LOGIC; OR, THE ART OF THINKING: IN WHICH, Besides the Common, are contained many excellent New Rules, very profitable for directing of Reason, and acquiring of Judgement, in things as well relating to the Instruction of a Man's self, as of others.  
In Four Parts.  
The First Consisting of Reflections upon Ideas, or upon the first Operation of the Mind, which is called Apprehension, etc.  
The Second of Considerations of Men about Proper Judgements, etc.  
The Third of the Nature and various kinds of Reasoning, etc.  
The Fourth Treats of the most profitable Method for demonstrating or illustrating any Truth, etc.  
TO WHICH Is added an INDEX to the whole BOOK.  
For the Excellency of the Matter, Printed many times in French and Latin, and now for Public Good translated into English by SEVERAL HANDS.  
LONDON, Printed by T. B. for H. Sawbridge, at the Bible on Ludgate-hill. 1685.   

AN ADVERTISEMENT OF THE AUTHOR.  
THIS Small Treatise is altogether more beholding for its Birth to Fortune, or rather to an Accident of Divertisement, then to any serious Design. For it happened, That a Person of Quality, entertaining a Young Nobleman, who made appear a Solidity of Judgement, and a Penetration of Wit much above his years; among other Discourse told him, that when he himself was a Young Man, he had met with a Person, from whom in fifteen days time he had learned the greatest and most material Part of Logic. This Discourse gave occasion to another Person then present, and one who was no great Admirer of that Science, to answer with a Smile of Contempt, That if Monsieur— would give himself the trouble, he would undertake to teach him all that was of any use, in the so much cried up Art of Logic, in four or five Days. Which Proposal made in the Air, having for some time served us for Pastime, I resolved to make an Essay: And because I did not think the vulgar Logic's, either Compendiously or Politely written, I designed an Abridgement for the particular use of the Young Gentleman himself.  
This was the only Aim I had when I first began the Work; nor did I think to have spent above a day about it. But so soon as I had set myself to work, so many new Reflections crowded into my Thoughts, that I was constrained to write 'em down for the discharge of my Memory. So that instead of one day, I spent four or five; during which time, this Body of Logic was formed, to which afterwards several other things were added.  
Now though it swelled to a greater Bulk of Matter than was at first intended, yet had the Essay the same success which I at first expected. For the young Nobleman having reduced the whole into four Tables, he learned with ease one a day, without any assistance of a Teacher. Tho true it is, we cannot expect that others should be so nimble as he, who had a Wit altogether extraordinary and prompt to attain whatever depended upon the Understanding.  
And this was the accidental occasion that produced this Treatise. But now whatever censure it may undergo in the World, I cannot be justly blamed for committing it to the Press; since it was rather a forced then voluntary Act. For several Persons having obtained Copies of it in Writing (which cannot well be done without several Errors of the Pen) and understanding withal, That several Booksellers were about to Print it, I thought it better to send it into the World corrected and entire, than to let it be Printed from defective Manuscripts. But then again I thought myself obliged to make divers Additions, which swelled it above a Third Part, believing the Limits of the First Essay too short for a Public View. And to that purpose we have made it the Subject of the following Discourse to explain the End, which we propose to ourselves, and the reason why we have included so much variety of Matter.   

THE TRANSLATORS TO THE READER.  
THE Common Treatises of LOGIC are almost without number, and while every Author strives to add something of his own, sometimes little to the purpose, sometimes altogether from the matter, the Art is become, not only Obscure and Tedious, but in a great measure Impertinent and useless.  
Thus the Schoolmen may be said to have clogged and fettered Reason, which ought to be free as Air, and plain as Demonstration itself, with vain misapplications of this Art to Notion and Nicety, while they make use of it only to maintain litigious Cavils and wrangling Disputes. So that indeed the common LOGICS are but as so many Counterscarps to shelter the obstinate and vainglorious, that disdain Submission and Convincement, and therefore retire within their Fortifications of difficult Terms, wrap themselves up in Quirk and Suttlety, and so escape from Reason in the Clouds and Mists of their own Raising.  
For remedy of which we are beholden to this Famous Author, who has at length recovered this Art, (than a noble Science when not Pedantic) from Night and Confusion; cleared away the Rubbish that oppressed it, and pruned off those Vnderwoods' and superfluous Boughs, that overshaded and eclipsed the light of true Reason; so that now LOGIC may be said to appear like Truth itself, naked and delightful, as being freed from the Pedantic Dust of the Schools.  
It has had this Influence upon the World already, that several Books have been already Written from the Rules of this LOGIC, not only by the Author himself, no less Celebrated for his Writings, then for many other worthy Actions that recommend him to the Commonwealth of Learning: Nor is his diligence in this particular, less to be applauded, for having cleansed the Augean Stables of so many Systems, from studied Barbarism and Delirium. For which reason this LOGIC was thrice Reprinted in France, so great was the satisfaction in those Parts; and likewise Translated into Latin for Universal Benefit; and now is rendered into English, as being a Small Treatise, no less Useful for the Conduct of Human Life, than to instruct and guide us wand'ring in the Labyrinths of Unsettl'd Reason.  
Let not the Reader slightly pass these Pages over, but seriously digest This Art of Thinking, and being digested, let him disperse the Applications into all the Judgements, which he makes of Things, and into all the Actions of his Life, if Knowledge and Understanding be his Aim.   

THE FIRST DISCOURSE; Showing the DESIGN Of this New Logic.  
THERE is nothing more worthy of Esteem, than soundness of Judgement, and an exact measure of Wit to discern between truth and falsehood. All the other faculties of the Mind are of singular use, but exactness of Reason is universally profitable upon all occasions, and in all the employments of Life. For it is not only in the Sciences that it is a difficult thing to discern truth from error, but also in all those affairs and actions both of the Body and Mind, which are the subjects of human discourse. There is in every one a signal difference, while some are true and some are false; and therefore it belongs to Reason to make the choice. Who choose aright, are they who are endued with an equal poise of Wit; such as make a wrong choice are they whose Judgements are depraved; wherein consists the chiefest and most Important difference between the faculties of the Understanding.  
And therefore it ought to be the most principal Study of a Man to form and shape his Judgement, and to render it the most exact that possible may be; the main aim to which his utmost diligence ought to tend. To this end we must make use of Reason, as the Instrument to acquire Knowledge, and on the other side, we ought to make use of Knowledge to perfect Reason. Truth of Understanding being Infinitely of greater value than all speculative Knowledge, by means of the most solid and certain Sciences: Which ought to be a caution to all men of Prudence, not to engage farther in those speculations, than while they serve to that end; and only to make trial of those Studies; not to employ therein the whole force of their Wit..  
For if the diligence of Men do not tend to this end, they will not find the study of the speculative Sciences, such as Geometry, Astronomy, and Physic, to be other than a vain amuzement, or that they be much more to be valued than the Ignorance of those things; which at least has this advantage that it is less troublesome, and does not puff Men up with that sottish vanity, which they ascribe to themselves from the knowledge of those fruitless and barren Sciences.  
The hidden secrets and mysteries of those Arts are not only of little profit, but altogether useless, if Men consider 'em only in themselves and for themselves. For Men were not born to employ their time in measuring Lines, in examining the proportion of Angles, or considering the different motions of Substance. Their Souls are too lofty, their Life too short, their time too precious, to busy themselves about such petty Objects. But they are obliged to be just, to be upright, to be judicious in all their discourses, in all their actions, and in all affairs which they undertake.  
Which Care and Industry is so much the more necessary, by how much this one rare perfection, exactness of judgement, is to be admired above all others: for every where we meet with none but wand'ring Understandings, uncapable of discerning Truth, who in all things take a wrong Course; who satisfy themselves with corrupted reasons, and fain would impose the same upon others; who suffer themselves to be led away with the smallest Experiences; who are always in excesses and extremities; who want sufficient staidness to preserve themselves constant to the Truths which they know, as adhering thereto rather by hazard, then sound and judicious choice; or else quite contrary, continue so obstinately fixed in their opinions, that they will not so much as listen to those that could undeceive them; who boldly decide and determine Arguments, which they neither know nor understand, and which were never yet understood by any other: who make no difference at all between Speaking and Speaking; or only judge of the truth of things by the tone of the Voice: he that talks smoothly and gravely, speaks reason; he that cannot readily explain himself, and seems to be in a heat, must be in the wrong; and more than this they know not.  
Which is the reason that there are no absurdities how insupportable soever, which do not find their Champions. He that has a design to deceive the World, shall not fail of Persons as ready to be gulled, and the most ridiculous Fopperies shall meet with Understandings proportionate to their Folly. And indeed we ought not to wonder at any thing, while we find so many People infatuated with the Fooleries of judicial Astrology, and persons of gravity so seriously handling that Subject. There is a certain Constellation in the Firmament which some men have been pleased to call a Balance; as like a Balance as a Windmill and all one. This Balance, they cry, is an Emblem of Justice, and all that are born under that constellation shall be upright and just. There are three other Signs in the Zodiac which they call, the one a Ram, the other a Bull, the third a Goat; and which they might as well have called an Elephant, a Crocodile, or a Rhinoceros. Now the Ram, the Bull, and the Goat are Beasts that chew the Cud; and therefore they that take Physic when the Moon is in any of these Constellations shall be in danger to vomit it up again. These are strange extravagancies; yet as extravagant as they are, there are persons that utter 'em abroad for sound ware, and others that as easily believe 'em.  
This falsehood of the Understanding is not only the Cause of those Errors that are intermixed in the Sciences, but of the greatest part of those faults and Crimes that are committed in Civil Life and Conversation, of unjust Quarrels, of ill grounded Lawsuits, of rash advice, and of Erterprises ill contrived and worse managed. There are few of these miscarriages that have not their source from some Error or Defect of Judgement. 〈◊〉 that there is no Defect which it more concerns a man to Correct in himself then this.  
But as this amendment is greatly to be desired and wished for, so is it equally as difficult to maintain, seeing it depends much upon that measure of Intelligence which we bring into the World at our Birth. For common Sense is no such Vulgar Quality as men take it to be. There are an infinite company of dull and stupid Heads which are not to be reformed by Instruction, but by restraining 'em within those bounds which are proper for their Capacity, and hindering 'em from meddling with those things of which they are uncapable. Nevertheless, 'tis very true, that the greatest part of the fallacious Judgements among men proceed not from this Principle; as being rather caused by the precipitation of the Brain, and through defect of Consideration; from whence it comes to pass that they judge rashly of what they only know obscurely and confusedly. The little regard and love of Truth in Men, is the reason that they take so little pains, the chiefest part of their time, to distinguish what is true from what is false. They admit into their Breasts all sorts of Discourses and Tenants, rather choosing to suppose them to be true, then to examine 'em. If they understand them not, they are willing to believe that others do. And thus they load their memories with an infinite number of falsities, and afterward argue upon those Principles, never considering what they say or what they think.  
Vanity and Presumption also contribute very much to this Miscarriage. They think it a shame to doubt, and not to know; and they rather choose to talk, and determine at a venture, then to acknowledge their not being sufficiently informed to judge aright. Alas! we are full of Ignorance and Error; and yet it is the most difficult labour in the World to draw from the lips of Men such a Confession as this, I am deceived, I am at a stand; though so just and so conformable to their Natural Condition.  
Others there are, on the other side, who not having wit enough to know that there are a thousand things full of obscurity and uncertainty; and yet out of another sort of vanity, desirous to let the World see that they are not swayed by Popular Credulity, take a pride in maintaining that there is nothing at all certain. Thus they discharge themselves of the trouble of examination, and misguided by this evil Principle, they question the most constant Truths, even of Religion itself.  
This is the Source of Pyrrhonism, which is another extravagance of human Wit; which though it appears quite contrary to the rashness of those that decide and determine all things, flows nevertheless from the same Spring, that is to say, want of Consideration. For as the one will not take the pains to find out Error, the other will not be at the trouble to face Truth with that steadfastness which is requisite for convincement. The least glimmering suffices to make the one believe notorious falsehoods; and to the other is a sufficient satisfaction to make 'em question the greatest certainties. But as well in the one as the other; it is only want of Industry that produces such different effects.  
True Reason places all things in their proper station. She causes us to scruple all things that are doubtful, to reject what is false, and ingeniously to acknowledge what is clear and evident; without contenting ourselves with vain Arguments of the Pyrrhonians, which do no way destroy the rational assurance we have of things certain, not in the very judgements of those that propose 'em. No man ever seriously doubted whether there were a World, a Sun and a Moon, or whether the whole were bigger than its part? Men may outwardly say with their Lips that they doubt such a thing, but they can never affirm it in their hearts. Therefore Pyrrhonism cannot be called a Sect of People that are persuaded of what they aver, but a Sect of Liars. So frequently do they contradict one another in discoursing of their Opinions, their hearts not being able to accord with their Tongues, as we may find in Montaigne, who has endeavoured to restore that Sect to this Latter Age. For after he has affirmed that the Academic's differed from the Pyrrhonians, he declares himself for the Pyrrhonians in these words, The Opinion of the Pyrrhonians, saith he, is more bold, and altogether much more probable: Whence it appears, that there are some things more probable than others. Nor does he speak this to maintain a piece of suttlety: they are words that escaped him before he was aware, and that proceeded from the bottom of Nature, which the falsehood of Opinion cannot stifle.  
But the mischief is that in things that are not so subject to Sense, these Persons that place their whole delight in doubting all things, will not permit their Wit to apply itself to what might confirm their Judgements; or if they do, 'tis very slightly; by which means they fall into a voluntary suspense and wavering in matters of Religion, as being pleased with that state of Darkness which they procure to themselves, and more convenient to allay the stings and reproaches of their Conscience, and give the free Reins to their passions.  
Seeing then, that these irregularities of the Understanding, which appear so opposite, while the one gives easy belief to what is obscure and uncertain, the other still questions what is clear and evident, have yet the same Source, that is to say, want of attentive Study to discern the Truth; the Remedy is visible, since there is but one way to guard ourselves from those miscarriages by rectifying our Judgements, and our thoughts with mature and studious deliberation. Which is the only thing absolutely necessary to defend a man from surprises. For as to what the Academics affirmed, that it is impossible to find out the Truth, unless we had the marks of it, as it would be impossible to know a Runagate Slave, if met by chance, unless his peculiar marks were known, it is a mere frivolous piece of suttlety. For as we need no other marks to distinguish Light from Darkness but the Light itself, so neither do we need any other marks to distinguish Truth, than the brightness of the Evidence which surrounds it, and subdues and convinces the Understanding, maugre all opposition. So that all the Arguments of these Philosophers are not able to prevent the Soul from surrendering herself to Truth, when fully penetrated by its piercing rays, than they are able to hinder the Eyes from seeing, when open, and that they are pierced by the light of the Sun.  
But because the Understanding suffers itself to be sometimes abused by false Appearances, for want of necessary consideration, and because it has not attained to a knowledge of things by long and difficult examination, most certainly it would be of great advantage to find out Rules for the improvement of the Search of Truth, that so it might become more easy and more surely effectual; nor is it impossible but that such Rules might be found out. For since that Men are frequently deceived in their judgements, and sometimes again as rightly understand when they argue one while ill, another while well; and after they have argued ill, are capable to see their Error; 'tis but observing by reflecting upon their own thoughts, what method they followed when they argued well, and what was the cause of their mistake, when they happened to be deceived, and by virtue of those reflections to frame Rules to themselves, whereby to avoid being surprised for the future.  
This is properly that which the Philosophers undertake and which they make such magnificent promises to perform: And therefore if we may believe 'em, they furnish us in that sort of Learning which they design to this purpose, calling it by the name of Logic, with a Light sufficient to dissipate all those Clouds that darken our Understanding. They correct all the Errors of our thoughts, and give us such infallible Rules that we cannot miss the Truth, and so necessary withal, that without 'em it is impossible to know any thing of certainty. These are the Applauses which they themselves give their own precepts. But if we consider, what we find by experience concerning the use which these Philosophers have made of those Rules as well in Logic, as in other parts of Philosophy, we may have sufficient cause to mistrust the verity of their Promises.  
But because it is not just to reject whatever is beneficial in Logic, because of the ill use that is made of it; and for that it is not probable that so many great Wits, who have so sedulously studied the Rules of Reasoning, could find out nothing that was solid and material; and lastly, for that custom has introduced a kind of necessity for us to have at least a rough knowledge of Logic, we thought it might in some measure contribute to the public advantage, to draw from thence whatever it contained most serviceable to rectify our judgements. And this is chiefly the design of this Treatise, together with some new Reflections that came into our thoughts while the Pen was in our hands, and which indeed make up the greatest and most considerable part of the whole.  
For we find that the ordinary Philosophers had no other intention then to set down the Rules of good and bad Arguments. Now though it cannot be said that these Rules are altogether useless, since many times they serve to discover the fraud of intricate and puzzling Arguments, and to dispose our thoughts to argue and refel in a more convincing manner; nevertheless we are not to believe that this benefit extends very far; the greatest part of the Errors of men not consisting in their suffering themselves to be deluded by ill Consequences, but in permitting themselves to be swayed by false judgements, from whence false Consequences, are drawn. And this is that for which they who have hitherto treated of Logic have found but little remedy; and which is therefore the subject of the new Reflections so frequent in this Treatise.  
Nevertheless we are obliged to acknowledge, that these Reflections which we call new, because they are not to be found in Common Logics, are not all the Author's own; but that we have borrowed some from the Writings of a famous Philosopher of this Age, wherein appears as much perspicuity and curiosity of Wit, as there does confusion in others. Some few other Reflections we have also drawn from a small Manuscript of the deceased Monsieur Paschal, entitled, The Soul of Geometry, and this is that which we have made use of in the Ninth Chapter of the first part of the Difference between the Definitions of Name, and the Definitions of Thing, and the five Rules which are explained in the fourth Part, more largely handled there then in this Treatise.  
As to what we have taken out of the ordinary Logic Books, our following observations declare.  
In the first place we had a design to bring into this Treatise all that was really beneficial in others, as the Rules of Figures, the Divisions of Terms and Ideas, with some reflections upon the Propositions: other things we thought of little use, as the Categories or Predicaments and Places; but because they were short, easy and common, we did not think fit to omit 'em with a caution however, what judgement to make of 'em, to the end they might not be thought more useful than indeed they are.  
We were more doubtful what to do with certain other Things, sufficiently knotty, but of little profit, as the Conversion of Propositions, the Demonstration of the Rules of Figures; but at length we resolved not to leave 'em out, the difficulty itself not being altogether useless: For true it is that when it does not terminate in the knowledge of any Truth, we may have reason to say, Stultum est difficiles habere nugas, 'Tis a foolish thing to labour in difficult trifles. Yet are they not altogether to be avoided, when they lead us to something of Truth, since it may prove to a man's advantage to exercise himself in the understanding of Truths that are intricate.  
There are some stomaches that only digest light and delicate Diet, and there are some Wits that cannot apply themselves to the study of other then easy Truths arrayed in the Ornaments of Eloquence. Both the one and the other is a niceness not to be commended, or rather a real Weakness. For a man must endeavour to enable himself to discover Truth, when it is most concealed and enveloped, and to respect her, in what shape soever she appears. For if a man be not able to surmount that niceness and distaste; which is easily conceived of things that appear a little subtle and Scholastic, he does but thereby contract and shrivel up his Understanding, and render himself uncapable to apprehend any more than what is to be known by a long series of several Propositions. So that when one Truth depends upon three or four Principles which he must necessarily consider and study all at one time, he is amazed and foiled, and many times deprived of the knowledge of several things highly advantageous; which is a fault of great consequence.  
The capacity of Man's Understanding shrinks or dilates itself according to use and custom, and therefore for the enlarging of the Intellect the Mathematics and all difficult Studies chiefly conduce; for they cause an expansion of thoughts, and exercise 'em in diligence, and embolden 'em in a steady confidence to stick to what they know.  
These are the reasons that induced us not to omit those thorny Subjects, and to discourse of 'em as nicely as any other treatise of Logic. They who think 'em tedious, may forbear to read 'em, and indeed we have already given 'em that caution at the beginning, that they may have no reason to complain, since it is at their own choice to read or let 'em alone.  
Nor did we think it necessary to mind the disgust of some persons that abhor certain terms of Art, framed only to retain more easily the several figures of Argumentation, as if they were some Charms in Magic, and frequently spend their insipid jests upon Baroco and Baralipton, as being too Pedantical; for we looked upon their Puns to be more Pedantical than the words; for there is nothing ridiculous in the Terms, provided they be not adored for too great Mysteries, for it would be very absurd indeed for a Man that was going to dispute, to admonish his opponent beforehand that he intended to dispute in Baroco or Felapton.  
Men sometimes make an ill use of that reproach of Pedantry, and sometimes fall into it themselves. while they lay it upon others. Pedantry is a Vice of the Mind not of the Profession; for there are Pedants in all habits, of all conditions, and all qualities. To utter Law and mean things in bombast expressions, to bring in Greek and Latin by head and shoulders, to be in a pelting chafe about the order of the Attic Months, the habits of the Macedonians or such like frivolous disputes; outrageously to abuse another, that is not of his opinion about a passage in Seutonius; or about the Etymology of a word, as if his Religion and his Country lay at Stake; to endeavour to raise all the World against a Man, as a disturber of the peace of Christendom, that has not a venerable opinion of Cicero, as Julius Scaliger has endeavoured to do against Erasmus; to interest himself for the reputation of an ancient Philosopher, as if he were one of his nearest Relations, this is properly that which entitles a Man to Pedantry. But to make use of a term of Art ingeniously found out, for the ease of the Memory may be easily allowed without any such reproach.  
It remains that we should give a reason for omitting so many questions as are found in the common Logic-Books, as those which are handled in the Prolegomenus, universal a part rei, Relations, and such like. To which it may suffice to answer, that they belong rather to metaphysics then to Logic, tho' that was not the principal reason that induced us so to do; for when we believe that such or such a thing may conduce to rectify the Judgement, 'tis not material to what Science it belongs. The ordering of various sorts of knowledge is as free as the ranging and methodizing Letters in a Printing-house, provided the method be natural. 'Tis sufficient that the thing inserted be serviceable to our use, and not to consider whether it be foreign, but whether it be proper, and therefore it is that you shall meet in this treatise with several things appertaining to Physic, and Ethics, and as much metaphysics as are necessary to be known; tho' as for those things we do not pretend to have borrowed from any other person. Whatever may be serviceable to Logic appertains to it: and indeed it is a ridiculous thing to see how several Authors torment themselves, especially Ramus and the Ramists, tho' otherwise Men of sense, to bond the jurisdiction of every Science, and to keep 'em from entrenching one upon another, as if they were marking out the Limits of Kingdoms, or bounding the Prerogatives of Parliaments.  
But that which induced us wholly to lay aside these School-questions was not barely their difficulty, and their being out of use; for we have handled several of the same nature; but because that having so many bad qualities, we thought they might be dispensed with, without offending any person, as being so little regarded or esteemed.  
For it behoves us to make a great difference between unprofitable questions, with which the writings of Philosophers are insignificantly stuffed. Some there are sufficiently contemned by the Authors themselves; and others there are which are celebrated and authentic, and which are notoriously handled in the writings of persons otherwise of great esteem.  
And therefore it seems to be a kind of obligation upon us, in reference to those celebrated and common Opinions, how false soever they may be thought to be, not to be ignorant of what has been said concerning 'em. We owe that Civility or rather that Justice, not to their falsehood, which deserves it not, but to men prejudiced against 'em, to prevent their rejecting what others value without Examination. It being but reasonable to purchase at the trouble of understanding those questions, the privilege to scorn 'em.  
But there is a greater liberty allowed in reference to the former, and those Logical ones which we have thought fit to omit are of that nature: They have this convenience that they are of little Credit, not only in that part of the World where they are unknown, but even among those that profess to teach 'em. No Man, God be thanked, takes the part of Universal a part rei, the unities of Reason, nor Second Intentions, and so we have no reason to fear least any one should be offended, for passing 'em over in Silence.  
Nor will it be amiss to advertise the Reader, that we have allowed ourselves a dispensation, not always to follow the rules of a Method altogether exact, as having set down many things in the Fourth Part, which relate to the Second and Third. But we did it of set purpose because we thought it more proper to see in one and the same place, all that was necessary to render a Science altogether perfect, which is the main design of the method handled in the Fourth Part, and for that reason it was that we reserved the discourse of Axioms and Demonstrations for that place.  
And thus we have well nigh given ye a prospect of our design in this Logic. Peradventure for all this there will be very few that will reap any advantage by it, because it is not their Custom usually to practise Precepts by express Reflections. Nevertheless we hope that they who will carefully peruse these Sheets, will receive such a Tincture from thence, as will render 'em more exact and solid in their Judgement before they perceive it; as there are certain remedies that cure the Diseases of the Body by augmenting and fortifying the vigour of the Parts. However it be; the Treatise will be no long trouble to any one; for they who are but a little before hand in the World of Learning may read and con it in seven or eight days, and it is a hard case, if in a Treatise that contains so much variety; they do not find something sufficient to repay their trouble.   

THE SECOND DISCOURSE Containing an Answer to the Principal Objections made against this Logic.  
THEY who adventure to impart their Works to public view must resolve at the fame time to have as many Censures as Readers. Nor ought this Condition to appear either unjust or burdensome. For if they are really uninterrested, they ought to have abandoned their propriety in making the thing public, and from that time look upon it with the same indifference, as upon the Works of a Stranger.  
The only right that they can reserve to themselves is that of correcting what shall be found defective, to which end those various Censures that are made of Books, are very advantageous. For they are always profitable when they are just; and when unjust, they do no harm.  
Nevertheless Prudence sometimes requires that upon several Occasions we should submit to Censures not always altogether so just; for though they do not make appear the thing reproved to be bad, they show us at least that it is not proportionable to the Understanding of those that find fault. Now it is better without doubt, if it may be done without falling into any greater inconvenience to choose a temperature so just, as in satisfying the judicious, not to displease those whose judgements are not so exact; since 'tis not to be supposed that all our Readers will be men of Wit and Intelligence.  
Thus, it were to be wished, that men would not look upon the first Editions of Books, but as rude Essays which the Authors propose to the Learned to understand their Sentiments of the Composition; to the end that by a Collection of various thoughts and Censures, they may endeavour upon a second review to bring their work to perfection to the utmost of their Capacities.  
And this is the Course we would willingly have taken in the Second Edition of this Logic; had we heard more than what the World had already said of the former. Nevertheless we have done what we could: as having added, struck out, and Corrected several things according to the thoughts of those who were so kind as to let us know their objections.  
And first of all for the Language, we have almost in every thing followed the advice of two Persons, who gave themselves the trouble to observe some faults that were crept in through inadvertency: and certain Expressions which they thought were not properly chosen. Nor did we adhere to their Opinions till by Consultation with others, we found' that all their Opinions agreed. In which case we thought we might be allowed our Liberty.  
The Reader will find more Additions than Alterations or Retrenchments; not being duly informed of the faults that were found in what was already done. However 'tis true that we understood of some general Objections that were made against the Book, which we thought no Let to our farther Progress; believing that they themselves who made 'em, would easily be satisfied, when we should give our Reasons for what we did. For which Cause, it will not be amiss to return an answer to the chiefest of those Objections.  
Some there were offended at the Title, Of the Art of Thinking, instead of which they would have had, The Art of well Reasoning. But we desire 'em to consider, that in regard the aim and design of Logic is to give Rules for all the Actions of the Understanding and as well for simple Ideas, as for Judgement and Arguments, there was no other word that comprehended all those different Actions; whereas the word Thought comprehends 'em all. Simple Ideas are thoughts; Judgements are thoughts, and Arguments are thoughts. True it is, a man might have said the Art of well thinking; but that Addition was not necessary, being sufficiently employed by the word Art, which signifies of itself a method of doing any thing well. And therefore it is enough to say the Art of Painting, the Art of Numbering; since no man supposes it to be an Art to Paint ill, or mistake in casting accounts.  
There is another Objection against that multitude of things drawn from other Sciences discoursed of in this Logic. Which because it assaults the whole design, and gives us an occasion to explain ourselves, it is necessary to examine with so much the more care. To what purpose say they, all this motley, variety of Rhetoric, Ethics, Physic, Metaphysics, and Geometry? When we thought to meet only with Logical Precepts, we are transported of a sudden into the Upper Region of the most lofty and notional Sciences, before the Author know whether we understand 'em or not. Rather ought he not to have considered, that if we had all those Sciences already perfect, we should have no need of his Logic? And had it not been better for him to have given us a plain and downright Logic with Rules explained by Examples drawn from common Things, then to encumber 'em with perplexed and intricate Notions.  
But they who argue thus have not sufficiently considered, that the greatest disadvantage to a Book is not to be read; since it can only be serviceable to those that read it. And so whatever contributes to cause a Book to be read, contributes to render it useful. Now it is certain that had I gratified their fancies, and made a dry barren Logic with the usual Examples of Animal and Horse, how exact soever and methodical it might have been, it would have only augmented the number of so many other Books, of which the World is full, and which are therefore never read. Whereas it is this Collection of different Things that has procured the Sale of this, and caused it to be with less annoyance and distaste than others.  
Nevertheless this was not the Principal Aim we had in this mixture; for we are apt to believe we have followed the most natural and most useful way of handling this Art, by applying a remedy as much as in us lay to an inconvenience that rendered the Study of it almost fruitless.  
The Experience shows us, that of a thousand young men that Learn Logic, there are hardly ten that know any thing of it, six months after they have performed their Exercises. Now the real cause of this so frequent either forgetfulness or negligence seems to be this, for that all the Subjects treated of in Logic, being of themselves abstracted and remote from use, the examples also by which they are explained are no way taking, and seldom discoursed of otherwhere; so that making no impression upon the fancy, they are with the greater difficulty retained in memory, which suddenly loses all the Ideas it had a while ago conceived.  
Moreover finding these common Examples not sufficient to prove that the Art itself may be applied to any thing useful, they accustom themselves to immure Logic within itself, not suffering it to extend any farther; whereas Logic was invented to be serviceable as an Instrument to the rest of the Sciences; so that having never seen its true use, they never make any use of it, but are glad to be rid of it, as of a mean and unprofitable Knowledge.  
For remedy of which Inconveniency, we thought it the best way not to separate Logic, according to the usual custom, so far from the rest of the Sciences, for the Service of which it was designed, but to join them together both the one and the other by the means of Examples drawn from solid Reading, showing at the same time both the Rules and the Practice, to the end that so the Scholar may learn to judge of those Sciences by Logic, and retain Logic in his memory by the help of the Sciences.  
So that this variety is so far from being a means to darken these precepts, that nothing can contribute more to brighten and explain them; for of themselves they are too subtle to make any Impression upon the Mind, if there be not something to make 'em pleasing and acceptable to the Fancy.  
Therefore to render this mixture the more acceptable, we have not borrowed examples at a venture from those Sciences, but have made choice of the most important Points of truth, and which might be most serviceable to the Rules and Principles to find out the truth in other matters, which could not be handled at the same time.  
For Example, as to what concerns Rhetoric, we considered that there is little advantage to be drawn from that Art, for the finding out of thoughts, expressions, and embellishments. Our wit furnishes us with thoughts; Use affords us Expression, and for figures and ornaments they are many times superfluous; so that all the Benefit from thence consists in avoiding certain evil habits of writing and speaking, especially an Artificial and Rhetorical Style composed of false Imaginations, Hyperboles, and forced Figures, the most unpardonable of all Vices in an Orator. Now perhaps you will find in this Logic, as much Information for the knowing and avoiding those defects, as in those Books that expressly handle that Subject. The last Chapter of the First Part, showing the nature of figured Style, at the same time shows the use of it, and discovers the true Rule by which you may know Legitimates from Spurious Figures. The Chapter where we treat of Places in general may very much avail to prune off the superfluous abundance of vulgar Arguments. That article wherein are marked out false and ill-cohering Ratiotinations, into which the Vainglory of long and ornamental Haranguing frequently engages many, while it throws disgrace upon all manner of falsehood, proposes by the by, a most important Rule of Rhetoric, than which there is nothing more prevalent, to frame and adapt the Mind to a simple, natural and judicious Style. Lastly, where we are in the same Chapter cautioned to beware of provoking those to whom we direct our Speech by sharp and biting Language, we are also taught to avoid several Errors which are therefore so much the more dangerous, by how much they are most difficult to be observed.  
As for Ethics, the principal Subject of this Treatise would not permit us to insert more than we have done; nevertheless I am apt to believe by what is set down in the Chapter of false Ideas, of Good and Evil, in the First Part, as also in that other Chapter of fallacious arguing that happens in civil converse, that Men may see the large extent of it, and how it conduces to display a great part of human Irregularities.  
There is nothing in Metaphysics more considerable than the Original of our Ideas, and the separation of Spiritual Ideas, from Forms Corporeal. The distinction of the Soul from the Body, and the proofs of its Immortality founded upon that distinction. All which things are largely handled in the First and Fourth Part.  
In several places also occur the greatest part of the general Principles of Physic, which it will be no difficult thing to Collect together. From whence the Reader may be sufficiently enlightened in what is most proper to be known concerning Ponderosity, the sensible Qualities, Actions, the Senses, the attractive Faculties, the occult Virtues, substantial Forms, sufficient to undeceive Us of an innumerable company of false Ideas which we sucked in from our Infancy to the prejudice of Truth.  
Not that I however, because here are many things to be learned, would have the Reader neglect such Books as expressly treat upon those Subjects, which are therefore carefully to be studied. But we have considered that there are certain Persons, who may think this general and cursory knowledge of the Sciences sufficient; and so it may be perhaps to those that never intent to devote themselves to the study of Divinity. For Theology requires an accurate knowledge of Scholastic Philosophy, which is as it were its Mother Language. Now though it is impossible they should find all that they ought to learn in this Book, nevertheless I dare affirm they may find whatever is convenient to be laid up in the memory for Use.  
As to what they object that there are some of the Examples that are not proportionate to the Capacities of young Beginners; they err in their affirmation, unless it be in reference to Geometry. For as for any of the rest, they may be easily understood by all that are not altogether void of understanding, though they never learned any thing of Philosophy. Nay, perhaps they may be more easily understood by those who are as yet free from all manner of prejudice, then by such as are amply furnished with the Maxims of Common Philosophy.  
As for the Examples of Geometry, 'tis very true they will not be understood by all the World; but where lies the inconvenience? For they are only brought where Geometry is expressly, & by itself, discoursed of, and so may be passed over without any harm; or at least where the things are so clear of themselves, that they need no illustration, or else are so explained by other examples, that the help of a Geometrician is no way requisite.  
Besides, if they examine the places where these Examples are made of; they will see that it was a hard matter to find others that were so proper: there being only this Science which is able to afford us clear Ideas and Propositions not to be controverted.  
For Example, speaking of Reciprocal Proprieties, we have affirmed, that there is such a Propriety in Rectangle Triangles, where the Square of the Hypotenuse is equal to the Squares of the rest of the sides. Which is clear and certain to all that understand it: They that do not apprehend it, may suppose it so to be; nor will they for that the less apprehend the thing itself which the Example is brought to prove.  
Again if we had been to produce the Common Example of Risibility, which is the reciprocal Propriety of Man, certainly we had proposed a thing not only very obscure but very much controverted. For if we understand by Risibility, a power of contracting and dilating the Lips, I know not why we may not teach Beasts to imitate those Motions of the Lips; and some we know there are that do so. But if we include within the signification of this word not only the change of the Countenance, but also the thoughts that accompany and produce it; and so by Risibility mean a Power to Laugh, by thinking; in that manner all human Actions may be called reciprocal Qualities; there being none but what are proper to men, if we join 'em with Thoughts: And thus Walking, Eating, Drinking shall be called reciprocal Qualities of Men; since one Man Walks, Eats, and Drinks thinking. Which if it be granted, we shall never want Examples of Reciprocal Proprieties; which however will never satisfy those, who attribute thinking to Beasts, and who may as well allow 'em Laughter with Thought. Whereas the Example before alleged will not admit these Cavils as being certain and uncontroverted among all Men.  
In another place we hinted that there are some Corporeal things which we apprehend after a Spiritual manner without the help of Imagination. And to confirm this we brought the Example of the Chiliogon or Thousand Angled Figure. Which Figure we conceive clearly and distinctly in our minds, though the Imagination cannot from any delineation of it be so distinct as to display its Proprieties. Cursorily also we asserted that one of the Proprieties of this Figure was that all these Angles were equal to 1996 Right Angles. And it is apparent that this Example proves what we intended to make out in that place.  
It remains that we clear ourselves from an envious Complaint that some Persons have made against Us, that we have taken out of Aristotle's Examples of vicious definitions, and ill cohering Argumentations; which seems to be done out of a secret design to destroy the Peripatetic Philosophy.  
But they had never pronounced so severe a Sentence against Us, had they considered the Rules to be observed in citing of Examples of Errors, which however we have adhered to in quoting Aristotle.  
First, Experience shows us, that those which are vulgarly proposed, are of little or no use, and difficult to be remembered, as being framed at pleasure; besides that the Errors are so palpable and so visible, that a Man would think it impossible to stumble upon 'em. Therefore it is much more to the purpose, to the end that what is said concerning those Errors may be the more deeply retained in Memory, and the more easily avoided, to select some notable example of the Errors, into which some celebrated Author has already fallen.  
For finding the Reputation of great Men not free from noted slips, we are incited by Care and Industry to preserve ourselves from the like surprises.  
Moreover seeing every Man is bound to make what he writes as profitable as may be, therefore of set purpose those examples of Errors are to be produced, of which it most imports us not to be Ignorant. For it would be an endless toil to remember all the dreams and trifles of Flood, Vanhelmont and Paracelsus. And therefore it is better to search examples in famous Authors, whose Errors it may be worth while to understand.  
Now all this is to be found in Aristotle to a Hair's Breadth. For nothing can so effectually persuade a Man to avoid a fault, as to show that such a Man as he, stumbled at the same Block. And his Philosophy is become so famous through the vast number of deserving Persons that have embraced it, that there is all the reason in the World his defects should be exposed. Which being so, we thought it would be worth while for the Reader to take a review of the maxims of the Peripatetic Philosophy, yet because it is never good to be deluded, those Maxims are so proposed, that what they are may be easily known, as having cursorily marked out the defects, for farther detection of their fallacies.  
Which we have not done to lessen the Reputation of Aristotle; but rather to do him honour as much as may be done by those that differ in opinion from him. And 'tis visible in other places, that the points which are taxed of errors, are of no great Importance, nor shake the foundations of his Philosophy, which we had no Intention to assail.  
But if we make no mention of those things wherein Aristotle has excelled in several of his Books, the reason was this, because the series of the discourse did not afford an opportunity so to do; which however we would willingly and gladly have done, if occasion had offered; nor had Aristotle wanted his due applause; who beyond all controversy was a person of a capacious and searching Genius, upon which he relying, has linked together long Chains of consequences in such matters upon which he discoursed: and therefore he has been very prosperous in what he has written in the second Book of his Rhetoric concerning the Passions. Egregious also are his notions and observations which he has delivered in his Politics, his Ethics, his Problems, and his History of Animals: and as confused as his Analtics are, yet we must confess that almost all we know concerning the Rules of Logic, is taken from thence; so that there is not any Author from whom we have borrowed more than from Aristotle in this Logic, as one to whom the Body of the precepts belong.  
True it is that the most imperfect of his Works seems to be his Physics, as being also that which for a long time has been condemned and forbidden by the Church as a Learned Person has made appear in a Treatise written to that purpose; though the principal fault of it was not that it was false, but that it was too true, and taught nothing but such things as could not be concealed from our Knowledge. For whoever doubted but that all things were composed of matter, and a certain form of matter? Whether matter being to put on form did not want it before, that is to say, whether it did not suffer Privation? Or whoever questioned those other principles of his metaphysics, wherein we are taught that all things depend upon form; that bare matter is void of action; that there are place, motion, faculties and qualities: But after all this, we do not seem to have learned any thing new, or are we more able to give a reason of any of Nature's Effects.  
But if there be any persons, a many there are, who believe it a Crime to descent from Aristotle, it will be no difficult thing to make it appear how far remote from Reason such a vain assertion is.  
For if we are obliged to reverence the memory of some Philosophers, that is only for two Reasons, either out of a prospect of the truth to which they have adhered, or for the Reputation which they have acquired among the Learned.  
For the sake of Truth we reverence 'em, when they keep close to it; but truth does not require that we should honour falsehood, in whomsoever it appears.  
As for the consent of Men in the approbation of a Philosopher, certain it is, that 'tis a good reason for giving respect; nor can it be denied, but very imprudently, without great weariness. And the reason is, because in contradicting the generality, we may be justly suspected of Presumption, as believing ourselves more clear-sighted than so many others.  
But when the learned World is divided in their opinions, as to the worth of an Author, and that Persons of Reputation appear on both sides, we are not then obliged to that Reservedness, and we may freely declare, what we approve, and what we dislike in those Writings about which the Learned are divided. For than we do not oppose our Sentiments against the Sense of the Author and his Abetters, but side with those that maintain the contrary Party.  
And now behold the true Condition of Aristotle at this day. His Philosophy has experienced both Fortunes, sometimes exploded and condemned by all; otherwhile received and applauded by all: at this day it is reduced into a middle Condition between the two Extremes. In France, Flanders, England, Germany, and Holland they write frequently for, and against Aristotle's Philosophy. The Parisian Conferences as well as their Writings are divided into two parts; nor does any one complain of this open War, declared against him. The most famous Professors no longer condemn themselves to that slavery of blindly receiving and maintaining whatever they find in his Books, and some of his Opinions are utterly exterminated; for what Physician will now maintain that the Nerves proceed from the Heart, as Aristotle believed, since Anatomy clearly demonstrates now, that they derive there Original from the Brain. Whence proceeded that saying of St. Austin.  Qui ex puncto cerebri & quasi Centro omnes Sensus diffudit. Who diffused all the Senses from the point, and as it were the Centre of the Brain. 
And what Philosopher dares be so obstinate as to affirm, that the swiftness of ponderous things descending increases proportionably to the proportion of their weight? When any Man may end this dispute, by letting two ponderous Bodies never so unequal in proportion, fall from a high place; at what time he shall find very little difference in the swiftness of their Motion.  
All things violent are of short Continuance, and all extremes are violent. 'Tis very hard measure to proscribe all Aristotle's opinions, as formerly has been done. On the other side it is an unreasonable Servitude, for a Man to pledge his assent to all he has written, and to allow only him for the standard of Philosophy, as afterwards they went about to do. Men cannot long endure such a Tyranny, but by degrees they will recover the Possession of their rational liberty, which consists in approving what they judge to be true, and rejecting that which they judge to be false.  
For it does not seem contrary to Reason, that Reason should submit to Authority in Sciences, which treating of things above Reason, are bound to follow another Light; which is that of Divine Authority. But in Sciences that depend upon the support of Reason; Reason acts well and by her own Precepts, when she decrees that there is no Obedience to be given to the Authority of Philosophers against Reason.  
This is the Rule, which we have followed in discoursing the Opinions of the Philosophers, as well ancient as modern, we have sought for Truth in both, neither espousing the quarrel of any Sect, nor bidding battle to any.  
So that all that is to be concluded, when we reject the Opinion of Aristotle, or any other is only this, that in such a point we disscent from; not, that we do not consent in others; much less that we have any aversion against 'em; or seek to degrade or lessen their worth. And this modest Procedure of ours we hope will be approved by all just Judges, and that they will acknowledge, that there is nothing in the whole world, but a sincere desire to contribute to the Public Good, as far as lies in the Power of a Treatise of this nature, without Passion or Hatred against any Person Living.   

LOGIC; OR THE ART OF THINKING.  
LOGIC is the Art of well using Reason in the knowledge of Things for the instruction as well of a man's self, as of others.  
This Art is derived from the Reflections which men have made upon the four Principal Operations of the mind, Apprehension, Judgement, Discourse, and Disposition.  
We call Apprehension the simple Contemplation of Things that present themselves to the Mind, as when we consider the Sun, the Earth, a Tree, Rotundity, a Square, Cogitation, Entity, pronouncing nothing expressly concerning 'em; and the form under which we consider 'em is called an Idea.  
We call Judgement, that Action of the Mind, by which assembling together several Ideas, we either deny or affirm this to be That. Thus considering the Idea of the Earth, and the Idea of Round, we affirm or deny the Earth to be round.  
Discourse we call that Operation of the Mind, by which out of several Judgements we frame another: Thus when we have judged that true Virtue ought to be referred to God, but that the Pagans did not refer it to God, from thence we infer that the Virtue of the Heathen's was not true.  
We call Disposition that Action of the Mind, by which we range various Ideas Judgements, and Ratiocinations upon one and the same Subject; in that Order which is most proper for its Explanation; and this by another Name we call Method.  
These Operations proceed merely from Nature, and that sometimes more perfectly from those, that are altogether ignorant of Logic, then from others that have learned it. So that it is not the business of this Art to find out the way to perform these Operations, for that we have from Nature alone, that has given us the use of Reason, but rather to make certain Animadversions upon those things which Nature herself operates in us, which may be of a threefold use to us.  
First we are thereby assured, that we make a right use of our Reason. For the Consideration of Rules begets in us a more fervent Application and attentive Industry of the Mind.  
The Second is, that thereby we more easily detect and explain the Errors and Defects which we meet within the Operations of the Mind. For oftentimes it falls out, that we discover by the mere Light of Nature the faults of Ratiocination, yet are not able to give a reason why it is false. Thus they who know not what belongs to Painting, may take exceptions at the defects of a Picture; tho' they are not able to tell the reason why they find fault.  
The third is that we are brought to a more accurate knowledge of the nature of our Understanding by these Reflections upon the Operations of the Mind. Which, if we look no farther than mere Speculation, is to be preferred before the knowledge of all Corporeal Things, which are infinitely below Spiritual Considerations.  
Now supposing those things, which we revolve in our Minds, in reference to our own Thoughts, were only done with respect to ourselves, it would suffice to consider 'em in themselves, not clothed with words or any other signs: but in regard we cannot manifest our thoughts to others but by the benefit of exterior Marks; and for that this Custom is so prevalent, that when we meditate alone, the Things themselves do not present themselves to our Thoughts, but in the clothing of those words by which we express 'em to others, it is necessary for Logic to consider Ideas joined to words, and words joined to Ideas.  
And thus by what we have said it follows, that Logic may be divided into four Parts, according to the several Reflections which we make upon the four Operations of the Mind.  

FIRST PART. Containing Reflections upon Ideas or upon the first Operation of the Mind which is called Apprehension.  
SINCE we cannot have any knowledge of what is without us, but by the assistance of Ideas which are within us, what we shall discourse of Ideas may be thought perhaps to be the most important Part of Logic, as being the foundation of all the rest.  
We may reduce these Reflections to five Heads, according to the five ways of considering Ideas.  
1. According to their Nature and Original.  
2. According to the Principal difference of the Objects which they present.  
3. According to their being single or compound; where we shall treat of Abstractions and Precisions of the Intellect.  
4. According to their Extent or Restriction; that is to say, their Universality, Particularity, or Singularity.  
5. According as they are clear and obscure, distinct or confused.  

CHAP. I. Of Ideas, according to their Nature and Original.  
THE word Idea is of the number of those words which are so clear, that they need not to be explained by any other; there being no other more clear and simple.  
So that all that can be done in this case to avoid error and mistake, is to observe the false notions and interpretations that may be attributed to this word: while some make use of it only to signify that manner of conceiving, which is performed by the application of the Mind to those Forms that are depainted in our Fancies, and is called Imagination.  
For as St. Austin observes, Man ever since his fall has been so accustomed to contemplate Corporeal Things, the forms of which enter through our Senses into our Brains, that the most part believe they cannot apprehend a thing, when they cannot imagine it, that is, contemplate it as a Thing Corporeal: As if Man had no other way to think or apprehend.  
Whereas no man can make a Reflection upon what occurs to his Thoughts, but he must acknowledge, that he conceives many things altogether destitute of Corporeal Form; and finds a difference between Imagination and perfect understanding. As for example, when I imagine a Triangle, I do not contemplate it only as a Figure consisting of three Right Lines; but I also consider those three Right Lines as present by the force and internal Application of the Mind; and this is properly to imagine. Or if I would think of a Figure with a Thousand Angles, I presently apprehend that it is a Figure consisting of a Thousand Sides, as easily, as I apprehend a Triangle to consist of three Sides; but I cannot imagine the Thousand sides of that Figure, nor behold 'em as being present, with the Eyes, as I may so say, of my mind.  
Nevertheless, 'tis very true, that the daily practice of Imagination, in apprehending Corporeal things is the reason, that oft times, when we imagine a Figure of a thousand Angles, we form in our Thoughts some confused Figure or other. But it is evident that the Figure thus formed by the assistance of Imagination, is not a Figure of a Thousand Angles; as nothing differing from that form, which any one would frame in his Thoughts, were he to imagine a Figure of ten Thousand Angles; as also for that it is no ways serviceable to discover the Proprieties that made the difference between a Figure of a Thousand Angles from any other Polygon.  
And therefore I cannot properly imagine a Figure of a Thousand Angles, for that the Figure which I would frame in my Imagination would represent to me any other Figure with a great Number of Angles; and yet I can very clearly and distinctly conceive it, as being able to demonstrate all its proprieties; as that all the Angles together are equal to 1996. Right Angles. And thus by consequence it is one thing to imagine, another thing to apprehend.  
This is yet more evident by the Consideration of many things which we clearly apprehend, and yet can no way in the World attain 'em by Imagination. For what do we apprehend more clearly, than our thought when we think? Nevertheless, it is impossible to imagine a thought, nor to delineate any form of it in the Brain. What forms of the Particles of Affirmation, Yes, and Negation, No, can be described in the Fancy. Yet both he that denies, and he that affirms the Earth to be round have the same express Imaginations, Earth, and Rotundity. To these the one adds Affirmation, which is an Action of the Mind, which conceives without any Corporeal form; the other adds a Negative, which is another Action of the Mind, and much more incapable of a formal description.  
When we speak then of Ideas, we do not call by that name those Images that present themselves to the Fancy, but whatever offers itself to our thoughts; at what time we may truly affirm, that we apprehend a certain Thing, after whatever manner we apprehend it.  
Whence it follows that we can express nothing in words, so that we understand what we say, but that it is evident from thence, that we have in ourselves the Idea of the thing signified by our words; though that Idea may happen to be sometimes more plain and distinct; sometimes more obscure and confused, as we shall declare hereafter. For he would contradict himself that should affirm he knew what he meant by the words which he pronounces, and yet at the same time that he pronounces 'em, should understand nothing but the sound of those words.  
And this is that which shows us the falsity of two Opinions broached by the Philosophers of these Times.  
The first is, that we have no Idea of God. For if we had none, in pronouncing the word God, we should apprehend no more than the three Letters G, O, D, and he that only speaks English, would have no more in his thoughts, when he hears that word pronounced, then if he should come into a Synagogue not understanding a tittle of Hebrew and hear the names of God Adonia or Elohim.  
Moreover when some men would be called Gods (which was the Frenzy of Caligula and Domitian) there could be no Crime of Impiety laid to their charge, for that there is nothing in the three Letters G, O, D, or the two Syllables De-us which may not be attributed to a Man, abstracting the Idea from the word: For which reason the Hollander was never taxed with Impiety, who called himself Ludovicus De-us. What was then the Impiety of those Princes, but that they left at least a part of its Idea to the word Deus, so that it signified that transcendent and adorable Nature of a Deity, and appropriated to themselves both the Word and the Idea.  
But had we not the Idea of God, upon what could we ground all that we say of God? As that he is One, that he is Eternal, Omnipotent, all Mercy, and all Wisdom. Of which there is nothing comprehended in the sound of the word God, but in the Idea which we have of God, and which we join to the sound of the word.  
And hence it is that we refuse the name of God to all false Divinities; not but that the Word might be attributed to 'em, being taken materially; but because the Idea which we have in ourselves of the Supreme Being and which we have annexed to the word God, belongs only to the True God.  
The second of these false Opinions is what an English man asserts, That Ratiocination is nothing else but a Connexion and Chain of names linked together by the word, Est, it is. Whence it follows, that by reasoning we can conclude nothing of the nature of Things, but only concerning their Appellations; That is to say, that we barely see whether we assemble together well or ill, according to the Covenants we have made with our Fancy concerning their significations.  
To which the same Author adds, If this be true, as it may be it is, reasoning will depend upon words, words upon imagination, and imagination perhaps, and which is my Opinion, will depend upon the motion of the Corporeal Organs; and so our Soul will prove no other than the motion of some parts of the Organical Body.  
We are willing to believe that these words contain an Objection far remote from the Sense of the Proposer; but in regard that being so Dogmatically expressed, they ruin the Immortality of the Soul, it will be of great importance to lay open the fallacy of the Objection; which it will be no difficult thing to do. For the Covenants of which the Philosopher speaks, can be no other than the consent of men to take certain sounds for signs of those Ideas existing in our Minds. So that if we had not besides the Names, the Ideas of Things in ourselves, those Covenants would have been impossible; as it is impossible by any such Covenant to make a blind man understand what is meant by the words, Red, Green, or Blue. For not having these Ideas in his Mind, he cannot join 'em to the sound.  
Moreover several Nations having given different Names to Things, even to those that are most apparent and simple, as are those which are the Objects of Geometry, they could not discourse in the same manner of the same Truths, if discourse were nothing but a Connexion of names by the word, Est, it is.  
And since it appears by this variety of words that the Arabians (for example sake) do not agree with the English about the same signification of Names, so could they never agree in judgement or discourse, if their Discourse depended upon that Covenant.  
Lastly, when we say that the signification of words are Arbitrary or ad placitum, we stick deep in Equivocation. For it is true that it is a thing altogether Arbitrary to join this Idea to that Sound, rather than another. But Ideas are not Arbitrary things that depend upon our Fancy, more especially those that are evident and distinst: Which that we may make manifest we say, that it would be very ridioulous to think that real Effects could depend upon things purely Arbitrary. Now when a man has concluded by his Reason, that the Iron Axel that passes through the two Millstones of a Corn-Mill could turn a about, without turning the lower Millstone, if being round it passed through a round hole; but that the same Axle could not turn without turning the upper Millstone; if being square, it were fastened in a square hole of the upper Millstone; what he has undertaken to prove undeniably follows. And by consequence this Discourse is not a Connexion of Names according to a Covenant entirely depending upon the Fancy of men; but a solid and conclusive Judgement of the Nature of Things by the consideration of Ideas, which men have been pleased to denote and signify by certain Names.  
Thus much as to what we understand by the word Idea; we are now to say something concerning their Original.  
And now the Question is, whether our Ideas proceed from the Senses, and whether that common Maxim be true; There is nothing in the Intellect, which was not first in the Sense.  
This is the Opinion of a Philosopher of Great Reputation in the World, who begins his Logic with this Proposition; Every Idea derives its Original from the Senses. He confesses however that all Ideas are not the same in our Senses, as they are in the mind. But he pretends that they were at least formed out of those that past through our Senses, either by composition; as when out of the separate Ideas of Gold, and a Mountain, we make a Mountain of Gold; or by Amplification and Diminution, as when out of the Idea of a Man of Ordinary Stature, we make a Giant, or a Pigmy; or by similitude and Proportion; as when out of the Idea of a House we have seen, we make the Delineations of a Structure that we have not seen: And thus, saith he, we apprehend God, who is above the reach of Sense, under the shape of a venerable Old Man.  
But according to this Doctrine, it would follow, that all our Ideas, tho' relating to no particular Object that ever approached our Senses: must be all Corporeal, and represent nothing to us, but what has passed at least by parts, through our Senses: and consequently that we can conceive nothing but by the help of Images, like those which are formed in the Brain when we see, or imagine Bodies.  
But though this Opinion be maintained by other School Philosophers as well as himself, I shall not scruple to affirm that it is very absurd, and as contrary to Religion as to true Philosophy. For to speak nothing but what is evident, what is there that we conceive more distinctly than our thoughts themselves? What proposition clearer than this, I think, therefore I am? However we can never be certain of the truth of this Proposition, unless we understand distinctly what it is to Be, and what to think. Neither is it to be required from us to explain these terms any farther; because they are such that Men so clearly understand, that a copious explanation would but render them more obscure. If then it cannot be denied but that we have in ourselves the Ideas of Entity and Thought, I ask, through what door of the Senses they entered into the Mind? Are they Ideas of Light or Colours to enter through the Sight? Are they shrill or deep sounds to make way through the Ear? Are they Odoriferous or noisome to enter the Smelling? Are they savoury or nauseous to enter the Taste? hot or cold, soft or hard, to glide through the Feeling. If it be said they were formed of other sensible Images, let 'em demonstrate what those sensible Images are, from whence these Ideas of Entity and Thought proceeded; as also how they were formed, whether by Composition, or by Amplification, by diminution or proportion; for if they cannot answer agreably to Reason, it must be taken for granted, that the Ideas of Entity and Thought are far from any way deriving their Original from Sense; but that our Soul is endued with a Faculty to form'em of herself, though it may happen sometimes, that she may be incited to make use of something that strikes the Sense. As a Painter may be induced to paint a Picture for the price that is promised him; and yet it cannot be said that the picture drew its Original from the Money.  
But what the same Authors add, that the Idea which we have of God, draws its original from Sense, because we apprehend him under the Idea of an Old-Man, is a thought unworthy any other than the Anthropomorphites, and which confounding the true Ideas that we have of Spiritual things with the false Imaginations that we conceive of those Sublimites out of an evil custom, of imagining all things amiss; whereas it is as absurd to pretend to imagine that which is not Corporeal, as to hear Colours, and see Sounds.  
To refute this opinion, we need no more than consider, that if we had no other Idea of God, then of a venerable Old-Man, all those other Judgements which we make of that Idea ought to appear false to us, that are contrary to that Idea; for we are naturally induced to believe that our judgements are false, when we clearly see that they are contrary to the Ideas which we have of things. Otherwise we shall never be able to conclude certainly that God does not consist of parts, that he is Incorporeal, Omnipresent, and Invisible, when all those Ideas are no way agreeable to that of a venerable Old Man. And if God had at any time ever appeared in that form, it does not presently follow that we should have no other Idea of him but that; for so we should have no other Idea of the Holy-Ghost then that of a Dove because he once appeared in that Shape, as God in the same manner might be conoeived to be a Sound, because the sound with which the Name of God is pronounced, awakens the Idea of God in our Minds.  
It is therefore false that all our Ideas proceed from the Sense: rather it may be affirmed on the other side, that none of those Ideas that enter our Minds, deduce their Original from the Senses unless by accident, that is when the motions stirred up in the Brain, which is all the Senses can do, give an occasion to the Soul to produce true Ideas, which it would not otherwise do; tho' for the most part those Ideas are nothing like the other that are formed in the Sense and in the Brain; and besides the greatest number of Ideas being such, as not having any mixture of Corporeal form, cannot without a most manifest absurdity, be referred to the Sense.  
If any one object that at the same time that we have an Idea of spiritual things, as of Thought (for examples sake) we entertain also a certain Corporeal Image of the sound that expresses it, they aver nothing contrary to what we have alreadly proved; for that form of the Sound which is present in the imagination is not the Image of the Thought, but of the Sound; nor does it serve to represent it otherwise, then as the Soul being accustomed when she hears this Sound, to conceive the thought, forms at the same time an Idea of thought, altogether Spiritual; which has no reference to the Idea of Sound, but as only annexed to it by Custom; Which is apparent in Deaf people, who have no Ideas of Sound, yet have the Ideas of their thoughts, at least when they reflect upon their thoughts.   

CHAP. II. Of the Objects of Ideas.  
WHatever we conceive, is represented to our Minds, either as a Thing, or a manner of a Thing, or as a thing modified.  
I call that a Thing which is conceived to consist of itself, and as the Subject of all those things that are comprehended in it, which by another name is called Substance.  
The Manner, Attribute, or Quality of a Thing, I call that, which when it is conceived to be comprehended in the Substance, and not to be able to subsist without it, determines it to exist after a certain manner, and gives it a certain denomination.  
A Thing modified, I call a substance, as it is determined by a certain mode or manner.  
All which things will be apprehended more clearly by Examples.  
When I consider a Body, the Idea of it represents to me a Thing or Substance: because I consider it as a thing subsisting by itself, and which has need of no other to exist.  
But when I consider this Body to be round, I consider a Round-Body, and this Idea represents to me the Thing Modified.  
The names which are used to express these things are called Substantives, or absolute, as the Earth, the Sun, the Soul, God.  
Those also that primarily and directly signify the Modes or Manners, because they have some Correspondence with Substantives, are called Substantives and Absolutes, as Hardness, Heat, Justice, Prudence, etc.  
Such names as signify the Things as Modified, marking out primarily and directly the Substance, tho' more confusedly, and indirectly the Manner, tho' more distinctly, are called Adjectives, and Connotatives, as Round, Hard, Just, Prudent.  
But here we are to observe that the Mind being accustomed to know most things as Modified (in regard she attains not the knowledge of 'em but only by accident, or by those qualities that strike the Senses) often divides one essence of a Substance into two Ideas, of which the one she takes for the Subject, the other for the Mode. Thus although there be nothing in God, which is not God himself, yet we apprehend him as an Infinite Being; and with us Infinite is the Attribute of God, as Being the Subject of the Attribute. Thus also we consider Man as the Subject of Humanity, or having Humanity, and consequently as a Thing Modified.  
And then the essential Attribute, which is the thing most itself, is apprehended by the Manner of the Manner, because it is as it were inherent in the Subject. And this is called the Substantive Abstrasted, as Humanity, Corporeity, Reason.  
Nevertheless it is of great Importance to distinguish that which is truly the Mode from that which only seems to be so, For the Confounding of Manners with Substances, and Substances with Manners is the chief ground of all our Errors. Therefore the Nature of the true Mode is such, that the Substance of which it is the Manner, may be clearly and distinctly conceived without it; but the manner cannot be alternately clearly conceived; unless the Relation which it has to its Substance be as readily apprehended, without which it cannot naturally exist.  
Not but that we may apprehend the Manner, without such an exact and distinct consideration of the Subject. But that which demonstrates that the Relation of the Manner to the Subject, is contained, at least, confussedly in its conception; because we cannot deprive the Manner of that Relation, but that we must destroy the Idea of it at the same Time. Whereas when we conceive two Substances, we may deny one thing of the other; yet never destroy the Ideas of either.  
For example, I may deny Prudence, without considering the Man, who is prudent; but I cannot conceive Prudence, and at the same time deny the Relation, which it has to Man, or any other intelligible Nature capable of Prudence.  
chose, when I consider what appertains to an extended Substance, which is called a Body, as Extension, Figure, Mobility, Divisibility, and on the other side whatever belongs to the Mind, as Thinking, Doubting, Memory, Will, Discourse, I may deny all that of the Extended Substance, which I conceive belongs to the Thinking Substance, and yet distinctly apprehend the Extended Substance, and all the Adjuncts that belong to it. And I may reciprocally deny of the Thinking Substance, whatever I apprehend of the Extended Substance, without considering what I have conceived of the Thinking Substance.  
Which also proves, that Thinking is not the Manner of the Extended Substance, because that Extension with all the rest of the Attributes belonging to Extended Substance may be denied of Thought, and yet a man may rightly apprehend of Thinking.  
It may be here farther observed, that there are some of these Modes or Manners, which may be called Intrinsic; because they are apprehended to be in the Substance, as round or square; others may be said to be extrinsic; because they are taken from something which is not inherent in the Substances; as beloved, seen, desired; but these things depend upon the Actions of others. And these sorts of Modes or Manners, are called in the Schools, Extinsical Denominations. But if these Modes are taken according to the Manner whereby things are apprehended, they are called Second Intentions. Thus to be Subjected, to be Predicated are Second Intentious, because they are the Manners whereby the things themselves are apprehended, as they are in the Understanding, conjoining two Ideas, affirming one to be the other.  
It is farther to be observed, that there are other Modes which we may call Substantials, because they represent to us true Substances applied to other Substances like to Manners; of which sort are Clothed, Armed, etc.  
There are others which we may call simply Real, and these are the true Manners, which are not Substances, but Manners of Substance.  
Lastly, there are others which we may call Negatives, because they represent the Substance to us with a Denial of some real or substantial Manner.  
Now if the Objects represented by these Ideas, whether Substances or Manners, are really such as they are represented to us, we call 'em true. If not, they are false Ideas, in such a manner as they may be. And these are they which in the Schools are called Entia Rationes, Entities of Reason, which happen for the most part when the Mind conjoins two Ideas real in themselves, but distinct; thus the Idea of a Golden Mountain is an Entity of Reason, compounded of two Ideas of a Mountain and Gold, which the Mind represents as conjoined, when really they are not so.   

CHAP. III. Of Aristotle's Ten Predicaments.  
TO this Head of the Objects of Ideas, the ten Predicaments of Aristotle may be reduced; as being but several Classes, under which that Philosopher comprehended all the Objects of our Thoughts; compredending all Substances under the First, and all accidents under the other Nine.  
The first Substance, which is either Spiritual or Corporeal; the second Quantity, which is either discrete, when the Parts are divided as Numbers.  
Or Continued, when the parts are conjoined, and then either successive, as Time and Notion; or Permanent, which by another name is called Space, or Extension in Length, Breadth, and Profundity; length alone making lines, Length and Breadth making surface, and all together causing Solidity.  
Third Quality, of which Aristotle makes four Kind's.  
The first comprehends Habitude, a disposition of Mind or Body, acquired by reiterated Acts, as the Sciences, Virtue, Vice, Excellency in Painting, Writing, Dancing.  
The Second Natural Ability; such as are the Faculties of the Soul or Body, the Understanding, the Will, the Memory, the Five Senses, Swiftness of Foot.  
The Third, Sensible Qualities, as Hardness, Softness, Ponderosity, hot, cold, colours, sounds, odours and several sorts of Relishes.  
The Fourth, Form and Figure, which is the extrinsical determination of Quantity, as Round, Square, Spherical, Cubical.  
Fourthly Relation of one thing to another, as of Father to Son, Master to Servant, King to Subject, of Power to the Object, of sight to the Thing Visible; to which may be added all things denoting Comparison; as like, equal, bigger, less.  
Fifth, Action, either considered in itself; as to walk, leap, to know, to love; or externally, as to strike, to saw, to break, to manifest, to hear.  
Sixth, Suffering; as to be stricken, broken, to be manifested, heated.  
Seventh, where; as when we answer to Questions about Place; He is at Rome, at Paris, in his Study, or a bed.  
Eighth, When we answer to questions about Time, as when did he Live? a hundred Years ago; When was this done? Yesterday.  
Ninth, Situation, as Sitting, Standing, Lying, behind, before, upon the Right-hand, on the Lost.  
The Tenth, the manner of having, as to have any thing about a Man for Clothing, Ornament, Armour; or to be Clothed, Adorned, Armed, to wear Breeches, etc.  
These are Aristotle's Ten Predicaments formed for the Birth of so many Mysteries, though to say truth, of very little use, and so far from rectifying of Judgement, which is the Scope of Logic, that they frequently do much mischief; and that for two Causes which it will be worth while to display in this place.  
The first is that these Predicaments are things looked upon as things grounded upon Reason and Truth, whereas they are things merely Arbitrary, and which have no ground but the Imagination of a Man that has no Authority to prescribe Laws to others, who have as much Right as he, to dispose in the same, or any other order the Objects of Thinking, according to the Rules of Philosophy, which every one embraces. In a word, the following Distic contains whatever falls under our Consideration according to the new Philosophy.  
Mens, Mensura, quies, motus, Positura, Figura, Sunt cum materia Cunctarum Exordia rerum.  
For the followers of this Philosophy believe they have drained all Nature out of these seven Heads.  
1. men's or the Thinking Substance. 2. Matter, or the Extended Substance. 3. Measure, or the Bigness or Smallness of every part of the Matter. 4. Position, or Situation one in respect of another. 5 Figure. 6. Their Motion. 7. Their Rest, or slower Motion.  
The other Reason why we think this Series of Predicaments to be pernicious is this, because it occasions Men to satisfy themselves with the outward Rind of Words, instead of Profiting by the wholesome Fruit, and to believe they know all things, so they are able to say by rote certain names of Arbitrary Signification, which yet imprint no clear or distinct Ideas, as we shall afterwards demonstrate.  
Here something might be said of the Attributes of the Lullists, Goodness, Patience, Magnitude, and the rest. But it is such a ridiculous Invention, to think that they are able to give a Reason of all things by the application of a few Metaphisical words, that it is not worth refuting.  
And therefore a very Modern Author has affirmed with great Reason, that the Rules of Aristotle's Logic are serviceable, not so much to discover what we are Ignorant of, but to explain to others, what we know already: but that Lul taught us to prattle fluently and without Judgement of that of which we know nothing at all. And therefore Ignorance is to be preferred far before this false Knowledge; for as St. Austin judiciously observes in his Book of the utility of Belief, such a disposition of the Mind is highly to be blamed for two Reasons. One, for that he who is persuaded that he understands the Truth, renders himself uncapable of Learning any more: and Secondly because such a Presumption and Rashness is a sign of an ill-governed and ill-qualified Mind. Opinari saith he, Duas ob res turpissimum, est, quod discere non potest, qui sibi jam se scire persuasit, & per se ipsa temeritas non bene affecti Animi signum est; For the word Opinari, in the purity of the Latin Tongue, signifies a disposition of Mind, that consents too lightly to uncertain things, and so believes that he knows what he does not understand, and therefore all the Philosophers maintained, Sapientem nihil Opinari; and Cicero blaming himself for that defect, says that he was Magnus Opinator,   

CHAP. IU. Of the Composition and Simplicity of Ideas, wherein is discoursed the manner of knowing by Abstraction or Precision.  
WE have affirmed by the by, in the second Chapter; that we may apprehend the Mode or Form without considering distinctly the Substance of which it is the Mode, from whence we take an occasion to explain, what is Abstraction of the Intellect.  
The narrow Limits to which our Souls are confined are the reason that we cannot perfectly apprehend things, if a little compounded, without considering 'em in Parts, and according to the several shapes that they may receive. Which is that, which we generally call knowing by Abstraction.  
But in regard that things are variously compounded, some of Parts really distinct, which we call Integral, as the Body of Man, Number, etc. It is easy thence to understand, that the Mind may consider one Part and not another, because these Parts are really distinguished: But this is not that which we call Abstraction.  
Now it will be more advantageous to consider these Parts separately, to a distinct knowledge of which we can never else attain. For example the Body of Man can be no otherwise known, then by dividing it into all its Parts; as well similar as dissimilar, and by setting several names upon every one. Arithmetic also stands upon this foundation. For we have no need of Art to measure or count little Numbers, for the Mind is able to receive them entire. So that the whole Art consists in numbering separately those Parts of Number, which being whole we cannot reckon. For as Capacious as the Mind is, it is impossible for it to multiply two Numbers consisting of eight or nine Figures, without a separate Multiplication of each Figure by itself.  
Secondly, we know by Parts, when we apply ourselves to one manner not considering the Substance; or to two separately, which are not however inherent in one and the same Subject. This is done by the Geometricians who make a Body extended in Length, Breadth, and Profundity, the Object of Geometry. But for the more accurate knowledge of this they first apply themselves to the Consideration of one only Dimension. Then they consider two dimensions, Length and Breadth, which they call a Superficies; and lastly all the three dimensions together, which they call solid Bodies.  
Hence it appears how vain and ridiculous the Subtleties of the Skeptics are, who endeavour to call in question the certainty of Geometry, because it supposes Lines and Superficies that never were; for it does not suppose Lines without Latitude, nor Superficies without Profundity; but it supposes that Longitude may be considered without the consideration of Latitude; which is a thing beyond all Controversy, for in measuring the distance between City and City, we only measure the length of the way, not troubling ourselves about the Breadth.  
Now by how many the more Manners we divide things, so much the more capable we become of accurately understanding 'em. Thus we see in motion, when the determination to what place, is not rightly distinguished as well from the motion, as the parts of the determination, so long nothing can clearly be concluded concerning the causes of Reflection and Distinction, which is done by the help of this Distinction, as may be seen in the Second Chapter of Des Cartes' Optics.  
Thirdly we know by Abstraction, when the thing has several Attributes, but we only consider one, setting all the rest aside. For Example, I consider, That I think and by Consequence that I am he who thinks. Now in this Idea of myself thinking, I can only consider the Thing-Thinking, not considering that I am the Thing-Thinking, tho' in Me, Myself, and the Thing-Thinking are one and the same, and so the Idea which I have conceived of the Person-Thinking will not only represent me myself but all other Persons that think. In the same manner, if I consider an Equilateral Triangle, as it is described in such a Paper, with all its other determining Circumstances; that Idea will only represent this Triangle to me. But if I call off my thoughts from the consideration of these particular accidents, and apply myself to the consideration of this Figure, as consisting of three Lines; the Idea thus formed will hence more clearly explain the Equality of the Lines, and thence I become more apt and Skilful to make a representation of all other Triangles of the same Nature. If I am to go farther, and not to stop at the Contemplation of the Equality of Lines, but am to consider it as a figure consisting of three right Lines, this Idea will express all the sorts of Triangles. Lastly, if omitting the number of the Lines, I only conceive a superficies bounded with Right-Lines, I shall form an Idea of Figures consisting of Right-Lines; and thus by degrees I may ascend to extension itself. For in these Abstractions, the inferior degree contains the Superior, together with some conjoined determination. Thus I think contains the Thing Thinking: thus an equilateral Triangle contains a Triangle, and thus a Triangle comprehends a Right-lined Figure, and the upper degree represents many things so much the more clearly, by how much the less it is determined.  
Lastly, It is manifest, that by the benefit of Extraction, Common Ideas are produced out of Singular, and out of Common ones still more Common. By which we are admonished to proceed to what is to be said concerning the Universality and Particularities of Ideas.   

CHAP. V. Of the Universality, Particularity and Singularity of Ideas.  
ALtho' whatever exists be Singular, nevertheless by the help of Abstractions, we may have several sorts of Ideas, of which some will express Singulars; and such is the Idea which every one has of himself; others will express many things together, as when a Man thinks a Triangle, considering nothing else but that it is a figure containing three Lines, and as many Angles; which Idea so formed, may serve for the apprehension of all other Triangles.  
Ideas representing one thing, are called Singular and Individual: and their Objects are called Individuals, but they that represent several things, are called Universal, Common or General.  
The names that denote the first, are Proper Names, as Socrates, Rome, Bucephalus. These that signify the latter Common and Appellatives: as a Man, a City, a Horse. And as well Universal Ideas as Common names may be called Generical Terms.  
Note that there are two sorts of Generical Terms, one of those that are called Vnivocals, to which the Universal Ideas are so tied, that the same name may agree with several things according to the same sound, and the same Notion that is annexed to the Sound; of which sort are a Man, a City, a Horse.  
The other is of those that are called Equivocalls, the Sound of which is the same, annexed to different Ideas, so that the same sound or word may agree to several things, but not according to the same but various Ideas which custom has subjected to the word. Thus Canon signifies a great Gun, and Ecclesiastical decree, and a Rule of Art; for these significations belong all to different Ideas.  
These Universal Equivocalls are of two sorts. For various Ideas subjected to one Sound, have either no Relation one with another, as in the word Canon; or else they have some Relation; as when the name primarily signifies one Idea: others no otherwise then as they relate to the first Idea, as the Cause, Effect or Sign, and these Equivocalls are called Analogous; thus Animals, the Air, and Diet are said to be Healthy.  
Now the Idea first joined to the word, denotes Health, which is proper to Animals; but others are added, approaching near to the primary Idea, as being the Cause of Health; and therefore we call the Air Healthy, and Diet healthy, because they both contribute to the preservation of Health.  
Nevertheless when we hear speak only of Universal Terms, we understand Vnivocalls only, with the Universal Ideas annexed.  
But among all these Universal Ideas there are two which it highly concerns us rightly to distinguish, that is to say, Comprehension and Extension.  
I call the Comprehension of an Idea all those Attributes that are contained within it, so that none can be taken away, but the Idea must be destroyed. Thus the Comprehension of the Idea of a Triangle, includes Extension, Figure, Three Lines, three Angles, and the equality of those Angles with two right Angles.  
I call Extension the Subjects with which the Idea agrees, which are also called the Inferiors of the Universal Term, which being related to those, carries the name of Superior. Thus the Generical Idea of a Triangle extends itself to all the several Species of Triangles.  
But though the Generical Idea confusedly extends itself to all the inferior Subjects, nevertheless between the Attributes which it comprehends, and the Subjects to which it is extended, the difference arises from hence, that we cannot despoil the Idea of any of its attributes without destroying it, as hath been said; whereas we may restrain the Extension of the same, by applying it to some of the Subjects, yet never injure the Idea.  
Now the Restriction of the Generical Idea may happen two ways.  
First by the addition of an Idea distinct and determined. Thus if I add to the Generical Idea of a Triangle, that it has a right Angle, I restrain the Generical Idea of a Triangles to a certain species of a Triangle, which is therefore called a Rectangle Triangle.  
Secondly, By the addition of an Idea confused, and undetermined; as if a Man should say, some Triangle. In which case the Term is made particular, because that now it extends itself only to a part of the Subjects, which before comprehended all, and yet that part to which it is restrained is not determined.   

CHAP. VI Of the five Universal Ideas; Genus, Species, Difference, Proper, and Accident.  
WHAT has been said in the former Chapters opens us a way for the explanation in few words of those Vniversals which are Vugarly made use of in the Schools.  
For when the Generical Idea represents to us their Objects as Things, and that in Substantives and absolute Terms, it is called either Genus or Species.  

Of Genus.  
Genus is called an Idea as being so common that it extends itself also to other Universal Ideas. Thus a square Figure of four sides is a Genus, in respect of a Parallellogram or a Trapezium. And in like manner Substance is the same in respect of Substance extended, which is a Body, and the Thinking Substance, which is a Spirit.   

Of Species.  
But the common Idea which is another more Common and General, is called Species. Thus a Parallellogram, and Trapezium are Species' of a Square Figure: and thus Body and Spirit are Species of Substance.  
But one and the same Idea may be called a Genus, if it be referred to other Ideas to which it extends itself: but the Species, if it relates to an Idea more General, to which it is subservient. Thus Body is a Genus in respect of a Body animate or inanimate; but a Species in respect of Substance. Thus a Square is a Genus in respect of a Parallellogram, but a Species in respect of a Figure indeterminately taken.  
But there is another Notion of Species, which does not fall but upon those Ideas, which cannot be called Genus'; as when any Idea has only under it individuals and singulars. Thus a Circle has only under it singular Circles, which yet are all of the same Species, and these Species' are called the Lowermost.  
There is also a Genus which cannot be a Species, which is called the Supreme of all Genus'; whether it be Ens or Substance. Nor is it much material to know it as relating rather to Metaphysics then Logic.  
I have called those Ideas which represent to us their Objects as Things either Genus' or Species'. However it is not absolutely necessary that those Objects should be either Things or Substances; it suffices that they be apprehended to be like'em. For though they be Manners, they may be represented without any Relation to their Substances, and only be referred to other Ideas of Manners either more or less General. Thus Figure, which is the Manner of a Figured Body is a Genus in respect of Figures consisting of straight or crooked Lines.  
On the contrary, Ideas that represent to us their Objects as Things modified, and that in adjective or connotative Terms, if they be compared with Substances which these Connotative Terms signify but confusedly, though directly, whether these Connotative Terms denote Essential Attributes (which indeed are nothing else but the Things themselves) or Manners, yet are they not called either Genus' or Species', but either Differences, or Propers, or Accidents.  
They are called Differences when the Object of the Ideas is an Esse; ntial Attribute, by which the Species is distinguished from another Species as Extended, Thinking, Rational.  
They are called Propers, when the Object really belongs to the Essence of the Thing, though not the first thing that is considered in it, but depending upon the first; as Divisible, Immortal, Docible.  
Common Accidents are so called, when their Objects are true Manners, which cannot be separated by the Understanding, from the Thing whose Accidents they are, without destroying the Idea of the Thing in our Minds; as Round, Hard, Just, Prudent.   

Of Difference.  
Now whereas Genus has under it two Species; of necessity the Ideas of Both include something of themselves, which is not comprehended in the Idea of the Genus. For if they had nothing different from the Genus, they would be Genus' themselves; and as the Genus is predicated of both the Species', so both the Species' are predicated one of another. Hence the Essential Attribute to the Species not being found in the Genus, is called the Difference of it, and is the Universal Idea which we have of it: because it can solely and only represent to Us this Difference, wherever it be found; that is, in all Inferiors of that Species.  
For Example, Body and Spirit, are two Species' of Substance: therefore there must be something more in the Ideas of Body and Spirit, then in the Idea of Substance. Now that which we first see more in Body is Extension; what we see first in Spirit is Thought. Hence the Difference of Body will be extension; of Spirit, Cogitation. That is Body will be a Substance extended, Spirit, a Thinking Body.  
Hence it follows, that Difference is doubly referred, either to the Genus, which it divides, or to the Species which it Constitutes; and farther that it is the primary part of that which in the Comprehension of the Idea is included in the Species. Hence every Species may be expressed by one word only, as Mind, Body; or by two conjointly, that is of Genus and Species, which is also called a Definition, as Substance extended, a Thinking Substance.  
Secondly, Difference, because it constitutes the Species, and Differences it from other Species', ought to have the same extent with Species; and for that reason Difference and Species ought to be predicated one of another; as thus, Whatever thinks is a Spirit, every Spirit thinks.  
But often times it happens, that in several things there is no Attribute that offers itself which agrees so fully with the whole Species as to agree only with that Species and no other. In this case the way is to join together several Attributes, and the Assemblage not being to be found in any other Species, constitutes the difference. Thus the Platonics asserting that the Daemons were no less rational Animals, than Men, would not admit Rational to be the Reciprocal difference of Man, but added another to it, that is to say, Mortal; which is not the Reciprocal difference of Man, as being common to Beasts: yet being both joined together, they only relate to Man. And thus we frame to ourselves Ideas of the most part of Beasts.  
Lastly, It is to be observed, that it is not always required that both the Differences dividing the Genus, should be Positive: it suffices that only one be such. Thus two Men are sufficiently distinguished, if he be said to follow an Employment which the other does not; tho' he that wants the Employment has no less positively than what the other has.  
Thus Man is generally distinguished from Brutes; for Man is a Creature endued with a Soul; but Brutes are mere Animals. Yet the Generical Idea of Brutes contains nothing in it positively, that is not found in Men; only we add to that Idea, a denial of that to be in them which is in Men; that is the Soul. So that the difference between the Idea of an Animal, and the Idea of a Brute consists in this, that the Idea of an Animal neither excludes nor includes Cogitation within its Comprehension, whereas nevertheless it is contained in its Extension. On the other side, the Idea of a Brute excludes Cogitation out of its Comprehension, and therefore cannot sort with Man.   

Of Propers.  
The difference being found out which constitutes the Species, that is, the primary essential Attribute distinguishing it from any other Species, if enquiring farther into the nature of it, we find another attribute depending upon the Principal by necessary Connexion, and consequently altogether agreeing with this only Species, such an Attribute we call Propriety: and because it agrees with all the Inferiors of the same Species wherever it be, we adopt it into the number of Universals, and make a Fourth.  
For Example, To have a Right-Angle is the essential difference of a Rectangle Triangle. Now because it necessarily follows that Angles being Right, the Square of the Hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other sides, the Equality of those Squares is taken for the Propriety of a Rectangle Triangle, which agrees with all and only Rectangle Triangles.  
Nevertheless some will have this name of Proper to be of a larger Extent, and hence arise those four Species of it.  
The first is that which we have already explained, and which agrees with all solely, and always: thus it is the propriety of all Circles, and only Circles, and always to have all Lines drawn from the Centre to the Circumference equal.  
The Second agrees with All, but not only All. Thus it agrees with an extended Body to be divisible, because all extended Bodies may be divided, although Duration, Number, and Force may also be divided.  
The third may agree with one only; but not with all. Thus it is only proper to a Man to be a Physician or a Philosopher; tho' all Men are neither Philosophers nor Physicians.  
The Fourth may agree with all and only, but not always.  
An Example of this we have in Grey-hairs of Old-men, which is proper solely and to all Men, but not always; that is, not till Men arrive to Old-age.   

Of Accidents.  
We have already declared in the Second Chapter, that a form or Manner is that which cannot naturally subsist but by the substance, and that it is not joined to the Substance with any necessary Connexion; So that the thing may be exactly understood, though the Form or Manner be not conceived. Thus we exactly understand a Man, not considering whether he be Prudent or no; but Prudence cannot be conceived unless we apprehend the Man, or some Intelligence being capable of Prudence.  
But when we couple the confused and indeterminate Idea of Substance with the Distinct Idea of any form or manner, this Idea may represent all things, wherein this manner is included.  
Thus the Idea of a Prudent Man will represent all prudent Men; the Idea of Round will represent all Round Bodies. And these Ideas being thus expressed by Connotative Terms, are those things which make the first Universal, called an Accident; because it does not essentially belong to the Thing to which it is attributed; for if it did, it would be either Difference or Propriety.  
But here it is also to be observed, as we have hinted before, that when two Substances are conceived together, another may be conceived as the form or manner of the other. Thus a Man Clothed may be considered as something compounded of a Man and clothes. But to be Clothed, in respect of that Man, is the manner of his appearing only, under which that Man is conceived, though the Garments are Substances: and thus, to be clad: will belong to the first Universal.  
And so much for the universals so pompously cried up in the Schools; for 'tis little material to know that there are Genus, Species, Difference, Propriety, and Accident; but to know the true Genus', the true Species' of Genus', their Proprieties and accidents, that's the main thing required; for the attaining of which knowledge we make no question to give some light in the following Chapters, after we have spoken something beforehand of the Complexed Terms.    

CHAP. VII. Of the Complexed Terms, their Universality, and Particularity.  
Sometimes to some certain Term we join other Terms, from which arises in our Minds a total Idea, of which we may affirm or deny those things, which cannot either be denied or affirmed of the single terms separately taken; from whence proceed the Complexed Terms; as a Prudent Man, a Transparent Body, Alexander the Son of Philip.  
These additions are sometimes made by Pronouns Relative, as the Body which is Transparent, Alexander who is the Son of Philip; the Pope who is Antichrist.  
And indeed it may be affirmed that although these Pronouns are not always expressed, yet they are always to be understood, because that in altering the Proposition, they may be Expressed. For a Transparent Body, and a Body that is Transparent, are equivalent.  
But that which is chiefly to be observed in Complexed Terms is, that there are two kinds of Additions, of which the one may be called Explicative, and the others Determinative.  
The Explicative in positive words, explains that which before lay hid either in the Comprehension of the Idea of the first Term, or at lest which agrees with it as an Accident, so that it agrees with it generally and according to its entire Extension. As when I say, A Man who is a Creature endued with Reason; or a Man who naturally desires Happiness; or a Man who is Mortal. For what is here added is only Explicative, not changing any thing in the whole Idea, which is annexed to the word Man: nor restraining it to signify only certain Men; but only it denotes those things more clearly which are common to all Mankind.  
Of this nature are those Additions which are applied to Names, distinctly denoting Individuals, as when we say, London is the largest City in Europe; Julius Caesar was the greatest Captain in the World; Aristotle the Prince of Philosophers; Lewis the Fourteenth King of France; for here the Single Terms so pronounced, lose nothing of their Extension, as being first determined as much as they could be.  
Determinative is that, which being added, restrains the Signification of the General Term, so that it is not now accepted in its full extension, but comprehends only a part of it; as Transparent Bodies, Wise men, a Rational Creature. These additions are not simply Explicative, but Determinative, because they maim and curtail the Extension of the first Term; for the name of Body here signifies only a part of the Body of Man, as a part of Men; of a Creature, as part of the Creatures.  
But it is the Nature of these additions sometimes to create a Singular out of a Common Term, when they contain Conditions Individuant: as when I say the King now Reigning, the Common name of King is determined to the single and only Person of James II.  
There are also two other kinds of Complexed Terms; of which the first is Complexed in words, the other in Sense only.  
Of the first kind are those that have the Addition expressed, as in the Examples hitherto mentioned.  
Of the other kind are They, in which one of the Terms is only pronounced, the other understood: as when we say, the King. This Term is Complexed in Sense; because when we pronounce the word, the Idea of the Common name does not present itself to our minds alone, but, as adjoined to it, the Idea of Lewis 14. who now Reigns in France. The infinite number of Terms is meant of those which being thus complexed, occur in daily Talk, as in every Family, Master, implying such a One. Some Terms are also Complexed as well in Words as Sense; but after various manners. Thus the Prince of Philosophers is complexed in words, because the name of Prince is determined by the word Philosopher; but in respect of Aristotle, to whom the Schoolmen are so addicted to give that Title, it is complexed in Sense, when the Idea of Aristotle is only obvious to the mind, nor being expressed by any Sound that denotes the Person.  
All Adjectives or Connotatives are either Parts of Connexed Terms, though they are clapped together with their Substances, or complexed in Sense, when the Substantives are understood. Because, as we have said in the Second Chapter, these Connotative Names denote the Subject directly indeed, but more confusedly; the Mode or Form indirectly; but more distinctly.  
And therefore the Idea of the Subject is very General and very confused, representing sometimes Entity, sometimes a Body, which for the most part is determined by a distinct Form of the Idea. Thus White signifies a Thing that has Whiteness. And hence the Confused Idea of the Thing, is determined to signify those things only that are White:  
However in this Matter, it is chiefly to be observed, that there are some Complexed Terms, which although they be only determined to one only judividual, nevertheless retain an Equivocal Universality, which may be called an Universality of Error. For when men agree that one only Thing is signified by such a Term, but dispute what that only Thing really is, it happens that this Term is applied by some to signify this Thing, by others, another Thing. Hence it is requisite that such a Term be farther determined either by the variety of Circumstances or the Series of Discourse that the signification of the Term may be made precisely apparent.  
Thus true Religion signifies one sole Religion, which is really the Church of England; but because all People and every Heresy think their own Religion to be truest, these Terms are highly Equivocate, by Equivocation of Error. For if an Historian should write that his Prince was most addicted to the true Religion, it cannot be said what he means, unless it be known what Religion the Historian professed. For if he were a Church of England Man, it is understood of a Church of England Prince, or of a Mahometan, if the Historian were an Arabian Mahometan; and so of a Roman Catholic Prince; if the Author were a Roman Catholic.  
Complexed Terms, wherein there is Equivocation of Error chiefly comprehends those Qualities of which the Sense is no Judge, but the Mind. For men are prone to differ in their Opinion, concerning such Things.  
For Example, should we affirm, that no Soldiers were listed by Marius, but such as were six foot high, this Complexed Term, Soldier, six foot high, is not subject to Equivocation of Error, when it is easy for Soldiers to be measured, that we may know whether they be six foot high or no. But had it been decreed that none should be listed but such as were stout, this Term had been much more liable to Equivocation, when as it might be attributed to such Soldiers, that looked like stout Men, but are indeed but mere Cowards.  
This Equivocation of Error is often found in Complexed Terms, The Chiefest of the Parisian Geometricians; the most Learned, the wickedest, the richest of Men. For though these Terms are divided by Individuant Conditions, seeing that one Person might be the chiefest of the Parisian Geometricians; nevertheless this Term might be ascribed to several, though proper only to one; in regard it is an easy thing for men to vary in their Judgements concerning this matter; so that every one shall give this Title to him, whom he thinks to be the best and most excellent Geometrician.  
These Forms of Speech also; The Sense of the Author, what the Author declares upon this Subject, are of the Number of these Equivocates; especially if the Author be so obscure, that there be any Dispute about his Sense. And thus we find continual Altercations concerning Aristotle's Opinion of Philosophers, while every one endeavours to draw him to their Party. For although Aristotle had but one Sense concerning one Thing; yet because he is variously understood by several, these words, the Sense of Aristotle, are the Equivocations of Error. For every one pronounces that to be the Judgement of Aristotle, which he is persuaded that Aristotle meant; and so if several believe, That Aristotle had a different Opinion of the same thing; these Terms, the Sense of Aristotle in such a matter, though singular in themselves, can never be applied to Many, that is to say, to all those things, that Aristotle shall be said to have written upon such a Subject; for so they shall signify with every one, what every one is persuaded the Philosopher thought.  
But that we may the better understand, where lies this Equivocation of Error, it is to be observed, that the Terms of it are Connotative; either expressly, or in sense. Now as I have said, in Connotative Terms may be considered as well the Subject, which is directly or confusedly expressed, as the Form or Mode which is directly and indistinctly signified.  
Thus White confusedly denotes a body, distinctly Whiteness; thus, the Sense of Aristotle, confusedly signifies some Sentence, Thought, or Doctrine of his; distinctly, the Relation of that Doctrine to Aristotle, to whom it is attributed.  
However the Equivocation which is found in these Terms does not properly arise from the Form or Mode, which being distinct, can never vary; nor from the Subject confusedly considered, as not being freed from that confusion. For Example these words, Prince of Philosophers, cannot be Equivocates, in regard the Idea of Prince of Philosophers can be distinctly applied to no Individual. But Equivocation consists only in This, that the Mind instead of the confused Subject substitutes another which is distinct and determinate, to which Form or Manner are applied. But in regard men dispute about this matter; they may ascribe the Title of Prince or Chief to several Persons, and signalise 'em afterwards with what additional word they think most convenient. Thus formerly Plato was called the Prince of Philosophers; which Title is now conferred upon Aristotle. Thus the words, True Religion, not having any distinct, but a confused Idea of any Religion, are no Equivocates, because they denote nothing but that Religion which is absolutely True. But when the Mind has annexed the Idea of True Religion to the distinct Idea of some particular Worship distinctly known, they become egregious equivocates, and signify that Worship with every one, which they account the True Religion.  
The same is the Condition of these words, That which such a Philosopher held of such a Matter. For while they abide in their general Idea, the general Idea simply and generally will signify the Doctrine delivered by such a Philosopher concerning such a Matter; as the Doctrine of Aristotle concerning the Nature of the Soul. Whereas the same words, that which, etc. that is to say, this Doctrine, while it is under a confused Idea applied to no distinct Idea, is not capable of Equivocation. But when the Mind instead of that Doctrine confusedly conceived, substitutes a distinct Doctrine, & a distinct Subject; then according to the variety of distinct Ideas, that same That which, etc. may be liable to Equivocation. Thus the Doctrine of Aristotle touching the Nature of the Soul is an Equivocate with Pomponatius, who asserts that Aristotle believed the Soul to be Mortal; and with several others of his Interpreters, who on the other side affirm that Aristotle taught the Immortality of the Soul, as well as Plato and Socrates. Hence it is, that words of this nature most frequently signify the thing with which the form indirectly expressed cannot agree. Suppose for example's sake, that Philip was not the Father of Alexander, as Alexander himself endeavoured to make out; these words, the Son of Philip, denoting Generality, any person begot by Philip, erroneously spoken of Alexander, denote the person that is not really the Son of Philip. In like manner these words, the Sense of Scripture alleged by a Quaker, to prove a Sect quite contrary to Scripture shall denote that very Sect in his Mouth, which he thinks to be according to the Sense of Scripture, and which he has therefore dignifyed with that name, of the Sense of Scripture; nor are the Papists more in the right than they, who pretending to adhere to the Word of God; for among them the word of God, signifies that Oglio of Superstitions which they would obtrude upon the Protestants instead of God's Word.   

CHAP. VIII. Of the Clearness and Distinction of Ideas, as also of their Obscurity and Confusion.  
IN Ideas clearness may be discerned from Distinction, and obscurity from confusion; for we may call that a clear Idea, when it imprints in us a lively, as I may call it, Sense of itself, whereas otherwise it may not be so distinct. The Idea of Pain because it strikes us so sensibly, may be called a Clear Idea; but yet it is confused, because it represents Pain to us, as being in the Hand, when indeed it lies in the Sense.  
Nevertheless we may call every Idea clear, so far as it is distinct; for all obscurity arises out of Confusion. Thus the sense of the Pain that hurts us is clear and also distinct; but what is confused in the Feeling, that is to say, that the Pain is in the hand, cannot be said to be clear.  
Now because Clearness and Distinction are one and the same in Ideas, it will be very requisite to examine why some Ideas are clear, others confused.  
But this will be more apparent by the help of examples, than any other way, and therefore let us wove together a Catalogue of the first Ideas, as well clear and distinct, as obscure and confused.  
The most clear Idea is that which every Man has of himself, as of the Thing that thinks; as also the Ideas of those other Appendices to our thoughts, as to Judge, Discourse, Deliberate, Perceive, Imagine.  
Ideas of extended Substances also are most chiefly clear to us, as also the Ideas of their Properties; as Figures, Motion, Rest; for tho' we may feign that there is no Body, no Figure, (tho' we cannot feign any such thing of the thinking Substance, while we think) yet we cannot say we clearly perceive what is Extension and Figure.  
We also clearly apprehend Duration, Order, and Number, so that we consider the Duration of any thing to be form, under which we consider the thing, so long as the form continues in it. Thus order and number no way differ in effect from things Ordered and Numbered.  
All these Ideas are so clear, that we frequently render 'em more obscure, while we endeavour to illustrate 'em with new Observations, and frame to ourselves other Ideas than those which we have from Nature.  
We may also say, that the Idea of God is clear in one respect, tho' in another most obscure and imperfect.  
It is clear, because it suffices to discover the great number of Attributes in God, which we certainly know are no where else to be found but in God, but it is obscure in respect of that Idea which the Blessed have of him in Heaven. And it is also Imperfect, in regard our Minds being limited and finite, cannot but most Imperfectly conceive an infinite Being; for Perfection and Clearriess in Ideas are two different things. For they are Perfect, when they represent to us whatever is in the Object; Clear when they represent to us as much as suffices to apprehend the object clearly and distinctly.  
On the other side they are confused and obscure Ideas which we have of Sensible Qualities; as of Colours, Sounds, Odours, Tastes, Cold, Heat, Ponderosity, etc. As also those of our desires, as of Hunger, Thirst, Pain, etc. Now mark the reason of the Obscurity of these Ideas.  
In regard we were first Children before we were Men, and that exterior things operating within us, stirred up various Sensations in our Mind by the help of those Impressions which they made in our Bodies; the Mind conscious that those Sensations are affected against her will, and that by some Body's (as for example the Sensation of heat by the Eire) would not only judge that there were some things without her, which were the causes of these Sensations, (wherein she was not deceived) but going farther, imagined something in the Objects, altogether like Sensation, or at least like the Ideas thence arising. Upon these Considerations therefore, she formed Ideas to herself, and transferred the Sensations of Heat, Cold, etc. into those things that are without her. And by that means those confused and obscure Ideas of sensible qualities arose from hence, that the Mind intermixed her own false Judgements with those that she derived from Nature.  
Now in regard these Ideas are not natural but Arbitrary, Men have made a most fantastical use of 'em, and turned 'em into mere Chimaeras; for tho' that Heat and Burning are two sorts of Sensation; the one weaker, the other fiercer, we have allowed heat to the Fire, affirming Fire to be endued with Heat, yet we have deprived Fire of the burning faculty, or of the pain which we feel in approaching too near it, denying Fire to be affected with Pain.  
But if Men had rightly apprehended that Pain is not to be attributed to the Fire that burns the Hand; yet had they been in another error, while they thought pain to be in the hand which the Fire burns, when as pain is only in the Sense.  
This was not only the Opinion of some of the ancient Philosophers, as the Cyrenarches, but even of St. Austin himself; For says he in his 14 Book, de civitat. dei, Pains said to be Pains of the Flesh, are pains of the Soul in the Flesh and out of the Flesh; for pain of the Flesh is only an Injury to the Soul, and a certain dissent from its suffering: as the Pain of the Soul, which is Sadness, is a dissent from those things that befall us against our Wills.  
Thus in his seventh Book upon Genesis. C. 19 When the Soul feels the Afflictions of the Body, she is offended in her act of Government of the Body, her Rule being disturbed, and this offence is called Pain.  
Now that that Pain which is called the Pain of the Body, belongs to the Soul and not to the Body, is manifest from this, that those things that affect us with Pain, seldom trouble us when our minds are intent upon other things, as we sinned by the African Priest, (of whom St. Austin L. 14. de Civitat. dei C. 24. Who when pleased, upon the Counterfeiting of Groans and Lamentations, would so abstract himself from his Senses, and lie as it were for Dead, that they could not make him sensible of Pinching and Pricking, nor of the heat of Fire, till it began to scorch his Skin.  
Moreover it is to be observed, that neither the ill disposition of the hand, nor any motion arising from burning, causes the Soul to be sensible of the Pain, unless this Motion be Communicated to the Brain, by certain small Strings included in the Nerves, and extended from the Brain to the Hands, and other parts of the Body, which cannot be moved unless that part of the Body be also moved from whence they derive themselves. So that if there be any accident that hinders these little Strings from communicating their motion to the Brain (as in the Palsy) a Man may endure Wounds and Pain without any Sense of Pain. Insomuch that what appears yet more strange, a Man may have a pain in his hands that wants hands, as often it happens to those whose hands are cut off; for that if the threads of the Nerves extended from the Hand to the Brain be moved near the Elbow, where they terminate, they may move that part of the Brain to which they are fastened, in the same manner as it might be moved, if the same threads descended to the hand, as the one end of a small Rope may be moved in the same manner, if drawn about the middle, as if pulled at the other extremity; and thus the Soul should feel the same Pain as it would feel if the Person had hands. For the Soul directs its attentiveness thither from whence that motion of the Brain used to proceed, which before affected it with that sort of Pain. Thus the Reflections that we behold in a Glass appear in the same place where they would be, should they be looked upon with direct beams, as being the most usual manner of beholding Objects.  
And these things shall suffice to let us understand that it may well be, that a Soul separated from the Body may be liable to the Torments of Hellfire, and to feel the same Pain, as any one would feel through the tortures of Earthly Fire; in regard that when it was joined to the Body, it was not the Body but the Soul that felt the pain of the Fire, and that pain was nothing but a certain sadness of the Mind wherewith it was afflicted for the sufferings of the Body, to which it was joined by God. Why then may we not conceive that divine Justice may so accommodate some part of the material Body to the separate Soul, that the motion of that matter may excite troublesome and afflicting thoughts in the Soul so separated.  
But let us return to confused Ideas. The Idea of Ponderosity is no less confused than any of the rest already recited; for having observed from our Infancy, that Stones and other heavy things fall down as soon as let go out of our hands, we formed an Idea of the thing falling which is genuine and true. We also formed an Idea of the reason why the thing does fall, which is true likewise; but when we only saw the Stone, and nothing else that forced it downward, out of the rashness of our Judgement we concluded that there was no such thing as what we did not see, and therefore that the Stone fell by virtue of its own proper and intrinsic Force, and at length we affixed to this confused Idea, coined only in our own Judgements the name of Ponderosity.  
It came to pass also that we made different Judgements of the same things of which the same Judgement was to be asserted, for as we saw Stones moved toward the Earth, we found straw move toward Jet, and Steel toward the Loadstone. Therefore the same Reason that bequeathes that quality to Stones to be moved toward the Earth, aught to allow the same qualities to Straw and Iron for moving towards Jet and the Loadstone. However this would not satisfy; but on the contrary we have assigned to Jet, Amber, and the Loadstone certain qualities which we call Attractive, when with the same ease we might have endued the Earth with the same quality of attracting heavy things. However these attractive qualities, (as also Ponderosity itself) sprang from Illegitimate Ratiocination, by which it was concluded, that Iron was necessarily attracted by the Loadstone, because there was nothing seen that pushed the Iron toward the Magnet; whereas it can never be conceived, that one Body should attract another, unless the Body attracting be moved, and the Body attracted be fastened to it.  
To these Judgements of our infancy we owe for those Ideas that represent to us Ponderous and hard things, more solid than Light and thin, and having more Body or Matter. Thus we believe that a Vessel full of Gold contains more matter than if it were filled with Air, for those Ideas derived themselves from no other Foundation, then that when we were Children we were wont to make extrinsical Judgements of all things, according to their Actions in reference to us. Hence because ponderous and hard Bodies acted more violently than Light and Thin, we concluded that they contained more Substance than the other. When true Reason tells us, that the same part of matter possesses the same space, and the same space is always filled with the same quantity of Matter.  
So that a Cubic Vessel of a Foot will contain no more Matter, being filled with Gold then Air. Nay, in some Sense it may be said that being filled with Air, it contains more matter for a Reason not now longer here to be insisted on.  
It may be said that from the same Root of fore-judging of things, sprang the foolish opinions of some, that our Souls are either the thinnest part of the Air composed of Atoms, according to Democritus with the Epicureans, or the Air kindled, as the Stoics; or a particle of Celestial Light, as the Manicheans, or of later days Flood; or a subtle Wind, as the Socinians; for none of these could ever persuade themselves that Wood, Stones or Dirt could ever be capable of thinking. And therefore Cicero at the same time that he asserts with the Stoics, our Soul to be a subtle Flame, places it among absurdities, not to be endued to think it should e'er derive its Original from Earth or thick Air; For saith he, I beseech ye, is it possible to think that such a force and mass of Memory was ever sowed in the Earth to spring up again, or thickened together out of Cloudy and Foggy Air? For they believed that the more subtle and pure they made the matter, so much the less material, the less thick and corporeal it would be, that so at length they might rarify it into a thing of Thought, which however is very ridiculous; for a Body is not thinner than a Body, only that it is divided into lesser particles, and more easily agitated. For thus on the other side it makes less resistance than other Bodies; on the other it more easily penetrates their Pores. But whether it be indivisible or divided, whether it rest or be moved, however it is not less material, less corporeal, or more capacious of Thought, it being impossible that the motion or figure of the Matter whether subtle or thick should have any thing common with Cogitation; or that a certain part of the matter that never thought, when it rested like the Earth, or was gently moved like the Water, should come to a knowledge of itself upon a more vehement Motion or augmenting the force of Agitation.  
Much more might be said upon this Subject, but this shall suffice for the understanding of all confused Ideas, when they have all their Causes like to these.  
There is one Remedy for this mischief, to cast away all prejudicated opinions engrafted in our Infancy, and to assert nothing of what it belongs to Reason to pronounce, because we so judged it heretofore, but because we now judge it to be so upon Examination. So shall we have only natural Ideas, and for such as are confused, we shall only retain those that are clear, as that there is something in the Fire which is the reason that I feel the heat; that all things which are ponderous, are pushed down by some certain cause; not determining any thing of what is in the Fire that causes that burning, or of the cause that makes the Stone fall down till I find my knowledge confirmed by clear Reasons.   

CHAP. IX. Some Examples of confused and obscure Ideas drawn from Ethics.  
IN the former Chapters we have brought some Examples of confused Ideas, which for the reasons given we legally assert to be false; But being all taken out of Physics, it may not be from the purpose to produce some others out of Ethics, in regard that false Ideas, which are formed of Virtues and Vices, are far more dangerous.  
Nor indeed is any one more happy, or more unhappy because he has a true or false, a clear or obscure Idea of Ponderosity, Sensible Qualities, or the Senses. If in those things he be more or less knowing, he will neither be the better nor the worse; whatever our opinion be touching those things, we shall never alter it for our own sakes. Their Being is independent from our knowledge, and the Conduct of our Life is Independent from their Being. So that all Men are allowed to await that Knowledge which shall be our portion after this Life, and to leave the Government of the World to the Goodness and Wisdom of God who governs it.  
But no Man can excuse himself from endeavouring to acquire a right Information concerning Virtue and Vice, because that from the prescripts of Judgements made upon these things, our Lives are to be governed, our Manners composed, and the Eternity of good or evil to be expected.  
And as the false Ideas of Virtue and Vice are the reason that we judge amiss of 'em; so infinitely better would it be to know and amend these with Care and Industry, then to study the rectifying of those other, which precipitancy of Judgement, or the prejudicated errors of Youth have obtruded upon us in reference to natural things, which can only supply Matter for lean and barren Speculation.  
To discover all those false Ideas, would require a Transcription of the whole Body of Ethics; but our only design here is to propose certain Examples of the manner, how they are formed by annexing together several Ideas that are not really annexed, which produces several vain and idle Phantoms, which Men never cease hunting after, and miserably waste their time in hopes to attain that which is of no value when attained.  
Man finds in himself the Ideas of Misery and Happiness, which is neither false nor confused, while general and abstracted: He has also the Ideas of Baseness and Excellency. He covets Happiness, avoids Misery; he admires Excellency, despises Baseness.  
But the Contamination of Sin, which has alienated God from Man, in whom alone he could have found true felicity, and to whom alone he ought to affix the Idea of it, has affixed this Idea of Happiness to an Innumerable company of other things. To the Love and Prosecution of which Man is carried headlong, as if he thought to recover his lost felicity in them.  
Hence has arisen a vast heap of false and obscure Ideas, while every one thinks he shall be happy in the possession of what he loves; miserable, if deprived of it. But Man has lost his true Nobility, and real Excellency by Sinning. Hence, that he may love himself, he is constrained to represent himself to himself, other than what indeed he is, and to hide his Indigencies and Miseries from himself; to add many things to the Idea of himself, which belong not to him to the end he may appear Greater and more August. And now behold the common Series of these false Ideas.  
The first and chiefest is the propensity of Concupiscence to the Pleasures of the Sense, arising from some exterior things: For when the Soul perceives that her darling Pleasures proceed from those things, she immediately joins the Idea of good to those things, and the Idea of bad to those other things that deprive her of those Pleasures. And observing afterwards that Power and Riches are the usual Instruments, whereby to acquire the means to indulge Concupiscence, she begins to esteem these for great Happinesses, and pronounces for Blessed, the Rich and Potent that enjoy 'em; the poor miserable, for being deprived of these Delights.  
But now as Felicity has always Excellency for her Companion, the Mind never separates those two Ideas, but always looks upon as great, all those that she considers as happy, and as little and mean, all those that are poor and unhappy. And this is the reason that we contemn the poor, and admire the opulent. But these are such unjust and false Judgements, that St. Thomas believes, it is this worship and admiration of Riches, which is so much condemned by St. James the Apostle, while he forbids a more honourable place to be assigned to the Rich then to the Poor; tho' this place is not to be so literally expounded, as if we were not to show some outward-veneration to the Rich, which is not due to the Poor; seeing that the order of the World, which Religion does not disturb, requires it, and this practice has been all along observed among men, highly eminent for their Piety. And therefore it is to be understood of that inward respect, which looks upon the Poor as subjected under the Feet of the Rich, and the Rich as infinitely exalted above the Poor.  
But though these Ideas and the judgements that arise from thence are false and unreasoable, yet are they common to all men that have not rectified 'em, as proceeding from concupiscence with which all men are infected. Hence it happens that we not only think so honourably of the Rich, but that we also know that all other Mortals render 'em the same honour and esteem. So that we represent to ourselves their Condition not only as environed with all splendour and advantages that attend it, but worship it with all that inward Adoration of Judgements with which we flatter the Wealthy, and are known not only by the Common Discourse of Men, but by our own Experience.  
This Phantom of a Rich man, whom the Crowd of his admirers surround, gaze upon with fixed Eyes, and reverence with an inward Worship of Fear, observance and abject servility, is the true Idol of the Ambitious, for for whose sake they endure so many miseries and throw themselves into so many dangers.  
Now that it may appear that this is that which they all covet and adore, let us suppose that there were but one only man in the World endued with Reason, and all the rest men merely in shape, were all but Statues moved by Engines; and that that one Thinking Man, knowing well that all those Statues that resembled him outwardly, were all deprived of reason and thought, had a secret way to move 'em by certain Springs so that they might perform all the Offices which he had a mind to require from men; we may believe this Person would sometimes take pleasure to divertise himself with the several Mouments he should give to these Statues; but certainly he could never delight himself or take any pride in the Honours, Bows and Cringes that they made him: rather he would be as weary of 'em as of so many Puppets; and at length would satisfy himself with such a train as should suffice for necessary Services, without desiring any greater number of these Statues than should be for his use.  
So that it is not the simple and external Obedience of Attendants separated from the internal submission of the Mind that is the Object of aspiring Ambition. 'Tis Dominion over men not Statues which they covet; and the pleasure of those that Rule proceeds from the impressions of Fear, esteem and admiration which they imprint in others.  
From whence it is manifest that the Idea with which they are blinded is no less vain and empty, than the Idea of those whom we properly call Vainglorious men, who are they that feed themselves with Praises, Eulogies, Titles, and other things of this nature: The only thing that distinguishes the one from the other is the single difference of Opinions and Judgements, which both are desirous to communicate to others. For as it is the main desire of the Vainglorious to excite in others a sense of Love and Esteem for their Knowledge, Eloquence, Wit, and Dexterity; 'tis the delight of the ambitious to excite in others motions of Terror, of Obedience and Submission to their Grandeur, and Ideas conformable to those judgements, by means whereof they appear formidable, exalted and Potent. So that both the one and the other place their happiness in the Thoughts of another: but the one make choice of one sort of Thoughts, the other of another.  
There is nothing more common then to see these vain Phantomes composed of the false Judgements of men, how they overturn Erterprises of greatest importance, as being the principal mark to which all the Actions of our lives are directed.  
That same Valour so highly esteemed in the World, which causes them that would be signalised for brave and stout, to throw themselves into the most apparent and threatening dangers, is no more oft times then an over earnest bending the Mind to these vain and shallow Things that fill the Brain. Few Persons when they are serious despise Life, and they who seem to dare death at a Breach or in a Battle, tremble like others and frequently are more afraid when Death attacques 'em in their Beds. But this same bravery of theirs which they show upon sundry Occasions proceeds from hence; that they have still hover before their Eyes the reproaches thrown upon Cowards and Pusilanimous Creatures; and on the other side the applauses which are given to the Valiant; and the Phantosm arising from these two Considerations so possesses their Minds, that they have no leisure to think upon Death.  
For this reason the Person that is most conversant in the sight of men, becomes the most Generous and Brave; and that, because of the Judgements which other men make of him. Hence it comes to pass that the Captains are more courageous than the Common Soldiers, and that the Nobility and Gentry carry more lofty minds then the Ordinary Sort of People. For that having more honour to lose and to acquire, they are more sensible and jealous of it. The same labours, said a great Captain, are not equally toilsome to a General of an Army and a Common Soldier: For the Captain of an Army, upon whom the Eyes of all men are fixed, is thrust forward to difficult undertake, whereas a Common Soldier dilates his thoughts no farther than the hopes of his Pay, or the gains of Plunder, or the Reputation of being stout, which seldom extends beyond his own Regiment.  
What do they propose to themselves that build such stately Fabrics above their Condition and their Fortune? Not the advantage of commodious living therein. For such a costly Magnificence does 'em more harm then good; and it is evident, that if they were alone in the World, they would never put themselves to that Charge and trouble; or if they thought they should be despised by all that saw those Houses. Therefore the Houses are built for the sake of others that they think will applaud the Buildings. They imagine that all that shall behold those Palaces, will entertain motions of Respect and Admiration for the Master. And therefore they represent themselves to themselves as in a Theatre, sitting in the midst of their Palaces environed with erouds of People, that behold all from top to bottom, and thence conceive 'em Great, Potent, Happy and Magnificent; and this Idea filling their Minds, spurs 'em on to those expenses and to be at that trouble.  
Why do men load their Coaches with such a great number of Lackeys? Not for the great service they do, for they are rather a trouble then a Convenience; but to imprint in the minds of the beholders an Idea, that it is some person of great Quality that passes by; and the prospect of that Idea, which they imagine the sight of a Coach so loaden will create in the beholders, satisfies the vanity of him to whom those Coaches belong.  
And thus, if we weigh in the same balance all Conditions, all Employments, all Professions that are esteemed in the World, we shall find that that which renders 'em delightful, and alleviates the pains and toil that attends 'em, is this, that they represent to the Mind the Ideas of Respect Esteem, Fear and Admiration that others have for us. On the other side, that which renders solitude tedious to the most part of the World, is this, that in separating themselves from the view, they also separate themselves from the judgements and thoughts of men. For so their hearts become empty and famished as being deprived of their usual nourishment, and not finding in themselves, wherewithal to feed their Thoughts. And therefore the Heathen Philosophers deemed a solitary Life so insupportable; that they scrupled, not to aver, that a wise man would not be bound to enjoy all the blessings of Body and Mind, to live alone; and not to have any person to whom he might impart his happiness by discourse. And indeed there is nothing but the Christian Religion that can render Solitude desirable; for because it teaches men to despise the World, it affords 'em at the same time other Objects to employ the mind and more worthy to fill the heart, for which they have no need of the sight and commerce of Company.  
But here it is to be observed, that the desires of men do not terminate in knowing the thoughts and judgements of others concerning themselves; but being known, they make a farther use of 'em to aggrandise and exalt the Idea which they have of themselves, adding to them, and incorporating other Ascititious and Foreign Ideas, and imagining through a gross delusion that they are really greater, be cause they live in a larger House, and that there are more people who admire 'em. Though all these things are extrinsical as to themselves, and belong not to 'em at all; nor can the thoughts of other men preserve or vindicate 'em from the want and misery to which they were before obnoxious.  
From whence we may discover what it is that renders agreeable to men several things which otherwise are altogether incapable to divert and delight the mind. For the reason of the pleasure that men take therein arises from this, that the Idea of themselves represents 'em to themselves greater than ordinary, by means of some vain circumstance which they add to it.  
They take delight in discoursing óf the dangers they have run, as forming from the accidents an Idea which represents us to ourselves either as prudent, or else particularly favoured by God. We love to discourse of sicknesses we have escaped, as representing to ourselves the strength of our Bodies, able to encounter such desperate attacks of Mortality.  
We love to be Victorious in every thing, even in Play, wherein there is nothing of cunning but all hazard, though we do not play for gain; adding to our own Idea the Idea of Happiness at the same time. This imaginary happiness we are apt to think, belongs to us, as a permanent Quality, which makes us claim the same success for the future as our Right. Thus Gamesters choose to try the Fortune of the Dice with some before others: which is nevertheless very ridiculous: for a man may be said to have lived happily to such a moment; but that he shall have the same Fortune the next hour; there is no farther probability, but that we may be as certain that they who have been hitherto miserable, may for the future be happy.  
And thus their Minds who are addicted to the World, have no other Objects of their desires, than these vain Chimeras that daily distract their Brains; and even they who carry the greatest reputation for wisdom, feed themselves with these Dreams and Delusions. And therefore only they who direct their Lives and the Action of their Lives to Eternal Things, may be said to fix their thoughts upon real, solid, and permanent Objects, when all others do but follow vanity and empty Nothing, and give themselves over to Lies and Errors.   

CHAP. X. Of another Cause of Confusion in our Thoughts and Discourse; Ideas annexed to Words.  
WE have already said that the Necessity we have to make use of External signs to express our Minds, is the reason that we fix Ideas to words in such a manner, that many times we consider the words more than the things.  
For it is to be observed, that tho' Men have frequently different Ideas of the same things, nevertheless they make use of the same words to express 'em; as the Idea which a Heathen Philosopher has of Virtue, is not the same which a Divine hath, yet both express their Idea by the same word Virtue.  
Moreover the same Men at different Ages have considered the same things after very different Manners; and yet they have rammassed all these Ideas under one name: which is the reason that in pronouncing the word or hearing it pronoun'cd, a Man is presently Confounded, apprehending the word sometimes according to one Idea, sometimes according to another. For Example, a Man understanding that he has something within him, whatever it be, which is the occasion of his Nourishment and Growth, has called it a Soul, and has extended this Idea not only to what resembles it in Animals, but in Plants.  
And perceiving also that he had Thoughts, he has called this principle of Thought by the Name of the Soul. Whence it has come to pass that by this Resemblance of the name, he has taken for the same thing, the principle of Thought, and the principle of Nourishment and Growth. In like manner the name of Life is given to that Faculty from whence the Animal functions proceed, as also the Cogitative Faculty, which are two things absolutely different.  
Thus these words, Sense and Sensation, when they are spoken of any of the five Senses, are vehemently pestered with Equivocations. For three things happen to us when we make use of our Senses, as 1. when we see any thing. There is a Motion in the Corporeal Organs, as the Brain and Eye. 2. These motions give an occasion to the Soul to perceive something. As when by the motions first begun in the Eye, by the reflection of the Light, in the falling Rain opposed to the Sunbeams, it has the Ideas of Red, Blue, and Yellow. 3. We make a Judgement of what we see; and thus we judge these Colours to belong to the Rainbow, which we pronounce to be of such a Magnitude, of such a Figure, and at such a distance from us. Of these three the first only belongs to the Body; the other two solely to the Mind; however by occasion of what is performed in the Body. Nevertheless we comprehend all these three things under the name of the Sense or Sensation of the Sight or Hearing. For when we say the Eye sees, or the Ear hears, it cannot be understood but according to the Corporeal Organ; it being apparent that the Eye does not apprehend the objects which it sees, nor judge of 'em. On the other side we do not say we have seen such a one, if the mind called off by another object has not made reflection upon the person that presented himself before our Eyes. And then we take the word See for the thought formed in our Mind, in pursuit of what passed in our Eye and in our Brain. And according to this Signification of the word See, it is the Soul and not the body which sees, as Plato maintains and Cicero after him. For indeed saith he, we do not now behold with our Eyes the thing which we see; for there is no sense in the Body. There are as it were certain Passages made from the seat of the Soul to the Eyes, the Ears and Nose, and therefore seeing often interrupted either by some thought, or the force of some Disease, we neither hear nor see with open or entire Eyes or Ears. Whence we may easily apprehend that the Soul both hears and sees, not those parts which are but as the Windows of the Soul. In short, we take those words Sensation of Sight, Hearing, etc. for the last of these three things, that is, for the Judgements which the Soul makes in pursuance of the Preceptions it has made, by occasion of what passed in the Corporeal Organs, as when we say the Senses are deceived, at the same time that we see a crooked Stick so appearing in the Water, or the Sun but two foot in Diameter. For it is certain there can be no Error or Falsity neither in those things that happen in the Corporeal Organs, nor in the bare Perception of the Soul, which is only a simple apprehension; but the Error proceeds from hence, that we judge amiss, in concluding that the Sun is but two Foot in Diameter, in regard that by reason of its vast distance from us, it comes to pass that the Image of the Sun which is formed in the bottom of the Eye, is near at hand, of the same bigness which an object of two Foot would form at a distance more proportionable to our manner of Sight. But because we have made this Judgement in our Youth, and for that we are so much accustomed to it, that it is made at the same Instant that we see the Sun, without any Examination hardly, we attribute it to the Sight, and we say we see the objects little or great, as they are nearer or more distant from us, tho' it be indeed the Mind, not the Eye that judges of their smallness or magnitude.  
All Languages are full of words of the same nature, which not having any more than one Sound, are nevertheless the significations of Ideas altogether different.  
But we are to understand that when an Equivocal word signifies two things which have no Relation one to another, and which Men have never confounded in their thoughts, it is almost impossible that Men should thereby be deceived, or that they should be the cause of Errors. For the Equivocal word Aries a Ram, which signifies both a certain Creature, and a Sign in the Zodiac, shall never impose upon a Person that has but a grain of common Sense. Whereas it is a difficult thing not to be deceived when the Equivocation arises from the errors of Men, who have regligently confounded different Ideas, as in the word Soul; for we take it for granted, that they who first made use of those words, did inquire into their Significations, and so it suffices us to pronounce 'em, without ever examining whether the Idea which we have of it be clear and distinct. Nay, sometimes we attribute those things to the signification of the same word, which falls not, but upon Ideas of things altogether Incompatible, not perceiving that we have confounded two different things under the same Word.   

CHAP. XI. Of the Remedy of Confusion in our Thoughts and Ratiocinations, arising from the Confusion of Words: Of the Benefit of defining Words; and of the difference between the definition of Things and Names.  
THE best way to avoid the confusion of Words, which we find in different Languages is to make a new Language, and to coin new Words, to belong only to those Ideas, which they are assigned to signify. To which purpose there is no necessity to frame new Sounds of Words, because we may make use of such as are usually practised, looking upon 'em, as if they had no signification, that we may ascribe to 'em those Notions which we intent 'em; which it behoves us design by other simple words, free from all Equivocation. Thus were it to be proved, that the Soul is Immortal, this Word Anima, the Soul, being Equivocal, will easily make a Confusion in what is to be said. For the avoiding of which, I will retain this word Soul, as a sound destitute of all Notion, and make use of it only to denote that thing which in us is the principle of Thought, by saying I call the Soul that, which in us is the Principle of Thought.  
Behold here the definition of the word, with so much benefit made use of by the Geometricians, which is cautiously to be distinguished from the definition of the thing.  
For in the definition of the thing, as thus, a Man is a Rational Creature, time is the measure of motion, we leave to the Term defined, that is Man, and Time the usual notion wherein we assert other Ideas to be contained, as the Idea of Rational Creature, Measure of time, whereas in the definition of the word, as we have already said, we only mind the Sound, and afterwards determine the sound to be the sign of some Idea, designed for other Words.  
But great heed is to taken lest we confound this definition of the word of which we here discourse, with that other of which others speak, who will have it be the explanation of what a word signifies according to the vulgar Idiom of the Language, or its Etymology, which we shall speak more of in another place. But here we only mind the particular use to which he that defines a word, will have it applied for the better understanding his meaning, not caring whether it be taken in the same Sense by others.  
And from hence it follows 1. That the Definitions of words are at pleasure, but that those of things are not so. For every Sound being of its self and in its own nature indifferent, to signify any thing, it is lawful for me for my particular use, provided I advertise others of it, to determine a Sound to signify any thing precisely without the mixture of any other. But it is quite otherwise with the Definition of things. For it does not depend upon the pleasure of men that Ideas should include whatever they would have 'em to include: for that if in defining Ideas we add any thing which they do not comprehend, we fall into inevitable Error.  
To give an Example of the one and the other: If in despoiling the word Parallellogram of all other signification, I apply it only to signify a Triangle; this is lawful for me to do, nor do I commit any Error in so doing: nay provided I only take it in this Manner; I may affirm that a Parallellogram has three Angles equal to two Right Angles. But if I leave the Vulgar Idea to this word, to signify a Figure whose sides are Parallel, and yet affirm that a Parallellogram is a figure consisting of three Lines, in regard this would be then a Definition of the Thing, it would be absolutely false; it being impossible that a Figure consisting of three Lines should have its sides Parallel.  
In the second place it follows, that Contentions about the Definitions of words ought not to be raised, for that Reason, because they are Arbitrary. For you cannot deny that a man has not given the signification to a Sound which he says, he has, after he has given notice of it, nor that it has not that signification according to the use which he makes of it; but we may contend about the Definitions of Things because they may be false, as we have already shown.  
Thirdly it follows that every Definition of a word when it cannot be called in Question, may be taken for a Principle. Which cannot be said of the Definitions of Things; in regard they are propositions that may be denied by those who shall find any Obscurity therein. And therefore like other Propositions they ought to be proved, and not to be taken for True; unless they appear perspicuous in themselves, like Axioms.  
But as to what I said but now, that the Definition of a Name may supply the place of a Principle, it requires a farther Illustration. For it is only true, in regard it cannot be controverted but that the determined Idea may be called by the assigned name. Nevertheless we ought not to conclude any thing of the Idea itself, nor to believe it can exhibit any thing positively to us for that reason alone, because it is called by such a Name. For Example, I may define the Name of Chimaera and say, I call a Chimaera that which implies a contradiction; however it does not thence follow that a Chimaera is any thing. In like manner, a Philosopher says to me; I call Ponderosity the Interior Principle which causes a Stone to descend without any compulsive violence; I should willingly grant the Definition without contradiction, because it leads me to the knowledge of what he desires to make me understand; but I will deny, that what is signified by the word Gravity is any thing real, in regard there is no such principle in Stones.  
I will explain this a little farther, because there are two great Errors committed in Vulgar Philosophy upon this Subject. For it confounds the Definition of the Name with the Definition of the Thing, and attributes to the former what only belongs to the Second. For the Philosophers having coined an infinite number not of Names but of Things accord-to their own Fancies which are altogether false, as not explaining neither the Nature of Things nor the Ideas which naturally we have of 'em, yet they obtrude these Definitions upon us for such as are not to be contradicted. So that if any one deny 'em, when deservedly they may be denied, they exclaim against him as one that ought to be exterminated the Schools, as not fit to be disputed with.  
Secondly the vulgar Philosophers very seldom or never make use of those Definitions of names, to remove or clear any obscurity, nor fix 'em to any certain Ideas clearly designed, but leave 'em in darkness and confusion. Whence it happens that most of their disputes, are only disputes of words; and whatever is clear and true in Ideas, that they abuse, to establish and maintain, what is confused and dark in the same: which Error would be avoided by the Definition of the Name. Thus the Philosophers believe that there is nothing in the World more unquestionable than that Fire is hot, or that a Stone is heavy, and that it would be a folly to deny either. Which indeed they may make all the World believe, so long as they forbear from the Definition of Names. But when once they do that, it will presently appear what is obscure, and what apparent in reference to those things. First than it is to be asked 'em, what they mean by these words Hot and Ponderous? For if they answer that by Hot they only mean that which is only proper to cause in us a Sentiment of Heat, and by Heavy that which falls downward not being propped up; they may then deservedly say, that it is a folly to deny Fire to be Hot and Stones to be Heavy. But if they mean by Heat that which has in its self a Quality like to that which we imagine when we feel heat; and by Heavy that which has in itself an Internal Principle which causes it to fall to the Centre, not being compelled by any violence from without; it will be easy then to demonstrate to 'em, that it is no denial of a clear thing, but of a thing which is very obscure, if not altogether false, that Fire is hot in that Sense, or that a Stone is heavy; in regard it is apparent that Fire causes in us a sense of Heat, by that action whereby it operates upon our Bodies, but it is no way evident that there is in the Fire any thing like to that which we feel in the Fire. And it is as evident in the same manner that Stones fall down; but it is not so clear, that they fall of themselves without any outward detruding Violence.  
Thus we see the great benefit of defining names, for that by this means we understand what it is we dispute of, that we may not contend in vain about words, which we understand some one way, some another, as is frequently practised even in our ordinary discourses.  
But besides this benefit there is also another, which is, that we cannot many times have a distinct Idea of a thing, unless we make use of many words to denote it. Now it would be Impertinent especially in writings that concern the Sciences to be always repeating a long Series of words. And therefore having once defined the thing by several words, we fix to some one word the Idea conceived to serve instead of all the rest.  
Thus after we have found that there are numbers that may be divided into two equal Numbers, to avoid the often repetition of those words, we fix this Propriety, and call a number that may be divided into two equal Numbers, an even Number. Whence it is apparent, that as often as we make use of the defined Name, the Definition is to be mentally supplied, which a Man must have always so ready in his Mind, that as soon as he hears even Numbers, he presently understands such a number as may be divided into two Numbers: and these two things ought to be so inseparable from the thoughts, that the Tongue should no sooner express the one, but the Mind should add the other. For they who have defined Names as the Geometricians do with so much Care, did it only to abridge their Writings (or as St. Austin says) Lest by continual Circumlocution they should Create delays: but yet they do not do it to abridge the Ideas of the things of which they discourse, believing the Mind will supply the entire Definition to short words, which they only make use of to avoid the Perplexity which multitude of words would produce.   

CHAP. XII. Certain Observations of great Importance, touching the Definition of Words.  
HAving thus explained the nature, benefit and necessity of the definition of Names, it will not be from the purpose to speak something of their use, lest an ill use be made of 'em.  
First, all Names are not to be defined; for that would be often unprofitable and impossible to be done. I say unprofitable; for that when the Ideas conceived of things are distinct, and that all Men understanding the same Language, conceive the same Idea, it would be superfluous to define such a name, because we have already the intent of the Definition, as being fixed without a definition to the distinct and clear Idea.  
But this happens in things that are purely simple, of which all Men naturally have the same Idea, so that the words by which they are denoted, are understood by all men in the same sense, or if there be any mixture of obscurity, that which is clear is primarily understood. And so they who make use of such words to denote a clear Idea, need not fear lest they should be understood amiss. Such are the words, Ens, or being, Thought, Extension, Equality, Duration or Time. For tho' some may obscure the Idea of Time by several Propositions, which they call Definitions; as that Time is the measure of motion according to Priority and Posteriority; nevertheless they never mind these definitions themselves, when they speak of Time, nor do they conceive any other thing of it. So that both Learned and Unlearned with the same facility understand the same thing when they hear, that a Horse takes up less time in pacing a Furlong then a Tortoise.  
I have said moreover, that it is impossible to define all words. In regard that to define some words, there is a necessity of using other words that express the Idea, to which that word is to be annexed. And then if these words which were made use of to explain the the first, be also to be defined; there will be a necessity for other words, and so to the World's end. And therefore there are some primitive words which cannot be defined, and it would be as great a fault to be too curious about their Definitions, as not to define sufficiently; for both ways we fall into the same Confusion, which we labour to avoid.  
The second observation is, that we ought not to change Definitions known and already received, unless we meet with something in 'em that is to be found fault with; for it is always more easy to teach the signification of a word to others, when Custom already received, at least among the Learned has fixed it to an Idea, then to annex it anew to another Idea, and force it from a former, to which it has been properly joined by daily use. And therefore it would be a great error to alter the Definitions received by the Mathematicians, unless where there are any that are not sufficiently plain and obvious to Sense, or such whose Ideas are not Politely described as in Euclid may be thought the Definition of Angle and Proportion.  
Thirdly it is to be observed that when there is a necessity to define a name, it behoves us to approach as near as may be to common Custom, and not to give to words a Sense altogether foreign to what they already have, or which are contrary to their Etymology; as if a Parallelogram should be defined, a figure consisting of three Lines. But if the word has two significations, it must be deprived of one, that the other may be only affixed to it. Thus when Heat signifies as well the feeling which we have of it, as the Quality which we believe to be in the Fire, like to that which we feel, to remove this ambiguity, I will use the name of Heat, but I must not apply it but to one of these Ideas, dismising it from the other, saying, I call Heat that feeling which I have when I come near the Fire; and to the cause of this Sensation I would give a name altogether different, as of Ardour or Burning; or else the same name with some addition, which determines and distinguishes it from Heat taken for the Sensation of it, as is that of Virtual-Heat.  
The reason of this observation is taken from hence, that Men after they have once affixed an Idea to a word, are not easily induced to separate it from the word: and so the old Idea still returning, obliterates the new which they have from the late Definition. So that Men more easily accustom themselves to a word of no Signification, as if a man should rather use the word Bara to signify a Figure consisting of three Lines, then despoyl the word Parallellogram of the Idea of a Figure whose opposite sides are Parellel, to make it signify a Figure whose opposite sides are not Parallel.  
This is an Error into which all the Chemists are fallen, who take delight to change the names of the most things of which they discourse, and to give them names which already signify quite other things, and which have no correspondence with the Ideas to which they join the words. Hence those ridiculous Ratiocinations of some of those people, particularly of one who asserts, that the Pestilence as he imagined, being a Saturnine Disease, was to be cured by hanging about the Neck of the Patient, a plate of Lead, which is called Saturn by the Chemists, and whereon is also to be engraved upon a Saturday, which day is also sacred to Saturn, the Character by which the Astronomers denote that Planet. As if arbitrary and feigned sympathetic Affinities between Lead and the Planet Saturn, or between the same Planet and Saturday or the little Signature of the Astronomers could be any way effectual for the Cure of Diseases.  
But that which is more insufferable in this jargonry, or gibberish of the Chemists, is their Profaning the Sacred Mysteries of Religion to make 'em serve as a Veil to cover their pretended Secrets; insomuch that some are arrived at that height of Impiety; as to apply what the Scriptures speaks of the true Christians, That they are the Chosen Race, the Royal Priesthood, the Holy Nation, the People purchased by God, and whom he has called out of darkness to his wonderful Light, to the Chimerical Fraternity of the Rosy Crucians, whom in their own Imaginations they term the only wise men that have attained Immortal Happiness; as having by virtue of the Philosopher's Stone found out the way to fix the Soul in the Body; for as much, say they, as there is no Body so fixed and incorruptible as Gold. Of which dreams, and of several others of the same nature there are to be found a great number in Gassendus' Examen of Fludd's Philosophy. Which demonstrates that there is no disease of the mind more dangerous than that of Enigmatical Scribbling, which causes men to imagine that their least solid thoughts, if I may not call 'em false and altogether Impious, will pass for great Mysteries, if clad in words unintelligible to the Common sort of men.   

CHAP. XIII. Of another sort of Definition of Names by which their Significations are denoted according to Common Use.  
ALL that has been said of the Definition of names, aught to be understood only of those, by which every one defines the words for his particular use; and this is that which renders 'em free and Arbitrary, it being in the power of every one to make use of what Sound he pleases to express his Ideas, provided he give notice before hand. But in regard that men are not perfect Masters of any but their own language, every one has a privilege to make a Dictionary for his own Use, but not for others, nor to interpret their words by particular Significations which we have fixed to words of his own. And therefore seeing that notion of words is not to be explained which is proper to ourselves, but that which is proper to the word according to Common Use, such Definitions are not to be called Arbitrary; yet are they to be obliged to represent, though not the truth of the Thing, yet the truth of the Use; and they are to be esteemed false, if they do not really express the Use, that is, if they do not join to Sounds the same Ideas which are annexed to such Sounds by the Common Custom of those that make use of 'em. And this demonstrates also to us that Definitions may be contested, because we find daily disputes about the signification which Custom gives to words.  
Now, though these sorts of Definitions of words seem to be the business of the Grammarians, whose Province it is to make Dictionaries, which are nothing else but the Explication of Ideas which men have agreed to affix certain Sounds, yet may we raise upon this Subject several important Reflections for the rectifying our Judgements.  
The first, which may serve as the foundation of all the rest, that men do not many times consider the whole signification of words; that is, that the words often signify more than they seem to signify, and that therefore they who interpret the signification, do not thoroughly unfold all the Ideas which the words imprint in the minds of the Hearers.  
For to signify in a Sound pronounced or written is no other than to raise an Idea by striking our Ears or our Eyes. Now it comes frequently to pass, that one word, besides the principal Idea, which is looked upon as the proper signification of the word, excites several other Ideas, which may be termed Accessories, of which we take little notice, although the mind receive their Impression.  
For Example, if a man should say to another; You Lie, and that there should be no more notice taken then of the principal signification of the Expression, 'tis no more than to say, You know the contrary of what you affirm. But besides this principal signification, the words according to Custom raise an immediate Idea of Scorn and Contempt, and make a man believe that he who speaks the words cares not what injury he does the other; which renders the signification of the words injurious and offensive.  
However sometimes these Accessary Ideas are not fixed to words by Common Use, but are only added thereto by him that makes use of 'em. And these are such as are raised by the Tone of the Voice, by the Alteration of the Countenance, by Gestures, and other natural Signs which six to our words an infinite number of Ideas which vary, change, diminish, augment the signification by joining thereto the Image of the Motions, Judgements and Opinions of him that speaks.  
And therefore if he who affirmed that the Tone of the Voice was to be measured by the Ears of the Hearers, believed it sufficient to speak loud enough to be heard, he understood not the use of the Tone of the Voice, the Tone oft times signifying as much as the words themselves. There is one Tone for Instruction, another for Flattery, another for Reprehension. Sometimes a man is willing that his Voice should not only reach the Ears of him he speaks to, but that it should pierce and run through 'em. Nor would any one think it well, that a Lackey being loudly and vehemently reproved, should answer, Sir speak lower, I hear you well enough. For 'tis the Tone of the Voice that makes one part of the Reproof; and it is necessary to imprint that Idea in the mind of the Servant, which the Master would have it make.  
But sometimes these accessary Ideas are fixed to the words themselves, for that usually they thoroughly excite those that pronounce 'em. And this is the reason that among several expressions that seem to signify the same thing, some are injurious, some are mild, some modest, others impudent, some honest, others dishonest; for that besides the principal Idea with which they agree, men have affixed other Ideas which are the cause of this variety.  
And this observation may serve to discover a piece of Injustice very usual among those who complain of the reproaches thrown upon 'em, which is to change the Substantives into Adjectives. For example, if they are accused of Ignorance or Imposture, presently they cry out for being called ignorant and falsifying fellows, which is not reasonable because that the words do not signify the same thing; for the Adjective, ignorant and falsifiing, beside the signification of the offence which they discover; they include the Idea of Scorn; whereas the Substantives of ignorance and imposture, denote the thing to be such as it is, without aggravation or extenuation. And we might instance other things that would signify the same thing after such a manner, as would include moreover a soft and lenifying Idea, and which would demonstrate that the person had a desire to excuse and extenuate the Crime which he laid to the others charge. And those are the ways which prudent and moderate men make use of, unless some reason prevail with 'em to act with more tartness and vehemency.  
Hence also may be understood the difference between a plain and a figured Style, and why the same thoughts seem much more lovely, when they are expressed by a figure, then if they were restrained to a plain manner of Speech. Which proceeds from hence, that figured expressions, besides, the principal thing, signify the Motion and Gesture of him that speaks, and imprint both the one and the other Idea in the mind, whereas simple expressions sets forth only the naked Truth: For example, of this half Verse of Virgil, Vsque adeone mori miserum est? were expressed simply and without a Figure; Non est usque adeo mori miserum: Without doubt the sentence would not have had that force; and the reason is, because the first Expression signifies more than the second; for it does not only express the thought, that it is not so miserable a thing as Men think to die; but it represents also the Idea of a Man, as it were provoking death; and undauntedly looking it in the face; which; without question is a great and lively Accession to the signification of the words: Hence it is no wonder that it makes a deep impression in the Hearer; for the mind is only instructed by the verity of Ideas, but she is not roused but by the representation of Affections.  
— sivis me flere dolendum est  
Primum ipse tibi—  
— If thou wouldst have me weep it first behoves  
thyself to grieve—  
But as figured stile not only signifies the things themselves, but also those affections of the mind, which we conceive in meditating and speaking, we may judge from thence, the use which we ought to make of it, and what are the Subjects most proper for it. Visible it is, that it is ridiculous to make use of it in matters merely speculative, which we contemplate with a calm and placid Eye, and which produce no motion in the Mind. For since that Figures express the Passions of the Soul, when Figures are intermixed where the Soul is no way moved, such agitations of the Mind are contrary to Nature, and seem to be a kind of Convulsion. For which reason there can be nothing more preposterous than the stir and hurlyburly which some Preachers make, who fly out into fury and extravagant Bombasts, upon all manner of Subjects, and who are no less furious upon Philosophical Digressions, then upon truths, the most weighty and necessary for Salvation.  
On the other side, when the Subject of the Discourse is such, that it requires a rousing and waking of the mind, it is a fault to deliver himself in a jejune and frigid stile, and without any manner of motion.  
Therefore Divine Truths not being simply proposed only to be known, but much more to be beloved, reverenced and adored by Men, without doubt, the noble, elevated and figured manner of Elocution, observed by the Holy Fathers, is much more proportionable to the Subject, than a flat and meager Style, like that of the Scholastics; since it not only teaches us the Truths we are to know, but also endeavours to raise in us, those Sentiments of Love, Reverence and Affection, which the Fathers had for those Truths, when they wrote, and which representing to us the Image of that Holy disposition, must of necessity contribute more to imprint the like in us. Whereas the Scholastic stile being plain, and contenting itself with the Ideas of the Naked Truth, is nothing so effectual to produce in our Souls those Motions of Respect and Love, which we ought to have for the Truths of Christianity, which render it not only less profitable, but less delightful, since the soul itself is more delighted in observing the motions of her affections, then in acquiring knowledge.  
Lastly, 'tis by means of this Observation, that we may resolve that famous Question among the Ancient Philosophers, whether there be any words to be counted unchaste? And by which we may also refute the Arguments of the Stoics, who justified that we might make use indifferently of any words, though impudent and obscene.  
They were of opinion, saith Cicero in a Letter, which he wrote upon this Subject, that there were no words that were either nasty or obscene; for they say, that the obscenity proceeds either from the things, or it is in the words. It does not proceed simply from the things, because they may be expressed in other words that are not esteemed so nauseous; nor is it in the words, considered as they are, because it happens ofttimes, that one word signifies two things, and so in one signification it may be nauseous, in another well enough approved.  
But all this is no more than a vain piece of suttlety which grew from hence, that those Philosophers did not consider those accessary accidents, which the mind adds to the principal Ideas of things: for from thence it comes to pass, that one and the same thing may be expressed honestly by one sound, and lasciviously by another, if one of the sounds has an Idea which covers the obscenity, and the other an Idea that lays it open.  
Thus Adultery, Interest, Male-Copulation are no obscene words, tho' they signify most obscene actions, because they represent 'em covered with a vail of Abhorrency, which shows that we look upon 'em as crimes, so that those words rather signify the wickedness of the actions themselves. Whereas there are certain words that express those Acts, without any Abhorrency, and which describe 'em rather grateful and pleasing withal, adding an Idea of Impudence and Lasciviousness. And those are the words which are said to be bawdy and dishonest.  
There are also certain Circumlocutions, by which certain actions are chastely expressed, which though lawful, yet participate something of the Corruption of Nature; for such Circumlocutions, not only plainly express the things themselves, but also the disposition of him who speaks of 'em in that manner, and which by his reservedness testify, that he mentions 'em with trouble and dislike, and that it is his desire they should be concealed, as well from himself as from others: Whereas others uttering the same things more freely and at random, make it appear, that they take delight in those kind of objects, which being a Lascivious pleasure, it is no wonder, if the words which imprint that Idea, should be accounted contrary to modesty.  
For which reason it comes to pass, that sometimes the same word is esteemed modest at one time and immodest at another; which has constrained some of the Hebrew Rabbis, to place certain Hebrew words in the Margin of the Bible, to be pronounced by those that read it, instead of those which the Scripture makes use of; which happened from hence, that when those words were made use of, they were not at all immodest, because they were read with some certain Idea that represented these words with reservedness and modesty. But afterwards that Idea being separated, and custom having added another of impudence and Wantonness, they became nauseous and uncivil: And therefore the Rabbis, to prevent the mind from being amused with that evil Idea, were solicitous, that the People should make use of others in reading the Bible, which no way altered the Text.  
And therefore it was an ill Excuse of an Author, whom the profession of Religion obliged to an exact Modesty, and who was deservedly taxed to have made use of an undecent word, to signify an infamous place, to allege, that the Fathers had not scrupled to make use of the word jupanar, a Brothel-house, and that he often found in their writings, the words Meretri●e, and Leno, whore and Pander, and several others hardly to be endured in our Language. For the liberty which the Fathers took to make use of those words, aught to have convinced him, that they were not at that time accounted words of Ignominy; that is to say, that custom had not added that Idea of obscenity which rendered 'em Infamous; and therefore he drew an ill conclusion from thence, that it was for that reason, permitted him to make use of terms of Debauchery, so esteemed to be in our language; for that these words do not really signify the same thing, which those did of which the Fathers made use; seeing that besides the Principal Idea in which they agree, they also exhibit the Idea of a debauched mind, and contain a mixture of Licentious Impudence.  
Seeing then these Accessary Ideas are of so great Importance, and dissolve the primary Notions into so many various Ideas, they would do well, who compile Vocabularies or Dictionaries, to mark out those significations, and make a distinction to the Readers, between words Contumelious and Civil, Tart, chaste and Immodest, or rather absolutely to obliterate the Latter, which it would be much better to be ignorant of, then to understand.   
The End of the First Part.   

LOGIC; OR THE ART OF THINKING. Containing Considerations of Men about Proper Judgements.  
Part II.  

Chap. I. What a Proposition is? Of the four sorts of Propositions.  
AFter we apprehend the things themselves, by the help of Ideas we compaer the Ideas together, and observe 'em as they agree or differ one among another, and in that manner join or separate 'em, which is called to affirm or deny, and by a general name to judge.  
This Judgement is otherwise called a Proposition; and it is manifest that it ought to have two Terms, the one, of which any thing is affirmed or denied, which is called the Subject, the other which is affirmed and denied, which is called the Attribute or Predicate.  
Nor does it suffice to have apprehended these two Terms, but they must be conjoined or separated in the Mind. And this operation of the mind, is noted in the Proposition, by the worst Est, it is; when it is alone, it is Affirmative; but when we deny, we add the Participle non or not: Thus when I say, God is just, God is the Subject of the Proposition, just the Predicate. The Verbs is, denotes the action of the mind affirming, that is conjoining the Idea of God, and the Idea of just, as agreeing together. But if I should say, God is not unjust, the Verb is, with the Adverb joined, denotes an action contrary to affirmation; by which I affirm those Ideas do not agree together; for that there is something in the Idea of unjust, which does not agree with that which is contained in the Idea of God.  
But though it be necessary that every Proposition should consist of these three words, yet it may consist of two, and sometimes only of one.  
For Men, for the more succinct way of speaking, have invented several words, which signify both the affirmation, that is the Substantive, and the attribute which is affirmed. Of this number are all those words that are called Substantives, as God exists, that is, is existent: God loves Men, that is, He is a lover of Men; but the Substantive, when it is single, ceases to be purely Substantive; for that then the most general of the attributes, is joined to it, which is ens, or being, and so non ego sum, I am not, is as much as, I am not a being, or any thing.  
In the same manner at other times, the Subject and the Affirmation is included in the same word, as in the first and second Persons among the Latins, as when I say, sum Christianus, I am a Christian; for ego is the Subject of this Proposition, included in the word sum.  
Hence it is apparent, that one word among the Latins constitutes a Proposition, in first and second Persons of those Verbs, which before contained the affirmation with the Predicate; so veni, vidi, vici, are three entire Propositions.  
Hence it may also be concluded, that every Proposition is either Negative or Affirmative; and this is that which is contained either in the affirmation or the denial.  
But there is another difference of Propositions deduced from the Universality, Particularity or Singularity.  
For the Terms, as is said in the first part, are either singular, particular or Universal.  
Universal Terms may be taken, either according to the full extent, the signs of Universality being either expressed or understood. As are all, for an affirmation, for denial none, as all Men, no Men, or according to the indefinite part of the extent, with the addition of the word some, as aliquis Homo, some Man; or any other way, according to propriety of Speech.  
Hence happens a certain variety, greatly to be observed in propositions; for when the subject of the proposition is the Universal Term, taken in its full extent, it is called a universal proposition, whether it be affirmative; as every impious Man is a fool; or negative, no wicked Man is blessed.  
When the common Term is taken accoring to the indefinite part of its extent, as being restrained by the addition of the word some, it is called a particular proposition, whether it be Affirmative, as some cruel Men are Cowards; or Negative, some poor Men are not miserable.  
But if the Subject of a Proposition be singular, as when I say, Lewis the 13th. hath taken Rochel, it is called singular.  
But though this Proposition singular be different from the Universal in this, that the Subject of it is not common, yet has it a greater Affinity with it, then with the particular, because the Subject, for the very reason that it is singular, is necessarily taken in its full extent, which is the Essential Propriety of an Universal Proposition, and distinguishes it from the particular; for, that a proposition may be universal it little imports, whether the extent of the Subject be great or small, provided it comprehend all things: And this is the reason that singular Propositions supply the place of Universals in Argumentation; so that all Propositions may be reduced to four sorts; which are marked by these four Vowels A. E. I. O. for the ease of the Memory.  

A. An Universal Affirmative, as, All vicious Men are slaves.  
E. An Universal Negative, as, No vicious Man is happy.  
I. A Particular Affirmative, as Some vicious Man is Rich.  
O. A Particular Negative, as, Some vicious Man is not Rich.   
And that they may be the better retained in memory, they are comprehended in this in Distic.  
Asserit A, negat E, verum generaliter ambo:  
Aslerit I, negat O, sed particulariter ambo.  
They are wont also to call Quantity, the Universality, or Particularity of Propositions.  
And Quality is called the affirmation or negation, which depend upon the word which is accounted the form of the Proposition.  
And so A. and E. agree according to quantity, but differ according to Quality, as do also I. and O.  
But A. and I. agree according to quality, but differ according to quantity, as also do E. and O.  
Propositions are also divided according to matter, into true or false; and it is clear, that there can be no Proposition, which is neither true nor false; for that every Proposition declaring the judgement which we make of things, it is true, when that judgement is conformable to truth, and false when it is not conformable.  
But because we often fail of sufficient light, to discern truth from falsehood, besides those Propositions that seem to be true, and those that seem to us to be false, there are some that seem to be true; but of which the truth is not so evident, but that we have some apprehension that they may be false; or else such as seem to be false; but of the falsehood of which we are not sully assured. These are called probable Propositions, of which the first are more probable, and the latter less probable.   

CHAP. II. Of the opposition of Propositions, having the same Subject and Predicate.  
WE have already declared, there are four sorts of propositions, A. E. I. O. Now it may be demanded wherein they agree or differ, when several sorts of Propositions are deduced from the same Subject, and the same Attribute, which is called opposition.  
It is easily seen, that there can be but three sorts of oppositions; though one of the three is subdivided into two others.  
For if they be opposed in quantity and quality both together, A. O. and E. I. they are called contradictories, as every Man is an Animal; Some Man is not an Animal: No Man is free from sin. Some Man is free from sin.  
If they differ in Quantity only, and agree in Quality, as A. I. and E. O. they are called Subalterns. As every Man is a Creature, some Man is a Creature: No Man is free from sin; some Man is not free from sin.  
But if they differ in Quality, and agree in Quantity, than they are called contraries or subcontraries: Contraries, when they are Universal; as Every Man is a Creature, No Man is a Creature.  
Subcontraries, when they are particular: Some Man is a Creature; Some Man is not a Creature.  
Now if these Propositions are looked upon as they are true or false; it is easy to judge,  
That contradictories are never together either true or false; but if one be true, the other is false; and if one be false, the other is true; For if it be true that every Man is a Creature, it cannot be true that some Man is no Creature; on the other side, if it be true that some Man is no Creature, it cannot be true that every Man is a Creature.  
This is so clear that a farther explanation would but render it more obscure.  
2. Contraries can never be probable, but they may be both false. They cannot be true, because then contradictories would be true; for if it be true that every Man is an Animal, it is false that some Man is not an Animal, which is the contradictory, and by consequence, much more false, that no Man is an Animal; which is its contrary.  
But the falsity of the one does not infer the falsity of the other; for it may be false; that all Men are just, and yet it may not be true, that no Man is just; since there may be just men, though all men are not so.  
3. Subcontraries, by a Rule altogether opposite to that of contraries may be probable, as in these two Propositions. Some Man is just; some Man is not just; for justice may agree with one part of Men; and not with the other. And therefore affirmation and negation never happen in the same Subject; for some Man is taken for one part of Men, in one part of the Proposition, and for another part in the other. But they cannot be both false; for if it were false, that some Man is just, it would be true, that no Man is just, which is the Contradictory, and much more true, that some Man is not just, which is the subcontrary.  
4. As for the opposition of Subalterns, it is no true opposition: because the particular is the consequence of the Universal; for if all Men are Creatures; some Man is a Creature: If no Man be an Ape, some Man is not an Ape: Therefore the truth of Universality infers that of Particulars; but the truth of Particulars does not infer that of Universals; for it does not follow, because it is true, that some Man is just, that it should be true, that all Men are just: On the other side the falsehood of Particulars infers the falsehood of Universals; for if it be false that some Man is free from sin, it is more false that all Men are free from sin: But the falsehood of Universals does not infer the falsehood of Particulars; For though it be false, that all Men are just, yet it does not follow, but that some Man may be just: Whence it follows, that many times Subaltern Propositions may both happen to be true, and sometimes both to be false.  
I forbear to speak of the Reduction of opposite propositions to the same sense, as be altogether unprofitable, and for that the Rules are only true in the Latin.   

CHAP. III. Of Propositions simple and composed; That there are some which seem to be simple, but are not, and which may be called complex. Of Complex Propositions both as to the Subject and Attribute.  
WE have said, that every Proposition ought to have at least, one Subject and one Attribute; but it does not follow from thence, that it ought not to have no more than one Subject and one Predicate. Such then as have but one Subject and one Attribute are called simple, and they that have more than one Subject and one Predicate are called Composed. As when I say Good and Evil, Life and Death, Poverty and Riches come from the Lord. The predicate, Come from the Lord is affirmed not only of one Subject, but of many, that is of Good and Evil, etc.  
But before we explain the composed Propositions, we must observe that there are some which seem to be composed that are not so, but Simple. For the singleness of a Proposition is taken for the Unity of the Subject and the Attribute. Now there are several Propositions that have properly but one Predicate and one Attribute; but of which either the Subject or the Attribute is a term complex, which includes other Propositions, that may be called Incident, which make no part of the Subject or Predicate, being joined by the Pronoun Relative, who or which, whose propriety it is to join together several Propositions, to the end they may all encorporate into one.  
Thus when Christ says, He that does the will of my Father who is in Heaven, shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.  
The Subject of this Proposition contains two Propositions, as containing two Verbs; but in regard they are joined by the Relative who, they only make a part of the Subject. Whereas when I say, good and evil proceeds from the Lord, there are properly two Subjects, because I affirm equally both of the one and the other, that they come from God.  
The reason is this, for that the Propositions being joined to others by the Relative, who, are either Propositions but imperfectly, as shall be said hereafter; or else are not considered as Propositions then made, but as Propositions that have been made before, which are at that time only conceived like single Ideas. Whence it happens to be the same thing, whether we pronounce these Propositions by Noun-Adjectives, or by Participles without Verbs, and without the Relative, who; or with Verbs and with the Relative. For it is the same thing to say, The invisibile God has oreated the visible world; or God who is visible, has Created the World which is visible. Alexander themost valiant of Princes vanquished Darius; or Alexander who was the most valiant of Princes, vanquished Darius. For as well in the one as the other, my principal aim is, not to affirm that God is Invisible, or that Alexander was the most generous of Princes; but supposing both the one and the other as affirmed before, I affirm of God, conceived as Invisible, that he Created the visible World; and of Alexander conceived to be the most generous of Princes, that He vanquished Darius.  
But if I should say, Alexander was the most valiant of Princes, and the Vanquisher of Darius, 'tis evident that I should no less affirm of Alexander, both that was he the most valiant of Princes, and that he was the Vanquisher of Darius; and therefore there is good reason that the latter sort of Propositions should be called composed Propositions; whereas we may call the other Propositions complexed.  
We are also to observe, that complexed Propositions may be of two sorts. For Complexity, if I may so call it, may light either upon the matter of the Proposition, that is to say, upon the Subject, or the Predicate, or both; or else upon the form only.  
1. Complexity falls upon the Subject, when the Subject is a Term Complexed, as in this Proposition. He is a King who fears nothing.  
Beatus ille qui procul negotiis  
Vt prisca gens Mortalium,  
Paterna Rura bobus exercet Suis  
Solutus omni foenore.  
For the Verb Est is understood in the last Proposition; Beatus being the Predicate, and all the rest the Subject.  
2. Complexity falls upon the Attribute, when the Attribute is a Term complexed, as Piety is a Virtue that renders a Man happy in the greatest Adversities.  Sum Deus Aeneas, fama super aethera notus. 
But here we must observe that all Propositions composed of Verbs active, and their cases governed, may be called Complex, as containing in some manner two Propositions. For example, if I say, Brutus killed a Tyrant, this is as much as to say, that Brutus killed somebody, and that he whom he killed was a Tyrant; which is very remarkable to be observed; for when these Propositions are urged in Arguments, sometimes there is but one part proved, the other being supposed, by which we are frequently obliged to reduce those Arguments into the most natural Form, and to change the Active into the Passive, to the end, that the part which is proved may be directly expressed; as we shall show when we come to discourse of Arguments composed of complex Propositions.  
3. Sometimes Complexity falls upon both Subject and Predicate, both the one and the other being a complex Term, as in this Proposition. The great ones who oppress the Poor, shall be punished by God, who is the Protector of the Poor.  

Ille ego, qui quondam gracili modnlatus avena  
Carmen, & egressus sylvis, vicina coegi,  
Vt quamvis avido parerent arva Colono:   

Gratum opus Agricolis; ut nunc horrentia Martis  
Arma, virumque cano, Trojae qui Primus aboris  
Italiam, fato profugus, lavina que venit  
Littora.   
The first three Verses, and the half of the fourth, compose the Subject of this Proposition, and the rest makes the Predicate, and the affirmation is included in the word Cano.  
These are the three ways that Propositions may be complexed as to their Matter, that is to say, both as to the Subject and the Predicate.   

CHAP. IU. Of the Nature of Incident Propositions, that make a part of Propositions Complexed.  
BUT before we speak of Propositions, whose Complexity may fall upon the Form, that is to say, upon the Affirmation or Negation, there are several important remarks to be made upon the nature of Incident Propositions, which make one part of the Subject or Attribute of those that are complexed according to matter.  
1. It has been already said, that Incident Propositions are those whose Subject is the Pronoun, Who; as Men who are created to know and love God; or Men who are Pious, where the Term Men being taken away, the rest is an Incident Proposition.  
But here we must call to mind what has been said in the sixth Chapter of the first Part. That the additions of Terms complexed are of two sorts, the one may be called simple Explications, when the addition altars nothing in the Idea of the Term, in regard that what is added, agrees generally with the term in its full extent: as Men who are created to know and love God.  
The other may be called Determinations; for that, what is added to the term not agreeing with it in its full extent, restrains and determines the Signification, as in the second Example Men who are Pious. From whence it follows that there is a Pronoun, Who, Explicative, and a Pronoun (Who) Determinative.  
Now when the Pronoun (who) is Explicative, the Attribute of the Incident Proposition is affirmed of the Subject, to which the Pronoun (who) refers; tho' it be but incidently in respect of the total Proposition; so that the Subject itself may be substituted to the Pronoun (who) as in the first Example, Men who were Created to know and love God. For we might say, Men were created to know and love God.  
But when the (who) is Determinative, the Predicate of the Incident Proposition, is not properly affirmed of the Subject to which the (who) refers. For if in this Proposition, Men who are Pious are Charitable, we should put the word Men in the place of (who) by saying, Men are Pious, the Proposition would be false, for this would be to affirm the word (Pious) of Men, as Men. But in the other Proposition, Men who are Pious are Charitable, we affirm neither of Men in general, nor of any Man in particular, that they are Pious; but the Understanding joining together the Idea of (Pious) with that of Men, and making an entire Idea, judges, that the attribute of Charitable agrees with the entire Idea. And therefore the entire Judgement which is expressed in the Incident Proposition is only that, by which our Understanding Judges that the Idea of Pious, is not incompatible with that of Men, and so they may be considered as joined together; and afterwards we may examine how they agree together, being thus united.  
Many times there are Terms that are doubly and trebly Complexed, being composed of several parts, of which every one is separately complexed; and so we may meet with several Incident Propositions, and of several sorts; the Pronoun of the one being Explicative, and the other Determinative, as in this Example. The Doctrine that places Sovereign Happiness in the pleasures of the Body, which was taught by Epicure, is unworthy a Philosopher. The attribute of this Proposition is Unworthy a Philosophyer and all the rest is the Subject: and so the Proposition is a Complex Term that includes two incident Propositions. The first, That places Sovereign happiness in the pleasures of the Body, where the Pronoun is determinative; for it determines (Doctrine) in general to be that which affirms Sovereign Felicity to consist in the pleasures of the Body; whence it would be an absurdity to substitute the word Doctrine to the Pronoun, by saying Doctrine places Sovereign Happiness in bodily Pleasure.  
2. The second incident Proposition is, which was taught by Epicurus, and the Subject whereto the Pronoun [which] refers, is the whole complex Term [The Doctrine which places Sovereign happinness in bodily Pleasure] which denotes a singular and individual Doctrine, capable of divers accidents; as to be maintained by several persons: tho' in its self it be determined to be taken always after the same manner, at least in this precise case, as it is extended. And therefore it is, that the Relative of the second Incident Proposition, [which was taught by Epicurus] is not determinative but only Explicative; so that the Subject to which the Pronoun refers may be substituted in the place of the pronoun, by saying, The Doctrine which places Sovereign happiness in bodily Pleasure, was taught by Epicurus.  
3. The last remark is, that to judge of the nature of these Propositions, and to know whether it be determinative or explicative, it behoves us to mind rather the Sense and Intention of him that speaks, than the Expression alone.  
For there are many times complexed Terms, that seem uncomplexed; or less complexed than indeed they are; for that one part of what they enclose in the mind of him that discourses, is altogether understood and not expressed, as has been said in the sixth Chapter of the first part, where we have shown that there is nothing more usual in discourse then to signify singulars by general words, for that the Circumstances of discourse make it appear that there is a singular and distinct Idea, joined to that common Idea which answers to the word, that determines it to signify only one thing.  
I said that this was generally known by the Circumstances, as in French, the word Roy or King signifies Lewis XIV.  
But there is yet a Rule that may serve us to judge, when a common Term retains a general Idea, and when it is determined by a distinct and particular Idea, though not expressed.  
When it is a manifest Absurdity to apply a Predicate to a Subject, retaining a general Idea, we must believe that he who made that Proposition, has deprived that Subject of its general Idea. Thus if I hear a Man say, the King has commanded me such a thing, I am assured that he has not left the word King in its general Idea, for a King in general gives no particular Command.  
If a Man should say to me, The brussels Gazet of the 24th of January 1662. is false as to what was transacted at Paris, I should be assured, that there was something more in the mind of him that spoke, than what was expressed in those Terms. For those words are not sufficient to make me judge whether the Gazet be true or false: So that the Relator must have in his thoughts some piece of News Distinct, and particular which he judges contrary to the Truth; as if the Gazet had related, that the King had made a hundred Knights of the Order of the Garter.  
Also in such judgements as are made of the Opinions of Philosophers, when we say, that the Doctrine of such a Philosopher is false, without expressing distinctly what that doctrine; is as (the Doctrine of Lucretius, touching the Nature of our Soul is false) it necessarily follows, that in such sorts of Judgements they who make 'em, do mean a distinct and particular Opinion under the general words (Doctrine of such a Philosopher). And so such sorts of Propositions dissolve into others like to these. Such an opinion that was maintained by such an Author is false. The opinion that our Soul is Composed of Atoms, which was taught by Lucretius is false. So that these kinds of Judgements always enclose two Affirmations, when they are not distinctly expressed. The one Primary which relates to the Truth itself; which is, that it is a great error to believe that our Soul is composed of Atoms; the other Incident, which refers only to the Historical part; that this error was generally taught by Lucretius.   

CHAP. V. Of the falsehood that occurs in Complex Terms and Incident Propositions.  
WHAT we have already said may serve in answer to one celebrated Question, how to know whether there be no falsehood but in Propositions, and whether there be none in Ideas and simple Terms.  
I speak of falsehood, rather than of Truth; for there is a truth in things that is certain, which is their Conformity to the Will of God, whether Men think of 'em or not; but there can be no falsehood of things, but as they relate to the understanding of Man, or any other understanding subject to errors, which judges falsely that a thing is that which it is not.  
The Question is, whether this falsehood is only to be met in Propositions and Judgements.  
The usual answer is, no; which is true in one sense; however that hinders not, but that there may be falsehood, not in single Ideas, but in complex Terms. For it is sufficient, that something may be judged or affirmed in them, either expressly or virtually.  
Which will be more plain, if we consider particularly two sorts of complex Terms; the one, of which the Pronoun is explicative, the other of which it is determinative.  
In the first sort of Complex Terms, we are not to wonder if we find any falsehood. For the attribute of the Incident Proposition, is affirmed by the Subject to which the Pronoun relates. As in Alexander who is the Son of Philip, I affirm, though incidently, the Son of Philip of Alexander; and by consequence there is a falsehood in it, if it he not so.  
But here we are to make two or three remarks of moment.  
1. That the fasilty of an Incident Proposition does not blemish the truth of the Principal Proposition.  
For example, Alexander who was the Son of Philip, overcame the Persians: This proposition ought to pass for true, though Alexander were not the Son of Philip; because the affirmation of the principal Proposition, falls only upon Alexander, and what is incidently added, does not hinder, but that Alexander might vanquish the Persians.  
Nevertheless, if the attribute of the principal proposition, had relation to the incident proposition, as if I should say, Alexander the Son of Philip was Amintas 's Grandchild: Then would it only be, that the falsehood of the incident proposition, would render the principal proposition false.  
2. Titles that are given to certain Dignities may be given to all that possess that Dignity; though what is signified by the Title, do not at all agree with 'em. Thus because the Titles of Holy, and Thrice Holy, was formerly given to all Bishops, we find, that the Catholic Bishops at the conference of Carthage, did not scruple to give that Title to the Donatist Bishops (the most Holy Petelian said it) though they knew well that there could be no true Holiness in a Heretic Bishop. We find also, that St. Paul gives the title of best and most excellent to Festus Governor of Judea, because it was the Title usually given to the Chief Governors,  
3. But it is not so, when a Person is the Author of a Title which he gives to another, and which he gives according to his own, and not the opinion of others, or according to popular error; for than we may impute to himself the falsehood of such proposition. Thus when a Man says, Aristotle who is the Prince of Philosophers, or simply, The Prince of Philosophers, believed that the Original of the Nerves was in the Heart; we have no reason to tell him this is false, because Aristotle was not the best of Philosophers; for it is enough that he has followed in this the common opinion, though it were false. But if a Man should say, That Gassendus, who is the most Learned of Philosophers, believed that there was a Vacuum in nature; we may with reason dispute the Title which he would give Gassendus, and make him responsible for the falsehood, couched in that incident proposition. A Man may be also accused of Falsehood, who gives to the same person a Title which is not suitable to him, yet not be blamed for giving him another Title, which is less true and less agreeable. For example, Pope John the XII. was neither Holy, nor chaste, nor Pious: As Baronius acknowledges; for tho' they who called him most Holy could not be taxed of falsehood, yet they who called him most chaste and Pious, were very great Liars, though they did it by Incident Propositions; as if they had said, John the XII. the most chaste Pope, decreed such a thing.  
This is what I had to say concerning incident Propositions, where the Pronouns (Who or Which) are explicative; as to those other where the Pronouns are determinative, as Men who are Pious, Kings who love their Subjects, certain it is, they are not liable to falsehood, because the predicate of the Incident Proposition is not affirmed of the Subject to which the Pronoun relates. For example, should it be said, That such Judges as do nothing for favour or reward, are worthy of applause, it is not therefore affirmed, that there are any such Judges, who are so upright. Nevertheless I believe there is always in these Propositions a tacit and virtual Affirmation, not of the actual Congruity of the Predicate, with the Subject to which the Pronoun relates; but of the possible Congruity. And if there be any deceit in this, we may rationally conclude there is a falsehood in the Incident Propositions. As if it had been said, Souls that are square are more solid than those which are round; here the Ideas of Square and Round being Incompatible with the Idea of a Soul, taken for the principle of Thought, I judge that those Incident Propositions ought to pass for false.  
And hence it may be said, that the greatest part of our errors proceed. For having the Idea of a thing we frequently join to it another incompatible Idea, and by that means attribute to the same Idea, that which is not suitable to it.  
Thus finding in ourselves two Ideas, one of the thinking Substance, another of the extended Substance, it frequently happens, that when we consider our Soul, which is the thinking Substance, we insensibly intermix something of the Idea of the extended Substance, as when we imagine that the Soul fills up a space like the Body, and that it could not be at all if it were no where, which are not Properties that belong to a Body. Whence arose that Impious error of the Mortality of the Soul. We may read an excellent discourse of St. Austin upon this Subject, in his tenth Book of the Trinity; where he shows that there is nothing so easy as to know the nature of our Soul. But that which confounds men is this, that being desirous to know it, they are not satisfied with what they know, without any great trouble; that is to say, that it is a Substance that thinks, desires, doubts, and knows; but they add to what it is, what it is not, fancying the Soul under some of those Phantosms, under which they were wont to conceive Corporeal things.  
On the other side, when we consider Bodies, we have much ado to abstain from intermixing something of the Idea of the Substance that thinks, hence we affirm that heavy things tend to the Centre; of Plants, that they seek for proper nourishment; of Crisis' in Diseases, that it is nature that goes about to discharge itself of what is baneful, and a thousand other Whimsies. More especially in our Bodies, that Nature has an Inclination to do this or that; when we are assured that we have no such desire, nor ever had any such thought, and that it is ridiculous to imagine, that there is within us any other thing than ourselves, that knows what is good or hurtful for us, that desires the one, and eschews the other.  
I believe moreover that we are to attribute to these incompatible Ideas, all those murmurings of Men against the Deities; for it would be impossible to murmur against God, if we conceived him aright: as he is, altogether Wise, Omnipotent, and all Goodness. But the Ungodly considering him as Omnipotent, and the Sovereign Lord of all the World, attribute to him all the misfortunes that befall 'em, wherein they are not deceived; but because at the same time they apprehend him to be cruel and unjust, which is incompatible with his goodness, they impiously inveigh against him as the Author of the miseries which they suffer.   

CHAP. VI Of Complex Propositions, according to Affirmation and Negation: of one sort of those kinds of Propositions which the Philosophers call Modal.  
BEsides those Propositions where the Subject or Attribute is a Term Complex, there are also others that are Complex; because there are Terms or incident Propositions, which only regard the form of the Proposition, that is, the Affirmation or Negation which is expressed by the Verb; as if I should say, I affirm that the Earth is round. Here I affirm, is only an incident Proposition, which ought to make a part of something in the principal Proposition. Nevertheless it is visible that it makes no part either of the Subject or of the Attribute: for they suffer no alteration, as being understood as entirely as if I should simply aver, the Earth is round. So that the incident Proposition falls only upon the Affirmation which is expressed in two manners; the one most commonly by the Verb [Est] the Earth is round; and the other expressly by the Verb I maintain.  
So when they say, I deny it, it is true; it is not true. Or when they add in one Proposition that which supports the Truth; as when I say, The Reasons of Astronomy convince us, that the Sun is much bigger than the Earth. For the first part is only a support of the Argument.  
Nevertheless it is of great Moment to know that there are a sort of these Propositions which are Ambiguous, and which may be taken differently, according to the design of the Propounder. As when I say, all Philosophers assure us, that heavy things fall of themselves. Now if it be my Intention to show that heavy things fall down of themselves, the first part of this Proposition will be only Incident, and will only support the affirmation of the latter part. But if I intent to report this opinion of the Philosophers, without approving it, than the first part will be the principal Proposition, and the last will only be a part of the Attribute. For so I affirm not only that heavy things fall of themselves, but that all Philosophers assert it. And it is easily seen that these two ways of changing the proposition, alter it in manner, that it becomes two different Propositions, and different in Sense. But it is easy to judge by the Consequence, in which of the two Senses the Propositions are to be taken. For Example, the Proposition being laid down, I should add; But Stones are heavy, therefore they fall down of themselves, would be plain that I had taken the first Sense, and that the first part was only Incident. On the other side, if I should conclude thus, Now this is an Error, and by consequence an Error may be taught by the Philosophers, than it would be manifest that I had taken the Proposition in the second Sense; that is, that the first part will be the principal Proposition, and the second part only the predicate.  
As for Complex Propositions, where the Complexity falls upon the verb, and not upon the Subject, nor the Predicate, Philosophers have particularly taken notice of those that are called Modal; because the Affirmation or Negation is modified by one of the four Modes, Possible, Contingent, Impossible, Necessary.  
And because every Mode may be affirmed or denied, as it is possible, it is not possible, and in both manners be joined with the Affirmative or Negative Proposition, every Mode may have four Propositions, and the four together sixteen, which are denoted by these four words, PURPUREA, ILIACE, AMABIMUS, EDENTULI; of which this is the Mystery. Every Syllable marks one of the four Modes.  

1. Possible.  
2. Contingent.  
3. Impossible.  
4. Necessary.   
And the Vowels in every Syllable, which are A. E. I. or U. denotes whether the Mode be affirmed or denied, and whether the Proposition which they call the Thing said, aught to be denied or affirmed in this manner.  

A. The Affirmation of the Mode, and the Affirmation of the Proposition.  
E. The Affirmation of the Mode and denial of the Proposition.  
I. The denial of the Mode, and Affirmation of the Proposition.  
U. The denial of the Mode, and denial of the Negation.   
It would be lost time to produce Examples, which are easily found out. We are only to observe that PURPUREA answers to the A, of Propositions Incomplex. ILIACE to the E. AMABIMUS to the I. EDENTULI to the U. So that if we intent the Example should be true, having chosen a Subject, we must take for Purpurea an Attribute that may be universally affirmed. For Iliace, one that may be universally denied. For Amabimus, one that may be affirmed particularly, and for Edentili, one that may be denied particularly.  
But whatever Predicate we take, this is always certain, that all the four Propositions of the same word have always the same Sense, so that one being true, all the rest are true.   

CHAP. VII. Of several sorts of Composed Propositions.  
WE have already said, that composed Propositions have either a double Subject, or a double Predicate. Now of these there are two sorts. One where the Composition is expressly marked; the rest where it lies more concealed, and which the Logicians for that reason call Exponable; which require Exposition or Explanation.  
Those of the first sort may be reduced to six Kind's, Copulatives, Disjunctives, Conditinal, Causal, Relative and Discretive.  

COPULATIVES.  
We call Copulatives those that include several Subjects or several Attributes joined together by an Affirmative or Negative Conjunction; that is to say, (And) or (neither) For (Neither) does the same thing as (and) in these sorts of Propositions; for that (neither) signifies [and] with a Negative which falls upon the Verb and not upon the Union of the two words which it joins; as if I should say, that Knowledge and Riches do not make a Man happy. Here I unite Knowledge and Riches, affirming of both that they do not make a Man happy, in the same manner as if I should have said, that Knowledge and Riches render a Man vainglorious.  
These Propositions may be distinguished into three sorts.  
1. When they have more Subjects.  Life and Death are in the power of the Tongue. 
2. When they have several Predicates.  
Auream quisquis mediocritatem  
Diliget, tutus caret obsoleti,  
Sordibus Tecti, caret invidenda.  
Regibus Aula.  
A well Composed Mind hopes for good Fortune in bad, and fears not bad fortune in Prosperity.  
3. When they have several Subjects and several Attributes.  

Nor House, nor Land, not heaps of Brass or Gold,  
From the Sick Lord a Fever can withhold,  
Nor anxious cares repel.—   
The truth of these Propositions depends upon the truth of both the two parts. Thus if I say that Faith and a good Life are necessary to Salvation, this is true, because both the one and the other is necessary. But should I have said, a good Life and Riches are necessary for Salvation, this is a false Proposition, because Riches are not necessary for Salvation.  
Propositions that are considered as Negatives, and contradictory in respect of Copulatives and all others composed, are not all such, where Negations occur, but only such where the Negation falls upon the Conjunction, which happens several ways, as by putting the [Not] at the head of the Proposition. Thou dost not love, and forsake thy Friend.  
For thus it is, that a Proposition is made Contradictory to the Copulative, by expressly denying the Conjunction; as when we say that it cannot be, that a thing should be this and that at the same time.  
That a Man cannot be wise and in love at the same time.  Amare & sapere vix Deo conceditur. 
That Love and Majesty do not accord well together.  Non bene conveniunt, nec in una sede Morantur Majestas & Amor.—  

Of Disjunctives.  
Disjunctives are of great use; and these are they, wherein the disjunctive conjunction [or] is found.  Amity either finds friends equal, or makes 'em equal. 
A Woman either loves or hates; there is no Medium.  Aut amat, aut odit mulier, nihil est tertium. 
He that altogether lives in Solitude, is either a Beast or an Angel says Aristotle.  
Men are guided either by interest or fear,  
Either the Sun moves about the Earth, or the Earth about the Sun.  
Every action proceeds from good or bad judgement.  
The truth of these Propositions depends upon the necessary Opposition of the parts, which admits no Medium. But as they ought to admit no Medium, that they may be necassarily true; so that they may be only morally true, it suffices that they do not usually admit a Medium. And therefore it is absolutely true that an action done with Judgement is either good or bad, the Theologians making it manifest that there is nothing in particular that is untrue. But when they say, that Men never act but by interest or fear; this is not absolutely true, since there are some who are lead neither by the one or the other of these Passions, but merely upon the consideration of their Duty: So that the main truth of this Proposition lies in this, that the greatest part of Men are governed by these two Affections.  
Propositions contradictory to disjunctives are those where the Truth of the Disjunction is denied. Which among the Latins (as in all other composed Propositions) by putting the Negative at the Head of the Proposition. Non omnis actio est bona vel Mala: and in English. It is not true, that every action is good or bad.   

Conditional.  
Conditionals are such as have two parts bound by the condition (if) of which the first where the condition lies, is called the Antecedent; and the other the Consequent. If the Soul be Spiritual, is the Antecedent, it is immortal, is the Consequent.  
This Consequence is sometimes mediate; sometimes immediate: It is only mediate, when there is nothing in the terms that binds both parts together, as when I say, 
If the Earth stand still, the Sun moves:  
If God be just, the wicked shall be punished.  The consequences are very good, but they are not immediate; for that the parts not having any common term, are bound together by something which is not expressed but reserved in the mind; that the Earth and the Sun being perpetually in different Situations; necessarily it follows, that the one is movable, and the other immovable.  
When the consequence is immediate, it is usually requisite,  
1. Either that both parts have the same Subject.  
If Death be a passage to a more happy life, it is desirable.  
If you have failed to feed the Poor, you have killed the Poor.  
2. Or that they have the same Predicate.  
If whatever God inflicts upon us for Trials sake, aught to be dear to us.  
Sickness ought to be dear to us.  
3. Or that the Attribute of the first, be the Subject of the second.  
If Patience be a Virtue,  
Some Virtues are irksome.  
4. Or lastly, that the Subject of the first part be the Attribute of the second; which cannot be but when the second part is Negative.  
If all true Christians live according to the Gospel,  
There are no true Christians.  
Here the truth of the Proposition is not regarded, but the truth of the Consequence. For though the one and the other part be false, nevertheless if the consequence of the one, in respect of the other, be good, the Proposition, as far as it is conditional, is true.  
As, 
If the will of the Creature be able to hinder the accomplishing of Gods will,  
God is not Omnipotent.   
Negative Contradictories are opposed to Conditionals, when the condition is denied; which among the Latins is done by prefixing the Negative—  
— Non si miserum fortuna Simonem  
Tinxit, vanum etiam mendacemque improbafixtin  
But in English they are expressed by (although) and a Negative, 
If you eat of the forbidden Fruit, you shall die,  
Though you eat of the forbidden Fruit, you shall not die.  
Or else by, It is not True;  
It is not true, that you shall die if you eat of the forbidden Fruit.    

Of Causals.  
Causals are those that contain two Propositions joined together by Conjunctions of the cause (because) or (to the end that)  
Woe to the Rich, because they have their folicity in this world.  
The wicked are advanced, to the end, that falling from on high, their fall may be the greater.  
They can, because they think they can.  
Such a Prince was unfortunate, because he was not born under such a Planet.  
Under these sorts of Propositions may be also reduced those which are called Reduplicatives.  
Men, as Men, are rational,  
Kings, as Kings, are subject to none but God.  
That these Propositions be true, it is required, that one of the parts should be the cause of the other; whence it comes to pass that both are true; for that which is false is no cause, nor has it any cause why it should be. Yet both parts may be true, when the Causal is false. Thus a Prince may be unfortunate and born under such a Planet: Though it be false that he was therefore unfortunate, because he was born under such a Planet.  
Therefore the contradictories of Propositions chiefly consist in this, that one thing is denied to be the cause of the other.  
Not therefore unhappy, because born under such a Constellation.   

RELATIVES.  
Relatives are those that include some Comparison and some Relation.  
Where the Treasure is, there is the Heart.  
As he lived, so he died.  
As much as thou hast, so much art thou worth.  
Here the Truth depends upon the exactness of the Relation; and they are contradicted by denying the Relation.  
It is not true, that as he lived so he died.  
It is not true, that a Man is esteemed in this world according to what he has.   

OF DISCRETIVES.  
Discretives are those, where various Judgements are made, and this variety is denoted by the Particles (but) (notwithstanding) or words of the like nature, either expressed or understood.  
Fortune may deprive me of my Wealth, but not my Virtue.  
I endeavour to set myself above things, but not to be subjected to 'em.  
They who cross the Seas, change only their Country, but not their Disposition.  
The truth of these Propositions depends upon the truth of both parts; and the separation between 'em. For though both parts were true, a Proposition of this sort would be ridiculous, if there were no opposition between 'em, as if I should say, Judas was a Thief, and yet he took it ill that Mary Magdalen powered out her precious ointments upon Christ.  
There may be several Contradictories of a Proposition of this nature; as if one should say, 
'Tis not upon Riches, but upon knowledge that happiness depends.  
Which Proposition may be contradicted several ways.  
Happiness depends upon Riches, and not upon knowledge.  
Happiness depends neither upon Riches nor knowledge.  
Happiness depends both upon Riches and Knowledge.   
Thus we see that Copulatives are contradictories of Discretives. For these two last Propositions are Copulative.    

CHAP. VIII. Of Propositions Composed in Sense.  
THere are other composed Propositions, whose Composition is more concealed and intricate; which may be reduced under four sorts. 1. Exclusive, 2. Exceptive, 3. Comparative, 4. Inceptive or Desitive.  

1. Of EXCLUSIVES.  
Those are called Exclusive, which denote, that a Predicate so agrees with his subject, as to agree with that alone, and no other. Whence it follows, that they include two various Judgements, and by consequence are composed in sense. Which is expressed by the word (only or some such like words. Or in English, There is none but God only who is to be beloved for his own sake, all other things are to be admired for the sake of God.  
Only those Riches which thou freely bestowest, shalt thou freely enjoy.  
Virtue only makes Nobility, nothing else renders a Man truly noble.  
I know this only, that I know nothing, said the Academics.  
Lucan speaking of the Druids, makes this Disjunctive Proposition composed of two Exclusives  
— you know  
The God and Heavenly Numen, you alone,  
Or else to only you they are unknown.  
These Propositions are contradicted three manner of ways.  
1. By denying that the predicate agrees with the subject alone.  
2. By affirming it agrees with something else.  
3. By alleging it agrees with the one and the other.  
Thus this Proposition, only Virtue is true Nobility, it may be contradicted.  
1. That Virtue does not make any one Noble.  
2. That Birth renders a Man Noble as well as Virtue.  
3. That Birth ennobles a Man, and not Virtue.  
So the Maxim of the Academic's, this is only certain that there is nothing certain, was variously contradicted by the Dogmatics, and the Pyrrhonians. For the Dogmatics deny it, by maintaining that it is doubly false, because there are many things that we know most certainly; and therefore it was not true, that we were certain that we knew nothing. And the Pyrrhonians averred that it was false, for the contrary reason, that every thing was so uncertain, that it was uncertain whether any thing was certain.  
And therefore there is a defect of Judgement in what Lucan speaks of the Druids; because there was no necessity, that only the Druids should be in the truth, in respect of the Gods, or that they should only be in an error. For in regard there were sundry errors, concerning the nature of the Gods, it might well be, that though the Druids had different thoughts concerning the Gods, from those of other Nations, they were no less in an error than other Nations. Here it is also to be observed, that there are Propositions which are exclusive in sense, though the exclusion be not expressed. As in this Verse of Virgil, where the Exclusion is marked out,  una salus victis, nullam sperare salutem. 
Thus luckily Translated into French, where the Exclusion is understood.  
Le salut des vaincus est de n'en point attendre.  
The safety of the vanquished, is not to expect it.  
Nevertheless it is more usual in the Latin then French, to suppress Exclusions. So that there are some passages not to be Translated with all their force, without making exclusive Propositions, though in the Latin the Exclusion be not marked.  
Thus 2 Cor. 10. 17. Qui gloriatur, glorietur Domino; aught to be thus Translated, Whoever rejoices, let him rejoice in the Lord.  
Gal. 6. 7. Quae seminaverit homo, haec & metet. A Man shall reap no more than what he has sown.  
Ephes. 4. 5. Vnus Dominus, una fides, unus Baptismus. There is but one God, but one Faith, but one Baptism.  
Mat. 5. 46. Si diligitis eos qui vos diligunt, quam mercedem habebitis? If you love only those that love you, what recompense shall ye deserve?  
Seneca in his Troas, nullas habet spes Troja, si tales habet. If Troy has no other hope then this, it has none at all: As if the Latin had said, si tantum tales habet.   

2. OF EXCEPTIVES.  
Exceptives are those where a thing is affirmed of the whole subject, except some one of the Inferiors of the Subject, by adding a Particle of Exception, which denotes that what is predicated, does not agree with that Inferior. Which visibly includes two judgements, and renders those Propositions composed in sense. As if I should say, None of the Sects of the Ancient Philosophers, except that of the Platonics, have acknowledged God to be incorporeal.  
Where two things are to be understood, 1. That the Ancient Philosophers believed God to be Corporeal. 2. That the Platonics believed the contrary.  
The covetous Man does nothing well, but when he dies.  
No Man miserable, unless compared.  
No Man is mischeifed but by himself.  
Except the wise Man, said the Stoics, all Men are truly Fools.  
These Propositions are contradicted as many ways as the Exclusive.  
1. By affirming that the Stoics wise Man was as much a fool as other Men.  
2. By maintaining there were others, besides the Stoics wise Men, that were no fools.  
3. By alleging that the Stoics wise Man was a Fool, and that others were wise Men.  
We are farther to observe, that the Exclusive and Exceptive Propositions are the same thing, only expressed after a different manner, so that with little difficulty they may be changed the one into the other. And thus we see that this exceptive of Terence,  The Ignorant thinks nothing well done but what he does himself. 
Was changed by Cornelius Gallus into this Exclusive.  That, only right he thinks, which he does himself.  

OF COMPARATIVES.  
Propositions where a Comparative is designed, include two judgements. For it is one thing to say a thing is such a thing, and to say that it is more or less than another: By which means these Propositions become composed in sense.  
The greatest of losses is to lose a Friend.  
Many times a pleasing Raillery makes a deeper Impression in the most important affairs, than the best of Reasons.  
Less hurtful are the wounds of a Friend, than the deceitful kisses of an Enemy.  
These Propositions are contradicted several ways, as that maxim of Epicurus. Pain is the greatest of Evils, was contradicted one way by the Stoics, and after another manner by the Peripatetics, while the Peripatetics averred that pain was an evil; but they likewise maintained that Vice and other Irregularities of the Mind were far greater Evils than Pain. On the other side the Stoics would not allow Pain to be an Evil, so far were they from acknowledging it to be the greatest of all Evils.  
But here it may be disputed, whether it be always necessary that in these Propositions the Positive of the Comparative, should agree with both the Members of the Comparison; for Example, whether we ought to suppose two things to be good, that we may aver the one to be better than the other?  
It seems at first that it should be so; but we find it otherwise in practice; for we see the Scripture makes use of the word Better, not only in comparing two good things together: Better is Wisdom than Strength, and a prudent Man then a strong Man.  
But also in comparing a good with an Evil, Better is the patient then the proud Man.  
And sometimes in comparing two evil things together. Better is it to live with a Dragon then a scolding Woman. And in the Gospel, it is better for a Man to be thrown into the Sea with a Millstone about his Neck, then to hurt one of the Faithful.  
The reason of this practice is, because a greater good is better than a lesser. And by the same reason we may say, though less properly, that a benefit is better than an Evil; for that whatever has some goodness, has more than that which has none at all. We may also say, that a lesser Evil is better than a greater Evil, being looked upon as a kind of Good, in respect of Evil, and therefore the lesser Evil has more of that sort of goodness than the greater Evil.  
But we are to take care lest the overheat of Dispute carry us unawares into vain brangles about these forms of Speech, as they did Cresconius the Donatist Grammarian, disputing against St. Austin. For that same Father having said that the Catholics had more reason to upbraid the Donatists with Tradition, than the Donatists to reproach the Catholics, Cresconius thought he might from those words, Traditionem nos vobis probabilius Objicimus, conclude, that St. Austin acknowledged that the Donatists had reason to tax the Catholics. For if you said he, more probably; we therefore probably. For the degree augments what is placed before it, does not impugn or deny what is said before it. But St. Austin refutes this vain subtlety, first by examples of Scripture, and among the rest by that passage of the Epistle to the Hebrews, where St. Paul having said, That the Earth bearing only Thorns was Cursed, and was only to expect to be Burnt, he adds, But we hope better things of you dear Brethren; not says the Father, that they were good things which he had rehearsed before, to bring forth Thorns and Briers, and to deserve Burning, but rather because they were evil, that those being avoided they might choose and wish for better, that is, Benefits contrary to such great Evils. And afterwards he shows from the most famous Grammarians the falsehood of his Consequence; in regard that Virgil might have been taxed in the same manner, to have taken for a Good the violence of a Distemper, that enrages Men to tear their own Members, because he wishes better may befall good Men.  
Dii meliora piis erroremque hostibus illum,  
Discissòs nudis laniabant dentibus artus.  
How then, Meliora piis says the holy Father, as if they had been Blessings, and not rather extreme Evils, to tear their Bowels with their own Teeth.   

Of INCEPTIVES and DESITIVES.  
When we say that any thing begins, or ceases to be, there are two judgements made; one that the thing was before the time that we talk of; the other, what it was afterward, and so these Propositions of which the one are called Inceptive, the other Desitive, are composed in sense, and they are so like, that it is much better to make but one sort of 'em, and to handle 'em both together.  
The Jews did not begin till their return from the captivity of Babylon, to make no longer use of their ancient Characters, which were those that are now called the Samaritan.  
1. The Latin ceased to be vulgarly spoken in Italy about five hundred Years ago.  
2. The Jews did not begin till the first Century after Jesus Christ, to make use of Points for Vowels.  
These Propositions are contradicted as the one and the other relates to the two different times. So there are some who contradict the latter Proposition; alleging, though falsely, that the Jews always used points, at least to read by, and that they were kept in the Temple. Which is contradicted by others, who affirm that points were never used till after the first Century.   

A General REFLECTION.  
Though we have showed that these Propositions Exclusive, Exceptive, etc. may be contradicted several ways, yet it is as certain, that when they are barely denied, without any farther Explanation, the Negation falls naturally upon the Exclusion or the Exception, or the Comparison, or the Alteration, denoted by the words of beginning or ceasing. Therefore if any one believed that Epicurus did not place chief happiness in Bodily pleasure, and it should be said to him, that only Epicurus placed chief happiness in Pleasure, if the other barely denied it, without adding any other thing, it would be in full declaration of his Sense, because a Man might have reason to believe upon that bare Negation, that he still believed that Epicurus placed his chief happiness in pleasure, but that he was not the only person who was of that opinion.  
Also if a person should ask me, knowing the integrity of a Judge, whether he still sold Justice? I could not answer barely, No.  
For that such a No, would only signify that he did not still sell Justice; but at the same time the other was left to believe, that he had formerly done it.  
Which shows us that there are some Propositions, to which it would be unjust to require a bare answer, by Yes, or No; for that when they include two Senses, a true answer cannot be given but by explaining both the one and the other.    

CHAP. IX. Observations to find out the Predicates and Subjects in Propositions, expressed after a less usual manner.  
CErtainly it is a defect of vulgar Logic, that it does not accustom young beginners to understand the nature of Propositions or Arguments, but according to the order and forms which are used in the Schools, which are frequently different from what we find in the Writings of others, whether in Oratory, Morality, or any other of the Sciences.  
And therefore they have no other Idea of a Subject or an Attribute, but that the one is the first Term of the Proposition, and the ●he other the latter. And of Universality and Particularity, but that there is in the ●ne, (All) or (None) and in the other, (Some) whereas all these things are subject to Frequent Errors; and it requires Judgement to discern these things in several Propositions. Let us begin with the Subject and Attribute.  
The only and true Rule is to observe by the Sense, of what a thing is affirmed, and what is affirmed is this, for the first is always the Subject, and the latter the Predicate, however disposed in order.  
Thus there is nothing more common than these sorts of Propositions; It is a shameful thing to be a slave to Lust. Where by the Sense it is visible, that a shameful thing is that which is affirmed, and consequently the Predicate; and to be a slave to Lust, is that which is affirmed of the thing, that it is a shameful thing, and consequently the Subject. Likewise in St. Paul according to the Latin. Est questus magnus Pietas cum sufficientia; whereas the true order should be Godliness, with sufficiency, is great gain.  
Likewise in this verse.  Happy the Man that knows the cause of things. 
Happy is the Predicate, all the rest is the Subject.  
But the Subject and the Attribute are yet more difficult to be found out in complex Propositions. And we have already showed that sometimes there is no discerning, but by the consequence of the Discourse, and the Author's Intention, which is the chief Proposition, and which the Incident in the two propositions.  
But besides what has been said we may yet observe, that in complex propositions, where the first part is only the Incident Proposition, and the latter is the principal; as in the Major and Conclusion of this Argument, 
God Commands us to honour Kings.  
Lewis the XIV. is King.  
Therefore God commands us to honour Lewis the XIV.   
Here the Verb Active is to be changed into the Passive, to find out the true Subject of this principal Proposition. For it is plain when I argue after this manner, that my principal intention in the Major, is to affirm something of Kings, Whence I may conclude that we are to honour Lewis the XIV. And therefore what I affirm of the Command of God is only an incident Proposition which confirms this Affirmative, that Kings are to be honoured. Whence it follows that Kings is the Subject of the Major, and Lewis the XIV. the Subject of the Conclusion. Tho if we consider things but only superficially, both the one and the other seem to be no more than a part of the Attribute.  
These Propositions are also frequent in our Language. It is a folly to listen to Flatterers. It is the Hail that falls. It is God who has purchased us; But the Sense sufficiently demonstrates, that to replace these Propositions in their natural order, they ought to be thus expressed.  
To listen to Flatterers is a folly.  
It is the hail that falls.  
He that has purcbased us is God.  
And this is almost Universal in all Propositions that begin with It is, and where afterwards follows (who) or (that) to have the Attribute at the beginning, and the Subject at the end. And let this suffice for once, to let you see, that the examples produced demonstrate, that we are to judge by the Sense, and not by the order of the words. And this is necessary to be known, that we may not be deceived in taking those for false Syllogisms, that are really true. For that want of discerning the Subject and the Attribute in the Propositions, we believe 'em contrary when they are conformable to the Rules.   

CHAP. X. Other Observations to know, whether the Propositions are Universal or Particular?  
SOme Observations of the same nature, and no less useful, may be made of Particularity and Universality.  

1. OBSERVATION.  
We must distinguish Universality into two sorts. The one may be called Metaphysical, the other Moral.  
I call Metaphysical Universality, when the Universality is perfect and without exception; as, every Man is living, which admits no exception.  
I call Moral Universality, that which admits some exception: For in Moral things it suffices, that things are so for the most part. As St. Paul both citys and proves,  
The Cretans are always Liars, evil Beasts, slow-bellies.  
Or as the same Apostle alleges in another place.  
All seek their own things, not the things of Jesus Christ.  
Or according to that of Horace, All Musicians have this Vice, etc.  
Or according to the usual Phrases, 
All Women love to chat.  
All Young Men are inconstant.  
All Old Men praise the time past.  In all these Propositions it suffices that it be so for the most part, neither is any thing to be concluded strictly.  
For as all these Propositions are not so general, but that they admit exceptions, so they may render the conclusion false. For it could not be particularly inferred, that any Cretan was a Liar, or an evil Beast, though the Apostle citys in general that Verse of one of their own Poets.  The Cretans are always Liars, evil Beasts, and Slow-bellies. 
For that some of that Island might not be guilty of those vices which were common to others.  
Therefore the moderation to be observed in these Conclusions, which are only morally Universal, is on the one side, to draw from thence with great judgement particular Conclusions; and on the other side, not to contradict 'em, nor to reject 'em as false; though we may oppose certain Instances wherein they may stray from the Truth, but to be satisfied, if they may be extended from others beyond their just limits, that they ought not to be taken too rigorously according to the Letter.   

2. OBSERVATION.  
There are some Propositions that ought to pass for Metaphysically Universal, though they may admit of Exceptions, that is, when those Exceptions are exotic, and such, as according to common use, are not comprehended in those Universal Terms. As when I say, All Men have two Arms. This Proposition ought to pass for true, according to ordinary use. And it would be but mere brangling to oppose against it, that there have been Monsters who were Men, though they had four Arms. It being plain that there was nothing intended concerning Monsters, in these general Propositions; and that the only meaning of the Assertion was, that according to the order of Nature, all Men had two Arms.  
In like manner it may be said, that all Men make use of words to express their thoughts; but that all Men do not make use of writing. Nor would it be a rational Objection to contradict the truth of the Proposition, by instancing dumb People, because it is evident, though the sense be not expressed in words, that it was not meant of such as had a natural impediment to make use of sounds, either elude, it will not be amiss to speak of another sort of Knowledge, which ofttimes is no less certain, nor less evident in its manner, then that which we draw from Authority.  
For there are two general ways, by which we know a Thing to be true; The first is the knowledge which we have by ourselves, whether we have attained it by Observation or Ratiocination, whether by our Senses or by our Reason; which may be generally termed Reason, in regard the Senses themselves depend upon the judgement of Reason or Knowledge; the word being here more generally taken than in the Schools; for all manner of knowledge of an object drawn from the same object.  
The other way is the Authority of Persons worthy of credit, who assure us that a thing is so. Tho of ourselves we know nothing of it. Which is called Faith or Belief, according to the words of St. Austin, for what we know, we owe to reason; for what we believe, to Authority.  
But as this Authority may be of two sorts, either from God or Men, so there are two sorts of Faith, Divine and Human.  
Divine Faith cannot be Subject to error, because that God can neither deceive us nor be deceived.  
Human Faith is of its self subject to error, for all Men are Liars according to Scripture: And because it may happen, that he who shall assure us of the certainty of a thing, may be deceived himself. Nevertheless as we have already observed; there are some things which we know not, but by a Human Faith, which nevertheless we ought to believe for as certain and unquestionable, as if they were Mathematically demonstrated. As that which is known by the constant relation of so many Persons, that it is morally impossible they should ever have conspired to affirm the same things, if they were not true. For example, Men have been naturally most averse from conceiving any Antipodes, nevertheless though we never were in those places, and know nothing of any Antipodes but by human Faith, he must be a Fool that does not believe 'em. And he must be out of his wits, who questions whether ever there were any such Persons as Caesar, Pompey, Cicero or Virgil, or whether they were not feigned Names, as Amadis de Gaul.  
True it is, that it is a difficult thing to know when Human Faith has attained to this same assurance; and this is that which leads Men astray into two such opposite Deviations: So that some believe too slightly upon the least report. Others ridiculously make use of all the force of their wit, to annul the belief of things attested by the greatest authority, when it thwarts the prejudice of their understanding. And therefore certain Limits are to be assigned, which Faith must exceed to obtain this assurance; and others, beyond which there is nothing but uncertainty, leaving in the middle a certain space, where we shall meet with certainty or uncertainty, as we approach nearer to the one or the other of these Bounds.  
Now than if we do but compare the two general ways, by which we believe a thing to be true, Reason and Faith; certain it is, that Faith always supposes some Reason. For as St. Austin says in his 122. Epistle, and in several other places, we could never bring ourselves to believe that which is above our reason, if reason itself had not persuaded us, that there are some things which we do well to believe, tho' we are not capable to apprehend 'em, Which is principally true in respect of Divine Faith. For true Reason teaches us, that God being truth itself, he cannot deceive us in what he reveals to us concerning his Nature and his Mysteries; whence it appears that though we are obliged to captivate our Understanding in obedience to Faith, as saith St. Paul, yet we do it neither blindly nor unreasonably (which is the original of all false Religions;) but with a knowledge of the Cause, and for that it is but a reasonable Act to Captivate ourselves to the Authority of God, when he has given us sufficient Proofs, such as are his Miracles and other Prodigious Accidents, which oblige us to believe that he himself has discovered to Men the Truths which we are to believe.  
As certain it is in the second Place, that divine Faith ought to have a greater Power over our Understanding then our own Reason. And that upon this Dictate of Reason itself, that the more certain is to be preferred before the less certain; and that is more certain which God assures us to be true, then that which Reason persuades us; when it is more contrary to the Nature of God to deceive us, than the nature of our own Reason to be deceived.    

CHAP. XIII. Certain Rules for the guidance of Reason, the belief of Events that depend upon Human Faith.  
THE most customary use of sound Judgement, and that faculty of the Soul, by which we discern Truth from falsehood is not employed in speculative Sciences, about which so few Persons are obliged to spend their time, and yet there is no occasion wherein it is more frequently to be made use of, and where it's more necessary than in that Judgement which we ought to make of what passes every day among Men.  
I do not speak of judging whether an Action be good or bad, worthy of applause or reproof, for that belongs to the regulation of Morality; but of judging of the Truth or Falsehood of human Events, which may only be referred to Logic, whether we consider 'em as past, as when we only endeavour to know whether we ought to believe 'em or not; or whether we consider 'em as being to come, as when we fear or hope they will come to pass, which regulates our hopes and our fears.  
Certain it is, that some Reflections may be made upon this Subject; which perhaps may not be altogether unprofitable, or rather may be of great use for the avoiding of certain Errors into which most People fall, because they do not sufficiently study the Rules of Reason.  
The first Reflection is, that there is a vast difference to be made between two sorts of Truths; the one that only relates to the nature of things, and their Immutable Essences abstracted from their existence, the other that relates to things existent that relate to human and contingent events, which may or may not come to pass when we speak of the future, and may probably never have been, when we talk of what is past. I speak this with reference to their next causes, making an abstraction of their Immutable order in Divine Providence; because on the one side it does not hinder Contingence, and on the other side being unknown to us, it contributes nothing to make us believe the things themselves.  
Now as all things are requisite in truths of the first sort, there is nothing sure, which is not Universally true, and so we must conclude that a thing is false if it be false in any case.  
But if we think to make use of the same Rules in human Events; we shall always judge falsely, and make a thousand false Arguments.  
For these Events being naturally contingent, it would be ridiculous to seek out in them for a necessary Truth. And so that person would be altogether void of Reason, who would believe nothing of such things unless it were made out to him, that it was absolutely necessary they should be so.  
Now would he less deviate from Reason that would require me to believe any particular Event, (suppose it were the Conversion of the King of China to the Christian Religion) upon this only ground, because it is not Impossible to be so. For seeing that another who should assure me to the contrary may make use of the same Reason; it is clear that that reason alone cannot determine me to believe the one rather than the other.  
We must therefore lay it down for a certain and unquestionable Maxim upon this occasion, that the possibility alone of an Event is not a sufficient reason to make me believe it, and that I may have reason also to believe a thing, though I judge it not impossible, but that the contrary may have come to pass; So that of the Two Events I may rationally believe the one and not the other, though I believe 'em both possible.  
How then shall we resolve to believe the one rather than the other, if we judge 'em both possible? Observe the following Rule.  
To judge of the Truth of an Event, and to persuade myself into a Resolution to believe, or not to believe a thing; it must not be considered nakedly, and in itself, like a Proposition in Geometry; but all the circumstances that accompany it, as well internal as external, are to be weighed with the same consideration; I call Internal Circumstances such as belong to the Fact itself; and external, those that relate to the Persons, whose Testimonies induce us believe it. This being done, if all the Circumstances are such, that it never, or very rarely happens, that the same Circumstances are accompanied with Falsehood: Our Understanding naturally carries to believe the thing to be true; and there is a reason for so doing, especially in the Conduct of the Actions of our Life, that never requires a greater assurance than a moral Certainty, and which is satisfied upon most occasions with a great Probability.  
But on the other side, if these Circumstances are such as are frequently accompanied with Falsehood; Reason requires us to suspend our Belief; or that we should look upon as false what is told us, when we see no likelihood, that it should be true, though we do not find any absolute Impossibility.  
For Example, we demand, whether the History of the Baptism of Constantine by Silvester be true, or false? Baronius believes it true; but Cardinal Perron, Bishop Spondanus, Petavius, Morinus, and the most eminent of the Roman Church believe it false. Now if we insist upon the sole Possibility, we have no reason to reject Baronius. For his opinion contains nothing absolutely impossible; and to speak absolutely, it is also possible, that Eusebius, who affirms the contrary, affirmed an untruth in favour of the Arrians; and that the Fathers that followed him were deceived by his Testimony. But if we make use of the Rule already laid down, which is to consider what are the Circumstances both of the one and the other Baptism of Constantine, and which are those that carry the greatest marks of Truth, we shall find 'em to be the latter. For on the one side, there is no great reason to rely upon the Testimony of a Writer as fabulous as the Author of the Acts of Sylvester who is the only person of Antiquity, who has spoken of Constantin's being baptised at Rome. And on the other side there is no liklihood that a Person so Serious and Learned as Eusebius should presume to report an untruth relating to a thing so remarkable, as the Baptism of the first Emperor that restored the Church to her Liberty, and which ought to have been spread over all the World, at the same time that he wrote, which was not above four or five Hundred years after the Death of the said Emperor.  
Nevertheless there is an Exception to this Rule, by which we ought to be satisfied with possibility or likelihood. That is, when an action, which is otherwise sufficiently attested, is contradicted by Incongruities, and apparent contrarieties with other Histories.  
For than it suffices that the Solutions brought to enervate these Repugnancies be possible and probable; and it would be unreasonable to require other positive Proofs; for that the Act itself being sufficiently proved, it is not equitable to require that we should prove all the Circumstances in the same manner. Otherwise we might call in question a thousand most certain Histories, which we cannot make agreed with others of less Authority, but by Conjectures which it is impossible to prove positively.  
For example, we cannot bring to an agreement what is delivered in the Kings and Chronicles concerning the years of the Reigns of several of the Kings of Juda and Israel, but by assigning to some of the Kings, two beginnings of their Reigns, the one during the Life of the Reigning Prince, and the other after the decease of their Parents. Now if it be asked what Proof we have that such a Prince reigned for some time with his Father; we must confess there is none Positive. But it suffices that it is a thing Possible, and which has often come to pass at other times, to make it Lawful for us to suppose it, as a Cicumstance necessary to reconcile Histories otherwise certain.  
And therefore there is nothing more ridiculous than the endeavours of some persons of this latter Age, to prove that St. Peter never was at Rome. They cannot deny this Truth to be attested by all the Ecclesiastic Writers, and those the most ancient, as Papias, Dionysius of Corinth, Caius, Irenaeus, Tertullian; against whom there is not any one that has made the the least Contradiction.  
Nevertheless they imagine they can ruin this Truth by Conjectures; for example, because St. Paul makes no mention of St. Peter in his Epistles written to Rome; and when they are answered that St. Peter might be then absent from Rome, in regard he is not said to have fixed his seat there, as being one that often travailed abroad to Preach the Gospel in other places; they reply that this is urged without any Proof, which is Impertinent, because the Act which they oppose, being one of the most confirmed Truths in Ecclesiastical History, it is sufficient for those that uphold it to reconcile these pretended Contrarieties, as they do those of the Scripture itself; for which, as we have showed possibility is sufficient.   

CHAP. VII. An Application of the preceding Rule to the Belief of Miracles.  
THE Rule which we have explained is without doubt of great Importance for the well regulating our Reason in the belief of particular Acts. For want of the due Observation of which we are in great danger of falling into the two dangerous extremities of Credulity and Incredulity.  
For example, there are some, who make a Conscience of questioning any Miracle; because they have a fancy, that they should be obliged to question all, should they question any; and for that they are persuaded, that it is enough for them, by knowing that all things are possible with God, to believe whatever is told 'em touching the Effects of his Omnipotency.  
Others as ridiculously imagine, that it is in the Power of the Understanding to call all Miracles in question, for no other reason, because so many have been related that have proved to be false, and therefore there is no more reason to believe the one than the other.  
The Inclination of the first is much more tolerable than that of the latter; though true it is, that both the one and the other argue equally amiss.  
They both depend upon common Places. The first upon the Power and Goodness of God; upon certain and unquestionable Miracles, which they bring for proof of those that are called in question; and upon the Blindness of Libertines; who will believe nothing, but what is proportionable to their Reason. All this is very good in its self; but very weak to convince us of a particular Miracle. For God does not always act according to his Power; nor is it an Argument, that a Miracle was wrought, because others of the same nature have been wrought. And we may do well to believe, what is above our Reason, without being obliged to believe all that Men are pleased to obtrude upon us, as being above our Reason.  
The latter make use of common Places of another sort.  
Truth says one of 'em, and Falsehood appear with Countenances alike; the same Gate, the same Steps we behold with the same Eyes. I have seen the rise of several miracles in my Time. And tho' they vanished in the birth, yet we cannot but foresee the Train they would have gathered, had they lived to their full Age. For it is but to find out the end of the Thread, and to cut it into as many pieces as we please, and there is not a greater distance between nothing and the smallest thing in the World, than there is between this and the greatest. Now the first that were intoxicated with this beginning of Novelty, coming to spread their History, find by the opposition which they meet with, where the difficulty of Persuasion lodges, and make it their business to Fucus over that part of a false Peice. Particular Error first causes public Mistake, and afterwards public mistake causes particular Error. Thus the whole Structure of the miracle by some pulled down, by others upheld, and by addition enlarged at length grows up to a considerable Pile. So that the most remote Witness is better instructed than he that lives close by, and the last that heard of it, better confirmed then the first Publisher.  
This Discourse is ingenious, and may be profitable to prevent us from being led away with every Idle Report. But it would be an Extravagance from hence to conclude generally that we ought to suspect whatever is said of Miracles. For certain it is, that what is here alleged relates only to those things which are taken up upon common Fame, without enquiring into the original cause of the Report. And we have no reason to be confident of what we know upon no better grounds.  
But who so blind as not to see that we may make a common place opposite to this, and that at least upon as good a Foundation?  
For as there are some miracles that would deserve but little credit, should we inquire into their Original, so there are others that vanish out of the memories of Men, or which find but little credit in their judgements, because they will not take the pains to inform themselves. Our understanding is not subject only to one sort of distemper, but several, and those quite contrary. There is a sottish stupidity, that believes all things the least probable. But there is a conceited presumption that condemns for false, whatever surpases the narrow limits of the understanding. Sometimes we hunt after trifles, and neglect things of greatest moment. False stories spread themselves every where, while true ones can hardly get liberty to creep abroad.  
Few Persons have heard of the miracle that happened in our time, at Faramonstier, in the Person of a Nun, so blind, that hardly the Balls of her Eyes were left in her Head, who recovered her sight by touching the Relics of St. Fara, as I am assured by the Testimony of a Person that saw her in both conditions.  
St. Austin affirms, that many real miracles were wrought in his time, that were known but to few; and which, though most remarkable and wonderful, spread no farther then from one end of the Town to the other. Which induced him to write, and relate, in his Sermons, to the People, such as were most certain. And he observes in his Twenty second Book of the City of God, that in the single city of Hippo, near Seventy Miracles were wr●●●●● within two years after the Building of a Chapel in Honour of St. Stephen, besides a great number of others which he did not commit to writing, which however he testifies to be true upon his knowledge.  
We therefore see that there is nothing more irrational, then to guide ourselves by common places, upon these occasions; whether it be in rejecting all Miracles, or embracing all. And therefore we must examine 'em by their particular Circumstances, and by the credit and knowledge of the Reporters.  
Piety does not not oblige a Man of Sense to believe all the Miracles in the Golden Legend or the Metaphrast: In regard those Books are so full of Fables, that there is nothing to be credited upon their Authority: As Cardinal Bellarmin has made no scruple to confess of the last.  
But I affirm, that every Man of Sense, bating his Piety, aught to acknowledge for true the Miracles which St Austin recites in his Confessions and his Book de Civitate Dei, some of which he saw, and others of which he was informed by the Persons themselves, in whose sight they were wrought. As of the Blind Man cured at Milan before all the People, by touching the Relics of St. Gervace and Protasius, which he reports in his Confession, and of which he speaks in the 22d. Book de Civitate Dei, cap. 8. A certain Miracle was wrought at Milan, when we were there, when a Blind Man was restored to his sight, which could not be unknown to Thousands; For it is a large City, and there was then the Emperor; and the thing was done before a vast Multitude of People, crowding to the Bodies of the Martyrs, St. Gervase and Protasius.  
Of a Woman cured in Africa by Flowers that had touched the Relics of St. Stephen, as he testifies in the same Book.  
Of a Lady of Quality cured of a Cancer by the sign of the Cross which she caused to be made upon the Soar, by one that was newly Baptised according to a Revelation which she had had.  
Of a Child that died unbaptised, whose restoration to Life the Mother obtained by her prayers to St. Peter, in the strength of her Faith, invoking him in these words, Holy Martyr restore me my Son: thou knowest, I ask his Life for no other reason, but because he should not be eternally separated from God.  
Now if these things may be supposed to have happened as they are related, there is no rational Person but must acknowledge these things to be the Finger of God. So that all their Incredulity could do, would be to doubt of the Testimony of St. Austin, and to believe him a falsifyer of the Truth, to gain a Veneration of the Christian Religion among the Pagans. Which is that which they have no colour to imagine.  
First, because it is not likely that a Person of his judgement would have told an untruth in things so public, wherein he might have been convinced of falsehood by infinite Numbers of Testimonies, which would have redounded to the Ignominy of the Christian Religion.  
Secondly, because there was never any Person more a professed Enemy of Falsehood, than this Holy Man, especially in matters of Religion, having made it the work of entire Treatises, to prove that it is not only unlawful to tell a lie; but a thing so detestable, that it is not to be made use of, though for the Conversion of Men to the Christian Faith.  
I have the more enlarged myself upon this remarkable example, of the judgement that is to be made of the Truth of Actions, to serve as a Rule upon the like occasions, because we most commonly deviate in those things. For every one thinks, that it is sufficient for the decision of these to make a common Place, which for the most part is only composed of Maxims, which not only are not Universally True, but not so much as probable when they are joined with the particular Circumstances of Actions, that fall under Examination. And therefore Circumstances are to be compared and considered together, not considered a part. For it often happens, that an Act which is not very probable in one Circumstance, aught to be esteemed and taken for certain, according to other Circumstances: And on the other side, an Action which appears to us true, according to one Circumstance which is usually joined with truth, aught to be deemed false, according to other weakening Circumstances, as we shall make out in the following Chapter.   

CHAP. XV. Other Remarks upon the same Subject, of the Beleif of Events.  
THere is yet one other Remark of great Moment, to make upon the Belief of Events. Which is, that among those Circumstances which we ought to consider, that we may know whether credit be to be given to the Fact, or no; there are some which we may call common Circumstances, because they frequently occur; and are far oftener joined to Truth then Falsehood, and then if they be not Counterbalanced by other particular Circumstances, that ruin the motives of belief drawn from common Circumstances, we have reason to believe those events, if not to be certain, yet at least to be probable; which probability is sufficient, when we are bound to pronounce our opinion in such cases. For as we ought to be satisfied with a moral assurance, in things not capable of Metaphysical certainty; so when we cannot obtain a full moral assurance, the best we can do, when we are to resolve, is to embrace the most probable; for it would be contrary to reason to embrace the least probable.  
But if on the other side these common Circumstances, which would have induced us to believe a thing, be joined with other particular Circumstances that ruin the motives of belief, drawn from common Circumstances, or be such as are rarely found without falsehood, we are not then any longer to believe that event. But either we remain in suspense, if the particular Circumstances enfeeble the weight of common Circumstances, or we believe the action to be false, if the Circumstances are such as are usually the marks of Falsehood.  
For example, it is a common Circumstance, for many Contracts to be signed by two public Notaries; that is, by two public Persons, whose chiefest Interest it is to be just and true in their employments, because not only their Conscience and Reputation, but their Lives and Estates lie at Stake. This consideration alone is sufficient, if we know no other particularities of the contract, to make us believe that the Contract is not Antedated. Not but that it might be so; but because it is certain, that of a Thousand Contracts, Nine Hundred Ninety Nine are not. So that it is infinitely more probable, that this contract is one of the Nine Hundred Ninety Nine, than the only Antedated Contract of a Thousand. So that if withal, the integrity of the Notary that signed it be known to me, I shall most certainly believe, that there is no foul play in the Writing.  
But if to this common Circumstance of being signed by two Notaries, there are joined other particular Circumstances, as that the Notaries are Persons of no Conscience or Reputation, so that they might be instrumental in falsifying the deed, yet shall not this make me conclude that the deed is antedated. But if besides all these, I can discover other proofs of the Antedate, either by Witnesses or convincing Arguments, as the inability of the Person to lend Twenty Thousand Crowns, at a time when it shall be demonstrable that he had not a Hundred in cash, I will then resolve to believe the contract to be falsified, and it were unreasonable for any Person to believe me to believe otherwise; and I should do ill, to suspect others, where I did not however see the same marks or Falsehood, not to be false, since they might be as well Counterfeited as the other.  
We may apply all this to several matters that cause frequent disputes among the Learned. We demand if such a Book were written by such an Author whose Name was always to it? And whether the Acts of a Council are True or Counterfeit?  
Certain it is, that we ought to give Sentence for the Author, whose name has been long acknowledged and affixed to the Work; and for the Acts of a Council which we read every day; nor are we to believe the contrary, but upon very strong Reasons.  
Therefore a most learned Person of this Age, being to prove, that the Epistle of Cyprian to Pope Steven, about Martian Bishop of Arles, was none of the Holy Martyrs, he could not convince the Learned, his Conjectures not seeming sufficient to deprive St. Cyprian of a Peice that had always carried his Name, and which has a perfect resemblance of Style, with the rest of his Works.  
In vain also it is, that Blondel and Salmasius, not able to answer the Argument drawn from the Epistles of Ignatius, for the superiority of Bishops above Priests, in the Infancy of the Church, pretend those Epistles to be Counterfeit, though as they were Printed by Vossius and Usher, from the Ancient Manuscript in the Florentine Library: Insomuch that they have been refuted by those of their own party. For that confessing as they do, that we have the same Epistles which were cited by Eusebius, St. Jerom, Theodoret, and Origen himself, there is no likelihood that the Epistles of Ignatius, being collected by Polycarp, that the true Epistles should have disappeared, and others be counterfeited in the time between Polycarp and Origen or Eusebius. Besides that those Epistles of Ignatius, which we have now wear such a Character of the holiness and simplicity, so proper to the Apostolic Times, that they justify themselves against the vain accusations of being false and counterfeit.  
Lastly, all the difficulties that Cardinal Perron proposes against the Epistles of the Council of Afric, to Pope Celestin▪ touching Appeals to the See, cannot prevail with us to believe otherwise now then before, but that those Epistles were really written by the Council.  
But it happens sometimes that particular Circumstances carry more weight in Persuasion, then long Possession.  
So that altho' the Epistle of St. Clement to St. James Bishop of Jerusalem be translated by Ruffinus, near upon thirteen hundred Years ago, and that it is cited and owned for St. Clement by a Council of France, above twelve Hundred years ago, yet we can hardly believe it otherwise then Sergeant. In regard that St. James being Martyred before St. Peter, it is impossible that St. Clement should write after the Death of St. Peter, as the Epistle supposes.  
Thus though the Commentaries upon St. Paul are attributed to St. Ambrose, and cited under his Name by a great number of Authors, together with that imperfect Work upon St. Mathem, under the name of chrysostom. All Men however at this day agree that they belong to neither, but to other ancient Authors full of many Errors.  
Lastly, the Acts of the two Sinuessan Councils under Marcellin, and two or three at Rome, under Silvester, and another at Rome under Sixtus III. might be sufficient to persuade us of the verity of those Councils, if they contained nothing but what were congruous to reason, and which might be proper for the times, wherein they are said to be Celebrated; but they contain so many absurdities, so disagreeable from those times, that there is great likelihood of their being false and counterfeit.  
And these are the Remarks which may serve for these sorts of judgements. But we must not imagine 'em to be of such great use, as always to free us from the danger of being deceived. All that they can do at most, is to guard us from the more gross and apparent Absurdities, and to enure us not to be carried astray by common Places, which containing something of general Truth, cease not however to be false upon many particular occasions, which is one of the chiefest sources of human Error.   

CHAP. XVI. Of the Judgements we ought to make of Future Accidents.  
THese Rules that serve us to judge of Things past, may be applied to things to come. For as we probably judge a Thing to have come to pass, when the certain Circumstances which we know to be usually joined to the Fact; we may as probably believe that such a thing will happen, when the present Circumstances are such as are usually attended by such an Effect. Thus the Physicians judge of the good or bad success of Diseases; Captain of the future Events of War; and that we judge in the world of the most part of contingent Affairs.  
But as to these Accidents of which we are some part ourselves, and which we may either promote or prevent by our care and foresight, in avoiding or exposing ourselves to harm or danger; it happens that most persons fall into many errors, so much the more grievous, by how much they seem to be guarded by reason; because they only set before their Eyes, the Grandeur and consequence of the advantage which they wish for, or the mischiefs that they fear, not considering the likelihood and probability that this advantage or inconvenience may happen or not happen.  
In like manner, when it is any great misfortune which they fear, as loss of Life or Estate, they think it prudence not to take any care to prevent it. Or if it be any great advantage which they expect, as the gain of a Hundred Thousand Crowns, they think they act wisely to endeavour the gaining of it, if the Venture cost but little, let the probability of success be never so small.  
By such a Ratiocination as this it was, that a Princess hearing that some Persons had been overwhelmed by the fall of a Roof, would never go into a House, till she had all the Roofs first viewed; and she was so fully persuaded, that she had a reason for so doing, that she accounted all other imprudent, that did not as she did.  
'Tis also this appearance of Reason, that engages several Persons into inconvenient and excessive cautions for the preservation of their Health. This is that which renders others distrustful even in little Things; for that having been sometimes deceived, they believe they shall be deceived in all their other Business.  
This is that which enveagles so many People to Lotteries, to gain, cry they, Twenty Thousand Crowns for one Crown, is not that a very great advantage? And every one believes himself shall be that happy Person, upon whom this great Fortune shall shower itself: Never considering, that though the Lots promise Twenty Thousand for One, 'tis Thirty times more probable to every particular person, that he shall be a loser than a winner.  
And this is the Defect of this Ratiocination; for that we may judge what is fit to be done, to obtain the good and avoid the evil, we ought not only to consider the good and the evil in its self; but also the probability whether it may happen or no; and Geometrically to consider the Proportion which the things hold together; which may be demonstrated by this Example.  
Ten Men at play, stake every one a Crown, there is but one can win the whole Stake, all the rest are loser's. So that every one has these two chances, either to lose One Crown or win Nine. Now if we should consider only the gain and loss in themselves, it might seem that all had an equal advantage: But we are to consider moreover, that if every one may win Nine Crowns, and can only lose one, it is also nine times more probable in respect of every one, that he shall lose his One, then win the Nine; while every Man has nine Degrees of Probability to lose one Crown, and but one degree of Probability to gain Nine; which equals the hopes and fears of Gain and Loss.  
All Plays of this Nature, are as equitable as Plays can be, but all that are not under this Equality of Lots are unjust. And hence it is that it may be plainly made out, that there is an evident Injustice in all sorts of Lotteries; for the Master of the Lottery usually claiming the tenth part of the whole Fund for his own share, the whole crowd of those that play is cheated in the same manner as if a Man playing at a Game, wherein there were as much likelihood of winning as losing should Play nine Pistols to one. Now if this be disadvantageous to the whole Crowd, it must be also the same to every particular person, because the Probability of losing, far more surpasses the Probability of gaining, than the advantage we hope for, the disadvantage of Losing.  
Sometimes there is so little likelihood in the success of a thing, that how advantageous so ever it be, and how small soever the hazard of winning, it is better not to hazard. Thus it would be a foolish thing to play twenty Sols against ten Millions of Livres, or against a Kingdom, upon condition he should not win, unless such an Infant taking out the Letters out of a Printers Case by accident, did all of a sudden Compose the first twenty Verses of Virgil's Aeneiads. For indeed there are few Moment's escape us, wherein we do not run the Risco of losing more, than a King that should stake his Kingdom to such a Condition.  
These Reflections seem of little value, and are so indeed if westop here; but we may make use of 'em in matters of greater Importance; and the chiefest use we can make of 'em is to render us more rational in our hopes and fears. For Example, there are some Persons that are in a Pannic dread when they hear it Thunder; which clatter and hurly-burly in the Sky, if it put 'em in mind of God and Death, 'tis well; but if only the fear of being Thunderstruck causes this extraordinary apprehension, than it will easily appear how little Reason they have. For of two Millions of Persons 'tis very much if one be killed in that manner: and we may also aver, that there is no sort of violent Death happens so rarely. Since then the fear of mischief ought to be Proportionable to the greatness of the danger, and the Probability of the Event, as there is no sort of danger that so rarely befalls us as to be killed with Thunder, so have we the least reason to fear it: since that fear will no way avail us to avoid it.  
Hence Arguments may be produced not only to undeceive such People as are so over morosely and unseasonably cautious in the Preservation of their Health and Lives, by showing 'em that those Precautions are much more mischievous than the danger so remote from the accident which they fear; but also to disabuse another sort that always argue thus in other affairs, there is danger in this Business, therefore it is evil. There is Profit in this, therefore it is good: In regard we are not to judge of those things, either by the danger or the advantage, but by their proportion one with another.  
It is the Nature of things Finite to be exceeded, how bulky soever they be by the least of things, if multiplied often enough; or if the little things are far more Superior to the great ones in probability of Event, than they are inferior to 'em in bigness.  
For an Atom may exceed a Mountain if it be sufficiently multiplied, or if this great Good we wish for is so difficult to be obtained, that it surpasses the little one more in Magnitude, than the little one surpasses the greater in facility of being obtained. The same is to be said of those mischiefs which we fear; that is, that the least Evil may be more considerable than the greatest Evil, which is not Infinite, if it surpass it according to this Proportion.  
There are nothing but Infinite things that can be equalled by any temporal advantage, and therefore they are never to be put in the Balance with any of the things of this Word. And therefore the least degree of Facility for a Man to save himself is worth all the felicities of this World joined together. And the least danger of losing it is more considerable than all temporal mischiefs, if only looked upon as Misfortunes.  
And this may be sufficient, for all rational persons to draw from what has been said, this Conclusion, with which we will end our Logic. That the greatest of all Imprudence, and highest of all Madnesses is this, to spend our Lives and our Time in any thing else then in what may be serviceable to acquire us a Life that never shall have any end. Since the Good and Evil of this Life is nothing, if compared to the felicities and sufferings of the other; and the danger of falling into the one is as great as the difficulty of acquiring the other.  
They who draw this Conclusion, and follow it is the conduct of their Lives, are Prudent and Wise, let 'em be never so unlearned in Arguments concening the Sciences. Whereas they who neglect it, though never so Learned in other things, are called in Scripture Fools, Madmen, and make but an ill use of Logic, Reason, or their Lives.   
THE END.    

THE TABLE.  
THE first Discourse. Showing the design of thy new Logic. Fol. 1  
The Second Discourse. Containing an Answer to the Principal Objections made against this Logic. ●.  

PART I. Containing Reflections upon Ideas, or upon the First Operations of the mind, which is called the Apprehension 44. 

Chap. 1. Of Ideas, according to their Nature and Originl 45.  
C. 2. Of the Objects of Ideas 58.  
C. 3. Of Aristotle's Ten Predicaments 64.  
C. 4. Of the Composition and Simplicity of Ides, wherein is discoursed the manner of knowing by Abstraction 69.  
C. 5. Of the Universality, Particularity and Singularity of Ideas 74.  
C. 6. Of the Five Universal Ideas, Genus, Species, Difference, Proper and Accident 73.  
C 7. Of the Complexed Terms, their Universality and Singularity 87.  
C. 8. Of the Clearness and Distinction of Ideas; as also of their obscurity and confusion 97.  
C. 9 Some Examples of confused Ideas, drawn from Ethics 108.  
Of another cause of Confusion in our thoughts and discourses 121.  
C. 11. Of the Remedy of confusions in our Thoughts and Ratiocinations, arising from the confusion of words. Of the benefit of defining words; and of the difference between the Definition of Things and Names 126.  
C. 12. Certain Observations of great Importance, touching the definition of words 134.  
C. 13. Of another sort of Definition of Names, by which their significations are denoted according to common use 140.    
PART II. 

Chap. 1. What a Proposition is? Of the fourth sorts of Propositions 162.  
C. 2. Of the Opposition of Propositions, having the same Subject and Predicate 168.  
C. 3. Of Propositions Simple and Compound. That there are some which seem to be simple but are not; and which may be called Complex Propositions, both as to the Subject and Attribute 171.  
C. 4. Of the Nature of Incident Propositions, that make a part of Propositions complexed 177.  
C. 5. Of the falsehood that occurs in Complex Terms, and Incident Propositions 183.  
C. 6. Of Complex Propositions, according to Affirmation and Negation. Of one sort of Propositions which the Philosophers call Modal 190.  
C. 7. Of several sorts of Composed Propositions 194.  
C. 8. Of Propositions composed in sense 204.  
C. 9 Observations to find out the Predicates and Subjects in Propositions, expressed after a less usual manner 215.  
C. 10. Other Observations to know whether Propositions are Universal or Particular 219.  
C. 11. Of two sorts of Propositions necessary for the Learning of the Sciences, Definition and Division 229.  
C. 12. Of the Definition of a Thing 235.  
C. 13. Of the Conversion of Propositions, with a thorough Inquisition into the Nature of Affirmation and Negation, upon which the Conversion depends. And first of the Nature of Affirmation 240.  
C. 14. Of the Conversion of Affirmative Propositions 247.  
C. 15. Of the Nature of Negative Propositions 249.  
C. 16. Of the Conversion of Negative Propositions 249.    
PART III. Of Discourse or Ratiocination 1. 

C. 1. Of the Nature of Ratiocination, and the several parts of it 2.  
C. 2. The Division of Syllogisms into Simple and Conjunctive; and of simple into Incomplex and Complex 6.  
C. 3. General Rules for simple Syllogisms incomplexed 8.  
C. 4. Of the Figures and Modes of Syllogisms in general. That there can be no more than five Figures 17.  
C. 5. The Rules, Modes and Foundations of the first Figure 21.  
C. 6. The Rules, Modes and Principles of the second Figure 26.  
C. 7. The Rules Modes and Grounds of the third Figure 30.  
C. 8. Of the Modes of the Fourth Figure 33.  
C. 9 Of Complex Syllogisms, and how they may be resolved into Common Syllogisms, and how judged by the same Rules 37.  
C. 10. A General Principle, by the help of which, without any other Reduction into Figures and Modes, the Truth or Falsehood of all Syllogisms may be known. 46.  
C. 11. The Application of this General Principle to several Syllogisms that seem to be intricate. 50.  
C. 12. Of Conjunctive Syllogisms 55.  
C. 13. Of Syllogisms, whose Conclusions are Disjunctive 61.  
C. 14. Of Enthymemes and Enthymematic Sentences 67.  
C. 15. Of Syllogisms composed of more than three Propositions 69.  
C. 16. Of Dilemmas 73.  
C. 17. Of the Places or Method to find out Arguments; and how this Method is of little use 77.  
C. 18 The Division of Places into Places of Grammar, Logic, and Metaphysics 82.  
C. 19 Of the several sorts of vicious Arguments, called Sophisms 90.  
C. 20. Of bad reasoning in civil Conversation and common Discourse 116.    
PART IU. Concerning Method 158. 

Chap. 1. Of Knowledge, that there is such a thing, that the Knowledge of things by the mind is more certain than what we know by our Senses, that there are some things of which Man's understanding is uncapable. The advantage of this necessary ignorance. 159.  
C. 2. Of the two sorts of Method, Analysis and Synthesis. An Example of Analysis. 171.  
C. 3. Of the Method of Composition, and particularly that which is observed by the Geometricians. 181.  
C. 4. A moreparticular Explication of the foregoing Rules, and first of those that relate to Definitions 184  
C. 5. That the Geometricians seem not to have rightly understood the difference between the Definition of words and things 190.  
C. 6. Of the Rules in Reference to Axioms 194.  
C. 7. Certain Axioms of Moment that may serve for Principles of great Truth 201.  
C. 8. Of Rules relating to Demonstration 205.  
C. 9 Of some Errors usually occurring in the Method of the Geometricians 208.  
C. 10. An Answer to what the Geometricians allege for themselves 217.  
C. 11. The Method of Sciences reduced to eight Principal Rules 219.  
C. 12. Of what we know by Faith, whether Human or Divine? 221.  
C. 13. Certain Rules for the guidance of Reason, the belief of Events that depend upon Human Faith 225.  
C. 14. An Application of the preceeeding Rule to the Belief of Miracles 230.  
C. 15. Other Remarks upon the same Subject, of the Belief of Events 237.  
C. 16. Of the Judgements we ought to make of Future Accidents 242.     
FINIS.