¶ The most notable and excellent discourse of the Christian Philosopher Athenagoras, as touching the Resurrection of the dead, translated out of Greek into Latin by Peter Nannius, and out of Latin into English by R. Porder.  
A TREATISE. VERY Necessary and profitable for this our last ruinous age of the world, in the which are such swarms of Atheists and Epicures, whose pestilent infection is more to be feared then papistry. Therefore worthy the consideration of all men, as well for overthrow of their pernicious errors, as staying the faith and conscience of the weak and unlearned.  
¶ Imprinted at London in Paul's Churchyard, by W. Williamson.  
Anno. 1573.   

¶ To the right worshipful, his singular good friend M. William Fleetewood Esquire, Recorder of the most honourable City of London, his well willer Richard Porder wisheth felicity in Christ jesus.  
IT is true (right worshipful sir) which the auctor of this work at the very first entry thereof doth allege, that some error doth as it were cleave to every treatise or disputation, for Aristotle contendeth that mundus est aeternus, The Stoics have assigned two beginnings of all things, to weet, Deus, & materia: Democritus and Epicurus say, the world is composed ex atomis temere & casu concurrentibus, that is: of little motes flying together in the air, and cleaving one to an other, and so increasing this great massis lump, or earthy globe of the world. Thales saith, water was the brood mother and beginning of all things. etc. And other acknowledged this world to have a beginning, and God to be the cause of that beginning, and by their diligent studies and wisdom, have found out of what divers elements mankind was composed: Yea further by their great know ledge in many mighty works of God, but specially in the creation of man, they confessed God to be perfectly wise, perfectly just, and summum bonum, out of which reasonable knowledge (naturally graffed in man it seemeth) the author of this treatise took his ground to prove the resurrection of the dead by reason. First admonishing all those that doubt or believe not this doctrine, to examine effectual by reason the cause of their unbelief or doubting, for he affirmeth truly, that to admit doubts, or incredulity without due examination in reason why, is the part of the prodigal as he calleth them, that is, of such as spend their wits waste fully and carlessly, without reason or judgement: and as there were many errors about the beginning of things, so not a few errors (touching the repairing of those things, which God made to be restored after their dissolution) were the cause of this man's writing. For Epicures & the Saducees flatly denied the resurrection, As Sardanapalus last king of Syria declareth in an Epitaphe, which he made for himself a little before he leapt headlong into the fire, wherein he was brent as Strabo noteth.  
Cum te mortalem noris, presentibus exple  
Delitiis animum, post mortem nulla voluptas  
Namque ego sum pulvis, qui nuper tanta tenebam  
Haec habeo quae edi, quaeque exaturata libido  
Hausit: at illa manent multa & preclara relicta  
Hoc sapiens vitae mortalibus est documentum  
That is, for as much, as thou knowest thyself to be mortal, glut thy desire with present delights. After death there is no pleasant solace, for see I am dust, which of late possessed so great honour & riches. Those things oncly I have, which I did eat: Yea what greedy lust hath devoured, I hold in possession: But all my gold, magnificient buildings, lands, riches and honour left behind me remain for other. Lo I am an example and wise lesson for all mortal creatures to consider. It grieved this Epicure that he could not eat all the world while he lived: Also Philetus & Hymineus said, it should be spiritual. Some heahten hathbeleeved the soul only should remain for ever with the Gods. And other thought the soul should survive the body, and yet could not tell what should become of it, as Aelius Adrianus the Emperor, who desperately cried in his sickness,  
Animula vagula blandula  
Que nunc abibis in loca?  
Nec ut soles, dabisiocos  
Hospes comesque corporis  
Pallidula, rigid a nudula.  
O my little sweet soul, whither wilt thou now depart away from me? For thou being pale, numb, and naked, shalt not henceforth enjoy thy pleasures as in times past, being a guest and companion of the body. Other thought that soul and body did perish together, and also should rise again in the last day, of whom Eusebius, saith, Exorti sunt autem alij quidam tum temporis in Arabia. etc. At that time there sprung up an other sect in Arabia, which held an opinion contrary to the truth, which said that souls perished together with the bodies, and also should rise with the bodies in the last day. Other affirmed that men's bodies should rise, but not the self same bodies, nor the same flesh. All which false opinions contrary to themselves, and repugnant to the Christian faith, as your worship heareth them daily confuted by authority of scriptures and examples in the same: so here you shall see the same overthrown by force of reason: and where some grant God to be able, and yet doubt of his will, Athenagoras showeth that the ommpotencie, justice, wisdom and will of God are so linked together by an inviolable decree concerning this matter, that the Epicures may aswell deny that there is a God, as deny the resurrection of the dead, and last judgement. And though some have signed reasons (as seemed to them) wherefore they doubted of this matter, as the transmutation of one substance into an other by digestion (for so physicians define digestion) namely of men's bodies devoured of beasts and birds, and the same beasts and birds devoured by men. etc. And so conclude an impossibility that men should rise again with their own bodies. The author doth phisically make away to lose or unknit those doubts by these reasons, that all such meat as man and beast eateth, is not turned into the substance of the eater, but only that part which is truly natural for substantial food by order of creation or of nature. And that seeing the creator was able and did know how to compose bodies of sundry severed substances, he also is able and could not be ignorant how to conserve the integrity of the nature & substances composed, though they might be dissolved and scattered into how many so ever thousand parts or places. Against the heathen he affirmeth that who so ever hath received the law, must be justified or condemned, but it was not the soul only, but soul and body, therefore soul and body must be justified or condemned, which cannot be unless the body rise, ergo the dead must needs rise again. And further as it is absurd to attribute the affections of the body to the soul, so is it an unjust thing to say the soul shallbe justified or condemned: but it is absurd to say the soul is a thief, a hooremonger, or murderer, for that way the soul offendeth by the instruments of the body, and therefore soul and body must needs come to judgement, which cannot be unless the dead rise, and therefore the dead must needs rise again. And though it may be said these be but arguments probable and not necessarily strong of themselves, to confirm or establish the truth: yet are they of sufficient force to shake doubts and incredulity in pieces, which is the authors purpose in this treatise, and therefore I refer your worship to his arguments, you shall find him hard, & no marvel, for he written in Greek, which tongue much abhorreth our common phrase. There was but one copy in Europe to be foundwhen this was first translated into latin, and therefore might be infected. And besides this Athenagoras doth not only play the Philosopher in matters philosophical, but in the profoundest matter of Religion, so that your worship taking him in your hand, have to deal asmuch with a most cunning divine, as with a most wise philosopher, and in a matter of great importance: namely the resurrection of the dead, whereon the chiefest part of our religion dependeth M. Peter Nannius taught him to speak latin thirty two years since at the university of Louane in Brabant, and now I have taught him to speak english in London, made him a free denizen, and brought him acquainted with your worship, as with a man very meet for wisdom, learning, & authority, to give in the behalf of our whole city honourable entertainment to so noble a stranger. And as I heartily desire you to accept my doings as a token of thankfulness (though far from a just recompense) for your manifold friendship to me sundry ways showed: So I humbly beseech you to make him a free man of London, bring him acquainted with the honourable Lord Mayor, & his right worshipful brethren the Aldermen, with liveries of all companies, and their yeomanries, for he was a wise Citizen, a Religious divine, a prudent philosopher, a great lover of Justice, & a most faithful Patron to Christ's Church, as appeareth in that more than thirteen hundred years ago, he written an Apology or defence in Greek to Antonius & commodus Emperors, in the behalf of the Christians. Not devilish Diagoras can raze the walls of that City where godly Athenagoras dwelleth: All godless Atheists, beastly Epicures, scoffing Lucianists, mocking Machiauelists, revolting julianistes, Hypocrites and abominable workers how soever they blear men's eyes, are made afraid by Athenagoras of that just judge, which cannot be blinded, bribed, out faced, nor entreated, before whom all must stand, having their deeds naked and bore to answer for themselves, and receive sentence of life or death eternally. And thus fearing jest through uttering over many waste words, I may be thought rather cumbrous then commendable, I beseech the almighty preserve your worship to his will and pleasure.  
At London this 10. of October. Anno. 1573. By yours to his poor power, Richard Porder.   

¶ ATHENAGORAS, A Christian Philosopher of Athenes, of the Resurrection of the dead.  
SOme error doth, as it were, grow, & very nearly cleave unto every determination, and treatise, which dependeth & is grounded upon the truth of these things.  
But it proceedeth not of any principle, and natural inclination of the things, nor of the causes of their substance, but by the labour, and means, of them, which do esteem and have in great honour cointerfeyt seed, to corrupt the truth withal.  
That this thing is true, you may easily gather. First by the earnest study of aurcient writers, which bestowed their labour upon this matter, in that they do descent, both from them which were long time before them, as also from those which lived in their time. But especially you may gather it by the variety of opinions which were amongst them.  
For these men did let no truth pass without some depraving, not not the essence, not the knowledge, not the working, of God, nor many other things, which do in order follow these. Not not so much as speech which is the painter of all godliness.  
For some of them do utterly despair to attain the truth of such things, other some do writhe away themselves to that which seemeth to them best, and other do much doubt in things manifest.  
Wherefore I think, that he, which mindeth to dispute of these matters, had need to use two manner of treatises, the one to make defence for the truth. The other to try which is the truth. The first I think must be used against those, which be doubtful, and hard of belief, the second to them, that wish well, and be favourers of the truth.  
Wherefore it behoveth them, which do mind to boolte, and to search the nature of these matters, to mark diligently, what present commodity requireth, and thereby to direct their discourse, and fitly apply the order of things to necessity, that whiles they do place those things, which be first according to order in the first place, they do not against that, which is seemly, and forsake the respect of necessity, care, and or congruity.  
For like as unto a demonstration, & natural consequence, those things, which do entreat of the matter, are before those which are spoken in defence of it: so when we have respect to profit, those things, which are in defence of the matter, are to be handled before those, which do discourse of the matter.  
For like as the husbandman can not conveniently sow his domestical seed, unless his ground be purged from all wild, and unkindly matter, and such things as may annoy good seed: neither the physician minister any wholesome medicine to a sick body, unless he purge him from all his noisome humours, or stay the affluence of excessive corruption and filthiness: so can not he, which teacheth the truth, speaking of the truth, persuade any thing, as long as their abideth in the minds of men a certain false opinion, which doth gainsay the reasons of the truth.  
Whereupon we having a respect, and regard unto congruity, & convenience, have preposed our treatise of the defence of the truth, before it, that doth entreat thereof.  
Which thing at this time and in this question to do seemeth not unprofitable, whilst we have before our eyes that, which necessity requireth, especially in that discourse which handleth the resurrection of the dead.  
For in this matter we find some, that utterly believe it not, other some that are very doubtful, and of them, which admit, and assent to the principles, and grounds of this question, some do yet nevertheless waver in an uncertain, and inconstant opinion, as much as they, which be doubtful, and, that is most absurd, they do suffer this wavering of mind without any occasion of doubting, which they can draw from things themselves.  
For they can allege no cause any thing likely, why they either doubt, or stagger.  
That this thing is true you may easily perceive after this manner.  
For truly all hardness of belief, doth proceed not rashly of a vain, & light opinion, but for some urgent cause, & likelihood well fortified.  
For than incredulity hath a reasonable excuse, when the matter itself, which is not believed, containeth some thing, which is incredible.  
For not to believe those things which have no cause of doubting, is proper to such men, as do not use any sound judgement in searching out of the truth.  
Therefore it behoveth them, which do not believe the resurrection, or do doubt of it, not to direct their opinions according to that, which without consideration seemeth to them probable, or acceptable to the prodigal, and those which live in too much riot: but in searching and considering the truth of this doctrine, either to ascribe no cause thereof to the creation of man, which is easy to be refuted, or else to impute all things created to God the author of all, and thereby to prove that the resurrection in no case is to be believed.  
And they may do this, if either they declare, that God lacketh will, or wanteth power to restore to life a dead and dissolved body, so that he make it sound, and join it together, to renew the form of the old man. Which thing if they can not prove, let them leave of their wicked unbelief, and detestable blasphemy.  
But it shall appear by those things, that follow, that they say falsely, whether they allege, that God can not, or that he will not. For lack of power in any man is thereby perceived, if either he know not what must be done, or if he know it, yet is so weak in strength, that he can not well accomplish the same.  
For he which knoweth not what must be done, can neither take in hand, nor yet bring to pass any thing at all, especially of those things, which he hath no knowledge of.  
But he that knoweth what is to be done, and how, and by what means it may be finished, but yet hath either no strength at all, or else not sufficient to accomplish the matter, the which he well understandeth: he, if he be wise, & will look upon his own ability, either will not take it in hand unadvisedly, or shallbe disappointed of the end of his work.  
But it is impossible, that God should be ignorant in any point, or parcel of the bodies, which be appointed for the resurrection.  
For it is not possible, that it should be hid from him, whether every one of the corrupted members be gone, and what putrefied, things the parts of the elements have received into them, & have admitted into like nature, although amongst men, that which is powered again into the universal nature of the elements doth seem altogether inseparable, & indeprehensible.  
For to him, which before that any thing was created, was not ignorant of the nature of the elements, before they were, where of bodies do take their beginning, neither were the parts of the elements unknown, out of the which he was minded to gather that, which pleased him for the constitution of man's body, it is manifest enough, that he would not be ignorant, whether every thing might depart which he took to make perfect his work withal, when the composed masses are to be sundered, and severed.  
For as touching the order of our affairs, and the judgement of other our business, it is a greater matter to foreknow those things, which are not, yet before they come to pass: but as touching the majesty, & wisdom of God, both these are natural & like easy, both to foreknow those things, which are not yet created, & also to discern those things, which be resolved.  
And truly even the creation of bodies doth well declare, that God hath power sufficient to restore dead bodies.  
For if he made bodies, when as yet they were not, and brought forth the principles of them, whence they had their beginning: he can also repair the same by what mean soever they were dissolved, with the like case.  
Neither here shall this reason fail, whether they draw the beginning of things from the matter, and stuff of them, or frame bodies of the elements, as the first principles of all things, or of their seed in procreation.  
For in whose power it is to transform matter, which in the beginning was with out form, and to adorn it with many, and diverse countenances, which before had no shape, and to gather together the parts of the elements, and to divide into many parts the seed, which was one, and uniform, and to garnish that with joints which before was without joints, and to give life to a thing without life: he also is able to unite together that, which is scattered abroad, & raise up that, which lieth, and make that alive, which is dead, and change that, which was corruptible, into incorruption.  
The same workman also, can by his power, and wisdom, when a body is is toarne in pieces by a multitude of diverse beasts (how many so ever do use to set upon such bodies, & thereby fill their paunches) separate it from them, and join it again to his members, and parts, whether they went into one beast, or more, or whether they went into divers, one after another successively, or whether with them being consumed, they do return again to their first beginnings, as by natural putrefaction things are accustomed to do.  
This thing truly, doth seem to have greatly troubled men of excellent learning, which thought the doubting of the common people (I know not upon what occasion) to be weighty, & of great force.  
They say that many bodies in shipwreck by sea, and in rivers, have been meat to fishes, and that bodies, which were slain in war, or upon some other sharp occasion, & other circumstances of things, when they could not be buried, were a pray to every beast, as each first could meet therewith.  
Seeing therefore that these bodies be devoured in such sort, and the members, and parts, whereof these bodies did consist, be torn in pieces, and therefore by the nature of growing together be made the brawns, sinews, & inyutes of beasts, they say it is impossible, that they should suffer any separation, or division one from an other.  
Besides this they bring forth another thing, which is more hard, namely, that seeing those beasts which be nourished with the members of men be eaten as fit for man's meat, and therefore being put into men's bellies, be united together with the body of them, which eat them: it followeth necessarily say they, that the members of man, which tell before to these beasts, for their food, do pass into other men's bodies seeing those beasts which did devour the flesh of man, do transmit their substance into the brawns of them, which receive nourishment of those beasts whom men were eaten.  
Then do they here unto tragically exaggerate, the limbs of Children cut of and eaten either in hunger, or madness, and children devoured of their parents, through the craft and deceit of enemies, they add moreover the table of the Meads and the tragical banquet of Thyestes', and what so ever mischief hath been committed, either amongst the Gréecians, or among the Barbarians upon these grounds they infer well as they suppose, that there can be no resurrection, seeing it can not be, that the same members should rise again in diverse bodies together. For either the first bodies can not consist, when the limbs are gone thither, where they make a furniture, or if they be restored to the first owner, the bodies of them, which follow, can not be perfect.  
These men do seem to me, first of all to be ignorant of the power, & wisdom of the creator, & governor of all things, which prepareth nourishinent fit, & agreeable to every nature, and kind of living thing, & doth not ordain every nature to concur to the contemperature, and mixture of every natural body, neither doth stagger, & stay in severing the parts of things grown together, and suffereth all things according to their proper nature, both to do, & suffer, and sometime contrariwise stoppeth them, & doth convey, & take away, what he list, & whether he listeth.  
Beside this the same men seem to me, not to know thoroughly, the strength and nature, either of things, which do nourish, or of those which are nourished. Otherwise they would have known, that not every thing, which is powered from one in to another, is made food fit, & agreeable to the nature of that thing, that taketh it.  
But that some things assoon as they be received into the belly, do perish, either by vomiting, or by excrement, or by avoiding, by some other mean, so that they endure not one little while the first, and natural concoction, or any other mixture with the things, that nourish. As therefore not every thing, which is concoct, & hath suffered the first alteration, is wholly joined with that, which nourisheth the body, seeing that some things thereof be, as it were, expelled of the nourishing power & faculty of man, by the belly, & other some after the second change, and alteration in the liver, are avoided and severed unto other things, which do exceed the power of nourishing, & the very change itself, which is in the liver, doth not wholly nourish, but straineth some of it unto accustomed superfluities: so in like manner the liver doth sometime convert that, which it did retain to nourish the parts of the body with all, into some other thing according to the nature of that, which beareth greatest sway, and doth most abound, which is accustomed either to destroy that which is next unto it, or else to change it into his own nature.  
Seeing that there is therefore much natural difference, in all living creatures, & seeing that food must by nature be aptly applied to every kind of beast, and changed with the body, which is nourished therewith, and seeing that in the meat of creatures there be three manners of purifyings, and avoydinges thereof, it is requisite that, that meat perish wholly, or be sent whether it is accustomed, or be changed into some other thing, what soever is not covenable for the nourishment, & food of any creature, as a thing, which can not be mingled, and contempered therewith, and the force of the nourishment of the creature must naturally agree, and descend through natural (as I may term them) sieves & sarches, and being throughly purged by these natural cleansings be made most pure, that it may be adjoined to the body, the which only (if you use the terms of things a right) you may call nourishment, as that, which hath cast away all, which is not agreeable, but hurtful to the constitution of the creature to be nourished, & hath also shaken of that great infarced, and stuffed weight, which the stomach used to fill itself, and satisfy appetite withal.  
But no man will doubt, that this most pure nourishment is united with the body, and that it is entangled, & doth grow with all the members and joints thereof, and that it, which is not so, but is contrary to nature, doth perish by and by, if it be mingled with the strongest parts of the body, or doth destroy by little & little the strength of the body, which it overcometh, and doth turn it into naughty, and venomous juice, as a thing which bringeth nothing agreeable and wholesome to nourish the body withal.  
And the greatest argument of this thing is, because that either grief, or dangers, or death doth thereupon invade bodies, if with an eager appetit they swallow with their meat some poison, or other thing, which is contrary to their nature, which without peradventure bringeth destruction to the whole body. For truly those things, which are nourished, are nourished with those things, wherewith they be acquainted and be natural, but are destroyed with those things, which be repugnant to their nature.  
If then by the discord of these things, which do strive with the nature of living creatures, the natural nourishment also is corrupted, and doth take neither all those things, which be ministered to the body, nor yet any thing upon a sudden to the increase of the flesh, but that only, which being purified by all concoctions cometh pure, and therefore showeth itself fit to nourish the parts: it is plain, enough that nothing which is against nature, can be united to those creatures, to whom that meat is not both natural, & agreeable: but that either it is cast down raw, and corrupt through the belly, before it be changed into some other juice, or if it do long continued in the members it doth breed some fault, or disease hard to be cured, corrupting either the natural nourishment, or else the flesh, which hath need of nourishment.  
And if it be driven away with medicines, or overcome with better diet, or natural strength, yet it will not depart out of the body without some small hurt, as bringing nothing available for lack of ability to grow, & to be joined together with it.  
To be short if any man grant nourishment to be subministred thereby, and add, there withal that it is usual, although in deed it be contrary to nature, that it be digested, and changed into any thing that is moist, or dry, or hot, or could, yet although these things be granted, it shall not follow, that any furtherance cometh thereby to the bodies of those which rise again, that they get thereby a fuller number of members, seeing that it is neither a part of the body, nor yieldeth the likeness, or steed of any part of the body, nor yet doth continued still with the members nourished, or if it do rise again together with the members rising again, it doth profit nothing to the use of life, whether it be blood, phlegm, choler, or spirit. For then the bodies, which were nourished shall not now have need of that, which sometime they needed, when hunger, and corruption being past, the necessity of taking nourishment shallbe taken away.  
Now if any man imagine, that such transmitation of meat doth extend itself to the creation of flesh, yet notwithstanding necessity shall not compel, that this flesh being newly created of nourishment, when it cometh to the body of an other, must return again to absolve the perfection of the former body, as a part of it: because that the ●●she which hath received this nourishment from some other body, neither doth keep it long, nor that which cometh from another, doth long abide there whither it cometh, but to the contrary suffereth a great alteration, when sometime it vanisheth away by grief, sometime it pineth away by care, sorrow, labour, and sickness, and sometime by reason of the untemperateness of heat and cold, the humours do not change themselves into flesh and fatness, so that the bodies which have received these meats, do continue still the same that they are.  
Seeing that such things happen in the affections of the flesh, you may much more easily perceive the same in the flesh which is nourished with improper meats, seeing that it sometime increaseth to a huge bigness, and covereth it with fat by reason of the meats, which are taken and again casteth it away by some means, & is diminished either for some one, or for many of those causes which we have before rehearsed, so that that flesh only remaineth, which hath strength to bind, to thicken, and to cherish, namely such as is chosen of nature, and is like and agreeable to those meats, wherewith according to nature, nature furnisheth life, and sustaineth the labours of life.  
But neither, as the right is, whether those things which we have spoken of be cleansed away, or whether they be received, can that be proved to be true, which is objected by these men, neither can men's bodies be mingled & coupled with bodies of the same kind, whether in eating they be beguiled by some man's guile, so that they feel not the taste thereof, or else voluntarily for hunger, or by reason of madness do pollute themselves with devouring bodies of their own kind, unless peradventure we know not that there be some beasts endued with the shape of men, or compounded of diverse natures, so that they consist partly of men, partly of beasts, such as the boldest of the Poets are wont to fayne.  
But what shall I say of those bodies which are given to no living creature to devour, and which only for the worthiness of their nature have obtained the honour of burial, seeing that the maker of all things hath assigned to no creature any body of like form for meat, although according to nature they are fed with bodies of diverse form.  
If so be that, they can declare, that the flesh of men is given to men for meat by the ordinance of nature, what impediment shall there be, why there should not be mutual slaughters of us committed, as is accustomed to be done in things granted by nature.  
And truly, let them, which dare say thus, ravenously devour the bodies of their dearest friends as most dainty meat, that they may eat them, whom they loved best.  
But if this be ungodly, and an heinous, and abominable offence to be spoken, & to be detested above all other wicked meats and mischievous acts, for man to devour the limbs of men, & again if it be true, that that which is against nature, is not received of the hungry members, and that which is not received for meat, cannot grow together with those bodies, for which it is not meat naturally: it cannot be that men's bodies at any time should be confounded with other bodies of the same kind, into whom contrary to nature they are thrust for meat, although they be stuffed into their belies by reason of some grievous calamity.  
For flying back and refusing nutritive faculty, and being cast thither, from whence they had their first beginning, are joined to their first grounds for a time, & yet being severed from thence by the wisdom & power of him, which ordereth all things, they shallbe joined one to another again in most convenient order, whether they have been burnt with fire, or consumed with water, or devoured of beasts or being cut of from the body of him, which is yet alive, waxed rotten before the other parts: yet coming together again amongst themselves they shall possess the same place, that they may make the same proportion and constitution of the body, and repair the resurrection & the life of the body being dead or all together dissolved.  
It is not convenient to prosecute these things at large: for they have a declaration confessed and not doubted of, especially among such men, as do hate beastly and brutish customs.  
But seeing their be many things profitable to the searching out of these matters: first of all I wish them to be excluded, which run to human works, & to men, the makers thereof, whose works being worn out, or rotten by reason of time, or clean undone by some other mean cannot be renewed again by a similitude drawn their hence, do go about to prove, that God either will not, or if he will, can not restore a dead and vanished karcas to his former state: neither do they consider with themselves, that by this means, they be contumelious against God, whilst they compare powers differing one from an other in every respect, or rather the possessors of the powers, and do compare things artificial with things natural.  
It is not without fault earnestly to deal with such men. For it is a foolish thing in deed to gainsay light, & vain persons: but it is a great deal more probable, & of all other the truest to affirm that to be possible to God, which is impossible to men. Wherefore if either by these things which are probable, or by all those things, which be heretofore examined, reason doth declare it to be possible to God, it is manifest enough, that it must not be counted impossible, or to abhor from the will of God.  
For what he will not do, therefore he will not do it, either because it is unjust, or else because it is unworthy.  
Furthermore this injustice is perceived, either about him, which riseth, or about some other thing without him.  
But it is manifest, that there is no injury done to any thing at all, which is without those, that rise again, and are existent in nature. For the intelligible creatures do receive no injury by the resurrection of men, for there being is nothing thereby hindered, and the resurrection of men doth bring no reproach or hurt to them, as it doth seem not to do also unto things without reason, and soul.  
For they after the resurrection shall not remain, and to such things which be not, can no wrong be done.  
But if you do imagine them to be, than yet shall they feel no wrong by the resurrection of men.  
For if when they are bestowed on the nature of man, and be brought under yoke, and all kind of servitude, for the behoof of them, being subject unto misery, do yet suffer no wrong, much less shall they suffer injury, when man shallbe made incorruptible, and be placed free from all need, and misery, and they also delivered from all kind of servitude.  
For if they were endued with the gift of speaking, they would not accuse the maker of all things, as though contrary to right they were placed under the condition of men, because they were not admitted into the fellowship of the same resurrection.  
For to those things, whose nature is not equal, he that is just, doth not attribute one end or honour, & where is no sense of justice as in brute beasts, and things without life, there is no indignation for any in justice.  
This also can not be said, that in man any injury is perceived by that he is raised from the dead.  
For he, as he is framed of soul, and body, so he receiveth injury against other part, other body, or soul, and a wise man will not affirm the soul to suffer injury therefore, because by this means it doth not retain the same trade of life, in which now in this present world it liveth.  
For if now, dwelling in a corruptible body, and subject to passions, it suffereth no injury, much less dwelling in an incorruptible body, & subject to no passions, shall it abide any wrong.  
Nay, farther than this, even the body feeleth no injury. For if now being corruptible, and joined in fellowship with an incorruptible soul, it taketh no wrong thereby, much less shall it take wrong, when on both sides they are incorruptible.  
Furthermore neither can this be said, that it is an unworthy thing for God, that he should restore and gather again resolved bodies.  
For if that, which is less in dignity (namely to created a mortal body, subject to affections) did not seem unworthy God, much less shall it be unworthy for him to bring that into the world, which is more excellent, and endued with immortality, and fréenes from passions.  
If therefore by those things, which are first in nature, & those also, which consequently do follow the first, every point, which was in question, be plainly showed, & declared: it is manifest enough, that the restoring of bodies is such as is not unworthy of God, and which he both will and can bring to pass.  
For by these things the falsity of the contraries, and the absurdity of them, which believe not is declared.  
For what need is there to speak of the mutual agree of one thing with another, and of the mutual coherence between them, as though they were separated by some diversity, and it were not lawful to say that what God will, that he can do, and is for his majesty, to do with dignity.  
But we have said before that there is one disputation concerning the truth, another in defence of the truth, & have declared wherein one of them differeth from an other, and when, and amongst whom it profiteth.  
Notwithstanding it will nothing hinder us, for common, safety's sake and order, that those things, which have been said may agree with those things that shallbe said, to take our beginning from the self same things, and such as are congruent unto them: for it behoveth the one by nature to have the pre-eminence, & the other in steed of a waiting man to make way for the chief. And with his waymaking which goeth before to take away all hinderances and impediments.  
For the treatise which is of the truth, seeing it is necessary for all men, both for their safeguard, and preservation is first and chief, both by nature, order, and profit: by nature because it setteth forth the knowledge of things: by order, because it is in, and together with those things, the judgement and knowledge whereof it promiseth: by profit, because it maketh defence and safeguard to them which know and learn it.  
But the discourse▪ which is for the truth, is inferior both in nature and power: for it is less to reprove a falsehood then to establish a truth, and followeth by order.  
For it exerciseth force against them, which believe the falsehood. But a false opinion groweth, and proceedeth of a second sowing, as it were, & of corruption.  
But although these things be thus, yet sometime this is put before the other, and is more profitable, because it taketh away, and forepurgeth troublesome incredulity, or some new doubt, or some false opinion, and both these tend to one end.  
For both seeketh godliness, as well that which refuseth the falseshood, as that which establisheth the truth, & yet are they not all one. For the one is necessary, as I said, for all believers, and them which have any care of the truth, & their own salvation, the other is more profitable in some time and among some men.  
These things are spoken briefly, to keep the remembrance of the former words.  
But now we must return to our purpose, and declare that that treatise is true, which is concerning the resurrection and that upon that cause, for the which, and by the which the first man & his successors were borne, although they were not both created after one manner.  
Then we must prove it by the nature of all men, in that they be men.  
afterward by the judgement of the creator, which he will give of them, according as they have lived, which judgement no man will doubt of, but that it is most just.  
But the handling of the cause doth consist in this point, that we search out, whether man were made unadvisedly, and to no end, or for some purpose.  
If he were created for some purpose, whether it were that he should live, and continued in this life, the, which he was naturally ordained unto, or that he should minister some profit to an other.  
But if he were created for some profit, whether it were for the profit of the creator, or of some other thing which belongeth to the creator, & is more regarded of him, then man.  
Here truly, using a common and simple kind of searching in beholding of things we find, that whosoever is endued with reason, and is moved to do any thing by reasonable judgement, doth nothing unadvisedly, of those things, which he doth willingly.  
For that he doth, he taketh in hand, either for his own sake, or for some man's sake, which he loveth, or inflamed with the desire and natural inclination to that thing, which he hath done.  
As for example (For we will use a similitude that our purpose may be plain) A man buildeth a house, and that for his own proper use; he furnisheth also his house being in order; with Camels and other beasts, whose help he hath need of, not for his own use as it seemeth (although the latter end be referred to him) but as touching the next & néereth cause, for their commodity whom he careth for.  
But he begetteth children, not for his own use, nor for the profit of any thing, which belongeth unto him, but that those, whom he begetteth, may be & remain alive, as far as it is lawful, and may be done, ministering a remedy to his own death by the succession of children, & believing thus far, that he hath put of mortality.  
But God neither created man unadvisedly, seeing he is wise. (For a wise man doth no thing unadvisedly) neither for his own use & necessity (for he hath need of nothing) & that which hath need of nothing, doth not desire profit of those things which he createth) neither did he make man for the profit of any other of his works, for nothing amongst those things, which are endued with reason and judgement, whether it be great or small, is created or shallbe created for the use of any other thing. For such things are created only for their own life and safety.  
Neither hath reason found out any other end, why men were created, seeing that they were ordained to be immortal without the need of any thing, seeing that they require no help of men for the safeguard of their life, & seeing that all beasts be subject, and all things else do minister commodity to men, for whose use they were made.  
But beasts have no use of men: for neither is it, nor was it at any time lawful to debase that creature, which is chief & ruler of all, for the use of other things which are under him, or to bring that which is endued with reason, under the yoke of those things, which be without reason and unfit to rule.  
Wherefore, if man were created neither without cause, nor unadvisedly, nor to no end, (for there is nothing amongst the works of God done unadvisedly, if we consider the meaning and intention of God) nor yet for the profit of the creator, nor for the commodity of other things, which the creator made, it is manifest enough that if we look upon the first and universal cause, GOD created man for himself, and his own goodness & wisdom, which you may easily perceive in all things created: but if you search out the next cause, and that which agreeth with men being created, you shall find that man was borne to this end, that he should live.  
But not in such a life that should continued for a while, & strait way should perish for ever.  
For God (I think) hath given such a life to beasts that creep, and to birds, and to fishes: but to them which bear about them his own Image, and there withal have a mind which is the finder out of things, and are adorned with the gifts of reason, he hath assigned a perpetual continuance, that by knowing their creator, and following his power and wisdom by laws and justice, they might with those virtues happily continued everlastingly, with which they established their former life, when they yet lived in their earthly, and corruptible bodies.  
For such things as are created for the behoof of other things, when those things, for whose use they were ordained do perish, do not without cause perish also, and can not remain for any purpose, because there is no place amongst things created of God, for vain idleness.  
But those things which were for this end created, that they should be and continued (the cause being joined and entangled with their nature, seeing the cause doth only exact and require, that they should be) it is not possible that they should at any time suffer such violence, whereby they should utterly be abolished.  
Furthermore, seeing that this cause is understood by a perpetual kind of being, and doth consist in this point, it is necessary that that creature do remain in safety, which was thus created, and do and suffer those things which be agreeable to the nature thereof, both the parts whereof it consisteth, doing that which in them lieth, so that the mind doth continued and remain invariable in the nature wherein it was created. For it was therefore created, to bridle the affections of the body, & to esteem with seemly judgement, and measure, with upright measures whatsoever befalleth: But the body was ordained to this end, that it should incline itself to such things, as be natural, & receive those alterations, which are attributed to it by nature, and that amongst other changes, which happen unto it, either in age, or beauty, or bigness, it should admit the resurrection.  
For the resurrection is a kind of change, and that the last of all, and also the alteration into a better thing, which then shallbe in the bodies of them, which be a live.  
We are as sure of these things, as we are of them, which have already happened, and considering our own nature, we do not bear impacientlye this our needy, and corruptible life, as agreeable to this present world, and we constantly hoop for Eternity of life, rid of all corruption, which we do not ground upon the inventions of men, feeding ourselves with a vain hope, but we believe an unfeigned and sufficient witness (namely the reason and ordinance of the creator) according to the which, he hath framed man of a soul immortal, and a body, which also he hath endued with reason and equity, given by nature to conserve, and keep his gifts, and those things, which be agreeable to a discrete life, and a mind endued with reason.  
Whereby we know well enough, that God would not have ordained such a creature, nor furnished it with all things necessary for perpetual continuance, if he would not have it continued, which he had in such sort created.  
Wherefore, if the maker of the world created man, that he should use wisdom in all his doings, and that being made a beholder of his magnificence, and wisdom, which he declared in every place: with the contemplation of these things should continued, and that according to his purpose, and will, and the nature, which he engendered in them, truly the cause of the creation doth confirm, and make credible an endless continuance, and this continuance a resurrection, without the which man cannot continued.  
It is manifest therefore by those things which have been spoken, namely by the cause of the beginning, and the will of the creator, that the resurrection is confirmed.  
Seeing that therefore the cause is such, why man was brought into the world, it shallbe now expedient to consider those things which by natural order, do follow the former reasons.  
For if we weigh, and consider this business, the nature of men created doth follow the cause of their creation, and the just judgement of the creator upon them, doth follow the nature of men created, and after all these, followeth the end, why they live.  
Seeing that therefore those things, which go before be plainly declared, the nature of men must be hereafter declared, and that either by true opinions, or by inquisitions, what sort soever they be of.  
That demonstration doth get a credit not inconstant to those things which are spoken, which hath his beginning not from some thing, or place, which is without the matter, or doth arise of the opinions, or decrees of others: but doth arise of common understanding, or is gathered by the consequence of those things, which be last, to them which be first.  
For that, is either of the first decrees, or of those things, which only by warning, do stir up, and as it were, raise out of sleep natural understanding, or of those things, which naturally in fellowship do cleave unto the first decrees, and be of natural consequence.  
And it behoveth him, which declareth this order, to make plain, what doth follow consequently the first, or the last, in deed that he do not negligently handle either the truth, or some assertion proceeding from the truth, neither confounded those things which be repugnant in nature, or pervert the natural order of things.  
Wherefore, I think it expedient for them which take pain in this argument, and do desire wisely to determine, whether there be any resurrection of men's bodies, first to consider the force of those things, which do make this demonstration, the parts being compared together, and what place every thing doth obtain, and what difference is between these things, and the first, second, and third, and last of all what doth consist in the last place. In placing of these things in order, it behoveth that the cause be declared why man was created that is to say, the mind and purpose of the creator, for the which he took in hand to created man. afterward, the nature of man (which in order obtaineth the second place) must be fitly placed and applied, partly because we cannot judge of both at once, partly because they be both together, & do bring the same furtherance to this present purpose: partly also because by these things, as chief, & principal, and drawing their beginning from the workmanship of God, the resurrection is plainly declared: notwithstanding by the rule of wisdom also a man may gather the certainty of this thing.  
I say the rule of wisdom doth consist in this, that rewards, and punishments according to just judgement, may be bestowed upon every man, according to his deserts, and that the end of them do answer to their life.  
For many which have taken in hand to dispute of the resurrection, did assay to bring all their business to effect, only for that which is third, thinking the cause of the resurrection of men to be only for judgement.  
But that is manifestly proved false, because that all men rise again, yet all that rise again are not judged.  
For if only the justice of judgement be the cause of the resurrection, it should necessarily follow, that they, which have not at all offended, or have committed notable acts in their lives, should be exempt from the resurrection, and they also, which in the beginning of their age, do end their life, which they themselves also think sufficient, that the resurrection be not for judgement, according to the principal cause, but according to the determination, and appointment of the creator, and the nature of that, which is created.  
But seeing that the only cause of the creation of man doth suffice, if it be well looked upon, to confirm the resurrection, which by the natural guiding of reason doth follow the bodies being dissolved, yet peradventure it shallbe reason to omit nothing of those, which we have appointed, and to declare in convenient order the power & efficasie of the causes, than afterward of those things that follow, for the behoof of such men, as cannot perceive those things by their own wit, and amongst other things to set forth the nature of men created, which doth lead us to the knowledge of the same matter, and doth breed as great credit to the resurrection.  
For if the whole nature of man doth consist of an immortal soul, and a body made fit according to his creation, and if God have attributed neither to the soul by itself, nor to the body alone, such a beginning or life, but unto perfect men, which are made of both these parts, that whilst they live, using the same parts, of the which they received their beginning, and life, they might come to the same common end, and reward, it is necessary, seeing one creature is made of both these parts, which is endued with all the affections both of the mind and body, which doth, and exerciseth all things, that require the judgement either of the senses or of reason, that the whole course of these things be referred to some end, that all things, and in all points, both the beginning of man, and the nature of man, and the life of man, and whatsoever he doth, or suffereth, & the end agreeing to his nature, do run together to one consent, and mutual combination.  
But if there be one consent, or harmony of every living creature, and a mutual passion, and participation of affections, both of those which have their beginning from the mind, as also of those which proceed from the body, it is necessary that in all these, there remain one end, and one reward, but there shallbe one end in deed, when the same creature shall consist of both his parts, which shall happen for the ends sake: but the same creature shall perfectly consist, when those things shallbe present with it, and those parts restored to it, by the which his perfitness is absolved.  
But the renewing of the same men, doth declare that the resurrection of dead bodies doth necessarily follow, whether the self same parts can not be naturally joined together, or the same men restored, or return again to their own nature.  
If therefore, mind and reason be given to men, to the end that they should judge, not only of intelligible, substances but of the wisdom, justice, & goodness of him, that gave these things: it is necessary that if those things remain for whose sake this reasonable judgement was given, reasonable judgement should also remain, which was given to discern those things.  
But it is impossible that this judgement should continue, unless that the nature do eke continued, which keepeth & cherisheth it, in the seat & resting place thereof: but man is he, which receiveth wit & reason into him, and not the soul by itself, therefore it must needs be, that man consisting of both parts, do continued for ever. But it is impossible for him to continued for ever, unless he rise again. For unless a resurrection be a mean, man in no case can endure. And if the nature of man can not endure, the soul was in vain mingled with the neediness of the body & the accidents, and affections thereof.  
The body also is in vain unto the soul, giving place to the regiment thereof, and is bridled by it to the end it may obtain the thing, which it desireth. And in vain is mind, in vain wisdom, in vain the observation of justice, and exercise of virtue among men, and the appointing, and disposing of laws, is to no purpose. And to be short, what soever is commendable in men, & by men's procurement, is in vain. Yea, & that which is greater, the very engendering and nature of men is in vain.  
Wherefore, if all vainness be all together excluded from all the works of God, and his function, it is necessary that the continuance of the body in his nature be coeternal with the immortality of the soul.  
Let no man marvel, that we call life cutten in sunder by death, and corruption, a continuing, sith we are not ignorant, that there is not one only signification of the word, nor one only manner of continuing, and no marvel seeing the nature of things continuing, is not all one. For every thing according to the nature thereof hath her proper continuance. You shall not find in those things which are wholly incorruptible, and immortal, a like, and uniform continuance, because the substances of the things above, are not like the things beneath.  
Neither is it convenient to require in men a continuance ever like unto itself, indistinct without any variety, as in those things is, which from the beginning were created immortal, and do only by the appointment of the creator continued everlastingly, but that men have their continnaunce according to the soul from their creation without any alteration or change. But according to the nature of the body, men have immortality by a change. For the cause of the resurrection doth require it, & looking thereupon, we look for the dissolution of the body, as it, which followeth this needy, and corruptible life, and after ward we hope for an incorruptible continuance without alteration, neither making our end like to the end of bruit beasts, neither to the continuance of those things, which be immortal, jest for the lack of knowledge in this matter we make the nature and life of men equal, and like to those things, which we aught not.  
We must not therefore be troubled. If there be any inequality espied in the perduration of men, neither ought we to despair of the resurrection, when the separating of the soul from her bodily members, and the dissolving of the bodily members from it do dispart the continual tenor of the life.  
For although the bringing a sleep of the senses, & of other natural strengths, which naturally doth arise in man's rest, & for a season do slumber, and in a manner are again revived, do seem to cut a sunder the sensible life, yet we do not refuse to count it a life, for which cause, I think, some men do call sleep the brother of death, not because they would thereby declare the stock of them as though they came of one ancestors, & parents, but because like things happen to them, which be a sleep, and to them which be dead in respect of the rest and quietness of the senses, when they understand nothing of things present, or which are then done, nay they perceive not themselves either to be, or to live.  
If therefore we do not refuse, to call the life of man, being full of such inequality even from man's birth unto his death, & interrupted by all those means which we have before rehearsed, a life: then aught we not to despair of the life, which is ordained to succeed our dissolution, which bringeth together with it the resurrection, although for a season it be cutten a sunder, by the departure of the soul from the body.  
For the nature of men posseding from the beginning, and that according to the decree of the creator, an inequality attributed unto it, hath an unequal life, and a continuance, distinct sometime by sleep, sometime by death, & by diverse alterations of ages, so that the first do not plainly appear, when the last do suddenly come upon them.  
For who would believe, unless he were taught by experience of things, that so great force lieth hid in the moist and soft seed, or that such diversity of bigness, and greatness, which ariseth and is framed thereof, is hid therein, namely of bones, sinews, gristles, and also of muscles, flesh, and bowels, and other parts of the body?  
For in the seed, being yet moist, a man can perceive no such thing, nor in children be those things perceived, which in young men do increase, nor those things do appear in youth, which the estate of man possesseth: nor again in the state of man, which age hath.  
But although amongst those things, which are said before, some do nothing at all, and some but obscurely declare the natural changes, and alterations coming on men, yet notwithstanding they, which are not blinded with naughtiness, and sluggishness, do know, what we must judge of these things. For first of all it is required, that the seed be sown, afterward when, it is separated into parts, & joints, & the young ones being now fashioned do come to light, receive in their first age height, after their height the absolute perfection of the whole body, after a while cometh on the natural decreasing of strength, which prolongeth itself even unto old age, then at the last, when the bodies are worn away, dissolution cometh on.  
Like as therefore in this business, neither the seed by any likeness, or similitude, doth declare, either the life, or form of man, nor the life doth foreshow the dissolution, wherewith the joining together of parts shallbe resolved into the first element, yet the order, and guiding of natural events doth get credit to those things, which in their own appearance, and show, do seem to deserve no credit: even so reason by searching the natural consequence, finding the truth, doth establish the resurrection, (which is much more certain, than experience, to prove those sayings, wherewith a little before we endeavoured to get credit to the resurrection) and that therefore because we are all of one 〈…〉 kindred, as proceeding from one & the 〈◊〉 beginning. For our beginning proceedeth from the procreation of our first parents, whom God created.  
But some men even from the beginning, whence they come are established to believe, other some following nature, and the life of man, as their guide, do get belief, of the wisdom of God toward us.  
For the cause, according to the which, and for the which men were borne, agreeing with the nature of men, doth obtain her force, by the workmanship of man created.  
But the cause of justice, according to the which God will judge men, whether they live well, or ill, doth take his force from the end of men. For therefore are men borne. But it dependeth rather upon the providence of God.  
Seeing that therefore those things be declared, and proved by us, as far as we could, which were of the first order, let us declare now also those things that follow. But I speak of the reward and punishment, which according to just judgement, shallbe bestowed upon every man according to his deserts, and of 〈…〉 which shallbe correspondent to 〈…〉 of man. But let that be done in such order, that such things go before, as be naturally of the first place, and first let us entreat of the cause of the judgement, which words we therefore speak, because we have a care of the chief stay and order of this disputation in hand, and because it behoveth them, which admit God, as the creator of the whole world, to attribute the charge, & care of all things to his wisdom, and justice, if so be that they will stick unto the foundation appointed, & the principles once allowed.  
Furthermore, seeing they be of this opinion, it is reason, that they think nothing either of things terrestrial, or celestial to be destitute of the care and providence of God, but that the care of the creator doth extend itself unto all things indifferently, as well unto those which be open, as those, which be hid, and unto those, which be great, as those which be small. For all things, which be, have need of the providence of their creator, but every thing peculiarly according to his nature, & for that purpose, for which it was created.  
For I do not think it expedient, with much labour particularly to declare, and distinguish with divisions, what is agreeable to the nature of every thing. Man truly, of whom we now entreat, as he is hungry, hath need of meat, as he is mortal, hath need of succession of children, as he is endued with reason, hath need of judgement.  
But he hath need of judgement, that he may lawfully labour for living, and succession.  
But it is necessary, that seeing sustenance, and succession do pe rtayne to that, which consisteth of both parts, judgement also do pertain to the same. But I call that which is compound of both parts, a man consisting of a soul, and a body, and such a man to be accused of all things, which he doth, so that he receiveth either a reward, or punishment for them.  
If therefore the sentence of just judgement be pronounced against that, which consisteth of both parts, according to his doings, it cannot be, that the soul alone should receive either reward, or punishment for those things, which it committed with the body.  
For the soul by itself is not touched with those offences, which are committed by the pleasures of the body, or meat, or apparel: neither must the body receive reward, or punishment, because it perceiveth not the danger of laws, & judgement, but man which consisteth of both these parts, must receive judgement for all his doings.  
But you can perceive by no mean, that this doth happen in this life, for that is not lawfully observed in this present life, seeing that we see many, which are wicked, and abound in all iniquity, to persist void of any misfortune even until death, & we see them, which are well known for there virtue, to spend their life in suffering griefs, vexations, slanders, reproaches, and all kind of affliction. Neither can you perceive it after death, for that which consisteth of both parts doth not remain, seeing the soul is separated from the body, and the body itself dissolved into those things, of which it was first made, and nothing now remaineth, which reserveth the old form, or nature, or yet the memory of those things, which are done.  
Wherefore, that which followeth is evident, namely that (as the Apostle saith) this corruptible being dissolved, must put on incorruption, that those bodies which be dead, being made alive by the resurrection, and those things being joined together again, which were cast a sunder, or altogether consumed, every man may justly receive those things, which he hath committed by reason of the body, whether they be good, or ill.  
Against them therefore, which do admit the providence of God, and receive the same principles, and grounds, which we do, and afterward (I know not how) do shrink, and revolt from those opinions, which they received, & thought well of, you may use such words, and other much more plentiful: if you will dilate at large those things, which have been spoken briefly, & in few words. But against such, as make a doubt concerning the principles themselves, it shallbe good to appoint another principle, and ground before these, that in the mean time we may imagine things, that may be doubted of, and must be searched out by questions, which they doubt of, namely whether the life, and manners of men be neglected, and darkened with the gross shadow of the earth, which hideth, and wrappeth in ignorance, and silence both the men themselves, and also their deeds.  
Or which is much more certain, whether we must think, the creator to be ruler of the things created, and to be the observer, and judge of all things, which are done, or committed, as well deeds, as thoughts.  
For if there shall at no time be judgement of the acts of men, than men shall have no pre-eminence above bruit beasts, and they shallbe in worse case, than bruit beasts, which do bring their affections under bondage, and do greatly regard, and honour godliness, justice, & other virtues. Contrariwise, the beastly and savage life shallbe counted best, and virtue on the other side a foolish thing, the threatens of judgement worthy to be laughed at, and to follow pleasure the happiest thing of all, & that shallbe counted the common decree, and chief law of all men, which is pleasant to naughtypackes, and riotous persons, let us eat and drink, for to morrow we shall die.  
For the end of such a life, is not pleasure, as some men think, but a full voidness of perceiving.  
If therefore the creator hath some care of his creatures, and the judgement of good, or evil acts shall at any time approach, it shallbe either while they do well, or ill in this present life, or after death, as long as they consist in dissolution, and separation. But neither way can you find that just judgement is observed.  
For good men in this present life do not receive the rewards of virtue, nor evil men punishment for their wickedness, that I may in the mean time let pass, that as long as the nature, wherein we now are doth continued in safety, the nature of man cannot abide sufficient punishment for his manifold, & grievous offences. For when a thief, or prince, or tyrant doth heap innumerable murders of men one upon another, it cannot be, that he can make satisfaction for his sins by one death. When also a man doth think nothing truly of God, and hath lived in all voluptuousness, and blasphemy, hath despised all the divine commandments, hath broken the laws, hath committed whoredom both with women, and children, hath injuriously overthrown Cities, hath burnt houses with the inhabitants, hath spoiled provinces, hath destroyed by slaughter great people, and countries, & whole nations: how can he in this corruptible body suffer condign punishment for his deserts, seeing death doth prevent his deserved torments, and this mortal nature is not sufficient to punish duly one offence.  
Therefore in this present life, the judgement of every man according to his worthiness, and desert, can not be declared, nor after death, for death is a destroying of the whole life altogether, if the soul perish, and be putrefied together with the body.  
Or else truly the soul remaineth, & cannot be dissolved, nor broke in sunder, nor corrupted, but the body is dissolved, keeping no longer the remembrance of things done, or the sense of such things, as happen unto it.  
For if the whole life of man be utterly destroyed, there appeareth no respect or care of men, neither doth there seem any judgement ordained for well or evil doing: but whatsoever wickedness is in a lawless life, will approach, and overflow again, and other inconveniences, which such a life doth bring with it, as a flock of companions, and amongst them impiety the denier of God, which is chief, & ruler of that life, in which men live without law.  
And if the body be corrupt, and as every part is dissolved, so it departeth to the elements, which be of the same nature, but the soul doth continued by itself incorrupt, yet there shall not be place to judge the soul, when justice shall not be present.  
But it is an heinous offence to suspect any judgement to proceed from God, or of God, in which justice is not present: but justice is not present when he remaineth not in safety, and capable of judgement, which committed just, or unjust acts, but he that committed all things in his life, which must be judged, was man, and not the soul alone, to be short this kind of dealing doth defend justice in no point.  
For in receiving rewards for things well done, undoubtedly the body shall suffer wrong, because it was partaker of the travail in doing things well, and now is not partaker of the honour which is rendered for well doing: and seeing pardon is often granted to the soul for diverse offences, in respect of the need and necessity of the body, if the body be disappointed of the rewards, for the which whilst life lasted, it suffered labours, how shall it be counted not unjust?  
Contrariwise, if wickedness be condemned, the soul shallbe injuriously dealt withal, if it alone suffer punishment for those things, which it committed in life time, at the suggestion of the body, drawing it to his own appetites, and motions, whilst some time it is lead from that, which is honest by violence, sometime by stealth, sometime it is drawn by a violent inclination, & some time it giveth itself to vices, for to gratify, and slatter the fellowship of the body.  
Or how, I pray you, is it not unjust, that the soul only should be condemned for those things, to the which according to his own nature, it hath neither desire, nor motion, nor inclination, as superfluity in carnal pleasure, violence, covetousness, injustice, & other offences, which are committed for this cause?  
For if many offences be committed, because men cannot well rule their inordinate affections, and the affections keep a whurly burly to this end, that they may help, and remidy the need, and necessity of the body.  
For they prepare all things for the behoof of these things, that thereby a man may come to the use, and fruition, and also marriages are begun, and other business, which happen in the life time, in which, and about which every thing, that is worthy either of praise, or dispraise, is considered. Where is here equity's, seeing the soul is condemned for those things, which the body is desirous of, and draweth the mind to the fellowship of the same affection, that it may obtain the thing desired? And seeing desire, pleasure, fear, grief, the unruliness of which affections is subject to judgement, have their beginning from the body, notwithstanding the offences proceeding from thence, and the punishments for them, do lie upon the souls shoulders, which required no such thing, which desired no such thing, nor feared, nor suffered any such thing by itself, as man is accustomed to suffer.  
Furthermore, if we say, that they be affections not only of the body, but of man, because he hath a life consisting of both parts: yet can we not affirm, that they pertain to the soul, if we plainly behold the proper matter thereof.  
For if it have no need at all of any nourishment, it will never desire those things, whose use it requireth not to conserve his being, neither will it be ravished with those things, which by nature it doth not enjoy, nor yet be sorry for the want of money, and possessions, as things nothing pertaining unto it.  
Wherefore, if it remain free from corruption, it feareth nothing, that may destroy it. For it feareth not hunger or sickness, or maiming, or mangling, or fire or sword, because it can take no misfortune, or hurt by these things, seeing no body, or that which hath a body, can touch it in any point.  
If therefore it be absurd, to ascribe the affections peculiarly to the soul, it is also great injury, and far from the judgement of God, to attribute the punishment of them to the soul.  
Beside these things, which have been spoken, how, I pray you, is it not unjust, that although the virtues, and vices can not be considered to remain, specially in the soul, seeing we throughly perceive, that all virtues of men, as also vices contrary to virtues, be not in the soul separated from the body, and consisting by itself, yet we will refer the punishment, and reward of them to the souls alone?  
Or how I pray you can a man perceive valiance, and manliness in adventuring dangers to be only in the mind, which feareth neither death, nor wounds, nor maiming, nor hurt, nor reproachful handling, nor those griefs or miscries which happen thereby?  
Or how again can you perceive temperance, and wisdom, where no desire doth allure the mind to meat, or natural copulation, or any other pleasure, or delight, and where nothing either disturbeth within, or provoketh without?  
Or last of all, how can you imagine prudence, when the matter of things to be chosen, or to be eschewed, doth not pertain unto the Souls, seeing the matter of choice in doing things is not subject to the soul, or rather no motion, or natural inclination is in it to do any thing.  
But where is there at all any fit justice amongst the souls, whether you consider things of the same nature, or things external, or from whence, or to whom, or by what means, shall they give that, which is right, according to the worthiness of every man, or according to proportion? truly there is no such thing, if you except the honour to be bestowed by them upon GOD, seeing they have no inclination, or motion, either to use their own, or abstain from other men's, seeing use and abstinence is seen in those things, which by nature have need of such things. Contrariwise the soul is so borne that it needeth no such thing, and thence is it, that you can not perceive the proper use of the members in a thing so engendered.  
Furthermore, this is most absurbe, that the laws made, should be referred to men, and the punishment of the laws wrested to the souls alone.  
For if he which received the law, aught also rightly receive punishment for breaking the law, and man received the law, and not the soul alone, it is right, that man suffer punishment for his offences, and not the soul alone.  
For truly God commanded not the souls, to abstreyne from things unlawful, as adulteries, murders, théefts, robberies, and from contempt of parents, and all hurtful, and unjust desire of other men's goods.  
For this commandment, honour thy, father and mother, doth not appertain unto the souls, seeing such names do not belong to them. For one soul doth not beget another, that it may challenge to itself thereby the name of a parent. But one man begetteth another.  
And furthermore this commandment, thou shalt not commit adultery, can not be spoken, or understood aptly of the souls, seeing in them there is no discretion of the masculine, or feminine kind, or aptness, or desire of carnal copulation, and where the desire is not, it is impossible, that the mixture should be made. But amongst whom such mixture is not, truly lawful copulation, namely which is in wedlock cannot be found, & where such copulation, as is in wedlock, is not, there also unlawful desire of carnal company with another man's wife (for that is adultery) hath no place.  
Moreover, the precept of eschewing theft, or desire of too much, doth not serve for the souls. For they have no need of such things, as they that have need of, do get for themselves for their natural need, or necessity, either by theft, or robbery, as gold, silver, cattle, or any thing else necessary, either for meat, or apparel.  
For that is unprofitable for an immortal nature, which is desired of them, that need, because it is profitable.  
But let a more curious trade be left for them, which desire more diligently to search out these things, or more earnestly strive with our adversaries.  
But seeing those things, which have been spoken before, be sufficient for us, & agreeable with these things, & as it were with one consent do establish the resurrection, it doth not seem convenient to tarry longer in them.  
For we did not direct our purpose to this mark, that we should omit nothing, that belongeth to this matter, but that we might briefly declare to all them, that are come hither, what men ought to think concerning the resurrection, and that by the force of those things, that we have already spoken, they might measure the force of other reasons, belonging to the same purpose.  
Seeing those things, which we had in hand be searched out, and examined, it remaineth now, that we consider the cause of the end, already plain, and evident, which hath need of no care more, then that it be added to the rest, jest it seem either to be omitted by reason of oblivion, or hinder the argument in hand, and division made in the beginning. For these causes, and other belonging to the same purpose, it shall be convenient, to declare the matter only for this cause because those things, which consist by nature or art, have their peculiar ends, which custom, & common understanding doth teach, & those things which are before our eyes, do witness the same.  
Do we not see one end ordained for husbandmen, another for Physicians, and again one for those things, which grow out of the earth, another for creatures living thereby, and engendered according to a natural order, and sequel of succession?  
Wherefore, if it be evident, and necessary, that natural, and artificial faculties, and the acts of them do follow their end, every one according to his nature: it is necessary altogether, that the end of man, be excepted from the communion of the rest, as a peculiar nature.  
For it is not lawful to assign one end to those things, which lack reasonable judgement, and those, which according to natural law, and reason do their actions, and use wisdom, and justice in life.  
Neither therefore voidness of grief is the proper, & peculiar end of these things. (For you may find that also in those, that be without sense) nor yet the enjoying of those things, which delight, or nourish the body, nor abundance of pleasures. Otherwise it were necessary, that the beastly life did excel, & the life adorned with virtues were an unperfit thing. For such an end is proper to beasts, and cattle, & doth not pertain to men, which have an immortal soul, & reasonable judgement, nor yet the felicity of the soul separate from the body.  
For we do not look upon either the life, or end of either part, of which man consisteth, but on that, which hath fullness, and perfection of both parts.  
For man which hath received this life, is such a one. And it is necessary, that he have a proper end, agreeable to his life.  
Wherefore, if an end must be ordained for that, which is both together, namely for that which consisteth both of soul & body, & you cannot find it, neither while he continueth in this life, for the causes now oftentimes alleged, nor then, when the soul is separate from the body, because man must be thought no such thing, when his body is dissolved, or wholly dispersed, although the soul remain by itself, it is altogether necessary that the end of men do appear in some other recomposition, and renewing of both parts, and the same creature, and seeing that doth follow of necessity, it is necessary also, that there be a resurrection of bodies dead, and wholly dissolved, and that the same men be made again, seeing that the law of nature doth command not every end, nor of all men, b●t of those, which lived in the former life. But it is impossible for the same men to be made again, unless the same bodies be restored to their souls. But that the body receive the same soul, can by no other mean be brought to pass, then by the resurrection.  
For when that cometh to pass, an apt end doth follow the nature of men, an end truly of: a 〈◊〉 life, and reasonable judgement. A man shall not offend if he say it is it, that we may for ever cleave, and continued with those things, wherewith chiefly, and especially natural reason doth agree, and consent, and that in respect, and consideration of him, which is, & for the behoof of those things which it pleased him to promise', although the common sort of men more earnestly, and vehemetlye desire such things, as are now presently, and do nothing esteem or regard this end. For the multitude of such, as do leave, and go from the end agreeable to them, doth not wea●… 〈◊〉 common ordinance of duty 〈…〉 a peculiar examination is ●●pointed against that, and punishment, and rewards or●●●ned, which be correspondent to the measure of well or evil doing.  
FINIS.