A brief OF THE ART OF RHETORIQVE.  
Containing in substance all that ARISTOTLE hath written in his Three books of that subject,  
Except onely what is not applicable to the English Tongue.  
LONDON Printed by Tho. coats, for A 〈…〉 Crook, and are to be sold at the 〈◇〉 Bare in Pauls Church-y 〈…〉   

A brief OF THE ART OF RHETORIQVE.  

The first book.  

CHAP. I. That rhetoric is an Art consisting not onely in moving the passions of the judge; but chiefly in proofs. And that this Art is profitable.  
WEE see that all men naturally are able in some sort to accuse and excuse: some by chance; but some by method. This method may be discovered: and to discover method is all one with teaching an Art. If this Art consisted in Criminations only, and the skill to stir up the Iudges, to Anger, Envy, fear, Pitty, or other affections; a Rhetorician in well ordered Common-wealths and States, where it is forbidden to digress from the cause in hearing, could have nothing at all to say. For all these perversions of the judge are beside the question. And that which the pleader is to show, and the judge to give sentence on, is this onely: Tis so; or not so. The rest hath been decided already by the Law-maker; who judging of universals, and future things, could not be corrupted. Besides tis an absurd thing, for a man to make crooked the ruler he means to use.  
It consisteth therefore chiefly in proofs; which are Inferences: and all Inferences being syllogisms, a Logician, if he would observe the difference between a plain syllogism and an Enthymeme,( which is a rhetorical syllogism,) would make the best Rhetorician. For all syllogisms, and Inferences belong properly to logic; Whether they infer truth, or probability: & because without this Art it would often come to pass, that evil men by the advantage of natural abilities, would carry an evil cause against a good; it brings with it at least this profit, that making the pleaders even in skill, it 〈…〉 merit of the cause. Besides ordinarily those that are Iudges, are neither patient, nor capabl● of long Scientificall proofs, dr●●●e from the Principles through many syllogisms: and therefore had need to be instructed by the rhetorical, and shorter way. Lastly, it were ridiculous, to be ashamed of being vanquished in exercises of the body; and not to be ashamed of being inferior in the virtue of well expressing the mind.   

CHAP. 2. The Definition of rhetoric ●  
rhetoric, is that Faculty, by which wee understand what will serve our turn, concerning any subject, to win be 〈…〉  
Of those things that beget belief; some require not the help of Art; as Witnesses, Evidences, and the like, which wee invent not, but make use of; and some require Art, and are invented by us.  
The belief, that proceeds from our invention, comes partly from the behaviour of the spea, ker; partly from the passions of the hearer: but especially from the proofs of what we allege.  
proofs, are in rhetoric, either Examples, or Enthymemes; as in logic, Inductions, or syllogisms. For an Example is a short Induction, and an Enthymeme a short syllogism; out of which are left as superfluous, that which is supposed to b● necessary understood by the hearer; to avoid prolixity, and not to consume the time of public business needlessly.   

CHAP. 3. Of the several kinds of Orations: and of the Principles of rhetoric.  
IN all Orations, the Hearer does either hear onely; or judge also.  
If he hear onely, that's one kind of Oration, and is called Demonstrative.  
If he judge, he must judge either of that which is to come; or of that which is past.  
If of that which is to come, there's another kind of Oration, and is called Deliberative.  
If of that which is past; then 'tis a third kind of Oration, called judicial.  
So there are three kinds of Orations; Demonstrative, judicial, Deliberative.  
To which belong their proper times. To the Demonstrative, the Present. To the judicial, the Past, and to the Deliberative, the time to come.  
And their proper O●●●●s. To the Deliberative, Exhortation and Dehortation. To the judicial, Accusation and Defence. And to the Demonstrative, praising and dispraising.  
And their proper ends. To the Deliberative, to prove a thing Profitable, or unprofitable. To the judicial, just, or Vnjust. To the Demonstrative, Honourable, or Dishonourable.  
The Principles of rhetoric. out of which Enthymemes are to be drawn; are the common opinions that men have concerning Profitable, and unprofitable; just, and Vnjust, Honourable and Dishonourable; which are the points in the several kinds of Orations questionable. For as in logic, where certain and infallible knowledge is the scope of our proof, the Principles must be all infallible truths: so in rhetoric the Principles must be common opinions, such as the judge is already possessed with: because the end of rhetoric is victory; which consists in having gotten belief.  
And because nothing is Profitable, unprofitable, just, Vnjust, Honourable or Dishonourable, but what has been don●, or is to be done; and nothing is to be done, that is not possible: and because there be degrees of Profitable, unprofitable, just, Vnjust, Honourable, & Dishonourable; an Orator must be ready in other Principles; namely of what is done, & not done; possible & not possible, to come, and not to come: and what is Greater, & what is Lesser, both in general, and particularly applied to the thing in question; as what is more and less generally, and what is more profitable, and less profitable, &c. particularly.   

CHAP. 4. Of the subject of Deliberatives; and the abilities that are required of him, that will deliberate of business of State.  
IN Deliberatives there are to be considered the subject, wherein; and the ends, whereto the orator exhorteth, or from which he dehorteth.  
The Subject is always something in our own power, the knowledge whereof belongs not to rhetoric, but for the most part to the Politiques; and may be referred in a manner to these five heads.  

1. Of levying of money. To which point he that will speak as he ought to do, ought to know before hand the revenue of the state, how much it is, and wherein it consisteth: and also how great are the necessary charges and expenses of the same. This knowledge is gotten partly by a mans own experience, partly by Relations, and accounts in writing.  
2. Of Peace, and war. Concerning which the councillor or Deliberator, ought to know the strength of the Commonwealth; how much it both now is, and hereafter may be; and wherein that power consisteth. Which knowledge is gotten, partly by experience, and Relations at home, and partly by the sight of Warres, and of their events abroad.  
3. Of the safeguard of the Country. Wherein he onely is able to give council, that knows the forms, and number, and places of the Garrisons.  
4. Of Provision. Wherein to speak well, it is necessary for a man to know, what is sufficient to maintain the state; what Commodities they have at home growing; what they must fetch in through need; and what they may carry out through abundance.  
5. Of making laws. To which is necessary so much political, or Civill Philosophy, as to know what are the several kindes of Governements; and by what means, either from without or from within, each of those kinds is preserved, or destroyed. And this knowledge is gotten, partly by observing the several governments, in times past by History; and partly by observing the government of the times present, in several Nations by travel.   
So that to him that will speak in a Counsel of State, there is necessary this; History, Sight of Warres, travel, Knowledge of the revenue, expenses, forces, havens, garrisons, wears, and provisions in the State he lives in; and what is needful for that State, either to export, or import.   

CHAP. 5. Of the ends which the Orator in Deliberatives propoundeth, whereby to exhort, or dehort.  
A An Orator in exhorting always propundeth Felicity, or some part of Felicity to be attained by the actions he exhorteth unto: and in Dehortation the contrary.  
By Felicity, is meant commonly, Prosperity with virtue, or a continual content of the life with surety. And the parts of it are such things as wee call good, in body, mind, or fortune; such as these that follow.  

1. Nobility, which to a state or nation is, to have been ancient inhabitants; and to have had most anciently, and in most number, famous Generalls in the Warres, or men famous for such things as fall under emulation. And to a private man, to have been descended lawfully of a family, which hath yielded most anciently and in most number, men known to the world for virtue, riches, or any thing in general estimation.  
2. Many and good Children. Which is also public and private. public, when there is much youth in the state endued with virtue,( namely of the body, stature, beauty, strength, and dexterity: Of the mind, valour, and temperance) Private, when a man hath many such Children, both Male and Female. The virtues commonly respected in Women, are of the body, Beauty, and Stature; Of the mind Temperance and Houswiferie without sordidnesse.  
3. Riches. Which is, Money, cattle, Lands, Houshould-stuffe; with the power to dispose of them.  
4. Glory. Which is, the reputation of virtue, or of the possession of such things, as all, or most men, or wise men desire.  
5. Honour. Which is the glory of benefitting, or being able to benefit others. To benefit others, is to contribute somewhat, not easily had, to another mans safety, or riches. The parts of Honor are, Sacrifices, Monuments, Rewards, Dedication of places, Precedence, sepulchers, Statues, public Pensions, Adorations, Presents.  
6. Health. Which is the being free from Diseases, with strength to use the body.  
7. Beauty. Which is to different Ages different. To Youth, strength of Body, and sweetness of aspect. To full men, strength of body fit for the warres, and Countenance sweet, with a mixture of Terror. To old men, strength enough for necessary labours, with a Countenance not displeasing.  
8. Strength. Which is the ability to move any thing at pleasure of the mover. To move, is to pull, to put off, to lift, to thrust down, to press together.  
9. Stature. Which is then just, when a man in height, breadth, & thickness of body doth so exceed the most, ' as nevertheless it be no hindrance to the quickness of his motion.  
10. Good old Age. Which is, that which comes late, & with the least trouble.  
11. Many and good Friends. Which is, to have many that will do for his sake, that which they think will be for his good.  
12. Prosperity. Which is, to have all, or the most, or the greatest of those goods which we attribute to Fortune.  
13. virtue. Which is then to be defined, when we speak of Praise.   
These are the grounds from whence we exhort.  
Dehortation is from the contraries of these.   

CHAP. 6. Of the Colours, or common opinions concerning Good and evil.  
IN Deliberatives, the Principles, or Elements from whence we draw our proofs, are common Opinions concerning Good and evil. And these Principles are either Absolute, or Comparative. And those that are Absolute, are either Disputable, or Indisputable.  
The Indisputable Principles are such as these.  
Good, is That, which wee love for itself.  
And That● for which we love ●omewhat else.  
And That which all things desire.  
And That to every man which his reason dictates.  
And That, which when wee have, we are well, or satisfied.  
And That which satisfies.  
And the Cause or Effect of any of These.  
And That which preserves any of These.  
And That which keeps off, or destroys the contrary of any of These.  
Also to take the Good, and reject the evil, is Good.  
And to take the greater Good, rather then the less; and the lesser evil, rather then the greater.  
Further, all virtues are Good.  
And Pleasure.  
And all things beautiful.  
And Iustice, Valour, Temperance, Magnanimity, Magnificence; and other like habits.  
And Health, Beauty, Strength, &c.  
And ●ic●●●.  
And Friends.  
And Honour, and Glory.  
And Ability to say or do: also Towardlines, Will, and the like.  
And Whatsoever Art, or Science.  
And Life.  
And Whatsoever is just.  
The Disputable Principles are such as follow.  
That is Good whose contrary is evil.  
And whose contrary is good for our Enemies.  
And whose contrary our Enemies are glad of.  
And of which there cannot be too much.  
And upon which much labour and cost hath been bestowed.  
And That which many desire.  
And That which is praised.  
And That which even our Enem●es, and evil men praise.  
And What good men prefer.  
And What we do with advice.  
And That which is Possible, is Good,( to undertake.)  
And That which is easy.  
And That which depends on our own Will.  
And That which is proper for us to do.  
And What no man else can do.  
And Whatsoever is Extraordinary.  
And What is suitable.  
And That which wants a little of being at an end.  
And What we hope to master.  
And What we are fit for.  
And What evil men do not.  
And What we love to do.   

CHAP. 7. Of the Colours, or common Opinions concerning Good and evil comparatively.  
THe Colours of Good comparatively depend partly upon the following Definitions of Comparatives.  

1. More, is so much, and somewhat besides.  
2. less, is that, which and somewhat else, is so much.  
3. Greater and more in number are said onely Comparatively to less, and Fewer in number.  
4. Great and Little, Many and Few, are taken Comparatively to the Most of the same kind. So that Great and Many, is that which exceeds; Little and Few, is that which is exceeded by the Most of the same kind.   
Partly from the precedent Definitions of Good absolutely.  
Common Opinions concerning Good Comparatively then are These.  
Greater Good is many, then fewer, or one of those Many.  
And Greater is the kind, in which the greatest is greater then the greatest of another kind. And greater is that Good then another, whose kind is greater then another's kind.  
And Greater is that from which another Good follows, then the Good which follows.  
And of two which exceed a third, Greater is that which exceeds it most.  
And that which causes the greater Good.  
And that which proceeds from a greater Good.  
And Greater is that which is chosen for itself, then that which is chosen from somewhat else.  
And the end greater then that which is not the end.  
And That whichlesse needs other things, then that which more.  
And that which is independent, then that which is dependant of another.  
And the Beginning, then not the Beginning.  
[ Seeing the Beginning is a greater Good, or evil, then that which is not the Beginning; and the End, then that which is not the End; One may argue from this Colour both ways, as Leodamas against Chabrias, would have the Actor more to blame then the Advisor; and against Callistratus, the Advisor more then the Actor.]  
And the Cause then not the Cause.  
And That which hath a greater Beginning or Cause.  
And the Beginning, or Cause of a greater Good, or evil.  
And That which is scarce, greater then that which is plentiful; because harder to get.  
And That which is plentiful, then that which is Scarce; because oftener is use.  
And That which is Easy, then that which is Hard.  
And That whose Contrary is greater.  
And That whose Want is greater.  
And virtue then not virtue, a greater Good. 'vice, then not 'vice, a greater evil.  
And greater Good, or evil is That, the effects whereof are more honourable, or more shameful.  
And the effects of greater virtues, or Vices.  
And the excess whereof is more tolerable, a greater Good.  
And those things which may with more honor be desired.  
And the Desire of better things.  
And those things whereof the Knowledge is better.  
And the Knowledge of better things.  
And That which wise men prefer.  
And That which is in better men.  
And that which better men choose.  
And That which is more, then that which is less delightful.  
And That which is more, then that which is less honourable.  
And That which wee would have for ourselves and Friends, a greater Good; and the contrary a greater evil.  
And that which is Lasting, then that which is not Lasting.  
And That which is firm, then that which is not firm.  
And what many desire, then what few.  
And what the Adversary, or judge confesseth to be greater, is greater.  
And Common then not Common.  
And not Common then Common.  
And what is more Laudable.  
And That which is more honoured, a greater Good.  
And That which is more punished, a greater evil.  
And both Good and evil divided then undivided, appear greater.  
And Compounded, then simplo appear greater.  
And That which is done with Opportunity, Age, Place, Time, means disadvantageous, greater then otherwise.  
And That which is natural, then that which is attained unto.  
And the same part of that which is great, then of that which is less.  
And That which is nearest to the end designed.  
And That which is Good or evil to ones self, then that which is simply so.  
And Possible, then not Possible.  
And That which comes towards the end of our Life.  
And That which wee do really, then that which we do for show.  
And That which wee would be, rather then what we would seem to be.  
And That which is good for more purposes, is the greater Good.  
And That which serves us in greater necessity.  
And That which is joined with less trouble.  
And That which is joined with more delight.  
And Of the two, that which added to a third makes the whole the greater.  
And That which having wee are more sensible of.  
And in every thing, That which we most esteem.   

CHAP. 8. Of the several kinds of Governments.  
BEcause Hortation and Dehortation concern the Common-wealth, and are drawn from the Elements of Good and evil; as wee have spoken of them already in the Abstract, so we must speak of them also in the concrete; that is, of what is Good, or evil to each sort of Common-wealth in special.  
The Government of a Commonwealth, is either Democracy, or Aristocracy, or Oligarchy or Monarchy.  
Democracy is that, wherein all men with equal right, are preferred to the highest Magistracy by Lot.  
Aristocracy is that, wherein the highest Magistrate is chosen out of those, that had the best education, according to what the laws prescribe for best.  
Oligarchy, is that, where the highest Magistrate is chosen for wealth.  
Monarchy is that, wherein one man hath the government of all; which Government, if he limit it by Law, is called kingdom; if by his own will, tyranny.  
The end of Democracy, or the Peoples government, is Liberty.  
The end of Oligarchy, is the riches of those that govern.  
The end of Aristocracy, is good laws, and good ordering of the City.  
The end of Monarchy, or Kings, is the safety of the People, and conservation of his own authority.  
Good therefore, in each sort of Government is that which conduceth to these their ends.  
And because belief is not gotten onely by proofs; but also from manners; the manners of each sort of Common-wealth ought to be well understood by him that undertaketh to persuade, or dissuade in matter of State. Their manners may be known by their designs; and their designs by their ends; and their ends by what wee see them take pleasure in. But of this more accurately in the Politiques.   

CHAP. 9. Of the Colours of Honourable and Dishonourable.  
IN a Demonstrative Oration, the subject whereof is Praise, or Dispraise; the proofs are to be drawn from the Elements of Honourable, and dishonourable.  
In this place we anticipate the second way of getting belief; which is from the manners of the Speaker. For Praise, whether it come in as the principal business, or upon the by, depends still upon the same Principles. Which are these.  
honourable, is that, which wee love for itself, and is withall laudable.  
And that Good, which pleaseth us onely because 'tis Good.  
And virtue.  
virtue is the faculty of getting and preserving that which is Good; and the faculy of doing many, and great things well.  
The kindes of it are these.  

1. Iustice; which is a virtue, whereby every man obtains what by the Law is his.  
2. Fortitude; which is a virtue by which a man carries himself honourably, and according to the laws, in time of danger.  
3. Temperance; which is a virtue, whereby a man governs himself in matter of pleasure according to the Law.  
4. Liberality; which is a virtue, by which we benefit others in matter of money.  
5. Magnanimity; which is a virtue, by which a man is apt to do great benefits.  
6. Magnificence; which is a virtue, by which a man is apt to be at great cost.  
7. Prudence; which is an intellectual virtue, by which a man is able, to deliberate well concerning any Good leading to Felicity.   
And honourable, are the Causes, and Effects of things honourable.  
And the works of virtue.  
And the signs of virtue.  
And those actions, the reward whereof is Honor.  
And the reward whereof is rather Honor, than Money.  
And that which we do not for our own sakes.  
And what wee do for our Countries good, neglecting our own.  
And those things are honourable, which good of themselves, are not so to the Owner.  
And those things which happen to the dead, rather then to the living.  
And what wee do for other men, especially for Benefactors.  
And bestowing of Benefits.  
And the contrary of those things we are ashamed of.  
And those things which men strive for earnestly, but without fear of Adversary.  
And of the more honourable, and better men, the V●rtues are more honourable.  
And more honourable are the virtues that tend to other mens benefit, then those which tend to ones own.  
And honourable are those things which are just.  
And Revenge is honourable.  
And Victory.  
And Honor.  
And Monuments.  
And those things which happen not to the living  
And things that excel.  
And what none but we.  
And Possessions we reap no profit by.  
And those things which are had in honor particularly in several places.  
And the signs of praise.  
And to have nothing of the servile, mercenary, or Mechanicke.  
And that which seems honourable; Namely such as follow.  
Vices confining upon virtue.  
And the extremes of virtues.  
And what the Auditors think honourable.  
And that which is in estimation.  
And that which is done according to custom.  
Besides, in a Demonstrative Oration, the Orator must show, that he whom he praiseth, did what he praiseth unconstrainedly, and willingly.  
And he does so, who does the same often.  
praise, is speech, declaring the magnitude of a virtue, Action, or work.  
But to praise the work from the virtue of the Worker, is a circular proof.  
To magnify, and to Praise, differ in themselves, as Felicity, and virtue. For praise declares a mans virtue; and Magnifying declares his Felicity.  
praise, is a kind of inverted Precept. For to say, do it because 'tis Good, is a Precept. But to say he is Good because he did it, is praise.  
An Orator in praising must also use the forms of Amplification; such as these.  
He was the first that did it.  
The onely man that did it.  
The special man that did it.  
He did it with disadvantage of Time.  
He did it with little help.  
He was the cause, that the Law ordained Rewards and Honours for such Actions.  
Further, he that will praise a Man, must compare him with others; and his actions with the actions of others; especially with such as are renowned.  
And Amplification is more proper to a Demonstrative Oration, then to any other. For here the Actions are confessed; and the Orators part is onely this, to contribute unto them Magnitude and L●ster.   

CHAP. 10. Of Accusation and Defence, with the Definition of Injury.  
IN a judicial Oration, which consists in Accusation and Defence, the thing to be proved is, that Injury has been done: and the heads from whence the proofs are to be drawn, are these three.  

1. The causes that move to Injury.  
2. The Persons apt to do Injury.  
3. The Persons obnoxious, or apt to suffer Injury.   
An Injury is a voluntary offending of another man contrary to the Law.  
Voluntary is that which a man does with knowledge; and without compulsion.  
The causes of Voluntary Actions are Intemperance, and a Vicious disposition concerning things Disirable. As the Covetous man does against the Law out of an intemperate desire of Money.  
All Actions proceed either from the Doers disposition, or not.  
Those that proceed not from the Doers disposition are such as he does by Chance, by Compulsion, or by natural necessity.  
Those that proceed from the Doers disposition are such as he does by custom, or upon Premeditation, or in Anger, or out of Intemperance.  
By Chance are said to bee done those things, whereof neither the Cause, nor the Scope, is evident, and which are done neither Orderly; nor always, nor most commonly after the same manner.  
By Nature are said to be done those things, the Causes whereof are in the Doer; and are done orderly; and always, or for the most part after the same manner.  
By Compulsion are done those things, which are against the Appetite, and Ordination of the Doer.  
By custom those Actions are said to be done the Cause whereof is this, that the Doer has done them often.  
Vpon Premeditation are said to be done those things which are done for profit, as the End, or the way to the End.  
In Anger are said to be done those things which are done with a purpose of Revenge.  
Out of Intemperance are said to be done those things which are delightful.  
In sum, every Voluntary Action tends either to Profit, or Pleasure.  
The Colours of Profitable are already set down.  
The Colours of that which is Pleasing follow next.   

CHAP. 11. Of the Colours, or Common Opinions concerning Pleasure.  
PLeasure is a sudden and sensible motion of the soul, towards that which is natural.  
grief is the Contrary.  
Pleasant therefore is that, which is the cause of such motion.  
And to return to ones own Nature.  
And customs.  
And those things that are not violent.  
unpleasant are those things, which proceed from Necessity, as Cares, Study, Contentions. The contrary whereof, Ease, Remission from Labour & Care: also Play, Rest, sleep, are Pleasant.  
Pleasant also is that, to which we have an appetite.  
Also the Appetites themselves if they bee sensual, as Thirst, Hunger, and Lust.  
Also those things to which we have an appetite upon persuasion and Reason.  
And those things we remem●er, whether they pleased, or displeased, then, when they were present.  
And the things we hope for.  
And Anger.  
And to be in Love.  
And Revenge.  
And Victory. Therefore  
Also Contentious Games; as Tables, chess, Dice, Tennis, &c.  
And Hunting.  
And suits in Law.  
And Honor and Reputation amongst men in Honor and Reputation.  
And to Love.  
And to bee beloved and Respected.  
And to be admired.  
And to be flattered.  
And a Flatterer:( for he ●eemes both to love and Admire.)  
And the same thing Often.  
And Change, or Variety.  
And What wee return to afresh.  
And to learn.  
And to Admire.  
And to do Good.  
And to receive Good.  
And to help up again one that's fallen.  
And to finish that which is unperfect.  
And Imitation.  
And Therefore the Art of Painting.  
And the Art of Carving Images.  
And the Art of Poetry.  
And Pictures and Statues.  
And other mens Dangers, so they be near.  
And to have escaped hardly.  
And things of a kind please one another.  
And every one himself.  
And ones own pleases him.  
And to bear Sway.  
And to be thought Wise.  
And to dwell upon that which he is good at.  
And ridiculous Actions, Sayings and Persons.   

CHAP. 12. Presumptions of Injury drawn from the persons that do it: or Common opinions concerning the aptitude of Persons to do Injury.  
OF the causes which move to Injury, namely Profit and Pleasure, has been already spoken Chap. 6.7.11.  
It follows next to speak of the Persons, that are apt to do Injury.  
The doers of Injury are.  
Such as think they can do it.  
And such as think to be undiscovered when they have done it.  
And such as think though they bee discovered, they shall not be called in question for it.  
And such as think though they be called in question for it, that their Mulct will bee less then the gain, which either themselves or their friends receive by the Injury.  
Able to do Injury are 

Such as are Eloquent.  
And such as are practised in business.  
And such as have skill in process.  
And such as have many Friends.  
And Rich men.  
And such as have Rich friends; or Rich servants; or Rich Partners.    
Vndiscover'd when they have it, are.  

Such as are not apt to commit the Crimes whereof they are accused: as Feeble men, Slaughter: poor and not beautiful men, Adultery.  
And such as one would think could not choose but be discovered.  
And such as do Injuries, whereof there hath been no Example.  
And such as have none, or many enemies.  
And such as can easily conceal what they do.  
And such as have some body to transfer the fault upon.   
They that do Injury openly are, 

Such, whose friends have been injured.  
And such as have the Iudges for friends.  
And such as can escape their trial at Law.  
And such as can put off their trial.  
And such as can corrupt the Iudges.  
And such as can avoid the payment of their fine:  
And such as can defer the payment.  
And such as cannot pay at all.  
And such as by the Injury get manifestly, much, and presently; when the fine is uncertain, little, and to come.  
And such as get by the injury, money; by the penalty, shane onely.  
And such on the contrary as get honor by the injury, and suffer the mulct of money onely, or banishment, or the like.  
And such as have often escaped, or been undiscovered.  
And such as have often attempted in vain.  
And such as consider present pleasure, more than pain to come; and so intemperate men are apt to do injury.  
And such as consider pleasure to come, more then present pain: and so Temperate men are apt to do Injury.  
And such as may seem to have done it by Fortune, Nature, Necessity, or custom; and by error rather then by Injustice.  
And such as have means to get pardon.  
And such as want Necessaries, as poor men: or Vnnecessaries, as Rich men.  
And such as are of very good, or very bad Reputation.     

CHAP. 13. Presumptions of Injury drawn from the Persons that suffer, and from the matter of the Injury.  
OF those that do Injury, and why they do it, it has been already spoken.  
Now of the Persons that suffer, and of the Matter wherein they suffer, the common Opinions are these.  
Persons obnoxious to Injury are, 

Such as have the things that we want, either as necessary, or as delightful.  
And such as are far from us.  
And such as are at hand.  
And such as are unwary, and Credulous.  
And such as are Lazy.  
And such as are Modest.  
And such as have swallowed many Injuries.  
And such as wee have injured often before.  
And such as never before.  
And such as are in our danger.  
And such as are ill beloved generally.  
And such as are envied.  
And our Friends.  
And our Enemies.  
And such as wanting friends, have no great ability either in speech, or action.  
And such as shall be losers by going to Law; as Strangers, and workmen.  
And such as have done the Injuries they suffer.  
And such as have committed a crime, or would have done, or are about to do.  
And such as by doing them an injury we shal gratify our friends or superiors.  
And such, whose friendship we have newly left, and accuse.  
And such as another would do the Injury to, if we should not.  
And such as by injuring, wee get greater means of doing good.    
The Matters, wherein men are obnoxious to Injury are, 

Those things wherein all, or most men use to deal unjustly.  
And those things which are easily hide, and put off into other hands, or altered.  
And those things which a man is ashamed to have suffered.  
And those things wherein prosequution of injury, may bee thought a love of contention.     

CHAP. 14. Of those things which are necessary to be known for the Definition of just and Vnjust.  
WHen the fact is evident, the next inquiry is whether it be just, or Vnjust.  
For the Definition of just and vnjust, we must know what Law is; that is, what the Law of Nature, what the Law of Nations, what the Law Civill, what written Law, and what unwritten Law is; and what Persons; that is, what a public Person, or the City is; and what a private Person, or Citizen is.  
Vnjust in the opinion of all men, is that which is contrary to the Law of Nature.  
Vnjust in the opinion of all men of those Nations which traffic and come together, is that which is contrary to the Law common to those Nations.  
Vnjust onely in one Common-wealth, is that which is contrary to the Law Civill, or Law of that Common-wealth.  
He that is accused to have done any thing against the public, or a private Person, is accused to do it either ignorantly, or unwillingly, or in anger, or upon premeditation.  
And because the defendant does many times confess the fact, but deny the unjustice; as that he took, but did not steal; and did, but not adultery, it is necessary to know the Definitions of Theft, Adultery, and all other crimes.  
What facts are contrary to the written laws, may be known by the laws themselves.  
Besides written laws, whatsoever is just, proceeds from Equity, or goodness.  
From goodness proceeds that, which we are praised, or honoured for.  
From Equity proceed those actions, which though the written Law command not, yet being interpnted reasonably, and supplied, seems to require at our hands.  
Actions of Equity are such as these.  

Not too rigorously to punish Errors, Mischances, or Injuries.  
To pardon the faults that adhere to mankind.  
And not to consider the Law so much, as the Law-makers mind; and not the Words so much as the meaning of the Law.  
And not to regard so much the Fact, as the intention of the Doer; nor part of the Fact, but the Whole; nor what the Doer is, but what he has been always, or for the most part.  
And to remember better the Good received, then the Ill.  
And to endure injuries patiently.  
And to submit rather to the sentence of a judge then of the sword.  
And to the sentence of an Arbitrator, rather then of a judge.    

CHAP. 15. Of the Colours, or Common Opinions concerning Injuries, comparatively.  
COmmon Opinions concerning Injuries comparatively, are such as these.  
Greater is the Injury which proceeds from greater Iniquity.  
And from which proceedeth greater damage.  
And of which there is no revenge.  
And for which there is no remedy.  
And by occasion of which, he that hath received the Injury, hath done some mischief to himself.  
he does the greater Injury, that does it first, or alone, or with few.  
And he that does it often.  
Greater Injury is that, against which laws and Penalties were first made.  
And that which is more brutall, or more approaching to the actions of beasts.  
And that which is done upon more premeditation.  
And by which more laws are broken.  
And which is done in the place of execution.  
And which is of greatest shane to him that receives the Injury.  
And which is committed against well-deservers.  
And which is committed against the unwritten Law, because good men should observe the Law for Iustice, and not for fear of punishment.  
And which is committed against the written Law, because he that will do Injury neglecting the penalty set down in the written Law, is much more likely to transgress the unwritten Law, where there is no penalty at all.   

CHAP. 16. Of proofs Inartificiall.  
OF artificial proofs wee have already spoken.  
Inartificiall proofs, which we invent not; but make use of, are of five sorts.  

1. laws. And those are Civill, or written Law: the Law, or custom of Nations: and the universal Law of Nature.  
2. Witnesses. And those are such as concern Matter; and such as concern Manners. Also, they be ancient, or present.  
3. Evidences, or Writings.  
4. Question, or Torture.  
5. oaths. And those bee either given; or taken; or both; or neither.   
For laws, we use them thus.  

When the written Law makes against us, we appeal to the Law of Nature, alleging, 

That to bee greatest Iustice, which is greatest Equity.  
That the Law of Nature is immutable; the written Law mutable.  
That the written Law is but seeming Iustice; the Law of Nature very Iustice. And Iustice is among those things which are, and not which seem to be.  
That the judge ought to discern between true and adulterate Iustice.  
That they are better men that obey unwritten, then written laws.  
That the Law against us does contradict some other Law. And when the Law has a double interpretation, that that is the true one, which makes for us.  
And that the cause of the Law being abolished, the Law is no more of Validity.    
But when the written Law makes for us, and Equity for the Adversary, we must allege 

That a Man may use Equity, not as a liberty to judge against the Law; but onely as a security against being forsworn, when he knows not the Law.  
That men seek not Equity because tis good simply, but because good for them.  
That it is the same thing not to make, and not to use the Law.  
That as in other Arts, and namely in physic Fallacies are pernicious; so in a Common-wealth t'is pernicious to use pretexts against the Law.  
And that in Common-wealths well instituted, to seem wiser then the laws, is prohibited.     
For Witnesses, wee must use them thus.  

When we have them not, wee must stand for Presumptions, and say 

That in Equity sentence ought to bee given according to the most probability.  
That Presumptions, are the testimony of the things themselves, and cannot be bribed.  
That they cannot lye.    
When wee have witnesses, against him that has them not wee must say 

That Presumptions, if they be false, cannot be pun●shed.  
That if Presumptions were enough, witnesses were superfluous.     
For writings, when they favour us we must say, 

That writings are private and particular laws; and he that takes away the use of Evidences abolisheth the Law.  
That since Contracts and Negotiations pass by writings, he that bars their use, dissolves human Society.  
Against them, if they favour the Adversary we may say, 

That since laws do not bind that are fraudulently made to pass, much less writings.  
And that the judge being to dispense iustice, ought rather to consider what is just, then what is in the Writing.  
That Writings may be gotten by fraud or force; but Iustice by neither.  
Th●t the Writing is repugnant to some Law, Civill, or natural; or to ●ustice; or to Honesty.  
That 'tis repugnant to some other writing before, or after.  
That it crosses some commodity of the judge( which must not be said directly, but implied cunningly.)      
For the Torture, if the giving of it make for us, we must say, 

That 'tis the onely testimony that is certain.  
But if it make for the adversary, we may say, 

That men enforced by Torture speak as well that which is false, as that which is true.  
That they who can endure, conceal the truth; and they who cannot, say that which is false to be delivered from pain.      
For oaths; he that will not put his Adversary to his Oath, may allege, 

That he makes no scruple to be forsworn.  
That by swearing he will carry the cause, which not swearing he must lose.  
That he had rather trust his cause in the hand of the judge, then of the Adversary.  
He that refus●th to take the Oath, may say. 

That the matter is not worth so much.  
That if he had been an evil man, he had sworn, and carried his cause.  
That to try it by swearing for a Religious man against an irreligious, is as hard a match, as to set a weak man against a strong in Combat.    
He that is willing to take the Oath may pretend 

That he had rather trust himself, than his adversary; and that 'tis equal dealing for an irreligious man to give, and for a religious man to take the Oath.  
That 'tis his duty to take the Oath, since he has required to have sworn Iudges.    
he that offers the Oath may pretend 

That he does piously to commit his cause to the Gods.  
That he makes his Adversary himself judge.  
That 'twere absurd for him not to swear, that has required the Iudges to be sworn.  
And of these are to be compounded the forms wee are to use, when wee would give, and not take the Oath; or take, and not give; or both give, and take; or neither give, nor take.    
But if one have sworn contrary to a former Oath, he may pretend. 

That he was forced.  
That he was deceived, and that neither of these is Perjury, since Perjury is voluntary.    
But if the Adversary do so, he may say 

That he that stands not to what he hath sworn, subverteth human society.  
And( turning to the judge) what reason have we to require, that you should be sworn, that judge our cause● when wee will not stand to that wee swear ourselves  
And so much for proofs inartificiall.        

The second book.  

CHAP. I. The Introduction.  
OF belief proceeding from our Invention, that part which consisteth in proof, is already spoken of.  
The other two parts follow: whereof one ariseth from the manners of the speaker; the other from the passions of the Hearer.  
The Principles, Colours, or Common Opinions, upon which a mans belief is grounded concerning the manners of him that speaks, are to bee had partly out of that which hath been said before concerning virtue, book 1. Chap. 9. partly out of those things which shall be said by and by concerning the Passions. For a man is believed either for his Prudence, or for his Probity, which are virtues; or for good will: of which among the Passions.  
The Principles concerning belief, arising from the passion of the Hearer, are to bee gathered from that which shall now bee said of the several Passions in order.  
In every one of which three things are to be considered.  

1. First, how men are affencted.  
2. Secondly, Towards whom.  
3. Thirdly, For what.    

CHAP. 2. Of Anger.  
ANger is desire of revenge, joined with grief fo● that He, or some of his, is, or seems to be neglected.  
The object of Anger is always some particular, or individual thing.  
In Anger there is also pleasure proceeding from the imagina●ion of revenge to come.  
To Neglect, is to esteem little, or nothing: and is of three kinds.  

1. Contempt.  
2. Crossing.  
3. Contumely.   
Contempt, is when a man thinks another of little worth in comparison to himself.  
Crossing, is the hindrance of anothers mans will without design to profit himself.  
Contumely, is the disgracing of another for his own pastime.  
The common Opinions concerning Anger are therefore such as follow.  

They are easily Angry that think they are neglected.  
That think they excel others; as the Rich with the poor, the Noble with the Obscure, &c.  
And such as think they deserve well.  
And such as grieve to be hindered, opposed, or not assisted. And therefore sick men, poor men, Lovers, and generally all that desire, and attain not, are Angry with those that standing by, are not moved with their wants.  
And such as having expected good, find evil.  
Those that men are Angry with, are 

Such as mock, deride, or jest at them.  
And such as show any kind of Contumely towards them.  
And such as despise those things which we spend most labour and study upon: and the more, by how much wee seem the less advanced therein.  
And our friends, rather then those that are not our friends.  
And such as have honoured us, if they continue not.  
And such as requited not our courtesy.  
And such as follow contrary courses, if they be our inferiors.  
And our friends, if they have said, or done us evil, or not good.  
And such as give not ear to our entreaty.  
And such as are joyful, or calm in our distress.  
And such as troubling us, are not themselves troubled.  
And such as willingly hear or see our disgraces.  
And such as neglect us in the presence of our Competitors; of those we admire, of those wee would have admire us; of those we reverence, and of those that reverence us.  
And such as should help us, and neglect it.  
And such as are in jest, when we are in earnest.  
And such as forget us, or our Names.  
An Orator therefore must so frame his, judge or Auditor, by his Oration; as to make him apt to Anger: and then make his Adversary appear such, as men use to be Angry with all.      

CHAP. 3. Of Reconciling, or Pacifying Anger.  
REconciliation is the Appeasing of Anger.  
Those, to whom men are easily reconciled, are 

Such, as have not offended out of Neglect.  
And such as have done it against their will.  
And such as wish done the contrary of what they have done.  
And such as have done as much to themselves.  
And such as confess and repent.  
And such as are humbled.  
And such as do seriously the same things, that they do seriously.  
And such as have done them more good heretofore, then now hurt.  
And such as sue to them for any thing.  
And such as are not insolent, nor mockers, nor slighters of others in their own disposition.  
And generally such as are of a contrary disposition to those, whom men are usually angry withall.  
And such as they fear, or reverence.  
And such as reverence them.  
And such as have offended in their Anger.    
Reconcilable are, 

Such as are contrarily affencted to those whom we have said before to be easily Angry.  
And such as play, laugh, make merry, prosper, live in plenty, and in sum, all that have no cause of grief.  
And such as have given their anger time.    
Men lay down their Anger for these causes.  

Because they have been revenged of another.  
Because they have gotten the Victory.  
Because the Offender has suffered more, then they meant to inflict.  
because they think they suffer justly.  
And because they think the revenge will not be felt, or not known, that the revenge was theirs, and for such an injury.  
And because the Offender is dead.  
Who●oever therefore would assuage the Anger of his Auditor, must make himself appear such, as men use to be reconciled unto: and beget in his Auditor such opinions, as make him reconcilable.    

CHAP. 4. Of Love, and Friends.  
TO Love, is to will well to another, for that others, not for ones own sake.  
A Friend is he that loves, and he that is beloved.  
Friends one to another, are they that mutually lo●e ●●e another.  
A Friend therefore is he, 

That rejoiceth at ●●●●hers Good.  
And that grieves at his h●●t.  
And that wishes the same with ●s to a third, whether good, or hurt.  
And that is ene●y or friend to the same man.    
We love them, 

That have done good to us, or ours, especially if much, readily, or in season.  
That are our Friends Friends.  
That are our Enemies Enemies.  
That are liberal.  
That are Valiant.  
That are just.  
And that we would have love us.  
And good Companions.  
And such as can abide jests.  
And such as break jests.  
And such as praise us, especially for somewhat that we doubt of in ourselves.  
And such as are neat.  
And such as upbraid us not with our vices, or with their own benefits.  
And such as quickly forget injuries.  
And such as least observe our errors.  
And such as are not of ill tongue.  
And those that are ignorant of our Vices.  
And such as cross us not when we are busy, or angry.  
And such as are officious towards us.  
And those that are like us.  
And such as follow the same course or trade of life, where they impeach not one another.  
And such as labour for the same thing, when both may be satisfied.  
And such as are not ashamed to tell us freely their faults, so it be not in contempt of us, and the faults such, as the world, rather then their own consciences condemns.  
And such as are ashamed to tell us of their very faults.  
And such as wee would have honour us, and not envy, but imitate us.  
And such as wee would do good to, except with greater hurt to ourselves.  
And such as continue their friendship to the dead.  
And such as speak their mind.  
And such as are not terrible.  
And such as we may rely on.    
The several kinds of friendship, are Society, Familiarity, Consanguinity, Affinity, &c.  
The things that beget love are, 

The bestowing of Benefits. Gratis.  
The bestowing of Benefits. Vnasked.  
The bestowing of Benefits. Privately.     

CHAP. 5. Of Enmity and Hatred.  
THE Colours, or Common Opinions concerning Hatred are to be taken from the contrary of those, which concern Love and Friendship.  
Hatred differs from Anger  
In this, that Anger regards onely what is done to ones self; but Hatred not.  
And in this, that Anger regards particulars onely; the other universalls also.  
And in this, that Anger is curable, Hatred not.  
And in this, that Anger seeks the vexation, Hatred the damage of ones Adversary.  
That with Anger there is always joined grief; with Hatred not always.  
That Anger may at length be satiated, but Hatred never.  
Hence it appears how the judge, or Auditor may be made Friend, or Enemy to us; and how our Adversary may be made appear Friend or Enemy to the judge; and how we may answer to our Adversary, that would make us appear Enemies to him.   

CHAP. 6. Of fear.  
fear is a trouble, or vexation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of an evil at hand, which may hurt or destroy.  
Danger is the pensiveness of the evil feared.  
The things to be Feared are 

Such as have power to hurt.  
And the signs of will to doe● us hurt, as Anger and Hatred of powerful men.  
And Injustice joined with power.  
And Valour provoked, joined with power.  
And the fear of powerful men.    
The men that are to be feared are, 

Such as know our faults.  
And such as can do us injury.  
And such as think they are injured by us.  
And such as have done us injury.  
And our Competitors in such things as cannot satisfy both.  
And such as are feared by more powerful men then we are.  
And such as have destroyed greater men then we are.  
And such as use to invade their inferiors.    
And men not passionate, but dissemblers and crafty are more to be feared then those that are hasty and free.  
The things especially to be feared are 

Such, wherein if wee err, the error can not be repaired; at least not according to ours, but our Adversaries pleasure.  
And such as admit either none, or not easy help.  
And such as being done, or about to be done to others, make us pitty them.    
They that fear not are, 

Such as expect not evil; or not now; or not this; or not from these.  
And therefore men fear little in prosperity.  
And men fear little that think they have suffered already.    
An Orator therefore that would put fear in to the Auditor, must let him see that he is ob●oxious; and that greater than he do suffer, and have suffered from those, and at those times they least thought.   

CHAP. 7. Of Assurance.  
ASsurance is hope, arising from an imagination that the help is near, or the evil a far off.  
The things therefore that beget Assurance are, 

The remoteness of those things that are to be feared, and the pensiveness of their contraries.  
And the facility of great, or many helps or remedies.  
And neither to have done; nor received Injury.  
And to have no Competitors, or not great ones; or if great ones, at least friends; such as we have obliged, or are obliged to.  
And that the danger is extended to more, or greater than us.    
Assured, or Confident are 

They that have oft escaped danger.  
And they to whom most things have succeeded well.  
And they that see their equals, or inferiors not afraid.  
And they that have wherewith to make themselves feared, as wealth, strength, &c.  
And such as have done others no wrong.  
And such as think themselves in good terms with God-Almighty.  
And such as think they will speed well, that are gone before.     

CHAP. 8. Of shane.  
shane is a perturbation of the mind arising from the apprehension of evil, past, present, or to come, to the prejudice of a Mans own, or his friends reputation.  
The things therefore which men are ashamed of are those Actions which proceed from 'vice, as 

To throw away ones arms; to run away, signs of cowardliness.  
To deny that which is committed to ones trust, a sign of Injustice.  
To have lain with whom, where, and when we ought not, signs of Intemperance.  
To make gain of small and base things; not to help with money whom, and how much we ought; to receive help from meaner men; to ask money at use from such as one thinks will borrow of him; to borrow of him that expects payment of somewhat before lent; and to redemand what one has lent, of him that one thinks will borrow more; and so to praise, as one may bee thought to ask, signs of wretchedness.  
To praise one to his face; to praise his virtues too much, and colour his vices; signs of Flattery.  
To be unable to endure such labours, as men endure, that are elder, tenderer, greater in quality, and of less strength then he, signs of Effeminacy.  
To be beholden often to another; and to upbraid those that are beholden to him, signs of Pusillanimity.  
To speak and promise much of ones self; and to assume ●o ones sel●e more then his due, signs of Arrogance.  
To want tho●e things which ones equals, all, or most of them have attained to, is also a thing to be ashamed of.  
And to su●fer things ignominious, as to serve about anothers person; or to be employed in his base actions.    
In Actions of In●●mperance, whether willingly, or unwillingly committed, there is shane: in Actions of Force; onely when they are done unwillingly.  
The men before whom we are ashamed, are such as wee respect, namely, 

Those that admire us.  
And those whom wee desire should admire us.  
And those whom we admire.  
Those that contend with ●s for honour.  
Those whose opinion we contemn not.    
And therefore men are most ashamed in the pre●ence 

Of Old and well bread men.  
Of those wee are always to live with.  
Of those that ●●e not guilty of the same fault.  
Of th●se that do not easily pardon.  
And of those that are apt to reveal our faults● such as are ●●n injured, Ba●●biters, Scoff●rs, comic Poets.  
And of those before whom we have had always good success.  
And of those who never asked any thing of us before  
And of such as desire our Friendship.  
And of our familiars, that know none of our Crimes.  
And of such as will reveal our faults to any of those that are name before.    
But in the presence of such, whose judgement most men despise, men are not ashamed.  
Therefore we are ashamed also in the presence 

Of those whom we reverence,  
And of those who are concerned in our own, or Ancestors, or kinsfolks actions or misfortunes, if they be shameful.  
And of their rivals.  
And of those that are to live with them that know their disgrace.    
The Common Opinions concerning Impudence are taken from the contrary of these.   

CHAP. 9. Of Grace, or Favour.  
GRace, is that virtue, by which a man is said to do a good turn, or do service to a man in need; not for his own, but for his cause to whom he does it.  
Great Grace is when the need is great; or when they are hard, or difficult things that are conferr'd● or when the time is seasonable, or when he that conferr's the favour is the onely, or first man that did it.  
need, is a desire joined with grief for the absence of the thing desired.  
Grace therefore it is not, if it be not done to one that needs.  
Whosoever therefore would prove that he has done a Grace, or Favour, must show that he needed it to whom it was done.  
Grace it is not  
Which is done by Chance  
Nor which is done by Necessity.  
Nor which has been requi●ed.  
Nor that which is done to ones Enemy.  
Nor that which is a trifle.  
Nor that which is nought, if the Giver know the fault.  
And in this manner a man may go over the Praedicaments, and examine a benefit, whether it be a Grace for being This, or for being so Much, or for being Such, or for being Now, &c.   

CHAP. 10. Of Pitty, or Compassion.  
PItty is a perturbation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of ●urt, or trouble to another that doth not deserve it, and which he thinks may happen to himself or his.  
And because it appertains to Pitty to think that he, or his may fall into the mi●ery he pities in others, it follows that they be most compassionate  
Who have passed through Misery.  
And old Men.  
And weak men.  
And Timorous men.  
And learned men.  
And such as have Parents, wife and children.  
And such as think there bee honest men.  
And that they are less Compassionate  
Who are in great despair.  
Who are in great prosperity.  
And they that are Angry, for they consider not.  
And they that are very Confident; for they also consider not.  
And they that are in the Act of contumely; for neither do these consider.  
And they that are astonished with fear.  
And they that think no man honest.  
The things to be pitied are 

Such as grieve, and withall hurt.  
Such as destroy.  
And Calamities of fortune, if they be great; as none, or few friends, deformity, weakness, lameness, &c.  
And evil that arrives where good is expected.  
And after extreme evil, a little Good.  
And through a mans life to have no good offer itself, or being offered, not to have been able to enjoy it.    
Men to be pitied are 

Such as are known to us, unless they be so near to us, as their hurt be our own.  
And such as be of our own yeares.  
Such as are like us in manners.  
Such as are of the same, or like stock.    
And our equals in dignity.  
Those that have lately suffered, or are shortly to suffer injury: and those that have the marks of injury past.  
And those that have the words or actions of them that be in present misery.   

CHAP. II. Of Indignation.  
OPposite in a manner to Pitty in good men, is Indignation, which is grief for the prosperity of a man unworthy.  
With Indignation there is always joined a joy for the prosperity of a man worthy, as Pitty is always with contentment in the adversity of them, that deserve it.  
In wicked men the opposite of Pitty is  
Envy; as also the companion thereof, delight in the harm of others, which the Greekes in one word have called 〈◇〉. But of these in the next Chapter.  
Men conceive Indignation against others, not for their virtues, as Iustice, &c. For these make men worthy; and in Indignation wee think men unworthy.  
But for those goods which men endued with virtue, and noble men, and handsome men are worthy of.  
And for newly gotten power & riches, rather than for ancient, and especially if by these he has gotten other goods, as by Riches, Command. The reason why we conceive greater Indignation against new then ancient Riches, is, that the former seem to possess that which is none of theirs, but the ancient seem to have but their own. For with common people, to have been so long, is to be so by Right.  
And for the bestowing of goods incongruously: as when the arms of the most valiant Achilles, were bestowed upon the most eloquent Vlysses.  
And for the comparison of the inferior with the superior; whether superior in the same thing, as when one Valiant is compared with a more Valiant; or whether absolutely superior, as when a good scholar is compared with a good Man.  
Apt to Indignation are, 

They that think themselves worthy of the greatest goods, and do possess them.  
And They that are good.  
And they that are ambitious.  
And such as think themselves deserve better what another possesseth, then he that hath it.    
Least apt to Indignation are 

Such as are of a poor, servile, and not ambitious Nature.  
Who they are, that rejoice, or Grieve not at the Adversity of him that suffers worthily, and in what occasions, may be gathered from the contrary of what has been already said.  
Whosoever therefore would turn away the compassion of the judge, he must make him apt to Indignation; and show that his adversary is unworthy of the Good, and worthy of the evil, which happens to him.     

CHAP. 12. Of Envy.  
ENvy is grief, for the prosperity of such as ourselves, arising not from any hurt, that we, but from the good that they receive.  
Such as ourselves I call those, that are equal to us in blood, in age, in abilities, in glory, or in means.  
They are apt to Envy, 

That are within a little of the highest.  
And those that are extraordinarily honoured for some quality that is singular in them, especially wisdom or good Fortune.  
And such as would be thought Wise.  
And such as catch at glory in every action.    
And men of poor spirits: for every thing appears great to them.  
The things which men envy in others are, 

Such as bring glory.  
And goods of fortune.  
And such things as we desire for ourselves.  
And things in the possession whereof wee ex●eed others, or they us a little.    
Obnoxious to Envy are, 

Men of our own time, of our own Country, of our own age, and competitors of our glory.  
And therefore,  
Those whom we strive with for honour.  
And those that covet the same things that we do.  
And those that get quickly, what we hardly obtain, or not at all.  
And those that attain unto, or do the things that turn to our reproach, not being done by us.  
And those that possess what we have possessed heretofore. So Old and decayed Men Envy the young and lusty.  
And those that have bestowed little, are subject to be envied by such, as have bestowed much upon the same thing.    
From the contraries of these may be derived the Principles concerning Ioy for other mens hurt.  
He therefore that would not have his Enemy prevail, when he craves pitty, or other favour; must dispose the judge to Envy; and make his Adversary appear such, as are above described, to be subject to the Envy of others.   

CHAP. 13. Of Emulation.  
EMulation is grief arising from that our Equals possess such goods as are had in honour, and whereof we are capable, but have them not; not because they have them, but because not wee also.  
No man therefore Emulates another in things whereof himself is not capable.  
Apt to Emulate are, 

Such as esteem themselves worthy of more good then they have.  
And Young and Magnanimous men.  
And such as already possess the goods for which men are honoured: for they measure their worth by their having.  
And those that are esteemed worthy by others.  
And those whose ancestors, kindred, familiars, Nation, City, have been eminent for some good, do Emulate others for that good.    
Objects of Emulation are, for things, 

virtues.  
And things whereby we may profit others.  
And things whereby we may please others.    
For Persons, 

They that possess such things.  
And such as many desire to be friends, or acquainted with, or like unto.  
And they whose praises fly abroad.    
The contrary of Emulation is Contempt.  
And they that Emulate such as have the goods afore mentioned, contemn such as have them not: and thence it is, that men who live happily enough, unless they have the goods which men honour, are nevertheless Contemned.   

CHAP. 14. Of the Manners of Youth.  
OF Passions we have already spoken. Wee are next to speak of Manners.  
Ma●ners are distinguished by mens Passions, Habits, Ages, and Fortunes.  
What kind of Manners proceed from Passions, and from virtues & Vices,( which are Habits,) hath been already shewed.  
There remaines to be spoken of the Manners, that are peculiar to several Ages and Fortunes.  
The Ages are Youth, Middle-Age, Old Age.  
And first of Youth.  
Young men are, 

Violent in their desires.  
Prompt to execute their desires.  
Incontinent.  
Inconstant, easily forsaking what they desired before.  
Longing mightily, and soon satisfied.  
Apt to Anger, and in their Anger Violent, and ready to execute their Anger with their hands.  
Lovers of Honor, and of Victory more then Money, as having not been yet in Want.  
Well-natured, as having not been acquainted with much malice.  
Full of Hope, both because they have not yet been often frustrated, and because they have by natural heat that disposition that other Ages have by Wine; Youth being a kind of natural drunkenness. Besides, Hope is of the time to come, whereof Youth hath much, but of the time past little.  
Credulous, because not yet often deceived.  
Easily deceived, because full of Hope.  
Valiant, because apt to Anger, and full of Hope; whereof this begets confidence, the other keeps off fear.  
bashful, because they estimate the Honor of Actions by the precepts of the Law.  
Magnanimous, because not yet dejected by the misfortunes of human life.  
And lovers of Honor more than of Profit, because they live more by custom than by Reason, and by Reason wee acquire Profit, but virtue by custom.  
Lovers of their Friends and Companions.  
Apt to err in the excess, rather then the defect, contrary to that precept of Chilon, Ne quid nimis; for they overdoe every thing: they Love too much, and Hate too much, because thinking themselves wise, they are obstinate in the opinion they have once delivered.  
Doers of Injury rather for Contumely then for damage.  
merciful, because measuring others by their own Innocence, they think them better than they be, and therefore less to merit what they suffer; which is a cause of Pitty.  
And Lovers of Mirth, and by consequence love to jest at others.    
jesting is witty Contumely.   

CHAP. 15. Of the Manners of Old Men.  
THe Manners of Old men are in a manner the contraries of those of Youth.  
They determine nothing: they do every thing less vehemently then is fit: they never say they know; but to every thing they say perhaps and peradventure; which comes to pass from that having lived long, they have often mistaken and been deceived.  
They are peevish because they interpret every thing to the worst.  
And suspicious through Incredulity, and Incredulous by reason of their Experience.  
They Love and Hate, as if they meant to continue in neither.  
Are of poor spirits, as having been humbled by the chances of life.  
And Covetous, as knowing how easy 'tis to lose, and hard to get.  
And Timorous, as having been cooled by yeares.  
And greedy of life: for good things seem greater by the want of them.  
And Lovers of themselves out of Pusillanimity.  
And seek Profit more than Honor, because they love themselves; and Profit is among the goods that are not simply good, but good for ones self.  
And without bashfulness, because they despise seeming.  
And hope little; knowing by Experience that many times good counsel has been followed with ill event, and because also they be timorous.  
●nd live by Memory rather than Hope; for Memory is of the time past, whereof Old men have good store.  
And are full of talk, because they delight in their Memory.  
And Vehement in their Anger; but not stout enough to execute it.  
They have weak, or no desires, and thence seem Temperate.  
They are slaves to gain.  
And live more by reason than custom; because Reason leads to Profit, as custom to that which is honourable.  
And do Injury to endamage, and not in Contumely.  
And are merciful by Compassion, or imagination of the same evils in themselves; which is a kind of Infirmity, and not Humanity, as in Young men, proceeding from a good opinion of those that suffer evil.  
And full of complaint, as thinking themselves not far from evil, because of their Infirmity.  
Seeing then every man loves such men, and their discourses, which are most agreeable to their own Manners; 'tis not hard to collect, how the Orator, and his Oration may be made acceptable to the Hearer, whether Young, or Old.   

CHAP. 16. Of the Manners of middle aged men.  
THe Manners of Middle aged men, are hetweene those of Youth, and Old men: and therefore,  
They neither dare; nor fear too much: but both as is fit.  
They neither believe all; nor reject all; but judge.  
They seek not onely what is honourable, nor only what is Profitable; but both.  
They are neither Covetous, nor prodigal; but in the mean.  
They are neither easily Angry; nor yet stupid: but between both.  
They are Valiant, and with all Temperate.  
And in general, whatsoever is divided in Youth, and Old men, is compounded in Middle-age.  
And whereof the excess, or Defect is in Young or Old men; the Mediocrity is in those of Middle age.  
Middle age for the Body I call the time from thirty to five and thirty yeares: for the Mind the nine and fortieth, or there abouts.   

CHAP. 17. Of the Manners of the Nobility.  
OF Manners that proceed from the several Ages wee have already spoken.  
Wee are next to speak of those that rise from several Fortunes.  
The Manners of the Nobility are 

To be Ambitious.  
To undervalue their Ancestors equals. For the goods of Fortune seem the more precious for their Antiquity.  
Nobility is the virtue of a Stock.  
And Generosity, is not to degenerate from the virtue of his Stock.    
For as in Plants; so in the razes of Men, there is a certain progress; and they grow better and better to a certain point; then change, viz. ●ubtle wits into madness; and stayed wits into Stupidity and blockishness.   

CHAP. 18. Of the Manners of the Rich.  
RIch men are Contumelious and Proud. This they have from their Riches. For seeing every thing may bee had for money, having money, they think they have all, that is good.  
And Effeminate; because they have wherewithal to subminister to their Lust.  
And Boafters of their Wealth: and speak in high terms foolishly. For men willingly talk of what they love and admire; and think others affect the same that they do: and the truth is all sorts of men submit to the Rich.  
And think themselves worthy to command, having that, by which men attain Command.  
And in general they have the Manners of Fortunate fools.  
They do Injury with intention not to hurt, but to disgrace; and partly also through Incontinence.  
There is a difference between New and ancient Riches: for they that are newly come to Wealth have the same faults in a greater degree: for new Riches are a kind of rudeness and apprenticeship of Riches.   

CHAP. 19. Of the Manners of Men in Power and of such as prosper.  
THe Manners of Men in Power, are the same, or better then those of the Rich.  
They have a greater sense of Honor then the Rich; and their Manners are more Manly.  
They are more Industrious then the Rich: for Power is sustained by Industry.  
They are Grave, but without Austerenesse: for being in place conspicuous, they carry themselves the more Modestly; and have a kind of gentle and comely Gravity, which the Greekes call 〈◇〉.  
When they do Injuries, they do great ones.  
The Manners of Men that prosper, are compounded of the Manners of the Nobility, the Rich, and those that are in Power; for to some of these all Prosperity appertains.  
Prosperity in Children, and goods of the Body, make men desire to exceed others in the goods of Fortune.  
Men that Prosper have this ill, to be more proud, and Inconsiderate then others.  
And this good; that they worship God; trusting in him, for that they find themselves to receive more good then proceeds from their own Industry.  
The Mann●rs of poor men, Obscure men, Men with out Power, and Men in Adversity, may bee collected from the Contrary of what has been said.   

CHAP. 20. Common Places, or Principles concerning what May bee Done, what Has been Done, and what Shall be Done; or of Fact Possible, Past a●d Future. Also of Great and Little.  
we have hitherto set down such Principles as are peculiar to several kindes of Orations.  
Now we are to speak of such Places as are Common to them all as these, Possible, Done, or Past, Future, Great, Small.  
Possible is that 

The Contrary whereof is Possible.  
And the like whereof is Possible.  
And then which some harder thing is Possible.  
And the beginning whereof is Possible.  
And the end whereof is Possible.  
And the usual consequent whereof is Possible.  
And whatsoever we desire.  
And the beginning whereof is in the power of those, whom we can either compel or persuade.  
And part whereof is Possible.  
And part of the Whole that is Possible.  
The th● general if a Particular.  
And a Particular if the general.  
And of Relatives if one the other.  
And that, which without Art and Industry is Possible, is much more so with Art and Industry.  
And that, which is Possible to Worse, Weaker and Vnskilfuller, men, is much more so to Better, Stronger, and more skilful.    
The Principles concerning Impossible are the Contraries of these  
That Has been Done.  
Then which a harder thing Has been Done.  
And the Consequent whereof Has been Done.  
And that, which being Possible he had a will to, and nothing hindered.  
And that, which was Possible to him in his Anger.  
And that, which he longed to do.  
And that, which was before upon the point of Doing.  
And whose Antecedent Has been Done; or that, for which it uses to be Done.  
And if that, for whose cause we do this, then This.  
The Principles concerning Not done, are the Contraries of these.  
That Shall be Done.  
Which some man can, and means to do.  
And which some man can, and desires to do.  
And which is in the way, and upon the point to be Done.  
And the Antecedents whereof are Past.  
And the Motive whereof is past.  
Of Great and Small, More and less, see Chap. 7. book 1.   

CHAP. 21. Of Example, Similitude, and Fables.  
OF the Principles both general, & special from whence proofs are to bee drawn, has been already spoken.  
Now follow the proofs themselves, which are Examples, or Enthymemes.  
An Example is either an Example properly so called( as some Action past:) or a Similitude( which also is called a Parable:) or a Fable( which contains some Action feigned.)  
An Example properly so called is this, Darius came not into Greece, till he had first subdued egypt. Xerxes also conquered egypt first; then afterwards crossed the Hellespont. We ought therefore to hinder the King of Persia from conquering egypt.  
A Similitude, or Parable, is such as followeth. They who choose their Magistrates by Lot, are like them that choose for their Champions those on whom the Lot shall fall, rather then those, who have the greatest strength; and for their Pilot, not him that hath skill; but him whose name is drawn out of the urn.  
A Fable is in this manner. The Horse desiring to drive out the stag from their common pasture, took a man to assist him; and having received into his mouth a bridle, and a rider upon his back, obtained his intent, but became subject to the Man. So you of Himaera, having( in hope to be revenged of yonr Enemies) given unto Phalaris sovereign authority, that is to say, taken a bridle into your mouths; if you shall also give him a guard to his person, that is, let him get up upon your backs, you become his slaves presently past recovery.  
To find out Examples, that is, Actions done that may serve our purpose, is therefore hard, because not in our power.  
But to find Fables and Similitudes, is easier; because by conversing in Philosophy a man may fain somewhat in nature like to the case in hand.  
Examples, Similitudes and Fables, where Enthymemes are wanting, may serve us in the beginning of an Oration for Inductions; otherwise are to be alleged after Enthymemes for Testimonies.   

CHAP. 22. Of a Sentence.  
A Sentence is an universal Proposition concerning those things which are to be desired or avoided, in the Actions, or Passions of common life. As  
A wise man will not suffer his Children to bee over-learned.  
And is to an Enthymeme in rhetoric as any Proposition is to a syllogism in logic.  
And therefore a Sentence, if the reason be rendered, becomes a Conclusion; and both together make an Enthymeme.  
As for Example.  
To bee overlearned, besides that it begets effeminacy, procures envy. Therefore he thatis wise will not suffer his Children to be overlearned.  
Of Sentences there be four sorts.  
For they either require proofs, or not: that is, are manifest, or not.  
Such as are manifest, are either so assoon as they are uttered; as  Health is a great Good. 
Or as soon as they are considered; as Men use to hate, whom they have ●urt.  
Such as are not manifest are either Conclusions of Enthymemes; as He thatis wise, will not suffer his Children, &c.  
Or else are Enthymematicall; that is, have in themselves the force of an Enthymeme; as mortal men ought not to carry immortal anger.  
A Sentence not Manifest ought to be either inferred, or confirmed.  
inferred thus.  Tis not good to be effeminately minded, nor to be envied by ones fellow Citizens. A wise man therefore will not have his Children overlearned. 
confirmed thus.  A wise man will not have his Children overlearned, Seeing too much learning both softens a Mans mind, and procures him envy among his fellow Citizens. 
If a reason be added to a manifest Sentence, let it be short.  
Sentences become not every man; but onely Old men, and such as be well versed in business. For to hear a young man speak Sentences, is ridiculous; and to hear an ignorant man speak Sentences is absurd.  
Sentences generally received, when they are for our purpose, ought not to be neglected, because they pass for truths. And yet they may be denied, when any laudable custom, or humour may thereby be made appear in the Denier.  
The commodities of Sentences are two.  

One proceeding from the vanity of the Hearer, who takes for true universally affirmed, that which he has found for true onely in some particular; and therefore a man ought to consider in every thing what opinion the Hearer holds.  
Another is, that Sentences do discover the manners and disposition of the speakers, so that if they be esteemed good Sentences he shall be esteemed a good man; and if evil, an evil man.   
Thus much of Sentences; what they be; of how many sorts; how to be used; whom they become; and what is their profit.   

CHAP. 23. Of the invention of Enthymemes.  
SEeing an Enthymeme differs from a logical syllogism, in that it neither concludes out of every thing, nor out of remote Principles; the Places of it, from whence a man may argue ought to be certain, and determinate.  
And because whosoever makes a syllogism rhetorical, or other, should know all, or the most part of that which is in his question; as whosoever is to advice the Athenians in the question, whether they are to make war or no, must know what their revenues be; what, and what kind of power they have: and he that will praise them, much know their acts at Salamis, Marathon, &c. it will be necessary for a good speaker to have in readiness the choicest particulars of whatsoever he foresees he may speak of  
He that is to speak extempore, must comprehend in his speech as much as he can of what is most proper in the matter in hand.  
Proper I call those things which are least common to others; as, He that will praise Achilles, is not to declare such things as are common both to him and Diomedes; as that he was a Prince, and warred against the Trojans; but such things as are proper only to Achilles; as that he killed Hector and Cygnus; went to the war young, and voluntary.  
Let this therefore be one general Place, From that which is Proper.   

CHAP. 24. Of the Places of Enthymemes Ostensive.  
FOrasmuch as Enthymemes either infer truly, or seem onely so to do; and they which do infer indeed, bee either Ostensive; or such as bring a man to some impossibility; wee will first set down the Places of Enthymemes Ostensive.  
An Ostensive Enthymeme is, wherein a man concludes the question from somewhat granted.  
That Enthymeme which brings a man to an impossibility is an Enthymeme wherein from that which the Adversary maintaineth, wee conclude that which is manifestly impossible.  
All Places have been already set down in a manner in the precedent Propositions of Good, evil, just, Vnjust, honourable and dishonourable: namely they have been set down as applied to particular Subjects, or in Concrete.  
Here they are to be set down in another manner; namely in the Abstract, or universal.  
The first Place then let be from Contraries, which in the Concrete or Particulars is exemplified thus. If Intemperance be hurtful, Temperance is profitable: and if Intemperance be not hurtful; neither is Temperance profitable.  
Another Place may bee from Cognomination or affinity of words: as in this Particular. If what is just be Good; then what is justly is well: but justly to die is not well: therefore not all that is just is Good.  
A third from Relatives; as This man has justly Done, therefore the other has justly suffered. But this Place sometimes deceives: for a man may suffer justly yet not from him.  
A fourth from Comparison, three ways.  
From the Greater to the less; as, He has strike his father; and therefore this man.  
From the less to the Greater: as, The Gods know not all things; much less man.  
From Equality: as, If Captaines be not always the worse esteemed for losing a victory; why should Sophisters?  
Another from the Time: as, Philip to the Thebans: If I had required to pass through your Country with my Army before I had aided you against the Phocaeans, there is no doubt but you would have promised it me. It is absurd therefore to deny it me now after I have trusted you.  
A Sixth from what the Adversary says of himself: as, I phicrates asked Aristophon, whether he would take a bribe to betray the Army: and he answering no; What( says he) is it likely that Iphicrates would betray the Army; and Aristophon not?  
This Place would be ridiculous, where the Defendant were not in much more estimation then the Accuser.  
A seventh from the Definition; as that of Socrates; A Spirit is either God, or the Creature of God: and therefore he denies not that there is a God, that confesses there are Spirits.  
An eighth from the distinction of an ambiguous word.  
A ninth from Division: as, If all men do what they do for one of three causes, whereof two are impossible; and the Accuser charge not the Defendant with the third; it follows that he has not done it.  
A tenth from Induction: as, at Athens, at Thebes, at Sparta, &c. and therefore every where.  
An eleventh from Authority, or precedent sentence, as that of sapph that Death is evil, for that the Gods have judged it so, in exempting themselves from mortality.  
A twelfth from the Consequence: as, 'Tis not good to be envied; Therefore neither to be learned. 'Tis good to be wise; therefore also to be instructed.  
A thirteenth from two contrary Consequences; as, 'Tis not good to be an Orator, because if he speak the truth, he shall displease men: if he speak falsely, he shall displease God.  
Here is to be noted that sometimes this argument may be retorted: as thus, If you speak truth you shall please God; if you speak untruth you shall please men; therefore by all means be an Orator.  
A fourteenth from the quality that men have to praise one thing, and approve another: as, We ought not to war against the Athenians upon no precedent injury; for all men discommend injustice. again, We ought to war against the Athenians; for otherwise our Liberty is at their mercy, that is, is no liberty: but the preservation of liberty is a thing that all men will approve.  
A fifteenth from Proportion: as, seeing we naturalise strangers for their virtues, why should wee not banish this stranger for his vices?  
A sixteenth from the similitude of Consequents: as, He that denies the immortality of the Gods, is no worse then he that has written the generation of the Gods. For the same Consequence follows of both, that sometimes there are none.  
A seventeenth from that, that men change their mind: as, If when we were in banishment, wee fought to recover our ●ountry, why should wee not sight now to retain it?  
An eighteen from a feigned end: as, that Diomedes choose Vlysses to go with him, not as more valiant then another; but as one that would partake less of the glory.  
A nineteenth from the Cause: as if he would infer he did it from this, that he had Cause to do it.  
A twentieth from that which is Incredible, but True: as, that laws may need a Law to mend them; as well as Fish bread in the salt water, may need salting.   

CHAP. 25. Of the Places of Emthymemes that led to Impossibility.  
LEt the first Place be from inspection of Times, Actions, or Words, either of the Adversary, or of the speaker, or Both. Of the adversary; as, he says he loves the People, and yet he was in the conspiracy of the Thirty. Of the speaker; as, He says I am contentious; and yet I never began suit. Of Both; as, He never conferred any thing to the benefit of the Common-wealth, whereas I have ransomed divers citizens with my own money.  
A second from showing the cause of that which seemed amiss, and serves for men of good reputation that are accused; as, The Mother that was accused of Incest for being seen embracing her son, was absolved as soon as she made appear; that shee embraced him upon his arrival from far, by way of Salutation.  
A third, from rendering of the cause, as, Leodamas, to whom it was objected, that he had under the thirty Tyrants, defaced the Inscription( which the People had set up in a Pillar) of his Ignominy; answered, He had not done it; because it would have been more to his commodity to let it stand; thereby to endear himself to the Tyrants, by the testimony of the Peoples hatred.  
A fou●th from better counsel; as, He might have done better for himself; therefore he did not this. But this Place deceives, when the better counsel comes to mind after the Fact.  
A fifth, from the Incompatibility of the things to be done; as, they that did deliberate whether they should both mourn and sacrifice at the funeral of Leucothea, were  told, that if they thought her a Goddesse, they ought not to mourne● and if they thought her a mortal, they ought not to sacrifice.  
A sixth( which is proper to judicial Orations) from an Inference of Error; as, if he did it not, he was not wise, therefore he did it.  
Enthymemes that lead to Impossibility please more than Ostensive: for they compare, and put contraries together, whereby they are the better set off, and more conspicuous to the Auditor.  
Of all Enthymemes, they be best, which we assent to as soon as hear. For such consent pleaseth us; and makes us favourable to the speaker.   

CHAP. 26. Of the Places of seeming Enthymemes.  
OF seeming Enthymemes, one Place may be from the form of speaking; as when a man has repeated divers Sentences, he brings in his conclusion, as if it followed necessary, though it do not.  
A second from an ambiguous word.  
A third from that which is true divided to that which is false joined; as that of Orestes, It was justice that I should revenge my Fathers death; and it was justice my Mother should die for killing my Father, therefore I justly killed my Mother. Or from that which is true joined to that which is false divided; as; one cup of Wine, and one cup of Wine, are hurtful; therefore one cup of Wine is hurtful.  
A fourth from amplification of the Crime. For neither is the Defendant likely to have committed the Crime he amplifies; nor does the Accuser seem, when he is Passionate, to want ground for his Accusation.  
A fifth from signs; as, when a man concludes the doing of the Fact from the manner of his life.  
A sixth from that which comes by Chance, as if from this that the Tyranny of Hipparchus came to be overthrown from the love of Aristogeiton to Harmodius, a man should conclude, that in a free Common-wealth loving of Boyes were profitable.  
A seventh from the Consequence, as, Banishment is to bee desired because a banished man has choice of places to dwell in.  
An eight from making that the cause which is not; as, In Demosthenes his government, the war began; therefore Demosthenes governed well. With the Peloponnesian war began the Plague, therefore Pericles that persuaded that war, did ill.  
A ninth from the omission of some Circumstance, as, heal did what was lawful, when shee ran aw●y with Paris, because shee had her Fathers consent to choose her own Husband; which was true onely during the time that shee had not chosen.  
A tenth from that which is probable in some case, to that which is probable simply; as, Tis probable he foresaw, that if he did it he should be suspected; therefore tis probable he did it not.  
From this Place one may inserre both ways, that he did it not. For if he be not likely to do it, it may be thought he did it not: again, if he were likely to do it, it may be thought he did it not, for this, that he knew he should be suspected  
Vpon this Place was grounded the Art, which was so much detested in Protagoras, of making the better cause seem the worse; and the worse the better.   

CHAP. 27. Of the ways to answer the Arguments of the Adversary.  
AN Argument is answered by an opposite syllogism, or by an Objection.  
The Places of opposite syllogisms, are the same with the Places of syllogisms, or Enthymemes: for a rhetorical syllogism is an Enthymeme.  
The Places, of Objections are four.  
From the same, as, To the Adversary that proves Love to be good by an Enthymeme, may be objected, that no want is good, and yet love is want; or particularly thus; The Love of Myrrhato her Father was not good.  
The second from Contraries; as, if the Adversary say A good man does good to his friends, an Objection might bee made that then, an evil man will do also evil to his friends.  
From Similitude, as thus, if the Adversary say all men that are injured, do hate those that have injured them, it may be Objected, that then, all men that had received benefits should love their benefactors, that is to say, be grateful.  
The fourth from the authority of famous men; as when a man shall say, that drunken men ought to be pardonned those acts they do in their drunkenness, because they know not what they do, the Objection may be, that Pittacus was of another mind, that appointed for such acts a double punishment; one for the Act, another for the drunkenness.  
And forasmuch as all Enthymemes are drawn from Probability, or Example, or from a sign fallible, or from a sign infallible: an Enthymeme from Probability, may be confuted Really, by showing that for the most part it falls out otherwise: but Apparently or Sophistically, by showing onely that it does not fall out so always; whereupon the judge thinks the Probability not sufficient to ground his sentence upon.  
[ The Reason whereof is this. That the judge, while he hears the fact proved Probable, conceives it as true. For the understanding has no Object but Truth. And therefore by and by, when he shall hear an Instance to the Contrary; and thereby find that he had no necessity to think it true, presently changes his opinion, and thinks it false, and consequently not so much as Probable. For he cannot at one time think the same thing both Probable and False: and he that says a thing is Probable, the meaning is, he thinks it True, but finds not arguments enough to prove it.]  
An Enthymeme from a fallible sign, is answered, by showing the sign to be fallible.  
An Enthymeme from an Example, is a●swered, as an Enthymeme from Probability; Really, by showing more Examples to the contrary; Apparently, if he bring Examples enough to make it seem not necessary.  
If the Adversary have more Ex●mples then wee, wee must make appear, that they are not applicable to the Case.  
An Enthymeme from an infallible sign, if the Proposition be true, is unanswerable.   

CHAP. 28. Amplification and Extenuation are not Common Places. Enthymemes by which Arguments are answered, are the same with those by which the matter in question is proved, or disproved. Objections are not Enthymemes.  
THe first, that Amplification and Extenuation are not Common Places, appears by this, that Amplification, and Extenuation do prove a fact to be great, or little; and are therefore Enthymemes, to be drawn from Common Places; and therefore are not the Places themselves.  
The second, that Enthymemes, by which Arguments are answered, are of the same kind with those, by which the matter in question is proved, is manifest by this, that these infer the opposite, of what was proved by the other.  
The third, that an Objection is no Enthymeme, is apparent by this, that an Objection is no more, but an Opin●on, example, or other Instance, produced to make appear, that the Adversaries Argument does not conclude.  
Thus much of Examples, Sentences, Enthymemes, and generally of all things, that belong to Argumentation; from what Places they may be drawn, or answered.  
There remaines Elocution, and Disposition to be spoken of in the next book.    

The third book.  

CHAP. I. Of the original of Elocution and pronunciation.  
THree things being necessary to an Oration, namely proof, Elocution and Disposition; we have done with the first, and shall speak of the other two in that which follows.  
As for Action, or pronunciation, so much as is necessary for an Orator may bee fetched out of the book of the Art of Poetry, in which wee have treated of the Action of the Stage.  
For Tragaedians were the first that invented such Action, and that but of late; and it consisteth in governing well the Magnitude, Tone, and Measure of the Voice; a thing less subject to Art, then is either proof, or Elocution.  
And yet there have been Rules delivered concerning it, as far forth as serves for Poetry.  
But Oratoricall Action has not been hitherto reduced to Art.  
And Orators in the beginning, when they saw that the Poets in barren and feigned Arguments, nevertheless attained great Reputation; supposing it had proceeded from the choice, or connexion of words, fell into a style, by imitation of them, approaching to Verse, and made choice of words.  
But when the Poets changed their style, and laid by all words that were not in common use, the Orators did the same, and lighted at last upon words, and a government of the Voice and Measure proper to themselves.  
Seeing therefore pronunciation, or Action are in some degree necessary also for an Orator, the Precepts thereof are to bee fetched from the Art of Poetry.  
[ In the mean time this may be one general Rule. If the Words, Tone, greatness of the Voice, Gesture of the body and Countenance, seem to proceed all from one Passion, then 'tis well pronounced: Otherwise not.  
For when there appear more passions then one at once, the mind of the speaker appears unnatural and distracted. Otherwise, as the mind of the speaker, so the mind of the Hearer always.]   

CHAP. 2. Of the choice of Words and Epithets.  
THe virtues of a Word are two; the first, that it be perspicuous; the second, that it be decent; that is, neither above, nor below the thing signified; or neither too humble, nor too fine.  
Perspicuous are all Words that be Proper.  
Fine Words are those, that are borrowed or translated, from other significations; of which in the Art of Poetry.  
The reason why borrowed Words please is this. Men are affencted with Words, as they are with Men, admiring in both that which is foreign and new.  
To make a poem graceful, many things help; but few an Oration.  
For to a Poet it sufficeth with what Words he can, to set out his poem: but an Orator must not onely do that; but also seem not to do it: for else he will be thought to speak unnaturally, and not as he thinks; and thereby be the less believed; whereas belief is the scope of his Oration.  
The Words that an Orator ought to use are of three sorts. Proper; Such as are Received, and Metaphors.  
Words taken from foreign languages, Words compounded; and Words new-coyned are seldom to be used.  
Synonimaes belong to Poets, and equivocal words to Sophisters.  
An Orator, if he use Proper words and Received, and good Metaphors; shall both make his Oration beautiful, and not seem to intend it; and shall speak perspicuously. For in a Metaphor alone there is perspicuity, Nouity, and sweetness.  
Concerning Metaphors the Rules are these.  

1. He that will make the best of a thing, let him draw his Metaphor from somewhat that is better. As for Example, let him call a Cr●me, as Error. On the other side, when he would make the worst of it, let him draw his Metaphor from somewhat worse, as, calling Error, Crime.  
2. A Metaphor ought not to be so far fetched, as that the Similitude may not easily appear.  
3. A Metaphor ought to bee drawn from the noblest things, as the Poets do, that choose rather to say Rosy-finger'd; then Red-finger'd Aurora.   
In like manner the Rule of Epithets is,  
That he that will adorn should use those of the better sort; and he that will disgrace, should use those of the worse: as Simonides being to writ an Ode in honour of the victory gotten in a Course by certain Mules, being not well paid, called them by their name[ 〈◇〉] that signifies their propinquity to Asses: but having received a greater reward, Stiles them the sons of swift footed Coursers.   

CHAP. 3. Of the things that make an Oration Flat.  
THe things that make an Oration flat, or insipid, are four.  

1. Words Compounded;[ and yet a Man may Compound a word, when the Composition is necessary, for want of a simplo word; and easy, and ●eldome used.]  
2. foreign words. As for example, such as are newly derived from the latin; which though they were proper among them whose tongue it is, are foreign in another Language: and yet these may be used, so it be moderately.  
3. Long impertinent, and o●ten Epithets.  
4. Metaphors, indecent, and obscure. Obscure they are, when they are far fetched. Indecent when they are Ridiculous, as in comedies; or too Grave, as in Tragaedies.    

CHAP. 4. Of a Similitnde.  
A Similitude differs from a Metaphor onely by such Particles of Comparison, as these, As; Even as; So; Even so, &c.  
A Similitude therefore is a Metaphor dilated; and a Metaphor, is a Similitude contracted into one Word.  
A Similitude does well in an Oration, so it be not too frequent; for 'tis poetical.  
An example of a Similitude, is this of Pericles; that said in his Oration; that the Baeotians were like to so many oaks in a Wood, that did nothing but beate one another.   

Of the Purity of Language.  
four things are necessary to make Language Pure.  

1. The right rendering of those Particles which some antecedent Particle does require: As to a Not onely, a Not also; and then they are rendered right, when they are not suspended too long.  
2 The use of Proper Words, rather than Circumlocutions, unless there be motive to make one do it of purpose.  
3. That there be nothing of double construction, unless there be cause to do it of purpose. As the Prophets( of the Heathen) who speak in general terms, to the end they may the better maintain the truth of their Prophecies; which is easilier maintained in generalls, than in particulars. For tis easier to divine, whether a number be even or odd, then how many; and that a thing will be, then when it will be.  
4. Concordance of Gender, Number, and Person; as not to say Him for Her; Man for Men; Hath for Have.   
In sum; a Mans Language ought to be easy for another to red, pronounce, and point.  
Besides, to divers Antecedents, let divers Relatives, or one Common to them all, be Correspondent: as, He saw the Colour; He heard the Sound; or he perceived both Colour and Sound: but by no means, he heard, or saw both.  
Lastly, that which is to be interposed by Pare●thesis, let it be done quickly: as, I purposed having spoken to him( to this, and this purpose) afterward to be gone. For to put it off thus; I resolved after I had spoken to him, to be gone, but the subject of my speech was to this and this purpose, is vicious.   

CHAP. 6. Of the Amplitude and Tenuity of Language.  
A Man shall add Amplitude, or Dignity to his language, by such means as these.  

1. By changing the Name with the Definition, as occasion shall serve. As, when the name shall be Indecent, by using the Definition; or Contrary.  
2 By Metaphors.  
3. By using the plural Number for the Singular.  
4. By Privative Epithets.    

CHAP. 7. Of the Convenien●e, or decency of Elocution.  
ELocutions is made Decent, 

1. By speaking Feelingly; that is with such Passion as is fit for the matter he is in; as angrily in matter of Injury  
2. By speaking as becomes the Person of the Speaker; as for a Gentleman to speak Eruditely.  
3. By speaking Proportionably to the matter; as of great affairs to speak in a high, and of mien in a low style.  
4. By abstaining from Compounded, and from Out-landish words; unless a man speak Passionately, and have already moved, and as it were inebriated his Hearers. Or Ironically.    
It confers also to persuasion very much to use these ordinary forms of speaking, All men know; Tis confessed by all; No man will deny, and the like. For the Hearer consents, surprised with the fear to be esteemed the onely Ignorant man●  
Tis good also having used a word that signifies more than the matter requires, to abstain from the pronunciation and Countenance that to such a word belongs; that the Disproportion between it and the matter may the less appear. And when a man has said too much, it will show well to correct himself: For he will get belief by seeming to consider what he says.  
[ But in this a man must have a care not to be too precise in showing of this Consideration. For the ostentation of carefulness is an argument oftentimes of lying; as may bee observed in such as tell particularities not easily observed, when they would bee thought to speak more precise truth then is required.]   

CHAP. 8. Of two sorts of Stiles.  
THere be two sorts of Stiles. The one continued or to bee comprehended at once; the other divided, or distinguished by Periods.  
The first sort was in use with ancient Writers; but is now out of date.  
An example of this style is in the History of Herodotus; wherein there is no Period till the end of the whole History.  
In the other kind of style, that is distinguished by Periods, a Period is such a Part as is perfect in itself; and has such length, as may easily be comprehended by the understanding.  
This latter kind is pleasant; the former unpleasant, because this appears finite, the other infinite: in this the Hearer has always somewhat set out, and terminated to him; in the other he foresees no end, and has nothing finished to him: this may easily be committed to memory, because of the measure and cadence( which is the cause that verses be easily remembered;) the other not.  
Every sentence ought to end with the Period, and nothing to be interposed.  
A Period is either simplo, or divided into Parts.  
simplo is that which is Indivisible; as, I wonder you fear not their ends, whose actions you imitate.  
A Period divided, is that which not onely has perfection and length convenient for respiration, but also Parts. As, I wonder you are not afraid of their ends, seeing you imitate their actions: where in these words, I wonder you are not afraid of their ends, is one Colon, or Part; and in these, Seeing you imitate their actions, another: and both together make the Period.  
The Parts, or Members, and Periods of speech ought neither to be too long, nor too short.  
Too long, are they, which are produced beyond the expectation of the Hearer.  
Too short, are they that end before he expects it.  
Those that be too long, leave the Hearer behind, like him that walking, goes beyond the usual end of the walk, and thereby outgoes him that walks with him.  
They that be too short, make the Hearer stumble; for when he looks far before him, the end stops him before he be ware.  
A Period that is divided into Parts, is either divided only; or has also an opposition of the Parts one to another.  
Divided onely is such as this; This the Senate knows; the consul sees; and yet the man lives.  
A Period with opposition of Parts, called also Antithesis, and the parts Antitheta, is when contrary Parts are put together; or also joined by a third.  
Contrary parts are put together, as here, The one has obtained glory, the other Riches; both by my benefit.  
Antitheta are therefore acceptable; because not onely the Parts appear the better for the opposition; but also for that they carry with them a certain appearance of that kind of Enthymeme, which leads to impossibility.  
Parts, or Members of a Period are said to be equal, when they have altogether, or almost equal number of Syllables.  
Parts or Members of a Period, are said to be like, when they begin, or end alike: and the more Similitudes, and the greater equality there is of Syllables, the more graceful is the Period.   

CHAP. 9. Of those things that grace an Oration, and make it delightful.  
FOrasmuch as there is nothing more delightful to a man, then to find that he apprehends and learns easily; it necessary follows, that those Words are most grateful to the ear, that make a man seem to see before his eyes the thing signified.  
And therefore foreign Words are unpleasant, because Obscure; and plain Words, because too Manifest, making us learn nothing new: but Metaphors please; for they beget in us by the Genus or by some common thing to that with another, a kind of Science: as when an Old Man, is called Stubble; a man suddenly learns that he grows up, flourisheth and withers like grass, being put in mind of it by the qualities common to Stubble, and to Old men.  
That which a Metaphor does, a Similitude does the same; but with less grace, because with more prolixity.  
Such Enthymemes are the most graceful; which neither are presently very Manifest, nor yet very hard to be understood; but are comprehended, while they are uttering, or presently after, though not understood before.  
The things that make a speech graceful, are these; Antitheta, Metaphors, and Animation.  
Of Antitheta, and Antithesis hath been spoken in the precedent Chapter.  
Of Metaphors the most graceful is that which is drawn from Proportion.  
[ Aristotle( in the 12. Chapter of his Poetry) defines a Metaphor to be the translation of a name from one signification to another; whereof he makes four kindes, 1. From the general to the Particular. 2. From the Particular to the general. 3. From one Particular to another. 4. From Proportion.]  
A Metaphor from Proportion is such as this, A State without Youth, is a year without a Spring.  
Animation is that expression which makes us seem to see the thing before our eyes; as he that said, The Athenians powred out their City into Sicily, meaning, they sent thither the greatest Army they could make; and this is the greatest grace of an Oration.  
If therefore in the same Sentence there concur both Metaphor, and this Animation, and also Antithesis, it cannot choose but be very graceful.  
That an Oration is graced by Metaphor, Animation and Antithesis, hath been said: but how tis graced, is to be said in the next Chapter.   

CHAP. 10. In what manner an Oration is graced by the things aforesaid.  
TIs graced by Animation, when the actions of living Creatures are attributed to things without life; as when the Sword is said to devour.  
Such Metaphors as these come into a Mans mind by the observation of things that have similitude and proportion one to another. And the more unlike, and unproportionable the things be otherwise, the more grace hath the Metaphor.  
A Metaphor without Animation, adds grace then, when the Hearer finds he learns somewhat by such use of the word.  
Also Paradoxes are graceful, so men inwardly do believe them: for they have in them somewhat like to those jests that are grounded upon the similitude of words, which have usually one sense, and in the present another; and somewhat like to those jests which are grounded upon the deceiving of a mans expectation.  
And Paragrammes; that is, allusions of words are graceful, if they be well placed; and in Periods not too long; and with Antithesis: for by these means the ambiguity is taken away.  
And the more of these; namely, Metaphor, Animation, Antithesis, Equality of members a Period hath, the more graceful it is.  
Similitudes grace an Oration, when they contain also a Metaphor.  
And proverbs are graceful, because they are Metaphors or translations of words from one species to another.  
And Hyperboles, because they also are Metaphors: but they are youthful, and bewray vehemence; and are used with most grace by them that be angry; and for that cause are not comely in Old men.   

CHAP. 11. Of the difference between the style to be used in Writing, and the style to be used in Pleading.  
THe style that should be red ought to be more exact and accurate.  
But the style of a Pleader ought to be suited to Action and pronunciation.  
Orations of them that pled, pass away with the Hearing.  
But those that are Written men carry about them; and are considered at leisure; and consequently must endure to be sifted and examined.  
Written Orations appear flat in Pleadi●g.  
And Orations made for the bar, when the Action is away, appear in Reading insipid.  
In Written Orations Repetition is justly condemned.  
But in Pleadings, by the help of Action and by some change in the Pleader, Repetition becomes Amplification.  
In Written Orations Disjunctives do ill; as, I came, I found him, I asked him: for they seem superfluous, and but one thing, because they are not distinguished by Action.  
But in Pleadings 'tis Amplification● because that which is but one thing, is made to seem many.  
Of Pleadings that which is judicial ought to bee more accurate, then that which is before the people.  
And an Oration to the People ought to be more accommodate to Action, then a judicial.  
And of judicial Orations, that ought to bee more accurate, which is uttered to f●w Iudges; & that ought to be more accommodate to Action, which is uttered to Many. As in a Picture, the farther he stands off that beholds it, the less need there is that the colours be fine: so in Orations, the farther the Hearer stands off, the less need there is for his Oration to be Elegant.  
Therefore Demonstrative Orations, are most proper for writing, the end whereof is to be red.   

CHAP. 12. Of the Parts of an Oration, and their Order.  
THe necessary Parts of an Oration are but two; Proposition, and proof: which are as it were the problem, and Demonstration.  
The Proposition is the explication, or opening of the Matter to be Proved.  
And proof is the Demonstration of the Matter Propounded.  
To these necessary Parts, are sometimes added two other; the Proeme, and the Epilogue, neither of which are any proof.  
So that in sum there bee four Parts of an Oration; the Proeme, the Proposition, or( as others call it) the Narration; the proofs( which contain Confirmation, Confutation, Amplification, and Diminution;) and the Epilogue.   

CHAP. 13. Of the Proeme.  
THe Proeme is the Beginning of an Oration, and as it were the preparing of the way before one enter into it.  
In some kinds of Orations it resembles the Prelude of musicans, who first Play what they list, and afterwards the ●une they intended.  
In other kinds it resembles the Prologue of a Play, that contains the Argument.  
Proemes of the first sort, are most proper for Demonstrative Orations; in which a Man is free to foretell, or not, what Points he will insist upon; and for the most part 'tis better not● because when a man has not obliged himself to a certain matter, Digression will seem Variety: but if he have engaged himself, Variety will be accounted Digression.  
In Demoustratives the matter of the Proeme consisteth in the Praise or Dispraise of some Law or custom, or in Exhortation, or Dehortation; or in something that serves to incline the Hearer to the purpose  
Proemes of the second kind are most proper for judicial Orations. For as the Prologue in a dramatic, and the Exordium in an Epique poem, setteth first in few words the Argument of the poem: so in a judicial Oration, the Orator ought to exhibit a model of his Oration, that the mind of the Hearer may not bee suspended, and for want of foresight err or wander.  
Whatsoever else belongs to a Proeme, is drawn from one of these four. From the Speaker. From the Adversary. From the Hearer, Or from the Matter.  
From the speaker and Adversary are drawn into Proemes such Criminations and Purgations as belong not to the cause.  
To the Defendant 'tis necessary in the Proeme to answer to the accusations of his Adversary; that those being cleared, he may have a more favourable entrance to the rest of his Oration.  
But to the plaintiff 'tis better to cast his Criminations all into the Epilogue, that the judge may the more easily remember them.  
From the Hearer and from the Matter are drawn into the Proeme such things, as serve to make the Hearer favourable, or angry; attentive, or not attentive, as need shall require.  
And Hearers use to bee attentive to Persons that are reputed good; to things that are of great Consequence, or that concern themselves, or that are strange, or that delight.  
But to make the Hearer attentive, is not the part of the Proeme onely, but of any other part of the Oration, & rather of any other Part, then of the Proeme. For the Hearer is every where more remiss then in the beginning. And therefore wheresoever there is need, the Orator must make appear both the probity of his own person, and that the matter in hand is of great consequence; or that it concerns the Hearer; or that it is new; or that it is delightful.  
He that will have the Hearer attentive to Him, but not to the Cause, must on the other side make it seem that the matter is a trifle, without relation to the Hearer, common, and tedious.  
That the Hearer may bee favourable to the Speaker, one of two things is required; that he love him, or that he pitty him.  
In Demonstrative Orations, he that Praises, shall have the Hearer favourable, if he think himself or his own manners, or course of life, or any thing he loves, comprehended in the same Praise.  
On the contrary, he that dispraises, shall be heard favourably, if the Hearer find his enemies, or their courses, or any thing he hates involved in the same dispraise.  
The Proeme of a Deliberative Oration is taken from the same things, from which are taken the Proemes of judicial Orations. For the matter of a Delib●rative Oration needeth not that natural Pro●me, by which is shown what wee are to speak of; for that is already known: the Proeme in these, being made onely for the Speakers, or Adversaries sake; or to make the Matter appear great, or little, as one would have it, and is therefore to be taken from the Persons of the plaintiff or Defendant; or from the Hearer, or from the Matter, as in Orations judicial.   

CHAP. 14. Places of Crimination and Purgation.  
1. ONe is from the remo●vall of ill opinion in the Hearer, imprinted in him by the Adversary, or otherwise.  
2. Another from this, That the thing done is not hurtful, or not to him, or not so much, or not unjust, or not great, or not dishonourable.  
3. A third from the recompense; as, I did him harm, but withall I did him honor.  
4. A fourth from the Excuse; as, It was Error, Mischance, or Constraint.  
5. A fift from the Intention; as, One thing was done, another meant.  
6. A sixth, from the Comprehension of the Accuser; as, What I have done, the Accuser has done the same; or his, Father, Kinsman, or Friend.  
7. From the Comprehension of those that are in Reputation; as, What I did, such, and such have done the same, who nevertheless, are good men.  
8. From Comparison with such as have been falsely accused, or wrongfully suspected, and nevertheless found upright.  
9. From Recrimination; as, The Accuser is a man if ill life, and therefore not to be believed.  
10. From that the Iudgement belongs to another Place, or Time; as, I have already answered, or am to answer elsewhere to this Matter.  
11. From Crimination of the Crimination; as, It serves onely to pervert Iudgement.  
12. A twelfth, which is common both to Crimination and Purgation; and is taken from some sign; as Teucer is not to be believed because his Mother was Priam's sister. On the other side. Teucer is to be believed, because his Father was Priam's enemy.  
13. A thirteenth, proper to Crimination onely, from Praise and Dispraise mixed; as, To praise small things, and blame great ones; or to praise in many words, and blame with effectual ones; or to p●aise many things that are good, and then add one evil, but a great one.  
14. A fourteenth, common both to Crimination and Purgation, is taken from the interpretation of the fact: for he that purgeth himself interpreteth the fact always in the best sense, and he that Criminates, always in the worst; as when Vlysses said Dyomedes choose him for his companion, as the most able of the Grecians, to aid him in his exploit: but his Adversary said, He choose him for his cowardice, as the most unlikely to share with him in the Honour.   

CHAP. 15. Of the Narration.  
THe Narration is not always continued and of one piece; but sometimes, as in Demonstratives, interrupted, and dispersed through the whole Oration.  
For there being in an a Narration something that fals not under Art; as namely the Actions themselves, which the Orator inventeth not; he must therefore bring in the Narration of them, where he best may. As for example, If being to praise a Man, you would make a Narration of all his Acts immediately from the beginning, and without interruption, you will find it necessary afterwards to repeat the same Acts again, while from some of them you praise his Valour, and from others his wisdom; whereby your Oration shall have less variety, and shall less please.  
Tis not necessary always that the Narration be short. The true measure of it must be taken from the matter that is to be laid open.  
In the Narration, as oft as may be, tis good to insert somewhat commendable in ones self, and blamable in ones Adversary: As I advised him, but he would take no counsel.  
In Narrations, a man is to leave out whatsoever breeds compassion, or indignation in the Hearer besides the purpose; as Vlysses in Homer, relating his Travels to Alcinous, to move compassion in him, is so long in it, that it consists of divers books: but when he comes home, tells the same to his wife in thirty Verses, leaving out what might make her sad.  
The Narration ought also to be in such words as argue the Manners; that is, some virtuous or vicious habit in him of whom we speak, although it be not expressed; As, setting his arms a kenbold, he answered, &c. by which is insinuated the Pride of him that so answered.  
In an Oration a man does better to show his affection then his judgement: that is, Tis better to say, I like this, then to say, This is better. For by the one you would seem wise, by the other good. But favour follows goodness; whereas wisdom procures envy.  
But if this Affection seem incredible, then either a reason must be rendered, as did Antigone. For when shee had said, She loved her brother better than her Husband, or Children, shee added, for husband and children I may have more; but another brother I cannot, my ●arents being both dead. Or else a man must use this form of speaking; I know this affection of mine seems strange to you, but nevertheless it is such. For tis nor easily believed that any man has a mind to do any thing that is not for his own good.  
Besides in a Narration, not onely the Actions themselves; but the Passions, and signs that accompany them, are to be discovered.  
And in his Narration a man should make himself and his Adversary be considered for such, and such, as soon, and as covertly as he can.  
A Narration may have need sometimes not to be in the beginning.  
In Deliberative Orations; that is, wheresoever the question is of things to come; a Narration, which is always of things past, has no place: and yet things past may be recounted, that men may Deliberate better of the future: But that is not as Narration, but proof; for tis Example.  
There may also be Narration in Deliberatives, in that part, where Crimination, and Praise come in: But that part is not Deliberative, but Demonstrative.   

CHAP. 16. Of proof, or Confirmation, and Refutation.  
proofs are to be applied to some thing Controverted.  
The controversy in judicial Orations is, Whether it has been done; whether it has been hurtful; whether the matter be so great, and whether it be lust, or no.  
In a question of Fact, one of the Parties of necessity is faulty( for ignorance of the Fact is no excuse) and therefore the Fact is chiefly to be insisted on.  
In Demonstratives the Fact for the most part is supposed: but the Honour and Profit of the Fact are to be Proved.  
In Deliberatives the question is, Whether the thing be like to be, or likely to be so Great; or whether it be just; or whether it be Profitable.  
Besides the application of the proofs to the question, a man ought to observe, whether his Adversary have lied in any point without the Cause. For tis a figne he does the same in the Cause.  
The proofs themselves are either Examples or Enthymemes.  
A Deliberative Oration, because tis of things to come, requireth rather Examples then Enthymemes.  
But a judicial Orations, being of things past, which have a necessity in them, and may be concluded Syllogistically, requireth rather Enthymemes.  
Enthymemes ought not to come too thick together: for they hinder one anothers force by confounding the Hearer.  
Nor ought a man endeavour to porove every thing by Enthymeme lest like some Philosophers, he collect what is known, from what is less known.  
Nor ought a man to use Enthymemes when he would move the Hearer to some affection: for seeing divers motions do mutually destroy or weaken one another, he will lose either the Enthymeme, or the affection that he would move.  
For the same reason, a man ought not to use Enthymemes when he would express Manners.  
But whether he would move affection, or insinuate his Manners, he may with all use Sentences.  
A Deliberative Oration is more difficult then a judicial, because tis of the future, whereas a judicial is of that which is past, and that consequently may bee known; and because it has Principles, namely the Law; and it is easier to prove from Principles, then without.  
Beesids, a Deliberative Oration wants those helps of turning to the Adversary; of speaking of himself; of raising Passion.  
He therefore that wants matter in a Deliberative Oration, let him bring in some Person to praise, or dispraise.  
And in Demonstratives he that has nothing to say in commendation or discommendation of the principal Party, let him praise or dispraise somebody else, as his Father, or kinsman, or the very virtues or vices themselves.  
He that wants not proofs, let him not only prove strongly, but also insinuate his Manners: but he that has no proof, let him nevertheless insinuate his manners. For a good man is as acceptable, as an exact Oration.  
Of proofs, those that led to an absurdity please better then those that are direct or Ostensive; because from the comparison of Contraries, namely Truth and Falsity, the force of the syllogism does the better appear.  
Confutation is also a part of proof.  
And he that speaks first, puts it after his own proofs, unless the Controversy contain many and different matters. And he that speaks last puts it before.  
For tis necessary to make way for his own Oration, by removing the Objections of him that spake before. For the mind abhors both a Man and his Oration that is damned before hand.  
If a man desire his Manners should appear well,( lest speaking of himself he become odious, or troublesone, or obnoxious to obtrectation; or speaking of another, he seem contumelious, or Scurrilous) let him introduce another Person.  
Last of all, lest he cloy his Hearer with Enthymemes, let him vary them sometimes with Sentences; but such as have the same force. As here is an Enthymeme. If it be then the best time to make peace when the best conditions of peace may be had, then the time is now, while our Fortune is entire. And this is a Sentence of equal force to it. Wise men make peace, while their Fortune is entire.   

CHAP. 17. Of Interrogations, Answers and lests.  
THe times wherein tis fit to ask ones Adversary a question, are chiefly four.  

1. The first is, when of two Propositions that conclude an Absurdity, he has already uttered one; and we would by Interrogation draw him to confess the other.  
2. The second, when of two Propositions that conclude an Absurdity, one is manifest of itself, and the other likely to bee fetched out by a question; then the Interrogation will be seasonable; and the absurd Conclusion is presently to be inferred, without adding that Proposition which is manifest.  
3. The third, when a man would make appear that his Adversary does contradict himself.  
4. The fourth, when a man would take from his Adversary such shifts as these, In some sort 'tis so; In some sort 'tis not so.   
Out of these Cases 'tis not fit to Interrogate. For he whose question succeeds not is tho●ght vanquished.  
To equivocal questions, a man ought to Answer fully, and not to be too brief.  
To Interrogations which wee foresee tend to draw from us an Answer contrary to our purpose, we must together with our Answer presently give an Answer to the objection, which is implyed in the question.  
And where the question exacteth an Answer that concludeth against us, we must together with our Answer presently distinguish.  
jests are dissolved by serious and grave discourse: and grave discourse is deluded by jests.  
The several kinds of jests are set down in the Art of Poetry.  
Whereof one kind is Ironia, and tends to please ones self.  
The other is Scurrility, and tends to please others.  
The latter of these has in it a kind of baseness: the former may become a man of good breeding.   

CHAP. 18. Of the Epilogue.  
THe Epilogue must consist of one of these four things.  
Either of inclining the judge to favour his own, or disfavour the Adversaries side. For then when all is said in the cause, is the best season to praise, or dispraise the Parties.  
Or of Amplification or Diminution. For when it appears what is good or evil, then is the time to show how great, or how little that good, or evil is.  
Or in moving the judge to Anger, Love or other Passion. For when tis manifest of what kind, and how great the good or evil is, then it will bee opportune to excite the judge.  
Or of redemption, that the judge may remember what has been said.  
Repetition consisteth in the matter, and the manner. For the Orator must show, that he has performed what he promised in the beginning of his Oration, and how: Namely by comparing his Arguments one by one with his Adversaries, repeating them in the same order they were spoken.    
FINIS.