AN ENQUIRY INTO THE JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCERY IN Causes of Equity.  
I. Upon what Ground and Foundation that Jurisdiction is Built.  
II. At what time the Chancery began to Exercise that Jurisdiction, and upon what Occasion.  
III. How Modest and Moderate the Exercise of it was at first.  
IV. How wonderfully it is Grown, and Enlarged; And  
V. What is the best Remedy for Restoring, and Maintaining the Common Law.  
Humbly submitted to the Consideration of the House of Lords, to whom it belongeth to keep the Inferior Courts within their Bounds.  
By Sir ROBERT ATKYNS, Knight of the Honourable Order of the BATH.  
To which is added, The CASE of the said Sir Robert Atkyns upon his Appeal, against a Decree obtained by Mrs. Elizabeth Took and others, Plaintiffs in Chancery, about a separate Maintenance of 200 l. per Annum, etc.  
London: Printed in the Year 1695.   

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORDS Spiritual and Temporal IN Parliament Assembled.  
My Lords,  
THE following Treatise, together with the state of the Case annexed to it, is Humbly Presented to your Lordships, to whom it properly belongs; the Subject matter of both, relating to that Supreme Jurisdiction in Cases of Appeals from Courts of Equity which is exercised by your Lordships, as being the last Resort: Your Lordship's being also the true and just Moderators in all Disputes between other Courts in points of Jurisdiction; you having the Coercive and Directive Power of keeping the rest of the Courts within their due Bounds, set them by the Law and Constitution of the Nation, that they do not Overflow their Banks, nor Usurp nor Encroach one upon another.  
Your Lordships besides, have a more peculiar Right and Title to the Service of the Composer of this Treatise, who hath had the Honour to serve your Lordships for some Years, and in several Parliaments, in an Eminent Station, and with a large Testimony and favourable Acceptance from your Lordships, as appears by that hearty and kind Address which your Lordships made on his behalf; besides his ordinary Attendance and Assistance as one of the Judges, which he began about Four and twenty years since.  
If what he hath written seem too free and plain, he hopes he is excusable, the Necessity and Importance of the Case so requires: And he may be allowed a more than common Zeal for the Common Law, he having sat so many Years as a Judge in several of the Courts in Westminster-Hall; he himself, and his Three immediate Ancestors, having been of the Profession for near Two hundred Years, and in Judicial places; and (through the Blessing of Almighty God) have Prospered by it. His Great Grandfather living in the time of King Henry VII. and they all have, in their several turns, undergone the Charge and Labour of Readers of Lincolns-Inn.  
And your Lordships, and your Noble Ancestors have always, and upon many great Occasions, constantly Testified a true and hearty Zeal for the Common Law of England; as will largely be manifested by this Treatise, and the Conclusion of the stated Case annexed to it.  
The only Design of this Treatise, being merely to Assist and Serve your Lordships, in your Discharge of that Mighty Trust reposed in your Lordships; to whom the Treatise and Case is entirely submitted, by  
My Lords, Your Lordship's most Humble, And Faithful Servant, Robert Atkyns.   

AN ENQUIRY INTO THE Jurisdiction of the CHANCERY, IN Causes of Equity, etc.  
IT cannot, nor (as to the present Occasion and Enquiry) it need not be denied, but that the Names of Chancellor and Chancery are very Ancient, not only in Foreign Countries, 
The Names of Chancellor, and Chancery.  but even in this Nation, both in the times of the Saxons, and continued from thence down to our times. But our proper business at present is to Inquire, what those Great and High Names did at first import and signify; and what Change hath been introduced in their signification by process of time, derived down to this present Age.  
Sir Henry Spelman, (that Learned Antiquary,) in his Glossary printed in the year 1687. pag. 109. gives us a Series of the Chancellors in this Nation, and begins with Turketulus, Chancellor to Edward 
The first Chancellor in England.  the Elder, (as he is called in our History of the Saxon times) in the year of our Lord 924. near 800 years since. Rembaldus was Chancellor to Edward the Confessor, Roll. Abr. Tit. Chancellor. 1 part. 384.  
Sir Francis Bacon, (sometime Lord Chancellor of England) in his Resus●…itatio, at the end of that Book, sets down a Catalogue of our Chancellors, beginning with Mauritius, in the time of our William the First, Anno 1067. And Dugdale in his Origines Juridiciales gives the same. See Sir Edw. Cook 4 In●…tit. 78. in the Chapter of the Chancery, are the Names of several Chancellors n ancient times.  
This shows the Antiquity of the Names; but our business is to learn the Nature of them, and what their Business and Employment 
The Nature of the Chancery, and Office of Chancellor.  was at first, and when, and how it changed.  
Nomen ab Officio. We may learn what the latter (the Officium) is, from the Name; so that the Nomen may be a true Notamen of the thing, (as it ought to be.)  
The Name of an Office, or Employment, generally imports the most eminent and noted part of the Employment, though it consists of divers parts. Cowel in his Interpreter upon the word (Chancellor) deduces it from (Cancellare) id est, Literas, vel scriptum, line â per medium deductâ, damnare. Which, (as the word now in use with us) is to Cancel, or make void; and it is performed by drawing cross Lines over the Letters Patents, 
So Minshew upon the word.  or other Writings, to signify they are made void, and are to be of no farther use.  
And this ('tis likely) was borrowed from the Lettuces of Wood or Iron laid Croswise one over another, to divide or enclose one part of a Room, from the rest of that Room, so that a Man 
Cambden's Britannia, p. 143.  might see through them; within which Enclosure the Judge, or Officer sat, so as to be seen and spoken with, but yet defended from the press of those that resorted to them. As it is used in Churches, where the Chancel is divided from the Body of the Church, and the Clergy from the People, in the first design of that partition. And this rather relates to the place called the Chancery, than to the Chancellor. But from the resemblance of this partition, the word is also applied to the Office or Duty of the Chancellor, which was (Cancellare) to draw cross Lines over a Writing, that is, to Cancel it.  
From hence it may be collected, that at first the Chancellor's principal Employment was, to Cancel Writings, for he had his Name from it.  
And Cowel citys Lupanus, as testifying the same. That the Name of Cancellarius was belonging to every Register, who also was styled Grapharius a Scribe, a writer of Writs, or Actuary, a 
A Ministerial, not Judicial Office at first.  Register of the Acts and Proceeding of a Court; not a Judge, but an Officer, attending upon Judges; Qui conscribendis Judicum acts dat operam.  
It appears by Sir Francis Bacon's Resuscitatio (before cited) That Turketul (before mentioned for a Chancellor) was Abbot of Croyland, (as the succeeding Chancellors till the time of King Henry the 8th. were generally Clergymen,) and their principal Employment was in serving at the Altar in Spiritual Things.  
And in a Subscription by Rembaldus, Chancellor to William the First, as a witness to Royal Charters, (among others) he did not subscribe in the first place, but after divers Bishops, Abbots, and others; which shows something of his Degree and Character at that time. And Mauritius (Chancellor to William the Conqueror) subscribed as a witness to that King's Charter after the Bishops, and before the Abbots. Rolle's Abridgement par. 1. fol. 384. and long before the Conquest, in the time of Ethelbert, (the first Christian King of the Saxons) Augemandus the Chan-cellor (as Sir Francis Bacon supposes) subscribes a Charter by the Title of (Referendarius) a Referee, or Reporter, (as Minshew upon that word) which seems by that to be the higher Title; and the Office of both, as he observes, signifies an Officer that received Petitions directed to the King, as Masters of Requests have done of late; and made out Writs and Mandates, suited to the different Cases of the Petitioners: Whence 'tis probable, the place of the Office afterwards acquired the Name of Officina Brevium.  
It appears by Sir Henry Spelman's Gloss. pag. 106. Connectuntur Munus Cancellarii & Capellani Regis in the time of King Ethelbert, nec deinceps, nisi rarò, disjunguntur: The Chancellor was usually the King's Chaplain.  
In the Conqueror's time the Chancellor was styled the Master of the College of Scribes, or Clerks, which College probably was, what we now call the Chancery Office; whose Duty was Diplomata Scribere: whence, what was daily written by them have been called (Writs).  
Sir Henry Spelman, ib. pag. 106. under the Title or Head, De Cancellario recentiori, & de Cancellariâ, says, Olim nec praetoriâ fungebatur Jurisdictione, nec Curiae alicujus praerogatiuâ; which 
The Chancery▪ an Office.  seems to deny him any Jurisdiction; and makes the Chancery, rather an Office than a Court, even in the Latin Proceedings of it.  
And mentioning Gervasius Tilburiensis, (supposed to be the Author of the Black Book in the Exchequer) in Henry II. time, and Bracton, who was a Judge in Henry III. time, treating of the Chancery; Non de Curiâ (says Sir Henry Spelman) intelligendi sunt, sed de Officinâ Brevium & Chartarum Regiarum.  
8 H. 4. 13. b. by Gascoign chief Justice, it is said, The Chancery is not a Judicial Court. See the true Nature and Duty of the Office of the Lord Chancellor, set out by our ancient Author Fleta, lib. 2. cap. 12. to direct Suitors to Writs proper for their respective Cases.  
Sir Edward Coke, 2 Instit. 552. and 554. says, The Court of Chancery, and the King's Bench, are but one place; that is, The Chancery was an Office in, or belonging to the King's Bench. And the Author of Novarum Narrationum, written in the beginning of Edward III (4th Instit. 81.) calls it a Court, yet he corrects and qualifies it again, and says, the use of it was, Pro Brevibus Originalibus emanandis, sed non pro placitis Communibus tenendis. It had no Judicature. And Sir Henry Spelman further observes, That Briton, (supposed to be the then Bishop of Hereford) who wrote in the time of Edward I▪ giving an exact account of all the Civil Courts in his time, De hac tamen, (meaning the Chancery) ne verbum ille, nec, quod sciam, alins quisquam, ante aevum Edvardi Tertii, vel eum circitèr. Then it began (it seems) with a Jurisdiction at Common Law; whereby we may conjecture, that about the time of King Edward III. or Richard II. time rather, that Office set up for a Court, as what here follows seems to concur with; and then began their Latin, and Common Law Pleas, as distinct and separate from the Court 
When the Chancery, from an Office, set up for a Court.  of the King's Bench; And upon the Judgements given in their Common Law and Latin Proceedings, (which Sir Henry Spelman conceives not to be very ancient neither) Fitz. Abr. Error. 70. Dier. 315. plac. 100 Error lies in the King's Bench; which proves the King's Bench to be the Superior Court, whereof formerly it was but a part and member. Nor can the Chancery, to this day, try the Issues there joined, in matters of fact, but by the help of the King's Bench; sure therefore it was very weak and deficient, if it were a Court, not to have power to try its own Issues. Nor are those 
a 5. E. 3. c. 14.  Issues tried before the Chancellor; he is not so much as present at the Trial of them, having no Authority in it, but they are tried before the Judges of the King's Bench; Dyer 288. plac. 51. & Latch. 3. 5. Rep. 92. 9 Rep. 98. and then returned again to the Office whence they came, Rolls 2d Rep. 291. Stury and Stury's Case 21. Jac. says, they are but one Court. Rol●…s 2d Rep. 349. by Judge Doderidge towards the end, viz. That as to the Law-proceeding, the King's Bench and Chancery are but one Court. Mich. 10. E. 3 fo. 59 (by Shared) that the King's Bench, and the Chancery, are but one place. And does that look like a distinct Court, where Issues are joined? but the same Court (if it be a Court) cannot try those Issues; How defective is that Court then in its Power? Where shall we find the like in the World? It plainly proves, that this High Court of Chanc●…y, in its Original, was but an Office belonging to the higher Court of the King's Bench.  
In its Equity-proceeding 'tis not a Court of Record; this is acknowledged of all hands; but ab incertis initiis excrevit ad Insignem Magnitudinem says (that Learned Antiquary) Sir H. Sp. 
The Chancery, as toits Equity, no Court of Record.  He makes a conjecture of the Original of its Jurisdiction in Equity; wherein by the way he ascribes to the King a greater trust and power than our Common Law doth own, as shall be further noted hereafter; for Rex id potest, quod jure potest, viz. Sir H. Sp. gives the King a power of deciding Causes in his own person, and of mitigating the rigour of the Law by himself alone; Unless in this last, he be understood only in his Prerogative of Pardoning, which belongeth to the King. But he moderates what he had said before, of the Latitude of the Prince's power; in Justitiâ exhibendâ, by subjoyning, that the Prince still did it by the Administration of his Court of Peers and Barons; which, 
The King with the Peers administered Justice, not the K. alone.  according to the Dialect now in use, must refer to the Lords House, or House of Peers. And by his Margin he understands the Residence of the Court of Peers, which he speaks of to be (Aula Regis,) sometimes so called in the Saxon Laws; and here indeed was the true and ancient Right of the Jurisdiction in Equity; and (Curia sua) consisted of the Peers. Barones olim de causis cognoscebant ad aulam Regiam delatis. 1b. Sir Hen Spelman's Glos. pag. 68 Inter privilegia Baronum, on the word (Baro.) But that I may make haste (as this great Officer the Chancellor himself did, in process of time from his minority, and the first dawning of his power, to bring him to his Magnitude;) I proceed to inquire about what time, by what steps and degrees, by what Means, and upon what Occasion, he arrived to his Altitude and transcendent power, as our Authors instruct us.  
But before I enter upon it, let me premise some few things, which may guide us in passing a Judgement upon what is so set down, and I set down nothing as my own private opinion; I only make a Collection of what is delivered upon this Subject, by the most grave and learned Antiquaries and Authors; and I submit all to the Judgement of the Lords, for whose Information only this is written.  
I●… hath been the Wisdom, and I may say the true natural Genius of this Nation, from its Original and Infancy, especially in Administration of Justice, and of what is subservient and conducing towards it, to place the Power and confer the Trust, not in any one single Person, but in many or more than one. And 
The Administration of Justice not entrusted in o●… single hand by the Common Law.  it is the Advice of a Lord Chancellor, Sir Francis Bacon, as to the very Jurisdiction we are Treating of, which he calls Praetorian; let it not (says he) be assigned over to one Man, but consist of many, because it little differs from the power of making La 〈…〉; and he would have their power limited to cases heinous and extraordinary, and not invade ordinary Jurisdictions; and that it reside in the Highest Courts of Judicature, (which with us is the House of Lords) lest it prove a matter of Supplantation of Laws: See his Advancement of Learning, pag. 445. and pag. 446. the 43d Aphorism. Above all, says he, it most imports the certainty of Laws, that Courts of Equity do not so swell and overflow their Banks, as, under pretence of mitigating the rigour of the Laws, to dissect or relax the Strength or Sinews thereof, by drawing all to Arbitrement. The Lord Coke in his first Instit. 155●… a and Ploughed. in his Commentaries, take notice, that the wisdom of the Law had so ordered it, That matters of fact shall be decided by Twelve Men in a Jury; and matters in Law, by Twelve Judges Sworn to the Common Law; in no Case by one single Person.  
Sir Henry Spelman affirms, that this was the Genius or Humour of all Europe, But, to confine ourselves to our own Nation, he particularly observes, that Prisci nostri Reges coram Omni Regno jurabant, etc. Justitiam per Concilium Procerum regni sui tenturos. The Kings alone never did determine matters either in Law or Equity. Ingens Exemplorum Multitudo, quibus prisci illi Reges Causas ad palatium suum allatas, non Unius alicujus judicio, sed Communi Procerum Concilio definiêre. This circumscribes that unlimited Power, which in the beginning of that Paragraph Sir Henry Spelman seems to ascribe singly and solely to the Kings; from whence the Advocates of the mighty Power of the Chancery, (like true Herodians, who cried up Herod) would derive the like to their Chancellors. Fessi autem (meaning it of our Kings) tautae rei mole, coguntur exemplo Moysis, Judiciorum lancem Delegatis credere. No doubt but it was done by the Commune Concilium of the Nation, as Mr. Selden in his Titles of Honour concludes of many such like public Transactions; though the Records and Rolls of them are not now extant. Tunc erectis seorsim à Palatio Tribunalibus, (pointing, as he supposes, at the Original of our Courts of Westminster-Hall) Singula multis quamvis ex Canone judicaturis (though tied to certain Rules) Nullum unico Substituerunt Judici, Justitiam, (uti veritatem) rati tutius, apud plures conservari. Neque ideo, vel in Curiis ipsis infimis & Rusticanis (this best shows the Nations Humour) Monocriten preferebant qualemcunque; it would not be endured. The Freeholders in the Country Courts, meant by the Curiae rusticanae, were to determine Fact and Law both: that is, were the sole Judges of the Folkmoteses, or Country Courts: Only there lay an Appeal in exorbitant Cases, that is, in extraordinary matters, ad Palatium Regni, and they received a Determination from the King, (not from him alone) but E Concilio Procerum.  
This expounds the Law of King Edgar. Lambert de priscis Anglorum Legibus, pag. 63. Viz. Nemo in lite Regem appellato, nisi quidem domi (viz. the Country Court) consequi non poterit. Sin Summo jure domi urgeatur, ad Regem, ut Is onus aliquâ ex parte allevet, provocato: that is, Moderate the rigour of the Judgement, not alone, nor by a Chancellor, but by advice of the Peers, as before is manifestly proved.  
Sir Henry Spelwan proceeds further to observe, that several 
Judges joined with the Chancellor.  subsequent Statutes which gave power in many particular and limited matters to the Chancellor, never referred them to him alone, but still in Conjunction with others. 31. H. 6. C. 4. the Chancellor has power given him, calling to him any of the Justices to proceed by their Advice, even in the Court of Chancery itself. 5º E. 4. Inter Cobb & Nore, by Authority of Parliament, Power is given to the Chancellor and Two Judges, to order a matter of Collusion. In all this the Humour and true Genius of the Nation was still pursued. He instances too in the Statutes made in the 20th year of Edward III. about the Forest of Windsor, and in the Statute about Assizes of Novel Disseisin, whereby in special Cases pro tempore only, Power was given to the Chancellor, in Conjunction with othérs.  
In the Case of Prohibitions, in Sir Edward Coke's 12 Rep. 63. 
* See Sir Edward Coke's 2 Instit. i●… the Chas of Arti culi Cleri. fol. 601, 602.  Banoroft, Archbishop of Canterbury, had informed King James the First, That the King himself might decide Causes, etc. in his Royal Person; and that the Judges are but Delegates of the King; and that the King may take what Causes he please to determine, from the determination of the Judges, and may determine them himself. And the Archbishop said, that this was clear in Divinity, that such Authority belongs to the King by the Word of God. But Sir Edward Coke (than Chief Justice) in the Presence, and with the clear Consent of all the Judges of England, and Barons of the Exchequer, answered, That the King in his own Person cannot adjudge any Case, either Criminal, or between Party and Party; but it ought to be determined in some Court of Justice, according to the Law and Custom of England. 4 Instit. in the Chap of the King's Bench, fol. 70. The King (that is, the Law and Constitution of the Government) hath committed all Power of Judicature to several Courts of Justice. This is necessary to be remembered, because it is confidently affirmed by the Advocates of the Equity-Jurisdiction of the Chancery; that the Kings of England anciently, and at the first, did Administer Justice, and more especially did mitigate the Rigour of the Law, by Equity, in their own Persons alone; and afterwards did delegate the same Power of Equity to a single Person, (the Chancellor) who (as they phrase it) hath the dispensing of the King's Conscience, as well as the Custody of it: And that, to the King alone, in such Cases, an Appeal doth lie; which, by what hath been already said, is manifestly untrue, as shall yet be further made out.  
Sir John Fortescue (who was a Lord Chancellor) in his Book De laudibus Legum Angliae, pag. 64. says, to Prince Edward, (Son to King Henry VI) proprio ore Nullus Regum Angliae Judicium proferre visus est, & tamen sua sunt omnia Judicia regni, licet per Alios ipsa reddantur. Just as all our Laws are said to be the King's Laws; not that he hath the sole Legislature, (as Sir Robert Filmer doth weakly, or rather wilfully, though groundlessly infer;) but Denominatio sumitur à Majore, as is most frequent in common Use; it is but an Embryo till he quicken it by passing the Bill.  
In the next place, Let us inquire at what time, and by what occasion, this Jurisdiction of the Chancery in Equity began; by which it may appear, whether it be Entitled to it, either by Prescription, or by Act of Parliament, for Non datur Tertium. The same Proofs and Authorities will serve to manifest these: ●…7. H. 7. Keilway 42. b. by Vavasor. The Sub-Paenâ began in the time of Edw. III. and that (says he) was against the Feoffee upon Confidence, that is, to Uses. Mr. Lambert, who was a Master of the Chancery, (Sir Edward Coke 2 Instit. 552,) in his Archeion. pag. 72, 74, 75. says, that the Kings used to refer matters in Equity to the Chancellor, (from whence the Chancellor was anciently Styled (Referendarius) as was noted before) or to him, and some other of the Council. And tho' this doth not, (as he observes) plainly erect any Court of Equity; yet (as he supposeth) it is the laying the first Stone of the Chancery Court: and pag. 73. That in the time of Edward III it was a Newly Erected Court, which may be understood of its Latin Pleas. The Book called, The Diversity of Courts, written in the Reign of King Edward III. Treats of the Jurisdiction of the Chancery, according to its ordinary Power, which are the Latin Proceedings, or by the Rules of the Common Law; but says nothing of that which the Chancellor holdeth in Equity. Et quod non invenis usquam, esse putes nusquam. It was enabled to deal in some special and particular Cases by Parliament, which were but Temporary neither; which proves, that in such or in the like Cases, the Chancellor could not meddle without the help of Acts of Parliament: Nor were those Cases referred to his Equitable or Arbitrary Power neither, as some misapprehend. For Sir Edw. Coke 4 Instit. fol. 82. says, That Acts of Parliament giving Power to the Chancellor to hear and determine Causes in Chancery, are ever intended of the Court of Record, there proceeding in Latin, Secundum Legem & consuetudinem Angliae, which Power is not contested. And Mr. Lambert, pag. 74. ut supra, says, he does not remember, that in our Reports of the Common 
No Reports of Causes in Equity in the Chancery, before the time of K. H IU. The Time.  Law, (in which Reports, under the Titles of Conscience, or Subpoena in Fazh. or Brook's Abridgement, many Cases of Equity in the Chancery may be found) there is any mention of Causes before the Chancellor for help in Equity; but only from the time of King Henry IV. in whose days, by reason of those intestine Troubles between the Two Houses of York and Lancaster; Feoffments to Use did either first begin, or first grew common; for Remedy in which Cases chiefly, the Chancery Court 
The Occasion.  was then fled unto.  
No Book-case, (says that great Champion for the Common Law, Sir Edward Coke, 2 Instit. 552.) nor Reports of the Law, make any mention of any Court of Equity in the Chancery used, before, or in the Reign of King Henry V. but they speak of the Chancellor's ordinary Jurisdiction, which is at the Common Law, and by Latin Proceedings; which proves they were very rare at that time.  
The few Causes heard by the Chancellor, in the Reigns of 
Uses of Land.  King Henry VIth and Edward IVth, in Equity, by English Bill, are most of them concerning Uses of Land. And how great an Invasion that new Invention of Uses was upon the Laws of England, (both the Common Law and the Statute Law,) and how pernicious they have been to Men's Estates; and what occasion they have been of Contention and multiplying Suits, shall appear by what follows; See Doctor and Student, pag. 71. to that purpose. Sir Edward Coke's 2 Instit. 553. 
No Act of Parliament gives the Chancellor, the power of Equity.  affirms, That no Act of Parliament printed, or unprinted, gave the Chancellor any power to hold any Court of Equity. The Stat. of 36 Edw. III. Cap. 9 without question, (says that Grave and Reverend Judge, and true lover of his Nation) refers to the ordinary power of the Chancellor; but gives him no shadow of any Absolute Power, (meaning a Power of Equity.) See the 2 Instit. fol. 553.  
See that remarkable Case of Sir Richard le Scrope, in Sir Robert Cotton's Abridgement of the Records of the Tower, pag. 351. Numb. 10. (exceeding pertinent and useful in many respects to our present Enquiry, and gives great light to us in many things). It is mentioned also in Coke, 2 Instit. 553. it happened Anno 17 of King Richard II. John de Windsor complained by Petition 
Sir Richard le Scrope, or John de Wind●… for's Case.  to the King, against Sir Richard le Scrope, and Sir John Lisley, for detaining divers Manors in Cambridgshire from him; to which, (as he alleged), he had a Right and Title. Both Parties submitted the matter to the King's Arbitration; The King committed it to the Council, (not to the Chancellor alone,) the Council decreed it for Windsor, (than Plaintiff,) under the Privy Seal; they sent to the Chancellor to confirm that Decree or Award, under the Great Seal; which was done, and a Special Injunction to Sir John Lisley; and a Writ to the Sheriff to Execute it; (A strong Case in all its Circumstances). Sir John Lisley, one of the Defendants, not satisfied with the Decree or Award, Petitions the King in Parliament; that is, Appeals from it, and prays the Matter may be determined at the Common Law, notwithstanding the Decree or Award so confirmed. The King by Privy Seal, Order the Chancellor to Supersede the Injunction, and the Writ and Decree. The Decree was reversed, and both Parties ordered to stand to the Common Law; and Windsor's Petition was dismissed. Sir Edward Coke says, that this Decree 
The first Decree in Chancery was reversed, and the matter left by the House of Lords, to the Common Law.  so made by the Council, was the first Decree in Chancery, that he could find; and that upon a deliberate hearing of the whole matter, by the Lords in Parliament, it was adjudged, that Sir John de Windsor should take nothing by his Suit, but stand to the Common Law; that is, (according to our now usual Language,) His Petition or Bill in Equity was dismissed, and the Parties sent to the Common Law. I desire that both these Authorities last cited, may be compared together, viz. Sir Robert Cotton's Abr. and Sir Edward Coke's 2 Instit. 553. the one gives light to the other; Juncta juvant. This Instructs us in the method of Proceedings in Equity, used in the time of King R. II. and most likely in the times preceding: Not to the Chancellor alone, but to the King himself, to be referred to the Council. And the Case of Sir Richard le Scrope, was in a matter where there was remedy at Law, (so that they were out of their way, in Petitioning to the King in it); and therefore the Decree was reversed by the Lords in Parliament, before whom the Appeal did properly lie; nor would the Lords themselves determine it upon the Merits of the Cause; viz. who had the right, but referred the Parties to the Common Law, to the right course; and yet it was a Decree made by the Submission of all Parties to the Arbitration. So ready were the Lords at that time to do right to the Common Law: Sir Edward Coke says, this was the first Decree made by the Chancellor in the Chancery, who did, (as it seems) in limine titubare, (stumble at the very Threshold); which (some say) is ominous. The Proceedings in this Case of Sir Richard le Scrope, was (as I find) when Thomas Arundel, Bishop of Ely, and afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury, was Chancellor; who, no doubt, did much influence the King and Council, in making the Decree.  
They have been Churchmen, and divers of them of the highest rank, (Cardinals,) who are upon good ground supposed 
The Churchmen were the first Setters up of a Jurisdiction in Chancery, in matters of Equity.  to be the first Setters up, and promoters of this absolute Power in Chancery; the Chancellors generally in those elder times, being of the Order of the Clergy.  
And they began (as is usual in beginnings) with great modesty, and to exercise their Power in some few Cases, which failed of ordinary help; and when Parliaments were not so frequent as formerly, to whom recourse should have been, and who would have censured such assuming of new Jurisdictions, (as they afterwards very frequently did). And the Setters up 
The Judges were at first wont to be consulted with by the Chancello.  of this new Jurisdiction, would not at first adventure to do it by One single Person alone, though never so high, but with the Concurrence of the Judges; and they too, not sent for into the Chancery, to attend and assist the Chancellor; but those new Cases of Equity were sent into 
* S●…e Fi 〈…〉. Abr. 〈◊〉 Subpoena; and Brooks Abr. tit. Conscience, and Pasc. 22. E. 4. 6. Pla. 18.  the Exchequer Chamber, where the Chancellor himself resorted to the Judges, with their Causes in Equity; and these are many of them reported in our Year-Books of those times. And those Causes were constantly determined by the opinion of the Judges; and this method took off the Judges, (whose Superior the Chancellor was, in Dignity and Grandeur) from opposing that new Jurisdiction, by granting Prohibitions to stop the Proceedings of the Chancery in such Cases, as it was their Duty to have done.  
See Mr. Selden's Notes upon Fleta; How the Clergy, (who anciently had their Sole dependence upon the Bishop of Rome, and held themselves not Subject to the Temporal Power,) still promoted and endeavoured to introduce the Civil Law into this Realm, but yet were still withstood by the Lords and Commons, who were always hearty Friends to the Common Law. Sir Edw. Coke's 2 Instit. fol. 626. at the end of that folio, it is said, in the Indictment against Cardinal Wolsey, and charged upon him, that he intended Antiquissimas Angliae Leges penitùs subvertere, & enervare, Universumque hoc Regnum Angliae, & ejusdem regni populum Legibus Imperialibus, vulgò dictis Legibus Civilibus & earundem Legum canonibus, imperpetuum Subjugare & subducere, etc. Cardinal Wolsey's being in the height of Favour and Authority with King Henry VIII. hated both Parliaments, and the Common Laws; and he was the means that but one Parliament was holden in Fourteen Years.  
The Common Law was the true Natural and Original Law 
The Common Law, the only Law in England, anciently.  of England, used ever since the departure of the Romans, and brought in by the English Saxons again; Qui suis tantummodò quas secum, è Germanià (whether they had transplanted them) attulerant, Moribus usi sunt, only their ancient Customs, and no other. Caesarei Juris (says learned Selden) usus plane reperitur Nullus per Annos amplius Septingentos, (more than 700 years). There was no Chancery-Law to determine matters of fact, 
aa Dr. and Student, pag. 15. by Jury, and not otherwise.  much less titles of Freehold, by Depositions of Witnesses only, or by an Absolute or Arbitrary Power, in all that time of 700 years. No Man was suffered to have a Civil Law Book in his keeping: King Stephen by his Edict did forbid it. The Saxons, Danes, and Normans owned no other Law, than that Law which Anglorum Commune vocitamus, says 
The Books of the civil Law introduced into England by the Clergy, are commanded to be 〈◊〉.  the famous Selden in his Dissertatio ad Fletam, pag. 502, 503, 505, 506, 508. And Johannes Balaeus tells us, that Theobaldus Cantuariensis Archiepiscopus quasdam Leges in Angliam attulerat, sed eas, ut Reipublicae nocivas, Rex Stephanus perpetuo Parliamenti Decreto damnavit, delevit, incendi fecit. The Common Law was in King Stephen's time, and before (says Selden) the Study of Men that were otherwise Learned too. Sed Moribus Majorum tantum, patrioque utebantur illi Jure; qùod & ante & ad nostra usque tempora Angliae Commune vocitatur; and their 
The Nobility were anciently the Students of the Common Law.  Studies were furnished with the Precedents of Judgements, and Copies of Reports of Law-proceeding, like those of our Year-Books; and no other were cited in their Courts. And the Students and Residents at the Inns of Courts, who afterwards were the Countors or Pleaders, were not Clerks or Solicitors, (as many now adays are, to the declining of that Noble Profession), But the Sons of Noble Men, and of the best of the Gentry, as we read in Sir John Fortes●…ue, in his Treatise De Laudibus Legum Angliae.— Juris Anglicani (says Excellent Selden) ut Supra 537. quod Commune vocitamus quae Gentis hujus Genio ab intimâ Antiquitate adaptatum fuit, Singularis aestimatio, atque inde, non immeritò, in eodem adhaesio constans, & sane pertinax.  
In that great question, (says Selden in his Dissertation, ib. 539.) concerning the right of Succession to the Crown of Scotland, referred by all Parties and Pretenders to the Decision of our King Edward I. Anno Regni 19 & Anno Dom. 1292. about which they met at Norham, in the Bishopric of Durham. It was Debated as a Praeliminary, whether it should be judged and decided by the Law of England, or of Scotland, or the Caesarean, or Civil Law, as being the Jus Gentium; (see Riley's Placita Parliamentaria, 143. in the middle of that Page,) our King Edward I being the Sovereign or Superior Lord of Scotland: It was concluded before Roger de Brabazon, (a Judge of the King's-Bench; Sir Edw. Coke says, Ch. Justice, 2 Instit. 554.) the King's Delegate or Substitute, for that Great and Noble Occasion; That the Caesarean or Civil Law, should by no means be allowed of: Nè inde Majestatis Anglicanae Juri, fieret detrimentum. And Selden, speaking of the Civil Law, pag. 540. ib. says, about King Henry IIId's time, Jus Caesareum was newly brought in, Et à nonnullis, maximè ex genere Hieratico, proculdubio perquàm adamatnm, atque prae Anglicano in pretio habitum. See that admirable and right English Preamble, to the Stat. of 25 H. VIII. Cap. 21. What Laws only are binding to this Nation, viz. none, but those Laws which the People of England have taken at their free Liberty, by their own Consent to be used amongst them, as the customed and ancient Laws of this Realm, originally established, and none otherwise: Not any new Rules devised, ex re natâ, at the Discretion of any one Man, though never so Great, or Wise, or Learned; but never consented to by the Nation, and from the first appearance of them, declaimed against by several Acts of Parliament, and by a multitude of Petitions of the whole Commons in Parliament, complaining of their Process as a Novelty, began at first but about Richard II. or Henry IV. time; a time of great Troubles. See to this purpose Cott. Abr. 2 H. 4. Nu. 69. 3. H. 5. Nu. 46. 9 H. 5. Nu. 25. Roll. Abr. 26. par. 1. fol. 371. D. nu. 2. Yet let me here observe one thing more by the way, namely, that from these beginnings here, of the Chancellor's Power, though so restrained as we see, by the several particular Acts of Parliament that gave them: Occasion was taken afterwards to Engross the Power of Equity, and to take it from the highest Court of the Nation: And those that plead for it, do without all sense or reason, ascribe it to some few Acts of Parliament, that referred some particular Cases to him, as fairly giving him the power; whereas those Acts of Parliament manifestly show the contrary. Utcunque verò, (says Sir Henry Spelman,) se res habuerit, fiquidem vel Exutis sociis, vel cedentibus (shaken off, sitting silent, or weary of being Mutes) apud ipsum Unicum, (meaning still the Chancellor) remansit tandem Jurisdictio. It so came to pass, that he could not well tell how, that the Chancellor grasped it all, and shook off his Associates, or they proved Deserters. And one Act of Parliament more Sir Henry Spelman mentions, viz. 36 E. 3. Cap. 9 as trusting the Chancellor singly; but it hath been already shown, that the matter so entrusted by that Statute, had no reference to Equity, nor indeed to any Judicial power to be exercised by him, but merely as ministerial rather, directing Remedies by Writs, in order to a Decision by a Legal Course, and by the Common Law. He proceeds farther, viz. Ascitisque & protractis in Cancellariam pluribus quam Justum videbatur; Populus (meaning the Commons in Parliament) ad candem cohibendam Legem rogat, non autem tulit, sed benignè à Rege responsum est, (as was wont) mandaturum se id parciùs fieri quam prius solitum. This was 4 to H. 4. about which time the Chancellor first began to arrogate 
The H. of Commons constant opposers of the Equitable Jurisdiction of the Chancery.  to himself this power, (as shall be more fully shown hereafter.)  
See Sir Rob. Cott. Abr. pag. 410. 2 H. 4. Nu. 69. a Petition of the Commons against the very Original Process of Subpoena, that it might no more be used; and that the Subjects might be treated according to the rightful Laws of the Land, 
And of the Process by Subpoena.  anciently used; see Rolles' Abr. part 1. fol. 370. more at large. And that this Process was illegal, appears by another Petition of the Commons, 4 H. 4. Nu. 78. Vid. rolls Abr. ut supra. The Commons in their Petition 4 H. 4, Cott. Abr. Nu. 78. pray, that the Suggestions made in Chancery, may be tried by a Jury; and if they be found false, that the Jury may give the Defendant damages: And that the Plaintiff, before he be allowed to take out a Subpoena, may find sufficient Surety to answer such Damages; which shows the good Opinion the Nation had of Juries.  
The Petition of the Commons, 4 H. 4. Nu. 110. intimates, that all the Estates of the Realm, were in danger by the Chancery-proceeding, and they pray remedy for God's sake. It is very useful and pertinent also, to set down what further Sir Henry Spelman mentions: Simile quiddam (says he) agitatum ferunt in Parliamento, Anno primo of King Henry VI Sc. Neminem ad Cancellariam provocaturum, cui duo Justiciariorum Regis non ferrent testimonium haud Subvenire Legem Terrae. Two Judges of the Common Law, (which is called the Law of the Land, in distinction from the Chancery-Rules,) were to make way for every Bill in Chancery, by their first certifying, that the Plaintiff had no Remedy at Law: which was an excellent expedient, and worthy to be made a Law by a short Act, to be passed for that purpose.  
The Judges of the Common Law, who are Sworn to maintain the Law, were thought the most competent, and worthy to be entrusted in it; and not looked upon as partial and unindifferent, which is a Scandalous Reflection upon the Government and Constitution. See the 2 Instit. of Sir Edw. Coke, pag. 544. there is a Writ directed by King Edw. II. to the Judges of the King's-Bench, in these words: Vos Locum nostrum in placitis teneatis & nostram praesentiam supplere debeatis; and in the Case of Walter de Langton, ib. fo. 573. Contemptus ministris domini Regis facto eidem Domino Regi inferuntur, says the Record, in the 33th year of King Edw. I.  
It appears, that the Chancellor could not Act, no, not in many ordinary Matters, till enabled by the Parliament. See 14 E. 4. fo. 1. Brook Abr. Tit. Brief. plac. 483. and then his Power was limited, and he alone was not entrusted, but he had an Association of others. Quantum mutatus ab illo! It farther shows when he began to enlarge and assume a greater Power, and how unwarrantable it was in his first Exercise of it, not grounded upon any good Authority; for we should have been sure to have heard of it in the King's Answers to the Petitions of the Commons against it, (as was constantly used upon such Petitions, where there was any Law to warrant what was so complained of;) had there been any, either Prescription or Act of Parliament, the Chancellor being constantly the chief Person among the Tryers of Petitions in Parliament, and framing the Answers of those Petitions in Parliament; together with the Bishops, Lords and Judges, which of late hath been wholly disused.  
And lastly, it proves how early this new Jurisdiction of the Chanceries Proceeding in Equity, was decried and exclaimed against, not only for the Abuses in the Administration of it, but for usurping a Jurisdiction, not founded upon any good Authority, and carried on by the Potency and Greatness of the Chancellor. Nor was there any the least pretence of any Prescription or Act of Parliament, to support it: Nor was it taken to be any part of the Law of the Land, or of the Common Law, though taken in the largest sense; but rather contra-distinct, and indeed opposite to it, and destructive of it.  
Sir Henry Spelman at last takes leave of this great Officer, and of his Court, by showing what a mighty increase came flowing in from that ill Weed, (the Invention of Uses or Trusts, which are still the same.) But to this point there are plenty of far greater Authorities and Authors, for whose Testimony herein I shall reserve it.  
Another thing to be premised, is, that as the King had no such Power himself singly, and in his own Person only, to decide Causes of Equity, and therefore could not Delegate it to any one Man, (as 'tis pretended he might;) so, and upon the 
There can be no Jurisdiction in Equity, but either by Prescription or Act of Parliament; not by any Charter, or Commission from the King.  same ground and reason, the King by our Law could not by his Commission, Erect any Court of Equity. It can be grouned and warranted only upon a Prescription, or an Act of Parliament; neither of which can be pretended to, in the matter in hand; it was so adjudged 26 Eliz. in the King's-Bench. Sir Edw. Coke 4 Instit. fol. 87, & 97. That a Court of Equity cannot be Erected, but only by Act of Parliament, or Prescription. And the like in the Lord Hob. Rep. 63. Resolved also in Marmaduke Langdale's Ca. 12. Rep. 52. That the King cannot raise a Court of Equity: the reason is, because a Court of Equity proceeds by the Rules of the Civil Law, and not by the Common Law. 6 Rep. 11. b. and 2 Instit. 71. The King may appoint a new Court, and new Judges, but cannot change the Law. Hill. 8. H. 4. fol. 79. by Gascoign, That the King by his Charter cannot out the People of their Inheritance, which they have in the Common Law: So note, the Common Law is the People's Inheritance.  
In the next place, Let us proceed to examine about what time, and upon what occasion, this Court of Equity exerted its Power, which hath in part fallen in among our former Inquiries. For the time and occasion too, Mr. Lambert in his Archeion, pag. 75. refers it to the time of King Henry IU. and the occasion was taken from Feoffments to Uses: For remedy in which Cases the Chancery was fled unto: With this agrees Sir Henry Spelman, in his Glossary, pag. 107. at the lower end Doctor and Student, fol. 98. Sir John Davy's Rep. in his Preface; Mr. Hunt's Argument for the Bishop's Right, etc. pag. 144.  
And to prevent mistakes herein, it must be observed, That 
What Equity meant anciently.  the word Equity, hath been very anciently used, (long before this Jurisdiction began in Chancery,) but not in a Contradiction, or in Opposition to the Common Law of the Land, (as now it is;) but either in a mild and merciful Expounding of the Law, by the known and sworn Judges of the Law; or as synonimous, and signifying the same thing as Law, Justice and Right. For the Laws of England were not looked upon then, as being like the Laws of Draco, Sanguinary and Cruel, and Rigorous, but merciful and equitable in themselves, and so expounded and administered by the Judges of the Common Law. Mulcaster the Translator of the Chancellor Fortescue, being a Student of the Common Laws of England, in the Reign of King H. VIII. could readily observe to his Reader, from his Study of those Laws, and from the Arguments used by his Author (the Excellent Sir John Fortescue,) Easdem nostras Leges non solum Romanorum Caesarum, sed & omnium aliarum Nationum Constitutiones multis parasangis prudentiâ Justitia & equitate praecellere facilè perspicias. See his Preface. Non quod principi placet, Legis vigorem habet, non quicquid de voluntate Regis, though his Will be not Arbitrary neither, but guided by Discretion, and though he define secundum aequum & bonum) sed quod Magnatum suorum Concilio (Regiâ authoritate praestante) & habita super hoc deliberatione, & tractatu rectè fuerit definitum. So writes Bracton, Lib. 3. Cap. 9 fol. 107. and so Britton, Sir Gilbert Thorneton, (Ch. Justice, in the time of King E. I.) and Sir John Fortescue Chief Justice, and afterwards Chancellor: These invincibly prove the Nature of our Laws. The Kings of England, were from the first Foundation of the Government, Sworn to observe the old known Laws of the Realm, which were called Usus & Consuetudines Regni, and that they would not suffer any Innovasion, which was often attempted by the Pope and his Clergy, who endeavoured to introduce into this Realm, the Civil and Canon Laws.  
King Henry I. writing to the Pope upon such an occasion, tells the Pope stoutly, Notum habe at Sanctitas vestra, quod me vivente, Usus Regni Angliae non imminuentur. Et si ego in tanta medejectione ponerem, Optimates mei & totus Angliae populus id nullo modo paterentur. And all the Nobles of England, by Consent of the Commons, wrote to Pope Boniface upon the same occasion, Non permittemus tam insolita & tam indebita, Dominum nostrum Regem (etiamsi vellet) facere, seu quo-modo-libet attemptare.  
The Lord Chancellor, and Lord Keeper is also Sworn to do Right to all, after the Laws and Usages of this Realm, (not secundum aequum & bonum, nor other Rules of Equity.) 2 E. 3. fol. 20. It is said in that Book, by the Chancellor sitting in the 
What is meant by Equity, in the true sense of it.  Chancery, and speaking of that Court; This, (says he) is a place of Equity, where we grant a Writ to every one that Sues for his Inheritance. So that to issue out Writs, as Officina Brevium, is by the Chancellor's own acknowledgement, a proper work of Equity. It seems to be the only use of the word (Equity,) at that time, 2 Instit. 53.  
The Civilian Vinius in his Comment upon Justinian's Institutes, pag. 20. Nomen Aequitatis (says he) duplicitèr accipitur, vel in genere pro aequo, quod cum omni jure conjunctum est: vel in specie pro eo quod est à Jure Civili diversum. Omnibus Legibus aequitas inesse creditur. Nomenque juris non meretur, quod ab omni Aequitate destitutum est. He mentions no Equity contrary to Law, or to Control the Law; nor any other than what was to be exercised by the very Judges of the Law themselves, in all Cases that came before them. Ploughed. Comment. 466, & 467. In the Case of Eyston and Studde, it is said, No Makers of Law can foresee all things that may happen, and therefore it is convenient, that the fault be reformed by Equity. This the Chancery-men will catch at, as making much for their practice of relieving in such unforeseen Cases, where the Law looks severe and rigorous. But the Case cited proceeds further, and makes not at all for the Chancery, if it be heard out. And, the Sages of our Law, have deserved great Commendation, (says that Case,) in using Equity in Cases of Rigour, in the words of a Law; for by that they have mollified severe Texts, and have made the Law tolerable. Who are meant generally in our Law-Books and Arguments, by the 
* By the Stat. of Articuli super chartas, cap. 5. in anno 28. E. 1 The Judges are called, the Sages of the Law.  Sages of the Law, but the Judges, to whom by Law belongs the Construction of the Acts of Parliament and the pronouncing of our Laws? See the 2 Instit. fol. 611. The Judges in their Answ. to the 16th Objection, & 614, & 618. the Judges only are to expound Acts, though they concern Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction: Here is no need of a distinct Court of Equity. Such a Case of Equity was that of Reniger and Fogassa; the first Case in Ploughed. Comment. though determined by a Privy Seal, it being in the King's own Case, concerning the Customs. There is another Equity, says that Case of Eyston and Studde in the Comment. which differs much from the former, and may be thus defined. Equitas est verborum legis directio, efficiens cum una res solummodo legis cavetur verbis, ut omnis alia in aequali genere eisdem caveatur verbis. As for instance, the Stat. of 9 E. 3. Cap. 3. which gives an Action of Debt against Executors, shall be extended by Equity to Administrators, (though not within the words.) But this also is done by the Judges of the Common Law. Here is no mention of a Chancery-Equity; and it had been (according to the right Rules of Logic,) no good Division, if it had not taken in all the parts, called the Membra Dividentia, which ought to be Toti adaequata, Keckerm. Systema Logicae, pag. 245. regula quarta; Doctor and Student, pag. 27, 28. Equity is to be exercised in the mild and merciful Construction of a Law; and in some Cases departing from the strict and rigorous words of a positive Law, rather than oppress any Man by it, which is not by appealing from that Law, or from the Court where that Law is administered; but resorting from the Letter, to the true intent and meaning of the Law, and the true mind of the Makers of the Law. Ubi aliud suadet necessitas, cessat humanae constitutionis vigour, cessat & voluntas Nomothetae. But this is the Duty of the Judges of the Common Law, and to be done in the same Court, and in the same Suit and Action; and not in another Court, and by a new Suit, under pretence of Equity; for that were to censure the Law, and the Judges of the Common-Law Courts; and to charge the Lawmakers, either with Ignorance, or overmuch Severity, which is not to be suffered: And this (says St. Germin, the Author of that Treatise) is secretly intended and understood in every general Rule, of every positive Law, according to what is before remembered in this Discourse, out of the Case of Eyston and Studde, in Ploughed. Comment. and what is said by the Author of Doctor and Student, pag. 27. Laws, says he, covet to be ruled by Equity, which is not meant merely to be done in another Court, Proceeding by Equity, but by an equitable Construction of the Law, in the Court of the Common Law, as appears pag. 28. b. the latter end of that Chap. And those Equitable Constructions are there called Reasonable Exceptions of the Law, and hold as well in Cases at Common Law, as upon Statutes, (as appears by the Case there put at Common Law,) pag. 29. Cap. 17. and on the b. side of that page, in medio, it is said, the Parties shall be relieved in the same Court, and by the Common Law, Plowd. 88 b. & 205. b.  
Thus in the Exposition of a Statute, Judges depart from the words of the Law, rather than run into an absurdity or inconvenience, by a too literal Exposition, (as in the Case upon the Stat. of Marlbr. concerning Distresses.) The Judges, Hill. 30. E. 3. gave Judgement against the express words of that Stat. though the words were in the Negative too, as is observed in the argument of Reniger and Fogassa's Case. In Ploughed. Comment. fol. 9 b. and it is a Rule in the exposition of Statutes, many times to depart from the words, to meet with the mind of the Lawmakers, whose intent (as it must be presumed) is to do no Man wrong. See in the same Case, in Ploughed. fo. 10. and in the same Book, fol. 57 b. 199. b. & 203. Laws expounded not only different from the words, but contrary to them, rather than do any Man wrong. Such sense is to be made of the words of an Act of Parliament, as may best stand with reason and equity, and which most avoids rigour and mischief.  
Plowd. 364. a. in the Case of Stowell against the Lord Zouch, It is spoken there by one or more of the Judges: Some Cases by necessity in Construction, are to be excepted out of a Stat. 2 Instit. 25. Many Cases may be within the Letter, yet not within the meaning of an Act, 2 Instit. 107. in Principio, 110, & 111. and general words of a Stat. may be restrained by Construction, 2 Instit. 502. and the Exposition of Statutes belongs to the Judges of the Common Law, 2 Instit. 618. Hill. 13 Jac. 1. in the King's-Bench, Vaudry and Pannell's Case, Rolles' Rep. first part, 331. It is there said, that if a Court of Equity made a false Sentence, it may be reversed by the King; that is, by his Commission; for Mic. 42, 43, Eliz. in a Suit in Chancery, by the Countess of Southampton, against the Lord of Worcester and others, for the Manor of Henningham: It was resolved by all the Justices under their hands, (which is now in the Chancery,) That when a Decree is made in the Chancery, upon a Petition to the Queen, she may refer it to the Justices, (but not to any others,) to examine and to reverse 
The Judges of the Common Law, are to review and reverse Decrees in Chancery.  it, if there be Cause; and the Lord Chancellor agreed to this Resolve; and upon such a Petition and Reference, the Decree made in that Case in Chancery, was reversed by the Justices. This was in time before any Contest between the Two Jurisdictions, viz. in Queen Elizabeth's time, and before the Judges were looked upon as not indifferent.  
It appears 3 H. 5. Nu. 46. That the Commons in a Petition complain, That many were grieved by Writs, which were called 
John de Waltham Bishop of Salish. the Inventor of the Writ of Subpoena, in the wicked time of King Richard II.  (Writs of Subpoena,) which they say were not used, till the time of the last King Richard: That John de Waltham, Bishop of Salisb. of his Subtlety, invented and began such Novelty against the Common Law; and that they proceeded upon those Writs, according to the Civil Law, in Subversion of the Common Law: and they pray, That an Action of Debt of Forty pounds may lie against such. See the Record at large, Roll. Abr. first part, 371. (too briefly Abridged by Sir Robert Cotton;) This is of the Nature of a Presentment, by the Commons of England, (the Grand Jury of the Nation,) and it doth invincibly prove and testify the time when this Jurisdiction was first set up in Chancery; for the Writ of Subpoena is the first Process of that Court, in Cases of Equity, and 'tis 
The Writ of Subpoena called a Novelty, by a Petition of the House of Commons, in the Reign of King Henry V.  called a Novelty, and Names the first Inventor (John de Waltham) who was Keeper of the Rolls, in the time of King R. II. which is now called Master of the Rolls; but in the time of King R. II. it was looked upon as an inferior Office, as may be observed upon the Supplication of Will. de Burstall in the 1 R. II. Ryley's Placita Parl. in the Appendix, pag. 670. who styles himself A Petit Clerk, Keeper of the Rolls of the Chancery, and prays his Patent may be confirmed by Parliament, as a work of Charity. See Sir Edw. Coke's 4 Instit. fol. 95. & 96. ad finem: And John de Waltham was Burstall's immediate Successor. This also speaks the mighty growth of that Court; this petit Clerk now takes place of the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas.  
Let us hear the Judgement of an ingenious Writer, and a worthy Person, Mr. Hunt before mentioned, in his printed Argument for the Bishop's Right, in Judging Capital Causes in Parliament, pag. 144. One may wonder, (says he) That there is nothing in Antiquity, that gives Authority to so celebrated and busy a Court, as the Chancery at this day is; none can be able to Cope with it, but the highest and Supreme Sovereign Power; (he means, I suppose, the last Resort, the Lords,) and it is the proper work and care of that Court; (and to that Court only, is this address made). It occasions (says Mr. Hunt) a multitude of Suits, tedious in delay: The Expenses many times equal (sometimes exceeds) the Value of the Right in dispute; and (that which is worse,) the Event is very uncertain. That Court, says he, had its Rise from Feofments made upon Trust, to avoid Forfeiture to the Crown, in times of Civil War between the Two Houses of York and Lancaster, 21 E. 4. fo. 23. Bro. Abr. Tit. Conscience, plac. 21. by Fairfax.  
It increased from the Nicety of Plead, especially in Actions upon the Case in the Common Law Courts, and from the Potency of the Chancellor, who commonly made and unmade, says he, the Twelve Judges.  
If we may give due respect and credit to learned Sir Edward Coke, and to the Resolutions of many Reverend Judges, in several Cases in several Kings and Queens Reigns, and allow them to interpret Acts of Parliament, (to whom, out of all doubt, it does peculiarly belong.) We may conclude, That upon such Proceedings in Equity, for matters tryable by a Jury, and especially where a Freehold is concerned, and where (if there be a right) there is an ordinary Remedy for it. I say, upon such Proceedings, 
That a Prohibition lies to stop a Suit in chancery. See Mich. 13. E. 3. Fuzh. A bridgment. Tit. Prohibition, plac. 11.  be they in the King's Courts Ecclesiastical or Temporal, or in a Court of Equity, not only a Prohibition will lie to the highest of those Courts, to forbid them, but a Praemunire also will lie, to punish them severely, be they never so high; because it brings matters tryable at the Common Law, and of Freehold and Inheritance, ad aliud Examen, and to be discussed, per aliam Legem, as says Sir Edw. Coke's 3 Instit. fol. 121. in the middle of that fol. in the Chapt. of Praemunire; and the very Statutes made in those Cases, are Prohibitions in themselves.  
If it were thought convenient, by the Supreme Legislature, to have any such Power exercised in an ordinary and constant use of it, possibly it might better be deposited in the hands of the Judges, of the ordinary Courts of the Common Law; (whatever Sir Francis Bacon says to the contrary, in his Advancement of Learning,) which has been successfully experimented, as in the late Court of Wards mixed of Law and Equity; and in the Court of Exchequer, where matter of Equity, by the Stat. of 33 H. VIII. C. 39 is allowed to be pleaded in the same Court and Office, among the Latin Proceedings. But neither of these Courts ventured upon such a Course; no, not to proceed in a Course of Equity by English Bill, till enabled to do so by Act of Parliament; though some have been of Opinion, that the Exchequer had such an Equitable Jurisdiction by Prescription. And it is a thing to be admired, that after so many Courts suppressed by several Acts of Parliament, as that of the Star-Chamber, the Court of the Council, in the Marches of Wales, and others; and several Courts that have very politically surceased the Exercise of their Jurisdiction of their own accord, as not being warranted by Law; as the Court of Requests, etc. That the Friends to the High Court of Chancery, as to the Exercise of an Equitable Jurisdiction, have not endeavoured to fortify their Court with an Act of Parliament, under due and reasonable Regulation; especially when it once fell, (though in times of Usurpation) under a large Correction; which, though it wanted a good Authority too, yet it manifestly shows the sense of the whole Nation, whom the then Usurping Powers thought it good Policy to gratify and indulge; for in pessimis temporibus, as well as ex malis Moribus, bonae oriuntur Leges. as to the matter of them; as in the short Reign of Richard III.  
I can appeal to that Highest Judicature, (the whole House of Lords,) who have had many years Experience of me, begun about Twenty Four years since, (for so long ago I was their Assistant,) and to Thousands more, with whom I have had a public Conversation for about Fifty years, and some for a shorter time; that this is no new, or sullen and revengeful Humour in me, but proceeds from a Love to my Country, and Gratitude to mine, and my Ancestors Profession; and from a desire to have myself, and my own Posterity and Neighbours, Free and Happy.  
Let me observe from Mr. Hunt before cited, that what he writes, doth appear to be the Vulgar and Common Opinion concerning this Court of Equity, (for which reason I cite him.) It points out to us, whether we are properly to resort for a Regulation, (that is to the Lords House,) and (with all Submission and Reverence to that High Court be it spoken▪) it is a Trust reposed in them, to reform this Lesser, (though commonly called The High Court of Chancery;) and to keep the rest of the Courts within their due Bounds. As for the Court of the King's-Bench, (to whom it most properly belongs, to grant Prohibitions upon such occasions.) 2 Instit. fol. 610. Prohibitions are not of Favour, but of Justice. It is now grown to that pass, through the length of time and disuse, that the Court of King's-Bench might possibly find it, (Imparem Congressum) unless encouraged to it, by that Supreme Court of the Lord's House. Observe too, that this Author Mr. Hunt, does concur herein with many other Testimonies, when this Court of Equity had its first rise and beginning, and whence it took the occasion of 
The Mischiefs from the Invention of Feofments to Uses, and in Trust.  such a Jurisdiction, viz. from the Feofments upon Trust, whose beginning too we know, and what the Design and purpose was of such illegal and fraudulent corrupt Feofments, and Conveyances to Uses upon Trust were, we shall further examine, and hear the Opinion and Judgement of several Reverend Judges, and divers Writers besides, upon that Subject, before the close of this Discourse, of which much hath already been said, as from Sir Edw. Coke, Ch. Jus. (who was a faithful Friend to our Nation 
Lamb. Archeion, pag. 75. Dr. and Student, 98. Sir Henry Spelman Gloss. 107. Fitzh. Ab. Tit. Subpoena, through that whole title, still about Uses, 2 H. 4. Cot. ●…br. Nu. 69.  and Laws;) Mr. Lambert, who was a Master of the Chancery, Mr. Dugdale in his Origines Juridiciales, from the Ch. Jus. Popham, in Chudleighs Ca in the first Rep. of Sir Edw. Coke, fol. 139. b. and from the rest of the Judges and Arguers of that Case; whose Judgement as to this point, viz. both of the Original of this Jurisdiction of the Chancery, and the mischievous effects of those Conveyances, to Uses and upon Trust and Confidence, (for they are all one, and so mentioned in the Act of the 27 H. VIII. whose design was to extirpate both,) will more fully appear. 1 Rep. 121. b. There were (says that Case) Two Inventors of Uses, Fear and Fraud; Fear in times of Troubles and Civil Wars, to save Inheritances from being forfeited, (which in Truth and in plain words, was the same thing with fraud to evade the Law that inflicted those Forfeitures:) and Fraud, to defeat due Debts and lawful Actions and Duties. Before the time of Richard II. (says the Ch. I. Popham, in that Case;) no Act of Parliament, or other Record, nor any Book nor Writing, made any mention of Uses of Land.  
Hear the Opinion of the King, Lords and Commons, (the whole Nation) concerning Uses; in the Preamble of the Statute of 1 Rich. III. Cap. 1. The makers of that Statute set forth the mischiefs arising from such Conveyances to Uses and Trusts, viz. great Unsurety, Trouble, Costs, and grievous Vexations to the Buyers of Land, or to such as took Leases. In the Preamble of the Stat. of 27 H. VIII. Cap. 10. viz. That by divers subtle Inventions and Practices by Fraudulent Feofments, Fines, Recoveries and other Assurances, craftily made to secret Uses Intents and Purposes, etc. Manifold Mischiefs did ensue. Out of which Statute, both from the Preamble and Body of it, may be observed, (10. 
* Uses and Trusts the same things.  That Uses and Trusts are the same things, Styles Rep. fol. 21. & 40.) 20. That the intent of the Lawmakers, was to extirpate both, as being but the same: But we know where Trusts are supported, as if they were distinct things from Uses, and a plentiful Harvest hath arisen from them; though it hath been resolved, that an Use cannot arise out of an Use; but this is evaded by giving it the Name of a Trust, and making them distinct things. So that we may learn from what hath been said, when, and whence these pernicious things called (Uses) and (Trusts) had their Original, and who was the first Inventor of the Writs, called Writs of Subpoena; all about the time of 
Sed Mala perlong as invaluér●… morat.  that Exorbitant and Tumultuous Reign of King Richard II. and that such Conveyances ought at first to have been adjudged void, being fraudulent, as other fraudulent Conveyances have been, by the several Statutes of 52 H. 3. Cap. 6. 50 E. 3. Cap. 6. 2 R. 2. c. 3. 3 H. 7. C. 4. 19 H. 7. Cap. 15. Trin. 7 H. 6. fol. 43. If a Man make a Feoffment in fee, Proviso tamen, that the Feoffor shall always have the Profits of the Land, that Proviso is void and contrarious, by Hankford a Judge of the Common Pleas, in the time of King Richard II.  
Now, What an absurdity and contradiction is it in Reason, and a mockery and abuse of the Common Law, That a Man shall use the just and necessary Liberty the Law allows him to convey away his Land, but it shall be so agreed, that he to whom it is conveyed, shall not be one jot the better for it, but it shall still remain his in point of Profit, that conveyed it away? And so it is all but a Delusion and Deceit, and the honest intention of the Law is baffled by it; But a world of work is made by this for a new Court. The Judges, who are the Conservators of the Common Law, and of the rights of the People, early decried these Inventions of Uses, and so have several Acts of Parliament: But the Potency of some great Churchmen and others, did still own and support them; for they bring great Profit with them to the Jurisdiction.  
Under this pretence, and upon these occasions, began the Invention of Uses and Trusts, which have wonderfully perplexed and turmoiled almost all the Estates in England; so that Men's Estates and Titles are not now so much guided and governed by the old, and most wise and certain Rules of the ancient Common Law, as by new invented Rules, in a new Court, to the subverting of the Common Law, and Ruin of many Families.  
How much work have they cut out for our Parliaments, by making many Acts of Parliament to redress the Abuses? but the Mischiefs are insuperable, and the many good Remedies provided by several Parliaments have been rendered fruitless: and I cannot for my life tell how it hath so come to pass, unless by the excessive Power and mighty Favour that hath been indulged to the Persons in that High Office; such as Cardinal Wolsey, and others of the Hierarchy, who were formerly in that great Office, and were wont to have a mighty stroke in the Government.  
By reason of these Conveyances to secret Uses and Trusts the Lord was Defrauded of his Ward, heriot, and Escheat. To remedy this was the Stat. of 52 H. 3. Cap. 6. called the Stat. of Marlebridge, made, which made such Conveyances void as against the Lord; and several other Statutes to the same purpose.  
The Creditor who supposed the same Feoffor, (he still being in Possession, and taking the Profits) to be still the Owner in Law he lost his debt, till the Stat. of 50. E. 3. c. 6. made the Lands however liable to satisfy the Debts; and many Statutes more were made in the like Case.  
A Man that had cause to Sue for his Land, knew not against whom to take his Remedy, and to bring his Action: For one Man had the naked Name or Title, like the titular Bishops of the Church of Rome; and another had the Use and Profit, till the Stat. of 1 R. 2. c. 9 made an Assize maintainable against the Pernor, or him that took the Profits.  
The Wife was Defrauded of her Thirds.  
The Husband of his Tenancy by the Courtesy.  
The poor Farmer of his Lease.  
The Crown, of the Forfeiture for Treason; whereby Men were more emboldened to commit Treason.  
The Stat. of 1 R. 3. c. 1. Tho it meant well, yet gave too much countenance to these mischievous Uses, by making good the Estates granted by the cestuyque Use: Whereas, it should rather have set a brand upon those Conveyances to Uses, and have declared them all void, as being generally mere Frauds and Cheats; for so the Judges were in those times wont still to pronounce them. And that Stat. of 1 R. 3. deals plainly in the matter, by setting forth in the Preamble, the great Unsurety, Trouble, Costs, and grievous Vexations that daily grew from them; but at last, that Statute deals too gently by them.  
And several other like Statutes were made, but to no very great purpose; for means were found out to evade them.  
At last came forth the Stat. of 27 H. 8. cap. 10. and this undertook, and plainly so intended, to pluck up this unwholesome Weed by the Roots: Which good Law, first reciting the excellent quiet and repose that Men's Estates had, by the wholesome Rules of the Common Law; but cunning Men had sought out new Inventions by fraudulent Feofments, and Conveyances craftily made to secret Uses and Trusts, to the utter subversion of the ancient Common Laws of this Realm, (as the Preamble speaks,) for the utter EXTIRPATING and EXTINGUISHMENT of all such subtle practised Feofments, Abuses and Errors; It is Enacted, That the Possession of the Land shall be in him that hath the Use; and that he shall have the like Estate in the Land as he had in the Use.  
How strangely hath all this good Intention, Pains and Care been made of little or no effect, and the mischiefs still continued by a distinction invested between Trusts and Uses, directly against the often repeated Clauses, and manifest plain meaning, and express words of this good Act!  
For though the Judges of the Common Law were now by this Act to judge of Uses, (which before was the work of the Chancery,) they being now converted by this Act into Estates at Law.  
Yet some Men, perfectly to elude this good Act, have confidently maintained, asserted and allowed a distinction, between an Use and a Trust.  
And though they are content, (because they cannot help it) that the Judges of the Common Law may determine of Uses; the Courts of Equity shall hold a Jurisdiction in matters of Trust.  
And most of the great Estates in England have, by colour of this, fallen under their determination and controlment, and now have a dependence upon a Jurisdiction of Equity.  
Whereas, Were there the least colour left by that Act of 27. H. 8. for any distinction between an Use and a Trust, (as most certainly and plainly there is none;) yet as certainly and clearly that Act of Parliament meant to extirpate those Trusts, as well as Uses, as any ordinary Capacity, well perusing that Statute to this purpose, may easily perceive. I humbly and heartily beg that favour of every Lord to read over deliberately this Stat. of 27 H. 8. cap. 10. for this very purpose; for it will plainly discover this gross abuse.  
As to the length of time, wherein such a Power and Jurisdiction of Equity hath been exercised in the Chancery, yet it plainly appears, not to be grounded upon Prescription, the Original being known, and not so very ancient neither; and modest too, and moderate at first, (as most such are in the beginning;) and having from the first starting of it, been hunted and pursued with full Cry, and upon a fresh Scent, and in view, and having hardly any Colour of an Act of Parliament; That length of time (were it much longer) would be no Plea for it: See Dr. Barrow in his Treatise of the Pope's Supremacy, pag. 154. He that has no right (says he) to the thing that he possesses, cannot plead any length of time to make his possession lawful.  
King Henry VIII. by Acts of Parliament, restored the Regal Ecclesiastical Sovereignty, after it had been usurped upon by the Popes and their Prelates near 400 years, that is, from the time of William the Conqueror: For than began their Encroachment. And the Act of Parliament of 1 E. 6. C. 2. Sect. 3. calls it a power that had been Usurped by the Bishop of Rome, contrary to the Form and Order of the Common Law used in this Realm, in high derogation to the King's Royal Prerogative: from whence we may observe, That Usurping upon the Common Law, and Usurping upon the King's Prerogative, go together. The Bishop's Courts here in England took their Original from a Charter of William the Conqueror; so that this Jurisdiction was a great Limb lopped off from the Primitive Common Law of England: For before that Charter of King William, Ecclesiastical Causes were determined in the Hundred Court, and not by Witnesses only, and not by the Canon Law, but by the Law of the Country. But this Charter was made by advice of the Arch-Bishops, Bishops, Abbots, Princes, and Temporal Lords. See Fox his Acts and Monuments, Vol. 〈◊〉. Lib. 4. pag. 2●…. says Mr. P●…inn in his first Tome of his Vindication of the Supreme Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction of our English Kings. The Charter itself, (says he) recites, that it was done Communi Concilio, for which he citys, Seldeni ad Eadmerum Notae, pag. 167, 168. So that still the old Common Law of England hath been upon the losing hand.  
The Civilians hold, that Possessor malae fidei ullo tempore non 
Regula Juris.  praescribit; yet I heartily concur with that Reverend Chief Justice Sir Edw. Coke, (a most true and hearty lover of his Country, and an high honour to, and honourer of the Profession of the Common Law,) in his 4 Instit. 246. at the end of that folio; in Respect, (says that Good and Great Man) that this Court of Equity hath had some continuance, and many Decrees made by it, it were worthy of the Wisdom of a Parliament for some Establishment to be had therein, and to this intent have I chiefly used this freedom; for I never loved Quiet a movere, but in order to a better Security. And for that end I choose to make this Humble Address to the House of Lords; It is the House of Lords, who are theSupreme Court of Justice, that can set the true and legal Bounds and Limits to the Jurisdiction of Inferior Courts, and can say to the biggest of them, Hitherto shalt thou come and no further, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed. And such their Judicial Declarations are not to be controlled by any, but the Legislative Power. Almighty God gave a strict charge to his own chosen People of Israel, to observe those Ordinances and Laws, which he gave them by Moses, which were very particular, and wherein nothing was left to the Discretion of the Magistrate; nor had the Magistrate any Latitude, whereby he could depart from the plain and common sense, and Judge Secundum Aequum & Bonum Arbitrarily. But they were commanded, Deut. 4. 2. Ye shall put nothing to the word which I command you, (says God by Moses,) neither shall ye take aught therefrom; and the 12 Deut. the last verse, in Cases of Difficulty, that might arise upon the Construction of those Ordinances and Laws, a Provision is made by Almighty God, that in such Cases resort should be had to the Priest, and to the Judge who should declare the Sentence of Judgement. This seems to refer to some special Revelation of the mind of God in such difficult Cases, which God made known to the Priest that stood before the Lord to minister, 17 Deut. 8, & ●…2 verses; but here was nothing entrusted with the Priest or Judge, of relieving against the pretended rigour or extremity of the Law in any Case, and resorting to another Court, without consulting with Almighty God. And in Cases of Difficulty of expounding of our Law, or supplying any defect; in the one Case we must have recourse to the Supreme Court, and in the other to the Legislative Power. The Judaical Law stoops so low, and is so precise and singular, as to tell them what might not be taken as a Pledge, what Number of Stripes might not be exceeded upon punishing an Offender. That Law, (as Moses says of it) 30 Deut. v. 11. & 14. was not hid from them, but very evident, (as the Marginal Note says) so that none could pretend ignorance. It was near unto them, Lex erat Domina & rectrix populi Israelis, says Melancthon in his Chronicle. The Lord Chief Justice Hale, in his Preface to the Abridgement of Rolls, speaking in Commendation of the Common Laws of England, says, These are not the product of the Wisdom of some one Man, but of the Wisdom, Council, Experience, and Observation of many Ages, of Wise and Observing Men: They are the productions of much Wisdom, Time and Experience. Again, says he, The Common Laws of England are more particular than any other Laws, and this prevents Arbitrariness in the Judge. General Laws leave a great Latitude to Partiality, Interest, and variety of Apprehensions to misapply them. And after all this Wisdom, Certainty, Particularity, and mighty Caution to prevent Arbitrariness, shall they be all made Subject to the Sudden and Arbitrary Opinion of any one Man to Control these Laws, under a pretence of Equity, against the Severity and Rigour, (as they term it) of these Laws? Justitia est aequalitas, non quae nobis videtur, sed quam Lex ordinat, says Zenophon, speaking of a Decision of a Controversy made by Cyrus amongst the Youths, when Cyrus himself, being a Youth, was chosen a Judge amongst them: But Cyrus not observing the Rule of Law, received Correction for it. Quod docet (says Zenophon) leges ante-ferendas esse propriis. opinionibus.  
That the Common Law, and the Laws of the 
9 E. 4. fol. 14. There the Chancellor affirms, that he has an Pbsolute Aower.  Land are contra-distinct from Equity Proceedings, and that the Proceedings in Equity are not comprehended under the general words of the Laws of the Land, or the Common Law, appears by many Authorities, and by the several Petitions of the Commons against the undue Proceedings of the Chancery: as 2 H. 4. Numb. 69. There the rightful Laws of the Land anciently used, are distinguished from the Proceedings by Writs or Letters under the Privy Seal in Chancery: so 4 H. 41 Nu. 78. 3 H. 5. Nu. 46.  
It was said with great Meekness, Moderation and Prudence, by that good natured Gentleman, and very learned Person, when in his height, (which he deserved) the Lord Keeper Bridgman, in the Case of Fry and Porter in Chancery, being assisted by the two Ch. Justices, and Ch. Baron, If I were (said he) of another Opinion, yet I would be bound by the Opinion of my Lords the Judges: and doubtless he was in the Right, it being in a matter of Law, wherein not himself, but they were the sworn and proper Judges. See the Modern Reports, Printed in 1682. fol. 313. 22 Car. 2. but a late Lord Chancellor followed not this Example. Now to satisfy the highest Judicature, (the House of Lords,) that upon several Grounds, and for several Reasons, a Prohibition by Law might be granted by the Court of King's-Bench; and to induce the Lords so to declare, (to whom that properly belongs,) which will be of great use for the future, after so long a disusing of it: I shall, with the favour of the Lords, cite these following Authorities; and when such Prohibitions are granted, an Appeal, or Error, lies before the Lords upon it, so that the Lords do not part with any of their Jurisdiction by it. Fitzh. Natura Brevium, fol. 138. Letters B. & C. Crok. Jac. 335. Heath versus Ridley, Rolle's 1 Rep. 252. If a Man sue in any Court, a Plaint of Detinue, for any Charters that touch and concern Freehold, if it be not in the Court of Common Pleas, by Writ of the King, (where what concerns Freehold ought to be Sued,) the Party may Sue a Prohibition to forbid it. The words (any Court) must undoubtedly comprehend the Chancery Court of Equity. But yet more plainly in that point, see the form of that Prohibition, viz. Cum placita de detentione Chartarum sive Scriptorum Liberum Tenementum tangentium in aliquibus Curiis quae Recordum non habent, secundum Legem & Consuetudinem Regni nostri sine Brevi nostro Placitari non debent, etc. 4 Instit. of Sir E. C. fol. 71. It belongs properly to the Court of King's Bench, by granting Prohibitions to Courts Temporal, to keep them within their proper Jurisdiction. And in the 2 Instit. fol. 601, & 602, & 615. in answer to the 21th Article, the Temporal Courts must always have an Eye, that the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction usurp not upon the Temporal; and fol. 618. at the upper part of that folio, the Judges are bound by their Oaths to grant Prohibitions; and in the same 2 Instit. foe 607. at the end of the Answer to the 10th Object. that Prohibitions are not of Favour but of Justice to be granted; this is affirmed by all the Judges.  
Hooker in his Ecclesiastical Polity, pag. 26. stoutly affirms, That for the manifestation of the right of Governing, the assent of them that are to be governed seemeth necessary; and pag. 27. he further asserts, That all public Regiment, of what kind soever, seemeth evidently to have arisen from deliberate Advice, Consultation and Composition between Men. If so, than it ought not to be assumed merely by a Man's own Will and Pleasure, or without any lawful ground, and against the known Rules of Law. Thus much for the Title and Right of Administering Justice: then as to the manner of the Exercise of it, when it is so assumed, it is most commonly suited to the Usurped Right and Title: And therefore Learned Hooker proceeds further to speak also to that point, ibid. To live, says he, by One Man's Will, is the Cause of All Men's Misery. This, says he, constrained Men to come to Laws, that all Men might see their Duties beforehand, and know the penalties of Transgressing.  
But if under the specious pretence of the Laws being in some Cases rigorous, and of relieving against that Rigour by the wide Rule of Secundum aequum & Bonum, it shall be in the breast of One Man of great Power, and in great favour, to dispense with those Laws, or to Judge according to his Discretion, by an Absolute and Arbitrary, and Dictatorian Power: What becomes of my best 
* See the Preface to Cok. 5th Rep. fol. 4. & Hill. 8 H. 4. fo. 19 by Gascoign.  Birthright, my Freehold and Inheritance, which I have in the known Laws of England? And what becomes of my property, which that known Law gave me? By which known Law I squared my Actions and Affairs, and thought myself secure by it, and myself, my Family and Posterity well provided for. And after all, because I could not divine, what might be the Discretion and Judgement of One great Person, and thereby have fenced against it, I must not only be defeated of my Right, disappointed of a Provision for my Family, (for which I had long been labouring;) but beyond all expectation, after a tedious and chargeable waiting for the Event and Issue of a Chancery-Suit, I shall be doomed to pay Two or Three hundred pounds by the Name of Costs, because I could not Prognosticate, what would be the Opinion or Judgement of One single Person upon my Case, who is not so tied to Rules as the Judges are. This wonderfully enriches the Men of the Chancery. Leges humanae (says that good Chancellor Fortescue, in his commendation of the Laws of England, pag. 11. on the b. side of the Page,) non aliud sunt quam Regulae quibus perfectè justitia Edocetur, as they are Leges à ligando, so they are Regulae à dirigendo & Regulando. And id. pag. 25. b. & 31. b. (says the Chancellor still,) Non potest Rex Angliae ad Libitum suum Leges mutare regni sui. This Excellent Chancellor Fortescue, lived in the time of King Hen. VI and was Ch. Justice of the King's-Bench, Anno 20 H. 6. (as appears by Dugdale's Origines Juridiciales, pag. 58, & 62.) yet has not a word to say in Commendation of this Equitable Jurisdiction, though it then began to spring up, and he himself were Chancellor, (as he styles himself,) but rather seems utterly to condemn it, by so highly commending the 
* 2 Just it. fol. 611. See the Opinion of all the 12 Judges, in their Answ. to the 16th Object. How much the Trial of a Fact by 12 Men Sworn, viuâ voce, as to be preferred before the Conscience of One particular Man, guided by Paper-Proofs.  Trials of matters of Fact by Twelve Men, and preferring it infinitely before that of the Civil Law, (which the Chancery follows) by the Testimony of Witnesses only; and by as much extolling the certainty of our Common Law, administered by the Judges of it. Could he possibly have forgotten to mention that Jurisdiction, he himself being Chancellor, had he approved of it? It is excellent advice in the Preface to Sir Edw. Coke's 7 Rep. fol. 2. b. Quoad fieri possit, quam plurima Legibus ipsis definiantur; quam paucissima verò Judicis Arbitrio relinquantur.  
Now let us take Notice of the ill Effects that have arisen from the Exercise of this Equitable Jurisdiction, which in general words were taken notice of by a Bill, that lately passed One or both Houses of Parliament; take these Instances.  
First, The Common Law of England, which is the 
* Hill. 8. H. 4. fol. 19 by Gascoin, that the Common Law is the People's Inheritance.  birthright of every English Man, and which is so agreeable to the Genius of this Nation, and a Law of their choosing, is by this new Jurisdiction Subverted; and the Civil Law, which hath been so vigorously opposed by the Lords and Commons from the beginning, and in all Ages, is introduced; which brings our Rights and Estates to be determined, ad aliud Examen, to a Decision by Depositions of Witnesses only, and in such a manner examined, (as is observed by that incomparable Treatise of the Chancellor Sir John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae) in a private Room, before an Officer called An Examiner, not before the Judge of the Court, and many times upon leading Interrogatories. Whereas, the Truth is best discovered, when Witnesses are produced in the face of the Court, and Examined by the Judge of the Court, in the presence of the Parties to the Suit, and their Council, and Witnesses brought to confront one another. There is many times much in the Countenance and Carriage of a Witness, to help to the manifestation of the Truth or Falsehood of his Evidence, and by Questions suddenly asked him. Tacitus in his Annals in his Second Book, Chap. 8. tells us, that the ancient custom of Rome was, That even the Vestal Virgins, that in all other Cases were recluse and veiled, yet upon occasion for their Testimony, they were examined as Witnesses, in the common place of Plead and Judgement.  
Secondly, The Judgement and Determination of Causes in Chancery, depend upon the sole Opinion and Conscience of one single Person, whose Power therein, (as some of our Books and Modern Authors presume to affirm) is Absolute and Arbitrary. Sir John Davys in his Preface to his Reports, fol. 11. b. says, The Chancellor hath Potestatem absolutam in binding and losing the Proceedings of the Law, and in deciding of Causes by the Rules of his own Conscience; and that the King trusts him with his own Conscience, Tr. 9 E. 4. fol. 14. Pasc. 22. E. 4. Fitzh. Subpoena, placit. 16. by Hussey, The Chancellor's Judgement is not guided always by certain and known Rules, so that no foresight can sense and provide against it. We are not forewarned, and therefore cannot be forearmed; and all this by a Jurisdiction, at the first assumed, but not legally granted. The first Chancellor in this Exercise of this Power, not at all ask that material Question, Quis me constituit Judicem? as our Blessed Saviour himself did in the like Case. And how expensive and dilatory in Proceedings, we have been already told by the several Books and Authorities cited, and it shall be yet further observed.  
We may read in the Lord Coke, in his Magna Charta, 29th Chap. in his Exposition (fol. 51.) of the words (per Legem Terrae,) What mischiefs and horrible vexations did arise, when this ancient and fundamental Law, this (Lex Terrae) was laid aside, in divers Cases by the Act of 11 H. 7. Cap. 3. and a Liberty given to proceed without any finding and presentment, by the Verdict of Twelve Men, upon a bare information for the King; altho' the Justices of Assize, and Justices of the Peace, were entrusted in it, to proceed according to their Discretions, upon bare proof by Witnesses, whereby the Judges and Justices, (who might best be trusted with such a dangerous Power, if it might be allowed to any) were not only Judges of the Law, as the Judges of the Common Law Courts at Westminster-Hall are, but also in the place of a Jury, to judge and determine of Fact too, as the Equity side of the Chancery too often doth; and yet this Liberty was given by an Act of Parliament, (which cannot be said of the Jurisdiction we are treating of,) yet the Nation could not bear it, but was restless till that intolerable Act of 11 H. 7. Cap. 3. was Repealed by the Act of 1 H. 8. C. 6. and the Trials by Juries thereby restored again.  
The Lord Coke in the same Chap. fol. 54. further declares, That if any Man, by colour of any Authority, where he hath not any in that particular Case, Arrest or Imprison any Man, or cause him to be Arrested or Imprisoned, this is against this Act of Magna Charta: and it is most hateful, says he, when it is done by Countenance of Justice; and I take it to be worse if done by a Countenance of Equity, and by colour of a new invented Writ, first devised By John de Waltham.  
Mr. Lambard in his forecited Archaion fol. 84. speaks thus, If the Chancery have no certain Rules and Limits of Equity, if it be not known beforehand, in what Cases the Chancellor will relieve, and where not; then neither the Subject can 
Sir Hen. Sp. Gloss. 108.  be assured, how, or when he may possess his own in peace, nor the Practiser in Law, be able to inform his Client, what may become of his Suit. Misera est Servitus, ubi jus est vagum, Cancellarius Angliae, (says Sir Hen. Spel.) non aliter tenetur Decretis suae Curiae, vel sui ipsius, quin, elucente nouà ratione, Recognoscat, i. e. he reviews, quae voluerit, mutet, & deleat, prout suae videbitur Prudentiae. A certain late Author in his Preface to his Book entitled, The happy future State of England, Printed 1688. citys, Leo Afer, who tells us, That the Inhabitants of the Mountain Magnan on the Frontiers of Fez, have not any settled Judicature, nor certain Law; but for deciding of Controversies, (when they happen) they stop some Travellers passing that way, to give Judgement in them, and they defray the charges of their stay: This is speedy and cheap, but very uncertain in the Decision; they might as well determine by casting Lots.  
But we in England have contrary Laws, (as some do imagine;) so that we serve two Masters, that are divided in their Commands, and command contrary things; and the one undoes what the other does. These are like divers Weights and Measures, which are an Abomination to the Lord, Prov. 20. 10. In one Court they measure Men's Actions and Rights by one Rule, in another Court the same Actions again by contrary Rules, as if there were Two contrary first Principles and Deities in Nature, (as the Marcionites and Manichees held;) the one benign, kind, and indulgent; the other rigorous and destructive to Mankind.  
The People of England have a Right to be Governed, and their Lives and Estates Subjected to no other Laws, but such as are of their own choosing, to which they consent, according to that most excellent Preamble to the Stat. of the 25. H. 8. Cap. 21. The Laws of England, (as the Preamble tells us) have been taken by the People of England at their free Liberty, by their own Consent, to be used among them, as the Customs and Ancient Laws Originally Established, and not otherwise. Sir Francis Bacon in his Resuscitatio, pag. 65. in his Speech upon taking his place of Chancellor, tells us, that the Roman Praetors, (whose Office had the greatest Affinity with the Jurisdiction claimed in the Chancery,) used to set down at their Entrance, how they would use their Jurisdiction; and he acquaints us with the Excellent charge given him by King James I. at the delivery of the Seal to him, viz. To contain that Jurisdiction in its due limits, without swelling, or excess. The excess, or tumour, (says Sir Fr.) arises ist from that Courts embracing Causes merely determinable and fit for the Common Law: For the Chancery is ordained (says he) to supply the Law, not to subvert it; Tho' by his favour, the supplying of a Law is the proper work of a Parliament. 2. The Tumour arises (says Sir Fr.) from neglect of the Assistance of the Judges in Cases of Difficulty, especially if they touch upon Law. The Power, says he (in his advancement of Learning,) of moderating Laws, little differs from the power of making them. 
Pag. 445. Aphor. 37.   
Vinius the Civilian sets forth the true Office of the Roman Praetor, pag. 16. Neque praetor aliud quam Magistratus fuit Juridicundo, non Condendo. Custos Juris, non Arbiter; and again, pag. 12. Neque ante Lex vi suâ constat, Civesque ad Observationem vel paenam obligat, quam populo innotescere potuerit, quod sine promulgatione sive publicatione aliquâ fieri non potest. To every good Law of Man it is requisite that it be manifest, (among other Properties,) says Dr. and Student, 4 Chap. pag. 7. b. Now, How is that Law manifest, that depends upon the sudden Opinion and Judgement of One Person, who guides that Opinion and Judgement, not by any positive, certain, and particular Rule or Law clearly defined, but according to that large and indefinite Rule (Secundum Aequum & Bonum) which is directly contrary to the temper and mind of the Common Law of England, which delights in certainty? Sir Fr. Bacon in his Advancement of Learning, pag. 436. The first Dignity of Law (says he) is, That they be certain; Certainty is so Essential to a Law, as without it a Law cannot be just: and pag. 444. That is the best Law, which gives the least Liberty to the Arbitrage of the Judge; and he is the best Judge that takes the least Liberty: yet afterwards this Grave Chancellor is not steady to himself, but is for allowing to Praetorian Courts of Equity, Power of supplying the defects of Law, which (as I said before) does belong to the Parliament only; and herein he seems (under favour) not to be so consistent with what he himself writes in his other Treatise.  
It is very well observed by Dr. Barrow in his Treatise of the Pope's Supremacy, pag. 255. The means and methods by which Power and Jurisdiction from small and modest Beginnings, arrive at last to a strange Height and Exorbitancy. The Patriarchate Power (says he) of the Pope can no otherwise be claimed, but by his Invasion and Assumption, ibid. 256. The Pope's universal Sovereignty and Jurisdiction hath no real Foundation, either in Scripture or elsewhere; and pag. 257. he shows by what means so groundless a Claim and Pretence, gained Belief and Submission to it. Eminency of any kind, in Might, in Place, etc. does easily pass into advantages of real Power and Command over those that are inferior, etc. Any small Power is apt to grow (says he) and spread itself into a Flame, etc. and pag. 261. All Power is attended by dependencies of Persons enjoying subordinate Advantages under it, which do grow proportionably by its increase, enjoying Wealth, 
* See in Tacitus' Annaeis, Lib. 11. cap. 2. What excessive Fees were taken by Advocates for Pleading Causes; whereas, by the Law Cincia, it was provided of old, that for Pleading of Causes, no Man should take either Money or Gifts; at length their Fees were moderated by a Decree of the Prince and Senate.  excessive Fees, Credit, Support, Privileges and Immunities thereby: Let us look into the beginning of that late Jurisdiction of the Precedent and Council in the North. In the Annals of Queen Eliz. Printed 1630. Lib. 2. pag. 68 in the Reign of King H. 8. (says that nameless Author;) when the Rebellion in the North, about suppressing the Abbeys, was pacified; whilst the Duke of Norfolk stayed in those parts, many Complaints were brought unto him of Wrongs done in the Rebellion: Some of them he compounded himself, and some of them he committed to Men of Wisdom under his Seal, to be by them Compounded; which when the King understood, he sent him a peculiar Seal to use in these Causes; and the same Seal he committed (after the Duke was called back) to Tunstall Bishop of Duresme, and appointed to him Assistants, with Authority to hear and determine the complaints of the poor. He was then first of all named Precedent, and the Authority of his Successors hath ever since increased very much. This Presidentship (says the Annals) which is now full of Honour, hath from a poor beginning grown up in a short time to this Greatness: See Sir E. C. 4 Instit. 245. Chap. 49. upon the same Subject. Rushworth in the Second part of his Historical Collections, pag. 1336. mentions how that Mr. Hide (afterwards Lord Chancellor) than a Member of the House of Commons in the Parliament, 1640. by Command from the House of Commons, presented to the House of Lords a Complaint against this Court, of the Precedent of the North; and tells the Lords, that that Court by the Spirit and Ambition of the Ministers trusted there, or by the natural Inclination of Courts to enlarge their own Power and Jurisdiction, had so prodigiously broken down the Banks of the first Channel in which it ran, as it had almost overwhelmed the Country, under the Sea of Arbitrary Power, and involved the People in a Labyrinth of Distemper, Oppression and Poverty. Another Member of the House of Commons complaining to the Lords of the Star-Chamber; first he sets forth the Original of it by Act of Parliament, by the Stat. of H. 7. which he calls the Infancy of that Court: But he says further, that Court by Cardinal Wolsey, 8 H. 8. was raised to Man's Estate; and from whence (says he) being now altogether unlimited, it is grown a Monster, and will hourly produce worse effects, unless it be reduced by that hand which laid the Foundation, which is by Parliament.  
Let Loose but Power, and you shall quickly see,  
How wild a thing unbounded Man will be.  
Cowley in his Davideis, pag. 128.  
It deserves to be considered how it fares with the Profession of the Common Law of late years, since the Chancery hath been so exalted. Readins at the Four Inns of Court twice every year, upon some public useful Statutes which were very ancient, and of great esteem and authority in our Courts of Justice, are now wholly discontinued. There being no consideration had who have been Readers, in the call to the Degree of a Sergeant at the Law, nor in the choice of Judges, to the utter overthrow of that Exercise; the Lord Chancellor having a great stroke in recommending Persons to that Degree and Employment; and this hath happened but of late, since the Court of Equity hath swelled to that Height and Greatness. Nor have the Nobility and Gentry so much applied themselves to the Study of the Common Law, nor the Students to the performance of Exercises, whereby they should prepare themselves for the practice of it, when they observe the Profit and Preferment to run in another Channel, and forsake the Old. Hence it comes to pass, that an inferior sort of Men oftentimes procure themselves to be admitted of the Inns of Court, and called to the Bar, and suddenly leap into mighty Practice and extraordinary Gain in the Court of Chancery, having taken no great pains in Study, but arrived only at some experience in the Course of that Court, which is soon attained to.  
It may be worth the while to look into some of those Cases wherein these Courts of Equity do most frequently exercise their Jurisdiction, and then consider whether there be any great necessity of resorting to those Courts for Relief in such Cases; or whether they might not be relieved more easily, with less expense, and more speed, and as clearly by the help of the Courts of the Common Law, without going a tedious and chargeable Course at Common Law first, (as it sometimes falls out,) which after all must serve for nothing, but be all set aside, and a new, but more tedious and more chargeable and uncertain Course of Equity be undergone at last; which seems to Strangers, (not so much accustomed to the like) to be very absurd and impolitic, in the Constitution of our Laws and Courts. It is according to the Latin Adage Penelope's telam texere & retexere. Put the Case that a Man pays a Debt upon a single Obligation, without taking an Acquittance, and afterwards he is Sued by the Obligee upon that Obligation, which is clearly against Conscience, he cannot at Common Law plead payment without producing an Acquittance, which he hath not to produce, and is therefore Remediless at the Common Law; for it is a Maxim, that every charge must be discharged, by that which is of as high a nature as that which charges. A Record must be discharged by a Record, and a specialty by a specialty, and not by a bare Averment of the Party that is charged with it: And the true reason upon which that Maxim is grounded is given by St. Germin in his Book Entitled, A Dialogue between a Doctor of Divinity, and a Student of the Common Law, written in the Reign of King Henry VIII. pag. 22. b. & 23. where he puts the same Case: That Maxim (says St. Germin) is grounded upon great reason, and to avoid a great inconvenience, that else might happen to come to many People; that is to say, That every Man by a bare Averment shall avoid a Bond, and this is the true reason of the Law; and though (says St. Germin) it may follow thereupon, that in some peculiar Case a Man by occasion of that general Maxim may be compelled to pay the Money again, yet the Law took heed to that which may often fall out, and do hurt among the People, rather than do hurt to particular Cases. And the Law setteth a general Rule, which is good and necessary to all, and which every Man may well keep without it be through his own default. But after all, Tho' the Obligor in such Case be Remediless at the Common Law, yet, says the Author (St. Germin,) pag. 23. he may be holpen in Equity by a Subpoena. And so says Sir Geo. Cary in his Reports of Causes in Chancery, pag. 2. 1st Case, and there are Precedents of it in Chancery, says the Archbishop of York, who was Chancellor: And the like is said by Moreton, Archbishop of Canterbury, than Chancellor, and afterwards Cardinal (another Clergyman) Pasc. 7. H. 7. fo. 12. I suppose these Authors rather speak the Usage and Practice of the Chancery in such Cases, 
22 E. 4. See that year Book, fol. 6. and that it shall be tried by Witnesses; and the Judges are utterly against the Subpoena, and the than Chancellor agreed to it. See Sir Edward Coke's 13 Rep. fol. 44. in the upper part, concerning the infinite Exceptions to Witnesses in the Civil Law Courts.  than what was their own Opinion and Judgement. For if this Relief in Chancery in such Case may be allowed, what becomes of that great reason upon which that Maxim was grounded, (as the Author himself observed before?) and how is that great Inconvenience avoided by this Maxim, which the Author mentioned in the same breath? If the Chancery may receive the same Averment, and upon proof by Witnesses, without trying the Fact by a Jury, that Court may relieve the Party. Does not the Inconvenience return again, and are not the People as much hurt by it? Or, is it a Mischief and Inconvenience in the Common Law Courts, and none in a Court of Equity? It were better the Law were changed, and that such Averment of the payment might be pleaded to the Action at the Common Law; where if Issue be joined upon it, it must not only be proved by Witnesses, but found also by Twelve Men to be true, rather than the Chancery shall receive that Averment and allow it to be proved by Witnesses only, and one single Person to be Judge of the Fact, upon proof by Witnesses, without referring it to the Judgement of Twelve Men; upon whose Verdict our Law, and the very Genius of the Nation from of old, lay so much stress, and are so fond of it. Yet let me observe further, That by the Chanceries doing this, there is another Great and Fundamental Maxim invaded; nay, several other Maxims; as that general Rule, That a Court of Equity cannot Relieve against a Maxim in Law; Rolle's 1 Rep. 219. And again, That a Court of Equity is not to determine of matter of Fact, if it be denied, but it ought to go to a Jury to Try it. And the Author of Doctor and Student himself appears to be of the same mind, not to allow of any Subpoena in such Case, pag. 155. in the middle of that page he holds, That where the Common Law in Cases concerning Inheritances, putteth the Party from an Averment, for eschewing of an Inconvenience that might follow thereupon, among the People, if the same Inconvenience should follow in the Chancery, if the same matter should be pleaded there; he says, no Subpoena should lie in such Cases; for as much and as great Vexations, Delays, Costs and Expenses might accrue to the Party, if he should be put to answer such Averments in the Chancery, as if he were put to answer them at the Common Law; and therefore, says that Author, it is, that no Subpoena lieth in such Cases, nor in any other like unto them.  
In the Cases of Conveyances made in Trust, which is the great and busy work of the Courts of Equity, to enforce the performance of those Trusts, enough hath been already observed, how that the Stat. of 27 H. 8. makes Uses and Trusts to be the same thing: and the drift of that Statute was to Transfer the Possession to the Use, and thereby what before the making of that Statute was relieveable only in Equity, is by that Statute now relievable at the Common Law, and thereby the Common Law in Effect restored, which before was usurped upon by that mischievous Invention of Uses. But how is the intent of that Law evaded, by making a groundless distinction between Uses and Trusts, 
* 44 E. 3. fol. 25. Bro. Tit. Feofments to Uses, plac. 9 & plac. 20. Feeffees to Uses, are called Feoffees in Trust.  to the mighty enriching of some Men? Mighty profit arises to that Court by Redemption of Mortgages, wherein Relief being given, long after the time limited by the Parties, great Inconveniencies happen to the Mortgagee, by expecting the event of a tedious Suit, and what his Estate or Interest will at last fall out to be, whether real, or only personal, or of what value, and how to dispose of it in the mean time, as 'tis probable he would, if he knew it would be a real Estate, (as the Common Law does Judge it,) or whether only personal, and then to be left to an Executor, to perform his Will, or make a Provision for a younger Child, or how to dispose of it in case it prove the one or the other; he is a long time held in Suspense, till after some years the Court of Equity come to a Resolution about it. Many good Proposals have been made by a Bill lately depending in Parliament, and upon other occasions, from others that have been well wishers to the Nation, that might have cured these Mischiefs, but mightily opposed; For this is one of their Diana's, by which not only a Livelihood, but many a large Estate is gotten. The like mischiefs do arise from long Leases, utterly against the Ancient Common Law of England; but being generally made in Trust, and many times to attend upon the Inheritance, draws all the Trade into Courts of Equity; and they must be resolved to have the same qualities with Estates of Inheritance, as to be limited by way of Remainder and the like; and thereby a Confusion made of the distinct Species of Estates, whereby new and difficult Points and Cases every day arise: but by these means, almost all the Estates in England will in length of time, by degrees, fall under the Decision of Courts of Equity. So also, by relieving against the Penalties and Forfeitures of Bonds and Securities for Money, which might and would easily be provided against, by the Agreement of the Parties in their first Sealing with one another; but is wholly neglected by reason of this common Relief given in Courts of Equity, in such Cases; though to the great Vexation, and mighty Expense of the Parties at last, who repent of this Course, when it is too late.  
But that which is of greater Importance than all that hath been hitherto observed, and is of a more Transcendent Nature in the Exercise of the Jurisdiction of Equity in the Chancery, is, that they relieve in Cases after Judgement obtained at the Common Law, and render the Judgement of no Effect; so that all the time and charges spent in gaining that Judgement, are lost.  
They of the Chancery, supposing that the Statute of 4 to Henry IU. Cap. 23. doth not extend to the Court of Chancery, tho' it Ordain and Establish in express words, viz.  
That after Judgement given in the Courts of the King, the Parties and their Heirs shall be thereof in Peace, until the Judgement be undone by Attaint or Error.  
Which liberty being taken of a Jurisdiction in Equity, after Judgement at Law, tends (as the Preamble of that Statute does recite,) to the great impoverishing of the Parties aforesaid, subversion of the Common Law of the Land.  
And the Preamble tells us what the mischief was that occasioned the making of that Statute, viz. That such Judgements were again Examined, and the Parties made to come upon grievous Pain, (that is, by Process of Subpoena,) to answer thereof of new, sometimes before the King himself, sometimes before the King's Council, and sometimes to the Parliament.  
It does not indeed by plain and express words mention the Chancery, which yet (as is held by the Chancery-men) is Coram Rege;  
But does the Statute restrain the King himself, and the Council, and the Supreme Court, the Parliament, from the Liberty of examining into Equity after Judgement given? and can we Believe it might be indulged to any other Court whatsoever? whether, to a Court then in being, (if the Chancery were so,) or to any other Court of Equity, that should in aftertimes be Erected? Would not all the mischief recited in the Preamble of that Statute, and intended to be remedied by it, return again upon us? Did the Makers of that Law mean to forbid it to these High Resorts and Powers, the King, the Privy Council, and the Parliament, out of favour to the Chancery, or to any Court of Equity, that after the making of that Statute, should assume to itself a Jurisdiction in Equity? that the Chancery, or such other Court might Engross to itself this mighty and exceeding busy Employment, of Relieving in Equity after Judgement, and so over-top the Courts of the Common Law? Will not the Common Law be still Subverted thereby, which that Statute meant to redress? And how will the Parties to such Judgement be in Peace? A Peace with a witness! to be involved again with a new tedious expensive Chancery-Suit, so uncertain in the Event, and tied to no certain Rules.  
When the Plaintiff at Law flattered himself, and was glad that he had arrived at his desired Haven, Post varios casus, post tot discrimina.—  
He is wonderfully deceived; he must set out to Sea again, to another long East-India Voyage.  
But what Authorities, Law-Books, or Resolutions of Judges, or Courts of Justice, have the Chancery had, for the expounding of the Statute of 4 to Henry IV. in this sense? which utterly makes that Statute of no Effect, besides those of itheir own Chancellors, and besides the Privy-Seal of King James I. upon consulting only with his own Council at Law; A very strange way of Proceedng!  
The Great Seal and the Privy Seal are on their side, ('tis true) if these in such Case must be submitted to, what then becomes of the Stat. of 2 E. 3. cap. 8. whereby it is accorded and established, That it shall not be commanded by the Great nor the little Seal, to disturb or delay common Right: and though such Commandments do come, the Justices shall not therefore cease to do right in any point; the Stat. of 14 E. 3. c. 14. is fully to the same effect.  
The complaint against the late Court of Star-chamber, which yet was established by Law, was, that by experience it was found to be an intolerable burden to the Subject, and the means to introduce an Arbitrary Power: and therefore that Court was taken away by the Act of 16 Car. 1. Cap. 10.  
I shall now on the other side endeavour to make it clear to the Honourable the Lords, that such Proceedings of the Chancery, of Relieving after Judgement at Law, upon any pretence of Equity whatsoever, is not only against the express words and meaning of that Act of 4 H. 4 but against the Ancient and Fundamental Common Law of England; and this I doubt not to make out by all sorts of Authorities and Resolutions, Ancient and Modern, and in the Reigns of several Kings and Queens of this Nation, and that not one authentic Legal Authority can be produced to the contrary.  
I shall begin with the most ancient Authority, and that is in 6 E. 1. in the Case of the Earl of Cornwall, cited in Sir Edw. Coke's 3 Instit. in the Chapter of Praemunire, fol. 123. Judgement was there given before the Justices of Oier and Terminer, against the Bishop of Exeter and his Tenants: The Archbishop of Canterbury Excommunicated all Persons that dealt in those Proceedings against the Bishop of Exeter and his Tenants, before those Justices.  
The Record says, That the Judgements given in the King's Court ought not to be Impeached in any other Court. This appears by that Record to be the Ancient Law.  
The Stat. of 4 H. 4. now treated of, is in effect a Declaration of the Common Law; for it recites in the Preamble (as was before observed,) that such Proceeding was in Subversion of the Common Law of the Land, which proves it to be done against the Common Law.  
In the Case of Cobb and Nore, Pasc. 5. E. 4. Coram Rege, cited by Sir Edw. Coke, in the same third Instit. fol. 123.  
A Judgement was obtained by Covin and Practice, against all Equity and Conscience in the King's-Bench: For the Plaintiff in the Judgement retained by Collusion an Attorney for the Defendant, without the knowledge of the Defendant, then being beyond Sea; the Defendant's Attorney confesseth the Action, whereupon Judgement was given: The Defendant sought his Remedy by Parliament, and by Authority of Parliament Power was given to the Lord Chancellor, by advice of Two of the Judges, to hear, and order the Case according to Equity.  
If the Chancellor had any such Power before, what need was there of resorting to the Parliament? Non recurritur ad extraordinarium, nisi cessat ordinarium: And why was it not referred to the Chancellor alone without Associates, if it did of Right belong to him before? Such a Case in these days, would be held in Chancery, to be a most proper Case for the Relief of that Court.  
And Note further, That one Person alone, though a Lord Chancellor, was not to be entrusted with a Judicial Power, but others were joined with him.  
In the 22 E. 4. fol. 37. It is said by Hussey, Ch. Justice, If after Judgement the Chancellor grant an Injunction, and commit the Plaintiff at Law to the Fleet, the King's-Bench will by Habeas Corpus discharge him.  
In the 21th year of K. H. VIII. Articles were Signed by Sir Tho. Moor (the Chancellor himself,) and by Fitz-James (Ch Justice,) and Justice Fitzherbert, against Cardinal Wolsey: One was for Examining matters in Chancery, after Judgement at the Common Law; in Sir Edw. Cok. 3. Instit. fol. 124. in Subversion of the Laws; See the 2 Instit. fol. 626. at the end of that folio (before cited,) more of Cardinal Wolsey, and the Indictment against him.  
In Crompton's Jurisdiction of Courts, fol. 67, & 69. and 57 
* Fol. 41. & 67, & 57 fully.  about the time of 13 Eliz. a Man was Condemned in Debt, in the Common Pleas; that is, had Judgement entered against him; and he Exhibited a Bill in Whitehall, and had an Injunction to stay Execution: and the Plaintiff that had the Judgement at Law, moved in the Common Pleas to have Execution, and it was granted, notwithstanding the Injunction: afterwards the Chancery committed the Plaintiff at Law to the Fleet, for Suing out Execution; and the Lord Dier, (Chief Justice,) and the whole Court of Common Pleas, delivered him out of the Fleet, by Hab. Corpus.  
In the Case of Sir Moil Finch and Throgmorton, Mich. 39 & 40. Eliz. Throgmorton Exhibited a Bill in Chancery against Sir Moil Finch, and showed clear matter in Equity to be Relieved against a Forfeiture of a Lease, for years pretended by Sir Moil, for Breach of a Condition, where there was no default in the Plaintiff Throgmorton.  
To which Bill the Defendant in Chancery, (Sir Moil Finch) Pleaded, That he had obtained Judgement in the Exchequer, in an Ejectment, in the Name of his Lessee, against Throgmorton, (the Plaintiff in Chancery,) and that Judgement had been affirmed in Error, and demanded the Judgement of the Chancery; if after Judgement given at the Common Law, he should be drawn to answer in Equity; Egerton would not allow the Plea, but overruled it.  
(Note, He did not Plead the Statute of 4 H. 4. but grounded his Plea at the Common Law).  
Queen Elizabeth referred the Consideration of this Plea and Demurrer to all the Judges of England, (not to her own Council Learned in the Law;) for the Twelve Judges are the proper Judges of this Question, though it concerned their own Jurisdiction.  
After hearing Council, and the intent of the Lord Chancellor 
☜  being said to be, not to Impeach the Judgement, but to Relieve upon collateral Matter in Equity:  
Upon great Deliberation, it was Resolved by all the Judges of England, That the Plea of the Defendant in Chancery was good.  
And that the Lord Chancellor ought not to Examine the matter in Equity, after the Judgement at the Common Law; For though he would not Examine the Judgement, yet he would by Decree, take away the Effect of the Judgement.  
And it is there said, That the Precedents produced in the times of H. 8. and E. 6. were grounded upon the sole Opinion of the Lord Chancellor, and passed Sub Silentio.  
And that no Precedent nor Prescription, could prevail against the Statutes of the Realm.  
Thereupon, this being certified to the Queen, the Plea stood for a good Plea. Note, The Twelve Judges are the most proper Expounders of Statutes; see the 2 Instit. fol. 611. in the answer to the 16th Objection, made by the Bishops and Clergy; where all the Judges do affirm, That they never heard it excepted to, (before the time of King James I.) that any Statute should be expounded by any other than by the Judges of the Law; and fol. 618. in the answer of the Judges, to the last Objection of the Bishops, it is truly said by all the Judges of that time also; That if the Twelve Judges Err in Judgement, it cannot otherwise be reform, (not by the Chancellor, nor by the Bishops,) but Judicially by the Parliament, the Superior Court, not by the Council Table neither.  
They further resolved, That the Interpretation of all Statutes that concern the Clergy, being parcel of the Laws of the Realm, do belong to the Judges of the Common Law; yet this was a Contest about Jurisdiction.  
P. 11. Jac. in the King's-Bench, Crok. Jac fol. 343. Courtney versus Glanvil: The Plaintiff had a Decree against the Defendant Glanvil, after Glanvil had obtained a Judgement at the Common Law by Confession, and Glanvil was imprisoned by the Chancery for not obeying the Decree. It is said by Cok. Ch. Just. That the Decree and Imprisonment was Unlawful, being after Judgement; and that the King's-Bench upon an Habeas Corpus, aught to Relieve Glanvil. The same Case is reported by Sergeant Rolls in his 1st Rep. Mich. 12. Jac. fol. 111. and Coke said, While I have this Coif on my Head, I will not allow it.  
Hill. 11. Crok. Jac. fol. 335. in the K. B. Heath and Ridley's Case, It is said by the Court, That by the Statutes of 27 E. 3. cap. 1. & 4 H 4. cap. 23. After Judgement given in Curia Domini Regis, be it in Plea Real, (not 
* Fitz. Abr. tit. Trial. plac. 6. By the word (Royal) is meant (Real) See that Case in the Year-Book, and Sir Rob. Cott. Abr. 424. Nu. 110.  Royal) or Personal, it ought not to be avoided but by Error or Attaint.  
And in the same term, it was delivered for a general Maxim in Law, That if any Court of Equity doth intermeddle with any Matters, properly Triable at the Common Law, or which concern Freehold, they are to be Prohibited.  
Mich. 12. Jac. in the K. B. Roll. 1 Rep. fol. 71. Wright, versus Fowler, It was ordered by that Court, That Cause should be shown why a Prohibition should not be granted to the Dutchy-Court, for Proceeding upon a Bill in Equity after Judgement: thereupon the Plaintiff in Equity relinquished his Bill.  
Mich. ●…13. Jac. K. B. Rolls 1 Rep. foe 252. Coats and Suckerman, against Sir Hen. Warner; George Crook prayed a Prohibition to the Duchy, for Examining a matter after Judgement in the King's-Bench, by Coke, Crook, Doderidge, and Haughton: It is said, We are resolved that no Court of Equity may meddle after Judgement, and a Prohibition was granted.  
It is further said, That a Prohibition may be granted by the King's-Bench to the Common Pleas, or Exchequer, and so of all the Courts of Westminster-Hall; if they hold Plea against an Act of Parliament, or against the Common Law.  
Mich. 16. Car. 〈◊〉. in the K. B. Crok. Car. 1. fol. 595. Calmadies Case. A Prohibition was granted against the Court of Requests for proceeding in Equity, after a Judgement given in the King's-Bench.  
And the Court Resolved, That so they would always do, whenever any Exhibited Bills there, after Verdict and Judgement.  
And the Case of Austin versus Brereton is there cited, which was 40 Eliz, Austin obtained Judgement in the King's-Bench; the Defendant Brereton Sued in the Court of Requests to be Relieved, and the Plaintiff at Law was Committed by the Court of Requests, and was Bailed by the King's-Bench; and Sir Tho. Gawdy (one of the Judges) was convened before the Queen for it, yet it was held good; and Brereton was enforced to satisfy the Judgement.  
Mich. 7. Car. 2. 1655. in the Exchequer, Sir Tho. Hardres Rep. fol. 23. Morel versus Douglas, The Bill in Equity was to be Relieved against a Judgement, by Nihil dicit, upon a Bond for the Money was paid. There was a Demurrer to the Bill, upon the Stat. of 4 H. 4. and the Court allowed the Demurrer.  
There the Case of Langham and Limbrey is cited, where the 
☜  same point was Ruled by the House of Lords, by advice of all the Judges; the Judgement was for no less than 18000 l. in an Action of Covenant.  
Trin. 1658. In the Exchequer, Sir Tho. Hardres' Rep. fol. 121. Harris versus Colliton; The Defendant had Judgement at Law 
See also the Book entitled, The Modern Reports, fol. 61. in the case of King against Standish.  against the Plaintiff in Equity, for Rent of an House. The Plaintiff in Equity (Harris) Exhibited a Bill in Equity, to be Relieved against that Judgement; Suggesting, that the House was Demolished in the War, so that he could make no Profit. The Defendant in Equity (Colliton) sets forth the Stat. of 4 H. 4. and Demured to the Bill.  
Finch, (afterwards Lord Chancellor) argued for the Defendant Colliton, to maintain the Demurrer.  
As to the Precedents he answers, That a 1000 of them will not change the Law, and many of them passed Sub silentio, or upon the sole Opinion of the Chancellor, who is willing to enlarge his own Jurisdiction, (this was plainly and stoutly said.)  
He further held, That there were no regular Proceedings in Equity till of late times; for Parliaments ought to have been once or twice a year, to redress such Grievances.  
Stephens (who argued for the Plaintiff in Equity) held, That 
☜  the Statute of 4 H. 4. did not extend to the Chancery, because the Jurisdiction in Equity of the Chancery was 
* Cok. 12 Rep. fol. 38. at the lower end, Statutes that Prohibit Proceedings in Ecclesiastical Courts extend to Courts afterwards Erected.  not in being, at the making of that Statute, and therefore it could not be restrained by it.  
Bigland for the Defendant; That the Statute of 27 E. 3. cap. 1. of Praemunire, did not extend to a Suit in Chancery, because the Chancery was not a Court of Equity, at the making of that Stat. and Lambert (who was a Master of the Chancery in his time) is cited to prove it.  
And 'tis there said, That the Chancellor TOOK NtOT UPON HIM ex Officio, to determine matters in Equi●…y till Edw. IVth's time.  
Saunders (afterwards Chief Justice of the King's-Bench) of Council for the Plaintiff at Law, grants it to be true, that at the making of the Statute of 27 E. 3. there were no Proceedings in Equity in Chancery; but that the words (or in any other Court) will extend to any Courts that then were, or at any time should be, where there might be the same mischiefs, viz. by Impeaching Judgements given in the King's Courts, which are so often declared to be in Subversion of the Law.  
He affirms, That the Proceedings by English Bill in Chancery, are not Coram Domino Rege in Cancellaria, (as the Latin Proceedings are,) but by a Bill or Petition directed to the Lord Chancellor, and not to the King. This Case was adjourned, and we heard of no further Proceeding. I was then of Council for the Plaintiff at Law to maintain the Stat. of 4 H. 4. and the Demurrer.  
Crompton's Jurisdiction of Courts, in the chapter of the Chancery, fol. 67. he allows of the Statute of 4 H. 4. and agrees it extends to the Chancery, and mentions what is written by Doctor and Student upon that point.  
So that here are all sorts of Resolutions in this very point, and from all sorts of Authorities in Law, and in several Reigns Ancient and Modern, by the whole Parliament, declared by several Statutes; by the House of Lords, by all the Twelve Judges, at several times; by all the Courts of Law in Westminster-hall, and in particular by the Court of Exchequer; most of whose business is to Relieve in Equity, grounded upon a Power and Jurisdiction, vested in them by Act of Parliament, if not by Prescription; (the two only ways whereby a Jurisdiction in Equity can be given, as has been often resolved, and was before observed). And all these are Unanimous, not one Judge dissenting or doubting; not any one Resolution, Book, or Authority in the Law to the contrary: And yet, as I am informed, the Court of Chancery constantly, and without any hesitancy or scruple made of it, proceeds to Relieve in Equity after Judgement at Law.  
The Plea and Argument for it on the Chancery side (which we may find in a late Author, the Title of whose Book is, Reports of Cases in the Court of Chancery, Printed 1693. to which is added Arguments to prove the Antiquity, Dignity, Power, and Jurisdiction of that Court: And much to that purpose is recited in Sir Edw. Coke 3 Instit. fol. 125. in the beginning of that folio.  
It is a Privy Seal, 14 Jac. Anno 1616. whereby that King (assuming to himself a Power to Arbitrate between the Courts of the Common Law and the Chancery, in questions concerning their Jurisdiction, and more especially in the great Dispute between the Judges and the Chancellor: Whether the Chancery could Relieve in Equity after a Judgement obtained at Common Law; which Dispute did arise upon the construction of the Stat of 4 H. 4. cap. 23. (whichdid by Law belong to the Judges to determine and resolve, as hath been proved: and they had determined it.)  
King James taking it to belong to his Kingly Office, to Arbitrate in such Cases, Decides (as they would believe) the Controversy, by adjudging it with the Chancery, which he signifies under his Privy Seal; and thereby does Will and Command, the Chancellor shall from thenceforward proceed to give such Relief in Equity: And this was done against the Unanimous Resolution of all the Judges of England, and without calling the Judges to Debate it, and without any Hearing of them; looking upon them as Parties concerned and practical, (which is a Scurvy Reflection, and Scandal upon the Justice of the Nation; See the 2d Instit. of Sir Edw. Cok. fol. 617. The Answer of the Twelve Judges to the Twenty fourth Objection, to this purpose;) so that the King upon hearing his own Council, Learned in the Law, only took upon him to Overrule all the Twelve Judges in a point of Law, and to Interpret and Expound an Act of Parliament, which properly belongs to the Judges, next under the Supreme Court.  
And no wonder is it, if King James I. took this Arbitrage upon him, as belonging to his Kingly Office, and resolved it under his Privy Seal; when his constant Opinion was, that he was above the Law; and that it was Treason to affirm the contrary; which yet all the Twelve Judges stoutly did; 
See Sir E. C. 12 Rep. before cited, fo. 65. at the upper end the Opinion of K. James I.  and cited Bracton for it; Rex sub Deo & Lege. See a Collection of King James' Works, in a large Folio, Printed 1616. pag. 203. where he affirms, that the King is above the Law, and that he may Interpret it: And pag. 534. That it is his Office to make every Court to contain itself within his own Limits; See the Act for regulating of the Privy Council, etc. 16 Car. 1. cap. 10. beforementioned in the 5th Paragraph, it is Declared and Enacted, That neither his Majesty, nor his Council, have, or aught to have any Jurisdiction, Power, Authority, by Petition, Articles, or any other way, to draw into question, determine, or dispose of the Lands or Goods of any of the Subjects of this Kingdom; but the same aught to be Tried and Determined in the ordinary Courts of Justice, and by the ordinary Course of Law. See the several ancient Statutes that require and command the Judges to proceed to administer Justice, without Regard had to the Great, or Privy Seal, that command the contrary, Magna Charta cap. 29. 2 E. 3. c. 8. 14 E. 3. c. 14. 
See 2 Inst. foe 601. the 1st Objection.  20 E. 3. c. 11.  
Some will argue for the Jurisdiction of the Chancery in Equity, from the Statute of Westminster the 2d, 13 E. 1. cap. 24. which directs, That Nemo recedat à Curia Regis sine Remedio; from hence they Collect, that where there is matter of Equity, wherein the Common Law cannot Relieve, there the Chancery by this Statute is enabled to provide Remedy.  
Whereas the Design and Scope of that Statute extends no further than to the framing of Writs, in order to Relief by Actions at the Common Law, where the Register of Writs (that ancient Book of Law) had for some new and special Cases provided no Writ; which is the first step in every Action, and is proper work for the Chancery, which is therefore styled, Officina Brevium.  
It is very far from giving that Court any Jurisdiction in Equity; but it shows what Remedy is to be given towards a Proceeding at the Common Law, and not to Relieve against it.  
But it may be noted from this ancient Statute, that neither the Chancellor nor the Chancery could alter an Original, or so much as frame a new Writ, were there never so great Necessity for it, till enabled by this Statute. It could be done only by the Parliament; and in such Cases the Parties were forced to wait till the meeting of a Parliament, though they had manifest Right, and clear Equity on their side, but no Remedy at Law. If it were then a Court of Equity, why did not the Chancery Relieve in Equity, because the Party was without Remedy at Law?  
Note in the next place, That the Parliament by that Statute doth not entrust the Chancellor alone, nor any one Person, with the framing of new Writs, fitted to such new Cases; though they were Cases that had a manifest Right, but not a Legal Remedy; and yet. Writs serve but as a mean to bring the Case to a Judgement; but it refers the matter also to the Clerks (now called the Masters of the Chancery) to frame Writs for such new Cases. And those Clerks (now Masters) were, as Fleta describes them, Men of profound Science, (What! in the Civil Law? no, but) in the Laws and Customs of England; Qui in Legibus & Consuetudinibus Anglicanis notitiam habeant pleniorem.  
And these Masters have Caution given them by that Statute, that if any 
2 Instit. fol. 408.  Doubt or Difficulty did arise about framing those Writs, Atterminent querentes ad proximum Parliamentum, & Scribantur Casus in quibus concordare non possunt. Et de consensu Juris peritorum fiat breve.  
Why was it not referred in such Case to the Lord Chancellor, at least where the Masters could not settle and agree the Form, it being a Form? No, not to any one Man, and it was a Work proper for a Parliament; and in those days, Parliaments met often for these very purposes; and it was settled by an Act of Parliament in King Alfred's time, (and it is a Law still in force,) That for ever, twice a year, or oftener, if need were, in time of Peace, a Parliament should be holden at London; and as Bracton (a Judge) tells us, this was so ordained to determine of Cases that were new, and had no Remedy at Law, or a doubtful Remedy, but good Equity; (where was the Chancery-Equity then?) Si aliqua Nova & inconsueta Emerserent, quoe nunquàm prius evenerunt: Ponantur in respectu usque ad Magnam Curiam, ut ibi per Concilium Curioe terminentur.  
And there are infinite Precedents, (says the Learned Coke) in the Rolls of Parliament, of such references to the Parliament; and to that end were Parliaments 
Ryley, ibidem, fol. 411, 386, 374, 373, 371, 361, 362.  so often to be held; and it took up most of their time. See Ryley's Placita Parliamentaria, in the Appendix, fol. 525.  
And the infrequency of Parliaments hath given occasion to other Courts to Transact in those matters, that are indeed proper for the Parliament. The Exorbitances of great and high Officers have been many times a means to hinder and prevent the frequent Meetings of Parliament, as in the Case before mentioned of Cardinal Wolsey; lest their Exorbitancies should be questioned.  
All these Mischiefs might be Remedied, either by some good Act of Parliament to be Passed, as has been often endeavoured; or by Referring the Determination and Judging of Bills of Review of their Decrees into good and indifferent hands; or by the Supreme Court's declaring, that the Courts of the Common Law in Westminster-hall, aught, ex Debito Justitiae to grant Prohibitions to any Court whatsoever, that either Usurp a Jurisdiction where they have none of Right, or exceed their Jurisdiction where they have one. This Legal Remedy having been long disused and laid asleep wants a Revival. In order to obtain these peaceable and most necessary Helps, this small Treatise is Humbly recommended to the grave Consideration of the HOUSE OF PEERS.  
FINIS.   

ERRATA.  
Page ●…1. line 31. politically r. politicly. P. 32. l. 6. r. his Exercise. P. 40. l. 43. it heir r. their.