A REPLY To a Paper of Dr Sandersons, CONTAINING A Censure of Mr. A. A. his book OF THE Confusions and Revolutions OF Government. London, Printed by A. I. and are to sold by T. R. 1650. Dr Sandersons Paper and Censure. UPon persual of Mr Ascham's Book you left with me, I find not my selfin my understanding thereby convinced of the Necessity or Lawfulness of Conforming unto, or Complying with an unjust prevailing Power, further than I was before persuaded, it might be Lawful or Necessary so to do: viz. As paying Taxes, and Submitting to some other things (in themselves not unlawful) by them imposed or required; such as I had a Lawful Liberty to have done in the same manner, though they had not been so Commanded, and seem to me in the Conjuncture of present Circumstances, prudentially necessary to preserve myself or my Neighbour from the Injuries of Those that would be willing to make use of my Non-submission, to Mine or His ruin; so as it be done with these Cautions: 1. Without Violation either of Duty to God, or any other just Obligation, that lies upon me by Oath, Law, or otherwise. 2. On●ly in the case of Necessity otherwise not to be avoided. 3. Without any explicit or implicit acknowledgement of the Justice and Legality of their Power: I may submit to the {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} (to the Force) but not acknowledge the {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, (the authority) or by any Voluntary Act give strength, assistanc, or countenance thereunto. 4. Without any prejudice unto the claim of the Oppressed Party that hath a right, Title; or casting myself into an Incapacity of lending him my due and bounden Assistance, if, in time to come, it may be useful to him towards the Recovery of his Right. 5. Where I may reasonably, and Bonâ Fide presume, the Oppressed Power, (to whom my Obedience is justly due) if he perfectly knew the present Condition I am in, together with the Exigence and Necessity of the present Case, and all of Circumstances thereof, would give his willing Consent to such my Conformity and Compliance. So that, upon the whole matter and in short, I conceive I may so far submit unto the Impositions, or comply with the Persons of a prevailing usurped Power, unjustly commanding things not in themselves unlawful; or make use of their Power to protect one from others Injuries, As I may submit unto, comply with, or make use of an highway Thief, or Robber, when I am fallen into his hands, and lie at his Mercy. As for Mr Ascham's Discourse, though it be handsomely framed, yet all the Strength of it to my seeming (if he would speak out) would be in plain English these: 1. That self-preservation is the first and chiefest Obligation in the World, to which all other Bonds and Relations (at least between Man and Man) must give place. 2. That no Oath, at least no imposed Oath, at what Terms soever expressed, binde's the Taker further than he intended to bind himself thereby; and, it is presumed, that no man intended to bind himself to the prejudice of his own safety. Two dangerous and desperate Principles, which evidently tend 1. to the taking away of all Christian Fortitude and Suffering in a Righteous Cause: 2. to the Encouraging of daring and ambitious Spirits to attempt continual Innovations, with this Confidence, that if they can by any ways (how unjust soever) possess themselves of the Supreme Power, they ought to be submitted unto: 3. to the Obstructing unto the Oppressed Party all possible ways and means, without a Miracle, of ever recovering that just Right, of which he shall have been unjustly dispossessed: And (to omit further instancing) 4. to the bringing in of Atheism, with the Contempt of God and all Religion, whilst every man, by making his own Preservation the Measure of all his duties and Actions, maketh himself thereby his own Idol. The Reply. jam sorry so strict a Censurer could find any words to commend (as he saith) the handsome frame of a book, whose Deductions he doth not like: And I had rather have accompanied so great a Judge to the trial of its Basis and Principles, than he left by him thus suddenly groping in the dark, when every devious step hath a Precipice, yet hear the way (as laid out in that book) affirmed to be both generally good, and generally bad. If he had ruined its foundations, or disabled it in any one nominated Chapter or Section, we might with greater confidence avoid it, as a fabric ready to fall by its own nod. But what he hath not effected by the way of Censure, the Author of the Exercitation Of the exercitat on concerning usurped Powers. concerning usurped Powers hath done as little by the way of Answer. I should not have mentioned him at all (the main of whose book relates to several other Authors of a different historical seen) did not I find him (as I shall here show) contradictory both to friend and foe, to himself, to the Principles of the Parliaments first engagement, to this Dr. to Boxhornius, and to the learned Grotius. Besides he pretends only to answer two Chapters of our Author, not taking Notice of the last Additionall Chapters. But by the rules of all logic it is no way of answering an Argument, but a kind of denying a Conclusion, if the Respondent only turn aside to prove a Proposition contrary to the deductions of the first Position asserted. For by that means he answers nothing of another's, but only proves something of his own, and so le●ves the Comparison of reasons still a question; which (not to scandalize the Gentleman) is the only subject and Method of that second Chapter which he bestows so Magisterially, and to so little purpose on our Author. The State of the controversy. Whether in order to public Obedience in civil government, the Consideration of the things commanded (as they are not in themselves bad) be above the circumstantial qualification of the Persons Commanding? As to do the Offices of a judge or justice of Peace by Uirtue of Commission derived from any governor what ever. BY civil Government our Author means a public and ministerial Power, ordained sometimes and in some Places extraordinarily by God, but ordinarily now by man in his public Necessities, to the end that nations may be conserved from Confusions and Private injuries in meo & ●uo, and that they may in all forms act securely according to their Natures, Religion and Necessities. The Author of the Exercitation saith, p. 10. 12. Government must be delivered by custom or Law, But I would he could inform Vide Bacon's Hist. H. 7. p. 144 us by what Positive Law Nimrod and others in heroical seizures entered into Government at first, and whether our Henry the seventh, entering into the Government when by Law he stood accused of Treason, could this way be owned, or any from him to be lawful governors? By lawful, the Doctor here understands that which is legal (which relates but to private Justice and its Tribunals) so that by lawful Commanders he understands those only, who legally derive their Authority continuedly from those who were originally authors of it: by which they who have Ius ad regnum succeed uninterruptedly (as Boxhornius saith) In locum ultimi, & injus primi; which Principle (tho it hath such great assertors) is of no security to present Princes and governors, making our Obligations in oaths of Allegiance as uncertain, as the right so specified in them is, and may shake all the Kingly Titles and crowns in Christendom; as the Exercitation doth sufficiently by his not clearing himself, p. 2. Where he saith, Princes are rightly invested with sovereignty, 1. Immediately by God. 2. Mediately by his committing it to the people to Elect. 3. When God by a Reservation of his Power still Exer. p. 2. in terposeth to design the Person. Tho this be well said, yet it is not enough. For first it provides not for people's obeying a capital family in Genarchaship, of which our Author treats Chap. 11. part. 2. Secondly, what shall we say to such governors who were not originally designed immediately by God, nor mediately by such a free choice of the People as he requires, and as was scarcely ever practised since Nimrod's entry? Thirdly, seeing according to him God still reserves the prerogative of designing Persons to governments, but that the public Revelation of his will by Prophecy and Miracles is ceased, what then doth that Author but allow men to undertake to change governors and Governments by virtue of Private spirit and Revelation, which we are not able always to confute, no more than others are able always to prove to us, and after this how will that Author be ever able to prove a certain usurpation in his sense? To avoid these perplexities and inquiries, our Authors, or rather St Austin's Principle is safer both for Princes and people, viz. That we obey those who plenarily possess us, and force us not to the practice of things in themselves impious. They who according to Hosea 〈◊〉. 4. Set up Kings, but not by God, are accountable for it; but doth it follow that we of the People during that uncertainty might not obey them? The like inconsonancies hath he to this purpose, p. 3. Where speaking concerning the manner of the people's consent to make a true Title in a Prince; he saith it matters not whether it be antecedent or Consequent to Possession. For first, if it be with the unjust dispossession of another (which he ought Principally to have spoken to) than the people's subsequent consent cannot make the intrusion lawful to the intruder. Secondly, what will he say to Boxhornius, who maintains the same Cause with him, and argues that the people's consent, tacit or express, antecedent or subsequent to another's Possession, cannot take away the right which the Heirs of a successive Prince have to govern, tho their father might be justly ejected? Because (saith he) the original Compact was in consideration of the first blood, not of the particular persons governing. But by these loose arguments they do but perplex one another, more than us: and for Boxhornius it is sufficient that he makes the Hollanders his Countrymen rebels still, and this King of Spain likewise but an usurper, if he derive not every way a right from the first blood in compact. Wherefore according to the Statute of Henry the seventh, for obeying the King being, we suppose our governor to be lawful, and then proceed to make laws and to conform to them. Our Author understands that to be lawful which is not so much legal as Equitable; because it is de jure publico, of which there is no mortal tribunal to Judge, or to receive the Pleas of such supreme dissenting Powers. So that by lawful commanders he understands p. 1. those who in this state of confused families, and uncertainty of traditional disguised and interested knowledge of rights may to us (if not to themselves) be more equitably then Legally such, when they plenarily possess, Protect, and Command us lawful things. By lawful things our Author means things no way disconvenient with the society of mankind, nor with the Principles of the Christian p. 3. 〈◊〉 1. Religion, and therefore may lawfully be practised by us of the People at all times, and in all countries. Such things as these are. 1. The payment of duties and taxes for the present benefit of Protection. Because a little time serves to ruin a man, especially in the Privation of all government. 2. A right to join with others to oppose that which might otherwise confound the quiet of a whole Nation, and disorder political legal and universal Justice. 3. To go to the present Tribunals for conserving livelihood, meum and tuum and all legal justice. 4. To act subordinatly in inferior offices and callings, so as may be for the good of our poor Neighbours, which is but a passive Obedience, as all Obedience originally it, being done only Ex Jussu Imperantis. It is agreed by all, that in things unlawful, the Consideration of the Persons (Lawful or unlawful) weighs not at all; For in that Case we must obey God the supremest Magistrate rather then man. But when lawful things are commanded, then three things are in Consideration. 1. Some say, that to legitimate our Obedience we must first assure ourselves of the Legality of the Persons Commanding; and then we may obey them in all lawful things, otherwise in nothing. 2. Our Author hath asserted in several Chapters, That in this confused state of the World, wherein Interest (which makes false Gods, and counterfeit laws for Heaven) makes and maintains many Princes by the like fictions (as they who would be owned as the offspring of the Gods) and Princes themselves oft not permitting the trial of their Rights, require as much faith for civil, as for Religious Interests, he asserts (I say) that such an original and legal assurance being a moral impossibility, it is best and enough for our present Obedience, to inform ourselves, Whether the kingdom be plenarily possessed by those p. 1. c. 7, 8. who in present exercise immediate command over it. And if so, than we may obey them in the lawful things above specified. For he hath showed that all governors are but ministerial for the quiet practice of the rules of Right, and that therefore, they enter not into the definition of Justice. Besides for arguments sake he saith, that a thing should be continued as Civilly lawful, it is not always necessary that it should enter, Sine dolo aut vitiato principio, provided it be not irrational when it is entered, or unjust as a custom: Every circumstantial error makes not a false Church, nor every sin an untrue believer. Neither doth all civil obligation or contract among People begin by mutual Consent. But in Ui●e exerc●. p. 4. the Cases De in rem verso, & negotiis gestis, when other men's businesses are well done for them, it is sufficient if there be Rei con●rectatio, a voluntary meddling in the business of another man; as in the redemption of other men's Children from slavery, whom the Parent ought by the Law of Nature to redeem; also in the Guardienship of the Minor, which is always the state of a commonwealth, according to an old and true axiom, Respuh: semper est in curâ & tutelâ: But the Law allows the Guardien to look after the Minors Rights at his Charges, tho he know not of it, or knowing, would not (through peevishness) have them so looked after. From whence I coherently infer, That the protection of this supreme State- guardien like a Meritum infers Allegiance as a Debitum, according to Solomon, Prov. 27. 18. He who keeps the figtree shall eat the fruit thereof. Nay i● he administer the same political Justice, and give the same Protection or Security, we are bound to do more than obey him, viz. praise God for him. All of us say, that it is sufficient in the Change of the sabbath, if that which was moral in it remain still: and in the Point of Mission of Ministers, we say the doctrinal Succession is sufficient, tho there were Change or Interruption of the personal since Christ's time: and what can hinder us from saying the same concerning things Civilly lawful (when there are civil Changes of Persons or governments) but immediate Interest, Ambition or Revenge? For this Reason Christ and his Apostles bade us not so much beware of illegal and false Princes, as of false Prophets; because at the day of Judgement we shall all be examined concerning the things themselves done here in the flesh, not under what political Titles and forms. 3. The Censurer stands balancing betwixt these two ways of Obedience, and for want of that Christian fortitude which he speaks of, outwardly only pretends to a station of Neutrality, although really he is most consonant with our Author, nor any way opposite to his public Assertions, or to present Obedience. The Cases wherein the Censurer allows Obedience to a The Cases of Obedience. supposed unjust Authority. First, He directly saith, he can pay taxes, and conform to other things imposed by those who unlawfully and plenarily possess a Kingdom. Here he leaves us in the dark, by not naming those other things, which may be (for aught we know) all those other things asserted by our Author. Howsoever he sufficiently acknowledgeth the present Authority, and so falls off from those of the first opinion: But how he conceives he hath liberty to pay taxes and other duties without being commanded l understand not. Secondly, he saith, he can obey in things not unlawful in themselves; Which is the utmost of what our Author asserts, especially in the Chapter of political justice. Thirdly, he can conform to what in the Conjuncture of present Circumstances may seem prudentially necessary for his own, and his neighbour's preservation from Injuries: He approves not of a nonobedience, which might be made use of to his own danger. But for assuring his Obedience in these three general heads (which comprehend the whole state of Subjection) he must have these five provisoes, which I shall examine, only to see how far they are opposite either to Reason, or to the Book which he Censures. Those three Cases of Obedience are allowable then only, when they Provis 〈…〉 1. violate no Duty to God, or Obligation of Oath or Law. The same is asserted largely by our Author, showing how things in themselves just and necessary, are not displeasing to God: as also how Promissory Oaths always have tacit conditions innate to them, in regard of their uncertain futurition: That the condition of political Oaths, is to obey whom God permits plenarily to possess Kingdoms, which is the sense in which Kings themselves understand them. Though such Oaths may be violated by Princes, who at the expense of the people's blood, dispute de jure ad regnum, yet that ended, the poor People in submitting to changed Titles, violate no former Oaths. For the matter of such Oaths Sanderson praelec. 7. sec. 7. and Laws (as the Censurer himself hath taught it) is consumed to them, and as I may say, dies to them like fire, rather by extinction, than by corruption. Otherwise all the World should be obliged to moral impossibilities, which the Censurers Book of Oaths will not allow. For that were to be ever restless among ourselves, till we brought God to our bent; as if we could force him to continue such Persons and governors only, as we approve of best ourselves. The second Proviso gives allowance only in Cases of extreme Necessity. 2. Which our Author likewise asserts to be that alone which Originally makes, interprets, and finally abrogates Laws and governments ministerial to them, and so becomes the Caesar of Caesar's. The third is, When he may reasonably presume, that the Power to which his Obedience is justly due, upon consideration of his present exigencies, 3. would (if he knew them) dispense with his present Obedience to a prevailing Power. Our Author asserts thus much and more (Chap. 10. p. 2.) not here contradicted, especially when the supposed governor derives such an absolute clear right as is here pretended. This Proviso for self-Preservation, runs to the end of all the Circumstances of Subjection to a new possessor; and may be (as he saith) as reasonably presumed from all right powers actually ejected, as it was reasonably practised by King Ferdinand antecedently to his ejection out of the Kingdom of Naples, to prevent the desolation of his Subjects. This indeed was a releasement by dispensation, because he then was in possession: But when Princes do (as the civil Law saith) and as in the Government of the 24 years which our Author Uide. p. 1. c. 1. supposes, when Edward the fourth lived in Flanders, pati capitis diminutionem, and are reduced to the station of private Persons, living in other orbs, subject to other Magistracies; then the Law looks at them as civilly dead; so that the releasement than is by extinction, as the same Law saith, {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. Death dissolves all things alike. The Author of the Exercitation, p. 58. falls highly foul on the Dr. here, and will not allow him this Proviso, saying, Such a presumptive releasement is groundless, and highly impious, and is but his own act, & that cannot be a discharge. The Doctor & our Author here speak not of the extremities of one particular man, but of a whole Nation, in which Case Posito sed non concesso that Princes had such an inalienable right of Property in People, & that government were for the person governing primarily, yet the presumption were good, and would discharge a man in foro interiori, though not in exteriori, where (for reasons of state) summum jus is sometimes summa injuria. I wonder What express Letter of the Law there was to Authorize our saviour's pulling corn in another man's field, or David's eating the showbread, or Samson's killing of himself? whom Josephus excused, because when he saw he could live no longer but with a reproach to God, he conceived he might then anticipate his death. Vid. Grot. l. 2. c. 19 §. 5. de Iu: bel. & Pacis. The exercitation p. 60. saith, The Oath of Allegiance prevents such a Presumption, and obliges during life to do all that possibly may be done for such an absent Prince. Our Author chap. 9 Proves that we are bound to do the utmost of all our moral not of all our natural endeavour, and that not during life, but during Possession, which is the scope of that Promissory Oath. Otherwise what will he say to our late King's Oath, with the now King of Portugal, contrary to that which he took with the King of Spain as King of Portugal? and what will he say to those Cases which our Author puts to him chap. 9 concerning those who in frontier places fall sometimes into the possession of one Prince and Allegiance, and sometimes into another quite contrary? In opposition to our Author the Exercitation delivers a strange Doctrine, affirming, That when such Enemies prevail they can pass no Obligation upon men so reduced, as thereby to make them indebted to them for their lives, because they were unjust enemies. According to this, there will be no faith kept betwixt Enemies (who oft presume one as much as another of the justice of their Causes) neither were Prisoners, released upon their Paroles, bound to keep them, and that brave Roman released at Carthage upon his faith to return again from Rome, did not only a sottish, but an unjust act in keeping it. But saith he in opposition to our Author p. 60. a new life cannot be given, and so consequently no new Obligation, and our Author cannot really prove his life another than it was. R. When a man's life is given, it is civilly, though not naturally taken to be another: and if it be a contradiction to say a man can in no consideration be said to have a new life, because it is naturally still the same, than I am sure he contradicts the whole current of the gospel, which tells us how we may become New Creatures, and Saint Paul, Rom. 7. did but prevaricate, when he said, It was no longer he that did such things, because the old man was dead in him; which is not to be understood as if the former individual soul of Saint Paul were changed for another. But that Author to maintain himself in these straits asserts this as his Principle for all, p. 56. That people's oaths are all absolute and irrespective, and have no implications of ifs or and's, &c. From whence (notwithstanding his great sufferings for the Parliament) he must directly condemn their first engagement against the King, and so he doth plainly, saying, p. 13. That it is unlawful to resist or fight against any just Magistrate, as he understands just in Title, and yet p. 56. he calls KING CHARLES The late invasive Prince. Secondly he thereby upbraids the Covenant, which provided for the preservation of the King but conditionally, in the preservation of Religion and Law. But indeed if we trace him we shall find that he knows not what to make of the Covenant himself. For p. 4. where he speaks of the degrees of usurpation, he saith distinctively that it may be either against the Oath of Allegiance, or against Covenant which bounds it. He might trulier have said which derogates from it, because that which the King was sworn to keep, we in it (contrary to his oath and consent) swore to take away, viz. Episcopacy: Moreover p. 59 he saith the party sworn to in the Covenant, is not the King, but the people of all ranks in the three kingdoms, who therefore, (as he infers) carry the power of Obligation to, and releasement from it in themselves, which is a wild extravagancy and Leads to attempt any madness, and to dissolve all Government, and Allegiance, the People of private callings being sworn in relation and subordination to their respective Judicatories, as himself (after all) confesses with some contradiction in his America case. p. 5. That the houses presorihed the Covenant to the People: and if you would know, quo ju●●, he saith as impertinently in the same page, by virtue of a Coordinate ●anck with the King; For Coordinata f●se ●nvicem supplent, and have mutually a power to act fully one for the other; As if the King legally could (in the making of laws and laying taxes) at sometime act, not only his own share, but that of both houses also; and so consequently might both houses comprehend themselves and the King, and consequently give an Oath of Allegiance in Covenant, which is an unsound argument, because it satisfies not both ways alike, and hath contradictions of Government involved in it. Our Author chap. 9 p. 2. hath shown how impossible it is that any Promissory Oath can be absolute and irrespective, and so hath this Doctor (the Censurer) also praelecti. p. 7.§. 7. And the Exercitator at last with more contradiction confesses p. 61. That such an Oath may be indeed suspended, but not dissolved: Whereas it is a known Maxim, Obligationes non sunt inpendenti, the Obligations of See Mr A. p. 2. c. 3. sect. 2. Promises cannot be suspended: quia annus & dies debentur, we owe time, which may suspend the adimpletion of a Promise, but not its obligation. Otherwise we must allow (though he would not) reservations for several allegiances for the same people, for the same actions, and the same time, which is as contradictory, as if we would have several centres for the same equidistant Lines in a Circle, and that in Holland they owe allegiance both to the States, and to the King of Spain, and in Portugal to the King of Spain, and to the new King. The fourth Proviso of the Doctors is, when this may be without prejudicing the oppressed party in his dues, and without disabling ourselves to help him in his recovery afterwards. This Notion is fitted only to distract people, by putting them in a way how they should do nothing in present with faith, only that they might thereby act any thing afterwards with madness; Yea, though every thing both in Religion and Nature be more favourable for Peace then for War. This is indeed a refined Chimaera, as if People could in a State live half by themselves, by their own Laws, and their own Militia, and so be taken into no plenary protection or possession, by which they may be exposed in a Moment to certain ruin. For nonobedience can expect nothing but non-protection; as King James in his Apology objected to Pius Quinius when he absolved his Catholic Subjects from their Allegiance, upon a pretence that he was an heretical, and therefore an unlawful King: To which the King replied, That what truth soever there might be in this his unlawfulness, yet it was never asserted in the Church before, That temporal Obedience to any temporal power was against faith and salvation of souls: a Doctrine which this Censurer doth ill now to second a Pope in against a Protestant King. Nay, though it were true That one Prince or Power commands to the prejudice of an other ejected, yet the people's obedience, when necessary, is not unlawful, but in submitting their Tutela is inculpata. For it is easy to understand how we may have a right to receive what another may not have a right to give; as a Necessary alms begged and received from one who got his riches by wrong and oppression: as also in borrowing money upon biting Usury, when a man cannot by moral diligence get it other ways. As for the dues here mentioned, I shall speak to them in the next. Proviso. Here I must observe that the Author of the Exercitation hath an express Chapter against no other Author which I know of but the Doctor in this Chap. 32 his forth Proviso, highly blaming him for giving way to the temporizing reservations of Allegiance during the interval and prevalency of another Power: at which Power some profess themselves so much scandalised, that they cannot see how they may with a good Conscience ever go to Law in the present Courts of Justice for their debts and rights. But for their ease this Exercitation hath found out an excellent expedient for them (tho not moulded from that equity whereby Saint Paul appealed to Caesar) which is, That they may now recover their dues in those Courts, provided they give not such titles to the judges and Officers as they should give to the lawful Magistrates. I wonder whether this Gentleman thinks the like exception and scruple might not have been made against their Courts during the Parliaments first War with the King, when Judges and every thing else was regulated here, only by his name, and absolutely against his Will. Such another expedient for the Kingdom of Scotland would set all right in their justice too; For I believe the King of Scotland hitherto hath made no more Judges in Scotland then the Prince of Wales hath done in England. But the grand Case of Conscience p. 10. will tell this Gentleman (how truly let him look to it) that his expedient salves not half the difficulty; and that after he hath received that which he judges in himself is j●stly his own, by the might and power only of an unjust Court, yet he hath not his own: because a thing in itself just is not recovered by their help justly: For Justice and judgement is then only just, when it derives from the Just legal Magistrate, and Justice, as he saith p. 26. looks upward, as well as downward. The like Note doth he recommend to the Clergy, p. 24. advising them not to preach on such unseasonable days as a wrong Magistrate shall appoint for some Religious duty, yea, though the Parishioners were willing to hear the word of God. Surely he cannot think but they will follow Saint Paul's authority, rather than his, who enjones them to be instant both in season and out of season. The fifth Proviso is, That this submission be only to the {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, not with an acknowledgement of the {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} of the prevailing Power. I know not to what purpose this criticism is inserted to weigh against the consequence of such important Cases and Arguments, unless it be to indispose people by perplexing them. Though the difference betwixt those two Greek words, be no more than is betwixt Potentia and Potestas, or as is more Critically betwixt power and Authority, yet our Author p. 2. ch. 11. §. 9 proves that the inequality of force, or Potency is the original ground of ruling, as well as Impotency is of subjection. For which reason Master Hobbes his supposition, That if there were two Omnipotents, neither could obey one the other, is very conclusive. But if I show that {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} Rom. 13. 1. signifies no more than the establishment of a supreme {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, when it comes at last to be (as Saint Paul saith) {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, and without further contests actually possesses all other Powers, and that every Country hath not a Prophet to give assurance of God's extraordinary revealed will, than I suppose this Proviso will signify noting. That such is the meaning of {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, Rom. 13. is evident. Because v. 1. the Apostle speaks only of the Powers which de facto are, and that by this very word {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. Moreover he interprets it clearlier. v. 3. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, They who actually rule are a terror to evil works: but how? the answer is in the same verse, Because they carry or hold not the sword in vain; which can in no sense be understand of those who have actually lost the sword; by which dispossession they are disenabled to fright anybody, being in the sense of the Law Civilly dead themselves. Seeing then the change of God's Vice Roys, or of the hands which carry swords, is of his secret disposing, not by mere chance or human contrivance, it will concern us to submit to them (after an establishment) as to an Authority or {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, and that for Conscience sake; lest by continual disturbance (and without assurance for the success of more than our moral endeavours have attained to) we unnecessarily breed a public disturbance to our own and others destructions. But if by {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} he mean a clear right without interruption, derived ab origine from some capital family or Compact, he might put all the World into an endless suffle, before he should find such Persons for all kingdoms: And Princes quietly possessed or (as Henry the Seventh would have it) established, are but little beholden to him for this doctrine of Allegiance, as little as the People are to him for his Divinity, who for want of that, which they cannot get, are by him necessitated ever to do all just things doubtingly and without faith. If he speak as a Casuit he cannot argue Prescription for the clear right of one against the present Possession of another. For Prescription of itself proves only a Comparative right, as one may be some what better than the other, only because ancienter. Prescription is but a kind of Penalty in a State, and therefore is allowed the Opinion and effects of Right, and in a trial makes an Excellent exception against the claim of another; as when Iept●a objected 300. years' Possession to the Ammonites. The C. Law presumes that what cannot appear to be another's, is therefore the possessors, & because men have so much interest in the continual preservation of those necessary rights which truly belong to them, therefore in the sense of that Law, that thing cannot appear to be another's, which hath been for so many years neglected by him: & for such negligence the Law judges him worthy to be punished with the loss of what he pretends to. This perhaps is an inconvenience to particular men, yet States allow it as an Equity to avoid a greater inconveniency, viz. public disquiets, perpetual controversies, and uncertainty of Properties. But how suddenly doth all this, vanish when we argue de jure ad regna? For trial of which there is no tribunal, coercion, or Regula juris, save that one and all of necessity. Neither can a Casuis● plead time against truth; nor by that Accident ever make wrong become right, or turn quantity into quality. The Author of the Exercitation takes much pains disperstly to prove an {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} on his new sense, but so, that if he had a King to day, he would go near to cachier him to morrow, unless (after Possession) he would submit to the people's consent for giving him a new Title (which Henry the seventh refused) or for confirming an old Title. he saith all lawful power is founded upon the Wills of those over whom it is set, p. 4. I wish he had specified how he understands this: For tho the Senate might give Caesar an Authority over the town of Rome, yet from that Position a man might question what right he or they could have to extend their Authority so far from Rome as this Country of ours is, contrary to the wills of those millions which they governed: Moreover St Paul wrote his 13 ch. to the Romans, with an exhortation to obey them there, where they (the Roman Magistrates) never entered by the free Votes of the People. They who according to Hosea 8. 4. do set up wrong Kings are only answerable for it, but I doubt that the rule which he gives us, p. 62. Whereby we may know when a Prince is given by God, is not in his own intent sufficient. For if we want the revealed will of God (as Miracles and public prophecy now are ceased) I believe the authority of Gamaliel (who for aught we know had not the spirit of God) signifies very little in this Argument, viz. That if it be of God it will l●st. For many things which are not of God's express ordination last long, and many things of God's liking last but a little, as Jebus power. From whence he infers coherently, p. 63. that for the present we must submissively bear those evils, yet three lines after he contradicts all again, saying we are allowed to remove them when they are befall 〈…〉; as if a man could at the same time both carry and throw down the same bur●hen. In the midst of these rounds which he runs, I wonder what fixed rules he would give for the reception of ambassadors (when they must first prove their Master's Titles) for the limits and duration of Empires, & c? The laws of Nations must and do determine these, and not the municipal laws of any one Country; But p. 53. he professeth he knows not what the laws of Nations or of War mean, if they derogate or vary from other human laws, as they indeed do, War beginning there where other Law ends, and reciprocally, and if he knows not this it is neither Mr Selden's not Grotius &c. faults, but his own. For want of this he censures Grotius very impertinently for saying, That if one Compeer unjustly invades the others rights, he may by the Law of War lose the exercise of his own rights. This Gentleman p. 54. thinking to mitigate the rigour of this, heightens it; For saith he, it is not necessary that his right should be lost, but that he make reparation, and according to the justice of the Scripture he ought but to make a fourfold restitution of damage. But I pray you what difference is there betwixt losing a right, and not having that without which no satisfaction can be made, nor any readmission may be obtained? Princes are still little beholding to him for these Arguments. For after a War, and the desolation of Countries, how can an invading Prince satisfy for the real damages which are so many? Or for the personal injuries or murders of so many, of which there can be no Compensation at all? The assertion of our Authors ninth Chapter not being this, That mere violent extrusion takes away a sovereign's right, I have nothing to do to follow the Arguments of the Exercitation Chap. 2. as if they were positive answers to our Author; I shall only vindicate him in two places where the Exercitation would fasten Contradictions on him. Our Author saith, that we are bound to own Princes so long Ch. 10. p. 2. sec. 3. as it pleases God to give them the power to command us, and when we see others possessed of their powers, we may then say, that the King of Kings hath changed our viceroy; and yet speaking of Antichrists Dominion, he saith, it can by no Prescription become lawful, neither can a Christian submit himself to it without wounding his faith; which saith the Exercitation is a Contradiction. I answer with King James, that we speak here only of temporal Obedience in temporal things, and as the Pope is a Secular Prince he may have Allegiance due to him, (upon which account several Protestant Princes have received his Nuncios) although his spiritual Capacity may be denied him. Thus they who in his Country may not go to his Churches, may safely obey him in his other Laws and Courts, in which assertion there is no Contradiction. Secondly, Our Author saith, that the Obedience which the Israelites owed to Nabuchadnezzar, ought not to be a general rule for subjection, which contradicts the former Position, as the Exercitation conceives, but erroneously. First, because they were given up as a prey to him. Secondly, Because they were warned by Prophets so to obey, whereas we now of this Age neither have them, nor Miracles to warrant us. Hitherto I have showed you what consonancy there is betwixt the Censurers Positions and Provisos with our Author. But lest so much truth might unawares do some harm, and that interests might not be changed with opinions, he lays the Book aside, and falls roughly on two Assertions, which yet he saith our Author hath not spoke openly to. The first concealed opinion of our Author, or rather the Doctors uppositions. 1. own supposition is, That no Oath binds the taker further than he intended to bind himself thereby, and it is presumed, that no man intended to bind himself to the prejudice of his own safety. Who can sufficiently wonder at the Doctors great error in this assertion? Seeing the fourth Chapter in the second part of our Author is expressly & in terminis writ to prove the quite contrary; showing that a Promissory Oath is to be taken in the principals or Propounders sense; sine subticentiâ aut amphibologiâ. Because a Promise is a Pact for transferring something to another, as to a principal, whose sense we are bound to follow, if our sense tells us that such or such is his sense, and no further, unless we will ourselves. As for our Ministers former Subscriptions to Episcopacy, and their swearing since to extirpate it in Covenant, our Author ch. 8. hopes Mr. Chittingworths' Vindication to be sufficient. The second tacit supposition is, that self-preservation is the first and chiefest obligation in the World. Our Author affirms it to be the first, as in the State of Nature, p. 2. c. 11. but not the chiefest for many civil and Religious Obligations which derogate from that afterwards, especially where the Question is directly of Christ come in the flesh. Yet he affirms p. 2. c. 11. that most civil bonds made betwixt man and man are but for better securing self-preservation: and that men bound to venture their lives, are not therefore bound to lose them. Because the Obligation is of all our moral, not of all our natural endeavours: and upon this ground he saith, chap. 8 p. 2. that soldiers most strictly sworn to a Prince, may in 〈…〉 rout take quarter: because to die for him, is to do nothing for him, but fruitlessly to cease to do any thing at all, either for the glory of God, or for the good of our surviving Neighbour. Yea, this very Doctor saith, Praelec. 7. sect. 7. That Fathers may disinherit their Children, and Children their Fathers, though they swore never to do so, viz. If they seek to destroy one another; which according to him involves full forfeiture of rights, even to public Parents notwithstanding former Oaths of Allegiance. And as if the Doctor were ne'er resolved to say plainly by whom it is that Princes cease to reign, he himself affirms in his Paper, that in the like conjuncture of Circumstances he can likewise allow himself the same prudentials to prevent Dangers which might otherwise happen to him by such changes, and yet he will not openly allow so much to others. Which as King James in his Apology saith is a doctrine full of blood, unnecessarily keeping poor people either from quarter or Protection, kingdoms from Peace, authorityes from settling; and in the search of uncertain rights (which this Doctor makes necessary for just actions) he makes us feel trepidation in our consciences, see crowns tottering on princes' heads, find atheism in our actions, and desolation in our Country. In sine, seeing no man knows better than he (who is so great a Master of Reason) that if he had brought never so many more Incommoda, and those true ones, yet he could not by that logic have overthrown one Positive Argument of our Author; I could therefore wish, that by answering that which was published so long before any change of government here, he had made his reasons more public than his scandal. Unless (after so many Precepts of Christ and his Apostles, the practical Obedience of them, and of all the rest of the World ever since) he can show wherein our author's assertion of public Obedience, is more chargeable with Novelty, or the contempt of God, then St Austin's which he wrote in the same terms, and in relation to the like changes and confusions, viz. Quid interest sub cujus imperio vivat homo moriturus, si illi qui imperant ad impia & iniqua non cogant? Nam quid intersit ad incolumitatem bonosque mores quod alij vicerunt, alij victi sunt, omninò non video. That is, What matters it under whose government he who is daily dying lives, if they who command force him not to the practice of impious things? For I cannot any ways perceive what advantage it is either to our safety, or integrity of life and manners, that some are conquerors, others are conquered. Aug. Civ. dei. l. 5. cap. 17. FINIS.