ΑΛΛΗΛΘΚΡΙΣΙΑ.  
A TREATISE CONCERNING Judging one another, Being Several DISCOURSES On the Occasion of our Saviour's Precept,  MATTH. 7.1. Judge not, that you be not judged. 
LONDON, Printed for J. Wright, at the Sign of the Globe in Little-Britain. 1675.   

The PREFACE.  
Good Reader,  
THe Reason in very short why this small Treatise is Published is, because it was judged, that there would likely some more Good come of it than of not doing it, and this again because the Matter therein contained was thought true, and in some considerable degree useful and profitable, and not yet either so particularly, or in such Method and Manner discoursed by any other as to render this Discourse superfluous.  
The first of these is but too little regarded especially in Practical Matters, where Men attending principally to the Practice of them, do less mind the precise and exact Truth, and therefore whether they are not (as commonly they are) too unlimitedly and generally affirmed. Besides Men commonly receive Practical things and what is taught concerning their Duty with more general Veneration, which makes them more easily and presently to attribute to them the perfection of Truth, or to judge them true. Men are apt too to suspect themselves of some unwillingness to do, and consequently to know their duty, when they question and examine whether it be truly so or no; and that this sticking and doubting proceeds from thence, which indeed is too often true, whence it comes to pass that Men are generally more careless and secure concerning the truth of these Matters when they deliver them, and many hurtful mistakes are conveyed with some profitable truths.  
As for the profitableness of the Argument, and what is discoursed thereupon, I know it will be variously judged according to men's various inclinations or informations. Men judge things profitable, either because they will, it pleaseth them to judge so, or because they see and perceive them to be so; that is because they perceive and apprehend the good effects thereof, the one commonly is called the Judgement of affection (because our inclinations are usually from Affection) the other the judgement of Reason; both may be in several, nay in the same Men various enough. The first is the most inconstant and divers, but the second is so too according to men's various informations or apprehensions from Reason or Experience; one Man may have observed and remembered many excellent effects or uses of any certain thing, another very few, or none, or bad ones only, whence one judgeth it very profitable, another very little so, or not at all, or bad and hurtful, and yet both may judge prudently and truly, if it be only of what appears to them: I leave every one freely to their own Reason and Observation in this particular, only I suggest that they would not exclude their future information, that they would not judge only according to what they have heretofore; but also according to what they may hereafter observe themselves, or learn from others. The miscarriages in judging one another are so universal among the common sort of Christians, and so frequent and little regarded even in wiser and better disposed, and yet so very mischievous, as may be partly understood from one part of this Discourse, that it is to be presumed the mischievous effects thereof have not been hitherto so much taken notice of and resented, as they seem to have deserved in compare with other Matters. We see Men every day eagerly and fiercely and even to Persecution to contend concerning the usefulness and truth of their knowledge and judgement in other Opinions Religious, Secular, Divine and Humane, which would put very knowing but unprejudiced Men to much study to find out any good use or effect thereof, more than ofttimes the pleasure of mere knowing somewhat though very useless, confusedly, or only conceited some great matter by them; when in the mean time they are utterly careless of their knowledge and judgement of one another, whence it is manifest they are presently affected with mutual esteem and love, or with contempt and hatred, are Friends or Enemies, and consequently effectually disposed to be negligent of at least, or to do good or mischief to one another, and consequently to hinder or help what they are good for in the World, and who knows where the Good or Evil may stop? I hope it will not be the less useful and truly valuable for being that which is truly Moral Knowledge: For that being only the knowledge of our Manners, that is, the habitual inclination of our Wills, Choices, and active Faculties, what should be perpetually their ultimate Object or their End, which can be but one, viz. The greatest. perfection and happiness of the whole Universe known to us taking in God himself, what the intermediate one's or means; in what degree they are to be proportioned. The Knowledge of the one true and right end and just measure of all our habitual Inclinations and Actions, I say, Moral Knowledge being this, it is manifest there is no other Knowledge we are capable of comparable for its good use and effect, and consequently much to be valued, separated therefrom, or considered not subservient or instrumental thereto.  
For by it alone we are directed to the obtainment of that perfection, by which we tend to do any good to others, or which keeps from doing any harm, the fruit or good effect of other Knowledge considered alone is chief the pleasure and delight immediately arising to the Mind, and is confined within ourselves. Good Morality in this sense is the greatest perfection our Natures are capable of, being nothing but the universal right determination of our Wills and Choices to the best and most excellent end, viz. The greatest Perfection and Happiness of the whole Universe, taking in God himself: It is nothing but Universal Goodness, it tends to an infinite good without ourselves, and therefore no wonder that the possession and exercise of it in sincerity and vigour fills the Soul with the greatest delight and satisfaction. All other things in the World may be used well or ill, and seem to be equally capable of both, and therefore indifferent; this only cannot be the cause of any thing but good in the World, nor can it be conceived that any thing else should render us capable of reward from God, that is, of any Happiness or Perfection, but at least a Will to do all the Good with it that it is usable for. For why should we have either, if we do no Good, or do Mischief therewith? But if this Morality be the most excellent thing we are capable of: Then sure is its Knowledge.  
Some have valued and prized Knowledge by other Characters than Usefulness and good Effects; such as is its being by Revelation or inspired: And therefore have thought every Truth and the least revealed to be of greater concernment or worth more than the greatest known by reason or natural Light, especially if not revealed too; not attending that the Reason of Revelation is not only the utility of a truth (though there is always sufficient) but the difficulty of its being otherwise known.  
Much more might have been suggested in so considerable a Matter: But this is enough if not too much in this place.  
Lastly, As for this Discourse's not being superfluous, I should be glad to be mistaken, and that this Argument hath been so Handled and Treated of already as to render this useless.  
I shall give thee no further trouble (Good Reader) but only desire that thou wouldst read this Treatise (if thou thinkest fit to read at all) with the same design it was Composed, viz. Of Guidance and Conduct of ourselves in this particular, and consequently that it might contribute something to the increase of universal Charity, Justice, and Wisdom in the World.   

The Contents.  

CHAP. I.  
§. I. THe several senses of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to Judg. p. 7, 8.  
§. II. That in the general sense of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to Judge, two parts may be observed, 1. The inward action of Mind. 2. The signification of the Action. p. 11, 12.   

CHAP. II.  
What Judgements may be thought forbidden by our Saviour both Principally and Secondarily, or Occasionally, are reckoned up, which are six. p. 13, 14.  
§. I. The first prohibited Judgement, too great a proneness to pass our Judgements concerning Persons in any respect at all. p. 15.  
§. II. The second is too great a proneness to pass judgement on the worst side. p. 19, 20.  
§. III. The third is rash Judgement, without any reason or without sufficient reason. p. 23, 24, etc.  
§. iv The fourth is false Judgement. p. 29.  
§. V The fifth thing forbidden is too great a proveness to declare and signify our Judgement. p. 34.  
§. VI The sixth and principal is the undue end of Judging, viz. ultimately to please one's self, (Selfishness, Self-love) and this by Malice, Hatred, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, Revenge, Envy, Flattery, by Anger, Fear, Busiebodiness, Curiosity. p. 37, 38.   

CHAP. III. What Judgements are not forbidden.  
§. I. 1. In general not a Judging out of Charity. p. 39  
§. II. 2. In general not when there are and appear more good Effects thereof than of the Omission. p. 40.  
§. III. 3. Many particular Cases are instanced in for example to our Prudence, in which it is not prohibited in general to observe and pass Judgement concerning others Qualities and Actions. p. 42, 43.  
§. iv 4. It is not prohibited universally to pass Judgement on the worst side. p. 45.  
§. V 5. It is not universally forbidden to declare our Judgement and that on the worst side. p. 46.   

CHAP. IU. Contains some Causes of these forbidden Judgements.  
§. I. The Causes of too much proneness to Judge in general, of which the first Idleness. p. 49.  
§. II. The second love of Activity, of doing somewhat. p 52.  
§. III. The third is Curiosity or of knowing somewhat. p. 54.  
§. iv The fourth a Selfpleasing in our Ability or reputed Ability to judge. p. 56.  
§. V Causes of too great proneness to judge on the worst side, of which the first is mere Ignorance. p. 57  
§. VI The second ill dispositions of Will, as 1. Hatred. 2. Revenge. 3. Pride. 4. More particularly Affectation of Superiority in any thing. 5. Envy. 6. Contempt. 7. Flattery. p. 59  
§. VII. That the Causes of rash Judgement are the same with those of the two former. p. 68  
§. VIII. That the Causes of false Judgement concerning Persons are defect in our understanding, in our Will. p. 69.  
§. IX. The first Cause reducible to one of those two is Ignorance. p. 70.  
§. X. The second, an Opinion or Judgement too unlimited, that all Men are like ourselves: Some instances hereof: This extended to God himself; that it hath been the Cause of making God in Humane Shape, and that the representing God or any thing in him by Humane Shape is likewise the Cause of such an Opinion concerning God. p. 76, etc.  
§. XI. The third is too general a belief of Testimony or Report. p. 85.  
§. XII. The fourth Cause is an observing only what is good or what is bad in a Person, and not observing both. p. 88  
§. XIII. A fifth is a want of a prevalent love of Truth. p. 92, 93.  
§. XIV. A sixth is our Passions, the instances thereof. That Passions determine our Judgements three ways among others. 1. By bringing to mind only those things which are true indeed, but serve to maintain or increase them; but keeping out those which tend to abate them, so that they never appear. 2. By thrusting into our Minds more than is true of that which maintains them. 3. By thrusting out those things which may be suggested and true, but yet serve to extinguish them; or by causing a Man not to attend thereto, or the Evidence that is in them; or by confounding the attention or perception on purpose that it might not see the most necessary truth which it cannot deny if it did see. p. 97, 98, etc.  
§. 15. A seventh Cause of false Judgement either on the good or bad part is all Appetites whatsoever, besides those of Truth and Universal Justice, of which one more useful Instance. p. 106.  
§. 16. The Causes of too great a proneness to declare our Judgements much the same with what have been mentioned, viz. Idleness, Selfpleasing by Activity, Curiosity, Conceit of ability and sufficiency to judge, by fancied Reputation therefore, by Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, Envy, Contempt, Anger, Flattery. p. 110.  
§. 17. The Causes of the last prohibited Judgement out of such bad Principles as are , the Corruption of our Natures improved by Custom, and wilful ill Usage of ourselves. p. 111.   

CHAP. V Treats of the mischievous Consequences or Effects of these prohibited Judgements.  
§. I. The ill Effects of too great a proneness to judge others in general are.  
1. Too great a neglect of our own Affairs and principally our Manners, in which we are principally to employ ourselves. For, 1. We cannot so well know that in another Man concerning which we pass judgement, as what is in ourselves. And, 2. We can make more certain effectual use of our Judgement and Observation of ourselves. p. 112, 113, etc.  
A 2d. ill Effect of too great proneness to judge in general, is an Usurpation of another's right, or Tyranny. p. 118, 119.  
§. II. The ill Consequences of too great proneness to judge on the worst side are, 1. False Judgement. 2.  Contempt, 3. ofttimes unjust Suspicion in others of the Judgement coming from the worst Principles, whence 4. Contempt, Hatred, Revenge in the Persons judged against the Person judging. p. 122, 123.  
§. III. The ill Consequences of rash Judgement are, 1. The usage of a Man's self thereto. 2. The rendering a Man's Testimony inconsiderable. 3. It is occasion to Men of Hatred, Contempt, Anger, etc. p. 125.  
§. iv The ill Consequences of false Judgement are, 1. A Man's own Discredit. 2. The ill distribution of the Good or Evil that is in a Man's power to bestow or inflict. p. 126.  
§. V The ill Consequences of too great a proneness to declare one's Judgement are, 1. It renders a Man contemptible. 2. It draws others from their Business. 3. Mutual Suspicions, Animosities, Envyings, Contempts or foolish Admiration and Esteem, vain Trust and Expectation. p. 127.  
§. VI The ill Consequences of judging out of Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, Envy, Anger, Contempt, Flattery, etc. are, 1. The increase of those Passions with their ill Principles in ourselves and others, which are the most detestable things, 2. It exposeth to the Hatred, Anger, Revenge, Contempt of others. 3. The Persons who are thus judged by us, judging us again untruly on the worst side out of Revenge. p. 133.  
§. VII. The contrary of all these mischievous Effects and Consequences put together and briefly counted. p. 138.   

CHAP. VI Contains some Remedies to prevent those prohibited Judgements. Of which the  
§. I. 1. And one of the most general is to remember and attend to the mischievous Consequences thereof, as also their Causes. The one to make us willing, the other able to abstain therefrom. Those more affectionately Represented, and these Exhorted against. p. 146.  
§. II. A second Remedy is to possess our hearts with an universal Charity and Benignity to all. p. 155.  
§. III. 3. Is to rivet sound in our Minds the love of Truth. p. 156.  
§. iv 4. More particularly ask thyself again and again, whether thou art sure thy Judgement be true. p. 157.  
§. V 5. Ask thyself whether thou wouldst not have true what thou judgest. p. 160.  
§. VI 6. Use thyself much to dwell at Home. p. ibid.  
§. VII. 7. Have a special care of all Passions that they do not precede but follow thy Reason, and when they do this, that they do not blind or confound it. p. 162.  
§. VIII. 8. More particularly be sparing in, or refrain altogether from judging a Person thou art inclined to hate or be angry with, or more expressly then set thyself to shake off all Prejudices, of which more, and more properly in the Rules to follow. p. 164.  
§. IX. 9 Discourse more of Things than Persons. p. ibid.   

CHAP. VII. Some few Rules to be observed in our Judging generally and for the most part.  
§. I. Pass and declare all thy Judgements out of Charity. This Charity how meant. The signs of this Charity to others in judging. 1. More readiness to judge on the good side than on the bad. 2. An excusing others, and saying all we can justly for them. 3. Frequent judging ourselves. 4. Calmness and Modesty. p. 164.  
§. II. A second Rule briefly mentioned is to judge truly. p. 173.  
§. III. A third, Have a care of all Passions, but especially of Anger before Judgement. p. ibid.  
§. iv A fourth, Declare not thy Judgement, when thou thyself art guilty, of which the Reasons. p. 175.  
§. V A fifth, If thou judgest when guilty, resolve to be innocent for the future, and first condemn thyself, of which the Reasons, 1. Because every one ought to love himself as well as his Neighbour in all Circumstances aliks', 2. It is an excellent Example in a thing very rare, and yet extraordinary useful. 3. Ones own Judgement concerning others is thereby rendered more effectual. 4. Every one knoweth more certainly the truth of his Judgement concerning himself. 5. Men's Care and Zeal will be here more certainly employed with success. p. 177.  
§. VI A sixth, That it is more safe generally not to declare thy Judgement than to do it, of which one Reason. p. 179.  
§. VII. A seventh, Be more cautious in passing or declaring thy Judgement in these following Cases, 1. Concerning thy Superiors. 2. Thy Friends, 3. Thy Enemy. 4. A Person generally innocent and well-disposed, but once or rarely overtaken. 5. Wrathful and Bashful Persons. 6. Before much Company. 7. Before Enemies. Of all these their respective Reasons. p. 180.  
§. VIII. An eighth is, Be inclined rather to defer thy Judgement till thou art desired. Some Reasons hereof. p. 190.  
§. IX. A ninth, Is more freely and frequently to pass or declare Judgement concerning one to another, when thou seest a Person concerned, defective in his Ability or Care for himself. Followed with some Reasons, these Rules rerecounted briefly. p. 192.  
§. 10. An Exhortation to the exercise of Charity and Prudence in this so considerable a part of our Conversation, the Scope and Design of the whole Treatise. p. ult.    

Errata.  
Pag. Line For Read 5 7 Foolishly out of, etc. Foolishly, out of etc. 19 2 And readiness, and a little readiness. ib. 11 Deal and.  ib. 19 Contrary to the, etc. contrary to it, the. 33 14 Judgement: This rash Judgement. This etc. 38 21 Principally moreover, Principally: Moreo. 43 16 care, are. ib. 19 Those out of, etc. Those. Out of, etc. 54 9 There, for, etc. , 60 5 Ourselves so to do; Ourselves, so to do; ib. 13 Pleasures, Pleasure. 62 7 It is so: In, etc. It is so. In, etc. 63 2 To be an excellent, To be an excellent. 73 19 (For Christ) (For Example.) 75 15 Looks, Books. 98 ●8 Increased, Increased. ib. 27 (which obtains in Inanimate things but principally in etc. (which may be to Inanimate things, but principally to, etc. 99 9 Many or all, perhaps Many or all perhaps, 104 7 By bringing into our Minds not only what Not only bringing into our minds what. 106 26 And favour; nay, etc. And favour. Nay 117 12 More than in thine, More in thine, etc. 122 14 is, are. 124 17 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ib. 22 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 129 17 To bad, etc. Too bad, etc. ib. 18 Too be, ctc. To be, etc. 135 27 More o'er less, More or less. 146 1 when we judge to do, when we judge, to do. 147 2 Therefrom. The Therefrom, the etc. 153 11 justruction: Hardly. Instruction. Hardly.   

A TREATISE CONCERNING Judging one another.  

CHAP. I.  Mat. 7.1. Judge not that you be not Judged. 
AVery good Commendation of any Argument or Subject of Discourse, is its Usefulness for the Prevention of very Mischievous and Hurtful Effects and Consequences: Such is this of men's passing Judgement concerning other men's Qualities and Actions, the Principles and Effects of them. The too great Proneness, Readiness and Frequency of doing it, and that on the bad side, to Suspect, Accuse and Condemn, and this most-what rashly, that is, without Reason, Uncertainly, often Falsely. Nay, not being content with this, on all Occasions without any Reason or Cause but Self-love, Pride, Hatred, Envy, Flattery, Curiosity, Busibodiness, or the like, to make it known and declare it to others. Whereby they dispose themselves to be Unjust and Uncharitable to others, and hardly to like any Body but themselves, or those that are like themselves, or some way or other Useful and Profitable to them, that is, themselves in others. And as much do they dispose others by this their Behaviour and Temper, both by way of Imitation and Revenge, or Self-defence, at least to behave themselves in like manner to them, and to pay them in their own Coyn. Men hereby too, growing Strangers to themselves, and being busier in other men's Tempers and Actions than their own, are taken up in mending in others that which is not Faulty, or they can less mend if it be: While they neglect themselves where it may be more to be mended, and where they can better do it.  
A Vice or Fault, this seems too Extraordinary frequent. For what more frequently comes into our thoughts and Discourses at all times, than other men's Persons, and consequently their Qualities and Actions. All our Behaviour to one another, to all sorts of Persons, supposeth and followeth our Judgements we make one of another; which are very rarely exactly true, and sincerely Charitable; but most-what altogether rash and prejudiced by Self-love, and consequent Passions, or blended and mixed. Few Men also employ themselves in Judging, or Discousing of things appertaining to Persons abstracted from Persons, because they are not accompanied with a sensible Subject; which with what appertains thereto, they best apprehend and conceive: And for the same Reason among others, the Persons are others, not themselves, they most frequently occurring to their Senses. Men seldomer see themselves in their Glasses, than others directly with their Eyes: And then they being great, but as foolish and unreasonable Self-lovers, are not only willing therefore to have nothing Faulty, Bad, or Imperfect in themselves, which is well: But also not to see it, and then they judge they really have none; when they have as many, or more, and greater than others; which is foolish and bad. Bad, because it proceeds from ultimate Self-love: Foolish, because the mistake through Self-flattery, is very Hurtful and Mischievous to themselves, whom they so much love. For hereby they deprive themselves of the greatest good, that is of becoming universally Good and Virtuous; while they overlook what is amiss in themselves, and see it not at all; or if they do, they take it for something that is Virtuous and Commendable, or much more so than it is. Nor is this Fault or Vice, only to be seen in ordinary Persons: But is also very general to all sorts, even to those who have had the Opportunity of the best instructed Education. Witness Books and Writings, where ofttimes Men proclaim aloud, and leave upon Record; and this most willingly, rashly, foolishly out of Pride, Envy, Revenge, Contempt, the Ignorance, the Folly and Mistake, the Rashness, Falshood, Knavery, Hypocrisy, Obstinacy of one another. This is that which our Saviour here Warns and Adviseth against in this long and Excellent Discourse of his, both to his Disciples and a multitude of People, who were gathered together from all the Country about, to see and hear what he did and said: And it seems they heard so much, as put them into great Wonder and Astonishment. Both in respect it is like of the Excellent Matter of his Preaching and Discourse, being more Moral and Spiritual than that of the Pharisees and their Scribes and Doctors was, who most-what read them Lectures of tithing Mint and Cummin, and the minute small Matters of their Law: And then in respect of his manner of Speaking, which was with more Authority: That is, so as to move them more to mind and believe the things he said, and that (among other Ways) by speaking them so, as if he most certainly knew the Truth and Concernment of what he spoke; they on the Contrary, it may be, only probably, uncertainly, dubiously and coldly reasoning about their small Questions.  
In treating of this Argument, the Sum or Contents of our Discourse shall be these;  
I. Only just to mention the true Sense of the word here used, to Judge, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
II. The Judgement here forbidden, shall be more particularly explicated.  
III. What Judgement here is not forbidden, though in danger of being taken for that which is.  
IU. Whence this forbidden Judgement here proceeds, what are the Causes.  
V The mischievous Effects or Consequences hereof, which will be so many Reasons too, why we should not be guilty of it.  
VI The Remedies to prevent or mend it.  
VII. How we should govern our Judgements of Persons, both concerning their Virtues and Vices.  

Sect. I.  
I. For the First. The word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here rendered to Judge, hath several Significations in Scripture.  
1. In General to pass Judgement, that is, to affirm or deny, any Proposition or Sentence thought of. This is the most ordinary Sense, and every where occurs, 1 Cor. 11.13. Judge in yourselves, [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.] Is it comely for a Woman to Pray with her Head uncovered. And the same in 1 Cor. 10.15. I speak as to Wisemen, Judge you what I say: i. e. Pass your Judgement, give your Opinion after Consideration, of what I am now about to propose unto you: And where this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is thus used in the Septuagints Translation of the Old Testament, it may Answer to the Hebrew words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and other words.  
2. More particularly, To pass Judgement concerning the Actions or Qualities of a Person, either of his Virtues or Faults, Good or Bad: And this is as often met withal; and so it is, three or four times presently after one another, in 1 Cor. 4. 3, 4, 5. But with me it is a very small thing, that I should be judged of you, or of Man's Judgement: Yea, I judge not mine own self: That is, As for yours, or any Man's Judgement concerning my Faithfulness in my Stewardship, of the Mysteries of the Gospel (of which in the two former Verses) whether I am, or am not Faithful, I make a little account of it. Their Judgements upon many Accounts, it may be, being but little, if any probable signs of the Truth. Nay, I pass not Judgement concerning this thing Universally myself; I, it may be forgetting, or not seeing many things in myself: But the Lord is he that doth always, and hath right to Judge, who is All-knowing and Just, as it is in Verse 5.  
3. More particularly yet: It signifies to pass Judgement concerning a Persons Innocency or Merit, that he is Innocent: That is, an Acquitting and Absolving him, so is the Sense: To Judge the Cause of the Poor and Needy. Spoken of Jehoiakim's Father. And, To Judge the Fatherless and Oppressed, that the Man of the Earth may no more Oppress, Psalm. 10.18. Here, and in such like the Septuagints word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, answering to the Hebrew, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
4. On the contrary, it ofttimes signifies to pass Sentence or Judgement concerning a Persons Fault, or Gild, or Punishment he deserves, that he is Guilty, and deserves Punishment; that is, to Condemn or Accuse. For in both this is done, in the one as a Judge, in the other as a Witness: And therefore it signifies the same with its Compound, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to Condemn. This is also a most frequent Sense of this word, both in the New and Old Testament, as Rom. 14.3, 4. Let not him that eateth, despise him that eateth not: And let not him that eateth not, judge him that eateth. That is, As he that did Eat, and was so well informed in his Liberty, of the good Effects of it, as to put no Distinction between Meats, upon the Account of any Divine Command, but only his own Prudence, was not to despise the other for his Ignorance: So he also who did make such Distinctions, was not to condemn the other of Unconscientiousness or Profaneness; that is, Neglect or Contempt of his Duty commanded by God's Revelation. And in verse 4. is the same Sense, Who art thou that Judgest? that is, Condemnest another Man's Servant. Where, by the way, you must take Condemnation in the Sense I shall by and by limit, as also understand it here between private Persons, and with this Circumstance, that it was before the Christian Jews had time to inform themselves well, and to understand the Reasons of this Liberty; and to get rid of their Inclinations, to believe still the Mosaical Law, to be observed even under the Messias' Government: But that by the Buy.  
And to go no further, ver. 10. still of the same Chapter, Why dost thou judge, or why dost thou set at nought thy Brother? That is, surely, Why dost thou so judge thy Brother, as after Judgement to contemn him, and to despise him? But such a Judgement must be, that he is Faulty, or Ignorant, and that is to condemn him. Now which of these Senses the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here hath, I shall by and by tell you, when I more explicately and distinctly inform you, what Judgement it is that is here forbidden.   

Sect. II.  
To give you yet a more distinct Notion of the General Sense of this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it is to be observed, that it consists of two Parts. The First is the Inward Action. The Second, the Signification of it.  
The First, Is to pass Judgement only in a Man's thoughts, silently in one's own Breast.  
The Second, Is to signify this our Inward Judgement to others, by Words and Speech, or any other convenient Sign. I observe this principally, because it may be permitted and laudable ofttimes to do the First, when it is not to do the Last. A Man may, nay aught often to give Judgement concerning things and Persons; when he may, and ought not for many Reasons to signify it. Such as are the Circumstances of the Persons Faults, who may be a Superior, a Governor, a Friend, one otherwise very Wise and Innocent, or one either through Bashfulness, or Wrathfulness, not able to bear it, or many the like: So the Circumstances of Company, either that there are any, or too many, or such as will make more ill use of such a Judgement of ours, may make it reasonable and just, to abstain from making known our Judgement. And many still, other Circumstances may there be, for these are but to give Instance.    

CHAP. II.  
WE proceed to the Second General, viz. What kind of Judgement may be here Forbidden, or Commanded against, what this may be more Distinctly. And they may be among others, these Six things, some principally and firstly, some occasionally and secondarily.  
1. Too great a Proneness, Propensity, Inclination, Readiness to pass any inward Judgement in General, concerning other men's Qualities and Actions.  
2. Too great an Inclination to pass this Judgement on the worst side, to judge them Imperfect or Bad, to attribute some Defect or Infirmity to them, or to accuse or condemn them for some Fault.  
3. To pass this Judgement without any Reason at all ofttimes but only a Man's will: Sometimes indeed with some Reason, but little, slight, sudden or in general, not with so much either on one side or tother, as a Man might and ought to have found out and considered: When one doth not spend so much Time, nor use so much Care, Heed, and Attention, in the Reason of his Judgement as he ought, which sometimes is more, sometimes less, according to the Importance of the thing judged, or rather of the Judgement. And this is called Rashness, or Temerity, a rash Judgement, a rash Censure of others.  
4. To pass this Judgement contrary to the Reasons even appearing to us, (which must always proceed out of some bad Principle next to be named) sometimes with some appearing Reasons, but falsely. And this is called False Judgement, which we ought to do what we can, when it is permitted us to judge, to prevent.  
5. Too great a readiness to declare, signify, talk of these our Judgements; and that is, principally to do it upon all Occasions not sufficiently Reasonable, nay, upon none at all.  
6. And lastly, Above all (in which only the Blame, Fault, Viciousness, Iniquity, is to be found) a bad Principle or End of our Judgement concerning others, which is but too often the cause of all the other Imperfections. Such as is a want of Charity, Hatred or Malice, Self-love in General, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, Envy, and the like, of which hereafter. In all the former we may be Defective, Wanting, Imperfect; but here we are Wicked, Bad, Unrighteous.  

Sect. I.  
1. Too great a Proneness and Readiness to pass Judgement, concerning others in any Respect; which is always concerning their Qualities of Power, or Knowledge and Wisdom, or their Goodness, or their Actions hence proceeding. I say, too great an one; for all passing of Judgement is not here prohibited, as I shall hereafter mention. Now this too great a Proneness or Inclination, is Various according to Persons, and must be determined by every Man's Prudence, when it is so. In some Men it may be much their Calling, their Business, it may be what is committed to their Care, for very excellent Uses and Purposes to observe and give Judgement of others. And therefore they are to bend and incline themselves to get so much Readiness and Aptness, or Quickness, to observe and judge, as may make them best able to discharge that Trust. Such are all kind of Governors, who have the Care of others Qualities and Manners; Magistrates, Ministers, those who have the Education of Youth, Masters of Families. All these will do ill if they do not take notice, and judge concerning the Tempers, and Behaviours of their Subjects, People, Youth, Children and Servants, as much as they can, without too much Neglect of themselves, or other worse Effects. Again, There are some that observe others to very good Use and Purpose: what is Good, they are prone to imitate; what is Bad, to shun and avoid: and this that they may clearly apprehend Virtue and Vice; which ofttimes we better see in others, than in ourselves. What is usually signified by the Proverb, That Standers-by see more than Gamesters. Men ofttimes would neither be so Sensible of their own Virtue nor Vice, Good or Ill-Qualities, if they did not observe them in others. When they see a Man practising any Virtue, or using any good Quality of Prudence, Diligence, any Instance of Power rightly and well, and especially when commended or thought well of, or having some other Advantage; it makes them well pleased with themselves in these things, if they have them, or to endeavour to obtain them, if they want them. And so Vices often appear to us more and more ugly and nasty in others, than in ourselves: Such as is Intemperance, Pride, Oppression, etc. And what may the Observer say, Am I like such a Person? I did not think I had been so Foolish, so Contemptible, Base, or Vile a thing before. These Men too are so far from neglecting themselves thereby (the common Mischief of our concerning ourselves so much with others) that they mind themselves hereby the more, and to better purpose.  
But now on the other hand, but few Men are Governors of others at least of many: many also observe and take notice of others good Qualities, and are thereby excited to affectation of being Superior, consequently to envy Detraction and Contempt. And you shall see them judge and speak often of the most considerable Men, and the most considerable Qualities in them, with Abatement and Diminution; which as it may not sometimes, so it most-what proceeds from the  Principles. They'll take notice too, more surely of their Imperfections, and be apt to be moved to be well-pleased therewith, from the former Principles still; and consequently to multiply and magnify them. Now it were a great deal better for Men of such a temper, to withdraw their Eyes from abroad, and to turn them homeward, unless they could or would make better use of their Observation; and readiness in such Men to Observe and Judge others is too much, and therefore here forbidden. Others again there be, who may and do take notice and observe what others do, and are generally with Approbation, and be ready to imitate every thing, and it may be the worst things most. Those who you shall ordinarily here say, that such Persons do so or so, that they may excuse themselves; these it were better for them to neglect and take no notice of other Men, and not to mind what others do. It is much better for those Men to mind what they themselves should do, than what others do. Here again a little proneness to mind or judge what others are or do, is too much.   

Sect. II.  
2. The Second thing I conceive may be here forbidden, is too great a Proneness to pass Judgement on the worst side, to attribute some Imperfections to others, to accuse and condemn them. And this may be, though our Judgement be not false, (which is another Particular forbidden) but never so true; nor do we yet consider or attend to the Principle from whence it proceeds, but only to the effect which is consequent; and here again as in the former Particular, the Degree forbidden is various. Some Persons may and aught to take notice of, Judge and Condemn other men's imperfections and faults (but always be sure, with as accurate truth as they can, with Prudence and Charity) more often and frequently, others rarely or little. Those as I said in the former Particular, who are Governors of others so far forth as they do and aught to undertake that Office, so much ought they to take notice, observe, judge, condemn, yea, reprove and correct (but always with Prudence and Charity, of which more hereafter) their Infirmities or Misdemeanours. Those also who do it out of no worse end, nor find no worse effect, than the good one of freeing themselves from too general and confused admiration of other men's Persons, and consequently Approbation, imitation of all they do, though many things weakly and amiss; finding themselves first without Self-flattery, able to Judge from other Reasons than Examples.  
Those also who having a desire to be more tightly and accurately perfect and good, mark the Imperfections or Miscarriages of Men, and that of the best and most considerable, that they may prevent and amend them in themselves, and be more accurate Patterns and Examples of Accomplishment and Virtue. Not out of Pride or Affectation to be Superior to all others; but out of a great desire of perfecting themselves, and out of Charity to others.  
Such Persons of such a Temper, though very rarely I doubt, we may sometimes meet withal. So likewise when Persons, Estates, or Qualities are of great concernment, and influence to us and others, to the Public, and this presently and on a sudden; and our Judgement might tend to prevent any mischief therefrom, which deferred would be too late in such Cases, Sufficiency and Tendency to judge or believe rather on the worst side, is to be preferred. The contrary would be too pernicious or hurtful Security. Such as these, I say, and Men in such cases, are to be allowed more frequently, to employ themselves in observing and judging other men's Imperfections or Faults, in their Temper or Conduct. But these on the other hand, who may experience not elsewhere better effects of this their Observation and Judgement, than an occasion and temptation for, and a gratification of their Pride, Self-love, Envy, Affectation of Superiority, Malice, Ill-will, Revenge, or the like; so far forth as they experience this so much to them is it Prohibited.  
And in general, it may be delivered as one pretty general sign, when we may do this too much (there seldom being a better effect than this, a bad one) viz. When thereby we are indisposed and hindered to take notice of, and approve of the good qualities and laudable that are in the same Persons, and consequently judge of them in general very unjustly, and are according unreasonably affected towards them, undervaluing, contemning, hating them; that is, the qualities in them when we ought not, or more than we ought: And this we may see, I doubt, too frequent and common an effect, of this Judging and Condemning Persons; in so much that there are very few but may be hence concluded to be too much inclined and prone thereto, and to do it but too much. Where you hear one or once commended, and his good qualities observed, you may hear many, and many times dispraised, and his Faults and Imperfections quoted; at least oftener than they are really in proportion to their good Qualities and Actions, or oftener than they should be signified and made known.   

Sect. III.  
3. The third thing I conceive may be here forbidden, is one's Judging without any Reason at all, but only ones Will and Inclination, or without sufficient Reason, the best he could or ought to have had all Circumstances considered; that is, rashness or temerity in Judging, and when it is on the worst side, to condemn any Person, it is now usually called rash Censure. Of the first of these there is no Degrees or Differences, but it is perpetually in all Persons at all times forbidden. For if there appear no Reason at all to us, why we should judge one or t'other way, we are to suspend our Judgement. That which is usually expressed by saying, we do not know, we cannot tell, it may, or it may not be so indeed; (if we apprehend the possibility) but whether it be or be not, we are Ignorant. In our Judgements concerning some things, we may sometimes follow our Inclinations both without and contrary to some smaller Reasons; but then they must be very strong, such as are natural and born with us, and which we cannot oppress or hinder by our wills though we would, and we do not find they proceed from any Insincerity, any secret desire or inclination to gratify any Lust, but that we are possessed with a serious and upright unmixed desire to know the truth in order to Goodness: And this, indeed, seems to be a sign of great reason for that Judgement, viz. Of this inclination being Impressed by God, and consequently he being Good, that it is true and useful. Such are men's strong inclinations notwithstanding all appearance of reason (though but such, and and real deceits) to the contrary, which may be brought by Cavilling men, to believe God's Existence, his Justice to punish and reward, Immortality of Souls, distinction of Actions right and wrong, universal Goodness our great perfection, and ultimate Self-love, contrary to the truth of our Senses, etc. these God hath anticipated us withal. But in our Judgements concerning Persons, no such inclination is to be followed by no means, which notwithstanding is extraordinary frequent, but always from some secret passion of hatred, displeasure against the Person, not for any reason, but some bodily temper which is called Antipathy, and ofttimes past offences, etc. Of the other, viz. Judging without sufficient reason, there is variety; that which may be sufficient reason to one Man, or at one time in one thing, may not be to another. One Man may be more capable and able to examine a thing further than another; and yet both, may be, aught to pass their Judgement: As if one Friend should for very good ends, ask the judgement of some other, concerning the Qualities or Actions of a third. So sometimes the time for Deliberation or Information, may be necessarily shorter in one affair than in another; and yet the Judgement is then to be passed too, and not neglected: And so the Judgement concerning one thing of less moment (and yet enough too) may be with require our Opinion too) may be with less reason or probability, than another of greater Importance. And here this rash Judgement is not to be allowed on either side, as well to the advantage as disadvantage of the Person, concerning his good or his ill-qualities or actions. We are not to judge Men better than they are, as well as not worse; and consequently falsely and foolishly admire and approve of what they say or do without reason, only because we will, and as we say we imagine so; not with that sufficient Reason as we ought to have: Though the extreme of Judging Men rashly better than they are, being less frequent or hurtful, I suppose the other is here principally intended, viz. The Judging Men rashly worse than they are, and censuring them.  
This Imperfection very often proceeds from Ultimate, and therefore Inordinate Selfpleasing ourselves by mere Activity of this kind. We must be passing Judgement of every thing we see, or that appears to us, and as soon and as fast as may be; we cannot stay so long as to call to mind, or examine Reasons. This is too troublesome to most, and would spoil the pleasure of it: Oft-times Men make it their Diversion but imprudently chosen, to be at any rate wantonly Judging and Discoursing of Persons in general. Oftentimes also the Cause or Principle is Selfpleasing again, by the exercise and sense of our ability and sufficiency of Wit or Understanding; we much pleasing ourselves that we can observe what others do and judge, and discern whether they are good or bad, do well or ill, especially what the most considerable Men do; and here most, because it is a sign of a greater Comparative ability, that we see Imperfections and Defects, even in the Wiser and Better sort of Men, which they do not (as we think) see in themselves. The first of these Causes is more ordinary, the second in those most often, who really are of considerable ability. These are more innocent Causes as not arguing so much of Self-Love, in opposition to the good of others or to Charity; as the other of Malice, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, and thence secret Envy which are but too frequent.   

Sect. IU.  
4. The Fourth thing forbidden is false Judgement, which although it may be more hurtful in effect, yet it may be and often is more innocent in the principle or end, than the former. For a Man may often judge false and out of Charity and Duty too, and with as sufficient reason as he could find or observe. But yet a Man having first seen he may or aught to pass his Judgement, aught to adhibit the greatest care that it be true: This is a great instance of Justice which as every Man at all times is bound to, so then especially when he undertakes to be a Judg.  
The most general Instances of rash and false Judgement concerning Persons, Qualities and Actions, and perhaps which comprehend all others, are these:  
1. When we Judge imperfections, defects, faults, of any kind or sort to be in Men, when they are not.  
2. When we Judge those to be much greater imperfections, than indeed they are compared with others, we mistake in the quality. The first again is, First, Either when we judge Imperfections to be in Men one or more, when either there is none, or not so many. When we mistake in respect of the Number. Secondly, When we Judge more of that which is; a greater Degree and a greater Constancy of these Imperfections, which really are in the Persons, to be in the Persons, than there is, we mistake in the Degree and in the Continuation or Duration: And thus on the contrary also, we often judge as rashly and falsely of ourselves, or any we favour, or who are Friends to us.  
We judge perfections and good qualities to be in ourselves and them, and more of these Perfections in number, and them to be greater, and more of each of them in Degree and Frequency, or Constancy, than indeed there is; when all this is a mistake, and oft a silly or wilful one, and on the contrary judge ours and our Friends Imperfections and and their degrees of Intention and Frequency fewer, and the Imperfections less than indeed they are; and we to that purpose conceal, connive at, forget them willingly, even to our own Consciences and our best Friends, and this out of ultimate and foolish mistaken Self-love. A thing often to be observed in sick and dying Persons, very backward to take notice of their sins and faults, and the degrees of them, and to reckon them up all, and to make a frank acknowledgement to their own Consciences or their Friends. A sign too of no very great degree of Repentance, or a Conversion from sin. In the first, we multiply and magnify the Imperfections, Infirmities, Defects, ill-Qualities of others: Here the good ones. Surely much the better extreme as to its Effects (as it seems) even when it proceeds from ultimate Self-love, as well as the other extreme (which is too often) and not out of Charity.  
A more particular and very useful Instance of the First General is, when we Judge the Actions of Men to proceed from worse Principles, Ends, Designs and Qualities in them, than indeed they do. A thing the more diligently and carefully to be avoided, because of very mischievous and evil consequences, and yet extraordinary frequent and easy to be fallen into. Thus often we accuse and condemn Men of Covetousness, Pride, Unconscientiousness, or the like, from some actions which really were the effects much of a wise and discreet Virtue, and had very little mixture if any of these Vices.  
A thing very often, especially happening in refusal or denying, the Cravings and Desires of others.  
Thus we accuse Men often of great Wilfulness, when it is Weakness, of Wickedness or Evil-disposition of Will, when it is Ignorance and Imprudence; of deliberate Mischievousness, when it is a sudden Surprise. How often shall you hear Men fiercely accuse one another of Malice, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, than the first of which nothing more devilish and worse, can be thought or said of a Man, (though I wish it were not so often true) when there is no such matter, but an impartial and upright Justice; that is, Charity to the Public, or at worst ignorance, mistake, men's not attending, forgetfulness or the like. This is very often seen in the behaviour of Sects and Parties one towards another: Where the Inconsistency of Opinions with good Conscience, is often fiercely affirmed too universally, before it is known what Advantages they have had for Information. Though I acknowledge too, there may be oft very sufficient signs for a very probable Judgement: This rash and false Judgement in these or the like Instances being so mischievous, and yet frequent, is (as I said, when it is on the false side) diligently to be avoided; and rather let the defect, the rashness, and the mistake, be on the other hand; which usually argues much of Wisdom and Charity, good Nature, and a great freedom from ultimate and inordinate Self-love, and especially when it is towards Adversaries: And therefore it is a lovely and amiable thing, it is called good Interpretation and Candour. When one judgeth most favourably, and putteth the best sense and meaning upon Actions and external appearances, when there is equal probability on both sides, or there is none at all of either appearing; and when it is constrained to judge worse, it is with pity: According to that invaluable 13th Chap. of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, to be written in the most deep and lasting Characters in our Souls, and to be read every morning, nay, as oft as may be, verse 5. Charity as it beareth all things, so it believeth and hopeth all things.   

Sect. V.  
5. The Fifth thing forbidden, is, too great a Proneness and Aptness to pronounce, to declare and make known our Judgement and Opinion concerning others, especially on the bad side: To be always talking thereof, though to no visible good effect, nor out of any good Principle. And to be in pain as it were till they have delivered themselves, and this usually comes too from the Inordinate love of Activity, of doing somewhat, of Restlessness, which is called Busibodiness; and sometimes from the other worse Qualities so often mentioned, Malice, Pride, Envy, Revenge, etc. and mostly from a mixture of more of them together: With all which too, as in all other Actions of Men insincere, (as most are I doubt) some small mixture sometimes there may be of Justice, that is, of a kind of common Charity. This too great Proneness or Inclination considered without its Principle or End, (as I have told you before) admits of Variety. Some Men ought to have more, as all Governors and Overseers of others Manners, or in general of their good Qualities. Those also that find the good effects of good Instruction, Self-amendment, kindly and laudable Emulations, Pity, an endeavour for the good of the faulty, and of others, to amend or prevent the same elsewhere. Others on the contrary who are private Persons, in a private Capacity or Condition, apt to gratify thereby their Envy, Pride, Hatred, Contempt of others, Self-conceit, affectation of Superiority, will have seldomer sufficient reasons to pass or declare their Judgement; and when they have, the good effects are not so considerable in them as in the former Persons: Consequently they must nourish a lesser Proneness and Inclination thereto. These Men also who find they can better discern, choose, govern, and Instruct themselves in all Circumstances, of declaring their Opinion concerning Persons, such as I have before mentioned, of the Persons judged, the Persons before whom, etc. These also may be more free, and allow themselves more of this Proneness. Those on the contrary, who may and aught to observe themselves forgetful, unable to take notice, or discern the fittest Circumstances; or not to be able to moderate or govern themselves when they do, but what they have in their mind it must come out; those who are thus dull and weak, aught to lay aside this Proneness and Inclination, to subjugate or weaken it so far forth, and to betake themselves more to mind their own affairs immediately.  
In General (of which more hereafter) the declaration of this our Judgement, must always be done with all the signs, and with the best effects we can of Charity, in doing Good, and consequently Self-denial. Charity, I say, sometimes more immediately respecting the Person of whom we judge, sometimes ourselves, it may be, (as in the case of sin, when we ought to vindicate ourselves) sometimes some others, Bystanders, sometimes altogether: Be sure let there not appear any the least sign of doing it out of ultimate respect to ourselves in any kind, nor let the effect be only such with a neglect of, or in opposition to the good of the Person, or others. And a great many signs there are of this, which may better come in in another place.   

Sect. VI.  
6. And lastly. And above all is here forbidden, the undue end of our Judging others, viz. Selfpleasing ultimately, and that several ways, by others hurt or mischief, positive or privative: These are, Malice, Hatred, Pride, Envy, Revenge, Flattery and base Fear, Busibodiness, Curiosity, etc. This is that which is here principally intended; this mainly advised against by our Saviour; as also judging on the worst side, suspecting, accusing, condemning Persons out of the foresaid Principles. As appears by the reason subjoined both in this and the next Verse, [Judge not] is here taken in the sense in which [that you be not judged] is: But by that is meant suspected, accused, condemned by others, principally out of the former Principles. For if it were meant of the Judgement of the good side, the avoiding of that would be no motive not to judge, because it would not seem an evil to the Person judging. I say, principally moreover, I have mentioned the defect of being too prone in general to pass Judgement, though it may happen on the good side; and so to declare one's Judgement, and to judge rashly or falsely, though still on the good side on this occasion, as belonging to our Judgements, to suggest unto you, that they might be occasionally forbidden too, and are Defects, Infirmities. All the forementioned Particulars, if they can be supposed to proceed not from these bad Principles, but from good, viz. Charity, though imprudent and mistaken; though they may be immediately hurtful and do mischief, yet they are not vicious, faulty, wicked. But more of this when we come to the Causes of these forbidden Judge here, especially of rash and false ones.    

CHAP. III.  

Sect. I.  
BUt what Judgements are here not forbidden, though they may be apt to be mistaken for those which are. And in general these two, viz.  
1. Not an observing or judging out of Charity, a sincere and unmixed Charity. For sometimes, surely, we may exercise our Charity both in good and bad Judgements. The principal thing here forbidden, is passing our Judgement out of bad Principles, such as are Ultimate Selfishness, Malice, Hatred, Pride, Envy, etc. But then the contrary cannot be forbidden to pass Judgement out of a good one, and the only good one, viz. Charity, or , unless all Principles of a Man's actions were forbidden.   

Sect. II.  
Nor, Secondly, Is it ever forbidden to a Person, when there are more good effects of his doing this, than of his omission: Nay, then contrariwise he is commanded to do it. The first respects our Principles or End: The second our Prudence or the Effect. The first of these may be without the second, viz. A Man may give his Judgement and Opinion concerning Persons and Actions, out of Charity and very good Intentions of doing the most good unlimitedly in general, whether it be particularly applied to ourselves or others, or both; and yet, as far as we see, the effects of it may be bad. A Man may both inwardly and outwardly commend and discommend Persons unseasonably with a very good meaning, through want of Information. And so the second may be without the first too; that is, There may be very good effects and consequences of a Man's passing and pronouncing his Judgement, when the principle may be bad enough. A Man may approve or condemn what is truly good or bad in others, and consequently dispose himself and others to an imitation of the one, and an eschewing of the other, especially if he be a Person of some esteem; and yet he may do the first out of fear or flattery, or because it is like somewhat in himself, not because it is a quality or thing really profitable to the World, and therefore would have it more propagated. And the second out of Envy, Hatred, etc. not because it is a thing mischievous and hurtful to the Person himself, to others, or displeasing to God Almighty.  
In sum, whensoever it doth appear to any Man that it would be worse if he did not pass his Judgement, that there would be worse consequences thereof than if he did, any where to others as well as himself, considering himself but as any other Person, just in the same Circumstances; and to do it for this very reason and cause, this common Good; this, I say, is not here prohibited.   

Sect. III.  
Thirdly, But more particularly therefore in the first place, it is not universally prohibited here to pass Judgement. In the Cases and Circumstances I have formerly mentioned, and innumerable more (if we descend to particulars) it is not. It is much permitted, nay, enjoined to Governors, somewhat less to private Persons. Laudable it is in Men to have regard to, and observe the qualities and actions generally of those that are their Superiors, to compare their own with, and see their defect, and to be excited to Amendment and Imitation: To look at, and to judge their own faults in others, if thereby they find themselves disposed to see them more clearly in themselves, and to be put in mind of them. Laudable it is to observe good qualities in others that we may rejoice in them, and be glad to see any thing good in the World, and be able to encourage it by a discreet Observation and Commendation thereof. Consequently we are not commanded to be negligent, and utterly careless of what other Men care or do: For this is contrary to the former generals of Charity and Prudence, we should then be prohibited both those out of Prudence and Charity to our Neighbour, both good and bad Men, and to ourselves too, we are obliged to take notice of them what they are and do; to encourage and help, or to rejoice in what is good, to check, hinder, and prevent what is bad and mischievous in the World, by our pity and just endeavours. We are not surely to say with Cain, Am I my Brother's keeper? Yes, we are all so, that is, we should be so: We are not like Brutes, to live only within our own Skins, to care for no Body but ourselves, and inhumanly to say, What care we what others do? We'll look after ourselves; let them be good or bad we matter not, we think it best always to mind ourselves; we see Men busy themselves too much about others matters. In the first of which thou art bad and wicked, being only selfish; in the other mistaken and imprudent. Thou art always to have regard to the common good in all thou art and dost, and therefore when thou appliest thyself to mind thyself, and to do good to thyself, it must always be to fit thyself to do most good in general, it must have that for the end. Thou art also often (and thy own prudence must determine, for it may be too often) to step out and see what others do and are, and concern thyself charitably and prudently for thy Neighbours, and to please and serve God consequently; there is a time when this is best. Besides, indeed thou mindest thy own self to best purpose and effect, when thou disposest thyself to be of this charitable and prudent Temper; which may sometimes be best done by use and exercise.   

Sect. IU.  
Fourthly, Nor in the next place is it prohibited universally to pass Judgement on the worst side, to Accuse or Condemn; for it is permitted to the Overseers of others Manners, and Instructors, and Teachers of good Manners; and to Friends, whose care and industry for the good of those whom they thus judge it will excite; to those that would free themselves from too partial an admiration of Persons; to those who have a mind and design to be more accurately good, in things of more great and public Concernment; and in many other Circumstances, which every ones private prudence must determine. Much less still is the contrary commanded or indulged, viz. To judge that good and laudable which is bad and to be condemned, to judge falsely on the best and favourable side: for to judge falsely is ever forbidden, and to judge according to Truth when we do judge, is always commanded and enjoined. We are not neither to think well of all Persons, and all in Persons, to praise, speak well of all things. We may and aught, when Charity and Prudence are the reasons of our using our Judgements, to think of things as they are, to think that bad or faulty which is so, as near as we can be informed, and to say so too; as it follows in the next particular.   

Sect. V.  
Fifthly, Nor in the next place is it here universally forbidden to declare and make known our Judgements, and that on the worst side. But there are many Circumstances in which it is of much better effect so to do. Sometimes to reprove (always with Charity and Discretion to be sure) the Guilty or Faulty, and to let him know our Opinion concerning any Actions, or Temper, or Quality in him, may be of excellent use, and be a means to amend the Persons, and to prevent the like for the future. Sometimes to admonish others, lest they imitate or do the like; we may make known our Judgement to them, especially when the faulty Person is Incorrigible, or to prevent some fraud, or hurt or mischief that otherwise might be done by one to another: We are not always to hold our Tongue, nor conceal all signs of our Opinions, be Meal-mouthed for fear of displeasure, or the like causes; which as it may be in the effect very mischievous, so it proceeds usually from Treachery or Cowardice. Much less still is it commanded or permitted here to signify a contrary Judgement, to what we really have in our Breasts; to speak or otherwise so to behave ourselves as if we thought well of, approved and liked that which we do not: To do this out of the self-end of preventing any evil, or procuring any good from a Person, is called Flattery. We are not to say, That evil is good, or darkness light. We are not either for fear or favour, to Commend and Praise what in our Judgement and Conscience we condemn. But when we think ourselves obliged to declare, and make known our Opinion and Judgement concerning any Person or Actions, it must always be with Truth, although it be to disapprove or condemn. But then to be sure, let this be always done with a sincere inward Charity, and all the just signs of it, and of freedom from any Self-design, and especially that which is in such a case most ordinary and suspected, viz. from Pride and Imperiousness, and therefore with Modesty, with great Discretion and Prudence; that is, a discerning and foreseeing when it may, and when it may not be of good use and effect to do or not do it: Of which hereafter under another Head.  
Here is to be noted, that as these Actions of Judgement are not prohibited, so not all Inclinations thereto.    

CHAP. IU. We proceed to the Fourth General Head. viz.  

Sect. I.  
TO Instance in some of the Causes of these prohibited Judgements here, those especially which are more Proper, Immediate, Frequent, and most in our own power to prevent.  
We must run them over again. And  
First, Of too much Proneness to judge in general the Causes some of them may be:  
1. Too much Idleness: By which I mean not a Man's doing nothing (for that cannot be, every Body is always employed, his Thoughts are always taken up about somewhat) but a Mans not having any destined or set-purposed-Employment, which one should always choose, as that in which he can best serve God and the World, do most good in his Generation. A neither designing nor purposing to pursue always, (or at least but when any extraordinary occasion happens) any particular, nor his General calling, as is usually distinguished; neither that which he with some others employ themselves about, nor that which all Men should, such as Reflection upon ones own Actions, the end, design, the event or effect of them; the having respect to the pleasing of God, and doing good some way or other to our Neighbour, to the Public, and the performance of some general Duties to God and our Neighbour, which all are constantly obliged to perform. Men's not having, I say, constantly such designed, purposed, and set-employment, gives their Mind leave, let's them at liberty to wander about any where, to be employed about any thing that shall from any cause be thrust upon them, or shall occur. Now this is far more usually others Persons and Actions than themselves; partly because they are far more the object of our External Senses, which affect Men generally more strongly and frequently than any thing from within themselves; and than what we have proposed or objected to us, we naturally and laudably are prone to be judging somewhat or other concerning them, or appertaining to them. But Men that have any set constant Calling to employ themselves in, and besides perform their general Duties to God, their Neighbour and themselves, are not so much at leisure to mind and attend to what others are and do, and consequently to judge. Just for Example, as Idle wand'ring Beggars, who, as we say, are never out of their way, and have not certainly designed Place or Business, turn to every By-House to see who dwells there. They look upon, observe, talk to or talk of every Passenger they meet; when the Man that hath some designed Affair or Business, with certain time and place in his Journey, hardly observes or minds, or but very little and passingly, the Company upon the Road, nor any way diverts or stops himself: Such was the fault of the younger Widows which Saint Paul bids Timothy to advise: They learned to be Idle, wand'ring about from House to House; and then, They were Tatlers and Busiebodies, speaking things which they ought not, 1 Tim. 5.13. This is a privative Cause.   

Sect. II.  
Secondly, The Love of Activity merely, ultimately, to no better end but only to please themselves therein. Themselves are too little a Sphere, there is more variety of things to be observed and judged in all others who they know, than only in themselves; whence they do it with greater life and vigour, Men think it a dull thing (and that's their only reason) to mind principally themselves, and things appertaining to them, and it may be the same things too for the most part, to live in a round; not always, but so much as is for most Men most expedient. And then when Men do observe or take notice of others Persons, qualities, and actions, they will be passing Judgement, because there is more of Action, than in suspending, doubting, or merely observing. That seems to be a slow dull thing too in compare with a Man's briskly and smartly, and uninterruptedly passing Judgement. Besides that, suspending, doubting, being Ignorant, argue an imperfection, and this fault may have the name of Busibodiness, viz. When out of love of being Busy, merely to be always doing somewhat, and that with vigour and smartness, Men employ their Thoughts in Observing and Judging other men's, either Qualities or Actions: Not out of any Neighbourly or Charitable Principle; not because they see a great deal of good they may do by it, and therefore would do it accordingly; that is, not out of Reason, Prudence, Charity. Men ofttimes Bustle and are Busy in the World, and they know no other Reason but that they love to be so; and nothing more often occurs about which they may be so, than what other Men are or do.   

Sect. III.  
Thirdly, The third cause is sometimes Curiosity; that is, a Man's pleasing himself merely and ultimately, in knowing something he did not know before, and being very much conceited of himself there, for not directing his knowledge to those things which are most profitable, which he can make best use of, do most good withal, nor attending to them. Hence it comes to pass that Men are not content to mind, and know themselves or their own minds (if it was less difficult than it is;) nor yet things more nearly Relating to themselves, which is more easy: But they are also more inquisitive into, and desirous to know the. Affairs of others, what they are and do, and observe them, and consequently to pass Judgement of them; which is a sign to them, but oft a very false one, that they do know: Because we use to do so, and should do so, viz. Pass Judgement only of things we do know. If we should not pass Judgement, but doubt or suspend, we should seem to ourselves to be Ignorant; which we would not do because we will ultimately, and please ourselves not to be so. To doubt, or to suspend one's Judgement because one does not know, is but very rare and in few Tempers; but it should be always and is to be preferred before Knowledge, because it is a better thing, a greater excellency to withhold a Man's Judgement, where there is no Reason seen, where one doth not know or see (the Connexion of what he affirms and does) the Truth itself, than it is to know the Truth itself. The one is but a perfection of our Understanding, t'other a great virtue of our Wills, and we shall be the wiser the more we thus judge, and accordingly behave ourselves: I say, rather to say and think we do not know when we indeed do not, then to know though never so certainly.   

Sect. IU.  
Fourthly, A fourth cause may be an Instance or Branch of Pride; that is, to please ourselves too much merely, either that we have, or are reputed to have, an ability and sufficiency to understand, and direct others and their affairs too, better than they themselves can: When 'tis only so conceitedly by us, and we know not others Circumstances; or were we in them we would do the like or worse; or if we had this ability, perhaps we had better be without it; whilst it makes us less able to understand and direct ourselves, by using our minds to Wander abroad, and to attend to others, and depriving us of the opportunities of Self-reflection. It is very often seen, that those who are extraordinary forward not out of some sense of Duty to give Counsel, Advice, or Judgement of other men's Concerns, are very negligent and careless, and unapt to follow the very same, when it is as useful and profitable for themselves.   

Sect. V.  
Secondly, For some of the Causes of too great a Proneness to judge on the worst side, whether truly or falsely, (but not therefore, or because they are true or false) in ourselves, they are all either Ignorance, or some Ill-disposition of Will.  
1. Ignorance, viz. Of the bad effects or consequences of this our too great Proneness, which Ignorance may proceed from Ill-dispositions of Will, either on set purpose, or designed then when we judge; and we wilfully shut our Eyes, and do not attend to what might better inform us; or it may be contracted before. But it may proceed too sometimes, even from Love and Charity. So we see sometimes Persons much desirous of their Relations, or others Good and , very apt always to suspect the worse of them, and to observe their Beginning, bad Inclinations, and to think them so; but not so much to take notice of the contrary good ones in them; and this partly that they might timely prevent any evil that may happen to them thereby. And so may it be in public Affairs, and of very great and universal Concernment especially, and yet soon out of our power; nay, so we see it in ourselves sometimes. Some Men being too apt to look upon their Faults and Imperfections, and to magnify them, and to take no notice of what's good in themselves, and consequently to judge falsely concerning themselves on the worst side: Though this is but rare in compare with the other extreme, and proceeds from an imprudent and ignorant love, not attending that they ought, and may do themselves as much good by their being pleased with, and encouraged by, and thankful for the good they have; as by being afraid of, removing, and preventing any evil fallen upon them, or that may fall upon them: and not considering still that it's best be sure, all things considered, to judge always according to Reason and Truth; not to trouble and perplex our selves with vain fears and endeavours, and for other good effects thereof.   

Sect. VI.  
Sixthly, But I doubt the far more usual Causes of too great Proneness to judge on the worst side, are ill-dispositions of Will in general, Self-love and Selfpleasing ultimately in various Instances, such as are more particularly Selfpleasing by:  
1. Hatred of, or Malice (an habitual Hatred) against any Person in general: Than which there is nothing in the World more detestable, because the most Mischievous, and it is the greatest degeneracy from, the most opposite and contrary to, the most excellent perfection in the World, which is Goodness, and is usually attributed to the Devil; that is, the worst of Being's. This is when a Man pleaseth himself ultimately in doing mischief to, in vexing and hurting another Man, other Persons. It is easy to see, how this disposeth a Man to the greatest readiness to judge any thing bad in the Person to whom he is thus affected. For if we thus please ourselves in doing Mischief, we shall endeavour that we may still please ourselves so to do; and that we may so do, we'll represent Persons as bad as we can, as great evils (whether true or false, it matters not) as we can. This, I say, manifestly is a Cause in us of being mischievously affected, and of doing what we can to them: And this again, is a Cause to such Persons of Pleasures and Delight. He therefore that wills the End, viz. Pleasing himself by the mischief of others, will will the Means thereto; and that's one, viz. Judging them as great Evils as we can. It is like a Man's dressing up another Person in ugly or contemptible Habit, that he might please himself in hating or contemning him; whereas the Person's true and natural Make or Features, was more beautiful and comely than his own. But this is so truly a hateful disposition, that I would be willing rather to think there is no such thing amongst Men,  there may be amongst the Infernal Spirits, or elsewhere in the World.  
2. Though in the second place, Revenge comes somewhat near it; that is, to please one's self in doing evil to another Man, merely because he hath done evil to him; which is a very unreasonable thing. For why should there be more mischief in the World, because there hath been some already? Clear contrary, the more there hath been, the less there should be. I know ofttimes there is a mixture of Justice and Self-defence, to prevent the like for the future, but ofttimes too there is more pretended than there is; and when there is a love to Justice and a just and reasonable Defence, it is a Cloak to hid much of the other too, or a Pill that hath much of that Poison in it. We have the more need to be Skilful and Subtle in the discovery of the sincerity of our Hearts; that is, the ends or designs that move our Wills.  
Now it is here likewise manifest, that to judge a Person as bad and as imperfect as we can, will augment, whetten and sharpen our Revenge, and consequently if we be so wickedly disposed, our Pleasure and Delight too; and as before, he that wills the End wills the Means thereto, when he sees it is so: In revenge too, is often mixed the affectation of Superiority.  
3. Somewhat less a bad Cause, but bad enough too, is Pride, or a Selfpleasing ultimately in the instances of our power: And here more particularly,  
(1.) Selfpleasing in our Superiority to others in any thing, a branch of Pride, i. e. to be Ultimately and more than aught pleased therewith, inordinately and immoderately. A very mischievous Temper and Appetite. I do not see that any degree thereof is allowable, or that it doth any good more than the gratification of the proud Person. To affect to be Superior in some excellent and useful Quality, may be an occasion sometimes of a Man's excelling therein, and consequently of some good effect: But it is not because he affects Superiority, that is not the precise Cause, but because that Superiority happens to be an excellent thing. And yet more particularly.  
(2.) Envy a kind of this affection of Superiority, not the passion so much; that is, a desire of depriving others of any Good they possess which we have not; (as is to be understood too, in the foregoing cause of Hatred and Revenge) but the cause or principle of our being prone to this Passion; that is, pleasing ourselves ultimately, that we have some good things which others have not, and being very glad they have them not, and sorry and grieved if they have them: And this makes us to will both that it should seem so to us, and that it really should be so. That it should seem so; and therefore we wilfully judge it is so, that others are in general much Inferior to us in any good thing, or less Superior at least than indeed they are, and therefore particularly that they are guilty or defective, where we are not, that they are such or such. We would have others not better, or as bad, or worse than our selves, and are much pleased it is so, and therefore we make it to seem so to ourselves, and wilfully judge it so, when it may be it is not in our power really to make it so. For the same reason Envy also makes us to will it should be so indeed, and to endeavour it as much as we can: and therefore particularly, so far as we esteem, honour, love, reward good things, that they should not be honoured, beloved, rewarded, or the like, and consequently that they should not seem to others to merit it; and consequently both to judge and make known our Judgement very greedily and readily that they do not, to bear witness against them. It is called Detraction, when a Man from this or such like Principle, is judged not to have some good Quality that he hath really; and Slander when he is judged to have some bad one, which he is free from. A contrary temper to that wise Admonition of the Wiseman, Prov. 24.17. Rejoice not when thine Enemy falleth, and let not thy heart be glad when he stumbleth.  
(3.) Contempt, this hath an effect contrary to admiration: Admiration of any Person in general and confusedly, causeth a Man to judge all things in or any way belonging to that Person excellent, and to attribute more to him than he hath. Contempt in general of a Person, on the contrary, causeth us to judge all things appertaining to the Person contemned, mean or small, or to attribute to him many and greater Imperfections than indeed are in him, in some such manner ordinarily signified. Tush, there is no great matter in such a Person, indeed he may be so or so: But that's a small thing if he be; nay, there is nothing laudable in him, what's matter what he saith or doth? He is weak, silly, wilful, etc. Whereas we ought not thus confusedly to pass Judgement, but more distinctly; if there be any thing contemptible, yet there may be other things very considerable. Men also may please themselves merely in contempt of another, as a Mark or Sign (to themselves, though it may be to no Body else) of their own Superiority, and being better; and that they may more contemn and consequently please themselves, (as it was before in hatred) make him appear to themselves, and judge him much more contemptible than he is. Both these last particulars are contrary to the Apostolical Precept, in that excellent Chapter, Rom. 12.10. In honour preferring one another. Be we rather inclined to judge others better than ourselves, and to give unto them the signs thereof, rather, I say, than assume them to ourselves, even when equal probability of both sides, or some (it may be) advantage of our own: for the more excellent effect only sometimes of checking and controlling, and subduing, and bringing under Command, that unreasonable and inordinate Self-love. These three are Branches of Pride.  
(4.) A fourth cause is Flattery in Judging: That is, when a Man pleaseth himself ultimately, in pleasing any one that is an Adversary or Enemy to the Person concerning whom he gives Judgement, and consequently is well pleased to hear of his Faults or Imperfections. A Man may use out of Flattery so often to tell his Judgement to the disadvantage of a Person, that at last he may unawars come to believe it himself; and partly that his Flattery may not at any time be discovered, oblige himself to believe it, and persuade himself that that is true, which before he did but say was so, though he thought the contrary. And here it may be observed, that as too great a Proneness to judge on the worst side, doth proceed from these Causes mentioned: So it is a most ordinary thing for the passing, and especially declaring one's Judgement and Opinion on the advantageous side, i. e. That a Man hath more of some good thing than indeed he hath, to proceed from some of the same Causes too, viz. Hatred, Envy, Indignation. For Example, That a Man hath more Revenue, Treasure, Honour, Power, Ease, Pleasure, than indeed he hath, only to expose him more to the Envy or Indignation of others. And in general, Men judge thus in a thing which they account a reward to him who they think doth not, or they would not have him either to merit or receive it, most commonly it is an easy thing from Circumstances, to discern from what Principles such Judgement proceeds: But some may be so cunning as to conceal or dissemble.   

Sect. VII.  
Seventhly, For the Causes of rash Judgement and Censure, they must be the same with those of the two former particulars. The Causes of rash Judgement in general, Idleness, Busibodiness, Activity, Curiosity, Pride, and of rash Censure or Judgement, without Reason, but a Mans own Will on the worst side as such; are among others, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, Envy, Contempt, Flattery. To which we may add Anger and Wrath, which if a Man be not very careful, disposeth us to as much uncharitable and unreasonable Judging as the former, and a Man is seldom or never to trust his Judgement of any Person after that fierce and confounding Passion, but refer it to another time, when calmness and freedom from Passion, gives him more ability to see the Truth, and more impartiality to judge. And now all these Causes, methinks, are so Unreasonable, Inhuman, and Unchristian, when thus nakedly represented, that they cannot but stir up in Souls not quite degenerate, or corrupted, dead, and senseless of what's good, many of these very Passions against themselves, and seem the ugliest Objects that can be beheld. These are those which compose a Devil more, and are more essential to him than any other shape.   

Sect. VIII.  
iv The Causes some of them of false Judging as false, or of falsity, error of Judgement concerning Persons, whether on the good or bad side, may, as in all other false Judgements, be reduced to two within us in General.  
1. Defect in our Understanding which here in this case is but one, viz. Ignorance, in a large sense, viz. the Absence, or want of Apprehension, or of the actual Knowledge of something which would influence our Judgements.  
2. In our Will, a mere inclination to any certain false Judgement, whether it be from Custom and Use, or from the Love, and for the sake of any certain Object.  
In this particular case of false Judgements, some of the most frequent Causes more or less remotely, and some way or other reducible to these two, are these:   

Sect. IX.  
(1.) In general; mere Ignorance of the truth of things, where there is no defect of Will. So a Man may judge an action in respect of the effect and principle of it, to be well or ill done, when it is the contrary; and it was the case of the Jewish and Gentile Christians, passing Judgement of one another's Eating, and abstaining from certain Meats, and observing or not observing some certain Days and Times, and consequently imposing them upon one another from their own private Opinions; not as determined by their rightful Superiors or Governors, Rom. 14. Some of them through Ignorance judged, that those who took the Liberty to eat forbidden Meats, contrary to the Mosaical Law (which they thought was still even under the Messiah to be observed) did an evil Action, and out of an evil Principle too possibly, viz. Profaneness, or want of that respect for God's Commands which they ought: And this probably too, because they found in themselves that if they should do so, it would proceed from such a Principle (which will be a second Cause presently to be named.) The other Gentile Christians judged right concerning the action of abstaining from Meats, that it was not right; and the Non-observation of, or Liberty from the Jewish Law was a Christian privilege, or it did not belong to the Christian Religion: But possibly too they might (if they did not) judge wrong, concerning the Principle of these Jewish Christians, viz. That it was out of Superstition or Pride, that the Gentiles might not be in all things equalised to themselves, and that the Ancient Constitutions of their Religion might seem more considerable. From hence also (more particularly) it proceeds, that even very Honest and Just Persons (though much oftener in the World, it proceeds from ultimate Self-love or a mixture of it) judge themselves Comparatively more Superior to others in good qualities, and truly more valuable than they are, viz. They know and observe more their own Perfections and good Qualities, their Number, their Nature, the degrees of their worth and excellency from their effects, than they do those of others. They can tell better all the Good qualities they have in themselves, than what are in others; many of which, or but few, they may ever have had occasion to observe: They may also, and do see, and take notice of all the uses and good effects of any Perfection which is in themselves, having frequent occasion to observe them; but hardly of any of that which is in another; when he possibly could quote as many more of his. And hence (a little further) it comes to pass, that every one extols and cries up his own Art though never so trivial, and prefers it before others, really believing what he saith. Hence also it is, together with some Rashness and Precipitancy in inferring, that Men judge others too generally and too confidently to be Ill or Good qualified Persons; to have more of Defects or Perfection comparatively each with other, than they really have; that they have (for Christ) such or such ill qualities and imperfections (which may be true) but none or much fewer good qualities to balance them, than indeed they have; and than they themselves would have known, if they had had some other opportunities of knowing them: They have had only occasion or means to know the defects and Ill qualities, and not the Good, and so perhaps on the contrary; and yet they do not observe so much, nor reflect upon it, nor attend unto this Caution. Now Men ought to pass Judgement first distinctly, that at such or such a time, in such or such a performance or action, there appeared to them such defect or commendable quality, and then from thence according to the degree of probability or likelihood in the Consequence (which if the observation be but once, is oft but very small) if there be just occasion, to infer and conclude concerning the Qualities of the Person in general, as to number, degree, and constancy; which men commonly do all in a clutter together confusedly. There have been Men known, who have not only once but often appeared very mean and defective, (especially in some Circumstances, as in Public, in Conversation after Action, in haste or with expedition) and yet have at that time been much more valuable, but could not show it; and generally in other Circumstances of Life, they have much exceeded those who have appeared much better at certain times.  
It most often requires a pretty long Conversation, especially to more slow Observers and Reasoners, to know and pass a general Judgement truly concerning a Person: That which is usually signified by the Proverb, Of eating a Bushel of Salt with a Man, before one chooseth him for a Friend.  
This is the reason ordinarily (to give no unuseful Instance) that Men are often judged in general better or worse than they are by their Discourses and Looks. If a Person hath wrote a Book in which there hath appeared somewhat considerable of Piety or Virtue, or Judgement, or Wit, or other Good quality, he is generally thought more such in more things, and more constantly than he is, whereas there is set down his Thoughts and Inclinations which are more rare; whence also greater expectations from him in his Discourse, Conversation, Employment, than are reasonable; and sometimes upon their observed failure, greater contempt and under-valuing of him; sometimes (as when the Judger follows common Opinion and Testimony, as most do) an undue admiration and approbation of all he saith and doth. The like on the contrary; when Men for some too light or satirical, or obscure Speech or Book, are judged more careless, trivial, ill-natured, or confused in more things, and more constantly than indeed they are. All which seems much like as if Men should from one handsome or crooked-finger of a Person, judge confidently concerning the Beauty or Deformity of his whole Body.   

Sect. X.  
(2.) More particularly; an Opinion or Judgement too universal and unlimted, that all other Men are like ourselves: Which as it is true sometimes, so it is often false. This comes from actual Ignorance, or non-attention of this Rule's not being Universal; and that other signs of men's Qualities and Tempers are to be adhibited and made use of, and that there is great variety in Men. So ofttimes we judge such an Action to proceed from such a Reason, or such a Principle, or such a Temper in a Man, (suppose from Self-interest ultimately, Pride, or Covetousness,) because it doth so in ourselves, or at least we are strongly inclined thereto; never taking any other account of any other Circumstances (such as his former Temper, manner of Life, Actions in the like case, etc.) which might give us sufficient reason to believe and judge the contrary. The same Action may proceed from several Principles, Ends, and Purposes: And very different and contrary Actions (especially in divers Persons) may proceed, and full often do from one and the same general Principle, and due End. So Men are apt to judge other men's inclinations like their own, and that some things please others as much as themselves; and other things are distasteful, tedious, and burdensome, because they are so to themselves. So many judge that the Gratification of many inordinate Appetites or Lusts in us, are extraordinarily pleasant to all Men, say they what they will, and Virtue and Religion is a dry sapless thing to all Men; nothing of Pleasure or Delight to all those that profess it, but that it is taken up or pretended to, for some other particular Ends, and that they would be otherwise if they dared, and would be glad to be rid of the burden, or freed from the confinement thereof; and that therefore they are Hypocrites: And from the same cause are frequent false Judgements on the Good side, and Persons and Actions are often judged better than they are, which is the better extreme. In so much that very oft very Good-minded Men cannot believe that Men are so wicked as they are, that they are so Selfish, Unjust, Fraudulent and Deceitful, Perjurious, Filthy, and Sensual, Impious and Atheistical, as indeed they are, and so are as often cozened in their dealing with them, and ofttimes give their Commendation and their Charity where they are not deserved.  
This is so general a Cause of Error in our Judgements concerning Persons, that we extend it to God Himself, and it takes place very frequently in our judgements concerning God Himself. So Men judge Him not so much to love Holiness, to hate or disapprove of Sin and Vice, and consequently that He will not so much take care to reward the one, or severely to punish the other: No, He'll be Kind and Merciful, and let them alone, and Indulge them to take their pleasure as they will, or at least He will not be so hard to Torment or Punish them for what's past; and all this because they are so disposed themselves, and they for their parts are very indifferent to Virtue or Vice, and would let Men alone to please themselves therein; they see no great reason why they should trouble themselves or others thereabout. Like those wicked Persons, Psal. 50.21. These things hast thou done, and I kept silence: Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such a one as thyself, but I will reprove thee, and set them in order before thine eyes.  
Thus some Men think God Envious as it were, and if not delighted, yet content with His Creatures misery for His own Pleasure ultimately. They think Him Arbitrary, and Pleasing Himself ultimately in the exercise of His Power, and this because they themselves are so, or at least inclined to be so. And one, yet further, Reason of this, is Men's ultimate Self-love, whereby they are inclined to, and do actually judge many things in themselves good Qualities and Perfections which are not, and consequently attribute them to God, whom all Men naturally judge to possess all Perfection: Which is true, supposing the Perfection doth not necessarily infer or involve some Imperfection: A thing which is of great use to be taken notice of.  
The same hath been one reason of some Men's (the Heathens at least) Idololatrical making Images, and corporeal Representations of God in Humane shape; viz. They have judged God in this respect in Form and Shape like themselves, and this out of Self-love, together with a natural Proneness to conjoin things, which use to be in our Perceptions and Judgements conjoined: Such as is a rational Soul and Spirit joined with a Body of Humane shape, for which cause among others, Angels and Cherubims are so pictured. This is observed by Cicero, in the Person of Velleius the Epecurean, Lib. 1. de natura Deorum. Quod vero sine corpore ullo vult [Plato] Deum esse, ut Graeci dicunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, id quale esse possit intelligi non potest, careat enim sensu, careat prudentia, careat voluptate necesse est, quae omnia Deorum notione comprehendimus, i. e. Plato's Opinion, That God hath no Body, cannot be understood: For than He must want Sense, Prudence, Pleasure, which we comprehend in the notion of the Gods. And again, Quod si Omnium animantium formam vincit Hominis figura, Deus autem animans est; ea profecto figura est quae Pulcherrima sit Omnium. Quoniamque Deos Boatissimos esse constat, beatus autem esse sine virtute nemo potest, nec Virtus sine ratione constare, nec ratio usquam inesse nisi in hominis figurâ, hominis esse speciè Deos confitendum est. To this purpose: That if Humane shape be better than that of any other Animal, and God be an Animal, than He must needs have the best and the most Beautiful. And because God is a most happy Being, and He cannot be Happy without Virtue, nor have Virtue without Reason, nor can Reason be any where but in a Humane shape, therefore God is of that shape too. So Cotta, the Academic, in his reply to Velleius: Homini homine nihil Pulcrius videri, blandam enim conciliatricem esse naturam & lenam sui, i. e. Man, indeed, thinks nothing more Beautiful than himself; so Nature flatters itself. Herodotus in his Clio, relating that the Persians made no Statues, nor Temples, nor Altars to their Gods, but that they counted them Fools who did so; gives this Reason in his Opinion, viz. Because they did not think the Gods to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sprung from Men, and consequently (I suppose) not of their shape, as the Greeks did. Whether this Proneness to judge God like ourselves out of Self-love, use and custom of concelving and judging, hath been the cause of making Images, and corporal Representations of God, or something in God by Humane shape, among Christians or no: Yet, I think, there is but too much Reason to believe, that the judging God like Mens-selves, hath been but too much the effect of it, especially among the Vulgar: I am sure it hath a very great natural tendency thereto. And the effect (it is probable) would have been much more, if it had not been hindered by the Christian Doctrine, (which notwithstanding some have kept those in Ignorance of, who have in this respect most need of it) and especially by the Admonitions and just reproaches of those whom these Patrons of Images as fastuously, as foolishly, and falsely call Heretics. A custom and usage so sottish and childish, that never any who had their Religion from the True God, or who had any notion of His Spiritual and Infinite Nature either among Jews or Heathens, pretended any sufficient reason for, (as the instruction of the Vulgar, etc.) or did not contemn and deride it, until some Christians in the times of the greatest Ignorance and Corruption of Manners, within some few Hundreds of years, introduced it into the Christian Church. But to return from this Digression.  
In Opinions and Persuasions: Some even of the better natured Persons oft judge, that Men cannot be of such a persuasion but out of some ill disposition of Will, and such a particular one too, viz. Self-interest; that is, it is for some designed good to themselves (besides the being in the Truth) so to be persuaded; and this because they find themselves inclined thereto, and if they were of such persuasions it would be from such Causes: Not considering want of Information, Ineptitude to apprehend things any other way but as they have been accustomed, a great usage of themselves so to conceive and judge, may be the causes of such really false Opinions of theirs. Nor do I see it a thing but very generally to be determined, how far a true Lover of the Truth, or an Honestman in this particular, may err and mistake. Though I think too on the other hand, very ofttimes other Causes of false persuasions are alleged, besides some naughty disposition of Will, when it is not so, or but in small measure, and this alone hath the greatest Influence indeed.   

Sect. XI.  
(3.) Too general a belief of every Testimony or Report, whether in Talk or Books, which proceeds ofttimes again from mere actual Ignorance, or Non-attention, that most Reports are most-what very fallible signs of what's true, and sometimes none at all: That there are much better Proofs of things sometimes from contrary Testimonies of better Persons, sometimes from other things. This proceeds also from love of Activity and Curiosity, of Knowing and Judging somewhat new and fresh, and sometimes from the worse Principles so often named. All Testimonies are more or less signs of what's true, according as the Persons are more wise and knowing, or more veracious willing and careful to say no more than they know: Now how many Actions of Persons reported to be done with certain Circumstances, and from certain Principles and Reasons, by those who neither do, nor can know any thing of them: Or if they do, yet through temerity, rashness, and precipitancy, curiosity, suspicion, envy, flattery, or some other disposition of Will, do so either invent or change, by adding or detracting or substituting, that sometimes none at all, most-what but little, rarely very much of what they say is true and to be believed. But yet what more ordinary than for Men to believe all without stick or scruple. The further too still Reports go, through the more Persons they pass, they are still the more uncertain, because still the more alteration; and as it rarely happens for Persons who observe things by their own sense or reason, to report them just as they observed them, through forgetfulness or rashness: (Besides that they might not discern some Circumstances.) So it is as rare and seldom for the same things to be conveyed from any one to another exactly, without some alteration. I believe that the more Cautious and Wise, cannot but have observed, that in almost all Reports and Testimonies concerning Persons, their Actions, Principles, Qualities, or Tempers, either the things are quite false, or but some general part of them true. The more Cautious and Discreet, Honest, and lovers of Truth we observe Men to be; the more we may in their Reports and Testimonies concerning Persons, either on the Good or Bad side, defer to them of our Belief and Judgement of the truth of what they say; and these in any degree considerable, are but too few. A good short Memorandum of this particular is that excellent Precept, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Remember to unbelieve or disbelieve, i. e. Either to suspend thy Belief, or to believe the thing to be false.   

Sect. XII.  
(4.) A fourth Cause of our false Judgement on either the Good or Badside, is our attention to, and taking notice of, or observing only either the good or bad Actions or Qualities, Perfections or Imperfections of Men, together with their Effects and Consequences; and not both. Whence it comes to pass, that those Persons in whom we attend to nothing or little but what is Good, (which is still the better extreme) we judge much better than indeed they are; and thus it is usually in our Judgements of ourselves or our Friends, or those we love and favour: But on the contrary, those in whom we attend to, or observe what is bad or imperfect only, their bad qualities or actions, the bad effects and consequences of these; and not at all or but little of what is Good, we judge them much worse than they are; Judge them to have done a great many and very bad actions, to have a great many and very bad qualities; but none or very few good. This as it is the most mischievous, so it is the more frequent extreme. Men being now so far from that Humane and Christian temper of universal Kindness and , that they are but very few they care for, or to whom they are disposed friendly, in comparison of those they do not. This again may sometimes proceed from mere necessary Ignorance and want of Information. For sometimes a Man may have seen, or otherwise known much Good by a Man, and none or little bad; either because the Man wanted his proper Temptation, or through dissimulation of his temper and inclination, or for other reasons: And on the contrary, a Man by himself or others, may know many bad things by a Person, and little Good; when he may have much in him which he had never the opportunity to observe, or the Means otherwise to know. But it most-what proceeds from some undue disposition of Will, and when a Man is partially, not justly affected to Persons, and as he ought; he is either pleased or displeased with Persons, more than in general he might observe them to deserve or merit. Thus you shall but too often see (to give Instances of that side which is most to be avoided) that Men will take more notice of, and better remember one bad Action in a Person, than twenty good ones; and consequently this shall procure him more Disreputation or Disesteem, than they shall honour or goodwill: So ungrateful and ill-natured a thing, is but too much of the World: Whereas we should say, such or such a thing indeed, at such a time is amiss, bad or evil; but than 'twas but once, or seldom perhaps; nay, I know it is oftener otherwise, and he hath such or such good qualities, there he is to be commended, that is or was well done. And this should be done not to soothe Men up, or to make them content and so well-pleased with themselves, notwithstanding many ill Actions, Vices, and Imperfections, as not to endeavour to prevent, reform and amend them too; but to encourage them so to do; since they have so much Good in them already: And to make one's Counsel or Reproof more effectual; since this ready taking notice and approbation of what's Good in them, is an Argument of an impartial Love, Charity, and Kindness to them in the Person exhorting or reproving. And here I'll only add by the way, because it is a thing of frequent and great use in Humane life, that it is the same kind of Cause of our false Judment of the Goodness or Evilness of things, viz. We only observe and attend to either the Conveniencies or Inconveniencies, the Good or Bad effects of things, but not to both together; which is oft from mere Ignorance, oftener from some Passion. We may observe it every where in public Constitutions, in Domestic, Private and Personal affairs. Whence ofttimes we hurry and haste to mend things for the worse, and are discontent, ill at ease, make ourselves unhappy, repine, murmur, are unthankful to God unjustly, and without reason; and yet after some experience of the contrary Inconveniences we are running back again, with many other mischievous and hurtful Consequences. Oft-times too on the other hand, we will not stir to mend things, taking notice only of their Conveniencies, and not of their Inconveniencies, which might without greater be redressed. The first generally is the defect of those who affect Novelty: The second of those who affect Antiquity, i. e. Who inordinately and immoderately love them; either absolutely for themselves without reference to any good use or effect, or more than what they can really contribute to any such good use, doth deserve. The first is commonly the temper of Youngmen; the second of Old: In the one being an immoderate appetite of Activity; in the other of Ease.   

Sect. XIII.  
(5.) A fifth Cause is want of a prevalent love of Truth. Men most-what in their Judgements and Discourse concerning Persons (nor is it much less in things, witness the generality of Books) look more at other things, little or not at all at the truth of what they judge or say; they take little heed whether it be really true or no, and therefore seldom examine, suspend, or pronounce doubtfully, or according only to appearing probability. It is true, they say, and think things to be true, very confidently and strongly, but this not because they see the truth of what they affirm, but because they would have it true. Not because their Understanding and Perception goes before their Judgement, and their natural affection to Truth makes them so judge, but some other disposition of will; such as I have so often named, Activity, Curiosity, Pride, Hatred, Envy, Anger, Contempt, Flattery, etc. Whereas we should be very careful to possess our Minds with such a serious love of the Truth, that we may have a constant reverend regard thereto in all our Judgements and Speeches concerning others. And this we should do without much trouble, if we used ourselves thereto, and did but use to check ourselves, and ask the Question, and pause a little whether we know it to be true or no. We should love not only to speak truth without Neighbour, but of our Neighbour too. We should look upon Truth as a most Sacred thing, ever to be inviolable and to be the main, if not the only perfection of our Judgements; without which we had better have none at all. We had better be utterly Ignorant, and never judge at all, than do it erroneously: For by that means our Actions and Resolutions are determined and directed amiss, and are mischievously made use of. For were it not much better that we were ignorant, and passed no Judgement at all of Persons, either of the quantity or quality of their Perfections and Imperfections, than by being mistaken therein sometimes to neglect or punish the Innocent and Well-deserving, and to be Beneficent and bestow good things upon those that ill deserve, and make ill use of them. In few words, Men judge falsely because they will not judge truly, or are not pleased therewith, or at least but little and in such degree only that it is not effectual. For it is not every degree of love to the Truth, that will secure a Man from false Judgements of things, and here of Persons: But it must be a greater degree of Love thereto, than to the thing which at any particular time may be a temptation to the contrary. And if we would be always secure, we must have a stronger Affection thereto than to any other Object, which may occur in our Lives, more than to the favour or goodwill of the Greatest or Best, more than to Mischievousness, Superiority, either in Reputation for, or Possession of any Good thing, more than to Power or Greatness, more than to Gain or Riches, finally any other good Advantage or Interest. We must look upon our uprightness or truth of our Judgements or Opinions, as a far greater proper Good, a richer and more excellent Possession than all these; whereby we do more Good than by all these without it. And consequently be more shamed and afraid to be Erroneous, and live in Falsehood and a Lie, than any other evil or hurtful thing to us, except Vice and Sin.  
We must in a general sense; Buy the Truth, and sell it not: That is, prefer it before all other things that are inconsistent with it, and cause us to part with it, also Wisdom, Instruction, and Understanding, the means to obtain it, Prov. 23.23. If we do not do thus, if we be not thus tempered and disposed, if we do not judge this a greater good; we shall have our Judgements affected, strengthened, bend, and determined by our love to other things in all Matters, where there is not apparent demonstration, but only high degrees of Probability; as it is almost in all affairs of Humane life. Nay, even in these a Man may wilfully blind and confound himself, or divert his attention; and if not make himself judge false, yet at least hinder himself from clearly seeing and judging truly, and make himself doubt as it were; saying, when a thing cannot be denied, Truly, I do not know, or the like; and in such a manner shuffle and contrive to bring himself at least to suspension and doubt and confusion. Every Man hath some degree of love to Truth naturally, some more, some less, more than sometimes to more, sometimes fewer other things; and accordingly they are more likely, more often to judge truly. But it is and must be a greater degree than to all other things universally and constantly, that will always secure from all prejudices of his will.   

Sect. XIV.  
(6.) The sixth Cause I shall name is our Passions, both those of the Concupiscible and Irascible appetite, as they are usually called: Or more plainly, those that have good; and those that have evil for their immediate Object. Such as are the simple ones of Love, Hatred, Joy, and Grief, and Desire: And others compounded of these, as Revenge, Anger, Hope, Fear, etc. These all in every Case, cause us to judge to the advantage, and in favour of themselves; that is, so as they may be preserved and maintained, the Instances of which are , and innumerable. Thus for Example: Love causeth us to attribute to the Object beloved things that are lovely, whereby the Passion is maintained or increased; and hatred on the contrary, to attribute, or ascribe, or adjudge to the Object hated those things that are hateful and evil, for its own preservation or increase, whereby it is kept up or augmented, and made more keen and sierce: And all this without any regard to the truth or falsehood of what is judged. So likewise what we desire, we will think it is good Positively or Privatively. In desire properly so called, or where the good we desire, is a possession of some good thing, we most readily judge the good thing a great Good, and consequently its Possession. In Anger and Revenge, where the good thing desired is a removal of some evil or grievous thing to us, by doing evil to it (which obtains in Inanimate things, but principally in Persons) we are extraordinarily prone and forced to judge this removal a greater good, and in order thereto the evil to be removed a mighty evil. And therefore more particularly in Persons to whom we are thus affected or passionated, we judge many kinds and degrees of evil or bad things to be in them, many or all, perhaps more than indeed there are, which are seldom but very confusedly apprehended, and signified usually by some name, to which our passions of Anger, Hatred, or the like have been joined, (as that of some Sect or Party) whereby still these our Passions are gratified; that is, supported, maintained, nay, augmented and boiled up to the greatest degree of Agitation and Violence. And those men's judgements thus from Passions, whereby they are maintained and increased, though they may happen to be true; yet it appears by Experience, that they are more generally false. Their happening to be true, sometimes makes Men ofttimes justify and think well of such passionate Judgements; whereas the truth was not at all seen by them, nor was it the Reason or Cause therefore of their Judgements.  
These Passions thus bias, and warp, and determine our Judgements three Ways among others.  
1. By bringing to mind and furnishing our Invention only with those things which maintain or increase them, and which are true; and keeping out the contrary, hindering those from appearing which may abate or extinguish them, which are as true too. We all may have often observed how much we have presently to say for a Person whom we love, how plentifully and readily our Invention is furnished; What long Orations we can make in his behalf and praise; How many excellent Qualities, and in what great Degree, appear to us in him, and we attribute to him. All which grant to be true. But we have nothing to say against him, nothing to his disadvantage, nothing that is bad, imperfect, or faulty in him appears, or comes to our mind; when as much might as truly there have been said too. And so on the contrary (the worse or at least the more frequent extreme) in a Person whom we hate, are revengefully and wrathfully affected to, with whom we are angry: Then how many Faults in him, or Imperfections crowed presently into our Minds? All his past bad Actions and Qualities remembered, his present observed, nay, his future too foretold; and altogether fly about immediately in our Fancies; and we could give a Catalogue sometimes of many hours long, and make large Declamations against him; the Man hath been this and that, and tother, all which we'll grant to be true too: But then, how barren are our Inventions for him, we have nothing or very little to say to commend him. This would be a very dry Theme for us. We remember, or take notice of nothing considerable in him: Whereas it may be here is as much, and as true to be said by any other Person who is Calm and Reasonable, not thus possessed by these Passions against him; nay, and we ourselves can do it when we are out of that Passion, when the Man is not altered (except it be in that one particular for which we are angry with him) he is the same still, he is no better nor worse, when we are, and when we are not so affected to him; 'tis we only alter and change. And so in particular Actions, how easily can we, by how many Arguments, commend, justify, or excuse any Action of our Friends, and with as many discommend or aggravate that of our conceited Adversary, whom we are in hatred with, or bear grudge against, or are wrathful and angry with? Hence therefore we give false Judgements concerning Persons qualities or actions; judging them much better or worse than they are; we having only Arguments and Proofs on one side brought to our Mind, by our passions, and those on the other kept out by them. Which is like, as if corrupted or bribed Officers should permit no Witnesses to come into, or appear in the presence of the Judge, but those that shall serve for that side or the Cause that they are bribed for: And yet often our Mind and Reason, the Judge, not attending and taking notice of this Bribery and Partiality of these Officers, the Passions (though it might and should) may think it very truly judged; at least as it ought according to the Evidence that it had; and set down, and be content, and think all was well done, and truly they were very honest and sincere in their Judgements. This is one of the most sly and close Cheats and Tricks we by our Passions put upon our Reasons. The more had we need here to be cautious, and now more especially when the Deceit and Cozenage is discovered. And both on this and the two following, as well as other accounts, it is a special Maxim of Wisdom, not to trust those Judgements, where Passions have gone before Reason: But do one of these three things. Either, 1. Be calm and and have no Passions at all. Or, 2. If thou wilt for Invention-sake have any, then passionate thyself equally on both sides. Or, 3. Raise up in thyself a greater and commanding passion for Truth, which will make all the Evidence and Proof thou hast in thy keeping, appear equally on all sides. But here I may prevent what is to be said in another Head.  
2. And very briefly: Our Passions cause us to judge in favour of themselves, by bringing into our Minds not only what is true on one side, and keeping back what is so on the other, but also by thrusting into them more than is true: And therefore we observe in our Friends and in our Enemies, (that is, to whom we are so) more virtues or faults, fine or foul things, and more of them too than any Body else not alike prejudiced can see, or than indeed there are. And,  
3. When things on both sides do come to our Minds, as especially when suggested by another, who would discourse or defend the Person we are passionated for or against; I say, when this is, by thrusting them on one side away again, or turning a Man from them, or causing one wilfully not to attend to them; or if that cannot be, not to the Proof and Evidence that is in them; nay, not to be able, it confounding and agitating our Minds, and drawing their force another way: And so it is by every days Experience observed, that he that is under the passions of Hatred and Anger against any thing or Person, will not attend to what can be said or proposed in their Commendations or Defence; nor will nor can ofttimes apprehend the Proof or Consequence thereof. So on the other hand, Timidity, or Fear, or Scruple to judge amiss concerning Persons, especially on the bad side, may cause many not to judge according to the best probability that doth appear to them, without any prejudice from any Person, or ill disposition of Will: But this is an effect of Passions, more visible and more to be observed by the Person himself misjudging, than the former, and therefore in that respect more easy to be prevented. And here we see manifestly one of the principal mischiefs of Passions, as there are also very good use of them; and how much therefore it concerns us to govern them well.   

Sect. XV.  
(7.) Another Cause of false Judgement either on the good or bad part, may be all Appetites whatsoever, besides those which have Truth and universal Justice for their Objects. By which Justice, I mean, nothing else but such a love of, and desire to do Good to each particular, as is most consistent with, or productive, or effective of the greatest Good of the whole; that, always with regard to, measured and moderated by this. I say, all Appetites besides those; not only those which cause it on the bad side, as Malice, Pride, Envy, Revenge, (which two last seem mixed of the two former) and others which have been formerly mentioned; but those also which cause it on the favourable side, as in Flattery, when a Man by passing his Judgement before another concerning himself, or his Friend, desires to please him, and to gain his good opinion and favour; nay, partial and imprudent Charity itself may be the Cause. As when a Man having no Self-end (more than the pleasure of the Action) in giving his Judgement concerning a Person to whom he hath a strong inclination to do good, but without that due actual heed to, or foresight of the Hurt or Evil that may come of this his Beneficence to him, or to others elsewhere, or at some other time, that is, partially or imprudently, judgeth him more deserving than in truth he is.  
To give particular Instances of false Judgements from these Causes would be endless; only one may be observed for Example, which is frequent and of consequence.  
Contradicting the Judgement of others, passing Judgements contrary to those of others; and ofttimes the more, by how much the Number or Reputation of those others are the greater. When we see one praised or dispraised by them, contrariwise to dispraise or praise either in general, or quoting particulars, and multiplying and magnifying of them. Generally this is out of Pride, that we might Equalise, or be Superior to others in our Invention, or Discretion, or Honesty, the Abilities which fit us for Judging; that we might not at least seem to ourselves or others, to be inferior in those Qualities; that others might not seem as if they were only able and fit to do it.  
In all which there is affectation of Superiority, Vainglory, and Ostentation, Envy; which are several Branches of Pride. And this we see not only among the Vulgar, and in ordinary Conversation, but among the Learned; who often when any Author is generally commended (and it may be too much) set themselves to multiply and magnify his Faults and Defects, but to diminish his commendable Qualities, by concealing or extenuating them. And on the contrary, when an Author is now outdone, and thought to be much exceeded by another, and therefore comparatively undervalved, they endeavour to multiply and magnify what is Good and Deserving in him; but to neglect, conceal, or lessen what is Bad and Defective: And consequently by this unobserved prejudice, they give false Judgements concerning them. I know these Instances may proceed from a careful Veracity and Justice, because Men commonly both praise and dispraise excessively, and their Judgements may be true; but it is more rare even to have any thing thereof, but much more rare still to see this without some mixture of the other Causes.  
And here we may just take notice of one reason of the aptness of Men to recriminate, to accuse their Accusers though never so Just and Modest; or presently to quote their Infirmities and Faults, viz. Men know that by possessing the Person to whom they are accused with Hatred, Envy, Anger, etc. against him who accuseth them, they shall cause him to judge confusedly, and in general the Accuser a bad or silly Person, and consequently all that appertains to him, and consequently his Testimony; and that therefore it is not to be believed. We see this design most-what to take effect with the Vulgar, where there is almost always Revenge too.   

Sect. XVI.  
The Causes of the Fifth prohibited Judgement, viz. Too great a Proneness to declare and make known our Judgements, may be and usually are the same now often mentioned in some of the former, viz. Idleness, ultimate Selfpleasing by Activity, Curiosity, Vain-conceit of ones own sufficiency and ability to judge of others, fancied Reputation ; also by Hatred, Revenge, Pride, affectation of Superiority, Envy, Contempt, Anger, Flattery: And Persons who are too prone thus to do on the worst side out of such Principles, especially now named, one or more of them, and are frequent and busy in doing of it, are those who are called properly Tale-bearers; concerning whom you have so many Advisements in the Book of the Proverbs, and of the mischievousness of their Employment, as Prov. 26.20, 22. and 16.28. and 11.13.   

Sect. XVII.  
Lastly, For the Causes of men's passing Judgement in Thought and Speech, concerning Persons on the worst side, out of such bad Principles as are aforenamed; I have no other now to name, but only the corruption of their Natures, and inclinations thereof when born into this World, by some certain Causes, and this improved and increased by too constant an ill usage of themselves, their wilful compliance therewith; few taking care to correct and amend by the Grace of God, what is bad and amiss in themselves, their natural Degeneracy and Corruption, their Inordinacy and Immoderacy of appetite, but swimming down with the Stream, and doing that which is most easy.    

CHAP. V We have dispatched the Fourth General Head, the Causes of prohibited Judgement.  

Sect. I.  
THe Fifth is the mischievous Effects or Consequences, which are so many Reasons, and should be so many Motives to beware and to abstain therefrom. We shall observe some of these in each particular prohibited Judgement distinctly.  
I. Of too great a proneness to judge others in general; the ill effects are these:  
1. The first is, That too great a Proneness, and Practise accordingly, to observe and judge others, causeth us to neglect our own Affairs. The more our Eyes are abroad, the less at home; for they cannot be in two places. We cannot mind two things at once so different and distant. And it is every where by Experience seen, that those who little take notice of what others are and do, are usually more attentive to their own Business, and what immediately belongs to themselves. The time that is spent in Reflection upon others Actions and Principles, would otherwise most-what (if we are not very dull for want of Variety) have been converted to the observation of our own. Such shamefully neglect ofttimes to purpose, or set apart their own Actions, what they will, what they will not do; and their own Principles, out of what End, and for what Reason, and the execution of their purposed Actions, that they even forget to do what they themselves had purposed and designed, because they are busy and employed in gazing at others. Wisdom is before him that hath understanding, but the eyes of a Fool are in the ends of the Earth, Prov. 17.24. The sense may be, That a Man of understanding regards and looks at more often his own wisdom, to see where he acts wisely, out of foresight of, and in order to good Ends; but a Fool's thought are roving, and employed about things far from him, the most remote and impertinent; that is, of Persons and Actions (among others) which he can little make use of in comparison. As the Man that looks at his own next steps, employs himself generally to better Purpose, than he that gazes at the Horizon, or bounds of the Heavens. Now the further ill Consequences of thus doing, is this, that we transfer our Observation and Judgement there, where we can make less good Use, if any; and from thence, where we could have used it to much better purpose for the most part.  
For, 1. Thou canst not so well know that, concerning which thou judgest in another Man, as in thyself, thy Judgement will be the less certain, and consequently the Effects of it less certainly good. All our Judgements concerning others, are concerning their Qualities or Actions, and of their Actions sometimes, whether they have been at all, sometimes out of what Principle, sometimes to what effect or good purpose, whether they should have been done. Now, no Man can tell so well what Qualities are in another Man, as what are in himself: No man can so well tell the Principles of another Man's actions, his end, intention, and design, as those of himself; every Man may know his own Heart better than another Mans. No Man can be so sure of what is done by any Man, as the Person himself. And lastly, It is but rare that any Man of these great Talkers or Judgers, know the Circumstances of any Man's condition, and consequently what can or aught to be done by such a Person, so well as he himself; and surely he doth or may (unless it is because he is an idle Busybody, or worse) know the circumstances of his own Actions, better than he can those of another Man, and consequently what is fittest to be done in his own Case, better than in another Mans. Why then doth he not busy himself there? viz. At Home. (I speak not universally, but for the most part:) For sometimes in some Cases a Man may know other men's Affairs better than they themselves, and than their own Affairs, and give their Judgement with Modesty, and out of Friendship. Yet how frequent is it for Men, and the most Ignorant and Sottish, most peremptorily and confidently to judge what others who are truly Wise aught to do, what would be fittest and of best effect for them to do, to direct or find fault; where it is apparent they know little of the Circumstances of their Condition or Affairs, and these cannot reasonably be thought to be such strangers to their own Business and Affairs as not to know more, and to know better what they have to do, and aught to do; yea, and are as good to do it too. But that's another Consideration.  
2. But then, Secondly, If thy Judgement be as certain, and if another did indeed such a bad Action, or out of such a bad Principle, or hath any bad Quality; it may be you can contribute little to the preventing the like for the future, or to his amendment or help, it may be none at all, if distant, though thou wouldst, he is out of thy reach, thou canst not let him know thy Judgement, or he'll not care for it if he do; but in thyself thou mayst do much, prevent the next time, otherwise dispose thyself, nor do, nor be so any more, mind thy own Faults or Infirmities. Thou art without Comparison, more than in thine own power to direct, altar, or change thyself, than another Man is, and yet thou art very busy about him, and negligent of thyself. Which is like as if one should be very solicitous concerning another Travelling-mans' way, and diligently observe whether he went right, or in a bad way (it may be to direct him too if he went wrong, it may be only to gratify Curiosity, or to laugh at him) when he could not, or would not come at him to direct him; and in the mean time he never minded his own, and so perchance falls into a Slough, or Ditch, or wanders into a wrong one: Or as if thou shouldst be careful of another Man's Health, or Legs, or Eyes, which it is little in thy power to use when they are never so perfect, and neglect thy own which thou canst use at thy pleasure, and it may be have more need of being looked after, and are worse than thy Neighbours. Or to use part of our Saviour's own Comparison here, to be peering into thy Neighbour's Eye, and taking notice of a Mote there, when thy own Eye hath the same, if not a Beam: When (as our Saviour also Himself intimates here) if thou pulledst out thy own mote or beam first, thou mightst use thy own sight to help thy Neighbour; but if thou shouldst pull out that of thy Neighbours, it may be thou canst not assure he shall so well use his clearness.  
2. Another evil consequence of too great a Proneness, and too frequent Judgement of others, (or it then is so) is most what an Usurpation of another's right, (or of that which for another to have, would do most good) a taking from another what is his due, it is a piece of Injustice. For generally those who give Judgement concerning others, would oblige them both to judge as they judge, and do so too, to do accordingly. They are apt to impose their Judgements; and this by all the power they have, and therefore will Inflict what evil lies in their power if they do not; which may be at least Ill-opinion, disgrace, or Ill-speaking-of, even in the meanest Person. They are seldom content themselves to pass their Judgement, but they would have Persons of whom they judge, to Judge as they do, and do as they would have them, or think fit they should; and are Angry, or Ill-pleased if they do not: And here they would take away their Liberty of judging in their own Affairs, in acting according to their own Judgement; they would deprive them of making use of their own Examination and Prudence, and then of determining themselves. But is not this every Man's Right in respect of private Persons? Is it not better the Judgement and Determination of a Man's own Actions for Example should rest in himself? It is true, I may give my Judgement when desired, or asked, or where the defect of Ignorance or Infirmity is manifest out of Friendship; but then with deferrence to the Persons own Judgement and Determination at last. And this not carelessly and as being displeased, because he follows not me; but with an acknowledgement of his Right, and an Acquiescence therein. Every Man is a Prince and supreme Moderator to himself under God, in abundance of his Actions, most of his External, such as Domestic ones, and Personal especially; and of his Internal, as his willing, designing, Intentions, Opinions, and Judgements; and it is most for the Public, or Universal good, it should be so. And Men should be left to the exercise and use of their own Prudence and Liberty in many things, though they should not so well use it altogether as they might: The one may be a greater good, than the other an evil. Besides, It is most likely, every Person should best know the Circumstances of his own, especially more private Actions, and consequently what's fittest to be done, or not done: Or if any did better know sometimes, and were better and more virtuous to direct; yet, How should it be known when? And who would not pretend to it? So that there would be nothing but Confusion, and every one would be every one's Lord and Master. And yet, I dare say, it is to be observed, a most frequent piece of Injustice and Tyranny, and running through all sorts of Men, and lodged even in the Beggar's breast. Men are not content Men should be Judges in any of their own affairs, even Private and Personal; but they will be judging, directing, reproving, urging, and forcing as much as they can, them to be, and do as they would have them, lording and domineering over others; not seasonably, modestly, and friendly advising only. This gratifies and increaseth Pride in us also, and this is that in part which the Apostle reproves, in Rom. 14.4. Who art thou that judgest another Man's servant? Why wouldst thou be Govenrour of another Man, and needs have and force him, compel him to judge and do as thou judgest; or else wouldst hate him, despised and blame him in words too, (I suppose) if he did not, when-as in this case, he is only subject to God?   

Sect. II.  
II. The evil Consequences of too much Proneness to judge on the worst side, (I speak as to the effect only, though the Principle be not bad) is,  
1. That it leads a Man to false Judgements, and to judge Persons worse than they are.  
2. That it consequently disposeth a Man to Contemn, Undervalue; nay, Hate a Person more than he deserves. Whence,  
3. It begets Suspicions, and belief in others, that this his Judgement comes from the worst principles, of Self-love, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Envy, Contempt, etc. when it really may not be so. Whence  
4. It disposeth and gives occasion, and is but too often an effectual temptation, both in those whom he thus judgeth and others, to contempt, hatred, and revenge toward him, and that by observing and marking, making known and publishing his Faults and Infirmities too, which really are so; which otherwise they neither would nor should have done; nay, by adding thereto, increasing their number and greatness, and judging him worse than he is, as the former had done by his Neighbour; whence further hatred and contempt reciprocally from them to him, and more than he deserves too; hence again, it may be Hatred and Revenge stirred up in him again, against them. So that now, behold what a crowd and heap of Mischief there is on all hands, instead of mutual Charity and Beneficence. Part of this is the Motive, our Saviour Himself here subjoins to His Command, to abstain from Judging, viz. With what Judgement ye judge, ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye meet, it shall be measured to you again. That is, If you judge Men otherwise than you ought, they'll do so by you again, they'll pay you in your own Coin; Men do not use to be behind with one another in these requitals: I conceive, That ye be not judged, is meant of Men; and so in the next Verse, [Ye shall be judged,] and not of God. For God will not judge Men otherwise than is Right, and as aught to be; and therefore not as Men, who judge one another otherwise than they ought. By the way, this Reason of our Saviour's, was an Adage or Wise-saying among the Jews. So in the Jerusalem Targum, or Chaldee Paraphrase, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 With the same measure a Man measures, shall it be measured to him again whether good or bad, Gen. 38.24. And again, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. Measure for measure. So they feign Judah to have spoken to himself, when Thamar his Daughter being condemned by him to be burnt, for playing the Harlot, she produced the Signet, Bracelets and Staff, which he had given her, and bid him discern whose those were, as a punishment for him, who had fraudulently asked his Father Jacob the same question concerning joseph's Coat, whom he with his Brethren had thrown into the Pit, and made his Father believe he was torn with wild Beasts. This by the buy.   

Sect. III.  
III. The ill-Consequences of rash Judgement, especially of Censure, are:  
1. That it disposeth, useth, and habituateth a Man thereto, both in his Judgement concerning Persons, and every where else.  
2. It renders a Man's Testimony very inconsiderable. For who will much heed what that Man judgeth, who is known to judge any-how, without any regard to Reason for what he judgeth, and consequently any sign of truth. It is time ill spent to give such inconsiderate, and rash, slight precipitate Persons but the hearing only.  
3. It gives occasion to Men, of Anger, Wrath, Hatred, Contempt; they always suspecting such unreasonable Judgements to come from worse Principles than mere Vanity and Wilfulness, viz. from Malice or Envy against them; at least concluding, and truly, that there wanted the Care and Love to their Neighbours they should have had: For Men so well affected one to another, will rarely judge without Reason, to each others disadvantage. Besides, what ever the Principle be, the very ill effect will make Men ordinarily angry enough.   

Sect. IU.  
iv The ill Consequences of false Judgement, are,  
1. A Man's own Discredit and Disreputation, for carelessness, prejudice, inability and weakness, to judge right and true; whence also a Man invalidates his Testimony and Witness, and even then when he may judge well and true. He that more often judgeth false than true, gives reason to, any Man never to believe him merely upon the account of his Testimony; and therefore not even then when he may judge true. For it is more probable (considering merely the Persons Testimony) that he that hath more often judged falsely than truly before, doth judge amiss now.  
2. The distribution of the Good or Evil that are in ones power, reward, or punishment, (those of private Men I mean) such as are Praise or Dispraise, charity of Alms, or Chastisement, good or bad Word, taking or commending to any Employment or Office gainful or creditable, or refusing or discommending. I say, the distribution of these to ill purpose, viz. Good things to the Bad, or less deserving and neglectful, or Bad to the Good and Well-deserving.   

Sect. V.  
V The ill Consequences or mischievous Effects of too much proneness, or rashness, in declaring one's Judgement unseasonably, or doing it when it ought not, Are,  
1. It renders a Man contemptible, or somewhat distasteful; Either because he hath not Discretion to distinguish between times, and to discern when it is seasonable and of good effect, and when not, and it is better to refrain, to hold one's tongue: Or, because he cannot govern himself, he cannot contain his inclinations, whether from mere Talkativeness and Busiebodiness, or from some other worse Principle, he is Impotent: Or, lastly, Because he will not, but out of hatred, Revenge, Wrath, or Envy, or Flattery, or the like, he chooseth to do it, and readily takes all such occasions of mischieving another, by possessing others with an ill or mean Opinion, and by stirring up the same passions and affections in them against the Person, which were in himself.  
2. Drawing others from their own Affairs or Business, whether it be the Persons concerned in the Judgement, or others. Such Tatlers are like idle Persons, who will not work themselves, not mind their own Business, nor let others mind theirs: But with their stories concerning others wantonly divert them, or concerning themselves fright them or accuse them, and force them to neglect their work to answer them, defend themselves, or get them away.  
3. Therefore mutual suspicion, distrust, hatred, animosities, slight, envyings, contempts, or foolish esteem, vain trust, (if the Judgement be on the Advantageous side) too great and too general one of another: Nothing more ordinary than for Men upon the Whisper, or Report of some ill quality, action, imperfection or infirmity of another, to conceive presently to bad an opinion in general of him, and too be too wrathfully, contemptuously, or enviously in general affected towards him. And it were far better generally, that Men were ignorant of one another's faults and defects, than upon the occasion of their discovery, to be so uncharitable and unjust, as they usually are. Besides, these hasty Tatlers give no time for a Persons Amendment usually, if he hath been faulty once. But this effect is more certain, when that which is reported concerning any one, particularly respects him to whom it is told: As when it is said, I believe he is so or so ill affected towards you, or hath done this or that against you, to your prejudice. For Men here are presently more Passionate, and sooner inflamed, as being in their own case, they are more sensible and fond of their own good; and this too much and beyond Reason, what ought to be, otherwise the Effect would not be bad.  
There are few who have so much Charity and Humility, as to acknowledge their fault or infirmity, when truly and out of good intent, or at least with no bad one, it hath been observed, spoken of, and mentioned by another; or hearty to forgive, when it hath falsely, foolishly, or maliciously been done. It is better therefore generally (and these things are but so to be taken) to give Persons no such occasions of anger, hatred, contempt and envy, by especially the declaration of a Man's Judgement, or of what he knows of others to their disadvantage, but to be very sparing in so doing; and in general never to do it out of any worse Principle, than a general Charity to Men, and consequently love to what is just and right; out of no selfishness, no hatred or contempt of the Person in general, but of love rather to him; out of hatred or contempt of the particular Vice, or Imperfection only; and one would be glad it were otherwise. And then as to our Prudence never to do it, but when seeing the necessity thereof, we are in Wisdom as well as Charity, obliged to it. Be not a Witness against thy Neighbour without cause, i. e. Without some foreseen so good an effect, as aught to be a cause thereof, Prov. 24.28. And, ver. 17. Rejoice not when thine Enemy falleth: Nor let thy Heart be glad when he stumbleth. And hitherto is referred the telling stories to one Person, of what another Person hath said of him, or done towards him behind his back, and again to the latter, what the former hath said of him. If this be frequent, it is usually out of Talkativeness, Busibodiness, Hatred, or Flattery, either to do a Person an ill turn, by ill disposing his Neighbour towards him, setting him against him; or to do one's self a good turn, by getting the favour of the Person to whom we report, as seeming so much concerned for his Credit and good Reputation, or other Good. Though this may be done too sometimes out of a hearty sincere Charity and Prudence, without any ultimate Self-end.  
Where no Wood is (saith the Wiseman) there the Fire goeth out: So where there is no Tale-bearer, the strife ceaseth, Prov. 26.20. As Wood is usually conceived the cause of Fire, so such Stories or Reports, whether true or false of one to another, are the cause of Strife and Contention. And, ver. 22. The words of a Tale-bearer are as Wounds, and go down into the innermost parts of the Belly. That is, Usually the stories of such Persons affect deeply their Minds to whom they are told, with keen, smart, violent, and piercing Passions of Vexation, Anger, Revenge. And, Prov. 16.28. A froward Man sendeth forth strife, and a Whisperer separateth chief Friends. Such a Person by his frequent stories, if he be believed, puts Enmity not only between Strangers, but Friends; not Friends only, but chief Friends; for so probably the Hebrew word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may there signify, it otherwise signifying Excellency and Superiority. A great many say you have in the Proverbs of the like nature.   

Sect. VI.  
VI The ill Consequences of judging out of Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Envy, Anger, Contempt, etc. Are,  
1. The increase of these Passions, and their Principles in ourselves by use, and in others by our example, which in the degree, or so far forth as they habitually possess our Souls, render us unworthy of Life or Being. For so far forth we do as much Mischief as in us lies; and surely as far as we see, 'twere better than in that respect that we were out of the World. And although Self-love and Fear, may ofttimes restrain and hinder us from being the Authors of such Mischief to our Neighbour, whereby we may be Obnoxious to humane Laws; yet there may be as much of these in our Hearts, as may render us detestable to God, whose Knowledge and Punishment we can neither conceal ourselves from, nor escape. But there are infinite Mischiefs which we are capable of doing one to another, which humane Laws cannot take notice of: In so much that a Place, Company, or Society, may be weary of us, and yet cannot tell how to be rid of us. These dispositions make us like Dragons and Basilisks, that where ever we come, we kill, and and do mischief with our very Breathes and Eyes. These are the Frenzy, the Plague of our Souls, which make every Body very reasonably shun and run away from us. Finally, some make themselves hereby Enemies both to God and Men, and fit company only for the Infernal Spirits, whom we are most like; and by their being as bad as ourselves, their company will be a very suitable punishment for us. Further, one of the worst mischiefs of such Principles and Tempers is, that by our example we infect others, and make others like ourselves; we make to ourselves company of the like nature to us, and to one another: We propagate it, we give occasion to, and stir up the same Lusts and wicked Inclinations in others; we help to make them more common and ordinary, and therefore the less shameful, and the less suspected and believed, to be so bad as they are.  
2. It exposeth us to the Hatred, Anger, Revenge, and Contempt of others. If these Qualities in us when but suspected (as in our Judgement sometimes of the worst side) were the occasion thereof, how much more when they but too evidently appear to be the principles of our Judgements? All prejudices of Judgement concerning others from ultimate Self-love, render us generally contemned or hated more over less, according to the degree thereof that appears; at least pitied by the Best and Wisest. Nothing generally more hated than Hatred itself, Ill-nature, Malignity, Pride, of which unreasonable and unjust Contempt is one sort. I say, it exposeth to their hatred and contempt sometimes justly, when they judge truly of us, most-what unjustly and more than we deserve. Men seldom observe due measures in these Passions, sometimes by way of Justice, most what by way of Imitation, or mixture of both: And now when we are thus affected to Men ourselves, and they by our Example, and out of Justice, or Ill-nature, or both, are so affected to us again, and to one another: How innumerable are the Mischiefs which are consequent? viz. Just all that we see in the World, Men are properly the Causes and Authors of one to another. All men's mischievous Wills and Intentions one towards another, proceed from want of Charity, from Hatred in themselves, or from the same ill Qualities in others really, or supposed and presumed; either because Men hate one another when it is not deservedly, or when it is.  
3. But a more particular mischief of our judging others out of Hatred, is, their judging by way of Revenge untruly of us in general, of our Qualities, Principles, or Actions: Whence our Example in any thing that is Good in us, is rendered ineffectual, all our Actions though never so good, are either not taken notice of, neglected, or interpreted in the worse sense; that is, those that come from never so good Principles, and are very natural signs thereof, will be deemed Signs of bad, or mere Signs and Hypocritical. It is true, this will often happen through Persons ill-nature, and aptness therefore to judge on the worst side, when there is no occasion or cause on our part given, and then we being not able to help it at all, or not without loss of time better spent, may do well to glance a little Pity, and so neglect and take no further notice: But when we ourselves are the Cause, or give the occasion by our uncharitable, or imprudent Judgements of others, we cannot spend time better than by removing them, to take away the prejudice against the example of any thing that is Good in ourselves.   

Sect. VII.  
And thus we have run through some of the most considerable mischievous Effects and Consequences, of these prohibited Judgements by our Saviour; the avoiding of all which ought to be so many Motives to the practising of this Negative Duty: Nor ought the contrary good Effects of abstaining therefrom to do less, viz. The minding our own Affairs, the employing ourselves about our own Business, the keeping at Home, and applying ourselves to our own proper Works and Callings, the more accurate care of our own Principles and Prudence, Hearts and Actions which we can best know and direct, mind and make use of; and not only minding our own Affairs, but permitting others to mind theirs, and to be Masters of their own Principles and Actions, to examine, judge, and determine themselves, we only interposing our friendly Advice and neighbourly Counsel, when asked or desired; or when we see our Neighbour fails in his Prudence or Power in a matter of more considerable moment to him, than our time is to ourselves or others; then indeed not to be too intent to our own Business, and through Surliness or Carelessness of our Neighbours concern, to refuse, or not to mind, but to knock off a little from our own Business, and lend a helping-hand; like as all Men are so good natured, as to leave their Shops, and Trades, or Employments a while, to quench a Fire in another Man's House, though there should be no danger to themselves, or to give a Lift to their Neighbour's Horse or Ass.  
But otherwise not to be busy in meddling, or tyrannical in imposing on other Men in their own Affairs, and usurping their Right. Moreover the securing of ourselves from a disadvantageous false Judgement, and an unreasonable contempt undervaluing, nay, it may be hatred of Persons, to which that disposeth us: However, from a being suspected guilty of the worst of Principles of our Judgements, and consequently from giving occasion and temptation to others of dislike, Hatred, Contempt, Anger, or Revenge against us, and that by an unreasonable severity in their judging of us, observing and proclaiming of our Faults and Infirmities; nay, and more and greater than we were ever so unhappy as to be guilty of, or overtaken with; which otherwise they would have taken no notice of, concealed neighbourly, or excused. And then securing ourselves from reciprocal Anger and Wrath in ourselves, against their so unjust and ill principled Judgements, to which notwithstanding we ourselves gave a needless occasion, whence all manner of Mischief and mutual Injuries; Thy securing therefore of the Innocence and Peace, mutual  and Beneficence of each other.  
Again; the prevention of foolish, blind, unreasonable, precipitate and rash Judgements. The preservation of the credit of our Testimony, and putting ourselves thereby in a capacity of, sometimes to the ease and conveniency of our Neighbours, determining or assisting to determine the Controversies or Differences between them. The preservation at least of the Credit and Opinion of our unprejudiced Charity, and care of our Neighbour's Credit and Reputation; of the want of which we give but too just Suspicion, by our rash and inconsiderate Judgements, when on the worst side. Further still, the prevention of Discredit and Disreputation to ourselves, for our Carelessness, Inability, or Weakness to judge, or for our wilful prejudices by our false Judgements; when we were able to judge better, that is, truly; nay, when it is a thing always one of the most in our Power of any thing in the World. For who cannot judge, and say, that he knows not, if he be Ignorant, and hath no probability more on one, than t'other side, or that it appears and seems to him, indeed, more probable? In which he needs never to be mistaken, although the thing may prove contrary to what appeared to him?  
Further, The securing us from the Breach of the material part, at least of the Ninth Commandment, viz. Of bearing false Witness against our Neighbour.  
Moreover, principally the Just and Beneficial disposing of our Kindnesses and Favours, and the withholding them according to the degrees of each one's Merit or Demerit, the prudent and profitable dispensing our Praise or Dispraise, Good or Bad word, Recommendation or Refusal, Charity or Chastisement: Not to squander away foolishly, nay, to ill purpose, what Good is in our power to bestow, and to withhold it as unseasonably, when it would be to good Effect laid out.  
Further still; the prevention of our own being slighted or contemned, for want of Discretion, or Self-government in the use of our Tongue and Conversation, for unprofitable or hurtful Talkativeness and Busiebodiness, and of being grudged at for worse Principles (suspected or real) of our unseasonable and lavish Declaration of our Judgements. But more considerable much is the prevention of mutual Animosities, Grudges, Ill-will, Discords, Contentions, Strifes between Men, usually arising from the suspicion, or certain knowledge of one another's ill words, actions, affections, and dispositions to, and concerning each other. Which if they had been concealed, and not too hastily been told or discovered, might have been repent of, and the Persons of another mind, and so no need of giving warning thereof to the Persons concerned, and Charity and Peace had been still preserved and maintained. The Humility and Forgiveness of the World, is too little to bear the knowledge of men's few faults and miscarriages one to another, and therefore they had not need be multiplied. The prevention therefore of all the mischiefs of Tale-bearing. Yet further, the not drawing of others from their better Employments, by disturbing them with false, untrue, or at least useless and trivial judgements and Reports concerning them; which although they are easily neglected, passed over, and slighted by those that are wiser and better, and well provided in the World; yet they very sensibly touch, and much affect those who are not so; of whose Good we ought, as good Neighbours and Christians, to be justly tender. Finally, and above all, the prevention of the Increase and Improvement in ourselves (by using ourselves to the wicked Principles of Judging, so often named) of those hellish, wicked, and base Dispositions in us, to name them now and no more, those of Hatred, Malice, Revenge, Pride, Envy, Contempt, Anger and Wrath, Flattery; which if we have any degree of wise Self-love, we shall more endeavour to secure ourselves from, than from the most loathsome, tormenting, and kill Diseases of our Bodies. The prevention consequently of exposing ourselves to the Hatred and Contempt of others, but too justly deserved, and of the loss of all the benefits of mutual ; Friendship, and kind and loving Conversation. And lastly, The rendering our Example effectual; that if there be any thing Good in us, it might not be at all lost and do no Good; nay, our good Example be turned into a bad one by men's unjust, (but by us occasioned and provoked) bad Interpretations of what we are, and do.  
All these things and many more, which might be observed, of the like nature, those Mischiefs of doing contrary to our Duty, and the advantages and good Effects of the Practice of it in this particular of our Judgements concerning others, ought reasonably to make us careful of our Principles and Prudence therein, more than ordinary, viz. That we be not too Prone to judge others; much less to Judge them on the worst side; to observe, accuse, and condemn them, even in our Hearts; not to judge rashly, and without all Reason, but our Wills; not to be Inconsiderate; not to judge falsely, but always when we judge to do it exactly, according to Truth as near as we can; not to babble out our Judgements at any rate, not to be too prone to do that, but to do it out of Charity always, and with Discretion and Prudence; never last to pass our Judgements out of the worst of Dispositions, Selfpleasing by Activity, Curiosity, Hatred, Pride, Revenge, Envy, affectation of Superiority, Contempt, Anger, Flattery, etc.    

CHAP. VI  

Sect. I.  
WE are now come to the Remedies or Means to prevent those prohibited Judge, of which one of the most General, And  
1. Shall be to remember and attend to the great number of mischievous Effects and Consequences thereof, and then to the Causes of them. The first will dispose our Wills to be averse therefrom. The second will direct us to some means to effect our Wills. The first will make us willing to abstain therefrom. The second able. Call to mind therefore, and think of, as oft as thou may'st be in danger, how much of that time spent in observing and judging of others, might have been spent in Self-examination, reflection and attention to thy own Business and Affairs. How idly and unprofitably, to say no worse, I employ myself there, in comparison to what I might do, if my thoughts were more at Home. How much more uprightly and prudently might I carry, and demean myself in all my Actions. Again, how troublesome and importunate it makes one Man to another, to be too frequently Checking, Controlling, Determining them in their own Affairs, to be Tyrannical and Injuring. How unreasonable and mischievous it is to be disposed to Hate, Undervalue, or Contemn Persons, more than in impartial Judgements they deserve, and to be consequently the Causes of our selves being Undervalved, Hated, Contemned therefore, and more than we deserve. Again, the being occasions and causes of Sin and Trouble, both to ourselves and others in the World. How foolish is it to expose ourselves to just censure for Folly, Rashness, Inconsiderations, Weakness, Indiscretion and Partiality, and to be neglected justly, and not to be fit to do any good to others by our Testimony? The bearing false Witness against our Neighbour, how should it pinch and wring us, and hurt us, as much as if we nipped or cut our own Fingers, or gashed our own Flesh? What a pitiable thing is it, and mischievous, to see a Man mistakenly to struck the Bad, and strike the Good, because he thinks well of the one, and ill of the other; just clean contrary to what should be, and like Madmen out of their Wits? Why should any Man call upon himself Contempt, Hatred, Anger, or Revenge, for his weak, imprudent, peevish, or ill-natured Tattling his Opinion of others? How hateful a thing is it, to be the Cause of Hatred, Animosities, Grudge, Ill-wills, Discords, Contentions, Wranglings and Brawling, and mischievous Actions between Men, to set the World on Fire, to be a Firebrand? Consider, can any Man who wisely loves himself and the World, for the good of which he is made, endure, to be the Author of mischief only, to be better out of the World than in, consequently to see himself a constant Judge to condemn, and Executioner too by his Hatred, Malice, Ill-nature, Enmity, Envy and Spite, Revenge, Anger, Pride, affectation of Superiority in Judging, to be a Pest and Bane to the World, and to improve these most Noxious qualities in himself, by Exercise and Use, and in others by the imitation of his example, and to banish kind and friendly Conversation? Is it not also brutish enough, and a sign a Man hath no Mind to get any Good quality, wherein he may be an useful Example to others? Or if he hath, he cares not whether any be the better for it or no?  
Consider, and attend to these and such like things, especially at those times when you may have most need, when you find yourselves most prone to offend in this kind, or when upon Reflection on yourselves at any time you find you have so done. And as we shall do well thus to learn and inform ourselves in, and remember and call to mind these, or some of these ill Effects, both when we are about to do amiss in this kind, and when we have done so, to prevent the like for the future, by getting our Minds against it; so that we may know how to do it, it will be useful to take notice of, and remember the Causes that we may remove them.  
Eat we therefore and avoid Idleness; let us choose and mind some Calling of our own in particular, nor let us neglect our general Calling of serving God, Self-examination and Reflection, occasional doing Good and Beneficence. Have we a care of Busiebodiness, and merely to be doing and talking, for doing and talking sake, but always for some further good end. And so likewise have we a care of Curiosity, or a humour and desire to observe and know every thing, though most Remote from us, and Impertinent to any good use or design we can put it to, merely for the observation and knowledge sake; and it is no matter where the things be never so small and trivial, and in others (as they will be for most part) too, so it will gratify that Humour in us, and that is all we care for. Secure we ourselves from this Childish temper, and if we desire to observe and know things, let them be Profitable and of Concernment, and those which we may make best use of, and that is, be sure, what is in ourselves. Let us have a care also of that particular branch of Pride, viz. Affectation to know and direct others in their own Affairs and Actions.  
But most Industriously let us eschew and flee the gratification of ourselves, by the hatred of others and revenge. Far be this from us, and Pride and foolish affectation of Superiority, and therefore envy, fury wrath and anger against Persons in general, as also Contempt, the most common Causes of Detraction and Slander. Let them not come near us, nor enter in the least within any the doors of our Breasts. Flattery too and ultimate base fear of any one's displeasure, or seeking of their favour, we must also despise and scorn, which doth so much betray us ofttimes to Judgements on the worst side of some, that we might please others; let us be sure to inform ourselves as well as we can, when we judge concerning others, and not do it ignorantly. And more particularly, let us have a care we do not too generally conclude all Persons like ourselves, nor suffer ourselves to be abused by public Report or Testimony, and judge all true what we so receive; make always an allowance one way or another; at least most generally suspect and doubt till further Examination, if it be worth the while. Let us have a care of that kind of Partiality, whereby we observe and take notice but of one sort of Qualities or Actions in Men, none but their Good, or none but their Bad, as they are our Friends, or Foes, as we are well or ill affected towards them; but let us be free and indifferent to see both Faults and Imperfections in our Friends, and Virtue, and what's good and laudable in our Enemies. Let us stir up and maintain always in our Minds a strong habitual love of the Truth, which will be by and by a more particular Instruction: Hardly any thing of more good effect in this business, than the government of our Passions, to remove, calm, quiet them, if you intent to pass any considerable Judgement as to Truth, viz. Love, Hatred, Admiration, Contempt, Revenge, Anger, and the like; suffer we not our Minds and Memories to be Bribed by these, to admit only what can be said on one side, and not of another; nay, more than can or ought to be said, and to thrust upon us what is not true, and thrust out again what is or may be true, because against them; suffer we not our Minds to be ruffled and confused by them, and not to be able, and willing not to attend to the evidence of what we would not have to be True, or would have to be False, though never so manifest: For what can be expected from us of Truth and Justice in our judgements concerning others, when we are so affected? And lastly, Let us seriously endeavour to Reform, Correct, Amend the Corruptions and bad Inclinations of our Nature, that ultimate Selfishness, seeking our own selves without any regard to the good of others, nay, with an express contempt thereof, and by their mischief or hurt; as if their good were not Good, as well as mine; hence consequently Hatred, Malice, Revenge, Pride, affectation of Superiority, Envy, Contempt, causeless Anger, Flattery: Seek we, I say, to cure our Nature by Observation, Caution, Endeavour, and God's Assistance. Thus if we take but heed to, and remember these and all other which are the Causes of our too busy, disadvantageous, rash, selfish, false, malicious, proud, envious, wrathful, contemptuous, flattering Judgements of others, and remove them, we shall certainly prevent the Effect.  
But more particularly, I shall recommend to you some Remedies, which follow.   

Sect. II.  
2. And therefore secondly, But more particularly possess we our Hearts and Minds throughly, with an universal Charity and Benignity to all, with a proneness and readiness to do Good any where, but only where we see (and therefore in some Circumstances, as where the thing concerns many, and is not so soon known, to consider and deliberate) it will be necessarily the cause of a greater Evil; which will in general extraordinarily secure us. Nor let us suffer ourselves to be beaten from this temper of Mind by any ill carriage, misdemeanour, folly or injury of others. Let us still retain a true love of Benevolence for the Person, whatever our Keenness be against the Vice or Imperfection. Say still with thyself, what pity it is Persons should be so much their own and others Enemies, as to be guilty of any voluntary Wickedness; but if it be an Imperfection out of their power, then more need still to be pitied and relieved by us, if we be not employed in things of greater concernment. This will dispose us to diminish, abate, or connive at, and look off the Infirmities or Imperfections of others, and therefore either judge favourably, or not at all; except, where (as I have oft said) our mutual, Christian, common and universal Charity and Prudence, obligeth and stirreth us up, provoketh us to do otherwise.   

Sect. III.  
3. Rivet sound into thy Mind the love of Truth; let nothing whatsoever cause thee to be out of the Truth, scorn to feign, judge rashly or falsely concerning the worst disposed and affected Man towards thee, i. e. Contemn this Quality, but not out of a haughty Pride. i e. Ultimately, because it is thine own Imperfection: But out of an universal common Charity, i. e. Because of all the Mischief, it is the cause of both to thyself and others. And, indeed, there is some reason why here thou shouldst less do this; because if he be faulty and imperfect indeed, there is▪ but too much true already, why shouldst thou make an addition?   

Sect. IU.  
4. And yet more particularly, ask thyself again and again, (especially in Judgements of more Concern and Importance) whether or no thou be sure that thy Judgement be true: Stay not till another ask thee how thou knowest. For then for thy Credit and Reputation, lest thou shouldst seem to have said any thing rashly or untrue, or out of bad Principles, thou'lt be tempted to invent somewhat falsely, and to feign and allege somewhat, it may be, true, but insufficient, and yet persuade thyself, or at least seems to him that asks thee, that it is good proof. But do this privately, or tacitly thyself, when thy Credit may not prejudice thee against the Truth, but engage thee to it. And if it happen thou shouldst have overshot thyself, be most ready to Retract it, and acknowledge so much. Ask thyself I say, how thou provest it. And when thou dost, suppose, thyself before the most impartial person, who hath no particular respect to any person or persons, that is inconsistent with Truth and Justice, one that loves thee and the person thou judgest, and every body else; (and some such it may be thou mayest have known in the World, be sure God is so) whether thou thinkest he would admit of the proof and evidence for what thou affirmest or sayest as sufficient. Then again, suppose thyself in the same case with the Person thou judgest, and he in thine to judge thee: Whether wouldst thou be content he should judge so of thee, as thou dost of him now? Whether dost thou think that if he had thy Proof only for what he said concerning thee, thou wouldst think it sufficient, and aquiesce, and grant that he had good Reason for what he said? If thou shouldst be afraid to remit the censure of thy Judgement to an impartial Person, who neither hoped nor feared any thing from thee, and was above that, but thou shouldst suspect he would not judge as thou dost, if it were but for a small Wager, if thou wonldst not be content thy Brother should judge of thee in the same manner, and for the like reasons (and be sure either thou dost not rashly say, and fiercely thou wouldst, when if it come to be done thou wouldst not) if thou shouldst find this I say; this sure would put a check to thy Judgement, and make thee somewhat ashamed thereof: But if thou didst it in the greatest sincerity, than thou mightest and wouldst proceed to judge with more confidence and freedom, because thou findest thyself free from any ill Principles; and yet more particularly that thou mayst try thy own sincerity.   

Sect. V.  
5. Ask thyself whether thou wouldst not have true, what thou judgest concerning others, whether thou wouldst as willingly it should be false; nay, suppose it be on the worst side, thou art rather inclined it should not be true, or that thou art (considering that absolutely without any further respect) sorry it is true, and wouldst alter the case if it were in thy power. These things will principally serve to secure us from rash and false Judgements, especially those of the worst side.   

Sect. VI.  
6. Use thyself much to dwell at Home, that is, to make thyself, or something more immediately appertaining to thee, the Object of thy Observation; and particularly then when thou dost judge another, or art about to do it, cast a quick eye back upon thyself, whether thou, it may be, art not guilty of that which thou condemnest in another, or wouldst not be if thou wert in their Circumstances, it may be more; for assuredly it is a very ordinary thing. As for example, It is most frequent to judge and condemn others for Pride and Covetousness, out of Pride and Covetousness; or reflect whether thou art not guilty of as bad. Thus doing will ofttimes find us more and better work at Home in ourselves, and so consequently will keep us from using our Observation and Judgement abroad, which then is too much, when it might be better employed nearer hand in our own selves. This will also restrain us from judging falsely and rashly, and pronouncing our Judgement without necessary ends of Charity. For we are generally inclined to be ashamed, when we attend to it, to do that in another's case, which we would not have done in our own. Now when we observe our own Faults or Imperfections, we find we are not very willing (at least not gladly be sure) to look upon them, we are loath to acknowledge them, or judge ourselves guilty of them, we shift, we apologise, excuse, or if we can, deny; be sure we'll have Reason and Truth evident (for the most part of us, I except some discontented Persons with themselves) before we conclude against ourselves: Why then should we not so do by others, as we do by ourselves? I know no Reason but it is as just in one, as in the other case.   

Sect. VII.  
7. Have a special care of all Passions in Judgements, especially of Anger, the most boisterous and rude one. Let these not precede, but always follow Reason, that so they do not bribe, or prejudice, or deceive even Reason itself, as I have heretofore more particularly told you how they may, and then that they do not confound it. Passions, they either prejudice or blind our Judgements. The experience of this is so frequent, that there is none but may have observed the numerous miscarriages of Judgements from hence. And in order to this means, let us keep our Minds sober and calm towards others, have a care of using them to be affected with Passions immediately before Reason upon every occasion. Some you may observe, whose Minds are like Tinder, or Gunpowder, which take fire always at every spark. And in order hereto again, use we Temperance and Sobriety, with moderate exercise, not too violent, fierce, and active, that our bodily temper may be less subject to them, less confused, dull, and yet fierce. Too much Drink especially, and violent and frequent bodily Exercise and Action dispose much to Confusion, and Passions, and rash Actions, and consequently to blind rash Judgements. We most-what see such Persons more Talkative, Meddling, Opinionative, and Peremptory, and rudely and carelessly, or Proudly and Huffingly say any thing of others, though never so innocent and their Betters, and very uncivilly sullying their Names with their foul Breath. This will secure you from rash and false Judgements.   

Sect. VIII.  
8. More particularly, be sparing most to give thy Judgement concerning a Person thou findest thyself inclined to hate or be angry with: Suspect thyself, refrain, for thou wilt be prejudiced even undiscernedly to thyself. Or if Circumstances should necessarily require thy Judgement, remember how thou art affected, set thyself to shake off that prejudice; say all thou canst for the Person first in thy thoughts, and be passionated against those Passions and the Prejudice of them, that thou shouldst thereby be so cozened and deceived thyself, and so unjust to others. This will give check always to the bad Principles of our Judgements so often named, and prevent also many rash and false Judgements.   

Sect. IX.  
9 Discourse more of Things than Persons. Thus we have suggested to you some remedies to prevent or amend the Miscarriages in our judging concerning others. I desire you would remember and make use of them, and try their Efficacies, and consequently prevent the many great and frequent Mischiefs, of which they are the Causes, and contribute considerably to the Peace and Innocency of the World.    

CHAP. VII.  

Sect. I.  
WE are now in the last place to observe to you some few Rules to be made use of in our Judging others, viz. generally, and for the most part. For it is rare that any rule of Prudence, or the using any certain Means to obtain our due End of Universal Charity, is Universal and never to be receded from.  
1. Which cannot be too often named, and the most general is: Pass and declare all thy Judgements out of Charity; that is, because thou seest it better so to do, and more good effects of it, than not to do it; not to thyself only, but any where. Out of Charity, I say, in general to do more Good than thou seest Harm, let it light where it will, where ever thou seest it. Which part of Good effects may sometimes be more particularly received to thyself, as to expel thy too much Indifferency and Coldness to the Good or Hurt of others, to the love of Truth and Goodness, to use and exercise the good government and direction of thy Judgement, of which as a Superior in some sort thou mayest have more need, as of a necessary quality for thy place and duty, to imitate what's Good, eat what thou observest Bad in others, etc. Part of these good effects to the Person himself judged, to encourage him in any good Quality or Action, to check or restrain him from what's bad, to advise him of his Error or Fault, which but by a discreet and seasonable Judgement of him from some other Person he would not have taken notice of. Men would want considerable advantages to the knowledge and minding of their Faults and Duties, Perfections and Imperfections, if they were, and did what they listed, and no body cared or dared to observe, and pass their Judgements concerning them. It is better they should know that others, and that wiser than themselves are Observers and Spectators. And lastly, Part of them to others, to encourage them to follow or imitate if they be commended, or to restrain them from Imitation, or being drawn a way, if we disapprove and discommend. We may see it for the good of others oft frankly and cheerfully to speak well of, and commend in their hearing, and to reprove or disallow according to the greatness of the Fault or Imperfection. And we may in some cases think ourselves reasonably too cold and indifferent or dull in observing and saying nothing of what's Good or Bad in others. I say, let all our Judgements be with the foresight of, and being affected with all those or the like Good effects, which we may see may follow. And then be sure we may conclude, that such Judging out of such a Principle will please God too. And then you have all the particulars of your one general due End of all your Actions, viz. The greatest Good of the whole Universe. Here therefore I exclude ultimate Self-love, that it be not to gratify ourselves only any of these ways before mentioned, by Activity, Curiosity, Hatred, Revenge, Anger, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, Envy, Contempt, Flattery, etc.  
I exclude also all Ill-will or Contempt against the Person, but only against the Vice and Imperfection of him; nay, I affirm we ought always to have a love of benevolence to the Person. The Charity I speak of, must be an Universal and Unlimited one to the whole, and therefore must comprehend and take in every particular we see, and consequently the Person himself guilty of any Fault or Imperfection. Now, because Men are oft apt to deceive themselves and others by their confident pretences, some Signs when we do judge out of Charity, are these:  
1. More readiness and willingness to judge every where on the Good side than on the Bad. This is a sign we would have no Evil in the World if we could, not without an absolute necessity for a greater Good, and consequently of a most unlimited and universal Charity.  
2. An excusing others, and saying all we can justly and truly for them, and that such an Action, which oft proceeds from some bad Principle, it might in such a Person proceed from Ignorance, he might be mistaken, he might think so or so, or he might do it by Surprise, or the forces of Temptation, the Temptation might be strong, and consequently not argue a very small degree of Goodness; and if it be in matter of Prudence, that the Person might consider well, and otherwise than we do, or it may prove otherwise than we judge. In all which, as we are to show our Charity thus by excusing or lessening what we ought; so we are too to show it by a modest disapprobation of what's Imperfect or Faulty in them sometimes, and not through Idleness, Laziness, Coldness, or Flattery, and fear to Displease for the present, betray the faulty Person, or others, into too good an Opinion of themselves, and to be content willingly to be no better. This thus excusing is a sign, I say, that a Man would willingly have as little, and as few Faults in the World any where, as might be, and consequently of a very universal Charity.  
3. A third sign is a frequent Judging of ourselves, especially on the worst side; that is, observing and condemning ourselves for our own Faults, and acknowledging our own Imperfections. The observation, judging and acknowledging our own Faults and Imperfections, doth not use (I speak for the most part, these not being universal Signs) to proceed from any hatred of ourselves, is very consistent with men's love to themselves; for we do not see men hate themselves so forwardly; they love themselves, and all they do most-what proceeds therefrom. Wherefore it is more likely that such persons Judgements concerning others, might proceed from a love of the persons judged too, and of others in general; they deal by them, as they deal by themselves, and no worse. But when we see men forward to observe and judge others, and never to mind themselves, it is a sign this proceeds from busibodiness, or curiosity, or some worse Principle: For if it proceeded from any charity to the person, why should they not be as kind to themselves? Cannot they see it will do them as much good to judge themselves, as it will do others to judge them? And so likewise, Is it likely Men should see any more good come on't to the World to judge others, than to judge themselves? Is it not rather suspected, nay, manifest to Men, that there would be much better Consequences, if Men more betook themselves to observe and judge themselves than others, at least equal? If therefore it proceeds out of Charity to the World to observe and judge others, why should not the same move us to do so by ourselves?  
4. A fourth sign is, when our Judgement is passed with Calmness and Modesty. These are, first, Signs of the absence of all bad and unallowable Principles, and therefore of the presence of a Good one (for some there must be.) Calmness is a sign of, or rather is the absence of Passions, and more particularly of Anger, Revenge, Hatred, of our Activity, Curiosity, and Busiebodiness, and consequently of Rashness, and other Prejudices. By Modesty, I mean, a not Inordinately, and Immoderately affecting, nor assuming to one's self any instances of his Perfection or Excellency, and among others, Superiority, great Merits, whether truly or falsely. This therefore where and when it is, is a sign that the Person's judgement comes not from Imperiousness, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, Envy, one kind of that (for the more we depress others, the more we make ourselves superior to them) Contempt; nay, nor from flattery. For Fear, affectation of Friendship or Favour, is a thing that the modest Man is free from too. Now by how much these are signs of the absence of our bad Principles, the several instances of Selfishness, so much are they the signs of the presence of a good one (for some there is always) viz. of Charity.   

Sect. II.  
2. A second general Rule, which hath been before mentioned in other places, is always to judge truly. Here I would have it set down as a short Rule to be easily remembered, and always ready at hand: But because I have already spoken so much of this, I shall now add no more.   

Sect. III.  
3. Have a care of all Passions, but especially of Anger before Judgement. This hath been also mentioned before in the Means. Always judge before, and if the Case require it, that is, if there is no way of removing the Evil but by a desire of inflicting another less, then let thy Anger follow a clear and calm Judgement: Some Reasons in brief are, because thou art in great danger of being prejudiced, and that indiscernably, to judge rashly or falsely; and then thou dost no good to the person judged, if he hear, or hear of thy Judgement. For he'll be prejudiced against thy Judgement, as being rash, or coming from pride, or ill will against him; wherefore he'll think he ought not, or on purpose, and out of displeasure against thee, he will not believe what thou thinkest and sayest concerning him; He will have no regard thereto. Nor will others be the better, for thou givest a bad example. Nor dost thou inform them; for they will not trust thy Judgement, nor take thy Word and Testimony then; they'll think thou art partial, not an upright Judg. I say, this will be, when they see thee judge with fierce passions without, and before any reason assigned. Otherwise, I confess, when a thing first calmly appears true, and of concernment to be judged and believed, and no other way will do but that way; then to appear warm, and not too indifferent.   

Sect. IU.  
4. Declare not thy Judgement, when thou thyself art guilty. One reason is, because that, as hath been before said, the Person concerned and others, will think it proceeds not from any Charity, but from Selfishness, Ill-will, Pride, and so consequently they presently fly out against thee, and are displeased at thee for that, and take no notice of thy Judgement, whether true or false. There passions are more moved with, and they more attend to the principle of thy Judgement, than the truth of it. The reason of which is again, that Men being ultimate Self-lovers, and Proud, would have reason to love themselves as much as may be; whence they are more apt far presently to take more notice of others Faults than their own; and consequently when any one passeth Judgement concerning them more presently to look at the fault, than the truth of his Judgement. This is the reason we see every one fly presently in the face of the guilty Judger, and ask him whether he be not as bad, and least of all bears his Judgement or Censure; viz. They think it here more than ordinarily manifest, that it proceeds not out of Love to them (for why then think they, should he not love himself as well); but out of Envy, Pride, or the like. Every Man will say to such a Man, Physician heal thyself. That he is an unskilful or unfaithful Physician, that hath some by-end, who goes about, or undertakes to cure that in another Man, which he cannot or will not in himself. Clodius accusat Mechos, Catilina Gethegum. Let us see thee Mend thyself first, say they, and then we'll believe indeed, thou seest reason to judge another for it, and mayst do it out of Charity.   

Sect. V.  
5. Or if thou dost judge when guilty, resolve to be Innocent for the future, and condemn thyself in the first place, because more ready to take notice of thy own faults than of others. This will give Men more assurance of thy Circumspection, and Wisdom, and Charity, and consequently make them more attend to thy Judgement, and believe it according to its Truth. When thou seest (for Example) any Person commit any thing which offends thee, and for which thou art ready to blame or reproach him, and hearest others do so: Before thou passest thy Judgement, reflect upon thyself sincerely; say to thyself, Am not I guilty of the same in some degree or other, and cannot or will not see that in myself, which now I am about severely to reprehend in another, and it may be deservedly in respect of the Offender, only it would come better out of my mouth, if I myself were first Innocent or Penitent? Don't I see at least a Beam in my Brother's eye, when I have as great an one or the same in my own? There are Five Reasons among others, why a Man should first or equally take notice of his own faults, accuse and condemn himself.  
1. Every Man ought to love himself sure as well as his Neighbour, as he would do another Person of the same qualities; and if it be good his Neighbour's faults should be observed and judged, that he might be advised and amended, sure it is good his own should too.  
2. A Man gives a very good Example to others, that they should do so by themselves too; which is a thing so very rare, and yet of such extraordinary use and benefit.  
3. He renders his own Judgement concerning others, when he doth pass it, more effectual, by giving to understand it proceeds not from Imperiousness, Domine ring, Envy, Peevishness, or Busiebodiness, but from a wise Charity, out of a prudent Love, he doth by others as by himself, he spares not himself.  
4. Every one knoweth most certainly the truth of his Judgement concerning himself.  
5. Here men's care and zeal will be more successfully employed certainly; for every Man hath it more in his own power to mend and reform what he observes and condemns in himself, than what he condemns in others.   

Sect. VI.  
6. For the most part it is most safe, that is, of more certain good effect not to declare thy judgement than to do it. And therefore when at any time, or in any particular case thou seest no advantage of good consequence or effects on either side to pass Judgement or hold thy Tongue, rather choose to refrain; do it not till thou seest some considerable advantage. And one reason is, because a Man may (for the most part I say) pass his Judgement at another time, may have opportunities enough to do it; but he cannot recall it when passed, he cannot undo what he hath done, Nescit vox missa reverti. And yet the practice of Men is generally clean contrary; that is, if there be not something to affright or deter them, they seldom refrain to spend their censures very freely.   

Sect. VII.  
7. Be more cautious and sparing in sometimes passing sometimes declaring thy Judgement in these following Cases.  
(1.) Concerning thy Superiors, especially on the worst side; and that because, 1. As to their Principles they being far from our Observation, and there being few or very uncertain signs thereof (for the most part) our Judgements here will be very uncertain. And  
2. As to their actual prudence and foresight in matters concerning their Office, it is for the same reason to us uncertain, but yet far more likely (to compare it with that of their Inferiors or other private Persons) to be more and better than what is in them. For they make it more their Business to attend to what is most for the general good of those who are under their care, when Inferiors look only or principally at themselves. And then they generally have better information what is so. And truly, it seems likely that if there were as much assurance of the Integrity of Governors, or their sincere love to the public Good, as there is of their knowledge, the Judgements of wise and honest Men would generally with reason be for their honour and advantage; though with rash and proud Men, of which always are too many, the most manifest Integrity and Wisdom will not be sufficient to procure them Truth and Justice.  
3. The contempt or undervaluing of them and their Authority (which follow upon our Judgement) is of much worse effect than that of private Persons, as generally Laws, public Advices and Sentiments, and Examples too sometimes are of more use than private Opinions and Examples: They being, I say, generally better, of more comprehensive and certain good effect, as done by a greater and more generous Charity, with more of a public Spirit, and more Prudence and Wisdom: Private Persons, especially still the more Vulgar, are generally more Selfish and Foolish.  
(2.) Be more sparing in declaring thy Judgement concerning Friends. For if thy Judgement be on the good hand, it will be suspected Flattery or generally Self-love. And therefore it is generally, when any one commends his Friend, allowed for him, nay, expected he should interpose his excuse, that it is said by him who might be suspected Partial, and more apt to speak somewhat beyond the Truth. But if thy Judgement be on the worst side, thou wilt be esteemed Ungrateful, and were it never so true, yet it should not have been said by thee; and therefore in such Cases too we see Men Apologise and make an Excuse, and allege some more than ordinary reason, that obligeth them to pass such a Judgement on their very Friend.  
(3.) Be more sparing in doing it of thine Enemy: the reason is, because thy Judgement will be suspected and believed to proceed from Hatred and Ill-will; I say, be more sparing and cautious in these, and such like Cases. I do not say, but that sometimes there may be sufficient reasons to do it; but then there is more than ordinary Prudence to be used in such manner as I have now Instanced, to prevent or remove the hindrance of its good effect.  
Nay, I advise rather to take occasion to pass thy Judgement on the good side here; that is, to commend him and speak well of him for what thou knowest good and commendable in him; for than thy Judgement is believed, and consequently of better effect to those who hear it for encouragement to Imitation. Thou givest also a good Example to others of thy Unprejudicedness, and being above and untouched by busy Passions of Hatred, Ill-will, or Revenge, and of being such a generous lover of Truth and Goodness, as not to conceal, but willingly take notice of, and approve what is really in the Person laudable, though thine Adversary, it may be too altogether undeserved and without reason.  
And lastly too, By this exercise and use thou really dost procure and confirm in thyself this Generosity, and Manliness, and Christianness (for nothing more commended in Christian Religion) of Temper, and subduest Selfishness and the rabble of its Slaves, those inordinate and immoderate Appetites and Passions, makest them sneak and dare not to appear.  
(4.) Be more sparing and cautious in declaring thy Judgement concerning a Person generally Innocent or well Disposed, but once or rarely overtaken; and that because it is most likely that he will do so no more, or mend without thy judging him to himself or others. Nor is there much danger of others imitating him in one single or very rare Action, when they know he generally doth the contrary; (only indeed if one should observe it who knows not the Man, he may be informed that the Man was surprised and useth not so to do) and than what needed the trouble or shame or discredit that thou gavest him, it was unnecessary: And no evil of Pain or Punishment must be admitted, but where it is necessary for a greater good. And then it is an usual sign to others of some ill nature and Pride, that is pleased too much in others Faults or Infirmities; when Men are so ready to judge the first; and consequently is of bad Example to them, and prejudicial to one's self. Or if thou dost see reason to take notice of such Fault or Infirmity, let it be very shortly, and presently seconded with a Commendation of him for his general past Innocency or freedom therefrom; and that thou doubtest not but that he himself the most disapproves of it, and will not readily do so again. All which are signs of freedom from any Selfishness, of Charity and Prudence, and consequently the more likely to have good effect on the Person concerned, and others too.  
(5.) Be sparing in declaring thy Judgement of wrathful and bashful Persons, either to themselves or others. One reason is, because the wrathful and angry Man will not and cannot bear it through Pride, and the bashful through Shame, that is, Fear. To the wrathful Man it is at least to himself ineffectual; for he'll the more justify or defend himself, and do or be the same thing again out of Revenge and Pride; it will give him occasion of wrath and attempting Mischief; he'll turn and rend thee. I say, this for the most part (as all other Directions of this kind): For sometimes it may be requisite for his and others Good, first calmly and softly (signs of  to him by doing him good) afterwards shortly and smartly (that is, out of real Benevolence still, but by some pain or evil to him) to pass Judgement concerning any Principle or Action of his, let him take it how he will, and but too impatiently.  
And as for the bashful Person, it is too great a punishment for him; less would have done: And always do as little evil as thou canst: A private Hint to him would have been sufficient. Be not a Witness against thy Neighbour without a cause, and deceive not with thy Lips, saith the Wiseman, Prov. 24.28. That is, Do not pass nor make known thy Judgement either privately or publicly, without sufficient reason.  
(6.) Be sparing in declaring thy Judgement on the worst side before much Company; especially Persons whose Favour or good Opinion is more considerable, and who are in no great danger of Imitation.  
One reason is, because most-what less Discredit or Disgrace would have sufficed to the Mending or Correcting of the Person; if it had been before but one or two, either before the Person himself concerned, or from whom it might have been conveyed to him. The Faults or Imperfections had need be great or frequent, and the Person or Persons very confident and presumptuous, obstinate and conceited, and a danger of some general Infection, when they are so much published and made known.  
(7.) Be sparing in declaring thy Judgement on the worst side before Enemies, or Adversaries, or ill-disposed.  
One reason is, because they are, or are in danger of being prejudiced and partial in their Judgements, concerning the Person to whom they are ill-affected already; and thou by thy Judgement confirmest and increasest this their Partiality. They are but too ready to catch at and take notice of any thing spoken disadvantagiously, and to add to it too and aggravate it; and thou art not to give them the occasion if there be no greater good to be had thereby, not with a less Inconveniency to be procured. Those too that are of an ill Temper, and apt to be Envious and Proud, will make ill use thereof, and gratify and augment those Vices in themselves, and afterwards be generally contemptuous and ill-affected towards the Person thou discommendest. It is more safely done, and very profitably ofttimes before Persons of a benign and generous Temper, and those who are Discreet, who make from thence profitable Observation of the Causes the mischievous Effects of the Defects, Infirmities, Faults and Vices of Humane Nature, to Direct, Govern, and Moderate themselves, to Advise and Counsel others with Reason, and even the Person himself whose faults are noted, if it comes fairly in their way: Not to contemn or despise the Person in general, much less to hate him. Sometimes this may be done unawares, but ofttimes it proceeds from an ill will to the Person judged; and therefore from an intent and design to exasperate and incense his Adversaries against him more; knowing they are apt easily to take fire. Oft-times it comes more from Flattery, to pick Thanks and ingratiate ones-self with him who is enemy to the Person judged, whom they judge they please hereby, being willing to hear of the others Faults and Infirmities, to gratify his Hatred or Pride, or that he may have wherewithal to justify his being so disposed against him, that he might seem to be his Enemy with more Reason. If it be not thus, yet ofttimes this will be suspected; a Man will incur the suspicion of an ungenerous Revenge, or Hatred, or Ill-will, or Flattery, or at least the accusation of Imprudence.  
That's the 7th Rule, Be more sparing in thy Judgement, 1. Concerning Superiors. 2. Friends. 3. Enemies. 4. Once or rarely Surprised. 5. To and of wrathful and bashful Persons. 6. Before much Company. 7. Before Enemies or Ill-disposed.   

Sect. VIII.  
8. Be apt and inclined rather to defer thy Judgement concerning others till thou art desired; and that either by the Person himself, or others who may be much necessarily concerned to know another Persons Qualities or Conditions; and then not to refuse it. Some Reasons are, because that hereby thou accustomest and usest thyself to Self-government and Direction, to Act for certain Ends, and by certain Rules, particularly thou causest thyself to refrain thyself, and to be free and averse from Busiebodiness, and impertinent and profitable meddling with other men's Matters, and other bad Principles of Judgement, partly by mere disuse, partly by attending to this Rule, and the good effects of it: Again, thy Judgement is then more likely to be true. Further, Thou securest thyself also from suspicion of Prejudice, and consequently thy Judgement is more heeded, and it being more likely to be true, may be of good use to the Person desiring, and the other concerning whom it is desired if known, to advise and forewarn them of some Fault or Imperfection to be reform or get rid of, which otherwise would not have been minded or believed. Further, Thou dost a very good turn for, and gratifiest him that inquires of thee. It may be also an occasion of a good Turn and of a Kindness to the other Person thou passest thy Judgement of, to remove some unjust Suspicions or Opinions concerning him. It may be he was believed or suspected worse than he was. Thou mayst rectify some Mistakes.   

Sect. IX.  
9 Thou mayst then more freely and frequently declare thy Judgement concerning one to another, or to more; when thou seest them deficient in Ability or Wisdom, to take care of themselves; and particularly when they are actually Ignorant of something in another Person, which may be of great concernment to them; or are deceived in their Opinion concerning him, whence some great Detriment or Damage may arise from one to the other.  
Thus for Example: If a Man knows or reasonably suspects a Man to be False and Faithless, to be Fraudulent, or to be Poor and Insufficient, who yet would be bargaining with, or borrowing of another, or getting some interest in his Person or Estate, of which he may be Ignorant; or to persuade to some Actions and Opinions which may be childish, foolish, or hurtful; a Man may advise the Persons concerned, and give them his Judgement then unasked, not out out of any Ill-will to the one; but of  to and Care of the other: For a Man ought to be a Friend to every Man, and a Brother, and nor permit if he can any one to be dammaged or mischieved, and to keep him from the commission of a Sin. A Man may ofttimes meet with Persons in the World who are innocent too and simple, of no great prudence and foresight, who are also rash and precipitate, or dull and inapprehensive, who therefore may be easily imposed upon by others, and made a Prey of by them. Here it is a prudent piece of Charity to advise and fore-warn and to discover the Designs and Qualities of those who would and do abuse their Simplicity, and imprudent well-meaning Honesty.  
Some Reasons of this are the same with the former. It is an exercise of Virtue and Prudence in ourselves. It is an act of more than ordinary Charity to the Person in danger to be deceived, to lend him thus the use of thine Eyes for his safety and good. It is a very seasonable making use of thy Judging; that is, it will do most good now, when at another time perhaps it would do none at all, or not so much. Here in this case when a Man desires thy Opinion or Judgement, thou removest his Solicitude, and satisfiest him perhaps, if he be Ignorant thou informest him; whereas if thou givest thy Judgement unasked, before thou art desired, and where the Man is sufficient himself, thou wilt do them no kindness, nor will they so much mind thee, nor thank thee for it; for it may be they have none, or not such need of thy Judgement just then; and thou wilt be more suspected too of Busiebodiness or Ill-will. So also where thou art not desired by one Person to give thy Judgement concerning another Person, but unasked because of the Persons Insufficiency, out of Charity thou dost it, the effects most-what are very good, and if therefore thou dost it, thou art no less prudent than charitable. And these are the most considerable Rules I have now thought of, for the Mannagement and Government of ourselves in judging others; which in very few words for Memory sake, I will reckon up again.  
1. Be sure it be never inconsistent with Charity, but always done out of the prospect of some good end.  
2. With the exactest truth.  
3. Beware of all Passions before Judgement.  
4. Declare not thy Judgement when thou thyself art guilty. Or  
5. If thou dost, first accuse and condemn thyself.  
6. It is better and safer generally, not to declare thy Judgement of Persons.  
7. Be sparing in judging and declaring thy Judgement on the worst side concerning Superiors, Friends, Enemies, Surprised, Wrathful and Bashful Persons, before much Company, before Enemies and Ill-disposed.  
8. Defer thy Judging much, till thou art desired or asked.  
9 Interpose it to them whom thou seest defective in their Ability or Care for themselves. Many more by Experience may be taken notice of and observed.   

Sect. X.  
10. I have nothing more to do in this Argument now, but only to remind you of the two general things I intended and aimed at in this Discourse principally to recommend to you, and that is Charity and Prudence, in a business that is very frequent, and takes up a very considerable part of our Lives. For it is very obvious and easy to observe, that a great part of our Actions of Life, are the thinking and judging, and talking and discoursing of other Persons, their Qualities and Actions. The Charity is in the last of the six Farticulars. The contrary of which I here think principally prohibited, which was to judge out of any nltimate Selfishness, and therefore not out of Busibodiness, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, Envy, Contempt, Anger, Flattery, or the like. But if this bad Principle be prohibited, than if ever Judging be permitted in any Case (as sure it is) the contrary of Charity is commanded; for one of those Ends and Principles must be our Prudence, is concerned in the other five prohibited Judgements, viz. to be too prone to judge in general, to be too much inclined to judge on the worst side, to judge rashly, to judge falsely, to be too forward in declaring our Judgements. All the Causes, Consequences, Remedies and Rules I have mentioned, are but more particulary Motives and Incentives to our Charity, or Directions for our Prudence. And now therefore I hearty exhort you to the Practice of what hath been spoken. That you would adorn this part of your Conversation with the two most excellent Ornaments, not only of our Souls, but of the Divine Nature itself. For our Charity and Prudence are but little imitations of God's infinite Wisdom and Goodness. How beautiful, lovely, and pleasant a thing it is to see each one discreetly tender of his Neighbours good Name, Reputution, Interest, or Concern? How lovely a thing is generous Love? And what a reverend thing is unaffected Prudence in all our Conversation, and particularly here? What unhandsome things are Rashness and Falshood? How ugly and contemptible Selfishness, Hatred, Malice, Pride, Envy, Contemptuousness, unguided Anger, Busiebodiness, vain Curiosity, Flattery? etc.  
Finally, remember we are Christians, and who it is, viz. Our Master and Saviour Himself, who hath here expressly forbidden these things (Judge not that ye be not judged). The same our Master and Saviour send down His gracious Influence to help us, to do what He hath taught and commanded us. Amen.    
FINIS.