by examples. For though the government of the Venetians belong to the gentlemen, yet are they but private citizens, in such number,& of so diverse degrees, that it cannot be denied, but it contains a great part of the Popular government,& cannot be imitated in many things. Notwithstanding, it is chiefly laid on these ij. foundations, on the which the same commonweal leaning& staying, hath by the space of so many ages, maintained her liberty with unity and civil concord, and is mounted to such glory& high estate. This unity of the Venetians hath not proceeded from the situation of their city( as many men suppose) because there may be;& haue ben sometimes discords amongst thē; but rather from a form of government, so well ordained and proportioned to itself, that of necessity it yields so excellent and wonderful effects. For we must consider to the contrary, that by reason our city had never a like form of government, therefore our affairs haue evermore been subject to ordinary alterations, being one while as it were oppressed by the violence of gangrenes, another while rent asunder through the ambitious and covetous discord of certain persons, and as quickly broken in pieces through the unbridled licentiousness of the commonalty: and whereas Cities were builded for the tranquilitie and happy life of the inhabitants; the confiscations of our lands and goods, the banishments and beheadings of our unhappy Citizens, haue been the hap and tranquilitie that we haue had. The government brought in by the Parliament, doth not differ from those kinds of government, which at other times haue ben in this city, that haue ben full of discords and calamities, and after endless broils both public and private, haue at last engendered Tyrannies. For the Duke of Athens in the time of our ancestors, oppressed not the liberty for any other occasion, nor Cosmus de Medici in the times following, whereat we need not to marvel. For when the bestowing of the Magistracies,& the determining of laws need not the common consent, but depend on the will of the les●er number, then the citizens being intentive& careful, not of the common welfare, but of their private desires& purposes, do follow particular factions& conspiracies: whereunto the divisions of al cities are joined, being the most certain pestilence& death of al commonweals& empires: how much more thē standeth it with wisdom, to shun these forms of government, which both by reasons and others examples, we may know to be pernicious& dangerous;& to take those forms that be behooveful& happy? For this speech will I freely utter, that the government always ordained in our city in such sort, that a few Citizens therein haue unmeasurable authority, is a government of a few gangrenes, who are so much the more dangerous then one tyrant alone, as the evil is so much the worse, by how much the more it is committed& multiplied. And though there were no other inconvenience in it, yet at least, by reason of the diversity of opinions, of ambition,& variable desires of men, no long agreement could therein be hoped for. And discord, which at al times is most dangerous, should at this time be more perilous, wherein you haue sent so mighty a lord into exile, wherein you are deprived of a good part of your state,& wherein Italy having strange armies within her bowels, is fully laid open to most great dangers. Very seldom, yea it may be never, hath it lain absolutely in the power of the whole city to take order for itself, according to hir own good pleasure: Now therfore sith the benignity and goodness of God hath delivered that power into your hands, lose not you the opportunity of founding a free government, and so well ordained, that not only during your own lives, it may make you happy, but also that you may promise the everlasting continuance of the same,& so leave for an inheritance to your children& successors such a treasure& felicity, as neither yourselves nor your ancestors ever had or knew. These were the speeches of paul anthony. But to the contrary, Guy anthony Vespucci spake thus, If the government established in that form which paul anthony Soderin hath propounded, would so easily bring forth the desir●d fruits, as they are rehearsed, doubtless he should haue a wonderful evil taste, that in our country would wish for any other government: and he should be a very bad Citizen, that would not be greatly in love with a form of commonweal, wherein mens virtues, deserts, and valour, should above all other things bee respected and honoured. Howbeit, I see not how wee may hope that a government resting wholly in the peoples power, should be fraught with so many commodities. For this know I well, that reason teacheth, experience proveth, and the authority of great men confirmeth, that in so great a multitude, there is not such wisdom, such experience, nor such order to be found, as that the wise should be preferred before the ignorant; the good before the bad; and men of experience before them that never had the government of any affairs: For as upright judgements cannot bee hoped for at the hands of an unfit and ignorant judge, even so should there not any wise or reasonable election or determination be hoped for at the hands of a people that is full of disorder and ignorance. And, what wise men can scantly discern, which spend their time about nothing else; shall wee beleeue that a multitude being rude, ignorant, consisting of so great diversities of minds, conditions, and manners, and wholly regarding that which concerneth itself particularly, can distinguish and perceive it? I omit to speak of the immoderate persuasion that every one will haue of himself, which will cause in all men a greedy desire of honour. Neither will it suffice men in a popular government to enjoy the honest fruits of liberty, but they will all aspire to the principal degrees, and haue place in deliberations of most important and hard matters. For the modesty of giuing place to the skilfullest and best deserving persons reigneth less in this city then in any other. And so entering into this persuasion that of right we ought all to be equal in all things, the rooms of virtue and valour, being in the power of the multitude, shall bee confounded. And this greedy desire extending to the most part, will bee an occasion, that they who know least, or least deserve it, shall bee able to do most; for by reason they are the greatest number, they will haue the most power in the state where opinions shal be accounted, and not weighed. This being considered, what warrant or assurance can you haue, that they holding themselves content with such a form, which you would haue now ordained, will not straightway fall to the troubling of that state of the commonweal, which hath been wisely brought in; by new inventions, and imprudent laws, which wise men shall not be able to withstand? Which things being at all times dangerous in such a kind of commonweal, are more to be feared at this present, sith the nature of men is such, that when they pass from one extremity, wherein they haue been forcibly kept, they leap wilfully into another, without staying in a mean. So he that cometh out of tyranny, unless he be held back, falleth headlong into all manner of excessive licentiousness, which may also justly be called tyranny. For the people are like unto a tyrant, when they give to him that deserveth not, take from him that deserveth, and confounded the degrees and differences of persons. And it may bee, that the tyranny thereof is more hurtful, then the ignorance daungerous; forasmuch as it hath neither weight, measure, nor law, but disordered naughtiness. Neither ought the example of the Venetians to move us: For the situation of their city worketh somewhat in their behalf, the form of government received there a great while since, may do much;& matters there are so ordained, that deliberations of importance, are more in the hands of a few then of many; and their wits peradventure being not naturally so fine and subtle as ours, they are more easily contented. And yet the Venetian government standeth not onely vpon those two foundations that haue been alleged, but it greatly availeth to the perfection and stability thereof, that there is evermore a Duke, together with diverse other ordinances; which whosoever intended to bring into this commonweal, should find many gainsayers, by reason our city doth not at this instant, take her being nor her institution and establishment with laws. And therefore old customs, oft contrary to the common welfare, and men suspecting that under colour of the preservation of liberty, a new Tyranny would be raised, do not give place to wholesome counsels, even as in a body full of evil humours, medicines serve not to so good purpose as they do in a body that is purged. For these reasons, and for as much as worldly matters commonly wax worse and worse, it is more to bee feared, that whatsoever shall at this beginning bee unperfectly ordained, will in time grow to utter disorder, then to be hoped, that with time or opportunity it should be brought to perfection. But what need we seek for examples abroad, sith we haue sufficient at home? When did the people ever absolutely govern this City, but it was full of discord● or rent asunder, and at last the Estate suddenly changed? And if we will seek for examples in other places, why remember wee not that the government in all respects Popular, was the occasion of so many tumults in Rome, insomuch, that had it not been for martiall skill and diligence, the life of the same commonweal had been short? Why call not we to remembrance, that Athens a most flourishing and most mighty City, lost her Empire, and then fell into the bondage of her own Citizens and of strangers, for no other cause, but for that the greatest affairs there were ordained by the consultation and determination of the commonalty? I see not vpon what occasion it may bee affirmed, that in the form which the Parliament hath invented, there is not perfect liberty to bee found; sith every matter is referred to the disposition of the Magistrates, who remain not in Office continually, but are changed; neither are they chosen by a few, but allowed and confirmed by a great mainie; neither by the old custom of the city ought they to bee put again to lotting: Howe then can they bee distributed by practices, or according to the fantasies of particular citizens? Wee shall haue a far greater warrant of our safety, when the most weighty affairs shall bee under the examination and direction of the wisest men, and of them that bee of best experience, and the gravest, who will govern the same after another order, with another manner of secrecy, and with another fashion of iudgement then the people would do; who are unfit for such matters, and sometimes are very liberal in spending, when no need requireth, and other whiles in time of need so sparing and niggardlie, that oftentimes for the saving of a small charge, they fall afterwards into very great expenses and dangers. now even as paul anthony Soderin hath affirmed, most great and most important is the weakness of italy, and specially of our own country. Therefore what want of wisdom should it bee, in such a time as the skilfullest and best experienced physicians are needful, to commit ourselves into the hands of them that haue least skill and experience? Finally, it is to bee considered, that you shall maintain your people in greater tranquilitie, and shall more ea●ilie direct them to such deliberations as are behoveful and convenient for themselves and the welfare of every man, by committing into their hands a moderate part and authority in the commonweal. For if you refer all matters to their arbitrement, it is greatly to bee feared, that they will become ouerlustie, and wholly disagreeing from the counsels of your wise and well affectioned citizens.  
now, as concerning the house of Medici, 
The house of Medici.  mentioned in these former Orations, it obtained at Florence( under the name and show of a Gouenement, well near Cittie-like) very great power and authority for the space of threescore yeares together, beginning at the said Cosmus de Medici, a citizen of singular wisdom, and wonderful richesse, and for those respects he was greatly renowned, and was had in great reputation in all parts of Europe. Peter succeeeded Cosmus, and after Peter succeeded laurence, a man of great wit and excellent counsel, no less noble and valiant then his grandfather, howbeit, using more absolute authority in the government of the commonweal, yet gently and friendly, and such as was needful in a town of liberty, as Philip de Comines saith, He took twenty men for the guard of his person, by the commandement and licence of the Senate, which commanded what he listed. Notwithstanding, he governed moderately in this high authority, and was one of the wisest men of his time, and in great reputation through all italy, and with many foreign Princes. But the other Peter his young and unwise son supposing the same authority to be due unto him of right, undertook to govern like a lord, making himself fearful to other men by means of that guard, by committing many violences, frays, and lavishly spending the common treasure: Whereby he fell into the hatred of the Citizens, and was banished by the Senate, with John the cardinal, and julian, his brethren. And when he had fled and abandoned that high estate, the people in a tumult put themselves in armor, and spoiled all the movables of his house, which were worth above a hundred thousand crownes. This befell in the time of king Charles the eight his passage, when he went to Naples. Afterwards, when this cardinal John was chosen Pope, and called lo the tenth, he caused the proclamation and sentence of banishment to be repealed, and restored the house of Medici to the former highnesse, authority, and reputation. Howbeit, the Florentines recovering their liberty, set up the Popular government again, and after the taking of Rome, and the captivity of Pope Clement, defaced and pulled down in all places of the city the arms of the house of Medici, specially those that were fixed on the public buildings which they had erected, broke down the Images of lo and Clement that stand in the temple of the annunciation, made sale of the Popes goods, and employed them in paying the debts of the commonweal. By which doings they so angered the Pope, that he stirred up the forces of the Emperour Charles against them, and after a long siege subdued them, and made them yield to such conditions as liked himself: obtaining not onely the return of the Medici, but also causing the commonweal to bee changed into a dukedom, and that to bee for ever possessed by them. The first Duke was Alexander the Popes nephew, and the Emperours son in lawe, who was slain by laurence his own near kinsman. In whose place succeeded Cosmus, who for a long time governed this estate, joining Sienna to it, and after yielded it up to his eldest son, for the better settling of him therein before his own death: as is reported by Guichardine in his first, second, third, sixteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth books, Paulus divinus in his first, five& twentieth, seven& twentieth, eight and twentieth, nine and twentieth, and eight and thirtieth books. Machiauel in his second book of the history of Florence. John Michel brute in his first book of the same history, written in latin:& Philip de Comines in king Charles the eight his voyage to Naples the ninth and thirteenth chapters. 
The City of Genoa.  The City of Genoa being builded in a place fit to govern& command vpon the sea, if great opportunity were not hindered by the pestiferous poison of civil discord, is not like other Cities of italy, subject to one division alone, but divided into many parts; for the remnants of the old contentions of the guelphs and Gibelines are there still; and there reigneth the disagreement between the Gentlemen and the people, whereby many Cities haue been destroyed in italy, and specially in tuscan: For the people because they would not endure the pride of the nobility, restrained their power with many most severe and rigorous laws; and amongst others, suffering them in some respect to participate of all other Magistracies and honours, they barred them specially from the dignity of Duke; which sovereign magistracy is given for term of life, though by reason of the inconstancy of the same City, there be but a few men that haue enjoyed so high honour until their deaths. But the division between the Adorni and the Fregosi, is as great: Who being come from low degree to great authority, do strive together for the dignity of Duke, which for the space of many yeares hath continued always in the one or the other of these families. For the Gentlemen of the guelphs and Gibellines, because they were barred from it by Lawe, would willingly haue procured it to fall into the hands of such of the people as were of their faction. And the Gibellines favouring the Adorni, and the guelphs the Fregos●, these two families in process of time are become more noble and mighty then those houses whose name and authority they followed before. Sometimes these divisions are confounded, so as often they that are of one selfsame side against the contrary side, are also amongst their own selves divided into diverse sides; and contrariwise, marched together in one side with thē that follow another side. F. Guichardine in his 7. and 10. books, rehearseth a new kind of government, brought up at Genoa under the name of liberty, the sum whereof was thus, That by a counsel of four hundred Citizens all the Magistracies and dignities of their city, and chiefly the Duke and the sovereign Magistrate should bee created for the space of two yeares: and the law abrogated, whereby the Gentlemen were afore barred from them. And forasmuch as it was a most expedient foundation for the preservation of liberty, that remedy should be provided for the appeasing of the Citizens dissensions, which had ben for a long space greater and more dangerous there then in any other City of italy, the names of all the families were put down, and only eight and twenty of the same city kept still, and the most famous and most notable families retained they, saving those of the Adorni and Fregosi, which were fully extinguished, under the name and number of which families, they assembled all these gentlemen, and the people remained nameless. And the more to confounded the memory of the factions, they put the families of the Gentlemen with the families of the people, and those of the people with the families of the Gentlemen, and those houses which had ben partakers with the Adoni, into the houses which had followed the Fregosi, and so contrariwise, some of the Fregosi into the houses that had followed the Adorni. And a law was made, that there should bee no difference between them, that might bee a greater impediment to the one then to the other for the attainment of the honours and Magistracies: by which mingling of men and names together, their hope was, that in short time the pestiferous remembrance of factions, would bee clearly extinguished. Paulus Io●ius hath like speeches of the government of Genoa in his six and ●ventieth book. 
Sienna.  Sienna for a long time hath been the chief and mightiest city of tuscan, next after the city of Florence,& was governed by itself, howbeit in such sort, as it rather knew the name than the effects of liberty: For that it being drawn and divided into many factions or members of Citizens, that amongst themselves were called states or orders, obeyed that side which as time fel out, and through the favor of strange potentates, was stronger then the rest; as F. Guicchiardine reporteth in his first book. But the commonweal of Venice, 
Venice and the commonweal thereof.  which is aristocratical, chiefly in respect of the Senat and the college of the sages, hath the parts therof so well tempered together and proportioned( as wee haue touched in many places of this work) that it hath ben very long preserved at home from sedition and alterations, at least from such as haue been of any great importance: and abroad hath defended itself against the forces of many strange Princes, having already lasted welneere twelve hundred yeares without the violence of warres at home, and without falling into the yoke of foreign government, or changing the first religion wherein it was founded. Many old commonweals haue passed it in greatness of Empire, in chivalry, and in renown of haughty enterprises, but there can none of them bee compared unto it in goodness of government and laws, to live well and happily; neither can any bee found that hath so long reigned. And in truth wee may well affirm, that of states governed by commonalties, it is the perfectest that hath been ever red off, or seen. Notwithstanding, as in worldly things there is none so perfect, but there is somewhat in it blameworthie, so bee there some imperfections in this state, which often haue been the cause of casting it into great toil and danger. First of all, 
The Gentlemen of Venice.  the Gentlemen that there haue the whole dominion, having utterly excluded the people from the government, do divide amongst themselves all charges and offices, or the most part of them, wherein there is either honour or profit, whereat the other Citizens, ( amongst the which there is a great number of wise, rich, and courageous men) wonderfully repined, and conceive great disliking,& specially for that the number of the said gentlemen is so increased in tract of time, that now it is very excessiue● And contrariwise, in the cities and countries under their subiection, the noblemen& mighty men are kept very low, by reason of the fearfulness that the same state hath always been in, least by getting credite and authority at the peoples hands, they might stir them up to rebellion and sedition. Neither haue the same chief Citizens any hope of obtaining any office or bnfice of importance: For there he not half enough for the Lords. Another inconvenience is there in the same Estate, and that no small one, namely, that for fear least any amongst them should attempt to usurp the dominion of the state, if he were in credite and authority with the people and soldiers, they serve not their turn with any general or particular captain of their own Nation, specially in their armies by land, but give the charge of their army most often to strangers: Therefore when their Captaines, and a great part of their soldiers bee strangers, they bear not that affection and zeal to the state and commonweal, which they do that are members thereof. And although they join in commission with the generals and cheeftaines of the war, certain assistants whom they call Proueditors, without whom the said cheefetaines can neither execute nor determine any thing of importance, even in those matters that concern the war, yet is not this a sufficient remedy: for sith those Proueditors are no warriors, they may easily commit great errors; and the Cheefetains seeing themselves subject to such persons, and constrained to obey them in that wherein they haue no knowledge nor understanding, do very oft conceive great indignation thereat, and serve not with such good will and forwardness as they would if they had the whole authority: sometimes also they are content to see those things haue bad success which are done against their minds, after the pleasures and humors of the said Proueditors, as wee may find that it hath oftentimes happened. There is also between the said Gentleman and Lords great partiality, namely between those who are descended from the ancient founders of that city, and those who since in process of time haue ben created; who are now more in number then those of the ancient houses: For either of these said factions seeks to haue chief authority, as well in governing the commonweal, as in offices, and in other honours and profits; whereby it oft happeneth, that in matters concerning the Estate, they do dissent, and as it were severally band themselves in taking parts, regarding more their particular passions, then the public good of the signory; to which passions, they are subject as well as other men. And although that by the prudent and good government of the wiser sort, there hath not ben bread as yet through occasion thereof any sinister effect of great importance, yet by con●inuance it is to bee feared, that when the evil humours of this mystical body, shall be too much multiplied and corrupted, the disease will show itself, being then so sharp and dangerous, that there will hardly bee found a remedy in time. Claudius Syessell in his first book of the monarchy of France, the third chapter: Contarine in his first and fift books of the Venetian commonweal: Iouianus Pontanus in his first book of the neapolitan war, Paulus divinus in the first book of the Sabellian histories: and Bembus in the history of Venice: Philip de Comines in the voyage of Charles the eig●● to Naples, chap. 21.    

CHAP. VI. Of the changes happening in Oligarchies.  
OLigarchies are changed in two most plain and evident manners: The one is, if the Gouernours do unjustly oppress the common people; For then the first that ●hey light on seems sufficient and fit enough to be their patron and protector, especially if any of those that govern, do undertake this charge, as did Lygdamus in ●he Isle of Naxus, who afterward usurped tyranny over the Naxians. The other maner o● changing the oligarchy hath not his beginning from the sedition of the people, but i● caused by the rich men, and that in many sorts. For sometimes the oligarchy is destroyed by the rich men who do not participate in the government, especially when the number of those that govern is very small, as it happened at Marsilia, Istrum, and Heraclea, and in other cities, where they who were not admitted to the Magistracies, did never cease from mutining, until they had changed the form of the Estate, and made it lawful first that the eldest brethren, and then the younger might be admitted to the authority of government. Certes, in some places the father and the son, and in others, the elder and younger brethren cannot bear office together, but that is where the oligarchy is more civilly ordained. At Istrum it became in the end a democraty. At Heraclea from a smaller number, it rose to six hundred: and at Gnidus the oligarchy was changed through the dissension which grew between the noblemen, because few persons were admitted to the government of the commonweal: and( as it hath been said) if the father governed, the son was by that means excluded; and if there were many brethren, the eldest only was thereto admitted. So that the people rising likewise by reason of their discord, and choosing one of the Noblemen for their head and leader, assailed the rest and overcame them, for every factious cause is weak. And long since at Erythrae, during the oligarchy of the Basilidae, although otherwise they demeaned themselves well, yet the people disliking to be subject to a few persons, changed the form of the government. Oligarchies are likewise changed of themselves through the factions of those that led and flatter the people, and that in two sorts: The one, when there is a flatterer among the oligarchical persons themselves, although they bee very few in number: as at Athens in the time of the thirty gangrenes, Chares got himself power by flattering them, and Phrynichus after the same sort, in the time of the four hundred. The other is, when the lords who are of the oligarchy do flatter the people; as at Larissa they who were called the Cities guard, flattered the people, because they were chosen by them: as also it happens in all the Oligarchies, wherein the magistrates are not chosen by the governors, but are thereto advanced for their large revenues, or by companies,& chosen by the soldiers or the people: as it came to pass at Abidus. In like sort, where the administration of iustice is not executed by those that govern: for then the iudges seek to please the people, that they may thereby obtain the sovereign authority of iudgement, and they change the commonweal, as it happened at Heraclea near the sea of Pontus. They are besides changed, when men attempt to reduce the Oligarchy to a smaller number, for seeking equality they are constrained to call their people to their aid. The Oligarchies are also changed when they that govern, haue prodigally spent their goods, by leading a voluptuous& dishonest life; because thē they do altogether seek innovation,& that so far, that they themselves usurp the Tyranny, or stir up others thereunto, as Hiparinus incited dionysius at Siracusa;& one called Cleotimus at Amphipolis, who brought in the Chalcidians to inhabit there, and after that they were received, he set thē at dissension with the rich men: And at Egina he that laboured for Chares, practised to chang● the commonweal by such a means. These men therfore do sometimes attempt an innovation in the commonweal, sometimes they rob the state,& thereby fall to discord either with their own associat● or with those that would withstand this their thefts: as it happened at Apollonia on the sea of P●ntus. But when there is no dissension, it cannot be easily destroyed by itself, whereof there is an evident sign in the commonweal of Pharsalius, where few men command over many, because they do honestly& quietly demean themselves one towards another. Likewise, such estates are destroyed, when they bring into the Oligarchy another form of oligarchy, which thing cometh to pass, when the prin●●pal charges& dignities are not communicated to al the governors, although they be few in number: as hath sometimes happened at Elis, where the commonweal was governed by a few senators,& was yet brought to a smaller number, because they held their places during life,& were but 90 in 〈◇〉& because their election resembled a Potentacy,& was like the election of the Lacedem●● senators. moreover, there are many changes made in Oligarchies, as well in time of war, as of peace: Of war, because they not daring to trust the people, are enforced to wage foreign souldiers; and he to whom they commit the charge and conduct of them, doth oft become a tyrant, as did Timophanes at Corinth: or i● many be joined in this charge, they usurp a Potentacie: and sometimes they of the oligarchy ●earing to fall into such danger, admit the people into a part of the government, b●●ause they are constrained to use them in their warres. And changes happen in time of peace, when for the doubt and suspicion that one hath of another, they commit the guard& keeping of the city to foreign soldiers, or to some captain that is a Neuter, who do sometimes become lords of two parts, as it happened at Larissa during the rule of the Aleuadians who were of Samos; and at Abidus during the factions, whereof one was the faction of Iphiadus. Furthermore, seditions arise through the mutual offences which the Oligarchical persons do offer among themselves, persecuting each other for causes of marriages, or sentences of iudgement: of marriages, as may appear by the examples before alleged; and Diagoras likewise being offended about a marriage, subverted the Eretrian oligarchy, which was held by the Horsemen● For causes of iudgement, as the sedition which was raised at Heraclea for a sentence given in iudgement; and at Thebes, by reason of adultery, where they did justly proceed to the punishment of the crime committed, but seditiously and scandalously, as well they of Heraclea against Eurytion, as they of Thebes against Archius, whom their enemies bare so great hatred, that they caused them to bee bound by the necks to the pillory with chains of iron. Likewise many Oligarchies are destroyed because they are too imperious, and that by some who haue part in the same government, and are offended with the insolence used by the rest: as the oligarchy of Gnidus, and that of Chio. There do yet further happen changes, as well in the Comonweale so generally called, as in Oligarchies, where●he counsellors of Estates, the iudges and other officers are chosen for their revenues: For it doth oft come to pass, that the proportion of revenues, which is at the first ordained, to the end that few men in the Oligarchies, and men of mean substance in the commonweal, may attain to public offices, is for a time observed; but if through the prosperity, caused by peace or by any other means the same possessions amount to a greater value, then all the Citizens become capable of al dignities, which change doth happen sometimes by little and little and secretly,& sometimes sooner. Such are the causes whereby Oligarchies are changed and trouble with seditions. Likewise, both democracies and Oligarchies are sometimes changed not into contrary forms of commonweals, but also into others of the same kind: as the lawful democracies& Oligarchies into those that use absolute power, and they again into those that are lawful.  
Oligarchies are troubled with seditions in two manners, the one, when the multitude of poor men are at variance with the rich; the other, when the rich men agree not among themselves. And this happeneth through many occasions, whereby the said Oligarchies are changed not onely into contrary forms of commonweals, but also into others of the same kind, more gentle or more severe. But when the oligarchy is not troubled with dissension, it cannot be easily destroyed.  
AT Marsil●a.] Strabo in his fourth book of cosmography writeth thus: The Massilians being governed by an aristocraty, do surpass all men in equity of laws; Their counsel consisteth of six hundred, who enjoy this honor for term of life, and are called Timouchi: Of whom there are fifteen being chief of the Senate, who dispatch all common occurrence: and of these fifteen there are three Presidents, who haue the sovereign authority of government. But none is received into the number of the Timouchi, unless he haue children, and be issued from the stock of a burgess, at the least three descents: their laws are publicly propounded after the manner of Ionia.  
As at Athens in the time of the thirty gangrenes.] The Athenians being vanquished by the Lacedemonians, were for a time constrained to abolish the Popular Estate, and receive the government of a small number, choosing thirty men, who should haue the whole authority and jurisdiction of all matters: These thirty governors were by their general name, Reformers, but in effect plain gangrenes. They were to ordain a Senat, and the other officers of the commonweal, and besides to make laws and statutes, according to which, the said officers should judge and order themselves in their several charges. And touching the laws and statutes which they were to establish, they used continual delays, wanting thereto no colours of vain occasions. And mean while they choose a Senate and the other officers out of their own friends and sectaries, who had the name of Senators and Magistrates, but were in very dead ministers of these thirty gangrenes wickedness: yet at the beginning, they condemned in open iudgement,& put to death some of the most notable caitiffs that were in the city, so that for that time even the better sort liked well their government. But eftsoons seeking by little and little to do things by force that were unjust, they sent to the Lacedemonians to demand of them a guard for the surety of their persons, promising them to establish in Athens such a government, as should tend greatly to their profit: which guard when they had obtained, they apprehended a great number of the wealthiest Citizens, such as they thought to be the fittest prey for them, whom they put al to death, and confiscated their goods, having falsely charged them that they had attempted and conspired some innovation. But when they proceeded in this Tyrannicall manner, banishing some, and putting others to death, they became so deeply hated of all men, that they were deposed and expulsed. In whose places the Athenians choose ten other men, to whom they gave sovereign power and authority to see if they could without trouble or tumult pacify all things: But they in stead of seeking to establish peace and concord between their Citizens, attempted likewise to make themselves Lords and gangrenes, as the others had done. But Pausanians King of the Lacedemonians coming to Athens with an army, made agreement between them that were in the city, and the banished men that were without: And from that time forward the Athenians began to govern themselves after their ancient manner. Diodorus Siculus in his 14. book, chap. 1.2, and 14. Plutarch in the life of Lisander.  
IN the time of the four hundred.] The Oligarchy of these four hundred is already known by the places alleged out of thucydides. Plu●arch in the life of Alcibiades; speaking of the change of the government at Athens, which was put into the hands of a small number of the Nobility saith, That although they were but four hundred, yet they would be called and accounted five thousand: who were overthrown and expulsed by means of the aid& succour which Alcibiades and his friends ministered to those that took part with the people.  
WHEN they bring into the oligarchy another form of oligarchy.] That is, when an Estate is governed by a small number of Noblemen and rich men, and two or three of them having secret intelligence each with other, do purchase to themselves the chiefest employments in the commonweal. sallust speaking of the roman Senate, saith thus: Paucorum arbitrio belly domíque respublica agitabatur, penes eosdem aerarium, provinciae, Magistratus, gloriae triumphique erant. Caesar, Pompey,& Crassus, allying themselves together, brought in another oligarchy, sharing among themselves the roman Empire, in causing to be given each to other governments of provinces and charges of great armies. Which Monopoly of so great mighty Lords, caused the ruin of the commonweal. For the force which was before divided in two parts, did as it w●●● equally balance the commonweal,( even as a boat which is on both sides laden ali●●, so that it cannot tilt on either hand) but being afterward joined in one body, and becoming but one, did incline or bend so mightily, that there was none able to counterpoise it, so that in the end it turned itself upside down: as saith Plutarch in the life of Pompey, which author writeth also to the same effect this which follows, in the life of M. Crassus: The City of Rome being divided into three factions, viz. of Caesar, and Pompey,& Crassus, the graver and wiser sort held with Pompey, they that were lighter and more forward to attempt things with desperate rashness, followed Caesars hopes. Crassus swumme in the midst, making his use of both, and oft changing parts in the administration of the commonweal, being neither a constant friend, nor a dangerous and deadly enemy, but did easily dissolve both friendship and enmity, as he saw it for his profit, so that very oft within small distance of time he would praise and blame, defend and accuse the same laws and persons. Then these three personages joining their factions together, did for a time govern the whole state of Rome, according to their own wils with general consent, which was the overthrow of the people and Senate. And afterward he saith, When Caesar was come from his province of Gaule, so far as Lucca, many romans came to see him, and amongst the rest, Pompey and Crassus, who having conferred with him in secret, concluded to go thoroughly forward with their purpose, to the end, that they might haue in their own hand all the power of the roman Empire. And that for that cause Caesar should hold still the forces that he had, and that Crassus and Pompey should take other provinces and armies. Long before that time the Decemuiri, who had ben created and appointed at Rome for the reuiewing and establishing of laws, sought means like new gangrenes to establish an oligarchy by making their authoririe perpetual, which was but for a time; so that the other Citizens were constrained to depose them by force, as writeth Titus livius in the third book of his first Decade: and Osorius in his second book, the thirteenth chapter.   

CHAP. VII. Of the changes happening in Aristocraties.  
but seditions are raised in Aristocraties, because few men haue any part in public honors: which we haue affirmed to bee the cause of troubles in Oligarchies also, and indeed the aristocraty is an oligarchy. For in either state there are few Gouernours, howbeit not in one selfsame manner, and therefore seemeth the aristocraty to bee all one with the oligarchy. This necessary happeneth where there is a m●lsitude of high minded men, that think themselves equal in virtue, as they were in lacedaemon, that were called Parthenians( for of such were they begotten:) these vpon the disclosing of the enterprise which they practised against the state, were sent to dwell at Tarentum. Or else seditions are raised when any of them that be of high calling, and not inferior in virtue, are unworthily and spitefully handled by them which are in more honor, as Lisander was by the kings. When some valiant man is not admitted to office and honour, as Cynadon, who in the time of king Agesilaus, was author of the conspiracy against the Lacedemonians. again, when some are very needy, and others rich, which happe●eth cheesly by means of the warres, and befell at lacedaemon in the time of the wars of Messina, according to the Poet Tirteus his opinion, as appeareth in his book entitled the Eunomie: At what time many being impoverished by means of the long continuance of those warres, required an equal partition of the territory. Also if any one be mighty, and haue the means to make himself more mighty, so far, that he endeavour to rule alone; as Pausanias seemeth to haue been at lacedaemon, who was captain general in their warres against the Medes; and Hannon at Carthage. But chiefly as well the commonweal as the aristocraty is destroyed, when the law is not obser●ed. The gro●nd of which mischief lieth in this, that the democraty and the oligarchy are not well mixed in the commonweal; nor these two states in the Aristocraties with virtue, to wit, the Popular state and the rule of a few, which require a mixture with commonweals, and many of those states that are called Aristocraties, wherein the Aristocraties do differ from those that are name commonweals, and therefore some of them last the less time, and some longer. For those are called Aristo●raties which bend most to the oligarchy, and those are name commonweals which bend most to the multitude. Therefore such kinds of states are more safe and sure then others. For they to whom the commonweal is imparted and communicated, are the greater number and more strong; and when they enjoy equality, they are the easier to be contented: but where they that abound in richesse, are of most authority in the state, they seek for nothing else but to injure and excel others too much. To conclude, towards which part soever of the two the commonweal inclineth, it is changed, by reason either of them go about to augment their own side. As for example, the commonweal is changed into a democraty, and the aristocraty into an oligarchy, or into contraries, as the aristocraty into a democraty, because the poorest sort, as men injuried, draw the commonweal clean to the contrary. And commonweals are changed into Oligarchies. For equality alone according to worthiness, maketh the state stable, when every one enioieth that which pertains unto him. This my saying was verified amongst the Thurians, who at the first choose their magistrates in respect of the greatest revenues, and after came to a less stint, and had a greater number of them. And when the Noblemen had gotten all the land into their hands, contrary to the law in that behalf provided( by reason the form of government was most oligarchical, and authorized them greatly) then the people being exercised in arms, and of experience in wars, ouermaistred the guards, and compelled those which held too great possessions to yield them up. Further, for as much as all commonweals that are aristocratical do incline to the rule of a few, the Noblemen may do more there: as at lacedaemon the wealth is in a few mens hands, and the Noblemen haue the most liberty to do what they will, and to bestow their children in marriage, as best liketh themselves: which thing caused the destruction of the commonweal of Locres, by the alliance and affinity which they entred into with dionysius, which could not haue befallen in a democraty or aristocraty, well mixed and tempered. But then is there a secret change in Popular states, when they are marred by little and little, as it happeneth in all commonweals, as hath been before shewed, in speaking generally of their alterations, when we said, that the neglecting of small matters is one of the causes thereof. For when men haue first omitted some matter appertaining to the government, then they do more lightly and easily change some other thing of greater importance, until at last they haue lost all the order and ornament of the commonweal: as befell in the commonweal of the Thurians, where for as much as it was forbidden by law that no man sh●●ld be lieutenant general of the army above the space of five yeares, certain young men skilful in the warres, and of good reputation amongst the soldiers of the guard, despising the gouernours, and thinking easily to obtain what they pretended, undertook the abolishing and repealing of that law, to the end it might be lawful for the selfsame persons to remain continually in this charge, chiefly, for that they perceived the people would willingly assent thereto: Whereupon the magistrates called counsellors, who being appointed to consider of this matter, were against it at the beginning, but afterward consented thereunto, thinking that when this law was changed, the rest of the commonweal should not be touched: but after when they would haue resisted other alterations which were likewise attempted to be made, they could do no good, but all the order of the commonweal was changed into a Potentacie by the authors of this innovation. moreover, all commonweals are dissolved sometimes of themselves, sometimes outwardly, when there is some contrary commonweal either near to it, or far from it, that is of might and power; as happ●ned to the Athenian● and Lacedemonians: For the Athenians in all places destroyed the Oligarchies, and the Lacedemonians the democracies. Thus ha●e we almost declared from whence the changes a●d seditions of commonweals do spring.  
Seditions never arise in right Aristocraties, but in those that are mixed. First, because a few men haue the government there, and specially when there are others that think themselves nothing inferior to them in virtue. Next of all, when the virtuous men are either unworthily and spitefully dealt with by those that are more honoured, or not admitted to bear office and honour. again, when some are very rich, and others extremely poor: also if some one excel above all others, and bee able to usurp Tyranny. But chiefly, as well that which is called a commonweal as the aristocraty, is dissolved, when the law is broken; which disorder is bread, by reason that the democraty and oligarchy are not well mixed in the commonweal nor in the aristocraty, with virtue: For which cause such kinds of states are changed, one while into democracies, another while into Oligarchies, according to the power of the factions. As for example, the commonweal is changed into a democraty, and the aristocraty into an oligarchy; or the aristocraty into a democraty, and the commonweal into an oligarchy. Also these commonweals are marred by little and little, as the others are, by letting slip some small mischief at the beginning, and after by suffering a greater mischief, till at last all the whole order and state bee there changed. moreover, every kind of commonweal is dissolved, either through an inward disease and mischief at home, or by another contrary and mighty commonweal, either near to it, or far from it.  
AS they at lacedaemon, that were called Parthenians.] When the Lacedemonians moved warres against the Messenians, because they had ravished and defiled their virgines that went to their feast, they bound themselves by great oaths, never to depart from Messina, till they had subdued it: at the siege whereof they obstinately continued by the space of ten yeares By means whereof considering, their wives as weary of such long widdowhead sent for them to come home, and fearing least if they continued any longer, the warres would bee more hurtf●ll to themselves then to the enemies, by reason that if their enemies lost any of their men, they had others born in their stead; but they themselves, besides the expenses and detriment of the wars, dispeopled their city by the barrenness of their wives: Therefore determined they to choose in all the army the young soldiers that were come after the making of these oaths, and were not bound by the same, whom they sent home to their city, with leave and licence to use all their wives indifferently according to their will, in hope that by means hereof they might more easily haue children, if they changed to their liking. now those children that were thus begotten and born, were name Parthenians, to cover the spot of their mothers. And when they came to the age of thirty yeares, perceiving themselves unprovided of any manner of lands, or goods, because they had no certain fathers whom they might succeed, they made choice of one Phalantus for their captain( who had been the author of sending the young men from the army) and conspired against their country. Vpon which occasion they were banished, and after long travell by sea, arrived by chance in italy, and took the city of Tarentum, wherein they stayed,& drove out the inhabitants thereof.  
AS Lysander was by the Kings.] Lysander was one of the greatest captaines of his time, who having ended the warres which the Lacedemonians long time had against the Athenians, won to his country the principality and superiority of Greece, as well by sea as by land, wherefore he was much esteemed and honoured; but afterwards seeing himself debased and evil entreated by king Agesilaus, he attempted for spite to take from the two royal houses their privilege of the kingly estate, to the intent, to deliver it in common to all the families of the spartans: and about this controversy, had raised a great trouble in the city of Sparta, if he had not died so soon as he did. Behold how great ambitious minds that cannot hold a mean, and refrain from exceeding too much in the government of commonweals, are oftentimes the occasion of more mischief then goodness: as Plutarch affirmeth in the lives of Lysander and Agesilaus: and Diodorus Siculus in the fourth chapter of his fourteenth book.  
OR when some valiant man is not admitted to bear office and honor, as Cynadon.] Zenophon writeth, that this Cynadon was a mighty and hardy young man, who in the first year of the reign of Agesilaus, conspired with other Lacedemonians against the king and the chief of the city: Vpon the disclosing of which conspiracy, he was committed to prison, and then being demanded wherefore he had enterprised such kind of wickedness, he made no other answer, but to this end, that he would not bee the most underling of the Lacedemonians. Therefore he and his complices with their hands bound behind them, were led through the city, and whipped and put to death.  
AS Pausanias in lacedaemon seemeth to haue been.] The Lacedemonians for the not diminishing of their forces with idleness, and for the revenging of the outrage and cruelties shewed unto them by the Persians, made war against them, invading& spoiling the country that bordered next to theirs, and made Pausanias general captain, as well of themselves, as of the other Cities of Greece. This Pausanias minding of a captain to make himself a king, conspired with Xerxes to bring Greece under his subiection, and for his reward covenanted with him to take his daughter in marriage: and to the end, that Xerxes should give credite unto him, he delivered into his hands, the prisoners that he had of his. And for the better keeping of the matter secret, he wrote unto him to kill al the messengers which he should sand unto him, as soon as they had done their message. But Aristides captain of the Athenians, who was joined in commission with him, resisted his enterprises, and wisely disclosed his treason; and within a while after Pausanias was accused and condemned: as justine affirmeth in his second book, and thucydides in his first book and fifteenth chapter: Plutarch in the lives of Themistocles and Aristides. Diodorus Siculus in his eleventh book, and tenth chapter, which reasoneth in this sort concerning the matter of Pausanias: Whereas wee haue accustomend in all places of our history to enlarge and exalt the glory of virtuous men, by commendations joined to the end of the declaration of their doings, and contrariwise to accompany the death of the wicked with the reproaches and shames that are due unto them, it is not reasonable that we should let pass the wickedness& treason of Pausanias, without condemning and blaming it: For who is it that would not wonder at his folly, sith after he had done so much good service to Greece, after he had won the battle of Platea, and after he had executed so many other goodly and great things, could not keep his authority, but through too much love and desire of the riches and delights of Persia, defamed and lost all the glory which he had won before; for by too much pride and selfewening in his prosperity, he began to disdain and hate the plain manner of living, according to the Laconian fashion, and inclined to the f●llowing of the Persian superfluities and delights; where as himself was the man that least of all others ought to imitate the manners and factions of strangers, as one that knew not by hearsay, but had himself tried by effect, howe much more the order and manner of living used in his own country, was better and more agreeable to virtue, then the fashions of the barbarous people; and through his own wickedness alone was not he only punished, as he had deserved, but also was the cause that his Citizens and countrymen lost the dominion and principality of the sea.  
AND Hannon of Carthage.] justine in his one and twentieth book, writeth, That Hannon Prince of Carthage, seeing how his riches did excel the power of the City, attempted to make himself King and Lord, and to kill all the senators. For the accomplishment whereof, he invited them all on a solemn day to the marriage of his daughter, intending under colour of religion to commit this treason, to the end also that he might the more easily bring to pass this his complotted intention and malice. Therefore caused he preparation to bee made for the people to dine in the porches and public places, but the Senate he invited to his own house, to the end, that he might the more secretly and without witnesses cause them to eat the poisoned meats, and so kill them, and then bee master of the commonweal, when it should bee deprived of the government. This treason being disclosed by the seruants to the Officers, was by them avoided, but not regarded, for they feared least in revealing the matter, there would be more danger by reason of the Princes power, then in dissembling it. And therefore feigning as though they would make a law for expenses, and for refraining from banquets; they made a general statute, whereby they gave a certain limitation to all marriages generally, without any mention of Hannon, to the end, that it should not seem that they meant him specially. But when he saw how he had missed of his purpose, he determined again at a certain day to procure them to be slain by his soldiers; howbeit, he was again bewrayed. Therefore fearing least he should be arrested of high treason, and arraigned thereof, he betook himself to a strong town, with twenty thousand armed men of his family: At which place whilst he solicited the africans& Mores for aid, he was apprehended and taken: And after that he had been beaten with rods, his eie● put out, and his arms and legs broken, to the end, he might receive punishment in all the members of his body, he was put to death in the presence of all the people, and his body thus mangled, was hanged vpon a Gibbet. And further, all his children and others of his lineage, though they were innocent in the matter, were likewise put to death, to the end, there should not any remain of that so detestable stock, which might follow the example of so heinous an offence, or reuenge his death: as Paulus Orosus affirmeth in his fourth and sixth chapter.  
THE Athenians in all places destroyed the Oligarchies, and the Lacedemonians the democracies.] Aristotle in the fourth book of the Politiques the eleventh chapter, speaking of these two people, saith thus: They that haue obtained the principality of Greece, respecting each of them the form of their own commonweals, haue founded and established in Cities, some of them democracies, and othersome Oligarchies; not regarding the welfare of the same Cities, but their own private commodity. Diodorus Siculus in the seventeenth chapter of his thirteenth book writeth thus: These two chief cities striving either of them for the principality of Greece, demeaned themselves diversly, and used clean contrary proceedings: For the Lacedemonians did always accustom to deliver the government and authority of directing the affairs of the cities, which they reduced to their league, into the hands of the noblest& worship fullest of the same: And the Athenians clean contrary, established therein a popular government, and delivered the sovereign authority into the hands of the multitude. And in the fifteenth book, the twelfth chapter, he saith: But in Greece the Ci●ies we●e in trouble and broil by means of the alterations of the government, which were the occasion that many rose up in the same, attempting innovations, by reason that in the most places there was not any manner of Magistrate that had authority to command; and for that the Lacedemonians supported& favoured them that would establish a government of a small number of honest men; and contrariwise, the Athenians learned to them that would maintain the sovereign authority of the people, and establish the form of a popular government. Plutarch in the life of Lisander saith, In all the Cities tha● Lysander passed by, if they were governed by the authority of the people, or that there were any other kind of government, he left in every of them a Lacedemonian captain or governor, with a counsel of ten officers of them that before had ben in amity and secret confederacie with him. Thus did he also as well in the towns, which had been always in league with the Lacedemonians, as in those which lately had ben their enemies. And lower he saith: In mine opinion Theopompus the Poet was deceived, when he compared the Lacedemonians to vinteners, saying, that they offered a taste to the Grecians of the sweet drink of liberty, and after mingled it with vinegar; for even from the beginning, the tasting of their government, and the digesting thereof by the Grecians, was very sour, by occasion that Lisander in all places, took the government out of the peoples hands, and delivered it into the hands of a small number of the most violent, most audacious, and most seditious persons that were in every City.   

CHAP. VIII. Of the particular preservation of states.  
NOw will we treat of the preservation of all states in general,& of every one particularly. First it is certain, that if we perceive by what means states are destroyed; wee shall also understand those whereby they are preserved. Forasmuch as of contrary causes spring contrary effects, and for that perishing or destruction is contrary to preservation. Therefore in well tempered commonweals, heed should bee taken above all things; that nothing be done contrary to the laws and customs, and specially that an inconvenience& mischief should be looked unto at the first budding; how small soever it be. For the corruption that creepeth in by little& little, is no more perceived, then small expenses be, the often dibursing whereof consumeth the substance of a house. This change is not noted, by reason it cometh not altogether, for mans understanding is therein deceived, as by a sophistical and captious reason, inferring that if every part be small, the whole must needs be small: The which is in some respect true, yet is not so: For the whole& all are not a small thing, but are composed of small things. Therefore the chief point of all consisteth in taking diligent heed of this beginning, and the next in not crediting those subtleties which are craftily and captiously invented to deceive the people. For why, they are sufficiently reproved and refeled of themselves by their own works. We haue set down before what we call wil●ss and crafts of commonweals. again, we are to consid●● that some Aristocraties and Oligarchies continue, not for that they be safe and sure forms of government, but because they that are placed in the magistracy, demean themselves modestly therein, as well towards them that haue no authority in matters of state, as also towards the others tha● haue authority therein: to wit, by doing no manner of injury to them unto whom the commonweal is not imparted& communicated,& by admitting the chief of the country unto the public government. Also by not defrauding thē of honor that be ambitious and desirous therof, nor depriving the multitude of profit,& by living popularly& courteously with their fellows. For the equality that the popular sort do seek for in the multitude, is not only just, but also requisite to be observed amongst such as are of like estate. Therfore if there be many in the government, it is expedient for them to observe many popular fashions: as to create the Magistrates for the space of six months, to the end, that all they that be in such sort like, may be p●rtakers of the same. Because such men amongst thē are already as it were some people. And therfore there often arise amongst them leaders& flatterers of the people, as hath ben before declared. Again, by this mean the Oligarchies& Aristocraties fall less into Potentacies, for it is not so easy a matter to enterprise any wickedness; by remaining a short time in the magistracy, as by continuing a long space in the same: which breedeth tyrannies in Oligarchies and democracies, for they exercise Tyranny that be of most power in each state; as the captaines of the people, and the Potentates; or else they that possess greatest Magistracies, if they continue long in the same. Also commonweals are preserved, not only by being far from those things that may mar& dissolve them, but also by being near thereto, for fear maketh men more heedy and circumspectly about affairs concerning the state. Therfore they that are careful of the welfare of the commonweal, ought oftentimes to propound& fain certain fears, to the end, that the citizens should be always ready to make defence, as the souldi●rs be in the nightwatch when it is set, by making as great reckoning of the danger that is far off as though it were at hand. Further, great care is to be had by provision and penalty of laws, for the withstanding of seditions between men of great calling, and to prevent others before they fall into it. For every man cannot discern a mischief when it first buds, but only he that is very skilful in government. And for the remedying of the alteration which grows in the oligarchy& in the commonweal, vpon occasion of revenues when it happeneth, the revenues continuing all one and the selfsame that they were before,& the m●ny being augmented, in that case it is expedient to c●●ferre the quantity of the common or public revenue, with the revenue in times past: To wit, in cities where the examinations& surueiors of it are made from year to year in that space. And in those that are greater, from three yeeres to three yeeres, or from five yeeres to five yeeres. And if the wealth and substance be augmented or increased beyond the first stint& value ordained, concerning the attaimment to the government of the commonweal, then to augment or diminish that stint according to the tenor of the law, as the wealth increaseth or decreaseth. For in Oligarchies& commonweals, where the contrary is used, the oligarchy and the Potentacie come too much aloft; or the commonweal is changed into a democraty,& the oligarchy into a Commonweal or a democraty. It is a common rule in the democraty, oligarchy, monarchy, and in every form of commonweal, not to make any too mighty, but rather to endeavour the directing and distributing of promotions& honors, in such sort as they may be but small, and enjoyed a long time by thē that are admitted and preferred unto them; than for to order& dispose of thē, as that they should be very great, and enjoyed but a short time by thē that should be placed there: for men was nought & cannot all abide the prosperity of fortune: or else when they haue committed all the honors into the hands of any, that in such case, they take them not away again altogether, but by little& little. And chiefly to provide by law, that no man so rise& grow up, that he excel all others in power of friends, or of riches; if it befall otherwise, then to cause such personages to absent themselves from the city. Also because they seek innovations in the private life, it is expedient to establish a Magistrat, to haue an eye to thē that frame not themselves to live according to the form of the state; as in the Democraty, according to the Democraty;& in the Oligarchy according to the Oligarchy,& likewise of all other commonweals. And if any part of the city through prosperity become too insolent, or rise much, it is to be specially remedied for the same causes. The remedy hereof is, to commit always the charges & offices into the hands of those parts that be directly contrary to that part which waxeth insolent; I mean that the good& upright men be opposed to the multitude;& the poor to the rich;& that there be endeavour used for the mingling of the poor together with the rich; or that the part that is in a mean between both, be increased& preferred. For that preventeth the seditions which might rise by means of inequality. But there is no greater rule to be observed in every commonweal, thē to provide by the laws, that the public offices be not gainful,& specially this ought to be observed in the oligarchy: for the common people take it not in so evil part, that they are barred from the government( but rather rejoice that they may spend their time about their own business) as when they think the magistrates rob the commonweal, for thē conceive they a twofold spite that they are deprived both of honors & profit. And by this only means may the democraty and aristocraty stand,& be together by yielding to the noblemen& to the common people what they demand: which is a thing that may be done. For the admitting of all men indifferently into the government, is Democratical: And that the Noblemen should be magistrates, is aristocratical: which will befall when the officers shall be stripped of all means to draw profit out of the same. In which case the needy will not bee hasty to haue it, because they shal get nothing by it, but will be willinger to apply their own business:& the rich may better exercise the Magistracies, because they haue no need to gain by the commonweal: insomuch, that the poor will become rich by having leisure to ply their work,& the noblemen shal not be subject to the rascal people. But to the end the common treasure be not robbed, let payment be made of the money of the commonweal in presence of al the citizens,& the rolls or bills of account delivered into the custody of the fraternities, companies,& tribes of the city. And to the end the magistrates may execute their offices without gain, it is reason that honors be set down by law for thē that well& orderly shal execute the same. Now in democracies it is reason the rich should be spared,& their possessions and fruits not divided& made equal with other mens, as is privily compassed in some commonweals. And it is better to forbid them the making of great& unprofitable expenses, as at open shows,& in the lanes with torchlight and such like. So also in the oligarchy it behoveth to haue great care of the poor, and distribute unto them those Magistracies wherein there is some profit to be had,& where any rich man doth thē injury to punish him more grievously then one poor man should be for hurting another. Also that inheritances descend not by way of gift, but by right of kindred& consanguinity:& that no man may haue above one inheritance. By means hereof, the goods& possessions shal be the equaller,& many needy persons shal become rich Also it is expedient in the democraty& oligarchy, to give to them that haue least preferment and part in the government, either an equal part or the chief parts in al other things; as in the democraty to the rich,& oligarchy to the poor: except those offices wherein the authority of the commonweal consisteth, which ought to be committed to them onely, or to many of them that haue the government.  
Although the means requisite for the conservation of states, may be understood by the causes of their destructions already declared, yet for the clearer understanding of the present matter a great mainie of them are set down. And first, that nothing bee committed contrary to the laws and customs, and that specially by remedying of inconveniencies at the beginning, how small soever they be; that credite be not given to the guilefulnesse and craft devised for the deceiving of the commonweals, whereof we haue spoken in the fourteenth chapter of the former book; that they that be placed in the Magistracies, behave themselves modestly, as well towards them that haue the managing of public affairs, as towards those that haue not, in doing no wrong to the one sort, and living popularly and courteously with the others; that they who haue care of the welfare of the state, be watchful always, and ready to their defence, in propounding and feigning fears often, to make the Citizens the more diligent in their matters; that contentions and debates arise not amongst the great personages, and that the others be prevented before they fall out; that a law bee made that no man shall vnmeasurablie grow into honour and credit,& become very rich, or get too many friends, vpon pain of banishing them out of the country, that are found so to exceed; that private persons frame their manner of living, according to the form of every commonweal whereto they are subiects, and that therefore Magistrates be ordained to look unto it; that no part of the City become too insolent by means of prosperity; that the Magistrates be not addicted to gain, and that they draw no profit out of the offices by robbing th● commonweal, and that in like sort they be forbidden by law to make great and unprofitable expenses. It doth particularly avail the Oligarchies for avoiding of alteration, happening there by the stint of revenues, to make from time to time surueyes of their wealth, and to augment or diminish the revenue, according to the tenor of the law, as wealth increaseth or decreaseth. It is also behooveful to democracies and Oligarchies, to treat them in the best sort that is possible, that enjoy least part in the state, as the rich in democracies, and the poor in Oligarchies; except in such cases as concern the chief Magistracies, wherein consisteth the sovereign authority of the commonweal, which ought to be administered only by them of the government.  
IT is requisite and behoveful in the democracies to spare the rich, and in the oligarchy to haue great care of the needy.] As Cicero affirmeth in the second book of his offices. In primis autem videndum erit ei qui rempublicam administrabit, vt suum quisque teneat, neque de bonis privatorum publiè diminutio fiat. Perniciose enim Philippus in tribunatu cum l●gem Agrariam ferret, quam tamen antiquari facile passus est,& in eo vehementer se moderatum praebuit: said cum in agendo multa populariter, tum illud malè. non esse in civitate dvo millia hominum qui rem haberent. Capitalis omnino oratio est ad aequationem ●onorum pertinens: qua peste quae potest esse maior? Hanc enim ob causam maximè vt sua tenerentur Respublicae ciuitatésque costitutae sunt. Nam& si deuce naturae congregabantur homines: tamen spe custodia rerum suarum, urbium presidia quaerebant. Et subdit: Qui vero esse populares volunt, ob cámque causam aut agrariam rem tentant, vt possessores suis sedibus pellantur, a●t pecunias creditas debitoribus condonandas putant, labefactant fundamenta Reipublicae. Concordiam primùm tollunt, quae esse non potest cum aliis adimuntur, aliis condonantur pecuniae: deinde equitatem, qua tollitur omnis, si habere suum cvique non licet. Id est enim proprium( vt suprà dixi) civitatis atque urbis, vt sit libera,& non sollicita suae rei cuinsque custodia. Ergo in primis opera danda, vt juris& iudiciorum aequitate suum quisque teneat:& neque ten●iores propter imbecillitatem circumueniantur, neque locupletibus ad sua veltenenda vel recuper anda obsit inuidia.   

CHAP. IX. Of the qualities that are to be required in the chief governors of a state.  
THey which are to exercise the chief Magistracies, ought to haue three things: First, a love to the present state: next of all, great sufficiency to execute those functions and charges that are required in the office: Thirdly, virtue and Iustice, fit for every commonweal. For if the Lawe bee not all one, and the selfsame in every commonweal, it followeth that there must needs bee many differences of iustice. But there is a doubt, when all these things are not to bee found in one selfsame person, howe men shall proceed to the election, I mean if any one bee sufficient to guide an army, but in other respects a bad man, and not a friend to the State; and another just and a friend thereto; In what manner shall the election bee made? In mine opinion it is needful to haue respect to two points, to wit, to that wherein all men do most participate, and are most endowed withall; and to that wherein they least participate, and are least endowed withall. Therefore in the choice and election of a general captain, wee must rather haue an eye to experience in martiall affairs, then to virtue; for there be fewer expert captaines then good and honest men. Contrariwise, in the keeping and disposing of the money and treasure of the commonweal, greater virtue is to bee required, then men for the most part are endowed withall, although the science and skill be common to all men. Also a doubt may be moved, if a man haue sufficiency in him to govern, and bear good will to the state, what need he shall haue of virtue, if with those two things he may be able to perform as much as is expedient; or whether virtue be requisite also: because it may so fall out, that those men that be endued with these two things, may bee vicious and incontinent livers, who though they know they offend and love themselves, yet can they not help themselves by governing their own affections. So may it befall, that some men may thus demean themselves toward the commonweal. Generally, whatsoever we affirm to be enacted by law, to the benefit of Commonweals, doth preserve and uphold commonweals. But the chief groundwork( as we haue already often touched) lieth in procuring that party and side which is content with the present state, to be stronger then the other that is malcontent therewith. Besides all this, we are not to bee ignorant of those things whereof those commonweals are ignorant at this day, that haue transgressed and swerved from the mean. For many things that are supposed to be ordained for the avail of the people, do dissolve the popular states. And diuers other things that seem apt and fit for the state and government of a few, do mar and destroy the same. They who suppose any such thing to be a virtue and perfection, do draw the commonweal to excessiuenesse, not knowing that as a mans nose that somewhat goes out of that strait& right form which is chiefly commended, so as it yields somewhat toward crookedness or fatness, is notwithstanding faire& comely to the eye, howbeit, if any man stretch it further to excessiuenesse and too much, first he takes away the proportion and due measure of the member,& at last brings it to that pass, that it will seem no more a nose, by reason of the excessiuenesse or want of contraries. And so fares it with other parts of the body. The very like doth come to pass in commonweals. For the oligarchy and democraty may be born withall, though they be far from their good order: But if either of them be farther and more stretched out, first the Comonweale shall be impaired, and at last they will proceed so far, that it shal no longer be a commonweal. Therfore the lawmaker and man fit to govern, must haue skill& discretion to know what popular means uphold or destroy the democracies,& what things fit for Oligarchies do preserve the Oligarchy, sith neither of these two states can stand without rich men& the multitude; for if goods should be equal, thē must the commonweal needs change hir form. Therfore the destroying of the rich, or of the poor, by unreasonable laws, is the ruin of commonweals. Some do offend and stray from the right way, both in democracies and Oligarchies; namely, the ringleaders of the people in democracies( where the multitude is master of the laws) by keeping the city always divided into two sects or parts, striving against the rich, though to the contrary they seem evermore to speak in the behalf of the rich: and in Oligarchies, the gentlemen and fautors of the same, who ought evermore to show themselves favourers and furtherers of the peoples benefit, and to take other maner of oaths then they do at this time. For now adays in some Oligarchies they swear in this manner: I will bee the peoples enemy, and practise as much mischief against them as lieth in my power. Yet were it convenient that they should show and dissemble the contrary, and promise vpon their oaths to do the people no wrong. The readiest way and greatest means that hath yet ben spoken off, for the upholding and maintaining of commonweals( which at this day is neglected in all places) is that the bringing up& training of children and youth, bee fitted according to the commonweals. For most behoveful laws and decrees ratified by the consent of all the gouernours, do no good at all, except the subiects bee accustomend and trained to frame their lives and manners, according to the pattern of the commonweal: as for example, if the laws bee popular, let them bee trained and brought up popularly; But if the laws be fit for the oligarchy, then let them be brought up Oligarchically. For if there be incontinence in any one, it is also in the city. Now convenient training and bringing up according to the pattern of the commonweal, is not to accomplish matters for the pleasing of the Gouernours in Oligarchies or Popular states, but rather such kind of things, whereby the one sort may be maintained in the oligarchy, and the other in the democraty. Now in Oligarchies the children of the Gouernours bee nicely and daintily brought up, and poor folkes children are exercised and hardened with labour, so as they haue the more will and power to practise innovation. And in those democracies that seem most popular, there is no such kind of order as there ought to bee, because liberty is there not right; but evil defined and understood. For two things there bee, whereby the democraty seemeth to bee defined and rightly taken, to wit, by the authority which is in the hands of the greatest part of the people; and by liberty: For that which is just and rightful, seemeth to bee equal: and this seemeth to bee equal, that those things bee ratified which please the multitude: and liberty and equality seem to consist in this, that every man do what he list. Therefore in such democracies every man liveth according to his own pleasure and desire, as Euripides saith: But that is stark nought. For the manner of living and demeaning of men according to the form and pattern of the commonweal, is, not to bee judged a bondage, but a welfare and safety. These be the means whereby commonweals are changed and overturned, and whereby they are upheld and maintained.  
Sith it is a thing most requisite for the upholding of states, that the sovereign Magistracies bee in the hands of fit and sufficient persons: Therefore are the qualities hereof declared, that bee necessary for the chief Gouernouts of a state, which bee three. First they must love the present state; secondly, they must haue sufficiency, lukewarmness, and experience in government; thirdly, they must bee endued with that kind of virtue and uprightness which is fit for the commonweal wherein they are. If all these things bee not to bee found in one man, that kind of quality is cheefelie to bee considered in the election of the Magistrate, which most seldom is found in men. But nothing is fitter for the upholding of a State, then the making of that side( which is content with the present State) stronger then the other side that is not content therewith. Further, discretion is to bee used, that there bee no excessiuenesse and vnmeasurablenesse in those means that uphold commonweals, as in the means that are fit for democracies and Oligarchies. Because that by stretching them out too far, such commonweals are impaired, and at last ruinated, when the rich in the one are destroyed, and the poor in the other driven out. Also it is requisite for the preservation of commonweals to fit the bringing up of citizens according to the pattern of the same. As, if the laws be popular, that they be brought up popularly: And if the laws be fit for Oligarchies, that then they be brought up Oligarchically: and that the one sort may be maintained in democracies, and the other in Oligarchies.   

CHAP. X. Of the changing, marring, and overturning of Monarchies.  
IT resteth that we discourse of the monarchy, and consider what things may destroy and preserve it. Almost the same accidents do gro● in kingdoms and Tyrannies, as wee said, did chance in commonweals: For the Kingly State doth imitate the aristocraty, and the Tyranny is made of the extremest sort of the oligarchy,& of the democraty,& is therfore very hurtful to the subiects, for it is compounded of two corrupt commonweals, retaining the transgressions and blemishes of thē both. moreover, it will easily appear, that the beginning of Monarchies hath proceeded of contraries, for the Kingly state was first ordained for the defence of good men against the multitude: and the King was created out of the number of good men, according to the excellency of his virtue, or virtuous deeds, or of the stock from whence he came. The tyrant was created by the multitude, against the Noblemen, to the end, that they should not oppress them, as is manifest by the events and issues of things. For almost all gangrenes haue become so, through being Captaines and leaders of the people, having gotten credite by forging accusations against the nobility. Then one sort of Tyrannies hath sprung up in this manner, the Cities being already grown great. Others, of those that having been Kings before, haue violated the ancient customs of the country, desiring to command more absolutely. Others, of such as haue been chosen to the chiefest Cities: for in ancient times the people allowed long time to Magistracies and public charges. And others of Oligarchies, where they had chosen and preferred some one to great offices, for to hold them in manner of sovereignty: for in all these manners they might easily usurp a tyranny, if they were but willing thereunto, because some had already the power of a Kingly estate, and others the honor, as Phidon in Argos, and others which made themselves gangrenes, having before Kingly authority; and those of Ionia and Phalaris, the honour. Panecius among the Leontines, and Cypselus at Corinth, and Pisistratus at Athens, and dionysius at Syracusa, and others in the same sort, of Captaines of the people haue become gangrenes. So the Kingly state doth resemble the aristocraty, in that it is given according to the persons dignity, or through his virtue, or birth, or honourable deeds, or through all these things together, and through power. For all those that haue well deserved, or might well deserve of Cities and Countries, haue attained to this honour; some in defending them from bondage, as Codrus; others in setting them at liberty, as Cyrus; some for building a City, or conquering a Country, as the Kings of the Lacedemonians and Molossians. The office of a King, is to see that the rich be no way injuried, nor the multitude outraged. The Tyrannical State( as hath been often said) hath no respect to the public commodity, unless it be for his own peculiar profit: and the only end end or aim of a tyrant, is pleasure; of a king, honesty. Wherefore the desire to exceed in money, is Tyrannicall; and to excel in honour, more kingly. The kings guard is of Citizens, the gangrenes of strangers. That the tyranny hath the vices and corruptions of the democraty and oligarchy, it is manifest: of the oligarchy, in that it chooseth riches for the only end whereat it aimeth; otherwise the guard and magnificence thereto requisite, could not be maintained: likewise, in that it doth in no sort trust the multitude, and therefore takes their weapons from them. Item, the oppression of the people, the driving them out of the citadel, and forcing them to disperse themselves, is common to them both, as well to the oligarchy, as to the tyranny. It taketh likewise of the democraty, the making of war against the Nobles, the destroying of them by covert, or open means, and banishing them as aduersaries and enemies to that state, because they are the authors of conspiracies: when some will seek to rule themselves, others refuse to endure subiection. For which cause, Periander counseled Thrasibulus to lop off the highest ears of corn; as if it were necessary always to make away the chiefest Citizens.  
The Philosopher, after he hath declared the means whereby commonweals are altered and destroyed, he reasoneth likewise touching Monarchies, whereof there are two sorts, to wit, the kingdom, and the Tyrannnie; showing the beginning of either of them, together with the difference of their ends, and causes which mar and destroy them: affirming them to be the very same that be in other commonweals; the kingdom following the steps of the aristocraty, and tyranny imitating the oligarchy and the democracies. The end and scope of the king is the profit of the commonweal, whereunto he referreth all things. The end and scope of the tyrant is pleasure. The office of the King is to provide, that the rich be not in any wise injuried, nor the common people outrageously and reproachfully dealt withall. The tyrant regardeth not the commonweal, except it be for his own private profit, having all the faults of the oligarchy, and of the democraty. The King excelleth in honour, the tyrant in money. The kings guard is of Citizens, the gangrenes guard is of strangers.  
FOR all they which had deserved well.] Aristotle in the third book of the politics, the tenth chapter saith: Forasmuch as the first were benefactors of the multitude, either by inventing of arts, or by warres, or by gathering them into companies, or in giuing them lands, they were voluntarily created Kings, and transferred the same kingdoms by succession to their posterity. As Cicero affirmeth in the second book of his Offices. Subijciunt se homines imperio alterius& potestati pluribus de causis. Ducuntur enim aut beneuolentia, aut beneficiorum magnitudine, aut dignitatis praestantia, aut spe id sibi utile futurum, &c.  
SOME by keeping them from falling into bondage, as Codrus.] There were many old quarrels and grudges between the Athenians and the Dorians, which the Dorians minded to end by warres. And therefore sought they to learn of their gods what the success of the war should be: It was answered them that they should haue the victory, so they killed not the king of the Athenians. For this cause they assembled themselves against them, and coming to the battle, before and above all things they commanded their men to take heed that they slay not the King of the Athenians, called Codrus: who being advertised of the answer given by the gods, and of the commandement of the Dorians, clothed himself in base apparel, and took a burden of boughs vpon his back, which he carried into the Dorians camp. And because there was a great throng, he of set purpose with a bill which he carried about him, stroke and hurt a soldier, who presently slue him. And after he was dead, the Dorians perceiving it was Codrus King of the Athenians, went their ways without fighting any battle. By which mean, and through the virtue of their king, the Athenians were delivered from this war: as justine reporteth in his second book.  
OTHERS by setting them at liberty, as Cyrus.] The Persians before his time, obeied the Medes, out of which bondage they were not onely delivered by Cyrus, but obtained also the Empire of all Asia, transferring the monarchy of Medea into Persia, as Herodotus and justine affirm in the first book, and Diodorus Siculus in his second book. Therefore Cyrus in the eight book of his Pedia or institution, written by Xenophon, rejoiceth when he made his last will, that he left his Country in noble state, and honoured above all other countries in the world, whereas before it had neither famed nor renown in Asia.  
THE office of the king is to keep the rich that they bee not in any wise injuried, nor the common people outrageously or reproachfully dealt withall.] Cicero in the second book of his Offices saith: Mihi quidem on apud Medes solùm( vt ait Herodotus) said apud etiam maiores nostros fruende iustitia causa, videntur olim b●ne morati reges constituti. Nam cum premeretur multitud● ab his qui maiores opes habebant, ad vnum aliquem consugiebant virtute praestantem: qui cum prohiberet iniuria tenuiores, aequitate constituenda, summos cum infimis pari jure retinebat. Ergo hoc quidem perspicuum est, eos ad imperandum deligi solitos, quorum de iustitia magna esset opinio multitudinis. Adiuncto vero hoc, vt ijdem etiam prudentes haberentur, nihilerat quod homines his authoribus non posse consequi se arbitrarentur. Therefore a good king ought to preserve the Noble and rich men, and not to displease his people; to resist the ambition of the mighty, and to repress the insolence of the common people. Besides these two Offices, the roman Emperours had one difficulty, which lay in fitting themselves to the cruelty and covetousness of the men of war, a thing of such toil and loathsomeness, that it wrought the destruction of the most of them. For it was altogether unpossible to satisfy both the people and the soldiers together. For the people love quietness and peace, and so doth the Prince that is of a mildred and modest nature: whereas contrariwise, the souldious desire a Prince that is warlike, insolent, cruel, and given to spoil, wherein their desire was to train the Emperours to the hindrance of the people, for the increasing of their own pays and pensions, and for the satisfying of their covetousness and cruelty: which was the cause that some Emperours having neither by cunning nor by nature the dexterity and skill to keep both the one and the other in awe, did commonly continue small times their Monarchies. The great turk is brought to the like inconvenience, who by keeping always near about him for his guard a great number of footmen, called Ianissaries, and of horsemen, must needs seek their favor and good will( without all respect of the people) as Machiauel affirmeth in the nineteenth chapter of his Prince.  
AND the kings guard is of Citizens, and the gangrenes of strangers.] Aristotle in the third book of the peacocks, the tenth chapter saith, The Kings are guarded by the power of Citizens, the gangrenes by strangers. And the Kings govern according to the law, and exercise dominion over such as are voluntarily subject: The gangrenes rule by constraint: insomuch, that the one sort are guarded by the Citizens, the other against the Citizens.  
We must therefore deem, that the beginnings of alterations in Monarchies, are almost all one with those that happen in commonweals, as hath been already declared: for many subiects are provoked to conspire against the Monarchies by reason of injustice, and for fear, and for contempt. injustice is chiefly committed by occasion of reproach and injury, and sometimes also by occasion of spoiling men of their goods. And they tend to the same ends in Tyrannies,& kingdoms, as they do in the aforementioned commonweals: for as much as Monarchs abound in riches and honours, to which things all men aspire. Some conspiracies bee made against the persons of Princes, othersome against their state. Those that are done for reproach and injury, are against the person. And as there be many sorts of injuries, every of them is cause of despite and wrath. The most of them that be incensed to wrath, do conspire, to the end to bee avenged, and not to excel others. As the conspiracy against the children of Pisistratus was caused through the injury done to Harmodus his sister, and by reason that he himself had ben provoked, and dispightfully handled: For Harmodus became their enemy for his sisters sake, and Aristogiton for Harmodus his sake. Also there grew a conspiracy against Periander the tyrant of Ambracia, for that as he sat at a banquet he had asked a young boy that he loved, whether he were with child by him. Pausanias slay King Philip, because he neglected the injury that was done unto him by Attalus. Derdas conspired against amyntas, surnamed the small, because he boasted of the abusing of his youth. Euagoras the Cyprian conspired against Eunucus, whose son he slay, for the injury which he thought he had receive at his hands, in that he forsook his wife, who was the said Euagoras his kinswoman. Also many rebellions haue been made against Monarchs, for the villainous and shameful acts that some of them haue committed against the bodies of other folk: as the rebellion of Crates against Archelas, who was always grievous and irksome unto him, because he had his unlawful company; insomuch, that this occasion, and also a less, sufficed him: or because he gave not him any of his daughters in marriage, as he had promised. But when he was entangled in the warres with Sirria and Arrabia, he married the eldest to the King of Elibee, and the youngest to the son of amyntas, supposing thereby to haue less controversy with him that was born of Cleopatra. Notwithstanding, the ground and true cause of the hatred and turning of Crates his mind against Archelas, was for that he took it in evil part that he was procured and compelled to serve his filthy lust. Hellanocrates of Larissa conspired vpon the very like occasion: For when Archelas had abused his youth, because he restored him not into his country according to his promise. This Hellanocrates imagined that Archelas had desired& used his company to injury and reproach him, and not for love. Paron, Heraclides, and Enian, slay Cotis to bee revenged for the injury done to their father. And Adamas forsook Cotis and went from him, because he had caused him to be gelded in despite& reproach, while he was a boy. Also many in anger because they had ben beaten and wounded in their bodies, haue ●laine or enterprised to kill princes and kings: as at Mitilene, Megacles conspired with his friends, slay the Pentalides governors of the town, who in all places as they walked up and down, use with iron clubs to beat those that passed by them: and afterwards Smerdes slay Pentilas for that he had ben beaten by him, and drawn about by his wife. Decamnicus was the author and director of the conspiracy against Archelas, and the first that stirred up the other rebels. The occasion of his anger was, for that Archelas had delivered him to the Po●t Euripides to bee beaten, who bare a grudge, because he had used some speech of the stinking of his breath. And many other haue for like causes ben slain or laid in wait for to that end.  
Three things provoke subiects to conspire against Monarchs, namely, injustice, fear and contempt:& conspiracy is made either against the person of the Prince, or against his state. That conspiracy which proceedeth of injury, whereof there are many sorts, is against the person of the king for reuenge of outrage, dishonour, or damage received. Touching the which Aristotle allegeth many examples fetched from the manners& customs of Greece, whereto it is easy to add an innumerable others, both ancient& modern, wherewith we may be furnished by the licentious life of princes in their great authority. For the abusing whereof, many of them haue ben greatly despised, and either killed or shamefully driven out of their states.  
INIVSTICE is chiefly committed by occasion of reproach and injury, and sometimes also vpon occasion of spoiling men of their goods.] Aristotle in the chap. following saith, The Monarch ought to abstain from all kinds of injury, and specially from two sorts; the one, from beating of folk, the other from dishonouring youth by filthy lust. Therefore injuries concern goods, blood, or honour. Of those that concern blood, the threatenings are more dangerous then the execution, yea they are most dangerous, and the execution without all peril; for he that is dead, cannot think of reuenge, and they that be alive, for the most part, care very little or nothing at all for it: but he that hath been threatened, and seeth himself of necessity constrained to do, or suffer, becometh a dangerous person, and one greatly to be feared by the Prince. Next to this necessity, goods and honour are the two things which most offend men, and whereof the Prince is to take heed, for he cannot strip a man so naked, but he shall leave him a knife to work reuenge withall, nor so much dishonour him, but he will yet retain a steadfast mind to seek for redress. Now amongst those honours which are taken away, the honour of gentlewomen is of greatest weight& importance. And next to it the despising and disdaining of a mans person.  
SOME conspiracies are made against the persons of Princes, others against their state.] Brutus and Cassius with their complices conspired against Iulius Caesar to kill him, desiring to deliver their country whereon he signorized, keeping it in thraldom. Henry earl of Derby conspired against his own kinsman Richard King of England, to take the crown from him. Richard and Edward Dukes of york, against Henry the ●ixt to the same end. Pepin& Lotarius conspired against Lewys the Pitiful, their father, Emperour and King of france, to compel him to leave and resign the imperial dignity, and to led the rest of his life in the solitariness of religion. Gaguin writeth in his fourth book, and Paulus AEmilius in his third book, Catiline and Hanno, of whom we haue spoken before, conspired against their countries, the one against the roman, the other against the Carthaginian state.  
THE conspiracy against the children of Pisistratus was caused through the injury done to Harmodus his sister.] Pisistratus the tyrant of Athens at the time of his death left three sons, Diocles, Hipparcus, and Hippias, against whom a conspiracy was made vpon this occasion: Diocles the eldest son, having forced a young Damosell, sister to Harmodus, was by him slain. Hippias minding to reuenge his brothers death, caused Harmodus to be apprehended, and diligently to bee examined vpon the rack concerning them that were guilty and consenting to the death of his brother, and Harmodus name all the gangrenes chief friends, who caused them presently to be all slain. And afterwards when the murderer was asked again whether he had any more complices in this matter, he answered, There be no more that I desire to see slain, saving thyself. By which speech he gave him to understand, that he had overcome him and his tyranny, even as he had revenged the shane done to his sister. When this came to the knowledge of the Athenians, they drove Hippias out of the city, and sent him into exile: as justine writeth in his second book. Plinie declareth, that the Athenians erected Images for them. But thucydides speaketh otherwise concerning this matter in his first book: The Athenians( saith he) beleeue and say commonly that Hipparcus was slain by Harmodus and by Aristogiton, because he was a tyrant; and consider not howe at the same time that he was slain, Hippias that was the eldest son of Pisistratus, reigned in the City of Athens, whose brethren Hipparcus, and Thessalus were, and that one day Harmodus and Aristogiron( who had undertaken to kill them all three) imagining that the matter had ben disclosed to Hippias by some of their complices, durst not execute their enterprise against him, doubting least he were advertised of it. But nevertheless they determined to do some act worthy of memory before they were taken. So they came and found Hipparcus, who was busy in offering sacrifice at the Temple, which was called Leocorion, and there slay him. As Plato writeth in his second Dialogue of the Symposes.  
PAVSANIAS slay king Philip, because he neglected the injury done unto him by Attalus.] Plutarch in the life of Alexander the great, declareth that murder in this manner: When Pausanias had been villainously outraged in his body by the knowledge& commandment of Attalus and Cleopatra, and could not obtain redress nor iustice at the hands of king Philip, he turned his wrath against him, and slay him for despite. The fault of which murder was for the most part imputed to Olimpias, for shee( as the report went) provoke and incensed this young man boiling in anger, so to do: but there was some suspicion also that touched Alexander. justine in his ninth book setteth down this matter more plainly. While King Philip expected the aid of Greece, he determined to celebrate the marriage between Alexander, whom he had made king of Epyrus, and Cleopatra his daughter. So the day was appointed whereon the marriage should bee solemnized in great triumph, as the dignity of the two Kings required: whereat there were many plays and pastimes. And as king Philip was coming to behold them being between the two Alexanders, the one his own natural son, and the other his son in law, without any of his guard about him. Pausanias a young Gentleman, whom no man suspected, espied Philip in a narrow place, and passing by, slew him. By this means the day which had ben appointed for great triumph, was turned into great mourning. This Pausanias had ben in his youth violently abused in his body by Attalus, who besides the reproach& outrage he had done unto him, committed another thing against him that was more villainous: For he caused him to come to a banquet, and when he was drunken, was not content to abuse his body, but exposed it to other of the gests, as a common strumpet, whereupon every body after derided& mocked him: of which reproach and outrage he had often made complaint to king Philip, who fed him with words, and laughed him to scorn. Therefore when he saw that he who had committed this reproach and outrage, was honoured, and made captain and lieutenant to the king, he turned his anger against the king himself. Thus revenged he his injury vpon the judge, because he could not reuenge it vpon the party. Many were of opinion, that Olimpias( Alexanders mother) had procured him to this dead, and that Alexander was privy to it, because he was no less angry and displeased that Philip had forsaken Olimpias his mother, to mary Cleopatra, then that Pausanias had ben so vilely abused, and specially for that he doubted least Philip would leave the kingdom to the son which he had by Cleopatra: Diodorus Siculus in the six and twentieth chapter of his sixteenth book, declareth all the matter at large, concluding in this manner: Behold how Philip who was the greatest king of his time that was in all Europe, and who for the greatness of his power placed himself in the rank of the twelve gods, pitifully ended his daies, after he had reigned the space of four and twenty yeares. This Prince had at the beginning of his reign very small power, but he increased it greatly afterwards, not so much by force of arms, as by his gentle speech and by his good behaviour, and the good countenance he shewed all the world. And it is said, that himself gloried more in his martiall wisdom, and the exploits he had done through good skill to deal wisely in matters, then in those that he had executed by prowess and force of arms. For in victories( said he) all they which fight in the battle, haue part; but in the exploits, which I haue done by skill of handling of matters wisely, the honour is due to none but to myself alone.  
The like happeneth through fear, which we haue reckoned as one of the causes that work the destructions of Monarchies, as well as of other states. As Artabanus wrought a trech●rous practise against Xerxes, fearing the accusation made by his enemies concerning Darius, whom he had caused to be hanged without the commandement of Xerxes: and supposed that Xerxes would pardon him, and not remember it for the good cheer which he had made him at supper.  
conspiracy riseth vpon occasion of fear, when a man is threatened by the Prince, and will prevent it by practising to execute that first which he supposeth to be pretended against him. These threatenings are very hurtful to Princes, and the cause of more vehement conspiracies, then wrongs and offences be. Therefore they ought to refrain from threatening. For it is expedient to deal friendly with men, or to provide sufficient security against them, and never to bring them into such terms, as to give them occasion to think that they must needs die, or deliver themselves from death. The Emperor Commodus had two Captaines of praetorian souldiers, whose names were Letus and Electus, whom he accounted two of his chief and most familiar friend; so had he Martia for the best beloved of his concubines: but because they often blamed him for those acts which he committed contrary to the dignity of his person, and of the Empire, he determined their death, and wrote in a bill, Martia, Letus, Electus,& some other names of men that the next night he intended to put to death. This bill he laid under the pillow of his bed, and when he was gone to the hot house, a young man that was highly in his favour, playing about the chamber, and vpon his bed, found the bill, and as he went out of the chamber with this paper in his hand met Martia, who took it from him and red it, and seeing the contents, sent immediately for Letus and Electus, who perceiving the danger they stood in, determined to prevent it, and without delay the night following slay Commodus. The Emperour Anthonius Caracalla warred in Mesopotamia, and had for his lieutenant Macrinus, a man more civil then warlike. And as it falleth out, that bad Princes stand always in fear least that bee executed against them which they think they haue deserved, Antonius wrote to Maternianus his friend, being then at Rome, appointing him to inquire of the Astrologers, if there were any that aspired to the Empire, and to advertise him thereof. Maternianus wrote back unto him that Macrinus aspired to it. This letter fell first into Macrinus hands, and perceiving that he must needs kill the Emperour, before any new letter came to him from Rome, or else be killed himself, he committed the matter to Martiall a Centurion his faithful friend( whose brother Antonius a few daies before had slain) who executed this commission.  
ARTAEANVS wrought a treacherous practise against Xerxes.] Diodorus Siculus in the 15. chapter of his eleventh book, setteth down that conspiracy in this sort: Artabanus of the country of Hyrcan, a man in great credit with his master king Xerxes, and captain of his guard, enterprised to kill him, and to make himself King: he acquainted another with his enterprise, whose name was Mythridates, an Eunuch, who lay in the kings chamber, in whom the king put more confidence then in any other. This man was Artabanus kinsman and old friend, by reason whereof he easily consented to his treason. Therefore Artabanus coming secretly by night into the kings chamber by the means of his Eunuch, slay him in his bed:& then went strait towards his children, who were three in number, to wit, Darius the eldest, the second Artaxerxes, and the third Histaspes, who at that time was absent from the court, for he had the government of the country of the Bactrians. now then after the killing of Xerxes, Artabanus went to Artaxerxes, for it was night still, and gave him to understand, that his brother Darius had slain their father, to the intent to usurp the kingdom: And counseled him so to deal( before his brother had got all into his possession) that through his own slothfulness and want of courage, he were not compelled to serve, where he might be lord, make himself king, and bee avenged vpon him that had slain his father; promising him withall( if he would enterprise the matter) to give him the guards of his fathers body. Artaxerxes believed it, and presently went with the guards of his father, to kill Darius his elder brother. Therefore Artabanus perceiving his enterprise in such forwardness, took his own children with him, telling them that now was a fit time to get the kingdom, and bending himself against Artaxerxes, stroke him with a sword: Artaxerxes feeling himself wounded, but not to death, quickly took his sword to defend himself, and stroke Artabanus so right, that he fell dead to the ground. Thus Artaxerxes being almost wonderfully saved, and having withall revenged the death of his father, succeeded him in the kingdom and in the Empire of Persia. read justine also touching this matter in the beginning of his third book.  
Other conspiracies are caused through contempt; as a certain man seeing Sardanapalus spin amongst Gentlewomen, if it bee true that is reported thereof. And although it happened not so to him, it may nevertheless happen indeed unto some other. Dion rose against dionysius the latter, through contempt, chee●ly because he perceived the other Citizens bore him evil will, and because he was always drunk. And some friends conspire against Monarchs, through contempt, whom they despise for the trust that is reposed in them, as men that can execute their enterprise before they be disclosed. moreover, they that think they can obtain the state, conspire in some respects through contempt: For as men that perceive themselves of sufficient power to attain their purposes, and making no account of danger, by reason of their power they easily enterprise: As the generals of armies against the Monarchs. As Cyrus did against astyages, despising his life and power, because his army was corrupted,& because he himself wallowed in delights and pleasure. And Senthis the Thracian against Amadoceus, being master of his army.  
The Prince is despised when he sheweth himself variable, light, e●feminat, cowardly, and not well stayed, from which imperfections he should more carefully keep himself than from a rock in the sea, and should so carry himself; that men may aclowledge in all his actions a certain majesty, nobleness of heart, gravity and constancy; causing that in those things specially which concern the particular matters of his subiects, his sentence may stand for an irrevocable decree: and he should maintain himself in such reputation, that men should fear to go about to deceive him. The prince that procureth such estimation of himself, cannot fail to be greatly feared and redoubted, and being so, hardly will any man attempt to conspire against him: neither shall he bee easily assailed of any that knoweth him to be a lord that is valiant, and both honoured and obeyed by his people. It is therefore necessary for him to cause the fear of his name in two places; the one within his own country, in regard of his subiects; the other in foreign countries, in regard of strange Potentates, from whom he shall defend himself with good munition and good friends that are his allies and confederates, who will never fail him, so he use good order and government in his own forces: and when foreign matters go well forward, domestical causes will remain in good state, unless some secret conspiracy at home disturb them: Wherein he cannot provide a better remedy then by not making himself to be despised and grudged at by his subiects, but contenting them by honest means. For hatred and contempt, are the two chief causes of conspiracies: for the conspirator thinketh he doth greatly-gratifie the common people by the death of the lord that hath their evil will and is despised. And where he should imagine to hurt him, he would scarce execute the enterpri●e, by reason of the infinite difficulties which are in the directing and performance of such attempts: for ther is nothing but all kind of dreadfulness, iealousy, distrust, and fear of punishment, before the conspirators eyes, to dismay and make them slack in their purposes, whereas the Prince hath on his side, the majesty of his crown, the laws, the help of his friends, and his Guard; whereto if the good will of the common people be added, there shall not bee found so rash and fool hardy a man that dare take such folly in hand.  
As a certain man seeing Sardanapalus spin with gentlewomen.] Sardanapalus king of the Assyrians, who was far corrupter in all kind of lewdness then a light woman: And although his Lieutenants were not permitted to come to the sight of him, yet Arbactus his lieutenant in Media, through great ambition and means, obtained with much ado to see him, and found him amongst a company of his concubines, spinning of Purple, in womans apparel, lighter in countenance, in apparel, and wanton toys, than any of the rest, appointing the damsels to their tasks and work: Whereat Arbactus was so offended, that so great a number of men wearing armor, obeyed a woman which dealt about a wool, that he disclosed what he had seen, to his fellowes the lieutenants of other provinces: to whom he declared how he would never obey such a kind of man as had rather be a woman than a man: And he did hereby so stir them up, that all with one accord made warres against him. When knowledge hereof came to Sardanapalus, he sought not( as a man should do) how to defend his kingdom, but( as women do) a place where he might hid his head. Notwithstanding within a short time after, when he perceived himself driven to it, he came forth with a few men without order to the battle: where being immediately overcome, withdrew himself to his royal palace, wherein he caused a pile of wood to be made, then did he set himself& his riches vpon it, causing fire to be put under it, performing in that thing only, a mans act. After his death, Arbactus was made king in his stead, who transferred the empire of the Assyrians to the Medes: as justine writeth lib. 1. But Diodorus Siculus lib. 2. cap. 107. wrote thus concerning that matter: Sardanapalus the 30 king of the line of Ninus, and last king of the Assyrians, went beyond all his predecessors in slothfulness and idleness: for besides that he was never seen abroad by any man living, he led an effeminate life with his concubines, wearing one while a crimosen coat, another while a coat of fine wool, another while a womans cloak. he painted his face, and all his body, according to the manner of a strumpet, showing himself more lascivious then women themselves, and counterfeited his speech according to the imitation and likeness of theirs: He desired not only to haue daily such food both in meat and drink, as might provoke him to lightness, but also gave himself wholly to lust, abused one while the office of a man, another while the office of a woman, besides all honesty, without regard of kind,& without all shane. While Sardanapalus continued his manner of living in this dissolution and wickedness, Arbaces of Medea, a man full of great virtue, and of a good stomach, captain of the army that was yearly sent by the Medes before the city of Nine, subverted& wholly destroyed the state and kingdom of Assyria, which had so long lasted Budeus saith, That when Sardanapalus departed out of the world, he carried away with him and as it were spoiled the earth of goods, very near worth fifty millions of gold.  
DION rose up against dionysius the last, through contempt.] Dion, son of Hippias, overthrew the Tyranny of dionysius, and with less means then ever man had, that before him took such matters in hand, overthrew the greatest and mightiest state that then was in all Europe, contrary to the opinion and hope of all the world. For who would ever haue believed that he that arrived in Sicilia only with two ships of burden, could haue overcome a lord that had at his disposing 400 vessels with oars, an 100000 footmen, 10000 horsemen, with such provision and munition of armor, corn, and money, as was needful to furnish the maintenance of so great a power, and that besides al these things, had in his obedience one of the greatest and mightiest cities that then was in al Greece, that had so many havens, so many goodly storehouses, so many strong castles that could not be taken by siege, and besides all that, was in league with many great and mighty confederates? but the thing that gave Dion the victory in this enterprise, was chiefly his noble heart and valiant mind, with the love& good will that they bare him, whom he came to set at liberty. And that which more availed him then all this, was the slouthfuln●sse and cowardliness of the tyrant, with the hate and evil will that they bare him, whom he unjustly kept in bondage. All which causes concurring together in one selfsame time, brought those matters to effect, which otherwise were altogether incredible. The history appeareth in Diodorus Siculus his sixth book, and in Plutarch in the life of Dion. George Gemist in his first book of the acts of the Grecians, declareth also the enterprise of Dion, and what followed thereon.  
AND some friends do conspire against the Monarchs through contempt.] Commonly, they that conspire against Monarchs, are familiar with them, and men of great credite about them, and there bee some that are provoked to conspire sooner, by reason of too many benefits& good turns which they haue received, then by occasion of too much wrong and outrage: as Perennius did against Commodus, Plautian against severus, and Seian against Tyberius, who had ben advanced to great riches by the Emperors,& to so great degree of honor, that they thought they wanted nothing to the perfection of their authority& power, but the Empire, whereof not minding to miss, they conspired against their masters, whose conspiracies had all such ends, as their vnthankefulnesse deserved. Therfore the Prince that will keep himself from conspiracy, ought more to fear thē whom he hath raised to great preferment, then them whom he hath hardly dealt withall. For these of the latter sort want commodities wherewith the others abound, and their wils be all alike: for the desire of reigning, is as great or greater, thē the desire of reuenge. Therfore Princes ought not to give so great authority to their friends, as that there should not remain some odds and space between it& their own sovereign dignity; and that there should not be between both, something to bee wished for by them: otherwise, it shalbe a strange and rare case, if it fall not out with them, as it did with those Emperors.  
As cyrus did against Asti●ges, despising his life& authority.] Cyrus was son of Maridane, astyages his daughter, that was married to cambyses a Persian lord. Zenophon in the first book of the institution bringeth in cyrus a young child, flouting at the delights and superfluities of Astyages his grandfather, the which in sum may bee referred to the saying of Aristotle-Neuerthelesse Herodotus in his ● book writeth, that the cruelty and hard dealing of Astyages, was the occasion that he lost his empire, and the Medes their liberty.  
And Senthis the Thracian, against Amadoceus.] Zenophon maketh mention of their strife, in the fourth book of the greek affairs.  
Some conspire for many such things together, as for the contempt which they haue of work: and for the gain which they seek for, as Mithridates did against Ariobarzanes:& for this cause make they invasions, specially they that be hardy of nature and courageous, and are preferred to honour by the entrails, in martiall offices; for manhood possessing power, waxeth audacious: and by means of each of the same, rise they against their princes, as men that may easily attain to their purpose.  
The bold and courageous of nature, being advanced by the entrails, and preferred to the guiding of the armies, conspire against them through contempt of their persons, and for the hope they haue to get their state, or some great province depending on the same. So the last kings of the race of Clouys, being grown very slothful, and so subject to their pleasure, that no account was made of them, enjoyed no more for a certain time but the bare and only name of king, and left the whole government of the kingdom to the Maiors of the Palace, and Constables: who having the forces in their hands, and disposing of al affairs concerning peace and and war according to their own discretion, took so much boldness vpon them as to drive them away and place themselves in their steads. Charles Martel with such power kept four kings under his tuition,& by means thereof gave an entrance to Pepin his son to obtain the crown, which caused Childeriks hairs to be clipped( who was the last king of that race, without children& without wit) and put him in a monastery, and after practised to procure himself to be chosen king, as one that could well perform the duty of a king, and to be placed instead of him that was unfit for it, by the nobility of france: who to that end were by Pope zachary dispensed withall for the oath of fidelity that they had taken to the other. And after came Stephan his successor into France, of very purpose to consecrate Pepin, and to settle Pepin in his usurpation, under the cloak and authority of Religion: as Gaguin writeth in his 4 book, and Paulus AEmilius in his 2 book. Likewise Hugh Capet, a man of mighty courage, when there was none to withstand his practices and enterprises, so handled his matters with force and violence, that he obtained the kingdom, and procured himself to be crwoned king of France; saying he was admonished to do so as he was asleep, by S. Valerie and S. Richard, because he had worshipped their bodies with great honour and reverence, and was careful to lay them again in their own places, when they had been transported out of their graues by the Normans: To which miracle he added the lawful succession of his lineage; for he boasted that he was issued of Odo the Angeuyn, whom the nobility of France by reason of the cowardliness of Charles the simplo, had placed in the kingdom: as Paulus Emilius writeth in his third book, and Gaguyn in his sixth book.  
As Mithridates conspired against Ariobarzanes.] Zenophon in the 7 book of the expedition of Cyrus the younger, speaketh of one Mithridates governor of Lycaonia and Cappadocia.  
But in them that conspire for ambition, there is another maner of cause besides those that are before recited: for they assault not the gangrenes as some do, to the end to possess the great profits and honours which they see in them, but determine to hazard themselves in doing some act worthy of remembrance, thereby to purchase reputation and renown: they( I say) assault not gangrenes to the end to get their state, but glory. Notwithstanding there be few that attempt to conspire for this cause; for they must be resolved to make no account of their lives, so they may attain their purpose. And it is needful for thē to haue the like mind that Dion had, for he assaulted dionysius the tyrant with a few privy-councillors, saying, that he was so minded that it should suffice him in what place soever he came, to haue set this enterprise so far forward, though after he had entred never so little into the gangrenes country, he should presently die, and that this death should bee honourable unto him.  
In old time great honors were set down in Greece for them that killed the gangrenes. Therefore many were pushed forward by this ambition, to conspire against them, to get glory and reputation: such a one was Dion amongst the Grecians, who invaded dionysius the younger: and Brutus amongst the romans, who slay Iulius Caesar, to free the commonweal from Tyranny, and to purchase the renown and reputation of a good Citizen. Plutarch in their lives compareth them together. Now when there are such ambitious conspirators, which haue no care nor fear of death, so that they may effect their purposes, it is very hard for a Prince to beware of them: but the best means for the avoiding of such danger, is that he get the general love of his subiects, for when he hath obtained that, there will not bee any man, how desperate soever he be that will attempt any thing against them. Nam( vt ait Cicero libro secundo Officiorum) rerum omnium nec aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas, quam diligi, nec alienius, quam timeri. Praeclarè Ennius.  
Quem metuunt, oderunt:  
Quem quisque odit, periisse expetit.  
Multorum autem odijs nullas opes posse obsistere, si antea svit ignotum, nuper est cognitum. Nec vero huius Tyranni solùm, quem armis oppressa pertulit civitas, interitus declarat, quantum odium hominum valet ad pestem; said reliquorum similes exitus Tyrannorum, quorum haud ferè qui●quam interitum similem effugit. Malus enim custos diuturnitatis metus: contràque beneuolèntia fidelis est vel ad perpetuitatem. Nec vero vlla vis imperij tanta est, quae premente metu posset esse diut●rna. Testis est Phalaris, cuius est praeter cateros nobilitata crudelitas, qui non ex insidijs interijt, nec à paucis, said in quem vniuersa Agrigentinorum multitudo impetum fecit.  
The Tyranny is likewise destroyed by an exterior manner, as every other commonweal, to wit, if there be any contrary estate of greater power. For doubtless there wants no readiness thereunto by reason of the diversity of government; and that which all men desire, if they can, they will execute. The contrary forms of commonweals, are as the democraty to the tyranny: in like sort, as one potter is contrary to another, according to Hesiodus: sith the last kind of democraty is a tyranny. Likewise, the Kingly state and the aristocraty, by reason of the contrariety of government. Wherefore the Lacedemonians destroyed many Tyrannies, and the Siracusans also while they were well governed. Sometimes the tyranny is destroyed by itself, when there ariseth a faction between those that participate therein, as it did long since come to pass in the tyranny of Gelon, it was overthrown by the means of Thrasibulus, Gelons brother; who flattered Gelons son, and brought him up in e●seminate delicateness, that he himself might reign: wherewith the young Princes friends being offended, gathered power and made resistance, to the end, that the tyranny might not be destroyed, but rather Thrasibulus: but their complices seeing this opportunity, expulsed them all. And Dion having by force of arms, and with the help of the people expulsed dionysius, whose kinsman he was, was slain.  
The tyranny is destroyed in two manners, the one outward, the other inward. Outwardly, as every other kind of commonweal, when there is any contrary Estate of greater power, as the roman commonweal, having attained wonderful great force and might, destroyed all the kingdoms that it could, and made them small provinces. The Venetian signory extending her dominion into the firm land of italy, hath destroyed many petty Lords and gangrenes, at Padoa, Verona, and other places which it hath conquered. Contrariwise, the Tyranny is enemy to commonweals, and doth every where destroy them, if it haue power and means to do so: as in ancient times the Macedonian Tyranny, destroyed the chief commonweals of Greece: and that of Persia, the Popular sta●es of Ionia Demosthenes in his first Oration in favour of the Olinthians, saith thus: {αβγδ}. Tyrannies are likewise destroyed by inward means, when the Lords of the gangrenes blood, and such as p●rticipate in the Tyranny, do band themselves each against other: as the quarrel that grew between dionysius and Dion his wives brother: and between Gelons kinsmen after his death. Gelon and dionysius were both of them gangrenes at Syracusa, where their Tyrannies continued not long. Tamberlan or Themirlan the great Tiran of the Tartars established the seat of his Tyranny at Samarcand, where it presently failed through the dissension of his sons. In like sort the estate of Cyrus lasted not long in his progeny, but decayed through the envy which cambyses bare to his brother Smerdis; and through his insolence. Neither did the estate of the Emperor severus endure long, by reason by like dissension, growing between his sons. The Empire of Greece being possessed by the Paleologi, was brought to ruin through their mutual discords.  
As it did long since come to pass in the tyranny of Gelon.] Herodotus in the seventh book of his history sheweth how Gelon attained to the Tyranny at Siracula, which as Aristotle saith here, was destroyed through the discord of his kinsmen.  
Now sith there are two principal causes for which men conspire against the Tyrannical states, to wit, hatred, and contempt: it is necessary that this hatred be against the gangrenes, yet their ruins and destructions do for the most part proceed from contempt. There is an evident sign of this in that many who haue usurped estates, haue likewise held them during their own lives, but almost all their successors haue presently l●st them: for by leading voluptuous lives, they grow into Contempt, and minister sundry occasions for the working of their own destructions. Likewise, anger is to be accounted a part of hatred, sith it doth in some sort cause the same effects; and it is oft of greater force then hatred, because men being angry, cannot admit nor use reason in that perturbation of their minds. And men do chiefly vpon the receiving of injuries, suffer themselves to be carried away by the impetuous passion of anger. By which means the Tyranny of Pisistratus his children was destroyed, as also sundry others. But hatred do●th greater hurt: for anger is with grief, so that a man cannot easily use reason therein: but hatred is without gree●e.  
A Prince must above all things preserve his estate, which thing doth no less consist in doing nothing that is vnmeet and unseemly for him, then in doing all that doth beseem him. But he that doth fashion himself to austerity or affability, more or less then he ought, is no longer a King or a Prince, but becometh either a popular flatterer, or a proud master, and procureth to himself either the contempt or hatred of his subiects: yet it seemeth that the one is an error, committed through too great bounty and humanity, the other through arrogance and fierceness. It is so difficult a thing for a Prince to carry himself well in the government of a great Estate, that many haue been as much hated or ●espised for being too gentle, or too severe, as for being covetous, cruel, spoilers of the State, or cowards, effeminate and slothful persons. Pertinax was created Emperour of Rome against the soldiers wils, who having learned to live licentiously under Commodus, could not endure the discipline and reasonable order whereunto Pertinax would haue brought them: Who having by this means purchased their hatred, and there being hereunto adjoined a certain Contempt, by reason of his great age, he was slain presently after his aduancement to the Empire. Alexander was of so great bounty and clemency, that among other praises which his eternal renown doth give him, the histories record, that for the space of fourteen yeares that he had reigned, there was never any man put to death but by sentence and order of iudgement: Notwithstanding, because he was accounted a man of small courage, and one that suffered himself to bee ruled by his mother, he fell in the end into such contempt, that his army conspired against him, and bereaved him of his life. Contrariwise, if we consider the qualities of Commodus, severus, Anthonius Caraculla, and Maximinus, we shall find that they haue all ben cruel and extreme exactors on the people, and that to please and satisfy their soldiers, exercised all the outrages, wrongs, and violences, that might possibly bee committed on their subiects: but each of them had a miserable and shameful end, save only the Emperour severus, who was endued with such magnanimity and prowess, that by keeping still the love of his soldiers, although he did greatly tyramnize over his subiects, yet it was easy for him to enjoy an happy reign, because his virtues made him so admirable both to his people and soldiers, that the one were astonished, and the other content and full of obedience. Antonius Caracalla his son was likewise very valiant, and garnished with excellent parts and virtues, which caused him to be feared of the people,& well thought of by the soldiers: For he was a warlike man, hardened to the enduring of all travail and pains, a despiser of delicate fare, and all other pleasures, whereby he won the good will and love of the soldiers: But his insolence and cruelty were so immoderate and excessive( for he had put to death vpon particular and private occasions, the greatest part of the roman people, and all those of Alexandria wholly) that in the end he was hated by all the world,& became dreadful to his nearest and most familiar friends, and finally was slain by a Centurion in the midst of his army. Commodus being of a cruel and beastly nature, that he might the better exercise his greedy and extorting Tyranny against his subiects, did exceedingly favour the soldiers, whom he nourished and maintained in an unbridled and immoderate liberty: on the other side not observing the degree of his high dignity, he would descend into the open Theatre to fight before all the roman people with skirmishers and sword-players, and committed sundry other base acts, and unworthy of the imperial majesty, whereby he grew by little and little to lose the good will of his soldiers, and so consequently being hated on the one side, and despised on the other, it is no marvel that conspiracies were wrought against him, and that they of his own train, and of greatest account about him, caused his death. Maximinus was a great warrior, and for that cause was chosen Emperour through the disliking which the army conceived of the said Alexanders peaceable government, but he held not the Empire long, by reason of two foul blemishes that were in him; the one because he had been of base and abject estate, having kept beasts in the country of Thrace, which was a thing notorious to everyone, and bread a marvelous disdain and contempt of him; the other, because at the beginning of his reign, he deferring his return to Rome, there to take possession of the imperial seat, caused men to conceive a general opinion of his cruelty, by reason of the rigorous in humanities which his lieutenants did by his order and commandement use both in the City of Rome,& in sundry places of the roman Empire: So that the world disdaining him for the baseness of his birth, and on the other side hating him for his cruel nature, which th● feared, first afric revolted from him, then the Senate, with all the people of Rome, afterwards Italy, and lastly his own army which lay at the siege of Aquilea. But finding the City not to be won, and hating his felonious nature, and withall fearing him the less, because they saw him bearded on all sides by many enemies, they slay him. The Emperor Nero was abominable for prodigality, whoredom, and cruelty, through which vices, he became contemptible to all the arms which rose against him, and hated by the Senate, which condemned him to haue his neck put in a furke, as theeues were used, and to be whipped to death with rods: Whereof he hauing● intelligence, fled by night out of Rome, and lamenting that none offered to rid him of his life, he said, Haue I then neither friend nor enemy? Finally, as he slay himself, he cried out that he had lived filthily, and died more vilely. The whole City of Rome did so rejoice at his death, that all the people wearing such hats as slaves do when they are made free, triumphed as being delivered from a cruel reign and Tyranny. Seneca wondering at the dissolute and excessive prodigality of Caligula, saith thus, It seemeth to me that Nature brought forth this Prince, to show what extreme vices can do when they light on supreme and sovereign fortune. He was so horribly depraved, and so incomparably vicious, that he would spend at one banquet one hundred thousand ●estertians. But although he sought to further his insatiable humour with the wits and devises of all the gluttonous and prodigal persons that he could hear of, yet could he scarce find means to wa●t in the charges of one supper the tribute of three provinces. He caused himself to bee called Lord and God, he did carnally abuse his three sisters, made his palace a Brothel house, prostituting therein the roman ladies, slay cruelly many Senators and others, for which wicked acts, he was himself slain by a Tribune of the soldiers. The Emperour galen for his dishonest life, for the things that he had impudently committed, and for his disloyalty, was not only despised of men, but also of women: Therefore in his reign rose up thirty rebellious gangrenes, among whom there was a Marshall, whose name was Marius that was called Emperour, and Xenobia and Victorina reigned. justine in the beginning of his third book writeth, That Xerxes King of Persia, who had ben the terror of the world, began to bee despised by his own men after he had ben so unfortunate in the warres of Greece, insomuch, that one of his Captaines and most familiar Chamberlains seeing his majesty to decline and decrease from day to day, enterprised to kill him, and by that means to make himself King. I will pass over Domitian, Heliogabalus, julian, and others innumerable in all Monarchies both ancient and modern, as Heathens, Christians, and Mahometians, which for their wickedness and cowardice, haue had miserable ends, and come all to nothing.  
To knit up the matter in few words, all those causes which wee haue affirmed to destroy the immoderate and last oligarchy, and the unreasonable and extreme kind of democraty, may be applied to the Tyranny: for these forms of commonweals distinct and severed, are kinds of Tyrannies.  
The latter kinds of the oligarchy and democraty, are a Tyranny, not of one man, but of many together; when a certain number of the richest play the gangrenes in the oligarchy, and the people in the democraty: as Aristotle saith in his fourth book of peacocks, the sixth chapter.  
The kingdom is least of all destroyed by outward causes, and therefore lasteth longest, but is commonly overthrown of itself in two manner of ways. The one, when the chief lords of the kingdom are divided, and at variance amongst themselves. The other, if the Kings go about to reign too Tyrannically, and will accomplish most matters according to their own pleasure, and contrary to the laws. At this day there bee but few kingdoms, but are rather M●narchies and Tyrannies, than kingdoms: For the kingdom is a voluntary state or g●uernment, given by mens own accord, and the king hath power over the greatest matters: And whereas there are many like unto him,& none so excellent, a● that he can be equal to the highnesse and dignity of this estate, therefore men do not voluntarily obey the same. If any men attempt to reign through deceit, or by violent force, this seeweth already to be tyranny. As fo● kingdoms that descend by inheritance, there is another cause of their destruction,( besides these that we haue declared) namely for that many persons endued with no virtue nor valour, but justly had in contempt, do succeed in the same, and that they not having Tyrannicall power, but kingly honour, do live more dissolutely, and therefore are easily destroyed. For he is no longer a king, when his subiects will not obey him. But the tyrant exerciseth dominion also over them that are not voluntary subiects. Therefore the Monarchies are overthrown for these causes and s●ch like.  
Although of all public states, the kingdom lasteth best; and of kingdoms, that which passeth by inheritance is lesser subject to sedition then that which goeth by election, and of those kingdoms that pass by inheritance, that which goeth by succession to the heir male only, not so subject to sedition as that which may fall to the heir female, by reason it may come to a man of a strange Nation, having other manners, other language, and another fashion of living, whereby many troubles may happen, yet notwithstanding there is no kind of kingdom, whatsoever it bee, that lasteth for ever. For after they be established by the virtue and prowess of the first founders, they grow a certain space, then remain they in their state another space, after that begin they to decay, and at last perish two manner of ways, as all other commonweals do: to wit, by outward and inward means; but seldom outwardly, and by foreign causes when they be well governed, and able to defend themselves with their own forces, against the invasions of strangers. By this mean did the romans, whilst their government was a commonweal, destroy many kingdoms, as Macedonia, Numidia, Mauritania, Pontus, Bythinia, Cappadocia, and Suria, whereof they made provinces. Inwardly, and by domestical causes, are kingdoms overturned, when the chief lords of the same, be at division and discord; and when the Kings seek to reign by violence, doing most things according to their own pleasures, and contrary to the ancient laws of the country. So kingdoms that pass by inheritance, are sometimes overturned by reason of Contempt and disobedience, when children or other imperfect and vicious persons unworthy of that honour, succeed in the same.  
WHEN the principal sorts of the kingdom are divided, and at variance amongst themselves.] As of late yeares, the greatest part of the kingdom of Hungary hath been occupied by the turk, by occasion of the divisions that were between the chief lords of the country, taking part one while with one side, and otherwhiles with another side, as it came in their heads, or as present advantage procured them. In old time the divisions and discords in France between the houses of orleans and Burgoigne, intermixed with the Englishmen, were like to haue subverted the kingdom, at such time a● king Charles the sixth was fallen into a frenzy.  
IF the kings go about to reign too Tyrannically.] Aristotle in the chapter following saith, As the kingdom is destroyed through becomming more Tyrannical thē it should, so the Tyranny is preserved by approaching nearer to the manners and fashions of a kingdom. Therefore the more moderate the authority of kings is, the more and the better it is settled, loved, and honoured. Contrariwise, if they will govern too absolutely, they los● straightway the good will of their subiects, and hasten their own decay.  
IF any attempt to reign by deceitor by ●orce, it seemeth to be tyranny.] The Magician in Persia that usurped the kingdom after the decease of cambyses, feigning himself to be Smerdis, cambyses his brother, reigned a while by deceit; vpon the disclosing whereof, he was slain by the conspiracy of the seven Persian Lords: The history is recited by Herodotus in his third book. christian, King of denmark, who would reign by force and rigour in Sweathland; for the cruelty which he used, was expulsed out of all his dominions, and after cast into prison, where he lead the rest of his life: Munster in the fourth book of his Cosmography. Therefore according to Aristotles opinion, A king is properly a parsonage excellent in nobleness of blood, or in virtue, or in power, or in beauty of body, and quickness of wit: the third of the Politiques, the eleventh and twelfth chapter, and in the seventh book, the fourteenth chapter, that governeth a State alone for term of his life, according to the laws, not regarding his own particular commodity, but the welfare of the commonweal, as overseer of the same, and governeth voluntary subiects, being himself, religious, courteous, favourable to the good, and full of industry and diligence, and dreadful to the bad.  
AS for kingdoms that descend by inheritance, there is another cause of their ruin.] Siessell in his first book of the French Monarchy, and the eight chapter: I presuppose( saith he) that the greatest danger of bringing those states that are governed by Monarchs to confusion, and into the hands of the commons, consisteth in the changing of the Princes, and chiefly when they go by natural succession from father to ●onne, or from one cousin to the next of the kindred, as the monarchy of france useth to do. For it chanceth often, that to a good and valiant king succeedeth a wretch spotted with many vices and imperfections, or else a young child, whereupon ensue many disordered and wilful things by occasion of the misgouernment of the same vicious king, or of them that haue the government of the king that is a child, or altogether blockish; which may cause great desolation and destruction to a state, as hath been seen by many examples in this our own kingdom. And without all fail, when vengeance is to fall vpon the same by the decree and will of God, it shall come by these or other like means, ordained aforehand by the wisdom& providence of God, which mans reason and wit shall not be able to withstand: and it may be, that it will happen at such a time as there shall bee most likelihood of prosperity, and least doubt of change and adversity; to the end, that men being deceived in worldly matters, may know the frailty and instability thereof, and the power and providence of God; as hath been sufficiently seen to fall out in our time, and read off in many ancient histories. Which God grant either never to come to pass, or at least not while there shall be a king of this most noble and ancient race. But to speak according to mans reason, I affirm that all such remedies as can well be devised and imagined for the withstanding of those inconveniences when they happen, are more ready and certain in this Monarchy, then in any other. For to speak of the disorder that may happen through the imperfection of the heads and Monarchs, there be many remedies that may bridle their absolute authority, if they bee depraved and wilful. And greater means to restrain them that might haue the government of the realm, if they be imperfect and weak in all respects, through want of age, or otherwise. And yet notwithstanding evermore remaineth the royal dignity and authority in his perfection, not wholly absolute, nor too much restrained, but ruled and bridled with good laws, statutes, and customs, which be so established, that they can hardly bee broken and frustrated, though sometimes, and in some places, there do some breach and violating of the same happen. After he saith, there be three chief re●traints whereby the absolute power of the French kings is bridled, to wit, Religion, Law, and government; and declareth them in order, throughout the same third book. Wee haue oftspoken of the same in our discourses, as occasion was offered.   

CHAP. XI. Of the maintaining and upholding of Monarchies.  
TO speak generally, they are preserved by such means as are contrary to those that destroy them: but to speak particularly, kingdoms are maintained by reducing them to a more moderate form. For of how much the fewer things, the Princes be absolute lords, so much the longer must every Princely state last, by reason they be less violent, and in manners more equal to others, and consequently less envied of their subiects. For this cause the kingdom of the Molossians lasted a great while, and so did the kingdom of the Lacedemonians, by reason the state at the beginning was divided into two parts, and afterwards king Theopompus moderated it, as well in other things, as by adding thereunto the magistracy of the Ephori, or Tribunes. For by cutting away some part of the Kings power, he augmented the kingdom in continuance of time. Insomuch, that in a certain manner, he made it not lesser, but greater, as it is reported that he answered his wife when she did chide, and demanded if it were not a great shane for him to leave the kingdom less to his children then he had received it from his father: No( said he) because I leave it them in such plight, as it shall last the longer. Now, Tyrannies are upholden and preserved two manner of ways, very contrary each to other: The one is delivered from hand to hand, and observed by many gangrenes in their governments. It is reported, that the most part of those things which concern this way, were invented by Periander the Corinthian: and many like may be drawn out of the government of the Persians. Therefore the means in old time invented for the preservation of Tyrannies, are these, as to abase and pull down as much as is possible, the most excellent men, and rid away those persons that haue the noblest minds, and not to permit unto the subiects, feasts, assemblies, learning, nor any other like thing; but to beware of all things which haue accustomend to breed these two things, haughtiness of stomach, and mutual confidence; to forbid them schools and all other idle companies; and to provide by all means, that all the subiects shal not know one another, because this knowledge causeth greater trust and faithfulness between them. That always the yeomen of the guard, and strange people, show themselves in the streets, and walk before the citizens. So whatsoever the subiects go about, shall not be kept secret, and they will grow by custom to haue less courage, by serving continually: hereto may be added many other ways, according to the Persian and Barbarian fashions, which are Tyrannicall,& of the same effect. Likewise, to seek the disclosing of whatsoever the subiects say and do, and to haue spies; as they that at Siracusa were called reporters:& jeron sent hearkeners wheresoever there were any companies and meetings of people. For they are the less bold to speak their minds freely when they stand in fear of such kind of men, and if they should be bold to speak freely, then will they use the less secrecy. That they accuse one another, and fall at variance, friends with friends, the common people with the Noblemen, and the rich with the rich: and to impoverish the subiects, is Tyrannicall; to the end, there should be no guard kept, and that they being driven continually to work for their livings, may haue no leisure to conspire. For example hereof, we haue those high towers of egypt, called pyramids, the temples dedicated to the gods by the Cypselides, the building of Olimpus by the children of Pisistratus, and the munitions of polycrates about Samos: which things tend all to one end, namely, to hinder and impoverish the subiects: and so doth the exacting of tributes and money, such as happened at Siracusa, where in the time of dionysius the tyrant, the citizens in five yeares space were constrained to contribute all their goods. again, the tyrant maketh warres, to the intent, to occupy the subiects, and that they shall always haue need of a head or captain. Surely, the kingdom is preserved by friends, but the property of a tyrant, is to mistrust friends; as though all men would, and friends chiefly could destroy him. Also all those things are tyrannical, which are done in the last and worst kind of democraty, as the liberty of women in houses, who disclose their husbands secrets; and the infranchising of bondslaves for the same cause; for slaves and women attempt nothing against gangrenes: it is rather needful for them, in respect of the good usage which they recei●e, to wish well to tyrannies and democracies: For the people desireth to be a Monarch. Therefore the flatterer is in estimation with both of them; namely, with the people, the Popular captain, who is a flatterer of the people: and with the gangrenes, they that behave themselves lowly to them, which is a work of flattery. And therefore tyranny favoureth the wicked, in as much as gangrenes take a pleasure to be flattered, which never would any man of free and noble heart do. But the good do love, or flatter not: also the wicked are profitable for them in wickedness, for one nail driveth out another, as the proverb is. Also it is a point of tyranny, not to take pleasure in a grave and free person, for the tyrant himself will needs seem alone to bee such a kind of man. And whosoever on the contrary side useth gravity and freeness, he taketh away the excellency and maisterlike authority of the Tyranny. Therefore gangrenes hate such manner of men, as the destroyers of their estate. Likewise● to feast and banquet more with strangers then with the Citizeens, it is a point of Tyranny, as if the one were enemies, and the other not aduersaries. These and other like things are Tyrannicall, and do preserve the Tyranny, being nevertheless full of wickedness. But all these means may in a maner be comprised in three● sith the tyrant doth aim chiefly at three things, The first is, that his subiects haue neither courage nor knowledge, because cowardly and ignorant men do never conspire. The second, that there be a mutual distrust among them, for the Tyranny is not destroyed, unless some do before repose confidence each in other. And for this cause gangrenes are enemies to good and virtuous men, as to those that may endamage their estate, not only because they will not be used like slaves, but also because they are loyal and faithful between themselves and to others, and do not accuse either any of themselves, or any other. The third point is, that their subiects haue no power or means to execute any thing: For sith commonly men do not undertake things impossible, none will seek to destroy the Tyranny, when they haue no power to do it. These are the three ends whereto the gangrenes purposes do tend, and al the gangrenes enterprises may be reduced to these suppositions, that their subiects distrust each other, that they haue no power, and that they be cowards and ignorant. And this is the first manner of preserving Tyrannicall states. The other manner hath a contrary consideration in the things aforesaid, and may bee gathered from the destructions of kingdoms. For as the kingly state is destroyed through becoming more tyrannicall then it should, so the tyranny is preserved by approaching near to the manners and fashions of a kingdom, retaining still force and power to command not only those that do willingly obey, but those also that do it unwillingly, sith by losing this force, he looseth both the name and state of a tyrant. This foundation being presupposed and assured, he must partly use those other manners and fashions also, and partly seem to use them, making thus a fair outward show of a good kingly government. First and chiefly he must fain himself to be very careful of the public good of the state, and use no such expenses as may offend the people, as to wast prodigally the revenues and treasure of the city, on strumpets, strangers and players, but give account of the money received and employed by him, as some gangrenes in former times haue done. By doing so, he shall bee accounted a good husband for the commonweal, and not a tyrant. And he needs not fear want of money at any time, being lord of the City: but it is good and profitable for gangrenes when they go abroad in any expedition, or other urgent affairs, rather to want then to leave treasure hoardward up. For by this means, they that are deputed and appointed by them for the guard and keeping of the country in their absence, will attempt the less against them. Now it is certain, that these are more to be feared then the citizens, for the citizens go with the gangrenes, but the other remain at home. moreover, touching the imposition of taxes and subsidies, he must so carry himself therein, that he seem to levy them for the maintenance of the state, and to employ the money that is thereby gathered, in the preparing and prosecuting of the war when need shall require: and he must make such an outward show, that men may esteem him as a keeper and treasurer of the pablicke money, and not as of his own. He must also not seem austere, but grave, and of such behaviour, as that they who shall haue occasion to speak unto him, may not fear, but rather reverence him: which thing he can hardly do, that is contemptible. Therefore although the tyrant should make no account of other virtues, yet at the least he ought to haue that which is requisite for a governor, and cause such an opinion to be con●●●ued of him, that not he only, but also his whole train and seruants offer no injury to any of his subiects, neither boy nor girl. And that his women do in like sort demean themselves towards other women, because many Tyrannies haue been destroyed by reason of the injuries which women haue offered. Touching bodily pleasures, he must order himself clean otherwise then the gangrenes that are now adays do, whom it sufficeth not to follow their delights from the morning to night, and to continue them for many daies and nights together, but they will also haue men know that they live so, that they may haue them in admirati●●, as fortunate and happy men: but let him moderately use such pleasures, or at the least let him see●e to others, as one that makes no account of them, and sh●●s them. For he that is sober cannot easily be surprised or contemned, but the drunkard may; neither he that is watchful, but the sleepy person. And he must do clean contrary to the things before mentioned, in beautifying and adorning the City● as if he were a guardian and procurer of the good therof, and not a tyrant. He must further more make a show to love above all things God and religion, for the subiects stand in less fear of sustaining any wrong or oppression by Princes, if they think them to be religious, and that they fear the gods, and likewise they will less conspire against him whom they suppose that the gods do love and favor. Now he must seem such a manner of person without any suspicion of wickedness. moreover, he must honour and advance good men that excel in any thing, so that they may not haue cause to think, that they might receive greater honor or aduancement of their own Citizens, if they lived in liberty. Besides, let the tyrant himself bestow honor on such men, and inflict punishments by others, as officers and iudges. There is yet farther a common precept for the maintaining and preserving of every kind of monarchy; that is, to make no man overgreat, or at the least to advance more then one, because they will watch, and haue an eye on each other: but if it so fall out, that he must raise some one, let him not choose one that is haughty& audacious, for such persons will boldly attempt what thing soever. Likewise, if he find it requisite to deprive any one of credite and authority; he must do it by little and little, and not take from him all his power at once. Besides, he must abstain from all kind of injury, and especially from two sorts, the one from beating folk, the other, from dishonouring youth by filthy lust; whereof he must take great heed towards those that are ambitious: For covetous persons do take grievously the injury that is offered them in taking away their goods; and those that are either ambitious, or good men, do the like for the loss of their honour. Wherefore such punishments are not to bee used, or else to be inflicted according to the law and custom of the country, and not in contempt or reproach. And if it chance that he so converse with the youth, as before was said, let him do it for love, and not through tyrannicall liberty; at the least, if he do them any dishonour, let him recompense it with greater honour. But amongst all them that conspire against the gangrenes person, which purpose to kill him, he must fear and take great heed of those who care not for their own lives, so as they may rid him of his life, and he must chiefly dread those who think that any injury hath ben offered, either to themselves, or to such persons as they hold dearest: for they that through despite and anger attempt such things, haue neither fear nor carewhat becomes of themselves, according to Heraclitus his saying, That it is an hard thing to fight against anger, which costs a man life. And whereas Cities consist of two parts, namely of poor men and rich men, it must be so provided, that both parts think their safety and preservation to depend on the estate,& there must great heed be taken, that they do not wrong or hurt each other in any thing. Only, let him haue the stronger on his side, that if any stir arise, he bee not enforced to enfranchise the slaves, or to take the Citizens armor and weapons from them: for one of the two parts being joined with his own power, will be sufficient to resist the other part, if it should assail him. But it were superfluous to prosecute such things particularly, sith the intention or aim thereof is manifest: for he must refer all his actions to this end, that his subiects may not esteem him to be a tyrant, but a steward and a king, and not as one that applieth all to his own peculiar profit, but to the public good of the state, as guardian thereof. And that he observe a mean in his life, and be not given to excess; using familiarity with the Noblemen, and gratifying the people. By these means he shall doubtless make his state and government not only fairer and more desirable, in that he reigneth over better subiects, and not servile or abject persons, and in that himself shall not be either hated or feared, but also of longer continuance. Finally, he must so fram●●●d fashion his manners, that he be half virtuous or good; and not bad, but half bad.  
The causes which destroy kingdoms and Tyrannies, being declared; according to the former method those causes also are set down, which do preserve and maintain them: and first they are generally upheld by those means that are contrary to the causes of their ruins: as the kingdom if it be less Tyrannicall and absolute, and the Tyranny, if it approach nearer to the Kingly state, which said Tyranny also is preserved and maintained in two manners, the one very rigorous, the other more moderate. To the rigorous manner are referred all the severe, or rather cruel acts which gangrenes are wont to do, respecting only their own safety and profit, as to suppress so much as may bee, the most notable persons, and to make away such as haue stout courages, to forbid their subiects the use of banquets, schools for study, idle meetings, and all other things that breed haughtiness of heart, and mutual confidence, to keep them from knowing each other thoroughly;( for this knowledge causeth greater trust and faithfulness between them) to haue foreign soldiers, showing themselves in the streets, and walking up and down before the Citti●ens houses, thereby to strike the more terror into them, and to keep them in continual fear, to haue spies& privy hearkeners in every corner of the city, who may discover and report to him whatsoever shall be therein done or said. Likewise to use such means, that friends may falsely accuse and live in discord each with other, the vulgar sort with the Noblemen, and the rich men between themselves; to impoverish them, and haue them always busied, to the end, that through wealth or idleness they may not conspire; and that being troubled with any war, they may always haue need of him to be their leader and cheefetaine. The kingdom is preserved and upheld by friends, the tyranny doth altogether distrust friends, and therefore giveth great liberty to women and to slaves against their Lords. gangrenes must in no wise haue near them grave and freeminded men, because such persons do diminish the Lordly excellence and authority of the tyrant, who will himself alone seem and bee accounted such a kind of man. Likewise, when he will banquet, let him do it with strangers more then with Citizens: all which means being very Tyranncall, are reduced to three points. The first, that their subiects bee both cowardly and ignorant: the second, that they distrust each other: the third, that they haue no power nor means to conspire. Which three things being very pernicious, are not gathered by Aristotle to allow them, or instruct men in them, but rather that they may beware of them, by knowing the misery of gangrenes, who are constrained to serve their turns with such evils, thereby to assure their persons and Estates. Machiauel of Florence writing of a Prince, hath taken from this place the most part of his precepts, adding thereunto roman and Italian examples. now almost all these means haue relation to the first manner of preserving and upholding Tyrannies, which is full of severity and rigour. The other manner contrary to the former, as being more gentle and moderate, is, that the tyrant imitate the government of the Kingly state; provided that he haue always power, whereby he may command, not only over those that are voluntarily subject( which thing a King doth) but also over those that do unwillingly obey. he must feine to haue great care of the public good of the State, and use no prodigality, thereby to offend the people; not seem a tyrant, but a steward; nor as Lord of the common treasure, but as bestower and keeper thereof; nor austere and haughty, but grave and civil: he must likewise beware that none of his train do injury any one, and especially that his women use no outrageous nor insolent demeanour toward other women. He must moderately use his pleasures, and above all things make show of loving God and Religion. he must honour and advance good men, and such as excel in any thing; and himself bestow rewards, but inflict punishments by others, as Officers and Iudges. The tyrant hath this common with the King, to make no man overgreat, or else to advance many, to the end, that they may haue an eye each to other: not to raise haughty& audacious men, who are usually prompt and forward to attempt any thing; and when he hath raised them, if he find it requisite to pull them down, he must do it by little and little, not taking from them all their credite and power at once: he must abstain from all outrage, especially from beating any, and from dishonouring youth by filthy lust, or if he do so, he must seem to do it rather for love then through tyrannical liberty. And whereas cities consist of rich& poor, who do not commonly well agree; that he maintain thē friendly together, having the strongest always on his own side, that through their help he may bee able to resist others that assault him. That he be familiar with Noblemen, and gratify the people, so framing his manners, that he bee good or half good, and not bad, but half bad. Aristotle seemeth to haue been too curious in the setting down of these Tyrannicall means, sith evil Princes are sufficiently inclined of themselves, to invent what will serve for the maintaining of their high estate and safety, so as it is not needful to instruct them by books. Machiauel fashioning his Prince, hath fetched from hence( as I haue alleged) the principal grounds of that institution, which must bee read with great discretion, because it is written by an author without conscience, and without religion, respecting onely worldly power and glory, which deceiveth many men. But we that purpose to set forth nothing, which wee thought would not serve to the honour of God, and the common welfare of mankind, will pass over these discourses, concluding with Cornelius Tacitus, That men are to honour things that be past, and to obey those that be present, and that they ought to love good Princes: And whatsoever they bee, to tolerate and bear them, for the withstanding as much as is possible, of disorders that happen by alterations. And as touching the decay and upholding of Monarchies, we will say with sallust. Si Regum atque Imperatorum animi virtus, in place, ita vt in bello, valeret: aequabilius atque constantius res humanae seize haberent, neque aliud aliò ferri, neque mutari ac misceri omnia cerneres. Nam imperium facile his artibus retinetur, quibus initio partum est. Verum ubi pro labour desidia, pro continentia& aequitate libido atque superbia inuasere, fortuna simul cum moribus immutatur: ita imperium semper ad optimum quemque à minus bono transfertur. Idem alibi, Sepè ego cum animo meo reputans, quibus quisque rebus clarissimi viri magnitudinem inuenissent: quae res populos, nation●sve magnis authoribus auxissent: ac deinde quibus causis amplissima regna& imperia corruissent, eadem semper bona atque mala reperiebam: omnesque victores divitias contempsisse,& victos cupiuisse. Et subdit: Saepè iam audivi qui reges, quae civitates& nationes per opulentiam magna imperia amiserunt, quae per virtutem inopes coeperant. Idem in Oratione ad Caesarem de Republica ordinanda: Postquam mihi aetas ingeniùmque adoleuit, haud ferme armis atque equis corpus exercui, said animum in literis quòd natura firmus erat, in laboribus habui. Itaque ego in ea vita multa legendo atque audiendo ita comperi, omnia regna, civitates, nationes, usque eo prosperum imperium habuisse, dum apud eos vero consilia valuerunt, ubicunque gratia, timor, vo●luptas, ea corrupere: pòst paulò, imminutae opes, deinde ademptum imperium, postrem● servitus imposita est. particularly, As touching the preservation and destruction of the roman Empire, 
The roman E●pire.  which for any thing that is found in writing, and that ever was seen by experience, hath been the mightiest and greatest kingdom that ever was: I find, that those ways which the wisest Emperours invented for the assurance and preservation of the same Empire, turned to the decay and destruction thereof. First the ordinary armies that Augustus had ordained, as well about the city of Rome, as in the borders of his State, did undo many of his successors, and brought to ruin the roman Empire itself, which sometimes they put to sale, to deliver it into his hands that would give them most for it. Secondly, the transporting and removing of the roman Empire, which Constantine the great made from Rome to Byzantium( which since by his own name hath been called Constantinople) thereby to make it more sure and strong against the Persians, and other people of Asia: For by transferring unto this place the forces and chief richesse of the romans, and by dividing the Empire into the eastern and western, he did greatly weaken it, so as the roman Empire was first destroyed, and then the eastern: which if they had continued united, had been able long, and almost for ever to withstand all invasions. thirdly, whereas the Emperours supposed to strengthen themselves by strange soldiers that were hirelings and helpers, whom they called to their succours, and specially the goths, they by weakening the proper and natural forces of the Empire, at unawares put Rome and Italy, and consequently the other provinces into the hands of the barbarous people whereof shall be spoken more at large in the history of goue●nement, wherein wee declare the beginnings, proceedings, continuances, fadings, and destructions of the great states that haue been hitherto. One rare thing amongst others, hath been observed in the roman monarchy, That whereas it began in Augustus, it ended the four hundred seuentie and one year after, in Augustus; who was expelled from Rome after the discomfiture and death of his father Orestes, by Odoacer king of the Herules● who occupied all italy: whereof he changed the name, calling it Odoacria, after his own name. So failed this monarchy, being wholly oppressed and destroyed.   

CHAP. XII. That of all States the oligarchy and Tyranny do least continue.  
OF all commonweals, the oligarchy and tyranny continue the least space. For the Tyranny that hath lasted longest, was that of Orthagoras and his children at Sicione, which lasted 〈◇〉 hundred years. The cause of this lasting was, for that they dealt mode●ately with their subiects, and in the mos● part of their affairs, they submitted themselves to the laws: and for that Clisth●ne● being very skilful in the warres, shewed 〈◇〉 himself conte●ptible: and because also in many things they endeavoured to use the people fa●●●rably. Likewise, it is said, that Clisthenes crwoned the judge that had spoken against 〈◇〉 victory. Some men hold opinion that the image of him that so judged, is it that standeth in the market place●●t is affirmed also, that Pisistratus being cited into the court of the Areopage, stood to iudgement there: The second Tyranny was in Corinth, which the children of Cypselus exercised, and that lasted threescore and thirteen yeares, and six months. For Cypselus reigned thirty yeares, Periander ●●●re and thirty, and Psam●●●●●● son of Gordus three yeares. The cause of this so long continuance thereof, was the same, for Cypselus dealt gently with the people● and never in all the time of his reign used any guard● Periander was a Tyrann●us man, howbeit warlike. The third tyranny was held by the children of Pisistratus at Athens, which was not contin●all: because Pisistratus who played the Tyr●n was twice exp●●sed, insomuch, that in three and thirty yeares he 〈◇〉 and seventeen of them, and his children eighteene● and so all the time of their rule m●●●fi●e and thirty yeares. Amongst other Tyrann●es, that of Hieron and Gelon at Siracusa lasted not long, but onely eighteen yeares: 〈◇〉 after Gelon had reigned seven yeares, he died in the eight, and Hieron reigned 〈◇〉 yeare●. Thrasibu●●● 〈◇〉 expulsed in the eleventh month. Many other 〈◇〉 h●●e been all of sl●●● con●●●ance. Thus 〈…〉 shewed wel●eere all the means whereby 〈◇〉 also and ●●●●chies are destroyed and preserved. Now 〈…〉 commonweal treateth of the ●●●●gings of sla●es, howbeit, 〈…〉 of them 〈◇〉 he assigneth 〈◇〉 any pr●●er change of the best and 〈◇〉 Commonweale● saying, how Nature hath so ordained, that nothing la●teth for ever, and that all things 〈◇〉 a certain c●mpasse of time, or per●●●; are changed. And that they begin to change by those things, 〈◇〉 is the 〈◇〉, or third number and an half, which being joined to a q●inary or fift number, maketh two harmonies, that is to say, when the number of this description becomes full and whole: a● if nature did sometimes bring forth bad persons, whose malice could not be amended by instruction, it may be he saith not altogether amiss, for that certain men may bee born altogether unapt to receive any manner of teaching or virtue whatsoever. But wherefore should this change be more proper to that best commonweal of his framing, then to other commonweals, and all things that come into the world? And as for the time wherein he saith all things are changed, those same that began together, are changed together, as if they be made ●●e day before the longest or shortest day of the year, they shal therfore change together. Further, wherefore shall this commonweal bee changed into the Lacedemonian commonweal, sith the most commonweals are of●ener changed into a contrary form, then into that which is next unto them● There is the very like reason in all other sorts of changes. For he saith that the Lacedemonian commonweal changeth into an oligarchy, and the oligarchy into a democraty, and the democraty into a Tyranny, although they also change clean contrary, as the democraty into the oligarchy, yea rather then into a monarchy. again, he speaketh not of the Tyranny whether it recei●e alteration or not, neither if it change, what is the cause thereof, nor into what kind of Commo●weale it changeth. Neither was it an easy matter for him to tell it, by reason it is uncertain and vndetermined, for in his opinion the change ought to be mad● into the first and best form of commonweal, insomuch, that there should bee a continual course or going round about. But one Tyranny is sometimes changed into another, as at Syeiene the Tyranny of Miro● into the Tyranny of Clisthenes: and into an oligarchy, as at Calchis the Tyranny of Antileon: and into a democraty, as the Tyranny of Gelon at Siracusa: and into an aristocraty, as the Tyranny of Charilas at lacedaemon, and likewise at Carthage. Also the oligarchy is changed into a Tyran●y, as in S●cily w●lne●re all the old Oligarchies were, as that of the L●ontines into the tyranny of Pa●●●ius: and that at Gele into the Tyranny of Cleand●r: that at Rhegium into the Tyranny of ● Anaxilas, and likewise in many other Cities. It is also absurd to imagine, tha● the Tyran●● i● changed into an oligarchy, because th●y that are authorized in the offic●s of the commonweal, bee 〈◇〉 and greedy of gain, and the rather because ●here be many exceedingly wealthy, who think it not just and reasonable that the p●ore should haue an equal part in the city with the rich. And i● many Oligarchies it is not lawful to exercise gainful occupations, but there bee la●●● that forbid the same: howbeit, at Carthage, which is governed by a democraty, they may lawfully apply the same, and yet nevertheless hath not their Comm●nweale vpon that occasion been hitherto changed. even so is it impertinent to say, that in the oligarchy there bee two Cities, the one of the rich, the other of the poor: For wherefore should there bee so in this kind of commonweal more then in the Lacedemonian Commonweale● or in some other, where all men possess not equal goods, neither are all alike good? And admit now that none wax poorer then be●ore, yet when the multitude of the poor increaseth, the oligarchy is nevertheless changed into a Demo●ratie: and the democraty into an oligarchy, when the rich be mightier then the people, and the people show themselves negligent, and the rich use more diligence and wariness in their affaires● B●t whereas there bee many ●●●sess of the changing, he toucheth one onely, namely, that by living prodigally, and being utterly undone by vs●rie, men ●ull into poverty; as though they had been all, or th● most of them rich at the beginning, which is false: For when any of the chief sort haue wasted their wealth, then attempt they in●●●●tions; but not the others: for at their hands there is not any trouble to bee feared● neither cha●nge they therefore rather into a democraty then into another kind of Commonweale● again, if they bee barred from p●blicke hono●rs, or when some ini●stice or wrong i● d●●● unto them, they raise seditions, and change commonweals( though they h●●● an spent their substance) by reason of the liberty which they haue ●o do what they ●s●● The cause whereof bee saith, is too much liberty. And whereas there be many s●●●● of Oligarchies and democracies, Socrates reciteth the cha●●ges thereof, as though either of them were but one.  
Of all commonweals the Tyrannies and Oligarchies do least continue, because they are full of violence and injustice. And if any of them last somewhat long, it is by reason of the moderation thereof, and the virtue of the governors. Further, the opinion of Plato in the eight book of his commonweal touching the short or long lasting of commonweals, is found fault withall: The which opinion, though it bee judged most obscure by Iamblicus and Ficinus, and such, as left by Theon, who had specially undertaken the exposition of the mathematical places in Plato; yet we haue assayed to enlighten it in some kind of sort, in translating his commonweal, and here will touch the necessariest points thereof, for the understanding of Aristotle.  
WHICH lasted an hundred yeares.] The longest Tyranny that is spoken of here, hath not lasted above a hundred yeares. kingdoms last very long, as we see the kingdom of France hath lasted above eleven hundred yeares: the kingdom of Castile eight hundred: the kingdom of England in the race of William the conqueror, five hundred yeares: the kingdom of Hungary seven hundred: that of Poland four hundred: the Monarchy of Assyria lasted twelve hundred and nine and thirty years, which is the longest age of a Monarchy that is found: That of the Medes continued three hundred: that of Persia two hundred and thirty, when the natural Persians reigned first there, who were bereaved thereof by the Macedonians; then the Parthians governed there, and after that the Saracens, then the Tartarians, and after it returned again to the Persians. The monarchy of Alexander continued three hundred yeares, that of Rome four hundred threescore and ten. The Empire of Constantinople eleven hundred and threescore. The reign of the turk hath already lasted near three hundred yeares, descending always from father to son, even to the twelfth heir now reigning, which was never seen elsewhere. The kingdom of Tunis lasted nine hundred years: the Empire of almain above six hundred.  
because Pisistratus playing the tyrant, was twice expulsed.] Herodotus in his first book, also Plato in Hipparcus, declareth how the said Hipparcus son of Pisistratus was slain by Hermodus and Aristogiton●  
NOW Socrates in Platoes commonweal, treateth of the changes of states.] Plato in the eight book of his commonweal bringeth in the Muses reasoning of the changes of commonweals in this manner: It is hard to change the city that is thus constituted; But for as much as all things that haue beginning, are subject to perishing, so this kind of constitution shall not last for ever, but shall bee dissolved. This dissolution happeneth not only to plants, but also to earthly living creatures, with the fruitfulness and barrenness of the soul and bodies, when the revolutions of every circuit of the circles, do fall shorter to them that bee shortliued, and contrary to them that be contrary. They whom you haue trained and brought up to be governors of cities, though they be wise, shall not for all that know by reason together with understanding, the fruitfulness or barrenness of your kind, but shall be ignorant of the opportunity to engender, and now and then shall beget children out of season. now the period or circuit of the divine generation, is it that containeth the perfect number; and of the human generation, in the which, first the increasings that surmount and excel; and three distances that be surmounted and taking the four terms or bounds of likes and vnlikes, and of increasing and decreasing, haue made all things answerable and comparable together, of which terms the sesquitercian root joined to the quinary, being thrice augmented, doth make two harmonies; the one equal equally, an hundred ti●es an hundred; the other odd, and longer by an hundred numbers of Diameters, comparable to the Quinarie, one and ones, and two vncomparable, and of a hundred cubes of the Ternarie. All this geometrical number in soothe hath great virtue and efficacy touching good and bad generations, which being unknown by the keepers of your city, if they match the Husbands with the wives out of season, the children that shall bee born of them, will bee neither witty nor happy. And though their elders appoint them to bee Princes that are found to bee the better, yet because they are unworthy to succeed their fathers, they will begin to neglect their subiects, and will not haue such care is requisite, of music, or religion, and of exercise of the body, which shall be the occasion of making your children also more ignorant of good learning: and the Magistrates that shall be so appointed, shall bee the less apt to discern the kinds of men, recited by Hesiodus: and being amongst you, to wit, the Golden, the Iron, and the copper kinds, and because the iron shall bee mingled with the silver, and the copper with gold, there shall arise therein unlikeness, and discordant inequality. And where such things happen, they breed always warres and enmity, so that in all places where there are such kind of men, there is continual trouble through seditions and tumults. Thus may you see what the muses sing in very dark terms touching the changes of commonweals.  
SAYING it is so ordained by Nature, that nothing lasteth for ever.] There is nothing under heaven that lasteth always. But all things that haue beginning, must come to an end, and whatsoever groweth, must likewise diminish, being subject to corruption and change, according to the time appointed unto it by the course of Nature, as is seen by experience in plants, and in wights, which haue their ages and lastings certain and determined. This instability is also found in provinces, Nations, Cities, manners, laws, Sects, Empires, realms, commonweals, Potentacies, States, Families, Sciences, and Languages. We look for nothing but for the destruction of the world, and the day that shall consume this whole frame, containing all things both divine and human; and reduce it to that old Chaos, and first darkness. Plato in Timeus, and in his Dialogue of the governor. Aristotle in his Meteores, and Seneca in his natural questions, suppose this to happen by the fatal law of the world, as well according to the moving of the first heaven, whereof the other inferior or lower thanksgivings, and all natures, do depend: As by the conjunctions and separations of the planets, whereunto the elements, and all things that are composed of them, do obey. Whereas then mens material bodies being created and composed of the four elements and humors that bee contrary, are maintained and preserved in life, so long as the said humours do agree, yet is it unpossible but at the last one will exceed the others, and thereby the mass or lump, return to his first matter by the dissolving of the same combined mixture. even so falleth it out with the mystical bodies of the society of mankind, which being joined by a civil and politic union, do begin to decay by the diversity of wils disagreeing, and at last come to nothing. And as mortal men live so much the longer, and in better health, as they be of better complexion, and use better government; so are those cities and states that are best established and governed, maintained longer and in better sort: notwithstanding, there never hath ben nor can be any that endeth not quickly or slowly, how good order soever be used therein: Such is the instability and course of all things that are here below, especially of states. Whereunto the most renowned Astrologians do agree, and that so far, that they will determine not only the lives and fortunes of men, but also the prosperities and adversities of Nations, as after the old Chaldeans and egyptians, ptolemy hath done in his Quadripertite, and sithence the Arabians and some Christians adding thereto the lasting of sects Plutarch in the life of Romulus, speaking of Astrologers saith, They will say that a town hath the revolution and the time of the continuance thereof, prefixed, as well as the life of man; and that it may be known by the situation of the star●es in the day of his birth.  
AND that all things in a certain circuit of time, or period, are altered.] Plutarch in the life of Silla. The skilful soothsayers of tuscan being demanded, answered, That this so strange sign declared the change of the world, and the passage from the same into another age: for that they hold opinion how there must be some ages clearly differing one from another in manners and fashions of living. To every of the which God hath prefixed a certain time of continuance, howbeit, that all come to the ending of their course within the space of the revolution of the great year. And that when one is finished, and another ready to begin, there happeneth some marvelous and strange sign in the earth, and in heaven: so as they which haue studied in that science, do straightway clearly know how there be men born, wholly differing from them that were before, in their lives and manners; and that be more or less acceptable to the gods, then they that were before. For they say, that amongst the great changes that happen at these passages from one age into another, the skill of foretelling things to come, groweth in reputation, and doth foretell aright when it pleaseth God to sand more fit and more certain signs, whereby it may be able to know and foreshow things to come. And contrariwise, in another age it falleth into contempt, and groweth out of credite, because it is rash, and faileth in the most part of her Prognostications, by reason it hath but dark means, and deformed instruments, to know what shal come to pass. Cicero is Scipios dream, thus describeth this great year. Homines populariter annum tantummodo Solis, id est unius astri reditu metiuntur. cum autem ad idem, vnde semel pròfecta sunt, cuncta astra redierint, eandémque totius caeli descriptionem longis interuallis retulerint, tum ille verè vertens annus appellari potest, in quo vix dicere audeo quam multa secula hominum teneantur. nanque, vt olim deficere sol hominibus, extinguíque visus est, cum Romuli animus haec ipsa in templa penetrauit: quandocumque eadem parte sol, eodéque tempore iterum defecerit, tum signis omnibus ad idem principium, stellísque reuocatis, expletum annum habeto. Cuius quidem anni nondum vigesimam partem scito esse counuersam. Plato in Timeus saith thus, From thence is proceeded the virietie of the night, and of the day, and therefore hath ben brought in the revolution of the circuit, alone& wise: the month, after that the moon hath gone about her circled, and overtaken the sun: The year, when the sun hath accomplished his course. As for the revolutions of others, there be few men that understand them, know their names, measure and distinguish them by number; insomuch, that they know not the times, and that their revolutions are infinite in multitude, and wonderful in variety. They may notwithstanding easily understand, how the perfect number of time doth then make us the year perfect when the eight revolutions that are measured by the circuit of one, and the same nature and always like, shall be all returned to their head and first beginning. In the translation of Timeus, which was published a good while ago, we haue declared that Plato meant by the perfect number of time, when the seven planets, and other fixed stars come back again to their first places, and represent unto us the same nature that was in the beginning of the world, which time containeth an infinity of years, and reneweth the world, giuing new motion unto it: Some say this great year containeth 15000 yeares of the sun, others 36000: the firmament, on the which it is ruled, passing one degree in every hundred yeares: and because there be 365 degrees, therfore the course thereof cannot bee accomplished in less then 36000 yeares. Others reckon as far as 49000, and that the neather world, from seven thousand to seven thousand yeares: and the heavenly, with al things generally, from fifty thousand to fifty thousand successively, are infinitely renewed: which proceedeth of the variable moving of the eight sphere, one while from the East, another while from the West, sometimes from the South, and sometimes from the North, which the Astrologians call a moving of Trepidation. This sphere from seven thousand to seven thousand yeares, maketh his said moving, to wit, seven times in all his secular revolution: every of which times causeth the dissolving and renewing of this neather world: and when it is come to the seventh after 49000 yeares, which are seven times seven, the heavenly world cometh to be entirely dissolved, to the end, that it may be thereupon renewed, and take again a communicating of form and matter. The Chaldeans, Persians, egyptians, and old Grecians considered and judged the chief events of the world by the eclipses of the sun and the moon, and by the stars, whose aspects are toward the places of the eclipses, or which ascend together, or are in the midst of the sky. Afterwards the Arabians, and specially A●bumasar, haue divided the space of time whereof we spake, by the great conjunctions of the planets, specially of the three uppermost, to wit, Saturne, jupiter, and Mars, whom they affirm to haue wonderful power in the alterations of this neather world,& the changes of kingdoms, laws, sects,& other notable things, according to the quality of the Triplicities wherein they happen, fiery, airy, watery, and earthly:& that there haue been seven of them since the beginning of the world, according to the Hebrewes and their computation, and that the eight shall be in the year of the world 7040, and of the incarnation of Christ, 1593. P. d'Ally Cardinal in the concord of astrology and theology, and of the history, and in the book of laws and sects: Roger Bacon in the Epistle to Pope Clement: Sepulueda of the moving of the sun: Leon an Hebrew in the third Dialogue of love: ptolemy in the the Quadripartite: But Picus Mirandula hath taken great pains in the confuting of those opinions and fantasies in twelve books written by him against Astrologers.  
BY those things whose root is the sesquitertian, or third number, and an half.] The Septenary or number of seven, is made of four and three, wherein is found a sesquitercian proportion, because four containeth three, and a third part. And the septenary joined to a quinary maketh twelve. So the quinary is composed of two and three, in which there is a sesquialteran proportion, for that three containeth two and a half, and therein is found the consonancy, {αβγδ}. The third consonancy is {αβγδ}, in double proportion, whereas then the septenary and quinary put together, make up the twelfth: certainly the twelfth containeth two harmonies, to wit, dia tessaron, and dia penned, and is as dia pason, for as much as dia pason is a sound composed of dia tessaron and dia penned. Now Plato hath written this according to the opinion of Pythagoras& his Disciples, who did account numbers, proportions, and mathematical figures for the first causes of all effects of the world, which Aristotle controlleth in the thirteenth and fourteenth books of his Metaphisicke.  
solid number.] solid numbers are those which add depth to length& breadth, as cubes, pyramids, and pillars, &c.  
AS if nature sometimes brought forth evil people, whose naughtiness cannot be remedied by instruction.] The cause wherefore the commonweal, yea the best commonweal may be marred is, that some men in a certain period or revolution of time, are born with so naughty a nature and disposition, that it is not possible to reform them by instruction; and when they meet in such a commonweal, they mar it: certainly, in considering the records of things passed till this age, it seemeth that there hath been always in the world some good mingled amongst evil, and that virtue and 'vice go by turns, passing from country to country, and reigning more at one time, then at another. For sith mens matters are in perpetual moving, they go up and down incessantly, mending or empairing anterchangeably. It is seen how a province or city founded by some exeelent parsonage, prospereth a while through the virtue of his government, and waxeth better and better, aiming right toward the midst or the top of his perfect course of government: and after declineth from height to lowness, or from the midst to the uttermost part. virtue had her first seat in Assyria, from whence shee removed into Media, then passed shee into Persia, and at last walked so far, that shee came to dwell at Rome. And if sithence the destruction of the roman Empire, there hath not ben any that hath lasted long, nor wherein the world hath holden his virtue assembled and united; in recompense thereof, it hath spread the same into diverse places, as into France, Castile, Portugall, almain, England, Poland, Muscouie, into the Empire of the Turkes and of the Maxmilian, and a good while since into the lands of the Saracens, whose kings accomplished so great conquests, subdued so many countries to their obedience, and at last destroyed the Eastern Empire of Rome. At this day Greece may serve for an example, which in times past having flourished in riches, feats of arms, and learning, above all other countries, is now brought into miserable slavery, being full of poverty and ignorance: Italy which had been dreadful through all the world, was afterwards occupied by the goths, huns, and Lombards,& at this day is come asunder, being without Religion, without law, without mar●●● and civil discipline, full of uncleanness, looseness, and beastliness, if we credit M●chia●ell, who doth so emblason it in the second book of his discourses. Behold how virtue and 'vice, knowledge and ignorance, prowess and cowardliness, do follow one another, honouring and defaming countries and nations in diuers seasons, through the providence of God: who will haue every of them as his turn falleth, to take part of good and bad, to the end they should not forget themselves, of wax too proud and insolent by remaining in perpetual prosperity.  
For he saith the Lacedemonian state changeth into the oligarchy, and the oligarchy into a democraty, and the Democrati● into the tyranny.] Such kinds of change● are laid forth in the eight and ninth books of Platoes commonweal, and by us translated in the fourth of these books of Politiques, or touching government, as they were found to haue correspondence to Aristotles discourses.   
Here endeth the Fift book of Aristotles government.   

THE sixth book OF ARISTOTLES CIVIL GOVERNMENT, TRANSLATED out OF greek, AND FRENCH, INTO ENGLISH. The Argument.  
CErtain matters already treated of in the fourth and fift books, are here more diligently examined: and withal are declared the likenesses; properties,& differences of Commonweales, and after what manner they may be assembled. But he insisteth most on democracies and Oligarchies, showing which is the worse, or the better; and setting down means to preserve them both: what manner of people are fit for them, and what Magistrates be necessary, behoveful, and honourable in every state.  

CHAP. I. Of the properties and congruities of every Commonweale, and of their ioinings and knittings together.  
WE haue be●ore shewed how many commonweals there be, and what be the differences between the counsel and the chief part of the commonweal, and spoken of the order of Magistrates and judgements, and which do fit each commonweal. again, wee haue treated of the destroying and upholding of Commonweals: from whence they spring, and for what causes. But sith there be sundry kinds of democracies, and likewise of other Commonwea●●●, if there remain any point, not sufficiently declared, it shall not be ●misse to examine it, and to deliver and set d●●ne a way that is fit and convenient for every thing. We are also to examine the ioinings and knitting together of all the ways before mentioned, which make the varieties and diversities of commonweals: so that the Aristocraties draw near to the likeness of Oligarchie● and commonweals seem to be more popular, I mean the ioinings and knittings together, that are to be treated of, and haue not yet ben handled. As for example, if the counsel, and the electing and creating of Magistrates, be ordained according to the use of the oligarchy, and the courts and judgements according to the manner of the aristocraty; or the judgements and the counsel, according to the ●auor of the oligarchy, and the creating of the Magistrates, according to the order of the aristocraty, or in some other maner that such properties of commonweals may be knit and brought together. We ha●e already discussed for what city what kind of Democraty is fit, and likewise what oligarchy for what people, and so of other commonweals, which sort is fit for each of them: notwithstanding it is expedient not only to declare which of these commonweals is the best for cities, but also how it ought to be constituted: therefore will we briefly reason of these commonweals and others, and first of all of the democraty, for thereby shall we understand the clean contrary commonweal, which is it that some call the oligarchy: For this method will we take in all kind of popular things, and that seem to imitate the democraty; for of the joining and knitting of these together, do grow the kinds of democracies, whereby it falleth out that there is more then one democraty, and that they differ. There be two causes wherefore the democracies be many in number: the first is before mentioned, namely, that there is a difference between people, in that some be apt to tillage, othersome to base occupations, and others bee workmen and hirelings. If we join the first to the second, and the third to both those, the●e shall not be onely a difference that the democraty is better or worse, but also that it shall not be the same. The second is that whereof we speak now; for the joining of those things together that are convenient for democracies and seem fit for them, do make the diversities of democracies, when there be more of the same things in one democraty then in another, or that all of them meet together in one democraty. The knowledge whereof is behoofull as well for the founding and ordaining of new democracies, whosoever shall be so minded, as for the reforming of them that are already founded. For the founders and establishers of commonweals do assay to join all things together that are fit and convenient for their purpose: But they err in the doing thereof( as we haue in our former. book alleged, when we treated of the destructions and vpholdings of Commonweals.) Now will we declare the chief grounds and allowed opinions, with the manners and things that every State desireth.  
The matters treated of in the fourth and fift books are here briefly repeated, to renew the remembrance thereof, and to serve as a preparative for the more ample understanding of democracies and Oligarchies: which being of many sorts, are varied according to their parts whereof they consist: As the counsel, the creating of Magistrates, and form of judging, are compacted somewhile one way and somewhile another; causing the Aristocraties to seem Oligarchies, and the Commonweals more Popular: as if the counsel and creating of Magistrates be founded after the manner of Oligarchies, by the stint of wealth: and the manner of judging according to the aristocraty, in respect of virtue and lukewarmness: Or the creating of the magistrates according to the aristocraty, and the office of judging according to the Democratie● the bringing together or separating of which properties or congruieties of commonweals, do make them better or worse: the consideration whereof is most necessary, as well for the establishing of a new commonweal, as for the reforming of an old already marred. Now beginning with the democraty, he considereth all things pertaining unto democracies: of which joinings and knittings together, diuers kinds of democracies result two ways; the one through the difference of people, by reason some be Farmers, some graziers, others Craftsmen, and others workmen for wages: the other, through the afore mentioned congruities and properties of the D●mocratie, whereof shall bee spoken in the sixth chapter.   

CHAP. II. What the end and ground of the democraty is.  
THerefore the end and foundation of the popular state, is liberty: For it is an old saying, that in this commonweal only men enjoy liberty, at it seemeth that every Popular state aimeth at the same. Obeying and governing by turns, is one t●ken of liberty: for the right or law of the people is to haue equality according unto number; and not according to dignitie● and where this is right, the multitude must needs haue the chief authority, and that which pleaseth many, must be the end and law. For they say it behoveth that every of the Citizens haue equality, insomuch, that in democracies the poor haue greater authority then the rich, by reason they are the greater number. And in such a kind of state the opinion of the most prevaileth and is preferred. It is then a sign of liberty, that all that be popular or holders on the peoples side, do set the same always before their eyes, as the end and foundation of the commonweal: another token of liberty is● to live as men list; which they call the effect of liberty: For as much as the property of bondage is, not to live according to a mans own discretion. This is the second end& ground of the popular state; whence hath proceeded the not obeying of any man, saving by turns, and it furthereth the maintenance of that liberty, which is according to equality. This being presupposed, and this kind of beginning or foundation being laid, we affirm that these are popular institutions or properties, namely, that all the Magistrates be created out of all the citizens; and that all the citizens command and govern every particular person; and that every man when his time and turn falleth, govern all the Citizens; that the Magistracies be distributed by lots, either all, or those that require experience or art; that in the giuing of Magistracies there be no respect in any wise had of revenues, or very small; that no man may enjoy one magistracy twice, or very seldom, or very few, except the offices and charges of the warres; that the Magistrates continue but a small time in office, either all, or as many as is possible; that all the Citizens judge causes, and that they be chosen out of men of all degrees, and haue the judging of all controversies and matters, or at least of very many, and of the weightiest and chiefest, as the correcting and calling to account of the Magistrates, and of the state of the commonweal, and of private contracts and bargains; that the assembly or congregation of the people haue the sovereign authority of all matters, or of those that bee of greatest weight and importance; that the Magistrate haue chief authority in no matters, or in those that be of small weight. Now of Magistracies, the counsel or Senate is very popular, where no fees be appointed to all: for therein the power of this magistracy is taken away, when the people to whom great fees are assigned, do take into their own hands all the judgements, as hath ben declared in the former books: Then also that fees be given to all, chiefly to the assembly or general court, to the Iudges, and to the Magistrates; if all that be not possible, at least they give fees to the Magistrates, the Iudges, and the counsel, and to the chief assemblies, or to the Magistrates that are constrained to take their diet together. again, sith the oligarchy is defined by nobleness of birth, richesse, and lukewarmness, their contraries seem to be popular, to wit, baseness of birth, poverty, and being mechanical. Likewise that no office be perpetual, or if any remain of the old change, that the power thereof be taken away; and that it be not given by election by voices, but by lots. These things be common to popular states. Now that which chiefly seemeth to be a popular state, and the extremest kind, proceedeth from the right or law that all men aclowledge to bee popular, which is, that all the Citizens enjoy equality in number: For this is equality, that the rich govern not more then the poor, and that they alone haue not the authority, but all equally in number: for by this means they think that they haue equality and liberty in such a kind of state.  
liberty being considered as the end in every sort of democraty, it doth appear in two things, namely, in the course of ruling and governing by turns; and in the licence of living, as pleaseth every man best, without yielding obedience to any man otherwise then in his turn. There be ten properties of Popular states, that the Magistrates be created indifferently out of all the citizens, and all govern every man,& every man all men, as their turns fall; that the Magistrates be created by casting of lots, either all wholly, or at least they in whom science and experience is requisite; and that they be not authorized in respect of any proportion of revenue or wealth, or that it bee small; that one and the same office, may not be born twice by any man, except it be seldom, and by few, saving martiall offices; that the magistrates continue but a little while in office, either all, or as many as shall bee possible to bee reduced to this reason; that all created out of all, do judge and determine of all matters, or of many, and the principalest; pallest; as of the correcting of the Magistrates of the government of the commonweal, and of private contracts and bargains; that the assembly or congregation of the people do order all or the greatest things; the Magistrate chief of none, or those that be of very small importance: that the counsel haue no fees: that if there bee any common revenue, all bee feed, to wit, the counsel, Iudges, and Magistrates; if that cannot bee, then the principal assemblies, and the high Iudges, or the Magistrates that haue their diet together: that the Popular state be governed by men of base birth, poor men, and base craftsmen: that no magistracy bee perpetual, or if there bee any one, to put it down and reduce it from election to lots.   

CHAP. III. How right is to be observed in the democraty.  
NOw next of all it may bee doubted after what manner they shall haue this equality, to wit, whether the goods of five hundred Citizens must be made equal to a thousand, and that those thousand are to haue as much power as the five hundred: or if the equality must not bee framed after this fashion, but rather when the equality is thus made, to take as many out of the thousand, as out of the five hundred; who shall haue all the authority of determining and judging: whether is this commonweal most just, according to the right or lawe of the people, or rather that commonweal which regardeth the great number. For they which hold with the Popular states, affirm that to bee lawful and right which seemeth good unto many: They that hold with the Oligarchies, is that which is thought good by the richest, maintaining that the proportion of wealth must bee respected in judging and determining: but both of them haue inequality and injustice. For if we account that right which few men determine, it is a tyranny, because if one rich man possess more substance then the rest, according to the oligarchical right, he shall bee worthy of the government of the State. Or if wee account it according to many in number, they will deal unjustly and injuriously, confiscating the rich mens goods, as it hath been said before. What manner of equality then shall that bee which both confess and allow? Wee will consider and find it out by those things which both hold to be just and right: for they say that ought to bee ratified which seemeth good to the greater part. Be it s●, yet not altogether, but sith the City consisteth of two parts, to wit, of rich men and poor men, let that bee followed which seemeth good to both, or the greater part: but if they bee of contrary opinions, then that which seemeth good to the greater part, and to those which haue most revenues: as if the one bee te●ne, the other twenty, and six rich men be of one opinion, and fifteen poor men of another, and so there bee added to the poor four rich men, and to the rich five poor men, when both parts are counted, let that part prevail which hath greatest revenues. And if it so chance that they be equal, there should bee the same doubt that now is, if the assembly were double, or the iudgement, because then it must bee remedied by lots, or by some such other means. But touching equality and right, although it bee very hard to find the truth thereof, yet it is easier to attain thereto by the hazard of lots, then by persuading those which may bee superiors: sith the inferiors do always seek equality and right, whereof they that haue most power make no account.  
Sith equality and right ought so to bee observed in the democracy, that th● poor may haue therein as much power as the rich, to know howe this may best bee done, suppose that in a city, whose government is Popular, there are a thousand poor men, and five hundred rich men; the question is, whether parts opinion shall be followed in consulting or judging any thing, the rich men being compared with the poor touching the valuation of wealth, so that one rich mans voice prevail as much as two poor mens. Aristotle concludeth that this is equally good in two manners, the one, in causing the opinion of a thousand poor men to haue no less force then that of five hundred rich men, the other, in electing and advancing to the Magistracies as many out of the number of the five hundred rich men, as of the thousand poor men, which are twenty on the one side,& twenty on the other, both which manners are more just and reasonable then to establish that which pleaseth the greater number, as do they of the Popular estate, or to follow that which the rich men will haue decreed, as do they of the Oligarchies; sith from both these manners sundry inconveniences arise.   

CHAP. IIII. Which is the best kind of democracy.  
now sith there are four kinds of Democracies, that is the best kind which is the first in order, as wee haue declared in the former discourses, and it is the ancientest of all. I mean the first, according to the distinction of people. For the best sort of people are the Husbandmen, so that a democracy may bee established, where they live by husbandry or pasture. For such people because they haue not much wealth, are not idle, and cannot therefore frequent the public assemblies, and sith they want things necessary for the sustenance of life, they follow their business, and seek not other mens goods, but take greater pleasure in labouring then in governing and having Offices, especially if there bee small profit therein; for the vulgar sort prefereth profit before honour. There is an evident token hereof, in that men in ancient times haue endured Tyrannies, and at this present they endure the Oligarchies, provided, that they bee suffered to follow their labour, and that their goods bee not taken from them: for presently some grow rich, and the others are not in extreme want. Besides, to haue the authority of electing and controlling, or punishing the Magistrate, doth satisfy their desires, if they haue any ambition. For among some people, although they haue not the right and power of electing the Magistrate, but some are by turns appointed thereunto, as at mantinaea: yet many are content to haue authority in the chief counsel, and wee are to think that this is a form of democracy, as it was sometimes at mantinaea. It is therefore behoveful for the aforesaid kind of democracy, and the custom is such, that all do elect and control the Magistrates, and haue in their own hands the power of judging, that the chief Magistracies be held by persons chosen, and the greatest by those that haue greatest revenue; or else without having any regard to the revenue, by those which are fittest for them. The commonweals which are so governed, must needs be well governed, for the Magistracies shall always bee in the best mens hands with the peoples consent, who will not bear any envy to good men: and they who are noble and good, ought to content themselves with this order, to the end, they be not governed by others worse then themselves: and in this manner their government shall be just, because the correction or punishment belongs to others: for it is very requisite and profitable that the Citizens be kept in order, and not suffered to do what they list, for such absolute liberty causeth the same evil in a City, as it doth in every particular man; so that it is necessary that the commonweal shall receive great good, when good men do govern without the hurt and reproach of the people. It is therefore manifest that this is the best kind of democracy, as also for for what cause it is so, viz. because the people therein is such. But for the inducing of them to follow Husbandry, there were certain laws which were in a●ncient times used by many, and are very profitable, as to suffer no man to haue any land, but according to a certain measure and quantity, or else to a certain place of the city. It was anciently ordained in many Cities, that the first inheritances might not bee sold. There is also a certain law ascribed to Oxylus, tending to the same effect, which forbiddeth the lending of money vpon any piece of land. We may at this time ordain and accommodate this, by means of the law of the Aphytali, which is very expedient for that which we speak of: ●or although there be many, and they possess a small territory, yet they are all Husbandmen, because they let not the whole possessions, but divide them into so many parts, that the poor also may exceed them in revenues. Next to the multitude of Husbandmen, the best sort of people are shepherds, who live on their cattle, for they agree in many things with the Husbandmens profession, and by exercise grow very fit for the warres, and haue their bodies hardened to live and continue in the open air without seeking any covert. Almost all the other kinds of people, whereof the Democracies consist, are worse then these, because their lives are bad, and because there is no virtue in the exercises of mechanical and mercenary men, and of such as use buying and selling. Besides, because all that sort of people is daily in the market place, and in the City, it is therefore easily assistant and present at public assemblies, but the husbandmen being scattered abroad the Country, do not assemble themselves, neither haue they such need thereof. And where the situation of the place is such, that the Country is far distant from the city, it is easy to establish a good democracy and commonweal, the multitude being constrained to make as it were Colonies in the fields. And therefore although there be a great number of those of the City, and of such as keep or haunt the shops and markets, yet cannot they assemble themselves without those which dwell in the Country. Sith we haue declared how the best& first kind of democracy should be constituted, it may be easily understood how the other kinds should be established, if men proceed therein by following the same manner, in separating or removing always the worse sort of people. Touching the last kind of democracy, because it is communicated to all, it cannot bee endured by every city, nor bee easily preserved, unless it bee established with good laws and customs. Now wee haue shewed be●ore almost all the corruptions which destroy both such a form of commonweal and all other forms: but to establish this democracy, and to make the people thereof mighty, they that haue knowledge in such matters of government, haue been accustomend to receive thereinto as many men as they could, and to make Citizens, not only those that were lawfully born, but bastards also, and those whose fathers or mothers only were Citizens, sith all this is fit for such a kind of people. When the guides and leaders of the people haue thus taken order for it, yet they must receive so many, that the number of the vulgar sort may but exceed the Nobles, and those of mean Estate, and they must pass no further, for if they exceed them too much, they trouble the commonweal, and they cause the Nobility of the democracy to conceive disliking and discontent; whereupon the sedition at Cyrene was raised: for men make no accouut of a small inconvenience, but by increasing it doth more appear. Furthermore, such ordinances are profitable for this kind of democracy, as Clisthenes used at Athens, seeking to augment the democracy: and that which they of Cyrene used, who established the Popular state: for it is requisite to make sundry other tribes and fraternities, and to reduce the private sacrifices to a less number, and to make them common, as also to invent all means possible, whereby they may all bee mingled, and to abolish the former familiarities and conuersings together. moreover, the Tyrannicall customs seem to bee all Popular, as the permission of slaves, which may be in some sort behoveful, as also of women and children, and to suffer every man to live after his own pleasure, which thing shall much profit such an estate, because the vulgar sort had rather live disorderly then modestly.  
There are four kinds of democracies, as hath ben said in the 4. book. cha. 4. The first is of Husbandmen: the second of shepherds,& where the citizens live vpon pasture: the third is of tradesman, and mercenary people: the fourth, where every one liveth as he list himself, without respecting or regarding the laws and magistrates, sith all is therein Tyrannically administered, according to the will and decrees of the people, through the persuasion of their flatterers and leaders. The first kind of democraty is the best, which consisteth of Husbandmen, who having small wealth, are constrained to labour, and haue little leisure to frequent the public assemblies, by which means the laws bear rule amongst them. The popular properties of this democraty are, first, to haue seldom any general assembly; secondly, that in this general assembly or great counsel, they haue power to create, and control or punish Magistrates, and to hear them give account of their doings, either all together, or some certain chosen by all; thirdly, that the greatest and highest Offices be given according to the valuation of most wealth& revenues, and executed by men of sufficiency, full of virtue, knowledge& experience. There are four laws very requisite and profitable for the maintaining and upholding of such a kind of democraty: The first, that it bee not lawful for any one to possess more land then the measure or quantity allowed by the state: The second, not to sell the first inheritances: The third, to lend no money on any piece of land: The fourth, not to give whole inheritances to particular persons, but to divide them by so many parts, that every one may haue a portion thereof, and may follow Husbandry. The second kind of democracy, is of those people that live by the keeping of cattle, which for the most part consist of shepherds, who because they remain commonly in the open air, without any covert, living simply and poorly, haue both their bodies and mindes hardened to the enduring of military travails and troubles: Wherefore such a form of commonweal hath the second place of goodness amongst the Democracies. The third kind of democraty is not so good, the people therein being of all sorts, merchants, Artificers, and Mercenary men, who are far worse then Husbandmen and shepherds, because their employments and actions haue nothing agreeable to virtue, and because by reason of thier idleness they haue leisure to meet and assemble themselves often. Touching the last kind of democraty, sith it is worse then the rest, it hath need to preserve itself by sundry means, which are reduced to four. The first is, that the Gouernours admit as many citizens as they can, not onely such as are lawfully born, but also bastards, or them whose fathers or mothers onely were citizens, until the multitude of the vulgar sort exceed the number of the Noblemen, and those of mean estate, without passing any further. The second manner is to increase the number of the Tribes or lineages, by making the private sacrifices less and public. The third, to use all means for the entermixing of them together. The fourth is, the liberty of slaves, women, and children, and the suffering of every one to live after his own pleasure, as is used in the tyranny: for the people is a tyrant.   

CHAP. V. An advertisement for the preserving of Democracies.  
IT is the office of a lawgiver, and every other person, which undertaketh the ordaining and establishing of an estate, not to make it great or only, but rather that it may bee of continuance, because is no hard thing for any whatsoever form of government to last two or three dayes. It is therefore requisite that wee return to the discourse which we haue made before touching the preservations and destructions of Commonweals, and thence gather or frame the safety therof, shanning the causes which destroy them,& following such laws, as well written as unwritten, which do chiefly contain the means whereby commonweals are preserved, and not to think that it is either a Popular or oligarchical thing, which causeth the city to live in a very Popular or very oligarchical manner, but that which causeth the stability and continuance thereof. now adays the Gouernours to please the people, do make the most part of the goods common, by way of Iustice. But they who haue care of the commonweal, must do clean otherwise, for they must ordain that the goods of condemned persons bee not made the peoples, nor appropriated to the state, but that they bee adiudged to the use and service of religion. By this means men will beware as much of offending, because such punishment is proposed, and the vulgar sort having no hope of gain, will not bee so forward to condemn those which are accused. Likewise, public accusations must bee always seldom made, by imposing great penalties on false accusers, sith they are not wont to accuse the people, but the Noblemen. Furthermore, it is requisite that all the Citizens wish well to the commonweal, or at the least that they repute not the gouernours for enemies. But because the last kinds of Democracies are greatly peopled, and because also it is very hard to haue general assemblies, without setting down some fee or allowance, which thing is dangerous for the Noble and rich men, where there are no public revenues, sith it is necessary to commit exactions and confiscations by false judgements, whereby many Democracies haue been destroyed: Therefore where there are no revenues, it is good to haue few assemblies, and to decide many matters in few daies, for that is very profitable, to the end, that the rich men fear not the greatness of the charges, if not the rich but the poor haue fees allowed them for judging. It is also profitable, to the end, that causes may bee the better decided, sith the rich men will not bee long absent from their private business, but for a small time they are well content to do it. But when there are public reuenues● that which the guides and leaders of the people do now adays, must bee shanned, for they in taking their part, divide that which remaines, and haue need thereof again, because such an help to needy persons, is like a vessel full of holes. And he that is a true Popular governor, must see that the people bee not too poor, for that maketh the democracy worse. Wherefore, it is necessary to provide with great care and diligence, that there may bee such abundance as may continue. And sith the same is also expedient and profitable for the rich men, the money which is made of the public revenues, must bee gathered, and then distributed to the poor, especially if so much money may bee made, as may serve to buy some land; if not, then to help them thereby to use Merchan●ise or labour; and if this may not bee done to all, yet at the least let this destribution and equality bee made by the Tribes or lineages of the city, or by some other part of the same by turns; and that in the mean while the rich men do bear the Offices and charges of general assemblies, being freed from superfluous and vnnessarie charges of the commonweal. The people of the Carthaginians by observing this form of government, won the favour and good will of the people: for by sending some of the people to bee Magistrates in their Colonies, they did by this means enrich them. Likewise, the Noblemen that are courteous, and haue any iudgement or understanding, ought to distribute amongst themselves the poor and needy people, furnishing them with means whereby they may labour: and it should bee good to imitate the people of the Tarentines, which make the use of their possessions common and equal to the poor, and hereby they get the good will and favour of the vulgar sort. Besides, they haue divided all the Magistracies, and will haue some to bee given by election, and others by lots: by lots, that all the people may haue equal part therein: by election, that they may bee the better ruled and governed. This may bee done by equally dividing the same Office and authority, that is, by giuing it one time by lots, and another time by election. Wee haue thus declared howe the democraty ought to bee established.  
whosoever will establish the fourth kind of democraty, ought to observe ten precepts: the first is, not to haue respect so much to the greatness, as the continuance therof, and to seek or work the safety and stability of it, shunning those evils that may destroy it, and seeking means for the preservation thereof, both by written and unwritten laws: the second is, to adjudge the goods of condemned to the use and service of religion, and not to apropriate them to the state, nor distribute them to the people: the third, to see that there be few public judgements and condemnations, by imposing great penalties on false accusers: the fourth, that all the Citizens do both like and wish well to the present state, or at least they hate not the chief Magistrates: the fift precept is, that in the last kind of democracies, wherein there is great store of people, and no public revenue, there be seldom any assemblies made, and that many matters be dispatched in few daies: the sixth, that the base sort of people grow not too poor, and that where there is public revenue, it be spared and saved by good husbanding thereof, to the end, that the needy people be therewith holpen, either every one particularly, or generally by the tribes and lineages by turns, that they may be able to buy lands, and so be busied in husbandry, or else to use Merchandise: the seventh, that the rich men leaving their vain and superfluous charges, bestow those that are necessary in conuocating the general counsel, and other public assemblies: the eight, that they sand always some of the people into the colonies with charge and commission, where they may be employed and enriched: the ninth, that the rich men distribute among themselves the poor, and maintain them: the tenth, that some Offices bee given by election, and others by lot; by election, to the end, they may bee the better executed; by lot, that the people may participate in them: which thing may be done in the same Office, by giuing it one time by lot, and another time by election.   

CHAP. VI. How Oligarchies ought to be preserved.  
WE shall also hereby perceive how Oligarchies are to bee ordered. Now every oligarchy must be framed of contraries, in respecting the contrary form of democracy, chiefly, that which is well tempered, and the first kind, which resembleth much the commonweal, so generally called, where the wealth and revenues are to be divided, and the one made less, the other greater; less, as those according to the rate, whereof the necessary Offices are given; and greater, as those according to the rate whereof the chief Offices are given: and that every one that hath revenues, be admitted to the authority of government. Likewise, that the people be thereunto received, according to the valuation of wealth, in such number, that the gouernours may haue more power then the rest which do not govern. And there must always be associated in the government of the commonweal, some of the better sort of the people. We will in like sort ordain the oligarchy following, by stretching and extending it a little: but that kind of oligarchy, which is opposite to the extreme kind of democracy, and which is the most violent and Tyrannicall of all Oligarchies, because it is the worst of all, it hath therefore greater need to haue the safety thereof carefully and warily provided for. For as bodies of good& healthful constitution, and ships well furnished with mariners, do bear many faults or imperfections without danger; but contrariwise, as sickly bodies, and leaking vessels, or such as haue bad mariners, cannot bear the least faults, so the worst kinds of commonweals haue most need to be carefully upheld. The great number of inhabitants preserveth the Democracies; for it that is opposed to the right, that is according to worthiness. But on the other side, the oligarchy is preserved by good order.  
Aristotle having purposed to treat in this sixth book severally of democracies and Oligarchies, after he hath dispatched and finished his discourse touching democracies, entereth now into the Oligarchies, wherein he doth insist the less, because the one is understood by the other, sith they are contraries: for there are as many kinds of Oligarchies, as there are of democracies, which are opposed correspondantly each to other, viz. the first kind of oligarchy to the first kind of Democraty, and so the rest. Touching the first kind, it is very good, and draweth near to the commonweal, so generally called, that the wealth and revenues be therein divided into less and greater: less, as those whereby men may attain to necessary Offices: greater, as those according to the rate& valuation, whereof they are chosen, which shall execute supreme and sovereign Offices: wherein such regard is to be had, that the Gouernours haue more power then the rest, and that the better sort of the people, may participate in the government. The second and third kind of oligarchy, are likewise to be established by augmenting the revenues: but the last kind of oligarchy, correspondent to the last kind of democraty is most bad and Tyrannicall, which like a sickly body or a ship at sea ill rigged and furnished, hath need of greater care for the upholding and maintaining thereof. now, as democracies are preserved by the great multitude of people, so are Oligarchies upheld and continued through good order.   

CHAP. VII. Of the parts of the people that are meet for war, and how all kinds of Oligarchies ought to use them.  
NOw sith there are four chief parts of the people, the Husbandmen, Artificers, Merchants, and Hirelings: and four parts for war, the Horsemen, Footmen armed, Footmen unarmed, and seafaring men: where the country is fit for Horsemen, there may bee well established a mighty oligarchy, for the inhabitants may maintain themselves through this power, and it doth also belong to men of great wealth to keep horses. Where the country is fit for the training up of footmen, there may be established the second kind of oligarchy, for the use of heavy armor is fitter for rich men, then for poor men. But the power of the light armed soldiers and seafaring men, is altogether democratical. Now a daies where there is a great multitude of such people, if there arise any sedition, they do oft fight worse, which evil must be remedied by the example of good Captaines, who mingle with the horsemen& footmen that are thoroughly armed, a sufficient number of light armed men. And in this manner the popular sort do in seditions overcome the rich men, because being lightly armed, they do fight with ease against the horsemen, and well armed footmen. Then by establishing such a power of them, they do establish it against themselves. But whereas there are two ages, and some are old, others young, children must be instructed and trained up while they are yet young, in light and easy exercises, and when they shall be past their childhood, they must be enured and hardened to endure labour, as wrestlers. It is requisite to allow the multitude a part in the authority of government, either( as it hath ben said before) those which haue revenues, or as the thebans do when they abs●●●●● for a time from mechanical labours, or as they do at Marsilia, choosing the worthiest as well of those that are in office, as of those that are out of office. Besides, there must bee annexed some extraordinary charges to the chee●e ●ffices, possessed by those that are o● other estate, to the end, that the people may willingly forbear them, and not envy those that for the enjoying of them, bestow such costs. Now it is seemly and expedient, that at their entering into office, they make sumptuous sacrifices, and some public buildings, that the people being feasted, and seeing the City adorned and garnished both with Temples and other buildings, may rest content with such a kind of government. It will also be expedient for the rich ●en to leave a memory of their bounty and magnificence, although the governors in Oligarchies, do at this time clean contrary● seeking profit no less then honour. And therefore it were better to call such estates little democracies. Thus we haue declared how Democracies and Oligarchies ought to be.  
Almost all the properties of the democracy and oligarchy, being shewed, it is declared, in what places both the one and other may be conveniently ordained, and what sorts of people are fit and apt to receive them: and Aristotle doth likewise continue the recital of those means whereby Oligarchies are preserved.   

CHAP. VIII. What Offices are necessary ●or any estate, and what commodious and honourable.  
WE will now entreat of offices, and show how many there are, and what they be,& of what things they haue charge, as we haue said before. For the City cannot be without necessary Offices, nor be well governed without those that concern the good order and ornament thereof. moreover, it is necessary that there bee fewer offices in small Cities, and more in the greater, as hath ben already said. We must not then be ignorant what offices are to be conjoined, and what are to be severed. Of the necessary Offices the first is to haue charge of the market, and thereto must bee appointed an Officer, who may oversee mens contracts, and to look that there bee honest dealing among them. For in every City almost some things must of force be bought, and others sold, for the mutual and necessary use thereof, and this approchet● very nigh to that sufficiency, for which they seem to haue been gathered into the body of one commonweal. The second charge being also near to this, is of public and private things that concern the city, to the end, that the houses and streets may be well and decently kept, and such as are fallen to decay, repaired;& the bounds observed without strife or contention, and all other things, requiring like care. Many do call such a kind o● office an Edilitie● which containeth sundry parts,& in those cities which are much peopled, some are appointed to one charge or part therof,& some to another, as some to the repairing of the walls, others of the conduits, and some to the keeping of the havens. There is also another necessary charge, and like to this, as consisting in the same things; which nevertheless are in the fields without the city,& they which haue the oversight thereof are called, some of them maisters of the fields, some of the forrests,& so there are three charges of these things. There is another office, whereto belongs the receiving of the public revenues,& the keeping of the money that is made therof, as also the disbursing thereof, as the necessity of the state shal require: such officers are called receivers and treasur●rs. There is another, which consists in writing private contracts, and the sentences pronounced by the iudges, as also suits, accusations, and actions are to be framed by those which haue this office. But in some cities such offices are divided among many, who are al reduced under the charge of one chief,& they are called notaries, falconers,& by other like names. That office which follows next to this, is very necessary,& the most troublesone of all other offices, consisting in the executing of judgements on accused and condemned persons, and in committing men to prison. This office is little pleasing, by reason of the great enmity which is thereby purchased, so that unless there be great gain to be gotten by it, no man will undertake it, or if any do undertake it, they will not deal therein according to the laws, yet it is necessary, because the judgements given on suits& causes, should be bootless& to no purpose, if they were not put in execution, and had effect. For if civil society cannot continue without the use of judgements, much less can it endure, unless they bee executed. Wherefore, it is better that this Office bee not one, but that there bee sundry thereof in sundry places. It is requisite to divide after the same manner the actions and suits of laws, as also that several Magistrates do execute several matters, and that young men do rather put in execution the causes of young men, and that such as concern men more in years, condemned by one Magistrat, be executed by another; as that which the praetor or provost of the city shall haue decreed, to be put in execution by the AEdile, and so generally those causes executed by one Magistrat which haue been judged by another. For sith they that execute them, shall purchase less enmity, so much the rather shall they take effect. But if the same Magistrates do both condemn and execute, they incur double hatred, and by meddling in all matters, they become odious to all men. In many places the iailor and executioner are two several offices, as at Athens that which is called the office of the eleven. It is therefore better to divide their charge also, and to use means for it by some devise, sith it is no less necessary then any of the former. For good and honest men do greatly shun this charge,& it cannot be safely committed to bad persons, who ought rather to be kept& looked unto themselves, then to keep others. It is then expedient that they haue a several office, and that they do not exercise the same office continually, but that the young men where there is any degree or order of young men& keepers, be appointed to these charges one after another. wherefore we will set those offices first, as being very necessary, next these, others less necessary, but of greater authority, wherein there is required great experience and faithfulness: as are those offices which concern the guard and defence of the City, and all those that are ordained and instituted for the war, and it is necessary both in time of peace and war, that there be some appointed to keep and look unto the walls and gates of the city, and to make inquisitions, and to enrol the Citizens. Then over all these charges there are in some places more officers ordained, in other fewer, as in small cities there is one over all: such officers are called Captaines general, or Cheefetaines of armies. Besides, if there bee horsemen or light armed footmen, or archers, or mariners, offices are sometimes appointed over every of them, whom they call Admirals or Generals of the Horsemen, or Colonels of the footmen: under whom again there are others as Captaines of gallies and of companies, having Centurions, Decurions, and other particular officers under them: and they are all comprised under the kind of military affair●s. Such then is the maner of this office, but because the Magistrates, if not all, yet some at the least do deal in public affairs, it is therefore needful that there be another Magistrate, who may review and control their accounts, and not be employed in any other matters: some call them controllers or Censors, some maisters of the accounts, others inquisitors, and some again protectors. But besides all these offices, there is another, and that the chiefest of them, which whosoever do execute, they haue the oversight of the state, and govern the multitude, where the people doth bear rule. For it is expedient that there bee some to assemble them, who may haue the chief authority. They are in some places called forecounsellors or preconsulters, because they consult before: but where the people commands, they are rather called a Senate or counsel. Then there are almost so many offices belonging to the City. There is another charge concerning the service of the gods, as are Priests and others, to whom is committed the administration of religion, as to haue care of the Temples, to re-edify those that are ruinous or decayed, and to provide and look to such other things as are ordained for the honor of the gods: which charge is in some places all one, as in small Cities: sometimes also there are many sorts thereof, and all divided or distinguished from the office of Priesthood, as keepers of the consecrated money, sextons. The other charge next to this, which is severally ordained for al public sacrifices, which are not by the law appointed to the Priests, but concern the honour of that God which is protector of the city, these are name Kings of the sacrifices, or high Bishops, called {αβγδ}. Then to repeat this matter, the necessary offices consist almost in these things, in religion, war, public revenues, expenses touching the market, the city, the havens, and the religion: furthermore in judgements, contracts, writings, executions, imprisonments, accounts, inquests, controlling of magistrates, and finally in the Senate or counsel of the commonweal. But properly and peculiarly in those Cities that are quiet and wealthy, wherein great care is had of descence or comeliness, there is appointed a Magistrate for the discipline of women and children, for the observing and keeping of the laws, and for the government of places for exercise: and besides, for gimnasticall and musical games, and other like shows. Of these Offices, some doubtless are not popular, as that for the discipline of women and children. For poor men must of necessity use their wines and children, as seruants, for want of slaves. And whereas there are three sorts of Magistracies, by which the chief Officers are chosen, namely, they that look to the observing of the laws, the Preconsulters, and the Senate or Counsell● they of the former, haue an aristocratical office; the second an oligarchical; and the last, which is the Senate or counsel, is Popular. Thus haue wee briefly handled almost all the public Offices.  
Some Offices are necessary, and others honourable: those are necessary which cities cannot want, and those honourable which serve for the ornament and beautifying therof; and some of them belong to civil government, others to religion. There are seventeen kinds of Offices, the first necessary Office is of them that are clerk of the market: the second of them that haue charge of the public and private buildings of the City, and they are called aediles: the third concerneth the same thing in effect, but without the city: the fourth is of receivers and treasurers: the fift of Notaries and falconers: the sixth of executioners and iailers: all which Offices be very necessary, as bee also those that follow, which are withal of greater authority, wherein there is required much experience and faithfulness, as are those Offices which concern the guard and defence of the city, and all those that are ordained and instituted for the war, which wee refer to the seventh kind of Offices, as Captaines, Generals of Armies, Constables, leaders of the Horsemen, Colonels of the footmen, Admirals; under whose command are sundry other inferior Officers: the eight is of the Masters of accounts, and controllers of other Offices: the ninth is of those that haue the oversight of the State, assemble the counsel, and are therein President; as were the Consuls at Rome, and now in swisser land the Auoyers, Burgmaisters and Amans: the tenth is of the forecounsellers, preconsulters, or procurators, who examine matters,& then propound them to the counsel, as are the Sauij or Sages at Venice, being sixteen in number, and so called, because they seem to haue a farther insight and iudgement in causes of weight, then all the rest: the eleventh is of Priests, and others appointed to the service of the gods, and the administration of religion, as Bishops, Chanons, Curates, Chaunters, and others distinguished from the Office of Priesthood, as Wardons, and Sextons, &c. the twelfth of the Kings of the sacrifices, as at Rome, at lacedaemon, and in egypt; or of high Bishops, called {αβγδ}, as at Athens, to whose charge were committed the public sacrifices made in honour of that God who was protector of the City: the thirteenth is of those Officers who are appointed for the discipline of women: the fourteenth for the institution and education of children: the fifteenth of those that look to the observing of the laws: the sixteenth of such as oversee the exercises: the seventeenth concerns the public games and shows. Of all which Plato doth treat at large in the sixth book of his laws, where he declareth how they should be ordained, in what number, and after what manner created, and what every magistrates charge is, in matters touching either human affairs, or the service of the gods, in war and peace, in the city and abroad. Aristotle hath already spoken of it before in the fourth book, the eleventh chapter.    

THE SEVENTH book OF ARISTOTLES CIVIL GOVERNMENT, TRANSLATED out OF greek, AND FRENCH, INTO ENGLISH. The Argument.  
ARistotle having treated in the former discourses, of states which are not absolutely good, but by way of supposition, declareth in this seventh book, which is the perfect commonweal, and wherein consisteth the welfare of cities, and civil states. Whether the active life is to be preferred before the contemplative, or not: how men are made good by nature, custom, and reason, or discipline: he ●reateth also of the situation, commodities, and ornaments of a city, of the quantity and condition of territories, of the number and quality of Citizens, of marriages, procreation, bringing up and training of children.  

CHAP. I. Of the perfect commonweal, and the happy city.  
HE that will undertake duly to treat of the best commonweal, ought first of all to declare what life is most to be wished and desired: for if he be ignorant thereof, he must needs be ignorant of the best form of commonweal, for it stands with reason that they should live well, who use a good form of Comonweale, according to their commodities, unless there happen some extraordinary le●. Therefore is it behoo●efull first of all to determine what kind of life is by all men most to be wished, and next of all to examine whether the same bee good publick●ly and privately, or diverse. Now then supposing that we haue elsewhere sufficiently discussed many points concerning the good life, we will repeat them here. doubtless, as touching the division already set down, it cannot be denied, but that whereas good be divided into three parts, namely, into those that are external, into the goods of the body, and into the goods of the mind; all men cannot be happy, for he shall never be accounted happy, that hath not any portion of manhood, nor of temperancy, nor of iustice, nor of wisdom, nor he that is afraid of every fly, nor he that being hungry or thirsty refraineth not from the worst things, nor he that for the value of a farthing will kill his dearest friends, nor likewise he that is senseless and without reason, like a child or mad man. Now ought all men confess these things to be so as we haue declared them: nevertheless they disagree in the quantity and in the immoderate excess of them. For how little virtue soever they haue, they think that sufficient: But their desire is to excel infinitely in riches, possessions, power, glory, and such like things: whose error is easy to be refuted by the works themselves, sith virtue is not gotten and kept by the outward goods, but the outward goods are gotten by virtue, and that the happy li●e, whether we account it to consist in pleasure, or in virtue, or in boo, falleth rather to them which excel in goodness of manners, matched with wisdom, and ha●e outward wealth in a reasonable measure, then to those which haue greater store therof then they haue need of, and lacketh the other goods. But vpon good consideration of the matter we shall ha●e understanding of the same by reason. For the outward goods haue some end wherefore they are, being as it were instruments: and every profitable thing is such, that the excess thereof must needs be hurtful, or of no profit to him which hath it. But how much soever the goods of the mind do abound, so much the more good do they, and therfore are not only honest, but also profitable. To be short, it is certain that such is the comparison and proportion of the good dispositions, or best states and affections of every thing ●mongst themselves, as is of the excess, by which the things themselves do differ one from another, whereto we account the dispositions to appertain. Therefore if the mind, both as it is absolutely taken without respect of the good which we reap thereby, and as it hath relation to ourselves, is of greater honour, and more precious then the possessions of the body, then must the good disposition and best state of every of these, haue all one the same prop●rtion that is in their subiects. moreover, such goods are naturally to bee desired for the mind, and all wise men ought so to desire them, and not the mind for them: let us then resolve ourselves, that there happeneth as much felicity to every man, as he possesseth virtue& wisdom, and so far as he worketh according to them; taking example from God who is blessed, not in respect of any outward good, but in respect only of himself, and because he is of such a kind of nat●re: for good fortune doth dif●er from felicity, in that the goods that are from without the mind, come unto us by chance and fortune; but no man is just nor wise of fortune, nor by fortune. Therfore it followeth, and is to be inserred by the like reasons, that the city is happy and blissful which is good, and doth order well her affairs. Now it cannot be that they should order their affairs well which do not good things: neither is any kind of action whatsoever, either of man or of city, to be acco●●ted good, without virtue, and wisdom: withal, the strength, iustice, and wisdom of a city, haue the same virtue and form, as haue those qualities of particular persons, in respect whereof they be called just, temperate, and wise. Thus haue we set down these matters by way of a preamble, because we could pass no further without saying somewhat of thē, neither was it possibly for us here exactly to examine al the reasons belonging to the same, for why, it is a work pertaining to another enterprise and place. Now let us presuppose, that the good life severally& particularly of every citizen by himself, and jointly and commonly of the cities themselves, is it that is so furthered and furnished with virtue, that it is able to perform virtuous actions. We will for this time omit those doubts which may be objected herein, and consider of thē afterwards, if there be any which will not ●eeld to our saying.  
Whereas after Aristotles opinion, happiness consisteth publicly and particularly in the enjoying the goods of the mind, of the body, and of fortune; which are from without us: as well the city, as the private person, is to be accounted happy, which partaketh and enjoyeth all the three goods together. But that he do abundantly enjoy the goods of the mind, as moral and intellectual virtues, and the other goods in mean sort, to wit, the goods of the body; as beauty, health, and strength; and the outward goods, which be riches, honours, glories, and such like things.   

CHAP. II. Whether the felicity of one particular person, and of the city be all one, and which life is to be preferred, either that which is employed in action, or that which is spent in contemplation and study.  
IT remaineth now to examine whether the happiness of each particular man& of the City, be all one or not. But this is a manifest thing, because all men do consent that it is all one: for all those which place the good life of each particular person in richesse, do account the whole city happy which is rich: and the preferrers& favourers of the tyrannical life, think that city most happy that commandeth& ruleth many. And he which commends each particular person, chiefly in respect of honesty and virtue, will call that city happy which is virtuous. But herein two points are to be considered, the one, what life is to be preferred, whether that which consisteth in the public government, and fellowship of the city; or rather that kind of li●e which is solitary, and is separated from the civil society: The other point is, what form of commonweal and disposition of a city is good, or whether the public government, is to be desired of all men, or of certain, and not of all. Now it appertains not to the mind and consideration of him which dealeth about civil matters, to set down what is to be desired of each particular person, but what is to be wished for of al men in general: And therfore haue we put forth this question, as peculiar to our method, leaving the other as being strange. Now therfore that commonweal must needs be good, by the order whereof every man may do well& live happily, wherein there is no doubt. But there is a controversy( amongst those which confess that the virtuous life is to be wished) whether the civil& active life is more to be desired then that which is severed from all outward things: as the contemplati●e life, which all men think to be fit only for a Philosopher, for they as well old as new, which haue fervently aspired to virtue, seem to choose these two lives, I say the li●e which is employed in government,& the Philosophers life,& it is a matter of great importance to know in which the truth lieth: for wise& discreet men should always apply themselves to the best end; both every man particularly, and the city generally. But some think that the rule and government over neighbors& borderers that is executed with lordly a●thority, stands with great injustice: but if it be civilly executed, that thē there is no injustice in it, but yet that it is contrary to peace& tranquillity. Others contrarily think that the life spent in action& government, is only worthy for a man,& that private persons cannot better exercise the works of every virtue, then those which deal in public affairs, and go●erne the commonweal: these be their opinions. Others uphold, that the Lordly and Tyrannicall maner of commonweal is only happy, and in some places the having of dominion,& bearing rule over neighbors and borderers, is the end and mark whereas the laws of the commonweal do aim. Therfore where there be many laws made, and dispersed here& there in many places, if they haue regard to some end, doubtless they tend wholly to haue rule and dominion: as at lacedaemon, and in Crete, almost all their whole discipline& multitude of laws, are framed and directed for the wars. Furthermore, this faculty is honoured amongst all nations which are able to bring others into subiection, as among the scythians, Persians, Thracians,& Frenchmen. In some places there be laws made for the encouragement of this virtue, as at Carthage they honor men with as many rings as they haue ben times in the wars. There was in times past a law in Macedon, that those which had not slain some enemy, should wear a girdle of a halter: and amongst the Scythians, it was not lawful for him which had not slain an enemy to drink of the cup which they carried about and drank o● in the solemn feasts. The Hiberians( a warlike nation) set as many pillars about the grave of every person deceased, as he had slain enemies in his life time. There be in other places many other like fashions, either established by law, or allowed by custom; although if we look well into the matter, it should seem against reason, that the man who is fit to govern a commonweal, would intermeddle with showing the maner& fashion of commanding and bearing rule over such neighbors and borderers as willingly yield, and such as are compelled to obey: for how can that which is not lawful, beseem him? for it is lawful, not only to govern justly, but also unjustly: and it may be that a man may overcome other men unjustly, which thing notwithstanding we see not to fall out in other sciences: for it is not the office of a physician or Pilot to cause compulsion to be used; one to the sick, the other to the mariners. But many think the lordly kind o● government to be citilike,& that which they say is not just& behoo●eful for themselves, they are not ashamed to exercise against others: for they seek for a lawful government among themselves,& care not what iustice is done elsewhere: a matter against al reason, except by nature one be a master,& another a seruant. Now if it be so, it is not behoveful to strain a mans self to govern all men, but them onely which are fit by nature to live under government; as Hunters ought not to take men to be sacrificed and eaten, but wild beasts which are good to eat, and fit for such purposes. Notwithstanding, a city may be happy by itself, to wit, that city which useth a good form of government, if it were possible to find some one City inhabited severally by itself, using virtuous laws, whose order and discipline tended not to the wars, nor to get victory over the enemies: for let us put the case that there were no such thing in it, therefore all martiall exercises are to bee accounted honest, howbeit, not as the last end of all things, but as ordained for the same. The virtuous lawgiver ought therefore to haue consideration of the city, and of the kind of men, and of all other societies, howe they shall attain to that good life and felicity, which is possible and convenient for them. It is also the Office of the lawgiver to see if there be any neighbours and borderers, after what maner every of them is to be used and dealt withall, and what duties are to be observed toward them. But wee will hereafter treat in convenient place, to what end the good commonweal ought to tend.  
The whole city is happy in the selfsame manner that each particular man is, because the felicity of particular persons, ensueth the welfare of the city, and is accounted such, as the opinion is that they haue therof: some men placing it in richesse, others in great power, and large compass of dominions, referring all their discipline to war, and to govern as in old time the Lacedemonians and romans did: which Aristotle reproveth as wicked and unjust, except by chance they light on some such to bee commanded, which are naturally slavish. Plato also in his first book of laws findeth great fault with the Lacedemonians, who set by nothing but Fortitude, neglecting all other virtues. Others place felicity in moral and intellectual virtues, whereabout they are at strife still to learn which virtuous life is most to be desired, and whether that which consisteth in action and in the government of the commonweal, or that which consisteth in contemplation, being far from intermeddling in any affairs.   

CHAP. III. Whether felicity doth consist in the active or contemplative life.  
WE will dispute against those which confess that the life joined with virtue, is most of all to be desired, and yet disagree about the use thereof, and will set down the reasons of either party: some despise the offices of the commonweal, deeming that the life of a free man differeth from the life of a civil governor, and howe that kind of life is most of all to be wished for: others affirm that the gouernours life is the best, because it is not possible by doing nothing, to do well; and that well doing and felicity is all one and the selfsame thing. Both of them do partly say well, and partly not. The one affirm the life of him which is free from such trouble, to be better then his that governs: which thing is true, because there is no generosity in using a slave, as he is a slave; and besides, in the commanding of things necessary, there is no decence or honesty: yet it is an error to think that every government is a lordly kind of rule, for the government of free men doth no less differ from that of slaves, thē doth he which is free by nature from him which is a slave by nature, whereof we haue sufficiently spoken in the former discourses: but it is not good to prefer the doing of nothing before labour and employment, sith happiness consists in action: besides, the actions of good and just men haue for their end many good things. This being thus determined, some will think that it is very good to bear rule over al, sith hereby many just& honest things may be done: so that he who may bear rule ought not to resign his power to another, but rather to take it from him:& that the father haue no regard of his children, nor the children of their father, nor one friend of another, in this respect: for that which is good is greatly to be desired, and to do well is good: perhaps they should say true, if that which is most to bee desired, did happen or befall to spoilers and oppressors of people, which thing cannot possibly be, and therefore they presuppose a falsehood, for such a kind of man is no more able to use honesty in his actions, unless he do as much excel others as a man doth excel a wom●n, or the father his children, or the lord his slaves. Wherefore he which doth herein transgress, shall not be afterward able to do so well, as he hath done ill, and swerved from vertue● for between those which are like, honesty and uprightness consisteth in turns or interchange; for this is equal and like: but inequality between equal persons, and unlikeness between like persons, is against nature. And nothing which is against nature, is honest. If then there were any other better in virtue& ability to do well, it were honest to yield unto him, and just to obey him. Now he must not be endowed with virtue only, but with power also, by means whereof he may use action. If these bee well propounded, and if we account felicity to consist in well doing, it followeth that the active life, as well publicly of the whole City, as particularly of every peculiar person; is the best. nevertheless, as some suppose, the active life is not to bee referred to others: neither ●re the meditations only active, which are caused through things that spring from our actions, b●t rather those which ●re perfect in themselves, and the contemplations and considerations which are desired for themselves: for to do well is a final cause, and consequently some ●ction● We do likewise say that they do chiefly and properly use outward actions, who mark by conceit and cogitation, as a master builder. Furthermore, it is not necessary that Cities which are situated apart 〈◇〉 other, and haue chosen this manner of life, should be wholly without action, for as much as this may happen by their parts, sith there be many mutual actions between the parts of a city one with another● The like is seen in every man: otherwise God could hardly be in good estate, nor the world●●ith they haue no outward actions, besides those which are proper unto them. It doth therefore ●ppe●re, that one selfsame life is good for every one in particular, and likewise publicly for cities and men.  
Aristotle continuing his discourse of the active and contemplative life, doth compare them together, and saith that the favourers and affecters of both these lives, do err, as well they who leaving the active life, do extol the contemplative only; as the other who commend so much the active life alone, and esteem not the contemplative. For they who prefer the quiet kind of life before the busy kind,& that which is employed in government, are deceived in that they think that every government is a lordly kind of rule; which is properly over slaves, far different from that which is over free men. In like sort they are deceived who prefer the busy before the quiet kind of life: in that they suppose that they who are given to contemplation, do nothing; because they onely are not to be known, who exercise iustice, and the virtues referred to another; but they also whose nature is contemplatiue● sith contemplation is a kind of action, and that a most excellent kind, because the perfection thereof is inward, and because also it is desired for itself. Aristotle who was very studious, doth in the tenth of his ethics, and first of his metaphysics maintain that comtemplation is the more excellent. Cicero in the first of his Offices, doth learnedly and elegantly handle the ●ame question: and he who took pleasure in the managing of public affairs, doth prefer action before contemplation.   

CHAP. IIII. Of the commodities requisite for the establishing of a good kind of government, and of an happy city, and of the greatness of a city.  
but sith we haue premised these things, and disputed be●ore of other commonweals, we will now speak of that which rem●ines, and first we will show what grounds it is requisite to haue for the constituting of such a city as men might desire. For it is not possible to establish a commonweal, without having in some different measure the things which are thereto expedient and needful. We must therefore presuppose sundry commodities, as it were in wishing for them, whereof nevertheless there is none impossible: I mean the multitude of Citizens, and greatness of the territory; for even as other Artificers, as an Embroderer and Shipwright, must haue stuff meet for their work, which by how much the better it is, so much the fairer and better that piece of work will bee which is made thereof, in the like sort, the governor and Lawmaker must haue his proper matter well and conveniently prepared; The first commodity hereunto requisite, is the multitude of inhabitants, how many, and of what nature they ought to be. Likewise, regard must bee had to the territory, how big and what kind of soil it must bee. Many then suppose that an happy and flourishing City should bee great, if this bee true, they know not which city is great, and which is small, for they judge it to bee great by reason of the number and multitude of the inhabitants, whereas they should rather respect the power then the multitude: for there is a certain duty and work proper to a city, and that city which can best perform it ought to bee accounted great, as, you will not say that Hippocrates was a greater man, but a greater physician then another man who may exceed him in greatness of body: yet if men in judging the greatness of a city respect the number of the inhabitants, they must not haue regard to every multitude of men, because there is of necessity in Cities a great number of slaves and strangers: But they should haue regard to those which are a part thereof, and of whom it consisteth, as of her proper members; for the abundance of these doth witness the greatness of a city: but that city which can afford many Artificers, and few soldiers, cannot b●e great, for there is difference between a great, and a populous city. And it is known by experience to bee very difficult, or rather impossible that a city which is too much peopled, can bee well governed. Certes, of all the Cities, whose government is accounted good, wee see not any which is too populous. And hereof reason itself doth assure us, for the lawe is a certain order, and the good instituting of laws, is of necessity good order: But the excessive number of inhabitants is not capable of order. For this should be a work requiring Gods omnipotent power, which comprehendeth and governeth the globe of the whole world. Then sith goodness or fairness doth usually consist in multitude and greatness, that city wherein there is the prescribed proportion of greatness, it is doubtless the best or fairest. There is also a certain measure of greatness in cities, as in all other things, in living creatures, plants and instruments, for each of them being too small, or of excessive greatness, cannot retain his power, but shall thereby wholly loose his nature, or remain unprofitable: as a ship of an hand breadth is not in very dead a ship, nor that also which is of two furlongs, but being come to some greatness, either through being too little, or through excessive highnesse, it will sail ill: in like sort, the city which hath few inhabitants, is not sufficient, although a city bee a thing sufficient. If it haue too many inhabitants, it shall bee furnished with things necessary as a Nation, not as a city, neither is it possible to govern it well. For who could bee the guide and leader of an huge multitude, or a crier, unless he were like to Stentor? Wherefore that is to bee accounted the chiefest city which hath such a number that may suffice first and principally of itself to live well in civil society. And although a city may bee greater by exceeding this proportion, yet it is not infinite, as hath been said. It is easy to understand by the effects themselves, what is the term or bound of this excess: for the actions of a city are sometimes in commanding, and sometimes in obeying. The authority of commandement and iudgement, is the action of a commander. now, to judge uprightly, and to bestow the Magistracies on worthy persons, it is necessary that the Citizens do know each other, of what estate and quality they are: And where this is not done, neither can Offices bee well disposed, nor judgements well ordered: For it is no reason that they should rashly proceed in either of them, as doubtless they do in a city which is too populous. Besides, strangers and forriners may easily intrude themselves into the commonweal, because it is no hard matter to bee hidden in so great and excessive a multitude. Wee will then conclude, that the good definition of a city is a great multitude of inhabitants, having sufficient means whereby to live, and a natural knowledge of and between themselves. Thus wee haue spoken enough of the greatness of a city.  
The former discourses touching a happy life and touching action and contemplation, haue been propounded as preparatives for the better consideration of a good form of government, the foundation whereof is grounded on the abundance of things necessary, which abundance consisteth in two commodities, the one is the multitude of inhabitants, the other the quantity and quality of the country or territory. An happy city should bee neither too great, nor too little: but sith fairness consisteth in multitude and greatness, that City whose proportion is moderate, must needs bee faire and flourishing: which proportion must not bee judged by the number or multitude of all sorts of inhabitants, as bondmen, sojourners, and strangers resorting thether, but by respecting the true and right Citizens, whereof it is composed, as of the proper parts or members: also the ability thereof, for it is not possible to govern a city well that is too populous, as cairo in egypt, Constantinople in Greece, Paris in France, Chambala in Cathaia, Muscho in Muscouia, Fez, Samarcand, milan, by reason of the multitude and confusion therein, repugnant to the lawe and to discipline grounded on good order. There is besides this another evil, that the Citizens not knowing each other, the virtues and sufficience of those who are to bee chosen to Offices and Magistracies, remain unknown: and strangers being hidden in the excessive multitude, do more easily intrude themselves into charges of government.   

CHAP. V. Of the soil or province, which is the most commodious.  
WE may say the like of the country, and need not doubt touching the quality therof, but that the best and most praiseworthy by the consent of all men, is that which is furnished with most sufficience, as of necessity that country is which is fertile and abundant in all things. For to haue all things, and to want nothing, is sufficience. Now it must be so sp●tious both in length and largeness, that the inhabitants may live together in quiet, both in sufficient and modest sort. If this which we haue propounded be well said or not, we will hereafter discourse therof, when we come to that place, where we shall fully and at large treat of the purchasing, and of the abundance of wealth, how and in what manner men should dispose themselves for the using thereof: For many doubts arise in this consideration, by reason of those who draw this matter to the one or other excess of li●e, some to sparing, some to superfluity. It is nothing hard to know what the form of the region ought to be. And in some places we must beleeue skilful Captaines, who say that the entrance thereof should be difficult and dangerous for the enemies, and the issue easy for tho●e of the country. Besides, as we said that the multitude of inhabitants in a City, should bee no greater, then that they might easily know each other, there is the like reason touching the country. And to be easily known is nothing else then to be of such a situation; that it may easily be succoured. If we should constitute or establish a city according to our own desire and wish, We would seat it in a place which should be commodious by sea and land. One of the profits growing hereby, is before alleged, to the end that it might haue succour from all places; the other, that grain& all manner of fruits, may be commodiously brought thither, that the carriage of wood, or whatsoever other commodity the Country doth yield, may be easy.  
The soil or region that is fruitful,& aboundeth in al things, is very good, being withal so spacious in length& largeness, that the inhabitants therof may live without discord in su●●icient sort. The form that is sure and safe for war, must haue the entrance thereof difficult and dangerous for the enemies, and the issue easy for those of the country, that they may saly out, and succour each other within. It shall also bee commodious having an easy way for the conveying of wood, and other commodities growing there, from one place to another. Those Authors that wrtie of Husbandry, as Columella, Varro, Cato; and of building, as Vitruuius, and Baptist Albert a valentine, do handle this matter at large.   

CHAP. VI. Whether the pensiveness of the sea be profitable or not.  
TOuching traffic by sea, whether it bee profitable or hurtful to well governed Cities, there are many doubts: for some affirm that it is very pernicious to the good discipline of a City, that strangers trained up in other laws, resort thether: and that to people it much by the traffic of the sea, in sending forth and receiving into the City a multitude of Merchants, it is against the ordinance and institution of a good government. But if these inconveniences bee avoided, there is no doubt that it is better both for ●afety and abundance of all necessaries, that a City or country bee near the sea. For to resist the enemy, the inhabitants for the full assurance of their own safety, must be able to haue succour easily conveyed unto them from all parts, as well by sea as by land, that if it be not possible to hurt the enemies both ways when they assail them, yet at the least they may the more offend them by the one or the other, having both. Besides, they may furnish themselves with such necessaries as they want, and sand out those whereof they haue abundant store: for a City must use traffic and Merchandise for itself, and not for others. And they which keep open marts for al the world to repair to, do it to gain thereby. If such covetous desire beseem not a City, neither also doth the keeping of such marts beseem it. But sith we see at this present in many Countries, harbours& havens lying commodiously near the City, in such sort, that they are not within it nor far from it, yet enclosed with walls and other like fortifications; certainly, if there grow any good by their communion, the City that is so situated shall haue it; and if there bee any inconvenience, it may be easily avoided by statutes, declaring and appointing who may converse and traffic together, and who not. Touching power by sea, there needs no doubt to bee made, but that it is good to bee furnished therewith according to a certain quantity, for it is not requisite and behooveful for the Cities self onely, but also for some bordering friends, to bee ●eared, and to haue succour ready, as well by sea as land. The number and greatness of this source must bee according to the state and manners of the City. For if it flourish, and be as a princess and commandresse of others, it must of necessity haue this power proportionable to the actions thereof. nevertheless, it is not needful that there bee in Cities great store of seafaring men, neither is it meet, that such men bee a part thereof. For they which are employed as chee●e aboard the ships, and haue the oversight and command of such people, are free, and are taken out of the ●ootmē. But if there be great store of peasants and husbandmen dwelling near, there will never be any lack of mariners, which thing we see at this present in some places, as at Heraclea, where they haue their gallies furnished, although their City be less then many others. Wee haue spoken sufficiently of the soil or country, and of havens, Cities, the Sea, and power in shipping. Touching the number of Cities, we haue before discussed how it is to be determined.  
The pensiveness of the sea is profitable for safety and abundance; not for mens manners which are corrupted by receiving strangers, or resorting into other Countries. Plato maketh the same discourse in his fourth book of laws. There is at this presant a most sharp and rigorous lawe in China, whereof wee haue spoken in the fift book, forbidding on pain of death the entrance of strangers into the country, or the bringing of any thither by their sailors and shipmen: as it appeareth by Osorius of Portugall in his book of Nobility: and by the Iesuites Indian Epistles, and particularly that wherein is declared the death of francis Xauer, who would go thither to preach the gospel.   

CHAP. VII. Of what quality or nature the citizens ought to be: and a commendation of the Grecians.  
WE will speak of what nature the Citizens ought to be: which thing is easily known, if we consider the most famous Cities of Greece, and all the habitable parts of the earth, considering howe many sorts of people there are. For those Nations which inhabit could places, and in Europe, are full of courage, but haue no sharpness of wit, nor cunning; for which cause they do the longer continue in liberty: but they are without any good form of government,& cannot bear rule over their neighbours. They of Asia are witty, and more apt to the learning and practising of arts, but they are not so courageous, and are therefore subject, and do serve continually. The greek Nation as it is in the midst between these two places, so doth it participate of both, being courageous and ingenious, for which cause it doth continue and keep her liberty, and is well governed, and might command the whole world, if it had but one manner of government. The people of Greece haue the same difference between them, sith some of thē haue one onely nature, and others are well disposed to both qualities. It is therefore n●essary that they who are fit to be trained up in virtue by the lawgiver, haue by nature both wit and courage. For whereas some affirm, touching those to whom the guard and de●●nce of the City is committed, that they should show themselves friendly to those whom they know,& rough or rigorous to those whom they know not: ammositie or couragiousnesse is that which causeth love, sith that is the faculty by which we love. The sign hereof is, that a mans mind is more provoked against his familiars and friends, then against unknown or strange persons, when he thinks himself to bee despised by them. Wherefore the Poet Archilechus, accusing his friends, doth very fitly speak thus to his mind, Art thou not tormented by thy friends? Likewise, the commanding, and liberty, come to all men from this faculty; for the mind is imperious, and inuinsible. Yet it is not well said that they should be rough towards those whom they know not, because they ought not to bee so towards any person, neither are magnanimous men rough by nature, save only towards those which injury them. And that which wee said before, doth rather incense them towards their familiars, if they think themselves to be injured by them, and that by good reason; because from whom they expected some good turn, they do both see themselves deprived thereof, and besides, receive ●urt: Hence is the proverb come, That the contentions and enmities between brethren are most bitter, and that they who haue extremely loved each other, do extremely hate. Wee haue hitherto shewed what the nature and number of Citizens ought to bee, and haue moreover almost determined the quantity and quality of the region or country. For wee are not to seek for the same certainty in things which depend on reasons, as in those which are discerned by the sences.  
having treated of the greatness of a city, and the commodiousness and situation of the Country or region, he speaketh now of the nature of Citizens, who for the maintenance of their liberty must be both courageous and ingenious: and he sheweth what kinds of people haue these two qualities, namely, the inhabitants of those Countries that are in the midst between the North and South, being temperate in heat& could, in the fourth and fift climate, wherein stands a good part of Greece, Italy, France, and spain, from which Countries hath sprung almost all the excellence that hath ever been in the world, in Learning, in arms, and in all Liberal and Mech●nicall Arts. But the meridional or southern people, who are in the second and third climate, through the excessive heat thereof haue commonly sharper wits, but smaller courage: and they that inhabit the farthest parts of the North, by reason of the excessive could and abundance of blood, are very courageous, but of small wit and prudence. Aristotle saith the like in his little Treatise De sensu& sensibili, and in the fourteenth Section of his problems. Plato in the Epinomide doth writ in like sort of Greece, and of the Grecians; and in Timeus, of the country of Attica, and the Athenians. Likewise Hippocrates in his work of the air, Waters, and Places, doth use the like discourse touching the parts of the habitable world, affirming that the people of Asia are such as they are here described. Galen likewise doth very learnedly examine this point in that little work, wherein he proveth that the motions of the mind, do follow the temperature of the body: and it seemeth that Aristotle hath borrowed this discourse of Hippocrates and Plato. Marcus Varro in his first book De re rustica is of the same opinion, praising his country Italy, as Aristotle doth Greece; and he allegeth Eratosthenes, who divided the whole world into two parts, viz. the North and South, from which proceedeth all that diversity of things which we see, according to the nearness or distance of the sun.  
AND all the habitable parts of the earth, considering how many sorts of people there are.] Claudius Ptolomeus in his second book of the judicial part, the second Chapter, which concerneth the universal property of Countries: The properties of Countries( saith he) haue been usually distinguished either by all parallels and all Angles, or by their sci●uation towards the ecliptic, and the sun: For they that inhabit our country, which is situated in a northern quadrant, who are under the southern Parralleles, that is, who are described by the equinoctial, even unto the summer tropic, as the sun passeth over them, haue their bodies as it were burnt, their hair curled and thick, their faces narrow, and their stature slender, and they are hot of nature and manners, cruel through the great heat which reigneth in those countries, and are those whom wee commonly call AEthiopians, who are so disposed as wee haue said, and haue such a constitution of the air. And herein both all living creatures, and those things that grow on the ground, are found to agree. But they who are under the northern Parralleles, that is, they that dwell in the Countries which are set under the North, because their vertical point is far from the zodiac, and from the heat of the Sunne● do abound in could and moisture, wherein there is great nourishment, which is not drawn by the heat that is near: For which cause men are there of white colour, having long hair, with great and well proportioned stature, but they are could of nature and manners, and cruel by reason of the vehement could that is in those Countries. The sharpness of their Winter is hereunto correspondent, as also the greatness of those things that grow on the ground, and the fierceness of the beasts: wee do generally call them Scythians. As for them that inhabit the Countries situate between the Summer tropic, and the North, because the sun goeth not over their Zenith, yet runneth not too far from it towards the South, they live in a very temperate air, wherein there are small differences of heat and could, they are therefore of mean heat and stature, and of a temperate nature, dwelling near together, and being of mildred and gentle manners. And they who are nearer to the South, are more ingenious and advised in their actions, and are commonly more skilful in matters that concern the state& motions of the heavenly bodies, because their vertical point is nearer to the zodiac,& to the wandring stars which are under it, by the nearness whereof they haue their minds prompt and ready to conceive and search out arts, especially the mathematics. Likewise, the eastern people are more vigorous and sound of conceit, keeping close nothing: for we do truly say that the East is of the suns nature, and therefore that part of the day is to bee accounted more manly and dextrall. We see also in living creatures, that the right sides are stronger. Contrariwise, the western people are more effeminate, soft, and given to secrecy: for that part belongeth to the moon, which doth always show herself towards the West between the interlunar spaces, and for this cause as nocturnal and sinistral, she is accounted opposite to the East. Then he treateth of the manners and natural institutions which are in the places situated under every sign of the zodiac, which matter is handled likewise by Iouianus Pontanus in his whole work De rebus Coelestibus, and in his urania: by Manilius in the Astronomicke: and by Iulius Firmicus.  
FOR whereas some affirm touching those to whom the guard and defence of the City is committed, that they should show themselves friendly to those whom they know, and rough or rigorous to those whom they know not.] Aristotle meaneth Plato, whom he reproveth for bringing in Socrates in the second book of his commonweal, discoursing thus of this matter. SOCR. Shall he not need such a nature as is thereto proper and fit? ADIM. What else? SOCR. Let us choose then if we can, the natures meet for the guard and defence of a city. ADIM. It seemeth that we ought to do so. SOCR. By jupiter it is no small enterprise, yet we must not fear, but do what we can. ADIM. No certes. SOCR. think you that a generous dog differeth in nature from a generous young man, in as much as concerns this duty of defence and watchfulness? ADIM. What say you? SOCR. Both of them should haue a good sent, bee swift to follow that which they haue found by their sent, and strong to fight when they shall haue overtaken it, as need shall require. ADIM. It is necessary that they haue all this, and besides be courageous, if they mean to fight well. SOCR. Why not? he that is thus hardy, will he not bee choleric, bee it horse, or dog, or any other beast? Or do you not know that the passion of anger is inexpugnable and invincible, making the mind fearless, and altogether untamed, when it is present? ADIM. I know it well. SOCR. Then it is manifest what manner of body such a person should haue. ADIM. Yea certes. SOCR. And that his mind should be inclined to choler. ADIM. It is so. SOCR. But tell me Glaucon, shall not they having such a nature be sharp and rough among themselves, and towards the other Citizens? ADIM. Not easily. SOCR. They ought to be gentle to their own, but rough to the enemies: Otherwise they will not tarry till others destroy them, but they will destroy themselves. ADIM. Yea verily. SOCR. What shal we do then? Where shall we find a gentle and choleric nature together? For the gentle nature is in some sort contrary to the choleric. ADIM. It seemeth so. SOCR. But whosoever shall want either of these, cannot bee a meet person for this place, and it seemeth impossible that these two natures can bee joined together, whereupon it followeth, that there cannot be had any such a one as we require. ADIM. I beleeue it. Thē( quoth Socrates) thinking on the aforesaid discourse, we haue reason to doubt, for wee haue strayed far from the similitude that was propounded. ADIM. How say you? SOCR. Are there not found such natures as men would never haue thought, having these contraries? ADIM. Where. SOCR. This is seen in other creatures, but chiefly in this, wherewith wee compare ours. For you know, that the nature of a generous dog is to bee gentle towards those whom he doth familiarily know, and clean contrary towards those whom he knoweth not. ADIM. I know it. SOCR. Then it was possible, and not against nature, to find for this purpose such a one as we sought. ADIM. It was not against nature.   

CHAP. VIII. What the true parts of a city be, and the necessary parts thereof.  
but as in other things which consist by nature, those are not parts of the whole substance, without which the whole cannot be: so also all those things are not to be set down as parts of a City which are of necessity in Cities, neither yet of any other whatsoever society, whereof there is made one certain kind. For any thing being equally or unequally communicated, ought to bee common, and the same to all that communicate therein● as necessary sustenance, or the proportion& quantity of the territory, or some other thing. But where things are so disposed, that the one is done for this cause, and the other thereunto appointed: they haue nothing common, saving that the one d●th, the other receiveth: I mean as the tool or instrument,& the workman, haue nothing common with the work which they do, for there is nothing common between the house and him which builds it, but the house is as it were the end proposed to his science. In like sort, although the city haue need of riches, yet riches are not any part of the City. And there are many living things which are parts of riches: but the city is a certain company or society of such as are like, whose end led the best kind of life that is possible. Then sith felicity is the chief and sovereign good, and sith it is an action and a certain perfect use of virtue, wherein some do sufficiently participate, others little or nothing at all; doubtless that doth cause the several kinds and differences of a city, and the sundry forms of commonweal: for sith every one aims at this diversly, and by diverse means, hereby it cometh to pass, that the manners of mens lives, and that commonweals do differ. We see then how many things there are, without which a city cannot be, because thererein are of necessity comprised the parts, whereof we say that a city consisteth: And because my saying may bee the better understood, I will set down the number of a Cities actions: first therefore it must haue victuals; next it must haue Trades, sith mans life hath need of many instruments; thirdly armor, because it is necessary that the citizens be furnished therwith as well for the safety of their estate and chastising of rebels, as for their defence against the attempts and enterprises of strangers; besides, there must be some store of wealth and money, wherewith the city may help itself both in domestical occasions, and in the warres; the fift and principal thing is the observance of religion, which is called Priesthood; the sixth thing in number,& the most necessary of al, consists in the administration of iustice, touching the commodities and rights between them. These are the actions requisite in all Cities: for a city is not every kind of multitude, but such a kind as is of itself sufficient to live in good estate, as we said before. And if any of these things want, such a society hath no absolute sufficience in itself. Then sith a City standeth by these actions, there must of necessity bee therein Husbandmen to prepare and furnish the city with victuals, tradesman, soldiers, rich men, Priests, and Iudges of things necessary and profitable.  
In this Chapter and that which followeth, he speaketh of the parts of a city, what they are, and howe the exercises thereof may bee communicated, according to the diversity of governments and ages. There are then about six actions, without which no City can be. First it must haue victuals, wherewith the husbandmen and shepherds do furnish it: secondly many trades and handicrafts: thirdly, armour as well to defend it self, against subiects that rebel, as against strangers that may invade or assault it: fourthly, abundance of wealth and money to employ in public and military affairs: the fift action, is the observance of religion and maintenance of service and worship of the gods, which is committed to the Priests: the sixth and most necessary of all, consisteth in judging, which charge is double, the one assigned to the Iudges of civil and criminal causes, the other to senators and counsellors of Estate. These are the actions exceeding necessary, for the constituting and maintenance of every city: without which it cannot bee, nor consequently without those that do them: Namely, Husbandmen, shepherds, Artificers, soldiers, Rich men, Priests, Iudges, and Counsellors of Estate.   

CHAP. IX. Whether all the charges of a city are to be indifferently communicated to all persons, or whether some are peculiar, others common.  
THese things being determined, we are yet farther to consider whether they ought all to be communicated to all: For it may so happen, that the same persons shall be all both Husbandmen and Artificers, and Counsellors and Iudges: or whether each of these aforesaid charges is to bee given severally, or whether some are of necessity peculiar, others common, yet not in every commonweal, as wee haue said. For it may be that all men do participate in all things, and that al do not participate in all things, but some in some, from whence proceedeth the diversity of commonweals: for in Democracies all do participate in all things, in Oligarchies not so. But sith wee now discourse of the good form of commonweal which may chiefly make a city happy, and sith it is impossible that happiness can be without virtue,( as hath been said) certainly in that City which is well governed, and which hath men that are just in very dead, and not by supposition, the Citizens ought not to live by mechanical arts, because such a kind of life is base and contrary to virtue; neither ought they also to be Husbandmen, because rest is required for the attaining of virtue, and for the government of the commonweal. And sith they likewise which are appointed and employed in the warres, bee therein required, as also they which consult of things profitable, and judge of things just or unjust, which seem ●o be the principal parts of the City, Whether these charges ought to be diverse, or whether both may be committed to the same persons. They may doubtless in some sort bee committed to the same persons, and in some sort to sundry persons: for in regard that either charge requires a diverse vigour of age, and that the one hath need of wisdom, the other of strength, they should bee committed to sundry persons: but in regard that it is impossible that they who can use violence and prohibit them, will always endure subiection, they should be committed to the same persons: for it is in their power which manage arms, to continue or not continue that form of government whereby the state is ruled. It rests therfore that the commonweal be committed to both, not at the same time, but as Nature hath ordained, which giveth strength to young men, and wisdom unto those which are elder. It is just and expedient to distribute them after this manner unto both: For this distribution is according to worthiness. Besides, whereas wealth and possessions are necessary for Citizens, and such only as haue them, are true and right Citizens, it follows by necessity that they ought to be rich. For handicraftmen or any other sort of people, whose actions serve from virtue, are no part of the city, which thing is manifest by the supposition that wee made before, because felicity must needs bee joined with virtue, neither ought wee to call a city happy, respecting any part thereof, but having regard to all the Citizens. It is likewise manifest that the possessions must belong to them, sith the Husbandmen are either slaves, or barb●rous people, or such of the peasants as dwell thereabout. There rests yet to speak of, among the charges by us recited, the Priests charge, whose institution is manifest. For sith the Citizens ought to honour the gods, certes they are not to make any Husbandman or Artificer a Priest: and whereas also the Citizens are divided into two sorts, namely of those which are employed in the warres, and of Counsellors, and sith it is meet that the gods be honoured, and that they who haue long laboured, may in the end live at rest and quiet, the office of Priesthood is to be bestowed on such persons. We haue declared those things, without which a city cannot stand, as also how many parts there are in a City: for although Husbandmen, Artificers, and all sorts of mercenary people bee thereto needful, yet the warriors and Counsellors are parts thereof, and each of them is separate, the one always, the other by turns.  
The necessary actions of every city being declared, it is demanded whether they may all bee exercised by all sorts of citizens, as in the Democracies: or some by some, and other by others; as in the Oligarchies the rich men exercise Merchandise, arms, the Offices of Priesthood and judging,& the poor men do by their toil furnish the city with victuals, and use trades. It is resolved and concluded, that in a good commonweal, Artificers, Merchants, and Husbandmen, cannot be true Citizens; the exercising of which professions are either base or too laborious: but the warriors, Counsellors, Iudges, and Priests, are the true parts of a city: and the charges thereof may bee well committed to honest citizens, and to the same persons in diverse ages, according to the order of nature, which giveth strength to young men, whereby they are fit for war, and wisdom to ancient men, and greater knowledge to judge and consult. Touching the dignities of religion, it is meet to bestow them on those of the elder sort, that they may in their old yeares rest and repose themselves after they haue passed through the several charges of government, and haue long time laboured and taken great pains. Besides, wealth, possessions, and money, should bee in such persons hands that are rich, and constitute the chief parts of a City; sith slaves, barbarous people, or such peasants as dwell near thereabout, do use Husbandry.   

CHAP. X. That the distributing of cities by the kinds of the inhabitants, hath been anciently used.  
THis seemeth no new thing nor lately come to the knowledge of those which haue discoursed and written of government, that the city should bee divided by orders of exercises, and that they who are employed in the warres, should not be Husbandmen. For this manner is yet observed in egypt, and in Crete, having been ordained in egypt by Sesostris,( as men say) and in Crete by Minos. Likewise, the manner of eating publicly together, seems to bee very ancient, and to haue been observed in Crete since the reign of Minos, and in italy long before. For they who know the country, say that Italus was king of Oenotria, of whom that people took the name, and in stead of Oenotrians were called Italians. whereupon that cost of Europe between the strait of Sicile and the Lametique gulf( which are distant each from other half a daies journey) was name italy. Now they affirm, that this Italus caused the Oenotrians, of wandring shepherds to become Husbandmen, and that among other laws which he gave them, he did first institute that manner of dieting together, and that even at this present some that are descended from him, do use it, with certain laws of his which they haue received. The Opicians dwelled towards the Tyrrhene cost, and were in ancient time, and are yet at this present called A●sonians, and the Chaonians dwelled towards Iapicia& Ionia, called Sirtis: which Chaonians descended from the Oenotrians. Then the manner of eating publicly together, was here begun, and the division of the Citizens by kinds, was first used in egypt. For Sesostris reigned long before Minos. Perhaps it is to be believed, that many other things haue in length of time been oft invented, or rather infinitely. And it is likely, that want hath first shewed and caused the finding out of things necessary, and that afterward such as serve for ornament and plenty, haue b●n augmented. We are to think that the same hath come to pass touching forms of government. Now that all these things are ancient, we may know by the egyptians, who are held to be of very great antiquity, and haue laws and civil institution. Wherefore it is expedient to use those things which haue been well in●ented, and to assay the supplying of whatsoever shall want. We haue shewed before that the country ought to be in their hands who manage arms, and in theirs which govern the Estate, and why the Husbandmen should be distinguished from them, as also of what quantity and quality the region should bee. First wee will speak of the distinction or separation, and show what kind of people Husbandmen should be. We find it not good that the possessions should be common, as some would haue them, but we like well that the use therof be common by way of courtesy, and that no Citizen want sustenance. All men agree, that the manner of dieting together is profitable for well ordered commonweals, we will afterward show for what cause we do likewise think so. Now it is requisite that all the Citizens bee thereto admitted, although it be no easy matter for poor men to contribute out of their own substance the portion which is set down, and maintain their other family. Besides, the charges which are required for the service of the gods, are common to all the city. It is therefore necessary to divide the country, into two parts, and to assign the one part to the public use of the state, the other to private persons: and to divide either of them again into two, so that one part of the public revenues be employed on the service of the gods, and the other laid out in defraying the expenses which grow by their dieting together: and that likewise of the private, one part lye on the frontiers, and the other near the City, to the end, that each of them having two lots distributed unto him, they may all haue part in both places. By this means they shall enjoy equal right, and shal better agree if there arise any war against their neighbours or borderers. And where this manner of dividing is not observed, there doth the one part little care for the enmity of any neighbour state, and the other fears it too much. For which cause in some places there is a statute, that such as dwell near the frontiers, may not be admitted to counsel, when consultation is to be had about the m●●uing of war against their borderers: as if they could not well determine by reason of their p●rticuler interest. It is therefore expedient to divide the country in this maner, for the reasons aforesaid. If it might be according to my desire and wish, I would haue the husbandmen to be slaves, not all of one nation, nor too courageous; for by this means they will be metre for labour, and less suspected of attempting any innovation. secondly, I would haue them to be some of the barbarous people which dwell round about, being of like nature with the former, and that some should peculiarly belong to those which hold and enjoy the possessions in particular,& that others should be appointed to labour in that part which is public. We will afterward show how slaves are to bee used, and why it is better to propose liberty for a reward unto all.  
sith cities haue need of many necessary actions, it is better that they which use them, be distinguished and separated; as husbandmen from soldiers, Iudges and Senators from Artificers, which should also be divided by their trades, and every trade haue his quarter, even as we see the Channons and monks dwell apart in cloisters. And this manner of distributing the multitude or vulgar sort of Citizens by kinds and orders of different exercises, is very ancient, which the egyptians did long time use, who gloried that they were the ancientest people of all the world,( as it appeareth by the beginning of Platoes Timeus) having received this said manner of distributing from Sesostris, who ordained it first in egypt, from whence it came afterward into Crete, at this present also is used at cairo,& Fez( as John Leon writeth) and in many great Cities of Asia and afric. Others suppose, that the manner which is used at Paris, is more seemly& commodious, where tradesman and Artificers are intermingled. The Citizens being thus divided, as it hath been said, by kinds, and separated in their exercises, should diet together by fifteens, twenties, or such other number, to the end, that they may know each other, and continue their mutual good will: which thing was first ordained by Minos ●● Crete, then at lacedaemon by Lycurgus, and before them in italy by king Italus. Now the city onely should not bee divided in such manner, but the country also is to bee divided into two parts, the one public, the other private. And again each of the two parts must be divided into two other, so that one part of the public is to bee appointed for the defraying of charges that grow aforesaid, meetings and dieting together,( which are necessary for every well ordered commonweal) the other, for the service of the gods, and matters of religion. In like ●ort, of the private, one part must lye on the frontiers, the other near the city, to the end, that every citizen having two portions distributed unto him, all may haue like interest in both places; and being in like estate, like surety; and the same care, if there arise any war. As touching husbandmen Aristotle according to the ancient manner of Greece doth wish, that( to the end they should be more meet for labour, and less prove to rebellion) they were slaves, of diuers Nations, not too courageous, to whom liberty should bee proposed for their reward; or else that they should be strangers who might dwell scatteringly about the Country, and hirelings of like nature to slaves, and that some of them should peculiarly belong to those that hold the possessions in particular, and the rest appointed to labour in that part which is public.  
THAT the city should be divided by orders of exercises.] Plato in Timeus, in that place where he bringeth in the egyptian Priest talking with Solon, touching the antiquity and government of Athens, and of the City of Saith: If you consider( saith he) the laws which they use, and compare them with ours, you shall find therein great likeness: First the Priests dwell apart from the common people, next the Artificers use their trades, each sort by himself, and not indifferently or confusedly one amongst another. The like do their shepherds, Hunters, and Husbandmen. Diodorus Siculus in his first book, the eight chapter. The policy of the egyptians consists in three sorts of people, namely husbandmen, shepherds, and artificers: The husbandmen taking small wages of the priests and noblemen, do from their youth continually al their life time follow husbandry, by which means they become far better and skilfuller therein then the people of any other country, both because they haue learned it of their fathers and ancestors, and also by reason of their continual use and experience, so that they know better then any other men the natures of soils, the seasons fit for watering and sowing, and the manner how to gather and keep grains and fruits, as well by the observation of their ancestors as by their own care& diligence. In like sort the shepherds having learned also of their ancestors how to drive, feed, and keep their cattle, continue always that manner of life, being greatly furthered, both by that which their said ancestors haue found out touching pasturage, and other no less necessary matters thereunto belonging,& by such things as some among themselves haue by their diligence& study observed: For they that keep goose and other housebirds, do take therein such care and pains, that beside the common nature which those birds haue with others that are kept elsewhere, they make a wonderful increase therof, because they let not the said birds hatch their own eggs, but taking thē from them, they do themselves by such means as they haue invented, rear up the young ones, far otherwise then in other countries men are wont to do. Touching arts& trades, we see that in egypt all kinds of works are marvelously well made,& come as it were to their perfection: For the artificers and workmen in egypt do employ themselves in those works only which are permitted by the laws or which they haue learned of their fathers, not troubling themselves with matters of the commonweal, so that neither the dislike or hate of the teacher, nor civil discord, nor any other thing whatsoever can hinder thē in their exercise. In other countries every tradesman may leave his first estate to take another, and to follow some of thē husbandry, others merchandise,& others sundry occupations: yea some of thē will oft repair to public assemblies, which are used in Cities, governed by the people, where being corrupted with money, they cause and consent to things that turn greatly to the cities hurt. But in egypt, if an Artificer intermeddle in the affairs of the commonweal, or use many trades, he is grievously punished: Finally, the same custom and institution in public and private matters hath been anciently observed by the egyptians, which their ancestors left unto them.  
AND that they who are employed in the war, should not be Husbandmen.] Herodotus in his second book writeth, that in egypt it is not lawful for them that are employed in the warres, whom they call Calasyres and Hermotyiues, to use or exercise any other thing save arms; the knowledge whereof is shewed and taught unto them from hand to hand, and from father to son. Diodorus Siculus in his first book: The whole revenue( saith he) of the realm of egypt being divided into three parts; the college of the Priests receives the first portion thereof● for the said Prelates are in great credite and authority among the inhabitants of that country, both because the charge and administration of religion is committed unto them, as also because they are endued with knowledge and learning, and teach the rest. And they haue this portion allowed them, as well for the ordering and offering of sacrifices, as for their necessary sustenance; for the egyptians think, that they ought not to neglect, much less omit the service and reverence due to the gods, or that the ministers and officers employed in the affairs of the commonweal, should want maintenance. These Prelates give attendance about the Kings to aduise and counsel them in matters of great weight, foretelling things to come through the knowledge that they haue, as well by the stars, as by their sacrifices, and report out of their holy books such things as haue come to pass in former times, that the Kings may thereby know what is expedient and profitable for them: and they are not( as in Greece) one man or one woman onely appointed to keep the consecrated things, but many of them are as it were dedicated and emplo●ed in the service, honor,& worship of the gods, who afterward leave the charge and administration thereof to their children. All which Priests with their posterity are exempted from all subsidies, and haue the second place after the king, of honour, dignity and reputation among the egyptians. Another portion of the public revenue belongeth to the Kings, who employ the same in their wars, the maintenance of their estate, and in rewarding those that by their good service haue deserved it; by this means the people is not charged with tributes or new taxes. The third part and portion is received by the Gentlemen, and others appointed to serve in the wars, wherein through continual use and exercise they are skilful, and by reason of this pay that they receive, are the more ready and forward to undertake whatsoever dangerous enterprises: for it were against reason, that they who are wholly bent and employed in the defence of the people safety, should receive no allowance nor profit of their country, for which they fight. There is yet besides another far greater profit herein, for they being hereby more enriched, are the willinger to procreate children, and to leave issue behind them, so that the country being by this means well peopled, hath no need of foreign soldiers, and the children having received from their fathers the knowledge of all things that concern warfare● and being trained up and enured thereto, become both skilful and valiant soldiers. Plato in the second book of his commonweal. SOC●. Tell me, doth not the exercise of arms seem very artificial? GLAVC. Yes surely. SOCR. Is there greater care to be had of a shomakers trade thē of military discipline. GLAVC. In no sort. SOCR. We haue forbidden the shoemaker to take vpon him to be a husbandman, an embrotherer, and builder together, but to be only a shoemaker, to the end he may be skilful in his trade. We haue also assigned to every one that profe●●ion whereto he is inclined by nature, and which he is to use all his life time, leaving all other professions, that by observing opportunities, he may do it the better. Is military discipline of so small reckoning, that a man may easily be both an husbandman and a soldier, and use the trade of a shoemaker or any other; although none can ever play well at a cunning game, unless he haue used it from his youth, and diligently practised it? And shall he which taketh a buckler or any other weapons, bee presently a skilful soldier? But among other instruments there cannot be found any that can make a good workman or wrestler, or that can profit him which is ignorant of his own art, and him that hath not sufficiently exercised it. ADIM. Instruments were then greatly to be esteemed, if they had such virtue. SOCR. Sith a privy-councillors profession is greater, shall it not therefore require greater leisure, greater Art and Exercise? ADIM. Yes surely in mine opinion. The same author repeateth in the beginning of Timeus the chief points of his commonweal. First of all( saith Socrates) haue we not separated the soldiers from the husbandmen and artificers? TIM. Yes. SOCR. Assigning to every one that which is sit for him according to his nature, with one onely exercise to every art. We said that they who were chiefly to follow arms, should only keep and defend the city against those that would attempt to endamage it, were they strangers, or of the same country; using great modesty towards the inhabitants, as true friends by nature; but fierce in fighting against their enemies. TIM. doubtless it is even so. SOCR. For it is requisite that they be( as we haue said) by nature partly choleric, and partly courteteous, having both these qualities so tempered that they may demean and carry themselves aright, both towards their friends and enemies. TIM. They should indeed bee such. SOCR. And touching their education, is it not meet that they use bodily exercises and music, and be instructed in all other disciplines that are meet for them? TIM. Yes surely. SOCR. We said farther that they who shall be thus trained up, shall haue neither gold nor silver, nor ought else peculiar to themselves, but as helping and serving the commonweal, they shall receive wages of those whom they guard and defend, who shall therewith sufficiently furnish them, that they may spent it in common, and liuewel& orderly together, having no other care thē only of virtue. TIM. You said so indeed.  
PERHAPS i● is to be believed that many other things haue in length of time ben invented, or rather infinitely.] The same Aristotle in the twelfth book of his metaphysics, the eight chapter saith, That philosophy hath ben oft found out( as it is likely) and lost again. Plato in the third and sixth book of his laws affirmeth, that the knowledge of government began when cities were begun, and the institutions and ordinances thereof when mankind was multiplied: and he thinketh that in an inestimable, and as it were infinite length of time, innumerable cities haue ben built and destroyed,& that they haue sometimes of little ones become great, and of great ones little; sometimes of good bad, and contrariwise of bad good. So Aristotle who thought the world was eternal,& Plato which said that it had a beginning, but that it should never perish; haue affirmed that the same things in kind, haue ben infinitely, and that they should infinitely remain, that there is nothing the like whereof hath not ben, that there should bee nothing which had not been before, and that there had been nothing that should not be again afterward: which vicissitude or successive change being continual and perpetual, must be referred to the thanksgivings of the celestial bodies, and to their powers: whereto Plutarch agreeth, writing thus in the beginning of Sertorius his life. It is not perhaps( saith he) a thing to be marveled at, that in infinite space of time, even as fortune doth diversly turn and change, it doth happen through the casual meeting of accidents that are altogether like. For whether there be a prefixed and certain number of chances which may happen; Fortune hath sufficient plenty of matter to produce effects that may haue mutual resemblance; or whether human effects be comprised in a determinat number, there must needs oftentimes happen things wholly like, sith they are done both by the same causes, and the same means. Pomponatius in his book of enchantments, writeth thus towards the end: They then that hold the world to be eternal, say that the same things haue ben infinitely found out, and infinitely lost, when as the countries wherein such things flourished, were destroyed by fires or deluges, which must of necessity happen at certain seasons, through the thanksgivings and progresses of the stars. Which is confuted by Vines in his first book de veritate Christiana, in that chapter wherein he proveth, that the world is not eternal.   

CHAP. XI. Of the situation of a city, and of four things.  
WE haue shewed before, that a City should be seated in the most commodious place that may be, both by land and sea, and in respect of the whole country. Touching the situation thereof referred unto itself, we are to wish it such, that regard may bee had to four things. First to the East, as being a thing very necessary, for those Cities are most healthful which are set towards the East, and towards the winds that blow from thence. Secondly, to the North for coolness. Touching the rest, it must bee ordered, that the situation of the city be accommodated to the actions both of peace and war: of war, that the Citizens may issue and make sallies with ease, and the enemies not approach nor besiege it without great pain and trouble: But that above all things it be well furnished with wels and fountains, but if this cannot be, they must haue recourse to the remedy thereof which hath ben in former times found out, which is, to haue great cisterns able to receive and hold abundance of rainewater, so that they may haue no want thereof, if they be besieged& deprived by war of the commodities of the country. But because it is necessary to provide for the inhabitants health, which consisteth chiefly in the situation, that the city be seated in such a place,& haue such a prospect, secondly in using good& wholesome waters, great diligence in herein required: for the things which we do oft and much use about our bodies, do greatly further our health: sith then the virtue of waters and winds is of such a nature, it is very expedient in well governed Cities, where the waters are not all alike, and where is no store of conduits to divide them, that those waters which are good to drink, may be separated from those which serve for other uses. Touching strong places, they are not in like sort profitable to all estates; high built fortresses are good for Oligarchies and Monarchies: equal and even places for Democracies: and neither of both for Aristocracies, but rather it is requisite to haue in such a state many strong places. Touching private houses, that form is held to be most pleasant and meet for other respects, when they are well framed and built after the modern fashion, devised by Hippodamus: But for the greater surety in war, it shal be better to haue thē built after a contrary maner, and as they were in ancient times, because by this means strangers cannot without difficulty and danger come unto them, nor the assailants being once entangled, wind themselves out. It shall therfore be good to use therein both these forms, which thing may be done, if we dispose them as husbandmen do the arbour of their vines, and make not all the city penetrable, but in certain parts and places, as it shal be requisite for the safety and beautifying therof. Touching the walls, they who affirm that the cities which honor& embrace virtue, should not use any, speak very simply, and after the ancient maner,& do plainly see that experience hath controlled the error of those cities which did therein glory and boast. I grant that there is no honor in defending themselves by the help of their walls against those which are either like, or do not much exceed them in number: but because it is possible, and sometimes it doth so fall out, that human prowess, and the valor of a few persons cannot resist thē; if they will save themselves,& not be destroyed nor outraged, they must hold the strength of walls to be most assured and profitable for war, especially at this time wherein so many engines for the assaulting of besieged places haue ben denised. For not to enclose cities with walls, is as much as to lay open the country to the roads and invasions of the enemies, and to pull down and lay level the highest places, or as much as not to wall private houses, least they which dwell therein, should become cowards. We are not likewise ignorant that the inhabitants of those cities which are enclosed with walls may use them in two manners, both as if they had walls, and as if they had none: which thing those Cities which are vnwalled, cannot do. If this be so, thē should the walls not only be built round about them, but also such order be taken, that they may serve both for an ornament to the city,& for the necessary occasions of war, as well against other subtleties, as against these modern devises. For as the assailants do by all means seek to prevail, so are there some means already found out, and more must be sought and invented for the defence of city, for commonly men do not enterprise war against those which are prepared and furnished.  
In choosing a place fit for the building of a City, regard must be had to the situation thereof, that it may stand commodiously by land and sea, to the wholesomenesse of the air, to the wind that cometh from towards the sun, and chiefly to the Easterly next to the Northerly winds: likewise to the surety of the place, that it may not be easily besieged, but that the approach thereunto be painful to the enemies, and the sallies or issues easy for the Citizens: whereof he hath already spoken in the fift and sixth chapter of this book: but above all things that it be well furnished within with running and wholesome waters, which greatly further health, or at the least with cisterns, therein to keep the rain water. See Hippocrates in his Treatise of the air, of Waters, and of Places: Plato in the sixth of his laws: Vitruuius in his eight book de Architectura. Touching places of strength, they are not in like sort fit for all Estates: but for Oligarchies and Monarchies, those that are built high: for Democracies, equality and euennesse: and for Aristocracies many places well fortified. Aristotle writeth of the building of private houses, according to the ancient form of Greece, which is declared by Vitruuius in his sixth book, the tenth Chapter. The city must likewise be compassed with strong walls, bulwarks, trenches, and rampires to resist warlike engines, which were many and terrible while he lived, but more ingenious and violent in these our times, as is artillery, which more then a thousand five hundred years since, was found out in Germany, the use whereof is come now to such perfection, that nothing can withstand it. Polidore Virgil De rerum inuentione. Herein is the Lacedemonians vanity reproved, who remained a long time without walls, and were in the end constrained to wall their city.   

CHAP. XII. Of temples, public or common houses and places to diet together in.  
NOw sith the multitude of Citizens must be divided by companies, who are to diet together, and the walls fortified in sundry places with towers and bulwarks, wheresoever they may be fitly erected: it shall bee doubtless very expedient that some of these aforesaid companies, do assemble in the bulwarks. It seemeth then that these things should be thus ordained. The Temples consecrated to the gods,& the places where the chief feasts of the Magistrates are kept, should haue a convenient, and the selfsame place always; reserving holy places that bee severed by the law, or if there be any oracle. Such will this place be, if it haue such excellency, and stand so much above others as is fit for the seat of virtue, and be stronger then those parts of the city which be next unto it:& it is expedient to make about it such a public place, voided of buildings, as is called in thessaly the Free place: In which place there is no buying and selling of wears, whither no craftsmen, Husbandmen, nor such like do repair, except they be called by the Magistrates. The public place also shall bee beautiful and pleasant, if there bee exercises appointed there for old men. It is convenient to divide this ornament according to ages, and to cause the magistrates to be amongst the young men, and the old men amongst the Magistrates. For the presence of the Magistrates before their eyes, doth breed a right shamefastness, and honest fear. The market ought to bee severed from the public place, in a place convenient for the conveying and bringing of all things that come by sea, and by land. And sith the multitude of the city is divided into two parts, to wit, into Priests and Magistrates: The place appointed for the Priests to take their diet in, should bee near about th● Temples, and that of the magistrates which haue authority in matters of contracts, and in pleas, in attaching and arresting of persons and such like business, and also of them which haue the charge of the Market and of the town, ought to be near the public place, in some famous and frequented part of the city. This place is very needful about the public place, which wee would haue to be voided of buildings, and this to serve for necessary actions. It is convenient to observe this order in the country, and to set up for the Magistrates, whom they call keepers of the woods and forrests, and gouernours of the Countries, some forts and places to eat in, serving for defence. Also there must be Temples in the villages, dedicated as well to the gods, as to famous and noble personages. But it were superfluous to stay now too curiously about these matters, seeing they are not hard to be known, but rather to do. For to discourse on them is the Office of wishing, but the execution thereof is the benefit of fortune: Wee will therefore for this time let them alone.  
This Chapter containeth the things that belong to the beautifying and profit of a city: as Churches, Oracles, public places appointed for plays and exercises, and market places, severed one from another, common places to diet in together, lodgings of Priests, and of Magistrates.   

CHAP. XIII. Of felicity, and the means to attain thereunto, and how men wax virtuous by three things.  
but let us return to our discourse touching the commonweal, and declare whereof, and of what manner of things that city should bee founded and compacted, which is happy and well governed. There be two points wherein every kind of goodness consisteth: The one, that the intent and the end wherefore actions are enterprised, be uprightly grounded and ordained: the other, that the means of attaining thereunto bee found out. For these things may agree and disagree amongst themselves, seeing that now and then the scope and end is well laid& proposed, but there is an error and oversight in the means of attaining thereunto; and contrariwise, it may fall out, that the means are good, but the proposed end nought. Sometimes, each of them is nought worth, as in physic oftentimes they judge not aright, what maner a one a healthful body should be, neither direct their care to that end which they haue propounded. Notwithstanding that, in all Arts and Sciences these two things must needs bee, to wit, the end, and the means of attaining to the end and purpose. now it is a most clear case, that all men desire to live well and to obtain blisfulnesse and welfare: howbeit, some are able, and other want means so to do, either by reason of some kind of fortune, or by nature: for a good and blessed life requireth some help, yet less in them which are of good nature and well disposed; and greater in them which are of an evil nature, and evil disposed. Others at the beginning seek not felicity aright, although they are furnished with means which may led thereto. Sith therefore our intent is to see what is the good commonweal,( which is that whereby the city is well governed, and the city is then well governed, when it chiefly happeneth to bee blessed) doubtless men should not bee ignorant what felicity is: Whereof we haue treated in our ethics, if any good may bee reaped of those books; and haue declared, that felicity is an action and perfect practise of virtue; not by way of supposition, but simply and absolutely: I mean by supposition, the things which bee necessary; and by simply, the things which are honest: as just pains and punishments proceed from virtue, yet nevertheless bee necessary, and necessity maketh them honest: for it were better that men and Cities had never need of such things. But the actions which concern honour and plenty of wealth, are absolutely honest: for the one riddeth away evil, and such actions contrariwise are preparatives and workers of welfare. Now although the virtuous man do constantly suffer poverty and sickness, and other calamities, yet notwithstanding happiness consisteth in contrary things. For the virtuous man( as we haue declared in the ethics) is he which by means of virtue possesseth such goods as are absolutely good. Therefore it must then follow, that of necessity his use of them is virtuous, and absolutely honest. Therefore men think that outward wealth is the cause of happiness. In like sort, as if a man should think, concerning good playing vpon an harp, that rather the instrument then lukewarmness were the cause thereof. wherefore of the things above touched, some ought to be had aforehand, and othersome to be prepared by the lawgiver. For which cause when we lay the foundation of a city, the favour of fortune is to be wished about those things which depend of her, and whereof we account her mistress. But as for the making of a city virtuous, it is not the work of fortune, but rather of science and election. Now the city is virtuous, when the Citizens that be members and partakers of the commonweal bee virtuous, and in mine opinion all Citizens are partakers and members of the commonweal. Therefore let us examine how men become virtuous. For if all men could be virtuous together, so as it were not needful for every Citizen particularly to be virtuous, that were most to be desired, because then all men could not be virtuous, but every one must be so to. Now men become good& virtuous by three things, to wit, Nature, custom, and Reason. For first one must be born, as to be a man, and not some other creature: then must be haue some disposition, according to the body and the soul. There be some things which is not sufficient for one to haue by nature, because they alter by custom; other some of a variable nature, and through custom wax one while worse, and another while better. Therfore other wights live more according to nature,& few there be which live by customs: but man liveth also according to reason, wherewith he only of all other living things is endued. wherefore these things ought to agree and frame well together. For men by reason perform many deeds against customs and against nature, if they bee persuaded that it is better otherwise. We haue before declared of what nature Citizens ought to be, for the making of them tractable and obedient to their lawgiver. It remaineth that we speak of the institution and training of people. For some things are learned by custom, and othersome by harkening.  
Two things there bee wherein men proceed well and evil, to wit, in the end, and in the means tending to the end. They proceed well, when the end and purpose is good, and they haue found out the means that led thereunto: and they proceed evil, when there is no mean to attain thereunto: and whereas it is not good to err in either, and that all men desire to live happily; some attain to this happiness, and others cannot attain thereunto, by reason they are hindered by fortune, or by nature. Now the happy life consisteth in the perfect use of virtue, being assisted with bodily and outward goods, as instruments: as appeareth by the discourses made in the first and tenth book of the ethics, wherein two sorts of actions do depend, some of which bee necessary and good by supposition, as the punishments executed by order of Lawe, whereof Cities necessary haue need, although it were better to make the men good: otherwise the other actions are simply and absolutely honest, which concern honour, nobleness, liberality, and such like. Therefore the virtuous City is happy, and that city virtuous where the Citizens that be members of the commonweal be virtuous; becoming such by nature, custom, and reason: which three things when they frame well together, do make the bringing up and institution good, and when they disagree they make it nought. Plutarch treateth of this place of the institution, learnedly and gravely, in his little work of the bringing up of children.   

CHAP. XIIII. Whether the gouernours and obeyers, ought always to be all one and the selfsame persons, or changed by turns, and to what end the commonweal ought to be directed, that it is for peace and tranquillity, and not for wars and lordly dominion.  
NOw forasmuch as every civil society consisteth of governors and obeyers, let us examine whether the gouernours or obeyers ought to bee changed, or continue always all one and the selfsame persons during their lives. For the discipline& institution ought always to be applied to this end. If thē some persons were so excellent above others, as we suppose the gods and heroical personages do excel men, and that straightway they would show themselves to haue great excellency, first in body,& then in mind, as that the excellency of the gouernours were undoubted, and manifest to the obeyers; certainly it were better, that all one and the selfsame persons should always govern, and the selfsame always obey during their lives: But sith as this is no easy thing to find, neither doth that commonly happen( which Sillax writeth to bee a custom amongst the Indians) that their Kings so much excel their subiects: it is necessary for many causes, that the turn and course of governing and obeying, should bee equally imparted to all the Citizens: for there is one kind of equality amongst those that are like, and it is a hard matter for a commonweal to last which is founded contrary to right. For why the other inhabitants● of the country which are desirous of alterations, do always join with them which are barred of the government: and the gouernours cannot bee so many in num●er, as that they should bee strongest. Notwithstanding, there is n● doubt but there ought to be some difference between the gouernours and obeyers. Therefore it is the Lawgiuers duty to consider how these things shall go, and after what manner the commonweal should be communicated and imparted: whereof we haue spoken before. For nature hath given the choice, making of all one and the selfsame kind, some young, and others more aged, and it is meet for some to obey, and for others to govern; and no man will find himself grieved to obey according to age, nor account himself an underling, specially being in possibility to attain this honour, when he shall come to more yeares. We may then in some sort say, that they which govern and obey are all one and the selfsame persons, and in another sort that they are not the same, so that it is necessary that the institution be sometimes the same, and sometimes diverse: and he which will command, must first haue obeied. Now the Estate of government,( as we haue said in the former books) is either for his ca●se and sake which governs, or for his which obeyeth. The one, is called a Lordly manner of government, the other a government of free men, and there are certain employments which differ not so much in the actions, as in the end for which they are done. Wherefore many actions which seem servile, may be well performed by young men which are free born, sith regard of credit and disgrace differ not so much in themselves, as of the end and cause for which they are done. But whereas we said that the virtue of a Citizen, of him which governs, and of a good man, is all one; and that the same person must first obey, and afterward command; the lawgiver must both endeavour to make men good, and consider by what exercises he may make them become so,& what the end of a good life is. Now there are two parts of the soul, whereof the one hath reason of itself, the other hath it not of itself, yet can obey reason. Of which parts we say that those virtues are in regard of which a man is called in some sort good. It is no hard thing to understand i● whether of the two the aforesaid end is, specially to those which follow our division: For the worse is always for the betters sake, as it appeareth as well in things which are done by art, as in those that are natural. Now that part which is endowed with reason, is the better, and is divided likewise into two, according to our usual manner of dividing, namely into active and contemplative reason: So must this part be of necessity divided, and there is no doubt but that the actions haue the same correspondence,& that the actions of that thing which is better by nature, are more to be desired of those which can obtain them all, or two which are the most to be desired amongst thē: For that is always most to bee desired of e●ery man, which is the chiefest and last to be obtained. Our whole life is again divided into labour and rest, war and peace. And of those things which are to be done, some be necessary and profitable, others honest, in which it is requisite to observe the same choice which is observed in the parts of the soul and their actions, as to make war for peace, to use labour for rest, and to do things necessary and profitable for those which are honest. It doth therefore behooue the lawgiver in making laws to haue regard to all these things, as well to the parts of the soul, as to their actions, but chiefly to stay on the best, and in those which are final. The same order also is to be kept in the divisions of mens li●es and affairs. For it is good to bee so disposed, that one may b●th follow his business, and serve in the war; provided that rest& peace be still preferred, and that necessary and profitable things be done, but rather those which are honest: So that the training up of those which are yet children, and of other ages who haue need of discipline, must be directed to these ends. They among the Grecians who are at this day thought to be well governed, and those Lawgiuers who haue formed and constituted such commonweals, seem not to haue directed them to the best end, nor their laws and ordinances to all virtues, but to be wholly inclined to those which seem most profitable. They likewise which haue written since of such matters, do therein show that they had the same opinion: For they praising the Lacedemonians commonweal, commend their Lawgiuers intent and purpose, who referred all his laws to victory and war; which error may be easily reproved by reason, and hath ben confuted by the events of things. For as the most part of men do greatly covet and thirst after rule, sith by that means they may obtain many commodities, and great prosperity: So Thibron seemeth to praise the Lacedemonians lawgiver, and so doth also whosoever else hath written of their commonweal, because they being long exercised and enured to the perils of warfare, haue greatly extended and enlarged their dominion: But sith they do now no longer bear such rule, it is certain that they are likewise no longer happy, nor their lawgiver good. Besides, it is ridiculous, that observing still his laws, and being no way hindered from using them, they haue lost their happy life. Neither do they judge well of bearing rule, whereof the lawgiver should seem to make great account, because the commanding and governing of free men is better, and hath more virtue therein, then the lordly kind of ruling. Furthermore, a city is not to be thought happy, nor that lawgiver to be praised who doth exercise it in subduing their neighbours and borderers, to the end, to signorise over them, sith many inconveniences do thence arise: For whosoever can, will doubtless attempt as much against his own Citizens, and seek to make himself lord of his own Country. Whereof the Lacedemonians accuse King Pausanias, although he were advanced to so high a degree of honour. Then no such reason or law is profitable or meet for Cities, for the lawgiver must imprint in mens thoughts this opinion, that the selfsame things are good both publicly and privately. Neither ought men to exercise arms, thereby to bring others into subiection, who deserve it not: but first and chiefly that themselves be not brought into subiection by others, next, to win some estate, whereby profit may grow to the vanquished, not with intent to reign over men in what manner soever, but to command those which are apt and meet to serve. Now the events of things, agreeing with the reasons which may be framed, do sufficiently witness, that the lawgiver should rather study to refer warlike affairs and all other laws to rest and peace, sith many such Cities haue ben preserved by making war; and having attained large dominions, haue soon after decayed: for in peace they do as it were rust and lose their brightness, even like iron, whereof the lawgiver is the only cause, who hath not taught them to live in quiet.  
The better to take order for the education and training up of youth, it is first requisite to know whether they that govern and obey the city, should be always the selfsame, or else sundry persons, who may command and obey as their turns fall. But if there were any such gouernours that excelled both in body and mind, it should bee better that the most excellent might always govern: But among those that are like and equal, it is both more just and sure to command and obey by turns. The commonweal then must be ordained and instituted according to the order of nature, which of the same kind maketh some young, some old; to the end, that the elder may govern, and the younger obey: so that both the governors and obeyers are in some sort the selfsame, and in another sort diverse, by applying hereunto the discipline: touching the government of young men, it ought to bee free, not lordly, respecting their commodity that obey, not theirs that command, because the actions that are commanded, be just, honest, or dishonest, not so much in regard of themselves, as of the end for which they are done. Wherefore the lawgiver must consider by what customs and endeavours the Citizens may be made good, sith the virtue of a good man, a good Citizen, and of him that commandeth in a good state, is all one: And sith virtues are certain habits of the mind, as Aristotle writeth in the second of his ethics, the lawgiver must therefore know the difference between the parts of the mind, of which, the one is reasonable, the other unreasonable, yet cannot obey reason, first of the ethics, and the last chapter, and that the unreasonable part is as it were the subject of moral virtues, and the reasonable part the subject of intellectual virtues: sixth of the ethics, and the first chapter. And although a man be called good in respect of both these kinds of virtues, yet are the intellectual better, and in the use of them doth chiefly consist an happy life. But as there are two kinds of reason, namely, active and contemplative, sixth of the ethics, the first chapter; so are there also two kinds of virtues, and the contemplative is the better, by means whereof an happy life is sooner attained then by the active: For honest things are to be preferred before necessary and profitable things, as rest before travail, peace before war. And in such sort must be ordered the bringing and training up of youth,& other ages, whereon it followeth, that the Lacedemonians commonweal was not well instituted, because the laws and actions thereof were all referred to war and victory, not to quietness and peace; which thing causeth many inconveniences, and is likewise condemned by Plato in the first of his laws.   

CHAP. XV. What virtues ought to be in a commonweal.  
NOw sith it seemeth that mens actions haue the same end both in public and private respects, and that it is necessary to define a good man and a good city in the same manner, there is no doubt but that those virtues which concern rest are requisite, for peace is oft the end of war,( as hath ben said) and rest the end of labour. Now those virtues do further tranquillity, and the leading of a commendable life, which are used both in time of rest, and of business, for there are many things very necessary for a quiet life, and therefore a city must haue Temperance, Fortitude, and constancy: For as the proverb is, slaves haue no rest, and they which cannot valiantly expose themselves to dangers, become slaves to those which assail them. Then in our employments and business, strength and constancy are needful, and in time of rest philosophy; and in both, Temperance and Iustice: but these two are more needful in time of peace and tranquillity, for war constraineth men to be just and temperant, and the enjoying of prosperity with rest in peace, doth make them more insolent. They therefore who seem happy, and to haue the fruition of all things which cause felicity, haue great need of iustice, as if there be any such as are said by the Poets to dwell in the fortunate Islands, for they shall chiefly haue need of philosophy, Temperance, and Iustice, because they enjoy more rest and tranquillity in the abundance of such good things, whereby is appeareth, that no city can be happy and virtuous without these virtues. But if it be gross and filthy not to be able to use such good things, it is much more gross, not to be able to use them in time of quietness; and that men in labouring and following the wars, should appear good, and in time of peace and rest servile. We must not therefore exercise virtue, as doth the City of the Lacedemonians; who do not therein differ from other men, because they account not that the chief and sovereign good which others do, but because they think to attain thereunto by any one virtue. Th●n sith these good things are greater then those which grow by war, doubtless the fruition of them is better the●of other virtues, and more to bee desired for itself: but how and by what means, we will declare. It hath ben already shewed, that three things are needful, namely, Nature, custom, and Reason: it hath ben also concluded of what Nature the Citizens should be. It remaineth now to consider, whether it bee better to train them up first with reason, or with customs, sith these things must agree together. For reason may swar●e from the good end, and sometimes also is lead by custom. It is manifest, that as in other things, so in this generation is from the beginning, and the end from some beginning of another end. Then sith reason and understanding are to us the end of nature, the generation and institution of manners must be thereunto applied. Besides, as the soul and body are two, so we see there are two parts of the soul, the one unreasonable, the other reasonable●& their habi●es likewise two, of which the one is Appetite, and the other understanding. Now as the body is engendered before the mind, so is the unreasonable part before the reasonable: as it appeareth in that anger, will, and concupiscence do show themselves in children so soon as they are born; but reason and understanding come not naturally, until they be of riper age. It is therefore necessary to haue care of the body before the mind, and then of the appetite: yet the care which is had of the appetite, must be referred to the understanding, and that of the body to the mind. If then the lawgiver ought from the beginning to see that their bodies be very good who are brought up, he must take order touching marriage, and consider of what age and nature they should be who join themselves in wedlock.  
Sith the chief and sovereign good consisteth in the same thing, as well in regard of every peculiar person, as of a whole city, and sith that virtue is the selfsame which maketh a man good, and a city good, the city therefore must bee endowed with those virtues chiefly which are referred to peace and rest, as Iustice, Temperance, and philosophy. But because peace is oft obtained by war, and rest by travail or labour, those virtues also are requisite whereby war and affairs are managed. Nor are the Lacedemonians to be imitated, who although they measured virtue in the same sort that other well ordered Cities did, yet they erred in that they thought to attain thereunto by the military kind of virtue only, whereto they wholly addicted themselves: Wherefore by warring, they both upheld their estate, and flourished; but by enjoying peace and quietness, they lost their happiness and Empire. The like happened afterward to the romans. The Turkes at this present refer all to power& victory, not sparing through their ambitious desire of rule, neither those of their own religion, nor others: but when they shall embrace rest, then shal they likewise draw near unto their ruin. The first care therefore which every lawgiver ought to haue, is that the Citizens be well procreated, the next that they bee trained up in good manners: For this cause he must before all things take good order touching marriages, and consider of what nature the husband and wife should be, and at what time they should be coupled in matrimony.   

CHAP. XVI. Of the time wherein men and women should be coupled in marriage, and of the procreation of children.  
THe lawgiver in taking order touching this matter, must haue regard to the persons, and to their time of life, to the end they may agree in their ages according to the same, and that their season, strengths, or forces be not unlike; as if the man were apt for generation, and the woman barren, or the woman apt and the man impotent: For such things cause brawls and discords between them. Next he must haue regard to the succession of children, that they be not too far distant from the age of their fathers: For then neither can they yield any duty and recompense to their Parents, being far stricken in yeares, nor their Parents help them. On the other side it is no less vnmeet that they approach too near thereunto: For herein there is a great inconvenience, because such children will use less reverence to their Parents, as being equal, and the pensiveness of their ages will breed contention in their keeping of house together. Furthermore, to return whence wee haue digressed, he must haue this regard, to the end, that their bodies who shall bee born, may bee according to his desire: all which things he may accomplish almost by the same industry. For sith the power of generation doth wholly fail in men at seuentie yeares, and in women at fifty, the beginning of their coniunction must by proportion of age concur to these two times. The joining of young persons in marriage, is not good for the procreation of children, for as in all other creatures, the births of those which are too young, be vnperfect● and females, and of small bodies: so must it likewise of necessity be in men, whereof we see the experience in those cities, wherein the custom is to join in marriage, persons which are too young; for there the men are imperfect, and of small stature. Besides, young Damosels tra●aile more and with greater pain in childbearing, and more of them die therein. For which cause some expound that answer of the Oracle made to the Troezenians, as if many of thē died for bestowing their daughters in marriage while they were too young, and not for gathering fruits before they were ripe. Furthermore, it is expedient in regard of Temperance, to keep them from marriage till they be more in yeares, for they which begin so young to haue the company and use of men, are more intemperant. Likewise, the bodies of young striplings are hindered from their full growth, if while they are growing, they use women. For herein there is a certain term of time, which being past, their growth ceaseth. Wherefore it is expedient that maidens be married about the age of eighteen yeares, and men at seven and thirty, or therabo●t. Thus they shal be joined in wedlock, while their bodies be in full strength, and shal cease from procreation in fit time. moreover, the succession of children will not fall out amiss, being partly in the flower of their youth, if procreation do presently follow according to the reason of the time; and partly in the declining of their age, about seventy yeares. Thus we haue shewed at what ages men and women may be coupled in marriage. Now touching the seasons of the year, we must use thē as many do at this present, who choose thereunto the winter. And i● shall bee good to observe in the procrcation of children, the precepts which are given by Phisitians and natural Philosophers. For the Phisitians do speak sufficiently touching the seasons which are good for the health of the body, and the natural Philosophers touching the winds, preferring the northerly winds before the southerly. But it should be better to show what bodies are apt for generation, in that place wherein is handled the bringing up of children; we will therfore now speak briefly therof. For the habitude or disposition of wrestlers is not good for such a constitution of body as we require, neither yet for health or generation; nor that disposition which is too delicate or too weak; but which is the mean between both. doubtless there is requisite an habitude enured to labours which are not too violent, nor all of one sort, as the habitude of wrestlers; but to those actions which belong to free men: this is to be observed as well in men as women. Likewise women with child must haue care of their bodies, living not too much at ease, nor too delicately. And this may be remedied by the lawgiver if he appoint them to visit daily the Temples of those gods whom they honour and pray unto for conception. But contrariwise the mind must be quiet and settled: For children in the mothers womb receive good and hurt, even as fruits do from the earth. As for the destroying or bringing up of children, there should be a law that none might bring up any which were imperfect or lame in any of his lims. And for the avoiding of too great a number of children, if it be not permitted by the laws of the Country to expose them, it is then requisite to set down how many a man may haue; and if any haue more then that prescribed number, there must be used some means that the fruit may be destroyed in the mothers womb, before the little ones haue any sense and life, for it were great wickedness to attempt it afterward. But sith wee haue limited the age wherein men and women may join in marriage, we will also show how long they may use the art of generation, and when they ought to give it over, for the children of those which are more in yeares, as well as of those which are too young, bee unperfect both in body and understanding:& the children of aged persons are weak. It is therefore good to follow herein the time, in which iudgement and understanding are come to their full ripeness, and that is commonly about the fiftieth year, as the Poets say, who measure mans age by seuens. Then five or six yeares after this age, it is meet to use no more the act of generation, nor to company with women, unless it be for health or some other cause. And as for the carnal knowing of another husband or wife, we hold it for certain that it is not honest for a man to touch any other woman then his own wife, while he is called her husband. And if any during the time of procreation do otherwise, he is to be pronounced in famous, and duly punished according to the quality of the offence.  
advertisements touching marriage, of which some are drawn from nature, the rest from the opinion and custom of Aristotles time● or from his own opinion. The first is, that the husband and wife be in the same time disposed and apt, the one to beget, the other to conceive, and that their forces bee not herein unlike. The second, that the children approach not too near to the age of their fathers, nor be too far distant from it. The third, that the wife bee eighteen yeares of age, the husband eight and thirty, when they begin to procreate children: and that they give over, the woman at fifty yeares of age, the man at seuentie. The fourth, that they bee not married too young, nor too old, sith the children of those that are too young, as also of those which are too old, bee imperfect both in body and understanding, and besides those children weak, whose parents were aged when they begat them. The fift, that the winter be chosen as a fitter time for genration, and the Northerly winds more agreeable then the Southerly. The sixth, that the disposition of their bodies which procreate, be not too strong as that of wrestlers, nor too weak and tender through pampering, but mean between both. The seventh, that women being with child haue care of their persons, not being too idle, nor living too much at ease, but walking oft abroad, and using strong food. The eight, that it be not lawful to bring up children which are unperfect or impotent in any of their members. The ninth, that there be a certain number limited of begetting children, and that they which exceed this number, be destroyed in the mothers womb before they haue sense and life. The tenth, that the fittest age in men for the begetting of children, is in the fiftieth year of their age, when mans iudgement and understanding are come to their full ripeness; and that after that time they abstain from women, unless it be for their health. The eleventh, that adultery be forbidden, as well on the wives part as the husbands, and that whosoever shal do otherwise, be pronounced infamous and punished. Among these advertisements the eight and ninth, must in no sort be observed by Christians, but altogether abhorred.   

CHAP. XVII. How children should be brought up.  
WHen children are born, there is great regard to bee had with what kind of food they should bee nourished for the strength of their bodies. Wee see by other living creatures, and by these Nations which are given to warlike discipline, that much feeding on milk is very good for the body, provided that there bee no wine mingled therewith for the preventing of diseases. Besides, all the motions which may possibly bee used in this age, do greatly profit. And to the end that the members by reason of their tenderness be not writhed or made crooked, some Nations do even at this day use artificial instruments which keep their bodies strait. It is good to enure them so soon as they are born, to suffer could, and this is very profitable as well for health, as for military exercises. wherefore many barbarous people haue used to plunge their children when they are born in riuers, or cloth thē in thin apparel, as the Gaules. Forwhereto soever they may be accustomend, it is better to accustom them thereunto even from their birth, so it be done by little and little. Now the disposition of children, by reason of their heat, is naturally apt to endure in could. Wherefore this and such like care is to be had in their first age, but afterward until they bee five yeares old, it is not good to teach them as yet any science, nor cause them to use any necessary labours, least their growth should be thereby hindered; but onely with such motions as may keep their bodies from becoming slow and lazy. Which said motions should be prepared both by other actions, and by plays or sports. Neither must their plays bee dishonest ar painful, nor too dissolute. Touching the tales which they should hear in this age, the Magistrates that are chosen for instructors of children, are to see thereunto, for all such beginnings must bee applied to their future exercises. It is therefore meet that the most part of their plays be imitations of those things which they must afterward do in earnest. They which make laws against the crying of children, do not well, because such motion helps their growth, and doth in some sort serve for exercise to their bodies. For they which labour, gather strength by holding their breath, which thing happeneth to children, when they are urged to cry. Likewise, the instructors or trainers up of children, must take great heed to their manner of living, and above all things that they converse not with slaves. And it is also necessary that during this age until they be seven yeares old, they be brought up at home. Then it is meet to keep children all this time from hearing or seeing any dishonest things. And the lawgiver ought to banish altogether out of the city all ●e●d, and file his talk, as well as other vices. for by speaking freely of dishonest things, they learn to do ill, which is near unto it. And it should especially bee● looked unto children, that they neither hear nor see such things. But if any one be found speaking or doing any forbidden things, if he be free born, but not yet admitted into the number of those which diet together, he should be excluded from that honor, and receive correction; if he be somewhat elder, he should bee noted as infamous, for having committed a slavish act. Now sith wee haue forbidden the speaking of such things, it is manifest that wee forbid them also to look on lewd pictures, or dishonest fables. The Magistrates therefore are to see that there be no image nor piece of painting which may represent such actions, unless it be of some gods, to whom the law doth grant that privilege, and permitteth that they of the elder sort do offer sacrifice unto thē ●or their wives and children. The magistrates ought furthermore not to suffer the younger sort to hear Iambiques pronounced, or to see comedies played, until they haue attained to the age wherein they are received into the number of those which diet together, and that their discipline and institution may keep them all from drunkenness and other like inconveniences which grow thereby. We haue now slightly passed over this matter, but another time we will conserre longer vpon it. For this present we haue made as much mention therof, as was nec●ssary● for perchance Theodorus the plaier of tragedies did not amiss in this, that he never suffered any other plaier, how absurd soever he were, to get vpon the scaffold before him; as though the lookers on were won by those things which they bear first. The very like happens through the accustoming of men and of other things, for alwai●s the first things delight us most. Therfore all evil things, are to be banished from youth. When they bee above 5 yeares old, they ought in the 2 yeares following to be beholders of the sciences which they must learn afterward. There be 2 ages whereinto the institution of youth is to be divided, namely from the age of seven yeares to the age of fourteen yeares, and again from the fourteenth, till the one and twentieth. For they which divide the ages by seuens, must commonly say amiss: but it is rather meet to follow the division of nature, because every art and every institution, will supply the want of nature. Therefore consideration is to bee had what order ought to be set down concerning children: next whether it be better to bring them up publicly or privately, as the use at this day is in many cities: thirdly, of what manner this training and institution ought to be.  
After the Philosopher hath declared how children ought to be procreated, he declareth now their food, exercises, and bringing up, setting down likewise many precepts in that behalf. The first is, that their first nourishment be milk, which is a very natural nourishment, and fit to make their bodies strong, so it be not mixed with Wine: The second, that they use all motions possible for that age: The third, that while they are yet tender, their bodies be kept strait with some instruments devised for that purpose, to the end, that their members grow not crooked: The fourth, that they be accustomend even from their birth to suffer could, which thing is good both for health and military exercises: The fift, that after they can go of themselves and speak, they be not constrained to the learning of any science, until they be five yeares old, nor to use great labour, least their growth should bee thereby hindered, but that they use such motion as may keep their bodies from waxing slow and lazy, and that there be some kinds of plays& sports devised for them, not dishonest or dissolute, nor too painful and troublesone: The sixth, that their governors and instructors teach them pretty tales, meet for the imitation of those actions which they must afterward do in earnest: The seventh, that their cryings and like unquietness be not hindered, because such motion helps their growth, and doth in some sort serve for exercise to their bodies: The eight, that above al things they neither converse nor talk with slaves: The ninth, that they neither hear nor see dishonest, wicked, or odious things, nor use to recite them; and if they bee herein disobedient, they ought to bee chastised according to their age and quality: The tenth, that in considering the things whereunto the children are born and apt, their institution be divided into two ages, namely from the seventh year to the fourteenth; and from the fourteenth to the one and twentieth. Plato in the second and third of his commonweal, and in the seventh of his laws, doth handle at large the whole bringing up of children.    

THE EIGHTH book OF ARISTOTLES CIVIL GOVERNMENT, TRANSLATED out OF greek, AND FRENCH, INTO ENGLISH. The Argument.  
THe Philosopher continueth this discourse touching the bringing up and discipline of children, begun in the former book, saying that it is very necessary for a lawgiver, and for every governor of any Estate, to haue great care thereof, because the manners of the Citizens serve greatly for the institution, preservation, and happiness of commonweals. First he will haue the children to be instructed publicly, then he setteth down what things they should bee taught, and he rehearseth four principal things, which are Grammar, or the art of Exercise, Painting, and music: whereupon he disputeth severally, whether it be profitable or not, and finally delivers his opinion touching the manner how it should be taught; in which place he speaketh of songs, and harmonies, to know which are to be received, and which not.  

CHAP. I. That children should be publicly taught and instructed.  
WHen no man doubteth that the lawgiver ought chee●ely to provide for the bringing up of children, and that the neglect hereof doth greatly hurt the commonweal: For the manner of government must be framed according to every commonweal, sith every one hath her peculiar and several customs whereby it is maintained,& at the first established. As the democracy hath popular customs,& the oligarchy oligarchical, and always the better customs is cause of the better commonweal. Besides, as there are in al faculties and arts certain beginnings, wherein men must bee beforehand instructed, and as it were acquainted therewith, for the doing of such works as appertain to every of them, doubtless the like cometh to pass in the actions of virtue. Sith therefore there is but one end and scope to every City, it must needs follow, that there should be but one, and the same institution and teaching of all. Which ought to be executed publicly and not privately, nor according to the maner which every man useth at this day in taking care of his own children, instructing them particularly,& in such particular sciences as pleaseth himself: for the teaching and exercise of common things ought to be common, and withall men ought to judge, that every man is not his own, but that they do all belong to the city, sith every one is a member of the city, and that the diligence of every part hath relation naturally to the diligence of the whole. Wherein the Lacedemonians are praiseworthie for their great care about the teaching and bringing up of their children, especially publicly. That then it is behoveful to take order for the instruction and teaching of children, and that it should be publicly, it appeareth.  
Forasmuch as it hath been already resolved, that it is behoveful to prepare for attaining to the end, by the means that led thereto; and that the end and scope of a good commonweal, is the same that the end of one man alone is; and that such an end is felicity, and that manners and teaching are the means of attaining thereunto: Therfore the citizens of a good commonweal ought to bee conveniently brought up and taught according to the form of the same, because every commonweal hath her peculiar customs, whereby it is founded and maintained. Wherefore Aristotle goeth forward with this point, which was begun in the former book; and maintaineth, that such care is most necessary for every civil governor, because the manners of the Citizens are great helpers to the establishing and preservation of commonweals. His opinion is like unto Quintilians, that children should bee instructed publicly according to the manner of the Lacedemonians, and not privately according to the will and pleasure of their parents; because the children are not proper to them, but belong to the city, as parts of the famed. For naturally the diligence of every part hath relation always to perfection of the whole. Zenophon in his first book of the institution of Cyrus, writeth that the institution of the children of Persia was public.   

CHAP. II. Wherein, and how children should be instructed.  
WE must therefore know what this institution is, and how children should bee instructed, for at this day it is doubtful, because all think not that the same things should be learned by youth for the attaining of virtue, or an happy life. Neither is yet agreed on whether their institution and instruction should bee referred to the intellectual, or to the moral part of the mind. And the consideration hereof is the more intricate, by reason of the vulgar maner of institution: nor is that question yet decided to know whether it bee better to teach them things which are profitable for mans life, or those which tend to vertue● or such as are the most excellent; for every of these points hath some to maintain it. Touching those which tend to virtue, there is nothing fully resolved on, sith all men do not honour the same virtue, and therefore it is no marvel if they disagree in the exercise thereof. There is then no doubt that amongst the profitable things, such as are necessary, ought to bee taught, but not all; as it will appear by distinguishing those which are seemly and Gentlemanlike actions from those which are base: but amongst the profitable things, those onely should be exercised, which make not the person base that exerciseth thē. Now that action is to be accounted base, as also that art and discipline which maketh the body, or mind, or understanding, of a free man unapt for the use and actions of virtue. We do therefore call those Arts which mnke the bodies disposition worse, base and mercenary exercises; because they hinder and dull the understanding. It is not unseemly to follow and practise some liberal sciences unto a certain measure: but to be too much addicted thereunto, and to follow the study thereof, even to the attaining of perfection, is a thing subject to the aforesaid inconveniences, and there is great difference for what cause men do and learn. For if it bee for themselves, or for their friends, or for virtue, it is not unseemly nor base: but they which do it for others, shall oft times seem to do basely and mechanically. Then the disciplines late set down are doubtful, as hath been said before.  
The lawgiver in taking order for the institution& training up of youth, must haue regard to two things, the one, wherein children must be instructed, the other, how: for it is not yet agreed on to what end the institution of children must be directed, whether to profit, or manners, or contemplation. And this happeneth through the variety of mens opinions, who place their end in diverse things, for some think that children should learn things necessary and profitable; others, that they should bee instructed in virtues: wherein also they agree not, some preferring the intellectual virtues, as philosophy; others the moral virtues, as they who deal in worldly affairs, and govern commonweals; others again preferring that which concerns magnificence and sumptuousness. Touching things profitable, there is no doubt such as are necessary, ought to be learned, yet not those that be base, but those that beseem an honest man. There are some disciplines which may be accounted base and profitable,& likewise honest, according as they are used, and as the end is whereto they are referred: For if they be exercised for gain, they become base and mechanical; if to pleasure friends, and for virtue itself, they are seemly and honest.   

CHAP. III. That children must be taught four things, viz. Grammar, the art of Exercise, music, and Painting.  
THere are about four things which are usually taught to children, Grammar, the art of Exercise, and music. For the fourth, some add Painting: Grammar and Painting, because they are many ways profitable to mans life: the art of Exercise, because it maketh men strong: As for music, it might be doubted of, for at this day many learn it for pleasure, although they of ancient times, haue from the beginning placed it in the number of disciplines, because Nature seeks not onely to do well, as wee haue often said, but also to bee able to enjoy an honest kind of rest. This is the beginning of all things, that I may once again repeat that which I touched before. For if both are to bee desired, rest must be preferred before travell and labour: not the rest which men spend in pl●y, because then play should of necessity be the end of our life, which cannot bee, but wee do rather use play among our business. For they which labour haue need of rest, for which, play was invented: but travail and doing of business, is joined with labour and straining. Therefore it is needful to intermingle play, observing time and occasion to use the same, and to take recreation in manner of physic. For such moving of the soul is ease and release from toil, and rest is desired for pleasures sake. And the taking of rest seemeth to contain pleasure, felicity,& a happy life; which happeneth not to labourers, but to them which live at ease and rest: for the labourer and doer of business laboureth and taketh pain for some end and purpose that he wanteth: and felicity is an end which all men suppose, not to be matched with sorrow, but with pleasure. This pleasure is not deemed by all men to be of one sort, but every man applieth and fashioneth it according to himself and his own disposition. Notwithstanding, an honest man doth make choice of the best kind of pleasure proceeding from honest things. Wherefore it appeareth, that for honest living at ease and rest, it is needful to learn certain things, and to be instructed and trained in the same, and that these instructions and trainings be undertaken for their sakes which learn, and that those which concern labour and business, are desired as necessary, and in regard of other things. Therefore our ancestors haue placed music amongst the sciences, not that it is necessary, for it hath no such thing in it, nor for that it is profitable, as the knowledge of letters is to Merchandise, and to household affairs, and to the mathematical sciences, and to diverse other civil actions. But painting seemeth behoveful for the better judging of Artificers works: So wee should not account music behoveful, as the art of Exercise is for the maintenance of strength and health, for wee see neither of these gotten by music. It remaineth then that it serveth to live Gentlemanlike at ease, whereunto men seem to haue ordained and assigned it, in that they haue attributed to the same the pastime and mirth which is deemed to bee fit for Gentlemen. For which cause Homer saith, it was delightful to call a singer to the feast: and after he had name certain others, call in( saith he) a singer, that his sweet song may make us all merry. And in another place ulysses upholdeth that pastime is good when men are joyful, and the persons sitting at the Table, do hear singing through all the house. Now it appeareth, that music is a certain science, and ought not to bee taught to children, as behoo●efull and necessary, but as Gentlemanlike and honest. But whether there be one only kind of it, or diverse kinds, and which they be, and how to be taught, we will speak of these matters hereafter, for this time it shall suffice, that by some testimony of men of old time, we haue confirmed our opinion touching the usual sciences specially music. Further, we are to teach youth some profitable sciences, not only in respect of profit, as it appeareth in the knowledge of letters, but also to the end they may thereby attain to other sciences. Likewise, the art of painting is to be shewed unto them, not only for that they should err the less in the getting of particular saleable things, or take heed of being deceived in buying and selling of furniture and household stuff, but rather to the intent they may learn to consider the beauty of bodies. doubtless, the hunting after profit and advantage in all places, is not fit for Gentlemen and Noblemen. Sith therefore it is clear, that children are rather to be taught and trained by manners, than by reason, and rather in those things which pertain to the body, than in those which belong to the moving of the mind; we will infer thereof, that they ought to be committed to the art of exercising of bodies, and to the art of hardening children in diverse strifes, whereof the one frameth the nimbleness of the bodies, and the other the actions.  
In old time there were in Greece four faculties which Parents did accustom to cause their children to learn: Grammar, the art of Exercise, music, and Painting: for certain profits fit for mans life. Grammar serveth to speak well and to red and writ well, for the knowledge of letters is necessary for merchandise, for the guiding of household affairs, for the getting of skill, and for the continuance and perpetuating of mans remembrance, and for the public and private life, in time of peace and war, and of rest and business. The faculty of Exercise serveth to the maintenance of health and strength, by ordering the body with honest& moderate exercises, as fensing, shooting, casting the ston, riding, wrasteling, running, leaping, dancing, and swimming. music serveth for the solace and comfort of the mind and recreation after labour and travell, and hath ben always reckoned for one of the liberal sciences, whereof there shall be a more ample disputation in the three last chapters of this book. Painting serveth for the better consideration of the beauty of bodies, and understanding of the proportion of all things, that in buying and selling men may haue the more discretion; and for the drawing of plots of public and private buildings, which is necessary for the art of building, for adultery, utensils, and all other instruments and tools for the war, and for the description of countries, towns, and castles, and their heights, bredths,& lengths: of living creatures of all sorts,& of their parts, and of herbs, trees, roots, leaves, flowers, and fruits, for physic& the knowledge of simples: as Plato affirmeth in the third book of his commonweal, and in the seventh of his laws.  
grammar.] Diodorus Siculus in his twelfth book and fourth chapter writeth, That Charondas the lawgiver preferred grammar, that is, the knowledge of letters, before all other sciences: and not without cause, for by means thereof, the most behoof●full things in the world are committed to writing, as sentences, letters missive, last Wils and Testaments, laws and Constitutions, and such other matters as are chiefly necessary for mans life: and who can sufficiently commend the knowledge and use of letters, according to the worthiness therof? By them, they that died long ago do live again in the remembrance of them that live: and they that are far asunder, do by letters communicate with their friends that bee absent, as fully as if they were present. In the treaties that are made for the pacification of wars between Cities and Kings, the faithful keeping of letters is necessary for the conservation of the Articles agreed vpon between them. To conclude, letters be the onely way that preserve the goodly sentences of wi●e men, the Oracles and answers of the gods, philosophy, and generally all the Sciences, and that transport them from hand to hand to the suruiuors. Therfore we must deem that nature is the cause of our living, but that learning gotten by means of letters, is the cause of our well living. Wherefore he made a law, that all the children of the city should learn letters at the charges of the commonweal, which should maintain schoolmasters to teach them; deeming that the poor( being otherwise unable to pay the stipend due to the maisters) should bee deprived of the best and necessary instructions. By which law he hath wisely remedied the hindrance of the poor, who had ben bereft of so great goods, if he had not given them a mean to learn letters, and had not deemed it a thing worthy the providing for at the charge of the commonweal: wherein he ●urmounted and passed the wisdom of all Lawmakers which before him had made laws, that sick poor folk should bee looked unto, and healed by Phisitians, retained in wages for that purpose by the commonweal; for they haue taken order for the curing of sick bodies only, and this man hath provided for the healing of minds, sick with ignorance: so much the more specially, for that wee desire never to haue need of Phisitians to heal the diseases of bodies; and contrariwise, we desire to be evermore, with them that teach letters and wisdom.   

CHAP. IIII. Of the faculty of exercise, and how children should bee exercised.  
IN those Cities which at this day seem to use great diligence in instructing of children, some men apply themselves to get a championlike activity, marring their faces, and hindering the growth of the bodies. And though the Lacedemonians haue not fallen into this error, yet do they with labour make themselves beastlike and vnmanlike, as though that were a great furtherance to manhood and fortitude. Howbeit, as wee haue often said, we must not respect one virtue ab●●●, nor th●● especially. And though wee should respect this, yet haue they not found the means thereof: For wee do not see in other wights, nor in strange Nations, that strength and manhood doth accompany the cruelest manners, but the most mildred and Lionlike. There be many Nations addicted to kill and eat: as the Achaians vpon the sea of Pontus, and the Heniochians, and among those which inhabit further into the land, some like to these, others more cruelt, who though they led a thievish life, yet haue they not Fortitude. Besides, wee know that as long as the Lacedemonians did exercise continual labours, they excelled all others, and now are excelled by other people of Greece in such seats as concern the faculty of exercise, and in martiall employments. For they did not excel for exercising of children in this sort, but for this onely that they were exercised against them which exercised not themselves. Therefore they should chiefly be exercised in honesty, and not in cruelty: for never will any wol●e or other brute beasts adventure themselves in any honest danger, but rather an honest man. They therefore which herein yield too much liberty to children, and care not for instructing them in necessary things, do make them very vile; and by supposing to make them serviceable to the commonweal in one work onely, they make them worse then others, as reason sheweth. This is not to bee judged by their first doings, but by the present deeds, for now adays they with whom they haue to do, follow their skill, and in time past they had no imitators. It is therefore resolved vpon, that the faculty of exercise is to bee used, and after what manner it is to be practised. For until the age of about fourteen yeares, light and gentle exercises must be used, without joining thereunto any violent feeding, and strained labours, to the intent they hinder not their growth. For it is no small token that such inconvenience groweth thereof, sith wee shall not see in the plays of Olimpus two or three selfe●ame and all one persons which haue gotten the game, in their first years, and when they come to mans estate, by reason that in youth, through strained exercises, they consume their strength. But when they haue bestowed three yeares next after the age of fourteen yeares, in other sciences they are driven to ●ie their age following, to necessary labours, and a prescript form of diet. For the body and mind must not labour both together at one time, because these labours haue their effects contrary by nature, sith the labour of the body hinders the mind, and the labour of the mind hinders the body.  
Two faults are commonly committed in teaching the faculty of exercise to children: The one is that by assaying to make them strong, their faces are marred, and the growth of their bodies hindered. The other is, that they make them beastlike and cruel, by directing their whole training to one martiall virtue alone, as the Lacedemonians did. Therefore Plato in the third book of his commonweal, considering the faults of the art of exercise, will not haue it shewed alone, but mingled with music: that being so tempered, the one may serve to the strength and health of the body; and the other to the modesty of the mind: affirming also in Timeus, that the body ought not to bee exercised without the mind, nor the mind without the body, because these two skills being separated, the one engendereth rudeness and wildness, the other tenderness and delicateness. But Aristotles opinion is, that they should be moderately shewed to children until the fourteenth year of their ages, by easy and gentle exercises, without joining thereunto violent food, and of hard digestion, nor constrained labours, to the end their growth should not bee hindered. And after that age, when they haue employed three yeares in other sciences, that then they may bee exercised in harder labours of the body, and fed with grosser meats. Plato in his seventh book of laws sheweth also after what manner the art of Exercise is to bee learned and practised.   

CHAP. V. Of music by way of disputation, and how children should learn it.  
IN the former discourses wee haue already set down some doubts concerning music, which it shall be good to repeat in this place to serve as an occasion to a more ample disputation which may be here made thereof. For it is not easy to r●solue what force music hath, and why it is to bee learned, to wit, whether for sport and recreation, as sleeping and drinking, which of themselves are no virtuous things, but pleasant, and withall cause the ceasing of care, as Euripides saith; therefore set they music in this rank, and use all these things alike, I mean Sleeping, Drinking, and music, whereunto they add dancing: Or rather whether it be better to refer music to virtue, and that as exercise nimbleth the bodies, so music may dispose the manners, accustoming to make merry with honesty: Or whether it serve for the passing away of time honestly, and for the getting of wisdom; for of those things which are alleged touching music, this ought to be the third. Now that children are not to bee taught for plays sake, it appeareth by this, that they play not when they learn, and that it is a pain to learn. Neither is it meet that children and such ages should haue it taught them as a seemly recreation, because the end& perfection agreeth not with any imperfect thing. But peradventure the study of children might seem to bee brought in by sport for to serve them when they bee grown to mans estate, and come to perfection. If it be so, why then do they learn it themselves, and not use it as the Kings of the Persians and Medeans, who enjoy this pleasure and art by the means of others which are skilful therein? For it is necessary, that they which continually exercise one selfsame action or art, do it better then others which bestow therein so much time as may serve onely to learn it. But if they should labour in such things, then should they by the same reason learn to make ready their own meat, and to play the cookes, which were an absurd and impertinent thing: there is the same doubt whether it can better the manners. For to what end shall they learn it, and wherefore shall they not rather receive pleasure by hearing others, and be able to judge therof as the Lacedemonians are, who can judge of good or bad tunes, yet haue not learned the art thereof? There is the same reason whether men use it for the passing of time in seemly and honest sort. again, wherefore shall they learn it themselves; and not receive pleasure thereof by others? Let us consider the opinion which we haue of the gods. Certes, we shall never red in the Poets that jupiter himself doth sing or play on the harp, but wee do call and account such persons base, and we say that such an act doth not belong to any man of quality, unless he bee drunk or merrily disposed. But perhaps we will afterward consider thereof: The first question is, to know whether Muiscke is to be accounted science or not, and which of the three things by us set down it can do, discipline, or play, or a Gentlemanlike and happy life. But it is by good reason necessary for them all, and seemeth to participate of all. For play is for rests sake, and rest must needs bee pleasant, sith it is the medicine of that grief and trouble which grows by labour. And it is certain that such pastimes as yield any credite to those which use them, ought not onely to bee honest, but pleasant also, because felicity consisteth in both. Now wee do all confess that music is a very pleasant thing, as well the naked and simplo kind, as that which is with melody: and the Poet Museus saith, That songs are pleasant to mortal men. For which cause men do with good reason use music in public meetings and honest pastimes, as a thing which hath power to rejoice& delight. Whereupon it might be thought that children should be taught it. For all things which yield pl●●sure without hurt, are not good in regard of the end only, but also of succeeding our labours, as it were by turns. Then sith men do seldom attain to the end, and do many times rest themselves, and use plays, it shall bee very profitable to take recreation thereby; not excessively, but so much as is needful, thereby to enjoy pleasure. But some men do propose play unto themselves for an end, and that peradventure, because the end yeeldeth some, but not all pleasure; which they seeking, take one for another, because there is some likeness in the end of our actions. For the end is not desired for any future thing, nor such pleasures likewise for the things which are to come, but for those which are past, as labours and troubles: whereupon it might bee conjectured; that this is the cause for which men seek happiness by these pleasures. And sith music is st●died not for itself alone, but also because it is a friend and furtherer of rest, it might bee demanded whether this do accidentally come unto it, for the nature thereof is more worthy then the aforesaid use. Neither must we receive by music the common pleasure only which all men do receive and feel, because music hath a natural pleasure, and therefore the use thereof is agreeable to all ages and manners; but wee must besides consider whether it pertain to the manners, and to the mind, which may be easily known, if we receive thereby any quality touching our manners. Now that we receive thereby some quality, it appeareth by sundry others,& chiefly by the games of Olimpus, which do doubtless ravish mens minds;& ravishment is an affection which hath relation to the manners of the mind. Furthermore, men hearing any imitations, feel a sympathy, although they be not in verse nor melody. Then sith music is a pleasant thing, and sith virtue consisteth in honest delectations,& in loving and hating; certes there is nothing which should bee so much learned, as to judge well and to delight ourselves with courteous manners, and honest actions. Now there is in rhymes and songs as well some likenesses drawing near to the very natures of wrath, and of gentleness, of manhood, and temperance, and of all their contraries; as also other some which pertain to manners, as is proved by experience: For the mind is altered at the hearing of them. And our accustoming of ourselves to be offended or well pleased with such kinds of things, drawth near after a sort to the very things themselves, as for example, if any man take pleasure in beholding the image of another, not for any other cause then for the forms sake, it must needs be that the sight of the same part whose picture he looketh on, pleaseth him well. There is not in the other sensible things, any likeness or imitation of manners: as for example, in those things which move the sense of touching or tasting, and but a little in those which move the sight. Such are the figures which move little, and such is the common sense of all persons. moreover, these are not images of manners, but rather signs, representing the colours and figures of manners which are in the body when it is troubled with passions. But if it make any matter to behold these things, children ought not as much to see the works of Pason, as of Polignotus, and some other painter or graver which expresseth manners. That there be imitations of manners in harmonies themselves, it is manifest, in that there is presently such difference in the nature of harmonies, that the hearers are diversly disposed, and not moved all after one sort by every of them, but are stirred up by some of them to sadness and weeping, as by that tune which is called Mixolydian; and by other wax more mildred in mind, as by the base tunes; and by some other moderately& constantly, as the Dorian tune amongst all harmonies seemeth to do; the phrygian tune rauisheth. These things are very well set down by them which haue studied this science, who confirm their reasons by the witness of the deeds themselves. The like also happeneth in rhymes, for some of them cause graver manners, and others lighter fashions: again, some of them haue foolish and unapt thanksgivings, and othersome haue honester thanksgivings. Therefore it followeth of these reasons, that music hath force to dispose the affections of the mind in diverse sorts. And if it be able so to do, without all doubt children ought to be instructed and taught the same. Certes, the teaching of music is fit for the nature which children haue, at such time as by reason of their age they do nothing with a good will except there be pleasure in it. And music of her own nature is pleasant, and it seemeth that there is affinity between harmonies and rhymes. Therfore many wise men affirm that the soul is an harmony, or that there is harmony in it.  
In this place he discourseth affirmatively and negatively, whether music bee a science, and whether it ought to be learned for recreation& pleasure, or whether it serve for manners and an happy life: about which there are many goodly reasons set down for each way, which are pleasant to red, and easy to understand.  
MANY wise men do affirm that the soul is an harmony, or that there is harmony in it.] Plato in his Phedon bringeth in Symmias talking thus with Socrates: I beleeue assuredly Socrates, that you know well enough what we think of the soul, to wit, that there is in our bodies some intention and complexion of hote and could, dry and moist:& that the certain temperature and agreement of those qualities, are our soul living in the body when those qualities be moderated& tempered together. Therefore if the soul be a certain harmony, then at all times, when and as often as the nature of these qualities which are in the body, diminisheth or increaseth too much by reason of sickness or other inconveniences, the soul also( though it bee most divine) must needs perish forthwith, like as other tunes do which consist in voice, or are made by other skill: but the rest of the body lasteth longer, until it bee burned or consumed by rottenness. Consider therfore what is to be answered to any one that shall say, the soul is nothing else but a certain temperature and agreement of qualities together, which are in the body; and that the soul death and endeth the first. Socrates answering hereunto, doth by many goodly reasons confute that opinion of them who supposed the soul to bee a harmony and mixture of humours, comparing the body to a harp, and the soul to a harmony. This book I did lately translate into French, and set it forth with annotations, where the scrupulous sort may see the handling of this disputation. Cicero in the book of Tusculane questions saith. Proxim● autem Aristoxenus musicus, idémque philosophus● censet animam esse ipsius corporis intensionem quandam, vel●t in cantu& fidibus, quae harmonia dicitur: sic ex corporis totius natura v●ri●s modos cieri, tanquam in can●u sones: hic ab artificio non recessit,& tamen dixit aliquid quod ipsu● quale esset, erat multo a●●è dictum& explanatum à Platone.   

CHAP. VI. That music is to be learned by singing and playing on instruments, and what instruments should be used.  
but whether they ought to learn it by singing and playing vpon instruments, or not( as we haue cast a doubt before) we will now declare. It is certain that it stands him greatly vpon who will excel& become such a o●e as he wisheth to be, ●o set his hand to the work. For it is imp●ssible or very hard for them which haue not exercised a work or function, to give a good iudgement therof. And also it is certain that children ought to bee occupied abo●● some thing, and it is to be supposed, that Architas his rattle was well invented, which he ga●e to children to keep them occupied, least they should break or spoil any thing about the house; because children will be doing something. Therefore this play of all other is very fit for children, but when they wax bigger, they are put to learning in ste●d of the rattle. That children therfore are so to be instructed in music, as that they exercise the works thereof, it hereby appeareth. Furthermore, it is not hard ●o set down what is fit or not fit for ages, and to confute them which uphold the study thereof to be vile. First of all sith it is convenient to lay hand to the work for to judge rightly of the same; therefore is it needful that while they be children, they should exercise the same: after when they wax elder, that then they should leave the exercise of it, but they may well judge thereof, and take pleasure of the same by reason they learned it in their youth. As for the blame which some do lay vpon music, as though it made men vile, it is no hard matter to answer it, if we consider how far they which are to bee taught in the civil virtue, are to proceed in this art, and what songs, and what rhymes they are to use, and also vpon what instruments they shall learn. For it is likely there is some difference therein, and that therein consisteth the dissolving of their objection: because there is no impediment to the contrary, but that certain sorts of music are able to do that which is said. It is then a most clear case, that it is convenient to learn this Art, with such respect, that it be no impediment to their future actions, nor make the person vile and unapt for martiall and civil exercises: First for practise, and next for skill. As for the manner of learning it, it shall be good that too much labour bee not employed in such things as are too full of cunning, nor in wonderful and curious works, which in this age are come into theaters and open plays of music, and since haue been reduced to discipline. But farther, it is convenient to spend time about such things, until some pleasure may bee received by sweet songs and rhymes, and not to understand onely the common music, as some other living ●ights and the vulgar sort of children and slaves do. Hereby it appeareth what instruments are to bee used. For they should not bee taught to play vpon fl●●es, nor any other instrument which is pec●liar to men of skill, as the harp, or if there bee any such like; but vpon those instruments which are able to make the hearers of music, or of some other science good. moreover, the flute serveth to no purpose for the framing of manners, but rather s●irreth up to wrath, insomuch that it is to bee used at such times as the use therof tendeth more to the purging and cleansing, then to the instructing of the mind. Here will I also add what hath happened unto it, which is contrary to science, namely, that the sound of the flute hindereth the use of reason. Therefore our ancestors haue vpon good ground ●orbidden the practise thereof to children and free men, although they had used the same before. For when they had gotten more leisure through the abundance of wealth, and bare a better mind toward virtue, and conceived a great opinion of themselves before and after the warres of the Medes, by reason of the good success which they had in the same, they applied themselves to all manner of sciences without choice or iudgement of any, but by searching them out, and training them onely. Vpon this occasion amongst other sciences they received the art of playing vpon Flutes. For in lacedaemon a certain master of the company of singers, played himself vpon the Flute to his company of singers, and it grew to such practise in Athens, that the most part of the Noblemen learned it, as appeareth by the Table which Thrasippus set forth, when he furnished the charge of the plays for the Tribe of Eicphantide. Afterwards experience itself reproved it, when they could better discern those things which either appertained or did not appertain to virtue. Likewise, many old instruments haue been rejected, as the Pictides, Barbites, and others which tended to the pleasure of such as heard them, as the seven cornered and three cornered instruments, and Dulcymers, and all those instruments which require the skill of the hand to play vpon the same. And not without cause haue the men of old time devised the fable of the Flutes, who say, that Minerua after shee had invented the Flutes, found fault with them, and cast them away: And it is not against reason to say that the goddesse did so, for that shee misliked the disfiguring of the face which the Flutes make; although it bee more likely and credible that shee did so, because the skill of playing vpon the Flutes, doth no good to the mind, and for that wee attribute unto Minerua all Sciences and Arts. But forasmuch as wee condemn the artificial skill and exercise of instruments, and account that artificial which serveth to the playing of music, not directing him to virtue which practiseth the same, but tending to the absurd and filthy pleasure of the hearers: Therefore deem wee that such kind of exercise is not fit for honest men, but rather for slaves and craftsmen: For the mark whereunto they direct their end and scope is nought. For the importunate and ridiculous looker on hath accustomend to change the music. Insomuch, that after a sort he depraueth and marreth the players which study to please him and their bodies, by reason of the thanksgivings which they make.  
Children ought to learn music, not onely by hearing, but also by singing and playing vpon iustruments themselves. For it is not possible to judge rightly of the same otherwise. But it is not convenient to accustom them to all manner of songs and instruments, nor to take pains about those that are too artificial, wonderful, and curious, which contain more ostentation then profit.  
FOR when they had gotten more leisure through the abundance of wealth.] whosoever considereth the affairs of people and Nations, shall find, that their beginnings were small, base, and poor, and that need taught them by little and little the use of necessary things, and that afterwards came up those which serve for pomp and ornament. The which matter Plato in his Critias or Atlanticus, hath divinely declared, writing in this sort, {αβγδ}, &c. That is to say, When as they wanted necessaries for this life by the space of many ages, and both they and their children thought onely of those things which were needful for them, and talked of them, they despised the remembrance of antiquity. For the curiousness of learning and seeking out of old matters haue usually come into cities through idleness, when any haue already prepared such things as are needful for this life, and not before. And which is more, it hath been observed in many Nations, that they began to decay when they embraced learning: for when they bee poor they prosper by deeds of arms, and when they wax rich, they fall to study, by means of the leisure which they haue gotten, and forsake the labour and hard exercises of the warres. For as much then as the Nations at their beginnings bee poor, they make no account of learning, and very few men are there found in them that haue leisure to study and writ. Therefore the original and antiquities are unknown. But when idleness increased through wealth, then Arts and Sciences grew in reputation: as it is happened in Greece, Italy, amongst the Gaules, and in many other Countries, and shall in like sort happen hereafter. sallust in the conspiracy of Catiline complaineth, that at Rome in old time there had been no Hystorians. Quia prudentissimus quisque maxim● negociosus erat, ingenium nemo sine corpore exercebat: optimus quisque facere quàm dicere,& si●● ab aliis benefacta laudari, quàm ipse aliorum narrare malebat. Cicero 1. de Oratore: Nam posteaquam imperio omnium gentium constituto diuturnitas pacis ocium confirmavit, nemo ferè La●dis cupidus adolescens non sibi ad dicendum study omni enitendum putavit. Idem author in eadem praefatione libri primi dicit, graecoes homines non solùm ingenio& doctrina, said ocio studiòque abundantes. Stephen Pasquier, in his first book of the Searches of France, the first chapter, complaineth of the old inhabitants of Gaule,& of the French men that succeeded them, for the small care which they haue had, to set down in writing their virtue to the posterity.  
AND conceived great opinion of themselves before and after the warres of the Medes, by reason of the success which they had in the same.] he meaneth the voyage that Xerxes King of Persia and of the Medes, made into Greece; which is so much spoken of in the greek histories, whereof Diodorus Siculus in the first Chapter of his twelfth book, writeth as followeth, which is very fit for the understanding of the place: The voyage of Xerxes King of Persia against Greece, by reason of the great power which he brought with him, put the Grecians in a greater fear then ever they were in before: for they well knew that these warres were undertaken against them to bring them all into bondage, and seeing that all the greek cities that are situate in the country of Asia were already in subiection and bondage, they thought that those of Greece itself should speed little better. But when the success of that war proved otherwise then was hoped for by the Persians, they were not onely without danger of servitude, but did also therein purchase exceeding glory, and every town and city grew thereby so wealthy, that all the world meruelled by what means things were so fallen out contrary to mens general expectation. For after that, until fifty yeares and upwards, Greece did marvelously flourish, increasing in all felicity: and this her prosperity and wealth caused all arts to flourish, so that wee find that the most excellent which ever were in the world, lived in that time, as among others Phidias the Image maker. Sciences likewise, and chiefly philosophy, were greatly esteemed and studied: so was eloquence through all Greece, but especially at Athens. For at this time lived the Philosophers, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; and the orators, Pericles, Isocrates and his Schollers; and those famous Captaines, Miltiades, Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, and Miromides, and many others whom it were too long to rehearse: but chiefly the Athenians enlarged their Empire and glory through their pvissance, so that their name was spread through all the habitable world.   

CHAP. VII. Of harmonies and rhymes, or numbers.  
WE are yet farther to consider of harmonies and rhymes, and how they are referred to science: to wit, if all harmonies, or all numbers and rhymes must bee used, or if there be a distinction to bee made of them. Next, whether wee should prescribe to those which study learning the same manner, or some other third. And sith wee see that music consisteth in the composing or framing of harmonies and rhymes, we must know what efficacy both of them haue in regard of science; and which kind of music is to bee preferred, whether that of melodies, or that of rhymes. We suppose that many things haue been well said touching this matter by some modern musicans and Philosophers skilful in music, to which authors wee will refer those which desire the exact knowledge thereof, and will propound onely in general the several kinds. Now sith wee allow that division of songs which some Philosophers haue made, who term some moral, some active, and others ravishing; and apply the nature of harmonies to each of them accordingly, wee affirm that music is to bee used not for one profit onely, but for many, as for science and for purgation: wee will now speak simply what wee mean by purgation, whereof wee purpose to speak more plainly in our art of poetry. Thirdly, for honest pastime and for the recreation of the mind, as also for release from toil. Then it is certain that all kinds of harmonies may bee used, but not in the same manner, but for the learning of those which are very moral: for the hearing of others which are performed with the hand in this art, as well active as ravishing, because the affection which doth vehemently moon certain minds, is found in all, but in some more, in others less, as compassion and fear, and likewise the ravishing of the mind: For there are some subject hereunto, whom wee see in using verses which stir up the mind, to bee in such a plight, as if they had taken physic and some Purgation. The same thing doth of necessity happen to those which are prove to compassion, or fearful, and generally to all such persons as are subject to any passion: and to others, according as every one is thereto inclined: all which receive some purgation, and are merry with pleasure. Likewise the purgative songs procure mirth and gladness in men without hurt. Wherefore the musicans which play in theaters, ought to haue regard to such harmonies and such songs. But because the beholders are of two sorts, the one free born and skilful, the other importunate and unruly, consisting of mechanical and mercenary persons and such like, there must bee used for them also certain plays and sight● which may delight and recreate them. For like as their minds bee wrested from the natural disposition of the same, so bee there as well harmonies which serve from the order of good tunes, as also vehement, rough, and rude songs, and every person taketh delight in that which is fi● for his nature. Therefore players are to bee allowed to use such kind of music to such lookers on. But for institution and bringing up, we are to use( as I haue set down) moral songs, and such harmonies as the Dorian is, as we haue before touched. And if there be any other harmony which they that are learned in philosophy and music haue liked of, it is also to be allowed. Socrates in the books of the commonweal hath not done well in leaving the phrygian harmony only with the Dorian: and that sith of all instruments of music he condemneth the flute, for the phrygian harmony hath the like virtue amongst harmonies, that the flute hath amongst instruments, being both of them causers of troublesone motions, as poetry teacheth us: forasmuch as every raging fury, and every such other moving, is caused more by the Flutes, then by any other instrument; and amongst harmonies, take their com●linesse in the phrygian tune: so that the Dythyrambe seemeth certainly to bee phrygian, which they that are skilful in this matter, do prove unto us by many examples, and amongst others by the example of Philoxenus, who having undertaken to sing Dythrambicall verses in the Dorian tune, could not perform what he had taken vpon him, but being lead by nature herself, fell into the Phrygian tune, being a convenient harmony. As touching the Dorian harmony, all men confess that it is very constant, and most convenient for manly manners. moreover, sith wee praise the mean between two extremities, and because wee say the mean ought to be followed, and that the Dorian hath this nature, being compared with other harmonies, it is without all doubt that the Dorian songs are most fit to bee taught unto children. But two things are to bee regarded, namely, what is possible, and what is convenient to bee done. For all men ought rather to enterprise such things as are possible, and which are fit for them, the which are determined by the ages themselves, as for example, it is not easy for folk which are weak through age, to sing strong and vehement tunes, but nature hath given to that age the low tunes. Therefore Socrates is also rightly found fault withall herein by certain musicans, because as concerning teaching and bringing up of children, he condemned low harmonies, as if in his opinion they caused drunkenness, not according to the force of drunkenness, which causeth raging fury, but for that they are faint, broken, and base. Therefore it is good to learn such harmonies and such songs, to use them in old age. again, if there bee any such harmony as is fit for childrens age, because it may bee an ornament and instruction withall, as the Lydian harmony of all harmonies seemeth to bee: doubtless it is convenient as touching the teaching and bringing up of children, to haue regard to these three things, to wit, to the mean, to what is possible, and to what is meet and convenient.  
Songs bee moral, or active, or ravishing. Those bee moral which imitate the manners and affections, and appertain to instruction. Those active, which pertain to rest and pleasure, to the end, to recreate the mind, and rest the body, that it may return stronger to labour. Those ravishing, which are vehement, as the sound of Trumpets, drums, and Cornets, whereby mens minds are vehemently moved, and as it were put out of reason. As much is to bee deemed of harmonies, and they ought to bee framed as songs bee, to wit, some to manners and bringing up, other some to the purgation or ridding away of troublesone affections; and the rest to recreation. One harmony is Dorian, another Phrygian, and another Lydian, taking their names of these Nations, which had music differing each from other, as at this day the French harmoniess bee mildred, the Italian harmonies mournful, the English and high Dutch harmonies manly, and the Heluetian harmonies, stirrers of troublesone motions. It is therefore convenient to use music for three causes, namely, instruction, purgation, and recreation: neither must good harmonies onely bee used for honest and skilful persons, but sometimes also such as are lewd and wanton must bee used in the theaters to recreate the vulgar and mechanical sort, whose minds being depraved, take pleasure in like kinds of harmonies: for every one delighteth in that which best fits his nature.   
The end of the eighth and last book of Aristotles Politiques, or discourses of government.   

A Table of the Chapters contained in these eight books of Aristotles Politiques.  

The first book.  Chap. Pag. OF a city or commonweal, and the parts thereof. I 2 What is a city: and that it consisteth by nature: and that man is naturally a sociable and civil creature. II 3 Of a family and the parts thereof, specially of the master and Seruant. 21 4 Of a Bondman, and Bondage, by Nature and by Law. 31 5 Of possession, and of the natural acquisition of goods necessary for life: withal of the variety of livings and trades of men: and of true riches. 36 6 Of artificial getting by way of exchange: and of the invention of money. 44 7 That the skill of acquiring and getting is servant to the skill of housekeeping, called Oeconomie, and to the skill of political governing: and how it ought to be used. 48 8 Of the other parts of housegouernment which belong to the husband and the father: also of such virtues as are respectively requisite for gouernours and obeyers. 55  

The second book.  1 That all the commonweals of his time deserved correction: and first of all Platoes, reproving that community of things which Socrates devised in it. 61 2 The reproof of the community of behooves and children, brought in by Socrates in Platoes commonweal. 71 3 The reproving of the community of goods and possessions. 75 81 5 Of Phaleas his commonweal: and of the Chalcedonian commonweal. 88 6 Of the several commonweals of Hippodamus, and of the Milesians. 92 7 Of the commonweal of the Lacedemonians. 104 123 9 Of the commonweal of Carthage. 127 10 Of the commonweal of Athens, ordained by Solon. 131  

The third book.  1 Of a city, and of a citizen. 137 2 When any alteration happeneth in a city, in what case the city shall be said to remain, the same that it was before, or otherwise. 14● 3 Whether the virtue that belongeth to a good man, be the same with that which belongeth to a good citizen. 144 4 What is a commonweal, and how many kinds therof there be. 148 5 Of the division and definition of commonweals, and of their transgressions. 149 6 Of the right and law of the democraty and oligarchy: 151 7 Who ought to bear rule in a city. 156 8 Of the end of policy, which is the public good and civil iustice, and that it is the noblest end of all other faculties. 159 9 When a man doth greatly excel in virtue, how they ought to behave themselves, and of ostracism. 162 10 Of a kingdom, and the several kinds thereof. 168 11 Of the fift kind of government, whether it be more expedient for a city to be governed by a good man, or by good laws. 172 12 Of an absolute King, and how people are more disposed to bee governed by one sort of government, then by another. 179  

The fourth book.  1 What a Politician or a lawgiver ought to consider in the establishing of a commonweal. 168 2 He resumeth the division of commonweals, propounded in the former book: and declareth how bad ones are opposed unto the good. 188 3 Why there are diuers forms of government. 189 4 That a democraty and an oligarchy are not simplo forms: and that there are many sorts and kinds of democracies. 190 5 Of the kinds of oligarchy. 199 6 For what cause there are many sorts of democraty& oligarchy. 200 7 The division of governments, according to Platoes opinion: and of the kinds of the aristocraty. 201 8 Of the government generally called a commonweal. 205 9 How the commonweal so called generally, is made of the democraty and oligarchy. 206 10 Of the Tyrannicall State, and the kinds thereof. 208 219 12 Of that which doth generally concern the preservation of Cities, and what manner of multitude is fit for a democraty or an Oligarchy. 221 13 Of the sleights and subtle devises by the rich against the poor, and by the poor against the rich, to purchase to themselves the government of the state, and how the lawgiver should take order for it. 223 14 That there are three parts of all commonweals, the counsel, the Magistrates, and judgements: and first of the authority of the counsel, and the manners thereof. 224 15 Of the ordinance and authority of Magistracies, and of their distinctions. 232  

The fift book.  1 Of the changes happening in public Estates. 241 2 From whence seditions spring, and of their causes. 255 3 A declaration of the causes of seditions. 260 4 The issue of the occasions whereby Gommonweales are changed. 268 5 Of the changes that happen in Democracies. 273 6 Of the changes happening in Oligarchies. 290 7 Of the changes happening in Aristocraties. 300 8 Of the particular preservation of states. 305 9 Of the qualities that are to be required in the chief gouernours of a state. 308 10 Of the changing, marring, and overturning of Monarchies. 310 11 Of the maintaining and upholding of Monarchies. 325 12 That of all States the oligarchy& Tyranny do least continue. 331  

The sixth book.  1 Of the properties and congruities of every commonweal, and of their ioinings and knittings together. 338 2 What the end and ground of the democraty is. 339 3 How right is to be observed in the democraty. 341 4 Which is the best kind of democraty. 342 5 An advertisement for the preserving of democracies. 344 6 How Oligarchies ought to be preserved. 346 7 Of the parts of the people that are meet for war, and how all kinds of Oligarchies ought to use them. 347 8 What offices are necessary for any estate, and what commodious and honourable. 348  

The seventh book.  1 Of the perfect commonweal, and the happy city. 351 2 Whether the felicity of one particular person, and of the city be all one, and which life is to be preferred, either that which is employed in action, or that which is spent in contemplation and study. 352 3 Whether felicity doth consist in the active or contemplative life. 354 4 Of the commodities requisite for the establishing of a good kind of government, and of an happy City, and of the greatness of a city. 355 5 Of the soil or province, which is the most commodious. 357 6 Whether the pensiveness of the sea be profitable or not. 358 7 Of what quality or nature the citizens ought to be: and a commendation of the Grecians. 359 8 What the true parts of a city be, and the necessary parts thereof. 362 9 Whether all the charges of a city are to be indifferently communicated to all persons, or whether some are peculiar, others common. 363 10 That the distributing of Cities by the kinds of the inhabitants, hath ben anciently used. 364 11 Of the situation of a city, and of four things. 369 12 Of temples, public or common houses and places to diet together in. 370 13 Of felicity, and the means to attain thereunto, and how men wax virtuous by three things. 371 14 Whether the governors and obeiers ought always to be all one and the selfsame persons, or changed by turns: and to what end the commonweal ought to be directed, that it is for peace and tranquillity, and not for wars and lordly dominion. 373 15 What virtues ought to be in a commonweal. 375 16 Of the time wherein men and women should be coupled in marriage, and of the procreation of children. 377 17 How children should be brought up. 378  

The eighth book.  1 That children should be publicly taught and instructed. 381 2 Wherein and how children should be instructed. 382 383 4 Of the faculty of exercise, and how children should be exercised. 385 5 Of music by way of disputation,& how children should learn it. 386 6 That music is to be learned by singing and playing on instruments, and what instruments should be used. 389 7 Of harmonies and rhymes, or numbers. 392  
FINIS.   

certain extraordinary escapes touching the sense, happening through the oft and thick enterlining of the copy.  
Pag. 208. line 31. outwardly, red, without. ibidem, line 32. wholly, red, not at all. pag. 271. line 1. but onely the good that is understood, red, but onely he that is skilful. pag. 352. line 15. and 16. the possessions and the body, red, possessions or the body. pag. 349. line 14. young men and keepers, red, such as are deputed to the guard and keeping of the city. pag. 355. line. 34. to be known, red to be accounted such as use action.  
The rest are both less material, and not very many.