The following MAXIMS were found amongst the Papers of the Great Almanzor; and though they must lose a good deal of their Original Spirit by the Translation, yet they seem to be so Applicable to all Times, that it is thought no Disservice to make them Public.  

I. THAT a Prince who falleth out with his Laws, breaketh with his Best Friends.  
II. That his Exalting his own Authority above his Laws, is like his letting in an Enemy to surprise his Guards. The Laws are the only Guards he can be sure will never run away from him.  
III. A Prince that will say, He can do no good, except he may do every thing; teacheth his People to say, They are Slaves if they may not do what they have a mind to.  
iv That Power and Liberty are like Heat and Moisture; where they are mixed, every thing prospers; where they are single, they are destructive.  
V That Arbitrary Power is like most other things that are very hard, they are also very apt to break.  
VI That the Profit of Places should be measured, as are more or less conducing to the Public Service; and if Business is more necessary than Splendour, the Instruments of it ought in proportion to be better paid: That the contrary method is as impertinent, as it would be to let the Carving of a Ship cost more than all the rest of it.  
VII. That where the least useful part of the People, have the most Credit with the Prince, men will conclude, That the way to get every thing, is to be good for nothing.  
VIII. That an extravagant Gift to any one man, raiseth the Market to every body else; so that in consequence, The Unlimited Bounty of an Unthinking Prince, maketh him a Beggar, let him have never so much Money.  
IX. That if ordinary Beggars are whipped, the daily Beggars in fine , out of a proportionable respect to their Quality, aught to be hanged.  
X. That Pride is as loud a Beggar as Want, and a great deal more Saucy.  
XI. That a Prince who will give more to Importunity, than to Merit, had as good set out a Proclamation to all his loving Subjects, forbidding them to serve well, upon peril of being undone by it.  
XII. That a Wise Prince will not oblige his Courtiers, who are Birds of Prey, so as to disoblige his People, who are Beasts of Burden.  
XIII. That it is safer for a Prince to Judge of men by what they do to one another, than by what they do to him.  
XIV. That it is a gross mistake, That a Knave betwixt man and man, can be honest to a King, whom of all others men generally make the least scruple to deceive.  
XV. That a Prince who can ever trust the man that hath once deceived him, loseth the Right of being faithfully dealt with by any body else.  
XVI. That it's not possible to find out such an honest Knave, as will let no body else Cheat him.  
XVII. That if a Prince doth not show an Aversion to Knaves, there will be Inference that will be Natural, let it be never so Unmannerly.  
XVIII. That a Prince who formeth his Opinion too soon, will be in danger of repenting it too late.  
XIX. That it is less dangerous for a Prince to mind too much what the People say, than too little.  
XX. That a Prince is to take care, the greater part of the People may not be angry at the same time; for though the first beginnings of their Ill Humours should be against one another, yet if not stopped, it will naturally end in Anger against him.  
XXI. That if Princes would reflect how much they are in the Power of their Ministers, they would be more circumspect in the Choice of them.  
XXII. That a Wise Prince will support Good Servants against men's Anger, and not support Ill ones against their Complaints.  
XXIII. That Parties in a State generally, like Freebooters, hang out false Colours; the pretence is, The Public Good; the real business is, To catch Prizes; like Tartars, whenever they succeed, instead of improving their Victory, they forceably fall upon the Baggage.  
XXIV. That a Prince may play so long between two Parties, that they may in time join together to be in earnest with him.  
XXV. That there is more dignity in open Violence, than in the Unskilful Cunning of a Prince, who goes about to impose upon the People.  
XXVI. That the People will ever suspect the Remedies for the Diseases of the State, where they are wholly excluded from seeing how they are prepared.  
XXVII. That changing Hands without changing Measures, is as if a Drunkard in a Dropsy should change his Doctor, and not his Diet.  
XXVIII. A Prince is to watch that his Reason may not be subdued to his Nature; so as not to be so much a Man of Peace as to be a Jest in an Army, nor so much a Man of War, as to be out of his Element in the Council.  
XXIX. That a man who cannot mind his own business, is never to be trusted with the King's  
XXX. That Quality alone should only seem to make a show in the Embroidered Part of the Government; but that Ignorance, though never so well born, should never be admitted to spoil the Public Business.  
XXXI. That he who thinketh his Place below him, will mind it so little, that he will certainly be below his Place.  
XXXII. That when the Prince's Example ceaseth to have the Force of a Law, it is a sure sign that his Power is wasting, and there will be but little difference between men's neglecting to Imitate, and their refusing to Obey.  
XXXIII. That a People may let a King fall, and yet still remain a People, but if a King lets his People slip from him, he is no more a King.    

Printed in the Year MDCXCIII.