ANIMADVERSIONS upon those Notes which the late Observator hath published upon the seven Doctrines and Positions which the KING by way of Recapitulation (He saith) lays open so offensive.  

POSITION I. THat the Parliament has an absolute indisputable power of declaring Law: so that all the right of the King and People depends upon their pleasure.  

To this the Observator saith, It has been answered, That this Power must rest in them, or in the King, or in some inferior Court, or else all suits will be endless, and it cannot rest more safely then in Parliament.    

ANIMADVERSION I. THe Observator hath contracted his majesty's words, but hath kept the sense in more general terms, and seems (though but faintly) to justify the Position, by approving (I know not whose answer) That this Power can rest nowhere more safely, then in Parliament. He means the Parliament without the King; If he had allowed the King his place in Parliament, I know no understanding man but will easily subscribe, That the King in Parliament, or the Parliament with him, have an absolute undisputable power, both to make and declare Law; and to end all suits of what kind soever, determinable by human law within the kingdom. And here is the most safe resting of this Power (and here it hath ever rested) and not in the King alone (who claims not that Power, but is willing to govern his Subjects according to the known laws) and much less in any inferior Court. But that such an absolute undisputable Power of declaring Law, as hath lately been assumed, by the Major part of the present sitting Parliament, should be resting in them, is neither necessary for the ending of suits, nor can be safe, either for King or Subject. If they may declare that for a Law, a fundamental Law, which never yet was Enacted, or had any being; and deny the plain undoubted laws that have been Enacted, or frustrate them by some unheard of interpretation, (as if such interpretation had been some mental (or rather parliamental) reservation laid up within the Parliament walls, to be produced upon emergent occasions, by their successors) they will have so full an Arbitrary power, that the right and safety of King and People must wholly depend upon their Votes. Which power can never be safe, either for King or People, nor can they produce one precedent that may warrant such a Power. But they are not bound or limited by such precedents. That's the second Position.   

POSIT. 2. That Parliaments are bound to no precedents.  

OBSERV: Statutes are not binding to them, why should then precedents? Yet there is no obligation stronger than the honour and justice of a Parliament.    

ANIMAD. 2. If Statutes be not binding to them, there is no reason that precedents should be. And he saith true, Statutes are not binding to them, that is, de facto, they are not (for they in some things go directly against them) but de jure, they are; that is, they ought to be binding to them, till they be repealed by the same power they were made, that is, by Bill orderly passed both Houses, and ratified by his majesty's royal assent. And unless they can show better reason than their bare Assertion: precedents (as they are the best warrant, so) they are, and aught to be the limits and bounds of their proceedings. He might have said as truly, That oaths are not binding to them: and therefore neither Statutes nor precedents. But the Observator tells us (Pag 44.) That the oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance are not endangered, by making the Kingdom, and not the King, the proper subject of Power, And he yields reason for it. For (saith he) he that ascribes more to the whole Universality, then to the King, yet ascribes to the King a true Supremacy of Power and Honour above all particulars. I wonder what he means by a true supremacy of Power and Honour above all particulars. Surely, he means nothing but priority of place, and height of Title; for he is allowed little power over some particulars, namely, over the Members of either house, and whom else they please to exempt (as they did sergeant Major Skippon for his Power and Commands.) But this distinction helps them: The Members of either House are sharers in that supremacy which is in the universality and above his; and by the power of that supremacy they can exempt whom they please from the power of this, inferior (pardon the ph●se, absurdities cannot be expressed without a solecism) Supremacy. Very good. But, in good sober sadness, doth the Observator think this distinction was thought on by the Framers and enjoiners of that Oath, or that the Members of the House, at their entering the House, did take their Oath to the King, as to the supreme over all, with exception of themselves, or reservation of an higher Supremacy to themselves, when they should be entered? It is hardly credible; Nor do all (that desire to tender all due honour to the Parliament) believe that they are so the universality, or the kingdom, as the observator presumes. They are trusted by the universality and kingdom, and we pray, that they may discharge that trust, not knowing, but that a multitude of men subject (every one of them) to error, may fail in their judgement, and being not exempted from the common condition of the sinful sons of Adam, may possibly, not rightly discharge the trust committed to them, as well, as the King, who is blasted with foul sailings, anderrours, and judgement. Me thinks, men that so much detest Popery, should not borrow the grounds of their reasoning from them: and I shall as soon believe the council of Trent, telling us that they are the universal Church, and therefore cannot possibly err, as that the Parliament is the universal unerring and unpervertibly just body of the kingdom. And surely, the Spirit of declaring must needs reside in a strangely large measure in them, who have power, thus to declare not only Law, but oaths too; a greater, than which the Pope's flatterers never gave him; and hardly ever any Pope assumed so great: Quo te constringam mutantem protea nodo? How shall these men be bound to do right, who so easily untie the knots of these sacred books of Law and oaths? why, yes; There is a bond that will do it; The obligation of the justice, and honour of a Parliament. But can any man be sure, that they whom neither Law, custom, and precedents of their ancestors, nor oaths can bind, will be always held in by the obligation of justice and Honour? Is it not possible, that they may (in time) find a power in themselves of declaring that obligation void, as well, as have done the other? The same obligation of justice and Honour, is as strong upon Kings, (and hath ever been held more powerful and obstrictive in them, then in any state managed by a Community; and yet they dare not trust his Majesty, though so obliged. The observator than must pardon me, if I desire, they may rather be held in, (and hold themselves so to be) by the old obligations of Law, precedents, and oaths, rather than that the King's liege-people should be put wholly to confide to that single obligation of the justice, and Honour of a Parliament.   

POSITION 3. That they are Parliaments, and may judge of public necessity without the King, and dispose of anything.  

OBSERV. They may not desert the King, but being deserted by the King, when the kingdom is in distress, they may judge of that distress, and relieve it, and are to be accounted by virtue of representation as the whole body of the State.    

ANIMADVER. 3. His Majesty sets down this Position in more words, but these are much to the same purpose, and upon these the inference which His Majesty makes follows undeniably, That then the life and liberty of the Subject, and all good laws made for the security of them, may be disposed of, and repealed by the Major part of both Houses, at any time present, and by any ways and means procured so to be: And His majesty shall have no power to protect them. They see nothing, that see ●ot the misery, which may follow upon such a vast transcendency of arbitary power, if it were invested in the Parliament, which (I dare boldly ●●y) was never claimed by any Parliament, though in conjunction with (the ●ead of it) the King. Every (the meanest) Subject hath such a right and propriety in his goods, that without Law, they cannot be taken from him, though to be employed for the public good. And though the safety of the people, be the highest Law, and that do (many times) give a power above other laws, and against them, to the supreme Magistracy in a State, to dispose of private men's estates, yet the unchangeable rule of justice, must have place, even in that highest Law, and that requires a compensation to be made to those, whose states or goods are so disposed of; and never gives power to uphold the public good with private injury. Nor can it be imagined, that a State upheld, by such helps, should not be able to make a just compensation to those, by whom it was upheld. But let us hear our observator. They may not (saith he) desert the King. Gramercy, for that; I am glad to hear they have yet any obligation upon them to tie them to the King. Yet I know not well what he means by deserting the King: if he mean it in that sense, which he doth the Kings deserting of them, which (out of question) is his not assenting to whatsoever they shall think fit; Then in reason, they should not, by their disallowing all his Proposals, have driven him to dissent from theirs, and so to have deserted them. Well; But being deserted by the King, when the kingdom is in distress, they may judge of that distress, and relieve it. All their power then is upon supposition of the Kings deserting them. So that if it appear, that His Majesty hath not deserted them (as many good men believe he hath not, in the redress of any real grievance,) than they have no such power. And however, they claim this power only when the kingdom is in distress; but how, if the Kingdom be not in distress, or (at least) that distress be only or principally, caused by their claiming of that power which cannot consist with the Honour and royal Estate of His Majestly; which all men (by their late Protestation) are bound to defend. If it beso, we may easily discern how far they may stretched this power, which they claim only in order to distress; and that they may make as much use of it, as the Pope doth of his power in temporals; In ordine ad spiritualia. He claims no more, though (some have said, he hath right to more;) and the Parliament will need no more, to do as much as he takes upon him to do with Christian Princes and States. But they must have a right to their power in this case of distress; whence have they that? why, they have it as the whole body of the State, and that they are, and must be so accounted, by virtue of representation very good. But let us consider his words a little more. There is no understanding man, but must and will acknowledge (Unless he wilfully derogate from them,) that the Parliament represents the body of the State, for those ends, for which they convene, as an ambassador doth the Prince that sends him, in the manage of that business for which he is sent; But this is not an absolute representation to all intents and purposes. Besides, whom do they represent? The Body (saith he) of the State. Be it so: but it is only the body, without the head. And if they were not by representation only, but really, the whole body of the People (if it were possible, they should convene together) they are all but an assembly of Subjects, of men to be governed, not to rule, to be commanded, not to command their Head and sovereign: and then there can be no virtue of representation that can advance them to the power, which the observator ascribes to them, when such power was never in the whole body, which is represented. No? never such power in the whole body? I know the observators stomach will rise here. Did not the people's consent, at first make Kings and convey power into their hands? Truly Sir, not solely; but grant it, what then? Marry, he saith than it is a principle in nature. Quic quid efficit tale est magis tale; In English, 
Pag. 2.  If the People make a King, they are more King themselves, or if they give power, they have more power: and may resume and exercise that power when they please. Excellent learning, and well applied, I believe he learned this piece from Suarez the Jesuite. But the observator, may know, that that rule admits many limitations; and surely, it holds only in causis totalibus, which the People are not in the constitution of Kings. But suppose their consent, did at first give power to Kings; when their consent is given for them and their successors to a King and his heirs, can the succeeding People cut off the entail, and retract the consent their ancestors have given? By what right? with what justice? I know not, but the People may contract for them and their successors in the conveyance of sovereign power (if ever they had it in their hands to give) as any man may in the conveyance of his lands or goods: and that such conveyance may be as binding to successors in the one as in the other: and then I am sure, they cannot have power at all times, and in all succeeding ages, to resume what they have so given. Our King's right (so far as it is derived from the People) is of this kind. And if he had no other grounds for his claim of sovereignty, (as it is most certain, that he hath) such a consent once granted, were sufficient to bind the People, that it cannot ever be lawful for them; by a major part of them (Coming in with their Nolumus hunc regnare super nos) to deprive him of that right. But surely, they would never make so absolute a grant of their power to Princes as to divest themselves of it. Good Sir, show me that proviso in their grant. But it seems to you unnatural they should: I do not wonder it should seem so to you, who make it agreeable to the Clearest beams of human reason, and the strongest inclinations of nature; 
Pag. 3.  (and by consequence, as you would persuade the World, justifiable;) For every private man to defend himself by force if assaulted, though by the force of a 
Pag. 16.  Magistrate, or his own Father, and though he be not without all confidence by flight, &c. I wish whilst you have such recourse to nature, you would not forget Christianity, which teaches subjection and obedience, and gives no liberty; (either to private men, or the major part of the communality) of resistance, but saith, they that resist, shall receive to themselves damnation. And 
Rom. 〈…〉▪  if the observator be a Gentleman, he should tender how he hath recourse to nature in point of right, lest he give occasion to some Wat▪ Tyler's chaplain, to preach again upon that text: 
When Adam dolve and Eve span,  
Who was then a Gentleman.  he may find a goodly Sermon upon that Text, set down by John Stow in Richard the second, and such Doctrine delivered upon it, the use, of which would shake his title to his inheritance, and the name of Gentleman.   

POSITION 4. That no member of the Parliament ought to be troubled for Treason, &c. without leave.  

OBSERV. This is intended of suspicions only, and when leave may seasonably be had, and when competent accusers appear not in the impeachment.    

ANIMAD. 6. His Majesty hath said so much of this and so little of it hath been answered, (or indeed is answerable,) that I shall not need to say much. Only I observe the modesty of this observator; that he doth not absolutely say, they are not to be troubled for those crimes; out not upon suspicion only, &c. I know not what he may call suspicions, but I believe, the best evidences, may easily be held for bare suspicions, if they may not have liberty to speak out; and that they cannot have, unless the accuser be first in safe custody, and brought to trial, where they may legally be produced. And, I believe, few wise men will think it reasonable, that the grounds of suspicion of treason, should necessarily be opened before trial.   

POSITION 5. That the sovereign power resides in both Houses of Parliament; The King having no negative voice.  

OBSERV. This power is not claimed as ordinary, nor to any purpose; but to save the kingdom from ruin, and in case, where the kingdom is so seduced, as that he prefers dangerous men, and persecutes his loyal Subjects.    

ANIMAD 5. His Majesty infers upon this Position. That himself must be subject to their Commands. This sounds, but harshly in the cares of loyal Subjects; That any posture wherein they can be put, can raise Subjects to a capacity of sovereignty, and reduce their sovereign to become their Subject. But he comforts us here, and tells us, this power is not claimed as ordinary, nor to any purpose, &c. This is but poor comfort, it is not: but it may be in good time, if they please. He doth not say, they shall not hereafter, or cannot claim it as ordinary, and to other purposes then that he names. So that there may be other causes, that may make them claim this power, as well as this. But indeed, they need no other, if it be in their power to declare that to be the case of the King and Kingdom when they please. But they will never do it, but where there is a just cause for it; and the truth leads them to it. Truly, I believe honourably of the justice and wisdom of Parliaments; but I do believe, that they are not either infallible, or that they cannot possibly do amiss. And the observator must bring better arguments; (and I fear, he cannot bring so good to make me believe otherwise,) then ever yet were brought for the infallibility of a general council. But I have said enough for the present of the residence of sovereign power in the Parliament, and the ground of their claim to it, by the virtue of representation in my third Animadversion. I shall here only give the Reader a brief gloss upon the language here used by the observator. To save the kingdom from ruin, (that is, from Monarchy or being governed by the King. The King is seduced,) that is, he is persuaded (by his own understanding, and other evil counsellors,) not to part with his sovereignty, nor to become a subject to his subjects. He prefers dangerous men, (that is, such as would have him still to be their King, prosecutes his loyal subjects,) that is, such as would rule him, and the people at their pleasure.   

POSITION 6. That the levying of forces against the personal commands of the King, (though accompanied with his presence) is not levying of war against the King: but war against his authority, not Person, is war against the King.  

OBSERV. If this were not so The Parliament seeing a seduced King, ruining himself, and the kingdom, could not save both, but stand and look on.    

ANIMAD. 6. I Thought this Position so strangely paradoxal, and so apparently contrary to reason, and common sense, that no man would have appeared in the defence of it. Yet this Observator never blushes, nor blinks at it, but affirms it stoutly. But for all that, I shall believe very slowly. That the King's Person can at any time be without the King, or without his Authority: Or that they may destroy the King's Person, to preserve the King. My Faith is not strong enough to believe these sublime points, and mysteries of State: I shall subscribe thus far, That war against the King's Authority, (though in the absence of his Person) is war against the King: But that the King and his Person should be in two places, will never (I fear) down with me. But however I'll see his reason: What's that? Why else the Parliament seeing a seduced King ruining himself and his kingdom could not save both, but must stand and look on. Surely this reason is full of weight, and ready to burst, it is so big with probability. I suppose the Reader understands his language here, by my former gloss; But if we should take the words as they sound, the reason would seem as strange, as that which it is brought to confirm. The King ruining himself and his kingdom, a mad King, or an idiot (He means) and then 'twere fit the Parliament appointed him a guardian. Ruining himself and his kingdom. It is Possible; That the King should ruin himself and his Kingdom. What? The King alone? Is he alone able to do it without the People? It is hardly credible? If he have the people on his side, and a prevailing Major party, I think the Observator (standing to his own Principles) will not deny that he hath sovereign power with him, and that it is unnatural to think the Community should destroy itself. But the Community (he will say) is to be looked at in Parliament. Well, But good Sir, may not the people withdraw the power of representation, which they granted to the Parliament; was their grant so absolute, and so irrevocable, that they dispossessed themselves wholly of taking or exercising that power, their own proper persons? Remember your principles about the conveying of sovereign power into the hands of Kings, and if you can show no better Cards for their power of representation, than the people's revocable consent, (and I would fain know why it should be more revocable from Kings than men) you will find their tenure in it very tickle.   

POSIT. 7. That according to some Parliaments they may depose Kings.  

OBSERV. 'tis denied that any King was deposed by a free Parliament fairly elected.    

ANIMAD. 7. I like this note better than all the rest, and am wholly of his mind: That never any free Parliament, fairly elected, deposed any King: and I hope (whatsoever his principles seems to insinuate) they do not believe they have power to do it, and pray that they may never attempt, (at least, not be able) to depose the King, or destroy Monarchy.   

The author's Protestation.  
HAving finished these sudden Animadversions: I do protest in the presence of Almighty God, with my life, power, and estate, to maintain and defend, so far as lawfully I may, The true Reformed Protestant Religion, His majesty's Person, Honour, and royal Estate, The just Liberties of the Subject, and the Power and privileges of Parliament (so far as I shall be able to know or understand them) and to do all other things contained in the late Protestation. And this I do sincerely, and from my heart, believing myself to be under the guilt of Perjury, if I fail in any one thing here protested. And therefore shall never hold myself absolved, by observing one, if I violate it in any other part. I shall ever defend His majesty's Person, Honour, and royal Estate, as my sole sovereign, and the Parliament (next under him) in the highest capacity of Subjects as the supreme Indicatory, the great council and Body Representative of this kingdom, And I pray, that all those that do not join with me, may either speedily be converted or confounded.  
Faxit Deus.    

LONDON, Printed for William Sheares, 1642.