RICHARD BAXTER'S Catholic Theology: PLAIN, PURE, PEACEABLE: FOR PACIFICATION Of the DOGMATICAL WORD-WARRIOURS, Who, 1. By contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. And by taking VERBAL differences for REAL, and their arbitrary Notions for necessary Sacred Truths, deceived and deceiving by Ambiguous unexplained WORDS, have long been the Shame of the Christian Religion, a Scandal and hardening to unbelievers, the Incendiaries, Dividers and Distracters of the Church, the occasion of State Discords and Wars, the Corrupters of the Christian Faith, and the Subverters of their own Souls, and their followers, calling them to a blind Zeal, and Wrathful Warfare, against true Piety, Love and Peace, and teaching them to censure, backbite, slander, and prate against each other, for things which they never understood. In Three BOOKS. I. PACIFYING PRINCIPLES, about God's Decrees, Foreknowledge, Providence, Operations, Redemption, Grace, Man's Power, freewill, Justification, Merits, Certainty of Salvation, Perseverance, etc. II. A PACIFYING PRAXIS or Dialogue, about the Five Articles, Justification, etc. Proving that men here contend almost only about Ambiguous words, and unrevealed things. III. PACIFYING DISPUTATIONS against some Real Errors which hinder Reconciliation, viz. About Physical Predetermination, Original Sin, the extent of Redemption, Sufficient Grace, Imputation of Righteousness, etc. Written chief for Posterity, when sad Experience hath taught men to hate Theological Logical Wars, and to love, and seek, and call for Peace. (Ex Bello Pax.) LONDON, Printed by Robert White, for Nevil Simmons at the Prince's Arms in St. Paul's Churchyard. MDCLXXV. I entreat the WRATHFUL, CONTENTIOUS, ZEALOUS DOGMATISTS conscientiously to study these Texts of Scripture: MATTH. 28. 19, 20. Go, Teach all Nations, Baptising them into the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you. Mar. 16. 16. He that believeth and is Baptised shall be saved. Acts 11. 26. The Disciples were called Christians. 1 Cor. 15. 1, 2, 3, 4. I declare to you the Gospel which I preached to you, which also you have received, and wherein ye stand, by which also ye are saved, if ye keep in memory what I preached to you, unless ye have believed in vain— That Christ died for our sins,— and that he was buried, and that he risen again the third day— 2 Tim. 1. 13. Hold fast the FORM of sound words, which thou hast heard of me, in FAITH and LOVE which is in Christ Jesus. 1 John 4. 15. Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God dwelleth in him, and he in God. Rom. 10. 9, 10. If thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy Heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved: For with the Heart man believeth unto Righteousness, and with the Mouth confession is made to salvation. Acts 8. 37. If thou believest with all thy heart thou mayst (be baptised) And he said— I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. Rom. 14. 1. 17, 18, 19 Him that is weak in the Faith receive, but not to doubtful disputations— For the Kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but Righteousness, Peace and Joy in the Holy Ghost: For he that in these things serveth Christ, is acceptable to God, and approved of men: Let us therefore follow after the things which make for peace, and things wherewith one may edify another. Rom. 15. 5, 6, 7. Now the God of patience and consolation grant you to be like minded one towards another (or, mind the same thing one with another) according to Christ Jesus; That ye may with one mind and one mouth glorify God.— Wherefore Receive ye one another as Christ also received us, to the glory of God. 1 Tim. 1. 3, 4, 5. Charge some that they teach NO OTHER doctrine, nor give heed to fables and endless Genealogies, which minister Questions, rather than godly edifying, which is in faith: Now the End of the Commandment is Charity, out of a pure heart and of a good conscience, and of faith unfeigned: From which some having swerved, have turned aside to vain janglings. 1 Tim. 6. 3, 4, 5, 6. If any man teach OTHERWISE, and consent not to wholesome words, the words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to the doctrine which is according to Godliness, he is PROUD, KNOWING NOTHING, but DOTING about Questions, and STRIFES of WORDS, whereof cometh envy, strife, rail, evil surmisings, perverse dispute of men of corrupt minds, and destitute of the truth, supposing that gain is godliness, (or thinking that godliness is advantage;) from such turn away. 2 Tim. 2. 22, 23, 24. Fellow righteousness, saith, charity, peace, with them that call on the Lord out of a pure heart: But foolish and unlearned Questions avoid, knowing that they do gender strifes: and the servant of the Lord must not strive. V 15, 16, 17. Study to show thyself approved unto God, a workman that needeth not be ashamed, RIGHTLY DIVIDING the word of truth: But eat profane and vain babble: for they will increase to more ungodliness, and their word will eat as doth a canker. 2 Tim. 2. 14. Charging them before the Lord, that they STRIVE not about WORDS, to no profit, to the subverting of the hearers. 1 Cor. 8. 2, 3. If any man think that he knoweth any thing, he knoweth nothing as he ought to know: But if any man LOVE GOD, the same is KNOWN OF HIM. Jam. 3. 1, 13, etc. My Brethren, Be not Many Masters, knowing that we shall receive the greater condemnation— Who is a wise man, and endued with knowledge among you? Let him show out of a good conversation his WORKS with meekness of wisdom. But if ye have bitter zeal (or envying) and strife in your hearts, Glory not, and Lie not against the truth. This WISDOM descendeth not from above, but is earthly, sensual, devilish: For where envying and strife is, there is confusion and every evil work: But the wisdom from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy: And the fruit of Righteousness is sown in Peace of them that make Peace. Acts 15. 28. It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us But not to Church-Tyrants, Dogmatists or superstitious ones. to lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things— Phil. 3. 15, 16, 17. Let us as many as be perfect be thus minded: and if in any thing ye be otherwise (or diversely, or contrarily) minded, God shall reveal even this unto you. Nevertheless whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing. Phil. 2. 1, 2, 3, 4. If there be any consolation in Christ, if any comfort of love, if any fellowship of the Spirit, if any bowels and mercies, fulfil ye my joy that ye be like minded, having the same Love, being of one accord, of one mind: Let nothing be done through strife, or vain glory; but in lowliness of mind, let each esteem other better than themselves: Look not every man on his own things, but every man also on the things of others: Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus— Who— made himself of no reputation. 1 Cor. 1. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14. Now I beseech you brethren by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ that ye speak the same thing, and that there be no divisions among you: but that ye be perfectly joined together in the same mind, and in the same judgement: For it hath been declared to me of you brethren— that there are contentions among you— that every one of you saith, I am of Paul, and I of Apollo's, and I of Cephas, and I of Christ: Is Christ divided? Was Paul crucified for you? or were you baptised into the name of Paul? I thank God, that I baptised none of you, etc. 1 Cor. 3. 1, 2, 3, 4. I could not speak to you as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal, as to babes in Christ— For whereas there is among you envying, and strife, and divisions, are ye not carnal and walk as men? See Eph. 4. 1, etc. after. John 17. 20, 21, 22, 23. I pray— for them which shall believe on me— that they all may be one, as thou Father art in me, and I in Thee, that they also may be One in us, that the world may believe that thou hast sent me. And the glory which thou gavest me I have given them, that they may be one, even as we are one: I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one; and that the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them as thou hast loved me. Matth. 5. 9 Blessed are the Peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God. Rom. 12. 18. If it be possible, as much as in you lieth, live peaceably with all men. 2 Cor. 12. 20, 21. I fear lest when I come I shall not find you such as I would— lest there be debates, envyings, wraths, strifes, backbitings, whisper, swell, tumults— Lest God will humble me among you, and I shall bewail many, etc. Gal. 5. 19, 20. The works of the flesh are manifest— hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings— 1 Cor. 14. 33. God is not the Author of Confusion, but of Peace, as in all Churches of the Saints. Acts 20. 30. Of your own selves shall men arise, speaking perverse things to draw away disciples after them. Phil. 1. 15, 16. Some indeed preach Christ even of envy and strife, and some also of good will: The one preach Christ of contention, not sincerely— Rom. 16. 17, 18. Now I beseech you brethren, Mark them which cause divisions and offences contrary to the doctrine which you have learned, and avoid them: For they that are such, serve not our Lord Jesus Christ, but their own bellies: and by good words and fair speeches, deceive the hearts of the simple. Luke 9 55. Ye know not what manner of Spirit ye are of— The Angelical Gospel of the Ends of Christ's Incarnation, Luke 2. 19 GLORY TO GOD IN THE HIGHEST: ON EARTH PEACE, GOOD WILL TO MEN (or WELLPLEASEDNESS IN MEN.) John 20. 26. Peace be unto you. Grace, Mercy and Peace, with all that are in Christ— and Love— Gal. 6. 16. Eph. 6. 23. 1 Pet. 1. 2. & 5. 14. 2 Pet. 1. 2. 1 Thess. 5. 13. 2 Cor. 13. 11. Finally, brethren, farewell: be perfect, be of good comfort, be of one mind: Live in Peace; and the God of Love and Peace shall be with you. Amen. 1. Assert. THe BAPTISMAL COVENANT expounded in the ancient CREED is the sum and Symbol of Christianity, by which Believers were to be distinguished from unbelievers, and the outward Profession of it was men's Title to Church-communion, and the Heart-consent was their Title-condition of Pardon and Salvation; And to these ends it was made by Christ himself. Matth. 28. 19, 20. Mark 16. 16. 2. All that were baptised did profess to Believe in God the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, and devoted themselves to him, with profession of Repentance for former sins, and renouncing the Lusts of the Flesh, the World and the Devil, professing to begin a new and holy life, in hope of everlasting glory. 3. This form of Baptismal Covenanting and Profession begun with Christianity (and called our Christening, or making us Christians) hath been propagated and delivered down to us to this day, by a full and certain tradition and testimony and less alterations than the holy Scriptures. 4. The Apostles were never such formalists and friends to ignorance and hypocrisy, as to encourage the baptised to take up with the saying [I believe in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost] without teaching them to understand what they said. Therefore undoubtedly they expounded those three Articles: And that exposition could be no other in sense than the Creed is. And when Paul reciteth the Articles of Christ, 1 Cor. 15. and mentioneth the Form of sound words, we may be sure that they all gave the people one unchanged exposition as to the sense: Christianity was one unchanged thing. 5. Though I am not of their mind, that think the twelve Apostles each one made an Article of the Creed, or that they form and tied men to just the very same syllables, and every word that is now in the Creed; yet that they still kept to the same sense, and words so expressing it, as by their variation might not endanger the corrupting of the faith by a new sense, is certain from the nature of the case, and from the Agreement of all the ancient Creeds, which were ever professed at baptism, from their days; that cited by me (Append. to the Reformed Pastor) out of Irenaeus, two out of Tertullian, that of Marcellus in Epiphanius, that expounded by Cyril, that in Ruffinus, the Nicene, and all mentioned by Usher and Vossius agreeing thus far in sense; And no one was baptised without the Creed professed. 6. As Christ himself was the Author of the Baptismal Creed and Covenant, so the Apostles were the Authors of that Exposition which they then used and taught the Church to use: And they did that by the Holy Ghost as much as their inditing of the Scripture. 7. Therefore the Church had a Summary and Symbol of Christianity (as I said before) about twelve years before any Book of the New Testament was written, and about sixty six years before the whole was written: And this of Gods own making: which was ever agreed on, when many Books of the New Testament were not yet agreed on. 8. Therefore men were then to prove the truth of the Christian Religion, by its proper Evidences and Miracles, long before they were to prove that every word (or any Book) of the New Testament was the infallible perfect Word of God. 9 Therefore we must still follow the same Method, and take Christ's Miracles to be primarily the proof of the Christian Religion, long before the New Testament Books were written. 10. Therefore if a man should be tempted to doubt of the certainty of this or that Book, words or reading, it followeth not that he must therefore doubt of the Christian Faith. 11. A thousand Texts of Scripture may be not known and understood, by one that is Justified: but all the Baptismal Articles and Covenant must be understood competently by all that will be saved. 12. Those Church-Tyrants, Dogmatists or superstitious ones, who deny the sufficiency of this Test and Symbol (made by Christ and his Spirit) to its proper use, (to be the Symbol of such as in Love and Communion we are to take for Christians) do subvert the sum of Christ's Gospel and Law, and do worse than they that add to, or alter the lesser parts of the Word of God. 13. Therefore our further Additional Confessions must be only to other subordinate ends; As 1. To satisfy other Churches that doubt of our right understanding the faith: 2. To be an enumeration of Verities which Preachers shall not have leave to preach against (though they subscribe them not.) 14. Object. Heretics may profess the Baptismal Creed. Answ. 1. And Heretics may profess any words that you can impose on them, taking them in their own sense. All the Councils are not large enough to keep out subscribing Heretics. We must not make new Symbols, Rules and Laws as oft as Knaves will falsely profess, or break the old ones: there being none that may not be falsely professed and violated. 2. Many subscribe to the whole Scriptures, that yet are Heretics. 3. Church Governors are for this, to cast out those or punish them, who preach, teach and live contrary to the certain and sufficient Rule which they profess. Judicatures are not to make new Laws, but to punish men for breaking Laws. A heart-Heretick-only is no Heretic in foro Ecclesiae. He that teacheth Heresy must be proved so to do, and judged upon proof: which may be done without new additional Symbols, Rules or Laws of faith. So that all this contradicts not the sufficiency of the Baptismal Creed as the Symbol of Christian Love, Communion and Concord. I thought meet to add this more fully to what I said in the Epistle, to convince men of the true terms of Union, and of the heinous sin of all the sorts of Adding and Corrupting overdoers, that divide us. THE PREFACE, AGAINST CLERGY men's Contentions, AND Church-distracting Controversies. THAT the Churches of Christ are dolefully tempted and distracted by Divisions, no man will deny that knoweth them: That the Clergy is not only greatly culpable herein, but the chief cause, cannot be hid. But which part of the Clergy it is, and what be their dividing Errors and Crimes, and how they should be cured, is indeed easy for the truly faithful and impartial Spectators to perceive, but exceeding hard (as experience tells us) to make the Guilty throughly know, and harder to do much effectually for the cure. For the error and sin which is the true cause, is its own defence, and repelleth and frustrateth the Remedies. And so each party layeth it from themselves, on others, and hate all that accuse them, while they are the sharpest (and perhaps most unjust) accusers of the rest. I shall here freely tell the Reader the History of my own Conceptions of these matters, and then my present thoughts of the Causes of all these Calamities, and the Cure. I. I was born and bred of Parents piously affected, but of no such knowledge or acquaintance as might engage them in any Controversies, or disaffect them to the present Government of the Church, or cause them to scruple Conformity to its Doctrine, Worship or Discipline: In this way I was bred myself, but taught by my Parents and God himself, to make conscience of sin, and to fear God, and to discern between the Godly and the notoriously wicked: For which my Parents and I were commonly derided as Puritans, the Spirit of the Vulgar being commonly then fired with hatred and scorn of serious godliness, and using that name as their instrument of reproach, which was first forged against the Nonconformists only; And the Clergy where I lived, being mostly only Readers of the Liturgy, and some others that rather countenanced than reproved this course, I soon confined my Reverence to a very few among them that were Learned and Godly (but Conformists) and for going out of my Parish to hear them, my reproach increased: About eighteen or nineteen years of age I fell acquainted with some persons, half Conformists and half Non-conformists, who for fear of severities against private Meetings, met with great secrecy only to repeat the public Sermons, and Pray, and by Pious Conference edify each other. Their Spirits and Practice was so savoury to me, that it kindled in me a distaste of the Prelates as Persecutors, who troubled and ruined such persons, while ignorant Drunkards and Worldlings were tolerated in so many Churches, yea, and countenanced for crying down such persons, and crying up Bishops, Liturgy and Conformity: Before I was ware, my affections began to solicit my understanding, to judge of the Things and Causes by the Persons (where the difference was very great). But yet my first Teachers kept my judgement for Conformity as Lawful, though not Desirable had we Liberty, till I was ordained. But soon after a new acquaintance provoked me to a deeper study of the whole Controversy than I had undertaken before; which left me persuaded, that the use of Liturgy and Ceremonies was lawful in that case of necessity, except the Baptismal use of the Cross, and the subscription to all things, etc. But in 1640. the Oath called [Et Caetera] being offered the Ministry, forced me to a yet more searching Study of the case of our Diocesane Prelacy (which else I had never been like to have gainsaid.) At a meeting of Ministers to debate the case, it fell to Mr. Christopher Cartwrights lot and mine to be the Disputers; and the issue of all (that and my studies) was, that I settled in the approbation of the Episcopacy asserted by Ignatius, yea, and Cyprian, but such a dissent from the English frame, as I have given account of in my Disputations of Church Government. My genius was inquisitive, and earnestly desirous to know the truth: my helps for Piety were greater than my helps for Learning, of which I had not much besides Books: sickness helped my seriousness, keeping me still in expectation of death. All my reverenced acquaintance (save one) cried down Arminianism as the Pelagian Heresy, and the Enemy of Grace: I quickly plunged myself into the study of Dr. Twisse, and Amesius, and Camero, and Pemble, and others on that subject: By which my mind was settled in prejudice against Arminianism, without a clear understanding of the case: whereupon I felt presently in my mind, a judgement of those that were for Arminianism; as bad or dangerous adversaries to the Church; and specially of the then ruling Bishops: which yet I think I had not-entertained, had I not taken them withal for the great Persecutors of Godly able Ministers, and serious Christians, not only for Ceremonies, but for holy practices of life. Being under these apprehensions, when the Wars began, though the Cause itself lay in Civil Controversies, between King and Parliament, yet the thoughts that the Church and Godliness itself was deeply in danger by Persecution and Arminianism, did much more to bias me to the Parliaments side, than the Civil interest (which at the heart I little regarded): At last (after two years' abode in a quiet Garrison) upon the Invitation of some Orthodox Commanders in Fairfax's Army, and by the Mission of an Assembly of Divines, I went (after Naseby Fight) into that Army as the professed Antagonist of the Sectaries and Innovators, who we all then (too late) saw designed those changes in the Church and State which they after made. I there met with some Arminians, and more Antinomians: These printed and preached as the Doctrine of Free Grace, that all men must presently believe that they are Elect and Justified, and that Christ Repent and Believed for them (as Saltmarsh writeth). I had a little before engaged myself as a Disputer against Universal Redemption, against two ancient Ministers in Coventry (Mr. Cradock and Mr. Diamond) that were for it. But these new notions called me to new thoughts: which clearly shown me the difference between Christ's part and Man's, the Covenant of Innocency with its required Righteousness, and the Covenant of Grace with its required and imputed righteousness: I had never read one Socinian, nor much of any Arminians; but I laid by prejudice, and I went to the Scripture, where its whole current, but especially Matth. 25. did quickly satisfy me in the Doctrine of Justification: and I remembered two or three things in Dr. Twisse (whom I most esteemed) which inclined me to moderation in the five Articles: 1. That he every where professeth, that Christ so far died for all, as to purchase them Justification and Salvation conditionally to be given them, if they believe. 2. That he reduceth all the Decrees to two, the fine & de mediis, as the healing way. 3. That he professeth, that Arminius and we and all the Schoolmen are agreed, that there is no necessity consequentis laid on us by God in Predestination, but only necessity consequentiae or Logical (but in Election I shall here suspend.) 4. That the Ratio Reatus in our Original Sin, is first founded in our Natural propagation from Adam, and but secondarily from the positive Covenant of God. 5. That Faith is but Causa dispositiva Justificationis, and so is Repentance. These and such things more I easilier received from him, than I could have done from another: But his Doctrine of Permission and Predetermination, and Causa Mali, quickly frighted me from assent. And though Camero's moderation and great clearness took much with me, I soon perceived that his Resolving the cause of sin into necessitating objects and temptations, laid it as much on God (in another way) as the Predeterminants' do. And I found all godly men's Prayers and Sermons run quite in another strain, when they chose not the Controversy as pre-engaged. In this case I wrote my first Book called Aphorisms of Justification and the Covenants, etc. And being young, and unexercised in writing, and my thoughts yet undigested, I put into it many uncautelous words (as young Writers use to do,) though I think the main doctrine of it sound. I intended it only against the Antinomians; But it sounded as new and strange to many. Upon whose dissent or doubtings, I printed my desire of my friends Animadversions, and my suspension of the Book, as not owned by me, nor any more to be printed, till further considered and corrected: Hereupon I had the great benefit of Animadversions from many, whom I accounted the most judicious and worthy persons that I had heard of: First my friend Mr. John Warren began: next came Mr. G. Lawson's, (the most judicious Divine that ever I was acquainted with, in my judgement, (yet living), and from whom I learned more than from any man): next came Mr. Christopher Cartwright's (than of York; the Author of the Rabbinical Comment. on Gen. chap. 1, 2, 3. and of the Defence of King Charles against the Marquis of Worcester). Answers and Rejoinders to these took me up much time: next came a most judicious and friendly MS. from Dr. John Wallis; and another from Mr. Tombs; and somewhat I extorted from Mr. Burges: the answers to which two last are published. To all these Learned men I own very great thanks: and I never more owned or published my Aphorisms (but the Cambridge Printer stole an Impression without my knowledge). And though most of these differed as much from one another (at least) as from me; yet the great Learning of their various Writings, and the long Study which I was thereby engaged in, in answering and rejoining to the most, was a greater advantage to me, to receive accurate and digested conceptions on these subjects, than private Students can expect. My mind being thus many years immersed in studies of this nature, and I having also long wearied myself in searching what Fathers and Schoolmen have said of such things before us, and my Genius abhorring Confusion and Equivocals, I came by many years longer study to perceive, that most of the Doctrinal Controversies among Protestants (that I say not in the Christian World) are far more about equivocal words, than matter; and it wounded my soul to perceive what work both Tyrannical, and unskilful Disputing Clergymen had made these thirteen hundred years in the world! And experience since the year 1643. till this year 1675. hath loudly called to me to Repent of my own prejudices, sidings and censurings of causes and persons not understood, and of all the miscarriages of my Ministry and life, which have been thereby caused; and to make it my chief work to call men that are within my hearing to more peaceable thoughts, affections and practices: And my endeavours have not been in vain, in that the Ministers of the Country where I lived, were very many of such a peaceable temper (though since cast out), (and a great number more through the Land by God's Grace (rather than any endeavours of mine) are so minded.) But the Sons of the Coal were exasperated the more against me, and accounted him to be against every man, that called all men to Love and Peace, and was for no man as in a contrary way. And now looking daily in this posture, when God calleth me hence, (summoned by an incurable Disease to hasten all that ever I will do in this World,) being uncapable of prevailing with the present Church disturbers, I do apply myself to posterity, leaving them the sad warning of their Ancestors distractions, as a Pillar of Salt, and acquainting them what I have found to be the cause of our Calamities, and therein they will find the Cure themselves. II. I Have oft taken the boldness (constrainedly) to say, that I doubt not but the Contentions of the Clergy have done far more hurt to the Christian World, than the most bloody Wars of Princes. And I must reduce the Causes to these three Heads: I. The Abuse of POWER, II. Of WISDOM, III. Of GOODNESS; or of the Names of these: the three great Principles of Humanity. That is, I. By Clergy TYRANNY, II. By OPINIONISTS or Dogmatists, III. By SUPERSTITION and HYPOCRISY, or PRACTICAL BLIND ZEAL. But among all these sorts, selfish PRIDE, IGNORANCE and UNCHARITABLENESS or want of LOVE are the great effectual Causes. And departing from CHRISTIAN SIMPLICITY, in Doctrine, Worship, Church-government, and Conversation, is the grand instrumental means of most of our Schisms, Distractions and Calamities. I. Only by Pride cometh Contention, Prov. 13. 10. The Church-TYRANT is Proud of his Superiority and Wealth: The OPINIONIST is Proud of his supposed Knowledge and Theological Wisdom; on which account the Gnostics troubled the Church of old. The HYPOCRITE and the (honester) ignorant Zealot, is Proud of his supposed Holiness or Goodness: And for an eminency and precedency and praise in each of these, they all conspire (while they disagree among themselves) to trouble the Church of Christ: In a word, Selfishness, Ignorance and want of Love, are the Causes of men's personal ruin and damnation, and the same are the Causes of the Church's divisions, and all the miseries of the World. II. And that IGNORANCE is a Common cause even in the Gnostick Dogmatists that cry down Ignorance, Error and Heresy, needs no other proof, than the diversity of Opinions which such contend for: Every side pretend, that it is ORTHODOXNESS, FAITH or the Great Truths of God, which they defend; And in one Country or with one Party, one thing is Orthodoxness and the Truth, and another thing in another Country or Party, and another thing with a third, etc. And did they all but know what is Truth and the Will of God indeed, they would cease their Contentions; and all the Sects would meet in Unity. III. And did men but LOVE their neighbours as themselves, and were as easily persuaded to think well of, and deal gently with their neighbours as themselves, and as hardly drawn to condemn, hate, hurt or injure them, I need not tell you how easily, quickly and universally we should be healed. But before I speak of the Instrumental Means, I will fullier open the three forementioned Causes. I. Religious Clergie-TYRANNY hath so notoriously, so long, and so greatly made havoc both of Piety, and Peace, that he that is not an utter stranger to Church-History cannot be ignorant of it. I need not tell any Learned man, how many even moderate Papists, much more Protestants have thought, that Constantine and other Emperors that over-exalted the Clergy, poured out Poison into the Church: making great preferments a bait to invite all the worst of men, to be seekers and invaders of Church Offices and Power, and to corrupt those that otherwise would have been useful men: especially when (Christians having first made them their Arbitrators, in obedience to St. Paul's counsel) they were made the Legal Judges of the Causes of all contentious Christians, and so set up Secular Magistratical Courts. I need not tell them what work almost every General Council (as those of one Empire were called) did make! what work even the first at Nice had made, had not Constantine burnt their Bills of accusation against each other, and personally lamented their divisions, and driven them on to peace! what work was made in that at Chalcedon, and that at Ephesus, and so of others! what a horrid scandal the case of John and Dioscorus was, and the murder of Flavianus, and many others! nor yet how the controversies against the Nestorians, Eutychians, and Monothelites were managed! I need not tell them, how soon Victor began at Rome, nor what Socrates and others say of Cyril and Theophilus at Alexandria; nor yet how Nazianzene was used at Constantinople; nor how copiously and vehemently he accuseth the Bishops, and wisheth that there were no such inequalities among them, as gave them advantage to do hurt; nor what he saith against their Councils: nor yet of the quarrels of Basil and Anthymius, nor of Basils' sharp complaints of the Roman and other Western Prelates: I need not tell them of the Usage of chrysostom, even by such men as Theophilus, Epiphanius and their partakers; nor of the dividing of the Constantinopolitan Christians thereupon; nor how the violent Prelates made Separatists and Non-conformists of Chrysostoms' adherents, by the name of Joannites; and how unlikely that Schism was to have been healed, had not wiser Bishops succeeded, who restored Concord by honouring Chrysostoms' Name and Bones, and dealing kindly with his followers: I need not tell them of the sad work made at Ariminum and Syrmium, and oft at Rome, Constantinople and every great Episcopal Seat: nor of the bloodshed between Competitors, at the Election of Damasus; nor of the separation of St. Martin from the Synod of Bishops led by Ithacius and Idacius; nor of the difference of him and Ambrose from the rest about the compliances with Maximus. The World knoweth of the doleful Rupture that hath continued between the Roman and the Greek Church about a thousand years; And of the many Schisms at Rome by various Anti-popes', even at once above forty years together; And of the reason of the calling of the Councils of Constance and Basil to end them; And how the King of Rome keeps up his Kingdom to this day; what work he hath made with Frederick, the Henry's, and other Germane Emperors; what divisions this caused among the Clergy; what blood he caused to be shed for Jerusalem, and how many thousands of the Waldenses have at divers times been slaughtered; what work the Inquisition hath made in Spain and Belgia and elsewhere; and the flames of Persecution in England, and almost in all Christian Lands; what work the Holy League did make in France, and the English Bishops in many a War with their Kings; besides the case of Becket and such others; By whose instigation two hundred thousand Protestants were lately murdered in Ireland, and many again in Piedmont; I say to tell such things as these to those that are acquainted with Church History, is vain. And I would those that yet think cruelty the best way to set up themselves (or Religion, if that must bear the name) and to repress their adversaries (or Schisms,) would but (among many others) read the Epistle of great Thuanus before his Works to Henry King of France. But is it only the old Bishops, Greeks and Papists, that have made such havoc in the Churches? Even those that pretended to moderation did by the Germane Interim make many hundred Churches desolate. And the ten years' imprisonment of Caspar Peucer (vid. Histor. Carcer.) and the silencing of many and many faithful Ministers, and the banishment of many, doth show with what Spirit, many of the Lutherans carried on their work. And doubtless, had the Calvinists in Belgia been as wise and peaceable as the English Delegates were at the Synod of Dort, and been as far from Tyranny as they should have been, matters had never come so oft to Blood or Tumult among them as they have done, nor Grotius and the Arminians had so much to say against them. I will not meddle with the matters of this Island in our times, seeing they sufficiently speak themselves. But how cometh this Clergy Tyranny to be so common, so long and so powerful in the World, to make Parties, and draw Princes into Wars? 1. It must be remembered, that true Godliness is not common in the World: Too many take up Christianity, as in the Eastern parts the posterity of the old famous Christians are now Mahometans. 2. The Gospel and true Spirit of Christianity is contrary to the minds and worldly interests of carnal, ambitious, covetous, voluptuous men. So that they profess a Religion which their own hearts abhor as to its serious practice. 3. Every unrenewed man hath such a worldly fleshly nature, and is voluptuous, proud and covetous: And none of them love to be reproved or crossed in their way. 4. Church Honours, Dignities and great Revenues, and Clergie-ease in an idle life, are a great bait or temptation to a carnal mind: And the worse men are, the more they will desire and seek Church preferments, and make all the friends they can to get them; And the more self-denying men will not do so, (but perhaps avoid them.) 5. The diligent seekers are liker to obtain and find, than the neglecters and avoiders: And so the Churches to be usually in the power of the worse sort of men, and Religion to be under the Government of its enemies. 6. Men in power, and the Major Vote, have great advantage to execute their own wills, and to put Laws on others, and bring them under what Characters they please; and so to affix the names of Heretics or Schismatics on them, if they fulfil not all their wills: yea, to silence them, and suppress their Writings, and make them to be little understood in the World, yea, or by their neighbours round about them. 7. The Vulgar (as they are for the Conqueror in the Wars, so) usually are for the upper and stronger side in peace, that have Power to hurt them, and have the Major Vote; And also easily believe them, and think men that suffer, are like to be guilty of what they are accused. 8. Godliness being against a worldly mind and interest, and the Rabble usually for it, hence ariseth a Conspiracy of carnal Clergymen, and the Rabble, against those that are most seriously Godly, as if they were their enemies, and a surly, proud, intractable sort of people. As Sulpitius Severus describeth Ithacius and his followers, (and even Mr. Hooker out of him Eccl. Pol. Praefat.) 9 Such men in Power never want flatterers at their ears, to praise all that they do, and to exasperate them by slandering and reviling sufferers. 10. The long possession (since the days of Constantine) of Great Places and Power by the Clergy, within the Roman Empire (now the Greek and Latin Churches,) doth seem to justify men's Usurpations and Tyranny, and make all dissenters seem singular and Schismatical, (which was and is the Papal strength against the Reformed.) 11. Too many of the Secular Rulers of the World, have much of the same Spirit; And find also their interests so twisted in show with the Papal Clergies, that they dare not cross them. 12. The faults of those that suffer by them (in doctrine and imprudent carriages) use to give them great advantage, and make all their odious characters and names of them believed and received, (as the case of the Waldenses and of the Lutherans and Calvinists in Germany too fully prove.) II. The second Rank of Church-disturbers are DOGMATISTS or men that profess exceeding zeal for ORTHODOX Opinions, or Theological Knowledge. And thus three instances tell us of the Cause of our Calamities, 1. That of Gnostick and Heretical persons, who account every new Conceit of theirs, to be worthy the propagating, even at the rate of Theological Wars and Church Confusions; and cry out [But the Truth, and sell it not], when it is some error of their own, or some unprofitable or unnecessary notion. 2. The case of the Romanists (to say nothing of all the old contentious Bishops and Councils, and the controversies about Persona and Hypostasis; and about many words and forms of speech). What do the Roman Councils for many hundred years last, but on pretence of preserving the faith uncorrupted, multiply divisions and new Articles of faith (quoad nos)? And while they cry down most of Christ's Church as Heretical or greatly erroneous, they have run themselves into the grossest errors almost that humane nature is capable of, (even to the making it necessary to salvation, to deny our own and all the sound men's senses in the World in the case of Transubstantiation). 3. The case of the Schoolmen, and such other Disputing Militant Theologues: who have spun out the Doctrine of Christianity into so many Spider's Webs; and filled the World with so many Volumes of Controversies, as are so many Engines of contention, hatred and division: And I would our Protestant Churches, Lutherans and Calvinists, had not too great a number of such men, as are far short of the Schoolmens subtlety, but much exceed them in the enviousness of their zeal, and the bitterness and revile of their disputes, more openly serving the Prince of hatred against the Cause of Love and Peace. O how many famous Disputers, in Schools, Pulpit and Press, do little know what Spirit they are of, and what reward they must expect of Christ, for making odious his Servants, destroying Love, and dividing his Kingdom? How many such have their renown as little to their true comfort, as Alexander's and Caesars for their bloody Wars? But how cometh this Dogmatical Zeal so to prevail? Consider, 1. Nature itself is Delighted in Knowing much: Else Satan had not made it Eves temptation. Without Grace, even Theological Speculations may be very pleasing to men's minds. Morality and Holiness is principally seated in the Will. 2. Satan hath here a far fairer bait, than worldly Wealth and Pleasures and Honours, to tempt men, and steal away their hearts, from that Love and Practice which is Holiness indeed. All men are bound to Love God's Word, and his Truth must be precious to us all: and now it is easy for the hypocritical Dogmatist to take up here, and make himself a Religion of Zeal for those opinions, which he entitleth God to. And O that I could speak this loud enough to awaken the Learned World of Disputers, to so much jealousy of their own hearts, as is necessary to their own safety, as well as to the Church's peace! This thing called Orthodoxness, Truth and Right-believing (precious in itself, if it be what it is called,) is made by Satan an ordinary means to deceive Learned men, and keep them from a holy and heavenly mind and life, when grosser cheats would be less effectual: Theologie is valued by many as the Mathematics are, as a pleasant sort of knowledge; and by others as the Jews were zealous of their Law, by a formal sort of Religiousness; one sort being zealous for their Opinions, and another for their Ceremonies from the like principle of formality. 3. Yet Nature that would know much, is dull and slothful, and loath to be at that great and long study and labour necessary to obtain it. 4. And it is but few that are born with a quick natural capacity. 5. And it is not the most that have the happiness of very wise, experienced and throughly Learned Teachers: but most are instructed by half witted men. And young persons know not how to choose the best for themselves, nor their Parents neither ordinarily. 6. Ease and Interest, or the Veneration of certain persons, maketh men fall in with those Opinions that are in best esteem in the places where they live, and among the persons whom they most value. 7. Reason is man's noble faculty, and therefore that which man is aptest to be Proud of: And though few have much knowledge and wisdom, almost all would be thought to have it, and are too proud to endure to be accounted ignorant or erroneous. 8. The Dignity of the Pastoral Office, and Academical Degrees, maketh men think that the Honour of knowledge is their due, and necessary to their work. And therefore they will expect and claim it that deserve it not: and it shall be taken for Pride and Singularity for any man to convince them of ignorance or error. 9 Many of them are godly men and excellent Preachers, and cried up (deservedly) by good people: And therefore they take the reputation of more knowledge than they have, to be their due; and the people are ready to join with them in reproaching all that differ from them. 10. Great knowledge being rare, the half-knowing men are still the major part by far (alas how far!) And so if Synods be called, or most Voices heard, these will still pass for the Orthodox men, and a more judicious man will scarce be heard among them. 11. Learning is of many ages got into certain forms of words; and he that hath got some organical arbitrary Notions, passeth for a Learned man; or he that can speak many Languages: while true real wisdom (which consisteth 1. In knowing the Greatest Things, and 2. In fitting words to things) is much neglected: whereby as hypocrites deceive themselves and others with forms of piety, so do Scholars with forms and notions instead of knowledge. 12. These humane formalities of wisdom have prevailed to bring the Scripture, and the best part of wisdom, into disesteem, as a dull and low kind of knowledge; as if Logical, Physical and Metaphysical trifling, were a higher matter. 13. No man is sufficiently apprehensive of the greatness of the Curse in the confusion of Tongues: whereby as we can preach but to few Nations in the World, so we cannot intelligibly converse with one another. All words (being arbitrary signs) are Ambiguous; And few Disputers have the jealousy and skill which is necessary to discuss equivocations, and to agree of the meaning of all their terms before they use them in disputing: And so taking Verbal differences for Material, doth keep up most of the wretched Academical and Theological Wars of the World. 14. And nothing here undoeth all the World in point of wisdom, so much as overhasty judging or prefidence: It is natural to almost all to fasten presently upon the first appearances, and to be confident before they have half tried: In cases where seven and seven years serious study is necessary to a through digested knowledge, every Novice will presently conclude as if he were sure. And then as every one is apt to be confident, so to be tenacious; every error leading on more, and the reputation of the person being concerned in it, mutability being a shame: And so it becometh a very difficult thing to unlearn the errors once learned; as white Paper is easier written on than that which is written on before. 15. And then no man knoweth his own error (else it were no error), nor knoweth what another man's perceptions are, nor what any other man knoweth more than he. 16. And lastly, the odious names of dissenters (the common usage) doth quickly affright even beginners from thinking well of their Opinions, (yea, or of their persons and piety usually). And by all these means almost all are of the opinion of the Country where they live, or of those that they most reverence, or which are most for their interest; and boldly condemn the rest not understood. III. And the pretence of HOLINESS or a blind practical Zeal, and Superstitious Religion, both in Hypocrites and many honest ignorant people, hath not a little hand in the distractions of Christ's Church. It was the appearance of more Spirituality and Strictness which drew Tertullian to the Montanists, and which promoted a great part of the Heresies which have torn the Churches. This bore up the Cause of the Priscillianists, and of those that Bernard and Cluniacensis so much inveigh against, (I suppose Manichees with some better persons mixed:) This kept up the Donatists; but above all the Novatians long in great reputation: This was the strength of the Anabaptists in Germany and the Low Countries, as their adversaries confess. Saith G. Wicelius Meth. Concord. c. 12. p. 42. [Retinctores hac una parte duntaxat sapiunt, tenentes doctrinam Ecclesiae Catholicae] speaking of the necessity of a holy life: This is the strength of the Quakers among us now, and of almost all the separating and Censorious Sects: And were not so excellent a thing as Godliness the Motive, abundance of good people durst never have done the great evils which we have seen done in this age, to the great shame of our profession, and the sad calamities of Church and State. (And if I myself have formerly in my unexperienced youth, promoted any dividing or unwarrantable ways, it was upon this and the former mistake; which I beg daily of God to discover to me to the full, and beg the pardon of the miscarriages which I know, and which yet I know not of.) And if you Consider these things following, you will not wonder that mistaken Godliness should cause divisions: 1. Holiness and God's Love or wellpleasedness with man, is the best thing in this world, or that man is capable of. And therefore is most desirable, and most Honourable. 2. Therefore all good men prefer it before all other things; And are justly more averse to any thing that is against it, than to any worldly loss or suffering. 3. Yea it is God's Interest more than their own: And all good men are against all that displeaseth God, so far as it is known. 4. We all know but in part, and as in a glass and darkly: Even the most of Teachers take abundance of things for True and Good that are False and Evil, and for False and Bad which are True and Good; Much more are Godly vulgar people ignorant, and consequently err in many things. Even they that cry out against the vulgar Ignorance, and insufficient Teachers, know far less than they are Ignorant of themselves. 5. He that mistakingly thinks any thing is Good or Bad, Duty or Sin, which is not so, will be zealous in pursuit of his mistake, if he be serious for God: A good principle will hasten him on in a wrong way, whatever it cost him. 6. Ignorance and timerousness cause superstition, which is a conceit that God is pleased by overdoing in external things, and observances and laws of their own making, and so they that make part of their own Religion superstitiously (as most good people do in some things through ignorance,) will censure all others as Good or Bad, by the measure of their own mistakes. 7. He that thus mistakingly thinks that men sin when they do not, will have a proportionable dislike of them, and aversation from them: And will be ready to speak as he thinks of them, and so will be guilty of calumny, and calling Evil Good, and Good Evil. 8. The World will abound still with real evil and scandals; And all parties will be faulty: And usually the greater part of the Clergy in the Christian World will be guilty of so much Ignorance, pride, contentiousness, worldliness and sensuality, as will greatly grieve and offend good people. And this will occasion alienation and separations even with Godly persons: The sacrifice of the Lord was abhorred through the sins of Eli's sons: The case of the Clergy at this day in the Greek Church in Moscovie, Armenia, Syria, Abassia, etc. yea among too many of the Germane Churches, is very lamentable, by Ignorance and scandal: And the corruption of the Roman Clergy was it that facilitated the revolt from the Papacy, at Luther's reformation. He that readeth Cornel. Must, Ferus, Espencaeus, Erasmus, Alvan Pelagius, Clemangis and such others describing their own Clergy, and Jos. Acosta of them in India, etc. will see much of the Cause of the Divisions in the World: And all the old Writers that writ against the Waldenses, do make us understand that the ignorance and wickedness of the Clergy then, was it that drove them from the Roman Church. Saith Wicelius Meth. Concord. c. 11. p. 39 Quum tales ad nullum honestius vitae institutum idonei sunt, mirum sit si bonos sacerdotes praestabunt: sic itaque procedente tempore regetur Ecclesia ab asinis, & praedicabunt imperitissimi misero populo, quod nunquam didicerunt ipsi. Adolescentes optimi quique abhorrent propterea ab instituto illo, quod nolint suam libertatem sibi eripi, etc. I have oft said, what caused St. Martin to separate during life from the Synodical Bishops about him: And what Gildas saith of such, that no excellent Christian will call them Ministers: And it's very observable not only as Dr. James in the Margin of Wicelius hath cited, that there are many Canons against wicked Priests celebrating and Massing, but Wicelius himself saith (p. 17.) Non admittantur sacra concubinariorum, quos Deus pejus odit, atque manifestarios incestus: Meminerimus in Decretis Pontificum piè caveri, Ne quis Missam ejus Presbyteri audiat quem scit indubitanter concubinam habere, aut subintroductam mulierem. (And yet there are now men pretending to piety among Protestants, that speak of, and use those Godly persons more hatefully who refuse to hear such wicked Priests, than they do those Priests themselves.) Light and Darkness have no Communion: And the Church will always have bad Ministers and Members: And many good people through Ignorance will think that they should go further from them than they ought: And will not distinguish between that private familiarity which is in their own power, and that public Church Communion which the Church Pastors are the guides and judges of. And so the honesty and the ignorance of these good men, meeting with the vulgar wickedness, will be as the congress of fire and water, and will occasion ruptures and parties in the Churches. 9 The carnal Clergy will usually hate and persecute Godly zealous Preachers: (As even the case of Ph. Nerius and Baronius at Rome showeth, which had almost made disturbance:) And then sufferings will be a stronger temptation to hard thoughts and too much alienation than most are able well to overcome. 10. And the Godly people will adhere to their Godly suffering Teachers, and run further in bitterness against the carnal and persecuting party, than their suffering Leaders do desire. 11. Yet interest and temptations will prevail with too many of the sufferers to connive at the bitterness and alienation of the people, (if not to countenance it,) which they do not justify: And so the rapture will grow still greater. 12. And all men have some Pride: And Godliness being the best thing may become the object of Pride as well as Knowledge and Power. And so many will affect to have their Piety Conspicuous, and therefore to be singular or of some small party that is eminent; and so by separation to stand at a more conspicuous distance from the vulgar sort of Christians, than Christ would have them: And so many a good man hath more of Pride in his profession and separation than he is ware of. 13. And because God's word, and his last judgement, and Heaven and Hell, do make so great a difference between the Godly and ungodly, it occasioneth many to think that they must difference men by their own censures and separations farther than indeed they ought. 14. And it greatly promoteth Schisms that good people are unacquainted with Church-history, and know not how just such Opinions and Schisms as their own have in former ages risen, and how they have miscarried and died, and what have been their fruits. 15. And few men have that humble sense as they ought, of their own Ignorance and badness, which would keep their suspicions and Censures more at home, and make them more compassionate to others. 16. And few love their Neighbours as themselves, nor consider while they hate men's sin, what is lovely in their Natures and Capacities of grace. 17. And the Piety of almost all Sects of Christians on Earth is already corrupted with so many humane superstitious additions, that few can escape the temptation of Censuring accordingly. 18. And the Church will always have many hypocrites, who quiet their Consciences by adhering to the strictest Ministers and Churches, instead of a mortified, holy and heavenly heart and conversation. 19 And lastly, Persecution and hatred from others, and the due Love of Godly persons, tempteth too many Ministers to overrun their own judgements, and follow the more censorious sort of persons further than they ought (at least by connivance,) and to be ruled by those whom they should rule. And thus Divisions are occasioned even by Piety itself. II. But yet were the Principles of Division never so many and pernicious, Interest might have led more of the world to Quietness and Concord, had not Satan, the great enemy of Love and Peace, seduced them to that Instrumental Means and way, which will never consist with Concord. It is that which Christ and his Apostles have done very much to prevent, but the Devil (even with all the sorts forementioned) hath much prevailed against their precepts. The Grand case of the Christian World is, WHAT IS THE TRUE CENTRE and RULE OF CONCORD? Can they find out this, it would hold men of various tempers to it. I. Christ first laid down the Description and Measure of Christianity, in the Baptismal Covenant; and ordained that all should be accounted Christians in foro Ecclesiae who by Baptism were solemnly devoted to him, in a professed Belief and Covenant, Dedication and Vow to God the Father, Son and Holy Ghost: These he would have called Christians or his Disciples, and this is their Christening, and so ever called in the Church. 2. And next he made it his new (that is Last) and Great Command, that All his Disciples should Love each other, and live in eminent Unity and Peace: which he accordingly wrought them to by the first pouring out of his Spirit, Act. 2. & 3. & 4. II. The Apostles founding the Church in this Baptismal Vow or Covenant, and mutual Love, exhorted accordingly all the Baptised to Love each other, and to Receive even the weak in faith, but not to doubtful disputations, Rom. 14. & 15. Oft vehemently charging them to be of one mind and live in Love and peace, and to beware of them as not serving Christ but their own bellies, who were for Divisions, 1 Cor. 1. 10, 11. Rom. 16. 17. And though they came with pretences of ORDER, WISDOM or PIETY, such Good words, and fair speeches were noted to be engines to deceive the hearts of the simple, Rom. 16. 17. And whereas the objection seemed unanswerable, How can they so agree, who are of several judgements about Good and Evil? Paul often warneth them to hold fast the form of sound words, and summeth up (as 1 Cor. 15. 1, 2, 3, 4.) the Articles of their faith, and chargeth them that so far as they had attained, they should walk by the same rule, and mind the same things, and if in any thing they were otherwise minded, stay till God revealed the matter to them, Phil. 3. He oft chargeth them to be of one mind and judgement (thus far) and to live in Love and Peace, and to do nothing by strife and vain glory, but in honour to prefer others to themselves; and not to strive about words that profit not, nor about unnecessary Questions, seeing such dispute and strive gender to ungodliness, and fret like a Canker, and pervert the hearer's minds: Yea he directeth the Pastors to edify souls, rather by a Teaching than a disputing way, and to convince gainsayers, by meek instructing opposers, to see if thus God will give them repentance to the acknowledgement of the truth: for the Minister or servant of the Lord must not strive; Love is their work to be effected in others, and Love must be their Principle, and Love must be their mode and means, even Loving others as themselves: Oft are they called by Christ and his Apostles from masterly opinions, aspire and endeavours, and to be as little Children; and the servants of all, and as stewards of God's mysteries and helpers, not Lords of the Church's faith, and not to domineer over the flock of Christ, but to oversee them not by constraint but voluntarily: And what cannot be done by Light and Love, is not to be done by them at all: The Magistrate and not they, must use the Sword; but not to make men believers (for he cannot.) And though Vossius and others have rendered Reasons enough to persuade us that the story of the twelve Apostles making each one an Article of the Creed, is not credible, nor that they shaped it in every word to the present form, yet it is to me a certainty, that the Apostles made and used the Creed for sense and substance as the very summary and test of Christianity, long before any Book of the New Testament was written (about twelve years, and almost sixty six before the whole.) For 1. It is certain that all Christians were Baptised: 2. It is certain that they then professed to Believe in God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and to Covenant accordingly, renouncing the flesh, the world and the Devil. 3. It is certain that the Apostles and Pastors laboured to make men understand what they did, and would not delude them by taking the bare saying of these three words. 4. And it is certain that the Pastors altered not the Christian faith, but taught the same for substance to all that were baptised. 5. And it is certain that should men have taken much liberty to use new words or forms at Baptism, in opening the faith, it might easily have corrupted the faith and introduced a new doctrine. 6. And it is certain by Church History that (though some variety of little words was used, yet) this same Creed for substance (except the two or three clauses mentioned by Usher and Vossius) was commonly used at Baptism from the days of the Apostles. 7. And we find yet that this Creed is nothing else but the explication of the three Baptismal Articles; of which see Sandford and Parker (too Learned Non-conformists) in their very Learned Treat. de Descensu Christi at large. 8. And it is certain that if the Apostles did take this course so many years before they wrote any of the New Testament, they did this (as well as that) by the Holy Ghost: and so that the Holy Ghost seconding Christ's own Baptismal Law, or Instituted test, did make the Creed to be the summary of the Christian Belief, twelve years before we had any Book of the New Testament, and about sixty six as is said before we had them all. And then it will appear what is God's appointed test of Christianity, Communion and special Love. All which considered, though I think it is the truth which I long ago wrote against a Treatise of a Learned man (Mr. Ashwell) in the Append. to the second Edition of my Reformed Pastor, yet I publish my Repentance that ever I wrote it, as fearing lest it occasioned the turning of men's minds from this great truth which he and I agreed in, and which I find few consider as it deserveth. But the Gnostics began the corrupting game, and by pretences of higher knowledge, spoiled men by vain Philosophy, which engaged the Apostles to cry them down, and to warn all Christians to take heed of being so spoiled, and to vilify arbitrary Philosophical notions, tricks and vain janglings, as likely to draw them from the simplicity of Christianity. And the certain truth is, that he knoweth neither the Interest nor the Ignorance and weakness of man, nor the nature of Knowledge, who doth not know, that the frailty and employments of mankind are such as that there never will be an universal Concord in very MANY, or UNCERTAIN, UNNECESSARY things; And O that I could write it on all men's hearts, or doors at least, that The Christian world will never have Concord, but in a FEW, CERTAIN, NECESSARY things. Therefore Paul said to the Corinthians, 2 Cor. 11. 2, 3. I am jealous of you with Godly jealousy: For I have espoused you to one husband, etc. But I fear lest by any means, as the Serpent beguiled Eve though his subtlety, so your minds should be corrupted from the simplicity that is in (or towards) Christ. O mark these words all ye contentious Church - TYRANTS, DOGMATISTS and SUPERSTITIOUS ones. Read and study them well. God laid down the terms of the Church's Concord in seven Unities. 1. One Body or Church Catholic; 2. One Spirit or Holy Ghost, as the soul of that Church; 3. One Hope, or Heavenly felicity hoped for; 4. One Lord of the Church, our Head and Saviour; 5. One Faith, or Creed, or Symbol of our belief, and Belief thereof; 6. One Baptismal Covenant; 7. And one God and Father of us all, who is above all, through all and in us all. Eph. 4. 3, 4, 5, 6. And it is the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace, that on these terms we are charged to keep, v. 2, 3. with all lowliness and meekness, with long-suffering, forbearing one another in love. But now cometh the Serpent (note 1. The author,) and by subtlety (2. Note the means,) even as he beguiled Eve (3. Note the precedent) which was by promising her more knowledge and exaltation to be as God; and he corrupteth men's minds, (4. Mark the effect) though it is knowledge and advancement of mind that he promiseth and pretendeth: Even by drawing them (as to higher POWER, KNOWLEDGE or HOLINESS) from the Christian simplicity, (5. Mark what the Corruption of Religion is.) And what is this Christian SIMPLICITY which they forsake, and how are they thus Corrupted from it? I. The Church - TYRANT departeth from the SIMPLICITY of Church Government first, and will not hear Christ's vehement charge, Luk. 22. With you it shall not be so: He cannot understand such Texts because he would not. Hence how unlike is the Secular-Papal and Patriarchal state to the Ministry appointed and described by Christ! To reduce them to that, they think is to be enemies to the Church; And do they not then take Christ for their Capital enemy? because they are enemies to humility, mortification and the Cross, Phil. ●. 18. (To across bearing not to cross making.) The Papists think that Greg, the seventh that took down Princes was the most glorious instrument of the Church's exaltation: And by turning all to corporeal Glory, they lose hearts, and destroy the souls whom they profess to save. And having first corrupted GOVERNMENT from the Primitive simplicity, and made Princes their Lictors (as Grotius speaks in that excellent Epistle newly translated by Mr. Barksdale,) they next corrupt DOCTRINE, and WORSHIP consequently. For TYRANTS must have their Wills in every thing: and numerous and needless Laws and Canons must be made to show their power and fulfil their wills, that they may be Lawgivers and a Rule to all the World. And when they have made a seeming Necessity of doing things unnecessary, then to plead the Necessity which they have made, is the sum of all their arguments. And they that are against strict and precise adhering to the Scriptures, or observance of Gods own commands, are yet so strict for obedience to their proud imperious wills, that they persuade themselves and others, that without it there can be no order, no unity, no peace, but rebellion and confusion: And so they cry up Obedience, Obedience, that their Idol wills may be bowed to by all without control; And when they are mere Usurpers, and use no Power given them by God, they yet get the advantage of making all odious that obey them not in the least and greatest matters, by the names of schism, unruliness or such like. O say the Papal Usurpers, [The Church must be obeyed, or there will be no order: Disobedience in small matters is no small sin] when they have set up an Idol power against Christ; as if to disobey him, whose Laws they make void by their Traditions and Usurpations, were a lesser fault. And when they have departed as far from the Christian simplicity, in Doctrine, Government and Worship, as their voluminous Councils and Decretals, and Missals differ from the ancient simple Christianity, and have made as many snares and engines to divide and tear the Church of Christ as there are noxious (that I say not Needless) Laws, Canons, and Decrees imposed as necessary to peace and concord, than not men's mouths are more opened against schism, when they have unavoidably caused it, yea are the greatest schismatics; And no men call so loud for Unity and Concord, as they that have first made it a thing impossible. Let none think that I am speaking against any true Church-Government, or faithful Pastors: But I appeal to the Consciences of these Papal Tyrants; 1. Whether it would not be far easier for Christians to Agree, in A FEW, PLAIN and NECESSARY things, of Christ's own Institution, than in a multitude of humane decrees and articles, composed in words more liable to Controversy? Will not more subscribe to the Creed, than to all the Councils? 2. Have they not room enough to show their Power, and work enough to do, in seeing to the execution of Christ's own Universal Laws, and preserving mere Order and Decency in undetermined circumstances, that all may be done to edification? 3. Doth not every needless Oath and Subscription by which they would tie men faster to themselves in controvertible cases, plainly tend to undermine themselves, and keep up still a conscientious party against them? For while men have nothing to do but live quietly under a Government, they will be glad of peace: But when they are put to Subscribe, Declare, Covenant and Swear that all this is good or lawful, or that they will never be against it, it sets men unavoidably on the deepest studies of the case, and so all the people are set on trying and judging of that, which else they would never have meddled with: For what honest man will say, swear or promise he knoweth not what? Even as some crafty Rebels would undermine Princes, by drawing them to put the controverted parts of their Prerogative into the Subject's Oaths, that so they may make all the people Students and Judges of the cause, and unavoidably make factions and dissenters, that else would have lived quietly if they might: so do the Papal Clergy ruin themselves by such overdoing impositions. I remember Lampridius tells us that Alexander Severus (that great enemy of injustice) was so severe, that he would have made a Law to regulate men's Apparel: But Ulpian changed his mind by telling him, that Many Laws cause Divisions, and make occasions of disobedience. They cry out, There will be no order if Ministers and people be left to their own discretion in such and such circumstantials; But do they dream of Perfect Concord on earth? and that men of such various Interests, tempers, educations, converse and degrees of knowledge should not differ in a word, or gesture? Our English Rulers make no Laws, what Gesture shall be used in singing Psalms, or in Hearing Sermons, and there is no division or great disorder in them: But if on pretence of nearer Concord, they should tie all to one Gesture, this or that, we should presently find it an engine of division. And O how many such Engines have the Papal Clergy made and used long! and to what purpose? To silence faithful Ministers, to torment faithful Christians in the Inquisitions, to brand the best men with the names of Heretics and Schismatics, to gratify all profaneness and malignity, to quench brotherly love, and to tear the Church into pieces; And no experience will make them wiser. II. And the DOGMATISTS also have done their part, by departing from the Simplicity of the Christian Doctrine, to set the Christian world together by the ears. Of which Hilary hath written sharply against the Making of new Creeds, not sparing to tell them that even the Nicene Fathers, led others the way: And Hierome wonders that they that were for the word hypostasis questioned his Faith, as if he that had been Baptised had been without a Faith or Creed which all at Baptism do profess. But this will not serve turn to these Corrupters. Councils, Doctors and Schoolmen have been led by the temptation of more subtle-knowledge, to be Wise and Orthodox overmuch, till the Church's Faith is as large as all the Decrees of General Councils the side at the least, and the Church's Laws a great deal larger! And what abundance of dubious Confessions, Declarations or Decrees are now to be subscribed or believed and justified, before a man can have his Baptismal birthright, even the Love, peace and Church-Communion bequeathed to him as a Christian by Christ! And now controversal writings fill our Libraries by Cart-loads: And a Use of Confutation is a great part of most Sermons among the Papists, Lutherans and many others; And men are bred up in the Universities to a Militant striving kind of life, that their work may be to make Plain Christians seem unlearned dolts, and dissenters seem odious or suspected men, and themselves to be the wise and Orthodox persons, and triumphant over all the erroneous, that were it not for these Contenders would destroy the And so Ministers are armed against Ministers, Churches against Churches, Christians against Christians, yea Princes against Princes, and Countries against Countries, by wrangling contentious Clergy men. And (O what an injury is ●t!) Young Students are almost necessitated to waste much of their lives (which should be spent in preparing them to promote faith, holiness and Love) in reading over multitudes of these wrangling writers, to know which of them is in the right: And most readers catch the disease hereby themselves; And those few that at great cost and labour come to the bottom of the differences do perceive, that the Proud Opiniators have striven partly about unrevealed or unnecessary things, but chief about mere ambiguous words and arbitrary humane notions; and multitudes condemn and revile each other, while they mean the same things, and do not know it. One writeth a Learned Book against such a party, and another confuteth such an Adversary (especially about Predestination, Redemption, freewill, Humane Power, Grace, Merit, Justification, Pardon, Imputation, etc.) and then many read and applaud all as excellently done; (Alas, for the low estate of the Clergy that while!) when a truly discerning man perceiveth that it is but a striving about unexplained words, for the most part: And thus being Over-wise in pretences of Zeal for Truth, and under-wise in understanding it, and departing from Christian simplicity of doctrine, and even deriding the Christian Creed, hath made even some honest men become dividing Engineers, and their Articles, and Controversies the Church's calamity. III. And what Practical misguided zeal about worship hath done, almost all Sects, Novatians, Anabaptists, in Germany and here, and the various sort of Churches that refuse Communion with one another, and that condemn, or cast out dissenters from them, and preach and talk and backbite their brethren into the odium or distaste of their seduced auditors; the bitter invectives in Pulpit, talk and press of the several Pastors and people against each other (and worse than words where they have power:) all these speak so loud, as may spare me the labour of any further discovery; and calls us all to make it the matter of our lamentation. And what shall I say in the conclusion, now I am near to my departure from this contentious world? but sound a Retreat to all these unhappy militants, that will not let Holiness prosper by the necessary advantage of Peace. Cease your Proud contendings, O vainglorious Militant Clergy! Learn of the Prince of peace and the holy Angels that preached him, to give Glory to God in the highest, who giveth Peace on Earth, and wellpleasedness. in (or towards) men. Did Christ or his Apostles make such work for Christians as you do? The great Shepherd of the flock will take your pretences of ORDER, ORTHODOXNESS (or Truth) and PIETY, for no excuse, for your corrupting ORDER, FAITH and PRACTICE by your TYRANNY, SELF-CONCEITEDNESS and blind ZEAL and SUPERSTITION; and for using his name against himself, to the destroying of that Love, and Concord and Unity which he hath bequeathed to his Church; and for serving his enemy, and dividing his people, and hardening Infidels and ungodly ones by these scandals. Return to the primitive simplicity, that we may return to unity, Love and peace. Dream not of them upon your own corrupting terms. And read and read over again and again Jam. 3. which doth describe you, condemn you, and instruct you. If you say, Physician heal thyself: Who hath wrote more of Controversies? I answer, peruse what I have written, and you will see, it is of Controversies, but against Controversies, tending to End and reconcile. If any thing be otherwise (except necessary defence of certain necessary faith or duty) I retract it, and condemn it: Let it be as not written. I have meddled much with Controversies in this Book: but it is to end them. The God of Peace give Wisdom and peaceable principles, minds and hearts to his servants, that (though I shall not live to see it) true Love and Piety may revive in the Christian world, by the endeavours of a healing Ministry, and the shaming, restraint and reformation of the CONTENTIOUS CLERGY, whether TYRANNICAL, DOGMATICAL, or SUPERSTITIOUS. Amen. Jan. 25. 167●. Of DIVISIONS and CONTENTIONS among Christians, Consider I. The EFFICIENT, I. PERSONS: 1. The Devils. 2. Men: 1. A Contentious Clergy. 2. Unwise and wicked Rulers instigated by them. 3. The deceived people that follow them. II. QUALITIES, viz. I. Remotely: 1. Selfishness in Carnal hypocrites, who prefer worldly interest. 2. Slothfulness in Students, in seeking truth. 3. Hastiness in Judging, before digested conceptions and proof. II. Nearly: Want of 1. Humility and self-acquaintance: Pride. 2. Knowledge: Ignorance and Error. 3. Love to others: Envy, Malice and Bitterness. III. Instruments, or Engines, 1. In General: Corrupt departing from Christian Simplicity. 2. Particularly, 1. From Simplicity of Doctrine, by DOGMATISTS Words & Notions: 2. From Simplicity of Practice, by SUPERSTITIOUS additions. 3. From Simplicity of Discipline by CHURCH-TYRANNY. II. CONSTITUTIVE Causes, viz. DISCORD, [1. In JUDGEMENT of things necessary, ALIENATION, [2. In WILL and AFFECTION, viz. 1. Privative; by denying due Communion. 2. Positive, 1. By Contention. 2. Malice. 3. Hurtfulness to each other. DIVISION, [3. In Necessary PRACTICE, III. The EFFECTS, viz. I. On THINGS, viz. on Church▪ 1. Doctrine & Preaching, and Writing, turning it into vain and hurtful wrangling. 2. Worship, Prayer, Sacraments, corrupting them by faction, partiality and wrath. 3. Discipline, corrupting it into Secular or factious Tyranny, or a dead Image. II. On PERSONS, viz. I. Particular, 1. Themselves, 2. Their followers: 1. The Gild and Deceit of false-Religious zeal. 2. The Death of true Holiness and Heavenly Conversation. 3. The Death of Love, and Life of Wrath and injuries. 3. Rulers, viz. 1. Corrupting them by factious clamours against their Subjects. 2. Tempting them unto persecuting Laws and Executions. 3. Engaging them in bloody Wars abroad. 4. The Innocent, viz. Injuries to 1. Private persons, 1. By censures, slanders, backbitings, making them hated. 2. Denying them due Love, Communion and help. 3. Persecution, silencing, and other mischiefs. 2. Princes, 1. Weakening and grieving them by the Subject's discords. 2. Dishonouring them by defaming Excommunications. 3. Urging them to be the Clergies Lictors or Executioners. 5. Enemies and Strangers, scandalising and hardening them in Infidelity & sin. II. Societies, I. Churches: 1. Corrupting them in Doctrine, Worship and Order. 2. Weakening them by discord and division. 3. Shaming them before the World. 4. Making them less fit for God's Love and Communion. II. Kingdoms: Weakening them, dishonouring them, and drawing them into the Gild of Feuds, Wars and Persecutions. iv The REMEDIES. I. Persons, 1. Christ the Prince of Peace, and the Church's Head and Centre. 2. Wise Princes, who understand the Interest of 1. Christ, 2. Their people, 3. Themselves. 3. Able, Wise, Holy and Peaceable Pastors. 4. The Mature, Experienced, Mellow, Peaceable sort of the people. II. Qualities, 1. Diligent Study under wise Teachers. 2. Sincere Holiness: A dying life:— 1. Humility. 2. Knowledge. 3. Love, to others as ourselves. 3. Deliberate Judging upon trial. III. Means, 1. Returning to Christian Simplicity 1. In Doctrine: The ancient Creed, etc. 2. In Worship. 3. In Discipline. 2. Magistrates forcing the Clergy to keep the peace, and forbear strife. 3. Subject's obedience in all lawful things required by Authority. V HEALTH or Cure. 1. Rulers, Pastors and people of one MIND, 2. One HEART in Love, 3. One MOUTH and practice, in things Necessary, in Communion and mutual help: And mutual loving forbearance in Infirmities and things unnecessary; edified in Love. VI The EFFECTS hereof. I. GLORY to God, 1. In the Hallowing of his Name, and Honour of Religion. 2. In the increase of his Kingdom, and Conversion of the World. 3. In the Doing of his Will on Earth, as it is done in Heaven. II. Peace on Earth. 1. Increase of Holiness, Heavenliness and Love. 2. Mutual Delight herein: The Joy of Health and Concord. 3. The Church's Strength and Glory. III. Gods WELLPLEASEDNESS in MEN: His Church will be meet for his Love, Delight and Communion, and be liker to Heaven, and enjoy its foretastes. An Appendix to this Premonition. SInce the Printing of this, the World hath seen a specimen of such contention, as I lament, in a contest between a young insulting Assailant, and a jocular contemptuous Defendant; in my judgement both running into extremes; whether verbal or real, their own explications must further tell us: The extremes of the former are reprehended by many: By the later, (a person of great wit and piety,) I perceive that some men have such conceptions of the Covenants of God, as will give occasion to some Readers to think, that by mis-describing them, I have erred and misled men, through this and many other Writings. And men that are not able to conquer the obscuring and tempting notions of their Authors, are still calling for Answers to every inconsiderable objection, or contradicting word that is suggested to them; and little things puzzle and stop such Readers (though otherwise pious and worthy persons) who have not by long and accurate studies methodised and digested the matter that is disputed of: Not therefore to offend any man by opposition, or to defend other men's extremes; but to prevent the frustration of some of these Writings, and the scandal or trouble of my Reader, I must take notice; I. That some think that [the Covenant of Grace must be considered, 1. in its Constitution; and 2. in its Execution: The Constitution of the Covenant is God's firm and unchangeable purpose of saving his Elect, to the praise of his glorious Grace.] For the word signifieth a disposition, appointment, or ordering of matters, whether there be a restipulation or no; (the English word, Covenant, seduceth our understandings): The fixed purpose and determinate counsel of God, in Scripture, is called a Covenant, Jer. 33. 20. II. The execution of this fixed Constitution is God's wise and gracious managing of all things for the accomplishment of that glorious design which he had in the prospect of his eternal counsel, which he steadily and regularly pursueth through all the vicissitudes that his mutable creatures are obnoxious to, etc. pag. 718, 719. 1. On God's part; whatever grace and mercy was in his eternal purpose, that is given out to us by Christ, etc. III. 1. Christ cannot be the foundation of the Covenant, because Christ himself is promised in the Covenant as the great comprehensive blessing, Isa. 49. 8, 9 2. Free Grace is given as the true reason of the Covenant, Heb. 8. 8. iv The Constitution of the Covenant in God's purpose and counsel, hath no condition at all: nor is that the Condition of the Covenant required of us on our part, which God promiseth to work in us on his part; nor that which God in Covenant bestoweth; nor that which presupposeth other Covenant mercy's antecedent, etc. V A promise of pardon and life on condition of believing and obeying, is no Covenant of Grace at all, and neither better nor worse than a threatening of condemnation, etc. It's no more a Covenant of Grace than a Covenant of Wrath.— It's not great matter where it is founded. p. 584, 586. VI God hath not dispensed with one jot or title of the moral Law, but, Do this and live, is as strictly exacted as ever: so that unless a Surety be admitted, and the righteousness of another owned, the case of all the sons of Adam is deplorable and desperate. To deny the righteousness wherein the believing sinner may stand before this righteous and holy God, is to affirm the eternal damnation of all the World. VII. The Covenant mentioned justifieth not, but declareth our Justification, which is the immediate proper effect of Christ's righteousness. VIII. Never any man in his wits affirmed that the righteousness of Christ is the formal cause of our Justification: Give us but leave to call it the material cause, or the meritorious cause immediately and properly of Justification, etc. Some will think that they are great and heinous errors, which either these words, or some of mine that seem contrary, import: But I must crave leave here to follow my usual method, in separating the Controversies de re & de nomine; and then I think that even these strange words prove not him and me at so great a distance as they seem to intimate. For I grant him as followeth de re. 1. That God hath such a decree of Election or eternal purpose as he describeth, and calleth the Constitution of the Covenant. 2. That God doth wisely and graciously execute this Decree. 3. That all Grace and Mercy is given by Christ: (And therefore so far as Mercy is common, Christ is the common cause of it.) 4. That Christ himself is a blessing or gift decreed, and also freely given by God, even from his love to the World, Joh. 3. 16. 5. That God's electing Act, or Decree, as in him, hath no condition: nor his purpose to give Christ as a Saviour to mankind. 6. On our part no condition is required, either that God may elect us, or that the first promise of a Saviour be made, or that Christ come into the World, or that he fulfil all righteousness, or that he obey, or die, or rise, or be glorified, or come to judgement, or raise the dead, or that he enact it as his Law of Grace, that [he that believeth and is baptised, shall be saved; and he that believeth not shall be damned.] 7. Nor is any condition on our part necessary (absolutely, necessitate medii) that the Gospel, or the first Grace, yea the first special Grace be given us. 8. That Christ by his suffering and merits hath procured to his elect, not only pardon and life if they believe and obey him, but Grace to cause them effectually and infallibly to believe, repent, obey, and persevere. 9 That no man can or will believe and repent, but by his Grace. 10. That to give men a promise of pardon and life if they will believe, repent, and obey the Gospel, is not the whole of Christ's Grace to any: but wherever he giveth this, he giveth also much means, and gracious help, by which men may do better than they do, and so be more prepared for his further Grace. 11. That if God only gave men a promise of pardon if they believe, and gave them no Grace to enable or help them to believe, it would be no saving Covenant. 12. God did not repeal his Law of Innocency, (or as he had rather call it, of Perfection); nor did properly dispense with, or relax the preceptive part of it: Nor is it absolutely ceased, as to a capable subject: And therefore Christ was bound to perfection. 13. God would not have his Law to be without the honour of the perfect performance of man's Mediator, though it be violated by us all. 14. No man is saved or justified but by the proper merit of Christ's perfect obedience; yea, and his habitual holiness and satisfactory sufferings, advanced in dignity by his divine perfection. 15. This merit, as related to us, supposeth that Christ, as a Sponsor, was the second Adam, the Root of the justified, the reconciling Mediator, who obeyed perfectly with that intent, that by his obedience we might be justified; and who suffered for our sins, in our room and stead; and so was in tantum our Vicarius poenae, as some phrase it, or substitute; and was made a curse for us, that we might be healed by his stripes; as he was obedient, that his righteousness might be the reason as a meritorious cause of our Justification: which supposeth the relation of an undertaking Redeemer, in our nature doing this, and in our stead so far forth, as that therefore perfect obedience should not be necessary to be performed by ourselves: And righteousness therefore is imputed to us, that is, we are truly reputed righteous, because we, as believing members of Christ, have right to impunity and life, as merited by his righteousness, and freely given to all penitent believers. And Christ's own righteousness may be said so far to be imputed to us, as to be reckoned or reputed the meritorious cause of our right or justification, as aforesaid. Thus far we are agreed de re: And then de nomine I willingly leave men to their way of speech. 1. If he will call God's Decree, his Covenant in Constitution. 2. If he will call the execution of his Decree, his Covenant in execution. 3. If he will call nothing else the Covenant of Grace, or at lest nothing of narrower extent, but what comprehendeth God's eternal Decrees, and the promise and gift of a Redeemer, (and so of the rest,) I cannot help it; his language is his own. But I shall tell you further my thoughts de re & de nomine. 1. De re: 1. God's eternal decrees, purposes, or election, give no one right to Christ, Pardon or Life; and so justify not man. 2. The execution of God's Decrees, yea, of Election, hath many Acts besides Justification. 3. It must therefore be some transient Act done in time, & ad extra, by which God justifieth men. 4. There are divers such acts concurring in several sorts of causality, or respect. 5. Christ's meritorious righteousness and satisfaction are the sole, proper, immediate causemeritorious of all the Grace or Mercy procured and given by him, there being no other meritorious cause of the same kind either more immediate, or at all coordinate, and copartner with him. 6. As Christ giveth us Holiness qualitative and active by the real operation of his Spirit, (though he merited it immediately himself;) so doth he give us right to impunity, to the further Grace of the Spirit, and to Glory, by the instrumentality of his Covenant, as by a Testament, Deed of Gift, or Law of Grace. Which by signifying God's donative will, doth not first declare us justified, or to have the foresaid right to Christ and Life, but doth first give us instrumentally that right; and so immediately justify us. (And God's will giveth us not right as secret, or of itself, but by such instrumental signification.) 7. God hath signified his will to us, partly by absolute gifts and promises, and partly by conditional: that such there are, he that denieth, must deny much of the Scripture. Christ was absolutely given to fallen mankind for a Redeemer; and so was the Conditional Law, or Covenant of Grace; and many other mercies But he hath made and recorded a conditional Gift of Christ, as in special Union, (to be our Head,) and of Pardon and Salvation. 8. It is Christ's stated Constitution, that [he that believeth, and is baptised, shall be saved, and be that believeth not shall be damned, Mar. 16. 16. That if thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that God raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved: for with the heart man believeth (Christ's resurrection) unto righteousness, and with the mouth confession is made unto Salvation, Rom, 10. That except you repent you shall all perish, Luke 13. 3, 5. That men must repent, and be baptised, for the remission of sins, Acts 2. 38. And repent and be converted, that their sins may be blotted out, Acts 3. 19 So, Rev. 22. 14. Matt. 6. 14, 15. Ezek. 33. 14, 16. 1 Tim. 4. 8. Godliness is profitable to all things, having the promise of the Life that now is, and of that which is to come.] Call these Laws, or Covenants, or what you will, we are agreed that all this is the word of God. 9 These terms of life and death are the rule of our practices, and our expectations, by which we must live, and by which we shall be judged: and therefore we may truly say that they are Christ's Law. And they are God's signified determination of the conditions of life and death, and his donation of our right to Christ, Pardon and Life, is contained herein; and therefore this may truly be called Christ's Testament and Covenant, in several respects. 10. Though all duties be prescribed by God's Law, and so each Precept is a material part; yet formally or specifically the Laws to which these material parts belong, must be distinguished by the distinct conditions of life and death. 11. God hath made more Promises, Donations and Covenants, than one or two; which must not be confounded: 1. His Law and Covenant made to and with man in innocency is one. 2. And his Law and Covenant made to and with Christ, as Mediator, is another. 3. And his absolute promise of a Saviour to the World, with the conditional promise or Law of Grace conjunct, was the first edition of another. And the Gospel, as after the incarnation promulgate, was a more perfect edition of it: (to pass by Abraham's Covenant of Peculiarity, and the Mosaical Law, as such.) 12. Though Christ be promised in one of these, and be God's antecedent gift, he may nevertheless be the Author of another, (and so far the foundation,) as well as the meritorious cause. 13. That may be of free Grace which is merited by Christ; yea, and that which is annexed to the Evangelical worthiness of a believer. 14. That may be a condition required of us, to be done by the help of Grace, which yet is the effect of that Grace, and given us by God. 15. It is a true Covenant between God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and man, which is solemnly entered into in Baptism: And this is a Covenant of Grace, even that proceedeth purely from Grace; and of Grace, as given by God, and by us accepted. He that will confound these various Covenants, Promises, and Laws, on pretence of their unity, (though there is doubtless a wonderful unity of all the parts both of God's moral (signal) means, and his physical works) shall confound much of Theology. 16. The Law made to Adam never said [either thou or another for thee shall obey;] but it bound man to perfect, perpetual, personal obedience. 17. Therefore that Law, as it obliged us, is not fulfilled by the obedience of Christ, but only as far as it obliged him; nor can any man be justified by it, as a fulfiller of it, by himself, or by another: nor did Christ fulfil it in any other man's person, though in his stead, so far as is aforesaid. 18. The Law doth not command any man since Adam, perfect, personal obedience, as the means or condition of life; nor promise any life on such a condition as is now naturally impossible: but though it be not repealed by God, is so far ceased, by the cessation of the subjects capacity to be so obliged. 19 The Laws obligation of us to punishment is dispensed with, and dissolved by a pardon purchased by our Mediator. 20. Christ's righteousness is nevertheless the meritorious cause of our righteousness or justification, though he justify us by the instrumentality of his donative Covenant, as giving us right to our Union, and Justification and Life; and though our Faith and Repentance be the condition of our Title. 21. We accept two Concessions as containing that truth, which showeth that we do not much differ de re, could we more happily order our organical conceptions: 1. That Christ's righteousness is not the formal cause of our Justification: 2. p. 596. [Seeing the satisfaction was not made IN THE PERSON of the offender, but his substitute; it was necessary that THE BENEFIT of ANOTHER'S satisfaction should be communicated in such a way as might best please that God whose Grace was the only motive to his acceptation of a substitute: It is the undoubted privilege of the Giver, to dispose of his own gifts in his own way: And it was absolutely and indispensibly necessary that the sinner should be duly qualified to receive such transcendent favours, purchased at so dear a rate, and fitted to return the glory to a Redeemer; which an unhumbled, unbelieving, unconverted and unsanctified sinner could not possibly be.] He that writeth this, cannot sure much differ from me hereabouts. But he is charitably uncharitable, when he saith, [Never any man in his wits affirmed it so, (that the righteousness of Christ is the formal cause of our Justification.) It's too charitable to hid that which cannot be hid, of so great a number; whom it seems he never read (for all his Commission from all the Systematical Divines of Germany, etc. p. 696.) And it's too uncharitable to judge so many excellent men out of their wits. The truth is, so many speak so, that I have been doubtful I should be smartly censured for saying otherwise.] Forma qua justificamur est misericordia Patris & perfecta Justitia filii, saith Ant. Fayus in his Accurate Theses, Th. 60. p. 280. (And by misericordia Patris being the form, you may see how he understood Imputation.) The number that thus speak, are too great here to be recited: so that even the most judicious Davenant, lest he should go out of the road, was fain to make this the Theses to be proved by him; Imputatam Christi obedientiam esse causam formalem justificationis nostrae, probatur; Cap. 28. p. 362. etc. de Instit. habit. But let none turn this to our reproach, nor take all these for mad; for it is but an unapt name, and by him and many others sound meant: for the greater part of these Divines say but that Imputatio Justitiae Christi & Remissio peccatorum are the form, not of Justification, as in us, but as it is Actus Justificantis, (as Altingius, Maresius, Sharpius, Bucanus, Spanhemius, Nigrinus, Sohnius, Beumler, and many others: And Paraeus, Joh. Crocius de Justif. and many more expressly deny Christ's righteousness to be the formal cause: And I believe that all they that assert it, mean as the rest, though they speak incautelously and unaptly. And what they mean by [Imputation,] let Davenant speak, ib. c. 27. p. 359. [Imputantur quando illorum intuitus & respectus valent nobis ad aliquem effectum, aeque ac si a nobis, aut in nobis essent,— siquis indignus aut ignavus ob paternam virtutem & merita erga rempublicam, in gratiam regis admittatur,— gratum & nobilitatum dicamus per & propter Imputationem virtutis paternae.] This is Bradshaw's sense, but yet the similitude falls short. So Altingius states the Question; Loc. Com. part. 2. p. 679. [An justificatio consistaet in Imputatione Justitiae Christi, hoc est in Imputationae Justitiae per Christum acquisitae?] And what Protestant will deny this? And Maresius (with him) saith, [Cum Paulo justitiae Imputatio & peccatorum remissio idem sint, prout nullum est discrimen inter satisfactionem Christi & illius meritum, non est necesse subtilius inter haec dùo scrupulose distinguere, cum remissio sit peccatorum tum commissionis, tum omissionis & per illam jus plenum ad vitam aeternam habeamus.] (But this needeth somewhat more I think,) Loc. 11. p. 284. And the description of the effect showeth what the Imputation is, which Maresius truly thus describeth, Exeg. Art. 23. p. 326, 327. Transit reatu (peccatum orig.) ut non amplius imputetur; adhaeret quidem ei inseparabiliter Reatus potentialis sive in actu primo; ut sonat intrinsecum meritum poenae; sed ablatus est Actualis, sive quoad actum secundum, ut sonat jus & voluntatem Dei de paena illa adhuc exigenda: N. B. Thysius in synopsi Leidens. Disp. 33. p. 413. saith, [Mirum hic videri non debet Christi justitiam; non meritoriae solum & materialis, imo & Formalis causae rationem habere, cum id fiat diversi mode, nempe qua illa est, propter quod, in quo, seu ex quo, & per quod justificamur.] So he taketh Christ's righteousness to be all three, (the meritorious, material, and formal cause of our Justification.) De nomine, I add as to our Author: 1. I hope few will follow him, in calling the Decrees of God, the Covenant, and confounding Election and the Covenant in Constitution. For my part, I will not. 2. Constitution signifieth, 1. actum Constituentis; 2. more usually passively, statum seu rem constitutam: God's Eternal Purpose is not properly the Covenant in Constitution in either sense. 3. God's Eternal Decree is nothing but his Essence (for there is nothing in God but God, and nothing but God eternal) denominated, as related to its connoted object, (which from eternity was nothing.) And the Covenant in Constitution is not God, nor shall be by me so called. 4. Nor will I call the whole execution of God's Election by Christ, the Covenant in Execution; nor any part of it but that which Scripture so calleth. 5. I grant him that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is usually taken for a divine disposition and constitution: but that is not merely in God's Decree, but (as Grotius hath at large opened,) (Praef. ad Annot. in Evang.) as it is God's signal revealed determination of the terms of life and death; or as it is a Law and a Covenant on God's part imposed on us, before we consent. And Jer. 33. 20. doth not call God's mere Decree, his Covenant; (but his created course and law of nature.) 6. He that will but try the Texts which his Concordance referreth him to, and cannot find a multitude of places where the word [Covenant] is taken for somewhat else than God's Decrees, and their general Execution, even for a Law with its premiant and penal sanction, and for a free donation or promise, which yet hath its proper conditions, as the moralis dispositio recipientium; and that cannot find divers such Covenants made, by God, with Christ and us, that are really distinct, and not to be confounded, must not expect that I here trouble other Readers with such a task as his conviction. 7. I fully agree, that Christ's righteousnrss is fitly called, both the meritorious and material cause of our Righteousness or passive Justification: (Though I lately read one contending that it cannot be both.) For we mean but that it is that Matter or Thing which meriteth it. The First Part: OF THE Nature, Relations, Knowledge AND DECREES OF GOD; AND OF freewill AND PROVIDENCE, As the Objects thereof. Such selected Verities as are needful to reconcile the common Differences about Predestination, Providence, Grace and freewill, between the Synodists and Arminians, Calvinists and Lutherans, Dominicans and Jesuits, etc. By RICHARD BAXTER. LONDON, Printed by Robert White, for Nevil Simmons at the Prince's Arms in St. Paul's Churchyard. MDCLXXV. THE CONTENTS. Sect. 1. WHAT Knowledge of God is here to be expected, Pag. 1. Sect. 2. Of man's Soul as the Glass or Image in which God must be seen, p. 3. Sect. 3. The several inadequate Conceptions which together make up the most exact and orderly Knowledge of God, p. 4. Sect. 4. The Relations and Denominations of Gods Active Power, Knowledge and Will, as to the Creatures, p. 6. Sect. 5. Of Futurity, and the pretended Eternal Causes of it, and God's Knowledge of it, p. 8. Sect. 6. Of the Coexistence of the Creature with God in Eternity, and of God's Knowledge of them as existent, p. 13. Sect. 7. Of the presumptions and uncertainties of many Scholastic Disputes about God's Knowledge, which should moderate our censures of Dissenters in such matters, and check our sinful curiosity, p. 15. Sect. 8. More of Gods knowing things future, and of Permission of sin, p. 24. Sect. 9 Of Predetermination, Universal Causation, Humane Power, and the Nature of Liberty of Will: Distinguished in a Table, p. 27. Sect. 10. Of Natural and Moral Power and Impotency: Their difference, p. 36. Sect. 11. More of the same; and Whether God bind man to Impossibilities? p. 39 Sect. 12. Of Scientia Media, p. 42. Sect. 13. Of the Will and Decrees of God in general. Their simplicity and diversity, supposed priority and posteriority. Of Negations, of Nolitions and Volitions of Negatives, etc. p. 45. Sect. 14. Several distinctions of Gods Will explained, 1. Positive acts, and non-agency. 2. Positive and Negative as to the object. 3. Positive and Oppositive, Volitions and Nolitions. 4. Immanent and Transient. 5. Efficiently Transient and Objectively Transient. 6. Natural and Free. 7. Efficient and Permissive. 8. Beneplaciti & signi de eventu & de debito, Decretive and Legislative. Where the true nature of Laws is opened. 10. Absolute and Conditional. 11. Effectual and uneffectual. 12. Antecedent and Consequent, p. 49. Sect. 15. Whether God's Decrees must be said to be diversified and proved, according to the order of Intention, or Execution. Whether God do intendere finem? and what is his End. The Order and Objects opened, p. 57 Sect. 16. What Election and Reprobation are? The order of the Decrees called Reprobation, and of the Objects: Of Negations of Decree, p. 66. An Additional Explication of Divine Nolitions, p. 76. Sect. 17. Whether God Will, Decree or Cause Sin. Five Acts of God in and about Sin. What Sin is. Many ways God can cause the same thing that the sinner causeth, and so fulfil his Decrees, without Willing or Causing the Sin. Objections answered. God freely (not idly or impotently) restraineth his own possible operations, sometimes that he do not such or such an act at all, and sometime that he do but so much towards it, and no more. Whether God be ever Causa partialis? p. 84. Sect. 18. A Confutation of Dr. Twisses Digress. 5. li. 2. sect. 1. Vindic. Gratiae, where he asserteth that God Willeth the existence of Sin, and that sins are a medium sua natura sum & unice conducibile to the Glorification of his Mercy and Justice, p. 92. Sect. 19 The same Doctrine in Rutherford de Providentia confuted, Whether things be good, because God willeth them, or willed by him because good? resolved. Whether there were eternal rationes boni & mali. Dr. Field vindicated, p. 106. Sect. 20. The old Doctrine of Augustine, Prosper and Fulgentius, thought by some Jesuits too rigid, but indeed Conciliatory, (for absolute Election to Faith, and so to Salvation, and for no reprobating Decree, but only of Punishment for Sin foreseen, but not decreed.) Prosper ad Cap. Gall. Sentent. translated, p. 115. Sect. 21. The sum of Prospers Answer to Vincent. 16. Object. p. 118. Sect. 22. Fulgentius words to the same sense, p. 121. Sect. 23. The healing Doctrine and Concessions of many called Calvinists, of the Synod of Dort, Pet. Molinaeus, etc. p. 124. Sect. 24. And of Petr. á Sancto Joseph, Suarez, Ruiz, etc. on the other side, especially Bellarmine's at large, and others, p. 127. ERRATA. PART 1. pag. 10. l. 38. in marg. for Reason Being r. Relation being: p. 24. l. 25. r. those Causes: l. 26. r. first Case: p. 27. l. 2. r. Of predetermination. Reader, Pain and Greater business forbade me to gather the Errata: some are gathered by a Friend out of the first Book; many more I must leave to your ingenuity: I see in the Premonition p. 4. l. 22. for [Mr. W. [Mr. D.] l. 47. for [Armatus] [Annatus]. Also Dial. 11. p. 231. l. 30. r. [refuse]: Dial. 13. p. 291. l. 13. for [not] r. [done]. Catholic Theology: The First BOOK. PACIFYING PRINCIPLES Collected from the common Notices of Nature, the certain Oracles of GOD in the Holy Scriptures, and the common Consent of Christians. For the RECONCILING OF THE CHURCH-DIVIDING and DESTROYING CONTROVERSIES, especially about PREDESTINATION, PROVIDENCE, GRACE. and freewill, REDEMPTION, JUSTIFICATION, FAITH, MERIT, WORKS, CERTAINTY OF SALVATION, PERSEVERANCE, and many others. In Three Parts. I. Of God's Nature, Knowledge, Decrees (and Providence about Sin, with Man's freewill, as the Objects of the former.) II. Of God's GOVERNMENT and MORAL Works. III. Of God's Operations on Man's Soul. By RICHARD BAXTER, An earnest Desirer of the UNITY, LOVE and PEACE of Christians; For endeavouring of which, he expecteth with resolved Patience, still to undergo the Censures, Slanders and Cruelties, of IGNORANCE, PRIDE and MALICE from all that are possessed by the Wisdom and Zeal, which are from beneath, Earthly, Sensual and Devilish, the Causes of Confusion, and every evil work, James 3. 14, 15, 16. LONDON, Printed by Robert White, for Nevil Simmons at the Prince's Arms in St. Paul's Churchyard. MDCLXXV. The First Part: OF THE NATURE, KNOWLEDGE, WILL AND DECREES of GOD, As far as is needful to the intended CONCILIATION and CONCORD. SECT. I. Of our Knowledge of God, as here attainable. THough it be about the Knowledge, Will and Decrees of God, that our Controversies are agitated, yet because the consequent Verities are scarce ever well understood, without the understanding of the Antecedents, out of which the Consequents arise, and without the just order, place and respect which the later have unto the former, and unless things be understood in their true Method; I will therefore expose myself to the obloquy of those, who will call it Overdoing, so far as to premise somewhat of the Deity itself; But not what is necessary to the full explication of the Divine Attributes (as we are capable) as must be in a Method of Theologie (which I have attempted elsewhere); but only so much as lieth under our Controverted Subject: And when I have done that, I shall leave the rest. Thes. 1. To Know the only true God and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent, is Life Eternal. * John 17. 3. Bradward. l. 1. c. 11. p. 198. The first necessary incomplex Principle is God, and the first complex simply is of God, Deus est, etc. But yet it is not to us the primum cognitum. 2. To † Exodus 20. know GOD is to know his Being, Nature, and Relations: For though those Relations that are to Man be not essential to his Divine Nature, yet are they essentially contained in the signification of the name [GOD] as he is the object of our Faith, and Religion. For to be OUR GOD doth speak his Relations to us, as well as his Nature; As the name KING and FATHER doth among men. 3. We neither have, nor can have here in flesh any one proper formal Conception of the Divine Nature, that is formally suited to the truth in the object: But only Metaphorical or Analogical Conceptions; borrowed from things better known. 4. Yet nothing beyond sense (at least) is so certainly known as GOD, so far as we can reach, though nothing be less perfectly or more defectively known, or less comprehended. Even as we know nothing Visible more certainly than the Sun, and yet comprehend nothing Visible less. 5. It is not true which many great Metaphysicians assert, that the Quiddity of God is totally unknown to us: For than it could not be life eternal to know him; nor would a mere Negative knowledge cause in us a sufficient Positive Love, or Joy or Trust, etc. But to know that we cannot know him, would but infer that we cannot Love him: For we Love not an unknown Good. 6. Nor is it true that Pet. Hurtado de Mendoza (in fine Disput.) and some others say, that the Notions of Life and Intellect are all that we have of the Quiddity of God, and that the Divine Will is not a Quidditative notion. 7. God is here seen in the Glass of his Works, with the Revelation of his Word and Spirit. And from these works we must borrow our conceptions. * The doubt is, How Imperfect works can notify the perfect God: And the Schoolmen manage it as an insuperable difficulty, Whether God could have made the World, or any thing better than it is? If you will pardon me for making that easy, which they make ineffable, I answer, Goodness is Primitive (that is, God) or Derivative, which only is in Creatures: This last is formally Good, as it is Related as Conform to Gods Will, the Prime Good, as its Rule: To be à Deo Volitum is the formal notion of Created Good. And so the world is perfect, and can be no better, because it is as God willeth it: And yet God can make particular creatures better to themselves, and to one another; He can make any man more wise, more holy, etc. But bonum sibi is no further properly bonum, than it is Volitum à Deo: Therefore God can make the world far otherwise than it is; and yet then it would be no Better. For still it would be but as God willed it to be: So that the matter and private Goodness might alter; but the true form of Goodness would be still just the same as now. 8. Therefore though the Thing intended when we speak of God, be transcendently and only in Him, and not in the Creature, yet the first use of the words is to signify something in the Creature. And therefore the Creature is the famosius analogatum, though Nothing to God. 9 In the use of these notions we must still profess that we apply them to God no farther than to signify his perfections: And all words must be as little as may be used of him in strict disputes, which imply imperfection, when better may be had; But the highest are to be preferred. 10. And we must still profess, that we take none of these words to be formal proper univocal terms, lest the concealed Metaphor or impropriety occasion false conceptions of God, and unworthy of Him; and also tempt men to run them further by false inferences. 11. God's Nature is most simple, undivided: And so must an adequate conception of Him be: But Man can have no such conception of Him; but must know what he can know of this One GOD by many partial inadequate conceptions. 12. Yet must we be very careful that these inadequate analogical Conceptions be Orderly, and not as (I will not say how commonly) it is done by some, a confused heap: For the Mind that so conceiveth of Him, greatly injureth itself and Him, and the Tongue and Pen that so describeth Him, dishonoureth Him: And though the Ignorant, for whom Catechisms are written, cannot lay together a full Scheme of the Divine Attributes in just method; yet those few which they can understand and remember, they would as well and better understand and remember in the true method, were they taught it, than in an heap. For Method is a great help to understanding and memory. We would not give a Prince his Titles so confusedly; nor draw his Picture monstrously, with the arms where the feet should be, and the feet where the arms, or the back before, and the face behind, unless we exposed him purposely to scorn. Every man knoweth the difference between a Clock or Watch in order, and the same in confused parcels on a heap; and between an Army and a Rout, etc. Shall Order be the beauty of the World and every Creature in it; and shall we deny it only to the God of Order? I crave the pardon of Divines for entreating them to amend this in their Doctrine, but especially in their Catechisms, yea, in their Understandings first. SECT. II. Of man's Soul as the Glass in which we must see God. 13. THe principal Glass in which we must see God, in his Nature; among all his Creatures here, is the Soul of man; which is said to be made after the Image of God; And which being ourselves, we can best perceive. 14. The Soul of Man beareth God's Image in three parts of it, or respects: 1. In its Nature it is the Image of the Divine Nature: 2. In its Rectitude it is the Image of the Divine Holiness and perfection: 3. In our Dominion over the inferior Creatures, and eminently, in Superiors over Subjects, it hath the Image of his Majesty and Supereminence. 15. I We have no one adequate Conception of the Nature of our own souls; but must think of them by partial inadequate Conceptions. And that by many (not feigned or forced, but) real and necessary Trinaries in Unity. 16. And first the Three Inadequate Conceptions of its Being are the Generical, the Differencial, and the Proper-inseparable Accidental, viz. that it is, * 1. Substantialitas Generica, is loco materia: Aegid. Rom. saith Quodl. 1. q. 9 p. 18. Non est materia in Angelis: bene tamen est aliquid loco materia: quia non sunt Actus purus, sed habent aliquam potentialitatem admixtam: Unde in li. de Causis scribitur, quod Intelligentia habtant suam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. suum materiale. Et hoc forte volunt illi qui in Angelis Materiam ponunt; Cum ipsi dicant materiam illam non esse ejusdem rationis cum materia corporalium: Solùm ergo in verbis videntur discordare à nobis: Quia & nos ibi aliquod materiale ponimus. (N. B.) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Vita, Proprietatibus suis praedita. The first notion is substantia abstractè à forma concepta: The second is the Conceptus formatis: The third its Accidents, not acquired, but natural. By LIFE I understand not Relatively only, that it is the Life of the body or Compositum; But essentially as in its nature it is Life itself, or a Living substance formally, as well as the Living Principle in the man. The word [Spirit] as commonly used by us, comprehendeth all this; but what a Spirit is, we know but by these partial Conceptions. 17. To pass by the Three Vital Faculties, Vegetative, Sensitive and Intellective, (because I describe it but as the Speculum Deitatis). 2. This One Formal Principle, LIFE, as it is man's soul, must be itself known by us by these Three inadequate Conceptions, as making up the Form of the soul, 1. Vital Activity (or Power), 2. An Intellect, 3. A Will. † See Aureolus in 2. d. 9 that in separated substances (Angels) there is a Motive power beside the Intellect and Will; with whom Suarez and many others do agree. 18. 3. And the EXISTENCE of these Formal Principles cannot justly be understood by us, but in these three gradual inadequate or partial Conceptions, 1. As in Potentia-activa seu Virtute: 2. As in Actu immanente: 3. As in Actione transeunte: (Not as it is in Passo, but as it is Status vel Modus Agentis.) 19 II. The Moral or Holy Image of God on the soul, is the Holy Perfection or Qualification of these Faculties, as they are In Virtute by Holy Dispositions; As in Actu immanente, by Holy Intrinsic Acts and Habits; And as to Action ad extra, by a Holy Rectitude: And this Image consisteth in the souls Holy Vivacity or Activity, and its Wisdom and Goodness, or its Holy Liveliness, Light and Love. 20. III. The Image of God's Majesty or Supereminence consisteth in 1. The Sub-propriety which we have in Inferior Creatures; 2. The Sub-government; 3. That we are under God Their End (and Benefactors). SECT. III. The several inadequate Conceptions which in order make up our Knowledge of God. 21. BY the Knowledge of our own Acts we know our Powers and the Nature of our own souls (though imperfectly); And by the Knowledge of our souls, we know the nature of other Intellectual Spirits; And by the Knowledge of ourselves and them, and the Scripture expressions of his Attributes, we know so much of God as we can here know. And accordingly must speak of Him, or be silent: For we have no higher notions, than such as are thus Analogical; expressing that which is in God in an unconceivable eminency and transcendency, by words which first signify that which is formally in the soul (as is said). 22. And so we must conceive of God by all these following inadequate Conceptions, confessing the impropriety, but having no better. I. The Essence of God, who in Scripture is called in two words [An Infinite Spirit] is necessarily conceived of by these Three Conceptions: 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 2. Vita, 3. Perfectio. The two first being the substantial Conceptus of a Spirit, and the third that which answereth to all perfective degrees, properties and accidents in Creatures, and comprehendeth a multitude of Perfective Attributes: which I express in the Abstract, being loath much to use Concretes or Adjectives of God. Of these as the first answereth to Matter in Materials, and to the Genus and substantia abstractè sumpta in Spirits, so doth the second to the Form and Difference; when yet in God there is no Composition, or Matter. 23. II. And the Formal Conceptus [VITA] must itself be conceived of in this Threefold inadequate Conception; 1. * It is a great dispute with the Schoolmen, Whether God's Power be any thing but his Intellect and Will: that is, a necessary distinct conceptus inadaequatus of God? (For he is one simple essence.) Durand. 1. d. 38. q. 1. justly affirmeth it: Vasqu. in 1. Tho. q. 23. d. 102. c. 2. saith, Haec sententia no●null is recentioribus mirum in modum probatur: yet he is against it; (though Suarez be for it). But it is partly by misconceiving of the Potentia Vital is in man, as if it were only Executive ad extra, or in the inferior faculties; and partly on such frivolous reasons as tend also to a denial of his Intellection and Volition. Methinks, they that acknowledge God's Understanding and Will to be analogically so called (man's being the first which the word signifieth though God's infinitely more excellent) should on the same reason grant, that Vita & Potentia activa are terms as applicable to God: For which denomination many reasons and cogent may be given: And I am sure the language of the Scripture and our Creed will warrant this conception. Potentia-Actus, 2. Intellectus, 3. Voluntas. I call the first Potentia-Actus, to avoid Concretes, and to signify, that as God hath no Potentia Passiva, so his Potentia-Activa is not an idle cessant Power, but in perpetual perfect Act; and that Act is a most Powerful-Act: so that neither Potentia alone, nor Actus alone, but both together, are our best Conception of this first Principle in the Deity. And I take it for granted, that even in Man's soul, the Potentia-Vitalis Activa, the Intellect and Will, are not as Thomas thought Accidents, but the formal essence of the soul, as the Scotists and Nominals better say; And I have largely elsewhere proved, and therefore stand not here upon it. 24. III. And the Existence of this Divine Essence, must be known by us in this Gradual Threefold Conception: 1. As in Virtute (vel Potentia) 2. In Actu Immanente, 3. In Actione Transeunte: Of the first I shall say no more, but what is said before. By the second I mean Gods own most perfect Essence as Active in itself, without extrinsic effect or object. By the third, I mean not the Creature or the Divine Action ut recipitur in passo, or the effect: But the Divine Essence itself in the state of Agency ad extra; which the Schools conclude to be Eternal, though the effect be but in Time. Yet if any will call this a free, and not a necessary state of the Divine Essence, I contend not. 25. iv The Essential Immanent Acts of God are Three: 1. SIBI VIVERE, or to be Essential Active Life in Himself, 2. SE INTELLIGERE, to know Himself; 3. SE AMARE, or to be Amor sui. 26. V The Trinity of Divine Subsistences or Persons also must be here acknowledged; 1. The FATHER; 2. The WORD or SON; 3. The HOLY SPIRIT: Of which the Schoolmen have said so much, (if not far too much) as that I may turn the Reader to them. 27. I have elsewhere shown that many of them, and other Divines, do take the Three last named Immanent Acts in God, to be the same with the Three Persons or Subsistences; Even the Three Divine Principles (Potentia-Actus, Intellectus & Volunt as) as in Act thus Immanently; But of these great Mysteries elsewhere. All that I say here is, that seeing the Trinity of Divine Principles (or formal Essentialities) and the Threefold Act, are so certainly evident to Natural Reason itself, that no understanding person can deny them, we have no Reason to think the Trinity of Eternal Subsistences incredible, and a thing that the Christian faith is to be suspected for, but the quite contrary; though they are mysteries above our reach, (as all of God is, as to a full or formal apprehension). 28. Though God have no Real Accidents, we are fain to conceive of Him with some Analogy to Accidents: where, 1. The Universal Conception is PERFECTION, which comprehendeth all. 2. The Divine Principles considered in PERFECTION denominate God, 1. Potentissimus, 2. Sapientissimus, 3. Optimus. 29. The Attributes of the Divine Persons are, 1. Distinguishing; viz. 1. GENERANS, Patris: 2. GENITUS, Filii: 3. PROCEDENS, Spiritus Sancti. 2. Common to all, such as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. 30. The particular Attributes, analogical as to Creatures, Comparate, Relative and Negative, are very many: But yet in Order to be conceived of, and not confusedly; which elsewhere I offer to the Readers view. 31. VI Gods Causal Relations to his Creatures, are in General those named by S. Paul, Rom. 11. 36. OF HIM and THROUGH HIM and TO HIM are all things. And he is, 1. The first EFFICIENT, 2. The supreme DIRIGENT, 3. The Ultimate FINAL Cause of all things. 32. God's EFFICIENCY is terminated, 1. On the Things in their Being, 2. In their Action and Operation. 1. And in the first respect he is the Cause, 1. Of their Existing Essence, 2. Of their Order, 3. Of their Goodness or Perfection: And so he is, 1. The CREATOR, and Conserver, 2. The ORDINATOR, 3. The BENEFACTOR of all the world. And in the second respect, (as to Action) he is, 1. The Actor or Motor of all things (by his Active Power) 2. The Governor of all (according to their several Natures) (by his wisdom) 3. The Perfecter of all things in their attingency or fruition of their proper End, (by his Goodness.) 33. VII. As to MAN in special God is now Fundamentally Related to him as his CREATOR, his REDEEMER and his REGENERATER or SANCTIFIER; eminently ascribed distinctly to the FATHER, SON and HOLYSPIRIT: From whence floweth, NATURA, MEDELA, SALUS, or NATURE, REDEEMING GRACE., and RENEWING GRACE. (HOLINESS and GLORY) (that is, LOVE begun here and perfected in Heaven.) 34. VIII. From CREATION there resulteth a Threefold Moral Right and Relation of God to Man: 1. He is our Absolute OWNER or LORD to dispose of us, and Act us by his Power. 2. He is our Supreme RECTOR, Morally to Rule us as Intellectual free-agents, eminently by his Wisdom. 3. He is our LOVER and Ultimate END; as he is Goodness and Love itself; To Love Him and be Loved by him perfectly for ever, being Amantissimus & Amabilissimus in his Goodness. 35. He that leaveth out any one of these Relations of God to man, (to be Our Owner, Ruler and Lover and End) leaveth out that which is Essential to Our God, as the word is Relatively used in the Precepts and Promises of the Holy Scripture. SECT. iv Of God's Relations to the Creature and denominations (thereupon) in his Power, Knowledge and Will. 36. THe Three Divine Essential Principles, Related to the Creature, ad extra are denominated, 1. His Omnipotence, 2. His Omniscience or Knowledge of them, 3. His Volition and Love of them. He who is Potentissimus, perfectly Powerful in Act, in Himself, is denominated Omnipotent, because he can do all things ad extra which belong to That God's Power is Infinite, quia est ipsa Infinita Essentia, is past doubt: But whether it may be called Infinite, as respecting outward objects, is disputed: And some prove the affirmative, by asserting Infinite Objects: But Gregor. Ar. n. 1. d. 43. q. 2. hath reasons too subtle to be here recited: One of them Vasq. useth in 1. Tho. q. 25. d. 103. c. 2. & disp. 104. Vid. opiniones Gabriel. Scoti & Thomae de ratione nominis Omnipotentia Divinae. Power: 2. And he who is Intellectus se Intelligens ad intra, is denominated Omniscient or Knowing all Creatures, from the exterior objects: 3. And he who is Voluntas se Volens, or Amor se Amans ad intra, is also denominated willing of exterior things. 37. But (by the way) how the Creature is called exterior to God who is Essentially every where and in all, and how God is not a Part of Universal Being, and how God and the Creature are no more than God alone, is elsewhere somewhat explained, but transcendeth man's Understanding to comprehend. 38. God's Transient Acts are of two sorts: 1. Effectively Transient (as Creation, Regeneration, etc.) which do cause somewhat without. 2. Objectively only Transient; which cause nothing, but suppose the Object. 39 It is a dreadful thing to be overbold, rash and presumptuous, in speaking and asserting any thing without clear proof, of God's Knowledge and Will; especially to reduce them to all the Modes and Methods of a man, even as to the order of his Acts: seeing we are forced to confess, that even Intellection and Volition are spoken of God with exceeding great impropriety, D'Orb●llis 1. d. 40. inquit [●icet in Deo non sit proprie Habitus, est tamen ibl aliquid intellectum à nobis per modum habitus, siquidem scientia in nobis est Habitus ad cognoscendum, sicut Virtus est habitus ad operandum. Cognitio Divina cum semper maneat, congrue signatur per modum habitus.] and man's Acts which are the prius significatum, are further below Gods, than a Worm is below a Man. Therefore were it not that the presumption of the Schools and Polemical writers, hath made that Necessary as Defensive, which else would not be so, I should scarce dare to say this little following: 40. I. The Power of God is denominated Relatively Omni-potency in three instants to Three several Objects: 1. In the first instant, as to All things which belong to Power: And so God can do all things, which are hence called Possible. 2. In the second instant, to All things meet or Congruous to the Divine Intellect to be willed and done: And so we say, that God can do All that is meet to be done, and nothing that is unmeet. 3. In the third instant (of reason) as to All things which he willeth to do: And so we say, that God can do whatsoever he will do. And so Possibility hath various senses. 41. II. Gods Intellect is Relatively denominated Omniscient, in respect ●eid. Rom. quodl. 3. q. 3. saith, That God's speculative knowledge is before his Velle; but his Practical determined ad o●●s is after as we must conceive of it. to three sorts of Objects also in three instants: 1. In the first instant he knoweth all Possibles, in his own Omnipotence: For to know things to be Possible, is but to know what He can do. 2. In the second Instant he Knoweth all things, as Congruous, eligible and Volenda, fit to be Willed: And this out of the perfection of his own wisdom: which is but to be perfectly Wise, and to know what perfect Wisdom should offer as eligible to the Will. 3. In the third instant he knoweth All things willed by him as such (as Volita): which is but to know his own Will, and so that they will be. 42. In all these instances we suppose the Things themselves not to have yet any Being: But speak of God as related to Imaginary beings, according to the common speech of men. 43. These therefore are not properly Transient Acts of God; because it is but Himself that is the object indeed, viz. His own Power, Wisdom and Will, though it be de creaturis in that which is called his Ideas. 44. It is usual with Divines to ascribe Ideas to the Divine Intellect, after the manner of men, against which I quarrel not, but am myself afraid of presumption. 45. From what is said, you may see, that the Common School distinction of all God's Knowledge, into scientia simplicis Intelligentiae, & purae Visionis, is not accurate, and the terms are too arbitrary and dark to notify the thing intended; and that the scientia media added doth not mend the matter: And that a fit distinction is plain and obvious. 46. III. Also the Will of God as Related to things not yet existent, hath in several instants a threesold object, (as we may conceive of God after the manner of men.) 1. The Possibility of things, which God is said to Will, in Willing his own Power as respecting them. 2. The Congruity, Goodness and Eligibility of things, as in his own Knowledge; which is but to Will the perfection of his own Understanding. 3. The Future existence of things Good and Eligible, to be produced in their fittest season. 47. They that say God can do no more than he doth, must mean only in the second and third instants or sense; or speak very presumptuously, if not blasphemously. 48. That God doth not all that he Can do, is no note of imperfection in his Wisdom or Will, but is from the perfection of both. 49. Nor doth it hence follow that he hath either a Vain or an Unactive Power. For his Power is his perfection, and therefore not Vain: And it is ever essentially Active in himself, as he is the Living God: And was neither Vain nor Unactive when there was yet no Creature. 50. God's Power doth not therefore Create or operate ad extra merely as Power; For than it should do so ad ultimum posse, and from Eternity: But as it Voluntarily puts forth the effect. 51. God's Knowledge merely as Knowledge, or as the Knowledge of Congruities, Future things, yea, or things Existent, is not Efficient, nor yet as it concurreth with his Will ut finis (or his Will of Complacency;) But only as it concurreth with his Efficient Will. 52. God's Knowledge and Will effect nothing add extra, but by and with his Active Power, as efficient. 53. Therefore Bradwardine and many other Schoolmen, do not congruously say, that God's mere Volition without any Effective Power is all his Causing Influx: Unless they thrust two Conceptions into one word, and mean a powerful active Volition. For, 1. By the same reason that we must ascribe to God Intellection and Volition, we must also ascribe Active Power; These being three principles in his Image. 2. And in Man Mere Willing effects not. 3. And they that say God willeth ut eveniat peccatum ipso non efficient, sed permittente, suppose that he willeth something which he effecteth not. But against them in this Suarez and others have said enough. 54. Though God's Nature have no Real Accidents, but simple essential perfection, yet Relations, or Relative Accidents are not to be denied of him. For indeed (as Ockam hath copiously proved) * That Relations have no entity extra intellectum prae●er absolutum, Ockam in many disputes in his Quod lib. showeth. Relations have no real Entity, or are nothing besides the Absoluta and the Act of Reason about them. † Relation is but comparabilitas. Relation is but rerum Comparabilitas, which Reason useth by actual comparing conceptions of them. 55. Though the Thomists say, that man only is Related to God, * An Relationes reales sint in Deo ad Creaturas, e. g. Creator, Dominus, etc. Affirmatur ab Ockam & Gabr. 1. d. 30. q. 5. Durand. q. 3. Marsil. 1. q. 32. a. 1. Greg. Ar. 1. d. 28. q. 3. a. 1. Pet. Hurtad. Negatur à Thomistis: sed est Lis de nomine ut notat Vasquez in 1 Tho. q. 13. a. 7. Nullum quippe fundamentum de novo est ex parte Dei, sed creaturae: Ideo Thomistae ●ocant Relationem rationis. relatione rationis, and not God to man, yet Pet. Hurtado de Mendoza and others strongly assert, that God himself hath not only Relationes rationis and Transcendental, but predicamental Relations also; as Creator, Dominus, Rector, etc. which the Scriptures constantly ascribe to him; And which indeed are no way notes of Imperfection. For if it be no Imperfection in God to Create, Redeem, Sanctify, Rule, etc. it can be none to be related to us as a Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, Ruler, etc. For it is nothing more. 56. As God's Immanent Acts are his Essence, but not simply as Essence; but as Essence in the distinct Acts of self-living, self-knowing, self-loving, related to Himself: so his Actions ad extra are his Essence as Related to the Creature, but not simply as Essence, but as Essence-Acting. 57 God's Will as merely Ordinant or Dirigent effecteth only Order and Direction, but not the Substances ordered. 58. His Will quà Finis is not Efficient. † Bonavent. in 1. d. 45. q. 2. Resol. Deus non dicitur Omnivolens, sicut Omnipotens & Omnisciens, cum Voluntas abstrahat & à ratione actualitatis, & à ratione causae. See his plain explication of it. Vide Alliac. in princip. 1. At è contrà Bradward. l. 1. c. 10. cor. pag. 197. But not accurately enough; though it seems but lis de nomine. 59 His Will quà Finis is his Will as Pleased by being Fulfilled. 60. All that is Good is Pleasing to God, and so is the final fulfilling of his Will. 61. God willeth efficiently all that is Good, which cometh to pass; For all Good that is ever done, is done by him, though not by him only. 62. But he willeth the various production of things, as they are variously produced; some solely by Himself, and some by Creatures and means; some necessarily by necessitated agents, and some freely by free agents. 63. As God's Efficient Will causeth the thing willed (whether substance, accidents, rule, order, etc.) so his Final Will or Complacence supposeth the Pleasing thing in Being: That is, If it be the Thing itself, that he is Pleased in, it is supposed Existent; If the thing as Past, it is supposed Past, or that it was existent; If the thing as future, or fore-known, or forewilled, it is not the thing itself that is in that instant properly said to Please him, but his own Knowledge and Will concerning it: Though we use to call this, The Thing in esse Cognito aut Volito. SECT. V Of Futurity and its pretended Causes. 64. THe Possibility and Futurity of things, are not accidental notions, or relations of the things themselves; but are termini diminuentes, Of Futurity, see Bonaventures distinction of futur. quoad successionem temporis, & quoad ordinem temporalis ad aeternum secundum consecutionem with the application, in 1. dist. 38. dub. 2. Vid. Blank de Concord. lib. & decret. 1. n. 54. that futurity is nothing but respectus rationis, and needs no cause, but that of the thing future. as to the Things, and are spoken of Nothing. To say that a Thing May be, or Will be, which now is not, is to say that now it is nothing. 65. Nothing is no Effect; and therefore hath no Cause: Therefore things Possible and Future as such, have no Cause. 66. Therefore Possibility and Futurity as they are taken for any attribute or accident or mode of Creatures, as objects, are mistaken; Though they may be Conceptions in the mind of Creatures, concerning that which is not. 67. Therefore also God is no Cause of any Eternal Possibility or futurity. 68 Therefore the Possibility and futurity of things (conceived as an effect) hath no Eternal Cause: For there is nothing Eternal but God. 69. Though man Imagine Things which are not, and then think that they Can be, and Will be, because that Is, which Can or Will Cause them, and thence frame notions and names of Nothing, and call it Possible and Future; we must be very fearful and not unreverent and rash, in ascribing such a dance or lusus of notions to God, unless as used with great impropriety after the manner of weak man. 70. God knoweth his own Power, Knowledge and Will; And so knoweth what he can do, what he knoweth to be eligible, and what he will do. And if any will call this knowledge of God, by the name of the Possibility or Futurity of the thing known, or will denominate, Nothing, (as an Imaginary something) as Possible and Future, relatively from God's Power, Will or Knowledge, Let them remember, 1. That Nothing hath no relation. 2. That properly they should but give the denomination to that which is, that is, to God's Power, Will and Knowledge, and say God Can, e. g. make a World, or Will do it; and not to that which is not: And when they say that e. g. the world is eternally possible or future, they can justly mean no more, but that God can and will make it. 3. And that this is but lis de nomine, and not a real difference (whether futurition be thus from Eternity). 71. And especially let them remember that nothing in God is Caused: There are no effects in God: Therefore as there is nothing from Eternity but God, and therefore possibility and futurition must needs be names of God himself, or some Divine perfection or conception (which is himself) if they be said to be eternal; so such Possibility and futurity can have no eternal cause. For God hath no Cause, nor any thing in God. 72. If the Futurity of sin must have an eternal Cause, than God causeth Pennot. l. 3. c. 14. citeth many Father's saying, that things are not future because fore-known, but fore-known because future: And Augustine, Greg. M. Boetius, Ans●lm, Lomb. & Aquin. saying the contrary. And he citeth the four ways of the Schoolmens reconciling them, and concludeth that in regard of the Creatures being, the first is true; and in regard of free acts, the second. I think that in regard of sin neither is true. Unless [Because] signify only rationem denominationis objectivam; And even if so it is dubious, whether they be not simultaneous as Relations are. the futurity of all sin: But that is not so. For none is the Cause that sin will be, but he that (mediately or immediately) causeth the being of it when it is. 73. Imagine (per possibile vel impossibile) that a thousand years hence a free created agent (that can do otherwise) will cause such an act; It may be denominated Future without the taking in of any antecedent cause into the notion. It is called Future because it will be, and not because there is at present existent any cause from whence it will be mediately or immediately. 74. Though Futurity be Nothing, yet this Proposition is something, [This or that Will be.] And to know the futurity of a thing, is most properly to know the truth of that proposition [It will be.] 75. God knoweth not by Propositions (for that is the imperfect mode of man) But he knoweth Propositions when they are existent, as humane instruments or conceptions: And therefore he knoweth the truth of all true propositions of futurity. 76. What man knoweth by Propositions, God knoweth otherwise by a more transcendent perfect, but incomprehensible way; Therefore God knoweth that every thing will be, which will be. 77. There were ●o Propositions from Eternity: (For man that useth them, was not: And God useth them not, though he know them as used by man): Therefore this proposition [Hoc futurum est] was not▪ from Eternity; Because non entis non sunt affectiones. 78. But if there had been such Propositions from Eternity, as, [The world will be made, Christ will be incarnate, etc.] they would have been true: And so the eternal Futurity of things, as commonly disputed of, can be nothing but the Eternal Verity of a Proposition de futuritione, which was no proposition (because then there was none); only in time man's brain Imagineth or feigneth that then there might have been Creatures, who might have used propositions the futuritione rerum, which if they had, they would have been true. 79. All Verity is either, 1. Rei, 2. Conceptus, 3. Expressionis; And 1. Ubi non est Res, ibi non est Veritas Rei: The thing which was not from Eternity, was not a True Thing from Eternity. 2. The Divine knowledge that such and such things will be, was True from Eternity, by an incomprehensible way above propositions. 3. If there had been any Propositions Mental or Verbal de rerum futuritione, they would have been true. And this is all that can truly be said of the Eternity of futurition. 80. Only this being added, that so far as God's will was the first Cause determining of any thing that will be, so far he was eternally the Cause of the truth of this proposition, Hoc erit, when such a proposition shall be. 81. But where Gods Will is not the first cause of the Thing which will be, there it is not his causing the truth of the proposition that is the cause that it will be; (Though his Knowledge be a medium from whence it may Logically be inferred that it will be.) 82. Moreover, whatever is from eternity, must be Res, or modus rei, or Relatio. But from Eternity, there is no Res futura, no modus rei futurae, no Relatio rei futurae. * I know that the Judicious Greg. Arim. 1. d. 28. q. 3. pag. 122, etc. asserteth these four things: 1. That aliquid potest reserri realiter ad non ens: 2. Non ens potest realiter referri ad ens: 3. Quod Deus aeternaliter referebatur ad Creaturam quae non erat: 4. Quod Deus realiter reserlur ad creaturam ex tempore. And his reasons are very considerable for three of them: But as to the second which concerneth our case he faileth. For 1. his first reason, that relations are ever mutual or convertible, I deny his proof as vain, as to the reality of the relation. 2. And that res non existens is causa I deny: Fuit causa, non est. 2. And remember that he instanceth only in things as caused or foreknown: Sin therefore can be called future but as fore-known. 3. Remember that his Master Ockam hath oft (in Quodl.) proved that Relations are Nothing, besides the quid absolution, and Reason Being nothing but Comparabilitas, all is but to say, that God fore-knew what would be, and therefore had there been such a proposition from Eternity as [This will be] it had been true. Vid. Aquin. 1. p. d. 38. q. 1. a. 1. Bonav. ib. a. 1. q. 1. & 2. Durand. 1. d. 38. q. 1. Scot ib. q. 1. Cajet. Bannes, Rip. Zumel. Nazar. Molin. Vasqu. Arrub. etc. 1. p. q. 14. a. 8. Greg. Valent. 1. p. d. 1. q. 14. punc. 5. s. 3. Alvar. de Auxil. disp. 16. Snarez de A●xil. l. 1. c. 13. Ledesm. de A●xil. dis. 2. Ruiz de scient. d. 15, 16, 33, 36, etc. For non entis non est Modus, vel Relatio. If you add that it is Denominatio extrin eca, I answer it must be then God himself only, as denominated Knowing, or Willing that This or that shall be, (which is not properly the futurity of the thing). For otherwise it must be a denomination of Nothing. 83. Obj. The Object is before the Act of Knowledge. Therefore a thing is future before God knoweth it to be future. Answ. 1. To be future is a word whose sound deceiveth men, as if it signified some being; which is not so. 2. God cannot know that a thing will be, unless it will be; But this signifieth no more but that he cannot know this proposition to be true [This or that will be] unless it be true: But 1. there were from eternity no propositions. 2. And the proposition is not true before it is a proposition. 3. And therefore not before it is conceived in the mind, whence it hath its first being. 4. But if you might suppose God to have eternal propositions, their Being is considerable before their Verity; and the Verity hath its Cause. But that cause is nothing but what is in God himself, which is either his Decree of what he will Cause, or his foreknowledge of what will be caused by a sinning Creature: And neither of them as a cause of the truth of the proposition, causeth that the Thing will be: nor yet is any other existent Cause supposed; but only that God knowing that he will make the free agent, knoweth also that this agent will freely sin: In all which the futurity is Nothing, nor is any existent cause of it necessary: But only the truth of the proposition would result from the Infinite perfection of God's knowledge. 84. Obj. The futurity of things is True whether God or man know it or think of it or not. Answ. 1. Futurity being Nothing is neither true nor false. * According to Greg. and the Nominals sense of Relations before cited, two Nothings may eternally be Related to each other, One as a future Cause, and another as a future effect: And if there were now not Being, but hereafter (per impossibile) a Being would arise of itself, it is future though there be none to know it. But this futurity hath no Cause: And it is no more, but that this Proposition, Hoc erit, would be True if there were any to conceive it. 2. But all that you can truly mean is but this, that whether it be thought on or not, this is a true proposition, Hoc vel illud futurum est. Which is true when there are propositions, extrinsical, which no man thinketh of. But 1. God hath no propositions; 2. Much less extrinsical from Eternity. But if he had any, they would be nothing but the acts of his own knowledge. 3. And they have no Cause. 4. If they had been uttered by words, they needed no Cause but his perfect knowledge. 85. Obj. Futurity is the Object of God's knowledge; and the object is a † To the Question, An praescientia Dei sit Causata à rebus? Bonavent. answereth (in 1. dist. 38. q. 1. a. 1.) Praescita Causa sunt praescientiae Divinae, non essendi, sed aut Inserendi, aut Dicendi— Secundum rationem essendi Praescientia potest esse Causa aliquorum praescitorum, licet non omnino: sed nullo modo è converso. Secundum rationem Inferendi sunt mutuo causae, quia mutuo antecedunt & consequuntur: & antecedens est causa consequentis. Secundum rationem Dicendi, futurum est causa praescientiae, & non è converso: Nam praescientia, dicitur scientia ante rem: constat ergo quod importat ordinem ad posterius: & si scitum esset semper praesens, esset scientia, sed non praescientia. Bonavent. 1. dist. 38. dub. 3. saith, God's knowledge called Approbation connoteth & effectum & bonita●em: but when it is called simplex Notitia, it connoteth only the event, but in itself is one. Thus denominations by Connotation and relation may be many ways diversified, both of Knowledge and Will. cause of the act. God knoweth things to be future, because they are future; as he knoweth existents, because they exist. Answ. Still I say, 1. Futurity is Nothing; and Nothing hath no Cause. 2. Nothing is eternally in God but God: and God hath no Cause nor is an Effect. 3. At least that which is Nothing cannot be the Cause of God. 4. It is not true that God foreknoweth things, because they will be; but only that he fore-knoweth that they will be. 86. God's mere foreknowledge, nor his mere Will without efficient Power or Action, causeth not the thing future, and therefore is not the Cause that It will be. But where Knowledge and Will with Active Power cooperate, they are true Causes of the thing. And nothing is a proper Cause that It will be, but what will Cause its being. 87. By all this it is evinced that God Causeth not the futurity of sin; And that there needeth no Decree of God to make Sin pass è numero possibilium in numerum futurorum; And consequently that the Learned and pious Dr. Twisse his Achillean argument, which is the strength of his Book de Scientia Media is but delusory: As the excellent Strangius also hath fully manifested. And his admired Bradwardine is as weak in his attempts on the same subject, and proveth God the Cause of all futurition by no better reasons than he proveth, that without him there would be no impossibles; yea that non posset esse impossibile: When it were impossible any thing should be, were there no God; and yet that impossibility is nothing and needeth no cause. It's strange how some Learned men confound Things and Nothings, and the Notions and Names of Nothings with the Nothings named. So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 18. p. 221. will tell us how God knoweth complex objects, and distinguisheth those that are antecedent to God's Intellection from those that are consequent: The former sort are such as these [God is God, is eternal, omnipotent, etc.] These he saith are the Causes that God knoweth them, being before his knowledge of them: The other about Creatures are after it and caused by it. Yet doth the good man thus humbly Preface [Non proprie & distinct said similitudinary balbutiendo vix tenus possum vel scio, ignarus homuncio, excelsa scientiae Dei mirabilis resonare.] But see how the world is troubled with this profane * Herutus in his Quodlib. puts the question, Whether it be not a Mortal sin in a Divine to omit things necessary, and to treat of curiosities? But he was too guilty himself to answer it as plainly as he ought. presumption, and how justly Paul cautioned us against seduction by vain Philosophy: and what danger the Church is in of losing Faith, Religion and Charity, and peace in a game at words. What is this Complexe object [Deus est]? Is it any thing or nothing? If nothing, it is not before God's knowledge and the Cause of it. If any thing, Is it God or a Creature? A Creature is not before God, nor a cause of his knowledge, which is God himself. If it be God is it his Essence as such, or his Essential properties, or the Persons? None of these: For God's essence is the prime Incomplexe Being, and not a Complexe proposition, [Dens est]: His Properties, primary, are Omnipotent-vital-power, Intellect and Will; But these also are the same Incomplexe essence, and not propositions: And his Intellect as an object of itself is not before his Intellect as an Actual Knowledge of himself, nor the cause of it: All the sense he can make of it is, that this proposition [Deus est, & est Aeternus, etc.] if it had had an eternal being, would in order of nature have been conceivable to us before this [Deus scit se esse] or before his knowledge itself: or that if man had been the Knower, it had been first a true proposition that He is, before he knoweth that he is. But God knoweth not himself by propositions. Words (in ment vel ore) are but artificial organs for blind creatures to know by. And doth God need such to know himself? Doth he know by Thinking and by Artificial means, as we do? Hath he Entia rationis in his Intellect, as man? (as Propositions are). And had he an Intellect and these Entia rationis or propositions in his Intellect (Deus est, etc.) before he knew them? yea, and his self-knowledge (which in Act is his pure, eternal, necessary Essence) caused by these? All that you can say is, that poor creatures know by Propositions, and phantasms, and divers thoughts; and that God knoweth man, and therefore knoweth all our propositions and thoughts as ours: but not that he had the like eternally in himself, and knoweth them in himself; and that Himself as a proposition, is the Cause of himself (or self-intellection) as in Act. He can know that you see by Spectacles, and yet not eternally use Spectacles himself as the Cause of his sight. But Bradwardine saith, that God knoweth illa vera complexa quae voluntatem divinam praecedunt, per solam suam essentiam, sicut alia vera incomplexa; Illa vero quae voluntatem ejus sequuntur, non scit Deus per illa complexa neque per aliquid aliud à voluntate ejus semota, sed per suam voluntatem, vel per suam substantiam cum voluntate, etc. More presumption still! He saith God knoweth complexa sed non complexe; And who knoweth what sense those words have? What meaneth he by complexa but Notions, that is, names and propositions, as distinct from the Things? And what is it to know propositions complexe, but to know them as they are? And what is it to know them incomplexe, unless it be to know quid physicum a proposition is, or to know that it is no proposition, that is, to err? If God know a Complexum or a proposition, that Proposition is in being: And where was it in being before God knew it? If in God (or no where) 1. God then is a proposition; 2. And God is before he knoweth himself; 3. And a proposition being in intellectu an act of knowledge, it is to say, that [God knoweth that he is, before he knoweth that he is: and his knowing that he is, causeth him to know that he is]. If it be said, that by complexa he meaneth not organical notions, words nor propositions, but the Verity of Gods Being, Eternity, etc. I answer; To know things, is said to be [to know some Truth] because by knowing the thing, we can make this proposition [This is] or [This truly is.] But God's knowledge of Things is not as ours, but by pure perfect intuition, and so maketh not propositions in himself by knowing things: But if it be the Truth of this proposition [Deus est] that you mean, it supposeth that proposition to exist (for, quod non est, non verum est); and so to exist in God; which is denied: And it is that proposition that Bradwardine speaketh of. But if by Truth, you mean nothing but God's Essence; that is not a Complex object, which he speaketh of: And he saith not, that God knoweth suam essentiam, & creata vel futura, but that he knoweth per suam essentiam quod Deus est, & est Omnipotens, Aeternus, etc. & per suam essentiam cum voluntate quod mundus futurus est. So that it's a proposition that he calleth complexum incomplexè cognitum by contradiction; when he cannot prove that God's Intellect made propositions in itself, and that antecedently to themselves, and the Causes of themselves. And all this which men talk in the dark about God is nonsense, to trouble themselves and the world with, on false suppositions that God's knowledge is such as ours, or that we can have formal conceptions and descriptions of it: when we should tremble to read men thus profanely take Gods Name in vain, and pry into unrevealed things. I have purposely been the larger on this instance, to warn the Reader to take heed of the common cheat of Scholastic Word-mongers, who would obtrude on us humane entia rationis, or Thoughts, as real Divine entities, and would persuade us that every nothing which they make a name for, is therefore something, yea, some of them God himself. What I have said of Divine Intellection, I say of his Volitions, of which cap. 20, 21. Bradwardine saith, that Voluta priora, viz. Deum esse, omnipotentem esse, bonum, cognoscentem, etc. sunt Causa. But, 1. It is too bold to say, that Gods Will is an Effect. 2. If it were so, it must be his Essence, Omnipotency and Intellect that is the Cause of his Will, and not a Complex verity, as [Deus est, omnipotens, bonus est, etc.] For Gods Will is not caused by Propositions. 3. If you say that his Volition as terminated objectively on his Essence, Goodness, etc. is his Will in act (se Velle; which some call the third Person) yet here would be no Cause and Effect, but our distinct partial conceptions of that incomprehensible simplicity, which hath no real diversity or priority. SECT. VI Of God's Knowledge, and the Coexistence of the Creature. 88 AUgustine well and truly saith, that foreknowledge in God, is the same with the Knowledge of things present: Past, present and future, through his Infiniteness and Eternity, being alike to him, even all as present. 89. But this dependeth upon the Indivisibility of Eternity: in which all the things of time are included, and co-exist. 90. Thus saith Augustine li. 2. ad Simplic. q. 2. Quid est praescientia nisi scientia futurorum? Quid autem futurum est Deo qui omnia supergreditur tempora? Si enim in scientia res ipsas habet, non sunt ei futurae, sed praesentes: ac per hoc non jam praescientia sed tantum scientia dici potest— Si autem sicut in ordine temporalium creaturarum, ita & apud Deum, nondum sunt quae futura sunt, sed ea praevenit sciendo, bis ergo ea sentit; uno quidem modo secundum futurorum praescientiam, altero verò modo secundum praesentium scientiam: Aliquid ergo temporaliter accedit scientiae Dei. quod absurdissimum atque falsissimum est. Thus with Augustine Nothing is future to God, lest the after-knowledge of things as present, seem an addition to the first. And if this be true, than futurity had no eternal Cause. 91. See more ibid. in August. to the same purpose. And li. 15. de Trinit. cap. 7. Et in Psal. 101. And Gregor. Moral. li. 20. cap. 23. that Prescience is not properly in God, nor any thing future to him. So Anselm. opusc. de Concord. cap. 1. See also Arriba Concil. li. 3. c. 11, 12, 13, 14. and Boetius and Aquinas there cited. And à cap. 16. ad cap. 26. the whole Controversy handled of the coexistence of all things with God in eternity. * Vid. Bonav. 1. d. 36. ar. 1. & plurimos Scholast. in 1. d. 8. viz. Tho. q. 2. Cajet. Zumel. Bannez. Nazar. Gonzal. Arrubal. q. 14. hac lin. Vasquez. Fasol. & Alvarez. de Auxil. l. 2. disp. 8. & 9 Navarret. Cent. 52. Suar. l. 1. de Scient. c. 7. & 8. Ruiz. de Scient. disp. 28. Albert. To. 3. Princip. 4. Corol. 2. q. 2. Valent. 1. p. disp. 2. q. 14. punct. 5. sect. 1. Alarcon. 1. p. tract. 2. d. 2. c. 8. Tanner. 1. p. d. 2. q. 8. dub. 6. Gillius l. 2. de Essent. Dei, tract. 10. c. 15, etc. Arriba in Concil. per plura cap. cum multis aliis. Lychet. in 1. p. d. 39 q. 1. Tuiss. de Scient. Med. Bradward. l. 3. c. 51. p. 828. & corol. p. 830. 92. But because Scotus, Durand. Gabriel. Greg. Molina and many others digest not this notion, I shall open it to you in a moderate and undeniable sense, how things may be said to co-exist with God in eternity. When temporary Creatures are the subjects of Relation to God, than God is denominated by extrinsical denomination as the terminus of that Relation: But when God or Eternity is the subject of Relation to Creatures, then temporary creatures are denominated as the termini of the Divine relation. And so Eternity (being as Divines conclude indivisible and tota simul quia sine partibus) being one and the same, communicateth somewhat of its Name to the multifarious fluid creature, as its terminus: And as the Mutations of creatures in existence and operation thus communicate various denominations to the actions (knowledge and will) of God; so God's Unity and Constancy giveth various denominatinos to the creatures. * Card. Sarnan. Concil. Th. & Scoti, p. 22. inquit, Deus per suam aeternitatem sine aliqua successione sui est omnibus praesens: sed non sine successione rerum. Ideoque omnia quae sunt, suerunt & erunt, coexistunt in aeternitate, & habent etiam esse cognitum in ment divina. Et ideo bene dicunt & Thomas & Scotus. And so, because things when they exist, do co-exist with eternity, and eternity hath no prius & posterius, and the Prepositions [ab] & [ad] & [ante] & [post] have there no true signification, therefore it may be said, that as Indivisible Eternity co-existeth with the creature, so the creature co-existeth with and in indivisible eternity, and so with All eternity, and not with a part. 93. Hence you may see how both say may be true; both that Eternity (or God and his Knowledge) ever co-existeth with creatures, and also that it doth de novo begin to co-exist; viz. As God is extrinsecally denominated from the real mutation of the creature related to him; or as the creature is denominated extrinsecally as related to the indivisible God and Eternity: even as God and the creature are variously considered towards each other, as the Relate, or as the Terminus. 94. To clear it by a low similitude; When a Rock in the Sea is the Relatum, and the Sea the Terminus, it may be said, [This Rock is the constant Companton of the Sea]: And also thence, that [The Sea is the constant companton of the Rock] the title of Constancy being thus mutually used, but in a various ●ense. So when the Sea is the Relatum, and the Rock is the Terminus, it may be said, that [The rolling Waves pass by the Rock as its unconstant companions] And consequently, that [The Rock is an unconstant Companion of the Waves.] So you may say, that [the Eternal God or Eternity doth indivisibly co-exist with the temporary creature, or with time;] and thence that [the temporary creature or Time doth co-exist with indivisible eternity.] And yet that [the transient creature doth transitorily co-exist with God] and so that [God doth but temporarily co-exist with the transitory creature]; as the reason of the denomination is variously fetched in. 95. In like manner quoad locum it may be said, that [the finite creature doth limitedly co-exist with God] and so, that [God as the Terminus of the creatures existence, doth limitedly co-exist with the creature]. But also that [the Infinite God doth immensely co-exist with the finite creature] and [the finite creature doth co-exist with Immensity.] 96. † This supposeth (with Pet. Hurtad. and other Nominals,) that God is Related to the creature, and that Scotus his answer to Aquinas resting on the contrary supposition, that only the creature is Related, is therefore vain. Aegid. Roman. Quodl. 3. q. 3. pag. 135. Totus decursus rerum est Deo praesens: Ideo circa hoc non fallitur; sive sit necessarium sive contingens: cum infallibilitas divinae cognitionis non det rebus necessitarem, n●c tollat à contingentibus contingentiam: Futura s●nt praesentia praescientiae Divinae, etc. For this coexistence, see Ricard. in 1. d. 38. q. 3. & d. 39 q. 1. a. 1. Capreol. 1. d. 36. q. 1. a. 2. & d. 38. q. 1. a. 2. Ferrar. count. Gent. 1. c. 66. Caje●. 1. q. 14. a. 13. On the contrary, see Alens. 1. ●. q. 23. in 4. a. 3. Bonavent. 1. d. 39 a. 2. q. 3. Scot ib. q. 1. Dur. q. 3. n. 12. Greg. q. 2. a. 2. Gabr. 1. d. 38. q. 1. a. 2. Mar●il. in Thom. Vas●u. in 1. Th●. q. 14. a. 3. d. 64. r. 3. 4. But note 1. That as the denominations of a universal may be better distributed and restrained by its relation to particulars, than particulars can be denominated like the universal; so it is here unfitter to give the attribute of God relatively to the creature, than to speak of God as Relatively limited to the creature. And therefore it is more unfit to say that the creature co-existeth [eternally and immensely] with God, than that God co-existeth [temporarily and limitedly] with the creature in relation. 2. That the most proper expression is to fetch the attribute from the Nature of the subject, rather than borrowedly from the correlate: And so it is fittest to say, that [The Eternal and Immense God doth co-exist Eternally and Immensely with the Transitory, finite creature]; And that [the creature doth Transitorily and finitely co-exist with the Eternal Immense God]. 97. As Time is no Real being, but the Duration of Being's, which is nothing but their Existence not ceasing; so Eternity is nothing really distinct from God himself; but it is God's existence considered as having no measure of duration, no beginning, no middle, no parts of duration and no End. 98. Eternity therefore is a Notion which may be called Indivisible and Divisible in several respects. It is Indivisible properly and in itself considered; for it is nothing but God himself as existing sine mensura tempor is perfectly and indivisibly: But it may be called Divisible Intellectually (by humane, partial or inadequate conception; not by partition), as it is compared to transitory time; and because as man's narrow head must know one God suo modo by many inadequate conceptions, or not at all, so must he know Eternity suo modo, by conceptions drawn from partible Time. 99 By this much the great Objections of the Scotists may be satisfied by a Conciliation: They say, 1. That which existeth not, doth not co-exist; nor God with it. 2. That Eternity indeed includeth all Time successively as present in it; but not future Time. To the first I answer, 1. That it is granted that Time hath successions, and only the present Instant is: And that which Is not, co-existeth not with Eternity: But yet seeing Eternity is Indivisible, it is not part of it that co-existeth with one of our Instants and part with another; but All indivisibly with each instant. 2. And when it is said, That the Creature existed not ab aeterno, if you intellectually divide Eternity into past and present and future, like Time, it's true: But speaking properly, it is fallacious: For [Ab] aeterno implieth a division of Eternity, and a preterition of one part, which is commonly supposed false. But if the denomination be searched from Eternity, seeing it is Indivisible, you cannot say that to day it co-existeth with this day, and not with to morrow, for if ever it co-existeth, it always co-existeth: For, ab & ad, & ante & post, & fuit & erit, are words of falsehood spoken properly of Eternity (according to the commonest doctrine.) 100 And to the second the same answer serveth; Denominating Time in itself, you may say that some is future, that is, Is not, but Will be, and so that it is not In Eternity till it come. But fetching the Name from Indivisible Eternity, Future there is a word of false importance: There is no Futurity in Eternity. And it Indivisibly includeth all successions of our Time. 101. Yet we lay no stress on any of this as necessary to reconcile our Controversies: And we readily acknowledge and maintain, that by Extrinsic denomination from its Relation to our successive Instants, Eternity and God himself may have new and various denominations (of which more anon). SECT. VII. Of School Curiosities and Uncertainties about God's Knowledge. 102. ABout God's Knowledge Scholastical presumption hath gone so far, as that I should rather with trembling fly from their questions, than seek to solve them, if the opposition of their curiosity and the defence of truth, were not by them made necessary to others, and consequently some consideration of the thing. 103. Some presume to tell us, that God knoweth Creatures only in his own Essence, and not in themselves, which must needs be false, if the Creatures Aureolus in Capr●ol. 1. dist. 35. are in themselves Intelligible: Because God's perfection importeth the knowledge of all that is intelligible. 104. Others tell us on the contrary, that God knoweth the Creatures Vid. Rad. li. 1. Cont. 29. ar. 1. p. 452. Vid. Tanner. 1. p. d. 2. q. 8. dub. 3. Valent. p. 1. d. 1. q. 14. p. 3. S●ar. de attrib. l. 3. c. 2. & 3. Rad. ib. p. 453, 454. Pet. Aquil. 1. dis. 35. Lombard. 1. d. 36. Henr. 1. d. 5. Aegid. 1. q. 3. Greg. Arim. 1. q. 1. Gabr. 1. q. 3. a. 3. Ruiz. 1. d. 10. Aluiz. tr. 1. d. 5. & 6. Alarcon. 1. p. di●p. 2. c. 3. etc. Granad. 1. p. contr. 2. tr. 3, 4. only in themselves, and not in his own Essence: But doubtless so far as they may be said to be in his Essence, (which is at least Virtually) they are there intelligible. 105. Scotus with his followers hold that God's Intellect hath two Objects, one Primary, immediate, and motive, by virtue of which all other things are known; and this is God's Essence. The other secondary, mediate, and not motive, but terminative, and such is the Creature; known only in God's Essence, as per aliud prius cognitum in quo continetur, & non per propriam speciem. But here they are at the greatest loss. 106. For to the Question, How the Creature is in God, their necessary Ignorance bewrayeth itself by their divisions. It is agreed that all things were eternally in God as in the first cause virtually and eminently. But say some, The same numerical perfections are in God, as in the Creatures, viz. Infinitely in God, and finitely in the Creatures: But this maketh God and the Creature to be One, and deifieth Creatures. 107. This they are put to, for the solving of that great difficulty, Whether God and the Universe conjunct contain more Entity or perfection intensively or extensively than God alone, and the World's Being add any Entity besides Deity? 108. They that are for the Negative, judge it blasphemy to say, that God alone is Less than God and the World; For he seemeth not to be of Infinite Entity to whom any thing can be added. The question is not Whether the World add any Divine Being to God, but any Being at all be so superadded, as that God is made a Part of the Universe. And I confess that Parson, and toto minor, are words that I dare not apply to God. 109. On the other side, saith Rada, Though Intensively nothing is added ●bi supr. p. 454, 455. So ●radwardin● is hard put to answer his Seminator ●borum, li. 1. c. 7. p. 184. that saith, The number of things to God is sinite: and to sinite some what may be added: Ergo to God's knowledge somewhat may be added (which drove ●asquez to as●rt Infinite intelligibles.) But plainly God's knowledge is Infinite in knowing himself: But not as terminated on finite creatures. to God, yet Extensively we must say, that entity and perfection in the Creature is so added, as that God and the Creature are More than God alone; because else we must say, either that God and the World are one, or else that the World is Nothing, or hath no Being: which is false. 110. Who dare venture on either of these dangerous consequences; either that God is but a Part of Entity and Less than All, and so not Infinite; or that the World is God or Nothing? If we should say, that the Entity of the Creature being but Analogical Entity, is no Addition to Gods being, Ens non dicitur Univoce de Deo & Creaturis; as the Sco●ists deny the antecedent, so it hardly satisfieth the mind: Because even this Analogical Entity is real positive Entity, and not nothing: And therefore though it add not Deity, it seemeth to add Entity; and both sorts to be more than One alone. 111. And if we should say, that the World is an Accident of God, (as The witty Dr. Fairsax in his Book of the Bulk of the World, saith It is aliquid Dei; and so do all men that confess a God: and P●t. Hurtado and many others prove that it is no dishonour to God to have Real Relations, which we call Accidents, as is afore noted. a man's hair is of a man, supposing it were voluntarily Caused by him); And that it is no imperfection in God to have Accidents, as long as his Essence is no Accident, nor Compounded; And so that the World is no part of God, Essential or Integral; but being an Accident it is no Addition of Entity to God; Because as the word [Man] or [Peter] includeth not only his Parts, but his hair as an Accident, so the word [God] may include the World as an Accident: This would be judged novel, bold, presumptuous, and is not fully satisfactory, had it no ill consequents. 112. The only way therefore is to confess our Ignorance, and that it must needs be that the mind which cannot comprehend Gods Immense Eternal Essence, must be unable to solve such questions as imply such a comprehension: And it were well if men's experience of their utter incapacity to understand some such Cases, would warn them more cautelously to meddle with others. 113. The Scotists' doctrine is laid down by Rada in these Conclusions; 1. Deus cognoscit alia à se. 2. Cognoscit omnia perfectissime. 3. Non cognoscit alia à se per repraesentationem & motionem quam ipsa de se faciunt. 4. Creatura non est objectum primarium & immediatum Divinae cognitionis. 5. Sed tale est Divina essentia. 6. Distinctam tamen aliorum Vasquez in ●. Thom. q● 19 disp. 80. Praescientia est ipsa substantia Dei, quae aliàs Cognitio est creaturarum possibilium, additò respectn solum rationis ad res futuras; quarum dicitur scientia: Ita ut s●res futurae non essent, Deo quidem deisset, praescientia, sed non scientia: & si res futurae non essent, non esset in Deo libera Voluntas, quae significatur cum illo respectu libero: esset tamen Voluntas Complacentiae, ipsa viz. essentia divina cum respectu rationis necessario ad res possibiles. Ita & Ferrariens. c. 75. habet Cognitionem. 7. Deus cognoscit creaturas in su● essentia. 8. Cognoscit res in se ipsis & propriis earum naturis, si fiat determinatio cognitionis ex parte rei cognitae. In all this it seemeth to me to be overbold presumption to conclude, 1. That God knoweth not the Creature immediately: And the reason he giveth is as bold, quia tunc vilesceret Divinus intellectus. None of this can be proved, though I presume not to assert the contrary. Yet it seemeth to us that the Creature is Quid intelligibile in se immediate, and that it is the perfection of God to know all that is intelligible, and not a vilifving of him. As it is no vilifying of his Power to make every thing as it is. The Creature no doubt is not the Primary intelligible object: But whether it be not Immediately Intelligible in se is the doubt. 2. And it seemeth to me a presumption to say, that else the Creature would move the Divine Intellect, and that God as the object moveth his own Intellect as agent; For Moving signifieth Causing, and there is in God (say all Divines) no Effects, and therefore not Causing of them; and so no such moving. 114. It is also an agitated Controversy with them, Whether it be God's Essence as such which the Creatures are Represented and known in, or in his Knowledge itself as such? They that are for the former say, that the Creature is represented in the Divine Essence before it is known (as in a glass) because the object is presupposed to the act: saith Cajetan, the Cajet. 1. p. q. 14. art. 5. Ruder ignorant sort thus imagine. The second opinion is thus delivered by Rada, Res non continentur in Divina Essentia ut prior est cognition Rad. li. 1. contr. 29. art. 2. pag. 460. actu & formaliter; nec ibi repraesentantur actu & distinct. 2. Creaturae in Divina Essentia non prius habent esse repraesentatum actu & formaliter, quam intelliguntur. 3. Creatura (formaliter loquendo secundum Scot in 2. d. 1. q. 1. lit. H. quod aliquid dicitur formaliter intelligibile) non prius habet intelligibile quam intelligatur; sed per intellectionem habet primum esse actuale & formale, & proprium expressum & repraesentatum. And their similitude is, that as man's mind doth not presuppose second notions (Genus, species, etc.) but make them, so doth God the Creature as intelligible intelligendo. 115. This leadeth them to another doubt, Whether the Creatures have from Eternity an esse real distinct from God's Essence? Where Henry. saith that they have a true esse reale essentiae, at non existentiae, because Henr. (refor. Scoto. in 1. d. 36.) quodlib. 8. q. 91 & q. 4. 1 & ●. Scot 1. d. 36. Vid. Th. Waldens. de antiq. fid. l. 1. c. 8. cont. Wicles. omne possibile est ens real; & est in genere, etc. Thus do men play with the notions of their own brains. Scotus confuteth this by seven arguments, which is easily done. 116. But their next doubt is greater, Whether the Creatures have from eternity an esse intelligibile & cognitum distinct from God's essence? What the esse Cognitum is, whether it be ens real or rationis or quid medium? Scotus is the Author of this notion of esse cognitum as an esse formale & proprium quod creatura habet distinctum ab esse suae Causa; in quo in Divino intellectu creaturae ipsae per intellectionem producuntur; e. g. Lapid●m in esse cognito producit, sicut intellectus noster secundas intentitiones facit, & ita rebus ipsis esse cognitum tribuit: nam sicut lapis visus per visionem habet esse visum, ita lapis cognitus per cognitionem esse cognitum habet— sed ut primum ejus esse, per quod esse formale habent— Imo esse rerum Possibile in esse cognito fundatur. Who can read such Scot 1. d. 43. l. D. & d. 36. l. M. Rada l. 1. Cont. 29. art. 3. p. 466. presumptuous assertions of the unknown mode of Divine Intellection without dread? And what a dance and show is here made of mere words, while a Creature that is no Creature, is said to have an esse which is no esse (of them) and so confessed? For (though Cajetan and others mistook him,) Scotus confesseth that this esse congnitum non est ens real, nec medium Vid. Rad. ib. inter ens real & rationis, sed est ens rationis purum, & omnino nihil, contra ens reale distinctum, ita, quod nullatenus aliquid realit at is habet. And is not here then a presumptuous play with words? Scotus thus explaineth it. If Caesar were annihilated, and the statue of him remained, Scot 1. d. 36. q. uniclit. G. Caesar would have an Esse repraesentatum in the statue, which is neither an esse essentiae vel existentiae total or partial. And saith Rada, Ex his manifest colligitur esse cognitum Creaturae in Deo secundum Scotum esse Rad. ubi sup. pag. 467. omnino nihil, prout nihil opponitur enti reali sive essentiae sive existentiae,— & non magis esse nihil Chimaeram quam hominem in esse cognito, quia utrique inest negatio totius entis. And indeed the esse repraesentatum Caesaris is nothing but the modus statuae, which per modum signi is apt to bring the shape of Caesar to the beholder's imagination. And 1. Can they prove any such Modifications of God? 2. And if they can, should they so abuse words as to call that modus Intellectus Divini, an esse primum formale creaturae distinct from God? The sum of the Scotists' opinion is thus expressed by Rada Esse cognitum creaturae est Ib. p. 468, ens Rationis, solum habens esse in intellectu Divino objectiuè, sicut secundae intentiones in intellectu creato— sed res in esse cognito non est objectum motivum sed terminativum secundarium. 1. As if God had any objectum motivum! 2. Or as if we poor mortals knew that God hath entia Rationis! Though we confess that we may so speak of him after the manner of men; if we confess the great impropriety of the speech. 117. From hence ariseth another Controversy, Whether to God's understanding the Creatures, there be necessarily prerequired in him distinct relations to the objects? which I will not trouble you with their agitation of. 118. But the great Controversy is of the Divine Ideas; especially Whether the Creature as in Esse cognito be a Divine Idea? Aquinas denyeth it, * Aq. 1. p. q. 15. art. 1. and saith that an Idea is the Divine Essence as imitable by the Creature. Scotus, Gabr. Ockam, Gerson, etc. affirm it. Aquinas his opinion † Scot 1. d. 35. q. unica. & 36. Gabr. 1. d. 35. q. 5. Gerson l. vit. spir. animae. Lect. 2. Corol. 12. See in Pennot. l. 3. c. 9 p. 114. etc. the four different opinions about. Ideas, and the doubtfulness of them. is thus opened by Cajetan, Rada and others, 1. Idea non significat solum fundamentum imitabilitatis. 2. Nec tantum respectum imitabilitatis. 3. Sed utrumque. 4. Essentia Divina cognita ut imitabilis à Creatura per modum exemplaris est Idea. 5. In Deo est idearum multitudo. 6. Multitudo idearum arum in Deo non est multitudo rerum reipsa inter se, & ab essentia distinctarum. 7. Nec multitudo rationum formalium, sive rerum formaliter distinctarum. 8. Sed est multitudo rationum intellectarum. 9 Non distinguuntur ratione per actum intellectus creati. Idearum multitudo est multitudo rationum à Deo intellectarum. 119. The Scotists think Augustine of their mind, and give us their sense in these conclusions, of Rada, 1. Ideas, hoc est, rationes in ment Divina August. Quaest. l. 83. q. 46. Scot 1. d. 35. q. unica. Rada l. 1. cont. ●29. art. 5. p. 497, 498, etc. collocatas tam Graeci quam Latini tradiderunt. 2. Idea non est Divina essentia secundum se & absolute sumpta. 3. Non est quid aggregatum ex essentia & respectu imitabilitatis. 4. Non includit in sua ratione respectum rationis nec tanquam aliquid sibi essentiale, nec tanquam modum intrinsecum. 5. Idea in ment Divina est ipsamet creatura cognita. And Scotus his definition is, Idea est ratio aeterna & incommutabilis in ment Divina, secundum quam aliquid est formabile extra tanquam sccundum propriam rationem ejus. Vid. Durand. in 1. d. 36. q. 2, 3. De Ideis vid. ●tiam Bonav. 1. d. 36. q. 1. Richad. m. 1. d. 35. q. 4. Aquil. Scotel. in. 1. d. 36. q. 1. (who seemeth dubious of his Master's doctrine.) pag. 240. & q. 2. Vide diversitatem opinionum de qu. Quorum sunt Ideae. 120. By this you see how widely they are disagreed what an Idea is in God: And yet they conclude (as Rada ib. p. 480.) neminem nisi his intellectis sapientem esse: Nam quamvis Deus Opt. Max. ex cognitione suae essentiae sit Infinite sapiens, ac proinde ex cognitione Idearum non efficiatur sapientior intensive, attamen si Ideas, quarum ratio incommutabilis est, ignoraret, non esset Omniscius. Et Art. 3. p. 470. he saith, [Deus esse nequit sine Ideis.] We all grant that without the Knowledge of all things Intelligible, God cannot be, nor be Omniscient. But the name of Ideas is fetched from man's mode of Intellection, which is ever conjunct with somewhat of Imagination or sense; which also seemeth included in our notion of Ideas, which therefore are usually called Images or Species. And as we are most certain that Intellection in God both in the form and mode doth so Infinitely transcend and differ from humane Intellection, as that it is not the same thing; so we are very unfit in this woeful darkness to talk so peremptorily of things unknown, and to conclude that God hath not a more perfect knowledge of things, than by Ideas, or any thing fitly so called. The world therefore should not be troubled with such presumptions. 121. The next doubt among them is of Future Contingents, Whether and how they are known of God. That they are known of him is past doubt: But how is the great difficulty. Aquinas his mind is thus expressed by Rada, Concl. 1. Futura Contingentia prout sunt in suis causis indeterminatis, Rad. ibid. art. 3. p. 494. solum conjecturali cognitione cognosci possunt. 2. Futura contingentiae in seipsis possunt certa & infallibili cognitione cognosci. 3. Deus non cognoscit praecise futurum contingens, prout est in suis causis indeterminatis. 4. Deus cognoscit futura contingentia ut praesentia in sua real & actuali existentia, quae eis convenit extra suas causas. 5. Deus certa & infallibili cognitione praescit futura contingentia. 122. The mind of Scotus he thus expresseth, after many notes and distinctions. 1. Deus cognoscit omnia futura contingentia quoad omnes Id. ib. ad. pag. 504. conditiones existentiae eorum, sic, quod quaecunque eye in tempore contingenter insunt, perfect ab aeterno attingit. 2. Deus non cognoscit certo & determinatè futura contingentia per hoc quod sunt sibi in aeternitate praesentia. (Should I here recite you the reasons by which he and other Scotists and Dr. Twisse do propugn this assertion, and those by which Cajetan and many Thomists do oppugn it, I should tyre you. It shall suffice to say that both sides talk in the dark of that which is utterly above man's reach). 3. Certitudo Divinae essentiae respectu omnium quantum ad omnes conditiones existentiae, non habetur per ideas. (This also is on both sides tediously disputed in the dark). 4. Qui nosset causas naturales futurorum, etiam eorum quae necessarias causas habent, ut Solis, Lunaeque defectiones, non proinde infallibilem eorum notitiam assequeretur, nisi determinationem divinae voluntatis circa hujusmodi eventus cognosceret. (That's true, because they are all but dependent second Causes). 5. Deus cognoscit futura contingentia certo & infallibiliter; quia Divina essentia ut ratio cognoscendi repraesentat divino intellectui rem determinate futuram ex determinatione divinae voluntatis. And this is Scotus his way, which Dr. Twisse propugneth. 123. Here Scotus supposeth things to lie in this order in the Divine Scot Quodlib. q. 14. Litter. S. & T. Intellect, [1. The Divine Essence moveth the Divine intellect to know it self, and all that is formally in it. 2. To the simple Intellection of all that is Intelligible, as abstracting from existence, or any order to it. 3. To the knowledge of all necessary copulations, which are known by connexion of terms, and this naturally and necessarily before the wills determination: because they are not True because God willeth it, but antecedently formally of themselves. But not so to the Knowledge of contingent copulations, etc.] How easy were it to open much uncertainty and figment in these bold assertions? Vid. Rad. ib. p. 497, 496. Vid. Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp. 16. sect. 5. p. 173. Citing abundance of Schoolmen as holding etiam nunc posse Deum efficere ut non voluerit aut praedestinaverit nec praescierit; and some saying yet more, nunc esse possibile per potentiam absolutam, ut non fuerit facta revelatio de futuris Dei operibus. Is not this profane boldness with the most holy God? 124. And here a great deal of dispute there is about the Liberty of God's will, and the nature of contingency. Some Thomists, (whom our Westminster Assembly follow, but it should not have been put into a Confession of faith) say that nothing is to be called Contingent in respect of God. But the Scotists contrarily say that there could be no contingency if it were not first from God's free will: and that he freely and contingently made all the world: All Actions being either naturally necessary or contingent; And if God had made all of natural necessity, they had been eternal. 125. And here they say that Gods will hath first a Liberty of contradiction, (to will or not will.) 2. And a Liberty to divers objects, (which I call of competition or comparison) yea and to will contrary objects by the same act. 3. But not a Liberty to contrary Acts (Velle & nolle) because that would be mutability. 126. And here many maxims are used by them as sufficient to answer all objectors, which yet are ambiguous or uncertain themselves. 1. One is, that God receiveth not the certainty of his Knowledge from the Creatures: And therefore if their present coexistence in eternity were proved, it would no whit clear the doubts, or help the Thomists, who are here at a loss for a sufficient answer. My business is to side with neither, but to deter the Reader from the presumption of both parties; and to that end, to open the uncertainty of what they say. And so it is enough to answer, that As the Creature in being is no addition to Gods being or perfection, so to Know the Creature is not any addition to God's Knowledge or perfection; but only the terminative acting of his perfect Knowledge ad extra. And that their word [Receiveth] hath a false supposition. For God Receiveth no Knowledge (though man's knowledge be partly Receiving); but the Infinite Light of his Intellect is emitted knowingly to the Creature. So that God's knowledge may be terminated on Creatures, and thence denominated This or That knowledge without Reception. 127. Another maxim is that of Augustine, Non aliter facta quam fienda novit, and no new mode of Knowledge is to be imagined in God: which both sides make use of. To which I say, that nothing can be called God's Knowledge, but either his Essential Intellection, or the termination of it on the Creature. The first is never changed: But the second, say the Nominals, is but an extrinsic denomination of it from the various terminating objects: And whether you will call them terminations, or Relations, or denominations, they may be New and various (of which more anon) without any change or variety in God: even as the Sun is not changed by the various Receptions or terminations of its influx here below. 128. * See the marginal citation, sect. 16. out of Pet. Alliac. Cam. who giveth three reasons against Scotus his making God's Volition to be the reason of his knowing future contingents, 1. Because it falsely supposeth priority and posteriority in God. 2. Because it maketh God's intellect in primo instanti to be neutral de futuritione, and so in that instant daretur medium in contradictione. 3. Because it falsely supposeth one Act of God to be a medium & ratio of another. Therefore he concludeth, 1. That the case is unsearchable. 2. But most probably Intellectualis & aeternus Dei oculus est quaedam Intuitio quae immediate super quamlibet rem actualiter vel potentialiter existentem simul fertur: Ideo tam circa futura quam praesentia vel praeterita omnium contin●entium veritatum certum habet judicium: & divina intuitio est talt immensum judicium. Another maxim is, that God knoweth things even Intuitively eternally in himself (his Will) when they exist not. Answ. As Abstractive and Intuitive are words signifying the divers modes of Gods knowing things, they are but presumptuous figments, for aught I see; It being past man's reach to know the mode of Divine intellection, more than above the reach of a bird or beast to know the mode of ours. But as we may more easily and safely distinguish and denominate God's Knowledge from the objects, so we may well say, 1. That he knoweth not that Creature to exist in nunc temporis which doth not so exist. 2. And that esse Volitum is not esse existens. And therefore to know the former is not formally to know the latter. 129. Yea it is here disputed Whether there be indeed any contingency Read the dispute of Pet. Alliac. Camerac. m. 1. q. 11. ar. 3. R. S. and Gregory's and Okams' and his own opinion, about the possibility of Gods not knowing what he knoweth, and that it is in the power of the Creature to make God not to have known them, and much more such like. I confess I tremble to read (not the falsehood but) the boldness and presumption of such disputes, as fearing they are profane. or not (which the Doctrine of Hobbs and the Dominican Predeterminants' must needs exclude, which make all events to be necessitated by God). The Reasons against it are, 1. Whatever God fore-knoweth must necessarily be: but he fore-knoweth all that will be: ergo— 2. All things future are from eternity determined in Gods will to one part of the contradiction: ergo necessario erunt. 3. All the acts of the Creatures will is to be done, by the physical efficient necessitating insuperable predetermination of God the first cause: ergo, there is no place in such necessity for contingency (which is a posse tendere ad esse vel non esse.) 130. Many and different answers are given to these, and those of the Thomists and Dominicans are mostly shuffling and vain: But plainly and briefly, 1. God's foreknowledge, 2. And his mere will, when they are not joined efficiently with power, or a will de efficiendo, do no whit at all Cause or necessitate the effect or event, or ponere aliquid in objecto. It is only a Logical necessitas consequentiae in ordine probandi that ariseth Vid. D'Orbellis in 1. d. 38. dub. 1. Bonaventur. and (saith Dr. Twiss) all the Schoolmen say the same. from them, which consisteth with contingency, and not a physical necessity in ordine essendi as from a Cause, called consequentis, or effecti. And, 2. God's Knowledge and Will rather prove contingency; For he doth not only know and will hoc futurum, but hoc contingenter futurum: Therefore it will be. 3. And the last argument from necessitating predetermination I shall elsewhere confute, and show their contradiction who say that God doth predetermine the thing contingently to come to pass. 131. But it cannot be denied but that Gods will is from Eternity determined about every contingent event: And therefore that Necessitate existentiae the determination of it is eternally necessary: And therefore that which we call Its Liberty is but the perfect manner of its determination, as Bradwardine confesseth. 132. But what is all this stir about? The great business of all is to show how God fore-knoweth sin. For saith Rada, It's easy (from God's Ibid. are 3. p. 503. Volition) to show how he knoweth things that are not sin: but how knoweth he sin from eternity, seeing this was never in esse volito? And Vid. 1. d. 36. q. 1. a. 2. Bonav. ib. q. 1. a. 3. Durand. ib. q. 1. Cujet. Bannez, Zumel. Rip●, Gonzal. M●lin. Vusqutz, Arrub. Fasol. Aluiz 1. p. q. 14. a. 10. Tanner. 1. p. disp. 2. q. 8. dub. 8. Granad. 1. p. Cont. 2. d. 5. here the way of the Scotists proveth utterly insufficient. Dr. Twisse and Rutherford and some Dominicans say, that God fore-knoweth it, because he Decreed to Cause all the Entity of the Act with all its circumstances from which the form of sin is but a resulting relation. But this subverteth Religion. Rada ibid. and Twiss oft say, he Decreeth to permit it, (and that it shall come to pass ipso permittente, saith Twiss:) Qu● permissio (saith Rada) non accipitur in communi, sed pro eo quod est permittere Ibid. art. 3. p. 503. de facto deficere & in peccatum ruere subtrahendo efficacia auxilia quibus positis non foret peccatum. Quare haec est bona consequentia quantum ad illationem prcaise; Deus permittit aliquem peccare hic & nunc de facto: ergo, peccat: ergo, valet consequentia, Deus voluit ab aeterno permittere ut Petrus peccaret de facto tali & tali occasione oblata: ergo peccabit: Dixi quantum ad Illationem praecise. Quia quantum ad Causalitatem non est bona illa consequentia * Vid. Ruiz de scient. d. 17. Gr. Valent. p. 1. disp. 1. q. 14. punct. 7. Alarcon. 1. p. tr. 2. disp. 3 & 4. . But to pass by their supposition of Gods knowing consequences by argumentation, I shall confute all this anon. 133. And here the Thomists and Scotists have another skuffle, on the Vid. Aquin. 1. p. q. 14. art. 13. ad secundam. Scot ●● 1. d. 39 q. 4. Rad. li. 1. Co●t. 30. art. 5. pag. 310, 311, etc. See Lychet. Confutation of Cajetan and Ockam at large in 1. p. d. 39 q. 1. fol. 254. ad 268. Leg. Pennot. li. 3. c. 11 & 12. p. 118, 119, etc. question, Whether this knowledge of future contingents and the conditions of existency in God, be Necessary in him, or free and contingent? The Thomists thus conclude, 1. Si futurum contingens secundum se, & suam propriam naturam consideretur, necessitas nullatenus ei convenire potest, sed sola contingentia. 2. Si futurum contingens consideretur secundum quod subest Divinae scientiae, est necessarium absolute. 3. Haec propositio, Deus scivit Antichristum futurum, est simpliciter & absolute necessaria: sed ho● consequens, [Ergo Antichristus erit] non est absolute necessarium sed contingens, si secundum se consideretur: At ut divinae scientiae subest, est absolute necessarium. 4. Scientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium prou● jam ad ipsa est terminata, est simpliciter necessaria. And they prove the affirmative thus, 1. God's knowledge is Immutable: therefore necessary. 2. To know future Contingents is Perfection: therefore necessary in God. 3. This Can be in God: therefore it necessarily is in him. 134. The Scotists thus express their sense, (after much explication), 1. Futuro contingenti secundum suam propriam naturam consider ato null● necessitas conveire potest. 2. Futura contingentia, etiam ut subsunt Divinae scientiae, non sunt necessaria. 3. Futurum contingens, etiam at subest Divinae scientiae, est q●oad esse simpliciter contingens, & secundum quid necessarium. 4. Propositio haec [Deus scivit Petrum futurum] sieve sit de praesenti, vel de praeterito, non est simpliciter necessaria, sed ex suppositione. 5. Praefata propositio & omnia futura contingentia, sunt necessaria necessitate immutabilitatis. 6. Scientia Dei respectu omnium creaturarum quoad esse existentiae earum est contingens, & ex suppositione necessaria. I recite the words of Rada only, that I may not weary the Reader by referring him to peruse too many Authors, and because no man better discusseth the differences. See also his answers to the Thomists arguments, pag. 514. He that would peruse more, may see them named in Ripalda lib. 1. d. 38. Alex. Alens. 1. p. q. 23. memb. 3. ar. 4. Thom. count. Gent. c. 66. Francis. Mayro. 1. p. d. 38 & 39 Lychet. 1. d. 39 q. 1. & 37. and may read Aquin. 1. p. d. 38. q. 1. ar. 5. Aureol. 1. d. 38. ar. 1. Ockam & Gabri. ib. q. unic. ar. 2 & 3. Greg. ib. q. 2. Durand. ib. q. 3. Fab. d. 54. Cajet. Naz. Bannez, Zumel, Gonzal. Arrub. Molin. Vasq. Fasol. m. 1. p. q. 14. ar. 3. Tanner. 1. p. d. 2. q. 8. dub. 3. Valent. 1. p. d. 1. a. 14. p. 3. Suarez li. 3. the Attribute. c. 2. Ruiz d. 10. Bonavent. 1. d. 39 Aquil. Scotell. in 1. d. 39 q. 2. And on the same a multitude of other known Scotists, etc. 135. Should I proceed to open to you all or half the questions about which the Schoolmens acutest wits do but dream, concerning the Knowledge and Decrees of God, I should weary myself and the Reader to little purpose; If you would see what the Thomists say of these, Ripalda will direct you where to find them. And the Scotists and Nominals being fewer are soon found. such as, An scientia actualis aliorum sit de Essentia Dei? An Essentia Dei sit Motivum adaequatum ejus scientiae? An Deus cognoscat creaturas ex seipso, aut ex alio per discursum? a & quomodo scientia Dei possit dividi in plures? a & quomodo Deus cognoscat Mala? a & quomodo Deus cognoscat negationes & privationes? An Deus cognoscat Entia rationis? An habeat in se Entia Rationis? De scientia Media. An scientia Visionis sit causa futurorum? An futur a causa scientiae? An scientia simplicis intelligentiae sit causa futurorum & practica? An Deus cognoscat futura compenendo & dividendo? An Deus cognoscat praesentia eadem indivisibili cognition, qua ipsa praenovit futura? An Deus noverit Infinita scientia simplicis intelligentiae? An eadem cognitione se & creaturas cognoscat? An existente objecto pro solo imperio Voluntatis Divinae possit non esse in Deo aliquis actus scientiae divino intellectui possibilis? etc. with a multitude of lesser questions which arise in the handling of these; And with as many more about Predestination, God's Decrees or Volitions, Predetermination, etc. I think rather your patience is put to it sufficiently already. 136. If you say that by reciting these difficulties, I do but confound men's understandings, rather than elucidate the things in hand, I answer, If Nic. D'Orbellis in 1. d. 41. a. 2. Posset dari una responsio generalis ad quaestiones consimiles; quod debilitas nostri intellectus non sufficit ad indagandum abyssum judiciorum Divinorum. Nec mirum: cum ad plenum non valeamus cognoscere modicae herbae seu minimi vermiculi proprietatem. The very same hath Bradwardine, though a presumptuous Schoolman. See also Vasquez in 1. Thom. q. 19 disp. etc. c. 2. pag. 503, 504. where he fully and freely confesseth that our understandings are utterly stalled about God's Liberty of Will as related to things future. Nodus hic mea quidem sententia insolubilis est; vix enim vitare possumus circulum in reddenda ratione: Certissima ratione investigare possumus quid in hac re non sit: Quid vero sit, verbo explicari difficillimum, aut pro hoc statu impossibile est. Qui autem videt Deum, de ejus Voluntate Liberâ quatenus principium liberum est futurorum, long aliter sentiet, & unico verbo exprimet sine hisce relationibus rationis. See the rest there to the same purpose. And this is the confession of them all: of which more after. you are lost in them, I have my end, which is to make you sensible how unmeet it is, that the Peace of the Church, and the Concord and Communion of Brethren should at all be laid on such multitudes of difficult and unsearchable things which are many vain, and others past man's understanding. Shall we call one another by the names of Sects, and reproach our brethren, as for the truth of God, and as if it were for his Glory, till all these Controversies are cleared to us all? I who profess them to be beyond my reach, and profess my Ignorance of very many of them, am yet censured by my Brethren as too Scholastically curious for so much as naming them, or meddling with them; yea, and for deciding cases which may and must be decided: And of all our present Ministers, I am confident there is not one of fifty (if of a hundred) that hath either throughly studied them, or ever will do. Now if the Church must have Love and Concord, how will it be had? Of those few (one of a hundred that study them throughly) six men it's like are of three opinions. And what shall the ninety nine do that never so studied them? Either they must know what they never studied, and be in the Right where they understand not what they say: Or else they must unite by an Implicit faith. And in whom shall that be? If the Church, what Church is it? Are not many Churches of many minds? If of the Papal Church, it hath more wit than to decide such Controversies; so that their Doctors are almost Sectaries by divisions to this day. 137. And if any will dream that the Controversies between the Calvinists and Lutherans (or Arminians) and the Dominicans and Jesuits can be resolved for either side without meddling with these questions, he is a person too ignorant to be fit to speak confidently in the Cause. Let him but try a dispute with any able adversary, and he shall be carried to these whether he will or not. 138. But if it be one that is so confident on either part, as to think that his side or opinions are so great and clear, as that the contrary are unfit for our toleration, and communion, I must be so free with him as to say, that he bewrayeth so great Ignorance and Pride, as make his own fitness for communion much more questionable. For is it not most odious Ignorance, for a man not to know his own Ignorance of so many mysteries which no mortals know? And is it not loathsome Pride, for men to be so confident of these false conceits and arrogate to themselves a knowledge which man's earthly state is uncapable of? 139. And it filleth me with shame to find, that (though some stir hath been lately made against the Jansenists) yet all these Sects (Dominicans, Jesuits, Scotists, Nominals, etc.) can live in communion notwithstanding their differences, when yet the Protestants have prosecuted the same differences with all that bitterness, which you may find in the Germans Historians and Divines, (such as Schlusselburgius, Calovius, and many more) and in the sad History of the Low Countries, and in Heylin's Life of Archbishop Laud, and which you may still hear in all parties, in their ignorant censures of one another, by the names of Calvinists and Arminians. And yet the Church of Rome is justly condemned by us for its uncharitable Cruelty against Dissenters, when thus we thereby condemn ourselves. SECT. VIII. More of God's Foreknowledge, and of Permission of Sin. 140. BUt to leave this Wilderness, and speak more of things certain, or such as belong to us in our measure to know: It is certainly unknown to mortals, formally, what knowledge is in God (as is aforesaid), and much more in what Manner he knoweth either Future's or Contingents, or any Creatures, ex parte scientis. 141. If any particular manner therefore offer itself to your minds, as that which probably seemeth to be the right, it may afford you reason therefore to suspect that it is not the right: Because it is certain that the Manner is passed our reach. And what man can comprehend is infinitely below God. 142. If the Case of Aaron's Sons, the Bethshemites, Uzzah, Uzziah, and others that presumed too boldly to meddle with holy Rituals and Ceremonies was so dreadful; what is theirs that profanely toss Gods own Name, and pretend to know that of himself, which they know not, and turn his secrets profanely into matter of Contention against the Churches of Christ? 143. Either Futurity as such, is Intelligible in itself to God, or else the things future are Intelligible as in Eternity; or else futurity is intelligible only in its Causes: We can think of no other way (but God hath more than we can think of.) If it be Intelligible in itself, or as things are In Eternity, the Controversy is mostly ended: The perfection of God's understanding than is proof enough that he knoweth all that is intelligible. But if it be only in the Causes, it is either as those Cases necessarily will Cause, or else as freely and contingently. The first Cause reacheth Pennottus propugn. l. 3. c. 11. n. 1. noteth, that even the reconciling of the certainty of Divine pre-science with contingency, was quite past the power of man's understanding in this life, in the opinion of these subtle Schoolmen, Gabriel 1. d. 38. q. 1. a. 2. Ock●m ibid. q. 1. Marsil. 1. q. 40. How much more difficult will it be to reconcile God's Decrees, and most of all his premotion if predetermining with contingency? Plainly and honestly saith Bonaventure, in few words, in 1. d. 37. q. 2. Divina Cognitio quia à re non Causatur, nec dependet, ideo potest esse certa de re contingenti. not our Controversy: For sin hath no necessitating Cause, but free. The second is the same difficulty with that in question, viz. How God knoweth that a free undetermined Cause (man's Will) will this or that way determine itself? Nothing is knowable to us as certain from an uncertain cause; which hath no antecedent reason to prove its future self-determination to this more than to that. 144. If we go to the Jesuits Scientia Media (as it deserveth not that name, so) it is insufficient to this use. For all those circumstances in which God sore-knoweth that the will shall determine itself, are such as necessitate the will so to do, or not: If they say the first, they give away their own cause, and the cause of Religion (speaking of sinful Volitions). If the latter, the case is still as difficult (and the same) as if they had never mentioned those circumstances or conditional knowledge: viz. How God knoweth that a will still free and not necessitated will choose sin rather than duty? For from non-necessitating circumstances it followeth not. 145. If we go the way of Scotus, and say that he fore-knoweth it in the determination of his own will de rerum futuritione, either that will is supposed to be a Causing efficient will; or not? If it be, it reacheth not the case of sin, seeing Gods will doth cause no sin. But if not, then still the difficulty is the same as before, How God that willeth the Event, but causeth it not, doth know that his Will shall be done? For it is not from the Cause to the Effect. To say that his own Immutability proveth it, is no proof: For if his Immutability Cause not, the Effect ariseth not from it: And to say that his Omnipotency or Absoluteness inferreth it, is no proof, unless his Omnipotency Cause it. And to say that it followeth Logically Necessitate Consequentiae, though not Causally necessitate effecti vel consequentis, that what God willeth to be, shall be, is most certain: And so is it from his foreknowledge (which medium yet the Scotists say is here insufficient.) But that is because it is here supposed that what God so knoweth or willeth to be future, he willeth to be future by the causation of some Cause: for he willeth not any thing to be without a Cause. Besides that still sin is not willed by him to be future at all. * See in Alliaco after cited the notable reasons by which the Nominals confute Scotus in this opinion (which yet Dr. Twisse Praef. ad l. de scient. Med. saith did first invite him to School-divinity.) 146. And here I am to confute the foresaid reason of Rada (recited Thes. 130.) God, saith he, fore-knoweth sin, in that he knoweth that he decreeth to permit it. And Dr. Twiss often saith, that all confess, that Permission certainly inferreth the event of the thing permitted. I answer; † This also Annatus de Scient. Media cont. Twiss. granteth him cap. 5. §. 1. But not as ex ratione permissionis, but by hypothetical Connotation, Because we use the word Permission about that which aliunde will be if permitted. So that it is a Compound notion, when thus used. There is not so much as any great appearance of the Truth of the consequence unless limited. To Permit is nothing but non-impedire, not to hinder. And if a thing will come to pass because it is not hindered, than the world would have been made without God, and man saved without God, if he would not hinder it. Try if your work will be done merely by your not hindering it. 147. Indeed the word Permission is oft used as a complicate notion, signifying both the permission and the event permitted: But that's nothing to the nature of proper permission itself. 148. A man may be hindered, 1. Morally; and that 1. By Commands, 2. By Threats, 3. By Promise and persuasion; 4. By Gifts; 5. By terrifying stripes on himself or others. In all these respects God permitteth not sin, but hindereth it by them all. 149. 2. Or a man may be hindered Physically. And that 1. By to●al restraint and disabling, 2. Or by lesser impediments which make not the act impossible, but difficult. God doth not always thus hinder sin, and therefore thus he permitteth it. He doth not disable the sinner, e. g. to lie: And he doth not always render it difficult to him. But it followeth not necessarily, that this will be done, because it's possible; no nor because it is easy or not difficult to be done. 150. * Rui●. de praedet. Tr. 2. di●p. 12. §. 1, 2. p. 172. so defineth Permission as I confess so it is positively decreed: viz. (Increatam permissionem Deus non praed●finit) Creata permissio simul complec●itur qu●rundam rerum productionem & aliarum rerum negationem, quibus positis peccatum permittitur. And if by permission they will mean quid positivum, it must have a positive Will and Cause; but what's that to the Negative, or mere non impedire? (Thus still all our wranglings shall be but about ambiguous words.) His reason §. 2. is, Permission of sin is good: 1. Negatio Volitionis essicacis qua Deus impediret peccatum. (And he said that permissio increata is not decreed.) 2. Negatio motivorum, etc. 3. Prod●ctio & Constitutio circumstantlarum. 4. Generalis concursus. Ans. 1. Nothing is not Good: mere Negations are Nothing. 2. Moral Negations or Logical (that is, Denial and restraints) are something, and have a Cause. 3. Production and Concursus are something and have a Cause; but so is not a me●r non-impedition, which is proper permission. But the Case differeth as to permitting of a propense agent, and an indifferent agent, and a contrarily disposed agent. To permit a stone to ascend, will not make it ascend. To permit the Air to move, will not make it move. But to permit a stone in the Air to fall, I think with Durandus, is enough to make it fall, supposing the continuation of the Nature of it and all circumstances. And so is it in permitting some sinners to sin. 151. But yet here we must distinguish, 1. Between a necessary and a free agent, 2. Between Adam's sinning and ours; 3. And between the sin of a man strongly inclined or but weakly, or that hath many dissuasions or but few. 1. Though a bad man be under a moral necessity of sinning in the general, that is, of not living innocently, yet he is not under a necessity of committing every sin that he committeth: nor is it a valid consequence, He is a bad man: Ergo he will do this, and that, and the other Sin: Because a free agent oft acteth contrary to his habits. 2. And some Sinners have so great impediments in sinning, that they stand long in aequilibrio before the act. 3. And Adam had no more propensity to his first sin, than to the contrary: So that bare permission will not infer the Certainty of all sin, atleast; and therefore will not here serve turn. 152. But saith Rada, it is not common permission, but also a withdrawing of effectual helps against sin. Answ. 1. God did not so by Adam at first. 2. But are sufficient or necessary helps also withdrawn, as well as effectual? If so, then Adam was as much necessitated to sin by God, as he was to die by Gods withdrawing his Vital influx or sustentation, and it would have been as naturally Impossible for him not to sin, as to live without God. But if not so, then while Necessary Grace, called sufficient, is continued, the withdrawing of any other inferreth not a necessity of sinning. But indeed it is an unproved and improbable fiction, that God withdrew from Adam any Grace which he had given him, till Adam cast it away. It is therefore no good Illation, Deus permittit aliquem peccare: ergo peccat: unless by permitting you mean withholding necessary help; which is more than proper permission. 153. And it must be remembered that God is far from a total permission or non-impedition of sin: He always hindereth it so far as to forbid it, to threaten damnation to affright men from it, to promise salvation and all felicity to draw men from it: He tells men of the vanity of all which would allure them to it; And his daily mercies, and corrections should withhold men from it. Only by doing no more, nor effectually changing or restraining sinners, but leaving them to their own choice under all these moral restraining means, he permitteth sin. 154. But it is also confessed, that when by great sin these means themselves are forfeited, some of them are ofttimes withdrawn or not given: And so some are without that Teaching, those mercies or those corrections which others have: But yet they are still under a Law of Grace. 155. And it is still supposed that God as the first Cause of Nature, upholdeth man in the Nature which he gave him; and concurreth with it as the first Mover and Universal Cause: And therefore that man's Inclination to Felicity, Truth and Goodness which is Natural, doth continue. Otherwise it is confessed, that Permission would infer sin materially, but no sin formally, if by permission be meant Gods withdrawing Reason, freewill, or executive power. 156. But I easily confess, that if the Dominicans predetermining Premotion * Or Bradwardines' Effective Volition as necessary and productive of all that cometh to pass. in sinful actions could be proved, that would certainly infer the event of sin; And if God decreed so to pre-determine the will, sin may be fore known in that decree. And if Scotus or the rest had been of that mind, they had never omitted that easy solution of the Case, How God fore-knoweth sin? But this I have elsewhere confuted, and shall add a little here. 157. But first (having disproved all these presumptions of God's way of foreknowing future sin) I shall in a word tell you the answer which may and must satisfy us; which is, [That God's Understanding is Infinite, and therefore extendeth by its own perfection unto all things intelligible; But How his understanding reacheth them, what Ideas he hath of them, how they are Intelligible to him, with such like, are sinful presumptuous questions of blind men, who know not their own ignorance. And no manner of understanding is properly Divine, which mortals can comprehend.] SECT. IX. Of Predestination and freewill (of which see more Sect. 20. against Mr. Rutherford.) 158. THough Pre-determination belong to God's Execution, and be after his Volitions in order, yet because I am now only to speak of it, as a pretended medium of his knowledge of sin, and as quid decretum, I shall touch it here. It is confessed that there is no substance which God is not the Maker of (besides himself); Nor any Action of which he is not the first Cause. 159. God may well be called the perfect first Cause of humane Actions, in that he giveth man all his Natural faculties, and a Power to Act or not act at this time, or to choose this or that, and as the Fountain of Nature and Life and Motion, doth afford his Influx necessary to this free agency. So that when ever any Act is done, as an Act in genere, God is the first Cause of it: For it is done by the Power which he giveth and continueth, and by his Vital Influx; And there is no Power used to produce it which is not given by God. 160. An Act as such, hath no Morality in it, but is quid naturale; And so it is from God as he is fons naturae. But the Morality of an Act is formally the Relative Rectitude or obliquity of it, referred to Gods Governing Will or Law, and to his amiable Goodness or Will as it is man's End. And Materially it is (not the Act as such, but) the Act as exercised on an unmeet object rather than on a meet one, or to an undue End rather than a due End, or else the Omission of the Act as to the due End and Object, which is the sin, and the fundamentum of the sinfulness; and so è contra. 161. This Comparative mode of exercise addeth no proper Physical Entity at all to the General nature of the Act as such. In Omissions (of Loving, Trusting, Fearing, Serving God) there is no Natural Act, but a privation of it. In committed sins, to Love this Object rather than that, hath no more Natural Entity than to Love that rather than this; and no more than is in the general nature of Love as such. A modus Entis is not Ens: But this Comparative choice, is but the Modus Modi entis: For an Action is but Modus Entis, and this is but a modus actionis. 162. It is therefore an invalid argument which is the All of the Dominicans, that Man should be a Causa prima, and so be God, if he could determine his own will without God's predetermining pre-motion; and there should be some being in the world which God is not the Cause of: For this morality and modality is no proper being above the Act as such. 163. If any will litigate de nomine entis, let them call it Being or nobeing as they please; but it is such as God can make a Creature able to do. And he that dare say that God Almighty who made all the World, is not Able to make a Creature that can determine his own will to this object rather than to that, under Divine Universal Influx, without Divine predetermining pre-motion, on pretence that his wit doth find a contradiction in it, is bolder against God, than I shall be. And if God can do it, we have no reason to doubt whether it be done. 164. Men seem not in denying this, to consider the signification of the word * It is a contradiction therefore of Dr. Twisse who oft saith, that God denied to Adam no grace ad posse, but he denied him grace necessary ad agere: For he hath not the Power who hath not that which is necessary to the act. Vid. Rad. li. 1. Cont. 29. art. 1. pag. 457. [POWER] when they confess that God giveth man the Power to choose or refuse, and yet say that it is Impossible for him to Act by it, without the said pre-motion. If so, It was only a Power to Choose when predetermined to it. He that hath a proper Power to Choose, is Able to Choose, and Can Choose, by that Power. 165. God therefore is truly the first Cause of the Act by Giving the Power, and doing all that belongeth to the fons naturae to the exercise. And he is the first Cause of our Liberty in making us free-agents; and he is the first Cause of the Moral Goodness of our actions, by all that he doth by his Laws, Providence and Grace to make them good. But he is no way the first Cause of them as evil. 166. When we say that God causeth the Act of sin as Causa universalis, * Bellarmin's Universal Cause, seemeth the same wi●● what Durandus meaneth. And Pennottus denying Durandus' opinion, saith, l. 4. c. 16. p. 212. Non quod evidenter sequatur ex hac opinione dari duo prima rerum principia: Multi enim Philosophi, ut Plato, Aristot. ●gnoverunt unum primum principium omnium, & tamen non agnoverunt istud primum principium ess● causam immediatam omnium esse●luum Causarum sec●ndarum. the sense of this word must needs be opened by this distinction. A Cause is called Universal, 1. In praedicando, Logically; And so Artifex is causa universalis rei artificialis, & Statuarius est Causa particularis, & Polycletus est causa singularis hujus statuae. 2. In causande, as to the effect. And so that is an Universal Cause, whose causality extendeth to many effects. And this is twofold: 1. When it is the cause of somewhat common to all those effects, but not of all that is proper to each, unless its causality be otherwise (as by the dispositio recipientis) determined. And so the Sun is causa universalis of the sweetness of the Rose, and the stink of the Dunghill, etc. And so God is the Causa universalis ut fons naturae, by his common sustaining and moving Influx, of all sinful actions, 2. When it is the Cause of those actions, not only as to that which is common to them all, but as to that which is proper to each by which they differ from one another, and that of itself, and not as determined by the dispositio recipientis, or by any other cause. And so God is the Universal Cause of all that is merely physical in all beings and actions; As in Generation, etc. which is properly to say that he is at once, both Cause universalis, particularis & singularis. And how far he is thus also the Cause of all the moral Good of all Actions I must open to you more distinctly in the third part. But of the sinful morality of Actions he is not such a Cause; but only a mere Universal as aforesaid. 167. They that denying our self-determining power, do make Volition, and free-Volition to signify the same, and Cogency to be nothing but to make men willing and unwilling both at once in the same act, do seem rather to jest, than seriously dispute. And to define freewill, to be only Lubentia vel Volitio secundum rationem, is no other. For Velle juxta rationem, is no more than Velle; the Will being the Rational Appetite distinct from the sensitive. And if Velle and Libere Velle be all one, why do we blind the World with words, and do not plainly put the case whether man hath any will, and not whether his Will be free? And if to take away its Liberty or constrain it, be nothing else but to make the same numerical act which is a Volition simultaneously to be no Volition, or not the Volition of another thing, the question whether the will may be constrained is ridiculous. If the will be not forced as long as it willeth, or willeth juxta rationem, then to question whether it can will by constraint, is to question whether it can at once will and not will; † Of this see je Blanks excellent Theses de lib. arbitrio absolute. The definition of Alvar●● of freewill is [lib. arbitrium est facultas voluntatis & rationis ad utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum & agendum unum vel alterum] which Rivet resteth in, and fitteth the doctrine of necessitation; but I think expresseth not Liberty strictly taken: It may be ad utrumlibet if Satan had a power to move it as I move my pen. Bellarmine's is [lib. arb. est libera potestas ex his quae ad finem aliquem conducunt unum prae alio eligendi, aut unum & idem respuendi vel acceptandi pro arbitrio nostro ad magnam Dei gloridm concessa] which Paraeus dissenteth not from. But all defining is vain, ●ill the ambiguous word [Freedom] be distinguished, and the sense accordingly variously stated. yet is this description only of Liberty and constraint too common with some. 168. But if this were so, then ☞ 1. The suspension of the will might be nevertheless by force or restraint: which is a non velle; And so when they say Voluntatem ab ipso Deo non cogi posse, because when it acteth it acteth willingly, (that is, when it willeth, it willeth) the consequence holdeth not, because it may be forced from all action: (unless they mean that it cannot noll. & non agere at once). 2. And if this were so, then either they mean that God cannot naturally necessitate the will to act, or that such a natural necessitation consisteth with its Liberty. If the first, they destroy their doctrine of Predetermination: For what is that but God's Physical irresistible efficacious premotion, determining the will to act? And what is natural necessitation if this be not? If the latter, than they contradict their own definition of Liberty, which they oft give us, that it is Liberty from natural necessity (which Twiss calleth Libertas naturae distinct from Libertas conditionis, vel civilis.) And what more natural necessity than that which refulteth from that premotion of God as the first cause of all action, without which no agent natural or free can act, and which none can resist? 169. Their opinion of Liberty also leaveth no difference between brutish appetite or spontaneity, and freewill, save only that this doth follow reason: which indeed is a difference of Guides, but not of Liberty. 170. And according to this opinion, if God gave Satan power to move any man's will to sin by as true a physical motion and as unresistible as I move my pen, it were no constraint, nor loss of natural Liberty, because it is moved to be Willing. 171. And if they lay all on the Acts congruity to the Habit or Inclination, then if Satan could infuse unresistibly into the Will, an Inclination to hate God or to any sin, and then physically determine it according to that inclination, it were no force, or loss of natural liberty. 172. But I think he that by irresistible efficiency makes a man's will wicked both in its Inclination and Acts, doth incomparably more against him and his liberty, than he that could force his tongue or hand against his will, or he that only tempted and persuaded him. 173. The grand Reasons why we cannot receive the Dominicans doctrine of predetermining premotion, are elsewhere given; I now name but these three, 1. Because (whatever vain talk is used to blind men) it maketh God the sole-total-first-necessitating cause of all the sin that is committed in the world, or can be. 2. It unavoidably destroyeth the Christian faith: For if God be really the said determining Cause of all lies and other sins in the world, than his Veracity which is the formal object of faith, is gone: And no mortal man can tell whether Prophets and Apostles are predetermined to speak true or false, nor when God moveth them to the one or the other: For to Call their motion by the name of Inspiration, will satisfy no man, that God's Inspiration can do any more (at least to interest himself in the act) than his necessary physical premoving determination. 3. Because it feigneth God to damn most of the world for not-conquering God, who insuperably predetermined them to the forbidden act; that is, for not being Gods, or greater than God: And that he sent Christ to die only for those sins which he thus premoved us to irresistibly, and it was as impossible to forbear, as to touch the Moon. 174. In the issue of all these Controversies, the sharpest contenders seem agreed, whether they will or no: Arminius granteth that all events of sin or damnation are from eternity necessary necessitate consequentiae, * Bonavent. in 1. d. 38. q. 1. Resol. Praescientia Dei rebus praescitis necessitatem non imponit cum ●o modo res cognoscat quo futurae sunt— Duplex est necessitas: Absoluta quae opponitur Contingentiae, dicitur necessitas consequentis: Respectiva dicitur necessitas consequentiae: & haec non opponitur contingentiaeut si ambulat, movetur— In praescito non est necessitas absoluta, sed solum consequentiae. Nicol. D'Orbellis 1. d. 38. dub. 1. Duplex est necessitas, Consequentiae & consequentis: Bene sequitur necessitate consequentiae, Deus novit me cras sessurum, ergo sedebo: consequens tamen est contingens— ut homo currit, ergo movetur. Nos concedimus Liberum arbitrium in ●o quod agit, liberum esse ab omni necessitate, ut proprie non possit necessario agere quoad exercitium sui actus; quamvis respectu Divinae ordinationis certo & infallibiliter agate. Ames. Bellarm. Enervat. To. 4. l. 4. c. 1. He meaneth it of a caused physical necessity, no doubt. which is (as is said) but a Logical necessity in ordine probandi: that is, It is a good consequence, [This God fore-knoweth, ergo it will come to pass:] And it is only the necessitas consequentis which he denyeth; (which Rob. Baronius Metaph. calleth necessitas causata, and I had rather call necessitas effecti) which is in ordine productionis. And Dr. Twiss doth sharply reprehend him for feigning that he or any others do assert any more than necessitas consequentiae: And bringeth in the testimony of many Schoolmen professing concordantly that there is no more than this, which also foreknowledge itself will infer; It's worth the reciting: Vindic. Grat. Li. 2. p. 1. Digres. 5. [Quid quod ab eruditis eadem statuitur necessitas ab utraque profluens, tam à praescientia Dei quam ab ipsius Voluntate. Nam licet Arminius voluerit necessitatem à Dei voluntate profectam esse necessitatem Consequentis, à praescientia verò promanantem duntaxat Consequentiae; aliter tamen visum est magnis Theologis. Sic enim Durandus [Non bene dicunt illi qui dicunt quod omnia de necessitate eveniant per comparationem ad Voluntatem divinam; quia omnia respectu Voluntatis Divinae eveniunt libere; & ideo absolute loquendo possunt non evenire.] Expressius Bonaventura [Dei voluntatem absolutam necesse est impleri; conditionalem verò minime: sed advertendum quod est necessitas consequentiae, sicut praedictum est de praescientia: Ipsa enim non habet necessitatem consequentis sed consequentiae; Quia necessario infertur & sequitur, Deus praescivit hoc; Ergo hoc erit: Sed tamen non necessario praescit: quia in actu praesciendi frequenter notatur effectus contingens. Sic intelligendum est quod Voluntas Dei absoluta connotat eventum rei, & ideo est ibi necessitas consequentiae: sed non consequentis; quia non mutat eventum rei— unde sicut praescientia quia necessario infert effectum, non potest falli: sic voluntas absoluta quia necessario infert (that is, in arguing) non potest impediri.] Annatu● de scient. Med. count. Twiss de Libertate cap. 6. seemeth not to understand him, as to this Necessity consequentiae, which is not at all Causal of the event, but of the Conclusion in arguing; Leaving it out, from whence the event is. Ita Trigosius in sum. Theol. Bonav. [Effectus contingentes & liberi si comparentur ad scientiam, providentiam, & Voluntatem Dei dicuntur necessarii secundum quid, sive ex suppositione, quae necessitas vocatur conditionalis & consequentiae, non tamen absoluta & consequentis.— Quoniam istae consequentiae sunt optimae [Deus praescivit hoc futurum, Ergo erit: Deus vult aliquid fieri; Ergo fiet eo modo quo voluerit, & quando voluerit; Quia non stat dari antecedens verum & consequens falsum.] Istis ad amussim congruentia sunt Aquinatis illa [Quamvis Voluntas Dei sit immutabilis & invincibilis, non tamen sequitur quod etiam effectus sit necessarius necessitate absoluta— sed solum conditionata, sicut & de praescientia dictum est.] But the word [effectus] here is more than the rest say. And more fully ibid. sect. 18. pag. (Vol. min.) 230. [Quid quod Scholastici, nominatim vero Aquinas & Durandus (nec quenquam novi aliter sentientem, N. B.) non aliam agnoscunt necessitatem rerum, ratione Voluntatis Dei, quam quae dici potest necessitas consequentiae.] And yet plainer ibid. sect. 18. pag. 332. c. 2. [At ea necessitas quam juxta nostram sententiam oriri putat Arminius ex Decreto Dei, revera non tam ex Decreto Dei fluit, (quod monuit Perkinsius, & vere,) quam ex suppositione decreti divini, in Argumentatione scilicet: quoties scilicet posito decreto Dei de re aliqua futura, legitime infertur necesse esse ut suo tempore futura sit. At hujusmodi necessitas nihilo minus evincitur ex suppositione actus liberi cujuscunque quam ex suppositione decreti Divini: etenim posito quod existat actus liber, necesse est ut existat.] 175. We are all agreed then what Necessity it is that foreknowledge, decree, and providence infer as to the acts of sin: viz. of Logical consequence. Let them now but make it good that their Physical efficient predetermining premotion causeth no other, and I will contradict it no more. 176. But whereas they constantly say that God predetermineth man's will to the mode as well as to the act, that it be done freely as well as that it be done; if Willingness and freedom were all one, I would grant it, on their grounds. But if an Immediate-Physical-predetermining - efficient premotion, and an invincible causation of Habit and Act by the first Cause, bring no other necessity but of Logical sequel, and be no real cause of the thing itself, I confess I understand not what they mean, nor know what Liberty is, if the will have not a Power to act without such a Predetermination. 177. The same I say of Camero's and others way of predetermining by Vid. Bellar. de lib. arbitr. l. 3. c. 8. prop. 6. Pennot. propug. li. 1. c. 23. p. 46, 47, etc. Scot 2. d. 25. Henric. quodlib. 1. q. 16. Bannes' 1. p. q. 83. a 1. dub. 2. Cont. 2. Suar. Met. q. 19 sect. 6. Vasquez 1. p. d. 67. n. 14. a chain of necessitating Causes, viz. that God by the object necessitateth the act of the Intellect in specie. 2. And that the Intellect necessitateth the will. For all cometh to one, if all sinful Volitions be necessitated. Nor will it satisfy any man well that Camero doth resolve all man's sin into the Devil's temptation as a necessitating cause, till he know into what to resolve the Devil's sin: And he may turn Manichee in time that can believe that God gave the Devil power to necessitate innocent man to sin, and bring all sin and misery on the world; much more he that saith, that God did all this himself. 178. As there is Libera Voluntas, and Liberum arbitrium, or Libertas Voluntatis, & Libertas hominis, so there is a coaction or constraint of the Co-action in sensu composito is a contradiction and impossible: but not in sensu diviso; to be forcibly or by unresistible power made willing of unwilling. Yet in a large sense I confess that Voluntarium quà tale est liberum. Will and of the Man. I should take my Will to be constrained, if by an unresistible power it were suddenly made impious in act and habit, or either. But the man is not said to be constrained, so long as he hath his Will. 179. The unhappy descriptions of freewill, which I mentioned, Jansenius hath To. 3. li. 6. de Grat. Salvat. cap. 5. & 6. And Annatus de Incoacta Libertate confuteth them at large: As [Implicat contradictionem ut Voluntas seu Volitio non sit libera, sicut implicat ut Volendo non velimus. Latet Contradictio in eorum dictis qui dicunt Voluntatem, id est, Volitionem esse posse quae non sit libera. Apud Augustinum esse liberam, & esse aliquam hominis & Angeli Voluntatem seu Volitionem pro iisdem prorsus usurpantur. Voluntas seu Volitio, & libera Voluntas idem est, sicut & Velle & libere Velle: & Impossibile est ut Velle non sit liberum—] Lege etiam Annatum & Petavium Cont. Vincent. Lerinens.; & Pennoti propugnacul. haec plenius tractans. 180. The Liberty of the will consisteth not in such an Indifferency as Leg. Guil. Camerar. Scot Disp. Philos. Moral. qu. 4. for Gibie●fs sense of Liberty as not involving defectibility. leaveth it in aequilibrio equally inclined to this or that (As Macedo against Tho. White confesseth with others;) For then all Habits or Inclinations to this rather than that, destroyed Liberty: But in an Indetermination with a Power of self-determining: which power is called Indifferent, because it is a Power to this or that, and not because it is equally inclined, no nor equally a Power to either. For there may be inequality. 181. When Dr. † Twiss. de Scient. Med. l. 2. c. 3. p. 265. Annat. de Scient. Med. Disp. 1. c. 6. §. 5. p. 135. Twisse with Bradwardine * Vid. Bradward. l. 3. c. 10, 11. & passim. about the definition of freewill, (which positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis potest agere vel non agere) limiteth [omnibus] to 2. causes, Annatus playeth upon his oversight, as if he said that [Agere posset voluntas sine requisitis ex parte causae primae.] But no doubt Dr. Twisse meant the limitation as to the non-agere only: and that with the explication [non quasi motio Divina sit inter ejusmodi prae-requisita quae voluntatem creatam indifferentem relinquat.] Though indeed we cannot imagine that the causae secundae should operate and ponere omnia ad agendum requisita sine prima. And we may well say indeed that Voluntas potest non agere, if the second cause only do its part, when non potest omnino agere. This therefore should be better opened. 182. If by [omnibus requisitis] be meant only [merè necessariis sine quibus agere non potest Voluntas] this taketh not away the Moral (much less the Natural) Power ad agendum vel non-agendum, nor necessarily determineth it. But there may be such an effectual or * That August. Anselm●, I ●mbard, Aquin. Scotus, held some Liberty con●stent with necessity, see their words cited by Pennottus li. 1. c. 15. p. 32. And so doth Alph. à Castr. advers. Heres. in ●b. Liberl. for which see Rada ●●● 1. most accurately. potent operation on the will, as shall Certainly and Constantly determine it, by causing to determine itself: and antecedently take away its Moral power ad contrarium, though not its Natural. Of the difference between the Natural and Moral power, I shall somewhat insist, and elsewhere more at large. 183. The Natural Liberty of the Will must be distinguished from its Moral Liberty (from evil dispositions) and its Political Liberty (from restraining Laws.) 184. The Natural Liberty seemeth to † Quid sit Libertas, vide Ockam Quodl. 1. q. 16. & Soncin. Meta. l. 9 q. 17. & Scot 1. d. 39 lit. F. & Waldens. Doct. sid. antiq. li. 1. c. 25. & Medin. 1. 2. q. 6. art. 2. Bannes' 1. p. q. 83. art. 1. dub. 2. concl. 2. prob. 4. and many desinit. cited by Pennottus l. 1. c. 33. p. 63. Vid. Pennol. l. 1. c. 3. five senses of Liberty: But it is no perfect distribution. And whereas cap. 14. he maketh only Election as distinct from Volition (in four respects) to be the formal act of the Will as free, it is true as freedom is taken in the narrowest sense, as abovecited: But there is a freedom also of all Volitions: And there is One common Notion of Liberty which is a genus to both. And he confesieth that the will ad finem is free quoad exercitium actus. consist in these three things; 1. That the Will as a finite dependent Creature, be a Power given and upheld by God of self-determining or morally specifying its own acts, without any necessitating Pre-determiner (Divine or humane.) Where note that all Divine Predetermination taketh not away that Liberty: But not to be able to determine itself without Divine Physical Efficient Predetermination, is inconsistent with its Natural Power and Liberty. 2. Liberty containeth the Wills Empire over the inseriour faculties (respectively with variety, Despotical or Political.) 3. To be from under the power of any creature, as to necessitation. 185. As the Posse Velle hoc vel illud, velle aut non velle (in quibusdam) sine divina vel alia extrinsica praedeterminatione, is the Wills Natural Liberty, so not to be pre-determined to sin, (in act or habit) by God or creatures, is the Wills Political Freedom, or Libertas Condition is, as Dr. Twisse calleth it: which God himself hath given it, and never taketh away from it. 186. And to be Habitually and Actually Holy, is the Wills Ethical Liberty; which all men have lost so far as they are corrupted by sin: and all men have recovered, so far as they are sanctified by Grace. This is the freewill which Grace restoreth to us. 187. Habits do not determine the Will infallibly per modum nature, or necessitate its act. Because a man oft acteth contrary to habits. 188. There are some things which Natural Inclination infallibly causeth the Will to determine itself to, without the loss of its primary natural Liberty. 189. For all Liberty lieth not in such an Indifferency as Morally may fall either way: But a certain Natural Liberty is consistent with a constant certainty of self-determination ex Inclinatione Naturali, as 1. To a simple * Aug. de Nat. & Grat. cap. 46. Perquam absurdu●n est ut ideo dicamus non pertinere ad Voluntatem nostram quod beati esse volumus, quia id omnino nolle non p●ssumus:— nec dicere aud●mns ideo Deum non Voluntatem, sed necessitatem ●aòere justitiae, quia non potest V●lle pectar●. He that would fully see the sense of August in, Prospen and Fulgentius de ●ibert. with least labour, let him read all their own words in Paul. Iren. his ●ias Patru●. Volition of our own felicity; 2. As to a simple Volition Boni sensibilu quà talis. 3. As to a Volition medii unici, noti, ubi nihil repugnat. 190. And yet here, I mean but quoad specificationem actus: For quoad exercitium it may be omitted. 2. I confine it to simple Volition, which may consist with † The common doctrine that Election or comparate Volition is only de Mediis, is false: No one thing is necessarily our end. God is refused by the wicked: Felicity may be refused if put in competition with public good or Gods will. He is a Beast that would not choose to be annihilated, rather than the World or Kingdoms should be annihilated. But the simple Volition here is necessary. Comparate Nolition of the same thing. 191. Some Habits are so strong, that (with the Concurrence of convenient objects and circumstances,) the Will doth never act against them; and though they do not absolutely necessitate, nor take away the Natural power ad contrarium, yet do they constantly procure that power to determine itself well or ill according to them, as resembling a Natural Inclination in some degree. 192. That which is commonly called Liberty is not the greatest excellency of the will or felicity of man; An indifferent and undetermined state, is a middle state between that of Brutes and Angels, and is fitted to a Viators condition. But so far as Grace and Holy Habits fix the will to a constant certain self-determination to Good, so far is it set in such a Liberty of excellency as Gibieuf describeth, above our state of lose indifferency. 193. Because Order is necessary to a clear and full understanding, and all our controversies are indeed resolved into this of freewill, I will here delineate it, as I understand it. I. freewill as to the Quid nominis is ambiguous as to the Object, and is I. Libertas proprie dicta: Quae semper est Libertas ab aliquo Malo, viz. I. A malo Effecto viz. 1. A Peccato 1. Actuali 2. Habituali. 2. A Miseria 1. Privativa 2. Positiva. II. A Mali efficient I. Physice. I. Supra nos: (Deus Optimus Malum peccati non efficit.) II. Intra nos: Ab inclinatione Naturali determinante ad malum. III. Extra nos, viz. à 1. Personis. 1. Angel●s 1. Bonis, qui nec volunt nec possunt. 2. Malis: qui non possunt. 2. Hominibus: qui non possunt. 2. Rebus: Objectis, etc. quae non necessitant. II. Moraliter. I. Supra nos: (Deus peccatum non Causat moraliter.) II. Intra nos 1. Ab ipsius Voluntatis 1. Prava Inclinatione. 2. Malis Habitibus. 3. Actibus, (ad pejus ducentibus.) 2. Ab ignorantia & errore Intellectus. 3. Ab inferiorum facultatum (sensus, phantasiae, etc.) tentatione. III. Extra nos, viz. ab 1. Angelis 1. Bonis: Qui neminem ad malum alliciunt. 2. Malis: 1. Quoad tentationum species: 2. Gradus. 2. Hominibus, viz. 1. Ne Tyrannide 1. Bona vetent, 2. Mala praecipiant. 2. Ne falsâ doctrinâ Intellectum corrumpant. 3. Ne practicè nos tentent 1. Illecebris 2. Nocumentis. 3. A Rebus 1. Terrorem incutientibus, etc. 2. Allicientibus. III. A Causa Mali Deficiente, viz. 1. Deficientia Physicâ: 2. Deficientia Morali distinguendâ, ut antè de Causa efficiente videre est. II. Libertas Improprie dicta: cum illud dicitur Libertas 1. Quod Majus quid est, ut Dominatio. 2. Quod Minus: utpote Boni nihil continens: viz. I. Ad supra, viz. Libertas 1. A Dei Gubernation, per Leges & judicium. 2. A Dei Attractione & Determinatione Gratiosa & finali. 3. A Dei Dominio & dispositione arbitraria. II. Ad Intra, Libertas 1. A Voluntatis Inclinatione naturali ad Bonum naturale. 2. A Voluntatis Habitu Confirmato, & Perfectione, Inclinante ad bonum spirituale, Deum scilicet, sanctitatem, coelestia. 3. Ab Intellectus Lumine, specificante actum per Boni intuitum. III. Ad Extra, viz. 1. Libertas ab Angelorum Gubernation & Auxiliis. 2. Ab Hominum 1. Instructione per doctrinam. 2. Regimine necessario per Leges. 3. Auxiliis amicis (in spiritualibus, etc.) 3. A Bonitatis Objectivae determinante attractione. I mention all these Objective Distinctions, as about the Common use and abuse of the Name of LIBERTY or freewill, that you may be able to examine men's words that shall mention it. 194. II. As to the thing itself: passing by our, 1. Moral Liberty from Sin. 2. Our Political Liberty from restraints of Rulers. 3. I shall speak only of the Natural Liberty in hand: And there show I. Quid sit, viz. I. Essentialiter. 1. Voluntatem esse sub Deo principium propriae determinationis, & actuum suorum Dominam, potentem se praedeterminare sine necessitante praedeterminatione, Divinâ vel extrinsecâ. 2. Imperare caeteris facultatibus (sed divers.) 3. Absolute, direct & proprie, nulli subjici praeter Deum, viz. I. Ab extra. 1. Non Angelis vel Daemonibus. 2. Non Hominibus, imperantibus, suadentibus, etc. 3. Non Objectis, (sicut est appetitus brutorum.) II. Ab intra. 1. Non sensibus vel phantasiae, dum objecta praesentant. 2. Non Passionibus; (tametsi molestiam ei facessant.) 3. Non Intellectui: Qui dirigit; non imperat. II. Consequenter. I. In voluntate: Hinc nihil potest 1. Imprimere ei malas Inclinationes, nec auferre bonas. 2. Efficere malos Habitus, aut auferre bonos (necessario.) 3. Determinare eam ad Actus malos necessario. II. In Persona: Et ita Personae Liberum Arbitrium est, Me 1. Bonum vel Malum morale posse agere, si velim. 2. Posse Mereri si velim, & malum non commereri posse invitum. 3. Posse foelicem esse si velim, & non Infoelicem nisi Voluntario peccantem. II. Qualis sit: Estque Libertas Voluntatis, I. Conjuncta cum necessitate conven●● ente naturali, 1. In Volitione simplici seu Amore propriae foelicitatis, 2. In Volitione simplici seu Amore Boni sensibilis, 3. In Volitione Medii unici foelicitatis, omnimode boni, Quoad Actus specificationem. II. Separata à necessitate naturali, viz. 1. In Subjectione & Amore erga Causam primam (Creatorem.) 2. In Volitione simplici Dei ut Finis, & Boni spiritualis. 3. In Electione Finis ubi plures praesentantur. 4. In Electione Mediorum ubi diversa offeruntur. 5. In Actu Intendendi finem electum, quoad Exercitium. 6. In Usu Mediorum, & facultatibus subditis imperandis. III. Quotuplex sit Libertas Voluntatis; Estque 1. Libertas Contradictionis, vel Exercitii, viz. Velle aut Non-velle; Nolie a●t Non-nolle. 2. Contrarietatis, seu specificationis quoad Actum, viz. Velle aut Nolle. 3. Competitionis, Comparationis, vel Contrarietatis, vel specificationis, quoad Objecta: viz. Velle aut Hoc aut Illud; Nolle Hoc vel Illud. 195. If any man will dispute about freewill named and not defined or Vid. D'Orbellis n. 2. d. 25. d●●. 2. d● distinct. lib●● a●bit●ii. distinguished, nor tell us in what sense he taketh it; or if Divines will tediously and fiercely dispute An sit, before they Agree or prove, Quid sit, they are fit to be pitied, than to be read or heard. SECT. X. Of Natural and Moral Power as fore-seen. 196. ANd having here anticipated the Doctrine of freewill, I will (as fittest for the Readers use) connex the Difference of the Natural and Moral Power of the Will or Man, as it cometh under Prescience and Decree. If you will put the question, Whether homo lapsus sine auxilio gratiae po ●it resistere gravi tentationi? Vel An possit essica●iter diligere Deum sine gratiae speciali auxilio, etc. The Schoolmen will ordinarily say, No, as well as Protestants. Vid. Careres Sum. Theol. 22. cap. 1. p. 11, 12, etc. Power is called Natural in all these respects: 1. Because it is in our Natures and we have it from our birth. 2. Because it is essential to the soul. 3. Because it operateth per modum merae naturae, quantum in se, and not freely. Man's soul hath three Powers called Faculties, The Vital-Active, The Intellective, and The Volitive Power: Of which the two first are natural in all these three respects, in themselves considered: But the Will is natural only in the two first respects; And so are the other two so far as they are imperate by the Will, being, as imperate, participatively Freevill 197. Power is called Moral, 1. Because it is itself Morally Good or Evil, as a Disposition of the soul. 2. Because it is a Power to Moral Actions. 3. Because it is not called A POWER in the strict physical sense, but Morally, that is, Reputatively, called Quasi Potentia. 198. Two things are called a Moral Power: 1. The Natural Powers themselves, not simply as Natural, but as thus Morally qualified. 2. The Moral disposition of the Natural powers. † Natura humana, e●usque potentiae Naturales, quamv●s mere naturales sint, sibi innatam proserunt potentiam receptivam gratiae, immo ●tiam potentiam activam ●x se aptam ut simul cum divino auxilio vitalit●r producat supernatural●m actum fidei, charitatis, etc. Ruiz. 199. Morality is first seated in the Will, and from it our Power is first called Moral: But yet it is secondarily in the other two faculties. 200. As to Dr. Twisse his saying, that Potentia non fundatur in Potentia, (Moralis scilicet in Naturali, and as others say, Accidens non fundatur in accident:) I answer 1. Potentia univocè sic dicta non fundatur in potentia: But this is not such. 2. It is false that accidens non fundatur in accident, as the instance of Relation proveth: The term [Accident] is indeed so ambiguous, as proveth that the distribution of all things first into Substance and Accidents is not genuine and congruous, but inept. If you will call Calor, Lumen, or Motus Accidents, and call Gradus also an Accident, and then say, that Caloris, Luminis, Motus, non dantur diversi gradus, because Accidentis non est accidens, you are not to be believed. And if you will say that Ordo is an Accident, and that Qualitatum, Actionum, etc. non datur or do, it is false. 3. But the worst of the error is, that the Natural Powers are called Accidents, which is a falsehood of very ill tendency in many respects: They are the very formal Essence of the soul. And surely the soul may have its Good or Evil Dispositions. 201. There is in the very Essence of the Natural Power or faculty, besides the Vis vel Virt●s agendi, a certain Natural Inclination to some things, which is Inseparable from it, from which the Schoolmen say even of the Will that it is quaedam Natura, & pondus animae. So the soul is Inclined or propense (and not only Able) to Activity as such, to Intellection as such, to Volition as such; and objectively to Truth as such, and to Natural Good and felicity as such. And there is an Inclination of the soul, which is not essential and inseparable, but is much under the power of the Will, and may be got and lost. 202. This adventitious Disposition, is found in the soul in various Degrees: 1. When it is in such a Degree only, as that immediately and properly without any other power added, the will may be said to be Able to Act thus or thus, than it is called a Moral Power: But when it is in such a degree, as that we are Disposed to Act promptly and easily, it is called a Habit. 203. He therefore that is so far disposed to any Good act, and whose Indisposition, or disposition to the contrary, is but such, as that in his present state, without any more help than * Yet the Jesuits themselves (as Ruiz ubi sup.) are not so much for the necessity of predisposition, but that they confess that Grace oft taketh occasion of things natural, or indifferent, yea, of heinous sins themselves. And that the beginning of Justification (Sanctification) is not from the strength or endeavours of nature, but from Grace he largely proveth in the whole disp. 17, 18. as Vasquez and Suarez and other Jesuits also do. he hath, he can move his own will to the said act, and the difficulty is not so great, but that such Power sometime doth overcome it, is said to have a Moral Power. But he that wanteth not Natural force or power, but only a right Disposition of his Will, and so far wanteth it, as that none in his case do ever change their own acts to good, without more help and power than he hath, is said to be Morally unable or impotent: and not only to want the Habit. 204. Whether the Natural Powers be properly called A Power to Believe, Repent, Love God, etc. without the Moral Power or right disposition? though it be a question of some use among the Contenders about these matters, yet it is chief de nomine, and therefore of the less moment. This is to be granted of all de re, † Of this see Mr. Truman's Treatise of Natural and Moral Impotency, and Mr. William Fenners notable though popular Tractate of Wilful Impenitency. that Unbelievers want not that Natural Power or faculty, which can Believe and Repent if duly suscitated and disposed: But through an Ill Disposition and contrary course of action, and want of due excitation, that Power will not Act, without God's special Grace. Which [Will not] signifieth, 1. The Undisposedness, 2. The Non-agency: And in strictest speech, the former is best expressed by [The Will is undisposed and averse to Believe, etc.] and the latter by [The Will doth not consent.] But the first may be expressed by [It cannot] because it will not come to pass: Though it is no such [Cannot] as is distinct from [Will not] but the very same. And as [Power] is distinct from [Will] and a man is said to be Able to do that which [he can do if he will], so no doubt but he that Will Believe and Repent, can do it, so far as he is Willing. And this is it that Augustine so much pleadeth for, when he would have us distinguish [Cannot] and [Will not], and when he saith, that Posse Credere est Omnium; Credere autem fidelium. 205. To the fuller opening of this, note the following Conclusions. No man doth that which he cannot do, at that instant. 206. Humane (and all created) Power is dependent, and is not properly a Power to do any thing, but on supposition of God's Emanant support and concourse, as he is the first Cause of Nature. 207. Humane Power is finite, and is not a Power ad omnia, but ad haec: which therefore are called Possible to us. 208. Power being a Relative word, it may be said to be nullified ad hoc by an alteration of the Object only: As if you double the weight, that man may be Unable to bear it, who Can bear it when it was less: when the object is changed, and not the power indeed. 209. Power supposeth the due object and its due proposal or state. We have no Power to see invisibles, to understand things not intelligible, to will things not apprehended to be good, and not so revealed, etc. 210. The three Conjunct Powers of the soul suppose each other, though they are not formally the same: We have no Power to Will objects not understood, nor to understand, will or execute without Vital-activity; nor to understand most things without the Wills determination ad exercitium. 211. The due qualification also of the Inferior faculties (the Senses, and Fantasy, and Organs) is supposed to the being of true Power. We never had Power to see without eyes, no more than without Light. This Power of the Inferior faculties some call Potentia secunda, as to the acts of the Superior. 212. It is no true Power ad hoc, which is put to overcome a Greater opposing Power. We never had Power to overcome God, or to act against his premoving pre-determination (as Bradwardine truly saith.) 213. A man may be Able mediately to do that which he is not Able Immediately to do: I mean he that can write with a Pen, or move things with an Engine, and so act but as a partial, though Principal Cause, may not be Able to write without a Pen, nor to do the same alone as a Total Cause. 214. And a man may have Power to do that Mediately and Hypothetically hereafter, which he Cannot do Immediately, that is, at the present time. He can learn to write, and after can write, who cannot write till he hath learned. Thus Infants have a remote Power of speaking, and Infidels of believing. 215. No man Doth all that he is truly and properly Able to do. 216. No man doth all that he is Disposed and Habited to. Sudden objects oft carry us againt strong Habits. 217. A man ordinarily Wills and Acteth according to the predominant Habits of his soul, if he have objects and means. 218. A man always willeth that which he is soley disposed to will, or most disposed to will, at that moment; and which he apprehendeth sub omnimoda ratione boni: Much more if he were perfectly Habited to it, in his Vitality, Intellect and Will. 219. No man acteth without the Essential fundamental Inclination to Good and to Natural felicity: But a man may by sudden instigation and occasions will that which before he had no particular disposition to: A Power may be without a Habit. 220. No Good man's Habits here are perfect in goodness. 221. No Bad man here is at the worst; nor destitute of all Moral Power to all things commanded him of God. 222. A bare Moral Power which cometh not up to be an Inclination or Habit, determineth not the Will of itself. 223. Habits tend to the Wills determination per modum naturae, ut appetitus; But they are not sufficient to it, or necessary determiners de eventu. 224. Weak Habits are oft born down: Strong ones rarely, yet sometimes. 225. An unholy soul is much more Impotent as to the great Internal Acts of Loving God, delighting in him, etc. than to any mere external Act which the Natural Power extendeth to: And so are the regenerate in that measure as they are unrenewed. 226. But we are more able to Love or Will aright, than to Work and Do aright; because here both must concur, which requireth more Power than one alone. E. g. to Rule the Thoughts aright requireth more Power than to be Willing to rule them. 227. Yet in that measure that a man is Willing to do Good, he is Morally able, (and more than able) Because Morality being first seated in the will, it is no farther Morally Good or Bad, than it is Positively or Privatively Voluntary. He that is sincerely Willing, is sincerely Abole, and he that is Perfectly Willing, is perfectly able (and more.) 228. Every man's Natural faculties may be called Moral Powers as to the Obligation, as being obliged by God to Moral Good. 229. And because Obligation presupposeth some true Power to obey, mediately or immediately, present or former when the Law was made, therefore man's Natural faculties, though undisposed, are thus far called a moral power to the commanded act. SECT. XI. Whether God bind Men to Impossibilities. 230. THis leads us to the question, Whether God bind men to Quaudo praeceptum supernaturale obligat, non potest vitari peccatum contra illud absque auxilio gratiae. Pet. à S. Joseph. Thes. Univers. Theol. de auxiliis p. 83. Alliac. Camerac. 1. q. 14. R. saith, 1. We cannot be bound to a simple impossibility: 2. We may be bound to Will an Impossibility (as that his sin past had not been, though he doubt of this.) 4. He may be bound to that which is not in his power, to do of himself: So every one is bound habere gratiam; & quilibet viator fidem infusam: & tamen non est in creaturae potestate actiuâ. things Impossible. Where we must needs distinguish 1. Of disability Antecedent to the Law, and Consequent. 2. Mediate and Immediate. 3. Between Impossibles as such, and as Things Hated or Nilled. 4. Between Primary and Secondary Moral acts. And so I answer, 231. 1. No Law of God (or just men) bindeth to things Naturally Impossible before the Law was made and broken, by an Immediate obligation. 232. A just Law may antecedently bind us mediately to that which is immediately impossible. So he that cannot Read, may be bound to Read mediately; that is, first to Learn, and then to Read. And Paul requireth men to work with their hands, that they may have to give to him that needeth, (and then to give;) which yet before they have got it, is impossible. 233. The obligation of a Law ceaseth, when the thing commanded becometh Impossible without the subjects fault. 234. Every sin is Voluntarium-prohibitum: And so far as Impossible things may be Voluntaria-prohibita (which is all the doubt) so far they may be sins. 235. God's Law is Antecedent to our practice, and mediately ex parte sui bindeth us at once to all that we must do to the End of our Lives. As if a Master in the Morning command his servant his work till night. Therefore as if that servant purposely break his Spade or other Tools that he may not work, he is not therefore so disobliged as to be guiltless; even so when man by sin disableth himself to his commanded duty, the Law is not changed, but is still the same, nor is he thereby excused. 236. Here the Primary sin is that which contracted the Impotency: The Secondary sin is the Impotency itself, thus wilfully contracted and seated in the will. The third rank is the not doing of all that was first commanded, and the doing of all that was forbidden. 237. But if it be not only a Moral Vicious Impotency that is contracted (such as the habitual unwillingness in question) but a Physical Impotency (as if a man drunk himself stark mad, or blind, etc.) this is a sin (and the consequent acts and omissions) not simply in itself considered, but secundum quid, and participatively, as it partaketh of the first sin, which is described itself to be [a Voluntary forbidden act disabling us to future duty, and That a necessity contracted by our own fault (as by drunkenness) excuseth not from guilt, see August. l. de Natur. & Grat. c. 67. & Aquin. n. 4. d. 50. q. 2. a. 1. virtually containing a sinful life to the end.] 238. But if it be this Physical Impossibility that is contracted, then though the Law change not, yet the Subjects capacity being changed, strictly and properly God is not said after to Oblige him by that Law, because he is not Receptive and Capable of such new obligations; And yet he is not disobliged as to his benefit. For no man getteth a right to any benefit by his fault. What then? Why, the Precept to that man is passed into a Virtual Judiciary Sentence, condemning him as disobedient; even as it is with those in Hell. 239. Therefore since the fall, the Law of Innocency in itself is the same, which once said [Thou shalt continue perfectly Innocent;] but it doth not properly oblige us as a Law to that Innocency or perfection which we were born without, because we are become uncapable subjects: Much less is that Innocency now the Condition of any Promise or Covenant of God; as if he still said [Be personally and perpetually Innocent, and thou shalt live; and that thou mayst live.] But the Law being still the same, we that are uncapable of the duty, are not uncapable of the guilt and condemnation: Vid. Bellarmin. de Grat. & lib. a●b. li. 5. per totum, etc. 30. de dist. necessitates. And therefore the Law and Covenant are now become a Virtual Sentence of Condemnation for not obeying personally, perfectly and perpetually to the death. For he that hath once made Innocency Naturally Impossible to him, is Virtually in the case of one that hath persevered to the death in sin 240. But if the contracted Impossibility be not Physical but Moral, the case is quite different. For then the thing is a threefold sin in itself as aforesaid; 1. The disabling sin. 2. The vicious Disability or Malignity of the Will. 3. And the after sin thereby committed, and omission of duty. More of Physical and Moral Impotency. 241. 1. No righteous Law forbiddeth Physical Impotency as such, nor commandeth men Physical Impossibilities, as is said; But God's Laws primarily forbidden the malignity of the Will, which is its Moral Impotency. Bradwa●dine plainly saith li. 3. c. 9 p. 675. that [Nullus actus noster est simpliciter in nostra potestate (we grant not absolutely and independently) sed tantum sec●ndum quid, respectu Ca●sarum secundarum. Nihil est in nostra potestate nisi subactiva, subexec●tiva & subservience necessary, necessitate naturalit●r praecedente, respectu ●oluntatis divinae. Quod ideo in nostra dicitur potestate, quia cum volumus iliud facimus voluntary & non in●iti. So that by him no creature was ever able to do more or less than it doth, except you call him able to do it, that can do it when God makes him do it: but that is not to be able before, or when he is not caused to do it. 242. 2. Rulers use not to make Punishments for Physical Impotency; But for the Wills Malignity God doth. 243. 3. Rulers use not to propound Rewards for Physical Impossibilities; But for the fruits of Moral Sanctity or Habits, and for themselves, God doth. 244. 4. No just Judge condemneth men for Physical Impotency; But for Moral God and man do. 245. 5. No Good man hateth another for Physical Impotency; But for Moral malignity God and man do. 246. 6. An enlightened Conscience accuseth and tormenteth no man for mere Physical Impotency and Impossibilities: But for the Wills Malignity Conscience will torment men. So that it is evident that one sort of Impotency maketh an act no sin (in its degree) and the other maketh it a greater sin. For Nature and common notices teach men to judge that the More Willingness, the more culpability. But he that hath Actual and Habitual Wilfulness, and is as some Adulterers, drunkards, revengeful persons, proud, covetous, etc. who are so bad that they say, I cannot choose, are the worst of all the sorts of sinners, by such disability. 247. It is most probable that God overcometh Moral Impotency, and giveth Moral Power, by Moral Means, and Operations: For though God can give it by a proper Creation without Moral Means, and we cannot say that he never doth so, nor how oft he doth or doth not; yet it is most probable that his special Grace, doth by his Trine Influx of Power, Wisdom and Goodness, Life, Light and Love, suscitate the natural faculties of the soul to the first special Act, and by it cause a holy Habit, which he radicateth by degrees; And this is Metaphorically a Creation. 248. This is certain, that since the shall we have the same essential faculties; that Original sin is not as Illyricus so long and obstinately maintained (though an excellently good and Learned man) a Substance, though it be the Pravity of a substance: And that sin changed not the humane species; Nor doth Grace change our species. It is certain that the Acts of these same natural faculties are commanded to all men, even the unregenerate, under the names of Faith and Repentance; And so these are their duties. And it is certain, that a Course of Moral means (preaching, reading, meditating, conference, threaten, promises, mercies, afflictions) are appointed and used to the procuring the said faculties to perform these commanded acts: It is certain that these Means have an Aptitude to their end: And that God worketh by his own means: And appointeth not man to use them in vain; And that in working Grace, God preserveth and reformeth Nature, and worketh on Man as Man: and according to the Nature of his means. 249. And I think none dare deny, but that God is Able by his Spirits powerful operation, without any Antecedent new Habit or disposition, to set home these same means so effectually on the Natural powers of the soul, as shall excite them to the first Acts of Faith and Repentance: And by them imprint a Habit, as is said, and shall be said again in Part 3. And if he Can do so, and Can do otherwise, which then is likest to be his ordinary way, I leave to the observers of Scripture and Experience. 450. This is the Common sense of Divines, who place Vocation, exciting the first act of Faith and Repentance, before Union with Christ, and before Sanctification, which giveth the habit, till Mr. Pemble Vind. Grat. taught otherwise, whom Bishop G. Downame confuted in the Appendix to his Treatise of Perseverance. 251. As to the question, How this Grace is called Infused, and not Natural? I answer, It is called Infused and Supernatural, because, 1. It is not wrought by any Natural-moral means only, but by Supernatural-moral means, viz. Revelation, in and by the Gospel of Christ. 2. And this supernatural Revelation cannot work it, without the special extraordinary operation and impression by the Holy Ghost, above the common concourse of God with all his Creatures, as he is fons naturae. This the Schools have Metaphorically called Infusion. 252. But it may be called Natural, 1. In that man's Natural faculties receive God's Influx, 2. And perform the act: 3. And are perfected by it as the Natural body is by Health. 253. And what the difference is ex parte Dei agentis (& ex parte effectus) between God's Natural and Gracious operations, I shall after open in the third Part. 254. The Schoolmen, especially the Scotists and Ockam, and many Franciscans, Benedictines, and other Friars, (yea, such Oratorians as Gibieuf) have fled so high in making Grace supernatural, (feigning a state of pure Naturals that had none) and talk so phanatically of the Deification of the soul, as I think hath ensnared some Sectaries among us to imitate them, feigning that the first Covenant is Moral as a Law, and the second Covenant is the very in-being of a Divine Nature, which they (though obscurely) seem to describe as somewhat above all Habits and Inclinations, put into our own nature, like another form or soul: Which overdoing tendeth to tempt men to Infidelity, by doubting whether man's Nature was made by the Creator to enjoy God in Heaven or not, when it must be made another thing to attain it. SECT. XII. Of Scientia Media. 255. AFter this Digression about our Will and Powers as the objects of God's Knowledge and Decrees, I return to the Doctrine de Scientia Media. And that God knoweth from Eternity the truth of all conditional propositions that are true, is past all doubt, If we may suppose that God had eternal propositions. No doubt but he knoweth now that such propositions are true [If such Causes be put, they will or will not produce this or that as the effect.] 256. But if it be an Imperfection to have mental propositions to know by, and God knoweth not by them, but only knoweth them as the instruments and way of humane knowledge, (For no doubt but he knoweth all that's ours,) Than it must be said that he had from eternity, but the foreknowledge of the Creatures conditional propositions. And who can well determine this? 257. And this will lead the arrogant disputers to other inquiries no less difficult, Whether it be only or primarily the Proposition itself as ens rationis humanae or as the Thought of man's mind which God knoweth, or the res ab homine cognita, that is, futurition itself? And if the former, How God knoweth them to be True? If the latter, How he knoweth futurition? 258. And here inextricable difficulties will still arise before them, Whether to have the notion of futurity, be not a part of the Creatures imperfection? Whether God know not all things as present? Whether [Nothing] be properly Intelligible in itself? Whether it be not only Propositions de nihilo that are known, and not the ipsum nihil, (such as futurition is?) Whether to ascribe such knowledge of [Nothing] and such notions or propositions to God, be to ascribe perfection or Imperfection to him? 259. If we may or must say that God from eternity fore-knew our Propositions of future contingents, which are Conditional, yet we must not say or think that his knowledge quoad actum is conditional, so as that the Creatures * Nic. D'Orbellis saith, Communiter distinguitur triplex cognitio Dei, viz. approbationis, visionis & intelligentiae. Cognitio approbationis est tantum Bonorum: Cognitio Visionis est corum quae sunt, fuerunt, vel crunt: Cognitio intelligentiae seu simplicis notitiae, est omnium quae possunt esse. Hujusmodi autem cognitiones non differunt secundum se; sed secundum distinctionem connotatorum. Et Bonavent. 1. d. 38. dub. 3. Dicendum quod in nobis notitia simplex & notitia beneplaciti dicunt diversas cognitiones; & diversos modos cognoscendi— A Deo autem una tantum cognitio est. Sed illa una facit Deus, quod homines multis. Et ●●●o illa una dupliciter significat— state is the condition of God's Knowledge in itself: But only that the object is a conditional proposition, speaking the Condition of the event fore-known: From which Gods Act is denominated conditional only denominatione extrinsecâ, not as an Act, but as This act. 260. We deny not but God may be said as truly to know the truth of hypothetical as of absolute propositions; If one be the object of his Knowledge, the other is: Which proveth the hypothetical proposition to be less perfect than an absolute, but not God's knowledge of it to be less perfect. 261. Nor doth God's foreknowledge that Adam will sin in such circumstances, make his understanding depend on the Creature, but only to be terminated on the Creature as an object: And so it doth in all Acts where the Creature is the object: This objection therefore belongeth also to the dispute, Whether God know any thing but himself? or out of himself? 262. The feigning God to have in himself so many acts of knowledge, really distinct, and to lie in such an order, is intolerable, seeing God is most simple. But by extrinsical denomination, his Knowledge may by us, through our weakness and necessity, be distinguished according to its respect to diversity of objects, by inadequate conceptions: But on that pretence to feign many needless distributions, is profane, 263. They that think it a good confutation of scientia mediae that Non decreta non sunt futura; therefore no futurition can be known but as Decreed, do err much in the antecedent, (For it is false that sin is Decreed) and are either erroneous or uncertain in the conclusion, (For God fore-knoweth sin so far as it is intelligible.) 264. The sense of the question de Scientiae Media, is not the conditionatis Vide Pet. à Sanct. Jos. Disp. 4. Sect. 1. p. 465. the Scient. Med. necessaries, as [If the Sun set, it will be night] Nor yet of such conditionals as are merely disparate, and have no kind of dependence or connexion, as [If Peter die quickly, John will live long:] But of such conditionals, as have some reason of the Connexion, and yet leave the will in an undetermined power to act or not. But we know no difference between these ex parte Dei Scientis, but only denominatione extrinseca ex parte objecti. 265. Much less dare we conclude with them that God's knowledge See all this modestly and judiciously handled by Fr. Zumel Disput. in Tho. p. 1. especially his Conclus. 6. p. 127. And Ockam 1. d. 38. q. 1. Et. Greg. Arim. ib. q. 2. a. 2. Et Gabr. Biel ib. qu. 1. a. 1. Et Ant. Cordub. quaest. q. 55. dub. 10. of Conditionals is in God before his will to concur, or that they exist; For we are not acquainted with such priorities and posteriorities in God, except by such denomination. 266. Methinks it is but sumbling to say with Pet. à S. Joseph Suav. Concord. Disp. 4. p. 484. A nemine dubitari quin ad cognitionem futurorum sub conditione, necessarium sit aliquo modo decretum divinum; cum n●hil possit esse futurum sive absolute sive sub conditione, nisi Deus ut prima Causa dut absolute, aut sub conditione velit ad ista concurrere. At See the short answer in Pet. à S. Joseph. Suav. Concord. p. 576. the first look this seemeth to be spoken of the cause of futurition, or of the knowledge of it: And if not, the Decree seemeth mentioned to no purpose: For futurum tantum sub conditione, is not as such futurum; For the condition suspendeth the futurition: A conditional proposition de futuro is as true of that which will never come to pass as of that which will. And if they mean that God Decreeth e. g. that Judas shall sin if he be so and so tempted, it will lay the cause of Judas sin more on God in their own apprehension, than their Cause or the Truth will bear. For if God Decree that unnecessary Causes shall certainly effect the thing (sin) let them take heed of the consequence. 267. I could never see how the Doctrine de scientia media doth at all Pennot. l. 4. c. 23. saith, 1. Scientiam Mediam maxima cum probabilitate defendi posse. 2. Hunc modum reconciliationis (decretorum cum Libertate) principaliter & immediate non inniti Scientiae mediae, sed solum remote: quia principaliter illa non ponitur in Deo ad conciliandam arb. libertatem cum Diu. decretis: sed ut Deus provide & sapientissime omnes actus, maxim liberos disponere possit; & dirigere ad oped. fines. serve their turn: seeing they use it to show how God knoweth that Determinately, which he forseeth but in Conditionibus sine quibus non, or in unnecessary and not determining causes. And their own answer signifieth nothing more to the purpose, but that God can know future contingents by the Infinite perfection of his understanding, which is most true. But that he knoweth them ever the more for the supposition of circumstances, they never prove. Therefore the doctrine of God's knowledge of such Conditional propositions, and contingents as so circumstantiated, seemeth True materially, (that They are the Objects of God's knowledge;) but false efficiently as if they were any Causes of his knowledge, (which hath no Cause;) but only extrinsical denominaters of it in that act: And it seemeth useless and needless to their purpose. 268. For I confess I think that we need no more, and are capable of no more to satisfy us, how God knoweth any thing Intelligible, than to say, By his Infinite perfection. Man knoweth by Reception ab extra, but so doth not God. And if the Quest. How doth God know this, suppose extrinsic efficiency or reception, it is blasphemous! And I confess I hear men dispute How God knoweth? with horror as I hear men curse and swear and blaspheme: knowing how uncapable such Moles as we Mortals are of understanding the intrinsic manner of God's knowledge; And I detest the very question, and am but persuading others to detest it thus understood. 269. Much more do I think it arrogant presumption in those that dispute pro scientia media to say that God Can not otherwise know future contingents. As Annatus de scient. med. p. 85. contr. Ab omiibus con●●s●●● est, nullam veritatem fugere intellectum Di●inum: ac proinde propositiones de fu●●ris contingentibus, etc. Blank. de Concord. lib. cum Decretis. 1. Thes. 49, 50, 51— Twiss. D. 1. c. Seclusa Scientia Medi● non remanere in Deo praescientiam absolutam futurorum contingentium. Et cap. 6. Seclusa Scientia Media non posse praedefiniri à Deo liberas creatae voluntatis actiones. O Man! O Worm! Who art thou that in cases so unsearchable darest assert a non posse upon the Almighty God thus in the dark! 270. And it is no less arrogant in the adversaries of Scientia Media, such as some of our own, and the Scotists who dare say that God Rada ●●i ●●pr. (who was one of the Congregation where it was disputed before P. Clem. 8. and was against it; as Pet. à S. Josiph and others tell us.) cannot know future contingents, but in the predefinition and decrees of his own will. As if we had seen into all his Powers and Acts, who dwelleth in the unaccessible light. Whereas we know little of the smallest of his works. 271. And as audaciously do the Dominicans plead that God cannot otherwise know our future free acts, but by decreeing by immediate identificate premotion to predetermine them as the total first efficient cause. Nothing can be more certain than that we know not How God knoweth, who scarce know How we know ourselves. 272. He that hath read but one half what is said upon this subject by Zumel, Ripa. Gonzal. Fasol. Arrub. Aluiz, Alarcon, Alvarez, Tanner, Ruiz, Greg. Valent. Suar. Molin. Cantarel. Navar. Curiel. Cabrera, Mascaren. Verdu, Fonseca, Mendoz. Lessius, Diotalev. Moncaeus, Theophil. in Theolog. Natur. Aegidius Conink, Pennottus, Petr. à S. Joseph, Annatus, Twisse, etc. yea or but any two Contenders, and is not convinced that they talk presumptuously of things which are unknown above their reach, Non d●sunt ex nostris qui scientiam mediam aliquate●us agnos●unt, inquit Strangius l. 3. c. 13. p. 675. naming even Gomarrus, Walaeus, and Lud. ●●ocius, as also Jacob. Martinius and other Lutherans: and are we further from Arminius than Gomarrus was? doth not think reverently enough of God, nor knowingly and humbly enough of man: And he that doth but weigh the difficulties which Durandus his third opinion casteth in the way, and doth but try to solve well all Lud. à Dola's Questions, Part 1. cap. 9 p. 96, 97, etc. and to answer well all his arguments against the usefulness of Scientia Media, Part 2. and against the truth of immediate physical Predetermination, Part. 3. and against Identificate Concourse (as to evil actions) Part 4. may soon find that much of these matters are so far above us as to be nothing to us, and unfit to be thought necessary to our Peace and Concord. 273. The old doctrine of God's Prevision, and this de Scientia Media, in all that is within our reach come all to one: And they err that hold it to run pari passu, equally about Good and Evil. God fore-knoweth not evil Acts because he willeth them, or the futurity of them, nor because he decreeth to predetermine the will to the act in specie which is sin: But he willeth to effect that which is Good, and may so far know it. SECT. XIII. Of God's Will and Decrees in General. 274. GOds Decrees de futuris and his Will de praesentibus are in themselves the same, save as to the extrinsic denomination from the divers state of the connoted objects. 275. God's Decrees are not his works in themselves considered, but only That God's Decrees are not to be taken for a thing past and ceased, but as a thing still doing, Pennot. li. 4. c. 24. thinketh is the best notion to reconcile them with liberty. But ab extrinseco & Connotative they must be denominated past; though without change in God. Of this Dr. Twisse hath animadverted. when with his executive power, they operate ad extra: and then his knowledge and will are his working, being productive of the effects. 276. As in point of simplicity God's Acts are all One and yet many, that is, One ex parte agentis as his Acts are but his Essence; and yet many ex parte effecti & objecti, & inde denominatione extrinseca; so also as to their Eternity God's Acts are all Eternal as they are his Essence, ex parte agentis; and yet some of them new and temporary, some past, some present, some future, ex parte effectus, & objecti, & inde denominatione extrinsecâ. 277. Yet I confess that it passeth my understanding to conceive how it is, that the same Act is Eternal ex parte agentis, and yet but temporary ex parte patientis & effecti: that God should from eternity do all that ever he doth ex parte sui to create the world, to redeem, sanctify, justify, etc. and yet that nothing should be done by it till lately. Which drew Ludou. à Dola (de modo conjunct. Concurs. par. 1. c. 2. p. 20.) to say, [Probatur Actionem Dei externam seu Concursum in actu secundo esse actum ab ipso Deo distinctum ex natura rei, ante opus intellectus. Quia Deus non solum poterat nihil agere ad extra, sed de facto per aeternitatem nullum producebat effectum, & de novo incepit operari in principio temporis. Igitur actio Dei est omnino distincta ab ipso Deo: Neque dici potest actionem quidem Dei fuisse ab aeterno, sed effectum non fuisse nisi in tempore; Quia tametsi Virtus, & Potentia agendi, & Principium operationis, esse possit antequam Causa actu agate; tamen Actio esse non potest quin Causa verè agate & producat. Ac impossibile est Causam vere Agere & producere, quin effectus aliquis ab ea producatur & agatur. Nullus autem effectus producebatur à Deo ab aeterno: ergo non habebat Actionem ab aeterno (loquimur de productione ad extra & transeunte.) Sane non potest Actio esse sine termino & effectu suo. Sed Actio essentialiter est sui termini productio aut conservatio, & ne con●ipi quidem potest sine illo: Estque prorsus inintelligibile dari productionem aut conservationem alicujus rei, & non dari actualiter ipsam rem; Estque Omnis actio intime conjuncta cum effectu, qui per ipsam formaliter producitur, aut conservatur; nec sejungi ab illa potest.] And so Aureolus. 278. In this also we we must confess that the matter quite transcendeth our capacity: And as this is rash in à Dola, to affirm so confidently a thing above him, so we must not be rash to affirm on the contrary more than is certain. But so far as we may venture, the common way seemeth the far safer: Because God is unchangeable not only Morally, but Naturally. And this Action as distinct from the Effect, is made by him, to be neither the Creator nor a Creature, but a Creating, or moving Act, between both; which is not convenient. And as it is intelligible that God can Velle or Decree ab aeterno, mundum fieri, Petrum justificari, etc. in hoc tempore; so we are not sure that God cannot do all that Act from Eternity, which shall effect only in Time, by the concurrence of his will. Though I confess that the case much differeth, between an * Ego quidem fateor nostram libertatem cum Voluntate Dei facilius conciliari juxta eorum sententiam qui dicunt, actum volendi & intelligendi non esse operationem immanentem elicitam, aut libere additam ipsi essentiae; quam si dicamus esse actum quendam liberum elicitum: Utroqu● tamen modo conandum. Vasqu. in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99 c. 2. And if this will make it easy, easy it must be: For Gods free Volitions and knowledge of things extrinsic are commonly said to be no real additions to his essence, but dum unus, simplex, immutabilis, plura, & mutabilia scit, vult, facit, his will and understanding are denominated by relation and connotation as various from the various objects. Immanent Act, (such as nuda Volitio,) which doth nihil efficere, and an Effecting Act. But many conceive that God causeth all things merely by willing them. (Though I see not but that will must be a Powerful emanant operative will, which is more than mere will.) And we are so unacquainted with God, and all Active natures, as that we cannot say that Action exparte agentis may not be sine termino, objecto & effectis. And all Philosophical Divines agree that God hath no Power out of Act; but an Active power always equally in act, exparte sui, and so is a pure act. Let us (per possibile vel impossibile) suppose the Sun to be what it is, and no other Creature to be with it in being: This Sun would in vacuo emitt its motive, illuminative and calefactive radios by Action. And yet nothing would be moved, illuminated or heated by it: There would be no Terminus, and no effect. And suppose afterward all other Creatures to be made; then the divers Termini and Recipients would make a diversity of effects, and the various disposition of the Recipients would make that one Action of the Sun, to produce motion in one, light in another, heat in another, sweetness from the Rose, and stink from Weeds, and so of other effects. I do but tell you why we must not peremptorily deny much more of God. 279. Prescience with Predefinition or Decree do not infer causally That the Potentia executi●a ia Deo is principium absolut● p●oximum agendi ad ex●●a, See ●ennot. l. 3. c. 13. n. v. & A●uin. 1. d. 45. a. 3. ad. 2. that necessity of the event as predetermining premotion doth: Because they do (alone) nihil ponere in objecto. So that if it could be proved that God doth eternally Decree or will the event of sin, and men's damnation absolutely, it would not prove (alone) that he is therefore the cause of them. It is not therefore the Predetermination of bare Decree which we lay those consequences on, but efficient predetermination. 280. Lombard, d. 45. well concludeth That even that freewill of God by which he willeth, decreeth, and loveth the Creature, is his essence: Bradwardine l. 3. c. 5●. p. 8●9. argueth that Gods will de creandis, was antecedently free; and yet concomitantly and consequently necessary, and both immutably from Eternity. But yet the Name [Amor Petri, odium peccati, etc.] signifieth not his Essence as such, but his Essential will as denominated from the created or humane object. 281. Therefore it cannot be inferred hence, that God is a Creature, because he Willeth or Loveth the Creature: Because his Loving it denominateth his Essence as terminated on or connoting the object, and not as in itself simply. 282. It is not fit or lawful to ask after any Cause of the Will of God; Because it is the first cause of all things else, and hath nothing Superior or antecedent to Cause it; And God is absolutely independent, and is not to be called the Cause of himself. Ruiz who saith that Gods will hath a final cause, meaneth but a final object, as he confesseth. A Tree is a passive recipient cause of the Termination of the Suns calefacient act and of the ●ffect as received: but not of the act ex parte sol●●. 283. Even the Acts of God's freewill or Decrees, have no Cause even in God himself; no more than those called Necessary. For we must not say that any thing in God is an effect. 284. Yet as God's Acts are oft denominated by Connotation from the object, (which in man is a constitutive Cause of the Act, loco materiae,) so extrinsic objects may be called The Causes (but rather the Objects) of God Will, Love or Knowledge, not as his Essence, but only as so denominated by that Connotation of the object. 285. These distributions of God's Volitions in Number, and by specifying objects, and individuating objects, which are called material constitutive causes of the act, are all according to humane weakness; in us who know God but enigmatically, and in a glass: But yet if any man use such words in a broader manner than we think fit, before we censure and condemn him we must hear his sense explained. For all that ever we can say of God is improper, analogical, yea metaphorical; And it is but in degrees of impropriety that all words about God's attributes and actions differ; For (as is oft said) no man hath formal proper conceptions of any thing in God. If God should not speak to us in this improper language of our own, he must not speak intelligibly to us, unless he create another understanding in us. And he himself in Scripture using such language of himself, alloweth us to use it, while we profess to disclaim ascribing to God any of the imperfection which it seemeth to import. 286. On these terms not only Various Volitions are ascribed to God in Scripture, and exterior causes of them, (as John 16. 27. the Father Loveth you, because ye have loved me, and believed, etc.) * So Gen. 22. 16. & 26. 5. Prov. 1. 24. Luke 11. 8. & 19 17. Gal. 4. 6. Eph. 5. 6. 1 Sam. 28. 18. 1 King. 9 9 & 11. 34. & 20. 42. 2 King. 10. 30. 2 Chron. 34. 27. Psal. 91. 14. But also Fear, Affliction, Grief, Hatred, Repenting, Rejoicing, etc. Deut. 32. 27. Isa. 63. 9 Gen. 6. 6. Psal. 5. 5. Gen. 6. 7. 1 Sam. 15. 11. Joel 2. 13. Jer. 15. 6. Hos. 11. 8. Zeph. 3. 17. Jer. 32. 41, etc. and exterior causes of them. 287. That which is to be understood by all these, is 1. That man is so far the Cause of the Effects of Divine Volitions, as the Dispositio receptiva, may be called a Cause. And I before shown in the instance of the effects of the Sun's Influx, how great a hand the various Dispositiones materiae receptivae have in the diversifications of effects. 2. And that God's Volitions themselves are hence relatively denominated. 288. Therefore we must say, that Gods electing Peter and his rejecting Judas, his Love to Peter and his hatred of Judas, are not in specie the same act of his will; nor his Loving Peter, and his Loving Paul the same Numerically; As his knowing of Peter to be a Saint, and his knowing Judas to be a Saint, is not the same numerical act of knowledge; Though as they are God's Essence, all are but one. And we must say that he Loveth one because he is good, and hateth another because he is evil; and he justifieth men because they believe, and condemneth men because they believe not; that he forgiveth a sinner because he repenteth, etc. Though Gods Will have no efficient Cause. 289. Those Volitions of God which are but Immanent as to Efficiency, but Transient Objectively, are some of them to be denominated as before the thing willed, and some as after. The Will of effecting is before the thing willed: The Will ut finis, or Complacency and Displicency (as also Intuitive Knowledge of the thing as Existent, estimation, approbation, reprobation of it) the Will of Continuing, modifying, altering, perfecting, destroying, suppose the existence of the thing willed in esse objectivo. And so many Volitions may be denominated as beginning in time, as connoting the objects. † Pennottus li. 4. c. 24. p. 235. confidently argueth, that because God can Love him that he hated or Loved not, he can therefore Predestinate him whom he reprobated, or change his decrees without any change in himself. I answer, 1. I grant that God can Love a Saint whom he hated as a sinner before, and cease hating him without any change save relative and by extrinsical denomination. 2. But his inference seemeth to me false and dangerous, unless he had meant it of executive Election and Reprobation which he doth not. For 1. Proper Love and Hatred connote an Object as existent, and by such connotation are named: And his fourth supposition is false, that Love is nothing but Gods Will to give a man life Eternal. For the formal Act of Love is Complacency: And the Velle Bonum is another thing, as I think an effect of Love; or at the most another act of Love. And we deny that any absolute. Velle bonum alicui is ever changed, though displicence be changed: Because it is the same with Decree. 2. And the reason why the said Decree or Volition (if absolute and proper) may not be denominated changed is, because it maketh its own object, and so supposeth it not pre-existent, and dependeth not on it denominatively: And therefore it would infer God to be mutable, to change it; But it is not so in the other, which as to the Relation and Name followeth the Mutable creature; as doth God's Knowledge of present existents and preteritions as to denomination and connotation. And it is no more wrong to God's Immutability so to name them, than to his simplicity to name them many and divers. 290. And in this sense it is no more wrong to God's Immutability, to speak of Him as being before in Potentia only as to such Relative denominations. As the Rock in the Sea hath not yet that proximity to the Wave which a twelvemonth hence will touch it, and yet is not therefore mutable: Or as you are yet but in potentia to the termination of his Relations who will pass about you, before and behind, on the right hand and on the left. So God was but Potentially the Creator and Redeemer of the World from Eternity. Though as to any real passion God hath no passive power. 291. In this sense of relation to the objects and effects, it is that we conceive of God's acts of Knowledge and Volition in a certain order of nature, as one being before and one after another; Though not as they are God's Essence. 292. Yet because the use and truth of words or names, is their signification of Things as indeed they are, and we should put no name on any creature, but what is adapted to notify it aright to man's understanding; we must much more be afraid of putting any causeless, unmeet, unnecessary names of reality or distinction on the Will or Acts of God. 293. God's Will is not Appetitus rei desideratae; for he wanteth nothing. 294. God willeth efficiently all that he effecteth; and finally by complacence, all that is Good. 295. God's Willing or Loving Himself, is Himself; or an inadequate Conception of Himself as he is. But his Willing or Loving Creatures, is (as is oft said) a relative connotative Conception of Himself as extrinsecally denominated, and not as he is himself. 296. God's Will ad extra is Free; And therefore it cannot be said that he Willeth or Loveth ad ultimum potentiae, all that by Power he is Able to Will, or Love, or do: or that he doth all that he is Able to do. 297. Therefore it cannot be denied that there is in God a Negation of Volition: that is, that he willeth not some things which he Can Will. As to have made the World sooner, greater, with other sorts of creatures: to have made some men better, wiser, richer, etc. The exterior objects of Gods Will are finite, and contingent beings. 298. Therefore to ascribe to God a Negation of some Possible Volitions cannot be charged as making Gods Will to be Idle, or Neutral, or as any Imperfection: seeing it is but his free-negation of his own Act, through his perfection. 299. Nor can it be said, that hereby we make God Finite in that his Will is made Finite in Act, which is Himself. For his Will is Infinite as it is his Essence, and as it Acteth upon Himself; though as it acteth ad extra on finite temporary Creatures, it must needs be relatively, and connotatively as to the terminus denominated finite: which all must hold de re, that think not the World is Infinite. If the Sun were alone in Vacuo, it would be as Great as now it is, and as perfect: And yet as its beams are terminated on this or that recipient Creature, they are more limited. 300. We cannot prove that really God hath any Positive Decrees or Volitions of Nothings as such. 301. Therefore none such should be asserted by Divines, much less pretended necessary to be believed, to our Concord. 302. It seemeth more allowable to hold the Negative, that God hath no such Decrees; because Nothing is not a capable terminus of a Divine act: And therefore it is a fiction of Scaliger, that [Omnipotentia agit in non ens, ut fiat ens,] Exercit. 365. n. 9 pag. 1074. And si entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate, much less Divine acts. Also Non-volition is enough to a nonexistence or a Nothing; Therefore a Nolition need not be feigned to it: & frustra fit per plura, quod, etc. 303. Yet knowing so little of God as we do, I dare not boldly assert the contrary: But it's enough to know that this must not be asserted, and built on in our disputes. 304. How God Willeth future Contingents troubleth the Schools with many needless difficulties as well as how he knoweth them. About his knowledge of them, before treated of, there are besides the Dominicans that lay it on Pre-determination as decreed, and the Scotists that lay it on Decree or Will alone, several other opinions: One is of Ambr. Catharinus de Praed. Sanct. who holdeth that God knoweth not future Contingents, cert● sub conditione causali, but only by conjecture: Because the object is not otherwise scibile. 2. Vasquez saith, that God cannot know a future contingent merely contingent, as being not determinate: And that the Proposition hereof is ever false, because it is spoken by way of Causality and Consequence, when there is none. 3. Suarez and others say, that God knoweth future contingents, even when the Condition is disparate or of no Causality, a true Connexion of the terms suffering. Albertinus Princ. 4. To. 1. qu. 4. dub. 1. p. 292. pretendeth to a middle way, viz. 1. That future contingents sub conditione are certainly known of God, whether the condition be Causal or merely Conditional. 2. But quando Conditio est disparata, non potest futurum Contingens sub illa Conditione cognosci à Deo. 3. But because there is a Concomitancy between the terms of the propositions, such a disparate Proposition may be known of God, sub ratione Concomitantiae. And accordingly they diversify God's Decrees. To the question, Whether conditional future contingents may be known of God in his Decree, he first telleth us of a threefold Decree, 1. Conditional quoad Actum & Objectum, ut [si discernerem concursurum cum voluntate creata, si talis occasio occurreret, hoc futurum esset.] 2. Ex parte objecti only, (being absolute ex parte actus.) 3. Absolute on both parts; I refer you to him p. 296, 297. if you will see the decision, lest I perplex and weary you: And for the same reason pass by a multitude of other controversies of these men. SECT. XIV. Of several Distinctions of Gods Will. 305. MAny distinctions of Gods Will are used about these Controversies: As, 1. The Positive Acts of Gods Will are distinguished from his not-acting (or not-willing.) 2. The Positive objectively, from the Negative-quoad objectum. 3. The Positive from the oppositive. 4. The Immanent and the Transient acts. 5. The Transient efficienter, and the Transient only objectively. 6. The Natural and the Free. 7. The Efficient and Permissive acts. 8. Beneplaciti & signi. 9 Absolute and Conditional. 10. Effectual and uneffectual. 11. The Decreeing Will and the Preceptive Will. 12. Antecedent and Consequent. And because you will meet with all these, I shall tell you in what sense only they must be received. 306. I. Of the first I have said enough before. God's freewill hath its free-not-willings, that are no nolitions. 307. II. The meaning of the second is, that God doth positively will some Being's, and some Negatives. If they mean Negative Propositions, it's true, but inept; Because those are Positive Being's. If they mean in the second branch [Nothings] they cannot prove that God Positively at all willeth them. But he oft willeth their Antecedents and consequents, and occasions, and he willeth all creatures to be Limited and Imperfect, and so Negations must needs consequently pass upon them: And in that he willeth not-more, and willeth causes which may be deficient, men improperly and consequently say he willeth negatively, ne sint Plura, and the defects. But this is not strict speech. 308. Yet in a Moral sense God is oft said to will Nothings (or Negatives quoad esse:) (As that men shall not have grace, that they shall not live, or not be pardoned, or saved, etc.) 1. Because he doth properly and positively Will and make that Law which condemneth them to these penalties; 2. Because he will have Christ positively Condemn them to Privative punishments; 3. Because he doth positively take away some of the mercies which tend to save them; 4. And he doth freely and penally not-give them that which they are deprived of. So that this Language is not unfit while we speak of Moral Subjects, and of God after our manner. But in strict speech it cannot be proved that any [Nothing] is the proper object of a Volition of God. 309. The opinion of Scotus and his followers is known this way. And subtle Albertine To. 1. princ. 4. qu. 4. p. 297. saith, that Congruentius dicitur Deum non actu Positivo velle negationes,— & Resp. Deum non See after the Additions of Divine Nolitions. habere actum positivum non concurrendi, sed negationem actus Volendi dare concursum efficacem: & ●uxta hunc modum melius intelligitur quomodo se habet Voluntas Dei circa peccatum. Nam Deus non vult peccatum actu positivo, sed tantum negative se habet circa concursum efficacem dandi remedia illa per quae efficaciter impediretur peccatum— Vid. caet. 310. III. The third distinction is between God's Love and Hatred, his Volitions and Nolitions; And this must be used. But Hatred and Nolition in man have more of imperfection, than Love and Volition, importing somewhat contrary to us, and either hurtful, troublesome, feared, or that possibly may be so. Therefore we must confess here, that we speak of God with greater impropriety, and must disclaim the imperfection in the sense. 311. But if you would not be abused into many errors, swallow not the name [Love] and [Hatred] without distinction; Lest the forecited reason of Pennottus cheat you; viz. [God Loveth a man converted whom he Hated while wicked: Ergo he can decree or predestinate a man to salvation, whom before he decreed and reprobated to damnation.] And all rose from this falsehood, that [Love is nothing but the Willing of salvation to us] and so the same with Decree: Whereas Love is also, yea, most properly a Complacency in Good as Good, and Hatred a Displicency in Evil as Evil. Benevolence is sometime Antecedent and sometime an effect of this in man. 312. iv The Immanent and Transient acts, I need say no more of. 313. V But Divines use to omit the next distinction (of Transient D'Orbellis in 1. d. 4. Quando quaeritur utrum Electio vel Reprobatio rationem Meritoriam habeant, hoc non intelligitur quantum ad Voluntatem divinam, au●●jus actum, qui est Deus: sed quantum ad transitum ejus super ob●ectum; seu quantum ad ordinationem ad ipsam Voluntatem. acts) so much, that few of them let you know, whether that which is but Objectively Transient, be numbered by them with Immanent or with Transient acts. Briefly, 1. As God's Will is the first efficient, and with his Wisdom and Executive Power doth effect ad extra, it is effectively Transient, (though Essentially Immanent in itself.) 2. But as Gods Will is (as aforesaid) the Final Cause or End of all things, and willeth things only Complacentially, supposing all that is Complacent to be Existent (in esse real, vel in esse cognito) so is it only Objectively Transient, and not effectively; and therefore by many is numbered with Immanent acts. And as God may be said to know and will the creature in himself, and to Love the Idea of it in himself, the phrase is not to be blamed: But as the Creature in itself considered by foreknowledge or present knowledge (if we may so distinguish) is the object, it seemeth unfit to call the act Immanent, though it do nihil ponere (vel efficere) in objecto. 314. But Gods Will as it effecteth Relations ad extra, is even effectively Transient, as well as that which altereth qualities: e. g. his Pardoning, Justifying, Adopting acts of Will. 315. VI * How far God's Volitions of creatures are free, the subtlest confess to be unsearchable. Vasquez (ut supra) in 1. Thom. q. 19 disp. 80. p. 504. [Licet assignemus in Deo libertatem comparatione facta cum objectis & rebus creatis, tamen non assignamus sufficientem rationem ex parte Dei cur nunc actu libero efficaci reseratur ad has potius quam ad illas; Siquidem Idem omnino manens in s●, poterat eas non velle quas vult: Quare cum rem exactius enodare contendimus, difficultatem praedi ●am e●adere n●● possumus.] See more of him before. Gods Natural Volitions are those which ex natura rei, could not be otherwise; that is, All his Volitions of his own being and perfections; To which some number natural necessary objects, in the creatures: As his Volition that Contradictions shall not be true; that two and two shall be four, or two more than one, etc. His Free Volitions are those which might have been otherwise as to the nature of the thing, and as to the power of the Divine will. Such is the Volition of the being of all the Creatures. 316. The Schoolmens contention whether the Son be freely begotten, and the Holy Ghost freely proceed, ariseth from the ambiguity of the word [free;] which I will not trouble you with. 317. Yet all agree that God's Volitions are all eternal, and therefore eternally necessary necessitate existentiae. 318. And some think it best to say that they are respectively to be called both Necessary and Free; Because Gods will choose that which his wisdom saw was Best, and he must necessarily choose the Best. But we must not be here too bold in our Conclusions. 319. VII. The distinction of an efficient and permissive Will is no better, nor other, than that of a Volition and no Volition. But to distinguish the Efficient and Permissive Act, implieth a falsehood, That Permission as such is an Act. 320. Yet God's Law may be said to have a permissive Act, that is, He may declare [This I permit you to do, or leave indifferent] as to political permission. And as to Physical permission, I have showed before, that some positive removal of Impediments, are sometimes called non impedire, or permission: But permission itself as such is no act. 321. VIII. The distinction of Vol. Beneplaciti & signi is old and common: But not a distinguishing the Acts of God's will, but rather his Volitions from the signs of them. For it is his Voluntas beneplaciti that there shall be such signs. 322. The five signs commonly named by the Schoolmen are Praecipit ac prohibet, permittit, consulit, implet. And the older Schoolmen say that these are called Gods Will Metaphorically only, yea by a remote sort of Metaphor, they being not man's will properly but metaphorically Aqu. 1. q. 19 art. 11, 12. Pet. de Alliaco 1. q. 14. A. Voluntas Dei sumitur Proprie; & tunc signat divinum beneplacitum, quod non est aliud quam ipse Deus volens. 2. Impropriè & metaphorice pro aliquo signo ejus, etc. only when applied to man, and accordingly called Gods will. But some of the latter say that they are proper signs of God's real will. The truth is, they that first used this distinction seem to have intended only God's Government, if not his word alone with the performance of it, by Voluntas signi, (of which next.) Indeed the whole sensible world and all things in it, is some way or other a sign of God's will: especially the nature of man himself, with the nature of all creatures about him, and the order in which he standeth to them; which is therefore called, The Law of Nature. 323. Physical Permission is no positive sign, nor of a positive will (as For this read Alliaco ib. further after cited: And his citation of Gregor. that Voluntas beneplaciti is respectu complexi Volitio, prosecutio aut fuga, Aut simplex complacentia & displicentia, & est ipse Deus praeter connotationem. afore opened:) But Legal permission may be. 324. The distinction between praecipit and consulit would be vain, but that Aqu. and some others expound consulit by Persuading. For God counselleth to nothing but what is Best; and that which is Best, precept (even natural) maketh it our Duty to choose: But Precept going before and Making Duty, Perswading-counsel may come after and urge us to perform it. 325. God's Voluntas signi & Beneplaciti are never contrary properly taken: Nor doth he give us any false signs of his Will; And therefore his word is always true: But there are many things which ignorance misjudgeth to be a sign of some Divine Volition, which they signify not; and some dark signs which are not easily understood. If men mistake Gods works or word, the sign was not false, but their exposition of it. But of this next. 326. IX. Dr. Twisse useth instead of this the distinction of Volunta● Beneplaciti & Praecepti. His sense is Right, but the terms are too narrow. ●●●● si●●● seu preceptor, ●●●● di●●tur du●●●●●●●●. 1. Q●●● ita sit q●●● per tale signum vel prae●●p●●●● signatur ad intentionem praecipientis: Et sic semp●r impl●●●r. Name p●r tale praeceptum significatur aliquid debere fieri à Creature: & ita est: Aliter tale sign●m non ess●t verum. 2. Quod ita sit vel ●iat sicut per tale praeceptum signatar de●ere fieri: & sic non semper impletur. Pet. de Alliaco 1. q. 14. F. T●e true Distinction is of God's Will of Natural Things and Events as such, and his Will de Debito vel Jure as such: His will as it is the Fountain of Nature, and as it is the fountain of Morality or Right: O● his Will of Natural Events and his Law. 327. This distinction is of Greater and more Necessary use to us than any of the rest; yea so great that it is included in the first principle of Religion and morality; and is understood (distinctly or more darkly, but really) by all Christians and moral agents. 328. The distinction is fetched from the objects: The common object of the one being Nature as such, and of the other Debitum or Jus as such. 329. As God's Will de Naturalibus is his Bene placitum; and the effects of it are the signa subsequentia, and prophesy a prognostic of the effect; so Gods will de Debito is his Beneplacitum, signified by his Law and Judgement. 330. Though the word [Law] be usually taken more narrowly for only [Statute eminent Laws] yet I here take it general●y; And it is [The Governing Will of a Rector signified, constituting or confirming Right (or Dueness) from and to the Subject; or A Rectors constitutive Determination of Right; or, The sign of a Rectors Will constituting Right.] 331. God being most Great and Wise and Good, and man's Creator, and thence our Absolute supreme Rector, his Will must needs be the fountain of all Morality and Right. 1. Sicut Divina volunt as in g●●●re causae e●●ici●●is est prima ●●●● causa, sic ips● in ge●ere ●eg●● obligantis est p●ima ●ex seu Regula. 2. Sicut divina voluntas est efficiens causa quia vult aliquid esse vel ●●●●: sic ipsa est ●ex obligatoria quia vult aliquid ad aliqualiter esse vel non esse tereri. 3. Sicut divina Voluntas est ●ex perfectissima rationalis creaturae, sic Lex Christi vel doc●rina est signum perfectissimum volu●●●tis divinae. Pet. All●●. Camer. in 1. se●; ●●●●. 1. ●●●● Dei signi non semper impletur. 2. Voluntas ●en●placiti antecede●s, non se● per impletur. 3. Volunt●s beneplaciti constque●s semper impletur. Prohibiti●●et non signat Deum Nolie efficaciter illud fieri quod prohibet fieri. Idem 1. q. 44. F. De praecepto & prohibition s●t●● patet quod quilibet ten●tur se conformare universaliter tali Voluntati— D●●●●ri obligationem, non est proprie l●quendo effectus o●ligationis ●●●●; sed te●●ri ad implendum est ●jus e●●●●tus. Idem ib. ●. H. 332. It is not the Will in itself that is a Law, nor doth any Immanent act oblige us, or constitute Duty: But it is Gods Will as signified. And therefore Lex aeterna is an improper speech. 333. Tilenus and others who think it fit only to distinguish Quid Deus ipse vult facere, and Quid à nobis vult fieri, do but hid and not open the truth: For the terms seem to express the Event in both, and distinguish not of Event and Duty. Whereas if God Willed the Event of what he commandeth us, as he doth of what he effecteth, it would be done. And he doth also by his Absolute Decree, Will many things to be done by us, which his Law commandeth not. Such as are many mere Natural actions, quas à nobis vult fieri. 334. Morality being but Modality and Relation of Natural Entities, the Acts or Habits themselves commanded and forbidden are quid Naturale in themselves considered, and so far are under God's will de naturalibus; But it is only the Debitum or Jus that is constituted by his Legislative will. 335. Though Gods will de Naturalibus must operate by real efficient efflux, yet his will de Debito effecteth by mere signification or notification to the subject. 336. Legem facere vel signum dare is an act of Gods will de quodam naturali vel eventu: (For the signum is aliquid naturale.) But per signum facere Jus is that which is proper to the Governing or Legal Will. 337. If we will denominate Gods will here ab origine, It is, 1. Antecedent to the Creature, (supposed;) And that is his Creating will. 2. Supposing the Creature in Being; and that is, 1. His will as Proprietary and Actor of all things; And that is his Moving and Disposing will, of Events. 2. His will as Governor (Morally) And that is his Morally Ruling will. 3. His will ut Amator & Finis; And that is his Beneficent and felicitating will. And among these it is his Regent will which I am treating of. And though his Law as making Jus, be the first and chief part, yet his Judgement as it decideth, and his Execution as it giveth every Man his Right and Due, is included. 338. It is not Gods will without the sign (as is said) nor the sign without his will, but the sign as notifying, and his will as notified that is a Law, and Jus the Effect: Gods will is the principal Cause, and quasi Anima Legis; and the sign is the instrumental Cause, and quasi Corpus. 339. The Sign re●pecteth these things, 1. The matter due. 2. The dueness or right. 3. The will of God concerning or constituting it. 4. The mind and will of man to whom this is signified. Or, 1. God's will as the Efficient of Right. 2. The matter and form of Right as Constituted. 3. The mind and will of man as the terminus. 340. These signs of Gods will are, 1. Natural, called the Law of Nature: which is the Natura & ordo rerum, especially ipsius hominis as before described. 2. By extraordinary Revelation. The latter have the great advantage of plainness, significandi rem praeceptam. The former hath the fuller evidence of its Author and Original that it is indeed of God. Both are his Laws to man. 341. La●, Judgement and execution (the three parts of Government) differ in that, 1. Law maketh the Debitum or Jus; 2. Judgement determineth It is of great use for a Divine who handleth God's Laws to understand the nature of Laws in genere (as Suarez in praes. de Legib. showeth; which Book is one of the best on that Subject that is extant among us.) of it by decisive application; 3. Execution distributeth according to it. 342. The Jus vel Debitum, instituted by the Law, is twofold. 1. A Subditis: What shall be Due from the Subjects: the Debitum Officii. 2. Subditis: what shall be Due to the Subjects: viz. 1. Antecedently to their merits (which is 1. The act of our Governing Benefactor. 2. Or a Divider: such was the Law for dividing the Israelites inheritances.) 2. Consequently; which is by the Retributive part of the Law (commonly called the Sanction,) which is 1. By the Premiant part, what Reward shall be due: 2. By the Penal, what Punishment. 343. Accordingly Laws have several parts: 1. Precept and Prohibition, making Duty: 2. Retributive, 1. Premiant, 2. Penal; called Gods Promises and Threats: 3. And subservient or accidental; 1. Narratives Historical, Chronological, etc. 2. Pure Donations: 3. Prophecies; 4. Doctrinal, 5. Exhortatory, 6. Reprehensive, etc. 344. Though Debitum vel Jus facere, be the formal operation of a Law; (which is to be Fundamentum Relationis) yet the Act of the chief parts (preceptive or penal) is commonly called Obligation: And so many say that obligare aut ad obedientiam aut ad poenam is all the action of a Law. But Obligare is a Metaphor, and therefore in dispute to be laid by, or to give place to the proper terms: And the Premiant act is not properly called obligation; nor the penal act, save in a secondary notion, as he is ●bligatus ad poenam ferendam, if judged, who is first Reus poenae, or to whom it is made Due by the Law. 345. The obligation aut ad obedientiam aut ad poenam is not of equality in the disjunctive. As if God were indifferent which we chose: But it is primarily ad obedientiam, and but subserviently add poenam as a means against future disobedience, and a securing the ends of Government, in case of sin. 346. But the Preceptive and the Premiant parts, are each chief or final in several respects: God Commandeth us a Course of Duty or Right action to this end, that we may be Happy in his Love. And he promiseth us first, and giveth us after in foretaste, this Happiness, to draw us to Duty. 347. But here is a wonderful inseparable twist; and in the main an Identity. God Ruleth us as a Father, or Regent Benefactor: All his Benefits are Freegifts, as to the Thing and Value; But given 1. In an Order. 2. And the rest as means to the ultimate. In which respects they are a Reward, or means to it. His very Law is a Gift and a great Benefit. Duty is the means to keep his first Gifts and to receive more. The very doing of the duty is a receiving of the Reward; the object of duty being felicitating. (As if feasting or accepting offered wealth or honour were our work.) Holiness is happiness, in a great part. And in our End or state of perfection all will be one: To Love God, Rejoice in Him and praise him, will be both our duty and felicity, means and end, as it were, in one. 348. Whereas some say, that if there were no Law, sin would deserve punishment, it is an error: For it is due only by Law. But it's true Of all the following distinctions, note these words of Bonavent. in 1. d. 4●. a. 1. q. 1. Volunt●●em D●i Antecedentem s●● Conditionalem, possibl●e ●●●● non impleri:— at consequentem & absolutam nequ●●uam. S●●un●um Da●●sc. Voluntas ben●p●aciti ●t ●apl. Antecedens seu Conditionales & consequous, qua vult quantum in s● est omnium salutem; & alsoluta sive consequens, qu● determinate vult aliquid q●●d no●it certitudin 〈…〉. Intelligendum ●●● n●llam Dei Voluntatem p●sse superari aut cassari; Aliquam tamen posse non imp●eri (●t antecedentem) Aliq●●m ut consequentem impossibile ●sse no● impleri, ●●● impedi●i:— Non ●tiam possibil● est Voluntatem Dei cassari: Nam cassam di●itur aliquid dum pri●●tur e●●ectu p●●●●io ad quem est: Voluntas aut●● nullo privatur esseciu ad qu●m est p●●p●ie. Nam quod dicitur quod Deus vult omnes homi●●s salvos fieri quant●m in s● est, haec Voluntas non connotat salutem; nec proprie est ad effectum salutes: sed connotat ordinatio●●m naturae, sive natur●m ordinabil●n ad salut●n. ●●●● ni●il plus est di●●re Deus vult istum sal●●● fieri quantum in se est, q●●m De● placuit dare isti ●●●●ram per quam posset p●●●●●ire ad sa●u●em; & quod Deus para●●● esset ju●●re, ita quod salus non deficit prop●er dese●tum à p●nte Dei. Therefore it connoteth also all the helps which God affordeth men. that it's due by the mere Law of Nature, without any superadded Positive Laws. 349. God's will called Legislative, or Governing is ever fulfilled in strict sense, that is, So much as is God's part and the Laws part to do, is ever done: e. g. God saith [Perfect obedience, etc. shall be Adam's duty] and it is done: It is his Duty whether he will or not. He saith [To steal shall be sin] and it is sin. He saith [He that believeth shall have right to Justification and Glory, and he that believeth not shall be Filius mortis, that is, Death and Hell shall be his Due] and so it is. Thus strictly all Gods Will is done. 350. But in the secondary remote sense every sin violateth the Will of God, by breaking his Law: For when he saith [Obedience shall be thy duty;] we use to say, It is God's will that we should obey him: And so when we do not obey him, we are said to Violate his will. But this is but metonymically: For that which is Gods will indeed is but that we shall be bound to obey (whether we do or not:) And the event, whether we shall or not the facto, is not at all determined by the Law. 351. Therefore if it were proved that God did Decree one thing, and command the contrary, it would not prove two contrary wills in God; nor is there any great show of a contradiction in it. For to say [I forbidden Judas to hang himself] and [I decree that he shall hang himself] are no contradictions; It is but to say, [It shall be his Duty to preserve his life] and [Eventually he shall not preserve it.] All that is a man's Duty doth not come to pass: And to determine of Duty, is not to say, It shall come to pass. Otherwise God's word were false whenever man sinned. Nay in reality, Augustine (truly) judged that by God's Law Hell was Due to Paul unconverted, and yet then he was a chosen Vessel, and God Decreed to save him. He thought that Perseverance was the Duty of some that after fell away, and that Heaven was their Due on condition of perseverance till they fell away, (though not presently to be possessed;) and yet that God decreed that ipso permittente eventually they should fall away and perish. 352. If a King made a Law that no man shall murder another, and yet knoweth that a certain Traitor that hath broken Prison, is like to fall into the hands of some Thiefs or Enemies that will kill him, If he be secretly willing that he be killed by them, it is no contradiction: The Law maketh it their duty not to Kill; But it saith not, that they shall not de eventu, by way of Prognostication. 353. But yet indeed God never doth command an act or forbid an act; ●nd yet Decree that the same Act immediately commanded shall not be ●one, or that the act directly forbidden shall be done. Because sin is a thing ●hat God cannot decree or will, (of which anon.) 354. But the effect of the commanded or forbidden act is sometimes said ●o be commanded or forbidden: And this may be contrarily decreed of God. And men that think not truly of the matter, think that this is to Decree a thing forbidden, and so they err by such confused thoughts. E. G. God's command is that I shall relieve a poor man, and not let him fa●ish; and that I shall heal the sick, etc. and yet God may decree that this ●oor man shall be famished, and this sick man die; And yet no contradiction. For indeed [Relieving] in effect, is but the End of the Act which is commanded me, and not the act itself: I am bound to offer him ●elief: But if one cannot take it, and another will not, yet I have done my duty: And so in the other instance. So God commanded Abraham ●o sacrifice his Son, and yet decreed that he should not be sacrificed; And ●his without any contradiction. For the act that under that name was commanded Abraham, and made his duty, was not actual eventual sacrificing. (For then it had been a duty to resist the Angel and do a thing impossible.) But to consent and endeavour on his part to sacrifice his Son: which he did. So the preservation of our own and others lives is commanded us by God, and yet at the same time men's death decreed: Because the thing indeed commanded, is not Preservation as it signifieth the effect and success, but only Preservation as it signifieth our true endeavour. So the Jews were forbidden to kill Christ, and yet God decreed that Christ should be killed: For the thing forbidden them was their own Consent and wicked act: But the thing that God willed and decreed was only the effect, without any Will of their Act that caused it (unless in genere actus,) but only a permission of it. Men of gross brains that cannot distinguish and judge accurately, may blaspheme God in their ignorance, in a case that to a discerning judgement is very plain. 355. * Of which see Amyraldus against Spanhem. de Grat. Universali. The next distinction of God's Will, is into Absolute and Conditional; which some Divines use and others condemn, and say that God hath no Conditional Will. The common answer which most Schoolmen and other Papists agree with the Protestants in, is, that there are Conditions rei volitae of the event of the thing Willed, but no Conditions of the act of Volition in God. As Aquinas saith of Causes, † De Vol. Conditionali, & authoritatibus & rationibus pro eadem Vide Ruiz. de Vol. Dei, disp. 20. But his assertion that [Una creatura est Ratio movens tanquam objectum materiale (secundario) ut Deus velit aliam producere] is a fiction, though he lay his stress on it about the ordo decretorum. For movere is causare, and nothing doth cause or move God to act. There are Rationes effectuum & eorum ordinis: but none of the efficient Acts of God in him: If you say, It is absurd to say, that God had no Reason to will the creation of this world rather than another: I answer, That is an Act of efficient Wisdom, above all Reason: But to fetch Reasons from the object, and thereby to be moved to Act, is the part of the imperfect creature. Reasoning properly is below God: much more to be moved by extrinsic objective reasons: Yet on this Ruiz disp. 24. layeth a great fabric; and so men may draw twenty Schemes of Gods Reasonings as they variously fancy. Deus vult hoc esse propter hoc; non autem propter hoc vult hoc. 1. There are both Causes and Conditions of the event willed of God. 2. Denominatione extrinseca ex connotatione objecti his Will is hence called Conditional; meaning but a Volition of Conditionals. 356. That God willeth Conditions, and Conditional Propositions, and Grants, is past all controversies. For he willeth his own word, which is his work: But his word hath conditional promises and threats: And as his word also may be called his will, he hath a Conditional will, because a Conditional word. 357. God's eternal Omniscience proveth, that at no instant he had a will properly Conditional quoad actum: Because he that at the same instant fore-knoweth whether the Condition would be done or not, must needs have his will to be thereby absolute. But yet if it had pleased God to suspend the Act of his own Volition, upon a humane Condition, it would not have exposed him at all to the charge either of mutability or dependence: which is very clear. For 1. It is presupposed his Will as Voluntas & Essentia is unalterable, and is not that of which we speak. 2. But only his Volition as terminated on this or that object, and so as haec volitio ab objecto denominata. 3. And his efficient Volition, and Power is terminated on objects in time, without mutation in God. 4. And N. B. that God doth suspend his own Possible Volitions in many cases; As he doth Not will to make more Worlds, more Men, more Suns, more Laws, etc. than de facto he will make. 5. And it is no more defectiveness in God to suspend a Volition for a time, than thus to do it for ever. 6. And it is no more Dependence on the Creature to Terminate his Volition only on a qualified subject (performing the Condition) than to terminate his Efficient Power and will on such or such a qualified subject. As e. g. He terminateth his Omnipotent Concourse for Generation only on the materia seminalis recte disposita; He concurreth to burn by fire, etc. And if his Acts effectively Transient may be terminated only and temporarily on disposed objects, If he did so in acts Objectively Transient, and did freely not-will the damnation of man till he had actually sinned, but suspended his will freely till then, and then the novo terminated it on the said qualified object, I see no show of Dependence or Mutability. For I oft cleared it before, that the termination of God's Knowledge, Will or Power on any particular Object, is in him no addition to its estence; And doing it the novo, is no change in him but in the Creature only; no more than it would be a change in the Sun or its active Emanations, if a thousand new creatures newly receive its Influx and are moved by it variously according to their several Conditions. Yet I have before given reasons why incipere jam praedestinare is more incongruous language. 358. I put in this only to deprecate the blind uncharitable censures of dissenters in this point, who think that God's Volitions are New and Conditional and suspended, quoad actum hunc ad hoc objectum; and cry out, It is blasphemy, and maketh God mutable and dependent. I am against their opinion as well as you as to Conditional Acts: But false charges prove you not to have more truth, but less love and sobriety than others. 359. XI. The next distinction of God's Will is into Effectual and Uneffectual. And here he that would see a great deal said on the question, Whether God have any uneffectual Will, and whether man's will can frustrate it, may see too much in a multitude of Schoolmen on 1 Sent. q. 45. & 46. Some answer (as D'Orbellis, etc.) that the Voluntas Beneplaciti is Aq. a. 1. Scot q. un. Durand. q. 1. Bonav. art. 1. Greg. Arim. q. un. ar. 3. Pennot. l. 4. c. 22. Alvar. de Aux. disp. 32. Ruiz de Volunt. disp. 18. Gran. de Vol. Dei. Tract. 4. disp. 3. Suar. l. 4. the Pradest. c. 8. Gr. Val. disp. 1. q. 19 p. 6. Cajct. Nazar. Ban. Zum. Navar. Gonzal. Molin. Vasqu. etc. in 1. p. q. 19 ar. 6. Ripa. Arrub. Fasol. ibid. Nic. D'Orbel. 1. d. 46. and many other Scotists, etc. ever effectual, but not the Vol. signi; which yet seeing he well explaineth to be only the making of Duty, he might well have said is still effectual to its proper primary effect. Greg. Arimin. (and many others) distinguish of the will of Complacency and Displicency, and that Prosecutionis & fugae; and say the latter is effectual, and not the former: which others say of the Absolute Will as distinct from the Conditional. The plain truth I have oft opened before: Gods Will is the first Efficient, the chief Dirigent, and the Final Cause; (in which the three Principles, Power, Wisdom and Goodness are eminet.) 1. His efficient will is ever effectual, and never frustrate. Whatsoever pleased the Lord (to do) that he did, in Heaven and in Earth, in the Sea and in the depths, Psal. 135. 6. And who hath resisted (this) his will? Rom. 9 19 2. His Directing will is ever effectual as to the making of the Law or Rule, and of Due or Right thereby: For so far it is efficient of that effect: But it is too oft violated by our sin. 3. His final will or Complacency is Gods being pleased with the Being, or Action, or relation of the Creature, and supposing it, is not efficient, and therefore not effectual. And I know no need of more upon this question. 360. XII. The last now to be named is, The Antecedent and Consequent. will. This also is handled by many Schoolmen, and much used by the Jesuits and Arminians. To pass by others, Pennottus handleth it propugn. l. 4. c. 21. having first showed, c. 20. p. 225. that Chrysostom and Damascene first used it. His explicatory Propositions are, 1. Vol. Antec. Chrys. in Eph. Hom. 1. Damas●. fid. Orthod. l. 2. c. 29. & count. Manich. ad ●●nem. & Cons. non est in Deo respectu omnium Volitorum, sed solum respectu ●orum quae aliquo modo pendent ex lib. arbitrio creaturae. 2. Voluntas antecedens est illa qua Deus vult hominis salutem quantum in ipso est, & qua illum ad salutem ordinat, & media ad salutem necessaria praeparat, quibus nisi per ipsum hominem steterit, salutem assequatur. 3. Non semper Voluntas antecedens & Consequens circa objecta contraria versantur, sed potest idem objectum esse Volitum à Deo Voluntate tum antecedente tum consequent. 4. Voluntas antecedens in Deo est Voluntas beneplaciti, & non solum voluntas signi. 5. Voluntas antecedens est formaliter Alliaco Camerac. 1. q. 14. D. E. tells you the sense of Thom. Scotus, Ockam, & Gregor. of this distinction: and that of Scotus and Ockam is to the same purpose with what I here say of it; including that antecedent Grace which they call sufficient, which God giveth to persuade men to consent. The Schoolmen are disagreed of the sense of this distinction: and not understanding it, contend about it. See Ruiz de Vol. Dei, disp. 19 §. 2, 3, 4, 5. p. 195, 196, etc. & proprie in Deo existens, & non solum per metaphoram ad eum modum, quo Voluntas signi. 361. I tell you their sense, that I may the better open the plain truth to you, which is as followeth. 1. This distinction of Vol. antec. & cons. is not applied to God as he is our Creator, or End, nor as he is mere Proprietor or Benefactor; but only as he is Rector, or Moral Ruler of man. 2. As Government hath an Antecedent and Consequent part, viz. Legislation and Judgement (with Execution) so Gods Antecedent will is nothing but his Legal will, or his Will as Rector signified by his Laws: And his Consequent will, is his Judicial will, or expressed in Judgement; One Antecedent to Man's part (obedience or disobedience) and the other Consequent to it. 3. It is most certain that God willeth Antecedently all that is in his Law, that is, that all that believe and repent shall be saved: And that he willeth Consequently that Judas e. g. and every finally impenitent unbeliever shall be damned. For what God doth, that he willeth to do: But God doth himself make such a Law, and pass such a judgement: Ergo he is willing of it. SECT. XV. Of the Order of God's Decrees by way of Intention and Execution. 362. THere is no part of this Controversy more contentiously and I fear presumptuously and too audaciously handled, than this of the Intentional order of God's Decrees. Of which many have said much, but no man hath laid so great a stress on it as those two very good men Dr. Twisse and his follower Samuel Rutherford. * Scotus' order is elsewhere recited: Take Vasquez's as in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. d. 95. c. 6. Both of the adult and infants: [1. Praeviderit Deus omnes in Massa perditionis peccato obnoxios propter transgressionem Adami: 2. Hoc non obstante, voluit primaria voluntate ex seipso quosdam parvulos & omnes adultos ad beatitudinem pervenire, & ad hoc media sufficientia concesserit, quamvis efficacia & congrua negaverit; non intentione excludendi ●os à regno, sed ostendendi divitias suas in vasa misericordiae. 3. Ut viderit ●os in p●cca. orig. aut actuali decedere, & 4. Ob id efficaciter decreverit ipsos expellere à beatitudine, & adultos ad poenam ignis destinaverit, ex quo quarto instanti incipit Reprobatio eorum à gloria. Circa alios vero parvulos quibus non concessit posse applicari remedia, Ordo in divina praescientia & eorum reprobatio à negatione gratiae incipit.] Would you not think that he took all these for distinct thoughts in God? when he meaneth no real diversity at all. But on this supposition we have had many very bold Schemes of Gods Intentional Decrees given us; of which you may see some in worthy. Mr. Perkins Golden Chain, and in Beza, and out of him in English his Tractate published with Mr. Gilbies' of Predestination, and in Piscator, and others. 363. By this way the Anti arminians are fallen into the distinct parties, of Sublapsarians, and Supralapsarians; And these into two parties; one making man as not existent in esse cognito, the other man in innocency, the object of Predestination. 364. 1. The common way is to distribute the Means among themselves, as any of them are subservient to others, as their end, and so to make a great many of Decrees or parts of the Decree, first of the ultimate end, and then of the next, and the next to that, and so on, till you come to the first means which is no end; as the Writer imagineth them to lie. 365. 2. The second way is invented as Conciliatory by Dr. Twisse (and so it is) viz. that God hath but two Decrees, one the fine, and the other de mediis, and that all the media are the objects but of one Decree, and so that we need not trouble the Church with disputing which of them is first or last. 366. 3. A third opinion I have long ago read in a MS. of Animadversions on Dr. Twisse by a Learned Judicious and Godly Doctor (yet living) who proveth that God hath but one Decree the fine & de mediis, which casteth away all the matter of the Controversies about the priority and posteriority. And it were well if the Controversy were so ended. 367. 4. Many Arminians writ as if the order of Intention and of Execution were the same, and so begin at the other end, and give us a Scheme just contrary to the first sort, (Beza, Perkins, etc.) 368. 5. Some hold that Intendere finem is proper to the imperfect creature, and not belonging to God; and therefore that he hath no order of Intention in his decrees at all, because no proper end. 369. 6. Some hold that the whole business of the order of Intention is utterly beyond our reach: And therefore that we should meddle only with the order of Execution: Thus saith the most judicious Bishop Davenant sound, Dissert. de Praedest. & Reprob. cap. 9 pag. 209. Haec argumentatio (Corvini) vocat nos ad speculationem valde difficilem & dogmaticae Theologiae fundandae minime accommodatam. Nititur enim consideratione Prioritatis & Posterioritatis in illis duobus Voluntatis Divinae decretis de dando Mediatore & de Electis servandis, quae utraque ab aeterno fuere concepta & constituta. Add me quod attinet, scio ordinem Executionis, secundum quem Deus voluit beneficia ad homines pervenire, nullo negotio poss● delineari: At quo ordine Deus consignata ea tenuit ab aeterno in ment ac voluntate sua, is solus enarrare praesumat, qui se Deo ab arcanis & aternu consiliis etiam affirmare audeat. Fatemur Deum ab aeterno constituisse, ut omnibus salvandis Christus primo in loco proponeretur, dein per fidem apprehenderetur, hinc ut eorundem justificatio sequeretur, tum sanctificatio, & demum Glorificatio. Sed siquis minime contentus hoc ordine executionis velit etiam nobis describere seriem Decretorum Divinorum ordine conceptionis in ment & Voluntate Dei quasi distinctam, atque urgeat cum Arminio Divinam justitiam impugnari nisi hoc consideretur ut illo prius, is mihi videtur nimium ingenio suo fidere. And he citeth Gabr. Biel in 3. d. 2. q. dub. 3. saying Prioritates illas in Divinis hisce decretis non esse ponendas, sicut nec pluralitates actuum ordinatorum. Ac proinde siquis considerare velit talem ordinem horum decretorum ut ponat Christi incarnationem electione priorem, vel è contra, hanc considerationem esse falsam specnlationem. 370. Dr. Twisse who reduceth them to two, excludeth man's salvation from the Decree de fine, and thus enumerateth the decreed Means: Twiss. in Vindic. Grat. ll. 3. Digres. 3. pag. Vol. minoris 52, 53. [1. The Permission of sin (of which more anon.) 2. The gift of a Saviour. 3. The grace of Vocation, Faith, Repentance and Perseverance. 4. The Salvation of persevering penitent believers.] And so as to the ultimate end only [quod Prius est intention, posterius est executione.] But that the order of execution only is to be observed among the Means. 371. The matter itself (or at least my thoughts of it) I shall open as plainly as I can with brevity. First premising that their own doctrine should take them off their confidence and contention about this order of intention. For, 1. They oft tell us that all God's Decrees are eternal without any order of Time. And should we not then be afraid of boldness about any other order? 372. 2. They oft tell us, that Prescience and Science, Predestination and Destination are all one in God, and not to be thought of as acts past and ceased. 373. 3. They oft tell us, that God is one, and his Will is himself; Praedestinatio Dei est ipsa Dei essentia quae est necessaria. Alliac. Camer. in 1. q. 12. D. See in Ruiz de Vol. Dei, disp. 24. how they are confounded about the ordering of God's decrees as to the order of Intention and Execution: His Solution supposeth that Unius objecti Volitio est ratio determinans ad aliorum volitionem: When as ex pa●te Dei there is but One Volition, and that hath no cause; and the Ratio is a deceiving ambiguous word. and his Decrees are his Will, and therefore are all but one. 374. 4. They cannot deny but that all our conceptions of God are improper, and analogical or metaphorical more or less; and that what Knowledge and Will in God is formally, no mortal knoweth. And should we dispute then audaciously about this Order? 375. 5. None can deny, but that these Mysteries require the highest reverence, and that it's dreadful to take God's Name in vain, and dally with the Consuming fire. And yet shall we presume? 376. 6. They all confess that our Lord Jesus, his Prophets, Apostles, or Scriptures, lead them not this way, and decide not these Controversies, so as that they can stand to their decision alone. 377. 7. They cannot deny, but that desiring arrogantly to be as Gods in Knowledge, was our first Parent's sin, that ruined them and us, and that this was Satan's first successful game. And that our disease is like to be such as its original. 378. 8. Lastly, They cannot choose but know, that it is the troubling of the Church with new Articles, and new practices, and leading them from the simplicity that is in Christ, even as the Serpent beguiled Eve, (with the promise of more knowledge,) which hath been the great plague and divider of the Churches in all Ages; though the Apostle foretold them that It was this that he feared of them. And are we not self-condemned, if after all this, we will censure and reproach one another, and foment divisions for that which most certainly no mortal understandeth? 379. I. And first your very foundation is uncertain, that God doth properly Intendere finem. Nay, it is certain that (as Aquinas aforecited Vasqu●z saith, that Gods own Goodness is not a final Cause of his Volition; supposing that movere ad Electionem medii is final Causality. Ruiz asserteth the contrary; taking final Causality to be first esse primum objectum: And thus men strive about artificial notions. Vasq. 1. d. 82. c. 1. Ruiz de Vo●. Dei, d. 15. §. 1. p. 159. But that nothing is the Ratio Volendi but his own Goodness, see Albert. 1. p. tr. 20. q. 19 m. 1. a. 1. Alex. 1. p. q. 35. m. 3. Henric. quodl. 4. q. 19 Gabr. 1. d. 14. q. 1. a. 2. Dried. de Concord. p. 1. c. 3. Vasq. disp. 82. Scotus 1. d. 44. Molin. 1. q. 19 a. 5. saith) though Vult hoc esse propter hoc, non tamen propter hoc vult hoc. He prescribeth Ends to Man, and setteth Ends to Means which are fi●es operis; But that he Intendeth an End Himself, must be said very improperly, or very uncertainly, or not at all. The truth is, that we must say that God doth finem intendere, because we must speak of him after the manner of men, or not at all. But it is not true in the same sense as we speak it of man, and as the word properly signifieth; but equivocally. 380. For, 1. To Intent an End, is to make that End a Cause why we choose the means (as most say:) But God's Election or Actions have no Cause. All deny that there is in God Cause and Effects; or that propter hoc vult hoc. 381. 2. In man to Intent an End, doth imply that a man yet wanteth his end; and that it is somewhat that he needeth, or at least doth not yet obtain. But God needeth nothing, and hath no end that is desired or wanting, nor but what he continually possesseth or enjoyeth, as well now as hereafter. 382. 3. We know no such thing as Intendere finem where the Act and the End are the same. Intendere is not the same with Finis. But in God they are the same: He that is most simple hath no Intention, which is not Himself, and no End which is not Himself, and so both are one. 383. 4. Our Intendere finem is not the same really with Electio mediorum. But God hath no Intention but what is really the same with Election, though not denominatively, connotatively and relatively. 384. 5. Divines usually say, that Nothing below God himself can be his End. But where there is no means, there is no End or intention of it. But to God there is no Means. He is not a Means of himself; And no creature can be a means of him: If we say, that any thing can be a means ut Deus sit, vel ut sit Maximus, Sapientissimus, Optimus, it were no better than Blasphemy. God then hath not an End like man. 385. Yet necessity constraineth us to use the phrase, but these things must still be understood when we use it. 1. That no creature can be Gods End; unless you will call an object as terminative, an End; or else an Effect. 386. 2. That it is not God's Essence and perfections that is an end as to any medium; But it is his Will: For his Free Will is the Beginning, and the Complacency of that Will is the End of all things. But if you call God his own Object, and so call the final Object an End, so we must consider God as Loving Himself; and Himself is the End or final object of his own Love or Complacency; and he himself as Loving himself, is said to Act on that End or Object. And indeed eternal self-knowledge and self-love (which some of old ventured to call the second and third Persons) are the Great Immanent Acts of the Divine Essence, (with the sibi vivere.) And it seemeth the chief Notion of Holiness in God, that he Loveth Himself in primo instanti, and that he is most Amiable to his Creatures in secundo instanti, and that he is the Cause and End of all that is good in them. Thus a final object of his own and our Love or Complacency, God is passed all doubt. And secondarily his Will is pleased and fulfilled in all his works. 387. 3. Yet by that Complacency we mean not that God is passive, or receiveth any Delight from the Creature, or hath any addition by it to his felicity: But as he is a Communicative Good by way of Efficiency as the first efficient Cause, so is he a felicitating Good to the Creature as its End, and he is Love taking the creature into its nearest Communion with him: which is his Complacency, and the End of all things. And hence it is that God is said when he had finished his works, to Rest complacentially in all as very Good. 388. 4. As the Complacency of God's Will is his End, in the formal notion (so far as it may be said of God) so his Glory is his End in the Material notion. 389. That his Glory is not Formally his End, is confessed by all Divines who say that nothing below God can be his End. But by his Glory is meant something below himself; some creature, or action of the creature. Ergo, etc. For if by his Glory be meant Himself, there is no Means to such an end. 390. Therefore by God's Glory is meant the shining lustre of his Image; or the Appearance of God in his Works: And not only man's Praising and Glorifying thoughts and words of him: which though they are our highest duty, are unfit to be God's End, alone. Yet are they part of that Glory which is materially his End, though not the whole. 391. This Glory or Appearance of God, which is materially his End, is, 1. The perfection of the whole Creation. 2. Next that the Glory of the Celestial Kingdom, containing Christ and all the holy ones. 3. Next that the Glory of Christ's own person alone. 4. Next that the Glory of the Holy ones alone, etc. 392. Because this perfection of the Universe is not yet accomplished, but shall be, improperly we may say that God hath not yet attained his End, that is, his Material End. 393. 5. But properly and formally Gods End is never unattained: Because his Will is never unfulfilled, though the things willed be not yet perfected. For when e. g. the first day's work was made, all was done which he then willed to be done, and so for the second day, etc. And now all is done which he would have now done: And his Will is ever perfectly pleased; And he wanteth nothing. So that an End not attained, is not to be ascribed to God, except materially. 394. Thus God is said to have made all things for himself, Prov. 16. 4. Because for His Pleasure they are, and were created, Rev. 4. 11. 395. For his Decreeing disposing Will is fulfilled by all, even the wicked that are for the day of Evil: Though his Commanding Will being not fulfilled by sinners, according to that he is said to have no pleasure in them, but to hate them, Psal. 5. 5. Heb. 10. 38. Mal. 1. 10. Ezek. 18. 32. 23. & 33. 11. Jer. 22. 28. & 48. 38. Eccles. 5. 4. Psal. 5. 4, etc. 396. And lest any think that thus God misseth of his End, let it be well noted, 1. That this phrase of Gods taking no pleasure, is objectively both Positive, Privative and Oppositive, that is, It signifieth that God will deprive the wicked of felicity, or the Communion of his Love, and will load them with sorrows, and will set himself against their Comforts. But 2. As to Gods own Complacency of will, it is but equal to a negative: His felicity lieth not in theirs: And so as Gods will hath no actual Complacency in Nothings (as in more Worlds, or Creatures, than ever will be) and yet his Complacency is perfect; so though he have no Complacency in the Holiness or Salvation of those that are never Holy or Saved, Hence they dispute▪ Whether Gods Providence always attain his Ends: and Ruiz citeth for the affirmative, Cajet. Naz. Alvar. and Scot Marsil. Okam, Gabriel, Hervaeus, Driedo; and for the negative, Alex. Aquin. Durand. Marsil. Capreol. Ferrar. & communiter recentiores, Molina, Zumel, Vasq. Suarez, Valent. Becanus, Sirenus, Pennottus, Arrubal, etc. And all this difference is about names and words. And Ruiz is for the Negative, sect. 3. pag. 56. qui● aliquos fines Deus intendit volitione conditionata, & non totaliter efficaci. So that the question is, An Volitio conditionate & inefficax sit Deo ascribendae quando v●lt ea auxili● quae consensum hominis reddunt possibilem, vel hominem faciunt potentem? Et an volitio haec dicenda sit Intentio finis? For he concludeth as agreed on by all, that God's Providence is never frustrate, hindered, deceived, or fluctuating, nor any thing done against it absolutely, or against its total adequate End. yet his Complacency is perfect. 397. There is no doubt but Man hath Ends and Means, because God hath so appointed it, and made him not in a state of perfection, but in via: Yea, Angels have an End and every creature, because defective dependent beings; even in a formal sense. 398. God is this Ultimate End of man, as he is to be perfectly Loved and Pleased; to which all are means: And the means are ordered as Ends to one another. 399. Usually where the Scriptures and Preachers do speak of God as the End, and of Intention of Ends, they mean Man's Intention and End, prescribed him by God. But if they speak of Gods, they mean only, formally the fulfilling of his will, and materially his Glory, or the perfecting of his works. 400. The finis operis as distinct from the finis operantis is nothing but the aptitude and tendency of the work to the Authors Intended End, or to some effect: Not that the opus quà opus finem intendit. 401. If all these difficulties lie in the way, Whether and how far God intent an End at all, judge how far it is fit to contend about the Mental Order of his Intentions, and whether Judicious Davenant was not in the right. 402. II. If it were granted, that Quod prius est Intention, posterius est executione, nothing would follow to gratify either party in these Controversies. For all would be but this, that [God Intended Himself, and the Fulfilling or Complacency of his own Will, before he willed any thing else that ever cometh to pass.] And what's this to the business? 403. But they say, It is his Glory that he first intended: I answered before, His Glory is, 1. Himself (and then it's the same which I asserted:) or 2. a Creature (and then it is not formally his End.) 2. His Glory as it is his Complete Image on the whole perfected World, is his End indeed Materially: But that is but to be the Complete Means: The perfected means may improperly be called his End: But forma denominat. 404. When they say, that it is the Glory of his Mercy and Justice, 1. They say but the same and need no other answer. 2. They speak very defectively: For it is to ascribe to God a defective Decree or Intention, which is not for the glory of all his revealed perfections: Doubtless whatever is materially the perfect means of glorifying God, must glorify his Greatness and Active Power or Life, his Wisdom and his Goodness, and therein his Veracity or fidelity, his Justice and his Holiness, his Benignity and mercy, his Immutability, Independency, etc. All this must be in the means itself. 405. If Mr. Perkins, Beza, Gilbie and many other good men had well considered this, they had never made the glorifying of God's Mercy and Justice in the salvation of some and the damnation of others, God's ultimate end; Thereby committing many palpable errors. 1. Making quid Creatum vel Creaturae to be formally or properly God's end, which is but a Means. 2. Making one little parcel of that means, to be the end. 3. Inserting two acts or parts only of that which they themselves confess to be but Means. For what should the names of Salvation and Damnation do in the description of the end? Are they any part of the end? Why is not Redemption, Justification, Sanctification, Preservation, Resurrection, etc. as well put in? Is he not Glorified in them as well as in final salvation or damnation? Yea and in Creation and the fr●me of nature too? Yea why is not the glory of Angels, and all the world put in, as part of the same means to his end? 406. If it be said that it is only God's Glory of Mercy and Justice in men● salvation and damnation which is the end of Redemption, Conversion, Preaching, Ordinances, Sanctification, Adoption, etc. 1. I deny it: His Power, Wisdom and Goodness, and his forementioned subordinate attributes are thereby Glorified also. 2. It is an injury to God unworthy of a Divine, to make God to have as many distinct ultimate ends, as they think there are particular aptitudes or tendencies in the means. 407. For undoubtedly we must feign in God no more ultimate ends than one. And undoubtedly the means consisting of innumerable parts, make up one perfect whole, in which Gods Glory shineth so, as it doth not in any part alone. And he that will cut God's frame into scraps and shreds, and set up the parts as so many wholes, will more dishonour him than he that would so mangle a Picture, or a Watch, or Clock, or House, or the pipes of an Organ, or the strings of a Lute, and tell you of their beauty and Harmony only distinctly. Well therefore did Dr. Twisse reduce all the Decrees de mediis to one: But they are one in their apt composition for one end: And the Glory of Sun, and Stars, and Angels, and the whole Creation is a part, and the Glory of our salvation and damnation is but another part. 408. The order therefore of God's Decrees in respect of the Execution is on●y fit for our debate: (Any farther than that we may moreover say that Gods will or Himself is all his ultimate end, and his Glory shining in the perfection of his entire works is the perfect means.) And there is nothing else that we can reasonably controvert. And about this our Controversy is next to none at all. Here we may well inquire what is prius vel posterius, quid superius, quid inferius, etc. and that to our edification. 409. Seeing then that we are agreed (as is said) with Aquinas that * Ruiz de Vo●●n. Dei disp. 15. §. 4. p. 163. prettily argueth that Si non potest dari ratio ipsius ●olitionis divinae, sed solius denominations extrinse●ae resultant●s ab e●●●●lis creat●●, sequitur ●anas esse plurima● Th●o●ogorum de ordine, depend●●tia vel ratione divi●●●um volitionum, post quam inter illos constat quem ordinem, dependentiam v●l ration●m habeant externa objecta inter se. The conscquent is true. They are vain indeed, though he deny it. And all his reasons p. 161, 162, etc. to prove that dantur i● creat●●a rationes finales moventes divinam voluntatem, are but triflings with the ambiguities of the word Ratio and abuses of the word Causa, having before confessed that there is no Real Cause. And are there Causes that are not Real? 1. We grant the Creature is an Object of Gods will: and the object is b● some called the material cause of the act in ●●●●●●●● numero. 2. It is the Terminus and Recipient of the divine influx. 3. It may therefore ●e causa materials of the diversity of the effects of God's influx as Received in patient ex di●ersitate dispositions. 4. Our acts may be the effects of God's Volitions. 5. And may be second Causes of other effects. 6. Those other effects may be said to be Gods nearer ends, speaking of him after the manner of imperfect man. 7. Where our acts are not causes, they may be conditions sine quibus non, of many of God's acts quoad effectus, (as sin is of punishment at least.) 8. In all these respects God's Volition which is One in itself, may and must be denominated divers from the diversity of these effects and objects, which therefore are the Ratio nomin●●: And he that would prove any other Ratio or Cause of the first Cause, the will of God or any of his acts as in himself, must first renounce all natural and Scholastical Theology at least. He citeth Durand. Major, Richardus, etc. But Durandus 1. d. 41. q. 1. doth but say that God's Acts are thus to be reckoned secundum rationem, as likening Gods reasoning or thoughts to ours, (ut. n. 7.) and not ●uxta rei veritatem. Richard. is full for what I say; 1. d. 45. Voluntas sive volens de Deo secundum essentiam dicitur: non est aliud Velle, aliud Esse: But yet his Velle hoc speaketh not his esse quà esse; and therefore he addeth that when God is said scire aut velle, it is his Essence; but to say, Hoc aut illud scit aut vult is but to say, Hoc aut illud est subjectum scientiae vel voluntatis quae ipse Deus est. Et Voluntas Dei est prima & summa Causa omnium; cujus Causa non est quaerenda; & non est diversa Voluntas, sed diversa locutio de ea in Scriptures. And Richardus in loc. p. 141. saith but this, that Ipsius divini Velle nulla est ratio motiva, cum realiter idem sit quod Deus: Tamen Ordinationis quae est inter divinum velle & ipsum volitum bene est ratio aliqua respectu alicujus voliti. Which is no more than I have said. And as to Major, Ruiz did ill to cite him, who there professeth that Predestination and Volition is but Relatio rationis & denominatio extrinseca as to God. And his ordo signorum in ment divina is but the Scotists assimilating Gods acts to man's. Deus non propter hoc vult hoc, sed vult hoc esse propter hoc, that which we have to do is but to inquire, 1. De re, how one thing is a Cause or other means of another; 2. And so how God Decreed it to work and be. 410. And 1. It is agreed that the Creation was God's first work (that we know of or have any thing to do with:) This had (as to the first part) no Antecedent Object, but produceth its effect, which some call its object. But the latter day's works had an antecedent object, and also a produced effect. And accordingly God Decreed from Eternity that this should be his first work. From whence by connotation that may be called, his first Decree. 411. That sin or the Permission of sin, or other mere Negatives, are not to have place among the asserted Means and Decrees, I am anon in due place to manifest. 412. 2. God having made man, did give him a Law both Natural and Positive: This was next done, and therefore decreed to be next done. 413. 3. Man having broke this Law, God judged him, and laid on him some indispensible penalties. This was decreed to be done in the third place. 414. 4. At the same time God promised Man the victory by the Woman's Seed, and giving him pardon of the destructive penalty, became his Redeemer, and put him under a Covenant of Grace; first given to mankind in Adam, and afterwards in Noah. And this was decreed to be so done. 415. 5. Though all were thus put under this Covenant, and God forsook none that first forsook not him, yet did he give more Grace to some, than to others, to Abel, e. g. than to Cain, so that those that did actually repent and believe and live to God, were justified and adopted and made heirs of life. And thus he decreed to do. 416. 6. Perseverance also was the effect of his special Grace, which accordingly is Decreed to be given. 417. 7. The Cainites, Canaanites and others that were the wicked Seed of wicked Parents, who forsook him and his Grace, he accordingly judged, punished and forsaken: And so decreed. 418. 8. The Seed of the faithful he eminently blessed, especially of Abraham; whom he took (by reward) into a further special Covenant, superadded to the common Covenant of Grace, taking his Seed into a peculiar political and gracious relation to him, promising the multiplication and prosperity of them, and that the Saviour should come out of them: All which was so decreed to be done. 419. 9 The Messiah came in the fullness of time, and did and suffered all that is mentioned in the Gospel: And gave us a more perfect Edition of the Covenant of Grace, and greater grace with it, even more of the Spirit, with a better Ministry, Ordinances and Church-state: Which were so decreed to be done. 420. 10. To some Nations of the Earth this second Edition of the Covenant of Grace, (that is, the Gospel) is freely promulgate or Preached, who deserved it no more than others, while others for sin are left under the first darker Edition, and under desertions and grievous punishments, for their forefathers and their own violation of it. 421. 11. Where the Gospel cometh among many that all deserve rejection for the resisting of grace, God giveth to some that grace which infallibly Converteth them, and consequently justifieth, adopteth and sanctifieth them. All which he decreed. 422. 12. Giving also Perseverance as aforesaid, he finally justifieth all such in Judgement, and Glorifieth (Christ first, and) them with Christ: singly and conjunctly at the final consummation. And he Decreed to do all this accordingly. 423. If the Decree of God be called but One, for the Reasons before given, the Controversy is then at an end: But if it must be distinguished and called Many Decrees or parts, it must be either from the Effects o● from the supposed objects. 424. 1. If from the Effects, there will be no Controversy about the Decrees but what is first about the Effects themselves. And most of them now named are uncontroverted. 425. 2. And we cannot well denominate and distinguish the Decrees from any thing else but the Effects, (even as we do his operations, as Creation, Redemption, etc.) But the objects than are passed doubt such as follow. 426. Viz. 1. The object of the Decree of Creation as such (distinct from the Effect) is Nothing: that is, There is no object. 427. 2. The object of the Decree of Legislation is man considered merely in his Being and Naturals as such. 428. 3. The object of the Decree of the first Judgement, was man newly fallen. 429. 4. The object of the Decree of the giving of the Promise of Christ, the New Covenant in the first Edition and pardon and grace by it, was fallen man first judged. 430. 5. The object of the Common grace of that Covenant from first to last, is fallen judged man brought under that Covenant of grace (ut norma officii, judicii & beneficii.) 431. 6. The object of the Special grace of God (at first) viz. for effectual Conversion, to men under that Covenant, was the same as last mentioned, Man brought under the Covenant of grace; of whom 1. Some were prepared and disposed by Common grace for Special. 2. And it's like some not, but suddenly surpirzed by mercy. 432. 7. The object of Abraham's special promise, (besides the Common Covenant of grace) was Abraham eminent in faith and self-denying obedience to God: And afterward his Seed for his sake. 433. 8. The Object of the actual gift of Christ incarnate, and the perfect Edition of the New Covenant by him, was the sinful world that had transgressed both the Law of Innocency and the first Edition of the Covenant of grace, and the Jews that had broken Moses' Law. 434. 9 The object of the gift of the Gospel as promulgate or published is the same, adding, the world as now Redeemed by the Actual sacrifice, Merits and Resurrection of Christ incarnate. 435. 10. The object of the Commonest grace of the Gospel Covenant, is Redeemed man brought under this Covenant as the Norma officii, judicii & beneficiorum (quoad jus;) or, subditi obligati. 436. 11. The object of the grace of this Covenant proper to the Visible Church, and common to its members, are Visible Christians, or Baptised Professors. 437. 12. The object of the first effectual grace of saving Conversion (saith and repentance) is certain persons Redeemed and brought under the obligation of this new Covenant; Of whom some are prepared by common grace, and (its like) some are not. 438. 13. The object of the gift pardon, justification, adoption, the spirit of sanctification and right to life, (and all this in Christ by union) is a Penitent Believer, and the seed of such dedicated in Covenant to God. 439. 14. The object of many acts of auxiliary grace, and of higher degrees of grace is (ordinarily) such as have well used former degrees of special grace: But also, who God is freely pleased to give it to. 440. 15. The object of the grace of Perseverance is the same last mentioned: If not all the Justified; which I reserve as almost our only real Controversy to handle in its proper place in the next Chapter. 441. 16. The object of the Act of Raising the dead is all the world, as appeareth in Joh. 5. 22. to 32. 442. 17. The object of the Justification of the soul alone at the first appearance is, the soul of a member of Christ, or one faithful and persevering August. ad Simplic. l●. ●. qu. 2. Quia non inv●●●● Deus opera in hominibus qu●●lig●t, id●o man●● propositum justification is ips●us: s●d quia ill●d ●●●●, ut justifi●●t cred●nt●s, id●o inv●nit opera quae jam ●ligat ad r●gnum c●lor●●. in his Covenant: or a Saint. 443. 18. The object of the final justification of the whole man, is a Saint ●isen from the dead. 444. 19 The object of Glorifying Grace, is a member of Christ, or a Saint thus finally Justified (either in soul first, or in soul and body after as is said.) 445. 20. The object of God's greatest felicitating complacency is the Glorified Church of all the holy ones: And the object of his utmost universal complacency in the Creature, is the Glory of his image shining on the whole Universe in perfection: (As the object (as we may call it) of his Essential Volition, Love or Complacency, is Himself.) And as these are the objects of the grace thus distinguished by the effects, so are they of the will or Decree of giving it, as denominated according to the order of Execution. Besides which Davenant on one account, and Twisse on another grant that quoad media there is no other for man to know. 446. By this it appeareth that the Corrupted Mass simply considered was the object of no one of all these graces. But the Corrupted Mass as Judged first, and after as Redeemed, and after as under Covenant, etc. Much less was it any effect of God, as corrupt. 447. The corrupted Mass judged, was not as such the object of God's discrimination by Election of some, and rejection of others: For they were commonly brought all under the Covenant of Grace, and had a common sort of grace, before the discrimination. SECT. XVI. Of the Order of the Decrees called Reprobation. And of Election and Reprobation in themselves. 448. ACcordingly in the order of execution we must reckon the objects of that which some call Reprobation, answerable to what D'Orbellis in ●. d. 40. [Distinguuntur, Scientia, Praescientia, Providentia, propositum, electio, dispositio, praedestinatio & reprobatio. Haec differ●nt secundum rationem, licet sint idem reali●er in Deo. 1. Scientia Dei est certa Cognitio omnium praeteritorum, praesentium, futurorum, fierique possibilium tam bonorum quam malorum. 2. Praescientia est futurorum praecognitio— Reprobati vero appropriate dicuntur Praesciti— Providen●●a est praescient●a futurorum in quantum ●●nt ● praescient● in ●in●m ordinabilia— 3. Propos●t●● est actus Voluntati● Divin● tam respec●●●uturorum ag●ndorum, quam permittendorum. 4. Electi● supra Propositum addit discretionem electi à ●uo contrario, s●il. boni à malo. 5. Dispositio est praescientia faciendorum, respiciens fi●ri rei, & cognitionem; sicut provientia respicit esse rei postquam facta est— 6. Praedestinatio est propositum divinae voluntatis, conferendi gratiam & gloriam praedestinatis. 7. Reprobatio est propositum permittendi reprobatos permanere in obduratione finali, & ●etribu●n●i eis interminabilem p●nam, propter corum iniquitat●m.] is before said of Election: But order requireth that I first speak of Election and Reprobation as in themselves, what they are. 449. Election as to the etymology I need not explain. It is taken 1. For a Temporary actual Taking one rather than another by way of Choice. Which is 1. By mere Volition, or Election of the will. 2. Or also by manual Apprehension or Executive Election (As a man taketh a woman to wife.) 2. Or it is taken for An Eternal Electing Decree of God. 450. God's Executive Election in Time is twofold 1. By giving one man converting effectual Grace which he giveth not to another. 2. By taking confequently that Converted person to be one of his Adopted and Justified ones, as his choice peculiar treasure. 451. God's Mental Election being an Act of his will, is either his mere Decree of the Event, 2. Or his Decree as efficient, 3. Or else his complacency. The first is eternal. The second is eternal ex parte Dei, but not ex parte effectus. The third is eternal as it is God's essence, but is denominated Temporary by connotation of the object; as also may the second be: About these there needs no quarrel. 452. All the special grace which God giveth in Time, he decreed from Eternity to give: And though some decrees have special objects in esse cogni●● supposed, none of them have a proper exterior cause. 453. It is not possible that any Creature can have any good which is not a pure gift of God, however he may require of man Conditions of Reception, in the order of Collation. Therefore the Decree must needs be free. 454. As to the question whether God elect men upon foresight of any good in them, enough is said before to answer it. If the question mean whether God's Knowledge or Volition be first in themselves? I answer, neither; For nothing in him is before or after other. But if God might be spoken of as man, we must say that his Understanding is the first specifying primiciple, and the will the first quoad exercitium actus. And therefore that the Divine understanding represented to his will, the object i● its Eligibility. If the question be what is the objects represented eligibility in esse cognito vel Ideali, it is answered, 1. We must distinguish of the Divine Volitions called Elections by the divers effects: 1. (To pass by the rest) It is one thing to Elect to Glory, or Velle Glorificare; And here the object of Actual Glorification, is a persevering Saint: And you must distinguish God's Volitions by his executions, or not at all (which you had rather.) 2. It is another thing to choose one to the first grace of faith or true Conversion. And here the object of the execution is, as is aforesaid, sometime one prepared by common grace (though without merit,) sometime one extraordinarily wicked: Look over what I said of the objects, and the question of foresight is answered, as far as it belongeth to our enquiry. 455. Those that deny all special arbitrary Election, must deny all special arbitrary effectual differing grace: which I shall prove elsewhere by itself; And now refer such to Davenants Dissertation de praedest. where it is fully proved, and defended. 456. One thing which deceiveth such men is, that they forget that God standeth to man, not only in the Relation of a Rector per Leges, (for so he dealeth equally with all that make not the inequality themselves:) But also as a Proprietor and a Benefactor, in both which Relations he is free to do with his own as he pleaseth. And free Lords and Benefactors use not to distribute equally their gifts. Nor do they consider that de facto God visibly maketh wonderful inequalities; He maketh not men as great or good as Angels, nor Stars as glorious as the Sun: The whole showeth us admirable variety, arbitrarily made by the great Benefactor, who giveth not to us a Reason of his will. 457. The word [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] Reprobus, in Scripture is used no where that Jer. 6. 30. I remember, but Rom. 1. 28. 1 Cor. 9 27. 2 Cor. 13. 5, 6, 7. 2 Tim. 3. 8. Tit. 1. 16. Heb. 6. And the word [Reprobation] is not used at all, as any act of God. But predestination and election are oft used on the better side, and rejecting, hating, forsaking on the other side. And electing implieth that some are not elect. 458. About the object of that which many call Reprobation, be sure to distinguish, between a true object of any Act, circa quod versatur, and which is subjectum inhaesionis, and a mere object of speech, or subjectum praedicationis: Else you will with many be ensnared to think that every subject or object of a predication which in the series of God's judgements you meet with, is the object of some positive act of God. 459. And though we would quarrel with no man about mere words, yet lest words deceive you I add, that as the word Reprobation seemeth to signify a positive Act, and yet a great part of the desertion of the Reprobates is by God's preteritions and not-acting and privations; therefore it is not the whole series that the word Reprobation aptly expresseth, but only some particular Acts. 460. The word Predestinate used Rom. 8. 29, 30. and Ephes. 1. 5. The presumption of the Schoolmen in defining the Act of predestination is tremendous: See Ruiz de provide. disp. 3. sect. 9 ad 11. who concludeth that Predestination is an Act of God's Intellect, and a Practical act, and is Actus affirmans D●i volitionem libere decern●nt●m de finibus rerum & mediis, etc. q. d. Volo Petrum beatificare & per talia media, etc. It is not this will, but the knowledge of it. 1 Cor. 2. 5. (it's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 though not spoken of persons) Act. 4. 28. (translated [foredetermined]) when applied to persons is ever taken in Scripture as an act of mercy: And the ancients Augustine, Prosper and Fulgentius use the words [Praedestinati & Praesoiti, the predestinate and the fore-known] as of late men use among us the words Elect and Reprobate. 461. Though men differ as their opinions lead them in the exposition of such texts as * Vid. Bezam in Rom. 8. 28. de proposito. Rom. 8. 28, 29, 30. Ephes. 1. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. and some take them to speak of predestinating Individuals, and others only of species, that is, of believers, sufferers, Lovers of God, etc. yet as to the matter itself none that is judicious can or doth deny but that God eternally Predestinateth Individuals; The Jesuits commonly confess it, though they differ on the question, how far it is on foresight of faith: But that foreseen Believers individually are eternally elected to salvation, thev cannot deny. And the Learnedest Jesuits maintain that God giveth faith in time, and electeth Individuals to faith itself from eternity: That is, eternally decreed to give them faith, or to give them that Grace by which he fore-knew that in the advantageous circumstances in which he decreed to put them, they would freely, and he decreed should infallibly, believe. 462. The conceit and supposition of many, that Election and Reprobation are such perfect contraries, as that they run pari passu, and that God willeth in the one just as he doth in the other, End and means, for matter and order, is a gross mistake. Augustine, Prosper, Eulgentius and Davenant of late, with many more have showed, that God predestinateth Leg. Daven. Dissert. de Praed. & Reprobat. copiose hae● probant●m. Et Zumel Disput. 5. §. 5. p. 335. & ●●●●. & objec●o elect. pag. 367, etc. men to Faith, and perseverance, and to Glory, and not only to Glory upon the foresight of faith and perseverance: But that he p●edestinateth or decreeth men to damnation, only on the foresight of final impenitence and infidelity, but not to Impenitence or Infidelity itself. 463. The Grand difficulty that occasioneth all our Controversies herein is, How to discern that God is the Author of all our Good, and yet not the Author of Sin, nor of Damnation saving for sin. And both parties are very desirous to hold and see that both these are true: Nay, both believe them: But they differ only in the way and method of manifesting it. 464. There are three opinions about Reprobation: 1. One is, that ●od Positively decreed from eternity to glorify his Justice in the damnation of the most, and to that end to occasion and permit their hardening and unbelief: so that Reprobation is Positive both as to the Act and Object. 2. The other is the opinion of the Synod of Dort (as expressed) defended at large by Davenant and many others, that Reprobation is Gods Positive Decree not to give saith and and repentance to the same men, and to damn them for impenitence and infidelity: and so is Positive quoad Actum, but Negative quoad Objectum, (as to the first part, not giving faith.) 3. The third is the Opinion of subtle Scotus and his followers, that in primo instanti Reprobation is Negative quoad Actum & Objectum; So Albertine before cited. that is, It is no Act of God at all, but only a Nonelection or preterition: which is I suppose the meaning of Dr. Stern of Dublin College, who hath written a Latin Tractate maintaining that God Reprobateth none, that is, by any Act. 465. The method laid down by Scotus is this, [Offertur Voluntati s●● hunc peccaturum vel peccare: Primo voluntas ejus circa hunc non habet Scot 1. d. 47. Vid. Signa Mayronis in fine. Against Scotus his foundation, that God knoweth future contingents only ut Volita, saith Alliac●in 1. q. 11. N. [Sed ista propositio non est intelligibil●s, 1. Quia talia instantia & prioritatem & posterioritatem esse in Deo no● est verum. 2. Quia impossibile est quod pro aliquo instanti talis complexio de futuro sit neutra: Alias pro tune daretur medium in contradi●●ione. 3. Quia pon●● aliquid esse medium & rationem cog●oscendi in Divino intell●●lu.] Velle: Velle ●nim ipsum habere peccatum non potest. 2. Potest intelligere Voluntatem suam non volentem hoc: & tunc potest velle Volunt●tem suam non velle hoc: & ita dic●●ur Volens sinere, & v●luntarie permittere: sicut ex alia parte praesentato sibi Juda, primo Deu● habet non Velle sibi Gloriam, & non primo Nolle— & potest tun● secundo reflectere super istam negationem actus & Velle eam: & ita V●lens sive voluntarie non eligit Judam finaliter peccaturum, & non nolitione● gloriae, sed non-volitionem gloriae. 466. It is notable that both Dr. Twisse and Bishop Davenant, do disclaim this opinion of Scotus without offering us any one argument against it; which is so unusual a course with one of them, as would persuade one to think that they had not much to say against it, but (what they intimate) the harsh sound of the words, that God should be here a non-agent. 467. The truth seemeth to me, that as Davenant saith, Scotus was the first artifex of this ordering of various Acts in the mind of God: So here he saith too much, and is too bold, and feigneth a subsequent Volition of a former non-volition without cause or proof, merely to scape the censure which yet he now incurreth, of making God too little active. 468. So far was Scotus from being the first Author of this Opinion, of a Negatio volendi peccatum in God, that their common Master Lombard Lombard. 1. d. 47. most expressly asserteth it, and that more plainly and sound than these over-subtile men. Upon which his Commentators copiously dispute An in Deo p●ssit esse pur● omissio absque volitione & nolitione positiva? of which besides the Scotists and Nominals, you may see Aquin. 16. a. 2. Durand. 1. ●. 47. q. 1. Ruiz de Volunt. disp. 8. sect. 3. concls. 2. Albertin. To. 1. princip. 4. q. 4. dub. 2. Vasquez 2. p. 1. disp. 79. num. 17, etc. Suarez Metaph. disp. 30. sect. 9 n. 59 Fonsec. Metap. li. 7. c. 8. q. 5. sect. 3. Aluiz Tract. 2. disp. 6. sect. 3. Montepil. 1. p. disp. 33. a. 8. c. 1. & 3. Durandus distinguisheth of contra & praeter Voluntatem, and saith that Voluntas etiam beneplaciti antecedens, quae est solum quaedam Velleitas, may be such as many things are praeter & contra eam. But Voluntas beneplaciti consequens is such as nothing is contra eam, but sin is praeter eam; etiam mala fieri. Neque enim vult fieri, nec vult non fieri. I like not what he addeth: Idem forte diceret aliquis de quibusdam bonis quae fiunt merè à libero arbitrio, sed non de omnibus, viz. quae fiunt à praedestinatis, etc. 469. And it is to be noted, that Durandus with other Schoolmen argue, that if sin were willed by God, God would be the Author of it: God's Volition, say they, being efficient. And Estius (a yet plainer Schoolman than Durand) saith, Quicquid sit Deo Volente, fit Deo authore: who also citing Aquinas' consent, saith, Omnimode tenenda est in hac parte doctrina magistri, mala nec esse nec fieri Deo Volente. And against the vain distinction of Aquin. 1. q. 19 ar. 9 ad 1. & 3. [Deus non vult malum, sed vult malum fieri sen eventre] he saith that [Velle mala, & velle mala esse seu fieri] idem est. Voluntas enim adrem simpliciter, est ad rem ut sit.— Qui vult virtutem, vult virtutem esse; Qui vult peccatum, vult peccatum esse— neque aliud sit velle mala, & velle mala esse aut fieri. 1. d. 47. sect. 7. pag. 228. (It seemeth there were some then of Dr. Twisses and rutherford's opinion.) 470. And that you may see Estius mind further in this, and also see all the Objections now used answered, I will here annex (though out of place) his answer to them. Obj. 1. Sin is not committed Deo nolente: ergo Deo volente fit. Resp. Neque nolente, neque volente Deo fiunt, sed permittente. 471. Obj. 2. Mala esse aut fieri bonum est 1. Ad perfectionem universi, Aquin. 1. q. 1●. art. 9 ad 3. answereth in the same manner. 2. Ad decorem, etc. Ita August. Enchir. 10. & 11. & c. 96. Bonum est ut sint mala. Resp. Neg. Major: Et 1. Mala sunt Universi non ornatus & perfectiones, sed id deformant, etc. 2. August. non dliud vult, quam Bonum esse mala permitti. 472. Obj. 3. They cannot be, unless God will them to be. August. Enchir. 95. Non fit aliquid nisi Omnipo●ens fieri velit. Resp. The reason assumeth a falsehood. And Augustine is interpreted as speaking only of the Permission as willed, and not the Event. 473. Obj. 4. Omne verum est à Deo: esse & fieri mal●● verum est: Vid. Aquin. 1. d. 47. q. 2. ad 1. Ergo. Resp. Non Hugonis sed sophistarum est: Nam verum qua verum est à Deo: De rebus malis sunt conceptus mentis veri. (Indeed malum qua objectum scientiae non est malum.) 474. Obj. 5. Aug. Enchir. 100 Peccatum non fit praeter Dei voluntatem, quod fit contra. Resp. Loquitur de permissionis voluntate, non ipsius mali. Albertinus words To. 1. Princip. 4. q. 4. dub. 2. pag. 297. I cited before for a Negation of Will. 475. Suarez distinguisheth of Gods Will Voluntarily determining to go Metap. disp. 130. sect. 9 num. 59 no further, and a will suspended without such a determination: And the first he denyeth not, but the latter he denyeth in God as imperfection: But upon reasons so weak, likening God to man, that I think them not worth the reciting. 476. No mortal man can prove, that God must needs have actual Volitions of Nothings as such. And consequently that he hath any such: And Yet let the Reader note, that though I hold that no man can prove a Positive Volition or Nolition of Nothings (ordinarily at least) and so would shorten the Controversy, yet my Conciliation doth not at all rest on this, but will proceed sufficiently if you say that God Positively willeth his Not-willing and his Permissions. that his perfection excludeth them not. 477. Yet I grant that he willeth the Truth of humane Negative Propositions: For those are something, though about Nothing. 478 That such Decrees or Volitions de nihilo are not necessary, appeareth, in that 1. Either they are necessary in All instances de nihilo, or only in some. Not in All: Ergo, not qua tales: For if only in some, it must be from some singular accidental reasons: A quatenus ad omne valet consequentia. That they are not necessary in all, is granted in that no man (that I know of) ever asserted it. And to assert it, is great presumption: For then there must be infinite Negative-Positive Decrees: As e. g. that there shall not be innumerable more Worlds, more Suns, more Atoms, that this and that and every particular atom or sand shall not be a Sun, a Star, an Earth, a Man, a Dog, a Fish, etc. And infinite Decrees, about every Stone; as many about every pile of grass, and as many about every creature, what they shall not be. And infinite Decrees about infinite (or innumerable) Possibles, that they shall not be existents, that they shall not be thus or thus named, etc. Who can prove or dare affirm, that all these Infinite Nothings, have Positive acts of Decretive Nolition from Eternity in God? 479. 2. We must not feign unnecessary Acts in God: But such Positive Nolitions of Nothings seem unnecessary: For Nothing will be nothing, without a Nolition, as well as with it: What need God Nill the Being of Petavius Vol. 1. li. 9 Theol. dogmat. de praedest. cap. 16. pag. 656. thus describeth the old opinion of our Countryman Johan. Erigena Scotus, Docuit u●icam tantummodo pradestinationem esse in Deo, qua electos ad aeternam foelicitat●m destinat: nullam outem ad aeternam esse damnationem. How near is this to the other Joh. Scotus Duns. See what Bishop Usher saith of this Scotus Erigena and Goteschalcus. Petavius saith, [Idem à Ca●olo Calvo unice dilectus erat.] See to this sense the Decrees Synodi Carisiacensis contra Gott●chaltum, in 1 Tom. Concil. Gallic. p. 66. more Worlds, more Creatures, more Names, etc. when it is not possible that ever they should be, unless he positively will and make them. Yea, if (per impossible) there were no God, Nothing would be Nothing still. To feign or call for a Divine Nolition to keep Nothing from becoming something, is too presuming. 480. 3. All those Schoolmen and Divines who tell us, that every Will of God, except his complacency and displicence, is effective, must needs be against a Positive Nolition of Nothings: For that effecteth nothing. If they say that they mean it only of Volitions and not of Nolitions, I answer, 1. Is not God's Nolition a Velle non? What is it, but a Will that this or that shall not be? 2. And in man as Volitions are for some Good, so Nolitions are for the depulsion of some Evil: But Indifferent-Nothings, that are in esse imaginato neither Good nor Evil, have no Volitions or Nolitions even in man. 481. 4. God's Will is his Essence, variously denominated as variously terminated on the objects: But Nothing is no object, and so no termination of God's Will; and so no object to constitute an act in specie velindividuo by connotation or extrinsic denomination: Therefore God is not to be said to Will it, or Decree it. If you say, that it is something in the Idea of God's Intellect; I answer, It is presumptuously asserted: Who can prove, or aught to feign that there is in God Ideas or Conceits of such nothings as never will be any thing, in the forms of somethings? For Nothing as nothing, hath no form to be conceived of. 482. Object. Thus you deny Nothings as such to be known of God. For if they cannot be the objects of his Nolitions, then neither of his Knowledge. Answ. Properly Nothing as such, is not an object of Knowledge at all. But a Proposition de nihilo is: But of this more anon. 483. 5. Certainly God doth freely suspend or limit the Acts of his Power: Therefore he may for aught we know (that I say not, It is certain that he doth) suspend or limit the Acts of his Will. God doth not make more Worlds, nor more Men, Birds, Beasts, Fishes, Plants, Stones, Sands, Atoms, Names, etc. than are and will be. He doth not sanctify more than are and will be sanctified; nor give more grace to the sanctified than ever they will have: when he Can if he Would. And when the Principles of the Divine Nature are Coequal, why should we say, that he who undeniably suspendeth the possible acts of one, freely, suspendeth not the acts of the Free Principle (the Will) itself? or is it like that one should be here active, and not the other? 484. 6. Positive Nolitions of Evil do seem in man to come from the Imperfection of his created nature; As being Passive, and Capable of, or obnoxious to evil, or in danger of it, and so needeth defence against it, and his Nolitions are the defensive and depulsive principle. And though we must speak of God according to our mode, we must say nothing needlessly which importeth weakness or passiveness or danger in him. 485. * Again let the Reader note that my Cause lieth not on this, but because I have said so much of it, I think meet to take notice of the most that is said against me: Vasquez in 1. Tho. qu. 19 a. 3. disp. 79. c. 3. doth purposely confute Scotus, and affirmeth, that Gods will is not to be conceived of as Negative quoad actum about any Negatives; but that he hath a positive act of Nolition of every nonentity and non-futurum, and so (ut alibi) hath infinite nolitions of infinite non-futures. He himself confuteth their reason that say, God is not in potentia ut, velit, and I need not answer it. But he layeth all his cause on this as a demonstration, (and maketh it a very useful doctrine for the explication of reprobation) that Quodcunque non esse creaturae cujuscunque referri potest ad divinam Voluntatem ut objectum appetibile, quod ipsa velle possit: Ponamus Deum velle rem aliquam non esse: deinde ut dicatur negative se habere, opus est variationem aliquam intrinsecam esse aut in Deo, aut in rebus non futuris: At non, etc. Voluntas autem Dei non necessario negative se debet habere, quia illud non esse est app●tibile: The sum is, God can Positive Will nonentity, ergo he doth. And this is his All, to which elsewhere he oft referreth us. But let the sober Reader consider, 1. He confesseth, that Gods Will is his immutable and simple Essence, and in itself is not at all diversified to or by objects, but only extrinsecally denominated diversely: so that all this is but the relatione & nomint. 2. And is it not presumption to frame a Logic of second notions, and say, This and not that is applicable to God, as if it were to man, when their Logical notions as to man himself are so arbitrary? 3. He answereth none of the arguments to the contrary which I use. Nil frustra must be feigned of creatures: much less of God. 4. We being agreed that whoever be in the right, it inferreth no difference in God, but in our denominations of his Will, the seven cases here granted him; may fully satisfy them that will so denominate Gods Will. 5. But in a Physical and proper sense I deny his supposition. It is no Nonentity that is properly bonum & appetibile, though it may be Malum. Bonum as well as Unum & Verum are affectiones seu modi entis. Et ubi non est Ens non est modus. That which is not, is not Good; or appetibile. Morally we say improperly, It is good not to be sick, not to have an enemy, not to die, etc. But we mean but 1. It is Good to live, to be well, to have all that good which an enemy would deprive us of, and 2. That it is Evil to, die, to be sick, to have an enemy. We say, It's Good not to be erroneous, wicked, deprived of Heaven, etc. that is, It is Good to know truly, to be godly, to be glorified, and it is Evil to err, to be wicked, etc. 6. God's Will is considered either as 1. Efficient, 2. Or as finally fulfilled and pleased. As Efficient it cannot Will nothing: for nothing is not made or caused. And impedit●● ut ●●s fiat, may be by effecting the hindering Cause. And as final, or as fulfilled and pleased, Nonentity can properly be said to be but the not displeasing of it. Nothing is no object of the Will: though a Proposition or in men an oppositive thought be somewhat. It seemeth to me a presumptuous playing with the Majesty of God to affirm, that we must ascribe to him infinite Positive Volitions that infinite Atoms, Names, etc. shall not be; when even to men we only ascribe reductively and morally, the nolition of things evil. 7. It is certain that God suspendeth his Velle & facere about nonentity? And why not as well his Nolle? or Velle non esse? as aforesaid. But here after others a late philosophical Physician saith, that Nothings may be Bona Moralia, though not Naturalia. I answer, It is not true save by a reductive improper speech. Morality is Modality. The negative Commandments forbidden evil, and command the nolivion and resistance of it: To murder, etc. is evil: and to nill it and positively resist and subdue all in us that tendeth to it, is good: But the bare non occidere is not moral Good. All moral Good is radically in the Will, and no farther in any forbearance of an act, than a positive act of the Will makes it Obedience: And yet here I go not so far as Ockam, as I have said elsewhere. I grant that when the positive nolition and restraint of an act to which we are inclined or tempted, is the good of obedience, the not-doing of the Act is loco materiae circa quam, and so must go to an adequate conception of the duty, although it be no proper part, nor good in itself: But Ockam goeth further, and maintaineth that the external act of duty with the internal Volition hath no more moral goodness than the Volition alone: But I think that the action is a subject (or loco subjects) of a derived secondary goodness, as Scotus asserteth. They that are against this, are moved with a fear, lest we make God an Idle Spectator, and not the Governor of the World. But they consider not, 1. That the suspension of his Powerful Operation inferreth no such thing: God is not Idle, because he Causeth not, or maketh not infinite Nothings (or possibles to exist:) Not is he the less Governor of the World: And yet Idleness and Government are words that more directly signify non-operation and operation, than any mere Volitions or Nolitions. Men may thrust out words, but no rational answer against this argument. 486. 2. And note well, that Gods not knowing, or not-nilling nothing is from his Perfection; and not any privative Ignorance or Negligence: For he knoweth all that is an object of Knowledge; and willeth all that his Wisdom judgeth meet to will (or nill respectively): So that to tell God that he is Ignorant if he know not an unintelligible object, or Idle if he Will or Nill not at our direction, is as much blasphemy, as to tell him that he is Impotent if he cannot sin, or cause Contradictions to be true: The case is the very same. 487. Object. But Scripture oft ascribeth both Nolitions of Nothings, and Knowledge of them unto God. Answ. And so must we in that sense as the Scripture doth: We will say, and must say of some Nothings, that God Nilleth them. I hope the Learned will not take it amiss, if I speak where the Schoolmen are too silent, as well as desire silence where they unprofitably speak, as long as the case is, 1. Weighty, 2. And made plain, 3. And I go the middle healing way. 488. In all these cases and respects we ascribe Nolitions unto God● I. He that by a Positive operation causeth a limited cause, may be said to cause the limitation of effects by consequence. And he that positively willeth realities with such limitations, from whence the consequence necessarily followeth [Nothing else will ever be] is said Morally, or ●reputatively or by Consequence to Will that Nothing else shall be. And he that knoweth all things that belong to the perfection of knowledge, is improperly said to know all Nothings, in that he knoweth that Nothing more is or will be. And so as knowing Being's is by consequence reputatively or morally called the knowing of Nothings by men, we are said to use such terms of imperfection even of God, lest we seem to make him Idle or Ignorant. When we say, that God is the Cause that th●re is no more creatures, we mean but that he causeth not more creatures. And so to say, that God willeth that there shall be no more Worlds, meaneth but that God willeth not that there shall be more. 489. II. This Interpretative consequential Act, which is but morally so called, is fitlier expressed in the gross of universal Nothings, than of millions of imaginary particulars. It is fit to say, that by willing a limited or finite World, God willed that there should be nothing more, than to say, He willed that there should not be a Sun in every man's pocket, or Heaven and Earth in every man's fist, etc. Though as to the truth all is one. 490. III. When God positively willeth the Positive hindering of a thing, he may morally be said to Nill the thing, or to Will that it shall not be. That there are Positive Impeditions of God (by Dr. Twisses leave) I have elsewhere proved: But than you must suppose that as the fountain of Nature, as it were by a Decree, he hath resolved to continue the Nature of things and his natural Concourse: which supposed, their Natures may incline them to such Action as needeth Positive Impedition. So God hindered the fire from burning, and the Lions from kill Daniel (its like) Dan. 3. & 6. Certainly if a man can stop a Cartwheel with a Stone, or bind a man in chains, God can do the same. And men's Inclination to sin needeth a Positive Impedition. Now though non-agere is nothing, and hath no cause, yet he that destroyeth or hindereth the Cause of Action, is morally said to be the Cause that there is no Action: Though strictly it be but destroying the Cause of Action, and so preventing further action. And this moral language even of God is the fit, because it is of Moral things. 491. IU. And here God's Law being called his Will, though it be formally but de debito, yet being materially de re ipsa, a double reason will thence arise. For when God forbiddeth and condemneth sin, etc. 1. He doth very much to hinder it, and that positively (and so he doth by his grace), 2. And his prohibition may be called his Nolition signified. 492. V And God properly willeth the Being and Truth of Negative propositions, [viz. This or that will not be.] and knoweth them (as made by man at least). And as I said, sin as the subject of a proposition is not sin, or hath no harm in it. As sin repent of, or the object of repentance and hatred maketh up a Virtue, and is not sin indeed, but the knowledge of it: So here. But yet hence the phrase may be borrowed, and it may be said, that God Nilleth the existence of such Possibles, because he willeth the truth of the proposition, They shall not be. 493. VI But here note, that when God is Morally and most fitly said to Nill such Nothings, it is not as Nothings, but as Possible Evils: For only Evil is the proper object of Positive Nolition: so that it may be spoken fullier of sin, than of other Nothings, even fitly in a Moral sense. 494. VII. Lastly, Acts of Will are ordinarily ascribed to God, when it is mere operations or privations that are meant; and so the phrase is as they say ab effectu ad affectum. When a man 1. Denyeth his aid, 2. And actually hindereth, it is a sign of nolition. And so from Gods 1. Not causing, 2. And his hindering, he is said to Nill that Nothing (that never shall be.) So much of the phrase. 495. Now for application. 1. Non-dare fidem, aut gratiam, not to convert, is Nothing; Therefore it is not Positively willed or decreed of of God: or at lest no man can prove it so to be: So not-to give the Gospel, the Spirit, etc. 496. Yet note, that when man's sins have so forfeited such gifts that they are penally withheld, this non-agency hath the denomination of a Moral Act. And also that the making of the Penal Law, which maketh this Privation due as a punishment, was a positive act of God, and had a positive Volition. But Negations not-penal are not so. 497. 2. Not to hinder sin, or to Permit sin (barely as permission) is Nothing: (As elsewhere I have proved.) Therefore it hath no Positive Decree or Will: save that when it is penal, and the execution of a Law, that Law being a real natural being, and the Jus thence resulting a real relation and the executive Privation quid Morale, they are Willed and Decreed answerably as they are. To permit a man to be spiritually Dead is [not-to make him alive:] To permit his Darkness or Ignorance, [is not-to give him Light or Knowledge:] To permit his unbelief is [not-to cause him to believe.] To permit his want of Love, is [not-to give him Love.] To permit his positive sins of Malignity or Carnality, is but [not-to cure and hinder them by Grace or Providence,] supposing the Natural support and concourse, which the Author of Nature giveth to all things. 498. Therefore when God's Acts in themselves are his Essence and all one, and are diversified but by connotation of divers objects, relatively and denominatively; when he knoweth all things uno intuitu, and willeth all that he willeth unica Volitione; when nihil physicum is no denominating terminus, of a physical act, (though so far as it may be called Moraliter, id est, Reputative aliquid, as a Privation, it may be said to denominate reputatively, as a quasi aliquid;) and that which is moraliter vel imputative nihil, cannot morally denominate; when both Non dare spiritum, gratiam, fidem, vitam, etc. and permittere infidelitatem; peocatum, etc. are truly Nothing, and even in Reputative Moral sense, are wihil morale, when they are not penal; (And as antecedent to sin, they are not penal;) Judge now impartially whether 1. Those men deal not presumptuously with God, 2. And troublesomely with his Church, who assert the Being of Positive Decrees and Volitions in God about such Nullities, and raise Controversies about the Reasons and the Order of them, yea, unto dangerous inferences; when as 1. They can prove no such thing in God as they assert. 2. Nay, when we say so much to prove the contrary. 499. And here consider, whether Scotus himself assert not without all need or proof, that God hath a positive knowledge and reflexive Volition of his own Non-Volition? and so that a Nullity as to his own act, must be the terminus of a positive act? When that Nullity is neither God, nor a Creature, nor aliquid vel Dei vel Creaturae; and so seemeth to be no denominating terminus of a distinct act. Yet no doubt, God is not to be called Ignorant of such Nullities or Idle; for those are terms of privation: If God be said either not to Know nothings or not to Wil● or Nill them, it is because it signifieth his Perfection: And no part of perfection is wanting to him. But we must not place his perfection in a conformity to our imperfect mode of knowing or willing. 500 For we dare not here presume peremptorily to determine Negatively, that God doth not positively Will his own non-agency or non-volitions; because we know how dark we are and distant from God, and unfit to say any thing but certainties of him, as certain truth: But we abstain from the contrary assertion, as utterly unproved, and we will impute no needless acts to God as his Perfection: Though we yield to reputative moral denominations. 501. And so I contradict not the language of Aquinas 1. q. 14. 9 who saith, that God knoweth such nonentity as never will be, ut possibili●. And esse in potentia quamvis non in actu is more than nothing. But remember that esse in potentia speaketh the esse Potentiae, but the possibile is a pure nothing. So that this is but to know the Potentia, and not any thing else. Yet no doubt but God knoweth all things as they are in himself; that is, he knoweth that he can do all things, and knoweth what he knoweth and willeth; but this is no esse creatum but God himself, at least as to that which never will be. But if any will call it a knowing of things possible which are nothings, when God knoweth his own Power to make them, we quarrel not with words, while the sense is known. 502. But remember that it is not the Knowledge, but Decrees and Volitions of God that our enquiry now is about: And Aquinas and his followers commonly say, that Gods will goeth not so far as his knowledge; and that he knoweth indeed mala ex bon● of which they are the privation (as no doubt he doth so far as it is not imperfection to be said to know them, or as they are objects of knowledge) but yet that Mala neque vult, neque ●●lit, sed tantum non-vult, as Lombard said. 503. Ockam Quodlib. 3. q. 6. hath the question, Utrum Cognitio intu●tiva potest esse de objecto cognito? And he 1. concludeth that per potentiam divinam potest esse de object● non existente; but he meaneth only quod fuit vel fuerit. 2. That naturally it cannot be. And faith that Contradictio est quod vis●o sit, & tamen illud quod videtur, non sit in effects nec esse possit: Ideo contradictio est quod chimaera videatur intuitive: fed non est contradictio quod illud quod videtur nihil sit in actu extra ca●som suam, dummodo possit esse in effectu, vel aliquando fuerit in rerum natura— Unde Deus ab aeterno videt omnes res factibiles, & tamen ●unc null● fuerunt— By which it is plain, that he meaneth as Aquinas, that it is not as Nothings, but as Possibles and Future's they are known even by God, saving that Aquinas and his followers judge that they are from eternity fore-known in their proper existence, by reason that all times and things are present in Eternity. Now to know a Possibility of a thing, is not to know the Thing: But to know the Power. For Possibile is nihil. And as Ockam proveth, that Universal is qualitas mentis, and is nothing else, nor any where else existent, so we may much more clearly say the Possibili that besides Potentia it is nothing but the Conceptus mentis what that Power can do. 504. And if an Artificer get the Idea of a fabric or frame which never was in the World, and Resolve to make such a real thing, that which is in his mind, is but his own Thought or Imagination, and nothing else: And to call it Domus vel Navis Possibilis, signifieth nothing else, or it is delusory. 505. Holkot Quodlib. li. 2. qu. 2. lit. C. D. E. ad primum dicit [Dico plane quod aliae res à Deo nullum esse habuerunt ab aeterno distinctum à Deo: Neque esse quidditativum, neque esse Potentiale, neque esse repraesentativum, secundum quod diversi antiquit us opinati sunt.] Quod probat. Ad art. secundum he saith, that the Creatures had no being in God from eternity, but improperly good men have so spoken, because he knoweth them, and can produce them. And ad art. 3. q. Whether it be true, that Rosa e. g. non existens, concipitur aut intelligitur? he reciteth twelve arguments for the affirmative, and then reciteth the negative as the opinion of others: And though he say not which side he taketh, yet he confuteth the arguments for the affirmative, and bringeth nine arguments for the negative, which he saith nothing against. Thomas' opinion of the question you may see in his Interpreters in 1. d. 36. & 1. q. 14. ar. 9 Ruiz de Scient. d. 17. Valent. 1. q. 14. punct. 7. Tanner. 1. d. 2. qu. 8. dub. 8. Gran. 1. p. Cont. 2. d. 5. Aluiz. tr. 2. d. 9 506. Yet let it be still remembered that all this Controversy is not properly de re, but de modo loquendi; or of the extrinsic denomination of God's Will, and not of his Will as in itself, which is his Essence, and but One. But yet here denominations must be carefully used. 507. And by the way, that you may understand what I mean by denominations, from connotation and relation to the terminating object, note what Ockam saith in Quodlib. 5. q. 25. that Conceptus est vel 1. Absolutus e. g. hominis, 2. Connotativus, e. g. albi, 3. Relativus, ut patris: & differunt in hoc: 1. Conceptus absolutus omnia sua significata significat aeque, primo, & uno modo,— in recto— 2. Nomen Connotativum proprie significat primo unum, & aliud secundario, & unum in recto & aliud in obliquo— 3. Conceptus relativus maxime concretus habet omnes praedictas conditiones quas habet connotativus: sed differunt in hoc quod quandocunque conceptus connotativus vere praedicatur de aliquo, convenienter potest sibi addi suum absolutum, in aliquo solum: quia nihil est album nisi sit album albedine: sed Relativo potest addi casus obliquus qui non est ejus absolutum— ut servi dominus— Omnis Conceptus Relativus est Connotativus: at non è Converso. 508. If any shall think that he hath any advantage against what I have said by Scotus his opinion, that Voluntatis objectum non est Bonum tantum, sed & E●s; & Voluntas potest Velle Malum qua Malum; and that the Will hath other objects, praeter finem & media, viz. Entia absoluta not so related in the apprehension, and consequently that there may be a Nolition of Non Enti●, and not only as Mala; And the like of Ockam in 3. d. 13. qu. 13. add dub. 3. Gabr. Gregor. etc. Let him remember that the greater part of the Schoolmen are against this opinion; And that the owners of it, assert not this consequence of Divine Nolitions, commonly, but say as Guil. Camerar. ibid. p. 1. q. 2. pag. 158. that between Volitions Leg. Guil. Camerar. disp. moral. li. 1. q. 2. & 3. pag. 156. etc. & Phil. Fab. 1. d. 3. qu. 3. cap. 2. & q. 4. c. 7. Scot 1. d. q. 4. ad 4. & q. 1. a. 2. & 2. d. 3. qu. 10. & d. 6. q. 1. & de Anima q. 19, 20, 21. and Nolitions there is this order, that Volitions go first, and we nill things only, because they consist not with what we first Willed. And Gods will need not to rise up with an actual opposition especially against its own acts or suspensions, where a non-agency will do the same thing. An Additional Explication of Divine Nolitions. LEst all this seem not clear enough in so mysterious a business, and because I have oft insisted on it, I will yet add this further explication of my thoughts in these following Theses. 1. Understanding and Will in God being not the same thing as in man, we must not think that we have any other conceptions or expressions of them than Metaphorical or Analogical. 2. Therefore we must not say, Thus and Thus God understandeth and willeth, but After the manner of men we must thus conceive of it. 3. But there are several degrees of impropriety of speech: and in a greater degree repentings, wrath, hating, grief, etc. are in Scripture spoken of God; but in strict disputes the lesser degree must be chosen, that is, such conceptions as have least of imperfection. 4. In man the Will is an Appetite, and essentially connoteth the want of what we have an appetite to, or a self-insufficiency: but so it doth not in God. 5. And Nolitions in man yet signify greater imperfection, viz. that there is some evil or hurtful thing which is at enmity to him, or against his good, and which he would be delivered from, or overcome: and it is in the will the beginning of a war, or resistance: But it is not so in God. 6. That which is Good we Will, and that which is Evil we Nill, and that which is neither, we neither Will nor Nill. Accordingly we must after the manner of men ascribe to God, 1. Volitions of Good, 2. Nolitions of Evil, 3. A Non-velle and Non-nolle of that which is neither. 7. Nothing is Good, but 1. God himself simply and primitively, and 2. The works of God secondarily and derivatively as the glory or splendour of his perfections is found in them, and as they are the products of his will: 3. And the Acts or Works of his creatures in a third degree. 8. The Goodness of the creature being essentially relative to Gods will, that is, Its conformity to it as its product, the creature is eo nomine Good because it is that which God willeth. 9 Hence the grand difficulty is resolved, Whether God could have made the World Better? No: not in the first and properest sense of created Goodness, because he cannot make it any other than what he willeth it to be: But he might make it otherwise and might diversify it, and make particular creatures Better to themselves and one another, which is a lower sense of Goodness: But in all diversifications they would be still perfectly Agreeable to his Will, and so be still equally Good or Best. 10. The Goodness of the third rank of beings (The Acts of Free-Agents) is their Conformity to his Law or Governing Regulating Will. 11. God hath as Creator and Motor become the Voluntary Root or Spring of Nature and natural motion, and accordingly established all second causes as natural agents under him, and doth by them operate in a natural necessitating and constant way: And this is antecedent to his Laws to free agents: And this natural course of agency we must not expect that he should alter, but rarely by miracles. 12. Nothing is at enmity and Actively opponent to God's natural agency or motion: for else there should be something besides God and his works which he must overcome: Though some natural motions may oppose each other, yet all concur to one end. 13. Nonentity or Nothingness, is not contrary to God as an opponent. 14. Therefore seeing * Saith Alliac. Camerac. 1. q. 12. a. 1. B. [Reprobatio secundum aliquos est non-propositum dandi vitam aeternam. Et ille dicitur Reprobatus secundum aliquos cui Deus non proposuit dare vitam aeternam.] Et postea [Certum est de multis quod Deus non vult quod in bonis meritoriis perseverent— Et non vult quod conditio impleatur; Quia si vellet utique impleretur:] But he saith not [Vult non impleri, etc.] Gregorius non debuit inferre quod non misereri est effectus Reprobationis, cum sit ipsa Reprobatio. Id ibid. Nolle is not a mere Non velle, but a Velle-non, which is the war of the will against an opponent, and the root of opposition ad extra, it is an unmeet phrase to say that God doth Nile any Nonentity, or any mere Natural opposition to him: or that he Willeth any natural entity or motion which he effecteth not. 15. But God being secondarily the Rector of free-agents, and making them Laws to Rule their own Volitions and actions, he doth by those Laws oblige their reason and will, to restrain and resist some natural or sensitive appetites and inclinations, and so to resist some natural motions of God in nature, in which he is pleased to operate by second causes but in tantum and resistibly (as a stronger natural motion may resist a weaker.) 16. And God doth by his grace and help internal and external, assist them in that resisting agency which he obligeth them to. 17. Therefore God may two ways be said to resist his own natural motion, by his Laws, and by his assisting grace: (But his Laws contradict not one another.) 18. To God as mere Rector therefore two things may be said to be opponent, 1. Such sensitive and natural inclinations and actions as are by Grace to be resisted; 2. And all moral evil. 19 And therefore as God may be said to Resist these, so also first to Nill them: And so to have Decrees against them. 20. God's Volitions and Nolitions here are his essential will denominated from the effects and objects. And that effect of God from which he is said to Nill both these, is as is said, 1. His Laws, 2. His grace or help. And in this we are agreed, 1. That he forbiddeth sin and commandeth us the restraint of appetites and senses, etc. 2. And that he helpeth us so to do: Therefore the rest of the School-Controversies here that trouble the world, are but logomachies, about the Names of Nolitions and Nolitive Decrees. 21. The thing properly willed by God in a Law, is but the debitum, the duty of the subject to do what is commanded, and not to do what is forbidden. 22. It is not a mere non-agency that is meant by a prohibition, but a positive nolition of the subject, restraining him from the forbidden act: And all proper moral obedience or disobedience, Good or Evil, is primarily in the will, and no further secondarily in the exterior act or restraint, than as they are Voluntary; and in non-agency but in a third sense or instance as the consequent of nolition and the refraining act. 23. If any therefore will say in this sense, that God doth positively Nile the forbidden Act, and so will a nonentity sub ratione mali moralis in this remote sense, we will not contradict him but say as he. 24. And accordingly we may say that God hath a positive Decree of nonentity, or against moral evil; where non-agency is loco materiae, that is, in tantum, so far as to do all that he doth against it; but not absolutè ne eveniat, ubi evenit. 25. But we may not therefore speak so unaptly as to say that he willeth positively all or any nonentity or non-futurity of mere naturals that are non-futura. 26. Therefore we may much less say it of his own Natural Impeditions, that he positively willeth non-impedire ubi non impedit: For he is not to be thought of as a restrainer of himself by Law or self-opposition. It is enough to say that non-vult impedire. 27. Much less may we say that positively vult non velle-impedire, lest we make another Velle necessary to that Velle, and so in infinitum. ●annes in 1. q. 23. a. 3. p. 2●●. confesses that the sense of all this question is but which way God, who is one pure act, unvaried about all varieties, is most conveniently to be mentioned by us: and that Deus respects culpae quae futura ●●at in reprobi● non habuit a●●um voluntatis affirmati●um quo voluerit esse pec●ata, a●● illos p●ccaturos. (Whence it followeth that All future's or existents are not positively willed: Even the formale p●●cati is quid ●uturum.) But he thinks it most fit to say that God positively willeth the permission of sin, 1. Because it is Good. Ans●r. Nothing is ●●●ther Good nor bad. 2. B●● ause else the difference between the predestinate and reprobate would not fall under providence. Answ. As if giving that grace to on● which is not given to another, made no difference. 3. Because else ●n would come by cha●●●e as to God's foreknowledge. Answ. As if nothing would not be nothing without a positive d●●r●e that it shall be nothing? or God could not know a nothing, or a crime, as such, so far as it is quid intellect●i perfe●●●●im● intelligibile, without positive willing it: How then knoweth he the female peccati? 28. It is proper to say that Deus non vult permittere peccatum, ubi id non permittit; and that vult permittere aliquid indifferens quod per legem positive permissum est: quia permissio ista est quid positivum. 29. After the manner of men it may be said that consequentially he willeth or decreeth a thing, when he willeth or decreeth that from which it necessarily followeth, though it could not be proved that the will of God is directly terminated on that consequent thing itself: And so it may be said, that Qui vult quid majus, consequenter vult minus illud quod in majore includitur. And so as when God commandeth duty he doth more than politically permit it, he may be said eminenter to permit it, and so he may be said to will or decree his own permission of it: But that is not formaliter as permission, or a negative non-impedition, but eminenter, because he formally willeth the quid majus, viz. the command. 30. So God may be said eminenter to will his non dare gratiam, aut Gloriam, when he penally as a Judge, denyeth it to a sinner. But here the thing formally willed is a positive judicial denial, rejection or exclusion of the sinner, which the privation followeth. And now for the application of all this to our case it may be perceived, 1. That the very Controversy is such, as a sober Christian should be afraid to resolve on either side. † Aristot ad Nichom. inq●it, Est hominis modi●ati non majorem in disputando certitudinem aut subtilitatem explicationis dis●derare, quam rei ipsius de qua disseritur natura ●●●●tur. Han● sludiosis in m●●oriam r●●●co, ●t qu●● sit ●imis argu●●● in disserendo contra Ecclesia d●●ri●an de causa peccati, & contingentiae. Strigelius in Melan●th. Loc. pag. 297. Quisqu● plus ●●sto non sa●it, ill● sapit. It is a tremendous thing to poor sinful worms, who know not the nature of one arenula or pile of grass, or the soul of an insect, nor how the perceptions of a poor Bee is ordered in gathering her Honey and Wax, and making her Combs, etc. to determine insolently and contentiously in what order God conceiveth of things, or willeth them? which first and which second, and what reasons move him? and for what use and end each thing is willed? and whether he have positive Volitions of every nonentity that it shall not exist then? etc. I am afraid lest my very opposing and rebuking of this presumption should be found guilty of bold profaneness, while I so much meddle with so unsearchable a thing; which I should avoid, had not disputers and railing censurers made it necessary. 2. That though while we talk together familiarly and popularly, men may leave each other to liberty to say that God Decreeth nonentity, or willeth that Infinite species and individual nothings shall never be, yet to make this the matter of a Church-dispute, and censure those that say not as they say, and calumniate them as favouring some perilous error, seemeth to me no better than diabolical. 3. All men that have the brains, hearts and faces of Christians who hold that all these distinctions signify no true diversity in Gods will exparte sui, should openly tell the world in the beginning, middle and end of such disputes, that It is but about words that we dispute, even what Logical terms Artists must use in distinguishing of that which hath no real diversity? even about the dreadful Majesty of God and what Names to put on his simple volition? 4. And they should well bethink them how far it is safe, to think of that as divers which is not divers; and to multiply conceptions and distinctions of Gods simple essence beyond true necessity: and whether then to contend about the priority of such conceptions be more holy or profane? 5. For all the reasons before given, If they will say that God Decreeth penally to deny or not to give Grace or Glory or any good thing to them that forfeit it, there is reason for the expression according to Scripture, after the manner of man: But if they will fly higher and say that Gods Simple essential will, is to be called A positive Decree or Volition that Judas, e. g. shall not be named John, Thomas, etc. that there shall be millions of distinct nonentity, etc. or that any positive Volition is of necessity to non-futurities or non-existences in mere physical respects, where no positive action is necessary, (save only that by consequence he that decreeth and willeth to make such and such finite creatures, may consequentially and improperly be said to will that there shall in general be no more, in that he willeth not that there shall be more, and they cannot be without his will,) I fear such are overbold with God. And so are they that say that he hath a Positive Decree or Will, non dare Christum ante lapsum Adami, non dare fidem, non impedire peccatum, in such instances or cases wherein the [dare] is no Act of a Rector, nor the [negare] the positive Law, judgement or penal denial of a Judge, but only the dare belongeth to a free Dominus-benefactor. Bannes' ubi sup. p. 272. argueth [Omne ordinabile in bonum finem quod invenitur existens, est volltum à Deo: sed Permissio peccati est, etc.] Ans. Permissio illa quae nihil est, neque exiestens est neque ordinabile: De permission● autem activa verum est. So Ruiz de Praedef. Tract. 2. disp. 12. copiously proveth a positive will or decree of Permitting sin: But then he defineth Permission so as to include both Production of circumstances and general concourse; And who denyeth that such positive beings must have positive Causes? But what's that to mere non-impedition? (Thus still words are the matter of our quarrels.) Yet sect. 7. he confesseth that he findeth none of the ancient Schoolmen that expressly say that the Permission of sin is fore-decreed, nor that the Later deliver it sub iisdem verbis. Adrian in q. de Clau. sol. 982. [Ret●nere nihil positivi dicit, sed solum non solvere: & ergo non oportet Claves esse, sicut nec Deum causam effectivam esse.] See Alliaco before cited showing that Lombard took Permission of sin to be no Act, either Velle or Nolle, but a non-velle & non-efficere, which he himself contradicteth not. Penal permission or non-impedition of sin, and denying or not-giving grace, may be said to be decreed or willed, because God threatened them antecedently by a Positive Law, which should make them due, and that Law was the product of Gods will. Though strictly it is but the Positive Law and the Debitum poenae here that God willeth, which the non-impedire & non-dare gratiam follow. But Gods not making men Angels, or Stars, or Suns, and his making us men, free and defectible, and his permitting the first sin, and his giving men no more grace antecedently (before forfeiture) as free benefactor & dominus suorum, none of these have the same reason on which to found such denominations of Gods will and essence. And seeing Nolitions in man are the results of his Insufficiency and war against noxious evils, we must not ascribe such Imperfections to God; but only such Nolitions as his Actions as Rector per Leges & Judicia have made to signify no imperfection, as being not contra nocumenta, but only contra injurias as against himself, & contra nocumenta as against his creatures, i. e. contra peccatum. And now I may answer the solitary argument of Vasquez, mentioned in the Margin (that non entia, non dare gratiam, non impedire peccatum, etc. may have aliquam rationem boni & amabilitatis, and so may be Willed, Loved or Decreed.) Answ. 1. In mere Naturals, Negations are not properly any way good or evil; but Privations are Natural Evils, and not good. 2. To be occasio sinè qua non of good, (as sickness is of the Physicians' honour, and sin of Gods,) is not any true ratio boni vel amabilis: The bonum & amabile is only the good that on that occasion is done: The occasion is neither efficient, constitutive or final cause of any good, nor any causal proper medium. 3. In Morals, mere Negations are neither good nor evil, nor have any Morality, but only Positives and Privations. 4. In morals God judicially doth that whence Penal privations follow, and he may penally non agere, non dare gratiam, to execute his Law, and demonstrate his truth and Justice on sinners, and occasion the perception of his mercy to others. And here the non-agere, non-dare, permittere, being loco materiae volitae, may after our mode be said to be Volita seu decreta, & bona. But properly it is not the nonentity, that is bonum or Volitum, but the positive Law and Judgement, and the relatio debiti p●nae, and the ratio poenae in the privation, and the demonstration of truth, justice, holiness, etc. therein. 5. But sinful privations, that is, sinful Volitions, nolitions, or non-V●litions of the Creature, are not properly per se or per accidens, propter se vel propter aliud good or amiable, or willed or decreed of God. And they that prove that God cannot be the Author of sin, because he cannot be Causa deficiens, must mean as much, or speak impertinently and deceitfully. It is not impertinent which Judicious Strangius saith, Lib. 3. c. 13. p. 677, 678. If Scientia Media be an useless conceit, how much more cum extenditur ad ejusmodi infinitas & vanissimas connexiones rerum disparatarum quae nunquam futurae sunt? (He instanceth in many, and addeth [De hac re Ariaga disp. to. 1. d. 21. sect. 7. — dicit, non sibi videri in Deo esse scientiam harum, quia talis scientia videtur plane impertinens: Ad quid enim nosceret Deus quid Chimaera esset factura sub tali conditione impossibili, etc.] Et ipse D. Twissus de Scient. Med. p. 472. Si plures Angelos Deus condidisset certe decrevisset ut etiam illi agerent aliquid in Gloriam Dei: Nec tamen decretum aliquod hujusmodi Deo decenter tribui potest, etc. I know the case is not just the same with that before us: but the reason is the same for both. But still I profess that If it be not an injurious imputing imperfection to God to assign him positive Volitions of every negative, I shall concur with them that do, and extend God's Volitions as far as ever the object and his perfection will allow; And say of them as Judicious Blank doth of God's knowledge (De Concord. lib. cum decret. 1. n. 64.) [Saltem ille minus periculose errat qui putat Deum scire ea quae forte scibilia non sunt, quam qui negat Deum scire quae revera scit, & quae intra Divinae omniscientiae objectum continentur.] So here; so be it that God be not feigned to will sin, I contend the less against them that say He positively willeth Infinite numerical Nothings, and his own non-acting. † Bradward. l. 1. c. 13. Cor. 10, 11. brings in (too profoundly like one of Thom. Anglus his Ergoes) that God is the Causa prima of every nothing (non esse) because he is so of negations: As if Nothing could be an effect and have a Cause: or as if a negative conception or proposition were not something, viz. a Thought or a Word, as well as an affirmative: Such workmen make the world with words. 509. BEing afraid of wearying the Reader I pass by other School-controversies here, and only propound to each man's Conscience, whether 1. He that is the affirmer of unproved acts of God, 2. And that about his secret unsearchable Volitions, 3. And of such acts as make the difficulties inextricable about Gods being the Cause of sin, be not on the far unsafer side, than he that only saith, Quae supra nos nihil ad nos? If these be not certainly false, they are certainly unproved, and therefore not to be here received. 510. And I say here as Buridane saith about the forementioned nature of Liberty, Ethic. li. 3. qu. 1. p. 152. Simpliciter & firmiter credere volo— quod Voluntas caeteris omnibus eodem modo se habentibu●, potest in actus oppositos— Et nullus debet de via communi recedere propter rationes sibi insolubiles, specialiter in his quae fidem tangere possunt aut mores: Qui enim credit se omnia scire, & in nulla opinionum suarum decipi, fatuus est. De festuca enim tibi sensibiliter praesentata, formabuntur centum rationes, vel quaestiones, de quibus contraris sapientissimi doctores opinabuntur: propter quod in qualibet harum deceptus erit alter ipforum vel ambo: Ideo non miror si in hac altissima materia non possum per rationes & solutiones satisfacere mihi ipst.] 511. To proceed in the application, * Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. d. 95. c. 1. Sunt non-nulli Thomistae qui tam severe hanc sequuntur opinionem ut affirment, ●undem ordinem servasse Deum in reprobatione quem in praedestinatione tenuit; scil. ut ante praevisa peccata sola sua Voluntate decreverit quosdam à regno Coelorum excludere, licet non ad poenam sensus destinaverit.— Deinde quos voluit excludere permiserit labi in peccatum ea intentione ut eos excluderet à regno sicut decreverat. Et c. 2. Parum ab hac sententia dissert Scotus, qui qu. 1. d. 41. asserit in Deo duplicem esse Reprobationem; alteram vocat Punitivam, alteram permissivam— Et punitivae dari causam, & ex praevisis peccatis factam fuisse;— Permissivae non dari causam, quia quod homo permittatur labi in primum peccatum, nulla ex parte illius datur causa: hujus enim solum nititur Scotus causam negare— Hinc ordinem hune in ment Divina assignat: (etc. ut alibi.) Scotum sequuntur Bassolis, Corduba, etc. Objicit Bradward. Privationes ut eclipses, mors, etc. habent positivas causas. To which what I have said is a sufficient answer. And 1. Sometimes they have not; but only the cessation of a causation: 2. They never have a positive efficient of themselves, (for nothing is not made) but only a positive remover of the cause of that which the subject is deprived of, or an interposer or hinderer of the causation of it, e. g. of Light or life; And death hath no cause but that which ceaseth the causes of life. Reprobation is commonly looked at in the two most notable parts (as called,) 1. God's Reprobating men to unbelief and impenitency; 2. His Reprobating men to final damnation. The last of these also is considered in the execution, 1. As Privative. 2. As Positive, called Poena damni & sensus. And both (especially the Privative part) are considerable, 1. As executed by man himself on himself freely. 2. Or as executed by God: Concerning each of these observe, 512. 1. Not to Believe and Repent is no real entity: And not to Give faith and Repentance (as is said) is no real entity: And to Permit Infedelity and Impenitency is no real entity (as is proved:) And not to Decree the Giving of saith, and the hindering of unbelief is nothing: And (most clearly) besides these four nothings, nothing can be proved either existent or needful. All that cometh to pass, will come to pass without any more ado. Therefore. 513. As far as any mortal man can prove God hath no such Act of Reprobation at all, as is, 1. Either a Decree that a man shall not eventually Repent. 2. Or a Decree not to give him Repentance. 3. Or a Decree to Permit his Impenitence. 4. Nor can we prove an after Volition of his own former non Volition which is asserted by Scotus. But the three first we have great reason to lay by; and so not only to say as Davenant that this part of Reprobation is an Act negative quoad objectum, but that it is no Act, and there is no other Reprobation as to this part save, 1. Gods not decreeing to give faith, 2. And his not giving it. 514. 2. And as to Damnation, so much of it as consisteth in sin itself, God no otherwise causeth than as he doth all sin, which is properly, not at all; It being but the Act as an act which he causeth as the Cause of Nature, and not as sinfully qualified: and so no more decreeth this than other sin. 515. And most men little think how much of damnation lieth in sin itself, and the privative consequents which need no other cause. 1. To be ignorant of God and Goodness. 2. To be void of the Love of God and Holiness, and Holy persons, and all the Holy employment of Heaven. 3. To be thereby void of all the Delights of Holy ones, which consist in such Knowledge, Love and Employment, Praise, Obedience, and holy Communion. 4. To be uncapable of the Reception of Divine complacency; as he that maketh himself blind is uncapable of the light, or he that maketh himself unlovely is uncapable of immediate Love. 5. To be defiled and diseased with all kind of sinful lusts, and malignity, and made like the Devil. 6. To have all sorts of Lusts in violence when they can have no fuel or satisfaction, and so to be tormented with these lusts. To have extreme selfishness and Pride, when they have cast themselves into the utmost shame and misery. 7. To see that no Creature can deliver them, and to despair of ever being better, as having no hope from God or any other. 8. To see or know that others enjoy the Glory and everlasting felicity which they have lost. 9 To think how easily once they might have attained it; and how it was offered freely to their choice. 10. To think of all the solicitations of mercy that importuned them, and all the time and means they had. 11. To think for how base a vanity they lost it, and that misery was their wilful choice. 12. To be tormented with envy and malice against God that forsaketh them, and against his Saints; And to feel conscience awakened setting home all their former folly; All this is nothing but sin and its own effects, which hath no Causation at all from God, but to continue the nature which he gave them, and is not bound to destroy. And how great a part of hell is this? 516. Nay we know not how much sensible Pain may be the consequent of their own sin, without any other Act of God, than his common continuation of nature itself: As a man that eateth Arsenic, or unwholesome meat, is tormented by it, without any other act of God, than as the universal Cause of Nature. 517. All this much of Damnation then being merely the work of the sinner himself, so far as there is no Act of God in the execution, so far no man can prove any Positive Act of Volition or Decree. 518. But 1. As God in these is the universal cause of Nature, and so of natural acts, 2. And as in other instances he actually further punisheth them, 3. And as he actually made that Law which made these penalties the sinners due; so far God hath a Positive Decree and Volition, that these persons shall be damned: And moreover, as improperly or morally his not sanctifying them, and not saving them is called his Act, and is really their penalty, even so may his not-willing to save or glorify them be called his Decree and will to damn them, if you will. 519. By this time we are ready to answer our first question, What are the objects of these several acta of God, so far as connotatively we must call them several. And 1. * Besides all before cited against Volitions de nihilo, see Ruiz de Vol. Dei, disp. 6. §. 1. p. 36. [Antiquorum gravissimi sentiunt Deum non omnia Velle, sed ea duntarat bona quae in aliqua differentia temporis existunt: proinde possibilia que nunquam futura sunt non amari à Deo, ●●●● Mala: & inde Deum not esse omni-volentem: & n●llam creaturam à Deo amari necessario: Ita Albertus, Alexand. Bo●●vent. Richard. Gaby. Bannez, Zumel, Molina, Valentia, Scotus Against which he bringeth frivolous reasons, and asserteth, that God willeth as a material object, the Goodness which the Creature would have if it were made, and this as to all Creatures which never will be. What putid contradictions are here? to will Goodness which is no Goodness, of all Creatures which are no Creatures, as material objects, which are nothings? God willeth his own Power, whence man calleth that Possible which is nothing. But was there from Eternity any Possibles not-future to be willed? What was there from Eternity but God? And are all the●e Nothings God himself? Gods not giving the Gospel to any persons, is no Act, and so hath no object. But reductively or improperly the object is, Man sinning against the grace of the first edition of the Law of Grace: that is, These are the subject de quo, of which it is truly said, They are without the Gospel. 520. 2. Gods not converting effectually some that have the Gospel, is no Act, and hath no object: But the subject of the Privation, called the Object, is, Some part of those men who have forfeited the helps of special Grace by their abuse or neglect of the Gospel and the Commoner grace which was given them. 521. 3. Gods not Pardoning, Justifying, Adopting and Sanctifying men, is no Act and hath no object: But the subject of the Privation, and object of the Laws contrary sentence, is, Impenitent, Unbelievers, or the non-performers of the condition of Justification, etc. in the Covenant. 522. 4. Gods not Glorifying men, is no Act, nor the damnation which consisteth in sin as aforesaid, is none of God's act: But the sentence of condemnation is God's Act, and no doubt some other Positive Execution. And the object of these is, All finally Impenitent Unbelievers, and unholy ones, that is, who performed not the Condition of that Edition of the Covenant of Grace which they were under. 523. And it being past all denial that these are the objects of the Executive Acts, we must say that these also are the objects of the Decrees accordingly, where a Decree is proved, and when we speak of them only juxta ordinem executionis, and not Intentionis, which I laid by before. 524. And lest you recur to it, once more I will recite (more of) Davenants words de ordine Intentionis. De Praed. & Reprob. cap. 1. p. 107. [1. Sciendum & tenendum est si Dei naturam & perfectionem in se consideremus, illum non prius unum videre, deinde aliud, neque prius hoc decernere aut velle, deinde illud; sed unico & simplicissimo actu, etc.— 2. Ex parte tamen Rerum quae decrevit signa quaedam prioritatis & posterioritatis distingui possunt,— Hic tamen observandum est, inter ipsos Scholasticos non admodum certam & constantem esse hanc doctrinam de hisce signis seu instantibus prioritatis— Scotus, qui primarius est ad haec signa fabricanda artifex, videtur non-nullis non solum eadem posuisse priora & posteriora secundum nostrum intelligendi modum, sed etiam statuisse unum esse in ipso Deo prius naturâ alio. (But from this he vindicateth him.) Ex adversa parte Occamus noster haec signa quocunque modo considerata negavit, in 1. d. 9 q. 3. Et Biel ejus sententiam amplexus haec signa oppugnavit. in 3. d. 2. q. 1. dub. 3. [Prioritates, in Divinis non sunt ponendae, sicut nec pluralitates actuum ordinatorum. Unus est enim Actus in Divinis, re & ratione indistinctus, qui est ipsa essentia Divina.— ne secundum nostram quidem considerationem talem ordinem Prioritatis & posterioritatis concipi posse in decretis Divinis, ut talis consideratio non sit falsa speculatio.] If this hold, our Controversy of the order is at an end. 525. And he added the words even of a rigid Thomist [Domin. Bannes, quamvis non omnino explodat haec signa cum Biele, perpendens tamen discordiam Theologorum in his assignandis [Animadvertendum est, inquit, quam pro libito in negotio praedestinationis & reprobationis multiplicentur instantiae à Theologis, & quam parum illa conferant ad assignandam rationem differentiae inter praedestinatos & reprobos. Liceat itaque hic paucis monere, non esse nimis confidendum, aut certo dogmati adhaerendum, ulli certo ordini decretorum divinorum, sive à Protestantibus, sive à Pontificiis assignato, cum difficile sit duos reperire, sive inter nostros, sive inter adversarios, qui ad amussim per omnia consentiant in hac serie decretorum divinorum describenda. Caveat it aque un●squisque ne talem considerationem praedestinationis & reprob inducat quae vel Divinae justitiae, vel gratiae gratuitae adversetur, & t●m non multum refert quo ordine prioritatis, etc.] SECT. XVII. Of God's Causing, and Decreeing Sin. 526. BUt because it is the avoiding of Gods Causing and Willing sin Of too many such enquirers it may be said with Augustine, de Utilit. Cred●ndi cap. 18. Dum nimis quaerunt unde sit malum, nihil reperi●nt nisi malum. Obj. Omnis determinatio di●ina est immutabilis: Omnia siu●t Deo determinante: Ergo omnia siunt immut●hiliter. Respondet M●lan●th. Ad maj. Est immut●bil●s necessitate conseq●entiae. Ad minor. Dissimil●s est determinatio in bonis & malis actionibus: Mala siunt, 1. Deo praesciente & non impedi●nte, non autem adjuvante vel impellente: Item, Deo sustentante naturam & suum opus: Item, Deo eventus certos decernente: Strigel. in Melancth. pag. 296. Carbo Compend. Thom. 1. q. 19 a. 9 Malum ut malum nullo app●titu potest appeti nisi per a●●id●ns. Deus ●ullo modo vult malum Culpae— Deus neque vult si●ri malum, ●●que non vult, sed permitti. Ruiz de praedesin. Tr. 2. disp. 13. §. 3, 4. would prove a decree to permit mortal sin in the unjust and just ex destitutione & circumstantiis. And d. 16. §. 3. he tell●th us of many ways by which God maketh sin the occasion of his Grace without causing or willing sin, in form or nearest matter. which is a great reason of these Controversies, I shall say somewhat more particularly of that. About which there are various Opinions. 1. Some think (as Hobbs) that no acts of the will are so free as not to be necessitated, as the motions in an Engine, though unobserved by ourselves, who see not the Concatenation of Causes. 527. 2. Some Dominicans, and our Dr. Twisse and Rutherford held, that no act natural or free can be done by any creature, without the Predetermination of God's Physical efficient immediate Premotion, as the first total Cause of that act: But yet that this standeth with Liberty, because God causeth contingentia contingenter fieri. And that he so causeth every Act of sin in all its circumstances; and the totum materiale peccati; and all that the sinner causeth: But yet that he is not the Author of sin, nor causeth the form; Because 1. They say, that sin hath no efficient cause, but a deficient, which God is not, being not obliged to act: And sin is nothing, but a privation. 2. Because God is under no Law: and therefore though he do the same things that man doth, it is sin in man, but not in him: And saith Holkot, he is the cause of sin, but not the Author, because he commandeth it not by his Law. 3. At other times they say, that sin is formally a Relation of disconformity to the Law of God, and God causeth the whole act as circumstanced, but not the relation, which resulteth from it. 4. And God causeth not sin as sin, but as a means to his Glory, or as a punishment of former sin. 528. 3. Others say, as Camero, that the Intellect necessitateth the will, and the Objects and temptations necessitate the Intellect, and God causeth the Objects and Laws, and permitteth the Tempter. 529. 4. Others say, that God only as the Cause of Nature, 1. By Support and Concourse necessary to all agents, causeth the Act as an Act in general, 2. And giveth Power also to act or not act freely, 3. And as Governor of the World doth that which he knew men would make an occasion of their sin, 4. And also by his Providence causeth many effects, of which men's sins are also a cause, 5. And after bringeth good out of their evil: 6. But as to the sin itself he is no cause of it, either as sin or punishment, either of the form, or of the Act as morally specified, that is, as it is about this Forbidden object (or End) rather than another. And this opinion I take to be the undoubted truth. 530. Let it here be noted, 1. That the five things here granted are all certain truths, 2. And that they are as much as is necessary on God's part, in respect to the events which we see; And unnecessaries are not to be asserted; 3. That they fully show God to be the perfect Governor of the World, and all therein; 4. And yet to be no Author of sin: Let us consider of the particulars. 531. I. It is certain that God as Creator hath made man a Vital Agent, and therefore a self-actor (under him); and an Intellectual Agent, and therefore is not tied to follow the perceptions of sense alone; And a Free-willing Agent, and therefore hath a Power to Act or not Act hic & nunc, or to choose or refuse, or to choose this rather than that as far as consisteth with his Necessary Volitions (which I acknowledged and enumerated before: which is part of Gibieufs and Guil. Camerarius Scot meaning by their servato ordine finis: Though I think that Annatus doth not unjustly accuse Gibieuf of confusion and unskilfulness in the managing of that matter.) 532. II. It is certain that as Motus vel Actio is quid Naturale, it is of God as the first Cause of Nature: * Vid. Gregor. Arim. in 2. d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg. 8. & 12. whose judgement many Schoolmen follow: Vasquez thus abbreviateth and reporteth him in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99 c. 4. [M●tionem Dei ordine causae priorem esse cooperatione & determinatione nostra in operibus bonis: at in operibus peccati, etiam secundum substantiam & seclusa malitia priorem esse nostram determination●m: & codem ordine baec inter se comparari in aeternita●●.— Ex quo inserunt Deum praefinisse opera bona ante det●rminati●n●m nostram ullo modo praevisam; sed mala secundum substantiam nequaquam, nisi praecognita determinatione nostrae voluntatis. Vid. Marsil. in 1. q. 45. ar. 2. post 4. conclus. And so when a sinner acteth, it is not without this Universal first Cause: Whether God do it only, as Durandus thought, by the mere continuation of the nature of all things, Active and Mobile, or by any superadded concourse besides, is nothing to our present business; which only showeth that God is the Cause. 533. III. It is certain that Governing Providence by doing good doth set before men that which they make an occasion of all their evil: Every thing is turned into sin by sinners, † Titus 1. 15, 16. and to the unclean all things are unclean, through the uncleanness of their own minds and consciences: As to the pure and holy all things are pure and sanctified. Bad stomaches corrupt the wholsomest food. All Gods mercies are abused to sin. 534. It is certain that God fore-knew this: And yet that he is no way obliged to deny men life, or take it away, lest they abuse it, or deny men all those mercies, or remove them, which he forseeth that they will turn to sin. 535. iv It is certain that God often concurreth to the causing of the very same effect which sin also causeth; and so is as a concause of it with sin: And this effect is so near to the Act of sin, as that the sin itself is oft called by its name as if it were its nearest matter (which it is not.) And this is the occasion of the Great mistake of men in this case, that canno● distinguish. Of which more anon in the instances. 536. V And it is certain, that God as the Governor of the World, doth do much good by the occasion of men's sin. But this is not to turn the sin itself into good. 537. VI And to these five operations of God, I add, as to his Volitions, that all this which he doth, he willeth or decreeth to do. And he hath no contrary will at all. 538. But that which we deny is, that He is any proper cause of the sin itself, efficient or deficient, culpable or not culpable, Physical or Moral; For the opening of which we must inquire what sin is, and what goeth to its being or constitution. 539. All grant that God is our Ruler by a Law, and also our ultimate End as he is Optimus & Amabilissimus, and that he is our absolute Owner: And that as rational free agents we that are his own, are also his Subjects and Beneficiaries, and made capable of Loving him as our ultimate end, and of obeying his Laws: And that sin is our Disobedience to these Laws, with our denying God ourselves as his Own, and withholding or perverting the Love which we own him as our End. 540. As Logic hath confounded us in most other cases by arbitrary unsuitable second notions (making us a shoe not meet for the Foot,) so that it's easier to know Things without those unfit notions than with them; so hath it done here. Men may more easily know what sin is, and what it is to disobey a Law, and that either by doing what we should not, or by not doing what we are commanded, than they can know by what Logical or Metaphysical name it should be called: Whether a privation, or a relation, an act or no act, etc. But it is not only for Logicians that God made his Laws; nor is it only a Metaphysical Conscience that will accuse men or condemn them, and torment them for their sin. 541. No Act merely as an Act in genere is forbidden of God. For the soul is an Active nature, and can no more cease all action, than to be: though it can forbear a particular act as to this object, and at this time. And God is the Cause of Acts as such. 542. I have showed before that as Action itself is no substance, but the mode or motion of a substance, so to choose this object rather than that, hath no more of Action in it than to have chosen the other, or than Ex to verb quoth D●us conc●● at nobiscum ad actum peccati, prout facultas liberi arbitrii postulat, sive prius, sive posterius, sive simul, non sequitur malitiam Deo esse tribuendam, cum illa solum ex modo operandi creaturae sequatur. Vasquez in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99 cap. 4. the general nature of action when existent hath: So that this Moral specification addeth not to the natural generical entity. 543. It is therefore 1. Acting, 2. Not acting, 3. Moral disposition, which are Commanded and Forbidden by God: And not any one only: and these not in themselves, but about the Materials commanded or forbidden Objectively, in the Law. To Act on a forbidden object; Not to Act on an object when commanded, and to be viciously disposed to either, is a sin. 544. You may see then, that sin is a Connotative notion, yea, and a Relative notion; It connoteth a Ruler, a Law, and End, a Subject, and is thus variously Related. 545. As Subjection is the Root of Obedience, and all obedience Virtually, being A Consent to obey, and Love is the Root of benefits; so to forsake God simply as our Rector or our End, or our Owner, is Atheism practical, and all sin in one: But to violate only a particular precept de mediis, is but a particular sin. 546. God is the Cause of the Law which commandeth and forbiddeth, and God is the Cause of Nature, and Objects, and Action as Action: That therefore which he hath made man's part is to Love God and Holiness, and not to overlove the creature, nor to love it as our End or in his stead: and to do all that he commandeth, and not to do the particular acts about such particular objects as he forbiddeth. 547. The remote subject or relatum then of sin, is the person sinning; But the nearest is the Act, Omission or disposition; The fundamentum or ratio referendi is the said Acts, Omissions or dispositions, as such or such, about such or such objects, commanded or forbidden; which is a Relation; And the form of sin is the Moral Relation of Disobedience, or Disconformity to the Law. So that if you must needs have it in Logical notions, Sin is a Moral Relation, resulting from a Physical relation of Actions, Omissions or dispositions of God's subjects, which are modified contrary to his Law. 548. It is a Moral Relation as it is Disobedience, found in a Moral agent against a Law and Rector as such. It is a Physical Relation as the Act, etc. is prius naturâ quid naturale, about an object that is quid naturale. It's fundamentum (of both relations: And one Relation may be sounded in another) is the Mode of the Act, Omission or disposition, as to an undue object, etc. as it is forbidden by the Law. Of the subjects and relatum I have spoken before. 549. So that the form of sin being Relative can have no Cause but that which causeth its fundamentum: and cannot possibly but result when that is laid. 550. It were an injury to God to feign him to make such a Law as should say, [Though thou hate me, see that that hatred be not Related formally as a breach of my Law,] or [I forbidden thee not to commit Adultery, but only forbidden that thy Adultery be quid prohibitum or a sin.] For if God forbidden not the act, it cannot be a sin: and if he forbidden it, it must needs be sin; And so of omissions. 551. They therefore that tell us, that sin is nothing, but a Privation, speak not satisfactorily, nor altogether truly. It is no substance indeed; nor any such Reality as Man cannot Cause without Gods Causing it (supposing his Universal Natural Support and Concourse.) But the thing forbidden is often Acts and Dispositions as well as Omissions: and the form of sin, is a Moral Relation, which hath so much reality as a Relation hath (if that be any). And that Relation hath a positive name; It is not only a mere Nonconformity, but also a Disconformity, becaused founded in See Dr. Wallis against the Lord Brook of this, very well. Actual Volitions and Nolitions as forbidden, and not only in Omissions. 552. Subtle Ockam Quodl. 3. q. 15. disputing Utrum rectitudo & deformitas actus differant à substantia actus? denyeth it; and after a Confutation of the common saying, that Deformitas est carentia rectitudinis debitae, & distinguitur ab actu, quod in peccato Actus est materiale, & carentia justitiae debitae inesse est formale, concludeth, [Quod deformitas non est carentia justitiae vel rectitudinis debitae inesse actui, sed est carentia rectitudinis debitae inesse voluntati: Quod non est aliud dicere, nisi quod voluntas obligatur aliquem actum elicere secundum praeceptum Divinum quem non elicit; & ideo rectitudo actus non est aliud quam qui debuit elici secundum rectam rationem.] But I conceive, 1. That the rectitude of the Will can be nothing else but the rectitude of its acts, suspensions and dispositions; 2. That Ockam here describeth only sins of omissions, whereas the Rectitude of the Will is ofren also materially in not doing or willing what is forbidden. And with these two animadversions I am reconciled to Ockam: who addeth, [Ad aliud dico, Quod illud dictum de Materiali & Formali est falsum; Quia aut est peccatum commissionis aut omissionis: si primo modo, est Materiale sine formali: quia ibi non est carentia rectitudinis, debitae inesse actui: si secundo modo, tunc est ibi carentia quae est formale sine materiali.] Resp. 1. To the first I add, that It had been true, if it had been the Act as an act that had been forbidden, or else the species of the act as quid naturale; But it being the Act not as an act in genere, but as this act thus modified or specified by an undue object, that Act with its Relation as quid physicum are presupposed as the relatum to the moral relation of Pravity or Disconformity. And to the second I say, that it's true that Omission is not Materia Physica; but it is an inadequate first conception of sin, and so is materia moraliter dicta vel loco materiae. And the Omission being considerable, 1. Quatenus Non-agere, 2. Qua privatio naturalis, 3. Quadratus & Privatio & disconformitas moralis, these three inadequate conceptions take up the whole nature of the sins of omission. 553. The same Ockam Quodl. 1. qu. 20. Utrum actus exterior habeat propriam bonitatem vel malitiam moralem? even as dependent on the Will? And he denyeth it against Scotus who affirmeth it: I will not trouble the Reader with their reasonings; not doubting but Ockam erred, and that it's true, 1. That no exterior act is Morally good or evil primarily, 2. But that secondarily and participatively as it is voluntary, there is a morality in the acts. Words, and deeds, and passions are under Law next to the Will, and in dependence on it. As the body conjunct with the soul is a secondary part of the man, so are our exterior acts of sin. 554. The conceit that making sin a mere nothing, doth seem to justify God as not Causing it, is a mere vanity. For, 1. It justifieth the sinner more; who no more is the Cause of nothing than God. 2. Either man is able to do that Something or Act which sin is the privation of, without any other Power than he hath, or not. If he be, than even the Act of sin is not imputable to God: If he be not, than every sin is like our not making of a Sun, or Moon, or World: which if it be a culpable defect, they make God the first deficient. 555. He that would see more of this question of the essence of sin, may read Rada lib. 2. contr. 16. (who first ingenuously confesseth that Tho. and Scotus differ but in words and not in sense, and then layeth down eleven conclusions of little use.) And Marius Scribonius Cosmo. disp. 18. Scotus in 2. d. 37. Bonavent. in 2. d. 35. dub. 6. Henric. Quodl. 1. qu. 25. Alm●in. Moral. tract. 3. cap. 17. Richard. in 2. d. 34. ar. 1. qu. 7. Alex. Ale●s. 2. q. 94. memb. 2. Durand. 2. dis. 31. q. 2. Medin. 12. q. 71. ar. 6. Specially Vasquez 12. disp. 95. cap. 9 Guil. Camerar. Scot Disput. Philos. Part. 1. Mor. q. 3. pag. 162, etc. Argent. in 1. d. 35. q. 1. ar. 2. Gabriel Biel 2. d. 36. q. unica. Valent. 1. 2. d. 2. q. 14. p. 3, etc. Suarez 1. 2. tract. de act. hum. d. 2. sect. 2. Azor. li. 4. c. 24. Tanner. 1. 2. disp. 2. q. 5. dub. 2. & 3. & disp. 4. q. 1. dub. 1. Vega in Trident. 6. c. 39 & li. 14. c. 13. Cordub. l. 3. q. 10. & Cajet. Zumel. Curiel, & alios in 1. 2. q. 19 ar. 4. & q. 71. ar. 6. And, who is usually sounder than most of them, Lombard himself Dist. 35. & Ripalda opening him and citing others dist. 34, 35. But the ordinary Christian that understandeth but what Disobedience signifieth, needeth none of them all. 556. * It is not only Dr. Twisse (after confuted) that supposeth sin to be willed of God as conducible to the perfection of the World, but even Ruiz the Jesuit de Provide. dis. 2. sec●. 4. p. 27. maintaineth that Minus perfectus evasisset Mundus si nulla permitterentur peccata; nune autem ●●asit perfectior occasione peccatorum: and citeth Aquin. Alexand. Albert. Bonav. Richard. Agid. Caiet. Ferrar. Marsil. for the same. But 1. An occasion is no cause nor medium, as such, and therefore never the more willed, if that were true. 2. But I have before briefly confuted the Schoolmen on both sides about this question, viz. Particular Creatures would be to themselves better, were there no sin: but whatever possible alterations were made by God, the Universe would be neither worse nor better than it is, as to that proper Goodness which must absolutely denominate it: For the Goodness of all Creatures is to be conform to the Creator's Will, which is the denominating measure of fundamentum; And so they are, and so they would be, were they altered: But sin is disform to his Commanding Will, and not conform to his Complacence or Efficient Will. He argueth, Had there been no sin, there had been no such exercise of Liberty, no Saviour, etc. Answ. And are t●e Angels worse than man? And had not all this been as good, if God had willed it? Though the five acts of God forementioned about sin, are as far as we need to go, to the common Ends which we agree in, yet many objections are made against this much as not sufficient, but God must have a greater hand in sin: And 1. They object, that to make God but an Universal Cause, is to put something in being, viz. the Act in specie morali, which God is not the Cause of; And so, 1. To make Him idle and unactive as to that: 2. To deify man by making him a first Cause of that moral species. To which I shall lay down such answers as I think will satisfy the considerate, to this Objection which is indeed their All: But I am sorry that the subject occasioneth me to repeat what I said before. 557. 1. Remember that even an Act in genere is not a substance; And that the moral specification is less as to natural entity than it; indeed making no addition of Entity to it, as was showed. And Dr. Twiss asserteth, that this moral specification is not a proper specification of acts. 558. 2. Note that few dare say, that God is not Able to make a free agent with Power to choose or refuse without Gods further predetermining premotion. And if God can do it, we have no reason to debase his work, and think he did not. 559. 3. Note, that for God to make a self determining agent that shall act without his predetermination, is but to put forth his own Active Power with limitation or suspension, that is, To Will and Act or Operate, so far and no further. 560. 4. And note, that this restriction of the Divine operation is not from any finiteness of his power, as if he could do no more, but from the freedom of his Will, and the Conduct of his Wisdom, who seethe it good to do no more. 561. 5. Above all note, that as all Divines agree, that God doth not Act ad ultimum posse, as natural agents do, so the truth is most evident in the finiteness of the World, and the effects of his Power: For God doth not make as many men or other creatures as he could do: He doth not make every man as strong, or wise, or good, or long-lived as he could do: He doth not make every Stone, or Clod, or Tree as Active as he could do, nor move every thing as swiftly as he could do. Now all that is undone which God could do, all possibles which are not existent or future, do tell us plainly that God doth freely suspend the action or operation of his Power, totally as to them: which is much more than to suspend it but in part with free agents, and to give them a Natural self-determining power, without further premoving predetermination of them. If all the World tell us, that he hath the far greater suspension, why should we think the less absurd? 562. 6. And Reason telleth us (what the Schoolmen oft say) that God who showeth us that he delighteth in wonderful variety of his creatures, doth very fitly thus beautify the Universe by a middle rank of creatures, that stand between Confirmed Angels, and the Brutes, viz. Intellectual-free-agents, left to a natural Power of free choosing or refusing, without necessitation, in the midst of various objects, to prepare them by trial for a better state. 563. 7. And note too, that we say not that God's predetermination of man's will destroyeth its best Liberty: God can predetermine the will to Good as he doth the Angels, as a great blessing and felicity: To predetermine the will physically, is to end that Liberty to that particular act, which consisted partly in being undertermined: But that Liberty which consisteth in deliverance from all true evil, is increased by such a Gracious predetermination: And therefore Jansenius pleadeth only for the necessity of predetermination to Good by medicinal Grace, and not to Evil, or mere Natural actions. Yet we say, that even to Good, God can procure the will to determine itself, by moral means, which infinite Wisdom can sufficiently improve. But it is only 1. A natural power to act without predetermination from God or Others, 2. And a Liberty of Condition, from all predetermination ab extra, to evil (from God or Creatures) which I here assert and plead for in this cause. 564. 8. Much less do we take the Will from under the Power and Government of God: For, 1. It could have no self-determining Power but of God, one moment. 2. He giveth it this power, to make us capable subjects of Moral Sapiential Government. 3. He giveth us Governing Laws accordingly. 4. And he attaineth all his Ends and fulfilleth all his Will, as perfectly in consistency with our power and freedom as if we had none such at all: so that God hath his proper Will, whether men Will or not. 565. But the turning point of difficulty here is, Whether God is ever Causa partialis? and if we so make him, is it not injurious to his perfect operations? All our Controversies turn upon the decision of this one question. See the End. For if we may conceive of God, as Scotus speaketh, like one that draweth at the same Ship with another; and the act of both must concur to the effect; then all is easy, and we may say when men Love not God, repent not, believe not, etc. that God did his part, but the sinner did not his, and so the effect failed. As if a Father did resolve that he will help I remember one derideth John Goodwin for this similitude or the like, (Mr. Roborough.) his little Child to lift up a weight, and will put to nine hundred ninety nine parts of the strength that is necessary, but no more, because the Child shall do something (one part) to show his willingness and obedience; Here if the thing be done, it is the Father that deserves nine hundred ninety nine parts of the praise: If it be undone, the Child only doth deserve the blame. But we have more to say. 566. Note therefore, 1. That here the Child hath in himself a Power independent on his Father, and therefore the whole effect is not to be ascribed to the Father. But man hath no Power but of God, and what he holdeth, yea, and useth in dependence on him. And therefore the praise of all his Power and his Acts as Acts are due to God. 2. And all the good Inclinations of his will, and all the Laws, promises, persuasions, threaten, mercies, afflictions, examples, convictions, which tend morally to turn his will, are from God; so that in every good Volition or action man doth no more than God did both enable him, command him, persuade him and help him to do, and so procure the actual determination of his will. So that de re we see how much God doth always (besides that Grace may sometimes for aught I know otherwise predetermine:) And we see what man doth: And all that you can desire more is, that no man that doth any good act, should be able at that instant not to do it, or to do otherwise; and than it must follow that no man that omitteth a good act, or that sinneth, could do otherwise: which are false. * Molina maketh God Causam partialem 1. p. q. 14. a. 3. disp. 6. Sotus li. 2. Phys. disput. de causis denyeth it; And Zumel disputeth against it in Disp. in 1, 2. Thom. p. 43. Concl. 2. And so do many others; And great diversity here is among them while some affirm and some deny, but none of us understand the mystery of divine concourse. So that here is only the lis de nomine left, An Deus sit Causa partialis? I think it fittest to say, that he is Causa totalis of his own Act, and of the effect as it is an Act, and of all that is laudable in it too, for the reasons aforesaid. But yet he is not the Causa sola, nor in that sense totalis of the Moral specification, as if when he giveth his Creature a Power of choosing or refusing freely, it could not be done, without his further physical predetermination. 567. And (under favour) I take the name Causa partialis, to be improper, and that it should properly be called Pars Causae: For when divers concur in efficiency, all make but one proper efficient Cause. † So say Ockam and Gabriel Biel though Zumel call it a most improper mode of speaking, because so no one 'Cause could be called Total: And why should it, if it be not? (except that God is above our order, and so not a Part.) Bonavent. in 1. dis. 38. q. 2. inquit, Futurum triplex est: Quoddam est cujus Deus est tota Causa, ut Creata: Quoddam cujus Creatura, aut Voluntas est Tota Causa, ut sunt defectus & peccata: Quoddam cujus Deus & Creatura simul sunt Causa, ut sunt opera naturalia & moralia; quia Deus cooperatur creaturae: Respe●●u primi futuri Divina praescientia est tota causa: secundi non causa: tertii est Causa sed non tota. Gab. Bi●l in 2. d. 37. bringeth in Scotus saying [Licet Deus Volendo causat omnia quae causat, non tamen ideo est Causa totalis: quia vult etiam secum concurrere alias causas, & utrumque vult, & effectus esse, & secum concurrere Causas secundas, non diversis, sed una Volitione, nec unum plus alio, sed aeque utrumque & simul— Et nulla Creatura est Causa totalis— Quia semper concurrit Deus ut Causa partialis— Et ad dub. 2. ex Greg. Arim. Nobiscum ●anquam Causa partialis producit actum malum. Gregor. Arim. his words are (in 2. d. 34. a. 3.) Actus mali quem efficit Peccator, Deus est immediata Causa: Partialis tamen, co-efficiens actum eundem. Of Greg. Arim. see more in the conclusion of this Chapter. Now I suggest to the Learned Reader that is against me, How he will decide the forementioned hard question, Whether there be more Entity in God and the Creature than in God alone? It is dangerous saying Yea or Nay: and we know not well what to say: But for my part, as I said, I will not say that God is Pars Entitatis, nor yet that the Creature is not Ens, nor yet that it is God: But the solution must be either from the Equivocation of Entity, or from the Creatures Inexistence in God, or from somewhat rather which I know not. And just so here; the question is, Whether God's Causation and Man's be more than God's alone? And I will not say that Gods is a Part; nor yet that Man's is none, nor that it is the same with Gods: But that Gods acting and concourse are quite above the reach of Mortals. 568. But here again note what I said even now, 1. That it is no more sign of finiteness in God, nor dishonour to him, to be a limited or Partial Cause, than to be no Cause, and limited totally by suspension of the whole act: And yet so he is as to all Possibles which he doth not make or move. 2. And that it is his own free will only that thus limiteth him; As it doth from giving all men more grace, etc. So that really here is matter of satisfaction. 569. Though he offend me by making God the Cause of sin, I will here cite the words of our Countryman, Holkot Quodl. lib. 2. qu. 1. [Est sententia omnium Theologorum quod Deus est Causa immediata omnis rei productae, sic quod omni creaturae agenti, sive sit Natura sive Voluntas, Deus coagit: & sic imaginandum est quod in omni actione creaturae qua aliquid producit, Deus & Creatura sunt duae causae Partiales illius producti: Non sic imaginando quod Deus producit unam partem effectus, & creatura aliam, & ob hoc dicatur Causa partialis— sed ideo quia concurrunt in agendo vel causando— Unde tam causa universalis quam particularis dicitur communiter causa partialis: & ideo etiam Sol & Hom● sunt duae causae partiales hominis generandi; & similiter Vir & Mulier: Quia ad hoc quod aliquid dicitur causa partialis sufficit quod sit tale quod propter ipsum & quoddam aliud vel quaedam alia res ponatur in esse, sit quod illis positis res est, & aliquo istorum ablato res non fiet.] 570. Further I desire that it may be specially noted, that God is our Creator in order of Nature before he is our Ruler; And that Nature is before Morality, (obedience or sin.) And that God as Creator first settled the order of Nature so, as that the Alteration of that Law or settled Order should not be ordinarily expected by us, though he can alter it: And therefore that man is man, and hath a Natural Power of Self-determination, and that God upholdeth him, and concurreth as an Universal Cause, belongeth to this fore-setled natural order, and is presupposed to moral determinations and specifications, either as from God or man. 571. And note, that to Good Acts we have need of more Help from God, than this mere Natural Causality and Concourse. And therefore God affordeth us more accordingly; but not to all alike. 572. It is further objected, against this way, that our making Reprobation to Infidelity, Permission of sin, not-giving faith, etc. to be no Acts of God, cometh all to one as to men's sin and damnation; because man cannot believe, nor avoid sin, without those Acts of Grace which God withholdeth? Answ. I confess it were all one if the supposition were true, as it is not: For we have proved after, that man hath power without those acts of Grace which God suspendeth, by that Common Grace which he giveth, to do more good and forbear more evil than they do: Of which in due place. 573. It is objected also, that while we make God's Providence to fill the World with occasions of sin, which he fore-knoweth men will take to their damnation, yea, as long as God could prevent all sin, and save all souls, and yet will not, it cometh all to one which way soever you go in these Controversies. I answer, 1. Undoubtedly Gods Judgements are unsearchable. But when we come into his Light, we shall be perfectly reconciled to them all. 2. And undoubtedly God doth whatsoever he will, and all that he thought meet to Decree or Will, shall come to pass in despite of sin. 3. And when we have said all, flesh and blood will be unsatisfied, till faith and the will of God do satisfy us. 4. But yet be it known to you, that there is a great difference between Gods permitting sin (after great means against it) and his causing it: Between the making of a free agent, and putting life or death in his choice; and his causing men unavoidably to sin, and then to damn them for it. The Holiness of God's Nature will stand with the Being of sin, by man's causing; but not with Gods causing it. And the Truth of God's Word must be considered. 574. If this were all one (to Damn men unavoidably, and to give them their free choice of Heaven or Hell, in the means) it is strange that so many Learned men as among the Jesuits, Arminians, Lutherans and Greeks, do hold no other Grace at all, but what leaveth man to such a free Choice, could ever be so satisfied: (when others hold that the Elect have more.) SECT. XVIII. A Confutation of Dr. Twisse 's Digr. 5. l. 2. sect. 1. Vind. Grat. 575. I Come now to consider of what is said by them that go further about God's will or Causality as to sin. And because Dr. Twisse hath a peculiar Digression (Vindic. Grat. li. 2. p. 1. Digr. 4.) I will somewhat animadvert upon it. He beginneth [Sententia nostra haec est, Deum hactenus dici posse Velle peccatum quatenus vult ut peccatum ●iat— viz. ipso permittente: And so he maketh the question, An Dens Velit ut peccatum eveniat ipso permittente? Arminius thought God willed only his own Permission of the sin: Twisse saith, that he willed that sin should come to pass, God permitting it. Arminius his concession cannot be proved (as I have showed;) But Twisses must be disproved. And 1. I will give you our Reasons against it. Bonavent. in 1. d. 46. q. 3. resolveth this question very plainly and truly [Mala ●ieri nullatenus bonum esse potest: sed bene occasio boni: And showing the difference between Causa, Casus & Occasio, he saith that Causa est procedens & intendens: Casus p●ivat Intentionem sed non operationem: Occasio privat utrumque. And he distinguisheth Occasion into that which hath ratio●●m Acti●i & excitat agentem; and that which hath but rationem passivi, as one by another's evil exciteth himself to do good. And also between the evil and the ordinability to good. And saith the evil is but the occasio passiva of the good, and the ratio boni quod substernitur, is occasio aliquo modo activa— Vide locum. 576. Let the Reader remember, that what the Author saith of God's Willing, he also in the point of Predetermination saith of his working: viz. that he Causeth as much as he willeth: But I pass that by now because I have largely confuted it elsewhere. And to speak to One is to speak to both. 577. 1. All sober Christians are agreed, on what side soever, that God is not the Cause of sin, except some odd presumers who are condemned by the generality: One or two spoke some hard words that way in Belgia, whom the Synod of Dort rejected: Mr. Archers Book was burnt for it by the Parliament or Westminster Synod. Beza himself (in Rom. 8. 28. & passim) abhorreth it as intolerable blasphemy. But this Doctrine in question plainly maketh God the Willer and Cause of sin: Yea more, very much more than wicked men or Devils are: which is not true. 578. For they make Men and Devils to be but a second premoved predetermined Cause of the Act (of Volition and Execution) whence the formal obliquity necessarily resulteth: But 1. God is certainly the Cause of the Nature which is the Agent: 2. He is the Cause of the Law which maketh the act in specie to be sin: His saying, Thou shalt not commit Adultery or Murder, maketh Adultery and Murder to be sin, when they are committed, which they would not be without the Law. 3. God causeth and ordereth all the objects and occasions. 4. And now they also say that God willeth ut peccatum fiat, (and is the first predetermining Cause, even the total Cause, of all that is in the act and all its circumstances, without which predetermination it could not be.) So that man doth but will what God first willeth, and act what God first moveth him unavoidably to act, as the pen in my hand. 5. And the Law and the Act being put in being, the Relative obliquity is but the necessary result, and hath no other cause. 579. And note here what Estius before cited (after Aquinas) saith that to Will that peccatum sit vel fiat, is all that the Sinner himself doth, when he willeth sin. And therefore it's a vain thing here to distinguish between willing sin, and willing the event, futurity and existence of it, ut peccatum fiat vel eveniat: (Though I confess I was long detained in suspense if not deceived by that distinction.) For he willeth sin, who willeth the existence of it, or that it be or come to pass. 580. And note, that it is both matter and form, Act and obliquity which they say God willeth ut fiat: For it is sin: And forma dat nomen. It is not sin, but by the form of sin. But if they had said otherwise, it had been all one: For he that willeth the fundamentum, relate and correlate, Saith Twisse Vindic. Gra●. li. 1. P. 1. Sect. 7. p. 137. [Posito quod velit per●ectiones istas manifestare, necesse est non impediat ingressum peccati, sed permittat.] 1. As if he had proved that God was not able to manifest his Mercy and Justice by Laws, and Illuminating men to know them, without execution by the occasion of sin? 2. Yet doth he make Christ's death unnecessary and his satisfaction to Justice so far as that God could have accomplished our pardon and salvation another way if he would: And is sin better or more necessary than Christ's satisfaction? 3. And methinks they that lay so little on Moral means and operations of Grace in comparison of Physical, should not give so much to sin, which were it a means (as it is not, but a Passive and opposite occasion) is but a moral means. And himself saith page 136. [Permissio peccati proprie medium est assequendi ●inem à Deo praefixum: At peccatum non est Medium proprie dictum, sive manifestandae Dei misericordiae, sive justitiae: Media enim ejus sunt naturae, ut ad ea facienda, mov●atur quis ex intentione finis.] Would the Reader have a better confuter of him than himself? But he there addeth that it is Materia etsi non medium, as stone and Timber to an House. And yet sin they say hath no matter besides the subject and object, but is a mere Privation of moral Rectitude. But if it be to the Devil's Kingdom loco materiae, it is not so to Christ's. Rather, if a beggar Want a house, is that Want the Materia domus? no nor the Materia of his mercy or bounty that buildeth it. Thus the defectiveness of the subtlest wits abuseth God and his Church, when the Christian simplicity of modest souls with a holy life would honour him. So Sect. 9 pag. 137. Peccatum mihi videtur propri● dicendum esse materiam manifestandae Dei sive misericordi●, sive i●stiti● poti●s quam medium: Permissionem vero peccati medium esse ejus manifestandae proprie dictum. But 1. how oft elsewhere doth he forget and contradict this? 2. Permission itself is nothing (being but non-impedire.) And is nothing, or non-agere, a proper means? But especially I entreat the Reader to observe that in that very place Twisse and Arminius are herein professedly agreed, that it is the Permission of sin, and not the sin, that is the Divine medium (only one saith Praedestinationis, and the other providentia:) And yet they will differ while they agree: And I that differ from both, would agree with both. willeth the Relation. 581. There is nothing left to be said then, but that God willeth that sin be done, but not as sin, or because it is sin; But this is nothing. For, 1. Either none or few of the Reprobate do will sin because it is Sin, but because of the pleasure of sense or imagination, or for seeming good. 2. And if a man or Devil do maliciously Will sin as sin because it is against God, so doing is but one of their sins, which they say God willeth ut fiat before they willed it (and predetermined them to it:) so that here is nothing in it but what is first and chief of God. 582. If they say that God willeth it for the Glory of his Justice, and so do not wicked men, but for wicked ends or in enmity to God; I answer, That proveth that God hath a will which the wicked have not, but not that the wicked have any will which God hath not: For that Will and that Enmity to God still is but one of their sins which they say God first willeth ut fiat. 583. Obj. But it is only ut fiat ipso permittente, non faciente. Answ. The hypocrisy of that addition maketh it but the worse in the assertors. For 1. They usually make Gods will effective of the thing willed. 2. They maintain that there is nothing in the act as circumstantiated which God is not the total first efficient Cause of. 3. They confess that the formal relation necessarily resulteth from the act and Law: And why then do they put in the word [permittente?] Would not that deceitfully insinuate to the Reader that the sinner doth something which God doth not do, but only permit, when they mean no such thing? For that is my second reason against them. 584. 2. By their doctrine God never permitteth sin (which is false:) For that which he Willeth and Causeth as the first total Cause, he cannot be said to Permit: To do a thing, and move another to do it, will not stand with proper permission. 585. Obj. But God preserveth our own Liberty in acting. Answ. 1. By Liberty you mean nothing but Willingness as such, that God doth not make mens Nilling to be a Willing or contra in the same act. Which is but to say that God causeth me to Will sin, and not to Will-nill-it? 2. If you mean more, I deny that ever God gave Power to the Will, to Will or Nill contrary to the Volition and physical premoving predetermination of the first cause. 3. But if all this were so, it's nothing to the present case; and doth not prove that God is not the Cause of the sin, but only that man is a Cause also, caused by the first Cause; and that God Wills and Causeth us to sin willingly and freely. 586. 3. By this means they make God equally to Will and Cause our Holiness and our sin: For they cannot possibly tell us what he doth more to Cause our Holiness, than to Will it, and to predetermine the will of man to it, (besides commanding it, which is a moral act, and we speak only of proper efficiency.) He doth but will that Holiness be, and cause all that hath any entity in it; And so they say he doth about sin. 587. Obj. He loveth our Holiness for itself, and so he doth not sin. Answ. The first is denied by themselves, if you speak of God's end: For they confess that God only is his own end, for which he loveth all things: 2. And his Love is either his efficient or complacential Volition. 1. The efficient which is all that is now in question they must confess is equal to both, if he equally will the existence of both. Object. But he hath a Complacence in Good only. Answ. 1. He hath a Complacence in the fulfilling of his own will as efficient. Therefore if sin be the fulfilling of his Will, he hath a complacency in it. The formal reason of a pleasing object to God is, as it is the fulfilling of his own Will; And to break his Law they make to be such: ergo, pleasing. 2. But if it were not so, that's nothing to our Case, of the efficient Will. 588. 4. To avoid tediousness, in sum, This opinion seemeth to me, to leave very little or no place for the Christian Religion. For 1. It overthroweth the formale objectum fidei, which is Veracitas Divina, and leaveth no certainty of any word of God: For if he do will and predetermine by premotion, ut fiat omne mendacium, quod fit, than we have no way to know that he did not so by the Prophets and Apostles. 2. It maketh the Scripture false, which saith so much of God's hatred and unwillingness of sin. 3. It obliterateth the notion of God's Holiness, which is made the great reason of our holiness. 4. It maketh man's Holiness to be no Holiness, but a common or indifferent thing. 5. It maketh sin, so little odious (as being a Divine offspring) as will destroy the hatred of it and care to avoid it. 6. It will thereby nullify all our Godly sorrow, repenting, confession, and all practice of means against any sin. 7. It will hardly let men believe that Christ came into the world, and did and suffered so much to save men from sin, and to destroy it. 8. Or that it is the work of the Holy Ghost to sanctify souls and mortify sin. 9 It will hardly let men believe that there is any Hell, and that God will damn men for ever, for that which they did upon his prevolition and predetermination, unavoidably. 10. It seemeth to give Satan's description to God, and more. For Satan can but tempt us to sin, but they make God absolutely to will that it be, and physically to predetermine us to it. And so Christ that came to destroy the work of the Devil, the father of lies, malice and murder, should come to destroy the work of God. 11. It taketh away the reason of Church discipline, and purity, and of our loving the Godly and hating wickedness. 12. It would tempt Magistrates accordingly to judge of vice and virtue, good and bad in the Commonwealth. 589. Now to their arguments. 1. Rev. 17. 17. [God put it into their hearts to do his will, and to agree to give up their Kingdoms to the beast.] Answ. 1. He that readeth Dr. Hammonds exposition applying this to Alaricus sacking Rome, with the effects, will see that the very subject is so dubious and dark as not to be fit to found such a doctrine on. 2. It was the effect of the sin that God willed, and not the sin. 3. He is not said to put the sin into their hearts, whether pride, covetousness, cruelty, etc. but only to do his pleasure and agree (or make one decree) to give up etc. which he could most easily do by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts, which with their own sins, would have that effect which he willed: If a thief have a will to rob, God may put it into his heart to go such or such a way, where a wicked man to be punished will be in his way. 590. But for brevity, besides what is said, I shall farther direct the impartial Reader, how to answer all such objections: And withal let the confounding cavillers against distinguishing, see, what blasphemy and subversion of Religion may enter, for want of one or two distinctions which confused heads regard not. 1. Be sure to distinguish the name of sin, from the nature. 2. And remember that no outward act is sin any further than it is Voluntary (by privation or position of Volitions.) 3. Distinguish between the Act as it ●s Agentis, and as it is in Passo. 4. And between the Act and the effect. 5. Between the effect of a single cause and of divers causes, making a compound effect. 6. And between a forbidden object compared with the contrary, and one forbidden object compared with another. 591. And then all this satisfying Truth will lie naked before you. 1. That the same name usually signifieth the sin and the effect of sin; or the Act as Acted and as Received. Adultery, Murder, Theft, usually signify the Acts of the Adulterer, Murderer, Thief, as done and as received ●n Passo, and as effecting. 2. That the former only is the sin, viz. first the Volition, Nolition, or Non-Volition, and secondarily the imperate act as animated by the Will: And no more. The reception of this act in Passo is not sin (as such;) nor the most immediate effect of this act: It is but the effect of sin. 3. And you will see that the same effect may have several causes: a Good and bad; And so God may be a cause of that effect, which man's sin also concurreth to cause: And God doth not therefore Will or Cause the sin. 4. And you will see that God may morally cause the effect as it is on this object rather than another forbidden, though both make the act sinful, and yet not Cause it as it is exercised on either of those objects compared with such as are not forbidden. 592. And you will here plainly see that God hath many ways to Cause the effect without willing or Causing the sin. As for instance, 1. He can do it by adding (as I said before) a good act to the sinners bade one. As when Caiaphas is willing to kill Christ, God can put into Caiaphas' De hoc vid. Ockam ubi supra. thoughts, the jealousy of the Romans over the Jews, and the visible danger they are in if they should be thought to have another King: which thoughts in themselves are true and good: So he can put into Pharaoh's thoughts the loss of the Israelites service, which was not sinful of itself. The wise Reader that can impartially receive truth without respect of persons, may find much in Episcopii Institut. Theol. li. 4. sect. 4. the provident. in his answering all these Texts of Scripture, as mis-expounded by some. And his moderate opinion expressed in Conclus. 2. in the end of that Section, how far doctrines are or are not damning which subvert the foundation, is laudable, and his reason very good and clear, (viz. so far as they actually prevail with the will and practice: Even as our faith is saving as effectual and practical, and not as a dead opinion, so is error damning.) I think as he doth. 593. And 2. God can set that object before a sinner which he is most inclined to abuse: Which is not to Will his sin: But may proceed from Gods Willing the Effect. As if Absalon be by Pride and Lust inclined to Adultery, his Father's Wives may be in his eye and way. And God may will to punish David by their passive pollution, without willing his act of sin at all, interior or exterior. 594. 3. And God can remove other objects out of the way, so that this object shall be solitary, or most obvious to the sinner. As if a drunken man were resolved to kill the next he met, God can keep Peter, John, etc. out of his way, and so Judas shall be the next. 595. 4. Yea God can suspend his own intrinsic concourse as to some one sinful act by which it will follow that it will fall upon another object. Many other such ways God hath, which are unknown to us. 596. And if you suppose a man so inclined to Murder or Adultery as that he will exercise it on the next most provoking object, if God now did Cause the Act, as exercised on a forbidden object, compared with another it were to Cause the sin. But if he only be the moral Cause that he e. g. kill Judas rather than Peter, this is not to Cause sin: For to choose Judas rather than Peter for the object, is no sin: For, as I said, God c●● do it only by removing Peter, and Willing that he shall be preserved. 597. Suppose a King that hath made Laws against Murder foreknow that a Robber is waiting in such a Road for a prey, and that a Traitor broke out of Prison will go that way, and so will be robbed and killed, He may will or desire the Death of the Traitor as a punishment; He may restrain some that would travail that way before him; and may restrain some that would lay hold on the Robber, or drive him away, that so this Traitor may be killed: And yet only Permit, and not Will at all, the Robbers Will or Ac● as it is Agentis, but punish him for it, and hate it, and Will only the effect. 598. The next Text cited is, 1 Pet. 2. 8. Whereunto also they were appointed (viz. to stumble on the rock of offence.) Resp. 1. This hath respect to Luke 2. 34. [he is set for the fall of many, etc.] and of Christ's own words, that he that falleth on this stone shall be broken in pieces. And no more can hence be gathered, but that God hath decreed that as a Punishing Judge, 1. He will leave the rejecters of Christ to go on i● their own sinful way, 2. And that their opposition to him shall be the●● ruin. So that 1. He doth not speak this of any but the rejecters of Christ that deserved it. 2. He speaketh not at all as willing their sin, but only as one that penally denyeth them further grace. 3. But the thing that he is said to Ordain them to, is not sin, but Ruin the consequent of their sin: The word [stumbling and falling] signifying their distraction. 599. The next Text is, 2 Thes. 2. God shall send them strong delusions (or the acting of deceit) that they should believe a lie. Answ. Here is nothing signified, but 1. That God shall permit Magicians and false Teachers to vent deceits, 2. And permit wicked men to believe them: which is mentioned as a permitted consequent, and not as an end intended by God: And the word sending is used because the permission was Penal for their sin. And his punishing-providence might morally cause the deceivers rather to go towards these men than towards others. 600. The next is Rom. 1. 24, 26, 28. God gave them up to uncle●●ness, to vile affections, to a reprobate mind, etc. Resp. Here is nothing at all said but a Penal desertion and permission, and no Will or Cause of sin in God. 601. The next is Act. 4. 28. To do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done. Answ. Here is nothing said of sin at all, but of the effect of it: All that was done on Christ, even all the effect in passo God foredetermined should be done: But the Act ut volentis & agentis he neither willed nor caused as on this forbidden object. And though elsewhere the Doctor deride this answer (that God decreed Christ should die, or be sacrificed, and yet decreed not that the Jews or any one else should do it,) It is a great and necessary truth: He that willed the effect, and did much himself to cause it, willed not the murderers sinful act: And permitting and foreseeing it was enough. 602. The next is Isa. 10. 6. and so Amos 16. 17. Prov. 22. 14. 2 Sam. 12. 11. 1 King. 11. 31. & 12. 24. God sends the Assyrian as his rod. Thy Wife shall commit Adultery, and thy Children fall by the sword.] They that are hated of God shall fall therein—] David was foretold his Wives should be vitiated: The ten Tribes fell from Rehoboam: It was of God that he took not good counsel: Pharaohs heart was hardened by God. Answ. The first is only a Prophecy, and a penal effect of sin, and nothing of God's Willing or Causing sin. And so is the second: Though God can send afflicters by the ways before mentioned, without willing their sin. The third speaketh only of a penal permission of sin. And the rest all speak only of Gods penal permission of the sin, and his decreeing and foretelling the effects of it, and his occasioning the sinner to take one sinful object (not as such, but) rather than another. 603. As the Wind hath its natural course, and so hath the Water, and the Miller Causeth neither of them, but supposing them, doth so set his Mill to Wind and Water that by the mere receptive qualification of the patiented, they shall fulfil his will, and he is the Cause of the effect, viz. that they turn his Mill and grind his Corn: so is it easy for God to use men's sins (permitted) to his ends without willing them * Even Vasq. in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 49. c. 8. pag. 758. saith that Of men's [non respondere vocationi] God is Causa per accidens, ut removens prohibens, dum negat auxilium efficax congruum. But this is but a Controversy about a Logical name [causa per accidens] which Gibieuf and many others do with as good reason deny to be fitly applicable to God, as to man's sin. . 604. Next the Doctor cometh with Reasons: And the first is, because † Pet. Alliac. Cam. 1. q. 14. A. [Secundum Bradward. & alios qui tenent quod Deus vult mala culpae, & quod respectu cujuslibet rei habet Velle vel nolle, nec habet solum non velle; Deus illo modo non permittit mala culpae fieri; sed ideo secundum hunc modum dicitur permittere, quia non approbat ea, ne● impedit ea fieri cum poss●t— sed secundum Magistrum Deus permittit ea, quia nec vult ea fieri, nec vult ea non fieri; quia si nollet non fierent, sed solum non vult: & per consequens non habet actum voluntatis respectu hujus quod est malum culpae fieri—] Saith Bonaventure, (that plain and honest Schoolman) li. 1. dis. 47. dub. 2. Di●●nd●m quod non est sig●um quod De●● velit illud quod ●●●●●i●●itur; sed quod velit illud quod ex ●o elicitur. Alli●co ●● q. 14. A. 1. Permittit qui. nec pr●cipit, nec ●●●●, nec consulit, sed indul●●t: & talis Permissio est signum Voluntatis Dei: quia aliquem actum significat in si● permittente: & ita Deu● non permittit mala culpae— ●● Permittit fieri quia nec habet Velle, nec habet nolle, sed solum non Velle ut flat: Et talis Permissio non est signum Divin● Voluntatis: quia ●ullum actum Volendi significat in sic permittente: & isto modo secundum Mag. Deus permittit mala culpae. Permission is a sign of Willingness as well as command: And what is permitted (and that for good) infallibly cometh to pass. Answ. All this is before confuted. * If he really hol● with Bradward. li. 1. c. 33. that God willeth all that he permitteth, why is it denied that he willeth the formale peccati as much as the materiale, seeing he permitteth it? But his citation of Bradwardine I think not myself obliged to regard; nor do I consent any more to that doctrine in Bradwardin● than in him. See Alliaco before of Bradward. It's false that non impedire efficaciter is a sign that one wills the thing. The King that only forbiddeth drunkenness or murder by a Law with penalties, could also lock up or guard some men, and effectually keep them from the sin. And doth he Will it because he doth not so? And it's false that all cometh to pass, that is not hindered. 605. His second argument is spoken very plainly and grossly, viz. [Both sides confess that the substrate act is done, God not only willing it, but effecting it, v. g. Absalon 's congress with his Father's Concubines: Yea not only the congress as an exercised imperate act, but that the Volition of congress, the internal elicit act, was efficiently and Principally of God: why then should it be denied that the very evil and deformity of the act was done, God willing it, though not effecting it, or any way failing of his duty? Especially when the Malice and Deformity doth necessarily follow the substrate act, in respect of the Creature though not of God.] Answ. Hobbes could desire little more. But we vehemently deny that the substrate act is of God as it is morally specified, that is, as it is exercised on this forbidden object rather than another lawful one ex parte eligentis: God did not as a principal efficient cause Absalon to Will that Congress with his Father's Concubines, nor to Act it. The nature of the Wind and Water, and God as the Cause of Nature, cause the wind and water to act, and to act as they do, on their own part: But that they turn this wheel and millstone, and run in this Channel rather than another, is long of the Miller. Absalom's Motus qua motus, and qua cupido ordinata, was natural from God: but not as acted hic & nunc towards this object: And the Reception of the Act by that Object supposing his lust and action, might be morally and penally from God. 606. If you here bring forth the common Medusa's head, and tell me, that It is injurious to God that his act be determinable by a Creature, and so dependent; I confidently answer you for God, 1. No man is injurious to himself: And God did not wrong himself, when by making a Creature with free self-determining Power, he resolved so far (partially) to suspend his own operation, so as not to necessitate the will: no more than he wrongeth himself by a Greater suspension, in making no more Worlds or Creatures. 2. You quite mistake: We do not at all alter or limit God's Acts or influx, nor determine it, but terminate it, and determine of that effect which requireth both Causes, God and Man, and cannot be (ordinarily) by one alone, because God hath otherwise appointed. And again I beseech the adversaries to note, How great and innumerable changes are made in the world, by the various Disposition of Recipients? The Rose and Vine and Weed and Dunghill, do not at all Change the Action of the Sun: but their various Reception and co-operation is the Cause, that its Act hath such various effects. And it is the Miller's work in making a various and special Receptivity in his Channel, Wheels, etc. which causeth the variety of effects. And God hath enabled men Variously and freely to Receive his Influx. 607. His third Argument is, God giveth not that effectual Grace, without which he fore-knoweth sin will not be avoided: ergo he is willing that it be done. Answ. I deny the Consequent: It only followeth that he doth not Absolutely and effectually Nill it. If the King have several subjects inclined to eat a luscious poison; And his Children he effectually keepeth from it; one he locketh up, another he committeth to a Keeper, another he keepeth the poison from: But to a Traitor he saith, [I once forgave thee, and saved thy life, and I now command thee that thou avoid this poison, and if thou do not, it will torment and kill thee; but if thou wilt take no warning, take what thou gettest by it.] Can you prove that it is his Will that this man eat the poison prohibited? 608. Next he citeth Augustine's threadbare sayings, and blameth Aquinas and Arminius for denying his Authority, and commendeth the greater reverence of Bellarmine: And so Anselm, Hugo, etc. Answ. 1. We stick not on one man's Authority; God holdeth not his Holiness and the Church its Religion on Augustine's authority. 2. Augustine hath ten times more plain enough for what I hold: See the places cited in Paul. Eiren. Triad. Patrum. 3. He knew its like that Estius and many more expound Augustine's words as terminating Gods Volition on his own permission, and not on the sin, or fieri. 4. I think plainly that Augustine there spoke not of inward Volitions, but outward Acts, and that not as Agentis but in passo or the effects. And so it is true, that no murder, theft, treason, or other effect is produced in the world, but what God positively decreeth shall be produced, either by doing some effects himself (as drowning the world,) or permitting sinners to do them, while he causeth not their act but the Receptivity of the Passum, and so the effect, etc. 609. Pag. 194. Retorting on Aquin. he thus argueth Because God doth will his own Goodness, therefore it is necessary that God will that sin be done, he permitting it. For it is not to will his essential Goodness, which needeth no acquisition, but he willeth to manifest his Goodness. But the evil of sin is not opposite to the manifesting of God's Goodness: Yea nothing is more * So Twiss. contr. Armin. pro Junio pag. 91. dissenteth from J●niu● that saith peceatum ad rationem universi facere per accidens, and saith Mihi vero dicendum videtur Peceatum conducibile esse per se ad bonum universi quatenus conducit ad illustrandos tales divinae majestatis radios— And if so, it must per se be Loved of God as Good. Yet contr. Corvin. he saith, that No sober man saith that sin is a medium of the execution of Reprobation, but only the Permission of sin. Reconcile them that can. conducible to it than this; I say to the manifesting of God's Goodness by way of mercy in sparing or by way of Justice in punishing. Answ. Horresco recitans, 1. God's Volition of his Essential Goodness is his Necessary Volition. 2. God hath no End to acquire, but always hath his end, and is never without it. 3. If God had necessarily willed the particular way of manifesting his Goodness, than he doth all things necessarily, and could do no otherwise, and it seems by you could not manifest it without sin. 4. Doth he not manifest his Goodness as much to the Innumerable Glorious Angels, who never sinned? And would it not have been as much manifested to us if we had been as they? 5. The very indetermination of the will, and its mediate Liberty is not the highest excellency of his Creatures: It is better than the sensitive Necessity of Bruits, and lower than the confirmed Necessity of the blessed: It is our defectibility. And the excellentest or Best of his works most honour God's Goodness. 6. Is it not the strongest temptation that men have in this world to doubt of or dishonour the Goodness of God, to think how he permitteth the world to be drowned in wickedness, and be so like to hell? 7. Doth not Christ turn the Prayers of all Christians against your doctrine, viz. that God's name may be hallowed, his Kingdom come, and his will done on earth as it is in Heaven (which is not by any sin?) 8. Do not your words tempt men to be indifferent to sin, if not to love it, if nothing be more conducible to honour God's Goodness? 9 Is not that conclusion a great wrong to Christ, Scripture, Ministry and Holiness, as being no more conducible to manifest God's Goodness than sin is? 10. It is not true that sin is any Cause, or true Means at all of glorifying God or doing any good. It is but a presupposed Evil, by delivering us from which God is glorified. As your eating poison may occasion the honour of an Antidote and Physician: It is no Cause or proper medium of it, but only an occasion, and mischief sine quo non; But if God had not saved us from sin committed, he could have glorified himself in saving us from committing it: God loveth and is glorified most in that which is most like him as his Image, which is, the Holiest sinless soul. To be a medium to God's glory is to be good: To be as conducible to it as any thing, is to be as good as any thing save God and his glory. But sin hath no Good, much less such good. Why else doth not God equally delight in sin, and in the death of the wicked, as in holiness, repentance and our life? seeing all things are for himself, and that which glorifieth him most, is best. 11. Here also confusion causeth mischief: one distinction might have scattered this mist, viz. Between sin indeed and sin in notion. Sin indeed, or essence and existence never did good nor honoured God. Sin in notion or in esse objectivo is no sin, but the Matter of Virtue and 80 Joh. à Combis compend. Theol. l. 3. c. 1. tells us that sin is profitable three ways, 1. Ut bene ordinatur, ut fur in patibulo. 2. Propter coactionem, & amaritudinem. 3. Propter mall considerationem: And many popular Books say the like: But this is but abusive language tending to deceive: As if sin did good, because punishing sin, and repenting of it, and hating it do good: As if hating sin were sin. Thus unhappily is the world troubled by abused words. Holiness, and doth much good. When you say God knoweth sin from eternity, you'll say with Scotus, that in esse cognito sin was in God from Eternity: But so sin is not sin. David saith, My sin is ever before me, Psal. 51. And we daily Repent of it, and confess it: But this is but to have the Idea or conception of it in the mind, and so it is not sin indeed but the notion of it, which is in esse objectivo. Else it would defile us to think of it, and repent of it; whereas thus sin objectively is the matter of the grace and duty of Repentance, Hatred, fear, watchfulness, prayer, confession, etc. And so sin in esse objectivo as a grace may glorify God. 610. To Aquin. that saith Malum non est appetibile he saith, that Malum moris quod opponitur bono, est proprium uniuscujusque; meum malum bono meo— Though the sin of a man willing that which is forbidden him be his sin,— yet it followeth not that God may not will this Evil of another: The Reason is, because it is not forbidden to God to will it: wherefore though it be evil and dishonest in man to will it to whom it is forbidden, yet not to God— And seeing that Moral Evil or sin is summè conducibile, chief or most conducible to make way to represent God's Goodness, this abundantly sufficeth to prove it desirable to God— We say that this evil which we affirm to be willed of God, is not at all evil as it is objected to the will of God, but as to the will of the creature, being forbidden the creature, but not forbidden God. Answ. Shall we preach thus to the people? Will this Doctrine convert souls to repentance or faith in Christ? 1. The question is not, Whether to will sin be sin in God? But Whether he will and cause the sin of man? which you sadly assert. 2. God's Glory is our End, and to forbear things prohibited is but the means: If sin conduce as much as Christ and Holiness to God's Glory, why may we not desire it sub ratione medii, though not as praeceptum? We must desire that which is most conducible to God's Glory. 3. Though God be under no Law, his Perfection of Nature and Will is the fountain of all Laws, and instead of a Law to him. And we must be Holy because our God is Holy. 4. It is still false that sin is any Medium to God's Glory, or desirable, or hath any good. 5. God is Good and delighteth to do good. And he is the Just Ruler Of which vid. Gibieus at la●ge. of the World: And I would not have Kings take such Justice for a pattern as you describe, as if God vehemently forbade sin, and sent his Son, and Spirit, and Ministers as an Army against it into the World, and will da●● men for it for ever, and yet willeth and causeth it, as summè conducibils August. de Nat. & Grat. c. 25. fol. 314. Non hoc eis dicimus quod sibi iste (Pelagius) opposuit, ut esset Causa Misericordiae Dei, necessarium fuisse peccatum: Utinam non fuisset miseria, ne ista esset misericordia necessaria. Id. ibid. cap. 31. Et altius Dei consilium fateor me ignorare, cur etiam ipsam superbiam, quae in re●●e factis animo insidiatur humano, non cito Deus sanet, pro qua sananda illi piae animae cum lacrymis & magnis gemitibus supplicant, ut ad ●am superandam & quodammodo calcandam & obterendam dextram conantibus porrigat. Even Vasquez the Jesuit saith of Gods denying men grace, and of nonentity that God willeth them, thus [Non-esse alicujus rei secundum se quat●nus malum quoddam ipsius rei est, non placet Deo— Sed sub alia ratione placere potest; nec enim in eo est omnis ratio mali. Name in non-esse alicujus rei, potest comparatione ad reliquum universum, vel ad justitiam vel ad poten●iam D●ialiqua ratio boni apparere, ob quam non tantum potest placere Deo, simplici complacentia, sed etiam efficaci voluntary, qua discernat rem illam non facere: Similiter cum Deus alicui negat gratiam suam au● gloriam non placet ut malum quoddam ips●●s est, ● Quia sicut non disp●●cet persona, sic nec malum illius ut il●ius est placet ●● sed placet sub alio respects, sub quo etiam non potest non placere: qui● scili●●t o●tenditur in eo potentia Dei, miser●cordia in elcctos, etc.] By this he will teach men to say so of sin: But 1. He confesseth that this controversy is not of any thing real in God; (as if he had distinct real acts); but only of the extrinsical denomination of God's Essence. 2. He can give no reason why the malum poenae of a ●reature as such may not ●e willed of God, as much as nonentity, though not finally for itself. 3. Nonentity hath not omnem rationem mali, but it is enough that it hath nullam rationem boni. 4. It is the imperfect conception of man that taketh Nothing to be any way Good. A n●gatione subjecti ad negationem modi valet argument●m: Nonentities are no true modes of the Universe. It is improper to say that God's Power, Wisdom or Mercy is glorified by any nothing or nonentity: It is by some being that God is glorified. 5. It's a contradiction to say Voluntate efficaci vult aliquid non esse: How is that efficax quae nihil efficit?— But God doth efficaciously hinder many inclined agents to act according to their inclination. And that impedition may be a Positive act. So disp. 95. c. 9 he saith that the end of Gods Permitting sin, is oftendere divitias gratiae suae & liberalitatem qu● usus fuit erga praedestinat●s: denegans congruas vocationes reprobis, ostendit praedestinatis, easdem vocati●nes, quibu● fu●runt ad gloriam praeparati, grat●● omnino ipsis fuisse donatas. But 1. Man's act comparing himself with another is quid real, & v●lltum à Deo: And the proposition [that the other hath no grace] is quid real, or ●ns rationi●. But nothing declareth nothing. ●. If Gods will be his simple essence, only diversely denominated from effects and objects, how can nothing denominate it but as non-efficient or not-willing? Indeed it might denominate a Nolition existentiae, if an Act of Gods were necessary to hinder existence; but not where non-efficere is enough. Antonine better saith, l. 1. §. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Ut, quantum ad Deos attinet ac suggestiones, adjutationes, inspirationes ab ipsis profectas, nihil obstet omnino quo minus juxta naturae praescriptum confestim vivam, nisi ipse tandem in culpa sim, qui Deorum submonitiones, & tantum non claras praeceptiones, neutiquam observem. I marvel the Doctor insisteth not on his own great Reason, viz. Futurity is eternal, and therefore hath an eternal cause, which is God: And he that willeth the futurity of sin, willeth the sin, that is, that sin shall be. This seemeth stronger than all the rest, if the antecedent were true: And so he might prove that the futurity of the very form of sin is God: For nothing is eternal but God: But the futurity of the form of sin (according to these men) is eternal (or ab aetern●): Ergo it is God. But saith excellent Le Blank de Concord. lib. cum decret. 1. n. 55, 56. Praesertim nullo modo probare possum quod Gu. Twis●us pluribus locis asserit, Decretum Dei & ejus Voluntatem esse solam & unicam Causam futuritionis cujuslibet eventus: e. g. inobedientiae Adami, etc. At inquit doctus ille vir, Futuritionis quae ab aeterno fuit, nulla Causa dari potest quae ab aeterno non fuit. Resp. Hoc supponit futuritionem esse aliquid reale à re ipsa distinctum, & quod causam aliam habeat quam res ipsa futura: At hoc falsissimum: Nam futuritio nil aliud est quam respectus quidam rationis & extrin●eca denominatio rei futurae— Recte ponitur arg●mentum, Ab aeterno nihil fuit praet●r Deum: Ac pro●●de futuriti● quae ab aeterno fuisse dicitur vel nihil reale fuit, vel fuit ipse Deus.— Quod est Causa cur res in tempore existat, idem plane Causa est cur res ab aeterno extitura fuerit. Sicut quod Causa est quod res aliquando fuit, Causa est cur in aeternum dicetur praeterita— Ad effectum futurum sufficit Causa futura, sicut ad praeteritum sufficit Causa praeterita— This is plain and easy truth. to his Ends, and saith [It is not evil to me, though it be to you. I'll ●●●ment you for doing it, though it was by my Will and predetermination.] And what Justice should Kings rather imitate than Gods? 6. Sin is not malum Deo so as to Hurt him, or make him Guilty: But it is, so as to be a Violation of his Laws, and a contempt and dishonour to his Wisdom, Goodness, Greatness, Authority, Justice, Mercy, Truth, etc. If all the World joined in hating and blaspheming God that made them, though you say, that this is not malum Dei, but malum nostri, and therefore God may will it ut fiat as a desirable thing, we cannot be content with such confusion. Malum is either Physicum vel morale; and either in aliquo or contra aliquem. God is not capable 1. Of Physical Evil in himself, and therefore we cannot hurt him; 2. Nor of Moral Evil, and therefore he can have no sin or malignity. 3. But he is capable objectively of Injury; we can wrong him when we cannot hurt him. 4. And we are capable of being Reputatiuè vel moraliter Hurters and destroyers of God, whom we cannot hurt: Because the sinner doth it quantum in se; and therefore is called an Enemy to God. It is no thanks to the wicked that there is a God, who would have none (as to his Holiness and Justice) if it were in his power. Moreover, God is Good and doth good. And though he made Man freely, yet supposing that he will make him Man (a Rational free agent in his Image to Know and Love him)▪ it necessarily followeth that he must make him Holy. God cannot make a man in the Image of the Devil, and call it his own: As Parents generate Children in their own likeness, so God doth regenerate his own in his Image: He that thought it a good argument, [What Communion hath light with darkness, Christ with Belial, etc.] would sure have taken our part in this, that God cannot be the Author or Cause of the Image of the Devil, and of the works of darkness. 611. Therefore where he addeth, that God Willeth Malum esse that sin be, as the Matter of exercising his mercy and justice, not as his sin, but tantum vult fieri malum alterius, I deny it with horror as a reproach of God's holiness. The terminus à quo is not the Materia misericordia vel justitiae exercendae. God willeth the glory of his Mercy and Justice, in pardoning and punishing foreseen presupposed sin: But he willeth not the sin, but only our deliverance from it, or punishment for it. Suppose (per impossible) that the King had power to restrain all men from offending him, and yet saith, [I will do only what is Congruous to the Rational free nature of my subjects as such, and not all that I can do, and therefore will restrain them only by Laws, except some few beloved ones; but I will honour my Mercy and Justice on offenders.] Can you hence prove, that he willeth, decreeth or loveth ut appetibilia all the Treasons, Rebellions, Murders and Blasphemies that are committed? It is not these that he willeth ut Materiam, but deliverance from these as from the malum à quo. If your prodigal Son be addicted to Robbing, and you could lock him up, but you resolve that you will try him once more, and if he ro● you will let him suffer imprisonment and come to the Gallows, and then beg his Pardon, that suffering may hereafter be his warning; Here if you choose rightly it is not his Robbing that you will, no not ut sit vel fiat (for you had rather he would forbear:) But only his forsaking it, and his suffering to that end, on supposition that he rob again. 612. Pag. 105. He saith that [By the same reason as God might not will the being of sin, by his permission, he might not permit it.] Answ. A raw unproved assertion: God might not make an Indifferent freewill, left to its own liberty, with a thousand warnings and helps against sin, unless he may also Desire them to sin. Prove this, else you say nothing. 613. He addeth that sin be or exist is not only Bonum per accidens, because God will make it the matter of glorifying his mercy and justice; but it is ex natura sua quoddam ordinabile ad Gloriam Dei, & consequenter Bonum est ex natura sua in genere conducibilis— Answ. All unproved and false. 1. Sin is not so much as Bonum per accidens. 2. God doth not make it the Matter of glorifying himself, but only glorifyeth his Mercy and Justice against it as the terminus à quo, and not by it as the matter, though it may be called an Occasion sine qua non, as to this particular act and way of his said glorification. 3. Much less is it conducible hereto, which implieth a Medium that hath some natural or moral causality. 4. And least of all is it ex sua natura conducibile. It is not sin, but 1. Some effects or consequents of sin, 2. Our deliverance from sin, and the punishing of sin, which are conducible to God's glory. 614. Next he insulteth over Aquinas twice, as unhappy and vain in his censures, with a Magna est Veritas & praevalebit: laborare potest, vinci non potest: And argueth that because ex permissione infallibiliter sequitur peccatum, therefore to permit sin is the same as to will that sin shall be ipso permittente. Answ. 1. It's pity that sin should have so good an Advocate, and God's Holiness so good an Adversary, through mistake. And that so unhappy a Cause should be managed so confidently and triumphantly, though it's well that it's done so weakly. 2. The falsehood of his assertion about permission as general I have opened before. 1. Three sorts of things may be said to be Not hindered (which is all that Permission signifieth.) 1. Things bend to a certain motion, 1. By Natural inclination (as a Stone in the Air to descend) 2. Or by Moral Vitiosity, as the Will of a wicked man. 2. Things merely indifferent; (1. Naturally, as some think the Air is to motion: 2. Morally: as suppose a Will such, to Good or Evil.) 3. Things averse to that Motion (as 1. Naturally a Stone to ascend, 2. Morally, as the will of an Angel or Saint to hate God, or the will of a wicked man to Love him.) Also you must distinguish between Not-hindering at all, and not hindering effectually. And so it's clear, 1. That in the first case, the Motion will be if it be not hindered. But that it is not caused by not-hindering it, but by its proper moving causes. In the second case the consequence of futurity is false: And where the inclinations to good and evil (that is, to superior and inferior prohibited good) are equal; yea, though antecedently somewhat unequal: Yet bare permission ascertaineth not futurity. 3. Much less in the third case; where the soul must have positive help or provocation. Sure he did not think that all or any ungodly men would infallibly Love God, if God did but Permit them. But Gods Permitting or not hindering sin may respect divers acts. 1. I● God continue not his natural support, man will be no man, but be a●●●●lated, and so will neither do good nor evil. 2. If God uphold man's nature, in its Integrity as it was in Adam, and give him not Moral means and helps of Grace, and his natural concourse, Adam's sin would have necessarily followed. 3. If God give Adam both such support and means to stand, and do no more, God's permission would not have inferred the certainty of Adam's sin, when he fell, any more than before: For God withdrew no grace from him which was necessary to his standing. 4. I● God give a lapsed sinful man Nature and common grace, it followeth not necessarily because God doth no more, that he will commit every sin that he is not further hindered from: but it's certain that he will not do the works to which special grace is necessary. 5. If God give to the faithful the Holy Spirit, and continue his influx necessary to the continuation of the Power and Habits of holy actions, with necessary means, and do no more, this man will do some good and some evil, and though he may be equally said to be Permitted to do this sin as another, yet he may do one and not another. 6. God totally permitteth no man to sin, but hindereth them many ways, though he hinder not all alike. 7. It's possible for two men to have equal helps to duty and equal hindrances to sin (or the same man at several times,) and yet for one to do the duty and forbear the sin, and the other to commit the sin and omit the duty; As many Schoolmen have copiously proved. Yet in this case Permission would be the same thing to both. But if you use the word [Permission] as connoting the Event, than indeed you may say that the event (from another cause) will follow. And God's non-impedition will ab eventu actionis be extrinsecally denominated Permission in the one case and not in the other. But this is but from your arbitrary use of the word. 615. Next the Doctor assaulteth Durandus who thus argueth, Gods will followeth only his approving Knowledge. But he knoweth not sin approvingly; being of purer eyes, etc. He answereth, 1. God approveth that sin be, though he approve not sin. 2. God willeth the manifestation of his mercy and justice: Ergo, he willeth the existence of sin as that which is necessarily required to it. To which I reply, 1. The first answer is unproved and false. God approveth not that sin be. If he did, few wicked men do more, as Esti●s saith: For it is not sin as sin or evil that they will, but that it be for other ends which seem good. 2. He phraseth it with his [ad qu●d necessario, etc.] as if God first willed this manifestation of his Justice, etc. as the end, and then sins existence as the means (yea, the necessary means): But this is false, as I have fully showed. 1. And his own opinion should confute it, that maketh one Decree only de mediis: And this particular Manifestation being some Acts of God, and not God himself, ●or the Complacency of his Will, must needs be part of the media ad finem ●●timum. 2. And indeed sins existence is not a necessary means willed for ●ods glory: but it is a presupposed mischief, our Deliverance from which ●● punishment for it, is willed for his glory: It is indeed necessary, but ●●ly necessitate existentiae in esse praecognito as a foreseen evil, and so pre●pposed to those acts of God which are the Means of his glory. Therefore his assertion of a Notitia approbationis rei tanquam Bonae in ●nere Conducibilis, etsi non honesti, is detestable. 616. Ibid. p. 196. He again saith, that Though it be dishonest in the ●eature to sin, because forbidden, it is not dishonest in God to will that he ●● it by his permission, it being unice conducibile to his glory— ●nsw. 1. Fie upon this conducibile and unicè too. 2. Fie upon this oft ●peated [permittente non efficient;] It is utterly lusory or immodest: ●or a man that maintaineth that no sinner doth any thing in sinning, but ●hat God as the first total cause predetermined his will to, even as to all ●e entity in act and circumstances imaginable; and that in all omissions, ● was a natural Impossibility to have done one omitted act without this ●edetermining premotion: And for the man that in the next saith that ●alum non est Objectum Volentis aut facientis, but ipsa effectio rei, I ●y for this man yet to say, that the creature effecteth sin, and God effecteth ● not, is too too gross. The common evasion is, that sin is not any ●●ing, and therefore not effectible: But why then do they say, that the ●eature effecteth it? when they have said and defended, that the crea●re doth nothing but what God doth, and what he unavoidably maketh ●●m do. 617. Durandus argueth, that Sin cannot be judged convenient by a ●●ght understanding: Ergo, not by God. The Doctor answereth, That ●es own sin cannot be judged convenient, but another's may. He in●anceth 1. When a man willeth that an Usurer lend him money on usury: ● When a Christian Prince willeth a Turk to swear to a League by Ma●●met: 3. When God willed that Absalon should defile his Father's Concu●nes. And he addeth, that for us to sin, is contrary to our right rea●●n, because it is forbidden and hurtful to us: But for God to will that ●e sin, is not contrary to his right reason, as not forbidden or hurtful ● him. Repl. 1. No man should will unlawful usury: He that willeth to Bor●●w, though he cannot have it without usury, doth not will the usury, ●ut the money non-obstante usura. As he that chooseth to travel with Blasphemer, rather than to go alone in danger, he doth not will his blasphemy, but his company, non obstante blasphemia. 2. The same is to ●e said of swearing by Mahomet: It is only the Oath as an Oath that is ●● be willed, and not as by Mahomet; that is not willed but unwillingly ●●dured. 3. Absaloms' instance is answered before: God willed only davids punishment, and the Passive Constupration as an effect of sin, ●n a foresight of Absaloms' active Volition and sin, and not as willing ●is at all. And we have hitherto thought that God's holy Wisdom and will is the Cause of his holy Law, and much more against sin than man's is: And that God willeth not, and causeth not the sin of man: And is it now come to ●his, that sin is contrary indeed to our right reason, but not to Gods, because ●e is no subject: You may next say, that Holiness is meet for man, but not ●or God. 618. Pag. 197. Again he is at it, Bonum esse ut sint mala: Quia bonum est ut Deus finem sibi praefixum assequatur: At hoc sine intervent● mali & peccati nullo modo potest. Repl. 1. It is not per peccatum ut medium, though not sine peccat●. 2. Interventus therefore implieth a falsehood. For in esse cognito sin is antecedent or presupposed to the way of glorifying Justice and Mercy upon sinners; sinners are the object: And consequently you must take it (as before proved) for antecedent to the Volition or simultaneous. 619. He urgeth, Oportet haereses esse, ut qui probati sunt manifesti fiant. Answ. That neither meaneth that men ought to be Heretics, nor yet that God loveth, willeth or approveth that there be heresies: But only 1. God decreeth to manifest the difference between the sound Christians and the rest: 2. And he forseeth that there will be heresies. 3. Therefore he decreeth to try them by the occasion of those heresies which he forseeth (and hateth.) The same is the case of all trial by persecutions: And God willeth not the sin of active persecution, but only the effect or passive part. So that the oportet (by your own confession of it) signifieth no more than a Logical necessitas consequentiae, which foreknowledge without Volition will infer. 620. He addeth [Obj. It sufficeth that God permit sin, (and not will it) Resp. But either the existency of sin infallibly followeth the Permission of it, or not: If not, God's Intention may be frustrate: If yea, What matter is it, whether God will that sin shall be, he permitting, or s● permit it as that infallibly it will be? so we obtain either of these, it's all one to our cause of predestination.] Repl. 1. If it be all one, take up with that agreement; and make ●● further difference with them that grant you enough. 2. In case of ve●●ment Inclination to a sin, it would follow upon God's total permission: (but God never totally permitteth sin.) But in other cases, it will not follow: that is, It is not a good consequence, that This or that sin will be done, because God doth no more to hinder it, than that which sometime hindereth it not. And yet God's Intention is not frustrate: For ●● will infallibly come to pass, from its proper cause, which God foreknoweth: And the consequence is good from his foreknowledge. And is not that all one, as to the certainty of God's intentions? 3. You phrase it as if sin followed God's permission, as a deficient cause, or as that which cannot be otherwise, unless God do more to hinder it, and so we●● necessary thence necessitate consequentis (or as others call it necessitate ●●tecedente) which is false, and oft denied by yourself. 4. The very truth is, Permission is a word of so great ambiguity and laxity, as relating to so many sorts of Impedition, that it is but delusory with●● much distinguishing, to say sin will or will not follow it. If you restra● it to a non efficaciter impedire, as is usual, it taketh not away the ambiguity much. For still the question is, What must make it effectual, unless you call any impedition effectual merely ab eventu, whatsoever it be ●● itself. 621. He saith that the Universe would not be perfect, if there wer● perfect holiness and no sin, and so no pardon or punishment. But ●● giveth us no proof, but confident assertion, at all. I need not say, th● It would be more perfect if there were no sin; It sufficeth me to say, tha● It would be as perfect: And so that it is not Necessary to the World perfection, that there be sin or Hell. God could have freely willed the contrary. And God's Goodness could have been as fully manifested if i● had so pleased him, and his Holiness too, without sin or Hell. It's unpleasing to me, that this good man pleadeth so hard against a necessity of Christ's satisfaction for sin, (in another digression) and yet pleadeth as hard for a necessity of sin; As if it were more necessary to God's Glory than Christ. 622. It is very observable in all this controversy, that he asserteth pag. 198. [That it's past all controversy, that neither God, nor the most sinful creature, do will any thing, but as Good. And that no man can be instigated to malice (or evil) but only to the Act which is evil; because he that is instigated, is instigated to do something. But to the evil of an act, no efficiency is necessary, but deficience only.] How far this is true or false, I have opened before. I here only note, that he confesseth that he that causeth the Act of sin, (which he saith God doth more than man) causeth all that is causable. 623. Yet p. 199. he saith, Sin is of man only as the cause, when he professeth that man doth nothing but what God doth to cause it (yea, as the first total cause) and that as to Deficiency, man can do no more than he doth without predetermination, which if God withhold, man can no more help it, than make a World. So that all the mystery of his language is this; that because man is under a Law, and God is not, therefore man doing the same act as moved by God, must be called the only cause of sin, because it is no sin in God. But, if we spoke as plain men ought to do, should it not rather be thus expressed by you [God is the chief cause of sin in man, but not in himself?] 624. Pag. 200, & 201. he hath the same over and over again, that Non abhorret à recta ratione Dei velle peccatum fieri ab hominibus— Quod ex se habet quod conducibile est ad ●onum tanquam Materia scilicet, non tantum idonea, sed & necessaria exercendae divinae justitiae & misericordiae: and that this manifestation conjunct with sin is Deo multò appetibilius, than that Good which sin depriveth us of (that is, Holiness:) Because this Holiness is only the Creatures Good, and the other is the Creators Good. Answ. But as the assertion is all false, so the reason is vain: For if he distinguish the Creator and Creature as subjects, he is quite mistaken: For both is the Creatures good, and neither the Creators: For to manifest Justice and Mercy is not God's Essence as in itself, but his Work of Punishment and Mercy. And the glory of this, is but the resplendent excellency of it as it is the appearance or Image of God. And all this is in the Creatures Holiness: The Holiness of Christ's Humane Nature, and of Angels and Saints in Heaven is as much the Creators, as is his Works of Mercy and Justice; And God's glory shineth as much in them: And it is the glory of his Goodness, if not of Mercy which preventeth sin and misery: yea, and of Mercy too: For though mercy relate to misery, it is as well to possible misery prevented, as to existe●● misery removed: And if he speak not of Subjects, but Proprietors, the Bo●um Creaturae is also Creatoris. SECT. XIX. The same doctrine in Rutherford de providentia confuted. 625. I Have been too long in confuting this Digression of Dr. Twisse which is contrary to the commonest doctrine of Protestants; and The sum of their opinion. I think soundeth not well in Christians ears: The sum of which is this: [Neither God nor Devil do will sin as it is evil; but God is the first willer of its existence, because it is in its own nature sum & unice conducibile to the manifestation of his Justice and mercy: And willing and Loving being all one in God, he thus singularly Loveth the existence of sin, above its contrary (holiness) for this end: And by Predetermining premotion (which he much more largely writeth for elsewhere) he causeth as the first total Cause all that man Causeth; But it is sin in man because forbidden him, but not in God, because not forbidden him; And therefore God is not to be said to cause sin (though he cause all that is caused) but to permit it, because he causeth it not in himself; nor is he to be called a Deficient cause of our omissions, because he is not bound to Actuate us; but man is to be called the efficient and deficient cause, because he is under an obliging Law, Though God made that Law: And though he can no more than a stone act without physical predetermination, nor forbear acting when so acted, yet he is to be called free, because he is actually willing (or his will doth act) and because he is predetermined by none but God.] This is the true sense of their opinion as opened by themselves. I shall now briefly consider what Rutherford saith to the same sense. 626. Cap. 15. pag. 186. To Annatus charging Twisse as denying God's permission of sin, because he maketh him the * Nec omnino negari potest Voluntatem Dei esse Causam rerum omnium quas fieri velit. Twiss. recitante etiam Rutherf. de Prov. c. 15. p. 186. See all their Reasons for Gods causing sin, or willing its existence answered by Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp. 26. p. 262, 263, 264, 265. As also against Gods predetermining to the immediate materiale peccati: disp. 27. p. 270, etc. disp. 28, & 29, & 30, etc. usque ad p. 580. As to the common saying that God willeth not sin as sin; all men will confess (Dr. Twiss. often) that neither doth a wicked man do so. Peccans ut sic non intendit peccatum quoad illud quod est formale in peccato, seu carentiam conformitatis; sed intendit actum ut est in genere moris, inquit Aureolus in 2. d. 42. a. 3. pag. 319. I will not conceal a more difficult argument than most of theirs, which may occur to others: God caused (e. g. in Nathana●l, Peter, etc.) this act of saith before Christ's coming; [the Messiah is to come hereafter.] When Christ was come, this was false, and so evil: God still caused the faith which he gave them. Therefore he caused an untrue belief and evil, and that supernaturally. But I answ. 1. God caused the habit of their faith, and the act. The nature of the habit was in general A belief of all divine revelations: and in special A belief in the promised Messiah. The termination of the act on the Messiah as future rather than as Incarnate, required nothing positive in the Habit: The same Habit served to both acts, unless the latter being for the nobler act had some addition; but the former needed none. 2. And that this Habit might bring forth the act in that circumstance, no more was necessary but 1. God's word [Christus venturus est.] 2. And God's influx on the habited faculty to cause it to act according to that habit: So that when God had reversed that word [Christus venturus est] he was no longer the cause determining the mind to believe that word; but only the cause that the habit of faith was still towards Christ: But not at all sub ratione venturi. For the determining word was called in, and it was an imperfection not to know so much, where it was not a sin. Cause of the Act, the Liberty and the Prohibition, and to Cause is not to Permit; he hath no better answer than to say, that God doth not permit the Act, nor the Evil of the Act, but he permitteth the evil act: and 2. To say that the Dominicans and Jesuits hold the same as he. Which is to jest with holy things, and not to argue. As if he said, God made neither the soul nor the body, and yet he made the man. What! is it (as it's said, that none animased unio est vita) so Doth God permit the Union of Actum and Mal●m? No, that he pretendeth not. 627. To prove that God willeth the existence of sin, he bringeth the instance of Joseph's case, Gen. 45. To which I say that the text saith not at all that God willed the Will or Act or Sin of Joseph's brethren; but only the Venditio passiva or effect and the consequents; Nay only the consequents are mentioned in the Texts: His replies to the answers prove no more than the five things which I before asserted about sin. Nothing so much deceiveth them, as not distinguishing between the sinful act, and the effect or passion, when they are called by the same name (as Selling, Killing, etc.) 628. His next instance is of Christ's death, of which I said enough before: But 1. He understandeth his adversaries as ascribing only the Consequents of Crucifixion to God's will; which is his mistake: It is Crucifixion itself passiuè sumpta which they ascribe to it (some of them at least.) And let men too wise against God deride it as much as they will, God can will and Love that Christ be Crucified, and yet hate and not will the will and act of the Crucifiers, but only foresee it, as aforesaid. And let them jeer God as Idle or asleep, if he neither will nor effectually nill the sin; we will believe it to be his perfection and liberty, which they so deride. 2. And whereas he addeth that Active Verbs are used as Gen. 45. Misit me Deus, Isa. 53. Deus voluit eum conterere, Zech. 13. Ego percutiam Pastorem: and God delivered Christ to death: I answer, It is too too gross to persuade us hence that any of these Texts say that God willeth the sinners will or Act. [God sent me] speaketh God's act, that is, his disposal of the effects and consequents of them: But doth this signify, [God willed your malice or your act?] God did bruise Christ; which signifieth that he was a concause of his death: but not that he willed or Caused the Jews to will or act his death. And so of the rest. 629. The rest of his instances are such as I have answered before, or as the former answers fully invalidate; And therefore I will not weary myself and the Reader with them. 630. Cap. 18. p. 230. he asserteth, that [Sin is a Medium to God's Glory, and that not per accidens but per se. Because sin by how much the worse it is in genere mali inhonesti, by so much the better and fit means it is, in genere boni utilis & conducibilis to God's glory, etc.] All which I have before confuted: and think not his defence of it worth repeating. 631. Many assertions he hath cap. 18. which all depend on the false supposition that Sin is a medium per se of God's glory, and the unproved supposition that God positively willeth the Permission of it (which is nothing:) whence he inferreth that God Intendeth it in this and that order, and much other vanity. And still they confound sin in esse real which is no medium, with sin in esse objectivo which may be a part of holiness, and no sin at all. 632. Cap. 19 he argueth, God useth men and devils in the very act of sinning as his instruments, viz. to punish, to try, to humble, etc. ergo, he willeth the event that they sin. Resp. Here is deceitful ambiguity in the words [instruments] and [useth.] Properly an Instrument is an efficient cause moved by the principal to an effect above its proper virtue. And so a sinner in and by the Act of sinning is no Instrument of God. For God moveth him not to that Act as specified or circumstantiated so as is prohibited; And being not at all so moved by him (as David to murder Urias, and to vitiate his Wife) he is not properly thus his Instrument. But sometimes the word Instrument signifieth a presupposed Agent, whose Action another can improve to his own ends: As the wind and water are improperly called the Miller's Instruments of turning his Mill; and the spring and poise are the Clock-makers Instruments of moving his Clock or Watch; and a Mastiff Dog is my Instrument to keep away Thiefs; and a Greyhound is my Instrument to kill a Hare, and a Ferret to catch a Rabbit, and a Hawk to catch a Partridge, etc. And yet we cause not at all the Nature or Motion of the Wind, or Water (but we can hinder the Water,) nor the nisus of the spring, nor the gravitation of the poise (but set the recipients so as that the effect shall be done as we would have it:) nor cause we the fierceness of the Mastiff, the inclination or motion of the greyhound, ferret, hawk, etc. but only tie them up and let them lose as our ends require. But zeal maketh some men deride that God should be said to be no more the cause of sinning; and they cannot allow him the skill of every dull Artificer, or at least a will to use it, without willing and causing the thing which he forbiddeth. 2. And the word [using] signifieth, sometime using by motion, as I do my pen; and sometime by ordination, and adjoining some concause, or fitting the receptivity of the patiented to the effect as aforesaid; as we use; wind, water, dogs, hawks: Thus only sinners by sinning are Gods used instruments: supposing his natural concourse and support. And they are not his Instruments thus neither in the same sense as these creatures are ours: For their fierceness, craft, inclination, action, is good, and we do and may will it for our ends: But sin is not good; And therefore God willeth not it at all, but only the consequent of it, or effect: And that Effect is not Good, as it is the effect of sin, but as God setteth in, and causeth the same effect which a sinner causeth (as in generation per concubitum illicitum.) But when God willeth and causeth the effect, and forseeth and permitteth the sinful Volition and act, which concurreth to that effect, such a sin is improperly called his used instrument or medium, but properly is none. 633. To Gibieuf and others saying that God acteth not by sin as an instrument, and willeth it not, but the effects; he answereth that It's absurd, because the sin itself is castigatory, and hath such like effects; and therefore God need not will that effect as after it. But all this is from the forenoted confusion: It is not only the distant effect, but the very immediate effect, which is the Act itself ut recipitur in passo, which God sometime is said to Will. As he willed that Jobs Cattle were taken away, and that Christ were killed, and that Malchus ear be cut off, and that Paul be scourged, and smitten on the mouth, and that the Apostles were oft imprisoned, etc. And yet God only forseeth but willeth not that will and act of the agent, which he forbiddeth. 634. And here note, that when the name of the Effect or Passion connoteth the sinfulness of the Act, than it is less meet to say that God willeth it: As to say that he willeth that we be persecuted, murdered, slandered, belied, etc. But if any will so speak, they must mean only the Passion, as distinct from the action: And then the difference is but in nudo loquendi. 635. To those that object that thus he maketh God the chief author of sin, the effect being more to be ascribed to the Principal Cause than to the instrument, he first ill-applyeth some frivolous distinctions, and instanceth thus: [The hangman as the Judge's instrument hangeth a man in malice or revenge: Ergo, the Judge much more, in revenge: Non sequitur.] Putting in Revenge which is but a Cause, as if it had been the Effect, which was in question. And thus [The Sword that killeth a man is not culpable: ergo, nor the striker: Non sequitur.] As if the question had been of the Negation of an effect, and not of the position of it. And thus [If two servants role a stone, one being commanded and one forbidden, one being father to the other; The Son (forbidden) roleth it unlawfully: ergo, the father (commanded) much more: non sequitur.] Resp. 1. As if the act of the Father and the Son were the same act, because the effect is the same, which is notoriously false: unless de specie. 2. Whose Instrument do you suppose the Son to be? If the Fathers, it is because the Father commanded him contrary to the Master; And if so, the argument is good: The Son's act was a fault who obeyed: ergo, the father's more who commanded him: saving that commanding maketh another no necessary Instrument, because he can disobey: But God's premotion is supposed by you unavoidably to predetermine us. 636. But pag. 255. he giveth the true answer, that the consequence holdeth, not of a metaphorical improper Instrument, who hath somewhat of his own which he hath not from the principal agent, yea such have somewhat of Principal Causality, and somewhat mixed of their own which they have not of God, besides the nature of a pure instrument: such are sinners to God. Therefore it holds not, that the horse halteth: ergo, the rider halteth (no nor causeth it.) Thus insciously he unsaith what laboriously he writeth a Book to prove: and the very same that I say. The Rider doth not cause the halting as it is halting at all; but only as it is Motion in genere: so doth God by sinful acts: That they are exercised on the forbidden object rather than another, is not at all of God, but that they are Actions in genere is of God. 637. So p. 256. he well sayeth that the fault of the pen is not to be ascribed to the Writer, nor the effect as from that fault; nor of the Saw to the Sawyer; And so of the Sabeans robbing Job: And he asserteth, p. 257. that Diabolus & Impii homines sunt causae principales in actu peccandi. And what need we more? Remember then that sin is an effect, and hath a Cause, and to make man a Principal Cause in actu peccandi is not to deify him: And he saith p. 256. that if God were the moral impeller as a principal agent, he were the principal cause of sin. But if you mean by moral impulse, only commanding it, let others judge whether Physical premotion be not much more than command: And whether I cause not my pen to write, though I command it not: And quoad terminum, to impel a man physically to moral acts, is moral impulse. 638. But the plausiblest argument is Cap. 20. p. 261. viz. God willeth sin as it is a Punishment of sin: * Vid. Aureol. in 2. d. 37. p. 300, 301. showing six ways how sin is a punishment of sin, without God's willing the sin: But if we make it sin, he will make it be a punishment. ergo he willeth that the sin come to pass or be. And indeed Augustine saith much contr. Julian. to assert Gods willing of sin as a Punishment of sin. But I answer this, 1. Even these men themselves oft say that God willeth not the formale peccati, but the materiale: And forma dat nomen: ergo he willeth not sin as a punishment, in proper sense. 2. Sin itself (though denied by many Arminians) is verily a Punishment, and more to the Sinner himself than to any other. † Gab. Bid in 2. d. 36. concludeth, 1. Omne peccatum est poena. 2. Non omnis culpa est peccati alterius poena (viz. non prima.) 3. Omne peccatum posterius poena est prioris, & causa (nisi ultimum fuerit) posterioris. And Bonavent. there cited by him showeth how sin bringeth poenam damni & sensus. And he showeth there how each sin is its own punishment, the formale peccati being first, and the formale poena next in the same act: And how the latter sin is the punishment of the former, as being an effect of it; For when we have cast away the Intention of the right end, there is nothing sufficient to hinder more sin. Biel. ib. In a word, God antecedently so form nature, that if we will sin, that sin shall be our misery, and as a voluntary self-wounding, cause our pain, and let out our blood and life. And it is the most difficult part of the question, how God maketh sin a Punishment to the sinner himself; which yet I have plainly opened before, and here repeat it. To be sin or disobedience and to be Punishment are no absolute entities, but are two Relations of one and the same Act; but not as referred to one and the same correlate. God is not at all the Cause of the Act which is sinful, in its forbidden mode and circumstances (as Claudicatio equi before said) but only in genere actus, or hujus actus when two sins are compared: But that the Act when done is sin and is punishment, God is the Cause of both: That is, he maketh man's nature first, and in that and by revelation, his Law: by which he first maketh man's duty, and telleth him what shall be sin if he do it: And next he doth by his threatening tell him, that this sin itself shall be the sinners own misery if he do it: As if (as aforesaid) God first made man of such a nature as that poison would torment him ex natura rei: And then commandeth him to avoid it; And then threatneth that it shall torment and kill him if he eat it. Here now God maketh the Man and the Law: God maketh not the Act of sin as modified or obliqne, or as that circumstantiated act. But when the act is caused by Man, God by his Law causeth two Relations to result, first that of sin, and then that of punishment. So that man first causeth the sinful act, and then that it is quid prohibitum, and quid poenale result from Gods Will and Law made before. Now if God cause not that sin which is a punishment to ourselves, he causeth not that which is a punishment to others; And yet supposing it, he maketh it a punishment to us and them, on several accounts. 639. But though God cause not the sin, yet when he hath before in his Law threatened to withhold his grace and spirit if we sin, without which grace and spirit we will sin, If God now for former sin do deny us, or withhold that grace or help which we need to keep us out of it, he is morally and improperly said to cause that sin as a punishment, because that penally he refuseth or forbeareth to save us from it, and so permitteth it (as is said.) 640. The Arminians grossly err, if he cite them justly, Remonst. in Script. Synod. art. 1. p. 202. saying that God may predetermine and pre-ordain the obstinate and rebellious to sin by his penal judgement, and yet those sins are not be reckoned to them for sins, nor increase their guilt: unless the word [sin] be used equivocally: For to have sin and no sin, are contraries. Whether God determine Idiots and Madmen to those acts which would be sin in others, as he doth Bruits, I leave to others. 641. I am weary of pursuing this ungrateful dispute. As to his controversy Q. Whether things be good because God willeth them? or he will them because they are good? against Camero cap. 22. Whether God will Justice and holiness because it is good, or whether it be good because God willeth it? It troubleth me to read bitter and tedious disputes about that which one easy distinction putteth passed all controversy. Of things ad extra Gods will is first the efficient, and then the ultimate end, as is oft said: Gods will as efficient giveth first the Being and then the Order to all things: or else they could never be what they are. All created Justice and Holiness is such, that is, Good (for Goodness is their essence) because God's efficient will made them so: And then God's final will taketh complacency in them or Loveth them because they are so. But if they talk of Goodness or Justice, etc. as it is in God, there is in him no effect and so no cause of himself or any thing in himself. 642. But some things God maketh moral duties by the very work of Creation, and Ordination of the World, without any other Law: And these are called Duties by the Law of Nature, because the very Natura rerum is a Law, that is, a signification of Gods will constituting man's duty. It is man's essence to be an Intellectual-free-agent; It is impossible that such an agent Created of God should not be God's Creature, and Gods own, and dispositively a Moral governable agent, and that he should not owe God all that he is and hath and can do, and that God should not have the Jus Dominii & Imperii over him, and Jus ad summum ejus Amorem * Deus non posset obligare nos ad hoc quod teneatur sibi non obedire: Quaero enim an tenetur obedire, an non? si sic, habetur propositum: quia tenetur & non tenetur, quod est impossibile— Consequentia patet, Quia teneri non obedire, est teneri ad aliquid. Pet. de Alliaco 1. q. 14. T. Yet after he thinketh it possible for God to have made a Reasonable creature not obliged; As if his very nature were not obligatory: His instance of the Mad is vain; for they are not actually Reasonable. Ockam presumptuously concludeth that God could command a man to hate God and make it meritorious, it being no contradiction: His follower Greg. Arim. confuteth him; And Cameracensis invalidateth the confutation, and leaveth it doubtful. But it is a contradiction to be a man, and not obliged by Nature to Love God; And a contradiction to be bound by nature to Love him, and yet stante natura bound to hate him: And a contradiction to hate God and be good or happy. It is a contradiction to be a Created Man, and not Gods Own, and his obliged Subject and Beneficiary. Therefore it is a contradiction that submission, obedience and Love should not be his Moral duty and good, and that self-alienation, rebellion, or disobedience and hatred should be no sins. 643. To dispute then (as he doth with Camero and his followers) Whether it be good ex natura rei, or by God's mere freewill? is a strange dispute, and of most easy resolution. Either they speak of Gods creating will, or of some other subsequent Volition. Man is made man by God's free creating will: And the foresaid Relations, and duties are made such by making him Man. And the duties of Love and Justice to others are made such by his Creators placing him in a world where his Neighbours are about him, who are due objects; as a part of the society, This he himself confesseth pag. 329, 330. like a Wheel in a Clock: The Creator's will is before Nature, and therefore before natural duty, as the Cause before the effect. God could have made beasts instead of men, who had owed him no more than beasts can do. But from the Nature of a Man coexistent with God, his said duties to God so necessarily result, that it could not be otherwise; nor did there need any subsequent act of Gods will to make that duty. 644. But those that are not Duties by Nature, must have moreover a Vid. Durand. 1. d. 38. qi 4. n. 9, 10, 11. Scot 3. d. 37. q. 1. Gabr. 3. d. 37. a. 2. Suarez de Legib. l. 2. c. 15. Aquin. 1, 2. q. 94. a. 5. & q. 100 a. 4. further act of Gods will as signified to make them so; As the Mosaical Ceremonies, our Sacraments, etc. 645. And many Natural Laws and duties are mutable, towards one another, because the very Nature and Natural Location or Order of the Things from which they did result, are mutable; And a word of God can make a change: when yet before such antecedent mutation, the duty must be duty still. 646. As to Mr. rutherford's oft saying that Omnis actus entitativus simplex est moraliter de se indifferens, neque bonus neque malus; And then that per actum simplicem he meaneth such as include not the object, It is ludicrous or vain talk. There is no such Act as hath not an object, any more than physical form without matter. Quicunque movet, aliquid movet; Quicunque intelligit, aut vult, aliquid intelligit aut vult, (vel seipsum vel aliud.) An Act without its object is but a partial or inadequate Generical conceptus of that Act which hath an object; or an abstract partial notion of an act. Why then doth he talk of that which is not? Had he said that every act is in the first instant rationis, or abstract-partial conception, an Act in genere, before it be intelligible as this or that act, about this or that object, he had spoken intelligibly as other men do. 647. Such another question many called Arminians much use, Whether Whether Justice etc. be eternally good or have rationem boni aeternam? Justice etc. be eternally good? Or An dentur rationes boni & mali aeternae & indispensabiles? which needs no other solution than this last. There is no such thing as an Universal, existent per se and not in some Individual: And so no such thing as Love, Justice, etc. Bonum, Malum, which is not alicujus Justitia, Bonum, etc. There was no Creature from Eternity being Just or unjust, good or bad. But Gods perfect Nature But that Gods own eternal perfection hath in it that root of humane virtue (truth, justice, etc.) which therefore analogically have the same name (our holiness being God's Image) I would prove to the Reader by this weighty reason: Because else we have no certainty that God's word is true: For all our certainty is hence, that God cannot lie. But if Veracity be not in God, we cannot prove that. And if he have not that which is eminenter Justice, mercy, etc. how can we prove that he hath Veracity? might be called Eternally Just, in that he must necessarily be Just, if he had been a governor: And necessarily was Just, when he freely became a governor. And also this proposition was Eternally true, (if there were eternally propositions) [Si Homines existerent, Justitia in ipsis debita foret: & quandocunque Homines fuerint, Justitia in ipsis debita fuerit.] But when all the sense of these questions is no more, but what Duties are natural, and what superadded (called Positive,) and what natural duties are immutable and what mutable, it's an unhappiness that the world must be troubled with such uncouth forms of speech as make the question unintelligible, till unravelled. 648. As to rutherford's charge of Camero and his followers in France, Amyraldus, etc. with Semipelagianism and Arminianism and filthy opinions, it is but the effect of the good man's overweening, and conceitedness of his own apprehensions, which must be allowed or endured in most of these contenders; And the fruits of such disputes is like to be little better. But the worthy praises of Blondel, Dallaeus, Placeus, Capellus, Amyraldus, Testardus, etc. shall survive such reproach. And a thousand pities it is, to read a good man Voluminously proving God to be a Willer of sins existence, and a prime-predetermining Cause of all prohibited Volitions and acts, and reproaching the Jesuits, Lutherans, Arminians and Socinians as the great enemies of God's Providence for denying this; As if he would tempt the World to think that Socinians were in the right, and that Jesuits, Lutherans and Arminians were the only defenders of the Holiness of God, whilst Calvinists made him the Lover of all the sin in the World, as the most appetible conducible Medium to his Glory. 649. But (to proceed) his next Argument is, cap. 23. Sin conferreth something to the splendour, ornament, and plenitude of the Universe: E●go, See Bonavent. well confuting this in 1. d. 46. q. 3. Malum fieri nullatenus bonum esse, sed bene occasio boni. God willeth its existence: This is answered before. The antecedent is utterly unproved. Sin addeth nothing to the ornament or perfection of the World. His word is no proof. 650. Afterwards he heapeth up many frivolous arguments against that which he calleth reproachingly, The Idle Permission of sin; and saith, that it frustrateth the prayers of the Saints, and their patience, their gratitude, trust, hope, fear, joy, alloweth the arrogance of the persecuters, fighteth with God's Wisdom, Clemency, Justice, Providence, with the Ministry of the Word, the Promises, Threaten, with Ministers confirming ●●● against sufferings, and it is blasphemously injurious to God, and contrary to the order of things in the world, that he should permit sin, and not will the being of it. Resp. What is it that a man, yea, a pious man in a blind zeal of God and self-conceit, may not pour out confident words for? What a case is the poor Church in, when the unlearned people must be on both sides charged by their Teachers with blasphemy, what way ever they go? This man will tell them that they are * Pag. 370. blasphemous, and overthrow all reason and Religion, if they say that God only Permitteth sin, and doth not himself will the being of it, and move unavoidably all wills, and tongues, and hands, to all the blasphemies, persecutions, and murders that are done, and damn men for it when he hath done. And others will as confidently say that he is a Blasphemer, for charging God to be much more the cause of all forbidden acts of wickedness than Devils and men are, and the● damning them for it, and for putting God into the shape of the Devil, and painting him odious to humane nature, that man may not love him: What shall poor people think when they are thus torn and tormented by their holy Guides? But all his arguments are before answered, when I shown him how many ways God hath to secure the Effects and Events in the world, and attain all his Ends, and yet only Permit, and neither Will, nor Love, nor Cause the sin. 651. Cap. 26. he cometh to plead for Predetermination, and saith p. 385. God predetermineth us (to the Act of hating God) in linea me●● physica, & non morali. Mere delusory words. He maketh it by the Law of Nature a sin to hate him, and then he maketh men hate him ●● linea physica & non morali! as if the moral sinfulness resulted not from the Law and act; that is, here from Nature itself, viz. of the Man and act, both which God made. 652. Pag. 386. he saith, that [Directa & expressa & efficax Dei V●litio, qua Vult ut sit seu fiat actus Dei odii, non facit Deum Malitia q●● I confess Gab. Biel in 2. d. 37. speaketh too like these several atheological assertions: as do many others. per accidens sequitur actum, authorem.] Resp. But that per accidens is no reason of the denial, if God cause that accident also, as the first cause. If he make a Law, and make the forbidden act, the relation of sinfulness is an Accident indeed, but ariseth from the said fundamentum so necessarily that it cannot be otherwise. But it should have made a holy Divine to tremble to have said, that God directly, expressly and effectually willeth men's Act of hating God, viz. that it exist or be. 653. And it is false that he saith, that God is equally the Cause that men hate him, if he will the Act hypothetically, ineffectually and determi●ably by another's will, as if he willed it efficaciously. And so when he maketh the Doctrine of Universal Concourse and Causation, as guilty as ●is predetermining pre-motion. As if God could not make man a free-●iller and agent, and as the spring of Nature, enable him and concur ●o his Act as an Act, in genere, without causing it to terminate on the forbidden object in specie. As if it were impossible for the Sun to be ●n universal cause of the stinking of a Dunghill and Weed, without being ●he special: or as if God must be made the cause of every blasphemy, unless ●e will make the blasphemer speechless, and of every villainy, unless he will strike men dead to prevent it. This is not reverend and holy judging of the most holy God the Judge of all. 654. The sum of all his Vindication of God from being the chief Author of all sin (pag. 387. & passim) is but this one reason, God is under no Law. But if this be all, why do you not speak out what you mean, but hold that which you dare not name, viz. [That God is the chief So Bannes in 1. q. 23. ●. 3. p. 270, 271. Voluntas hominis mal● est quia exercet actum odii Dei sine regula rationis, immo contra legem Dei; Deus autem bona vol untate vult fieri illum actum, permittens defectum Caus● secund● in ipso, ut inde aliquod majus bonum faciat: which is true of the act in genere, but not as it is Odium Dei. For so if he will it and cause it, he doth more than permit: and the defectus Causae secundae is that very odium as against God. And doth God cause the greatest sin that he may do good by it? He can do as much good without causing the evil. ●nsuperable cause of all the sin of Devils and men for which he damneth ●hem, and that both as to the matter and form; but yet thus to do is no sin in God himself, because he is under no Law.] This is your most ●lain undoubted sense, or else your Book is nonsense; What need we then any further enquiry what you hold? It is delusion to pretend that you are accused for making God a sinner. We charge no such thing on you: But only for making him the chief insuperable cause of all the sins of men and Devils. 655. Pag. 400. he plainly professeth that the Will as a physical agent is the cause of the act as physical, and as under a Law, and that act is against the Law, so he is the cause of the Malitia actûs, and culpablo. So that God causing by his own confession both Act and Law, there is no modest subtersuge left for his not openly professing that he asserteth God to be the cause of all sin, the principal cause, both as to matter and form. 656. The rest of that Disputation striketh me with such horror in the reading, that I confess I have not the patience to proceed any further ●n it, nor shall further thus exercise my Readers patience. The case is plain. Either Hobbs, or freewill permitted, must carry the cause in the case of sin: There is no middle way. He that will read Ruiz and rutherford's answer impartially, needeth no more of mine for the confutation of his vain responses. 657. But cap. 29. p. 484. he falleth also on our most Learned and Judicious Dr. Field, because in his lib. 3. c. 3. of the Church he contradicteth his opinion; and it must move just indignation in the Reader that he addeth [idque probare conatur contra reformatas Ecclesias.] Unworthy injury to the Reformed Churches, more than to the worthy Dr. Field! How falsely are they interessed in your unhappy cause! See the Synod of Dort, where there is not a word for it. Is one Twiss with his Rutherford, or Maccovius, or a few such, the Reformed Churches? Let the Reader peruse the Articles of the Churches of England, Scotland, France, and all the rest, and see where he can find your Doctrine of Predetermination unto sin. Even Jansenius himself is against it among the Papists, when his Dominican Predecessors are the Fathers of it. Nothing more common with English Divines than (as you did before yourself) to explicate Gods causing the acts of sinners, by the similitude of the Riders spurring a halting Horse, or the Sun's making a Dunghill stink; which only speak the cause which we call universal, and is the very thing which we assert. And it is most unsavourily done, to get into the Chair and magisterially say [Fieldus vir alioqui doctus, in his controversiis minime se versat●● esse prodit— & Zumelem * Zumel in Disp. 1. Thom. de Voluntat. hom. & lib. arb. pag. 219, 220. Quod D●●s non sit causa peccati, though he speak cautesously and as in other men's names, yet concludeth plainly, that God is but the Causa Universalis of sin, and that man is the specifying determining cause, even que universalem determinat ad speciem concursus & actus ipsius, sive solum determinet eam formaliter ad speciem, etc. Yet this is a high Thomist and defender of absolute grace. non satis intelligit, quip non satis g●●rus controversiarum Arminianarum, & scripsit dum aulam Armini●● plus aequo faventem haberent. † Thus magisterially did good Dr. Twisse censure Junius and Vossius (his Son-in-law) as men unskilled in Scholastic Divinity, who were both most excellent men, and hit upon the reconciling truth, above most in their age. Junius his Discourse of predetermination is one of the first that ever I found that excellency in, and with his Irenicon is most worthy of great esteem. ] But how easy is it for a man to overvalue himself, and contemn another? I highly value the piety in Mr. ●●therfords Letters. I am no fit arbiter ingeniorum: But when I hear other men say that one Field was more Judicious than many rutherford's, I confess by reading their several writings I find no temptation to deny it; And why should Field and consequently Davenant, Ʋsher, Carlton, M●ton, Hall, the Synod of Dort, and I think the far greatest part of Protestants (I verily think fifty if not an hundred for one) who are against you, be made odious by the supposition of being not far enough from Arminians, rather than Maceovius, Twisse and Rutherford take it for a disgrace, to hold the same opinions against God's Holiness, which the D●●nican Friars hold, who have been the bloody Masters of the Inquisition, and murdered so many thousand Protestants or Waldenses and Alligenses? And that which he saith of Fields writing when the Court favoured Arminianism, is notoriously false, and such insinuations unworthy of so good a man as the speaker. Fields Works were printed singly before they were printed together in Folio. And his fifth Book was printed A●no 1610. and the words cited are in the third printed before. And the Synod of Dort was called An. 1618. and sat 1619. also; And King James was a zealous suppressor of Arminianism, and sent five or six Divines thither to that end. And long after in King Charles his days, Pet. Heylin in the life of Archbishop Laud will tell you, that the Armini●● Bishops then were but five, Neale, Laud, Buckeridge, Corbet and Hows●●, to whom Learned Montague was after added: So that they durst not trust their Cause with a Convocation. Field then shall be a most Judition worthy Divine, when partiality hath said its worst. 658. And what is his error? Why he saith that it's a contradiction to say that God causeth the Act (in all its state,) which is the Materials peccati, and causeth not the formale, which is inseparable. A foul error indeed, to tell you that he that causeth the subjectum, fundament●●, rationem fundandi & terminum causeth the relation; and that he that maketh an European white and an African black causeth the dissimilitude, and so doth he that maketh the strait Rule and the crooked line, th● forbidding Law, and the forbidden act. 659. Were it not that the necessity requireth such work, because such Books are in men's hands, I should think I had injured the Reader, by th●● much: For my work is not to confute Books, but to assert sure reconciling truths. Otherwise the confutation of the rest of that Book (for God's willing and causing all forbidden acts in their full state, and the existence of sin) is most easily answered. SECT. XX. The old Reconciling Doctrine of Augustine, Prosper and Fulgentius. And first Prosper ad Gallorum Qu. 660. IT is a strange thing to me that when Pelagius, Julian, Faustus, etc. thought Augustine a Novelist, and (as Usher asserteth) would have fastened the title of Predestination-Hereticks on his followers, and almost all confess, that Augustine was, if not the first, yet the most notable public Vindicator of absolute Predestination and Grace, yet the Judgement of Austin, with his Disciples Prosper and Fulgentius, doth not serve turn to quiet, if not to end these controversies, among those who profess to be their followers! when as they have so copiously and plainly written upon the case! 661. I entreat the Reader that is inclining to any extremes, but to read ●over first those short answers of Prosper ad Capitul● Gallorum and ad Objectiones Vincent. And most of the Sententiae de Capit. I shall think it worthy my labour to recite, to force them on the Readers observation, and let him see the highest old Doctrine of God's Decrees. Sent. 1. Whoever saith, that by God's Predestination, as by fatal necessity, men compelled into sins, are constrained to death, is not a Catholic. For God's Predestination doth by no means make men bad, nor is the cause of any man's sin. Sent. sup. 2. He that saith, that the Grace of Baptism received doth not take away Original sin from them that are not predestinated to life, is not a Catholic. For the Sacrament of Baptism, by which all sins He meaneth that those that sincerely covenanted with God in Baptism, were truly pardoned, though he thought some of them fell away and perished. are blotted out, is true even in them who will not remain in the truth, and for them that are not predestinated unto life. Sent. sup. 3. He that saith, that they that are not predestinated to life, though they were in Christ regenerated by Baptism, and have lived piously and justly, it profitteth them nothing, but they are so long reserved till they fall to ruin, and they are not taken out of this life till this happen to them, as if the ruin of such men were to be referred to God's constitution, is not a Catholic. For God doth not therefore prolong the time of any man's age, that by long living he should fall to ruin; and in his long living, fall from the right ●aith: seeing long life is to be numbered with the gifts of God, by which a man should be better and not worse. Sent. sup. 4. He that saith, that all are not called to Grace, if he speak of such as Christ is not declared to, is not to be reprehended— Sent. sup. 5. He that saith, that they that are called, are not equally called, but some that they might believe, and some that they might not believe, as if to any man the Vocation were the cause of his not believing, saith not right. For though faith be not but by God's Gift, and Man's Will, yet Infidelity is by man's will alone. Sent. 6. He that saith, that Pree-will in Man is Nothing, but it's God's predestination which worketh in men, whether it be to good or to evil, is not a Catholic: For God's Grace doth not abolish man's choice (or freewill) but perfecteth it; and revoketh and reduceth it into the way from error, that that which was bad by its own liberty, may by the operation of God's Spirit be made right. And God's predestination is always in Good; which knoweth how either to pardon with the praise of mercy, or punish with the praise of Justice, the sin which is committed by man's will alone. Sent. 7. He that saith, that God for this cause giveth not Perseverance to some of his Children whom he regenerated in Christ, to whom he gave faith, hope and Love, because by God's foreknowledge and predestination they were not differenced from the mass of perdition: If he mean that God endowed these men in Goodness, but would not have them remain in it, and that he was the cause of their turning away, he judgeth contrary to the Justice of God. For though God's Omnipotence could have given the grace of standing to them that will fall, yet his grace doth not first forsake them, before they have forsaken it. And because he foresaw that they would do this by a Voluntary desertion, therefore he had them not in the Election of Predestination. Sent. 8. He that saith, that God would not have all men saved; but a certain number that are predestinate, speaketh hardlier of the altitude of God's unsearchable grace, than he should speak; Who would have all men to be saved, and to come to the acknowledgement of the truth; and fulfilleth the purpose of his will on them, whom being foreknown he predestinated, and being predestinate he called, being called he justified, and being justified he glorified. Losing nothing of the fullness of the Gentiles, and of all the seed of Israel, for whom the eternal Kingdom was prepared in Christ before the foundation of the World. For all the World, is chosen out of all the World; And out of all men, all men are adopted— So that they that are saved are therefore saved, because God would have them saved: and they that perish, do perish because they deserve to perish. Sent. 9 He that saith, that our Saviour was not Crucified for the Redemption of the whole World, looketh not to the Virtue of the Sacrament (that is, Sacrifice) but to the part (or participation) of the unbelievers: When as the blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, is the Price of the whole World. From which Price they are Aliens who being either delighted in their Captivity, will not be redeemed; or when they are redeemed return again to the same Captivity: For the Word of the Lord falleth not, nor is the redemption of the World evacuated: For though the World in the vessels of wrath knew not God, yet the World in the vessels of mercy knew him. Which God without their preceding Merits, took out of the power of darkness, and translated into the Kingdom of the Son of his Love. Sent. 10. He that saith, that God substracteth from some the preaching of the Gospel, lest perceiving the preaching of the Gospel they should be saved, may decline the envy of the objection by the pa●●onage of our Saviour himself, who would not work Miracles with some, that he saith would have believed had they seen them: And he forbade his Apostles to preach to some people; and now suffereth some Nations to live without his Grace— Sent. 11. He that saith, that God by his Power compelleth men to sin, is deservedly reprehended: For God, who is the Author of Justice and Goodness, and all whose Statutes and Commands are against sin, is not to be thought to compel any to sin, and precipitate them from innocency into crimes: But if there be any of so profound impiety, as that they are reckoned to be beyond the remedy of correction, they receive not an increase of their iniquity from God, but are made ●●●● by themselves: because they deserved to be left of God, and given up to themselves and to deceivers, for their former sins: that so their sin should be a punishment of their sin. Sent. 12. He that saith, that obedience is withdrawn from some that are called and live piously and righteously, that they may cease to obey, doth think ill of God's Goodness and Justice, as seeming to constrain the godly to ungodliness, and to take away good men's innocency from them; When as He is the Giver and Keeper of godliness and innocency: He therefore that adhereth to God, is acted by the Spirit of God; but he that departeth from God, doth fall from his obedience (or cease it) by his own will. Sent. 13. He that saith, that some men are not made by God to this end that they might obtain eternal life, but that they might be the ornaments of their times, and for the good of others, would speak better if he said, that God who is the Creator of all men, maketh not them in vain, who he forseeth will not be partakers of life eternal: Because even in bad men, nature is God's good work, and Justice in their damnation is laudable. But he cannot well be blamed that saith, that even by the condition of such the World is adorned * But not by their sin i● self. , and that those that hurt themselves by their own iniquity, are born for the good of others: For the multitude of the ungodly though innumerable is not disgraceful (or a deformity) to the World, or unprofitable to the Kingdom of God, seeing that by their propagation cometh the generation that is to be regenerate; and by tolerating and loving them, God's people become the more illustrious.— Sent. 14. He that saith, that they that believe not the preaching of the Gospel, are unbelievers by God's predestination, and that God so decreed, that they that believe not be unbelievers by his appointment (or decree) is not a Catholic: For as Faith which worketh by Love is God's gift, so unbelief is none of God's constitution: Because God knoweth how to ordain Punishment for sin, but not sin itself. And it followeth not, that what he remitteth not, he committeth: The predestinate therefore liveth by the faith which is given him: The non-predestinate perish by Voluntary and not constrained infidelity. Sent. 15. He that saith, that Foreknowledge is the same with predestination, doubtless in our good works, conjoineth (or mixeth) those two: For what we have of God's gift, and is said to be foreknown, must needs be predestinate: And what is said to be predestinate, must needs be foreknown. But in our evil works, only the foreknowledge of God must be understood. Because as he foreknew and predestinated, the things which he doth himself, and giveth us to do: so he FOREKNEW ONLY and DID NOT PREDESTINATE the things which he neither doth himself, nor requireth us to do. SECT. XXI. Prosper 's answers ad Object. Vincent. 662. I Will crave the Readers patience while I add the sum of hi● Answers also to some of the Objections of Vincentius. Obj. 1. That Christ died not for all— Resp. His death is a remedy in itself sufficient to profit all; but if it be not taken it will not heal. Obj. 2. That God would not have all saved, though they would. Resp. We must sincerely believe and profess that God would have all saved:— That many perish, is by the merit of them that perish: That many are saved, is the gift of him that saved them. For that the guilty are damned is God's inculpable justice; that the guilty are justified is God's unspeakable grace. Obj. 3. That God made most of mankind that they might perish for ever. Resp. God is the Creator of all men; but No man is made by him that he might perish: For the cause of being born is one, and the cause of perishing is another. That men are born is God's gift; that they perish, is the sinner's desert: He maketh men, that they may be men— Obj. 4. That the most of men are made of God, not to do Gods will, but the Devils. Resp. It is madness, and against reason to say that it is by Gods will that Gods will is not done: and that the damner of the Devil and his servants would have the Devil served.— Obj. 5. That God is the author of our sin, in that he maketh men's wills evil, and maketh a substance which by natural motion cannot but sin. Resp. This objection they make because we hold original sin and misery— But we hold that whatever is of Nature is of God, and none of that which is contrary to Nature. But sin is contrary to nature, from whence cometh death, and all that is of death:— God is the author of no man's sin, but the Creator of his Nature, which voluntarily sinned, when it had Power not to sin; and by his own will man subjected himself to the deceiver. And it is not by Natural but by Captive Motion that he liveth in sin, till he die to sin, and live to God; which without grace he cannot do. Obj. 6. That God maketh in men such a will as is in Devils, that of its own motion can and will do nothing but evil. Resp. The whole world lieth in wickedness— But even very bad men may be reconciled, and Devils cannot.— And God put not evil affections in men. Obj. 7. That it is God's will that a great part of Christians neither will nor can be saved. Resp. If you speak of them who forsaking the Godliness of a Christian conversation and faith, do irrevocably pass over into profane errors and damnable manners, it's doubtless that having such a will, they will not be saved; and as long as they will not be saved, they cannot be saved. But it is by no means to be believed that such men fell into this desperate case by the will of God, when rather God lifteth up all that fall— For no man is raised or established but by his Grace. It is therefore Gods will that they continue in a good will; And he forsaketh no man before that man forsake him, and converteth many that do forsake him. Obj. 8. That God will not have all Catholics to persevere in the Catholic faith, but will have a great part of them to apostatise from it. Resp. The same answer serveth to this blasphemy as to the former. Obj. 9 That God would have a great part of the Saints to fall from the purpose of holiness. * The Reader must note that their common opinion than was that some true Saints do fall away▪ and perish. Resp. This madness also needeth no other answer. Obj. 10. That Adulteries and corrupting consecrate Virgins do come to pass because God predestinated them to fall. Resp. It is a detestable and abominable opinion, which believeth God to be the author of any man's evil will or evil action: whose predestination (or decree) is never without Goodness and Justice † That is, [of nothing but good and just.] . For all the ways of God are mercy and truth: Adulteries and Corruptions of Virgin's God knoweth not how to institute, but to damn; not to dispose * That is, ut sint▪ , but to punish. Which evils when men commit, they serve their own lusts— God's predestination neither exciteth, persuadeth or impelleth the fall, malignity, or lusts of sinners; but plainly predestinateth his own Judgement, by which he will reward every one according to what he hath done, whether good or evil: which Judgement would never be, if men sinned by the will of God. But be it will: And every man whom the discerning of God's knowledge shall set at his left hand, shall be damned, because he executed not Gods will, but his own. Obj. 11. When incest is committed between Fathers and their Daughters, Mothers and their Sons, it is therefore done, because so God fore-decreed that it should be done (or come to pass.) Resp. † Let the Dominicans not●▪ this. If it were objected to the Devil himself, that he is the author and incenter of such villainies, I think that with some reason he might discharge himself of the envy, and overcome the committer of such wickedness by his own willing of them. Because though he be delighted with the madness of sinners, he can yet prove that he forced them not to sin. With what folly and madness than is that ascribed to God, which may not be wholly ascribed to the Devil, who is but the adjutor of the baits of sin, and not the Causer (Generater) of the Will? God then fore-decreed not that any such businesses should be done, nor prepared that soul to any such end, who will live wickedly and filthily. But he was not ignorant that it would be such, and he fore-knew that he would justly judge of such. So that to his fore-decree nothing else can be referred, but either 1. That which belongeth to the due retribution of Justice, 2. Or to the not due bestowing of grace. Obj. 12. That by God's fore-decree men are made of Children of God to be Children of the Devil; and of Temples of the Holy Ghost, the Temples of Devils; and of members of Christ, members of a Harlot. Resp. God's Predestination, though to us while we are in the perils of this life it be uncertain, with him is unchangeable— But those of whom it is said, They went out from us because they were not of us— did willingly go out, and willingly fall away. And because they were foreknown to be such as would fall away, they were not predestinate. But they had been Predestinated, if they had been such as would have returned, and remained in holiness and truth, So that God's fore-decree is to many a cause of standing, and to none a cause of falling. Obj. 13. That all those faithful and Saints who are fore-decreed to eternal death, when they return to their vomit, seem indeed to do it by their own vice: but the cause of that vice is the fore-decree of God; which secretly withdraweth from them good wills. Resp.— Indeed to all that relapse from faith to infidelity, from Holiness to filthiness, and are not purged by emendation before the end of their lives, nothing but eternal death is due: But it is wickedness to ascribe the cause of such ruins to God: who though he foreknow by his eternal knowledge, what reward he will give to every man's deserts, yet this his Impossibility of being deceived, doth not bring into any man either a necessity or a will * Note this you that are for his first predetermining all forbidden Volitions and acts. of sinning. If therefore any man fall from Godliness, he is carried headlong by his own will; he is drawn by his own concupiscence; he is deceived by his own persuasion. There the Father doth nothing; the Son doth nothing; the Holy Ghost doth nothing: nor doth any thing of the will of God intervene in such a business; by whose help we know many are kept from falling, but none impelled to fall. Obj. 14. That this great part of Christian faithful Catholics and Saints who are fore-decreed to ruin and perdition, if they beg of God perseverance in Holiness, shall not obtain it, Because God's decree cannot be changed, by which he fore-ordained, prepared and fitted them to fall away, Resp. To the breach of the Law, to the neglect of Religion, to the corrupting of discipline, to the forsaking of the faith, to the perpetrating of any sin whatever, there is no predestination (or fore-decree) of God at all. Nor can it be that men should fall into such evils by him, by whom men rise out of such. If therefore men live in holiness, if they profit in virtue, if they remain in good studies, it is the manifest gift of God, without whom the fruit of no good work is acquired. But if men fall away from these, and pass over to vice and sin, God there sendeth them no evil temptation, nor doth he forsake him that will fall away, before he be forsaken by him. And for the most part he keepeth men from forsaking him, or if they depart doth cause them to return. But why he upholdeth one and not another, it is neither possible to comprehend, † N. B. nor lawful to search; seeing it may suffice to know, both that it is of him that men stand, and it is not of him that they fall away. Obj. 15. That all the faithful and Saints who are predestinated to eternal death; when they fall are so disposed of by God, that they neither can nor will be delivered by repentance. Resp. Falsely said and foolishly: For they that fall away from faith and holiness, as they fell by their Wills, so by their Wills they rise not▪— But God taketh the way of amendment from none; not depriveth any of the possibility of good: For he that turneth himself from God, taketh from himself both the will and the power of good. It's no good consequence, as the Objecters think, that God taketh away repentance from men, because he giveth it them not; and that he casteth down those that he taketh not up. For it is one thing to act the innocent into a crime (which God cannot do;) and another not to pardon the Criminal, which is the desert of sin. Obj. 16. That this great part of the faithful and holy, which is fore-decreed to eternal death, when they pray to God in the Lord's prayer, Let thy will be done, do only pray against themselves, viz. that they may fall and be ruined; because it is the will of God that they perish by eternal death. Resp. The Truth saith not this, that it is the will of God that the faithful and Saints do fall from faith and innocency and perish. But Truth saith, This is the will of the Father that sent me, that of all that he hath given me I should lose none— But if by the generality of Vocation, and the abundance of God's goodness, even those that will not persevere are mixed with the persevering, when these fall away from Godliness, they fall not (or are not forsaken) of God's help, but of their own wills: nor are impelled to fall, nor cast off that they may forsake; but yet are fore-known to fall away by Him that cannot be deceived: And when they pray, Thy will be done, they pray not that they may fall— Which God will not do (or Cause) any way, by any means: For this by their own naughtiness, their own liberty will do: But this they pray against themselves, (which doubtless is Gods will) that when the Son of man shall come in his Majesty, etc. they that will not do Gods will, and yet pray, Let thy will be done, are heard in that which is God's will, that the imitaters of the Devil be judged with the Devil. For they that have despised Gods inviting will, shall feel his revenging will. SECT. XXII. The words of Fulgentius to the same sense. 663. I Must crave of the Reader that he remember that my reciting the Judgement of these Fathers for the falling away and perishing of many that were in a state of Life, is not at all as declaring my own judgement, but Theirs; none then that I read of thinking otherwise. * Except Jovinian be truly accused by Hierome, the brevity and obscurity of whose accusation and confutation, leaveth us very uncertain what it was that Jovinian held. But we are sure that the spirit o● uncharitableness and concention though in a good ●●●● learned man) had no ●●all hand in the stigm●●zing of him and Vigilantius as Heretics. . I shall (for the End sake) be yet a little more ●edious in citing some of the say of Fulgentius. Fulg. l. 1. de Verit. praedest. cap. 6. To good men God giveth what good they have, and keepeth it: But to the wicked and ungodly, God neither ever could prepare or give evil works, which they should damnably serve: nor did he ever put into them evil wills by which they should culpably will things unjust: but he prepared for them the punishment of Hell, that they might feel revenging justice in endless fire. An evil will is not of God: And therefore the just Judge doth punish it in men, because the good Creator findeth not in it the order of his Creation. And perseverance and contumacy in sin and pride, because it is not of Gods giving, is condemned by God revenging. Et l. 1. ad Monim. c. 26. He will punish in the wicked, that they are bad, which he gave not, nor did he predestinate them to any iniquity: and that they willed unjustly was none of his gift. And because the persevering iniquity of an evil will, ought not to remain unpunished, he predestinated such to destruction, because he prepared just punishment for them— Observe that God predestinated wicked and ungodly men, to just punishment, not to any unjust work: to the penalty, not to the fault: to the punishment, n●● to the transgression: to the destruction which the anger of a just judge requiteth sinners with; not to that destruction (or death) by which the iniquity of sinners provoketh God's wrath against them. The Apostle calls them Vessels of wrath, not Vessels of sin. Cap. 27. The wicked are not predestinated to the first death of the soul, but to the second death they are:— That which followeth the sentence of a just Judge; not that which preceded in the evil concupiscence of the sinner. Ibid. c. 23. It beseemeth believers to confess that the good and just God, fore-knew indeed that men would sin, (for all things to come are known to him. For they were not future, if they were not in his foreknowledge:) But not that he predestinated any to sin. For if he predestinated man to any sin, he would not punish man for sin. For God's predestination prepareth for men, either the godly remission of their sins, or the just punishment of them. God therefore could never predestinate man to that, which he had resolved both to forbid by his precept, and to wash away by his mercy, and punish by his justice. God therefore predestinated to eternal punishment, the wicked who he foreknew would persevere to the death in sin. Wherein as his foreknowledge of man's iniquity is not to be blamed, so his predestination of just revenge is to be praised: That we may acknowledge, that he predestinated not man to any sin, whom he predestinated to be punished deservedly for sin. And ad Monimum li. 1. pag. (edit. Basil.) 68 reciting Augusti●●● words he saith [He taught that only pride was the cause of man's iniquity, and that God predestinated not men to sin, but to damnation; and that they are not helped by God, the cause is in themselves and not in God.] The same he reciteth again ex lib. 2. Aug. de baptis. parvul. [that their wills be not helped by grace, the cause is in themselves and not in God.] The same he again repeateth pag. 69. 70, 71, 72. and [that Augustine's mind was that good works God both fore-knew and predestinated:— But evil works, that is, sin, he foreknew indeed, but did not predestinate (or decree.) For there is not God's work, but his judgement. Therefore in sin God's work is not, because that sin should be done was not decreed by him: But therefore there is his judgement, because it is not left unrevenged, that an evil man worketh without God working.] And ib. li. 1. pag. 15. [That which is not in his work, never was in predestination. Therefore men are not predestinated to sin.] So p. 29. And p. 31. and forward. And p. 29. [No man justly sinneth though God justly permit him to sin: For he is justly forsaken of God, who forsaketh God. And because man forsaking God, sinneth, God forsaking man keepeth justice.] 664. I am loath to weary the Reader with more. Should I do the like by Augustine's words it would be too wearisome. His judgement is the very same as theirs. I will only cite one passage out of him, about man's Power to believe. Tract. 53. in Johan. having showed that God only foreknoweth men's sin, and foretelleth it (as the Jews) but causeth it not, he cometh to answer John 12. 39 They could not believe etc. If they could not how was it their sin?— saying, [You hear the question, brethren, and see how deep it is: But we answer as we can.— Why could they not believe? If you ask me, I quickly answer, Because they would not. For God foresaw their evil will, and foretold it by the Prophet— He blinded their eyes, etc. And I answer that their own wills deserved this also. For God blindeth and hardeneth, by forsaking and not helping; which he may do by a judgement secret, but not unjust. This all religious piety ought to hold unshaken. Far be it from us then to say that there is iniquity with God: If he help, he doth it mercifully; if he help not, he doth justly.] 665. By all this the Reader may see past all doubt, that Augustine and his two disciples, (than whom none known to us in the whole world than went higher for Predestination and Grace) did plainly take up with this, that 1. GOD NEITHER CAUSED OR WILLED SIN, no, not ITS BEING, or the forbidden ACT. 2. That OUR SIN was of OURSELVES. 3. That ALL GRACE and perserverance was OF GOD. 4. That ELECTION was ABSOLUTE of GOD's mere will, and not upon his foreknowledge of any merits of man's. 5. That God predestinated none to sin, but predestinated men to Punishment, ONLY ON THE FORESIGHT of their wilful sin. 6. That he hardened men but by deserting them. 7. That he never forsook them till they forsook him first, and deserved it by sin. In a word, that man's destruction is of himself, but his help of God; who resolvedly chooseth some to salvation, and helpeth them accordingly with that effectual grace, and especial perseverance, which he justly giveth not to others, though if he would he could. SECT. XXIII. Healing Principles and Concessions of the Synod of Dort, etc. 666. I Know not how to conclude this discourse more suitably to my ends, than by opening to the Reader who is sensible of the Church's sin, misery and danger by our contentions and divisions, how much the parties whom I endeavour to reconcile, are agreed in judgement about these matters, and that in their own words. Remember still that it is not some few that run further than the rest (either Episcopius, Curcell●●●, etc. on one side, or Maccovius, Rutherford or Dr. Twisse, or Alvarez and other Predeterminants' on the other side,) whose particular opinions I cannot undertake to reconcile: But only the generality of the Calvinists who go no further than the Synod of Dort (which is my test of the party) and the moderate Arminians, Lutherans, and Jesuits (in these points) on the other side. And let none reproach me for putting in the Jesuits, for as I know that very few Calvinists fly near so high for Predetermination as the Dominicans do; so I know that (though Arminius himself was a sober man, and Episcopius is cried up by some, as Volkelius and other Socinians are by others, as most clearly rational, yet) there is none of them all that equal in accurateness of search and clearness of reason, either many of the ancient Schoolmen, or Suarez, Ruiz, Vasquez, Albertinus, and many other latter School Jesuits. 667. The first thing that I will desire of the Reader is to peruse those many healing concessions contained in the writings, especially Irenicons, of many Learned Calvinists already extant: Especially Davenants two dissertations, Dr. Sam. Wards works; the Judgements of Davenant, Morton, Hall, to Dury about this: Bishop Robert Abbots, and Bishop Carltons works oft on the by: Bishop Usher of Redemption, etc. Mr. Fenn●r of wilful Impenitency, and Hidden Manna, Joh. Bergius for Reconcil. I●dov. Crocii Syntag. Conrade. Bergii Praxis Can. Junii Irenicon and of predeterm. Paraei Irenicon. Amyrald. Defence. doct. Calv. & Irenicon. Testard. de nat. & Grat. Hotton. de toler. Theses Salmur. but above all Le Blanks Theses, Vossii Thess. & Histor. Pelag. Musculi Loc. Commun. And the general Irenicons, as all Durie's, Hall's Peacemaker and Pax terris, Burroughs Iren. Acontii stratagem. Satana (an excellent book) etc. 668. Next I will insert some words to this end, in the Synod of Dort. I. About the first Article (of Predestination) they open free election, but mention no other Reprobation but God's not-electing, or passing by, some whom he found in sin, and in the misery in quam se suâ culpâ praecipitarunt, etc. and not giving them effectual grace of Conversion, but leaving them in their sin. And can any doubt of this? or do any Jesuits or Arminians deny it? Where also they declare that God is no cause of men's sin, but themselves; And that the Children of the faithful are by Covenant so holy, that their salvation who die in infancy is not to be doubted of: And that those that find not saving grace in themselves, but yet use the means, have no cause to be cast down at the mention of Reprobation. 669. II. About Christ's death they say, that His satisfaction is of infinite value and price, abundantly sufficient to expiate the sins of all the world; And that the promise is that whoever believeth shall not perish, which is to be preached to all: And that many yet repent not, believe not, but perish, is not through any defect or insufficiency of Christ's sacrifice, but by their own fault. And that others believe is of undeserved grace. 670. III. In the third and fourth Art. sect. 8, 9 they say that the fault is not in Christ or the Gospel, that many that are called are not converted and come not, nor in God that calleth them and giveth them many gifts, but in the called themselves that receive not the word of life, etc. And that you may see that they hold a conditional will or decree not only of future but of non-future contingents, they say that [As many as are called by the Gospel are seriously called, and God seriously and truly showeth by his word, what would be acceptable to him, viz. that the called come to him.] So that here is a serious declaration of Gods will to those that never will come to him conditionally if they would come. These kind of notions please or displease men, as the interest of their opinions requireth. 671. And the confession of Pet. Molinaeus received by the Synod, is worthy observation pag. 290, 291. where he saith [Sin is the Meritorious Cause of Destination to punishment] And [Though natural corruption be cause sufficient for Reprobation (as we kill new spawned Not only of punishment itself. Serpents before they hurt any) yet there is no doubt but that for what cause God damneth men, for the same he decreed to damn them: But he damneth reprobates for sins committed; For they suffer in hell not only for original sin, but for all actual sins; whence is the inequality of punishment: Therefore God Decreed to damn them for the same sins: For nothing hindereth but that God who considereth men in natural corruption and pravity may consider them also polluted in the actual sins which they will thence commit. And among the sins for which any one is Destinated to punishment no doubt, is unbelief and rejection of the Gospel— No reason suffereth, that he should be Reprobated for rejecting of the Gospel— to whom the Gospel was never revealed— That God destinated any to eternal punishment, without consideration of impenitence and unbelief, we neither say nor think— And though God predestinate the Elect to faith, he doth not predestinate the Reprobate to unbelief; For we must distinguish the media which God findeth in men, from those which he maketh. He findeth in men unbelief the means of damnation: But faith he findeth not, but maketh. Therefore he predestinateth to faith, but not to unbelief: For he predestinateth but to that which he decreed to make. Lastly, Impenitence in order goeth before Reprobation; but faith is after Election as being its effect—] Is not here enough to reconcile? And next of Christ's death he saith that [It is abundantly sufficient to save all men in the world, if they would believe: And that all are not saved by it is not through the insufficiency of Christ's death, but of their pravity and unbelief.] 672. And pag. 295. he saith that Arminius holdeth irresistible grace, and that the Elect are drawn of God by effectual grace, whose effect is most certain and infallible (by Congruity.)— 673. The British Divines in their Suffrage say that [Pag. 11. Th. 1. Expl. God in the decree of Election prepareth Glory, and effectual Rom. 9 11. 15. 21▪ Joh. 10. 26. Rom. 6. 21. grace, intending that it shall be effectual: This he doth not for the Reprobate; and besides this negation, they know no act of Reprobation, as opposite to Election.] And they say that [the Gospel and grace, are denied to none but the unworthy (sinners,) And that God damneth none, nor destinateth none to damnation, but out of the consideration of sin.] 674. The Hassian Divines ibid. Par. 2. pag. 34. say [The just Judge (God) doth not for one cause Decree to punish; and for another execute it on the guilty, but both have the same cause: that is, both original and actual sin.]— 675. The Helvetian Divines there say, p. 37. §. 12. [Which is the Order and Number of God's Decrees, seeing Gods thoughts and ways are not as ours, and none of us are of his Council, we leave to Him alone whose understanding is infinite.] 676. The Embdan Divines ibid. p. 75. say [No one is predestinated by God to sin] which they there prove. 677. On the second Art. the British Divines say (p. 78.) [God having Act. 10. 43. Rom. 3. 24, 25. Ma●k 16. 15, 16. mercy on fallen mankind, sent his Son, who gave himself a price of Redemption, for the sins of the whole world. Thes. 4. In this Merit of Christ's death is founded the Universal Gospel Promise— Th. 5. In the Church, where for this Gospel-promise salvation is offered Isa. 59 ult. 2 Cor. 3. 6. Tit. 2. 11. 2 Cor. 5. 19 Luk. 10. 9, 11. Joh. 15. 22. Heb. 2. 3. & 4. 3. & 6. 4. Mat. 10. 15. to all, there is that administration of Grace, which is enough to convince all the impenitent and unbelieving, that they perish and ●o●e the offered benefit, by their voluntary fault, and neglect or contempt of the Gospel.] 678. On the second Article p. 103, 104, etc. there is the suffrage of the famous Mathias Martinius, in 26 Theses of universal Redemption, and seven Theses of special Redemption, and seventeen Errors rejected, so sound, so full, so accurate, that I know not whither to refer the Reader to see the whole controversy more shortly yet clearly and sound opened: And therefore entreat him to peruse it, seeing I may not be so tedious as to transcribe it all; and know not how to leave out any. 679. To the same sense have Iselburge and Lud. Crocius adjoined the● suffrages, the last being both brief and full. 680. The same Breme Divines say no more of Reprobation but these three Thes. 1. That there is a Decree of preterition as to special saving Rom. 9 12, 19, etc. Mat. 7. 21. Deut. 4. 34. grace. 2. That none are condemned but justly, for their sins. 3. That others as unworthy are converted in Mercy: And if others had said no more of this, it had been never the worse. And of Infants they say [Of only Believers Infants, who die before they are capable of doctrine, we determine that they are beloved of God, P●tavius chideth Gerson, Biel, Cajetan, Catherinus for their found opinion of Infant's salvation without Baptism. and saved, as holy by Covenant-relation: which Baptism is a Confirmation of—] SECT. XXIV. On the other side. 681. ON the other side read but Suarez and Ruiz to save me transcribing, and see what they grant (besides that Ariminens. and many old Schoolmen go as far as the Synodists, as the Dominicans do much further.) Petr. à S. Joseph. Suav. Concord. writing for Scientia Media, summeth up the difference between them and the Thomists (that is, the Arminians and Calvinists) so briefly as is worth the reading: In which he granteth, 1. [That God from eternity antecedently to any absolute foresight of merits (or preparation in us) did freely and of mere mercy elect all those to Glory that are saved:] But denyeth [that God antecedently to the absolute foresight of sin, did absolutely decree to exclude any from glory, or to addict them to eternal punishment: or that the Creation of Reprobates, and all natural or supernatural good conferred on them, are the effect of reprobation.] 2. He granteth that [the Decree of Predestination is certain and immovable in three respects: 1. In that just so many shall certainly be saved as God hath predestinated. 2. In that the same species of men shall be saved whom God predestinated to glory: so that both materially and formally, the number of the predestinate is certain. 3. In that by the force of Predestination, anteceding all Merits * That is, Rewardable acts of man. , yea, and Causing them, God giveth to the predestinate, effectual helps of grace, by which they shall infallibly come to glory.] And is not here a fair concession for peace? And must not the remain●ing differences be only 1. About words, 2. Or unsearchable Orders of God's Decrees and Modes of operation? Read him further, and see. 682. Dion. Petavius the Jesuit is too large to transcribe. Vol. 1. Theol. Dogm. lib. 9 of Predestination is worth the reading; especially to know what the Fathers held of God's Decrees, who generally agreed, that God Which he largely showeth in their own words; better than any that ever I saw, and may save the Reader much labour in the investigation of the sense of the Ancients herein. decreed none to Hell, but upon foresight of their own sin. Though he himself doth furiously rail at Calvin, and Amyraldus, yet he so far acquitteth all other Calvinists save Beza and Piscator, and a few that he calleth mere fools, that he saith, They have all forsaken his opinion, and instanceth in the whole Synod of Dort, who he saith desert him. And he professeth that Augustine's judgement may safely be held, which is it indeed, that those now called Calvinists own, except in the point of perseverance. See his lib. 10. c. 1. & 9, 10, 11. But what a plague, livor and faction is to the Church and the owner's souls, let but these ugly words of his be witness, lib. 10. cap. 14. p. 728. [Calvinus nocentem nullum, innocentes omnes damnari statuit] When ●e had made Amyrald an impudent liar, for proving Calvin to think otherwise. O take heed of the spirit of a Sect. 683. Suarez de Auxil. l. 3. cap. 6. about sufficient and effectual grace, See Zumel reciting the opinions of Molina, Bellarmine and Suarez de Gratia efficaci, Part ●●●●. pag. 50, 51, etc. (into which all the other controversies fall,) confesseth that [Sufficient grace is that quod satis est ad efficiendum supernaturalem actum, quod tamen non facit, non ex insufficientia auxilii, sed ex libertate Voluntatis: But effectual grace is called such not only ab eventu & effectu, sed etiam quia vires praebet efficacissimas Voluntati, & singularem vim habet ad agendum.] And is here no ground for Christian Concord in this point? But of this subject, I must speak more particularly in the Third Part. 684. Bellarmine himself hath enough I think to convince any man, I am told to my face that our Doctrine of Absolute Reprobation we have learned from the Papists; Another professeth that the Jesuits ten of them for one favour the absolute irrespective decree, follow herein, as they think S. Austin, but especially their S. Thomas and Scotus, with all the rabble of rotten Schoolmen, and the whole tribe at this day of the Dominicans, who are busy Zealots for the Cause, of whose consent some among us are not ashamed to brag. Twisse against Hoard li. 1. pag. 85. This reporter maketh us at one with Jesuits and Dominicans. And yet may we not be so with Protestants? that he must have a subtle contentious wit, that can find any great intolerable difference herein between him and the Synod of Dort: (I Writ not for them that will revile God's truth, if Bellarmine do but own it.) De Grat. & lib. arb. li. 2. cap. 9 this is his proposition [Though a Grace sufficient be given to all, yet no reason from us (or our part) can be given of God's predestination,— By which we exclude not only Merits properly so called, but also the good use of freewill, o●●● grace, or both as foreseen of God, though it be not called Merit, but de congruo, and though it be not called a Cause, but a Condition ●●●● qua non praedestinaretur.] (And what else would you have excluded?) And he goeth on in divers Chapters at large to prove from Scriptures, Augustine, Tradition, Reason, that there is no foreseen Cause or Condition of predestination in ourselves. 685. And I desire the Reader to note his Order of the Decrees (for they must all be meddling with the Order of God's inward acts▪ But he doth i● most briefly and plainly thus) ib. cap. 9 [According to our mode of understanding, this seemeth to be the Order of Predestination in God's mind: 1. God forseeth that if he make man he will fall with all his posterity; And withal he seethe th●● he can deliver all or some as he please. 2. He decreeth (or willeth) to create man, and to permit him to fall, and mercifully to deliver some of the number of the fallen, leaving others justly in the mass of perdition. 3. He contrived apt remedies for the saving of the elect: I● which the incarnation and passion of our Saviour hath the first place▪ 4. He approved those remedies, and then chose Christ and us in him, before the Constitution of the World. 5. He disposed, ordained, and in a sort commanded that so it should be done.] Is not this as high as the Synod of Dort goeth? yea, more rigid than many of the Suffrages? For he mentioneth no giving of Christ, or any remedy at all to any but the Elect, nor carrying the rest any further tha● the common mass of perdition, before they be forsaken; contrary to what Martinius, Crocius, Molinaeus, the British Divines, and others delivered to or in that Synod: And indeed it is unsound. 686. If you say, that he gins with a Scientia Conditionalis. I answer, It's no more than what all sober men will grant de re, that is, that God knew from eternity that if he so made man as he did, he would fall: or, if there were eternal propositions, God eternally knew the truth of this hypothetical proposition, [If I so make man, he will fall.] If this was quid intelligibile, no doubt but God knew it. But de ordine & de nomine, whether it be fit to parcel out God's knowledge (and Volitions) into such shreds and atoms, and so denominate them, let them look to it on both sides that trouble us with their divisions. 687. And note Bellarmine's further explication [Of these acts▪ (saith he) the first is of the understanding, the second of the will, the third of the understanding, the fourth of the will, and the fifth of the understanding; and in that last the essence of predestination especially consisteth.] 688. Yea, cap. 15. whereas many distinguish predestination to faith or grace, from election to glory, and say that the latter is upon the foresight of faith as a condition, though the first be absolute, he opposeth them and copiously laboureth to prove that election to glory is absolute without any foreseen condition in us, as well as that to grace: Though without something in us, we have not a Right to glory: Even (saith he) as if a Physician were sure that by such a Medicine he can cure a man, and so resolveth to give it him, the Medicine is the Cause that he is cured, but not that it was ascertained by the decree of the Physician before. 689. And c. 15. ad obj. 2. he proveth God's certain foreknowledge ●erein, because [Though all have pro loco & tempore sufficient grace to be converted if they will, yet indeed no man is converted, and no man persevereth, but he that hath the special gift of Repentance and Perseverance, which is not given to all, but to those only for whom God decreed it.] 689. And to them that say, the Elect can refuse grace, he answereth ●hat [They can indeed; but it's certain that they will not; because God will call them so as he seethe so congruous, that they may not refuse his call: For thus true grace is refused by no hard heart, because it is given with a purpose to mollify it. And there is no danger lest God should want skill or arguments, to persuade any man to what he please.] 690. And indeed before de Gratia efficaci li. 1. cap. 12. he tells us, that ●here are three opinions wherein the efficacy of grace consisteth: The first is, that it is called effectual only from the event, through man's con●ent: which he disproveth. The second, that it is only efficacious by necessitating physical predetermination, which he thinks to be an error on ●he other extreme: And the third which he defendeth is [that it is efficacious by God's will that it shall be so, and by the Congruity or moral aptitude of inward and outward persuasions and means which God useth with a decree to turn the will.] And who can say that God cannot do this? or if he can, that he doth not? Is here yet any room left for quarrelling and bitter censures in this point? * When even Bradwardin● holdeth, that God's Volition of man's act alone (which Bellarmine includeth) is the effectual unresistible Grace ●● parte Dei operantis. 691. Lib. 2. cap. 16. he maketh two acts of Reprobation the very same that almost all the suffrages in the Synod of Dort assign, and the same doctrine that Davenant, and the Synod deliver. His first act of Reprobation is Negative, the second Positive; [1. Non habet Voluntatem eos salvandi, 2. Habet Voluntatem eos damnandi:] And as to the first, [Nulla datur ejus causa ex parte hominum, sieut neque praedestinationis: Posterioris causa est praevisio peccati.] They are unmerciful contenders that this much Reprobation will not satisfy. 692. He proveth as the Calvinists do, [that it was not so much as for original sin foreseen, that God is said to hate Esau; because than he would have hated Jacob also: but it must be referred to the ●eer will of God, that one was loved to salvation, and the other so hated as not to be saved.] Just as the Synod of Dort saith. 693. Francisc. à Sancta Clara, alias Davenport, a Learned Scotist in his Deus, Nat. Grat. Probl. 1. pag. 3. describing Predestination out of Augustine, Arriba, Scotus, Suarez, etc. saith [And with all these agreeth the description of Predestination Art. 17. of the English Confession.] 694. And Probl. 2. of the Causes of Predestination he noteth that [We mean not the Causes of Gods will, ex parte actus volendi, sed ex parte volit●rum, in quantum Deus vult unum esse propter aliud.] And on that supposition how easy is it to agree? 695. But he addeth [If you had rather say as Suarez 1. p. l. 2. the praed. c. 1. that also ex parte actus divini (there is a Cause,) it must be, not as God's act is absolutely considered, for so it is his essence that hath no cause; but as terminated on the Creature.] 696. Pag. 7. he himself professeth, that when the Protestants say that [on the part of the Predestinate there is not so much as any meritorious Cause, Disposition or Condition, they speak but the common opinion of all the School Doctors, taking it properly and in Scripture sen●e. And what Montague and the Arminians speak of foresight, he disowneth, as contrary to Paul, August. Aquin. 1. p. q. 23. a. 5, etc. Scotus, Bradwardine, Estius, Smisings,— Yea, he rejecteth Abbot Joachim who denying any Cause of predestination in God, yet asserted a cause of it by an aptitude in the Predestinate and the Reprobate, one being foreseen more humble and prepared for Grace, and the other more proud and unprepared] pag. 5, 6. 697. Yea (ordering God's Decrees after the usual presumption) be Ruiz de Praedefin. tr. 2. disp. 6. sect. 2. p. 86, 87. Deus pro suo beneplacito decrevit ab aeterno efficaciter causare liberas operationes honestas prius ratione quam illas praevideret ut absolute futuras— Unde infallibiliter sequitur liberi arbitrii operatio (necessitate consequentiae:) Pag. 87. 1. Scriptura fidem, sanctitatem & quodlibet discrimen sanctorum à reprobis, reducit ad electionem gratuitam: 2. Ex vi sortis, etc. 3. Divina electio absque meritis est causa quae discernit justos ab impiis. Quamvis (n) liberum arbitrium sit secundaria causa s●ipsum discernens, qua potuit resistere vel consentire— Haec tamen liberi arbitrii cooperatio revocatur in Deum ut in primariam causam suaviter praedefinientem. E● Tr. 3. d. 18. sect. 3. p. 222. Ea merita nihil obsun● quidditati gratiae quae tanquam ex prima radic● nascuntur ex prima gratid data absque ullo prorsus merito: At●amen quodlibet etiam levissimum & remotissimum meritum de congruo, si ex illo nascitur prima gratia, vel propter illud datur, obesse quidditati gratiae: Yea, he addeth p. 223. Conditio, ratio, vel occasio prorsus separata à merito, impetratione & dispositione, adhuc repugnaret (primae) gratiae: quoniam adhuc maneret debitum connaturalitatis, quamvis abesset debitum obsequii. asserteth, that God first intendeth our blessedness as the end, before he intendeth us grace, faith, etc. as the means: And therefore cannot do it for foreseen faith, etc. Yea, that he first decreed to give us blessedness, before he decreed to create us, as Scotus 3. d. 7. and Ovan●● ibid. q. 3. a. 2. Yea, that God willeth all this, before he knoweth that it will be, as Scotus 1. d. 39 And that seeing all God's Volitions of giving any good, are free, without any precedent Cause in man, it must needs be that the Decree of glory and not of grace only, must be without Merit. And he concludeth p. 13. that they have no quarrel here with the Doctrine of the Articles of the Church of England. 698. Probl. 3. he resolveth with Smising, that the reason why this absolute decree of God consisteth with freewill, is because that God doth not only decree the event, but also the mode, that it shall be freely done: And therefore his decree doth not only consist with Liberty, but maketh it necessary. 699. His feigned order of the decrees is pag. 27. that 1. God decreeth to glorify, 2. To give grace and merits to obtain it, and that definitively: 3. Then he forseeth that they will concur with grace. 4. Then he decreeth the execution, that glory shall be given them by the means of their operations. And of Reprobation; 1. That God effectually decreeth to do so much as he doth, on his part to give them glory; 2. And also so far to give them grace; 3. Then he forseeth that they will not cooperate with that grace; 4. He decreeth to permit them to fall into sin; 5. And then decreeth their damnation.] I would not cite this man if he were a Thomist or Dominican (who are known to go higher than the Synod of Dort, though their reputation at home with their party tempt them to rail at the Calvinists:) But as he is a Scotist, and so of a middle profession. (Though Dr. Twisse perceived how much their founding God's foreknowledge in his Volitions, advantaged him.) 700. Supposing you to remember the ordo signorum of his Master Scotus before cited, I adjoin the order Doctoris illuminati (viz. Fra●. Mayronis) in li. 1. d. 41. q. 4. Sunt quatuor signa: Est ergo pri●●● in quo Judas & Petrus offeruntur Voluntati Divinae ut neutri: & t●● Voluntas Divina ordinavit Petrum ad gloriam: nullum autem actum positivum habuit circa Judam, secundum Augustinum. Secundum signum es● in quo ordinavit Petrum ad gratiam: & tunc circa Judam nullum act●● positivum habuit. Tertium signum est in quo relinquuntur sibi ip●●s●● & uterque cadit in peccatum. Quartum signum est in quo Petrus res●●git; Quia non potest permanere: quia praedestinatus intelligitur ex primo signo. Judas autem non resurgit; eo quod non habet relevantem in Deo: ideo reprobatur.] Here you see a Reprobation that is no Act of God, but a non-acting, or is negative quoad actum and not only quoad objectum. And he before saith out of Scotus and with him [Ideo dico sicut dicit Doctor noster, Quod prius Deus videt merita quam reprobum; licet prius non vide at merita quam eligat:] which is the commonest Doctrine of the Schoolmen and other Papists, as well as Augustine's. 701. So D'Orbellis in 1. d. 41. [Et dicunt quidam quod non est alia ratio quare Deus istum elegit, & non illum, nisi quia placet— Eo enim ipso quod placet, ideo rectum est, propter summam ipsius Voluntatis rectitudinem— Sic dicit Scotus, quod licet non videatur aliqua ratio praedestinationis à parte praedestinati, aliquo modo prior praedestinatione; Reprobationis tamen est aliqua ratio, propter quam scilicet ista actio terminatur ad hoc objectum & non ad illud:— Cum Reprobare sit Velle Damnare, Reprobatio habet ex parte objecti, rationem, scilicet peccatum finale praevisum— Non videtur autem dicendum conformiter de Praedestinatione & Reprobatione; Quia Bona Deo principaliter attribuuntur, Mala autem nobis. Quia tamen▪ Apostolus videtur totum ho● imperscrutabile relinquere, Rom. 9 O altitudo, etc. ideo dicit Scotus quod eligatur opinio quae magis placet; Dum tamen servetur Libertas Divina, absque injustitia. Hoc autem debet fieri absque assertione pertinaci. Rationes namque particulares, propter quas ex parte diversorum Divina inferuntur judicia, sunt imperscrutabiles.] But note, that as to the first part of Reprobation, non velle dare gratiam, Scotus, Mayro, etc. hold it to be nothing, or no act at all. 702. And what D'Orbellis next addeth of Bonaventure setteth us at no further odds. [Bonav. dicit quod licet non sit aliqua ratio Causalis, seu meritoria, praedestinationis à parte praedestinati, (quia siquis posset de condigno mereri primam gratiam, tunc Gratia non esset Gratia) Potest tamen esse aliqua ratio congruitatis & condeoentiae praedestinationis; Non quantum ad significatum quod est Volitio Divina, sed quantum ad Connotatum quod est Gratia & Gloria. Potest enim dici quod Deus praedestinat istum proper praevisionem bonorum operum ut aliquo modo sunt à libero arbitrio: Licet enim Gratificatio vel Justificatio sit principaliter à Divina Voluntate, hoc tamen est cum cooperatione & praeparatione liberi arbitrii; quia ut Aug. Qui fecit te sine te non justificabit te sine te. Unde cum peccator facit quod in se est, meretur de congruo justificari, seu secundum quid, ex condecentia Divinae liberalitatis.] But the true meaning of this is no more than Protestants commonly hold, that God giveth special Grace usually to such only as are prepared for it by more common Grace; and so this preparation is quid praevisum in God's decree, but no Cause of his Act of Volition or decree. 703. And in the next words he granteth, that even this Preparation to special grace, is not always necessary, [Deus tamen sine aliqua praeparatione & cooperatione aliquos justificat, ut patet de sanctificatis in utero, & de parvulis post baptismum ad coelum evolantibus; aliis sine baptismo decedentibus— etc.] 704. And though they oft say, that God would have all men saved quantum in se, they mean not, that God doth all to it that he can, but that he maketh all capable of salvation, and so far helpeth them, that the failing shall not be on his part. For so Bonavent. ubi supra in 1. d. 47. a. 1. q. 1. explaineth it, plainly adding, that here Gods will connoteth not salvation itself, but only the said Capacity and helps. 705. Obj. But many say, that Predestination doth not necessitate the eve●. Answ. Twisse told you before that we are agreed all in this; It inferreth a Logical Necessity Consequentiae, though not a physical Consequentis: As Bonavent. 1. d. 40. q. 2. Ex parte rei evenientis nullam: ex parte De● praescientis aliquam; scilicet immutabilitatis certitudinem: Yea, as to grace and salvation it is certainly Causal as they confess. 706. Obj. Many say, that a predestinate person may be damned. Answ. Even as D'Orbellis in 1. d. 40. a. 2. [Ista propositio, [Pradestinatus potest damnari] est falsa in sensu composito; & vera in sensu divise] Vide explicat. It is unchristian and unmanly to revile men that say the same that we do, merely through distaste, or because we will not be at the labour to understand them. 707. Obj. We cannot be reconciled to them that give so much to man's freewill. Ans. How much do you mean? It's a dreadful thing to hear some good men ignorantly blaspheme God, as the chief cause of every villainy in the World, merely ●poh a factious prejudice and partial opposition to other men, whom they never understood! Would it please you to hear that God draggeth men into sin as by the hair of the hea●, when the Devil himself can but allure them? I know it would not. D● but make it plain as a granted thing, that God doth not Will or Love sin, and do more to Cause it, than the Devil, or the wickedest sinner himself doth, and you can scarce tell how to differ from the greater part of the Schoolmen themselves, or sober moderate Lutherans that are thought to be dissenters. Let it be the Devil's work, and no good Christians, to paint God in the shape of the Father of lies and all iniquity: Our God is Holy, and Holiness becometh all that draw near him, and is the mark of all that shall see his face. Dear Brethren, let not us that daily and justly condemn ourselves for sin, and take such odious titles to ourselves, make ourselves yet Holier▪ than God, and make God a far greater Lover and Cause● of sin than we are. I will add one description of freewill out of the last named Schoolman, D'Orbellis a Scotist, in 2. sent. d. 25. dub. 2. And tell me what the most rigid opposer of freewill can desire more. [Q. Whether freewill be equally in all that have it? Ans. freewill may be compared 1. To that which it is free from, 2. And to that which it is free to 1. In the first sense, there is a threefold Liberty; 1. From constraint, 2. From sin, 3. From misery. Liberty from sin is not equally in good and bad, nor in man on earth and in Heaven. As Aug. Enchir. That's the freest will, that cannot at all serve sin. And Liberty from misery is not equally in all: But Liberty from constraint is equally in all, because the will cannot be forced. Though in God and the blessed there be a Necessity of Immutability, yet not of Co-action. And necessity of Immutability, repugneth not Liberty: For the will is called Free simply, not because it so willeth this, as that it can will the contrary: but because that whatever it willeth, it desireth it by its own Empire; Because it so willeth any thing, that it willeth to will it: And therefore in the act of willing, it moveth itself, and useth dominion on itself; And so far it is called Free, though it be immutably ordained to it. * But it were not so, if it were immutably ordained and moved to sin. 2. But if freewill be compared to that to which it is free, viz. To do right (for as Anselm saith, It is a faculty or power to keep rectitude) so it is not equally in all: For this Power is in God of Himself; and in the Creatures received from God: And it is more in the confirmed than the nonconfirmed, and in the good than in the bad. And seeing to be able to sin, is a diminution of Liberty; therefore according to Anselm, to be able to sin, is no Liberty nor part of liberty▪ taking freewill according to the Common Reason of it. But to have power as to the Act which deformity is annexed to, may well be a part of Liberty, not simply, but of Created Liberty. And so the deformity in the Act more agreeth with freewill as it is a Creature, or as it is of Nothing, than as it is Freevill — Dub. 3. Can freewill be compelled? Answ. God can destroy it, but not force it; for that is a Contradiction: But he can well effectually incline it, and make it move itself freely to which part God will. * But to sin he will not so incline it. I think this is as high as you can desire. And yet there is nothing in all this, but what both parties may well bear with, and it hath indeed much soundness in it. But here he treateth only about equality of Liberty, but how much of it the unsanctified have, he elsewhere showeth, and I have oft told you how much the most are agreed in it. 708. To conclude, The heart and sum of all our differences is how to make God the total first Cause of all Good, and not to make him the Cause of sin, and the damner of man for that which he himself insuperably causeth. I hope both sides hold fast both the conclusions (that our sin and destruction is chief of ourselves, but in God is our help, and our good and happiness is all from Him.) And if they both hold this, it is not the difficulty of joining them together, and opening Gods unsearchable methods, that must disjoint us, and draw us to withdraw our Love, or contemn each other, or disturb the Church's peace and unity. 709. Gregory Ariminensis and Gabr. Biel have come so near the rigid Dominicans that the Reader may think that they plainly say the same of Gods Causing all the Act of sin, as Alvarez, Twisse and Rutherford say. But let the Learned Reader note these things; 1. That over and over they affirm that though God Cause all the Act of sin, yet he is but the Causa partialis: I like not the phrase myself for the reasons before given; but by this they do greatly differ from the aforesaid Authors: see Greg. 2. d. 34, 35. ar. 3. frequently saying, that God is Causa partialis. And in answering Aureolus ad nonum he thus fully explaineth it: Dicendum quod Causa dupliciter potest accipi Totalis: Uno modo Totalis totalitate relata ad Causam; id est, sufficiens Causare effectum absque concursu alterius Causae praecise causando sicut Causat: & sic neganda est ista Consequentia: Quoniam nec Deus nec Creatura est sic Totalis Causa actus mali. Nunquam enim talis actus fieret, si De●s non Causaret ●um; Neque etiam si Creatura non causaret, & Deus non aliter causaret, quam nunc de facto causat, concurrendo cum Creatura. Alio modo Totalis totulitate relata ad effectum, id est, totum effectum causaus: Et ejusdem poss●nt esse plures totales Causae: ejusdem enim Volitionis secundum totum est Causa Notitia & etiam Voluntas. Here note, that 1. He taketh not Causa totalis for the same with Solitaria. 2. That he asserteth only, that God causeth the Totum of the Act, but not by a total Causation of it: And that God's way or sort of Causation is not sufficient to cause it if man concurred not, which they say he freely doth, and could do otherwise. 710. So that these men's way of freeing God from being the cause of sin is like Scotus his; As if (as I before made the similitude) a Father to try his Child's obedience, bids him lift up a Stone, which he cannot do of himself; and the Father holdeth his hand and joineth his strength, yet not add ultimum posse, but with a purposed restraint so far that if the Child will not put forth his degree of strength, it shall not be done. But who can comprehend the ways of Divinè concourse? 711. And it is to be noted, that when Aureolus argueth, that [if God immediately concur, either he determineth man's act, or man determineth God's act, or neither; which are all absurd:] here Biel citeth Scotus as holding the third, and answering Neither, as no absurdity. But Greg. Arim. that seemeth to go higher, yet saith, [ * Ubi suprae ad 8. Juxta modum loquendi arguentis dico quod Deus sequitur determinationem Voluntatis: non qu●● determinatio Voluntatis fit aliqua Entitas distincta à Voluntate & acts ejus, quia primo fiat à voluntate— nec intelligendo quod prius natura Viluntas agat actum quam Deus, proprie loquendo de priori natura: Quoniam tunc sequeretur quod posset illum agere, Deo non coagente.— Sed ad hunc sensum dico Deum sequi Determinationem Voluntatis; Quoniam ideo Deus agit illum actum, quia † I think it should be [Eum.] cum Voluntas agit. Et non ideo qu●● Deus agit, ideo Voluntas agit: & ideo magis proprie dicitur Deus coager● Voluntati in talem actum causandi, quam Voluntas dicatur coagere De●.] You see that these Nominals do toto coelo differ from Alvarez, T●isse and Rutherford. (And yet Alvarez would fain be moderate in that one Disputation which Dr. Twisse in a peculiar Digression oppugneth.) 712. And note, that the thing which moved Gregory to go so far as he doth is, Lest God should be denied to be the Cause of all Natural Entity: But if you set before the will, the Creator (or Chief Good) and the Creature (or sensual pleasure) the Act in genere as a Volition is an Entity, or modus entis: But who can prove that comparatively as it is terminated on the Creature, rather than on the Creator, it hath any Natural Entity, more than the act in genere; or any modality which God is not able to give a Creature power to cause, or not cause, without predetermination from God or any other? 713. Yea, Ariminensis seemeth to mean this himself, when ibid. d. 34, 35. a. 2. ad 5. he saith [Deus ●potest solus actum illum causare, & act●● odiendi, id est, qui est odium Dei, & mendacium etiam potest causare▪ Non tamen potest causare actum odiendi Deum, seu odium Dei: neq●● potest Causare Mendacium vel mentiri, neque potest causare actum ●●lum; Quare quemcunque actum causaret solus, licet ille nunc sit Odi●● Dei vel mendacium, vel aliquis actus malus, si tamen Deus solus ill●● causaret, sicut potest illum causare solus, non esset actus, neque odi●m De● vel mendacium.] But whatever he thought, I have before answered this difficulty of the Entity of the acts of sin. I mention Ariminensis judgement the rather, because the Learned Calvinists commend him: And I remember when I once asked Archbishop Usher which of the Schoolmen he most valued as the soundest, he said Greg. Ariminensis. 714. Is not all this doctrine from these men cited conformable to the doctrine of the Synod of Dort? Who in the conclusion name many positions which they and all the Reformed Churches with them do, toto pect●re detestari, abhor with all their hearts: Among which one is, Deum n●●● puroque Voluntatis arbitrio, absque omni peccati ullius respectu vel intuit●, maximam mundi partem ad aeternam damnationem praedestinasse & creasse. And another is, Eodem modo quo electio fons est & causá fidei ac b●norum operum, reprobationem esse causam infidelitatis & impietatu: Another is, Multos fidelium infantes ab uberibus matrum innoxios abrial & tyrannice in Gehennam praecipitari, adeo ut iis nec Baptismus, nec Ecclesiae in corum baptismo preces, prodesse queant. And it is much to be noted, that in conclusion they desire all men to judge of the Doctrine of the Reformed Churches, not by Calumnies, nor by the Private say of some D●ctors, ancient or later, but by the public Confessions of the Churches, ●●● and by the Declaration of this Synod. Therefore not by the extremes of Beza, Piscator, Spanh●m●●s, Twisse and Rutherford; but by what the Articles of the Churches subscribed by the Pastors do contain. Otherwise we shall be far more foolish than the Papists, who will not expose their Church to obioquy or division by standing to the say of Alvarez or Molina, or any private Doctor whosoever. 715. And it is notorious to any impartial-pe●user, that the whole fo●● of the Doctrine of the Church of England, in the Articles, Catechism, Liturgy, Homilies, and all their public Writings, was drawn up by men of Augustine's judgement, who were for absolute Election, and Universal sufficient Redemption and Grace ad posse, but for no Reprobation but on foresight of sin. 716. And it is greatly to be noted, with grief of heart, that among Good men, it is partly General prejudice, but chief the Interest of their Reputation with those among whom they live, which is the great impediment of the Church's Concord. The name of a Calvinist is so hateful among the Papists, that even the Predeterminant Dominicans who go higher than ever Calvin did, (and the Jansenists, who go as high in the main cause, and higher than the Synod of Dort,) do yet find it a matter of necessity to rail at Luther, Zuinglius, Calvin, etc. lest their party should think that they are turned Heretics. And the Protestants that agree in some points with the Papists, are fain to rack the Papists words, to a worse sense than is meant, lest their fierce opposers should make men believe that they are half Papists, or err with them. And the moderate Calvinists are fain to stretch hard, that they may seem to differ more from the Arminians than they do, lest a self-conceited reviler should blot their names with the suspicion of Arminianism. O doleful case of all the Churches! But where Protestants are few and made odious by the Papists, as differing from them further than they do, there Reputation is not so great a temptation; And there they freely confess their concord, where they do not differ. And so in Colloquia Torunensi c. 4. the great. depuls. Calum. sect. 5, 6. all the Reformed Churches of Poland with Joh. Bergius the Duke of brandenburg's Chaplain, and others did profess, [Falso accusamur, quasi Mortis & Meriti Christi pr● omnibus sufficientiam negemus, aut virtutem imminuamus, cum potius idem hic quod ipsa Synodus Tridentina ses. 6. cap. 3. doceamus, viz. Etsi Christus pro omnibus mortuns sit, non omnes tamen mortis ejus beneficium recipere, sed eos duntaxat quibus meritum passionis ejus communicatur. Causam etiam seu culpam, cur non omnibus communicetur, nequaquam in merito & morte Christi, sed in ipsis hominibus esse fatemur.] Here was no partial interest to make them afraid of being suspected to comply with Papists. 717. I end with this request to all my Brethren who by their averseness to the Doctrine of Common or Universal Grace, do keep open the Churches dangerous wounds, 1. That they will give Scripture leave to rule their judgements, and try whether it be possible to build special Grace, on any other foundation than presupposed common Grace? and whether to deny this, be not to deny the very tenor of the Gospel, and pull up the foundations of our Religion? 2. That they will but read over Davenants two dissertations, and the second Tome (at least) of the Learned Dallaeus his Apology against Spa●hemius, that is, The words of an hundred and twenty ancient Writers and Councils, beginning at Clemens Romanus, and ending with Theophylact, and sixty three Protestant Divines and Synods (to which I think I could add as many more, that speak more plainly to the point, or near it.) And if after all this they have so great a zeal to contract the Glory of God's Mercy, and deny his Grace, as that they will cast off the judgement of all the ancient Churches of Christ, and so many later, rather than acknowledge it, I shall cease disputing with them, and seek to quench the fire which they kindle in the Churches of Christ by Prayers and Tears. The End of the First Part. THE Second Part OF GOD'S GOVERNMENT, AND MORAL WORKS. WHEREIN Of his Laws or Covenants, of Redemption, of sufficient and effectual Grace, of Faith, Justification, Works, Merits, Perseverance, certainty of Salvation, etc. so far as the Church-troubling-Controversies do require. LONDON: Printed for Nevil Simmons, at the Prince's Arms in St. Paul's Churchyard. 1675. The CONTENTS of these THESES cannot be well given you, without reciting too great a part of them: But rather than none, take this imperfect summary following. Sect. I. OF man's first State and the first Law, and its penalty. Whether Adam had a promise of Life? and whether that Promise or Covenant be now ceased as to all men? Page 27. Sect. II. Of the first Edition of the Law or Covenant of Grace, that it was made with all Mankind in Adam and Noah: Of the Promise to Abraham: Of the Terms of the first Edition of the Universal Covenant of Grace. How far it is a Law of Nature. How far those without the Israelitish Church were under it: Of the Israelites Covenant, pag. 31. Sect. III. Of Christ's Incarnation and our Redemption. The Law of Mediation. What Christ undertook for us: How far he represented us● The true nature of his Satisfaction. Of his Righteousness and Merits, pag. 37. Sect. IU. Of the Law of Grace or New Covenant in the last Edition. The Nature Conditions, and yet free Donations of it, pag. 42. Sect. V. Of the giving of the Holy Ghost: His common and special Works: The extent of the New Covenant: Of the state of those that have not the Gospel: And what Law they are under, pag. 45. Sect. VI. How far Christ died for all, and how far not, pag. 51. Sect. VII. The antecedent and consequent Will of God, explained. Of Justification by Faith. What faith it is; and what it doth, pag. 54. Sect. VIII. Of Justification by Christ's Righteousness imputed. The false sense of Imputation opened and fully confuted. The true sense asserted. Whether Christ paid our Idem or Tantundem? Whether he made his Satisfaction to God only as to a Rector, or as Dominus, vel pars laesa, or how? pag. 59 Sect. IX. Of the sorts of Justification: And first of constitutive Justification. Of Righteousness: How far it is or is not in our own habits or acts. What Right the Covenant giveth the baptised to following helps and degrees of Grace. Further, what must be in ourselves. Man's holiness is no dishonour to God's Grace. How far Christ strippeth us of our own Righteousness. More against the false sense of Imputation; Objections answered, pag. 69. Sect. X. Of Merit: The case plainly and briefly decided. The Gospel-Condition or Merit, is but the accepting a free Gift according to its nature. Whether we may trust to our own Faith, Repentance, Holiness. The last Argument for the false sense of Imputation, answered, pag. 79. Sect. XI. How Faith justifieth? whether as an Instrument? pag. 82. Sect. XII. How far Repentance is a Condition of the Covenant: And what it is: Whether Faith or it be first: How Faith and Love differ, pag. 83. Sect. XIII. Of the degrees of Pardon and Justification: Whether losable: And whether future sins be pardoned, pag. 85. Sect. XIV. Of Justification by Sentence of the Judge: What it is, ibid. Sect. XV. Of initial executive Pardon or Justification, in Sanctificati● How far necessary, yet imperfect, pag. 86. Sect. XVI. Of assurance of Pardon: Of doubting: Whether it be D●●● Faith to believe ones own Justification or Salvation. The Sp●● Testimony, pag. 88 Sect. XVII. Of love to God as the end of Faith; and foretaste of He●●● pag. 91. Sect. XVIII. Of Perseverance, and its certainty in order to the comfort●● certainty of Salvation. Few certain of Justification, and ●●●● of Perseverance. The words of the Synod of Dort. The ●● thers Judgement about certainty of perseverance, pag. 93 Sect. XIX. Of mortal Sin, or such as will not stand with the love of G●● and a state of Justification, pag. 103. Sect. XX. What Repentance for particular sins is necessary to par●● pag. 106. Sect. XXI. Some solution of all the former difficulties in twenty Prop●●ons, 108. Sect. XXII. Few certain of Salvation. The reconciling consequents of ●●● pag. 112. Sect. XXIII. The case of Perseverance further opened and applied, pag. 113. Sect. XXIV. The sum and scope of this Discourse of Certainty, pag. 116. Sect. XXV. Degrees of falling, and danger, pag. 118. Sect. XXVI. Of final Justification at Judgement: More of the Agreement Paul and James about Justification by Works, pag. 119. Sect. XXVII. Of the number of the glorified and the damned, pag. 123. A PREMONITION. MY work at present is but to lay down so much of the Christian Doctrine briefly, as is necessary to be understood for the reconciling of the Controversies about Predestination, Providence, Grace and freewill: And therefore pass over ●any other weighty Points, and must not stand largely to prove all ●s I go, which carrieth its own evidence: The true nature of the first ●aw or Covenant deserveth a more accurate discussion than I can here ●ake; and much passeth as certain with some, which hath but little ●roof. And here I meet with these different Opinions: 1. Some say that the condition of the first Covenant was not Innocency, but sincerity: And ●at Innocency was only a Duty, necessary necessitate praecepti, but not ●edii: or that it was ut medium necessary ad melius esse, or to some cer●●in degrees of felicity, whereof it was a condition, but not to felicity it ●●lf. And that the Covenant of Grace doth herein agree with it; both ●f them damning man only for mortal sin, and punishing them temporally only for venial sin. And he seemeth to be of this mind, who saith ●●at, Do this and live, or Innocency or Works was the Condition only ●f Moses Law, but that Adhere and Vanquish was the Condition of the ●rst Covenant: But these are ambiguous unsatisfactory terms: If the ●eaning be, [Adhere to God and his Law by perfect Innocency, and vanquish all temptations to Sin,] this is the same with that Innocency which ●e say was the Condition. But if he mean only, [Adhere to me sincerely by love as thy Ultimate End, and vanquish all temptations which ●ould draw thee from me, to another Ultimate End or God,] this is ●he same with the first opinion; which many Papists seem to hold. 2. But the more common Opinion is that which I assert, That Innocency was the Condition, not only of Life eternal, but of all the benefits of God's Covenant, and the least sin the forfeiture of all. They that are for the first Opinion think, that if Adam had committed ●ut a small or venial sin (as a sinful thought or desire after the forbidden ●ruit, without the act or full consent) it had been against God's natural Goodness and Justice to have condemned him to Hell for it. And con●quently that Christ died not to pardon the pains of Hell as due for such ●●ttle sins; but only temporal smaller punishments. But God best knoweth his own Nature; And nature telleth us, That ●ll sin deserveth punishment: And he that sinneth, so far removeth his ●eart from God, and forfeiteth his Spirit or Grace: And he that hath ●nce so turned from God in the least degree, cannot of himself return ●or heal himself; and had no promise of God's Grace to do it: And ●herefore it is not to be supposed that he should sin no more, but such a minute sin; for greater will come in presently at that breach, unless God recover him, which he was not in Justice bound to do: And no one know●th so well as God how much malignity is in the smallest sin; And it was as ●asie for sinless Adam to have continued sinless, as for carnal men now ●o forbear gross sin. And he that sinneth deserveth not Heaven or Life; ●nd there are divers degrees of punishment in Hell, according to the degrees of Sin: And Christ died for all our sins: therefore they d● every one deserve death: which consisted not with a right to Life: therefore not with a right to Heaven: And an immortal Soul was not naturally to be annihilated; therefore to live in some punishment as separated: And Rom. 3. 9 all were under Sin, yet all had not gross S●●▪ Rom. 6. 23. The wages of Sin is Death. Rom. 5. 12. Death passed on al●, for that all have sinned. Rom. 2. 12. As many as have sinned with●●● Law, shall perish without Law. And we must pray for the pardon of a●● Sin: And unpardoned Sin will damn men. These are the reasons ●● this side. They of the other Opinion say, That the Gospel-Covenant shewe●● God's Nature as well as the first Law: That God had not been unjust indeed, if he had permitted him to fall into great Sin, and so to peri●● who committed the least: for he so permitted Adam to commit the first that was before innocent: But the Justice of God bound him not so it do: nor would have damned a Lover of God, for a small Sin, no more than now: That we must not feign a Law which we cannot prove▪ That God changeth not his holy Nature, and therefore not that Law, which is the expression of it: That Christ died for all Sin, and all needs pardon; but that proveth not that the least deserved death, much less Hell; but that by Christ's Death the deserved punishment must be remitted; that all, even Infants, are guilty of mortal Sin in Adam: The Death is the wages of that Sin which brought it, but not of the least: That Adam's Law was not severer than that by Moses, which saith, D● this and live, and yet condemned not men for smaller sins; That God proclaimeth pardon of some Sin, in the very Law of Nature as from his Nature, Exod. 34. and the Second Commandment, That Nature teacheth all the World to believe it: That God said not to Adam, [●● the day that thou thinkest a vain thought,] but [That thou eatest,] etc. That mortal Sin is pardonable by Christ which else could not by the first Law: but God could otherwise have pardoned a vain thought, if he would: That no Text of Scripture saith, that every Sin deserveth Hell, nor is threatened with Death.] And as the condition of the Penalty, so the condition of the Promise to Adam is here also controverted by Divines: 1. Some say that the condition of Life was personal, perfect, perpetual Obedience till ●●● change; which God would make as he did by Henoch when it pleased him: (which seemeth to me the probablest Opinion). 2. Others think that Adam was to have continued in Eden for ever under that same conditional Law (which is less probable.) 3. Others think, that had he overcome the first temptation, but so far as to adhere and vanquish, that is, to continue the love of God, and not to eat that Fruit, or commit any other mortal Sin, which of its nature killeth Love, he had been confirmed, as the promised Reward. 4. I have lately met with an exceeding ingenious M. S. (written partly against myself, after others) which asserteth, 1. That the Glory of Justice is the end of God's Government. 2. That Do this (perfectly) and live, or Sin (at all) and die, are the constant terms of Justice under every Covenant. 3. That if Adam had performed but one ●● of Obedience, by that Law, he should have been rewarded with confirmation, or the Holy Ghost (as the Angels) and with everlasting life. 4. That now all our Reward is only the Act of God's Justice, giving ●● life, as merited by us in Christ on the terms of the Law that saith, Do this and live, Sin and die; in whom we are perfectly innocent and rewardable; and we have no rewardable Righteousness, nor any to justify us; but perfect Innocency imputed; because as not to be a Sinner is no merit of a Reward, so pardon of Sin is no Title to a Reward, etc. It is not my present task to clear up all these Difficulties, (having done more towards it in my Methodus Theologiae); but only so much as our present conciliatory work requireth: But yet because I and the matter in hand are nearly concerned in the M. S. I shall briefly animadvert on all the substance of it; having first said of the condition of the penalty but a few words. I. I am loath to confound the certainties with the uncertainties, in this matter. 1. It is certain, that God's Law of Nature was man's first and principal Law; to which the supernatural Revelations were added, and comparatively few. 2. It is certain that God's Law was perfect, and that both as the impress and expression of God's perfect Wisdom and Holiness, and as the Rule of Perfection to Adam: And therefore that it obliged him to perfection. 3. But this Perfection to which he was obliged, was not at first, all that his nature would be capable of at last; It was not his duty the first hour of his life, to Know or Do as much as after the longest time and experience, and as much as in heavenly perfection: But he was bound to Know, and Love, and Do at first, as much as at that time his nature was capable of, supposing necessary Concauses and Objects. 4. This is summed up in, Loving God with all the Heart, Mind and Might. But the All in maturity and after full experience, and in Glory, is more than the All in unexperienced juniority. To know, love and obey God, to the utmost intention of his present natural Power, supposing due Objects, media and concauses, was Adam's duty and all defectiveness herein was culpable, or sin. 5. All sin of its own nature deserveth punishment: Therefore so would the least culpable thought or word in Adam, or the least culpable defect in the extent or intention of any holy affection in him. 6. It is certain that Adam's eating the forbidden Fruit, or any one such sin as consisteth not with the predominancy of his Love to God as God, in habit, such as is now inconsistent with true Grace, and is called mortal, was to be punished with death temporal and eternal, according to the Justice of that Law. 7. They are different questions, 1. What God might do. 2. What he would do, (as decreed). 3. What he must do, (as necessary because of Justice or Veracity), to the breaker of that Law. And it is clear that God might, as an Act of Justice, punish the least culpable thought, or remissness of degree of Love, with Annihilation, or with any pain-everlasting, which to the Sinner were no worse than Annihilation. Because, 1. Antecedently to his Law, he might have done that much as an affliction without sin. 2. And after he did no way (that I know of) oblige himself to the contrary to a Sinner, before the Covenant of Grace. 3. And having threatened punishment in general, he might choose what punishment he saw fit. 8. What God would do as decreed, the prediction or the event only can tell us. 9 That God must (by necessity of Justice and Truth) punish the least sinful thought or remissness, with some degree of punishment, according to that Law, seemeth to me somewhat clear. 1. And yet it is more clear that it is various degrees of punishment which are comprised in the word [Death] or [Filius mortis] in the threatening; And that we cannot say, that Justice made it necessary to God to punish the least vain thought or remissness with the greatest punishment, or damnation. But (as to the uncertainties) 1. With what degree of punishment God in Justice must, or would have punished a vain thought, or any sin consistent with his habitual prevalent love? 2. Or whether a vain ☞ thought must needs have separated Soul and Body, or caused that which we call Hell? 3. Or whether God could in Justice have pardoned that vain thought, upon less satisfaction than the sufferings of Christ? These with many others are questions too hard for me, what ever they may be to wiser men. But I am satisfied that God would never have damned in Hell any Soul that had the habitual predominant love of God, though culpably remiss, and otherwise sinful, while he remained such; yea that Hell and such love of God are inconsistent: And therefore if any such sin would have damned Adam, it must be by further quenching and expelling the Spirit of Grace, or forfeiting and losing Divine assistance, and so first losing that habit of love. The rest I leave to the more illuminated. II. Now as to the M. S. (said to be written by a young man of New England, deceased, M. W.) it hath so much accurateness, that in reading it, I greatly lament the Author's death, before maturity and converse had rectified some of his notions, and he had longer improved his excellent understanding for the Church. And because my Doctrine is particularly opposed in it, I shall stay to animadvert on the substance of the Book. And it may be reduced to these Propositions. 1. The great fundamental point of it is, That man was made to glorify God's Justice for ever. Animad. This is a great truth, not well considered by many: But it is but a part of the truth, which is, That man was made to glorify God's Vit●● Power, Wisdom and Love, and is governed eminently by Wisdom, making ORDER, and justly keeping it, together with mercy, because the glory of Holiness and Love also is the end. Which I have more carefully opened hereafter. §. 2. M. S. The reason of special government is, That man is causa consilip; Though as he desireth and seeketh good in general, he is but a natural Agent: And therefore Twisse erreth in saying, that God slay punish an innocent man, because he may afflict a beast. Ans. 1. By causa consilio he meaneth a rational free Agent, having an Intellect and freewill; This indeed maketh and proveth man a subject made to be morally governed. But when he had laid all his stress on this freewill under the name of causa consilio, he went too far in seeming with Gibieuf (whom he citeth and followeth as his great Light▪) to confine the name of true liberty to the Amplitude and Holiness of the Will, which is another kind of Liberty: And (as Armatus truly saith) Gibieuf was fit for a scraphick pious Discourse (in a Platonic strain) than for such Controversies. 2. As Rada and other Scotists well prove, there is no Act of the Will, even to good in general, which is not free, though some be necessary, and the inclination is natural and not free. 3. Yea he proveth, that there is no such thing as a Volition of any good ingenere, saving as the generical nature of good is found in some particular (in esse cognito.) 4. Twisse was not so weak as to call that punishment which is not for sin, but calleth it Affliction or Cruciatum only. And he speaketh not what God may do by his ordinate Will: But I think that you are in the right, and he in the wrong, because the very making us men, and so governed Subjects, is a declaration of God's ordinate Will, not to make us miserable but for sin. 3. M. S. Adam's whole man was sanctified, and so fitted to obey, and to glorify Justice: His freewill was not an indifferency, but (as Gib.) that noble virtue of his Soul, by which he could go above all created good, so that Liberty and Eupraxy or Obedience are all one: But we cannot stir an inch to God, above the Creature. Liberty is to imitate God, whose Will closeth with himself, and resteth in himself for ever: And mutability is but an adjunct of our Liberty. An. I have better opened and distinguished Liberty before, Lib. 1. Natural Liberty is to be distinguished from moral, which you describe; and vehemently assert the former under the name of causa consilio that cannot be forced: But mere indifferency or mutability is no Liberty itself. 4. M. S. Adam was not made with notions in his Mind, no more than with colours in his Eyes; but he was made able and fit to see God in the frame of Nature, especially in his own Will, as inclined to universal good—. An. Scaliger and others think, that Ideas are born in us, which maketh the Chicken fly at the shadow of the Kite, etc. But I rather say as you, that it is but a Disposition; which will so easily act, that some call it an Idea, and it is the same thing that they mean while they differ about the name. §. 5. M. S. Do this and live, is the way that Justice will be glorified in: And that doing would merit life, Adam either knew by nature, or supernaturally, at least was confirmed in it by supernatural revelation. An. This is all true. §. 6. M. S. Do this and live, as the only terms of life are a Catholic and Theological axiom: Not the words; but Energetic Wisdom printed on the frame. And the meaning is, close with the last end; or with the true Universal God as such, which is the sum of the Decalogue: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, etc. The Wills closing with God: And Obedience is in the subordinate faculties executing the pleasure of the Will.] An. 1. Obedience is first in the Will itself. 2. Tou do not intelligibly acquaint us whether by [Do this] you mean any sincere closing with God as▪ God and our End, above all Creatures, as the godly now do, though with culpable remissness and imperfections; or only the most perfect Love and Obedience, without any imperfection or remissness, or vain irregular thought that is culpable. But by [Do this] I perceive you mean, Take God for thy God, and love, adore, and trust him. §. 7. M. S. This was to be expressed by eating of the Tree of Life, and not of that of Good and Evil, sacramentally, to acknowledge also the Sovereignty of God. An. 1. All Obedience formally respecteth God's Sovereignty. 2. No doubt the Trees were symbolical, and the remembrance of them should yet teach us to prefer living to God, before a selfish, disturstful, needless knowledge; the increase of which increaseth sorrow. 3. But that Adam was commanded to eat of the Tree of Life, I cannot prove, unless the general obligation to choose the best was as a Command. §. 8. M. S. To be naturally happy is proper to God: therefore Adam was to be led to it freely by a Covenant. An. To be happy necessarily, and independently, and primarily, is proper to God: But you can never prove it any contradiction or impossible for God to make a Creature naturally happy; nor that there are not such. §. 9 Here the M. S. citeth some words of his Gibieuf, making our Being in God initially, and finally to be our state of amplitude and liberty, and our going out from God, to be our particularity and state of necessity; as if we were pre-existent in God, and our individuation ceased upon o●● return into him as our End. An. But these are Platonic Phantasms; And Gibieuf who was a devout Oratorian, and talketh too oft of our Deification, as Benedict●● de Benedictis, Barbanson, Baker, and other Friars that talk phanatically, must be read with caution and exception; and as the Soul need not fear too near a Union with God, as the loss of its individuation, so neither must it desire or hope for such. §. 10. M. S. An unchangeable state of Happiness in the love of God, is called Eternal Life. An. No doubt but that is called Eternal Life in the fullest sense, which actually endureth to eternity as to that particular Subject: And so, 1. The life of Glory perfectively. 2. And a confirmed state of Sanctity here initially, are usually called Eternal Life. But 3. Whether the lossable state, which the Angels fell from, and Adam fell from, or that measure of Grace, which the ancient Fathers thought the justified may fall from, be never so called also, I cannot prove. §. 11. M. S. Adam's promised Happiness, was, 1. Essential, in this perfect holiness or love of God. 2. Complimental, in the enjoying God i● all the sanctified Creatures in that Paradise, but not to be translated to Heaven, which Christ only procureth us. An. I inclined to that Opinion 26 years ago, when I wrote the Aphorisms which you oppose: But I now incline more to the contrary, and rather think man should have been translated to Heaven as Henoch and Elias were, upon many reasons, which I now pass by: Though I take it yet to be scarce certain to us. §. 12. M. S. The Holiness of God, is his loving himself as his End; And the third Person proceeding by a reflex act of the infinite Will and self-love of God, is therefore called the Holy Spirit. An. 1. This notion of God's Holiness (that it is his Self-love) is not to be contemned; It seemeth to be so, with this limitation, that you confine not his Holiness to this, but take this only as the most eminent among the inadequate conceptions of it: For his whole Transcendency, in Being, Life and Knowledge, as being adoreable by the Creature, and its End, and the Fountain of all created Goodness, and specially of Morality, is also God's Holiness. 2. But the saying that God is his own End, seemeth improper, though tolerable if spoken but analogically: For God neither hath nor is to himself a Cause nor an Effect, a Beginning nor an End. 3. That the third Person proceedeth by a reflex Act of the infinite Will, many Schoolmen boldly say: And so some say, that he is God's actual self-love, which is ●he same that you call his Holiness: And some say, that he is the Divine Will or Love considered in itself, as distinct from Vital Power, and Intellect (or Wisdom.) But of this I have spoken more largely elsewhere. §. 13. M. S. Adam's promised Reward was, to be fixed in an unchangeable state of pleasing God, by this Holy Spirit: not by infusing any new quality which should unchangeably fasten him to the Rule, (for no created thing can unchangeably keep a man from falling.) An. 1. The promise to Adam is very obscure: But Happiness it must needs be, and everlasting: 2. But it is passed my reach to conceive how the Spirit of God can fix man in perfect holiness without any fixing quality (as it's called) on his Soul. A constant Act the Soul must have: And 1. If that Act be caused by any Divine Impulse, disposing the Soul so to act, than that disposition is a quality. 2. And if there be not both disposition and habit, than the Soul will not in Glory be habitually, or qualitatively holy, but only actually. 3. And a habit-acting being perfecter than an act without a habit (or inclination) the Soul will be more imperfect in Glory, than in this state of Grace. 4. Operari sequitur esse: God fitteth all his Creatures to their works. And as when he will give Immortality, he will give a Nature fit for Immortality, even indissoluble and incorruptible; so when he giveth perpetuity of Love, he giveth a nature or habits fit for perpetual Action. Christ saith, A good Tree bringeth forth good fruit, and an evil Tree evil fruit: Make the Tree good, and his fruit good. 5. The Operations of Love in Glory, should be ex potentia aut violentia, aut neutra, if there were no intrinsic disposition or inclination to them. In a word, it is a contradiction, for a Soul to be perfectly holy, and not have the perfection of inclination to its Acts. 3. But if the meaning were, that no holy quality alone sufficeth, without God's Influx, that were no more than what must be faid of every Creature: without Divine Influx no Creature can be or operate a moment: No created thing of itself, without God, can continue; How then should it keep a man from falling: But if the Soul have any more goodness of nature or inclination in it than the Devils have, it must be a created thing, or God himself: If only God, that proveth not a Saint to be himself better than a Devil, as to nature or disposition, but only that God in him is better. His reason why the Sun is naturally fixed to its Operations, but not a glorified Soul, is (§. 14. M. S.) that one is a natural, and the other a voluntary Agent: One, as Gibieuf saith, Non agit, sed agitur, the other doth agere & non tantum agitur.] An. 1. Gibieuf and you were deceived, in thinking that such naturals none agunt: Passive matter doth not Act ex principio essentiali (unless Dr. Glissons and Campanellas' Doctrine hold true.) But the three Active Natures, Intellectual, Sensitive and Vegetative (and so Fire and the Sun) do ex principio Activo essentali agere: but nothing doth Act, without an Antecedent Influx to action from the first Cause, in which it is passive: For no Creature is Independent. 2. Voluntas est quaedam Natura, quamvis libera: To move naturally only and not freely is proper to Agents merely natural, distinct from free: But to move freely, and yet from a fixed principle, which shall infallibly determine the Soul to act freely, is not a contradiction; nor that which Gibieuf should deny to the glorified. §. 15. M. S. Man, though a Creature, is the first Cause of his own action: He moveth and sets himself on work: else he were not causa consilio: But not immutable: else he were no Creature. An. You set up freewill and Power more grossly in terms than I dare do, though, I suppose, our meaning is the same. Had I said thus, what had I heard? I only say, that man may be a causa prima secundum quid, of the moral specification or modification of his own Actions: But he is simpliciter no causa prima of the Action in genere actionis: else he were God. But a causa principalis he may be called, though not prima. 2. You never proved that God cannot make a Creature naturally immutable dependently on himself, that is, such as will never change unless God change them; nor that Jesus Christ is not such in his Humanity. §. 16. M. S. This confirmation is not by being in Heaven; but by the Holy Ghosts special working on the Soul, revealing still God's Perfections to it. An. And doth this Operation of the Holy Ghost make the Soul never the better, in nature or disposition, but only in Act? Though it's true, that no habits immutably fix without the Influct of the Holy Ghost. §. 17. M. S. Merit is the suitableness of the work to the wages. An. Merit is manifold, and needs better explication: In the Commutative Justice of mere Proprietors, merit is indeed the Comparative value of things, and in works, their suitableness as you say to the wages, that is, their equal worth. But in distributive governing Justice, there is no wages, but only Reward: And merit is the moral aptitude for Reward: which is as various as the Law is that one is governed by: There are five sorts of Law, that by five sorts or ways of Justice, require five sorts of merit: 1. God's Law of Innocency to Adam: where Justice called nothing, but personal perfect Obedience, Merit: 2. God's Law to the Mediator, who was obliged perfectly to keep, 1. The whole Law of Nature. 2. The Law of Moses. 3. A peculiar Law of Mediation (to die, rise, do Miracles, etc.) The keeping of all this was Christ's Merit. 3. There is Christ's Law of Grace to fallen man (in the first, and in the perfect Editions,) where our keeping of it, is by Gospel-Justice called in Scripture 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, our worthiness or merit, that is, in tantum, secundum quid, in relation to that Law. That is to repent and believe, to love God and obey him sincerely. 4. There is the Law of Moses, peculiar to the Jews, which hath its peculiar required merit. 5. And there are the Laws of Men appointed and allowed of God, which have their peculiar Justice and Merit. All these are not to be confounded, much less all denied, as if there were no merit but between Proprietors in Commutative Justice; In which sense no Creature can merit of God. §. 18. M. S. According to that Covenant, any one Act of Obedience in Adam would have merited confirmation and eternal life; that is, one act of holy love. An. I believe it not, because it is not written, nor naturally revealed, that I know of. My reasons against it are, 1. It is dangerous to add to God's Word. 2. The words [In the day that thou eatest thou shalt die] seemeth to look further than to one first act or day, and is as much as whensoever thou eatest; though he should obey till that time. 3. It is utterly improbable that Adam did not perform one Act of Love or Obedience before his Fall. For, 1. We are uncertain how long he stood; However confident some Rabbins, and Broughton and some others are, that it was the same day in which he was created. 2. You confess he was made with powers sanctified and fitted to obey. 3. God's Law of Love was written in his heart, and as old as himself; and could not but oblige a fit subject to the act. And he must sin all that while that he loved not God as God. 4. He had many thoughts and affections all that while; which were sinful if not animated by holy Love, and done in Obedience to God. 5. He spent some time, which was sinfully spent, if not spent in Love and Obedience. 6. God spoke to him, and so had sensible Communion with him, which must needs oblige him to some love. 7. He had a Law given him to dress and keep the Garden, which if he accepted not by consent in Obedience to God, he sinned. 8. He gave names to all the Creatures upon Gods bringing them to him; which must be done obediently or sinfully. 9 He had the Law of Marriage given him, with the Woman; which if he received not in love and obedience he sinned. 10. He had all the World before him to show him Gods Perfections, and if yet he had not one act of love to God as God, he heinously sinned. 11. He had the Law of Love and Obedience given him by way of Covenant, that is, binding him presently to consent; And he could not delay a willing consent one minute or hour without sin: And consent is Love and Obedience in the first act. 12. He loved himself, and his Wife, and other Creatures before his Fall: But if he loved not God before, than he all that while loved himself, his Wife, and all the Creatures more than God, yea without God: And then they were his Idols. 13. Else he never used one Creature holily before his Fall, and therefore sinfully. 14. You make Adam to have had less actual good before his Fall than the weakest Christian now; If not than many wicked men; who have some moral good secundum quid, though not simpliciter. 4. I do not think that the Reward which Christ was to have for his fulfilling the Law was immutability or confirmation: For I think he had that in his very nature, by the Unity of the Divine and Humane in one Person. But I think that the perfect Glory of his Humanity was part of his Reward, Phil. 2. 7, 8, 9 Heb. 12. 23, etc. And therefore that Glory hath much more in it, than confirmation in Grace: But it's plain in the Gospel, that it was not only one Act of Obedience, which was Christ's condition, in order to his receiving the Fruits or full Reward of his Merits: But it was perfect Holiness of Nature and Life to the end of his course on Earth. Else you must say that Christ's first Act of Obedience was his performance of his Covenant-Condition, and all the rest for some other purpose only; which is absurd. 5. One act of our Obedience now is not the fulfilling of all the Condition of the Covenant of Grace, nor entitleth us alone to Glory, unless God cut off our life as soon as that act is done: Perseverance to the end is part of our Condition of Glory. And we know of no such difference between Adam's Covenant or Case and ours, as will prove it otherwise with him. 6. Else it would make the Condition of the Covenant of Grace to be much harder and severer than of the Law of Innocency; which is not likely: To perform one act of Love and Obedience, is not so hard as to do it to the death, though we lose our lives in the expressions of it. Object. But our first Faith giveth us Right to the Spirit of Confirmation and Immutability, though more must be done for Perfection. Answ. 1. It appeareth then that Perfection and Glory is more than Confirmation. 2. It is certain, that the Regenerate are mutable as to the degrees of Grace, and are far from Perfection at the first. 3. The generality of the Fathers and ancient Churches thought that true Justification, and Right to Heaven, and true Love to God, was lost by many: And Austin himself and his Followers so thought. 4. And they that think otherwise yet know, that Glory is still given us (quoad jus in the Promise) on condition of our perseverance: And we should hardly find so many Threaten against them that fall away, if all might so easily know that the first act of Obedience doth so fix us, and give us in justice a Right to Immutability. §. 19 M. S. The Arguments to prove that any one Act had the pròmise of Immutability and Glory are these, Argument 1. If God were to declare his rewarding Justice, than he must reward one act. Thus Bradwardi●● also chideth his Master Lombard, as inclining to Pelagius, for holding that Adam could have forborn Sin by his freewill, without God's spidel Grace, that is, his Will that so it should be: which he saith was necessary before the Fall as well as since: and that else Adam by once not s●●ning, when tempted, had merited Confirmation, as he saith the Angels did, being tempted by Leviathan, lib. 2. c. 10. An. 1. God was not obliged to any Reward, but according to the tenor of his Law. Prove that his Law promised Glory or Immutability for one act? 2. Bonum est ex causis integris: one act is but a small pa●● of a man's life. The Promise was to the whole course only. 3. God did reward every act: His acceptance, and the continuance of all ●he blessings of that Paradise, and the comfort of his Love, was a gre●● Reward. §. 20. M. S. If one act of Obedience deserved unchangeable Happiness than God must bestow it. But, etc.] An. I deny the minor: One act deserved it not. No act deserved in Commutative Justice: And no act deserved it of governing Justice, but such as the Law antecedently made it due to. §. 21. M. S. Merit, it is a fuitableness of the work to the wages. ●●● that please God are under his good pleasure; the fruit of which must be ●●● enjoying of his Spirits infinite assistance. This Adam might have claimed ●● Justice, and gloried: for one act deserveth a Reward.] An. This is sufficiently answered; 1. Wages strictly taken is M●●●● given by a Proprietary commutatively: It's blasphemy to say that God can owe any Creature such, for he can receive nothing but his own. The word when used to us, is improperly taken: But praemium a Reward we have; but no work deserveth that, but by the ordinate Justice of the Law. Some few Papists talk of a dignity ex proportione oper●●, but the Scotists and the wisest of them deny any but, 1. Ex congruitate. 2. Ex pacto. Your suitableness may signify either, 1. A congruity ad fines regiminis; or else ad praemium qua promissum: And thus it's true▪ But it's not proved that any one act was such. 2. Or it may signify a suitableness in proportion ex simplici dignitate operis, obliging the Governor antecedently to his Law. 2. Or obliging God as Proprietor to compensation; And so it is untrue, that Merit is a suitableness of the work to the wages, here. 2. It's unproved that God's pleasedness must ever be showed by the Spirits infinite assistance: or that one act deserved this. It's unlike that the Angels that kept not their first state, did never one act of Obedience, nor were never under God's approbation; Prov. 16. 7. When a man's ways please the Lord, he maketh his Enemies to be at peace with him: God saith, This ●is a Reward: You say less than eternal life is none; 1 King. 3. 10. The speech of Solomon pleased the Lord: And yet one would think by his filthiness, and Idolatry, and forsaking God, that he was not glorified, nor made immutable. With the Sacrifice of Alms God is well pleased, Heb. 13. 16. Phil. 4. 18. and with Relation-Duties, Col. 3. 20. And yet all that did them (even sincerely) were not glorified then, nor absolutely immutable. §. 22. M. S. Arg. 2. Unchangeable misery would have been the reward of one sin: Ergo, etc.] An. I deny the consequence: Misery was threatened to one sin; Glory was not promised to one act of Obedience. Obedience, during life, is certainly due from Man to God: He that denieth it him in one act, denieth him his due: But he that giveth it him in one act, giveth him but little of his due. Your Argument is like these: The Soldier that is a Traitor in one act, deserveth death: Therefore he that watcheth or fighteth but once deserveth all his wages and honour. The Son that curseth his Father once, deserveth punishment▪ Therefore he that obeyeth him once deserveth the Inheritance. He that is bound to pay an hundred pound forfeiteth his Bond if he leave a penny unpaid: Therefore he forfeits it not if he pay but a penny: The Servant that is hired for a day or year, doth forfeit his wages if he be idle or rebel an hour or a day: Therefore he deserveth his wages, if he do Service but an hour or a day: The disease of one part may kill a man: Therefore the health of one part only will keep a man alive. He that is hired to build a House or a Ship well, forfeits his wages for one hole, or gross defect: Therefore he deserveth his wages if he lay but one Brick or Board. But bonum est ex causts integris. §. 23. M. S. His Sin is more his own than his Obedience. Ans. The assistance of the Spirit could not take place in the first act, because not deserved: And his Obedience would have been as much his own as his Sin. An. This is quite beyond the Jesuits: 1. It's true that the rewarding gift or help of the Spirit (for confirmation) was not given Adam to his first act: But it's not true that he had no help of the Spirit: If you will not call Gods necessary Grace, which you said did sanctify all his powers, by the name of the Spirits help; you must say, It was the help of God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit; without which he could have done nothing. 2. But can you think that God did as much to his Sin, as to his Sanctification; and caused it as much as he was ready to cause his first Obedience? Should he have been no more beholden to God for his Holiness than for his Sin? This is too indifferent a Liberty, and not Gibieufs Amplitude. It is not possible for a Creature to have any thing that's good but of God, nor any good from God but by mere free Gift, as to the Good or Value; though it be by rewarding Justice quoad ordinem conferendi, and comparatively, why this man hath it rather than that. §. 24. M. S. There is no stinting or determining, unless you stop here (at the first act.) An. I deny it: There are three Opinions more that are all more probable. The first which supposeth the Reward of life eternal due upon the over▪ coming of the Devils first temptation, which would have drawn from the Love of God; And so [Love and Conquer once] was the Condition. The second which supposeth that the Condition was the Conquest of this particular Temptation, to eat of the forbidden Fruit, and the after eating of the Tree of Life. The third which supposeth the only Condition of life eternal to the personal, perfect, perpetual Obedience, or perseverance, till God of his own pleasure should translate Adam, and end his life of trial. I take this last to have far most probability, for all the Reasons before given: I am sure that the tenor of the Law of Nature made it Adam's Duty still to love God, and obey him, and resist all that was against it: And I find no Promise that his Nature, or the Law of Nature should be changed, for this or that act, or for conquering some one temptation. I find that Christ's own Covenant-Condition was more than one act: And the Condition of our Glory is overcoming, and being faithful to the death, and continuing in Christ. And I will not add to the Covenant of God. §. 25. M. S. Arg. 4. From the nature of an obediental act: which includeth the approving of the whole Law. An. 1. Approving the things that are excellent, is made consistent with wickedness, Rom. 2. But I will suppose you to mean a full consent to the Covenant of Innocency. But 2. How prove you that such consent was the whole condition of life, and that it might not be fallen from? and that Adam never did consent before his Fall? and yet not sin▪ 3. All the godly approve of God's Law, and consent to it, and love it, and yet merit not as keepers of it; for they break it, Rom. 7. 4. Yea Covenant-keeping to the last, as well as Covenant-consent the first moment, is now to us the condition of immutable Glory. §. 26. M. S. Adam would not obey at first, but suspend while he looked about the World, to see if there were any good sufficient for him below God: Therefore he sinned not then. An. This is before confuted: He could not in that Integrity, and after such divine Revelation, be unresolved one hour whether he must first love and obey his Maker, without sin. §. 27. God cannot freely give eternal life to a Creature without Reward for doing, because the reasonable Creature was made for the Glory of Justice. An. 1. You may say, that God will not to man, but not that he cannot, nor that he doth not to any Angel. For man was not made only for the Glory of Justice, but of Power, and Love, or Goodness also. 2. It's certain, that God as a free Benefactor giveth many good things freely, and ●● as a Reward for doing: As 1. He so freely made all things good in the Creation, and gave man all his antecedent good: He so gave Ad●● his primitive Holiness, and Helps, and Paradise, and all the Creature●. 2. He so gave Christ to the World, without desert: and so far pardoned the first sin, as that cometh to. 3. He so far gave man the Covenant of Grace. 4. He so gave all Christ's Miracles, Resurrection, Doctrine, the Scripture, etc. 5. He so gave Apostles and Ministry to the World. 6. He so sendeth the Gospel to some Nations and Persons above others. 7. He so giveth to many the first special Grace, as he did to Paul. 8. He so giveth to many Kingdoms and Persons Wealth, and Health, and Strength, and such other mercies above others. 9 He so giveth greater measures of Grace to some than to others. 10. And it seemeth that he so (in part) giveth the same Glory to some that came in but at the last hour of the day. It is certain, that all in quantum tale, is from God only as a free Benefactor, or as the Amor primus: And the order of distributing it is twofold: Some antecedent to man's merit or acts, and independent on it: And this is no Reward, (though sometime it is an antecedent act of Justice, such as is the making of a good Law or Promise.) And some consequent juxta morman legis; And these are Rewards: And though God hath assured us now, that no man shall have Heaven but by rewarding Justice, yet that may be, because he thought meet to place man first on Earth in a life of trial, and undetermined Liberty: But that he hath no Angel that was made Immutable, or that Christ was not made immutably holy, let them say that can prove it, for I cannot. §. 28. M. S. It's like that the Angels that stood and they that fell had unequal help: for unequal Effects are of an unequal Cause. But Adam and the Devils had sufficient Grace, and God forsook them not till they forsook him. An. 1. This last I accept as true, and more than some will grant. 2. The first is above our reach: only we can say, both that God giveth more Grace to some than to others freely. 3. And yet he himself is simple and immutable in causing of various and mutable Effects. §. 29. M. S. By Christ's passive Obedience imputed we are pardoned and justified, and by his active imputed we deserve the Reward, and are under Gods approving Will. An. 1. By the merit of his habitual, active and passive, that is, of his performing all his mediatorial Covenant with the Father, we are pardoned, and justified, and adopted to eternal life, principally as a Reward to Christ (not to us as meriting by him) and subordinately, according to Gospel-Justice or Order, as a Reward to Believers for their Faith and Obedience; by him who will Reward every man according to his Works, and will be glorified in his Saints, and admired in Believers, because they believed, 2 Thess. 1. 6, to 12. We are under Gods approving Will, principally as united to Christ, reconciled, justified, adopted; and subordinately as sanctified and obedient. For the Father loveth us, because we have loved Christ and believed, Joh. 16. 27. And it is life eternal to know the Father and the Son, Joh. 17. 3. And because we do those things that are pleasing in his sight, whatever we ask we receive, 1 Joh. 3. 22. §. 30. M. S. By Christ's imputed suffering we are but where we were: For the Law to have nothing against us will not justify us, unless it have something for us. An. This great question needeth distincter handling: Adam's Law doth not justify us, but condemn us, nor Moses' neither; nor any but the Law of Grace. Your foundation is unsound. 2. The imputing of Christ's Suffering, is not God's Language, but your own, and may be well or ill understood. 3. If the Law have nothing against us, it hath no Sin of Omission against us: Therefore not our omission of Love and Obedience. And then we are reputed such as had perfect Love and Obedience. 4. But indeed it is not so. By the deeds of the Law no Flesh can be justified: The Law still hath this against us, that we have sinned; which he that denieth is called a Liar, 1 Joh. 1. The Reatus Culpae in se, or the Reality of this, that we have sinned, is impossible to be done away. But the Reatus poenae, & culpae ut ad poenam is done away: But not by the Law, but by the Redeemer and new Covenant. The Law doth not say, We are sinless, or deservers of life: But the Gospel saith, We are pardoned, and adopted, and sanctified, through Christ's perfect meritorious Righteousness. §. 31. M. S. Else Sin and Punishment should be the cause of life: for Sin is the cause of Suffering, and that of Pardon. An. This is the grossest passage in this Book; A palpable fallacy. You may as well say that Lazarus' dying and being buried were the causes of his reviving; because antecedent evils from which he was revived: Or that the Jews killing Christ were the causes of his Resurrection; Or that Peter's cutting off Malchus Ear was the cause that Christ cured him; Or that Peter's denying Christ was the cause that Christ pardoned him. Sin deserveth Punishment; but Punishment as such deserveth not Pardon or Life: They in Hell deserve not Heaven. If God had threatened but a temporal Punishment; As a years sickness, etc. this had not deserved the following impunity, or peace, but only interrupted peace, the Sin deserving this and no more. A Malefactor's scourging deserveth not his after peace. And Christ's Suffering merited not our Pardon as reputed our suffering, nor merely as suffering; For had we suffered, we had not been pardoned. But the voluntary Suffering of so glorious and innocent a Person, to demonstrate Justice, deserved our impunity and more, because God would have it so, and it was a means most apt for this excellent end, to save lost man, and to vindicate and glorify the Wisdom, Truth and Justice of the Universal King, and to demonstrate the Goodness and Love of our great Benefactor. But sufferings as such do mer●● nothing; even Christ's own Sufferings merit but as they are the fruits of Obedience and voluntary consent, on the foresaid accounts; much less do the sufferings of the Sinner merit: For he is supposed involuntary in them; and it is God the Judge that is the Author of them as such. §. 32. M. S. Else the Law should be laid by, and life given without it. An. The root of all your Error is, That God giveth us life by the Law of Innocency or Works, and that we are justified by that Law● which is not true. God laid none of it by; but man by sin made the promissory part (which gave life on condition of perfect Obedience and Innocency) to be impossible, or null: It ceased cessante capacitate subditorum, by man's mutation, and not by Gods: But the preceptive part remaineth still, as far as it reacheth materially the state of Sinners. But man having made it impossible to be justified by the deeds of the Law, God made us a new Law or Covenant, according to which he judgeth Sinners, and by which he first giveth Righteousness, and then according to it sentenceth men as Righteous. §. 33. M. S. Justification of the Posterity of Adam should have been the same for substance as of Believers by Christ. Adam's one Act should have confirmed all his Posterity in him as a public Person: The Covenant of Works and of Grace agree in justifying by imputed Righteousness: but out of a Head by Generation, the other by a divine Person.] An. This is presumptuous adding to God's Word, in the very substance of the Covenants; yea and a flat contradiction of it 1. What Scripture telleth us, That all Adam's Posterity should have been confirmed in immutable Holiness, if he had obeyed? 2. What Scripture saith, That one Act should have done this? 3. What Scripture saith, That his Righteousness should have been imputed to all his Posterity? and they all accounted to have fulfilled the Law in him? The Scripture tells us nothing of God's purpose to make so sudden a change of his Law, as if he made it but for one man, yea for o●● Act, and then would make another to Rule the World by ever after: The Law said (in sense) [Obey perfectly and live; Sin and die]. Now if the Condition had been performed by one Act, or one man, for all the World that ever should come of him to the last, and they all be born in the fixed possession of the Reward, than the Law which giveth that Reward still but conditionally hath no more place. As in Hell, God doth not say to the damned, Obey and live, so neither doth he say to them in immutable Glory, I give you immutable Glory if you will obey. The means cease so far as the end is either attained, or desperately lost. He that saith, Run well, and you shall have the prize: Fight well, and you shall be crowned; Overcome, and I will give you a Kingdom; will not say the same to them, when after running, fight, overcoming, they have received the Prize, the Crown, the Kingdom; (though possibly they may have the continuance on condition still if that continuance was not also promised on the first condition alone.) So that you feign God's Law to be incredibly mutable, if God said by it to Adam, Obey in one Act (o● obey thyself) and thou and all thy Posterity for that shall have the Reward: For than he can never be supposed to say the same again to Adam, or to any man: And yet you think you stand so much for the immutability of that Law, as that we must all be justified by it to the ●nd. Nay it seemeth that after one Act of Obedience, all the World should have been under no Covenant any more; or no promissory conditional Law, but only fixed by necessitating Light and Love, as those in Glory ●re: For when this Condition was fully performed, this Law or Covenant as conditional must needs cease: And you imagine not, I suppose (at▪ lest mention not) any other conditional Covenant that should succeed it. And necessitation is not a Moral Law, suited to such as you call cause consilio in this life. You would make all the World after one ●ct, to be if not lawless, yet Comprehensors and not Viators; Professors of life eternal, and not seekers, in a life of trial. But I find not but that all Adam's Posterity should have been born and ●ived under the same Law that he was made under: And all of them ●hould still have heard, [Obey and live, or Sin and die]. And if Adam ●ad obeyed till his translation to Glory, or confirmation in the Reward, I find not in Scripture any Promise that this should have been imputed to his Posterity, as the full performance of the Condition of their Life or confirmed Happiness: but that still their own sinning would have been a possible thing, and death would have been the wages of their Sin. You seem not to set Adam's Merits and imputed Righteousness any ●igher than Christ's. And I am too sure that the justified Members of Christ do sin, and must ask daily pardon; And whether or not they be confirmed against total Apostasy, I am sure few if any of them are confirmed against the possibility, or existence, or futurity of Sin, And if you say that Adam's Posterity, though confirmed, should have sinned too, but should have been pardoned as we are; It would be another presumptuous addition and contradiction of Scripture, to assert Pardon without a Saviour and a pardoning Covenant. 3. Adam's Obedience would have justified his next issue from this false Accusation, [You are born of a sinful Parent, or not of a righteous Parent]. But it would have justified no man against this Accusation, [You are personally a Sinner, or have not personally loved God and obeyed him]. Therefore it would have justified any man against this Charge, [You are to be condemned for Adam's sin]. But it would have justified no man against these Charges, [You are to be condemned for your own personal Sin; or, you have no right to Glory by God's Promise to the adult, which maketh their personal Obedience the Condition]. 4. And (though I cannot again here have time to deal with Confounders, who think that Imputation or Justification are words which have but one sense,) I must say that even so, Christ's Righteousness is not so imputed to any man, as to be to him in stead of his personal Obedience to the Law or Covenant of Grace which he is under: But it will justify any. Believer from these Accusations, [You must be cast into Hell for breaking the Law of Innocency, or you must be shut out of Heaven, because you deserved it not by perfect Obedience; or you have no perfect or sufficient Saviour; or you are such as God cannot pardon without wrong to his Truth▪ Wisdom or Justice.] It will justify no man from any of these Charges, [You are Sinners: you deserve condemnation by the first Law: you are Impenitent, or Unbelievers, or Hypocrites; or have not performed the conditions of life in the Law of Grace.] The two first we must confess, and not justify ourselves by a denial: And against the last we must be justified by our own Repentance, Faith and sincere Obedience. He that will say to the Accuser, that chargeth him with final Infidelity, Impenitency or Unholiness; I am justified by the Imputation of Christ's Righteousness, will but add to his sin. 5. There are all these differences between our Justification according to the first Law (had we been capable of it) and that which we now have. 1. One would have been by God as Creator and Legislator to the Innocent: The other by Christ as Redeemer and Legislator to the sinful World. 2. One would have been for personal, perfect, persevering Obedience: The other for Christ's Merits, as purchasing a free Pardon & Grace to penitent Believers, and upon our own Faith and Repentance, as the Conditions of the new Covenant. 3. One would have been without pardon; and the other chief or much by pardon: In one, if our Public Root had perfectly obeyed, we must also have perfectly obeyed, or die. In the other, because our Public Root did perfectly obey, Faith and sincere Obedience to the end, is all that is required of us to ou● Glory. 4. In one the personal matter of worthiness or merit, must have been all that perfection which God in justice could require of man: In the other, it is only, The acceptance of a free Gift, according to its nature and use, and after the thankful use and improvement of it: with other such differences. §. 34. M. S. What Christ did as surety is imputed to us; but not his Suretyship, or being a public Person.] Ans. This is true, if you understand Imputation in Scripture sense, or sound, and not in their sense who presumptuously say, That God reputeth us to have done all by Christ, which he did for us in his Obedience to the Law. §. 35. M. S. Christ did not all that he did as Surety; but only that which answered the Law.] An. I suppose you mean, that which the Law requireth of us: But the word [Surety] is ambiguous, and after here explained, and whether you understood it sano sensu I know not. He did all that he did as the Mediator and Sponsor, for man's Redemption: And we are pardoned and justified by the merit of all his own Covenant-keeping with the Father; even of such acts as the Law required not of us: And some which the Law required of many, he did not, because it required them not of him. §. 36. M. S. The Law said not, That Christ must be a holy Husband or Father, etc. The Imputation of one Act of Christ's Obedience is sufficient (to our Justification and Merit of life) though it need not be curiously set in this or that part of his life.] §. Still more presumption; 1. Where saith the Scripture so? 2. You must not assert absurdities or presumptions, and then think to put off the detection of them, by calling it curious? If this be true, doubtless it was Christ's first act of Obedience which merited Glory for us. And so it is that first only that must be imputed to us, to that end. And who ever thought so before you? The Friars have some of them said, That minima guttula sanguinis Christi, One drop of his blood was enough to redeem all the World: And our Divines say, Why then was the rest shed? So I ask you, 1. Why did Christ do all the rest of his Obedience after the first Act? Hath none of it the same end and use? 2. How shall we be sure that a Sinner must not plead or trust to any of Christ's Righteousness, but the first act for his Justification and Reward? or must he trust for it to that which was never by Christ intended for it? 3. This is contrary to the Scripture, which layeth our Justification on his whole Righteousness as meritorious, and on his Obedience to the Death, and on his rising again, and on other parts first, Rom. 4. 24. & 5. throughout, etc. 4. Sure they that are so curious, as to tell us which physical act of Faith justifieth (in specie & numero) (for some say only the first instantaneous act doth justify,) will not think it curiosity to inquire which one Act of Christ's Obedience justifieth us? when according to your Doctrine, it is evident that it must be the first: And they that say, It is Justification by Works, to be justified by any act of Faith in specie, besides the recumbency on his Righteousness to be imputed to us, or by any numero besides the first, will likely say that it is Justification by another Righteousness than that which the Scripture saith is imputed to us, to be justified by the Imputation of any but the first Act of Christ's Obedience. Or else that (if all be imputed) we have a redundancy of Righteousness, and deserve many Heavens, or one oftener than needs. But when men have received some unsound Principles, all things must be forced to comply with them. §. 37. M. S. Towards the end, the M. S. summeth up my Assertions, and setteth down some as contrary to them. In reckoning up mine, he showeth candour and ingenuity, and a good memory, having not the Book at hand: But I must advertise his Readers, 1. That he taketh all from my Aphorisms, the first Book I wrote, in my youth, when my Conceptions of these things were less digested; wherefore I have above twenty years ago retracted that Book, till I had leisure to correct it, and have since more fully opened my judgement in my Confession, and in my Disput. of Justification and other Writings, and most fully in my Methodus Theologiae unpublished. 2. That he overlooketh my asserting our Adoption to be by the Merits of Christ's Active Obedience, yea and our Justification too, as well as by his Passive. 3. That reciting my words, that it is by God's Will in the form of his Donation or Covenant that Faith hath that use to Justification which is nearest it, viz. the formal Reason of a Condition, he leaveth out my other assertion, that Faiths material disposition or aptitude to this form or office, is the very nature of it, as fitted to that use about its Object, Christ, which Gods design and our case required. His Assertions as against me are as followeth. §. 28. M. S. 1. There is no way to Life but by Doing: It is not enough that the Law be not dishonoured, but it must be glorified. An. Doing is a word of doubtful sense: It's one thing to Do all that the Law of Innocency required; and another thing to do all that the Law of Grace maketh necessary to life: It's one thing to Do all ourselves, and another thing for a Mediator to merit Pardon and Life (to be given conditionally by a new Covenant) by Doing all in kind (and much more than all that we should have done) for us (though not in our persons). The way to Life now hath many parts, 1. Christ's perfect, habitual, active and passive Righteousness, (fulfilling the Law of Innocency, and the Law of Moses, and the peculiar Law of the Mediator,) to merit Pardon, Spirit, Adoption and Glory to be given by the New Covenant on its terms. 2. The said New Covenant as the donative Instrument and Law of Life, and Pardon, and Adoption by it. 3. Our doing or performing the Conditions of the New Covenant by Grace. But our personal Doing all according to the Law of Innocency really or reputatively, to be justified by that Law, is none of the way of Life, which you think the only way. (And I hope we shall both meet there). §. 39 M. S. It's clear as the light of the Sun, that their fundamental distinction is absurd, to make sinning and suffering equivalent to doing: because he that hath born the utmost penalty, hath done no more towards living, than he that never sinned or suffered: else Adam in Innocency should have been sentenced worthy of life. If a Servant instead of his Service steal, and restore it, he meriteth not his wages, etc.] An. 1. It's certain that you mistake and wrong us: I never put sinning among the things that are equivalent to doing or meriting: Of this before. 2. I doubt you noted not sufficiently that no Creature can merit commutatively as a Proprietor of God, as a Servant doth his wages; nor can have any thing of God but what (in respect of such merit and the value of the thing) is an absolute free Gift: free as to commutation: And that all God's Laws of Life, are but a prescription of the wise Order in which he will give his free benefits; As a Father will give Lands to the Son that will behave himself decently and thankfully, and not to the contemptuous Rebel: So that as to commutation no Man or Angel hath other merit, than not to commerit the contrary (perdition): God is never the better for our Doing. If you dream of meriting commutatively from a Proprietor by work for wages, I can soon tell you what we set up instead of such merit: I hope you had no such thoughts, but want of due distinguishing. But as to Doing and Merit in respect to Paternal Justice, that which I set instead of fulfilling the first Law is a● aforesaid, (not sinning and suffering, but) 1. Christ's Satisfaction, and the Merit of his complete Righteousness. 2. The Gift of Pardon and Life by a new conditional Covenant merited and made by him. 3. Actual Pardon of all sin thereby. 4. Actual Adoption. 5. Our fulfilling the Condition of that Covenant, that these may be ours. And thus the Law was dishonoured by our Sin, but is glorified by Christ's Obedience and Satisfaction; And Gospel-Justice, but specially Mercy, glorified in our personal Obedience to the Gospel: without such Doing indeed (Christ's as Principal in fulfilling the Law in the Person of a Mediator, and ours as subordinate in obeying the Gospel,) there is no Glorification. And I think this is plain truth. But in your instance of a Servant deserving his wages, you seem to look at Commutative Justice, when we have to do only with governing (Paternal) Justice: And you should have remembered that if the Servant do not his Work, in order of governing Justice, it is his crime: And if he have no fault, he hath no fault of Omission: And he that hath no Sin of Omission hath done all his Duty, and so deserved the Reward. As for Adam. 1. In the first instant of his life he was bound to no present Duty, before he could do a moral Act. 2. But afterward I think he merited in tantum & pro tempore; and had not the Condition of the Promise been of further extent than one act, he had merited life: But a Reward for a years Duty is not merited by an hours. §. 40. M. S. There is a medium between just and unjust: He was non-justus; He was not actually just, though habitually: He had done nothing for which the Law could justify him: else why did he not live for ever? An. 1. Habitual holiness fits a Soul for Glory, where no more is due (as if one die immediately.) And so it would have done Adam, had God translated him instantly, and made him no Law of actual Duty. 2. But afterward that Adam in Innocency did that for which the Law would justify him in tantum, for that time, He fulfilled all the Law for so long: else he had sinned by Omission. 3. But that Law giving life eternal only to Obedience to the end of his time of trial, he merited not that life by initial Obedience. This was initial imperfect Righteousness, wanting perseverance; but not a medium between Just and Unjust, except as Just signifieth the merit of Life by persevering Righteousness to the last: And so I never denied but in a disobliged Subject there is a medium: Adam was not bound to do a years work the first hour; and so was neither just nor privatively unjust as to the future years work: but as to what he was presently obliged to, he was either Righteous or a Sinner. Here you come short of necessary accurateness. Perseverance is a part of our Condition of Glorification: Yet he that is not dead is just, if he be a Believer and obedient: And if God now call him by death, he shall be glorified: But he hath not now done all that is to be done till his death, if he live longer: So that his Right to the present possession of Glory before death is not justifiable, but his Right in case he now die, is. §. 41. M. S. Faith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere cannot be put in exchange for fac hoc; and therefore justified only as it relateth to him who hath suffered and done for all that will receive him. An. 1. Exchange is an ambiguous word: Here is no proper exchange. Faith is not a fulfilling of the Law of Innocency, nor so reputed by God: Christ did both satisfy for our not-fulfilling it, and also by that and by fulfilling it himself (not in our persons, but his own) did merit the free Gift of Life to us to be ours, upon new Covenant terms, and Faith and Repentance are the Conditions of that New Covenant, and so are that Duty which is laid on ourselves to do instead of perfect Obedience, supposing Christ's Satisfaction and Merits, which are instead of it quoad precium or principally, as our said acts are instead of it as to what is necessary in ourselves: And the Apostle who so oft saith, Faith is imputed to us for Righteousness, doth neither by Faith, mean Christ, nor mean that Faith is imputed as a fulfilling the Law of Works: But that having no such merit of our own, (or Righteousness) our believing in him that hath satisfied and merited for us, is reckoned to us instead of a Righteousness or Merit, as being all that now is necessary to our Justification in ourselves, (our persevering Obedience being afterward necessary to our Glory.) 2. No doubt Faith relateth to Christ, and here connoteth him as its Object: It were not Christian Faith else: But it is also related to the New Covenant as its Condition, and in that form hath its place to our Justification, which cannot be denied: Therefore you untruly say, [Only as relating to Christ,] and your words confute yourself: You say, [Who hath suffered and done for all that will receive him.] You speak either of secret Decree (and that giveth no Right) or of Covenant Donation: And to say, He and his benefits are given in Covenant to all that will receive him,] is all one as to say, The Covenant giveth them on condition that we receive him]: which is true. §. 42. M. S. 5. It is impossible that the terms of the Covenant of Grace can be any other than they are: because nothing but receiving him can make him mine.] An. 1. That proveth not that Faith is not the Condition, but that it needs must be so. 2. It is impossible, now the Covenant is so made, viz. ex necessitate existentiae: But that God could have made it not otherwise, is not a thing for man to say. 3. Confound not passive Reception with active moral Reception: Justificari is passively to receive Justification; and to be first related to Christ as mine, or to be one that he is given to, is passively to receive Christ: Active moral receiving is the Wills consenting thus to have him on all his terms, and is the means of the other: It is this and not the other that is Faith: And could not God possibly have made Christ ours, by any alteration of the terms: sure they that confine Faith to the receiving of Christ's imputable Righteousness, will grant that God could possibly have put one act more of Faith into the Condition, or on● act of Gratitude, Desire, Love or Repentance? And Dr. Twisse thinks he could have given a man a Right to Life without Christ's Satisfaction, and to Christ without Faith, and that so he doth to Infants. §. 43. M. S. There is no Righteousness in point of Justification, but only in conformity to the Rule, Do this: that only brings a man under the approving Will of God. An. 1. But what is the Do this that you mean? Adam's Law said, Do this and live: Moses Law said, Do this and live: The Law given to Christ said, Do and suffer this, and I will give thee Power over all Flesh, to give eternal life to as many as I give thee, and believe]. The Law of Christ to Sinners saith, Do this and live: This is the work of God that ye believe, etc. But all these Do are different, for all that; It's an unknown Faith or Repentance which is no Act or Duty. 2. There is no Righteousness but the conformity to the Rule of Righteousness, if you speak only of that Righteousness which is of that species: But there is another sort. He that is justifiable is just so far. If Satan say, Thou art conde●nandus, to be damned to Hell, and shut out of Heaven, for breaking the Law of Works: I must deny it: not by saying, I did not break it, but keep it by another, or I did not deserve damnation; but by alleging, He that is pardoned, is not to suffer any pain of sense or loss: I am pardoned by the New covenant, through the Merit of the Satisfaction and perfect Righteousness of Christ. Adam's Law will not justify you; nor Moses' Law neither: The Law requireth personal perfect Obedience: It never said, [Thou or another for thee shalt obey:] It knoweth no Surety: To give a Surety, and to accept his suretyship, is the act of the Law. Giver as above his Law, not fulfilling that Law, but securing the ends of Government (and of it) by another way: To pardon a Sin and Penalty is not to fulfil the Law that threatened it, but to dispense with it; which Justice can do upon a valuable consideration, securing the ends of Government: And Veracity is not impeached by it. For 1. The sense of silius mortis is, Death shall be thy due; and so it was. 2. And death was actually inflicted on man himself, though not all that which he deserved. If the Law of Innocency justify you, you need no Redeemer, you need no Pardon, you need no New Covenant to justify you, nor can it do it. 3. We are justified by Doing, though not by our fulfilling the Law of Works, by ourselves or another. We are justified by two sort● of Doing: Principally by the Merit of Christ's perfect Righteousness; and subordinately by our fulfilling the Conditions of the Covenant of Grace, (which Baptism celebrateth.) 4. God's Will approveth of all that is good, so far as it is good: It approveth of habitual Holiness in Adam, and would have done in his Infants had he stood; and doth so in all Christians now: And I will believe that Christ, before he actually obeyed, was under▪ God approving Will. But not as one that had merited by Obedience: For God doth not suppose any to do that which they do not, nor oblige them to do to-morrows work today. §. 44. M. S. The issue in a word is, 1. Suffering for Sin is not doing, nor equivalent in point of Justification, 2. Nor can God, having satisfaction for what was done cross to his Law, lay aside that in order to the conveying of Life, and substitute believing instead of it. Therefore Faith justifieth ratione objecti only. Now we [Do] in another, Christ, instead of doing in our own persons. An. I doubt this is another Gospel than the Apostles delivered us; though I hope that practically we meet in one. 1. To the first I answer, It's true; but you do ill to intimate that we think otherwise. Suffering by the Sinner never satisfieth, because it must be everlasting: Suffering by Christ satisfieth not merely as suffering, but as the voluntary suffering of God-Man, aptly glorifying Justice and Love, and securing the ends of Government. This Satisfaction is not equivalent to doing in Justification: For Doing all required, would have justified us against this Charge, [Thou art a Sinner, by Omission and Commission, and thou hast deserved Death, and hast not deserved Life, according to the Law of Works.] Against this Charge, I look for no Justification, but confess it is all true. But Christ's Satisfaction justifieth us against this Charge, [God must damn thee (by pain of loss and sense) or else he is not just, because thou hast deserved it.] And Christ's perfect Righteousness also justifieth us against this Charge, [God must damn thee and deny thee life, because thou didst not merit it by perfect Obedience]. The Justifier says, No: because Christ's Merit in Doing and Suffering hath glorified the Law and Justice of God instead of my Merit, and hath procured us Pardon and Life given by the New Covenant. 2. To the second I answer, 1. God did not lay aside his first Covenant, but man by sin did lay it aside, by making the Condition impossible. 2. You overturn the Gospel too much, by thinking that the Law is not laid aside as a Covenant or Promise, (though I grant that the Precept as a Rule of Life continues:) To say that the sense of Adam's Law was, [Thou or another (Christ) for thee, shalt obey.] And that we are justified by that Law, is to confound Law and Gospel, and make a Gospel of that Law, and make the Covenant of Works not to condemn us; or both to condemn and justify, and to feign man to live and be judged by the Covenant that is ceased. God saith now to no man living, [Be innocent, and so merit life, that thou mayst live.] And God doth not repute us innocent at all. 3. To the third I answer, It is notoriously untrue, that Faith justifieth only ratione objecti, unless you mean that efficiently it justifieth not at all, which is true. For we are justified by it also ratione foederis, because that which is materially Faith in Christ (a justifying Saviour) and so connoteth its Object as the meritorious Cause of the free Gift and Pardon, is (by reason of this aptitude) made the Condition of that New Covenant or Gift, which is its nearest interest or reason of our being justified by it. And it is the Law of Grace by which we must be judged and justified. And at that Bar, the question which Life or Death dependeth on, will be (supposing Christ's Merits) whether we are penitent Believers, or impenitent Unbelievers, and so have part in Christ or not: And if Satan accuse us as being impenitent Unbelievers, and the question be whether we have true Faith or not? my Opinion is, that we cannot be herein justified by pleading the Object, when the Act is questioned, and saying, That Christ fulfilled that Law: unless you could prove that he justifieth impenitent Infidels, and (as Saltmarsh said) repent and believed for us. But the grand Case remaineth, Whether we are justified by the Law of Innocency, by fulfilling it, and meriting in another, without any sort of doing of our own by ourselves? Mr. Wotton, Mr. Gataker, and abundance more, have long ago said much to confute your Error, besides Mr. Bradshaw, whom you name; But I add, I. I have before proved that by the deeds or sentence of the Law of Adam or Moses, no man can be justified: 1. He that hath sinned against it cannot be justified as not having sinned: For factum infectum fieri is impossible to God himself. 2. The Law that condemneth us doth not justify us. 3. What Paul, Rom. 3. & 4. frequently saith against Justification by the Law of Moses will hold here a fortiori: And Christ keeping Moses Law (as far as he was capable of Obligation) that also would else have been imputed, and so we should have been justified by that Law also; which the Scripture copiously denieth. He that saith, He hath no sin, deceiveth himself, and is a liar, and the truth is not in him. And the Law of Adam justifieth no man that hath sin. II. We did not fulfil it and merit in Christ: But Christ did in the Person of a Mediator, voluntarily undertaking it, on his Father's terms, and not as our Instrument, or in our Persons. I have elsewhere given abundance of Arguments against that, which I must not here repeat. This Author took notice of my Objection, that he that is reputed perfectly Innocent and Obedient, is uncapable of Pardon, and needeth no satisfaction, or remitting, or rewarding Covenant, besides that which he kept, but answereth it not. This subverteth the Gospel and Religion. Quer. If there be no Reward nor Life but of Justice, and no Reward but for Christ's Merits, and all Believers equally merited in Christ, as fulfilling all the Law; 1. Whence cometh the inequality of Grace and Glory? 2. How come any Believers to be left long under sins and weakness of Grace, and temporal punishments? III. The Merits of Christ have procured us the New Covenant (sealed in Baptism) by which we have a new Rule offiicii & judicii, (for such is every Law) Christ is not the only Subject of God: He made us not lawless or Rebels. God still ruleth the Church by a Law or Covenant: This is the Law or Covenant of Grace: Deny this Covenant, and you deny the Gospel: This Covenant or Law obligeth us to Duty: And it promiseth and giveth Pardon and Life in and with Christ: This Covenant hath Conditions; various conditions of various Benefits; Our first true consent (which Baptism celebrateth) that is, our first believing and repenting is the condition of our first Union with Christ, and our Pardon, and Adoption, and the Spirit. Our sincere Love and Obedience to the end, and overcoming, is the further condition of our final Justification at Judgement, and our Glory. This Covenant we are now under, and by this we must be finally judged, justified, or condemned. No man shall be saved, unless (if at age) he personally perform the conditions of this Covenant: And every one shall be saved that doth. Faith, Repentance, Love to our Redeemer, Gratitude, Prayer, sincere Obedience, are all such Doing, as by this Covenant are made the necessary means of Glory: But not such Doing as Paul opposeth to the Jews, as maketh the Reward not of Grace, but of Debt. The Author of this Law is just: His Justice will give to the performers of the Condition all that he hath promised. The Scripture oft useth all these Titles; 1. That of Reward, as being the state of the benefits retributed. 2. That of Justice, as being the principle of Reward. 3. That of Works, as being the matter rewarded; even our personal Works wrought by Grace, and not only those which Christ did. 4. That of worthiness or merit, as being the relation of the Work and Person to the Reward. 5. That of Righteousness, as being the state of the Person performing these Works, as pronounced by the New Covenant. If I prove not all these by express Scripture, believe your new Gospel. I. It is Reward, Heb. 11. 6. He that cometh to God, must believe that God is, and that he is the Rewarder of them that diligently seek him. It's he second Article of Faith, Prov. 13. 13. Mat. 6. 4. Himself shall Reward thee openly, and vers. 6. 18. Prov. 25. 22. Mat. 16. 27. Then shall ●e reward every man according to his Works; even Christ when he cometh ●n Glory with his Angels: If you say, He meaneth his Works done by Christ, read Mat. 25. and believe it if you can. So Rev. 22. 12. 2 Joh. 8. Heb. 11. 26. Col. 3. 24. Ye shall receive the Reward of the Inheritance. Col. 2. 18. 1 Cor. 9 17, 18. 1 Cor. 3. 8, 14. Luke 6. 35. Mat. ●. 12, 46. & 10. 41, 42. Prov. 11. 18. Psal. 19 11. & 58. 11. Heb. 10. ●5. II. Gospel paternal Justice rewardeth men (supposing Christ's Merits) ● Tim. 4. 8. A Crown of Righteousness, which the Lord the righteous Judge shall give me, and not to me only, but to all them that love his appearing. Rom. 2. 5. The righteous Judgement of God, who shall give to every man according to his Works. To them that by patiented continuance in well-doing, etc. 2 Thess. 1. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. Psal. 67. 4. & 46. 10. Psal. 11. 7. Gen. 18. 23, 24, etc. And multitudes of other places, Heb. 6. 10. God is not unrighteous to forget your work and labour of love. 1 Joh. 1. 9 If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive our sins, etc. Isa. 45. 22. III. The thing rewarded is called Works done by man (not legally justifiable, but evangelically) Mat. 16. 27. Rev. 2. 26. Rev. 14. 13. & 20. 12, 13. Jam. 2. 21, 24, 25, 26. Rev. 2. 2, 9, 13, 19 & 3. 1, 2, 8, 15. Heb. 6. 10. Rev. 22. 12. 1 Cor. 15. last. And it's called Doing, 2 Thess. 3. 13. and Gal. 6. 9 Rom. 2. 7. 2 Cor. 5. 10. Heb. 10. 36. Mat. 25. 21, ●3. & 12. 50. & 7. 22, 23. & 6. 1, 2. Luke 8. 21. Joh. 13. 17. Col. 3. 23, 24. Heb. 13. 21. Rev. 22. 14. And keeping his Word or Commandments, 1 Joh. 3. 22. and 1 Joh. 2. 3. and Joh. 15. 10. & 14, 15, 16. Dan. 9 4. Eccles. 12. 13. Prov. 4. 4. Exod. 20. 6. Deut. 5. 29. Ezez. 18. 21, etc. And Obeying, Heb. 5. 9 He is the Author of eternal Salvation to all them that obey him. Acts 5. 22. Rom. 6. 16. Obedience unto Righteousness, etc. iv The Relative aptitude of the Work for the Reward is called Worthiness, or Merit, and the performer Worthy (evangelically not legally). And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily signifieth that which preponderateth in the balance; but cannot note here any worth or merit by commutation, but that aptitude which resulteth from the goodness of the action as related to the Promise, Rev. 3. 4. A few— which have not defiled their Garments, and they shall walk with me in white, for they are worthy. 2 Thess. 1. 5, 6. The righteous Judgement of God, that ye may be counted worthy of the Kingdom of God, for which you suffer. Seeing it is a righteous thing with God to recompense— to you that are troubled, rest with us—. 11. That God would count you worthy of this calling. Luke 20. 35. They which be counted worthy to obtain that World—. 21, 36. That ye may be accounted worthy to escape— and stand before the Son of Man. So Eph. 4. 1. Col. 1. 10. 1 Thess. 2. 12. Mat. 10. 37, 38. V The title of Relation given to the Works and Persons evangelically is Righteousness, or Justice, 1 Joh. 3. 7. He that doth Righteousness is righteous. Matth. 25. 46. The righteous into life eternal: 21. Well done good and faithful Servant; v. 35. For I was hungered, and ye, etc. Mat. 13. 43. Mat. 10. 41. Ezek. 18. 20, 24. & 33. 12, 13, 18. Rom. 6. 16. & 8. 10. 1 Cor. 15. 21. Eph. 5. 9 & 6. 14. 2 Tim. 4. 8. Heb. 11. 33. 2 Cor. 9 9 And the godly are called Righteous, in relation to their Hearts and Do near an hundred times (if not much more) in Scripture, though but in subordination to Christ's meritorious Righteousness, and but secund●● quid, and not simpliciter. See the Texts further recited in my Confession of Faith. And now he that (considering all this) believes, 1. That Christ is no King, 2. Or we no Subjects, 3. Or that he hath no Law of Grace or Covenant, which we are under, 4. Or that this Law, or Covenant, will not justify them that perform that Condition, (from legal-executive damnation, by giving them Pardon, and Right to Life, for the Merits of Christ): 5. And that Faith, Repentance, and persevering holy Obedience, will not materially justify any man that hath the● from the charge of having no part in Christ, because of Infidelity, Impenitency, Unholiness or Apostasy; 6. Or that he that performeth the Gospel-Conditions shall not be judged rewardable, or evangelically worthy of the promised Reward; 7. Or that the same thing which as Good and a Benefit is a Gift absolutely free against commutative Merit, is not yet quoad ordinem conferendi & recipi●ndi a true Reward. 8. And so that we have no Reward for any Works but what Christ did in his own Person. 9 And that the Judgment-Day will be to try whether Christ did his part or not, and so to judge him, and not to try whether we have part in him, and did our parts or not, by repenting, believing, loving, obeying and overcoming, and so to justify us, primarily by his Merits and Covenant, and subordinately by our performance of the Conditions; And 10. He that believes that instead of all this, we ourselves did by Christ as our legal Person both keep all the Law of Works from first to last, and merit Life, and also satisfy God's Justice for not keeping the Law, and so redeem ourselves, or suffer in Christ for our own Sins, and purchase Pardon and Salvation for ourselves: 11. Or that God accounteth us so to have done, what we did not: 12. And so that it is the Law of Works and Innocency by which we ourselves are justified: 13. And that for meriting in Christ we are fixed presently in the immutable state of eternal life, which is the Reward: 14. And that this is not a Reward to Christ only, but to us as Meriters in him; He that can believe all this, with abundance more of the Libertine new Gospel-Doctrine (commonly called Antinomian) which dependeth on it; doth quite differ from my Faith, who believe that Christ suffered, satisfied, fulfilled the Law, and merited in the Person of a free Mediator only; fulfilling all his own mediatorial Law or Covenant, and receiving his Reward, and freely upon these Merits, and his Power received, making a Deed of Gift of Himself and Life (Pardon, Adoption, Spirit and Glory) to all that truly consent to his Covenant, and overcoming do persevere therein, and perform sincere Obedience to the last: by which Law or Covenant he will judge men at last, that is, will justify or condemn them: And this short and plain Doctrine of Faith is it, which I am constrained by the full and plain testimony of the Scriptures to embrace: And I never yet saw any thing against it, which is not easily confuted, though my life is not like to be long enough, nor am I idle enough, to write against all that have written against me. In conclusion, I must give notice to the Reader, that there are many great and weighty Points of great difficulty concerning our LOVE to GOD, and the order of it in respect to Faith, Repentance, the love of ourselves and our felicity; and our love to Creatures, etc. which I pass by in this Treatise, as having spoken with some care of them in my Christian Directory, in the Appendix to the Chap. Of loving God, in Tom. 1. And if that seem too intricate to any, as being too long; in brief, I suppose that the Thomists grossly err in placing beatitude chief in the Intellect, and their Reasons (especially as Medina useth them) are very weak; and the Scotists are more sound, who place it in the Will, and those other most sound who place it in the perfection of the whole man actively; but objectively in God: And most plainly that very plain judicious School-man Aegidius Romanus Quodlib. 3. Qu. 18. p. 187, 188. who saith in short, 1. That God is the final Object simply; 2. That the love of God (or velle) is the final act; or beatitude formaliter: 3. That beatitude (or rather the ratio finis) is principally in the Object, and next in the Act: 4. That subserviently or quodam genere the visio Dei is the Object, and the velle videre Deum the Act. See also Aegidius, Quodl. 4. qu. 11. clearly proving three ways that we must love God above ourselves, yea and not (properly) for ourselves, but for himself, and ourselves and all things for him. But 1. I think he mistaketh in saying that the Act of the Will is not the Object of the Will, and so that Visio and not Amor are felicity objective: For as Amesius saith, Dicimus omnium gentium consensu volo velle; and one Act may be the Volition of the next; and a complacency in that past: And what doth a Believer will more than perfectly to love God, next to God himself? And Amo Amore is an Act that we have full experience of. 2. And I am passed all doubt; that Beatitudo nostra qua talis is not the principal end of man, but God, 1. In his own Perfection or Godhead; 2. The fulfilling or pleasing of the Divine Will; 3. The Glory of God's Image or Perfections as shining, 1. In the Universe, 2. And therein most eminently in the glorified Society, 3. And therein most eminently in the Person of Christ, 4. And next in all those that are most excellent in their Order, 5. And among them in ourselves, our holiness and felicity: And this but in our own rank and place: For our Perfection and Unity with Christ and the glorified, will end all that narrow corrupt selfishness, which now maketh men dream that they are chief their own ends, (that is, their own gods) and that their Beatitude is the highest final notion, as if God were to be loved chief for ourselves, as the means of our Beatitude: It being worth the considering, whether it be not a wrong to God to love him at all sub ratione medii to ourselves as an end, though we must love him as the first Efficient of all our Good, and our Great Benefactor, ourselves and benefits being but means to Him, though yet (not He, but) many of his Gifts, may be loved as means to our Happiness, and that and all things for God himself. Among the Scotists, Rada well openeth this Case; and the worst of them all (in 4. Sent. de Beatitud.) is far better than Dr. Stern, the Dublin Physician, in his Medela Animae, and too many more novel immature Disputers, who would make our Happiness the chiefest end both of our selves and God, merely because that God can have no addition of Felicity: A reason vainly excluding such other respects, as men that writ of such Subjects should not be ignorant of: especially when they reproach the Schoolmen, and save themselves the labour of understanding them; (when though they are too presumptuous and curious, yet) one Rada, one Aegid. Column. Rom. one Joseph Angles, etc. hath more clear explication of such Difficulties as they presumptuously tamper with, than an hundred of our late Oratorical Novelists, who are proud of their undigested new Philosophy, and their unripe daring Wits. THE Second Part. OF GOD'S GOVERNMENT, AND MORAL WORKS. SECT. I. The first Law. 1. GOd the free Creator, Lord and Benefactor of the world, was pleased to make his Creatures of various ranks; and among the Rational to make Man a free undetermined self-determining Agent, not fixed by Necessity in Love and Obedience, but left with a Power of Loving and Obeying, which he could use or not use; that so he might be a fit subject of Gods Moral Government by Laws, and persuasions in this world, in order to a more fixed state of holiness. Not but that Angelical Confirmation had been better for us; But it pleased not God to compose the universe of Creatures only of the noblest order. 2. When God exerciseth only a Moral not-determining operation upon this world of Free Agents, it is not any dishonour to his Will or Power as if he could do no more; But it is his Delight thus to govern the creature according to the nature and rank which he hath made it in; and his non-volitions and non-operations of a higher sort, are agreeable to his Perfection, Wisdom and Liberty▪ Higher action being used on higher creatures. 3. Yet hath God placed and kept these free Agents, not only under his Moral Government, but also under his Dominion and disposal; so that he will do with them as his own, what he lift, and none shall frustrate his disposing Will. 4. It pleased him first to make man perfect under a Law of Perfection, making innocency or perfection the only condition of Life, and the contrary of Death. 5. When Man had sufficient Grace to have kept this Law (not sufficient to ascertain the event, but sufficient Power to have stood, that is▪ as much Grace as was necessary to his standing, sine qua non esse potuit▪ & cum qua esse potuit) he broke it, and sinned against that sufficient, Grace, before God either denied him any thing necessary, or withdrew any from him. 6. From whence it is clear that the Nature of Man's Will is such, as that it is made to use a Power which doth not necessitate, or determine itself, or is determined necessarily, but freely: And that it is no Deifying of the Will, nor extolling it above its Nature, to say that it can act or determine itself, without God's pre-determinating premotion; or by that same measure of help which at another time doth not determine it. Though its Nature, and its Act as such be of God, yet so is its Liberty too; and therefore by the Power and Liberty given by God, the Will can act or not act, or turn itself to this object or to that, without more help than the said natural support and Concourse: And this Power and Liberty is its Nature, and God's Image. 7. From hence also it is evident that there is such a thing (or operation of God) as Grace Necessary called sufficient, which is not effectual. For God took no Grace away from Adam before he sinned, nor let out any temptation upon him which he was not able to resist; nor did he sin for want of necessary Grace; but by that same degree of help might have overcome. 8. God passing Sentence on fallen Man for sin, would not forgive him the temporal death, nor common calamities of this life, but cursed the creatures which he was to use, as part of his penalty. 9 But the Great evil which sin brought on man, was the loss of God's approbation and complacency, and of his Spirits saving Communion and help, and of God's Image on man's Soul, and of Communion with God herein; and also his right to life eternal. All which man's own sin cast away, and man was both the Deserver and Executioner▪ without any change in God. 10. Yet was all this privation penal, in that God made Man such a creature, as that his own sin should become his punishment or ruin if he committed it, so that all Punishment is not determinatively of God, though God's Antecedent Will did make that which by man is made a Cause. As in argument, God saith antecedently [If thou sin, thy own sin shall be thy torment and misery] and man saith [I will sin] Therefore it is Man that is the determining Cause of the Conclusion [My own s●●, shall be my torment and misery]: So it is in Causation, God antecedently to man's sin, doth resolve [I will make Man such a Creature, with such a Mind, Conscience and Will, as that his Holiness shall be his Health, and Joy, and his immediate Receptive capacity of my favour and of his Communion with me, and of his title to my spirit and Glory: And that if he forsake me and his Holiness, in the very Nature of the thing, he shall lose all this Life, Light, and Love, Joy and Communion, and title to my Grace, and shall feel the torments of his own Conscience telling him of his sin and loss.] This is God's Antecedent Law: Nay, this is God's Antecedent Creation, to make man such a Creature. Now if man sin, his ow● sin doth ipso facto become his misery, and yet is not caused at all by Gods But yet that his Nature was made such as sin should prove a misery to▪ was Gods Work. And from that Antecedent Creation or Constitution the Relative form of a Punishment resulteth to the Sinner. Even as God saith [If thou Murder it shall be thy sin] or [Thou shalt not Murder] And man doth Murder: Here the Act that is sin is of man; but that the Relation of sin belongeth to that act, resulteth partly from the Law which forbiddeth it; and yet God is not the Cause of sin; though he Antecedently decreed, [Murder shall be sin if thou commit it.] So is it also with this sort of Punishment which is either sin itself, or the effect or result o● sin immediately. By which we see that when sin and punishment are found in one thing, God is the Cause (Antecedently) of the formal Relation of a Punishment, without being a Cause of the sin: yea, antecedently is some cause of the formal relation of the sin, by his Law, without causing any of the sin itself, as the author of it. As if God make man of such a temper, as that surfeiting, drunkenness, lust, will make him sick, and hazard his life; Here God did not otherwise punish him than by making him such a man; which he turned to his own destruction by his sin. If a man make a thorn Hedge about his Garden, that men may not steal his fruit, and those that will shall ●rick themselves, it is they that prick and punish themselves. If God say, He that will leap into the fire shall be burnt, or into the water shall be drowned; it is they that do it that cause the evil; and yet some formal relation of penalty may result to it from God's conditional antecedent Law. I say not that God executeth no other kind of punishment: But these are the most common. 11. Man having thus cast away God's Image and his Innocency, could beget a Child no purer, holier or better than himself: For he could not communicate that which he had lost. So that our Nature is vitiated with Original sin, and unhappy in the miserable effects. Bradwardine hath a shift which serveth them that say man could do no good in Innocency without supernatural Help, viz. Making that Help to be God's Will that it shall be done: But is not Gods Will called our natural Help when it is the foundation of Nature, working by natural means? It's true that free will without Gods Will could do nothing. 12. The promisory part of the Covenant or Law of Innocency became null or ceased with man's first sin, cessante subditorum capacitate; and so the Condition which is its modus. So that no man ever since was under the Obligation of that Law as a Covenant of life, saying [Be Perfect or Innocent and Live], nor obliged to perfect personal perpetual obedience as the condition of Life; for it was become naturally impossible. And God maketh not Promises and Covenants upon Natural impossibilities, whatever we say of Moral ones. If the Devils before their fall were under this Covenant [Be Perfect and Live.] Yet now they are not under it. Here some worthy Divines go into both extremes: Some say that all the Law of Innocency is ceased, Precept, Promise, and Threatening. Others say that all still are in force or being. The Truth I think is between them as followeth. 1. God still commandeth perfect obedience, so far as that the least violation of his Law is sin. 2. This Law bindeth us as the Creator's Law: but not as mere Creator: But as put with Nature into the hand and power of the Redeemer, to whom all Power or Government is committed, and so all Laws are now both the Creators and Redeemers. 3. These Precepts bind us not now in so full a sort as they did Adam, even to obedience; Though the Law be as perfect: Because there is some Dispositio Recipientis necessary to the effecting an Obligation upon us: And where any Natural Impossibility hath befallen us, though by sin, it will make some alteration in the obligation. 4. The Commination of the said Law is so far still in force, as to make Punishment (even perpetual) to be our desert for every sin, and so far to oblige us to Punishment, that if we are not pardoned, we shall not escape; for it is natural for sin to deserve Punishment. 5. This obligation is not only Remediable or pardonable, but conditionally (as well as by the Fundamental Merit of Christ) Remedied and pardoned to all men immediately; and actually pardoned to penitent Believers. 6. The Promissory Covenanting part was not (properly) Abrogatedly God: For he was not the Changer. 7. The Promissory part is now really ceased, and is No Promise, no●●● Covenant of God: And this was done by Man's ceasing to be a capable subject; which because some few worthy Divines deny, I prove. 1. If it be yet a Promise, it is Absolute (which none saith) or Conditional: And if so, either the Condition is quid praeteritum, quid present, vel quid futurum: But none of these; 1. A Past and Present Condition are not proper Conditions of the thing, but forms of speech: And either that Condition already is, or is not; If it be; the Promise is absolute in sense: If it be not; the Promise is No Promise i● sense, but equivalent to a Negation, as common reason as well as the civil Law confesseth. If it be quid Ignotum, the notice may be Conditional still, but not the proper Donation. But here it is quid notissimu●, and God is feigned to say, If Adam and his Posterity have no sin, I will justify and bless them; which is equivalent to [I will not]. If the Condition be supposed Future, e. g. [If Adam and his seed sin no more, they are just] it is false, because they are already guilty. 2. The essence of a Condition is to suspend the effect, till performed. But here the effect is not suspended: Ergo there is no conditional promise, Total loss is no suspension. 3. When the Condition is once totally violated and become impossible, all sense and civil Law saith, Res transit in judicatum, & Lex in Sententiam; and the Promise ceaseth Cessante capacitate Promissarit: And so it is here. 4. That which is a Promise is also a Law, and is essentially the Expression of Gods Will for the Government of his Subjects, and for a conditional Rule of Right to the thing promised: This is its very definition▪ But it is unworthy of God, to say that he doth ever since the fall, tell the world, [If you are not fallen or Sinners, you shall be justified] or [on condition that you be such as never did sin, you shall live]. This were to threaten or condemn us ironically or with derision, under the name of a Promise, or Covenant, or Law. Yet the change as I said is made by man, who hath made himself uncapable to be the object of such a Promise, or subject to such a Law. And I know that it is a Question of no small Difficulty, whether any proper promise of life was made to Adam himself, and so whether this was properly a Promising Covenant? But I can presume to say no more than I can prove; which is, 1. That as Natural there seemed to be in it an intimation of the Will of God, to give Adam perpetual felicity if he obeyed, 1. In that God made his Soul Immortal: Not such as could ●●t cease to be; but such as in its Nature was fitted to perpetuity. And a perpetual Soul must be perpetually happy or unhappy: And God would not subvert the Nature of Spirits, nor make Souls unhappy for nothing. 2. Because Holiness itself would be and infer Happiness to a perpetuated Soul. To love God perfectly is to be perfectly happy. And God would not have taken away man's holiness from him. 3. Because God having voluntarily become man's Rector, that Justice which consisteth in doing as a Rector ob fines regiminis, secundum mores subditorum, seemeth to be a virtual Promise, that it shall go well with the obedient. 4. Because God put into man's Soul a natural inclination to its own perpetual felicity. 5. And also a holy Inclination perpetually to Love his God, and to know him. 6. And God commanded Man in the very Law of Nature (and positively) certain means to be used, no doubt in order to such felicity as the end which man by nature was obliged to intent. And doubtless God would not do all this in vain; His command to seek Life, is a kind of Promise, that faithful seekers shall obtain it. 7. And as Nature made Punishment due to the sinner; so it seemeth employed in that very threatening of Nature, that the obedient shall speed better. Whoever is angry with me for it, I must say, that these Natural Evidences are no inconsiderable persuaders of my judgement, and directors of it about the certainty and nature of the Promise to Adam. 2. But besides these, though the Scripture be very silent here, yet the same seemeth employed, 1. In the threatening of death to Adam. 2. In the titles of [Redemption Reconciliation Remission,] &c. given in the Gospel to the acts of our Salvation by Jesus Christ: which seem to import that they restore us into that state of Heavenly hope, which we fell from in Adam; when we all sinned and came short of the Glory of God, Rom. 3. SECT. II. The first Edition of the Law of Grace. 13. When God judged man for sin, at once he promised him a Saviour, and through him as promised, made a new Law of Grace with man. 14. This Law giveth pardon of the Spiritual and Eternal Punishment, and of all save what was excepted in the Sentence foregoing: But pardon, not to be absolutely and immediately received, but by degrees and upon certain terms: And with pardon a free gift of Life Spiritual and Eternal, and so of the Spirit and Communion with God, on the said conditions. 15. The Promise Gen. 3. 15. is plain as to Mercy and Salvation, and darker as to the promised seed, and his mediation; and dark as to the Condition on man's part: But (by Sacrifices, etc.) it is like that Adam had it more explained to him, than those short words make it to us: But this is clear that by this new Covenant God becometh man's Merciful Redeemer and Pardoner, and Ruler on terms of Grace in order to recovery and Salvation; And that man was to Believe in God as such, and accordingly to devote himself in Covenant to him. 16. This Law or Covenant was made with all Mankind in Adam: For all were in his loins; and God hath given us no more proof that the first Covenant was made with Adam as the Father of Mankind, than that the second was so made. 17. God's deal with Mankind are a certain confirmation of this truth, and an exposition and promulgation of this Law and Covenant of Grace as extended to all Mankind. For God doth not use them according to the rigour of the violated Law of Innocency, but giveth them abundant mer●ies and means which tend to their Repentance and recovery, and obligeth them all to Believe that he is merciful and their case is not desperate, and to Repent and use his means and mercies in order to their return to God and their Salvation. There are no Nations in the world that even to this day are not under such mercies, means, and ob●●gations; and therefore none that are left as the Devils in Despair, under the unremedyed Covenant of Innocency alone. 18. But though the Law of Grace made to Adam be it which the world was then put under, and to be Ruled by, and the tenor of it extended to all Mankind; yet those that would partake of the Blessings of it, were to consent to it as Covenanters with God, and to Belie●● in and obey God their Redeemer pardoner and restorer, in the thankful sense of all this mercy; which because the ungodly did not, they and their posterity fell under a double guilt and curse, both as violate●●s of the Law of Innocency and of Grace: and therefore incurred a spec●●● penalty: Cain and his offspring being first thrust out further from the believing obedient people of God, and at last the whole world except eight persons perishing in the deluge. 19 Noah with his house being saved to be the Root of all Mankind that should succeed him, God renewed with him and Mankind in him, the same Law or Covenant of Grace which he had made with us in Adam, with some additionals: To show us that though the wicked and their seed had forfeited the benefits, yet the Covenant was not altered, but stood in its first sense in force to all, and would pardon and save all true Consenters. 20. I'm for his transgression brought a new Curse on himself and his posterity, besides the mere fruit of Adam's Sin. So that though God altered not his Law of Grace, yet they became a cursed Generation. 21. By multiplied transgressions, the Sons of men did still more degenerate and revolt from God, till Nimrod and others by wickedness and presumptions brought down the new and grievous penalty of confounded tongues, (the great hindrance of the propagation of the truth to th●● day) And at last, the most fell to odious Idolatry, not knowing the true God, but given up to sensuality and wickedness. 22. Abraham being faithful and escaping the Idolatry and wickednest of the world, was eminently favoured and beloved of God, and be●●●ving Abraham's Promise. and trusting God in his promises and in the great trial of his S●●, is honoured with the name of the Father of the Faithful: And God renewed with him the Covenant of Grace which he had made to all men in Adam and Noah, with special application to his comfort; and added● special peculiar Promise to him, that his Seed should be a holy Nation chosen out of all the world to God, and that of him the Messiah should come, of both which Promises (the common and the special) Circumcision was a Seal. 23. Yet this was no repealing of the Law of Grace which had been made to all the world, nor was it an excommunicating or rejecting of all others, or a confining of God's Grace and Church to him and his posterity alone; but only an exalting them above all others in these peculiar dignities and privileges. For at that time holy Sem was living, and long after, who in all likelihood was a King, and its like that the Posterity of him and Japhet were not all fallen away from God; and Melc●●zedek was such a King of Righteousness and Peace and Priest of the most high God as was a great type of Christ's own Heavenly Priesthood; and therefore it's like had some Subjects that feared and worshipped God The Scripture giving us the History of the Jewish Nation, and affairs ●● the principal, and of the rest of the world but a little on the by, we cannot know by it the full state of all other Nations, nor what Religion and Worshippers of God were there. But the History of Job and his Friends, the probability that all the Children of Ishmael, of Keturah, of Esau, forsook not God (for they were circumcised and therefore were Covenanters) with the Case of Nineve after; and Abraham's thoughts that even a Sodom had at least had fifty righteous persons in it, etc. assureth us that the Jews were not God's only Church, but a peculiar people, and a Nation holy above the rest. And as the Covenant of Grace was still the Governing Law to the rest of the world, (though most rejected it by rebellion) so it is not to be thought that none consonted to it and were faithful. 24. The special promise to Abraham of the Messiah to be his seed, which was more than was made to Adam and Noah, as it belonged not to Mankind in general, so was it not promulgate or known to them, but only to the Jews, and the few that conversed with them. Therefore the rest of the world, were not obliged to know and believe it, who never heard of it. 25. What Conditions of pardon and life were necessary to all Mankind The terms of the Universal Covenant. then in general, is most probably gathered out of these Texts of Scripture. Exod. 34. 6, 7. And the Lord-proclaimed the Name of the Lord—. The Lord, the Lord God, Merciful and Gracious, long suffering and abundant in Goodness and Truth, keeping Mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, transgression and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty, visiting the iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children, and to the children's Children unto the third and to the fourth Generation. This is the description of God given by his own mouth, as he is to be Believed in, and as they were to be subject and devoted to him: And what mouth can surelier reveal him. And Heb. 11. 6. Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must believe that God is, and that he is the Rewarder of them that diligently seek him. Act. 10. 34, 35. Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons, but in every Nation he that feareth him and worketh righteousness is accepted with him. And John's and Christ's Preaching were, Repent; And Except ye Repent ye shall all perish: And Christ was a Prince, and a Saviour to give Repentance to Israel and Remission of Sins. 26. The belief of the pardoning Mercy of God to the penitent, and the recoverable state of Souls, and the duty of Repenting, and seeking pardon and mercy of God, in order to Salvation, in opposition to despair and neglect of all endeavours for recovery, is so common to all Mankind, that (though self-love may make them hope inordinately for that which they would have to be true; yet) it is most apparent that it proceedeth from some Natural notion of God, and is to be numbered with the Notitiae Communes; which are past controversy with all Mankind. 27. Therefore though the Law of Innocency was the Law of Nature in the first and eminent sense, yet this Common notice of Gods pardoning Mercy, and man's duty to Repent, hope and seek Salvation may well be called, The Law of lapsed Nature, as the other is the Law of Innocent Nature. For the Nature of God, and the nature of Man, with all circumstant Natures, and the course of natural Providence running so much in the way of great restoring mercy, do certify mankind of the foresaid hopes and duties. 28. For it is not (as some have said) an absurdity, but a certain Truth, that the Law of Nature is as far mutable as Nature itself is mutable. For the Law of Nature (commonly mis-described) is nothing else but the Nature of Man and all other Creatures of God, so far as per modum sign● they notify to us Gods Will appointing what shall be Due from us and To us, as the instrument of God's Government of Mankind. Now this Notification is most by the Resultancy of duty from the Nature of Man compared with God and all the Creatures that he hath to do with. And the very variety of circumstances (as in the case of Adam's children's Marriages and ours, etc.) may alter Nature's signification, obligation and Law. 29. That which is called the Covenant of Nature or Innocency, was in the Main the very Law of Innocent Nature in all the parts of it. 1. Nature being perfect, revealed Man's Duty perfectly to obey. 2. Nature declared Punishment to be due to sin; yea to all sin. And this punishment to be suitable to the nature of the Offender compared with the God offended, and the injury done. Especially that if men will undo themselves, by forsaking Life and Love and Joy, and casting themselves into darkness, diseasedness and misery, when it is foreshewn them, God is not bound to hinder or recover them. 3. Nature telleth man that God who made his Soul a simple Intellectual spirit, and Life itself (though created and dependant) intended not to annihilate it; and that its noble faculties, fitted to know God, and Love him, and Live to him perfectly in Immortality, were made for this employment in Immortality, and not in vain. And that he that Naturally maketh it man's duty to hope and seek for Immortal happiness, hath not made this hope or duty in vain: Nor will fail or frustrate or destroy them that forfeit not their hopes. So that the Covenant depends not alone upon supernatural Revelation. 30. But that which Nature revealeth about the penalty, is 1. Not that God of necessity must punish the loss of Innocency as highly as he may do. 2. But that he may justly punish the Sinner in rigour, by temporal, spiritual and eternal miseries. 3. And that the Ends of Government (the honour of his Wisdom, Goodness, Power, Truth and Justice, and the order of the humane world) do require that sin scape not free, but some exemplary punishment be a Vindication of God, and a warning to Man: which our death, afflictions, and spiritual sufferings manifest in part, and the sufferings of Christ more fully. So that pardon, and dispensing in part with his Right to punish us according to the Law first broken, is no falsehood in God, nor any injustice, nor any violation of his Law of Nature. 31. The Law which God put all mankind under after the fall, and the world without the Church is under still, is the Preceptive part of the Law of Innocent Nature as de futuro, the promise of it being ceased, and the penalty not totally nullifyed, but made remedyable by an act of oblivion or Conditional Covenant of Grace. q. d. [Thou shalt perfectly obey me, for the time to come; and every sin shall deserve everlasting punishment, so far as that I might justly inflict it, and will do it if it be not remitted: But all thy sin shall be forgiven thee, and thou shalt have the free gift of pardon and salvation, if thou Believe in me thy merciful Saviour, and repent and give up thyself to me to be saved, and to be Mine by sincere obedience and Love.] 32. The deliverance of the Israelites from Egypt by Moses, and their imbodying into a new Commonwealth, with a Theocratical Government in a peculiar manner, and a new body of Divine Laws, were all done in performance of God's Covenant with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, separating their seed as Holy from all the world. Not as if no other were Holy in the world; but as the Priests and Levites were sanctified to stand nearer to God than the people, and so specially Holy; even so Israel was a Holy Nation, as being nearer God by separation than the rest of the Nations of the world. 33. The entire Law of God which the Israelitish Nation was under had all these parts. 1. The remaining preceptive and directive part of the Law of Nature. 2. The Universal Covenant of Grace made with all mankind in Adam and Noah, and personally renewed to Abraham for himself and his posterity. 3. The special promise to Abraham and his seed as a peculiar people of whom the Messiah should come. 4. The body of the Law of Moses as a Law for that Commonwealth or Polity (which was not so given to any other Commonwealth or Nation.) * L●g. Suarez de L●g. l. 9 who c. 6. distinguisheth of the Law strictly taken, and so it hath not (saith he) promises of eternal felicity; and the Law as including the promise to the Fathers; and so it had such promises. But those promises being the Soul of the Law should not by the Jews have ever been separated from the rest, in their conceits of it. 1. The first of these undoubtedly is still in force. 2. The second is turned into the perfect edition of the Covenant of Grace, to those that have the Gospel: And it continueth to the rest of the world unrepealed, as to the substance of the mercies of it, (further than men deprive themselves of them by forfeitures, as wicked men here do as to the mercies of the Gospel) But as it is a promise of Christ's future incarnation, it ceased by his coming. 3. The third is ceased by performance and by the Jews apostasy: Though some think still that it is in force, and that a national conversion shall perform that promise to the full. But Mr. Calvert (a Learned young man) hath lately written to prove that no such national conversion is to be expected, but only such additions of particular men's conversion to the Catholic Christian Church, as are of that kind which hath been more fully done on the Jews already. 4. As to the rest, it hath troubled Divines how far Moses' Law is abrogated or ceased; partly as to the Judicials, and chief as to the Decalogue. And that we may not be too forward to call one another Legatists or Antinomians for this difference (those now called Antinomians being rather Libertine deniers of the Law of Christ) I will notify to those that know it not, that it is as much a difference among the Papists greatest Doctors, who yet bear with one another in it, and the Pope decideth it not. Some say that the Decalogue now obligeth not as the Law of Moses, but only as the Law of Nature, and of Christ: So Soto de Instit. li. 2. q. 5. ar. 4. concls. 2. Medina 1. 2. q. 103. ar. 3. quem aliqui moderni sequntur, saith Suarez, de Leg. l. 9 c. 11. p. 761. and Tolet. in Rom. 3. Anot. 15. Salmer. ad Rom. 7. disp. 6. Victor. Relict. de Matrim. 2. p. n. 3. Barrad. To. 1. li. 2. c. 21. Valent. To. 2. disp. 7. q. 7. punc. 7. To whom Suarez joineth himself; confessing (pag. 764, 765.) that if (as some hold) Moses Law had been only a Declaration of the Law of Nature, and not the novo preceptive, it could not be said to cease. But he truly holdeth it to be constitutive or preceptive also to those that it was by Moses delivered to: And of this opinion I profess myself (notwithstanding all that on other points I have written against the Antinomians) Believing that Christ now is the Universal Lawgiver; and that the very Law of nature (as Nature itself) is now His Law, and that he hath taken it in to his Gospel administration, and so the Decalogue is materially in force, but not formally as part of the proper Mosaical Law, save only that as Declarative and ex paritate rationis, we may collect that God who for such reasons so bound them, doth bind us to the same things by the same natural Reasons. But there are other Papist Doctors that hold that as to the Morals Moses Law as preceptive is still in force, even as then by him delivered, and that to all Christians, so Bellarm. de Justif. li. 4. c. 6. Lorin. in Act. 15. Vasquez who with Durandus Paludan. Paul. Burgens. And Suarez saith that Alph. a Castro and most so speak: And Vasquez denyeth the Law of Nature as such, to have properly a Divine Obligation, saith Suarez, which he confuteth the Leg. l. 9 c. 11. p. 764, 765. But this controversy when examined, containeth not much more than verbal disagreement, and so their mutual forbearance doth confess. 34. The Jews instead of excelling in Holiness proportionably to their privileges, did grow carnal and proud, and 1. Much neglected the Law of Nature. 2. Much over-looked the spiritual Covenant of Grace, made with them and all the world. 3. And misunderstood the chief part of the special Promise made to Abraham, not understanding commonly the high, spiritual or universal Office and Kingdom of the Messiah, but dreaming that he was but to be their Monarch, to make them great, and to subject the world to them. 4. And they misunderstood the Law of Moses or Covenant on Mount Sinai; as if the design of it had been but by its special holy excellency to justify the doers of it, by and for the doing, and to pardon all the spiritual and perpetual punishment of Sin, upon those terms which it appointed for a Political pardon, and to give life spiritual and eternal, upon those bare conditions on which their Law gave them Political benefits. overlooking the great causes of Justification and life in the Messiah, and the common Covenant of Grace, and Promise of the Messiah made to Abraham. And this is the error which Christ and his Apostles found them in. Yet proudly boasting of their Law and Political privileges, and despising all the rest of the world, as outcasts in comparison of them. 35. Though the behaviour of all the rest of the world, till Christ's coming be little notified to us, yet this much is sure, that they were commonly more Ignorant and Idolatrous than the Jews, that yet they retained the common notices of nature; that they remembered by Tradition those intimations of the necessity of propitiatory Sacrifice, so as to keep up the custom of Sacrificing among them: That many of them with exceeding diligence sought to find God, or know him in the works of Nature and Providence, and attained to great and excellent understanding, especially in Greece and Rome: And many of them lived very strict austere and laborious lives, in great Justice and Love, and in the practice of many excellent Precepts towards God: For the Heavens declared the Glory of God, and the firmament shown his handiwork: Day unto day uttered speech, and night unto night showed knowledge; There was no speech or language where their voice was not heard: Their li●e went through the earth, and their words to the world's end, Psal. 19 1, 2, 3, 4. For all God's works do praise him, and the Lord is good to all, his tender mercies are over all his works: Psal. 145. 9, 10, 17. He is King in all the earth. He was not the God of the Jews only, but of the Gentiles also. Rom. 3. 29. Because that which may be known of God was manifest in (or to) them, for God had showed it to them. For the invisible things of him from the Creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: his Eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse, because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, Rom. 1. 19, 20, 21. God left not himself without witness, in that he did good and gave men rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling their hearts with food and gladness, Act. 14. 15, 16. Seeing he giveth to all life and breath and all things, and hath made of one blood all Nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation, that they should seek the Lord, if happily they might feel after him and find him: though he be not far from every one of us: For in him we live and move and have our being; For we are also his offspring, Act. 17. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29. For there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek; For the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon him. For whoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved: But have they not heard? Yes verily, their sound went into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world— Rom. 10. 12, 13, 18. Despisest thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance and long suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to Repentance? Who will render to every man according to his deeds. To them who by patiented continuance in well doing seek for Glory and Honour and Immortality, Eternal life— Glory, honour and peace, and to every man that worketh Good, to the Jew first and also to the Greek; For there is no respect of persons with God— For not the hearers of the Law are just before God, but the doers of the Law shall be justified. For when the Gentiles which have not the Law do by Nature the things contained in the Law, these having not the Law are a Law unto themselves; which show the work of the Law written in their hearts, their Consciences also bearing witness; and their thoughts in the mean while accusing or else excusing one another. In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my Gospel— If the uncircumcision keeps the righteousness of the Law, shall not his uncircumcision, be counted for circumcision? He is a Jew which is one inwardly, and circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter whose praise is not of men but of God, Rom. 2. SECT. III. Of Christ's Incarnation and our Redemption. 36. In the fullness of time God sent his Son made of a Woman, made under the Law, to redeem them that were under the Law. Rom. 4. 4. But not them only; for God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. Joh. 3. 16. He was made sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him. He redeemed us from the Curse of the Law, being made a Curse for us. For he is the Saviour of the world, and the Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world. He is the Propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world: 1 Joh. 2. 2. For he tasted Death for every man, Heb. 2. being the Saviour of all men, but especially of those that believe, 1 Tim. 4. 10. For if one died for all, then were all dead; And he died for all, that they which live should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him that died for them and risen again, 2 Cor. 5. 14, 15. 37. As the eternal Word and Wisdom of the Father in his Divine nature only, was the interposing Redeemer by undertaking, before his Incarnation, and governed the fallen world by the fore-described Law of Grace; so upon his Incarnation initially, and upon his performance plenarily all things are delivered into his hands; even all the world so far as it was defiled and cursed by Man's sin; Man as the Redeemed, the Creatures as his utensils, and goods, (and Devils as his and our Enemies:) All Power in Heaven and Earth was given him, Matth. 26. 19 Joh. 13. 1, 3. and 17. 2, 3. All judgement was committed to him; and the Father judgeth no man (but by him): But hath given him to have life in himself, and to raise the dead, Joh. 5. 22, 23, 24, 25. For he hath made him Head over all things to his Church, Eph. 1. 22, 23. And for this end he died, rose and revived that he might be the Lord of the dead and the living, Rom. 14. 9, 10. For God hath exalted him and given him a name above every name, that in the name of Jesus every knee should ●ow, Phil. 2. 7, 8. And as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive, 1 Cor. 15. 22. 38. Christ upon his Incarnation performed but what God had Decreed, before the foundations of the world, and had obscurely and generally promised after the fall, at the first making of the Covenant of Grace. Which Decree of God, is after the manner of men called by some a Covenant between the Father and the Son; especially because the Prophets have sometimes (as Isa. 53.) described it by way of prediction as a Covenant between the Father and Christ incarnate. If we conceive of it properly under the notion of a Decree first, and a Promise after unto the world, so the Will and Mercy of God the Father and Son (with the Holy Spirit) are the cause of man's Redemption, Pardon and Salvation, even the fundamental Principal total Cause: And the Promise was man's security; and Christ as promised was the primary great mean●, which was to procure us the rest, by doing that, upon the foresight and fore-decree whereof, God did beforehand pardon and save Sinners. But if you had rather mention it as in the form of a Covenant, (which before the Incarnation, must be improperly taken, being only of God to himself, or a promise of and to Christ as to be incarnate) then the undertaking of the Father, and the Son herein must be carefully distinguished and described. The Father giveth up to Christ as Redeemer the whole lapsed cursed reparable world, (the several parts to several uses) and especially his chosen to be eventually and infallibly saved, and promiseth to accept his Sacrifice and performance, and to make him Head over all things to his Church, and by him to establish the Law of Grace (in its perfect Edition) and to give him the Government respectively of the Church and world, and to Glorify him for this work with himself for ever. And the second person undertaketh to assume man's Nature, to do and suffer all that he did, in perfect obedience to his Father's Will, and Law of Redemption, to fulfil all Righteousness, conquer Satan and the world, to suffer in the flesh, and be a Sacrifice for sin, and to conquer Death, and teach, and rule, and purify, and raise, and justify and glorify all true believers. 39 Before the Incarnation, Christ's future death and obedience being * Eadem suit sides in antiquis patribus & modernis qui alio modo credebant in specialia & alia credibilia quam nos. Immo aliquid eredebant quod nunc est salsum. Alliaco in 3. q. 1. not existent, were no real existent Causes in themselves of men's Justification: But that Wisdom which foresaw them, and that Will of God which Decreed them, as such (and not they without that foresight and Decree as existent) were the cause. 40. Nor were they either before or after the performance a proper Cause of God's Will which pardoned us; For Gods Will in it self can have no cause. But they were Causes, 1. Of the Thing willed, and 2. Also of the extrinsical denomination of Gods Will from the object and effect (of which anon). 41. Christ did not take upon him strictly and properly, the Natural or Civil person of any Sinner, much less of all the Elect, or all Sinners: But the person of a Mediator between God and Sinners: (Of which more afterwards). 42. Christ was not our Delegate, Deputy, Minister or Instrument to do what he did in our names, by representing our persons; as a man's Servant payeth his Master's debt by his command, or doth some work which he was to do by himself or by another. Nor did God or his own consent put him into any such Instrumental Relation, in our Civil persons. 43. Yet did he in the person of a Mediator, not only merit and suffer ●ro nobis & nostro bono, but also voluntarily as part of his Mediatorial work, suffer the penalty, nostro loco, in our stead: Not by a full representation of our persons; nor as if we could hence truly say, that we ●id (in sensu Legis vel Civili). Suffer in Christ, or satisfy God's Justice ourselves by Christ, nor that God or the Redeemer do reckon it to us, or ever will, to be a thing done by us in our own Civil person, though ●y Christ's Natural person; nor will ever give us all the fruits of it, on that reason and account, as supposing us so by Christ to have satisfied for, or Redeemed ourselves. But he suffered in the stead and place of Sinners, to satisfy God's Wisdom, Truth, and Justice, and to procure pardon and life for Sinners, to be given out by himself, on his terms, and in his way. 44. Much less did Christ in our persons, and we in and by him, in a civil sense, become habitually holy, and perfectly fulfil all righteousness: Nor doth God ever repute us to have ourselves in our own civil persons, thus fulfilled the Law, and been holy in and by Christ, or will justify us on such a supposition. 45. Christ is said to be made sin for us, in that he was made a Sacrifice for sin: But never was a Sinner indeed, or in God's esteem: For God judgeth not falsely: Nor did he ever take to himself the Gild of fact, or fault in itself, but the punishment and the guilt only in relation to punishment; the Reatum poenae, non culpae qua talis. But if any will call the Reatum poenae by the name of Reatum eulpae quoad poenam tantum, because of the relation and connotation, I strive not against the Name, so we agree of the thing: But safest words are best; especially seeing that obligatio ad poenam is it that is most usually and eminently called guilt: But Christ never undertook to be reputed of God one that was truly and formally wicked or a sinner; but only one that was a sponsor who consented to suffer for Sinners, that they might be delivered. And they are ill words of them that say, Christ was by imputation the most wicked man, the greatest Thief, Adulterer, Murderer, or Sinner in the world; Though such men may mean well, it were better speak in the Scripture phrase, and not so far overgo it. Had God imputed our sins so to him as to have esteemed him a Sinner or guilty of our habitual and actual sin as sin (even our hatred of God, and all our wickedness) God must necessarily from the perfection of his Nature, have hated him as a wicked enemy; yea, more than he hated any other man, as being guilty of a world of wickedness. Whereas God was still well pleased with him, and never hated him. 46. The satisfaction which Christ made to the justice of God was full and perfect; and so was his merit by his perfect Righteousness. 47. The perfection of Christ's satisfaction consisteth not in its being in stead of All the sufferings due to all for whom be died, so that none should therefore be ever due to the persons themselves. For death, afflictions, and the want of Grace, and withholding of the Spirits further help, etc. must be suffered even by the Elect: But it consisteth in its full sufficiency to those Ends for which it was designed by the Father and the Son. 48. The very Nature and Reason of the satisfactoriness of Christ's ●●●ferings, was not in Being the very same either in Kind or in Degree, which were due to all for whom he suffered: For they were not such: Of which more afterwards. 49. They could not be the same which was due by the Law: For the Law made it due to the Sinner himself. And another's suffering for him▪ fulfilleth not the Law (which never said, Either thou or another for the shalt die) But only satisfied the Lawgiver as he is above his own Law, and could dispense with it, his Justice being satisfied and saved. D●●alius solvit, aliud solvitur. 2. And sin it self (though not as sin) as ●● before opened, was the greatest part of the Sinners punishment (To ●● alienated from God, and not to love him and delight in him, but to be corrupted and deluded and tormented by concupiscence). 3. And the immediate unavoidable consequents resulting from sin itself, we●● punishments which Christ did never undergo. (As to be Hateful or ●● pleasing to God, as contrary to his Holy nature; to be related as Criminal, to lose all Right to God's favour and Kingdom, etc.) 4. And no●● of the further punishments which supposed real faultiness could fall ●● Christ; as the torment of an accusing Conscience for rejecting and offending God, for casting away our own felicity, and running into hell, etc. the sense of God's hatred of us as real Sinners. 5. Much less the devotions of the Spirit of Holiness, to be left without goodness, in a state of sin, and to hate God for his justice and holiness, which will be the damneds case. The blind zeal of them that think they wrong the sufferings of Christ, if they make them not thus of the s●me ki●● with all that we deserved, doth lead them to the intolerable Blaspheming of our Saviour; which if understood, they would themselves abhor. 50. Nor could Christ's sufferings be equal in Degree, intensively and extensively, to all that was deserved by the world: As is easily discernible by perusing what is now said, seeing our deserved suffering lay i● things of such a Nature, as to be left in sin itself, destitute of God● Image, and Love and Communion, under his hatred, tormented in Conscience; besides the everlasting torments of hell, which are more th●● these, upon all the millions of Sinners which were redeemed. 51. Yet did Christ suffer more in Soul than in Body, being at the present deprived of that kind of sense of God's Love, and Joy therein, which was no part of his holiness or perfection, (but not other) and having o● If in any of these points men of less accurateness use not the same words, take not therefore the old way of proclaiming them Heretics, till you have tried how far they err indeed. Most of our lower Divines of all parties would be made Heretics for want of Skill in the denominations allowable or not allowable by the Communication of idioms, if the Schoolmens accurateness must be the test. e. g. If the question were whether the Humanity be part of Christ, or Christ be compounded of a Divine Nature and Humane, & c. ●●●● would affirm it, that mean well. But saith Alliac. Camerar. 3. q. [Neque persona neque natura divina est composita; nec ●●●● est compositus ex duabus na●●●is, divina scilicet & humana; sive ex tribus rebus, Corpore scilicet, anima & divinitate: sed ●●●● ex duabus, secundum humanitatem, scilicet corpore & anima essentialiter, & ex infinitis partibus quantitativis integraliter. ●● non est concedendum quod humanitas sit Pars Christ●. Nam sicut homo non est compositus ex albidine, & substantia, 〈…〉 est Compositus ex humanitate & persona divina. How many have gone for Heretics for want of the Language of ●●●● and the Schoolmen? his Soul the deep sense of God's displeasure with Sinners and of his ●●●● of sin, though no sense of God's hatred to himself. For it is conceivable how Christ being the Lover and surety or Sponsor for Sinners, and undertaking to suffer as a Sacrifice for their sins, and in their stead, might have on his own Soul the sorrowful sense of God's hatred of sin and wrath against Sinners, though not properly terminated on himself; and so he bore the sorrow of our transgressions, and was so far forsaken of God for that time, and not further. 52. The true Reason of the satisfactoriness of Christ's sufferings was that they were a most apt means for the demonstration of the Governing Justice, Holiness, Wisdom and Mercy of God, by which God could attain the ends of the Law and Government, better than by executing the Law on the world in its destruction, (as in general was before intimated.) 53. The measure of the satisfaction made by Christ was, that it was a full salvo to God's Justice, and demonstration of it, that he might give Pardon and Life to Sinners, upon the new terms of the Covenant of Grace, and give what he after gave. 54. The matter of Christ's meritorious Righteousness, was his perfect fulfilling the Law given him as Mediator, or the performance of the Conditions of his mediatorial Covenant: From which resulted the Merit, so the Dueness of all the Benefits which God had promised in that Covenant as to Christ, though mostly for men. This was the Righteousness of Christ for man, and hence arose his Merit for us. 55. The matter of his Law of Redemption required of him was threefold, 1. That he should by habitual and actual perfect Holiness fulfil the first Law of Nature or Innocency which Adam broke; not just as it obliged Adam, in every point, but as it was common to man, and belonged to Christ as Man. 2. That he should fulfil all the Law of Moses given only to the Jews. 3. That he should perform the great things peculiar to himself as Mediator; which were to be a Sacrifice for Sin, to do his Miracles, to teach the Church as its Head: to Rule it, and to appoint Orders and Officers for it, to rise again, to conquer Satan, Death and Sin, etc. 56. That Christ did not fulfil all the Law in our persons, so as that we did it in and by himself, and are thereby justified, is further evident, in that he did not all the Duties which the Law bond us to perform, and for not doing of which we are truly Sinners. He did not do any of the proper Offices of a Husband to a Wife, or of a Wife to a Husband; of a Father to Children; of a Servant, or a hired day-labourer to a Master; of a Magistrate (King, Judge, etc.) to Subjects: of a Captain to Soldiers, or Soldiers to their Captain; of a Landlord to Tenants; of such as have great riches towards the poor: of the sick, the imprisoned, and abundance such like. Besides the personal Laws given to Adam in the Garden, to Noah, to Abraham, to David, ●●●●●olomon, the Prophets, and such others. Christ did not these same ●●●● for us; nor we fulfilled not these particular Laws in him. 57 The Disputes whether it be Christ's Divine, his habitual, his active, or his passive Righteousness, that is made ours to our Justification, seemeth to be but the Offspring of the error of the undue sense of Christ's personating or representing us in his Righteousness: And the parcelling out the uses and effects, (that one is imputed to us instead of habitual Righteousness, another instead of actual, and the third pardoneth our Sins,) is from the same false supposition. (It's well that they suppose not that his Divine Righteousness is imputed to our deification.) But the case is plain, 1. That Christ's whole Humane Righteousness, habitual, active and passive, are meritorious for us, (not as being the very same things, all which we should have done, and suffered, and had; as if we had, did and suffered them ourselves by one that had, did and suffered them in our persons (in a Law-sense.) But as being the parts of that one Righteousness of Christ as Mediator, which consisteth in the full performance of the Law of Redemption, or of his own Covenant with his Father, undertaken for our sakes. Having been, and done, and suffered what he promised, he is Righteous. 2. And his Divine Righteousness, by virtue of the hypostatical Union, dignifieth his Humane to its meritorious value. 58. By his Satisfaction or Sacrifice, and this Merit, Christ did procure all that Pardon, Life and Benefits, whatsoever that consequently are given us of God: And so is the true meritorious cause of all. 59 That Sacrifice and Obedience, Righteousness and Merit, which was directly given to God, for man, by performance of Christ's undertaking, may yet be consequently said to be given unto man; In that it was given to God for man, and in that the Benefits merited are given to man; and so relatively as to those Benefits, the Sacrifice, Obedience, Righteousness and Merit, may be said to be given us. As the Ransom is given to the Captive which is given for him, because the liberty purchased by it is given him. (Of which more after.) SECT. iv Of the New Covenant, or the Law of Grace in the Second Edition. 60. The New Covenant is Christ's Law of Grace; his Instrument by which he giveth Title or Right to the Benefits promised, and conveyeth Right to the Fruits of his Sacrifice and Merits; And his Law by which he governeth the Church as a Saviour, in order to Recovery and Salvation. It hath greatly scandalised the Papists against us to find some old Protestant's deny Christ to be a Lawgiver, and in his Gospel to have a Law. The case is sad, that any in opposition to others should run into such an Antinomian extreme: They are unlike to be good Preachers of Christ's Law, who maintain that he hath no Law: And there can be no sin against it, nor expectation of being judged by it, if he have none. And he is no King and Ruler, if he have no Law. But yet let the Papists forbear i●●●ing, and remember that the true meaning of most of them is no more, than to assert what Suarez himself propugneth, viz. that besides Revelations, and the Duties thence naturally resulting, (by natural Law) and the Sacraments, Christ hath no other Laws. And both Suarez and they are here to blame (for the Papists that are by some accused for calling the Gospel a Law, do also give too little honour to Christ's Laws); It beseemeth none of them to use such ill Language, whatever they mean. If they should say that the King is no Lawgiver, and hath no Laws, they would wrong him by that Language (as denying his Royalty) how well soever they should interpret it. For the Legislative-Power is the principal essential part of Sovereignty. But if any really deny Christ to be a Lawgiver, and when he hath done reproacheth the Papists and Arminians for contradicting it; it is but as the blind reproaching the purblind for seeing; when they that give most to the Laws of Christ (among these Contenders) do give too little. The Baptismal-Covenant, is a Law as imposed, and as imposing the Covenant-Duties, and as determining the conditions of Life and Death, according to which men must live and shall be judged: yea it is the most famous Law, which Conscience hath to do with; Though it be a Covenant as consented to, in the contract. That Sinners have terms of Life and Death, and offered Remedies against all their Gild and greatest Punishments, and Means prescribed, and Duties commanded in order to their recovery, when the Law of Innocency condemneth them; especially the obeying of the Ministry, and Word, and Holy Spirit of Christ, prescribing them his way of cure as their Physician, all this is a Law of Grace; even the Law of Liberty, and the Law of the Spirit of Life, which freeth us from the Law of Sin and Death. Christ's Law consisteth of two parts: (as is said) 1. The Law of Nature (called by many moral) as commanding the love of God and its attendent Duties, not now to an innocent man, but to a condemned-recovering Sinner, as the health to which his Physician doth restore him. 2. And the remedying Law which is more proper to the Redeemer called the Law of Faith; which appointeth us the terms and means of our recovery: which is, 1. Supernatural as to the Revelation of the matter and reasons of it, and the foundation of all in Christ's Work of Redemption and his Legislation: 2. But as to the obligation or efficiency of man's duty, it is both natural and supernatural at once: that is, when it is presupposed that Christ hath done, suffered and offered to our acceptance, all that is so asserted of him in the Gospel; 1. Nature obligeth us to believe it (upon evidence of credibility) and to accept it, and thankfully improve it: 2. Christ as the Father's Administrator, and our King, hath positively commanded us the same. Were it not for wearying the Reader, and myself, I would here answer all that Suarez saith, (de Legib. li. 10. c. 2.) to prove that no praeceptum positivum morale is added by Christ: And I would easily prove that as some parts of Nature are unalterable, and accordingly natural Duty, so some things of Nature are mutable, and so is that natural Duty which is founded on them: And Christ hath by supernatural Performances and Revelations made such changes in the nature of things, as inferreth new natural Obligations. Were the Devils redeemed, and Grace now offered them, nature would make it their duty to accept it. In sum, it is a sufficient confutation of all Suarez's Reasons, to say, that they run upon this false supposition, that Nature and supernatural Precept may not both oblige man to the same duty, and that God cannot lay two Obligations on us to the same action. For all that he laboureth, is to prove that supposing the Revelation, Nature bindeth us to believe all the Christian Articles, to preach, and hear, and pray to God by Christ, to love our Redeemer, and be thankful, etc. and that the Gospel is thus fitted to lapsed Nature, as the first Law was to innocent Nature. All which I like very well, and take it for a great honour to Christ and the Gospel, that it is so suited to the natural necessity and state of fallen and miserable man, and may be called the Law of sinful Nature. But Suarez himself had before proved that Moses's Decalogue was both a Declaration of what Nature bound men to, and yet also the matter of a new Precept of God: And why could he not see the same of the Gospel, it being so evident, that it containeth Christ's Commands? And the very sum of our Ministry is, 1. To disciple and baptise all Nations, etc. 2. And then to teach them to observe all that Christ commanded. And indeed Suarez confesseth (p. 816.) That Christ did by new commanding add new Obligations to the duties of Nature, though he deny that Christ added any positive Precept as to the moral matter commanded by the Law of Nature—. And by this instance you may see how near some men agree, that seem much to differ. But as to them that insist on it, that the Gospel and New Covenant are no Laws, and that we have none from Christ but the Decalogue and Old Testament; were I to write against them to purpose, I would plentifully prove them Subverters of Christianity itself, and give full evidence against them, to any that believe the holy Scriptures. And contrarily I would prove, that there are no Divine Laws but what are truly the Laws of our Redeemer, now in the world, and that all Infidels are ruled, and shall be judged by a Law of Grace, though not of the last evangelical Edition; and that he that feareth not breaking the Laws of Christ, shall hear at last; Those mine Enemies that would not that I should Reign over them, bring them hither and slay them before me, Luk. 19 27. a That Christ is truly a King, and so a Lawgiver, and hath proper Laws, and not only Doctrine; (and how great an injury some Protestants have do●e the Church by denying (besides the Antinomians) See Suar●z, de Leg. l. 10. c. 1. whose proofs of the thing are unanswerable; And I have long ago proved it in other Writings. But Suar●z asserting that Christ's Law is only Moral and Ceremonial, (in the Sacraments) and not judicial, doth plainly confess that God never instituted the Papacy and their Discipline: Yea he saith, (c. 2. p. 812. [Christus in sua l●ge nihil de praec●ptis judicialibus statuit: etiam si in Ecclesia Christi ut talis est, aliquae leges judiciales si●t necessariae ad politicum regimen Ecclesiasticum, quod suo modo spirituale est; nihilominus noluit Christus dominus per se ipsum illas leges far, sed id Vicariis suis commisit, potestatem ad illas ferendas eis tribuendo: Et ideo illae Leges non sub Lege Divina, sed sub canonica computantur: Pr●prie igitur loquendo de Lege divina nova, in illa non inveniuntur praecepta judicialia.] So that Christ never made the Papacy, nor any of its Laws. But indeed he appointed Baptism as our Church-entrance, and more than a Ceremony: and the state of C●u●ch Officers, and their work and discipline, Mat. 18. And what his Spirit did in the Apostles, he did in another sort than he doth by any ordinary Ministers that have but the Spirits ordinary help. b Aquinas and many other Papists ●oyn with some late Sectaries, and say that it's the Spirits Operation on the Heart, that is the Lex nova, and that it is not written: But he could not deny but that yet the Gospel is Lex nova Scripta: But falsely the nomine taketh this but for the secondary sense of the l●x: which is the first, and that the obliging Law▪ and the other the effects of it as various as persons are that have it, and not the Rule of Obligation: And elsewhere I have showed also the Lege natura. As to the question, Whether Christ's Law be exterior insignis (vocal and written) or in the Heart by the Spirit, Suarez truly saith, That lex imperans is in signis (in Scripture words) but lex impellens is the Spirit; which though here the chief, yet is not properly but metaphorically called a Law, (pag. 819. & li. 1. in principio.) Though he add, that it was eight years before the Gospel was written by Matthew, and longer by the rest, and that all that time and since it is written in the Heart. But memory may retain a vocal Law, before the Heart (by love and subjection) do receive it. 61. In this Law or Covenant is made a free universal Deed of Gift of Christ first, and of Pardon, Spirit and Glory in and by him to all Mankind without exception, who will believingly accept it in its true nature, as it is offered therein; Or [If they will so accept it as Believers.] 62. This Covenant is to be preached by Christ's Ministers, and men invited to believe and consent: And all that so do, are to profess that consent by a solemn Covenant in their Baptism, and so to give up themselves devotedly to God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; renouncing the Devil, Flesh and World. 63. For Faith in God the Father is as essential a part of that Faith which we must profess in Baptism, and is called commonly justifying, as Faith in Christ is: And so is Faith in the Holy Ghost in its place. For it is not possible to believe in Christ, without believing first in God, to whom he is the way, and with whom he is our Mediator; nor to believe in him fully as Christ, unless we believe in him, as giving us the sanctifying Spirit. 64. This Covenant is nevertheless free (as to the donation of the Gifts,) for being conditional: For the Condition is not the purchase, procurement by efficient causality, or any way a proper cause of the Gift as given, but only a dispositive cause of our reception of it, and of the Gift as received: It is a removens prohibens. The Condition as imposed, and as the mode of the Promise, is only a suspension of the Donation and Right till it be performed: The Condition as performed is a removing the suspension: And so it is a receiving cause; which is but dispositio materiae receptivae (of which more in due place.) 65. And the Gift is nevertheless free, because the Condition is but such as is morally-antecedently - necessary to the reception of free Gifts. For though physical Donation oft make its own way, and pre-require not such Conditions as these at least; yet moral Donation by Deed of Gift, supposeth that the person will receive it, and despising, or unthankful refusal, or turning it against the Donor, nullifieth such a Donation in the Civil Laws of men. 66. And the Benefits are nevertheless conditionally given, though the Spirit of Christ cause us to perform the Condition: For they are called conditional from the mode or form of the Covenant, which giveth men Right to Christ and Life expressly on condition of believing. 67. Though this believing be sometimes described as the assent of the Intellect, and sometimes as the consent of the Will, and sometime as a practical affiance, trusting Christ as a Saviour, to save us, with Soul and Body, to the renouncing and letting go all other trust; Yet when ever Justification and Life is promised to Faith, all these three are the essential parts of it. 68 The clearest discovery of the true nature of God's Covenant with man, and of that Faith by which we partake of the benefits of it, is in Baptism itself, which hath ever been the entrance of men into God's Covenant as consented to, and mutual, and so into a visible state of Christianity and membership of Christ and the Catholic Church. And therefore it is happy for us, that Christ so expressly delivered the form of the Baptismal Covenant, and the Universal Church hath so safely in her practice kept it. 69. This Baptismal Covenant which is conditional, and the consent to which doth make us Christians, must be still distinguished from the Covenant between the Father and Christ, or his Law of Redemption: And God promiseth not to us, all that he promiseth to Christ for us; nor giveth all to us which he giveth to him. 70. And it must be distinguished from God's mere Predictions concerning his Elect (that he will call them, renew them, and save them,) or if those Predictions run in the form of a Promise, either as they are promises to Christ concerning the Elect, or as promises to the Church in general, how God will perfect it, still they give no man a Law-Title or Right to any of the Benefits, till he is a Believer: They justify and pardon no man: And so they must not be confounded with the Baptismal Covenant, which is Gods stated Instrument of Justification and of Government, and the Law by which he will Judge us at the last. 71. This Baptismal Covenant is the character and test, by which we must judge who are Christians, and members of the Catholic Church of Christ, and not by their Subjection to a pretended vicarious universal Monarch. And this is the character (with consent to his relation there) by which every man's fitness for membership in a particular Church must be judged of; And not by other Covenants (besides that consent) and proofs of Conversion, not here included. And this containeth the true Characters, by which every man may know himself whether he be a true Christian, and must judge of his sincerity and right to Christ, Justification and Salvation, as he is or is not a sincere consenter to it truly understood in the essential parts. SECT. V Of the Gift and Works of the Holy Ghost. 72. There are three sorts of Operations of the Holy Ghost, one common, and two proper to them that shall have, or already have Justification. 1. The first is preparing common Grace, which maketh men fit for special Grace, which yet they may have that perish. 2. The second is that Grace of the Spirit by which we perform the The Thomists make the act of contrition and chari●y to be the ultimate disposition to Justification, which is with them the habit: And yet they say, that it floweth from that habit; And if the distinction of Alva●ez Disp. de Aux 59 p. 264. & possim be not contradiction, I understand it not, [Eadem contritio quae est ultima dispositio ad gratiam, & in genere causae materialis antecedit illam, in genere tamen causae formalis & efficientis, est effectus ejusdem gratiae.] Though that which is the effect of one act of God's Love, be the Object of another act. first Act of special Faith and Repentance, called commonly by Divine● Vocation, which goeth before any special habit; but not before any holy seed; Because the very influx of the Spirit on the Soul is as a seed, which exciteth the first act before a habit, though not ordinarily before some preparations. This Faith is commanded us as our duty first, and made necessary to us, as the Condition of the Covenant; And when we know it to be thus required of us, and hear in the Gospel the Reasons which should perfwade us, than the Holy Spirit moveth us by his Influx to believe and consent, where God and man are conjunct Agents; but man subordinate to God. 3. The third sort is the Spirits Operation of the habit of Divine Love, and all other Graces in the Soul, which is called his Indwelling, and Sanctification; This is that Gift of the Spirit (besides Miracles of old) which is promised to Believers: To this, Faith is the Condition: To this, upon believing it is that we have Right given us by God's Covenant; and thus it is that by Baptism our right to the Spirit, as an indwelling Sanctifier and Comforter is given us. 73. This third Gift or Work of the Spirit eminently so called, is in the same instant of time given us as the second, (but not of nature) or at least immediately thereupon when we believe: But yet they are not to be confounded on many accounts. 74. But yet though some degree of the Spirit be presently given to every Believer, it is usually but a spark at first; And there are further means and conditions appointed us for the increase, and actual helps from day to day: And he that will not wait on the Spirit in the use of those means, doth forfeit his help according to his neglect. 75. Hence it is that most, if not all Christians have lower measures of the Spirit than otherwise they might have, and that judicially as a punishment for Sin; However God is free herein, and if he please may give more even to them that forfeit it. 76. This Covenant of Grace, being a conditional pardon of all the world, The extent of the New Covenant. is universal in the tenor or sense of it; It is of all Mankind without exception that Christ saith, If thou confess with thy mouth, and believe i● thy heart, thou shalt be saved: No person antecedently is excluded in the world. 77. And as to the promulgation of it, Christ hath commissioned his Ministers to preach this Gospel to all the world, and to every Creature: So Matth. 28. 19, 20. Mark 16. 15, 16. that to the utmost of their power they are to offer and publish it to the whole world. And Princes and people are all bound in their several places to assist them, and to help to propagate the Gospel throughout all the Earth: So that the restraint of it is not by the tenor of the Law. 78. Those Nations which despise and refuse the Gospel are justly deprived of it, penally for that rejection. 79. Those Nations that live inhumanely and wickedly against the means and mercies which they have, do forfeit their hopes of more. 80. As God in all Ages hath visited the sins of the Fathers on the Children, as the instances of Cain, Cham, Nimrod, and others commonly show, and hath proclaimed it as his Name, Exod. 34. and put it in Tables of Stone in the Second Commandment (and not only of Adam's sin); so may he justly deal by the Posterity of the Despisers of the Gospel, in denying it them. Though he may freely give it the unworthy when he pleaseth. 81. All the rest of the world who have not the Gospel, and the Covenant The state of those that have not the Gospel. of Grace in the last Edition, are left by Christ in as good a state ●at least, if not better) than he found them at his Incarnation. He took ●way no mercy from them, which they had. 82. Therefore, as it is before proved that before Christ's time, none Of Zuingliu's Opinion of the Salvation of Heathens by name, Hercules, Theseus, Socrates, Aristides, Antigonus, Numa, Camilli, Caton●s, Scipiones, etc. Vid. Monta●ut. exercit. Eccles. 1. Sect. 4. & Twissum contra Corvinum, pag. 371. col. 1. Omnium temporum una est fides; Deum esse, eundemque & Justum, & Bonum, & Remuneratorem sperantium in se; omnium plene meritis respondentem, ante legem, sub lege, sub gratia: Nemini rectum sapienti venit istud in dubium: sine ista nemo unquam ingressus est ad salutem. Rob. Sarisberiens. Polycrat. de nugis curial. Pol. Peucer Hist. Carcerum against the Lutherans Concord saith, p. 715. Etsi nec ad Ethnicos ante natum Christum nec ad Judaeos post natum Christum misit singulares ministros: sonuit tamen v●x doctrinae de Deo patefactae utroque tempore: Hoc modo & adhuc sonat, ut exaudiatur nunc etiam a Turcis & Judaeis: Nec fuerunt unquam exclusi prorsus a gratia & miserecordia Dei ante Christum Ethnici: E quibus innumeri ex omnibus gentibus fuerunt ad Deum conversi: Post Christum natum Judaei: Panciores ex his tamen. of the world were left desperate, under the mere violated Covenant of innocency, but that the tenor of that New Covenant, as made to Adam ●nd Noah, extended to them all, so are they still under all the Grace of ●hat Edition of the Covenant, further than they are penally deprived of ●● for violating it. The Law of Grace in that first Edition is still in force, ●nd the Law by which the world shall be governed and judged; They ●re all Possessors of Mercy which leadeth to Repentance, and bound to use ●he means afforded them in order to Repentance and Salvation, and it is ●heir sin that they do not: For which it is ultimately that they are con●emned. Though wickedness harden men against the Law of Grace, ●hat changeth not God's Law to them, but brings them under the penalty. Not that any are bound to expect a Christ to come, but to perform the ●ommon Conditions of that Covenant before described. 83. Therefore no man is now condemned for Original Sin alone; Though it is pardoned to no man, till he perform the condition of it, in ●he pardoning Covenant. For God having brought all men under terms ●f mercy tending to recovery, they shall be judged as they use that recovering mercy, according to that Law of Grace which they are under, ●hether of the first or last Edition. 84. The exception which some make of Infants is vain: Because as ●ar as God hath revealed his mind about them to us, he esteemeth them ●nd useth them as parts of their Parents and Owners, and if he condemn ●hem, it is not for Adam's sin only, but also ultimately for their Parent's ●ejection of recovering Grace, and not devoting them to God in his Covenant. And though God will not condemn the Children for the Parents ●in; that is, when they themselves repent and turn to God. But the Scripture is most plain and frequent in expressing our guilt of our nearer Pa●ents sins against Grace, which is a part of our Original Sin: and aught ●ot to be so slighted as usually it is. However, 1. It is an incredible opinion, That God should rule and judge all the rest of the world by a ●aw of Grace, and leave only poor Infants without any mercy, under the ●eer Law of Innocency, and judge them only by another Law, than he ●oth all the world. 2. And it is the trick of a Deceiver to argue ab ●gnotiore, and carry his Cause into the dark. And Infant's Case is left to ●s in Scripture much darker than that of the adult. 85. Therefore it seemeth plain to me, that though Christ's Church be ●ow incomparably happier than the Jewish Church was, (in magnitude, ●ight, and grace, and excellency of privileges,) far above all the rest of the world, and so excelleth the state of Heathens far more than the Jewish Church excelled them; Yet the rest of the world stand now in much like relation to God and the Christian Church, as before Christ's incarnation they did to God and the Jewish Church, who were his pecu●iar (but not his only) people; the foedus peculiaritatis was theirs only; but not foedus gratiae: So are we much more, as a holy Nation, a royal Priesthood to stand nearer God than the rest of the world: But whether the Jews were all God's people on Earth I have before discussed, and proved ●he negative. 85. But certainly in no Nation under Heaven, there is no coming ●● God, or pleasing him without Faith; nor seeing him without Holiness▪ nor any Name given under Heaven by which men can be saved, but by Christ; Heb. 11. 5, 6. Heb. 12. 14. Act. 4. 1●. Rom. 8. 9 Joh. 14. 6. 1 Joh. 5. 10, 11, 12. nor any Sanctification but by Christ's Spirit; nor any coming to the Fath●● but by the Son; nor any Pardon and Life but by a Covenant of Grace, ●●● by the Merits and Purchase of Christ. But how far he giveth this S●●● and Grace where he is not known himself as Incarnate, is all the difficulty: (As to Infants and Adult). 86. Though God hath said less to us of their case that hear not the Gospel, than of Believers and Unbelievers (privative, * I desire the Reader to peruse Ga●aker's Preface to Antoninus of the Stoics. that hear it) because it less concerneth us to know it, and to be busy in judging the Servants of another, yet in this point are men's confide●●● and opposition most vehement. On one side some say, [Before I would believe that God hath shut all the millions of the Earth, fro● Adam's days till now, save a few Jews and Christians, out of all possibility of Salvation, so that they are left as the Devils without he●● hope or means, and perish Infants and all merely because God wi●● have it so, and that in everlasting fire; I will easilier believe that the Gospel is not true, as having less of Nature's light to condemn me, th●● for receiving such thoughts of the infinitely Good and merciful God.] On the other side, if I do but open the undeniable Mercies of God to all, which all the world hath experience that they possess, and that Covenant of Grace which the whole current of Scripture proveth the● under, some men that are so very wise in their own eyes, as hardly to suspect any thing to be an error which they have long held, and that build much of their Religion and Theological Reputation, in adhering to the Opinions of those whose communion they think most honoureth them, and out of a blind zeal for that which they account Orthodox, will presently without impartial consideration, or friendly debate, magisterially pass their judgement among those that reverence them, and backbite those that they cannot confute, and say, [Such a man holdeth dangerous Opinions, that Infidels may be saved,] and it's like falsely represent my words. When yet the same men perhaps will maintain that all the Elect are justified before they believe, and so that Infidels, even privative, are justified, so they be but elect: And this seemeth to them no injury to Christ: so powerful is prejudice, and pride, a●● partiality. 87. The question whether any besides Christians are put into a possibility of Salvation is easily and certainly resolved in the affirmative from Subit me certe subinde (ita ista dum lego, affectum me sentio, & ingenue agnosco) non stupor duntaxat, sed horror etiam, cum arcani Divini admiratione v●hementissima conjunctus, serio apud me reputantem, quam longe in multis ab ●o absim quod de se vir iste, veri ad salutem perduc●ntis tramitis ignarus, de se profitetur, nec quin vere & ingenuem, ambigi posse videtur: ut proinde & Marco & Epict●●●● tin● assurgens Hymnum illius vel maxi●o majorem & prastantiorem decantare jugiter debeam— Gataker Proloq. ● Antoninum. Read the multitude of Testimonies of the Virtues of Antonine, collected by Gataker post opera. Fuit Marcus Antoninus, vir omnium ●irtutum & sanctitate vitae praecipuus, coelestisque ingenii. S● baste. Munster. Cosmogr. li ●. Bonitatis ac sapientiae numine ab omnibus dum viveret in ea aestimatione bonoreque habitus, qua nemo unquam vel a●te ips●●, ●● quod n●vi●us post i●sum fuerit.— Nunquam ita conspirarunt scriptores, in tribuendo cuiquam quaecunque p●terant bo●itatis, inte●●●● 'tis, innocentiae, cujusvis den●que tituli apud ●thnicos speciosiss●mi testimonia: Celebrant illum non tantum ut principe● opti●●●, ●● simpliciter & absolute ut ●ominem optimum & philosophum optimum omnium qui u●quam extiterunt. Estque hoc ips●us peculia●e e●co●●● quod ita pr●dicetur, citra exceptionem ●llam praedicatur. Mer. Causabon. Praef. in Verse. Angl. ut citat. per Gataker. what is said: But the question whether any or how many are actually saved, doth depend on the resolution of the question, whether any of them are truly sanctified, that is, [do truly love God and Holiness, ab●●● the Pleasures, Profits and Honours of this world.] For nothing is mo●● certain in God's Word, than that all that do so shall be saved: For a ●●● to live in Hell with the predominant love of God, is as great a contradiction, as for a man to be sick in health, and both in the greater degree. God cannot damn or forsake a Soul that loveth him and is holy, (in sensu composito.) 88 And whether any or how many without the Christian Church, do truly love God, is a question which dependeth as to probability upon the foresaid grounds, but as to the certainty of the fact, upon that heart-knowledge of other men) which belongeth to God only. 1. How can I that live in an obscure corner of England, know whether any love God in Siam, China, Japon, or Persia, or at the Antipodes. 2. If I were with them all, and acquainted with every person in the world, I could have but a probability of the affirmative of any one, because I am not acquainted with the heart. But when the Scripture assureth us that it is the Law of Grace, and not only that of Innocency, which all the world is governed by, and shall be judged by, and so that their Sanctification and Salvation is possible; there is so great a probability, that this Covenant, and the mercies of it, are not in vain to all of them that are under it alone, and that the thing that is possible to so many millions, doth come to pass with some, that an impartial considerer of God's Nature and Government, may easily see what to think most probable. 89. Those therefore that teach the Church, that it is a certain truth, that no one in the world (Infant or Aged) is saved from Hell fire, but Christians only, and that this is not only certain to such great understandings as their own, but must be so to all true Christians, do but discover that they over-value their own understandings, and that siding hath contracted their thoughts and charity into a sinful narrowness, and that the Opinions of men, counted Orthodox, prevaileth more with them than the evidence of truth, and I think that they are to be numbered with those that by overdoing, do dangerously undermine the Christian Faith. 90. The Texts urged by them for this pretended certainty, are all abused some of these ways: 1. Either some one difficult Text is expounded contrary to the current of the whole Scripture. 2. Or the words that are spoken only of privative Unbelievers who hear the Gospel, are expounded of negative not-Believers who never heard it, nor could do. 3. Or that which is said against Unbelievers in general, is ex●pounded as against the non-Believers of the Articles of the Christian Faith which are superadded since Christ's Incarnation in special; As if all the Apostles before they believed Christ's Sacrifice, Resurrection, Ascension, etc. were Infidels in a state of damnation. 4. Or else they suppose (without proof) that the Spirit and Grace of Christ can extend itself to none that know him not as incarnate, crucified, risen, glorified, etc. (and so that the Apostles had no Grace till the Resurrection). Some such fallacy is in all these particular textual arguments, easily discernible. 91. Were it not evident in Scripture, that the world is under the Law of Grace as the norma officii & judicii, (as it is) yet could no man truly say that he is certain, that no one of them should be saved. For if they were all under the Law of Innocency, yet there is this great difference between it, and the Law of Grace, that whereas the sentence of the latter is peremptory, excluding all hope of Dispensation and Pardon, to the final Rejecters of its Grace, for ever; yet the former was a Law whose penalty was remissible, and it did not pass a peremptory sentence of despair. Though it gave no hope of Pardon, yet it took not away the hopes of it: that is, It had a threatening-dispensable: (as Dr. Twisse and many other say, Without a Saviour had God so pleased; And as others say, Through the virtue of Christ's Sacrifice even to them that know him not.) For the commination of that Law (which threatened not the death of a Surety, but of the Sinner,) was actually dispensed with in our Justification. And what God can do, they ought not to say, that they are certain that he never will do it, unless he had first said so himself. 92. If in all Humane Judgements Nature dictateth that in doubtful cases, the Judge should rather propend to the better interpretation, and favourable Judgement; why should it not be so in our judgement of God and man? The Nature of God is infinitely good; He hath proclaimed his Name, as aforesaid, even in the terrors of Mount Sinai, to be a God gracious, merciful, long-suffering, pardoning, etc. He hath protested or sworn, that he hath no pleasure in the death of the wicked, ●●●● rather that he repent and live: and so that he first seeketh the Glory of his Mercy; and exerciseth justice in man's destruction, but as his second work: He that saved no man (but Christ himself glorified) upon the terms of Innocency, but all by Grace, and never else took one Soul to Heaven, who had not first deserved Hell, doth surely first seek the Glory of his Grace. And we know that 1. All Judea was a small Country, like England; An inconsiderable point or spot of the Earth, as to its magnitude. 2. That most of the world's duration in likelihood was over (as Bishop Usher reckons, 4000 years) before Christ's death, and the second Edition of the Covenant. So that if none but Jews were ☞ saved all that while, the number was comparatively next to none. 3. That no man that I know of hath presumed to say, that before Moses time, none but the Seed of Abraham were saved. 4. That the Covenant made by Moses at Mount Sinai, and the enclosure of the Jews, was no casting off the rest of the world into a worse condition than they were before. 5. That none yet have presumed to say, they are certain that all the Seed of Keturah, of Ishmael, of Esau were damned: much less that Sem and all his Subjects, Japhet and all his Subjects (and Posterity till then) or that Job and his Friends, and Melchizedec and all his Subjects, were certainly damned. 6. That the Jews themselves were for the most part so wicked, that seeing few even of that little Country were saved, if you are sure that no others were saved, they were but a few in the world indeed. 7. That the Apostles (as is said) were in a state of Salvation, when under Christ's own teaching, they believed not many great Articles, now essential to the Christian Faith. So that all set together, will tell us, that the conclusion of the certain damnation of all without the Jewish and the Christian Church, seemeth not very desirable either as to the Glory of the good and gracious God, nor as to the good of Mankind; And therefore we should not propend that way in a case of doubtful arguing. And I desire the Reader impartially to consider, though Abraham knew not till God told him how bad Sodom was, yet when he asketh of God to spare it if there were but fifty Righteous in it▪ whether he do not imply that he thought most other Cities of that bigness had at least fifty righteous, if not more? For when God told him▪ that he would destroy it for the cry of their sins, he must needs judge it worse than ordinary? And was Abraham more ignorant than we? the Father of the Faithful? a Prophet that saw Christ's day and rejoiced? 93. It is a certain truth, that as God the Creator, so Christ the Redeemer doth extend his mercy farther than he himself is known: And as the S●● sendeth some light to the world before it riseth and is seen itself, so doth Christ send many excellent Gifts of his Grace, to those that know him not as Incarnate. And when all the world is delivered into his hand, we have reason to believe that the mercies which Philosophers, and all others in the world had, were communicated by him, (as the second Person, or Wisdom and Word undertaking man's Redemption, first, and as the Word Incarnate after.) 94. Those ancient Fathers of the Church, who lived near the Apostles times, (as Clem, Alex. &c.) who believed that some without the Church were saved, were never condemned for it as Heretics, no not by the busy condemning Ages. SECT. VI Of Universal Redemption. 95. By what hath been said, it appeareth how far Christ may be said to have died for all. Certainly (de re) all that Christ giveth to all, which is the fruits of his Death, he procured for all by his death: whatever we say of conditional Intentions, he certainly intended to give all that he giveth. But all these following particulars are given by Christ, either to all, or to more than the Elect. 1. The Humane Nature, common to all, is advanced and brought nigh to God, in Christ's Incarnation. 2. Christ's Sacrifice for Sin, and his perfect Holiness, are so far satisfactory and meritorious for all men, as that they render Christ a meet Object for that Faith in him which is commanded men, and no man shall be damned for want of the satisfactoriness of Christ's Sacrifice, or for want of a Saviour to die for him, and fulfil all Righteousness, but only for the abusing or refusing of his Mercy. 3. Christ's conquest of the Devil and the World, hath made man's conquests of them the more easy or possible. And his Victory over Death and his Resurrection, hath procured a Resurrection to all the World. 4. All men are his Subjects by Obligation, as he is the Redeemer, and so are under his healing, saving kind of Government. 5. A clearer revelation of Life and Immortality, is made by him, even to those that perish. And they have far greater helps than else they would have had, to set their hearts on a better World. 6. Especially a Law of Grace is made by Christ for all the world; (In the last Edition to all Joh. 1. 11, 12. & 3. 16, 17, 18, 19 1 Joh. 5. 10, 11. that hear the Gospel, and in the first to all the rest.) By the Promise of which, as by an Act of Oblivion, or Instrument of Donation, God hath Enacted and Given a full Pardon of all Sin to all Mankind, with Reconciliation, Adoption, and Right to Christ and Heaven, on condition of their acceptance of it, as offered them. So that men are pardoned and justified by that Instrument or Gift, if they will believe, and will not unthankfully reject their Mercies. 7. Apostles and ordinary Ministers were appointed to preach this Gospel to all the World, and make the Offer of Christ and Life to all men without exception. 8. The Matth. 28. 19 Mark 16. 16. execution of the violated Law of Innocency is forborn to all men, in the greatest part; Judgements kept off; and they kept out of Hell, while they have time and means to prepare for their Salvation. 9 Many and great Mercies which signify God's goodness, and lead towards Repentance, are given to all the world; even mercies forfeited by sins against the Law of Innocency, and given by the Grace of our Redeemer. 10. It is made all men's duty, to believe (the Revelation made to the●) to repent, to accept more mercy, and to seek their own Salvation. And such duty is not the smallest mercy. 11. He hath recorded his Word and Grace in the holy Scriptures, which all are allowed to use for their good. He hath filled his Doctrine or Gospel with such powerful convincing Reasons and Persuasions, which have a tendency to convince men, and convert them. 12. He secondeth his Word by many such Providences (in his Works, his Mercies, his Afflictions,) as greatly Act. 14. 17. & 17. 27, 28. Rom. 1. 19, 21. Rom. 2. tend to win men's Souls. 13. He hath left his excellent Example to the world, which greatly tendeth to men's Conviction and Salvation. 14. He hath appointed several Church-Ordinances, which are mercies to more than the Elect; as is the visible communion also which they have with the Upright, and their examples, prayers, etc. 15. To all these he addeth an obligation on all Christians, to do their best to convert and save all others. 16. And the Office of Magistrates under Christ, is appointed for these saving uses, to promote the Salvation of the people. 17. Death itself is now turned into a medicinal means, by the prospect of it to convert and save men. 18. Usually Gods patitience alloweth men time of Repentance, and taketh them not at the first denial, that they may consider and correct their former error. 19 Remedies are offered men fetched from Satan and Sin itself. The Tempter (by the malice of his temptations) oft detecteth his ow● fraud and men's danger. A natural enmity against Devils, and all that is known to be of them, is put into all Mankind: And Sin hath a sting to the Flesh itself, and is mad● such a misery to Sinners even in this life, as may much tend to alienate and deter them from it. And the world itself is made such a palpable vanity, and smart vexation, as tendeth to drive men to look out for a better, and not to love it above God. 20. Lastly, To all these means, there are certain internal motions, and strive of the Spirit of Christ, which he commonly vouchsafeth m●● in some degree, and which irritate Conscience to do its office; and which if men will but so far yield to as they can, have a tendency to th●●● recovery. All these twenty sorts of means and mercies Christ giveth to all, or to more than the Elect. 96. It being certain de re that Christ so far died for all, as to procure them all such Benefits as he giveth them, the question remaining i● de nomine, whether it be a fit phrase to say that Christ died for all? And this is put out of question by the Scripture, which frequently useth it, as is proved by the forecited Texts. We may well speak as God ordinarily there speaketh. 97. There are certain fruits of Christ's death which are proper to the Elect, (or those that are in a state of Salvation). As 1. Grace eventually Rom. 8. 30, 31. Act. 26. 18. 1 Joh. 5. 11, 12. Joh. 15. 1, 2, 6. Eph. 1. 22, 23. Col. 1. 19 Eph. 3. 17. Act. 5. 31. & 13. 38, 39 Col. 1. 13, 14. Rom. 5. 1, etc. Tit. 3. 5, 6, 7. 1 Pet. 1. 3, 4. Psal. 50. 15. & 46. 1. Rev. 22. 9 Heb. 1. 14. effectual working them to true Faith, Repentance and Conversion. 2. Union with Christ the Head, as his true living members. 3. The actual forgiveness of sin, as to the grand spiritual and the eternal punishment, Rom. 4. 1. 7. & 8. 1. 33, 34. 4. Our actual Reconciliation with God, so as to be beloved as his peculiar people. 5. Our Adoption and Right to the heavenly Inheritance, Psal. 4. 6. & 8. 16, 17, 18. 6. The Spirit of Christ to dwell in us, and sanctify us, by a habit of Divine Love, Rom. 8. 9, 13. Gal. 4. 6. Col. 3. 10. 1 Pet. 1. 16. & 2 Pet. 1. 4. 1 Joh. 4. 15. Joh. 3. 5, 6. 1 Cor. 6. 19 Gal. 5. 17, 18, 22. 2 Cor. 6. 1. 7. Employment in sincere holy acceptable Service, where they and their duties are pleasing to God, Heb. 11. 5, 6. 1 Pet. 2. 5, 9 8. Access in prayer, with a promise of being heard in all that's good for us (in God's measure, time and way,) through Christ, Joh. 14. 13, 14. Heb. 10. 19, 20, 22. 9 Well-grounded hopes of Salvation and peace of Conscience thereupon, Rom. 5. 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. 10. Spiritual communion with the Church-mystical in Heaven and Earth, Heb. 12. 22, 23, 24. Eph. 2. 19, 20, 21, 22. 1 Cor. 3. 22. 11. A special interest in Christ's Intercession with the Father▪ Rom. 8. 32, 33, etc. 12. Resurrection unto Life, and Justification in Judgement; Glorification of the Soul at Death, and of the Body at the Resurrection, Phil. 3. 20, 21. ● Cor. 5. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. Rom. 8. 17, 18, 30, 32, 35, 36, 37, etc. All these Benefits Christ hath made a conditional Deed of Gift to all the world: But only the Elect accept them, and possess them. From whence we certainly infer, that Christ never absolutely intended or decreed that his death should eventually put all men in possession of these Benefits: And yet that he did intent and de●ree that by his death all men should have a conditional Gift of them. (As Dr. Twisse doth frequently assert.) 98. Christ therefore died for all, but not for all equally, or with the same intent, design or purpose: So that the case of difference in the matter of Redemption, is resolved into that of Predestination; and is but Gods different Decrees about the effects of Redemption. 99 The particle [For] when we question whether Christ died [For▪] All is ambiguous: 1. It may mean [In the strict representation of the ●ersons of all as several, so that they may be said to have died or satisfied ●n and by him, as civilly in their own persons, though not naturally]. And thus Christ died not for all, or for any man: which yet is in some men's conceits, who thence say that Christ died not for all, because he did not so personate all. 2. It may signify [to die by the procurement of all ●ens sins, as the assumed promeritorious cause.] And thus Par●●● himself in his Irenicon saith, That the sins of all men lay on Christ; and so he died for all, that is, for all men's sins as the cause of his death: And you may tell any wi●ked man, Thy sins killed Christ (whatever the deniers say to excuse them). 3. Or it meaneth, that Christ died finally for the good of all men. And that is true, as afore explained. He died for the good of all; but not equally; that is, not with the same absolute Will, Decree or Intention of attaining their Salvation. 100 But the conditional New Covenant, without any difference in the tenor of it, doth equally give Christ, Pardon and Life to all Mankind (antecedently to men's rejecting the offer) on condition of acceptance. And Christ equally satisfied God's Justice for all the lapsed Race of Adam, so far as to procure them this Gift or Covenant, and the other foresaid common mercies: But not equally as to his Decree of the success: For there Election differenceth. 101. It is a thing so contrary to the nature of Christianity, and the Spirit of Christ in his Saints, to extenuate Christ's Merits, Purchase, Interest or Honour, or rob him of his due, that doubtless so many sincere Christians would never be guilty of such injurious extenuations, and narrowing of Christ's successes, but that they cannot reconcile special Grace with universal, and mistakingly judge them inconsistent: Nor durst opprobriously reproach his universal Grace, as they do, by calling it vain, lame, imperfect, a mockery, etc. if the conceit of their defending some truth by it did not quiet and deceive their Consciences. Whereas indeed universal Grace and special, do as perfectly and harmoniously consist, as Nature and Grace do, and as the foundation and the building, and as any generical and specific Natures: And so doth a general Decree, that [All who will believe shall be saved, and that this Promise shall be made to the world] with a special Decree that [Paul shall believe and be saved.] But on two accounts I pass by all the rest about the extent of Redemption, 1. Because I must give you a special Disputation or Tractate on that subject. 2. Because the most Judicious of English Divines (so far as I can know them by their works) Bishop Davenant hath said so much in his two Posthumous Dissertation the Redempt. & Praedestinat. (Published out of the hands of Bishop Usher) as might suffice to reconcile contenders on these two points, were not men slothful in studying them or partial or incapable in judging of these matters. SECT. VII. The Antecedent and consequent Will of God, etc. 102. The distinction of God's Antecedent and Consequent Will, used by Damascene, is by many applied to this controversy, but by none that I have read sufficiently explained, which is the cause that so many good men reject it, because they misunderstand it. It's truly said, that by his Antecedent Will, God would have all men to believe, repent and be saved, but by his Consequent Will, he will have all condemned whom he doth condemn. But than it must be understood, that this distinction i● not applied to the Will of God, as he is merely an Absolute Proprietary, or Benefactor, but as he is the King or Rector of the world; and so his Legislation is his Antecedent Will, and his Judgement is his Consequent Will. And no man of Religion can deny, either that God's Law is the signification of his Will, or his Will signified, or that his Judgement and locution is his Will declared; or that God's Law of Grace doth conditionally give pardon and salvation to all, antecedently to man's performance or rejection of the condition, or that God condemneth Infidels consequently to their Infidelity. The Law Antecedently to Man's part acted, saith, He that believeth shall be saved; and the Sentence consequently to his fact, saith, Judas an unbeliever or impenitent, shall perish. And thus the distinction hath no doubt or difficulty. 103. God by commanding faith and repentance, and making the● necessary conditions of Justification, and by commanding perseverance, and threatening the Justified and Sanctified with damnation if they f●● away; and making perseverance a condition of Salvation, doth thereby provide a convenient means for the performance of his own Decree, of giving Faith and Repentance and perseverance to his Elect; For he effecteth his ends by suitable moral means; and such is this Law and Covenant, to provoke man to due fear, and care and obedience, that he may be wrought on as a man. 104. To be justified by Faith in general, agreeth to the ages before Of Justification by Faith, etc. Christ's Incarnation, and those since: But so doth not the special kind of faith by which they are justified. For much more is Essential to that faith which we must be justified by to them that are under the last edition of the Covenant of Grace, than was (or is) to them that were under the first alone. Abraham believed not all our essential Articles of faith. 105. To be justified by faith in Paul's sense, is all one as to be justified What that Faith is. by becoming Christians. To be a Believer, a Disciple, and a Christian are all one in the Gospel sense. 106. The faith by which we are justified, as is aforesaid, is best understood The Controversy between the Papists and us about Justification is agitated i● vain till we agree of the sense of the words [Justification and Remission]. As I said elsewhere they take not only Justification for a qualitative change (such as we call Sanctification) but Remission of Sin) for, they know not what themselves: most of them talk as if it were a putting away the Sin in its essence, which can be meant of nothing but the Habit; for the fact cannot be infectum: Others seem to take it for remitting the punishment also with that change. Malderus most plainly in 1. 2. q. 113. a. 1. and p. 567. saith that Remission of Sin is, Ablatio Reatus culpae; At esse long aliud quam Nolle illud punire; non enim tantum facit Hominem non puniri, sed etiam non esse Poena dignum. Minus tamen est quam in amicitiam recipi, though yet no man is in a middle state, neque D●i amicus neque inimicus, yet cogitations possunt seterari, & Peccata Remittere idem est quod non imputare si hoc non accipias pro dissimulare, sed pro desinere esse offensum cum per Remissionem, Deo non imputante est quasi non fuerit. By this you may see that these Papists hold the same with those Protestants whom they seem most to resist and cannot hid it: But, 1. It will be true to eternity that Peter sinned. 2. To say so, is to blame him. 3 His sin deserved death. 4. The Law and the nature of sin past are the same after pardon as before. 5. God doth not change his mind of sin. 6. God's offence or displeasure is not a passion or mutable, but his essence as denominated from the object, to be [his Velle punire, and Justice that must punish] 7. For God to be appeased and no more offended, is but his Nolle punire peccatorem, and not to be obliged in Justice to punish him, but by his Covenant related to him as one that will not punish. 8. This change is in the sinner becoming not punishable; 9 That is, not worthy of it in the Gospel-sence, though worthy by the Law of Innocency. 10. All this is but that the Reatus p●na & culpae quantum ad poenam is remitted, but not the Reatus culpae simpliciter in se— And thus we are all agreed. by the Baptismal Covenant, and is essentially a Believing Fiducial consent to our Covenant relation to God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as our Reconciled Creator and Father, our Saviour and our Sanctifier, connoting the forsaking of all inconsistents. For it must needs be the same faith by which we have right to the benefits of that Covenant, and by which we are justified; because we have our remission and justification by the Instrumental donation of the Covenant, it being one of the benefits given by it: But Practical Faith, or Believing-consent is our condition of receiving our Covenant right to all the benefits in general; therefore to Justification in particular. 107. The Phrases of [Justifying faith] and [Faith justifying us] are humane and not Scriptural at all: And though they may be well used with explicatory caution, as being well meant, yet they are more liable to misled men, than the Scripture phrase, that [we are justified by Faith]; Because the former phrases are apt to insinuate an Efficiency, than the other; whereas faith is no efficient cause of our Justification nor any other act of Man: And the Scripture that speaketh of Justification by Faith sometime useth the phrase 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which no more signifieth any Instrumental efficiency of Justification, than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ex operibus: And though sometime 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be used, it is to signify no more than that God hath appointed it to be the Medium of our Justification as a condition, but not as any efficient cause. 108. The Faith by which we are justified (as I touched before) hath God the Father for its object as essentially as Christ the Saviour; as the said Baptismal Covenant showeth; and that not only secondarily as Christ being the Mediator and way to the Father, our faith in Christ connoteth the final object; but also directly and primarily as the Father is the first in Trinity, and as Creator first related to us, and as the end is first in our intention: Joh. 17. 3. This is life eternal to know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou baste sent. Joh. 13. 1. Let not your hearts be troubled, you believe in God, believe also in me. 109. And as essential is it to this Faith to believe in Christ as the Purchaser of Holiness and Heaven, as to believe in him as the purchaser of pardon; and to believe in him as the Teacher and Ruler of the Church, as to believe in him as the justifyer of believers. The inseparableness of these acts is commonly confessed. 110. Indeed it is essential to this faith, 1. To be the act of the three essential faculties of man's Soul, the Vital Power, the Intellect and the Will, 2. And to have for its object God the Father, Son and Holy Ghost; and that in Christ, all that is essential to him as a Saviour be its object: And therefore, 1. That it be an Assent, Consent and practical Affiance, 2. That it be a believing in Christ as God and Man, and as the Teacher, Priest and King of the Church, revealing the Gospel, reconciling us to God, and Ruling us in order▪ to Salvation. 111. To say that some one only of these parts of Christ's office, as they are Concept us inadaequati of a Saviour is the only object of justifying faith, and to say, that justifying faith is only one Act of the Soul, or many acts of one only faculty, or to say that we are justified only by such a one, and that to expect to be justified by Assent, Consent and Affiance, or by believing in Christ as our Teacher and Ruler as well as Priest, and as a justifying Judge, as well as a Justifying Sacrifice, and as a fulfiller of the Law, is to expect justification by Works, as Paul denyeth it; This is a vain distinguishing, a falsifying the Doctrine of faith and justification, a departing from the Scripture simplicity by corrupting seeming subtlety, and one of those humane inventions which have wronged the Church. And it is no wiser than to say, that when we speak of taking or receiving a Man to be a Husband, a Physician, a King, it is but one physical a● of the Soul, that is meant, or about one only physical conception in the object, which is inadequate. Whereas all such Moral or Civil acts co●tain many physical acts, and are suited to all things in the object which are essential to it in its moral or civil nature or relation. 112. And it is but the same deluding subtlety, and vain curiosity, ●● a playing with deceitful words, to say that we are justified by faith, Quatenus recipit Christi Justitiam, As it believeth in Christ's Sacrifice and perfect obedience only, and not, As it believeth in him as Teacher, Ruler, Sanctifier, Judge, or as he intercedeth for us in Heaven, etc. when the Scripture saith no such thing at all, but simply maketh faith in Christ (supposing Faith in God the Father) to be that by which we must be justified▪ 113. This distinction is founded in another falsehood supposed, which is that the effects of all Christ's saving works are as distinctly to be ascribed to several Receiving Acts of faith, as they are to the several procuri● acts of Christ, the object of faith, which is another corrupting addition to God's Word. One part of the work of our Salvation was done by Christ's humiliation, and another by him in his exaltation: one by his overcoming the Devil, and another by his overcoming the World; one by his Cross, another by his Grave, another by his Resurrection, another by his ascension, another by his making the new Covenant, another by his sending the Spirit, another by his sending the Apostles, another by his intercession in Heaven, another will be done by our Resurrection, and another by his last Judgement, and our Glorification; one by hi● as an obeying-subject, another as a Sacrifice for sin, many by him as a Prophet, many as a Priest and many as a King and Judge: But to say therefore that our acts of faith as Receptive have as various respects to the effects or benefits, and that we are justified by him only as we believe i● him as Righteous, or a Justifyer, and that we are adopted as we believe in him in another respect, and sanctified as we believe in hi● in another respect, etc. these are the dreams of corrupting curiosity. For that Christ who by all these several works, hath done all the office of a Redeemer to procure these several effects, is preached and offered to us to be entirely as such a Redeemer, believed in and received, and upon the condition of such an entire faith only, Christ and all these benefits conjunctly are by one Covenant given us, and no otherwise. And believing in Christ as Christ, who by all those acts hath himself procured us this Covenant, and these gifts, is that by which we are justified as it is one undivided faith; And the quatenus here as to Christ's own procurement of the effects hath its place, but as to the Act of our faith, and Christ as the object constituting that faith, there is no such diversity or order to be feigned, as if the several effects were accordingly to be ascribed to our several Believing or Receiving acts. 114. The ambiguity of the very word [Receiving] hath drawn many into this error: Receiving signifieth sometimes a Physical reception, which is merely Passive, or the Relation of the Patient as such to the Act and Agent. And this is twofold, 1. The Reception of a real being; and so to be sanctified is to Receive Sanctification. 2. The Reception of a Relation, such as all Jus, Right to a thing is; and so to be pardoned, justified and adopted, and to Receive pardon, justification and adoption, is all one. 2. Sometimes it signifieth Moral or Civil receiving, which is nothing but 1. The consent of the mind, called Acceptance. 2. And as to corporeal objects, sometime, the voluntary act of the body; as the Hand, taking that which is offered. Now if the Receiving in question were physical, (either rei vel juris ad rem) then indeed it would be so nearly related to the thing received, (which as received is no object, because Receiving so is no act) as that this quatenus in question might be applied to it. For it may well be said I receive Justification quatenus Justificatus sum, as I By this you see the answer to what Mr. Lawson in his excellent Theopolitica hath said against me on this point. Of which see fullyer my answer to Mr. Warner in my Disputes of Justification. am justified, and I receive Sanctification as I am sanctified, and vice versa, for they are but various words signifying the same thing. But of Moral Receiving the case is otherwise: For this is not physical Reception, but only a Moral Act, which is made a necessary medium, or Condition to Physical Reception, and thence is called Receiving; so Accepting or Consenting is a moral means or condition of that Having or Possessing which is consequential. And this Acceptance hath relation immediately to the thing as Given only, to be made ours, according to the Will of the Giver, and not made ours according to the order of the things given: That is, 1. The Ratio proprietatis, the Reason that they are ours is the will of the Donor, and the Collation is according to the order of his Will; though the Things Given have their intrinsic difference. 115. All men confess, that this Moral Reception, is an Act, and therefore hath an object (which Physical Reception is not). And that thus to Receive doth suppose a Moral Gift, which Gift maketh not the thing ours necessarily, as physical operation doth, but on supposition of our voluntary Reception or Consent. And all confess that God's Donation is by his Covenant, Testament or Promise; and this Covenant hath its proper nature and mode, that is, the Condition as imposed, antecedent to our Receiving. Therefore as the thing Given is made ours by the Donation, so according to the order appointed by it: and our Consent no otherwise maketh it ours than as the Condition of the Gift performed. But God's Covenant doth Give us Christ and Life; that is, Justification, Sanctification and Glorification in tithe or right, in one Gift, to be Accepted by one entire faith as the Condition, not making at all the order of the Gifts and faiths respect to them in that order, to be any of the Ratio proprietatis. 116. This will be plainer by humane instances. A Servants Relation is founded in his consent to be a Servant; a Wife's Relation is founded in her Marriage-consent to be a Wife, and to take that man for her Husband simply without any more ado. Now if the Master of that Servant, or the Husband of that Wife, be a noble man, a rich man, a wise man, a good man, and they knew all this, and by knowing it were induced to consent, and are to have their proportionable benefits by his Nobility, Riches, Wisdom, Goodness, yet their title to these benefits ariseth not from the act of their consent as it respected these benefits severally and distinctly, but merely by consent to their Relation, as being his Condition of Collation. The Wife is made Noble by her Husband's Nobility, she is made Rich by his Riches, she is instructed by his Wisdom, etc. But she hath no more Right to his Riches for marrying him in the notion of Rich, or for consenting to him for Riches, than for marrying him in the notion or thought of his wisdom or goodness. On her part, it was not consent to be Rich by him that gave her right to his Riches, and consent to be Noble by him that gave her right to Nobility; but consent simply to be his Wife that gave her right to all. 117. This is yet fullyer evident in that most usually men make consent to one thing to be the condition of their Receiving or Right to another. And usually that which one is most backward to, is made the condition of their Right to that which they are most forward or willing to have. The Master doth not say, If thou wilt have thy wages, thou shalt have right to it: But if thou wilt do my work, thou shalt have thy wages. The condition of Marriage is conjugal Love and fidelity: q. d. I will be thy Husband, and give thee right to all that I have, if thou wilt be and do what is essential to a Wife] and not [if thou wilt have my Riches, etc.] If a Father give a Child a free gift on any condition, it will likely be [If thou wilt be a thankful and obedient Child] and not [If thou wilt have it.] Or if mere consent to have it, be put, it is usually when it is some gift which it is supposed that the person is not very willing to have: [As if a Sick man will have Physic, if an ungodly man will have Teaching, Books or Godliness itself.] But to this usually they are induced by the Promise of somewhat else which they are willing of: As to the Sick [If thou wilt take this Physic, thou shalt have health.] To the ungodly [If thou wilt have Christ and holiness, thou shalt have pardon and happiness.] Now in the sense of Physical Receiving [He that receiveth Physic, hath Physic] and [He that receiveth health, hath health] etc. But in the moral sense of Receiving, which is Accepting as it is the condition of a gift, so [He that receiveth the Physic shall have the health] and [He that receiveth Christ and his sanctifying Spirit, shall have Pardon, Justification, and Salvation] Not that his willingness to have [pardon and happiness] is the chief or only condition of his [pardon and happiness.] But his Accepting Christ and his Spirit which men are naturally unwilling of, is the condition of that [pardon and happiness] which men would have. By all which it appeareth that to say, [Faith justifyeth me as it is the Receiving of Christ's Righteousness, and not as it is the Receiving of Christ as a Teacher, Ruler, etc.] is a confounding or seducing saying. For, 1. If it intimate that Faith Justifyeth us as an efficient cause [principal o● Instrumental] it is false. * Unless by Justifying they mean the acts of Love, Hope, Obedience called H●●iness. 2. If it mean that [Faith is the Condition of Justification quatenus, as it receiveth Christ's Righteousness only,] it hath either one or two falsehoods. 1. If it mean that Faiths receiving act, is the formalis ratio Conditionis, or that it justifyeth not qua conditio d●●ationis, but quae Receptio Justitiae Christi, it is false. Therefore qua here can signify nothing but the Aptitude of faith to be made the condition, and so Quadratus & Quae here are all one: 2. And then that [only the Accepting of Righteousness justifyeth us, that is, Is the condition of our Justification] is a falsehood. 118. Therefore our consent to be a Holy and obedient people, or to take Christ for our Teacher, Exemplar, Ruler, Sanctifier by his Word and Spirit, and Judge, hath at least as great a hand in our justification, (being principally the Condition of the Promise) as our belief in our acceptance of Christ's Righteousness hath. SECT. VIII. Of Justification by Christ's Righteousness, imputed. 119. Christ's personal Righteousness, Divine or Humane, habitual, active How little the Papists differ from the Imputation which they quarrel with. See in Bellarm. words cited and approved by Davenant de Justit. And Pet. a S. Joseph. Theol. Speculat. l. 4. c. 10. saith, [Obj. P●ccatum remitti non potest quamdiu homo manet conversus ad creaturam & aversus a Deo: At semper aversus erit a Deo nisi mutatur. Resp. Sufficere▪ mutationem moralem, quae per solam Dei condonationem fieri potest, ut jam homo non dicatur aversus a Deo. (This is Antinomianism, and false; As if God called not him averse who is really averse.) Obj. 2. Si peccatum remitti potest sine actu aut habitu— per solam imputationem erit quae est ●aereticorum sententia. Resp. Haereticos loqui de facto & non de imputatione peccati remanentis & vere non remissi: nos de possibili & de ver● remissione qua peccatum tollatur.] See how the case is turned and wranglers deceive themselves. We hold it neither de facto nor de possibili: and they hold it de possibili and not the facto, viz▪ that bare pardon and non▪ imputation may put away the very being of sin, and may save men. Of which more afterwards. But many others deny that sin can be remitted by extrinsic condonation: See Cacer's Sum. The. 22. c. 2. They ordinarily take Remission for destroying the sin itself. or passive (as it's called) is not given us or made ours, truly and properly in the thing itself, but in the effects (as was aforesaid) for neither the same matter; nor the same form is strictly ours. 1. That neither of them is ours in a physical sense is undeniable. If the Divine Righteousness were so ours, we were Gods. And a Habit, an Act, and a Passion (materially) cannot be removed from one subject to another, nor the same be in divers subjects: These are as palpable contradictions as Transubstantiation is. And the Relative form is founded in the matter or subject, and can no more be removed. The paternity of a Generator, and the paternity of an Adopter, are not the same, but two. And a Relation is an accident, also which perisheth when removed from the subject; and in another is another. 2. If it be said that both are ours Morally or Imputatively, I answer, It is true: But that phrase is of large and doubtful signification. 1. If the meaning be that [The Covenant of Grace doth as certainly pardon or justify us (in the way and degree promised by it) for the merit of Christ's Righteousness (in performing his Mediatorial Covenant with the Father) as our own merit (had it been possible) would have done; or our Innocency would have Justified us by the Covenant of Innocency] this is true. 2. But if the meaning be that [Christ's merit and satisfaction, by perfect holiness, and obedience, and suffering, are supposed or Reputed by God to have been inherent in us, or done by us in our civil person in Christ; or that in a sense natural or Legal we did all those things ourselves, or that God judgeth us so to have done, by Judging Christ and us to be the same civil person; or else that all the Benefits of Christ's Righteousness shall as fully and immediately be ours, as if we had been, and done, and suffered, merited and satisfied in and by Christ; All this is false. 120. For if this were so, we could need no pardon; for he that is reputed to be Innocent, by fulfilling all the Law, is reputed never to have sinned, by omission or commission: And he can have no pardon of sin, who hath no sin to be pardoned. Therefore such an Imputation of Christ's Righteousness to us, would make his satisfaction null or vain, or certainly neither imputable to us, nor useful for us. 121. Some to avoid this do divide the Time of our Lives, and suppose Christ's sufferings to have satisfied and purchased pardon of our sins, for all the Time before our Believing, and his Righteousness to be imputed to us for the Time since our Believing: But this is a humane fiction: For our sins after believing must have pardon too, by Christ's satisfaction. And some distinguish of our Time and State under the two Covenants, and say that Christ's satisfaction was for the pardon of our sins under the first Covenant, which continued but till the promise made to Adam, Gen. 3. 15. And so was for none but Adam's sin imputed to us; and that after that all being under the new Covenant, it condemneth none but the finally impenitent (who scape not) and so that Gods pardoning men since the new Covenant is but his preventing their need of pardon, or else pardoning temporal punishments only: But this is contrary to the Gospel, which tells us that Christ died for our sins, even all that ever are forgiven, and that all are forgiven to believers, (and not the necessity of forgiveness prevented) and not only Adam's sin as ours: Nor only the temporal, but the perpetual punishment. And even temporal punishment is not due to the innocent. 122. Some distinguish only of Actions, and not of Time, and say Christ's Sacrifice satisfied for all our sins, that they may be forgiven, and his righteousness is imputed to us, that we may be also accounted just; But this is but either ambiguity, or the fore-detected gross contradiction. For if by Justice they mean Reputed sinlessness, or perfecti●●, than these two cannot stand together: For he that is supposed a Sinner, is supposed not sinless or perfect; And he that is supposed sinless cannot be supposed pardonable. 123. Some think to avoid the contradiction, by distinguishing only the moments of Nature, and double respect of the same man's actions: They say that we are first in order of Nature supposed to be Sinners, and pardoned, and then to be such as moreover need the reputation of Innocency or Righteousness which is added to pardon. But, 1. He that is pardoned all sins of omission and commission, is accounted Innocent and Righteous as to any Gild of punishment, either of sense or Loss. 2. And he that is after accounted Innocent and Just from his first being to that hour, is judged never to have needed pardon: And so they make God come with an after act, and condemn his own foregoing act of error and injury; or at least to contradict it, and in the first instant to say [I pardon this Sinner] and in the second to say [I now repute him one that never sinned or needed pardon.] 124. But the commonest way of such Divines is, to say that Christ's Righteousness is first imputed; that is, we are reputed to have perfectly obeyed and been habitually holy in Christ, and then sin is next pardoned as a fruit of the merits of this. But this is still but the oft detected contradiction, that we are first accounted sinless, and therefore our sins are forgiven us. 125. Some say that the Law since the fall obligeth us both to obey and to suffer, and not to one only; else a Sinner bound to suffer, should not be bound to obey. Therefore Christ must do both for us: But this is too gross for any man to utter that ever knew what Law and Government is. Do they mean that as to the same Act and time, the Law bindeth us to obey and suffer? or for divers acts and instants of time? Do they mean that the Law bound man both to perfection and suffering for perfection, or to suffering for sin? No man doubts but when one sin is committed, and punishment deserved, the Law is still the Law, and bindeth men still to obey or suffer more the next moment, and again to obey or suffer more the next moment. But this concerneth not our question. Did the Law bind Adam to obey and to suffer before he sinned? Did it bind him both to obey and suffer for his new sin the next instant? It's true it bond him to suffer for his old sin? but not for the next before it is committed. And the obligation to duty goeth before the obligation to punishment for that same action; because the action cometh between; and the first is an act of God's antecedent Will, and the second of his consequent Will, that is, of the Retributive, and not the Preceptive part of the Law. And they note not that the question is not, what obedience a man is bound to, but what he performeth or must be reputed to have performed. If they will speak so unaptly as to say that the Law commandeth Lapsed man, not to have sin, or imperfect man to have been perfect; that is, that the Command to day bindeth Adam ad praeteritum not to have sinned yesterday, or bindeth to Impossibility in nature, that existent sin should not be existent, (in all which I leave them to their liberty of words) yet it is certain that no man hath perfectly obeyed for one year or day. And therefore if Christ's perfect obedience and holiness be imputed to them from their first being, than they are re●uted not-lapsed, nor-sinners from the beginning and, so not pardonable. But if it be only for the time after sin that Christ's perfection is ●theirs, after what sin must it be? If after Adam's, than we need no pardon of any but Adam's sin. If after conversion, than we need no pardon for sins after Conversion. If after our last sin, than Christ's perfection is not imputed to us till after death. 126. Others would come nearer the matter, and say that we are ●eputed Righteous as fulfillers of the Law, and yet reputed Sinners as Breakers of the Law: and that though there be no medium in naturals between light and darkness, life and death, yet there is between a ●reaker of the Law, and a fulfiller of it, viz. a non-fulfiller; and between just and unjust, that is not-just: But this is a mere darkness: There ●s a medium negative, in a person as not obliged; but none between Positive and Privative in one obliged as such. A stone is neither just nor privatively unjust: Nor a man about a thing never commanded or forbidden him: But what's this to the matter? God's Law is pre-supposed: we talk of nothing but Moral acts: The Law forbiddeth Omissions and Commissions: both are sin. Do these men think that he is not reputed Positively just, (and not only not-unjust) who is reputed never to have committed a sin, nor left undone a duty in his life. Can ●he Law be fulfilled more than so? What is Righteousness if that be not? Obj. Adam was neither just nor unjust in his first moment; no nor till he sinned say some, because till then he was not obliged to obey, or at least to any meritorious act, that is, to love God. Ans. 1. Adam was in his first instant but Habitually just, and not by Act, because not obliged to impossibilities any more than an Infant or a stone: But we speak only of obliged persons. 2. It is not true that Adam was not obliged to obey and Love God before he sinned, or that he never Loved God as God. Obj. At least Adam merited not the Reward, though he sinned not till then. Ans. 1. He merited what Reward he had, viz. the continuance o his blessings first freely given: but not an immutable state. 2. It is yet unresolved what that was by which Adam must merit Immutability and Glory? whether, 1. Once obeying or consent to his full Covenant. 2. Or once loving God. 3. Or conquering once. 4. Or eating of the tree of Life. 5. Or presevering in perfect obedience to the end; that is, till God should translate him, which is most likely. His not Meriting Immutability before the time, was no sin, we confess. 3. And we maintain as well as you, that Christ hath not only satisfied for sin, and merited pardon, but also Merited Immutable Glory. But consider, 1. That Adam's not doing that which was to merit Glory, was his sin of omission, and to pardon that omission, is to take him as a meriter of Glory. 2. Therefore it must be somewhat more than he forfeited by that omission and his commission, which cometh in by Christ's merit above forgiveness. 3. That Christ merited all this, both by his active, passive and habitual Righteousness, by which he merited pardon. 4. That it was not we that merited it in him, but he, to give it us only on the terms of a Law of Grace. 127. Yet some come nearer, and say that, To punish and not-Reward are not all one: And so the respect that Sin hath to the deserved punishment needed pardon and satisfaction: But our deserving the Reward needed Christ's perfect Obedience to be imputed. In this there is somewhat of truth. But you must avoid the errors that lie in the way, and a●● by most supposed truths. 1. Remember that man can have nothing from God, but what is a mere Gift as to the matter, though it be a Reward as to the order and ends of collation. And in this case, punishment is damni as well as sensus; And so the loss of the Reward is the principal part of Hell or Punishment. So that if Christ's death hath pardon● our sins of Omission, we are reputed to have done all our duty; And if so, we are reputed to have merited the Reward: And if he pardon our ●●●● as to all punishment of sense and loss, he pardoneth them as to th●● forfeiture of Heaven as a Gift, if not as a Reward. 128. But, say they, remission of sin is but part of Justification, because a man may be forgiven, and yet not reputed never to have broken the Law. To put away guilt, and to make one righteous are two thing. Ans. Still confusion. Gild is either of the fault as such, or of the punishment, and of the fault only as the cause of punishment. If all g●● both culpae & poenae were done away, that person were reputed po●● righteous; that is, never to have omitted a Duty, or committed a ●● But indeed when only the Reatus poenae (& culpae quoad poenam) is do● away, the Reatus culpae in se remaineth. And this Christ himself never taketh away, no not in Heaven, where for ever we shall be judged, once to have sinned, and not to be such as never sinned. 129. And this seemeth the very core of their error, that they th●● Of this see wotton de Reconcil. at large. we must be justified in Christ by the Law of Innocency, which justified Christ himself; and that we are quit or washed simply from all guilt of fault, as well as obligation to punishment: which is a great untruth, contrary to all the scope of the Gospel, which assureth us, that we are justified by the Law of Grace or Faith, and not by the Law of Works: That Christ freeth us from the curse and penalty of the Law: which he could not do, if we were reputed never to have deserved it, as never being Sinners. If we are reputed such as fulfilled the Law of Innocency (by another in our civil person, or as fully representing us,) all the Gospel is over-turned: There is no room for Repentance, none for the satisfaction of Christ, none for Faith in his blood, nor for Pardon, or prayer for Pardon, or any Grace, Act, Duty or Ordinance, Sacraments, Confession, or any thing which supposeth Sin. To say that Adam's Law meant, [Do this, by thyself or by Christ, and thou shalt live,] is a Humane fiction, not found in Scripture, confounding the Law of Innocency with the Gospel: And to say that the New Covenant maketh us one Person with Christ, and then the Law of Ad●● doth justify us, is a double error. We are not reputed one Person with Christ; nor doth the first Covenant justify any but the Person that performeth it. But we maintain as well as they, that the same Righteousness of God in himself, is manifested in both Covenants, and the same holy love of perfect Obedience, and the ends of the first Covenant are secured by the second. But the tenor and terms are not the same, nor the Righteousness of the subject as denominated from those terms. It is not the same Law which condemneth us and justifieth us, nor that justifieth Christ and us; nor is it the same Habits, or Acts, which are the immediate fundamentum of the Relation of righteous in Christ and in us, ●ough his Righteousness be the meritorious cause of ours. And therefore not the same with the thing merited. 130. The Truth which they grope after, and must reconcile them ●●●●, is as followeth. Christ in his Sufferings did stand in the room of ●●ners as their Sponsor, and satisfied Justice as was said before: And ●●d had other ends yet to accomplish: It was meet that the perfection ●his Law should be glorified by a perfect fulfilling of it by Christ, ●en we had failed. Satan was hereby confounded: God pleased and ●noured: Man shown what he should have been, and yet should do: ●ns nature in Christ was thus actively and habitually perfected: By all ●s Christ performed his Obedience to the mediatorial Law, and his Herveus Natal. quodlib. 4. q. 14. could speak thus much better than many Protestants. [Sicut meritum Christi quantum ad actum quem exercuit, non transit in alios; transit tamen in alios quantum ad effectum illius meriti illis qui applicantur ad Christum mediantibus Sacramentis vel mediante fide propria; Qui quidem effectus est Gratia quae est c●ntraria, culpae, & quae reddit hominem dignum vita aeterna: Ita etiam demeritum Adae, licet non transeat in alios quantum ad actum quem exercuit, tamen transit quoad effectum culpae originalis, quae est contraria gratiae, & reddit dignum poenae aeterna, & indignum vita aeterna. How doth this differ from the soundest Protestants as to the Imputation of Christ's Righteousness to us, or Adam's sin. avenant of Redemption; and so acquired a right first to himself of giving ●t the purchased Benefits to Sinners, by a new Law or Covenant of Grace ●●d according to it; By which Covenant, only as his Instrument, the ●her and Son give us Right to them, in an Order there established. ●●●● that is there given to us, Christ purchased for us, by performing his ●n Covenant first with the Father, by perfect Holiness, and Obedience, ●en in his Sacrifice on the Cross, and by all that he undertook to do as Redeemer, antecedently. The Purchase was made for this Donation ● its end, and is commensurate to it: just so much as Christ hath given ●●●● as to matter, manner, terms, degree, time, etc. he did purchase and ●rit for us, and no more. Had he antecedently done all that he did ●●●● our person, and we in him, in Law sense, the thing itself, with its separable consequents and effects, had been all ours ipso facto, before and without the donation or conveyance of a new Law or Covenant; nor ●d they been ever given us upon terms and conditions, when they were ●●●● own before, without those terms. But now what is given us by the ●ew Covenant, we have title to on this account, because it was pur●ased by the perfect Merit and Saerifice of Christ, and so given us by ●m, and by the Father. So that it is ours as sure as if we had merited it ●r selves, but not ours in the same order, and measure, and time, and ●ms, as if we had merited it ourselves (in our natural or legal per●ns). For than it would have been all ours at once ipso facto, even ●e merit itself, and the foresaid effects. We deserved punishment, ●nd Christ was punished in our stead, that we might be forgiven; not ●mediately, but on Covenant-terms: we had forfeited Life by sin; And ●hrist merited Life for us by his Perfection, (not in our persons, but in ●e person of a Mediator,) which Life was to be given to us by the said ●ovenant: The antecedent benefits (such as the Covenant itself) he ●veth absolutely, and antecedently to any act of ours. God reputeth all his Satisfaction and Merit of Christ to be as meet and effectual to procure us all these Benefits, to be thus given, as if we ourselves had done and offered: And in this sense Christ's Righteousness is given us, and made ours, ●●●● that it is given for us, and we have the said benefits of it: Not that God doth give us the very habits of Holiness which were in Christ, nor ●he transient acts which he performed, nor the very Sufferings which he underwent, nor the Relation of righteous satisfactory and meritorious, as ●●●● was that numerical Relation which immediately resulted from Christ's ●wn Habits, Acts and Sufferings; For such a translation of accidents is ●●●● contradiction. But God giving us all the effects, or Salvation merited, ●n itself properly, is said also not unfitly to give us the Merit or Righteousness which procured them; that is, as it was paid to God for us, to procure them; even as he is said to give Christ himself (antecedently ●● our Faith) to the World as a Saviour. And thus Christ's Righteousness, Merit and satisfaction may be said to be imputed to us, in that it ●● thus given us, and thus truly reputed ours. 131. But when the Text saith, Rom. 4. 24. Righteousness is imputed ●● us, the meaning is no more, but that God reputeth or judgeth us righteous though we have not the Righteousness of Innocency, or of the Law ●● Works; which indeed is done for Christ's meritorious Righteousness procuring it: But the Text speaketh not of Christ's personal Righteousness in matter or form, imputed to us as being itself our own. Impu●●●● Righteousness to us, is a consequent Act (after Faith) of God as Jud●● and not an antecedent donation. 132. And it is true that formaliter, non-punire & praemiari, ●●●punish, and to Reward are not all one: And in some cases a man may ●● freed from punishment, who is not rewarded: But it is as true as is a●●● said, 1. That God's Salvation, and all his Benefits, are ever free Gifts ●● to the matter and value first, and then the relation of a Reward is b● secondary as to the Order of collation, and the reason comparative, wh● one man hath them rather than another (as a thankful Child hath the Gift which the Contemner goeth without). 2. And that here, Not to have this Gift (forfeited by our sin) is to be punished: And so h●●● non-donari, is puniri materially though the relations differ. 3. And that it is the same Righteousness of Christ which meriteth our Impunity quoad damnum & sensum, and which meriteth our Right to the Gift of Life, both sub ratione doni as a Gift, and sub ratione condonationis as a forgiveness of the forfeiture, and of the poena damni: So that here ●● no room for the conceit, that Christ's death was only to purchase Pardon, and his Righteousness to merit Life. That which confoundeth men here is, their taking the divers Respects, and Connotations, and Conceptions of one and the same thing, to be divers separable things: Th● same Law hath the Preceptive part (to do and not do) and the Retributing part (penal and rewarding). The same Obedience of Adam was ●● doing what was commanded, and a deserving what was promised. ●●●● more was promised to persevering Perfection than to the first act of Obedience. One Sin deserved death; but one act of Obedience desern●● not immutable Glory. And as the same Act is formally Obedience related to the Command, and formally meritorious or praemiandus, ●● related to the Promise. And the same Act is sin and punishable, as related to the Precept (or Prohibition) and Threatening; so the same Glory is a free Gift in one respect (as related ut bonum to God as Benefactor) and a Reward in another (as related quoad ordinem conferendi to God ●● Rector.) And the same loss of Glory is poena related to the Threatening and it is the loss of a Reward as related to the Promise. And so the s●●● Merits of Christ's active, and passive, and habitual Righteousness, because our Glory, both by giving us pardon of our forfeiture, and by Covenant-Donation, and as a Reward to Christ, and to us when ●● perform the conditions of his Gift. 133. And it is certain, that Christ's Sufferings are first satisfactory and then meritorious, being a part of his Active, that is, voluntary O●dience. And Christ's Holiness and Obedience are meritorious of pardon ●● Sin, as well as of Salvation. 134. If there be (as there is) any thing which is given us throug●● Christ, more than our own Innocency or Obedience would have m●●●ted, the Gift of that is more than remission of Sin; And is to be ascribed accordingly to the Purchase of Christ's Merits. But yet both his Holiness and Sufferings (though not as sufferings) did merit it: And that was not a fulfilling of the Law in our stead. 135. This superadded Gift (whatever it is) seemeth in Scripture to be included in Adoption, and not in Justification: But yet it may in this sense be called Justification, in that when our Right to that Gift is questioned, that Right must be justified by the Covenant-Donation, and by Christ's meritorious Purchase of it. But this is only de nomine: We are agreed of the thing. 136. It is greatly to be noted, that as a Reward is in the formal notion more than not punishing (where materially they are the same) so Christ hath not at all merited that eternal Life should be ours, by way of Reward for our fulfilling the Law in him, but that it should ours by his free Gift, as a Reward to Christ for his own Merits. So that the Relation of a Reward for Perfection, belongeth only formally to Christ, (who taketh it as his benefit that we are saved through his love to Souls) but not at all to us. And to say (as too many hold) that Heaven is our Reward for our perfection of Holiness and Obedience in and by Christ, is a Humane Invention, subverting Christ's Gospel; or unfit speech, if better meant. 137. Yet a Reward it is to us, to be glorified; but that is not for our fulfilling the Law of Innocency by Christ, but for our believing in Christ, and performing the conditions of the Covenant of Grace: which giveth us Life as a free Gift; but yet in the order of the condition it hath the relation, and name of a Reward to us, in the Scripture. 138. So that here are three rewarding Covenants before us: 1. The Covenant or Law of Innocency rewarding man for perfection to the end; And this rewarded none but Christ: And it is false that we are rewarded by that Covenant, or justified by it, for Christ's fulfilling it. But it All the stir of the Papists is to prove that we have inherent Righteousness as well as pardon, which Protestants are as much for as they. The rest is de nomine justificationis, Malder. 1. 2. q. 113. a. 2. p. 572. Apostolus, 2 Cor. 5. non aliud vult quam Christum cui nullum debebatur supplicium, factum fuisse hostiam pro nostro peccato, ut nos qui apud Deum nihil merebamur, praeter. supplicium, justitia Dei fieremus in ipso; id est, gratis sine nostris operibus consequeremur per ipsius merita justitiam coram Deo.] What doth this differ from the Doctrine of the Reformed Churches. Idem ibid.▪ Quando Apostolus dicit multos constitui justos per unius obedienti●● significatur causa meritoria, non autem formalis: And so say we: But some call Christ's Righteousness the causa materials, meaning no more but that it is the matter of that Merit, for which we are justified; As if Adam had perfectly fulfilled the Law, his fulfilling it, had been meritorious of his sentential Justification, and yet the matter of his constitutive Justification; that is, of his Righteousness. And some unaptly call it the formal cause: But an unapt logical notion is not an error in Faith or Theology. Idem ib. p. 573. Quamvis ●x omnino rigida justitia solus Christus Dominus satisfactat; de condigno tamen, ita ut merces operi ●ono debeatur post Dei promissionem, meretur justus coronam justisi● quam reddet in illa die justus judex: Est nostra justitia tota, totum meritum, tota satisfactio dependens a me●ito & satisfactione Christi. Still here is a wordy Controversy. justified Christ. 2. The Law or Covenant made only to and with Christ the Mediator: And this Covenant further rewarded Christ as Mediator, giving him all that it promised to himself and us, for his performing the mediatorial conditions. And so our Life is Christ's Reward. 3. The Covenant or Law of Grace (for it is the same thing in several respects that's called the Law and the Covenant), which giving Life on the condition of Faith, doth justify and reward Believers. And we are justified and rewarded by no other Law. 139. When Rom. 4. oft saith (and other Texts) that we are justified by Faith, it connoteth and includeth that we are justified by Christ and his Sacrifice, Merits and Covenant respectively, believed in: But yet it is not Christ, nor his Sacrifice, or Merits, or Promise that is meant by the word [Faith.] It was a gross abuse of the Text so to expound it: Faith connoteth the Object, but it is not Christ that is called Faith. 140. But the meaning is, that man having forfeited Life, Christ's Righteousness (habitual, active and passive,) hath merited, that it shall be given us as a free Gift, but yet regularly under a Law: But the Law maketh nothing but believing acceptance the condition of our Right, and he that doth that much, shall, without perfection, be esteemed and used as righteous for the sake of the said Righteousness of Christ. So that in point of Merit, as to the value of the thing, Christ's Righteousness is instead of our Innocency: But as to the order of collation, something being still to be required of us as a condition of Right, so our Faith now is instead of our Innocency, as being all that is laid on us instead of ●●, that we may have right to Justification. And to assign this condition o● our part, Paul saith, That Faith is imputed to us for righteousness. To deny this sense, is to use violence with the Text. 141. Christ's Righteousness is made ours, as our Sins were made his: which is not in themselves, as is aforesaid: God forbidden we should think that Christ was ever reputed by God to be a Sinner, a Blasphemer, a Murderer, an Enemy to God and Goodness, one that had Satan's Image, and was his Servant, a Persecutor of himself, etc. But only our sin was imputed to him as to the punishment deserved: that is, he assumed the Reatum poenae, the punishment, and a dueness occasioned by our sin; but made his own by his voluntary sponsion; But never had he the rea●um culpae in its self, but merely as aforesaid respectively to the punishment. Even so we have the Righteousness of Christ, not in its self, as Proprietors of it, but in relation to the effects; that is, we have the effects, even our Justification, and other benefits as purchased by it, and for its sake: And as our guilt, or obligation to punishment, was not Christ's, till his voluntary sponsion or consent did make it so; Even so his Righteousness is not ours in the effects, till our voluntary consent accept it: Because i● is not a natural, but a contracted Relation that is between Christ and us. And as it is not a strict propriety in Christ's Righteousness that we have, so it is much less a plenary and absolute propriety: nor have we it in the Relation of a meritorious cause to all uses, as if it had been fully our own, but only limitedly to those uses which God accepted it for, and hath assigned to it in the Gospel; that is, it is but a certain sort and measure of mercies that are given us from it in God's time and way. 142. To the asserting of the rigid sense of Imputation, they are necessitated to say that, which supposeth God's repute of the matter to be false; that is, that he reputeth us to have done that in and by Christ, which we never did by him: But God judgeth nothing to be otherwise than it is? that he judgeth Christ to have been the Sponsor and Mediator, and in that person to have done and suffered as he did, is because it is true: But he judgeth him not to have been the legal Person of the Sinner, and as many persons as there be redeemed Sinners in the world, because that is not true. 143. They say that what the Surety doth, the Debtor doth in Law-sense, and to judge so is not to err. But there are several sorts of Sureties, much more of Instruments in paying a Debt. 1. There be free Sureties, who are not obliged to the Debtor as his Dependants; and these either by countersecurity, or by right of the thing, may recover all of the Debtor again. And therefore the Law supposeth not the Debtor to have paid the Debt by them; but that the Creditor made them both Joynt-Debtors for his own security. 2. There are Sureties antecedently, and Sureties consequently: One that before the Debt doth conditionally make himself a Joynt-Debtor, in case the Principal pay it not; And there is a Surety more properly called an undertaking-Friend, who after payeth the Debt, being disobliged before. Christ was not a Surety of the first sort, in Law-sense; And if you call God's Decrees, which are his Essence, Suretyship, your liberty of words changeth not the case. 3. There is a Surety who payeth the Debt in the name and person of the principal Debtor; (And he is not properly called a Surety, but an Agent or Substitute:) And Christ was none such; nor is any proper Surety such. And there is a Surety which, by the Creditors consent, doth pay the Debt in his own name, agreeing that the chief Debtor shall have no benefit by it but from him, as he shall give it, on certain terms: And this was Christ's case. 4. There is a Surety that payeth the same debt that was due from the Principal: And there is a Surety or Friend that undertaketh only to make the Creditor satisfaction, because the Debtor cannot pay. And this is the case. 5. Lastly, There is a paymaster that is the Debtors Instrument, whether Servant, Delegate, or whoever at his command or request doth pay it in his name and person: And this is not the case. And there is a proper Surety, who is a third person and no Instrument, and payeth it in his own name though for another. This, as I said, is the case; and therefore it is not we that paid it. Therefore to the Objection I say, that to judge Christ such an Instrument or Delegate of ours, or Surety that did all in our legal person; is to misjudge and err, as is proved, which God cannot do. 144. Christ did and suffered in the common nature of man, though not in the person of each Sinner. And man's nature is so far redeemed by him, that for the mere Original Sin of nature alone, no man shall perish, unless he add the rejection of Grace; (of which somewhat is said before.) But yet as Nature existeth only in persons, so it is all persons, who have this much benefit and more. But that he merited and satisfied in our Nature, is a proper speech, and truer than that he did it in our persons. 145. But all this similitude of a Creditor and Debtor, is to be limited in the application, according to the great difference of Sin and Debt, which will infer a great diversity in the consequents; which may easily be collected by the Reader. 146. As to the great and weighty question, whether Christ died for How far Christ died for sins against the Law of Grace. sins against the New Covenant, or only for those against the old: I answer, Distinction is here notoriously necessary. 1. If by the old Covenant, or first Covenant, you mean the conditional Promise, [Be perfect and live] no sin since Adam's is against that conditional Promise, because it ceased through man's incapacity, upon the Fall; And Christ died not only for the first sin. 2. If by the first Covenant you mean, the bare command of perfect perpetual Obedience, Christ died for sins against that command which is still in force, but not as a Covenant of Life given on that condition. 3. If by the first Covenant, you mean the punitive part of the Law of Innocency, saying, [Thou shalt die if thou obey not perfectly.] So Christ died for all our Sins in the strictest sense, even as we are condemnable for them by that Law. And that part also of the Law continueth to make punishment our due in primo instanti, though with an adjoined remedy. 4. If by the New Covenant, you mean the mere preceptive part of Christ's supernaturally-revealed Law, or of the foresaid Law of Nature, as in the hands of Christ, so Christ died for sins against the Law of Christ. 2. If by the New Covenant or Law you mean, the Promise and Threatening of Christ's Law, or either; so Sin may be said to be against them in two senses: 1. Objectively, as they are neglected by us: And so that Sin formally is only against the Precept, and Christ died for it. 2. Or as the Sin hath punishment threatened by the Sanction, and no pardon given by the Promise: And so Sin is in two senses also against the said Sanction: that is, 1. When it is such a Sin as the Promise giveth no pardon to conditionally, And such as the commination peremptority condemneth the Sinner for to remediless misery. And this Sin is the final non-performance of the Gospel-Condition (Faith and Repentance). And such only are fully obliged to suffer Hell by the commination of the Law of Grace: And for such Sin Christ never died: not because he never died for the person as to any other sin, or for any benefit, as some teach: But because, 1. He resolved never to die for that sin itself, (of final Unbelief, Impenitence and Unholiness.) 2. And because he never died to satisfy his own Law of Grace, and to take off its proper full obligation to final punishment; but only to satisfy God instead of man's suffering what the Law of Works obliged him to. 2. But there is also a mediate or conditional dueness of punishment, according to the Law of Grace: which is when a man by not believing and not-repenting at the present, and by neglecting and resisting Grace, doth so far forfeit all Grace and Salvation, as that God may cut him off, and cast him into Hell if he will; not having peremptorily said, that he will do it; nor given men any assurance that he will not. This man is not immediately and fully under the dueness of Hell fire, but on supposition that God should first cut him off; and then his Impenitence would be final, which is the first case: But this person is under all this guilt. 1. Guilty of punishment not forgiven against the Law of Works. 2. He is so far guilty of punishment, according to the Law of Grace, as 1. That no pardon is given him, or due to him. 2. And God may justly take away his Spirit and forsake him. 3. And God may justly cut him ●●●●. 4. And if God should cut him off, Hell will be his full immediate due. 147. By this it further appeareth, that we cannot be justified as personally Christ not capable of our kind of Obedience. fulfilling all Righteousness in Christ: Because we are all our life time principally under those great Duties of the Law of Grace, which Christ neither did nor could do for us. We are bound all our days to accept a Saviour, to accept pardon of Sin, and mortifying Grace, to confess our Sins, to repent of them, and sorrow for them; to labour in the use of all Means and Ordinances to mortify them; To do all our duties as Sinners, in that manner as those must do that are in a Physicians hands for Cure; To receive and apply Christ's Merits to that end; to beg his Intercession and daily pardon; To labour that imperfect Grace may be strengthened: In a word, Sin, and a desire of healing, so affect all that the Gospel commandeth us, that Christ was not capable of any of this. And if all this was undone till our Conversion, and much of it undone after our Conversion, and yet Christ never did it for us, not we in him; How can it be said that we are justified by fulfilling all the Law in and by Christ? yea the Law of Nature still commandeth us, to obey the Law of Grace, supposing it made and revealed to us. 148. The question whether Christ paid the Idem or the tantundem, is hence also more fully resolved: By payment is meant, either Holiness or The Idem or Tantundem. Suffering. And 1. This showeth that Christ's Obedience was not materially the same with ours (as aforesaid). 2. And I before proved that a great, and the far greatest part of our punishment was such as Christ could never suffer; either permitted Sin itself, or desertion by the Spirit of Holiness, or divine displeasure and hatred, or accusations of Conscience, etc. 3. And the Law binding only the Sinner, and not any Surety to suffer, and every man personally to obey, most clearly it is not Idem qu●d debetur, were it but merely because it is not ejusdem or per eundem. 149. Indeed solution of the Debt, and satisfaction strictly taken thus ●iffer, that satisfaction is solutio tantidem, vel aequivalentis alias indebi●i. And if Christ be said to have paid the very same duty and punishment which the Law required, he is denied to have satisfied for our nonpayment: For a Law that is fully performed can require no more, nor the Lawgiver neither: And therefore both Satisfaction and Pardon are shut ●ut. 150. It is not properly the Law which is satisfied, but the Law-giver ●s above Law as is said: But yet improperly the Law may be said to be satisfied in that the ends of the Lawgiver in it are obtained. 151. Though I own much thanks to God for what, near thirty years go, I learned from Grotius de satisfact. yet I must say that in this great question, whether Christ satisfied God for Sin as Domino absoluto, vel ●● parti laesae, vel ut Rectori, which he asserteth alone, I take him to come ●●ort of accurateness and soundness; And that this is the truth. God is to man, 1. Dominus absolutus, that is, our Owner. 2. Rector ●premus. 3. Amicus, Benefactor: vel Pater & finis. Sin is against God in all these three Relations: 1. As our Owner, it is a denying him and alienating his own quoad usum. 2. As Rector, it breaketh his Law. 3. As ●●r Lover and End, it is a departing from him. For 1. As our Owner, we we him total resignation and use as such. 2. As our Ruler, we own him subjection and Obedience as such. 3. As our Friend (Benefactor & Ama●●lissimus) we own him Gratitude and Love as such (which yet is part ●f Obedience too.) Now Sin being the privation of all this, God is to ●e satisfied for it as such, in all these three Relations; And is pars laesa ●● all these three Relations, that is, he is injured, though not hurt. It is ●●ue, that Government and punishing Justice, formally as such, belong to God only as Rector. And satisfaction is made him eminently in that Relation; yet also to compensate the injury done by sin to him in the other too Relations also. SECT. IX. Of the nature and distinctions of Justification. 152. Justification is a word of many significations, the Scheme whereof And 1. Of constitutive Justification. should I give them all, would seem to most Readers a troublesome distinguishing. Therefore I take up with these three most notable senses. ●. Justification constitutive: 2. Sentential: 3. Executive. The first is to make a man righteous; The second is to judge him righteous; The third is to use him as righteous. 1. By Impunity; 2. Reward. * The Papists are confounded in the point of Justification, by sticking to confounding words: They talk of Justification and remission of sin, but cannot tell men intelligibly what they mean. They say that Remission is a putting away the sin itself, and not only the Reatum poenae, and yet say (many) that it may be done without any physical change of the Sinner. 1. By sin they mean, not the Habit; for that cannot be removed without a physical change. 2. Nor the act▪ For that is past as soon as done. 3. When they say it is macula moralis habitualiter remanens; they talk gibberish and play with a metaphor, and the word [habitualiter;] A true habit is quid physicum, and what macula is they can tell no man besides a habit, disposition, privation ●r relation: If they mean that it is the Reatus culpae, or culpability that is done away, and not only the Reatus poenae, they hold ●he same thing which they oppose in those Protestants that go too far from them. And it is not sound: For the pardoned Sin●er will be culpable, though not punishable for ever; that is, will be really the man that sinned; and it will be an everlasting truth, This man sinned, though he be pardoned: See Pet. a S. Joseph. Theol. Speculat. l. 4. c. 10. pag. 509, 510, 511. The Papists say, Homo est formaliter justus per formam gratiae ipst ex●ri●secam, & non tantum per justitiam Christi illi imputatam: And yet [Nullus actus quantumvis perfectus sive sit▪ contritio, sive Amor Dei super omnia, est caus● formalis justificationis: Patres di●entes charitatem esse perfectam justitiam, intelligendi sunt dispositive, non autem formaliter. Because it is in the Habit, and not in the Act, ●r rather as others of them say in some internal inclination antecedent to the habits of Faith, Hope and Love, that they place Justification, or as we call it, Sanctification, Pet. a S. Joseph. Thes. Univers. de great. Hab. pag. 88, 89. 153 God never judgeth a man righteous (either by secret esteem or open sentence) till he have made him such. 154. To be made righteous, is to be justified in Law-sense; which is, To be justifiable (or justificandus) by sentence. 155. A man is righteous, 1. Particularly, secundum quid, as to some particular cause that he is accusable of. 2. Or universally as to all causes▪ 3. Or eminently, as to all those causes that Heaven or Hell depend upon. 156. 1. No man is universally righteous, really or reputatively. God judgeth no Saint in Heaven to be one that never sinned: And he that hath once sinned, is unavoidably under the Relation of ●●●● that sinned, to eternity, ex necessitate existentiae: which Relation is the very Reatus ipsius peccati; though all the ill effects be remitted. 157. 2. Every man hath some particular righteousness. For the worst man may be falsely accused, and be righteous as to that false accusation But this will not save him. 158. 3. That eminent Righteousness necessary to our Salvation, though it be not universal or perfect (else we should never be afflicted by chastisements or denials of Grace, or permissions to sin); yet is it at least perfect as to its proper use, and to our glorious perfection; And may be called our universal Righteousness, because it is all that we have. And ●● consisteth not of any one or two Causes, but of many: Of which no o●● must be excluded or set against the rest. As there are several Allegatio●● or Accusations against us, so there must be several parts of the matter of our Justification. 159. Not only an actual Accusation, but a possible or a virtual o●●, which we are liable to, sufficeth to denominate Justification as its contrary, in the first Law-sense of Justification. 160. It is our Right to Impunity, and to the heavenly Glory, which is to be justified finally in Judgement; and our persons as the Subjects of that Right: And our Actions but mediately in order to that end. 161. It is only at the Bar of Christ as Redeemer, that we are to be judged and justified, and not by God only as a Creator. Therefore it is by the Law of Grace that we must be judged to life or death, finally, and not by the sole Law of Innocency. 162. Therefore no man is justified by the Law of Innocency, either by the preceptive or retributive part: But we are justified only by the L●● or Covenant of Grace, against the Accusation which may be brought against us from the Law of Innocency: Against it; not by it. 163. We are liable to all these following Accusations, which will ope● to us the correlate Justifications, and the matter of each part. 1. It may be said by the Accuser of the Brethren, [Thou art a Si●●●●, against the Precepts of Nature and Grace.] He that denieth this is a Liar▪ Against this Charge there is no Justification for ever. But we must ●● Heaven confess that we have sinned: but Glory be to him that washed ●s from our sins in his blood (by Pardon and Sanctifiation.) 164. 2. Next it may be said, that [We did deserve Hell by our Sin.] This also is to be confessed for ever. 165. 3. It may be said, that by God's Law of Innocency Hell is ou● due, and therefore we are to be condemned to it. To this, we deny the consequence; because we have right to Impunity and to Glory, freely given us by God our Redeemer by a Covenant of Grace, merited for us, by the Obedience and Satisfaction given for us by Christ our Saviour. Where note, that here in this first part of our Justification, there are all these conjunct necessary Causes. 1. God's Love and Mercy giving: 2. Christ's Righteousness and Satisfaction meriting. 3. The Covenant instrumentally giving. 4. Right to Impunity and Glory (by Justification and Adoption conjunct) the thing given: which Right is our very Righteousness against ●his Accusation; that is, a relation, whence the other relation of just and justifiable resulteth: (For if you will not here see relations resulting from relations, pretend not to true accurateness in your search.) 166. These four Causes now were enough to constitute, and so prove ●s righteous against the Charge of being damnandi, if we were questionable no further. But the turning point of the day is yet behind; 1. Our allegation of Justification by Christ and the Covenant may be denied. ●t may be said by the Accuser, that the Covenant justifieth none but ●enitent Believers, and giveth plenary Right to Glory to none but saints ●nd persevering Conquerors, and that we are none such. Against this Accusation we must be justified or perish; else all the rest will be uneffectual. And here to say, that it is true, I died an impeninent Person, ●n Insidel, Hypocrite, or Ungodly, but Christ was a penitent Believer for Of our own personal performance, or righteousness, how far necessary to our Justification. ●e, or sincere and holy for me, or that he died to pardon this,] all this will ●e false and vain. Christ's Merits and Satisfaction is not the Righteousness itself which must justify us against this Accusation; But our own personal Faith, Repentance, sincere Holiness and Perseverance,] purchased ●y Christ, and wrought by the Spirit in us, but thence, our own acts. Mr. W. Thomas of Ubley, in his Book against Speed the Quaker, saith, pag. 42. part. 2. [This is an old Popish trick to make much of the Doctrine of the St. James in a mistaken interpretation, and to lay aside the Doctrine of St. Paul, Rom. 3. 28. when they should join both together, and ascribe to Faith the justification of men as sinners, and to work their justification as Believers.] This is sound, and needeth but fuller explication. ●e that cannot truly say, The Accusation is false. I am a true Penitent, sanctified persevering Believer must be condemned and perish. Thus ●aith and Repentance are our Righteousness by which we must thus far ●e justified. 167. But this is but a particular mediate subservient Righteousness, ●nd part of our Justification, subordinate to Christ's Merits. 168. Yet this being the Condition on our part for our Participation ●n all the free Gifts of the Covenant; Scripture useth to describe God's judgement as enquiring after this. The great thing to be glorified in judgement is God's Love, Wisdom, Justice and Truth, and Christ's great Merits and performance in our Redemption; But the great thing questioned, accused, tried and judged will be our performance of the Covenant of Grace as to our conditions. The day is not to try God whether he be ●ust, or Christ, whether his Merits and Satisfaction were sufficient; and whether he have done his part: But to try man whether, 1. He have ●rue Right to Impunity and Glory. 2. Whether he have performed the Condition on which the Covenant giveth that Right, and be indeed the ●rue Receiver of it. The Devil's hope cannot lie at all, in proving Christ or the Covenant faulty, or defective on their part; but in proving ●s to be none of the persons that have Right. This therefore is the Righteousness mentioned, Matth. 25. and of Faith imputed, Rom. 4, & c. ●nd elsewhere. 169. But if we will speak of Righteousness and Justification entirely, ●s that which containeth all its Causes, we must set all the five forementioned together, giving each one its proper place, and no one the ●lace or office of the rest. And give leave to the self-conceited, peevish, ignorant, blindly to revile you, for saying that you join your Faith and Holiness to make one Righteousness with that of Christ, as if it were not sufficient. And tell him, that Christ's Righteousness is not ours absolutely in itself, but to and in the proper effects: And that it is perfect as to its ●roper ends; And that he never intended it to this end, to be instead of Faith and Holiness in us, nor to make them needless to our Salvation. 170. No man must ascribe any thing to his own Faith or Holiness i● the least degree, which is proper to, 1. God's Mercy or Grace. 2. To Christ, or his Righteousness or Merits. 3. Or to the Covenant: not any thing but its proper part: And that must be granted it. 171. It is a vain Fiction in them that think our Right to Justification or Impunity, and our Right to Salvation, have not the same causes and conditions, but that our own Repentance and Obedience is a condition of our Right to Salvation, but not to Impunity or forgiveness. Whereas ou● very Justification is a justifying of our Right to Salvation, and the same Covenant giveth them conjunctly on the same conditions. 172. But our Right to both as begun, hath less for the condition th●● our Right to them as continued and perfected. For our believing▪ consent to the Baptismal-Covenant putteth us into immediate Right to all the benefits of the Covenant which we are then capable of, but not to all that we shall be made further capable of hereafter; we are pardoned, and should be glorified, if we presently died: But as we have more Grace to receive, so we have more Duty to perform as a means, yea a condition, of obtaining it. 173. This (overlookt by many) is much to be considered, both as to the case of Infants baptised, and the Adult. Many wonder that the What right the Covenant giveth to the after-helps and degrees of Grace. Children of godly Parents prove oft so bad, as if by the Baptismal-Covenant they had received nothing from God. But the Synod of Dort, Art. 1. §. 17. well concludeth that godly Parents have no cause to doubt of the Election or Salvation of their Children dying in Infancy, they being holy and in the same Covenant with their Parents. But the continuance of God's Grace hath a continued condition and means to be used on our part. The condition which the Covenant requireth to an Infants first Justification, is, [that he be the Child of a true Believer, by him dedicated to God]. And as the first Condition is to be found in the Parent (or Owner) so must the Condition of continued Grace as long as the Child continueth an Infant. And that is the continuance of the Parents Faith, and his faithful performance of his promise made to educate his Child in the way of God: But if the Parents should presently both turn Infidels, and so educate their Child, and give him up as the Janissaries are, to an Infidel to educate, I know God may nevertheless give him Grace above his Promise if he please (for a Benefactor as such is free): but I know of no assurance of it by Promise. For in Baptism both Parties were obliged for the future, and not one only. And if when the Child cometh to the use of Reason he wilfully reject and resist God's Grace, and break his Covenant, he forfeiteth God's further Grace. And I have noted, 1. That most Children which I have seen very early wicked, have been such whose Parents grossly neglected their Duty and Covenant as to a holy prudent careful Education of them; as if God must needs save their Children, because they were the Children of Believers, who thus betrayed them. 2. And those that were well educated by their Parents, usually show hopeful signs at first, till their own lusts grow up, and deceive, and overthrow them. The nature of the mutual Covenant, and the sad experience of the case of many baptised Children, maketh me incline to this Opinion; which I do not peremptorily assert, but humbly propose to better judgements with submission: ●ut whatever we say of the Parents, I doubt not but to the person at age, future benefits have future conditions. 174. Though God's Decree is that his Elect shall persevere, yet I conceive (with submission to better information) that the Baptismal-Covenant as such doth not absolutely promise or give right to so much Grace as shall certainly cause the baptised to persevere; that is, all that are rightfully baptised (even coram Deo as well as coram Ecclesia) have not perseverance secured to them by baptism. But only the Holy Ghost is given to them by Covenant to be their Sanctifier, and carry on his work to their Salvation, if they will use those means which God hath appointed, and doth enable them to use, in attendance on his Spirit. Though Election infer the certainty of perseverance, I never saw their assertions proved, who say, 1. That if Adam had once obeyed (say some) or overcome that one Temptation (say others) God promised confirmation to him and all his Posterity▪ 2. That the Baptismal-Covenant promiseth confirmation and certain perseverance to all the baptised, regenerate or justified. What God doth, I am not now questioning; but what in that Covenant he promiseth to do. 175. It is plain in the Scripture, that when men are converted and baptised, the particular helps of Grace are promised them upon further particular conditions: And that the continuance of Pardon and Right to Life, is promised them upon the continuance of their Faith, and use of means; And that actual Glorification is promised them on condition of overcoming and persevering: And therefore that we must use and take all these as conditions. 176. It is ordinary with some Writers and Preachers to tell men, What must be in ourselves. that no part of their Righteousness is in themselves; and with others, that at least none which they are justified by in any part is in them; and that it is all in Christ only: And that nature is loath to yield to this, but thinketh it a fine thing to have some little part of the honour to itself: And as to the honour of a good Action, if it be but 999 parts that it ascribeth to God, and taketh one part of a thousand to ourselves, it is a dangerous arrogation: we must have none.] This well explained, may be made sound: But thus grossly delivered, it is but a popular cheat under the taking pretence of self-abasement and giving Christ all. The Devil is as willing as any one, that you should have nothing honourable or praiseworthy in you: and be as vile as he can make you. It is God who honoureth those that honour him, and praiseth his Saints as the excellent on Earth, and his Jewels and peculiar Treasure, adorned with his own lovely Image, and partakers of the Divine Nature, and members of Christ, as his own Flesh: And it is Satan and wicked men that vilify and dishonour them. And I have oft lamented it, that these very men that hold this kind of Doctrine of self-abasement, as having no part of Righteousness, nor share at all in any good work, are yet too oft so proudly conceited of their own goodness (even for holding that they have none for which they are praiseworthy) as that their pride is no small trouble to the Churches and all about them. 177. whatever is of God is good: and whatever is good is laudable or praiseworthy, and meriteth to be esteemed as it is. 178. All the sanctified are inherently righteous: But with an imperfect righteousness, which will no further justify them in Judgement, save only against this Accusation, that they are unholy. 179. There is no Righteousness which will not justify him that hath it, in tantum, so far as he is righteous: For the contrary is a contradiction. For to be just is to be justifiable: He that gave but six pence to the poor is justifiable against this Accusation, that he did not give it. 181. All the Righteousness which formally justifieth us, is our own or on ourselves where it justifyeth us: For to be made just or justified in the I would here cite the words of B●za, Paraeus, Dr. Field, Bonhaus, B●llinger, Alberius, Zanchy, Aepinus, Spang●●bergius, Brentius, Confess. Augustan. etc. Asserting that [Justification] is oft used as Sanctification in Scripture, and that plenary Justification hath three parts, 1. Pardon. 2. Accepting us into favour and life. 3. The gift of the Holy Ghost, or inherent righteousness] but that Guil. Forbes hath largely done it. Consid. Pacific. 2 Thes. 1. 9, 10. first sense constitutively, is nothing else but to be made such as are personally themselves just. Pardon of sin is made our own; Right to Christ and Glory is made our own; Though Christ's Righteousness was the only meritorious cause of all this; which therefore is and may be called our Material Righteousness, as that which meriteth it is the matter. 182. He that is no cause of any good work, is no Christian, but a damnable wretch, and worse than any wicked man I know in the world: And he that is a Cause of it, must not be denied falsely to be a cause of it: Nor a Saint denied to be a Saint, upon a false pretence of sel●denyal. 183. As God is seen here in the Glass of his works, so he is to be loved and praised as so appearing: Therefore he that dishonoureth his work dishonoureth God, and hindereth his due love and praise; And his most lovely and honourable work on earth, is his holy Image on his Saints▪ And as Christ will come to be admired and glorified in them at last, so God must be seen and glorified in them here in some degree. And to deny the Glory of his Image is the malignant's way of injuring him, and that in which the worst will serve you. He that will praise God as Creator and Redeemer must praise his works of Creation and Redemption: And is it the way of praising him as our Sanctifier to dispraise his work of Sanctification? 184. Those poor Sinners of my acquaintance who lived in the grosse●● sins against Conscience (as Drunkenness, Whoredom, etc.) have been glad enough of such doctrine, and forward enough to believe, that there is nothing in man that in any part can justify him, or that i● any part of righteousness, but it is all out of us in Christ, and therefore they are as justifiable as any: But Conscience will not let them believe it as they desire. 185. It is arrogant folly to divide the praise of any good act between God and Man, and to say God is to have so many parts, and Man so many: For the whole is due to God, and yet some is due to Man: For man holdeth his honour only in subordination to God, and not dividedly in co-ordination: And therefore all is due to God: For that which is Man's is Gods, because we have nothing but what we have received. But he that arrogateth any of the honour due to God or Christ, offendeth. 186. If all had been taken from God's honour which had been given to the Creature, God would have made nothing, or made nothing Good;- Heaven and Earth, and all the World would derrogate from his honour; and none of his Works should be praised: And the better any man is, the more he would dishonour God; and the wickeder the les●. But he made all Good, and is Glorious in the Glory, and honourable in the honour of all: And to justify the holiness of his Servants is to justify him. 187. If these Teachers mean that no man hath any power freely to specify the Acts of his own will, by any other help of God, besides necessitating predetermining premotion, and so that every man doth all that he can do, and no man can do more than he doth; They dishonour God by denying him to be the Creator of that Free-power, which is essential to man, and which God himself accounteth it his honour to create. And they feign God to damn and blame all that are damned and blamed, for as great Impossibilities, as if they were damned and blamed for not making a world, or for not being Angels. 188. Thus also such men, teach that Christ strippeth a Christian of two things, His Sins, and his Righteousness: Or that Two things must be That all that are saved have inherent Righteousness or Holiness, none of us all deny: nor yet that in tantum we are Righteous by it: Nor that a man accused as being an Infidel, Atheist, Impenitent, ungodly, an Hypocrite, etc. must be justified by pleading all the contraries in himself, or else perish: And all agree that this inherent Righteousness is imperfect, and in us found with sin: and therefore that no man can be justified by it without pardon of sin; nor at all against the charge of being a sinner, and condemnable by the Law of Innocency. And what remaineth then, but to trouble the world with contending the nomine, whether this imperfect Righteousness shall be called Righteousness: and the giving of it called Justifying or making us righteous so far? cast away, for Christ; Sins and Righteousness: But they should speak better, if they would not deceive; nothing is to be cast away as evil but Sin. Righteousness, truly such, is Good, and never to be cast away. If it be no Righteousness, why do they falsely say that we must cast away our Righteousness. To cast away a false conceit of Righteousness, is not to cast away Righteousness, but Sin only. Indeed besides Sin, we are said justly to cast away that which would be the Object and Matter of Sin: And the phrase is fitlyer applied to a thing Indifferent, than to a thing necessary, lest it seduce. There is nothing so Good, which may not be made the object of Sin, not Christ or his Righteousness, or God himself excepted; But we must not therefore say that we must cast away God or Christ, because we must not thus objectively abuse them: So Holiness and true Righteousness (Inherent or imputed) may be objects of sinful pride and boasting; But it is not edifying Doctrine therefore to say that we must cast away Inherent and Imputed Righteousness: But yet true self-denial requireth that we deny our Righteousness (Inherent or Imputed) to be that which indeed it is not. And so when men accounted the Jewish observations to be a Justifying Righteousness in competition with, and in opposition to Christ, Paul counteth it as loss, and dung, and nothing in that respect: when yet elsewhere he saith, I have lived in all good Conscience to this day. And Christ himself fulfilled that Law and Righteousness. So if a man will conceit, that his common Grace will justify him without Holiness, or his Holiness, without Pardon and the Righteousness of Christ, he must deny this Righteousness; that is, he must deny it to be what it is not, and must cast away (not it, but) the false conceits of it: And so if any Libertine will say that Christ's Righteousness imputed to him, will justify him, without faith, or be instead of Holiness to him, he must deny Imputed Righteousness thus, to be what indeed it is not. 189. When we tell them, that, If we had fulfilled all the Law reputatively More against the wrong sense of Imputation; confuting many Sophisms. by Christ as our Legal person, we could not be bound to further obedience to it, They answer, that we are not bound to obey to the same ends as Chhist, that is for Righteousness, or Justification or merit, but in Gratitude. But this is but to give us the cause, and ignorantly to destroy At quis unquam e nostris nos per justitiam Christi imputatam formaliter justificari, asseruit? Prideaux Lect. 5 the Just. cap. 4. their own. For, 1. This is but to say, that when a man is reputed to have fulfilled all the Law, yet it is to be reputed unfulfilled as to certain ends. As if he fulfilled all the Law that fulfilled it not to all due ends: 2. Or as if the Law obliged one man to fulfil it twice over for the same life's time; once simply and in all its obligations, and another time for other ends. 3. Or as if the Law required any more than absolute perfection. 4. Or that absolute perfection had not been in Christ's holy The Papists concur with them that feign a middle state between Just and privatively unjust, viz. not just negatively, so Brianson in 4. q. 8. Cor. 3. fol. 145. at large: But they can give us no instance but in a stone or other incapable creature, that is not obliged: And we confess that if a man can be found that is not obliged to be Just, he is neither just nor (Privatively, but Negatively) unjust: But what's this to our case? And the Papists commonly join with them, that say that God remitteth not only the Reatum vel Obligationem ad poenam, but also the Reatum culpae in se; But when they come to open it, they mean but that God is not displeased with, or hath not a punishing Will against the Sinner: As if they knew not that as God's Love is our chief reward, so his displeasure is our chief punishment; And that Remission doth make no change in God, but by taking away Gild of God's hatred and other punishment, God then is reconciled because they are not objects of his hatred: And to take away the Reatum poenae and the Reatum culpae, non in se, sed quoad poenam is all one, and all that both sides mean if they understand what they say. But to all eternity it will be true, that we once sinned, which none deny. obedience. 5. Or as if there were any obedience whose end is not Righteousness and Justification, against the change of the contrary disobedience. Do not these men obey that they may be so far righteous? Or is not every man so far Righteous as he doth Righteousness? Is not every man that loveth God justifiable as a Lover of him for so far as he loveth him? 6. And is not Gratitude an end, and a thing commanded by the Law? If we obeyed perfectly in Christ, we were perfectly thankful in Christ. 7. But if they say that Christ fulfilled only the Law made to Adam for us, and not his own Law of Grace, and therefore that he obeyed for us, only to the ends of that Law; I answer, 1. If the ends and matter of that Law be fulfilled by us in him, our obedience to any other must be needless: For he that is supposed never to have sinned, need not use any means for pardon or remedy. 2. By this rule Christ only fulfilled the Law for Adam, and Eve, and for us only as we were in them, which is only Virtually and not Actually at all; but not at all for us according to any obligation that ever fell upon our persons. For, 1. We were never personally bound to perfect personal perpetual obedience as the Condition of life; For that Covenant as to the promise and condition ceased before any man was born. 2. And all the duty in the world which ●● are bound to, is to be done for Evangelical ends; for recovering Grace, and unto Gratitude, etc. To say therefore that we are perfectly Righteous, as having perfectly obeyed all God's Law in Christ, and yet that we are bound to obey all that Law that ever we were under to another end; and that Christ obeyed for us only as to that which we were never under personally but virtually in Adam, this is to say and unsay. 8. Lastly, they see not that their own answer implieth the truth of what we assert; and is the same that we give; which their cause is uncapable of: ●● We say, that Christ did indeed most perfectly obey the Law of Innocency, so far for us and in our stead (though not in our persons) as that he hath vindicated the truth and glory of God and his Law, by doing that which we should have done and did not: And hath merited for us a better Covenant, which obligeth us not at all to obey for the ends of the first Covenant, viz. that our perfection might be our Righteousness, or the condition of life; but only to obey for the ends of the new Covenant, for the obtaining and improving of Recovering Grace, and Salvation by Christ freely given us: which we ourselves must do or perish. 190. And whereas they tell us that [We may as well say that man must not die because Christ died for us, as not obey because Christ obeyed for us,] They strangely use our reason against themselves and know it not. For we say that we must die because we did not perfectly either obey the Law or suffer all its penalty by Christ as our legal person: But he suffered only to satisfy Justice in tantum● to this end, that man himself suffering death and temporal afflictions, and obeying the Law of Grace, might be saved from all the rest of the punishment. But if we had so fulfilled the Law as aforesaid, by Doing or suffering, we could not have died nor suffered the least affliction as a penalty. For all punishment in the essence of the ●elation is for sin. 191. And when they say that [It is no more inconvenient to say that Christ was perfect in our person, than that he satisfied in our person and we by him.] I answer, 1. Both are false and subvert the Gospel, as aforesaid. 2. But yet we may fitly say that Christ suffered in the person of a Sinner; but mark the sense. 1. Suffering as penal belongeth to a Sinner as such: But Satisfaction is an Effect of Christ's suffering, which resulteth not from the mere suffering, nor from the person of a Sinner: but from the Will and Covenant of God made to that excellent person who was God and perfect Man. So that it is not so aptly said, He satisfied, as it is that he suffered, in the person of a Sinner. 2. Note that it is not any other man's person that we mean that Christ suffered in, but his own. And we mean that he took upon him the person of a Sinner himself▪ in as much as he consented to suffer for Sin. And so personating here is not meant becoming any other man's person in Law sense, so as that other legally suffered what he did; But it is only his own persons becoming a sufferer in the stead of Sinners for their Sins: As the Apostle saith, He was made sin for us, so he might as truly have said, He was made a sinner for us; that is, so far by Imputation, as that he undertook to suffer as Sinners suffer, and for their sins. But because wordy controversies seeming real, are the great trouble●s of the world, lest any should think that we differ more than indeed we do, I would fain bring the matter as far from under the ambiguity of words as possibly I can. To which end I further add, 1. That as we hold that Adam was the Natural Root or Parent of Mankind; so also that Christ was the Foederal Root of all the saved, and in several respects (though not all) a second Adam. 2. Adam was but one single Natural person, nor did God (by error or arbitrary reputation) esteem or account him to be any other than he was. None of our persons were distinct persons in Adam, nor those persons that now they are: Therefore we were not so personally in him at his fall: But all our persons are in time and mediately by our Progenitors derived lineally from him (yet we deny not all Souls to be from God, and all Bodies an accretion of the common Elements); not as having been Persons existent in him, but being Persons caused remotely by him. Our present Persons were seminally or virtually in him; which is as much as to say, that not the Person, but the Semen Personae vel virtus causalis was in him: To be only Virtually, or Causally or Seminally in Adam, is in proper speech for that Person not really to have been in him: For Causa non est effectus, & Virtus generativa non est Persona generata: To be only Virtually in Adam is terminius diminuens as to personal inexistence, and denyeth it. And as Dr. Twisse hath oft well asserted, It is our natural relation to Adam supposed in God's Law, which is the reason of our participation in his Sin, and not any Will or Judgement of God, without or beyond our Natural interest: For else it should be God most properly who by his arbitrary imputation should either make us Sinners, or repute us such when we are none. But yet when we become Persons, it is by Derivation from Adam, and so the effect can be no better than the cause, and as soon as we are Persons we are Guilty persons, having Gild with personality from him, though we were not persons in him. 3. So Christ is, though not the Natural, yet the Federal Adam or Root of Believers: when he satisfied and merited, we were not in him either as in Adam seminally, as in a natural Generator, nor as existent Persons, nor did God falsely so repute us to be: But he was then the Cause (materially) or had that Virtus effectiva, which would Justify, and Sanctify, and Glorify us in due time. It was the Nature of Sinners, though not a sinful Nature which he assumed; But that Nature which he undertook was existent in his Individual person: and no other Individual person was existent in his existent personal Nature: So that when we say it was the common Nature of Man, we mean only specifice, that Nature which is of the same Species with all other men's, but not that which existed individually in any but himself; and a Species extra individuum is nothing but an ens rationis, or a notion. But it was individual Persons in whose stead or place Christ suffered, and whom he undertook to Justify, Sanctify, and Save, and gather into a holy Society to that end; and to that end he undertook and performed his office, and merited all this by his perfect righteousness: So that hereby he made Himself a Federal Head and Root of a holy Society (his Church): And whenever any person doth Believe and is united federally to him, he than receiveth the effects of that which was before in Christ as a Virtus effectiva. The Law made to Adam or to us, did not assign Christ to this office, nor oblige him to suffer or merit for sinners according to it: Therefore by so doing he fulfilled not the Law as it obliged us; that is, by that obligation, nor suffered by that obligation which bond us to suffer; But by the obligation of his own Consent, and that Law which was peculiar to himself as to the formal obligation, though materially he was bound by it to fulfil the Law of Nature and of Moses. The Law of Innocency then or Works, took not Christ for the Civil or Legal Person of such Sinner, or Believer, no more than it made him such. 4. As God's Law to the Mediator made him this office, so Christ's Law of Grace doth quoth jus & Relationem give to every true believing Covenanter, first, Christ himself in union to be their federal Head, and with him title to his Grace, Spirit and Glory. And now they are Personally and actually his federal Subjects, Friends, and Members; and have right to all his conferred gifts. 5. But this right floweth not immediately to them, from what Christ did or suffered for them; but from his Law or Covenant of Grace, by which as his Donative and Ruling Instrument he conveyeth that title to them. 6. And therefore they have no right before the Time, nor any but on the Conditions and Measure specified in that Covenant or Law; so that Righteousness is not theirs because it is Christ's, nor in the manner or measure and to the ends of the donation. 7. This much containeth the matter of this Doctrine of the Collation and Imputation of Christ's righteousness, still remembering that as no one till he was a Person, could be a person-guilty of Adam's sin; not when he was a person, any sooner than he was also guilty of his own inherent pravity, and none that had the use of Reason was guilty of either or both these only, without the guilt of his own Actual Sin, and all three together, (1. Adam's sin justly imputed to us, 2. And our innate Pravity, 3. And our actual Sin) are the parts which constitute our plenary guilt; even so no one till he is a Believer is related as a Member of a Perfectly Righteous Saviour; and that is done no sooner (in time) that he hath the Inherent Righteousness of his personal faith and federal consent; and that obligeth him to the further active righteousness of a holy life, and all these three conjunct (though not coordinate) make up the total Righteousness of a Saint, viz. 1. Our Relation to Christ in Union as to a perfectly Righteous Head, who fulfilled all righteousness for us to mer●● our Justification (which is called Christ's Righteousness Imputed to us, as being thus far reputed ours). 2. And our penitent believing consent to his Covenant, which is the condition of the foresaid Relation to Christ. 3. And our after Sanctification and obedience to Christ's Law. 8. And when we are commonly thus far agreed of the Matter, if any will contend for their self-coyned phrases and words, and not being content to call Christ our Redeemer, Saviour, Teacher, King, Priest, Head, Lord, Testator, Sponsor or Surety, Ransom, Price, Sacrifice, etc. as the Scripture doth, will needs plead that he is or was our Person, or was holy, obedient, suffered in our Persons, Legal or Civil, or was our Substitute, Delegate, Instrument, etc. his contention will be both corrupting and dividing: And yet I will acknowledge that among Lawyers the word [Person] hath so many senses, that in some of them (were they our way of speech here) it might be said that Christ did in some things personate each Sinner, or each believer, limitedly, in tantum & ad hoc, & non simpliciter, aut ad omnia: And all verbal quarrel I would shun even with them that speak ineptly, and dangerously, and injuriously to ●he truth and Church, so they will but by a sound and necessary explication vouchsafe us an Antidote against the hurtful tendency of their phrases. 9 Obj. If Christ's person be given us, than his personal Righteousness is given us with it. Ans. Yes, as his Person is: He is not given us as Proprietors and Lords to become our Own at our dispose: Nor is his Person made one Person with each or any of us: His Person is not turned ●nto ours, nor ours into his: As the Husband is not the person of the Wife, nor the King of each Subject; But as one that hath a Great, Wise, Learned, Bountiful, Holy King or Husband, hath also his Greatness, Wisdom, Learning, Bounty and Holiness, as they have him; that is, As his perfections for their good as far as his Relation binds him, but not as ●f his endowments, were removed from him to them, or falsely reputed to ●e in them, or his person to be their persons; so here, as we have a Christ, ●o we have a perfect Righteous Christ given us to be our federal Head when we believe; and the Righteousness which is not in us but in him is ●urs, so far as to be for our Good, as far as his Office and Covenant do oblige him: So that a Righteous Christ, and therefore the Righteousness of Christ are ours, Relatively themselves, quoad jus beneficis, so as ●hat we have right to these Benefits by them, which we shall possess: ●nd for the merits of his Righteousness we are conditionally justified and saved before we believe, and actually after: But are not accounted to be Christ, nor the Legal Actors of what he did, nor Christ accounted to be each of us. SECT. V Merit. 192. The great Controversy about humane Merits, which hath made ●o great a noise in the world, is of so easy solution, that I can scarce Confess. August. Art. 6. Semper sentiendum est, nos consequt remissionem peccatorum & personam pran●nciari justam id est acceptari, gratis propter Christum per fidem; postea vero placere etiam obedientiam erga legem, & reputari quandam Justiciam, & mereri praemia. Et Art. de Bon. operib. [Quanquam hac nova obedientia procul abest a perfectione legis, tamen est ●us●i●ia & meretur praemia, ideo quia personae reconciliatae s●nt. It a d● operibus judicandum est quae ampliss●●i● la●dibu● or●anda sunt quod sint necessariá, quod sint cultus Dei, & Sacrificia spiri●●alia & mereantur praemia. Ib. Ex●recitatio nostra & conservat ea. & meretur incrementum uxta illud Habenti dabitur: & Augustinus praeclare dixit, Dilectio ●er●ur incrementum dilectionis, cum viz▪ exercetur. Habent enim bon● apera Praemia cum in hac vita, tum post hanc vitam in vita aterna● ●hink but almost all sober understanding Christians in the world are ●greed in sense, while they abhor each others opinions as ill expressed or misunderstood. Distinguish but, 1. Of Commutative Justice, and Distributive Governing Justice. 2. And of Governing Justice according ●o God's several Laws, of Innocency, Mosaical Works, and of Grace. ●. And of Justifying and Meriting simply, and comparatively; And the case is so plain, that few things are more plain to us, that Christians controvert, Viz. 1. To dream of meriting from God by any Creature, Man, or Angel, in point of Commutative Justice, is blasphemy and madness; that is, That we can give him any thing that shall profit him, or which is not absolutely his own, as a compensation for what he giveth us. He maketh himself a God that asserteth this of himself. 2. To say that any since Ad●● save Christ, doth merit of God in point of Governing Justice, according to the Law of Innocency, is a falsehood: And he that saith, He b●●● no sin, is a liar. 3. To say that we can merit pardon, or Justification, o● Salvation merely by observing Moses Law, was the Jew's pernicious erro●. 4. To say that our faith and performance of the conditions of the new Covenant, doth merit by the retributive Sentence of the old Covenant; or that it is in whole or part any meritorious Cause that God gave the world a Saviour, or that Christ freely pardoneth and justifieth us all conditionally by the new Covenant, or that it supposeth not Christ's Righteousness to be the total sole meritorious Cause of that pardoning Covenant, and all the benefits as thereby conditionally given; All this is gross contradiction. 5. To deny subordinate Comparative Merit, or Rewardableness, as from Gods Governing distributive paternal Justice according to the Covenant of Grace, consisting in the performance of the condition of that Covenant, and presupposing Christ's total merits as aforesaid, i● to subvert all Religion and true Morality, and to deny the scope of all the Scriptures, and the express assertion of an Evangelical worthiness, which is all that this [Merit] signifieth: To say nothing of contradicting Catholic antiquity, and hardening the Papists against the truth. 193. This Comparative Merit, is but such, as a thankful Child hath towards his Father who giveth him a purse of Gold on condition th●● he put off his hat, and say, I thank you, who deserveth it in Comparison of his Brother, who disdainfully or neglectfully refuseth it. This last being absolutely said to Deserve to be without it; but the former only comparatively said to deserve to have it as a free gift. 194. And those that reject the saying of some Papists who in thi● sense, say that Christ merited that we might merit, placing our Evangelical merit in a mere subordination to Christ's, do but show what prejudice and partiality can do, and harden those who perceive their errors. 195. Some man may think that the high things required in the Gospel, self-denial, forsaking all, running, striving, working, loving, overcoming, Whether faith be not the mere Acceptance of a free gift according to its Nature? Against Merit, read of Papists Waldens. de Sacram. tit. 1. Gregor. Armin. 1. d. 17. q. 1. a. 2. Durand. 1. d. 27. q. 2. Marsil. 2. d. 27. Brugers. in Psal. 35. Eckins in Centur. de Praedest. Et inquit Fr. a Sancta Clara Deus, Nat. Grat. p. 138. tribuitur etiam Cusano, nec longe differt Stapletonus nostras Leg. & Suarez in 3. p. Tho. Disp. 10. Sect. 7. q. 3. See the Thomists sense of Merit, in Lud. Carbo Tho. Compend. 1. 2. q. 23. art. 4. p. 240. etc. are more than the mere Receiving of a free Gift. But, 1. If it were so, yet our first faith would be no more, by which we are Justified from all the sins of our unregeneracy. 2. But upon consideration, it will all appear to be no more materially: For, 1. When we say that it is the Receiving of the free Gift, we must mean According to the Nature and to the use of that Gift. As if you be required to take food, the meaning is, to Eat it, and not to throw it away: If you be required to take such a man to be your King, your Master, your Tutor, your Husband, your Physician, etc. the meaning is, As such, to the use of his proper office. And so Accept of God as God, that is, our Absolute Owner, Ruler, and End, and Christ as our Saviour, Prophet, Priest and King, and the Holy Ghost as our Sanctifier to Illuminate, quicken and renew us, is the su● of all the Positives of the Gospel. 2. For this very Acceptance of them in this Nature, and to this Use, includeth the using of them after accordingly: And if we do not so use them, we thereby reject them, and lose our own benefit of them; as he that eateth not his meat, refuseth and loseth it; and he that weareth not his clothes; and he that learneth not of his Teacher. 3. And then Self-denial, and forsaking contraries, and resisting impediments, is but the same motus ut a termino a quo; And he that refuseth to come out of his Prison and Chains, refuseth his Liberty; and he refuseth the Gold, that will not cast away his handful of dirt to take it. So that really all is but a Thankful Accepting of the mercy of the new Covenant according to its nature and use as it is offered. 196. It is a great question whether a man may Trust to his own Faith, Of Trusting in our own faith, repentance, holiness, etc. Repentance or Holiness. But some men still trouble the world with unexplained words, where no sober men differ. No wise man can dream that we may Trust to these for more than their proper part; as that we may Trust them to do any thing proper to God, to Christ, to the Spirit, to the Promise, etc. And to use the phrase of Trusting to our own faith or Holiness when it soundeth absolutely, or may tempt the hearers to think that they may Trust them for God's part, or Christ's part, and Of which see more in my Life of Faith. Tollit gratia Meri●um: non quod omnino nihil agamus, sed quia non satisfacimus legi, & procul absumus a perfectione. Melancth. in Loc. Com. de lib. arb. c. 7. not only for their own, is a dangerous deceiving course. But that really they may be Trusted for their own part, and must be so, no sober person will deny: For so to believe, obey, pray to God, etc. and not to Trust to them in their place; that is, not to think that we shall be ever the better for them, is unbelief and indeed distrusting God, and saying, It is in vain to serve him, and what profit is it that we call upon him? And such diffidence and despair will end all endeavours: Let every man prove Gal. 6. his own work, and so shall he have rejoicing in himself and not in another. This is our Rejoicing the testimony of our Consciences that in simplicity 2 Cor. 1. 12. and Godly sincerity we have had our Conversation in the world. If we are Justified by faith, we may Trust to be Justified by it. But the rare use of such a phrase in Scripture, and the danger of it, must make us never use it without need. (As if we were disputing whether the Popish or Protestant Religion be that which a man may trust for his Salvation) or the like. And when ever it's used, it implieth our Trust in God and our Saviour only for their part. 197. To conclude this great point of Imputed and Inherent Righteousness, The last objection of the mistakers of Imputation. To save me that much labour of citations, I desire the Reader to see in Guil. Forbes. Consider. Pacific. the Concessions of Vega, Pighius, Stapleton, and other Papists about Imputation of Christ's Righteousness, as granting us all that Protestants mean (as Bellarmine expressly doth) as Davenant, Nigrinus, Joh. Crocius, and many others have observed. it may be objected, that The same man may well be judged a Sinner deserving hell, never fulfilling the Law, nor satisfying Justice, nor deserving Heaven, in himself; that is, in his Natural person, and yet be Judged one that never sinned, but fulfilled the Law, is perfectly holy and righteous, and merited Heaven in his Legal or Civil person, in and by Christ; To which I answer, One man is but one, and hath but one person. But if you take the word [Person] equivocally, as signifying another that is made like him in some respects, or that hath his Nature, or doth somewhat in his stead and for his benefit, as a second person, say so, and we will strive with no man about words: If you will say we are now on earth in our Natural persons, and are in Heaven in Christ; or that we are Redeemed in our Natural persons, but Redeemed ourselves in Christ; or that you are sick in your Natural person, and well in your person in Christ, etc. I like not your language; but there are scarce any words so bad, which a man may not put a good sense on. But we would be understood, and plainly ask, whether Christ was properly every sinners or believers person in Law-sence, so that ipso facto God accounteth us to have been habitually and actively perfect in Him, and to have merited and satisfied in him? If so, the Law can look on one man but as one: And he that paid a debt by his Servant or any other as his Legal person, cannot be required to do it again in his Natural person, unless you will say that God loveth our Legal person, and will save it, and may hate our Natural person and damn it. The Scripture useth no such contradictory subtleties as these. SECT. XI. How faith Justifieth. 198. The common saying that faith justifieth as an Instrument might pass as tolerable, if too many did not strain it to a wrong sense, and raise Note, that when we call faith an Accepting it relateth to the Donation of the Covenant and the Donatum, which is a Jus ad beneficia: Renovation is effected by faith as a second cause, but Pardon is Accepted by it: And we fully grant the Papists that Renovation and pardon go together, whatever they call them. And some of themselves do speak just as we the Remissione & Macula, which others are confounded about. Vid. Wotton's citations out of the Schoolmen de Macula: de Reconcil. pec. And Brianson saith (in 4. q. 8. fol. 116. that sin as ●emitted or guilt, is [Tantum quaedam Relatio rationis, in quantum est objectum intellectus & Voluntatis divinae: Quia postquam commissit peccatum Dei voluntas ordinat ipsum ad poenum correspondentem peccato, & Intellectus praevidet pro omni tempore donec poena debita sit soluta. Videre peceata Dei, est ad ●oenam imput●re: Avertere faciem est, ad poenam non reservare: August. — Ergo ni● aliud est post actum c●ssantem p●●catis off●nsa, Macula, reatus, nisi ista relatio rationis: S●d hujus Ordinatio ad ●oenam ut est disconveniens ipsi animae, dicitur ejus Macula: ut autem est obligatio formaliter ad istam poenam dicitur R●atus: Et ut est divinae voluntatis, etc. dic●tur Offensa: Nil [n] aliud est Offendi vel Irasci in Deo, quam v●lle Vindicare ista poena]: But he after owneth that the culpa is another thing. unwarrantable Doctrines from it, and harden the Papists by unwarantable Answers. A Justifying Instrument properly is an efficient Instrumental cause of Justification, which I have elsewhere too largely proved that faith is not, either God's Instrument or ours, Physical or Moral, no● any way efficiently justifieth us. But justifying, is one thing; to Receive justification is another thing, and to be justified is a third. Faith i● no justifying act: But faith is in its Essence the Acceptance of an offered God, Christ, Spirit, for Life: This Acceptance is by the Covenant made the condition of our passive true Reception and Possession of Right (before opened): To be such a Condition performed, is to be a removens prohibe●s of the said Reception: which is strictly to be Dispositio materiae recipienti●▪ And so it may be called, 1. A Receiving Cause. 2. And a medi●● or dispositive Cause of the effect, Justification as Received, but not as Given: (As I said Dr. Twisse chooseth to call it) But this causa Dispositiva is p●● of the causa Materialis, viz. Qua disposita: A cause, or more properly a condition why I receive Justification, and by receiving it am Justified; which is their meaning who call it A Passive Instrument, that is, A ●●ceiving Instrument. 199. The plain easy truth is, that Faith's Nature which is to be [●●lieving Acceptance of Christ, and Life offered on that Condition] being ●● very essence is but its Aptitude to the office it hath to our Justification▪ by which the Question is answered, why did God promise us Christ and Life ●● the Condition of faith rather than another? Because of the congruity of its Nature to that office. But the formal Reason of its office as to our Justification is Its Being the performed Condition of the Covenant. And if God had chosen another condition, a condition it would have been. Now the true notion in Law being a Condition, Logicians would call this improperly a Receiving cause, and more properly A Receptive Disposition of the matter, reducing it to Physical notions. But the most proper term is the plainest, [We are justified by that faith, which is the Believing Practical Acceptance of God the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, as Given us on that condition in the Baptismal Covenant, because (or as) it is made by God the condition of his Gift thereby]. Understand this plain doctrine, and you have the plain truth. 200. They that say contrarily that Faith justifieth proximately as it is an Instrument, or a Receiving Accepting act, and not as a Condition of the Covenant, do evidently choose that which they vehemently oppose▪ viz. that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere justifieth: For the very 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere or the ●●●● of Faith, is to be an Acceptance of Christ given. But if they will to avoid this, say that By Faith they mean [Christ believed in,] then they say that by Receiving Christ they mean not the receiving of him, but Christ himself: And why then do they not say so, but trouble the world with such unintelligible phrases: But to open the senselessness and co●sequents of that Doctrine would but offend. All know that Chri●●●● the object is connoted as essential to the act of Faith. SECT. XII. How Repentance is joined with Faith. 201. Repentance is a Dispositio materiae recipientis too, and a part of the condition of the Covenant: And so far a Material or dispositive Receiving Cause: But not an Acceptance of the Gift formally, in its averting act. 202. Faith and Repentance are words used in Scripture in divers significations. Saith Malderus, Gu. Amesius a part recedit ab antiquo Calvinismo, quiae requirit ad justitiam bonae oper● tanquam conditionem praerequisitam, quod ●tiam extendit ad ipsam ●lectionem.] See here how little the Papists understand us. As Faith is sometimes taken for bare Assent, as Jam. 2. and usually for Affiance or Trust, and always when it denominateth a Christian or Justified Believer as such, it essentially includeth all the three parts, Assent, Consent, and Affiance, but yet denominateth the whole by a word which principally signifieth One act (which commonly is Affiance as including the other two); so Repentance is sometime taken comprehensively for the whole Conversion of a Sinner to God, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost; and so it includeth Faith in the narrower sense, and is the same thing as Faith in the larger sense, but expressed under another formal notion. Sometimes it is taken more narrowly, and that 1. As to the Act. 2. As to the Object. 1. As to the Act; and so the word Repentance signifieth only the Aversion of the Soul from evil, by sorrow and change of mind: And this is the strict formal notion of the word, though usually it be taken more largely, as including also the Conversion of the Soul to Good; which is the usual Scripture and Theological sense; though the word itself do chief signify the Averting act. 2. As to the Object, 1. Repentance sometime signifieth the Turning of the Soul from Sin and Idols to God as God; And so Repentance towards God, is distinguished from Faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ. 2. And sometimes it signifieth only the turning of the Soul and life from some particular Sin. 203. Repentance as it is the turning of the Soul from sin and Idols * The Papists take Repentance itself to be part of the Remission of Sins: And let the Reader note, for the fuller opening of what I have said of their darkness thereabouts, that Jansenius Aug. To. 1. li. 5. c. 22. p. 126. maketh four things to be inseparably contained in Remission, though distinguishable. 1. The Conversion of the Soul to God. 2. The abstersion of the Macula or filth. 3. Reconciliation or the remission of God's offence. 4. The relaxation of the aeternal punishment: That all these are then at once given us, we are all agreed: But whether the name Remission or Pardon of sin ●e meet for them all we disagree. Is it not visible then how unhappily we strive about words, whe● we talk like men of several Languages. But all is but removation and remitting the penalty of which Gods offence is the first part. And Macula is either the sin itself, or the relative consequents. to God, is the same with Faith in God in the large Covenant-sence, and includeth Faith in God in the narrower sense. Repentance as it is our Turning from Infidelity to Christianity is the same with Faith in Christ in the large Covenant-saving-sence, and includeth Faith in Christ in the narrower sense (as it is mere Assent). Repentance as it is a Turning from the Flesh to the Holy Ghost as our Sanctifier, is the same thing as our Faith in the Holy Ghost in the large Covenant sense, and includeth Faith in the Holy Ghost in the narrower sense. But when they are the same thing, the ratio nominis or formal notion is not the same. As man's mind is not so happy as to conceive of all things that are one by one entire single Conception; so we are not so happy in our language, as to have words enough to express things entirely by one name; but we must have several words to express our inadequate conceptions by. And so that is called Repentance as the Souls motion from the Terminus a quo, which is called sometimes Faith or Affiance, and sometimes Love, from the motion of the Soul to the Terminus ad quem, though the Motus be the same. But when Faith and Repentance are distinguished as several parts of the Condition of the new Covenant, the common sense is, that Repentance signifieth the Conversion of the Soul from Sin and Idols to God as God, which is, or includeth Faith in God: And Faith signifieth specially Faith in Christ as the Mediator and way to God; And so Faith is below Repentance, as a means of it. 204. By this the question whether Faith or Repentance be first, may partly be resolved, and partly cast out as founded in confusion. As they are both one thing, neither can be first, any otherwise than the same Motus ut a termino a quo, & ut ad terminum ad quem. But as they signify divers things, they have each of them div●r● acts, and in respect of each, are before each other. The Assenting act of Faith in general must needs be always before Repentance, as it is an Act of the Will. But the consenting Act of faith is also part of Repentance, and must follow that part of Repentance which is a change of the understanding. But whether the Repentance as towards God, or Faith in Christ be first, or Love to God, and Faith in Christ, I have discussed as accurately as I can, in my Christian Directory, Par, 1. cap. 3. pag. 182. and therefore thither refer the Reader. 205. And how Faith and Love differ I have there also opened, and therefore shall now only say, that Faith as it signifieth meet How Faith and Love differ. Assent, differeth from Love, as the act of the Intellect, from Volition: And Love formally taken presupposeth the Assent, and doth not contain it. But Faith taken largely in the sense of the Baptismal Covenant, containeth in it Consent, which is the Wills Volition, and therefore must needs have some initial Love in it as it acteth i● Desire. This Faith in God hath some Desire and Volition of God, and Faith in Christ, which is the Souls Practical Affiance in him, hath some Love to Christ in it. But the denomination is not from the same ratio formalis in each. It is eminently called Faith, when giving up our Souls to Christ to be saved in practical Affiance is the great work of the Soul, though it have something of Love essential to it. And it is eminently called Love (morally) when the Complacency of the Soul in Christ thus trusted, and in God our end, is the great work or business of the Soul. 206. This Holy Love as a fixed habit and employment of the Soul, and our Relation to the Holy Ghost to work it in us, is it that is promised and Given quoad jus in the Baptismal Covenant, of which Faith, though it have somewhat of actual Love or Volition in it, is the antecedent condition, which also I have so fully opened as afore cited, that I refer the Reader to it for this also. And somewhat was said of it before. SECT. XIII. Of the degrees of Pardon or Justification. 207. Some men lest they should yield that Justification is not one perfect finished act done but once, do feign that it is only the first act of Faith by which a man is justified. Indeed it is only the first act by which he ●s changed from an unrighteous to a righteous state: But to think that therefore we are never after justified by Faith, and so have not actually justifying Faith all our lives, but for one instant only, is fit for a Dreamer than a theological Discourser. 208. Our first constitutive Justification, being in its nature a right to impunity, and to Life or Glory, * ●●●● tells us, that 〈…〉 which 〈…〉 by Rege●●ra ●● and Just ●●●● on: ●u● what they mean by R●●nission they cannot tell themselves, as a foresaid: Pardon of the gu●● they mean not, or else they mean several things in one word. is a Relation which must be continued to the end, and therefore must have the true causes and condition continued, and would cease if any of them ceased. 209. As to the question therefore whether Justification be lossable, and ●ardon reversible, I answer, that the grant of them in the Covenant is unalterable; But man's will in itself is mutable, and if he should cease believing by Apostasy, and the condition fail, he would lose his Right, and be unjustified and unpardoned, without any change in God. But that a man doth not so the facto is to be ascribed to Election and special Grace, of which afterward. 210. Though all our past sins are pardoned at our first Faith or Conversion (or as the Ancients speak in Baptism) yet it is most certain that Pardon or Justification is not perfect at first, no nor on this side death: And the saying of many that Justification is perfect at first, and Sanctification only by degrees, is a palpable error, as I have elsewhere oft showed. For that is not perfect, 1. Which is not continued and brought on to its end, but upon continued conditions, and diligent use of means to the ●ast. * Neque enim peccati sui veniam impetravit Adam, ut a morte temporali, immunis esset. Twiss. contr. Corvin. pag. 343. col. 2. 2. Which leaveth many penalties unremoved, which have further means to be used for their removal, and further Right to it to be obtained: To have more and more Grace, and less and less Sin; and to have ●earer communion with God, are blessings as to the degrees, which we must by degrees attain a further Right to, and the privation of them are ●ore penalties to be removed. 3. We have new sins to be pardoned every day. 4. Our remaining Corruption is such as needeth a continued Pardon, till it be perfectly done away. 5. The Day of Judgement is not come, for which the most perfect Justification is reserved. SECT. XIV. Of Justification by Sentence of the Judge. 211. The second sort of Justification, which is by Sentence, is done by Christ as Judge, and so is an act of his Kingly Office. 212. Therefore were it true (as it is not) that justifying Faith were only the receiving or believing in Christ as a Justifier of us, it would not be a believing in him in his Priestly Office only but in act: For he merited our Justification as a humbled Servant, and a Sacrifice: He giveth it us in Right by his Covenant or Law of Grace as King and Benefactor: He promulgateth it as Prophet; He passeth the Sentences as King and Judge; He executively taketh off the penalty, and glorifieth us as King and Benefactor. There is no Justification by a partial Faith. 213. Though the estimation of a man as just, called the Sententi● judicis concepta, as distinct from the sententia prolata, be said to be ●● immanet act of God, and therefore from eternity, yet it is a mistake: For though it be not transient effectiuè and do nihil efficere ad extra, ye● it is transient objectiuè, and doth presuppose the existence of the qualified Object: For though God's Knowledge and Will in genere, or as such, are his eternal Essence, yet God's Knowledge and Love of John or Peter ●● Believers, are terms which signify not his Essence as such, but as trans●● and terminated on those existent persons relatively: So that the extrinsical denomination from the existent Object is temporary as it is. 214. As the Angels rejoice at a Sinners Conversion, and therefore know it, so the notifying of God's acceptance and pardon to the Angel●, may be called some sort of sentential Justification. 215. And the notifying our constitutive Righteousness to our Consciences, is some kind of sentential Justification. 216. But this Justification called in foro conscientiae is not the Justification by Faith so much spoken of in Scripture: For that ever goe●● before this. A man is ever made just, before he can be esteemed, judged, or known to be so. And this in conscience is an uncertain m●●●ble thing, according to the weakness of the man: And oft he that ●● just before God, doth most doubt of it, and condemn himself: This justification may cease when we sleep or think of other things; and may rise and fall daily, if not be often lost. And it is not of that grand importance to our Salvation, as justification by Faith is. 1 Cor. 4. 4. SECT. XV. Of initial executive Pardon or Justification. 217. But the most notable justification by way of sentence is, 1. By God's initial Executions here. 2. By the public Sentence and Executi●● at the Day of Judgement. 218. God speaking not by Voice, that is called his Sentence which decisively declareth his Judgement. But the Execution most notably declareth that: Therefore though they be two things with men, and sometimes with God, yet Sentence being oft passed principally by Execution, they are then both one. 219. In this sense to sanctify a man, is to justify him executively, and so sententially. For executive Justification and Pardon is the actual Imp●●ity, removing of deserved Punishment, and actual giving possession of Life and Salvation, which constitutive Justification gave us Right to. And as our privation of the Spirit and Holiness, and to be left in sin, is a great punishment; so to have the Spirit and Holiness given us, is executive See my Epist. before Mr. Hotch●● Book Of Forgiveness, and his Book. Pardon and Justification; And so will Glorification much more. 220. Executive Pardon and Justification therefore, though the last of three sorts is the noblest, as supposing both the other, and being their end and the perfecting of the whole work. 221. Non-punire is not always Pardon, because it may respect an innocent and uncapable Object. But the Rulers non-punire sontem is pardon, ● what degree soever. But a non-punire as the execution of an Act of oblivion, or Gift of Right to Impunity, is the fullest executive ●●rdon. 222. The same must be said of nolle punire; which is no pardon as ●● the Innocent, nor to a fore-seen Gild not yet existent; no more than ●● a stone: But when the person becometh guilty and obliged to suffer, ●●en Gods nolle punire becometh de novo a pardon denominatione extrin●ca, without any change in God. 223. For God perfectly to forgive sin, while any sin remaineth in the More of that imperfection of Pardon against Ockam and others. ●oul (epecially habitual) is a contradiction: For sin itself, though not ●● sin, nor as effected, yet as permitted and not healed, is the greatest punishment as was said. And there is no perfect pardon of the punishment, while such punishment is continued. And Ockam's great sub●lty failed, when Quodlib. 4. q. 1. he determined that per potentiam ab●●lutam Deus potest salvare hominem sine charitate creata, unless he meant that he can charitatem dare aliter quam creando: For to save a man without Grace or Love is a contradiction. His first Argument is, [God can do that immediately which he can do by ●●y second Cause efficient or final: * Can they tell us intelligibly how the sin of Unbelief and not-loving God, and other privations can be really put away, without the contrary quality or act? Scotus, with Rada & other Scotists go the same way upon the same false suppositions. And to confute one of them, is to confute all. And so the Papists that say Original Sin is forgiven in Baptism, as to the whole calpability and penalty (as Petavins in Elench. Theriac. Vincent-Lenis (i e. Fromondi) p. 111. c. 2●.) do grossly err: For 1. It cannot be that the pravity of man's will should not be culpable? 2. And the remaining of that pravity is itself a great punishment of the sin which procured it. The truth is (which should satisfy them) that to the truly baptised▪ or ●●eartconsenters to God's Covenant, Original Sin and all sin is pardoned at to the great eternal pernicious punishment; But not absolutely and perfectly pardoned yet, as to all degrees of punishment: Nor is all the ●●●pability ceased. But Love or Grace given is an efficient or final second Cause: Therefore God can save a man without it.] Ans. The minor is your mistake: Love here is Salvation itself, begun ●● this life and perfected in the next: And to give it, and not to give it ●re contradictions. All the rest of his arguments go upon the same mistake, as if Love were but a meritorious cause of Salvation, and not ●e thing itself. And as erroneously, Q. 4. he determineth that per potentiam absolu●m, God can remittere peccanti culpam & poenam sine infusione gratiae ●eatae, unless he had put the question only de modo conferendi gratiam, ●n alio modo sine infusione Deus illam potest efficere? But who knoweth ●hat infusion is distinct from other Divine efficience. Or unless he had spoken only of Gods giving the jus ad rem, & non rem ipsam, viz. Ipsam ●mpunitatem. For undoubtedly the poena damni (properly poena) is ●he privation of the Souls rectitude, health and happiness, which all consist in the love of God: And to pardon a man's forfeiture of Happiness executively, without giving him the happiness which he forfeited, ●r to give man happiness without giving him love to God, are both gross contradictions; unless equivocally you meant, making a man some other thing, and giving him the happiness of that other thing. His first argument here is, [Whomsoever God can by his absolute power accept as worthy of life eternal without infused Grace, to him he can forgive ●all sin without infused Grace: But, etc. For proof he referreth us to that which I now confuted, adding, That God could accept a man in his pure naturals to life eternal. I answer, It is a fiction that ever man had such naturals made by God, as were not endued with the principle and disposition of holy love, the same thing which infused Grace first restoreth; much more that Adam lived without the acting of this love. But if it were so, yet to accept man to life eternal, is to accept him to the love of God; so that if he did prove that a graceless man might be predestinated to Glory, he did but prove that he is predestinated to perfect holiness and the love of God; And though without this he may be predestinated, or might have had a promise, and right by promise, yet without it he could never have the thing promised, for that were to have God and not to have him; nor yet his necessary disposition for fruition; for without holiness he is not a capable disposed recipient of Salvation. The rest of his arguments run all upon this error, as i● love and holiness were only the means, and not the end and Salvation given. SECT. XVI. Of assurance of Pardon, Justification and Salvation And whether it be Faith. 224. The Faith by which we are justified is not a believing that ●●●● justified, but a believing that we may be justified: Not a believing t●● Christ is ours more than other men's, or that we shall be saved; but ● believing in Christ that he may be ours, and we may be saved by him. 225. There is assurance in this Faith; not assurance that we are s●cere, or shall be saved: But assurance that God's Promises and all ●● Words are true, and that he will perform them; and that Christ ●● the Saviour of the world, and that the love of God is our End ●●●● Happiness, and that all this is offered to us in Christ, even Pardon ●●● Life, as well as others; which offer Faith accepteth truly; But the Believer is oft uncertain of the sincerity of his own belief, and so of ●● Salvation. 226. How much certainty we have of Divine Revelation and Scripture verity, I have so fully opened in many Tractates, and lastly in o●● I know that the learned Conciliator Guiliel. Forbes doth confidently charge them as guilty of confusion, who place Faith in more faculties than one, and that call it Fiducia. But I doubt not but the error is his own, which tendeth to confusion, by not distinguishing a mere physical act from a moral or political, which is made up of many physical acts: And if he (or Bishop Gror. Downame, Camero, or any that go that way) had been put to tell what one physical act they will confine Christian justifying Faith to, they would have ●ound themselves in confusion: To say, It is assent, denieth not but that it must be an assent to many verities: And this assent signifieth at once a belief that God is true, and that this is his word, and that this word is true. He that saith, It is a belief of the assertion for the oredibility of the Assertor, can scarce prove that he nameth but one Act: And I know no such assent which ●●●● bitten essentially contain a trusting to the word of the Assertor or Testifier, called Fiduc●a. Can you believe a ●a●●, ●o●●●● be true, because he is credible, and not trust his credibility so far as believing him importeth: It is a contradiction? F●●● eredentis is nothing but a trusting to the Fides dicentis, and they are Relatives, as Act and Object. Though I grant that ●●●● is also a quietting applicatory Trust or Fiducia, which is but the exercise of Faith as supposing me to see my 〈…〉 Promise, which cometh after our first believing, in which we see but our receptive capacity that the Promise 〈…〉 with the rest of Mankind, and the thing promised is offered to me. called [The certainty of Christianity without Popery] that I will not here repeat it, further than to say, that it is not a perfect apprehension which we call our certainty, nor yet an uneffectual doubtful one; But such ●●● as will carry a man on confidence of God's Word to a holy life, and ●● the forsaking of all other hopes, even life itself, for the hopes which ●● given us by Christ: which yet may have several degrees in several persons. But objective certainty, which is the evidence of verity, is m●●● full than our subjective certainty (for want of our due receptivity ●● us) and is still the same in itself, though not equally brought or reveals to all. 227. Even doubting of the truth of the Scripture and Christianity may stand with saving Faith and Salvation, when it is not predominant, nor so great as to keep us from the said forsaking all for Christ and Heaven. 228. Doubting of man's own Salvation, is not always from weakness of Faith directly, much less is it the want of Faith itself. ●o● sometime a man may doubt, merely as doubting of the sincerity of ●● own Faith, and not at all doubting of the truth of the Word of God▪ But when it is the doubting whether the promises be sure, which make● a man doubt whether he shall be saved, this doubting is the debility ●● Faith. 229. The same may be said of despair: That despair is from the weakness or want of Faith, which cometh from an unbelief of the truth of the Promise: And that also is pernicious despair which (from what Cause soever) is so great as to take men off the use of necessary means, to attain Salvation. But that despair which cometh from overmuch self-condemning, and a conceit that a man's heart is false, and not that Gods Promise is false, may stand with true Faith and Salvation, if it be not so great, as to take him off the use of necessary means. 230. No man ordinarily can be assured of his Salvation or Justification without extraordinary Revelation, but by being assured first of the ●ruth of God's Promise, and of his own sincerity in believing: For his assurance is of the conclusion of this argument, [Whosoever sincerely believeth and repenteth is justified: But I sincerely believe and repent; ●herefore I am justified.] And the weakness of the apprehension of either of the premises is ever in the conclusion, which always followeth partem debiliorem. 231. There are therefore but two sorts of men who can believe that they are justified by a Faith properly called Divine, that is, which is a belief of God's Word herein; 1. Those that God revealeth it to by prophetical or extraordinary Revelation (if there be any such.) 2. Those who are more certain of their own sincere Faith, than they are that God's Word itself is true (if any such there be in the world.) For with all others the certainty of the sincerity of their own Faith being weakest, ●he conclusion followeth it. 232. If any man can possibly doubt more of the truth of God's Word, ●han of the soundness of his own Faith; though that man's Faith may be called Divine, it is no honour to it, because it hath so much doubting of God's Word mixed with belief: And it's like his greater assurance of his belief of it, is but his error, or infirmity. 233. Ordinarily therefore no Christians can believe fide Divina, that they are justified and shall be saved; that is, this is no Word of God, but a conclusion, of which one of the premises only, and that the stronger is God's Word. 234. To say that he that believeth shall be saved, is equivalent to this, [I shall be saved] is not true nor reasonable, seeing [I believe] is not God's Word, nor so certain as God's Word: And one of the premises is not equal to both. 245. When they say, That it's all one, when I am sure that I believe.] I grant it, if 1. This be in itself as evident. 2. And as certain to me as God's Word is; otherwise I deny it. 236. Obj. A man cannot believe, and not know that he believeth. Ans. But a man may sincerely believe, and yet through ignorance either of the Scripture or himself, be uncertain that indeed his Faith is sincere, and not such as is common to the justified. 237. Some Protestants by erring in this point, and saying that justifying Faith is a certain persuasion or belief that we are justified, and that it is Gods own Word that I or you are actually justified, or are sincere Believers, and that the believing it is properly fides Divina, have greatly scandalised and hardened the Papists, to our disgrace. 238. And so have those that say that in the Creed, the meaning of [I believe the Remission of Sin] is, [I believe that my sins are remitted actually.] And that all must thus believe. 239. Some say that the Spirit within them saith, that they are sincere Believers, and the Word of the Spirit is the Word of God, and to believ● it is to believe God. Ans. This is the Enthusiasts conceit: which if true, all such have prophetical Inspiration: For the Spirit to bring any new word from God is one thing, and to give us the Understanding, Love and Obedience to such a Word is another thing. The Spirit doth indeed assure us of our sincerity, but not by a new Word from God to tell us so; but 1. By giving us that sincere Faith itself. 2. By acting it and increasing it. 3. By helping us to know it. 4. By giving us the love of God, and other Graces. 5. By giving us the comfort of all. But the reception and perception of these internal Operations, is not properly called a Belief of the Word of God. Else when we make God's Word the adequate Object of Faith, we shall be still at an uncertainty what that Word is. 240. Yet this persuasion, that we are sincere and justified is divine, where the Spirit causeth it; but not a divine Faith. Yea it is participatively of divine Faith, because God's Word is one of the premises, though the weaker must denominate the conclusion. * Of this see Albertinus' Disp. at large. 241. Obj. A Reprobate or Devil may believe all the Articles of Faith without application: but justifying Faith applieth Christ and his benefits to ourselves. Ans. It's true: But this application is not a certainty, nor a persuasion, nor a believing that I am justified, no more than that I am glorified, no nor that I shall be so neither: But it is an accepting of Christ offered that I may be justified and saved. So that here are all these applying acts in it. 1. I believe that Christ as the Saviour of the World, is my Saviour as he is all other men's, and is not the Devils; that is, that he hath done that for me which he hath done for all mankind. 2. I believe that he is offered to me personally in the Promise or Covenant of Grace, on condition of believing-acceptance; and that with and for all his purchased benefits, and so for my Justification. 3. I believe that if I so accept him, I shall be justified. 4. By true consent I do accordingly accept him to justify, sanctify and save me. But when all this is done, 1. I do not believe that God hath said in his word that I am justified, nor that my Faith is sincere. 2. And my Faith is so weak, that I may long doubt of that sincerity which I have, and so of my Justification. 3. And when I come to be certain of my Faith, it is not by believing God, as saying, that I do certainly believe; but by experience of its sincerity, upon just trial, by the Spirits help. 242. No man can be sure that his Faith is sincere and saving, who is not assured that it will help him to love God as God above all (yea already doth so) and that it mortifieth selfishness, and will prevail with him to deny even life itself, and all the world, for Christ and Salvation. So far as a man doubteth of any of this, he must needs doubt of his own sincerity. 243. So weak is Faith in most that are sincere, and so little kept in exercise, and so strong is sense, and self, and flesh, and worldly b●its and interest, and Satan's temptations, that in my experience (who have conversed with as many that are careful of their Souls as most have done I think) it is a very small number that I could ever hear say, I am certain of my Justification and Salvation; But a great number who have lived in holy confidence, hope and peace, and some in great joy, but most in tolerable fears and doubting, and some few oppressed by those doubts. So that certainty of Salvation is very rare. 244. When Bellarmine saith, that our assurance more belongeth to Hope than Faith, and that it is but moral certainty by signs that we have of our Justification, Sincerity and Salvation, he so little differeth from the sense of almost all godly Protestants, that were it not through other distances, and partiality, we had never read in Luther's days, that for this one point alone, we have cause enough of our alienation from the Romanists. 245. They err on one extreme, who say, that all are commanded to believe that they are justified; (or any as if it were God's Word): And they err on the other hand, who command doubting or commend it, as if it were a duty or a benefit. And they speak the truth who say, that our doubting of our own Sincerity and Justification if we are sincere, is a sin of Infirmity, and a Calamity, proceeding from weakness of Faith, Hope, Love and Self-acquaintance, which we should use all possible diligence to overcome. But they that are not sincere are bound to know it; And first to seek and get sincerity, and then discern it. 246. It is by the Spirit that all Christians must come to their assurance: But not by the Spirit as speaking this in us as a word from God, [Thou art justified or shalt be saved, or art sincere]. But by the aforesaid Acts: The Spirit in us is first Christ's Agent, Advocate and Witness, to assure us that he is the Saviour of the World: And next he is our Witness to assure us that we are Gods adopted Children; which he doth by being in us Gods Mark, and the Pledge, First-Fruits, and earnest of our heavenly Inheritance, by effectual habituating our Souls to the predominant love of God, and Holiness and Heaven. wherever this Sanctification is, there is the Evidence and Witness of our Adoption. He that findeth by the Fruits that he hath the Spirit, findeth the certain proof of his Justification, and earnest of Glory. SECT. XVII. Of Love as the end of Faith. 247. This predominant Love of God and Holiness, is so proper a Cui non unus idemque vit● scopus est, hic unus idemque per vitam totam esse non potest. Non est satis quod dixi, nisi illud etiam adjeceris, qualis scopus hic esse debeat. M. Antoninus li. 11. sect. 21. p. 113. fruit of the Spirit, that it is the very heart of the New Creature, the sum of Sanctification, as love is the sum of the Law. So that to give the Spirit of Adoption, to cry Abba, Father, and to sanctify, and to work in us the love of God and holiness, are three phrases of the same signification in the Word of God. 248. As Christ as Mediator is the summary means and way to the Father, to bring man home to his Creator; so Faith in Christ is a mediating Grace, to work in us the love of God: And as elsewhere I have oft said, The bellows of Faith kindling Love, and Love working by holy Obedience, Patience, Mortification, Gratitude and Praise, is the substance of all true Religion. 249. Love being the final Grace, and Faith in Christ, but a means to 1 Cor. 12. last. & 13. 1. 2. 2. Whether the habit of Love in patria be better than that of Faith and Vision in genere moris only, or also in genere rei, the Schoolmen are utterly disagreed. Cacere's sum. Theol. 22. q. 5. a. 1. Utrum in sola charitate supernaturali sit amicitia hominis ad Deum? Affirm. Quia D●us ut a●●hor natura non ea communicate, quae sunt propria ejus, sed solum esse naturale & potentias quae, etc. The Reason is not so good as the Assertion. Vid. Bradward. li. 1. c. 1. cor. 30. Contra indoctos artis amandi, n●scientes Deum esse propter seipsum amandum, & c●tera propter Deum, omnesque actus humanos ad ipsum propter se finaliter ordinandos, ipsumque esse super omnia diligendum: and his following proof that God is not to be sinned against in the smallest of his Precepts, or in the smallest thing, to avoid the greatest pain, o● obtain the greatest good imaginable. it, the end must needs be more excellent than the means as such. And thus Paul giveth the pre-eminence to Love. 250. And no wonder if he prefer it also for duration; For Love is Heaven or felicity itself, yea somewhat higher than felicity as such. For as God is our End for and in himself, above the ratio foelicitatis, so God is our End as he is to be loved: And God the Ultimate Object, and Love the Ultimate Act, and Gods Love communicated perfectly to us, and Gods Will pleased in all this, are the inadequate Conceptions which make up the Ultimate End, supposing the perfection of Nature, and of the Intellect in the sight of God, as subservient hereunto. 251. Man therefore hath a degree of fruition, or attainment of his Ultimate End in this life, so far as he hath a delightful love of God: Though this be but the foretaste and First-fruits. 252. Therefore it is not by Faith only that we know what Heaven is, and are drawn to seek it and hope for it: but also by this earnest and foretaste of love; which worketh by a spiritual gust and sweet inward experience. The Intellect first hath Faith, and the Will hath Love; And a promise and earnest is more a promise alone. 253. When Faith hath wrought this holy Love in the Soul, it doth as much if not more to keep us from Apostasy than Faith itself. Therefore many unlearned Christians, by the power of holy Love, stand fast, when subtle disputing Doctors may cleave to the world, and fall away. 254. Though it be an ill expression of those Schoolmen that say, Love is the form of every Grace, that which I suppose they mean is true: that love being the final Grace, the rest as they are means to it, or the effects and expressions of it, are what they are partly in that Relation: The means is a means only by its Aptitude to the end; And is never loved (as such) for itself, but for the end: And what the effect hath, it hath from its efficient Cause. And it is true, that no Faith, no Fear, no Obedience, no Praise, no Suffering is further accepted of God, and a part of true Holiness, nor will prove our Salvation, than it participateth of predominant love to God. But this predominant Love is always an evidence of Life. 255. Qu. What if a man should by Faith in Christ be brought to the love of God, and after fall away from Faith in Christ, and yet retain his love to God, would that love save him? Ans. When you can prove that ever there was such a man, I will answer you. Till then such false suppositions are no otherwise to be answered, than by telling you, that if God should permit a man to fall from Christ, that man would lose the Spirit of Christ, and the sight and sense of all God's Love and Goodness manifested in Christ, and in all the Work of Redemption; And therefore he would lose the love of God. 256. How far Holiness is the design of Christianity, I have opened in a small Tractate on that Question; And how far Sanctification is to be preferred before Pardon as such, and yet Christ's Glory in pardoning us, I have showed there and in my Confession, and therefore will not here repeat it. SECT. XVIII. Of Perseverance, and the certainty of it, in order to certainty of Salvation, and true Comfort. 257. No man can be further certain of his final Salvation, than he is certain of his perseverance in Faith and Love. 258. Therefore it is a small number of Christians comparatively that ever were certain of their Salvation. For 1. No one that is uncertain of his sincerity is certain of his Salvation. 2. No one that holdeth this Doctrine [That the Saints that are justified may fall away, and that we cannot be sure of perseverance,] can be sure of his own Salvation. It's hard to conceive how he can be certain, who holdeth that no man can be certain: Now those that hold this Doctrine are, almost all the Papists, the Arminians, the Lutherans, and as far as I can learn by their Writings, all the ancient Writers for a thousand years after Christ. And the Semipelagians and Pelagians no man will put in as an exception, except Jovinian alone; against whom Jerome writing his second Book chargeth him as holding that a man truly baptised by the Spirit, could not sin: No doubt he meant, [to damnation or mortally]: But it's doubtful what his Opinion was. Augustine's report of him is of no great moment, who as Erasmus noteth (in his Argum. in Hier. adv. Jovin.) neither had seen Jovinians Book or Hieorm's but spoke by report. And Austin, Prosper and Fulgentius thought that all the Elect persevered as Elect, being chosen to perseverance; but that more were truly sanctified, justified, and in a state of Salvation had they so died than were elect: That all these fell away and perished. That no man could be certain whether or no he were elect, and should persevere. So that they denied all certainty of Salvation by ordinary means. And that none of all the Greek or Latin Fathers, then, or long after, went further from the Pelagians than Augustine did, I think I need not persuade any, that hath read them. 259. This historical Truth is useful to be known: From whence I infer, that it is possible for Christians to live in settled peace and comfort, in respect to their heavenly Felicity, without a certainty of perseverance and Salvation. For to think that no Papists, no Greeks, no Arminians, no Protestant Lutherans, nor any of the ancient holy Doctors, nor any of all the Martyrs or other Christians of their judgement, did attain to such holy peace and comfort, is unreasonable, and contrary to all Church-History, and to experience. 260. And though it were a far more joyful state to have proper certainty, yet reason and experience in other cases tell us, that without certainty a man may live a joyful and peaceable life, where probability is strong enough to remove all reasonable cause of fearfulness, though there be a possibility of the worst. As we see that men in youth and health, though they may possibly die, or fall into torments the next hour, yet do not therefore cast off comfort, and live in such trouble as they would do if they had probable cause to expect it. There is no wife living is certain that her own Husband will not murder her the next night; nor no Child certain that the Parents will not cast them off or kill them; nor no Friend certain that his dearest Friend will not do so; And yet few but melancholy people will therefore take up sorrow, and cast away all their comfort in life and peace, and in these Friends: Even these persons are their trust and joy. There is no man sure but he may be executed among Malefactors: And yet while there is no reason to expect it, a man may live a comfortable life. There is no man certain that he himself shall not fall into a particular crime of Murder, Theft, Perjury, or the like; And yet we live not therefore uncomfortably. For men's affections follow the powerfullest cause. 261. Hence also I conclude, that certainly the denial of certainty of persevering, and Salvation is not a thing that should break the love, peace or concord of the Christian Churches, or for which they should cast off or revile each other. For what sober man could do so by all those that I have instanced in. 262. It is a shameful self-delusion of some Disputers, who think when they have once believed that certainty of Salvation may be had, that they are then certain themselves, or next to certain of their own Salvation. But he that hath no more certainty to be rich, or healthful, tha● to believe that Health and Riches may be got, is far from having them. 263. Who was more full of confidence and joy than Luther, who speaketh more against the Papists, commanding men to doubt of the pardon of sin? who speaketh of a higher Faith than he on Galat. Yet he with Melancthon and all the first Protestants in the August. Confess. Art. 11. saith; [They damn the Anabaptists, who deny that those that are once justified can again lose the Holy Ghost.] 264. If Adam in Innocency had neither solid comfort, or cause of such, the state that we fell from was not so good as we commonly believe. But Adam had no assurance of his perseverance in that state: For he fell from it. 265. No man (as is said) is certain that he shall not fall into such a Vid. Judic. Theol. Palat. de persever. in Synod. Dord. p. 1. pag. 208. pr. 3. heinous sin, as Peter, David, etc. did. 266. The Synod of Dort saith, [By such enormous sins, they greatly offend God, they incur the guilt of death, they grieve the Holy Ghost, they interrupt the exercise of Faith, they most grievously wound Conscience, sometimes they lose the sense of Grace for a time; till by serious Repentance returning into the way, Gods fatherly countenance again shine upon them. And the British Divines in their Synodic. Explic. say, [They contract damnable guilt, and lose their present aptitude to enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. Adding, [So that while they remain in that state of Impenitence, they neither ought nor can persuade themselves otherwise, than that they art obnoxious to death. Rom. 8. 13. If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die. For they are bound in a capital Crime, by the desert whereof, according to God's Ordination, they are subject to death, though they be not yet delivered to death, nor shall be, if we respect Gods fatherly love, but shall be plucked out of this sin, that so they may be plucked out of the guilt of death. Lastly, For their present condition, they lose their aptitude to enter into Heaven, etc. And Thes. 4. p. 193. [Gods unmovable ordination requireth that a Believer thus exorbitant, do first return into the way by renovation of Faith and the act of Repentance, before he can be brought to the ways end, which is the heavenly Kingdom. By the Decree of Election, the faithful are so predestinated to the end, that they can not otherwise be brought to it, than by Gods instituted means, as by the King's high way. And God's Decrees of the means, and of the end and order of events, are as firm and certain, as those of the end, and of the events themselves. If any man therefore go on in a way contrary to God's Ordination, as the broad way of uncleanness and impenitence, which directly leadeth to Hell; he can never come that way to Heaven. Yea if death surprise him wandering in Luk. 13. 3, 5. 1 Cor. 6. 9 Heb. 12. 14. 2 Tim. 2. 19 Act. 27. 31. that outweigh, he cannot but fall into everlasting death. This is the constant and clear voice of the Scripture.— As Paul said of those in the Ship, etc. Act. 27. 31. — It is certain that David and Peter, God's Elect Servants, were to come to Heaven; But it is as certain that if one had remained impenitent in his Adultery and Murder, and the other in his denial of Christ and perjury, neither of them could have been saved. Providence and Mercy untie this knot, by providing that no elect person die in that state, in which, according to any Ordination of God's Will, he should have been shut out of Heaven. And Thes. 5. [In that interspace which is between the guilt of sin contracted by a grievous sin, and the renewed act of Faith and Repentance, such a Sinner standeth a person to be damned by his own desert, but by Christ's Merit and Gods firm purpose a person to be saved; but not before by excited Faith and Repentance, he hath obtained pardon, is he actually absolved.— But in such guilt the condition of the Faithful and of the Wicked is not the same.— To the Unbelievers is wanting the inward principle of Faith, without which the remedy is as far off, and cannot be made their own and applied.— If any would know the very moment in which a man that had contracted guilt by a heinous sin, is actually absolved, Cyprian seemeth to have determined it clearly in these words, [When I see thee sighing before the Lord, I doubt not but the Holy Ghost is breathing on thee: when I see thee weeping, I perceive him pardoning.] The like you have, Judic. Theol. bremen's. de persever. ib. pag. 233. n. 9, 10, 11. vid. & rejecta, pag. 237. 267. The British Divines in that Synod, Judic. de perseverant. p. 188. begin with this explication, that it is only the perseverance of the Adult Vid. Davenant and Ward de Grat. Baptismati. that are actually Believers, (and not of Infants) which is intended: For some of them (as Bishop Davenant and Dr. Ward) have written that an Infant state of Grace and title to Salvation may be fallen from and lost. 268. They add, ibid. p. 108. Thes. 3. [This persuasion of perseverance hath not that degree of certainty, which always excludeth all fear of the contrary: but is sometime lively, sometime languid, sometime, as in greatest Temptations, none— The first debility ariseth from the fundamental dependence of this personal affiance, which seemeth to come below the certainty of dogmatical Faith. For the Articles of Faith do affect our assent as immediate and first principles. But the truth of special Faith is not thence deduced as a necessary consequent, but is only subjoined by way of assumption. Ergo the firmness of that conclusion which maketh this persuasion, cannot be greater, than that which is in the weaker of the premises. But that sumption resteth on experimental signs, weighed by man's private Conscience: which being sometime doubted of, whether they are true signs, and sometimes hid by temptations, that they cannot shine out to our comfort, what wonder if Believers persuasion of their eternal Salvation be not always vegete and valide. Besides that the very Principles of the Catholick-Faith, though by revealed light clear in themselves, yet being not known to us, by certainty of evidence, but only of Adhesion, * Here I leave them with the Schoolmen. Adhesion (as Durand: confesseth) supposeth, or is strongest, where there is evidence: and such we have, though not sensible ipsius rei, yet veritatis testim●●ii. they beget not in us so firm an assent, as mathematical demonstrations, and common notions. But in beholding them, from the relics of carnal diffidence, some vapours, as it were, sometime arise, by which the light of divine immutable verity, seemeth to us to be resringed, and to waver. How much greater and daily is the error of every Believer in the beholding of their own personal affiance. 269. It is too certain, by sad experience, that a true Believer may lose much of the Grace which he once had, and may die in a worse and weaker state. 270. It is certain by God's Word, that the justified have need of warnings, that they fall not away, and of threaten if they fall; and Luk. 12. 4, 5. H●b 4. 1. 1 Cor. 9 27. Heb. 12. 28, 29. that they are obliged to fear it, by a cautelous preventing fear that they may escape it. 271. It is certain therefore that if the thing be denominated possible in relation to our own power, it is not only possible that we should fall away, but too certain that we should. 272. But if the event be denominated possible or impossible in relation to God's mere Decree or Foreknowledge, which as such do nihil They that are too favourable to the Dominicant predeterminants, should remember how far their Doctrine of supernaturality of Grace hath carried them against all possibility of knowing not only our perseverance and Salvation, but our present state of Grace: For they say that nothing but Divine Revelation can assure any man that his acts are from a supernatural principle: yea that only by the beatifical Vision which is by uncreated Species, can the true difference between the acts of acquired and infused habits be known. So Alvarez, li. 6. disp. 51. p. 232. Habitus virtutum Theologicalium solum divina revelatione cognoscuntur, certo & infallibiliter. Immo Bannes addit quod non possunt ●videnter cognosci secundam suam ultimam differentiam per speciem aliquam creatam propter similitudinem quam habent actus charitatis infusae & acquisitae, non potest quis, secusa divina revelatione, cognoscere infallibiliter actum charitatis quem habet in via esse supernaturalem, nec discernere certo utrum procedat effective ab habitu infuso vel acquisito, aut a nuda potential ● Besides Bannes, he citys as his Consenters, D. Toom. p. 1. q. 62. a. 1. c. & 1. d. 17. q. 1. a. 4. & Sotus de Grat. li. 1. c. 22. corol. 3. Cajet. 22. q. 6. a. 1. And by this it appeareth that their very Doctrine of Infusion and Supernaturality in excess is the very ground of their denying all certainty of Justification and Salvation. efficere ad extra, without respect to his operative power, so the Apostasy of the Elect is impossible logically, or their perseverance necessary necessitate consequentiae in ordine probandi, it being impossible that both these should be true, [Paul will apostatise] and [God decreeth the Paul shall not, or fore-knoweth that he will not apostatise]. But posita nulla operatione divina ad extra, it would be nevertheless possible in re & in causis, that such a one should fall away. For all possibles are not future's: Therefore as God may both foreknow and decree the nonfurity of a thing, (if a Negative needed a Decree) and yet decree that it shall be possible. So God may decree the futurity of a man's perseverance, and yet decree that it shall be possible, as to all Causes, that ●e persevere not. For he is supposed to decree only the determination of an undetermined Power, but not antecedently to take it away, and make it no free power. 273. But if the Relation of possibility be denominated from God's operative Grace effecting perseverance, than God hath various Operations: He can give his Grace by such an Omnipotent insuperable force, as shall predetermine the faculty so far as antecedently to take away the moral power (though not the natural) ad contrarium: And he can work in such a compliance with the liberty of the Will as shall only determine the power (natural or moral) to act, and not antecedently take it away; (unless as determining it, is a taking it away as to the contrary act at the same instant, as every man taketh away his own power by acting) when God operateth the first way (antecedently taking away the power a● contrarium) then the apostasy of a man is properly called Impossible, in relation to the impotency of all other Causes to overcome God, the cause of perseverance. But when God only worketh the latter way (not taking away the moral power ad contrarium, but determining it and the natural) than it is no proper expression to say that such a man's falling away was impossible antecedently; but only that 1. It is non futurum. 2. And logically impossible in order of arguing, that it should be so. And it is ordinary with high Antiarminians to say, That God's Decree and his Grace too, are such as only determine man's power, and that neither of them ordinarily make our Fall impossibile, but only non-futurum. But when God worketh by a greater force of Omnipotency, taking away the moral power ad contrarium, and how oft, what man dare say that he can tell? the difference being in the effect, and not in God. 274. Therefore though the dispute of the event as future or not future have its place, yet the dispute de possibilitate is usually but vain, and darkening: especially as managed by those Confounders, who only say, It is impossible that God's decree or foreknowledge be frustrate, and necessary that it be fulfilled, not distinguishing the necessity of a consequence in a syllogism from the premises, and the necessity of an effect as from its necessitating cause. God can cause without necessitating the second cause; much more decree and foreknow. 275. He that hath saving Grace in the least degree, cannot lose that degree, without losing all the species, or all saving Grace. But it's otherwise with him that hath a higher degree. 276. There have many of our acquaintance gone so far in a life of mortification, and diligence of suffering like Christians of the highest rank, who yet have fallen (to the death) to the denial of the very essentials of the Christian Faith, that from the very Doctrine of certain perseverance hath become a cause of doubting and trouble to some: who have said, [If a man could fall away from true Grace, I should not doubt but such and such a man did so, and I should hope that yet my heart may at the present be sincere: But seeing no man ever had true Grace who apostatizeth, these men had none, who in all proboble judgement of reason, were once far better than I now am: And I can never be sure that I have true Grace, till I go further than ever they did, which I almost despair of ever doing, having intimately known them to be no dissemblers.] Thus both ways of this controverted Doctrine have their troubling difficulties. 277. If none censured the deniers of certainty herein, but only those who themselves ever attain to a certainty of their sincerity, perseverance and salvation, they would not be enough to make any great division or breach about it. And could we but be impartial, and bear with the dissent of Brethren herein, as well as we do of the ancient Doctors and Churches, our peace and concord would be less disturbed by this Controversy than it is. I have elsewhere cited some; Tertullian is too harsh in conceding a mutability in God, Contr. Marc. li. 2. cap. 23, 24. [Si vero etiam circa personas levem vultis intelligi quum reprobat aliquando probatos, aut improvidum quum probat quandoque reprobandos, quasi judicia sna aut damnet praeterita, aut ignoret futura: Atqui nihil tam bono & judici convenit, quam pro praesentibus meritis & rejicere & adlegere, etc.] Yet this may have a good interpretation. Eusebius Praeparat. Evangel. li. 6. pag. 289, 290. [Yea these would fight (or be a contradiction) that the same man should both become honest (or good) and certainly foreknow that he shall be honest.] But I am not of his mind. But among those before Augustine, such passages are not so strange as these are in himself. De corrept. & Grat. cap. 13. pag. 539. [Quis enim ex multitudine fidelium quamdiu in hac mortalitate vivitur, in numero praedestinatorum se esse praesumat? Quia id occultari opus est in hoc loco: ubi sic cavenda est elatio, ut etiam per Satanae Angelum ne extolleretur tantus colophizaretur Apostolus— Nam propter hujus utilitatem secreti, ne forte quis extollatur, sed omnes etiam qui bene currunt timeant dum occultum est qui perveniant. Propter hujus ergo utilitatem secreti credendum est quosdam de filiis perditionis, non accepto dono perseverantiae usque in finem, in fide quae per dilectionem operatur incipere vivere, ac aliquandiu fideliter ac juste vivere, & postea cadere, neque de hac vita priusquam hoc eis contingat auferri. Quorum si nemini contigisset, tamdiu haberent omnes istum saluberrimum timorem, quo vitium elationis opprimitur donec ad Christi gratiam, qua piè vivitur, pervenirent; deinceps jam securi nunquam se ab illo esse casuros. Quae praesumptio in isto tentationum loco non expedit, ubi tanta est infirmitas, ut superbiam possit generare securitas. Et Epist. 101. ad Vitalem [Utile est quippe omnibus, vel pene omnibus propter humilitatem saluberrimam, ut quales futuri sint scire non possint—.] Et lib. 11. de Civit. Dei cap. 12. pag. 67. [Quis enim primos illo● homines in Paradiso negare audeat beatos fuisse ante peccatum? quam●●s de sua beatitudine quam diuturna, vel utrum aeterna esset incertos? esse● ante● aeterna nisi peccassent. Cum hodie non impudenter beatos vocemus quos videmus juste ac pie cum spe immortalitatis hanc vitam ducere, sine crimine vastante conscientiam, facile impetrantes peccatis hujus infirmitatis divinum misericordiam? Qui licet de suae perseverantia praemio certi sint, de ips● tamen perseverantia sua reperiantur incerti? Quis enim hominum se in actione profectuque justitiae perseveraturum usque in finem sciat, nisi aliqua revelatione ab illo stat certus qui de hac re justo latentique judicio, non omnes instruit, sed neminem fallit. So Prosper Resp! ad Gallor. cap. sent. ad secundam. [Qui dic●● quod ab his qui non sunt praedestinati ad vitam, non auserat percepta baptismi gratia Originale peccatum non est catholicus. Sacrament●● enim baptismi quo omnia prorsus peccata delentur, etiam in eyes verum est, qui non sunt in veritate mansuri, & ab hoc ad vitam aeternam non sunt praedestinati. Et scent. ad septimum. [Qui dicit quod Deus quibusdam filiis suis quos regeneravit in Christo, quibus fidem, spem, dilectionem dedit, ob hoc perseverantiam non dederit, quia a massa perditionis praescientia Dei & praedestinatione non sint disereti, etc. Vid. caetera & sent. sup. 12. Et Resp. ad object. Vincent. 12. [Praedestinatio Dei & si apud nos dum in praesentis vitae periculis versamur incerta est, apud illum tame●, qui fecit quae futura sunt immutabilis permanet. I need not tell the learned that Fulgentius is of the same mind with Augustine and Prosper. If this had not been Augustine's Doctrine, the predeterminant Dominicans had never maintained it as his against the Jesuits, which you may see in Alvarez Disput. 107. and many others. Much less would Jansenius * Yea and Bradwardine who speaketh more harshly than Alvarez, and yet asserteth falling away from true Grace, though not Predestination●, or Gods Will to save. And Jansenius●, To. 1. li. 5. c. 22, 23. p. 126, 127, 128. proveth that the difference between Augustine and Pelagius lay not about free Pardon, or infused habits of Grace, which Pelagius confessed (though many charge him with the contrary, who understand him not.) But that Pelagius confessed not the necessity of that actual Adjutorium Gratiae specialis to keep us from future sin, and to do our duty, besides pardon of former Sin and infused habitual Grace. By which it appeareth that Aug●sti●● and he agreed, that Remission of Sin and infused habits may be lost; and that Augustine said perseverance upon God's Will or Election, and his actual help or adjutorium conservans. the zealous Follower of Augustine (so perfectly acquainted with his Works) have so thought and said, and so propugned it. See him at large in his Augustin. de Grat. Christi, lib. 9 cap. 7. pag. 392, 393, etc. & lib. 3. c. 20. pag. 163, 164. Though I make no doubt but our Divines at Dort knew this to be Augustine's professed judgement, yet in their Judic. de Persever. I find three Sentences cited by them out of Augustine, as making for the contrary, by which I suppose they intended to prove him doubtful or wavering. But 1. Three doubtful passages as to the sense, are not to be set against a man's open frequently professed judgement, thus expounded and followed by all his Disciples. 2. Let us examine the Texts. 1. The last of the three is de Correp. & Grat. cap. 9 But though Davenant be that Divine whom I honour for judgement above all, or almost all since the Apostles days; yet I must say that in this they all dealt very negligently or partially: For in that place Augustine professedly distinguisheth of Sons of God, predestinate and not predestinate: and saith, [Nec nos moveat quod filiis suis quibusdam Deus not dat istam perseverantiam. Absit enim ut i●a esset si de illis praedestinatis essent, & secundum propositum vocatis, qui vere sunt filii promissionis. Nam isti cum pie vivunt dicuntur filii Dei: sed quoniam victuri sunt impiè & in eadem impietate morituri, non eos dicit filios Dei praescientia Dei. And expounding ex nobis exierunt sed non erant ex nobis, etc. ait, [Quid aliud dicunt, nisi non erant filii etiam quando erant in professione & nomine filiorum? Non quia justitiam simulaverunt; sed quia in ea non permanserunt. Neque enim ait, nam si fuissent ex nobis, veram non fictam justitiam tenuissent, utique nobiscum: sed si fuissent ex nobis, permanissent utique nobiscum. In bono illos volebat proculdubio manere: Erant itaque in bono, sed quia in eo non permanserunt— non erant ex nobis— non erant ex numero filiorum.— Nam non perit filius promissionis, sed filius perditionis.— Filiis suis non praedestinatis Deus perseverantiam non dedit.— Et rursus quos dicimus inimicos ejus, vel parvulos filios inimicorum ejus, quoscunque eorum sic regeneraturus est, ut in ea side quae per dilectionem operatur, hanc vitam finiant, jam & antequam hoc fiat, in illa praedestinatione sunt filii ejus, & dati sunt Christo filio ejus, ut non pereant, sed habeant vitam aeternam.— Quia ergo non habuerunt perseverantiam, sicut non vere Discipuli Christi, ita non vere filii Dei fuerunt, etiam quando esse videbantur & ita vocabantur.— Apud cum hoc non sunt, cui notum est quod futuri sunt, id est, ex bonis mali. Propter hoc Apostolus cum dixisset, scimus quoniam diligentibus Deum omnia co-operantur in bonum, sciens nonnullos diligere Deum & in eo bono usque in finem non permanere, mox addit, His qui secundum propositum vocati sunt, &c, vid. reliqua. Now the words which our Divines cite are these aforecited, which say, They were not the Sons of God that fell away. When nothing can be plainlier uttered by the pen of man, I think, than that Augustine affirmeth them to be Sons as to their sincerity of Faith which worketh by love, but not to be Sons by predestination; And that not all that are sincere in Faith and Love are Sons in the most eminent sense, but that part of them who are predestinated to perseverance and the inheritance; and that nothing but predestination and perseverance was wanting to their Salvation. He that doubteth whether this was Augustine's sense, when he hath read him, may doubt of almost any thing which he is unwilling to believe. The next Text is cited as Cont. Adult; (I suppose they mean Adversarios, and it's false printed,) Legis et Prophet. l. 2. c. 2. But I can there find nothing of any such Subject, much less sense. The only Text therefore of all cited by them out of Augustine remaineth, which giveth any show of favour to their Theses, and that is cited contra Julian. Pelag. l. 5. c. 3. In cap. 4. I find the words, viz. [Istorum (reproborum) neminem adducit Deus ad poenitentiam salubrem et spiritualem qua homo in Christo reconciliatur Deo.] This is all that I find dubious in him. Now whether these few words better declare his judgement than whole Chapters and Discourses, you may judge? And whether the constant tenor of his Doctrine do not direct us to conclude that this is here his sense, viz. that he calleth that poenitentiam salubrem, which effectually bringeth men to Salvation, and which endureth to the end (as such.) And by [a man in Christ] means not as aforesaid [a man given to Christ with a decree to save him]; and by [reconciliatur Deo] he mean not one that is so reconciled as to be a predestinate Son, decreed to Glory. Historical Truth must not be denied, nor doth doctrinal Truth need historical falsehood for its defence, nor can agree with it. This undoubtedly was Augustin's mind. Only one more Text they cite out of Ambrose de Jacob & vil● beata, li. 1. cap. 6. But Ambrose is of his Disciple (Augustine's) mind: The words are, Quis audeat accusare quos electos divino cernis judicio? Nunquid Deus Pater ipse qui contulit, potest dona sua rescindere, & quos adoptione suscepit, eos a paterni affectus gratia relegare. But 1. There Ambrose expressly speaketh of the Elect only. 2. And if he had not, such words as these are usualy spoken by the Fathers, who assert falling away; meaning that God will not reverse or rescind his Grace; if you cast it not away: As Prosper saith, God forsaketh none that do not first forsake him. If any man would see more of Augustine's judgement, the many Sentences cited by me in my Tract. Of Perseverance, pag. 5, 6. 7. and all those cited by Vossius Histor. Pelag. li. 5. pag. 559, 560, 561, etc. may easily put him past all doubt. See also VOSSIUS, ibid. pag. 563, 564. citing more of PROSPER to the same sense. That all the Fathers before Augustine were for uncertainty of Salvation, and falling away (de facto) of some that were in a state of true Grace and Justification, in which had they died they had been saved, this great Historian throughly versed in the Fathers, ibid. pag. 565, 566, 567. & pluribus sequent. showeth. For brevity, if you doubt, turn to these cited places, Irenaeus, li. 4. cap. 72. Justin. Martyr. Dial. cum Tryphon. pag. 206, 207. Clemen● Alex. Strom. li. 2. pag. 162, 166. Basil. Homil. in Psal. 114. & & homil. in Princip. Prov. Origen. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 li. 1. cap. 3. 13. ad Rom. li. 7. cap. 8. Macarius Homil. 14. 15. 24. 26. 28. Athanas. Contr. Arian. Orat. 4. Greg. Nazian. Orat. 40. de Baptis. Crysost. in Joh. 1. Hom. 1. & Epist. 5. & Homil. 77. add Antioch. (ut vulgo). Et ex Latinis Tertullian. li. advers. haeres. cap. 3. & li. de poenit. cap. 6. Cyprian. de unitate Eccles. cap. 12. & li. 1. Epist. 7. ad Rogat. & li. 4. Epist. 7. ad Mag. Ambros. (ut vulgo) in Rom. cap. 9 Chronat. in Mat. 5. Besides those after Pelagius, cited by Vossius, ibid. pag. 567, etc. Among whom Bernard is large and earnest against possibility and convenience of PERSEVERANCE and SALVATION. Vossius in his Thes. 12. saith thus of those that will deny this to be the ancients Opinion, [Quid quod Antiquitas tota indefectibilitati adversatur, nec quemquam quantum meminisse valemus, veterum invenire est qui sideles omnes omnimodam de perseverantia sui certitudinem habere arbitraretur. Fatentur quidem animos filiorum Dei dubitationis auxietate cruciari non debere cum spei fiduciam habeant, quae sufficienti consolation, et lapsuros sustinet et lapsos levet; At nihilominus negant posse quemvis exinde quod impraesentiarum fidelium se in numero esse sciat, tantum sibi de reliquo vitae tempore favorem Dei certo polliceri, etc. — vid. caetera. Et addit [Communem fuisse antiquitatis sententiam quam diximus, soli hodie negare possunt, qui caetera fortasse viri sunt non ineruditi, sed in antiquitat● tamen plane sunt hospites: vel animum habent unius et alterius sententiis ita mancipatum, ut eorum oculis videre malint quam suis cumque iis errare praeoptent quam cum aliis bene sentire. 278. As I have cited this unanimous consent of the Ancients only to prove that all that have the profession of Christianity and Charity should be far from thinking this an intolerable error which may not stand with brotherly love and peace, so to the same end only I shall tell you, that not only Calvinists have born herein with Lutherans, but also among the Roformed some have been of Augustine's mind in this, whom yet the rest very highly honoured. I will now instance only in Musculus, than whom few have been esteemed more sincere, impartial and sound in judgement. In his Loc. Commun. (for their great esteem translated into English) C. de Remiss. peccat. §. 6. pag. (mihi) 621, 622, 623. he saith [Discernendum est inter eam gratiam Dei quae nullas habet adjectas conditiones: qualis est quod solem suum producit super bonos & malos, pluitque super gratos & ingratos: & eam quae conditionaliter confertur; ad quem modum Peccatorum remissio nobis contingit. Posterior haec licet in Deo sit▪ constans & firma (non enim ille mutatur ut homo) nostro tamen vitio irrita redditur, dum conditionibus illius non stamus— Siquis igitur praeterritorum peccatorum condonationem per gratiam Divinae Clementiae consecutus, usque adeo ingratus, & salutis suae negligens evaserit, ut instar canis ad vomitum reversus, caeptam resipiscentiam rumpat palamque ostendat Deum se contemnere magis quam timere; plane dignum se esse declarat a quo praeterritorum peccatorum a quibus fuerat absolutus, poenae exigantur.— Hactenus igitur fieri potest, & merito accidit, ut semel accepta gratia reddatur irrita: Verum non debetur hoc Divinae Clementiae instabilitatis quae locum in Deo non habet; sed nostrae pravitati— Posset mihi objici hoc loco, relapsum ejusmodi per quem peccata semel remissa reddantur irrita, locum in electis habere non posse; immo ne in reprobis quidem; quod illi remissionis peccatorum, capaces esse nequeant, eo quod vera & viva fide per quam illa acquiritur, praediti non sint; ideoque neminem esse prorsus, in quo peccata semel remissa irrita fieri possint. Verum eos qui hoc argumento ducuntur moneo, ut de reprobis quod dicunt diligentius perpendant; De Electis consentio: De reprobis vero nulla ne illis unquam peccatorum remissio contingat, disputari posse intelligo. Dantur illis in Ep. ad Hebr. 6. illuminatio per Christum, gustus doni coelestis, participatio Spiritus Sancti, gustus item boni Dei verbi, ac virtutum futuri saeculi; & cap. 10. Sanctificatio quae est per sanguinem Testamenti, & Spiritus gratiae. Et 2 Pet. 2. Comparantur sui, quae ubi lota fuit, rursus in caeno volutatur. Quomodo haec illis sine omni peccatorum remissione contingere possint, non immerito quaeri potest in hac causa.] 279. But Alvarez telleth us (l. 10. the Auxil. Disp. 104. pag. 419. §. 1.) of some who hold that there is a Grace of Confirmation distinguished only by the degree of the same helps, which none can fall away from; and that a confirmed state is never lost, is ordinarily held by the Dominicans, though they agree not what this confirming Grace is: And many of the Jesuits confess such a state of Confirmation, making men impeccable as to Mortal sin. So that some are in statu and not only in decreto, secured from Apostasy, most confess. 280. And Vossius ubi supra copiously laboureth to prove that the Ancients held three degrees of true Grace: One which men might fall from easily, and oft did, though if they had died in it they had been saved: Another which men may lose as to the act at least, but scarcely as to all seeds and habits. And another state next to perfection, which none shall lose. I refer the Reader to his Collections, though I do not clearly perceive by them, that many had such distinctions of Believers: But the weak and the strong or confirmed all distinguish. 281. But the other side had need as much to be persuaded to pacific moderation in their censures: And first, They say, that it is an intolerable opinion which is confessedly contrary to all the ancientest Churches of Christ: And by Vincent. Lerinens. rule, (quod ab omnibus, ubique & s●mper) such singularity or novelty must be heresy, or certain error at the least. I answer, 1. They that assert this certain perseverance of all the justified, do believe that the Churches planted by the Apostles, were of their mind; which they gather from the Scripture. 2. The foresaid Rule holdeth indeed in things so universally received as Essentials of Religion, and Necessary Articles of Faith and Practice, without which men cannot be saved; But Universality of Consent in a doubtful or unnecessary opinion, or practice, may possibly be erroneous, and may oft lawfully be deserted. It was once (and beyond the investigation of its original) the practice of the Universal Church, that there should be no Adoration by Genuflexion on any Lord's Day, or on any Week day between Easter and Whitsunday: And this commanded in the Great Council of Nice, and the Canons of Trull: And yet the Papists themselves have now forsaken it. To distinguish as is usual, between such Canons of Practice, and points of mere doctrine, and to make consent of Antiquity more obligatory in the latter, is but vanity. For where a point of Practice is founded in an oportet or supposition of Divine or Apostolical authority, it must needs be at least as obligatory as a mere Doctrinal so founded. For all Precepts include Doctrines, and all Obedience includeth Faith; Though all Doctrine be not Preceptive, nor all Belief for immediate practice. For every Divine Precept includeth this assertion [This God commandeth]. And that God commandeth it, is de fide; and than it must be obeyed for God's Authority, as it is first believed for his Veracity. All therefore that can be said is, that this practice was not taken to be by a Divine universal Law, unchangeable; but by universal Custom of the Church: And so may there be a consent in unnecessary and questionable Doctrinals (as there hath been for the peripatetic Philosophy almost). The opinions of the Souls corporeity, of the Millennium, of the lust of Daemons, that there were no Antipodes, (to say nothing of some that Augustin● opposed) were little less than universally owned of some ages: And I doubt many Texts of Scripture, for want of perfect Translations, and skill in the original Tongues, were universally misinterpreted. 282. And the common objection which maketh the greatest noise is a mere injurious peevish cavil or slander; viz. when they say [You lead men to all wickedness, by teaching, that let them commit never such heinous Sin, they are sure that they cannot fall from Grace, nor lose their Justification.] For it's commonly acknowledged, that if any man should fall into a state of Sin inconsistent, with the love of God, he would lose his justification and right to Heaven, and that without any change in God. And they constantly hold that Gods decree the fine & mediis is one, and that he decreeth of his Elect, that [They shall persevere in love and holiness, and be saved;] and not that they shall be saved whether they persevere in holiness or not: And that they are no surer to be saved, than they are to persevere in holiness. SECT. XIX. Of Mortal Sin, or what Sin will not stand with Saving Grace. 283. But as to the question, How great the Sin must be which is inconsistent with true love to God, or holiness? that belongeth to the Controversy about Mortal and Venial Sin: where the difficulty is as great to one side as another: so great, that not only Pious Gerson, but many another have confessed it too hard for them well to solve. 284. In general, It is certain that all Sin is so far Mortal as to deserve Vid. Le Blank de Pece. Mort. & Ven. & 2 Disp. Death according to the Law of Nature and Innocency, and so far as to make us need a pardon: Though not so far as to be inconsistent with spiritual life and justification, and right to Glory, and to make damnation due to us according to the Law of Grace. And Protestant's confesses Vid. Rob. Baronim de Peccat Mort. & Ven. The best I know on the Subject. the distinction of Mortal and Venial Sin, under the name of Wickedness, or Reigning Sin, and Sin of Infirmity in this sense; that Mortal Sin is that which is inconsistent with true Faith, Repentance, Love, Justification and right to life, and is never pardoned till the person be changed by true conversion: But Venial Sin or Infirmity is that which consisteth Vid. Episcopii Resp. ad Qu●st. 64. q. 18. pag. 19 with all these aforesaid, and is presently pardoned by the Covenant of Grace, upon the actual or habitual Repentance or hatred of it in the Sinners. 285. It is certain that the interruption of the Act of Divine Love, will not prove a Sin to be Mortal. For though I detest such conclusions as the Jansenist gathereth from the Jesuits Morals, that loving God once or Davenant de Justit▪ Actuali, cap. 35. Saith that Sin may be called Mortal in three degrees. 1. Because it is never pardoned, as the Blasphemy of the Holy Ghost. 2. Those which bring novum reatum mortis sed remissibilem upon repentance. And such he maketh all such gross Sin acted as is mentioned, 1 Cor. 6. and Gal. 5. which be they that the Papists call Mortal Sin. 3. The daily infirmities of the faithful, which in rigour of Justice deserve death, but are pardoned by Grace. twice in a man's life, or once a month, may save him, yet it is certain that the love of God is not always notably acted by any: It is interrupted in our sleep, and in common studies and businesses which take up the whole man; And therefore if a Sin (as sinful study) interrupt it, that will not prove it a Mortal sin. 286. And it is certain that a sin is not therefore Mortal because it diminisheth the Habit of Love. For that may be in those that still are the justified Children of God. 287. There are two Degrees of Mortality in Sin, as our Divines at Dort do more than intimate (and those of Breme there): The one is, when sin putteth a man into the same state, as to the Love of God, which he or any other was in, in the next degree before true Justification, or Sanctification or Conversion: which is when the Habit of Divine Love, and all other saving Grace is so far lost, as that Habitually the Creature▪ is more loved than the Creator: If any do fall thus far (which is the controversy) then it's granted that their Justification, Adoption and right to Heaven, is lost. But while God is habitually dearest to the Soul, and Sin is habitually more hated than loved, there sin is habitually repent of; And for my part I do not think that person is unjustified, or should be damned if he so died. 288. And I believe that this was the case of David and Peter: And it's very improbable that they lost the very habits of love to God, and hatred of Sin. 289. The other degree of Mortality, the said Divines take to be some heinous Act of Sin like David's or Peter's, which destroyeth not the habit, but is so great, that the person, though he lose not his fundamental Right, yet is put into an immediate ineptitude and incapacity of Heaven, and his Right so suspended, as that he cannot have possession That Grace and Mortal Sin oppon●ntar privative sicht l●x & t●n●brae, etc. ●id. Careres Sum. Theol. 2. ●. pag 23, etc. till that obex be removed by true repentance. 290. If you ask them whether that man shall go to Heaven or Hell if he so die; they tell you that it is not to be supposed; for God hath decreed that he shall not so die, but shall repent (which Austin will say of all the Elect) and sometime he half dreamt of Purgatory for some such.) 291. The true reason why such a heinous sin must be actually Repent of before full pardon and capacity for Heaven, and the true note to know what sins must have such actual Repentance (and so are thus f●● Mortal) is this; there are some Sins so easily known to be Sins, and so notoriously calling the Conscience to Repent, that to lie in them unrepented of long (when the sudden violent temptation and passion's over, and a man hath opportunity to act according to his settled habits) will not consist with the truth of such a Habit of love and holiness, and of hatred of Si●: So that though necessitate praecepti the Act of Repentance be as necessary as the Habit, yet necessitate medii ad salutem it is the Habit that is absolutely necessary in se, and the act so far as the absence of it cannot stand with such a habit. This is my judgement of this difficult case: He that can open it better, deserveth all our thanks. But here the difficulty is exceeding great, what love to God that is which mortal Sin or ungodliness is inconsistent with: or by which a man may know that he hath saving Grace. I have contented myself hitherto with saying that It is a loving God above all: But that is still dark and short of satisfaction: Adrian (after Pope 6.) Quolib. 7. q. 3. 4. fol. 45, 46. hath called me to distincter thoughts. He concludeth, 1. A man that loveth a friend less than himself, may yet Sin mortally for that friend. (But that is no wonder, because, 1. He loveth his friend and self more tha● God. 2. And thinketh that he hurteth not himself so much as he profiteth his friend by Sin) 2. He inferreth that a Mortal Sinner doth not always love the Creature more than God; because he that loveth himself more may Sin mortally in love to his friend: For as a man may love himself more than the sole end for which he sinneth: So he may love God more. Ans. I suppose it is misprinted, for the sense should be [He may love God more]. But, 1. I doubt of the antecedent: That Sinner loveth himself as the End of his sinning for his friend: For it is to gratify that proud or selfish humour by which he loveth his friend for the Likeness, Love or Usefulness of that friend to himself; and so his love is finally for or to himself. 2. When he sinneth he doth not practically think that the hurt to himself or the wrong to God is so great an evil, as the pleasure of Sin is good. But his instance more poseth me; viz. that a mortal Sinner (or ungodly man) may choose rather to be annihilated, and his friend too, than Christ should be blasphemed by all the world, or than God (per impossibile) should perish, or lose his Omnipotency, etc. (for some Romans died for their Countries): Therefore he concludeth, that Thus to love God above ourselves or all, is not enough to Salvation; but we must also love God above all ut sinem ultimum & qui sit ratio & mensura diligendi caetera; Ita, viz. quod omnia refer at homo in Deum, nolitque am are nisi quantum Deo placuerit, & eadem velit abdicare & perdere ut satisfaciat divino beneplacito & Sanctae ejus voluntati, ut sit ei quantum ad amorem liberum attinet Deus omnis in omnibus, & dicat, vivo jam; non ego, sed Christus vivet in me; against it, He must not only so love God as that he would die rather than God should die or suffer (were it possible); but so as to love him as the end of all our lives, and to love the pleasing of his blessed Will in the glorifying of him, better than all things that can stand in any competition:] And I think this to be a necessary truth: I dare not say that every man is Godly that had rather die than God, or the Sun, or the Earth, or his Country should perish. God's Being is not, as such, our End: But his Will (or his Essence as it is his Will) is the Beginning, Governor, and End of all; And it is the Pleasing of this Will of God (in the Glory of our holiness and obedience, in which his holiness and other perfections are resplendent) which must be loved above all. As a man may choose to die, or at least lose all that he hath, rather than his Father should die or be for ever tormented; and yet will not forbear fornication and drunkenness to please his Father's will; because he practically thinketh that the bare displeasing of his Father doth not so much hurt him, as his sinful pleasure doth himself good; so is it in the present case. (And I may add that, God is not loved as God, that is, as perfectly holy and just in governing the world and him, by any bad man: But as he is the God and Preserver of Nature, Nature may love him; but not as he is a most holy Governor) which is essential to the Relative notion of our God. He concludeth therefore truly [That this true sort of Love to God doth put us in a state of Salvation, and Mortal Sin consisteth not with it.] But I agree not with him of the Impossibility of being certain that we have this Love, though I think his words worth the reciting to prove the difficulty of it: fol. 47. N. O. P. [Dico quod licet possit probabilem conjecturam habere, quod act us ille dilectionis insit; non tamen potest evidenter cognoscere & pro certo: Quomodo enim scire poterit, quod it a Deo se totum infundit propter se, i. e. bonitatem & Sanctitatem ejus, ●t nec Vitam aeternam nisi in Deo & propter Deum diligat? animo paratus, & efficaciter volens, omnia & seipsum & alia, quum Deo placcbit perdere, ut impleatur Sancta voluntas Dei? Quod etiam nulli creaturae nec ips●sibi libero aliquo amore adhaeret in se in Deo & propter Deum; Quae volunt as multo est purior & laudabilior quam volunt as perferendi pro Christo Martyrium pro spe assequendi vitam aeternam. Et certe longe aliud est optare aut Velle, quam sic Deum amare, & de facto sic affectum esse, & sic efficaciter velle, sicut opto & desidero efficax Velle Scientiae, seu ad scientiam: Sed ubi efficaciter id vellem, manum ad aratrum mittens, labori, vigiliis & id genus operis non parcerem— Si ponatur per Revelationem certiorari, non nego sic certum fieri posse— Nec expedit hominem nisi valde sciens & doct us fuerit de his multum se tentare, quoniam difficilimum est proprias affectiones metiri. But sure these fruits grow not on any common stock, and the Heirs of Heaven and Hell are not so like as to be undiscernible, nor God's promises such as no man can be sure that he hath a right to them. It is enough that these things do prove assurance difficult and rare. SECT. XX. What Repentance for particular Sins is necessary to pardon. 292. But the very Act of Repentance hath such various degrees, that those also here deserve our consideration. For he that hath the habit of holiness no doubt hath some degree of Repentance secretly stirring in him before it cometh to deep repentance, and open confession; I do not think that David was without all remorse and repentance till Nathan spoke to him, though his Repentance was not such as the quality of his sin required. And it is not every remorse nor every degree of Repentance which is sufficient to prove a Soul sanctified, that is, habitually possessed with that love of God, and the hatred of Sin. And such at least the act must be. 293. In gross known Sin, Repentance is not true unless it contain a Resolution presently to forsake it. He that is unresolved, though he have much remorse and trouble of mind, is not truly penitent: Nor he that is resolved only to forsake it sometime hereafter, or when he hath sinned once more, but not at the present. 294. And as this is true of actual Repentance, so a true Habit must be such as is the Habit of such acts: even a habitual love to present holiness, and a habitual hatred to present Sin; which in the course of our lives doth actually resolve us and preserve us, however a violent temptation do interrupt that course. 295. But whether every known Sin of the smallest sort in itself, have always such Resolutions of present forsaking it in all that are truly penitent, is a harder question. Many a godly man is frequently angry sinfully, and sluggish sinfully, and daily useth some idle words, and ungoverned and idle thoughts, and is sinfully remiss in the degrees of every duty, and knoweth all this to be Sin: And if he resolved presently to do so no more, he would not do so again so frequently as he doth. In such a case it is exceeding hard to judge of a man's repentance: And yet When Petavius out of Aquin. Elench. Ther. Vincent. c. 29. p. 109, etc. Distinguisheth Peccatum a Culpa, and saith that all Sin, is not Culpa, it is but a trifling with an equivocal or analogical sense of Peccatum: And his citation of Augustine there is upon a misinterpretation; which the Reader may easily perceive. alas, whose case is it not? we have a dislike of the Sin, and a wish that we were delivered from it: But that is but a desire that we loved it less, and hated it more; and proveth not that our hatred is sufficient. For many a man that liveth in gross Sin, doth wish that his heart were turned from it, and did not love it, when it is not so turned. And why will the same wish then serve about lesser Sins? And yet if present Resolution against every small Sin be necessary to pardon (even of known Sins) alas, who is pardoned? 296. And if the case must be resolved by the material magnitude or smallness of the Sin, what bounds shall we ever be able to assign, and what understanding is able to distinguish between the Sin so great which must be presently resolved against ex necessitate medii to pardon, and the Sin so small as may be pardoned without such Resolution? whether in speech every idle word be such? If not, whether every idle jest, or every lascivious word? or passionate word? or backbiting word (the ordinary Sin of many strict Professors) or every sinful Oath, or Curse, or Slander? who can say, it is this, and not that? And so in all commissions and omissions? 297. And it will still remain exceeding difficult what Resolutions against Sin will prove true Repentance: For as many a child under correction, so many an adult Sinner on his Sick bed, or under a terrifying Sermon, or conviction, not only seemeth, but doubtless is, as passionately resolved at the present to forsake his Sin, as a Godly man is, if not more: and yet quickly loseth all that Resolution, and liveth in the Sin which he resolved to forsake. 298. By this it would seem that it is not true Resolution which causeth not the ordinary forsaking of the Sin. For to Resolve to day, and Sin to morrow, is but to play with Sin, and not to repent or mortify it. And yet if actual forsaking be necessary (of All Sin) who then is penitent or can be saved. For there is no man that doth good, and sinneth Jam. 3. 2. not: And in many things we offend all. Who leaveth all the idle thoughts, and words, and negligence, etc. which he knoweth to be Sin? And the most understanding men than would be very hardly saved, who know almost all Sin, in comparison of the ignorant, who know it not? 299. And yet no doubt, those Sins which are materially small, may have such circumstances, as may make them more malignant than some greater in the matter: As when they are committed through malignant contrivances and ends, or in gross contempt, or negligence. So that this also maketh the decision of the case more difficult. 300. And it will be hard, not only to know which and how great the Sins must be which are unpardoned if lived in without forsaking, or without resolving to forsake them presently if known; but also how great, and what Sins unknown may stand with saving Grace. For surely if men should ignorantly reproach or reject God, or Christ, or the Holy Ghost, or live in Murder, Adultery, Perjury, etc. not knowing them to be Sins, this would not stand with saving Grace: And yet to live in some unknown Sin may. 301. And it is as hard to know how oft a gross Sin may be committed in consistence with true habitual Grace? And how oft the Resolution of the will may change, without the loss of holy habits. The te●●pter will say to David or Peter, If once, why not twice? If twice why not thrice? And who but God can say, just how oft? And yet to set no bounds confoundeth the just and unjust, good and bad, and maketh Sanctification but a name. And to say that Peter's Faith did totally fail, or that he was holy deprived of wholly love, or saving Grace, is rash and an unlikely thing. 302. And it must be remembered that the Will is always in the time of sinning, more for the committing the Sin, than against it, actually, or else it would not be committed; And in omissions, it is not prevalently for the Duty; else it would be done. And if it were Habitually so too, as to a holy or a sinful life, the person were unholy. And when the will (known by the practice) is sometime actually more for a gross Sin than against it, and daily actually more for some small Sins than against them, it is wondrous hard here to discern certainly that the contrary habit is our state. 303. And it addeth to the difficulty, that it is hard to be sure whether the Habit of Love and Holiness may not be predominant, and yet the very Habit of some one Sin (as well as the act) be stronger than the contrary habit: For a daily use of the acts seemeth to prove a prevalent Habit. As a Habit of Anger, of vain jesting, etc. And if a very Habit of one Sin may be prevalent, though not of all others, it will be hard to say either how great that Sin may be (and so whether a Habit of Lust, of Pride, of Covetousness, may stand with Grace, in that prevalency) or yet, how many Sins may be so habitually prevalent, in a sanctified man. But if no one, what shall those think of themselves that live in the daily act of smaller Sins beforementioned? And that they err who tell us that all Sin is equally mortified in the Habit, common experience fully proveth. But such men use not to distinguish between the General habit of Love to Good and Hatred to evil (which is as the trunk of the Tree to the branches (which may have their particular Cankers and Diseases) and is indeed Virtually a Habit of all Good, and against all Evil); and the particular Habits of Good and Evil which are also found in every Soul. 304. Yea the difficulty is yet greater, by our ignorance of the very nature of a Habit of the will, or of that Inclination of it to Good or Evil which is antecedent to the Act: which, he that hath read the Schoolmen and Metaphysics, or ever well studied it himself, will discern to be tantum non out of the reach of our understandings. That it is a Dispositive promptitude to Act, we feel: But whether that Disposition be itself a secret unobserved Immanent Act, disposing to the more open perceptible Act; (for the Soul is never out of Action, and certainly hath at one instant several Acts, of which that the fine is oft unobserved, and yet most powerful? As a Traveller that is taken up with other thoughts and talk would never hold on his way if the end were not actually intended, though he feel it not); or whether it be the Natural Inclination of the Will corroborated? and what that Inclination is? whether it lie much in a Receptive disposition of the acted faculties, by which they are still ready to receive the Active motion of the Agent power; as the Receptivity of the fuel causeth the greatness and constancy of a flame; or the opening of the window, the shining in of the Sun, or the composition of the adapted wheels, causeth the Clock or Watch to be easily and truly moved by the poise or spring; or what else it is that we call a Habit, is not so easily known as unstudied confident Disputers think: So that judicious Mr. Truman (Tract. of Impaten. Nat. & Mor.) seemed to despair of clear understanding it. And whether an Infant's Principle of Holiness, be Quid morale, which never came from any act, nor is the particular Habit of any act, any more than the Inclinatio naturalis ad bonum qua bonum? with abundance of other difficulties about Habits; These all make our case the harder to be resolved. SECT. XXI. The solution of all the former difficulties, in part. 305. Of all these difficulties, I have no better solution (besides what is aforesaid) than as followeth. 1. That a Dispositive Inclination of the Will to God and actual Holiness, is like to the Inclinatio naturalis ad bonum & foelicitatem, saving that it is not ours ab origine in our lapsed state, and that it is more movable and separable from the Soul; And so is quiddam naturae though not quaedam natura, called, The Divine and new nature in us; and is to the Soul what Health is to the man; And is the great Moral Principle within us; and is acceptable to God as being the Rectitude of his noble creature, * As to the Papists continual calumnies, that we call men just, whose continued wickedness is but hid and not imputed, and without inherent justice, we abhor both their confusion and their calumny, and distinctly give them this short account. 1. We hold a conditional universal pardon of all. 2. But no actual pardon of the destructive punishment, nor non-impuration of Sin, till men are truly converted from a wicked heart and life to the love of God, by Faith and Repentance. 3. And then all Sin inconsistent with the prevalent love of God, and a holy, just, and sober life is mortified and ceaseth. 4. But such infirmities as you call Venial Sins continue, and all our Goodness is culpably imperfect. 5. Though the destructive punishment be pardoned, the Reatus culpae in se continueth for ever: that is, It is an everlasting truth that we once sinned. 6. Our pardon and our Renovation are freely given us by Grace for the sake of the satisfaction, merits, and intercession of Christ, whose perfect Righteousness fulfilled that Law that man had broken. 7. In which sense his perfect Righteousness is said by Protestants to be Imputed to us because he did it and suffered for us, in the person of a Mediator; and so it was the Meritorious cause of all our Justification, Grace and Glory. And what hath any Papist or other wrangler against any of this? Ye●, we reject their lose Doctrine that say as Pot. as. Joseph. Theol. Spec. l. 4. c. 10. p. 511. [De potentia absoluta Gratia habitualis potest simul esse i● eode● subjecto (meaning in a predominant degree) cum peccato mortali sive actuali sive habituali: For as I said before against Okam and Scotus on that point, they are inconsistent contraries, as life and not-living, light and darkness; and their proofs of the contrary are frivolous. See Scot in 4. d. 16. Aliac. in 1. 99 Greg. Armin. in 1. d. 17. q. 1. ●. 2. Gabr. ibid. Rad● 2. p. Cont. 19 Suarez. in 3. p. To. 4. Disp. 9 Sect. 3. n. 8. all for this opinion. And against it Aureol: in 1. d. 1●. Ruard. a. Sect. 5. That a man cannot be just sine Justitia inhaerente por potentiam Dei absolutam: Pet. de Lor●a saith. in 2. 2. q. 24. a. 12. d. 22. as the Protestants do, that Peocatum Mortal● actuale (meaning some one act of a heinous Sin) may consist with Grace and the Habit of Charity, but not the Habit of such a Sin (that is in predominancy). See Malderus opinion, 1. 2. q. 113. a. 2. & 8. p. 574, etc. who saith, that D●us remit●endo offersam delet peccati maculam] and that [Macula is but the privation of Grace quatenus facit hominem D●o gratum] that is, of Acceptability or Loveliness: And accordingly he expoundeth the nature of Remission of Sin, as I said before. And Brianson in 4. q. 8. fol. 115. C. D. diligently enquiring what it is that remaineth after the Sin committed, can find nothing but 1. The Habit or privation of a good habit. 2. And the Gild which he calleth Reatum culpae, quae est q●●dam obligatio ad poenam debitam illi culpae. Illa (n) obligatio est qu●dam Relatio realis, non fundata super actum culpae, sed super essentiam a●im● non nisi ut culpae actualis est praevia; which is just the Protestant opinion, who say that the Gild is done away by forgiveness, and the Habit by Renovation, calling one Justification, and the other Sanctification: But we better distinguish Reatum c●spae in s●, & Reatum p●●ae s●u culpae ut ad poenam: One is the Reality of my being a Sinner, or one that did Sin. (This is never done away). The other is the obligation to punishment for that Sin. This is remitted. and virtually containing all good actions; and being the operation of the Spirit, by which he is said to dwell in believers. 306. 2. That this Rectitude or Holy Nature is first and radically active, in our Complacency or Displicency, Love or Hatred; And that what a man Habitually loveth, that his Will is habitually inclined to: And against that which he habitually hateth. 307. 3. That yet in acting, this inclination worketh freely, and always is specified by the conduct of the Intellect, which must tell us what is Good and Evil, Amiable and Hateful. 308. 4. That Love and Hatred being practical Habits, do ever engage the will in such Practical Resolutions, as are answerable to their nature and degree. 309. 5. That no Resolution will prove Holy Love and Inclination, but that which is fixed as proceeding from a fixed principle, which is like a new Nature in us. 310. 6. That this Resolution is first the fine: The Soul loving God and its own felicity in his eternal Love and Glory, is first firmly Resolved to adhere to God, and that felicity, and to prosecute it to the last, in all necessary means. 311. 7. That next the Soul firmly resolved of the use of means in general, is resolved also to choose and cleave to Jesus Christ, as the Head and Summary of all means, (as the Physician is as to Physic.) And ●o resolveth to adhere to all the Essentials of Godliness and Christianity. 312. 8. That all this is done by the Intellects discerning of those solid Reasons, which prove to us the excellency, necessity and possibility of all the foresaid ends and objects. And he that knoweth not fixing and ●olding Reasons for his Resolutions, cannot be expected to have fixed Resolutions. 313. 9 That these general Inclinations, Love, and Resolutions for God, for Means in general, for Christ and all the Essentials of Godliness and Christianity, are constant in the Godly; and virtually contain a Love of and Resolution for every known duty, and against every known Sin; but not actually: And these continue to show themselves in adhering practically to these Objects, and in the Practice of a Godly Life. 314. 10. That therefore Sin as Sin is hateful to every true Christian, and Godliness as such lovely: And that in respect of this radical general Habit, every true Christians love to God and Good is more than his averseness, and his hatred to Sin more than his love or Inclination to the created Good for which it is loved (For no man loveth Sin as Evil). 315. 11. That the Inferior sort of Means and Good, appear not always in their worth or necessity to the believer: Besides his Ignorance the remnants of Concupiscence may pervert his Judgement so far as to doubt of some means whether they are absolutely necessary, or at least, mihi hic & nunc. And this failing of the Intellect may embolden the Will to some degrees of negligence, even of known duties. And so we may doubt of some Sins whether they are Sins, and of others whether they are so great as to be inconsistent with God's love and our Salvation; and by that failing of the Intellect to be emboldened to commit them, while yet we adhere to God and holiness in the main as such. And so small Sins are ofter committed, and with less reluctancy than greater, because we think that their badness and danger is not so great. And though at other times we be more sensible of both, yet in the time of Temptation that apprehension may be altered: For the mind of a Godly man is more mutable about the Means than about the End, and about the smaller sort of Means and Sins, than about the greater. And when the opinion changeth not, yet the practical judgement may change; or when it is not turned, it may be suspended: Or truth may be apprehended with less quickening lively feeling; and than it will not sufficiently work: As a loud call doth suscitate us to action, when a negligent whisper is neglected. And upon some of these accounts known sins when small may more stand with Grace and be ofter committed, and more dully repent of, than greater. 316. 12. And as we must distinguish of Sins as more or less dreadful and dangerous, and of duty as more or less necessary, at least in our apprehension; so also of Sins which are more or less within the power of a willing mind to leave them. Some Sins are such, as that the forsaking of them requireth little more than a willing mind. As to forsake lewd Company, Taverns, Playhouses, Harlots, Drunkenness, Theft, Oppression, Persecution, Perjury, Deceit, etc. Mere will, though instigated by lust, committeth them; And a will that is but truly bend against them, may easily (as to power) cast them off. Whoever committeth them, doth it because he will do it. And to live in the frequent committing of these, is a greater sign of want of Holy habits, or Grace, than of others. For there are other Sins which besides willingness require great power, and care, and labour to forsake them: As to keep a just order in our Thoughts; to keep them from vain objects; to keep our tongues from accustomed vain words, to restrain strong passions upon great provocations; especially to forsake Sins of privation and omission; such as are unbelief as mixed with a weak Faith, and fears mixed with hopes and coldness of desire and prayer, and sluggishness of labour and endeavour, etc. A man may be truly willing to be stronger in all Grace, and to do all duty better, and to forsake all such Sins as these, when yet through the mere weakness of his Graces or Spiritual life, he cannot so exactly watch, nor so diligently labour, nor so patiently hold out, as the case requireth. Though it be not a Physical, but a Moral power which he wanteth, and that culpably; yet such Sins may more consist with true Grace than the former; and therefore are called ●●●s of Infirmity. 317. 13. When Ignorance of Truth, Duty, or Sin, cometh from an ●willingness to know it, or an unwillingness to use the known meanest ● help us to the knowledge of it, the neglect of such an unknown ●ruth or Duty, and the committing of such an unknown Sin, is to be ●dged of according to the measure of the foresaid willingness, or unwillingness. 318. 14. For he is not sincerely willing to know a Truth, to do a ●uty, to forsake a Sin, who is not willing to use the known necessary beaus appointed for these ends. For he vilifieth God and Holiness who ●inketh them not worthy the seeking by such means. To say, would love God and please him and be saved, if I could do it ●ith a wish or without these means, is no saving desire. 119. 15. And to desire to be delivered from Sin, and to hate it ● Sin, and yet to love it for the pleasure so much more, as that the ●terest of God and Heaven in us, is not strong enough to make us habitually willing both to leave it, and to avoid the temptations, and ●se the pleasure, but men had rather keep it than leave it on these ●rms; this is no sincere repentance, nor sign of a holy heart or life. 320. 16. Even the Habit of a particular lesser Sin (as of jesting, ●●le words, idle thoughts, etc.) may be stronger than the contrary particular habit, (I think) and thereby a man may habitually and actually live ●●d die in the Sin; and yet that habit not prevail against the radical ●●bit of Holiness, of Faith, Hope, Love, and Obedience in the ●●ain. 321. 17. A present full Resolution against Sins that are Great and of ●ie desertion to a willing mind, is essential to Repentance; as is also a ●●esent Resolution for great and necessary Duties, and to forsake some ●●aller Sins, though it be necessary necessitate praecepti, I think is not essential to saving Conversion and Repentance, and necessary necessitate ●edii to Salvation. 322. 18. He that committeth a Gross sin, (that is, a Sin evidently ●reat, and in the power of a willing mind to forbear) so often as ●oth show that habitually he more loveth it than hateth it, and had ●ther keep it than leave it, doth show thereby that all his professed repentance for it is unsound, and his heart unsanctified, and that he ●ath yet no actual pardon from God. 323. Therefore those among the Papists who absolve such from their ●ns, who commit Fornication or Drunkenness once a month (at least) ●r once in many months, or often, and come between and say, I Repent, ●o but delude them. For the nature of those Sins is such, that he that ● converted to an habitual hatred of them more than he hath a love ●o them, cannot return to them so oft: And he that doth not so hate ●hem doth not truly repent. And even their Hildebrand (Greg. 7.) ●● a Council at Rome expressly saith, that [neither false Baptism, nor false ●a feigned and unsound) Repentance do put away Sin. 324. 19 The chief trial of a man's Holiness and Repentance is by ●he main scope and business of his life, especially in the positive part, ●nd next in the oppositive: when a man is conscious that God, and Ho●iness, and Heaven, are his great end, which are dearer to him and more powerful with him than all things sensible, and the interest of the flesh, ●nd when he can and doth deliberately forsake all, when they stand in ●pposition to or competition with God and Glory, and so as to the course of his life, doth live by Faith, and not by sense, this is the true evidence of true Conversion; and no Sins are damning which consist with this. 325. 20. But because the truth of this must be discerned, not only by present Sense and Resolution, but by practice to prove that Resolution true, therefore no man can be certain of the sincerity of his own heart, and resolutions and repentance, but by the practice of willing universal obedience, forsaking gross and wilful Sinning, performing ●●cessary duty, striving to overcome infirmities, and hearty desiring perfect Holiness, upon terms of Mortification, Self-denial and diligat use of means. 326. Therefore much sinning will at least breed much doubtfulness and uncertainty of Justification and Salvation, and till it be forsaken no such certainty will be had. SECT. XXII. Few certain of Salvation: The Consequents of this in order to our Concord herein. 327. I conclude therefore that certainty of Justification and sincerity is not the lot of the weakest or weaker sort of Christians, but of the strong confirmed Christians only. By weak Christians, I mean not those that have weakest natural parts and common gifts (as Learning, Memory, Utterance, etc.) But those that have the weakest Faith, Hope, Love, Humility, etc. For Grace is not certainly discernible. 1. In the least degree. 2. When it is little in action. 3. When it is much clouded and oft I wonder that worthy Deodate, and Tronchinus in their suffrages at Dort say, pag. 49, 50. Notitiam, sensum, certitudinem istius Decreti Deus electis in hac vita largitur modo, mensura, tempore quo ipsi placet: Ncc ullus est electus, qui aetate rationis capace non ante mortem, certissiman istius decreti persuasionem per Spiritum Sanctum accipiat. I hope they mean but an effect objectively certain. The many Texts cited by them, else prove it not. conquered by its contrary: But only when, 1. It is strong and in a good degree, 2. And much in act, 3. And conquereth opposition. 328. Therefore few Christians have Assurance at the first (or of a considerable time;) because few are strong at first. 329. Yea, therefore few ever attain to certainty who are sincere, because most are still weak, and few come to strength and a great degree, and to much activity, and great conquest of all the contrary Sins, of heart and life. 330. This being the case about certainty of Justification; as to the certainty of perseverance might a man judge by the conveniencies, of the truth, it would draw us to think that the middle way of the Dominicans and some others were the right: viz. 1. That the least degree (or first) of true saving Grace is sometimes lost finally and such perish; But 2. That they who obtain confirming Grace, by a greater degree do never lose it. For so the Angels and Adam fell from the first degrees for want of Confirmation: And many think (though it is not proved) that had they overcome in the first (or some more) trial, they should have had confirming Grace for a reward. And the good Angels are confirmed (whether by reward or mere gift or nature we know not). 2. This would save Christians from that uncomfortable thought [I must go further th●● ever such and such a one did who fell away, and had lived strictly and suffered patiently, or else I cannot be saved. For if this be true, a man may be saved who goeth no further, or not so far as some have done that sell away. 3. This will keep men from security and presumption, in a state of weakness, and keep them in a necessary fear of falling away; that they may avoid it. 4. And yet it provideth a certainty of perseverance and Salvation, for strong Christians who are (and perhaps they only) fit for it and capable of it. 5. And it tendeth thereby to make men long for, and press towards a strong confirmed state. I only say that if this Doctrine be or were true, it hath or would have these conveniencies. 331. And I will boldly say, that (as I before said, The weakest Christians are not ordinarily capable of present certainty of Salvation, so) the weakest or worst sort of true Christians, are morally unfit for it. 1. He that sinneth as much as ever will stand with Grace, and as ever he dare for fear of losing all, is under so great obligations and necessity to be humbled, to fear, to be penitent and deeply sensible of his great ingratitude that he is not fit for the joy of Assurance of Salvation; and therefore not fit for assurance itself: He that is certain to be saved, must rationally be full of Joy; which is unseasonable to one that must lie in the tears of deep humiliation. 2. And such a one that loveth God and Christ, and Goodness, in the weakest measure consistent with Salvation, must have all other Graces and comforts proportioned hereto, or else there will be a monstrous inequality: But certainty of Salvation is a degree of applicatory Hope, quite above that very little Faith, and Love, and Obedience of such a one. 3. And this certainty must be the effect and product of other Graces (Faith and Love, etc.) And a feeble Cause will not bring forth an effect so much stronger than itself. 4. God's Wisdom in Government will not encourage even a child; in fits of contempt, neglects or disobedience by such Assurance. How can he more Reward and Encourage the best? And if every true Christian should have certainty of Salvation, when he sinneth as foully, as frequently, as grossly, and liveth as slothfully as ever will stand with sincerity, it would tempt such to go on in Sin, and be no better. 5. God hath his castigatory punishments for sinful Children: Even to death itself sometimes; and much desertion. And who should have such corrections, but the worst of his Children? But the certainty of their their Salvation, useth not to suit with such correction and desertion; or at least is forfeited in such a case. Lastly, experience telleth us, that it is not God's will that the worst of his Children (no nor any but the better sort) should have such Assurance: For, 1. De facto they have it not. 2. And in the nature of the thing it is quite out of their reach. SECT. XXIII. More necessary Concessions. 332. But yet all this is not enough to prove that any of the justified do totally or finally fall away. The controversy must not be decided by arguments from convenience, but by Scripture assertion; where the difficulty is very great, because no small number of Texts seem to favour both the opinions, the reconciling of which is not the work of every ordinary understanding. Those that are brought for the certain Perseverance of all the justified may be seen in Zanchy's Disputes with Marbachius, (the first hot and high agitation of this controversy as a matter of great moment and necessary determination, which I remember to have found among us). And those on the other side, Bertius, Thompson, and the Arminians commonly have collected. My own opinion about it I have so largely showed in a Book called My present Thoughts of Perseverance, beforementioned, that I need not here again deliver it. Though between that and this last opinion, as wise a man as I may be in doubt when he hath done his best for a satisfactory resolution. 333. I take Augustine's opinion so far as it is for Perseverance to be a certain Truth, viz. That All the Elect shall certainly persevere, and that the Grace of Perseverance is the consequent of Election, and not Election the consequent of foreseen Perseverance, (unless you mean only that part of Election which determineth of Glorifying, and exclude that which decreeth to give Perseverance.) But the difficulty is about the non-elect. And it is most probable that where God decreeth Perseverance, he decreeth to give Grace suitable thereto; As when he decreeth the Immortality of the Soul, he giveth it a Nature apt for Immortality. And therefore that such have Confirming Grace. But the controversy is, whether all true Grace do so confirm? 334. That an Argument cannot be fetched for Perseverance from the mere Nature of the Grace received, seemeth plain, by Adam's fall, and probable from the Angels. 335. Some * Vid. Mr. George Walker of the Sabbath. to avoid this, deny Adam to have been Holy, and suppose him only Innocent, and Neutral, and capable of Holiness (worse than those Papists † Petavius in Elench. Ther. Vincent. Len●s c. 23. p. 97. Saith that Adam had 1. Exterior Grace, viz. his outward blessings. 2. Interiour: And that, 1. Permanent, which was Bona Voluntas, vel Justitia Originalis ex omnium virtutum, fidei, spei, Charitatis, tum caeterarum quae in ment aut Voluntate resident, concursu concentuque colle●ta. 2. Transient, that is, Actual influx or inspirations. But whereas he bitterly censureth Vincent: for saying that Grace was in some respect natural, it is but de nomine that he quarrelleth. And it is as if we disputed whether Health and Food were natural to Adam? They were not essential to his nature; but the rectitude of it concreated with nature, and given by the Creator for nature: And yet of Grace, because sine merito, though not as now, contra meritum. God made all very good. In illa ●um secerat qui fecerat rectum. August. ab ipso citat. who feign his Holiness to be a supernatural addition to his natural state, thereby preparing men to believe that man was not made Naturally with an Immortal Soul, for Immortal happiness). But, 1. If Adam had an immediate Moral disposition to love God as God, and acted this, he was Holy: If he had not, it must needs be a Privation in him, and not a mere Negation: For a rational creature must needs be naturally obliged to love his Creator; yea, this is the first and summary Law of Nature to him: Therefore not to do it must needs be Sin, and the sum of all Sin: Therefore Adam thus is made a great Sinner ab origine before his fall. 2. If Adam loved not God in his weakest degree of recovering Grace, he was unsanctified: But if he did (as certainly he did) than it is not like that in his least degree of his recovering Grace, he was Holier than in Innocency (though he might stand on surer grounds). 3. And this opinion maketh unholiness of Nature to be no part of Original Sin: Because it would be no Privation, but a Negation: For our Nature in Infancy is not obliged to have that holiness which it never had and lost in Adam. And so Original Sin is almost all denied, and an unholy heart is made as innocent therein. 4. We are renewed according to the Image of him that created us, in wisdom, righteousness, and true holiness, Col. 3. 10. Therefore it was holiness which was the Image of God which we lost, and needs renewing. 336. The Argument for Perseverance from God's Immutability will hold as to all the Elect as such, but not to all the sanctified or justified as such. For the Angels and Adam's fall did not prove God mutable. And God can judge a thing or person to be changed, without being himself changed; but only denominatione extrinseca a relatione ad mutatum, is variously denominated. And even his Law or Covenant which saith He that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned, will not at all be changed if it justify a Believer to day, whom it condemned as an unbeliever yesterday, and should condemn him again to morrow if he should apostatise; or if it conclude us guilty every day anew of every new Sin which we commit. 337. It is a very hard thing to confute an Anabaptist, without granting that Infant Justification may be lost. For experience proveth * Brianson in 4. q. 4. 1. Corrob. fol. 36. Handling the question why the baptised Infants have infused Habits of Grace, and Virtues, citeth their opinions that hold the contrary, but inclining to the affirmative, he hath no better answer to them that object experience, which oftest findeth not signs of such habits when they come to age, than that they are known to us only by Faith. Matth. 28. 19, 20. Eph. 4▪ 2, 3. that the Children of Godly Parents too often prove ungodly: And if they had Justifying Grace in Infancy, they lose it: And if they have not, than the Covenant in which they are entered doth not certainly Justify them. And if so, than it is either the very same Covenant which the adult are baptised into, or another. If it be another than their Baptism is another thing: For Baptism is but the celebration of our Covenant with God. And another Covenant in specie maketh another Baptism in specie. And if so, it seemeth to be no Baptism of Gods appointing: For he hath but One Covenant of Grace to be entered by us, and sealed; nor but one Baptism: Indeed on man's part, there is a Covenanting with the Heart and with the mouth, an outward as well as an inward Covenanting, or Consenting: But it is all to one and the same Covenant of God. It is the same species of Faith in God the Father, Son and Holy Ghost which baptised Hypocrites and true Christians do profess. And Infants have no Faith of their own to profess, but are dedicated by another's will; the title-condition of the Adult is their own consenting Faith; but the title-condition of Infants, is nothing in themselves, but their Parents consenting Faith without them, which dedicateth them to God. Now we suppose the Parents to do this sincerely. If then the Covenant ascertain not present Justification to the Infant, who hath all the condition required by the Covenant, how can we say that it any more ascertaineth Justification to the adult, it being proved to be the very same Covenant and not another. But if it do ascertain it, than many lose it. I run not into their error, who tell us (and would have none of us Preach Christ's Gospel that will not say the same) that It is certain by the Word of God that Infants baptised dying before actual Sin are certainly saved] without excepting the Children of any Infidels, Pagans, or Apostates, which I cannot prove of the Infants even of Hypocrites or unsound Christians, or that the Child can he saved by that false Faith, which will not save the Parent or him that dedicateth him to God; or that the Children of Hypocrites or Infidels have the condition of Justification: And if that Word of God had been cited, that maketh the assertion certain, it would have been a great kindness to us from those whose Justice must go for such: (But we are thought unworthy of it.) For my part, I determine not the difficult case of Infant's loss of Justification. Their case is left dark to us in the Scriptures: But my judgement is fulliest expressed by the words of the Synod of Dort, Art. 1. §. 17. And Davenant's Treatise on that point is very judicious, and considerable, if wherever he speaketh of Baptised Infants, you will but suppose him to mean the Infants of true Christians, and not all. 338. It seemeth a hard saying that any member of Christ should be cut off, and become a member of Satan, and perish, though he were but an Infant member. But we must not let the Metaphor deceive us: It is not a Natural member of Christ's Person that perisheth, as if part of Christ himself fell off: But a Metaphorical Mystical Political Member. And Christ thought it no absurdity, Joh. 15. to warn his chief Members that they fall not off, and to speak by way of supposition of his branches as cut off, withered and burned. And Adam and the fallen Angels, before their fall, were the Beloved of God, and his Children, and yet fell from that love. There must be therefore stronger Arguments than this, to turn the Scales. SECT. XXIV. The sum and end of this Discourse of certain Perseverance. 339. The end and sum of all that I have said of Perseverance is but this, that the controversy is neither, 1. Of such weight; nor, 2. Of such facility and certainty, as that it should be made necessary to our charitable converse or Church Communion to hold either this or that: But we should number it with the dogmata not to be imposed on others, nor fit to make any breach in the love and concord of Christians; and for my part, I profess that I take him for the worse Christian caeteris paribus, whom I hear with disaffection blotting the names of others with notes of unsoundness and culpability, for dissenting in this point on one side or other, either as holding or as denying the certain Perseverance of all the justified, than those that differ from me in the point itself, without any proud supercilious confidence. And that it is to be numbered with Tolerable Opinions, I have proved by these Arguments, in sum, 1. That which is so difficult that very few of the Learned and Godly Teachers of the Church in all ages could discern a certainty of it, cannot be a point so great or clear, as to be made necessary for all Christians or all Pastors of the Church to agree in: But such is this: For my part I profess that though my judgement incline more one way than the other, it is with no certainty that I am in the right, and I see so great difficulties after my hardest studies and search, that my inclination is not without much doubtfulness: And humility and modesty forbidden me, to profess a certainty or too much confidence for a Doctrine, which I openly say, I cannot prove or find that any one Christian held of about 1000 years after the Apostles days, * Unless Jovinian may be excepted, which is doubtful. I have not read all Books, and therefore there may have been some such that I know not of: But I know of none, that I remember for a far longer time. I know the Learned Bishop Robert Abbot and others cite Augustine as on that side; But it's past all controversy, that it is not all the justified but only all the elect whose Perseverance he asserted. And I am not he that would be separated from the Communion of all the ancient Churches, and Doctors, and all the Greeks and Lutherans of these times. Methinks we should learn of the Papists at lest to be moderate in our censures, when they who are so much for Impositions, do yet bear in part of this, with one another, in the controversies between the Dominicans and Jesuits. 340. 2. My other reason is, as to the comfort of men's Souls, how little is the difference between these two conclusions. [I am uncertain that every weak Christian shall persevere.] And [I am uncertain whether I myself shall persevere.] The first is the Arminians, and the second is all or almost all weak Christians conclusion in the world: For I have fully proved elsewhere, 1. That the sinfullest and worst sort of true Christians have not a certainty of their own Sincerity and Justification, nor are they fit for it: Nay, that it is only strong, active Christians who attain to such Assurance: 2. And that there are but few strong active Christians comparatively in the world. 3. Yea, but few that will say [I am certain that I am sincere and justified] (excepting those that speak it opinionatively or presumptuously, experience satisfieth us. 4. And that one that is uncertain that he is justified at all, cannot be certain that he shall persevere in Justification, I need not ●rove. So that by our own common Doctrine and Experience, it is ●ew true Christians that are certain of their own Perseverance and Sal●ation: And what doth this comfort them more than their Doctrine, who say that it is not certain in itself, that any besides the strong confirmed Christians, and the Elect shall persevere? and that we can ●e certain of the Election of none but the confirmed and the persevering. 341. I confess it is a great comfort to doubting fearful Souls, if they ●an sound thus argue, in their doubtful state, [I am sure I had true Grace once, and I am sure none fall quite away that have it: Therefore I am sure I have it still.] But, 1. Even this could be the comfort of none ●ut those few that were once of the stronger sort of Christians: For no other can say [I am sure that I had true Grace once]. 2. And that present sense of sin which maketh them doubt of their present sincerity doth ●sually make them as much doubt of their past sincerity. 3. And though such a comfort I think be due to a causeless and melancholy doubter, (who feareth unjustly) which is fetched from former perceived sincerity, yet it is not fit for all Christians that are fallen into such doubts. For if a man be fallen as sinful, as will stand with any sincerity, (even ●n gross Sin) it is not safe for that man to argue, [I am sure that I once ●as sincere in my obedience; therefore I am sure it is so still] for the reasons which I gave before But by Repentance he must make sure that he is truly obedient, that he may be sure he was so. 342. For my part I will labour as earnestly as I can to make sure both that I am sincere and justified and shall persevere, and I will be none of those that shall command, commend, or encourage causeless troublesome fears: But preventing fear is the means of perseverance: Heb. 4. 1. Having a promise left us of entering into his rest, let u● fear lest any of you should seem to come short of it, Joh. 14. 4, etc. Abide in me and I in you.— 6. If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch and is withered, and men gather them and cast them into the fire, and they are burned. 7. If ye abide in me and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will— As the Father hath loved me, so have I loved you: Continue ye in my love. If ye keep my Commandments ye shall abide in my love— Joh. 8. 31. If ye continue in my Word, then are ye my Disciples indeed. So Col. 1. 23. & passim. And I will never reproach, or censure, or disaffect such men as holy Bernard (though I am not of his opinion) who said Serm. 1. de Septuages. [Quis potest dicere Ego de electis sum? Ego de praedestinatis sum ad vitam aeternam? Ego de numero sum filiorum Dei? Quis haec inquam dicere potest, reclamante nimirum, Nescit homo si amore dignus sit an odio? Certitudinem igitur non habemus: Sed spes fiducia consolatur nos, etc. SECT. XXV. Degrees of falling, and danger. 343. Every degree of Grace that is true, is not to be supposed proportionable to the strongest Temptations: But God preserveth the weak effecttually by keeping them from Temptations too strong for them. And that which a strong Christian overcometh might overcome a weak one, were he assaulted by it. Therefore to avoid and pray against Temptation, is the way to be delivered from evil. 344. Yet the weakest true Christian, in choice, resolution and trial, forsaketh all for Christ, and loveth God, and preferreth Glory in Heaven before his Life, and is a Martyr in resolution. And yet there are Temptations * What the Grace of perseverance, and what confirmation is, is a great controversy among the Schoolmen. Malderus in 12. Tho. q. ●9 a. ●0. d. 1. mentioneth five Opinions: 1. That they are both one, and consist in extrinsic Divine custody. 2. That the confirmed are necessitated to good, but the mere persevering do it freely. 3. That confirmation is only a more intense degree of the same Grace. 4. Mere perseverance is by ordinary Grace with God's custody, and congruous means: but confirmation is by Grace of itself most effectual, though not necessitating. 5. That confirmation is by a participation of the Gratia et charitas patriae. Malderus resteth in this difference, that the confirmed have such a measure of Divine help and heavenliness, as is stronger than the strongest Temptations: But the gift of perseverance only, is with such a degree of Grace, as would not serve, if God did not keep such from stronger Temptations. So that confirmation is a middle state between mere Perseverance and Glory. which are too strong for him: For 1. He that habitually preferreth God to the Creature and his life, may yet fall into such an act as Peter did; And by acting contrary to his habitual disposition and resolution, may weaken the habit, and forfeit Divine assistance, and deserve desertion. 2. And he that valueth Heaven and the love of God before his life, may yet by the nearness of an alluring Object, by the violence of sense and passion be drawn to a fleshly sin, and thinking that he may have the pleasure of that particular sin, without losing God's love, he may be drawn first to less, and by degrees to greater. 3. And he that is resolved for God, and Glory, and Christ, and Holiness, may meet with such subtle Arguments of Infidels or Sensualists, which he is unable to answer, and consequently unable to overcome. And his Understanding being deceived, his Will may follow; so that perseverance must be by the avoiding of Temptations. 345. The greatest sins after Conversion, which are truly repent of, are pardoned by God: And must be pardoned by the Church in order to Communion, if the manifestation of Repentance be such as answereth the ends (the signification of its reality) and the removing of the scandal and the dishonour of Religion, of the Church, and of Christ. 346. The Sin against the Holy Ghost seemeth unpardonable by the Text, though the Papists expound it by [hardly pardonably]. And it is [an obstinate infidelity and rejection of Christ as a Deceiver, upon a settled conceit that he did his Miracles by the power of the Devil, when they are convinced that they were actually done; and so a blasphemous fathering of God's great attestation upon the Devil, and a rejecting his last Witness to the Truth, which must convince those that ever will be convinced.] But I have wrote a Treatise of this Sin, and so shall pass it by. 347. If a true Believer should be supposed to fall quite away from the belief of Christ, it seemeth hard to imagine how he can do it without this blaspheming the Divine attestation of the Spirit, by which before he was brought to believe. And it seemeth that therefore, Heb. 6. & 10. this Apostasy is made the same with the unpardonable blasphemy of the Holy Ghost, which yet proveth not that it ever cometh to pass, but what it would be if it did. 348. Repentance which cometh from fear alone, without the love of God and Holiness, is no sign of justification, nor consistent with it: nor is such attrition sufficient to forgiveness: For the heart is not changed to God without love. 349. Though where there is more love to the Creature than to God, there is no true Sanctification (speaking of rational and not of sensual love); Yet where there is more fear of God than love to God, there may be Grace, though weak, so be it God be loved above the Creature. 350. A Deathbed, or late Repentance, is then acceptable, and sufficient to pardon, when it is the Heart or Love that is thus turned from the Creature to God habitually; so that if the person did recover, he would live to God: otherwise it is uneffectual; not because too late, but because unsound: But because fear is usually the principle of such men's Repentance, it is much to be suspected, though not dispaired of. 351. The day of Grace is never passed with any man while life continueth, so as that if he truly repent, he shall not be forgiven: For that is contrary to the Gospel-Covenant. But it is so far passed with some, as that after their obstinate forfeiture, the Means, Help, and Grace of Repentance shall not be given them, nor brought so near them as they were. SECT. XXVI. Of final Justification, and how Paul and James agree about Justification by Works. 352. Having said this much of constitutive Justification, and the not-losing of it, and assurance of it and its continuance, and touched the second and third sorts of Justification, (sentential and executive) as they are here in the way, I need not say much of them as after this life, because it may be gathered from what is said of Pardon and Justification constitutive: Yet a little I will add. And 1. At death a particular doom is passed on the Soul as separated: But whether only by execution and self-conviction, we know not. 353. The Resurrection as such is a common effect of Redemption, in right antecedent to men's well or ill deserving: And therefore all are raised Joh. 5▪ 22, 25, 26, 27. by Christ. 354. The Justification of Believers at the last day, will be that great Justification, to which all that went before were but means, and imperfect. 355. Christ will be here both Judge and Advocate, and as both justify Believers: And he will be the condemning Judge of the Wicked. 356. All men shall be then judged according to their Works or Deeds done in the Body, whether Good or Evil. * It is a gross oversight of D. Petavius, Elen. Ther. Vincent. c. 27. p. 110, 111. to acknowledge no other Reatus but obligation ad poenam; when as there is, 1. Reatus facti. 2. Culpae, which is the violation of the Precept. 3. Ad poenam, which resulteth from the threatening. And worse, p. 110. that non omne peccatum est culpa sed hoc solum quod ex voluntate, id est▪ libero arbitrio & alectione committitur nec imputatur in culpam nisi ex deliberatione & libera voluntatis electione trocedat. A'as, that God's Law must be thus denied or depraved, that sin may be made no sin, and so to need no Christ or Pardon. Cont. 1. Analogically it is peccatum in an Ox to go out of the furrow: But properly nothing in man is peccatum, but culpa: And all breaking a Law is culpa, and nothing else is peccatum. 2. Not to deliberate is a great and usual sin. 3. The omission of the Wills election or intention is sin, as well as an ill election. Woe to him that repenteth not of these, and is not pardoned them. 357. To be justified then will not be to be judged sinless, (as is aforesaid) but to be judged one that by God's Law (which must be the norma judicii) is not to be damned to Hell, but to be glorified in Heaven, or to be sentenced to endless life, and acquit from this Accusation that we are damnandi, or to be punished in Hell. And in order to this, to be sentenced such as have the true causes and conditions of Right to Impunity and Life: which are, 1. Immediately the gift of this Right by God himself in his Covenant, with Christ the Fountain of it. 2. A true Right and Relation to Christ as our Head and Saviour, and the only Meriter of this Covenant-Gift, and Justification, and Adoption, by his habitual, active and passive Righteousness and Sacrifice, advanced in dignity by Union with his Divine perfection. 3. True Faith and Repentance, with Love, Obedience and Perseverance, as the title-conditions required by the donative and condonative Covenant. 358. As I have before said, that a man must be justified at that Day from the charge of Infidelity by his Faith itself (and not by Christ's Merits) and from the charge of Impenitence by his Repentance itself; So I add, that he must be justified from the charge of Hypocrisy by his sincerity, and from the charge of Rebellion by his subjection, and from the charge of wickedness by final godliness and obedience, and from the charge of Apostasy by perseverance; But from the charge of his wickedness before Conversion, and his pardoned sins and weakness since, only by Christ's Sacrifice and meritorious Righteousness, and the Pardon purchased thereby, and given in the New Covenant. And from the accusation that we are Sinners in general, we have no Justification at all. 359. Judgement is the Genus, and Justification, and Condemnation are the Species: Therefore to be judged according to our Works, is to be justified or condemned according to our Works. 360. As I said, that it is God's Justice and Mercy, and Christ's Redemption of us, which are chief to be glorified at that Day; but it is our personal Gospel-Righteousness, or performance of the Conditions of the New Covenant, which is then to be tried, and we, and not Christ, that are to be judged; So I add, that the New Testament referring to this fore-seen, doth usually speak accordingly, of justifying us by Faith, by our words, or by our works, that he that doth righteousness is righteous, etc. And it speaketh of that same Righteousness as constituting us just first, by which we must be judged just at last. 361. It is very easy therefore where prejudice blindeth not men, to see the concord of Christ's saying, We are justified by our words, and Paul's by Faith, and not by Works, and James by Works, and not by Faith only. Christ speaketh of a particular Justification, from a common great Crime, a wicked Tongue as the sign or product of a wicked Heart; And this must be part of the personal material Righteousness, by which we must be justified as true Christians. * Tolet in Rom. 3. Annot 17. Estius in Rom. 3. 28. & Vega de justi●. cue 3. p. 899. say of Justification by Faith, as the Protestants do. Vid. & Stapleton. de Justifi. li. 8. c. ult. & Bellarm. de Justif. l. 2. c. 7, 10, 11. Suarez de Grat. l. 7. c. 7. n. 29. Topper. art. 8. the Justif. p. 25, 26, 27. Vasqu. in 1. 2. disput. 202. c. 6. n. 45. Coster. Enchir. p. 292. Paul speaketh of our being justified by being Christians, and not by keeping Mose's Law, or doing any Works which will be to us instead of a Christ or a free-given Pardon, and Righteousness by him. And James speaketh of the full condition of Justification, as continued final and complete, as it consisteth of its essential parts. 362. The Key of Understanding Paul's Discourses of Justification is, to know, 1. That the grand question which he first manageth is, Whether the Gentiles may not be saved without keeping the Jewish Law, as well as the Jews with it? 2. To prove the Affirmative, he proveth that the Jews themselves cannot be saved or justified merely or primarily by the Law, notwithstanding the divinity and great excellency of it; but must be justified by a Saviour, and free-given Pardon and Right to Life, and to which the sincere keeping of Mose's Law was intended to be but subservient. 3. That therefore it appeareth, that the Jews did so fond admire the Law, and their national privileges under it, that they thought that the exact keeping of it was necessary and sufficient to Justification and Salvation: And they thought the Messiah was not to be their Righteousness, as a Sacrifice for Sin, and Meriter of free Pardon, and the Gift of Life, but only a great King and Deliverer, to redeem them by Power from all their Enemies and Bondage. 4. That it was not Adam's Covenant of Innocency or Perfection which the Jews thus trusted to, or Paul doth speak against as to Justification (though a minore ad majus, that also is excluded.) For the Jews knew that they were Sinners, and that God pardoned Sin as a merciful God, and that their Petavius de Leg, & Grat. li. 1. c. 7. Well openeth the various senses, in which the Law doth or doth not promise life eternal: And through his two Books is much worth the reading of the difference of the Law and Gospel: See Mr. Allen's Treat. of the Two Covenants, with my Preface; And Mr. Truman's Great. Propitiat. with the Append. Law had Sacrifices for Pardon and Expiation, with Confessions, etc. But they thought that so far as God had made that Law sufficient to political ends, and to temporal Rewards and Punishments, it had been sufficient to eternal Rewards and Punishments; and that of itself, and not in mere subordination to the typified Messiah. Therefore they thought that he that kept the Law so far as to commit no sin which the Law punished with death or abscission, and that for all his other pardonable sins, performed the required Penances and Sacrifices, was by this, which is called The Works of the Law; that is, the keeping of the Law, a righteous justifiable person. 5. That the thing therefore which Paul disproveth them by is, 1. That the Law was never made for such an end. 2. That even than it stood in subordination to Redemption and free-given life. 3. That the free Gift or Covenant of Grace containing the Promise of the Messiah, and Pardon and Life by him, was before the Law, and justified Abraham and others even without it. 4. That their Law was so strict, that no man could perfectly keep it all. 5. That every Sin deserveth death indeed, though their Law punished not every sin with death by the Magistrate. 6. That their Law was never Obligatory to the Gentile world, who had a Law written in their Hearts; and therefore not the common way of Justification. * Jansenius. Aug. To. 2. c. 4. asserteth, That the chief difference between the old Law and the new, is, that the old was written in Stone and Tables, and the new only in memory and in the heart, and so maketh the Creed to be more properly this Law than the Scriptures, as being written only on particular occasions. But though we thankfully confess that the essentials of Christianity are so plain and few as may be remembered, yet the Creed is contained and explained in the Scripture, and without written Records, our Faith would have been but ill preserved, as experience and reason prove. 7. That their Law, as such, discovered sin, but gave not the Spirit of Grace to overcome it: Insomuch as though he himself desired perfectly to fulfil it without sin, yet he could not, but was under a captivity, that is, a moral necessity of imperfection, or sins of infirmity, from which only the Grace of Christ could as to guilt and power deliver him. 8. That no man ever came to Heaven by that way of merit which they dreamt of, but all by the way of Redemption, Grace, free Gift and pardoning Mercy. Therefore their conceit that they were just in the main, and forgiven their sins, and so justifiable by the mere dignity of Mose's Law which they kept, and by the Works of the Law, and not by the free Gift, Pardon and Grace of a Redeemer, and by the Faith and practical belief of that Gift, and acceptance of it, with thankful penitent obedient hearts, was a pernicious error. But the true way of Righteousness was to become true Christians, that is, with such a penitent thankful, accepting, practical belief or affiance to believe in God as the Giver of Salvation, in Christ as the Redeemer, and his Spirit as our Life and Sanctifier, and to accept Christ and all his procured Benefits, Justification and Life, as purchased by his Sacrifice and meritorious Righteousness, and given in the New Covenant on this condition, and so to give up ourselves to his whole saving-work, as to the Physician of our Souls, and only Mediator with God. This is the sum of Paul's Doctrine on this point. 363. I say again therefore, for any man to say that some one physical act, either assent, or consent, or affiance, upon one particular Object (Christ's Righteousness as offered us) is the instrumental cause of our Justification; and that to look to be justified by any other act of Faith on Christ, or on the Father, or Holy Ghost, or on Heaven the final Object (God in Glory), or secondarily as subsequent parts of the condition of Salvation, by Repentance, by praying for Pardon, by forgiving others, by Obedience to Christ, etc. is to look to be justified by Works in the sense that Paul excludeth them; this is but to abuse the Gospel and the Church, by a scandalous misinterpretation of a great part of the New Testament. 364. St. James therefore having to do with some who thought that Leg. Placeum. in Thes. Salvin. de h●sce. Vol. 1. & Conrade. Bergium in Prax. Cathol. & ●. e Blank. Thes. de Just. and our Mr. Gibbon's Serm. Of Justif. in the Morning-Exercises at Giles in the Fields. Paraeus de Justif. Cont. Bellarm. l. 2. c. 7. p. 469. Nos imputari nobis Christi justitiam ut per ●am formaliter justi nomin●m●r & simus, neque diximus unquam, neque sentimus, ut aliquoties jam ostendimus: Id enim pugnaret, non minus cum recta ratione quam si reus in judicio absolutus diceret, se clementia judicis donantis sibi vitam, formaliter justum esse, etc. the bare profession of Christianity was Christianity, and that Faith was a mere assent to the Truth, and that to believe that the Gospel is true, and trust to be justified by Christ was enough to Justification, without Holiness and fruitful Lives, and that their sin and barrenness hindered not their Justification, so that they thus believed (perhaps misunderstanding Paul's Epistles) doth convince them that they were mistaken, and that when God spoke of Justification by Faith, without the Works of the Law, he never meant a Faith that containeth not a resolution to obey him in whom we believe, nor that is separated from actual Obedience in the prosecution; But that as we must be justified by our Faith against the charge of being Infidels, so must we be justified by our Gospel personal holiness and sincere Obedience against the charge, that we are unholy and wicked, or impenitent, or Hypocrites, or else we shall never be adjudged to Salvation, that is, justified by God. 365. All this then is past controversy among considerate understanding men, 1. That Works justify us not as perfect, according to the Covenant of Innocence, because we have them not. 2. That the Works or keeping of Mose's Law, as conceited sufficient, or as set in opposition against, or competition with a Saviour or free Gift, or any otherwise than as the exercises of mere Obedience under Christ (as Mary, zachary, Elizabeth, Simeon, John Baptist, David, etc. used them,) could justify no man. 3. That consequently no other Works set up either in the said opposition or competition, or as any thing of Merit, or worth is ascribed to them, which is proper to Christ, or any part of the honour of God's free Gift, can justify no man; nor any other way, than as mere conditions, and exercises of thankful obedience or acceptance, in pure subordination to God's Mercy, and Christ's Merits, and the free Gift. But that Works are not excluded from being conditions of our justification, or the matter of it in any of these following respects: 1. That Faith itself, which is our act, and an act of Obedience to God, and is the fiducial accepting belief in God the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, for the benefits of the Covenant, is the condition of our first Covenant-right to these Benefits. 2. That this Faith is not actual Obedience to Christ as Christ (at first, but only to God as God). But it is the Souls subjection to Christ as Christ, which is our Covenant-consent to our future Obedience, and virtually, though not actually, containeth our future Obedience in it. 3. That there is somewhat of love, consent or willingness, of Desire, of Hope, of Repentance, which goeth to make up this moral work of Faith, as it is the condition; even our first Christianity itself. 4. That as the making of a Covenant is for the performing of it, and subjection is for Obedience and Marriage for conjugal Duties, so our said first Covenanting-Faith is for our future Faith, Hope, Comfort, and grateful Obedience and Holiness: And these are the secondary parts of the condition of Salvation: And so are the secondary parts of our Justifications, condition as continued or not-lost, and consummate: For to justify us, is, as is said, to justify our Right to Impunity and Glory. ●. That, as is said, our own performance of the condition of the free Gift of Impunity and Glory, by the New Covenant purchased by Christ's Righteousness, is the thing to be tried and judged in God's judgement; And therefore we must so far be then justified from the charge of ●ot performing that condition, of being Infidels, unsanctified impenitent Hypocrites, Apostates, and so of having no part in Christ and the free Gift, even by our personal Evangelical Faith, Holiness, Repentance, sincerity and Perseverance. And all this justification by Works St. James ●s for, and it is undeniable by any thing but prejudice, ignorance, and ●ding pievishness. Let the Reader of quick understanding pardon my repeating the same thing, which others will not yet understand. 366. Christ's Sermons, Matth. 5. & 6. 7. & 10. & 13. & 18. & 21. ●nd Luk. 6. & 11. & 12. & 16. & 18. & 19 and Joh. 1. & 3. & 5. & 6, etc. with all the Sermons in the Acts, and all the Catholic Epistles of Peter, James, Judas and John, and Paul's Epist. to the Rom. Chap. 1. 2. 4. 6. 7. 8. ●2, etc. Gal. 5. & 6. and a great part of the rest of his Epistles, are ●ade up of this Doctrine of * Methinks Jansenius greatly wrongeth his Cause, when he saith, To. 2. c. 13. that Primus Augustinus intelligentiam divin● grati● & novi Testamenti fide crediti a pervit fidelibus & ecclesiae. If we should say, that [Primus Lutherus] they would take it for a note of novelty and error: was the Church for 400 years ignorant of Grace and fundamental Verities? Contrarily I think that Christ's plain Doctrine in his Sermons, and the old Churches for 300 years in their plainer uncurious Writings, plainly delivered all the necessary Doctrine of Grace: yea even the Creed itself containeth it. Grace which I have asserted; And the ●eading of them will better instruct you in the true sense of Remission and ●ustification, than most Treatises written on that Subject which I have seen. 367. The perfection of Justification and Pardon will be by the final executive act, the taking the justified into Glory. SECT. XXVII. Of the fewness of the glorified, and the many that perish. 368. Though it be comparatively but a little Flock, and part of this world to whom God will give the heavenly Kingdom, yet the number will in itself be exceeding great. And it's very probable that (this Earth being a very little punctum of the Creation) that taking all God's rational Creatures together, the number of the damned will be found a very small number in comparison of the blessed; even as the Malefactors in the Jails are to the Subjects of the Kingdom. For the worlds above us are incomprehensibly vast and glorious; And the Text telleth us, Heb. 22. 22. That we are come to an innumerable company of Angels: Though the proportions be unknown to us, I speak this again, that mistakes tempt not men to unworthy thoughts of the infinite amiable goodness of God, or of the Christian Faith. 369. And what the Saints do want in number, they shall have in excellency, to glorify the goodness of God. The little Flock which shall have the Kingdom, shall be all Kings and Priests, and shall judge the world (Judgement in Scripture is much put for Government): They shall be equal with Angels, and shining Stars in our Father's Firmament, and shall sit with Christ upon his Throne: And shall in a word, in the perfection of their Natures, perfectly know, love and praise, obey and delight in God, in a perfect society in the sight of Christ's Glory, and be assured of this to all eternity. Amen. And we see in God's Works of Nature, high Excellencies are rare. There are not so many Suns as Stars, nor Stars, as Stones, or Leaves, or Trees; nor so much Gold as Earth; nor so many Men, as Flies, Fishes, and other Animals; nor so many Kings as Subjects; nor so many Teachers as Learners; nor so many men of learning and wisdom as ignorance. And we see there are not so many godly as ungodly. 370. And, as I told you before, that as Israel was not all God's people in the world before Christ's Incarnation, and that the Chatholick Church now succeedeth them in their high and rare Peculiarities and Privileges above the rest of the world, and far exceedeth them in the greatness of our Mercies; and that Christ's Incarnation hath put the rest of the world into no worse a condition than they were before; and that all the world is under a Law of Grace, and none under the Law and Covenant of Innocency only: So I now add, that all shall be judged by that Law which they were under; They that have sinned without a (written) Law, shall be judged without that Law: And what state each particular Rom. 2. Soul is in, the Judge only knoweth, and not we, who are insolently arrogant, if we will step up into his Throne, and judge his Subjects without his Commission. But this we know that God hath various degrees of Rewards and Punishments (as to Infants and Adult, so to the Adult among themselves.) And that he that gained but two Talents shall be Ruler of two Cities: And he that had but one might have improved one, though he could not have improved more than he had: And that they that have done good shall go into everlasting life, and those that have done evil to everlasting punishment. And the kinds and degrees of their different Matth. 25. last. punishments hereafter, how great, and how far involuntary, they are beyond the very miserable case of their sinfulness itself, are things that are unknown to us. But certain we are, that the Judge of all the world will do righteously, and that all wise and righteous men's judgements, when they shall see what the number of Sufferers, and the sorts and degrees of their punishment are, shall be fully satisfied of the Goodness, Clemency, Wisdom and Justice of God, and never once wish it had been otherwise. And that the Servant that knew his Lords Will, and prepared not himself, nor did according to his Will, shall be beate● with many stripes: But he that knew not, and did commit things worthy Luk. 12. 47, 48. of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall he much required: and to whom men have committed much, of him will they ask the more. 371. It is little understood by most how much man by sin itself is effectively his own Tormenter, (which tempteth man to doubt of Hell, as if it were Gods too much severity so to punish.) How Sin is a punishment itself, and how God antecedently made man's nature such, that if he would sin, it should torment him and undo him of itself (like poison to the Body) I have opened in the first Chapter. See Gabr. Biel in 2. d. 36. that Omne peccatum est poena, and the four Reasons of Bonavent. recited by him. 372. The Stoics and Platonists Revolution, and the Pythagorean Re-incorporation, are so like the Christian Doctrine of the Resurrection, that (though we must not with Origin seek to make them liker than they are, yet) those Infidels are unexcusable who take this for incredible, and yet take the other for the most rational conjecture. * Such as are most of the sober Heathens in the world. For the most religious and sober of them are Pythagorears to this day: Lege Varenium de divers. Relig. post Hist. Jap●n. Bless, Lord, thy own reconciling Truths, to the healing of thy Churches, or at least of some disjointed minds. And teach me with patience to bear the Obloquy and Reproach of mistaken zealous Consurers: And forgive them that know not what they say or do. And wherein I err, forgive and rectify me, and better inform both the Reader and me. The Third Part: OF God's Gracious Operations ON MAN'S SOUL; Their DIFFERENCE, and the OPERATIONS OF MAN'S WILL. For the fuller Decision of the Controversies about EFFECTUAL and DIFFERENCING GRACE.. By RICHARD BAXTER. LONDON, Printed by Robert White, for Nevil Simmons at the Prince's Arms in St. Paul's Churchyard. MDCLXXV. THE CONTENTS. THE Preface. Pag. 1. Sect. 1. The Presupposed Principles briefly repeated, p. 7▪ Sect. 2. The Order of Divine Operations, p. 9 Sect. 3. Of the Operations and Principles as compared, p. 12. Sect. 4. How far God useth Means, p. 16. Sect. 5. Of the Causes of the different Effects of Grace (and Means), p. 18. Sect. 6. Of the Limitations of Gods Operations on the Soul, p. 20. Sect. 7. Of the Resistibility of Grace, p. 21. Sect. 8. What is that Operation of God on the Soul, enquired of in many following Questions? And whether searchable by man? p. 22. Sect. 9 Whether God's Operation be equal on all? p. 31. Sect. 10. Whether it be Physical or Moral? p. 32. Sect. 11. What freewill man hath to Spiritual Good. p. 35. Sect. 12. More of Predetermination by Physical Premotion, p. 37. Sect. 13. More of Man's Power, Natural and Moral, p. 43. Sect. 14. Whether the giving of Faith be an act of Omnipotency and a Creation? and a Miracle? p. 46. Sect. 15. Of the Sufficiency and Efficacy of Grace? p. 48. Sect. 16. Of Infused Habits and the Holy Ghost, even special Grace, p. 53. Sect. 17. Whether Man be merely Passive as to the first Grace? p. 55. Sect. 18. Whether the first Grace, and the New and Soft Heart, or Faith itself, be Promised or Given absolutely, or on any Condition to be performed by man? ibid. Sect. 19 How God may be said to Cause the Acts of Sin, p. 57 Sect. 20. How far God, and how far man himself, is the Cause of Hell and other punishments, p. 62. The Conclusion. §. 1. The Concessions of the Synod of Dort, specially the British Divines: More of Divine Motion or Impress, p. 67. §. 2. The Epitome of Alvarez de Auxil. drawn up by himself in Epilogo in Twenty Conclusions, considered, p. 70. §. 3. A Censure of the other three ways described by him, viz. 1. The Jesuits de Scientia Media, p. 75. §. 4. 2. Durandus' Way, p. 76. §. 5. 3. That of the Scotists and Nominals: Of God's partial Causality, p. 79. §. 6. The true face and Scheme of the Dominican Predeterminant way, in the Sense and Consequents, in Fifty Propositions, and the Reasons of my preferring any before this, p. 80. A Summary of all, to satisfy sober minds. p. 100 Additional Animadversions on Mr. Peter Sterrey's Book of freewill: making God the Author of Good and Evil, as he is of Light and Darkness, p. 106. The Third Part: OF GOD'S GRACIOUS OPERATIONS ON MAN'S SOUL: AND THE SUB-OPERATIONS OF MAN'S WILL. For the Ending the Contentions about Sufficient and Effectual, Common and Special Grace, and Freewill. The Preface. THE first Part of this Treatise, though largest, and fullest of men's contentious Questions and opinions, is furthest from the true point of the difference and difficulty, which troubleth the Church▪ And is made large by accident, by way of disquisition and detection of the many ensnaring questions, and vain or hurtful wranglings of the Schoolmen. The Second Part cometh nearer our chief Controversies, and resolveth many other on the by; and containeth the sum of that part of Theology, which is most clear, and sure, and necessary. This Third Part which cometh up to the main Controversy, is short, and troubleth you less with other men's opinions, and Schoolmens Wranglings about Grace and freewill: Partly because you had enough of them by the way before▪ And chief because I would not by tediousness, and recitation of Contentions, obscure that which I most desire to make plain, nor discourage the Reader by the length. I think if I can manifest, that there is no real, or considerable difference among the Learned and Moderate on each side, (such as are the Synod of Dort on one side, and even Bellarmine, Suarez, Ruiz, etc. on the other, besides the moderate Lutherans and Arminians, (who may be ashamed if they go farther from us than the Jesuits) besides abundance of Schoolmen that are of a middle strain, between the Dominicans and Jesuits,) few understanding Divines would then think that there were any considerable difference remaining about Predestination, or the universality of Redemption; Those differences being but respective unto this. But about Perseverance I confess that there doth a real difference remain: But that it is of less moment than most on both sides say, and such as is no way fit to quench Christian Love, or alienate Christians from each other, or hinder their liberties or peaceable communion, I have fully proved in the Second Part, and formerly in a peculiar Treatise entitled, My Thoughts of Perseverance. If therefore I can truly disprove our pretended difference about the ●●●rations of Grace, or at least prove it to be but as it is, no greater not more intolerable than that of Perseverance, I shall think that all is done that is (thus) necessary. The main difference (seeming or real) is about the Power of Man's Will: Of which I have spoken much in the First Part, and purposely leave much to the Reconciling Praxis in the Second Book; which shall dissipate the cloud of ambiguous words: Till than it shall here suffice to manifest, 1. That we are agreed with them whose conciliation I endeavour, that ●● is not the natural Powers▪ essential to a man which we are deprived of. 2. But that these Powers have by our common corruption, a sinful Disposition, unfitting them for a due exercise for God and against sin. 3. And that all men (at least at age) are not depraved in the same degree. 4. That this Ill disposition is called a Moral Impotency, when it is such as while it remaineth, the sinful Act is ever done, or the commanded act is never done. There is then no Moral Power. 5. That the vicious sinful impotency of the will, and its Habitual or dispositive unwillingness to good, and proneness to things forbidden, is all one. 6. That he is Morally Able, who without any other grace than he hath, can do the thing commanded, or forbear the thing forbidden. 7. That there is no Power but of God. 8. That Nature, common grace, and special grace, give several powers or dispositions. 9 That a moral power is less than a good habit. 10. That every man hath a moral proper power to do more good than he doth, and forbear more evil. 11. That every man is commanded to use some means in order to his salvation, which he is morally able to use. 12. That God useth to bear long with the abusers of their Power before he forsake them. 13. That many have many persuasions and helps to use their power that abuse it. 14. That it's just with God to forsake such. 1●. And great mercy to the elect not to be so forsaken. All ●●●● will be made cleare● in their due ●●●●, which I shall now here offer you. §. 2. AS for the five Articles: I. The Article of Predestination, II. And the Article of Redemption, contain no difference between the parties, but only as they relate to the Articles of freewill and effectual Grace, as is aforesaid. For all must agree that God Decreed and Christ procured all that Grace or Mercy for men which he giveth them: Of which the Conditional gift of the Love of the Father, the Grace of the Son, and the Communion of the Holy Spirit in the Covenant of Grace, with a Commission to his Ministers freely to offer it to all Believing Consenters, and to seal it and deliver it by Baptism, is a great part: And many mercies, teachings, persuasions, and motions tending to draw them to Consent is another part. God decreed not to deny men that which he giveth them; and Christ's Death procured them all that he giveth them. To which add what elsewhere I have opened, that there is no necessity of ascribing to God any Positive Decrees of Negations or nothings. Else there must be a Decree against the existence of all the myriads of possible animals, atoms, names, words, etc. And remember that to Permit is not-to hinder, and so is a mere negation, or a doing nothing; and that not-to-give faith, repentance, grace, the Gospel, etc. is a negation, or a nothing, and so need no Decree, seeing a not-decreeing to give, etc. is sufficient: so that the whole of the Controversy about these two Articles is clearly devolved to the Controversies of Grace and freewill. III. And concerning freewill it cannot be denied, but that Natural freewill is part of that excellency or Image of God, by which man is differenced from bruits; and that it is such a faculty by which man can in some instances, determine his own will to this rather than that, without Divine predetermination; which is certain in the ●ase of sin, yea and of some good. For Adam's will could without any other grace than he had, have forborn his sin. Or else still all is but resolved into God's mere will. And it is agreed on (as is said before) that all men can do more good than they do, and forbear more evil than they forbear, and that without any more grace or help than they have when they use it not: so that it is not abhorrent from the nature of freewill, for a man to make a good use or an ill, of the same measure of grace at several times, or for several men to make several uses of the same measure. Therefore it is no unjust answer to the question, [Why did he forbear this sin to day, and not yesterday] or [Why did this man forbear sin and not that, supposing them to have the same measure of assisting grace,] to say [Because, this man, at this time, used that power which God had given him, in stirring up his own will to concurt with grace, and the other man, or this at another time, did not what he could.] Not that this answer is good in all cases, (where more grace is necessary to the effect,) but in this forementioned. So that it is no Deifying of the will of a Rational free-Agent, to say that it is essentially a self-determining faculty, made by God in the Image of his Liberty, and depending on him, and not able to Act without him as the first Cause, but yet on supposition of his Natural preservation and universal concourse, and of his directions and Laws, it is able to make choice hic & nunc to will or not will, to will this rather than that, without Divine necessitating predetermination, and without any more Grace or help than sometime it hath when it doth the contrary: All which showing the natural power of man's will, and its liberty, must be readily acknowledged by all sides, that will not say that Adam's first sin, and every sin of all men else, are all resolved into God's causation in case of commissions, and Gods non-causation in case of omissions, and into God's will in both; and that man can no more do any thing but what he doth, than he can be God, or overcome God, or live and act without God. And as we must thus agree that natural Liberty consisteth in a self-determining power peculiar to Rational free agents; so we are all agreed except the Pelagians, that man's nature is vitiated by Original sin, and therefore that the will which is naturally free from force and necessitation (except from God, who never necessitateth it to evil,) is yet in servitude to our own concupiscence, and is not free either from the enticements of sense, or the erroneous conduct of a blinded mind, or from its own vicious habits, (averseness to God and holy things, and proneness to things sensual, and seeming good:) And therefore that this Holy, or Moral Liberty of the will, must have the Medicinal Grace of Christ to heal it; (of which next▪) IU. And as to the Article of Effectual Grace, it is agreed on (and cannot I speak not of Grace as it is God's favour, but the effect: ●e gratia data, non de gratia dant●. with sobriety be gainsayed without subverting the main doctrine of the Scriptures) that whereas besides the Preparatory or Promeriting Grace of Christ's own performance, there is yet a threefold Grace necessary for the application or conveyance of the Benefits purchased by Christ; in the measure hereafter mentioned, all this is common. I. The first sort of Grace lieth in the enacting of a new Law of Grace, called also in several respects, The new Testament, the new Covenant, and the Promise. And as to this it is agreed, 1. That God made this Law, Covenant or promise in the first Edition with Adam and Eve after the fall, Gen. 3. 15. (the seed of the woman shall break the Serpent's head,) and did by Actual Remission, of their sin, and not-punishing them as the first Law threatened, yet more plainly manifest to them the pardoning Grace of this Covenant; And that he made this new Law or Covenant to all mankind in and by them: And that he again renewed the same Covenant of Grace with all mankind in Noah after the deluge. Those few inconsiderate persons that deny this, are not so valuable as to be an exception to our Concord. It is an intolerable conceit of any to think that the tenor or sense of the Conditional Covenant of Grace (for I talk of no other) extendeth not universally to all men, but that any men are yet lest under no other Law or conditional-promise or Covenant, than that of Innocency. For if that were true, 1. Then God should be supposed to make men a promise of Life, on a condition of present natural impossibility; And to say to sinners [If you be not sinners, you shall live.] 2. And to oblige men to the same Impossibilities as the means of their salvation, saying still to sinners [I require you sinners that you be no sinners that you may be saved.] 3. Which is indeed to say that the case of all that are under the first Law of Innocency only is desperate, and they have no more hope or remedy than the Devils. 4. And then Christ had mistaken the matter himself, when he commanded his Ministers to Preach this Gospel or Covenant to all the world, and every (humane) Creature, and tell them that If they believe they shall be saved, and to offer them Baptism if they consent. 5. And either Preachers must preach an untruth to many, or else not know what man to preach to. 6. But the actu-al force and obligation of the Covenant, puts all out of doubt, that the world is under a Law of Grace: For what man, that by siding hath not his understanding utterly distorted, to look only on one side, can say that none but the Elect are bound to Believe in Christ, or to Repent of sin, or to turn to God? and this as a means of their salvation? What man dare say, that any Heathens in the World, are under no obligation, to use any means at all, for the pardon of their sins, or the recovery and saving of their souls? What man dare say that it is no sin in them not to use any such means? And what duty or sin can there be without a Law? And what Law can bind men to accept of Grace, and to seek it, and use means for pardon, renovation and salvation, but the new Covenant or Law of Grace? Sure the Law of Innocency hath no such obligation. 7. Lastly, And God's usage of all the world, puts the case past Controversy. For he useth no man according to the mere Law of Innocency: All the world have a great proportion of the Mercies of the New Covenant; and therefore are not under the Covenant of Innocency alone. Yet we maintain that the preceptive part of the Law of Innocency as to the future, is still in force to all men [Obey perfectly;] And that the penal part is so far in force as to make death in the first instant due for every sin: But we add, 1. That the Remedying pardoning Law being in force with it, doth immediately dissolve that obligation, and make it uneffectual to the punishment of believers: 2. And that the Promising part of the Covenant of Innocency is utterly ceased by the cessation of man's capacity: And therefore that the Preceptive part (for perfection) is now no Condition of Life to any man. Two things I was wont in my Ignorance to say against the universal tenor of the new Covenant. 1. That God distinguished and excluded some at the first making of it, under the name of the Seed of the Serpent: But 1. No Scripture giveth us the least ground to think that men equally guilty, are some called the Seed of the Serpent, and some of the Woman, merely as denominated from or distinguished by Gods own will or decree, without any real difference in the persons. 2. And if the Image of Satan in Original sin, were it that denominated the Seed of the Serpent, than all the world should be excluded, because all are such before they are regenerate. 3. Therefore it is plain that it is not mere Original sin that denominateth any one, the Serpent's Seed, in the sense of that Text, but a consequent rejection and opposition of the Mediator or Grace of the new Covenant. 2. I was wont in my great Ignorance in my youth to think, that All men were merely under the first Covenant, till Conversion, and then they came under the second only. But this was but Confusion. To be under a Law or offered Covenant, as the terms of life or death, is one thing; And so all are under a Law or Covenant of Grace, and no man under the mere Law of Innocency; obliged to perfection as the sole condition of life: And to be obedient to this Law, and a Consenter to this Covenant, and so to be in the Covenant as Mutual, is another thing; And this is the case of Consenters only. So that I may take it for granted that we are agreed, that as to the first Edition of the Law of Grace to Adam and No, it extendeth or is in force to all the world, at least, till by enmity against Grace, they have made themselves desperate as the Serpent's seed: Yea then, the Law of Grace is in force to them, though they reject the Grace of it. 2. And as to the last Edition of the Covenant of Grace by Christ, 1. The tenor of it extendeth to all; as is visible Matth. 28. 19 Mark 16. 16. Joh. 3. 16. 2. And Christ hath made it the office of his Ministers by his commission, to promulgate and offer it to all. 3. And whereas providence concurreth not to the universal execution, we must all confess, that Christ came not to put the world into a worse condition than he found them in. If he did any no good by his Incarnation, he would do them no harm. Therefore they that never hear the Gospel, are still under the first Edition of the Covenant made with Adam and Noah, so far as it is unaltered. I add that word, because, that so far as the Promise was to give salvation by the Messiah hereafter to be incarnate, none is now bound to expect his future Incarnation, because it is past. But the same benefits that were due to believers before Christ's incarnation, are due since upon the true performance of so much of the condition as is still in force, and not repealed. 3. And we must needs agree, that the Ignorance of the Apostles before Christ's sufferings, of his death, sacrifice, and resurrection, doth show, that the faith of the Godly Jews then, was far more general, and less particular, than the faith now required of Christians. 4. And also, that more was required then, to be known particularly by the Jews that had the Scripture and Tradition to acquaint them with the Messiah to come, than of the rest of the world, that had not those distinct discoveries, nor Abraham's promises made known unto them: And how much Gen. 3. 15. might cause them to understand, we may conjecture by the words At least this much was required of all, that they believe that their sin deserveth punishment, and misery, and yet that God of his abundant mercy, by his Wisdom securing his Truth and Justice, will pardon sin and grant salvation to all that truly Believe and Trust in that his Wisdom and Mercy, and repent of their sins, and unfeignedly give up themselves to God as their merciful Redeemer. Thus far we are agreed about the Grace of the Covenant. II. And as to the second sort of Communicative Grace, that is, The Promulgation of this Law of Grace, and offers of the Covenant-Benefits to man, we are and must be all agreed, 1. That (besides what Tradition sacrificing did intimate,) the first Edition of the Covenant of Grace (as is said) is universally promulgate by Providence. For whereas by the violation of the Law of Innocency, all blessings were forfeited, and all miseries deserved, and no man had any notice by that Law, of any hope or means of his recovery: on the contrary, all the world hath great abundant mercies, and are not punished according to the first Law, and therefore have sensible forgiveness of sin; and all have an inward testimony or conviction, that they are obliged to gratitude for these mercies, and also to the use of certain means (as Repentance, Prayer, etc.) in order to their farther pardon and salvation. And all this fully demonstrateth that God hath so far promulgated the old Edition of the Covenant of Grace, as to make it notorious that the world is not under the mere Law of Innocency. And to believe in a Merciful pardoning God, (as he was Exod. 34. proclaimed to Moses is become even the Law of lapsed Nature. 2. And as I said, the last Edition of the Covenant is commanded by Christ in his Minister's commission to be proclaimed to all the world: Yea Magistrates, parents, neighbours, all men, in their several capacities are bound to promote it. 3. And the world hath actually heard so much of the Gospel, as that Paul in his days said, That their sound went into all the Earth and their words to the end of the world, Rom. 10. 18. when it had gone but a little way in comparison of what it hath since done. Thus far we are agreed of the Promulgation. III. The third sort of Grace is the Internal operation of the Spirit of God upon men's hearts; And here it is that the heart of all our difference seemeth to lie. SECT. I. The presupposed Principles. §. 1. THe way of God's operation on souls, yea, or bodies, or any creature, is so unsearchable, that I had rather silence, than pretend to decide abundance of the Controversies long agitated about it. And had not men's audacious decisions, and furious contentions (not yet allowing the Church's peace) made it accidentally necessary to repress their presumption and their error, I should reverently have passed by much that I must now meddle with. But the cure must be suited to the disease. §. 2. So much as is * See a notable discourse of Bradwardint of man's little knowledge of God, li. 1. c. 1. cor. 32. contrae philos. which excellently rebuketh audacity in this case. intelligible herein, is divine, and honourable, and amiable; and the prospect of God's Providence is delectable to the wise. For his works are great, and wonderful, sought out of them that have pleasure therein. §. 3. The nature or the order of them cannot be known by the single consideration of particular effects; but by beginning at the original, and proceeding orderly from the superior Causes to the inferior, and seeing how every thing worketh in its proper capacity and place: which man can do but very defectively; and therefore knoweth but little or in part. §. 4. It is necessary therefore that I briefly look back to the Principles of Providence and Action; which were partly mentioned before, where UNITY in TRINITY shineth to us in God and in his works. §. 5. * GOD is ONE INFINITE SPIRIT, in THREE ESSENTIAL VIRTUES or PRINCIPLES, LIFE (or ACTIVE POWER) UNDERSTANDING and WILL, † Bradwardine li. 1. c. 1. cor. 8. p. 5. Deus est Substantia & Potentia rationalis, habens intellectum & liberam voluntatem, cognoscens actualiter & ●olens. which are wonderfully ONE in ESSENCE, yet THREE we know not perfectly how, but as the Scotists say, formaliter, or rather as the Nominals, by connotation of their objects and operations ad extra, and so by Relation, and extrinstck Denomination. Not that Life, Intellect and Will, are formally the same in God as in the Creature, or can formally be conceived by us; But that while we must know God in a Glass, man's soul must be this Glass, and the Scriptures must be our Onomasticon and Logic Books, and we must use such Notions and Names of God, or none. §. 6. * Bradwardines' language is, Deum esse Omnipotentem active; nullipotentem passive. li. 1. cap. 1. corol. 1. n. 7. p. 5. These Principles as Transcendent in PERFECTION, are called GREATNESS † Communit●r antiqui Scholastic● agunt de int●ll●ctu, Voluntat●, & Potentiae operativae D●● quas● d● Potentiis ratione distinct is, inst●t●●ntque de ●llis peculiares tractatus cum Magis. Thom. etc. Ruiz de Voh●●●. Dei disp. 14. ●. 4. pag. 158. And he contradicting it saith as much, Nihilomiminus intra ●asdem linea● & gradus intellectus & voluntatis distinguimus Potentiam executivam ●● partem ●arundem Potentia▪ rum: But less aptly. (or OMNIPOTENCE) WISDOM and GOODNESS (or LOVE) by names borrowed from their effects upon the creatures. §. 7. This ONE GOD, is revealed to us in THREE PERSONS, The FATHER, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (Wisdom, Word and Son) and the HOLY SPIRIT. One in Essence: incomprehensibly Three, ad intus; but discernibly Three, in their Operations ad extra, and Relations thereto. §. 8. As we must conceive of GOD'S ESSENCE by INADAEQUATE Conceptions, (as aforesaid) or not at all, so must we of his EXISTENCE as in the Creature we call it Modally; viz. His ESSENCE being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (substance,) VIRTUS & PERFECTIO (which in the Creature, is MATTER (or substance) FORM and DEGREE): and his FORMAL VIRTUS being Potentia-Vitalis, Intellect and Will; so his Existence is considerable, 1. In VIRTUE itself, radically, (which is Potentia Activa Inclinata.) 2. As in Act, IMMANENT, objectively, (as God's self living, self-knowing and self-loving.) 3. And as in ACTION ad extra, either objectively or effectively TRANSIENT. And in this third respect God's Essence is the Operator of all his works. §. 9 The Three Divine Principles (Vital-active Power, Intellect and Will) and the Three Divine Persons, (Father, Word and Spirit) do always inseparably cooperate; But so as that there is a Trinity also of their Impressions or Vestigia, which are answerably to have a Trine attribution, each Principle being eminently apparent in his own impression, though with the rest. §. 10. God's WORKS are CREATION, GOVERNING and PERFECTING: And so he is 1. The first EFFICIENT OF ALL BEING Ex QUO (by creating and continuing, which are as one;) 2. The DISPOSING or GOVERNING Cause PER QUEM; 3. The END, AD QUEM, & IN QUO perficiuntur. §. 11. God having given a BEING to the Creatures, and their various species of being, is after by PROVIDENCE to manage them as Active or Passive in their several Capacities: And the ACTIVE Natures are threefold which he hath made to operate on the threefold Passives; viz. INTELLECTUAL, SENSITIVE and IGNEOUS (or VEGETATIVE in its proper matter) upon AIR, WATER and EARTH. §. 12. GOD is so Active as not to be at all PASSIVE. All the Active Creatures are first Passive as receiving the Influx of the first Cause, and Inferiors from the Superior second Causes: But they are Naturally Active in that dependence, and supposing that Influx. §. 13. The works of Providence about the Existent Creatures, are MOTION causing Motion: GUBERNATION causing ORDER: and ATTRACTION or meet objective Termination, satisfying their Appetites, and giving them their Ends. * Cyprianus sie explicat Act. 17. In ipso sumus; movemur, vivimus. In Patre sumus, in Filio vivimus, in Spiritu Sancto movemur: Pater est sons omnis essentiae; Filius est Vita; Spiritus Sanctus est agitator seu motor: unde apud Hebr. nomen habet Ruah, quod significat endelechiam, continuam & perennem agitationem: Vid. Strigel. in Melanct. Loc. come. pag. 294. §. 14. MAN being endowed by his Creator with his Image, in Vital-Active-Power, Intellect, and freewill, a Threefold Virtue in One, as the formal Essence of his soul, is peculiarly fitted for such acts of Providence as he must be under. §. 15. As the higher and Nobler Natures are under God the Immediate 1. Movers, 2. Governors of the Inferior; so also are they, 3. Their Immediate or nearest End; having a Goodness in them fitted to attract, terminate and satisfy the Appetites of the Inferior: God is not the only end of Appetites. §. 16. The Acts of Divine PROVIDENCE about MAN-existent, are, 1. Action or Motion, 2. Special Government, 3. Love. From whence God is Related to Man (the fundamental Relation of CREATOR supposed,) † I hold with Bradwardine li. 1. c. 2. cor. 3. Quod necesse est Deum servare quamlibet creaturam immediatius quacunque cansa creata: Et c. 3. cor. 3. Quod nulla res potest aliquid facere, nisi Deus faciat illud idem immediatius quolibet alio faciente: Et c. 4. cor. 3. ●adem de Deo Motore; ●aking immediation for proximity, and facere & movere for the action as such, and not for the mere moral specification and comparability. 1. As ACTOR vel MOTOR, 2. As RECTOR, 3. As AMICUS, vel FINIS, Lover, Benefactor and End. 1. ACTION as such is from God in the first relation. 2. Action as ORDERED is by him in the second. 3. Action as TERMINATED FINALLY and in perfection, is in him in the third. §. 17. Creation inferreth Propriety; and making us Good and inter b●na and ad bonum inferreth that God is our Benefactor: So that ab origine he standing in these three Relations to us, from what is past, he is to dispose of us by Providence accordingly. §. 18. God's Omnipotence is most conspicuous in Creation (propriety), and Motion: His Wisdom in Governing and Order: and his Good will in our Benefits (efficiently) and our Perfection (finally) in mutual Love. §. 19 MOTION is caused by Moving ●●●ce impressed: ORDER (moral) by LAW or signification of Gods Will de debito: And PERFECTION by attingency and union with our END. §. 20. From the first resulteth NECESSITY properly so called: From the second Moral RECTITUDE: In the third is FELICITY; as to single persons. §. 21. From the first (viz. God as Actor) upon Many or the Universe, ariseth CO-OPERATION or Concourse; All things work together, as the Wheels in a Watch. From the second (Divine ORDERING) ariseth HARMONY: and from the third, UNIVERSAL PERFECTION and Melody of the whole Creation; and to man, perfect Love. §. 22. Motion is unresistible unless by a greater or unequal Contrary Motion, or passive impedition: and its effect as such not free, but Necessary. Government by Law is resistible, and obedience free. Final Goodness or Love, do perfect and felicitate, necessarily and freely, not effecting, (for so they are not now considered) but satisfying so far as they are enjoyed. §. 23. The Creation being past, and Being's existent (except what Generation and Composition make, unfearchably▪) and Gods fundamental RELATIONS settled, we shall confound and be confounded, if we distin-guish not Gods after-actions according to the Relations in which he worketh them, and their foresaid differences in themselves. SECT. II. The Order of Divine Operations. §. 1. GOD is the Immediate Cause of all things and actions, caused * Bradwardine ib. p. 172. seemeth to favour Averrois saying that God is Forma omnis formae, & forma maxime essentialis & principalis cujuscunque formati: and so acteth all things: And indeed when we deny him to be the form of any creature, we mean that he is More and not Less. And that we have not a fit Analogical conception of God, than that he is eminently more than the soul of the world. And c. 14. p. 210. he calleth [Necessarium] the most proper name of God. But when he saith c. 17. that God's Essence, Omnipotence, Intellect Naturally precede God's Knowledge, and cause it, and so putteth Causes and Effects in God, he is too bold. by him, as to the Proximity of God to the effect. For he is every where present in Essence, and as near to every Being and Action as it is to itself. We must not conceive of Gods using means, as we do of man's, where the Pen, the Saw, the Knife, etc. is between the hand and the effect: God is as near and as total a Cause of what he doth, as if he used not second cause. §. 2. They that say God is thus Causa Immediata Immediatione & Suppositi seu Essentiae & Virtutis, speak true, but not aptly, because it ill insinuateth as if God's Virtus were not his Essence: when as in God they are all one: only as inadequate conceptions we may distinguish suppositum à virtute, but not otherwise; And it is not as quid creatum that we speak of Virtus. §. 3. Since the Creation, in the Motions of Providence, God who at first made the Universe to be One by conjunction and co-operation of parts (as truly as a Clock or Man is one) hath settled a course of second Causes, that one thing may act upon and move another; and though he work upon the Highest of these Causes immediately without any other subordinate Cause, yet on all the rest he ordinarily worketh by superior created Causes: which are some of them Necessary and operate in one constant course, and some of them Voluntary and Free, and operate more mutably and contingently. §. 4. The course of Necessitating Causes is commonly called NATURE, and the Influence of Angels and other Voluntary Causes distinguished from Natural: But they all operate as second Causes under the Influx and Government of God, upon us that are here on earth. §. 5. There is no Place where any Corporeal being is, where some Active created Nature is not with it: so that considering the proximity and the natures, we may well conclude, that we know of no corporal motion under the Sun, which God effecteth by himself alone, without any second Cause. §. 6. Joh. Sarisburiensis and some Schoolmen liken God's presence with the Creature in operation, to the fire in a red hot Iron, where you would think all were Fire and all Iron: But the similitude is too low. The SUN is the most Notable Instrument in visible Nature: And GOD operateth on all lower things by its virtue and influx; God and the Sun do what the Sun doth: and we know of nothing that God moveth here on earth (that's corporeal) without it. §. 7. But the Sun moveth nothing (as the Cartesians dream) by a single Motive Influx alone; but by emission of its Threefold Influx (as every Active Nature doth;) that is, Motive, Illuminative and Calefactive; which are One-radically in Three-effectively. §. 8. This Efflux of the Sun is universal and equal ex parte sui: But causeth wonderful diversity of effects, without diversity in God the prime Cause, or in itself. The same Influx causeth the Weed and Dunghill and Carrion to stink, and the Flowers of the sweeter Plants to be sweet; some things to live, and some to die; some things to be soft, and some hard, etc. In a word, there are few changes or various actions below (in bodies) which the Sun is not the Cause of, without difference in itself: But not the specifying Cause. §. 9 The reason why one equal Influx causeth such wonderful diversity of motions, is the DIVERSITY of RECEPTIVE DISPOSITIONS and natures. Recipitur ad modum recipientis. So one poise maketh various Motions in a Clock, etc. §. 10. God operateth on second Causes, as God, Omnipotently; but not ad ultimum potentiae, but Freely as he pleaseth. §. 11. God worketh by second Causes, according to the said Causes aptitude; so that the operation of Infinite power is limited according to the quality of the second cause which God useth. §. 12. There is a superiority and inferiority among Spirits as well as Bodies; And whether God work on all our souls by superior Spirits as second Causes, is unknown to us: It is not improbable, according to the order of his providence in other things: But we know little of it certainly. §. 13. But certain we are that superior Voluntary Agents, Angels and Devils, have very much to do with our souls, and operate much upon them. It is a wonderful power, which wise observers perceive Satan hath upon the Imagination, or Thinking faculty; (of which I could give some instances enough to convince a rational Sadducee.) And it is not like that good Angels have less power, skill, or will. §. 14. And we are sure that God hath ordained One Great Universal second Cause to convey his Spirit and Grace by; which is JESUS CHRIST. As the Sun is an Universal Cause of Motion, Light and Heat, to Inferior creatures, and God operateth by the Sun; So is Christ set as a Sun of Righteousness, by whom God will convey his spiritual Influx to men's souls: and there is now no other conveyance to be expected. §. 15. Christ's Humane Nature united personally to the Divine and Glorified, is by the Office of Mediator Authorized, and by Personal Union and the Fullness of the Holy Spirit enabled and fitted to this communication of God's Spiritual Influx to mankind. §. 16. Object. A Creature cannot be a Cause of the Operation of the Holy Ghost, who is God the Creator; Sending is the Act of a Superior: But Christ's humanity is not superior to the Holy Ghost. Answ. 1. Christ as a Creature is no Cause of any Essential or purely Immanent Act of God (for that hath no Cause.) But 1. He is a Cause of the Spirits operation, as it signifieth the effect; 2. And so the cause why his Act is terminated on the soul; and 3. Of the ordering of these effects; why rather on this soul than on that, and at this time, measure, etc. And 2. This Christ doth not as a superior sender of the Spirit, but a Ministerial, and a second cause: As a Master payeth his servants as his Steward determineth. §. 17. It is certain that Christ is the Political Cause or Head of this spiritual Influx on souls: that is, As Mediator is Authorized to determine of the Persons, measure, time, conditions, of the Communication of the Spirit: But whether he be a Physical Head of this Influx, by proper efficiency giving the Spirit from himself, as the Sun giveth us its Influx, is all that is disputable. That is, Whether the Spirit be first given Inherently to Christ, and pass from his person (as his) unto us, as the Spirits do from the Head to the Members? §. 18. This question may be put, either of all Natural Being and Motion, or only of Spiritual Motion in the soul of man. Whether Christ be so the Head of Nature, as that all Nature in Heaven and Earth, is sustained and actuated by him as the physical efficient Cause? or whether this be true of this Lower World which was cursed for sin? or whether it be true, at least of Humane nature? or whether it be true only of Gracious operations? §. 19 1. That Christ hath the Political dispose of the whole Universe (contained in the words Heaven and Earth) the Scripture seemeth to assert. 2. That he hath the Political disposal of humane nature, and of all other creatures that belong to man, so far as they belong to him (Angels, Devils, Sun, Air, Earth, etc. is past dispute. 3. That the real physical effects (acts and habits) of the Spirit on men's souls, are caused by Christ's Moral Causation by his Merit, and his Political Mission, is past dispute. 4. That besides all this, the Spirit itself by Baptism is in Covenant with all the members of Christ, and that as they are such, and is in a prior Covenant first Related to Christ himself, and so by this Covenant given us in relation as we are united to Christ, is past dispute. 5. And that Christ himself doth make such Physical changes on our souls by Means, and by the foresaid Political Mission of the Spirit, by which we are made Receptive of more of the Spirits operations, is past dispute. 6. But whether moreover, any Action of Christ's own Humane soul glorified do physically reach our souls? or whether the Holy Ghost may in its own essential Virtue (which is every where) be said to be more in Christ than elsewhere and communicated to us as from the root, or the Spirits effects on the soul to come by Reflection from the first effects on Christ, as Light and Heat from the Sun by a Speculum or Burning-glass, are questions not for me to determine. §. 20. Christ's spiritual Influx on souls is not single, but is ever Three in One (as the Sun's aforesaid,) which are according to the Threefold Divine Excellencies Communicated, and the Threefold humane Receptive faculties; viz. LIFE, LIGHT and LOVE: or spiritual Vivification, Activity and Power, spiritual Illumination of the Intellect, and spiritual Conversion or Sanctification of the Will by holy Love. §. 21. It is certain that it is not only on believers that Christ operateth by the spirit: For he draweth men by it to believe: and many wicked men that are not his elect have common, even miraculous gifts of the spirit, * Mat. 7. 21, 22, 23. Gal. 3. 1, 2, 3. Heb. 6. 5, 6. 1 Cor. 14. which are all communicated by Christ. §. 22. As Nature itself is in his Political power, and is delivered to him, so far as it is reparable, and belongeth to the reparation of man; so all gifts and operations Received by any in the world, which are Mercies contrary to commerit, are the effects of Christ: Even as the Sun shineth in the night by the Moon, and in the dawning of the day by itself unseen, and after by itself appearing; so Christ shineth to the Heathen world in abundance of natural and providential mercies, and by the help of many Creatures and experiences; and to some by nearer approaches, as well as to the Church by the manifestation of himself. All which is evident, 1. Because the whole lapsed world in Adam and No were brought under his own Covenant of Grace, according to which he operateth. 2. In that so much mercy after sin, will not stand with God's regiment by the mere Law of Innocency, violated. 3. In that Christ is expressly called the Saviour of the World; and the Saviour of all men, especially of them that believe; who died for all, in that all were dead, that they that live should live to him; who tasted death for every man, etc. And Joh. 1. 9, 10, 11, 12. That was the true light which lighteth every man coming into the world (or coming into the world, lighteth every man.) He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not. And v. 4, 5. In him was life, and the Life was the Light of man: and the Light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not, etc. §. 23. This threefold Influx of Christ's Spirit (for LIFE, LIGHT and LOVE) is not equally effectual on all, nor equally effectual on the same person at several times, nor each part of the influx equally effectual on the same person at the same time. The Reasons anon. SECT. III. Of the Operations and Principles as compared. §. 1. THough Power, Wisdom and Goodness or Love, all cooperate by the spirit of Christ; yet in the work of Man's Recovery their Impressions are not equal. But as POWER with Wisdom and Love, more appeared in the CREATION, (as is aforesaid;) so WISDOM with Power, conveying Love, appeareth more in our Redemption; and LOVE with Power and Wisdom is most conspicuous and illustrious in our Renewed state, begun indeed by Sanctification, but perfect in our GLORIFICATION. * As to the Question between the Schoolmen define & beatitudin, undoubtedly the Thomists err in placing it chief in the Intellect (And Medina and others give silly reasons for it, and the Scotists (of whom Rada well handleth it) are far righter: And Agid. Romanus briefly and clearly tells us the truth, Quodlib. 3. q. 18. p. 187. [Btatitudo est in aliquo finaliter & in a●●quo formaliter. Na● si ipsum objectum principa●● Voluntatis, prout habit rationem finis, sit beatitudo, oportet quod beatitudo principaliter sit in hoc objecto:— & consequenter formaliter in actu Voluntatis. Nam Voluntas in suum objectum tendit finaliter; sed per suum actum teadit in objectum formaliter: Ex quo apparet quod be ●titudo sit magis in ipso objecto Voluntatis, quam in actu: quia ratio finis est magis in objecto quam in actu.] This is clear truth, if you put but finis alone for beatitudo: For Beatitudo qua talis is not the principal end of man; but God as God in his perfect Goodness, and the fulfilling of his will next; and then our own beatitude with that of the bles●ed: And he maketh Vision (and not Love) to be the secondary final object of all. The Omnipotent Father (as is said) Createth Nature, with the Son and Holy Spirit. The Son, the Wisdom of the Father, is the Physician of souls, and healeth them by SKILL with Power and Love. The Holy Ghost, called by the Schoolmen, The LOVE of God, dwelling and working peculiarly in us to and in perfection, with power and Wisdom, is the PERFECTION of the soul: And so Natura, Medela, Sanitas, are the various effects of the Divine operation. §. 2. Therefore the SONS operation in procuring and communicating the SPIRIT (of Love and Holiness) is eminently sapiential. §. 3. The Impressions of all the Divine Virtues are excellent, in their several kinds: And it's hard for us to say that this is simply more excellent than that: But we can say, which is more suitable to the nature of man, to be esteemed and Loved by him. And so we esteem the Impressions of Wisdom and Love as most suitable to us. §. 4. A Horse or Ox excelleth Man in strength, and a Bird or Hare or Dog in swiftness; and a Mountain and an Oak in Greatness: And yet we account the Wisdom and Moral Goodness of man to be a greater excellency, and to make him the more noble Creature. §. 5. And God seemeth to tell it us, 1. By calling these his Image. 2. And by making man the Lord of these stronger Creatures. §. 6. And among men, we take him not for the most excellent who is the strongest, but who is the Wisest and the Best. And therefore the Wisest and Best are by Aristotle said to be born by Nature to Rule the rest: and by all sober men are thought to be the Fittest to Guide and Rule others; (how seldom soever it cometh to pass:) while the Robuster sort are Labourers and Mechanics. §. 7. Yet I deny not but the effect is answerable to the Cause; And as Active-Power causeth Action, and Wisdom and Government causeth the Order and Rectitude of action, and Love and Goodness the Perfection of it and the agent; so God's Vital-Power, Wisdom and Goodness, are equal, which are the Principles of all: As the Father, Son and Spirit are coequal: And God is indeed glorious in the Motion of Sun and Stars, etc. as well as in the Wisdom and Holiness of man. But besides the foresaid suitableness, this difference must be considered, that as Life, Intellect and Will, Power, By special Grace, some mean two distinct things: viz. 1. Our Love to God and other holy Habits and acts, or an Inclination to them. 2. God's favour to us, and acceptation of us, and that as relating to the Glory which he will give us: so that the first they call the Habit of Grace, qu● ens & qualitas, etc. and the latter they call the formal nature of Grace, viz. quatenus Deo gratiosi seu amati sumus. So Alvarez de Aux. disp. 60. p. 275. [Gratiam augeri in esse gratiae, (& similiter charitas in esse charitatis,) nihil aliud est quam quod per illam acceptetur justus ad majorem gloriam.] By which he decideth the question, whether Grace or Charity be increased by remiss acts, or only by intense acts, saying that [1. Gratia in esse gratiae, & similiter Charitas in esse Charitatis statim augentur, etiam per actus remissos (that is, We are made more acceptable to God, for greater glory:) But augmentum gratiae & charitatis in esse Habitûs, quod homo meretur per actus remissos, dabitur postea in primo instanti glorificationis.] And it seems that so they sometimes take Charitas too, both for the Habit and Act of our Love, and for our Amability or Dearness to God. Now this is ill done: For these equivocal words signify these, not as one, but as two distinct things: Amor & Amabilitas or Dearness are two things: Though Love be materially our Loveliness▪ yet not formally: the latter being an objective relation resulting from the former. Wisdom and Goodness, are Inadequate conceptions of One God, so all together are a more perfect expression of him, than one of them alone. Now in all these the former is still employed in the latter, as to the very sense of the word, but not contrarily. Power doth not always signify Wisdom or Love; but Wisdom signifieth the wisdom of one Potent, including power, (for there is Potentia Intellectiva.) And Will or Love include Power and Act. So Action may be without ORDER or Rectitude, and Perfection, but the order and perfection of Acts, include or suppose the Acts. §. 8. It is therefore the glory of God's SAPIENTIAL work of Government which eminently shineth forth in the communications of Grace by the Spirit of Christ: But not that Government which was fitted to the state of Innocency; but that which stands nearer to the End, as more demonstrating Love, and tending more effectually to it. §. 9 Therefore it is much to be noted that all this frame of Grace as tending to Glory, is usually called in Scripture, The Kingdom of God, and The Kingdom of Heaven, Matth. 13. 45, etc. which containeth the whole frame of Political Order and Government. §. 10. This Kingdom is the state of Relation between God and the Mediator as the Head or Ruler, and Man as the Subject, as he is to be guided by Grace to Glory. God who is Physically neither Parson nor Totum maketh himself here as it were a Relative Part, being the supreme Head; and the Mediator the supreme official Head, or general Administrator: who hath under him a course of Political means for the accomplishment of this his work. §. 11. As Christ himself is the Head Means or second Cause, so under him are Prophets and Apostles, eminently qualified to make them fit to do this work so as tendeth to success. §. 12. These Prophets and Apostles were endued with that special infallible Spirit, by which they certainly delivered Christ's doctrine and actions, and faithfully discharged all their trust. §. 13. They had the power of working Miracles many ways to confirm their doctrine as the Truth of God. (Besides Christ's Miracles.) §. 14. The Scriptures are God's Record, which they left us to be the continual standing signifier of his will. §. 15. In these Scriptures are his Doctrine to teach, his precepts to make duty and oblige, and forbidden sin (by prohibition;) his own and servants examples to move; his threaten to drive; his promises to draw, form into a Covenant, strongly to engage; the Records also of his Judgements and Mercies upon others, that they might every way be fitted to their sanctifying use. §. 16. He hath also instituted his Sacraments by which the mutual Covenant might be celebrated the more obligingly for its effects. §. 17. He hath appointed his ordinary Ministers as his standing officers through all generations to preach this word; And he endoweth them with special gifts thereto; and chargeth them vehemently to preach in season and out of season, with urgency and importunity, even to all mankind, 2 Tim. 4. 1, 2. Mat. 28. 19, 20. whatever it cost them, and whatever they undergo. §. 18. He hath appointed also Prayer as his Means to obtain Grace by preparing the heart to a due receptivity; by the excitation of desires after it: And Praise and Thanksgiving to sweeten it to us in the review when we have received it. §. 19 He hath commanded exercises of humiliation, confession, bringing down the body, to fit us to receive it by a due sense of our sins, unworthiness and wants. §. 20. He hath appointed the public assembling of his servants, that concourse might augment the Sacred flame, in the performance of all this Sacred work. §. 21. He hath instituted the Lord's day, to be wholly employed in such works and helps, that it be not neglected and lightly done. §. 22. He hath commanded every private Christian to be a helper to others, by conference, exhortation, and good example. §. 23. He hath made Pastoral discipline a great ordinance to promote the due performance of all the rest. §. 24. He hath commanded us by secret Meditation, Consideration, Examination, etc. to preach to ourselves, and night and day to think on Scripture, God, Christ, Glory, etc. and to stir up all God's graces in ourselves, and to reprove ourselves for all our sins. §. 25. He hath made it the duty of Parents to teach their Children diligently his word, lying down and rising up, at home and abroad, Deut. 6. & 11. and to educate them in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, having bound them first in Covenant to God and the Mediator. §. 26. He hath made it the duty of husband and wife to help each other herein, and of masters to help their servants, and all relations to sanctify their places and opportunities to this use. §. 27. He doth by multitudes of mercies and deliverances further all this work, to make known the more his Love to win the hearts of men. §. 28. He greatly promoteth it also by seasonable afflictions, to humble the proud, and awake the sleepy. §. 29. He maketh it men's great duty to tame the body, and mortify concupiscence, and make no provision for the flesh to satisfy the lusts thereof, Rom. 13. 13, 14. & 8. 13. Gal. 5. 21, 22. §. 30. He commandeth us to avoid the company of the wicked, and to join in the Communion of Saints, and walk with such as will be our helpers toward Heaven. §. 31. He commandeth us to avoid all Temptations of Satan, and the world and flesh, and to live in a continual war against them. §. 32. He maketh all the world about us, the book or glass in which we may see our maker and his will; yea even our own natures; and every Creature doth preach him to us; and all things must be sanctified and used to this holy end. §. 33. He setteth Death continually before our eyes, assuring us of the shortness of our lives, and showing us how we must leave this world, that we may read Vanity upon all, and not be deceived by it. §. 34. By all this we see that this Kingdom of Christ, is a sapiential frame of Moral Causes, designed for the Government of man, in right ordering his internal and external acts, and glorifying eminently the wisdom of our Ruler. §. 35. And he that will think rightly of this excellent frame must have all these things in his consideration: 1. That Christ himself is not only a Justifier and Actor of us, but a Prophet, Priest and King, and that the Government is laid upon his shoulders, Isa. 9 6. 2. That we are not only Patients and pardoned sinners, but also Subjects, and engaged Covenanters. 3. That Christ's Church is not like a Statuaries shop, but a Kingdom, and a School, where all must learn and obey. 4. That Christ hath not only Motive power, but Laws, Promises, Threaten, etc. to work by. 5. That his great blessings of Glory are his Rewards, and Hell at last after those here, are his punishments, foretold to work on souls. 6. That he hath a day, in which as Rector, he will judge the world in righteousness, according to what we have done in the body. 7. That faith is wrought by Preaching, and Love and Hope and obedience are the ends and uses of faith. 8. That the felicity of individuals, and in them of the Heavenly Society in one Glorified body with Christ, is the end of all, where Gods Remunerating Justice is to be glorified, and his governing Wisdom and Love for ever. §. 36. From all this I conclude, That they that slight all this work of God, by the contemptuous name of Moral Suasion, and take it to be a diminutive term as to the honour of it, to call it Moral, and by Means, and talk of God's work of Grace on the soul, as if there were no more in it very honourable, than a physical Motion, and God Converted souls but as Boys whip their Tops, or Women turn their Wheels, or the Spring moveth the Watch, are Cartesian blind Theologues, and overlook the very nature of that Theology which they profess, which is the Doctrine of the Kingdom of God over man; And while they see little but Matter and Motion, they are fit mechanically to treat of or deal with Stones, or Bricks, or Timber, than men ● being unfit to treat of humane Government, much more of Divine. SECT. iv How far God useth Means. §. 1. CHrist who is the chief means is used in all the Conveyances of Grace, to any one in the world. §. 2. God hath a double work in Illuminating and Converting souls: One by activity of exterior appulsive causes: The other within us on the Agid. Column. Rom. Quodl. 1. qu. 2. p. 5. citeth Dio●ys. de div. nom. l. 3. as holding that every order of second causes is like a beam of light streaming down from God, as so many cords let down to men to draw them up to God: And if a man should take hold of one of them and ascend to Heaven, he might imagine that Heaven did bow down to him, when indeed it moveth not, but he would draw himself up to it: so when upon Prayer or other second Causes, God doth us good, he seemeth to incline and bend to us, but it is not so, but he is unchangeable and it's we that are drawn and moved to him, and by the use of means by us, we are conjoined to God's purpose, that the things may be done for us which he hath decreed: Vid. reliq. where he confuteth the contrary errors. faculties of the soul, without those causes. I cannot better illustrate it, than by the causing of sight, hearing, etc. The Light without us, is not only a terminating object (as some dream,) but an Active thing, or Action, which operateth by appulse upon the eye: And the Sun and Aire are the causes of it. The eye is not only a passive Receiver (as some dream,) but an Organ where the visive spirits, and soul are Active: And God worketh internally on this visive faculty by his influx, to sustain it in its activity. And by a congress of these two fires or Active causes, the sensitive soul doth see. Now we all know that God giveth the external light only per media, by the Sun, etc. But how he sustaineth and actuateth the Visive faculty is more difficult. His own influx or Causation is undoubted: And that the same Sun ut causa universalis cherisheth and moveth the visive spirits: But whether God move the sensitive faculty or soul itself, by any superior spirit, or mediate cause▪ in its motion or action towards and on the exterior light, is past our knowledge: (Though the order observed in other cases, maketh it not improbable.) Even so in the Illumination of the mind, and conversion of the will, we are sure that beside the terminative object, there is an external motion which by the foresaid means is made at least on the senses, and imagination, whatever it do further on the Intellect: But in the superior Influx on the soul itself, what use God may make of Angels or other superior spirits or causes, we cannot tell. We are sure (as is said) that if there be a second cause, yet as to proximity it is never the less nearly from God: And souls being Intellectual, and for aught we know of the highest nature of Creatures, though not the highest Degree, neither is improbable, that God moveth us by a second cause, or that he doth it without. §. 3. But as Christ's fore-described mediate Causality is still supposed, so it is certain that God doth not only work (as some think) concomitantly with the word, but by it as his Instrument. Though his ways of co-operation are past the reach of man: yet this much is sure, 1. That he adap●eth the means to do their work, both word, Minister, etc. 2. And that his concourse maketh the due Impression on the sense and imagination. 3. And though no Philosopher certainly know whether the Images in the fantasy be merely passive as to the Intellect, or what use is made of them and the passions to Intellection and Volition; yet such use as is naturally to be made of them for these ends, God maketh, and manageth them accordingly by skill and power. §. 4. But here MOTION the effect of Active force, and ORDER of motion, as the effect of GOVERNMENT, must be well distinguished: For it is not so much the second Causes of the souls Action, as such, that we are now enquiring after: But of the ORDER and Rectitude of its Actions, which is done by Government. §. 5. That God doth work Grace on man by means, ordinarily, (as ordinarily he causeth natural effects by means; and Miracles are rare) may be proved by all these following evidences. §. 6. 1. In that he hath made so large provision of means, and that in an admirable frame, which is as it were, a Moral world. Which he would never do in vain; nor if he ordinarily worked without them that work which he hath appointed them to do. It is the reason of the British Divines in their suffrages at Dort. Had not God decreed to work Grace by means, he could have done it with a fiat. §. 7. 2. The Glory of this Kingdom or Sapiential Rule, which is so constantly and largely given him in the Scripture, Psal. 103. 10. and 145. and 119. throughout; and Matth. 25. As the Ship▪ master or Pilot is praised who by a Helm can turn about the Ship as he will, Jam. 3. 4. §. 8. 3. God worketh on all things according to their nature: And this is suitable to the nature of man: And the Causation is answerable to the effect: And ORDER is a moral effect, which needeth not a Creation but a moral ordering Causation. §. 9 4. Experience telleth us that those prosper best in grace that most faithfully and diligently use the means: And we never knew of any man 1 Tim. 4. 15. Prov. ●: 20, 21. & 3. & 5. & 8. & 13. 4. in the world, that came to Actual knowledge, faith, or Love, without means; but all by the causality of them. §. 10. 5. We find that the greatest neglecters and despisers of means, are every where most graceless, and the worst of men. §. 11. 6. We have (Ministers and people) frequent and strict commands, to use means most diligently, constantly and carefully. §. 12. 7. We have abundance of promises of God's blessing upon the Licet omnis causa secund● proprie dicta, causet effectum ex natura rei, tamen quod ipsa sit causa non est ex natura rei quia solum ex voluntate Dei. Alliac. in 4. q. 1. F. use of means: Act. 26. 17. I send thee to open their eyes and turn them. Rom. 10. How shall they hear without a Preacher, etc. Isa. 55. 2, 3. Hear and your souls shall live. Matth. 28. 20. I am with you always, etc. Luke 10. 16. He that heareth you, heareth me. Psal. 19 7, etc. The Law of the Lord is pure— Converting the soul. 1 Pet. 1. It is the incorruptible Seed that regenerateth us. Heb. 4. The word is powerful— and a searcher of the heart, etc. §. 13. 8. When God will save a people he sends them the Gospel, and Amos 8. 11. Prov. 29. 1● when he will forsake them he taketh it away. §. 14. 9 The Devil showeth his malice to souls and grace, by opposing the means, depriving men of them, or keeping them from them, or from the faithful using of them. §. 15. But it is none of my meaning that the bare means of itself doth change the soul, or that it is the principal cause: But only that God operateth Moral effects by Moral means, as he doth Natural by Natural means, being still the prime Cause of all himself. §. 16. If we thus conjoin all Causes and separate not what God hath conjoined, it will help us the better to escape error in this matter. But if men will dream that all the honour or action that is ascribed to second causes, is a derogation from God and a dishonouring of him, they forsake the truth and injure him. §. 17. For if this were true, that to honour the means or acknowledge Though God be proxi●u●● (not as in loco) in all his operations, yet seeing he operateth by second causes, he doth it according to them, as all experience tells us: Therefore to end these Controversies, we should consider more how those causes operate. second Causes, and their aptitude and efficacy, is to dishonour God, than God should be the greatest dishonourer of himself, by making and using such causes and means; And so many Creatures as there be in the world, so many dishonours are cast on God; and the excellentest Creatures would dishonour him most: which sottish conceit must needs be joined with Manichaeism, that an ill God was the Maker of the World. God is Glorious in all his works, and shineth to us in them all. SECT. V Of the Causes of the different Effects of Grace and Means. §. 1. * Gerhard. Tom. 2. de lib. a●b. cap. 6. §. 1. supposeth that no cause of the efficacy of Grace is found in the will of man, as being dead and vicious; but yet that Grace doth not physically determine the will, but so work as leaveth it a power to resist: and that resistance is it that maketh the difference between man and man by making Grace uneffectual. And Georg. Calixtus was of the same mind, as you may see in his words the Minist. Verbi. p. 241. & in Judic. de Controvers. num. 33. See ●e Blank Thes. de distinct. Grati●. ALl that is Good in the Difference between man and man, is Willed by God, and Caused by him: But nothing that is Morally Evil. §. 2. As in Nature, God seemeth to Cause Motion in genere by an equal universal Influx of the Sun, which maketh no difference per se, but per accidens; But the wonderful variety of motions and effects is otherwise caused: So it seemeth that Christ the Sun of Righteousness, affordeth by his Means of Nature (which he Politically manageth) an indifferent influx or help for Action as Action to the souls of men: which as Dr. Twisse frequently saith well, is to be called Nature rather than Grace (except as the repriving of Nature is Grace) so far as it is mere Power to Act; because it is equally indifferent to a good act as a bad, and to do or not do. §. 3. The Power of Action as such, being given by an equal Natural Universal Influx, it is the ORDER of Actions, where we must inquire of the difference and its Cause. §. 4. Action itself is not a proper substantial being, but a Modus Rei. But yet it is such a Mode as (by the Cartesians leave) requireth more Causation to it, than a mere non agere doth. But ORDO Actionum is but a modus modi. §. 5. ORDO is the beauty of the World, and soul; the genus of all Relation in fundamento, and of all morality, and worthy to have had a notable place in the predicaments: And yet we know not what to call it, whether any thing or nothing. The ORDO Rerum is not Res: And it is Rerum status; which we better know in se, than we know with what Logical Notion to clothe it. §. 6. This excellent Nothing is the sum of Morality in its form; and the business of frail man on earth, and much of the glory of the Church triumphant in Heaven. It is God's work and not ours to make new substances; It is ours to keep ORDER in ourselves, as God's work, yea, in the Actions, which God by Nature enableth us to. So vain a thing is man that can do no more than this, nor this but by the Power given him of God. §. 7. Vainly therefore do the Dominicans pretend that it is a Deifying of the Will of man to say that God can enable it to Cause the various ORDER of man's Actions, by mere moral helps, without Gods predetermining premotion to that order. For this is to cause no Real being. And he that is moved to the Act in genere needeth no more premotion from God, to the disorder and sinfulness of the Act. §. 8. And they that will call the production of faith, a Creation in the strict and proper sense, do not understand, that Creatio est Rerum, non ORDINIS rerum jam creatarum, vel existentium. An Act is of itself improperly said to be created, in a pre-existent Agent: That is not called created which is educed è▪ potentia materiae; nor that which is produced by the Potentia Activa prae-existentis forma: Faith is an Act of the same Natural Power or faculty which we had before: And Grace (or rather Nature usually) suscitateth that faculty to the Act as an Act in genere: And Grace doth cause us to ORDER that act aright, as to the due object, and other circumstances. But if any will call it a Creation, I contend not about the name. §. 9 But the whole state of the Man, Habitual, Relative and Practical set together, is called in Scripture, a New Creature, and the New Man, tropically, but not unfitly: Partly because we are really new, though not by another Humanity or Species of Natural Essence, yet by many Accidents: And partly, because those Accidents are so great and make so great a change of our state, as that they emulate a natural Essence; and we use to say in common things, that when an unlearned man is made learned, and a poor man a Prince, and a dying man healthful, he is another man. §. 10. Though God be one and the same, and Christ the same, and the Law and Word and many Antecedent means the same to many on whom they have different effects, This difference may be caused many ways. The Causes of difference. As 1. By the diversity of other inferior or concomitant second causes: 2. By the divers Disposition of the Receivers (a common cause of varieties in the World:) 3. By the diversity of Impediments and temptations: And many other ways. §. 11. * I know that Bradwardine li. 2. c. 32. Cor. p. 612. saith that Deum non dare scientiam, eratiam aut perseverantiam seu quodlibet munus suum creatur● capaci, est causa quare ipsa non accipit, & non habet: & non è contra. Et (p. 614.) Quicquid obex dicatur potest illa resp●nsio corripi, cum nullus possit hunc obicem tollere nisi Deus, vel per Deum prius praetollentem; & si ipse cum voluerit tollere, irresistibiliter tollitur; Auferam cor lapideum, etc. The great question is, How far the diversity of Receptive Dispositions is from God? Answ. 1. God made all equal at first in Adam. 2. All were equal in sin by his fall. 3. Cain and Abel differed from several causes, and not one alone. Abel differed from Cain in faith and obedience, by God's grace as the chief cause, and his own will and agency as the second cause. Cain differed from Abel by unbelief and sin, by his own will and Satan's temptations. 4. The sins of later parents (as of Cain, Cham, Esau, Achan, Gehezi, etc.) make a further difference, by depriving their posterity of some means, helps or grace, which else they had been equally capable of with others. 5. It is certain that man hath much to do about his own heart, by which he is to be the second cause of his own Receptive disposition; and if he fail, is the only cause of his indisposition. §. 12. Difference is but Dissimilitude: And an alteration of one of the subjects which soever, will make it dissimile or to differ from the other. When the good Angels stood and the evil fell, if you ask, Who made the difference, It was the Devils by forsaking their first estate: Though Constitutively, both their sin, and the Angel's obedience made the dissimilitude. If you suppose Cain and Abel equally under grace at first, and ask, Who made the difference, I answer, Constitutively cain's sin and Abel's righteousness maketh, or is, the difference: But as to Reputative efficiency, Cain made the difference by rejecting grace. So if you should suppose two equally qualified with common grace, and one of them to lose it, the efficience of the difference is Imputable to him. But if you suppose two equally lost in sin, and one converted and not the other, the Constitutive Causes of the difference are one's sin and the others repentance. But the Imputable efficiency is God's grace and man's repentance or will, that is recovered. §. 13. But when Paul doth ask, [Who made thee to differ?] he meaneth [Who gave thee that good by which thou differest?] and expoundeth it by [What hast thou which thou hast not received?] And no doubt but all good is received from God: And this would have held true, if God had by equal operation done as much on the other which had been uneffectual by his indisposition or rejection. §. 14. Nature and Scripture persuade us, that the same measure of help or influx is not enough to make one repent or believe, which is enough to make another. For the difference of souls, and temptations, and impediments plainly prove it. The same strength will not move a Mountain, which will move a Feather: nor the same Teaching make an ignorant Sot to understand which serveth a prepared person. §. 15. Bodily aptitude, or ineptitude do much to vary receptivities; which are usually Gods punishments or rewards for Parent's actions: And ofttimes for men's own. Some by fornication, gluttony, drunkenness, sports and idleness, make themselves even next to Brutes. §. 16. But we have great Reason from Scripture to believe that though God's Laws be equal, and his Judgements where men do not make an inequality; yet as a free Lord and Benefactor, he dealeth not equally with all that are of equal merit: Though he do no man wrong, nor deny any what he promised in his Word, but keep perfect Justice as a Governor; yet he may do with his own as he list, and he will be specially good to some, though others see it with an evil eye. §. 17. Whether all that are elect have at first a greater measure of the Divine help and impress than any that are not converted, no man can say (of which more anon.) But certainly all the elect were fore-decreed by God's will to that certain conversion, which others were not so decreed to. SECT. VI Of the Limitations of Gods Operations on the Soul. §. 1. THat which sticks in the minds of many is, that God being Omnipotent, all his operations must be equally unresistible and efficacious; because none can conquer God: But they must consider, that though he be Almighty, yet he doth not all that he can do: nor do his works equally manifest his Omnipotency. And there are these causes, for Limiting his operations in the effects. §. 2. 1. * Gemina operatio Providentiae reperitur, partim naturalis, partim voluntaria. Naturalis per occultam Dei administrationem quae etiam lignis & herbis dat incrementum. Voluntaria vero per Angelorum opera & hominum; Vid. catera. August. de Genesi ad lit. l. 8. cap. 9 & plura li. 9 cap. 15. The chief cause is his Wisdom and freewill. It is his Will to do what he doth, and to do no more: which hath no cause. §. 3. 2. Another cause is, that God operateth by Jesus Christ, whose Humanity is finite, being a Creature; and God worketh according to the Instrument or medium: As he shineth by the Sun, Moon or Stars, according to their several natures, and not according to his mere omnipotency, so doth he communicate Grace by Jesus Christ. §. 4. † Mark 6. 5. He (Christ) could there do no mighty work, because of their unbelief: and 7. 24. He could not be hid: and 1. 45. Jesus could no more openly enter into the City: with many such places, all speak of an Ordinate power working not ad ultimum posse. And Christ by Office being King and Prophet, will operate upon certain terms which in his Sapiential Government he sets down. And God will not violate those terms. §. 5. 3. Also under Christ there are many subordinate Causes; There are his Word, Preachers, and all the forementioned means and helps: and Christ will work according to these means. Though he tie not himself from doing more or otherwise. I have proved that this is his usual way. And the effect will be limited according to these second causes. §. 6. As the Sun shineth on us first in and through the air, which abateth somewhat of its force; and then through the exhalations, and then through the glass window, and each maketh some alteration as to the effect on us; so is it in this case. §. 7. 4. But the notable limitation is the foresaid Indisposition of the Receiver. Every eye hath a tunicle which the Sun's light must penetrate: But he that hath a suffusion, or he that winketh, hath a greater impediment to limit the effect: so is it with the various degrees of Indisposition, or moral incapacity, which yet be nothing if God did work ad ultimum posse, and did not as aforesaid; work according to his free will and second causes. SECT. VII. Of the Resistibility of Grace. §. 1. TO Resist Grace signifieth, 1. Either Not-to Receive it Passively * Ruiz de Vol. Dei, disp. 1●. §. 6. p. 187. distinguisheth of God's will, 1. As to its ratio totalis including not only the vi● aut causalitas effectiva, but also the formal reason of Volitio effi●ax, which includeth the prescience of future contingents: And so he saith, It is never resisted. 2. Secundum partialem & inadaequatam rationem praecise ut causa efficiens nostrorum actuum liberorum, & prout offert motiva, & confert causas secundas, & suum concursum, abstrahendo à formalissima ratione Volitionis efficacis, quae quidditatiuè supponit formalissimam rationem praescientiae, etc. Et ita etiam in sensu composito cum tota causalitate illius in actu primo, ut praecisus ab actu secundo, potest non sortiri effectum. ; as a stone receiveth not the rain ad intus; or as oil resisteth water; or hard things receive not impressions as the soft. 2. Or Not-to-Receive-Actually; which is Receptio Moralis; as a man receiveth not a gift who consenteth not; or as he resisteth the light who will not open his eyes: The bare Not-Consenting with the Will, or not using the senses or organs, not opening the hand, etc. is such a Resisting. 3. Or an Active opposition, which is more. As a man resisteth an Enemy, (with heart or hand); or a man by Nolition, and not only Non-volition resisteth a suitor. §. 2. Man's sinful soul resisteth Gods gracious operations, all these ways. 1. It is Passively become undisposed to Reception: And thus he is said to have a hard heart of stone, and a seared conscience, and to be dead and past feeling, Eph. 4. 18, 19 & 2. 1, 2. 2. It doth not do what it can do morally to receive grace, that is, it doth not Conari or suscitate it self to be willing of it. 3. Yea, it doth Positively resist by Action, and is unwilling of God's gracious operations: And this is twofold, 1. By willing the contrary, and prosecuting carnal interest, overloving the pleasures of the flesh, and so turning away from the motions of grace, 2. And therefore by an enmity to that grace and work, which would † Bradwardine li. 1. c. 1. cor. 8. p. 5. proveth that Gods will is universaliter efficax nec impedibilis, frustrabilis aut defectibilis: which we grant as to his will as it is efficient and not merely final and complacite: But yet the Schoolmen that say, he is not Omnivolens, give reason for it. convert him, and take him off his chosen Idols. §. 3. No creature by resisting God, doth abate or retund his essential Power or Activity, nor make any thing properly difficult to him. §. 4. All the Elect resist Grace before it overcome and convert them: And all our lives after we resist it too commonly when it exciteth us to duty, and draweth us from sin. §. 5. He that repenteth not of his Resisting of God's Spirit and Grace, doth not understand and well repent of his sin. §. 6. All Resisting is not Overcoming: All Resist grace, but all overcome it not, that is, do not frustrate it as to the due effect. §. 7. There are several Degrees of yielding to God's motions and operations, and so several degrees of overcoming. He is fully overcome by it, who yieldeth to it wholly; He overcometh it in some part, who yieldeth to it but in part. And because God's grace moveth us to more than we ordinarily yield to, therefore we do ordinarily overcome it in too great measure, even when we are happily overcome by it. §. 8. God worketh not alike on all: sometime (as on Paul) he so suddenly changeth the mind and will, as that at once he both produceth the Act of man's consent, and also taketh away even the moral (though not the natural) power to the contrary in the antecedent instant. So that no man ever denyeth consent who is so moved. And sometimes he procureth Actual Consent by such an operation, as in the antecedent instant might have been resisted and overcome, there being a Moral Power to the contrary. So that there is Actually-Converting Grace which was superable in the antecedent instant, as to Moral power; and there is such a converting Grace as no man ever doth overcome. §. 9 God's grace when it prevaileth, doth not take away, but determine the Natural power in itself, but by so doing formaliter & relatiuè it maketh it no power ad hoc to the contrary, in that instant. Of which more anon. §. 10. Such grace of God as cometh from his Absolute Will or Decree of the due Event, is never overcome. For God's decree is not frustrate. §. 11. God's gracious operations are never overcome by any contrary Act but what he himself is the Agent Cause of, as an Act: For in Him we Live and Move and Bebritia Yet man is the only Cause of the Inordination of that act, by which it is set in opposition to Gods other acts: For God doth not militate against himself. §. 12. The case lieth thus: God antecedently to his Laws, framed Nature, that is, the Being and Natural Order of all the World; and so he became the Head or Root of Nature; the first Cause, who by his wise decree, was to concur to the end with that Natural frame, and to continue to things their proper forms and motions: And man is one of his creatures, having a Nature of his own, to which God as the God of Name doth Antecedently concur. By this natural concourse of God, the foamy cator, the murderer, the thief, etc. are naturally able to do those acts: But being free agents that can do otherwise, God maketh them a Law to restrain and regulate them. And when they break this Law, they resist that gracious concourse, which suitable to the organical cause, God conjoineth with the means: But they do this by their Natural power and activity; not used as God requireth them, but turned against his own Law. So that if God would withdraw his sustentation, and destroy m●ns Nature, they could not resist his grace. But that he will not do, being his antecedent work: and so God is resisted by his own-given-power and act, disordered and turned against his grace. §. 13. The Will of God which is thus resisted, is only 1. His Preceptive or Legal will, de debito. 2. And his will of purpose, to give man so much help and no more by which he can and aught to believe and Repent, is said to be resisted or frustrate so far, when by man's fault it doth him not that good which it might have done. §. 14. God's Grace and Spirit are said to be resisted when the Word and other Means are * That God doth govern inseriora per superiora, and work by means, not for want of them, but from the abundance of his Goodness, so as to communicate to his creatures the dignity of causality, See Aquin. 1. q. 103. a. 8. & q. 104. a. 2. Alexand. 1. p. q. 26. m. 5. a. 2. & 3. & m. 7. Albert. 1. p. q. 67. m. 4. a. 1. Richard. 1. d. 39 a. 2. q. 3. & d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. Agid. Rom. 2. d. 1. p. 1. q. 2. a. 6. & ibi Gabritl d. 1. q. 2. resisted which call him to his duty. For these themselves are gifts and acts of grace. §. 15. But it is not the bar● Word or Means alone, but the Spirit working in and by those means which is so resisted: For though no mortal man can clearly know just how the Spirit concurreth and operateth by the Word and Means; yet we may know, that God doth limit his own operation to the aptitude of the means ordinarily; and that he worketh with and by them, not according to his Omnipotency in itself considered, but according to the means or organs. And as in Nature he operateth, nor quantum potest but agreeably to the order and aptitude of Natural Causes; so in Grace he operateth, non quantum potest, but according to the aptitude and order of the sapiential frame of Governing-means of grace. §. 16. When the preaching of the Word, Education, Company and other visible Means seem equal, God hath innumerable means, supernal, internal, external, invisible and unknown to us, by which he can make all the difference that he maketh in men: So that we cannot prove that ever he worketh on souls, without any second cause or means at all: (though we cannot prove the contrary neither.) And therefore he that resisteth all means, for aught we know in so doing resisteth all God's gracious operations on his soul. §. 17. * I know not how to find both sense and concord in the words of your Alvarez de Aex. l. 7. disp. 59 p. 264. Ead●m contritio que est ultima dispositio ad gratiam & in genere cause materialis antecedit illam; In genere tamen causae formalis & efficientis, est effeclus ejusdem gratiae: & propterea quamvis non sit meritoria gratiae, est tamen meritoria vitae aetern●:— Et p. 265. Contritio qua penitens disponitur ad infusionem gratiae habitualis, est meritoria vitae aeternae, ut Thom. 1. 2. q. 112. a. 2. ad 1. Ergo est effectus gratiae habitualis: Nulla enim operatio hominis est-meritoria vitae aeternae nis● procedat à grati● habituali, & ordine saltem naturae sit ea posterior: How can the Act be the ultima dispositio to the infusion of that habit which it floweth from? Unless he mean eadem specie, and not numerically: which yet is false: For it is not eadem, or else he falsely supposeth that the same Love of God may go before Grace. Whereas Dr. Twisse so frequently asketh, Whether Gods condional will (and so his operation) be [Volo te velle, modo velis, or credere modo credas,] to give us faith if we believe, and so maketh non credere or non velle to be the only resistance; and the Arminians to be ridiculous in making the effect antecedent to the cause as a condition of the causation and itself: This semi-subtilty, though it beget voluminous confidence, must cry peccavi, if a little more subtlety do but detect the defectiveness of it. We are not now enquiring of the Rationes fidem habendi, but of the Rationes non habendi; nor are we enquiring Whether God have made a Covenant or formal Promise of giving faeith upon antecedent conditions; But whether he deny (or give-not) grace for actual faith (effectual or sufficient) to any but those that resist and wilfully omit the preparatory acts which they were able to perform? even preparatory Volitons? Or if you will make the question to be de ratisnibus fidem habendi (not the causis Actus donandi) Whether God do not ordinarily give or produce the act of faith, in that soul, which doth not wilfully resist, and omit such preparatory acts as it could do? even Volitions? And so I answer, 1. It is not [I will give thee faith if thou wilt believe, or I will make thee willing if thou be willing of the same thing.] But it is, [1. If by resisting common preparing grace, thou so harden ●hy heart, or increase the privation of receptive aptitude in thyself, as that the same degree of grace, means, help, impress, will not change thee, which otherwise would have done it, and will change another not so self-hardened, thy gracelesness and destruction (both absolutely and as compared to others that are converted,) is imputable only to thyself. 2. And if thou be unwilling to use the Means as thou art able, to hear, read, or meditate on that which should affect thee, and unwilling (Privatively) to hear and receive the inward motions of my Spirit, which should convince and turn thee) and wilt not either by previous Cogitation, or immediate conatus and suscitation of thy Intellect to Think, and of the will to its act, actively concur to receive my gracious motions and influx; thy gracelesness (absolutely and comparatively) is imputable, not to me, but to thyself. 3. Much more, if when thou canst do otherwise, thou run the contrary way, and turn thy thoughts and affections eagerly after vanity, and hate and oppose my help and grace, because it is against thy lusts.] 2. Or if you will take it in the form of a half promise, or encouragement from God; thus, [1. If thou wilt not by wilful progress in sin, and custom, so increase thy Privation, and obdurateness, as that the same measure of Gracie●s Means and Impress will not convert thee as would do one that hath not so abused common grace: 2. And if also thou wilt at the present do what thou canst in stirring up thy own will to concur, and thy Intellect to consider, and wilt but Consent that my Grace shall help thee, and that thou wilt wait for it in the use of means: 3. And if thou wilt not hate and resist my motions, as enemies to thy lusts, and turn wilfully after vanity, in such a degree as thou art even Morally able to forbear; Thou shalt find that I am gracious and merciful, abundant in goodness, and truth, and forsaking none before they forsake me, and have not appointed thee these means in vain. To whom thus prepared did I ever deny the grace of faith? Name him if thou canst.] So that [Volo, si velis hoc] is one thing, and [Volo si velis aliud, & si ad hoc volendum quantum potes teipsum suscites, & Gratiam non oppugnes, nec contraria prosequaris, quando pravas Volitiones fr●nare possis] is another thing. §. 18. That God giveth his gracious operations sometimes in a Resistible limited degree, besides what is said, is most evidently proved, 1. In that all Divines confess, that in making the World, he hath not done quantum potest, but quantum voluit. 2. In that there are innumerable Possibilia quae non sunt aut existentia aut futura. God could have made the World sooner, or made more Orbs, Earth's, Trees, Men, Brutes, in specie, numero, and done more acts, and made more alterations than he doth. 3. There is certainly some Divine operation with and by his instituted means, which is limited to their instrumental aptitude. §. 19 And it is no dishonour to God's Omnipotency to work thus limitedly and resistibly: For, 1. Else he should be the Author of his own dishonour; who freely diversifieth Instruments, Receptivities and effects throughout the World in wonderful variety. 2. If the total Non-Volitions, Non-operations, or forbearing to do what he could (as in all the innumerable Possibles aforesaid) be no dishonour to him; then to will only in tantum, and to operate hoc & hactenus, limitedly and resistibly, is no dishonour: being more than not to Will and Work at all. SECT. VIII. What that Operation of God on the soul is, which is the subject of our many questions: (as Whether it be equal on all? Whether it be resistible? Whether it be moral or physical? Whether it be sufficient, when it is not effectual? etc.) And what the various opinions about it are, and how uncertain they are. YOU may think this should have come first; but for some reasons I have reserved it to this place. §. 1. I think the Ignorance of this in a great measure is common to all mankind: But the Ignorance of men's Ignorance, and presumptuous contending about what we understand not, pretending (even to triumphant scorn of dissenters) that we do understand it, is the very life of most of our contentions about these points. §. 2. My own judgement is, that our own Intellection and Volition in the body, are Acts that take in so much of the sense, imagination, and corporeal spirits, into that of them which we perceive and denominate, as that we cannot tell how far the Acts even of our own separated souls will differ from these which we here perceive, and from perception call Intellection and Volition. And much less do I know the difference between God's Vital-activity, Intellection and Volition, and ours. Some likeness there is, or else ours were not his Image: But all Schoolmen and Divines agree, that the names are not Univocal, and that it is not the same Thing in God as in man, which these names signify; And that no man can have a formal conception of them. I am satisfied that a glow-worm or the fire in a flint, yea or in a stick or clod, is incomparably liker the Sun, than Man's poor Life, and Intellection and Volition is like to Gods. And if so, how unfit are we unnecessarily to dispute of these acts of God with curiosity? or at all so as implieth a nearer likeness? The Lord knoweth that I would with reverence withdraw from this consuming fire, and no further meddle with it, than the Glorifying of God, and the pacifying of the contentious, and the healing of divisions, and calling off the presumptuous, doth require. §. 3. * The great difficulty is, what it is which we must conceive to go between God's essence and man's act or inclination given▪ Dr. Twiss accuseth the Jesuits for denying Intellection and Volition to be instantaneous Acts, sine motu: And yet his friend Alvarez holdeth the Divine Act antecedent to be properly motio, and would have his predetermination so described quâ praeviâ motion● actuali, causis secundis praesert●m liber is inharente, illas applic●t ●d operandum, etc. But it is either God or an effect of God which he calleth motio: If an effect, it is so called as it is in the receiver. And what motio▪ antecedent to man's Act, can be imagined in man, when motion is an Act, though every Act be not motion? Therefore they voluminously dispute de non ente, or of they know no● what. If we must have a distinct conception of it, I think, Vi● impress●, fit. By [Divine Action or operation] must be meant, 1. Either something in God, or something caused or Created by him. 2. If caused or created, it must be either something in the second Causes, or something in the Recipient soul. I think the distribution is sufficient. §. 4. I. In GOD, there is nothing but GOD: His Life, Knowledge and Will are no accidents, but his essence: And therefore invariable, and no subject for any of these questions. To ask whether God's Essential Knowledge, Will and Activity, be equal or unequal, physical or moral, etc. is to dote. §. 5. But yet this Knowledge and Will of God is transient or terminated Objectively, when it is not so Effectively. And so God is said to know things differently, as they differ; and to will things differently, as they are different objects: But this speaketh truly nothing New or various in God, but only a Relative and so denominative connotation of his simple essence, from these objects, whose diversity giveth divers names to Immutable, most simple Unity. Of this all Schoolmen (for substance) are agreed, however the Thomists, Scotists and Occamists differ about the notions of Ratio ratiocinata, formalitas, & denominatio extrinseca. §. 6. II. If it be the operation of the second Causes, ex parte operanti●●●n, and so of God by them, that we dispute of, the disputes would have the easier decision. But this is denied by the Dominicans, and another Infusing Immediate operation is made the subject of these Controversies. §. 7. III. It remaineth therefore that it is only the effect as in the soul-receiving, which we dispute of. And if so, this must be remembered, that we dream not of any Controversy about God's Action, as ex parte agen●is, in Him, or between him and the soul. §. 8. In man's soul, we know of nothing, but 1. The substance in the first notion as answerable to Matter in bodies. 2. The form, which is a Threefold Virtue or faculty in One; viz. The vital Power, Intellect and Will: which is at once Virtus, Vis & Inclinatio naturalis ad proprias actiones. All these are but Inadequate conceptions of the same simple essence, and not compounding parts. None of this is the thing in question, for the soul is presupposed to be a soul. 3. The Accidental and mutable Disposition of the faculties to the Acts. 4. The Impressions of superior Causes (God and means) in moving to the Acts. 5. The Acts of the soul themselves. 6. The Habits. I know of no more. §. 9 I. Though All Habits are dispositions, yet all Dispositions are not Habits: And before Habits, the soul may be many ways predisposed to the Act: As 1. By former acts of another sort, which yet conduce to this. 2. By other habits that are preparatory. 3. By deliverance from many Internal and External Impediments. 4. And lastly, By the Divine Impress itself in the instant of Nature, though not of time, before the Act. For God so disposeth the soul to act. §. 10. This predisposition, is sometime but a Moral Power, that is, in so low a degree, as containeth only the Necessary power to the act, with which alone it is sometime done. And sometime besides this Moral Power, it containeth some further degree of accidental Inclination, or propensity to the Act. And these degrees are various, in various instances and subjects. §. 11. II. When God moveth the soul to believe or repent, we must conceive that in the instant antecedent to the Act, the soul receiveth some Impress or Impulse from the divine essence by which it is disposed or moved to act * A●xilium praevium non appellatur à nobis Forma Voluntatis impressa: quoniam hoc nomen significare videtur qualitatem, constituentem potentiam in acts primo: sed proprio vocabulo dicitur motio Actualis, qua Deus vere efficienter facit ut liberum arbitrium operetur actum liberum determinatum cum vera & expedita facultate qua potest illum non operari si velit. Alvarez de Auxil. disp. 23. p. 108. M●tio is the proper notion, he thinks, between God and the Act or Habit of man, as aforesaid; but unaptly, I think, so conceived by him. . And though spirits (especially God) move not by such contact and impress as things corporeal, yet in an unconceivable manner, some spirit, some spiritual Impress, Influx, or motion must be Received, by which faith is caused. And this Impress and the Disposition to the Act, caused by it, perhaps are really the same. §. 12. III. The Act itself by this, and by the soul disposed and excited, is next caused: not given as pre-existent, but given by causal efficacious suscitation of the pre-existent faculty or power. §. 13. iv The Habit, which is a Promptitude to facile acting, is caused by all the forementioned causes conjunct, and not by any one alone, viz. by God, and his Impress on a soul some way pre-disposed, and by the soul itself further disposed and excited by that Impress. But of Habits more anon. And here because almost all our seeming difference dependeth on the question, What it is that is between God's essence and man's act, which is the cause of our Act, or may be called grace (sufficient or effectual, more or less, etc.) I shall tell you how Alvarez handleth the question, and thereby further show you, that it is a thing unsearchable, and past man's knowledge, and though I satisfy myself with calling it an Impulse or Impress, or a Received energy or force or Influx, yet these are but general notions, and tell us not as to a distinct formal conception, What it is; And you shall see that the boldest disputers know no more. Alvarez de Aux. l. 3. disp. 19 p. 77. tells you that there are these several opinions of it, (What is the previous motion by which God moveth and applieth second causes to operate?) I. Some Thomists hold that It is a Quality, not permanent, but by way of transient disposition with operation: Cabrera 3. p. q. 18. ar. 4. dub. 1. Conc. 4. n. 58. For it must be some Virtus, and that must be a Quality: Imperfect supernatural acts, as attrition, fear of hell, etc. are before habits, and have only such transient virtues or qualities, etc. II. Others hold contrarily that God's motion is nothing besides his own will or essence and man's act, being simultaneous; Their reasons I omit. * So Bradwardine and many others. And this would cut short most of our present Controversies if it would hold. Dr. Twisse saith Vind. Grat. li. 2. p. 2. Crim. 3. c. 15. §. 9 p. 348. Probabile esse nullam motionem à Deo recipi in Voluntatem; sed quia Deus velit Voluntatem creaturae Velle aliquid, necesse est ut velit. Ratio haec est, cujus solutionem mihi expediat Arminianus aliquis: Sola Dei Voluntate factum est ut Mundus crearetur. Quis enim influxus Dei potest fingi praecedaneus qui occuparetur circa nihilum, etc. III. Others hold that God's previous motion is somewhat received in second causes in order of nature before they operate: and when they are asked, What it is, they say, It is really the very operation of the second cause (e. g. man) itself, as it proceedeth from God— And so that God's premotion and predetermination of our Will is not really distinct from the actual determination by which the will determineth itself, but is the same; The same act being of God and man. (So that they make this motion to be somewhat received before we act; and yet nothing but our act; which is absurd.) iv Other Thomists hold that It is somewhat really distinct from our operations: and that is, Quoddam complementum virtutis activae, quo actualiter agate. (And he that knoweth what predicament this complementum belongeth to, and what it is, let him take this opinion for more than a mere compliment.) And here they tell you that they speak not of God's simultaneous concourse; for that Alvarez confesseth is nothing besides God's essence and man's act: But of his previous motion, which he saith, is somewhat more. So Amesius Antisynod. de Grat. c. 2. pag. 255. Satis esset apud omnes pios dicere Dei Velle sine ulla Impressione intercedente certe posse efficere ut Voluntas consentiat ipsius Vocationi. I now meddle not with the truth of this, and Twisses argument is easily answered; But I entreat the Reader to note into what all our controversies are by these excellent men reduced, who yet most aggravate them. What now is the Gratia efficax ad credendum? Nothing besides God's esse but ipsa fides. Is faith effective of itself? No. Is Gods essential will effective of it? Who ever denied it? What place is there for Controversies of sufficiency and efficacy, when it is but God's essence and the known effect of which they speak, and hold not (as Alvarez doth) any motion or Impress made by God upon mind or will at all? God's will then is effectual, quia vult effectum: and it is virtually sufficient for whatever he willeth not, but could will. But then no man can possibly do any more good or less evil than he doth, because no more or less is willed of God, which volition is the first necessary Cause of all things. And is not all their Volumes de Auxiliis Gratiae, and the several sorts, previous, simultaneous, operating, co-operating, etc. merely vain. when there is no such thing as any Grace besides God's mere will, and the Act of man: And yet Dr. Twisse elsewhere saith that God's Decrees do nihil ponere in objecto. (As if they differed in the nature of motion.) And he saith, that this is true both of supernatural acts which are from Infused habits, as faith hope, Love: and of Imperfect supernaturals as fear of hell and attrition, by which man is remotely prepared for Justification ● which proceed not from supernatural habits, but from the spirits special impulse, not yet inhabiting, but moving. And Alvarez thus concludeth— I. That which God doth in second causes, by which these act, is, Aliquid habens esse quoddam incompletum, per modum quò colores sunt in aere, & virtus artis in instrumento artificis— It is Aliquid incompletum & transiens cum ipsa operatione. (Are you ever the wiser for all this?) II. Hoc ens incompletum praevium actioni causae secundae producitur in illa effective à solo Deo, & nullo modo dependet efficienter ex influx● ipsius causae secundae. And therefore herein the will is passive, though not in its own Act, (as he falsely affirmeth Luther to assert; for what can act and not be active?) III. When second causes, natural or supernatural, have by their inherent form, sufficient Active virtue, per modum actus primi, proportioned with the effect, than God's premotion is not a Quality but proprio vocabulo dicitur, Motio Virtuosa, by which the universal cause maketh the second actually operate, according to its proper mode: Therefore it is not a Habit or disposition or natural power. IU. Yea in Imperfect supernatural acts (as fear of hell) which go before habits, and by preventing grace are elevated to the acts, it is not a Quality, but Motio Dei virtuosa by which they are done; and is of the same sort with that which causeth acts from habits. V This previous Motion is Really distinct from the operation of the second cause— and is not our act itself; but is immediately from God. (Which he useth many arguments to prove.) And can all this give any man a formal conception, what it is, which he calleth, aliquid incompletum, and Motio Virtuosa? We know not what the Vis projectis impressa is in corporeals: And can we tell how spirits, and how the God of spirits maketh his Impressions? or what the word Impression or Motion here signifieth? We know that we know it not if we know what we know and know-not. And why is it called Motio Virtuosa? Virtus he maketh a quality: It is no quality, and yet Virtuosa. Omnis motio est Actio. Is it Actio Increata? Then it is God himself; which he denyeth, and speaketh of somewhat between God and man's Act. Is it Actio creata? Then it is a Modus Agentis, for so is every Action, as such, as distinct from its effect in patient. And if so, it cannot be modus Dei; for than it is Ipse Deus: And if it be modus hominis, it is either homini● agentis vel patientis; If the first, than it is man's Action: If the second, it is formally no action: For modus patientis is passio; though many would confound action and passion with saying after their Masters, that Actio est in patient, which is equivocation. So that the plain truth is, that man's understanding can reach no further than to conceive, 1. That our souls are the termini of God's Volition and Active power. 2. That though God act not on us by corporeal contact, yet we must call ourselves Patients, and think of the Attingency of his Active essence with its effects, by some Analogy of Corporeal attingency, contact, and impressed moving force. But truly to know how God toucheth, moveth, operateth on any Creature and by what Impressions, or what there is indeed between God's essence and man's Act, we know not at all. And if Christ had never said, Joh. 3. [so is every one that is born of the spirit] our own experience might have told us that we know it not. Boldly then tell our Church-distracting wranglers, that contend about the nature, sufficiency, efficacy, resistibility of this Act of Grace, that they know not the very subject of their disputes. And shall we still fire the Church by striving about words that profit not but subvert the hearers, and tend to the increase of ungodliness? Yea and shall bold blind zeal use the Reverend names of God, and his precious Truth to colour and countenance these pernicious contentions? I grant that the nature of Grace, and the concord of it with freewill may be soberly treated of. But when men have followed the controversy beyond the ken of humane understanding, and there will proceed to build great Fabrics upon unknown suppositions, and perversely contend for them against Love and peace, they do but serve Satan against God, under the colour of his sacred truth and name. And I think it not amiss here to tell you what Alvarez saith to this Question (de Aux. l. 12. disp. 118. p. 481.) An Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratia p●ssit demonstrari naturali ratione (vel, cum Infallibilitate Praescientiae, Providentiae, & praedestinationis Divinae?) Where he tells you that one opinion of some Catholics is, that [It is certain by the doctrine of faith that man hath freewill, but it cannot be proved by natural reason.] The second opinion is contrary, that [It is not only evident to natural reason that man hath freewill, but also the concord of it with the infallibility of Divine prescience and providence may easily and clearly be made out by Scientia Media:] which is the Jesuits way. But the third opinion which he defendeth is, that [freewill may be evidently known and proved by natural reason alone: But how the actual use of it consisteth with the infallibility of the prescience, providence and predestination of God, and with the efficacy of the helps of grace; cannot be perfectly known or comprehended by natural light alone, and therefore the reason of it must be Believed and the understanding captivated to the obedience of Faith.] Where note, 1. That though he say [perfectè] he proveth that it cannot be known by that which is below a perfect knowledge. 2. And that he denyeth not only a practical saving knowledge, but a proper theoretical or dogmatical knowledge. For this he citeth those words of Cajetan at large (in 1. p. q. 22. art. 4.) which many others cite and commend, [In ignorantia sola quietem invenio, etc.] And there is no man besides Alvarez higher for the Dominicans way of Absolute predetermination, than D. Bannes who is of Cajetans' opinion (in 1. p. q. 23. art. 5. & 2. 2. q. 10. art. 1.) [Siquis non intelligit quomodo usus liberi arbitrii sit liber, & nihilominus sit effectus jam praedefinitus à Divina providentia, oportet eum credere— & Primum omnium debuisset credere quod aiunt se non posse intelligere: Credimus enim Catholicum mysterium Trinitatis, etiamsi non intelligamus.] And Alvarez citeth Calvin (lib. de aetern. Dei praedest. count. Pigh. p. 136.) saying [Siquis hoc mentis suae captu superius esse excipiat, idem de me fateor. Sed quid mirum, si modulum nostrum imcomprehensibilis & immensa Dei majestas exsuperet? Atqui tantum abest ut pro carnis ratione explicandum suscipiam sublime istud reconditúmque arcanum, ut quod initio praefatus sum assiduè in memoriam redire velim, desipere qui plus scire appetunt, quàm Deus revelaverit. Quare nos potiùs docta ignorantia delectet, quam intemperans & ebria plus quam Deus permittit curiositas.] What Augustine confesseth you may see a little in Alvar. ib. p. 482, 483. but more in himself often. What Suarez, Hurtado, Mendoz. and other the most subtle philosophical Divines confess commonly of the incomprehensibility of these things, and the darkness and uncertainty of our conceptions, I have elsewhere partly cited; and any that readeth them may find. Now all this being so notorious, and their ignorance commonly confessed, may I not confidently infer, 1. That then (seeing all must be reconciled by Believing) we must have nothing obtruded on us herein, which is not to be proved by the Word of God. What the Word saith of Predetermination, of the manner of God's operation on second causes, and influx on souls, and of the nature of his first effect or Vis Impressa, etc. we will receive: But yet men must not snatch up a metaphorical expression in one or a few Texts, and urge that against the frequent and plain expressions of the Scripture; of the spirits. Operation on souls, Christ himself saith (which is more than all forecited) [The wind bloweth where it listeth, and ye hear the sound thereof, but ye know not whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the spirit.] But as for the operations of God by the word preached and other means, and the Holy Ghosts operation by and with those means, and the Holy Ghosts indwel●●ng and operating after in Believers, these are frequently asserted in God's Word: And that all Christ's members have his Spirit, regenerating, illuminating, quickening, sanctifying them, both as he is in Covenant with them to be the sanctifier of their souls, and as the Love of God and all his Graces are by him caused in us: all this is sure. But if men will go further with us, and give us as many distinctions of God's Grace as Alvarez doth, and tell us that besides God himself, one of them (simultaneous operation) is nothing but man's act; and another (previous motion) is somewhat else, but no man knoweth what, but may be named [motio Virtuosa] though it be neither God nor a quality nor a humane act; And then will dispute how much of this [some thing] this motio virtuosa, will serve to such an effect, and how much to another, and how and by what reason it is efficacious; and will build on his assertions such a system of consequents, as shall make up the doctrines of a sect or party, which shall set up with this stock to militate against the Love and unity of Christians: this is the course that I oppugn. Once more, Let the Reader note that the ways of reconciling Grace and freewill, as Alvarez mentioneth them, are these four. I. The Jesuits way by scientia media, which I need not recite to the Learned, but think it meet to recite Alvarez words of their description of Grace. [Supponunt gratiam praevenientem & excitantem esse formaliter actiones quasdam vitales, quas Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur: sine nobis, inquam, libere cooperantibus, non tamen sine nobis vitaliter & efficienter concurrentibus; & consistere in illustratione & illuminatione Intellectus, atque excitatione & suasione voluntatis: quae efficienter procedunt ab intellectu & voluntate, non quidem ut Libera, sed ut Natura est: quamvis antecedenter dependeant à Voluntate ut Liberum arbitrium est, quatenus viz. ex ejus libertate fuit dependens, quod homo compararet notitias mysteriorum fidei vel eorum quae facienda erant, accedendo ad praedicatores, vel alio modo eos propriâ industriâ acquirendo, quibus notitiis Deus se insereret, eas elevando suo speciali influxu, ut supernaturales sint, & quales ad salutem oportet; & sic sortiantur naturam gratiae praevenientis. Suppositâ ergo Illuminatione, quâ Deus illuminat Intellectum, & proponit Voluntati bonum, ut sibi conveniens, affirmant, quod statim absque ulla libertate oritur merè naturaliter in voluntate motus affectionis ad bonum sibi propositum: quo motu allicitur & quasi invitatur ad amandum illud bonum, & imperandum potentiis executivis, ut illud exequantur, ut v. g. ad imperandum intellectui ut assentiatur rebus fidei propositis & explicatis. In his ergo duobus motibus, viz. in illustratione Intellectus & affectione voluntatis à Deo elevatis suo speciali influxu, consistere aiunt gratiam praevenientem & excitantem. Liberum autem arbitrium his duobus motibus gratiae praevenientis adjutum & excitatum, liberam habet potestatem imperandi aut non imperandi assensum fidei: Quod si voluntas fidem amplecti velit, actumque credendi imperet intellectui, influente simul nutu gratiae praevenientis quam habet, elicit in seipsa actum supernaturalem, qu● fidem amplecti vult, quóque assensum imperat intellectui; simúlque Intellectus motus imperio illo supernaturali voluntatis, illustrationéque divinâ adjutus, elicit actum supernaturalem assentiendi revelatis, & Gratia excitans seu praeveniens novo influxu, quo unà cum libero arbitrio influit in supernaturalem actum fidei, sortitur rationem gratiae adjuvantis, cooperantis & efficacis. Si autem voluntas pro sua innata libertate fidem nolit amplecti, gratia excitans & praeveniens manet intra limites gratiae sufficientis, nec est efficax, quia voluntas non voluit fidem amplecti, cum potuisset. II. The second is Durandus' way [Nullum esse necessarium Divinae voluntatis concursum ad actiones secundarum causarum, sed sa●is esse quod Deus eas produxerit in esse, & ipsas naturas, earúmque virtutes postmodum conservet.] But this is a partial recitation, for this sustentation of their Active Virtues is the same with an Universal Influx or Concourse to action as action, which Bellarmine is for. Read of this Ludou. à Dola. III. * So Malderus in 1. 2: q. 111. a. 3. dub. 1. [Hic Dei concursus quod attin●t ad identitatem realem ex parte termini (nam ex parte principii est ipse Deus, aut Dei voluntas) est ipsa actio Causae secundae quatenus est à Deo. Nihil ponit in ipsa Voluntate, sed est influxus D●i in actionem seu effectum.] So many others. The third he saith, is attributed to Greg. Arim. Scotus and Gabriel, (great Wits, if any.) Cooperationem Divinam se tenere ex parte effectus, non Causae, h. e. Con●ursum Dei non determinare Voluntatem nostram, nec aliquid in illam imprimere aut operari, sed immediate influere in effectum, eumque producere illo ipso momento quo à voluntate nostra producitur: Ergo Deus non determinat Voluntarem nec Voluntas Deum: Nam uterque concursum libere adhibet, & si alter no●●● concurrere, opus non fiet, sicut cum duo ferunt ingentem lapidem— Et licet simul operentur, tamen Deus operatur quia Voluntas operatur, non contra: (But this is partially recited, and it is true only of the effect: And his confutation is that then Graetia est pedissequa▪ Voluntatu: And why saith he not, God is pedissequus hominis, because he judgeeth men according to their works?) I have otherwise opened the matter than is expressed here of any of these. But can the sober Reader think that the IVth way (which is that of the Dominicans predetermining premotion of all acts good and bad) is so much surer than these three, as that he dare venture on that supposition to cry down his Brethren as enemies to the Grace of God, and to his Providence, who would gladly ascribe all to both which belongeth to perfection, and are only afraid to deny God's holiness, and the Christian Religion, by resolving all sin and damnation into the mere Will and Love and Irresistible Omnipotent efficiency of God? SECT. IX. Whether Gods Operations be equal on all? §. 1. IF the question be ex parte Dei, it is absurd to make a question of it. For God is the same, whatever the diversity be in his * Of Preparation for Grace, Medina noteth three degrees of it: one which Grace ever followeth (which is it that our Divines mean by effectual Vocation) and this he saith, is never had but by Gods special help: (the other two are distant and common.) But that the Schoolmen of the other parties think otherwise he confesseth, and saith, In hac quaestione Durand. Scot & propemodum omnes Nominales, quos sequitur Adrian. Quodlib. 7. q. 4. tenent partem affirmativam, scilicet quod homo per s●as vires sine speciali auxilio Gratiae, potest se ad Gratiam praeparare, sic ut consequatur gratiam infallibiliter, & ex merito de congruo: D. Tho. tenet contrarium: Medin. ib. p. 593. But then by sufficiens praeparatio ad Gratiam, he meaneth Conversion itself, dimovere animum ab iniquitate, & st in Deum convertere; sicut convertere faciem ad solemn, ut qui● illuminetur. works. And God's acts as in himself, are God. And there is no Virtue or Efflux from God, but what is a creature, or effect of God. §. 2. If the question be of second causes, and of God's operation in and by them; I answer, 1. Some things God Giveth and Doth as Rector of the World, by a Law, or according to a Law: And herein God doth equally, till man make a difference (as is aforesaid) viz. in his Legislation (though not in the promulgation) and in his Judgement. 2. Some things God Giveth and Doth, besides, as Owner and free-Benefactor: and here he primarily maketh a difference. So that there is a certain sort and measure of grace given equally, till men make a difference: And there is a sort and measure given unequally, by the mere will of God, as he diversifieth Natural things. §. 3. But if the question be of the effects on the soul, those effects are, 1. Man's predisposition, 2. The divine Impress, 3. The Acts, 4. The Habits, as is said: And as to the first; God equally disposed man at first: But two Causes have filled the World with very unequal dispositions: One is man's sin, corrupting themselves and their posterity more than as they are the seed of Adam (and this God is no Cause of.) The other is God's free differencing mercy to some of equal ill desert, giving them both Greater outward helps, and Common Grace, and fewer impediments, and so more preparing them for special Grace. But no man by Indisposition is deprived of special Grace, but he that hath contracted more than he had from Adam only. And God doth not equally repair and dispose all that have viciously undisposed themselves: Though while they are here, he giveth such mercy to all, as tendeth to their recovery. §. 4. If the question be of the equality of God's Impulse, or Influx on the soul, 1. There may be a diversity of further effects, where the Impress is the same in kind and measure; because of men's various Dispositions to receive it, and their various concourse: That may convert one, that doth not another. But yet God doth not make equal Impressions on men's souls: For, 1. His own freewill as a Liberal benefactor doth more for some (as Paul) than for others. 2. men's ill deserts may so forseit grace and quench the Spirit, as to make a difference. 3. The means much differ which several men have: And God usually operateth according to the means, upon the soul. §. 5. If the question be either of the Act or Habit, it is no question: For that were but to ask, Whether all men have equal faith, love and other graces? which common experience denyeth. §. 6. Whereas some will stick at my mentioning a Divine Impress on the soul, in nature antecedent to Act and Habit, I would have them remember, that either there is such a thing or not. If there be, I rightly mention it. If not, we are instantly at an end of all this sort of Controversies, and Calvinists and Arminians cannot differ if they would. For then the question must be only about that which is past question, viz. 1. Either about God's Act as in Himself, which is his simple Essence: 2. Or about the Act and Habit of Faith, Love, etc. in Man, which all the World knoweth is not equal; For all men have not faith: For as for pre-disposition, the question will be revolved to the same point; It is certain that all are not equally disposed, and it is certain that God's Acts as in him are his Essence. SECT. X. Whether the said Operation be Physical or Moral? §. 1. THis paltry question is worthy but a few words, though ● make too much stir. Of the sense of the words Physical and Moral having spoken before, I will not repeat it here. 1. If the question be the operatione ut est actus agentis, before the effect, it were but to ask, Whether God's Essence be Physical or Moral? which is unworthy an answer. §. 2. 2. If the question be of the Action of second Causes, as the Preacher, etc. if truly Acts, they are both Physical as they are really actus naturalis, and moral as they are the acts of free intellectual agents▪ But the Acts of Laws and other objects merely as objects (on man) are called Moral Acts, because they are but nominal; but indeed are no Acts, and therefore neither Physical nor Moral. For they are but signa; and significare is not agere; but is only an objective aptitude, by which an Intellectual agent can edify itself. All the Books in my Library teach me without any Action, by being signa objectively to my active Intellect. §. 3. 3. If the question be of the Divine Impress on the soul, it is quid real, and therefore physicum: And it is moral as it is the principium actus moralis. The same is to be said of our own Acts and Habits; They are physical and moral accidents. And they cannot be moral, unless they be physical. §. 4. But it must be known that to be quid naturale and quid morale, formally differ; as Actus qua talis, and ordo qua ordo, do differ ab ordine se● Relatione ad Legem & ad finem morum: and Moralitas est actus Physici, vel privationis Relatio, viz. ad Regulam & finem morum. §. 5. But if the question be not of the Morality of the Act, but the Morality of the Cause, viz. Whether Grace or divine action do cause Physically or Morally? I answer plainly, that There is no true Cause which is not Physical: A moral Cause, not physical, is but Causa reputata vel ●●minalis. Objects are usually said to Cause morally: But if they be merely objects, they cause not efficiently at all; but by termination only materially constitute the Act in specie. But some things vulgarly called objects (as Light, Heat, etc.) are Active and so effect. And he that doth proponere objectum, doth indeed effect, by speaking or doing: But he doth not effect any thing by the object on the mind, as it is a mere object. But the Vox loquentis doth more than present an object: It doth by agency suscitate the Spirits and operate on the organs of sensation. And many mercies, afflictions, and other means forementioned, have their several ways of active operation. But it is readily confessed, that nothing corporeal can by any direct efficiency operate on a soul; but only Active Spirits like itself. Remember therefore that I take the word Physical here as the Schools do, largely, as comprehending Spiritual or hyperphysical: And I plainly say de nomine, that God's operations of Grace are to be called Hyperphysical in respect to God the Agent, and Physical as they are Physical effects on man, and Moral as the same are in instanti secundo also moral effects. And that they are called Moral in two usual senses: 1. In that it is Morality or Virtue that is produced by them: 2. And in that objects being much of the Means, the operation or efficiency of objects as objects, is properly none at all; They do but materially (as it were) constitute the Act, and terminate it, and occasion it, as sine quibus non, which many call a Moral Reputative, Metaphorical Causation. And yet diversification is much by objects. §. 6. If this stumble any who look not at the greater inconveniences on the other side, and occasion them to think that it is little efficient operation which we own in the collation of faith and conversion: I desire them to consider well, 1. That it is no new substance at all that is to be produced; but a pray▪ existent substance and faculty to be actuated. 2. That it is not an Act as such in genere, that is to be caused by Grace▪ but the due ordering of acts as to right objects, etc. 3. That the soul as such is an Active Spirit, not indifferent between Action and cessation; but as naturally prone to Act, as the earth to rest, and as a stone in the air to descend, and as the Sun to move and shine: so that it is never one minute out of Action, even in this earthen tabernacle from its first being to the last breath, day or night: Though in different manner. 4. That God as the God of Nature doth uphold the soul in this Active Nature, affording it that Concourse or Influx necessary thereto, which in Nature he made due to it: As he doth to the Sun in its action, and to the souls of Brutes. So that Activity as such, distinct from the due order of it, is given by God in Nature. 5. And God hath placed the soul in the Universe, as a wheel in a Watch, where it must needs have some effects of the co-operation of Concauses, or superior agents. 6. And Angels and Devils who have very much to do with our souls, do work as Voluntary Agents, in Political Order, though not without the regulation of God's Law or Will. 7. And God can do what he will on souls without any second cause, though whether he do so, or what, we know not. 8. All this being supposed for Efficiency, objects duly qualified may do much for the Order of Acts, though properly they do nothing: so that though they be but ut Materia ad formam, occasions sine quibus non; yet the reasons of the great alterations in the World, being admirably fetched from the various Passive or Receptive dispositions of matter, no wonder Cum Thomistae dicunt, Deum suo auxilio efficaci physice praedeterminare Voluntatem ad actum bonum, non excludunt Motionem Moralem, sed eam presumption Alvarez de A●xil. disp. 23. p. 108. ●● if it be so with man's soul also. A spark of fire which long was unseen, if you put Straw, Gunpowder or other fuel to it, may burn a City or Kingdom, when yet the fuel is not an efficient cause (save the fire that is in it) but an objective Matter. What work doth a Student find all his life among Books? What abundance of knowledge doth he learn by them, which he had none of in his Infancy? And so do Travellers by viewing the actions of the World. And all these are but fuel to the fire. The soul only is the Agent, and all these are signs and objects that do nothing really on the soul at all. You may lead a Beast up and down, and govern them by objects; which yet act nothing on them. So Satan doth by the Drunkard, Glutton, Fornicator, Gamester, Covetous, etc. What Reputed work do objects make on them by doing nothing? Thus Ver●m & Bonum are said to work. And the case is this, The Active Spirit, is not only Naturally Active, but Essentially Inclined to some certain objects (Truth and Goodness): And this Inclination being their very Nature, when the object is duly presented to it, and itself delivered from all false objects, and erroneous Action on them, and ill habits thence contracted, it will Naturally work accordingly. And therefore duly (externally and internally) to bring God and Holy objects to the prospect of the soul, is the way of working them to God. And sure the World would never make such a stir about Preaching, to get fit men, and to persuade them to diligence, and to keep sound doctrine, etc. if these objective causes, as fuel to the fire, did not do much, by occasioning the Active soul to do its proper work. 9 Yet still remember (again) that Jesus Christ is the Political Head of Influx (if not more;) who sendeth forth the Spirit, as he please, but ordinarily upon his settled Gospel terms, to work on souls, by his threefold forementioned influx, with and by these means, according to them, but in an unsearchable manner; As God doth in Nature by the Sun and other Natural Causes. SECT. XI. What freewill Man hath to Spiritual Good, etc. §. 1. THe understanding of the Nature of the Power and Liberty of the Will, is the very key to open all the rest of the controverted difficulties in these matters: But having spoken of it so much before, in the former part of this Book, and more elsewhere, I shall no further weary the Reader with repetitions, than to note these few things following. §. 2. If any like not the name of freewill, Libera Voluntas, let them but agree about these two, the Power of the Will, and Free-choice, * Nolite esse adeo delicati, ut abhorreatis ab us● vocabuli [Lib. arbit.] Hypocritarum propri●m est rixari de vocabulis. Nemo offendatur hoc titulo, quia August. in multae Volume. & singulis fere pagellis ad fastidium Lectoris hoc vocabulum inculcat. Melancth. Loc. Com. de lib. arb. c. 1. Liberum arbitrium, and they need not contend about freewill. §. 3. 1. As to the first, It is the very Essence of the Will to be a natural Power or faculty of Willing Good and Nilling evil apprehended by the Intellect; and commanding the inferior faculties, either politically or despotically, difficultly or easily, perfectly or imperfectly, according to its resolution and their Receptivity. §. 4. 2. The Liberty of choice is not only Libertas Voluntatis, but Libertas Hominis, when a man may have what he chooseth or willeth: Here the Act of choosing is the Wills; but the object is somewhat else; either an Imperate act of some inferior faculty, or some extrinsic thing. So we say truly, that the unbeliever, or unconverted sinner, may believe, may repent, may have Christ and life, if he will (as Dr. Twisse frequently asserteth.) §. 5. 3. But the Liberty of the Will itself, is but the mode of its self-determination, as without constraint it is a self-determining principle in its elicit Acts, considered comparatively. §. 6. The Liberty of the Will is threefold, 1. Liberty of Contradiction, or exercitii; 2. Of † Note, that the Papists confess, that by Christ's Case it is proved, that Libertas specificationis inter bonum & malum is not necessary to merit: So Pet. ● S. Joseph. Thes. Univers. pag. 90. Contrariety or specification in the Act: 3. Of objective specification, which is Liberty of Competition. 1. The first Liberty is to will or not will; to nill or not nill. 2. The second is Liberty to will or nill this. 3. The third is Liberty to will This object or That, or to nill This or That. * Of the real difference of these three, see Rob. Baron. Metaphys. I take not that which many Schoolmen call Liberty of Complacence to be another sort of Liberty: Though I distinguish Liberty of simple Complacence, from Liberty of election; as being a prior distribution: And I deny not, but that Liberty (of Complacency specially) may stand with necessity of immutable disposition, yea▪ and with some sort of necessitating operation of God; as is in Christ and the Glorified: And in this large essential sense Liberum and Voluntarium are all one, supposing Voluntarium to be the act of a self-determining unconstrained will. So that the word [freewill] being so exceeding ambiguous (as my foresaid Scheme showeth) we must be sure that we pretend not the Controversies de nomine to be de re. But it is the Indifferency of a Viators will that we have now to do with, and not that state of perfect determination, or that Amplitude or advancement of the will, which Gibie●f and such others talk of: And note that by [Posse agere vel non agere] which we put into the definition of freewill, we must not mean that Potentia moralis metaphorica, which is nothing but the wills moral disposition or habit; but the Potentia Naturalis: And so it may be said of Christ and the glorified, that their not sinning or not willing sin, is not ex impotentia naturali, but ex perfectione. §. 7. The Will hath not all these sorts of Liberty about every object▪ For it cannot will known evil as such, etc. But it hath all these about several objects. §. 8. By this power and Liberty, the Will is made of God, to be a kind of Causa prima secundum quid, of the Moral ORDER or specification of its own acts: Not simply or strictly a Causa prima; For 1. It was God the first Cause that gave man this self-determining Power. 2. It is God that upholdeth it: And so it still dependeth wholly on his supporting will. 3. God concurreth by his universal Influx, to its acts. 4. God is still the Lord of it, and can turn it as he please, and overrule it to his Ends, and hath put no act of ours from under his power. But he willingly so forbeareth his own further operation, as that he hath made the Will able, on supposition of his foresaid support and universal influx, and rule, to Determine itself to the said ORDER of its Acts, without God's particular predetermining premotion. §. 9 As in the Vital and Intellectual faculties, it is God's Image to be Able to Act Vitally, and to understand; so in the Will this self-determining Power and Liberty, and Imperium over other faculties, is part of the same Image. And it is Gods wrong and dishonour ●o have his Image denied and dishonoured: And therefore to deny this Power of the Will is as much a disgrace of God's Image, as to deny man to be Rational. §. 10. God made man such an Intellectual Free Agent, that he might be a fit subject for Sapiential Moral Government: and accordingly he settled a Kingdom in the World: And as he governeth mere Natural Agents, by Natural motion, so he governeth Man as a Moral agent, by Laws and Moral means and motion: For he ruleth all things according to their Natures. §. 11. Yet as man, even his will, is quid Naturals as the subject of his morality, and as Aquinas oft saith, Ipsa Voluntas est quaedam natura; so God doth by Natural agency and Causation continue and actuate man as Natural, that so he may govern him morally in the rest, even in the moral ordering of his Acts. §. 12. When men say that the will is free from co-action, they mean not all the same thing. By co-action some mean nothing, but that willing is not nilling; or that God doth not make it to be unwilling and willing of the same thing, in the same respect, at the same instant, that is, God causeth not contradictions, it being Impossible: And so with the Prede●erminants usually to will, and to will freely, signify the very same. And if this be all the Liberty of the Will, then to move it as Naturally as a Stone is moved, to hate God, to will all sin, and nill all duty, so as that it can no more do otherwise than make a World, were no abatement of its Liberty, because it is Volition and Nolition which are the acts that it is moved to, (whether by God or Satan.) §. 13. But I yet see not why it may not as properly be called Coaction, to move the will by physical necessitation to will o● nill, as to move the Intellect to understand, or to move any natural agent. §. 14. If you say, that the word [Coaction] importeth reluctancy, o● unwillingness, or opposition; I confess with Scotus, that Potentia passive is well distinguished, into naturalem, neutram, violentam: and that the word Coaction may be so strictly taken, as to signify no motion but of a violated Patient: and so it is but lis de nomine: But a Necessitating motion o●● natural, and neutral patient is the same thing, what name soever you call it by. And they that acknowledge the pravity of the will, and its corr●pt averseness to God and spiritual good, must needs, by this rule, make Gods gracious change by predetermination to be a coaction, as being the motion of a contrarily disposed patiented: contrarily, I say, i● instanti priore; for the motus is supposed to change its disposition and act at once: But if still they say, that it is not contrary in eodem instanti, and that's its liberty; I say, then if the Devil had power as easily to effect by physical premotion a hatred of God and will to sin, in all men, as I can move my pen, it were no loss of Natural Liberty. And so man's liberty differeth not from a beasts, or from a plants, indeed, but only in the Nature of the Act: one willeth, when the other doth but appe●er●, but all by the like physical unresistible efficiency from other cau●es. This is but to play with the name of Liberty. §. 15. We take not this Liberty to be inconsistent with all kind of Necessity, as is opened before in the Table of Liberty. §. 16. Nor do we confound the several sorts of Liberty, (as the said Table showeth) 1. A Political Liberty from Restraint of Laws is one thing (not questioned in these disputes;) 2. And a Moral or Holy Liberty from vice or sinful dispositions and acts is another. 3. But it is the Natural Liberty of man's will on earth, that we speak of. §. 17. So far as any man is vicious, he wanteth the Moral Liberty of his will, and so far as he is virtuous and sanctified he hath it: that is, His will is so far freed from sin. §. 18. We take not Liberty of Will to consist in Neutrality † See Fr. Mac●do against White. of disposition or mere Indifferency: For the will acteth freely when it acteth according to its Inclination and habits, with the greatest propensity, yea, constancy of self-determination. §. 19 We take not the Indetermination of the will to be its perfection; but its Natural Imperfection: But such as God hath made it in, in this World, where all his creatures have not the same perfection. * Therefore we do with judicious Strangius distinguish the essential Liberty which is self-determination according to Reason, from that liberty of Indifferency, which is inconsistent with predetermination and necessitation. §. 20. Therefore though God hath thought this Indeterminate, self-determining Will, to be fittest for a Viator in his trial and preparation for felicity, yet perfection consisteth in the most Determinate state of Love, with the greatest necessity which proceedeth from the perfected nature of man, and the full communication of Love from God, which we hope to have in Heaven for ever. And he is best on Earth who is nearest to this state. SECT. XII. Somewhat more of Predetermination; with an answer to Dr. Twisse. §. 1. THough I remit the Controversy of * I remit the Reader to Strangius against the necessity of predetermination. Percipere non possum quomodo statui possit Deum causas liberas, etiam ad actus intrinsice malos, physice praedeterminare, quin inde sequatur Deum esse peccati authorem, etc. Le Blank Thes. 56. de Concursu, etc. Predetermination to a peculiar full Disputation on that subject, yet this touch in transitu I shall give here. 1. It is not God's mere Volition or Decree of the Event that we speak of; but his Physical Motion. 2. † It's strange the Dominicans are for burning and tormenting men for that which they hold God doth do in them and by them, and necess●tate them to. See Bra●wardine li. 3. c. 1, 2. ●●●od Deus quodammodo necessitat quamlibet Voluntatem creatam ad quemlibet liberum actum suum, & cessationem a● va●ationem ab a●●u▪ & bo● necessitate naturaliter praecedent●: & cor. p. 649. Omnia qu● sunt, fiunt aut eveni●●t, sunt, ●●●● & eveniunt ●● aliqu● necessitate ip●● natural●t●r praecedent●. This is just Hobbs. So●. 5. ●● 654▪ that No creature hath simple liberty of Contradiction, or Contingency, but only secundum quid in respect to second causes: but only God's acts of will ad extra are simply free and contingent. As if God had given no creature Liberty to forbear sin or do good; but doing it or not doing it were from God's necessitation, though not from the creatures! The Dominicans (the Masters of the Inquisition, and Murderers of the Waldenses and Albigenses of old,) and therefore faulty as well as the Jesuits, though there are very Learned men among them both, do commonly hold, that No Creature natural or free can act, unless God by Immediate physical efficient premotion predetermine it to that act, both in the act as such (which they call the substance of it,) and all the modes, circumstances and order of it. 3. Augustine and Jansenius after him, with their true followers hold not this necessity of predetermining premotion to all acts, natural, or sinful; but only to spiritual good acts: which is not from the Nature, but the Corruption of ●●an▪ and therefore the predetermination is not made, say they, by God's Common Natural Motion, but by Medicinal Grace. 4. Durandus and his followers (as Lud. à Dola) and Aureolus partly, do hold, that if God do but uphold ●ll creatures, as compaginate in the Universe, in the Nature he made them in, (and so natural Inclination, and media and objects all supposed) this sustentation and Influx maintaining their Active Natures, and means, is sufficient to cause an Act, without another particular predetermining premotion of God. As e. g. in Naturals, they think that if a Rock were violently held up in the Air, God continuing its Natural Gravity, and all other circumstant Natures and Concauses, this Rock if loosed can fall down of itself, without another predetermining premotion of God. And that a new Act of God (supposing the said support of Nature) is more necessary to the not-falling, than to the falling of it: As it was to the fires not burning the Three Confessors, Dan. 3. And I am unable to see the error of this Opinion. And so in Free agents, they think, that if God continue the Nature of a freewill, with all circumstants and necessary natures, it can freely determine itself, without another act of predetermining premotion; And doth so in each act of sin: Though as Jansenius saith, by accidental corruption, for Conversion we need Medicinal Grace. 5. The Jesuits, and all others explode this Opinion of Duràndus as singular, but give so little and slender reason of their dissent, as would draw one the more to suspect their cause. Instead of it they scarce know what to assert: But Bellarmine and the chiefest of them, under a pretended opposition, speak (I think) the same in other words, Even an Universal Concourse like that of the Sun, which operateth in specification according to the nature of Recipients, which specify the effect. Which Universal Influx, no doubt, Aureolus and Durandus include in God's sustentation of Nature: For to sustain an Active Nature in all its Active disposition, by a suitable active Influx, is universally to cause its motion. The difference they are unable to assign. 6. After these come Hobbs, Cartesius and Gassendus, with a swarm of Epicureans, (a Sect commonly despised even in Cicero's time, and yet called Wits in ours by men that have no more wit than themselves); and some of these say, that Motion needeth no continued cause at all, any more than non-movere: But when a thing is in motion, it will so continue, because it is its state, without any other continued cause than the motion itself. And so they may as well say (and some do) that when a thing is in Being, it will so continue till it be positively annihilated, without any continued causation of its being. As if esse & existere were nothing more than non esse; and agere were no more noble a mode of Entity than non agere, and so needed no more (that is, no) Cause. (For non esse & non agere need no Cause:) When this distraction is worn out and shamed, the next Age will reproach us for attempting the confutation of it; And yet the Wits of this delirant Age have not the wit to understand a Confutation. Some of them say, that Spirits cannot move bodies for want of Contact (as Gassendus). Some say, that Matter and Motion are eternal, and that of themselves; As if there were no God but Matter and Motion. Some say, that there is a God who gave matter one push at first, and so set it in that motion by which one body by a knock will move another to the end. And some say, There is no other Intellect; but the wonders of wisdom and order in the World are done by such fortuitous motion. But Hobbes meeteth the Predeterminants' and saith, that the Will is free in that its Act is Volition; but that this Volition is necessitated by superior or natural Causes as much as any motion in a Clock or Watch, and that it is unconceivable that any Act or Mode of Act can be without a necessitating efficient cause. But he differs from them in his consequents, and in the Notion of a Spirit, acknowledging no being but Corporeal. §. 2. The Predeterminants' commonly build not their doctrine on God's freewill, but on the Necessity of the thing: As if it were a contradiction, which God cannot do, for God to make a creature that can Determine itself, ad ordinem actionis without his particular predetermining premotion; or to make a Stone that can fall from the Air of itself, unless he move it downwards, besides his sustentation of its natural gravity, and all other natures, by his Influx, or universal Concourse. §. 3. But till they can prove the Contradiction, they must pass for the deniers of God's Omnipotency, which is to deny a God. §. 4. * Let the Reader note, 1. That all the rest of their arguments save this one are of no value. 2. And that Dr. Twisse affirmeth that God is not▪ always the effector of all Good either of Profit or Pleasure which yet he saith are Good. Now if there be no such Entity in Bonum conducibile, vel Bonum Jucundum, as necessarily to require God to be the Cause of them, tell us if you can, Why there is so much entity in Malum morale, as that man is not able to cause it, unless God predetermine his will? Yea, as to Entity, there is no more in Bonum honestum, than in the rest forenamed: His words are [Nos tueri poterimus, Malum fieri, esse Bonum per se: ne●●pe in genere Boni conducibilis, ad certum aliquem fi●●m: sed arguit adversarius, Ergo Deus esset non modo permissor, said & effector ●jus mali. Prorsus invalida consequentia: Apparet enim non necesse esse ut Deus sit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis: (N. B.) Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum, quod non sit alicui conducibile— Neque necess● est ut Deus sit author omnis boni jucundi, magis quam ut sit author peccati. Nam certissimum est, & extra omnem controversiae al●am positum, peccatum esse bonum in genere jucundi, etiam in genere conducibilis: potest enim peccatum nobis cedere in salutem—] Vind. Grat. li. 1. p. 1. sect. 7. p. 133. But whereas the Doctor upbraideth Arminius for confusion in not distinguishing the three sorts of Good in this controversy, An ●●li existentia bonum sit? viz. the bonum honestum, utile & jucundum; I must desire the Reader to avoid also the Doctor's confusion, and to be so much more accurate than he, as to remember that this distinction is but de Bono Creaturae, whose pleasure, profit and honesty are distinguishable: But that above these God Himself is the absolute and simple Good, and that things are first Good as related to him, the Prime and Ultimate Good: And that the highest formal notion of Goodness in the ●creature, is none of those three, but the conformity of things to the Will of God, the absolute Rule of Goodness. And therefore when we ask, An bonum sit ut sit malum? we mean not an sit bonum hominis secundum quid, but an sit bonum simpliciter, viz. conform Voluntati Divinae? And if they can prove that Deus velit▪ ●●●● fieri, we will confess it to be Good. But 3. Yet I deny it to be bonum utile, seeing it doth the sinner no good. For Bonum jucundum in genere is not sin. God would have men have more Pleasure than sin bringeth, and not less. But it is hoc minus jucundum sensibile preferred before hoc magis jucundum spirituale, which is sin. Now the prelation of a Less Pleasure to a Greater is no Pleasure. So that sin is neither utile nor jucundum. And the Doctor is quite out, in calling ●ccasio a medium▪ conducibile: and confesseth that sin is no otherwise conducible to God's Glory but as occasio. Whereas occasio, as such, is no medium at all, no more than possibilitas est ens; unless you take Medium very largely. Their chief argument is, that the moral specification of an Action is an Entity; and to say that any thing can cause any Entity without God's first causing it, is to deify that creature making it a first cause. Answ. 1. The comparative Order of Actions, (as the terminating them on this object rather than that, and at this time rather than that, etc.) is but the modus modi entis; and so is no proper entity. 2. Or if the Name be the quarrel, it is no other Entity than what God is Able to make a creature Able to cause without his predetermining Causality. 3. This power is the excellency of the creature, and the honour of its Creator. §. 5. As for their argument, that there is no effect without a cause, nor difference in effects without a difference in the causes; and that an undetermined cause cannot produce a determinate effect; I answer, 1. God is the cause of all differences without any diversity in himself. And he is the Free cause of all things necessary in the World. 2. The soul is God's Image. 3. The Will when undetermined hath a self-determining power. Therefore this is but petere principium. 4. But there are many sub causes that are a reason of the determination; As objects, opportunity, knowledge, the removing of competitors, etc. §. 6. Therefore Gibieufs, Guil. Camerarius, etc. way of predetermination by the Causa finalis, is nothing to our question; that being no efficient, but a Material, objective or Moral Causation. §. 7. When they say, that else God dependeth on the creature, and is determined by it, (as to his Concourse:) I answer, 1. How can God's free upholding the power of a free agent, be his dependence on it, when it expressly speaketh its dependence on him, without whom it cannot be nor act? 2. No creature determineth Gods Immanent acts: nor his transient, as to the mere Impress and first effect; and so not Gods Act at all: unless Terminating be Determining. It is only its own Act which the creature determineth, which is a secondary effect of God's act, as proceeding from the second cause. God's Influx maketh all that Impress on the soul which God intendeth absolutely: But whether by that Impress the sinner will consent, the will determineth, and is the chief determiner in Evil. §. 8. Saith Dr. Twisse Vindic. Grat. lib. 2. p. 2. Digres. 9 [The second cause non agit in primam, etc. Hoc faceret vel volendo, vel ali●d agendo, etc.] Answ. It's granted: God is not passive, nor doth any second cause act on him as passive: Who is his Adversary in this? §. 9 He addeth [Neither on the Influx of God do we act: for an Act is not the subject of an act.] Answ. 1. If by God's Act and Influx he mean not the Effect on the soul, it is a false supposition that God's Influx or Act is any other than his Essence: But if the said effect be meant, I have showed you that both Indisposition in the Recipient, and a contrary Act may resist it. §. 10. Against our Passive determination of the effect, he saith, that [God is denied to act by physical action on man's will— which if he did, he would rather determine it, than be determined by it, because it cannot resist him, etc.] Ans. 1. The will doth not resist by reaction on and against God; but by Indisposition, and by its own not acting when it can, etc. 2. Who dare deny all Physical Action of God on man's will, when it is quaedam natura? 3. The will doth not Determine God's will, nor reject his Impress, but only determine its own Act. 4. If God would act ad ultimum posse, the will would never disobey or fail of the due effect. §. 11. He saith ib. [Doth God move only to the Act in genere? or also to this species of action? The first cannot be said, For Suarez, Hurtado, say that God determineth the Agent to this Individual act. And the creature hath as much need of help to the species of motion (which is perfecter than the genus,) as to the genus. And God's Influx is singular, and not determined to Generical nature, etc.] Answ. God's universal motion (as the Suns) doth necessarily make its Impress on the creature, and giveth him sufficient help ex parte sui to Act; yea, necessarily continueth the soul in some Action. And that Action is singular, and not a non existent universal. But it is only the General Nature of a singular Act which Gods Natural Influx necessarily causeth: And the Moral species (what need soever we have of help to it) is caused otherwise; not by this common Influx of God as the root of Nature, but by a special Gracious Influx with and by special supernatural means. And this it doth only to Good and not to Evil: and not always with a causally necessitating influx, as to our act. §. 12. He addeth [If the will need not God's motion to its Act in specie, it is either in genere entis, or in genere moris. The first cannot be said: For the special Nature includeth the General and more. And the species in genere moris are no species of acts, but only accidents of humane acts, and that only by extrinsic denomination as to the Law,] etc. Answ. 1. The vanity of arbitrary Logical notions, is a wood for you to hid the matter in. You are not able certainly to define what physically specifieth an Action, and what not. To say that one is the species of an Act, and the other is but an accident and no species, is but to say that you will say what you list. We use to say that Acts are specified by their objects: And so when objects differ specie physica vel morali, the acts do so. But when the question is with Judas, shall I betray my Master or not? with another, shall I be perjured or not? with another, shall I commit this Adultery or not? with another, shall I pray in season or out of season? to another, shall I love God or the creatures more? shall I will or not will this? shall I will it or nill it? etc. Here you are so much at liberty that you may please yourself with saying, that to betray and not betray, to forswear and not to forswear, to love more or less in degree, etc. are physical species of entity, and so make physical species of Action. But I will not say that non agere & non ens is a species of Entity physical: Nor do I believe that we need God's Influx ad non agendum as such. And as for your Accidents of Actions, if you mean Relations, it is their fundamentum that we are questioning. The extrinsic denomination is founded in Relation, or else it's Causeless. In a word, Man by Common Influx can determine his own will to go this way rather than that, and also not to go, and this without a further physical predetermining premotion of God. §. 13. But here let the Reader note, that when he maketh Moral Good and Evil no species of Actions, but an extrinsic denomination (which is true, abstracting the relation from the fundamental difference of the Acts), and maketh God the Naturally necessitating Cause of all that is physical in the acts, he maketh God equally the necessitating prime Cause of Good and Evil, which are but relations resulting from the specified acts. §. 14. He addeth [If God move the will it is to that same act which it doth, or to another. If to another, why should it be said that God moved it to that which is not done rather than that which is done, when we speak not of moral, but necessary physical motion?] Answ. The Particle [Too] doth cheat you by ambiguity. 1. As [too] noteth, the effect, of God alone, it is [to] the Impress which he maketh on the soul; which effect he still obtaineth, which urgeth it towards its own act. 2. The same I say if [to] signify an absolutely intended end. 3. But if [to] signify the natural tendency of God's Impulse as to an effect possible and desirable, yea, and due by command from the subordinate cause (man's will,) than it was [to] our act of repentance, faith, duty, that God moved us: That is, he gave us that Power, and necessary influx by which it might and ought to have been done by us. §. 15. It is but to make toil for the Reader to answer all these fallacies and quibbles, founded in some false supposition or ambiguous word: else I would answer the rest of that Digression, and his Digres. 5. li. 1. p. 2. contra Alvar. Only here I must take notice, that in this Digr. 9 he himself rejecteth Greg. Arim. and Hurtado's assertion of Gods Determining us to this or that Numerical Act, as distinct from another ejusdem speciei, ut merum figmentum, & ad curiositati hominum nimium infoelici satisfaciendum duntaxat introductum. Whereas were it not for wearying the Reader, I might show, that the same Reasons will hold for or against this numerical, as are for or against his specifical predetermination. And the species having no existence but in the individuals, and himself saying, that God's motion is ad actus singulares, if he say that it is not to that singular act that is done, rather than that which is not done, he giveth up his whole cause. §. 16. But to this he hath an answer that it is a fiction and unsound to say, that [Possibilia quae nondum existunt do differre numero: cum differre numero est tantum existentium.] Answ. 1. He may as well say, that esse possibile is a fiction: when possibile is terminus diminuens ad esse. And is not possibile as much a fiction de specie as de numero? That which is not, neither is in specie nor in numero. But there is a Possibilitas numeri as well as speciei. Yet with this answer he oft insulteth over the Schoolmen, when at another time he would have said that Possibile hath an esse cognitum in both respects. §. 17. And I think the good man forgot that by this he quite overthroweth his Book de Scientia Media, and much of all his other Books, which are animated with the supposition of Gods Will causing faturition from eternity. For if only existentia differunt numero, futura non sunt existentia: And if the futurition of differentia numero be not decreed nor eternal (as of this Sun, this Earth, Paul, Peter, and their singular acts, etc.) than nothing is future from eternity: And so we are brought to the Arminians election of species only, and not of individuals (in primo instanti) which is rejected. Sure God electeth Individuals, or none: And if so, it is future individuals. Individuation existeth not but in existentibus. But if foreknowledge and Decree may be of future's and non-existents, it may be of individuals that are such, as well as of species. §. 18. Yea, he proceedeth to say pag. 412. [Deum scire plura esse possibilia quam sunt, non est scire multitudinem rerum possibilium; sed tantum scire se praestare posse ut detur major multitudo rerum existentium quam actu sit: Quare multitudo rerum individuarum Deo notum est tantum existentium, sive ea sit multitudo actualis, sive potentialis, etc.] And yet the soul of his Book de Scientia Media is [Causa transitionis rerum è numero Possibilium in numerum futurorum.] And my foresaid opposition to his Eternal Causation of futurity, is hereby confirmed. 2. It's true, that to know quid possibile, is not to know it to be existent, nor any more than to know what God (e. g.) can do; and so to denominate Nothing, quid possibile, as relating to Power: (And so Ariminens▪ saith Nothing may be Related.) But the like must be said of futurity: And it holdeth equally of the species and de numero, & possibilium & futurorum; so that here we have confitentem reum about the dance and dream of notions and nothings which I have before shown they beguile men's understandings with. And hence also my former doctrine is confirmed, of the nonnecessity of a causal decree of Negatives or Nothings, or of a Positive Volition of them. §. 10. The truth is, an Act of man's soul is such a thing, that de existentibus its hard for any of their subtleties to make known the difference of species, accidents or individuals ab objectis: And to know what interruptions they must be, that go to cut one Immanent act into two, or hinder unity. SECT. XIII. Of man's Power Natural and Moral. §. 1. I Have said so much of this also in the other parts of this Book, that a little here may serve. 1. Man hath no Power whatsoever but from God; and therefore doth not act as a prime Cause properly, because but by a derived power. §. 2. That which is a Power but hypothetically on Condition of something not existent, especially not in our power itself, is no power properly and univocally, but equivocally only. As to say, I am able to leap to Heaven if God will Cause it: I am able to lift a thousand pound with sufficient help which I have not: I am able to see if I had light: or to see a Phoenix if there were such a thing: or I am able to will or move with God's necessary predetermining premotion (say some) which I have not. None of this is a true Power ad hoc. But to constitute a formal Power, it is necessary that I have all things, without which I cannot do the act. §. 3. It is a contradiction to say that when a man hath the true Power to believe, yet he cannot do the Act, * As Jansenius and Dr. Twisse do, in making more absolutely necessary to it. without further premotion: which is to say, He that can believe, cannot believe. The Power connoteth the Possibile. §. 4. † Potentia rationalis naturae humanae non potest minui extrinsicè, & entitatiuè, per destructionem alicujus gradus ejusdem potentiae; potest tamen minui per appositionem impedimenti, quale est peccatum, vel per inclinationem contrariam ad peccata; quae inclinatio generatur per actus males: Necesse est enim ex hoc quod aliquid inclinatur ad ●num contrariorum, quod diminuatur inclinatio ejus ad aliud: Cum ergo peccatum sit contrarium virtuti, ex hoc ipso quod homo peccat, diminuitur bonum naturae, quod est inclinatio ad virtutem: Alvarez de Aux. li. 6. disp. 45. p. ●10. Ita Thom. 1. 2. q. 85. ar. 1. in corp. The true Natural Power of Intellection and Volition, every man hath as a man: And when God, Christ, Heaven are brought to us with all the Conditions necessary to Objects of Intellect and Will, we have formal power to understand and will them, in this Natural sense. What is necessary to the Being of an Object, and Revelation, I desire the Reader to see distinctly opened by me, in a small tract called, The Certainty of Christianity without Popery. §. 5. But the soul itself hath a vicious Indisposition to the spiritual exercise of these faculties or powers: And this is the morbus facultatum; And this Indisposition is called a Moral Impotency; because the soul is unfit by it to the exercise of its natural Power. §. 6. When this Indisposition is so great, as that no man in that case doth do the act, we say he is morally unable: And when it is not so great, but that under that Indisposition some men do the act, in that state of help we say that such a man is morally able. Therefore he that is yet more disposed, is so More able, and it hath various degrees. §. 7. But if a man have so great a disposition (skill and will) as that he is ready to the facile and frequent performance of the act, that Promptitude is called a Habit, and is more than a mere moral power (though a power also.) §. 8. It is certain that men can do more than they do: not only that they could do more if God would predetermine them, or give them more grace; but that properly they can. The worst hath Power to do more good, and forbear more evil, than he doth; And so have the best. §. 9 Adam had true proper Power, natural and Moral, to have stood when he fell: He sinned not for want of necessary Power to have forborn it. §. 10. They that deny this and resolve all sin into God's unresistible necessitating operation, or denying of power absolutely and antecedently necessary, I think do make way for Hobbes his Theology, or subversion of Religion. §. 11. Moral Power and Impotency are primarily such in the will (the first seat of morality) and derivatively or secondarily in the Intellect and executive Power. And therefore it is not originally and radically of physical necessity, but Free, as the will which is free is the Cause of it. §. 12. * Jansen. de Grat. Christ. l. 3. c. 15. denyeth that without effectual Grace men have a complete power to the Acts; but saith yet, They have power, 1. Remotissime, in that they have freewill. 2. By faith, not joined with Love, as being the beginning, etc. 3. Yet more by Love as the root, etc. And he noteth a double Impotency, Una est ex defe●tu alicujus quod non potest quantumlibet magna volu●tate, vel fortiter volendo suppleri. Talis est Impotentia illius qui caret rebus temporalibus ad largiendum, etc. (This is natural Impotency.) De tali Impotentia verissimum est quod D●us non jubet impossibilia: Nam hoc ipso quo talis oritur impossibilitas, vel praeceptum extinguitur, vel certe ad illud implendum, is cui praecipitur non amplius obligatus est. Non est enim culpae Voluntatis quod non ●iat, etc. Altera ex defectu ipsius Voluntatis se● Volitionis oritur, quae si adesset, quanta adesse debet, praeceptum facillim● impleretur: Tantummodo enim fortiter volendo impletur— Haec Impotentia nullo modo excusat cum qui non impl●t quod praecipitur: Posset enim implere si vellet. Quod si nol●erit, & ideo non potuerit, quis non cum dixerit pro ipsa tam perversa obdurataque voluntate culpandum▪ Vel●nt, plen●que velint; mox ut voluerint, imple●untur: si autem nolint, ideoque non possint, quis nolentibus vitio non vertat, & c? Nam revera defectus talis potestatis non est aliud quam duritia mal● voluntatis, à qua suscepta recedere non posse, non est aliud quam tenaciter nolle. Nature teacheth all the world so much to difference between man's Voluntary and Involuntary Acts and Habits, as to take the first to be directly laudable or culpable, as being not only virtuous or vicious, but in their relations to the Rule, to be Virtue or Vice itself; and the more men have of a vicious obstinacy and voluntariness in evil, the more all mankind condemn and hate them. Whereas involuntary necessity is everywhere taken for a just excuse: yea a necessit as volendi in a mad man or a phrenetick or melancholy person, maketh them the objects of men's compassion. And this Light and Law of humane nature is not to be rejected, because it may seem hard to answer the sophisms of those that would confound these sorts of Power and Impotency. §. 13. Therefore of a man that is no otherwise unable to Love God (e. g.) but only because (or in that) directly or indirectly, he will not, that is, is Dispositively, Actually and Habitually Unwilling; it is more proper and intelligible to say that he will not, than that he cannot: Though we may also say He cannot, when we mean but that he will not: But the most explicatory words are best. §. 14. No manshall be able so far to accuse God and excuse himself justly at last, as to say, I was truly willing to have Christ and Life as offered me, but I could not: or I was truly willing to leave my sins and wor●●ly vanities, and to live a holy life to God, but I could not: Yea Augustine and Twisse say more, that no man can truly say, [I would believe but cannot] (which yet I think needeth some limiting explication.) §. 15. Obj. But though all men Can have Christ (or faith) if they will, yet the unregenerate are unable to be willing. Answ. By Unable you must 1. Either mean that they want the Natural Power or faculty of willing it; 2. Or that they want some naturally. necessary concause or object, without which this faculty is no formal Power ad ho●▪ 3. Or that the Will is not well Disposed so to Act. 1. The first no man will say that taketh an unbeliever for a Man. 2. The second no man will say that will not by Hobbes his physical necessitation, turn Religion into a name or nothing, or the natural mot●on of an Engine called Man. 3. And the third (which is the truth) must be named as it is: In Controversies which exercise so great animosities and ●●●●al zeal as this doth in the Churches, it is an injurious thing to use seducing improper names, when the more plain and intelligible are at hand. Hereafter speak plainly in your contendings, and instead of [Cannot] say, An unconverted man will not believe, and his will is viciously undisposed to it, yea ill-disposed against it. Hold to this that we may understand each other; or confess that you quarrel about a word. §. 16. Obj. The Scripture useth the word [Cannot:] Can a Black●ore change his skin, etc. Answ. 1. The text may as fitly (at least) be translated [Will a Blackmore change his skin, etc.] Yet the word [Cannot] is brought in in the application; for here it is all one: That is, the meaning is, that some custom in sin doth cause such a settled Ill disposition or Habit, as without special Grace is never overcome: Which signifieth no more, than a r●●ted wilfulness and Love of sin, and enmity to Good. 2. But the meaning is not to affirm these two sorts of Impotency to be of the same nature [An Ethiopian cannot change his skin, were he never so willing] and [he cannot be willing to change it, without Grace.] But you cannot say that an accustomed sinner cannot learn to do good were he never so willing: nor yet that he can be as easily willing as the Ethiopian, nor as hardly made willing as the Leopard. 3. Figurative speeches are frequent in Scripture, and may alike be used by us in the like cases. But in Controversies a trope is an equivocal till explained, and must not be used without necessity and explication. 4. Where the text once saith, They could not believe or repent, it saith many and many times They would not. 5. The phrase [They could not believe, because Esaias saith, etc.] Joh. 12. 39 notoriously speaketh but of an Impossibilitas Logica consequentiae, and not of a physical disability in themselves, though it intimateth a settled wilfulness. 6. When it's said, Act. 4. 14. [They could say nothing against it,] it signifieth not a want of physical power, but mediate advantage. It's said of Christ, Mark 1. 45. He could no more enter into the City— 6. 5. He could there do no mighty work because of their unbelief. 7. 24. He could not be hid. Isa. 5. 4. What could have been done more to my Vineyard? Jer. 15. 1. My mind could not be towards this people. Mark▪ 3. 20. They could not so much as eat bread. 1. Thes. 3. 1. When we could no longer forbear, etc.— 1 Joh. 3. 9 He cannot sin— Heb. 9 5. Of which we cannot now speak particularly. Act. 4. 16. We cannot deny it. And 19 36. These things cannot be spoken against. Joh. 7. 7. The world cannot hate you. Luk. 11. 7. I cannot rise and give thee, (and yet he did.) Luk. 14. 20. I have married a wife, therefore I cannot come. Mar. 2. 19 They cannot fast. Neh. 6. 3. I cannot come down. So Gen. 34. 14. & 44. 26. 2 Cor. 13. 8. Numb. 22. 18. & 24. 13. Jos. 24. 19 1 Sam. 25. 17. Psal. 77. 4. and other places; I think you will not say it is natural and utter disability that is here spoken of: No nor of God when it is said that He cannot deny himself or Lie, 2 Tim. 2. 13. Tit. 1. 2. We must therefore explain such doubtful words, before we draw controverted conclusions from them, as supposing them falsely to be univocal. §. 17. The same Natural faculty may by the Alteration of objects and means, become formally a Power or no power ad hoc vel illud. And when Nature made it a faculty, Grace can make it a formal power to this or that without changing it in itself at all, in many instances or cases. §. 18. Men have a power even moral to the use of many means which God hath appointed for the begetting of faith, before they have a moral power to believe. §. 19 God hath appointed or commanded to all men, the use of certain duties and means for their Recovery by faith and repentance unto God: And there is no man that is not obliged to use such means; nor any man that is to use them in despair of success: The very command being some signification of God's will, that obedience shall not be in vain. Whether the name of an Implicit Promise be apt for that command, I leave to those that have a mind to contend about names. §. 20. Though a mere Indifferent faculty be (as Dr. Twisse saith) rather to be called Nature than Grace; yet it is Grace 1. Which giveth a gracious object to that faculty, though thereby it be still but an undetermined Power. 2. And it is more Grace which taketh off some vicious Ill-dispositions of the soul; and giveth it some more Disposition to believe, though but so much as common grace doth give. §. 21. It is not a mere Power that God giveth men to Repent and believe: But a Power accompanied with many Gracious help● and means to determine it aright (of which before.) §. 22. He that will not use such Power and means doth thereby forfeit further grace * Brianson in 4. q. 8. Cor. 3. fol. 152. maintaineth, i. Quod ad obtinendam eratiam necessario ex parte hom●nis praecedit aliqua dispositio. 2. Quod talem dispositio●em homo per selpsum potest si vult in se inducere, praesuppositâ influentiâ g●n●ali D●i. 3. Quo l talis dispositio ex parte hominis nullam inducit necessitatem introductionis gratiae ex parte Dei: sed totum fit merâ gratuitâ Dei voluntate. But the second must be done by common preparing Grace. : However God doth not always take the forfeiture, and will not of his elect to their destruction, but doth pardon them. §. 23. By all this it appeareth, 1. That all men have a natural power or faculties, enabled to all that is necessary to salvation, so far that it is not the want of a proper natural power that shall necessitate them to sin and perish; 2. That this Power is by vice undisposed to believe, etc. 3. That it hath some Indisposition to all that virtue or moral good which tendeth to salvation. 4. That it is not equally undisposed to all such Good. 5. That its Indisposition to some means of Recovery, is no greater than what may be overcome by God's commoner sort of Grace. 6. That this commoner Grace is not herein ever so effectual, as that all that receive it, do all the good that they can do by it, even in a moral sense; nor all that some others do that have no more help: But the wilful negligence of the receiver, or his diversion or resistance frequently frustrateth it; though not always. 7. That the right use of this commoner grace, in the use of the foresaid means, is a way appointed by God himself, and not in vain, by and in which men may be made fit to receive that special Grace which will call them savingly to believe. 8. That no man is denied that special grace that deserveth it not by the abuse of Common grace. (How the ca●e of Infants dependeth on the Parents I must not instance as oft as the exceptions of wranglers require it.) 9 And therefore no man is condemned for want of natural Power as such, but only for want of stirring up his natural power by those helps of grace, by which he might have done it, and for want of that further Good (faith, love, obedience) which by the helps rejected he might have been brought up to, had he not wilfully neglected the power and helps which he had. 10. Yea usually God long waiteth patiently on sinners with the tenders of mercy, while they reject it, before he utterly forsake them. SECT. XIV. Whether the giving of faith be an Act of Omnipotency? and a proper Creation? and a Miracle? §. 1. THe Reader must pardon me for troubling him with such frivolous questions about names, seeing unhappy Theologues have made it necessary. An Act of Omnipotency hath several senses Creation is an ambiguous word: Pet. de Alliaeo in 4. q. 1. G. telleth us of four Ordinary senses of the word, 1. Facere aliquod esse post non esse: 2. Facere aliquid esse post non esse ab illo agente quod potest hoc sine causali influxu materiae vel subjecti. 3. Facere aliquid esse post non esse, sire concursu causali seu influru materiae vel subjecti sine subjecto praesupposito ex quo illud fiat. 4. Facere aliquid esse post no● esse absque agente se solo causante, & sine concursu alterius causae efficient●. Malderus 1. 2. qu. 113. a. 9 p. 578. ex Tho. & August. Justificatio impii est maximum opus Dei. Secundum quantitatem tam magnum est Angelos justos c●eare: sed secundum quantitatem proportionis majus est impios justificare— quia major est di●properti impii ad gratiam quam justi ad gloriam; sicut ex plebeio creare ducem quam ex duce regem. Aug. Tr. 72. in Joh. Justis create & impios justificare, aequalis potentiae, hoc autem major is misericordiae est. : 1. If the meaning be Whether Omnipotency be the Agent Principle, it is past dispute. For it's all one as to ask Whether it be an Act of God? God hath no Power but Omnipotency, that is, perfect power. 2. If the meaning be, Whether the Giving of faith be an Adequate effect of Omnipotency, it is also negatively past doubt. Though those that take God to be but Anima Mundi, say that Either the World is Infinite or that God is not Infinite, as thinking the World to be his adequate effect; yet Christians are commonly agreed, that God hath no adequate effect. Even the making of the universe, the Giving of Christ, and the Glorifying of the Church, which are the highest effects of his Power, Wisdom and Love, are not adequate effects; For nothing but another God can be an adequate effect of God: And another God, is a contradiction. §. 2. 3. But if the sense of the question be only comparative; As, 1. Whether Omnipotency be more eminent in the giving of faith than Wisdom and Love (or Goodness)? 2. Or whether Omnipotency be more eminent in giving faith, than other works of God? they are both needless questions. And to the first I say, No: To the second, those other works of God must be named, and compared, by the presumptuous that have no safer work to do. §. 3. 4. If the question be, Whether the giving of faith be so great a work that no Power below Omnipotency could suffice to do it? I answer, it is a presumptuous paltry question of rash men. But yet if it must be answered, it must be negatively: Because as Omnipotence is more illustrious in the making of the world, than in causing a man to believe; so Christians agree that the world itself (as I said) is not an adequate effect of Omnipotency: Which maketh so many of the subtlest Schoolmen conclude that God could not be proved to be Omnipotent by the whole Creation ●as such, were it not further to be gathered from the notices of his perfection. Which were false if by Omnipotence they meant only a Power that can do all that is done: But they mean An Infinite Power; which they say must be so seen in an Infinite effect. But the world is not Infinite. §. 4. As to the second question, it is either de nomine or de re. If the former, let every man speak as he list for me, rather than I will contend with him, whether Creation of faith be a fit name. As to the matter, 1. It is agreed on, that faith is not a substance; 2. Nor an Accident con-created with a substance; 3. Nor a composition of substances into one, done by secondary Creation, Generation or Art. 4. But that it is the right ordered Act of a substance, whose natural power which performeth it, was pre-existent, though without that act and the moral disposition. Therefore it being a Modus entis or modus modi that we talk of, the common name is Alteration and suscitation, actuating and ordering: But if men sober sometime call it a New Creation (as indeed the whole frame of holiness together is called the New Creature in the Scriptures) and sometimes the Divine nature, sometimes Regeneration, sometimes a Divine Artifice, Alteration, Conversion, Sanctification, etc. it is the same thing that is meant by all their several names. §. 5. As to the third Question, Whether it be a Miracle * Justificationem non esse proprie Miraculum, Vid. Malder. ib. p. 578. Et Br●anson. in 4. q. 8. Cor. 2. fol. 144. confessing it above the power of a Creature to justify us, but not properly a miracle. p 1. As a Miracle signifieth a wonder, a thing is wonderful either for the Rarity or for the Great appearance of God's power in it. In the first respect, faith is not so Rare as to be a miracle: In the second, the Sun and Heavens are a greater wonder than faith. 2. But as a Miracle signifieth that which is done by second Causes, but unknown to us, and out of God's ordinary way of working; so it is no miracle. 3. And as some men call that a Miracle which exceedeth the power of the second causes, so all things would be Miracles that God doth: For they are effects of his power as exceeding the power of second causes. 4. As a Miracle is that which is done by God without any second causes, † Many good people would never be so much against the acknowledgement of second Causes if they understood the matter: But they ignorantly think it derogateth from God the first cause. so some think that the propagation of souls is a miracle: But of souls and faith it is much unknown to us, how far God useth second causes; But that Generation as to one, and Preaching and all other means to the other, are some sort of second causes, * We have no reason to think that God useth no second cause in working faith. It is much to be noted which Pet. de Alllaco saith in 4. q. 1. E. Plus facit Deut faciendo aliquem effectum mediante causa secunda, quam si faceret eu●dem effectum se solo: Quia in prima factione sunt plures termini divina actionis quam in secunda. For as he said before, Quandocunque Deus facit aliquem effectum mediante causa sceunda, ipse non solum facit illum effectum, sed etlam facit causam secundam esse causam illius effecti. Mar● this well. is sure. 5. And lastly, if by a Miracle be meant that effect, which God produceth both above the power of second causes, and by a more glorious exertion of his own power than in his Course of Nature and Government he useth by and with second causes, so it is not a Miracle, because in the way of his ordinate co-operation with his Gospel, he ordinarily produceth it. §. 6. So that as all Christians must confess that we had never believed if God had not wrought it in us by that spirit of Wisdom and Love which is Omnipotent; so to contend any further whether it be a Miracle, and a proper Creation, or an effect of Omnipotency as such, etc. are such questions as presumptuous Schoolmen heretofore, and hotheaded Sectaries in our times, have used to afflict the Church of Christ with, and to tempt their ignorant zealous followers into such employments, as most effectually destroy their charity, and injure others, and scandalise the world. SECT. XV. Of the sufficiency and efficacy of Grace. §. 1. I Have said so much of this before as that, lest I be tedious by repetition, I must be but brief. * Malderus against the Synod of Dort and 1. 2. q. 111. art. 3. dub. 8. bestirs himself with special industry to tell what Gratia efficax is: And he concludeth that it is afflatus gratiae praevenientis, & sub genere gratiae excitantis; & quae non respuitur cum respui possit; rather praeparans voluntatem quam adjuvans: rejecting Valentia who placeth it in the Habit of Grace caused by excitation; and à Lorca who takes it to be adjuvant; and those that make it co-operant; and those that place it in praedetermination physical; of which he confuteth four opinions, p. 502. and saith Probabilior sententia est quae negat omnimodam gratiae infallibilitatem, adeóque efficaciam sumi posse ex sola reali aliqua differentia, considerata ex parte gratiae praevenientis. And that Just and unjust have effectual grace, and therefore it differeth not from sufficient really. And he resolveth all per scientiam mediam, that Grace is effectual because ex proposito convertendi Deus it a hominem trabit sicut aptum novit ut sequatur & certissime secu●urum: and so that Grace i● effectual ere natura sua and not so called only ex eventu. I. By sufficient Grace is meant that which is necessary to the effect, and without which it Cannot be, but with it, it may be, though it sometimes be not. §. 2. That there is such a sufficient Grace not always effectual to man's act, is before proved by Adam's Case. And that no man hath such now for any means or duty in order to his recovery, as Adam had to stand when he fell, is not to be asserted or received. And that no prepared soul hath such sufficient Grace to believe, that yet believeth not, is a thing that is past our reach to know. §. 3. This sufficient Grace consisteth in a Power to the act: when the Indisposition of the natural power, is so far altered, or repressed, as that by the means and helps vouchsafed by God, the act is Morally possible to be done. For he that truly can do it, all things considered, is well said to have such necessary grace. §. 4. But God of his bounty usually giveth men more than such a mere moral possibility, by many additional helps and urgencies to the act, which I mentioned before. §. 5. But by [sufficient] is not meant [As much as is useful; yea or needful to the Ascertaining of the Event, much less to the meliority of the act.] §. 6. II. The EFFICACY of Grace relateth to the effect: And by the effect it must be described. Efficacy is Aptitudinal, which is the force and fitness of the Efficient Cause: Or Actual, which is Efficienty itself. §. 7. Aptitudinal efficacy is 1. In God; 2. In the means: And 1. In God's Absolute Power; 2. In his Ordinate Power. §. 8. 1. God's Absolute Power is Omnipotency, or Infinite; and therefore was aptitudinally efficacious to make a world before it was made. §. 9 2. God's Ordinate Power is the same Essential Omnipotency denominated from the Connotation of those effects, which he hath decreed to produce, according to the limited aptitude of second Causes and means, or the disposition of the recipient, or at least, as limited in the effects by his mere free will. §. 10. In these respects, though still God's power in itself be Omnipotency, yet in the limited way of operation, it is various, 1. As Gods Will quoad terminos is various, 2. And as the means are various, 3. And as the Receivers capacities are various. To one, the same operation ex parte Dei & mediorum (though not from the same Decree) is abundantly efficacious, and to another not. §. 11. And thus God so limiteth the effect of his Power, as that it shall be effectual sometime on a Condition to be freely performed by man receiving it, even by a former help, and not absolutely. §. 12. Therefore all that is Aptitudinally efficacious, is not actually efficient of every effect to which it was thus apt. §. 13. The aptitudinal efficacy of the means being of God, falleth in with his ordinate power, herein, and is not the thing in question. §. 14. The effects in respect to which Grace is called efficacious are, 1. The Giving of the Means themselves. 2. The first Impress on the soul. 3. The altering of the souls Disposition. 4. The production of the act. 5. And of the Habit. And it must be some of these effects which are called efficacious or inefficacious to others. So that by that time the state of the Question is truly opened, this which Dr. Twisse saith Arminius durst never speak out his opinion of, and which he and others make to be the very heart of all these Controversies, perhaps will appear to be nothing. §. 15. For what is that Grace whose efficacy you inquire of ● Is it Gratia operans or operata? The efficient cause, or the effect? If it be Gods Gratia operans, it is either the Prime Cause or the second Causes. If it be the Prime Cause, it is God's essence only; Even his Essential Power, Vasquez. in 1 Tho. ●●●● 19 disp. 8c. p. 5●●●●● [Voluntas libera De●, ●●●● essentia Divina significata per modum actus vitalis & affectus eliciti, cum revera sit ipsamet substantia Dei; includit tamen habitudinem etiam qúandam rationis ad res futuras, quae liber● Deo convenit, sient etiam res libere futurae sunt: Cum enim haec relatio consurgat ex fundamentis non necessaries, ●●●● ex rebus ipsis, & objects futuri●; ipsa etiam habitud●●●●●re Deo convenit; non intrinsicè, sed extrinsec● solum denomination●; quam Deo convenire, & non conve●ire, ●on est absurdum. Ergo cum Velle liberam Dei non solum includat essentiam, sed cum tali respects, ●ti-●●s● libera Volunt as poss●● D●o adesse, & abesse, ni●il sequitur absurdi, quod divina simplicitati & immutabilitati repug●et.] This little is all that they can tell us, what Gods free Volition of extrinsic effects is. And can you tell us any more? Bradwardine denying in God any executive power besides mere Volition (though he call him o●●nipotent antecedently to his self-knowledge and Volition) doth make Grace ●x parts D●● to be nothing but his Will, that we shall do the act, and be such and ●●ch. Intellect and will. And is that the Question [Wherein consisteth the efficacy of God's essence?] Why it consisteth in itself if you mean Aptitudinal efficacy; It is Gods essential Virtue. If you mean Actual efficiency, that speaketh the effect; of which more anon. So that about God's essential efficacy there is no Controversy. §. 16. But if you say that It is his Potentia quà ordinata and not quà essentialis vel absoluta that you inquire of the efficacy of; Remember that the word Ordinata or Limited signifieth no alteration in God's Power at all, but only An effect which as Limited and ordinate, from whence the Power causing it is extrinsecally so named. God's essential Power is never limited but Infinite; and to be Ordinate, is but to have ordinate effects. So that still either the Controversy must be of God's essence, (which is past Controversy,) or of some second cause, or some mere effect. §. 17. And if you transferr the Question to the efficacy of second causes, 1. You will deny yourselves, that means and second causes have any power but from God; 2. And that the very nature of those causes is sufficient to the ascertaining of the effect, because they cause mostly morally● And it is one of the accu●ations against the A●minians (right or wrong) that they lay all on moral suasion or causality. 3. And second causes are so numerous, and unknown to us, that we are uncapable of judging well of their efficacy. 4. But it is I think agreed between you, that the force of Means or second causes in Conversion is not such as necessitateth the will. Or if some of the Schoolmen and Jesuits, which with their Scientia Media do join Gratiam per congruitatem mediorum efficacem, do make this efficacy to be the chief cause of the effect, yet they deny it to cause necessarily; at least always, when the effect followeth. And what if we add, that objects effect not as such? And therefore this question de efficacia causarum secundarum, must extend to some second effective Agents, and not only to objects as such, nor to those that preach, present and offer objects, as such: And what that Agent 'Cause must be, under God, by that time you are agreed, you will find that they are new Controversies that will there rise up before you. And yet I think that if we will needs wrangle about the efficaciousness of any cause foregoing the first effect itself on the soul, it must be of the efficacy of some or all these second causes, or we must question whether God be God? For I can find nothing else to question. §. 18. It remaineth then that the question, Wherein the efficacy of Grace consisteth, must be meant of Gratia operata, even of the effect itself. And then either you mean, that this effect is efficacious to itself, or to something else. The first is such a contradiction as is not to be imagined, (that you should think that an effect is its own cause, and ask How doth faith, e. g. cause itself?) Therefore there is nothing left, but only to question, How the first effect of God on the soul in its conversion is efficacious of the second? §. 19 And here 1. Some of you will grant that as motion causeth motion by contact of bodies, so the first effect on the soul can cause the second. And others of you will deny it, and say that God's Actions being diversified only by the diversity of effects and objects, that which causeth the second effect is to be denominated a second Action, and not the same numerically which caused the first; no nor specifically if the effects specifically differ. And so as scholastic wits here exercise their curiosity, without respect to Arminianism or Calvinism, you will here fall into notional Controversies in the way. §. 20. 2. But granting that the first effect is that efficacious Grace which must cause the second, how shall we know what the first effect is, and what the second? God's Grace like the Sun is still shining though we are not still receiving it: When it worketh but the commoner sort of effects, these tend to more and more. The first Gracious effect may be forty years before Conversion. But this is not your meaning: But I suppose you will say that it is the first special effect or gratia operata, that is proper to the saved, which you mean. But to pass by, that Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius (much more their predecessors) held that sincere faith, Love, holiness, Justification, present right to Life if they so died, are not proper to the saved, but that some lose all these, If you say but [proper to the Justified or Sanctified or Converted,] or, it be the first effect which is proprium Justificandis which you mean; Are we agreed what that is? §. 21. Either the first effect on the soul, or the first Gratia operata, is the Act of faith itself, or somewhat antecedent. If the Act (as many subtly maintain) than it were a foolish question to ask, Whether the Act of faith be Effectual to cause itself, and How? Therefore it must be somewhat antecedent, or we can find no matter for our Controversy de efficacia Gratiae ad credendum. §. 22. If somewhat antecedent to the Act, it is either a Disposition, or Infused Habit, or an Impression, Impulse or Influx which is neither Disposition nor Habit. * Dico 1. Non certo constare ex divinis literis esse hujusmodi Habitus supernaturales. 2. At (baptizatis) infunditur Gratia ●o sensu quod efficiuntur D●o grati & consortes divinae▪ naturae, & renati. 3. Conceditur Dei adjutorium ut credamus, velimu●, diligamus, per inspirationem & infusionem spiritus sancti. 4. Dei adjutorium desuper infusum est omnino necessarium ut credamus, diligamus, etc. & non tantum ut facilius credamus. Medina in 12. q. 51. p. 282. See many definitions of a Habit confuted in Medina 1. 2. p. 271. and that, which he resteth in is Aristotle's, Qualitas quâ rectè vel malè afficimur. §. 23. 1. A proper Habit of faith it is not: Though Mr. Pemble singularly seem so to think, yet he meaneth but a seminal disposition. And it's commonly held that the Habit is given by sanctification, after the Act given in Vocation. 2. But if it were otherwise, the Habit is not always sufficient to ascertain the Act. For holy men oft sin against a Habit, and believers do not always exercise it. Habits Incline per modum naturae, but do not certainly determine to the act. 3. And of a Disposition it must be so said much more. §. 24. 2. And if it be an Impulse or Influxus Receptus (as I think we must affirm) this is but a general notion, of which our understanding is very crude or small. A mere Motus it is not: For (as was said in the beginning) the Divine Influx is threefold, viz. From Vital-Activity (or Power,) Wisdom and Love, to Life, Light and Love, in man. Now, as I said, if there be no such Impulse, besides the Life, Light and Love produced, our Controversy is at an end: For these are not efficacious or efficient of themselves. But if such a different Impulse there be, it's hard to know what it is in man. I conceive it best expressed by all these inadequate notions conjunct: 1. An inward urgency to this threefold act; which is called in the Schools, both auxilium, concourse, and Influx: 2. By which Urgency the soul is more Disposed to the Act (in hoc ordine) than it was before: 3. Which Disposition containeth in it a Moral Power to that Act (so ordered) and somewhat more; even some Inclination to perform it. If any man can tell me better what that Divine Impulse is which is antecedent to man's Act, I am willing to learn. §. 25. Now if this be the question, Whether this Divine Impulse, which is the first effect of God's spirit, be of its own nature efficacious to produce According to Jansenius the first Grace is Necessary Delectation or Love in act, before that which is free and full. And if so, then there is no grace causing this grace, and so none to be the subject of this question, Whether it be more or less, sufficient or effectual, operating or co-operating grace, which maketh one man love God initially rather than another? For it is no Grace, b● God's essential will; this Love be the first Grace, and no received Impulse antecedent to it. our Faith, Love, etc. as the second effect, I answer, 1. Sometimes God's Impulse is so Great, as propriâ vi, doth change mind and will and overcome resistance, and procure our act. 2. Sometimes it is so strong as that it prevaileth against the contrary ill-disposition, so far as to give man a Moral Power to the Act, with some Inclination, which yet contrary habits and temptations do overcome, and the Act doth not follow, which yet was not for want of Power to have done it: And this is called sufficient Grace. 3. We have great reason to believe that as in some Instances Gods greater Impress is the chief differencing Cause, so in other Instances an equal Impulse of God on unequally disposed subjects, doth produce the Act of faith, etc. in one of them, which it produceth not in the other, through the incapacity of the recipient. 4. Therefore there is a double degree of efficacy or Vis, One which only so far moveth and helpeth the will, as that it can do the act, and sometime doth it without more: Another which is so strong as that the second effect always followeth it. 5. But whenever the Act of faith is produced (by force or Impulse more or less) God is the first and principal cause of it, and man but the second, and the praise of it is accordingly due. And I think this decision accommodateth both sides of our contenders. §. 26. The foresaid Impulse or first effect, is only the work of God (and the means) and not ours: But the Act of Faith, Love, etc. is God's work and ours; and ours as Free-agents. Therefore that Impulse of God which is Aptitudinally efficacious on supposition of man's due reception and self-excitation, is oft not Actually effectual for want of that Voluntary Reception and self-excitation. §. 27. As to the various effects of Grace forementioned, 1. As to the preparation of Means and Gracious medicine (Christ, the Covenant, etc.) Grace is efficient of itself, and doth it. 2. As to the first Impulse or Impress on the soul, God certainly effecteth it, in some degree, wherever his spirit worketh on the soul. 3. Some Urgency, and some degree of disposition to the act, is constantly contained in this Impulse. And usually it giveth a moral power to the Immediate Act-required. 4. The Act of faith sometimes followeth this Impulse through its invincible force; And sometime it followeth it through its sufficient force, and the due Reception * Omne agens. requirit de necessitate aliquam dispositionem in suo passo: Maximè si illud pàssum habeat dispositiones action● illius agentis contrarias, ut patet de igne etc. Ergo cum Gratia non sit minus inmo magis quam naturalis forma; Certum est quod Gratia requirit majorem dispositionem in passo. Et voco illam dispositionem; Libertatem arbitrii sui Deo submittere, & se ad alteram partem declinare, scilicet ad volendum Gratiam recipere, & dolere de culpa commissa voluntary & libere per attritionem, Brianson in 4. q. 8. cor. 3. fol. 152. This is just the doctrine of our Protestant Preachers, supposing that Common Grace must make this preparation which the Papists grant. of the subject. And sometimes it followeth it not at all, through the Recipients' indisposition. 5. The Habit of faith ever followeth a special Act, through the powerful operation of the Holy Ghost. But usually it goeth not before the Act: Man hath not a fixed Habit to promptitude and facility of believing before he believeth, but after. 6. The Habit ordinarily procureth following acts, by the way of Inclination: but not necessarily nor always. For by strong temptations, Habits are oft born down. §. 28. If the question then be, Whence God's Grace is Aptitudinally and Potentially efficacious (able and fit to effect?) It is because God is God that he is Able; and his Impulse is such because he maketh it such. And if the question be, Whence Grace is Actually efficient of its first effect (the Impulse?) It is because God will so do; and his will hath no Cause, being the first Cause. And if the question be, Whence Grace is Actually efficient of man's faith? It is by its Impelling man to believe. But if you ask, Whence faith itself is; or of what cause is it an effect? I answer, of God as the first cause, and the Means as his Instrument, and of the Believer as a free second Cause. And if the question be, Why sufficient Grace which is Effectual ad Posse is not effectual ad agere? It is because (being but sufficient,) man's Indisposition and wilful neglect or opposition, maketh him an unfit Receiver. §. 29. There being nothing then but God's essence (and the means) antecedent to the first effect on the soul, and that effect ever following where God worketh: and the second effect being the effect both of God (by the first) and of man as a free agent, the questions, unde efficatia Gratiae, and unde effectus, are thus healingly answered. §. 30. Obj. But the will of God is the first differencing and effectual Cause: And that not as it is his essence, but as it is terminated on the Creature and decreeth such an effect. Answ. 1. It is no will but his essence which is so terminated or decretive. 2. That termination maketh no difference at all that's real in the will of God, but only in the effect or object. 3. What is the difference then between Gods will simply in itself, and as willing from eternity a thing not yet existent? None really at all. And that which is not yet, being Nothing; what Relative, Connotative and Denominative difference such Nothings can make on the will of God, besides the variety of imperfect notions in man's frail Intellect, let the wise consider. §. 31. From whence it is that School-divines after Augustine say, that with God there is no futurum velpraeteritum, no foreknowledge or fore-decrees, properly, because no difference of time, but only knowledge and will of things as present. §. 32. Yet Gods Vital Activity, Knowledge and Will as he himself is the object of them, have a Greater distinction; because to be self-living, self-knowing and self-loving are his Essential Acts on himself the eternal object (which made many Ancients account them the Trinity of persons.) And also to Will an existent Creature is an extrinsic denomination from existence: But to will that which is not, (that man shall be, that he shall believe hereafter, etc.) as it is nothing really different from God's essence, so it is but an extrinsic denomination of his essence, from nothing. SECT. XVI. Of Infused Habits, and the Holy Ghost Given us▪ The Schoolmen that speak most for the necessity of Infused Habits, cannot agree what use they are for; Aureolus supposeth chief for the right circumstantiating of Acts, rather than for promptitude to them and pleasure in them. And when all is said, they give men but small comfort from them, saying (as Aureolus, Brianson, etc.) that no man can be sure that he hath them, seeing acquired Habits may do the same things that Infused do. [Utrum Beatitudo supernaturalis hujus vitae sit magis in Habitibus quam in operationibus, vid. Suarez Metaph. disp. 44. sect. 8. n. 18. & Molina 1. p. q. 12. ar. 5. disp. 2. ar. 2. pro habitibus. Sed contra inquit Aegid. de Sancta Praesentatione Li. 4. de beatit. q. 5. a. 3. p●. 471. His non obstantibus oppositum▪ affirmant omnes Theologi qui bac de re scripserunt: nec videtur posse de hoc dubitari. And yet Alens. 2. p. q. 104. m. 3. Aquin. 1. 2. q. 51. a. 2. ad 3. & q. 63. a. 2. ad 3. & Valenti●●. To. disp. 4. q. 3. punct. 2. etc. are for preferring Habits. Idem Aegid. de Praesentat. li. 4. p. 443, 444. tells us that by Grace God is Present in the soul as his Temple otherwise than by Immensity and sustentation; But his praesentia Amicitia can mean nothing but the special effects of Gods Love. Nostrâ tempestate non solum est temerarium, & periculosum, sed ferè hareticum habitus insusos negare; Nam Concil. Vienens. etc. & universi Theologi uno consensu affirmant dari habitus insusos: Medina in 1. 2. q. 51. a. 4. 282. But Soto li. 2. the nat. & great. c. 17, 18. saith that the Concil. Trid. purposely forbore to define the case of infused habits. Let the Reader note that Jansenius proveth that Pelagius himself asserted infused Habits given in baptism, and that without merit. Jans. Aug. To. 1. li. 5. c. 22. p. 126. §. 1. EVery operation of the Holy Ghost is not the Giving of the Holy Ghost, which is specially promised in the Gospel to believers. For there are 1. Many common works of the Spirit; 2. And the special effect of faith itself before it. §. 2. This gift of the Holy Ghost unto Believers, was formerly two fold, the Gift of Miracles or wonders, and of special Holiness; of which the latter continueth to the end of the world. §. 3. The spirit is Given to Believers in several respects conjunct. 1. In that he is Given to Christ their Head, with whom by Union they are Relatively one Body▪ 2. In that He is Given to them by the Baptismal Covenant, in special Relation to their own persons, to be their sanctifier: In which respect they are Baptised into the name of the Holy Ghost, as being now in Covenant theirs. 3. In that he worketh in them▪ the Acts and Habits of Holiness, even of Love to God and to his Image; and helpeth them in all duties, and against all temptations, enemies and sins. But not that his essence is more in them than elsewhere, but his Operations from those Relations. §. 4. This Gift of the spirit is the great privilege of believers, and of Gospel times in the eminent degree, and He is the great Agent, Advocate and witness of Christ in us, the divine nature, and name of God and his mark upon us: our witness, earnest, pledge, and first-fruits of life eternal; and the great difference between Christ's living members and the unregenerate world. §. 5. So powerful and fixed is this Habitual Holiness or Love of God (for that is the sum of it) that though it be no substance, nor altar not man's species, nor operate not by natural necessitating determination, yet it strongly and constantly inclineth the soul per modum nature to the act of Love; and so emulateth nature, that it is called in Scripture the Divine Nature, and the new man. §. 6. The greatest blessing in this world is to have more of this Spirit, and the greatest punishment, to be forsaken by the spirit, and deprived of it: And believers themselves must fear most, lest they should quench and grieve the spirit, and be punished with any measure of its desertion: And their great work is to cherish it carefully, and obey it faithfully and constantly. §. 7. The word [Infusion] as to Habits being metaphorical, is ambiguous. 1. If the question be, Whether Habits be so Infused as that they are caused without Means? we must deny it ordinarily. 2. If it be, Whether they are not at all procured by any cogitations, desires, or preparatory duties of our own, to fit us to receive them? It is to be denied as to the ordinary way. 3. If the question be, Whether the Act of faith do ever go before the Habit, as a cause of it? It must be affirmed of the ordinary case. 4. If it be, Whether the Habit ever go before the Act? we must say, that some Impulse disposing to it doth. And God can cause a Habit before the Act: But we cannot prove that he ever doth so, much less that it is his ordinary way. §. 8. Whence it is plain that ordinarily All Infused Habits are so far also Acquired, as that they follow means and the Act: But all Acquired Habits are not such as are called Infused. §. 9 The difference is in this, that Habits are said to be Infused when the Holy Ghost doth excite the soul to the Act, and by that Act unto a settled Habit, by such a special powerful Impulse as would not follow Gods ordinary operation by mere natural second Causes. As the seal set home on the wax by a strong hand maketh a deep impression, more than when it's laid on lightly by a child: so are sacred objects and means and motives when set home by the spirit (allowing for the differences of the things.) §. 10. Whether in every true Believer a fixed Habit of Love instantaneously follow the first act of true faith, though weak: or whether in many God only give after the first act so small an increase of the Disposition, as is short of the true nature of a habit, till increased by frequent acts, is a case that I think more difficult than needful to resolve. §. 11. That which God worketh in Infants, is a seminal fixed disposition: But I cannot prove that it is a proper Habit. §. 12. Whether Adam's Natural sanity or sanctity antecedent to his first Act, was to be called more properly a Habit, or only a seminal disposition, I leave to others. But if his, and Infants be to be called Habits, you must say that they are only certain General Habits, such as Health in the Body, and not those particular Habits, which are strictly so called. §. 13. The nature of a Habit is not well known to mortal men. We know that it is a strong and fixed Disposition to prompt and facile action of this or that special sort. But what that Disposition is, we well know not: That is, whether it be the robur of the essential virtues or faculties of the soul, (Intellection, Will, Activity?) And if so, wherein that second Gradus Virtutis, which is not essential differeth from the first that is? And whether it be any thing else than a secret constant Act, in and by which the soul is excited to more sensible acts, it's hard to know. But certain I am that besides those Acts which taking in somewhat of Imagination or sense are ordinarily perceived by us (which are our ordinary conversation,) the soul hath also some deep secret fixed acts, which make no use of sense or Imagination, or none that is observed; and yet are the ruling acts of the man. Such commonly is the Intentio finis which operateth constantly without memory or observation in all use of means. As a traveller on his journey keepeth on his way, while he seemeth wholly taken up with the occurrences, company and talk of his way, and thinketh not sensibly of his end: And yet had he not an unobserved Intention of it, he would not go on. And night and day the soul hath this secret insensible sort of Action. §. 14. As when a spark of fire is blown up to a flame, and the excited Act doth tend to more, and the more it burneth (caeteris paribus) the more it is strongly inclined to burn; And yet no man can say that here is any new Matter that was not before existent, nor that the second degree of fire is not of the same nature with the first, nor that there is any thing but nature and action which inclineth it to more action; And yet how the same essence before not perceived is suddenly blown up by Action to such observable appearance and effects, is past the power of man to understand aright: So some such thing there is in the present case, allowing for the difference of natures, and kinds of operation. SECT. XVII. Whether man be merely Passive as to the first special Grace. §. 1. Answ. 1. THe Nature of man's soul is to be an Active Spirit, * Indifferentia Voluntatis in ordine ad auxilium praevium est indifferentia passiva: caeterum in ordint ad actum liberum, qu●m producit praedeterminata tali motion● praevia, indifferentia Voluntatis est activa & libera. Alvarez de Aux. disp. 23. pag. 115. and therefore what ever it receiveth, it receiveth it as it is in that nature. 2. But the same soul is Passive as well as Active, and that in the prior instant of nature; For it must receive from God the first cause: which made the Greek ancient Doctors and many of the Latins say as Damascene in sense, (though in grosser words) that the soul in respect to bodies was immaterial (or incorporeal) but it was material in respect of God. §. 2. Not only in its Receiving the Spirits first Impulse to Believe, the soul is Passive before it is Active: but also in its Reception of every sort of Divine Influx, even to every natural act. So that in this there is no difference between Conversion and any common act. For the soul is first passive in all●: even in receiving that Natural Influx by which we Live and Move and Be. §. 3. But the soul which is passive in Receiving God's Impulse to believe, (the first effect,) is Active in the producing of its own Act of believing, (which is the effect of many Concauses.) And, as I said, It is not the Habit of faith properly so called, which it passively Receiveth before the Act. SECT. XVIII. Whether the first Grace, and the New and Soft Heart be Promised and Given Absolutely, or on any Condition on our part; And so of faith itself? Answ. §. 1. BY the first Grace is meant, either simply the first, or the first special renewing Grace on the soul, proper to them that shall be Justified. Of the first Grace simply there is no Condition; for it is given Universally to all, (viz. a Reprieval, a Law of Grace, a Redeemer, etc.) And after this there is much common personal mercy given conditionally▪ and much absolutely, to all or some. * And as to the first moving inward Grace, see how copiously the Jesuit Ruiz (as Vasquez and others) proveth that it hath no initium in us, no not an occasion or disposition, much less merit, for which it is given: And he reasoneth from the Names, Creation, Generation by the seed of God, resuscitation and Gods being found of them that sought him not, and from the Cause of the difference between man and man. De pradest. Tr. 3. disp. 18. ●, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, etc. p. 227, 228, etc. Even Medina 12. p. 596. is so hesitant as to say] Esse probabilem sententiam Doctorum quod facienti quod in se est ex facultate naturae Deus▪ ex sua misericordia nunquam denegat gratiam. Sed dico quod probabilius est & magis consentaneum sanctis patri●us, praeclpu● Augustino, non esse Legem infallibilem quod homini p●●atori facienti quod▪ in se est, ex facultate natura, continub conferatur gratia. Nam si esser Lex infallibilis certè initium & bona pars justificationis esset à nobis, etc.] Thus the Papists herein differ as much as the Protestants among themselves. §. 2. It seemeth to me an error (which by oversight I was long entangled in myself.) to think that by the new and soft heart, is meant the first special Grace. For most Divines agree, that it is proper sanctification which is meant by it, as distinct from antecedent Vocation. Vid. Ames. Medul. de Vocat. Rolloc. de Vocat. Bishop G. Downame against Pemble, hooker's Souls Vocation, Joh. Rogers of faith, and many others. In Vocation they suppose the Act of Faith and Repentance suscitated by the Spirit; and thereupon a Covenant-Relation to Christ and to the Holy Ghost, with Regenerating, Sanctifying Habits ●o be given. And I see no reason to be singular herein. §. 3. That faith is by the Law of Grace, made a Condition of this Sanctification, and the Spirit promised us [if we will believe,] and so the Spirit given to us by Covenant in Baptism when we believe, is plain ill Scripture, and the commonest doctrine of all Divines. §. 4. Therefore if it be this Spirit of Sanctification that is meant by the New, the Tender, the Circumcised heart, it is not promised and given absolutely, but on condition of faith. §. 5. Let us peruse the several Texts where it is promised. Dent. 30. 1, 2, 3, 6. [When thou shalt call to mind among all the Nations— and shalt return unto the Lord thy God and obey his voice, according to all that I command thee this day— thou and thy children, with ●● thy heart and all thy soul; that then the Lord thy God will turn thy captivity— And the Lord thy God will circumcise thy heart and the heart of thy seed to Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul, that thou mayst live.] Here it is a Grace consequent to a condition, even to much obedience, which is described. And Deut. 10. 16. it is a command [Circumcise the foreskin of your hearts, and be no more stiffnecked.] Jer. 32. 36, 37, etc. [I will gather them out of all Countries whither I have driven them— and will bring them again into this place, and I will cause them to dwell safely; and they shall be my people, and I will be their God, and I will give them one heart, and one way, that they may fear me for ever.] So Ezek. 11. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20. And Ezek. 36. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29. In all which, there is a promissory Prophecy, how great a deliverance God would give the Nation of the Jews, both for body and soul; And their temporal return and liberty is promised and prophesied in the same manner as a new heart is. But here is not a syllable to prove that this is the first special Grace; any more than perseverance is, which in the same manner is promised in Jer. 32. 40. [I will put my fear in their hearts, and they shall not departed.] To say nothing how far in the first sense this was National to the Jews, nor how the performance did expound it, (For doubtless it is performed,) the Text itself premiseth [I will be their God, and they shall be my people] with other mercies. And no doubt but Faith and Repentance go before this Covenant-Relation to God; and therefore before the following gift of the Spirit, ver. 9 and Ch. 11. 19 And Ezek. 18. 31. the same is commanded, [Cast away from you all your transgressions whereby ye have transgressed, and make you a new heart, and a new spirit—.] §. 6. The promissory Prophecy of Jer. 31. 31, etc. is recited by the Penman of Heb. 8. 8, etc. to prove the cessation of the old Jewish Covenant, and that a better should succeed. And this much is easily proved out of both, 1. That God would certainly have a holy people among the returning Israelites, 2. And especially that he would have such in the Christian Church, as should be sanctified to him by his Spirit, and have a new and tender ●eart. And Predestination is well proved from the Text. But there is not a word to prove this to be the first Grace, nor that God's promise gave any man right to it, but upon condition of believing. For if God's Decree, Prophecy, or general Promise saying absolutely [I will do it] did prove it to be the first Grace, it would prove perserance such; which is false. The words prove no more but that God will do it. §. 7. And as this is no personal promise giving any man a right to the thing promised, which he may claim; but only foretelling what God will do, or give to some: so he hath other promises which are part of his Law of Grace, and do give men Right to these same Benefits. And so the Spirit of Sanctification and a new heart, is promised on Condition of believing; which therefore is the former special Grace. §. 8. If any therefore will prove that faith is given Absolutely, they must not do it by those Texts, which speak of Sanctification, which faith is a condition of. §. 9 But as to the question itself, Whether Faith be given absolutely or conditionally? I answer, 1. There is no absolute promise of faith made to any persons; but only promissory predictions of some indeterminate unnamed persons, that God will draw them and give them to Christ, and they shall believe and live. 2. All men have means and duty appointed them, for the seeking of that Grace which may convert them. 3. They are hereby bound to believe, that if they so do, they shall not lose their labour. For God setteth men on no unprofitable work. 4. Those that do this most faithfully, and have most preparing grace, are the likest to become believers, and the ordinary receivers of special grace. 5. Whether de nomine this encouragement shall be called a promise or equipollent, let them contend that list. 6. God can and doth suddenly convert some without such preparations; or else give them both sorts of Grace immediately as once. SECT. XIX. How God may be said to Cause the Acts of sin? I Have said of this also so much before, as that this Breviate here must serve. It is ill said, [Profite● mur incunctanter, prorsus impeditum iri quod universi simpliciter Bonum est, si impeditetur peccatum: quoniam h●● pacts impediretur patesactio Divin● misericordi● parcentis, & justitia vindicant is: Qu● quidem patesactio; non minus universi Bonum censenda est, quam q●●libet alia c●jus●ibet Del proprietatis, in ipso tanquam in speculo rel●cent is.] Twiss. Vindic. Grat. li. 1. p. 1. pag. 133. It is dangerous to talk so boldly of these mysteries. Here seem to me many errors and confusions. 1. It is false that God could not make known to the world that merciful nature which now pardoneth sin, and that Justice which now punisheth, if there had been no sin. His Laws▪ Promises and Threats do antecedently make them known. And God could cause blessed Spirits to know all his perfections before there was any sin. 2. God's Holiness and Goodness is called Mercy and Justice by extrinsic denomination, and connotation of sin and misery. And if his Holiness and Goodness had been known as preventing all sin and misery, men will think that he hath not proved that this had been Evil in the Universe, or less Good. 3. Posita Divina Volitione as the rule of Good, it followeth I confess, that it were evil not to have that will fulfilled. But I deny, that God willeth sin or its existence. Therefore it is not Good because not Volitum à Deo. It is sufficient, that it is not so far evil as to be Absolutè Nolitum; but only evil, 1. As prohibitum, 2. As hurtful to the sinner, and to others. Methinks they that maintain that sin is Privatio, should not say, that it is Positiuè Volitum à Deo. 4. All this dependeth on that curious question, Can not God have made the World better than it is? or at least as good with many alterations from what it is? They that hold the first, say that God freely made things no better than they are: But had there been no Devils, no Sin, no Toads, no disorder, the world had been better, that is, a perfecter demonstration of God's perfection. But they that are more modest, ar● content with the latter, and say, that God freely made things as they are, and not necessarily. But it had been necessarily if no other way had been as good. And that if God had pleased to show his Goodness by preventing all sin, it had been as Good, and no loss or disparagement to the Universe. 5. And he doth through all his Books beg the question, Whether a mere occasion be a conducible medium and so good? If he will stretch the word Medium so wide as to extend it to a mere evil sin● quo non, or presupposed, which hath not the least causality, efficient, material, formal or final, I will not strive for a word. But conducibile noteth some kind and degree of Causality, which sin hath not to the glorifying of God: It is the destroying of sin, that God is glorified by: Where the malum amovendum is not the bonum conducibile, but the ill state of the matter, without which God had not glorified himself by this Act, but by some other as well. §. 1. It must be well considered, that God made man's Nature before he made any positive Laws for him: And that the Law of Nature itself, is in order of Nature after Nature though not in Time: Man being first considerable as Man, before he be considerable as obliged to duty. And also that the Law, both Natural and Positive, is before man's obedience and sin. So that as man is first in order of Nature Man, and then Gods Governable Subject, and then (in order of Time) obedient or disobedient; so God is first his Creator, and then Nature Motor, and then his Governor by Legislation, and then his Gracious Helper, and lastly his Judge and Rewarder. §. 2. Therefore as Natural Being (substance and faculties) and Natural Motion are antecedent to Morality; so God's causation of both these is antecedent: and therefore to be Creator, Preserver and Motor is not to be the Cause of sin, or of Virtuous acts, as such. §. 3. God as Creator was not pleased to make all his creatures of one kind, nor of one degree of excellence: but in such variety as is wonderful to our observation. Besides the innumerable species of beings, and the innumerable parts of every compound being, the dissimilitude of indviduals of the same species is admirable: so that no two faces are perfectly like, no nor no two Stones in the Street, no two Trees, Birds, Beasts, etc. And therefore it is but consonant to the rest of his works, that MAN is neither perfectly like to Angels nor to Brutes: For as God made one sort of creatures naturally determined to things sensible, and another sort necessarily (though freely) determined to things spiritual; so it pleased him to make a middle sort, endued with Reason and freewill, undetermined as to their choice, and able freely to determine their own Volitions, without any predetermining premotion of their Creator or any other. That so they might be fit subjects to be governed in this Life, by Laws and other moral means. §. 4. God as Creator maketh substances, with their necessary Accidents, and as the Natural Orderer of them, placeth them in their natural order: and as Motor (or Actor) he causeth Action as such; But as Moral Rector he causeth only the Moral Order▪ of Actions, as far as belongeth to a Rector (the rest being presupposed in Nature,) and leaveth it to man to cause the rest. §. 5. Seeing God is not to be blamed for making such a creature as man (of a middle, defectible, undetermined Will, left to his free choice, with necessary helps,) it being part of the beauty of his works to be diversified; He is not then to be blamed for any of the sins of such a creature, because he supporteth his Being and his Active Nature, and is his first cause of Action. §. 6. God could prevent all future sin, if he absolutely willed so to do, either by destroying the World, or disabling the sinner, or by withholding his Moving Influx, or by such a change of his nature, as should make him indefectible. But he that made man in this Middle state, will so continue him, and not make a change in the frame of Nature, to fulfil our wills. §. 7. No Act as an Act, no Vital Act as Vital, no Intellection, no Volition as such, is Virtue or Sin; And therefore to cause it as such is not to cause either moral good or evil. §. 8. As God is Related to us as our Owner, Ruler and our chief good, (efficiently as our Benefactor, and finally as our End;) so to consent to these Relations, and to the Duties of our correlations, and to Practise them, is the sum of all Moral Good; even Dispositively and Actually, to be Resigned and devoted to God as our Owner, to obey and please him as our Ruler, and to be Thankful to Him, and totally Love Him, as our Benefactor and our ultimate End. All Moral Goodness lieth in this. §. 9 By which it appeareth, that Morality consisteth in the due or undue ORDER of our actions and dispositions, as they are a Moral Agent's related to God himself in these three Relations, and to his Actions therein, viz. his Disposals, his Laws, and his Attractive final Goodness with his Benefits. §. 10. In these, the Morality consisteth as simpliciter talis in all three inseparably, (as Gods Relations are inseparable and our correlations:) But the Relation of our Actions to any one of them, is Morality secundum quid. §. 11. And among them all, our Action, (submission, resignation, patience) to God merely as our Owner, is Moral but in the slenderest initial sense. And our Actions as related to him as our Rector, are Moral in the fuller formal sense, (And therefore by most accounted the only formal Morality, as being a relation to a Law): But yet our Actions as Related to God our Benefactor, Lover and End, are Moral in the highest, most perfective notion. §. 12. It is not only sub ration● obedientia as it is a thing commanded by a Law, that Love to God is Morally good, but also in that superior sense, formally as it is the Love of God. And therefore Love is called the Law of Laws, and the fulfilling of the Law, not only as commanded by a Law, but as being the End of the Law, and the state of perfection above it (as Christ is to the Law of Moses;) and also as being a Law eminenter (something greater) though not formaliter. §. 13. But as there is an Order in these Relations, so is there in the Morality of our Actions as towards them: So that the Last still includeth the rest foregoing. All Love is Obedience; and all Obedience is submission to our Owner: But all Obedience is not Love, nor all Submission or Resignation, formal obedience to a Rector: Though they must all concur, and not be divided, when they are formally distinguished. §. 14. I have thought it necessary (though I be guilty of some repetition) to open here the Doctrine of formal Morality (Virtue and Vice,) because we cannot understand how God is vindicated from being the Author of sin, till we know what sin is; which we cannot do till we know what Virtue is; which we cannot do, till we know what Morality is: And also because the Schoolmens most subtle elaborate inquiries into this point (especially the nature peccati) are generally too little subtle or accurate, as comparing it with this little, you may perceive. §. 15. From all this it is plain; 1. That God as the mere Author and Motor of Nature, doth not cause us to Obey or Love him. And therefore that these must be caused by another superadded operation. §. 16. Yet when we Obey and Love him, the Generical Nature of the Act is from God as the God of Nature, viz. as it is Intellection, Volition, Action: But that these Actions are so duly ordered as to be thus terminated on God and things commanded, is otherwise caused: For though the Generical nature of Action, Intellection and Volition as such, be seldom found but in some Moral species, and that be never found but in singular acts; yet can one causality procure the Generical nature, and another the Specifical, and another the singularity▪ in the same action. As the Sun is the Generical Cause, and the Virtus Seminalis the specifying, and the Individuatio seminis the Individ●●a●ing, of Plants, Animals, etc. §. 17. As God is the God of Nature, so he hath settled Nature in such a constant course of motion, as that we have small reason to expect that he should there make any ordinary mutations▪ And therefore (as the Sun aforesaid) he doth by his Generical Influx concur▪ with all Specifying and Individuating Causes, according to their several natures or receptivities. §. 18. They therefore that suppose that God as the Cause of all Action, must (of natural necessity ad esse) by physical efficient premotion predetermine every Act natural and free, to its object compared with other possible objects, and that in all its modes and circumstances, do confound Nature and Morality▪ and leave nothing for God to do in causing Holiness, but what he must needs do to cause all action that is caused, (allowing the difference of the second effects, ● yea, but what he doth in causing every sin: (For his Pracept is not with them the Causing predetermination.) §. 19 Jesus Christ▪ and his Gospel with all the fore described frame of moral means, and the Spirit▪ to cooperate, are the proper second causes▪ by which God as RECTOR will on his part ordinarily cause Moral Good; and hinder Moral Evil; and by which as our Lover and End he will draw man's soul to himself in Love. §. 20. God as Rector (though he vary his Laws in some things to several ages and places, and promulgate the same Gospel, with inequality, on several accounts, yet) according to the respective Laws that they are under, dealeth with all men in a certain equality, which is called Justice: that is, His Laws antecedently to man's acts make not difference, and as Judge he maketh none, but what man's different actions require according to the said Laws and Justice. But yet as Owner and as Benefactor he is free (not against, but) above his Laws, to make many inequalities, which are no injustice; they being not acts of formal Government: and so he may do with his own as he list. And thus though God give all their due according to his Law of Grace, yet he giveth to his Elect, such proportions of Grace, as he gave them no antecedent Right to by his Law: (or at least to many of them, passing by the controversy now, whether he do so to them all.) §. 21. God could cure and sanctify all men, if it were his Absolute will; but he doth not, and will not; being no way obliged: And he will be no loser nor sufferer by the creatures sin. §. 22. God's absolute will is as fully accomplished by man's free acts, as if they were all necessitated and Natural: And man's actions are as free, as if God had made no Absolute Decree of their futurity (as in Good he hath done, if we may so ascribe futurity to his Decrees.) §. 23. It seemeth that all sin beginneth in the wills omission of what it was able to have done. Even when Adam's appetite was to the forbidden fruit, and some think that this was the first part of the sin, it seemeth that it was rather in the Wills not restraining that appetite when it could have done it: And then positive sins do follow thereupon. §. 24. There is more Brutishness in sin, and consequently more privative and less positive faultiness of the Reason and Will, than many do consider (which Paul partly meaneth, Rom. 7.) For it is certain, 1. That a passion, e. g. anger or fear, may be forced on a man suddenly as ●n a Brute, without Reason. (As if you come behind one and affright him, or strike him suddenly: no Reason raised that passion, and consequently no Rational Will.) 2. It is certain that this passion without Reason can cause despotically a corporal motion▪ as the fearful will start, and run, and the angry strike without any reason or rational will, but as a Beast doth. 3. It is certain that it is the office of the Will to Rule this passion, and these motions. 4. And that it must have due information from the understanding, that so to do is good, and best. 5. If this information of the understanding did never miss of determining the Will, than man would never sin, but when the understanding failed of its necessary office, before the will: which would resolve all sin into the will of God as much as if he directly moved the will to it by necessitating, unresistible predetermination. For the Intellect as such hath no Liberty, but is necessitated by objects, further than it is under the Empire of the Will. And the Objects and Intellect are made by God. 6. Therefore it followeth that there is a certain measure of Intellectual true apprehension, according to which the will can excite and determine itself (without ●●y thing which it hath not) and yet can forbear. And that this not-willing what and when it should, is the beginning of all sin. §. 25. God is no Efficient or Desicient cause of this first Omission of the will: For efficient it hath none: And deficient God is not, who gave man power to have done it. But man is the deficient Cause. §. 26. Mans not believing, not knowing, not loving, not obeying, not desiring, trusting, fearing, etc. being the far greatest part of the sins of his life * Which made the worthy Bishop Usher die with these words, as his last, [But Lord, in special forgive my ●●● of omission.] , we see by this are not at all of God. §. 27. Though multitudes of positive Acts of sin do follow such omissions, (and go before some of them;) yet they being not sinful as Acts, but as Disordered (against the Rule and End, and upon undue objects, and especially comparatively▪ preferring the wrong object before the right) it seemeth that in their first instances they are all Omissive, and Positive in the second only: which maketh the Schoolmen so commonly say that sin is a Privation. §. 28. Yet the Moral formal Relation of sin, is not only Privative, but a Positive Disobedience or Disconformity: And so as Quid Morale formaliter— sin hath as much Relative being as Duty hath, viz. 1. As contra Legem significantem, 2. Contra Voluntatem Dei significatam; 3. Et contra J●● Divini Dominii Imperii & Amoris. §. 29. If any be unsatisfied in this, it is certain that in the Velle hoc prohibitum potius quam hoc imperat●m, there is no more physical entity, than in the Velle imperatum, no nor than there is in the Velle indefinitely considered as on any object. Or if any deny that, it is certain that there is no such addition of Entity (it being but ordo modi) in any such sinful Act from which as such the formal obliquity or sin resulteth, but what man can do, and doth, without Gods causing the Act as so ordered and terminated. So that God is no way the cause of formal sin. §. 30. † Bradwardi● dealeth more plainly, and maketh God's effectual Volition to be the total immediate cause that man sinneth, though it be no sin in God to do so▪ and saith that God willeth it for good uses, (as the sinner doth, or if he do not, it is because God maketh him unavoidably do otherwise.) They that say, He causeth all that man causeth, and that as the first necessitating or insuperable cause; but yet is not the cause of the form of sin, contradict themselves; seeing that form is but a Relation, which resulteth ipso facto from its fundamentam and terminus, and nè per divinam potentiam cannot but do so; And hath no other cause but what causeth them. §. 31. And they that say, that yet God is not the Author of sin, because he is under no Law, do but sport with dreadful things. And they mean that God is the chief Cause of all men's sins in the world, but not of any sin of his own; which is none of the question. §. 32. God doth neither Cause the sin, nor the futurity or existence of it, as some vainly distinguishing, maintain: (especially Dr. Twisse and Rutherford.) For (as Estius and others truly say) to cause the sin, is nothing but to cause the existence of it. And sin as sin, Dr. Twisse often saith, is not willed by the sinner himself. §. 33. So far as God Causeth not sin, he willeth it not: and they that say that he Loveth and Willeth the existence of it as a means to his glory, abuse God's Moliness, and are confuted before, Par. 1. §. 34. How God overruleth sinners, and the effects of sin, and procureth his own ends, not by the Means or Causality, but Occasion of it, I have so largely there opened, that I must refer the Reader thither. SECT. XX. How far God, and how far Man himself, is the Cause of Hell and other punishments. THough somewhat be said of this, in the Conclusion of the second Jo. Major in 4. sent. d. 50. fol. 289. q. 1. inquit concls. 3. [Sive actus damnatorum dicantur mali, culp● vel peccata, non patientur aliquam poenam inflictam ratione illorum actuum: Quia non sunt in statu merendi & demerendi] sed addit [Signanter de poena inflicta loquor quae à culpa distinguitur, & ejus est reordinativa per cruciatum. De poena enim acta non est possibile dare culpam quin suam poenam habeat annexam, eo modo quo idem potest habere se.] Ipsa scilicet peccandi continuatio, est poenae & miseriae continuatio. Nec mihi probabile videtur, quod Demerendi ratio cessat apud inferos: Praemium quidem mereri non possunt; At quare non Poenam commereri sunt putandi? Nun adhuc sunt subditi (etiam ipsi daemons) & sub quadam Lege? ide●que peccandi adhuc capaces? & nun omne peccatum suâ naturâ meretur poenam? Ipsius scilicet Joh. Majoris ibid. Conclus. 1. Est, [Damnati habent multos malos actus in inferno libere.] An op●abilius sit damnàtum esse, an non esse, vide quae ibidem sequuntur, ubi concludit [Itaque tenco si daretur viro optio, vel non esse, vel esse in perpetua flamma, quod licitè posset vel alterutrum, eligendum est non esse: Nam minus malum habet rationem boni.] See Aureolus in 2. d. 31. a. 2. pag. 301. showing ten ways how one sin causeth another, and so multiplieth and continueth itself in the wicked. Part, I think meet to say more here, because I find that the not understanding it doth tempt many to unbelief, and others to hard repining disaffected atheistical thoughts of God. §. 1. Again here consider that God made man such as he is in Nature, before either Laws or sins or punishments had any being; so that if you can but forgive God for making you men, (that is, Rational Free-Agents) you can have no fair pretence of quarrel with him: As will appear by these considerations following. §. 2. Man's Body and sensitive soul are of such a nature, as that things inconvenient will be his pain: He that will take poison shall be gripped and tormented by it, and he that will eat unwholesome meat, or will surfeit shall be sick, and he that will cherish diseases by sloth, or excesses, or abuses of nature, will have the pain of them; And he that will wound himself, or break his bones, will be his own afflicter; And he that cuts his throat or hangeth himself, must die. And all this without any doing of God, besides the making him a man, and continuing such a nature (under his Government) in and with the world. §. 3. Not only positive hurting, but omissions will bring men's bodies unto pain and death; As not eating, not exercising, not keeping warm, etc. And consequently such a life of prodigality or sloth as tendeth to such wants. §. 4. The inward senses, Imagination and Passions are so constituted as that their inconveniences will be a pain and torment, as well as the inconveniences of the outward senses. 1. Cares and Melancholy thoughts are distracting. 2. Desires breed such care, and are themselves like a thirst or hunger to the soul. 3. Fears are tormenting. 4. Sorrows if deep and long are as a living death. 5. Anger is a vexatious fever of the mind: And revengeful malice and envy do prolong it. 6. Despair anticipateth eternity of misery, etc. 7. And Love itself (how pleasing soever at first) is the strength of them all. §. 5. The superior faculties, as they are more noble, are capable of greater misery; and their corruption and disorder is the worst. To have an ignorant erring mind, that taketh evil for good, and good for evil; To have a carnal, malignant, wicked, obstinate, froward Will and sinful Affections, and by these to have men's actions misguided, and so the sensitive soul itself brought into the foresaid misery, through bad government, is a misery to man in the Nature, and immediate effects of the thing. §. 6. Man liveth among multitudes of fellow Creatures in the world, which will all be tormentors of him if he will make them such. As a post will hurt him if he knock his head to it. The fire will burn him if he touch his flesh with it. The water will drown him if he will leap into it overhead. The Sun will scorch him, the frost will pain him, if he expose himself to them. A Lion or Mastiff will tear him if he avoid them not. His neighbours will hurt him, (likely) if he hurt them, and cross their interest: Men in power will hurt him if he offend them: And all things will be to him as he behaveth himself to them. §. 7. All this being Natural, let us now consider what sin doth to the sinner here, and you will find that almost all his calamity consisteth in his very sin itself, and the natural effects of it: But yet it is sin as man's, and it is punishment as from God, when yet God is no Cause of the sin. §. 8. This is plain if you consider that God's Act by which he maketh sin a Punishment, was Before the sin, though the Relation of a Punishment come after the relation of sin. Here are two Agents, 1. God making Nature and a Law therein; 2. Man disordering his actions by transgressing. 3. Hence Immediately followeth Gild or the form of sin. 4. And with it, even in the change, or after it, the natural pain, of loss or hurt; 5. And this is Related to man as a punishment for the sin, in the last place. For instance, God made man, and God made meat, wine, and poison: God telleth Man in Nature, [I have made thee such a Creature, as that excess of Meat will make thee sick, excess of Wine will make thee mad, and Poison will torment and kill thee: I have given thee self-love, and command thee that thou avoid all these; and I will not deny thee necessary help; But if thou wilt not, it will be thy pain, which I will that thou suffer for and by thy sin.] I need not further apply it here; the application is obvious. §. 9 All this I speak only of natural punishments which by the Law of nature follow sin: what is supernatural is after to be considered. §. 10. And 1. It is evident that the Reatus culpae is either the sin itself or its inseparable effect. He that hath once sinned is Related to God as a sinner. And an infamous Relation, such as of a Rebel, a Rogue, a Murderer, etc. is no small evil, in all sound men's esteem. §. 11. 2. Sin is the Deformity, disorder, and disease of the soul; and its Habits are a kind of Vicious Nature: It is the Nature of Devils to be exceeding malignant, rebellious and at enmity with God and spiritual Goodness: To have a Nature or Disposition, which is averse to that which should be its own end, delight and happiness. And a wise man would rather be annihilated, than turned into a Toad, a Snake or Adder, though their nature be not offensive to themselves. How much more would he rather be annihilated than become a Devil? Wicked men are liker to Devils than they are ware of: They Love not God and Holiness: nay they have a malignant enmity to him: which maketh them so averse to all that is Holy in their lives, and to be such persecutors and haters of good men. So that the Scripture calleth their wisdom Devilish, yea and themselves flat Devils in plain words, and the Children of the Devil, Jam. 3. 15. Joh. 8. 44. Joh. 6. 70. One of you is a Devil. And 13. 2. Act. 13. 10. Thou Child of the Devil and enemy of all righteousness— 1 Joh. 3. 8, 10. He that commits sin is of the Devil— Therefore they are adjudged to suffer with the Devil and his Angels, as the Saints shall be equal with the Angels of God. For the truth is, a Saint and an Angel, and a wicked man and a Devil, do differ less than is commonly thought on. Now what sober man would not rather be Nothing, than be a Devil? To have a venomous, malignant, malicious, restless, rebellious nature, at enmity to Good and in love with evil? And who is it that maketh men to be such? Not God but themselves. 1. Is it not a great calamity to be mad? Wicked men are far worse: and they made themselves such. 2. Were it not a great misery to have a nature that had no Love to, or delight in, health, cleanliness, dwelling, food, friends, etc. but hated all of them, and set against them? How much more to have such an enmity to God and holiness and our own salvation? 3. Were it not a misery to have a nature distrustful of all our truest I egg. Bradwardine l. 1. c. 1. cor. 31. contra effraenes dlcentes omnia bonis & malis aequaliter ev●nire; malum aliquod impunitum, vel bonum aliquod irremuneratum manere— fingentes quoque divinae pietati & misericordiae infinitae nusquam congruere punire quodcunque delictum, sed totum semper dimittere misericorditer impunitum. Nun (inquit) omnis peccans to ipso fit malus & culpabilis, vel pejor, etc. amittitque pristinam libertatem & innocentiam & fit D●o dissimilior & remotior ab ●o? & nun hoc est poena & poena quam magna? & unde hoc nisi à prima justitia, à primo retributore omnium qui est De●s? See also his Corol. 38, 39 Lege Jansen. August. de stat. pur. nat. l. 3. c. 2. p. 358. Quod peccatum non potest non puniri à Deo: etc. 3. Quaenam sint illae poenae quae tam arctè cum peccato coherent. Et c. 4. Quod peccator in peccato manens non potest beatus fieri. Ubi itiam Augustini sensum de hisce videre est. friends: afraid of poison in all that we eat and drink, and still thinking that our own parents seek our death? How much more to have a distrustfulness of God? 4. Were it not a misery to be deceived with a thousand errors, and to take evil for good, and good for evil: and to spend one's days in bewildring perplexities or fal●e conceits? How much more to be mistaken about God, and things of greatest excellency and consequence? 5. Were it not a misery to have a Will that is perversely set against the wills of all our Governors and dearest friends? That must needs have and do whatsoever is forbidden us by the greatest, wisest and best of men? How much more, to have a Will that is thus set against the will of God? 6. It is a misery to have a violent Appetite after that which cannot be had, or cannot satisfy. To have vehement hunger and thirst without meat or drink, etc. Wicked men have such a diseased appetite after things that God told them would neither be satisfactory nor continuing. All this and more is in sin itself, in the Habits or Nature, which God never made. §. 12. The exercise of this diseased vitiated Inclination, is an actual torment: As it is more Joyful to use Grace, than merely to Have it; so is it as to sin more calamitous. And 1. men's wilful blindness and neglect of God, depriveth them of all the excellency and delights of holy knowledge. 2. Their Disaffection and malignity depriveth them of all that holy Joy, and unvaluable sweetness, which cometh in by the exercise of the Love of God; And of all the pleasures of a holy life. As a sick stomach doth loath a feast, and a malicious man hath not the pleasures of friendship: so how can that soul delight in God that Loveth him not? 3. Unbelief and distrust deprive the soul of all that quietness and content, which followeth faith and confidence in God. 4. A Rebellious will doth lose all that Rest which the obedient find in pleasing God, and in his blessed will. 5. Luxury and carnality and all sin deprive the soul of the pleasures of temperance, chastity, innocency, and a good and quiet conscience. 6. Wickedness and sloth deprive the soul of the pleasure of doing good to others, by works of charity, which is very great. Abundance such privations are in sin. §. 13. And sin itself brings the contrary torments. 1. Sinful malignity against God and Good men maketh the wicked eat their flesh as it were with envy, and vex themselves with persecution and revenge. 2. Sinful anger is a sinner's rage and pain: And though he have pleasure in revenge, it is a painful pleasure, like a troublesome itch. 3. Self-willedness maketh a man continual vexation and disappointment, while he must needs have that which he cannot have, or which will torment him when he hath it. 4. Carnal Love is the root of misery, while it Tantalizeth the soul, or longeth for its own vexation. 5. Sinful fear is a tormenting distraction. 6. Sinful grief is a continual sickness and self-vexation. 7. Sinful Desires engage men in self-afflicting labours. 8. Sinful cares are as thorns in a man's heart. 9 Sinful Impatience and discontent is torment itself. 10. Sinful, confused, unruly thoughts, are the annoyance and the shame of the soul. And all these are men's own sins, not Caused by God, but by themselves. §. 14. Next Sin itself, there is the natural consequent of it, which is caused by the sinner himself. As 1. That God doth not complacentially Love him: which is no change in God, whose Nature is to Love Good and Hate Evil; but in the sinner himself, who hath made himself uncapable. 2. And that God's Hatred is terminated on the sinner, is his own doing▪ Even as he that would open his naked breast to the scorching Sun, or cold Frost, is hurt by himself. When God hateth a sinner and delighteth in a Saint, there is no Diversity in Him, but in Them. 3. The loss of Right to Heaven and all Gods special benefits, is their own work, and not by any change in God. God made a Deed of Gift of Heaven to the faithful: And if they be unfaithful, it is their own doing to cast away or refuse that right. 4. Abundance of temporal mercies men's sins cast away. For §. 15. Sin doth here torment even men's bodies. The slothful and the prodigal bring want upon themselves: The glutton, drunkard, fornicator, and the idle, breed painful diseases in their own flesh: And most men dy● by some sinfully contracted maladies. §. 16. Besides the Natural consequents, and the natural effects on the Body, there are natural calamitous effects of sin on the soul; As 1. The consciousness of a man's sin, called An evil Conscience. 2. The shame that ariseth from the guilt. 3. The Conscience and sense of God's displeasure (a tormenting thing.) 4. Sadness for our folly in hurting ourselves. 5. And fear of all the after miseries. All hitherto mentioned, men do themselves against themselves. §. 17. Yea more, men themselves make other men their tormentors. The angry stir up others to hurt them. The offenders stir up Magistrates to punish them. The fornicator chooseth a filthy disease under the name of a pleasure, and kindleth a putrid fevor in his own soul. The covetous and unjust make all men their enemies; and so do many of the proud, tyrannical and oppressors. The froward will not give themselves rest in their own families; but make Wives, Husbands, Children, Servants, and every thing to be their own vexation. And O what work do bloody Tyrants by Wars and persecution make to themselves and others in the world? and what Calamities doth miserable mankind bring, by folly and wickedness, on themselves? §. 18. In a word, shall we not believe that there is a Hell, and know much of the nature of it; when we see a Hell already begun on earth? and the whole world walloweth in folly, filth, impiety, and woe? As Heaven is known here by its first-fruits of the spirit, so Hell may be (I think) more known by its beginning, as more notorious. Men are almost Devils already: conceive them but all turned fully into Devils by themselves (and not by God) and you will know much of Hell. §. 19 And for the Life to come, consider, that God made man's soul Immortal before man made it sinful: And who can expect that God should alter or destroy his work? Live we must, because we have Immortal souls. And must not men look to Live as they are? Such then as the wicked make themselves, no wonder if they continue. §. 20. And then exceeding wickedness will make them Devils; and all that they here initially brought on themselves, will be there in eminency. Their Minds will be blind as to Good and Evil, though not as to mere notional Truth. Their wills set against Gods will. Their hatred of God and goodness increased: Their Intellects, memories and thoughts, will be the treasury of pain; Their wills and affections the seat of misery And their invigorated power, will make all lively. §. 21. And a mind thus blinded cannot see God as Good, but only as hurtful by Justice. A Will that hath no Love to God and holiness, can take no delight in them. Heaven must be to them as a feast to a sick stomach: They turn their own Hearts from God and Heaven, and deprive themselves of all its joys. They hate the Heavenly society; and so ●an be none of their companions in delight. They deprive themselves of Innocency, of Divine Love, of the Grace of the Holy Ghost, of part in Christ, of peace of Conscience, by wilful diversion, opposition and incapacity, as he that shuts his Windows against the Sun-light. It is themselves that turn themselves thus out of Heaven. §. 22. And it will be their own Lusts that will tantalise or torment them. For God did let them know that this world and its pleasure must soon forsake them: They cannot expect that God should give them wealth, meat, drink, and carnal pleasures, after this life: If they will needs contract a fleshly thirst, God is not bound to follow them with satisfaction. §. 23. Even their malignity (like Satan's) will be their torment, filling them with envy at the felicity of the Saints, or hatred of their holiness. And when we are in Heaven, Devils and devilish men will be in subjection to the Saints, so low and base as will increase their rage. §. 24. It is likely that their very nature or substance will be much more base than that of the Glorified, as their place and condition will be: For God is not bound to make them Naturally Glorious. Devils dwell in the air and earth: And inhabitants use to be connatural to their Regions and Elements. However, it is a groundless fancy of too many that think that the sensitive faculties shall cease. The Organs and manner or sorts of sensation may be altered: But the soul will be still sensitive as well as rational (notwithstanding their vain objection about bruits.) And therefore the condition they put themselves into, will as necessarily give them sensible torment, as poison will in the stomach, and as despairing men now torment and make away themselves. §. 25. At lest when they have bodies, they will have sense. §. 26. Devils and wicked men with them, will objectively torment them. §. 27. I deny not but besides all these there may be punishments more efficiently from God. But all this alone, which sinners not only Deserve but Inflict upon themselves, will make a Hell of unspeakable misery. The Conclusion, Summing up the several ways of the Contenders. I Shall conclude with a further Explication, 1. What the Judgement▪ of the Protestants was in the Synod of Dort about the nature of Grace (besides what I have cited of theirs before.) 2. I shall give you some Animadversions on the Epilogue of Alvarez, 3. And of the Jesuits way of Scientia Media: 4. And of Aureolus and Durandus' way: 5. And of the Scotists and Nominals Causa Partialis: 6. I shall fullyer give you the sum and Consectaries of the Dominican Predetermination, and the reasons which alienate me from their way. 7. I shall Epitomise Jansenius, with some Animadversions on his way: 8. And sum up in few words what sober minds may rest in. §. 1. AND that you may see how little difference there is even in this point of Effectual Grace, where all the difference seemeth to be founded, 1. See what the British Divines say in the Synod of Dort; de art. 3. & 4. suffrag. p. 124. Th. 1. There are certain outward works, ordinarily required of men, before they are brought to the state of Regeneration Rom. 10. 14. Mat. 6. ●●. Act. 13. 46. Psa. 58. 5. or Conversion, which use to be sometime freely done by them, and sometime freely omitted: as to go to Church, to hear the Preaching of the Word, and such like. Th. 2. There are certain inward effects, which are excited in the hearts of those that are not yet justified, previous to Conversion and Regeneration, Act. 2. 37. by the virtue of the word and spirit: such as are, the knowledge of God's will, the sense of sin, the fear of punishment, the thoughts of deliverance, some hope of pardon. To the state of Justification— God's grace useth not to bring men by sudden Enthusiasm, but prepared and fitted (or disposed) by many previous actings by the Ministry of the word. As in natural Generation there are many previous dispositions 1 Cor. 4. 15. before the reception of the form; so in the spiritual we come to the spiritual birth by many foregoing actings of Grace. If God would immediately Regenerate and Justify a wicked man, not prepared by any knowledge, any sorrow, any desire, any hope of pardon, there were no need of the Ministry of man and the Word Preached to do it— Th. 3. Those that God thus affecteth by his spirit by means of the Word, them he truly and seriously calleth and inviteth to faith and conversion. We must judge of the helps of Grace by the nature of the offered benefit and by God's plain word, and not by the abuse and event. Se●ing the Gospel of its own nature calleth men to Repentance and Salvation, seeing the excitements of grace tend to it, we must not think that 2 Cor. 5. 20. 2 Cor. 6. ●● Gal. 1. 6. Rev. 3. 2. God here doth any thing dissemblingly— Nor can it be imagined that that calling by the word and spirit can make men unexcusable, which is given only to that end to make them unexcusable— Th. 4. Those whom he thus affecteth, God forsaketh not, nor ceaseth to promote them in the true way to conversion, before he is forsaken by them, by voluntary neglect, or the repulse of this initial grace. The talon of grace once given men of God, is not taken away from any man, till he bury it by his own fault. Therefore we are oft warned in Mat. 2●. 2●. Scripture, not to resist or quench the spirit, nor to receive the grace Heb. 3. 7. Prov. 1. 24. 2 Chron. 24. 20. of God in vain, nor to fall from God. Yea it is plainly given as the reason of Gods forsaking men that they first forsake him— Th. 5. Many lose these beginnings— Mat. 13. 19 Heb. 6. 4. 2 Pet. 2. 21. Th. 6. The Elect do not so behave themselves under these preparatory workings, but that for their negligence and resistance, they might justly be forsaken of God: But such is God's special mercy to them, that though Joh. 6. 37. ●er. 14. 7. & 32. 39 Phil. 1. 6. for a time they may repel or suffocate this exciting and illuminating grace, yet God doth urge them again and again, and ceaseth not to promove them, till he fully subjugate them to his grace, and place them in the state of regenerate sons. Th. 7. All men resist God's grace, and God might justly forsake all, Rom. 9 18. & 11. 35. Act. 28. 27. — but doth not—] By all this it is evident that they took not man to be forsaken of God in the state of mere original sin, or the corrupt mass, but as a wilful resister and refuser of offered Grace, and oft after the receiving of much preparing grace; and that God forsaketh none till they forsake his grace. 2. To the same sense our English Divines commonly tell us how, ordinarily God prepareth, men for conversion before he convert them; and how far persons unconverted may go in common grace: He that readeth Mr. Hooker of New England, Mr. John Rogers his doctrine of faith, Mr. Boltons' instructions for comfort— Mr. Meads Almost a Christian, and abundance such, will see that they were of the same mind. 3. Hence it is plain, that those persons that resisted this further work of grace, and forsook God first, had true Power to have done otherwise; and could have gone further than they did, without any other grace than they had: (Though quoad necessitatem sequentem vel consequentiae, it might be inferred even from God's prescience, that it could not be.) 4. They here describe Gods effectual grace by moral titles, of Gods urging them till they yield; though (as after they open it) God renewing active influx, maketh new creatures, and is not a mere moral indetermining suasion leaving the will indifferent. 5. The truth is (as is aforesaid) no mortal man can tell of any difference on God's part between his common and special agency on souls, but only on the part of the work done; Nay it is against the doctrine of all ●orts of Divines both Papists and Protestants as to the generality, that there is any difference at all. For they all say that all God's actions ad extra are nothing but his essence (viz. his essential knowledge, will and power) which is undividedly one, as terminated, effecting, related and denominated variously: E. g. by one Volition he willeth divers products, but not by divers volitions See the Conclusion of the first Chapter. ex parte sui, either considered specifically or numerically; but the specification and individuation is only in the effects, and in Gods will as relatively denominated. And if this be all men's doctrine, what an unhappy case is the Church fallen into, that the very same men that say this, should yet intolerably quarrel, Whether this one Divine attingency or operation shall be called Creation, infusion, urgency, excitation, persuasion, physical, hyperphysical, moral, or what else, when all are agreed that all are one and the same ex parte Dei. And as to the effects, I do myself think that a certain Impulse received on the soul, is the first effect, and the Act of man (as faith) is but a second, and that of both Causes: But we cannot tell well what that Impulse is; And therefore must dispute in the dark about the differences of it. And this is nothing to them that own nothing but God's essence as the cause of our act, as the first effect: If their opinion hold true that as in Creation there was no mediate Impulse between the Creator and the Creature (for there was no recipient,) so here there is no effect on the soul before the Act and habit of faith itself, than what is that Grace whose Ratio efficaciae we can make a Controversy of? Ad hominem at least I may say that it is common acts and habits, overtopped by fleshly interest and concupiscence, which are wrought by common grace; and that it is special acts and habits overcoming the flesh and world, which are wrought by special grace. So that those firemen that are resolved that yet differ they will, and implacably differ, and their adversaries shall be enemies of God's Grace whether they will or not, are yet defective in that acuteness and pregnancy of wit which is necessary to pretend a real disagreement, and are forced to say that they disagree when they have not wit enough to seem to prove it to any but those that take their choleric zeal and reproach for proof: For in this there is no difference among us. 6. Obj. At least we can prove that we differ in this, about the effects, that one side make Gods gracious habits given to believers to be, such as may be lost and die, and the other do not. Answ. That is no difference: You still want wit to make differences though you want not will. For both sides are agreed that perseverance ariseth not from the mere nature of the Habit of grace, but from God's superadded sustentation. For Adam and the fallen Angels had (as is commonly held) such kind of habitual grace as we (though objectively differing.) 7. Seeing there is no difference, on God's part (as they all conclude,) Resistible grace and irresistible, sufficient and effectual, can have no difference, but in the very effect or event, and the connotation of man's Power or impotency to the contrary. I know (as I have said) that not only the Dominicans and Calvinists, but Suarez and other Jesuits, say that Effectual Grace is such ex parte principii as is forcibler for faith as the effect. But they contradict themselves, who confidently say, that besides that effect, it is nothing but God's essence which hath no degrees or real differences. And man's power of Resistance and frustration is none as to Gods will and essence, but only as to the effect; When he could have done otherwise. 8. The same Vanity they declare in the question, Whether the same degree of Divine Grace, help, or operation, would Convert one man as doth another, or would Convert as doth not Convert. When they are agreed that the effect is not the same; and that the cause hath no degrees of difference. 9 And though it's past man's understanding to comprehend how all the various effects in the world should be produced without the least diversity in the Cause (Will or Action) ex parte agentis, and that Velle salvare Petrum, & velle damnare Judam, should be perfectly the same Volition ex parte Volentis; yet it is the liker to be true because man cannot comprehend it; as long as he hath no evidence to prove that it is not true. For God is incomprehensible. 10. Seeing then that we must consent, 1. That God Decreed to do all that he doth, and properly and absolutely no more; 2. And that Christ's death is the cause of all that it effecteth, and properly of no more (Of which the conditional gift of pardon and life is part,) And so that all the Controversy 1. Of Decree, 2. Of Redemption, is resolved into that of the effects; 3. And seeing all the effects are such whose difference we little differ about, if at all; and ex parte Dei agentis they agree that there is no difference: where then is the Difference among all the contenders? §. II. Alvarez his Epitome in Twenty Propositions, considered. BUt that all this may more plainly appear, I will recite the Twenty Conclusions, which Alvarez in his Epilogus giveth us as the sum of all his Book (one hundred twenty one Disputations:) And I shall tell you how far they are all to be consented to. * Thus Bradwardine concludeth his Book with thirty six errors, and as many verities, which he would have the Church, especially that of Rome, determine. But leaving out the most unsavoury parts or expressions of his own judgement, Whether God be the chief necessitating Cause of all sin, is none of them. I. freewill in lapsed nature cannot without the help of grace do a moral work, which by co-operation of the supernatural End shall be truly good, and a work of Virtue; so as that by the doer it be referred to God beloved simply above all, as to the ultimate natural End. Answ. It is granted, (and more) that though all natural men have one sort of Grace given them, yet, I think, this cannot be done without special saving grace. II. Man by the sole strength of nature cannot assent to all supernatural mysteries propounded and explained to him, as revealed of God, or because revealed of God so as the formal reason of his belief is Divine revelation. Answ. It's true: He must have commoner grace to believe them dogmatically and uneffectually; and special saving grace to believe them practically and savingly. III. Not only faith itself, but also the first beginning of faith proceedeth from the help of grace, and not from the strength of Nature only. Answ. Very true. iv The freewill of man in lapsed Nature cannot without the help of Grace Love God above all simply, even as he is the author of Nature. Answ. It's true. V Man in lapsed Nature without the help of Grace, cannot fulfil all the precepts even of the Law of Nature, nor overcome any great difficulty and temptation, even for any little time, which it is necessary to overcome, for the keeping of that Law. Answ. True: Therefore they have some Grace that do it. VI There is no Law, nor ever was made by God, of his giving the actual helps of preventing grace, to them that do all that is in them, by the sole faculty of nature: nor hath Christ merited or would have any such Law. Answ. True: For he giveth some common grace to all men antecedently, without any condition on their part: And though he give to those that use their common grace to the utmost (or near it) sufficient encouragement to go on and hope that such endeavour shall not be in vain as to the obtaining of peculiar grace, yet de nomine vel definitione, Whether this encouragement shall be called a Law, or a Promise, or neither, we contend not. VII. God by his helping grace floweth into freewill by premoving it that it may cooperate, and also truly-efficiently together with the same freewill causeth its pious operation. Answ. It's true: But all adjuvant grace produceth not the second effect, which floweth from both Causes, (of which before and after.) VIII. When God by his exciting Grace, striketh and toucheth the hearts of men, he doth not expect that the will by its innate liberty, begin its motion, by Consenting: But God by adjuvant grace effecteth, that it freely and infallibly Consent. Answ. It's true of all that do consent: But God hath a degree of exciting and adjuvant grace, which are Necessary and give the posse Velle, which cause not the act, through man's defect: And though God expect not that effect, as one that is deceived, yet he commandeth it, and requireth it of us. But exciting and adjuvant Grace are all one on God's part: And if you will difference the same things as connoting divers effects, you must denominate it more fitly from the effects, by words that notify the difference. IX. Adjuvant Grace and freewill are not Partial Causes of supernatural Consent, as two drawing a Boat, so as neither is premoved by the other, or maketh it cooperate with it. Answ. True: For God premoveth the will of man, though through man's fault it be not ever effectual. And though Gods will and man's be two Causes of the same effect, the term Partial is scarce fit, while man hath his whole power and activity from God. X. Scientia media is not to be ascribed to God,— But all prescience of the future co▪ operation of the will, even from the foresaid Hypothesis, presupposeth in signo rationis the free decree of God's will, by which absolutely (or granting that Hypothests) he will in us and with us effect that operation if Good, and permit it if Evil. Answ. Here come in your presumptions of things unknown or false. 1. That God knoweth future contingents, and conditionals is certain: But I think this scientia media unfitly named, and an unnecessary distribution, and insufficient to the Jesuits ends. 2. And your fiction of signa rationis, and the necessary antecedence of a decree of Gods, to his knowledge of every Volition of man, is a more ungrounded and perilous figment, which you have not proved. It seemeth a denial of God's Omniscience or perfection, that he cannot know an act future as future, but only as decreed to be so. 3. You deceitfully talk of permitting evil while you plead for the irresistible predetermining premotion of the will by God to every evil act with all its circumstances: Is that but Permitting? 4. To permit is Nothing: no act of God; but a non-agency: not to hinder. And how prove you, that God must of necessity have a Positive Decree, for every Nothing or non-agency? Is not the not-willing or not-decreeing to hinder a lie, e. g. (supposing natural concourse,) or to make more worlds, enough to the production of that lie by an ill inclined nature? or to the not-being of more Worlds? We are in the dark, and God is infinitely above us, and these tremendous mysteries are not to be so presumptuously handled by unproved assertions. XI. There is on our part no Cause, Reason or Condition assignable, for which Gods supernatural providence, in comparison of this or that hath the formal reason of predestination, or retaineth the common reason of providence: but predestination is to be reduced into the sole freewill of God. Answ. Most of this is about mere words. The word Predestination connoteth various effects and objects: and so is called various Acts. There is no efficient Cause in the Creature of any act of God: But there are objects without which Gods Acts have not their special denominations; and these objects are the termini, and called Material Constitutive Causes of those various acts as denominated various, specially or numerically: And so God's Decree or Will to Justify and Glorify man, hath something in the object as a necessary condition of it * That is, of that object. , which is not ●● the object of his decree of giving faith; And that hath something in its object, which is not in the object of the decree of giving a Redeemer to the World, or making the World, etc. if you will at all distinguish God's decrees by their objects, or effects: But if not, there will be no matter for any Controversy. And Predestination is an ambiguous word: If it be taken for All Gods fore-decreeing, or all about man, or all of Good to us; then our Being is the first effect of it in us, and the making of the World a preparatory effect, etc. And so, no doubt, the first effect supposed us no men, before, and therefore no condition in us. But if you take Predestination for God's decree of Giving us Grace and Glory only, than it is presupposed that we are lapsed sinners. And the decree of damning men is exercised only on them as foreknown damnable sinners; And the decree of penal denying Grace or faith to sinners for sin, supposeth them such punishable sinners: But the bare Negation of a Decree to give faith to one to whom the absence is no privation, is unfitly called Reprobation, (though men may talk at their own rates;) And we grant that some such no-decrees have no condition in the objects, for they have no objects: e. g. If you will feign that God decreed from eternity, to give me no faith before the Creation, or before I was born; or to give Innocent Adam no faith in a Saviour as dying for him▪ this were no reprobating act. But when God hath given men a Saviour with his common grace to believe in and accept, here if he deny them necessary grace to believe, it is a penal act. And note that Christ and Common grace as absolutely given to mankind, and offered to individuals, ever goeth before men's accepting or refusing him: And no man to whom he is offered, refuseth him for want of necessary help, till by sin against that grace he forfeit it. XII. God by an absolute and efficacious decree of his Will, antecedently to the prescience of the future good use of freewill, predetermined all good acts, which are done in time, specially those by which the predestinate come to eternal life. Answ. The substance of this seemeth true: only 1. Whether you fitly denominate a decree efficacious from eternity, which effecteth nothing till the Time, I leave to them that dispute of words. 2. You presumptuously determine God's Decrees to be antecedent to his prescience herein; when they are neither before nor after one another. 3. If by predetermining you mean more than predecreeing or prevolition, as if man's will was predetermined, when it was not determined, or determined before it had a being, you speak contradictions. But Gods own will was eternally determined (if we may so say of that which was never undetermined) to give all the grace that he giveth in time, and to cause all the good acts that he causeth, as he causeth them. XIII. The Co-operation of freewill with the gifts of grace, is in the predestinate, an effect of predestination; and efficiently proceedeth from God making us by the help of grace freely to cooperate; and consequently dependeth not on the sole and innate liberty of the will. Answ. I think so too. XIV. We must necessarily distinguish of a twofold help of Grace; one sufficient, by which man may be converted to God, or work piously: The other effectual, by which God effecteth that he be actually converted, and act piously. Answ. Hold to that, and contradict not the terms in your description, and all's well. XV. The effectual help of preventing or preoperating grace moveth man's freewill to act, not only by persuading, alluring, inviting, or other morally attracting, even inwardly; but also efficaciously and truly effecting, that the will moved and excited of God determine itself and act well. Answ. We know what man's persuading and moral operations are (a little): But the difference between these interior acts of God named by you no man knoweth. You cannot prove that his Interiour suasion is not truly efficient of the act: nor know you how God pro●ureth our determination, as to the mode of his interior operation. Your arbitrary names have no signification of your true formal conceptions of the matter. This Controversy therefore is vain. XVI. The efficacy of the help of preventing grace, and the infallible connexion of it with the free co-operation of the will, is totally founded and taken as from its first root, from the Omnipotency of God, and from the absolute and efficacious decree of his will, willing that the man whom he moveth be converted and work piously: nor doth this efficacy any way depend, no not as on a condition sine qua non, on the future co-operation of the created will; though the free act by which man persevereth depend effectively on his will moved by God. Answ. 1. I grant that all the good that cometh to pass is fore-decreed by God. 2. But Gods mere will effecteth it not without his Power. 3. His power effecteth it not from eternity before it is effected. 4. You leave out one of the causal Attributes; The effect of Grace is as well from the Wisdom of God, as from his Will and Power 5. God's act dependeth not on man's will. But man's co-operation which is his own act, you must confess dependeth on his will as the effect on the nearest efficient. 6. The non-efficiency of sufficient Grace dependeth on the sinners will. It was not merely nor principally from an absolute efficacious Decree or predetermination of God, that Adam's will omitted his duty first, or committed sin first. And if any run to the common shadow that sin hath no efficient cause, and man only is deficient, I answer 1. He is the first Reputative Deficient (though not culpable, because under no Law) who must be the first efficient of the contrary and is not: As if Adam's body had never had a soul, God was the first Non-efficient Cause, that is, into whose will and non-agency the whole ratio defectus is to be resolved. 2. Forget not that Alvarez himself saith, lib. 6. disp. 45. p. 210. [Licet peccatum originale non sit pro formali aliquid positivum sed privativum; peccatum tamen actuale est pro formali aliquid positivum, & causat in anima habitum vitii—] XVII. Supposing effectual Grace in freewill, it infallibly followeth, that freewill will consent and act piously: so that these two are incompossible, that effectual Grace be in a man, and that he actually descent. Answ. True, because it is not called properly effectual, unless either 1. Because it effecteth, 2. Or as it cometh from an absolute decree of effecting, 3. Or is of such a nature and degree that it cannot but effect. And in all these cases it is true. But such Grace may be eventually uneffectual, which had a sufficiency ex parte sui to effect. XVIII. The gift of perseverance, as such, and the efficacy of it, dependeth not, no not as on a Condition sine qua non, on the co-operation of our freewill, but on the absolute decree of God, effecting man's perseverance. Answ. This needeth no other explication or observation, but as aforesaid. Only that the Jus ad gratiam quâ ad finem perseveremus, is given on condition, in the Gospel, from how absolute a decree soever it proceed. XIX. Effectual aid and a Power of dissenting, are compossible in the same subject, and consist in the same will. Answ. True: And remember that a true Power is that quâ verè possumus; and not that faculty which could do this or that if God will predetermine it, and otherwise cannot; no more than the Sun can shine without him. When God withholdeth the Influx necessary to action, such a faculty is no true power as to that action in that State. XX. By preventing Grace efficacious as aforesaid, the Liberty of the will is not destroyed, nor the actual use of it hindered, but is wonderfully perfected and roborated. Answ. There is a Liberty that is perfected by some even necessitating freewill in name is owned by you all: I say as August. Enchir. c. 105. Sic oportebat prius hominem fierl ut & bene velle posset, & male; nec gratis si bene, nec impune si male: postea vero sic erit ut male velle non possit. Quia ordo praetermittendus non suit, in quo Deus voluit ostendere, quam bonum sit animal rationale, quod etiam peccare possit; quamvis sit melius quod peccare non possit. predetermination of God: And there is an inferior Liberty of Imperfect Viators, which some efficient Divine predetermination (feigned by you) would destroy. And if God did by that insuperable premoving influx (which omnipotently moveth all things) predetermine all men and Devils to all the wicked Volitions and actions that ever were done, with all the circumstances, and as respecting every object comparatively, so that no creature ever did nor can resist such a predetermination any easier than make a World, this were to destroy the true Liberty of that Creature, with his innocency and felicity: however you may at pleasure put the name of Liberty on, and deny the name of Necessity to, such an absolutely necessitated Volition and act; and then may say, that they are premoved and predetermined to do the Act of all sin freely (or constrained to do it without constraint,) and so the liberty of the will is established. For I see not but cogere ad Volendum is as apt a phrase, as cogere nolentem ad agendum; when a will formerly innocent is irresistibly predetermined by physical efficiency, to all those comparate circumstantiate acts, which are forbidden in God's Law, and that on pain of man's damnation. But note how wisely Alvarez left out the great difference, about predetermining to the acts of sin, from this summary of his disputations. §. III. Of the three other ways, and I. Of the Jesuits way. Quest. AS you have past your judgement on Alvarez and his Dominican way, tell us how much you think well or ill of in the other three ways mentioned by Alvarez, and recited by you sect. 8? Answ. I. I have said enough before to answer this: Briefly, as to the Jesuits way de scientia media, 1. It is certain, that God knoweth all that Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 22. d. 99 c. 6, 7. after the rejection of many opinions holds this the only way of Concord, 1. God's preventing operating grace is Vocatio Congrua with good cogitations, and the primus motus voluntatis ante actum liberum. 2. God's co-operating Grace ad consensum liberum is neither before nor after our act, but concomitant & simul. And so causeth no antecedent necessity, but concomitant (existentiae.) 3. This supposeth Gods Scientia futuri conditionalis. Against this Dr. Twisse hath said much in a peculiar Digression. And surely God ever operateth as God, which is ut Causa prima. But how far he determineth is the doubt. i a capable object of knowledge: And therefore he knoweth what conditional propositions of future contingents are true. 2. Whether this should be called scientia media or not, is a vain question. 3. God's acts ex parte sui being but his Essence, and all one, can not otherwise be distinguished, nor ordered as to the denominations of priority or posteriority, than as the objects are distinct, and by their order of priority and posteriority allow us by Connotation so to denominate the acts. 4. The Intelligibility and the Amability of things are in themselves simultaneous, though from the order of humane operations, we say that things are first Intelligible, before they are Amiable. And so we may say of God after the manner of men; but not otherwise. 5. God doth not will the form, or the act of sin as circumstantiated, and as the form necessarily resulteth from it: neither for itself, nor propter aliud; the essence or existence. 6. Therefore God doth not foreknow sin as willed and decreed by him: nor therefore foreknow it because he willeth it. 7. God fore-knoweth (or knoweth) the formale peccati as well as the materiale: yet almost all confess, that he willeth not the formale: Therefore he knoweth that which he willeth not: Therefore his Volition of it is not necessary to his knowledge of it. 8. There is no effect in God: for all that is in God is God; who is not effected: Therefore there is no Cause in God of any thing in God: Therefore Gods will or decree of Good is not the cause that he foreknoweth it, no● his foreknowledge the cause that he willeth it: But he both knoweth and willeth all that is Good, at once. 9 God's inward operations on the soul are real efficiencies, and yet moral, and to us unsearchable: They cause the will to determine itself to Good, when it doth so; but how we know not. But we know that he ordinarily worketh by means, and according to their aptitude. 10. God useth such means with the free wills of his elect as he foreknoweth will prevail with them; and setteth them in such circumstances as he foreknoweth they will freely act aright in: But his inward grace is the principal or chief cause: And he doth not will or decree to give them such means and circumstances, because he foreknoweth they will prevail. That is, Gods will and decree as in him hath no cause. 11. But the word [because] is in Scripture applied sometimes to God's Love or hatred, and sometimes to his outward acts: (as John 16. 27. The Father loveth you, because ye have loved me and believed—) And in the first case that which is meant, is, that the qualification of the object is the material constitutive cause of the act of God, (not as it is Himself, but) as relatively denominated ab extra from the object in specie vel individuo. And in the second case, It meaneth, that the effects of God ad extra called his transient acts as in passo, have their proper uses, and we our commanded ends in using them: And so God is said to send Ministers, e. g. because he would save the hearers; that is, the Ministry is a cause of men's ●●lvation. 12. From all this it appeareth, that they err who think that their scientia media is equally useful in the points of Election and of Reprobation, and that they run pari passa. For all Good is both willed and known, and so Election supposeth not the foresight of our faith or obedience as causal or antecedent, (if we speak of that Act of Election which is to faith and obedience.) But Evil is foreknown and not willed at all: And therefore there is no such Reprobation which is a will or decree that men shall sin: And the non-impedition of sin being no act, needeth no positive act of will or decree * Yet none of the stress of their differences lieth on this; And the Jesuits with the rest assert a Positive Volition de peccato permittendo, without proof: which I leave to ovens various opinions. . But Reprobation which is the decree of damning, ever supposeth the object to be a foreseen-sinner finally rejecting grace. The rest about this is spoken to sufficiently before. §. iv II. Of Durandus 's way. II. AS to the way of Aureolus, Durandus, Ludou. à Dola, etc. I conceive it is commonly rejected, because not understood, or because the wording of it soundeth disgracefully; But it is a great matter that all confess, how easily it would end all these controversies, were it true. And by Lud. à Dola's Explication, and what Capreolus saith of Aureolus, I conceive that they are commonly mistaken. Durandus thinketh, that to the motion of the Creature it is necessary 1. That God by his continued No doubt but God is quoad praesentiam Immediate in all his efficiency, and as Near to the effect, as if he used not second cause: But yet he is not so immediate as to exclude 2. causes, as media: And while he useth them, he operateth on us according to their kind of operations, even as if they were between him and the effect. And this is the sense of Durandus and à Do●a, and easily reconcileth all. Amyraldus de lib. Arbit. c. 4. concurreth with Durandus. It is considerable that all confess, that if Durandus' way did hold, it easily ended all the controversy. As Lud. le Blank noteth Thes. 3. the Concurs. Juxta hos doctores nulla est difficultas in conciliando divino concursu cum libertate, etc. And this way is as consistent with Gods certain disposal of events as predetermination itself. influx continue the being and the nature and properties of the agent; 2. And that he continue all the circumstant creatures, concauses and objects and the media of action; 3. And that no powerful impediment hinder the action. Now, say the Jesuits and Dominicans and the rest, God doth moreover concur as the first cause to the Act itself, by an Immediate efficient Influx, besides that by which he upholdeth the Power and second Causes. But I think that Durandus meaneth as much as they: that is, that God doth not only uphold the creature in its mere esse, but in its Nature, which is its Mobility, and its principium motus; And this Nature is not only a Power to Action, but also an Inclined Power. So that for God by constant Influx to continue a Natural Power and Inclination to Action or motion, with all necessary concurrents, without impediments, is truly by his Influx to concur to the motion as the first Cause; while his Influx is not only as to Being, but as to the Motive force, and inclination: And no more than this doth seem to me to be simply necessary to motion. Here the Reader must know, that the Controversy is equally of Natural and Free agents and action. And first let us inquire of natural action. I. Fire is an Active nature, as much Inclined to Action as Earth to non-action or rest. Yea, it's Active Virtue and Inclination is its very Essential Form, and this as to a threefold action, viz. Motion, Light and Heat. If God then make Fire and continue its Nature or Essential Inclination For I have before shown how many ways this is certainly done. The whole experience of the world showeth, that God doth operate by second causes according to their natures and ways of operation; Therefore it more concerneth us here to know, what second causes do on the soul in good and evil actions, than in these disputes is usually observed. Adrian. Quodl. 3. fol 18. Sententia Durandi & plurium aliorum certum tenet, etc. Quam opinionem ultimo tradit Magister 37. d. 2. judicium relinquens prudentis lectoris examini. to these acts, and continue fuel approximate with all necessary concauses and media without impediments, to say that this Fire yet cannot burn or act, without another kind of Divine premotion besides all this, even an Immediate physical impulse, besides the described Influx, is a plain contradiction: For Fire is essentially an Inclined Power to act. And that▪ which hath a true Power to act, can act: It's a contradiction to say, It hath power, but it cannot. And a Power naturally inclined to act, will act, caeteris paribus. The question than is, Whether it be an impossibility for fire to burn▪ if God do but as the first Cause of Nature, continue its burning power▪ and inclination with all concauses? or rather, Was it not a Miracle for the three Confessors, Dan. 3. not to be burnt in that fiery Furnace▪ If you say, that the Miracle was, in Gods withholding his additional premotion, you then imply that God as principium vel causa prima Naturae doth ordinarily give that additional premotion. For that is no Miracle which is not dissonant from the common course of nature. But nothing can belong to God as the Cause of Nature, but to continue Nature as he made it, and he actually premoveth and concurreth while by his Influx as the first cause, he continueth all its Moving Nature, both Power and Inclination. In the motus projectorum, so far as the moving vis impressa continueth and prevaileth, the motion continueth accordingly; And who can prove that though the vis impressa continue, e. g. in a Bullet shot out of a Gun, and all concauses, yet there can be no motion, unless God otherwise thrust it on, or move it by some other impulse▪ Suppose a Stone or Rock hang in the Air quasi per filum, or by somewhat that hindereth its descent: If God continue the Natural Gravity of that Rock, which is not only a power but an inclination to descend, and if he continue all concauses and media, and if the thread be cut or the impediment removed that held up the stone, yet saith the Dominican, this Stone cannot fall unless God moreover by another action thrust it down, or▪ by an efficient physical premotion predetermine it; or as▪ the Jesuits say, unless God concur with a further moving Impulse. A plain contradiction: That a Power of motion, strongly inclined to act, so as a greater power is necessary in the impediment that will hinder it, and this in genere Agentis, continued by Divine Influx, yet cannot act, unless otherwise moved. God worketh so constantly by Natural Inclinations of second causes, as fully proveth to us, that ut prima Causa Naturae, he hath decreed so to work. And how is that then but by his Influx into Nature as Nature? If my house cannot fall when the foundations and pillars are gone, unless God otherwise thrust it down; If I cannot fall though I leap down from the house top, unless God otherwise thrust me down; If the Town cannot be fired unless God predetermine it or concur, besides his continuation of Nature; why should we fear it; when we know not that God decreeth any more than the continuation of natural causes and that action which is by them, and by him as the upholder of them? II. And the case of Free-agents is here confessed to be the same. The Influx into their Natures and Virtues is it that continueth them in esse substantiali and in esse movente & moto: An Act is but the modus substantiae. And it surpasseth my understanding to conceive what it is, for God physice influere in actum immediate, & none in potentiam seu virtutem agentem: nor how he can be said to move the faculties to act, that doth cause the act and not meddle with, (and therefore not move) the faculty. Nor know I how an Act immediately (and not the agent) can be the terminus of a physical motion. Though it's easy to conceive how God should cause an act by moral and extrinsic objective means. Therefore, as God moveth things Natural by his Influx into their moving Virtues, or into the moving Virtues of second Causes, which being Active operate on passive matter; so as the Soul and its Will is quadam natura inclined to Action in genere, and to will good in special, God as the cause of nature moveth it by his Influx into the faculty, as he doth other natural agents: But having made it a Free self-determining Agent, his Influx upholdeth and moveth it as such: And the same Influx is upholding and moving, and moving as upholding; seeing God as Motor also, doth influere in naturam vitalem & liberam. Besides which supporting and moving Influx, no other predetermining premotion is necessary to an Act as an Act, (that I know of.) But the very natures or dispositions of lapsed man being depraved, the reparation of them is necessary to holy actions; And here also God operateth on the faculties, by right disposing them, and by that grace which Augustine and Jansenius well call Gratia medicinalis, (his special Influx causing, maintaining, and actuating it) he causeth the holy actions of believers. I do verily believe, that Durandus and his followers, under the name of supporting the natural and free faculties, did mean inclusively that which Bellarmine pleadeth for, A General Concourse to the Act as an Act; And that they differ in words and not in sense. And if his doctrine hold not true, I cannot see how God can be said to Permit men's sinful Actions, or any action at all. For if neither the Inclination of natural agents, (as of Fire to burn, a Stone to descend, etc.) nor the Inclination of the most wicked nature, would cause any act, unless God otherwise cause it by premotion; then there is no place for Impedition, (for we cannot be said to Hinder a Stone from speaking, or a Mountain from walking, nor anything from any act which it could not as): And permittere is non impedire. And therefore Gods moving a man to the Act of sin, is not a permitting him to sin; Motion being one thing, and the not hindering of motion, another thing (or nothing.) §. V III. Of the Scotists and Nominals way. III. ANd as to the third way, ascribed by Alvarez to the Scotists and Nominals, I think that de nomine it is not a proper expression to call God causa partialis. But if we agree of the sense, we may bear Vasqu. (ubi sup.) taketh Alex. Al. 1. p. q. 26. n. 7. a. 2. ad. 1. & Ronavent. 1. d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. to be for him, because they say, Actus nostros esse liberos quia Divina voluntas non est Tota Causa, sed cum libero arbitrio; quod cum sit proxima causa modificatur concursum prim●. But if this be his opinion he joineth with these Scotists and Nominals de causa non-totali. So Pet. à S. Joseph. Thos. Uniu. de Deo, saith that God is Causa totius effectus, sed non tota Causa, sed partialis. with improper expressions about God, of whom we can say nothing without some impropriety. Doubtless God and man are not to be accounted coordinate concauses of the act; but whatever man doth, he doth it in subordination to God. But God operateth 1. As the prime cause of Nature, in a established way, by natural causes; And so he giveth man his Natural vital power and the Liberty of using it: and by this Power and Liberty a man can do more than he always doth. So that God's natural causality and concourse doth not bring all the Power which he giveth men into proportionable adequate Action: but men freely exercise the same power sometime more and sometime less. 2. And in the like manner God causeth gracious or holy acts: Rectifying our Powers, and fortifying them by holy habits, and preserving and actuating them, by the Holy Ghost: Yet the Spirit is to Grace, as God the prime cause is to Nature: He giveth us more Gracious Power than we use, and than his own concourse always reduceth into adequate act: So that God's operations in Nature and Grace are not ad ultimum posse Dei, nor ad ultimum posse hominis; but limited by his most wise and holy will: And man as a free agent is not only Able, but obliged, to use his power further, than by all God's concourse or premotion it is used. And in this sense I conceive it is that Scotus and others call God and man Causae partiales, in that there is a certain proportion of premotion and help, which God as the first Cause of Nature and Grace, doth afford to man; And there is moreover a certain use of God's help and Grace, beyond what God predetermineth man to, (as comparative to this object rather than that, etc.) which man can do, and is bound to do; Not independently or in co-ordination with God; but by the Power and Liberty which God only giveth and upholdeth, and affordeth him sufficient help to actuate. Now if man do this Part which is left to his liberty, the effect always followeth. If he do not, it may not follow, though God gave him that necessary help or grace or premotion which is commonly called sufficient. And when Scotus likeneth God and man, to two drawing a Boat, where the strength of both must concur, I believe he meant no more than I have said. 1. All the Power is of God as the total first cause. 2. All the Grace that rectifieth and disposeth our faculties, is of God as the total first cause. 3. All the Act as an Act in genere, is of God as the total (though not the sole) cause. 4. All the Holiness or Moral Goodness of the Act is of God as the total first cause (though not the only cause.) 5. But all the sinfulness or moral evil of Acts and Habits is from Man. 6. And that implieth, that man's free will is not so much freed from sin, mutability and infirmity, but that it can neglect to use well the power and helps of grace afforded. But of total and partial Causality I have spoken more fully in the first Book. And of their opinion, that God's Influx puts nothing into the will, but only is ad actum seu effectum, if it be true, it easily endeth the controversy of the difference of sufficient and effectual grace, as to that Act: But it is to me unintelligible, and the thing quite above all our understandings, and very unfit for bold disputes, or mutual censures. §. VI The true face or Scheme of the Dominican predeterminant way, as to the sense and consequents. I Do readily confess that, as the sum of all the Controversy is, Whether man have truly any freewill, that is not moved as necessarily as any natural motions are caused; so the arguments of Hobbes and the Dominicans and Dr. Twisse are not easily answered. And had we not better proof of all that Morality and Religion which is inconsistent with this opinion, I should myself be inclined also to think, that we must be contented with the naked name of Liberty; there being nothing indeed, but Volition necessitated; and that man is an Engine moved by God and other causes, no less necessarily and physically than a Clock or Watch, but only by more invisible causes and to us unknown, and therefore our Volitions are called Contingent and free, when truly there is nothing contingent in the World. We that converse in the body with things corporeal, are so much strangers to ourselves and to all the race of Intellectual-free Spirits, that we are very prone to such gross corporeal imaginations, and to think that all action is like the motus projectorum, violent, and necessitated; and that it belongeth to the perfection of the first mover that it should be so, yea, that he himself should be in all things the most necessary agent, and consequently all things necessitated by him. But as Alvarez confesseth, freewill is proved by Aquinas and many others, by natural proofs, and no Predeterminant or Hobbist can give the tenth part so full and certain proof, of the necessitation of all Volitions, as we can give of all the contrary principles in Morality which are overthrown thereby. And therefore (whatever some think of the fatum Stoieorum) the Light of Nature taught almost all the Philosophers in the World, the Freedom of man's will, and the morality there founded: of which Groti●s hath collected so full a Volume of testimonies in his Book entitled De fato, that it shall save me the labour of transcribing any. Yet though I think Christianity inconsistent with their opinion, I doubt not but many of the Predeterminants' are good Christians, and excellently learned and acute Divines, as not apprehending the inconsistency of their own thoughts: And I confess that there is a Religion consistent with their fundamental error, which I shall therefore put into the Scheme, lest any think that none but Hobbes hath made the right deductions from it. And remember, that I charge them not to say all the words which I here lay down, but only that the reason why I myself do above all others eat their principles, is because I take this following to be the true sense and complexion of them, which I must also believe, if I do believe them: And I suppose the Reader to be acquainted with their own words, and to have their Books at hand. * At least that he have read Bradwardine and Alvarez, and Dr. Twisse and Rutherford. de Prov. Better saith Joh. Racon in 1. sent. d▪ 40. art. 2. De●s aliqua futura non vult v●lie efficaci; sed solu● permissive: & respectu sic productorum voluntas divina est Causa per Generalem, tr●buens agenti particular● facultatem agendt sic vel sit: non tamen determinat agens ad aliquam neque efficienter vult banc vel illam: & ist● modo Voluntas divina est causa actuum nostrorum quantumcunque deformium:— Talium actuum est causa determinans Voluntas humana praesuppositâ influentiâ generali Del▪ Unde ideo pecco quia vol● pèccáre: ità quod actus voluntatis m●ae est jam determinans me ad peccandum. And Gab. Biel post Scotum▪ Ità est ca●sa effectiva rectit●dinis quod quantum est de se daret illam act●●, s● voluntas cooperaretur. Universaliter enim quicquid D●us dedit antecedenter; daret et●am consequenter, q●antum est ex s●, si non esset impedimentum: Vcluntas autem quantum est ex s● non dat rectitudinem actul. Gal. in 2. d. 37. a. 3. q. 1. dub. 1. Ità & Okam in 1. d. 46. & 38. & fer● iisdem verbi● Orbellis m. 2. d. 37. & ita Fr. Mayro 1. d. 37. q. 1. ad 4. & q. 2. ad 4. & q. 3. concls. 4. & Greg. Arim. 2. d. 37. q. 1. a. 3. & d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg. 12. & alil quamplurimi. ● Bradwardine l. 1. c. 34. p. 300, 301, etc. speaketh too plainly to this purpose, with Hug● 1. de Sac●. 4. part. 1●. being more careful to make people think well of his [Deus vult malum] than to deny it; [Non quia quod dicitur, non bene dicitur, s●d quia quod b●ne dicitur, non recte i●telligitur.] And his mollification is that [God willeth sin only secundum quid; for God's Velle simplic●ter, as it's commonly taken, is to Love and approve it as good, and to reward it: And because the Vulgar so take it, we must not before them say that God wi●● let sin, because they too much abhor it. No act is unjust simply, but all just, and all the consequents of it just, in respect of God the Author. Therefore simply in the Universe, there is no sin or deordination; God willeth sin as a Physician doth poison in his medicine, for the exercise of the good, the punishment of the evil, the contemplation of the beauty of the world. He is not the author of evil as he is of good; for of that he, is the sole giver of faith, charity, etc. creating it. And God constraineth not men to sin against their wills: nor doth he cause it unjustly and culpably, etc.] Is not this mere Hobbs? 1. Doth God will any thing but good? Is not sin good then if he will it? 2. Is God's not Rewarding it, a not willing it? What if he rewarded not men for loving him? You feign God to will and cause all sin, and then damn men for it, and then prove that he is not culpable or did not properly will it, because he damned men for it. 3. Do you not make God as much the cause of evil habits and acts as of good, when you make him the total cause of all that is in them? 4. Do you not say that the sinner doth evil for good ends, and not for evil, as well as God? 5. Is not man an agent in Loving God as well as in hating him? 6. Is it any better to make a man sinful and miserable by making him willing, than to make him so by force against his will? Nay, could a man be made a sinner by force without making him willing? Is it not a contradiction? 7. Why call you it poison which God maketh a medicine of? You mean not that there is any evil in it which God caused not (as you say) more immediately than man: and so that God▪ first made it poison and then put it into his medicine. 8. And why are you afraid of speaking your opinion: to the world? Is it not because you are conscious that you speak against the common principles of nature, in which the vulgar are founder than yourself? 9 And much of this is▪ because you cannot tell how God punisheth sin with sin, unless he cause sin. What if by the Law of nature in Creation he ordain that he that is a glutton shall be sick, and that Arsenic shall corrode his bowels that eateth it, etc. and drinking too much Wine shall breed the Gout, etc. Doth he therefore cause men to eat and drink too much? or is not the excess from them? and yet the penal relation and consequents from God? And suitably to all this he defineth Grace and freewill; viz. Grace effectual (without which no one sin can be avoided) is God's will that it shall be done: (And so no man can any more do any thing, than what he doth, than he can make a world.) And freewill (li. 2. c. 1.) is [Potentia rationalis rationaliter judicandi, & voluntarit exe●quendi:] so that to will▪ and freely to will, is all one. And so man is moved to every sin, by necessitating premotion to do it freely, that is, he is made willing, that is, sinful. So c. 32. [In omni nonactione Deo & creaturae communi, prius naturaliter est Deum non-agere quam ipsam & quia Deus certam actionem per creaturam non agit, ideo creatura illam non agit, & non è contra.] So that all omissions (of faith, repentance, obedience, etc.) are fully resolved into God's first non-agency p. 611. [Quis nesciat quod quia Deus non fecit unum Angelum, aliam Stellam, coelum majus, ideo non facta sunt? Ità quioquid non fit à causa secunda Deus vult non fieri, & non vult positiué: Scilicet habet noll● illud fieri ab ta. Prius ergo naturaliter & causaliter est Deum nolle positive, quare & non v●lle & non facere causam secundam agere, quam ipsam non agere.] This is plain dealing: All men that Love not God, and all that hate him, are such because God will have it so, and make them do as they do. It would save many tedious volumes and intricate disputes if all would speak as plainly. But what is the Christian Religion then? I. Their fundamental Principle is, that It is naturally Impossible for any agent Natural or free to do any act, or vary any; comparatively or circumstantially, but by the Immediate Physical efficient adequate predetermining Premotion of God's Omnipotency, as the first Cause; besides his Influx by which he sustaineth their natures and concauses, and affordeth them his general Concourse or premotion to the act as an act in genere only. And it is Impossible for any Agent so predetermined by physical premotion, not to act in all the circumstances that it is so moved to act in. II. To say that any creature can act without this physical predetermination to all the circumstances, or can forbear to act when so predetermined, is by consequence to say, that such a creature, is God, the first cause. For it is as impossible, as to be God, or to make a World. III. Yea, the creature that will forbear any act which God so predetermineth him to, must be stronger than God and overcome him, or do contradictions. IU. And if God had not decreed so to predetermine by physical efficient premotion, he could not have known any future acts. No, though with Scotus we say, that he willed all those Acts antecedently to his prescience, it would not serve, unless he willed so to predetermine the agent in causing them. V Yet we will say, that the Will is free: but we mean only that to will and to will freely are words of the same sense. For a man is said to will freely in that he willeth, and his Willing is not a Nilling. VI freewill then is nothing but Facultas Voluntatis & rationis ●d utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum & ad agendum unum vel alterum: sed tantum prout à prima causa physice praedeterminatur: That is, it is such a faculty as God can predetermine to act which way he will, by making it will: yet its Indifferency is not only objective or passive, but also Active, because it is an Active Power of the will which God predetermineth. God predetermineth the will to determine itself. VII. We will call this the wills Power, but it is but hypothetically a Power, viz. It can act if God physically predetermine it: else not at all. As the Wheels of the Clock can move if the Poise or Spring move them, or rather; as the hand can move, if the Will and the Spirits in the Nerves do move it. VIII. The will is said to be free, partly by reason that its active power is capable of being determined by God, and then by itself ad utrumlibet, and partly in that it is not liable to coaction. IX. The will that is by Omnipotent physical premotion efficiently predetermined by God, is not constrained, because it willeth not unwillingly: that is, so far as it is willing it is not unwilling and reluctant. X. Yet the will that was one way inclined, habituated and acted in the precedent instant, is oft physically premoved and predetermined by Omnipotency to the contrary act in the next instant, which it could not resist: As he that in this instant wilmeth Chastity, may in t●e next instant be predetermined by unresistible Omnipotency to will fornication; or he that Loved God may be predetermined and premoved by God to hate him the next moment. But we will not call this irresistible efficiency [coaction,] because it is ad Volendum, and so in ipso acts there is no reluctancy or resistance. XI. When God hath given man a Power with liberty to will or nill, or not will, to will this or that, and also giveth him all necessary objects and concauses, and also as the first cause of natural and free action giveth him all that Influx which is necessary to an Act as such, yet the moral specification of that Act, to this proposed object rather than that (as to hate God, rather than to hate sin,) or to this Act rather than to that (as to hate God, rather than to Love him, or to speak a lie, rather than the truth) hath so much Entity in it, that it is a blasphemous deifying man to say, that man can do it, without God's fore-described unresistible predetermining physical premotion. XII. God made the Law which forbiddeth sin, and God made man's nature Intellectual and free to be ruled by Law; and God made and ordereth all the objects, temptations and concauses; and God by the said efficient, physical premotion causeth irresistibly every act of sin in all its circumstances: (As when David was deliberating, Shall I do this Adultery and Murder or not? God first by omnipotent motion determined his will to it, or else he could not possibly have done it.) And sin in its formale is nothing but the Relation of Disconformity to God's Law, which can have no cause but that which causeth the subjectum, fundamentum & terminum; nor can it possibly be, but it must exist per nudam resultantiam, hisce positis. And yet though God make the man, the Law, the act, the object, and all that is in the world from whence sin resulteth as a mere relation, we are resolved to say that God is not the Author or Cause of sin. XIII. Yea, though the Habits of sin are certain Entities, and therefore God must needs be their first cause in their full nature, according to our principles, who account it proper to God to be the first and principal cause of any such entity; yet we are resolved to say, that God is not the Cause or Author at least of sin. XIV. Yet we will say, that he is an enemy to God's Providence, that holdeth that man can possibly do any wickedness, unless God thus predetermine both Will, Tongue, Hand, and every active part, to every act which he hath forbidden with all its circumstances. XV. Sin is caused by God as to the circumstantiated Act which is the materiale, but not as to the formale: And yet we must confess, that the Relation is caused by causing the subject, foundation▪ and term, (all which God principally doth,) and can be caused no otherwise. XVI. But the formale of sin is but a defect or privation, which is nothing: Therefore man and not God is the cause of it; For God cannot be a deficient cause, nor have any privation. And yet we cannot deny but that 1. There is as much positivity of Relation in disobedience as in obedience, in curvity as in rectitude, in disconformity as in conformity. 2. Nor that God can be a Cause of Privations (such as death is,) though not a subject of them; even such a cause as they can have. 3. Nor that some of ours (even Alvarez) say that sins of commission (and habits) are positive in their formale. 4. And sin is such a Nothing, as is man's misery, and he is damned for and by. And if it be such a Nothing as can have no cause, man can no more be the cause of it than God. 5. And that the Reason of non existences, negations, or privations, is as notoriously resolved into the will or non-agency of the first necessary cause of the contrary, as existences and positives are resolved into his will and agency. And if a man cannot think a good thought by any help that God can give him, unless he physically predetermine him to it, than the reason why man doth it not is as notoriously to be resolved into God's not-predetermining him to it, as the reason why he doth it into his predetermination: and as it is night, because the Sun shineth not. XVII. But at least we can say that God is not the cause of sin, because he is under no prohibiting Law. Though it be true, 1. That his nature or perfection, the root of all Laws, is more than a Law: 2. And we know indeed that this proveth him not at all to be no cause of the sin of man, but only to be no sinner himself though he cause it: which is none of the question. XVIII. And from this necessity of predetermination it followeth, that all that part of our holiness and obedience which consisteth in not sinning, is not at all caused by God, e. g. that we hate him not, nor his truth and ways and servants, that we murder not, commit not adultery, steal not, lie not, covet not, blaspheme not, wrong none, do no evil, etc. we need no help of God for this; Because if he will not move our wills by efficient predetermination to do them, it is impossible for us to do them at all. XIX. And though we say that God willeth sin to be, by his permission only and not by his efficience, yet indeed predetermining by efficiency as the first cause, is the principal efficiency: And properly we must say that God permitteth no sin at all; For we say that his permission proveth the consequence of the thing permitted: And therefore we must say that he permitteth no sin but what is done. And that which is done by commission positively he effecteth by effecting the fundamentum; and therefore permitteth not: And men sin by omission because God doth not make them sin, and not because he merely permitteth it. For permission is not the impossibilibus. XX. God willeth not sin, because he willeth it not as sin, in its formale: which also we must confess that the wicked themselves do not. XXI. And whereas we hold that God cannot foreknow things future, but as he willeth or decreeth them, we must confess that the formale peccati as well as the materiale, was (such as it is) quid futurum, (if it was but futura privatio:) And therefore this would infer that God willed and decreed the formale peccati also. XXII. God's Will is his Love: and what he Willeth he Loveth. XXIII. God willeth the futurity and existence of sin, not only of the materiale, but the formale, even of all the sin that ever is done. XXIV. The existence of sin is Good and Amiable, not only by accident, but per se, as being very conducible to the Glory of God's Justice and Mercy, and therefore is per se Willed and Loved of God. XXV. It is incomparably much more sin than Holiness which God willeth, and Loves, and by predetermination causeth in mankind on earth: For it is much more sin than Holiness that existeth in man: And all that existeth God causeth as aforesaid (the circumstantiated act, and so the resultancy of the relative form:) And he willeth and Loveth the existence of all, and the thing existing so far as he causeth it. XXVI. God Willeth, Loves and Causeth sin incomparably more than wicked men do: For they Will and Love it with a humane mutable dependent will; but God with a Divine, primary, immutable will. Man causeth the forbidden act (whence the relation resulteth) with a Will that is irresistibly moved so to do by God (as the pen writeth; only s●o modo with Volition:) But God causeth it as the first omnipotent unresistible cause, of all that the Creature doth in sinning. XXVII. The same must be said of God and the Devil, who can no more commit one sinful act, till God unavoidably predetermine his will to it, by his premotion, than sinful man can. XXVIII. God by his Law, doth strictly forbid all those sinful acts which he principally and unavoidably causeth: And he strictly commandeth all those good acts, whose contraries he thus causeth us to do. XXIX. Though there is nothing in sin which can have a cause, of which God is not the Principal cause, and though he Willeth and Loveth all that he causeth, yet the Scripture saith that God hateth sin, and cannot behold it, and hateth all the workers of iniquity, and that it is abomination to him, that he is as one laden with it, and wearied, provoked, and offended by it. And that he Loveth the Acts of obedience and holiness, when he will not cause them, but doth cause and will the contrary. XXX. Pardon and salvation is promised and earnestly offered by God, to the Reprobate themselves, on condition, that they will believe and repent, when God doth avoidable as the first cause, determine their wills to the contrary acts, even to disbelief and impenitent hatred of God and holiness. XXXI. The Law of God is, that all the Reprobates shall be damned to hell fire, if they will not believe and repent, when his omnipotence doth unavoidably premove and determine them to unbelief and impenitence: and if they will not give over those acts of sin, to which God doth thus unavoidably move and determine them. XXXII. God's executions are answerable to these Laws; and all save Christians, and all professed Christians saving the sanctified, are to be punished in hell fire for ever, only for not doing the acts of Faith, Love and obedience, when God as the first cause predetermined them to the contrary; and for doing the acts of sin, when God unavoidably moved them to it, and made them do it: so that consequently all that are damned, suffer in hell, for not being Gods, even the first sufficient causes of their own acts, and for not being above God or stronger than he, that is, for not overcoming or avoiding, his invincible and unavoidable predetermining premotion unto evil acts. XXXIII. The same must be said of the Devils, who sin and suffer on the same terms. XXXIV. Q. What kind of torment than will there be in Hell? Can Conscience torment men for doing that which they were unavoidably made to do by Omnipotency? and for not doing that which without Divine predetermination they could no more do than make a world? or for not doing that whose contrary they were thus predetermined to? that is, for not overcoming God? (when they know the case.) Or must we not more congruously say, that the state of Hell torments lieth in a most vehement hatred of God for so using them, and a justifying of themselves? Or will every mouth be thus stopped in judgement? XXXV. Q. Is not Divine Justice the most perfect Justice? and the exemplar of all humane Justice (allowing for disparities?) And should Kings and Judges imitate this fore-described course? And how then would they be esteemed? XXXVI. Q Is not that best which is most agreeable to Gods Will and Love? And therefore sin better than Holiness in all that have sin, and not holiness, and in the Godly so far as they sin? because that it shall be so, is more (yea only) willed by God, and caused by his predetermination? XXXVII. Q. Whether this doctrine tend not to utter Infidelity, as to the Christian faith, by making it seem to men incredible? Is it credible that God sent his Son so wonderfully to expiate those sins which he so loved and caused as aforesaid? and to save his people from their sins, which God thus avoidable moved them to commit? and to destroy the works of God, under the name of destroying the works of the Devil? Must Christ suffer, bleed, die and bear God's wrath, for that which God unavoidably made man do by his principal determination? And is it easy for him that believeth one of these to believe the other? XXXVIII. Q. How will men preach and hear the Gospel, if they do it in congruity with this doctrine? Will they say [God sent us to beseech and charge you, not to do that sinful act, which you cannot do unless he make you do it by predetermination, and which you cannot avoid if he so make you do it. He beseecheth and importuneth you to do all those commanded acts, which you can no more do than make a world unless he predetermine you to do them, nor can forbear them if he do?] XXXIX. Q. How will men Repent, confess, resist temptations, pray, and use the means of Grace, if they believe that all sinful acts in the world are thus unavoidably Caused, and Willed and Loved of God as good for his Glory? XL. Q. Whether they that teach (as Dr. Twisse often) that sin is not malum Dei sed nostri, do not take it to be no injury to God, nor displeasing to his will? Or is not injury and displeasing, evil in respect to God as the terminus, though it be no h●rt to him, nor his evil as the subject or agent? And doth not the opinion that it's Evil only to us, and Good to God as conducible to his glory, teach men to hate it only out of self-love, and not out of love to the glory of God? yea to Love it as conducible to God's Glory, more than to hate it as evil to ourselves; seeing God's Glory must be preferred above ourselves? XLI. Q. Is not sin thus made a coequal with Christ? who is but a means to the glorifying of God, to which faith (Dr. Twisse) sin is summè conductbile? XLII. Q. Doth not this doctrine make the sanctification of the Holy Ghost to be unnecessary? when all that is to be done to save us from sin, is for God not to make us sin by his premotion▪ Or doth it not make sanctification to be nothing but this predetermination of God, which is made as necessary to sin as to duty, and so natural and gracious operations made the same, and God to do as much to produce evil efficiently as good? XLIII. Q. Is it not much worse to man, if God by predetermination make him first a sinner, (and wicked by sinful Habits) and then damn him for it, than if he should damn an innocent man for nothing? For sin and pain is far worse than pain without sin. And to compel the will unwillingly to sin, were it possible, is less than to make it willing. XLIV. Doth not he that affirmeth that the Devil doth but sin as efficiently predetermined by God, and doth not force, nor determine any man's will to any sinful act, but that God predetermineth all men and Devils to every sinful act committed, I say, doth he not describe God as worse than Satan (horresco quaerens!) if sin be the denominating evil, and the causing of sin be more than tempting to it? Had I not rather my will were resistibly tempted to sin, than unresistibly made to sin, by predetermining efficient premotion? XLV. Is not the objective Reason in Devils of man's implanted Enmity against them, Gen. 3. 15. because they are Enemies to God and us, as being themselves Lovers of sin, and Tempter's of us to sin and misery? XLVI. Doth not he take the directest course to root out the Love of God and all Religion from the World, and to tempt men to hate God, and so to begin a Hell on Earth, who describeth God in Satan's likeness and much worse; as much as being the principal cause of all sin in men and Devils, is worse than sinning when predetermined, and tempting others to it? XLVII. I think that the Dominican Predetermination, directly and necessarily overthroweth all certainty of Divine Revelation, by man, or Angel, and consequently all certainty of the Christian faith: even by overthrowing the very formal object, the Divine Veracity. For if God efficiently premove and predetermine all wills and tongues and pens to all the lies that ever are made in the world, than 1. To do so, is not inconsistent with his perfections or his will; 2. And then we can never know when he doth not so, unless by the event. This is grounded on these suppositions, 1. That God's revelations to us are not Immediate only by himself, but by some Creature, Angel or Man, or a created voice or sign. 2. That the Ratio certitudinis of such Revelations by a Creature, is because it is God that is the chief author of them. 3. That it is not conceivable how God can by any way of Revelation be more the author of it, than by physical efficient immediate adequate predetermining both will and tongue to the act with all its circumstances. Call it by what name you please, Inspiration, Vision, Illumination, Impulse, etc. it can speak nothing more of God's Agent efficient Interest than this predetermination doth. 4. If it did do more, yet it would overthrow all certainty of our faith: Because if God can efficiently cause, and that▪ as the total principal cause by predetermination, all the lies that ever were told in the world; we can never be sure that the other mode of his operation so far differeth from this, as that he cannot be the chief cause of a lie in this way as well as of all lies by predetermination. I have driven many to say their utmost, and could never yet hear any such difference assigned, as could prove any Inspiration whatsoever, to have more of Divine Causality in it, than physical predetermination doth signify and import: nor how this principle leaveth us any certainty that the tongues of all the Prophets and Apostles were not predetermined to speak falsely, (ab antecedente; and so their pens.) XLVIII. To say that God is not able to make a Creature with power to determine any one Volition of its own, even as modified, comparate or circumstantiate, without his efficient physical predetermination aforesaid, sayeth more against God's Omnipotency (though on pretence of a contradiction) than I dare say or think. XLIX. Yet after all this I grant that if all proper free will and contingency be denied, and every act in the world (as comparate and circumstantiate) made as necessary by predetermination as the motions in a Clock, yet a certain Religion is consistent with it, and the Atheist that hence would nullify▪ all Religion absolutely, would raise false inferences from this principle. Much more persuaded am I, that many that hold it are very worthy holy persons, much better than I am or can hope here to be, as not discerning the inconsistency of their opinions (as I said.) L. The Religion●consistent with it I conceive must be such as this: 1. There is a God who moveth all things by physical necessitation, even man's Volitions as well as any natural actions. 2. This God doth all that he doth himself by necessity, viz. of perfection, not of co-action: And there is no contingency in rerum natura. 3. This God hath made his Creatures of various ranks and degrees of excellency: And man a more knowing Creature than the Bruits. 4. Among men he maketh some wise, some foolish, some good and Godly, and some vicious and ungodly; And as he maketh the difference of men and beasts, of a Horse and a Toad, of the Sick and the sound, of Prince and people, rich and poor, so doth he of godly and ungodly, chaste and unchaste, etc. 5. Yet man being Intellectual, God will move him by means and second causes; and therefore hath made him Laws, obliging him the jure, and commanding his utmost diligence to keep them; promising and threatening Life and death hereafter for the keeping or the breaking of them: and appointing Ministers and Magistrates to persuade and drive him on. 6. And it's likely though not certain that God will do according to these Laws, in some considerable degree. 7. Man by his Nature, and by Scripture (which may be true) is bound to Love and serve his God above all other, as the Cause of all the being and good that is in the world, (whatever he do by us,) and of all our good. 8. There is another life of Reward for the good▪ and punishment for the bad, which must be our hope and fear. 9 God's Laws are called moral means, but 'Cause only as physical engines or tackle▪ to move man's will by the said necessitation. 10. God's hatred of sin, is no true hatred or nolition (where sin is:) but only his prohibiting it to us, and his punishing men for it. 11. If God did send Christ and the Apostles, and Miracles, etc. it was only to be tackle or parts, in this engine of physical operations. 12. God causeth and Loveth sin as much as obedience; but he maketh it not so Good and Lovely to us, it being our disease and misery. 13. As God no otherwise hateth sin than sickness, and sinners than the sick, and looketh on good and bad but as modal physical differences caused by himself; so must we do also: and hate that most that hurteth us most. 14. To mourn for sin, and confess it, and strive against it, or talk of Christ's suffering or satisfying for it, any otherwise than as a Voluntary disease and misery of man, or to avoid any sin any otherwise than as a misery to ourselves or others, is but the error of superstitious men. 15. Men should do all that ever they can to cure their sins, and live holily, so far as increaseth not their misery, and no further; and this only as a physical Voluntary perfection, and as the avoiding of a natural misery to themselves and others. 16. God will punish man, not out of any hatred of sin (which he willeth and causeth) but out of a differencing will, as he maketh Toads and Serpents, and causeth Cattle and Fowl to be killed by us, and Horses laboured in pain: Therefore we have no reason to fear any other misery in Hell, than God's arbitrary disposal bringeth on the more wretched sort of his Creatures, without any sinful commerit or provocation; and perhaps little more than we voluntarily here choose and bring upon ourselves, or of the same kind, our sin itself being our punishment though it pleaseth us, (As scratching is to him that hath the itch.) 17. Therefore the end of a man's life is the public good and his natural felicity; besides and above which to make God our End, as he is holy and to be pleased by Holiness, is an error; for all that cometh to pass whether sin or holiness, do equally please and fulfil his will, as they are equally caused by him, according to their several natures. I Have delineated this hypothesis with its consectaries as truly as I can. If any expect that I should have given you their own words for all that I have said. 1. Remember that I charge not all these words on them; but mention their judgement with the consequents. 2. That I charge not these consequents to be owned by the men, but upon their doctrine. And let any man discharge or justify them that can. 3. But I desire no more to prove that I wrong them not, than that the Reader be acquainted with their own writings, and not to impose too many on him, particularly, with Bradwardine, Bannes, Holkot and Alvarez, and with Piscator, Maccovius, Dr. Twisse, and Rutherford de provide. And I desire him first but to read the words which I have before cited and confuted of theirs in this Treatise; and the words of Alvarez and Twisse which I have cited and answered in my Disput. contr. Praedeterm. in Methodo Theolog. And I must profess that the Religion here described in the end, is all that I can prove consistent with their opinion truly understood in itself and its consectaries; and that if I held their doctrine, I think I could have no other faith: Which I have annexed lest the Hobbists should think that their principle, were it proved, would justify all Immorality and Irreligion. For this much they might be obliged to notwithstanding it. But he that can see so great eyidence for the Dominican predetermination, above the other three ways, and what I have here farther added, as for the sake of it, to admit so great a change of his Religion, or so great a degree of the forsaking of true Religion, he seethe not with my eyes, and I hope I shall never see with his, though I am not a stranger to the pretences for their way, that make it seem plausible to them that do respicere ad pauca. And if any think that I deal too harshly in clogging their opinion with such odious consequents, Let them prove them inconsequent, and I will recant it: But if they cannot, civility shall not make me hid and favour so great Impiety; and as little in Doctrine as in manners, (as Adultery, perjury, blasphemy; etc.) because he that thinketh he doth well, will not Repent, and an erring mind will justify sin, and fight against God and his truth in his own name; and it's more to Teach men to break a com-mand, than to do it, and confess the sin. They think it is for God that they err; And I think it is for God that I detect it. And who it is that erreth indeed, the Light must discover, and the studious impartial prepared Children of the Light must discern; and the Father of Lights must finally judge. Note that in the first part I speak as in the name of the Predeterminants'; till I come to the Questions, and thenceforward I speak as in my own name, which the Reader may easily perceive. §. VII. Of Jansenius his way of reconciling Grace and freewill. §. 1. BUt after all these cometh Jansenius, and justly blaming Philosophy as the great occasion of our heresies and errors, which misled the Schoolmen, Jesuits and others, he goeth to Augustine alone (as Lombard thought he had well done before him;) and disgraceth his cause by saying that Augustine first taught it to the Church, (as if Grace had been unknown by the former ages:) And because many will not be at the labour to know his mind by reading so big a volume, I shall briefly select what concerneth the matter in hand, and animadvert upon it. 1. His first Tome describeth the Heresy of Pelagius, wherein he proveth that Pelagius held all this that followeth concerning grace: 1. The Remission of sins, containing 1. Conversion to God, 2. The abstersion of the blot and filth, 3. Reconciliation, or remission of God's offence, 4. And of the eternal punishment. Jansenius Aug. To. 1. l. 5. c. 22. p. 126, 127. 2. That Pelagius owned the Infusion of habitual grace. And that God in Baptism did blot out all sins, purge, cleanse and expiate them, save and renew the soul, restore nature, deliver from the body of this death, and from the contracted custom of sinning: He held that Grace doth Regenerate, Illuminate, cause Faith, Justify, (even Infants,) Sanctify, make us new Creatures, incorporate us into Christ as his members, give us the anointing of the Holy Ghost, not only restoring us to the state that we were in in Adam, but to a better, and to be adopted sons of God, and saved. cap. 24. And 25. as to the Relative effects, that Grace Reconcileth man to God, maketh him an adopted Son of God, and the Temple of the Holy Ghost, an Heir of God, and co-heir with Christ: So that they acknowledge not only Habitual Infused Grace, but more; even in Baptism: As also the Assisting motions of the spirit to good acts, making them possible. Also that after Pope Zozymus had condemned the Pelagians, they went further, and that their design was but to lay men's salvation or damnation on freewill. lib. 6. c. 7. etc. And when he cometh to characterise Pelagius, he doth it as he doth elsewhere the Protestants, and as Malignants do Religious persons, by presumptions: viz. that he was indeed as Augustine saith, Temperate and of a good life but singular and very proud, (which he proveth by his opinion, and because he was against Swearing, and said, that God's servants mouths should vent no bitter thing, but only that which is sweet; and that Christians must be so patiented as readily to let go what is taken from them, and that gallantry and gay clothing is contrary to God, and that enemies must be loved as friends, and yet not believed, and that Riches must be forsaken, etc.) as holding nothing mean and moderate: that he affected novelty (and yet his errors were old, coming from Origen, ●uffinus, Palladius, Evagrius, Jovin●an and the Philosophers) that he affected fame, admiration, hypocrisy, pretending to more holiness than others, under the garb of poverty, etc. overvalued Reason, Logic, Syllogisms, Philosophers, etc. All which I mention, not to abate any man's dislike of any one error of Pelagius, but to show that it is so usual for dissenters to make one another seem odious, and to feign or aggravate faults, and to vilify or deny God's grace in others, that he that would not be tempted into malice, uncharitableness and slander, must take heed what he believeth, even of men accounted most abominable heretics. Doubtless Pelagius his denying original sin, and his laying too much on man's will, and too little on grace, are things to be detested. II. Jansenius asserteth that the Angels and Adam had such freewill as could obey or disobey, and so could determine itself to good, and persevere therein, without any more grace than they had when they did it not: And that by this freewill some Angels stood and some fell, and Adam fell when he might by it have stood, and thereby fell from a nobler sort of freewill, which consisteth in a due subservience to God, and fell to the Love of Himself (not primarily of external things) instead of God, and to selfdependency and dominion. De Grat. primi hom. c. 6. p. 40, 41, 42. etc. 7. [Nos hic asserimus tanquam sine dubitatione verissimum juxta doctrinam sancti Augustini & ecclesiae, omnia hujusmodi opera adeoque & ipsam fidem & dilectionem Dei, ab eo potuisse per arbitrii libertatem fieri sic ut ea non donaret ei gratia Dei.] vid. c. 7, 8, etc. The reason of this was sanitas Voluntatis Adami. c. 9 III. Yet Grace was necessary to man and Angels both to perseverance and to every good act. c. 10, 11. And c. 12, 13, etc. this Grace necessary to all was not Habitual Grace, (for that they had;) nor general concourse, which none denied: but it was Actual Adjuvant Roborating help. But the Grace given to Angels and Adam was Adjutorium sine quo non, giving the will power to determine itself, but not Adjutorium quo which ever determineth it. One giveth the Power, and the other the Act. (The same that is meant by the common distinction of Grace sufficient and effectual by the Dominicans.) Yet this Adjutorium sine quo non did with free will procure the Act in the standing Angels, and Adam while he stood: But that made it not Adjutorium quo because it is not so called (efficax) only ab eventu: but because it so helpeth that illo praesente continuo fiat id propter quod datur; illo absente nunquam fiat. p. 63. c. 14, 15. One is like Light and the visive faculty ad videndum; the other ut ipsa visio (such as all formal causes are, and Gods simultaneous efficiency.) The difference is (c. 15.) that Adjutorium sine quo non doth but perfect the power, and the chief honour belongeth to the will that useth it and could choose: But contrarily the adjutorium quo is the principal cause of the Act, and leaveth not the event to the will, but useth it effectually to the act intended. Therefore merit and perseverance in Innocency were no special gifts of God. iv That without or before faith no good work is done, but lies and sins: l. 3, & 4. c. 1. p. 223. no nor without true Godliness, p. 261. & passim. To think that Infidels and ungodly have any true virtue, is dotage. c. 17. V The first sin had no necessity, being mere sin, and no punishment, and so easily avoidable and wholly voluntary: Other sins are also punishments, and so partly involuntary and unavoidable and necessary: Though a sinner may forbear one sin by another. cap. 22. VI A rational Creature could not be made of God sinless without true Love to God, or at least a faculty most sufficient to love him and cleave to him. De statu not. pur. l. 1. c. 17. p. 323, 324. nor can God withdraw that grace of Love from the innocent. c. 13. VII. The grace of Adam, and of Christ, Adjutorium sine quo non, & Quo, do thus differ, that the first serveth the will, and is determined by it: The second (Adjutorium medicinale) giveth▪ the ipsum velle to the unwilling, which else it could not have. The Grat. Chr. Sal. Li. 2. c. 4. and is more than Lex, scientia, revelatio, remissio peccatorum, gratia sufficiens, habitualis, & per congruitatem efficax. c. 5. Also 1. The Adjutorium sine quo non giveth not Merit to the will, but it meriteth itself: But the Adjutorium Quo giveth us the ipsum opus & meritum. 2. The former is meritum humanum; the second meritum divinum, as given of God. 3. To the first Life would be merces meriti: To the second it is a free gift; Reward and Gift are repugnant. Angel's merited life. 4. By the first and free will Angels persevered: but we cannot but by the second. 5. The first (fine quo non) was given them that were to be differenced by freewill: The second to them that are to be differenced by grace. c. 6, 7, 8. One is adjutorium possibilitatis, the other actionis. c. 9 VIII. That since the fall no good can be in or of man, but by God's gift, and is not laudable in any but God. c. 23. Man hath no part of the praise. This grace is, ever effectual, determining, rapeth the will so that it is scarce perceived to act: It useth the will as an instrument, which way God will: It is insuperable, irresistible, not merely potential: It is never uneffectual, but in all that have it infallibly effecteth. c. 24, 25. IX. There is no grace of Christ but this (quo): None now fine quo non, or ad posse. c. 27. That ceased with innocency. X. This grace is ever effectual, but not ad omnia: It giveth some small degree to some, and more to others: And the weakest have not enough to produce faith, prayer, hope, obedience, but some Velleities and Complacencies only. c. 27. p. 86. XI. He distinguisheth sufficient Grace into that Prater quod nil aliud ex parte Dei per modum Principii necessarium est ut homo Velit ●●t operetur: And that Quod satis est ut homo dicatur posse operari, quamvis ali●● adhu● necessarium est ut de facto operetur. The later he denyeth not: As to the former he saith, Nullum jam dari hominibus lapsis gratia sufficiens, quin sit simul efficax. lib. 3. c. 1. p. 102, 103. This Gratia sufficiens is but the sine quo non, the grace of innocency and not medicinal, and that which Pelagius and the Massilienses held against Augustine, yea, ad gratiam naturae pertinet, & Lapsorum reparationi inutilis & pernictosa. cap. 2. p. 104. For it supposeth Nature to be sound. Quid homini misero perniciosius, quam illa gratia abundare, qua nemo unquam, fatentibus scholasticis, nisi majorem damnationem assecutus est? Hoc ipso quippe ●●●squisque damnabilior est, quo magis sufficienti gratia abundavit, Nemo ●●●● unquam sufficienti gratia usus est, aut utitur, aut vietur in aternum; qui mitius puniretur si tali auxilio caruisset; quo Deus neminem vel damnandorum vel salvandorum usurum esse praescivit. He concludeth c. 4. Nullam Christi gratiam effectu operi● ad quem efficiendum voluntati datur, ulla voluntatis pervicacia frustrans. XII. He maketh this to be the great doctrine of Augustine, that All God's Law, both old and new, is given to convince men that they cannot keep it, and all written precepts are to show men their sin, which maketh them the worse, because of the Laws restraint and commands: And that Law and Grace thus differ, that Christ's Grace is only Gods making us will and do; and the Law showeth that we cannot, and so driveth us from is to Grace; c. 4. That to Jews and Christians that have written Laws, there is no sufficient or adjuvant grace, but what maketh them do the act. c. 5. No potential grace (that giveth the power) is sufficient to the act, unless it give the act. c. 6. Hence is the necessity of sinning, p. 126. Unbelievers want Remote as well as Proximate sufficient help and all its principles. c. 11. And the Commands are to them impossible, yet make them unexcusable, c. 18, 19 XIII. That impotency excuseth a man, when he strongly would do the act and cannot; but not that by which he would not do it, though he cannot will it without grace. p. 145, 146. XIV. Christ's dying for All, is meant only for all the Church, or all sorts: yet as he giveth to others the grace of faith and Love without perseverance and salvation, so far he died for them▪ and prayed for them. c. 20. p. 163, 164. XV. The essence of the grace of Christ is a Heavenly Suavity or Delectation, given before our free act, by which the will is bowed to act what God will. It is a vital and indeliberate act of the soul, even of Love and Desire before Consent, and that Delight which is our Rest and Joy. li. 4. c. 1. & 11. Plainly it is a necessitated complacency, which is the first act of Love; when God and Righteousness, not for ourselves, but for themselves and as such, are Pleasing to the soul. XVI. Christ's grace is necessary only to Love God sincerely in every act of obedience, and only this Love and Suavity is Christ's grace, whatever other graces or acts as to the name it is found in. li. 5. c. 1. For nothing is good that is done only by Fear, and not in Love of Justice. The Justice Loved is not any habit or act of the soul, but God the Eternal Justice. c. 2. and the Justice of his Precepts. Virtue is nothing but the Love of God. c. 3. The four Cardinal Virtues are fourfold Love of God: And so all others. c. 4, 5. XVII. By the Love of God is not meant only that degree by which we Love him above all, but true sincere Love of God for himself, and not ullius creaturae intuitu: which is either Imperfect, not Loving him so well as the creature, (but only to an uneffectual Velleity) which yet how remiss and small soever, is the true and chaste fruit of the Love of God, even amoris amicitiae: or more perfect, which justifieth. The first is quaedam dilectio justitiae quasi simplex ejus complacentia, quae non eo usque increverit, ut adversantia isti bonae voluntati valeat superare. This goeth usually first, and sinners find a good will to goodness, and like it, and many years perhaps are wishing and purposing to leave their sins for it, and turn to God, till at last Love prevaileth. And this though imperfect, is true sincere Love, not from a perfect habit, but from the excitation of the Holy Ghost: It hath the same object as perfect Love, that is, Justice for Justice, or God for God, not loved on consideration of any other reward: which proveth it sincere Love. Such wish to live chastely, temperately, justly, but cannot come to it. Out of this imperfect love, springs faith; faith may be habitually many years before Justification: Justification is the grace of perfect Love to God above all: Hope and Perfect Love also come from this initial Love. c. 7, 8, 9 XVIII. As Hope, so Reward and respect to it may stand with this grace of Love: For the Reward is not desired ex amore concupiscentia for ourselves only; cum enim charitatis proprium sit & unica voluptas diligere Deum, non quia hoc sibi suave vel utile vel gloriosum est, vel alia quacunque consideratione redundat in se, sed quia ita est ordo creatur● sub creatore, qui propter seipsum super omnia (ex superexcellenti bonitate) diligendus est— ita unicum praemium est, veritatem & bonitatem Dei facie ad faciem contemplando ardentius amare & lavaare Deum; non quia utile est & beatificum diligenti, sed quid ae●●rnae veritati▪ congruum, dilecto debitum, etc. Amoris hic inchoati, Amor futurus consummatus unica merces. Praemium Dei ipse Deus est. Quisquis delabitur ab illa charitatis puritate, ut amore concupiscentiae incipiat velle & concupiscere sibi Deum, totum dilectionis ordinem quem natura docet, & Lex aeterna praecipit, diligendi perversitate perturbat. Name & Deum ad se refert, & seipso fruitur, quorum utrumque aeterna & indispensabili lege proscriptum est. c. 10. XIX. The fear of punishment (and attrition) is good, being f●g● mali; an Antecedent of wisdom: It is from a certain general grace, but not that properly called the grace of Christ: The Spirit of the Old Testament even of fear, is God's Spirit: not that which Christ died to give men, which is contrary (delectation;) but another much inferior grace, which after the firm belief of God's judgement and eternal punishment, fortassis Gratiam peculiaris cujusdam providentiae & operationis non excedit. They that have but the Righteousness of fear by knowing the Law, have not God's righteousness but their own: Indeed they have faith and that radicated, but not Christ's proper grace, but that which may come ex proprii arbitrii viribus, excited by providence, or, if you will, inspired fear: no sin can be avoided by it, but by other sin. c. 22, 23, etc. It is but of self-love. It is Legal righteousness and our own. c. 31, 32. XX. Liberty of will is either mere Voluntariness, whose contrary necessity is involuntarii coactio; or that free state which is the Love of God, consistent with simple necessity. lib. 7. XXI. Gratia Christi est Praedeterminatio voluntatis, sed non Dominicanorum praedeterminatio. 1. Praedeterminatio physica est motio nescio quae virtuosa, habens esse incompletum, ut colores in a●re, impetus in impulso: Gratia Christi est verissimus motus voluntatis, ineffabilis, viz. delectatio, etc. 2. Praed. physica non est eis actus Vitalis animi, sed aliquid cui voluntas tantum passive subjacet: Gratia contra, etc. 3. Praedet. physica in quibuscunque circumstantiis voluntas collocetur, omnem superat resistentiam & semper facit effectum: contra delectatia victrix, si alter ard●ntior est, in solis inefficacibus desideriis haerebit animus. 4. Praed. physica est instar concursus cujusdam generalis Dei in ordine supernaturali: Adjutorium Christi non ita. 5. Praed. physica necessaria statuitur omnibus agentibus ex vi causae secundae, etc. Christi adjutorium laesa tantum voluntati propter vulnus necessarium est. 6. Praed. physica propter naturalem indifferentiam voluntatis exigitur: Gratia non ita— 7. Praed. physica statui innocentiae necessaria dicitur: Gratia Christi non ita, ergo high (Dominicani) magis Aristotelici quam Augustiniani sunt. Gratia tamen est Praed. physica: And grace and freewill are reconcilable as Predetermination and freewill are. l. 8. c. 2, 3, 4. Summa est, quod Gratia Amantem & Volentem facit: & non tantum posse velle dat. In conclusion he belly Calvin, 1. As denying in man boni & mali electionem, and so in many ●ther points. cap. 21. XXII. His doctrine of Predestination as congruous to this I pass by, ●nly adding that he denyeth Angels to be elected of grace or to perseverance, which was but foreseen, and they were made to differ, not by ●race, but by merits: Man is elected to merits and glory; but to glory ●efore the foresight of merits. The Reprobation of Angels was after the purpose of giving them sufficient grace, and the foresight of sin▪ Permis●●on of sin was no effect of it: But the Reprobation of men was by God's positive absolute will, of men in original sin, and the effect of it excaecation and obduration; but not the permission of the first sin. lib. 10. This is the Epitome of Jansenius as far as concerneth our present business. The Animadversions. §. 2. I. IT seems Augustine and Pelagius were both pious men, that differed in the methodizing and wording those fundamental conceptions in which they agreed; by which Pelagius ran into errors. And I doubt, he was not so innocent as Jansenius intimateth, when he maketh Augustine to be the first true Teacher of grace, and Pelagius his Opinion to have been so ancient. And if it were not too bold to say so against one that read over all Augustine ten times, and all his writings against the Pelagians thirty times, I would say that I think that Austin owned more universal grace and freewill, than Jansenius supposeth him to have owned. Of Prosper and Fulgentiu● it cannot modestly be denied; who I think were of Augustine's mind. II. He confesseth that self-determining freewill and sufficient Grace, were the condition of the Angels and innocent man; and so that it is not alien to God's government, or prerogatives, for subjects to be so Ruled and Judged. III. He seemeth to me to ascribe far too much to innocent man and Angels in using sufficient grace, when he maketh their wills the chief laudable cause of the effect: I rather think that no Angel ever did any good, the chief praise of which was not due to God as the principal first cause. God giveth them all the power, liberty, help, means, motives, by which they do it; Besides that they did nothing but what he fore-decreed and willed they should (eventually) do: Therefore there is no good but of him as the first cause, though not as the sole cause. iv Whether the best actions of Infidels or ungodly men be properly to be called good, is but a Logomachy: Call them but a Less evil, or the abatement of evil, and actions that tend as Means to their repentance, and salvation, and I shall not disagree with you in this. V His concession that the first sin was not necessitated is of great moment: But it is a great mistake, that following sins are necessary, because they are punishments. It is not the existence of the sin that is a punishment, but the hurtfulness of it supposing the existence. If drunkenness, or gluttony be themselves noxious and penal, that is but a consequent of their existence, which was not necessitated by God as punishing them that caused them. VI The sixth I think sound, and the Schools [pure nature], as if Adam's Love (in the principle) was not his necessary Sanity, is unsound. VII. Here again, 1. I think he giveth too much to freewill in innocency, and too little to God. For Gods Help did not then serve man's will so much as Gods; and God fulfilled all his will while Angels used their power and liberty, and they did no good but what God willed and caused as he saw best. And while man and Angels used their liberty, they fulfilled Gods will in all their duty, as much as if they had been necessitated by natural predetermination. 2. And it is not true that their sufficient grace gave not Merit to the will: For it followeth not, that because they could have omitted a duty, therefore in doing it they did any thing of which God was not the prime cause: He that gave them all their power, disposition▪ objects, helps and motives, did give them that which he calleth Merit. 3. It is his grand error that Gift and Reward are repugnant, and that Life would not have been to Adam, and was not to the Angels of free gift, though of Reward. For it is impossible that any creature can merit of God as a Proprietor in point of Commutative Justice; seeing God is the absolute Owner of us and all things, and no creature can give him any thing but what is his own: Therefore there is a natural impossibility that quoad valorem rei, aut ipsum beneficium a creature can have any thing but of free gift: But God who is an Owner and Benefactor is also a Rector, and so the cause of Moral Order as well as of real Benefits; And so that which as a Benefit is a mere gift, yet quoad ordinem conferendi is given by God per modum praemii to those that will Accept the Gift according to its nature, and denied to those that will despise it and refuse it. As a Father will give a purse of Gold to the Child that will thank him, and humbly take it; and not to the Child that will spit in his face. J●nsenius doth so weakly open the nature of Merit and Reward, as that alone would show that he was not meet for his great undertaking: Though he excellently show that God is our Reward himself, yet the Ratlines praemii he ●aith little to, that can satisfy the judicious. Of which more anon. 4. Angels were differenced inter se by God's will and their own: And we confess, that so far as sin made the difference, it was by their own will and not by Gods: But was he sure that no such difference is made since the fall among men? He will confess, that when Eve sinned before Adam, it was she that made the difference: And how can he prove, that it was not Cain who by sin first differenced himself from Abel? or the Prodigal, Luke 15. that by forsaking his Father, first differenced himself from his Brother? According to his own principles who holdeth falling away from Grace and Justification, doth not he that falleth away, difference himself from him that standeth? He can never prove, that now two men may not have equal help from God to go to Church, or read a good Book, and one do it, and the other go to the Tavern; or read a Playbook. VIII. 1. God doth not so use man as his Instrument in good, but that he giveth the Instrument its proper aptitude and action as to the effect: And that which it is and doth may be spoken of it: To say a thing is good, is to praise it▪ and good must be called good; And to say that you were the Actor of Good and that Voluntarily, is to praise you. Therefore the Actor of good ex natura rei deserveth praise, seeing Truth must be spoken of all things. 2. God himself doth so often praise his servants, and promise to honour them that honour him, that to say no praise is due to them is to charge God with error. 3. To deny all Reward, and Merit as it signifieth Rewardableness, or Moral aptitude for Reward, is to deny the greatest part of the Scripture; to deny God to be our Rector, and so to be our God, to deny the whole frame of his Sapiential Government, and his glory therein, and so to deny his Laws, Judgement and Execution, Sin▪ Duty, Heaven and Hell. Th●● sum of all is this, ●. No man or Angel can merit of God in Commutative Justice as Proprietor▪ But only as Rector. All is (as is before said) of free gift from God as proprietor and Benefactor▪ 2. The same God who is Omnipotent, is also sapientissimus & optimus: And he that glorifieth his Power eminently as the Author of Nature, as Creator, Conservator, and Motor, doth also glorify his Wisdom in rerum Ordine: And he ordereth Moral Agents eminently per sapient●am ●t Rector per media moralia, viz. Doctrinam, Leges, Judicia: And he glorifieth his Goodness and Love partly Antecedently (to man's Actions) and as a free Benefactor; partly consequently, according to the order of his Laws. So that as his Attributes are inseparable, so are (herein) the operations of them. And the same Benefit is ut quid productum the effect of God's Omnipotency and Dominion; and ut Bonum & Beneficium the effect of the Benefactors Love; and yet quoad ordinem conferendi it is Pr●mium à Rectore adjudicatum. And between all these there is no repugnancy. 3. We grant that God Rewardeth no man now, according to the Law of Innocency, (for that condemneth every sinner.) 4. Nor according to, or for the works of the Mosaical Jewish Law. 5. Nor for any sincere obedience to the Law of Nature, or any other, without Redemption by Christ. 6. We are agreed that the Reward is now doubly and eminently a free gift, and the reward of Christ's merits. It is not only free as all Benefits from God to man are, as to commutation: but also after forfeiture freely given to sinners; and it is procured by the merits of Christ, who was freely given to be the Saviour of the world; and it is given us by Christ as free gifts are, upon condition of Acceptance; and an Accepting Will is God's free gift; and they that have it not, want it because they refused Preparatory grace, which they were able to have better used o● submitted to. So that the Reward is only such as a free gift, which quoad ordinem conferendi, & rationes adjudicandi is given by God as a Father; who at once useth Power, Love and paternal Justice, according to the tenor of his own Law of Grace, which is founded in Christ's perfect merits, and is Christ's own Law. VIII. and IX. 1. That quoad eventum the good Angel's grace was effectual, and Adjutorium quo as well as sine quo non, he granteth▪ (And adam's till he fell.) Let us find out the difference then. To say that yet They could have sinned, is a doubtful speech: If [could] signify P●t●●●iam naturalem, it is no● for want of Natural Power that Christ himself sinned not; but because perfection caused the right use of that Power. To be able to sin, or not to believe, or not to love God, if it signify any more than the Natural power which men abuse, is an improper speech▪ for sin is from moral impotency, (or indetermination,) and not an va●t of (other) power. But a Logical Possibility of any event but what ●ame to pass, God's very foreknowledge will exclude, (and so his Decree.) And if the question be Whether Adam could not have stood when he fell, it is agreed that he could. It seemeth then that our Controversy lieth plainly▪ ●● these two things, 1. Whether any man now (Holy or unholy) have any help from. God by Christ by which he is truly able to do any one good action more ●●●● other than he doth, or to forbear any more evil? 2. Whether all Divine causation or operation ●e such, as of itself alone will infer the certainty of man's Volition as the Effect? We g●ant that Divine prescience doth infer it, e●●●oessitate infallibilit●●●●. Divine Volitions some think are ever efficient of all that is willed, and that God hath no other operation but Volition (as Bradwardine and others.) Others deny this, 〈…〉 that God hath Power operative as much distinct from Volition a●●●tellection is, and also that God willeth more than he operateth or totally causeth. And of this opinion must Jansenius needs be, because he held that the freewill of Adam before his fall, and of the good Angels caused more obedience than God caused as to the totality of causation: And yet ●ethinks he should be loath to say that it was more than God willed or decreed. However the former is but a wordy strife: For if God operate only Volendo, yet his will as Immanent and a mere will (as man's,) must be distinguished from his will as transient and efficient by operation. So then the thing in question is, Whether God's power or will so far only as it is operative be so total a cause, as that hac posita ex vi causandi necessario sequitur effectum (viz. fidem, charitatem humanam) secuturum? And we grant that as ex perfectione Intellectus, it followeth, Deus praesc●t hoc futurum, ergo futurum est: so ex perfectione Voluntatis, & summo Imperio, & foelicitate Divina it followeth, Deus vult hoc futurum esse; ergo futurum est: and that ex necessitate existentiae, no doubt it is a good consequence, Deus hoc fecit, ergo factum est: But Whether from his mere adjutorium, or prime efficiency, limited by his own will, it be a good consequence, [God giveth as much help as is of necessity to man's volition; ergo, man will consent or will?] is the doubt. He granteth that in Innocency it would not have followed, but he thinks that now it will. We grant that God giveth not only the posse velle, but the ipsum velle to those that have it: His giving it being but a causing their faculties to Act: And we grant that wherever God absolutely willeth that his Help shall be successful, it is so: And also that whereas all the effect cometh from our natural Power, and Gods grace conjunct, God is the cause of both; And is ever the total cause quoad effectum, that is, totius effecti. And we grant that Gods causing Impress on the will is such on some, (and perhaps on all in the act of special sanctification) as ex vi causae will infer the effect, and is unresistible, and doth not only determine the will, but so determineth it as overcometh all moral power or disposition to the contrary. But yet that there is a Grace or adjutorium of Christ, which giveth a power either not necessitating the act, or when the act followeth not, such as he calleth sine quo non, I think for these reasons: 1. Because else no man can do any more good or less evil, than he doth: which I believe not. 2. Because else All men that perish are damned only for original sin, and its consequents which they had never power to avoid: which is quite contrary to the tenor of the Scripture. 3. And then God would judge them only by the Law of Innocency: whereas he will judge them by Christ and by his Remedying Law, for rejecting the remedying grace. 4. And then the Conscience of the damned, would have nothing to torment them with, or accuse them for, but original sin, and its unavoidable consequents: And it would give them this excuse and ease, God never made it Possible for me to do otherwise. 5. Because it teacheth men great ingratitude to say, I never had any help of Christ. 6. And so it teacheth them impenitently to extenuate their sin, if they do but find themselves wicked, and to say, I never sinned against any Grace of Christ. 7. And it feigneth God to give men all that reprival, and mercy which the reprobate have, from some other Cause and not by Christ; And so to make a kind of grace common in the World which the Scripture knoweth not, nor is according to the Covenant of Innocency or of Grace. 8. Because God is Immutable, and too gross mutations are not without proof to be imputed to his Laws and Government: Therefore it seemeth to me an injurious fiction to say as Jansenius, that God had such Laws as supposed man's self-determining will, and governed so as to use sufficient Grace or adjutorium sine quo non, to man and Angels, at the first, and tha● now he hath no such at all, but only a moving efficiency. I should sooner yield to the Dominicans and Hobbes that no other than necessitated Volitions are possible or ever were, than to hold as he, that there were other before the fall, and none ever since. For as to his great argument (vitiated nature) I answer it, 1. Man is man still; And therefore God ruleth him as man; And that in via. And if then man and Angels were supposed to have a self-determining freewill, that could do this or not do it, we have reason to think it is so still. Why is not grace merely sufficient as consistent with Lapsed as Innocent nature? (supposing that it is not the same help that is now sufficient to salvation as then.) 2. Consider the great difference between perfect Innocency, and some one commanded act: And 3. Consider that the helps afforded by grace are very great, and that Habitual Grace doth in some measure heal lapsed nature, or else what is it? He that is Habitually Prompt to Love and duty, hath some cure, and some ability: For to be prompt is more than to be able. And therefore it is an incredible thing, and a reproach of habitual grace, that Adam was more able to live and persevere without any sinful thought, word, or deed, than a Holy soul is to think one good thought, or speak one good word, or restrain one blasphemy or other sin. Therefore it is as credible that Christ's repairing habitual Grace enableth godly men (and his commone● grace common men) to think or do somewhat better than they do, as that Angels and Adam had no other grace, and could without other, live without any sin. Therefore I take Jansenius to do well in opening Original pravity, and the power of God's grace, and his special intent to save his chosen. But I think he so earnestly studied for that side alone, that he injuriously overlooketh the whole frame of sapiential Government, and the common grace which is presupposed to the special, and greatly wrongeth Christ and his grace, by denying him to give to men in common, that which our experience assureth us they possess. Ad X. When he maketh uneffectual Velleities to be Christ's unresistible grace, either he thinketh that men are saved with such only, or not; (for he speaketh not his mind plainly in that that I can find:) If yea, than he abaseth the grace of Christ, to think that many are saved by it, that love a Whore or any sin much better than God and Grace and Glory. If not (as I think he held) than he holdeth that most that have the effectual grace of Christ are damned, and had no possibility (properly) of escape. And why doth he make so harsh a thing of men's asserting a sufficiency of some uneffectual grace, and say to what purpose is it; and yet assert that to most men the grace of Christ had not so much as any sufficiency to save them, nor put them into any true possibility of life? Ad XI. I. It seemeth to me a contradiction to say (as in the second branch of his distinction) that Homo potest Velle, and yet that aliud adhuc adjutorium necessarium est ut de facto velit. For necessarium est sine quo res esse non potest: Therefore the non potest is present wherever the necessarium is wanting. But if they talk only of a passive or obediential power, and say, [Man can believe because God can make him believe,] and so denominate man Able to do that, which they mean God is able to make him do, this is but to play with words. II. His saying that now there is no sufficient grace, is before disproved, and by him not proved. That it is the same with that of the state of Innocency, is vainly said: It is the same in general, as man is the same; and Intellect and will the same: But to be able to live without sin, and to be able to forbear one sin or to hear a Sermon, or do one commanded act, are not the same. And to hold none but this with Pelagius, is not all one as to hold this with a more special grace. And that it is pernicious to the lapsed is rashly said: For in the reprobate it doth them no harm but good; and in the elect it tendeth to higher grace. And he mistaketh in saying that it supposeth nature sound: For if it were proved that nature without grace hath no good inclination, yet why may not unsound nature, receive grace ad posse? Is not that grace some cure of its unsoundness? and tends to more? III. But as to his saying that the more men have of it the more miserable they are, and the more damnable, and that no man ever used sufficient grace or will do, I answer, 1. The good man it seemeth forgot that all the same may be said as truly of his special Grace, both in them that come short of faith and Justification, and them that apostatise from it (as he holdeth many do.) 2. But it is not true, that having it maketh them damnable any more than having life, health and riches; but it's the abusing it. 3. That never any used sufficient grace, by his leave and the School-mens, is unproved: viz. that no man since the fall ever did any good, or forbore any evil, obediently, by such grace as left him able to have done otherwise in the instant before the act, or as inferred not his volition as necessary exviillius causae. 4. And that all that which cometh short of the effect, is none of the Grace of Christ is unproved, unless he mean only the adequate immediate effect. The Law doth make Duty, and so hath its effect; And God's motions make their various Impressions on the soul, and so have their effect: But whether a Godly man's will could not by that same motion have produced a better effect in his will than was produced by it, he must better prove. Ad XII. I. Whereas Paul opposeth the Law of works, and the Grace of Christ, he opposeth, or too far distinguisheth the Law of Christ and the Gra●e of Christ; Just as Sir H. V in his Meditations. He taketh all spoken and written precepts or Laws, to be the Law, which is distinguished from Grace, which is mere Alteration of the soul. But this is confusion, and subverteth true Theology. For the Law is the instrument of signifying God's mind, and the Spirit worketh with and by it on our minds: And both go together both before the fall and under Christ: And both are Grace now even as body and soul are one man: The Gospel is oft called Grace in the New Testament: It's true that a Law merely as a Law may be distinguished from the Spirits operations on the soul: And so Paul and Augustine oft show that the Jewish Law as a Law could not make men righteous without grace. And we deny not but the Law of Christ merely as a Law is insufficient without the Spirit● Grace. But to conclude hence that this is the difference between the Old ●ovenant, and the New, and the Righteousness of each of them (of men under them), that one is obedience to a written Law▪ and the other is the effect of the Spirit, is not sound: For under each Covenant there was both Law and Spirit, though with difference. Adam had Grace as Jansenius confusseth: And the Fathers before the Flood had Law and Spirit. And the Godly ●ews had Law and Spirit: And all Christians are subject to Christ their King, and obey his Laws, though by the Grace of his Spirit: And it is not two Righteousnesses that relate to Law and Spirit, but one as an effect of two concauses; The doctrine of faith and Law and promises of Christa●e the Means which the Spirit useth in operating our Faith, Love and Obedience. And it is not two Covenants that give these two: but as soul and body make one man, so the Word of Christ and his Spirit make up one total cause of our sanctification. The Spirit causeth us to believe that which the Word revealeth, and to love the good which it proposeth, and to obey the Precepts of the Word: Therefore the Gospel is Grace, and the Spirit is Grace, that is, a free gift of God to miserable sinners for their recovery, and inward holiness is the effect of both. And to feign that all obedience as it is performed to Christ's Law upon its proper motives is therefore not of the Spirit, or is our own Righteousness opposed to Christ's, because our own reason and freewill is exercised in it, is Phanaticism, and subverteth the Gospel, and the Prophetical and Kingly Office of Christ. II. God never gave a Law, no not to the Jews, only to convince them that they could not keep it; but to be the Rule of their obedience; And the Just did keep it in sincerity. But the Law of Moses as separated by the ignorant Jews from the promise and grace of Christ could not be kept by any to Justification. To say that Christ's Laws now have no higher end than to tell us that we cannot keep them, is Antichristianity. Are we commanded to repent, believe, love God, only to tell us that we cannot do it? It's true, that without the Spirits help, we cannot. But it's as true, that the Command is the Rule of our duty, and all the Gospel and Covenant of Grace, is the means of exciting us to our duty, by which the Spirit worketh in us faith, repentance, love and obedience. But, saith Jansenius, the Law of Christ is to humble men in the sense of their disability, and drive them to seek to Christ for his grace. I answer▪ 1. Is not humbling men, and driving them to Christ, a good effect? If so, than his Law is the means of all that good. 2. Were the Gospel and all the Apostles Epistles written only to drive men to Christ, and not to edify them and make them perfect to salvation? Were not the Precepts of Love and Holiness means of working Love and Holiness in men? Is not the Word the seed that begetteth men to eternal life? and is not the receiving of this seed into good and honest hearts, made by Christ the cause of holiness and salvation? Were not the Disciples clean by the word that Christ spoke to them? and doth he not say, that his Word was spirit and life, as being the concause of the Spirits vivification? He that never received more benefit by Christ's Doctrine, Law and Gospel, than to be convinced that he cannot believe, repent, obey or love God, hath not yet the benefit which they are principally intended for. But suppose that by Law he had meant the mere penal part or threatening (as some words would make a man suspect:) 1. It's a strange description of a Law, to exclude the precept and premiant part, and include only the penal part which is the last and least. 2. As it is the same Man that hath Love and Hatred, Hope and Fear, so it is the same Law of Christ which hath precept and prohibition, promise and penalty: And it is the same Holiness, or New Creature which is a conformity to all together. Of which more anon. III. He can never prove, that all unbelievers have no Power to ●●e any means which tendeth to ●aith, by a preparatory grace; nor that the use of all such means is Impossible to them. XIII. His distinction of Natural and Moral Impotency is good▪ But than that Moral Impotency itself must not be made the same with the Natural: else there will be the same reason for excusing sin by it. If man's Will had been made by God such as could not possibly love him or holiness, it would not have left a man unexcusable in judgement, that his enmity was Voluntary: It is reason enough for a man to kill a ●oad or Serpent as malum sibi naturale, because it is a hurtful creature; But this is no Moral Evil in them, nor is their death their punishment: nor yet in any ravenous creature, which preyeth on the rest that are innocent. And so would it be with bad men, if God had made them bad▪ Indeed if Adam have made them all bad, and God have given no Saviour▪ Grace or Remedy, they are condemnable and unexcusable, as they were virtually in Adam, if judged only by the Law of Innocency as made to Adam: But they are excusable if judged by Christ by the Law of grace, which condemneth no man merely as not innocent, or a sinner, but as a rejecter of grace. These things are so plain and weighty, that Ja●senius should not join with the Antinomians in opposing them. XIV. While he confesseth that Christ so far died for all, as to procure them all the mercy which he giveth them, I have no further quarrel with him, but to prove that a Condition pardon of sin and grant of Life eternal, with much means and help to make men perform the Condition, which is but a suitable Acceptance, is indeed mercy. XVI. That Christ's grace is Love, or Complacency in good, is a truth which I highly value: but with all these exceptions to his doctrine. 1. It is the Heart of the new Creature, and that which must communicate itself to all the rest, or else they are lifeless and unacceptable: For the will is the man in God's account; And complacency, or love, or appetite is the first act of the will; which is it that he calleth with Augustine Delectation: Grace lieth principally in a Placet. But the man hath more parts than his Heart: And all other parts of sanctification are graces of Christ▪ in their several places, and not love only. 2. Though no man is to love himself as God, nor instead of God, nor above God, nor as the noblest ultimate object of his love▪ yet all men are necessitated by nature to love themselves; and therefore to desire their own felicity in loving God, next to God as the final object of that love; And so our end is finis amantis vel amicitiae which includeth mutual complacency and union, though not in equality. And to such an end, grace causeth us to use the means: And Christ is proposed to us as our Saviour, and all his grace as for our good, and all Gods commands as necessary for our happiness, and sin is described to us to be hated as our o●● evil and destruction, and against our good as well as against God's will and honour. And with us this is denied scarcely by the Antino●ians themselves: Much less by any judicious Christians. 3. It is past the reach of any of us, to prove that our actual love is the first effect of the sanctifying Spirit on the soul. I mean not only, Whether some other acts (as Intellectual perception, and belief) be not in order of nature before it, and in time with it, and real parts of the same new creature, but also, Whether a● Alvarez and others say, there be not such a divine motion or Impulse on the soul tending to this love, and antecedent to love itself, in nature, (love being an effect of Gods will and m●●s,) which Jansenius denyeth. But 4. If it be not so, but really love be the first effect of God on the soul, than the controversies are all at an end, about the difference of sufficient and effectual, equal and unequal grace. For than it would be as Ja●senius saith, and there is no grace but the effect itself, and so there would be no question, but Whether all men love God, and all alike. But I yet believe that there is so preparatory grace of Christ which tendeth to the love of God. XVI. I believe that the will is the prime seat of Morality, and that love or complacency is as the spirit of all saving special grace. But yet it is ill said, that Christ's grace is necessary only to love or delight. For the soul of man hath three faculties, which must be conjunctly sanctified, viz. Vital active power, Intellect and Will; and sin is in all; And the Spirit reneweth them by a threefold effect, Vivification, Illumination and Conversion (or love.) And hatred of sin, and fear of sinning, and of God, are graces of Christ also, (as are obedience, patience, etc.) though below love. 2. There is an Analogical good that is done by self-love and fear, which hath a tendency to man's recovery, though not such good as is true holiness and hath a promise of salvation. XVII. I. Here we come to a difficult case: 1. Whether indeed any ungodly man or Infidel, do love God sincerely amore amicitiae & propter se: The doubt is, because to love him less than sinful pleasures and the creature, seemeth to be a loving him as less amiable or good. And to love him as such, is not to love him as God, nor indeed to love God, but an Idol of the imagination. I think we must say, 1. That no man loveth God adequately; for no man hath an adequate conception of him. 2. But yet that there are some essentials of such true love as is necessary and suitable to our dark and weak condition, which all must have that will be saved (either distinctly or confusedly): As to know and love him as the Infinite Spirit the first cause and last end of all, most powerful, wise and good, our Owner, our Ruler and our Benefactor and chief good: Father, Word and Spirit; the Creator, Redeemer and Sanctifier; the Author of Nature, Grace, Glory. 3. That no wicked or unholy person truly loveth God thus, viz. As his own Governor to make him holy, and save him from the Flesh and World: and as the Author of those holy Laws, by which he governeth, and a righteous Judge according to those Laws. 4. Therefore Jansenius' little sincere Love in sensual men is but a love of aliquid Dei, somewhat of God, and not properly of God as God: speaking of God as the object of love itself. 5. Yet the same person may have all the foresaid Notions of a Deity, and may notionally call them all good and laudable; but his Practical Judgement is not such of God as his holy Governor, Judge and End, as to bring him truly as such to love him. 6. Yet this may be called a Love of God analogically, as he is said to love the King who loveth him as great and good to the Commonwealth, though not as a governing restrainer of his lusts. By this I would have that explained which I have said of this subject in my Saints Rest. II. But here I am at ● further loss. Did he mean that this love called sincere, is in none but those that are saved o● not? As I said before, If he did, than a common Drunkard, Adulterer, etc. may have this love and be saved: But I suppose he meant Negatively: And if so, methinks hence all his opposition to sufficient Grace turneth back upon himself: And to him it may better be said, Why do you feign Christ and the Holy Ghost to give men such a Grace, such a Love to God, as no man ever was or will be saved by, without more? Is it any more dishonour to Christ, to give men some such Power to do some more good ●han actually they do, as Ad●m had to have continued innocent, than effectually to give so many persons sincere love which shall never save the●? (Whether these be they that he will adjudge to Purgatory I know ●●: If so, he will stretch the rank of Venial sins to those that other men call Mortal.) III. But yet my greatest difficulty remaineth: I am in doubt Whether he that denyeth common sufficient grace, and extendeth the grace of Christ seemingly but to few, do not really either make it the same thing with Nature, or extend it to all: For I suspect that all or almost all men on earth, (till they have sinned themselves into diabolical desperate malignity) have this which he calleth Amor amicitiae and sincere imperfect love to God and Justice. For Intellectus est Entis & veri intellectus, & Voluntas est Boni. Good apprehended such, is the Wills necessary natural object. And a simple complacency in apprehended good, is the wills first necessary act. Nature telleth man, that there is created goodness; and that the Creator who giveth it, must needs have more than all his creatures: And nature tells men, that the World, or millions are better than one person; and their good to be preferred: And how can it be then, that he that taketh the World to be so much better than himself, and God to be better, that is, more amiable than all the World, should not have the least simple complacency in thinking of him▪ All men take Wisdom and Goodness, and Beneficence for amiable: And they that believe that God hath most of these, must needs have some Love to him, not only as good to them, but as most excellent in himself: Insomuch that as Adrian the sixth before cited saith, in some sort a bad man may love God better than himself; and he is scarce worthy the name of a man, that would not rather be annihilated, or wish that he had never been born, than that there were no World, or no God, (if per impossibile he supposed he could live without them.) And if you tell every man that he hath that sincere love to God which is Gratia Christi, who hath the least love to God and Justice propter se, though he have more love to his fleshly interest and sinful pleasures, I doubt you will not much differ from Pelagius, and will have no way left but to say, that it is not of Grace by Christ that Nature is reprieved and supported: Or at least that this is of a common sort of grace. We may presume of many things as received from our Teachers: but it is hard to prove, that Adam the next moment after his sin was totally deprived of all degrees of love to God, and goodness, and so was privatively as bad as Devils; or that all mankind are naturally so: Though I believe that it was of grace, even Gods first pardoning act as our Redeemer, not so totally to execute the Law, nor take away his grace, and leave man to the utmost penalty of his sin, but to keep nature from being as bad as else it would have been. But sure Man is Man still, and not a Devil: And I speak with few or none that seem not to have some liking of God and goodness, or Justice as such; though they love not God or goodness, as contrary to their fleshly lusts, nor love God as their Sanctifier and Ultimate End. And thus the Carnal Mind is Enmity to God, being not subject to his Law, though this be consistent with loving him secundum quid. iv I believe him that there is a faith, such as the Devils, which may be without Justification, both in habit and act: But that the same Faith which after justifieth, can be many years Habitually before Justification (that is, Sanctification as he meaneth it) I believe not: Seeing God hath promised that all that believe (thus) shall be justified and have his Spirit. V Jansenius seems to me to set too light by Habitual Grace, as if it were some common thing in comparison of the Act: Whereas I take a Habit of love to God to differ from an act, either as a Spring or Rivulet from a drop, or as Honesty from an honest act, or Learning from a learned exercise, or as a fixed friendly Inclination which is like to Nature, differeth from a friendly action, and to be more excellent than a particular act. XVIII. His judgement of the Matter of the Reward (that it is but God himself seen and perfectly loved for himself) is of great use: But yet it is both lawful and ex individuationis principiis & ex natura humana necessary that we take and desire this as our own felicity, and so under God intent ourselves. And quoad rationem praemii it is the Reward of a Rewardable state or work, and therefore of the free act of a creature not merely necessitated: It may be a gift without Respect to our Liberty and Obedience, but not a reward: But it is both a gift and a Reward. XIX. That Fear and its effects are good, and yet not of Christ's grace; that they are of God's Spirit, but not the Spirit given by Christ, but the grace of some other Providence; All this I take for unsound and injurious to Christ and grace. Where doth the Scripture tell us since the fall, of any grace given to the World but by the Redeemer, who is Head over all things to his Church? If you say, that God can give men the grace to fear him and departed from evil without a Saviour or Mediator▪ how can you prove, that he may not do so by the rest? Either he giveth this grace as Rector according to his Laws or not: If not, then on the same reason you may feign that most men are not his subject;, nor under any Law of God; and so sin not, nor are punishable: If yea, than it is according to the Law of Innocency, or of Grace, (For if Moses Law as Jewish be called a third, it is nothing to our case.) If it be by a Law of grace, it is Christ's Law, either of the first Edition, called the Promise, or of the second, called the Gospel: The Spirit and grace (in various measures) given by both, are of Christ. It's a dangerous assertion, that there is any, yea, so much grace, which is not Christ's: It prejudiceth me against Jansenius' Opinion, that it should cast him on such absurdities, as to deny so much of the grace of Christ, while he pretendeth to honour it, and to set up such a feigned way and sort of grace without a Saviour, and yet speak so hardly of the Pelagians as he doth for wronging grace. 2. As Fear is one of man's natural passions, though but subservient to love: so the sanctifying of it is one part of the Work of Christ's Spirit. 3. I am sure Christ himself commandeth Fear, Luke 12. 4, 5. Heb. 4. 1. & 12. 28, 29. & passim. And is it our own Legal Righteousness to obey the commands of Christ? Indeed if Fear were all, or had no conjunct hope and love, it would be Legal, and show the Spirit of bondage, from which Christ delivereth us by the Spirit of Power, and Love, and a sound mind, which are the fruits of the Spirit of Adoption: For Moses Law separated by the Infidel Jews from the Law of Grace or Promise of a Justifying Mediator, could have no better effects than Fear: But Abraham that believed and foresaw Christ's day, rejoiced in that Faith, and yet had a Law of obedience which had its penalty; and so hath the Law of Grace which we obey. XX. Of freewill I have said enough before: Natural Liberty as distinct from the Moral freedom from sin and ill disposition, is sure more than mere Voluntariness: And I think if God gave Satan or man power, to take away from a Saint all his Habitual and Actual love of God and goodness, whilst antecedently the person did hate such a change and pray against it, by making him willing of evil, and making a Devil of him remedilessly, he would take away or cross the Natural as well as the Moral Liberty of his will, though it were Willingness that were caused. If any think otherwise, remember that it is but de nomine, for the re we are agreed, that such a change would be our great misery. XXI. I take it to be the commendation of Jansenius, that he renounceth the Dominicans Physical Efficient Predetermining Premotion, as naturally necessary to all actions natural and free. But his habitation, converse and worldly interest tempted him factiously to calumniate Calvin, lest he himself should become odious with his own party, and so miss of his expected success; which hath prevailed also with Gibieuf, Arnoldus and most other Papists to do the like, when they differ from their Brethren. XXII. He well saith, that Permission of the first sin is no effect of Reprobation: But his ordination of God's acts into [this Before and that After] and so his differencing the Election of Angels and men, I fear hath somewhat in it presumptuous and unproved. In conclusion, I much mislike in Jansenius, 1. His contempt of the Sacred Scriptures, as being not properly Christ's Laws, but some odd occasional Writings, his Laws being only in the heart and tradition. 2. His slighting of Habitual Grace comparatively, which yet is indeed Christ's Law and God's Image in the heart. 3. His ●eigning a new or odd sort of grace (fear) which is none of the grace of Christ, no not preparatory to his higher work, but a grace of some other Providence. 4. Consequently that there are men (yea, most) who are no subjects of Christ, nor under any Law of grace by Christ, and yet not under the mere Law of Innocency; and therefore are under some other Law (who knows what?) or lawless. 5. His damning all that perish merely for Original Sin, and its necessitated consequents, which no man had ever the least power to avoid. 6. His asserting that Angels and Adam had sufficient Grace, and freewill, by which the Angels did, and Adam could have persevered in Innocency and never sinned: And yet that since the fall, no ungodly man hath such help and freewill to any one better act than he doth, nor the holiest person to any better than he doth; but the best Saint is less able to do one better act, than Adam was to keep all the Law. 7. And so his consequent, that it is properly impossible for any man in the World, good or bad, to do any better than he doth. 8. That all they love God sincerely amore amicitia who love God and Justice propter se as amiable in himself, though they love their filthiest sins so much better, and all their fleshly worldly interest, as that they have but an uneffectual wish that they could leave them. 9 That we must not say, that Christ giveth men either a Power to do better than they do, nor yet that Grace of Fear which they have, (as being below him); And yet must say that he giveth multitudes this uneffectually sincere love, which never saveth them. 10. That a Habit of true faith may be many years in a man before i● justify him: when as the word [true] must mean some other faith, or else that same will never justify him which did not justify him so long. 11. His Antinomian or Fanatic distinguishing Law and Grace, as if Christ had no Precepts or Laws, but Operations; or else his Gospel and Covenant in signis were no part of his Grace. 12. And thence his fiction that all that which is done by any Grace ad posse, and in obedience to Christ's written Law, is a Legal Righteousness of our own, and no part of Christ's Righteousness. These with what else I have before disclaimed, I dislike in Jansenius his way: And yet think that a man that can well distinguish words from things, and will not be deceived by ambiguous terms, may show that even he and his adversaries are not so far disagreed as they seem. E. g. Whether Christ died for all? They are agreed that he died to procure for all so much Grace or Mercy as he giveth them; and that among these a conditional Pardon, and Gift of Christ and Life, is one, etc. And they agree that he died not with any absolute intent of giving them any more than he doth give them. What remaineth then, but the Controversy de nomine, Whether this much be fitly called, his Dying for all? which Scripture putteth out of doubt. The like I might say of many of the rest of the differences. §. VIII. I Conclude with this summary determination of all these Controversies to satisfy sober minds. 1. GOD our CREATOR is the Causa prima, the spring and Master and end of NATURE; and accordingly having antecedently made the creature in such variety as pleased him, 1. He Actively affordeth them all that general Influx by which the Being given them is supported, and they are sufficiently furnished for their several motions, operations or receptions. 2. And his Infinite Goodness and blessed Will is their common End in which they are all finally terminated; but variously thereby felicitated according to the variety of their capacities. 3. And as the Governor of the Universe he sapientially ordereth all things, and conducteth them from their Beginning to their End; but variously as they are various. II. So GOD our REDEEMER, having in Christ made all necessary preparations, and Redeemed mankind as to what belonged to a Saviour to do in Person upon earth, and having antecedently made an Universal Law of Grace, 1. Doth Reveal his Mercy to lost sinners, commonly, but in various degrees as he pleaseth; And doth concur with his Gospel, by vouchsafing a Common Gracious Help, which hath an aptitude and tendency to the recovery of lost sinners. 2. And as the final Infinite Good he felicitateth all that are by Grace conducted to him as their end; and on the rest will have his absolute will fulfilled, and will not be frustrate of his End, though sinners may be frustrate of theirs, and be unhappy. 3. And as Rector he sapientially conducteth man in the way to this felicitating End, antecedently by the Gospel, which is the same in itself to all that have it: and consequently as Judge by his Rewards; In which supposing his foresaid commoner preventing Grace, he consequently giveth men such further degrees of co-operating grace or help and spiritual mercy, as in the use of former grace, they are fit to receive: and justly and penally denyeth that to others which they have made themselves immediately unapt for, or uncapable of in the way of this ordinary common operation. But withal as a free Owner and Benefactor who may do with his own as he list, (as he diversifieth the works of Nature, though Nature keep a constant course, except in Miracles, so) he freely diversifieth the gifts of his Grace (external and Internal;) though as Rector and the common Benefactor of lost sinners, he altar not the terms and means of Grace, which he at first determined of. And the equality and constancy of his Rectoral and Judicial distributions, is no way inconsistent with the diversity which as a free Owner and Benefactor he maketh either in his Decrees or Gifts. So that he is the Cause of All Good, though not every way equally to All, to make All Good and happy: And he hath made man capable of Improving his Gifts, to return him his own with Usury, which he will require. But he is the Author of no evil of sin; nor punisheth any but for sin, and as a means to that Good which is better than the Impunity of the sinner: But he ruleth and causeth the Effects of sin, when he causeth not the sin itself. The Order of his Productions may be much perceived by man, and are fit for our observation. Of his own Knowledge and Volitions of them, we know no more, but that It is not formally the same thing as Knowledge and Will in Man; that It is most perfect and incomprehensible; that It is his Essential Intellect and Will variously named as variously connoting the effects and objects: that To dispute of any other internal order, priority or posteriority in God's Knowledge, or Will, (as if he had particular Thoughts, Ideas and Volitions as man hath, or any thing in Him were Caused by the object,) and to vex the Church with contentions hereabout, is a presumptuous arrogance and profaneness, which God will punish, and good and sober men should tremble at and hate, and not become parties, in such daring meddlings with the Consuming Fire. Notes on some passages of Mr. Peter Sterries' Book of freewill. §. 1. IT is long since I heard much of the name and fame of Mr. Peter Sterry, long Chaplain to Robert Lord Brook, and after to Oliver Cromwell when he was Protector (as then called.) His common fame was, that his Preaching was such as none or few could understand: which incensed my desire to have heard him, of which I still missed, though I oft attempted it. But now since his death, while my Book is in the Press unfinished, a posthumous tractate of his cometh forth of freewill: upon perusal of which I find in him the same notions (for so far as he meddleth with the same subjects) as in Sr. H. Vane, and somewhat of what Dr. Gibbon seemeth to deliver in his Scheme; but all handled with much more strength of parts and raptures of highest devotion, and great candour towards all others, than I expected. His Preface is a most excellent Persuasive to Universal Charity: Love was never more extolled than throughout his Book. Doubtless his head was strong, his wit admirably pregnant, his searching studies hard and sublime, and, I think, his Heart replenished with holy Love to God, and great charity, moderation, and peaceableness toward men: In so much that I hearty repent that I so far believed fame as to think somewhat hardlier or less charitably of him and his few adherents than I now hope they did deserve. Hasty judging, and believing fame is a cause of unspeakable hurt to the world, and injury to our brethren. §. 2. But I find that it is no wonder that he was understood by few, For 1. His sublime and philosophical notions, met not with many Auditors, so well studied in those things as to be capable of understanding them. It is a great inconvenience to men of extraordinary discoveries and sublimity, that they must speak to very few. 2. And though he cloud not his matter with so many self-made names and notions as Behmen, Para●elsus, Wigelius and some others, yet those few that he hath, do somewhat obscure it▪ 3. But above all the excessive pregnancy of his wit produceth so great a superabundance of Metaphors or Allegories, that (about the description of Christ especially) they make up almost all his style; so that to any ordinary Reader his matter is not so much clothed in Metaphors, as drowned, buried or lost: And though I confess my wit, being to his, but as a barren Desert to a florid Meadow, may be apt to undervalue that which it attaineth not; yet I do approve of my present judgement, in thinking, that (seeing all metaphorical terms are ambiguous,) he that excessively useth them befriendeth not the Truth and the hearers intellect, but while he is too much a Rhetorician, he is too little a good Logician: a●d as he is hardly understood by others, I should fear lest he feduce his own understanding, and can scarce have clear mental conceptions of that matter, which he utters by a torrent of ambiguous Metaphors, if he think as he speaketh, and his words be the direct expressions of his mind. I had rather be instructed in the words of the most barbarous Schoolman, adapted to the matter, than to be put to save myself from the temptation of equivocations in every sentence which I hear, and to search after that Truth (which is known only naked) under so florid a disguise and paint. §. 3. But I cannot deny, that though my temptations before were very great, to doubt whether the Doctrine of Universally-necessary Predetermination, as delivered by Bradwardine, the Dominicans, Dr. Twisse, Rutherford and Hobbes, were indeed to be rejected, the Reading of Mr. Sterry increased my temptation; not by any new strength of argument which he hath brought, but by the power of his pious florid Oratory, by which, while he entitleth God to the necessitating causation of all sin, and misery, he seemeth to put so honourable and lovely a clothing on them, from their relative order to God, to the Universe, and to their End, as that I felt my hard thoughts of both to abate, and I was tempted to think of them as part of the amiable consequents of the Divine Love, and of the Harmonious order caused by the manifold wisdom of God. §. 4. And by this I see, of how great importance it is in the world, not only what Doctrine is taught, and with what proof, but who speaketh it, and in what manner. For as I found the same things reverenced in Dr. Twisse and Rutherford, which were not so in Alvarez, or Jansenius, or Thom. White; so I found the same Doctrine of Predetermining Necessitation almost commonly brought into greater dislike by Hobbes and Benedictus Spinosa's owning it, and applying it to it's too obvious uses, than all In Tract. Polit. Theol. argumentations had ever before brought it; And I see it as likely to recover its honour by the pious and florid dress put upon it by Mr. Sterry, as if some new demonstrations for it were found out. §. 5. If I should recite Mr. Sterries' mind in his own Metaphors, the Reader may not understand it; If I Epitomise him and change his words, some may say that I misunderstand and wrong him: But I will not do it willingly; and if I do it necessarily, his stile is my excuse. He that would be seen must come into the light. §. 6. The sum of that which I am now concerned in, in Mr. Sterry's Treatise is, That the Freedom of all things is to act according to their natures; and so is that of the will of man; and that in God and man, Necessity and Liberty concur, and that whatever we do or will, we do or will it necessarily, as being moved to it by the first caus● and a chained connexion of necessitating causes; by which all things in the world are carried on: That a will not determined by God, but left to a self-determination without Gods predetermining causality, is not to be asserted, as contrary to God's Goodness, Wisdom, power▪ etc. That sin is a privation formally, and all that is positive in it is directly and not by accident of God's positive causation (else with the Manichees we must hold two first causes;) And that the formal privation is from the wi●lidrawing of necessary Divine causation of the contrary, and God is the Negative necessitating cause of it: Even as he causeth Light by the shining of the Sun, and causeth darkness by its setting or not ●hining: or as he causeth substances and shadows, Life and death; And that all sin thus as necessarily followeth God's not giving the contrary, or his leaving the defectible Creature to itself, as the darkness followeth the Lights removal; And this was the entrance of sin into the world; the Woman being Necessarily deceived, necessarily sinned; and all good and evil is thus (as to necessity equally) to be resolved into Gods causing and not causing Will; what he will cause cannot but be, and what he will not cause cannot be: And this is the beautiful variety and harmony in the Universe: In God himself is nothing but perfection, but the Greature being the shadowy Image of God, defectibility and imperfection is essential to it: so that he reduceth Morality to the frame, and necessity of physical motion, and maketh Moral Good and evil to be indeed as much natural good and evil and of the same kind (except as in another subject) as Summer and Winter, heat and cold, day and night, health and sickness, life and death, animate and inanimate, the unavoidable diversifications of the will and work of God; And that every permission of his will is accompanied with a positive volition of the thing permitted, (And yet that Will is not properly in God, but so called after the manner of man:) That sin is considered as related to the Principle of action, which is God, and so it is good; or as in the terminus Man, and so it is horrid, devilish, odious, evil, as blindness, death, darkness, caused all by God's desertion, or not operating otherwise than he doth. §. 7. To the quieting of the mind that cannot digest this, but thinketh God is thus dishonoured, being made more than Satan the cause of sin, and misery for sin, which the Scripture contradicteth; and that man is excusable at the bar of Justice that could no more (in innocency) forbear to sin, than to make a world; To them that think it hard that no one in all the world could ever possibly do more or less Good or Evil than they do, but that is all done, by physical motion as in an Engine, etc. he hath a great deal to say, and more than ever I elsewhere met with, and with great modesty proposed. §. 8. As to the Law (whose transgression is sin) he supposeth, that Whatsoever imposeth on us any thing to be done by us, as an antecedent condition to any consequent good, is the Law opposed to the Gospel. Pag. 173. Yea that the proposal or pressing of any Truth or Goodness on us, in a literal or moral way only, or the word as written in Letters, is the Law; and the spirit operating the thing itself on the soul is the Gospel; the first is the old Covenant and the second the New: That the proper and next ends of the Law (or letter) are sin, condemnation, death and the Divine wrath: To let in sin, and heighten it that it might abound; and to bring on us spiritual death; These flow not from the Law of itself; but by accident, from the weakness of the flesh and creature: But both Law and sin are brought in ultimately for good; viz. God having a design which he intended to enrich with the fullest, the highest glories of his Godhead, brings forth in the course of this design, a dark scene of all evils, sin, death, wrath; The evil in this scene is carried on to its utmost extent and height; Thus the variety becomes more full in the whole design, and the chief design is heightened in its greatest Glory; God in his Infinite wisdom so bringeth in this scene of sin and evil, that himself is perfectly pure and good in the contrivance and conduct of it. He setteth up a Law, good, holy and spiritual, but such that sin inevitably may take occasion from it through the frailty of the flesh and of the creature, to spring up as an overflowing flood, to display itself over all things in its fullest foulest birth. This Law is to convince us of the frailty and mutability in man's primitive state, etc. (viz. that he is a creature.) For Pag. 175, 176. man is composed of the light of God, and his own proper darkness; These two the Schools call the Act and Potentiality, the form and the matter, being and not being, which constitute every Creature; The darkness or nothingness, which is the Creatures own, is the proper ground of sin— The Law comes and distinguisheth the Light from the Darkness— Pag. 177. (so that to see sin is to see that we are Creatures;)— God withholds his Pag. 178. Divine presence, appearances and influences from man,— and so the darkness discovereth itself in man, and predominateth and captivateth him entirely, and becomes his choice and lord (so that sin is but an Imperfect Creature, and the Law to cause and show it.) §. 9 Pag. 113, 114, etc. He saith [The Immediate cause of the first change made in the understanding at the fall, was the Divine Glory withdrawing or withholding itself— Darkness is the privation of Light: Privations have no proper Causes, but accidental only. Thus the Divine Glory retiring from the understanding, or ceasing to shine in it, is by accident the cause of the darkness there; as the Setting or departing of the Sun is the cause of Night; which is not a blemish to the Sun, but its glory, that in its presence are all the beauties and joys of light, in its absence all the disagreeableness and melancholies of night and darkness: Pag. 115. All evil is from the absence of God, etc. P. 117. The fault in man is the deficiency which ariseth from the defectibility or nothingness of the Creature, in its shadowy state, in the purity of its first Creation. Pag. 122. The fall springs from the Harmony of the eternal design in the Divine mind, being comprehended in it as a part of it.] §. 10. And yet he makes man Guilty and unexcusable, and God just i● this; because [Gild is but our being really bad: And he that cannot deny himself to be bad, is unexcusable: And the opening of this causeth shame: And Justice is to Judge and use all creatures as they are.] §. 11. To be short, he maintaineth, that man can have no freedom from necessitating predetermination; If he should it would cross the nature of God, of the creature, of the soul, and the unity and harmony of all things; But that God causeth all sin negatively as necessarily, as he causeth darkness, or any natural privation: But then he doth with a torrent of Rhetoric so Praise God's design in it, and the beauty and harmony of all things made up of good and evil, unities, varieties, diversities and contrarieties, and showeth so largely the glory that cometh to God by sin, and the good to the Universe, and that it's but our narrowness and weakness of sight that maketh us take it to be any other than a part of the glory of the universe, though bad in and to the person that sinneth, that I confess I never found myself more tempted to Love sin, or to cease my hatred of it, than by his florid Oratory. §. 12. And withal, as he resolveth all the rest of Morality into Physical conceptions, so he seemeth to judge suitably of Hell and of Redemption, supposing that all this darkness that God brings on sinners, is but to prepare for their resurrection to a life of unity and glory; and that it shall go well with them in the end. §. 13. And as to the work of Redemption, his notions are too floridly or ambiguously delivered for me to undertake with confidence to unriddle: But this seemeth the sum: 1. That God is the fountain of Being by Emanation as the Sun of light: And that his eternal Wisdom is Jesus Christ in the first instant or nature. 2. That the first ●reature that he made (or emaneth from him) is a perfect universal mind, the platform of all the rest of the Creation; (such as the old Philosophers called the soul of the world, or an universal Intelligence:) And that this is Jesus Christ in his second nature and notion: which Arius knew, but did ill deny his divine nature. 3. That this Universal Spirit or Mind, maketh all the world besides, and is in them all: And so the whole Creation else was Christ's first shadowy Image, (or body.) 4. That the Angels are the noblest parts of this, and that the Deity first, and Christ's superangelical nature next, is one in them all, and they one with him, as the beams with the Sun, and as the lower part of the Sunbeams with the parts next the Sun. 5. That the soul of man is the next part of Christ's shadowy Image, into which he descended. 6. And so into all Bodies. 7. And as into a special Branch, into that Body born of the Virgin Mary. 8. And in that, and in other Bodies, he dyeth, and descendeth to his lowest state; and 9 Then, as the Sun, doth rise again, and bring all back to the state of pure spirituality in his superangelical nature, whence all sprang: And this is their Redemption; which is most floridly set forth. §. 13. This doctrine seemeth to reconcile Philosophy (or Gentilism) and Christianity: For what is it almost but names that are left in difference? That which a Philosopher will call an universal Intelligence, or soul of the world, he calleth Christ: And if such a soul there be, no one will deny but that it floweth into all particular souls and bodies, and is united to them, or is to individuals as the soul in the head to the soul in the hand and foot. §. 14. And if I did believe that sin, death, hell; and holiness, life, Glory, are in the world but as Winter and Summer, Night and Day, and, as Origen, that the wicked are but in a state of Revolution, and shall come about again into a state of hope; or, as he here seemeth, that their sin and misery is but like the dying of a flower in the fall, that shall in the Spring again be as before, (or rather another in its stead;) and that it is but the retiring of Christ from the Creature, as the spirit of the Tree in Autumn from the Leaves, I should then be ready to receive his Necessitating Predetermination to sin, and fit all the rest of my opinions hereunto. §. 15. There is (among many others) one Joh. Jessenius à Jessen Doctor & Eques Hungarus, who in a Tract. de Anima & Corpore Universi hath written much to the like purpose, save as being a Peripatetic he differeth from the Platonists; viz. The world is one Animal and hath one soul and body, which all Creatures are parts of: That Stars are Intellectuals, or Angels, and all intuitively know each others minds, loving the good, and hating the evil here, and are our chief friends and Keepers: That Death befalleth only us lower Creatures; Mors continua singulis, nulli tamen aeterna: Nam post longissimum temporis excursum, quem Plato triginta & insuper aliquot annorum millibus determinare ausus est, removebitur, factâ iterum aliquâ secundùm naturam solutione, redintegratione. And the Intellectus Agens he describeth as Mr. Sterry doth Christ in his second or middle nature, pag. 165. Intellectum agentem substantia primae atque Dei fulgorem esse; Non accidens, sed substantiam Intellige●tem; quaeprimò propriéque Intellectus dicitur agens:— Primae substantiae adhaerens, ab ea excurrens, indivisus & indivisibilis, non aliter ac Lumen à Lucido emanat: and so in many other particulars. §. 16. To all this my short time will allow me to give you but these short observations following: 1. The doctrine of Redemption is so much of mere supernatural Revelation, as that we must not easily receive that concerning it, which is not in the Scriptures; And where Christ's person hath such a description in Scripture as he giveth, I am not satisfied: (e. g. in pag. 232. where he thus saith [The Word made flesh, is the whole Tree of Being, Uncreated and Created, the Root, the Body, with all the Branches, putting forth themselves into one little top branch, now withering, that through its death, they may renew all to a fresh and flourishing spring.] I am loath to say that the Universe is Christ: that his Divinity is the soul, and the world his body, and every Man and Beast and substance part of it, and that he dyeth in all that die, and that his body born of the Virgin Mary, was but one top branch of the Tree, which Christ thus animateth, and so that all other bodies are as truly personally united to the Word, as that. §. 17. I will not deny that the Opinion of a Threefold nature in Christ, looketh very plausibly; viz. that the Divine eternal word (the first nature) produced and united itself to the prime created superangelical Mind (the second nature:) and that this second nature in the fullness of time produced and united itself to the humane (third) nature. 1. There are many texts which seem to countenance it. 2. It seemeth to give Christ the greatest honour, as being the most excellent of all God's Creatures; which is not so easily believed of him as Man. 3. It seemeth to expound those texts of the Old Testament, which mention such appearances of God to Adam, Abraham and others, which many of the Ancients say was Christ: And it seemeth to some more probable that some pre-existent created nature should assume a body, than the Divine nature only and immediately. 4. And it smileth on us as an opinion likely to reduce and reconcile the Arians, (once too great a part of the Christian World, (as called Christians) as not only Philostorgius, and Saudius show, but also Petavius de Trinit.) who holding the prime-created superangelical nature, and denying the Divine, it's like would the more easily be brought to acknowledge the Union of the Divine Nature with the superangelical, if the superangelical itself were first granted them; For they might the sooner be convinced that the eternal wisdom or word, which made that first creature, was intimately united to it. I know some pious worthy persons who upon such reasons incline to this opinion of a threefold nature in Christ; (Though some of them think that this second nature, was the humane soul, assuming only a body, and others, that it assumed both soul and body.) I am not forward to take men for unsufferable Heretics, that differ from me, or hold that which seemeth to me hard and strange; But I must say, 1. That I see no cogent proof of this superangelical nature: 2. That seeming congruities and conveniences must not embolden us to take up a doctrine which is new and strange to the Church of Christ, in so great a matter as the Natures and person of Christ are. 3. And were it never so true, if it be not sufficiently revealed to us in God's Word, it cannot be necessary to our salvation. 4. Yea presuming too boldly to conclude of unrevealed things, (so high) seemeth to me dangerous temerity, curiosity, and profaneness, like the Bethshemites or Uzzah's meddling with the Ark, and the Sons of A●r●n offering false fire. Let them therefore here thus proceed that dare. For I dare not. §. 18. But this much I easily concede, 1. That as all Being is originally from God, so there is a continued divine causation of them, without which they would all cease or be annihilated: which some call a continued Creation, and some an Emanation; and some a continued Action or operation ad rerum esse. And it is an intolerable error to hold that God hath made the World or any part of it self-sufficient or Independent as to himself, as to Being, Action or Perfection. We grant therefore that all the world is so far United to God, as to depend on his continued causality: And that the Beams do not more depend on the Sun, or Light; heat and motion on the Sun and other fire, nor the branches, fruit and leaves more depend on the Tree, than the Creature on God. §. 19 2. I grant that thus far the world may be said to be one, as all things are united in one first cause from which they flow, and by which they are. §. 20. 3. But yet all these are no parts of God, as the fruit and leaves▪ are of the Tree, and as the beams are of the Sun's But they are Creatures, because God's emanation or causation is creative, causing the whole Being of the effect: And it seemeth likest to the Sun (or fire's) causation of Motion, Light and Heat as they are in the Recipient, distinct ab essentia & actione Agentis quà tuli. §. 21. 4. I grant that (though as to proximity of essence God is no further from one Creature than from another, being intimate to all, immediatione essentiae, yet) he useth one Creature as a second Cause to operate on another; and that the Higher and Nobler, operate on the lower and more ignoble: And in that sense we may conceive that some Creatures are first from God or nearest to him, that is, of the highest nature and use. And so we deny not, but that it is like that in the Creation God made one nature existent, (e. g. the highest Intellectual) as more excellent, powerful, pregnant, active, and perfect than any of the rest: that there was in the wonderful diversity, some one that was Best, and above the rest. §. 22. 5. I grant that it soundeth probably that the first and noblest Nature in specie should be found but in one Individual; But of this there is not the least certainty to us mortals: viz. Whether from one God first flow one perfect Created Intelligence of Spirit; or, ab uno plures, two, three or millions in the first order flow from one God? Though in nature we see that from the trunk of the Tree few great members first arise, and multiplicity is in the extremities. And we grant that the greatest multiplicity appeareth where things dwindle to littleness or baseness: One sound Sheep i● better than a rotten one that hath a thousand▪ Worms in his Veins and Intestines: And a man that hath a thousand Lice on his Head is not the Nobler: And when the one soul hath left a Garkass, it may turn to thousands of contemptible Vermin: And a Looking-glass broken into an hundred pieces is not the better because it will make an hundred images of the face. But yet we are strangers to Gods unseen works, further than he revealeth them, and therefore must confess our ignorance. §. 23. 6. We grant that all God's works have some Union, Concord and Harmony among themselves; which yet consisteth with numerical diversity: And though Men and other Animals walk about with Bodies that touch not one another, (and therefore the ignorant conceive of them as totally incoherent, and think that though Pears, Apples and other Fruit on the Tree, and Trees in the Earth, be both Many, and Divert, and yet parts of one Tree, and of one Earth, yet it is not so with animals▪ because the union of spiritual beings in invisible:) yet indeed it is not probable that the souls of Animals have no dependant coherence with noblet supriour Spirits. Though (because we know of no nature above the Intellectual) it is utterly uncertain to us, Whether Humane souls depend on any proper superior Cause of their Being but God alone immediately; For God causeth the highest Natures, without any mediate second Cause: Though as to ORDER and helps of action and well being they may depend on others, as the several Wheels or parts of the same Watch or Clock, or as the Sheep upon the Shepherd. §. 24. Augustine de Anima is put to it, whether he will hold 1. That souls are Many and not One? 2. Or One and not Many? 3. On both One and Many? The two first he rejecteth: The last he confesseth hard to defend, but seemeth most inclined to: But what Union he meant, is hard to conjecture; Whether that they were all the spiritual Parts of one Universal, or one Greater soul (if souls may be Parts?) or Whether distinct products of one such soul (either Universitatis or hujus systematis)▪ or Whether One Relatively and Politically, by making up one society; or Whether one because emaning from one spring or Causa prima? The two last are certain: The two first are far otherwise. §. 25. 7. If he could prove, that there is one First, Best, Universal created Intelligence, or superangelical Spirit, which God made the chief of all second causes, by which he created and governeth all the rest, and that this is Christ in his second Nature, we would not deny, but that Christ as the Mediator of Nature (as Mr. Sterry calleth him) is in all other Creatures as the Cause is in the being of the effect; But it would not follow, that the Essence of Christ (or this Universal Intelligence) is any Constitutive Cause (or part) of each creature: For as God causeth them by Creative Emanation, and not as a Constitutive part of them; so we should rather hold, that (under God, by a Power of producing Entities received from him) this Universal Spirit did the same in a subordinate second place. §. 26. But his Opinions which I am now most concerned to renounce, are those about God's Moral Government, his Laws, Justice, our freewill, sin, guilt, and God's Redemption, Judgement and Punishment of man; all which I think he much subverteth. §. 27. And I. I take the root of his error to be, his overlooking and undervaluing God's Design in Making and Governing free Intellectual agents, by his Sapiential Moral Directive way: He supposeth this way to be so much below that of Physical Motion and Determination, as that it is not to be considered but as an instrument thereof: As if it were unworthy of God to give any creature a Mere Power, Liberty, Law, and Moral Means alone, and not to Necessitate him Positively or Negatively to Obey or Disobey. And this looking only at Physical Good, Being and Motion, and thereby thinking lightly of Sapiential Regency, is the sum; as of his, so of Hobbes, Spinosa's, Alvarez, Bradwardines, Twisses, rutherford's, and the rest of the Predeterminants' errors herein: And had not I other thoughts of this one thing, I should come over to their Opinion: For I confess the case to be of very great difficulty. §. 28. I think that as the Divine Life and Power glorifieth itself eminently in the Causation of the Being, Motion and Life of the creatures; so the Divine Wisdom eminently glorifieth itself in the Order of all things, and in the Moral Directive Sapiential Regiment of Intellectual free agents. And that God's Laws and Doctrine are the Image of his Wisdom, and an admirable harmonious and beautiful frame: And that all would think so, and be wonderfully delighted in them, were they completely printed on our Minds and Hearts. §. 29. II. And accordingly I think, that the glory of his governing Wisdom, and Punishing and Rewarding Justice, is a great and notable part of that glory which man must give him now and for ever. And that this Justice is not his physical using all things according to their physical aptitude only: But his Judging and Executing according to that moral aptitude commonly called Merit, by Punishments and Rewards: And that to deny God the glory of all this, is no small error in a Philosopher or Divine. §. 30. III. Accordingly I think, that God made man a free self-determining agent, that he might be capable of such Sapiential Rule: And that it is a great Honour to God, to make so noble a Nature, as hath a Power to determine its own elections: And though such are not of the highest rank of Creatures, they are far above the lowest: And that God (who we see delighteth to make up beauty and harmony of diversities) doth delight in the Sapiential Moral Government of this free sort of Creatures: And though man be not Independent, yet to be so far like God himself, as to be a kind of first-determiner of many of his own Volitions and Nolitions, is part of God's Natural Image on Man. §. 31. IU. Accordingly I take Duty to be Rewardable and Laudable; and sin to be odious as it is the Act of a free agent: And that the Nature of Moral Good and Evil, consisteth not in its being the mere effect of physical premotion, but in being a Voluntary Conformity or Disconformity to the Sapiential Rule of duty, by a free agent that had Power to do otherwise. §. 32. V. freewill then is not only the same with willing itself, or a mere agency according to Nature, by the premotion of the first determining necessitating Mover. It is not only such a freedom as Fire, Water, Beasts, and every moved thing hath, (to be moved according to the first Moyers action) which is in the, will of man; But it is a Power to be a first determining Specifier of its own acts as Moral: Not that it is never predetermined, but that it can do this. §. 33. VI. Accordingly I judge of Gild, and Shame, and the Accusation of Conscience; which will not be a bare discerning what God made us do or be; but what we voluntarily did or were, when we could do otherwise. §. 34. VII. And I am passed all doubt, that he grossly mistaketh the nature and distinction of Law and Gospel: 1. To think that God's Law, when it is not accompanied with physical predetermination, is but to show us that we are creatures, that cannot but sin. 2. Yea, hereby he wrongeth the glory of the Creator, that made no creature with a power to do any thing but evil, unless predetermined physically thereto. 3. It's gross to say, that all the Doctrine of Redemption, and Faith, and Justification by Christ, as a mere signum, Letter or Law, is the Law or Covenant of Works, and so that every Command is the Covenant of Works, and Physical Efficiency of Good in us is the Gospel or Covenant of Grace. For that which we call the Gospel is not true, if this be true: For this Gospel is a preached word spoken by man's mouth, which some believe, and some believe not, but reject and disobey, and therefore perish: Matth. 4. 23. & 11. 5. & 24. 14. & 26. 13. Mark 16. 15. Luke 4. 18. 1 Cor. 9 14, 16, 18. Heh. 4. 2. 1 Pet. 1. 25. 1 Pet. 4. 6. 2. Thess. 1. 8, 10, 11. Matth. 13. 10. Acts. 13. 7. It is a Law by which men shall be judged to life or death, Rom. 2. 16. Mar. 16. 15, 16. 2 Thes. 1. 8. Rom. 10. 16. John 3. 19, 20, 21. 2 Cor. 4. 3, 4. It is a word which some pervert, Gal. 1. 7. and many sin against, Gal. 2. 14. 1 Pet. 4. 17. The rejecters of it are to speed worse than Sodom and Gomorrah, and they cannot escape that neglect so great salvation. Whereas by his description, 1. No man ever yet sinned against the Gospel or Covenant of Grace: For it is not that Covenant or Gospel further than it is a physical effect on the soul. 2. And every Heathen that hath any good effect on his soul by Common Grace hath so much Gospel; 3. Yea, why is not then all God's Creation, being a physical effect, the Covenant of Grace; if that he doth be it, and all that he commandeth as such be the Law of Works? 4. And how then can the Law of Works and Grace be two, if every proper Law be the Law of Works? For a Law is sub genere signi, and a produced event is another thing. 5. And what sense will be found throughout the Scripture, if we must hold, that It is the Covenant or Law of Works which telleth us, that the Law of Works is abolished, and calleth us to believe in Christ for free Justification, and not to expect Justification by the Works of the Law, and offereth us pardon and life in Christ? etc. But I will add no more, seeing the plainness of the matter makes it needless. §. 35. The truth is, he distinguisheth between the Law and the effect of the Law and Spirit of God, and calleth one the Law of Works and the other the Gospel: whereas the Scripture only maketh it the excellency of the Gospel, that by it the Spirit effectually worketh on the soul more usually and more excellently; and no mere Law (of Works or Grace) will renew us without the Spirit. §. 36. VIII. And if Redemption be nothing but Physical efficiency by Christ, (who as a creating Mediator first giveth all creatures what they have, and next faileth them and leaveth them in darkness, as the Sun setteth, and then Rising again revolveth all things into his original pure spirituality, like the revolution of day and night, Summer and Winter,) it is sure another thing than the Scripture describeth it, which maketh it a noble part of that Sapiential frame of Moral Government which some despise. §. 37. IX. But let it be noted, that we hold, that as the Almighty Father is the glorious Creator, Motor and Life of Nature, and the Eternal Wisdom, Word and Son, the Glorious Ordinator, Rector and Redeemer, so the Eternal Love, and the Holy Ghost is the final Perfecter of believers, even of God's Elect; and that this Sanctification and proficiency, is by more than Moral Sapiential Regiment, even by the Real shedding abroad God's Love upon the soul, or by a Quickening, Illuminating, felicitating Communication of Divine Life, and Light, and Love, which yet maketh not the Sapiential Regiment vain. §. 38. And as to freewill I further say, that we are far from holding that it is a state of man in which he is Above God, or Independent and as a God to himself, or that God is any way a defective or idle (as they call it) Spectator of man's sins, or free acts: But that this rank and state of free agents is Gods own wisely-chosen work in which he is delighted. And that he doth truly attain his ends in all. §. 39 Therefore as Mr. Sterry magnifieth the harmony which ariseth from Moral Good and Evil as designed and necessitated by God, so we first admire the harmony which ariseth from Natural and free agents and their works; which must not be dishonoured and left out. §. 40. And more than so, we doubt not but all God's works are perfect, it being their perfection to be suited to his own will. And the difference between us and Mr. Sterry, Dr. Twisse, etc. is not▪ Whether God be Glorious in all his works, or they be perfect: For we say, that though man's sin be found upon God's works, and that sin be none of his works, nor any means (properly so called) of Pleasing or Glorifying him, nor at all willed or caused by him, but hated and punished; yet he loseth none of his complacency or glory by it, but notwithstanding its malignity, shineth gloriously in the perfection of all his works. §. 41. Yea, more we say, that men sin under his Disposing power, and that he will make use of their evil unto Good, and sin shall become an occasion of that Glory to God (as sickness to the Physician) of which it is no Cause or proper Means, nor of itself cond●ceth thereunto. Yea, and that no Act as an Act, how sinful soever, is done, but by God's causation as he is the fountain of nature, and prime Motor: Yea, more; that all the Effects and Consequents of sin that are not sin itself, are under the Causal Government and disposal of God, who will attain his Ends in all. §. 42. Therefore we differ but in this, Whether God get not all that glory which Mr. St. floridly describeth, notwithstanding sin, or on supposition of it as barely permitted (negatively, but with a Decree or Volition of all the good consequents occasioned by it,) rather than by sin itself, as a willed, designed effect of his own necessitating▪ Negations, and in the positive part of the acts as circumstantiated, of his determining premotion? Whether man's permitted sin, be any of God's works? And whether God's glory be not rather non obstante peccato, and also by occasion of it, supposed to be man's work only; and by all the good consequents caused by God, than by the sin itself as a Means conducible, or a Cause? §. 43. For we deny not, that God could have▪ prevented all sin if he had so resolved, and yet we believe not that such a permission is equivalent to a necessitating Motion, or Privation, as Mr. Sterry would persuade us: To make a creature no better than such as can do good if he will, and can be willing, (with a decree to make many willing,) is much different from making the creature bad, and then condemning him to Hell for being so, as an act of Justice. Yet we doubt not, but the Divine Light will shortly give us all a fuller discovery of that which shall vindicate the Wisdom, Goodness and Justice of God, in his Government of man, than yet the wisest mortals have. §. 44. Either you suppose that God doth all that he can do, or not. If yea, than you suppose that he cannot (nor ever could) make any one Creature, Worm, or Grass, more or less, greater or smaller, sooner or later, or otherwise, than he doth: which few will believe: (It being not for want of Power, but through perfection of Wisdom and freedom of Will that he doth no more.) But if God can make one creature more, or one Motion more, and yet doth not, I ask Whether you dare call that non-agency by the name of Idleness or deficiency? If not, why should the Non-causation of sinful Volitions in specie morali, or the leaving freewill to its own determination, be so called? Not to make more creatures, or more physical motion, or not to give more Grace and Glory, is as much a non-agency as not to determine a sinning Will. §. 45. As to all Mr. Sterry's Reasons against freewill, they are so Rhetorically rather than Logically delivered, that I think it not meet to trouble the Reader with any further answer of them, or to suppose them to have any more strength than those that other men plainlier have delivered. §. 46. I conclude with this repeated profession, that I am fully satisfied, that all the rest of the Controversies, about Grace and Nature, and Predestination and Redemption, as they stand between the Synod of Dort and the Arminians, are of no greater moment than I have oft expressed in this Book, nor worthy any of that stir and contention, which men that sufficiently difference not Words, Methods and Matter have made to the mischievous injury of the Church: And that the true life of all the remaining difficulties, is in this controversy between the defenders of Necessary Predetermination, and of freewill; that is, (not, What freewill sinners have left, but) [Whether ever in Angels or Innocent man, there was such a thing, as a will that can and ever did determine itself to a Volition or Nolition in specie morali, without the predetermining efficient necessitating premotion of God as the first Cause?] or as Hobbes speaketh, Whether ever a created will, did act, without a necessitating premotion? And whether to will and to will freely, be all one? And whether the will (except as to the kind of action) be not as much necessitated to will or not will, as my Pen to write or not write? are we call not its acts Contingent or free, either because they are what they are (Volitions,) or though Ignorance, because we see not the moving Causes? §. 47. And if this hold, for my part I must confess, that I think the Religion which agreeth with it, must neither be so good as Dr. Twisses, rutherford's, Bradwardines, or Alvarez's, nor yet so bad as Hobbes', or Spinosa's; but just such as Mr. Sterry's or the old Platonic or Stoic Philosophers: I mean not such as Mr. Sterry's was, (for I hear he was an excellent person;) but such as his Book (though obscurely) intimateth. And if any of that judgement have a better or worse, it is not in consistency with his own principles. FINIS. Catholic Theology: The Second BOOK. The SYNODISTS and ARMINIANS CALVINISTS and LUTHERANS DOMINICANS and JESUITS Reconciled: OR, AN END OF THE CONTROVERSIES ABOUT GOD'S DECREES and GRACE, and MAN'S freewill, MERIT, etc. If men are willing. A RETREAT TO THE MILITANT DIVINES, WHO HAVE TOO LONG WARRED ABOUT WORDS, and UNREVEALED THINGS; and KEPT THE CHURCH OF GOD IN FLAMES, and DRAWN CHRIST'S MEMBERS TO HATE, REPROACH and PERSECUTE EACH OTHER FOR THEY KNEW NOT WHAT. In a Dialogue between C. (a calvinist) A. (an Arminian) and B. (the Reconciler): and others. By Richard Baxter. Tim. 2. 14, 15, 16. Of these put them in remembrance, charging them before the Lord, that they strive not about words, to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers. Study to show thyself approved unto God, a Workman that needeth not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of Truth. But eat profane and vain babble; for they will increase unto more ungodliness: and their word will eat as doth a Canker. LONDON: Printed for Nevil Simmons, at the Prince's Arms in St. Paul's Churchyard. 1675. THE CONTENTS OF THE Second Book. The first days Conference, about Predestination. THe need of conciliatory endeavours, p. 1, 2. What this undertaking is, p. 3. Predetermination to Sin excluded; the case briefly opened, p. 4. The first Crimination by the Arminian: Of eternal absolute Reprobation, p. 6. Whether a thing not existent may be a Moral cause; or God's Acts have Causes, p. 7. How far God's Decrees may be said to have extrinsic Causes, p. 8. The second Crimination, Of God's decreeing Sin; either to predetermine it, or the event, or his permission, p. 9 The third Crimination: Necessitution of Sin by Negative decrees. Negation of decrees opened, p. 11. The fourth Crimination; The pure Mass whether the object of Predestination, p. 12. Decrees distinguished, p. 13. The fifth Crimination; Do the Decrees proceed according to the order of Intention, or of Execution, p. 14. The sixth Crimination; Denying all Conditional Decrees, p. 16. The seventh Crimination; Of absolute Election, p. 17. The eighth Crimination; Leading men to presumption hereby, p. 18. The ninth Crimination; Setting necessity and fate, p. 19 The tenth Crimination; Making God a Respecter of persons, by unequal Decrees, p. 21. The eleventh Crimination; Making God and Ministers Dissemblers, p. 22. Crim. 12. Of a vain power given, p. 23. The second days Conference, The Criminations by the Calvinist. What good this conciliatory attempt may do, p. 24. The first Crimination, Denying election uncomfortable. The second Crim. An election of Things instead of Persons, p. 26. The third Crim. Denying a decree of the first special Grave. The fourth Crim. of Scientia Media, p. 27. The fifth Crim. Denying Absolute Reprobation. Reprobation opened, p. 29, 30. Whether God will Sin, p. 30. or the Act, p. 31. How far man can cause his act undetermined, p. 32. Pretences for Gods causing Sin, answered. How God causeth the effect and not the Volition, p. 85, etc. What God doth about Sin, p. 37. The sixth Crim. Of Conditional decrees, p. 38. The seventh Crim. Of foreseen Merit, p. 39 The eighth Crim. Of making many Elections, p. 40. The ninth Crim. Ordering the Decrees according to Execution, p. 41. How God doth Velle finem. The Case opened, p. 42. The tenth Crim. denying an eternal cause of futurition, p. 45. Whether futurity be any thing, and have any cause, p. 48. The third days Conference, Of Universal and Special Redemption. The first Crim. Of the Armin. denying Christ's office to the world, p. 50. Calvinists for universal Redemption, what all agree in, p. 54. * To which I here add the Church of England Homil. li. 2. p. 185. [God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, etc.] But to whom did he give him? He gave him to the whole world, that is to say, to Adam, and to all that should come after him! O Lord, what had Adam, or any other man deserved at God's hands, that he should give us his only Son? We are all miserable Sinners, damnable persons, justly driven out of Paradise, justly excluded from Heaven, and justly condemned to Hell. See a Learned Gentleman's Reasons for Univers. Redemp. (yet living) Mr. Polehill, of God's Decrees. Did Christ die equally for all, p. 55. The second Crim. Denying express Scripture, p. 57 The Synod of Dort vindicated, p. 59 The third Crim. They deny the Gospel Covenant itself, p. 61. The fourth and fifth Crim. Making an impossibility, or falsehood the object of faith, p. 62. The sixth, seventh, and eighth Crim. Disabling Ministers to Preach, leaving most men remediless; teaching Infidels impenitence, p. 63. The ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth Crim. Exempting men from Hell torments; justifying Ingratitude; denying Christ's Kingdoms; tempting men to Infidelity, p. 64, 65. The fourth days Conference. The Calvinists first Crim. Making Christ die in vain, for them that he knew would perish, p. 66. The second Crim. An imperfect Saviour, p. 67. The third Crim. Dying for men in Hell, p. 67. The fourth Crim. To die for those whom he would not pray for, p. 68 The fifth Crim. Making Christ not to purchase faith, p. 69. The sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth Crim. Uncertain conditional Redemption; no more for the saved than the damned: Christ's sheep to know him before he know them; Pardoning Original Sin to all, p. 70. Crim. 10. To die for the Seed of the Serpent, p. 72. The fifth days Conference, Of Man's Sinfulness, and Impotency, and of freewill. The Armin. Crim. 1st. Denying all freewill, they deny all Morality, p. 73. What Liberty is here meant? largely discussed, to p. 79. What Liberty we hold, p. 79. Doth Original Sin necessitate all evil, p. 82. The second Crim. Denying Power to believe, p. 85. What [Power] [can] and [cannot] mean, p. 86. fullier opened, p. 87, etc. Questions hence answered, p. 96, etc. The advantage of some by denying Habits besides Power and Acts, p. 99 Habits proved, p. 100 Crim. 3. Making all men utterly and equally bad, p. 101. Crim. 4. Infants, Heathens, and most men made and necessitated to sin and damnation, p. 103. Of Infant's remedy, p. 104. Parent's sin defileth them, p. 105. Of Heathens Case, p. 106. Crim. 5. That none can do more good or less evil than he doth, p. 107. The sixth days Conference. The Calvinists Crim. 1. Denying original sin, p. 109. Original sin opened, p. 111. Crim. 2. That men can use their Naturals to prepare for Grace, p. 113. What man can do, further opened, p. 114. Crim. 3. Holding free will to good, p. 121. A manifold Liberty evinced by many Questions, p. 122. Whether any that use it not have liberty to believe, p. 124, 125. Crim. 4. That men are not dead in sin, p. 125. Crim. 5. That man is not merely passive in his first conversion, p. 126. Crim 6. None damned for Adam's sin only, p. 128. The seventh days Conference, Of Sufficient and Effectual Grace. Crim. 1. Of the Armin. Denying sufficient Grace they damn men for mere Impossibilities, p. 130. Had Adam sufficient Grace, p. 132. Of the 13th. Artic. of the Church of England, p. 133. How God willeth men's Salvation, p. 134. Crim. 2. Making Grace unresistible, p. 136. How far they do so. The eighth days Conference. Crim. 1. Of the Calv. They assert universal sufficient Grace, p. 139. Queries evincing Common Grace, p. 139. The greatness of their error that deny it, p. 141. Doth this satisfy, while God that can save men will not, p. 143. What Grace, and what sufficient Grace is, p. 145. Whether the same measure of Grace called merely sufficient, be ever effectual, p. 148. What the Grace in that question is. Whether a vis impressa? Of determination by God, and by the Intellect, p. 151, 152, 153. Crim. 2. By Grace they mean Nature as Pelagius, p. 156. What Nature is? Grace, how far supernatural, p. 158. Crim. 3. Making Grace but a Moral suasion, p. 160. Physical operation what, p. 162. Crim. 4. They hold faith to be acquired and not infused, p. 162. What acquired and infused means, p. 163. Dr. Twisse about this noted, p. 167, etc. Crim. 5. They hold Grace given according to works or preparation, p. 169. Crim. 6. They make the Will to have no sin or Grace, p. 171. Crim. 7. They make Grace resistible, p. 172. The case further opened, p. 173, 174, etc. Is there any universal second cause of Grace under God, (as the Sun in Nature) which worketh resistibly (and God by it) ad modum recipientis? p. 177. Christ how far such, ib. Crim. 8. They make man's Will to make himself to differ, etc. p. 180. What differing is? what the causes? as to believing, ib. How far God worketh by universal Grace, p. 185. Who made thee to differ, opened, p. 186. Crim. 9 Man's will maketh God's Grace effectual, and not Gods, p. 186. Whence Grace is effectual, p. 189. Differencing Grace what, p. 192. It not all the question of the Divine Impress, p. 193, 194. The case summarily opened, p. 196. The ninth days Conference, Of Perseverance. The Arm. Crim. 1. They make fear and care to be folly, p. 198. Crim. 2. They cherish all sin, p. 200. Crim. 3. Their Doctrine is uncomfortable on pretence of confuting, p. 200, 201. Both sides charge each other thus. A middle way about Perseverance, avoiding both, p. 204. Crim. 4. They dishonour God's Image making heinous sin consistent with it, p. 204. Crim. 5. Immodesty and singularity contradicting all the ancient Church, p. 206. Crim. 6. Contradicting express Scripture, p. 207. The tenth days Conference. The Calv. Criminations about Perseverance. Crim. 1. They overthrew the comfort of believers, that deny Perseverance, p. 208. What comfort may be had by such, p. 211. Crim. 2. and 3. They make God or his Covenant mutable, p. 212. Crim. 4. They deny the Promise of Perseverance, p. 213. Crim. 5. They infer a second Regeneration, p. 214. Crim. 6. They go against the Doctrine of Augustine, etc. p. 215. The just extenuation of this last controversy, p. 215. The eleventh days Conference, with a Libertine (called Antinomian) vindicating sound Doctrine against divers accusations. Chap. 1. Whether we must call men to come to Christ without Preparation, p. 220. Chap. 2. Of denying our own Righteousness, p. 223. Personal Righteousness necessary, p. 224. Of Reward and worthiness (or Merit) p. 225. The truth largely opened about merit and reward, p. 230. Reasons for it, p. 232, etc. Ch. 3. Whether our own Righteousness conduce to our Justification? Or we are any way justified by it, p. 238. Ch. 4. Whether the Gospel be a Law of Christ, p. 243. Ch. 5. Whether Christ (and not we) be the only party in Covenant with God, p. 245. Ch. 6. Whether the new Covenant have conditions, p. 247. Ch. 7. Whether justifying faith be a believing in Christ as Teacher, Ruler, etc. or only a receiving his Righteousness, p. 251. Ch. 8. Of Faith's Justifying Instrumentally, p. 251. Ch. 9 Whether Faith itself be Imputed for Righteousness, p. 252. Ch. 10. Whether it be a change in God to justify the (before) unjustified, p. 256. Ch. 11. Whether a justified man should fear becoming unjustified? ibid. Ch. 12. Of man's power to believe: and our calling the unregenerate to Duty, p. 258. Ch. 13. Of the witness of the Spirit, and of Evidences of Justification, p. 261. The Conclusion. The twelfth days Conference with a (learned) Lutherane. Whether the difference among Christians about Merit, be as great as some think it, p. 263. Some Protestants (and the late Lecturers) Reasons against Merit proposed, p. 265. and the case opened. Of the Doctrine of the Council of Trent, p. 266, etc. Of condignity, p. 267. The Doctrine of Vega, Scotus, Waldensis, Eckius, Marsilius, Bellarmine, Greg. Armin. Durand. Brugens. Cusanus, Stapleton, Bradwardine, Soto, Bonaventure st. Clara, and all the Schoolmen as he judgeth, Carthus: Cassander, p. 270. Holiness and Glory a greater gift than Glory without holiness, p. 271. Aquinas judgement. His confusion occasioned by his opinion that the new Law is that which is in the heart, and not written, viz. the Spirit (as the Quakers hold) ib. Vasquez denyeth Commutative Justice in God, with all the School Doctors, (17 of them cited). He confuteth it (even as to Christ). He denyeth proper Distributive Justice also in God, citing Bonavent. Scotus, Durand. Palud. Gabriel, Alexand. Aquin. etc. p. 272, etc. Aquinas sense, in Carbo's words, p. 275. Many Schoolmen deny as much as Legal or Governing Justice in God. Ruiz citeth for this Argent. Bassol. Suarez, Peasant: Suarez saith, God's promises are but naked Assertions declaring his Will. Durand. that promises signify not obligation: Greg. Armin. That the Crown is no Debt, but of free Ordination. Marsil. That God is no Debtor, but free Giver: Scotus, Major, Ricard. deny God to be a Debtor by his promise, but hold that Merits are such by Promise. Ruiz saith (against Suarez) That Promises are more than Assertions, but that God's obligation is to himself, p. 276. Medina against Meriting Remission, p. 277. Against Preparation, p. 277. Contarenus' judgement. Fisher's of Rochester, p. 278. The words of Tolet, p. 280. The thirteenth days Conference, with a Sectary. Of the great errors, sin and danger which many Ignorant Professors fall into, on the pretence of abhorring and avoiding Popery, p. 283. The sins of such as Calumniate sound Teachers as favouring Popery, p. 285. Errors vended by some Protestants through an injudicious opposition to Popery, p. 287. It's necessary that we mention them and repent of them, p. 288. Wherein these Sectaries agree with the Papists while they over-oppose them, p. 289. The great mischief that is done by railing at Truth as Popery, and calling good things Antichristian, and prating thus before they understand, p. 289. More of such mischiefs, with Counsel to the Guilty, p. 291, etc. Horrid Lies of Papists against Protestants, instanced out of Tympius, should warn us that we imitate them not. More Objections answered, p. 296, etc. A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A. (an Arminian) and B. (the Conciliator.) THE First Days Conference ABOUT PREDESTINATION. A. I perceive by your Writings, that you would make men believe, that the differences between the Arminians and Calvinists, are matters of no such moment as they are commonly judged to be, * Ista quae nullus in dubium vocant, Christianis omnibus mee judicie sufficere deberent absquo ulteriori & curiosiori investigations, tum intimae naturae, libertatis humanae, tum modi qu● gratia in nobis operatur, & quo ejus efficacia cum arbitrii nostri libertate concilianda est, de quibus nulla diserto, clara, & expressa extant in Scriptures or acula. But if they will needs be meddling, he wishes them modesty and moderation. Le Blank de distinct. Grat. Thes. 83. and that the distance is very small, if men understood themselves; and you would have it thought that you are the man fit for so great an undertaking, as the conciliation of these differing Parties is. But to deal freely with you, I take it to be but the effect of your own Ignorance, not understanding the Controversies; and of your Pride, in overvaluing your own Parts and Apprehensions: Or else you would never dream that you can come after such wits as Augustine, and Pelagius, and Celestine; such as Aquinas, Scotus, Ockam, Gregory Armi. Durandus, and their Followers; even such as Cajetane, Bannes, Zumel, Alvarez, etc. such as Suarez, Vasquez, Molina, Fonseca, Ruiz, etc. such Conciliators as Ariba, Gibieuf, Guil. Cameranius Scotus, Pennottus, Petr. à St. Joseph, Ludou. à Dola, Jansenius, and his Followers, with abundance such, and do that which none of these could do. But you are not the first Undertaker that hath miscarried. B. If I have been guilty of vain boasting, cite my words, and I will retract them: If not, these expressions speak but your prejudice. But, I pray let us spend no time upon such Impertinences, but speak that to the matter which tendeth to edify, that one of us may become the wiser at least. I first desire you to tell me, Q. Whether the ending or narrowing this difference be not exceeding desirable, could it be attained? A. Yes, there is no man doubts of that. B. Q. 2. And is not despair the enemy of all endeavours, and will any thing be done without some hope? A. And it's as true, that vain hopes cause labour in vain. B. The worst than will be but the loss of my labour: And I will tell you of what moment I judge the work. 1. In regard of the sinfulness of the Contentions: 2. In regard of the Calamitous consequents. 1. The sinfulness I take to lie, 1. In the matter. 2. And in the manner of prosecution. I. Th●●e things I judge to be sinful in the ●atter ● 1. That many differences are pretended to be▪ where indeed are none. 2. Differences about wo●●●s▪ and second ●otions, and ration● En●●ties ar● pretended ●o be differences about real Doctrines. 3. Little Differences are aggravated into great ones. 4. Unsearchable things are disputed, which no mortal man can understand. ●. As to the manner's it is done▪ 1. Preposterously, preferring these Disputes before the greater business of the Ministry. * Read in Procli Analect. pag. 646. the Epistle of Cyril Alex. to Proclus against the censuring of Theodor. Mopsuest. and his works, lest it tend to division and tumult in the Churches, Et Ep. 7. ibid. Joan. Antiochini ad Cyril. It would make one ashamed of humane nature, to read how basely the Dominians and some others (Alvarez de Aux. Disp. 115. p. 468, 469. & saepe Zumel, and many more, and Jansenius, Arnoldus, etc. yea, Gibieus, etc.) do abuse Luther and Calvin, merely to make other Papists believe, that they differ from them where they do not. And all through a carnal factious fear of losing their interest in their own Popish Party; as if we differed not enough, but must persuade the world, that we differ where we do not. See but Alvar●z. l. 12. Disp▪ 121. pag. 492. where he citeth six Errors of calvin's, as differing from him; whereas the ●our first are but one lie variously worded, and the two last no better▪ for in all of them Calvin saith not one jo● more in sense than the D●minican● do, whatever harsh word he may find in him; and the generality of the Calvinists (as they are called by scorners) say much less. 2. Perversely, wasting abundance of time and study about them, by which the Church might have been better served; and writing so many great Volumes of them, in crabbed Scholastic stile, I as must needs tempt multitudes to a lamentable loss of their precious time, before they can come to know that they lose it. 3. And, by sidings, and factious, and sharp reflections on each other, quenching Christian Love, and destroying Concord, and weakening the Church. II. The calamitous Consequents are, 1. The long, and yet unhealed alienation of Contenders minds. 2. The foresaid time and toil which those Volumes cost. 3. The abundance of idle talk, and lost studies about them, by the generality of Students. 4. The dangerous Factions made by it in the Churches. 5. The tempting each Party to confuse, slander, and blot the Names of one another. 6. Multitudes of Prelates and Pastors have been tempted by it into Persecutions. 7. Yea, wars and bloodshed in more Countries than one hath followed ●●●tly by this incension. 8. And hereby the poor people on each ●●●e are kept in bitter uncharitable thoughts of one another; and especially of those Pastors who are against their mind. And because things nearest us are first discerned, begin at home, and try whether all this be true or not. 1. Harken to the Ministers and people on each side. Do you not hear that it seemeth enough to them to slight each other with uncharitable alienation, when it's said, O such a one is a Calvinist, or such a one is an Arminian; yea, perhaps the Jesuit shall come in. Read over the many writings about Mountague's time, on his part, and against him, by Yates, Carlton, Watton, Burton, etc. But especially read Peter Heylin his writings on this Subject, and above all, his Life of Archbishop Laud, where he persuadeth us that this very Controversy was a grand part of the difference, which on both sides was prosecuted, till it brought us to our doleful War. 2. Go but to the Low-Countries, and see what work it hath made there, from the days of Arminius to this day▪ especially between Prince Maurice and the States, at the death of Barnevelt, the imprisonment of Grotius, etc. The Synod at Dort, and all the strife and discontent before and after it. 3. Peruse but the Volumes written on one side by Suec●nus, Arminius, Grevinchovius, Corvinus, Tilenus, Episcopius, Curcellaeus, Grotius, etc. with many Lutherans; And on the other side by Gomarrus, Lubbertus, Macchovius, etc. Molinaeus, Amesius, Dr. Twisse, Rutherford, Spanhemius, etc. and think how sad such Combats are. 4. Think what a lamentable distance to this day is kept up between the Lutherans and Calvinists in all Countries, and much upon the account of these same Controversies: And what bitter Books the Lutherans have written, comparing the Calvinists to Papists, Turks, etc. and how little Mr. Ducy by forty years' Labour did to reconcile them; and how small success all other Reconcilers have had, though excellent learned judicious men; such as Calixtus, Johan. Bergins, Conrade. Bergins, Ludou. Crocius, Mat. Martinius, Isleburg, Testaidus, Amyraldus, Placens, Capellus, Dallaeus, Blondel, Davenant, Hall, Carlton, Abbot, Morton, Preston, etc. 5. Think of the great Conflicts in France and Flanders, between the Jansenists and their Adversaries; and the multitude of elaborate Volumes between the Dominicans and the Jesuits: And of how many Age's continuance those contests have been. 6. Then rise up to the Time and Case of Faustus Rhegiensis, Cassianus, and the Massilienses, and their Adversaries; and the hard Characters left by those controversies on the names of worthy men. 7. From thence ascend to chrysostom and his Reproaches, and Austin's Censures on the other side, with all the Conflicts which he and his Abettors, Prosper and Fulgentius had with the Pelagians and Semipelagians of those times. 8. And lastly, read and pity almost all the Fathers, especially of the Greek Church, whose Names are now blotted with the censure of speaking too like our Arminians and Jesuits; and after all this, you will sure think this Contention was a very ill work, if it be proved causeless; and you will think that its time to end it, if it be possible. To which end, an attempt is not discommendable, if it should prove lost as to the greater part of men. And some, I doubt not, God will bless it to, at least to increase their love of peace. A. I pray you tell me what is your Undertaking, and in what measure it is that you think this Work may be accomplished? B. My Undertaking is this, [To prove, that in the points of Predestination and Redemption, there is no difference between moderate men of each Party, * Eadem enim difficultas fuit semper donationis in tempore, & praefinitionis aut praedestinationis in praescientia. Cum ergo in tempore detur nobis (prima gratia) sine ulla causa ratione, aut conditione sine qua non, sic etiam praedestinatur. Neque solum negari debet ratio, cur unus praedestinetur, alii ver● non, ut quidam dicebant, sed etiam quare aliquis praedestinetur nulla facta comparatio●●, siquidem nulla ratio esse potuit ob quam Deus dederit primam gratiam, nisi per modum sinis. Vasquez. in 1. Them▪ Disp. 91, c. 7. You see how much a Jesuit granteth. but what is resolved into the points of Grace and freewill; and in the points of Grace and freewill there is no real difference, but what is resolved into the question of the degree of God's co-operating influx, compared with man's agency, and with itself as on several Objects; which will prove either no difference at all, or else about a thing past man's Understanding: And, that only in the point of perseverance, there is a real perceptible difference; but such as is not worthy to be insisted on, to the breach of Charity, or the Church's peace, but must consist with toleration and mutual love.] A. I know not whether this great Undertaking look more smilingly on the Times to come, or frowningly on the Times past. For if this be true, what thoughts, what names do we deserve for troubling the Christian World, so perniciously and distractingly, with a feigned difference. But, I pray you, tell me in general, how you will manifest all this? B. 1. You must give me leave to tell you who they are that I undertake this Reconciliation of. 2. And then, how I shall perform it. I. It is not every violent Contend, that runneth into such palpable Errors as the common cause needeth not, and will say any thing rather than agree, that I am speaking of. About these matters, there are two Parties that stand on each extreme, who are not to be called Calvinists and Arminians; but by other Names, for their other Opinions. These I intent to confute distinctly, instead of reconciling them, which i● impossible, but by reforming them. 1. On the one side, I undertake not the Reconciliation of the Predeterminants', who hold, That [freewill is nothing but will a related to Reason, Lubentia juxta rationem; and that all its acts are as truly necessitated by the effications premotion of God, as is the motion of a Clock, or other Engine, or of a Bruit (though they will needs call them free, because they are Volitions, as if willing and free-willing were words of the same signification:) and that is deifying of man's Will or any Creature, to say, that it can move or determine itself to this Object rather than another, without a Physical perdetermining efficient premotion by God, at the first total Cause, notwithstanding God should uphold its natural power, and ●● the cause of Nature afford his necessary universal Concourse; and that to think that a Will thus predetermined by God could have forborn its act, it to deify it also.] They that think that God cannot make a Creature, whose Will can determine itself without his predetermination to that act as circumstantiated, though God uphold all its powers, and all natural concurrent● else, and that a self-determined, not predetermined by premotion is a God, or a Contradiction, I am to confute, and not to reconcile. A. How will you confute them? B. That is to be the work of a Disputation on that Point. It shall now suffice to mind you, that it seemeth to me very plainly to subvert Christianity, if not all Religion. For when Adam's sin, and all the sin in the World of Men or Devils, is resolved into the absolute unresistible Will and efficiency of God, as the first total Cause, and that it had been as impossible to have done otherwise as to be Gods, or to Conquer God; it's easy to perceive whether God ●ate such sin, and whether Christ died to signify his hatred of it; and whether he will damn men for not being Gods; and whether he that is said unresistibly to predetermine by immediate efficiency the thought, will and tongue of every Liar to every lie that ever was spoken, can have any word, delivered by man, which we can be sure is true. In a word, if this Opinion hold, it will allow no other Religion in the World, but this much, [To believe that moral Good and Evil are but like natural Good and Evil, which God doth cause a● a free Benefactor, differencing his Gifts in various proportions, as he seethe meet; as he differenceth Stars from Stones, and Men from Dogs, and equally causeth the wisdom of Man, and the poison of the Toad or Serpent; and so will make such differences in this World, and the next (if there be any) as pleaseth him, as he doth here between one Horse that's pampered, and another that is tired out with labour.] Well may they cry down the Doctrine of Merit and Demerit that go this way. It hath pleased God, by permitting Hobbs to reduce this Principle of the Wills necessitation unto its proper practice, thereby to cast more shame upon it in our Times for this Author's sake, than we could have expected, if none but such excellent persons as Alvarez * And more plainly, yet Bradwardine who maketh the necessitating cause of Sin and Hell, that God will have it so, and none can resist him. and his Brethren, Dr. Twisse and Rutherford had maintained it. But as Davenant well saith, It is an Opinion of the Dominicans, which Protestants have no mind to own. And there are two sorts that thus subject the Will to absolute caused necessity: 1. Those aforesaid, the Dominicans, who assist the predetermining premotion of God, as necessary to every act natural and free. 2. Those that make the Will as much necessitated by a train of natural second Causes, which is Hobbs his way, (and alas, the way of great and excellent healing C●mero). For they hold, That the Will is necessitated by the Intellect, and the Intellect by the Object ● and God made both Will, and Intellect, and Object, (and Law). And so Camero hath nothing to resolve the necessitating cause of Adam's sin into, but the Devil. But who necessitated the Devil to sin? This will be all one, when it is discussed. And if self-determining freedom of Will in Man be impossible, it will be impossible in the Angels; for they are not Gods. Therefore I now deal with none but those who confess, that God made Man's Will at first with a natural self-determining power and freedom, suited to this earthly state of government; and that Adam's Will by that same measure of Grace which he had, could have forborn his sin, at the instant when he sinned. II. The other extreme which I reconcile not, but confute, * Yet I am not ●●●tating the old way of ana●●●●a thing all the hard say or opinions of others, that being it that I writ this against, of which course the Epistles of Joan. Antioch. 5. 6, etc. and of cyril. A●ix. to Pro●●●s against his so using Theoa●●. Mops. in Pro●●●●●●● are worth the reaching. besides the fore named. 'tis▪ the Pelagians, who deny Original Sin, and acknowledge not the pravity of vitiated nature; and consequently must deny the need of Grace in the same proportion, and so far the need of a Saviour and a Sanctifier. And how far this also subverteth Christianity, you may perceive. A. But both these Parties have a great deal of very plausible reason for their Opinions, as you may see in the Dom●n●oans on one side, and Hobbes against Bra●hall, and in Dr. Jeremy Taylor, his Tre●●. of Repentance, on the other; and therefore are not to be so slighted. B. I do not slight them, but confute them. I confess that the cases are not without difficulty, yea not a little. But I am surer that Religion is not to be renounced, than they can be of the truth of their Opinions. And do you think that if one of them had written for the Cause of ●●▪ li●n, Porphyry or Celsus against Christ, that they would not have spoken as plausibly, and made the case seem as difficult, at least to be argumentatively answered as they here do. A. Now let us here your way or terms before mentioned, what they are? B. II. I suppose every sober man will allow me, 1. To distinguish Names and Words from Things, and * Vas●u. in 1. Tho. q. 2●. a. 3. d. 4●. c. 1. Bona pars huju● controversy (an reprobationis detur causa ex part● reprobi) d● v●ce est. nominal Controversies from real; and to that end to open the ambiguity of words as I go along: And to ●●ew when it is an arbitrary Logical notion, or an en● rational only that men contend about, instead of a reality. 2. I may be allowed, when confusion lapeth up many doubtful questions in one, to distinguish them▪ that each may have its proper answer. 3. I may be allowed to ●ast by, as unfit for contention, all those unrevealed and unsearchable Points, which none of the Contenders know at all, nor ever will do in this World. 4. And I will take leave to lay by the rash words of particular Writers, as not to be imputed to any others, nor to the main Cause; or as that which I am not obliged to defend, reconcile, nor at all to me●dle with. 5. And when all this is done, you shall see what A●to●● the remaining differences will prove. A. Begin then with the first Article of Predestination. B. Remember my ●ndertaking, that it is not to justify every ●●●● words that hath written on the Point; and therefore I will not lose time in citing or defending Authors: But produce you all your Acc●sations, as against the Cause of the sober moderate Cal●●●ists, and suppose me to be the person with whom you have to do. The first Crimination. A. 1. My first Charge is, That you hold that God doth from eternity Decree to damn in Hell fire the far greatest part of men, without respect See the conclusion of the Canons of the Synod at Dort, where this very Charge is denied with detestation. And can you tell better what men hold than they themselves. Episcop. Justit. Theol. l. 4. Sect. 5. cap. 6. p. 412. Col. 2. 52. Sect. 2. Statuitur, Deum eos secundum ●perasua judicare— & ●b. rebellionem & contumaciam corum dolere, irasci, etc. dam●are, etc. cum tamen non modo absolute eos perir● & peccare voluerit, sed & originario tali labe infectos nasci fec●rit, unde omnia ista peccata scaturire ac fluere inevitabiliter necesse erat. Quod quid aliud esse potest, quam histrionica quaedam & sc●nica actio? to any fore-seen Sin, or cause in them, but merely because ●●●● pleaseth him to do it: This is your Doctrine of Absolute Reprobation. B. That words may not deceive us, let us in the beginning on●● for all know what you mean by the word [Decree.] A. I mean the resolution or purpose of his Will the events, tha● this shall be. B. And, I suppose, we are agreed; 1. That Gods Will is nothing but his Essence denominated with respect to some Good as its Object. 2. And there was no Object really existent from eternity but God himself. 3. That Understanding and Will are not univocal terms spoken of God and of man, nor of the same formal Conception. And 4. That our formal Conception of Understanding and Will is only of them as they are in man, and not as in God; and so this to us is the prius significatum. 5. And therefore that God doth not understand or will in our sense formaliter, but only eminenter. 6. And lastly, That Mortals know not just how Gods eminent Intellection and Volition differ from the formal in Man. All this you must grant me, or be singular and ignorant. A. All this is past denial; but proceed to the Case. B. Do you differ from us de eventu, whether there be a Hell, or yet of the number of those that are damned? A. No: or if we do about the Case of Heathens, that belongeth not to this Point. B. Do you differ from us about the Cause of men's Damnation? We say that God damneth no man, but for Sin; yea, for Sin impenitently continued in to the last, against all the mercy which tended to their Cure. A. So far we are agreed: But it's not the cause of damnation which I speak of, but the cause of the Decree. B. Do you not hold that what ever God doth, he willeth to do? A. Yes, God doth nothing without a will to do it, at least consequently. B. Do you think that God willeth any thing to day, which he willed not yesterday, and so from eternity? A. No, we do not with Vostius make God mutable. B. Good still: you grant then that God damneth men; that he damneth them for sin; that he doth it willingly; that he willed it from eternity. And do you think that from eternity here was any thing but God? A. No. B. Then can that which is not be a cause; was there any thing but God himself to be the Cause of Gods Will from eternity? A. Not in esse real, but there was in esse cognito. B. So: now the game gins: Thus the World is cheated and troubled by Logical Notions, and mere words. Is that esse cognitum any thing or nothing? If nothing, it is no Cause; If any thing, is it God or a Creature? It can be no Creature, because it is eternal: If God, you do but say, That God caused his own Will. A. It is God's foreknowledge of Sin, which causeth his Decree or Will. B. 1. Even foreknowledge itself, say the Schools, is but the same with knowledge, and spoken (say they) but to the respect and sense of man. There being neither pri●s vel postori●s, before or after in eternity. But this I now insist not on. 2. It is commonly taken for blasphemy, to talk of a Cause of God, or any thing in God. If Gods Will be his Essence, it hath no Cause. He causeth not himself, being no Effect. 3. If this were so as you say, yet still you make but God himself the Cause of his own Will by his knowledge. * Vasquer in 1. Th●. d. 91. saith of the Cause of God's Decree, Divin● voluntatis non solum nullam esse causam finalem & motivam, per modum objecti, sed etiam nullum esse objectum creatum quod possit Deo esse ratio volendi aliud, sed solam suam bonitatem: Posse tamen unum creatum objectum esse rationem & causam alterius: & italicet Deus non velit unum objectum creatum propter aliud, velle tamen unam rem creatam esse propter aliam, quia ●na est causa alt●rius. Non erg●●●●● mus an aliud ●●●● ratio ●●tiva Deo per modum ●●●● ut velit nos pr●d●stinare, praeter suam bonitatem nihil enim esse potest. Id. ib. disp. 91. c. 4. Respectu voluntatis Dei nihil creatum est id cuj●s gratia, & ratio nolendi aliquid; sed propter quod c●tera esse vult Deus. For Si● f●re-seen is no Sin, and nothing is no Cause; so that you yourself resolve all into God. And indeed, what can be a cause of the first Cause, or any thing in him? Use not tergiversation, and vain words now, and tell me what you have to say. A. A thing not existent, but fore-seen, may be ● moral Cause, though not a physical; and so fore-seen Sin may be to God. B. 1. Yet dare you talk of a Cause of God. There is nothing in God but God. To be a cause of his Will, is commonly said to be a cause of his Essence; And shall so base a thing a● Sin cause God? 2. We are still at the cheating Game, of playing with arbitrary Notions. What mean you by a moral Cause? If a true cause of moral Being▪ that's one thing: If any thing that is not physically or properly, but by moral imputation only a cause of any event, that's another thing. The first you dare not own, as if any thing which is nothing (Sin not existent) were a Cause of Gods Will. The second Cause is called Cause metaphorica: It is really no Cause; but that, for which the Agent shall have such praise or dispraise as belongeth to one that ●●●● equivocally a Cause▪ 3. Therefore if you use not the word [Cause] equivocally, your rule is false. Nothing is no moral Cause. You will instance in good destr●d, in fine nondum existente, etc. But I answer you, Good and amiable are Accidents or Modes, which are never found but in an existent entity or subject. A negatione subjecti ad negationem accidentis, & à negatione est secundi Adjecti ad negationem est tertii, valet argumentum. That which is not, is not good or amiable: Therefore that which existeth not is no Cause. But if we will let go the toy, and come to the matter; It is no other good, but the desire of good, or the apprehension of the ●●●●rity of good which causeth; so that all the Cause is in the Agent. 4. The common reason of man must acknowledge, that when any m●n saith, That sin which is no sin, and nothing as fore-seen is the moral cause of God's Will, he must needs mean no real cause; Because to be a cause, is tertium Adjectum, and presupposeth to be▪ That which is not, is not a cause; much less of God, or of his Will. A. I can show you, that you overthrown the Christian Religion by your Logic: For if this hold true, than the fore sight of Christ's Incarnation and Sufferings, etc. was no moral true cause of Gods Will to pardon Sin, and save Souls, to ●hose under the Promise before the Incarnation. B. Your diversion turneth us from the matter, but advantageth you not at all. Would you bring it to deny so evident a Principle as this, that nothing can do nothing, nor cause nothing. It was not Christ's Body or actual Suffering, not yet existent, that caused Gods Will t● pardon Sinners. Nor had God's Will any proper cause: But seeing God willed one thing to be the means of another, he willed that Christ's Incarnation and Death should in the fullness of time demonstrate his Justice, and make it agreeable to the ends of his Government to dispense with the Law of Innocency, and to pardon Sin: And therefore (not Christ's Death itself, but) God's Decree of the Death of Christ Incarnate, was the cause of the Promise, and of the New Covenant made with Adam, and of the Salvation of Believers then. Which Will or Decree is called by some the interpellation or undertaking of the eternal Word. A. But at least Sin fore-seen is causa sine qua non. B. Call it by what name you please, as long as you confess it to be no Cause, (for causa sine qua non, is called Causa fatua, and is none) But it is not Sin which is Causa sine qua non; for it is no sin from eternity. A. It is the futurity of sin that is Causa sine qua non. B. Yet more notions! what is futurity? any thing or nothing? nothing certainly: For quoad ens, it is terminus diminuens; and nothing is no cause. But it is God's knowledge that Sin will be, which is to be called the Cause of God's Decree, as sine qua non, if any be. But I must deal most about futurition with the Calvinists, when I come to save you from Dr. Twisse his Ferula. A. I pray you then open me the matter as it is yourself. B. I will make your Cause better than you have made it; But not by making other men's worse, but by opening the reconciling truth. 1. I shall tell you in what sense Gods Will and Decrees may and must be said Predestinatio nihil ponit in praedestinato inquit Aquin. 1. q. 23. a. 2. to have an extrinsic cause, without change in God. 1. Know therefore that God's Essence is his Will, but not as Essence. To say that God is God, and that God willeth this or that, are not terms of the same signification. 2. God's Will is his Essence denominated from some amiable good as the Object; and so there is ever quid respectivum in the notion of Will. 3. As God willeth himself, the Act being perfectly immanent, his Will is called himself much more properly, than his Will of things extrinsic (which is ever either effectively, or at least objectively transient;) Because it is God that willeth, and that is willed or loved, (which made many Ancients say, That this was the third Person in the Trinity.) 4. But as God willeth things ad extra, though it is his Essence that so willeth them; yet it is unfit to say simply, that this Will is God; e. g. that to will Peter's Salvation is God, because the name Will here includeth the thing willed. 5. And therefore when we speak of Gods Will in the universal notion, as abstracted from all particular Objects and Acts, it is less inconvenient to say simply, that this Will is God, than when we speak of his Will in act ad extra. By this time you may see, that though Gods Will, as his Essence, hath no cause; yet his Will as denominated extrinsecally from the Object, may have some kind of Cause that is * Alvarez himself saith, that by a Cause he meaneth also any objective condition or reason of the Act. Objective, which is quasi materia actus, and the terminus sine quo non; that is, Gods Will is not denominated a complacency in Christ existent, or in Peter regenerate, * This is all that Ruiz his Reasons prove De Vol. Dei disp. 115. Sect. 4. p. 102 Who saith, that there is more than extrinsic denomination; Et relatio rationis ●um realis formalitas. But he doth but show by his quodammodo, that he knoweth not what to say. or his understanding, a seeing that the World was good, before any of these things did exist. So that by extrinsic denomination, without any change in God, he may and should be said de novo to know things to be existent, to be passed, to will things as existent with complacency, or will them with displicency: But not to will the futurity of men's damnation de novo; but yet his Will of the futurity of men's damnation hath several degrees of the Objective Cause, from whence it is denominated: As in esse cognito, the person who is the Object is in order of nature first a man, a subject, and then a Sinner, and a Despiser of Mercy, and then a damnable Sinner. And so these are indeed conditions in the Object, or Causae sine quibus non, or Objective material-constituent causes; not in themselves, but the foresight of them; not of God's Will as his Essence, nor of his Will as a Will, but of his Will as extrinsecally denominated, a Decree to damn Judas; e. g. because no otherwise is Judas an Object capable of giving such an extrinsic denomination to Gods Will. II. Both you and I hold, and must hold, that God decreeth to damn all that shall be damned. * Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. p. 709. Conclusio (quod Deus aliquos repro●at) est de fide constat ●nim ex scriptura multos a Deo reprobari. Vid. Ru●z de pr●de fin. Tract. 2. per totum. But it is false, that we hold that he doth it without any respect to fore-seen sin. For 1. He forseeth this Sin as the only meritorious cause of their damnation; what he doth in time, that is it which he decreed to do from eternity: But in time he damneth no man but for Sin; therefore from eternity he decreed to damn no man but for Sin: For sin, I say, as the cause of damnation, which Dr. Twisse doth frequently profess. 2. And though this Sin can be no proper efficient cause of God's Volition or Decree, yet it is a presupposed necessary qualification in the Object, as fore-seen in the Mind of God, and so, as aforesaid, is an Objective Cause as fore-seen. III. The execution of Justice, and glorification of it, and God's Holiness thereby is good, and fit to be the Object of God's Volition or Decree. But in the word Reprobation is in most men's sense included much, which we hold not, which is to be opened further anon. IU. And as to the absoluteness of God's Decree to damn those that are dammed; I think you will not deny it yourself, supposing them to be fore-seen finally impenitent Sinners. God doth not only will, that all the finally impenitent shall be damned; nor only that, e. g. Judas shall be damned, if he be finally impenitent; But also that Judas as fore-seen finally impenitent, shall certainly be damned. So that when the condition is fore-seen in the Recipient or Object; it is no longer a mere conditional Decree, but absolute, supposing that condition. In all this we are agreed. The second Crimination. A. II. But that's not all; But you hold, That God eternally decreed men's sin; yea, all the sin of Men and Devils; some say, That he decreed to predetermine men insuparably to the forbidden Act; and the moderatest, that he * Vid. Episcopii Resp. ad qu. 64. qu. 33. pag. 32. ●bi dicit, Deum decrevisse ut Judaei Christum e medio tolleren, ex praescientia quod id liber● voluntate, facturi essent, atque inde praedictiones certas natas esse. decreed the event, that Sin should come to pass ipso permittente quamvis non efficient; or at least, that he decreed his permission of it. B. I. The first sort are those few, whom I in the beginning renounced; of whom the Dominicans, and good Dr. Twisse, and Rutherford his Follower (de providentia) are the chief. I easily confess to you, that God made the Law, and God made man, and God maketh the Objects, and God causeth the Act as a natural Act in genere, by a natural general concourse: And if it could be also proved, that God were the chief efficient Determiner of the Will, and that by necessitation to this Act or Object comparatively rather than to that, (e. g. that David willed the Acts which were Murder and Adultery,) I could never deny that God is the chief Author of the Sin. For the formal reason of Sin is Relative, viz. Its disconformity to the Law of God. And the Relation resulteth without any new Act or Agent, Posito fundamento & omni absoluto: And neither God nor Man do or can do more to cause the Relation. And Dr. Twisse and Rutherford so far saw this, that the upshot of all their Vindication is; 1. That God causeth not sin as sin, but as a means to his Glory. 2. That God is under no Law, (as we are) and therefore can be no Author of Sin. But, to the first I answer; It's one thing to will Sin as Sin, and another thing to cause Sin as Sin. We charge them not, with inferring that God willeth Sin as Sin; but Nullus est Catholicus qui ignoret peccatum non esse effectum praedestinationis; etiam si praedestinatus occasionem ex eo saepius capiat suae salutis. Nam cum Deus causa peccati esse nequeat, efficitur ut Deus peccatum nulla ratione praedestinare possit.— Neque actus ipse peccati secundum esse naturale, non est effectus praedestinationis, quamvis sit hoc modo effectus divinae voluntatis, Vasquez in Tho. 1. q. 23. cap. 2. disp. 93. if he will it and cause it for another end, he causeth the formal nature of Sin, (that we may not play with the ambiguity of Quatenus) and that's as much as man doth. For Sinners do not all, if any, will sin as sin under this formal notion, as it is a breach of the Law of God, and displeaseth him; but as it bringeth them some seeming good: And by doing evil for that good, they are Sinners. To the second, we do not charge the Dominicans with making God a Sinner: But with making him the chief cause of the sin of man, even in its form. II. But this is nothing to the Calvinists in general. Therefore, I say, that yourselves hold the same that they do in this point. Q. 1. Do not all the Jesuits and Arminius hold, That God is the Decreer of what he is the Author of. And that God is the Author of the Act as an Act natural, in the general. See but Rob. Baronius his Metaphysics, and Bellarmine whom he followeth. A. That is nothing to the moral specification of the Act. B. And Dr. Twisse hath oft enough told you, where Arminius saith, That God would have Ahab to fill up the measure of his Sin. A. That is not that he willed the sin, but that Ahab having made himself wicked, God decreed not to stop him, but let him go on. B. Either you mean, that the Object of God's Decree was but his own permission (as the Arminians use to say) or else, that it was the Sin itself (matter and form) permitted, (not because it is sin or evil, for so man oft willeth it not at least, but) as an occasion of God's Glory. Arminius his words import the latter: And then you go as high as Dr. Twisse or Rutherford. But if you say, that it was but a rash word of Arminius, which you stand not to; to make plain and short work with you, I am so far from being liable to your charge, that I charge you as presumptuous, if not erroneous, in saying, that God decreeth or willeth to permit Sin. And I assert. 1. That God doth not Decree the form of Sin as Sin. 2. Nor yet the event of that form for any good end (For, Ut peccatum eveniat, is but peccatum futurum;) and what is it to decree Sin, but to decree that it shall be? Nor 3. Hath he decreed, that this Act which is the Sin, shall come to pass in its comparative circumstantiated state, from whence it is, that Sin in its form resulteth. And so Augustine's saying so much decantate by Dr. Twisse and others, * As Bradwardine who also tells us, That if God damn the Innocent, his Will is the rule of justice and equity: But I think they that so describe his Justice, do rather think that none are damned, than that the Innocent are; or may be, as an act of Justice, whatever a mere Proprietor may do. is not found, that nothing cometh to pass but what God willeth, either effecting it, or permitting it. It cometh to pass without God's willing it or decreeing it; so that he permitteth it, but decreeth not that it shall come to pass. Not that it is against his contrary absolute Decree; but as Lombard from other places in Austin telleth you plainly, God neither willeth that it shall be, (because it is sin) nor properly and simply willeth that it shall not be, for his Will is not overcome. 4. Yea, he cannot be proved to decree his own permission; Because to permit, is but not to hinder, which is nothing but a negation: And we have no ground to feign, that God hath Volitions or Decrees of nothing, or of negations. So that I say, that Sin cometh to pass without God's Decree of the event, or of his permission. (Though not without his Decree of the good which cometh by it; of which more, when I speak to the other extreme.) And of this also more anon. The third Crimination. A. III. You make God necessitate men's sin and damnation by your negative decrees, as well as others by their positive: For you hold, That no man can believe and repent, but such as God decreeth to give Faith and Repentance to: And no man can do any more good than God decreeth that he shall do. And some say that God decreeth, Not to give men any more Grace than he giveth them (which is a Decree objectively negative de non dando); And you and others say, That he doth not Decree to give them more. And so as a stone is not culpable for not flying, no more are Sinners, not elected, for not believing and obeying God. * Note what Vasquez. granteth in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 5. disp. 92. c. 2. Certum est praedestinationem gratiae, & ipsam primam gratiam (quod idem est) non esse in nostra potestate, sicut & praedestinationis & ipsius gratiae nullam causam aut occasionem ex nobis praecedere. B. You wholly mistake and misreport us. If we differ from you, it is by going further from the matter of the Objection than you do yourselves. 1. We hold, that God giveth many men power to do more than they do: And consequently that he decreeth to give it them. Men do not do all that they can do. Indeed we hold, That no man can do any thing, which God doth not give him power to do, and decree to give it him. And dare any of you deny this. There is no power but of God. 2. I hold not, that God hath any Will or Decree in proper sense, Not to give Grace, not to give Faith, not to give Repentance, Help, Means, etc. But only that he doth not decree to give it, where he giveth it not indeed; But as Lombard aforecited, saith, He neither Wills, nor Nilleth Aquin. de Repub. a. 3. q. 23. ad 3. Reprobatio Dei non subtrahit aliquid de potentia reprobati. Unde cum dicitur quod quod reprobatus non potest gratiam adipisci non est intelligendum secundum impossibilitatem absolutam, sed conditionatam. it. My Reasons are, 1. Only Good is the Object of God's Will, and Evil of his Nolition. But nothing is not Good, nor Faith, Repentance, etc. nor Grace, evil: Therefore God doth not will nothing, or nill the said good. 2. Frustra fit per plura, etc. It is presumptuous to feign needless Decrees and Volitions in God: But the Decree of nothing (of not giving Grace) is vain: For nothing will be nothing, without any Decree or Volition of God, as well as without any efficiency. If God neither make, nor will more Worlds, more Sons, more Men, there will be no more, though he have no Will or positive Decree that there shall be no more. 3. No man knoweth where to bond the Doctrine of Decrees de nihilo; And to make them infinite or boundless, soundeth so presumptously and profanely, that common reason doth disclaim it. It is possible that there be as many more sands, pebbles, straws, etc. made as are: It is possible to make every stone, or sand, an Animal, or the choice of a thousand other things: It's possible to give each man and Creature the choice of a thousand other names, places, circumstances: And must we feign in God a positive Will or Decree of every one of these possibles that they shall never be? That this Sand shall not be a Man, nor that Bird a Stone, Id. ib. ad secundum, Praedestinatio est causa & ejus quod expectatur in future vita a praedestinatis, scil. Gloriae & ejus quod praecipitur in praesenti, scil. Gratiae: Reprobatio ver● non est causa ejus quod est in praesenti, scil. culpae, sed est causa derelictionis ● Deo, est tamen causa ejus quod redditur in future, scil. poe●ae aeternae. etc. It is enough to conceive that Gods infinite Wisdom knoweth what is fittest to be, and that all that he willeth shall be; and that he willeth no more; and therefore no more Creatures will be. But he willeth to give power to free Agents, to do or not do certain acts in specie; and therefore they can do more than he decreeth they shall do. 2. And as to the necessity of men's sin or misery, you lay as much of it upon God as we; that is, no causal necessity at all, (as Rob. Baronius distinguisheth it well in his Metaphysics.) To omit all the Distinctions of necessity which Hereboord, and many others give us, that we need not, it is here sufficient to distinguish between mere Logical necessitas consequentiae in order of argumentation; and Physical or causal necessity in order of Being. God's foreknowledge (which you deny not) inferreth the former: For it is a good argument (what ever God fore-knoweth will come to pass: But God fore-knoweth the sins of all that sin; Ergo they will come to pass). The major is a necessary proposition, and so is the minor; therefore so is the conclusion. But yet God's knowledge causeth not sin; nor is it necessitated in any. Dr. Twisse, who goeth as high as predetermination, doth yet grant Arminius, that it is only necessitas consequentiae, and not consequentis, which Gods Decree or Will doth infer as to men's sin and misery; and professeth, that all the Schoolmen say the same; and blameth Arminius for pretending that we infer a necessitatem consequentis: And the other Arminius owneth. And are they not then agreed whether they will or not? I doubt not but predetermination inferreth necessitatem consequentis causally, though this be denied by them that hold it. But so doth nothing which we assert. The fourth Crimination. A. You will make either the pure mass, or man as man, or the corrupted mass, to be the Object of Predestination, (Election and Reprobation). And so make God desert most men in Adam's sin, as he did the Devils in their sin, without remedy, or hope. * Vasquez holdeth in▪ 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 8. d. 9 q. 4. c. 2. that Christ merited our Election out of the corrupted mass; not as Election is in God, but in the Effect: And that Paul, Eph. 1. [Elegit nos in Christo, etc.] utitur nomine electionis, quae est separatio illa a massa perditionis in qua multi relicti sunt. B. These are words of confusion, which, when opened, will appear nothing, and that we are all of a mind. Either you will distinguish God's Decrees by the Objects, or not. If not, you must not distinguish between Election and Rejection, willing and nilling, loving Peter, and hating Judas, etc. If yea, than you must not take up with the unexplained words, Reprobation and Election. 1. By Reprobation is meant either Gods Will to punish men. 2. Or his Will to give them no special saving Grace. 3. Or his not-willing to give it them. For the first, I told you before that the Object of God● Will to punish men in Hell, is a Sinner fore-seen finally rejecting Mercy. 2. The Object of his Will to punish men with positive temporal punishments, is the Sinner fore-seen in his immediate capacity for them. 3. Whether punishment by not giving that Spirit for Faith, Repentance, and Holiness, be decreed (being nothing but a not-giving) is before discussed. But if it could be proved, yet the Object of Gods denying further Idem d. 95. 1. Ferrariens. plane indicat Deum neminem damnare, aut rejicere a regno suo voluisse, quod ipse appellat deserere, nisi pravisa culpa. mercy and help, is evermore one that hath abused former mercy, or refuseth that as offered to him. 4. But Gods non-Volition to give Grace i● no act, and hath no Object. But we judge that all mankind are now from under the mere Covenant of Innocency, and that none perish but for the abuse of mercy, which had a tendency to their recovery (The case of Infants must be spoke to in its place once for all.) But all this belongeth to the Case of Grace and freewill. * How Augustine distinguished Election to Justification and to Glory. See him, lib. 1. ad simplic. q. 2. Et quae de ●o habet, Vasquez in 1. Thom. disp. 89. cap. 6. And 2. As for Election, we say that 1. The Object of Gods Will to glorify men, is man sanctifying and persevering in an immediate capacity for Glory in esse cognito. 2. The Object of Gods Will to give the Grace of perseverance, is a fore-seen sanctified person in the next capacity. 3. The Object of Gods Will to justify, sanctify, and adopt, is a fore-seen Believer. 4. The Object of God's Will, to give special Grace, which shall effectually cause men to repent and believe, is ordinarily a fore-seen disposed Sinner prepared by his common Grace; but sometimes an unprepared Sinner, whom, of his free will, he will suddenly convert, as it pleaseth him freely to distribute his benefits (all being unworthy.) 5. The Object of God's Will, to give the highest degrees of common Grace, external (in the purest preaching of the Gospel, and other mercies,) and internal (in greater helps of the Spirit) is sometimes a Sinner in esse cognito, who hath not grossly rejected lower helps, and sometimes freely the worse sort of Sinners, who have abused former mercies. 6. The Object of God's Will, to give the first common mercy which hath a tendency in its use to men's recovery and Salvation, is all mankind fallen in Adam: For all are under the New Covenant of Grace made with Adam, Gen. 3. 15. in some degree, (and with Noah) and all have much mercy tending to Repentance; and none are left as the Devils in despair, without any offered remedy or help. 7. The Object of Gods Will to give man the Covenant of Innocency, was Adam fore-seen as mere man. 8. The Object of Gods Will to create man, was nothing in the sense that we now take an Object in; that is, for the materia circa quam. But if you will call the intended effect the Object, than the Object of Gods Will here (and in the rest) is the thing willed. But if you will needs presume to seek one higher in the Mind of God, * Man knoweth by Reception, and so hath Ideas: But God can be no Recipient. you must say that it was man as conceived fit to be, as well as possible. For we can think no otherwise of the Divine Conceptions and Volitions, but as we are led by the analogy of humane acts. And so we must say, that 1. God's Power maketh it possible for all things to be. 2. Next God knoweth them possible. 3. He knoweth what is convenient or fit to be made, to his unsearchable ends. 4. He willeth that they shall be, and man among the rest, and so on. If you will needs have the order of Decrees, this is all that we can say of them. A. All this pleaseth us well: but it will not please your own Party, or the Calvinists; that you make so many acts of Election, which they tell you is but one entire thing, as mentioned in Scripture: Nor yet that you lay every Decree or Will upon foresight. B. You are mistaken: No moderate considerate man of them will deny any thing that I have said. For 1. As to the Scripture use of the word Election, it is not the mere name that we are now opening, but the matter in question: Nor is it the expounding of particular Texts that I am upon: And if I were, no man will deny but that the word Election is variously used in the Scripture: Sometime for God's eternal Will to make us Christians of Infidels, and to save us by Christ; and sometime for actual choosing us by converting Grace in time; and sometime for actual choosing men in time by Vocation to some office or special work, etc. 2. And as to the distinguishing of all these Volitions of God, no man will deny the effects to be distinct; undoubtedly these are various effects of God; 1. To make man. 2. To give him the Covenant of Innocency. 3. To give him the Covenant of Grace, with all the common mercies of it. 4. To give some Persons and Nations the Gospel, and other mercies above the greatest part of the World, with answerable helps of the Spirit. 5. To give men special Grace, effectual for Faith and Repentance. 6. To give men Pardon, Adoption, and Sanctification. 7. To give men Perseverance. 8. To give them Glory. And if these are various works, either you will distinguish of Gods Will by his various works, or not. * Sive secundum nostram rationem distinguamus illud decretum in plura, five dicamus esse unicum, non est multum curandum: Certum enim est apud omnes, Deum omnia & singula volutsse unico simplicissimo acta suae voluntatis: Est enim ipsius voluntas, & voluntatis operatio idem quod sua essentia simplex & individua si aliquis contenderet esse etiam nostro modo intelligendi esse unicum actum simplicissimum voluntatis, ego non cur abo. Vasquez in 1. Tho q. 14. a. 13. disp. 65. And is not this à short end of many Controversies. If you do not, our whole Controversy about the Order of the Decrees is quickly at an end (and I am content with the abreviation): For where there is no Distinction, there is no Order. And when I distinguish them never so much, I say, as well as any, that they are all one in regard of the one Will or Essence of God that willeth them. In God there is no real diversity; but his Will is thus variously denominated extrinsecally from its respect to the various objects to which it doth transire, and of the various effects which it produceth. And thus do all men talk of God. Else they could not distinguish his saving Will from his damning Will; nor Election from Rejection, in his Decree. So that no man can tell how to differ here. 3. And as to foresight, you as much mistake. For 1. I say not that God forseeth any good in any man, but what he giveth him, and willeth to give him; But we speak of the Order of those Volitions, in the way of execution. * Alex. Alice. is noted by Vasquez and others, as singular, for holding that Predestination to the first Grace was upon foresight of the future good use of that Grace as the cause: But he denieth that the first Grace is actually given on the same Cause: Therefore Vasquez thinks he changed his mind. 2. And all men that ascribe Intentions, Volitions, or Purposes to God, do and must make the Object of them as such to be Quid cognitum, or something which some call an Idea in the Mind of God; It is not a prius Volitum qua tale that is the Object of a Volition, but bonum intellectum. And therefore nothing but foresight or apprehension of the thing, needs to be put in the description of the Object. Nor do I deny, but that we must in our ordinary Discourse speak comprehensively, and denominate Election eminently from the noblest parts: For as our full Salvation includeth all, or almost all, so our Conversion and Glorification presupposeth all that antecedeth. And therefore as we may and must talk of Salvation in general, and not always stand to mention all the parts of it; so must we eminently talk of Election to Salvation, as comprehending the rest, and not always stand to distinguish of the parts. But when you will make a Controversy of the Order and the Object of these acts or parts, we must distinguish. The fifth Crimination. A. But you make God's Decrees to proceed according to the Order of Intention, * Vasquez, in 1. Tho. q. 23. disp. 89. c. 7. saith, That the duplex ordo alter intentionis, alter executionis, non s●nt in ment artificis sed alter in ment & consultatione illius, alter in re ipsa. But in man I suppose it must be said, that both may be in ment, the first circa rationes operandi; the second circa ordinem operandi vel effectum. For the mind itself saith, I will do this first, and that next. But in God we know of no such Order, except Relative and Connotative from the effect, because there is nothing in God but God. De fine & mediis; and so you feign God to Decree men's damnation; yea, and the denying them Grace; yea, and their Sin, ●ub ratione medii, as a means to his Glory: And so he first decreeth to damn them, and then to leave them in sin to that end. B. All this is your mistake: what any particular men say, I now mind not: But that which we hold is this; 1. I have told you, That not to give men Grace, Faith, yea, and Heaven, is nothing: And nothing needeth no Volition or Decree: Though both the Threatening and the Sentence of these Privations is something, and those are willed or decreed. 2. I have told you, That God decreeth no man's sin at all: It is no capable Object of God's Volition; unless as circa quod, as he willeth what use to make of sin presupposed. 3. Sin is no means of the Glory of God; and therefore is not willed as a means: otherwise it should have the rationem boni qua medium, and be eligible. But it is an evil presupposed; the curing or punishing of it, and not it itself, being the means of God's Glory: And therefore God doth not will it as a means. 4. Do not you yourself say, 1. That God doth glorify his Justice in the damnation of the Wicked? 2. And that he willed from eternity so to do? 3. And that he fore-knew who would be wicked? 4. And that he could have cured and saved them if he would? 5. And that he had no absolute Will or De●ree eventually or effectually to cure and save them, but only in tantum, to do so much towards it, which he knew would be uneffectual through their fault? 6. And that therefore the Decree of damnation, upon this foresight, did pass upon the individuals, and not only on the Wicked and Impenitent in general? All this you hold, and must hold; and what hold we more? 5. For as to the Order of God's Decrees, we further hold as followeth: 1. That though when there is need, we must distinguish them by their Effects and Objects; yet we dread the presumption of feigning those Orders in the Mind of God, which we know not of, and cannot prove. He had need to be better acquainted with the Divine Acts, that shall venture to tell us in what Order they lie in the Mind of God, than Mortals are, except where God hath plainly told us. * Vasquez in 1. Th●. q. 23. d. 94. c. 1. saith Scotus i've▪ d. 19 q. 1. Hac ordine instantia ratione in Dei pr●scientia & providentia dispon●●▪ In prime Deum seipsum intellezisse, in second intellexisse omnes creaturas; in terti● quosdam ad gloriam & gratiam praedestinasse circa alios vero se habuisse negative: in quarto vidisse eos casuros in primo parent, in quinto providisse illis remedium per Christi passionem, etc. 2. We hold, that God doth not intendere finem, or eligere medi● thereto, in the sense as man doth; because he wanteth nothing, and therefore doth not velle desideratum, nor seek any thing which he wanteth. But that improperly God is said to intent an end, when he doth but will to produce an effect, or else still perfectly enjoyeth that which is improperly called His end. And in the first sense, every Creature is his end; that is, the terminus or effect of his operation. And in the other sense, He himself only is his own end; that is, the complacency of his own Will. 3. Therefore to undertake to delineate the Order of God's Volitions or Decrees, according to the way of mental intention the fine & mediis, is a work unfit for us to meddle with, as being beyond our reach. 4. But those that will needs meddle that way, can go no further than to say, That God is his own end, (or the fulfilling or complacency of his Will) and therefore that God first willeth the complacency of his own Will, and then willeth all Creatures as the means thereto. And what is this to any of our Controversies? For the glorifying of his Justice, is but the means of the complacency of his Will. Or if you will say, that his Glory is his end, it is no created thing that you must mean by his Glory. For nothing created can be Gods Ultimate End. Or if you could prove that Scholastici omnes uno ●re fatentur nullam causam realem Divinae voluntatis posse assignari, non solum efficientem, materialem aut formalem (id enim satis compertum est) sed neque●in●lem non solum inter objects creat● sed ●●c su●m bonitatem, Vasq. 1. Tho. q. 19 d. 82. c. 1. (But by his leave, that which hath no caus● formati● ●● nothing.) But cap. 2. he maintaineth that Gods own goodness (only) is his Ratio volendi, sed non causa, which is held also by Al●ns. 1. p. q. 28. ●. ●. q. 3. Gabri. 1. d. 14. q. 1. a. 1. Henric. quod, l. 4. q. 19 Dried. de concord. 1. p. cap. 4. ●d ●. a created Glory were God's Ultimate End; that is, the appearance or refulgence of his Image or Likeness on the Creature: yet you must confess, that it is the Glory of God in his Conjunct Perfections, Power, Wisdom, Goodness, and that the Glory of his Punitive Justice must be either taken as a means to that; or else that God hath his End continually in the Glory which is upon every Creature, and every man and act of man. 5. Though Dr. Twisse so frequently inculcate, Quod prius est intention, posterius est executione; he saith, that it is but the fine & med●is, and not the medii● inter se; and that no medium is properly Gods End (and then nothing but himself is his End); and he glorieth as the discoverer of this Truth, that all the means are one to God, and therefore have but one Decree; so that he reduceth all God's Decrees to two, 1. Of his Glory as his End▪ 2. Of all the means thereto as one. 6. And other learned men's Writings I have seen, who come after him, and seek to prove that the Decree de fine & mediis are but one, and consequently that there is no such order to be feigned among them. 7. The plain truth is, Gods Will is the beginning and end of all: And all the World are the means of accomplishing and pleasing it: And it is always fulfilled and pleased, though not always by the same means: And God loveth no Creature finally for itself, but for Himself, as his Perfection shineth in it, and as it fulfilleth his Will. And to feign any other Order of Intention and Election de fine & medii● in God, is presumptuous; much more to lay our frames of them, and tie God hereto, and trouble the Church with contending for such Models. But the Order of Execution is intelligible (in part) to man: And we are sure that God eternally intended to execute his Will in that Order in which in time he doth it. And therefore this is the only necessary and the sufficient method of God's Decrees, which man can investigate. 8. We deny therefore that God decreeth or willeth to damn any before he forseeth their Sin; or that he decreeth to damn any, but as impenitent Sinners; or that the damnation of any man is his End; or See this question handled by Vasqu. 1. Tho. q. 19 d. 82. c. 4. & 5. & 6. that instantia secundum ●rdinem objectorum inter se assignanda sunt, & non ex sola Dei voluntate. that he decreeth any man's sin; or that he decreeth not to give them Grace; or that Sin, or not giving Grace, or not believing, etc. need a Decree, being nothing; much more that these are decreed as means to God's Glory. But if you speak the fine, 1. As that which man is bound to intent, 2. Or as a mere effect; so no doubt all things have their relation, use, and order to each other. The sixth Crimination. A. You deny all conditional Decrees in God, and so make them all absolute, and consequently arbitrary, merely because God will do it. B. Do you think we differ in this? You dare not profess your dissent L●g. Twiss. Vind. Grat. li. 1. Digres. 1. de Elect. p. 151. Et Episcopii Instit. Theol. li. 4. Sect. 6. cap. 6. pag. 412, 41●. from any of this following explication of our sense. 1. God's Will is the Cause and End of the whole Creation: And what ever pleaseth him to do he doth; whatsoever it pleaseth him shall come to pass, it shall come to pass; and what ever he is pleased to make our Duty by a Law, is made our Duty. All that God doth and commandeth is Arbitrary: His Wisdom indeed and his Will concur; but his Ends are within himself; and his Will is the end of his Will, so far as it may be said to have an end. Arbitrariness and self-willedness is God's Perfection, which is man's Sin and Usurpation. If you will stretch to that impropriety, as to say that He willeth it, because his Understanding seethe it fittest to be willed; and so make Causes and Effects in God; yet must you add, that the fitness or goodness so understood, is the Aptitudinal congruency to his Will. 2. We affirm that God hath many Decrees which are conditional in respect of the thing decreed. * Inquit Twissus Vind. Grat. li. 1. de elect. Dig. 3. p. 163. Aquinas diserte asserit, Deum velle hoc esse propter hoc; sed non propter hoc velle hoc, p. 1. q. 19 ●. 1. c. & ad primam voluntatem Dei rationabilem esse, non quod aliquid sit Deo causa volendi, sed in quantum vult unum esse propter aliud, Et q. 23. ●. 5. c. Eodem mod● produxi●u● Bonavent●ram, Scotum, Durandum, conspirantibus animis ●adem per omnia quod ad hunc apicem attin●t p●ofitentes. Vide quae addit ex suare sio ibid. p. 164. So Dr. Twisse frequently tells you. He maketh one thing a means and a condition of the event of another. And we say that God hath conditional Promises and Threaten; [If thou confess with thy mouth, and believe in thy heart, etc. thou shalt be saved]. And we believe that Gods Will made these Promises and Threats, and that they are the true signs of his Will: And that he will fulfil them. And so far he hath a conditional Will, and conditional expressions of his Will. 3. But as to the Act of Volition, we believe that his Wills are eternal, and have no proper condition of their existence, or not existing; because being existent, they are Necessary necessitate existentiae; e. g. God never had such a Will as this, [If thou repent, I will purpose or will to pardon thee if thou repent, or to make the pardoning conditional promise;] But [If thou repent I will pardon thee, and whether thou repent or not, I will conditionally pardon thee, or make that Covenant which saith, I will pardon thee if thou repent,] our Acts are the Conditions of God's Gifts and Acts, but not of his Will, as suspended on those Acts. 4. Sure this is your own sentiment: For you deny not that God knoweth from eternity whether the condition of each Event will itself be or not; And if so, it must be only the condition of the Event, and not of his Decree: For he that e. g. willeth absolutely that all shall perish that repent not, and knoweth certainly that Judas will not repent, doth thenceforth absolutely Will that Judas shall perish, though only that he perish conditionally. For that Will is no longer suspended on a Condition, but it is the Event only that is suspended. At least you must say, that it is passed into a certainty, equal to an absolute Will. 5. But we will come as near as truth will lead us. If by a Condition you mean only that Condition of the event which is not a suspender of God's Decree, but only a constituent qualification of the Object; so I grant to you, that though Gods Will as it signifieth his Essence, or his essential Principle of operation, in itself, have no cause or condition; yet as it is extrinsically denominated, the Volition or Nolition of this or that, the Object hath its Conditions; that is, qualifications, without which Gods Will is not so denominable. And so God's Will hath its Conditions of complacency or displicency in the Creature, without which he cannot truly be said to be pleased or displeased in them; yea, I told you, that these may oriri de novo, without change in God. And whether his judicial Will to condemn men as Judge, have the same conditions, we shall inquire further hereafter. I have already manifested, that the Objects of it have their proper qualifications. The seventh Crimination. A. At least you make Election absolute, if not Rejection; and say, that God electeth men to Salvation, without respect to any goodness in * To the question, An electio ad beatitudinem praecesserit praedestinati●nem meritorum. The affirmative is held by Cajet. and most Thomists, by Scotus, in 1. d. 41. q. 1. Durand. q. 1. n. 8. Aegid. ibid. q. 1. a. 2. Major. 1. d. 4. q. 2. Sotu● in Ro●. ●. Cordub. li. 1. q. 56. spin. ●. inquit Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. disp. 89. c. 1. But Vasquez holdeth the contrary, with Os●rius, Turrian, and many others, maintaining that Augustine held, Electionem ad gloriam esse e● meritis gratia pr●visis. And no doubt but God decreed Glory to be given per modum praemii, if that be all. them. B. I have said enough to this already; 1. Do you think that men are good before they are elected? when they are not men? You do not certainly. 2. Do you think that God forseeth any good in men, when he willeth to them their first good? no doubt you do not. 3. Do you think that God forseeth in men any second, third, or following degrees of goodness, before he intent to give it them? what need he purpose to give it them, if he foresee that they will have it without his Gift? 4. Do you think that God forseeth any power to do good in men, but what he intendeth to give them? or any good act, but what proceedeth from that power which he giveth them, and from his concourse, or co-operating influx? I dare say that you do not. 5. And do you think that we imagine that God giveth, or purposeth to give, any following mercy to him that hath not the necessary antecedent mercy? As to glorify any that is not justified, or to justify any that is not called. 6. You see then that it's necessary, if you will quarrel, that you distinguish of Election as before said. Though Gods Will in itself, as was now said, have no proper suspending condition; yet, 1. The effects of Gods Will have. 2. And the Objects of Gods Will have their necessary qualifications. 3. And some of God's Volitions are thence extrinsically denominated conditional. Now, 1. God giveth Salvation to no Unbeliever, but on condition of Faith. And God actually glorifieth none but penitent persevering Believers: And both these he accordingly decreed or willeth. And can you say then that Election hath no respect to the persons goodness. It hath not only respect to the good intended him, but to that good which is a necessary qualification found in him; that is, necessary to the benefit to which he is elected. God decreeth to give glory to none but persevering Saints, nor perseverance to none but the Holy, nor justification to none but Believers. But I will confess to you, that we hold, 1. That God absolutely willed to give Christ and the New Covenant to the World; 2. That he absolutely willeth or decreeth to give the Gospel and common Grace in a greater degree, to many a one that is no more worthy of it than others that are passed by, and to give it to none but the unworthy. 3. That he absolutely decreeth to give Faith and Repentance to many that have long resisted him, and are as great Sinners as those that have them not, and to none but the unworthy in proper sense. And dare you deny any of this yourself? The eighth Crimination. A. Thus you bring presumption into the World, and encourage men to Marlorate, as from Calvin, saith, in Joh. 15. 2. Certum decretum Dei a nemine infirmari posse: Stat igitur firma sententia, Quemcunque Deus ante conditum orbem elegerit, cum non posse perire: Quem vero rejecerit, cum non posse salvari, etiamsi omnia sanctorum opera fecerit. (An ill supposition) which Episcopius citeth with distaste. But Brentius ibid. cited by the same Marlorate, saith, Haec sententia occurrit c●riositati carnis, quae s●let arg●te magis quam reveren●●r de praedestinatione disserete, & pro suo ingenio colligere, nullum a domin● ad vitam a●●rnam electum posse damnari, eti●●si pessi●● vivat: nullum item a Domin● ad ignem aeternum deputatum posse salvari, eti amsi optime vivat: s● i●aque velle pro sua libidin● vivere. sin: If once they be elect, let them do what they can, they are sure to be saved; for they are certain that Election will not change. B. 1. You are leading us towards the question of Perseverance, before the time. 2. Do you think yourself that Election changeth? Is not this as much imputable to you as us? or do we differ here? Do not you say that God fore-knoweth who will be saved? And can God be deceived? or shall not all certainly be glorified that are so fore-known? Nay, do you not say that, at least, upon that foreknowledge, God decreeth each persons certain Salvation that shall be saved? And can that Decree which is upon foreknowledge be frustrate? Do not you then as much encourage presumption by a certain unchangeable Election as we. 3. It is factious perverseness (reflecting on yourselves as much as us) which puts in that word, [Let them do what they will, or live how they will, or sin they never so much;] For it falsely intimateth that God electeth men to Glory, that live impenitently in wickedness; according to our Doctrine. Whereas we say, 1. That if the word Election be taken partially, for the act of God's Decree to glorify them, none but fore-seen persevering Saints are the Objects; And a wicked Saint is a contradiction. Or if it be taken for God's Decree to convert a man, we say that this is true, that let the World live never so wickedly, God doth decree to convert some of them from that wickedness, but not all: Do you question this? 2. But if the word Election be taken comprehensively, than men's Holiness, Repentance, and Faith is part of the Salvation But Brentius ibid. cited by the same Marlorate, saith, Haec sententia occurrit curiositati carnis, quae solet argute magis quam reverenter de praedestinatione disserere, & pro suo ingenio colligere, nullum a domino ad vitam aeternam electum posse damnari, etiamsi p●ssim● vivat: nullum item a Domino ad ignem aeternum deputatum posse salvari, etiamsi optime vivat: se itaque velle pro sua libidine vivere. which they are elected to: And to say that God absolutely electeth Peter to live and die a Saint, let him (after Conversion) live and die never so wickedly; this is a putrid contradiction, such paltry dealing faction causeth; what do you differ from us in all this? * Vid. Episcop. Instit. Theo. li. 4. sect. 5. cap. 7. pag 415. col. 1. 4. But as to presumption hereupon, I answer you, 1. That there is no mercy which Satan will not tempt men to abuse, even Christ, and the hopes of Heaven itself. 2. As long as wickedness is that evil which Election decreeth to deliver us from; he that is wicked may be sure that he hath not the benefit nor mark of Election, and cannot have the least assurance that he is elect. 3. And while he that is truly godly knoweth that he is no further elected to Salvation than he is elected to persevere in godliness; this is no rational inducement to him to forsake godliness, any more than to renounce Heaven, but rather to conclude, I am decreed to persevere in holiness, therefore I must so do. 4. And to pass by the Controversy of perseverance till we come to it, it is as all confess, so few of the Elect that are certain of their own Election, that this Objection can extend but to a few. 5. Lastly, None are certain of their Election, but such as have strong clear active Grace and evidence; that believe firmly, and love God much, and obey him carefully: And such as these are fit to improve assurance, and to live in the fruits of love and gratitude. Did you ever know what love, and thankfulness, and delight in God, and holiness are, and yet can you think that they are the way to sin? You know nothing in Religion, if you know not, that they are the life and soul of true Religion, and the most powerful principles of Obedience and Perseverance. Nor do you understand the Gospel-design, if you know not, that the greatest manifestation of the love of God, is the greatest means of love, and thankfulness, and desire, and delight in God and goodness, unto man. The ninth Crimination. A. At least thus * Suetonius saith Tiberius was a neglecter of Religion, because he thought that all things were ruled by fate. Fate is set up in the World, and all things are under necessity, and unavoidable. B. You had this Objection about necessity before, and to the answer of it I refer you further, 1. Immutable Election doth set up but a consolatory quietting certainty in the World, without which man's mind must still be in troublesome, unquiet, if not tormenting terrors. Is it a wrong to you, if you can be sure to be saved? Had you rather live and die under these apprehensions, [I know not whether I shall be in Heaven Kipping Philonatur. l. 9 c. 11. p 431. voluntas ista absoluta hominem cum effectis suis ineluctabiliter necessitat hoc est ad unum oppositorum necessario constringit & determinat omnia ejus acta & eventa, ut non aliter evenire queant quam eveniant: where he confuteth Piscator's Arguments for such necessitating Decrees, p. 432, etc. or Hell for ever?] If you have not certainty, or a hope that is somewhat near it; I think this conclusion, if you be awake, and in your wits, must needs make your life a constant bondage, and the fear of death your constant misery, and must blast all the pleasures of your fulest Prosperity. Thank God that his Foundation standeth sure, and the Lord knoweth who are his; and see that you keep his mark upon you, professing Christ, and departing from iniquity. And do not cry out as if you were fatally carried to Heaven against your wills. 2. As for the word [Fate] it is ambiguous: Some by fate, mean but the certainty that God's Predictions shall be fulfilled; Quod fatur eveniet. Some mean only the certain connexion of Causes and Effects under Gods sapiential Government of the World. (As Campanella maketh Necessity, Fate, and Harmony, to be the result of Power, Wisdom, and Love; but not accurately enough.) And some say, (but how truly I know not) That the Stoics took Fate for some primary necessitating Cause, which did necessitate all Acts of the Gods and Men. It is a word that we have no need of; they that will play them with it may. 3. But as to Necessity again, I say, 1. Election maketh no man's sin or misery necessary, nor tendeth to it. 2. It maketh no man's Salvation Thus Fewrbornius in Fascicul. Disser. de termino vitae useth 17 Arguments, contra sententiam Calvinianam de fatali & simpliciter necessario termino vitae, (quasi Deus ex absoluto & simplici decreto & absque ullo ad causas secundas physicas, & voluntarias respectu, c●ique hominum genus & horam mortis praesixerat.) And all upon the encouragement of some ill and unsound words of Piscator, who is most extreme in this: whereas this is none of the Calvinists sense commonly, who hold that sin is only fore-seen, and not decreed: but all true means are decreed with the end in one Decree; therefore respected as decreed. necessary against his will in sensu composito. 3. The more it maketh our Salvation necessary, that is, certain and insuperable, the greater is God's mercy, the greater our happiness, and cause of gratitude and Joy. The Saints in Heaven are not offended at the certainty of their persevering blessedness. If you shall Object, That it necessitateth the perishing of all others, because none can be saved who are not Elect. Remember that this was your third Crimination, and is answered before. I say again, 1. Necessity and Impossibility are either Logical in ordine probandi; or Physical in ordine causandi. The first sort followeth upon your own Doctrine: He that God fore-knoweth shall sin and perish, it necessarily followeth Necessitate consequentiae; and it is impossible but it should follow, that he will sin and perish, but not by God's foreknowledge. Causal necessitating either taketh away the true power of escaping, or depriveth of such power by prevention: But so doth not the Election or Decree of God. 2. Though we hold such absolute Election as hath been opened to you, and that God decreeth to cause men to believe, before he forseeth that they will believe, (in order of Nature, according to humane Conception;) yet we hold as you do, that Reprobation doth not so proceed, but that God decreeth men to Hell only on foresight of final wickedness, which he never caused or willed. And if in this we agree with you, you must accuse yourselves as much as us. 3. God doth both Decree to give, and actually give men power to do more than they do; And his decreeing that another man shall well use that power which he hath, doth sure take away no power from you. 4. Yea, Gods not decreeing to cause you to use your own power well, doth take none of it from you; But includeth that such power you have: much less his Decree to do more for others. 5. All the World acknowledgeth, that a Benefactor as such is free to give his own benefits as he pleases, unequally. And giving more to one taketh nothing from another. Suppose that God had for 4000 years, till Christ's Incarnation, but willed and given his mercy equally to all the World, even so much as might leave the matter merely to their wills; and after that had given greater mercy to the Christian Churches, taking nothing from the rest: Had this been any injury or diminution to the rest? Suppose now God should fetch half the damned out of Hell, is this any more hurt or wrong to the rest than if he had delivered none. But all these things are here anticipated, and cannot be fully answered till we come to the Article of Grace; where we must show how God doth differ his Operations on men's Souls: For none can deny, but as he differenceth them, so he decreed to difference them, and no otherwise. The tenth Crimination. A. At least you make God's Decrees and Ways unequal, and make him a Saith Vasque● in 1. Tho. ●. 2●. ●. 3. d. 95. c. ●. Nullam dari causam Reprobationis ex parte reprebi, dicunt Durard. in 1. d. 41. q. 2. ●. 14. Greg. Armi. q. 1. a. 2. con. 1. & 5. Mars●l. 1. q. 4●. a. 2. con. 4, etc. Dried● 1. p. de concord. c. 3. con. ●. & 3. Adam in c. 9 add Roman. Ferrar. 3. cont. Gent. c. 161. Aquin. 1. q. 23. ●. 5. ad 3. ●x his tamen Doctoribus T●om. Driedo & Durand. non dicunt absolute, Reprobationis nullum dari causam ex parte reprobi: sed nullam esse causam ob quam hic potius quam alius reprobetur, aut quod idem est, cur hic praedestinetur et discernatur a mossa perditionis, ille vero in ea relinquatur & reprobetur, vid. Laetera. Respecter of persons, as decreeing to save one, and not another; or to give ●●re Grace to one than to another, of equal demerit. B. You may show your ignorance about this yourself; but this is no difference between the parties. For, 1. No man can deny but that God standing towards us in a threefold Relation, as our Owner and the Lord of all, as our Ruler, and as our Benefactor, so he is free in the first and third Relation. A Proprietary may do with his own as he list: And a Benefactor may unequally give his benefits as he seethe meet: For he is supposed to give only that which is no man's Right, till he give it them (by promise or collation). But as God is a Rector, and governeth Mankind by a Law, which hath Rewards promised, and Punishments threatened to promote Obedience, and as he is Judge according to that Law, and as he is a Benefactor already obliged by promise; thus God doth keep an equality in his Judgements and Executions, and ever proceedeth according to his Word or Law. He will in just equity and equality forgive, justify and adopt all penitent Believers, and no others, how great soever. He will glorify all persevering Saints, and no others, just according to his Word; Because his Law is Norma judicii, or that which he will observe in judging. If God forgive and save one penitent Believer and not another, you may say that he ruleth not in equity and equality. But in cases of other disposals and benefits, which no man hath right to by any Law or Covenant, the case is otherwise. 2. And full experience tells us this. God made not every Man an Angel, nor every Stone a Star, nor every Star a Sun, nor every Beast a Man, nor every Toad a Bird, nor the Dirt and Water Fire. Wonderful is the Variety of his Works through all the World: No two Birds, Beasts, Men, Stones, Trees, are perfectly equal and like. No two men's Faces, Constitutions, Parts, Dispositions, Virtues, are perfectly equal. With what various temperaments come we into the World? And is God a Respecter of persons for this? or are his ways unequal? As a free Owner and Benefactor he will diversify his Gifts, and do with his own as he list, though Sinners quarrel at it. You dare not say that God giveth his Benefits equally to all, that are of equal demerit. 3. The sin of respecting persons belongeth to a Judge, obliged by rules to equal distribution: By a Judge, I mean any judging and executing Governor, or obliged distributer of Rights. And it consisteth in partiality and injustice, because of something in the person, (as Greatness, Riches, Learning, Relation, Flattery, etc.) which is no just cause of that inequality. But this is nothing to God, who regardeth no man's person for any such thing, nor denieth to any man his proper due. The eleventh Crimination. A. * Both sides charge this on each other. Malderus, 1, 2. q. 111. a. 3. p. 519. Vocar●t illusorie Deus si talem gratiam sufficientem solum ideo daret quia non est efficax, etc. It is profaneness thus to venture on blasphemous charges against God, if 〈…〉 done by him ●●●●. You make God play the Hypocrite, to send abroad Ministers to entreat men to repent and be saved, when he hath decreed that they shall be damned, and not repent. And you make all the preaching, and means that are used for such men's Conversion, a mere mockery. B. No more than you do; For there is no difference as to this. 1. Do not you say that God fore-knoweth from eternity that Judas, e. g. will not repent, or be saved? yea, that upon such foreknowledge he hath decreed before he was born to damn him? And doth this make God play the Hypocrite, or his Word to be a mockery? We say but the very same of all that perish. 2. To help you to rescue both yourselves, and us from this accusation, consider, that God's Decree hath several parts. As, 1. That the lapsed World shall have a Covenant of Grace, and be entreated to be saved. 2. That Judas, one of this world, shall have his part among the rest. 3. Whereas Judas will not receive this offered Grace, for rejecting it he shall be condemned: These are the material parts of God's Decree; And is there any hypocrisy or mockery in this? God decreed not to condemn Judas, but for rejecting offered Grace: And this presupposeth the offer: He cannot reject that which never was offered him. What would you have had God rather say, [I foresee if I offer Judas Grace, that he will not accept it, and therefore I will offer him none, but condemn him, because he would have refused it, had it been offered.] By this rule, the sin of all the World against mercy and means of life, should have been prevented by offering them no means or mercy; and yet men perish and be damned for that which they never did, because God foresaw that they would have done it. Are not these ways unequal, in comparison of Gods, which vain men quarrel with. 2. But again, I tell you that your feigning to hold, that God decreed that Judas should not repent, is not true of those that you now talk with: It is enough that God did not decree that Judas should eventually repent. The twelfth Crimination. A. * The Jesuits themselves as well as the Dominicans deny as much as a possibility or power to unbaptized Infants (of being saved); And in their case are for as absolute arbitrary Reprobation as the highest, not only Calvinist but Antinomian, vid. Ruiz. de praedes. Tr. 3. disp. 15. sect. 1. p. 202, etc. And this upon the irrational Doctrine, that for want of baptism the Children of the holiest persons shall be condemned, though the Parents did their best to procure it, and so there is no will or sin the Cause: And yet godly persons have Merits to spare for souls in Purgatory, and none for their own Children. Though you say that God decreeth to give men more power than they use, yet you add, that none of that power will ever be well used, unless he fore-decree it; For you say that God absolutely willeth or decreeth every good Act, as well as the Power. And so no such Act followeth any Power, where God decreeth it not: And what good doth that Power do them. B. Still you anticipate those Controversies which belong to the point of Grace. But I answer, 1. You must answer this for yourselves first, for it as much concerneth you as us. For you teach that what ever Power God giveth men, it will never be exercised, unless he foreknow that it will be so: Yea, unless upon foreknowledge of man's due cooperation with God, it be decreed. For you say that God fore-knoweth all the Acts of Grace and Power that will be exercised; yea, and decreeth them on the said foresight, as your Doctrine de scientia media inferreth. 2. By this Objection there is no way to reconcile you to God's Providence, unless he will be ignorant of all men's future sinful Omissions, or unless he will not be beforehand willing of all the good that is in the World, or at least not decree it, and be the Author of it; Or else unless he will cause all men equally to use their powers, and do good alike. Now you dare not say, that ever any of these shall come to pass. You see and confess that all men do not use their power equally, nor do good alike. And you know God will not be before ignorant of it. And you shall never abate God's goodness so, as to keep him from willing and working too all the good that is the world. And will you therefore be unreconciled to him? 3. And where you say, what good then doth such power; 1. I pray you mark that you confess that we hold, that they had power. And if they had power to do good, they could have done it. For what else is power, but that by which I can do the Act. 2. The power given was a proportionable demonstration of God's Power, Wisdom and Mercy, and therefore it did good. 3. That it was not used to their own Salvation, was their own fault for which they suffer. And in all this we are agreed. And now I appeal to your considering Reason, whether there be any difference hitherto left in the point of Predestination between you and me? And I again mind you, that were it not for the importunity and prejudice of contenders, all that I have said of this had been needless. for it is obvious, that while we are all agreed of these generals, 1. That God decreeth to give all men just so much Grace or Mercy as in time he giveth them. * Apud veteres ecclesiae patres eadem omnino suit controversia, de causae gratiae, & Praedestinationis ex parte nostra. Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 5. disp. 9 pag. 658. 2. And that he absolutely decreeth not to give them any more but what he giveth them. All this Controversy of Decrees or Predestination, depends on the Controversy of Grace, how much it is that God giveth unto men. A. I confess that you have indeed proved yourself reconciled to me; But that is because you are an Arminian, and do not know it: For you grant me all that I can justly desire. But the Calvinists will not be therefore reconciled to you, or give you thanks. B. Except the few Predeterminants' afore-excepted, and some odd words that drop from passionate or injudicious men; I am past doubt that the generality of sober moderate Calvinists will stand to what I say, or may do it I am sure, in consistence with their main cause. And I am confident that these are the healing-terms that must unite us. And remember, that you confess, that thus far we differ not. Had you but this following Doctrine from one of the greatest Jesuits, V●squez in 1. Tho. q. 23. disp. 91. c. 11. p. 659. it might put you to your study to be able to disagree. Catholica sententia est nullam causam, nul●●ve initium, aut occasionem ex parte praedestinati excogitari posse, ob quam De●s aut in tempore gratiam ipsi donaverit, aut in praescientia dare decreve●●. Doctrina haec non solum intelligenda est de initio fidei, orationis, aut See all this largely proved by him to the end of the 18th Chap. ibid. ●oluntatis consequendi salutem; vel de aliis operibus quae circa Deum versan●ur; qualia sunt religionis; verum etiam de quovis opere moralis virtutis, ●●od in ipsum solum bonum honestum referatur. Et non solum excludimus initium, quod sit meritum condignunt, sed etiam meritum congruum seu impetratorium, aut dispositionem, & quamlibet causam & occasionem, ob quam Deus huic potius quam alteri gratiam donaverit, aut donare praefinierit; Ita ●● totaratio praeparandi huic potius gratiam quam illi, fuerit beneplacitum divinae voluntatis, nihil autem vel minimum ex parte praedestinati. Ita Thom. Marsil. Gregor. Armi. etc. And yet must we disagree. THE Second Days Conference OF PREDESTINATION. Between C. (a Calvinist) and B. (the Conciliator.) C. I hear of your undertaking to manifest the smallness of our Differences in the long controverted Articles of Predestination, Redemption, Grace and freewill. * Le Blank de dist. Grat. Thes. 80, 81. Tanta varie●as sententiarum & opinionum circa naturam & essentiam gratiae efficacis & rationem ac modum, quo in animis hominum operatur quae a tot jam seculis scholas Christianas exercet, arguit rem esse perplexam, obs●uram & quae undique multis difficultatibus scatet: Nec spes est fore contentionum ●inem, nisi curiositati modus aliquis statuatur, & omittantur qu●stiones arduae & nonnecessariae. Ac profecto longe consultius foret, & paci ac pietati Christianae conduc●b●lius in totum ab ejusmodi quaestionibus abstinere, quam sine fine rixari de rebus quae difficultate sua ing●nium humanum obruunt, & in quibus vix quisquam sibi potest satisfacere. Praesertim quaestion●s illae apud plebem Christianum in homiliis & concionibus non tantum nullo cum fructu, sed maximo saepe cum damno proponuntur, dum simplicium animis injic●untur varii s●rupuli, quos disputa●ionum ars & eloquentia satis postea discuter● non potest. And he mentioneth the things which he would have us take up with, which we are agreed in, viz. Quicquid boni ●obis ●nest, & a nobis fit, Divi●ae gra●iae deberi: Deun● esse qui omne bonum in nobis operatur sine Christo & spiritus illius a●xi●io in ●●s quae aeternam salutem promovent n●bil nos qui●quam posse, etc. D●um ●amen si● per grat●am suam in nobis operari, ●t libertati nostrae ni●●l decedat ●mp o q●i male agunt null●m occasionem habere a● Deo quae●endi, etc. But these Reconcilers do but hal● between two Opinions; and while they will be of neither side, they are like● and loved by neither. B. Blessed are the Peacemakers, for they shall be called the Children o● God. We will seek to please all men for their good to edification; an● yet seek to please no man before God, nor in sin, nor place any of ou● happiness in their favour, nor think much to bear their displeasure o● contempt: For if we (so) seek to please men, we are no longer the Servants of Christ. If God's favour were not enough for us, he were not our God. C. I am afraid your study of Syncretism or Concord will tempt you to war● and turn half an Arminian, and forsake the Truth. B. I thank you for your care of me, and I wonder not at your fears● as long as you mistake one another as you do. As all persecution o● God's Servants is raised by misreports, and misapprehending them to be very bad and dangerous persons, and as all sinful Schisms and separations in Churches arise from men's thinking one another to be very bad and unfit for communion; Even so these factions, and Church-dividing Contentions, come from a false conceit that each side is so dangerously erroneous, as that all good men must stir up their zeal, and with all their disputing-skill and contending-fervency must arm, to defend the Truth against them, and to save the Church and the Souls of men from the infection of their Error. Since I saw the nature of these present Controversies, it filleth me with shame and pity to think, what fierce and fiery work● there hath long been, what hatred, slanders, scorns, persecutions; what volumnious Contentions, what Snares laid for young Students; what factious Oppositions to each other among Pastors and People, throughout much of the learnedst part of the Christian World; and all in a dream, for the most part about mere names and words, or things, that none of them at all understood, nor ever will do in this World. O subtle Tempter! O foolish men! even wise and learned men! O lamentable Churches! O miserable World! C. I pray you tell me what good you look for by this attempt? Do you no● know how many such have come to nothing? B. I'll tell you what good I expect. I expect that here and there an impartial sober Divine should search into and find pacificatory truth: And that divers Students, not yet engaged in any Faction, should discern it: And that most of the idle, ignorant and factious, who find it most for their interest, ease and honour, to be servant for the Opinion which that party holdeth, with whom they do embody, will reproach myself and these attempts, and call me a Calvinist or an Arminian, or one that holdeth dangerous Opinions, and self-conceitedly over-valuing my own apprehensions, do trouble the Church, and strengthen the Adversaries by pretended Reconciliation. But I look that those that receive the Truth, should themselves be saved from the guilt of all that uncharitableness, faction and injury to others, which is caused by men's mistakes: And also that they should be a seed of Peacemakers, to propagate Truth to Posterity, till the Age come when God will heal the Churches, and banish contentious Error from among them. And in the mean time, I look for peace of Conscience in the Service of God, and in his approbation. And it will be reward enough to live out of the fire of Contention myself, and to escape the Fever of that zealous Wisdom which is earthly, sensual, and devilish, and with envy and strife doth bring in confusion, and every evil work: And to feel the sweetness of some of the Wisdom from above, which is first pure, then peaceable, etc. J●●. 3. 14, 15, 16, 17. And I am the more resolved not to omit my Duty through despair, for the experience which I have already had. I remember the time when in the Country where I lived, Sacraments and Discipline were neglected, through the distances of the Episcopal, Presbyterians and Independents, about the way of Administration, and we looked strangely at each other. I thought it our Duty to join in love and practice so far as we agreed, and pass by the rest till we could better see our way. But many years I thought I should be but scorned if I attempted it, and so for boar it in despair. But at last attempting it, almost all consented with whom I did endeavour this way of Concord, and I found no conderable opposition, and many other Countries began to follow our example. After this I saw that whilst Ministers only preached publicly, and spoke but now and then occasionally with the people personally, they were ignorant of their own Flocks, and edified them but little, and occasioned Disputes about examining them before a Sacrament, and many other inconveniences; And I earnestly wished that they would set up the course of Catechising and familiar Conference with all, from Family to Family in order through each Parish. And I thought that if a few Ministers should attempt this without the consent and concurrence of the rest, they would but be contemned by the people: But if all the Ministers of Reputation would consent, it might happily go on: But to motion such a thing I thought as vain, as to attempt that which seemed next to an impossibility. But when I did attempt it at last, I found little or no opposition; but the Ministers readily consented, and other Countries began the like; In so much that some Ministers of Helvetia sent to me their desires, of setting on foot the same course there. These instances confute despair, the great Enemy of all good, and make me resolve to do my part in any good Work, and leave the issue to God. I confess, and it's too well known, that some attempts since these for concord between Church contenders in England, were without success: But they have afforded my Conscience that peace, which doth abundantly compensate all my sufferings. When I pray, Thy will be done on Earth as it is in Heaven, I mean, Let us with the most holy alacrity perform thy preceptive Will and do our Duty; and then with confidence expect, and with complacence rest in thy disposing Will, what ever be the event. C. I have read your Undertaking, and what you have said to A. before, and I think you favour them too much, and make their Errors to seem smaller than they are. B. Do you follow the same method that he did. Begin with the same Point, and suppose me an Arminian for this time, and tell me the worst that you have against their Opinions, (not meddling with the Pelagians, who deny Original Sin; nor with the rash or odd say of particular men,) and let us try how wide you can prove the difference here to be, and whether all be not resolved into the Controversies of Grace and freewill. The first Crimination. C. I. They destroy the comfort of the Faithful, by * Episcop. ubi postea, p. 414. Nullo modo sequitur quod ad gloriam prius fuerant electi, quam crederent. denying that God did certainly and immutably elect individual persons to Salvation. B. You mistake them: They hold that he did certainly and immutably elect particular persons to Salvation. They hold that he foreknoweth what motions means and circumstances will eventually take with men's Wills, without such necessitation as is inconsistent with their liberty; and that to certain persons he immutably decreeth to vouchsafe them all those means and motions; and that he then forseeth that De certo numero electorum & salvandorum & de hoc opinionem Catharini & Thomistarum, etc. vide in Vasqu. in 1. Tho. q. 23. d. 101. c. 1, 2, 3. these will prevail, and that they will believe, yea decreeth that they shall thus prevail, and so decreeth that all those persons shall be justified: And in like manner that he forseeth what means and motions will prevail to their perseverance; and that he decreeth to give them those means and motions; and that by them they shall eventually presevere, and shall infallibly be saved. The moderate Jesuits, and Arminians, and Lutherans do maintain, and will grant all this. And all this is from eternity. And is not here then an eternal ascertaining immutable Election of individuals. The second Crimination. C. II. * Qui habet gratiam efficacem ad conversionem aut fidem praeordinatus est ad conversionem et fidem. Malderus, 1. 2. q. 111. a. 3. p. 519. They feign an election of † Vid. Episcop. Instit. Theol. li. 4. sect. 5. cap. 6. p. 413. Things, instead of an election of Persons; and say that Election is God's Decree to make Faith the condition of Salvation: And so they bring in an indefinite Election of Universals or Species of persons; that God decreeth to save Believers, & damn Unbelievers.; B. Doth any Christian deny any of this? * Restat ergo ut voluntates eligantur sed voluntas ipsa nise aliquid occurat quod delectet, atque invitet animum, moveri nullo m●do potest: Hoc autem ut occurrat non est in bominis potestate, August. lib. 1. ad Simplician. q. 2. 1. That God hath de facto, made Faith the condition of life, is visible in the Gospel: And what God did in time, from eternity he decreed to do. Therefore he decreed to make Faith the condition of life. 2. That God hath in his Covenant made a Deed of Gift of Christ and Life to all true Believers, and of Heaven to all that so persevere, and that he hath promised to perform this Covenant, is visible in the Scripture. Therefore God decreed to do this from eternity, even to justify Believers, and glorify persevering Believers. Make not the world believe that any of us question this. But if you mean that they deny all other Decrees of Election, and extend it not to individual persons, you mistake them. Read but Molina, Suarez, Vasquez, Penottus, and other Jesuits, and you will see it: And so you may in Arminius himself. They hold an Election of Individuals, as I last described it, in the way of their scientia media, besides the Election of Believers in general. See also our Playfaire on the Point. The third Crimination. C. III. They deny any Decree or Will of God to give men the first special Grace, effectually to make them believe and repent, but only that he decreeth to give them sufficient Grace, which their own Wills must make effectual. * They commonly acknowledge a preventing operating Grace, ●quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. But the Ratio efficaciae is controverted among them. B. Did not I tell you that all the Controversy of Predestination is resolved into that of effectual Grace? Such Grace as he giveth men, such he decreed to give them. This all confess. But what it is that denominateth Grace effectual, we are to consider in its proper place. Only let me here tell you, that all will grant you (of whom I now speak) that God decreeth to give men that special Grace which shall cause them to repent and believe. But on what terms, and in what manner it so causeth it, is afterward to be handled. * See Ruiz de praedef. d. 6. sect. 4, 5. proving Faith, Perseverance, etc. to come from God's Decree. The fourth Crimination. C. Their Doctrine de * Of this see more in the first Book. scientia media on which they ground their Opinions of God's Decrees, is many ways injurious to God; and is a fiction not to be made good. B. 1. I doubt all sides are over temerarious in their distribution of God's Decrees and Volitions. But, 1. All are agreed that ex parte Dei Volentis, there is no real difference in his Volitions; nor ex parte Dei scientis, in his knowledge: For so his Knowledge and Will are his Essence. 2. All agree, that ex parte objecti cogniti & decreti there is a real difference. 3. All must agree, that in God's Intellection and Volitions as denominated ab extra, viz. ab objectis, there is a relative or denominative difference. 4. Ex parte objecti, there is no man can question, but that this Proposition [If John have such and such means and helps, he will believe,] doth differ from this Proposition, [It is convenient and good that John shall believe] and from this, [John will believe]. 5. If you are against mincing Gods Knowledge into such scraps as these various objective Propositions do infer, you must be against the old distinction, into scientiam simplicis Intelligentiae, & scientiam purae visionis. For no doubt but God knoweth all things, how various soever, un● intuitu, with one simple knowledge, ex parte sui, though it be by our weakness denominated many, even innumerable, ex relatione objectiva, vol terminatione rei in quam transit. Doth not God with one Act know Convenients, Desirables and Future's? And cannot I here copiously thetoricate against you for your first and second sort of Divine Knowledge, as well as you do against them de scientia media. 6. It is agreed that God knoweth all things to be what indeed they are▪ and not otherwise. 7. It is agreed that God knoweth not as man doth, by Names, Propositions, or Syllogisms; And yet that God knoweth all Names, Notions, Propositions and Syllogisms, with their modes; as they are the measures, organs or actings of Humane Understandings. 8. † I refer the Reader to Blank, de Concord. lib. cum ●ecretis 1. Thes. 25. etc. where by citing their own words at large, he proveth that the most famous and resolute Antiarminians were for this scientia media conditionata, viz. Fr. Gomarrus (Arminius' chief Antagonist) in Mat. 11.— 21. Antonius Walaeus loc. come. de sctent. Dei, pag. 160. Paulus Ferrius Scholast. Orth. vindic. p. 203, 209, 210. Besides Rob. Baronius Metaph. sect. 12. disp. 2. num. 55, 56. (who in his last days was nearest to the Arminians, as appeareth in those Metaphysics.) And Jo. Strangius, l. 3. c. 13. p 675. nameth also Lud. Crocius Dyodecad. dis. 7. It is therefore undeniable to all Christians, that the thing which they call * Can Alvarez and his fellows well prove, that the permission of the first sin is an effect of Reprobation, as the word is used (in a fit and ordinary sense) they would do more to overthrow the Doctrine de scientia media circa malum, than is yet done. But they fail in their attempts of proving this: Of which after. scientia media, is as certainly in God, as is the scientia simplicis Intelligen●iae & Purae visionis; that is, [that God knoweth the truth of all true conditional Propositions, and knoweth what would be done, by such and such causes, or upon such and such alterations, if they were put]. Doth any Christian doubt of this? 9 Whether this should be called scientia media is a question de nomine, and that of no great importance, and not at all de re? 10. Whether it be of any necessity or use in this Controversy, is a question only about the order of argumentation, as long as the thing itself is confessed to be true. 11. Some that cashier it as an useless Engine in this matter, do go as far from you as the Jesuits and Arminians who use it; As you may see at large in Ludou. à Dola, and Durandus himself. 12. I am one that fear Presumption both in their and your distributions of the Knowledge and Decrees of God, and dread the taking of his Name in vain; And one that think that we need not the notion of scientia media for our satisfactory explication of these matters. But as the truth of the thing is confessed, so if it be applied only to the Doctrine of Reprobation (as it is commonly called) and not (at least always) to the Doctrine of Election, I see no untruth that it inferreth, nor no real difference that it will prove between us. The fifth Crimination. C. They deny absolute Reprobation at least, and say that God reprobateth no men, but upon foresight of sin; And so that he hath no Decree that men shall sin, nor that he will permit them to sin, nor that they shall do the act in particular which is sin: As if God had not decreed the hardening of Pharaohs heart, the sin of Sihon, of Rehoboam, of the Jews in kill Christ, etc. B. 1. I told you before, Reprobation is a word that signifieth several acts: You dare not but grant them, that God decreeth or willeth to damn no man but for sin, and as a Sinner: And this is the same thing that they mean. 2. If by Reprobation you mean God's Decree to give them no Faith or Repentance. 1. You must prove that God hath such a Decree or Will, for a mere negation, where not-decreeing or not-willing to give them Grace, will do as much. 2. All Christians must needs confess that God made a Covenant of Grace with fallen Mankind in Adam and Noah; And that no man is now under the mere Obligations of the Law and Covenant of Innocency, which saith [Be perfect and live, sin and die for ever]: And that there is some common mercy extended to all the World, which obligeth them to repent in order to Salvation. He subverteth Scripture, and all experience, that denieth this. Therefore all must grant, that God denieth no special Grace to any, but the abusers of this common Grace. And he decreeth to do but what he doth. * Thus our British Divi●es at D●rt, in their suffrage on Ar. 3. at large. Therefore the persons whom he decreeth to deny special Grace to, are none but the abusers of common Grace, or the rejecters of that special Grace, when offered. 3. If by Reprobation, you mean Gods Will or Decree to permit them to sin and perish wilfully; 1. You can prove no such Decree or Will: Because permission being a negation or nothing, needs it not, but will be as certainly without it, upon a bore not decreeing to hinder them from sin. 2. And you mistake in saying that Arminius denieth it: For he * Arminius himself expressly professeth, that in case God permits a man velle p●ccatum, nec●sse est ut nullo argumentorum gene●e persuadeatur ad volendum: Exam. Perk. pag. 153. Dr. Twisse against Hoord, li. 1. pag. 70. saith with you, That God decreeth his own permission. 3. You must take the pains to distinguish between negative and privative Unbelief, and between negative and privative not-hindring Sin, or not-giving Faith. Negative Unbelief is mere not-believing: And so none of us did believe from eternity, or before we were born: He that is not, believeth not; nor yet in the first instant that the Promise and Law of Faith was given us. Our unbelief is not sin, or privative, but on supposition that we are men, and have reason, and have a Law and Object of Faith. And Gods permitting us in this negative Non-belief is not to be called a privative, but only a negative permission. For God did from eternity so permit me to be no man, and no Believer, and yet this was not Reprobation. So God did negatively not hinder Adam's first sin, but not privatively; because not penally for any evil done, nor yet by denying him any thing that was naturally or morally his due: Therefore this was not an Act of Reprobation. But when the New Covenant of Grace, and the common Grace of the Covenant are once given men, and they are obliged to believe, than sometimes God penally denieth them Grace, and that is all which the Ar●inians put against absolute denial, because this denial is only for men's foregoing sin. But he also still negatively only, and not privatively or penally denieth some Grace to some, yea to all; And that is only such Grace as is neither morally their due, nor naturally due or necessary to them. And the denial of such is no Act of Reprobation. 4. If by Reprobation you mean merely God's Preterition; that is, his ●●t-willing or not-decreeing to give men Grace. 1. Not to Will or Decree, is nothing; And how can you call nothing absolute or conditional? These are the modes of Acts, and not of not-acting, or of nothing. All grant that Gods non-agency, non-volition, not-decreeing hath no cause, much less a cause in man, lest of all in man when he is no man. 5. The word Condition, either respecteth, 1. The thing or event willed; 2. Or the Will as relatively denominated with respect to that event; 3. Or that Will radically considered in itself. I opened this before, but think of it again; for the reason of the distinction is very plain. And, 1. God damneth no man but for sin, (nor privatively denieth any necessary Grace, but for sin.) Therefore the event no doubt is beforehand conditional; that is, dependeth on a condition: God decreeth to damn them if they live and die impenitently, and not else. 2. The Act of Gods Will as denominated from the said Effect or Object particularly, may be called, A conditional Act or Will. But if any think otherwise it is but de nomine. 3. The radical essential Will or Act of God as in himself can have no cause or condition. * [Though sin be acknowledged to be the cause of the Will of God in Reprobation quoad res volitas, that is, in respect of the punishment willed thereby, this hindereth not the absoluteness of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis: And unless we understand the Fathers thus, we must charge them with an Opinion, which Aquinas is bold to profess that never any man was so mad as to affirm, etc.] Twisse against Hoord, li. 1. pag. 49. But, 1. The actus reprobantis as really distinct from the effect, is nothing but God's Essence. And who saith that sin causeth God's Essence? 2. And the effect of Reprobation, as it is said to be a Decree not to give Faith or Grace is nothing: and therefore that nothing cannot aptly so much as extrinsically denominate God's Will or Essence as an Act. Is not here then a fair agreement? Ruiz. de praedef. d. 9 p. 150. Quantum ad negationem electionis & quantum ad permissionem peccati finalis, praed●finitus suit reproborum numerus. Dr. Twisse denieth none of this. 6. That God willeth or decreeth not sin formally, all the Christian world almost confess. And what loveliness is there in that only odious thing, that should tempt good people to father it on God, or attribute the being of it to his Will, or to be zealous Reproachers of those that say otherwise? 7. And if God will and decree the Act not only as an Act in general, but with all its modes and circumstances, he undeniably willeth or decreeth the form of sin, or the immediate necessary cause of it; which in the case of efficiency will more evidently appear. C. God willeth not the Form, that is, sin as sin, and yet he willeth the Act with all its circumstances. B. I have told you before that a wicked man may will sin in matter and form, and yet not will it as sin. To will it as sin, is to take the form of sin as such to be good, and so to be the ratio volendi; which few if any Sinners ever do. But to will both matter and form in one, not as the formal reason of Volition, but making total sin, the matter chosen as a means to some other desired end, this is possible for a very wicked man to do: But I think the ordinary case of Sinners, is not at all to will the form of sin, but cast that by, and to will the matter of it, for the carnal pleasure or inferior good which it seemeth to tend to. Now this excuseth not their will from wickedness, that they will not malum sub ratione mali, or sin because it is sin, but for another end. And shall we charge God of willing sin as the wicked do? C. God willeth it to a good end, and they to an evil end. B. As evil must not be done, that good may come by it, so neither must it be willed to that end. Man may need such a * Sure Arminius granteth enough, and that which atheous and many Schoolmen deny, and for my par● I cannot grant, when he saith, [At per accidens bonum est ut malum fiat, propter Det saptentiam, bonitatem & potentiam, secundum quam Deus expeccato materiam gloriae suaeillustrandae sumit. Est ergo peccatum isto respect● non medium per se illustrandae Gloriae Divinae; sed occasio tantum, non data in hunc finem neque natura sua ad illum accommodata, sed a Deo arrepta, & horsum mira arte & landabili abusu usurpata.] Armin. exam. Perkins. pag. 508. An occasion it is indeed: but I will not grant that ex peccato God fetcheth matter for his Glory; nor that by accident it is good ut fiat. Caeterum peccata etiam secundum rationem malitiae moralis, objecta sunt seu materia circa quam divina praedestinatio versatur: ●o modo quo versatur poenitentia, Vasqu. in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 5. d●sp 93. c. 2. means to his ends, but so cannot God. Yea, men have oft good ends for evil Acts: Many lie to glorify God, and sin for his Cause and Church, and for their own and other men's Salvation. Much of the Blood, and Cruelties, and Superstitions in the World, have had good ends; which yet excused not the things from sinfulness. C. God is under no Law, and therefore cannot sin: But man is. B. 1. That proveth God no Sinner; but not that he causeth or willeth not the sin of man. 2. God's natural essential Perfection is his Law, and more than a Law to him: And from that Perfection all Laws in the world, that are just and good, have their Original; that is, Gods own Laws are the expressions of his holy perfect Will and Nature; and Man's Laws are authorized by, and subservient to, and derived from the Laws of God, in Nature and Scripture: So that when the Apostle would describe a man best and likest unto God, he saith, That the Law is not made for the Righteous. 3. If God's Holiness and Wisdom make man a Law, forbidding sin on pain of Hell, the same Wisdom and Holiness, with his Justice and Mercy, will not will the sin so forbidden, nor cause it; nor consist with so doing. C. It is not the form or essence of sins that God willeth, but the existence, and futurity or event; not sin, but that sin be. B. I many a year studied thinking to prove that true: But I doubt it is but a game at words, and groundless distinguishing, for a false conclusion. For, 1. Sin is a Relation formally; even a disconformity of an Act or disposition, and so of the person to Gods Law. It can not otherwise be caused, but by making the Law, and causing the Act in the circumstances disconform. God maketh the Law, and God maketh man and his faculties, and God causeth the Object, and God permitteth the tempter: If God also cause the Act in the prohibited circumstances, he doth all that can be done in the causation of sin: And so of his Volitions or Decrees. As for the essence of sin in notion, without the existence, more may be said that God indeed is some cause of that, without culpability, yea by his Holiness and Power. For as the Relations of Curvitude and Dissimilitude result from the Relate's fundamentum, as compared to the Correlate, or terminus; so he that causeth any of them, hath some hand in causing the Relation as a Relation: And so God by forbidding Adultery, Lying, etc. by his Law, doth by Institution make those acts to be sin; that is, He layeth down the rule from which they are so denominated when committed. That Adultery is committed is long of man: that it is a sin when committed is long of God and man; God by his Law, and man by his Act. So that when you say God causeth not the essence, but the existence or futurity, you are so far out, as that less of causality is to be ascribed to him, as to the existence, than the essence. 2. But what is the existence but the essence existing, or extra causas? And what is it to cause sin, but to cause it to exist? And what is it to cause it to exist, but to cause it, or give it a being? And what is it to will that sin shall exist, but that the essence of it shall exist? And what is it to will the event or futurity, but to will that sin shall be? And what more can man will or do about it, to show himself to be bad, (as Estius and others fully manifest.) C. I cannot but think that God may will that Act which is sin, so he do not will it * Twiss. Vind. li. 2. Digress. 4. p. 201. Falsum est peccatum fieri ab homin● ut est peccatum. Licet sit peccatum ut fit ab homine, non tamen fit ab homine ut est peccatum, hoc est sub ratione peccati. Quanto minus in divinam voluntatem cadit,— cum hoc ●● in humanam voluntatem competat. as sin, (and so may cause it) Quod peccatum, but not Qua peccatum. B. Here are three things before us: 1. The common substratum or ●atter of the sin, which is the Faculty, and the Object, and the Act only in genere act us, or as not clothed with the forbidden circumstances. 2. The Act thus circumstantiated. 3. The Relative form of sinfulness. 1. No doubt but God doth cause all the first, the Faculty, Object, and the Act as an Act; e. g. In David's Adultery and Murder, and Peter's denying Christ, God gave them the Faculty by which they did it: He ●pheld their natural power; and as the Fountain of Nature concurred with it in and to the Act as an Act; But, 2. The Act as thus circumstantiated he neither caused nor willed, but permitted only; that is, that David should hic & nunc lust after her that was another man's wife, that he should vitiate her, that he should choose out Uriah to the Sword, that Peter should speak those particular words, etc. In the first sense, God willeth the Act which is sin, and the Faculty which is sinful; but not in the second as sinfully circumstantiated. And as for your Qua peccatum, I tell you again, few Sinners, if any, will it qua peccatum. C. What say you to this undeniable Argument: If God will not that Act which is sin, he willeth almost nothing that men do; For we sin in all someway or other. And so God hath little to do in the world. B. The last answer fully serveth to this. If we sin in every Act, yet all that is in every Act, is not sin, or prohibited. All that is good in the Act is of God, and willed by him. But it is the prohibited circumstances of the Act, which God doth not cause or Will, which morally specify it as sin. As when I pray, I sin in praying coldly, unbelievingly, with wand'ring thoughts: God causeth not these, though he cause the Prayer. Or to come from compound Acts to simple: Those wand'ring thoughts are not my sin as they are thoughts, but as they are upon an undue Object. A lie is not a sin as it is a word, but as this word which is false; And so in all others. C. But some Acts are simply forbidden in themselves, and not only in their circumstances: Therefore if God there cause the Act, he causeth the Sin. B. No Act as an Act is forbidden, but as circumstantiated, by Object, Time, Mode, Place, etc. Mr. Capell * Lib. of Tempt. chooseth lying only as an instance of prohibitum per se. But I answered before, that all the Act in lying is Volition, Intellection and Speech; And these as such are not forbidden: But only these particular words which are false. The common instance is Odisse Deum; But here hatred in itself is not the sin, but ●s unduly terminated on God as the Object. And this God willeth not. C. By this you deify man: For you make him the cause of something which God is no first cause of. And so man is made a first cause, that is a God. For the particularising of the Object, and the circumstantiating of the Act, is aliquid, something, and must have some first cause. B. The truth is, this one Objection is all that is considerable in the whole cause of the Dominican Predeterminants': Which I have answered in due place; and here briefly tell you, 1. That when two Objects are before me, a commanded and a forbidden one, there is * I have noted after, that Dr. Twisse saith, [Non necesse esse ut Deus sit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis; Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum quod non est alicui conducibile— neque necesse esse ut Deus sit Auctor omnis Boni jucundi, magis quam ut sit author peccati:] And these have as much entity as Bonum vel malum morale, Armi. dic. Grat. li. 1. p. 1. sect. 7. pag. 133. It is true that the Will is free ad actum utile & jucundum, in many instances: And God maketh the Object, e. g. Honey, or Eves fruit; and God maketh the Appetite: so that by making Nature God antecedently maketh the jucundity; that is, that if thou wilt eat Honey it shall be sweet or pleasant unto thee: But whether thou wilt eat it, he hath left free: so that if God also caused that determinate act, he caused all. And so it is confessed that God maketh the Law, the Object, and the man: and thereby maketh, that if thou wilt cause such an Act, so disordered, it shall be thy sin and misery: so that if God would as much cause the Act also he did cause all in sin. And they that ascribe the Act in suo modo to him, ascribe all to him. But as to Bonum utile, he ill nameth it Bonum conducibile: For it may be Conducibile ad malum & interitum. But it is not utile, unless it be conducibile ad bonum, yea ad fin●m ultimum. For all is not profitable that accomplisheth a man's ends or will. And God is the Author of all true profit to us. no more true natural entity in my choosing the forbidden one, than in my choosing the commanded one. To hate God, and love sin, hath no more natural entity, than to love God and hate sin: To speak an Oath or Lie, than to speak Truth and Holily: To will a forbidden Act, than to Nill it, and to will a good one. So that it is no deifying man to make him a first cause, of that which hath no natural entity; that is, of an Act, not as an Act, but comparatively as rather this way than that way exercised. And Dr. Twisse hence saith, That moral specification of Acts, is no true specification of them; And it's true that it is not a Physical specification. 2. If you say that we have a Liberty ad exercitium as well as of specification, or of Contradiction as well as of Contrariety; Even to will or not will, do or not do: And in this case to do or will when forbidden, is more than not to do or will; I answer, 1. The Soul is naturally an active vital power, and it is as natural to it to be in act, as to a stone to lie still; And the Cartesians will tell you, that Action needeth no more cause than Rest: But I rather say, that God never forbiddeth Action in general to the Soul; but only this or that Action upon this or that Object, at an undue time. So that no man ever sinned by mere Action as such, whether Vital, Intellectual or Volitive. The Action which God commandeth he willeth: The Action which he forbiddeth is but this or that upon an undue Object. Adam had this liberty of contradiction, to will or not to will this particular Act, of eating the forbidden fruit; but not to will or not will simply. Now for Adam to will to eat that fruit, instead both of nilling it, and of willing to please God by nilling or refusing it, had no more natural entity in it, than if he had not willed it, but willed somewhat else at the same time. 3. An Action itself is not properly Res, but modus Rei; and if any should say that God is not able to make a Creature, that supposing God the cause of its Power continued, shall be the first cause of its own Act or exercise of that Power, he saith that which no mortal man can prove. The Glory of God's Works, is their likeness to Himself; And as Intellection and freewill are parts of this likeness, we know not just how far God can go in such Communications. I see no contradiction in it, to say that a faculty maintained by God in its natural force, with necessary (though not determining) concourse, can determine itself without any more causation. And if it be not a Contradiction, God can do it. 4. But this is all prevented by considering, that man's Soul is never out of Act. It's active force is never idle; though it act not always the same way, nor with the same extension or intention: so that to reduce it into act, is not to reduce it from a mere potentia in actum, but from a power acting one way, or slowly, to act another way, or more intensely. 5. Yea, this is all answered by considering, that as I said, while God continueth the Soul in its nature, it continueth a naturally active force or power; inclined essentially to activity: So that though, I say▪ that Action needeth more cause than non-action, that is, here done, in God still causeth the active disposition. But supposing that upheld, I say, that there is oft more need of other causality or strength to keep it from Action, than to cause it to act. Whatever the world talketh against Durandus, they are never well able to answer à Dola (though in sense they that factiously oppose him mean the same as he.) And if a Rock hanged in the Air by something that might be cut off or removed (as a thread), supposing God to continue the nature of it, and all things else, there is more strength and causality needful to hold it from falling, than to make it fall, when the thread is cut. It was a work of God's Power to keep the fire from burning the three Confessors, Dan. 3. and the Lions from devouring Daniel, Dan. 6. and the Sea from flowing on the Israelites, and the Sun from moving in Joshuah's fight. 6. And yet consider that it is not so much as an Action, which is but modus rei, that is in question, but only the comparative circumstantiating of that action; so that it is but modus modi rei. 7. And lastly, The denial of the matter of our power and liberty in this I have elsewhere proved, overthroweth the certainties and fundamentals of all our Religion. Now whether any man should deny all our Religion, and certain necessary Truths, for such a metaphysical uncertain notion as this, that God is not able to make a Creature, that can cause a modus modi, in determining its active nature to this Object rather than to that, without Divine predetermination, let sobriety be judge. C. But thus you make man the specifier of his good acts, without God's determination, as well as of the evil. B. Jansenius is in the right in this: we have more need of Divine help to the willing and doing of good than of evil. We cannot do evil without his natural support and concourse: But we cannot do good, especially spiritual saving good, unless we have moreover his medicinal special Grace. To the specifying of good actions, there must ever concur Gods natural help, God's gracious help, and man's freewill or self-determination. It is not two or three determinations of the Will, which are made by these several Causes; but one determination. So that under God, man is the specifying determiner of his Will to good; or else he were not a Believer, nor rewardable or punishable. And that he cannot determine his Will to good as well as to evil, proceedeth not from the Original nature of the Will, (for with that such a determination was consistent) but from its Pravity or Corruption. But how Grace and freewill concur is after to be handled. C. Dr. Twisse Vindic. Grat. lib. 2. p. 190. (Vol. minoris) hath a full digression (4) to prove that [God willeth that sin shall come to pass, he permitting it, and saith, Nostri Theologi affirman●: Arminiani ●ontificii negant.] * This Digression of Dr. Twisse is answered in the first Book. His Friend Alvarez de Aux. li. 11. disp. 110. p. 442, etc. discusseth the Qu. An detur ex parte nostra causa reprobationis: and concludeth that [Reprobatio qua Deus statuit non dare aliquibus vitam aeternam, et permittere peccatum eorum, non est conditionata sed absoluta, nec praesupponit in Deo praescientiam demeritorum ipsius reprobi. 2. In Angelis qui ceciderunt nu●la datur causa reprobationis ex parte ipsorum quantum ad integrum effectum, etc. 3. Et ita de reprobatione parvulorum comparativa: & ita de adultis. 4. Non solum comparative, sed etiam absolute loquendo, nulla datur causa reprobationis quantum ad omnes effectus.] Where note, that he granteth that there is in man a cause of Reprobation as to some effects, viz. punishment; For by a cause he meaneth any prerequisite condition: For no doubt there is no efficient cause of any thing in God. And all his stress is laid on this, that the permission of the first sin, is the first effect of Reprobation, and this permission hath no cause in man: Ergo Reprobation quoad omnes effectus hath no cause in man. But the truth is, 1. A man may put such a sense on the word Reprobation, as to include what he please. But it's usually taken for God's Decree to damn men, and to deprive them of somewhat necessary to their salvation; and so is, 1. A positive Act as a Volition, 2. And privative, objectively, and 3. Some unfitly extend it to that which is objectively negative and not privative; 4. And some most ineptly extend it to that which is negatio actus, no Act, that is, to nothing. And so a man that will play with words, may say, that 1. God's non-agere, non●igere, is an Act. 2. That his non-impedire is an effect, which is nothing, and therefore no effect: And Alvarez utterly faileth i● this proof, either that non-eligere is an Act, or permittere vel non impedire an e●●ect; or that it is fitly called Reprobation, which hath ●● privation but a negation for its Object; e. g. that Judas shall not be an Angel nor i●●eccabil●; but have natural freewill, is no act of his Reprobation: And so of the permission of the first sin. Arminius himself exam. Per●ins. pag. 568. saith, [Vole●et Deus Israelem punire, & Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere— Propria, ●mmediata & ad●quata causa cur permiserit, ut Acha● i●●● cadem perpetraret, est illa quam dixi; mens●ra s●elerum implen●● erat. ●●●● D●●●●●tra peccatum hominis, per aliam ●●em Nabothum ad se evocare.] Which Dr. Twisse useth through all his Writings against him ad hominem, in stead of argument. methinks this concession should seem enough which is too much. And I conjecture, that Arminius wrote it by oversight and wo●ld have said, that God permitted Ahab to kill Naboth, because he would ●●●● him to ●●●●▪ up the measure of his sin: making permission the res Vo●●ta. But all thei● assigning Causes of Gods ●●●● are ●●●●●●ld; God being above all cause●. B. I wonder not that Dr. Twisse holdeth that God willeth it, when he holdeth that he efficiently premoveth and predetermineth the Will to every forbidden act, clothed with all its circumstances. That which God causeth, he must needs will. But when he saith, Nostri Theologi affirmant, he must mean but some few, such as Maccovius, Spanhemius, Rutherford, (and perhaps Piscator or Beza,) of his own mind. But the generality of Protestants either are against him, or meddle not with it. He that will read Davenant, and such others, shall find the difference. I remember but few English Divines at all that own it, besides the forenamed and Mr. Norton. But having written both an answer to this Digression of Dr. Twisse, and to his and Alvarez, and other men's Doctrine of physical predetermining premotion; I may pretermit that here. C. But by this they make God an idle Spectator of sin in the World, and so deny a great part of his Providence or Works. B. 1. This belongeth not directly to the Point of Reprobation, but of God's Works. 2. Take heed of such unreverent words of God: Who will not hold him guiltless that taketh his Name in vain. Dare you reproach God as Idle, if he do not all that your shallow thoughts will cut out for him? C. The blasphemy is theirs that give the cause by their unsound Doctrine, and not mine that do but denominate their consequents. B. Let us try that. Do you believe that God doth as much as he can do? that he made the World as soon as he was able, and could have done it no sooner? or that he is able to make no one Man or Beast, or Plant or Atom more than he hath made? nor to do any one action more than he doth? C. No: I hold no such thing: For God is Omnipotent and Free. B. I pray you then study it, and tell me, if God be not to be blasphemed as Idle, for such a total Non-agency or Free-suspension of his own Acts as to all such possibles; why should you call him Idle, if by the same Wisdom and freewill he only suspend some degree of his co-operation with man in the case of sinning? And if God freely decree that man shall be made a free Agent, able (by God's common generical concourse as the cause of nature) to determine or suspend his own Volitions, without any predetermining efficiency of God. If God will delight himself in making such a Creature, will you dare to say that he is Idle, because he moveth him not in another manner? you will not so reproach a Watchmaker, for not moving the Watch all day with his finger. C. I confess I cannot answer that: But how then is God the Governor of the World, if so much sin be done without his Will and Operation. B. The Work of a Governor, as such is only, 1. By Legislation, to make the Subjects Duty. 2. And by Judgement to try and decide the case of each Subject, whether he do that Duty. 3. And to see to the execution of that Judgement. But not to be the determining cause of all the Subjects Volitions and Actions. C. It is so with man, because he can do no more: but not with God. B. Indeed God governeth all mere Naturals and Bruits, by physical motion, as Engines are moved (as a Clock or Watch) by natural necessitation: And so he doth the mere naturals of man; (As his Concoction, Pulse, circulation of Blood, generation in the Womb, etc.) But God having made man an Intellectual free Agent, ruleth him as such, agreeably to his nature; even by moral Agency, by Laws and Judgement: And this is that Regency of which we speak. If you believe not that God is thus the moral Ruler of Mankind, or King of the World; you deny him to be God, and overthrow all Religion and Morality. C. But what say you to all the Texts that tell us, that God willed and caused that which wicked men did; as in the case of Pharaoh, Sihon, Rehoboam, Absolom, the death of Christ, and many others. B. One of the greatest oversights of them that thus Object, is, that they distinguish not between the sin, and the effect of the sin; or the forbidden Will and Act of the Sinner as of him, and the reception of this Act in passo, in the recipient. God can many ways concur to the causing of the reception and the effect, without causing the Volition or Act as Agents by a specifying determination. Especially when Custom compriseth both in one name; dull wits are easily here deceived▪ As the words, Murder, Theft, Adultery, Drunkenness, etc. do signify both the Volition and Act of the Agent, and the Reception or Effect. Now God can many ways make the sinful Volition and Act of every such Sinner, to produce that effect which the word Murder, Theft, Adultery, Drunkenness, etc. connoteth or includeth, without causing the Volition or Act forbidden determiningly. C. I pray you show me how? B. 1. He can by Providence order or set the Object in their way. 2. He can fit the Receptive disposition of the Patient to the effect: Most of the wonderful Varieties in the World are à diversa recipientium dispositione. That Act will produce an Effect on a disposed matter, which will not on another. 3. He can rule the Sinners Instruments of Action. 4. He can remove other Objects out of the way. 5. He can remove Impediments. 6. He can put in some good thought or desire into the Sinners mind, which shall determine the Effect. 7. He can suspend some concourse of his own, which will tend to this effect rather than another. C. Give me some Instances to make it plain. B. You need no other than the instance of the Murder of Christ: 1. When his time was come, he that before oft retired into the Wilderness, and lived in Galilee, came up to Jerusalem in their way. 2. He was willing himself to die for man, and so did not avoid it. And he went into the place where Judas could find him. And he spoke the words which he knew that they would call Blasphemy, etc. 3. God directed the Soldier's Spear to the Region of Christ's heart, which their intent or aim alone else had not done. And he provided a Cross, and a Simon to bear it, etc. 4. God did not open to them effectually those Reasons which should have moved them more to desire the death of Barrabbas. 5. Abundance of Impediments God could have set in their way (as the people's tumult, Pilat's resistance, etc.) which yet he did not. 6. God put into their minds (by moral means at least) the true apprehension of the probability that the Romans hearing of a King of the Jews, would turn their jealousy and fury against them, and take away their place and Nation. 7, He suspended that preserving operation by which he could have kept Christ alive on the Cross, and healed his Wounds, and caused him to come down from the Cross, when they promised him then to believe in him; and he restrained the Soldiers from breaking his bones, etc. And in all this, there is no Decree, Volition or Causation of their sinful Wills or Deeds. So in the case of Absalom's Incest (or any sinful Generation,) 1. God ordered it so, that his Father's Concubines were just in his way. 2. They had an inviting pulchritude; and an impotency of resisting. 3. The state of his affairs was such, as that the action had an appearance of tendency to his ends, by making him seem unreconcilable to his Father. 4. And for Achitophel and Absalon to know the truth of this, was no sin. 5. Other diverting Objects and occasions are kept out of the way, etc. Yet in all this God neither willeth nor causeth that Will and Act of Absalon in specie; but the effect. C. But by all this you do describe God as plotting and doing the same thing that they do. And (but for different words) this cometh all to one. B. 1. If you think this enough, why doth it not satisfy you? while it is granted by them that you oppugn. 2. It is not the same thing. Is it the same thing for Christ to be killed, and for the Jews to will and perform his Murder? Is man's Will and Act, and Christ's Death the same thing? 3. God did foreknow their sinful Will and Action, and permit it only, but did not cause it, but was a concause of the Effect. So God may to a Drunkard, 1. 'Cause strong Drink or Wine to be in his way. 2. And remove some smaller Drink, that would have satisfied him. 3. And remove Disswaders and many impediments. 4. And give him money, and facility of obtaining it. 5. And cause him truly to know that the Drink is pleasant to the taste, exhilerating, spiritful. 6. And cause it when he hath drunk it, to make him drunken. And none of this is quid prohibitum, or sin in man: But his sinful Will and Act, which are forbidden, are presupposed or fore-seen. C, I cannot see but that it cometh all to one, for God to permit that which he forseeth, and could easily hinder if he would. B. 1. Your conceits that it cometh all to one, must not overrule our certain knowledge of God's Holiness, and his true and holy Word, and all the certainty of Religion in the World. 2. We are sure that God is Holy, a hater of all sin, and a righteous Judge, etc. And are you as sure that it cometh all to one? And must all men else say that they are sure of it too, or else be back-bitten, and called Arminians, Jesuits, etc. 3. Do you consider what Gods permission is? It is far from a full permission. He doth all that belongeth to a Rector to hinder it. He strictly forbiddeth it by Laws: He openeth the malignity of it. He threatneth misery here, and everlasting damnation hereafter to them that will not forbear it or forsake it. He promiseth all blessings in this life, and endless Glory in Heaven hereafter, to them that will. He sendeth his Ministers, first with Miracles, after with sealed Doctrine and Gifts, to proclaim all this to the World, and to persuade them: He gave his own Son to condemn sin in the Flesh, on the Cross, and by his holy Life, and Doctrine, and Suffering, to declare the malignity, and hatefulness, and hurtfulness of it to the World: He sets up all his Ordinances, Magistracy, Ministry, Sacraments, Worship and Discipline to this end: He warneth the World by many Judgements; and especially by the Messengers of each man's death; and the constant Afflictions which are the fruits of Sin: He obligeth them to Obedience, by multitudes of Mercies: He sets Heaven and Hell before them daily; and is this permitting it? He doth indeed in this sense permit it, in that he doth not all that he can against it, or doth no more than as aforesaid. 4. If this permitting be all one as loving or causing it, then when God made man a free Agent, and resolved to rule him by moral means, and leave Adam to his own Will, it was a loving and a causing sin. And is every King or Parent a lover of Vice, who doth not all that he could do to restrain it? C. We do not hold that God loveth sin, though he will the event, and cause the act circumstantiated. B. I know you say that neither God nor man loveth sin as sin: But whether Dr. Twisse & Rutherford say not in equipollent terms, that God is the greatest Lover of Sin in all the world, judge by their confuted words in the former Book. 1. They deny not (nor can do) that Love and Voliti●● in God are all one. God's Love is not a Passion, but his Will. 2. They say, that God willeth that sin exist. 3. And that as summè & unicè conducible to his Glory. 4. And that this great conducibility is a great good. 5. That God is pleased finally in what he willeth antecedently. 6. And that as God is infinitely above man in his Being, so is he in the greatness, and power, and efficacy of his Volitions. 7. And that man loveth not, nor willeth not evil as evil, or sin as sin; but for inferior good infinitely below God's Glory, for which he willeth its existence. And is not this to say that he is the greatest Lover of it that is? C. Yet it sticks with me, that God should be the Omnipotent Governor of the World, and all Sin which is the common work of the World, should be without or against his Will: Providence is wronged by this. B. You mistake the matter: 1. That he decreed to leave any men ordinarily to their freewill, under moral Government, was not from impotency, as if he could have made man no better, or more necessary an Agent: But of his Wisdom and Freedom, by which he made the Bruits without Reason, and Stones without Sense. 2. All sin is done against the Law or commanding Will of God, which determineth only of Duty, and not directly of Event. But it is not done against his absolute Will de eventu: For God is not overcome nor frustrate of his Decrees. 3. I pray you once for all remember what I have told you in the first ●ook, that God's Providence doth about man's sin, and then you will ●ot say that he is Idle, or neglecteth his Government, unless he cause Sin. I. It is God that made man an Intellectual free Agent in his own Image, and the Lord of his own Acts, as a Creature morally governable by Laws: And so all his free power is of God, who still upholdeth it. II. As God is the Fons Naturae he is the Principium motus, and he concurreth as the first cause to all Action as Action in genere, and so to all that hath a physical entity and reality in sin: And I do not believe that Aureol●●, Dura●d, or Lud. à Dola thought otherwise, though they differ in expressing the mode of concourse. III. God giveth men all the mercies which they turn to sin, and is the cause of all those Objects which they inordinately love and abuse. iv God himself concurreth with Sinners, in causing the same effects which they cause also by prohibited Volitions and Actions (as in generation, etc.) even when custom giveth one name to the sin and the effect: And that by all the ways forenamed, and many more. V God as the World's Governor and Benefactor, maketh men's sins the occasions of much good, and ordereth and over-ruleth all Wills and Events, so as not to miss of any of his ends: But will attain all his ends, while the Sinner seeketh his own. VI All this that God doth he decreeth to do. And all that Sinners do he fore-knew. And neither his Wisdom, Goodness, or Power, is ever overcome by sin, or defective in any thing about it. And is not all this enough for you, but yet God must be the chief willer of sin. C. I confess that God can govern the sinful World by this much. B. Take in but one thought more, which I afterward suggest. Ockam laboriously endeavoureth to prove, that the outward Act hath no peculiar sinfulness in itself distinct from that of the Will. I have told you my Opinion of his tenet: But this is granted him, that no outward Act hath any sinfulness, but secondary and participative, as animated by the Will: and that sin is primarily in the Will alone. Now in abundance of the Scripture Texts alleged by Dr. Twisse and Rutherford, it is not the Will of the Sinner that God is made the Author of, but seemingly of the Act, (indeed of the Effect.) Now God cannot be the cause of any man's sin, unless he cause the sinful Volition. But I have anticipated our Dispute of Providence in all this, because it is here usually handled as the matter decreed. And therefore when we come thither, you must excuse me from repeating it, or pardon what you put me to do. The sixth Crimination. C. My next offence against them is, that they make Gods Will and Decrees conditional, and so make God dependent upon man. B. This is opened in the Second Book. * Vasquez in 1. Tho. disp. 91. c. 1. [Cum quaeritur an divinae praedestinationis detur causa? qu. non est de actu divinae voluntatis, quatenus est ipsa essentia divina, & res increata: sic notant scholastici omnes— clarum enim est divinae praedestinationis hoc modo non esse causam sed est de effectibus. Et perinde est quaerere causam praedestinationis ex parte nostra, atque causam aliquam totiu● effectus praedestinationis in nobis quae effectibus illis non sit annumeranda. Nam si quidpiam ponitur effectus praedestinationis nequit illud ulla ratione esse causa totius effectus.— In Deo, 1. Ipsa essentia Dei. 2. Respectus rationis ad res cognitas et volitas: Hic nascitur ex objectis: Ejus igitur possunt esse causae. Indeed they differ not from the Synodists (or Dr. Twisse himself, I think,) in this. That is, 1. They hold that God hath made conditional Donations, Promises and Threaten in his Word. 2. And that God may truly be said to Will and Decree his own Word, and all that is in it, with its conditional mode. 3. And as Aquinas and Twisse, and all say, Deus vult, hoc esse propter hoc; sed non hoc vult esse, propter hoc. God's Will doth not depend on the Condition; but Gods Will is, that the Effect or Event shall depend on the Condition. When the Condition is performed, it is not a medium of God's Volition, but of the Effect. 4. But yet this all must confess, that as to the bare extrinsic denomination from the Object, as Gods Will is variously denominated from things past, present and future, so it may be from absolute and conditional Grants and Promises: which you will not deny but God hath made. 5. And in case of sin and damnation, sin fore-seen is an objective condition, disposition or qualification sine qua non, of such as Gods velle damnare is immediately terminated on (as they confess at the Synod at Dort, and Molinaeus there openeth in his judgement at large.) C. But this decreeing upon foresight of somewhat in man, maketh God to follow the Creature, and depend upon it. B. It maketh him no way dependant at all: For the Creature neither causeth any Act of God, nor hindereth him from any thing which he would do. It is his own Will that this shall be the Order. But as to God's Acts or Volitions following man's, 1. They no way follow man's but as Objects; which Objects in their natures and qualifications, relatively terminate, or by connotation denominate God's Volitions. 2. And do you or any man deny that? Doth not God's Knowledge Praeteritorum & Existentium suppose the preterition or existence of Objects. Doth not God's complacential Volition of the holiness and glory of his Creatures, presuppose that holiness and glory? Doth not God's hatred of past or existent sin presuppose it? C. But what can God fore see in man, till he first decree to cause it, or at least decree that it shall exist? B. Sin: He decreeth neither, and yet forseeth it, (of which, lib. 1.) The seventh Crimination. C. * Aliqui scholastici minus caute de gratia Dei loquuntur. Patres negarent ●mne meritum causam & occasionem ex nobis praedestinationis nostrae, ut oftender enter gratiam in tempore omnin● gratis sint aliquo horum nobis donari, Vasq. in 1. Tho. qu. 23 disp. 91. c. 10. But some of them say, that the Gospel itself, yea and the first special Grace, is given to men upon merit of congruity, though not of condignity, and so is decreed on that fore-seen. B. 1. We mind not what some odd persons say, but what the moderate and sober say, whom we are reconciling. 2. But I pray you wherein do you differ from these? Is it in words, or sense also. C. In both: I hold no such merit, foresight, or decree. B. Do you hold that there is such a thing as common Grace, distinct from special? C. Yes: so do all Protestants. B. Is it not every man's Duty to make a good use of the common Grace or Mercies which he hath, as in order to his Repentance and Salvation? C. Yes: He that had but one Talon should have improved it. B. Is not a man that doth this as far as common Grace will go, more disposed and prepared to receive special Grace, than one that hath long abused it, and derideth God and godliness? C. Yes, no doubt some such are not far from the Kingdom of God. B. Have not * Doct. of Faith. Mr. Jo. Rogers, Mr. Tho Hooker, Mr. Rob. Bolton, † Instruct. for Comfort. Consc. Read Vasq. i● 1. Tho. qu. 23. a. 4. disp. 9 throughout, proving that Predestination to the first Grace is not upon foreseen Merit, no nor upon any fore-seen Cause sine qua non, no nor Condition sine qua non, etc. and against Cassianus, and the Massilienses, and the Greek Fathers, that the initium primae gratiae & praedestinationis is not from our free will: Yea, c. 10. opposing Scotus, Grabri●l, Cajet. Richard. Durand. Pantus. etc. as coming too near the Massilienses: Yea, and all that hold that facienti quod in se est ex viribus naturae, Deus non denegat gratiam. and abundance of other Protestants written much of Preparation to Conversion? And is it not our common Doctrine? C. Yes: but what's that to Merit of Congruity? B. What do you think they mean by it more than you by Preparation? C. They mean such Merit as it is decent for God to reward. B. The greater part, I think, by far of the Schoolmen say, That the first special Grace is not given upon any Merit at all. And the learned and sober that thus talk of Merit of Congruity and Decency, mean no more but this, 1. That God who commandeth men such use of his common Grace, as a means to special, doth command no Duty, and appoint no means in vain. 2. That such prepared persons are fit for special Grace than the unprepared, and malignant Enemies of it. 3. That it is Gods usual way to prepare men by common Grace, before he give them special Grace. 4. And many say that we cannot prove that God useth to deny special Grace, where he giveth the highest degree of preparing common Grace. And which of these are you against? C. But doth not God give special Grace also without such preparation? B. 1. Our foresaid practical Protestants seem to think not (to men at age.) For they oft say, that it cannot be conceived that a man can value Grace, and come to Christ truly, that hath no preparatory sense of sin and misery. 2. But I find not that the Papists usually deny it, but that God may give special Grace to the unprepared on a sudden. 3. But Papist's and Protestants are agreed that this is not his ordinary way. And where do we differ in all this? C. But we say not that there is any Merit in all this. B. Phy on that word Merit! I thought it was but the name that we differed about. 1. And many of themselves dislike the name, and say, It is unapt: And I think so do the Lutherans and Arminians more commonly. 2. And others say, that by Morit they mean nothing but a moral aptitude for Reward. And they say, that they can find no one fit name for that than this, which all Christians without known opposition used for many hundred years after the Apostles. And that the Scripture word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, worthy, is the same in sense. 3. And they usually say, that special Grace is called a Reward to the prepared, (if not unaptly, as many or most say, yet) but in a lower Analogical sense, and not as Heaven is the reward of Holiness: Because, of the latter, there is a flat Promise, and premiant Law or Covenant made by God; but of the former they can say no more than as aforesaid, that God appointeth no Duty and means in vain. The eighth Crimination. C. They make many Elections or Decrees where God maketh but one. * These are but contentions de nomine; as Vasquez truly saith about Durandus Opinion, who 1. d. 41. q 2. n. 11. concurring with other Schoolmen, that the question de causa praedestinationis, is meant only ex parte effectus, & de toto effectu, an scilicet totius effectus detur aliqua causa opposeth Ockam & Gabr. therein, on the supposition that glorification is no effect of Predestination, but the means to it. And that because Predestination is as prudence in a man, which is only circa media, which saith Vasque●, dis. 91. c. 4. non tam rei, quam vocis quaestio est. So also Bonaventure and Jave differ from others, and say, that Praedestinationis (quoad effectum) datur meritum congruum ex auxili● gratiae. But it's a mere strife about a word, while they take Predestination as reaching only to Justification, Perseverance and Glorification; and others take it as extending also to preparatory Grace, as Vasqu. also noteth, disp. 91. cap. 5. As an Election to Glory, and another to Justification, and another to Faith and Conversion, and another to have the Gospel, and another to be redeemed by a sufficient satisfaction of Christ, and another to be made men. And so vary the Objects.; B. Some of these are Decrees of common Grace, and not called Election by any that I know of, except, as some say, God chose Man and not Devils to have a Saviour. But all that I speak of are agreed with you, that God's decreeing Will is his Essence, and that it is but one God or Will in the notion of Essence or Principle, or Act as it is merely Agentis: But they say, that if we distinguish not Gods Decrees by connotation of the various Effects or Objects, our Controversies are at an end. And I ask of you, Do not you distinguish them when you dispute of their Order, Priority and Posteriority? C. Yes: There is no Order without distinction. B. Will you not distinguish Election from Reprobation? C. Yes: Though both be God's Decree. B. Will you not distinguish the Election of Peter, both from the Reprobation of Judas, and from the Election of Paul? C. Yes, as connoting various Objects and Effects. B. Is there not then the same reason for distinguishing Gods Volutions about one and the same person, as to various effects? As God's Will that Paul be born, that he be redeemed, that he be endured in his sin, that he be converted, that he suffer, persevere, be glorified? C. Yes: But though these be various Decrees, yet not Elections. B. These names and words are our unhappy Difference. 1. Remember then that you agree to call them divers Volitions or Decrees; and, I think, no sober man will fall out with you for the name Election▪ 2. But what reason is there in the nature of the thing, why you may not as lawfully and decently say, that to choose David to be a Saint, a King and a Prophet; to choose Paul to be a Christian, a Preacher, and a Marty●, ●●e various Elections, as well as various Decrees? 3. But my own Opinion is, that the denomination should follow the Object: And therefore where the Objects elected, or the Termini of the Relation are various▪ we may call them various Elections: But when they are diversified but as parts, we should call them various acts and parts of one Election. And no doubt but our election to have the Gospel, to Conversion, to Justification, to Perseverance, to Glory, to the Ministry, to Martyrdom, etc. may in several respects be named many, and parts of one Election. C. I confe●● I am convinced that it is a shame to make a quarrel of this: because it is about's word, and really there is no difference. But why make they various Objects in one man of these Decrees? B. What is it but diversity of Objects that doth diversify them? In the execution the case is plain. Paul uncreated and creandus was nothing, or no man. 2. Paul before he heard the Gospel, was a Pharisee that had not heard it. 3. Paul before Conversion and convertendus, was a persecuting Infidel. 4. Paul jam justificandus was a Believer. 5. Paul jam vocandus ad facrum Ministerium was a Christian. 6. Paul persevering, and ready to overcome finally, was a faithful holy Christian and Apostle. 7. Paul jan● justificandus per judicem finaliter & glorificandus, was a persevering overcoming Christian, Saint and Apostle. The ninth Crimination. C. * Bannes in 1. q. 23. a. 2. pag. 264. Jaciendum nobis est fundamentum necessarium, viz. quod in divinis omnia sunt simul & nihil prius aut posterius in aliquo genere causae, nihilque realiter ab alio distinctum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio. At quia non simplici conceptu sed multis & imperfect nos cognoscimus, necesse est distinguere, you may see a multitude of Authors and Reasons to prove that Gods Will to all Objects is but one most simple Volition, in Ruiz▪ de Volunt. Dei disp. 5. sect. 6. p. 34. But that's my next offence: that they order God's Decrees according to the order of Execution, and not according to the order of Intention: when as Quod prius est intention, posterius est executione. B. Dr. Twisse hath that word, I think, many score, if not hundred times: But it is no fit matter for contention. Do you believe that in God himself there is Priority and Posteriority of Decrees? C. Not in time: but in order of Nature or Intention. B. How can there be difference of Order, where there is no diversity? C. Though in God there be no diversity, yet you confess there is the Relative connotation and denomination from the Objects? B. True: Therefore the Order also must not be denominated from any feigned diversity in God, but from the Order of the divers Objects, as one is first or last, in time, or nature, or use. That which is first, God decreed should be first: That which is propter aliud, God decreed should be propter aliud: And that which is the end of another thing, God decreed should be its end. C. But even in God himself, we must, as men, conceive, that his velle ●●em, and velle media are not all one, but must distinguish them. B. As men, we must not judge falsely of God, when we know that it is false. If velle finem & media be certainly one without any diversity in God, saying what is in the connoted Objects, and the relation or denomination; how can we without sin distinguish where there is no difference? But I pray you tell me, what mean you by God's intendere ●●●em? C. I mean that as every wise man doth first will an end, and then do all for it, so doth God. B. We call nothing to man an end, but something which he wanteth, ●● at least is without: But God wanteth nothing, nor is ever without his ●●d, or the accomplishment of his Will. But of this I crave leave to refer you to the first Book, where I have fully shown that God willeth an ●●●● improperly, and not as man doth. But tell me, what take you to be strictly God's end? C. His Glory. B. What mean you by his Glory? C. Our Knowledge, Admiration and Praise of his Perfection. B. * Constat totius effectus praedestinationis non esse causam per modum finis aliquid ex parte praedestinati, cum Gloria quae posset esse sinis inter effectus annumeretur, Vasqu. in 1. Thom. disp. 91. c. 4. These are Acts of men, and can man's Acts be Gods chief ●od? C. I know some say, It is the objective Luster, or Demonstration of God's Perfections: Take that if it please you better. B. That Luster or Demonstration objective is a Creature: And can a Creature be God's Ultimate End? C. No: God who is the Beginning is the End alone. B. God is no efficient Beginning of himself or any thing in himself: For in God there is no Cause or Effects; how then can he be his own End or final Cause? * If any man will say, that to be generated, and to proceed in the second and third persons, are effects, I account it presumption to enter into a dispu ● of it: But it's certain, that nothing in God is effected by a a Creature, nor his Essence by himself. C. He is neither Beginning nor End, efficient nor final Cause of himself; but of his Works or Creatures only. B. Therefore not of his Volitions, or Decrees which are himself, not of any of his Actions merely as Agentis; because they are himself: but as they are in the effects. But how can God be the Creatures end? The Creature is no means, either that God be God, or that he be perfect, or that he be glorious in himself, or that he be just or merciful: It is the highest blasphemy to say it. C. You know all our Divines say, That God's end in decreeing, is the Glory of his Mercy in the Salvation of the Elect, and of his Justice in the damnation of the Reprobate. † Bannes' order is thus, 1. q. 23. a. 2. pag. 266. [Actus q●os nos possumus imaginari esse in ment divina tam communes quam proprio● circa praedesti●atos hi sunt: Cognovit Deus omnes homines possibiles; ex quibus quosdam dilexit quantum ad esse naturae, & hos voluit creare: ex quibus adhuc quosdam dilexit ad finem supernaturalem, quae divina electio dicitur; quatenus ex aliis quos creare volebat is●os seperavit sibi; & denique hos electos praedestinavit; hoc est, providet & ordinavit ut per quaedam media supernaturaliter efficaciter pervenirent in finem supernaturalem]. That nothing but God himself can be the objectum formale of God's Volition, see Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp. 15. sect. 6. p. 165. Ruiz de V●l. Dei disp. 22, 23, 24. pretendeth to more accurateness than others in ordering Gods Decrees, and other Acts. Denying with others all real distinction, but asserting a distinction secundum rationem ratiocinatam, and would persuade us that he knoweth what that is (what the fundamentum in re is) he refuteth many others Opinions de ratio ordinis (Molina's Vasquez, Zumel, Dried●s, etc.) especially Aureolus, and concludeth (sect. 5.) that inter divinas operationes ordo prioris & posterioris ex eo est, quod ●nus actus sit requisitus ad alium, vel sit, alterius ratio vel conditio: He confesses all these to be fictious, and that there is no real diversity, (and disp. 11. sect. 1. on the qu An in Deo sit proprie libera Volitio effi●ax) dicit (Nullius animus tranquilla pa●e qui●scit solutionibu● hac usque inventis, nec aliis se satisfacisse put at, qu● nec sibi satisfecerit.) Yet against Ockam he would have these fictions thought to be of very gr●●● use: when as all his profane tremendous presumptions are but enquiring after a cause of the first cause, under the name of Ratio vel conditio, while he denieth that indeed there is any cause. Their question is, why Gods Will is terminated on this Object rather than on that? And is not this to ask a cause of it (of the first cause); say but that Deus volitione ●nica vui● diversa diver si m●de ordinata, and you have said enough? Had they meant only the Ratio receptiva increatis, & ratio constitu●iv● alli●●●m divi●arum ut in effectis vel p●sso & ●● extrin●e●u● denominat●rum, it had been sense. But in God himself there is diversitas rationum volendi. B. Here are a multitude of Errors or Ineptitudes together. 1. That the name of the means (Salvation and Damnation) is put into the end. 2. That one little parcel of the means only is put, as if it were the whole. If we must speak so low, as to ascribe an End to God, we must say, that Ultimately he hath but one: And that one must needs be more than the glory of his Mercy and Justice towards man. Is all the rest of the world Angels and Men, Heaven and Earth, and Christ himself, no means in which he will be glorified? 3. That quid creatum is made Gods Ultimate End: For this Glory of his Mercy and Justice is no other, but a created demonstration or apprehension of it. 4. And why are Mercy and Justice only named, as though the glory of his Power, Wisdom and Goodness itself were here no part? C. If you like none of this, tell me your own sense of it. B. 1. I suppose that Intendere finem is spoken of God only in a transcendent sense, and not at all as it is of man. And, 2. I suppose that Gods Being hath no Beginning or End, nor any thing in him. 3. I suppose that Gods freewill, by communication of Essence, and of Perfections, is the Original free Cause of all things. He necessarily is what he is: but he freely made what he made. 4. Therefore I suppose that the same Will which is the Beginning of all, is the End of all: So that Gods Will as efficient is the Beginning, and Gods Will as fulfilled and pleased is the end of all his Works. 5. This may be called finis Dei improperly after the manner of men, but tolerably and with the least impropriety, and such as we must use. 6. This is more properly the commanded and appointed end of the Intellectual Creature, and analogically the end that all things tend to. 7. God is never without his end: For his Will is ever fulfilled and pleased; For pro hic & nunc he willeth nothing but what is. 8. But there are degrees of Perfection in God's Works, and the narrow Creature hath lower ends besides the Ultimate, inseparable from it. And so man must intent his own felicity, and above that the perfection of the Universe, and above that the complacency of Gods Will. 9 And because all the parts are to contribute to the perfection of the whole, and so all the parts of the means do make up one perfect Universe, in the state of Glory, and there and then the whole world shall bear the liveliest impress of the Divine Perfections, this Impress or objective Splendour and Image of God, together with the active Vision, Love and Praise of the glorified (which is part of the said Image or Impress) is called God's Glory: which shineth in part in every part, and perfectly in the whole perfected world. 10. So that in a word, the perfection of the Universe being the medium completed, is called Gods End in the lower material notion: And the fulfilling and pleasing of his Will in the perfected world, is called his End in the formal and higher notion. And we can say no more of God's Velle finem. C. I confess your explication of God's End and Intention seemeth to be most agreeable to the Principles of Theology. B. And do you think that it is wise and Christianlike dealing to fill the Church with Contentions, and make others odious to the people, about the Order of God's Decrees secundum intentionem, while men know not whether God do Intendere finem or not? or what his End is? or what his Intention is? or while they mistake all? Will you make as many fines operantis and Intentions in God, as there are fines operis, and as the means or Creatures are made for one another as an End? or will you assign to God one End alone? C. You know that in that our Divines do differ. Some that writ of the Order of the Decrees, make God's Glory the end of Salvation and Damnation, and these the end of Grace and permitted Sin, and these the end of Creation, etc. But Dr. Twisse writeth against them (even Perkins and Beza, etc.) maintaining that God hath but two Decrees; one de fine, and the other de mediis; and that his End is but one. B. If you are no better agreed, bear with others that differ from you. But either you diversify God's Decrees by their connoted Objects, or as divers intrinsic real Acts in God. If you say the latter, your own Party, and all the School-Divines, will say you blaspheme, by making God divisible or compounded, and will call you Vorstians. If the former, how innumerable must you make Gods Decrees? And why may not the Order as well as the species and number of them be so denominated from connotation? And then you will say that God first intended to make man as the end of inferior Creatures, and after decred to make them for man. And he first decreed that there should be fruit, and then that there should be a Tree to bear it, and then that this Tree should be rooted in the Earth, and then that it should be planted, and then that there should be Earth and Water to nourish it, etc. And if poor man be but a little part of God's Creation, unless we could anatomize the whole frame of the Universe, how should we know just what place and order our own interest hath in such a frame among so many millions of millions of Creatures, of which Angels and the superior World are nobler than we? Is he to be numbered with the Church's Friends, who will make us such work, and lay men's love and peace upon it? C. But what have you against the simpler way of two Decrees? B. In God those are not two but one: But I see not, but speaking after the manner of men it may pass, as the safest distribution by connotation and extrinsic denomination, if he had but rightlier described those two. Of which I said enough before. C. How would you then denominatively order the Decrees according to the order of Intention? B. According to Dr. Twisse's own rule and method, all that you can by that Order infer, is but this, that the infinite Creator first intended the pleasing and fulfilling of his own freewill as his Ultimate end, and next decreed to produce all things as he produceth them to that end, and so is pleased in all things in their proper time and place; but further to bring all this Universe finally to perfection, and in that perfection his Glory or Image shall be perfect, in which he will finally be pleased: And the glorification of man is a little part of that Perfection. And what will this do to the promoting of your Opinions? But I further ask you, Is it not certain that God decreed to make all things in the Order in which he maketh them in time? C. Yes: If you speak of the Order of Execution. B. And is not this Order of Execution needful to be observed? C. Yes, no doubt. B. And is not this Order of Execution easier to be understood? C. Yes; for we are little disagreed about it. B. If then this Order be plain, and sure, and needful, and that which we are all agreed in; and your Order of Intention be either none, or uncertain, and past the reach of mortal man, judge you what Order we should treat of, and who are the wise and peaceable men? C. Yet the Schoolmen before us have treated of that Order. B. Davenant tells you, That Scotus was the first Artificer of that Invention. Whether that be so or not, it's sure that you use to declaim against the School-mens profane curiosity and audacity: And where (except about the Trinity) hath it been greater than in this? And you know that few of them that give you the ordinem signorum, as they call it, do agree in the same Order; (As I have showed in some instances, lib. 2.) And if you will condemn yourselves in condemning them, why should we think that you have hit of the right Order any more than they? We have seen Beza's, Gilbie's, Perkin's, and we have seen Twisse's (much better,) and we have seen the Lutherans and the Arminians, and we see little agreement. Do you think that the Synod of Dort, that leaveth out such things, was not as wise as any of you all? Or was not Davenant as judicious as any of you in these Controversies, who openly and largely professeth, that he is not one of those Privy-Counsellors of God, who know in what Order things lie in his Mind, and can assign each Act its proper place; but he thinketh this Order of mental Intention in God to be utterly unsearchable, and the Order of Execution only fit for us to treat of. See his Dissert. de Praedest. The tenth Crimination. C. They seem to err much, in that they deny the eternal Cause of eternal Vasqu. 1. Tho. q. 14. d. 65. c. 4. vainly saith, Ens quod in universum est objectum intellectus non tantum est praesens, s●d etiam futurum, preteritum & possibile & quod futurum est aliquid, contrary to common reason: For these are all termini diminuentes as to ens real: That which only was or will be, Is not indeed, 1. The Idea in a man's mind de futuro, & de praeterito is something. 2. And so is the Proposition, Hoc suit, vel erit. And hence men falsely say, that futurum is aliquid; when it is only an assertion that aliquid erit. So also Aquinas saith, 1. dis. 38. a. 4. & de verit. q. 1. a. 8. That quae non sunt actu, aliquo modo sunt, in potentia Dei vel creaturae sunt, vel sunt in potentiae opinandi vel imaginandi, vel quocunque modo significandi: which is but to abuse men with words, & play with the equivocation of [sunt]. Posse vel potentia, opinio, imaginatio, etc. are something: But must nothing therefore be something? His question is, Utrum scientia Dei sit non-entium: And if he had no better way to prove the affirmative, than by saying that nothing is something, it's equal to silence. Vasqu. ibid. confesseth, Intellectui Divino secundum se, nunquam res objicitur nisi sicuti est: Unde quod non est, non objicitur sicuti esset. And here the Schoolmen contend, An Deus cognoscat actu infinita possibilia & futura: Aquin. Cajet. Ferrar. Bonav. Richard. Waldens. Vasqu. etc. affirm it. Durand. Almain. and many later deny it. Blank de concord. lib. & decret. 1. n. 58. well noted that futurity may be with out a Decree to predetermine the Agent: For sin is so, e. g. hating God, blasphemy. And that Dr. Twisse ill maketh God's Decree the sole cause of futurity. As to the presumptuous question, how God knoweth future things, besides that there is no time to measure God's Acts by, there need no other answer than that God's infinite Understanding knoweth all that is intelligible. But future's as such are intelligible. — Quid divinus intellectus infinitae ●●●tutis est: quicquid intelligibile est necessarie deb●t amplecti & intelligere: At futura contingentia intelligibilia sunt, ●o quod sunt determinatae veritatis, Vasq. 1. Tho. q. 14. d. 65. cap. 4. But whereas he himself also defendeth that future's are known in decretis divinis, he is forced to say that sin is known in God's Decree of the materiale peccati: where yet in his Doctrine of Simultaneous Concourse, he maketh God's concourse to be but part of the determining cause, which would not without man's free co▪ operation do it. Therefore the Decree of a half causation is not enough to infer the effect. futurition; (while they make sin that is eternally future, yet not to be eternally willed or decreed by God to be future.) How can things pass without a cause enumero possibilium, in numerum futurorum?; B. Alas! what men, and what Engines must the poor Church suffer and be tortured by? sure Paul foresaw these things, when he fe●red lest as the Serpent beguiled Eve, (with a promise of being as God in Knowledge) so he should draw us from the simplicity that is in Christ. And when he warned us to beware lest any beguile us with vain Philosophy, according to the rudiments of the world: And when he telleth us of a Wisdom which is foolishness with God; and of some who professing themselves wise, became Fools. Your Doctrine soundeth so unlike to Christ's and his Apostles, that I must crave your Interpretation of it, that we may understand before we wrangle. I pray you what is it that you call Futurition? C. The name tells you what it is. You know what we mean by it. B. I know that it is Grammatically a Noun Substantive, but doth it signify something or nothing? C. It signifieth that something will be hereafter. B. Now you turn it to a Verb: But is futurity anything or nothing? C. Suppose, I say, It is something? B. If it was eternally something, it is God: For nothing else was eternal. C. Suppose, I say, It is nothing? B. If it be nothing, it is no effect, and therefore hath no cause, and therefore no eternal cause. C. Suppose, I say, that it is neither something nor nothing: You know there are five sorts that Burgersdicius placeth between Res and Nihil, and futurity may be one of them. B. Five sorts of what? You cannot tell. If you take Ens or Res limitedly for less universal than Aliquid, or a Species of it, you may say that Datur medium inter Rem & Nihil. But sure esse and non esse are contradictories. And taking Aliquid, Ens or Res in the most universal notion, it is a contradiction, and a denial of the first principle of Knowledge, to feign a medium: Burgersdieius'es' five Non-entia quae non sunt nihil, are Privatio, Denominatio externa, ens Rationis, Relatio, modus entis. And all this cometh from the pitiful narrowness of man's mind, that can know nothing at all by one simple Conception, but by parts; And than it frameth several names, according to all its inadequate Conceptions, as if they all signified several somethings. 1. Privatio is itself a compound notion, including, 1. The absence of the form. 2. The debitum inesse. 3. The matters capacity of it. The first is Nothing: the second is a Relation (of which after): the third is the nature or mode of the matter, which is an inadequate Conception of Ens. 2. Denominatio externa, signifieth, 1. The Denominabilitas. 2. Or the actual denomination. The first is considerable, 1. Qua talis. 2. Or in causa velratione. Denominability in se is nothing else but an inadequate Conception of ens rationis: For I can call nothing by a Name. But the Ratio denominandi may be something; and as now intended is Relation. 2. And the actual denomination is Res, that is, Verbum vel mentis veloris. 3. Entia Rationis taken effectiuè & subjectiuè are confessed to be real Entities: but objectiuè it is denied. All Objects are so called, 1. As aptitudinal. 2. Or actually apprehended. 1. As aptitudinal they are not entia rationis, but something antecedent. 2. As actual, they are quid real: For they are conceptus humanus inadaequatè expressus, sub ratione materiae. A thought or conception is an Act which is quid real: And every Act consisteth of the modus agentis and the Object, which as such is quasi materia, and is essential to the Act: so that even Genus and Species, as in man's thoughts are quid real. And out of man's thoughts, they are Relation or nothing. 4. Relation is a something or nothing, which keepeth an exceeding room in all our Sciences. But when anatomised, it is considerable, 1. As in extrinsic Objects. 2. As in the mind of man considering them: 1. In the Object there is, 1. Quid absolutum, that is, the subject, the terminus, the fundamentum, cum ratione fundandi. 2, The formal Relation. The first is quid real, as is confessed. The second is nothing besides the first. It is nothing but rerum comparabilitas: And that comparability is nothing, besides the quid absolutum, or thing itself. When an Egg is new laid at the Antipodes, an Egg here is newly related to it ut simile: But nothing is added to this Egg; But only now the mind of man can compare it with that at the Antipodes, and consider, that in quantity, figure, colour, etc. they are like: which likeness as in ovo is nothing besides the same quantity, figure, colour, etc. themselves. But by those Realities, it is capable of being compared, and the mind can raise an universal notion of both, as compared. 2. But this comparing Act of the Understanding is quid real. So that Ockam in his Quodlibets hath well proved in many questions, that Relation is nothing besides the quid absolutum in re & in ment humana. And though his Gregor. Armin. at large dispute that non-entia may be related, yet it is on this supposition, that non-entia may be imagined, and be the matter of a thought or conceptus, and as such they are entia rationis realia; that is, that conceptus is quid real. But besides that, the Relatio non-entis is nothing but non-ens, and a mere nihil. Yet I confess that Rerum ordo is the sum of Relations and of morality; and that this Ordo is existent whether we think of it or not: But this Ord● is nothing distinct ab absolutis & rebus ordinatis, cum omnibus suis modis & circumstantiis realibus. Things are wonderfully divers by diversity of quantity, quality, distance, etc. But this diversity is nothing besides the said absolute quantity, quality, distance, etc. But I must not write a Logic for you: I am by this much remembered, that, as David saith, man walketh in a vain show or Image; when multitudes of nothings go for somethings, and fill up so much of his thoughts and life, and constitute so much of his Learning which he glorieth in. C. But you have said nothing yet of the fifth, which is Modus Entis. And futurition may be reduced to that B. A true modus entis is quid absolutum & real, and the same that we call an Accident: And Gassendus chooseth to call Accidents, Modes or Qualities: And they are not really distinct from the ens cujus modi sunt, if they be intrinsical Modes or Accidents, (as quantity, quality, action, etc.) But they are small inadequate conceptions of the thing modified: not conceptions of its constitutive chief denominating part, but yet conceptions of quid entis, so that an entire perfect conception of the thing, would comprehend or include the conception of the Mode or Accident. So that they that deride the name of Pars accidentalis as put for Accidens, speak not always so good sense as they think they do. But such Accidents or Modes as are extrinsical to the thing, (as clothes to the Body, Servants, Lands, Riches, Honours,) are not properly Modes and Accidents at all, but Adjuncts. C. Apply this to the point in question, (of Futurity.) B. If Futurity, as is said, be an eternal Being, it is God: If nothing it hath no cause. If it be called Quid medium, the very Quid is a contradiction to it. To begin backward, 1. If it be Modus Entis, from eternity, it must be Modus Dei: For there was no ens ab aeterno but God: If it be Modus Dei, it is Dens: For all in God is God. 2. If it be Relatio, it is absoluti alicujus relatio. If so, either of some real Being, or of nothing. If of a Being from eternity, it must be a Relation of God to the thing future, in that he either willed or fore-knew ●. For nothing was eternal but God. And if so, that Relation of God to the thing future is something or nothing. If something, it is God himself, and so hath no cause. If nothing, it is no effect, and so hath no ●●●●. But if it be the Relation of nothing, viz. of the thing future, (to an Intellect possible or real that could know it future) than it is nothing itself: For the Relation of nothing cannot be something, a real accident without a real Subject. 3. If futurity was from eternity ens Rationis, it was Rationis Divinae; for there was no created Reason ab aeterno: And if so, either Aptitudinal or Actual. If Actual, it was God: For all his Ideas and entia rationis (for I suppose you one of the bold men that affirm entia rationis to be in God,) must needs be God himself, and so have no cause. If Aptitudinal, and not yet in ment divina, but objecta possibilia; either they were something or nothing. If something, then there was something eternal besides God, which is not said by any of us. If nothing, to call them future, signifieth no more, but that God's infinite knowledge extendeth to things that are not as if they were, which is true: But futurity itself being nothing, hath no cause. 4. If you say that they are extrinsical Denominations, it is something or nothing that is denominated future. I know you will say, It's nothing. If so quatenus extrinsical to God, it was from eternity nothing, which you call a Denomination. But if you mean the Act of God denominating, it was quid real, that is God himself, who hath no cause. But yet this is the true foundation of the notion. Because God's Knowledge of all things, and his Will of all good things, extendeth to all intelligible and amiable Objects to all eternity; therefore we first justly denominate God to be an Intellect that knoweth what will be, and a Will which willeth all that he will do; And thence we say that the thing was future from eternity. And so from an extrinsic Denomination of God's Mind and Will we run on to give names to numberless nothings, and then talk, and write, and make Sciences and Disputes of them in our dreams, as if they were somethings. And this is the work of the fantastical World. And then we confound poor Scholars with the names of Entia Intentionalia, & Species, & Entia rationis, & Universalia. And with Aristotle, Themistius, etc. say that the Intellect is all things that it knoweth, etc. O what work have vain notions, and be-fooling Philosophy made not only in the World, but in the Church, and among those that call themselves Orthodox, and cry up the sufficiency of the holy Scriptures! (The notion of Privations, I need not here apply.) C. But things future are future, whether any one think of them or not. B. And some men will trouble and deceive themselves and others, whatever is said to them. It is certain, that possible and futurum are termini diminuentes & negantes quoad existentiam. That which only will be is not. Therefore the name signifieth nothing, but that the thing will be without any connotation of any cause of it; but it implieth that there is some fundamentum vel ratio, which might warrant any perfect existent Intellect to say, It will be. And there needs no more to that, but the eternal perfection of Gods own Intellect. But I have said more of this lib. 1. and therefore here will add no more. C. But how is it possible for God to foreknow that sin will be, unless he first Will or Decree that it shall be (by his permission)? B. I abhor the question and supposition. That such worms as we, who know not what Gods Intellect or Will is, should presume to conclude that he cannot foreknow sin, unless we can understand how he fore-knoweth it; yea, unless it be by a way that a man could foreknow it. When it is a wiser way of arguing, to say, [This is the way that man knoweth by, and that man can comprehend: Ergo it is not like to be the way of God's foreknowledge.] But remember one thing, that here you plainly make God to will the form of Sin as well as the matter? For is not the form future? C. Yes. B. And is not Gods Will his Love? C. Yes. B. And do you not make God then to love the very form of Sin, which yet you say that no wicked man loveth? C. No: It is but the existence of the form that he willeth or loveth. B. O excellent distinguishing! He willeth not the form of Sin, but only willeth that it be, or exist. The form is the Essence: He willeth that the Essence exist; but willeth not the Essence, which is nothing, but as existing! But do wicked men will any more, or so much, as that the form exist? C. Dr. Twisse saith, No. B. And if it were but the Act that existed, doth not God's Law make it sin, by forbidding it, and so cause the Essence? C. Yes. B. And if you say that God willeth the existence of the form of Sin, why say you that he doth not cause it? Is not his Will effective? or is it any more contrary to his Holiness to cause it, than to will or love it? C. He causeth the existence, but not the form or existence. B. What juggling is this in such tremendous matters? 1. What is it to cause the form, but to cause that it exist. To cause it to be, is all the causing that it can have. 2. And you confess that God's Law, by forbidding it, maketh it sin in specie when it existeth. Remember that you say that it is not only the matter, but the form of sin, which God willeth and causeth to exist. And is it not a contradiction to call it evil, and yet say that God willeth it? when his Will is the Rule of Goodness? C. It is not evil to God, but to us. B. So Dr. Twisse saith: And to be evil to us (even man's sin or damnation) is not evil to God. And so God is the great Lover of Sin and Damnation. But why then is he said to hate it? And is it not an Enemy to God, and contrary to his Holiness? Why did Christ die for that which God so loved? C. Sin is nothing, and therefore God causeth it not. B. 1. Relations and Privations have their Causes, and so hath Sin. 2. Else man cannot be condemned for causing it. The Synod of Dort and Reformed Churches teach no such Doctrine: But it ●● such as you that tempt the Arminians to revile them, and say, that you describe God in the shape of the Devil, and much worse, as loving and causing sin and misery more than he: that so the love of God may be extinguished. C. I think we must leave these Mysteries to God. B. But, good Brother, though I have stopped your mouth and censures of your Brethren, in this and such matters, do you expect that every ●onest Christian must be able to discuss all your Logical Fallacies, or else go with you for unsound and heterodox? And have you dealt fairly by the Church of God, to borrow from the Schoolmen such snares for men's Consciences? And must every man be persuaded that God is the greatest lover and willer from eternity of every wicked Act, that is not able to answer your smoky Sophisms about futurition and its eternal cause, with such like. I tell you the Serpent hath beguiled us as Eve, and turned men from the simplicity that is in Christ. C. I pray briefly give me the sum of what you drive at. B. The sum is, That though every Party, and almost every person of each Party, have odd notions of his own, and peculiar weapons, to wound his Brother's Reputation with, and militate against Love and Concord, and manifest the Pride of his self-conceited Understanding; yet all sober Christians, I think, are agreed in all this Controversy of God's Decrees, in all that is truly necessary to our brotherly love and peace. That is, All grant that God decreed to do all that he doth, and to give all the Grace and Mercy which at any time he giveth, whether to all or some. And that he absolutely and properly decreed no more. (But improperly he may be said to will an event in tantum, when he willeth only to do so much, or so much which naturally conduceth towards it, though he know that it will never come to pass.) But what it is that God actually doth or giveth in time is all the controversy, which is to be spoken of in the third Chapter. And were it not for your tenaciousness of contentious notions, I needed to have said no more than these few words here of God's Decrees. THE Third Days Conference (With an ARMINIAN of Universal and Special REDEMPTION A. The second Article of our Difference is so fundamental and ●omen tous, and our distance so great, that I cannot believe that you can say any thing sufficient to reconcile us. B. They that study Controversy as such, are apt every where to fin● matter of Quarrel, and weapons of Contention; but they that see● peace do find out the terms and means of peace, as sure and easy in themselves, which Contenders cannot see. Tell me, in a word, Are not all Parties agreed, that Christ by his Merits and Sufferings, procured for men all mercies which he giveth them ●●●● and no more, (but as he may be said to procure them that which he offereth and bringeth to their choice; which is properly to proc●re them that offer, or the benefit as offered?) A. Yes, I think both sides will grant this, that he purchased all that he giveth, and absolutely or fully no more. B. Why then all the Controversy is, what he giveth men: and that belongeth to the third and fourth Articles: And so I might dismiss this at the beginning, but for your expectations. But what is it that maketh you think the difference so great? The first Crimination. A. 1. The Calvinists and Synodists deny Christ's very Office, as he is the Saviour of the World, and the second Adam, the Redeemer of Mankind, and the Mediator between God and Man. And all this they confine to a small part of the World. * Malderus in 1. 2. q. 111. a. 3. d. 5. m. 1. p. 487. Non existimo opinionem illam Calvinisticam, quae negat pro omnibus & singulis Christ●m mortuum esse, tolerandam esse: nec inter studiosos varitaris debere obtinere locum opinionem qui non perinde admittunt quod omnibus in Adamo lapsis— iterum sit via (salutis facta possibilis per Christum & quod habeant per Christum in actu primo paratum, vel in actu secundo datum sufficiens auxilium gratiae, quo saltem media'e salvari possint, etc. B. Have you never read what Musculus hath written in Loc. Commun. and Bullinger in his Decades for universal Redemption? Have you not read the plain words of Calvin, cited by Amyraldus in Defence. Doct. Calvin. (though Petavius rail at him for it most furiously)? Have you not read the writings of Joh. Bergius, Conrade. Bergius, Lud. Crocius, Calixtus, of Camero, and his Followers at Saumers, of Testardus, Dallaeus, Blondel's Preface, etc. for Universal Redemption? Have you not read in the writings of Bishop Rob. Abbots, Bishop Carelton, Archbishop Usher, Bishop Hall, Dr. Sam. Ward, etc. their judgements for it? Have you not read Bishop Davenant's excellent Dissertation for it, de morte Christi? Know you not that it was the judgement of Dr. Preston, Mr. W. Whateley, Mr. W. Fenner, and many excellent Divines among us? Know you not that Dr. Twisse himself, I believe twenty, if not forty times over in his Works, saith, That Christ so far died for all, as to procure and give them Pardon and Salvation, on condition they will repent and believe; but he died moreover for the Elect, to procure and give them Faith and Repentance also? Know you not that Paraeus in his Irenicon saith, That the Sins of all the World lay on Christ on the Cross, as the cause of his Death? Know you not that it is the commonest Doctrine of the Protestants, That Christ died for all men as to the sufficiency of his death, but for the Elect only as to the efficiency of Salvation? And what can you say more or less than those few words signify? Know you not that the Synod at Dort itself saith, That Christ's satisfaction is of infinite value and price, abundantly sufficient to expiate the Sins of all the World; and that the Promise is, That whosoever believeth shall not perish. And this is to be preached to all. And, that many yet repent not, believe not, but perish, is not through any defect or insufficiency of Christ's Sacrifice; but by their own default. Musculus his words for Universal Redemption, are (Loc. Commun. c. de Redemp. Gen. hum. p. (mihi) 326. etc.) [Redemptio est generis humani: Ge●●s humanum Complectitur non unam aut alteram Gentem, sed mundum ●niversum, omnes viz. totius orbis nationes, cunctos homines à primo usque ad novissimum.— Generaliter est omnium.— Scimus non omnes Redemptionis hujus fieri participes: Verum illorum perditio qui non servantur, haud quaquam impedit, * It seems there were but few in Bradwardin's days, who were of his mind, in confessing the antecedent natural impossibility of any one's Salvation, or any good act, which cometh not to pass; seeing (li. 3. c. 29. p. 735.) he answereth them that say, [why should the Opinion of a few, trouble the Church, and the far greater number that is against it], by referring them to the paucity of wise men and Believers, and saying that truth must be preached for the few (Elect) that will receive it. And p. 737. tells us how Aristophanes, contrary to the six Judges, appointed by Ptolemy; did adjudge the Crown to that Poet that the people liked worst. quo minus Universalis vocetur Redemptio— Resolutio illa telluris qua passim omnia ad germinandum astate solvuntur, recte Universalis dicitur, etiamsi multae arbores— non germinent— etc. Anno Jubil●o Generalis omnium servorum liberatio erat, etiamsi multi in servitute ma●●●tes, gratiam liberationis respuebant. Ad eum modum habet & Redemptio istageneris humani— Quod illam homines reprobi & deploratè impii non accipiunt, neque defectu fit Gratiae Dei, neque justum est ut illa propter filios perditionis Gloriam ac titulum UNIVERS ALIS REDEMPTIONIS amittat, cum sit parata cunctis, & omnes ad illam vocentur, etc. — sic cuim cavebimus ne Catholicae Gratiae Gloriam obscuremus & in arctum Constringamus, vel cum phanaticis hominibus neminem prorsus damnari dica●us—]. Bullinger— A. You may spare your labour of citing Bullinger and Musculus, or Melanchthon, or Bucer, or such moderate men: But what are they to the rigid Calvinists?— B. Calvin saith, in Rom. 5. 18. [Communem omnium gratiam facit, quia omnibus exposita est: Non quod ad omnes extendatur reipsa: Nam & si passus est Christus pro peccatis totius mundi atque omnibus Indifferenter Dei benignitate offertur, non tamen omnes apprehendunt.] And in 1 Cor. 8. 11. [Dictum memorabile quo docemur quam (Chara) esse debeat nobis fratrum salus; nec omnium modo, sed singulorum, quando prounoquoque fusus est sanguis Christi.] And in 2 Pet. 2. 1. [Non immerito dicuntur Christum abnegare à quo redempti sunt,—]. And in 1 Joh. 2. 2. He saith, That qui dicunt [Christum sufficienter pro toto mundo passum esse, sed pro elect is tantum efficaciter,] say true, and that which commonly obtaineth in the Schools, though he otherwise expound that Text. A. You need not cite Calvin: Grotius said truly that he had his Lucida intervalla; and though Amyraldus seek to defend him from self-contradiction, Petavius calls him all to nought for it: But what can you say for your high Antiarminians, such as Paraeus, Molinaeus, etc.; B. Paraeus, (let all mark it) saith, Irenic. cap. 24. pag. 142. [Quod Christus pro solis electis satisfecit, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est, vel falsa accusatio: Omnium peccata Christus portavit, dissolvit, expiavit, si magnitudinem pretii, seu 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sufficientiam spectemus: Non omnium sed tantum fidelium, si 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, efficaciam, fructum, applicationem.] To which he citeth Ambrose, Innocent, Lyra, adding [Juxta hunc intellectum nulla est dissensio. Art. 6. itidem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est vel falsa accusatio. Promissiones Gratiae sunt Universales, pertinentque ad omnes, quoad praedicationem, invitationem, & mandatum credendi.] And on 2 Pet. 2. 1. [Erant Redempti respectu sufficientiae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.] Molinaeus Anatom. Arminianis. saith, cap. 27. sect. 8, 9 [When we say that Christ died for all men, we take it thus, that the Death of Christ is sufficient to save whosoever do believe; yea, and that it is sufficient to save all men, if all men in the whole World did believe in him: And that the cause why all men are not saved, is not in the insufficiency of the Death of Christ, but in the wickedness and incredulity of man. Finally Christ may be said to reconcile all men to God by his Death, after the same manner that we say the Sun doth enlighten the eyes of all men, though many are blind, many sleep, and many are hid in darkness, etc.] That most methodical acute Divine, Georg. Sohnius, saith, Tom. 1. Thes. de Justific. (mihi) pag. 104. [Satisfactio illa & justitia pro omnium temporum hominibus, & omnium hominum peccatis, & peccatorum omnium cum culpa tum poena sufficit, quia ab infinita persona dependet, Matth. 18. 11. & 12. 31. Rom. 5. 18. & 8. 32. 2 Cor. 5. 15. 1 Tim. 2. 6. 1 Joh. 1. 7. & 2. 2. Tit. 2. 14. Errand igitur qui Christum pro omnibus hominibus passum esse negant.]— A. But such violent men as Zanchy (the grand Patron of the impossibility of falling away) talk not at this rate. B. Zanchy saith, (Thes. Vol. 3. fine, Thes. 13. 16. de Volunt. Dei) Eadem de causa dici non potest Dei voluntatem proprie & simpliciter fuisse, ut Christus pro salute omnium moreretur, id est, ut omnis per ejus mortem servaretur, ac proinde Christum secundum propositum patris pro salute omnium mortuum esse; sed tantum, ut loquuntur, sufficienter.— Caeterum damnari etiam illi non possunt, qui spectata revelata voluntate Dei docent, & Deum velle omnes homines salvos fieri, & Christum pro salute omnium hominum mortuum esse, & neutrum velle peccatum; cum haec omnia sint verissima. And de Relig. Christ. fid. cap. 12. Thes. 2. [Credimus (Mar. 16. 16.) licet omnibus hominibus per Evangelii praedicationem Gratia Redemptionis, salus ac vita aeterna à Deo dispensanda serio proponantur, (quod enim permulti hujus non siunt participes, ipsorum sit vitio & culpa reipsa tamen non communicari nisi— electis, vocatis—] A. What ever these hold, I am sure your English Calvinists hold otherwise. B. Have you not read Bishop Usher's Tract, for Universal Redemption? Have you not read Davenant's Dissert. de morte Christi, so oft mentioned? Have you not read the Life of Dr. Preston, and how in the Dispute with Dr. White he maintained Universal Redemption? Mr. William Fenner in his Hidden Manna brings in Cain saying, [Christ died not for me, etc.] and answereth, [Mentiris Cain, Christ died for thee.] It would be too long to cite all. D. Rob. Abbot de Verit. Grat. Christi, pag. 35, 36, 37. [Huic disputati●ni dabit initium— Ambrosis Sententia in Luc. c. 7. l. 6. [Etsi Christus pro omnibus passus est, specialiter tamen pro nobis passus est—] Quibus verbis apertè significat ita Christum pro omnibus mortuum, ut tamen in morte Christi, hand omnes pares existimandi sunt. Communiter quidem pro omnibus mortuum— viz. pro omnibus satisfacere voluisse dignitate pretii— esto Christum in promiscuo sensu generis humani, se aliquo modo pro Judae dedisse, etc. — Neque enim Christus qua homo partitionem hominum vel discretionem ullam instituit ut quemquam dici possit à mortis suae beneficio excepisse, qui hac quidem ratione pro persequentibus & crucifigentibus promisono patrem rogat, nostro quod sit exemplo— Quod certe dolere non potnisset, nisi pro illis quoque quantum ex homine, crucem obire statuisset—] I told you before what Dr. Twisse saith twenty times over, That [Christ died to purchase Pardon for all if they will believe (conditionally) but for the Elect to purchase them also Faith itself.] The Annotations called the Assemblies, say, on Heb. 10. 29. [Sanctified by the Blood] [By which their sins were pardoned in regard of that meritorious sufficient Satisfaction purchased by it.] Abundance more I could easily cite. A. But they do but juggle and cheat the World with the Vizor of a Doctrine that cannot endure the Light: For by sufficiens pretium some say they mean but sufficiens si pretium fuisset, and no price at all. B. Those be but a few odd conceited persons, driven by you into extremes: They profess that Christ hath sufficiently satisfied for all, and purchased them effectually a conditional Pardon. They call not that a sufficient price and satisfaction which is none at all. A. But we agree not as to God's intent of the benefits to all. B. 1. That concerneth the Decrees. 2. The sober * [Quod ad magnitudinem & potentiam pretii, & quod ad unam pertinet causam generis humani, sanguis Christi est redemptio totius mundi: sed qui hoc seculum sine fide Christi & sine regenerationis sacramento pertranseunt, Redemptionis alieni sunt▪ Cum ergo per unam omnium naturam, omnium causam a Domino nostro in veritate susceptam, redempti recte omnes dicantur, non tamen omnes captivitate sunt eruti Redemptionis proprietas haud dubium penes illos est— qui sunt membra a Christi.] This of August. Rivet approveth of disp. 6. de Remp. p 100 But it's clea● that by Redemption in the last part. August. meaneth actual liberatition from Captivity, which no doubt is proper to the Elect. Papists agree, and say just the very same as the Synod. See Estius in 3. Sent. d. 19 sect. 3. Tapperus, Art. 6. Malderus Antisynod. p. 23, 24. Fr. Sonnius demonstr. Relig. Christ. l. 3. c. 19 † Vid. Vasquez To. 1. in 1. disp. 97. c. 2. & 3. Rivet citeth these, Disp. 6. the Redempt. And he himself makes Christ's death even partly effectual for all. And will you be more contentious and violent than all the sober Papists and Calvinists? Know * Saith Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 8. d. 95. c. 3. Cum omnes simul essemus eodem modo in primo parente damnati & eandem sententiam, subituri, non omnes sed quidam ex illa co●●uni massa fuimus separati, gratia congrua & efficaci usque ad finem vitae: ergo quidam fuimus prae aliis electi: sed gratia qua fuimus separati ne cum aliis damnati maneremus suit per Christum: ergo per Christum a communi massa electi sumus. Quod si ita in ●●●pore factum est, nemo ambigat in praescientia ●odem modo fuisse decretum, Neque vero ut quispiam sit causa eligendi aliquem ex multis damnatis, apus est ut ipse ità sit causa relinquendi alios obnoxios poenae, etc.— Christus causa suit nostra electionis, ut non-nulli potius eligerentur quam alii: Quia peculiari ratione merita sua ipsis applicavit, & pro eis oravit— ex iis qui post incarnationem ejus fuerunt ego non dubito Christum peculiari oratione & voluntate merita sua illis applicesse qui predestinati & electi fuerunt, ac propterea eos potius quam alios electos & predestin●●os fuisse. De quibusdam hoc certissimum est Luc. 22. Christus oravit pro Petro, etc. Et. Joh. 1●. Non pro mundo rogo, sed, etc. Quis autem ●●● are audeat Christum hac oratione vere meruisse Apostolis gratiam congruam & efficacem, qua usque in finem perseverarent, etc. you not how excellently our British Divines in the Synod of Dort have opened this, and as well the three Breme Divines, but above ●ll, most clearly and briefly the learned Matthius Martinius there? But I will name no more, when it is the whole of the famous Dallaeus his Apolog. Cont. Spanhem. Part. 4. To. 1. to show the consent of Protestants herein: And when his whole Second Tome● is to cite the very words of an hundred and twenty Fathers and Councils, for Universal Redemption and Grace, (Theophylact being the last) and sixty three Protestant Churches and Writers that speak for it, to whom I could add many more. A. If this be so, how cometh it to be a Controversy? B. A few particular men on each side that run into extremes, when once engaged run on further, and make a great noise, while sober men in silence pity them; And so with some the greatest and the loudest are taken to speak the common sense. And thus Spanhemius, Maccovi●s, and a few much inferior to them in learning here in England, have kept up the Contention. And several of the Jesuits, Lutherans and Arminians, have run out into the contrary extreme; and so the difference hath been made and maintained. So that with most Christians, the controversy is not whether Christ be the Saviour of the World, or died for all men; but how far, and in what sense he did so, that this Article may agree with the rest of our Theology. A. The sense is all: If we agree not in sense, we agree in nothing. B. The few extreme Contenders agree not in sense: But the generality of Christians, much more may I say Protestants, do, in all that is necessary to our common concord. If really you differ, tell me yourself, What do you hold that Christ purchased for all men, more than the Synodists do? Name me one benefit if you can. A. You would persuade me that we differ not indeed. 1. We hold that Christ procured and made the first Covenant of Grace with all Mankind in Adam and Noah: and so do not the Synodists. B. I think you can name few Protestants that deny it. Beza himself in that Edit. of his Annot. in Eph. 2. 12. which H. Stephanus printed 1588. saith, [This Covenant was made in the beginning, Gen. 3. 15. with Adam, and all that should be born of him; and afterwards, Gen. 9 10. with Noah, the other Parent of Mankind; as we have elsewhere noted,] plainly, they say that it is made to all men as a Law, then promulgate to Adam and Noah; even a Law of Grace, which Mankind was put under; And as an offered Covenant, and conditional Promise: But as, 1. A mutual Covenant. 2. And as giving right to Life, it is made, only with Consenters. Tell me whether you differ from this sense? A. No; this sense is according to the Scriptures. But moreover, 2. We hold that the second Edition of the Covenant also is made to all. B. It's granted you, that it's made to all that hear it, as far as aforesaid; and that Ministers should do their best to preach it to all: And do you hold any more? A. No: But, 3. We hold that this Covenant pardoneth all men's sins, on condition of Faith and Repentance, and not only the Elect. B. So do they, unanimously: I told you Twisse twenty times over saith the same. No man can deny that which is the very plain scope of the Covenant itself, to pardon all if they will repent and believe. A. 4. But, We hold also that Christ purchased for all men sufficient Grace to enable them to repent and believe. B. I told you that is the Controversy of the third and fourth Articles; what Grace Christ giveth all, he procured for all, which is not here to be anticipated, but opened in due place: And if I then manifest that in that point also you differ not, I shall prove that you differ not at all in these Points of Christ's Death and Universal Grace. A. But they say, That Christ died only for the Elect, effectually and with a purpose to save them, and purposed to save no other. B. You carry back the Controversy to God's Decrees, which we dispatched before. Tell me, 1. Do you hold that all are saved by Christ? A. No; that's none of the Controversy. B. Why then quarrel you with them that say, He died but for the Elect effectually, when they mean but that he saveth no other? A. But his death effected something for them; viz. the new Covenant and common Grace, though it effect not their Salvation.; B. Who denieth any of this? not the Synod of Dort. But, 2. Do you hold that God absolutely purposed to save any by Christ that never are saved? A. No: but conditionally he purposed it. B. Have we not before proved, that your quarrel about conditional Decrees, is but a strife about words in the dark. A. But they say Christ died not equally for all. B. Do you, or dare you, say otherwise yourselves? 1. You confess that his Death doth not equally save all: 2. You confess that from eternity God fore-knew who would believe and be saved, and who not. Now the question is of equality of benefit (before denied) and equality of Intention: And can you think that Christ, as God, at the time of his Death (or before) did equally intent or decree to save those that he fore-knew would neither believe nor be saved, and those that he knew would believe and be saved? You cannot, you do not imagine this. A. We do not: But we say that as to God's antecedent Will, he both elected and redeemed all alike; and the inequality is only in his consequent Will. But the Synodists say otherwise. B. 1. If you understand the distinction aright, they say the same as you: that is, If you thus distinguish only of the Will of God as Rector, or his governing Will, and by the Antecedent Will mean only the Legislative which making our Duty, goeth before our doing or not-doing it, and by the consequent Will, mean only the judicial which followeth Duty and Sin. God dealeth equally by all men in the first, (as to the tenor of his Law, though the different promulgation make a difference of Obligations,) but unequally in the second. 2. And if you distinguish thus of his eternal Decrees, either they respect Damnation or Salvation. And by his Antecedent Will, you mean that which goeth before the foresight of man's Will, and by the consequent, that which followeth this foresight. Now, 1. Have I not said enough to convince you that as it is Actus Agentis in God, we cannot prove any diversity or priority? But only ex connotatione objecti. 2. And as to Damnation, I have proved that they commonly agree with you, that God decreeth not Sin, but forseeth it, and decreeth Damnation only as for fore-seen Sin. whatever Piscator and a few more say, this is the common Doctrine of Protestants and Fathers. 3. But as to Election dare you say yourself, that God decreeth to change no man's Will, but upon foresight that the person himself will first change it? * Vasqu. and many Jesuits profess, that God's first Grace is given without any cause, condition or occasion in man. And saith Malderus in 12. Tho. q. 110. a. 1. pag. 469. Deus non. praesupponit in creatura bonum, quo ad ipsius dilectionem moveatur, sicut voluntas hominis benefactoris: sed bonum creaturae provenit ex voluntate Dei, qui vocat ea quae non sunt tanquam ea quae sunt. That is, God's efficient Will of Beneficence is first, and then his final Will of complacence; first God maketh us good, and then loveth us as good. If man change it first, God need not to come after to change it: If God change it first, than he decreed first to change it, and did not first foresee it changed. A. Neither: But he forseeth man's concurrence or not-concurrence with his changing Act of Grace. B. But can you think that he equally operateth on all, and that all the inequality is in their concurrence? Doth he do as much on every Persecutor (equally prepared) as he did on Saul? Doth he call all to follow him as effectually ex parte sui, as he did Peter, Andrew, etc. who presently left all and followed him? Did Christ himself preach to all Nations? or only to the Circumcision? Were not the sins of the Jews as much aggravated as those of Tyre and Sidon, Sodom and Gomorrah? or the Indians? why else should it go worse with them in the day of Judgement? and why else would Tyre and Sidon have repent if they had but had their means, were they not then as much prepared for mercy? Doth God equally send the Gospel to all Nations and Persons equally unworthy? Can you confute St. Paul? Rom. 9 Or can you give any reason why God must show equal mercy unto all? A. Yes: because else he is a respecter of persons. * Ruiz a Jesuit confesseth the Vol. Dei disp. 20. sect. 6. p. 226. That according to Augustine Christ so died for all, as that he had a special intent of saving his Elect, for whose sake as being among the rest, it is that he died and prayed for all in common: Aug. in Tract. 31. in Joan. c. 7. Non debebant desperare, pro quibus Dominus in cruse pendens dignatus est or are: videbat quosdam suos inter multos alienos. Illis jam petebat veniam a quibus adhuc accipiebat injuriam: Non enim attendebat quod ab ipsis moriebatur, sed quia pro ipsis moriebatur. He that would know Augustine's mind herein, may find it fully in Jansenius, or in the Trias Patrum de gratia, etc. B. I fully confuted this before, 1. Respecting persons is the fault of a Rector as such, especially as Judge: And so God dealeth equally; his Law being Norma officii & judicii as to all. But no man ever yet took either, 1. A Proprietor (Dominus absolutus); 2. Or a Benefactor, to be obliged to equality to all. Must you needs use all your Grounds, Trees, Goods, cattle, etc. equally? Must you needs make all men equally your bosom-Friends, your Heirs, your Beneficiaries, who are equally worthy in themselves? Must you needs give equally to all the poor, that are of equal need and merit? All this is contrary to the common sense and usage of Mankind. 2. And in a Judge, respecting persons, is the vice of them that deal unequally with men for some by-respect unworthy of such a difference; As for Birth, Beauty, Wealth, Power, Eloquence, Parts, Wit, Kindred, or any selfish interest, to pervert Justice, or deal partially. But God maketh no difference on such accounts. Yea a Judge himself, or a King, when he acteth not as a Judge, but as a King above Laws, or as a Benefactor, may reprieve or pardon one Thief rather than an other, yea and choose that which is the most learned, strong, wise, and capable of future Service to the Commonwealth. A. This seemeth a wrong to the rest that are not so used? B. Would it do the Thief that is hanged any good, to have the other unpardoned? Would it ease their pains in Hell, to have the company of all those that be in Heaven? If it be no wrong to them to suffer themselves, nothing but envy can call it a wrong to them, to have others escape. Had they love to others as themselves, it would be some comfort to them to think that others are in Joy and Glory? A. At least this is a real difference between the Parties. B. 1. The Schoolmen and many learned Jesuits (as I have proved, Lib. 1.) make it not a difference. And will you called Arminians or Lutherans go further from your Protestant Brethren, than the learned Papists and Jesuits themselves go? Are you not ashamed of this? 2. The Papists can bear with one another in these Points, and live in communion in one Church, (though the Jansenists Case hath had more than ordinary heats and stirs;) And yet the Dominicans go higher and further in the Controversy of Predetermination from the Jesuits, than the Synodists do: And are you more fierce or unpeaceable than they? 3. But remember here once for all, that you were not able to name any one benefit which Christ's death procured for all, other than the Synodists hold as well as you: But only you charge them as asserting more to the Elect. They give more (you say) to some, but not less to all. 4. And all this lieth in the point of Intention and Divine Decrees, which was sufficiently reconciled before. But you have by all this enticed me to mingle various Controversies, and to anticipate that of Grace and freewill, which is to be handled by itself in due place. But I have a word more to give you, by way of caution, if you will think on it. A. What's that? B. What will you say if Episcopius, Arminius, Corvinus, are the men that deny most Universal Redemption, while the Synod maintaineth it? How can Christ die for the sins of any Infants in proper sense, if they have no sin, and deserve no punishment? Or be a Saviour to save them from sin and punishment that have none? The second Crimination. A. By denying common Redemption, they deny the express words of 1 Joh. 4. 14. 〈…〉 guish of the phrase of dying for us, that we may not cheat ourselves by confounding things that differ. To die for us or for all, is to die for our benefit, or for the benefit of all. Now these benefits are of a different nature: whereof some are bestowed only conditionally, (though for Christ's sake) and they are the pardon of sin and Salvation: These God doth confer only on the condition of Faith and Repentance: Now I am ready to profess, and that, I suppose as out of the mouth of all our Divines, that every one who heareth the Gospel, without distinction between Elect and Reprobate, is bound to believe that Christ died for him, so far as to procure both the pardon of his sins, and Salvation, in case he believe and repent: But there are other benefits that Christ merited for us, viz. Faith and Repentance, etc. Twisse against Hord, li. 1. p. 154. Scripture, which saith, That Christ tasted death for every man, Heb. 2. 9 That he is the Saviour of the World, Joh. 4. 12. That he is the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sins of the World, Joh. 1. 29. That he died for all, that they which live, should live to him that died for them, 2 Cor. 5. 14, 15. That God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself, 2 Cor. 5. 19, 20. That he is the Saviour of all men, especially of them that believe, 1 Tim. 4. 10. That the Grace of God which bringeth Salvation to all men, hath appeared, Tit. 2. 11, 12. That he is the Propitiation for our Sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole World, 1 Joh. 2. 2. with much more to the same purpose. And do these men deal sincerely with God and the Scripture, that can distort all this to their own sense? And do they not use such violence with God's Word and their Consciences, as that on these terms they may make their own Religion, and believe what they list? Do they not plainly show that they take not their Faith from God, but from their Teachers, and believe as the Church believeth which they join with? Had it been but one or two Texts, or had they been obscurely uttered, a good man might have thought that he must reduce their sense to the many and more plain. But to oppugn the plain Gospel itself hath no excuse. B. You are sharp against other men's Errors, and other men against yours. But I have proved to you that the Synod, and the generality of the Protestant Churches in their Confessions, deny not any thing which these Texts say. They hold a common Redemption as well as you: our very Children are taught in their Catechism distinctly to believe, [1. In God the Father, who made them and all the World, 2. In God the Son, who redeemed them and all Mankind. 3. And in God the Holy Ghost, who sanctifieth them and all the Elect People of God.] This is the good old Doctrine, plain and true, and that which Austin taught. A. I am sure many of their Writers expressly oppugn common Redemption; and even Jasenius the Papist who joineth with them denieth it, and saith, that Augustine denied it: Therefore we stand not to his authority. B. 1. As for Augustine and some Protestants, they oft deny that Christ redeemeth any but the Faithful, because the word Redemption is ambiguous, and sometimes taken for the price or ransom paid, and often for the very liberation of the captive Sinner. And when ever Austin denieth common Redemption, he taketh Redemption in this last sense, for actual deliverance. But he asserteth it in the first sense, that Christ died for all. Yea, he thought his death is actually applied to the true Justification and Sanctification of some Reprobates that fall away and perish, though the Elect only are so redeemed as to be saved. Read yourself Augustine, Prosper and Fulgentius, and you will see this with your own eyes. 2. I have oft told you, it is our Protestant Confessions, and not some singular or private Writers, that you must know their Doctrine by. 3. Even those few Writers differ more from you in terms than in sense. For, 1. Many of them will confess all the same benefits by Christ to men in common which you assert. Few of them will deny that Salvation is tendered to all men's acceptance, and brought to the choosing or refusing of their own Wills. And you seem to them to say no greater matters as for the Elect. But they say that Christ purchased Faith itself for the Elect only, of which in due place. 2. And so with them the Controversy is, 1. About God's Decree or Intent of saving men by Christ. 2. And of giving them Faith. Tell me one word that you except against in the Synod in this Article. A. I except against sect. 8. where they say that [Fuit hoc Dei patris liberrimum consilium, & gratiosissima voluntas atque intentio, ut mortis pretiosissimae filii sui vivifica & salvifica efficacia sese exereret in omnibus electis, ad eos solos fide justificante donandos & per eam ad salutem infallibiliter perducendos: hoc est, voluit Deus, ut Christus per sanguinem crucis, quo novum foedus confirmavit, ex omni populo, gente, tribu & lingua, eos omnes & solos qui ab aeterno ad salutem electi & a patre ipsi dati sunt, efficaciter redimeret, fide donaret, ab omnibus peccatis sanguine suo mundaret, ad finem usque fideliter custodiret, tandem absque omni labe & macula gloriosos coram se sisteret.] B. Very good: This is all in the Canons that you can except against. And, 1. You see that this is only about God's Intention or Decree: And so you differ not at all by your own confession, in the Article of Redemption, as distinct from that of the Decrees. 2. Is it the inclusion of the Elect in this Intention that you except against? So will no sober Jesuit. Do you think that Christ was resolved certainly to justify and glorify no man at all? The Semipelagians will not say so. You say not so yourselves. Only some of you say, it is but upon foresight of Faith, and by the consequent will, of which I have said enough before. But do you think that Christ when he was on the Cross had no full purpose to save those infallibly * Episcopius in Institut. Theol. li. 4. cap. 5. pag. 410. confesseth that the opinion of Election may consist with that of universal Grace, which he propugned. who he fore-knew would believe, yea and to cause some men to believe? Those that come to him are drawn by the Father, and Faith is the Gift of God, Ephes. 2. 8. Who giveth us all things pertaining to life and godliness, 2 Pet. 1. 3. Even to will and to do of his good pleasure, Phil. 2. 13. To some it is given to believe, Phil. 1. 29. But of this enough before. 3. But, I suppose, it is only the word [Solos] in all the Canons that you except against. And dare or will you say, that God did absolutely intent and decree to sanctify and glorify all men by Christ? or any one that is not glorified? A. But their meaning is, that all the rest which are most of the World, are left out of God's Election, even unto sin and damnation, merely because God would so have it, and not from any ill desert of theirs any more than was in the Elect: which appeareth in that (as Episcopius noteth). † Instit. Theol. l. 4. cap. 5. sect. 5. p. 410. They that say the Fall or Sin is quid praevisum, fore-seen in Reprobation, yet deny that it is any * The Jesuits themselves, (as Vasqu●z and many others) ordinarily say, that nothing in man can be any cause of God's Decrees. cause of Reprobation: And then all cometh to one, whether God reprobate a Sinner or an innocent person, as to the cause. B. You have nothing about Redemption, I perceive, still to controvert, but about God's Decrees: If we must go back to them, review your words, and see how you cheat yourselves into distaste of you know not what, by mere confusion, for want of accurate Scholastic Heads, (I except not Episcopius himself, notwithstanding men of his own measure think otherwise.) 1. Whereas you talk of [leaving out] either you mean nonelection, or positive exclusion. If the last, it's false: not only the Scotists, but some Protestants (as Ferrius in Scholast. Orthodox. and others,) assert but a negation here; And Davenant and the Synod assert but a negative Decree quoad objectum; which is but as much as Arminius propugneth, who while he maintaineth that God decreeth not sin, but only his own permission of sin, (which is the Synods sense) yet hereby confesseth that he willeth or decreeth that permission. You say then that he decreeth to permit men's unbelief, and this is all that the Synod saith of nonelection, or leaving men out of the number of the Elect. 2. If you yourselves believe all this, with what face can you oppose the same in others? If you do not, either you believe that none are Infidels and damned, or you believe that God doth not permit it to be so, but it is done by conquering his Omnipotency, or else you know not what you believe: choose which you will. 3. Do you really differ (as Episcopius pretendeth) about the cause of Reprobation? As to the cause of Damnation, all are agreed that sin is the true meritorious cause. The question is only of Gods Will or Decree of it. And it is not of his sententia prolata, or Decree pronounced by Christ in Judgement: for of that also it is agreed that sin is the meritorious cause. Your oft recurring to your Objections, when they have been fully answered, puts me on the rediousness of repeating the same Answers. God's * The cause of Gods Will in reprobating. Will is considered either ex parte volentis essentially, or as extrinsically denominated from the connotation of the Object. In the first sense, you have not yet declared yourselves to deny the common Doctrine of the Christian World, that Gods Will is his undivided most simple Essence; and that God hath no cause, and so his Will in itself hath no cause; that in God there is nothing but God. Dare you say that a Creature made God? yea, that so base a thing as Sin made him? How then doth it cause his Will which is himself? Is Gods Will such a mutuable thing as man's? And is it not the first cause of all things? And shall men pretending to Learning reproach others, for not assigning a cause of the first cause, and that Sin, which is base than a Creature, causeth the Creator? But if you speak of Gods Will as denominated by connotation of the Object; mark what we grant you, viz. that as thus only Gods Will or Volitions are denominated divers, so are they denominated to be of this or that sort, and numerically also distinguished; And so they may be said to have a cause, but not an efficient cause, but only an * Arminius and Arnoldus Corvinus frequently affirm, that Faith is not the cause of God's Election to Glory, but only a condition in the object. objective cause; And what Cause is an Object? To let pass the Error of many Logicians, it is only (as an Object) a material constitutive cause (at least here:) And so sin is the objective material cause of that extrinsical denomination and relation of God's Will, called Reprobation to damnation. It is that dispositio objecti which is essential to the Object. And so as Gods Will may any way be said to have a cause, we will say freely, after the manner of men, that sin is the objective cause of the Decree of damnation. And speak now with shame, can you say more or less? Do you or any of us that are sober and understand ourselves, differ at all in this? 4. And you cheat yourselves and others more, in saying, [Not from any ill desert of theirs more than others]. When if you would speak congruously, you should only say, that when all deserved to be utterly forsaken, [God effectually prevaileth with the Wills of his Elect, not for any good desert of theirs above others.] You would insinuate, that God must punish no man, unless he deserve worse than every man whom he forgiveth; which is false. Do you not yourselves believe that all have sinned, and come short of the Glory of God? and that God might justly have let them perish? Do you not hold yourselves, that all men are guilty of resisting or sinning against Grace itself as well as against Nature? and that God may justly withhold his Grace from the Rejecters of it? and if he did so by all he did not wrong them? If God then leave not all, as he might do, but resolve to prevail with some infallibly, do you represent this mercy as if it were cruelty to others? What if it be apparent that you yourselves charge God with as much of that which you call cruelty to all the World, as the Synod doth to the Reprobate alone? (or as many of us do?) For they do but say that God leaveth the Reprobate to their own free Wills: And you say that he doth so by all the World. You say that God giveth all men that hear the Gospel so much Grace, as that they may have Christ and Salvation, if they will; And they say so too as confidently as you do. Tell me if you can then what Mercy or Grace you plead for as common more than they? you cannot tell me: And will you wrangle as if you differed when you do not. Only they say and think that they give more to God's Grace as to the Elect than you do, which is to be examined anon. And then you will quarrel about the Cause of the first Cause, the Will of God, and dream of it as if it were like the Will of Man, which is an effect and that of many Causes. Is it not enough for you that sin is the cause of all punishment, but it must also be the efficient cause of God's Will which is God? Yet again I tell you that all sobe● men will agree with you, that God's Volitions of extrinfick Objects, viz. Reprobations, denominate not God's Essence as such; (for we use not to say, [God is Reprobation or Election:] but only his Essence as terminated ad extra.) And (to gratify you to the utmost) we distinguish an operating efficient Cause, from a recipient Cause; And we maintain that a Sinner is the recipient Cause of Gods damning Volition or Reprobation: As shutting the Windows is the cause that my Room is dark, and opening them is the cause that they are light, not by causing the Sun to shine, but by receiving (or not receiving) it; so man is a receiving Cause of the Effects of Gods Will and Operation, and of the Will and Operation itself, as extrinsically denominated and diversified by the Effects. But this recipient Cause, is nothing but cause materialis objectiva, which hath two parts, the ipsa materia and the materiae dispositio. Take not on you still to differ, where you do not. The third Crimination. A. * Of that Deus vult omnes salves fieri, saith Alliaco 1. q. 14. F. 1. Potest exponi de voluntate signi: vult, id est, praecipit, vel obligat, etc. 2. Si exponitur de voluntate beneplaciti potest intelligi de Vol. antecedente: 3. Si de Vol. beneplaciti proprie dicta, debet intelligi, ut dicit Magister, i. e. nulli salvantur nisi quos Deus vult salvari: 4. Vel de generibus singulorum sed at singulis generum. By denying Universal Redemption, they deny that Universal Grace, which is the very express Covenant of Grace itself, that all men are already through Christ's satisfaction reconciled to God, and pardoned if they will believe; or that a conditional pardon is already given to the World. And to deny this, is to deny the Gospel, and Christianity itself, and to be no Christians. B. You would make yourselves and others believe that they deny that which they never dreamt of denying. Like him that dreamt that he was wounded, and called out for something to stop the blood. Do not all Protestaents profess to believe that Covenant and conditional Pardon as well as you? Do they not preach it constantly, and administer Baptism in the same terms as you do? who denieth that all are reconciled, if they will believe? A. But by that they mean only exclusively that all are not reconciled or pardoned, because all believe not; And not inclusively that all men are conditionally pardoned already. B. You mistake and slander them: Do they not read the very express pardon made already in God's Word? That [Whoever believeth shall not perish,] etc. Joh. 3. 16. Mark 16. 16? Do they not all acknowledge that this is a Law of God, an Act of Oblivion, Enacted long ago by God? And is not this visible written Promise or Law of Grace an existent conditional pardon of all? No man of sense, and understanding, and faith denieth it. A. But they say that in making it God's secret intent, was, that none but the Elect should have any saving benefit of it. * What say others less? Malderus in 1. 2. q. 111. a. 3. d. 5. p. 486. Cum de Redemptore dando Deus constituisset, ut secerneret illos quos elegit,— eum rerum ordinem elegit, in quo certi quos voluit homines a reliquis discernerentur, cosque pro beneplacito suo ad nullum bonum usum liberi arbitrii respiciens, ad vitam aeter●am praedestinavit; talemque tis gratiam decrevit cum qua certissimo & infallibiliter ad regnum pervenirent: Reliquos autem qui ex illo numero non sunt, reliquit non quidem sint omni auxilio Gratiae, sicut juste potuisset propter Adae peccatum, sed cum auxiliis gratiae secundi Adae ad ipsos derivandis in ordine ac cursu rerum jam electo: Et videns scie●tia visionis hos in peccato vitam finire, reprobavit eos & statuit in aeternum punire & a regno excludere. Thus the Jesuits ordinarily: And what is here considerably different from the Synod of Do●t? If the name of sufficient Grace be the quarrel, call it Gratia efficax ad posse, and all is ended. B. 1. Still you are returning to the dispatched Controversy of the Decrees; which is a confession that you disser not otherwise about Redemption. 2. Do not you yourselves hold the same which you quarrel with? 1. Inclusively they hold that the Elect shall be saved by Christ. And do you deny it? 2. As to the exclusion of others, they hold that God decreed not any man's Infidelity and Sin, but foreseeing their Infidelity and Sin, decreed that they should not be saved by Christ, but perish. And do not you say the same? Away with these contentious dreams. A. I am sure I can name you divers that say otherwise. B. It is the Synod still, and the common Confessions and Doctrine of the Churches which you have to do with: Tell not me of singular men. The Doctrine of the Church of England, I told you out of the Catechism. The Synods words I recited. And remember (as Dallaeus tells Spanhemius) that Davenant with the rest of the British Divines, Martinius and the other Breme Divines, who all gave their suffrages, and writ for Universal Redemption, did yet all subscribe in the Synod; And therefore undoubtedly understood that no words of the Canons were contrary to their sense of Universal Redemption. The later famous Helvetian confession saith, [We teach and believe that this Jesus Christ our Lord is the only and eternal Saviour of Mankind, yea and of the whole world,] (upon which words the English Collector of the Confessions giveth us a ridiculous Observation, that he thinks they meant the restoring of the world at last; contrary to the context: As if he had not known that Musculus, Bullinger, etc. were for Universal Redemption.) But that I be not over-tedious, I pray you peruse in Dallaei Apolog. To. 2. the citations out of the Confessions and Catechisms, and Liturgies of the Reformed Churches, viz. Of Berne, August. Bohem. Helvert. Saxon. Anglic. Palatin. Synod. Dord. Colloq. Torun. with a multitude of Protestant Divines. The fourth Crimination. A. They make it impossible for any man to believe in Christ at first, by a rational and true Faith: For his dying for men, being the Object of Faith, must be before the Act. And no man by their way can know that Christ died for him till he is a Believer; and yet they say that our first saving Faith must be a believing and trusting in Christ, as one that died for us. So that men must stay till they believe that Christ died for them, that they may have reason to believe that he died for them. For before the first Faith, or belief of it, they can have none. B. You still make the world believe that men hold that which they do not. This concerneth not the Churches, but some singular men. The common Protestant Doctrine is, That Christ by his Death hath procured the universal conditional Gift of Pardon and Life, contained in the Covenant of Grace, Mark 16. 16. Joh. 3. 16, etc. And that his death was thus far efficient, by which it is sufficient for the actual Justification and Salvation of penitent Believers. And that this is it that men must first believe, and so accept of an offered Saviour for Justification and Life, and give up themselves to him in the baptismal Covenant: which when they do they are justified and adopted, having right to and union with Christ, and in him right to the Covenant-benefits. And then Christ's death which was sufficient by its efficiency of Satisfaction, Merit, and the Covenant-grant, becometh efficient of Justification, etc. And are not you and they agreed in this? I confess that many singular Divines have given you this occasion: But what's that to the Churches? The fifth Crimination. A. They tell men that they must believe a Lie, or an unrevealed thing, that by believing it, it may become true, and they may be saved, and ease they shall be damned. For they say that Christ died for none but the Elect: And yet that others also are bound to believe that he died for them: And because they believe not this Lie God will damn them: But if they did believe it, it would be true: As if the Objective Truth were not before the belief of it. B. This also is but your quarrel with singular men, and not with the Churches, unless you wrong them. Their common Doctrine is, that no man in his first act of Faith is bound to believe that he is Elect, or that Christ died for him any more than for lost Mankind. But that he must first believe that Christ by his Death hath so far satisfied and merited for Mankind in general, as to procure the universal conditional Gift of Christ, Pardon and Life; And that they must believe that this is procured for, and offered to, themselves as well as other Sinners. And hereupon they are to accept this free Gift, and so it is theirs. What lie or unrevealed matter is in this? or what difference about it, among the Churches. The sixth Crimination. A. They disable Ministers rationally to preach the Gospel. For if Christ died for none but the Elect, and no Minister know the Elect, they know not whom to offer and preach Christ to; For the objective Gift must go before the offer: And that which is to be offered to every Sinner is, A Christ that hath already died and satisfied for him; and not one that is to die and satisfy for him yet, if he will believe. Therefore the very offer is as much as to say, [Accept Christ as one that hath satisfied for thee]. And so they make the very preaching of the Gospel, a lie, to most. B. I will not answer you as some that say, they tell not men that they are Elect, and that Christ died for them; but that if they will believe, than it is a sign that they are Elect, and Christ died for them: And they may offer him to all, that some may accept him. For I say as you do, that it is a Christ that hath already made satisfaction, and thereby is become a sufficient Saviour, who is to be offered to men. And the being of the Gift is before the offer of it in nature. But I say again that you fight against stragglers, in a Cause which the Churches are not concerned in: They say that it is a Christ who died for all as to sufficiency, who is to be offered to men, that he may efficiently save them. The seventh Crimination. A. They leave most men in the World as remediless as the Devils, who had no Redeemer: whereas God judgeth the wicked at last as Rejecters of his remedying Grace. If Christ died not for them, what differ they from the Devils in point of hope? B. I will not answer you as some, that though Christ died not for them yet they know it not, and the offer differenceth their Case: For still, I confess, that none is to be offered to men, but a Christ that was already offered to God for them, and hath made satisfaction. But again I tell you, that you fight with a shadow, and feign the Churches to differ from you, because some singular persons do so. The eighth Crimination. A. They harden men in impenitency for the most damning sin; even denying the Lord that bought them: For they tell all the Reprobates that they never sinned against a Christ that died for them. B. All this is the old fiction; and concerneth only some singular men. The ninth Crimination. A. They would exempt the Infidel World from much of the torments of Hell: For he that in Hell knoweth that Christ never died for him (especially adding that God unresistibly predetermined him to sin and unbelief,) cannot rationally have an accusing Conscience for his not accepting a Gift that never had a Being. B. I will not repeat the same answer as oft as you call for it by the same false supposition. Let them answer it that are concerned. The tenth Crimination. A. They teach the World abominable Ingratitude, and reproachfully deny a great deal of the Grace and Mercy of Christ, and the fruits of his Death and Sacrifice. For they teach men, that all the Mercies given to any besides the Elect, were no fruits of the death of Christ for them, nor were at all by him purchased for them; yea, that they are no Mercies to them at all, because God eternally decreed that they should turn them into sin, and suffer the more for the abuse of them for ever. And so all the rest of the World may say that they are not at all beholden to the death of Christ, for their Lives, Liberties, offers of Grace, and all other Mercies. B. Let them answer you that are concerned in the Charge. The Reformed Churches hold, That Mercy is to be judged of by its nature and tendency in itself, and not by man's abuse; and that God decreed no man's abuse of it; and that all the Mercies given to Mankind, since the forfeiture of all by Adam's sin, are procured and given by Christ as the Intercessor and Redeemer of the World; and that wicked men justly are deprived of life for rejecting it, and suffer Hell for abusing Mercy and refusing Heaven. The eleventh Crimination. A. They are Anti-christian half-Infidels. For they deny Christ's Kingdom as to its far greatest part: For when the Scripture telleth us, That to this end he both died, rose and revived, that he might be Lord both of the dead and living, Rom. 14. 9 And that the Father hath committed all Judgement (that is Government) to the Son, Joh. 5. 22. And given him all power in Heaven and Earth, Matth. 28. 18. And that his dying for all, obligeth all men not to live to themselves, but to him that died for them, 2 Cor. 5. And so that he hath by his death acquired a jus Dominii & Imperii over all Mankind; they deny him his Crown and Dignity, even this Right of Dominion and Empire as Redeemer, and deny the World to be obliged to subjection to him as their Redeemer: And so make that Rebellion for which they shall perish (Luke 19 27.) to be no sin. B. The Protestant Churches hold all that you charge them with denying. It's a pitiful work to caluminate that you may divide: Tell those singular men of all this, that are guilty of it. The twelfth Crimination. A. They make Christ to come on so narrow a design into the World, as if they would tempt Unbelievers to despise him: Even to die for none in all the World, for 4000 years, save a very few of the little Country of Judaea, (which was mostly wicked); and even since the Church was Catholic, but for a few called the Elect. B. 1. If you and they differ about the conditions of Salvation, say so, and tell the World the difference: If you do not, but are agreed that it is Faith, Repentance and Holiness, what are all these Objections, but fight by fictions against Concord and Peace? They never held that none out of Judaea were saved. And how many in the World are holy Believers, they pretend not to judge. They believe that all that are holy are saved by Christ, in all Ages and Nations of the World: And that all the Order, and Government, and common Mercies of the World, with the offers of Grace and Salvation to them that wilfully refuse it, are all to be ascribed to the death and procurement of Christ: And that his common Redemption is presupposed to our Faith and special Grace. * See my Direction to sound Conversion, Dir. 6. And now if this be all you have to say, review it and tell me, what disagreement you have found out, about the commonness of Redemption. THE Fourth Days Conference (WITH a CALVINIST) Of Common and Special REDEMPTION. B. We are now to try what difference you can find between the Lutheran and Calvinist Churches, or the Synodists and the moderate Arminians, in the Article of Redemption by the death of Christ. Name all that you have against them in this Point alone. The first Crimination. C. * These Objections are answered by Dall●us, Amyrald, Camero and Davenant, (Dissert. de Morte Christi) at large. And I have a full disputation on this Subject by itself. Lege Ephrem Sylli Sermon. de Passione Salvatoris. Ambros. in Psal. 118. Serm. 8. Sol justitiae omnibus ortus est, omnibus venit, omnibus passus est & omnibus resurrexit: si quis autem non credit in Christum, generali beneficio ipse se fra●dat. Ut si quis clausis fenestris radios solis excludat. Prosper de Vocat. Gent. l. 2. c. 16. Nulla ratio dubitandi est Jesum Christum pro impiis mortuum, ● quorum numero si aliquis liber inventus est, non est pro omnibus mortuus Christus: sed prorsus pro omnibus mortuus est Christus. They make Christ to have shed his Blood in vain; even for them that he knew were to perish for ever. B. How prove you it to be in vain? and that God can have no end in it, but actual Salvation de eventu to each person for whom Christ died? 1. When the Scripture most clearly telleth us de facto, That Christ died for all, even for them that perish, and that he bought them that denied him; be afraid of blaspheming God, by telling him, [If Christ died for any that perish, he died in vain.] I accuse you not, but ex natura rei warn you. I durst not tell God so. 2. God made man in Adam capable of Salvation, as the very perfection and end of his faculties and nature, and put him under a conditional Covenant accordingly. And will you say that God made Adam in vain in this capacity, and made the first Promise of Life, and the Tree of Life also, in vain; because Adam, and all of us in him, did sin, and come short of the Glory of God? Nay, God made not the Devils in vain in a state of blessedness, or the way thereto, though he knew that they would forsake that state and perish. It is dangerous reproaching the Counsels and unsearchable Works of God. 3. By your own reckoning it is not in vain: For you say that God's Justice is glorified on Unbelievers, and that this is his end. And what is that Justice, but the punishing of men for rejecting a Christ that died for them, and Grace that was procured and tendered to them? 4. But if you add all the other benefits and ends, you will see that it was not in vain. God demonstrated and so glorified his Love and Mercy to lost Mankind, in the very greatness of the Gift (of Christ, Pardon and Glory,) which the Impenitent do refuse. And Mercy is glorified notwithstanding the refusal. God giveth the Covenant aforesaid, or the conditional Grant of Pardon and Life to the World. He reprieved them, and gave them time of Repentance, and exercised Patience toward them to that end, Rom. 2. 3, 4, 5, 6. Act. 17. Rom. 1. 19, 20, 21, etc. Joh. 3. 16, 18, 19 He governeth the World on terms of Grace. He giveth all men abundance of Mercies and Means of recovery and life. He keepeth the World in order hereby; and maketh the wicked serviceable to the Salvation of Believers. In a word, he will lose nothing by any man's sin against Nature or Grace. Where then is the vanity of the Death of Christ, if in a common degree it be for all? The second Crimination. C. They make Christ an imperfect Saviour; by pretending that he died Cyril. Hierosol. Catech. 18. Multas aeternae vitae januas aperuit, ut om●es quantum in ipso est absque impedimento illo potiri possent. for some, to some lower ends, whom yet he saveth not. B. This needeth no other answer than the last. Is God an imperfect God to Adam, because he saved him not by the way of Innocency, at first made by God the way of Life? Or was he an imperfect God and Salvation to the Angels, because they kept not their first Estate? Or is the Holy Ghost an imperfect Sanctifier, because he giveth some but such common and temporary Grace and Faith, as is mentioned in Heb. 6. 5, 6. Matth. 13, etc. Or dare you say that no man that perisheth had any Grace or Gifts of the Holy Ghost, when some prophesied, and cast out Devils in Christ's Name? Must Christ do all that our muddy brains will dictate to him, or else be reproached as an imperfect Saviour? O take heed! The third Crimination. C. They cast that absurdity on Christ, as to die for those that were in August. de Symbol. ad Catech. l. 2. c. 8. saith, Perhaps Christ keepeth his wounds to show the wicked at the day of Judgement, and say, Videtis vulnera quae infixistis: agnoscitis latus quod pupugistis: quoniam & per vos & propter vos apertum est, neque tamen intrare voluistis. Hell when he was dying for them, and to make a Medicine for the dead and desperate. B. 1. As you would state the Supposition, it would be as liable to your charge of absurdity, to say, That he died for them that were long ago pardoned and saved, and to purchase Heaven for them that had possession of it long before. 2. But when we speak of Christ's Death as a Sacrifice for the Sins of all the World, we mean no more, but that in esse cognito & volito, the undertaking was so far for all, as that all should have the conditional Promise or Gift of Life by the Merits of it. And so as all that were saved before Christ's Death, had actual Salvation by it beforehand, as undertaken; so all that perished had a Gift of conditional Pardon and Salvation, and perished for refusing it. But at the time when Christ was dying, we say that he was not then intending to offer the second Edition of his Covenant, either to those in Hell or in Heaven: But only that he purposed to do what he from the beginning undertook, for the undertaken ends. The fourth Crimination. C. They make Christ to die for those that he would not pray for, Joh. 17. I pray not for the world, but for those that thou hast given me out of the world— B. He maketh himself to die for them. It is ofter and plainer said that he died for all, than it is, that he prayed not for all. And many plain Texts, yea the scope of the Gospel, must not be reduced to your feigned sense of one obscurer Text. 2. But doth the Text tell us, that he died not for the world, as it tells us, that he prayed not for them? Or doth it tell us, that he died for no more than he then prayed for? Or rather are not these your own Inventions? 3. But where doth the Text say, that Christ never prayed for any but the Elect? yea, or that he prayed not at all for the world, though he put not up that particular prayer for the world? Look on the Text, and you will see that he speaketh there only of the Disciples that followed him on Earth; And that he prayed not in that Petition for all his Elect only; And therefore he after addeth, vers. 20. Neither pray 1 for these alone, but for them also which shall believe in me through their word. And what was the prayer? [That they may be one, and kept from the evil of the world,] which is a blessing peculiar to his Disciples. But it is manifest, that Christ had other prayers for the world, even for many ungodly men; yea, for Reprobates. For, 1. On the Cross he prayeth for his Persecutors, Father, forgive them: And it is men's own invention to say that he meaneth none but the Elect: We must not unnecessarily limit where the Word limiteth not. And Stephen made Christ his Pattern. And it is gross fiction to say that Stephen prayed for none but the Elect. C. Doth not Christ say, That his Father heard him always? and can you imagine that he prayed for that which God denied him? B. 2. My next Answer should have prevented that Objection, which is, that what God giveth to the World for Christ's sake, that Christ may well be said to pray for; For it is the fruit of his Mediation. But God giveth much Pardon, and many Mercies to the World, for Christ's sake. 1. He giveth them an Act of Oblivion of conditional pardon of the eternal punishment; which Christ purchased, and therefore prayed for. * Ambros. de Paradis. c. 8. Venerat Dominus Jesus omnes salvos sacere peccatores, etiam circa impios ostendere suam debuit voluntatem: & ideo nec proditurum debuit praeterire, ut adverterent omnes, quod in electione etiam proditoris su●, servandorum omnium insigne praetendit— Quod in Deo fuit ostendit omnibus quod omnes voluit liberare. Nec tamen dico quia praevaricationem nesciebat futuram: immo quia sciebat assero. Sed non ideo pertuntis proditoris invidiam in se debuit derivare, ut ascriberetur Deo quod uterque sit lapsus.— Chrysost. Tom. 3. hom 9 de land. Pauli, [Ipse quidem vult omnes salves sieri; at non omnium voluntas ejus voluntati obsequitur: neque ab to aliquis cogitur: unde ad Jerusalem, etc. Deus paratus est ad salvandum hominem, non involuntarium, neque non volentem.] 2. He giveth them much Actual pardon of temporal punishments for Christ's sake. All the Life, Health, Time, Gospel, Means and Mercies, which ever he giveth them, are such as deserved full punishment would have deprived them of: And therefore they are all acts of executive pardon of that punishment. 3. And this very Chapter containeth a prayer for the World, viz. vers. 21, 23. That the World may believe, and know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them.— If you say that by the World here is meant only the Elect; I answer, 1. Your word is no Proof. 2. That they are prayed for, to believe and know, etc. is no proof: For many did believe that God sent Christ that yet were not saved. This soundeth but as a common Act of Faith. 3. And note, that here the world is contradistinguished, not only from Apostles, but those (abovementioned) that should believe by their word; and it is prayed, That the world may know that God loveth those that believe in him: which may extend both to the Conversion of such as then are unconverted, and to the conviction of others, such as are the common members of the visible Church (at least): As the Spirit is sent to convince the world of Sin, and Righteousness, and Judgement. 4. And it is not to be granted you without proof, that by the World is meant all Reprobates as such: For Judas is before distinguished from the World (as one given to Christ) when yet he was a Reprobate: But either it may be the World of present Unbelievers, whom Christ prayeth for elsewhere, though not there: Or the World of final professed Infidels and Enemies of the Church, as distinct from both Elect and Reprobate in the Church. And several expressions of Christ's before of the World's hating and persecuting his Apostles, seem not applicable to every Hypocrite, who prophesieth and casteth out Devils in his Name, and perhaps suffereth for his Truth, and excellently defendeth it, and hath some love to Believers. The fifth Crimination. C. They make Christ to merit only Pardon and Salvation to Believers, but not to have purchased Faith itself for any man. And by that way, no one that he died for would be saved; For Faith is the necessary Gift of God: And if Christ purchased not that, all the rest would be in vain. B. 1. Let us not here confound the Controversy de nomine & de re: That Christ died to purchase the Act of Faith for us, is no Scripture-phrase, so far as I know. If therefore it be only the phrase which they refuse, you may well bear with them. But as to the matter, they do not deny any of these things, 1. That Christ is the Author and Perfecter of our Faith, as Faith signifieth the Christian Religion, or the Objects and Doctrine of Faith. 2. That our own actual and habitual Faith is the Gift of God; (Though the controversies about the manner of giving it are to be afterward decided). 3. That all that Christ giveth, his Sacrifice procured; and therefore it procured Faith. All this is commonly granted by most Schoolmen, Papists, Lutherans, and moderate Arminians. But, 2. It must be considered that Christ did not die to purchase Faith as immediately, and on the same account, as to satisfy for Sin, and purchase us impunity or Redemption. The proper direct reason of his Sufferings, was to demonstrate the Justice of God against Sin, instead of man's own suffering for it; and thereby to procure Pardon. We may well conceive Christ promising to the Father as it were, [I will suffer for Sinners, that they may not suffer!] But you will hardly describe his Undertaking thus, [I will die, if thou will give men Faith,] or [I will give thee so much of my Blood for so much Faith.] But because he knew that without Grace no man would believe and accept his Gift, therefore he whose Sufferings were primarily satisfaction for Sin, were secondarily meritorious of the means to bring men to the intended ●nd; that is, of the Word and Spirit, by which Christ causeth Sinners to believe: so that Faith is a fruit of the Death of Christ in a remoter secondary sense. And in all this Name me any Christian Churches that are disagreed. C. To bring it only to a man's free will whether he will believe or not, is not to give him Faith; and to purchase no more is not to purchase it. B. Do you not perceive that here you divert to the Controversies of the Decrees, and of effectual Grace? Of the first we have said enough already: of the other after in due place. The sixth Crimination. C. They feign Christ to purchase only a conditional Pardon, Justification and Salvation, and so to leave it uncertain to the corrupt Will of man, whether any shall be saved or not. B. This also concerneth the Decrees, and is fully answered before. 1. That Christ hath purchased, and God given a conditional Act of Oblivion, or Pardon and Life to all, is the very Gospel itself, and to be questioned by no Believers. 2. None of them all do suppose Christ to die at uncertainties as to the success: for they suppose that he fore-knew the success from eternity. 3. They suppose not that the success was undecreed: For they that presuppose foresight of man's concurrence, yet assert an * Episcop. Instit. Theol. l. 4. sect. 5. cap. 6. Certum est posito decreto conditionato omnes ac singulos qui vel ad vitam electi sunt, vel ad mortem reprobati, recte ab aeterno praedestinatos dici posse & debere. eternal Decree of his Conversion upon such foresight. And it is not on the foresight of Faith, that they say God decreeth to give men Faith; but on foresight that the will of the Sinner will concur or not obstinately resist the Spirit that is drawing him to believe. And the Jesuits and Arminians by their Scientia media do hold God to be the chief cause of men's believing: For they say, That God foreseeing that man will believe if he have such a measure of help, and such means and circumstances, doth freely decree to give him that help of the Spirit, and those means by which he knoweth it will be done. So that here is no uncertainty, but different thoughts of the ascertaining decrees and ways. 4. And lib. 1. I have showed you, that not only the Schoolmen, but Bellarmine, Ruiz, Suarez, and many of the most famous Jesuits, do assert effectual Grace, to be such both ex voluntate operantis, and ex vi operationis, absolutely. And where then is this feigned difference? The seventh Crimination. C. They make Christ to do no more for Peter than for Judas; for those in Heaven than for those in Hell, while they say that he died equally for all. B. * Vasq. in 1. Thom. q. 23. a. 8. disp. 94. c. 2. Perantiqua Theologorum sententia quam ego Catholicam existimo est, non solum Christum nobis meritum ut a Deo diligeremur, & praedestinaremur per gratiam ejus ad gloriam; sed etiam ut eligeremur ex massa perditionis electione gratiae suae. Note that he speaketh only of the effect of God's Decree; and so it is all one as to say, that differencing Grace is merited by Christ: which is that which you would have. Equality here is meant either of his Intention, or of the benefits given: Those benefits are of several sorts. 1. No doubt but they err, who feign God equally to decree, and Christ to intent, the eventual absolute Salvation of all. 2. And they err that say, that he bestoweth equal benefits on all, even in this life: yea, antecedently to man's Will. But the New Covenant or conditional Promise, doth equally, as to the tenor of it, give Pardon and Right to Life, to all. But who is it that holdeth this equality of Intention or Benefit? Not the greater part of the Schoolmen, or other Papists, no not the learnedst Jesuits. Not the Lutheran Churches; But some few Arminians that run into one extreme, as you do into the other. Nay, how can they hold an equality of Intention, when they confess, that upon foreknowledge of their Unbelief, the condemnation of many was eternally decreed? C. Yes: they hold that antecedently to foresight, God's Intention is equal. B. 1. That foresight itself is from eternity. 2. Who can frame out Orders of antecedency in the mind of God, between his foresight and his Will, without confessing great darkness and impropriety of Speech. 3. And he that first giveth man to believe and will, doth not first foresee that he will believe and will, before he decree to give it him. The eighth Crimination. C. They make Christ's sheep to know him, before he know his sheep: that is, to believe before he decree to give them Faith. B. This is but the same in sense, with what is before answered; And it belongeth to the controversy of God's Decrees. They all say that God decreeth to give them sufficient Grace to enable them to believe, before he forseeth their belief: And most say more, as is aforesaid. The ninth Crimination. C. Some of them say that Christ's Death did actually deliver * Vid. Episcop. Resp. ad qu. 64. qu. 38. supposing the Salvation of all that die in Infancy. all men in the World from the guilt of Original Sin, and so that none perish for Original Sin; because what Adam did, Christ undid. B. You can name no Church that doth hold such Doctrine: And we have nothing to do with singular odd Persons. 1. Millions were unborn when Christ died, and were not guilty of Original sin till afterwards, and therefore were not capable of Pardon. 2. The Papists who damn unbaptised Infants cannot be of that Opinion. 3. What Adam brought upon us, Christ did deliver us from, upon his terms, and in his way, and by his degrees, but not immediately. He hath given all men a conditional Pardon of Original Sin, as he hath done of Actual, and no other. The Unregenerate are under the guilt of all Sin whatsoever. 4. But it is certain, that no man, except Infants, doth perish for Original Sin alone; For all men at age have other sins. And it being certain, that God offereth all men a recovery or remedy (mediately or immediately;) it is certain, that Infants perish not merely for Adam's sin imputed, as a remediless evil: but that their non-liberation, or not being pardoned and saved, is long of their Parent's Unbelief, and not entering them into the Covenant of God, who is the God of the Faithful and their Seed. The tenth Crimination. C. They make Christ to have died for the Serpent's Seed, against whom the enmity is proclaimed, when the new Covenant was first made, Gen. 3. 15. B. 1. If by the Serpent's Seed, you mean such as are God's Enemies, no doubt but Christ died for them, Rom. 5. 1. to 12, etc. What need reconciliation else? 2. If by the Serpent's Seed, you mean Reprobates as such, you can never prove it to be the meaning of the Text. 3. If you mean fore-seen final Enemies and Unbelievers, Christ died not for them as such, but as in their antecedent recoverable pardonable sin and misery. THE Fifth Days Conference WITH AN ARMINIAN Of man's natural sinfulness and impotency to good, and of freewill. A. You have hitherto persuaded us, that all the Controversies of the Decrees and Redemption, between the Synodists and Remonstrants, being resolved into those of the Execution, we should there expect the solution of all: To this therefore we are next to come. And first about man's Sinfulness, Impotency and freewill; And there all these things following offend me. The first Crimination. That some of them deny all true freewill, and others deny all freewill to good, and others to all spiritual good, by which man is made uncapable of being a moral Agent, and so uncapable of moral Good or Evil, any more than a Tree or Beast; seeing freewill is the seat of moral Virtues and Vices, which necessitated Natures are uncapable of. B. I hope you are willing to understand yourself, and to be understood. Tell me then, what mean you by freewill? A. I know that the true nature of Liberty is much controverted; but I mean that Qua positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, possumus agere vel non agere. * Alvarez hath these conclusions hereof, de Aux. l. 12. d 115. p. 469.— [1. Ad liberum arbitrium necessario requiritur quod positis omnibus antecedenter secundum ordinom rationis vel temporis, ad actum praerequisitis, possit operari vel non operari; Ita viz. ut cum iisdem praerequisitis, stet simul in libero arbitrio facultas & potentia qua possit operari si velit, vel non operari si velit. (But the question is, de posse velle.) 2. Non est de ratione aut definitione liberi arbitrii quod positis omnibus secundum ordinem causalitatis, antecedenter praerequisitis ad operandum talem actum, possit eundem actum non operari, in sens● composito; si compositio fiat, inter hujusmodi requisita, & carentiam talis actus, seu actum contrarium. 3. Legitima liberi arbitrii definitio, ita se habet lib. arb. est facultas voluntatis, & rationis ad utrum libet agendum, vel non agendum, & ad agendum unum vel alterum.] But I suppose his predetermination inconsistent with his potentia ad contrarium in the first proposition: Because it is antecedent to the wills self-determination and the Will is not able to determine itself against the predetermining causality of God, nor as he holdeth without it neither, and so hath no true power, but on supposition of the premotion of God predetermining. B. 1. Do you mean by agendum, imperate Acts only, or also Volitions? A. Both: All moral Acts of Body and Soul. B. That which is requisite to extrinsic moral Acts, is, that they be commanded by a determined will: You mean then that it is Liberty for the Tongue or Hand to be able to Act when the Will forbiddeth it, and not to Act, when the Will commandeth it. A. I mean it only of imperate Acts as voluntary; for it is the Will and not the executive power that is the seat of Liberty. B. 2. By Agere what Action of the Will do you mean? you know that man's Soul is an active nature, and can no more cease all action than cease to be. You may as well say that fire with fuel can forbear to burn, as a Soul to be active. A. I mean only moral Acts, of Virtue and Vice. B. All that a man doth by Reason is Actus humanus, a moral Act, either good or bad; And a man at the use of Reason liveth among thousands of intelligible Objects▪ necessarily presented to his Intellect by sense; and among thousands of Objects, good for us, or bad for us, desirable or hateful; And is it possible for such a sensitive, intelligent Creature, to live continually with intelligible, amiable or audible Objects, and to suspend all rational apprehensions, Volitions and Nolitions of them? A. I mean it not of all moral Action in general, but of this or that singular Act ●ic & nun●. B. I will not entangle you with an enquiry; whether he that c●n do every particular good act, cannot do all universally; and whether he that can forbear every singular evil (or good) acts cannot forbear all, when all is nothing but all singulars. But, 3. What mean you by [requisitis?] All things of mere necessity to the Act sine quibus non? Or also all things that can possibly be put to ascertain the Act? A. Of the first I am most fully resolved: Of the second there is much doubtfulness. If I include it, I know you will ask me, whether it be impossible for God so to determine the Will, as to make the contrary act impossible, without taking away its Liberty? And whether Christ could commit every sin? or else was not free? And whether Heaven take away all Liberty, if it make sin impossible? But briefly I answer you, that the Libertas Viatoris differeth from that in Heaven; and that Ours still supposeth a possibility of the Contrary, but Theirs doth not. B. But if it be their Liberty to be past a posse peccare, why should it not be ours to come as near it as may be? especially when we have the foretasts and first-fuits of Heaven on Earth, and Grace is the seed of Glory. A. It is our Liberty to be as far from sin as may be: But this is another kind of Liberty, and not to be confounded with that which is a mere power of doing or not doing. B. 4. But that a man can act positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis is no wonder; so can a Stone, or Bruit: but how say you potest non agere, when non-agere is not an effect or exercise of Power? There needs no Power ad non agendum. A. Yes; when Nature, or Vice, and Temptation draw us to a forbidden Act, it is a work of Power to resist them and forbear it. B. But sure Nature, Vice or Temptation do not so draw us to love God perfectly, to hate all Sin perfectly, to be heavenly-minded, to consent to suffer Death for Christ, etc. as that we should need any power to resist such drawings, or forbear such acts. How then do you make this a part of your power? A. But when the Spirit of God draweth us to love him, it is an act of natural abused power to resist him. And also in this and the former case I say, that by [possumus] here, we do not mean a moral or physical power always, but in this instance only a logical power: And our meaning only is, that we are not necessitated to Act or not Act; to love God, or to hate him, or not to love him. As Privations are reduced to Entities, in Descriptions, so are Impotencies to Powers. B. The word [Posse] then in your definition is equivocal, and signifieth both Power and No - Power. What a definition is that? But, 5. What maketh you call it by the name of Liberty, to be impotent? or, if you will, to be able not to love God? not to live to God? not to know God? not to trust God? not to repent of Sin? not to be heavenly-minded? what Liberty is this? yea, or to be able to hate God, and Sin, and damn yourselves? A. * Arnold. Coru. describeth it to be that without which we are not men. It is not Liberty specifically as it is for sin or against God; and so not Libertas moralis; but it is only Libertas naturalis, or the indetermination of the Will with a self-determining power, which is the natural seat of morality, and may be used to good or evil. Formalis Libertas arbitrii creati, non consistit formaliter in indifferentia objectiva, neque in indifferentia passiva; sed in indifferentia Activa ipsiu● facultatis liberae, quae indifferenter se habet ad opposita: quamvis adjunctam habeat vel praesupponat aliquam indifferentiam passivam ipsius potentia & indifferentiam objecti. Alvar. de Aux. l. 12. d. 116. p. 473. c. 2. B. Now you say somewhat, and come into the Light; Therefore having thus prepared the way, I add, that there is Libertas à malo, and Libertas ad bonum; both properly: But it is improper to say, Libertas à bono (naturali vel morali) vel Libertas ad malum qua tale. 2. As there may be a threefold Restraint or Compulsion, Physical, Ethical, or Civil; So there is a threefold Liberty, 1. Natural, which is a Liberty from natural necessitation from God, or our own faculties, or things extrinsic, unto any evil. 2. Ethical; which is a Liberty from vicious inclination, or necessitation by it at least. 3. Civil; which is a Liberty from the restraining or constraining Laws, of any that would or might draw us to evil, or keep us from good; and so of penalties by those Laws. To which is reducible Liberty from the ill commands and punishments of Parents and Masters, and from the violence of enemies or wicked men. And Liberty is either from sin, or from misery. But the distinctions about Liberty are so many, that I have given them you in a Table in the Second Book, and refer you thither, that we may agree on the state of the question, What Liberty it is that you mean? But first I shall ask you a few more questions. Quest. 1. Do you think that Liberty consisteth in the greatest indifferency of the Will, when it is merely in aequilibrio? A. No: For then every virtuous or vicious habit should take away Liberty. B. I pray you think on it then, Whether if strong habits which do tantum non necessitare, do not at all abate or take away any part of Liberty, it be like, that if such a habit were so strong as per eundem inclinandi modum to necessitate, it would not yet consist with Liberty of Will? Quest. 2. Do you think that a man is not necessitated to will his own felicity by a simple Volition? Is he free to desire misery as such? A. No: This is not an act of Election, and therefore not of Liberty. B. Do you think that this certain constant necessary act of the Will, is not a more perfect or excellent act, than that which you call free, which sometime is done and sometime not done, and is before uncertain? * Posse male agere non est aliquid quod ad Libertatis perfectionem pertineat: sed potius quaedam est imperfectio libertatem comitans in persona creata, & quae Libertati accidentaria est: Nam Deus, etc. Blank de lib. in genere, n. 33. Or, is it not a more excellent state of the Will to be constantly and certainly well determined, than to be undetermined, and defectible? I would know as we go on, whether the Liberty which we plead for, be good and desirable, or evil? A. I cannot deny but it is incomparably more desirable to be certainly and necessarily determined to good, than not: But it is better to be free and left to our own choice uncertainly, than to be determined to evil, or to be so determined to inferior good, as shall keep down the Soul from the superior. I do not take this indetermination and free power, for our best state, but for a middle condition, fit for a Viator that is tried here in order to his end. Beasts are necessarily determined to things inferior: The glorified Angels and Saints (its thought and hoped) are necessarily determined to things superior; and so was Christ: But our undetermined state of Liberty is better than one, and worse than the other, and fit for our trying life on Earth. B. You say well. Therefore remember, that our Liberty is no further good, than as it is a Liberty to good and from evil, * Posse peccare non pertinet ad rationem formalem liberi arbitrii: sed potius est quaedam imper●ectio arbitrii creati, competens illi, ●o quod factum est ex nibilo: Alvar. ib. d. 115. p. 470. Et hanc rationem assignat S▪ Augustinus, l. 2. de vitiis & concup. c. 28. & l. 12. de civet. Dei, c. 1. Unde Thom. 1. p. q. 62. art. 8. ad 3. ait quod Liberum arb. diversa eligere possit, servato ordine sinis, ut hoc pertinet ad perfectionem libertatis ejus; sed quod eligat aliquid divertendo ab ordine finis, quod est peccare, hoc pertinet ad defectum libertatis. Idem dicit de ver. q. 24. art. 3. ad 2. Voluntas nostra vere libera est, comparatione volitionis aut nolitionis, quam elicit, quolibet momento,— non solum quia prius natura quam se determina●et ad alteram partem, poterat seipsam non determinare ad eandem partem, sed ad oppositam: nec solum quia potest continuare, vel ac●istere ab operatione, quam producit in instanti praesentis temporis: sed etiam quia in instanti temporis quo elicit suam operationem, veram retinet potestatem & facultatem qua possit eam non elicere, si velit, aut etiam elicere, contrariam operationem: Alvar. disp. 116. p. 476. Here is a power Volendi si velit. But 1. Is it per candem volitionem, vel aliam? 2. Hath he qui non vult, Potentiam volendi pro hoc instanti? not from all determination: but that the nearer we draw to necessary love to God and goodness, the better we are. Q. 3. I further ask you, Do we not necessarily will also bonum sensibile, sensible good as such, with a simple Volition? and so are not at Liberty in that point? A. What mean you by a simple Volition? B. That by which we will a thing by simple complacence, considered as simply good, before the understanding compare it with any other good, and call the Will to an Election. A. No doubt but we have an Appetite to sensible good; but whether it be only the sensitive Appetite, or always the rational Appetite also? I am in some doubt. B. When sense perceiveth sweetness by taste or smell, light and pulchritude by fight and fantasy, sensual joy by internal sense, doubtless in an Intelligent Creature, the Intellect presently perceiveth suo modo, that these are such indeed as sense perceiveth, and also that they are bona sensibilia, and that bona sensibilia are verè bona in their proper order. And therefore as sensible good is apprehended by the Intellect, and made volible, so the Will must needs have a complacency or simple volition of it, though it may refuse it comparatively. A. I grant it you: Because I take not any simple complacency to be a free act whatsoever: but only comparative Elections. B. It's true, quoad specificationem actus, vel libertatem contrarietatis: But how prove you it true quoad exercitium actus, vel libertatem contradictionis? May not the Will suspend a simple complacency, or displicency, by not acting therein? A. Not while the Intellect apprehendeth the appetible good. B. But because the Will is principium exercitii, may it not first suspend the act of the Understanding, either by diverting it, or by its own omission in not exciting it to cogitation? But, to be short, I grant you, that about sensible Objects, sense may necessitate the first simple apprehension of the Intellect, and thereby the first simple complacency of the Will may be necessitated? But, 1. The comparing act of the Intellect. 2. And the very first apprehension of things altogether insensible or spiritual, are so far under the power of the Will, that the Will may suspend them. And so the Will hath a liberty of exercise or contradiction as they call it, as to its simple complacency about things insensible or spiritual, so far as it can suspend the Intellects apprehension of their goodness (at least.) The arguments of Camero and others to the contrary I know are considerable; but I must not now digress to answer them. Quest. 4. But further, If the Intellect perceive that there is but one means to a man's felicity, and that absolutely necessary, is it not necessitated to will that means, by its necessary willing felicity itself? A. It is commonly so concluded: But I am doubtful of it. B. And well you may, without limitation. For, 1. Felicity itself is considerable either in the complex notion, or in the incomplex matter; I do not think that the first is it that is necessarily desired, but the latter; even good itself, as existent or desired to exist: 2. And this good that is felicity is not necessarily known by the Intellect: One taketh it to be spiritual good, and another to be sensible good: One taketh it to be God, another to be the Creature: One seeketh it hereafter, and another here. Therefore the same man may be in doubt of this, both as he doubteth of the Truth, and as he doubteth of the suitableness of invisible things: And therefore though he knew that, e. g. Christ and holiness be the medium unicum to that end and felicity, which he thinketh or believeth predominantly to be the only felicity; yet as he hath some doubting of it, so he may have some desire of a sensible inferior felicity, though not predominant; and these may also make him the more uncertainly to choose the means to the former. 3. And if a man's understanding were fully satisfied, that the only true felicity is in God and Heaven, yet he cannot but both feel (sensibly) and know (intellectually) that there is also a present sensible good: And therefore he must complacencially will it: And his perception and will may grow inordinate, and be entangled by it, by undue adhesion and delight: And so he may be diverted from things spiritual; yea and oppose the means of his true felicity, as opposite to his lower beloved good. A. By this, you suppose that the same man may have two Ultimate ends. B. 1. If by an Ultimate end you mean that only which a man habitually esteemeth, loveth and seeketh above all resolvedly as his felicity, so no man hath but one. 2. But if you mean that which is his Ultimate end, either in a lower sense, or as to a particular act, I doubt not but he may have two: That is, he may sometimes by intellectual doubting waver towards one side to day, and towards another to morrow, though not equally; And he may also have an inordinate complacency in things sensible, and so use means to please his sense, while he knoweth that other things are better. 3. And the Schoolmen oft say▪ that bonum sensibile or the pleasing of sense, is oft made to be finis in this sense, in that it is not medium, nor referred to any thing else: As a holy person when he sinneth by sensuality, doth not love and use that Meat, and Drink, and Ease, and Honour, and Lust, only as a medium to God and Glory. But it is not finis, say they, properly, so as that other things are referred to it. But the truth is that even holy persons, may choose and use sinful means for their fleshly pleasure as an inordinate end; and Meat, Drink, etc. are such means: And so their Pleasure is properly an Ultimate end; But not the predominant chief end, and so not to be denominated finis hominis, quoad vitae Cursum, but only as to his odd inordinate act: And so Paul saith, It is not I, but indwelling sin. So that we may say that medium unicum ad unicam foelicitatem vel bonum amatum, & ubi est omnimoda ratio boni, & nihil repugnat, is necessarily willed; (For this is no Election:) But otherwise not. Quest. 5. But I also ask you, Whether you think not that some habits (to evil at least, if not to good) are so strong and like to nature, as that Fatetur Arminius, hominem sub statu peccati nibil quod vere bonum sit posse intelligere, vell●, facere, & binc quidem cum necessarie peccare, nisi Den● istam necessitatem gratiose tollat: sed quia statuit Deum foedere suo gratiae, quod cum hominibus i●it, ostendisse nolle se homine● praecise secundum primum pactum tractare, ideoque neque propter peccatum, originis condemnare, statuit etiam Deum paratum esse quaod se, tollere istam peccandi necessitatem & ●oc ipsi declarasse, Arnold. Coru. count. Tilenum, cap. 11. pag. 394. the Will till it be changed by an exterior power, is always, or almost always determined according to them. A. Ordinarily it is, as all experience telleth us: but not necessarily. B. You see then that it is but a very little Liberty (from necessity) which is left in case of such fixed Habits. And indeed, though you may truly say that they necessitate not by compulsion at all, nor yet by inclination so constantly to every evil act, but that some evil acts may be avoided where such evil habits are; yet you never knew the tenor of a man's Will and Life go contrary to a strong and rooted habit: so that so far they necessarily incline. A. It sufficeth that no inclination necessitateth to every act of Sin, nor from every Duty: For by one good act, they may be prepared for more. B. 1. It is true that you say, as to your conclusion. But, 2. You mistake the Antecedent. There is an inclinatio naturalis antecedent to adventitious habits, which is inseparable and necessitating, yea essential to the Soul (which I am not now to handle.) But Quest. 6. I further ask, Do you think that any man is free from God's Government, and subjection to his Laws and Judgements? A. No: His Service is perfect freedom. B. Quest. 7. Is it freedom to be from under the overcoming power of heart-melting Love, and infinite attractive Goodness? A. It is only an unhappy Imperfection, not to be over come by Love. B. Quest. 8. Is any Creature free from God's Propriety or Dominion, and from his disposing Will, by which he doth as he list with his own? A. No: But God as a Governor hath told us what he will do with us. B. Quest. 9 Is the Will free from the directing power of the Understanding? A. No: Yhat were no freedom, but bruitishness: But it is not determined necessarily by the Understanding. B. I will not now dispute that. Quoad specificationem actus in many cases, at least, it cannot go against it: But supposing the Understanding well informed, Is not that the most perfect and happy Will, that never goeth against it? A. Yes: For to go against it, is to sin. B. Quest. 10. Are we at Liberty from under the oversight of Angels? A. No: That were an unhappy Liberty: But they necessitate not our Wills. B. Quest. 11. Are we at liberty from the rule and doctrinal Education, Admonition, Reproofs and Corrections, of Parents, Masters and Tutors? A. No: All this is our Good, which we are not free from. B. Quest. 12. Are we at liberty from the Laws, and Judgement and Punishments of Kings, and their subordinate Magistrates? A. No: This is God's Order; and they are His Ministers for our good. B. Quest. 13. Is any Child of Adam free from Original Sin, and pravity, inclining them to evil, and making them averse to holy good? A. What ever Episcopius and Bishop Jer. Taylor say, I must say No: For I will not side with Pelagius against the Universal Church. B. Quest. 14. Is any unsanctified man free from the Dominion of this Original pravity, together with contracted habits of sin? A. No: For that is the very state of an unsanctified person. B. Quest. 15. Is any regenerate person perfectly free, from these sinful Dispositions and Inclinations last mentioned? A: Not till he attain to Perfection, which is not in this life. B. Quest. 16. Is any man free from all actual sin? A. There is no man that hath not committed actual sin heretofore; And no man that will not commit it again if he live long in the world; And no man that is free from the Reatus culpae; nor yet from the Reatus poenae till remitted. But, 1. There are many that live not in any mortal reigning sin. 2. And there are some hours in which a man doth not actually sin at all: As in a deep and dreamless sleep, etc. B. Quest. 17. Is any man (or all at least) wholly free from the crafty and violent Temptations of Satan? A. No: but they necessitate us not to sin. B. Q. 18. Are we wholly free from the temptations of false Teachers, Flatterers, Tyrants, Persecutors, Enemies, and other wicked men? A. No: But they cannot necessitate us to sin. B. Q. 19 Are we wholly free from a multitude of objective snares, of Prosperity and Adversity even in every Creature and way? A. No: but neither do they necessitate us to sin. B. Q. 20. Are we any further freed from the strong temptations of our own senses, appetites, and fleshly Concupisconce than Orace delivereth us? A. No: But neither do these necessitate each particular sin. B. Very good! Let us come to the Application. * Quod spectat naturam libertatis non minor est in utraque schola sententiarum varietas— Quidam docent libertatem arbi●rii oppositam non esse necessitati, sed coactioni tantum: Verum quae hic est controversia aut mere verbalis est, aut non magni momenti. Hi enim concedunt ad libertatem non sufficere immunitatem a coactione, nec libertatem in ea proprie consistere: sed in ●o quod agens liberum seipsum movet & agit, ratione agenti intellectuali propia.— Et agnoscunt agentia libera in plerisque suis actibus non solum immunia esse a coactione, sed neque esse ad unum necessitate quadam determinata. Adeoque ex eorum sensu nonnulli eorum actuum necessarii sunt; sed Plerique tamen contingentes— Quum autem Libertas extenditur ad actus necessarios et immutabiles, fatentur illam latiori significatione sumi: Libertatem vero strictius acceptam versari tantum circa contingentia— Qui contra pretendunt libertatem opponi, non coactioni solum, sed etiam necessitati, concedunt voluntatem suorum quorundam actnum ratione habere s● necessario, quamvis plerorumque respectu contingenter— Et in illis actibus ad quos voluntas immutabiliter & necessario determinata est esse quandam libentiam & complacentiam unde pat●t contentionem esse verbalem & non realem. Nempe utrique consentiunt quomodo res se habeat. Quaestio solum remanet, A● actus necessarii, Liberi dicendi fuit? Blank de Lib. absol. Thes. 8. 9, 10, 11, 12. And Th. 14. he citeth Estius his words, confessing the same of Bonaventure, that taking Voluntarium for Liberum, it is but a difference de nomine Libertatis. And Strangius de Vol. Dei l. 3. c. 14. p. 687. Neque nobis videtur hac de re litigandum, quia alioqui tantum esset 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Non ●●i● negamus, sic vocem liberi arbitrii recte usurpari, quamquam in alio sensu illas actiones diximus esse liberas. See Blank ibid. n. 17, etc. proving also that the quarrel among Protestants herein, is but about the Names of necessity and liberty, and that they are agreed of the matter. And Thes. 22, etc. That their difference about necessity, and indifferency in the matter of Liberty is but about the name, and easily reconcilable. And the same Th. 25. he saith of the [Positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, posse agere vel non agere.] And de Lib. arb. in genere Thes. ●5. he saith the same, (with Strangius) that it is a mere Logomachy between them that say, All voluntary acts are free, and those that deny it: while they take Liberty in several senses▪ one pro libentia secundum ration●m, the other pro indeterminatione & indifferentia, etc. That Liberty is consistent with necessity, in many Cases many of the chief School-men-hold. For which let the learned Reader peruse the Citations of them in Jansenius; and see specially Alex. Alexander 2. p. q. 72. numb. 3● a. 3. & Aquin. qu. 10 the Potent. a. 2. ad 1. & ejus sequacem Viguerium Institut. c. 3. sect. 3. vers. 1. (Cum plum ib●● aliis Thomistis) & Bonavent. in 2. d. 7. 4. 3. & d. 25. q. 2. And the Scotists and some Nominals I have elsewhere cited. Especially Reader; if you would see more on the Subject, Ripalda nameth you enough, Expos. Magist. l. 2. d. 5. qu. 12. that go several ways. But note (with Jansenius de Grat. Salv▪ l. 6. c. 37.) that the necessity of voluntary acts, as Scotas saith, is not previous to the Will, that the Will should be thought to fall under necessity as impelling it to, and fixing it in the act: For if it were so, Voluntas ageretur & non ageret: nec staret in tali actu libertas: sed est necessitas concomit●●●, it a quod ipsa intelligatur cadere s●b voluntate: sic quod voluntas propter firmitatem libertatis sua, sibi ipsi necessitatem impo●it, in eliciendo actum, & in perseverand●. If we are agreed in all these twenty particulars; and that in some of them we are under necessity, and in some next to it, and in others are under no small dangi●, and that none of all these denied is the Liberty of Will which you contend for, we are very unhappy, if we do not all agree of the necessity of God's Grace, and if yet there remain any other sort of Liberty about which we must needs contend. I pray you now tell me, What Liberty it is that you accuse your Brethren for denying? Is it a Liberty to good, or unto sin? A. Both, 1. They make man's Will necessitated to sin; and good to be impossible to it. And, 2. They make God's Grace to work so irresistibly as to take away the liberty of sinning. B. 1. What necessity is it that you mean? Is it more than in all that aforesaid yourself hath granted. 2. And who thinketh that man obeyeth Grace, and forbeareth resistance, or committeth sin, for want of either Power or Liberty? O that we could be so happy as to take away our own and other men's Liberty to sin, and to resist God, and to undo themselves! A. Tell me first what Liberty of Will you maintain, and then I shall best tell you in what in we differ: even as I have told you what Liberty we deny. B. The method is convenient, I. We grant that we have a Will which is naturally a self-determining Principle, and Lord of its own acts, able to determine itself with due Objects and helps, without extrinsic predetermining physical motion either of God or Creatures. II. We grant that this Will hath the command of other faculties, respectively; that is, of some politically (as they use to say) and indirectly, or imperfectly, and of others despotically or directly and more perfectly. III. We hold that this Will is directly and properly subject to none but God. iv For instance, neither Angels or Devils can determine it antecedently to its own self-determination, to its hurt, though Angels may help it, and Devils may tempt it. V. No men by the greatest Power or Violence, nor by the subtlest Oratory or Deceit, can necessitate or predetermine it, though they may do much to induce it to self-determination. VI No Objects (though they necessitate the sense and appetite, and the first apprehension of the Intellect,) can necessitate the Will to Election, or comparative self-determination; nor do Objects carry us by necessity as they do the Bruits. VII. Neither our external or internal senses, or imagination, can predetermine or necessitate the said elective or comparative Will. VIII. Though our passions and motions of the Spirits may much molest and hinder the Will, they cannot necessarily predetermine it in the said election and comparative acts. IX. Though the Intellect may direct it to that which it will determine itself to, (in some cases necessarily ex principiis naturae, and in others not necessarily;) and being itself deceived, may misled it to mischoosing and refusings, yet is it not the commander of the Will, but the guide, (as the eye to the Body, which causeth us not to go, but to go the right way): And being itself under the Wills command quoad exercitium, doth not efficiently predetermine it, nor can necessitate it to sin or misery, unless it be first the culpable, unnecessitated cause itself. X. And as none of these can necessitate the Will originally to evil Acts, so much less can they necessitate it to any evil habits, or inclinations, nor take away those that are good. XI. I hold that this freewill is joined with necessity (not constrained, but convenient, by its nature or inclination.) 1. In the specification of simple Volition of our own felicity. 2. In the specification of simple Volition or Love to sensible good as such. 3. In the specification of the Volition of that which is fully perceived to be the only means of our only felicity, and to be only good. But that it is separated from natural necessity, and such necessitation as is before denied. 1. In its subjection and love to God as its Creator or first efficient of good. 2. In its love to and simple Volition of God, as our Ultimate end. 3. In the election of any end, where divers things are Competitors to be our end (besides our felicity), whether God or the Creature. 4. In the election of means, where divers are offered. 5. In the exercise of the act of intending our end. 6. In the use of the means, and commanding the imperate faculties therein. XII. I hold that this Liberty of the Will is of three sorts (though but two are commonly held.) 1. Contradictionis, vel exercitii; viz. Velle aut non velle, nolle aut non nolle. 2. Contrarietatis seu specificationis, quoad Actum; viz. Velle aut nolle hoc. 3. Competitionis, vel comparationis, i. e. Contrarietatis seu specificationis, quoad Objecta, viz. Velle aut hoc aut illud, nolle aut hoc aut illud, vel hoc potius quam illud. XIII. Out of all these freedoms of the Will itself, resulteth the Liberty of the PERSON, usually called, largely, Liberum Arbitrium, or Free-choice: which is, 1. That no man can be compelled to moral good or evil against his Will. 2. No man can deserve Rewards or Punishments of God, against his Will. 3. No man can be happy against his Will, nor unhappy unless it be the Cause. XIV. All this that I have hitherto named is but man's natural liberty as a man, which all men have, and is part of that common natural Image of God, which differenceth us from Bruits, and is mentioned Gen. 9 6. XV. Besides this there is a political or civil Liberty, according to which no Man or Angel hath power to command us to sin against God, or to cast away our Innocency or Happiness, or undo our Souls. XVI. And God as our Governor doth not only give all men leave and liberty to be holy, but offereth them Life, and giveth every man his choice whether he will repent and live, or refuse Grace and perish; And much more than Liberty he giveth them, by Commands, Threaten, Promises, Mercies, Means, Helps, Entreaties, Afflictions, etc. urging them to repent and live. XVII. And this political Liberty containeth a freedom from all punishment from God, to those that cause it not by wilful sin: And more than so, a certainty of the Reward of Glory. XVIII. Besides these forementioned Liberties natural and political, there is also an ethical or moral Liberty from sinful Habits and Acts: And of that we hold, that every man is delivered from these sinful Habits and Acts, so far as he hath and useth God's Grace: And so that the sanctified are delivered from the reign or servitude of sin. XIX. And we hold that yet the habits of Grace do not necessitate this or that particular act of Obedience or Love, but it is too possible to sin by Omission or Commission notwithstanding these habits. XX. And we hold that the ordinary habits of Vice in the wicked do not absolutely necessitate them to this or that sinful Commission in particular, at least not to very many sins, but that it is possible for them to do some Duties, and forbear many sins, notwithstanding Original and superadded pravity. XXI. I add to the XI. Sect. before as an instance, that man's Will is not by any natural necessity, determined to will it's own felicity by the comparate electing Act of the Will; but hath Power and Liberty to refuse or nill it. This many will think strange, but I am sure that it is true. For man was made and redeemed, and is sanctified for a higher End than his own felicity; yea more than one, even the Glory and Pleasing of God, and the common Good. And reason telleth me undoubtedly that I ought to love that best which is best in itself, and that if my annihilation would conduce to the saving or happiness of the World, or of one Kingdom, or of thousands of Persons, I ought to consent to it for such ends; yea were it but to keep the Earth from perishing, and the Sun from being useless to this World. And though God in mercy hath so united my felicity with his Glory and the common Good, that there never will be use for such an option or choice, yet it followeth not thence that I may not say, that hypothetically (if I were put to it) such a thing is possible and would be due. And as Paul said, I could wish myself accursed from Christ for my brethren's sake, the Jews (not I do wish it, but would this save them, I could wish it, because the salvation of thousands, and their Service to God, is better than Ours;) even so may we. Annihilation is inconsistent with Felicity: But Annihilation might and should be chosen before the Annihilation of the World, or the perdition of millions, if God had called us to it. Yea Christ that saith, [It were good for that man that he had never been born,] implieth, that a damned man would choose it as a minus malum; yea many a one that I have known myself, desired it. Therefore it is a thing that the Will may do. XXII. And as another Instance, I need not prove, that the bonum sensibile which is necessarily loved or willed by some complacency or simple Volition, is not necessarily chosen, but may freely be rejected. Otherwise no sin scarce could be avoided. All these sorts or Acts of freewill we hold, and are agreed on. And are we yet unfit for concord and coalition for want of acknowledging the freedom of the Will? A. I must confess that you have acknowledged much. B. And I confess that so have you on the other side. I pray you now tell me, where lieth our disagreement? A. You overwhelm me with Distinctions and numerous particulars, so that I suspect you do but by this dust intent to blind our eyes. A man may make any thing good by such minute distinguishing, and atomizing matters to make them imperceptible. Did you deal plainly, I could answer you. B. Is this an answer fit for a learned or ingenuous man? Is confusion plainness with you? such plainness too many plani have deceived the Church with, and set well-meaning Christians together by the ears; so that the Christian World hath long pleased the Devil, and found him sport, as fighting-Dogs and Cocks do to men, and all by the cheats of ignorant confusion; Kingdoms and Factions fight about words which they never understood. Like the consulting Physicians who could not agree, whether their Patie●ts Ischury should be cured by Succinum, or by Electrum, or by Carabe, or by Ambarum, and the poor man died because they could not consent. If I distinguish vainly or falsely sine differentia, cannot you show where the vanity or falsehood is? How can you tell it is false or vain, if you know not where the falsehood or vanity is? Will you say, It is somewhere, but I know not where? Let that answer from others then to all your reasonings seem sufficient, [Your reason is false, and your argument naught, but we know not were the falsehood lieth.] A ready confutation, fit for our Church-troublers. I have purposely in the First Book, given you all the distinctions about Liberty which I use, in an orderly Table, that you may easily understand them by seeing them together: so that if there be falsehood or vanity in them, they are open to your easy search and view. Tell me what freedom is denied you, or else for shame contend no more. A. They hold that Original Sin doth necessitate all the unregenerate to do evil, and to forbear good, so that they cannot possibly forbear Sins of Commission or Omission. II. They hold that Grace doth irresistibly ne●●ssitate the Elect to believe and love God, and forbear Sin, so that they cannot do otherwise. B. I. Stay a little. 1. You must distinguish of several sorts of Good and Evil: 2. And of several sorts of Necessity. 1. I hope you will not think it false, vain or curious, to distinguish between, 1. An ungodly course of Life, and some one particular act of Sin: 2. The omission of the predominant Love of God, and a course of holy living, and special saving acts, and the omission of this or that commanded act. 2. And I hope I may advise you to distinguish between, 1. A constrained Necessity against our Will, and a voluntary Necessity, of diseased vicious inclination. 2. And between a necessity in sensu composito and in sensu diviso. 3. And between an uncurable and a curable necessity. And then I answer. I. We hold that an ungodly man by his Original and superadded pravity, is so strongly and fixedly inclined to a sensual ungodly life, that in sensu composito, while he is such, he will certainly live such a life in the main course of it. And do not you think so too? I pray you tell me? A. It is an idle question: For that is but necessitas existentiae. He that is ungodly is necessarily ungodly while he is so. B. II. We hold moreover that the same man will certainly, all that time, omit the prevalent love of God and all acts proper to the godly. A. That's but the same: else he were a godly man. B. III. We hold also that yet this man may forbear many acts of sin, and do many things commanded: and so is not under a vicious necessity of committing all Sin, or omitting all Duty. iv We hold also that his vicious necessity of disposition is curable, and not remediless and desperate. V We hold also that it is not curable without Gods saving sanctifying Grace, proportioned to his disease or pravity. VI We hold also that God hath appointed every man certain Duties and Means to be used in order to his cure. VII. We hold that he giveth much outward help, and some inward commoner Grace antecedent usually to sanctifying Grace, by which much of these Duties and Means may be used. VIII. And we hold that God appointeth no means in vain, nor commandeth any unprofitable Duty, or which man hath not sufficient encouragement to use, with hope of success, and is not unexcusable if he neglect. Do you differ from us in any of this? Or is there any thing more that we must have to be capable of your love and concord? A. Though I granted you a necessitas existentiae, that a wicked man's life while such be wicked in the main, (for that is but to say that a wicked man is a wicked man), yet I grant you not a necessitas effecti, as if his pravity made his wicked life unavoidable or necessary as a necessitating cause. B. His wicked life is considerable, 1. As to his inward actings, or to his outward: 2. As to the immediate or next Acts, and as to the remote. 3. And the necessity is voluntary or involuntary. And so I say, 1. He is under no natural or involuntary necessity; but under a * Etsi Amor ille non excedat vires physica● voluntatis humanae per se spectatae; eas tamen superat, si spectentur difficultates quae occurant. Unde fit, ut sine speciali auxilio non possit ad actum reduci naturalis inclinatio D●um super omnia diligendi. Non potest homo credere mysteria ●fidei ●t oportet ad salutem, sine gratiae auxilio, etiam quum sufficienter sunt proposita, & probatum a Deo esse revelatum. Non potest homo servare quoad substantiam ullum praeceptum affirmativum supernaturale de interno actu, sine auxilio gratiae etiam de singulis, Pet. a S. Joseph. Thes. general. de aux. p. 81. 82, 83. vicious inclination or habit, which will produce some effects certainly, and others uncertainly. 2. The certain effects of the habitual privation of the love of God, and enmity to him and to holiness, is, that his Soul will not in statu praesenti immediately, (nor till it be cured or over-swayed by a superior cause, ●) love God above all, nor love holiness, nor live a holy life: Because the Soul will not go contrary to its habitual inclination, without somewhat to overpower that habit. An effect will not be contrary to the fixed inclination of its cause. 3. And another certain effect of a Soul predominantly habituated to sensuality, is, that it will live a sensual life, constantly as to the bent of inward Volitions, and ordinarily as occasion serveth in outward actions. 4. But being not so necessitated to every Sin, nor against every Duty and means of Cure, this Soul is not under a necessity of so continuing uncured. Now if it be the present voluntary ascertaining Disposition which you deny, then, 1. You must hold that an Enemy of God can immediately love him above all, and live a holy life: 2. And that there is some cause in a man most habitually sensual, by which he can forbear both the inward desires and outward acts of sensuality; which are contradictions to him that knoweth what a prevalent fixed habit is. 3. And that all wicked Enemies of God have in them a cause that can immediately cure all their own enmity and pravity without God's Spirit of Grace; or else have his Spirit and Grace immediately at an instant at command. And if all a man's Original Sin, and contracted habits, be so easily laid by at any minute, the cure seemeth much easier than the depravation, which perhaps hath been a long time growing to that strength: which is contrary to all the World's experience: As it is easier to kindle a fire in the City than to quench it, and to catch the Plague or any Disease than to cure it, or to wound the Body than to heal it, or to pull down a House than to build it, to drown a Ship than to make it, etc. So all Ministers, Tutors, Parents, Christians; yea, persons find how woefully hard it proveth to cure one Sin; To cure the Ignorant, the Unbelieving, the Hardhearted, the Proud, the Lustful, the Covetous, the Passionate; much more the malignant Enemies of God and holiness. What need of the sanctification of the Holy Ghost, or the medicinal Grace of Christ, if the very depraved Will can do all in a moment of itself, and depose its enmity. A. You speak to me as if I were a Pelagian: I am not for any of this. But will rather yield to what you say. B. II. And as for your second Charge, * Vid. quae ha●●t Ruiz de praedefin. tr. 2. d. 8. per tot. de necessitate vaga consistent● cum libertate secundum quid. Et a. 9 p. 137. That all good actions are fore decreed of God, proved and multitudes cited that defend it. that they assert unresistible necessitating Grace, I pray you leave it to the Fourth Article, which is its proper place to avoid repetition. But here let me remember you by the way. 1. That not to love God, not to believe, not to repent, not to live holily, are no Acts, and therefore no Effects of power, but a privation. 2. That therefore Gods causing a man to love him, to Believe, to Repent, to be Holy, is not to deprive him of any power, but to give him act and power. 3. Therefore it is not a depriving him of any true Liberty: For true Liberty is the Liberty of some faculty or power. 4. But if you will call a voluntary Impotency and Viciousness by the name of a free-power, than God taketh away such Power by giving us Power, and such Liberty by making us free. But proceed to the next Crimination. The second Crimination. A. * The Arminians say that God giveth a supernatural power, even to the Will itself, and that by immediate operation, Synod. art. 3. & 4. p. 15, etc. And they add, [Mente illuminata & voluntati concessa supernaturali potentia partim per illuminationem, partim per virium immediatam insusionem; Deum quoque Affectus nostros & partem illam sensitivam corrigere, & bonis desideriis quorum objecta monstrat intellectuo, actus vero imperat voluntas, afficere: Quibus affectibus magis magisque correctis, castigatis & in ordinem redactis, promptior & facilior, ac minus impedita postmodum redditur voluntas ad exer●endos pietatis actus, non usque adeo ut ante reluctantibus affectibus, & lege illa in membris belligerante.] Qui asserunt eum quem Deus movet ad actum bunc necessario aut illum necessario agere, Alij vero pertendunt nulla proprie dicta necessitate illum ad agendum impelli. Verbis quidem discrepant, idem autem reipsa se●tiunt, Blank de Libertat. Absol. Thes. 22. See his proof following. They deny the Unregenerate to have any power to believe, repent or to do any good: And so they feign God to command men things impossible, and to condemn men for that as Sin which they could not possibly avoid, and for not doing that which they could no more do than make a World; and so to put men under a necessity of sinning and being damned. B. This is in sense the same with that about Liberty foregoing, though under the other notion (of Power.) But the truth is, it is the very core and true sum of all our Controversies, and if I prove this to be nothing but words, I shall prove them all so, about the four first Articles. I will here take it for granted that you speak not of any mere Passive or Obediential Power (as it's called) but of a proper active Power, and that truly so called, and not only hypothetically on supposition of things to make it up, which are not existent, nor to be supposed. I know of nothing in the Soul of man for our enquiry, but 1. The natural-faculties, or virtues, inclined naturally to their necessary Objects. 2. The right disposition, or adventitious inclination or habits of these faculties. 3. And the Acts. Tell me first, Do you know of any more? A. Not that I can remember. B. It is therefore the Faculties or Dispositions that we differ about, or nothing: (For it is not the Acts). Tell me then, Quest. 1. Do you ●now of any that deny all men's Souls to have the three faculties of Active, Power or Life, Intellection and Volition (which the Thomists say are Accidents immediately and inseparably emaning from the Essence; and the Scotists better say, are the very formal Essence of the Soul itself,) without one of which a man is no man? A. No, none doubt of this in sense, though some number them as three, and some but as two. B. Do we differ about the second? Do you believe that a Drunkard hath the habit of Sobriety, or a Fornicator of Chastity, or at least, that an ungodly man hath a holy habit or disposition to love God, and trust him above all, and to believe in Christ, and repent of Sin, and live in Holiness. A. No; no man saith that he hath such a habit: But he hath a power to do them, though not a habit. B. Is it any thing that you call a power besides the natural faculties, and their habits or dispositions? A. No: but the natural faculty is still a power to believe, love God, live holily, etc. without a habit. B. Do you not believe that an ungodly man is disposed, yea habituated to the contrary, viz. To a fleshly and worldly mind and life, and against a life of Faith and holy Love? A. Yes: at least some are: And I will not deny Original Sin, and therefore grant such a dispositive pravity in all, though not so much as in some is superadded: But yet these ill dispositions and habits are not so strong, but that the Sinner can for all that believe and repent, etc. B. No doubt but if he believe not, it is not for want of natural faculties. He hath an Intellect, a Will and a vital and executive power; And these all have that force or strength of natural activity which is necessary to Faith, Love, and every holy Duty: For these are the unalterable Essence (or Properties) of man as man; And if Sin deprived us of them, it should change our Species; And if Grace gave them, it should restore our Species, and we should be men by Grace only, and not by Nature. But you confess that these powers want their right disposition to act. A. But yet I say that this undisposed ill-disposed Soul, is able to act contrary to its accidental disposition., B. I tell you once for all, that the shaming and ending of all the Controversies between the Synodists and moderate Arminians (or Jesuits) lieth in the true opening of the ambiguity of this one syllable [Can]. And unhappy is the Church when its Pastors have neither skill nor love enough, to forbear torturing and distracting it, by one poor ambiguous syllable, not understood by the Contenders. But to compel you to conviction, Quest. 1. Do you mean by [Can] or [Able] or [Power] any thing besides the natural faculty and the disposition? A. No: I mean the natural faculty as related to this Act or Object now in question, e. g. believing and loving God. B. Quest. 2. Is not natural strength or power a thing belonging to man as man, which Sin destroyeth not, and Grace restoreth not. And have not all the Churches disowned Illyricus * Be●a angrily calleth him Turpis iste Illyricus, and Peucer, and Strigelius, and other Disciples of Melanchthon have defended the moral causation of Grace against him and such Lutherans, who went too much the other way. though a very learned, laborious, godly Divine, for making Original Sin the substance of the Soul itself? A. All this is granted you. B. Quest. 3. Therefore if Adam had natural power to love God, and if the sanctified have it yet, doth it not follow that all men have it? Because it belongeth to man as man, and is not changed by Sin and Grace, except in its Dispositions and Acts? A. Thus you make all the wicked able to love God. B. Yes; As to that sort of Ability which is but the natural faculty they are all able; but there is somewhat else they want. A. But the Name [Power] you confess yourself is Relative to something that is to be done, or to an Act with its Object; And when the natural faculty is not changed, but is the same in all men, yet the Relation of [Power] in it may be changed; as by a change of the Object, * Casp. Peucer Histor. Carcerum against the Lutherans physical motion, asserteth pag. 720. That Concurrentibus in conversione his tribus causis, verbo, spiritu S. & volantate hominis, agentibus suo loeo & ordine viribus in homint, quamqam ex se & natura sua prorsus invalidis ad spiritualia, rationalibus tamen & inter se differentibus, eoque ordine quo conditae sun● a sp. sancto per media verbi & sacramentorum in ordinato & Legitimo singulorum usu, ut in audit● verbi cum attentione & meditatione vir●ute sua efficaci singulis excitis liberrime, sine coactionis, impulsu & rapt●, & nova luce accensa in ment nova vero virtute voluntati communicata, etc. Qui assentiuntur & obsequ●ntur spiritui sancto virtute ejusdem id faciunt, non tamen sine actione, motu & annixu, Id. p. 722. Still note that the Grace called sufficient is that which giveth the Power without the Act: Therefore as many things concur to denominate us able, so do they to sufficiency of Grace: Malderus in 12. qu. 111. ●. 3. d. 3. saith, [Recte quidam eruditus annotavit, neque praedicationem, aut excitationem externam, neque internam illuminationem intellectus simpliciter esse gratiam sufficientem, quamvis in s●o genere quaeque sufficiens dici potest, etc. sed voluntas per boni affectus aspirationem supernaturali motione excitanda est. Our Bradward. shorteneth all the Controversy, li. 13. cor. p. 208, 109. telling us that Gods Will is the cause of every future, (and so of the future form of sin) and that if there were no God, there would be no Impossibile: Whereas I think there would be nothing but impossibles. For it would be impossible that any thing should ever be. But there would be no propositions de impossibili: Nay, he talks of a non-posse esse impossibile, and calls this mirum corrollarium. Adrian Quodl. 3. fol. 16. [Quis duplicitur potest crederese a peccatis abstinere non posse: 1. Quod non posset sine speciali Dei gratia & adjutorio & sic non errat. 2. Absolute credendo se non abstinere posse a peccata, aut non posse ad vitandum peccata a Deo sufficiens auxilium impetra●●, etiamsi fecerit quod in se est. Et hic error est species infidelitatis opposita fidei, ad quam obligatur credendo Deum just, pie & miscricorditer mundum gubernare: Illi-enim manifestissime repugnat, apud nunquemque sanae mentis Deum homini imputare ad culpam ad quod vitandum nec dedit, nec dare paratus est sufficientem facultatem; homini inquam facienti totum quod in se est. medium, helps, concauses, etc. B. You say true: But remember still that this is from no change in the natural faculty, as you confess: For it was never in any man a power, e. g. to act without dependence on God, nor to act without an Object in Specie, nor to act on an incongruous uncapable Object, nor without a due medium, and necessary concauses. Now if you mean that the change is not on man's faculties, but on the Objects, Medium, Causes, etc. that men do not love God while unholy, you are notoriously mistaken. For it is Sin that hindereth. And God is the same God, and Christ the same Christ, and the Word the same, and oft the preaching the same to a Believer and an Unbeliever. So that though outward helps and hindrances do much, the inward cause is most considerable. And if all were right within, it were no sin in us to be disabled by outward changes; It is no sin not to hear without a Preacher, or not to see that which is invisible, or not to understand that which is not Intelligible, or not to love that which is not Amiable, or that which is by distance or unfit mediums made no Object of our Acts; no more than not to touch the Moon, or not to see into the bowels of the Earth. Therefore though it's true that the Will is related as a power to capable Objects, and not as a power to things that by incapacity are no Objects; yet the change that is made on itself by Sin and Grace, doth not make it no power and a power in this natural essential sense. It is one thing that is called natural power or faculty, and another thing that is called, Aright disposition or habit: Therefore as to the first, the Soul of every man hath a true natural power to repent, believe and love God, and they omit it not for want of natural power, but of something else. A. Call it then a moral power if you will. B. We must so call it: But you must know what that is. It is not a power of the same sort with the natural power. The very word [Power] is equivocal or analogous to them. Else Grace should increase the Essence of the Soul, or make a man to be more a man, than he was before. And Dr. Twisse derideth the Arminians for saying that potentia fundatur in potentia, viz. Moralis in naturali, which were very just if it were powers of the same kind that were spoken of; but now being otherwise it is unjust: for no doubt but potentia moralis is in potentia naturali, as health is in the Body. Quest. 4. But I further ask you, Do you think that any men do now in an unregenerate state love God above all, and live a holy heavenly life, yea or effectually and savingly believe, by the mere power of their natural faculties, till they are changed? A. No; that's a contradiction; to be unholy and holy. I am none of those Pelagians that make Grace unnecessary to man's cure. B. Are you not convinced then that where the natural power is existent, something is wanting without which the acts of Holiness will not be performed? Tell me then what that is? A. That which is wanting to a man that hath sufficient Grace, is nothing but his own Concurrence or Will; For without any special Grace differing from sufficient he can believe. But that which is wanting to them that have it not, is sufficient Grace itself for believing, which they want for abusing the antecedent Grace sufficient for preparation. B. We speak not now of Grace as efficient, ex parte Dei agentis; But of Grace as it is in us, or an effect of the former: what is it in man that is wanting to believing? Is it a natural Power, or a right Disposition, or what? A. Till a man have sufficient Grace to believe, it is proper strength or power itself that he wanteth, and sufficient Grace is such a power: But when he hath it, he wanteth nothing but the Act, which he can excite and doth not. B. I confess I find Arminius, Arnoldus, Corvinus, and others granting, that all men are unable to believe till Grace enable them, and more than so, saith Arnoldus, There is more strength or power necessary now to believe in Christ, than was necessary to Adam to keep all the Law, partly because of the mysteriousness of Faith, and partly because we must first be restored to a new ability, which requireth more power than to keep what we had. (A sly equivocation, turning the question from the potentia operata to the potentia operans: If it did require more power in the efficient so to renew us, it followeth not, that he thereby putteth more power into us than Adam had: But God's Power hath no degrees.) But that which I ask you, is, whether this new power given by sufficient Grace, be of the same Species with our natural powers, or of some other. A. What if I say, It is of the same sort. B. Then (as I have hinted) you must make the Soul to have either two orders of natural powers of the same Species, one founded or subjected in the other (which is it that Dr. Twisse derideth;) or else indeed to have two Souls, (For I have elsewhere at large proved with the Scotists that the faculties are essential to the Soul;) or else you must make the specific powers of the Soul to have degrees, and Souls to be augmented, and so that they have more Soul that have Grace than they that have none, and so Grace is a kind of generation or augmentation of Souls. A. What if I say that it is of another Species? B. Then we must consider what it is. Is it of a superior Species or subordinate, or coordinate? If you say with some Friars and fanatics, that it is the Spirit of God in Essence, or God himself, it would be Omnipotency. If it be not any created Spirit or Substance, (which would alter our Species, or make each one two) it must be an Accident (as all confess it is, and therefore not ejusdem speciei with the faculties that are essential:) And if so, tell us what this power is? A. The Soul of man is itself so little known to itself, that we cannot easily tell what its natural powers be (as the difference between Thomas and the Scotists showeth:) much less can we tell how to conceive aright of the quiddity of the Accidents of a Soul, who know so little of the Accidents of Bodies, or of Bodies themselves. Let me hear what your own conceptions are of the matter, if they tend to elucidate or reconcile. B. He that will take up with the bare words, [Can] or [Cannot] and confess that he knoweth not what they signify, should not with the blind confidence of too many Contenders, trouble the people's ears in Pulpits, and set them on fire against one another, and by raving distracted the Churches of Christ, with such [Can's] and [Cannot's] [Able] and [Unable.] And yet this one poor word is the Granade or Fireball. If I pretend to understand it no more than you, yet I will be ashamed to vex and ensnare men's Souls with what I understand not; but will use the easiest intelligible words. But to answer your desires distinctly. 1. The Soul is, as you say, so little known to itself, that no man living, I think, hath a true formal conception of, that first accident or effect which it receiveth from God's Spirit, nor yet of the true nature of a habit or disposition following it. He that readeth but what our Metaphysics and Schoolmen have said of Habits, will find this to be true; and that their quiddity is passed his understanding. To say that they are qualities by which we are prompt to act, is but to name a general notion no better understood than the quaesitum, (Quality); and to name the effect (promptitude) and not the form or thing itself. II. The nature of fire seemeth to be a kind of likeness to Spirits. And in this sensible thing we cannot tell what it is that is added by excitation and incension. And they that talk of generation of fire, know not what generation signifieth: whether the production of a new simple substance that before was nothing? or the introduction of a new form into a pre-existent substance, by mixture, or how? or only a new motion? or if they say, It is a generation of new Qualities, they know not what the word [Quality] signifieth. But this much is apparent, that whether it be done by Collision or however, to kindle a spark or latent fire into a flame or incendium, is to excite a pre-existent active nature; And this excitation is by motion. And as we have some (very defective) conception what motion received is, in Bodies, and how by contact when it cometh from force, motus motum causat, & vis per motum vint quandam imprimit; so by some Analogy, we may conceive how Spirits move Spirits: and such as is the (unexpressible) action of one Spirit on another, such is the thing thereby imprinted and received; A kind of spiritual motus. And as in bodily motion the first thing received is the very thing moved by contact, qua talis, as itself in motion, or act; so Spirits sno modo seem, qua agentes & attingentes transcendently, to be the first received by the moved Spirits; And the second thing the vis impressa, and thence followeth the ipse motus. But if it to this day (most certainly) surpass the wits of the greatest Philosophers, formally to conceive what it is that adhereth to the res mota to contive its motion, and what that is that is called Vis impressa, and in what subject it moveth the projectum, etc. (For the Cartesian fancy that motus inceptus nunquam cessabit nisi impeditus, either tells us nothing of the continued cause, or supposeth moveri to be no effect, and to need no more cause than negatio motus, which is unworthy a confutation), what wonder then if it surpass the conception of all mortal men to know what that spiritual Vis impressa on a Soul is? But whatever it is, this much is the best notion that we can have of that which the Divine Action first communicateth, that it is influxus Dei Receptus; vel excitatio facultatum exe●●ata, as distinct from excitatio Dei excitans; It is passive excitation, or a spiritual Vis impressa, whence Action followeth. III. But it hath also a similitude to the Agent in more than simple motion, Even as the Sun or Fire doth kindle fire on combustible matter (which had also a latent fire before, or else it's not combustible); which is not (as the Cartesians feign, by motion alone, but by the operation of a threefold virtue in the Sun, viz. the motive, lucid and calefactive, producing the same in the Receiver: so the Spirit of God doth in this excitation at once communicate to the three faculties of the Soul, an impressed force for Vital-activity, Intellection and Volition; so that the three natural faculties by this received impress and excitation are suscitated to holy Activity, Knowledge and Love; the habit of which is holy Life, and Light, and Love abiding. For it is certain that it is not one only, but all the faculties of the Soul that are vitiated by Sin, and therefore all that must be repaired by sanctifying Grace. The Vital-active-power (as it is a faculty of the rational Soul) is as it were sleepy, dead and impotent, and must be quickened with spiritual life and strength. The Intellect is dark, and must be illuminated. The Will is carnal and unholy, and must be turned from the Flesh to God by mortification and by holy love. And all this the Holy Ghost doth by Action, but not mere Action in genere, but by a suitable communicative Action, quickening, illuminating and converting, or touching the Soul with love. iv The first effect of this received Influx * It is a great dispute among the Schoolmen, whether Grace & Theological Virtues (Faith, Hope and Love,) do really differ? saith Malderus in 1. 2. Tho. q. 110. a. 3. p. 472. [Non distingui, opinio est magistri— quem sequ●nt●r Scotus Alexand. Alber. Richard. Gabr. Durand. Vega, Bellarm. a: two. Inter quos tamen ea est diversitas, quod Durandus teneat distingui solo nomine Gratiam & Charitatem: Alii dicant, distingui sola ratione, non realiter aut formaliter, aut secundum speciem: Alii dicant formaliter distingui, ut sint species qualitatis diversae; ita tamen ut non sint duae res— Realiter autem ut duae res distingui est opinio Tho●●ae, Bonavent. Valent. Suarez, etc. Et ipse Malderus opinatur Gratiam esse Donum spir. sancti Charitati praevium: Et non potentiis sed in ipsa anim● essentia immediate implantatum: & quod virtus postea disponet potentias secundum inclinationem naturae: & ita antequam Charitatis virtute elevetur voluntas stabiliter ad hunc amorem consentaneum est ipsam animae substantiam prius natura elevari ad ejusmodi inclinationem per habitum aliquem non voluntati, sed sibi proxime inbaerentem.] Here is a venturous Conjecture, and such as may tell you that these men make not Grace to be natural; when besides all the habits of Faith, Hope, Love, and other Virtues or Graces in the Mind and Will, they hold a general habit or holy inclination in the Essence of the Soul, and not in the faculties, which differeth from Love and other such Virtues, as (they think) the faculties of the Soul differ from the Essence (as he after explains it): and is it that is called, The Holy Ghost and the Divine Nature in us: which is the same that Mr. Pemble held: An influx received from God before our Acts I acknowledge: And that this received impress some way disposeth the Soul to the following Act; and that Infants themselves may have such a holy disposition, and that this is some reparation or sanctification of nature: and if there be more I oppose not what I understand not: But the word Habit most properly belongeth to particular habits of this or that Act: (as Faith, Love, etc.) And whether you will call this Grace a general Habit or a Nature, I contend not: But I think that the founding it in the Essence and not in the Faculties, falsely supposeth the Faculties not to be the Essence; And I think that it differeth from the particular Habits or Graces, but as the natural power or ingenious disposition of an Infant doth differ from his said ingenuity when it is improved into habits; which I think are not another thing, but the same disposition advanced and perfected. But of this let each man think as he can. Bradwardine cuts short all the Controversy, and saith, [That as without God's special Grace, freewill cannot overcome any Temptation at all, so that special Grace is (besides all that is created) Gods own Will that he shall overcome it. So that by this no man can do any more than he doth, or than God willeth or decreeth that he do. And so by his Opinion, effectual Grace is God's Essence as decreeing, willing the effect; Lib. 2. c. 4, 5, 6, 7. Yea he saith, that no man that is not tempted can avoid any sin, without this special Grace, which is God's Will that he shall avoid it.] But this opinion is rare: Gods Will is his Essence and in itself simple and unchangeable. Indeed no good will be done but what he willeth: But the question is, whether he doth not both will and give much true proper power to do that which is never done? and so whether he that willeth not Good, or hateth it, do it always for want of power to do better. God's Will as immanent, and considered in itself only a Will, doth not create or cause ad extra: But his Will as productive or really causing, which we call his active or executive power (and he denieth it not to be productive, though he deny it to be any thing but Volition, de nomine). And if this be all, than the questions of the nature and efficacy of Grace are ended; and Grace ex parte Dei is nothing but his Will, what shall be, and a production of it by willing it; and in the effect it is nothing but the being of what he so willeth (Act or Habit). So l. 2. c. 13. he saith, [That the A●xil●um sine quo nullus perseverat, & per quod quilibet perseverat, est spiritus sanctus, Divina Bonitas & Voluntas,] (where he seemeth to hold that Dei Bonitas & voluntas is the Holy Ghost, the third Person.) And l. 2. c. 9 p. 498. he laboureth to prove that no Angel or Man (in Innocency) can by the greatest Grace before his Fall persevere a moment without God's special help, that is, God's Will that he shall so do. So that the necessitating cause why one Angel stood and another sinned, and why Adam sinned, is, because God willed it. And though he hold that Adam could not stand because God willed it not, yet he holdeth also that God positively willed it; not seeing that he had made that needless. Read but Ruiz de Vol. Dei copiously, proving that God willeth the Salvation of them that are never saved, and you will see that no Protestants more differ herein than the Papists do among themselves. And there is no reconciliation with them that hold that nothing is possible but what is future, or no man can do any thing but what he doth. or vis impressa that we know of, is, The Act excited itself. It is Action that God doth suscitate the Soul to, and Action next followeth. V As there is a difference between a Spark, or Candle, and a great incendium or flaming-fire; so is there a marvellous difference between the Souls Actions (upon the same Object and of the same kind) in the degrees: As we perceive by daily experience. In a dream, the same thoughts stir us not up to execution, as when we are awake will do it. And a man that heareth a cold Preacher, and coldly thinketh over all the same Truths, and mentioneth them, and subscribeth and professeth them (as of the evil of particular sins, the need of Christ and Mercy, etc.) yet feeleth no power in them; nor will all his knowledge overcome a small Temptation, or set him upon Duty; but he knoweth, and thinketh, and talketh, as if he did it not. And at another time, when his Soul is suscitated or awakened to seriousness, the same thoughts wholly take him up, and make him wonder at his former stupidity, and command his life with great facility. VI Experience telleth us that usually this effectual suscitation of the Soul to more powerful lively apprehensions and Volitions is done by a suitable external means: As by a more clear and lively awakening Ministry, by some notable Providence, especially by surprising sufferings and distress. A Thief when he is taken, or judged, a Fornicator when he is found in the shame of his Sin, a Prodigal in Jail or want, a Drunkard or Glutton when he is brought by it to the Gout or other pain and sickness, etc. have quite other apprehensions usually of the folly of sinning, than ever you could bring them to before, by any other the certainest convictions. VII. As we are certain by experience that the Acts called Intellection and Volition now, are such operations of the Soul as ever stir and use the Spirits, and we perceive both together as if it were a compound operation, and know not by experience what any Knowledge or Volition is which useth not the Spirits; so we find by true experience, that the suscitation of the said Spirits (or igneous particles) in us, much conduceth to the suscitation of the faculties of the Soul: By which fervent speaking, and awakening Providences do much: And also that they that have clear and quick Spirits, are easiliest awakened. VIII. We find also by experience, that the internal sensitive faculty hath a great share in these effectual operations: For the certainest apprehensions of the Intellect, work but defectively on the Will, unless they are accompanied with, or stir up some Sense, Affection or Passion; either Fear, Hope, Love, Desire, Delight, Anger, or some other proper passion. And Volitions themselves are but sluggish uneffectual Acts, as to the imperium or command of the executive Powers or Thoughts, unless they stir up some Passion to their aid; And therefore lifeless wishes are common with sluggish and unreformed men. IX. The Spirit of God can, and we have reason to think, sometime doth stir up the faculties of the Soul to holy Cogitations, Apprehensions and Volitions, without any other means, known to us, than what the person before used uneffectually: And when means are effectual to sanctifying Acts, it is principally by the operation of the Holy Ghost, and less principally the aptitude of the means. X. The first received influx ad actum is not it which we call a Habit: For a Habit is a fixed promptitude to act. XI. An habit in the Intellect is skill, or intellectual promptitude to Act rightly and easily. An habit in the Will, is inclination, and love itself radicated, or aversation and radicated hatred. And a habit in the vital executive Power, is a promptitude and vivacity to the right executing of the Wills commands (and first exciting it to act). XII. A habit infused is of the same Species with acquired habits, though it be otherwise caused, and of a more excellent use. And in both we have reason to think that the Act goeth before the Habit; Though the Holy Ghost can fix a Habit by one Act, when acquired Habits are caused but by custom or many Acts. XIII. In the strict sense, as Acts so Habits are specified by their Objects, and are not found but in such Species: But in a larger sense and less proper we may say that there are more universal Habits, not denominated at all from any sort of Objects, that is, the right Disposition of the Soul to its due operations: But this is but an inadequate universal conception of the same Habit, and not another thing I think. XIV. A habit of the Intellect about Principles is a Disposition to the knowledge of conclusions or consequents: And a habit of the Will ad finem, is a Disposition to the choice and use of the known means; but not strictly a habit to them. XV. Motion tendeth to further motion. One Act of the Soul disposeth it to or furthereth another: And as water that hath got a Channel and is set in motion, floweth still the same way, and fire by burning, the more forcibly proceedeth to burn; so the Soul by acting, the more readily holdeth on that course of action. XVI. The Soul hath at once more Acts than one, and upon more Objects. As at once it understandeth and willeth, so at once it operateth on and towards the end, and on and in the means. But one of them (specially ad finem) is usually deep, and not observed sensibly by the Agent; And the other is uppermost, and using the sense and fantasy more, and the Spirits, is easily perceived. And so a man in his travel, hath a deep unobserved but most constant and ruling Knowledge and Volition of his end or home; though yet he seem to himself seldom to think of it, but only of things obvious in his way. XVII. By all this its easy to perceive how hard it is to have the formal knowledge of the quiddity of a Habit: when we have presupposed all this before-said, 1. That the Soul is essentially of an active nature, and as naturally contrary or averse to cessation or non-action as a stone is to action: 2. And that it hath inseparably in its nature, an inclination to Truth and Goodness as such, and to its own felicity: 3. And that it hath multitudes of exciting Objects, and extraordinarily awakening Preachers, and Providences, specially dangers and sufferings, naturally apt to excite the Soul into act: 4. And that it hath the use of the sense, and sensitive passions, which things sensible are apt to excite, by which it may be itself excited: 5. And that it hath a certain degree of necessity of knowing by simple perception things received by the sense and fantasy; men may know much of Good and Evil, Duty, Sin, Danger, whether they will or not: 6. And that the Will hath a natural inclination to follow the Intellects apprehensions about Good or Evil, in its Volitions and Nolitions (though not always necessarily:) 7. And that the Soul excited to one Act is the more apt to another of the same sort: 8. And that a cursus actionum with the foresaid inclinations, is like a course of corporal motions, which strongly tendeth to continuation; (so that they that are accustomed to do evil, hardly do well:) 9 And that the potentiae secundae, the sensitive powers, and the Spirits by custom attain the same propensity to that way of action in themselves, and so become to the active Intellect and Will, what the Channel (worn by course) is to the Torrent or River, which with the natural gravity causeth the continuance of its course that same way: Or as a Horse, trained by custom who hath got his own peculiar habit is to the Rider: 10. And that the Soul hath its profound, or not noted Action which is constant, and maketh so little use of the spirits, sense, imagination or passion, as that it is unobserved, while it is predominant, (such as is the aforesaid intention of the end in the use of means: And doubtless the Soul is never unactive an instant, no not in sleep; but hath this kind of deep insensible action. It is knowing itself, loving itself, intending its own Felicity, deeply, secretly, insensibly, without using the memory and imagination, to the Act; and this deep insensible Act is such, as that a man may doubt whether it be not the very thing which we call a habit:) I say now, all these ten things being presupposed (which yet are none of them commonly taken to be the habit of Grace,) How hard is it to us to know, what a habit is indeed beyond all these, and what it is that it addeth to these? We are sure that it is a Disposition, Propensity and Aptitude to holy Action in Specie; But what that Disposition and Propensity is, besides all this forenamed, it is not easy to understand. And yet undoubtedly it is the Operation of the Holy Ghost. XVIII. How hard then must it be to know how much Power, or what kind of Power (and in what sense so called) it is that this superadded habit containeth, beside all the ten forementioned excitations and propensities? And whether it be properly called Power, and how it differeth from the potentiae naturales? XIX. But yet our great Disputes being more about the first act of Faith, which antecedeth the habit, than about any of the acts that follow the habit, the case will be yet harder, what that Power is which the Holy Ghost giveth before the habit of Faith, as to the performance of that particular act. That it suscitateth the natural faculty to act is certain: Therefore in order of nature it must be disposed or inclined to that act, before it act. That the Soul receiveth the Divine influx is certain: But no mortal man knoweth what that is. We commonly conclude that ex parte Dei it is nothing but God himself. By God himself is meant his Act; By his Act is meant his Essence as in Act: But how his Essence is always immutably in equal Act, and yet produceth a world in time, which it produced not from eternity, and how the equal Act or Agency of the Essence is natural, necessary and eternal, and the Effect free; How the Volition is necessary in se, and yet free in every termination and effect ad extra; How a natural-equal-eternal Agency, can produce such wonderful diversity of Effects; And how Souls are said to receive God's Influx, if it be nothing but his Agent Essence; All these are passed the reach of Mortals. XX. And it addeth to these difficulties that we are uncertain what use it is that God maketh of Angels in operating on the Soul. They are ministering Spirits for the good of them that are Heirs of Salvation, about the matters of their Salvation. It is absurd to think that Devils (whose very powerful Operations on our imagination we surely feel,) have more power to put evil thoughts into us, and stir up evil passions in us, than Angels good ones. And seeing a Spirit is more active than a Body, they that take the Sun to be a Body, and perceive that its Beams and Virtue, of Light, and Heat, and Motion, is extended to this Earth and incomparably further in a minute, should not take an Angel to be like a stone or staff, that moveth no where but where it corporally toucheth, and is no where, but where it moveth. XXI. And all Motion and Action hath so many impediments in the world, and all Active Natures (as fire) have so strong a natural inclination to act when they are not hindered by a greater Power, that we little know how much of the action of the Soul is promoted by removing impediments, internal and external: As they that damn up the water all ways save one, do force it to rise, (if it be a stream) till it flow that one way. Embittering all other things to a Soul, doth much to turn its thoughts towards God; and despair of any delight or felicity on Earth, maketh Heaven regarded. XXII. Seeing all naturally-necessary Concauses, Objects, Media are supposed to the Ratio formalis of Power, (which is Relative ad possibile) he that giveth or taketh away any one of those necessaries, doth give or take away Power, though he never change the Soul or faculty at all. And this is called A moral collation or causation of Power (not a moral Power). As when a man bringeth a Light into a dark Room, he enableth us to see; or if he bring in a Book, he enableth me to read that which else I could not have read: If he open the Windows, or if he cure me of blindness, by cutting a Suffusion, etc. So he that preacheth the Gospel to them that had not heard it, and God when he gave Christ and the Gospel to be an Object of Faith, did make the natural faculty to be more in sensu naturali, potentiam ad hoc, to which before it was no power, but hypothetically only. XXIII. The Will is not a Power of choosing or willing an unknown good: Therefore it may be truly said to be naturally unable to will that which the Intellect perceiveth not to be good. And he that giveth knowledge to such a Mind, doth truly give more power to the Will, as the loss of knowledge▪ is its loss of power. Though the Will itself should receive no habitual alteration by it. XXIV. We must not conceive of the suscitation of an active nature, as we do of the motion of dead matter, which is merely passive: But as of that which is passive indeed from God and superior Causes, but active in itself, and on inferiors; (And I think like the Sun beams, passive from no lower nature, save by stop or resistance of its own activity.) XXV. As the Scotists distinguish Passive (Receptive) Power, into natural (which is naturally disposed to the form received), and violent (which is averse or opposite to the form) or neutral (which is indifferent), and affirm the Soul to have the first sort of passive power (natural) to the love of God and supernatural felicity; so the distinction is sound, and their assertion is true as to the nature of the Soul in itself considered, (for it was made to love God). But accidentally by reason of adventitious pravity, it is but potentia passiva violenta: for the the carnal mind is enmity to God, and neither is nor can be subject to his Law. So that it is both natural and violent in several respects. XXVI. As for the great question, what is a moral Power? I answer, 1. Power may be called Moral ab objecto, because it is ad mores, and so our natural power is moral, and actus humanus and actus moralis are oft put for Synonima's. 2. Power may be called moral from the way of effecting it. And so our natural Powers also are moral; not in the Essence of the Soul, but in the Relative form of the power in specie vel individuo ad hoc objectum: For he that causeth or revealeth the Object, doth by moral causation give us a natural power ad hoc. 3. Power is called moral, formally; In that of itself it is a moral Virtue or Vice, Good or Evil: which yet could not be true if it were but mere power: For morality consisteth formally and primarily in the Will or Voluntary: And to be able to do Good or Evil, as such, is not formally any moral Good or Evil, (but natural): But Disposition is. 4. Power is called Moral, Analogically and Reputatively, as causa finalis is said to cause, when it is called a moral cause, and the operation metaphorical, or as he is called a moral cause who persuadeth to the End or Object. And so we take the word [Moral Power] in our question. And so the received Impress or Influx of Divine Agency, as also the habits of Grace in the Soul, are an Analogical Power; because they are necessary to the natural powers performance of the Act: And so the suscitation (as received) of a dormant active power, may be called Analogically a Power: And the right disposition of a power may be called a power: And the deep fore▪ described Action of the Soul, may be called a power to other sensible Acts. XXVII. Next to this moral power, is potentia logica which is but the name of Power given extrinsically from some other thing, without which the effect will never be, though it be possible, and the Causes have power sufficient. And the name of Impossibility de effectu is oftener and more tolerably here used, than of impotency as in the cause. So we say that whatsoever God willeth or decreeth is possible, and what he nilleth absolutely is impossible: And thence some say, That God can do it because be will, and he cannot do what he will not: And so we say, that in sens● composito an undisposed or averse Will cannot love or will aright; when perhaps no more than a Logical impotency is meant, viz. That these two Propositions cannot possibly be both true [Judas is undisposed to Love and Justice] and [Judas at the same time doth exercise Love and Justice] speaking of a predominant disposition. And this is but a denomination of the same sense, as necessitas consequentiae vel logica is, as distinct from necessitas consequentis vel effecti. And so we say, that he that is fore-decreed, yea or fore-known to be good cannot be bad: The meaning is not that he wanteth true power to be bad: But that in ordine dicendi these two cannot possibly be true, [Peter is decreed by God, or fore-known to be a Saint,] and [Peter will not be a Saint]. And this logical impossibility is meant oft in Scripture, as Joh. 12. 39 Therefore they could not believe, because that Isaiah saith, etc. not that this hindered them: but logically the consequentia, both these could not be true [that Esaia's Prophecy should be true, and yet that the Person prophesied of should be Obedient]. And so the words [the Scripture must be fulfilled] and [that the Scriptures might be fulfilled] are oft used, as to the inference. XXVIII. Thus by extrinsic denomination and connotation, impotency is oft imputed to the Agent from the incapacity of the Recipient: As it is said, Mark 6. 5. That Christ could do no mighty work there, because of their unbelief: When as this was not from a disability in Christ to have done it, if he would: But here it is first supposed that God hath ordinately fore-decreed to do no such Works, but where the persons were so qualified as to be capable of them; And than that the persons there were unqualified: And so the Effect was logically impossible, in sensu composito. Thus we say, That [God cannot save Unbelievers, he cannot hear the prayers of the Wicked, he cannot forsake the Faithful]: that is, [His Ordination and Decree supposed, logically such a thing cannot consist with it in verity.] XXIX. When something else, and not impotency, doth ascertain an event, by omission, or something besides Power ascertaineth the contrary efficiently, yet the effect is oft denominated possible or impossible, and ascribed to Power or Impotency, by a conjunction of this moral and logical denomination. So we say, That [God's pure eyes cannot behold Iniquity, that God cannot love the Workers of Iniquity as such.] Not for want of Power, but by reason of his perfect Will and Nature. So God cannot lie, Tit. 1. 2. And it is impossible for God to lie. God cannot deny himself, 2 Tim. 2. 13. God cannot be tempted with evil, Jam. 1. 13. So Joh. 10. 35. The Scripture cannot be broken. Isa. 1. 13. Your Assemblies I cannot away with. No wonder also if this be said of men: As, 1. Joh. 3. 9 He cannot sin, because he is born of God. Not for want of power, but partly he will not, and partly logically these cannot consist. So of the wicked, Joh. 7. 7. The World cannot hate you—. XXX. Oft times the word [Cannot] is taken politically, I cannot, that is, I must not, or I cannot lawfully: Quod turpe, impossibile. Gen. 19 22. I cannot do any thing, till thou be come out. Act. 10. 47. Can any man forbidden water, etc. that is, lawfully. 2 Cor. 13. 8. [We can do nothing against the Truth,] that is, by Authority from God. XXXI. Oft times in Scripture the word [Cannot] is meant only of that which a man cannot do without suffering, or loss, or difficutly. So Act. 4. 16. We cannot deny it,] that is, without the shame of falsehood. Luk. 14. 20. I cannot come,] that is, without such inconvenience as I am unwilling to bear. Jer. 29. 17. They cannot be eaten,] that is, without loathing. 1 Sam. 25. 17. He is such a Son of Belial, that a man cannot speak to him,] that is, without inconvenience by it. 2 Sam. 23. 6. They cannot be taken with hands,] that is, without hurt. Gen. 34. 14. We cannot do this thing,] that is, without God. XXXII. Oft times this inconvenience procuring unwillingness, this unwillingness is named like impotency, and it is said, Men cannot, because they will not. And so it is in divers of the last cited instances. Joh. 3. 9 They cannot sin,] that is, They will not. Luk. 14. 20. I have married a wife, and therefore I cannot come,] that is, I will not, because I cannot without this inconvenience. Neh. 6. 3. I cannot come down,] that is, I will not. Gen. 44. 26. We cannot go down. Josh. 24. 19 Ye cannot serve the Lord; for he is a holy God: that is, you are not disposed to do it holily, and then he will destroy you. Joh. 6. 60. This is a hard saying, who can hear it?] that is, willingly. Isa. 49. 15. Can a woman forget her sucking-Child?] that is, will she forget it? Jer. 2. 32. Can a Maid forget her Ornaments? Mar. 2. 19 Can the Children of the Bridegroom fast? etc. Mar. 9 39 Can ye drink of the Cup that I drink of, and be baptised? etc. 39 They said unto him, we can,] that is, Have you Wills disposed for such sufferings, and will you go through them? And this unwillingness when it is habitual and prevalent, is it that is commonly called man's moral impotency, as to believe, love, obey, etc. XXXIII. This impotency which is the moral pravity of the Will hath divers degrees: And the same degree of received help from God, will not cure it in one that will in another. The godly have some of it, and the ungodly more, and some of them more than others. But we use to call it absolutely a moral impotency, when the indisposition of the Soul is such, as that none such ever do believe and consent without more help of Grace than yet they have received. And we use to say that he is morally able, or hath power, whose indisposition is not so great nor Grace so small, but that some in that case by that same help do believe and consent, though it be rarely. But that power is morally called impotency, which no man ever reduceth to act. XXXIV. This moral Power is yet short both of Act and Habit; For a Habit is not only a power to Act, but to Act promptly, and easily, and aright. XXXV. By all this you may partly see how to answer the common questions about men's power or impotency to believe, and to love God. Quest. 1. Is every man able to believe, and love God? Answ. Every man hath that natural faculty, which hath sufficient of that sort of power called natural, to do it, supposing necessary concurrents. Quest. 2. Is any man naturally able, without Divine support and concourse, and without necessary Objects, Concauses and Media? Answ. No: no more than to make himself an Angel. He never had such power in Innocency. Quest. 3. * That Potentia peccandi is of God, see Aureolus in 2. d. 44. art. 2. pag. 327. 328. Utrum praecept● supernaturalia possit bomo servare fine specia●i auxilio gratiae? Resp. Quod non: quia ipsa neque●nt servari nisi eliciendo actus insusarum virtutum, etc. Carera sum. Theol. 2. 2. c. 1. And what would you have higher than his▪ q. 4. a. 1. An l●men supernaturale infusum fidei fit tota virtus agendi actum fidei? Resp. Ass-Quia actus fidei est quoad omnem rationem ●odum, substantiam, denominationem, quidditatem, supernaturalis: ejus vita in actu secundo supernaturalis, Deum & authorem supernaturalem attingens, nec continetur intra vires & ordinem naturae, & intellectus creatus suapt● natura est ad illam improportionatus, p. 38. 39 So other Thomists. But here wanteth some explication of supernaturality. Yea they assert (ut idem ibid. p. 39, etc.) That the Intellect hath not so much as a potentia obedientialis activa, but only passiva to the act of Faith; but conceive that the supernatural infused Grace of Faith is as necessary to enable the faculty to that act, as the faculty to the Essence of the Soul therein. Though yet they grant that the Intellect is causa fidei principalis, as the essence is which yet can do nothing but by the faculty: And thus they make potentiam fundari in potentia, which Dr. Twisse denieth. But a hard question troubleth some of the Schoolmen, seeing saith is wholly supernatural, and God's work, and it was so in the Jews that believed that Christ was to come; if that Faith continued in any some time after (as in Nathanael, etc.) Whether God still caused it when it became false as he did before? which must needs put them upon some exception: They say, How it is fides humana, but per opporentiam divinam, & D●us omnium dominus efficere potest ut quis ●li●●●ecidat fin● pacc●●o (Idem, ibid.) But a further answer may and must be given; which will be useful to the Case before us, when conside ed. Of which in due place. Is a man able to sin, if God Decree he shall not; or able to forbear sin, or obey, if God foreknow that he will not? Answ. Yes: for God is not supposed to decree or foresee that he shall not be able; nay, if God foresee that he will not do what he can, it inferreth that he can. But the event is a logical impossibility; that is, it is not true that it will be. Quest. 4. Is the Intellect truly informed, able to set right an habitually undisposed Will? Answ. It is able to do that towards it which on a better disposed Will would be effectual: But not to produce the effect. Quest. 5. Is a power not excited to Act, able to do that act? Answ. The question is, Whether a power not excited be a power? Yes, It is a Power, but such as will not act till excited. Quest. 6. Is that Grace which exciteth our Powers, another second Power? Answ. It is the excitation of a Power; or a received impulse: Call it Power or what you will, so you trouble not the Church with a needless wrangling about a Name, when there are others as fit. Quest. 7. Is a Habit a Power? Answ. It is somewhat not well known by man; But we know that it is less than the natural Power, in point of substantiality, as being but an Accident: But it is more than both natural and moral power, in order of perfection to the act: For to be able and prompt is more than to be merely able. Quest. 8. Is a hindered Power truly a Power? Answ. If the hindrance be such as the faculty is not able to overcome, it is not formally a power ad hoc: But otherwise it is. Quest. 9 Can God make a man able without any change on himself, to do that which he was unable for? Answ. Yes: If his disability lay in the want of extrinsic Concauses, Objects, or Media. Quest. 10. May a mere change of the Understanding enable the Will to do what it could not do? Answ. Not what it had not a natural Power to do: But what it wanted but a moral power or disposition to do; it may in two cases, 1. If God do powerfully illuminate the Understanding, and by the Understanding powerfully operate on the Will: Or in ordinary cases, if the understandings acts be clear and strong. 2. If the Will itself be not obstinately before ill disposed. Quest. 11. Is an unwilling Will able to excite or change itself? Answ. Even in the point of believing, it hath natural power and liberty to act otherwise than it doth, even to turn itself from the act of Unbelief to the act of Faith: But being undisposed and ill disposed, it will not do that which it hath a natural self-determining power to do; till God assist it or turn it by his Grace. Quest. 12. Can any man believe that Will? Answ. 1. A man that knoweth not the Gospel, or what to believe, upon a general rumour of it, may wish that he had it, knew it, and believed it: And yet cannot believe it indeed, till he know what to believe. 2. A man that perceiveth not the evidence of verity or credibility in the Gospel, and therefore believeth it not to be true▪ may for the end and matter wish he could see evidence of truth and believe it; And yet is not able, till he see it. And a Believer that believeth it weakly, may wish to believe it more strongly than he can. 3. One that consenteth not to leave his lusts for Christ, may know so much of the wisdom and happiness of those that can consent, as to wish he had such a Will himself, and that he were one of them: And yet may be morally unable, that is, unwilling so to do. For it's one thing to will Christ and Holiness for itself and God, and it's another thing to will to have such a Will. A man's own Will may be the Object of his Will, for fear of punishment, and so he may wish that he had a better heart, lest he be damned; when yet he loveth not Holiness for itself. In a word, 1. He that willeth God, Holiness, Christ, as they are, as better than all the World. 2. And that with a serious effectual Will, shall have what he willeth: And he that willeth such a Will, as part of God's holy Image, and for itself, above the pleasures of his Flesh, shall have it, yea already hath it. But a man may will such a Will, yea and Christ, and God himself, in a false notion, as minus malum, as not so bad as Hell, but less amiable than sinful pleasures, and yet be graceless, and undisposed to believe. The rest I pretermit. XXXVI. The Intellect as such understandeth necessarily per modu●● naturae: And therefore as such, its disposition or indisposition is not morally good or evil; And as it hath no freedom, so these habits or dispositions are but the accidental perfections or imperfections of a natural power, and participate of the natural necessity of that power: But the same Intellect, so far as it is under the power of the Will, and imperate, is the subject of moral acts and habits; and so as secondarily moral, they are secondarily free. XXXVII. To conclude, as Augustine saith, We use in common speech to distinguish Power and Will: and from one we say, Men are able, and can do this or that: and from the other we say, They will or will not. And both habitual or dispositive and actual willingness or unwillingness is not called usually Strength or Power, but Will: The Will itself hath its proper power to will, for it is a natural faculty: But its habits and acts are better known by the name of willingness and unwillingness, than of power. If therefore men would do as Scripture doth, usually express moral habits and acts by these their best known names, and when we use the terms of Power, Can and Cannot, would do it so rarely and explainedly as to be understood, that it is nothing but moral willingness and unwillingness that we mean, it would do much to end all this Controversy. For he that is puzzled with the question (unexplained) [Whether an Unbeliever can believe, and have power to repent:] would quickly be satisfied if the question were [Whether he be willing habitually, or actually to believe and repent.] And he that is stalled with the question, [Can a Sinner leave his Sin, and love Goodness?] would easily answer, [Whether he be willing to do it?] Yea and [Whether he be disposed or inclined to it?] Yea and [Whether he have a natural faculty of willing, which quoad potentiam naturalem can do otherwise?] A. You have been so tedious and numerous in your Distinctions and Observations, that no plain man is able to follow you. Do you think that poor Christians must be puzzled with all this, and lost in a multitude of distinctions, before they can know the truth, Whether a man can believe and repent, or not? B. I expected to hear your own mouth condemn you. Quest. 1. Is there any of these distinctions which are unnecessary to the decision of the present Controversy? If there be, name it and lay that by. 2. Is a general and an ambiguous term better understood by the bare ambiguous name, than by opening the particulars contained in it, and the ambiguities? Than Catechisms, and Commentaries, even on our baptismal Covenant, the Creed, Lords Prayer and Decalogue, are hurtful. Do you understand yourself what you mean by your [Power] and [Can] and [Cannot Repent] without considering of the ambiguity? 3. Will it satisfy you, if we use your words [Can] or [Cannot] what sense soever we take them in? Is that all that you contend for? Must the Church be fired about a word, which neither Side much stick at, could they have their sense of it? 4. But the truth is, You open your own shame: that must trouble the ears of honest plain Christians, with words which cannot be understood without all this ado; and will choose such terms as have so many meanings, to confound, or bewilder men, and that without explication; and even in strict disputes, and not only in Oratory; when as there are plainer enough at hand, which speak the matter as we are agreed. A. You tell us a great deal of habits of the Will, which are more than Power (in order to Action). But I find that some men of our Party hold, that there is no such thing in the Soul as an habit or disposition which is not merely a Power or an Act: They know no more. B. The truth is, too many on the other side, who know not how much they destroy their own work by overdoing, and use to fear but one extreme, do harp so much upon this string, that no wicked man is able to repent, or hath power to believe, or c●n forsake his s●●▪ that they have ignorantly given you the advantage which you lay hold on, 1. To call Grace still by the name of a mere power, and 2. Then to disgrace their Opinion, who say that God damneth men for doing that which, they are utterly unable to do. A. What is the advantage which you think we take by this? B. * Mark what Pet. a. S. Joseph saith, Thes. Univers. pag. 236. de Charit. Dare facilitatem agendi spectat ad virtutes acquisitas, no● autem ad infusas, quae solam agendi potentiam ●ribuunt. So that proper habits by this are nothing but acquired, which yet at other times he denieth. Herveus in Quodlib. 1. q. 13. undertaketh to show the difference inter potentiam & habitum, though habitus be potentia in a large sense as it is taken pro omni principio activo & passivo: And he taketh the substantia actus (as it's called) to be more reducible ad potentiam, and the modu● to the habit. But he leaveth the difference still in the dark. And Quodlib. 3. qu. 7. he is larger of it, and saith that a habit is [Dispositio potentiae pe quam disponitur ad actum] and that it supposeth a Power not sufficient to determine itself to prompt and facile action. The greatest that you have against your Adversaries. 1. By the first you make Grace to be no determiner of the Will at all, habitual or actual: For Grace, you say, giveth men but a power to believe and repent▪ And so whether a man will use that power or not, and will actually repent and believe or not, is never the more ascertained for Grace, if it give men but a power. For you leave it still to freewill to use that power or not use it. (I speak but of some of you.) 2. And hereby you contrive Grace into this conception, that it is but some common thing like nature, and as a man that hath power to sit, or stand, or go, may use that power as he will himself; so all men where the Gospel cometh have a power to obey it, which they may use as they will: But to the Will itself Grace giveth but this power: And if that were true that a habit of the Will were but a power to will, fair fall Pelagius. A. It's well you charge us not all with that Opinion; But I confess I am not yet satisfied that it is false, and that the Will hath any thing but power and act: But power facilitateth the act. B. You may say it facilitateth, because ●it maketh it possible, which is easier than that which is impossible? Is that facility? But mark. 1. If that Opinion be true, than 1. God's inward workings are not suitable to his outward means: For his means are Persuasions, and Exhortations, and Mercies, and Corrections, which are not only to make men able, but willing: And if they make them willing, they do in primo instanti dispose them to be willing, and then procure actual willingness, and then fix the Will in an habitual propensity. 2. If that Doctrine be true, than a habit hath no moral good or evil in it, it is no Virtue or Vice: And then there is no Virtue or Vice, that is, no such thing as moral Habits, but only Acts. For no man should call mere power or impotency, which is neither habitual, dispositive or actual willingness or unwillingness, by the name of Virtue or Vice. It is not goodness merely to be able to do good, nor evil to be able to do evil; unless as eating, walking may be good or bad materially by participation, so far as voluntary. 3. If that Doctrine be true, the Will as a Will should be an unsanctified or unrenewed faculty, further than it is found in action. For its disposition is its holiness and rectitude. 4. And a man should have no Grace in his sleep, or when he is minding natural things alone; unless you will say, as I hinted before, that sleeping and waking he hath still a Latent insensible Volition in act, which is it that we call a habit: But if you acknowledge such a habit, (even a fixed latent deep constant act inclining to other holy acts) the strife than is but about a name. 5. It is certain, that the Soul hath in it besides power and observed acts, a natural inseparable inclination. The form of the Soul is not only potentia, but potentia seu vis vel virtus inclinata; Man is not only able to love good as good, and felicity as such, and sensible Pleasure as such, but he is inclined to it. And if there be such a thing as natural inclination or propensity, besides power and act, than 1. It is possible and probable there may be a gracious inclination. 2. Yea and if the whole Soul be sanctified, must not its inclination be sanctified? 6. Why else are we said to be New Creatures, and have soft and tender hearts, and to be made partakers of the Divine Nature? Nature in active things, is a principle inclined to action, and not only able for it. And surely a Divine Nature can signify no less than an inclination to holiness and the love of God. 7. Whence can you imagine that a wicked man should rise every morning so ready to go on in wickedness again (that sleep doth not end his sin,) yea that he is so obstinate in such acts, if besides the act he hath nothing but a power to do evil? If you say that it is also a disability to do better or forbear; 1. You will extenuate his sin, by saying that he can do no better. 2. Experience telleth you that his sin is sensuality: And Appetite (inordinate which ruleth him) is more than Power, Impotency or Act; It is also an inclination to that Act. 8. No doubt but each faculty hath Grace suited to its nature and use: And therefore as the potentia vitalis activa & executiva, hath its power and vivacity, so the Intellect hath Illumination, and the Will holy Love, in disposition and in act. 9 Lastly, The Scripture calleth that which is given us by the name of the Spirit of God, (and I would the Church would hold to that name, and say, Men have or have not the Spirit of holiness:) But the word Spirit cannot be judged to signify nothing but power and act. Yea it is expressly named in reference to our three sanctified faculties, the Spirit of Power, and of Love, and of a sound Mind, 2 Tim. 1. 7. And the Spirit of Love or Adoption (Gal. 4. 6. Rom. 18. 16, 26.) is not only a power to love: A Child hath more than a power to love a Father; It is a filial loving nature which is called our regenerate state. And if it were only the Act also, why is it called a Spirit and Nature. A. To confess the truth you have said much to prove that we have ill managed this Controversy about Power and Impotency, to repent and believe: And for my part I mean hereafter to use most the common and Scripture phrase, and say as to the efficient, that men have or have not the Spirit, and as to the effect, that Power, Disposition, or Inclination, Act or Habit, are things to us observable in the Soul, and that cannot and will not, must not be confounded. And if it be moral or logical Power that I speak of, I will mention it properly as it is in the effect or event, called Possible or Impossible, rather than as it connoteth the faculty called Potent or Impotent thereto, lest I deceive men: And I will let them perceive an impossibility of consequence, from an impotency of sufficiency: For I know that when it's true, that logically in ordine dicendi it cannot be, (that is, be true,) that [God forseeth or decreeth that Peter will not sin,] and yet that [he will sin]; yet it is not true that [Peter had not power to sin]. But I proceed. The third Crimination. A. They make man so corrupted, and that by Adam's sin without his own consent, as that there is no good in him; But he is dead in sin: And so all men should be utterly and equally wicked. B. * Melanct: Loc. Com. de lib. arb. c. 7. Etsi peccatum Originis vitiat naturam, non prorsus aufert eam, nec delet nec mutat eam in aliam speciem. Et sp. sanctus non abolet, sed adolet naturam, non destruit, sed sanat. Et Ambros. de Voc. Gent. l. 1. c. 3. Nec quia spiritu Dei agitur, ideo putet se libero arb. career: quiae nec tunc perdidit, quando diabolo voluntate se dedit, a quo judicium voluntatis depravatum est, non ablatum: Non enim homo voluntate, sed voluntatis sanitate privatus est: cum a diabolo spoliaretur: cum igitur homo ad pietatem redit non alia in co creatur substantia, sed eadem quae fuerat labefactata repar●tur. The answer to the former might serve to this: But still I see that Names must be our quarrel. Is the question of the Thing, or of the Name, whether it be to be called Good? 1. As to the thing, they deny not that there are first notices and common principles of morality in all men's understandings. 2. Nor that the Intellect is inclined to truth as truth. 3. Nor that the Will is inclined to good as good. 4. Nor that natural Conscience doth somewhat for God and Duty, and against Sin in bad men. 5. Nor that a Heathen may have as much good as experience proveth some of them to have had, as Antonine, Alexander Severus, Cato, Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, Plutarch, Socrates, Plato, etc. 6. Nor that common Grace when the Gospel cometh may prepare them for special Grace, and make them almost sanctified Believers. In a word, almost all agree, that 1. Nature, as now upheld by Mercy, may have all the good aforesaid. 2. That common Grace with the Gospel may go further. 3. And that it prepareth for special saving Grace. If you deny this, you accuse them contrary to the fullest evidence that you could expect, whilst our British Divines at Dort tell you so largely how far universal or common Grace goeth in this preparing work; and when there are such a multitude of Treatises, written by the strictest English Antiarminians on two Subjects, 1. Of preparation to Conversion. 2. How far an Hypocrite (or unregenerate Person) may go in Christianity, (the Title of one of Perkins' Books.) 2. But if it be de nomine, whether this may be called good, it is a question unfit to trouble the Church with. All are agreed that is materially something commanded by God, partly conformable to the Law of Nature or Scripture, and that it tendeth towards the welfare of him that hath it, and of others; and is better than its contrary. But if we m●st set up a metaphysical Theatre to dispute de ratione Boni, by that time (on as good reason) we have prosecuted our disputes de ratione entis, uni●s & veri also, we may fall out with all that agree not, in Suarez his Metaphysics, or at least in Aquinas or Buridanes' Ethics. I pray you begin yourself, and tell me what is bonum, goodness, in your question? A. You shall not tempt me into so difficult a metaphysical or moral dispute, which I know the learned are so little agreed in: For you would but make use of it to insult over me. B. And yet is this one of your Accusations of your Brethren, that they agree not with you in the sense of such a word, as you dare not definitively tell your own sense of? Moral good in man is his conformity to the holy regulating Will of God, by resignation of ourselves to him as our Owner, subjection to him as our Ruler, and love to him as our End, or perfect Good, with all the exercise of these. Now, 1. In the strictest sense, men say, Bon●mest ex causis integris, and so where there is any sin, there is not good in that sense; that is, unmixed perfect good: And in that (with a more transcendent) sense Christ saith, That none is good save God only: I hope you will not quarrel with him for it. And yet the Papists commonly reproach the Protestants, as teaching that all that we do is sin, and no good, because we say that all is mixed with sin, and imperfectly good. I profess for myself, that I never loved, trusted, feared, obeyed God in all my life without imperfection: And I take that imperfection of my love to God, etc. to be the great and grievous sin of my Soul; so that I groan out all my days; the last dying-words of Archbishop Usher, Lord, forgive my Sins of Omission; And if the Schoolmen almost agree, that moral evil is privatio boni, methinks a Papist should hardly dream that his greatest Faith and Love have no degree of such privation. 2. But as the word [Good] signifieth that which is sincerely so though imperfectly, being more predominant in heart and life, than the contrary evil, and proveth the persons acceptation with God, and right to Salvation, and is the imperfect Image of God's holiness repaired, so all and only the sanctified are good. 3. But in the third sense, as goodness signifieth, such Inclinations and Actions as are good but in a low degree, and bade predominantly; so none deny but bad men have some good Inclinations and Actions. And de nomine here Divines agree not, either Protestants or Papists: some (and most commonly) call all such Actions good in their degree; Others say, That quia finis deest, none of it is to be called properly good. It may end all, to say that it is good analogically, as accidens is ens: or secundum quid, though not simpliciter. The fourth Crimination. A. * So do the Jesuits, as you may see in Vasqu. in 1. Tho. q. 23. & passive. They damn multitudes of Infants for Original Sin, which they could not avoid; yea and the Adult too as necessitated by it to sin, for the prevention or cure of which they have no remedy; especially all the Heathen World, in comparison of which, from Adam's days till now the rest are very few: so that they make the World to be made or born purposely for unavoidable damnation in Hell fire. B. Here are several things which must be distinctly spoken to, I. Of Infants. II. Of the state of the Heathen World. III. Of the necessity of sinning. iv Of the necessity of punishment for sin. Of these in order. 1. For the case of Infants, there are three questions to be handled, 1. Whether they have Original Sin? 2. Whether they are worthy of punishment for it? 3. Whether they are punished for it, and how many, and how? 1. For the first, I have proved in a peculiar Disputation, that Infants have Original Sin, that is, moral Pravity in disposition, with their participation in the guilt of Adam's sin, as being seminally and virtually in him. And I find you not yet denying it. 2. For the second, no Christian doubteth, I think, but that all sin deserveth punishment; But the desert of Actual Sin and of Original Sin are as different as the nature of the sin. Habitual or Dispositive Pravity is a Dispositive preparation or worthiness of punishment: And actual Sin, is an actual preparation for it, but all deserve it; that is, are Subjects morally fit for it, to demonstrate holy Justice. 3. For the third, Scripture and experience put it past controversy, that Infants suffer: For, 1. They are deprived of the Spirit of Holiness, as quickly appeareth by their early practice. Which privation is the greatest punishment here. 2. They are hereupon left to the power of their own Corruption; which desertion is a grievous punishment. 3. They have pain and sorrow. 4. And they die. And if they have all this suffering here, it is unlikely that they are wholly free hereafter, if not pardoned: Because, 1. They have immortal Souls that are capable. 2. And future as well as temporal death or misery is the wages of sin. And that their suffering is for sin, is undoubted, from Rom. 5, etc. And the Pelagians scarce deny but that Adam's sin caused it. And if it be proved that they have moral pravity, or sin of their own, than it is for their own sin. And if so, it is their own punishment. All the doubt than is, Whether all Infants are forgiven. And for that, 1. We see that the temporal punishment is not forgiven them. 2. We see as soon as they come to action, that to many at least, the foresaid penal desertion and privation of the Spirit of Sanctification is not forgiven them: And 3. Without holiness none can see God. 4. They that affirm it must prove it: which they neither do, nor can do. There is no word of Scripture which telleth it us. How then should that be part of our Faith, which is no part of God's Word? If you say that Christ, being the second Adam, saveth the World from all the sin and misery brought on them by the first Adam; I answer, 1. Conditionally he doth: He hath purchased Salvation to be given men on the terms of the Covenant of Grace, and all that perform the Conditions shall have Salvation. But 2. His bare Sacrifice itself without such application saveth none, any further than to bring them under the terms of the said Covenant. It is apparent by experience, that Christ doth not undo all the hurt that Adam did; immediately to all, or any one in the world, no not till death, no nor till the Resurrection. Sin and misery is still upon us. Infants show as soon as they come to the use of reason, that they were not brought to the Innocency that Adam had before the Fall. You yourselves distinguish the Impetration from the Application of Salvation as to the adult, and the reason is the same as to Infants, though the condition be not the same. Show us a promise of the Salvation of all Infants, and we will believe it. 5. Indeed they are saved conditionally as the adult are; and the condition is expressed in Scripture, [That they be the Children of the Faithful, dedicated to God.] The Parents and their Seed are in the same Covenant. And this is all that God revealeth of them. * Saith Twisse Cont. Corvin. pag. 136. c. 2: De Infantibus infantia sua morientibus falsum est quod nobis obtrudit: Neque enim dicimus ullos Infantes credentium & foederatorum Dei in infantia decedentes ad exitium destinatos: Sanctos enim eos pronunciat Apostolus. Et una cum parentibus fidelibus in foedere Dei comprehenduntur. But I doubt he befriendeth the Anabaptists more than he was ware of, when he addeth, [Obsignant (Sacramenta) credentibus remissionem peccatorum & vitam aeternam: At Infantibus quoties administratur Baptismus, non tam credentibus quam credituris obsignat promissiones istas: Non credituris autem nihil obsignant. If so, then to them that die in Infancy, or yet are Infants no pardon is delivered and sealed by Baptism: which is not sound. Of our guilt of nearer Parents Sin. Let them that reject me in this, hear Augustine, in Enchirid. c. 46. Pa●entum quoque peccatis parvul●● obligari, non solum primorum hominum, sed etiam suorum de quibus ipsi nati sunt, non improbabiliter dicitur: Illa quippe divina sententia, R●ddam peccata patrum in▪ filios, tenet hos utique antequam per regenerationem ad testamentum novum incipiant poenitere.— Reperiuntur plura peccata & alia parentum quae etsi non ita possunt mutare naturam, reatu tamen obligant filios, nisi gra●uita gratia & miserecordia divina subveniat. But whether God do also, without a Promise, save any of the Children of the Heathen World, or of wicked Parents? and how many? and with what Salvation? and also what degree of punishment they have in the life to come, we take for unrevealed things, which we are so far from making Articles of our Faith, that we take it to be presumptuous arrogancy to dispute it, and meddle with the Secrets of the Almighty. The Papists themselves are not agreed whether Infants have only the poenam damni as shut out of Heaven, or also poenam sensus? Jansenius and many more (yea most) have written for the first; and Petavius and others for the latter. But secret things belong to God. A. We cannot prove that all Infants are saved, nor do we presume to tell you what Salvation it, is that they shall have; But we hope the best: And I am glad to find that you take the Salvation of true Believers dying Infants to be sure (by the same Covenant which pardoneth their Parents), and that you do not peremptorily condemn all the rest. B. You know that the Synod of Dort have said the same that I do of true Believers Children, Art. 1. Sect. 17. and the rest they meddle not with. A. But I pray you tell me your thoughts, Whether Infants themselves do perish for Adam's sin alone? And what remedy is provided for them? B. The whole tenor of the Scripture putteth me past doubt, that Divines have strangely erred, by overlooking the common Interest and Communion of all Parents and Children, and appropriating our Original Gild to Adam's sin alone: But this requireth a larger Disputation by itself. At present consider, 1. That no Text of Scripture doth so appropriate it, or make Adam only the Corrupter of our Natures: But only maketh him the Original of our Gild and Pravity, as he was the Original of our Nature: And so he only is the Original of our Death and Punishment. 2. That the whole scope of Scripture containeth Promises and Penalties to Children with the Parents, for and by the Parent's sins, more plainly than any was antecedently expressed of Adam's Posterity as his: Yea the very Moral Law in the Second Commandment, and in the Proclamation of God's Name and Nature to Moses, Exod. 34. 6, 7. which nothing but prejudice and partiality can deny to be a valid proof, of a secondary Birth sin derived to us. And he that will read the Sacred History from the Curse on the Seed of Cain, and Cham, of the Case of Ishmael, Esau, Moab, Amnon, saul's grandchildren hanged, and so on to Matth. 23. 38. [On this Generation shall come all the righteous blood, etc.] And [His blood be on us, and on our Children,] with all the Promises to the Seed of the Righteous only, and Threatening to the Houses and Seed of the Wicked, with the reason of Infant-Baptism itself, 1 Cor. 7. [Else were your Children unclean, but now are they holy]; will soon be convinced that we are born under more guilt and punishment than what we derive from Adam. 3. And even Adam's sin could not be, or is not made ours immediately, but as we derive it from our nearer▪ Parent's: For our nature is no otherwise from him. Why am I guilty of what Adam did, but because I have a nature that was seminally in him? And was it not proximately in my nearer Parents? And can they convey their part of Adam's guilt and pravity to me, and no other? 4. And few sober men can deny, but that the Children of some Glutton's, Drunkards, Fornicators, etc. derive extraordinary diseased, and vitiously-inclined temperaments from their nearest Parents. 5. And no peculiar reason can truly be given for our guilt or pravity from Adam, which reacheth not to prove the derivation of the like from our nearer Parents, save only, 1. That Adam only was the Original. 2. And in Adam we sinned under a Covenant that gave no pardon: But now under a Covenant of Grace. A. If this hold, it will make easy the Doctrine of Original Sin, which I confess to you that I have been inclined to doubt of, by your Divines fastening all upon God's Arbitrary Imputation, rather than from the children's seminal in-being. B. Doubtless they have much tempted Arminius, Episcopius, Arnoldus Corvinus, Bishop Jer. Taylor, and others, to say so much against Original Sin as they have done, by feigning an (unproved) arbitrary Covenant of God made with Adam and his Posterity which was no Law of Nature, nor is made to any other since, (according to the change of the Covenant), and by which God imputeth Adam's sin to us, not because we were in his Loins (for then it would extend to others), but because it was his Will to do so; As if it had been God and not Adam that defiled our Natures, and made us all Sinners, by an unnecessary, if not ungrounded imputation. By which also they have kept men from knowing their secondary birth-sin. * Dr. Twisse frequently speaketh rightlier of the reason of the imputation of Adam's sin. The Church of England prayeth not for the Dead, but for the Living, when it saith, Remember not our Iniquity, nor the Iniquity of our forefather's: And Nehemiah and Daniel were of the same mind. A. But they say that than our Sins would increase as Ages go on, and the last Age would be the most sinful. B. Men will say almost any thing in their partiality, while they look but on one side. 1. The Covenant is now changed which men sin under: Not so as not to extend to Children: But it is now a pardoning Covenant; And when the sins of the Fathers are pardoned to themselves, they are pardoned to their Infants dedicated to God in the same Covenant, even by the same. 2. But where they are unpardoned, there is a certain sort and degree of guilt increased on the Posterity; and so no wonder if many Kingdoms of Heathens and Infidels feel it. 3. But as it is not so much to have a nature essentially derived from Parents, and to be seminally in them, as it is to be a sinning person, so the guilt proportionably differeth. 4. And there is a pardon of some temporal punishments which God giveth some bad men in this life. 5. And as to the punishment in Hell, there is a certain degree, that God will not exceed in hi● execution, and that humane nature, as it is, is capable of no more. And a man may have many Obligations to one and the same punishment, as he may to the same duty; and so a man is but hanged or put to death that hath deserved death seven times over among men: For the ends of punishment set the bounds in all executions. A. Well, but what say you to the second; The perishing state of Heathens. B. II. I have said so much in the First Book, that I must refer you thither; Now only saying, 1. That it is first to be considered what Law they are under; 2. And next how they keep it; 3. And then how they are judged by it. 1. Undoubtedly all the World is now under the Law of Grace, as to the essentials, as it was made with all men in Adam and Noah, though not as to the mutable part, which bond men to expect a future Messiah. That Law was made with all Mankind, Gen. 3. 15. and is never repe●●ed to Mankind. The World was under it (as to Obligation) before Christ's Incarnation; And Christ took no benefit from them which they had. Clemens Alexandrinus, and other Fathers, erred not in this to much as some have charged them to do: No man is now under the Covenant of Innocency alone. 2. But how all men keep or break their proper Conditions of this Law of Grace, as they are under it, he that knoweth every man in the World, and all their hearts and deeds can tell, but not I. 3. And no doubt but they are judged as they kept or kept not the Conditions of that Law of Grace which they were under. What difference there is, 1. Between the Conditions to the Christian-Church now, and the Jewish of old. 2. And between the Conditions to the Jewish of old, and the rest of the World, I have showed partly, Lib. 1. But because many self-wise persons are bitterly censorious against me, or any man that speaketh of any possibility of the Salvation of any, save Jews formerly and Christians now: I beseech the sober but to think of this one thing, that Abraham thought there had been fifty righteous persons in Sodom, even when God had told him how much worse it was than other places. How many then proportionably did he think there was in Canaan and all other Countries of the World. By which Abraham's judgement about the Salvation of others is manifest, though he was mistaken in thinking Sodom better than it was. And I desire to be a Son of Abraham, and am not wiser than he. A. This seemeth plain truth, however the World take it: And it is a wonder to me that any good man should take it ill to have so much of God's certain Grace acknowledged. But what say you to the third point, The necessity hence of sinning. B. I have answered it to you before: I now add, 1. It is not a physical necessity from the principles of Nature, but a moral necessity from the pravity of Nature. 2. It is not caused by God, but by sinful man. 3. It is not a necessity of committing all sin, or every particular sin, nor of omitting every duty. 4. It is not an uncurable necessity. 5. God of his free Grace hath provided the remedy himself, and tendered it in some degrees to all. 6. And he appointeth to all men certain duties and means to be used to this end, which they can use. 7. Therefore it is no necessity What cold comfort the Papists give to Infants, and what insufficient Grace they have that die unbaptised, they ●●●●only declare. See ●●●● in 12. q. 111. ●●●● 7. p. 496. of being damned. A. This answereth the fourth Question as to the Adult. But what remedy is there for Infants, especially among Heathens and Unbelievers? B. The same that is for their Parents: They have no sin but by their Parents, and God hath told us of no remedy, but that they be the Children of Believers dedicated to God. It is meet that their remedy come as their sin did. They have no Wills of their own, but be at the will of others. They are in Infancy, as if they were members of their Parents: And as the Hand and Heart doth far as the Head conducteth them, so may Infants here. A. But it's sad that all Infants shall be unsaved, if the Parents consent not. B. It is sad that men destroy themselves: And it is sad that they corrupt their Infants. But what way else would you wish God to save them? A. Certainly to save all dying in infancy. B. 1. And why not as well all at Age? 2. Then men would be tempted to think it the greatest act of mercy in the World, to go with an Army and kill all the Children of Infidels and Heathens, certainly to save them. A. So you may say by the Children of Believers then, if they be saved. B. No: for they have holy Education, under God's Promise, Ordinances and Blessing, and so are in great hope of being publicly serviceable to the Church, and also of attaining a greater degree of Glory. But it's an hundred to one but the Children of Heathens and Infidels, are bred up to be also such themselves. The fifth Crimination. A. They suppose that no man can do any more good than he doth, nor Quod Repro●us non possit gratiam adipisci, non est intelligendum secundum impossibilitatem absoluta● sed conditionatam, qui● reprobatio non subtrabit aliquid de potentia reprobati: Idem dicendum est de praedestinato quem salvari necesse est. Carbo Thom. Compend. 1. q. 23. ●. 3. Bradwardine and some Dominicans are liable to this Objection, but so are few Protestants, and the Synod of D●rt rejecteth it. forbear any more evil, than he forbeareth; Because he is not only predestinated to do just what he doth, and no more or less, but also predetermined physically in the practice, so that he cannot possibly do more or less than God predetermineth him to; And 1. God's Decrees having fixed all future events, all that man can do will not alter them: Beverovicius may tyre the World of Divines with his question de termino vitae before he will ever get satisfaction, how Physic can prolong a predestinated term of life. And 2. By this means God who set man upon a course of impossibilities or vain means, with great and urgent exhortations, is made a dissembler, and his revealed Will and his secret supposed contradictory, and the latter false: And how then can such a God be believed? B. These are but the bold effusions of a misunderstanding contentious temerarious passion. Here are set together several things, which must distinctly be considered: I. Whether man can do no more good, and forbear no more evil than he doth? II. Whether means to lengthen life or save Souls be vain? III. Whether God's secret and revealed Will be contrary, and the revealed false. I. As to the first, this unhappy syllable [CAN] by its ambiguity is the cause of all our silly quarrels. 1. If by [CAN] you mean [a physical power or faculty] man can not only do more good than he doth, but he can repent and believe who doth not. 2. If you mean a moral power, that is, such a degree of disposition to good as may be excited, or such an indisposition as may be overcome as to the act, without any more supernatural Grace than he hath; so all men can do more good and less evil than they do. And therefore the Synod of Dort rejecteth your accusation as a calumny. And men should know their own minds best. 3. If by [Cannot] you mean only a logical impossibility that these two Propositions be both true [Judas will believe and be saved] or [Herod will not be eaten with Worms.] And [God decreeth that Judas shall not be saved] and [that Herod shall be eaten by Worms] I confess your charge; and say that Arminius saith the same upon the supposition of God's foreknowledge. And how are you concerned to prove God to be either fallible in his foreknowledge, false in his Predictions, or mutable in his Purposes. By this rule all Prophecies take away men's power, and make it impossible to do the contrary. But you mistake: For they assert man's power: He that fore-knoweth and foretelleth that Judas will abuse his power, and decreeth to damn him only for abusing his power, doth imply that he hath such power—. But — Ergo.] II. Beverovicius (and other men's) question, de utilitate mediorum Aegid. Col. Quodl. 1. q. 2. Precibus sanctorum potest juvari praedestinatio: Non tamen sic, ut hae Divinum propositum immutent: sed quod taedem velut media illud ipsum propositum adimpleant mediantibus enim talibus orationibus, fit de nobis quod Deus disposuit.— Si Divina praedestinatio dicat Divinum propositum in se acceptum, non juvatur precibus; quia nullum aeternum juvatur per aliquod temporale: sed si dicant divinum propositum, non absolute, sed ut impletur mediantibus causis in effectu, sic praedestinatio juvatur precibus & operibus sanctorum. need not very learned Pens to determine it. He did well to make that learned and pious Lady Maria Van Schurman one of his Casuists. What can be plainer, than that means are made most necessary, and also the liberty of our Wills in the use of means, when God doth make this one Decree; e. g. [Peter shall hear, believe, repent freely but certainly, and be saved.] [Noah shall make an Ark freely, but certainly, and be saved from the deluge.] [Noah shall plant a Vineyard, and water and dress it in due season, freely but certainly, and it shall bear him fruit.] And [foreseeing that Judas will freely betray his Lord, I will condemn him.] [Such a Sluggard will not blow and sow, and therefore shall have no crop.] [Such a man will not use any meet remedy against his Disease, and shall die by it.] It's strange that nothing can please you unless God be ignorant, or mutable, and overrule not all the World. III. I have made it plain, that there is no show of contradiction between God's secret and revealed Will. What contradiction is it to say, [Judas, I command thee do not murder thyself,] and [I know that Judas will betray his Lord, and will despair, and do that which tendeth to his own murder, and for his sin he shall be so self-murdered]. Or [Judas will betray Christ, and shall be damned for it,] and [I forbidden Judas to betray Christ.] Plainly, 1. About punishment, Gods revealed Will in his Law, speaketh only de jure (vel debito) in forbidding it. 2. God's revealed Will by Prophecy sometime foretelleth that this Law will not be kept; and God's Decree is, that the punishment eventually be inflicted: so that one speaketh only de debito, and the other de eventu. And about sin it is but God's foreknowledge de eventu, and his Law de debito, that seem to you contradictory, without any reason. But this belongeth to the first Articles, where you had enough of it before: And man's true power to do more good, and forbear more evil than he doth, is so far from being denied, that it is asserted in all, and your charge denied generally by the Calvinists, unless perhaps by some rash contentious Disputer of a shallow brain, who cannot distinguish between physical, moral, and mere logical impossibilities. You may read the Synod of Dorts express renunciation of it, that man can do no more good than he doth, nor forbear more evil: And do you know their judgement better than they know their own? And will you go on to charge them with that which they abhor? THE Sixth Days Conference OF Natural Corruption and Impotency, and freewill. BETWEEN B. (the Reconciler) and (C. a Calvinist.) B. We come now somewhat nearer the heart of the Controversy: Try here your contending skill, Whether you can make this breach seem wider than you did the former, about Predestination and Redemption. The first Crimination. C. Some of them deny Original Sin, and so make man need no Saviour to pardon it, no Sanctifier to cure it, no Means or Duty on our part De modo & ratione, many Schoolmen and other Papists open it better than those that lay all upon God's mere Will. Viguerius Instit. c. 18. v. 11. maketh our membership of Adam, and natural derivation to be the reason of Imputation, as the act of the Hand is to the Man. So Joan. a Bonon▪ Panorm. de peccat. Orig. Non enim censetur quis sacere quippiam in alio nisi quod alius faciat, facit & ipse. So Contarenus, so Estius truly in Rom. c. 5. 12. Dicuntur omnes peccasse in Adamo ●tanquam in principio & radice, generis humani, quoniam in lumbis ●ju● erant quando pecca●it:] that is, seminally: All which, and many more such, Rivet citeth, as concordant to us. Chamier To. 3. Paustr. l. 1. c. 2. sect. 9 proveth that Bellarmine Peltanus, Delphinus, Cunerus, Alvarez, Va●quez, etc. are of the same judgement with the Protestants. See Drelincourts Synopt. Controu. Art. 64. Sed quid tibi in mentem venit, ut Infantes sola imputatione reos esse profitearis? Cum non modo in Adamo dum peccaret omnes sui●●●, a quo naturam nostram accepimus, ●t ratione naturae plusquam imputatione Dei, peccasse merito dicamur in Adamo, sed & conditionem misere corruptam & vitiatam ab iis hausimus: Twis. Contr. Corvin. p. 269▪ c. 2. & ib. p. 343. Certe peccatum Originis, ex primo Adae peccato (sed & ex nostro quippe qui in eo peccavimus omnes) fluit. Et p. 344. At sic Adami peccatum imputari posteris— nostri ad unum omnes negandum contendunt, (i. e. mera imputatione). In Adamo peccavimus omnes eandemque contagionem contraximus— Itaque Adami peccatum nobis imputatur sed non-tantum imputatur, sed & nostrum fuit, hoc est naturae nostrae, etc. — Ita saepissime Twissus recte. And Rivet in his Decret. Syn. National. de Imputat. Primi peccat. Adami, by express citations proveth the concord of Protestants and Papists about the very Imputation of Adam's sin, and among the Concordant numbereth Arminius, pag. 87. As also Baldwin, Brochmand, Dietericus, Hunnius, Index, Meisner, Spangenbergius, and other Lutherans: And Gell. Suecanus, the Ancestor of Arminius: And of the Papists, as Aegyd. Rom. Dion. Carthus. Gab. Biel, Ca●et. Clarius, Tolet. Sa●bout, Joan. a Bonon. P●●orm. Contaren. Bellarm. Pererius. Soto, Museus, Vigner. Estius, Becanus a Lapide, Catharinus, etc. Besides the concurrence of the Augustane and other Confessions: And though with the Socinians he cite the Apol. and Corvinus for the contrary, it is no more: And it is but this part of Original Sin, and not the Corruption that he citeth them as denying. And it is like that other men's ill exposition o● it, is that which they mean, or at lest which tempted them to it. for the cure, no true Baptism for Infants, no true Repentance for such Sin; and so are true Pelagians. B. 1. Those [some] I undertook not to prove of the same mind with you and me: But let us charge no more with it than we can prove guilty. That's nothing to all the rest: The Jesuits and Lutherans differ not from you herein as far as I can find, nor the generality of the Arminians. Those that are chief charged with it, are Arminius, Arnoldus, Corvinus, Episcopius, and Bishop Jeremy Taylor: Arminius expressly owneth it: Thes. private. 31. n. 9, 10, 11. pag. 299. Quoniam vero ratio-foederis a Deo cum hominibus primis mihi haec fuit, ut si ipsi in favore Dei & Gratia, per praecepti istius & aliorum observationem permanerent, ad posteros dona in illos collata transmitterentur, eadem gratia divina quae illis obligat: si vero illi eorum se indignos facerent per inobedientiam, posteri quoque ipsorum iis carerent, & contrariis malis obnoxii essent: Hinc accidit ut omnes homines qui naturaliter ex ipsis propagandi fuerint, morti temporali & aeternae obnoxios evaserint, & do●o isto spirit●s sancti si●e justitiae originali vacui: quae paena priva●io imaginis Dei & peccatum originale appellari solet. An vero praeter carentiam justitiae Originalis aliqua contraria qualitas constituenda sit, tanquam pec●ati Originalis pars altera, disquiri permittimus: Quamquam arbitramur vero similius illam solam carentiam ipsum peccatum Originale esse, utpote quae sola sufficiet ad quaevis peccata actu●●ia committen●um & producendum. C. Mark that he saith, but peccatum Originale appellari solet. B. 1. But he disowneth it not. 2. He owneth the name in the next Thesis. 3. While he confesseth the thing, the lis est tantum de nomine, if he had denied the name. Also in Disp. private. Thes. 67. de Baptis. p. 334, 335. he is for Infant's Baptism to wash them in the blood of Christ, and give them the Holy Ghost. And he maketh this to be a washing from sin. What else should it be? C. But he taketh it to be but Privatio Justitiae Originalis. B. 1. He taketh it to be doubtful. 2. Remember that he calleth it not Negatio, but Privatio. 3. Almost all the Schoolmen, and most or very many Calvinists say the same (though I do not). C. But in his Articuli perpendendi in fine, lib. p. 780. col. 2. he saith, that Peccatum Originis non est illud actuale peccatum quo Adam legem de arbore scientiae boni & mali transgressus est, & propter quod nos omnes peccatores constituti sumus & rei facti condemnationis & mortis. B. 1. Mark that he expressly maketh us by Adam's sin to be Peccatores & rei constituti. 2. So in the next Thesis. An peccatum Originis sit tantum carentia justitiae Originalis, & sanctimoniae primaevae, cum inclinatione ad peccandum, quae & antea in homine fuit, licet non ita vehemens, aeque & inordinata ut nunc est, propter amissum favorem Dei, maledictionem ejusdem, & amissionem ejus boni, quo in ordinem redigebatur; An vero contrarius quidam habitus justitiae & sanctimoniae infusus (vel ingressus, acquisitus) post peccatum perpetratum, Dub. Here he confesseth also a positive Original Sin in the inordinateness of the sensual inclination. 3. When he denieth Adam's Act to be our Original. 1. He denieth not (for no Christian denieth it) to be the Original Sin, that is, the first sin and the cause of ours. 2. And he seemeth but to mean that Adam's Sin individually was not ours: which is most certain: For the same Accident cannot be in two distinct Subjects: If our persons be not every one Adam's person, it is impossible that the same individual sin or guilt should be his and ours, any more than the same individual Soul. If God did arbitrarily (merely because he would do it) impute Adam's fact to all Mankind, and to every one personally, this would make it as many sins as there be persons; One man's Original Sin would not be another's, and none of theirs the same quoad formam numericam with Adam's. Adam's is adam's, and yours is yours, and mine is mine. We cannot therefore be heretic men for such doubtful forms of speech, in which we differ among ourselves. The plain truth is, the matter is not so well opened commonly among us, as to allow us to condemn others till we have better done our own parts. My thoughts are these: 1. That we were seminally and virtually really in Adam; having the very essence of our Souls derived from him; not being in him only as the House is in the head of the Architect, but as an essential form is in the generater; though we call both, esse in causa. 2. That we were not personally in Adam (though seminally) that is, we were not natural persons in him, when he sinned. 3. God supposeth no man to have been what he was not, or done what he did not: For he erreth not. 4. God is not the Author of Sin: Therefore he doth not by arbitrary imputing of Adam's act, and reputing us to have done what we did not, make all men Sinners, which Adam could not do. 5. But God doth truly repute us to have been seminally in Adam, and to have no Essence but what is really derived from his Essence: And as when a man is guilty, no part of him is innocent, neque semen neque sanguis, though they have not a distinct guilt, but participative qua partes rei; so we were Sinners in that act, and guilty of that act, so far as we were parts Adami, and in him. 6. This was not to be at that time guilty as distinct persons; for we were not such. 7. But we that were then only seminally inexistent, after became real distinct persons, and then that guilt even of Adam's fact, adhering still to us, became reatus personae, because the Subjects of it are personae. Even as if Eve had been made after the Fall, of Adam's Rib, that Rib at first was guilty, not by another, but the same numerical guilt that Adam was, as part of a Sinner: For it was a capable Subject of no more: But when that same Rib was made a person, it would be a guilty person; For it lost not the guilt by that change. But than it is not only or chief our Bodies which are from Adam (which are from the elements in our daily food) but our Souls. And therefore the adherence of the guilt to a rational spirit essentially flowing from another's essence, is more easily understood and defended than that of the corporal Rib could be. 8. I do (contrary to excellent Jos. Placeus) suppose that in primo instanti, this our participation in Adam's guilt is in order before our qualitative pravity: And that God doth therefore deny us his Spirit first, to make us originally holy, not only because Adam, but because we in Adam (as aforesaid) did forfeit and expel it. 9 I think that men's assertion of a Decree or Covenant of God, that if Adam fell, any more should be imputed to his Offspring than they were thus really guilty of themselves, is the bold addition of men's invention, of greater audacity than the addition of Ceremonies to the Worship of God, which yet some are more sensible of. 10. I think that if Adam had not sinned that same first sin, but had sinned another sin the next hour, or day, or month, or year, or any time before Generation, it would have been equally ours, as this first was, because we were equally in him, and no Scripture-Covenant makes a difference. 11. I think that whereas Adam's sin had twenty particular sins as parts of the whole, we were guilty of all, as well as of the first act or part; else we should not be guilty of his eating the forbidden ●ruit; for doubtless that was not the first: His incogitancy, and non-Nolition and sinful Volitions were before it. Yea I doubt not but we are guilty of all the sin that Adam committed, from his first sin till the making of the New-Covenant, at least. 12. I doubt not but if Adam had never sinned, yet (supposing the same Covenant to stand) if his Sons after him had sinned, we should have been guilty of it as we are of his sin: yea had it been but our nearest Parents. 13. I doubt not but that we are still so guilty of our nearer Parents Sins, further than as the introduction of the new pardoning Covenant, and the oft pardons by it, and the incapacity of nature, to bear any more punishment, may make a difference. This is not a place voluminously to prove all this. But if any Arminians be tempted to speak doubtingly of this Original Gild, while they confess Original sinful pravity, 1. Blame your own additions to God's Covenant, and your obscure writings of the thing; 2. And say not that they deny Original Sin, but express the matter as it is. It seemeth that Arminius by Peccatores & rei constituti sumus meaneth as we do. C. I must confess your explication is rational and concilatory: But how can you excuse Corvinus? B. See but how he defendeth Arminius against Tilenus, as holding our Original Sin to be truly Sin, and a punishment for Sin, and you will think that he denieth it not himself: See also what Twisse supposeth him to grant, Cont. Corvin. p. 253, 254. Indeed he doth two much obscure and extenuate the formalem rationem peccati in comparison of the ratio poenae in it. But I much suspect that there is much logomachy in the controversy, and that it is mostly de nomine peccati non de re. For I perceive some of them conceive of peccatum as a word that hath only an active signification from peccare: And because an Infant doth not peccare actualiter, therefore they say that Original Sin is not strictly called Peccatum, meaning that the Name properly agreeth only to an evil Act. And can a Controversy de nomine make a heresy? Ask them these Questions? 1. Whether an Infant be not animal rationale liberum, as having the same natural faculties with the Adult? 2. Whether he be not then capable of virtuous and vicious Dispositions? 3. And whether these are not bonum & malum morale? If he be not capable of malum morale, than neither of bonum morale? And if so, than not of Holiness, nor any moral aptitude for Heaven, any more than a Beast. This they all deny▪ and therefore must needs say that their vicious inclinations are malum morale, adapting them not only physically for physical evil, but morally for punishment. And truly if they will call Sin such a moral evil, I will not break communion with them about the sense of Peccare. C. But Amesius tells Grevinchovius, that it may be proved by good witnesses that he denied Original Sin: which Dr. Twisse many times over and over reciteth contra Corvinum. B. As the instance of three or four single persons is nothing to my business, so I am no judge of any such Reports, unless I had heard the witnesses myself. I have had so many notorious lies confidently reported of me by men not contemptible, that it hath taught me to be backward in receiving any Accusations, and judging before I hear the accused. Especially a man that writeth much is more to be judged of by his Writings, than by Backbiters Reports. C. But Episcopius is no way to be excused, Nor Bishop Jer. Taylor, who copiously plead against Original Sin. B. Therefore they are not the persons that I have now to do with; but have elsewhere as copiously proved Original Sin, and confuted such Arguments as they use; But the chief of my Arguments they touch not. The second Crimination. C. They say that man before regeneration can do that which is spiritually good; and hath power to use his naturals well, so that by degrees he may thereby come up to a state of saving Grace, or be fitted to be a Believer: And that some can believe and repent that do not. Whereas the Scripture maketh men dead in sin, and out of Christ we can do nothing. B. This unhappy [CAN] I tell you is our Cannon that battereth our Peace and Love; and pardon me if I tell you as I did them, that I doubt whether you understand well what it signifieth. Tell me, Quest. 1. Have not wicked men natural life? Or are they dead? C. No man doubteth of that. B. Quest. 2. Have they not natural powers or faculties for natural Acts? C. Nor is that denied by any man. B. Quest. 3. Is it not the same natural faculty of Intellection by which we understand and believe things common and spiritual? And the same natural faculty of willing, by which we love or will them both? C. Nor is that questioned by any. B. Quest. 4. Is there not such a thing as common Grace, distinct from, and short of true Regeneration or Sanctification? C. Yes, we are all agreed of that. B. Quest. 5. Is there any Nation or People in the World, that are not obliged by God to use some means towards their own Conversion, and to forbear their Sin? C. No doubt of it, but they are obliged to perfect Obedience, and they are specially obliged to repent, and use some means thereto. B. Quest. 6. Is there not such a thing in the World, as a true power to do something that never is done, and forbear what is not forborn? C. I know not what to say to that: An hypothetical power, and secundum quid so called there is: But of proper power I doubt. Dr. Twisse against Hord, li. 1. p. 71. saith, [Suppose all men had power to do any good: If God will not give them velle quod possunt, — is it possible that they should velle bonum, if God will not work it in them.] B. It is a logical impossibility of consequence (nothing to the purpose) which also foreknowledge would infer: But as to real power, denominating the Object possible, it is a palpable contradiction, to say I have true power to do an impossible thing: when to say I have power to do it, and to say, it is possible to me, are all one. Elsewhere Dr. Twisse can say, that God's velle eventum is not necessary ad possibilitatem, sed ad eventum. Do you doubt whether Adam was able to have forborn the sin, and so sinned for want of power to do otherwise? C. An obediential and passive power he had, and faculties that were able hypothetically if God had predetermined them by premotion and effectual Grace: But of the rest I doubt. B. We will not be diverted with empty words: A dead man hath an obediential passive power (as the School mean it). An hypothetical or conditional power is no power when the condition is not existent. If you say Adam could not but sin, you make his standing a natural impossibility, and God the cause of all his sin, whom he could no more overcome therein than make a World: And will men then believe that God hateth that sin which he unresistibly causeth, and sent Christ to die for it? and will damn men for not doing natural impossibilities? C. Well! suppose (as commonly we do) that Adam was able to have stood? and consequently that there is a true power in the World that's never acted. B. Quest. 7. Is no man by Nature with common helps and Grace able to do more good than he doth, and forbear more sin? C. No doubt, he can if he will; But the doubt is of his Will. B. Quest. 8. Is no man by Nature and common Grace able to will the doing of more good, and forbearing more evil, than he so willeth. C. His Will hath natural power; but it is contrarily disposed. B. Quest. 9 Can no man by Nature and common Grace, notwithstanding the undisposedness of his Will, yet so far restrain or prevail against his undisposedness, as actually to will and do more good and less evil than he willeth and doth. C. If▪ Adam could have forborn all sin, I must think common Grace P●aecipitur nobis bene agere; non quod possimus ex nobis illud facere, sed quia si faciamus totum quod in nobis est, semper Deus paratus sit facere quod in se est. Aegid. Colum. Quodl. 2. qu. 30. p. 121, 122. Nostrum est enim secundum Damascenum sequi Deum vocantem ad virtutem; vel diabolum vocantem ad malitiam: unde Damas'. l. 2. c. 30. Ipse est omnis boni principium & causa, & sine ejus cooperatione & auxilio impossibile est bonum velle vel facere: In nobis autem est, vel permanere in virtute & sequi Deum vocantem, vel rec●dere a virtute quod est fieri in malitia & se qui diabolum. Idem ibid. to be no Grace, if by it a man could forbear no sin, nor do any good.. B. Quest. 10. Cannot every man desire to be happy? and to escape Hell? C. Yes: For all do it in some sort or other. B. Quest. 11. Cannot some men without Holiness, forbear Murder, Treason, Theft, Adultery, and pass by a Tavern-door when they go in? C. Yes; for we see many forbear such sins: and therefore more might do it. B. Quest. 12. Cannot such a one go to a Sermon, and read good Books, when he goeth to a Tavern or a Playhouse? C. Hobbes will say no, who thinks that every Volotion is necessitated as the motion of a Watch is by the Spring: but so will not I. He cannot be willing to attend God's Ordinances as the godly do; but he can will to use them sometimes in his manner. B. Quest. 13. Cannot he by common Grace understand the meaning of the words heard or read, and remember them? C. Yes; and be a famous Expositor and Preacher too. B. Quest. 14. Cannot a man by common Grace know that he is a Sinner, and miserable by sin? and that he needeth Mercy and a Saviour? C. Yes; or else he could not despair with Judas? B. Quest. 15. Cannot he think of his own sinful and miserable condition? yea and think how to get out of it and be saved? C. Yes: despairing men cannot forget it: And a wicked Preacher, for common ends, can force his thoughts, most of the year, to meditate on God's Word, and holy things. B. Quest. 16. Can he not wish and desire that he had mercy and a Saviour, and so much Grace as to keep him from Hell, and so make him happy when he must go hence? And can he not by some earnest prayers speak out these desires? C. Yes: All men have not saving Grace, that go but so far. B. Quest. 17. Cannot a man by common Grace do all that which our Divines commonly say, an Hypocrite may do, or a half or almost - Christian? such as Mr. Perkins, Bolton, Rogers, Hooker, Mead, Bifield, and abundance more describe. C. Yes; they that have so much common Grace can go so far. B. Quest. 18. Are not the best of these men, by common Grace, more prepared for Conversion than some others? C. Yes: else what good did that Grace do them? and why should we write (as Mr. Hooker) of the Souls preparation for Christ? and Christ told one, Thou art not far from the Kingdom of God. B. Quest. 19 Doth God command all these men to use the means of their full Conversion and Salvation utterly in vain? C. No: it is not in vain, if he bless them to whom he will. B. Quest. 20. Lastly, Then tell me, if you acknowledge all these [CANS] or Powers, what is the power which you deny? C. A power to things spiritually good. B. Ambiguous words must not destroy Love and Churches. What mean you by [Spiritual?] C. That which is done by God's Spirit, to spiritual ends, and in a spiritual manner. B. Here are three things: The Efficient, the End, the Manner. 1. Is not the Spirit of God the Author of common Grace? C. Yes, that is not denied by any. B. 2. If by a spiritual end you mean, the foresaid saving of the Soul from Hell, you confess common Grace may give it. If you mean loving and intending God above all, do not the Arminians say as well as you, that none but the Regenerate can do it? C. I confess they do. Quum actus ille fidei non sit in potestate hominis naturalis, carnalis, animalis, peccatoris, eumque nemo praestare possit nisi per gratiam Dei, omnis autem Gratia Dei secundum voluntatem Dei administretur, & voluntatem quam apud se ab aeterno habuit, etc. Armin. Disp. Private. Thes. 41. Sect. 1. p. 30●. Aegid. Colum. Quodlib. 2. qu. 29. pag. 121. Cum bona habeant duplex esse, scil. Naturale & supernaturale: Dicendum est quod sine gratia habituali possimus bona agere quoad esse naturale; non quod supernaturale: Secundum sanctorum sententiam etsi sine Gratia possimus facere bona non tamen bene: ne● mereri per illa, etc. B. 3. What mean you by a spiritual manner? If you mean it, of doing all from that love to God, and intention of that end, the answer is the same. C. Man can do nothing of himself, without God. B. Did ever man in his wits think otherwise? Was it ever a controversy, whether we have any power that is not both given and still maintained by God? All the question is, but how God giveth it? and not whether we have it without him. One thinketh that he giveth more by the way of Nature than others do: And another thinks that he giveth more by the way of common Grace than others do: Mistake not yourself: you ascribe no more to God, than any even Pelagian doth; but only he ascribeth more to God by the way of natural conveyance than you do. I only except the Dominican Predeterminants', that ascribe all man's circumstantiated Volitions to God. Lay therefore the controversy where it is. C. But we can do nothing without Christ and Grace. B. I am more for that than you are. I doubt you think that we can do the works of Nature without Christ; For I find that many of you will not have so much as Magistracy to depend upon him derivatively. But all things are now delivered into his hands, and Nature is reprived and continued by some degree of Grace, that is, of Mercy contrary to Merit. But tell me, do men do that without Christ, which they do by his common Grace? C. The words signify, [Joh. 15. Out of me ye can do nothing.] B. And do you differ about that? Do not you before confess how far men out of Christ as to regeneration may go? Come to the point, and tell me where you differ? C. We differ here; that they think that God hath promised saving Grace to men prepared by common Grace, and we say, No. B. Very good: Is all come but to this? Tell me what is this to the question of man's power or impotency? This is only about God's Word. Quest. 1. Do you not believe that God hath made it the duty of all the Unregenerate, to desire, and beg, and seek his special regenerating Grace? and use means to get it? and avoid impediments? C. Yes: it is their duty; otherwise the omission of it were not their Sin. B. Quest. 2. Hath God commanded them to do all this in vain? C. I told you, that it is not in vain, if he convert but some few of them. B. My question was not, whether the command be in vain, but whether the duty commanded be in vain. And how doth one man's good use of common Grace, prepare another man for conversion, and not himself. It is for himself that God commandeth and earnestly exhorteth men to be reconciled unto God. And is this in vain to themselves if they do it? If they repent when commanded it is not in vain? If they use common Grace in seeking God, how prove you that it shall be in vain? If you say to your Servants, [Come and ask me for your Food and Raiment when you want them], they would think that Command did not set them upon a vain ask. If an able Physician that could cure a Disease at his pleasure should say, [Take this Medicine for the cure of your Disease] or [this preparative] it would be supposed not in vain. In this Command God is both Rector and Benefactor: As Rector, the right government of mankind is his end; which is not done by setting them on vain duty: As Benefactor, the good of his Creature is his end (as we may call it, under his Glory therein). And vain duty is an evil, and not a benefit to any. If the King sent to you to come and ask him for He that readeth the Doctrine of the greater part of the Papists, of supernaturality, ●and infusion of Charity or Grace, will have little reason to say that they bring them too much into the power of man: ●especially the Dominicans. Doth not Alvarez set Grace far enough out of man's power, when he saith, li. 7. disp. 69. p. 306. c. 1. Impossibile est quod Gratia habitualis sit connaturalis alicui substantiae creatae vel creabili: Ergo etiam est impossibile quod Charitas, vel ejus actus, sit ei connaturalis, aut ex solis viribus naturae procedens. Prob. antecedens, Quia contra rationem Gratiae est quod sit debita naturae; ex ●o enim gratia dicitur, quia gratis datur & non ex debito—. And is not a man's Being and Nature given him gratis & non ex debit●? Indeed had he defined Grace to be quod datur contra meritum, the contradiction in the terms would have allowed this game at words to be true: But words it is, and to no purpose, or else I cannot excuse it from blasphemy, to say that God is not able to make an Angel or any Creature in whom the habits of Grace or Love shall be connatural? Protestants hold on the contrary, that some degree of habitual Love was connatural to Adam and the Angels, though not as essential to their Natures, and so unlosable: And that Love is now called supernatural, because medicinal supernatural Grace must restore it to corrupted Nature. Rada the Scotist, Cont. 1. speaks better of supernaturality: For my part, that which I fear in these high strains of supernaturality, in these Papists Doctrine, and Sir Henry Van●'s is, ●est it should produce Infidelity and Saduce●sm; And he that to day holdeth that the Love to God is so exceeding far supernatural to perfect Nature itself, may to morrow hold that man's Species is changed by Grace; And the next day that it is more credible that man's Nature was never made to love God, or to be glorified, than to believe that God will either make him of another Species, or give him another Nature, besides the perfecting of the Nature created: Yea that God cannot make a Creature that shall naturally love his Maker. preferment, you would take it to signify half a promise. Now God's Promises are not strictly Obligations, any further than the notification of his Will, and giving the subject a right, is an Obligation; where God's Perfection is instead of an Obligation. And is such a Command [Ask, Seek, Accept,] no notification of his Will that our labour shall not be lost? I do not call it a Promise: But is it not a signification that God the Rector and Benefactor of the World, will not let the performer lose his labour. C. He loseth not his labour if he get by it but temporal mercies, and an abatement of his pains in Hell. B. Do you thus paraphrase God's Command, [Seek for Grace, and thou shalt have Health or Riches: or seek for Conversion and Salvation, and thou shalt have an easier Damnation.] This is still a duty that's vain as to the commanded End. C. I confess it were not in vain if they could do it as he commandeth: for God commandeth them to do it in faith, and spiritual sincerity, which they cannot do. B. Do you thus paraphrase the Command, [Seek Faith in Faith, and seek Sincerity in Sincerity] that is [You that have not Faith and Sincerity, if you have them already, seek that you may have them.] Did not you confess that they that have not special Grace are bound to seek it in the use of certain means? C. They are bound to do it, but they are not able. B. Did not you confess that they were able by common Grace to do the works of common Grace? and that in abundance of instances? What is common Grace for, if they can do nothing by it? C. It is equal to nothing, for it is not acceptable to God. B. Did not you confess that it is a preparation to special Grace, and may bring them nearer to the Kingdom of God? C. But without Faith it is impossible to please God. B. But there are several sorts of Faith, and several degrees of pleasing God. We grant that without special Faith it is impossible so to please God, as to have Justification, Adoption, or any Title to Heaven, as the members of Christ have. But by a common Faith men come to be less displeasing to God than grosser Infidels and Rebels; and are more prepared for converting Grace. You know that this is the common Doctrine both of our practical and polemical Divines, as you may see in their Books, and the Synod of Dort. C. But our Divines against the Arminians oft say, That a man that hath but nature and common Grace, cannot use them well. B. I am resolved not to be cheated by ambiguous words. To use them well signifieth, 1. To use them in love to God as the Ultimate End, and so none but the godly use any thing: And do not all the Arminians grant you that? 2. Or it is to use them so much better than worse men, as that they draw nearer God, and are more prepared for special Grace? And do not all our Divines grant that they may so far use them well? where then is the difference? C. The prayer of the Wicked is abomination to the Lord. B. By [wicked] is meant, either one that is yet unregenerate as such, or one that is actually set upon wickedness, progressively, and is not about returning to God. And by [abomination] is meant, either that which God accepteth not so far as to pardon and save him that doth it, though he judge him more prepared for Grace than others; or else that which he totally abhorreth as being no preparation to his Grace. A man that is unregenerate may so far seek mercy in a returning degree yet short of saving Grace, as that it shall not be in vain. Even an Ahab had experience of this; And so had Nineve and many others: And why else do you still confess a state of preparatory Grace? Is God's preparatory Grace abominable to him? Doth Christ give abominable Grace? or is preparation to Conversion an abominable thing? 2. But the Text speaketh of a wicked man as wicked: He that goeth on in a wicked life, and thinketh by Sacrifice and Prayers to pacify God, and make him amends, his Sacrifice and Prayers are abominable. But wicked men may have somewhat in them that is better than wickedness: They may have such a belief that God is, and that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently seek him; yea such a Faith in Jesus Christ, as shall move them to that sort of repentance and reformation as that they shall be almost true Christians, and not far from the Kingdom of God. And the wicked man that doth this, doth it not as wicked, but by common Grace. And though it be so far abominable as not to prove him justified, it is not so far abominable as to be all in vain. C. But when you have said all, yet they have no Promise. B. 1. You know, I suppose, how hard it is to understand certainly many Texts of Scripture, whether they be Promises to such or not! Matth. 7. 8. Every one that asketh receiveth, and he that seeketh findeth, etc. Lam. 3. 25. The Lord is good to the Soul that seeketh him. Amos 5. 4. Seek me, and ye shall live. Luke 11. 13. God will give the holy Spirit to them that ask him, etc. I only say that there is difficulty in these and such other Texts. 2. But you confess that God hath formerly made Promises of Church-Priviledges, and of temporal things to unsanctified men: Therefore if he did make a Promise of further helps of Grace, to them that well use former helps, it were no more incongruous. And 3. Truly I understand not what it is that moveth some men to be so much against such a conception, that God should make any Promise of further Mercy, to the obedient use of former Mercy, when it is so agreeable to his Rectorship and Bounty, and to the common interest of Mankind. 4. But yet I assert no such Promise: All that I plead for is, that you will state the difference aright as it is, and not misreport it, as if it were greater. C. How is it that you would have it stated? B. 1. You are all agreed, that by Nature man can do natural actions; and by common Grace, he can do the actions of common Grace; and by special Grace, he can do the acts of special Grace. Are you not all agreed of this much? C. Yes, this cannot be denied. B. 2. And you are agreed that the acts of common Grace are such as consist in a commanded seeking of, or preparing for special Grace. C. Yes, that also is agreed on. B. 3. And you are agreed, that the best state of common Grace is in the nature of the thing, certainly and always, a state of preparation or greater moral aptitude for special Grace, whether it certainly follow or not. C. Yes, that is not denied neither. B. The difference than is but this. One Party saith, That [God hath signified certainly his Will, to give special Grace to them that so seek it by common Grace, as to come up to the highest degree of preparation: And that this signification of his Will is a Promise]. The other Party saith, [That God by commanding such to seek his special Grace, and beseeching and exhorting them thereto, and giving them abundant means and helps, doth signify his Will, that they shall not labour in vain if they do it: and giveth them so much encouragement and hope, as that none hath cause of remissness by despair, but all are unexcusable that shall neglect such means and hopes. But that this is not a proper Promise, because it giveth them not a right.] C. You have truly stated the difference: And I confess that if I were comforting an afflicted Conscience ready to despair, I should tell such, that a Command to seek Mercy, implieth a certainty that he that so seeketh it shall find it; And if we could but say to men, as the people to the blind man, Behold he calleth thee, It would be near to a promise that he will heal them. B. But forget not that all this is but your anticipation of the Controversies about Grace, or God's Promises, and is no part of the Controversy about man's power or corruption. C. But there is a further difference yet. For they say, That man's Will hath power to resist the Grace of God, and frustrate it, which else would be effectual, if man did not overcome it. B. You have brought the Controversy now to a strange kind of power, and further confirm me that this empty [CAN] is the sum of the Controversy, which is nothing but a sound. This which you call power is nothing but natural power as morally corrupt and impotent. If it be non-agendo, that you mean they can resist, as by not-believing, not loving God, etc. What power is necessary to it? Is it an act of power, not to love God? Next say, that a dead man hath power not to live, and a dumb man hath power to be silent; and a blind man is able not to see. If it be agendo that you mean that they resist, the act as an act in genere is an act of that natural power which God himself giveth, upholdeth, and by universal concourse acteth: and so far it is no resistance. But as that act hath the prohibited Object, rather than another, so it is sin: And your meaning is that they say, Man can sin. And indeed is this the Controversy? Have you been blaming the Arminians, advancing man's natural Power and Will, and now do you become the advancers of it? Who advanceth or praiseth man more? He that saith, He can sin? Or he that saith, He cannot sin? Even now you pleaded, that men cannot believe, and will you now plead, that they cannot choose but believe? Is it a power to sin, that you accuse them for asserting? C. They cannot believe without special Grace: But they cannot choose but believe if they have it. B. It's true: Because it is not that which we call special Grace, if it cause them not to believe: And so it were a contradiction to say, That they have Faith, and they have not Faith. But this [cannot choose] is not an impotency [for to believe is an act of power]: But it is merely the name of a logical impossibility that these two should consist, [He believeth and he believeth not.] He that by Grace believeth, hath that natural power which of itself is able not to believe (if you will call it ability): But it is power determined to believe; and so Faith is become necessary, when a man hath it necessitate existentiae. But the asserting power to sin, and to be an Unbeliever, I will never charge on the Arminians, when I would blame them for advancing man. C. But it is a power to overcome God's Grace, which they assert. B. Read but Dr. Twisse his judgement of Resistance, and you will call it no more an overcoming; any otherwise than a weight overcometh my strength, which I can lift up, and will not. But I tell you, I will not be cheated with ambiguous words. 1. Either you mean an active or passive overcoming. 2. And either you mean an overcoming of God's utmost exerted Power by a greater Power; or you mean an overcoming of God's Will, and his Power exerted with an absolute Will of efficiency; or you mean the non-efficiency or non-prevalency of such an Act of God, as cometh without any Decree or absolute Will of prevailing, but with a Will of leaving the success to man's free Will: (as in Adam's case.) 1. Speaking improperly, you may say that all men that are not softened, convinced, converted by the means which God thereto appointeth, overcome God, in that they overcome the means. 2. Thus in not-repenting, not-believing, not-loving, etc. the less power any man hath, the more he passively overcometh: (as a hard stone overcometh the Hammer that breaketh it not.) 3. No Arminian holdeth that man is stronger than God, and overcometh his Power by a greater Power: Out of Bedlam none have such thoughts that are awake. 4. None of them think that any Act of God's Power is overcome, or is unsuccessful, which is exercised with his absolute Will or Decree of prevailing, or of the effect. 5. But they think that in some cases, yea ordinarily God Will is freely to exert no more of his power towards the causing of a commanded act, than what shall give man a power to obey, with some assisting motives, and leave the success or effect to his free Will. That God doth so sometimes, is proved by the case of Adam. Now whether you will call this overcoming or not, and whether you will say, Adam overcame God's Grace, or God's Grace overcame not Adam's Will, is but a Logomachy. The thing in question, is nothing but sinning against that degree of Grace, which enabled man to have done better. But all this belongeth to the controversy of Grace, and not of man's power: unless you think sin a powerful honourable act. C. At least in this they over-value man's power, in that they hold, That man's Will hath power to determine the influx of God, and so man shall rule his Maker: when God's influx or premotion shall but leave it to the Will of man, what shall be the success. B. This toucheth physical predetermination; and needeth no other answer than is oft given. 1. You wrong them: They hold not all (properly) that man's Will determineth God's Will, either as to the essence of the Divine Will, or as to the Act, connoting the mere Object: But only that it can determine of a common effect, which Gods and man's freewill would produce if both concur. 2. They do not think that m●●● Will hath any the ●least operation causally on God's Will in itself; but only that variations are made by variety of recipient dispositions, where the influx of the Agent is universal and equal: And so that man's receptive indisposition may be a cause that God's Influx work not the same effect on him which it would do on a disposed subject. 3. And they say not this of God's absolute Will and Power, but of his power operating restrainedly by his own free Will; when he will exert no more, than what shall be successful only on a free concurring and disposed Subject, and not on a resisting undisposed one. It pleaseth God that the Sun shall operate but with a common Operation, variable in the effects, by the various disposition of Recipients. The Flowers spring and are sweet, and Weeds stink, Trees grow, and Stones grow not; humanity is acted by it in men, and not in Fruits. God could have made the Influx of this Sun to have been causa specialis, and to have turned a Weed into a Rose, or a Stone into a Tree, if he had pleased: but he doth not. Now will you say that we are erroneous, and over magnify the recipient, if we say that its disposition is the cause of much of this diversity? and that the stone is stronger than the Sun and overcometh it? No: the Sun did all that was properly intended: Its beams came down on the Stone, as well as on the Animals and Plants. It warmed it, though it did not quicken it. So God doth his work on the Will of Sinners: His Influx is terminated on their Will, and had he sent it with a resolution to convert him, it should have done it. But seeing he sent it limitedly, only to enable a man to Will, and to concur so far as shall prevail, if he do what his own Will is able to do by self-excitation, it's no overcoming God, if the man sin. Once more, I say, that men that fear God should be very cautelous what they say in all Controversiès which are resolved into the nature of Divine Volitions, and their way of efficiency; Seeing, 1. Will in God is not the same thing as in man; an Appetite. 2. It's own determination, and the way of its determining us are confessed by the subtlest to be utterly unsearchable: Saith Vasquez (in Thom. q. 19 disp. 80. p. 503.) Quo autem pacto Deus seipsum determinet ad hoc potius quam ad illud, ineffabile sane est; nisiquod nostro modo intelligendi intelligimus essentiam Dei, quae est ejus voluntas, habere circa futura peculiarem rationem voluntatis cum respectu illo rationis: Et ideo dixi, in hac controversia intelligi posse certa ratiocinatione Quid not sit: Quid tamen sit, & quo pacto voluntas determinetur, explicari non posse: So that what Gods Act of willing or working is, besides his essence and the effect, they all confess that they are ignorant. And yet shall the more ignorant contend? The third Crimination. C. They hold freewill to good: that unregenate men have freewill Austin li. 1. de G●n. Contr. Manich. c. 3. professeth, That all men may believe if they will; and justifieth it in his Retractations: But if the Will of man be corrupt and averse from believing, we justly say, such a man cannot believe, yet this is an impotency, moral only, which is to be distinguished from impotency natural. For notwithstanding this, it may be truly said, that all men may believe if they will: And herein consists the natural Liberty of the Will: The moral Liberty consisteth rather in a sanctified inclination unto that which is good, whereby it is freed from the power of Sin and Satan, etc. But I never find that Arminians do distinguish these. Twisse against Hoord, li ●. p. ●● without God's special Grace; and regenerate men have freewill to do good and forbear evil, even when Grace effecteth not the event. B. This is an English Objection. What men that writ in Greek or Latin deny freewill? Did not all the ancient Fathers and Churches hold it till Augustine's time, of whom we have any notice? And are you coming to turn Christ's Body into a Heresy, or the members of an Harlot by your charge? Did not Augustine, Prosper and Fulgentius hold it? Who denied it for above a thousand or thirteen hundred years after Christ? And do you deny all freewill yourself? C. No; but it is freewill to spiritual good. B. What need I tyre you with the same things again. 1. Read but what I said to A. of freewill. 2. And see the Table of it in the Second Book. 3. And peruse what I have just now said of the power of the Will, and you will see that here is no more necessary. Make not new words to seem a new Controversy. Put but Liberty for Power, and and the answer to the last Crimination serveth to this. C. The tenth Article of the Church of England saith, [The condition of man, after the Fall of Adam, is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural strength and good works, to Faith and calling upon God: wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the Grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good Will, and working with us when we have that good Will. B. I had rather you dealt plainly, and kept close to the word of God, and evidence of Truth, than seek shelter from the words of those in power. But what Jesuit or Arminian will not subscribe to this? Who doubteth of it? How oft do they all maintain the necessity of this preventing and co-operating Grace? But by the words [no Power] you must not understand no natural power or faculty, but no moral power: For 1. Else man is no man. 2. It is a moral Subject which they speak of, and must accordingly be understood. But what freewill is it that you deny? Tell me what you mean by freewill? C. If you know what Will is, and what Free is, you need no exposition: the words are plain enough of themselves. B. Thus do men strive about words that profit not, to subvert the hearers, and increase to more ungodliness. Answer me these Questions. Quest. 1. Hath not the Will more than a Liberty Political, or by God's Law to forbear sin, and to do all good? Doth God forbidden it? C. No; he commandeth it, which is more than leave or licence. B. Quest. 2. Do you think that the Will is forced? Is it not a contradiction to Will unwillingly eodem respectu? C. Yes: we all hold freedom from compulsion. B. Quest. 3. Is not man's Will a self-determining faculty or principle naturally; so as to be Domina suorum actuum under God? C. Yes, under God; the understanding directing it. B. Quest. 4. Hath not the Will power and liberty to choose evil, or to sin, without Gods predetermining premotion? C. I dare not deny it, though many do▪ B. Quest. 5. Hath not the Will a certain command over the inferior faculties respectively, and can move or not move them? C. Yes: supposing it moved accordingly itself. B. Quest. 6. Can Angels or Devils necessitate the Will by any efficient predetermining premotion? C. No: I think not; for its commonly thought so. B. Quest. 7. Can any man by force or flattery necessitate another man to will any thing evil or good efficiently? C. No: They may strongly tempt, but not necessitate. B. Quest. 8. Can mere Objects as such necessitate the Will to a comparative The Opinion of Aegidiu● Roman, how the Will is actuated & determined I will set down, though not wholly approving it, Quodlib. 3. qu. 15. p. 177, 178: A fine, & ab ●o quod apprehenditur sub omni ratione boni, voluntas Activatur & Necessitatur. Ab his autem quae sunt ad finem & ab his quae non apprebenduntur sub ratione omni boni, potest Actuari, sed non necessitari: A ●ullo autem potestviolentari.— Ad finem nec activando nec determinando semovet: Ad ea autem quae sunt ad finem, facta in actu per finem potest se determinare, sed non activare: Quantum ergo ad actuationem nihil seiplum secundum seipsum movere potest: aliter idem secundum idem esset actus & potentia.— Nunquam voluntas per s● & directe actuat seipsum: sed bonum apprehensum est quod causat Volitionem in voluntate: & quod actuat eam.— Sed super hujusmodi Volitione voluntas habet dominium quia in potestate voluntatis est sistere vel non sistere in tali Volitione.— Lib●ra est quia cum intellectus ●ffert ei, e. g fornicationem sub utraque ratione, sub mala & sub bona oportet quod utraque consideratio sit Volita: Quamdiu enim stat in utraque tamdiu vult de utraque considerare determinat autem se hoc modo: Quia est domina sui actus potest totaliter desistere a consideratione unius, & totaliter insistere in consideratione alterius: Vel potest non totaliter desistere ab uno, nec totaliter intendere allied: sed magis esse intenta ad unum quam ad aliud. Si autem totaliter desistat velle considerare de inordinatione, vel notabiliter sit attenta ad considerandum de delectatio●e, modicum autem attendat ad inordinationem, tunc fornicatio sic apprehensa activabit cam & causabit in ●a volitionem] So that he thinketh that the free omission of the Wills command of necessary thoughts is the beginning of Sin: But what he saith of the Wills being actuated per finem & non per seipsam needeth better explication. Objects actuate but morally, that is, are occasions, and quosis materia disposita ad actu● terminationem; but it is the faculty or form that actuateth by proper vital agency▪ Et postea Qu. 16. pag. 183. Etsi entitas effectus reducatur in entitatem causae, non tamen defectus reducitur in defectum ●●●sdem causae. Non deficit causa, sed effectus ille deficit a causa. Etsi non sit voluntas in actu nisi prius sit in actu intellectu●, non sequitur quod non possit voluntas deficere nisi prius deficiat intellectus: Absque enim eo quod intellectus male proponat voluntati, potest se voluntas determinare male— viz. si sit intenta circa delectationem, non circa inordinatione●. act, that is, to choose this rather than that, (de mediis)? C. To good they cannot: but I doubt of it as to evil, whether Objects do not necessitate some men, so that they cannot forbear. B. Who made these Objects, and causeth their nature and existence? C. God made all things: Meat, Drink, Pulchritude, Money, etc. B. Doth God then necessitate men efficiently to Sin by Objects. C. I say not so: For Objects are not efficient. B. True; as Objects they are not: Therefore they effect not: Therefore they do not necessitate properly, which is an efficiency: Indeed they are but causae quasi materiales actus in specie seu individuo, and constitute it, and no act is without its Object: But they effect it not. C. Doth not the Sun effect our sight by its light? B. Yes: but not as a mere Object, for so it only terminateth and constituteth it as the matter: But it causeth it efficiently as an Agent. C. Well! I will suppose that so far as a wicked man is necessitated to sin, it is his pravity that doth it circa objectum (ut sine quo non) and not the Object itself efficiently and in proper speech. B. Quest. 9 Is the Will efficiently necessitated by the senses or fantasy? C. No otherwise than as by the Objects which they do present? B. Quest. 10. Is it so necessitated by the Passions? C. I know not whether I may say the Passions do it, or its own pravity, when the passions do disturb and tempt it. B. Quest. 11. Is it so necessitated by the Intellect? C. So Camero and several others thought, and consequently by the Objects: But I have many reasons against that Opinion quoad media, in comparate elections. But the Intellect may necessitate it circa finem; 2. And quoad media, in specificatione, etsi non quoad exercitium actus. B. 1. Quoad finem, it is not the Intellect that necessitateth, but the natural inclination of the Will; Intellection is but a previous act sine quo non. 2. Where there is no exercitium actus, there is no specification. Therefore you can only say, Non specificatur sine ductu intellectus; but the Will can prevent that ductum intellectus, if not suspend its act also after it. Quest. 12. Can any one but God, by force, impress ill habits on the Will. C. No: we were miserable if any could make us wicked. B. Quest. 13. Will God ever make any such evil habits in the Will. C. As a habit he may cause it, but not as evil. B. Quest. 14. Do you think that a Sinner is necessitated to every sin that he committeth, or to every Duty which he omitteth, so that he could not do otherwise? C. I think he is under a necessity of sinning: but I cannot say it of every sin which he committeth. B. You before granted many things to be in the power of the Will: And can you deny that power to be free, that the same things are in its liberty: I will tyre you no more; but desire you, 1. To peruse all your former concessions about man's power. And 2. To peruse all the twenty Concessions of A. Confer. 5. Criminat. 1. where he denieth freewill in all those senses, and then tell me, where is the difference? C. They think that our freedom is inconsistent with necessity; but so do not we, who think that Decree and Predetermination do necessitate. B. I have forced you before to confess your concord here. A Logical necessitas consequentiae in ordine probationis, Arminius and almost all men confess doth result from mere prescience. And Dr. Twisse professeth, that neither the Protestants or the Schoolmen hold any other necessity to result from Decree or Predetermination. C. But the pravity of the wicked necessitateth their Wills to evil. B. 1. Not to all evil: For 1. Men commit not all: 2. And you before confessed, that men can do more good and less evil than they do. 2. The truth is, as I distinguished power before into Physical and Moral, so must we do Liberty and Necessity. The Will hath its physical Liberty, and is free from physical necessitation, in all the sin that men commit, and in all the good they do (I think) though not from all Divine predetermining necessitation to good: Men do not good and evil as Bruits do their acts. But the Will hath a kind of moral necessity of doing evil, by radicated habits, and hath no further moral Liberty, than it is freed from the power of those evil inclinations. But these habits necessitate not physically, but morally, and that only to some sin, but not to all. A man can act contrary to a good or evil habit, as common experience proveth. But because men's Volitions and Actions are ordinarily or much agreeable to their fixed inclining habits, therefore we use to say that morally such can do no better; meaning that they will not. C. But sure you would not have me believe that there is no difference betwein us and the Arminians in the point of freewill? B. If there be any, either you know it, and can name it yourself, or you know it not, and then may be ashamed to contend about it. Quest. 1. Tell me plainly, Is not all the Liberty which you deny a moral Liberty a malo, from sinful dispositions of the Soul? C. There is much dispute about Liberty from Divine predetermination; But I will not meddle any further with that. I never contended against any freewill, but freedom from sinful habits, as supposed to be in men more than it is. B. Quest. 2. Do you not hold then that all men have freewill so far as they have effectual Grace, and Sanctification. C. Yes, in that degree: For voluntas per gratiam liberata est libera. B. Quest. 3. Do the Arminians hold that the Wills of the graceless and unsanctified are freed from sinful habits? and so are morally free to holy acts. C. No, I confess they do not: Corvinus and others oft say, that it is Grace that giveth us the vires credendi which we had not before; But some of them deny any habits to be in the Will: But these say the Understanding must be enlightened before we are able to choose aright.: B. Quest. 4. Doth not common Grace give men a moral Liberty to common good, from all necessitating inclinations to the contrary? C. Igranted it before as to Power, and therefore must as to Liberty. B. Where then is the difference between you? C. I take it to be here, that the Arminians and Jesuits say that the Wills of the Unregenerate are not only free to common preparatory good acts, but to the special acts of Faith and true Repentance and Conversion unto God, which we deny. B. Either you mean this of all unregenerate men, or but of some: 1. Of all they say it not: For the Synod of Dort chargeth them but with saying that men can use their naturals, so as by degrees to come up to Faith. They commonly hold, that ordinarily the Will must be prepared by commoner Grace, before it (morally) can believe, though such are freely Unbelievers, having a natural liberty or power to the contrary, though undisposed, and have a moral power and liberty to some preparatory acts. 2. But if you mean it of those that are come up to the highest preparatory acts, and also have God's Grace ad posse credere, where there is the posse morale, there is moral Liberty so far. But whether this be really any man's case, or how many, to have Grace to enable them to believe who yet never do believe, is a Controversy which I find not Protestants apt to meddle with; And it is too hard for us to decide. C. That is the very heart of the Controversy, whether ever God give immediate Power and Liberty to believe to any one, who never believeth and useth it. B. Where do you find this Controversy much meddled with, unless by the Schoolmen, who assert sufficient uneffectual Grace to believe? But this belongeth to the next Article (of Grace) though here you anticipate it. But if this must be it, I shall briefly dispatch it. 1. Adam's instance hath already made you confess, that such a thing there hath been, as Grace ad posse & non ad agere, called sufficient but uneffectual Grace? And your confession of all the foresaid powers that men have by common Grace (to do more good and forbear more evil than they do) yieldeth that yet such a sort of sufficient Grace ad aliquid there is. 2. The course of God's Administrations, maketh it seem most probable, that some and many have such a mere sufficient Grace to believe and repent: For if Adam had such a Grace enabling him to have fulfilled the whole Law of Innocency, it seemeth proportionable that the Rector of the World give some such a Grace to fulfil the mediate Law of believing and repenting, who use it not. 3. It's common with Dr. Twisse to cite Augustine with approbation as saying, Posse credore est omnium, credere vero fidelium, and to make this the great difference of effectual Grace from that which is more common, that it giveth not only the Posse velle & credere, but the Act. 4. But yet because we can know no more of God's secret workings than he discovereth, I take it to be dark and dubious: But that this is certain, that whoever wanteth the power or liberty of Will (moral) to repent and believe, they are penally denied it, for not using that power and liberty which they had, to inferior preparatory Acts. And you can carry this Controversy of freewill no further. And is it not then a horrid shame, to hear honest people so seduced into Love-killing factious sidings by their Teachers, as that Boys and Women speak of wiser and better persons with disaffection and reproach, saying, O he is a Free-willer, or he holdeth freewill, when they know not what they talk of: but are made believe that it is some monstrous impious Opinion, making a man almost an Heretic? When even you that lead them are unable to show me any proved (at least considerable) difference at all. C. Are there so many Books written de libero arbitrio between Jesuits and Arminians, and us, and yet is there no difference? B. 1. I do not say that no man that ever wrote of it, hath wrangled himself into any words of ill signification, or taking up any more than is defensible. 2. But if the main Controversy be not Logomachy, why do not you tell me what the real difference is? It is not fair-dealing to make me ridicuous for calling to you to name the difference, and yet yourself refuse to name it, and make it good. Will you assert what you know not, and accuse men without proof? The fourth Crimination. C. They hold that the Unregenerate are not dead in sin, and void of all spiritual good. * Of this read Milancth●n's Answer to all their Objections, in L●●. come. de liber. ar●. c. 7. and Strigelius on him. B. Do you think that they differ from you herein? This was spoken to before. 1. They hold that the Unregenerate have natural life, and so do you. 2. They hold that their faculties are bonum naturale, and so do you. 3. They hold that common Grace is bonum morale, at least Analogically so called, and so do you. Indeed as bonum is ex causis integris none on Earth is morally good, no nor doth any thing that is bonum morale, because it is imperfect; and so our defective holiness is not bonum morale in that sense: But as good is so called from the predominant Will, the godly have bonum morale: And as it is denominated from that which is not predominant, yet real in the Will, the Unregenerate in their common Grace have bonum morale. For common Grace is not merely quid physicum, nor merely sin. 4. De nomine, whether we shall call this spiritual good or not, when we have a Grammar written from Heaven, or by Apostles, we shall have more mind to dispute with you. But I told you once already, that 1. As to the efficient, it is spiritual, that is, common Grace is wrought by God's Spirit. 2. As to the end slightly and uneffectually wished it is spiritual; But as to the truest end (the pleasing and glorifying of God) predominantly and effectually willed and intended, it is not spiritual. 3. Nor as to the manner, if the exercise of such an intention be called the manner. Tell not men that we differ, because you can bring forth ambiguous words, and there dream of a difference; but plainly tell me, Are not you and they thus far agreed? and is not this all that's in your charge? The fifth Crimination. C. They hold that man is not merely passive in his first Conversion to God, which is contrary to us and to the Truth. B. When will the Lord give his Ministers as much skill to heal, as to wound? to find out real concord as to make differences in their Dreams and Fictions? Do you think indeed that you differ in this point? * The Jesui●es with the other Schoolmen commonly distinguish with Augustine the Grace which sine nobis in nobis operatur, from that which after cum nobis operatur; The first they call Operantem, the second Cooperantem: The first preventing, the second con-comitant; the first infused, the second governing; the first exciting, the second Adjuvant: Of which see Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. disp. 88 c. 9, etc. Alvar. l. 12. disp. 116. p. 473. In omni libero arbitrio creato, qua ratione creatum est, reperitur aliqua indifferentia seu potentia passiva secundum aliquam rationem. Nam 1. Lib. arb. creatum non est purus actus, nec lib. per essentiam' ut Deus—. 2. Ex sua natura est percabile.— 3. Non est impliciter primum se movens, sed movet se libere, motum tamen a Deo prius ration●. Here a Jesuit, Vasqu. 1. Tho. disp. 12. n. 4 Prima gratia non datur bene laborantibus, neque expectantibus, neque qu●rentibus ut definitur, Concil. Aransic. 2. Can. ● 4. 5. & 6. sed sedentibus in tenebris & umbra mortis. C. Or else I must think that we may be ashamed to show our faces to the people, if we make them believe that we differ when we do not, and thereby stir up their distaste of others. B. The question may have three several senses of passiveness, as man is considered, 1. In his Nature. 2. In his Action. And therein, 1. In the reception of the Divine Influx. 2. In the acting thereupon. And so the questions are, 1. Whether man's Soul be an active nature, or passive matter only? 2. Whether man's Soul be merely passive in the reception of the Divine Influx ad agendum? 3. Whether man's Soul be merely passive in its own first act of Faith or Repentance? Tell me, Are not these three distinct questions? And are they not all that you can devise? (unless you will make another, whether we are merly passive in the preparatory part?) And are you not now ashamed to confess that you need any answer to any one of these three questions. I. All the world is agreed save the Hobbists, and Somatists, and Sadduces, that man's Soul is not mere passive nature, but is an active nature, inclined to Action, as passive Elements are to non-action: And that when God moveth it, he moveth not Earth, Water or Air, but a Spirit, whose nature is self-moving (as fire) under the first mover. II. All the world is agreed, that the Soul and all Spirits are not, so purely and merely active as God is, but are partly and first passive; and that they do and needs must be receptive of the Divine Influx before they can act: For all Creatures depend on the first Cause, and both Being, Nature and Action would cease, if God's emanation to it ceased. And all the world agreeth, that no man before Conversion or after doth any act of Faith, Love, etc. no nor eating, and drinking, and going, etc. but he is in the first instant passive as influenced by God, before he is active. Who ever doubted whether physice recipere be pati? Did you ever know such a man? III. All the world is agreed, that man is not merely passive when he acteth. An Act is an Act sure! And to believe, repent and love is an Act, and an act of man's Soul. And Scotus who thinketh that immanent Act: are qualities (as we think of habits) yet thinketh that the Soul is truly active antecedently to that quality. Where now is there any room for a Controversy? C. You would make me believe that we are very ignorant Wranglers, that make a noise in our dream, and will not suffer others to rest! Do not the Arminians say, that man concurreth with God to the first act of his own Faith? yea that he maketh God's Grace effectual. B. You shall not again tempt me to anticipate the question of effectual Grace, though enough is said before to it as far as this Objection is concerned in it. God's Influx on the Soul is one thing: man's natural faculty receiving that Influx passively is another: And man's Act is another. To thrust in here a general word [man concurreth] and so to run away from clear and necessary distinction, is not the part of a man of knowledge. Did ever man yet deny that man herein concurreth as aforesaid? 1. Man concurreth not to make his Soul, nor to continue it in being or power. 2. Man concurreth not as any efficient of God's Influx on his Soul ad agendum. 3. But man receptively or passively concurreth as a Receiver of that Influx. 4. And man actively thereupon concurreth to believe and repent. Is not all this true? But you would tempt the Arminians to say, that it is you and not they that are herein to be accused? For what mean you else, by confining the Controversy to the first act of Faith, or to our first Conversion? Would you make men believe, that a converted man is not as truly passive in believing, loving God, etc. as the unconverted is? Must not the holiest person be passive in receiving the Divine Influx on his Soul, before, he do any holy Act? You seem to deny this? and than you are the person that err, by ascribing too much to man. If not, show the difference. C. There is a habit of Faith goeth before the first Act: And it is in respect to that habit that the Arminians say we are active procurers of it; which we deny. But the godly operate from a habit. B. You speak a private Opinion of your own brain, against the sense of the Concordant Churches. Where doth Scripture say, that a habit of Faith goeth before the first Act? Mr. Pemble * Vind. Grat● saith so indeed: yet he sometime calleth that but a Seed, which at other times he calleth a habit. Dr. Ames in his Medulla contradicteth it. Bishop Downame * In the end of his Treatise Of Perseverance. Le Blank. de diss. Grat. 2. Thes. 22. speaking of our being passive as to operating Grace, saith truly, [Non videntur hac in parte Reformati a sanioribus inter Scholasticos dissentire, licet aliis verbis mentem suam exprimant] The Schoolmen and Protestants little differ in the method of operations of Grace, and all are drawn by Controversies too near curiosity, beyond their reach. hath written a large Confutation of Mr. Pemble. The generality of Protestant Divines contradict it, and thus (with Rollock de Vocat.) distinguish Vocation from Sanctification, that they suppose Vocation to cause the first act of Faith and Repentance, and Sanctification to give us the fixed habit, the act intervening. Mr. Tho. Hooker is large upon it, in his Soul's Vocation. Will you start one man's Opinion, which Calvinists and Arminians are against, and feign this to be a difference between Calvinists and Arminians? And perhaps Mr. Pemble himself, by his first semen or habit, meaneth no more, than the Divine Influx ad actum received. I have before told you how unsearchable the nature of that Influx is, and how hard it is to know the true nature of an Habit. C. But Mr. Pemble saith, It is the Spirit that is given before we believe. B. Away with Ambiguity. By the Spirit is meant either the mere received Influx of the Spirit ad agendum; and so it is granted: Bad men receive the Spirits Influx to such acts as he moveth them to. Or else you mean, the foresaid fixed Habits and Dispositions, to a ready and facile ordinary Operation. Or else you mean, the Spirit given relatively by Covenant, undertaking to be the Sanctifier and Preserver of the Soul. In both these latter senses, the Spirit is not given before the first act of Faith, to Infidels. They have not the fixed habits of Holiness, Love, Hope, Obedience, etc. Otherwise they were holy Infidels. No Scripture speaketh it: nay contrarily it promiseth the Spirit as to Believers, and affirmeth it given after Faith, Eph. 1. 13. Joh. 14. 17. & 15. 26. Gal. 3. 14. & 4. 6. Joh. 7. 39 And that the Holy Ghost is not given in Covenant to Infidels I need not prove, to them that will not baptise Infidels. The sixth Crimination. C. They hold that none are damned only for Adam's sin imputed. * Yes, Vasqu. and other Jesuits hold, that Infants that have no remedy, are excluded from Glory only for Original Sin. .. B. And I think so do all Christians, or should do. 1. Of all the Adult there is no question. Is there any that hath no sin of his own? Or doth God forgive all their own sin to the damned? And as to Infants, 1. Wise men should not vex God's Church with matters no more revealed. 2. All the Scripture maketh them members, as it were, of their nearer Parents as well as of Adam, and as I have proved to you, threatneth them for nearer Parents sins (even in the Second Commandment, and Exod. 34.) as well as for Adam's. And all the world being, Gen. 3. 15. brought under a Covenant or Law of Grace, which conditionally pardoneth all sin, the not-believing of the Parent, is the cause of the non-liberation or not-pardoning of himself and his Infant. How can you say then that they suffer only for Adam's sin? 3. And sure their natural pollution is their own sin: And the Church of England, Art. 9 thus describeth Original Sin: [Original Sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk) but it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the Offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from Original Righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil: So that the Flesh lusteth always contrary to the Spirit: and therefore in every person born into this world, it deserveth God's Wrath and Damnation. And this infection of Nature doth remain, yea, in them that are regenerated, whereby the lust of the Flesh, called in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which some do expound, the Wisdom, some Sensuality, some the Affection, some the Desire of the Flesh, is not subject to the Law of God.] (Though I think that Text, Rom. 8. speak not of the Regenerate.) C. I include this Corruption when I speak of Adam's sin imputed; And though the Article mention not this Imputation, I suppose it was but through forgetfulness, and not that they denied it, as no part of Original Sin. B. * Vid. Chamier Paustr at To. 3. l. 1. c. 2. 7, 8. Contr Pigh. & Salmeron. & Pet. Mart. in Rom. 5. & Placaeum in Thes. Salmuriens. Vol. 1. & in Tractat. pecub. defence. de Imputatpeccati Adae: who are less for the imput. of Adam's sin than others, e contra vid. And Rivet's enumeration of Writers for that imputation, Defence. Council. etc. I have nothing to do with that, and am no judge of other men's thoughts that are dead. All that I desire you to observe is, that all understanding Protestants agree, that the sole Law of Innocency [Obey perfectly and live] is not the Law that God governeth the World, or any in it, by, since the Covenant of Grace was made, but all are under a Law of Mercy: And therefore Parents and Children, in and out of the Church, are judged by that Law which they were under, and not by the Law of Innocency alone, without any remedying Law of Mercy. THE Seventh Days Conference Between A. and B. Of SUFFICIENT and EFFECTUAL GRACE. A. You have made us hitherto believe that the Controversies about Predestination and Redemption, are all resolved into those of freewill and Grace, and if there be no difference here, there can be none there. Let us now then come to the core of the Controversy, which is all. The first Crimination. 1. The Calvinists deny sufficient Grace, * By sufficient Grace is meant that by which a man may be saved, and without which he cannot, in q. Vasqu. in 1. Tho. q. 23. disp. 97. c. 1. 1. Some▪ say that to some men for former sin, God penally denieth Grace sufficient for Faith and Repentance: So Tostat. in Mal. 4. q. 12. Greg. Armin. 1. d. 46. qu. unica Cajet. in Joh. c. 19 Roffens. Contr. Luther. ar. 26. Tapper. in art. 7. pag. 254. Henric. quodl. 8. q. 5. 2. Others say, that auxilium sufficiens is offered to all, and denied to no man in this life, how obdurate hour, which Vasq. in 1. Tho. q. 23. d. 98. c. 3. saith is the commoner Opinion of the Schools: Ita Adrian. in 4. q. 1. de poenit. Sotus de nat. & gra. c. 18. Driedo de Red. c. 3. & 5. Vega in Conc. Trid. l. 13. c. 13, etc. But Vasquez saith, cap. 5. That ad poenitentiam & ad fidem, it is non omnibus momentis, sed certis temporibus datum. They commonly agree to Augustine's words, though none know just how God changeth Wills, Certum est nos velle cum volumus sed ille facit ut velimus bonum.— Et certum est nos facere cum facimus, sed ille facit ut faciamus, praebendo vires efficacissimas— De Grat. & lib. arb. l. c. 16. etc. 17. Ut v●limus sine nobis operatur. These words put his Expositors hard to it. And Vasquez saith, That ut is here put finally, and the meaning is that to make us willing, he giveth us (without us) his preventing or operating Grace, or as Greg. his impulse: And if it mean any more it cannot be true: For doubtless man is the Agent or Willer when he willeth. So li. 1. ad Simplician. q. 2. Aliter D●us praestat ut velimus, aliter praestat quod voluerimus. Ut velimus enim & suum esse v●luit & nostrum: Suum vocando, nostrum sequendo quod autem voluerimus solus praestat; id est, posse bene agere & semper beate videre,] where the words also are obscure: but Vasquez noteth, that here the [ut] is not final as before; and that [Voluerimus] is not preterpefect tense, but the future tense: as the following words explain it: else he should contradict himself. Et de Eccles. dogm. c. 21. Manet ad qu●r●ndam salutem ●rbitrii libertas; sed admonent● prius Deo, & invitante ad salutem, ut vel eligat, vel sequatur: Et initium salutis nostra Deo miserante habemus: ut acquiescamus saluti-●erae inspirationi nostra potestatis est. and so make all men that are damned to suffer for mere Impossibilities, having no Grace to enable them to escape Sin or Misery; And consequently that Adam's sin only was avoidable, for which all the World is cast into a necessity of sinning, and none but a few elect ones have ever had so much as the possibility of any true remedy. Yea many of them deny that Adam himself had sufficient Grace. B. 1. The word [Sufficient] is sometimes taken, for all that is any way needful, and so it is that they commonly deny sufficiency of uneffectual Grace. More Grace might have certainly produced the Effect. A man is commonly said to have enough who needeth no more. Now more is here useful, needful, desirable to the facilitating and ascertaining the event. If you are not agreed with them in this, why do you pray for more Grace, and labour for more, and take it to be a sign of sincerity to desire more. For if the Regenerate have not Grace enough, surely the Unregenerate have not. 2. But in this Controversy the Dominicans and Jesuits, by sufficient, mean that which giveth the posse agere, that is, so much as is of absolute necessity to the act, without which it cannot be done, and with which alone it can or may be done. And in this sense the Protestants generally, and the Synod of Dort particularly deny not that there is such a thing as sufficient Grace. I have oft told you, that 1. They confess it in the instance of Adam. 2. They confess it in the case of common Grace, enabling men to common preparatory duty, which many are able to do, and do not; as I have evinced before in many instances, and the Synod, and specially the British and Breme Divines assert. 3. And as to the point of Faith itself, whether any unregenerate man have sufficient Grace to believe, which is not effectual, I find few meddling much with it. 4. But they commonly (I think) agree, that all regenerate men themselves have sufficient Grace for many an act of Faith, Love, Obedience which they never do. Is it not one of the Opinions which at Dort and frequently these Divines reject, as falsely imputed to them, that a man can do no more good, and forbear no more evil than he doth? And if he can do more, he hath power to do more: And power to act, is that which is called sufficient Grace. Therefore I need not trouble you any more with this Controversy, seeing under both the notions of Power and Liberty, it is decided, and confessed by you to be so before. Remember that all sufficient Grace is effectual; but not effectual to the act: It doth efficere potentiam, enableth men to act: but doth not cause the act itself, unless it be efficax ad actum, as well as ad potentiam. How ordinarily do they profess the possibility of doing more than is done, by godly and ungodly, and that all the power that men have is not reduced into act. Yea when some assert Predetermination itself, they say that it doth not destroy Liberty or Power ad contrarium, but only determine it. A. It is bad enough that they deny all sufficient Grace to believe that is not effectual, though not to other acts. B. You wrong them: They do not so: Have I not told you now, that they commonly grant that even the godly themselves have sufficient Grace to believe, which is not effectual as to many an act of Faith? And as to Unbelievers, 1. They say that all have not Grace sufficient or necessary to believe: And so say the Arminians. 2. But whether any one have or no, who believe not, they rather leave it to the Searcher of hearts as an unknown thing to them, than deny it. But they seem to infer that it is most likely to be so, in that 1. It is so with the godly themselves. 2. And with all other men, as to other acts of common Grace. And they all agree (as I said before) that no man is denied power to believe savingly, but for not using as he could his antecedent commoner Grace. And I think neither Party knoweth more than this, and in this both are agreed. And he that will assert his uncertain Conjectures, and then pretend that this is a Church-Controversie, is the maker but not the ender of Controversies. A. Some of them stick not to say that Adam himself had not Grace sufficient to stand, or forbear sinning: and if so, then there is none such. B. We have nothing to do with any odd persons words. Who is it that never speaketh amiss? I confess Dr. Twisse, Vind. Grat. l. 1. par. 3. de Reprob. sect. 2. pag. (Vol. minor) 306. saith, Gratiam ad peccatum vitandum necessariam duplicem esse dicimus; aliam ad posse vitare peccatum; aliam ad pecatum actu vitandum: illa est Gratia Regenerationis— Altera non in est homini per modum habitus, sed per modum passionis; & est motio quaedam gratiosa in voluntatem influens, & ad omnem sanctam actionem extimulans.— And so one or two say that Adam had Grace necessary ad posse stare, non autem ad actum. But this is but a few men's odd Opinion, contrary to plain truth. I mean, If by necessary ad actum be meant in the proper School-sense (not all that is conducible to ascertain it, but) that sine quo esse non potest, it is a contradiction to say that men have the power to Act, and yet want that which is necessary to the Act, that is, that without which they cannot Act. It is plainly, [They Can] and [They Cannot] (For we talk not the potentia passiva which a Stone, Tree, or a Beast, or a mad Man have). This distinguishing of things that differ not, must be detected, as well as confusion avoided. To say a man can believe, or hath power to believe, and yet wants that without which he cannot believe, is palpable contradiction. And where he maketh Regeneration to give the posse, before the Act, he speaketh obscurely or unsoundly. God's active Influx on the Will, exciting it to Act, is (at least) part of his Regenerating Grace. A man is not Regenerate before he ever actually believed or repent; though he first receive the Divine Influx ad agendum: Nor can he prove that any proper habit goeth before the first act. And whether it do or not, most certainly the nature, faculty, and the habit, and all together, is truly and formally no power ad hoc, to believe or love God, or do any good, without God's necessary Influx, Concourse or exciting Grace: No more than a Plant hath a power to fructify without the Sun or Earth: Of God's help ad bene esse we speak not: But to say that Gods exciting Grace is necessary ad actum, without which the Act cannot be, and yet that we have a power to do that Act without that Grace, is still a contradiction. This is potentia hypothetica & aequivoca, a term fit to play with: But it is true power, where nothing of absolute necessity sine quo non esse potest is wanting, which our Divines do commonly confess that Adam had, and that all men good and bad have to more good than they do. Therefore I find not that you are in that disagreed. And Dr. Twisse, as I told you, oft and vehemently professeth, Vindic. Grat. de Amis. Grat. Cont. Bellar. pag. (Vol. Minor) 230. c. 2. & 232. that man hath no necessity of sinning ex decreto, but logical consequentiae: But if it were true that we wanted that Grace which is absolutely necessary to avoid sin, it must needs follow that such are under an absolute present necessity consequentis also of sinning; as much as of dying, when God ceaseth to continue life. And if he mean that the Decree necessitateth not sin, but the denying of necessary Grace doth, he should have said so. Andr. Rivet Disput. 7. de Grat. Univers. p. 113. saith, [Sed non quemadmodum Pomificii & alii qui eorum sententiam vel sequuntur vel interpolant, nobis imponunt, ita ut plane negemus sufficientis Gratiae phrasin posse usurpari, aut dicamus nullam esse sufficientem ullo modo, quae efficax non sit, vel nullam esse efficacem quae ad conversionem & salutem non sit efficax— Id tantum dicimus, non dari omnibus talem Gratiam sufficientem, quae ita moveat omnium hominum voluntates, ut sit in potestate electionis motioni aut obtemperare, aut res●agari: adeoque nullum esse qui per talem gratiam non possit ad salutem pervenire, Deumque id velle omnibus & intendere.] You see that he will own no more, but the denial of a universal sufficient Grace for Salvation, intended of God, to all men. And you yourselves confess, 1. That God intendeth not Salvation for all men, unless conditionally, if they believe and repent, which from eternity he knew before he made them, that they would not. 2. And that all men have not sufficient Grace to Salvation, no nor to believe, but only to make them better, and bring them nearer it, and prepare them for it; (which some call Grace mediately sufficient to Salvation; but that's an improper Speech, as long as for want of their Obedience, they never attain to much that is absolutely necessary.) For my part I doubt not to assert, 1. That no man in the World hath Grace sufficient for Salvation, that is, Glorification, an hour before he dieth: For he cannot be saved without more; that is, without the Grace of perseverance to the end. But every believing Penitent hath Grace sufficient and effectual to give him a present Right to Salvation. And 2. I add, that there is no such thing as Grace sufficient to Salvation which is not effectual, and doth not save. Seeing all that persevere in holiness are saved; and they that do not, have not Grace sufficient (that is, necessary) to Salvation. 3. And I add, that no man hath Grace sufficient to give him a Right to Christ, and Pardon and Salvation, which is not effectual, and doth not procure it. For every penitent true Believer hath that Right to Christ, Pardon and Life: And he that is not a penitent Believer, hath not Grace sufficient to obtain that Right. A. Yes, if he have sufficient to help him to believe. B. Not so: unless he actually believe: For is not Faith in act, somewhat more than power to believe? When you confess that men are damned that have the Power, but not that have the Act. A. Yes; but man causeth the Act oft, when God hath given only the Power, and necessary concourse to the production of the Act. B. Corvinus and others of you ordinarily confess, that Faith itself is the Gift of God, and that Faith is more than a power to believe. And we denominate God's Grace by the various effects: Therefore I may say that a man that hath Grace sufficient to believe, yet hath not Grace sufficient to Justification, till he have, 1. The Grace of Faith. 2. And so the Grace of the moral donation of the Covenant, which is the justifying, pardoning Instrument. A. You seem then to deny sufficient Grace yourself. B. I assert, 1. That godly men have power or sufficient Grace to many acts of Faith, Love and Duty which they never do. 2. And that all men by common Grace, or sufficient, are able to do better than they do, in preparation for special Grace. 3. And that they are bound so to do, in order to their Salvation. And so that all men have some helps and Grace in its kind sufficient to enable them to seek Salvation, and that God will not forsake them till they forsake him. * But I am not able to prove what Vasqu. asserteth in 1. Tho. q. 23. disp. 98. c. 4. Nunquam occurrere nobis obligationem praecepti, aut tentationem sine sufficienti cogitatione qua & hanc vincere, & illud observare possimus. Loquor de precepts affirmative, cui non solum tempu● adest quo solet obligare, sed etiam cujus obligatio memoriae occurrit. And he addeth a great untruth, [Nam si nulla illius in mentem subiret cogitatio, nulla nobis ejus obligatio in●umberet,] unless by [sufficient Grace] he meant mere natural power, and by cogitation the natural power of cogitation, this is odious. As if a man were bound by no. Law of God or Man, if he could but make himself ignorant, contemptuous and wicked enough, never so much as to think of i●. A. But doth not your Church of England, Art. 13. say, [Works done before the Grace of Christ, and the Inspiration of his Spirit, are not pleasant to God, forasmuch as they spring no● of Faith in Jesus Christ; neither do they make men meet to receive Grace, or (as the School Authors say) deserve Grace of congruity: yea rather, for that they are not done as God hath willed, and commanded them to be done, we doubt not but they have the nature of sin.] B. This Article is intended against merit of congruity in the works of wicked men. And it is certain, that all their works are sin, in that they are in defectiveness of ends and manner, and in perverseness, the violations of the Law of God, (as to pray to God only to be saved from Hell, without love to God, and Holiness, or hatred of Sin; to give Alms for the same ends, etc.) where the love of God, the true end is left out, the action must needs be sin. But we say not that it is only sin, or totally sin. It is good and pleasing to God secundum quid, though not simpliciter: And such Actions as are sin by deficiency, may have a tendeney to better Actions, and so to Salvation, by that good that is in them. He that in mere love to his own Soul, will pray, hear, meditate, avoid sin, etc. is in a likelier way to Grace and Life, than he that will do none of this. And 2. The Authors of the Article, by merit of congruity, meant somewhat more than preparation for Conversion; For no English▪ Divines, I think, have denied that. 3. And by [Works done] they meant such as the Papists taught men too much to trust in, as giving Alms, building Hospitals, going on Pilgrimages, etc. which went under the notion of Sacrifices and Oblations under the old Law, when God said, He abhor●d the Sacrifice of the Wicked, and bid them be readier to hear, than to offer the Sacrifice of Fools. But it is not, I think, Soul-humbling Repentance, Confession; begging for Grace, considering their Ways, hearing the Word, etc. though but such as preparatory Grace may do, which they meant by Works. 4. And that is not done without Grace and the Spirit of Christ, which is done but by his common Grace; And yet I could wish the Article had been better worded. But if you will see the consent of an hundred and twenty ancient Writers, and sixty three Protestant Synods, Churches and Divines, for Universal Grace, read Dallaei, Apolog. part. 4. A. I am sure God saith, That he would not the death of a Sinner, but rather that he repent and live, and that he would have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the Truth, which they deny. B. No man denieth it, who denieth not the Scripture. And I can hardly believe that really you differ about the meaning of the words. Quest. 1. Do you believe that God is absolutely unwilling that any perish? and absolutely willeth that all shall be saved? A. No: but conditionally he is. B. Quest. 2. Do you think that he absolutely willeth the performance of that condition? A. I know you will say, If absolutely, it must come to pass, or God must be overcome. If conditionally, how doth he will that condition? and so in infinitum? But I will say, that he willeth it absolutely, and yet is not overcome or srustrate by a greater Power. For he willeth it only voluntate inefficaci, or with a velleity, which is not a willing to do it all himself, but that it be done by man. B. If he will that man repent eventually, with an absolute Will, the Impenitent then frustrate his Will or Desire. And it is a note of infelicity to have absolute Desires not obtained: If Gods Will be not done, is it not for want of Power or Wisdom to accomplish it? A. No: it is because he willeth not to effect the thing, but that man effect it. B. If you had said, that he conditionally willeth that man effect it, the failure had been no frustration: But that had been but to say, that he willeth that man shall will if he will; or at least, if he excite his own Will; and so the question would recur, How he willeth that excitation. But seeing you say, that God absolutely willeth that man shall will or excite his own Will, you must needs mean that God desireth that which he cannot obtain, and so is imperfect? A. No: I only say, that he desireth that which he cannot obtain by man's free agency, without exerting more of his own efficient power to obtain it. He could obtain it, if he would do all that he can. B. * Hoc v●lt Dtus ut omne●●jus vit● participes s●●t, circumsta●ti● vero p●n●rum non ipsius v●l●●tat● fiunt: sed pro merito ●●ru●● qui p●ccaverunt infer●●t●●: Vitam De●● cuique propria voluntat● tribuit●ram vero sibi quisque the●aurizat. Basil. in Psal. 26. This is no more than to say, that either properly he doth not will that man excite his own Will to the act (in that he will not do that without which he knoweth it will not be done); or that he willeth it but conditionally, [If so much help will procure it.] And for want of plain opening the case as it is, you do but entangle yourself in unintelligible words, when you talk of uneffectual velleities of the event which yet are absolute. A. How will you explain it better? B. As is sufficiently done before. 1. God absolutely willeth that it shall be man's duty to repent and believe. Duty is the thing antecedently willed with an absolute Will. 2. God willeth that Heaven shall be his due, if he perform that condition. 3. But if he will not perform it, that Hell be his due. This Will is conditional as to the thing willed. 4. These Volitions of God belong to him as Rector, (supposing him a Benefactor) giving out his benefits by a Law. And this Will is expressed by God's Law, which actually constituteth the absolute Debitum obedientiae, and the conditional debitum premii vel poenae. 5. The condition being past, God's consequent Will is absolute de premiando vel puniendo: He willeth the death of the Impenitent consequently. And this is but God's Will, qua judex, expressed by his Judgement actually. 6. Though in strict sense, the thing that God antecedently willeth is not the event, but the debitum vel jus, man's duty, and his due thereupon; yet because it belongeth not to a Legislator as such to do any more towards the event, than command it (supposing necessary power and helps) therefore after the manner of men, it is said, that God willeth the event (Repentance and Salvation) because he willeth to do so much towards it, even all that concerneth him to do as a mere Rector, (besides the donation of necessary power or help as a Benefactor.) And this is all that you mean, in which both sides are really agreed. A. I confess we use to explain it by his Antecedent Will, and saying that quantum in se, he would have all repent and live. But by quantum in se, we do not mean that God doth as much as he is able to it: Therefore your explication seemeth true, as well as conciliatory, that he doth quantum in se as Rector per leges, supposing also his necessary help. B. So God delighteth not in the death of Sinners, because it is not his Antecedent Will that they die, but only his consequent, on supposition of impenitency which he willeth not: And also because it is the good of Justice, and not our death and hurt as such, or for itself that God loveth and delighteth in. But when men return and live, they fulfil his antecedent Will, and do that which he loveth as good in itself. And he would have all men come to the knowledge of the Truth, and be saved; that is, He obligeth both Ministers to preach to them, and others to pray for them and help them, and themselves to obey and receive his Grace; And he giveth them means, and giveth Christ and Life by free donation to all, on condition they will but accept the Gift. And he that strictly willeth this much, may be said after the manner of men, to will the event. And this is all that both sides mean, if they understood themselves. The second Crimination. A. The great difference between us, is, that they hold God's Grace to be unresistible; * Okam, Gabriel, and Catherinus do hold, that there are three ranks of men in God's Decree: 1. One of persons eminently predestinated, to whom God will give such extraordinary Grace as shall ex se ascertain their Conversion and Salvation: 2. Another of the the ordinary Elect, who are fore-seen to use well sufficient Grace, and so elected to Glory upon that foresight. 3. The Reprobates who are decreed to Hell for their fore-seen sin. Vide Okam in 1. d. 41. q. 1. Gabr. ibid. q. 1. a. 2. & de hisce Vasqutz in 1. Tho. q. 23. disq. 90. c. 1. who contradicteth them, cap. 2. & 23. Yet denieth that in man there is any cause condition, or occasion of his predestination, disp. 91. Tilenus' against Camero layeth all upon the resistibility of Grace, but never sufficiently explaineth the word. The Arminians Synod, p. 15. assert, Etiam supernaturalem potentiam voluntati conferri, & hac ratione Deum immediate in voluntatem agere; modo illa actio voluntatem non necessitet, antecedenter, & libertatem potentiamque non volendi tollat. Hear a Jesuit, Ruiz de Praedef. d. 6. sect. 4. p. 91. Vocatio efficax suum effectum infallibiliter sortitur, quoniam suam efficacitatem accipit ex praescientia & proposito Dei, movente nostram voluntatem ut consentiat:— Nam insuperabilis virtus Vocationis secundum propositum est. Bradwardine, l. 3. c. 27, 28. asserting the necessitation of all that cometh to pass, would prove that yet Sinners deserve damnation, though they could not sin less than they did, because Christ merited Glory that could not sin.] But it's a deceit from the ambiguity of the words, [Can and Cannot]. It was not for want of Power that Christ could not sin, but by perfection of holiness: But it is for want of natural power to overcome God, that he feigneth men to be Sinners and damned. As if it did move man as a stone, or a dead body, and did necessitate or force the Will of man: Whereas we hold, that God worketh by such moral, internal and external suasion on the Will, as taketh not away the power of resisting and doing the contrary. B. I confess this is the Point that maketh the greatest noise. But let us inquire how far indeed you differ. 1. Resistance is Passive (as a hard block resisteth the wedge) or Active (as Fighters do resist each other.) 2. Resistance is effectual (when the Resister overcometh) or uneffectual (when it is overcome.) 3. The Act of Resistance, must be distinguished from the power of Resistance: And to overcome actual Resistance, from the destroying of the Power. 4. Physical and moral Power of resisting must be distinguished as is aforesaid. 5. Real and Logical Power of Resistance also must be distinguished as afore. A. Well: How do you apply these distinctions? B. 1. All the gracious Operations of God on the Soul of a Sinner, are not only resistible, but ever resisted, both passively and Actively, in some degree. 1. Materia passiva qua talis, is said to resist the motion of the active nature, in that its own nature is averse to Action, and the motus must be violentus. And though man's Soul be not material, yet as under God it is substantia passiva, and so passively may be said to resist, in a lower sort, that is, to require the exerting of the Power of the Agent to its motion: Though this putteth God to no difficulty. 2. But sinful Privations and Indispositions make the name of passive resistance to the Grace of God, yet more apt. 3. And the contrary operations and renitence of a vicious Mind and Will, are an active resistance. Though it be above our reach to know in what sense it may or may not be called a Resistance as to God's Act in itself (God being not passive); yet that it may be called a Resistance, as to the effect, is past doubt; (As I resist a man's Work, if I undo what he doth, though I touch not him.) All penitent men's consciences tell them that they resist God in all the good that he persuadeth them to, and doth them. 2. No man actively resisteth God, but by his own power: That is, 1. God as the Author of Nature, keepeth up natural Power, and concurreth with it. 2. Man vitiateth and perverteth this, in morals. 3. God by outward and inward motion doth Operate towards the rectifying of it. 4. Man using his natural power viciously against those rectifying Operations, striveth by it against God's gracious Work, and so resisteth him by his own strength. 3. When ever Grace effecteth the Faith, Repentance, Obedience which it moveth us to, it overcometh all our actual resistance. Grace is not always overcome, when it is resisted. To say that effectual Grace overcometh resistance, is but to say that it is effectual. 4. All Grace which is sufficient, that is, which giveth all that is absolutely necessary to the effect, is not victorious or effectual; and so it is resistible, as that signifieth superable, and that uneffectual; that is, all necessary sufficient Grace is not effectual. 5. It is an improper phrase to say that God's Power is overcome: For it is not done by a greater Power. But when God will put forth but a certain degree of Power in his gracious motions; the motions of natural power perverted by Vice, may be greater than them: And when they bring forth a contrary effect, are said to overcome them. 6. Therefore whether Grace be de facto resisted or not resisted, overcome or not overcome, is no matter of controversy, seeing the event doth decide the question. 7. Grace where it overcomes, is not properly said to overcome the mere physical Power or Act as such, but as perverted, and viciously used against God. 8. The power of sinning may be said to be overcome, when it doth not perform the presently-endeavoured act, but the contrary. 9 The Power may be said to be overcome, when it is destroyed, and is no longer a Power ad hoc. And so the natural power is never properly said to be overcome by Grace, but to be determined. 10. The vicious moral Power, which is but the evil habit or disposition, is always overcome by effectual Grace, as to that act where Grace prevaileth. But not always thereby overcome in itself as a habit, and destroyed; till the contrary habitual Grace destroy it. All this is passed all Controversy on both sides: And if so, tell me what difference about the irresistibility of Grace remaineth. A. It will put a man's brains hard to it to follow you, as you mince the matter by so many distinctions and propositions. B. And you put men's Consciences hard to it, to fire God's Church, by contending where you differ not, or can show no difference. Quest. 1. When you say that Grace is resistible, do you mean that de facto, it is never effectual and overcometh our resistance? A. No: then no man should be saved. B. Quest. 2. Do you mean that man's Will is more powerful than God? A. You need not ask me such a question. B. Quest. 3. Do you mean that God never putteth forth so much power in his work of Grace as man doth in resisting it? A. Here I must distinguish also: 1. Power is so called either as in se, in the virtue, or in the effect. 2. Power in man is so called either as merely man's, or as Gods that worketh in man. And so I answer, 1. God's Power in itself which way ever it worketh (in man or out of him) is the same, neither greater nor less than itself, for it is God. 2. Power in itself as Gods is infinitely greater than man's as such. 3. As power is so called from the effect, it is no Controversy: For the event still telleth which is the greater, or prevalent therein. B. You have answered well. Quest. 4. You do not mean I know that in the instant of acting, the Soul that willeth can nill the same thing at the same time, in the same respect, much less after the act is past, that it hath a contrary power ad praeteritum? It is, I suppose, only in the instant, antecedent to the act that you say Grace is resistible? A. You may easily be sure of that. B. Quest, 5. If you mean only that the natural faculty was potentia libera activa ad utrumlibet, till Grace procured it to determine itself: And so that Grace destroyed not the natural Power or Liberty; do you know any that differ from you in that? A. No, if they may take freedom in their own sense. B. Enough of that, I hope, before. Quest. 6. If you mean that the moral Pravity of this natural faculty, was such as could have prevailed against Grace, though it did not; do you not speak unintelligibly? For either you speak of a Logical possibility only, or of a real strength or power; If of the former, you equivocate; and you differ not from others: For you oft confess, that God's mere Prescience that it will not be, doth infer a Logical necessity consequentiae, and so a Logical impossibility of the contrary. But if by [Can] you mean a real strength or opposite power, you mistake the matter. Moral pravity is not strength or power at all; But the perversion or disease of strength or power. So that the case is not unsearchable: when a man is converted, what hath your question respect to, in the word [Resist] but the Act, the vicious habit and privation, and the natural faculty? Is there any thing else to be considered? A. Not that I remember; what then? B. The Act you confess is procured, and therefore not resisted (effectually.) 2. The privation resisteth but passively, and so hath no active power. And to say that the privation of Faith could have resisted the Grace that wrought Faith, implieth a falsehood, if you mean it of active power or resistance. 3. The contrary habit is not a power, but the ill disposition of a power. Therefore if it be de facto, overcome as to the act by actual Grace, or in itself by habitual Grace, it is on a false supposition to say, that it had power to have resisted, when as it hath no power, nor is a power. But if you speak of Logical possibility, its impertinent equivocation. 4. All that remaineth than is, that the natural faculty in the antecedent instant wanted not power or freedom to the contrary act; which is true, and none of them that are intelligent deny. For God by determining a free power, doth not destroy it, but use it, and determine it. And God's change of the Mind and Will, is not by any diminution or fraction of the power of it, but by a sapiential and loving efficacy, acting it aright, and more advancing it. Even in our after lives, he doth not take away our natural power to will and do evil, but he taketh away the vicious disposition of it, that we may certainly will and do well. Tell me yet then where is the difference? A. Though you over-whelm me by distinctions, you cannot so blind me, but I know a difference between these two Opinions, [when Paul first believed, he could have resisted and not believed,] and [He could not resist, and not believe.] B. That is, you have learned of the Masters of Confusion and Dissension to strive about words, which you understand not; and having the Football before you, you will drive it on. But little know you whither? nor how little thanks the great Shepherd of the Flock will give you at the last. Either show us the difference, or be ashamed to pretend a difference. A. I perceive that the Controversy about Resistance is resolved into that of power: [Can and Cannot resist], which was opened before. THE Eighth Days Conference Between B. and C. of SUFFICIENT and EFFECTUAL GRACE. B. I now expect your sharpest Charge against your Adversaries about the nature, efficacy and extent of Grace. The first Crimination. C. 1. They assert an Universality of Grace to all men, sufficient to their Salvation. * Malderus, in 1. 2. Tho. q. 109. a. 10. dub. 1. pag. 464. mentioneth five degrees of sufficient Grace: 1. That most imperfect degree by which Sinners may forbear a particular mortal sin. 2. That of the Regenerate by which they are able to forbear all mortal sin: but being infirm will not. 3. Adam in Innocency, who could easily have persevered, but did not; when some Angels did by the same degree which others had that fell. 4. That of the Predestinate, who have Gods special custody, before they are confirmed in Grace. 5. The Grace of Confirmation, of which there are five Opinions, (of which after.) Some Lutherans seem to go further in this than the Jesuits or Arminians, and to deny the distinction of sufficient and effectual Grace, saying that it is the same Grace that is effectual in one and not in another: but I think they differ but in words: So Gerhard, de lib. arb. c. 6. sect. 1. Concedimus sane spiritui sancto conversionis opus aggredienti multos resistere, con●ilium Dei adversus seipsos spernere— & hac ratione sua culpa gratiam conversionis a se repellere: sed propterea ipsam Gratiam in sufficientem & efficacem dividendam esse negamus, siquidem una eademque Dei Gratia est, quae in credentibus operatur, & quae ab intredulis repellitur. And he supposeth all men's Wills to be bad, and without power to convert themselves, and that God giveth them such Grace as doth not physically constrain or necessitate them or determine them; but such a suitable operation as they can resist: And so that the efficacy of Grace is not from the Will, but from Grace itself: but the inefficacy is from man: and the reason why any are converted, is from Grace: but the reason why any are not converted, is from their resisting that Grace; and so the Will of the Wicked is the differencing cause. Le Blank de dist. Grat. in suffic. etc. 68, 69. Remonstrantes non ideo Gratiam distinguunt in sufficientem & efficacem, quod putent gratiam quam accipiunt illi qui increduli manent & in peccatis perseverant non habere vim & efficaciam necessariam & praerequisitam ad hoc, etc. sed ideo solum grati● cujus su●t participes denegant efficacis n●men quod effectum ad quem destinatur in iis reapse non producat propter impedimentum quod illi ponunt— utrique ergo docent gratiam hanc satis virium habere ad ipsos convertendos— nihil ergo pejus h●t in parte sentiunt Remonstrantes illis qui Lutherani dicuntur: Ac proinde cum Reformati horum communionem non refugiunt, sed ultro eos ad pacem, etc. Magna est bonitas Dei in dandis bonis corporis & anim●: major est bonitas Dei in remittentis peccata magna & multa: maxima in patientia, &c: Strigel. Loc. 60. pag. 301. Carbo Compend. Tho. 1. q. 21. a. 4. Opus divinae justitiae semper p●●supponit opus miserecordi●; & in ea ●undatur tanquam i● prima radice quia ne procedatur in infinitum deveniendum est ad aliquid quod ex sola bonitate divinae voluntatis d●pendeat. B. I hope you have no malignant desire to extenuate God's Grace, but are willing to acknowledge it to be as great and large as indeed it is, if you can discern the proof. C. God best knoweth how to honour himself. B. Quest. 1. Do you think that all the World, or all that shall perish, yea or any part of the World is under the mere Curse of the Law of Innocency, as violated by Adam, without any remedy or mercy. C. I think they are without real Remedy, though not without all Mercy; for a delay of punishment is mercy. B. Quest. 2. Do you think that they are only under the Curse of that Law as the Devils are, without any possibility or offers of a remedy; or that they are also still under the Covenant-Offers of Life, upon condition of Innocency. C. I cannot suppose God now to offer a man Life, on condition he be no Sinner, whom he knoweth to be a Sinner: For such an Offer is equivalent to a sentence of Death, or denial of Life. Nor can I say that they are as desperate as the Devils, because they know not the desperateness of their case. B. Quest. 3. Do you think all the difference between them and Devils lieth in delay and ignorance of their misery? Then the most ignorant and presumptuous of them is the least miserable, though the most sinful; which cannot be? Quest. 4. But do you think that no Me●cy is to be offered ●o such? C. Yes: because we know not who are Elect, and who not. B. Quest. 5. Are we to offer men mercy only as Elect? or rather as Sinners and miserable, under a Law of Grace? and as Subjects of God obliged by that Law to accept it? C. We offer it to all Sinners, that the Elect may receive it. B. Quest. 6. Are none but the Elect under a Law of Grace, as the rule of their Duty, their expectation and of Judgement? C. Others may be under the Obligations of it, but not under the G●a●e of it. B. Remember then, 1. That they are not lawless. 2. That they are not under that mere violated Law of Innocency, [Be innocent and live.] 3. That they are under the Obligations of the Law of Grace. Quest. 7. Is there any of them that are not bound to use certain means appointed of God, in order towards their own Salvation? C. They are bound to intent their own Salvation, and with that intention to use some means: But God intends it not. B. Quest. 8. Doth God command men on pain of damnation to any vain endeavours, or use of means? C. He commandeth it not in vain: for it shall make them unexcusable. 2. They are not to judge their endeavours vain, because they know it not. 3. But in the issue all will be in vain to them. B. Quest. 9 Would it be in vain to them, if they really did the utmost that common Grace enableth any men to do? C. It is not properly Grace to them, and so not common. 2. It would be in vain to them. B. Quest. 10. Is that vain which bringeth a man into the nearest preparation for special Grace, and nearest to the Kingdom of God? C. To the Elect it is not vain: Nor to others for their sakes: Nor to others, as to the lessening of their pains in Hell: But as to their Salvation it is. B. Quest. 11. Who would it be long of (or be reputed the Cause) if it be in vain. C. Of themselves, who are born in sin from Adam, and are Unbelievers. B. You suppose it impossible for them to believe, and impossible for them not to be the Children of Adam. They made not themselves, and you suppose that for want of Grace they cannot believe. Quest. 12. When Death shall acquaint them with the impossibility that they were under, do you think, 1. That it will be the way of glorifying the Justice of God in Judgement, to have the World know that he condemneth Sinners merely because he will condemn them, for that which they never had any more true power to avoid, than to make a World? 2. Or will their Consciences in Hell accuse them or torment them for that which they then know was naturally impossible, and caused by God. C. We know not how God will glorify his Justice, or how their Consciences will torment them. It may be they shall then be as ignorant of the necessitating cause as now. B. 1. Do you know it now, and shall not they know it then? 2. God telleth us the contrary, That all hidden things shall be brought to light, and that God will justify his own proceed, by proving that men's destruction is of themselves, that every mouth may be stopped, and all the World be guilty before God: And he calleth it his Righteousness in judging, to give to every man according to his Works: and that men's Consciences shall then excuse them or accuse them, when God shall judge the secrets of their hear●s, (and not when he shall torment them, by deceiving them,) Rom. 2. 2 Thess. 1. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Matth▪ 25. & 7. 23, 24. 2 Tim. 4. 8, 9 Rom. 14. 10. Gen. 18. 24, 25. Quest. 13. Do you believe that none but the Elect have now any real mercy, besides a delay of their future misery, and hopes of its abatement. C. I do: For all things are to be judged of by the end: And that is really no mercy, which is not intended to a man's happiness, but his misery. As Afflictions are no evils to the Elect, because they are intended and work together for their good. B. Is the offer of Christ and Life no mercy? Is all God's patience and forbearance, as a means to lead them to repentance, no mercy? Is all the teaching, persuading, entreating condescension of Christ, no mercy? See what error here you run into, and how contrary to Scripture, and to nature itself? 1. You contradict God's Word, which frequently calleth them mercies, Psal. 145. 9 & 106. 7. 45. Neh. 9 19, 27, 28, 31. Jon. 4. 2. Rom. 2. 4. Matth. 18. 33. Isa. 63. 9 Ezek. 16. 2. You deny the chiefest part of men's duty; even to accept of mercy, to improve mercy, to be thankful for mercy, to be led by God's good-ness to Repentance, to use mercies as God's Talents to his Glory, etc. If you say, They know not but they are mercies; you feign God to bind men to duty, but by deceit: It is as mercies, and not as that which for aught they know may be mercies, that they are to be valued, used, etc. 3. You excuse men from the greatest aggravation of their sin: even sinning against Mercies: How can they sin against them that have none. 4. You feign God's Justice to be stragely glorified, by damning men in Hell for ever, for sinning against mercy, who never had any to sin against. 5. You will make Conscience justify the Wicked, and condemn Gods Judgements in Hell, instead of justifying God, and accusing themselves. 6. You must accordingly conclude that you never shown mercy to Child, Neighbour, or any but the Elect yourself, (because it was all to end in misery) or else that you were to them more merciful than God. 7. When man is made in God's Image, and we must be holy and merciful as our heavenly Father is, you set all men such a pattern of mercy and justice, as you would be loath your Prince or Parent should imitate. 8. You expose Christ's most compassionate tears to reproach, when, Luke 19 he looked on Jerusalem and wept over it, as having had a day of mercy; and when Matth. 23. he saith, How oft would I have gathered thee as a Hen gathereth her Chickens under her wings, and ye would not.— 9 You teach all God's Children in the World, to acknowledge no mercy, nor be thankful for any, till they are sure that they are Elect. And how few have that assurance? 10. You injure the Lord Jesus and his Covenant of Grace, while you say, that a conditional Gift of Christ and Life, Pardon and Salvation, even if they will but accept it, is no mercy to any that refuse it; nor yet the blood that purchased it as such. 11. You measure and denominate Gods great Mercies, according to man's vile abuse: As if it were no mercy, what tendency soever in itself it had to their Salvation, unless they accept it, and use it well, or if they reject it. 12. You are singular from almost all the Churches of Christ in the World: Contrary to the judgement of the ancient Churches, and of all present Church's of Greeks, Abassines, Arminians, Papists, or Protestants: expressly contrary to the Synod of Dort, and the particular suffrages of our British Divines there: except a very few men that by the heat of perverse Dispute against Amyraldus, the Arminians, etc. have been carried into such extremes. C. What mercy is it to a man to have Pleasure here a while, and Torment in Hell for ever? yea to have Christ and Life offered him to make him more unexcusable and miserable. B. In all this Discourse, it is not the nature of the mercy in itself that you deny, but God's merciful Intents: It is your mis-apprehensions about Predestination, which you are vending all this while, and there is the Core of your mistake, which we have sufficiently spoken to already. You talk as if God decreed men to Sin, to reject Christ, to abuse Mercies, to Impenitency, and consequently to Hell for so doing; which is all false. God decreed no man to these, or any other sin, nor to any punishment, but as for sin by them committed against his holy Law, which he foresaw, but willed not. Yea God decreed to set open the door of Grace▪ to Sinners, and to tender them mercy when they deserved misery, and to bring Life to the acceptance or refusal of their own Wills, and to entreat and importune them to accept it: His end in giving them mercy, is not to make them miserable, though consequently he will their misery for their sin. Now you feign in your own erroneous Imagination, that God first decreeth men's sin and damnation, and then giveth them all which we call Mercies as a means thereto, and then denominate them as bad as you have feigned them to be by such a● imagination. And you conceive of God's Decree as that which doth transire in praeteritum, is past and gone, when to God all time is nothing, but eternity is one everlasting instant. C. When you have talked all that you can for such kind of Mercy, it will not satisfy a man's understanding, who believeth that most of the world shall be damned, and that God fore-knew this from eternity, and would not prevent it when he easily could. Mercy that ends in Hell is sad mercy: He will have mercy on whom he will have mercy. B. Even under the terrible Law at Mount Sinai, God proclaimeth his Name and Nature, As gracious and abundant in Mercy. This Glory of his which he shown to Moses, is more gloriously showed to the World in Christ. And this you study perversely to obscure. And when you have contracted Salvation itself out of our own brain, into a narrower compass than God in Scripture doth, (who in every Nation accepteth them that fear him, and work Righteousness,) than you devise false Decrees and Intents, and father them on God to obscure the rest. And what do you by this, but seek to render God as little comely to his Creatures as you can. And if the love of God be Holiness and Happiness; If his Amiableness be his Goodness, even Himself; If it be Christ's great Work to reveal God in his Goodness, and by Faith to kindle holy Love. And if it be the Devil's malignity and work in the World to counterwork Christ, and represent God as unlovely, judge whether you serve Christ or Satan, and whether it be not his chief work of enmity against God that you carry on? But that you may have the true prospect of God's goodness in all this, you must remember that Gods Work as Creator goeth before his Work of Government, and his Work of Government in general before his Work of our Redemption; and his Work of Redemption and the Law of Grace before men's sin and Judgement. And 1. If God that hath diversified all lower Creatures as we see, did please in the Creation to make a rank of free-intellectual Creatures here on Earth, with power and help sufficient to attain to an Angelical Glory, if they would not wilfully prefer the way of misery, is there any want of goodness in making such a World? Are they not nobler than Bruits that have no such hope, though not than Angels that are confirmed. 2. And if he take pleasure having made such an Intellectual free Agent, to rule him morally by Laws, according to his nature, and to take it for his own great work to be his King or Rector in this sapiential way: That which much deludeth men in this, and wrongeth God, is that these foundations in Nature are not well considered. The issue of all the Atheists and discontented Unbelievers Accusations of God, is but this, That he made man but man, and nothing higher. A man is a mutable Intellectual free Agent, whose duty and happiness is left much to his own choosing or refusing. And being so made, he is accordingly to be governed; And as God showeth his greatness of Power as Creator and Actor of the universal frame of Nature, so he hath chosen eminently to show his Regent Wisdom, in his * Cusp. Peucer Hist. Carcerum against the Lutherans, pag. 719. An in homine ocioso, nihil agente, habenteque se pure passive; aut sicut truncus ad coactionem necessi●atis stoicae, afflatusve an abaptistici, sicut Flaciani somniarunt; aut velut brutum mutatione & conversione hominis physica aut hyperphysica, qualem fieri fingit Chimaera (that is, the Liber Concordiae) non sine sensu quidem, sed sine motu, ut subjectum patience & convertibile, eousque donec tantas accepit facultatis & virium quibus agere possit. moral Government of Men and Angels; And his wondrous Love, as the special Benefactor to the Vessels of Mercy. Power, Wisdom and Love (or Goodness) are never separated; But each hath its eminent demonstration. And the Omnipotent Father is most eminently glorified in his Power in the Creation, and sustentation and motion of the Universe; so the Son who is the Wisdom and Word of the Father (and the Father in him) is eminently glorified in his Wisdom in the Regency of the Intellectual World, by a sapiential way of Government by Laws and Judgement. And then steps up the physical Disputer, and profanely blasphemeth this honourable Work of God, and calleth it moral Operation in contempt, and thinks that unless God move man to every Volition, as he doth the appetite of a Beast, if not as we move a stone, or shoot an Arrow, he doth nothing, and it is his reproach. And to say that he can or did make a Creature that can freely will or not comparatively, even by the Power and general Concourse of God, they say is to feign him to make a God. And so both the Honour of God as Creator is denied him, and his Honour of sapiential Government is vilified. It is an excellent Work of the Creator to make a free Agent in his own Image. And it is a suitable and excellent Work as his King, to appoint him his end, and means, and work, and rule him by perfect Laws and Judgements. In all which also he acteth as a Benefactor, while he freely offereth him so glorious a Reward, to which as Rector he would lead him. And in that Relation will not be wanting unto him in any thing, which perfect Regiment requireth. * Of all this, if the Reader please to peruse a very small book which I have written, called A Vindication of God's Love, he may see more than I must here say. But contrarily saith Bradwardine, li. 2. c. 3. p. 614. [Quam facile posset Deus si veilet, tollere obicem sive actum? Hujusmodi quoque obex ponitur a Deo antecedenter: Quommodo ergo vult Deus conferre buic gratiam in quo parat obicem gratiam repellentem? Vel si Deus non dat gratiam propter obicem resistentem, & ipse Deus scienter & praecedenter causat hunc obicem quomodo ipse Deus non est causa non acceptionis gratiae salutaris?] I can hardly believe that they that thus take Sin and Hell to be nothing but the fruits of Gods good will, do believe that either of them are so bad as Scripture doth describe them, or so much to be hated or feared. 3. Consider also that Divine Love (the third Principle) as it hath its common demonstration and glory in the Works of the Omnipotent Creation, and in the Works of sapiential Regiment, so hath it also its peculiar eminent demonstration on the Elect in their Grace and Glory, or in their Holiness and Glory begun and perfected. And it doth not follow that because this Love is eminently glorified on a peculiar treasure, therefore there is no Glory in Gods other Works, or no reason for them. O that men had the wit to be humble, and confess that God is wiser and better than they, till they can come to more Wisdom to understand the Methods and Reason of his Works. As God hath his Honour in making Stars as well as the Sun, and Earth, as well as Stars, and Beasts, as well as Men, and Serpents and Toads as well as Birds, and Clay as well as Gold; so hath he his Honour in making a World of mutable defectible Intellectual free Agents (Men) as well as in making the confirmed Angels; and in gracious sapiential Government of them all, as well as in his extraordinary Beneficence and Love to his Elect. 4. And you must not feign the damnation of the Wicked themselves to be any such state as is inconsistent with the goodness of God to cast a Sinner into: We know not perfectly what Hell is: But as we know that it is the extremest humane misery, so we know that it is not at all worse than men's sins deserve; And that when we come to Heaven, we shall be perfectly satisfied of the Justice of God in men's damnation. And though I say not melius est peccatori miserum esse quam non esse; yet I will so far accord with worthy Dr. Twisse, as to say that melius est peccatores miseros esse quam non esse: Because else God would rather have annihilated them. For God doth that which is best: And his Wisdom, and Will, and Glory are fit Rules of Meliority, than the Will or Interest of Sinners. And it seemeth by the Devil's Kingdom, and Conversation in the Air and on the Earth (while yet they are in Hell, and reserved in Chains of Darkness) that their Hell is a state consistent with all that voluntary mischievous negotiation which they do. And it's like that though they have no Joy, yet their Wills have some pleasedness in the mischief which they do, as an angry and malicious man hath in revenge. And we have no reason to believe that the Hell of the damned is any worse or more violent or irrational than the Hell of the Devils, when they must go to that which was prepared for the Devils, Matth. 25. But if I should but open to you the plain evidence of this truth, how much of Hell consisteth in their sin itself, in which undoubtedly they are voluntary (though necessarily so, by their own doing and desert,) it might tend yet more to the abatement of all disparaging and unbelieving thoughts, of the Glory of God's gracious sapiential Regiment of the World. And to say that God could have made man better, and given him more Grace, is but as to say that he could have made Toads to be Larks, and Beasts to be Men, and Men to be Angels: And what if he did not? 5. And I again repeat what I have oft said, that all this Earth is but a point next inconsiderable in the vast Universe; And immeasurable spaces of those superior parts of the Creation are like to have proportionable Inhabitants for glory and number: And we know that we are come to an innumerable Company of Angels, Heb. 12. 23, 24. And for aught we know God may have millions of blessed Spirits, for one miserable wicked Soul. Therefore we must not talk against that which we do not understand. And if the Saints shall judge (wicked) Angels, and the World, (judging being usually put for ruling and punishing) we know not what hand we shall have ourselves in the execution of God's Wrath upon them, and how far they shall be as Slaves to Saints. C. You have said that (I confess) that tendeth to reconcile us all to God's Providence; But whether it will reconcile our own differences I doubt. How is that Grace sufficient to all men for Salvation, which never telleth most of a Christ, or of Salvation at all? * Jansen. de Grat. Christi, l. 2. c. 27. Non quaevis Gratia ad quosvis effectus inferendos sufficit: ut quidam imaginati sunt sed potestates operationum difficultati attemperand● sunt. B. You mistake your Adversaries. They hold not that all men have sufficient Grace to Salvation: But sufficient to help them nearer to Salvation. I tell you again, no Saint hath Grace sufficient to his full Salvation, till he is fully saved: Otherwise what need he any more? Some indeed call it mediately sufficient to Salvation, but that's but lis de nomine. C. If it be sufficient, what need they any more to that which it is said sufficient for? And yet more would do that which is not done. But no man should desire more than is sufficient. B. All this is a Game at words: * Blank de dist. Grat. &c▪ Thes. 77. Quod Thomistae recentiores affirmant illos in quibus gratia non est efficax ad conversionem nihilo minus gratiam sufficientem ad ●am haber●; id vero Reformati cun Jansenio negant m●ra logomachia est siquidem, etc. By [Sufficient] they mean only necessary help, without which the act cannot be done, and with which it can and may be done: They do not mean all that is needful ad cert● esse, or ad melius esse. Therefore I use rather to call it All necessary help or Grace ad esse. C. I pray you yet make it plainer to me, what that necessary or sufficient Grace is, that we may judge of it. B. Grace is taken either for the Favour of God, or for his Gifts. And so either for free Gifts without merit in point of commutative Justice: And so all that God giveth to any Creature, must needs be Grace. Or else for that which is given contrary to commerit (of evil). And so all is Grace which is given to Sinners. Grace is either, 1. Efficient-principal. 2. Efficient less-principal. 3. Objective. 4. Or subjective, which is the effect. I. Grace as the principal efficient, is either Gods mere Benevolence or Will to give. 2. Or his Act of Collation, as ex parte agentis. Both these are really one, and God himself, though differently denominated, and diversely conceived of by us. God operateth per essentiam. II. Grace as the less principal efficient, is all those means which have an Aptitude to effect (and so are apt to be efficients) or actually do so; As Christ, the Gospel, the Ministry, outward Mercies, Afflictions, etc. III. Objective Grace is those means which as Objects are appointed for man himself to act upon towards his own Salvation. As a Christ to be believed in and accepted, An offered Glory, a certain Promise, etc. iv * The Schoolmen have so many sorts of Grace as confoundeth themselves: when they have agreed, partly, 1. Of exciting Grace. 2. And of infused habits. 3. And of Concourse. 4. They are all to pieces about Gratia adjuvans per modum principii, what It is. Malderus tells us of four Opinions (in 12. q, 111. a. 3. dub. 2.) 1. That it is nothing but the infused Habit itself. 2. That it is but gracia excitans: 3. That it is quaedam qualitas infusa transiens cum ipso actu. 4. That God himself immediately supplieth the absence of a habit and defect of power to acts supernatural. He accounteth the case too difficult to be confident in: but inclineth to this▪ that this concomitant Grace giving power to supernatural acts before the habits, called by them Adjuvant Grace, is quasi formalis terminus seu effectus gratia excitantis & praevenientis & secundum rem non differre: Yet excitation is itself taken for an effect, and this effecteth this power in question. But in the justified he saith, the Holy Ghost, besides habits and powers, dwelleth. Will you lay any great stress on such niceties as these, past humane reach, and so confessed by the subtlest Contenders? Per peccatum non miunitur inclinatio naturalis ad bonum per subtractionem, sed per oppositionem impedimenti quod neque tollit neque minuit radicem inclinationis: cum enim peccatum non diminuat ipsam naturam rationalem, minuere non potest radicem naturalis inclinationis ad bonum quae identificatur cum natura: solum ergo minuitur bujusmodi inclinatio ex parte termini quatenus, viz. per peccatum p●nitur impedimentum pertingendi ad terminum unde quamtumvis in in●initum multiplicantur peccata non potest totaliter destrui inclinatio naturalis ad bonum rationis, Alvar. de Aux. li. 6. disp. 45. p. 210. Ita Aquin. 12. q. 85. a. 2. ad ●. & 1. p. q. 48. ar. 4. ad. 3. Peucer Histor. Carcer. reproveth the Lutherans, Concordia 2. quod non distinguunt inter vocationem generalem seu universalem, communem omnibus, & vocationem efficacem, pag. 724. Subjective Grace is that effect which is wrought on man's Soul, as the beginning of his recovery or healing, and having a tendency to more. C. Now tell us which of these it is that is sufficient. B. I. Undoubtedly there is no insufficiency in God. All that he willeth to do, he doth: And if he will no more, his Will is not to be called insufficient as to more, but null as to that Object: And we affirm no other proper Will of God, but such as is fulfilled. II. Gods means which wicked men enjoy are the same that the godly enjoy, and are sufficient ex parte sui, but not ex omni parte, that is, for as much as concerneth their own Office. So Christ's antecedent Preparations, his Satisfaction and Merits are sufficient. The Covenant of Grace is sufficient: The preaching of the Gospel is sufficient in its kind, etc. III. The objective Grace is sufficient; that is, God as he is to be believed in and loved, revealed in the Word and in his Works: Christ to be believed in; the Precepts to be obeyed, the Promise to be trusted, etc. And though it be doubtful to many whether Amyraldus and his Fellows were in the right, that thought that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and other objective Grace be qua objective, sufficient to all Heathens for Salvation; yet none can doubt but it is in suo genere, sufficient to all those good and holy acts which those persons may immediately exercise about them. And indeed he that loveth God but as the light of Nature, hath taught Heathens, or may teach men that he should be loved, if he be damned, must be a damned Saint in the love of God. But who do so love him, is another question. iv Subjective Grace is either Power, Act, or Disposition or Habit. 1. This Power is the very thing precisely which they meant by necessary or sufficient Grace. All men have true power to draw nearer Salvation, and do better than they do, though not immediately to do all that is necessary to Salvation. And he that can do it if he will, and also hath power to will it, is said to have sufficient Grace, which if he use not, the fault lieth in his wilfulness. 2. The Act, nor the just Disposition or Habit they have not. But that is their own fault, who had those Means, those Objects, and that Power by which they could and might have attained them. C. Is any one ever converted by this sufficient Grace, or not? If not, frustra fit potentia, etc. If yea, than it is effectual Grace. B. Now you have brought the Controversy to the parting point, where the two Parties use to part: (As you may see in Dr. Sanderson and Dr. Hamond's Letters. I will first answer your Consequences. 1. Non frustra fit talis potentia, though it never act. For 1. It attaineth other good ends, though it attain not their Salvation. 2. If one of a thousand should not use their power, or if a thousand to one do use it, that varieth not the case: For it is still as much vain to that one man, as if no one used it. But 2. So far as it is vain, that is, to their own Salvation, they make it vain themselves, and must blame themselves. 3. I ask you whether you think not yourself, that 1. All wicked men by common Grace; 2. And all godly men by special Grace, have power to do more good and forbear more evil than they do? If so, Do you hold that all that power which they never use to any of those omitted acts is vain? If not, why should this in question be accounted vain? But to the great difficulty itself, I answer, 1. You must not forestall the Truth by any of these false suppositions. 1. That there is any man to whom God giveth a mere Power, neither disposed, nor provoked to the Act. For 1. Man's natural faculty itself, besides natural power, hath all these aptitudes to the Act. 1. Man hath self-love, and a desire of felicity, and an unwillingness and fear of Hell and Misery, and of all that he knoweth doth tend to it as such. He can seek for Glory, Honour and Immortality, Rom. 2. And therefore God thus argueth with men, Ezek. 33. Turn ye, why will ye die? And 1 Pet. 3. 10. He that loveth life, and would see good days, etc. as making use of a common principle. 2. Man hath reason to understand what is told him of Good and Evil in some sort, and Nature containeth a Law written in the heart, Rom. 3. by which the Heathens did much of that which was written in the Scripture. 3. Man hath a Conscience to accuse and excuse. 4. He hath misery and necessity to move him: which may be known to him by common light and experience. 5. Sin, as sin is in common disgrace in the World: And Nature teacheth Mankind to distinguish moral Good and Evil; so that the worst do not love and own sin as sin: And did not Satan hid it with some vail of goodness, he could not draw them to it. Even those that murdered Christ, did it on a false pretence that he was a Sinner. 6. Man's nature hath an enmity to Devils, and a fear of them. And therefore will fly from evil so far as they perceive the Devil in it (for the most part.) For he is their known Enemy. 7. Lastly, All do known that they must die, and that this World will serve them but a little while; And they have great experience of its vanity and vexation: And Nature teacheth most, and the Gospel much more, that man's Soul is immortal, and therefore that there is a Reward for the Good, and Punishment for the Bad hereafter. 2. And as depraved Nature itself hath certainly all these advantages for good; so God addeth by his Works and Word many vehement Motives, Persuasions, and urgent Exhortations, Examples, Mercies and Corrections: And all these may give the Soul much more than a bare power to many good acts: For many such are really done by bad men; And to others they are almost persuaded, when they disobey. 2. You must not suppose, that just the same degree of means or help is necessary to one man as to another; or to the same man ever at several times. For one man's Soul may be more undisposed and ill disposed than another's: And the same man's more at one time than at another. And temptations and impediments may be greater at one time, and to one man than another. Experience assureth us, that less teaching will inform one man's understanding than another's. C. Have not all men the same degree of Original Sin? What can be said more of any than is said of all, that they are dead in sin? B. 1. The same word [Dead] may be used of all, if it were words only that you plead for. But that word proveth not that all are equally either guilty or corrupted. For though Adam's sin be the same to all, yet I have before told you (and shown you besides Scripture, Augustine's judgement for it) that there is also a participation of Gild of nearer Parents sins by Infants; And consequently of Pravity: Were it but the ill temper of body which many Drunkards and Adulterers convey to their Children, experience telleth us that it doth much in hindering the Soul. And all are not equal in this derivation of Original Sin. 2. And Adam's sin, with all other being pardoned to faithful Parents, is in them pardoned to their Infants dedicated to God; And we have reason to think that where the Gild is pardoned, the Vice is not equally transmitted as to others that are not pardoned in their infancy. 3. And it is not only Original Sin, but much additional Pravity, and particular habits of sin, contracted by practice, which is the impediment of Conversion. 4. Yea, and actual sin itself, which temptations stir up, as well as those habits. 5. And also the great guilt which all those acts and habits do contract, by which Gods Grace is yet more forfeited. All these are a great disparity, and show that more Grace is necessary to some than others. C. Well! Go on with your Answer to the main Question? B. My Answer is, that▪ if you will not turn Vorstians, but will receive the common metaphysical School Divinity about God, (to deny which, is commonly called Blasphemy by all Parties) I do not yet see any place for a disagreement. For the Question, [Whether the same measure of Grace which we call merely sufficient, is ever effectual?] is meant either, 1. Of God's Agency or Influx as it is Agentis. 2. Or of the Means. 3. Or of the Objects. 4. Or of Effects in the Soul. * Malderus in 1. 2. q. 111. a. 3. d. 8. Omnis gratia excitans est efficax & rata respectu sui effectus formalis quo homo excitatur, & quem sine consensu libero in homine ponit: non enim potest gratia pulsare, quin home pulsetur. And that exciting Grace is always sufficient Grace, to the Act to which it exciteth, see his Reasons, ibid. pag. 462. And 1. It is plainly the first that the most Contenders mean, upon a false supposition. They think that God puts forth one degree of strength to one effect, and another degree to another effect; and so that ex parte Dei operantis, there is a different Operation (in kind or degree) to the producing of different effects: which is blasphemy in the Judgement of the Philosophical Divines: For though we are fain to use the name of Act and Influx, yet it is nothing but Gods own Essence (in Power, Wisdom and Will) by which he produceth all effects. And (to say) that God's Essence is divers in kind or degrees, is contrary to his Simplicity and Immutability. And if all God's Operation (from the creation of the World to the moving of a Feather, and from the converting of Saul to the least gracious action of a Saint,) be done by the same kind and degree of power, and there be no difference at all in God or his Agency, but only as in passo in the effect, than the very supposition of your dispute, and the Subject being nothing, you may see how wisely you have long troubled the World. C. But it is unconceivable that there should be variety in the Effects, when the Cause hath no difference at all in its agency ex parte sui. B. * Aureolus in his Quodlib. 2. art. 2. pag. 13. (who hath many singularities) confidently maintaineth that there is some causal Action of God (e. g. in creation) between his essence and the effect: because posita causa ponitur effectus: but God did not create from, etc. and saith, This Action is not God, and yet no part of the Universe. But 1. It is utterly unintelligible what that should be: For Action is virtutis alicujus actio; and that virtus is substantiae virtus: Vis or Actio creata subsist not of themselves: Therefore an Action that is neither God, nor yet a Creatures Action is unintelligible. 2. And the difficulty will recur upon his own way: For either that middle Action is one or many, eternal or in time: If one and eternal, his own Arguments assault it: why then is the Effect temporary and multifaricus: If it be many Actions and temporary, it is all one for one eternal God to cause many temporary Creatures, as to cause many temporary Actions. Therefore when all is done, we must say that Omnia sunt ab uno: Though how we cannot comprehend. 3. And God's Essence is an infinite power in Act, intimately present with every effect: no other intermediate action need to be imagined. How now! Did the Calvinists so much stir up King James against Vorstius, and condemn him in the Synod of Dort; and now must we plead against you as Vorstians? Did not one God, without any diversity in himself, make all the variety of Creatures in the World? Can he not unica volitione velle plurima? And so unica actione plurima efficere? All multitude proceedeth from perfect Unity. C. But God's Influx or Action seemeth to be somewhat else than his Essence. B. You must mean ex parte Dei, or you say nothing: And if so, it must be some Creature: For besides the Creator and the Creature there is nothing. C. Action is not Res, but modus agentis. And so it may be in God. B. Some indeed make the three Persons to be three Modes in God, which yet others deny: But otherwise it is commonly taken for blasphemy, to say that God who is most simple and immutable, hath any true mode distinct from his simple Essence, much more that his Essence hath diversity of modes. And if you will deny this, we must make a whole new method of Divinity, and such as will most accommodate the Arminians. C. But to say that God doth Influere vel agere, and to say that he is God, are not words of the same signification. B. True: For they are different Conceptions that narrow-minded man must have about God in whom there is no difference. We have our general conception of Essence, and Perfections, and Relation, which we express by the Name GOD; And we have one more particular, yea our modal conceptions and expressions: And to express the one, is not to express the other. But that proveth no diversity in God. C. If Actio be in Passo, than it is not God, but a Creature. B. That old saying is but de nomine actionis. Doubtless there is of created Agents a certain modus by which in Action they differ from themselves; not-agent and agere signifieth somewhat distinct from the effect, which is it that is in Passo, and is called Passion. And if it be only quid creatum, or the effect that you mean, we will after speak of that: But now the question is of the efficient Causality. C. By this rule we must say that ex parte Dei, to will Peter's Salvation and Judas his Damnation, are all one. B. So all Philosophical Divines affirm: save only that the same Will unvaried in itself, is variously related and denominated ab extra from the diversity of Objects and Effects. C. At least then we may here denominate God's Operations on several Souls, as various from the variety of Effects. B. You may and must do so: But then remember that the question is but de nomine, and that you confess that there is no real diversity in all Gods Operations on men's Souls on his part, no not in degrees. II. And then as to the means, though for my part I think that a great diversity is caused by their diversity, yet you yourselves will not consent, that the question about sufficiency and efficacy be there laid. 1. Because it is a moral operation: and you think that some other physical operation causeth the difference. 2. Because many that live under the most excellent means are not converted, when some are that had far less. 3. Because you suppose no means sufficient of itself: and no means insufficient when God will work by it. But if this must be the question, it must be remembered that you grant, 1. That means are but sufficient for their own part, and not ad omnia: and therefore suppose somewhat in the person (disposition or use) to make them effectual. 2. And that God is the Author of means: and that in themselves they are the same oft to good and bad. But 3. That the diversity of men's dispositions maketh the same less suitable to one, which is now suitable and consequently more effectual to another. So that here is the same Grace oft times as in the means, made various by variety of Reception. And so that which you are to say of God herein is this, that when some wicked Parents have more vitiated their Posterity than others, and when some wicked men by their practices have more vitiated themselves, yet God doth not always give them a greater proportion of gracious means * Protestant Divines do commonly conjoin the operation of the Spirit and Word as well as Papists, and in some cases more. Thom. docet q. 22. de Ver. a. 8. Deum inclinare Voluntatem ad aliquid app●tendum, eam ●fficaciter & physice praedeterminando, non solum immediate, sed etiam mediate aliqua entitate, recepta in voluntate: & ex ment D. Tho. Deus movet om●●s causas secundas, & eas appl●●a ' ad suas operations, ita ut etiam quando ●●●●●t voluntatem, aliquid ●●●imit in illam per mo●●● transeuntis.] Alva●ez de Aux. disp. 23. p. 114. and helps than to others, but leaveth them under the common helps which convert the more prepared Souls. Not that God always doth so: For oft times to his Elect he doth as he did by Paul, or the Eunuch, vouchsafe them extraordinary means. For as a Benefactor he is free, and may do with his own as he list, and may make Vessels of Mercy and Honour of them that deserved worst. And the case of the Tyrians and Sidonians, compared with theirs of Capernaum and Bethsaida, doth prove, that less means are proportionable to some as being less ill-disposed, when greater to others may be uneffectual. III. And then as to objective Grace, it being the same God, the same Heaven, the same Christ, and the same Promise which is set before all that have the Gospel, this cannot be the Controversy. Though the revealing means be divers with many, so is not the Object, nor the Means to all. IU. All that remaineth then to be questioned, is the Effect which is subjective Grace: whether that Grace in one man which is but sufficient, be efficient in another? or in the same man at several times. And here by this subjective Grace is meant either, 1. The vis impressa. 2. Or the Power. 3. Or the Act produced. 4. Or the Disposition or Habit. The two latter are shut out of the question; which is not whether the Act or Habit be sufficient and effectual, but whether the Grace be so that is to cause them. Whether this vis impressa be always caused by means with God's Power set home (as the impress of a Signature by the Arm and Seal) or be caused immediately by God, without any proper means, the word being but a Concomitant, and not mediate Operator, is made a Controversy by some: But he that well considereth the Scripture here abouts, and the experience of man, will be likelier to think that it is God by means that ordinarily maketh the impress on the Soul, and that the same impress is the effect of both, though extraordinarily God can do without means. For 1. It is most likely that God should work on man most agreeably to his nature, and to his subject state under God his Governor. 2. And Christ himself as our Teacher and Example, and all his Gospel, are appointed to this use. 3. The Ministry and Ordinances are appointed to the same end; And Ministers commanded to fit their teaching to that end. 4. No man can prove that ever any came to actual Knowledge, Faith or Love, but by some means. Experience telleth Gods Servants that he worketh by them. 5. The most apt and powerful usually have best success; and those prosper most in Grace that use means best, and those speed worst that use them least. 6. God strictly commandeth the use of the means as means for that end, that his Grace may be wrought by them. 7. God promiseth his blessing on the means: Act. 26. 17, 18. 1 send thee to open their eyes, etc. Rom. 1. 16. The Gospel is the Power of God to Salvation. 2 Tim. 4. 16. Thou shalt save thyself and them that hear thee. Jam. 6. last. He that converteth a Sinner, saveth a Soul from death, etc. 8. When God forsaketh a Nation, by taking away the means, he usually forsaketh them as to further Grace. 9 The Devil seemeth to know this by his earnest opposition to a holy powerful Ministry, and other means throughout the World; so that we may say with Cypriam, Epist. 69. ad Pupian. Ut etiam qui non credebant Deo Episcopum Constit●enti, vel Diab●lo credebant Episcopum proscribenti. But whether it be by means or not, it must be somewhat different from Gods own Essence, which is imprinted or communicated. And to get a formal conception of it, what it is, if it be not the Power, Disposition, Act or Habit, is passed man's reach. Whatsoever it is, this is certain, 1. That God doth not give an Act as a thing pre-existent; but giving Faith is but causing us to believe, or do that act ourselves, which was none till we performed it. 2. That quoad effectum disposed Power and Act also, are more than Power and Disposition without the act. 3. Undoubtedly Dr. Fairfax, Of the Bulk, etc. of the World, pag. 5. 6, 7, etc. [Though God be the Maker of every Being that is physicaly so, it follows not that he is so of every Being that is morally so: It is enough that God is the Maker of the Power to do evil (which being good, may spring from him,) etc. [All that God doth towards sin, is to leave us to ourselves, to bring it forth if we will: and instead of driving on to it, as a fellow-helper or procatarktick cause, he draws from it, and towards the good, with unspeakable endearments of wooing, and drives from it by forbidding the Evil with all that earnestness of threatening, which may beget in man the utmostness of dread: Nor is he any nearer the physical cause of it, than to give that good power which is not the cause at all, as it looks towards him: for by giving this power he is at the same time the evil is done, as much the cause of the good that is not done: therefore he is not the cause at all. Besides, this power is not only good, but also needful: For though the the perfection of the Will in the next life, will not be in a wavering alike towards Good and Evil, but only in a selfwillingness to Good; yet in this life I think it mainly does and must. For this is a life of doing or believing, as it looks on to reward in that to come: and that is a life of rewarding as it looks back to doing or believing here, etc.] [Hence we may answer the old 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? For ●s sin is a moral thing, etc. unbounded Wisdom and Goodness having ●aid out endless happiness as a reward for Obedience, and endless wretchedness as punishment for sin; without this Obedience there could be no Heaven: without Sin no Hell. And without a power, not to do in both, there could be neither: So then, that God may have leave to make man happy for holiness, man must needs have power to make himself wretched for sin: That evil should always flow from evil in a chain of Breeders is a great misunderstanding.] Object. Then man may thank himself too for all the good he does that Being, as much of him as the other, etc. Answ. It follows not: For 1. Of all the good that man doth, God is still the moral Cause, egging on to it by all, etc. 2. And the same Almighty Hand that barely upheld while Sin was done, doth over and above further the thing that good is by enlightening the Mind, renewing the Will, healing the spring in man of that all which inbred Sin hath brought upon it; and in a word, making it every way more itself, God must be more an Owner than man; And thence the thing done falls in with the Divine Will, because it flowed from Divine Goodness. [That which is good in man by way of Offspring, being so in God by way of Wellspring.] Ibid. p. 10. the same degree of impress, or influx, or force, which causeth one man to believe or act, is not sufficient to cause any other worse disposed man to believe or act: nor the same man when he is more ill disposed and hindered. 4. If we put the case of men equally disposed, it is impossibly to prove that any two men in the world are equally disposed; Nay it is most probable that they are not: Their minds having far greater variety of thoughts to cause a difference, than their countenances have of particles, making the wonderful diversity which we see. Nor is the same man long equally disposed. 5. Men equally disposed (if such there were) may have unequal impediments without, and in their bodies, and temptations, which may cause them to need unequal help of Grace. 6. The same individual Impress which causeth no more than a Power, causeth not the Act also; For that is a contradiction; to cause the Act and not to cause it. 7. But a less degree of impulse or help may cause the act in one, when a greater degree causeth it not in another. 8. A wonderful difference therefore is made in this as well as in ●ll other diversities in the World, by the divers receptive dispositions of the Patient. Which made Johan. Sarisberiensis (in Nugis Curial.) and many Schoolmen to liken God (with some acknowledged difference) in his Operations to the Sun, which by one invaried efflux of motive, illuminative and calefactive power, causeth innumerable varieties of effects, as all the particular Creatures have various Natures and receptive Dispositions. 9 But all good disposition or preparation is of God; But by such ways of operation as we are searching after. But all ill disposition is from ourselves. 10. To conclude, God giveth men sometimes as much power to Will or Act, when they do not, as they have when they do. But (usually) not an equal predisposition, some having more indisposed themselves; which is to be changed by contrary acts. But whether de facto men equally enabled, predisposed, helped and hindered, do yet without any cause but their own freewill itself act or will variously, is a question that these Controversies need not come to: That such (were there such in the World) could do it, I take for granted, whatever they do. The Controversy is well known which Hobbes hath raised in the World, who saith, That to be free and to be willing is all one; and that every act of the Will is as truly necessitated by physical premotion, as the motions of any Engine are; And that we talk of liberty and contingency in the dark, not that there is any such thing indeed, but when we know not the train of Causes, we use those names, which signify but our ignorance: And that the first Cause and other superior Causes do by premotion as much necessitate each Volition, as the Archer doth the motion of his Arrow. And the Dominicans predetermination, and Camero's necessitation by a train of second Causes is the same I think. But I think God hath made a very good use (by his overruling ordination) of the Doctrine of Hobbes, (learnedly and timerously, or cautelously seconded by Gassendus, and improved by Benedictus Spinosa, an Apostate Jew in his Tractatus Politico-theologicus.) For the goodness and learning of such worthy men as were Alvarez, Twisse, Camero, (in all other points moderate and admirably judicious) hath been the grand temptation to the Church to receive that Doctrine, which Hobbes and Spinosa having plainly and nakedly propounded, is now detested by almost all good men. For from thence they have plainly inferred the subversion of all morality as distinct from physical motion, and consequently of all true Religion. I deny not that I find myself the Controversy in itself exceeding difficult; and that I have not been without temptations to their Opinion, nor yet am: And that indeed, all pretended middle ways between Hobbes, his Necessitation Physical, and true freewill, are but fancies as far as I can perceive. And if I leave true freewill, I must turn to their necessitation. I confess their arguing is very plausible; that there is no Effect without a Cause; and that when ever the Will chooseth one thing, and refuseth another, there is some antecedent Cause in the power, disposition, or external things: and that the same Cause in the same state and mode, having no difference in itself, doth always produce the same effect: Otherwise the diversity should have no cause: And that the Will being in the same disposition, and having all the same objects, helps, impediments and other circumstances, will have the same acts. All this is plausible: But 1. If I receive it, I must let go almost all Religion (as well as Christianity); of the truth of which I have a better proof than they can give for their Opinion. And we must not reduce certainties to the obscurest unsearchable uncertainties. 2. And in God himself their foundation is confuted: For he that is the first Cause eodem modo se habens sine ulla diversitate, unicus plurima, immo omnia causat. Therefore their Principle is false. 3. And finding man made after the Image of God, not only as holy, but as man, (Gen. 6.) I have great reason to think that freewill is part of his natural Image, and that as God is a causa unica plurimorum, so may freewill be: And that as a God is causa prima entium, so freewill may be a kind of causa prima (not actionis qua talis, but) of the comparative moral species of its own acts, (as choosing this thing rather than that) which is no addition to real entity, but a wonderful mode of it, which man cannot tell whether he should call something or nothing. 4. I say therefore that here is no Effect without a Cause: freewill may be the cause of various Effects, without a various predisposition. C. Doth not the Will act as it is disposed to act? B. That it acteth not always according to Habits, which are more than dispositions, is certain by experience. For objects oft prevail against habits; and habits do not necessitate. C. That is because the Will is otherwise disposed by some contrary stronger habits: As either by the habit of sensuality, or the natural inclination to felicity as such: which may bear down weaker particular habits or inclinations. B. No doubt but the Will is quaedam natura, and hath its natural inclination to good and felicity, which is its pondus and radical disposition to its acts; from which every act is caused that is done. But I say not that ever it goeth contrary to these radical necessitating inclinations to goodness. But de mediis it may have inferior particular habits which it oft goeth against. C. That is because the Understanding conceiveth that another thing is best; and so it is necessitated by the Understanding. B. The Understanding guideth, but doth not necessitate. That we Will rightly is caused by the Understanding (as that I hit the way is by my eyesight) but not that I exercise the Act itself. Though we Will not without or against the last strongest dictate of the practical Intellect; yet 1. Note that the Intellect hath divers perceptions at once (which is not commonly noted). It doth at once act a deep simple apprehension that e. g. bonum sensible is pleasant, and good, and amiable; and that bonum spirituale which cometh into competition, is yet better, may be at the same time perceived, with so low, dull and weak an apprehension, as that the Will may tenaciously so adhere to the first simple apprehension by a strong simple Volition, as that the second weak comparate apprehension may not move it to Election. 2. For we find that it is not the objective truth of an apprehension which turneth the Will, without some answerable clearness and liveliness▪ And as a Preacher that dreamingly speaketh of great things uncontrollably, but coldly, moveth not the hearers, so is it with the Intellect itself. And 3. The Will being principium exercitii can hinder the Understanding from perceiving truth, by hindering it from thinking of the evidence. 4. And the Will itself can suspend its own act, contrary to the understandings fluggish dictate. And not acting when it can (towards God, and true goodness,) is the beginning of all the disorders of the Soul. C. But saith Camero, etc. the Will is appetitus rationalis: And if it act against reason, it acteth not as a Will: And so also if it act without reason: Therefore it cannot forbid the Intellect to think (by nolition) unless the Intellect first say, Non cogitandum est. Nor can it choose but velle cogitare if the Intellect say cogitandum est: Otherwise the Will were a brutish, and not a rational appetite. B. 1. The Will acteth by reason, when it cleaveth to that good which is simply apprehended by the Intellect. The simple apprehension goeth first; e. g. [That this Fruit offered Eve is good and desirable]: This is true, and here the Will adhereth to it as good. Then should the understanding think comparatively of a greater Good, and say [This is evil as forbidden and as it hindereth a greater Good:] And this it performeth not, because the Will is here the beginner of the Sin: not perhaps by a positive nolition or forbidding the Intellect the comparing Thought; (for that it doth not without show of reason) but by neglecting or omitting to excite the Understanding ad exercitium; which it is brought to in Adam and Eve, 1. By diversion, being before taken up with the Creature. 2. By voluntary neglect or sloth. For the Will can omit its act without reason, and yet be a rational appetite. And the beginning of the Sin may be this omission of the Will, or it's over tenacious adhering to sensible good, apprehended truly by the Intellect. 2. And we have not so much acquaintance with the faculties of our own Souls, as to be sure that sense, and passion, and fantasy can do nothing immediately on the Will to help or hinder it. We find that the Will easily followeth Passion, and very hardly goeth against it. 3. Nay we are not certain, but there may be more bruitishness and less reason in many Sins, than most imagine; and that the violence of the sensitive appetite and passion, may not prevail both with the Will to forbear the excitation of the Intellect, and with the Intellect to omit its opposite Judgement, though neither Will or Reason in the first instant give consent. There are some also that think that we are scarce sure that the Will and the sensitive Appetite are two several faculties, rather than one between two guides. I say not as they: But this I will say, that I grow daily more confident, that they that make the rational and sensitive Soul in man to be two, and their Brethren, that without all show of proof, magisterially face us down, that the Soul at death puts off all sense (because it exerciseth it not by the same Organs which were adapted to the Bodies use), do both of them heinously wrong the Church, and darken many Truths, and open the way to Infidelity. C. But you cannot lay the beginning of sin on the Wills omission, to put the Intellect on the comparing thoughts; for the Intellect can understand against our Wills (as many know that which they had rather be ignorant of): And therefore needs not the Will ad exercitium. B. The Intellect may be forced: But it is not so always: Things sensible, and near at hand, may force the Intellect: But things unseen and distant must be voluntarily thought on, and studied, or else they will not be understood. C. If e. g. Eves Will had said to the Intellect, [Cogita Comparative] either the Intellect must first have said to the Will, [Comparative cogitandum est] or not: If not, then that Will would have been no rational Will. If yea, than the Will must have consented, or else been unwilling against reason, and so be brutish still. Therefore Sin must begin at the Intellect. B. 1. The Intellect did not say [Comparative cogitandum est] not only because it was not commanded so to say by the Will; but because the Will was so entangled before by the simple Love of the Creature, as diverted the thoughts from the Creator. 2. Suppose the Intellect did say coldly [Comparative cogitandum est] the Will did neglect it; being not necessitated thereby, and so the Intellect went no further. C. If the Will do velle bonum qua bonum necessario, it must needs necessarily velle bonum cognitum, and so must follow the Intellect. B. It doth necessarily velle bonum quando vult, i. e. non malum; but it doth not necessarily velle hoc, vel illud bonum inter plurima: Nay though the Intellect say nothing against it, yea something for it, the pre-engaged Will may neglect it. And yet possibly Eves Intellect did perform one comparative act which occasioned her further sin, viz. [If thou turn thy thoughts towards God's prohibition, thou wilt lose the pleasant good before thee]. And this was true. C. But if Eve's Will first over tenaciously stuck to the forbidden Creature, when the Understanding never said, It must do so; In so doing it was not a Will, but brutish Appetite. B. The Understanding said truly, [It is pleasant and Appetible] and so the Will in its initial desire sinned not. But that it looked no further, and excited not the Intellect to remember, and itself to desire more to please God, was by an abuse of its power and liberty of self-determining, and so the sensible good prevailed, because the superior good was forgotten and neglected. And the Will may thus suspend its act after an intellectual perception, without being brutish, though it so ●ar disobey Reason its guide. C. These things are exceeding intricate and difficult, for all that you say. B. They are so: * The same I say of objective and intellectual necessitation of the Will: saith H. Kipping truly, Inst. Philos. Nat. li. 9 c. 10. pag. 416. Errand Scholae reformat● doctores qui asserunt voluntatem ad actum suum determinari a judicio intellectus, ita ut voluntatic libertas nulla sit, constricta vero sit ad intellectus ductum a quo semper determinatur, Joh. Camero, Mart. Schogkius, Hornbeck. Maccovius, Heerbord, Host prolix & bene refellit Episcopius. But forget not, that the great difficulty is between us and the Hobbists or Infidels, and Fatists, and not between the true Christians among themselves, as to our present Controversies. I confess that the confuting of their Opinion, that [all Volitions are necessitated unavoidably by God's Operation] is a far harder work than the reconciling of the Lutherans and Calvinists, who go upon no such Principles. Tell me, Is this it that you would come to or not? If you once persuade me that God causeth all sinful Volitions as necessarily as he causeth a Tree to grow, and that man can no more avoid them, and that liberty of Will signifieth no more than velle, or not nolens velle, and so that God is the prime irresistible cause of all Sin, as much as of all Good, so far as it is capable of a Cause.] I must needs next believe, 1. That God hateth not his own Work: yea that he loveth it. 2. That he hateth no man for it. 3. That moral Good and Evil is nothing in man, but such as obeying or disobeying (proportionably) in a Horse or Dog. 4. Yea far less; because man doth ●ut as my pen which writeth as I move it, in respect to God: But so is not my Horse or Dog to me. 5. And how then to judge of all the Scripture, the Ministry, of the Incarnation and Death of Christ, of the Duties of a Christian life, of Hell, etc. it's easy to perceive, viz. That as God differenceth Men and Toads merely because he will do so; even so doth he the good and the bad in the World: and that Sin is no evil any way but to ourselves: and that God is as much the cause of it as of Sickness; and is as well pleased with the World's Infidelity and Impiety, as with the Church's Sanctity; And that he will not otherwise damn men for Sin, than erbitarily to make such base than others, as Dogs are than men; Benedictus Spinosa hath given you the Consectaries more at large. O how heartlesly should I preach and pray, how carelessly should I live, if once you brought me to this Opinion, that all sin is the unresistible Work of God (so far as it is a work) as much as holiness is? C. If there be no middle between freewill and this Impiety (as I confess I cannot disprove your Consectaries) its time for us to turn our studies against the common Enemies of all Religion and Morality, instead of contending with one another: specially when they have so much to say. B. And do you think they do well, and friendly by the Church, who take these men's part, and own their Cause in the foundation; and entangle poor Souls in such intricate difficulties; when we that know not the least of God's Creatures, or the mysteries of any of his Works, do little know all the quick and intricate actions of our own Souls. In a word, man hath more power to good than he useth, and that power is called sufficient or necessary Grace to the act; though there be many difficulties which no one of either side can resolve. The second Crimination. C. But I fear many of them with Pelagius by GRACE. do mean nothing So Dr. Twisse frequently repeateth that mee● posse credere is but Nature and not Grace, because it is equally a posse non credere. But 1. A natural power reprieved by Grace, and preserved and given for gracious ends. 2. And many and great helps of Grace to excite and rectify it, may be called an effect of Grace. but Nature itself, at least when they speak of the Heathens, who they say have some kind of Grace. B. Turn your eyes a little from the name of Pelagius, and every thing else that useth to blind Disputers with prejudice and partiality, and then answer me these following questions. Quest. 1. Do you think that Mercy contrary to sinful Commerit is not properly Grace? C. I confess it is? B. Quest. 2. Is not the whole frame of Humane Nature (and our Utensils) put into the hand and power of Christ the Redeemer, to be managed by him to his Mediatory ends, Joh. 17. 2. Math. 28. 19, 20. Joh. 13. 3. Ephes. 1. 22, 23. Phil. 2. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. For this end he died, rose and revived, that he might be Lord both of the Dead and Living. Rom. 14. 9 Joh. 5. 22, 23, 24. The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all Judgement to the Son, etc. And is not the very reprieval of the World from deserved ruin and misery so many thousand years an Act of Grace? and Nature now continued, used and improved by Grace, and so far may be said to be of Grace? C. This is plain truth, and must not be denied. B. Quest. 3. Is it not undeserved Mercy to all Mankind, that ever since Adam's Sentence, Gen. 3. 15. they are all ruled by a Law of Grace, and not the Law of Innocency alone, and by that Law of Grace must all be judged? C. If you before evinced that any thing is truly mercy to the Reprobate, I must confess it. But I have not before so much thought of this, what Law the World is under, as the case deserveth: But I remember Camero in the fragments of his dispute with Courcellaeus taken by Testardus, though he deny not that the Covenant of Grace was made with all mankind in Adam and Noah, yet saith, That by or for their nearer Parents sins the Infants of Infidels are out of that Covenant. B. 1. It's well you note, that it is not only Augustine (Enchir. ad La●rent.) and I that are for the Imputation of nearer Parents sin, in some Vid. Pet. Martyr in Rom. 5. confessing Augustine's judgement. sort, as well as Adam's. 2. He speaketh there of the Covenant as mutual, and not as a Law, or an offered Covenant, or Divine Disposition, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ (of which Grotius speaketh at large in his Preface to Annotat. in Evang.) And so I say the same as Camero: which is but this, that though it be a Law or offered Covenant of Grace, and not the sole Law of Innocency, which the whole World are now under as Subjects to be ruled and judged by it. Yet no Parent that consenteth not, hath any right to the promised benefits, nor is in it as a mutual Covenant (unless as any counterfeiting consent may oblige themselves) nor are the Children of such Parents any true Heirs of the said promised benefits for the sake of remote Ancestors, as long as their nearest Parents are Infidels. This is all that Camero there maintaineth. Quest. 3. Are not all the teachings, helps, means, time, and innunerable Mercies which Heathens and Infields have contrary to their Commerits, and consequently truly Grace? * Le Blank tells you that Polanus distinguisheth Grace into natural and supernatural, Thes. 27. dist. Grat. 2. C. They are at best but common Grace. But I am loath to grant that Nature is so much, if I could deny it. B. I am sorry that unwillingness and willingness can do so much with you about these matters. But I pray tell me, Quest. 4. What is it that you mean by Nature? C. I mean that fixed order of being and operation which God put all things in at their Creations at the beginning. B. You have done as the Incendiaries of the Church have done from the beginning of contentious Disputes: you have chosen a word unexplained Media a●tem destinate & propria & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sunt verbum et spiritus: Quibus etiam jungi possunt bona & mala hujus animalis vitae, quibus Deus ad eundem finem utitur. Armin. Disput. Private. Thes. 41. Sect. 8. to make a ma●ter of reproach of, which hath so many significations, and is so uncertainly used, that Philosophers themselves, even in their greatest accurateness, know not what to fix upon; though there are few words which they are more concerned to be agreed in, if they could. But where the thing is unknown, no wonder if there be discord about the Name. Fortune, Licetue alone de natura primo move●te may suffice to evince this. But I perceive you take not Nature for Principium motus et quietis, etc. nor for the essence of things, matter or form, or both▪ nor with Scotus de potentia for the passive power, nor in other senses usually intended by various Writers: But for the created status & ordo rerum, and the motus thereby alone caused. And if this he NATURE with you, you cast yourself into inextricable difficulties to know what you say. For 1. We are very much ignorant of second Causes, and their concatenation and co-operations; who ever took in pieces this great Engine of the Universe (as men do a Clock or Watch) to find out the form and compagination of each part? or ever understood it. 2. Who can tell certainly what is done by this compagination of Causes and Author fidei est spiritu● sanctus quem filius mittie a patre tanquam advocatum & vicarium suum, qui ipsiu● causam in mund●▪ & contra mundum agat● Instrumentum est evangelium seu verbum fidei, continens sensum de Deo & Christo quem spiritus intellectui proponit & persuadet. Arminius Disput. Private. Thes. 44. Sect. 6. co-operation according to its primitive state, who knoweth not the whole Engine, but some parts alone (not so much as one sand is to the whole Earth) seeing that it is the whole that cooperateth to the fore-described motions? And 3. Who knoweth how far God hath fixed the state and operation of second Causes? and how far he is pleased to alter them from their first state and course of motion, or daily doth it? 4. And who is so well acquainted with the state of the Universe in the Creation, and the state of it now, as to be able to make an accurate comparison, and tell whether or how much it is since then altered? or whether all things continue just as in the beginning. 5. Yea it is certain, that a great alteration was made both on man's Soul and Body, and on the Earth by the sin of Adam, and the Curse. 6. And it is certain, that God maketh much use of the Ministry of free Agents in the affairs of the World, even of Angels, Devils and Men, whose voluntary contingent acts (and consequently their effects) go not as a Watch or Cl●●k in one constant natural course of motion. How then can you tell here what is natural as to a great part of the changes upon man? C. You would make me believe that WORDS are so defecti●● as to delude us and befool us all, and that nothing men say can be understood. Doth not all the World distinguish between Nature and Grace? B. The vanity of speculative Sciences, and the misery of Mankind thereby, and the reason of Paul's contempt of the Philosophy then predicated, and the cause of all our love-killing Contentions, cannot be Sine hoc speciali auxilid Gratiae nihil boni posse ab ulla creatura rational●●eri est certiss●●um. ●ed an hoc auxilium Gratiae sit voluntatis Divi●● volentis illud absolute communicare, & per illud communica●●● absolute bonum ●p●rari, est in controversia po●itum Thealogis: nec immerito, cum vox absolute in Scriptures non inve●iatur▪ etc. Armin. exam Perkins. de praed. Sect. 6. pag. 501. Among many others, read but Vasqu●z in 1 Tho. & Pet. a S. Joseph de Auxil. divin. (in Thes. Univers. & spec. & moral.) & Ruiz, & Bellarmin. de Auxil. And you may see how much supernaturality the Papists stand for: Indeed for more th●● the Protestants in some cases, as in asserting the supernaturality of Adam's first Righteousness, etc. And many of the Schoolmen speak higher of Infusion than most Protestans, so that this a●ti●● will not prove the difference. readilier assigned than by charging them on the lamentable defectiveness and ambiguity of words next to the darkness of Humane Intellect. But the distinguishing of Nature and Grace is needful; but must be rightly understood. 1. Principally as Nature signifieth the constitution of man and all things as made by their Creator, and GRACE. the medela or medicinal Operation of God, by which he recovereth the lapsed sinful and cursed World. 2. And as any Motus, Action or Change, can be said to be from the first natural Principles of Action, so far they may be called natural: If from Nature alone, they are only natural. But as they come from recovering Grace they are gracious: If from Grace alone, without Nature, they are only gracious (whether there be any such, or any but Miracles, I pass by.) But as they are by and from Nature, either sanctified, or ordered and overruled by Grace, so they are both natural and gracious in several respects. C. This seemeth plain and true: and what do you hence infer. B. 1. All degrees of the medela or recovery of Nature are so many degrees of Grace. 2. Exparte Dei efficientis, the operations of Grace and Nature really are all one, and differ not: That is, God doth per essentiam operate in both, and his operating Essence is the same. But as the nature of a thing in its original or constitutive Principles are one thing, and the recovery of it from its vitiated state another; so relatively the same God, and his Will and Operations are to be variously denominated; even as he is the God and Fountain of Nature, and as he is the God and Giver of Grace. 3. I think it is past man's skill to prove that most Miracles themselves have no part of natural Operation in them. It is sufficient of God interpose and overrule the matter by any other immediate Operation of his own: yea or that he put natural Operations themselves out of that course, in which they would have gone if he had not so altered it. 4. By this you may plainly see that though all natural Operations are not gracious; All gracious Operations are also natural, except the highest sort of Miracles: that is, they are the Actions of some natural Principles, ordered by God's gracious Will to a gracious end, in a gracious manner. I also except such Operations of God alone, in which he useth no second Cause, but himself immediately without any instrument produceth the effect. But note, 1. That this is only in the Reception of the Divine immediate influx itself on the Soul, antecedent to our very first Acts: For our first Act (e. g. of Faith) is from God's Influx on our own natural faculties, and so from those faculties themselves as suscitated by God. 2. Note that this is no distinction between natural and gracious Operations, to be so immediate: For God doth as immediately operate in the natural: As in the Creation he made all the World by such immediate efflux, so he still operateth immediately on the first created Cause (whatever that is), and say almost all Divines) even when he useth second Causes, he himself is as near the Recipient and Effect, & immediatione suppositi & virtutis, as if he had used no second Cause at all: The difference being not in his distance or proximity, but in his using or not using a second Cause together with himself. 5. Moreover it is utterly unknown to us how far God operateth without Vocatio ad communionum Christi & beneficiorum ejus, est grati●sa ●ctio Dei qua homines peccatores re●s condemnationis & sub domin●o peccati constitntos, ex animalis vita conditione, ex mundi hujus inquinamentis & corruptelis, ●●●●t per verbum & piritum suum ad vitam supernaturalem in Christ● per poenitentiam & fidem consequendam, ut in illo tanquam capit● s●● ad●o destinato & ordinato unir●, & beneficiorum ejus communion●●rui que●nt, ad gloriam Dei, & ipsorum salutem. Armin. Dispur. Private. Thes. 42. Sect. 1. any second Cause, even on the Soul itself. As we know that Devils do much on the wicked, so we know not how far he useth the Angels or superior Intelligences in operating on the Elect: And yet we will not go so far as Aristotle did, in ascribing to the primum mobile. But as God is said to write with his own Finger the Law on the two Tables, and yet that Law was delivered by Angels; and as God is said to appear and speak to Adam and many others, when yet it must needs be quid creatum, which Humane senses could see and hear; Even so we know not when God operateth on the Soul, what spiritual Ministry he may use. And now tell me again, what it is that you accuse them of, that you think turn Nature into Grace? C. According to your explication I must mean nothing else, but that the name of Grace is given by them to Nature alone, with the natural operation is not gracious. B. Wherein is it that they thus err? Instance in particulars. C. 1. When they make Gods common Providences to be Grace: 2. When they make the preaching of the Gospel to be Grace. 3. When they make Reason and freewill to be Grace. B. I. Do you not believe that all Gods merciful Providences are acts of Grace? Are they not mercy contrary to merit, which is the definition of Grace in the general? And have they not an aptitude and tendency in medelam animarum to man's Recovery, which is the specification of Evangelical Grace? C. Yes, I grant all this: But we take Grace for the inward saving work of God's sanctifying Spirit on the Soul. B. 1. You do not only strive about words; but perversely abuse words, that you may have matter of strife. Will you confine the general name of Grace, not only to a Species, but to one inferior Species, and then accuse your Brethren for giving the name to other Species? As if you would accuse them for calling any besides a Philosopher or a Soldier a man? And 2. Do you know either Jesuit, Lutherane or Arminian, that holdeth that outward common Providences are inward Sanctification? C. Let that pass, and go to the second. B. II. Do you doubt whether the preaching of the Gospel be Grace? either as to the general or special definition? C. I deny not that the definitions agree to it; but I doubt whether it be a fit name, when use hath appropriated it to the inward Sanctification. B. 1. Here again you are convinced of striving about words: 2. And till you are forced, you confess it not, but make it seem a material difference. 3. You confess that your Adversaries name agreeth with the definition. 4. When you have abused the name yourselves by erroneous confinement of it to one species of Grace, you then plead your own sinful use as a reason sufficient against Etymology, Definition, the custom of all the Christian Churches from the beginning to this day; yea and against Scripture itself. 5. For the Scripture so useth the word, as you may see (sometimes for merciful Providences, sometimes for the Gospel, sometimes for Church-Priviledges, for Gifts, sometimes for Favour, and oft for recovering mercy in the general) Ezra 9 8. Zech. 4. 7. Joh. 1. 16, 17. Act. 4. 33. & 14. 3. & 20. 24, 32. Rom. 1. 5. & 5. 2. & 20. & 6. 14. 15. & 11. 5, 7. & 12. 3. 6. & 15. 15. 1 Cor. 10. 30. 2 Cor. 8. 19 Gal. 1. 6. 15. & 5. 4. Eph. 3. 8. & 4. 8. & 4. 7. Phil. 1. 7. Jud. 4. 1 Pet. 4. 10. & 5. 12. Tit. 2. 11. Eph. 3. 2, 7. Col. 1. 6. 2 Cor. 6. 1. C. Go on to the third instance. B. 1. Who do you know that calleth Reason and natural freewill in itself considered, by the name of Grace: I know not any such? 2. But 1. Reason as reprieved in order to recovery, and Reason as illuminated by common Grace, (and so freewill) are certainly a sort of common Grace. 2. And Reason as specially illuminated, and the Will as freed from Sin, are special Grace. But now you see the injury of your Charge, will you search and fear, lest even by contending, it's you that have run into worse than the Error which you declaim against as other men's. Is it not you that call a great deal of God's Grace by the name of Nature, yea sometimes of Wrath; and as I before evinced, deny much common Grace to be any Grace at all? And who wrongeth God more? He that honoureth his Works of Nature with an undue title (of Grace)? or he that utterly dishonoureth his Grace, and saith that it is no Grace? The third Crimination. C. They make Grace to be but a moral Operation or suasion, and seem to deny that physical operation which is eminently Grace: or at least take it to be but a physical use of moral means; And indeed I doubt whether some of them confess any other Grace than the Gospel and other means of Grace? And so the Spirit must work only on the Preacher, or on the sound of words, if he work not immediately and physically on the heart. * The untruth of this common Charge appeareth in the following citations. Vocatio ista tum externa est tum interna: externa per ministerium hominum verbum proponentium: Interna per operationem spiritus sancti illuminantis & cor afficientis ut attendatur iis quae dicuntur, fidesque verb● adhibeatur: ex utriusque concursu efficacitas vocationis existit. Is't a distributio non est generis in species, sed totius in parts, hoc est totalis ●ocationis in partiales acti●nes, etc. Armin Disput. Private. Thes. 42. Sect. 10, 11. Remonst. Synod. art. 3. 4. p. 15, etc. Si quaeratur ex nobis an Dei convertentis actio tantum moralis sit, suadendo, proponendo, invi●ando, Respondemus, Plusquam moralem esse, & si excitantem spectemus gratiam dicimus in ipsam voluntatem quoque potentiam supernaturalem insundi distinctam ab illuminatione: si vero cooperantem, dicimus cam physicam vocari posse, & realem ac propriam habere efficientiam. Note here their plain profession of physical and infused Grace. [Si quaeratur an praeter mentis illustrationem & ●ffectuum excitationem, & voluntatis invitationem nihil faciat Gratia per modum principii vel antecedenter ad conversionem, Respondemus facere, Id. ibid. ,.]... B. Still I fear that you are guilty of striving about words to no profit, but subversion of the people's Charity. 1. Moral hath usually three different senses. 1. Moral is as much as Reputative; As he that concealeth or encourageth a Traitor or Murderer, or defendeth not the assaulted, is, ex lege morum, reputed and judged as guilty of the Treason or Murder. And thus causa moralis is usually but causa ex lege morum reputata. 2. Moral is oft taken for Ethical, or that which is ex genere moris, either Good or Evil, Virtue or Vice, which contain all morality. 3. Moral is oft opposed to merely natural (forced, brutish, etc.) and meaneth the action of a free Agent as such. In which of these senses, or what other do you take it. C. I mean the first, that God doth but operate ut causa moralis per modum proponentis objectum; which Dr. Twisse saith is but in genere causae finalis, and so is but operatio metaphorica. B. It's pity that Christ's Disciples must be troubled with such uncertain arbitrary notions, without necessity. But what remedy: 1. I know no Law that forbiddeth me to descent from Dr. Twisse, or you in Logic or Physics. I do not believe that objectum qua tale is causa finalis: And no wonder; For 2. I hold that to be no proper cause which you call commonly causa finalis; And instead of advancing each Object to the dignity of a final cause, I take down the final cause to the order or rank of the prime Object of Volition or Intention. To be optimum is the Ratio objectiva primaria, it being most suitable to the Will. To be medium ad optimum is the Ratio objectiva secundaria. Bonum qua tale non agit in voluntatem, sed voluntas in bonum cognitum: Though the cognitio boni doth dirigere voluntatem. When it is commonly said, [Ob finem amatum volo medium, the preposition deceiveth us, as if the causalitas sinis were upon the Will: But it meaneth no more but that the Aptitude of the means, ad finem, is the Ratio bonitatis, and so the Ratio objectiva medii: I will or choose it, because it is apt or conducible to the end or chief object; that is, That it is Goodness for which I will it. Which speaketh no more but Rationem objectivam. 3. And all objects of the intellect and will are causes indeed of the act in specie; but what causes, Receptive and Terminative, such as we must call Material (so far as an act may be said to have matter) of which more anon. And if the object be no other than a material or receptive cause, constituting the act in specie, than the proposer of the object, who operateth but in subservience to it, can be no other than a preparer and offerer of the matter. But how great a hand this receptive cause hath in the mutations and diversities in the world, is little considered by the most. 2. But I pray you tell me, How many, and whom do you find that hold that God doth no more but proponere objectum? I remember none. C. What say they less when they call it Moral suasion, when suadere is but proponere objectum? B. So then, your accusations are your own Inferences, and not their words. But do they not commonly tell you of an inward suasion by the Spirit (and Conscience) as well as an outward by the word? C. Yes they do so; but that inward is but suasion still. B. But are you sure that by suasion they mean nothing but proposing the Object to the Intellect, and by it the Will. C. What else can they mean, if they speak congruously? B. As far as I can understand them they mostly differ not from the Synodists at all, in their meaning; (much less do the Schoolmen and Lutherans, who use not the word [suasion] so much as they.) For the thing that they mean is 1. That God's Spirit worketh on the Intellect by objective means, (though not only propounding that object, but also assisting and exciting the mind.) 2 That by the apprehension of the Intellect, the wills object is offered to it: And as Camero copiously pleadeth the act of the will is ever excited by the act of the Intellect. (Or indeed the object is so aptly presented, as that the will shall or may either by Natural or Gracious Inclination excite itself, supposing God's assistance.) But that the will is not moved, to any but an Apprehended Good. 3. And that God doth this work on the will in a sweet connatural manner; like as an effectual persuader doth, not forcing the Will, but preserving its liberty: and as the Arminians speak, not irresistibly, or by necessitation, leaving the act to be contingent. 4. But withal, it is most certain, that God operateth on the Mind and Will itself, and not on the Preacher of the Word only. 5. But no mortal man knoweth how; nor is able to comprehend his way of operation. 11. But next tell me what you mean by Physical, which is the other branch of your distinction? C. What should I mean but Natural, by Real Contact, attingency or influx on the Recipient? B. 1. God is above Nature, and not included in your Physics: How then do you call his operations Physical, ex parte agentis. No Physics pretend to treat of God. 2. Contact and proper attingency belongeth to Bodies: But God is not a Body; and therefore the Contact or Influx by which he operateth, is utterly unknown to mortal man, any farther than that it is by his Essence. 3. God is immense and essentially every where; and therefore such a Metaphysical Attingency or Contact, as may be spoken of him, he hath to all things in the world; and therefore must do all that he any way doth in such attingency. C. Explain it and resolve it yourself, if you like not my Explication. B. God's operations are called Physical or Moral, 1. In regard of God the Agent. 2. In regard of the means or second causes. 3. Or in respect of the effect. I. In respect of God the Agent they are not properly either Physical or Moral, but transcendently they are above both; for they are his Essence The Papists who are most for mere moral operations in this Controversy, yet have such strange opinions about the physical operations of Sacraments (e. g. Baptism on Infants) as that they make them to be instruments of Miracles, the Miracle being first wrought upon them (e. g. the water, and then on the receiver. Yea they seem to make God to operate miraculously with every Sacrament. and Will, which is the transcendent Head of all operations and causes, Physical and Moral. II. As to the Means or second Causes, those acts of God that have no such means or causes are not here concerned: And as for all those that have such means, no doubt but they are to be called both Physical and Moral: for Morality is but Modality or Relation, ex rerum ordine. And all Order, Mode and Relation, is Alicujus entis ordo, Modus & Relatio. And e. g. preaching the Gospel, is such an act of a Physical and Moral Agent, as is itself both Physical and Moral. Man is quaedam natura, and yet Intellectual and Free: And his act is quid physicum in genere entis; and yet quid morale in genere moris, & imputanda juxta l●egem morum. III. And as to the Effect, it is no doubt, both quid physicum (for Faith is actus realis) and quid morale: For it is morale bonum, & ita reputanda. And will any Arminian deny any of this, that understandeth words? Where then is your difference in this? C. But when you dispute about Pre-determination, you can say it is not Physical: what mean you by it then? B. We marvel that men should say that God physically predetermineth the Will to all acts of sin in the specifying circumstances, when as he predetermineth it not really to them at all, either physically or morally. So that it is here a Real efficient motion of God to the evil act, which we deny. C. And it is a Real efficient motion of God, to the act of Faith and Repentance which we assert, and mean by the word Physical. B. And this your Adversaries will not deny: and so you are in this agreed. The fourth Crimination. C. I doubt they hold not Faith to be infused, but acquired: whereas Arminius professeth Faith and Repentance Nisi Deo dante haberi non posse. Exam. Perk. pag. 57 and that both of them are denied to the Reprobates by the Decree of Reprobation. See his own words, At Deus statuit D●ereto reprobationis reprobis fidem, & poenitentiam non dare, concedo lubens illam assumptionem, sed recte intellectam. Twisse against Hord, p. 70. l. 1. Dr. Twisse showeth the difference to be so great, that an unjustified person may have an Acquired Faith about the same objects, when yet only an Infused Faith will justify. B. 1. Tell not me what you Doubt, but what you Prove, unless you mean no more, than to tell me of your injustice and uncharitableness: I find the Jesuits and Lutherans commonly asserting an Infused Faith, and I have met with few Arminians if any that deny it; though the word be not so much in use with them. 2. But because you that are the Accuser are supposed to understand what you speak against, I pray help me to understand it. Quest. 1. What mean you by Acquired Faith? C. That which we ourselves get by our use of means and consideration. B. Quest. 2. Is there any man in his wits that denieth Faith to be the effect of consideration? Do you not think what and why you must believe, and even believe in and by Thinking or Considering. Do you believe, and not think what or why? C. No, but it is by Infusion that we have those thoughts. B. Infused Faith then is by Infused Thoughts: Be it so; but than it is not without Thoughts or Consideration. But further; Quest. 3. Is there any Christian that denieth that Faith cometh by hearing, and the use of the means which God hath appointed us? I pray you hear Dr. Twisse against Hord, pag. 169. [God in his Covenant of Grace requireth obedience to salvation; but of his Free Grace undertakes to regenerate them, and work them to obedience: But how? agreeable to their rational natures; that is, by admonition, instruction, exhortation; that is, to work Faith and Repentance by exhorting and persuading them to repentance. All this he performs by his Ministers.] Do you not believe that the Apostles were sent to open men's eyes, and turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God,— Acts 26. 17, 18. And that Ministers must The Schoolmen-men and even the Jesuits ordinarily profess the necessity of infused Grace; yea many of them in a higher sense than many Protestants dare own. Even Molina himself asserteth the supernaturarality of Grace thus, [Ut consensus liberi arbitrii Deo excitanti & vocanti per gratiam praevenientem nihil in re sit qd. non supernaturale, & quod non simul a Deo ema●et, non solum tanquam ab allic●ente excitante, & invitante ad id arbitrinm▪ sed etiam tanquam a co-operanee per auxilium gratiae. And he pronounceth Anathema on them that affirm [Consensum arbitrii nostri Deo excitanti & vocanti per auxilium Gratiae praevenientis esse actum naturalem, aut posse elici sine auxilio & cooperatione ejusdem praevenientis Gratiae.] And the sum of his opinion about the nature and cause of our holy actions is, 1. That Gods universal influx or causation is necessary on our will to make them acts. 2. That freewill is the cause that they are these particular acts about this object rather than another. 3. That Gods particular or special influx of Grace is the cause that they are supernatural acts. And that preventing Grace doth give men good thoughts, and the first motion of the affections, before deliberation, and choice or liberty (as Vasquez also saith) which seemeth the same with the Doctrine of Ockam, Buridane, and the rest of the Nominals, who call it Complacency, as antecedent to Election, yea and Intention. To be pleased with the thing simply on the first apprehension they call a necessary natural act. Though the Scotists say that quoad exercitium actus vel libertatem contradictionis even that is free.) And it seems the same which Augustine and Jansenius call primam aelectationem. But converting Grace itself Molina takes to be a habit wrought by God's special help in and with the word or means. His words are of men that are hearing God's Word or thinking on it, [Influit Deu● in ●easdem notitias in●lux● quodam particulari ac supernaturali quo cognitionem illam adjuvat, tum ut res melius & dilucidius expendatur, & pe●etret, ●um●etiam ut notitia illa jam limites notitia supernaturalis, & ad finem supernaturalom in suo ordine attingat. Ind oritur in voluntate motus affectionis, etc. Yet no Jesuit is supposed to go further from the Calvinists than this man. In truth I cannot perceive but that Jesuits, Arminians, Lutherans, and all such are willing to ascribe as much to God's Grace, as they think consistent with man's freewill and Gods not being the cause of sin: which is the same thing that the Calvinists also endeavour, though●hey seem not to hit on the same names and notions to do the thing desired. save themselves, and those that hear them, 1. Tim. 4. 16. And that he that converts a sinner doth save a soul from death: James 6. ult. And that the word is the immortal incorruptible seed by which we are begotten again, and which remaineth in us: Are you now in doubt of this? C. It is one thing for God to work with the Word, and another thing to work by the Word: The first we confess; But if God work by the Word, than he must operate first on the Word, which is the Preachers act; and so by that Word on the soul, and not immediately: Therefore I rather think that the word is a concomitant than an instrumental cause. B. 1. You wrong yourself and Christ in that you will not believe him, John 3. that we mortals know not the way and manner of the Spirits accesses and operations on the soul, any more than the cause of the wind whose sound we hear. Do you not know, that you do not know how God's Spirit moveth our intellect and wills, and how he maketh use of instruments; except secundum quid in some particles revealed. 2. An hundred Texts of Scripture (which I omit lest I be tedious) tell us that the Word is a means or subordinate cause (to God) of his informing and reforming operations on men's souls. And it's dangerous to dream of any second cause that is so concomitant as to be but coordinate with the first cause, and not subordinate to it. And the word is not only subordinate to God as Instituter by Legislation and Declaration, but also to God as efficient operator. 3. God can work two ways by the Word, which are within our reach (besides others) 1. As it is the act of the speaker, by exciting and illuminating him. 2. As it is the species (as they call it) received by the senses and imagination, which God can by his power set home to the attainment of the due effect. 4. And yet I know not any, or many of your Adversaries that deny that besides this Divine operation by the Word, God hath another immediately on the soul, exciting it to operate upon the Word, as the vis plastica vitalis materna operatur in semen jam receptum. But I will here forbear to trouble you with the physical difficulties, whether the Word heard be only objectum intellectus, or also causa efficiens (as light is both to the eye.) And whether it be operative on the intellect, or only terminative, with other such like. C. Well I must grant you that all Infused Faith (as to the act) is Acquired: But all Acquired Faith not Infused: but infusion is added to our own endeavours, like the creation of the humane soul. B. I am glad that we are got so far on towards peace. But Quest. 4. What mean you by Infusion? Is it not a Metaphor? C. Yes, and we mean that immediate persuasion of God which you even confess to be besides his operation by the Word, and by our Cogitations. Even a Creation of an act or habit. B. Quest. 5. Is it the name [Infusion] or the thing that you plead for? C. The name (though I confess Metaphors must not be used unnecessarily in Disputes) is yet convenient: but that I leave indifferent. B. Quest. 6. Do you not think that the act of Faith is the act of man's own Intellect, and Will, or Soul, and that immediately. C. Yes, that cannot be denied. B. If so, then when you say that our act is Infused, I hope you will confess the term to be none of the plainest; and you only mean that God's Grace doth so operate on the faculty as to excite it so to act; and consequently that the thing first and properly infused is not the act of Faith itself, but the vis impressa facultatem, before described, by which the act is caused: And so in a secondary sense the act may be called Infused, but not most immediately. C. I confess it is the habit which we commonly take to be Infused; and therefore we use to distinguish habitus infusos ab habitibus acquisitis, rather than actus infusos ab actibus acquisitis. B. Is that Habit before the Act or after it? C. You know that it is a Controversy among ourselves. Mr. Pemble saith it is before, and the common opinion is, that it is after the first special Act. B. 1. I once received that from Mr. Pemble (ignorantly.) But that cometh to us by not distinguishing the vis impressa or first received influx of the spirit from a Habit: when as Amesius well saith, it is fit called semen fidei vel dispositio quaedam, than a Habit of Faith. For 1. no man can prove such an antecedent habit; and therefore none should assert it. 2. The true nature of a Habit consisteth in a promptitude to perform that special act with facility. But that we should have such a promptitude and facility not only while we are Infant Christians, but no Christians; as having not yet believed in Christ, is not probable according to our commonest observation. 3. All other Habits follow the Acts, and therefore we have little reason to say it is otherwise here. C. Doth the Soul believe before it is inclined or disposed to it? B. Inclination is a hard word, and belongeth both to Natural Inclination (such as we have to Felicity) and to Habits, and to mere Dispositions. And a pre-disposition we grant: As when you spur your Horse, you make him first the patiented of your act, and by suscitating his natural faculty, you dispose him to a speedy motion: though the similitude doth not quadrare per omnia, because God's influx is on the whole Soul itself. But this Disposition to the present act, is far less than a proper Habit; or it's another thing. C. When I spur my Horse, or whip my Dog, I do but stir up a former faculty, or slothful power: But God giveth a new life and power to them that were dead in sin. B. Yet, I cannot take words for matter. 1. It's nothing but the natural faculty or power which you suscitate in the beast: And hath not an unbeliever the Natural faculties or power? Is he not a man? Why do you not bury him, if he be not alive? 2. Death in sin is relative, or real: The Relative is Reatus mortis, which denominateth men filios mortis, and is done away by pardon. The real is the Privation of a holy disposition to the act of Faith and Repentance, etc. or of the Act itself, or of the Habit. You can name no other. Now 1. the death which consisteth in the privation of the first disposition to act (supposing all natural dispositions) is taken away by the first influx or suscitation of the Holy Ghost. 2. And by the same in secunda instanti is caused the Act, and the death gone that lay in its privation. 3. And (in the third instant, or afterward by degrees) is taken away the death which lieth in the privation of the Habit. And this giving the Habit, is called in Scripture and by Divines Sanctification as following Vocation, and it is wrought in us by degrees and not all at once, and that by the Spirits power, with and by our exercised Acts. In my youth I was so prematurely confident of the contrary, that the first Controversy that ever I wrote on (was a Confutation of Bishop Downam, Amesius, Medal. de Vocat) Mr. Tho. Hooker, etc. in Defence of Pemble herein; but riper thoughts made me burn that Script. C. But the spur or rod putteth no new power at all into your Horse; but God's Spirit putteth a new Power into us. B. I have talked long enough to you about Power before, and therefore would not turn back needlessly to say it over again. God's Spirit putteth no such thing into us, as we call a faculty or natural power: For that is the form or essence of the Soul; and our Species is not changed by Grace. But he giveth us that which is called a Moral Power, which consisteth conjunctly in the concurrence of means and objects, and the disposition of our faculties to the act. Hear Dr. Twisse against Hord, pag. 12. lib. 2. He secretly maintaineth that every man hath such a power by Grace, by which he may repent if he will: Concerning which Tenet of his, we nothing doubt but every man hath such a power: but we say it is nature rather. Page 18. Truly I see no cause to deny this, that even the wicked could do good if they would: We may safely say with Austin, Omnes possunt Deo credere & ab amore rerum temporalium ad Divina praecepta servanda se convertere, si velint. (Here is posse se convertere, id est, velte, si velit.) But saith Twisse, pag. 170. l. 1. [But such is the shameful issue of them that confound impotency moral with impotence natural, as if there were no difference] which he oft showeth is but the want of actual and dispositive willingness. Now the rod or spur may cause both a present disposition, and an act of will. C. But is this all the new Life and Spirit, and Divine Nature that is given us? Sure it is much more? B. No doubt but it is much more. But that Spirit, Life, and Nature is promised and given to Believers, and is promised on condition of our accepting Christ, in whom is our life: And therefore it is that habitual Grace which followeth the first act of Faith, and is a nobler disposition to the following acts. C. Will one act of ours cause a Habit? B. Not as ours only: But when the Spirit will work▪ by it, it will. But even that Habit I told you is weak at first, and increased by degrees. But proceed and tell me, Quest. 7. Are you sure that in the Acquisition of Habits there is no immediate operation of God on the Soul that causeth them? C. We all hold an immediate Influx necessary to the Being and Action of every Creature, natural and free: but not an immediate Infusion. B. What's the difference between Influx and Infusion? C. The first is an universal operation, the other a particular. B. Do you mean that the difference of the acts or operations is at all ex parte agentis, sen act us ut est agentis, antecedent to the effect, or only in the effect itself. C. I dare not say that there is any difference in God, for it is against his simplicity; and his very will and act as in himself is his Essence, though variously related and denominated by cannotation: Therefore I must needs confess that the diversity is only in the effect. B. Do you not see then what a delusory and troublesome stir men make for and about mere words? What's the Crimination come to then about Acquired and Infused Habits? when the difference is only in the effects? You confess that all proper Habits Infused are by our cogitation and use of means, and so are also acquired. And you confess that all Acquired Aabits are wrought besides our cogitation and use of means by an immediate influx of God; so that as to the Causes you can name no difference: And yet the words Acquired and Infused signify a difference in the Causes, and their operation, and not in the Effect, by their notation. Is not this deceit then? C. Tell me what you take to be the difference yourself? B. 1. I suppose that ab uno omnia, God without diversity causeth all diversity, which is only in the Creatures, and not in him. 2. I suppose that God hath appointed natural means and second causes for common natural effects; and his Will is, that they shall operate according to their aptitude: And that he hath appointed extraordinary means, even Christ, and supernatural Revelation, for the production of saving Faith: And it is his will that they shall work usually according to their aptitude. 3. It is his command that we use these several means (natural and supernatural) accordingly. 4. As these means are special, extraordinary, and for a special end (the production of Faith and Holiness.) So it is the will of God that they shall have answerable, noble, special effects; which effects besides his operation on and by the means, the said Volition of God itself produceth immediately operating on the Soul; not as a mere volition alone, but as conjunct with his Wisdom and Vital Power or Activity by which he operateth all in all. I could here say that God doth concur with these supernatural means on his Elect, with a stronger, greater, special energy, force, or influx. But I am loath to deceive you with bare words: for this force, energy, or efflux is either God or something created. God operateth by that Wisdom, Will, and Power or Activity which are his Essence: therefore there are here no degrees in any operation: And in the effects the degrees are not denied. The sum of all is then but this, natural effects are natural effects, and Faith is Faith: the difference we partly perceive; the means also are various▪ but in God the operator there is no diversity. And so you may see what the stir about Infusing and Acquiring is come to. C. I dare not deny this, because it is agreed on by all Philosophical Divines, and I should be called a Blasphemer, if I affirmed any real diversity in God, at least besides the Trinity of Persons, called by the Schoolmen Real Relations, and by some real modes of being. But it surpasseth man's understanding to conceive, that the same cause no way differing, ex parte sui, should produce variety of effects. By which it seemeth, that when there was nothing but God, his love to Jacob and his hatred to Esau, his decree to save and to damn, his will to make the world, and to destroy it, his foreknowledge of good and evil, had no real difference at all. And is it not somewhat of a lie then in us, to call those acts different, or by different names, which really have not the least difference at all. (But of this before.) B. God were not God, if man's shallow wit could comprehend him. All this must be confessed, unless you will be a Vorstian: But if our conceptions be not false, our diversity of names here is no lie; because we intent but to denominate God's knowledge and decrees or will, but by the relative connotation of the things known and willed. And though those things were nothing before the Creation, and so the difference between God's Decrees, etc. was really none at all, and the esse cognitum was nothing but God's simple Essence: Yet as Greg. Armin. hath disputed, there be some kind of Relations (which are nothing themselves) and consequently denominations which may be terminated on nothing (as praeteritu & futura are.) But if your understanding rest not here, do as I do, rest in a necessary and willing ignorance; and be but so wise as not to trouble the Church with that which you know not, nor imitate them that can show the valour of their raging zeal, by Writing or Preaching against them as the enemies of the Grace of God, which dote not as confidently as themselves. C. But what say you to Dr. Twisse 's words against Hord, (l. 1. p. 156.) Albeit it be not in the power of nature to believe fide infusa, yet is it in the power of nature to believe the Gospel fide acquisita which depends partly on a man's Education, and partly on Reasons considering the credibility of the Christian way, by light of natural observations above all other ways in the world. B. 1. * Pet. a S. Joseph. Thes. univers. de Grat. habit. p. 86. Datur aliquod donum Gratiae Divinitus infusum quod post operationem in anima nostra habitualiter permanet: Dari gratiam habitualem jam videtur esse de fide, post Concil. Tridenti●: antea tamen non erat habitus gratia sanctificantis realiter a charitate distinguitur (which others deny) Gratia habitualis constituit hominem in statu supernaturali, etc. The Reader that will peruse Casp. Peucer's Hist. Carcer. pag. 692, 693, etc. may see that the Luthorans were more for Infusion and miraculous operations of Grace, and may see a handsome explication of Conversion, and the operation of the Word and Sacraments: and pag. 698. De viribus humanis in renascentibus & renatis dum fit conversio & deinceps ad sinem. Credo quod gratuiti beneficii ac meriti Christi salvatoris applicatio & naturae mortuae vivifitatio in regeneratione non fit actione physica & br●ta aut raptu Enth●stastico, aut Stoica coactione, aut Magico aff●atu verbi, Sacramentorum & sp. sancti. Ne● mutatione Physica aut M●gica, hyperphysica substanti●, temperamenti & viriu● seu facultatem h●minis sentientis quidem, nec moventis se nec qui●quam agentis, sed sustinentis tantum impressionem, ut subjectum pations, sicut ran● reviviscunt a tepore solis, etc. By this you may see what this excellent man, Melan●●hons Son-in-law suffered his ten years cruel imprisonment for, by the instigation of Schmidelinus and other Lutherans, to their perpetual shame; and who was then (as the Papists still are) most for Physical infusions ex op●re operato in Word and Sacraments. Not only he, but all the Schoolmen distinguish acquired and infused Faith: But though the names sound otherwise, the difference meant by them is in the effects only (and the means) and not in God. He meaneth that a slight ineffectual belief may be performed by that disposition or moral power which is found before special Grace, as excited by good Education and helps: But an effectual saving Faith must be the product of a special impress of God's Spirit on the Soul; which is a special disposition and moral power to that act. And this is true: And no more can be truly meant or said. 2. But I will tell you a mystery added oft by Dr. Twisse, which may much moderate your judgement about the cause of men's condemnation, if it be true. He holdeth that no man is condemned for want of an infused Faith. C. How? why no man is condemned (at least that hath the Gospel) but for want of it: For if it be only an infused Faith that justifieth, than it is the want of an infused Faith by which men are unjustified: And if as you say, Infused and effectual or special Faith, be all one, sure men are condemned for want of special effectual Faith. B. His words are these against Hord, l. 1. p. 156. [Neither have I ever read or heard it taught by any, that men shall be damned for not believing fide infusa; which is as much as to say, because God hath not regenerated them; but either because they refused to believe, or else if they have embraced the Gospel, for not living answerable thereunto; which also is in their power, quoad exteriorem vitae emendationem, though it be not in their power to regenerate their wills, and change their hearts, any more than it is to illuminate their minds: Yet I never read that any man's damnation was any whit the more increased for not performing these acts.] And again, page 170. [It is true there is a Faith infused by the Spirit of God in regeneration: But who ever said that any man was damned because he doth not believe with such a Faith? As much as to say, that non-regeneration is the meritorious cause of damnation. C. I am amazed at this, especially his supposing that no man ever said that, which I thought no man of us had denied. B. I would think that his meaning is, that men are not condemned for want of Gods infusing act, but their own believing act; or for the privation of Infusion, but for the privation of Faith; or of Faith, not quatenus infused, but as they ought to have believed without infusion. But he was not so wanting in accurateness, but that he knew how to have expressed himself, had that been his meaning: And then I know not how his words will consist with this sense, [I never read that any man's damnation was the more increased for not performing these acts] where changing their own hearts is one. [And whoever said that any man was damned because he did not believe with such a Faith.] Here it is the Faith as such which is supposed spoken of; the privation whereof is not the meritorious cause of damnation. And indeed though the power of this Faith would have been in us, had there been no Sin or Saviour, yet there would have been no obligation to believe in Christ as Mediator: And therefore if the Law of Innocency had stood alone, even the want of an acquired Faith in Christ would have been no sin. But this is the unhappiness of such as must read Controversial Writings: There is no end of searching after the Writers meaning. But the thing itself I think is plain, etc. that only an effectual special Faith will save us: and it is such a Faith of which Christ speaketh, Mat. 16. 16. He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned, (though he believe with any other Faith whatsoever, which he calleth acquired.) Perhaps this his opinion hath some dependence on what he saith before (ibid.) He punisheth the disobedient with eternal death. True: but according to what Covenant? Not according to the Covenant of Grace: that is only a Covenant for Salvation: but according to the Covenant of the Law, the Covenant of Works.] Woeful error and confusion. The Covenant of the Law is almost as bad a phrase, as [the Covenant of the Covenant.] 1. God's Law of Innocency was a Law and Covenant in several respects. 2. So was the Jewish Law, which Paul meaneth by the Law of Works. 3. So is the Christian Law of Christ, and of Grace. No man is now condemned by the Jewish Law of Works as such, it being ceased; and never did it bind the Gentile world: The Law of Nature and of Innocency indeed condemneth the disobedient; but the Law or Covenant of Christ or of Grace doth condemn them to much sorer punishment, Luke 19 27. Those mine enemies that would not I should reign, etc. Mark 16. 16. He that believeth not shall be damned, Heb. 10. 29. Mat. 25. throughout. But this confounding of the Covenants I must not here rectify. But yet I hope he meant only that men suffer not for want of Gods Regenerating, Infusing Act, but for want of their own act of Faith. The fifth Crimination. C. I find Dr. Twisse (ibid. & alibi saepe) charging it on them, as holding that Grace is given according to Works (which is Pelagianism:) For they think that God looketh at some preparation in the Receiver, and giveth it to some because they are prepared for it, and denieth it to others because they are unprepared: whereas it is not in him that willeth nor in him that runneth, but in him that (of his mere good pleasure) showeth mercy. B. There is enough said of this after, about differencing and effectual Grace. But if we must say more, I ask you, Quest. 1. Do you by this phrase [according to Works] mean to urge the Scripture that speaketh in that phrase, in its proper sense, or do you Vulgatum illud facient● quod in se est Deus non denegat Gratiam intelligitur de faciente ●● gratia auxilie, Pet. ● S. Joseph. Thes. Univers. de auxil. pag. 83. Idem. pag. 90. Nequidem ipsius Christi opera fuerunt actu meretoria citra promissi●nem Dei usi ex se essent valoris in●●●iti (which needeth explication.) only use the phrase in some other sense of your own. C. I use Scripture phrase in Scripture sense, because I rest on its Authority. B. Quest. 2. Are we not also saved without Works in Scripture sense? And would it be contrary to Paul to say we that we are saved by Works; yea, or according to them in that sense that he speaketh of them. See James 2. 14, etc. Tit. 3. 5. Ephes. 2. 5, 8, 9 Gal. 3. 2. 5. 10. Acts 15. 11. etc. and 16. 31. Rom. 5. 10, And yet saved according to Works in another sense, James 2. 14, etc. Phil. 2. 12. Gal. 6. 4. Rom. 20. 12, 13. 2 Cor. 5. 10. C. In several senses of Works we deny it not. B. Quest. 3. At least you will grant that we are not justified by Works, and yet that we are justified by Faith: yea in another sense by Works. Quest. 4. Is not believing and repenting in order to Justification, and all holy obedience in order to Salvation; as truly op●● a work, and in a far nobler sense than preparation for Faith is? C. That cannot be denied. B. Then you cannot affirm that the phrase [not according to Work●] which excludeth not Faith, Repentance, holy Obedience to justification and salvation, doth intent the exclusion of all preparation in order to Conversion or Faith in Christ; when by Works excluded, it meaneth the same thing, or sort, in all. C. But saith Dr. Twisse, ibid. page 154. [Pardon and Salvation God doth confirm only on condition of Faith and Repentance: But ●● for Faith and Repentance, doth God confer them conditionally also▪ If so, whatsoever be the condition let them look to it how they can avoid the making of Grace, to wit, the Grace of Faith and Repentance, (to be given according to Works.] B. I know he frequently saith the same. But 1. I speak now only of the sense of that Scripture, and say, that this goeth upon a most false and dangerous supposition, that Justification, and Salvation are given according to Works, though Faith and Repentance be not: whereas in the sense of Works there meant by Paul, no man can be justified by Works. And though Christ saith, This is the work of God, that ye believe in him whom the Father hath sent; yet it is not that which Paul meaneth: Let not therefore Scripture words be abused to misled men's understandings. 2. But as to the matter of the Controversy, I spoke to it enough before. No man can deny but that God usually prepareth the Soul fer Conversion by a common sort of Grace: And though he may do what he list with his own, and extraordinarily may in an instant convert the most unprepared malignant obdurate person; yet that is not his usual way: (And some that think otherwise are led into the mistake by thinking that a man is converted, when he hath suddenly some terrifying humbling preparation, which endeth in conversion.) Whether he convert all that are brought to the very highest and nearest degree of preparation, I know not, nor perhaps you neither: But that usually he converteth all such we have very great reason to think probable: And that he hath not commanded men to seek his special Grace in vain. So that whether it be a proper promise on God's part, or only an encouragement short of proper promise, I told you before is a hard question. But we maintain that it is not that proper mutual Covenant which maketh a Christian, and is celebrated in Baptism, and giveth Salvation. If one of old John Rogers's, Thomas Hooker's, or Robert Bolton's hearers, when they were vehemently urging preparatory humiliation, desire, endeavour, etc. should have said to them, Sir, you play the Arminian, and contradict St. Paul, who saith that Grace is not given according to Ista ●●●dia nemini Deus dest●●●● propter vel secundum morita ipsius, sed ex pura puta Gratia: Nemini etiam denegat nisi juste propter gracedentia peecata, Armin. Disp. Private. Thes. 41. Sect. 10. Adrian VI Quodl. 3. q. 1. fol. 21. expoundeth Habenti dabitur thus, Qui habet verbi Dei amorem ut illuc mentis intuitum dirigat dabitur ei sensus intelligendi: & qui non habet verbi Dei amorem auferetur ab eo naturalis capacitas intelligend, &c Works: Therefore God will give it me never the more for such preparations: what would you have said to him. The truth is, practical Preachers in these practical cases, are carried with full sail into that truth which Disputers would wrangle out of Doors. But as for any work● meritorious in point of commutative Justice, y●a, or of any full and proper Covenant of God, giving a proper Right to the Sinner, upon which he may claim special Grace as his due, I know of none such before true Conversion; though God's commands and general promises give men sufficient encouragement. C. But what say you to Rom. 9 It is not in him that willeth or runneth, etc. B. I do not love to expound hard Texts unsatisfactorily by scraps: I will give you, God willing, a Paraphrase of the Chapter together by itself. I suppose you have read John Goodwin's and Dr. Hammonds Paraphrase. At present it may suffice to say, 1. That the meaning is not, that he that would have Christ, and Grace, and Holiness is no fit for it▪ than he that would not have them: nor that he that seeketh them is no fit for them than he that rejecteth them●nor that he that believeth is no fit for Justification than ●n Infidel; nor he that is holy any fit for Heaven than the unholy: nor yet that he that heareth, meditateth, prayeth, a● he can, and attaineth the highest degree of common Grace, is no fit or likelier for Faith or special Grace than he that despiseth it and the means of it. 2. But the meaning is, that God of his free mercy c●lled the Gentiles that were further from him than the Jews, and may give (both) the Gospel, (and the Grace of the Gospel) to one, and take it from, or not give it to another, when both of them are equally unworthy of it by their sin. So that the first and principal cause that difference●ha Jacob from an Esau, is not that Jacob before God's Grace did will and r●n, de●ire and seek Grace; but that Mercy begun with him, and gave him, though as unworthy as Esau, both commonner and special Grace, which caused him to will and run. And yet for all that both are supposed to have forfeited mercy by sinning against it; and it is in him that willeth not, and runneth not, that the cause of his misery, and privation of mercy is to be found. Yea in many an instance where mercy and helps are given by an equality, a wicked man may make himself to differ by his sin, and wilfully become worse than others. C. At least you must here confess, that de facto we do really differ from each other in this point. B. All they that hold all that Doctrine of Preparation for Conversion, which you find in the suffrages of the British Divines in the Synod of Dort do not (that I know of) differ from many of the Lutherans, and Jesuits, nor from many of the Arminians herein; while by the name of merit of Congruity, used by some, and Preparation by the other, no more is meant than they there assert: And as to the question of a promise or no promise, I showed you before how small the difference is; yea with some it is but de nomine, while one calleth that a Promise, which another calleth but a half promise (with Mr. Cotton) or a precept to use means with sufficient encouragement; when perhaps in the description of the thing they agree: So that among the most and sober practical Preachers, I yet see no real difference in sense at all, about the necessity of preparatory Grace. The sixth Crimination. C. For aught I can understand, some of them acknowledge no Corruption nor Grace in the Will, as having no Habits, but mere Indifferency or Liberty; but think that the illuminating of the understanding is enough to change the will. * The Remonstrants say, Synod. circ. art. 3. &▪ 4, p. 15. [Voluntatem i●super Deus in obsequium suum fle ctit, & ad actu● fidei & obedienti● ita inclinat per spiritum suum sanctum verbo utentem, ut voluntas per illam operationem non solum possit obedire, ●ed & obediat quoties obedit; non ex se, an● per se, aut a se. B. 1. These are a few odd persons, that differ from the generality of your Adversaries: and I am not to justify all that every man writeth. 2. But even of these I suppose the meaning of the most is, but this, that sin began inthe Intellect, and there Grace must begin: and that God worketh on the will but mediante Intellectu. And these Camero held as well as they; and so do many more. And these seem to differ, not about the necessity of Grace, but the manner of its conveyance to the will; whether it be only by the intellect. 3. And as the wind bloweth where it listeth, and we hear its sound, but know not whence it cometh, or whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit. We know that the will is vitiated as ill as the understanding, and needeth Grace as much as it: and that God is as near to the one in his operations as to the other, and giveth real Grace to both. But because the intellect is in the natural order, the first in acting, and the will but second; and because the act is commonly (and reasonably) supposed to go before the Habit (though not before all Divine Influx ad actum;) therefore men are uncertain whether God who first acteth the Intellect, do not by its act, first operate on the will. But this dependeth much on the Physical Controversy, whether the Intellect determine the will ad speciem actus, or at least really and efficiently move it; or rather only present the object to it, and so work but in subserviency to the material cause, which is constitutive indeed of the act in specie, but not efficient: and the perception of it goeth to the conditio objectiva, without which it is no object to the will. This I incline to with Scotus, and suppose that the Intellect moveth not the will per modum naturae, by necessitation. But while we know not the order and nature of the operations of our own souls, how shall we know the unsearchable way of the operations of the Holy Ghost. The seventh Crimination. C. They make God's Grace a resistible thing, which man can frustrate; and so God worketh at uncertainties. * Man's ignorance of the way of God's operation on second causes, told us by Christ himself, Job. 3. should end such quarrels and teach us all with judicious Davenant to profess uncertainty; and with judicious Jos. Placeus de lib. arb. p. 174. (speaking of the dependence of the second cause on the first, and the Papists digladiations about concourse and predetermination) to say, Nos quidem qua reverentia erga infinitam Dei majestatem ducimur, non audemus definire quanta sit dependentia causae secundae a prima: Nobis sufficit, modo ne Deo ullam peccatorum nostrorum vel minimam labem aspergat, non posse nimiam stat●i. To which also the very judicious Lt Blank subscribeth, Thes. 51. de concursu, etc. The Remonstrants Syn. are 3, 4. p. 15. etc. do profess that God's operation of the Intellect, Affection, and Will, do thus differ, that the converting work on the will is more resistible than the other. And to the question, An convers●o contingens sit et in certa, an vero necessitate causae aut eventus insallibiliter sequatur in ●o qui convertitur, Respondent, conversionem esse contingentem quia Libera est: nec tame● D●o incertam, quia praecognita est; nec sequi necessitate causae, sive consequentis, quia resistere poterat homo; sed necessitate consequentiae, etc. Et pag. 17. Declarat. [Quare dicimus hominis voluntatem ad volendum bonum non necessitari, sed hominem posse resistere, hoc est, non-velle, et saepe actu non-velle et resistere grati● sufficientis operationibus. B. I have said so much of this before, that I need not tyre you with much more. Quest. 1. Do you know of no way for God to work with certainty of success, if Grace be resistible. C. I will not say so: I know what you have said to this before. B. Why then do you speak that which is not valid in your own judgement? Quest. 2. Dare you undertake to justify all the world against the accusation, of having resisted the Grace of God. C. No; I dispute not on such hard terms. B. Quest. 3. Did you never repent yourself for resisting Grace? C. Yes, in some sense; but not as I now mean it. B. How is that? C. To resist the Gospel and Ministry is a resisting of Grace, and the Holy Ghost, Acts 7. and so I have done. But I speak of immediate resisting God., B. 1. Remember that here you confess that the Gospel is Grace, even to them that resist it. 2. God himself cannot be resisted immediately, where he worketh not immediately. 3. But where he doth so, he is said to be resisted; 1. Not by any repelling of his strength. 2. Much less by opposing a greater strength. 3. Nor by acting by any strength but what he giveth. 4. Not by causing any difficulty to him. 5. Not by frustrating any absolute will of his: But 1. Passively, by being ill disposed to the reception of that Grace which he offereth, and that operation which else might effect it. 2. And actively, by doing that which rendereth us yet more ill-disposed both naturally and morally by commerit. 3. As also in that we do that which is contrary to God's actions in their tendency to the effect. When he moveth us to hear, read, meditate, pray, love, trust, etc. and we do the contrary; this may be called a resistance. C. If God intent the effect, it will be done: but if he intent it not, how is he resisted in that which he never intended to do? B. You know the Scripture speaketh not at these rates; but when men will set their silly wits against God's Word, thus they will seem subtler than he: But it's but a dream. 1. God may be resisted when he intendeth not the effect: in that his Law is resisted, and with it that necessary measure of Grace, by which the effect might have been wrought. Though his Decree be not resisted, yet his Law and his Grace and help (which had a tendency to the effect, and a sufficiency on its part) may be resisted. 2. And he is ordinarily resisted in that which he doth both intent and do: For he seldom doth us any good without resistance, though he overcome. But he that overcometh resistance is resisted. C. But I mean by Resisting, Overcoming. B. Why then did you not speak as you meant. None dreameth that Omnipotence is overcome by a greater strength; much less by the derived power of us worms. But the Case is weighty which you and others perilously overlook. C. Let me hear your explication of it. B. God doth not work like necessary agents to the utmost that he is able. His Wisdom hath diversified Creatures; and his Wisdom hath appointed (even in the works of Grace) a established order of second causes and means which he will use for the effect. And his Wisdom and Free will hath fixed a certain degree or proportion of his concourse, suitable, 1. To the nature of man; 2. And to the nature and use of all those means; 3. And to the effect as it is to be ordinarily accomplished: Even as in nature, he concurreth with all causes agreeably to their established nature and use. Now though Omnipotency cannot be overcome, yet the same creature that hath a certain stated proportion of natural activity, and Gods suitable concourse (e. g. to a healthful body which hath strong appetites), and also a congruous proportion of Gracious means, and concourse and helps of Grace, by which he can rule the foresaid appetite, may yet by neglect of that help, and by wilful indulging of that appetite, make the appetite stronger than his ordinary degree of help, and so overcome the Grace of God, though he overcome not God's Omnipotence or Decrees. But there is yet another thing of great moment commonly overlooked. C. What is that? B. The great importance of that common saying Recipitur ad modum recipientis; on which, had I time, I would write a Book of Instances. Causa Receptiva is not well understood. Aristotle maketh Privatio to be one of his three Principles in Physics. By Privation must be meant, not Absentia formae, sed Dispositio materiae: And whether you will call it a third Principle, or only the due qualification of the first (Matter) to make it immediately Receptive of the form, the matter being de nomine & ●umero is small. But it is most certain, that the wonderful diversity of alterations, or effects of motion in the world, is very much to be ascribed to the diversity of Receptive Dispositions. And accordingly as in Physics the three Active Natures (Intellective, Sensitive, and Vegetative, (which its like is Ignis) are to be defined per virtutes suas Activas; so the Passive Elements (Earth, Water, and Air) are to be defined by their several contextures or constitutions, which make up Dispositionem Receptivam Influxus Activorum, unicuique propriam; which is their very form. In Physical cases, God doth first as Creator make all things in wonderful variety of natures, quantities, figures, and contextures. And secondly, he causeth an Universal Cause to Influence them generally; such as is the Sun for one (what other we know not well); whose ●r●ple influx Motion, Light, and Heat, affecteth all things according to their several Natures and Receptivities. The special Active principle in every living thing, is both cherished, and suscitated by this universal solar influx. But the diversity of effects is not from the Sun, but from the diversity of Recipients. The Sun by its influx is the cause that all things live, and move▪ But that one thing hath a life and motion Intellective, and another Nonsttive, and another Vegetative, that by the Sun's influx an A●orn brings forth an Oak, and every Seed it's own kind of Plant; that a Horse ●●●● as a Horse, a Dog as a Dog, a Sheep as a Sheep, etc. that the ●osa hath one smell, colour, shape; the Carnation another; the Tulip another, & ●. that the Dunghill s●●keth, that the Clay is hardened, the Wa● softened, etc. the innumerable different effects in the inferior creatures, are all caused by the Sun, as to their general nature (the received Influx of a Motive, Illuminative and Calefactive Virtue) but they are none of them in specie vel gradu unde differentia qua talis oritur caused by the Sun alone, but also by the variety of the suscitated vital forms in animals: And in things inanimate though not the Recipient, but the solar Influx be the efficient cause of the variety of alterations and effects, yet the Ratio diversitatis is more in the Disposition of the Recipient: The Sun's Influx is the same in itself without any difference, on the clay and wax, on the dunghill and the rose: Let the question then be what causeth the different effects? Answ. 1. The Sun's influx causeth all the Motion, Light, and Heat (which they all receive) as the Efficient cause. 2. The Material Recipients I have marvelled oft why Elisha called for a Ministrel, when the spirit of Prophecy was to come upon him: And so Music helped Saul. I am sure that Satan worketh on the minds of Melancholy, Choleric, etc. persons, by and according to the temper of the spirits and humours, and cannot do the same things without them. And perhaps the spirit of God, who can work as he list, will do it ad modum recipientis; and so Elisha's spirits must be brought up into an harmonious elevated preparation, that the mind may be made fit to receive the spirits extraordinary work. are the several things named, as Material. 3. The said Recipients being of divers Natures and Shapes, etc. have their variety of Receptive Dispositions. 4. The forma Recepta a sole, is nothing but its triplex influxus, Motus, Lux, Calor. 5. These are variously Received according to the various Dispositions of the Recipients. 6. Hence follow the Variety of the second effects; By the motive Influx some things are moved, when stones and houses stir not. By the Lucide Influx the eye seethe, when the hand doth not: the flowers appear in various colours according to their various Receptivities; and some things give little reflective appearance of their Reception of it. The Calid Influx cherisheth the living, and burneth by a burning-glass, when the dead stir not by it, and some unapt recipients are little altered by it. I call these the second effects which are thus various; For the first effects are still the same, viz. the Motive, Illuminative, and Calefactive efflux of the Sun is still sent forth, and some how or other reacheth every capable recipient in general: But the Alterations which are thereby made are diversified according to the diversity of Receptivities. But yet these Receptive Dispositions are no efficient Causes of this difference, or of any of the alterations. But they are the Receptive Material Causes, without which the efficient doth not make them, and according to which he doth make them. So that the Sun, though but Causa Universalis, yet is also the Universal Cause (and sole efficient) of all these Particular motions and alterations; And yet the Ratio differendi is not to be given from it, but from the different Receptivities, according to which it still produceth them. So the Rain falleth equally on the stones, on the earth, on vessels of various shapes and sizes: The stone retaineth none: The vessels variously retain it: As they are round, square, long, great, or small, so are they variously filled. The efficient cause of the difference, is the descent of the rain. The material constitutive cause, is the different quantities and shapes of the water. But yet the Ratio differendi is to be assigned from the diversity of Receptive dispositions in the vessels. And that you may see that these Receptivities are no efficients, and yet contain the chief Rationem differendi, note that the Reason to be given from them is, ex alter a differentium parte, still Negative or Privative, as on the other it is Positive: E. g. Why doth the Sun make the Rose smell sweet, and not the stone or dunghill? Because the stone or dunghill have not those odoriferous particles to be suscitated by it as the Rose had. Why doth the Sun move the Flies and not the Stones? Because the Stones had not that vital principle to be suscitated, as the Flies had. Why did not the rain fill the Stones as it did the Cisterns? and this Vessel as that? Because they had not the same Receptive and Retentive shapes. C. Well! but what is all this physical Discourse to our present Controversy? B. 1. The constancy of God in operating according to an established Order in the world, doth show us, that the God of Order delighteth so to do. 2. Therefore we have reason to conceive that he doth some such thing in the methods of Grace, as he doth in nature, viz. That he hath instituted a frame of means, which are the established way in and with which he will convey his Grace: And that he hath decreed to concur with a certain congruous universal influx which shall afford to all such a degree of suscitating, illuminating, and converting attractive force, as his wisdom seethe meet to be the established measure for the redeemed World. And this universal Influx is the sole efficient of all the good that is found in the redeemed: But 1. It is but a certain convenient proportion, and therefore will not do all that God can do; nor do the same on one man as on another; nor at one time as at another, on the same man. 2. And recipitur ad modum recipientis: The diversity of second effects may oft be most assigned to the diversity of receptive Dispositions. It is a wonder to see how the same causes variously work on men's minds that are dispositively diversified but by some preconceived opinion. You Remonstr. Declar. p. 17. Huic sua conversion● homo ex insita sibi pravitate & in res mundanas affectu, obicem & impedimentum liberum opponere potest, & ponit sape; five voluntas praedicationem Evangelii externam neglegat, & susque deque●abeat, tum quum ejus audiendi copiae fit homini: aut auditum verbum perfunctorie tra●●●t, magis rebus mundanis intentus; aut ali● modo impediat quo minue ipsi doctrina Evangelic● veritas, necessitas, utilit as a spiritu s●persuadeatur siut verbo assentiatur sed voluntatem, etc. & laxatis carni babenis spiritum extinguat, spiritui resistat, & bona desideria cogitationesque s●pius calitu● infusas & oblatas volent elidat & extermenet. may see two men learned, sober, pious, in doubt whether the Arminians or Calvinists, the Conformists or Non-conformists; yea perhaps the Papists or Protestants, be in the right. One is before hand more inclined one way, and the other the other way; yea perhaps not inclined in will, but have received in judgement a great apprehension that some one Principle is right, which more induceth to one side than the other. They both pray, and meditate, and resolve to read and search the Scripture and Controversal Writings with all possible diligence and impartiality: They set upon it; and one seethe all along as he goeth, the fullest evidence, as he thinketh for the one side and the other, seethe all go on the other side, through the difference of Receptive disposition. I have had sufficient notice of two Nonconformist Ministers, that had favoured in mind, the late cause of the Parliament in the Civil War, and by the face of the dreadfulness and heinousness of the guilt, if it should prove that their cause was bad, were brought to resolve to do all that possibly they could to be resolved. They both set themselves to Fast and Pray, they searched the whole Scripture, read over the Statute-Book, and all the Common Law-Books and Cases, that they could get, and all the History of our ancient Government, and of our late Transactions; they read what was said on both sides, and one saw all as clear as the light go for the King against the Parliament, wondering that any should make a doubt of it; and the other, though still not fully certain, was more confirmed in his old apprehensions the other way; yet both learned, able, judicious, godly, and truly desirous to know the truth, and many and many years begged it of God, and unweariedly followed on the search; and no carnal interest I am fully persuaded made the difference. And what then, shall we ascribe it all to immediate operations of God, without any more ado? No; as far as I could perceive the difference arose from hence: One of them was first deeply possessed with the sense of God's late Judgements Spiritual and Corporal on the Religious party which adhered to the Parliament; and thought these Judgements indicated their sin: Their Scandal, Divisions, Confusions, Matual Censures, and Errors were still before his eyes; and the Laws of Order and Government, and Obedience, and Patience, lay in greatest power on his heart. The other looked all abroad the world, to Infidel, Heathen, Mahometan, and Popish Kingdoms, and thought that tyranny was the grand sin on the earth, which kept out the Gospel, and consequently, Godliness and Salvation from the generality of mankind; that kept up Popery, and kept out Reformation; that silenced powerful Preachers, Suffrag. Theol. Britt. in Synod. Dord. art. 3. & 4. Sunt quaedam effecta interna ad conversionem praevia quae virtute verbi spiritusque in nondum justificatorum cordibus excitantur; qualia sunt notitia v●luntatis divinae, sensus peccati, timor poenae, cogitatio de liberatione, spes aliqua veniae. Quos Deus mediante verb● per spiritum s●um hunc in modum afficit, eos ad fidem, conversionemque vere & serio vocat & invitat. Quos ita afficit Deus non deserit, nec desistit▪ in vera ad conversionem via praemovere, priusquam ab illis per neglectionem voluntariam art hujus gratiae initialis repulsam, deseratur. and kept up Ignorance; that most served Satan, and fed the jaws of Hell. He thought of all the inhuman consequents of unrestrained Tyranny: He read Politics more than the other, and read more of the Greek and Roman History, and regarded more the Judgement of the several Parties and Religions among mankind: and he fell upon Bilson and Hooker the chief Prelatists; and he thought that God's Judgements consequential to those Wars had been incomparably less than the mercies and benefits, and that there were now proportionably multitudes more of Godly Ministers and People than there were before the Wars: And these different preconceptions and prepossessions, made them have quite different Interpretations of all the Scriptures, the Statutes, the Law Books, etc. which they read. And as the Proverb is, As the Fool thinketh, so the Bell tinketh: So it is wonderful to see in all things, how much the divers disposition of the Recipients, doth occasion diversity of effects from the same cause. C. But I hope you would not make us believe that all diversification is from man: Though the Sun be but an universal cause, yet God is also a particular cause, and a specifying; and who is it else that caused that diversity in the Creatures, which turneth the Sun's universal Influx into various effects. As God created the variety of Recipients, so he doth by Grace diversify man's Receptive dispositions. B. These are weighty matters, and deeply to be considered, with many thoughts and cautelous sobriety. We have two questions fallen before us: 1. How far God's Grace is resistible. 2. How God or man do cause diversities. Though I have been drawn on to speak much to the last, it is here but in order to the resolving of the first. The last is to be spoke to by itself anon. Before we come to that, these things I here conclude of. 1. That the Diversity of Nature, or Receptive Dispositions, being presupposed, God hath an established order of means, and a congruous established universal Concourse, which quantum in se, as far as belongeth to it to do, worketh equally on all. 2. That this established measure of aid, or concourse, recipitur ad modum recipientis, and operateth variously as to the effects, according to the various disposition of the Recipients: from whom the ratio diversatis is to be fetched, and not from it. 3. That this established measure of Concourse or aid may by the greatness of the Passive and Active Indisposition and Illdisposition of the Recipient, be both resisted, and overcome or frustrate. 4. That as Adam did resist and overcome such Grace, so do all wicked Hi praecedan●i effectus virtute verbi spiritusque in hominum mentibus producti, rebellis voluntatis vitio, suffocari & penitus extingui p●ssu●t, & in multis solent: ade● ut nonnulli in quorum mentibus virtute verbi spiritusque impress● fuit aliqualis notitia veritatis divinae, etc. mutentur plane in contrarium, etc. And even Alvarez. Disp. 18. n. ●0. saith, Si non operatur actione qui est in precepts imputabitur illi ad culpam eo quod su● culpa se impedivit, ne dareter illi auxilium efficax quod necessarium erat, ut actualiter operaretur: sicut si Deus imponeret homini pr●ceptum volandi, & quantum est ex parte sua offerret illi alas & adjutorium necessarium u● volaret, ipse autem responderet, D●mine nec v●l● alas accipere nec vol●re, merit● reputaretur reus, etiams● non possit absque alis, volare, q●ia sua culpa●se impedirit ne illi d●narent●r a De●. men in some cases now. And so do all godly men, in most of the sins (if not all) which they commit. 5. As God rarely worketh Miracles, (and we hardly know when he violateth his established course of nature, though we may know when he worketh beyond the power of any second cause known to us, and when he leaveth his ordinary way) but ordinarily keepeth to his established course and use of the second causes (even in his wonders.) So it is very probable, that in the Works of Grace, Recovery and Salvation, he ordinarily keepeth to his established order, his Ordinances, and fixed degree of Concourse. 6. Yet as God is still above all his Works, and a free Agent, and is no further tied to one constant order and measure of Concourse, than he toeth himself by his Wisdom and freewill; so God is free in the conveyance of his Grace, and can when he please, forsake that order, and work Miracles by Grace, as well as on natural things above nature. He can strike down Saul, and convert him by a voice from Heaven; and in a word, can do what he will. 7. And as in most wonders, its past our power to know whether and when God doth indeed forsake his established order, and work contrary to it, or without such second causes, as are unknown to us; though we can tell when he acteth unusually: So is it in this case, about his works of Grace. A Comet, or Blazing Star is an unusual thing, whose necessary antecedent cause we know not: And yet it is but a natural effect of second causes, operating in their established course; so are eclipses (better known) and unusual Tempests, and terrible Lightnings, etc. So great and sudden, unusual and wonderful changes may be made by Grace on sinners: and yet all in God's established course of working, and by those second causes which are to us unknown. C. But God is not a natural but a voluntary Agent; and Grace is hi● immediate work or offspring. B. 1. He is a voluntary Agent in Creation, Preservation, and in all the works and changes of nature: and yet he operateth constantly in his appointed course. 2. It's unknown to us, what means he useth, out of our reach, in his operations upon souls, as well as in nature. 3. We find that Grace keepeth a harmony with nature▪ ye● as morality is but the modality of things natural, so we may conceive that God may possibly work it, by the modifying of physical Agents and their actions, and the recipients. 4. Immutability and constancy is one of God's perfections; and the expression of it in the constant order of his Works is part of his glory in the world: Though our mutable Free-wills are better than the fixed or necessitated appetite of Bruits, that is not, as they are mutable, and the acts contingent, but as they have a higher object. But the fixed unchangeable wills of the Glorified (Angels and Saints) are far better than ours. And why should we think unsettled mutability of efficiency, to be the best discovery of God's Immutability. 5. But yet we grant that God is free to do what he please. C. But it is by fixed second causes that God keepeth a fixed order of natural productions and alterations in the world. But you can name no such universal second cause of Grace, affording under God a resistible Influx as the Sun doth in Nature. B. What will you say, if I name you such a second universal cause; (though if I could not, it followeth not that therefore there is none such.) I think I can name you one that all Christians should know; and yet it seems is not well by Divines themselves considered. JESUS CHRIST as MAN, and MEDIATOR is God's Administrator General of the humane world; and is compared to the Rising Sun, which illuminateth all the world, with a light suitable to it and them. So Christ is the light of the world, the Sun of Righteousness, that ariseth with healing Grace, and enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world: (or as Crotius and Hammond render it [which coming into the world enlighteneth every man] supposing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be the Nominative Case and Neuter Gender, and not the Accusative Masculine) In him was Life, and the Life was the light of men (not only to the sanctified who received, but uneffectually though quoad se sufficiently) the light shined in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not: The world that was made by him knew him not: He came to his own, and his own received him not (yet he came to them) But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, John 1. 3, 10, 11. It is apparent in Scripture that all power in Heaven and Earth is given to Christ, Matth. 28. 19, 20. that all things are delivered into his hands, John 13. 3. and God hath given him power over all flesh, John 17. 2. and he is head over all things to the Church, Ephes. 1. 22, 23. C. We all grant that Christ is an universal light and Saviour: 1. Objectively: 2. And as to his Doctrine, Covenant, and Example: But what's that to internal efficient Grace, which is immediately from God? B. Great is this mystery of Godliness: there is more in Christ than you take notice of, even the Spirit which must work Grace in men's souls, is two ways given first to Christ: 1. In that as Administrator general, the power of giving out the Spirit to mankind is now given to Him, even in his humane Nature. And he giveth it out in manner and measure suitable That Grace habitual is participatio naturae divinae, and how, and in what sense. Vide Caceres sum. Theol. 2. 2. cap. 1. And abundance of Jesuits and other Schoolmen go as far in asserting its supernaturality, and some in ascribing it to Christ, as Protestants do: But Vasquez and many go farther than many Protestants in supposing Christ the cause not only of Grace but of our Election to Grace. And yet even there the difference is most, if not only in words. The Thomists maintain even that Christ's humanity is the Instrument of the Deity in operating Grace in us, which the cause of the Eucharist leadeth them to. 1. To himself: 2. To us. 3. To his established means and Ordinances, by which he worketh. So that now the Spirit with its aid (common or special) is not given to any sinner immediately from God, as Creator; and as it was given to Adam before his fall, but by the Mediation of Christ the Redeemer. I mean not only the moritorious and procuring mediation, but also the powerful conveying mediation. Though God the Holy Ghost be still proximately the cause of Grace, yet Christ as Mediator is made by office, the Mediator and authorized giver of that Spirit and all its Grace; and so the measurer and orderer of his helps, and appointer of the conditions. 2. And Christ is first filled with this Spirit personally himself, that he may be a fit Head of vital Influence to all his Members, who by the previous operations of his Spirit are drawn and united to him. C. How prove you all this universal power in Christ? B. You have heard the express proof: And study further, 1 John 5. 11, 12. And this is the record that God hath given us eternal life; and this life it in his Son: He that hath the Son hath life, and he that hath not the Son hath not life. Rom. 8, 9 If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, the same is none of his. Mark that it is, The Spirit of Christ. John 15. 26. The Comforter (or Advocate) whom I will send to you from the Father. John 16. 7. If I depart I will send him to you. John 14. 26. The Comforter whom the Father will send in my name. Gal. 4. 6. And because ye are Sons God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying Abba, Father. Gal. 2. 20. I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the Faith of the Son of God who loved me. John 5. 21, 22. The Son quickeneth whom he will; for the Father judgeth no man but hath committed all judgement to the Son.— 26. For as the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given the Son to have life in himself. And that you may see that he giveth the Spirit with and by means, he saith, Verse 24. Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that heareth my word, and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life. John 6. 27, 32, 33. Labour for that meat which endureth to everlasting life, which the Son of man will give you: For him hath God the Father seated; that is, openly owned as appointed to this Office. He giveth life unto the world— Whoso eateth my Flesh and drinketh my Blood hath eternal Life— Dwelleth in me and I in him.— My Flesh is meat indeed.— As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father; so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me.— Verse 63. It is the Spirit that quickeneth, the Flesh profiteth nothing. John 3. 34. God giveth not the Spirit to him by measure. John 7. 39 This he spoke of the Spirit, which they that believe in him should receive. John 1. 5. 4, 5. Abide in me and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine; no more can ye except ye abide in me. I am the vine, ye are the branches. He that abideth in me and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit; for without me (or out of me) ye can do nothing. Matth. 28. 20. I am with you always to the end. 1 Cor. 6. 17. He that is joined to the Lord is one Spirit. 2 Cor. 3. 17. The Lord is that Spirit: and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. Phil. 1. 19 Through the supply of the Spirit of Jesus Christ. Col. 3. 3, 4. For ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God: when Christ who is our life shall appear, then shall ye also appear with him in glory. Ephes. 1. 22, 23. And gave him to be head over all things to the Church, which is his body, the fullness of him that filleth all in all. Do you need more to prove this great Office of Christ? C. Here is more than I have well thought on. But I find more to prove Christ the vital Head to his Church, than to prove him the universal dispenser of all Grace whatever is given to the world. B. Read them over again; what would you have more, than all Power, all things, all Judgement given or committed to him: And to be by Office the Redeemer, Saviour, and light of the world, coming as such even to them that neither comprehend him, know him, or receive him. I add another Text, Prov. 1. 20. to the end. — Wisdom crieth without, she uttereth her voice.— How long ye simple ones will you love simplicity, and the scorners delight in their scorning, and fools hate knowledge? Turn you at my reproof: behold I will pour out my spirit unto you, I will make known my words unto you.— Because I have called and ye refused, (see the rest.) Ver. 32. For the turning away of the simple shall slay them. And two things more I offer for your conviction. 1. That to show both his Power, and that he will exercise it orderly by means, Christ empowered his Apostles and Ministers under him to give the Spirit. And if the extraordinary Gifts were given by the laying on of their hands, no wonder if the ordinary were given by their Doctrine. 2. That on this ground Christ shall be the universal Judge of all the world, as he was the universal Lawgiver and light to all. But what need I more, when it is his very Office as Christ: as Prophet to be the universal Teacher, by Spirit and Word; and as Priest to sanctify by Spirit and Word; and as King to rule by Spirit and Word. C. I am amazed to think how little we well understand of our very Fundamentals and Catechism which we teach the ignorant: Methinks in this universal Light I see more than ever I before observed, that God indeed hath set up a Sun, an universal medium, a Christ, who in our nature is a Creature, to be the Donor and Convey or of all Recovering Grace to man, and to give out the Spirit in that stated order and measure as is suitable to his design and Subjects. And as on earth he gave out much light and help which was resisted and rejected, I now less wonder that it is so now he is in heaven; even as to his Spirit as well as his Word: When I consider, that though God be Infinite, his Grace is given out to mankind finitely, by a finite Creature, Christ as man; even as God shineth to us, not immediately, but by the Sun. I will no more than account it an injury to God, that he should be said to give limited and resistible degrees of Grace by Christ, but repent that I have so much grieved and resisted the Spirit of Christ myself. B. Proceed now to your other accusation. The eighth Crimination. C. They make man's freewill, and not Gods differencing Grace to be the cause that one man by Faith doth differ from another that hath Remonstr. Synod. ubi supra. [Si quaeratur quae sit causa cur hic convertitur, non autem ille? Respondemus, hic conv●rtitur quia Deus bunc non apponentem novam contumaciam convertit: Ille non convertitur quia novam contumaciam opponit: Quaeres, cur hic opponit novam contumaciam, altar none Respondemus, Hic opponit quia oppo●ere vult: Ille non opponit quia a gratia movetur ne opponere velit: Quaeres, anon ille qui non opponit novam contumaciam & per consequens convertitur, majorem ●abebat gratiam, quam qui opponit, & per consequens non convertitur? Respondemus, Antecedentem & praevenientem gratiam aequalem esse posse: sed coopelantem hab●t prior, & non posterior. not Faith. Contrary to Paul's supposition, who made thee to differ? Tilenus could not answer Camero to this charge. B. I doubt here again is a Controversy about words. I will speak to you as to one that would know the truth. 1. De re, as to the Controversy. 2. As to the meaning of the Text. I. Let us here consider, 1. What it is to Differ 2. What are the causes of such difference? I. To DIFFER is nothing but to be dissimile, unlike. Dissimilitude or Difference is a Relation. This Relation (as Ockam truly and largely showeth) is nothing extra intellectum, besides its fundamentum, subjectum & terminus, the Absoluta. II. Difference then being a Relation is the dissimilitude of divers persons compared. Here the natural numerical difference of persons, and abundance of other differences are presupposed. And it is the Difference between a Believer and an Unbeliever, the Penitent and Impenitent as such, that we have to consider of. Now here are two Subjects differing, and in each one, if not two differences from the other: So that here are two, if not four several Relations of dissimilitude between them. 1. Paul is a Believer; by which he differeth 1. From Nero as a Privative Unbeliever. 2. As a Positive Unbeliever. On the other side Nero 1. as a privative Unbeliever: 2. and a positive, differeth from Paul. Now every one of these Differences or dissimilitudes have a several cause. 1. The fundamentum of both Paul's differences from Nero are hi● own Faith; and the Termini are Nero's Privative and Positive unbelief. 2. The fundamenta of Nero's difference from Paul are his Privative and Positive unbelief, and the Termini are Pawles Faith to both. Now if the question be, what doth Constitutive make Paul differ from Nero, it must be answered Paul's Faith and Nero's unbelief. For dissimilitude resulteth from the one compared with the other. And if both had been Believers there had been no difference. And so were this the question, there were no difficulty in it at all. But the meaning of the question is not of the constitutive cause of the dissimilitude, or the fundamentum, but of the efficient cause of that fundamentum, or else of the diversifying Dispositiv Receptiva. Now supposing that Faith and Unbelief are the constitutive differencing causes; the efficient causes of both must be sought as the Ratio discriminis, and not of one only. Quest. 1. What is the cause (efficient) of Nero's unbelief? Ans. His own will or wicked heart. Quest, 2. What is the efficient cause of Paul's Faith? Ans. 1. The Principal efficient is God by his Spirit. 2. The meritorious cause is Christ. 3. The chief ministerial efficient is Christ as giving the Spirit to work it. 4. The Instrumental efficient is the Gospel. 5. The Immediate efficient is Paul: For it is he that believeth, and not God. Is there any one that denieth any of this? C. I doubt they think that man's will is more the cause than the Spirit; because they suspend the Spirits success upon man's will. B. Accuse not men by suspicions and doubts without proof; yea contrary to their own professions. Your crime of uncharitableness is not theirs; nor doth it follow that they are faulty because you are suspicious. * Alliac. Camer. ●. ●. q. 12. B. D●us nullum praedestinavit antony's praedestinat (accipiendo predestinationem secundo modo) propter aliquod bonum aut aliqu●m causam praevisam in praedestinato quia non stat aliquem noviter aliquod bonum habere, quin Deus prius voluerit & a●●terno, etc. You may read Corvinus to Tilenus expressly assigning the efficiency of all that Grace that maketh us to differ, principally unto God. Some of them only say [man cannot effect, (or convert himself) but he can resist: and so require no more of man to his conversion but not to resist: yea not to resist in an obstinacy and high degree. Others of them require of man also an actual concourse of his will by his power received, with the concourse of God: But they make God here incomparably the chief efficient; not only as to Priority of operation, but as to his causation of the effect. And they use to illustrate it some time as Scotus by the similitude of two drawing at a Ship, sometime by a Father, that should bid his Son lift at a heavy weight, and resolveth to put to 900 degrees of the force himself if his Son will but endeavour, and put forth one degree. In this case, if the Son will not put forth that one which he can do, and so the event fail; it is not by the Impotency nor absolute unwillingness of the Father. And if the child do put forth that one degree, will you say that he doth more to the effect than the Father that doth 900 parts; and that only because that the Father would not do all himself? But this carrieth us from the matter in hand, and is after to be spoken to. C. But if you make so many things go to make the difference, the question, who made thee to differ? must have a long answer. B. Not as Paul meant it, but as our troublesome Contenders use it, in Even those that found the infallibility on scientia media, make congruous Grace ex proposito convertendi to be the cause of the difference. So Malderus 1, 2. q. 111. a. 3. p. 517. Quod hic credat prae alio, indubie venit de misericordia Dei, ipsum si● vocantis ut accomodet assensum; misericordia inquam qua nos in C●risto elegit, Totum est miserentis Dei ipse vocat, ipse facit ●t vocatus veniat; ipse ●t currat; ipse nolentem praevenit, ut velit; volentem subsequitur n● fr●fira velit, vi sua Gratia ita sibi aptat liberum arbitrium; ut a nullo d●ro cord respecter, quod dici●●s provenire ex ●o quod meris, in●●●abilibus & occultis modis noverit Deus ita hominis ●over sensum ut accomodet assensum— Fatemur Dei omnipotentiam & Dominium quod habet in voluntates hominum▪ manifestari in gratiae eff●catia.— Et consensus homi●is est don●m Dei, descendens a Patre luminum▪ ●llumque consensum De●● vult & ●acit, quia facit ●ominem virib●● grati●●acer●. Ye● he yieldeth to ●radwardines Doctrine, supposing him only to intent necessitatem quandam consequentiae, necessarium esse hominem libere velle ill●d ipsum quod Deu● cuju● omnipotentia▪ quaecunque voluit facit) praevoluit ipsum ville libere. Item, gratiam efficacem der● intuit● meritorum Christi, non tantum quatenu● est▪ sufficiens●sed etiam quatenus est e●●i●ax dum seeundum propositum ●●●●.— ●●●m cura D●● non est aqualis do omnibus. another sense, the answer must be suited to the question. And here note that really it is the state of both parties compared, and not of one of them that constituteth the dissimilitude as is said: And the efficient causes of both states, are the causes of the difference. And so truly the cause of Nero's unbelief, and the causes of Paul's Faith (which are many as aforesaid) all set together are the causes of the differences; or rather all make up one cause of it. This no Logician can deny. But yet in vulgar speech we use to say that that person or thing is the cause of the difference, 1. Which is the cause of the singularity. 2. Or which causeth the state of the second person compared, supposing the state of the first person to be already existent. And so you will find yet several senses of the question. C. Explain it by some instances. B. 1. As to the cause of singularity. If one man be born an Idiot or a Monster, when we ask, what made him differ from other men, though really the causes of the dissimilitude be to be assigned on both parts; yet we mean only on his part, why is he not like others. So if one Child be unlike to all his brethren, or one Scholar in the School be much better or much worse than all the rest; or if one in a Family be sick, he that asketh, what maketh him differ? doth mean, what made him sick? etc. 2. And so as to Posteriority of State, if you suppose one of the dissimiliar parts pre-existent, and ask what maketh the other to differ from it? as if you ask why the Scholar writeth not like his Copy? why the Son is so unlike to the Father? why this age is so unlike the last? etc. We mean only what causeth the difference ex parte subsequent. C. Apply it to the case in hand. B. If you ask, what made the difference between the Devils and the persevering Angels? In the full and proper answer you must assign the reason on both parts: But according to the usual sense of the question, you must say [The wilful sin of the Devils made the difference.] For the equal state of uprightness went before the difference. So if you ask, what made the difference between the world after the fall, and before it? vulgarly, we must say, sin; because that came last. So if you ask, what made the difference between Noah and the world? between Lot and Sodom? Ans. Indeed, that which made one part sinful and the other righteous. But according to the vulgar sense of the question, it was the Righteousness of Noah and Lot, and the causes of that righteousness. So what made the difference between Judas and the eleven Apostles? Ans. Judas his wilful sin and Wickedness, (though indeed the cause is on both sides.) So what maketh the difference between Believers and the Unbelieving world? Really, the unbelief of the world, and the Faith of Christians with their causes: But it's like the speaker meaneth only ex parte credentium: And then the cause of their Believing is the cause of their differing. But now, if it hold true that God giveth a sufficiency of Grace ut causa universalis ex parte donantis (antecedently to men's accepting or rejecting) equally, then if one ask, what maketh the difference? you would understand him (why have not unbelievers Faith, as well as others? And then the answer would be, wilful resisting, or refusing Grace, or the moral special indisposition of the Recipients makes the difference; or else all would be alike believers. But note, that we ask not [What maketh the difference between Believers and unbelievers?] but do particularise the subject, and ask, [what maketh the Believer differ from the Unbeliever?] or what maketh the unbeliever differ from the believer?] It is then supposed that we mean only ex parte nominata. And thus in the vulgar sense the questions, [what maketh the believer differ from the Infidel?] and [what maketh the Infidel differ from the believer] must have various answers. C. I understand you thus in brief: 1. You say that constitutively it is Faith that is the difference on Paul 's part, and unbelief on Nero ' s. 2. The causes of the said Faith and unbelief, are the causes of the difference: (As the causes of the whiteness of one wall; and of the blackness of the other cause their difference.) 3. That to ask (why the Believer differeth from the Unbeliever?) is but to ask [why he is a Believer when the other is not?] 4. Here you say the two Relations of dissimilitude in two ubbjects make the questions two in one, viz. 1. Why or whence is Paul a Believer?] 2. Whence is it that Nero is an Unbeliever?] 5. You say that Nero is an Unbeliever through his own wilfulness, and illdisposition resisting Grace (Satan's temptations concurring.) And that Paul is a Believer from many conjunct causes: 1. God's Grace by his Spirit. 2. Christ's Merits. 3. Christ's donation of that Spirit. 4. The means by which he worketh. 5. The concourse of Paul's will. To which efficients you add in most a competent Receptive disposition in genere caus● materialis, both passive and active. 6. You say that in all this God's Grace is incomparably the greater cause than man's will. 7. But yet not the sole cause, and that some free-not-necessitated concourse of man's will, in the use of such Power as he hath, is a condition sine qua non ut dispositio Gratiae receptiva, ordinarily. 8. But that God is not tied to this, but may extraordinarily do otherwise. 9 But that this * Ruiz. de praedif. tr. 3. d. 18. p. 222. Resp. dispositiones proximas & pro●ertionatas ad gratiam n●●il ob esse quidditati gratiae, quoniam ex prima radice nascuntur ex prima gratia, quae absque ulla dispositione quasi creata est a Deo sine materia. At pugnabit cum quidditate gratiae quaelibet dispositio etiam remota. si ab illa sumit initium gratia ita ut prima gratia detur intuitu talis dispositionis. I● not this enough? pre-requisite disposition, and the concourse of man's will is only the use of a power freely before given of God, with all necessary helps to use it. 10. And therefore that God is from first to last the first cause of all that's good in man, though not the only cause; and that of himself man can do nothing. Have I not taken your meaning right. B. Yes, so far as you have recited it? C. But methinks yet you answer not the great question, which Camero baffled Tilenus with. It is not why Paul believeth? Nor why Nero believeth not? as singly considered: But comparatively, why Paul believeth rather than Nero? Speak to that. B. Camero and Tilenus were great and excellent wits. But if you can forgive the Truth, I must add that which they said nothing to, which will prove that a few degrees more of acuteness, might have shortened or better ended their dispute. It is the Comparatio personarum that is now the subject of that Controversy: why this man rather than that as compared? Here than we are to consider, 1. The Comparabilitas. 2. The Ipsa Comparatio. 1. The question as to the first is, either 1. Whether there was antecedently any such ratio comparandi in them, as might be a reason or motive to God himself, quoad actum ex parte agentis, why he should decree to give, or actually give Faith to one man rather than to another? 2. Or else whether there were any such difference antecedent as might be Ratio discriminis ineffectis, the reason why one received or had Faith, and the other not. II. And then quoad actum comparandi, the question is, whether God in his Decree or mind did truly compare the persons antecedently, and say (not only [I will cause this man to believe] and say [I will not cause that man to believe] or, not say [I will.]) But also said [I will cause this man to believe rather than that.] To these several questions than I answer. 1. Negatively to the first: For God's acts ex parte agentis are his essence; and as he hath no cause, but is the cause of all things, so thus far nothing in the world is a causal reason or motive to God. He willeth because he willeth, or rather without cause. II. To the second, There are in the Creatures different capacities, for terminating God● will and action objectively, and accordingly denominating his Volitions and Actions variously: And so this question must be divided into three. 1. Whether always. 2. Whether ordinarily. 3. Whether sometimes there be an objective ratio comparabilitatis and of preferring one before another, as to the effect of believing? or why Gods operation should effect Faith rather in this man than in that? To which I answer. Ad primum, 1. There are nearest Reasons in the immediate aptitude of the receiver. Such as is the highest degree of preparing Grace in one, which another hath not. And there are remote reasons or aptitudes. As e. g. A man of great learning, wit, and zeal, or some other remote aptitude, will be a fit person for God's work than another, when he believeth. 2. It is not known to any mortal man, what different aptitudes in both these kinds, God the only heart-searcher seethe, which no man can see: And therefore this question cannot certainly be answered as to both sorts. 3. But as far as our blind eyes can reach, it seemeth most probable to us, that God doth not always effect Faith according to the degrees of receptive aptitude of either sort. Because we see that sometimes he suddenly calleth very great sinners, and also some that are silly and little serviceable in the world. But yet what special aptitudes God may see in them we know not. Ad secundum, Qu. I answer, That it is Gods ordinary way to give Faith according to the first sort of predisposition alone (were there no difference in the last) that is, To those that have the highest degrees of moral preparation, or Common Grace, I take to be a certain truth. 1. Because in all Gods Works we see that he operateth by degrees in order, and, on predisposed matter, and that efficit juxta dispositionem recipientis. 2. But specially because he hath himself appointed a course of means for the obtaining of his special Grace, to be used by all men: And he cannot be thought to do all this in vain; nor to set men on doing their part in vain. And all practical Divines who preach so much for the souls preparation, are of this mind, that such preparation is the ordinary predisposition. Ad Qu. 3. I answer, That at least sometimes it is so, is past question with any sober man. For it is a contradiction, to call it preparing Grace, or Disposition; and yet to say that by it no man is made ever the more receptive or nearlier capable of Faith or special Grace. So much to the two questions de Comparabilitate. * Mark what Bannes himself saith of Common Grace, in q. 23. pag. 274. [Pie credi potest quod omnibus venientibus ad usum rationis Deus opem. aliquam ferat supernaturali quodam auxilio secreto instigante ad operandum bonum. 2. Si vera est opinio Thomae, etc. necesse est dic●re quod omnis qui justificatur, receperit gratiam praeparantem saltem prius natura quam praeceptum naturale adimpleverit. 3. Quotiescunque aliquis pec●at speciale peccatum contra supernaturale praeceptum, vel fidei vel p●nit●ntiae, etc. necesse est ut ille de facto receperit aliquam divinam inspirationem illuminantis Dei dut vocantis aut incitantis ad fidem, etc. Immo necesse est hominem tangi aliqua supernaturali inspiratione ut nullam ●abtat excusationem. Possibile est se●undam legem ordinariam quemlibet dum est in hac vita salvari. D●us paratus est dare omnibus quamdiu sunt in h●c vita auxilium quo fiant potentes converti, immo & auxilium specialius quo converta●tur si velint. I cite this, because for his Doctrine of Predetermination, Protestants much value Ban●es (a boasting Author, who thanketh God that their King burneth Protestant's.) Indeed the Dominio●●s commonly confess sufficient Grace which is not effectual. III. But as to the third question, Whether God Actually in his mind thus Compare men, and prefer one before another, and say, I will cause this man to believe rather than that? I answer, 1. There is no Act in God but his Essence, which is invariable, and indivisible. 2. But because his operations as terminated and productive ad extra are various, and have objective material causes of their diversity in the recipients; therefore we usually thence denominate God's volitions as various. And so when we see that one man hath Grace given him to believe, when another hath not, we hence say that God mentally and by Decree preferreth one before the other: when the difference is not at all in God, not his Act ex parte agentis, but only of and by God in the Recipients. C. But come yet nearer the heart of the case, and tell me plainly, 1. Whether the difference of Effects be more from the will and action of God, or from men's different Receptive dispositions. And 2. Whether all these different Receptivities be not of God. B. Order bids me begin with the latter. 1. The different Dispositions are of two sorts, Good and Bad. God is not the cause of the Indisposition or illdisposition of any. And as to the good disposition or Preparation of Souls, no doubt but he is the principal Cause of it all: but not the sole Cause, nor (always at least) the necessitating Cause; but oft giveth men that necessary help by which they might have been prepared for more, when yet they are not through their wilful resistance or neglect. For few men will deny that men have sufficient uneffectual Grace for some preparatory acts, though not for faith. Ad. Q. 2. I told you that the difference in the effects, resulteth from the Causes in both Subjects, and not in one only: That which maketh one a believer, and the other an unbeliever, maketh them differ. And I have told you what these Causes are. But further; I suppose as aforesaid, a certain established order and degree of universal help, external and internal, by Christ to the Soul, as the Sun affordeth to inferior Bodies: This established order of Grace, universally affordeth such a degree of Divine Influx and help, as will cause faith in a prepared Soul, and will not cause it in some much unprepared Souls: (For if as little help would serve the unprepared as the prepared, to what use is preparation, & quomodo recipitur ad modum recipientis;) In this case now the efficient of Grace is God, and not Man; but * That even Jesuits confess in their way of scientia media that the Ratio discriminis why one person rather than another hath Grace is from God, initially and principally, and not from any beginning in man. See Ruiz proving it at large in all his Tract. 3. Disp. 18. 19 De Praedest. exordio. So that this is no difference between us. Yea, more he maintaineth that ante fidem ni●il est dispositionis, meriti aut impetrationis. Sect. 3. Disp. 19 24. And one would think that this should satisfy even the Antinomians. But he meaneth only that this disposition is not always necessary. He that will in brief see what the Schoolmen say of preparative Grace, may find abundance of them cited by Ruiz ibid. d. 21. per totam, and what nature can do in preparation. Greg. Armin. in 2. d. 28. q. 1. a. 1. speaketh most like the Reformed. Aug. de bono persever. c. 8. Sed cur Gratia Dei non secundum merita hominum datur? Resp. Quia deus miserecors est. Cur ergo non omnibus? Et hic respondeo, Quoniam Deu● justus Judex est. the Ratio proxima of the difference in the event and effects is the Divers disposition of the Recipients. But here, mark well, that it is not the good disposition or preparation of one party, that is, the only, and I think, not the chief reason of the difference; but the Privative and Positive indisposition of the other party, is as much, if not, the chiefest reason. If one man shut his eyes against the light, when another doth not, the Ratio discriminis why one man differeth from another in seeing and not seeing, is on both parts, but principally on his part that shutteth his eyes; because the other doth but what he was made to do, and all living creatures should do: But the other absurdly crosseth nature. So that under an universal Influx and help, the said Influx is the efficient of the action or effect; but the disposition of the Recipients are the Occasions and Reasons to be assigned of the various effects; but especially the incapacity of the defective party. As the reason why the Sun doth make a Tree bear fruit, and not a dead stock, is because the Tree is an apt recipient of its influx, but the stock or stone is not. 2. But, (Note) that in case that God operate not by such an universal Influx only, but also by superadded special or extraordinary degrees of particular Grace, which by a difference from the universal Influx or degree, is peculiarly apt to procure the effects, here the ratio discriminis is principally to be ascribed to that special Grace, and not to the preparations on the Soul. C. Tell me then, what you think, whether God works by such an universal Grace, or by such a special Grace. 1. How far doth he work by universal Grace? 2. Is that universal Grace ever effectual of itself, on prepared Souls? 3. How far doth he also use the special particular Grace which you mentioned? B. I. To your first Qu. I answer, 1. God in the beginning made mankind upright in Adam and Eve, and made no difference as to the present case. 2. Eve having first sinned, did make a difference between herself and Adam, which God made not, nor altered first his universal Grace. 3. Adam next (without God's alteration) by Sin did difference himself from himself (as he was before). 4. God then set up a new universal Grace; even Christ with the new Covenant, and Recovering means, to give out universal help suited to his Covenant and means; to be the Giver of the Spirit, and the Light of the world (we cannot have time now to open the difference, between Christ's administrations before and after his Incarnation). There was at first an universal sufficiency in this Recovering help of Grace. 5. Cain (that could have done otherwise) wilfully sinned against this universal Grace and Covenant: and so made a difference between him and the rest of mankind, when God made none. 6. Whether Abel did offer his acceptable Sacrifice by this same universal Help alone, or by any special extraordinary Grace ex parte mediorum vel Influxus primi recepti, is a thing unknown to us, because unrevealed. 7. The Posterity of Cain (as of Adam at first) because Seminally in him, and personally from his very guilty essence, were justly deprived of some of that Grace, both Subjective and Objective which Cain had deprived himself of. Their natures were more vitiated, and so they were made less Receptive and more disposed as to the universal means and Influx. And by his secession from the holy seed, he was deprived of much outward means: And having forfeited the Spirit, he had less also of its helping Influx: And thus he and his posterity made themselves to differ, as if a Generation of Sinners should be born bl●nd, while the Sun shineth as it did before. 8. The Holy seed that's not yet Apostate, have great subjective and objective Grace. 9 The seed of Cain are still under the same Law of Grace, and universal conditional promise, that If they will believe and repent, they shall be saved: And they have some Means and some Help of Grace yet left them, which have an aptitude by degrees to bring them back again to God: And if they will not use that lower degree of Grace, by returning as they can, they forfeit that and further help. 10. But yet God hath besides this Universal Grace, some special and extraordinary ways and degrees of Grace for some, according to his Good pleasure. But this with the answer to your other two questions, will come in better anon, under the next head. C. Having spoke to the matter, now speak of the sense of the Text, 1 Cor. 4. 7. and Rom. 12. 6. For who maketh thee to differ from another? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive? Now if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it. B. It is most evident, that Paul speaketh of the Gifts or Excellencies themselves primarily and of Differing from others, but as a resultancy from those Gifts: And he meddleth not here with the question, why others have not those Gifts as well as they? and so why others differ from them. q. d. Are not all those things of which you glory, the free gifts of God? And is it not by those free gifts that you differ as more excellent than others? And should you boast of that which is God's free Gift, of which you are but Receivers? To pass by the common answer that Paul speaketh of Ministerial Gifts, and not of special Grace, what Arminian can deny any of this, about the Grace of faith itself. 1. He must confess that we have no Grace to cause faith, but what we have received; (For the Act which we performed is no otherwise to be said to be received, but as we receive the gracious operation which causeth it). 2. He cannot deny that by this Received Grace and Faith, the believer in excellency differeth from unbelievers. 3. Nor that such a Receiver hath no cause of boasting, as if he had not received it. Who will deny this? C. But they leave him to boast, that by his better preparation and disposition, he was a fit Recipient than another. And so all boasting is not excluded. B. 1. In Paul's Case (of extraordinary Ministerial gifts) there is less room for that much; because they are not given so much according to preparations, as saving Grace is: For even ungodly men may have them. 2. The boasting which is excluded, is a boasting of ourselves as against or without the glory of Grace, as if we had some excellency which we had not received. But our very Receptive disposition was received by God's Grace, even from his common preparing Grace: And that common Grace was freely given. 3. If by boasting, you would mean, an acknowledgement of God's grace, than all thanksgiving is boasting. Or if a Rejoicing in the effects of that Grace as Received and improved by us, than Paul so boasted often, yea and to the death rejoiced in this testimony of his Conscience, that in simplicity and Godly sincerity, and not in fleshly wisdom he had had his conversation in the world, 2 Cor. 1. 12. And that he tamed his body, and that he suffered for Christ, and that he had fought a good fight, 2 Tim. 4. 7, 8. If praising God's grace in his Servants, and that holy use of it, in wisdom, faith, love, obedience and patience, be boasting, God so boasteth of them and praiseth them, even at judgement, Math. 25. Well done good and faithful Servant. And Scripture throughout so boasteth of them. And we that must honour those that fear the Lord, Psal. 15. 4. must so boast of them also. But this is not the forbidden boasting. And as to Rom. 12. 6. 1 Cor. 12. Eph. 1. 6, 7, 8. and such like its past question that God freely diversifyeth Offices and such Gifts as he pleaseth; and we know of no praedisposition to which, even ordinarily, he tieth himself, as to many of them. But saving Grace is given more under a Law, and established course of means, in the use of which we must be fit Recipients. The ninth Crimination. C. They make the Grace of God to be Effectual, not from the Will of the Giver, nor from the proper force of the Grace itself, so much as from the will of man concurring: For they think that God's Grace is but universal and indifferent, and leaveth it to man's will whether it shall produce the act of faith or not: so that the posse Credere & velle is of God, but the actu credere & velle is of ourselves. This is the grand difference which I have reserved to the last; and as Dr. Twisse oft noveth the question, Unde Gratia fit Efficax? is it which they are loath to be brought to answer. B. I know that this is cried up as the great difference; And wherever things are mysterious and hard, there will be variety of Conceptions and words; from whence it will be easy to pretend real differences, and make them seem great▪ But because order befriendeth Truth, we must be agreed first of the subject of the question, what Grace is it whose Efficacy you dispute of? I take it for granted, that it is such as is to work, in genere Causae Efficientis. But tell me first, whether you Arminius confesseth God's infallible operation, thus, Nihil mali caveri posse nist Deo impediente certum est; Sed de modo impediendi disputatur: an ille sit ex Omnipotent● Dei actione in voluntatem hominis agente secundum modum naturae, unde impeditionis existit Necessitas; an vero ex tali actione quae ag●t in Voluntatem, secundum modum voluntatis qu● liber● est, unde impeditionis infallibilitas. Armin. Exam. Perkins pag▪ 501. Note, by Necessity Arminius doth mean Necessity consequentis, vel effecti, and confesseth necessity Consequenti●, (which here he calleth infallibility). And Dr. Twisse professeth that he and all the Schoolmen hold no other▪ And note the unde that he maketh the Infallibility to result from the operation of God, and not from his foreknowledge only. confess or not, that there is such a thing as Universal Grace, or Help of the Spirit, fixedly or ordinarily accompanying or working by the means of Grace, which operateth as the Sun, ad modum recipientis, and will not produce the same effect on one receiver as on another. C. I cannot answer what you have said for it: And when I read Dallaeus Apolog. and in him almost all ancient Writers, and late Churches for it, I dare not be so singular as Spanhemius and a few more of late in denying this Grace of God. Though I once thought that it had been Objective only, and with Amyrald I noted little more in the Controversy, than between the Objective and Subjective grace, as if there had been no other Efficient grace to come in question. But I am convinced, 1. that de facto there is a degree of Grace ad posse that leaveth men unexcusable, which is not effectual in the event: For I dare not say that I could never have sinned less, or done better than I did. 2. And that the same degree of the Spirits help is not sufficient to an utterly unprepared Soul, as to the prepared; or to cause a man to believe and love God above all, as may cause him to forbear some sin, or to use some means Non possunt initia illa accendi, aut fides inchoata retineri, dum voluntas omnino repugnat: Non enim Efficax est Spiritus Sanctus in eo, qui ne vult quidem audire Evangelium, & excuteretur si voluntas succumberet dubitationibus. Loc. Com. de lib. art. c. 7. for further Grace: Therefore such a thing as is called sufficient and universal Grace or help I do confess. But (by the way) if Christ be the universal Dispenser of this Grace, how reacheth it to those that know not Christ. B. 1. I have showed you in Cain's instance and his posterity, that it reacheth not Equally to all, no more than the Sun to the Southern and the Northern Nations. 2. I have proved to you that Christ was after the fall made the Head of the new Covenant, and that this Covenant was made with all Mankind. And that he is the Administrator General to all Mankind, and all things, Power and Judgement is committed to him: that he is now the Owner, Ruler, and Judge of all. 3. Therefore all the Light, Means and Mercies that are in any parts of the world, are as truly from Christ as the universal Mediator, as all light is from the Sun. (Even in Dungeons and Caverns, and where there is least) And as the Sun sends forth some light before it ariseth, and some after it is set, and some in the night, even by the Moon, etc. so doth Christ enlighten all the world, so far as they have light though in very various degrees. 4. You will not say that Christ by his Incarnation, did put all the rest of the world into a worse condition than they were in before his coming; and to take away from them any of the mercies of the Law of Grace, which God had made with them in Adam and Noah. C. I am afraid you go about to confound the world and the Church, while you make all to be the Kingdom of Christ; and to be under the Law and Covenant of Grace. B. I must still call you to difference the question de re from that de nomine. Whether all should be called the Church is one question? And how really they stand related to Christ, is another. To that the re I say, 1. It is past doubt that Christ the Mediator, is the Owner and Ruler of all the world de jure, even jure Redemptionis, as all are given to him of the Father. 2. It is doubtless that all are under his foresaid Law of Grace, as that which is in force to oblige them, and to punish them if they break it, and to reward them if they keep it. For they are not Lawless nor hopeless. 3. It is doubtless that all are possessed of many and great Mercies, as well as obliged to many duties, as tending to their recovery and salvation. And thus they are so far the Kingdoms of Christ. But yet the nomine they are not to be called the Church; because the Church is Regnum peculiaritatis. As the Israelites had the foedus peculiaritatis, and were Regnum peculiar before Christ's coming, and yet not the only people in the world that were under a Law of Grace (for that was universal). So is it now with the Christian Churches and much more. Briefly, Christ hath three sorts of Subjects in the world; 1. Subjects quoad obligationem; and so all the world are his Subjects (because first his beneficiaries). 2. Subjects by professed Consent, which is, 1. A half consent, as many without the Church. 2. A full consent by Baptism: and these are the Church visible. 3. By sincere Heart-consent; and this is the Church mystical or regenerate that shall be saved. In this I think we are agreed. C. Well; Supposing an universal help of Grace, how answer you the question? Under fit Efficax? B. Do you grant me then that this universal Grace is ever effectual? C. Stay there. You told me that's the turning point where Dr. Sanderson and Dr. Hammond came to a ne plus. But, 1. As to preparatory Acts we shall not deny it. I find not that our Divines do assert the necessity Vasq. in 1. Tho. q. 23. Disp. 88 Reciteth various opinions of the Schoolmen of the nature of operating and co-operating Grace: 1 Vegas in Conc. Trid. l. 6. c. 8. That operating Grace is each holy cogitation and first motion of the will, in which God acteth Physically, and Man is but Passive. And so the Nominals who make God only Active, and Man Passive in the efficience of Intellection and Volition (as he saith) And some Thomists. 2. The way of Aquin. Co●rad, Cajet. Dur. Anton. Sot. Dried. Tapper. Who say that Gratia operans is in the first free motion of the will, circa finem, whence the will is moved ad media, etc. 3. Greg. Armine's which many follow, supposing it Augustine's, Omn● opu● intellectu● & voluntatis non solum a Deo fieri, sed etiam a nobis tanquam a causa secunda efficient● Physice produci: Deum tamen sola sua virtute primo voluntatem applicare ad libere volendum, non jolum ●am praeveniendo praevia Cogitatione ex parte intellectus, & primo motu non deliberato timoris aut spei, sed etiam ●am impellendo ad consensum liberum. H●nc impulsum putat Gregor. esse medium quid inter ipsum consensum liberum ad qu●m cooperatur voluntas, & primum motum non deliberatum voluntatis, I●u cogitationem intellectus; & appellati ab Augustino Initium boni operis. 4. This Vasqu●z confuteth, and asserteth, that Gratia operans (quam sine nobis in nobis Deus operatur) according to Augustine is no such middle impulse, but ●psam Sanctam cogitationem, quae est ante consensum, & motum voluntatis subitum sine nostra libertate ex pia illa cogitatione ortum, quo deterremur a malo (he meaneth some passion) & ad bonum provocamur. And that co-operating Grace is Ipse consensus, liber in quo meritum reperitur, Etiam circa finem. Now either there is such a middle Impulse or not: If not, then besides God's essence, there is no effect on us antecedent to our consent, but the said cogitation and passion; And 1. These are commonly said not to necessitate the will. 2. And if they do, it must be but Morally, which is commonly held to be no way of necessitating though it may be of ascertaining the event. And so consent or our Volition itself would be but of co-operating Grace. And if there be such a middle Impulse, as Gregory holdeth, it is confessed by him and the Dominican praedeterminants, to determine the will only to act freely, and therefore not to necessitate it to consent, but only to ascertain it, and so the Volition will be as free as but by co-operating Grace, though the Impulse would be necessary which tendeth to it. of a special Grace for every preparatory Act. But of the rest I doubt. B. And then, 2. Sure you cannot deny it as to well prepared Souls. 1. Because you granted that the same degree of help may be effectual to a disposed Soul. 2. And so the Help though universal, will to a prepared Soul be proportionable to the desired effect; and is nevertheless Grace or powerful to such, for being universal, or uneffectual to others. 3. And it seems that such a kind of degree of Grace was effectual on Adam before his fall, and uneffectual in his fall. 4. And it seemeth congruous to Gods other works, that he give Grace suitable to his Law and Promise, which shall not be always uneffectual. So that it is most probable that to prepared Souls, that ordinary established degree of the Spirits Influx from Christ, which is universal, but uneffectual to the unprepared, is not only sometimes, but ordinarily effectual. I think none can prove the contrary. And the same Grace you confess to be effectual to preparation. But to unprepared Souls whom God will suddenly convert out of the ordinary way, a special extraordinary operation seemeth necessary. But wherein the extraordinariness of it consisteth, antecedent to faith the second effect (besides the extraordinary means) I think it past man's reach to know. C. Well, now tell us, Unde Gratia fit Efficax., B. Any ordinary Logician will tell you, that the effect is from all the causes, and not from any one alone. It is effectual in that it produceth the effect: To which each cause doth its proper part; and one is not all▪ The effect in question now is Faith. Faith is caused as is said, 1. By God's will as the Original. 2. By Christ as sending the Spirit (and meriting Grace first). 3. By the Spirit as the Operator. 4. By the Gospel as the Instrument. 5. By the Preacher as a Sub-Instrument. 6. But all this effecteth ordinarily in materia disposita, and no other. (Having before wrought that preparation). 7. But extraordinarily in materia indisposita, working disposition and all at once. Now here, 1. God's Will doth its part without any cause; Velle ex parte Dei (sicu● & agere) is his essence; and the termination of it in rem Volitatam hath no efficient, but only an Objective Cause. 2. This prime Cause is the prime reason of all the efficacy of Inferior Causes: Not qua voluntas simply moving them, but qua voluntas cum potentia executiva moving them; and qua volitio inferreth the necessitatem consequentiae of the effect. So that plainly, I think that no Good cometh to pass in the world, but what God forewilled, and nothing which he absolutely willeth, cometh not to pass; what he fore-knoweth is necessary, necessitate Infallibilitatis, and what he absolutely willeth, necessitate Imutabilitatis; and what he worketh from such a will is necessary necessitate invincibilitatis. 3. Though all the other Causes are the reason of the effect, and not only the first, yet none of them operate on the first Cause, and put any force into it for the act. So that its force is from itself, but theirs from it. And having said this much preparatorily, I thus resolve your great question. Here are three things before us, whose cause may be enquired of; 1. The necessitas Logica consequentiae, ex quo in ordine probandi necessario sequitur eventum futurum esse: And this is the Decree or Will of God, (yea, and his fore knowledge) This is presupposed. 2. The prime effect of Gods Will and Active power operating: And this prime effect is not our Faith, or Act, but the Impression or Received Influx of God on the Soul. For the Soul receiveth (its like) some Impression by the Divine Influx by which it believeth or acteth itself: It doth not Receive its own Act, as if that act had been first pre-existent in the Donor; but it performeth that Act because it is premoved to it. Now if the question be of this first effect, Unde operatio Gratiosa sit efficax, I answer, 1. The whole efficient reason is in the operator and operation itself. It is effectual ad impressionem ex natura rei, because it is an Act: If it did nothing, it were no Act transient. 2. And the specification and individuation is from the terminating object. It is denominatively and Relatively, one Act which is on a Stone, and another on a Soul, de specie: And it is numerically one which is on Peter, and another on John. If the Sun did shine in vacuo, there being no other creature to be objective or passive, it would still agere, but it would nihil efficere: quia nihil afficere; So God is one Infinite act, and ex parte sui never beginneth to act, nor ever ceaseth, nor is divided; But transiently he doth nihil afficere vel efficere, but first by making objects, and then acting on them. So that were there no mobile God's act would not movere. This first effect then of Impress hath an Effective and an Objective Cause, The Effective Cause is God's Essence; that is, his Active Power, Intellect and Will, and nothing else: (Supposing now that it be not God's operation on the Instrument or medium that we speak of, but immediately on the Soul itself). But Man's Soul is the Objective Recipient Cause of this first effect, which is, the Impress, or Influx received. 3. The Secondary effect is, Man's Act, Faith and Repentance itself. If the question, Unde Gratia sit efficax, mean this, (as with most it doth) than it is all one as to ask, Unde hic Effectus? For that God's Influx on the Soul immediately, is the sole Cause is false. Therefore the answer is, that this effect is from all the Causes conjunct: From God's Will, or Law, and Power and Wisdom; from Christ's mission of the Spirit (before merited); from the Spirits Impress or Influx; from the Gospel; from the Ministry (usually) and from the Agent Believer; all these as the efficient Causes. And it is from or on the prepared Soul (ordinarily) as the Materia disposita, vel Causa Receptiva, Objectiva of the Divine operation: And from or on God Christ, the promise, Glory, as the materia objectiva actus humani; where I conclude the Causa finalis as the chief object. Thus I have showed you truly and plainly unde fit fides, as that is all one as unde hic effectus; and that is all one, as unde Gratia fit efficax, as to this secondary effect. C. But I conceive that the sense of the question rather i●, which of all these is the chief cause or reason of the existence of the effect? B. Pardon my impatience of Confusion. The chief cause, and the chief reason are not always the same. There is no question but God is the only and total Causa prima, from whom all the rest have all their power and force. But by the Reason of the existence is often meant, that which in discourse must be assigned proportionately in answer to the question, Why is one converted rather than another? supposing God's Influx on them both: And this is oft the Receptive disposition as is said; for Reciptur ad modum recipientes. C. Well; But the question recurreth what is the chief Cause and Reason that one, not another, hath that preparatory Receptivity. B. The chief Cause is God why one hath it: The chief Cause why another hath it not, is himself, that is, the Moral deficient cause. The Ratio differendi I opened to you before. The most notable, if we suppose God's Influx to be of itself universal and equal, is the Indisposition of the Sinner, whence he doth difference himself from those that God causeth to receive even preparing Grace. But the true Ratio effectus is from all the Causes conjunct. C. But you must come at last, to some prime difference. And if you will say that the reason of our Preparatory effect or degree of Grace, is, because I used a former well, or did not refuse it, or was prepared for it, what will you say of the first degree. B. I say that the first preparatory Grace or help was given to Adam, and all in him: as the first natural goodness was. C. But where came in the first difference? B. By Cain's wilful Sin, against God and his Grace. C. But though you do with Augustine hold a communicated guilt of the sins of other Parents than our first, and so a difference between persons (yea and Kingdoms) thence arising, yet some Children as Esau and Jacob, born of the same Parents, must have in them some other cause of difference, even as to preparatory Grace. B. Suppose Gods fixed equal Influx universal, there are two Causes of difference herein. 1. One is the mere sinful wilfulness of one party, that doth not do what that Grace enabled him to do, by which a difference is made. C. You mean that Jacob better used his help than Esau. B. Not so: but that Esau more abused it than Jacob. Suppose Jacob had slept out his youth, or done no good, and Esau had rebelled against God also, and done much mischief, Esau had hereby made a difference, which is assignable without commending Jacob. C. Well, what is the other Cause? B. 2. God's own free differencing Will and Grace, who is a free Benefactor, and may do with his own as he list: and therefore freely loveth Jacob with the electing special love and decree which he hath not to Esau. For though I have all this while discoursed with you of the Ratio Efficaciae of an Universal Grace, I say not that there is no other. C. O: Now you come to the matter indeed. B. II. The Question Unde fit Gratia efficax, * Blank de Dist. Grat. Thes. 79. Naturam Gratiae efficacis Thomistae ponunt in motione quadam virtuosa quae est in voluntate, per modum quo impetus in re quae impellitur: Jansenius in ●ffectibus Amoris & desiderii boni coelestis & spiritualis, quibus suaviter sursum rapitur animus humanus: Discip●li Cameronis in pot●n●●ssima mentis illuminatione & persuasione quae voluntatem & ●ffectus secum rapit. Alii in omnipotenti & efficacissima Dei operatione qua novum principium spiritualis vitae Cordi hominis vocati inditur & homo sim●l excitatur ad actus eliciendos quae hic plerique v●i docti proferunt componenda potius quam opponenda videntur. Even they that are for Physical praedetermination, are not agreed what it is: some make it a transient quality passing with the act. Some say it is only man's Act itself as from God the first cause. Some with Alvarez say, It is Aliquid quod habet esse incompletum as colours in the air, that is, They know not what, and yet venture on hot contentions about it. And Jansenius who maketh it to be Delectatio or Complacentia, saith it is Actus vitalis & indeliberatus animo, & quidem amoris & desiderii praecedentis consensum ac delectationem illam quae & quies animi & gaudium dicitur. De Grat. Christi l. 4. c. 11. Much like to Vasquez, save that Vasq. calls it but an indeliberate prime motion of the affection and Jansenius calls it Indeliberate Delectation or Complacency; which certainly is an Act of man; and the Scotists say that all the Wills Acts are free, though not all its inclinations. But thus we strive about that which none of us understand, viz. How God moveth his Creatures and our Wills in special. being put of God's special Grace, by which he arbitrarily maketh a difference, and is more than his Universal Grace, must be thus resolved, That though other Causes concur to the effect, the Great, overruling, differencing, and ascertaining Cause, is the very quality and aptitude of God's operation itself, as proceeding from an absolute volition of the effect, and in the Means and Influx fitted to ascertain the effect. C. Wherein consisteth this differencing special Grace? B. Deceive not yourself: No mortal man can know in what it ordinarily, constantly, or chief consisteth. We know, 1. That though God as Rector per Leges, keeps one even and constant course, yet as Proprietor and Benefactor he may vary as he please: And that a Benefactor may give unequally to men of equal merits: And that God really doth so the facto: And that his Will hath no Cause. 2. We know that God hath innumerable ways to fulfil his Will, and make a difference between man and man, which are beyond the search of Mortals. 3. And though we can name divers which he can take, we know not de facto, which he doth take, hic & nunc. C. What differencing free acts of Grace do you observe. B. None which violate Gods established order, or diminish his universal Grace. But such as are superadded specially to some. As, 1. To Children of the same Parents, he giveth to divers a temperament of Body, as in one much more conduceth to thoughtfulness, tenderness, meekness, sobriety, chastity, zeal, honesty, etc. than in the other. He is a stranger to man that knoweth not this. 2. He sometime giveth them various Education: One is piously educated. Another is snatched away and made a Janisary. A third the Parents dying, leave to such as educate them viciously. And some the Parents apostatising educate in Heresy or unpiety themselves. 3. He oft casteth their lot under different means for their Edification. One is set Apprentice to a Godly Master, and another to an ungodly one. One is cast under a Holy able Minister, and another under an ignorant Seducer: One is cast among Godly Companions, and another among lewd Seducers, idle, wanton, voluptuous, unclean, malignant, scornful, or other such tempting persons, as that a great deal more grace or help is necessary to their preservation. 4. One (for aught we see of equal commerit) is impelled or occasioned to go to Church, just when an apt Sermon is prepared for him: and another occasioned to be absent. A Minister or Friend is sent (as Philip to the Eunuch, though by ordinary means) to meet with one, and speak suitably to his case; and not to the other. 5. One falleth under some great affliction, which taketh him down, and awakeneth him to seriousness; and another swimmeth down the violent and dangerous stream of prosperity and constant health. 6. One seethe some notable Judgements on others, or some convincing Providences, or hath some strange deliverance himself; which another never hath. 7. One Nation or Kingdom of equal ill desert, hath the Gospel and powerful Preachers sent to them; while others are left as the most of the world without it; yea, as the poor Islanders, Laplanders, Brasilians, Soldanians, and Cannibals. A thousand ways God hath to fulfil his Will which we know not of. But besides all these in point of Means, we see that under the same Means, or Sermon, or Family helps, there is not the same success: Not only because the unbelievers make the difference by sinning against sufficient universal Grace; but because God doth especially touch the hearts of some, by such Grace as he giveth not to others. Thus did he open the heart of Lydia, Act. 16. C. Methinks you should lay all on this Internal changing Grace, and not on the difference of means. B. Certain Experience telleth us, that most usually God giveth extraordinary differing means where his Grace shall work different effects. Christ himself who was to bestow extraordinary Grace after his Incarnation, was himself to be an extraordinary means: He must work Miracles, raise the Dead, rise from the Dead, etc. as the Means. The Apostles that were to do extraordinary things, in calling the unbelieving world to Christ, were to do it by miracles and extraordinary▪ means. The 3000 Act. 2. must have the Apostles miraculous gift of tongues to be the means of their Conversion. Cornelius must have both an Angel and Peter. Paul must be strucken down and blind, and hear Christ speak from Heaven, and after have Ananias' Ministry. The Eunuch must have Philip. The Jailor, Act. 16. must have an Earthquake; and so of others. And to this day we see how little God doth where there is no Ministry or Means. And how much the success of able, holy, skilful Ministers, doth differ from that of wicked, or Ignorant sots: And how usually in all the world, the success goeth according to the means; and that the instances of contrary are unusual rarities: Therefore separate not what the wisdom of God hath conjoined. C. But do you think that God ever ascertaineth the Effect, merely by such Moral Differencing helps or means, annexed to his universal Gracious Efflux or aid, without a special degree of that Immediate Efflux itself on the Soul. B. 1. We little know when God worketh Immediately, and how far His Efflux or Action ex parte agentis I oft tell you hath no degrees being himself: The degrees are in the Received Impress on the Soul. And it's like this special differencing Grace consisteth in a special degree of Impress: But when that Impress is made by the Spirit without the Instrumentality of Means, we know not. God can make our own Imagination, and spirit,, and inward temperament a means undiscernably to us. 2. If I have proved to you that even the universal Grace itself with common means, may attain the effect, and doth in many, who dare question, whether All, yea One extraordinary or special Means added by God to that Common Influx, (with a will of success) may ascertain the effect. It were Blasphemy to say that God hath not Wisdom enough thus to attain his ends, by a series of adapted means, in conjunction with that Grace. C. But methinks you spin too fine a thread, when you talk of an Impress of the Spirit on the Soul, as the first Effect, (of God alone, or God and the Means) antecedent to faith or the Act of man as the second effect (of God and Man together). I find not that our Curiousest School Wits do talk much of such an Impress. B. 1. You will find the same sense in the Thomists and many of the Schoolmen: And methinks it is clear in itself. The Act of Faith is done by us: Our Souls have need of some Grace to be the Cause or it. The Cause goeth before the Effect. This Cause must not be out of us, but within us: Grace therefore must be first within us as a Cause, before it is within us as the effect of it. Yea, Action being nothing but Modus Agentis, is not a fit recipient itself immediately of a vis impressa: It is the Soul or faculty that must Act; and to say that God's Influx is not on the Soul or faculty as the recipient, but on the Act of that faculty alone, seemeth to be unintelligible, if not absurd. It is our Act, or our Soul that needeth help or Grace? If not the Soul, but the Act, than we have need of none at all: For the Act is yet future, that is, is no act, and nothing, and so hath no need. 2. But if really you will hold to the opinion that our Act itself is the first Effect of God's Influx or Will, then take notice, that all our controversy here between you and the Arminians, what Grace is sufficient, and what effectual, is at an end; And it is on your part, and for the truth that I spin that thread which you account too fine. C. How do you manifest that? B. Most plainly: For if we have nothing to inquire after between God's agency ex parte sui and the Act of Faith, it is a ridiculous question to ask, what Grace is sufficient, and what effectual? and what difference between the one and the other? and what is that which maketh efficiently the difference? For either your Question is of the Cause or the Effect: If of the Cause, it is (besides the second Causes) nothing but God's Essence, even his essential Activity, Wisdom, and Will: And do you think that God's essence is diversified, as little and great, more or less, sufficient and effectual? Do you inquire for Diversity in simple unity? That which worketh all effects in the world, is one Cause, that hath in itself no real difference of parts, kinds or degrees. II. But if your question be of the Effect, it is ridiculous or past question. Do you ask what Grace in us it is that maketh the Difference, between a Believer and an Infidel? Why, your question answereth itself. It is Faith, and that maketh the difference in one, as Infidelity doth in the other. Do you ask what is sufficient? To what? If to Salvation it is perseverance in Faith and Holiness: If to Justification, it is Faith; if to Faith and Conversion; nothing pre-existent in us. Do you ask what maketh Grace effectual? what Grace mean you? If Faith, it's none of the doubt or Controversy: It is (improperly) effectual to Justification (being no efficient of it, but a Condition, which is a Receptive disposition) ex ordinatione divina, & virtute foederis. You must recur then and ask, what maketh God's Essence or Spirit effectual? As if God's essence had a Cause, or suffered from the Creature. But if you mean no more but what are the Causes of Faith? that's another question oft answered. Choose now whether you will lay all our Controversies on that fine thread, of God's various Impress on the faculties in order of Nature antecedent to Faith (in act or true habit); or else confess that we have no difference, nor show of any, but have many ages abominably abused the world. C. But seeing you maintain that God as a free Lord and Benefactor doth vary his gifts of Grace as he doth of Nature, though we know not when he doth it Morally, and by means, and when by Immediate differing Impress; yet methinks you should hold that by one of the two he always doth it: And that equal Grace hath never unequal effects by the unequal free reception, rejection, or other difference made by man. B. To conclude this whole dispute, 1. * By Grace here I mean not with Bradwardine Gods Will, as denominated from various objects: Gods Will in itself is but One, and the Effects are many: and the Will is variously denominated virtually ex connotatione terminorum vel effectuum. If he could prove more diversity in God's Will, or that no man can do any thing but what he doth, I should be of his mind. That equal universal Grace can end in different effects, in the same Man, and in divers men, by man's own free various concourse or neglect, I have fully proved to you. 2. And when we have proved that such a Grace there is, and so it can do, we have great reason to think that sometimes it doth so: And no man can prove that it never doth so. 3. And de facto I have proved, that sometimes it doth so: in Adam's case, and in Cain's making a difference, before God denied him sufficient Grace. And in all bad men and good men in the world, who sometimes sinfully omit to do that which by the same Grace they could have done and did another time. 4. But de facto: How oft, and when, and in how many, God converteth men by the one way or the other, no Mortal man can tell. And therefore forget not that when I call universal Grace, ordinary, and the special different Grace extraordinary; I intent not to tell you which God most usually doth the work by as distinct from the other. But I call one Ordinary because it is common to all, or more, in itself, and also concurreth always with the other in its work, and so is never left out: And I call the other Extraordinary, because it is above the universal degree and way, and proper to some, as superadded. C. You did well to remember that: For I was offended that you called that Different Grace, Extraordinary. B. I say again, to conclude, I will earnestly entreat you to take heed of these few errors in your foundation here, that they misled not your understanding in all the controversy. I. Do not think that God must needs act ad ultimum posse in all his operations: It's certain that as to many possible effects, he doth omnino non agere (as to make more Suns, more Men, more Worlds) And if he can therein totally not act, he can act limitedly or in tantum only as he freely will. II. Do not think these degrees of Operation as various ex parte Dei, for they are but his most simple essence. Nor do not Imagine that there is a certain Vis media called Grace, which is somewhat Causal between the Creator and the Creature. I doubt such a wrong conceit lieth at the bottom of all these disputes; and men think that besides God's essence, and the effects on the Soul, there is some middle force or cause called Grace, which is neither God, nor a Creature; whose kind and degree they inquire after. * As Aureolu● maintaineth. III. Do not overlook the Glory that God designeth to himself in his SAPIENTIAL Kingdom, Government, and operations, I doubt some think so much of Strength and Power alone, as if they thought God were Glorified by nothing else, or more in an Ox, or Horse than in a Man. And whatever is ascribed to God's Sapiential operation, they contemptuously call, A Moral Causing, and not a Physical: As if God must move men as he doth the air, the water, or a stone. Remember that though Gods Omnipotent Activity, his Wisdom and his Will, do still inseparably cooperate, yet they have each its eminent Impress, Effect and Glory. And so the frame of Nature is the Glorious Impress of Omnipotency, with Wisdom and Love: The Kingdom of God on earth, especially of Grace, is the Glorious work of the Wisdom of God, directly governing Man as a Moral agent by Moral means: And the Kingdom of Glory, as foretasted on Earth, and perfect in Heaven, is the glorious work of Divine Love. Separate not these, nor undervalue or dishonour any one of them; But study the Glory of God's Sapiential Kingdom and works. And remember that Moral Means, and Moral Operations of God, are not unsuitable to the Government of Moral Agents, in Moral works. iv Forget not the great difference between the way of operation suitable to such a Moral Rector as such, and to a mere Proprietor or Actor, and Benefactor. And then you will see, that standing Laws are the Rectors Instruments; and Judgements, and Executions equal according to those Laws. And that Life Eternal and God's Glory and pleasure being the ends of Government, it cannot be doubted but God's Laws to all the world, have some aptitude and suitableness on their part to that end. And therefore that the frame of Moral means and annexed help hath a certain universal equality, antecedent to man's sinful will, which by forfeiture and rejection maketh an inequality: And therefore it is one of the noblest parts of your study here, to find out what Acts God doth as Legislator, (for those are first and equal) and as Judge (which man maketh unequal) and what he doth as Owner and free-Benefactor; For so he may make what difference he pleases: And the wonderful varieties through all the world tell us, that he pleaseth to make very much. V Forget not that the Humane Nature of Christ Glorified is made of God, the Universal Sun, or Cistern of all Grace, by whom it is to be given out to all mankind; to draw them to God, and to rule and Sanctify them further when converted. And do not think of any Recovering Influx of God but by the Holy Ghost; nor of the Spirit given any way but by and from Christ, who first draweth men to him, by the same Spirit which dwelleth in them as a Divine Nature when they are united to him. VI And as Christ is the Healing Sun of righteousness, and the universal Medium or Mediator and Administrator both of Rule and Influx, so forget not that he giveth out this Spirit and Recovering Grace, much by a Law or Conditional promise, which hath its terms which must be observed. And as the measures of Christ's Influx are oft resistible, so it is specially, by all wise Christians to be noted, that the Giving or Denying of the Grace or operations of the Spirit, are the grand Rewards and Punishments in this world, above all Corporal ones, and those which all Christians should daily and principally respect in their Hopes and Fears; Marking when the Spirits operations are denied them, that they may find out the Cause, and with David cry (betimes) Cast me not away from thy presence, and take not thy Holy Spirit from me, Ps. 51. VII. Lastly, forget not, that as man is not moved as a stone but governed as a Moral agent, * Melanct. Loc. Com. de Lib. arb. c. 7. Joh. 6. Nemo venit ad me Resp. Cyrillus l. 4. Non vi quadam cogi trahique credentes putandum est; sed monitione, doctrina, revelatione: Omnis qui audit & discit a patre venit ad me: ubi auditus, disciplina, doctrina adest, ibi fides non vi, sed persuasione oritar. Non enim possum secundum Ecclesiae veritatisque dogmata liberam potestatem hominis, quod lib. arb. vocamus ullo modo negare. Ita Aug. tr. in Joh. 26. Non traheris? Ora ut traheris. Addit Strigel. p. 389. Sicui non placent haec Cyrilli & August. is amet sua somnia quoad volet. Utrumque & creder● & Velle est Dei quia ipse praeparat Voluntatem & nostri, q●ia non fit nisi nobis volentibus. Aug. Retract. li. 23. and as the wonderful changes by motion in the world, are made recipiendo ad modum recipientium, by the diversity of Receptive dispositions, which are no efficient causes of what they receive; so Man can and must do somewhat, yea much under God to the due Receptivity of Divine Influx; not without God, nor by any Power which is not freely given him of God; But by a Power which he may or may not use. And that the neglect of what we can do, and doing the evil which we could avoid, is much at least of the daily sin of good and bad in all the world. And that though the faithful Servant be laudable, he is yet unprofitable, and hath nothing to boast of. And even the young Birds must open their mouths if they will be fed: which man must do freely, as they do necessarily. And when God giveth Man not only the Gold if he will open his hand, and the Meat if he will open his mouth, or not turn away and spit it out, and also giveth him all his Vital power by which he can do this if he will, and also can will it, and giveth him both Freedom to use this power, and manifold persuasions and helps to use it, All this must not be reproached as no Grace, nor the world instructed in Ingratitude, by them that should Preach that Gospel of Christ, which maketh Gratitude he universal complexion of all our duties, which must give life and beauty to them all. And to take off your prejudice against Dissenters, remember that I have after told you, and oft in the Margin, that even many Jesuits, and Monks, and Friars profess, that the Efficacy of Grace is in and from the Nature or Power of it, and the Will of God, and not from the free will and co-operation of man. See Bellarm. de Grat. & lib. arb. c. 12. Vasquez oft cited. Pet. a Sancto Joseph. in Suat. Concord. elsewhere cited, and Idea Specul. Theol. l. 4. c. 7. Ruiz elsewhere cited, and abundance of Schoolmen. And what say any Calvinists herein more? THE Ninth Days Conference Between A. and B. OF PERSEVERANCE. B. We are now come to that point, where I confess that the difference between you is real: But I maintain it to be so small, as that no breach of Christian Love or Communion should be made for it; but it should be taken for a tolerable difference among Brethren. If you think it greater, say your worst of it. The first Crimination. A. By making it impossible to fall from Grace, they make fear, and care, and endeavour to be folly; or unnecessary at least: For what use is there of fearing an impossible hurt? or of care and endeavour to prevent it? And so all religious Duties and diligence, as means, are made to be but vain. B. 1. You wrong them in your supposition: Except a few ignorant men Aegid: Colum. Rom. Quodlib. 3. qu. 3. p. 135. Verum est quod ita erit sicut Deus praevidit: sed non est quod non possit aliter esse: Propter quod si praedestinavit & videt me salvandum; verum est quod ego salvabor: sed hoc non est verum, quod non posset aliter esse: potest ergo praedestinatus finaliter peccare, & potest damnari: Quia infallibilitas divinae praescientiae non imponit ei necessitatem: Attamen finaliter non peccabit nec damnabitur: Nulla est autem necessitas simpliciter, nisi conditionis, sicut omne quod est quando est necesse esse: Ita & futura quae sunt praesentia praescientiae, divinae; Necesse est evenire, quae Deus praevidit: non necessitate simpliciter, sed quia jam sunt praesentia Divinae praescientiae. Ita Malderus in 12. Tho. q. 103. a. 10. dub. 3. Jastus qui babet donum p●se●eran iae, excidere finaliter potest: sed nunquam excidet. Yet saith that quodammodo it may be said, Eum qui habet perseverent a donum excidere non posse: eum autem qui non habet non posse non excidere. So Aug. de correp. & great. c. 12. dicit, eos qui preseverantiae donum non habet non posse perseverare. So that this is but a strife about equivocal words. that understand not the state of the Controversy, I meet with few or none that say, It is impossible to sin or fall away; but only de eventu that it will never come to pass. For they say (as I remember I heard Mr. Vines once preach) that our falling away is not only possible, but too easy in respect to us, and the habits of Grace which we have received: But they lay the certainty of our perseverance on God's Decree and Promise. Now, say they, God did not decree that it should be non-possibile, but only that it should be non-futurum. And so that he hath promised the non-futurity, but not an impossibility of falling away. 3. And yet they sometimes use the term impossible here: But how? 1. Say they, There is a logical impossibilitas consequentiae; And so there is on supposition of mere prescience and prediction. For do but make this one of the premises [God fore-knoweth that Paul will persevere] and it is impossible this conclusion should be true: [Paul will not persevere.] But yet this may be nevertheless true, [It is possible for Paul to fall away.] But this impossibility of consequence in order of arguing, is nothing to the impossibilitas rei, in respect to the Causes. 2. And also they say, that there is impossibilitas hypothetica; supposing that man wilfully reject not Grace, God's Power itself is so engaged to defend him against Satan and all Enemies, that it is impossible for them to overcome God, and destroy him: But here impossible is related to the power of Enemies only: It is a thing that Satan hath not Power to do, to conquer Grace. 3. But when the question is of the Power of the Person himself, they say, It is unfit to say that he is unable to fall away, or that it is impossible in respect to his own Power. 1. Because that to fall away is an effect of Impotency and not of Power. 2. Because God will not so operate by his Grace, as to make a man unable to sin, but unwilling, and actually to keep him from it. So that Grace doth not make us impotent to resist it, and make it really impossible to us to fall away; but maketh us able and willing to stand, and causeth us freely de facto to persevere. 3. And I must tell you, that your Crimination is grounded on a lame and faulty recitation of their Opinion; you name but half of it, instead of the whole: which is, [That the sanctified never fall away from the due fear, and care, and endeavour of persevering, and consequently not from Sanctification or Justification]. And will you infer that [a man needeth not fear, care or live holily, if certainly he shall do so?] A. Yes! what need I take care of that which I shall certainly do? B. That is, what need you take care if you certainly shall take care! A. What need I trouble my own head about that which God will do, whatever I do? If he undertake to ascertain it, I may leave it to him. B. You talk contradictions! God doth not undertake to secure your Salvation whether you will or not, or care or not, or labour or not: But to cause you to will, to care and labour. And you say, If God will make me willing I need not be willing: If God will make me think of it, and care and labour for it, I need not think of it, or care or labour for it. The Sun need not shine if God will make it shine! You need not eat if God decree that you shall eat. Are not these weak Contradictions? A. But as weak as you make it, the Contradiction is their own: For they first make God to make their falling away to be impossible or certainly non-futurum, and yet say, that he will make them fear it: that is, to perform an Act without the proper Object: As if God decreed that they should fear Good as Good, or love Evil as Evil: No man can fear that which neither is, nor is taken to be fearful: An impossible (or certainty non-future) hurt is not fearful, or an Object of fear, unless to a mad man. B. There were much weight in what you say, but for that which you leave out: 1. That objective certainty may be separated from subjective certainty: that is, men may be uncertain of that which is certain in itself. 2. Yea few of the Godly have a strong assurance of their sincerity and Justification. 3. And no man in this life hath a perfect assurance, no more than other perfect Graces. 4. And every man's faith itself in God's Promises and fidelity is imperfect. Therefore while all these are imperfect, and not only so, but liable to sad assaults, and interruptions, and decays. 5. Yea and the person liable to such heinous sins, as look terribly towards Apostasy, you cannot say that fear is needless. For though God decree the certainty of their perseverance, that proveth not that they are perfectly certain of it. A. But God will not found our Duty on our Sin, nor command men to fear, because through sinful weakness they do fear. B. God will not make our Sin to be our Duty, (in sensu conjuncto). 1. But God will make Duty on supposition that Sin maketh it necessary. If you sin, God will make sorrow and confession your Duty, which would else be none. 2. Yea more, the same Act may be a Duty and a Sin in several respects. And so may fear of Hell be. A. Stay there! Do you not then make God the Author of Sin? For if he cause the Act as a Duty, when it is caused it will prove a Sin too. B. You mistake: Two Causes may cause two Modes and Relations of the same Act, and one not at all cause that which the other causeth. God causeth every Act in genere act us which is sinful, and yet causeth not the deficiency or exorbitancy of it: As the Rider maketh the Horse go, but not to go lamely. God knowing our uncertainty of our own Election and Sincerity▪ may make it our Duty, by a wise and careful fear to avoid our own danger: And yet that fear may not only come also from some ignorance and unbelief in ourselves, but have sinful degrees, and so have that in it which God is not the cause of. The second Crimination. A. Their Doctrine tendeth to the indulgence of all sin: * One would think that the Doctrine asserting the loss of Justification by mortal sin were stricter than the Calvinists: But judge by the Jesuits Doctrine, who teach that a man in mortal sin or unconverted may the congr●o merit Justification, Ruiz de praedest. exad. d. 19 ●ect. 4. p. 242. Ad meritum congrui non requiritur personam esse simpliciter Deo gratam; quin poti●s propter peccatum mortale fit inimica Dei; nihil●minus actus fidei & alii qui ex side procedunt secundum se, grati sunt, quantum sufficit, ut justificationem de congruo mereantur opera namque fraternae charitatis, Heb. 13. & miserccordiae sunt ut sacrificia, quibus Deum per mortale peccatum amissum promeremur reconciliatum accipere: & 1 Joh. 1. si confiteamur, etc. So that God's Justice is bound to be reconciled to, and Justify a wicked enemy, for an Alms or for Confession: Is not this an easy cure of enmity? But the promise is made only c●teris patibus, to true Believers, already just, but needing a particular remission. For if a man cannot fall away however he live, he may give up himself to lewd carnality, and say, I cannot fall away. B. This is the same shameless self-contradicting Accusation, and needs no other Answer. As if you said, [If a man cannot fall away, he may fall away.] To give up himself to carnality is to fall away; And you say that he may do this, because he cannot. The Doctrine of your Adversaries is, That God will certainly keep the godly from turning from him to an ungodly fleshly life: And how doth this conduce to ungodliness? A. The conceit of safety will make them careless. B. Not if they conceive that their safety and their carefulness are equally decreed. The bad and ignorant will abuse any thing. But I am persuaded that very many live the more holily for this belief: 1. Because as Prophecies conduce to their own accomplishment, in that what men believe will certainly come to pass, they all promote, and will not oppose: So it is in part in this case. 2. And when they believe that God will have it be, it greatly animateth their endeavours by hope, and taketh off their discouragements. 3. And when they find that God hath in his Decree conjoined their care and labour to the end, and hath no more decreed their perseverance, than that they shall carefully avoid sin and temptations, it maketh them fear that they are not Elect, when they find these signs of Election to be doubtful, and so preserveth them from presumption and security. The third Crimination. A. Their Doctrine is uncomfortable; in two respects, 1. In that it alloweth no man to be sure of his present Justification, Pardon and Adoption, who is not sure that he goeth further, yea that he is not quite in another stat● than any man that ever fell away: which it is not possible that many, if any one at all should be. 2. In that it alloweth no man to be sure of his Justification and Adoption, till he have so much Grace, as that no Temptation, how great soever, would turn him from Christ if he were tried by it. B. Wherein is the uncomfortableness of these? A. I. I have known myself some fall to Socinianism, Arrianism, yea Infidelity, denying Christ, or his Godhead, (which is his chief Essence) and the Scriptures, (and therefore sure had no saving Grace then, and died so) who had forty years lived in as eminent Piety, Humility, diligence in all religious Duties, charity to others, neglect of the World, and patiented suffering for their Religion oft times, as almost any men that ever I knew. And that they did not dissemble, not only their constancy, suffering and whole Conversation showed, but my own intimacy with them assured me, by which I knew the very thoughts of their hearts. Some of them were not of judgements clear and strong enough to discern the fallacies of Deceivers: Others of them were naturally too hasty in judging; And some were carried away by the advantages of the constant company of extraordinary able and insinuating Seducers. But divers of them, even after they apostatised, did continue so much strictness of life and charity to all men, and religiousness in their Theism, and Infidel way, and neglect of the World, as convinced me, that it was more the insufficiency of their judgements, than the hypocrisy of their hearts, which was the cause of their Apostasy. Now by the Calvinists Doctrine, none of these men were ever in a state of Grace: And of the strictest Professors round about us, there is not one of many hundreds that goeth so far as they did. And all these must be left uncertain of their Justification, till they are certain that they went beyond them all? yea and certain that they are unjustified, while they are certain that they came short of any one of them. B. The case that you describe I have known, and it is sad: But we know not the hearts of other men: There might be more sin and hypocrisy in them than we know of. A. Though God only be the searcher of hearts, yet long intimacy and near experience may make us so confident of some men's thoughts, as that I confess to you, you will never change my mind, if you plead against so great experience. I know their judgements were insufficient. But I will never believe that their hearts were false, as to what they knew. B. God hath made his Word, and not other men's hearts, the rule for us to judge ourselves by. A. But if you think that his Word tells us that we are the Children of the Devil, till we go beyond any that ever fell away, we must look both to that Word, and to such Apostates. B. The truth is, assurance of Justification and Salvation is not easily nor commonly attained: And it is not Opinions alone that will procure it: And while we have that sin and weakness, which is the cause of doubts, which Opinion soever we hold, we shall find occasion for our doubtings: But let us hear your second part of the Accusation. A. II. They hold that if any man fall away, by what temptation soever, it is because he was never sincere: And consequently that he is not sinners, that would fall away by the strongest temptation that possibly may assault him. So that every poor weak Christian, whose Infant-strength is not proportioned to the greatest temptations, must needs take himself to be still but an Hypocrite. B. We stand not by our own strength of habitual Grace, but by the upholding Love and Will of God. * Carbo ex Aquin. 1. 2. q. 137. a. 4. Si persev●rantia sumatur pro ipso habitu, indiget dono habitualis gratiae, ut caeterae virtutes infusae; si autem accipiatur pro actu perseverantiae durante usque ad mortem, non jolum indiget habituali gratia, sed etiam gratuito Dei auxilio conservante hominem in bono— praedestinatis per gratiam Christi, non solum datur ut perseverare possint, sed ut perseverent, ut Augustin. Per se potest perseverare in malo, non autem in bono. Bradwardine who holdeth that no temptation can be overcome without special help, that is, a divine Volition or Decree, doth yet hold that the same Will of God which saveth one man by overcoming his temptations, saveth others by keeping temptations from them. A. 1. When we dispute against their Doctrine, it is from the immortal quality of the seed of God abiding in them, that they plead for certainty of perseverance. 2. Who findeth not by constant experience, that God worketh on all things according to their Natures: And so on man as man, and so on Saints as Saints, and on the weak as weak, and on the strong as strong. Do we not see that he giveth men wisdom and all Intellectual abilities, before they speak and do as such abilities must fit them to do: When did you see God's Grace make ignorant, injudicious, fools, or weak persons, judge, speak and live, in equality with the wise? Do we not see that as man is, so is his strength and work, operari sequitur esse: The strong do as the strong, and the weak judge and do as the weak. Why else doth God give men strength of Grace? sure they that think the habit of Grace must needs be before any act, will not hold that all our lives after, the Acts (from immediate divine production) go beyond the degree of the habits. We know that God is the chief cause of our perseverance, and all our works that are good: But he causeth them by disposing and quickening, strengthening, illuminating and sanctifying our faculties to do them; which is habitual Grace. B. What is your own judgement in this point? A. Our judgement is, 1. That he that truly at the present preferreth the pleasing of God, and his Salvation, before all this World, is sincere, and justified. 2. That of these some have well settled apprehensions and resolutions; but others have such shallow Conceptions, and weak Resolutions, as that a very strong Temptation would change their minds, and overcome them. 3. But if they escape such Temptation and be not overcome, they shall be saved: For God will not damn men for possible Sin and Apostasy, which they were never guilty of, but only for that which they did commit. 4. And that it is no certain sign of hypocrisy, that they would have fallen away, had their Temptations been great, but only a proof that they were weak: 5. Else to pray [Led us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil,] should be rather [discover not our sincerity or hypocrisy by temptation]. 6. Therefore God useth to proportion men's trials to their strength: And that young and weak Believers may persevere, he exposeth them not (antecedently to their provocation) to great Temptations as he doth the strong. Even as while a young Tree hath little rooting, it hath also but a little top: else had it the top of a great Tree, and but the roots of a Plant, the first great Wind would overturn it. 7. Even strong Christians might possibly have some Temptations, which would over-match their strength, and turn them from Christ, if God should not keep them from such Temptations. 8. Therefore there are some Temptations so far above the very nature of man, by such Grace as is not a mere Miracle, to be overcome, as that God doth not suffer Mankind to be tried with them: As to be most tightly tormented many months, or a longer time. And in that unusual trial of the poor Christians in Japon, though many endured those torments many weeks, yet nature could not sustain them to the last; but when they had suffered as much as many Smithfield burn to death, at last almost all denied Christ, so that Christianity is now there extirpated. Now if Rogers, Bradford, Hooper, shown sincerity by suffering death, why should we not think that these did so that suffered far more than they, though afterward the degree was greater than their strength. 9 We hold that God's Punishments and Mercies to men in this World, are very much exercised in either permitting or not permitting great Temptations. * The same Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 16. holdeth that the cause of the damneds obstinacy in sin, is not only themselves, and Gods not-willing to cure and save them, but also Gods positive Will by which their obstinate wills are for ever continued in the act. But I see not why we should assert Gods positive Will of Sin in Hell or Earth, when his not-effectual willing to cure it is enough. And that for great sin, he oft delivereth men up to Satan, and giveth him the greater power over them. Yea that the nature of sin itself is such as giveth greater advantage to the Tempter: As he that will with Achan look on the wedge of Gold; or that will please his taste with delicious Drinks and Meats▪ or that will permit his eyes immodest Spectacles, hath thereby let in the Devil into his Imagination, and will not easily thence cast him out: And on the other side, he that pleaseth God, and conquereth one Temptation, obtaineth that Grace by which he is much saved from the next, and the Tempter is the more disadvantaged and restrained. 10. Lastly, We therefore hold, That seeing Temptations do not only try our sincerity or hypocrisy, (else we should desire them, for self-examination) but also tend to change men's minds, and make them worse, the way to persevere is to pray against and avoid Temptations, and resist those that cannot be avoided. This is our judgement: In which you see that we hold that all weak Christians that are sincere, may have assurance of their present Justification, though they are not strong enough to stand the greatest trials. And that they may well hope that God will save them from over strong Temptations, while they sincerely do his Will. B. But Christ saith, That he that forsaketh not all that he hath, and hateth not his own life, cannot be his Disciple. And what greater trial can there be, than the loss of life itself? A. Though some taking it to be hard that none are true Christians, that would not be Martyrs were they tried, have said that this Text speaketh de necessitate praecepti, non medii, [You must grow up to this at last, if you will be my Disciples]; yet I will not so force the Text, but say as you do. But 1. There are far stronger Temptations than the love of Life: Though not from Interest, yet from false reasonings, which may deceive the judgement: And one that would die for Christ while he believeth in him, may possibly have so strong Temptations to unbelief as shall exceed in danger, his fear of death. 2. And all men that at the present would forsake Life and all for Christ, yet have not the same fixedness of Resolution, nor the same degree of Faith and Love. No doubt but the Martyrs in the same flames had various degrees of Grace. Now a less firm and fixed measure may be loosened by degrees, or shaken by Seducers, and mutable man may after be overcome by that same Temptation which once he could have overcome. So that I accuse their Doctrine, as utterly inconsistent with true Christian Comfort, on both these account. And such is the success of those men that will overdo, and devise means of their own, for extraordinary comforts, which God never gave them. B. The comfort of poor Christians it seems standeth but on slippery terms in the Opinion of both sides, while each Party thinks that there is no true comfort in the others way. * Whether we may be morally sure of our present Justification, the Papists Doctors agree not among themselves, Bellarmine and many others affirm it, and others deny it: as Aureolus (cited by Brianson, in 4. q. 4. fol. 36.) and others that say, no man can know whether his Habits are infused? But doth not experience confute you? Do you not see that many have true Christian comfort that are not of your mind? A. That is because of some better Principles which they hold, and because they see not the contradiction and inconsistence. B. You come near to this truth; Indeed there are Principles better than either of your controverted Opinions, common to both sides, which may afford us great Consolation, and which sound Christians live upon. And I doubt your Disputes on both sides do more disturb than comfort most. But this must be granted, that Opinions are not true, because they are comfortable, nor all false that have any thing in them apt to trouble men, who have the sinful matter of trouble in themselves: no more than Physic is naught that maketh men sick. We must take our Comforts on God's terms. The truth is, your Doctrine seemeth more comfortable in the respects which you have named, as to the assurance of present Justification, and theirs more comfortable in another respect; viz. as to the continuance of it when they have it. But if this Doctrine were to be chosen by the comfortableness, yea and usefulness of it, there is a middle way (of some Schoolmen) which would be preferred before both. That is, that neither any of the Elect, nor any that have attained to confirmation ●r a fixed degree of Grace, do ever fall away: But that there are some not-Elect, who are sincere and justified, but weak and mutable (as Adam in Innocency) and not confirmed, who fall away and perish: And this Vossius thinketh was Augustine's Opinion. And Grotius in his excellent Epistle against Molin: lately translated into English by Mr. Barksdale, affirmeth it to be the common judgement of the Fathers: which will be no small advantage to it with me. And 1. This avoideth the uncomfortable Doctrine which you charge on them; For this holdeth that a weak Christian may have the comfort of present Justification, that is not certain to persevere, nor that he is any better than some that fall away. 2. And it avoideth the uncomfortableness which they charge on you, viz. that no man can be assured of his Perseverance and Salvation: For these hold that all the consumed may be assured of it; And that all weak Christians may possibly attain to confirmation. 3. And it only leaveth weak unconfirmed Christian● uncertain of Salvation, which both sides are agreed in. For they confess that weak Christians are seldom if ever sure of their present sincerity and Justification: And you hold that they are uncertain to persevere: And so both of you hold them to be uncertain of Salvation. But proceed. The fourth Crimination. A. They do reproach the Holiness of God's people, and his ●mage, and encourage most horrid wickedness, while they make all the s●● that ever was committed by any man after his Regeneration, to be consistent with Holiness and Justification: not only Noah 's Drunkenness, Lot 's being Drunk and Incestuous two nights together, David's horrid Murder and Adultery, Peter 's denying and forswearing his Lord; but (for instance) Solomon they say was a Saint, and justified, when he gave up himself to all manner of pleasure, and denied himself nothing, (and Paul saith, The carnal mind is enmity to God, and if ye live after the flesh ye shall die,) when he clavae in love to many Idolatrous women; having seven hundred Wives, and three hundred Concubines, and his Wives turned away his Heart after other gods, and his Heart was not perfect with the Lord— but he went after Ashtoreth, the Goddess of the Sidonians, and after Milcom, the abomination of the Amorites, and built an High Place for Chemoth, the abomination of Moab, and for Molech the abomination of Ammon; and likewise did he for all his strange Wives, which burned Incense and sacrificed to their gods: his Heart was turned from the Lord that appeared to him twice, 1 King. 11. 1, to 12. All this say the Calvinists you may do, and yet be Saints, and justified and saved. * Bradwardine, li. 3. c. 27. having maintained that all things come to pass by necessity, and cap. 29. p. 734. answering the Objection that this will make men cast all their sin on God, and be ungodly, answereth that it will do so by none but the Reprobate, and confesseth that so one of his Monastery did argue, and turned thereupon to a wicked life; but that he cannot help that, for he cannot predestinate men that are reprobated. All this may stand with God's Image, and true Holiness.; B. As to all the rest, except Solomon, the sin being one or two particular Acts contrary to the main bent and scope of their lives (which were holy) you seem, 1. To deny an evident truth, viz. that the habitual love of God was not extirpated by those Sins: Can you think that habitually (though the act was hindered) Noah, Lot, David, Peter, did not then love God and Holiness better than sinful Pleasures? And the Papists confess, that Sin is not mortal (that is, an evidence of spiritual death) till it conquer the habit of the love of God. 2. You seem to take your offence at the Mercy of God himself, because he will not disown men for such a particular sin, contrary to their general will and life. As if you provoked him to deal hardlier also with yourself, lest he deal too easily or mercifully with others. 3. But they are in these resolved that no man hath true Grace, that loveth not God and Holiness above the World and sinful Pleasure: And they and you are agreed in this: And in the hypothesis, if you can make them believe that any of these lost that predominant habitual love, they would grant that they fell from saving Grace. So that thus far you agree. 4. And as for Solomon's case, it is too hard for us all: Some think that he had but common Grace, till that Repentance which he published in Eccles. And that so much might produce his Proverbs, which say they were but spoken by him, and written long after by others (as some by Hezekiah's men). Others think that he did but tolerate his Wife's Idolatry, and that he aggravated his own sensuality in hyperbolical words, and so that his sin did stand with true Grace: Others think that he fell into a state of damnation (in which had he died he had been damned) but yet neither totally (from all feminal Grace) nor finally; and that others may do the like. In a word, the case is too hard for us: But our comfort lieth not in being sure what condition Solomon was in, either first or last. And also, as Means and Grace are greater under the Gospel than they were to Solomon, and Life and Immortality more brought to light, so more spirituality and heavenliness is now required of us than was then of them. As long as Christ hath fullier described to us the title-conditions of Salvation, we have better means to judge of our states, than the deciding of these Difficulties about Solomon would be. A. This is true, but nothing to the purpose: we prove by Solomon that a man may fall from Grace. B. How will you prove it against them that think Solomon had but common Grace, till he wrote Ecclesiastes, or repent of his Fall? A. He was a penman of the Scripture (the Proverbs) before; And he was beloved of God, and excelled all others in Wisdom. B. 1. Whether he wrote, or only spoke the Proverbs, you prove not? 2. You cannot prove that writing part of the Scripture, is a more certain sign of a Saint, than speaking part of it. And Balaam spoke part of it (what Jobs Friends were, I know not.) And if many Workers of Iniquity did by the Spirit prophesy and cast out Devils, in Christ's Name, how prove you that they may not write part of the Scriptures? (To pass by that, Pilate, Festus, Cla●dius, Lysta●, and other such, wrote part of it.) And an ungodly Preacher may now speak and write excellent things. 3. His Wisdom which he begged, and is magnified for, is described objectively to be political, physical and ethical; but how far spiritual the Text doth not speak. 4. God might be said to love him, as Christ did that man that was not far from the Kingdom of God: Complacencially, according to the good that was in him; And benevolently, as he purposed his future Sanctification and Salvation. I writ not this as my own Opinion, but to tell you that you cannot prove so much as you think you can. The fifth Crimination. A. * Even Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 15. who goeth as high against freewill as Hobbs, or any man doth, yet confidently holdeth the Apostasy of Saints, though not of the Elect; and questioning what causeth perseverance in Glory, he consuteth all th●t lay it on any thing as sufficient but Gods Will, which he calleth his Love, and the Holy Ghost. 1. Them that lay it on the nature of Grace. 2. Or the degree of Grace. 3. Or the sight of God. 4. Or the intenseness of that sight. 5. Or the delight in God. 6. Or the degree of that Delight. 7. Or on uniting adhesion to God. 8. Or the degree of that adhesion. 9 Or on our not seeing any good which we want. 10. Or the fear of misery by sinning. 11. Or that the joy taketh away freewill. 12. Or on a perfect beatitude in all these: All which he saith are insufficient, and Gods Will is the cause, though using these. And so in this life, men stand or fall, not because God giveth some his inward Grace (for that may be lost) and others not, but because God willeth the persevering and obedience of one, and willeth it not to another]. This is overdoing of the Champion of Grace against freewill. They show exceeding much immodesty, 1. In holding an Opinion which is contrary to the Doctrine of the universal Church, from the Apostles till of late times: neither Orthodox nor Heretic, being ever known to hold it, unless perhaps Jovinian alone, till above a thousand years after Christ. No not Augustine and his Disciples, who were thought by many to run towards an extreme in over-pleading for Grace; so that they were called by some Predestinarian Heretics. 2. And yet they have the face (instead of being ashamed of their own singularity) to revile others as heterodox, if not heretical, who will not be as singular as they, and set as light by the judgement of Christ's Church. B. I am not one of them that will cite any scraps of the Fathers, contrary to their current expressions, to contradict you: Vossius hath copiously related their judgements in his Pelagian History, and that as favourably for perseverance as there was cause; And Dr. Twisse, who frequently speaketh his distaste of him, saith nothing to prove his History false. Which in this, he that readeth the Fathers must confess to be true. But this should somewhat moderate you in your censure, 1. That the Writers of the first three hundred years are few, and their Writings (except Tertullias, Origine and Cyprian) very short; (even Clements, Alexand. and Justins not long). And few of them very learned and accurate Writers; who are the common Managers of Controversies: nor was this Controversy started in their times, and therefore not accurately searched into. 2. And if you say that this is the more for your cause, if it were not so much as made a Controversy; I add that the Platonic Philosophy which then most prevailed, might do somewhat to dispose them that way: For as Grotius de fato hath copiously proved (out of above thirty Philosophers and philosophical Christians) most of all the Philosophers, especially Platonists were for freewill, and most learned Christian Doctors came out of Plato's School, (and most of the learned Heretics too). 3. And yet Laertius in Zenone tells us, That the Stoics were against falling away, and taught that no truly virtuous man did ever cease to be such. 2. But above all, I would have you consider, 1. That this Point was not held by these consenting Doctors for an Article of Faith, and necessary to Church-Concord and Salvation; but as one of those many Opinions which were left free. 2. And that many or most of these Fathers did agree in some Opinions that are not true. 3. Yea that the greater part of them are by the Papists themselves charged with several Errors, and some and not a few with Heresies. 4. And that therefore the holy Scriptures being the only and sufficient Rule of Faith, we need not be so much ashamed as you intimate, in some things to differ from the generality of those Fathers, if the Scripture be more for us than them. There is many a Text of Scripture which Papists themselves interpret contrary to most of the Fathers, notwithstanding their Trent Oath to the contrary. Therefore your heavy Accusation of immodest singularity is too keen. But as for their Cross-Accusation of you as heterodox, I now meddle not with the truth, nor excuse any uncharitableness therein. The sixth Crimination. A. They contradict abundance of express Scripture, which asserteth that the godly may fall finally from true Grace. B. And they think that you rather contradict abundance of Texts that speak expressly for the contrary: It is none of my work now to defend either them or you: I have long ago written a peculiar Tractate of my own Opinion herein: Who is in the right I am not now determining: But that you over-magnify the difference on both sides usually, I shall show you in the end. No doubt but the Scripture is of itself sufficient to decide all Controversies, as a Rule of sound Doctrine, so far as God would have them clearly decided. But yet he that denieth that some things in Scripture are hard to be understood, will contradict not only Peter's words, but his own and all men's experience. For as it pleased God to make up the World of variety of Creatures, so also to make up the Scripture of Truths of various degrees of necessity and evidence. And in this Point there are so many Texts, that both Sides think do favour their Opinions, that we have not the same certainty as in many other Points, and therefore not the same consent and concord among the learnedest Divines, and the godliest Christians: And in my Observations most on each side are more moved to their Opinion in this, from the congruity that they think it hath with other Verities or the Analogy of Faith, than from the proper plain sense of the Texts which they themselves allege. So that though no doubt the Truth is to be found in the Scriptures, yet not with such ease and certainty as will allow us to make the decision of this Point, any part of the terms of our necessary Concord. THE Tenth Days Conference Between B. and C. OF PERSEVERANCE. B. You have now some advantage for your censure of Dissenters See Ruiz de Praedes. d. b. Sect. 4, 5, 6. Proving that Faith and certain Perseverance of all the Elect proceed from God's decrees or predefinition; and that all things work for their good, etc. This the Jesuits acknowledge. where the difference is real: But I am loath you should make it greater than it is, or make as hot and contentious work about it as Marbachius and Zanohy did. How odious soever Thompson and Bertius have been made by our side, and Jovinian, Calvin, and his followers by the other (though I wish there were no difference at all) I undertake to prove that the difference is not of so great moment as is commonly on both sides pretended; And no greater than should consist with true Love and Communion, even between the Members, yea the Pastors of the same Church, who are therein of differing opinions: But first let me hear what you have to aggravate it. The first Crimination. C. Their Crime is that they overthrew the comfort of Believers, by denying them any certainty of Salvation. * Paraeus himself maketh such an Intercision of Justification in Believers as I cannot own (in Bellarm. de Amiss. Grat. l. 1. c. 7.) Fides tunc dicitur Justificare quum actum proprium accipiendi remissionem peccatorum exercet. Hinc vero actum non exercet neque exercere potest fides aegra, saucia, sordibus carnis oppressa, peccatorum compedibus quasi ligata:— Justificati● la●●i● D●●● non imputat peccata; nempe resipiscentibus: Ante resipiscentiam certe imputat, infligendo poenas temporales, & imputarit ●tiam ●●fligendo poenas aeternas nisi resipiscerent.— Tunc igitur fides in lapsis habitualiter tantum ●ane●s proprie Justificans dici, aut eos Justificare non potest.] But his reason is bad: For faith is not called Justifying for the Reason which he giveth. The like say the Polonian Protestants in Colloq. Thorun. de Grat. Sect. 2. n. 11. Falso accusamur quasi statuamus semel justificatos Dei Gratiam ●jusque certitudinem & ipsum Spiritum Sanctum non posse amittere, quamvis in peccatis, pro lubitu, volutentur. Cum contra potius doceamus ipsos etiam renat●s quoties in peccata contra conscientiam recidunt, in iisque aliquandum perseverent, nec fidem veram, nec Dei gratiam justificantem, nedum ejus certitudinem aut Spiritum Sanctum pro tempore retinere: sed novum irae ac mortis aeternae reatum incurrere: Ac propterea nisi Speciali Dei gratia excitante (quod in electis fieri non dubitamus) ad resipiscentiam iter●m renoventur, reipsa etiam damnandos esse.] This is the same with the Doctrine of Augustine and Musculus, or near it. Yea, both Ursine and Pareus seem to come as far: Catech. de Peccat. actuali [Peccatum regnans est cui peccans non repugnat ideoque fit obnoxius aeternae morti nisi, etc. Propter quod non tantum ex ordine justi●iae Dei, sed ex reipsa, aeternarum poenarum reus est qui illud habet. Talia sunt omnia peccata in non renatis, quaedam etiam in renatis: ut error in fund●mento fidei, & lapsus contra conscientiam; cum quibus fiducia remissionis peccatorum, & consolatio vera non consistit; donec resipiscant. Quod enim etiam renati poss●t cadere in peccatum regnans, satis ostendunt tristissimi lapsus Sanctissiomrum hominum, ut Aaron●s, Davidis, etc. Rob. Baronim in his excellent little Treat. de Pec. Mort. & veniali, saith that by Mortal Sins the regenerate may, 1. Be excluded from that Grace and favour of God, by which he before loved them, ye● he incurreth God's hatred and displeasure, so far, etc. 2. Their Prayers, Thanks, Obedience, yea nothing that proceedeth from them, is then acceptable to God. 3. In that state God cannot forgive them, and give them peace of Conscience and joy. B. To be absolutely certain of Salvation, no doubt would be a very great comfort. But let us inquire, I. What number will be by this Doctrine hindered from this certainty. II. In what degree this tendeth to their discomfort. 1. And by the first enquiry, I doubt we shall find that you also hold Doctrines that hinder most men from concluding themselves certain of Salvation: and yet perhaps be very true. These Questions therefore, I crave your answer to. Q. 1. Do not you grant that we must take no comfort but what God giveth us, and on his terms; and that the false comforts of presumption are worse than none, or not desirable? And that all Doctrine is not true that were it true were comfortable? C. Yes, none will deny it you. B. Q. 2. Do you not find by experience (being a Pastor who hath discoursed with your Flock man by man about their state) that of those that you account truly Godly persons, there is not one of fifty, yea of an hundred, yea of many hundreds, that will say that they are certain of their Salvation; properly and fully certain. C. I suppose your question implieth your own observation, which I contradict not. B. Q. 3. And as for the multitude of more careless and lose Christians, do not you think that (whatever they say) their certainty is less than these Godly persons? C. Yes, no doubt: for their evidence is less or none. B. Q. 4. Do you not think that it must needs be so (that certainty of Salvation must be exceeding rare) considering that all these things must go to it? 1. There must be a certainty that God's promises are true: whereas the faith of most is weak. 2. There must be a certain understanding both of the meaning of the promise, and what are the true Conditions of it, and the difference between true saving Grace, and all that is but counterfeit or common. Whereas most are uncertain and dark herein, if not mistaken. 3. There must be these Evidences in the person himself; not only in reality, but in ascertaining-discernableness: which cannot be unless it be 1. Much and strong: for that which is small, is so like to the common and counterfeit, that it is seldom certainly discerned. 2. It must be in Activity: For Grace out of Act is not discernible. 3. It must be powerfully operative without, and in the life, to conquer temptation, and keep us in clear and sure obedience, in a Holy fruitful life: or else it will not be certainly discerned from dead opinion. 4. It must not be clouded and blotted by great and powerful habits of sin within, or acts of sin without. For these will many ways hinder assurance: And how few have all these Necessaries to make up an ascertaining evidence. 4. And it must be one that knoweth how by self examination to discern all this, to be certainly in themselves: That frequently and skilfully thinketh on the matter. 5. And it must be one that is not under the power either of Melancholy, or other distracting passions, or Temptations. 6. And one that knoweth the true difference between a Mortal sin (inconsistent with Justification) and a mere infirmity. 7. And one that knoweth the true nature of that Repentance which is necessary after sinning. And alas! how few be they that have all these qualifications. C. The Spirit of God can give them certainty without all this ado. B. What he can do is little to our case, but what he will do. If you once take that course, to teach men to look for assurance of their Salvation or Sanctification, without certain finding that Sanctification in themselves, you will make sad work in the Church of God. For nothing is more certain, than that without Regeneration, Conversion and Holiness, none shall see God. And that if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, which must be known by his fruits, he is none of his, Joh. 3. 3. 5. Math. 18. 3. Heb. 12. 14. Rom. 8. 9, 13. Gal. 5. 21. And that it is he that repenteth and believeth that shall be saved. And to be sure that a man is sanctified, and not to be sure that he hath the Graces of Sanctification, is a contradiction; to be sure and not sure of the same thing. And to say you are sure of Heaven without Holiness, is to say that you are sure that God's Word is false. C. But the witness of the Spirit certifieth us of all. B. True: And what is that? As your Reason witnesseth or evidenceth that you are a man, and your Life witnesseth that you are an Animal, so the Spirit witnesseth that you are one of Christ's; that is, the sanctifying, illuminating, quickening work of the Spirit: For the Having of the Spirit is your witness: And to have the Spirit is to have Holiness, which is his work; which also the Spirit, to complete his witness, helpeth us both to Act, increase, discern, and take comfort in. Q. 5. And I next then ask you, whether he that will have certainty of Salvation, must not also have (beyond a strong opinion) a certainty that this Doctrine of certain perseverance is true? C. Yes: No doubt of it. B. And are the generality of Professors certain of it, when not only the Greeks and Romans, but also all the Lutherans and Arminians, and most Anabaptists utterly deny it? I grant that men may be confident in the opinion which they are educated or fallen into. But are the unlearned certain, when most of the Learned are confident of the contrary? Following our Leaders eagerly is not certainty. C. It's granted you. B. Q. 6. I ask then, seeing so exceeding few of your own side are truly certain of their Salvation, who never receive the Arminians opinion, whether that be it that hindereth their certainty? II. And now let us try in what Measure their Doctrine hindereth comfort? Q. 1. Do you not think that many of those of your own side have much comfort though they attain not to assurance. C. Yes: Experience tells it us. B. Q. 2. Do you not think that some, yea many of the old Christians for a thousand years after Christ, had comfort, who yet were not of your opinion of Perseverance? All the Martyrs and great Sufferers for Christ, and the excellent Pastors, were not comfortless. C. That cannot be denied. B. Q. 3. Do you think that none of the Nations of Greeks, Armineans, Lutherans, nor any of the Anabaptists of their mind, do live in the comfortable hopes of Heaven? C. Yes, No doubt but many do. B. Why then you see that comfort may be had without certainty of Salvation. But I proceed to the Nature of the Case itself. Q. 4. Would not your life be uncomfortable if you fore-knew that you should commit Murder, Adultery, Incest, deny Christ, etc. kill your own Father, Mother, Wife or Child; and lie as long as David did in your Sin; (much more to sin as Solomon did)? C. Yes; I must needs be less comfortable in such a prospect. B. Q. 5. Would it not much grieve you if you knew that you should fall from the Degree of Grace received, to the very lest that is consistent with sincerity. C. It must needs be my grief; but yet such as would consist with greater comfort, because it consisteth with Salvation. B. Q. 6. Are you certain that these two last Cases to commit such heinous sins, and to fall so far from Grace, may not be your Case? C. No: I cannot be sure of it; because it may stand with Grace. B. Q. 7. Tell me then, what is it that now keepeth you from those sorrows which would befall you, if such a thing should be? C. The great hope that I have that it will never be. B. What are the Reasons of those your hopes? C. 1. Because I know that God is Good and merciful in himself. 2. And he dealeth with man upon terms of Grace. 3. And he hath given me experience of his mercy to myself. 4. And I have his general promises that He will not fail me nor forsake me: which though they assure me not that I shall not so fall, yet they assure me that ●e will not so far forsake me, without some heinous neglect of his Grace. 5. And I feel in myself a present detestation of such heinous sins, and a fixed Judgement and Resolution against them: And though I have not power of myself to avoid mutation, and back-sliding, yet I have reason to trust him for the keeping of this Grace, who freely gave it me. And the truth is, though man be mutable, he is not apt to fear the change of his own mind, when he is conscious that it is resolved on sound and unquestionable reason. 6. And it is not nothing, that I have been kept from all such sin till now. 7. And that it is a rare thing for any faithful person, so to fall: And why should I fear that which not one of a multitude ever falleth into. B. And why may not all these reasons comfort others, that are uncertain of their Perseverance in a state of Grace (Allowing but the difference of the degrees of the dangers.) Q. 8. Do you think that your Wife or Children are certain that you will not Murder them. C. No: they cannot be certain. B. Q. 9 Would it not make their lives sorrowful if they knew that you would do it? C. Yes, no doubt. B. Q. 10. What keepeth them from ever tasting of such sorrows at all? C. Such reasons as I before named to you. They know that I am a Husband and father, and have natural affections, not mad, nor wicked, but abhor such a thing, and they know that my love daily causeth me to do them all the good I can; and they see nothing to make them fear the contrary; and such a Villainy is not heard of in many Kingdoms in an Age. B. But they are as uncertain that they shall not by some heinous crime (even the seeking of your death) provoke you. C. Men fear not that which their Judgements and Wills are so averse to and resolved against, as that there is no probability of a Change. B. You see then upon what terms the ancient Fathers, (even Augustine himself that denied certainly of Salvation) and the Martyrs and other Christians of their times, and the most of the Christians now in the world, do hold their comforts: And that uncertainty of Perseverance overthroweth not all solid peace. Q. 11. But doth not the exclusion of Certainty of present sincerity and Justification, much more exclude Comfort, than doth the exclusion of Perseverance alone. C. Yes, no doubt: For to be sure that I am at present in a state of Leg. Jo. Gerhards To. 2. Tract. 13. de Peccat. act. c. 19 n. 92, 93, 94, etc. De differentia peccat. Mort. & Ven. life, and to have very strong probabilities that I shall so live and die, must be much more comfortable than to be uncertain whether I now am or ever was in a state of life. B. If therefore not one of many score or hundreds have a certain knowledge of their sincerity and Justification, who are of your own opinions, are you fit to cry out of others as the destroyers of Christian comfort, on the foresaid account? C. They destroy it by their Doctrine, and so do not we: It is with us, but men's own sin and infirmity that hindereth it. B. Q. 12. What say you to your Doctrines before objected against you? 1. That no man can be certain of Salvation, who is not certain that if he had the strongest Temptations in the world, he should not be overcome by them to fall away. Do not these put the comforts of the weak as hard to it, as their Doctrine doth? C. These are True Doctrines, but Theirs are false. B. That is the controversy, which I am not determining: I only answer your aggravation of uncomfortableness of their Doctrine. The second Crimination. C. Their Doctrine maketh God to be Mutable, and his gifts and calling Pet: Alliac. Camer. n. 1. q. 12. C. Quaelibet rationalis Creatura a Deo praedestinata potest damnari, & quaelibet Reprobata potest Salvari: Quia cuicunque Deus dabit gratiam & gloriam libere dabit: & per Consequens posset non dare: ergo, etc. Sed licet haec conclusio de virtute Sermonis sit vera tamen in sensu Composito intellecta est falsa. Thus all the quarrel is about words. to be liable to repentance; and that one day he loveth a man, and the next day hateth him, one day Justifieth and another condemneth him. B. This charge is injurious, upon gross mistake; and on the like grounds may be laid against yourselves. For, Q. 1. Do you not hold that God hateth all the workers of iniquity? C. Yes: as such. B. Q. 2. And that he that believeth not is condemned already, and that all Infidels and Heathens are unjustified? C. Yes; though God may decree to justify them hereafter. B. Q. 3. But doth not God after Love and Justify such as are converted? C. Yes; none doth deny it. B. Q. 4. If then this prove not God to be mutable, to Justify and Love such as he condemned and hated, why should it prove him mutable to condemn and hate such as he Justified and Loved? I do not say that he doth so; but if he did, or do, it will not prove any change in God. For as he that is One causeth all Diversity and Multiplicity of Being's; so he that is Immutable, causeth innumerable Mutations: The change is in the Creature, and not in God. C. Is it not a change to Hate where he Loved? These are immanent acts. B. No more than to Love where he Hated; In Man such words signify a change, but not in God: For it is not God's Immanent acts as Immanent that are changed, viz. His Activity, understanding or Will in itself: But only that Immanent Act as Objectively Transient (if not effectively); so that it is only, 1. The termination of the essential eternal Act on this or that Object. 2. The Relation of it to that object; 3. The Extrinsic Denomination of it, from that Relation, by Connotation, which are changed and diversified; and this inferreth no change in God. The third Crimination. C. At least they make his Covenant changeable, as condemning a man one day whom it justified the day before. B. Not at all. The Covenants Action is physically none, but only such as some call a Reputative Act; that is, per modum signi; and as the Fundamentum causeth the Relation. God's Legislation was a real Action: But the Law made doth not Act, at all; But improperly, morally, or metaphorically is said to Act, when it doth not; what Action doth the sign post perform? or the post and hand at a cross way? or all the Letters in all your Library which teach you the greatest mysteries? none at all? It is you that are Active on them. What Action do millions of Eggs at the Indies perform every time your Hen layeth? And yet they then have a new Relation of Similitude. So God's Law (nor Mans neither) is not at all changed, while ut instrumentum morale per modum signi & fundamenti, it condemneth the Infidel, and justifieth the Believer, no more than when it justifieth him at conversion whom it condemned before. The change is only (really) in the person. The fourth. Crimination. C. They make God's Covenant to be but Conditional, and deny that absolute promise, I will put my fear in their hearts, and they shall not departed from me. B. I find this Controversy (whether this promise, and that of taking away the hard heart, etc. was Conditional or Absolute, to be harder than sometime I thought it had been. And the determining which of you doth rightliest expound the Scripture is not my business. But, 1. The Jesuits and Lutherans and many Arminians confess, that God hath foretold that certain Individual persons shall persevere and be infallibly saved. 2. That this prediction may well be called a Promise in several respects; 1. In that it is de bono futuro. 2. As it is made to Christ, that he shall see of the travail of his Soul, and that none shall take those that are given him by the Father, out of his hands. 3. As it is made to Mankind in general; that there shall be certain (innominate) persons of them infallibly saved. 4. As it was made to the Israelites in special, that there should be more Grace given them, so that they should not departed from God to Idolatry at their return from Captivity, as they had done (which is the true meaning, I think, of the Text). But I ask of you, Q. 1. Doth the promise called Absolute (of taking away the heart of stone, etc.) give any person a Right beforehand to the benefit? C. Not such a Right as that any one can claim it as his own due, or know that he is the person to whom it belongeth: But such a right as that he is really the man to whom it shall be given. B. So you may say of God's mere secret Decree, or of a mere Prophecy. Q. 2. What comfort then can any man have by that promise, before it is performed, when he knoweth not that he is one that it belongs to? C. No more than that which you say before they grant. Q. 3. Is not this cited by you of the same sort? C. In respect to the first part it is, [I will put my fear into their hearts]; but not as to the second part [They shall not departed from me]. For men that have Gods, fear, may know that it belongs to them., B. It is strange that all the ancient Doctors and Churches for a thousand years, were ignorant of this plain Promise, if it mean that none that have God's fear shall departed from him. But if one say that it speaketh only of the Jews after the Captivity, not turning from God to Idols; and another say, that it conjoineth two distinct benefits promised to certain persons, (whosoever) but doth not make them as receivers of the first, to be formally the Subjects of the second, and so doth not promise to all that have Gods fear, but to those meant in the Text only, that they shall not departed: and if a third say that the promise is conditional; I am not now to decide this controversy: Augustine thought that it was spoken only of the Elect, and not of all that truly feared God. And as Gods promise to the Israelites, that they should be brought out of Egypt, and brought to the Land of Canaan, did not mean that every man that had the first should have the second; As the promise to the Apostles that they should have the Spirit of Miracles or Tongues, and should be saved, did not mean that every one that had that Spirit should be saved; so doth Austin expound, Rom. 8. 30. limiting all the following say to those that Verse 28. are said to be Called according to his purpose. But to decide this is not my present work. The fifth Crimination. C. They make a second Regeneration necessary, unless with the Novatians, they will deny pardon to those that fall after the first. B. Do they say so expressly; or is it only a consequent of their Doctrine? C. It followeth plainly, though they say it not. B. 1. There will be no end of odious accusations, if the Adversaries shall choose what Doctrine men shall be said to hold, as he spineth out consequences; what if they think that your Doctrine unavoidably brings in Anabaptists (the denial of Infant Baptism, I mean). C. That were strange indeed: Some men can draw quid vis ex quo vis. B. Answer this series of connexed Theses. 1. No one falleth away from a state of Justification (that's your Ground). 2. Many Baptised in Infancy prove wicked at Age. 3. Therefore none of those were justified in or before Baptism. 4. Therefore the Justifying Covenant was not sealed to them as to consenting persons (by themselves or Parents) who have a present right to this benefit (else Gods Covenant should be false or fail.) 5. Therefore they received not Christian Baptism: For, 1. Christ never instituted a Baptism, to seal any other Covenant, but that which giveth pardon and Justification. 2. Christ never instituted Baptism, to give only a future pardon to future consenters; but only to invest Sacramently present Consenters (or Covenanters, by themselves or Parents) with present pardon. These two are certain verities, easily proved, whatever some talk of future pardon by Baptism. 6. Therefore they are to be rebaptised. I think I can lose the links of this chain, or confute the last conclusion: But I leave you to your proper work. Davenant and Ward thought it must be done by denying your first Thesis. I assure you the trifling distinctions, of an outward and an inward Covenant, and of the benefit of Church Privileges sealed to all, and Salvation only to the Elect, or of present and future Justification sealed] will not do this difficult business. You must do better, or be Anabaptists. 2. Either it is quoad Nomen or quoad rem that they infer a second Regeneration, not as to the Name: For they so deny it. As to the Thing, 1. Some hold that men indeed may totally fall from special Grace; but that no such are ever recovered: Though other Gross Sins, which are not such a total Apostasy may be pardoned. These cannot be said to hold two Regenerations. 2. The rest say that the word Regeneration (like Generation and Creation) doth not only signify the causing of Holiness in the Soul, but the Order of doing it, that it be Now first done, and not before. As Christ's raising Lazarus was neither Creation nor Generation. So say they, Grace indeed is after infused de novo; but not first: Therefore it is to be called Repentance, and not Regeneration. So that the change they confess, but the Name of Regeneration they reject as incongruous. The sixth Crimination. C. They go against the Doctrine of Augustine, Prosper and Fulgentius. B. This is the rashest charge of all the rest. Beyond all controversy these three Fathers, held that all the Elect persevered; but that some were Justified, Sanctified, Loved God, were in such a state that had they died in, they had been saved, who yet are not Elect, but fall finally away and perish, and that none can ordinarily be certain of perseverance and Salvation, at least but strong confirmed Christians (which Vossius thinketh he excepted, but I cannot prove it). If you cannot have leisure to read Austin himself, read but, 1. What I have said lib. 1. 2. What I said in my Treatise of Perseverance. 3. What Vossius saith Hist. Pelag. de Persever. 4. And the very words in the Jansenists, Paulus Eryn. in his Trias Patrum. In a visible matter of fact, which all the world may see, that man who will deny this (as yet many have done, and even Dr. Kendal till Bishop Usher in my hearing and at my motion satisfied him) doth but tell us how men otherwise pious abuse God's Church, by trusting to their Leaders, and misreporting visible and copious Writings, and founding bitter censures and invectives upon such dreams, and yet thinking that all this is the Work of God. The Lord pardon and heal his Servants hasty partial judging of things and persons, and the bitterness, uncharitableness, injuries, contentions and divisions that have followed thereupon. The just Extenuation of this last Controversy. IN all these things following, the parties are agreed (for the most considerable). 1. That Adam fell from true Righteousness and Holiness, and lost the Spirit. 2. That therefore we cannot argue from the Nature of Holiness alone to prove that it cannot be lost. 3. That as the word Possible relateth to man's Power to do evil and omit good, it is not only Possible to fall away, but too easy: yea, it is not opus potentiae sed Impotentiae, except as Natural Power is exercised in the mere Act, with Moral Impotency. 4. Yea, without Gods preserving Grace, it is not possible to persevere. 5. God hath appointed us much duty to be done that we may not fall away: And among the rest, to discern, and fear the danger of falling away; and in that fear to departed from evil and temptations. 6. God hath promised us Salvation, on Condition that we persevere. 7. God oft threatneth the faithful with damnation, if they fall away, and describeth to us the sin and misery of Apostates. 8. The Justified may lose many degrees of true Grace, and die with far less than once they had, and so become uncapable of that Greater Glory, which they were morally capable of before. 9 It's too possible for them to fall into heinous sin: They are not certain that they shall never commit Adultery, Incest, the Murder of Parents, Wife or Children, etc. nor certain just how oft they may so fall, or not. 10. Such Sins make them so far morally uncapable of Glory, as that See the British Divines Suffrages at Dort, of perseverance. a sound Repentance for them, and from them, and a renewal of Faith, are necessary to full right or moral capacity. 11. God doth not decree any man's perseverance, let him live never so securely, negligently or viciously: For those that do so are fallen already: It is a contradiction, to persevere in holiness, and to live unholily. But God's Decree is ever entire, that such a one shall fear danger, fly temptations, live holily in the use of means, and therein persevere unto the end: He never separated these in his Decrees. 12. Except Hierome truly accuse Jovinian with it, there is not (that I know of) any Father, Christian, or Heretic, that hath written that Lege Vossi, Histor. Pelag. de Perseverant. no truly Justified persons fall finally away from Grace and perish, for above a thousand years after Christ: And it's commonly granted that generally they held the contrary: Even Augustine, Prosper and Fulgentius not excepted. 13. It is confessed to be a sad clog to the contrary opinion, that it is held against the Judgement of the Universal Church for above a thousand years, and so seemeth to bear the imputation of novelty and singularity: Though that be not a sufficient confutation of it. 14. It is confessed that the Greek and Roman Church the Lutherans and Arminians, and most Anabaptists, are against this Doctrine. 15. It is confessed that all these Fathers, and Churches of old, and all these Churches and Christians of late, are not void of the Christian comforts of the Gospel, even of faith and hope of Glory. 16. It is confessed that the Scripture hath many passages, so much seeming to favour both the opinions, as hath made the controversy thus difficult to so many Learned Godly Men: And what the Scripture is, it will be, to the world's end. 17. It is confessed that none can be sure of Salvation or perseverance, who are not first sure of their Sincerity, and Justification. 18. And to be uncertain whether one be a true believer, and justified, is more uncomfortable than to be sure of that, and uncertain of his perseverance. 19 No man can ordinarily be certain that he is Sanctified and Justified, that is not certain of the truth of the Gospel, and hath Grace somewhat strong and active, not clouded by great Soul-wounding Sins, nor frightful or melancholy passions; nor any that through Ignorance is uncertain of the true Nature of the conditions of the Covenant of Grace. 20. Certain experience of the defect of these qualifications, and of men's own Concessions, assureth us, that not one of a multitude of the strict Religious sort, have that which we call proper certainty of their Sincerity, Justification and Salvation: though they hold against the Arminians that certainty of perseverance must be asserted, as that which may be attained by them that are first certain that they are in a state of life. 21. Yet the forementioned knowledge of God's Mercy, Christ's Love and Covenant, with experience and many evidences of great probability may cause even such as are uncertain of their Justification, to live in some good measure of true Christian peace, though mixed with some doubts and fears: Because their Probability is much greater than their cause of fear. And much more may they do so, that doubt only of their perseverance. 22. It must be confessed that the Doctrine that none fall from Justification, hath its temptation also to discomfort, as in the two or three forementioned particulars (which I'll not repeat.) 23. It is confessed that if God should condemn those whom he before Justified, it would argue no change in Him or his Word; but in them alone. 24. It is confessed that some Justified persons (who live in as much sin, as will stand with sincerity) are at present unfit for assurance of perseverance and salvation: For it would not stand with that humbling correction which they are then most fit for. 25. Lastly, it is confessed that this point is no Article of our Creed, nor is an agreement in it necessary to Church-communion or Christian Love, but difference in it must be accounted tolerable. In all this the moderate are commonly agreed. On the other side, 1. It is commonly granted that all that are elected to salvation shall persevere (though how far that election is upon foresight they quarrel.) Cur ergo id quod Apostolis tunc fecit Christus non concedemus pro omnibus praedestinatis fecisse, ut peculiari modo sua merita illis applicaret & perseverantiam eis obtineret? nam si multi sancti pro aliis orantes conversionem eorum & perseverantiam impetrarunt, cur dicemus Christum pro omnibus praedestinatis non orasse, & peculiari suâ oratione tantam gloriam & gratiam illis obtinuisse? Vasquez in 1 Tho. q. 23. a. 8. d. 94. c. 3. 2. It's granted by all that not only such election, but foreknowledge of salvation and perseverance, maketh it Logically Impossible, quoad consequentiam, not to persevere: that is, It Necessarily followeth, [God foreknoweth it: Therefore it will come to pass.] 3. It is commonly granted that God forsaketh none till they forsake him. 4. And that so great is his Goodness that no willing ●oul, that solidly understandeth the Grounds of the Christian faith and hope, and is in Love with God and Holiness, and willing to use means and avoid temptations, hath any reason to vex himself with any such fears, as consist not with a life of greater hope and peace and comfort. And that living by faith on Christ and his Spirit and General promise, they should comfortably Trust him with their souls. 5. It's granted that the more Faith, Love, Holiness and obedience any hath, the nearer they may come to full assurance of persevering: and may live the more confident and joyful lives. 6. Many with Austin hold an Antecedent absolute special Election to faith and perseverance: and that no such elect ones fall away. 7. Many hold that besides Election, a degree of Grace called Confirmation, doth settle some in a certainty of perseverance: and neither the Elect nor Confirmed fall away: And that the confirmed may be certain of their own election, perseverance and salvation. And this seemeth to be the opinion of Origen, Macarius and divers Ancients: Even that God doth with Believers as he did with the Angels, and Adam, to whom he would have given confirming Grace, had he at first overcome. And where faith hath kindled so much LOVE to God and Heaven and Holiness, as that it is become a Divine nature in the soul, and operateth as the Love of Children to Parents, above mere Reason, as a fixed Habit, like a nature, than Grace seemeth to some Confirmed and not loseable. All these Concessions laid together (and more which I could fetch from the most learned Schoolmen,) do show, that though here the difference be real, it is in a point and a degree, where humane frailty, and the difficulty, and the nonnecessity of a fuller understanding it, do fully prove to all sober, self-knowing, loving believers, that it is their duty to bear with one another, without the quenching of brotherly Love, or denying Christian-communion to each other: But the wicked will do wickedly, and none of the wicked will understand: but the wise shall understand, Dan. 12. 10. The Eleventh Day's CONFERENCE. Of Christ's Righteousness imputed: of Faith, Justification, and man's duty; their several parts, to a Christians Comfort. Speakers: Saul, Paul, a Libertine Teacher. CHAP. I. S. SIR, I am now come to you in a greater strait than I was in before: I have met with a Teacher that tells me you are a deceiver, and have all this while misled me, and have taught me to build upon the sand of my own Righteousness, and set me on doing to my own undoing; and that I have not built on the Righteousness of Christ, and therefore all will end in my overthrow and ruin: I was not able to answer him; And I have prevailed with him to come to you, that I may hear you speak together. P. Did not I tell you beforehand of such temptations? and give you instructions for your preservation against them? S. I confess you did: But I find myself insufficient to use them without help when it comes to trial. P. The truth is, Infant Christians will still need the help of their Elders, and of Christ's Ministers, when they have been never so well fore-armed; as you need a Physician in your sickness, after all the preventing directions which he can give you. And you have done well to bring him, and to hear both sides together. Had you trusted to your own understanding, and only disputed it out privately with himself, you might have been enfnared to your danger. I shall willingly confer with him on these two conditions: 1. That you remember that it is You and not Him that I am to satisfy: and therefore when I have satified you, I have done: For to follow him as long as he will talk, will waste more time, than we have to spare. 2. That when you are delivered from this snare, you will remember that you must meet with many more such in the world: The Anabaptist will say as much to you for his way, and the Papist much more for his way; And most of them will affright you with the danger of damnation, if you turn not to them: Therefore when ever you are assaulted by any of them, bring them to me, and hear us together, as you now do. Lib. I am sorry to see how you abuse poor souls, and build them not on Christ, but on themselves! What a deal have you said to this man of Doing and of Working, and how little of Believing? You have set him on tasks of Duty, and he thinketh now to Do this and Live, and to be saved in his own do; his repenting, his praying, his keeping the Lords day; etc. while the poor man knoweth not Jesus Christ, and submitteth not to the Righteousness of God. You will needs be a Teacher of the Law, and bring back poor souls to bondage, that Christ may profit them nothing; but trusting to their own works and righteousness for life, they may fall from grace, and be found in their nakedness and sin. P. Sir, these General exclamations do but tell us, that there is something that you differ from us in, but tell us not what. If you are a lover of truth, and will speak to edification, tell us distinctly what are the points of our doctrine which you dislike: and let us debate them one by one. Lib. Among many others the chief are these, I. That you must not have men come to Christ till they are prepared. II. That you set men on Repenting, and Doing, and Working for salvation, and so teach them to trust in a Righteousness of their own; and do not tell them that All Christ's Righteousness is ours being imputed to us, and that Believing is our Conversion, to which you are to call men: If they Believe, they have a perfect Righteousness in Christ. III. That you overthrew the Gospel, in making it a Law. IU. And you make the new Covenant to be made with us, when Christ is the only party in Covenant with God. V And you make the new Covenant to have Conditions, and so to be the same with the old. VI You make Justifying faith to be a believing in Christ as a Teacher and Lawgiver, that you may lead in works: and not a mere Believing in him for Righteousness. VII. You make Faith to justify as a condition of our performance, and not merely an Instrument of our Justification, or apprehending Christ. VIII. You make faith in itself to be imputed to us for Righteousness, and not Christ only the object of faith. IX. That God is made Mutable by you, and forgiveth and justifieth them when they believe, whom he did not justify from eternity. X. That a justified man must be afraid lest his sin should unjustify him again. XI. You make men think that they are able to believe of themselves. XII. You call men to Duttes, and to Mortification, before they believe and are regenerate. XIII. Instead of the Witness of the Spirit, you comfort men by the Evidence of their own holiness and righteousness. These with abundance more, are the errors, by which you corrupt and deceive poor souls. P. Because Christ would have his Servants as Teachable as Children, and not to strive by needless disputes, I pray you be you the Teacher, and I will be the Learner, and tell me what you would have us believe in these particulars which you have named. And first of the first. Lib. I. Men must be taught to come presently to Christ without staying for Preparations, and not discouraged, delayed or kept off. The first Charge. P. By [Coming] I suppose you mean [Believing and Accepting.] I pray you teach me further then: Quest. 1. Must men believe in Christ before they Hear of him? Lib. No: How shall they believe on him of whom they have not heard? P. Quest. 2. Must they Believe that he is the Mediator between God and man, before they have learned that there is a God: and that this God is True, and Just▪ Quest. 3. Or before they have learned that man is a sinner▪ and deserveth death? and what sin is? Quest. 4. Or before they have learned that we cannot redeem and save ourselves? Lib. No: That were a contradiction. P. Quest. 5. Must men Believe that Christ is the Son of God, and the Saviour of his Church, before they have learned what it is to be the Son of God? or what a Saviour is? and what is the salvation which he hath wrought, and will vouchsafe us? before they understand the Articles of the Christian faith; that he was conceived, born, suffered, was buried, rose, ascended, is glorified, and the like? Lib. No man can Believe that which he doth not Understand. P. Quest. 6. Must men take Christ for their Saviour, before they hearty perceive that they want a Saviour, through sin and misery▪ and that they are lost for ever if he save them not? and that no other can do it? Lib. No: this is an impossibility and contradiction. P. Quest. 7. Must a man take Christ for his Saviour, before he is willing to be saved? Lib. Yes: He must come to Christ to make him willing, and not think that he must bring willingness with him: This is your Legal doctrine. P. Quest. 8. Is not Accepting Christ, an Act of the will? a willingness that he shall be my Saviour? And do you say, that a man must be willing to have Christ before he is willing? and not stay till he is willing? Lib. You would make me ridiculous: I say not, that he must take Christ before he is willing; But he must come to Christ for a will. P. In despite of edification you will stick in the Metaphor [Come to Christ]: What mean you by coming? Lib. Poor blind soul! If you had been taught of God you would have known what it is to Come to Christ! But you will not come to him. P. With such exclamations you cheat the ignorant! Cannot you tell your own meaning? What mean you by [Coming to Christ]? Lib. I mean Believing in him, and casting myself wholly on him. P. Still you stick in Metaphors: Can you cast yourself upon him for a will, before you are Willing? Is not that casting yourself, the act of your will, which we call Trust or Affiance? Lib. You would hid your Lies with words! You teach that men must have good desires before they come to Christ; as if they must bring with them good desires of their own, or by Preparatory Grace! P. Quest. 9 Can a man Accept of Christ as a Saviour to save him from sin and punishment and God's displeasure, and to justify, sanctify and glorify him, before he hath any desire to be saved from sin or punishment, or God's displeasure, or to be justified, sanctified or glorified? Lib. He that hath no such Desires, must come to Christ for them, and believe. P. Still [Coming] must hid your sense: Doth Christ give these Desires to be saved, before we Take him for our Saviour by Consent? Or after? Lib. You are catching me by craft. If I say [Before,] you will say, Then it is Preparatory to our Consent. If I say [After,] you will say, that it is impossible to consent to the Means till a man desires the end; and to Accept a Saviour before he is willing to be saved. But besides this, you tell men that they must not come to Christ, till they are broken▪ hearted, and sorrow for their sins: You heat the Win● of the Gospel so hot, that it shall burn men's lips, and then invite them to it. P. Quest. 10. Is it possible for a man Hearty to perceive that he is a heinous sinner, and hath displeased God abused mercy; hilled Christ, undone his soul, and wronged others, and not be sorrowful for it? nor be vile in his own eyes, or feel that he is a lost sinner? Lib. No: but all this he must come to Christ for, or Believe for. P. Do you mean that he must first Believe that the Gospel is True, and that Christ is an Offered Saviour; or else, do you mean that he must first Accept him as offered for a Saviour; or do you mean that he must first Believe that he is his Saviour accepted? or do you mean that he must first Trust in him as his Saviour? All these are different acts. Lib. You would confound us with your distinctions to keep out the light: This is the trick of such carnal Sophisters. P. Saul, You hear what this man hath to say against us. You hear that when he hath cried out against Preparations to Believing, that here are ten several Preparations which he cannot deny. I will now tell you what is our Doctrine and the truth, about Preparations. We hold that Christ is the True Light who lighteth every man that cometh to God; but in various degrees, by various means: He is the Lord of Nature as its Restorer, Rom. 14. 9 All power in Heaven and Earth is given to him, and all things put into his hand, Matth. 28. 18, 19 John 17. 2, 3. John 5. 22. He teacheth those that have not the Gospel, (and those that have it, first) by the Light of Nature, many Natural Truths, as that there is a God who is Almighty, Wise and Good, that we own him our Love and duty, that he is Just, etc. As the Sun enlighteneth the earth at its rising before it appear itself, so doth Christ the world. By the Gospel, he teacheth us more, even supernatural truths, about himself and our Redemption, etc. Some commoner co-operation of his Spirit goeth along with the Gospel, convincing and moving many that are not yet (or at all) converted: Those that Christ converteth savingly, are first in order brought to understand the Meaning of the word, and next to Believe the Truth of it, and so to Believe what Christ is, and what he hath done and suffered for us, and what need we have of him by sin and misery, and how freely he is offered to our salvation: And they are moved so seriously to consider all this, till it prevail with their wills, first to desire not only their own deliverance from Hell and misery, as all men may do, but also from a state of sin; and then to desire Christ as a Saviour to effect it, and bring them home to God: And believing that he is freely offered to them, they next thankfully Accept him by consent, and Trust him and give themselves to him. And all this is Christ's own work upon them: but in this order and by these degrees. So that coming to Christ signifieth divers acts, of which one is preparatory to the other. And whereas he tells you, that we keep men off from Christ till they are prepared, judge you whether he speak truth or falsehood. Do we use to call to sinners and say [Do not believe that Christ Reconcileth God and man till you first believe that there is a God. Do not make haste and believe that Christ will save you from misery before you believe that you are miserable: Or that he will wash away and pardon your sin, before you believe that you are sinners and need a pardon: Do not consent that Christ shall be your Saviour before you are willing to be saved; or before you believe that he hath died, rose, etc. and is offered you.] What need we persuade men from Impossibilities? Is it we, or their own necessity that keepeth them from Consenting before they Believe, and from believing before they Understand? We do as it were entreat poor sinners who love their dungeon, to open the windows that the Light may come in: And these men rail at us, and say, that we persuade men not to let in the light till they have first opened the windows! What need we do that, when it is impossible to do otherwise? We persuade men to believe that they are sick, that they may go to the Physician: And they rail at us for persuading men to delay going to the Physician till they think they are sick. We exhort sinners that are asleep in sin, to awake and run the Christian race: And they rail at us, as if we persuaded them not to run it till they are awake. So that the preaching of these men according to their Doctrine must be thus: [Come presently to Christ; stay not to hear the Gospel, or to consider of it, or to understand the meaning of it, before you Trust Christ as your Saviour: Presently cast yourselves upon him before you know who he is, or what he hath done for you; and trust him for the pardon of your sin before you perceive that you are sinners, or feel any need of pardon: Stay not for a will, but Take him or Accept him for your Saviour before you are willing of him, or willing to be saved.] Do you think this is the only Gospel-preaching? I pray you Sir, tell me yourself, How would you preach to the Indians if you were Mr. eliot's assistant? or to any other Heathens? Would you at the first word call them to cast themselves upon Christ for salvation? before you taught them to know that there is a God, or a Law, or sin, or punishment, & c? Lib. The Apostle called men presently to Believe in the Lord Jesus without delay, Acts 2. and Acts 16. and Acts 8. etc. And so should we. P. 1. What talk you of Delay? Are we for Delay, any more than you? The Angel, Acts 12. that smote Peter and bid him arise and go forth, was not for his delay, because he bid him not go forth before he arose, and before his fetters were off. 2. And you forget that the Apostles spoke to Jews who had the Preparatory belief of a God, and of the Law, and of the promise of the Messiah before. 3. And yet they first humbled them for sin, Acts 2. 37. till they were pricked at the heart; And the Jailor first trembleth, and both say, What must we do? Is this your kind of proof? And why did all the ancient Churches from the Apostles days teach men the Creed or Christian Doctrine, and Catechise them long before they baptised them? And I think the Anabaptists will do so now: And I think you would be loath yourselves to gather your Churches from among Heathens, Mahometans or Infidels, till you had taught and prepared them as much (at least) as we require. But let us hear whether in the second point you have any better or wiser Doctrine to teach us? CHAP. II. Lib. II. You should teach men to believe that all our own Righteousness is as filthy rags, abominable to God, and to be cast away with our sins: And that we are neither to trust to, nor to look at any thing in ourselves, for justification, or acceptance with God, or to procure eternal life: But that Christ hath both satisfied for our sins, and fulfilled the Law of Innocency for us. God imputed our sins to him, and he was by Imputation the greatest sinner in all the world; the greatest murderer, thief, fornicator, perjured person, rebel and ungodly man: For the sins of all the Elect did meet upon him, and were his: Therefore he was forsaken of God, and suffered the same Hell that we deserved. And God imputeth all his satisfaction and righteousness so to us, as that in God's account all the Elect (or at least All believers) did satisfy and fulfil all the Law in and by Christ: For he was our surety; and our Legal Person, though not our Natural person. So that what Christ was we were, and what Christ did we did, and what Christ suffered we suffered, in God's ●●count or imputation: And so we are as righteous as Christ himself, because all Christ's righteousness is ours. And we have no other, nor need no other Righteousness, at least in order to our Justification: This Righteousness of Christ is it by which we are Justified by the Law of works, which saith, [Obey perfectly, or Do this and Live;] For we Did all that is required in and by Christ: In this Righteousness only God accep●●th us: We have Right to it from eternity by God's Decree of Election: and our Consciences perceive our right upon our Believing; And to set men on Doing themselves for Life, when they should only Do from Life, is to deceive them and undo them. P. If these words did offer me any Light which we had not before received, I should gladly learn, and give you thanks. But if such talk as this, be all that must show you to ●e wiser than your neighbours, and ●●●●rant you to rail at them as Legal Preacher●, and such as ●●●●●●●● on by works, my soul must pity you, and all such poor sinners ●●●●●●●bled or seduced by you. But because this Head contain●●● many particular doctrines, I pray you let us speak to them in order. I. And first about our own Righteousness. And seeing I am the Lea●●er, I must crave your answer as fi●ted to my own doubts. And Quest. 1. Do you know how many times the words Just, Righteous and Righteousness are used in the Bible? Lib. No; I have not taken such an account as to tell you. P. Let us see the Concordance. Here you find it about six hundred and twelve times used, besides the words [Justify, Justifying and Justification.] Quest. 2. Show me how many of these six hundred Texts do not speak of such Inherent or Performed personal Righteousness, as is distinct from such as you describe in your sense of Imputation. Try whether one of twenty or forty or an hundred have such a sense. Lib. Not if such false teachers as you must be the expositor of them. P. Let us try some of them, and be you the expositor. 1 Joh. ●. 29. every one which doth Righteousness is born of God. 1 Joh. 3. 7, 10. he That personal Righteousness is necessary. that doth Righteousness is righteous. Whosoever doth not righteousness is not of God. Lib. You choose out those texts which countenance your own ends. P. My question is but, Whether God's word talk of any Righteousness, which consisteth in any thing that is in or of ourselves: Lib. Yes: that cannot be denied: But not in order to our Justification. P. Of the use we must speak ●non. Quest. 3. I next ask you then Wreather all these texts be not True? and whether we may not speak 〈…〉 Lib. Yes: We question not the Truth, but the meaning of the 〈…〉 P. Quest. 4. Is this Righteousness a● such (in that 〈…〉 have it) abominable to God▪ Doth not God command it▪ and require●● to obey his Laws sincerely? And doth he hate the obedience of his ●●●● Is not Holiness his Nature and Image in us: And doth he hate his Image and the Divine Nature? Is it not the mark of a Malignant to be a Hater of Holiness? yea of the Devil himself? And can you think that God ●●●● Hater of Holiness? What I he that hath said, Be holy, for I am ●●●●, and Without Holiness none shall see God▪ Lib. If you were not an unholy deociver; you would not intimate by such questions, as if I took God to be a Hater of Holiness. P. Is it not Holiness which the Scripture and we mean by Inherent Righteousness? Lib. But God hateth it not as Holiness, but as mixed with sin. P. Do you Believe, and Love God sincerely, and Love the Godly, or not? Lib. Better than such as you do, or else woe to me. P. And doth God Hate all your Faith and Love because it is mixed with sin? If he do, What difference between it and wickedness? or between you and a wicked man? God can but hate what they do: and doth he so by all that you do also? Why then may not your Neighbours imitate God, and hate all that you do? why may they not then deride and persecute you, for that which is hateful to God? For shame never more blame then your scorners or persecutors. Lib. I do not say that God hateth my Faith, Love, Humility and patience as such, but as mixed with sin. Therefore properly it is sin that God hateth, and not my Faith and Love itself. P. And is all come to this? What mean you then to rail at us that say the same? We all say that God hateth our sin, and the faulty imperfection of our holiness and obedience? and what say you more? Lib. But you say not that God hateth your Righteousness for the sin that cleaveth to it, though not for itself; as we do. Your Goodness is like an Apple fallen into the dirt or poisoned; and you are for wiping it, and keeping it: but God and wise men abhor it for the filth, and cast it away. P. Then it seems you cast away all Love to God and man, all faith, all honesty and obedience, chastity and temperance, because sin cleaveth to it. Lib. By casting it away, I do not mean, giving over to Love God and obey him, and turning wickedly to the contrary: but I mean that I count it dung in order to my Justification. P. I perceive by Teaching me, you are but Learning to speak yourself. I further ask you, Doth not God Love the Faith, Love, Obedience and Holiness of his servants, notwithstanding all their faults and imperfections? Joh. 16. 27. The Father himself loveth you, because you have Loved me and believed, etc. 2 Cor. 9 7. God loveth a cheerful giver. Psal. 11. 7. The righteous Lord Loveth righteousness; with many the like passages. Doth he not Love his Image? Lib. That is, because we are in Christ; and our persons and graces and duties are accepted all in him, being perfumed with his righteousness, and all our sins and imperfections pardoned and covered thereby: And as our Graces are the works of the holy Ghost, and not primarily as ours. P. Are you come so far already? All this is held not only by us, but by the Papists also. You confess then that for the merits of Christ's Righteousness, our sins are pardoned, and not only our persons, but our faith, Love and obedience, accepted and loved though culpably imperfect and mixed with sin. And so all your noise is come to nothing, and you say as we. II. But having found that we must have Inherent Righteousness, let us Of Reward and Wor●thiness or Merit. next consider What use we may make of it, and how far it may and must be valued and trusted to. And Quest. 1. Tell me whether God hath made any promise of a Reward to it, or not? Turn to the word [Reward] in your Concordance, if you remember not the Texts, and see. Lib. Your Legal principles and spirits makes the Scripture a snare and a stumbling block to you, as Christ himself is? When God talketh of Reward metaphorically, you take it properly, as if we could merit any thing of God. P. I only ask you, Whether God hath promised us a Reward? Lib. Yes: But it is a Reward properly to Christ, by whose grace we live, and not to ourselves. P. When Christ saith, [Great is your Reward in Heaven: and your father shall reward you openly,] Matth. 5. 12. & 6. 4, 6. and [you shall not lose your reward;] and Heb. 11. 26. [he had an eye to the recompense of reward;] and Heb. 11. 6. [God is a Rewarder of them that diligently seek him, etc.] is the meaning, [Great is Christ's Reward in Heaven, and God will reward Christ openly, and is a Rewarder of Christ only as diligently seeking him? etc.] Lib. You would make me ridiculous. I mean that it is for Christ's Merits or Righteousness which he did himself, and not for any thing in us or done by us, that we are rewarded. P. Say you so? Doth diligent seeking him, Heb. 11. 6. and praying and giving alms in secret, Matth. 6. 1, 2, 3, 4. and suffering for Christ, Matth. 5. 11, 12. and feeding, visiting, etc. Christ in his members, Matth. 25. etc. mean only that which Christ did, and not we? Is it Christ's prayers, and alms, and charity and sufferings that the text meaneth? Look over many such texts and judge. Lib. Still you would make my words contemptible. It is our duties that are rewarded, but it is not for themselves or any worth that is in them, but for the merits of Christ only. P. If God have no respect to anything in our duties in his reward, tell me, 1. Why are they said so oft to Please him? and we are commanded to do those things that Please him? and 1 Joh. he heareth us because we do those things that Please him. 2. And why then doth he not as well, for Christ's merits or Righteousness, reward our sinning, our folly and vanity, our idleness, our dreams, or all our natural indifferent actions, as our Love, and holiness? 3. And why do you and all men regard or reward a loving thankful obedient child, more than one that will scorn you and spit in your face? And why do all Princes and Rulers make any difference between the righteous and the wicked, a rogue and an honest man? And why do Churches so strictly try the Godliness of their members? Why do you make any difference in your Communion? What meaneth Church discipline? And why are you yourselves so desirous to be esteemed Godly persons, and differenced from others, if God himself do make no difference? And how is the righteous more excellent than his neighbour? and called Gods jewels and the apple of his eye, his peculiar people, a holy Nation, and his treasure? And why is it made the mark of a faithful man, Psal. 15. 4. that a vile person is contemned in his eyes, but he honoureth them that fear the Lord, if there be nothing in holiness and obedience any more than in sin, for God to reward? Lib. You delight to make me seem foolish, by your Cavilling! You might easily understand that I did not mean that good works are no more Rewardable than Idleness or Evil: But that they are not rewarded for their proper worthiness, as being faulty and so unjustifiable with God; but it is for the merits of the Righteousness of Christ, imputed to believers. P. When you understand what you should say, you will speak intelligibly: But be not angry that your confusion is laid open to you. About Merit and Imputation we must speak distinctly afterwards. That no works of ours are Rewardable till their faultiness is pardoned, nor Rewardable according to the Law of Innocency, nor upon any terms but those of the Covenant of Grace, which freely giveth salvation to penitent believing accepters, which free gift, and acceptance of our duties, is purchased by the meritorious righteousness of Christ; all this we hold as fast as you do. We dream not of any access to God but by a Mediator, nor of any acceptance of ourselves or our duties, works or righteousness, but on the account of Christ's merits and intercession, by which the sins of our best works are pardoned, and life eternal freely given to obedient believers. Of the worthiness of our works we must speak more anon. Lib. I smell whereabout you are: You make us hear the Pope that is in your belly: You mean as the Papists, that Christ hath merited that your works shall be meritorious. P. Hath not Christ Merited that our holy Love and obedience be Rewarded? Lib. Yes: but what's that to Merit? P. Hath he not by his Merit made them Rewardable? Lib. Yes, or else how can they be Rewarded? P. Do you not know that by Merit the Papists themselves profess that they mean nothing but Rewardableness? At least do we Protestants mean anything else by it? Lib. What the Papists or you mean, you best know yourselves; but I know what you say: And you both talk like the ignorant enemies of Grace. P. Do you include the Jansenists who say that all Christ's Grace now is nothing but his irrestible efficient operation of Holy Love in the soul: and that God moveth us to it necessarily or insuperably? and that he now giveth no Grace merely sufficient, which is not effectual? or merely effectual to make us Able, but also to make us Act? and that now he leaveth nothing to our freewill in Christ's gracious operations, but giveth in act all the Will and all the merit that men have? and that Fear and obedience of a Law written, is our own Legal Righteousness, (though it respect the new Law;) but Christ's Righteousness which he giveth us as distinct from our Legal Righteousness, is only his Spirit, or Love put into the heart? Lib. I do not believe that any Papist is so much for free grace. P. But if you deny it, and the book be opened, and it found there written, is it nothing to you to be found in falsehood? Lib. But I say not as Jansenius, that it is the Law written in us, but Christ's Righteousness imputed to us, which is our Righteousness. P. Did you not even now confess an Inherent Righteousness? Lib. Yes; but not to our Justification. P. Of that more anon: By Justification, they mean Making us holy. Lib. But Jansenius is not a common Papist: why tell you me of him? P. My business here is not to justify the Papists; but to understand your mind: I do not think you know what the Papists hold in it. Lib. I am not ashamed to be a stranger to their Books: But I will bring one when you will, that shall open the abomination of their doctrine of merit; Till then it's you to whom I speak. P. Content: we will make another day's work of that. Tell me then whether it be Names or Things that you make so much ado about? Lib. Both: we like not ill names: and worse false doctrine. P. What are the Names that displease you? Is Reward or Rewardableness one? Lib. No: if you will understand them well: For they are Scripture words. P. Is worthiness one of them? Lib. Yes; if you will say that we are worthy of the Reward or of salvation. P. Do you not know that the Scripture usually so speaketh? Rev. 3. 4. They shall walk with me in white; for they are worthy: 2 Thes. 1. 5, 11. Worthy of the Kingdom of God: 1 Thes. 2. 12. Walk worthy of God: Luke 20. 35. That are accounted worthy to obtain that world— 21. 36. That you may be counted worthy to scape all these things, and to stand, etc. Matth. 10. 11. Inquire who in it is worthy— 13. If the house be worthy, let your peace remain. If it be not worthy, let your peace return— 37. He that loveth Father or Mother more than me, is not worthy of me. Matth. 22. 8. They which were bidden were not worthy. Acts 13. 46. Ye judge yourselves unworthy of everlasting life— Is not this Scripture? Lib. By [Worthy] the Text meaneth not merit, but fitness to receive. P. Our question is not now of the Meaning, but the Name you know. Lib. I am not against the Scripture names, if well understood. P. Merit is a name I perceive that you are against. And we make so small a matter of words, that you shall choose any other name of the same signification, and we will forbear this, rather than offend you: But yet tell me, Q. 1. What if the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were translated Deserving and Merit, would it not be as true a translation as Worthy and Worthiness, when it is the very same thing that is meant? Nay, when Merit of Condignity is the highest kind, which the Papists themselves mention and are reproved for, do you not hereby imply that Condignity is a bigger word than bare Merit? Quest. 2. And I ask you, Whether all the ancient Teachers of the Churches since the Apostles, whose Writings are come down to us, do not familiarly apply these names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Meritum to believers? And if you persuade men that all these Teachers and Churches were Papists, you will persuade most that believe you to be Papists too. But such is the success of overdoing! Quest. 3. And I would know, Whether in common speech, Reward and Merit or Desert be not Relatives, as Master and Servant, Husband and Wife are? Is there any Reward which is not Meriti Praemium, the Reward of Merit? What mean you yourself else by the word Reward? Lib. I mean God's free Gift without respect to merit or desert. P. Doth not the usage of the World distinguish between a mere Gift and a Reward? What if you give money to the next man you meet without respect to any thing in him, will you call it a Reward? Review all the Scripture Texts that speak of a Reward, and see whether they have no relation to any foregoing act in man. God gave Christ himself to the lapsed world: Was this Gift of Christ a Reward? God gave some Prophets, some Apostles, etc. and giveth the Gospel to Infidel Nations: Is this Gift a Reward? or ever so called? Your humane nature is God's Gift: but is it a Reward? Nay, will you say, that the first Grace is a Reward; which is said to be Pelagianism? Lib. Well: but Rewards are Gods second Gifts as they follow the former, without respect to Worthiness or Merit. P. That cannot be neither: If God first Give the world a Saviour, and then give them the Covenant of Grace and Pardon through him, is this a Reward? If Christ first heal the sick man, and then cause him to walk, or if Peter and John first heal the lame man, and then cause him joyfully to leap, etc. is the second a Reward? If an Infidel's Life be first preserved, and then the Gospel given him, is this a Reward? Lib. No: but a Reward supposeth only our Fitness to receive a free gift, which is called our worthiness, and not our Merit. P. Do you mean our Natural fitness or our Moral? A man is Naturally fit for his food, when he is hungry: Will you say therefore that his food is his Reward for being hungry? Lib. Well; Let it be then his Moral, or rather his Spiritual fitness. P. Your explications are but darkening: Spiritual is either Natural or Moral as well as corporal. The soul as a Spirit is in its nature fit to understand common things here in the body; Is this understanding its Reward for being a Spirit? But Heaven is a Reward. Lib. Well: Call it a Moral fitness if you will: but what is that to Merit? P. It is so much to it, as to tell the world that such as you, do revile others for holding the same which you are forced to profess yourself, and wrangle about mere words, and know it not. For by [Merit] is meant nothing else but [A moral aptitude for Reward] or that Rewardableness which consisteth in Moral Good or Evil, as freely done and had, and so acceptable to God as our Governor. But tell me next what word will you choose to serve instead of Merit, that we may agree in it? Lib. I know not what words to use that please you, when we are not agreed about the thing signified: I hold not any Reward in proper sense, but only free gift, and therefore how can I tell you what word to use instead of merit? I think the word Reward is used but figuratively. P. Christ saith, [Matth. 6. 4, 6. Your Father which seethe in secret shall Reward you openly: Col. 3. 24. Ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance: Heb. 10. 35. Cast not away your confidence which hath great recompense of reward: Heb. 11. 26. He had respect to the recompense of reward: v. 6. He that cometh to God must believe that God is, and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him: Mat. 16. 27. He shall reward every man according to his works.] I ask you again, What is meant here by Rewarding? Lib. I tell you again, the meaning is, that as men show their liking of a thing that pleaseth them, by a proper Reward, so God showeth his liking of our duty by a free gift of some greater good, which therefore after the manner of men he calleth a Reward. P. If it be a Metaphor, I ask you but the Meaning and Reason of the name. If it be because it followeth our duty, than every gift that followeth our duty, is a reward, without any further respect to that duty, but the order of time: but that you denied before; Else Christ's Incarnation, and the Apostles, and the Gospel, and all that ever followeth our duty, should be a Reward. But if you mean, that it is called a Reward, as it is a sign of God's approbation of our duty only, then if God should tell men that he Approveth of their duty, it would be a reward, though he immediately annihilate them, or should never do them any good: which I think you will not say. If you say, that all three must concur, viz. that it be 1. A Benefit or Gift, 2. Following duty, 3. Signifying an Approbation of it, you come almost up to all that is asserted by them that you quarrel with: If God should by some benefit to one man signify that he approved the duty of another, or of a thousand more, and should annihilate them all; this were no reward to them. Therefore when you have talked all that you can devise to say, you must say, that there is some Fitness in the duty for that approbation and benefit, and that the Relation of the Gift to that Fitness, is it that denominateth it a Reward: And that though there be no Cause in man of any Acts of God ex parte agentis, yet are there Causes in man of our Reception and of the effects, ex parte recipientis; And so that man's Rewardable duties are his Moral aptitude, cause or condition, why he rather than one that doth otherwise receiveth that Gift, which is called the Reward. But we are gone from our question de nomine, and have already dispatched also that de re: Have you any more to say of any Matter besides words (in which you confess we speak as the Scripture doth) in which we differ? Lib. Seeing you like not my explications, tell me fully what you hold yourselves, and then I shall better know whether we differ in sense or words only. P. It's great pity for the Church's sake, but you would have understood that first, before you reviled us as Legal, and not have spoken evil of what you understand not. But it's better now, than not at all. Our judgement is as followeth: I. That God hath three Essential Attributes, which he expresseth and glorifieth in his works; His Vital Power or Activity, his Wisdom, and his Will or Love: That all these are and operate conunctly; but yet each appeareth in eminency in its special effects: That God's Power eminently appeareth in the Being and Motion of things; and his Wisdom eminently in the ORDER of things; and his LOVE in the Goodness and Perfection of things: That accordingly he is, 1. The first Efficient, 2. The chief Dirigent, 3. The ultimate Final Cause of all. II. That as to man, he is Related to us, 1. As our Creator, the Cause of our Being, Nature and natural Motion, as the Fountain of Nature: where Power is most Eminent. 2. As our Governor, and the God of ORDER, and the Dirigent Cause; where (all Attributes concur, but) Wisdom is most Eminent: 3. As our most Bounteous Benefactor, and most Amiable Good and End, where Goodness or Love is most eminent. III. That accordingly God is the Author of Nature, Grace and Glory; and since the fall, of Natura, Medela, Sanitas, of our Nature, our ORDER and Gracious Government, and of our Holiness and Happiness; and so is our Creator, Redeemer and Sanctifier. iv That neither Man, Angel or any Creature can possibly have any good, but by God's gift, any more than they can make themselves or a World: And this Gift must needs be free, seeing the Creature hath nothing that is good, but what it hath of God, and nothing to give him that can add to him, or but what is absolutely his own. V God is to us 1. Our OWNER, 2. Our RULER, 3. Our BENEFACTOR antecedently. And no man can Merit of God as he is an Owner or a mere Benefactor; for so he freely disposeth as he pleaseth of his own: But only of God as a Ruler, as is after opened. VI Therefore it is blasphemy to hold that man or Angel can Merit of God in point of proper Commutative Justice, which giveth in exchange one thing for another, to the benefit of the receiver: For as is said, God cannot Receive any addition to his perfection, nor have we any thing but his own to give him. Luke 17. 10. we are thus unprofitable servants as to a Proprietor in point of Commutation; though the unprofitable servant be da●●ned, Mat●h. 25. 30. in another sense; that is, who improveth not his Master's stock to the benefit of himself and others, and the pleasing of his Ruler. VII. Man's Duty therefore meriteth only in point of Governing distributive Justice: And not every way neither in respect of that; For Governing Justice is distinguished according to the Law that governeth us: which is either 1. The Law of Innocency, or 2. The Law of Grace: And no man since the fall can Merit of God according to the Justice of the Law of Innocency, which exacteth personal perfection. VIII. The Law of Grace is in its first notion, a free gift of Christ, Pardon and Right to Life Eternal by Adoption, to all that will Accept it believingly as it is offered, that is, according to the nature of the Gift. And this Gift or Conditional promise and pardon no man can merit: For Christ's perfect Righteousness and Sacrifice hath already merited it for us; and so hath left us no such work to do: Nor is there the least place for any humane Merit or Rewardableness from God, but on supposition of 1. Christ's Merits and Meritorious Righteousness, 2. And of this free gift or Act of Oblivion and Life, already made to us without our desert. IX. But yet this is not a mere Gift, but also a true Law: God is still our God and Governor, and Christ is Lord of all, Rom. 14. 9 He that is a King and Ruler hath his Laws and Judgement: That which is a Gift in the first respect, hath 1. It's condition, 2. Many commanded duties, and so is a Law of Grace in other respects. And it is only in respect to this Law of Grace that man is Rewardable, or can Merit. X. The Gift is from God as Benefactor, considered as Good and in itself. But it is from God as Sapiential Rector quoad ordin●m conferendi, as to the Order and Reason why one man rather than another receiveth it. So that we Merit not of God as Benefactor nor as Rector by the Law of Innocency or Works; nor yet as to the Value or Goodness of the Benefit, which is a free Gift: But only of God as Rector by the Law of Grace, which regulateth the Reception of his free gifts, merited by the perfect Righteousness of Christ, and so only as to the Order and Reason why one more than another receiveth that free gift. As if a Father hath many Sons, One living obediently, Others playing the prodigals, and upon his freely-offered pardon and grace one receiveth it thankfully, and the other refuseth it scornfully: Here both the obedient and the penitent son, have all upon free gift, as to Commutative Justice; but on various terms: And yet both merit in point of paternal Governing Justice; but very differently: One meriteth of strict Fatherly Justice; The other only of a forgiving Father, quite on other terms: And it is a Comparative Merit, by which he is fit for pardon than the Sons that despise it, and spit in the Father's face. XI. God as a Benefactor and a Governor, giveth some benefits Antecedently to any duty of man: And these are never a Reward to us, (but of Christ perhaps, in some instances.) As Legislation, so the benefits of it, and that attend it, are before Reward and Judgement. But other benefits are given by God both as Benefactor and Legislator, upon condition of some duty of ours in the Antecedent gift, and so in the Judicial sentence and execution that duty is rendered as the reason of our actual Right to them: And these are a Reward. XII. Our first Grace is no Reward, nor merited, because it antecedeth all conditional duty of ours. XIII. Our first Reception of Right to Christ, Pardon and Life, being given on the condition of penitent Acceptance in faith, may be called a Reward, because they are consequent gifts on condition: But because the condition is so slender a thing as the thankful Acceptance of a free gift, Divines agree not of the fitness of the name [Reward and Merit] while they wholly agree about the thing. But our after-mercies and final Glory, being promised on the condition of such a faith as worketh by Love, obedience and improvement of God's mercies in good works, and patience, perseverance and conquest of the Flesh, the World and the Devil; therefore they have more unanimously agreed not only de re, but that the names of Reward and Rewardableness or Merit and Worthiness are here fit; but used only in the fore explained sense. XIV. And though the Scripture oftest use the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which most properly signifieth wages, which sounds as more than praemium a Reward, yet we wholly grant you that this is figuratively used, and that no man deserveth wages or any thing commutatively of God: But every Scripture Metaphor hath its reason; And the reason of this is evident. Though God cannot be Profited, he can be Pleased. And his Will or Pleasure is the End of all his Government and Works: And he is Pleased most in that which doth the World, the Church and ourselves the most good, for in that he is most glorified: Now he so maketh his Laws and Promises, as if our own and other men's good were his, and his Reward for our Pleasing by Order, Justice and Goodness, he calleth wages metaphorically, being instead of profiting him. XV. By all which it is most obvious that we are not at all the less, but the more beholden to God, for the Merit or Rewardableness of our actions: For as all the Benefit is free Gift, so it is of his Grace that we do any thing that is good, and that he accepteth it as Rewardable: And if it be any honour to a man to be good rather than bad, and the Righteous be more excellent than his neighbour, it is an addition of mercy, that God will honour those that honour him, and commandeth others so to do, Psal. 15. 4. XVI. And now the case is very plain, both that Reward and Rewardableness (called Merit) there is, and why it is and must be so. 1. How can God be a Governor, and have a Law, and be a Judge, and Righteous in all this, if faith and godliness be not Rewardable? It is the second Article in our faith, and next believing that There is a God, that He is the Rewarder of them that diligently seek him, Heb. 11. 6. And when you would extirpate all faith and godliness on pretence of crying down Merit, you may see what overdoing tends to. 2. The very nature of all God's Laws and Promises evidently infer a Reward: Without it there were no such thing as Faith, Hope, Desire, Joy, Content, forsaking all: Psal. 19 11. In keeping them there is great reward. 58. 11. Verily there is a Reward for the righteous.— 3. There is notoriously a Reward even in this life, Matth. 19 29. Who would change the profit and pleasure of a holy life here, for that of the unholy? 4. Reward and Rewardableness are found in the very Law of Nature itself: In that we are made for God as our end, and it is God himself who is our Reward: And holiness hath a natural tendency to happiness, yea, is the beginning of it itself: And as God is said in Nature to make sin punishable, in that he hath so form Nature, that sin shall bring suffering in and with it (as poison brings pain and death); so in Nature he hath made our duty and holiness Rewardable, in forming man so, that health, peace and happiness shall be in and after it. Prov. 9 12. If thou be wise, thou art wise for thyself. 5. The Light of Nature teacheth Parents, Masters, Princes and all Governors to take Goodness to be Rewardable, and Crimes to be punishable: And nothing is more universally approved by the common notices of humane nature than Justice, or abhorred than Injustice. Nature saith as 2 Sam. 23. 31. He that ruleth over men must be just: And as Isa. 10. 1. woe to them that decree unrighteous decrees: And as Prov. 17. 13. Whoso rewardeth evil for good, evil shall not departed from his house: Conscience will rebuke him that rewardeth evil to him that deserved it not, Psal. 7. 4. The better any man is, the more he is for Justice, and abhorreth the unjust, (and Alexander Severus, and Antonine, and such Just Princes and Judges, are honoured by all Subjects and Historians.) And as all Power is of God, and Rulers are but his Officers, (Rom. 13. 4, 5, 6.) so their Righteous Government is but the inferior part of Gods own Government, (as the King governeth by his Judges and Justices): And therefore it is God that Rewardeth and Punisheth by them. And indeed by the same reason that men deny a Reward to duty (the faultiness being pardoned through Christ) they would infer, that there is no Punishment for sin: But God saith, Isa. 3. 10, 11. Say to the Righteous It shall be well with him, and say to the wicked It shall be ill with him. He will plentifully reward the proud doers, Psal. 31. 23. Yea, they reward evil to themselves, Isa. 3. 9 6. Holiness is God's Image, and the product of the Holy Ghost; and the Devil and Malignants labour to dishonour it: And contrarily God honoureth it, and by his Rewards will honour it openly before the world, Matth. 6. 4, 6. And Christ will come in glory to be glorified in his Saints, and admired in all them that believe, even because they have believed, 2 Thess. 1. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. 7. God will Govern man according to man's nature and capacity; else what need of Scripture, Ministry, etc. And man is naturally a Lover of himself, and God will make him know that he hath no need of him, but it is himself that shall be the gainer if he obey, and the loser if he sin: even to Cain after his first sin God saith, If thou do well, shalt thou not be accepted? but if thou do evil, sin lieth at the door. Man is an Intellectual and free agent: and therefore God will set before him life and death, good and evil, Deut. 30. 15. and whether they will hear or not hear, he will send his word, Ezek. 2. 5. and they shall be told of such Motives as should suffice to prevail with men of reason. 8. Man hath many and great Temptations to overcome; And as they work morally toward his deceit and ruin, so God will suitably give him such Moral motives as are fittest to move him to resist them: And therefore he will offer man so full and sure and glorious a Reward, as is fit to disgrace all the offers of the Devil, and will make men know that his Rewards are such, as no pleasure or profit of sin should stand in any competition with. Yea, he himself who is God All-sufficient will be our exceeding great Reward, Gen. 15. 1. No wonder if Moses (like other believers) despised the honours of Pharaoh's Court, and chose rather to suffer affliction with the people of God than to enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season, because he had respect to the recompense of reward, Heb. 11. 25, 26. And Paul went towards death rejoicing in these hopes, that having fought a good fight, and finished his course, henceforth a Crown of Righteousness was laid up for him by God the Righteous Judge, 2 Tim. 4. 8. who is not unrighteous to forget his servants work and labour of Love. And all believers are therefore steadfast and unmoveable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, as knowing that their labour is not in vain in the Lord, 1 Cor. 15. 58. And they work out their salvation with fear and trembling, laying up a treasure in Heaven, Matth. 6. 20. and laying up a good foundation for the time to come, and pressing forward for the prize, Phil. 3. 8, 9 and laying hold upon eternal life. Lib. All this leadeth us to our own works, and sets up the Law, and taketh down Christ and his righteousness, and is mere Popery, for humane Merits. P. If this be God's Word, and Christ's own Law and Doctrine, than you infer that Christ taketh down himself, and his own righteousness, and sets up man and humane merits. But give me leave to tell you, that if you deny [the Reward of Evangelical duty, and the Rewardableness or Worthiness (or Merit) of such duty, as it is but our Merit or Worthiness of the free Gift of Christ and Life, given by Paternal Love and Justice, to believing Penitent accepters, according to the tenor of the Covenant of Grace,] 1. You do contradict so much of the most express Texts of Scripture, as alloweth us to suspect that really you believe not the Scripture to be true, or that it is not it, but your own contradicting fancy, that is the measure of your belief; and you may on such terms hold the vilest absurdities, even what you list, as in despite of Scripture, while you pretend that it is for you. 2. You will deny the honour of God's Image on man, and the work of the Holy Ghost, and the design of Christ, who came to destroy the works of the Devil, and save his people from their sins, and purify to himself a peculiar people zealous of good works. 3. You will disgrace the Church of God, which Christ washeth and sanctifieth, and render it too like to the unsanctified world. 4. You will leave man no ground for true assurance of Justification or Salvation, while the difference between the worthy and unworthy is taken away. 5. You will harden the wicked in their false presumptuous hopes, and teach them to say, We are but unworthy, and so are all. 6. You will destroy the comfort of well doing, by denying the reward, and making it seem to be in vain. 7. Hereby you will take down all holy diligence in our Christian race and warfare, while you deny the prize, and recompense of reward, Heb. 11. 26. We run for an incorruptible Crown, 1 Cor. 9 25. Phil. 3. 14. 8. You will strengthen all Temptations, while you take down that which should be set against them. See Luke 12. 4. Heb. 4. 1. & 12. 28, 29. Matth. 6. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 19, 20, etc. Matth. 5. 10, 11, 12. 9 You will disgrace the Word and Ministry and all Means, if after all we are never the more accepted. 10. In a word, you deny God's Government, in denying his Governing Justice and Judgements, and that is to deny God to be our God: Yea, you deny all Religion, all the Kingdom of Christ, all Law, all Judgement, all Retribution, Heaven and Hell, all the true difference between Good and Evil, Holiness and Sin, all Praise and Dispraise, while you deny the Reward and Rewardableness of holy obedience by the Paternal Government of the Law of Grace: and that glory, honour and peace is to every one that doth good, both Jew and Gentile, Rom. 2. 7, 10. Lib. You would persuade us that holiness is good for nothing, if it be not Rewardable; as if you knew of no other use of it; so ignorant are natural men of the things of God which are spiritually discerned: I will tell you that which your carnal mind cannot understand; 1. Holiness, Faith, Love, Obedience, etc. are Gods free Gifts, excellent in themselves without a Reward: 2. They are Fruits of the Spirit, and marks and signs of our future felicity, though they deserve it not. 3. I told you that they are Rewards to Christ, and Gifts to us. P. 1. That they are Gods Gifts we doubt not: But are not Faith, Love and Obedience also the Acts of man by that Grace which is the gift of God? Lib. Yes, they are man's acts; but it is God that worketh them in us. P. And tell me if you can, 1. Why God cannot Reward those acts which are done by his own Grace? Cannot God make the Promise of a Reward to be a fit Moral Means for his Spirit to work by? Nay, doth not the scope of the Scripture tell you that he doth so? 2. Is there ever the less worthiness in it, because God causeth it? Tell me without shifting, Is an honest man no more worthy of a Prince's favour than a Thief? If you are no more worthy of liberty, and protection, and life, than Atheists and Rebels, why do you call men Persecutors for using you as if you were such? Why call you men Malignants for hating, deriding and opposing godly men, if they deserve no better than the worst? Lib. They deserve better from men, but not from God. P. Do you deny Rulers to be God's Officers, and that they are to make this difference by his appointment, and therefore it is done by God? 3. But without shifting tell me, Doth not every good action or inclination deserve praise from God and man? Doth it not deserve to be accounted and called just as it is? Lib. All our Righteousnesses are as menstruous rags: and what praise then do they deserve? Can that deserve praise, which deserveth Hell? P. 1. Come on then, let Conscience be a while unmuzzled: Why do you so much praise those of your own Church or Opinion? Why praise you so much the Ministers and people that are of your way? Why do you make a difference between them and such as are against you? 2. Why do you so aggravate the sin of those that vilify, deride and persecute you? Why call you the Saints, the precious ones on earth, God's treasure and peculiar people? 3. Why were you lately so angry with the Ecclesiastical Politician, the Debate-maker, and other such Books, which vilify men whom you and I have better thoughts of, if they deserve no more praise than the vilest men? 4. Why were you so angry lately when you heard of one that reproached you? and so pleased with one that proclaimed your wisdom and goodness, and took your part? 5. And if good actions deserve not praise from God himself, why doth he praise them so greatly in his Word? Why will he say before all the world, Well done good and faithful servant? etc. 1. Dare you call God Ignorant Legalist? or charge him with mistakes? 2. Doth not every thing and person deserve to be thought and called just as it is? Else lying or silence must be the virtue, and Truth the Vice. 3. Is there no more good in a Saint than in a Devil? If there be, doth it not deserve to be called just as it is? 4. May not he who deserveth Hell by the Law of Works or Innocency, be yet Morally fit for, that is, Worthy of Heaven, according to the Law of Grace, which pardoneth his sins, and freely giveth him Christ and Life? 5. Doth not God praise his Servants more than the Devil or wicked men do? And will you not please the Devil and Malignants, to tell them the contrary? And is it not the mark of a just man, that a vile person is contemned in his eyes, but he honoureth them that fear the Lord, Psal. 15. 4. Doth not God himself praise Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Joshua, David, Job, etc. Wrangle not against the unresistible Light. Our light must so shine before men, that they may see our good works, and glorify our heavenly Father, Matth. 5. 16. Christ will come at last to be glorified in his Saints, and admired in all them that do believe, because the Gospel was believed by them, 2 Thess. 1. 10, 11. No man hath seen God at any time in his Essence; but we see him here in a glass; and that is, in his Works and Image; in which it is that his glory shineth: And to say that God's Works and holy Image are not worthy (or Morally fit) to be praised, is to deny God his praise and glory on earth: He that despiseth you, despiseth me (saith Christ) and consequently him that sent me, Luke 10. 10. Lib. Faith, Love, Holiness, Obedience, Patience are worthy that God should be praised for them, but not Man: for they are worthy as God's works, but not as ours. P. 1. They are none of our works as the chief agents, but only second causes under God: And are not second causes to be praised in their places and degree? Will you not praise Sun and Moon and Stars, and all God's works, that he may be praised for them? Do you not praise a good Servant, a good Horse or Dog, a good House or Land? yea, and your Friend or Teacher? Do you not praise your own party, when you say that they are wiser and better than others? 2. Believe and regard the Word of God. Do none of these Texts following speak of Praise as due to men, in subordination to God? Deut. 26. 18, 19 The Lord hath avouched thee this day to be his peculiar people, and to make thee high above all Nations, in Praise, and in Name, and in Honour, and that thou mayst be an holy people to the Lord thy God. Prov. 27. 21. As is the fining pot for Silver, and the furnace for Gold, so is a man to his praise. Isa. 62. 7. Give him no rest till he make Jerusalem a praise in the earth. Zeph. 3. 19, 20. I will get them praise in every land, etc. I will make you a name and a praise among all people of the earth. Rom. 2. 29. Whose praise is not of men, but of God. John▪ 12. 43. They loved the praise of men more than the praise of God. 1 Cor. 4. 5. Then shall every man have praise of God. 2 Cor. 8. 18. The brother whose praise is in the Gospel, etc. Phil. 4. 8. If there be any praise, think of these things. 1 Pet. 2. 14. Governors are sent by him for the praise of them that do well. See Prov. 27. 2. & 28. 4. & 31. 30, 31. 1 Cor. 11. 2. Prov. 29. 23. Honour shall uphold the humble in spirit. & 21. 21. He findeth life, righteousness and honour. Psal. 149. 4. This honour have all his Saints. Prov. 3. 16. & 4. 8. & 8. 18. & 15. 33. & 20. 3. & 22. 4. Eccles. 10. 1. John 5. 44. Rom. 2. 7, 10. They that by well doing, seek for glory, and honour, and immortality, eternal life: Glory, honour and peace to every man that worketh good. & 9 21. & 12. 10. & 13. 7. 1 Tim. 5. 17. The Elders that rule well are accounted worthy of double honour. & 1 Tim. 6. 1. 1 Sam. 2. 30. Them that honour me, I will honour. Psal. 91. 15. John 12. 26. If any man serve me, him will my Father honour. 1 Pet. 2. 17. Prov. 13. 18. Do you believe and regard no one of all these words of God? Lib. I grant that God will praise the good, but not because we are worthy of it. P. 1. Have I told you that he himself calleth his servants worthy? and will you contradict God's Word? 2. Dare you yet deny any thing to be worthy to be called what it indeed is? Is not a Christian worthy to be called a Christian? and a sober man to be called a sober man, and an honest man to be called an honest man? Must humility make us liars? Tell me, Are you worthy yourself to be accounted and called an Infidel, a Heathen, an Apostate, a Heretic, a wicked ungodly man, that never repent, nor did good? Lib. That were to lie or slander, to call one what he is not. P. Are you not worthy then to be called contrarily, that is, what you are? Lib. ●●ought so to be called, but not for my worthiness. P. Must God and man account you such as you are not fit or worthy to be accounted? And will you go on to accuse and contradict God's Word? Your fancy hath got some harsh conceit of the sense of the word [Worthy] and that cometh still into your mind, as if it meant a worthiness which supposed not that all that we have is of mercy and grace: when the Scripture meaneth no such worthiness, but such as is that of a loving, dutiful, thankful Child, of the inheritance; A moral fitness. Lib. Well, suppose that our actions and we are worthy of Praise, that is, to be called as they are; yet they are worthy also of dispraise, that is, to be accounted as menstruous rags, defiled with sin, and deserving Hell; and is not this a pitiful praise? P. Did you ever hear us deny any of this? Why talk you of that which we are all agreed in? But 1. It is not holiness, but the faulty imperfections of it, and the sin that is contrary to it, which deserveth Hell. 2. And the faults of sincere believers deserve not Hell according to the Law of Grace, by which we are to be judged, so as to be liable to it, but only so as to be accounted condemnable, had we not been pardoned. Lib. But if our faith and holiness deserve some praise, what's that to the deserving of salvation? or being worthy of Heaven? P. All these words your obstinacy hath put me to use, to convince you that Faith and Holiness is worthy of any thing at all, and that the word [Worthy] which God himself useth of them, is not abused by God, nor false. But what it is that God will account the righteous worthy of, the Scripture must determine; where I have showed you before that the words are plain. They are counted worthy of God, 1 Thess. 2. 12. and of his Kingdom, 2 Thess. 1. 5. Worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection, Luke 20. 35. They shall walk with Christ in white, for they are worthy. Lib. Still I grant it in the Scripture sense, but not in yours. P. To end this tedious talk with one that seemeth loath to understand, say Yea or Nay to these two questions. 1. Do you allow of the use of the word [Worthy]? Lib. Yes: because it is in Scripture. P. 2. Do you deny it to be true in the sense I have opened, that is, that we have that worthiness which is nothing but a Moral aptitude for that promised Reward, which as to the worth of it is but Gods free gift, merited for us by Christ, and is only a Fathers Reward as to the ordering of it as our Governor, even a Reward of grateful Children. Lib. No: I cannot deny this sense to be sound. P. Then you grant both Name and Thing: And are not you ashamed then to have so long traduced and reviled such as hold and say but that which you are forced to justify? and to make poor souls believe that works are cried up, and Christ is injured, and men's salvation hazarded by it, when yet you confess that all is true, in word and sense. Lib. But when the Papists abuse such phrases to error, though the Scripture use them, we must do it sparingly and with caution. P. 1. But is that a good reason for you to revile those that use them in the Scripture sense? 2. And if you will forsake Scripture words as oft as men misuse them, it will be in the power of any Heretics to drive you from all Scripture phrase, by abusing all. 3. And how can you more effectually promote Popery, than by forsaking Scripture language, and leaving it to their possession and use? Will not men think then, that the Scripture sense is liker to be with them, than with you? Were it not better for you to hold to the Word of God, and only detect and disclaim men's ill expositions of it? CHAP. III. Whether our own Righteousness be any way necessary and conducible to our Justification before God? Or Whether we are any way justified by it? and how far? Lib. BUt if I grant you, that salvation is the Reward of our own faith and holiness, I shall never grant you that we are Righteous by it before God, or that it is any part of that Righteousness by which we are justified: for that is only the Righteousness of Christ. P. I hope you are not willing to wrangle about words not understood. Quest. 1. Do you think that the words [Righteous, Righteousness and Justification] have but one sense in Scriptures, and in our common use? Lib. No: you proved more before. P. Quest. 2. If the Devil, or Men, or a mistaking Conscience, should say that you (or any Saint) is an Infidel, or hath no faith, how must you be justified against that charge? Lib. By denying it, and by maintaining that I do believe. P. Very good: Then faith itself as faith doth so far justify you. And Quest. 3. If you be charged to be Impenitent and never to have truly Repent, how must you be justified against that charge? Lib. By denying it, and averring that I did Repent. P. So then, your Repentance itself must so far justify you. And Quest. 4. If you are charged to have been an ungodly person to the last, or not to have loved God, or your neighbour, not to have called on God, nor confessed Christ before men, nor to have fed, clothed and visited him (as you could) in his members, or not to have mortified your fleshly lusts, but to have lived after the flesh, in murder, theft, whoredom, drunkenness, etc. What is your righteousness against this accusation? Lib. I must defend myself against a lie by denying it to be true: I must be so far justified, that is, vindicated against Calumny by my innocency in those points. P. Very good: so far then you must be justified by your godliness, love, obedience, mortification, innocency and works. And what if you be charged as an Hypocrite to have done all that you did in mere dissimulation, how must you be therein justified? Lib. By denying the charge, and appeal to God that I was sincere. P. So then, your sincerity is so far your justifying righteousness. And what if you are charged with Apostasy, that you fell from Grace, must you not be justified by pleading your Perseverance? Lib. These are none of the Justification which the Scripture speaketh of: which is only against true accusations, and not against false ones. P. Say you so? What if one be truly accused, that he hath no part in Christ? and that his sin is unpardoned? or that he is under the guilt of damnation by the obligation both of the Old Covenant and the New? or that he never truly repent or believed? or that he is unsanctified, and never sincerely obeyed Christ, etc. Is this man justifiable? Lib. No: I say not that all men are justifyable: But who ever is Justified in Scripture sense, is justified only from a true Accusation. P. What is that true Accusation? Lib. That he is a sinner, and deserveth damnation according to the Law, and that he hath no righteousness of his own. P. Must he not confess all this to be True, if it be True? And is not confessing the Gild which he is accused of, contrary to justifying him? Do you not see here what Confusion you cast yourself into for want of noting the various senses of Justification? If by Justifying we mean Making an unjust man just, than it is true that he is justified from his Gild, that is, he is pardoned; and he is justified from the Laws condemnation, that is, a man condemned by the Law is pardoned; and he is justified from his reigning sin, that is, he is sanctified: But this Justification is not opposite to Accusation, but to Being unjust. But if you speak of Justification by Plea or Sentence, it is contrary to Accusation of Gild: And so no man is justified that is not Just, or Guiltless in the point of which he is accused. God will by no means clear the guilty, or justify the unjust, Exod. 34. 7, 8. nor say of the wicked, Thou art Righteous, Prov. 24. 24. 1 Pet. 1. 17. & 2. 23. Jer. 11. 20. Rom. 1. 32. & 2. 2. But that you are quite mistaken in saying, that Scripture never mentioneth Justifying man from a false accusation, these and many such Texts show, Rom. 8. 33. Isa. 50. 8. Prov. 17. 15. 1 Kings 8. 32. James 2. 21, 24, 25. Rom. 2. 13. Luke 7. 29. Matth. 11. 19 & 12. 37. Isa. 43. 9 26. Luke 10. 29. & 16. 15. Deut. 25. 1. Exod. 23. 7, etc. And how widely differ you from most Protestant Divines, who say that Justification is a Judicial Sentence of God as Judge? Though indeed it is of divers sorts. Lib. But it is not Scripture Justification, unless it be perfect: And all that we do is Imperfect. To justify him in some one thing, is not Justification by faith, but another thing. P. 1. No doubt but Scripture mentioneth both particular Justification as to some particular causes, and a more large Justification from all things that would damn him in Hell. And this latter is the Great Justification by faith, mentioned so oft in Scripture, that is, Upon and by believing we are first made just, by free-given pardon and right to life, (and true sanctification with it); and we are sentenced just, because so first made just. But this is not without our Faith and Repentance. 2. And that Faith and Repentance are a Righteousness Evangelical, that is, a performance of the conditions on which the Covenant of Grace doth freely give us right to Christ, pardon and life; and so are the Constitutive causes of that subordinate Justification. Lib. But your subordinate Righteousness hath no hand in our Justification. P. This is but singing over the old Song, by one that will not consider what is answered. Have you thought on all the Texts even now cited▪ Hath faith no hand in our Justification? Hath the performance of a Condition, and the Moral Disposition of the Receiver, no hand in the Reception of a Gift? What think you is the meaning of Christ's words, Matth. 12. By thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned? What meaneth St. James, that a man is justified by works, and not by faith only? Are men justified by that which hath no hand in their Justification? Lib. Christ meaneth [before mwn] and so doth James, and not before God. P. This is notoriously false, as contrary to the plain Text: Christ speaketh of the Account to be given of our words in the day of Judgement, vers. 36. And James speaketh of that which men are saved by, vers. 14. and that Justification which Abraham had, and that in an instance where Man did not justify him, and of that which was faiths life and perfection, vers. 17, 22. and of Gods imputing faith for, righteousness, as to a friend of God, vers. 23. And is this nothing but Justification before men? Lib. This is not the justifying of the man, but of his faith? P. 1. You contradict the Text which saith [Abraham, Rahab, A man is justified by Works]. 2. You contradict yourself; For if the faith be justified, the man is justified to be a true believer: For how could a man that fulfilled the Law, as Christ (and Angels) did, be justified, but by justifying his actions? And how can he that fulfilleth the Gospel conditions, be justified in that point, but by justifying that he fulfilled them? Lib. At least I may say, that this is not the great and notable Justification, which is only by Christ's Righteousness. P. We are not contending for its pre-eminence, but its truth and necessity in a subordinate place. Indeed we have one Justification by our Judge's sentence, which hath many parts and causes: God as Donor is one cause, and God as Judge another; And Christ as meriting is the only meritorious cause of the Justifying Gift and Covenant, and Christ as Intercessor another cause, and Christ as Judge another; And our Righteousness as it is our Right to Impunity and life another, and our faith and Repentance are conditions: All this is sure. Lib. But the Justification by faith is our Universal Justification; and that can be only by Christ's Righteousness: And we are not to trust to a Righteousness mixed of Christ's and ours; nor doth Christ's Righteousness need to be patched up with our menstruous rags. P. 1. No question but Christ's Righteousness is perfect, and ours imperfect, and ours is no patch or supplement to Christ's: He is not made righteous by our righteousness, but we by his. 2. But that which is perfect in him, is not made perfectly ours; nor formally ours in itself, as distinct from its merited effects. It is not ours as it is Christ's. Christ that is our Righteousness, is also made of God to us wisdom and sanctification: And will you say therefore, that we are not to be Wise or Holy, by any Wisdom or Holiness of our own, for fear of adding our patch to Christ's? 3. You use to say that Christ's Righteousness is ours as Adam's sin is ours; and say some, as Adam's Righteousness would have been, had he persevered. But 1. Adam's Righteousness would have indeed made an Infant initially just by propagation, that is, the innocent Child of an innocent Parent: But as soon as that Infant had the use of Reason and Choice, he must also have a Righteousness of his own, or perish: And this is no patch to Adam's righteousness. And indeed in his Infancy he must have a seminal Holiness of his own to justify him, as well as the relation of a Son of Adam. 2. So also, though we are guilty of Adam's sin by propagation, yet we have with that guilt, 1. An inherent pravity of our own, 2. And at age our actual sin: And both these are our unrighteousness, as well as Adam's sin imputed to us. Even so Christ the second Adam is a Root of a righteous seed: Our Contract by faith is as to him, what our Natural propagation is as to Adam; that is, the Condition of our Interest in his merits: We have as believers an initial righteousness in our relation to Christ; But we have also from him, 1. Inherent habitual righteousness; 2. The actual righteousness of faith, and true obedience and love. And these have their proper use and office, without which we must perish. 4. And I must tell you, that the word Universal is too big to be properly given to any man's justification or righteousness, but Christ's: Properly he only is Universally justified or righteous, who hath no unrighteousness at all imputable to him, and is justifyable in all things: But the best believer, 1. Was once a sinner originally, 2. Did oft sin actually, 3. Hath still sin in him, 4. And for some sin may be punished by the Magistrate, 5. And for sin is judged and punished by chastisements and death by God, 6. And the earth still cursed for our sake: 7. Yea, which is worst of all, we are still under the penalty of some privations (alas! how great) of God's Spirit and its Grace, and our Communion with God. And all this must be confessed; And such a one is not Universally justified or just. Lib. But still our own Righteousness doth but make us such as thankful persons must be for their Justification by Christ, and is no part of that Justification by faith: For if faith itself be that Righteousness, we have not faith by faith, and faith is not imputed to faith, but Christ's Righteousness is it that is imputed. P. Of Imputation in due place; 1. What need you talk against that which none of us assert? Do we not all hold, that our personal Gospel-Righteousness is subordinate to Christ's, and is by his Gift, as ou● Wisdom and Sanctisication is? Who dreameth that our faith is any part of Christ's Righteousness? But why do you waste time in vain cavilling against plain certain truth? Is there any thing in Name or Thing asserted by us that you can deny or question? Quest. 1. Do you deny that Scripture commandeth us to Believe that we may be justified? Lib. No. P. Quest. 2. Or that we are commanded not only Thankfully to Accept, but Thankfully to obey our Lord, Redeemer and Saviour? Lib. No. P. Quest. 3. Date you deny, that life or death eternal dependeth on this as a Condition or Moral means? and that we shall be judged according to it? Lib. No. I deny it not. P. Quest. 4. Is it not a Law that thus commandeth us, and by which we must be judged? Lib. Yes, If it were no Law; there were no duty and sin in belief and unbelief. P. Quest. 5. Is not a man so far just and justifyable by that Law, as he keepeth it? and justifyable against the charge of being one that must be Damned, by producing the Condition of pardon and life performed? Lib. Yes, I deny it not. P. Quest. 6. And doth not the same Law virtually justify the performer now, whom it will justify as the Rule of Judgement at last? Lib. Yes, no doubt. P. Quest. 7. And is not the Name of Righteousness many score times given in Scripture to our own actions done by Grace, and measured by the New Covenant? Lib. Yes, I cannot deny it. P. Why then while you deny neither Name nor Thing, what wrangle you about? And let me plainly tell you, that such men as you by indiscreet ever-doing are not the least of Satan's instruments to bring the Gospel under scandal, and harden the world in Infidelity and the scorn of Christ; while you would so describe the Christian Religion, as if this were the very heart and sum of it [Believe that all the Elect have fulfilled perfectly all God's Law by another, and that Christ did it as personating each of them, and therefore no crime of their own is imputable to them, nor any kind or degree of Goodness or Righteousness in and of themselves, is at least required of God, as any means or condition, of their present or future justification by their Judge, or as having any hand therein.] As if God were become indifferent what we all are, so that Christ be but Righteous▪ for us: when as it was Christ's grand design to restore lapsed man to God, which he doth not only by Relative benefits, but by Renewing them to his Image in love and holy obedience. Lib. Have you not lately and oft been told, that holiness and obedience are necessary now; but it is to other Ends than to justify us; (as for Cratitude, etc.) P. 1. We easily grant it is for other Ends than Christ's Merits were, and not to justify us as they do; nor in that Causality. They are not to purchase for us a free gift of pardon and life, nor the Holy Ghost, etc. as Christ did. 2. But again tell me, Hath not Christ a Law that commandeth our obedience to those ends (as Gratitude) which you mention? And is not the keeping that Law a thing that the same Law will so far justify us for? Yea, a Condition that life dependeth on? And if the Cause in Judgement be, Have you kept it or not? must you not in that be accordingly Justified or Condemned? Give over cavilling against plain necessary truth. Lib. By this you will fall in with the Papists, who take Justification to be partly by Christ's Righteousness, and partly by our own: and partly in pardon, and partly in faith and holiness. P. Tell not me of the Names of Papists or any, to frighten me from plain Scripture truth. 1. Why may not I rather say, Why go you from all the ancient Writers and Churches, even Augustine himself, by your new and contrary opinion? Was true Justification unknown for so many hundred years after the Apostles? 2. The most zealous Antipapists do confess that some Texts of Scripture do so take the word Justification: And multitudes of Texts so take the words Righteous and Righteousness. And he that will impartially consider them may find, that more Texts than are by us so confessed, do by Justifying mean [Making us Just, and so Accounting us] on all these causes conjunct, 1. As being Redeemed by Christ's Merits, 2. And freely pardoned, 3. And having Right to life, 4. And renewed to God's love and Image, 5. And so justifyable at the Bar of Grace by the Law of faith and liberty. 3. And the reality of all the Matter of this Doctrine is past doubt, if the Controversy de nomine Justificationis were not so decided. CHAP. IU. Whether the Gospel be a Law of Christ? Lib. III. YOu bring in your doctrine of personal Righteousness to Justification, by feigning Christ to have made a new Law; whereas the Gospel is but a Doctrine, History and Promise, and not a Law, and so no Rule of Righteousness and Judgement; And this many Protestants have asserted. P. I have read some such say in some men: And some I think meant no more, but that Christ did only expound, and not add to the Law of Nature, called by them the Moral Law: And these I have excused for their unhappy kind of expression. But for the rest, that mean as the words sound universally, they subvert Christianity, and as the Arrians denied Christ's Godhead, so do they his Office and Government, and are somewhat worse than the Quakers, who say, that the Spirit within us, is the Law and Rule of Christ; which is better than none: I pray answer me, Quest. 1. Is Christ the King and Ruler of the Church? Lib. Yes. P. Quest. 2. Is not Legislation the first and principal part of Government? Lib. Yes. P. Quest. 3. Do not they then that deny Christ's Legislation, deny his Government? Lib. Yes. P. Quest. 4. Is it not essential to Christ as Christ (the name signifying Relatively his Office) to be King? Lib. Yes. P. Quest. 5. Do they not then by this deny Christ to be Christ? Lib. No: for they confess that he hath a Law, but not that he made any since his birth. P. We grant 1. That the Law of Nature now is His Law: 2. And that the first Edition of the Law of Grace to Adam after the fall, was his Law: 3. And Moses Law was partly his. But you will not say that we are under this last, nor I hope that he hath no other than the two first. Lib. Why, what other can you prove? P. It is the Name or the Thing that you deny; (for you use to confound the cases:) 1. Whether the name be fit, judge by these Texts. Gal. 6. 2. Bear ye one another's burdens, and so fulfil the Law of Christ. James 1. 25. The perfect Law of Liberty. Rom. 8. 2. The Law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus, etc. Rom. 3. 27. Boasting is excluded? By what Law? Of Works? Nay, but by the Law of faith. Mic. 4. 2. For the Law shall go out of Zion, etc. So Isa. 2. 3. & 8. 16, 20. & 42. 41. The Isles shall wait for his Law. 1 Cor. 9 21. We are under the Law to Christ. Heb. 8. 10, 16. I will put my Laws into their minds— and hearts. James 4. 12. There is one Lawgiver, etc. Isa. 33. 22. 2. For Name and Thing note the terms of Equivalence and Connotation: 1. All the Texts where Christ is called a King, and his Kingdom named, (why should I needlessly recite them?) 2. All the Texts that mention his Commanding and Commandments, the same which we mean by a Law. Matth. 28. 20. Teaching them to observe all things whatever I have commanded you. Acts 10. 42. & 13. 47. Acts 10. 33. 1 Cor. 7. 10. John 15. 14. If ye do whatsoever I command you. 17. These things I command you. So John 15. 12. & 14. 21, 31. 1 Tim. 1. 1. Titus 1. 3. 1 John. 3. 23. & 4. 6. John 13. 34. 1 John 5. 3. & 2. 4. & 3. 24. 1 Cor. 14. 37. Acts 1. 2. Acts 17. 30. Blessed are they that do his Commandments, & c. Rev. 22. 14. 3. All the Texts that mention his Covenant, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being a Legal institution.) Heb. 8. 6. He is the Mediator of a better Covenant, & 8. 13. & 8. 10. & 10. 16. & 12. 24. Gal. 4. 24. 4. All those Texts that not only call him Lord of all, but say that All power in Heaven and Earth is given to him (therefore Legislative power) Matth. 28. 18. and all Judgement committed to him, John 5. 22. The Government is laid upon his shoulders, and of the increase of his Government there shall be no end, Isa. 9 6, 7. 5. De re, how can that man be a Christian, that denyeth that Christ hath made us any Law, and so denyeth his Kingdom and our obedience? I argue from the definition: That which hath the essential parts of a Law is a Law: But Christ hath made that which hath the essential parts of a Law: Therefore he hath made a Law. The Major is past dispute; The Minor I prove: That which hath a Precept making Duty, and a Promise and Threatening, instituting the Retribution by Rewards and Punishments, as an Instrument of Government, hath all the Essentials of a Law: But such is made by Christ: Ergo— The Minor (which only needs proof) I prove by parts and instances. 1. There is a Command to believe in God as our Reconciled Father by Christ: 2. To believe in Christ as Incarnate, and the Mediator, conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary, fulfilling all righteousness, dying, buried, for us, justifying us by his blood, rising, ascending, glorified, interceding, that will raise the dead, and judge the world, etc. We are commanded to believe all the Gospel: And to give up ourselves to Christ in the Covenant of Baptism, to trust in him, to pray in his name, etc. We are commanded to believe in the Holy Ghost as the Spirit of Christ, and to live in Communion with the Christian Church, to observe the Lords day (the first of the Week,) to preach and hear the Gospel, to receive the Lords Supper, to imitate Christ, to receive his Apostles and Ministers, to relieve his members as such, to take Moses Law as abrogated or ceased; And do you that are so strict in condemning all humane impositions as bold additions, believe that Christ himself hath made no Laws for Ordination, Sacraments, Preaching, Worship? and why fear you adding then? can one add to Nothing? And what a lawless sort of persons are you, if you will neither have Christ nor Man to make Laws for you? 2. And as to Promises and Threats or Penalties (of a far sorer punishment, Heb. 10.) I am ashamed to stand to prove them to you. [He that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned] is sure a Law. How shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation? See that ye reject not him that speaketh — Heb. 4. & 10. These mine enemies that would not that I should reign over them, bring them hither and slay them before me, Luke 19 27. with abundance such. Pardon here that my indignation suffereth me not to be longer or colder, but shortly to tell you further, that to deny Christ's Law is, 1. To deny him to be a King, and to be Christ, 2. To deny his Kingdom, 3. And his Government, 4. And his Gospel, 5. And his Officers power, both Kings and Pastors, 6. And your own subjection, 7. And all duty and obedience to him, 8. And the being of all sin as against his Laws. 9 And all Judgement according to his Laws, 10. And all reward for keeping his Laws, 11. And all punishment for breaking them, 12. And all duty to preach, learn or meditate on them, 13. And all blame on such as silence such preaching, 14. And indeed the very being of all Law and Government in the world: For since the Promise Gen. 3. (or at least now) there is no Law of God in the world, but what is the Redeemers Law: Even the Law of Nature now is in his hand, and is the Law of the Redeemer to lapsed Nature. And all the world had a new Law of Grace made to Adam in the first Edition; and the Church hath it now in the second Edition. And now what part of Christianity do you not destroy? Choose you now whether you will come off by confessing that you erred and differed from us but in a word not understood, or whether you will allow us to take you for downright Heretics? And bethink you whether those rash and self-conceited Divines that have reviled Papists and Arminians for saying that Christ's Gospel was a Law, or that he made a new Law, have done good service to the Christian or the Protestant Cause▪ or have rather done much to harden the Rapists into a more confident conceit that Protestants are Heretics? CHAP. V Whether Christ be the only Party in Covenant with God? and not Believers, or lapsed man? Lib. iv Mr next Charge it, that you feign the Covenant to be made with us, which is made only with Christ. Do you not remember that even the Westminster Assembly say in their larger Catechism, that [The Covenant of Grace was made with Christ as the second Adam, and in him with all the Elect as his seed?] But you feign it to be made with the Elect, nay, to others immediately, and not only as Christ's seed, in him, nor to Christ at all. P. I will not waste time in expounding or censuring other men's words: but as to the matter, is it not a most shameful thing, that a man of your profession and pretensions to knowledge, should confound those two Covenants which children should be taught in their Catechism to distinguish? By [a Covenant] here we mean, 1. A Covenant offered and imposed, which is also a Law: 2. A Covenant consented to and mutual. And now tell me, Quest. 1. Was it not a distinct Law that was made to us, from that which Christ was obliged by? I mean the Law of Grace and Faith? Was Christ commanded to Repent of his sin? or accept a Saviour? or pray for pardon? or mortify his lusts? or trust another to reconcile him to God? or be Thankful for such mercies? or any such like Remedying means and duties for himself? Lib. No: that must not be imagined. P. Quest. 2. Is not all this commanded by the Law of Grace? Lib. Yes: If it be a Law. P. Quest. 3. Was not Christ under a Law, which bond him, 1. To obey all the precepts of nature perfectly without sin? 2. To obey all the Mosaical Law as far as he was capable? 3. To do all this a sa Mediator to reconcile God and man, And to die for sinners, to work Miracles, to send out Apostles, to gather a Church, to intercede for us, and to present us Justified and perfect to his father? And are we obliged to do so too? Lib. No one so imagineth. P. Quest. 4. Did not Christ as a Covenanter undertake all this? And do we do so too? And do not we in Baptism ourselves, consent and promise, to take God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, for our Father, Saviour and Sanctifier, and to forsake the flesh, the world and the devil? Is it Christ only that is Baptised? Nay did Christ ever receive such a Baptism as this, to wash away his sins, and deliver him a pardon? Is it Christ or we that at Baptism make these promises to God? Is it to Christ or us that Christ himself saith, If thou believe and repent thou shalt be saved? Doth Christ as King make Laws and Covenants to bind himself only? Who seethe not, that hath any sense of Scripture matters, that The Mediators case, office and work is one, and ours another: that It is one Law that was given him, and another to us: yea, that which seemeth the same was another, being not formally but materially only the same (and forma denominat:) For he was to fulfil the Law of Moses and of Innocency, to such ends (as a Redeemer) and with such difference from our case, that it was not formally but materially (and that but in part) the same Law: and so his Baptism was formally another thing from any one's Baptism else in the World. It was one thing that Christ promised and undertook in his Covenant with the Father, and it's another thing that we undertake and promise. It's one thing that God promiseth to Christ upon his Merits (that he shall see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied) and another thing that he promiseth us (that our persons shall be Justified, sanctified and saved.) In a word, by the Law given to Christ, Christ himself is Governed as a Subject, and Justified and Rewarded by God as his Judge for fulfilling it. By the Law given to us, we are the subjects and Christ is the Governor, Lawgiver and our Judge, who will Justify, reward, or condemn and punish us. I know not how that man can preach the Gospel that knoweth not the difference between the Law and Covenant made to and with Christ as Mediator, and the Law and Covenant made to and with us, and in Baptism solemnly processed! Children should not be ignorant of it. Lib. But it is the same thing which is promised to Christ and us, viz. that we shall be justified and saved; and this is promised first to Christ, and therefore the words cited may be justified: Christ is the seed of the woman who is first to break the Serpent's head, Gen. 3. 15. P. 1. The same thing may be promised to different persons, in different Covenants: To promise to Christ that his elect shall be saved, and to promise Believers that they shall be saved, are two promises. 2. What one word do you find in Gen. 3. of a Covenant or promise made to Christ? It's true that he is the principal Seed there meant (though not the only:) But he is the Promised Seed: It's one thing for a promise▪ to be made to Christ, and another thing that Christ as the victorious seed ● be promised to man. There is no promise in Gen. 3. to Christ mentioned ●● (and what can be meant by a Promise of God to God himself?) but a prophecy and promise of a Saviour to man: But if there had, that would not have proved these two to be one. Understand the tenor and difference of these several Laws and Covenants of God, or pretend not to understand the Scripture: viz. 1. The Law and Covenant of Innocency made to Adam. ●. The Law and Covenant made to and with the Mediator for our Redemption. 3. The promise, Law or Covenant of Grace of the first Edition, made to Adam▪ and all in him, and renewed with No and mankind in him. 4. The Law▪ and Covenant both of Common Grace and of Peculiarity, at once given to Abraham, and perfected in the Law and Covenant of Works made by Moses with the Jews. 5. The Law and Covenant of Grace made by the▪ Incarnate Mediator (and the Father by him) in the second perfect Edition, with eminent peculiarity. CHAP. VI Whether the New Covenant of Grace have any Conditions? Lib. V BY feigning the Covenant of Grace to have Conditions, you make it to be a Covenant of works. P. Either by works you mean [any humane acts;] And so all God's Covenants with man (and his Laws) are of works; that is, It is some act of man that they require: For what else can be commanded? Or you mean as Paul doth, when he calls the Jews Law, a Law of works: And if so, you falsify his doctrine or ours. Prove if you can that by works he meaneth every humane Act, and that Faith itself is either no Act of man, or the works meant by him. Lib. Faith is a work, but it is not put in the Covenant as a work required of us, but as a gift to be given to us freely. P. Judge whether it be required of us, and that formally as a condition, by such texts as these: (yea whether obedience be not required as a Condition of our salvation, which is promised thereupon?) 1 Tim. 4. 8. Godliness hath the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come. Mark 16. 16. He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned. Rom. 10. 8, 9, 10, 13. If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thy heart that God raised him from the dead (N. B. this is an act distinct from accepting his Righteousness) thou shalt be saved. For with the heart man believeth unto Righteousness, and with the mouth Confession is made unto salvation.— For whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved. Matth. 6. 14, 15. For if ye forgive men their trespasses, your Heavenly Father will also forgive you: But if &c. Rev. 22. 14. Blessed are they that do his commandments, that they may have Right to the tree of life, etc. See Isa. 1. 16, 17, 18. & 55. 6▪ 7. Luk. 13. 3, 5. 1 Joh. 1. 9 Act. 3. 19 Heb. 5. 9, etc. Lib. God promiseth a Reward to our Actions, not as ours, but as h● own gifts. P. 1. Enough is said of Rewards before: We shall not by such talk as this believe either that God Rewardeth himself, or that he Rewardeth not us. But we easily grant that he rewardeth us for nothing which cometh not from his free bounty: For no creature can have any other good. 2. But if Faith, and Love, and Obedience be not commanded to us, but only given us, than they are no Duties, but Gifts only; and unbelief, hatred of God, and disobedience is no sin, nor brings no punishment. Lib. At least they are no Conditions of the Covenant. P. Do you think that they are any proper Means of our Justification and Salvation as their End? or not? Lib. Yes: I dare not say, that they are no means at all; Faith and Repentance are Means of our Pardon, and Holiness and Perseverance of our Glorification. P. What sort of means do you take them to be? Lib. They are such Gifts of God as in order must go before Salvation. P. Going before, signifieth only Antecedency, and not any Means. Lib. One Gift maketh us fit for a thankful improvement of another. P. This speaketh them only to be a Means to our Thankful improvement, and not to our Right to the things to be improved. Lib. I do not think that they are a means of our Right or title. P. Rev. 22. 14. Blessed are they that do his Commandments, that they may have Right to the tree of life, etc. Lib. It may be translated [that wash their garments] and [that they may have power upon] as Dr. Hammond noteth. P. 1. The Alexandrian Copy which giveth him this occasion, is singular, and not be set against all other (though the Vulgar Latin go the same way). Beza who yet thinks that a transposition of two Verses hath darkened these Texts, this Book being negligently used, because many for a time took it not for an Apostolical Writing, (or Canonical,) yet saith, that it is contra omnium Graecorum codicum fidem, that the Vulgar goeth. 2. But all's one in sense: For [to wash their Garments] is [to be sanctified or purified from sin] and not only from guilt of punishment: And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth such a Power as we call Authority o● Right (usually.) But what maketh you deny Conditions on man's part? Lib. Because, 1. It is supposed that a condition is profitable to him that requireth it. 2. It is some Cause of the benefit. 3. It is to be done by the performers own strength: whereas God giving ●s Faith, that can be no condition on our part which is first a Gift from him that requireth it: For to give it first, maketh it no condition of ours. P. Here we see what it is to quarrel about ambiguous Words: No one of these is true that you say, of the common nature of a condition; or at least as we mean by that word. 1. Civilians define a Condition to be Lex addita negotio, qua donec praestetur eventum suspendit. As it is Required it is only Modus promissionis, donationis vel contractus: as Performed it is only a Removal of an Impediment, and a Disposition of the Receiver. So that as the Non-performance is but the suspension of a Causation, so the performance of a Condition as such, is no Cause efficient: But it is dispositio subjecti, which you may call a necessary Modus of a Material Cause, as the Recipient may improperly be called; Dr. Twisse therefore calleth faith Ca●sa justificationis dispositiva. 2. So it be an act of our own, it is no way necessary that it be done without the Commanders help or gift: For he that giveth us to believe, doth give it by this means, even by commanding it, and making it a Condition of his further benefits, that so he may induce us as rational free agents, to perform it ex intuitu mercedis, or by the motive of the end or benefit. For he causeth it by suitable means. And no doubt, but faith, and the rest, are free acts of ours, though caused by God's grace. 3. And it is accidental to a Condition, that it be any way commodious to the Imposer. What profit is it to a Father that his Child put off his Hat and say, I thank you? And yet he may make that a condition of his gift. What profit is it to a free Physician, that the Patient observe his order in taking his Medicines? And yet he may give them on that condition. But yet I will add, that as usually men make that the condition of a Gift or Contract, which the person obliged is backward else to perform, and that which is somewhat either for the Donor or Contracters Interest, or the Ends of his contract: so God who taketh his Glory and Pleasure in his children's Good, to be as his Interest, and the End of his Gifts, and knoweth how backward we are to our duty, doth on these accounts impose on us our duty and conditions, his Pleasure and Glory being instead of his Commodity. But if [If] be a conditional Particle, and if Gods suspending by the tenor of his Donation, our Right to Justification upon our free believing, and our Right to Salvation on our free obedience, do prove Conditionality (as it doth all that we mean) than you see that the new Covenant hath conditions. Lib. Doth not God promise us the first Grace, even to take the hard heart out of our bodies, and give us hearts of flesh, and new hearts, etc. And I pray, what condition can the first grace have, unless you will run in infinitum, to seek Conditions of Conditions? P. 1. This is a Cause of great moment, of which I have myself had darker thoughts than now I have. 1. If one Benefit of the Covenant have no Condition (viz. the first,) will it follow, that none of the rest are given upon condition? May not God in Baptism give us a Right of special Relation to the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, his Love, Grace and Communion, Pardon, Adoption and Glory, on condition of Faith and Repentance, and yet himself give us that Faith and Repentance which is the condition of the rest? 2. But upon fuller consideration it will appear, that It is not the first Grace that those promises mean, by a new and soft heart: For who ever will examine them, shall find that the Texts mention Conditions and also antecedent Grace: And indeed, [A new and soft heart] is but the same thing which the New Testament calleth Sanctification. And yet that Sanctification is promised as consequent to Faith as its condition: And our ordinary Divines do accordingly distinguish of Vocation and Sanctification; holding that in Vocation the Act of Faith and Repentance are caused by God's Grace, before proper Habits; and that Sanctification is the Habits (specially of Love and Holiness) following them, (vid. Ames. Medulla. de Vocat. Rolloc. de Vocat. hooker's Souls Vocat. & Humil. Rogers of Faith, etc.) And this is the new and fleshy heart. But what need we more to prove that Covenant Conditional which I mean, when it is nothing but the Baptismal Covenant? where sure the condition is notorious, and every Baptising Minister prerequireth the profession of it. CHAP. VII. Whether Justifying Faith be a Believing in Christ as a Teacher, Lord, etc. or only a Receiving of his Righteousness? P. VI AS to this your sixth Charge, I have said so much elsewhere, in my Disputations of Justification, and in other Books, that I cannot justify the tiring of Readers by repeating it: And will say now but this little following: 1. That Paul doth not distinguish between justifying faith, and saving faith, but excludeth the Works excluded by him, from being the causes either of Justification or Salvation. 2. That if [Receiving Christ's Righteousness] be meant by them properly and physically, it is no sort of faith at all; but only [the effect of the donation,] which they call [Justificari,] or passive Justification: But if it mean a moral metonymical Reception, that is nothing but [Consent to have the offered gift]; And if only Consent to have Christ's Righteousness be Justifying faith, than all the Assenting part is excluded (in which Scripture much placeth it, and most Divines in part, and many in whole, besides Cam●ro and his followers). And so also all the Affiance or Fiducial acts are excluded, which almost all include; even that which they call Recumbency being distinct from Consent. 3. All these acts following are essential to Justifying faith, as well as this Consent to be Justified: 1. An Assenting belief in God, in the baptismal sense. 2. An Assent to the truth of Christ's Person, Office and Doctrine. 3. A belief in the Holy Ghost. 4. A belief of Pardon, Sanctification and Glory as possible, purchased and offered by Christ. 5. A Consent that God be our God in Christ. 6. And a Consent that Christ be our Teacher. 7. And our King, and Ruler. 8. And our Intercessor. 9 And our Judge and Justifier by sentence (and as our Advocate). 10. A belief of his Resurrection, Power and Glory. 11. A Trusting to the Father and the Son according to these forementioned Offices. 12. A Consent to be Sanctified by the Holy Ghost. 4. Plainly our Justifying and Saving Faith in Paul's sense is the same thing with our Christianity, or becoming Christians: And the same thing with our Baptismal faith and consent. 5. To believe in Christ as Christ is in Scripture Justifying faith: But to accept his righteousness only, and not to believe in him as our Lord, and our Teacher and Intercessor, etc. as aforesaid, is not to believe in him as Christ. 6. In my Answer (ubi sup.) to Mr. Warner, and elsewhere, I have detected the fraud of their quibbling distinction, who say, that All this is in faith quae justificat, but not quà justificat, as supposing a falsehood, that any act of faith quà talis justifieth. 7. They that say that only our Acceptance of Christ's Imputed Righteousness is the Justifying act of faith, and that to expect to be Justified by any other (viz. by Believing in God the Father, and the Holy Ghost, and believing a Heaven hereafter, and believing the Truth of the Gospel, and of Christ's Resurrection, Ascension, Glory, etc. and by taking him for our Teacher, Ruler, Intercessor, etc.) is to expect Justification by Works in Paul's disclaimed sense, and so to fall from Grace; I say, they that thus teach, do go so far towards the subverting of the Gospel, and making a Gospel or Religion of their own, as that (I must tell them, to move them to repentance) not only the adding of Ceremonies is a small corruption in comparison of this, but many that in Epiphanius are numbered with Heretics, had far lesser errors than this is. CHAP. VIII. Of Faith's Justifying as an Instrument. P. VII. ANd I have said so much in the foresaid Disputations of Justification and other Books, of Faith's Instrumentality and the reason of its Justifying interest, that I cannot persuade myself now to talk it out with you all over again; but only to say, 1. That I have fully oft proved from many plain Scriptures, that pardon and salvation are given (with Christ) in the Covenant of Grace, on Condition of a penitent believing fiducial acceptance. And therefore that it is most certain that faith is a Condition of our Justification; and so to be professed in Baptism. 2. The name of An Instrument given to faith, and its Justifying as an Instrument, are of men's devising, and not in God's Word. 3. But as to the sense, It is certain that faith is no Instrument of our Justification (Gods or Man's,) if it be meant properly of an Instrumental efficient cause. 4. But if it be taken Metaphorically, for an Act whose Nature or essence is An Acceptance of a free Gift, and so by Instrumentality be meant the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere, that is, Faiths very Essence in specie, than no doubt it is what it is. 5. Or if by an Instrument be meant, A Moral aptitude or Disposition of the person to be justified (answerable to the Dispositio Recipientis vel materiae in Physics) than it is such an Instrument. But how well this is worded, and what cause there is to contend for a word both of humane invention and metaphorical, and this as if it were a weighty Doctrine, I leave to sober judgements. 6. But it is certain that the Accepting Act of faith is but its Aptitude to be the condition of the Gift, and therefore that its being made by Christ the Condition is its Moral nearest interest in our Justification. CHAP. IX. Whether Faith itself be imputed for Righteousness? Lib. VIII. WHat do you but subvert the Gospel, when you put faith instead of Christ or of his Righteousness? When the Scripture saith that we are justified by Christ's Righteousness Imputed to us, you say it is by faith imputed. P. Do you think any sober Christians here really differ? or is it only about the Names and Notions? Which ever it be; 1. Of the name, Is it not oft said that Faith is and shall be imputed for Righteousness, Rom. 4. 22, 23, 24. James 2. 23. Lib. Yes: I must grant the words, but not your meaning. P. Where doth the Scripture say, that Christ's Righteousness is Imputed to us? Remember that it is only the Name that I ask you of. Lib. It saith that Righteousness is Imputed: and what Righteousness ●an it be but Christ's? P. I tell you still, it is only the phrase or words that we are first trying. Are these the same words [Righteousness is Imputed] and [Christ's Righteousness is Imputed?] If not, where are these latter words in Scripture? Lib. Grant that the words are not, and your words are. P. Then the question is, Whether Scripture phrase or man's invented phrase be the better and safer in a controvertible case? And next Whether you should deny or quarrel at the Scripture saying, that [faith is imputed to us for righteousness] and not rather confute our misexpounding it, if we do so? Lib. Well, Let us examine the sense then: What Righteousness is it but Christ's that is said to be imputed to us? P. It is none but what we have from Christ: But the phrase of Imputing supposeth it ours: And the meaning is no more, but that [we are reputed Righteous]: And the causes are not included in the phrase of [Imputing righteousness to us]; but in the words before and after. As Imputing sin to us, (and not Imputing it) is but to Repute, reckon or judge us sinners, or by sin guilty of punishment (or not guilty); so is it here. So that it is supposed, 1. That Righteousness, that is, This Relation of being Righteous, is the thing imputed: 2. Christ's Righteousness is the meritorious cause: 3. The Gospel Donation is the instrumental Cause: 4. Our Faith in Christ is the condition, and as such the subordinate matter necessary on our parts. And that faith is imputed for Righteousness, plainly meaneth but this, that Christ having merited and satisfied for us, all that is now required on our part to denominate (or primarily constitute) us Righteous, is to be true Believers in him, or true Christians. And I further ask you, Do you thus paraphrase the words [Faith, that is, Christ's Righteousness, is imputed to us for righteousness?] Lib. Yes: I do so: because the act is put for the object. P. Were it so said but once, and otherwise oft, you had some colour for this: But when it is never said [Christ's Righteousness is imputed to us] and so oft said [Faith is imputed for righteousness,] how shall ever the Scripture be understood at this rate, if still by [faith] it mean not faith at all, but Christ's righteousness? And why must not all other places that mention faith, be so understood also? But read the Texts, and set all together, and see what sense thus will be made of it. Rom. 4. 3. [What saith the Scripture? Abraham believed God, and it, that is, not his believing, but Christ's Righteousness, was Imputed to him for righteousness.] Is this a sober and modest paraphrase, or a shameless violence? Doth not [it] refer to [believing God] before mentioned? Vers. 4, 5. [To him that worketh is the reward not reckoned (or imputed) of Grace, but of debt: But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith (that is, not his faith, but Christ's righteousness) is counted for righteousness.] Is this a modest Exposition? Vers. 10, 11. [We say that Faith (that is, not faith, but Christ's righteousness) was reckoned to Abraham for righteousness: How then was it, (that is, not his faith, but Christ's righteousness) reckoned?— In uncircumcision: And he received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the righteousness of the fiath, (that is, not of the faith, but of the righteousness of Christ's righteousness) which he had being uncircumcised, that he might be the Father of them that believe, that righteousness (that is, Christ's) might be imputed to them also— who walk in the steps of that faith which Abraham had, etc. (doth faith here also signify no faith?) Vers. 13. When the promise is said to be [through the righteousness of faith] and Vers. 14. [faith made void] is it no faith that is here also meant by faith? And Vers. 16. [It is of faith— to that seed, which is of the faith of Abraham] is not faith indeed here meant by the word faith? So Vers. 18, 19, 20, 21. [Who against hope believed— And being not weak in faith— he staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief, but was strong in faith— And being fully persuaded that what he had promised he was able to perform] is it no faith that is meant in all these words? yea, or no act of faith, but accepting the righteousness of Christ? So next Vers. 22. [And therefore it was imputed to him for Righteousness] that is, Not his faith; but by [It] is meant only Christ's Righteousness, though it was faith that was over and over mentioned as the antecedent.) So Vers. 23, 24. [It was not written for his sake only that it (that is, not faith, but Christ's righteousness) was imputed to him; But for us also to whom it (that is, not faith) shall be imputed if we believe (is not that faith neither?) on him (that is, God the Father) that raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead (which is a distinct act from Consenting to have his righteousness:) who was delivered to death for our offences, and was raised again for our Justification;] Is the meaning that we are justified by the Imputation of Christ's Resurrection so to us, as that in Law sense we risen again in him, and by Rising fulfilled the Law of Innocency? I will not for shame and weariness thus go over other such Texts: but I must be so faithful as to say, that if good men, and wise men, and men that cry down the Papists and others for adding to God's Word, and corrupting it, and calling it a Nose of Wax, and introducing new Articles of faith, will yet own such Expositions as these, and accuse those that own them not, they are as great Instances as most I remember, except the defenders of Transubstantiation, how far education, or custom, or humane dependence, or faction and partiality and prejudice, may blind the reason of professed Christians and godly men. And that man that dare lay his comforts and hopes of justification and life upon such expositions of God's Word, should be modest in crying down the false hopes of others, and reproving them that build upon the sand. Lib. You have made a long discourse to make us odious upon a false supposition: We do not say, that in all or any of those Texts, by faith is not meant faith: but only that it is not faith as faith, or as an act of ours, but as connoting its object, the Righteousness of Christ. P. 1. Alas! a great number of better men than you, have too oft and plainly said without distinction that [Faith is not imputed to us for righteousness]. I hope they meant better than they spoke; but I would it could be hid from the world, that these words are not only in the Independents Savoy Confession, but even in the Confession of the Westminster Assembly, cap. 11. [Not by imputing faith itself, the act of believing or any other Evangelical obedience to them as their Righteousness: but by imputing the obedience and satisfaction of Christ to them.—] So also in the larger Catechism [Not as if the Grace of faith or any act thereof were imputed to him for his Justification.] How well soever they may mean, Gods oft repeated Word should rather have been expounded, than denied. 2. But what mean your cloudy words, [It is not faith as faith, but as connoting the object?] They that cannot speak clearly, seldom clearly understand what to speak. The Question is, Whether it be really and properly Faith, that is meant in all these Texts? or whether it be only Christ's righteousness? If you say, that It is both in several respects, you grant then that it is saith itself in one respect, that is imputed to us for righteousness. If it be only the object and not faith, why is it so often called [faith, believing, being persuaded, etc.] Will you say, that It is not faith as an act of ours only? Whoever dreamt it was? For à quatenus ad omne: If as an act, than every act (even ploughing, and walking, and sinning) would justify us. Will you say, that It is not Faith as a Moral Virtue or Good act only? Who saith it is? For then every moral good act would justify men. Do you say, that It is not by faith as faith in genere? It is granted you: For else (à quatenus ad omne) any act of faith would justify, even believing that there is a Hell. Will you say, that it is not any other species of faith, besides our baptismal faith? We grant it you. But if you will also say, that It is not this species, even the Christian faith neither that is meant, but only the object of it, then, 1. Why say you, that it is Faith as connoting the object; contradicting yourself: for if be not faith at all, it is not faith as connoting; that which is not, doth not connote. 2. And why say you, that it is not faith itself essentially? Is not the object essential as an object to the act in specie? Is it not essential to our Christian faith to be a Believing in Christ? 3. But what sober unprejudiced Christian that readeth the Text throughout, and hath not been instructed to pervert it, can choose but see that it is Faith itself that the Apostle speaketh of? and that it is our personal Relation of Righteousness that it is said to be imputed for? And who can believe that this is the sense [abraham's faith was imputed to him for Christ's Righteousness?] or this either [His faith, that is, Christ's Righteousness and not his faith, was imputed to him for Christ's Righteousness?] Undoubtedly by faith is meant faith, and by Righteousness is meant our own Relation. But it is most easy to discern, that the plain sense is [Christ being presupposed the Meriter of our Justification and Salvation, which he hath given the world conditionally by a Law of Grace, (or Covenant Donation,) by which now he ruleth and judgeth us, all that this Covenant, Gift or Law requireth on our part to make us Righteous, and entitle us to the Spirit, and everlasting life, is that as Penitent Believers we accept Christ and life according to the nature, ends and uses of the gift; (and this also by his grace).] Reader, hold close to this plain Doctrine, which most of the lower sort of Christians know (who have not fallen into perverters hands) and you● will have more solid and practical and peaceable truth about this point, than either Dr. Thomas Tully, or Maccovius, or Mr. Crand●●, or Dr. Crispe, or the Marrow of Modern Divinity * (Written by an honest Barber Mr. Fisher (as is said) and applauded by divers Independent Divines.) , or Paul Hobson, or Mr. Saltmarsh, or any such Writers do teach you in their learned Network Treatises, by which (being Wise or Orthodox overmuch, being themselves entangled and confounded by incongruous notions of man's invention) they are liker to entangle and confound you, than to show you the best method and grounds for the peace of an understanding dying man. Christ's Righteousness is Imputed or Reckoned to be as it is, the total sole Meritorious Cause of all that Grace and Glory given us in and by the Conditional Law or Covenant of Grace, and of our Grace for performance of the Conditions; and it needeth nothing at all of ours to make it perfect to this use; nor hath our faith any such supplemental Office. But this condition of our part in Christ, and of our Right to his Covenant-gifts, must be performed: and the sentence of Absolution or Condemnation, life or death, must be passed on us accordingly; it being not Christ, but we by this very Law, that are to be Judged, Justified or Condemned. And this is the Condemnation that light is come into the World, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil: But to as many as Received him, he gave Right to become the Sons of God, even to them that believe in his name: And there is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the Flesh, but after the Spirit: For being perfected, he is become the Author of eternal Salvation to all them that obey him: And it is not they that cry Lord, Lord, that shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven, but he that doth the will of our heavenly Father: For Godliness hath the promise of the life that now is, and of that to come. CHAP. X. Whether Gods justifying those to day that were yesterday unjustified, signify any change in God? P. IX. OF this also I have said so much in my Apology to Dr. Kendal, and in the two first parts of this Book before, that I shall now put you off with this short notice: 1. There is nothing changed, or new in God: That which on his part is in God the Cause of our Justification, is his eternal simple essence. 2. But God's Essence, Understanding, or Will considered simply in itself is not to be called, Man's Justification: But the effect produced by it; And partly the extrinsic object as terminating Gods act, and so by extrinsic denomination or connotation, God's Essential Intellect and Will is said, de novo to justify. But it is only man that is really changed. 3. The New effect in man from which God is said de novo to justify him, is 1. A new Right or Relation to Christ, pardon and life, and to the Father and the Holy Ghost: 2. A new objective termination of God's estimation, acceptance and complacency: And 3. A new heart hereupon at the same instant given us. I think none of this is from eternity: And that as God did the novo make the world, and judge it existent, and love and order it as existent, without any change in him, (as also millions of creatures proceed from his simple Unity) so is it here. And this needeth no more words with knowing or teachable men: And to others there is no end. CHAP. XI. Whether a Justified man should be afraid of becoming unjustified? L●b. THis fear of losing our justification, which you teach men, is most injurious to God's free grace and immutability, and a rack for Conscience to destroy men's peace. P. I have said so much of this before about Perseverance and Assurance, as forbiddeth me tedious repetitions. Here needeth no more but this explication of the matter which you confound: 1. Fear is either Causeful or Causeless. 2. Fear is either such as hindereth comfort, or such as helpeth it. 3. Fear is either a Duty, or an unavoidable natural passion, or a sin of unavoidable infirmity, or a more deadly or heinous sin. 4. It's one thing to cause and cherish Fear, and another thing to teach men that cannot avoid it, how to deal by it. And now I assert, 1. Too many are confident that they are justified, who ought not only to Fear that they are not, but to know it. 2. Too many that are Justified fall into such decays of Grace, and heinous sin, as that it becometh thereupon their duty to fear lest their hearts should deceive them, and they prove unjustified, till they rise by repentance and revived Faith. The uncertainty becoming unavoidable, some Fear in an uncertain person is a duty, without which he would show a contempt of God and his salvation. 3. Too many Justified persons have Grace so weak and unactive, and sin so strong, as that in that case, both uncertainty and fears are unavoidable to them: A Certainty beyond fear, supposeth a very high proportionable degree of all other Graces; (For the new creature in the chief parts useth to increase or decrease together:) But few have such high degrees of Grace. 4. A fear of particular great and heinous sins (which must be Repent of, if you will be saved) must be moderately feared by all Christians; none being certain that they shall escape them. 5. A believing lively apprehension of the dreadfulness of God's Judgement, as he is a consuming fire, and one that can cast soul and body into Hell, with so much as is necessary to vigilancy and labour for prevention, is all men's duty, Luke 12. 4, 5. Heb. 12. 28, 29. And on this consideration if we will serve God acceptably, it must be with reverence and godly fear. And we must keep under our bodies (with Paul) and bring them into subjection, lest having preached or professed, we should yet be cast aways. 6. Needful cleansing, repenting and preventing fear, doth secure and further our comforts, by removing the sin and danger that would hinder them. 7. All our enemies and dangers are not overcome till the end. And danger must be escaped by moderate fear. God who brings his servants over all their dangers, will save them by a sober fear and vigilancy, and not by fearlesness of the evil. 8. But all that fear which includeth error or unbelief, or distrust of Christ, is sinful, and to be resisted with all our care; And the more distrust, the greater is the sin. 9 All Fear that driveth from Christ, and faith, and hope, and love, and true consolation we cry down daily, as injurious to God and man. 10. We teach all Christians to contend with utmost diligence, to get up to the highest Trust, Love, Joy, Thanksgiving and Praise, as the proper Evangelical excellency, nearest Heaven: and to get as fast as they can above that fear which hath torment, which is cast out as love groweth perfect: and to pray and seek for the Spirit of Adoption, of Power, and Love, and a sound mind, instead of the Spirit of fear and bondage: And not to place too much of their Religion in that very fear which in its season is a duty, much less in hurtful sinful fear: But always and in all things to Rejoice in the Lord, with Love and Gratitude, and confidently to cast all their cares on him. 11. But as all men here are imperfect in Holiness, Faith and Assurance, and in their doubts, some fear of the event (besides mere reverence of God) is their duty, so we teach men how so to live in an uncertain fearing state, as safeliest to get above it. 12. And we know that sin, wickedness, presumption, self-deceit and pride are so common in the world, that Fear is very needful to the most; and we have cause to call with Paul to many proud Professors, Be not high minded, but fear (even lest God should cut them off as he did the Jews); and Having a promise of entering into his rest, let us fear lest any of us come short of it, Heb. 4. 1. And Christ thrice over reciteth his urgent exhortatory words, Luke 12▪ 4, 5. I say to you my friends— I will tell you whom you shall fear— Fear him who when he hath killed, hath power to cast into Hell; yea, I say unto you (the third time) fear him: Is not this authority full, and these words plain and very earnest, even to his friends? 13. And it is not fit to make such a Doctrine a fundamental certainty, which we find none of all the Churches of Christ held from the Apostles days for many and many hundred years (that ever I could read or hear of,) I mean that [all the Justified persevere]. Be it never so clear to you, that which now is, and so long was thought so far from clear and sure to the Churches of Christ, as it is no fit foundation for the Church's Concord, so neither for a Christians everlasting hopes, to be so much laid on it, as by some they are. CHAP. XII. Of Man's Power to believe; and of calling the unregenerate to Duty. P. X. & XI. OF the first of these I have said so much before, that I will here pass it by. And as to the second, you are a man of pernicious principles, and downright heretical and damnable, if indeed you would have us call no unregenerate persons to any duty whatsoever. Answer me these Questions: Quest. 1. Would you not have your Wife, Children and Servants taught, that it is their duty to love, honour and obey you? and your neighbours to deal justly with you? and the Rulers to protect you, and the Judges to do you Justice? Lib. I speak only of Religious and not Civil duties. P. You are indifferent it seemeth as to the Interest of God's honour and men's salvation: Let those alone, so be it your own interest be secured. Duty to you, must be preached, but not to God. But would you not have them taught to do you service as to the Lord, and as such as from him shall have punishment or reward? and to submit themselves to the Higher Powers for conscience sake as to the Ministers of God? and ●o Honour Father and Mother in obedience to God, and that by his reward their days may be long? Should not all be done to the Glory of God? Lib. Yes, it should be; but the wicked cannot do it: Therefore they must be first made Godly, and the Heart renewed, that the life may be amended. P. We are as much and more for Heart-work, and for beginning there, than you are ●● we know that God accepteth not the hypocrite, that draweth near him, and honoureth him with the lips, when the heart is far from him: The outward actions are no further Good or Bad, than they are ●●●● or from the Will. The Divine Nature, and Image of God, and life of the new creature, is the new heart by the Love of God shed abroad upon it by the Holy Ghost. But, Quest. 2. Are we to call men to no duty at all, to the getting of a new heart? Should we not persuade them to hear God's Word? Lib. Ye●: How shall they believe unless they hear? P. Quest. 3. Must we call them from the Tavern, Alehouse, Gaming-house, Playhouse, Whore-house, yea, from their lawfuiler employments that they may hear in season? and call Martha to choose Mary's part, and those that say, They cannot come because of their Oxen, Farms and Business, to change that mind? Lib. Yes, no doubt of it: Zaccheus must be in Christ's way. P. Quest. 4. Must we not persuade them to take heed how and what they hear? and to set their hearts to all God's Words, and to see that they despise not him that speaketh? but he that hath ears to hear, let him hear; and to consider of the truth and weight of all, and to search the Scriptures to see whether the things be so? Lib. I deny none of this. P. Quest. 5. May we not persuade them to come and talk and reason the case with Friends or Ministers, that we may convince them? Lib. Yes no doubt, as well as to hear in public. P. Quest. 6. May we not Catechise them, and teach them the Principles of Christianity, that they may understand them? Lib. Yes, as to the Matter; but to teach them your forms of Questions and Answers, is but formality and deceit. P. What? May we not teach them the words of Christ and Scripture? How shall the matter be understood without words? And what better words, than the words of Scripture? Lib. But a Form of the same words is but formality. P. Hath God forbidden us to use the same? Are Children and ignorant people fit to understand the mysteries of God, if you speak them every time in new or other words? or can they so remember them? And when the use of words is to signify Things, and the Matter is one and the same (for we have but one God, and Christ, and Gospel) what wild work will you make of it, if you speak the same things every time in other words? Are all those words equally fit to signify the same Things? Certainly some particular words are more fitted to each matter than other: And should not the fittest be most used? Doth not Christ deliver us a form of Baptism, and a form of the administration of his last Supper, and a form of Prayer? Are there not forms prescribed in God's Word, of the Priest's Benediction, and what the people shall say when they offer Sacrifice? Are not all the Psalms forms of Prayer and Praise (and were indeed the Liturgy of the Jews)? Doth not Joel put a form of prayer into the mouths of Penitents? Doth not Paul teach us to use Psalms and Hymns and Spiritual Songs, singing and making melody in our hearts to the Lord? Eph. 5. 19 Doubtless it is not only David's Psalms that are meant by these three words; but Hymns and Songs fitted to Gospel Worship: And if you would have none of them premeditated, nor be twice the same words, you would soon make yourself ridiculous to the world. If you say that this Precept was for them that could do so being filled with the Spirit, I answer, 1. It's true that they had their extraordinary endowments, which made a difference in the manner (as also in Praying and Preaching): But shall we dream that therefore the same duties belong not to us to be performed in the best manner that we can? 2. A man may from the Spirit pour out his soul to God in forms of Prayer and Praise, though the words were premeditated. In a word, if you would have all forms of Creeds, Prayer, Praise and administration of Sacraments, and Catechisms cast away, you are an enemy to God's true Worship, and the safety and edification of the Church, yea, you must cast away all the Scriptures, which are God's form of instruction, recorded for the Churches use to the end of the World. Quest. 6. But I further ask you, May we not persuade bad men to examine themselves, and to find, know and confess that they are bad and ungodly? and to lament it? Lib. Yes, that cannot be denied. P. Quest. 7. And may we not persuade them to believe that there is a God, and that the Scripture is his Word, and true? and that Christ is the Messiah? Lib. Yes; the Devils believe all this. P. Quest. 8. And may we not exhort them to Repent, and Turn to God, and so to believe in Christ as to receive him, and give up themselves unto him? Lib. Yes, you may exhort them: but they cannot do it of themselves. P. Must we exhort them to nothing but what they can do of themselves? Quest. 9 Is not Exhortation God's means to bring them to Repentance and Faith in Christ? Lib. Yes; I deny none of this; But that which you abuse men by, 1. Is bidding the ungodly prey, when the prayers of the wicked are abominable to God. And 2. In that you do not first call them to believe and come to Christ, before they do any other duty. P. 1. You granted me before that hearing and considering and searching the Scripture, and other things named, are to be done before Believing in Christ, by those that are yet unbelievers. He that believeth that there is a God, must behave himself accordingly in obeying God. 2. Men that believe in Christ but by Assent, that he is truly the Christ, and the Gospel true, and that there is a life to come, surely, if they love themselves, must do somewhat in order to a fuller Justifying Belief. 3. And are you so much against the very Law of Nature, worse than the Seamen that bid Ionas call upon his God, worse than the Ninevites, and than almost all mankind, as that you would have no men pray but godly men? Did not Peter bid Simon Magus repent and pray, Acts 8. And doth not God command the wicked, Isa. 55. to seek the Lord while he may be found, and call upon him while he is near? Should no graceless man ask Wisdom of God, who giveth liberally to all men, and upbraideth not, James 1. and giveth his Spirit to them that ask it? Must they not pray for Grace, Faith and Repentance, that want them? 4. But yet let me remember you, that we use not to exhort men to draw nigh to God with the lips alone; nor to pray without Desire. For Praying is but Desiring, and presenting that Desire to God. And when we bid men pray for Grace, we bid them desire it. And so bid them Repent and Pray, Believe and Pray; for Praying is a Returning act; And if we may not call them to pray, we may not call them to Turn to God. Mr. Eliot in New England teacheth the Indians another lesson, whose great work is to call them to pray, and the title that his Converts have, is the Praying Indians. Lib. But without faith it is impossible to please God, or do any thing which is not abominable to him. P. 1. But it is not impossible for one to have a common and temporary faith, and another a saving faith. 2. And one that believeth that God is, and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him, and this not savingly, may yet less displease God, and be less abominable than he was before without it: and also may do something that tendeth as a means, to that Faith by which he may please him. 1. A total unbeliever, and a wicked man as wicked, whose prayers are animated with wicked principles and ends, utterly displeaseth God, and his prayers and all such actions are abominable. 2. A convinced wicked man that doth somewhat from self-love for his own salvation, and specially one that is not far from the Kingdom of God, in the use of common grace, is less abominable, and pleaseth God secundum quid, or less displeaseth him, or seeketh that grace with which he may please him: And Christ is said to love such a man; Mark 10. 21. 3. But only the true Penitent believer so pleaseth him as to be an Adopted heir of life. CHAP. XIII. Of the Witness of the Spirit, and Evidences of Justification. P. XII. I Will spend no more time with you on this, than briefly to open your error, and then to tell you what we hold as certain truth. I. It is your gross Error to oppose Evidences to the Witness of the Spirit; for in the principal respect they are the same: as you may find by studying these Texts well: Rom. 8. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 23. 1 Cor. 6. 17. & 12. 4, 12, 13. 2 Cor. 3. 3. & 4. 13. & 12. 18. Gal. 4. 6. & 5. 5, 16, 17, 18, 25. 2 Tim. 1. 7. John 3. 3, 5, 6. Eph. 1. 18. & 2. 18, 22. & 4. 3, 4, 16, 23. & 5. 9, 18. 2 Thess. 2. 13. 1 Pet. 1. 2, 22. 1 John 3. 24. & 4. 13. Zech. 12. 10. Rom. 7. 6. Ezek. 11. 19 & 18. 31. & 36. 26. Eph. 1. 13, etc. Our having the Spirit, and our being sanctified by the Spirit, are the Witness, Seal, Pledge, Earnest, and First Fruits, and the Evidence of our Adoption and Right to life. It is not chief An inward voice or persuasion that we are Gods Children, that is the Witness. But II. As a man's Rational soul doth witness that he is a Man, so the Spirit of holiness witnesseth that we are Christians; and adopted 1. Constitutively, making us such. 2. And thereby differencing us from all that are not such. 3. And then helping us to discern that we are such: As the Reasonable soul perceiveth itself. 4. And helping us to exercise our Grace that it may be the more discernible. 5. And lastly, Comforting us by such Exercise and discerning: As Life and the Intellectual Nature are pleasing to themselves. The Conclusion. P. ANd now Saul what think you of the Cavils that have puzzled and troubled you? Have you heard any thing that should change your mind? S. I have heard that from you that confirmeth and satisfieth me: But I have heard that from L. which grieveth my very soul, 1. To think what temptations and perplexing trials poor ignorant Religious people are assaulted by, and how hard a thing it must needs be for such to escape deceit and sin, and great distractions. 2. To think in how sad a condition the Church of God is, that besides what they suffer from men of Violence, and the flatteries of the World, must be thus troubled and ensnared by men of high professions of Religion, and even drawn to corrupt the Word of God, and almost to preach another Gospel. 3. And that ever men of such professions should be guilty of so much evil: We to the World because of offences, and woe to them by whom they come. P. Alas! it is no new thing: Do you not remember that Paul had such and worse to deal with. Read Gal. 1. & 3 & 4. Read Rev. 2. & 3. Judas, & 2 Pet. 2. & James 2. & 3. & Acts 15, etc. and you will see, that even those purest times when they had Apostolical Gifts and Authority to restrain and settle them, were yet thus tried and troubled by men of high pretensions, so that Paul wisheth that they were cut off that trouble them; and Christ proclaimeth the hatred of his soul against the Doctrine of the Nicolaitans; and Paul tells the Corinthians, that Heresies must be among them, that those which are approved may be manifested among them; and the Ephesians, Acts 20. 30. that of their own selves should men arise, speaking perverse things, to draw away Disciples after them. And ever since in all Ages to this day, the Church hath been as Christ on the Cross, between two Thiefs, between the Tyrannical and the Superstitious Heretical dividing sort of professed Christians. But hold fast plain primitive SIMPLICITY and serious PRACTICE of a sober, righteous, godly and peaceable life, and you will get safe through all such snares. The Twelfth Day's CONFERENCE. L. A Lutheran: R. A Reconciler. Whether the Difference between Papists, Arminians, Lutherans and Calvinists about Man's Merits, be as Great as many think it? L. I Am greatly scandalised by a Sermon that you lately preached in London, in which you said (as many good people assure me) that the difference between the Protestants and the Papists was little more than in mere words: The City ringeth of it, and it is a common scandal, and offence. R. Seeing you heard it not, you are unfit to receive satisfaction about it, save only by telling you that the Report is false, and that which I said of some particular Controversies only, they seign to be spoken of all, or most, or others: But of this when you bring one that heard it, I will give you a further account. L. However I perceive by your words and writings, that you extenuate our difference about Man's Merits: And what is there that we more differ from the Papists about, than Merits; and from the Arminians, than their placing our Righteousness in our own Believing and Repenting? Is there any thing that more evacuateth the Righteousness of Christ? and destroyeth the honour of free grace, and justly entitleth them to the name of Antichristian? R. Forget not that before I further discourse with you, I premise, that I speak not a word to justify or excuse the Papists in general, or any one of them in particular, for any unsound word about this subject, nor to abate your just dislike of any of their errors: And before we proceed, I desire your promise that you will hear and speak with as little partiality, passion, and unrighteousness as you can, (for to lay by all, I cannot expect,) and that you will be true to what evidence of truth shall appear to you. L. Do you think that I love not Truth and Sobriety? Why do you so suspect me? R. Alas, how strange are our hearts oft to themselves! and how much of our own ignorance, temerity, passion and unjust partiality is there, in many a cause which we (sinfully) father upon God, and his Truth and Grace! But in order to our better understanding, I ask your answer to these Questions. Quest. 1. Had you rather it did truly appear to you, that the Papists and Arminians do less differ from us, than most conceive, or not▪ L. I had rather they did differ less, and if it be so, I had rather know it than not; But I would not hear that it is so, when it is not. R. Take heed that your heart deceive you not, and that you be not averse to know the truth, lest it should cross your own and other men's former censures. Quest. 2. If it prove true, that the difference is less than most take it to be, is he that falsely aggravateth it to the procuring of unjust odium, or he that truly openeth and extenuateth it, the more to be commended or approved? L. If you have the Truth on your side, no doubt but you do well, because Love and Peace also are on your side, and our fault is great that quarrel with you. R. Quest. 3. Do you think it is justice in any Papists to charge the crude unsound expressions of particular Writers, on the Protestant party as their Doctrine? (as Mr. Parker, Mr. Patrick, Mr. Sherlock are blamed for doing by the Non-conformists:) or for us to do the same by them? L. No: but where their Doctors agree, we may go further. R. Quest. 4. Do you think that the bare name of Merit, is cause enough to accuse any of false Doctrine, who meaneth by it nothing that is unsound? or that the name is reason enough for sharp accusations of such men? L. I am willing to difference the controversy de nomine from that de re, and not to make a greater matter of a name than there is cause: But yet ill names do tend to introduce ill Doctrines. R. Quest. 5. Do you hold that well-doing hath any Reward from God? L. It is not vain▪ It hath that blessing freely given which is improperly called a Reward. R. It is figuratively called Wages: And yet this is the commonest Scripture title, (and cannot you bear with God's Word?) But it is not improperly called Praemium a Reward: that is, A benefit given to one for well doing. Indeed if with the new Atheistical Philosophers, you take God but for a Physical Motor, and his Government, and Laws, and Judgement to be all but Motion, improperly and popularly so named, than you may say the same of his Rewards and Punishments. L. Well: you know that Protestants deny not Reward. R. Quest. 6. Is not Reward formally Related to some well-doing as the moral aptitude of the Receiver? L. Yes: it is such a Relation formally. R. Quest. 7. Are not they then of your judgement as to the Matter, who hold Merit in no other sense, than as it is [Rewardable well-doing] or [a Moral aptitude for Reward?] L. I deny not that with such I differ but in the Name. R. Quest. 8. Do not you know that it is the common usage of the word, in Civil and Ecclesiastical Writers, to take Meritum and Praemium so far for Relatives, as that omne Praemium est meriti praemium; though omne meritum be not Praemii meritum. Reward and Rewardableness are thus meant as related. It's true that Meritum is sometime taken less properly for any Dueness; ●s a man is said to Merit his Father's Legacy, that is, hath right to it: sometimes it is taken for any Moral Congruity: sometimes in malam partem for Commerit of punishment: and sometimes for a fault itself. As Calvin noteth on the word. But still every Reward is formally related to Merit or Rewardableness. L. But (not only our late Lectures against Popery, but) many Protestants say, that It is not Merit, unless there be an Equality of it in worth to the Reward; And therefore their Arguments against Merit are (as there). 1. The Reward is merely of Mercy and Grace: therefore not of Merit. 2. It is God's Gift: therefore not deserved. 3. It is by Inheritance. 4. We own all to God; and therefore cannot Merit. 5. Our works are imperfect. 6. We need pardon. 7. Our works are not equal in Goodness and Value to eternal life. 8. We cannot recompense God for what we have. 9 We cannot profit God. 10. Grace and debt are opposite. 11. We may not Trust our works (faith or love) therefore they merit not. So that the question is but of such a Merit as by equal worth maketh the Reward due in point of Justice. R. All these reasons sufficiently confute Merit in point of Commutative Justice: But they go upon a mere mistake, as if this were the state of the controversy between us and the Roman Church, or they took Merit in any such sense; unless it be some rare ignorant fellow (such as Romaeus seemeth by some words, and some few others): But do you grant that you differ but the nomine and not de re with those that take not Merit in any such sense, but mean as you do de re ipsa? L. That I must needs grant. R. Before we proceed then, let me briefly and plainly open the case. 1. God standeth related to Man, 1. As the Owner of us and all things: 2. As our Rector by Laws: 3. As our Benefactor. 2. To Merit, 1. Of a Proprietor or Owner, must be giving him somewhat to his gain or pleasure, for the worth of which he is bound by Commutative Justice, to requite us. 2. To Merit of a Ruler is to do that which he is bound to Reward in Distributive Justice, to perform his Rewarding promises, or at least for the Ends of Government. 3. To merit of a mere Benefactor is no more than not to be uncapable of his Gift, which is improperly called Merit. 3. All our controversy is about the second: God as our Governor ruleth us 1. At first by the Law of Innocency, 2. By the Law of Grace; and that 1. As delivered to the World in Adam and No, 2. Or to the Jews with the addition of the Mosaical Law of Works, 3. Or as delivered in the Gospel by Christ and his Spirit. 4. To dream of that Merit from God as a proprietor in point of Commutative Justice which our Arguments militate against, is tantum non madness: and is not the Doctrine of the Church of Rome (that I know of.) 5. To assert our Meriting of God as Rector by the Law of Innocency is dotage. And I know none that hold that we do so (by ourselves, though some hold that we do so per alium.) 6. Nor do any but Jews that I know of assert Merit after the Jewish Law of Works. 7. But they that hold that Christ hath Merited and freely Given a Conditional pardon and right to life to all mankind, even on condition of a penitent believing acceptance of the free gift, and this by a Law of Grace, which we must now be Ruled and Judged by, do hold that this Law hath its Reward, and man's acts accordingly their worth or Merit. 8. This Merit in point of Distributive Justice, is to be conceived of and defined according to the Regiment which it respecteth, which is God's Paternal Government of freely Redeemed sinners, by a Law of Grace freely pardoning and saving them if they will believe and accept the gift. So that it is only Meriting under a Law made by a Governing Owner and Benefactor, for the sapiential orderly disposal of a free Gift. As a Father will teach a Child Obedience by telling him that he will give him Gold or Meat, if he will thankfully accept it. 9 It is not true therefore that it is only a free Gift: For as it is a free Gift in regard of the Value and quoad rem, so that Gift is a Reward in regard of the Order of Conveyance, and tenor of the Donation, and the moral capacity of the Receiver, which men call Merit. 10. That we cannot (per impotentiam voluntariam moralem) perform the Condition, without Divine Grace, is nothing against the Tenor of the Donation, nor the nature of the Relation of a Reward. 11. But Reward and Merit in this case are furthest from that of Commutation, and leaveth least to man to boast of. 12. Yet may he truly glory in the effects of Grace with thankfulness to God, as Paul did, 2 Cor. 1. 11, 12. that in simplicity and godly sincerity, etc. and 2 Tim. 4. 8. that he had fought a good fight, etc. And he may justify his sincerity with Job, chap. 13. 15, 16. And Christ will say, Well done good and faithful servant, etc. Let him that glorieth glory in this, that he knoweth me, (saith the Lord,) etc. And Paul would rather die, than any should make his glorying void, as to his free preaching the Gospel. 13. And it is very false that in this sense a Christian is not bound to trust to his Faith, Repentance, Love, Obedience, only in their own place and office assigned them by God; but no further: As we may trust to the Bible, Preacher, Parents, so to hearing, reading, praying, etc. for their proper part: else we shall take them all to be in vain. Are they Means, or no Means? If Means, they must be judged and trusted as they are, and no further: And people are not to be frighted from necessary truth, by putting an ill sense upon words. 14. And though here be nothing of Commutative Justice, yet there is that which Justifieth the name of Wages used analogically in the Scriptures: Because Love in a Father maketh a Child's interest to be partly his own; and the Pleasure of his Will, is that to God who is Love itself and delighteth in his children's good, which Profit is to a humane proprietor. And now I will proceed with you in my Questions. Quest. 9 Do you think that Papists or Arminians do believe, that either Man, or Angel, or Christ can merit of God by Profiting him, in Commutative Justice? Or that it is possible for any creature to have any Good which is not the free gift of God? supposing man a free agent in his duty. L. I have hitherto thought that they so judge: Why else talk they of Merit of Congruity and Condignity, and that say some, ex dignitate, yea, and ex proportione operum? R. It seemeth you think not that you hold all this yourself. Let us try. 1. By Merit, they still mean a subordinate Merit, which supposeth the Benefit 1. To be God's Gift, 2. Merited by Christ. L. How prove you that? R. It is the express words of the Trent Council the Justif. Can. 8, We are said to be Justified gratis, because nothing that goeth before Justification, whether it be Faith or Works, doth merit the Grace itself of Justification: For if it be Grace, it is no more of Works; else Grace is not Grace. Can. 16. Though so much be given in Scripture to Good Works, that Christ promiseth him that giveth but a Cup of cold Water to one of the least, that he shall not lose his reward,— yet far be it from a Christian to trust or glory in himself, and not in the Lord, whose Goodness is so great to all men, that he will those things to be Their Merits, which are His Gifts. And Anath. C. 26. they thus open their Doctrine of Merit: If any say, that the Righteous ought not to expect eternal retribution from God by his Mercy and Christ's Merits, for the good works done in God, if by well doing and keeping God Commandments they persevere to the end, let him be Anathema. C. 31, 32. If any say, that a Justified man's good works are so God's Gifts, that they be not also the Justified man's good merits, or that the Justified do not truly merit increase of grace and life eternal by the good works which are done by God's Grace and Christ's Merit (of whom he is a living member) etc. Anath. sit. C. 16. To them therefore that do well to the end, and hope in God, Life eternal is to be proposed, both as Grace mercifully promised to the Sons of God through Jesus Christ, and as a Reward faithfully to be given by Gods own promise to their Works and Merits. L. Yes, this ridiculous Doctrine of our Meriting by God's Grace and Christ's Merits I have often read and heard of in them. R. It is somewhat bold to deride that which Scripture, Reason and all the ancient Churches do accord in. That Christ merited that we should subordinately merit, that is, be Rewardable, as before explained, hath no less consent. And Contra Rationem nemo fobrius: Contra Scripturam nemo Christianus: Contra Ecclesiam nemo Catholicus. L. But if the Council of Trent deny that Justification is at all merited, what is meant by the Papists Merit of Congruity▪ R. II. I think you hold not only as much of that as they, but (do you think it?) somewhat more. 1. As much: For 1. De nomine some of them deny that this is any merit at all, as well as you. And their Council asserteth it not (that I see.) 2. De re: They mean the same thing by Merit of Congruity, which Mr. Rogers, Bolton, Hooker and the rest call Preparation for Christ or for Conversion; And so the Council of Trent calls it: Which maketh a man a more Congruous Receiver of Grace than the unprepared, but doth not prove God obliged to give it him as a Reward. And do not you hold all this de re? 2. Yea and more: For the Council of Trent taketh Justification for Remission of sin and sanctification together, as after Faith: And so hold that Faith itself doth not merit Justification. But do not you hold more, de re, that Faith hath a flat promise of Justification (which is true)? And so God hath as it were obliged his fidelity to give it? which is it they mean by Merit. L. But what is their Merit of Condignity then? Is not that abominable? R. III. 1. You know that the words [Worthy] and [Worthiness] are used in the Scripture? Bear therefore with Scripture words. 2. And de re, they mean not all one thing, or use not the same expressions at least: Some (and many) with Scot●● say, that it is ex pacto, from Gods Promise that the Merit and dueness do result; or from God's Decree and free acceptation. L. I am sure your own friends say, that [These are few, and too modest, and indeed half Heretics for their pains.] R. I love not to persuade the World that men mean worse than they speak: What you mean by [too modest] I know not; but it is not true either that they are few, or taken by their Church for half heretics. And truth is well served by nothing but truth. But the author you mean, doth well in not opposing those that are of this mind, nor those that deny all merit of congruity; and in acknowledging that such there are. He is a stranger to the Popish Doctors who either taketh the Scotists themselves to be few (or judged half heretics) or else that it is they only that are of that opinion: of which more anon. L. But what mean they that say it is ex Dignitate, if not as profiting God? R. 1. I tell you they almost all conclude against commutative merit, and who is so mad as to think that we profit God? 2. I tell you that you may also ask what the Scripture meaneth by worthiness; And how else will you translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but worthy or deserving? And what is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but Mer●● 3. They mean [the Moral aptitude of Welldoing for the promised Reward:] And do you deny that? L. But some of them say plainly that it is of Debt? R. Yes: they oft say with Augustine that God by his promise hath made himself as a Debtor. L. But some say that Merit of condignity is ex proportione operum to the reward. R. It's impossible to know what every man meaneth, and impossible to make all men speak congruously: But as far as I can discern, most of them that so speak, mean, that the most wise God doth all things in order and harmony, and as he suiteth natural causes and effects, so he doth gracious ones: And that his free grace putteth into man's holiness, a suitableness to the Reward, which is but a suitableness of the habit and act to the object: And that he that Loved God much shall be much happy in that Love, and be much beloved by him: And so every Saint enjoy God according to the proportion of his Love or holiness; and Glory be varied according to the degrees of Grace. L. This we all hold: But you make them sounder and wiser than they are. R. Many of them and us want skill to speak very clearly: Confusion and darkness is found in all our conceptions and expressions so far as we know but in part: Those that you can prove to me are worse, prove it by them. I take this to be the common sense of those few that talk of Meritum ex proportione: For they most commonly disclaim the word equality, and all disclaim it as to commutation: And what else can they mean? And here I offer you an argument for Reward even in this sense of proportion which all the world cannot answer: supposing that God will freely continue man in life and immortality. If the Reward be essential to or necessarily inseparable from true love and obedience, then true love and obedience have certainly a Reward (and a moral aptitude for that Reward, or a Rewardableness, called Merit:) But the former is certain. For 1. To Love God is the souls health, pleasure and felicity itself (including the Knowledge of him;) And perfect Knowledge and love is perfect happiness. 2. To obey God is formally to do that which Pleaseth him pleasedly because it pleaseth him: And to Please God is man's ultimate End and Reward. 3. It is impossible but that God, by his perfection, should Love and be pleased with every thing that is Good according to the proportion of its goodness; and therefore with the Love and obedience of his Children. So that all those arguments of Protestants which well prove Holiness to be Happiness itself, prove the Reward to be essential or inseparable. L. If this be all that those few highest Papists mean, than they are but more zealous in commending holiness than the loser sort, as the Religious Preachers with us are: And if this be indeed their meaning, they are unhappy in expressing themselves, or we in understanding them, and our hearers unhappy that upon such misunderstanding are taught to abhor them. R. You know 1. That by Justification they mean Remission of sin and Holiness: 2. And that they hold that no works merit, but those that are done by the members of Christ and by his spirit, in love and holiness: 3. And that they merit nothing but what is primarily God's Gift: 4. Nor any thing but what is merited by Christ by another sort of merit, to which ours is but subordinate; 5. And that they commonly say that even faith itself doth not merit Justification (or Holiness;) because though it have a Promise of it, and so ex pacto it is due; yet there is in the nature of the things no necessary connexion between them: And now what can they mean after all this by condignity ex proportione▪ operis ad pr●mium, but this which I have described? Holiness is happiness and connexed to happiness, in its various degrees. L. But some say that they are so Impudent as to say that from the intrinsic worth of the work, setting aside the consideration of the promise, it is meritorious. R. 1. Their commonest opinion is that the natural Aptitude of Holiness and obedience, and the Promise of God set together make them rewardable (or meritorious as they call it:) which is most certain. God promiseth not his blessings and happiness to men for things evil, or worthless and indifferent. But 2. Some among their Doctors say that Were there no promise Holiness would be Rewardable; that is, that God's perfection proveth that he is Pleased with it and Loveth the holy: 2. And that it is happiness itself as is aforesaid: And as this doth but speak the suitableness of God's Image to be the object of his Love, and of obedience to be the Pleasing of his will; so it seemeth to me only to mean that Were there no Positive supernatural promise, yet the very Law of nature (which is God's first Law) containeth such a signification of his will [that he will love, and bless those that love him and obey him] as is indeed a kind of natural promise. And it is to be noted that all the Heathen World, who know not the written promise do agree in this as a natural Verity, that God loveth and is pleased with Goodness, love and obedience, and that it shall go well with them that are so qualified. And if we should forget the Papists, and preach to religious people with us, that there is no Goodness in the Divine Nature and Image of God, and in Holy love and obedient fruitful lives, for which God would love or be pleased with such as have them (supposing Redemption and the merits of Christ) any more than with the wicked, if it were not that he hath promised▪ (as if he had been surprised into a promise, not suited to the nature of the thing,) this would be abhorred by the same professors, who in other words, as it seemeth to be against Popery, will applaud it. But in all this you must remember, that it is presupposed that man's soul is before made Immortal by God as Creator; and that he might annihilate the most holy Creature if he will: But he hath declared that he will not, partly by the Nature of his soul, and partly by his natural and positive revelations: so that it is presupposed that God will continue us men; and then Holiness will be a proportionable Happiness. L. But I pray you give me further proof that the Papists mean so well and near us ●s you describe the case. Cite me the Authors. R. 1. You must take nothing for their Religion but what is in their Councils: And you must charge no error on them but what you can prove: For the Accuser is the prover. And I before cited to you the words of the Trent Council. But I justify not all that they there say: And one passage as it soundeth I greatly abhor; which is, that a Just man doth not venially sin, much less deserve hell in every good work, Can. 11. de Justif. whereas I doubt not but the very culpable defect of Love to God and other holy qualifications defileth our best works with sin: and every sin deserveth some degree of a hell, according to the Law of Innocency: But if they mean, 1. That Good works as such are not sin, 2. Or that our infirmities are not such as to which the Law of Grace threatneth hell and will condemn us; we are then of their mind, but we much mislike their words: For were there not an antecedent desert of hell, and a sinfulness so deserving (though not by an unremediable guilt) there would be no need of pardon. But to speak freely, the Council Doctors seemed not well studied in the doctrine of the Covenants (even Suarez de Legibus, one of the best, is herein short,) and so to speak confusedly of these matters: But they seem mostly to take notice only of the Law of Grace, and because that accepteth sincerity, and condemneth none for mere Infirmities, therefore they thence measure both fault and guilt (which they should not do:) For I find that they still presuppose Redemption and Pardon of sin, in the present case. But to proceed to their Doctors: Vega q. 4. defineth Merit thus, [Meritum est actio libera, acceptata ad aliquod praemium.] And de re, do you deny this? Davenport thus amendeth it [Meritum de condign est actio libera ab homine in gratia elicita, qua ex Justitia acceptatur ad praemium, etc.] (meaning Justitia promissoris.) Scotus 1. d. 17. q. 1. etc. will not have it meritorious because is done by grace, but by Divine decree, promise and acceptance. And this he calleth Justice, ex suppositione decreti & promissi: Non igitur ex natura actus oritur obligatio ad praemium, saith S. Clara: factâ autem pactione est debitum ex justitia: And thus say the generality of the Scotists. Yet some will not yield that God is so much as a Promiser lest he be obliged, but only an Assertor: as S. Clara noteth. Tho. Waldensis and some others deny all merit fitly so called. De sacram. tit. 1. Eckius, Marsilius and Bellarmine saith S. Clara deny all merit of congruity. Greg. Arim. 1. d. 17. q. 1. a 2. saith that there is no merit of blessedness by condignity. Durandus 1. d. 27. q. 2. saith there is no merit of condignity with God, nisi largo modo. So Marsilius in 2. d. 27. Brugensis in Psal. 35. Eckius in Cent. de Pradest. Cusanus, Stapleton and others, of whom S. Clara referreth you to Suarez in 3 Tho. disp. 10. sect. 7. q. 3. Bradwardine c. 39 fol. 338. laboureth to prove that the increase of Grace or Glory is not merited de condigno, but the congr●o, and that all Catholics so hold. And next denyeth merit de congruo, and all by reasons which S. Clara taketh to be valid. Soto a Thomist denyeth all merit de congruo, and saith the Fathers held it not. 4. d. 14. q. 2. a. 5. & l. 2. the nat. & Grat. c. 4. Bonaventure 2. d. 28. a. 2. saith Pelagius erred. 1. In holding that the first grace was merited; 2. That by the strength of freewill we can dispose or prepare ourselves for grace. S. Clara saith, Aestimo esse omnium Scholasticorum, non dari ex parte peccatoris ullam causam meritoriam, dispositionem, aut conditionem ad primam gratiam. For which he citeth August. P. Innoc. 1. ad Concil. Carth. Concil. Arausic. 2. can. 3, 4, 5. Concil. Trident. Sess. 6. c. 5. concluding, Et sine dubio hoc est de fide apud omnes Catholicos Doctores, nec ullus unquam oppositum tenuit. Et Bradward. optimus divinae Gratiae propugnator dicit express— esse Pelagianismum, licet intelligeretur solùm de merito de congruo. Yea Aquinas denyeth all merit de congruo as to Justifying grace, 1. 2. q. 14. a. 7. & in Rom. c. 4. Vega's judgement is commonly known. See Carthusian in Jac. 2. etc. I may conclude then with S. Clara, that Cassander spoke not unreasonably when he said, [Quo sensu hoc vocabulo Meriti & Merendi usi sunt Patres & Catholici, obscurum non est, nempe ut per illud gratiae Dei ex qua merita omnia oriuntur, nihil detrahatur. Quare nil est cur aut Ecclesiastici à loquendi forma & sententia in Ecclesia jam olim usitata discedant, aut Protestantes eam tam odiosè repudient aut condemnent.] And that Bucer said well, colloq. Ratisb. [Si sancti patres aut alii intelligunt Promereri, facere ex fide gratiae dei bona opera quibus Deus mercedem promisit; hoc sensu usurpare illud verbum minimè damnabimus.] L. Thus you seem to like the very word merit; which in your confession you do not. R. 1. I like the Scripture word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And they that translate it worthy, and account condignity the highest notion of merit, seem to allow that it may be translated [Meriting.] 2. I would fain find a word to serve instead of merit, answering Reward, and I cannot: What word can you find? Premiability and Rewardableness are long and unhandsome, and I remember no other, without using many words. 3. Yet I wish it disused, to avoid abuse and offence. L. But when Cassander saith, It is used as not encroaching on grace, I take all merit to encroach upon it and injure it. R. I ask you, Quest. 1. If you preach that [a Holy Lover of God is fit for Heaven and Happiness in God's love, than a wicked man, and hath a promise of it] and another preach, that [the Saints are no fit for God's love and happiness than the wicked, but only it's promised them without any fitness;] which would good men more dislike? I think that the first is but the very thing that most of the School Doctors mean: And that we at once abhor their words, and abhor the contrary, as they are variously presented to men. Quest. 2. And I ask you, Whether do you think it a greater Grace or Gift of God, to give a man that Holiness which shall fit him for Heaven (or as they call it Merit it,) or to give him Heaven without such Holy fitness (or merit?) L. Heaven without Holiness is a contradiction. But if God could make a beast or bad man Happy without it, doubtless yet both is more than one. I had rather God would make me here fit for Heaven by holiness, than not, and so all Christians. But we all take Merit to signify somewhat which profiteth God and which is our own, and not of his gift and grace: In which I see we are mistaken. R. Doubtless, as that God who can relieve your poor or sick friend without you, sheweth you a double favour if he will make you his instrument in relieving him; so if he cause you to work out your own salvation, it is a greater mercy than if he would carry you asleep to Heaven: And it's strange that men that know that all that we have is of God, should think his grace dishonoured by giving us the greater mercy. But to return to my account of the Papists. I will mention Aquinas farther, because you know who numbereth him with the grosser sort. 1. 2. q. 114. a. 1. He concludeth that man meriteth not at all of God according to absolute or simple Justice, which goeth by equality; sed secundum divinae ordinationis quandam praesuppositionem, as man obtaineth that as a reward by his operation for which God gave him the operative virtue. And so that here is but modus quidam Justitiae, as a Father hath to a Child, and merit only secundum quid, at non simpliciter. And he addeth, that our voluntary doing our duty is our merit, not as profiting God, but manifesting his glory, and pleasing his will; and so God is not a Debtor to us, but to his own will or to himself. And a. 2. he concludeth that without Grace even man in innocency, much less in sin could thus merit life eternal. When after therefore he speaks for merit of condignity as the acts are from the Holy Ghost, it is such a merit as aforesaid that he meaneth. But the first Grace he saith none meriteth. But I desire you for the understanding of Aquinas and such others to take notice, that the foundation of many confused speeches of theirs, is their confused notions of God's Laws or Covenants. For Aquin. q. 106. a. 1. doth go the way of Mr. Sterry and Sr. H. Vane and the Quakers, and conclude that the New Law (of Grace) is not written but in the heart, that is, that Lex nova principaliter est ipsa gratia spiritus sancti in cord fidelium scripta; because unaquaeque illud videtur esse quod in ea est potissimum: and so that Lex scripta is called a Law secondarily as a means to the former: Now this is gross abuse of an equivocal word by a vain pretence: For the word Law doth not first signify another thing because that other is most excellent; but less excellent things (as media ad finem) have their proper notions: And the world knoweth that the famosius significatum here is a Law ut signum voluntatis imperantis constituens debitum, as an instrument of Government; And that Sanctity of heart is the effect of the doctrine, and a disposition to obey; and is called a Law but in tropical sense. But indeed Paul oft describeth the Gospel as in the heart, and the Law as a thing; But that contradicts not what I say: but it was because the New Testament was not then much of it, if any, written and received in the Churches as God's Law: But Baptism expounded by word of mouth (in the three Articles) was the Christianity which Paul bid Timothy keep and commit to faithful men that might teach it. The Christian Religion was by word committed to men's memory first, and so to their hearts before it was put in writing: But yet it was primarily and properly a Law, ut signum obligans, and but metonymically as the soul was holy by it. The Law was one thing, even in the mind and memory, and the Love of God and it another, though called a Law. But from this notion (that the old Law was a writing, and the new Law was the spirit in us) no wonder if Aquinas gathered, that the word Justify chief signified to make us Good and holy persons; and that our Holiness being our real aptitude for our Glorifying and pleasing God, and so for our Happiness therein, was to be called our merit; meaning thereby but that same fitness for the End o● Reward, which Scripture calleth worthiness, and all religious Preachers and people among us zealously defend in other notions, where the Papists are forgotten. L. It can never enter into my thoughts that so many Godly Learned Protestants would make odious the Papists, if some of them at least meant no worse. R. Know you not that judicious George Major was made the head of Heretics, by Gallus, Amsdorfius, etc. for but saying, Bona opera sunt necessaria ad salutem: Read your Schlusselburgius of his heresy, and judge as you see cause. But whereas our Divines in confuting merit, do still describe it as of commutative justice, and not as of paternal Governing distributive Justice according to the Law of Grace, I will yet tell you what is said by Vasquez the Jesuit in 1 Thom. qu. 21. disp. 83. c. 1. & 2. & sequent. Which when you have read, I will appeal to common Reason and Christianity, 1. Whether it be not a sinful thing for ignorant Protestants to take it upon one another's reports that the Papists hold that doctrine of merits, which they do not, and so to make them unjustly more erroneous and odious than they are? 2. Whether it be not a very sinful serving of the Devil, for unlearned Divines that have read little of the Papists writings, to backbite and calumniate those of us who truly state the Controversy, and narrow the differences, as if we made the Papists better than they are, and took their parts, merely because we would have no good men belie them? 3. Whether it be not the way to harden and increase the Papists, to find such false dealing among their adversaries? Cap. 1. Vasquez falls upon some late Doctors who say that [Commutative Justice is properly and formally in God:] yet they say that it is not in God as it is in men, nor as including any imperfection: In the second Chapter he maintaineth, that Commutative Justice is not in God, according to propriety of speech: and that this is the judgement of all the former School Doctors to a man; He citeth many whom I recite to show that he is not singular: [Alex. Alens. 1. p. q. 39 m. 1. Scot in 1. d. 46. q. 1. in solut. arg. Richard. art. 1. qu. 1. Durand. q. 1. Palud. q. 1. art. 1. Capreol. in 1. d. 45. q. 1. art. 1. Concl. 14. & art. 3. ad arg. S. Thom. 1. contra g. c. 39 & ibid. ferrarians. Hosius in Confess. Polon. c. 73. Ruard. art. 11. Sot. 3. the nat. & great. c. 7. & 3. de Justit. q. 5. art. ult. ad. 1. Cajet. in hunc art. Joh. Bunder. in Compend. Concert. tit. 6. art. 7. Gabr. Biel supplem. in 4. d. 49. q. 4. art. 4. dub. 3. Bonavent. in 4. d. 46. art. 2. q. 1. ad 2. S. Thom. 1. 2. q. 114. art. 1. Conrade. ibid. Durand. iterum in 2. d. 27. q. 2. Perrar. count. Gent. 3. c. 179.] Then because some words of Medina and Cajet. and Romaus seem for Commutative Justice, he showeth that it was not their meaning: Next he vindicateth Scotus and Gabriel as having no such meaning in some words of theirs: Then he cometh to the case of Christ's own Merits, and saith, that some say [Christ satisfied for us in rigour of Justice.] But that Aquin. Bonavent. and such ancients use not that form of speech; but only teach, that Christ's satisfaction was perfect, that is, needed no Acceptilation: but to this it is not necessary that it be according to Justice properly, but that it was of equal condignity by way of Merit. And other Schoolmen that speak as aforesaid mean not that in Christ there was proper Justice towards God; but that the equality which he kept by the way and similitude of Justice in his satisfaction, was according to rigour: that is, needed not God's liberal acceptation, but was altogether of equal condignity; which is true: I except but some late ones, who contend that in that satisfaction there was proper justice; (whom he opposeth;) But they speak only of Imperfect Justice, such as is found in Creatures, which is not in God. In Cap. 3. he layeth down several foundations against Commutative Justice, and confuteth Cajetan and Medina who said that indeed between God and man there was no Commutative Justice, but inter res, that is, inter meritum & praemium there is; which he showeth is a contradiction of the former. In Cap. 4. he disputeth against commutative Justice in God to man, and that 1. Because there is not aequalitas dati & accepti; and to be short, he brings against it the very same arguments as Protestants urge against Merit, which showeth that both sides mean and oppose the very same thing: And he is so much against any Merit of ours from God in Commutative Justice, that he labours to prove that Christ's satisfaction was not such, nor can any▪ Creature so merit of God; much less is man's penance or satisfaction such: yea indeed he goeth too far in his reasons, as I think: For he argueth that where there is no Damnum (damage) in the sin against God, there is no proper injustice, but a common sort of it: and therefore there can no merit in proper justice by satisfaction (by Christ or us;) and that our sin bringeth no damage to God, ergo, etc. But I deny his Major: There may be injury where there is no Damage; and consequently injustice: Suppose a King or Father so far above his subject or son, as that all his disobedience would no way hurt or damnify him: yet it would injure him; because the father hath Right to the son's obedience (and love,) and Juri● denegatio est injuria. So that I confess that God cannot possibly give us anything by Commutative Justice, in a strict and proper ●ence; because we can so give him nothing in commutation: But I see not but that by sin, man sinneth against proper Justice, in not giving God his Own or Due, to his Injury, though not to his damage. But I confess the term Commutative nothing mutual Right, is improper; and their distinction of Commutative and distributive Justice is narrow, ambiguous, inep●, and therefore ●eedeth and not endeth Controversies: The true distribution of Justice is from the three Grand Moral Relations, Dominii, Imperii & Beneficii vel Amicitiae. 1. God hath the true proper Right of Propriety in us, and to our service: 2. He hath a proper Right of Imperium Rule, and so to our obedience: 3. By his Goodness, Love and Benefits, he hath a proper Right to our greatest Love and Gratitude. And he that sinneth denyeth God all these, and so doth violate proper Justice, denying him that to which he hath Right. But to return to Vasquez, having said, That our Merit and Satisfaction can be no benefit to God, nor our sin his damage, nec ulla inaequalitas inter ipsum & nos constituta est, quae sit objectum injustitiae propr●ae, he addeth that his punishments are no parts of commutative justice in resarciendis & vindicandis injuriis, because here is no reparation of damage, as Thom. 2. 2. q. 108. art. 2. And Cap. 5. he proceedeth to prove his doctrine, from the Condition of God and the Creature, we being as Children and slaves, absolutely his own; therefore there can be no proper justice between us: And he cometh to the great objection, that As free, our Actions are our own, and so may merit of Justice: and answereth No: because the Value of our works to which the Reward is given dependeth on God's grace, which he freely giveth and conserveth to us, though as▪ free the actions are of us as Causes: And because that Liberty is only a fundamentum of merit, but giveth not the work its Value (or worth;) therefore we cannot make God our Debtor, by any meritorious work of which he himself is the author and Cause. And hence he is so much against this merit of Justice, as to infer, that [Christ himself could not satisfy God according to strict Justice properly, by the works of his Humane nature; because the whole Value came from the Godhead itself, sanctifying the humanity and making his works worthy. Cap. 6. he proceedeth to show that though it be not true that some say, that full equal satisfaction may be refused, it being not the ipsum debitum, and that he proveth that a full equal satisfaction to proper justice cannot in justice be refused, and if it be refuseable, it is unequal; (though it may be equal condignitate meriti quae ad justitiam propriè non pertinet;) Yet even from Gods promise itself, it is no obligation of proper justice, that is on God to us. Confuting Sotus that saith that God's Fidelity is not to be referred to the virtue of verity, but properly belongeth to commutative Justice. If this be not enough, Disput. 86. he cometh to the other branch, Whether God have distributive Justice to us? and denyeth this also in proper sense. And proveth it by the authority of Bonavent. in 4. d. 46. art. 2. q. 1. ad 1. Scotus qu. 1. Durand. ib. q. 1. & in 2. d. 23. q. 2. num. 5. Palud. in 4. d. 46. q. 1. a. 1. Gabriel supplem. in 4. d. 49. q. 4. a. 3. dub. 3. Alex. 1. p. q. 39 in 1. & Thom. etc. & ex Anselm. & Aristot. Cap. 3. he proveth it by many Reasons. Yet Cap. 4. granteth that Justice distributive is in God, secundum quandam rationem generalem, non autem secundum propriam; concluding, Distinguendum est; Aut enim Propriè opponitur Metaphoricè, aut opponitur Communiter: si priori modo, Deo Propriè convenit Justitia distributiva; si posteriori, non convenit. If in all this you can justify this Jesuit and all the Schoolmen who he saith agree with him, from giving too little to humane merit, and God's Justice, I suppose few Protestants will accuse him of giving too much. L. But yet this Jesuit elsewhere is one of the greatest defenders of merit, for all that he saith in the words recited. R. Do you mean the Name or Thing? If the Name 1. Sure you will not make that a matter of much quarrel: 2. If you do, you must quarrel also with all the ancient Fathers; even with Augustine who (as Melancthon saith, Loc. come. de Lib. arb. of his use of the word freewill) doth use it throughout all his Volumes. 3. And if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be well translated Worthiness or Merit, you must quarrel with Christ and his Apostles also, (of which before.) L. But Aquinas his followers use the word Merits in a worse sense, and many a volume they have written partly to assert it and defend it. R. I hope you yourself would write to defend Gods retributive Judgement, and that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently seek him, Heb. 11. 6. If you would let an Infidel carry it, that pleadeth that obedience and patience have no Reward, the Christian cause is little beholden to you. Justice, Reward and Merit are Relatives in their sense; and you must deny All or none: For nothing can be Rewarded but a Rewardable act, which they mean by meritorious, (as nothing can be Punished, but a real or imputed salt; Poena and Culpa being so related also:) Though as Affliction may be without the commerit of culpability, so a mere Gift may be without Laudable merit. And Judicial Justice is the virtue of equal Judicial retribution, according to laudable or culpable actions. But what Aquinas and his followers hold, it's easy to see in himself, in Cajetan, in Ferrariensis and abundance such: I will now turn you but to such an Epitomiser as Carbo, (or Vignerius,) where it's soon found. Carbo 1. 2. q. 21. art. 4. saith [Actus humani habent rationem meriti & demeriti per comparationem ad Deum; Quia omnes actus sunt referribiles in Deum ut est ultimus ●inis, & ut regi● communitatem universi, & ità debet eis pro justitia retribuere; alias non haberet universi procurationem. 2. Homo quantum in se est, aliquid subtrahit vel exhibet Deo, cum servat, vel non servat ordinem à Deo constitutum. 3. Homo sic movetur à Deo ut Instrumentum, ut etiam moveat seipsum; & ideo meretur & demeretur. 4. Homo non ordinat se totum ad rempublicam, secundum omnia sua; & ideo non omnes ejus Actus sunt meritorii respectu reipublicae: sed totus ordinatur ad Deum, respectu cujus omnis actus est meritorius vel demeritorius. So that here is a meriting of God in the same sense as there is a demeriting and a meriting of God as the Rector of the Universe: not for any real profit to God, but for a free referring all our actions to him as the end, and keeping the order he hath constituted in the World, & quantum in nobis with a loving and honouring mind returning to him that which is his own. And do you deny any of all this? L. No, not the Matter, but this is not to be called Merit. R. If you will needs be the Master of Language, openly profess then that it is the Name that you contend about. Indeed Aquinas defendeth that which Vasquez seemeth to deny, that in God there is Distributive, though not Commutative Justice (quia à nullo accipit.) And that though God do all according to the good pleasure of his will, yet he doth all things Righteously, because his Will is the Rule of Justice, and he willeth what his Wisdom dictateth. And that he giveth himself his Due, in that he doth all to the glorifying of his goodness: and he giveth the creatures their due, in that he ordereth one for another, as its end, and the parts for the whole: yet he is not called a Debtor to any, because all are ordinated to Him: which Justice is called, The Condecency of his Goodness. And is there any thing to be blamed in all this? I am sure that English ears are so used to hear that God is Just, yea, that the Glory of his Justice is a great End of his Government, that good men will hardly endure you to deny it: Though yet through prejudice they hardly digest the name of that Merit or Rewardableness which is the object of that Justice; because of other men's abuse of the word, and some men's hard interpretation of it. But God the Righteous Judge will give the Crown of Righteousness (2 Tim. 4. 8.) not according to Names and Logical Notions, but men's works. L. But are other Jesuits of Vasquez 's mind, or many other Schoolmen of Aquinas his opinion? We commonly suppose them to give more to Merit. R. There are many School Doctors so strict herein, that they will not grant that there is any such thing properly as Legal or Governing Justice in God. Ruiz citeth for this Argentin. 4. d. 46. q. 1. a. 1. Bassolis ibi q. 1. Brianson in 4. q. 8. cor. 3. sol. 152. saith [Nullus fidelium fuit ita fatuus quod quaereret si peccator possit dare aliquid condignum, vel aequivalens gratiae Dei] speaking of Commutative Justice; But Ordinative Justice (which is that which we call Governing) only he defendeth in the case a. 1. Suarez (a Jesuit) the Just. Dei sect. 4. n. 8. Peasant. 1. p. q. 21. a. 1. disp. 1. concls. 2. But he thinketh that they differ but in words from others that assert Gods Legal Justice (vid●licet Scotus, Sotus, Rubellus, Lorca, Navarret.) Yet all agree, that God is (in some sense) Just. And Ruiz saith that Suarez (passim) maintaineth that God's Promises are but naked assertions, by which he declareth his will to give the benefit. And Durandus 2. d. 27. q. 2. n. 15. faith that God's promises signify not any obligation, but the mere disposition of God's liberality. And Greg. Arim. 1. d. 17. q. 1. a. 2. saith, that the Crown of Righteousness is not a debt, but only of Gods free ordination. And Marsil. 2. q. 18. a. 4. absolutely denyeth, that God is a Debtor, or doth any otherwise accept men's deserts, than by the free disposition of a gift. Scotus holdeth our acts are called Merit as relating to God's free Covenant or Promise to reward them, and not otherwise, but he absolutely denyeth yet that God is thereby made our Debtor, 4. d. 46. Major. 2. d. 27. not only followeth him, but saith, God may deny Glory to good works; (but he meaneth as the rest.) Richard. 2. d. 27. q. 3. a. 2. ad 3. seemeth to deny even Debt upon the title of promise. Bon●vent. 2. d. 27. a. 2. q. 3. saith but that God is quodammodo, in some sort obliged to glorify them that love him. Ruiz who is against all this, and maketh God's Promises to be proper promises and Covenants, and more than bare assertions, and that God is become a kind of Debtor by his Promise (and so it is not his Veracity only that is our security, as Suarez thinketh) yet holdeth, that It is but the Things promised that are Due or obliged to us, and that God's obligation is properly to Himself: that he hath indeed true Governing or Legal Justice, but tanquam objectum Formale & primarium respicit universalissimum bonum & praestantissimum quod est Ipse: & tanquam Materiale & secundarium objectum respicit universale bonum totius mundi constantem ex omnibus creaturis, quod praeponit particularibus bonis singularum creaturarum. Indeed he saith, that this Justice in God, is that [Quae solo natur● lumine demonstrari potest: ac proinde nullam supponit liberam Dei promissionem aut pactum, nullumque supernaturalem concursum aut gratiam.] But this is mere confusion by ambiguous words. These men talk as if they considered not, that Creation was a free act of God, and made man a Law in the Nature of himself and the circumstant creatures; And in this Law of Nature is a signification of Gods will to do good to the good, and reward the obedient, and this is a Natural promise. There could be no obedience, and so no merits, were there no Law: And if there be a Law of Nature, (and so God even by making us Rational free Governable Creatures was himself our Governor), these things supposed to be done by the very act of Creating, it is a contradiction to say that God is our Governor, and not a Just Governor, (being perfect as he is God) or to be Just, and yet not Resolved to use the obedient better than the disobedient. To be Governor, is to be the Orderer of Moral Agents: And what Moral Order is there, where the good and bad are not differenced in retributions? But the Papists conceits of all Promises to Adam and his merits being merely supernatural, confound them in many such disputatious. L. But do they not hold that a man may merit the remission of his own sins? (yea, and of the sins of others?) and justification also? R. Let Medina answer you in 12. q. 113. a. 1. p. 651. [Ad authoritates sonantes quod non meremur Remissionem peccatorum nec vero justificationem, non oportet satisfacere: Nam omnes convenimus, in hanc sententiam Catholicam & irrefragabilem, quod non meremur remissionem peccatorum.— ut Augustin. Nulláne sunt merita justorum? Sunt plane quia justi sunt. sed ut justi fierent, merita non fuere.] None merit Remission or Justification, with them. L. Not by merit of Condignity; but they say, that by merit of Congruity a man may merit Remission and Conversion and Justification. R. Medina ibid. p. 652. [Sed cum Meritum de Congruo non innitatur Justitiae, sed Congruenti●, proprie appellationem meriti non meretur.] And so say many others of them. L. But at least they hold that we may prepare ourselves for Justification or Conversion without Grace, or special Grace. R. Preparatory Grace is not the same that the Grace to which it prepareth us: But let the same Medina answer you, q. 109. p. 592. Deus expectat nostrum consensum (inquit Pelagius) ut nos convertat: ergo ex parte voluntatis nostra est pr●paratio ad gratiam suscipiendam. Sed h●c sententia est haeretica & contra Scripturas & Concilia; Veritas Catholica est quod Gratia Justificans datur sine meritis, & quod nemo se valet ad ●am praeparare sine auxilio speciali. Et p. 593. Ultima dispositio ad gratiam ad quam infallibiliter se quitur Gratia, non habetur ex facultate naturae, sed tantum dono Dei speciali. Do you say any more against Preparation for Grace without Grace, or against man's power to prepare himself? or against merit than all this? L. But sure Luther and his fellow Reformers had never so much inveighed against the Papists in the point of Works, Merits and Justification, if they had all taught no worse than these which you have cited; There are sure many others that say worse. R. No question but the Ignorance of the Priests was so great, and the carnal ends so powerful with covetous proud men, which were served by the abuse of the Doctrine of Merits and Good Works, that multitudes of such did ordinarily abuse it: If all Protestants taught the Protestant Doctrine uncorruptly, we should not have had so many differences and divisions as we have had; nor would one condemn another as you do us. L. But though the old Schoolmen might mean better, those that Luther had to do with, did sure speak much worse. R. I tell you, the Carnal and Ignorant sort of Priests and Friars did each man talk according to his model, and so do all Sects: Few had the Wit and Skill to open aright the common Doctrine: But 1. Our Dr. Field (of the Church) undertaketh to prove, that (excepting the tyrannical Papal faction, and the carnal and ignorant that served their ends, and by violence bore down the rest) the chief of the Doctors in the Church of Rome itself, did hold the great Doctrines which the Protestants against the Papists do assert. 2. To tyre you now with no more, I will cite but two of Luther's own adversaries in his days. 1. The first is the Learned Cardinal Contacenus who lived in the time of Luther's Reformation: Read but his Notes on Luther's Articles, and his Tract. of Justification, freewill and Predestination, and you will see that he saith almost as much for what you plead, as you would do yourself. I am loath to tyre the Reader with the citation of his words at large; Turn to them and read them, and see where he differeth from us. I confess the man was moderate; but never accused as differing herein from the Church of Rome, as in an Article determined of by their Councils: But their Doctors variously express themselves. The other is Fisher Bishop of Rochester one of the chief Martyrs of the Roman Cause, beheaded by Henry the Eighth for denying his Supremacy in Causes Ecclesiastical: who in Opuscul. de fiducia & misericordia Dei (Printed Colon. 1556.) speaketh as much and plainly for the interest of Faith and Mercy and Christ's Redemption as Protestants use to do. fol. F. Fide in Christum sola quis etiam citra quaevis opera justificatur. Nam si propriis operibus quis justificatus fuerit, is habet unde glorietur apud se: gloriari enim potest de operibus suis quibus justificatus est: Caeterum qui non suis operibus, sed fide justus effectus est, huic de se neutiquam est gloriandum, sed de Deo qui fidem ei dedit qua justificatur.— Introducit itaque Scripturam Paulus quae non per opera, sed per fidem Abrahae justificationem imputat; nimirum ut ita non sibi sed Deo totam referat gloriam— Ecce quia credidit Abraham, ideo per fidem justificatus est: Nam si per opera sua justitiam fuisset consecutus, jam non gratis ei Justitia fuisset dat●, sed magis operum respectu.— Si justificatio propter opera conferatur, jam ex debito confertur potius quam gratis, hoc est, quam per gratiam & ex gratuita Dei liberalitate.— Caeterum è diverso quando citra opera quis ob id tantum quod credat in Christum qui justificat impium, justificationem adeptus est, jam so●a fides sua illi ad justificationem imputatur. Ecce jam hic audis cui jam fides ad justitiam imputatur; ei viz. qui non operatur sed credit in eum qui justificat impium solâ fide. Et ●ol. G. passim. & H. Per fidem in illum sic expurgaremur, ut ille nostra peccata ferret, nos ejus justitiam assequeremur:— Non dicit factum fuisse illum Peccatorem, & nos justos per illum, sed illum Peccatum, & nos Justitiam Dei: See the rest — Nec est ut quisquam secum haesitet num pro suis peccatis Christus seipsum tradiderit: Immo credat, & securus sit ad eorum se catalogum pertinere pro quorum peccatis Christus semetipsum donavit: Nam si istud non crediderit, plane sejunctus est ab eorum consortio: fides enim ea res est, qua nos agglutinamur ita Christo, ut meritorum ejus facti simus participes: & per hanc constituti sumus una cum eo filii Dei pariter & cohaeredes— fol. I. Hoc tu quisquis es peccator persuasissimum habeas, quod si resipueris ac in Christum constanter credideris, jam Christum induisti, jam ejus spirit● donatus es, ●am denique communem cum illo patrem nactus es— See the rest. Et fol. I 5. Nam satisfaciente pro nobis hoc potentissimo sanguine, quotquot in Christum credimus à peccatis omnibus abluimur & justificamur, insiti Christo, atque in unum cum ipso ferruminati, sic ut omnia mala nostra per ipsum deleta sint, bon● vero ipsius cuncta nobis effecta sint communia: Is not this high enough? Fol. K. L. Is cord accedit quem veteris vitae poenitet— Quare fides in Christum una cum resipiscentia te justificat ab omn● peccato. Fol. M. Gratis confertur nobis ista redemptio; non ●llis meritis nostris— Namque ante quodvis Meritum justi constituimur, nimirum ut inde prodeant opera nostra justa: fiunt utique opera nostra justa per justitiam fidei— Quisquis igitur peccator fueris (nihil moror quo● quantaque & quam gravia peccata tua fuerint) si teipsum vere converteris ad Deum, teque ipsum in ejus misericordiam totum projeceris, credens Jesum Christum pro te mortuum, jam haud dubie primam istam Justificationem adeptus es. Sed cave te fallas, te conversum simulans quum non integre convertaris. Is quidem integre convertitur, qui toto corde peccatis renunciat, fiduciam plene suam collocans in Deo— What think you of all this? Do you differ from it? L. I will not be so malignant as to disown the truth, because a Papist speaketh it: But still you shall give me leave to believe that so many Protestants would never have said so much against their Doctrine in this point, if they had indeed held what these words import, which are as much as any Protestant herein saith. And you yourself in your Confession cite abundance of them speaking for man's Merits. R. 1. I cited them as using commonly the term [Merit] which I told you I had rather (because of men's misunderstanding) were disused, so we could agree of some fit safer word. 2. And I told you that one Rompus foolishly pleadeth for Merit in point of Commutative Justice, which the most reject. 3. And I told you, that the paltry phrase of Merit [ex proportione operum] is used by some, and rejected by others: And some that use it, it's like, have an unsound meaning in it, and others mean but that different degrees of Glory or Reward shall be given according to different degrees of holiness, which Protestants approve. But as I justify those Protestants who reprehend the unsound asscrtions of any Papists Writers, so I must advise you to charge nothing on any Sect or party of men, upon the words of particular men, but what that party owneth: nor to charge men with opinions, because others have so done before you, without finding what you charge them with in their own words. L. Would you have me so uncharitable as to suspect so many Protestant Writers of Calumny? R. 1. It is no Calumny to charge that on some Papists, which those some do hold. 2. It is perverse charity to receive unproved accusations of others, for fear of suspecting the accusers of calumny. By that rule all the false reports that now fly about in London should be received, if a good man or woman (specially many) have once spoken them. 3. And tell me whether you would have others observe the same rule towards you▪ For instance, you may see in Tolet (a Cardinal Jesuit) on the Romans, that he chargeth the Heretics (as he calleth us) with holding that God doth only Hid or forget our sins, and not impute them to us, but doth not mortify them. Whereas we all hold, that he Remitteth actual sins passed by Pardoning them as to the punishment; but that he mortifieth the present habits of sin, and preventeth the Reign of future sin (called Moral sin by them) in such as shall be saved. Which is the same in sense as they hold themselves. So he chargeth us as holding, that we have no Inherent Righteousness after Justification (no not Imperfect) but only Christ's Righteousness imputed; and that we hold obedience unnecessary as to our final or continued Justification: All which are false. And shall all the unlearned Papists believe this of us, for fear of an uncharitable suspicion of their Teachers? Multitudes of their Writers falsely charge us with these same errors. L. The Papists are Liars, and therefore to be suspected, but so are not our Divines. R. If once you fall upon such Rules as those (as that Accusations against adversaries are to be believed without proof, on one side and not on the other) Gods Rule against receiving evil reports will be cast out; and Charity and Justice will be cast away; and mere siding and saction will possess the place: And then all the question will be, Who are those Accusers that are to be believed? And if you think that it is your Teachers, the Papists that have many more, will think that they have more reason to believe them: And ●● the Anabaptists will believe theirs, and the Separatists theirs, and the Quakers theirs: and what falsehood and evil will not then be believed against all parties? and how odious will they appear to one another, and consequently all (Christians) to Infidels and Heathens? L. A man that is set upon a sodering design, may palliate any Heresy in the world, and put a fair sense on the foulest words; but God hateth such cloaking of sin, and compliance with it. R. May not Papists, Familists, Seekers, Quakers and all Sects say the same against Concord and Compliance with you? I pray you tell me what you think of these following words, before you know who wrote them; and take heed what you say of them, lest you strike you know not whom. [Quest▪ How is Justification free, seeing faith and repentance are required to it? Answ. There are two answers given; One is from Augustine's doctrine Epist. 105. the sum is, As Justification is taken inclusively, taking in Faith and Repentance as its beginning, it is free, because faith is free: But as it is taken narrowly for Justification following faith that is, for Remission of sin, and Reconciliation with God, it is merited by faith. But the other solution I more approve, and it seemeth more agreeable to Scripture: to wit, that even Remission of sin itself and Reconciliation with God, are given freely, no Merit of ours going before, and that neither by faith nor repentance we do merit the gift of this grace: For understanding of which, Note, that Faith hath not of itself any efficacy as it is our act, to Remit or Reconcile; but all the Virtue proceedeth from the object itself, that is, Christ; who●e Virtue and Merit God hath determined to apply to a sinner for his justification by faith in him: And what I say of Faith, I say of Repentance, and other dispositions, as in the example of them that looked to the Brazen Serpent, who were healed by looking: not that looking as it was an act of the eye had such a healing force▪ but the efficacy was from the Serpent, which God had appointed for the joure. So we say▪ of Faith, which hath not in its nature and from its entity any power to Remit and Reconcile, but as the Virtue of Christ doth this in believers: And so I answer, that If Faith justified as an act and of itself, Justification were not free; But so it doth not, but is a Medi●m by Gods good pleasure, by which the Virtue of Christ Justifieth believers: therefore faith (or repentance,) make it not l●ss free▪ ●. g. I give a Beggar a gift: He puts forth his hand and taketh it: If one tell me, Thou gavest it not freely, because he took it, or else had not had it, it were a ridiculous objection: For putting forth the hand doth not of itself bring him a gift: else every time that he puts forth his hand it would bring in a gift: But it is from the virtue and bounty of the giver. So is it as to faith and the dispositions by which the virtue of Christ and the free mercy of God do give Remission and Reconciliation to believers and disposed persons: so that it taketh not away Christ's Merit, nor maketh Grace less free, that faith or these dispositions are asserted. L. I know not how much men may mean worse than they speak: but these words are such as the best Protestants use. R. They are the words (translated) of the aforesaid Fr. Tolet a Jesuit and Cardinal on Rom. 3. pag. 157, 158, 159. But still remember, that by Justification they mean the holy effect of the Spirit on the soul; and indeed by Remission of sin, they most commonly mean the destroying or mortifying sin within us, and ceasing to commit the act: And they are dark and confused in these matters. L. But do not Papists hold forgiveness of deserved punishment? R. Yes: but they bring it in disorderly, and on other occasions: But if they did not, how could they hold, that any sin passed from our childhood till Conversion is Remitted or pardoned? For the Act is past as soon as done, & factum infectum fieri non potest: and so such past sins can have no remission, but forgiving the penalty, and healing the effects. And wrangling Papists consider not that this is the Remission that Protestants mean, who call their kind of Remission by the name of mortification: And so we endlessly quarrel about words, through our unhappy imperfection in the art of speaking, and words being arbitrary signs, the world is come to no agreement of their sense. L. You confess then their confused Doctrine, and you cannot excuse many of their Doctors from gross error herein. R. No, nor many honest pious persons that go for Protestants: What Papists have more plainly subverted the Gospel by their Doctrine on these subjects, than many of those called Antinomians have done by the contrary extreme? And who can justify all the sentences and phrases of many eminent Divines among us? yea, or of many of the most wise and accurate? For when all are much ignorant, who can say, I do not err? L. But undoubtedly you will be as bitterly censured for these your favourable interpretations of the Papists in the point of Merit, as if you were half a Papist yourself, and were but such a Mongrel as Erasmus, Wicelius, Cassander, or Grotius, or as if your Conciliatory designs would carry you as far at last as Grotius, Mileterius, Baldwin, or at least, as Montague, Guil. Forbes, and such others went. And others will then say, that you are justly served for writing so much against Grotius and his followers on this account as you have done, of which Bishop Bramhall and his Epistoler have already told you. R. Truth, honesty and God's approbation change not as men's interests, minds or tongues do: Time will come, that Truth will be more regarded, when Love and Peace are to be revived; unless God will forsake this contentious and unrighteous World. And I am so near, so very near that World, where there is nothing but Truth, Love and Righteousness, and where God is All, and the Fullness and felicitating object of holy souls, and where the censures of men are of no signification, that I am utterly unexcusable, if I should betray the Cause of Truth, Love and Concord, to avoid the obloquy of men, who speak evil of the things which they never understood. The Thirteenth Day's CONFERENCE. Of the great errors, sin and danger which many Ignorant Professors fall into, on the pretence of avoiding and abhorring Popery. Between S. A Sectary, and P. A Peacemaker. P. NEighbour, I understand that you are one of those that divulge your desamatory Lamentations of me as inclining to Popery, for some passages which I lately Preached in the City: I pray you speak that to my face which you so freely speak behind my back. S. Sir, the City ringeth of you as one that greatly wrongeth the cause of God, And my own ears heard you say that the difference between us and the Papists is little more than in ambiguous words, and points unsearchable. P. And this I hear you are one that have divulged, and so it is by such as you that the City is made to ring of it. But if this be an untruth of great aggravation, do you then deserve the title you assume, or are you a fit defender of the truth? or can your Conscience tolerate you herein? That which I said was this: I distinguished the Controversies between us and the Papists into such as depend on a Carnal Interest and Mind, and such as do not, but arise from the mere difficulty of the subject: In the former sort I said our difference is very great, and like to be so; and such are the differences about their Papal power and Church state, their Government, and worship as fitted hereunto; and many doctrines, as that of Purgatory, Indulgences, Auricular Confession abused by them, Transubstantiation, etc. But the other sort of doctrinals are made by many the matter of greater difference than there is cause; such as I named, Predestination, Providence, the cause of sin, man's power, and frewill, Grace, certainty of salvation, and I might have added, Justification and Merit as held by their Church and most of the Schoolmen: not that here is no difference indeed; but that long study hath made me certain that it is more in words than is commonly conceived: And this Truth is fit to be spoken though the mistaken be offended by it. Yea in these matters the Papists differ among themselves as much as with us. Dare you deny that these were my words? If you do you are a falsifier. S. When you speak so clowdily, who can remember every word you say? P. Is not this plain English? Peruse it and consider. And dare you carry false reports abroad on pretence of pious zeal, and then say, You cannot remember? Why would you report that which you cannot remember? Why would you not stay till you had helped your memory, by speaking with me or some one that could have informed you? But are not we in a hard case with such hearers as you, when we must look to be as oft belied as your understanding or your memory faileth? because your lose Conscience faileth with them: which is very oft. S. I am not alone in judging thus of you; City and Country ring of it: what company can one come into where you are not talked of? I daily hear good people lament you: and the best they say is, that God useth to let those men fall foully in some things who have been extraordinarily serviceable, that men may not idolise them. P. They that know me but half as well as I know myself, will know that I have enough to abase me before God and man: But will that warrant a course of lying and backbiting in others? Do you partly receive, and partly make and propagate false reports, and then plead the Commonness for your excuse? He that set London on fire might so have excused himself because the flame was common when he had caused it. The effect and prospering of your sin should humble you, and not seem to justify you. But yet I must tell you that Backbiting Sectaries are not the greater part of London: There are many sober people that are ashamed of your sin and folly. I will make this friendly motion to you: Instead of backbiting, Let us here to one another's faces, so friendly admonish each other of that which we take to be sin, as may help to bring each other to repentance: And do you begin, Tell me of all the evil that you know by me. S. I have nothing to accuse you of, but that your Principles are too large, and you vent them too freely, and thereby you harden Papists, and dishonour the Protestant cause, and wrong free grace, and the Righteousness of Christ, by your doctrine of Justification and man's Righteousness; And by coming so near Conformity, you grieve the hearts of good people, and may bring persecution on those that cannot do as you can. P. 1. About Conformity, forbear me here, for I must deal with you of that by itself elsewhere. 2. As to my doctrine of Justification, if I have not fully justified it elsewhere, I shall not now on this occasion. 3. But whether you or I be righter about Popery, let us now debate. Have you read my Safe Relig. and my Key for Catholics, and my Treatise of the Certainty of Christianity without Popery, and my late Dialogue, and my Treat. against Johnson of the Visibility of the Church? and others against Popery? S. I have somewhat else to do than read all your Writings. P. Why have you not then somewhat else to do than hear me, and backbite me, and judge of things which you have not leisure to understand? Do we not still deal on hard terms with such men as you? that neither speaking nor writing can make them know our minds? Have all your party that revile me, done more each one against Popery than I have done? But if this be all that you have to call me to repentance for, I have a great deal more to say against myself; And now I will deal faithfully with you: I beseech you try, whether it be not necessary that you speedily repent of all these following sins: 1. What a shame is it for one that would be taken for a Religious man to be so Ignorant as you are, and no better know the truth of Christ, from the errors of Popery, than (it appeareth) you do? 2. What a sin for one so Ignorant to be so rash and bold in venturing to judge of that which he understandeth not? 3. What a sin is it for one so Ignorant to be so proud of his pretended knowledge, as to venture to defame his Teachers for contradicting him in his erroneous conceits? Have you studied these things as long and hard as I have done? or are you sure that you have done it more in partially; and that God hath illuminated you so much more, as your confidence would import? 4. What an unchristian crime is it, to make lies and carry them abroad of your Teachers, and then be forced to confess, that it was the failing of your memory as to what you heard? 5. What a sin is it to be a backbiter? Neither you, nor any one of your quality did ever come to my face either to know my meaning, or to hear what I had to say, nor to reprove my sin, or convince me of my error. 6. Is not unrighteousness a sin, in your judging and reports, as it is in public Judgements? Should not a man be heard before he be condemned? especially a Minister of Christ? 7. What a sin is it to receive false reports from others, and encourage backbites whom you should rebuke and frown away? 8. What a heinous sin is it thus to destroy the Hearers souls, and as those that have the Plague, to carry your infection from house to house, and kill men's Love, and breed in them false conceits and bitter injurious thoughts of others? 9 What a sin is it with such unthankfulness to requite Christ's servants that spend their days, and strength, and estates in labouring for men's good? When I take none of your money, when I have these twelve years preached (as I had liberty) freely without hire; when I had been put on to plead the Non-conformists Cause in the costlies● circumstances, and to bear the greatest odium for it; when I was I think the first that was silenced on such accounts; when I have been twelve or fourteen years deprived of all Ecclesiastical maintenance; when I refused a Bishopric▪ when I have laboured in Writings and other duties to the consuming of my flesh in daily and hourly pain and weakness, and now look every Sermon for my last, and am ready to appear before my Judge: to be to the very last thus calumniated and reviled by peevish Sectaries, would be a sad reward, were your favour my reward! But is this just or grateful? or shall the unrighteous and unthankful be accounted the best men? I know I could have been one of the highest in your favour and applause, if I would have humoured and followed you: But I had rather that God should keep me from your honour, than buy it at so dear a rate. 10. And is it no sin thus to hinder the success of our labours, by making us odious or suspected by them that should profit by us? 11. Is it not hypocrisy, to cry out of the Bishops for silencing us, when you show that you would fain do it yourselves? Would not you silence me now if it were in your power? Yea, I doubt not but when I die, some of you will rejoice and say, that God did it in judgement on me. 12. And thus to make divisions among Christians, that should hold the Unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace, will one day be known to be a sin. 13. And so it is hereby to harden the enemies of Religion, by your clamours and the divisions which you cause; and tempt them to hate both you and us. 14. And it is worst of all to father all this on God, and Truth and Godliness, and use such holy Names for so bad a Cause. 15. And it aggravateth your sin, that you take no more notice of all those plain and terrible Scriptures, which as openly condemn your sin, as the sin of Drunkards or Swearers is condemned: were it but James 3. it would leave you utterly without excuse. 16. Yea, and that you can see the sins of such Drunkards and Swearers, yea, and see the Mote in the eyes of one that doth but use a Form or Ceremony which you dislike, and cannot see these Beams in your own. For all these sins I admonish you presently to repent. S. Who is it that is censorious? you or I? It is sin with you to open your sin. P. I desired you to open it: But see now how hard a work Repentance is, when in a Professor such sins as these will not be confessed. S. Well, come to the cause itself: Is it I or you that comply with Papists? P. I make that the business of this Conference with you: It is not you only, but some wiser men than you, that look so much at the evil of Popery, that they forget the evil of an unrighteous opposition, and of the other extreme: And they do as one that by labouring to cure another of a Dead Palsy, casteth himself into a Frenzy or a Fever: or like one that to avoid a Carrion that stinketh in the Ditch, doth run himself into the Ditch on the other side the way. God's Truth must be vindicated only by Truth; and Wisdom is best justified of her own children by Wisdom. God hath no pleasure in fools, no● doth his Glory need our lie. There is a time when the Devil will seem to be against error and sin (and so against Popery): but it is in a way which shall promote it: which commonly is by ill-doing and overdoing. I tell you plainly, the Cause of Truth and Reformation gets nothing by some men that se●m most zealous for it. For an unstudied half-wise honest Minister or private man to believe false reports of the Papists, and to mis-state Controversies, and to rail on them on such suppositions, and to mix many errors of his own in his opposition, and to backbite those that know more of the matter, as symbolising with the Papists, this is certainly serving the Devil, how honest soever the instruments in the main may be. S. I perceive that you have an aching tooth at the Protestant Divines as well as at me: Are you wiser than all they? or are you not warping to Grotianism which you have written against? P. Among the Protestant Divines there are well studied, knowing, solid men, that understand what they say, (such as Bishop Usher, Dr. Chaloner, Dr. Field, Dr. White, Chillingworth, Morton, Davenant, Andrews, and many such; and abroad, Camero, Dallaus, blondel, Drelincourt, Amyra●dus, Placaeus, V●ssius, Junius, Martinius, Crocius, Bergius, Bucer, Musculus, Melanchthon and many others:) and there are ignorant, hotheaded, self-conceited men, that rave in extremes, (as Gallus, Ambsdorsius and their companions did against Georg. Major, for saying [Bona opera sunt necessaria ad salutem]). And it is no wonder, that the best Churches have many such; and if such are the forwardest to judge and cry down all that are not as ignorant as they. And in our times, the World is more beholden to the fewness of buyers, and the wit of Booksellers refusing to Print them, than to the humility or modesty of such men, that the Shops do not abound with such furious Writings, ●s Mr. Brownes Antichristomachus, Mr. Danvers, Mr. Bagshaw, etc. and that Antichrist, Antichrist, is not made in Print the Universal Consutation of sober truth, as commonly as it is bawled out in words. S. Is it not safest to get far enough from Antichrist and Popery? Your study is to teach men how near they may come to sin without sin; and how to dance about the brink of Hell: For my part, I will be one of them that shall come out of Babylon, and partake not of her sins, nor touch the unclean thing, and that keep their garments undefiled; and not one that like you is grown Lukewarm by being overfond of Unity and Peace: You will follow Grotius its doubt at last. P. Uncleanness must not be touched, nor sin partaked of, nor lukewarm indifferency to sin entertained; we must go as far from sin as we can. But, poor deceived souls run into it, under the conceit of going far enough from it, and sometimes into greater than they avoid. S. What sin have such Protestants run into in their opposition to Popery? P. I will tell you some, I. In Doctrine: and II. In the consequent● and practice. I. It is more than one injudicious Protestant Divine that hath printed such unfound Opinions as these in opposition to Popery for want of judgement. 1. While they plead against the Romish false Tradition, they have weakened faith, by denying that necessary use of Historical Tradition of Scripture which Christianity doth suppose: (As others have denied the necessary use of Reason unto faith.) 2. They have wronged the Church by undervaluing the Tradition of the Creed and the Essentials of Christianity, by many means besides the Scriptures. 3. They have much wronged the Protestant Cause by denying the perpetual Visibility of the Church, and almost given it away, as I have showed against Johnson. 4. And their denial of its Universality, and confining it long to the Waldenses and such others, is an exceeding injury to the Church and Truth. 5. And so is some men's overdoing as for the Scripture, who teach men that they can be no surer of Christianity, (as delivered many years in Baptism before any of the New Testament was written,) than they are that there is no one error in all the Bible, by the carelessness of the Scribes and Printers, nor any humane frailty in the phrase. 6. And also their feigning the Scripture perfection to consist, in its being a particular determiner of all those circumstances of which it is only a general rule. 7. And those that make every form of prayer, or Ceremony to be Antichristian. 8. And those that make Justifying faith to be a certainty or full persuasion that we are elected and pardoned and shall be saved. 9 And those that say, that To believe that I am justified is to believe God's Word, or ●ides divina; either (as most say) because one of the premises is in Scripture, or (as excellent Chamier saith) because the Witness of the Spirit is God's Word. 10. And those that say All that have true faith, are sure they have such: (as Keckerman and too many others.) 11. Those that deny Christ to have made any Law. 12. And those also that assert Imputation of Christ's Righteousness in that sense which I have proved to subvert the Gospel. 13. And those that deny Faith itself to be Imputed for righteousness. 14. And those that deny that there is any personal Evangelical Righteousness in ourselves that is any way necessary to our Justification. 15. And those that lay all the stress of Faiths Justifying us on the notion of Instrumental efficiency. 16. And those that say we are Justified by no act of faith, but its receiving Christ's Righteousness; and all other acts of faith are the Wor●s by which none is justified. 17. And those that say, that Evangelical obedience is not meritorious as it signifieth only Rewardable in point of Paternal Evangelical Governing Justice, and as all the ancient Fathers used that word; because we merit not by Commutation. 18. And those that say, that man hath no freewill (at all, of any sort) to spiritual good. 19 And those that say, that Christ was in God's reputation, the greatest sinner, or wicked man, Adulterer, Murderer, hater of God in all the world. 20. And those that say, that he suffered in soul Pain altogether of the same kind with those that the damned suffer in H●●. 21. And those that in opposition to the Popish Government, Confession, Austerities, and several acts of Worship, do run into the contrary extreme, against due Government, Confession, Austerities, etc. And those that from dark uncertainty or à minus noti● do gather many conclusions against known truth. I pass by such as the Antinomians, who as I have proved▪ subve●t the Gospel itself, by running into the contrary extreme from Pope●●●. S. You are as ●ad as Parker, or the Debate-maker, that th●s l●y s●●ndal on the Reformers themselves. If these were their faults, you ●●●● cover them, and not open them. This had been enough for ● Romish R●bshakeh. P. You know not what it is that you say. This is to a●ho●●●●●●tance, and to prefer the honour of man before the honour of God: yea, to let the shame be cast on God's Word and Religion, lest the erro● of ●●●● be shamed. But all men are liars (that is, fallible) and God is ●●●●▪ He that confesseth and forsaketh his sin shall have mercy, but he that hideth it, shall not prosper. Are there not with you, even with you also (saith the Prophet) sins against the Lord our God? Why hath God recorded in Scripture the faults of so many of his servants, and foams them to such open Confessions? Did Paul wrong Peter and ●●●●, Gal. ●? or the Ministry when he said, All seek their own things, and no●e the things of Jesus Christ? or did the Evangelists wrong all ●he Disciples, by saying, that They all forsook him and fled? or James all C●●stians, saying In many things we offend ●ll? I think the Prou● Impenitence of many Professors, that will not confess sin, nor endure to be ●●led to it, lest Religion be dishonoured, is that great dishonour to Religion which God hath been long punishing us for. When such evils have ●●●● held and done as our age hath known, either it must be said that they are not evil, or that they are▪ If we deny it, and say they are God ●●●● and m●ns duty, we feign God, and Scripture, and Religion to be for all that evil, (which is to blaspheme). If we say It is evil, we must sa●● that we are the guilty causes of it. God will teach Ministers and Professors instead of Pharisaical self-justification, to take open shame to themselves that he and Religion may be vindicated, before he will deliver us from shame and sorrow: And he that will save his honour against this shame shall lose it, and he that will thus lose it and cast it away shall most effectually recover it. S. I think you would fain persuade us, that Protestants are as bad as Papists, and persuade us into the Roman Tents. P. That is but your peevish inference: But little do you know how much of Popery itself you have, while you think that you hate it more than I S. You would make me believe any thing, if you make me think that I have more of Popery than you. P. 1. Do not you agree with them in consigning the Catholic Church to one Sect or Party? only They to their Sect, and You to yours. 2. Do you not agree with them in your vehement condemnation of dissenters? only they excommunicate and burn them, and you deny them your communion and reproach them: But their charity extendeth much further than yours, and you condemn more dissenters than they do. 3. Do you not agree with them in being superstitious, by a great deal of self-made Duty and Sin? only theirs and yours are not in the same things: They say, Touch not, taste not, handle not some things, and you other things, while you say that God hath forbidden forms of prayer, and many lawful circumstances of Worship, and other such like. And I now entreat you and all the servants of Christ soberly to consider, whether a wild injudicious calling sound Doctrine and Practices Antichristian, and using that name as a bugbear for want of solid argument, and an injudicious running from Papists into the contrary errors and extremes, hath not brought on many the guilt and misery which in all the following particulars I shall open to you. 1. Such men have corrupted the Gospel of Christ, by bringing in many doctrinal errors, and opening a door to the heretical to bring in more. Almost all the Libertine Antinomian errors, have come in by an injudicious opposition to Popery, as if they were the Vindication of Election, Free Grace, Christ's Righteousness, Justification by faith, Perseverance, against man's Works and Merits: And it is not to be denied, that the said Libertine Doctrines do more contradict the Doctrine of the Gospel, even Christianity itself, than the Doctrine of the Papists about the same subjects do. I know this to be true, who ever is offended at it: Aquinas, Scotus, Gabriel, Bellarmine, Pererids, Tolet, yea, Vasquez, Suarez and Molina are not near so erroneous about Justification, Grace, Faith and good works, as Richardson, Randal, Sympson, Town, Crispe, Saltmarsh, and many such others are. Yet how many Religious people have I known, that have gloried in these errors as the sweet discoveries of free grace! 2. Such erroneous extremes in opposition to Popery have greatly dishonoured the Reformers, and Reformation. When it cannot be denied but such and such errors are found among them, it maketh all the Reformation suspected: as Illyricus his Doctrine of the substantiality of sin, and the nonnecessity of Good works to salvation, and as Andr. Osianders' Doctrine of Justification by God's essential righteousness did; and as many harsh passages in Piscator and Maccovins do, to name no more besides those before named. What a stir have our later Divines still with the Papists in defending some few harsh say of Luther, Calvin and Beza about the Cause of sin, and some such subjects? But downright errors cannot be defended. 3. Your injudicious opposition greatly hardeneth the Papists, and hindereth their conviction: When they find some errors in your writings, (as that all are bound to believe that they are elected and Justified; that this is the sense of the Article, I believe the forgiveness of sin; that this is sides divina, that we are Reputed of God to have fulfilled all the Law of Innocency habitually and actually in and by Christ, etc.) and then when they read that such men lay the great stress of the Reformation upon these, as the very cause of our rejecting Rome, and the artiouli stantisaut cadentis Ecclesiae, what can more harden them to a confidence that we are heretics and that they are in the right? As I have known the persons that had been in danger of turning Papists, if the error of Transubstantiation and some few more, had not been so palpable, as to resolve them, These men cannot be in the right; even so many Papists were like to have turned Protestants, had they not met with some notorious errors in such injudicious adversaries. 4. Yea we too very well know that your extremities have occasioned divers Protestants to turn Papists: Yea some Learned men, and such as have zealously run through many Sects in opposition to Popery themselves; (And some of my acquaintance that went as far in the profession of Godliness as most that I have known.) They have been so confounded to find partly palpable errors taken for sound doctrine, and sound doctrine railed at as Popery, and partly to see the shameful diversity and contentions of all the Sects among themselves, that it hath drawn them to think that there is no prosperity of the Church and Godliness to be expected but where there is unity, and Concord; and no Unity and Concord to be hoped for among Protestants; And therefore they must return for it to Rome: And Grotius professeth that it was this that moved him, to go so far towards them as he did. And I must needs say, that I believe from my very heart, that the shameful divisions, contentions, backbitings, revile, censurings, persecutions, errors and scandals of Protestants among themselves, is a far stronger temptation to turn men to Popery, than any thing that is to be found among the Papists to turn men to it: and that many are thus driven to it, that would not have been drawn. 5. And by calling good and lawful if not necessary things, Antichristian and Popish, you have made Religious people ridiculous and a scorn to many that have more wit than Conscience; as if we were all such humorous Novices, as would run mad by being frighted with the name of Antichrist: And as they deride you for it as Fanatical, so they the less fear Popery itself. 6. And by these extremities you corrupt the people's minds with a wrathful and contentious kind of Religion; which ●s easily taken up in comparison of a holy and heavenly mind. When you should kindle in them a zeal for Love, and Good Works, the mark of God's peculiar people, you are kill Love and kindling wrath: Gunpowder may be set on fire without so much blowing of the coal: Long experience assureth us that a siding angry contentious zeal is easily kindled, but a lively faith, a confirmed hope of Glory, a Love to God and man, needs more ado. S. Stay a little in the midst of your reproofs; Would you persuade us to a Union with Antichrist, and to live in Love and Concord with the members of the Devil? Are not the Papists such? Have you no way to reconcile us to Rome, but by pleading for Love and peace? Must we not contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the Saints, and not be Lukewarm to the doctrines of Jezabel that seduceth the people of God to Idolatry? P. 1. Were you perswadable I would persuade you, not ignorantly to contradict the truth of God, and call it Popery; nor to set up certain false or incongruous notions, and pretend them great and necessary verities; nor to make a stir for some odd unsound opinions, received upon trust from those that you thought best of, and to buzz abroad suspicious of Popery, against those that have more understanding and conscience than to imitate you; nor to fly in the faces of God's faithfullest servants (much less to use your tongues to backbite them) as if they were Antichristian, because they are not as shamefully ignorant and deceived as you are: And I would persuade you to study and digest well what you take the boldness to speak against; and not to talk confidently and furiously against that which you never understood: for it is the fool that rageth and is confident, Prov. 14. 16. I should think I had not a greater work than to build twenty such Cities as London or to conquer all the Turks dominions, if I could but persuade all that seem Religious to bridle their Tongues, lest their Religion be in vain, and instead of rash and busy talking of things that they understand not, and of rash judging and reviling men wiser than themselves, but to SUSPEND their JUDGEMENTS, and stay till they have taken time to hear, read or consider what is necessary to the true understanding of the case, and not to shame themselves, and abuse their brethren, and God himself, and wrong and corrupt the hearer's minds, by railing at that to day, which if they study hard and grow wiser, they will afterwards believe themselves. 2. And I would not have you think it good or lawful to belly a Papist, and say that he holdeth what he doth not; nor to pretend that they differ in the sense and matter, when the difference is but in the words: and then to think that all your injustice and false-dealing is excusable, if you do but say that some Godly Divines, or Religious people, said so before you, and you can prove out of their writings that you are not the first that did the wrong: Nor would I have you charge the unmeet or unsound expressions, of every ignorant, railing Papist, on all that are called Papists, no nor on all their Church: And therefore I would have you well read and understand their writings before you venture too far in your accusations. You would not be otherwise dealt with yourself; nor have the Protestant Religion (or the Non-conformists) charged with every unseasoned or unwarrantable sentence, of the many weak Writers that have self-esteem enough to obtrude their sentiments upon the world. The Papists have too many errors, and too great: you need not feign them to be more or greater than they are. 3. And I would persuade you not to take all that live under the Roman power and are called Papists to be of the same mind or rank, nor to damn any more than you are sure Christ will damn: but to consider what the Judicious Dr. Field undertaketh (and B. Morton in his Apology hath performed) even to prove that there are no considerable doctrines which constitute the Protestant Religion as different from Popery, which were not before Luther's Reformation defended by the greatest Doctors in the Church of Rome, though the defenders of them were discountenanced and born down by the Papal faction by power and violence. 4. And I would persuade you to believe that the name of Antichrist will not warrant you to lay by that Love and meekness and Justice which is due to mankind, yea and which heathens used to each other, and which you would have all men use to you: The servant of the Lord must not strive, but be gentle to all men, apt to teach, patiented (or forbearing,) in meekness instructing opposers, 2 Tim. 2. 24, 25. and if it be possible, as much as in you lieth, you must live peaceably with all men, Rom. 12. 18. and therefore follow peace with all, Heb. 10. 14. At least make Conscience of rash calumniating and slandering the worst. 5. And as to the texts that you refer to, I wish you better to study them, and you will find that they were not spoken of the Papists then, but of the Heretics or Sectaries of that age: It was the Nicolaitans and such others that are likened to Jezebel, as the text showeth you: And it was such as they, called Carpocratians, and Gnostics that denied or subverted the faith which Christians were earnestly to contend for: And we would have you zealously defend Christianity, without Lukewarmness: but not to abuse the world so much, as to ●eign all your dreams or opinions to be Christianity or the faith. And so I still say that though Popery must be faithfully rejected, yet your overdoing and mistaking way of opposition to it, endangereth the people's souls, by tempting them into factious wrath and unrighteous calumny, and destroying that Love and common justice which is due to Papists themselves, and much more to those Protestants whom you ignorantly calumniate. 7. Yea I add, that hereby you make false glasses for the people to see their own faces in, and cheat poor souls, with a carnal sort of Religion and zeal, as if it were that which is true and saving. Men are loath to know that they are indeed unholy: and therefore will be pretending to some kind of Religion to cherish their presumption, for want of ●ounder comfort: And O how many thousands are there that think that they are Godly persons, because they can rise up in the dark with confident reproach against this or that opinion or practice as coming too near to Popery! O that they hated all that cometh too near to a fleshly, worldly mind and life! or to selfishness and pride and overvaluing an ignorant understanding! It's pitiful to hear how many learned Preachers in Germany among the Lutherans, live in drunkenness, and worldliness, and how little of the spirit of holiness appeareth in their Sermons or lives, and how they make up all by a ●ervent preaching against the Papists and the Calvinists. Were it as easy to get faith, hope and Love, as to talk against other men's opinions, or to call that Popery which is contrary to your raw conceits, how happy were it for such men! But you little think that they that have a Religious zeal for forms and ceremonies, and they that are as zealous against them, may be of the same spirit and temper of Religions, being both but Formalists, though one's formality work for, and the others against such kind of things. And you are not ware that If you are wiser than those that you talk against, you must show it by your works and meekness of wisdom, and that the envious wisdom and zeal which is not from above, but is earthly, sensual and diabolical, may work as well by crying down other men's opinions as Popish and Antichristian as in other ways. 8. And under pretence of zeal against Popery, you turn the people's minds from the great matters of their salvation, which need their daily and most diligent study, and their most intense affections and regard: And so you starve our and destroy true piety, by calling off the people's minds to Controversy: And when they should be edifying one another in the comfortable hopes of another world, they are backbiting one another with accusations of Popery. 9 Yea Preaching itself is thus corrupted: And that which is appointed of God to be the means of men's edification in Love and holiness, (Eph. 4. 14, 15, 16.) is turned to be the bellows of keeping hot the furnace of wrath and injury. 10. Yea Prayer which should be most holy is thus also corrupted and profaned by too many; while they boldly bespeak the holy and dreadful God against one another, and against those things, which their ignorance misrepresenteth to themselves. And so God's ordinances are made a snare to souls, which are appointed for their salvation: and the man that can kindle in his hearers a transporting passion against this or that opinion or form as Popish, is cried up for an excellent preacher, and seemeth to edify the people while he destroveth them. 11. And by this means you seem to justify the Papists lies and calumnies against the Protestants, by doing as they do: They belie Luther, Zuinglius, Calvin, Beza, etc. with just such intentions and such a kind of zeal, as some over doing Sectaries belie them. And is it bad in them and good in you? 12. You teach the people a dangerous and perverse way of reasoning à minùs notis, which will let in almost any errors: From a dark text in the Revelations, or Daniel, or from the supposition that the Pope is the Antichrist, and all Papists have received the mark of the beast, you gather conclusions against the notorious duties of Love and peace, which the light of nature doth commend to all: Not that I am persuading you that the Pope is not Antichrist; but that all things be received but according to their proper degree of evidence. S. Now you open yourself indeed: All that revolt to Popery begin there, with questioning whether the Pope be the Antichrist, and telling men of the darkness of the Book of Revelations. P. I tell you I will abate no certainty that you have, but increase my own and yours if I could: but I would not have any falsely to pretend that they are certainer of any thing than they are: And no certainty can go beyond the ascertaining evidence: And if all Scriptures be equally plain, St. Peter was deceived, that tells us of many things hard to be understood, which the unlearned wrist as other Scriptures to their own destruction. And if the Revelations be not one of the hardest, I crave your answer to these questions: 1. Why are five Expositors usually of four opinions in the expounding of it? when it is those that have spent much of their lives in studying it (as Napier, Brightman, etc.) who are the Expositors? 2. Why will none of you that find it so easy at last write one certain Commentary which may assure which of all the former (if any one of them) was in the right? 3. Why did Calvin take it to be too hard for him, and durst not venture to expound it? 4. And if you take it to be so necessary as you pretend, tell me whether it was so necessary, and so taken by all those Churches, that for a long time received it not as Canonical Scripture? Surely they were saved without believing it. Though no doubt but the book of Revelation is a great mercy to the Church, and all men should understand as much of it as they can. But all that I blame you for here, is the perverting of the order of proof, in arguing à minùs notis. 13. And these over-doers that run things into the contrary extremes, do most injuriously weaken the Protestant cause, by disabling themselves and all men of their principles to defend it, and arming the Papists against it by their errors. When it cometh to an open dispute by Word or Writing, one of these men's errors is like a wound that lets out blood and spirits, and putteth words of triumph into the adversaries mouth: A cunning Papist will presently drive the ignorant disputant to resolve his cause into his mistake, and then will open the falsehood of that, and thence infer the falsehood of all the rest: And what an injury is that to the souls of the auditors, who may be betrayed by it, and to the cause itself? For instance, If one of our over-doers hold that we are reputed to have kept all the Law of Innocency and merited salvation ourselves by Christ, or that no act of faith is Justifying but the accepting of his righteousness, or that faith Justifieth only as the efficient instrumental cause, or that we have no righteousness which hath any thing to do in our Justification, but only Christ's imputed Merits, or that man's faith, Love or obedience are not rewardable, etc. how easily will a Papist open the falsehood of such an opinion to the hearers, and then tell them that they may see by this who is in the right. And, alas, what work would one Learned Papist make in London by public disputing, if we had no wiser men to deal with him than these over-doers? They may call Truth and Sobriety Antichristian, and talk nonsense as against Popery successfully to their own party; but I hope never to see the cause managed by their public disputes, lest half the Congregation turn Papists on it at once. If Chillingworth had not been abler to confute a Papist than those that used to calumniate him as Popish or Socinian, he had done less service of that kind than he did. 14. And it is an odious injury that these Over-doers do to the ancient and the universal Church, while in many cases, they (ignorantly or wilfully) reproach and condemn them, as if they were all the favourers of Popery, and call their ancient doctrine and practice Antichristian. Some of them ignorantly falsify the Father's doctrine, and upon trust from their Leaders aver● that they held that which they plainly contradict: and that which they held indeed, they cry out against as Popery. Such an instance we have newly in a Soldier, Major Danvers, an Anabaptist, which I have detected. And will Christ take it well to have almost all his Church condemned as Antichristian? 15. And hereby what an honour is done to Popery, and what a dishonour to the Reformed Churches, when it shall be concluded that all the Churches heretofore, even next after the age of the Apostles, and almost all the present Churches, were and are against the doctrine of the Protestants, and on the Papists side? And yet how many do us this injury, and the Roman Church this honour? About the nature of Justifying faith, and its office to Justification, and about the nature of Justification itself, and Imputation of Righteousness, and freewill, and man's Works and Merits, and about assurance of salvation and perseverance, how many do call that Popery, which the whole current of Greek and Latin Fathers do assert, and all the ancient Churches owned, and most of all the present Churches in the world? And those that call all forms of prayer, Popery, or the English Liturgy at least, when almost all the Christian world have forms, and most such as are much worse, do but tell men that the Christian world is on the side that they oppose, and against their way. 16. And it is a crime of infamy to be taken for Separatists from the universal Church; And in doctrines and forms of Worship, not only to avoid what we take to have been a common weakness, but also to condemn them as Antichristian, or as holding pernicious errors, is but to persuade men that we are not of the same body, and to own a sinful dishonourable separation. 17. And by all these means these Over-doers do greatly increase Atheism and Infidelity and profaneness among us, while their zeal against Truth and reproaches of sound doctrine, do make men think that our Religion is nothing but proud humour and self-conceit; and while they see us so boldly condemn almost all the world except ourselves, they will think that so few as we deserve not to be excepted. 18. By this injurious extremity against the Papists, we do but kindle in them a bitterer enmity to us, and hatred of them breedeth hatred in them of us, and so we set them on plotting revenge against us, as implacable injurious enemies; when we should deal soberly and righteously with all men, and seek to win them by truth and gentleness. 19 I And such deal with them do draw Persecution on the Protestants that live under their Dominions; and if we refuse to use them here as Christians, no wonder if abroad they use not the Protestants as Men. 20. And by such great abuses of Reformation, men hinder Reformation for the time to come, and do their part to make it hopeless, while they discourage such attempts, by dishonouring the Reformation which is passed Even as David George, and Munt●er, and the Munster Damages and Rebellions, do hinder the reviving of Anabaptistry in the world, and the shame of their old practices and successes, is as a Grave stone upon the Sepuleher of their Cause; so do these men do their part to make it with the whole Reformation, that none hereafter may date to own or meddle with such work. These that I have opened briefly to you, are the real fruits of false, injurious and ignorant zeal and overdoing against the Papists: And if Popery revive, it's like to be by such men. S. But Popery is an heinous evil; and corrupt nature is so prone to evil, tha● you need not thus dissuade men from going too far from it, or from overdoing against it, no more than from being overmuch religious. P. You may say the same as truly of the errors on the contrary extreme: All of them are evil, and men are prone to evil: But 1. Little know you how common it is in the world to spend men's zeal against the real or supposed evil of other men's Opinions, and thereby to strengthen the mortal evil of their own carnal affections and passions, and worldly lives, and to take a zeal for Truth and Orthodoxness for real Holiness, while usually such miss of Truth itself. 2. And you know not the wiles of Satan, how ordinarily he betrayeth a good Cause by the ill management of its most zealous friends, and doth undo by overdoing. When he will play the Devil indeed with Eve, he will seem to be more than God himself for Knowledge of Good and Evil, and for the advancement of mankind to be like God; and God shall be accused by him as if he were untrue, and envied our perfection. When he will play the Devil indeed with Christ, he will seem to be more for valiantness and trusting God than Christ was, and pleadeth Scripture for tempting God. When he will, play the Devil indeed in the Pharisees, he will be stricter for the sabbath, and for Discipline in avoiding the company of the Publicans and sinners, and stricter in fastings and diet and other observations than Christ himself; And he will be a zealous enemy to Blasphemy, and a zealous Royalist for Caesar, and a zealous honourer of the Temple and the Law, when Christ, or Paul, or other Apostles are to be destroyed by it. And when he will play the Devil in the Nicolaitans, Simonians, and Gnostick Heretics, he will seem to be for higher knowledge, and greater liberty than the Apostles were. And so when he would sow discord among Christians, and would kill their Love, and divide Christ's Church, and set them in a mental and oral War against each other, he will aggravate the errors and faults of others, and he will seem a more zealous friend of Truth, and enemy to Popery, Heresy, Error, Superstition, false Worship, or other faults than Christ is: But he knoweth why. S. But God telleth us himself, that he is jealous about his Worship, and hath in Scripture more severely executed his Justice upon the corrupters of his Worship, than almost any other crime. P. No doubt but God is jealous against Idolatry. He that knoweth not the true God from Idols, cannot honour him. And he that worshippeth him not as a most Great and Holy God, dishonoureth or blasphemeth him on pretence of worshipping him. And to worship him by an Image, is to persuade men that God is like that which that Image doth represent; which is to deny him to be God. And no doubt but the Jews great temptations to Idolatry from the Nations about them, were to be oppugned by great severities of God. And no doubt but Moses Law was to be honoured by God's severe executions on the breakers of it. But when you come to Christ's preaching, you find how oft he teacheth the Pharisees to go learn what that meaneth, I will have Mercy, and not Sacrifice. When he conferreth with the Woman of Samaria, John 4. she presently turneth from the doctrine of faith (as Sectaries do among us) to the Controversies of the times, [Our Fathers say, In this Mountain, and you say At Jerusalem, men ought to worship.] But Christ calleth her off such low discourse, and teacheth her to worship God as a Spirit, in spirit and truth, if ever she would be accepted of him. S. But it is a time now when Popery is striving to rise again, and how unseasonably would you abate men's zeal against it? P. No more than he was against his Lawyer's Zeal, who grew hoarse with senseless bawling for him, saying, I am glad he hath lost his voice, or else I might have lost my Cause. I am so much against Popery, that I wish it wiser and abler adversaries, than self-conceited unstudied Zealots, who will honour Popery, by entitling it to the Truths of God, and the Consent of the Ancient or Universal Church; or would make people believe, that it consisteth in some good or indifferent things, as in some Doctrines, Forms or Government, which others can see no harm in; And so teach men to say, If this be Popery, we will rather be Papists, than of them that rave as in their sleep, against they know not what. Can these men be persuaded to lay out their Zeal and diligence, in propagating the practical knowledge of Christianity itself, and let things alone which they understand not, and SUSPEND TILL THEY HAVE THROUGHLY STUDIED, or at least to forbear hindering wiser men, and calumniating and backbiting those that would by wisdom defend that truth which by folly and rashness they go about to betray, they might be meet for their share of that honour which now they forfeit. S. You strive against God's Judgements by which he hath oft times disowned Popery among us; and would make that less odious, which God by wonders hath oft called us to abhor. P. You still mistake: It is only your strengthening them, or sinning against God by false and ignorant accusations, and calumniating wiser men as favouring them, that I speak against. God hath oft marvellously preserved us from their attempts. But if you will use untruths against them, they will repay you two for one, and with what measure you meet, it shall be measured to you. Little know you how odious they render us by lies abroad where they are believed: and I would have no honest man to imitate them. I will instance to you in a few of their Stories. Saith Thom. Waldensis (a Learned man) against Wickliff, citante Tympio, pag. 104. [I will tell you a Story which I saw with my own eyes in the Cathedral of St. Paul in London: where Tho. Arundel a Venerable Prelate of happy memory, a Son, and Brother of Earls (the Bishop of Norwich and others assisting him) sitting in judgement, proposed some questions of the Eucharist to a certain Tailor of Worcestershire taken in Heresy; and when he could not be moved, and would call the most Sacred Host nothing but Blessed Bread, at last being commanded to do reverence to the Host, he blasphemously answered, A Spider is worthier of Reverence. And presently a great and horrid Spider descending from the top of the room by his thread, made directly to the Blasphemers mouth, and laboured to get in while he spoke. The Illustrious Prince Thomas Duke of Oxford then Chancellor of the Kingdom, saw the prodigy: which so confirmed them of God's revenge, that they burned the man] Saith the same Tympius Theatr. p. 148. [Oecolampadius an Apostate married Monk an. 1528. was strangled by the Devil in Basil, (as Luther reporteth in his Book of the private Mass): a death worthy his life. Luther writeth that he had proved it (explor atissimum esse) that Oecolampadius was killed by the fiery weapons of the Devil.] Carolostadius an. 1530. strangled by the Calvinian God went quickly to Hell, as Erasmus Albertus reporteth. John Calvin was consumed of the lousy disease, the Worms eating through all his body, with blaspheming words, cursed God and called on the Devil, and committed his soul to him, an. 1567. saith Bolsec in vit. Calv. c. 22. Beza writeth, that Calvin tormented four years miserably at last eaten with swarming Lice died unhappily and filthily. Pag. 154. Luther having supped daintily and gone merry to bed, was strangled in the night. Th. Bozius de sig. Eccl. l. 23. sig. 96. ●. 3. saith that he was certified by a Boy that served Luther and turned to them, that Luther hanged himself, but they swore all the house to conceal it. Ibid. id. [They say (saith Bozius) that when Bucer was dying, a horrid Devil stood by and almost frighted all present to death, of whom he (Bucer) was stricken that he might carry away his soul; for being pulled out of the bed, his bowels being scattered all about the Bedchamber, and he killed with many torments, did expire.] How like you such work as this? such horrid lies, of things fully known? Should not the detestation of them make us afraid of coming near them by any imitation, and to take heed what we believe or say of others? Abundance more such Stories, Miracles and Progidies you may find in Tympius and Caesarius besides many others. Read but those two Books and you will see who be the great pretenders to Prodigies and Miracles, and readiest to proclaim God's Judgements on others, when they that think they do it for the honour of God, alas, are unawares moved to it by the interest of that Cause and Party which is so much their own, as that it may be called Their own Interest. S. Well, for all this, I take it to be God's Mercy to possess the unlearned Professors themselves, with so great a zeal against all that savoureth of Popery; so that were it not for them, the Ministers themselves would comply further than they do: But when they see that it is the sensus communis fidelium, and they must lose all the good people if they comply, it holds them in. Many that cannot dispute against Popish errors and practices, can hate them. P. No doubt, but the habit of Divine Love, doth hold many good Christians much faster to God and the certain Essentials of Christianity and Piety, than the strongest disputing Reason would do without it. But if you will say the same of doubtful disputations, you will much mistake. In many such things the stricter professors go with the stream of their party, and follow them that carry it for the reputation of most godliness, or those leaders or friends that have most advantage on them. And do they not use the very same argument as you in different Countries for different and contrary causes? In Germany the Communis sensus fideliu●● is one thing, and in England another, and in France another in such matters. Yea, in the same Country in several times. I can remember since among the Religious stricter party, it was abominable to wear long hair, even to cover the ears, and now these twenty years they many of them exceed those that then were accounted Ruffians. It was then a crime with them to take Tobacco, and now it is none: and thus custom changes the matter with them. And now in some Congregations they will not sing Psalms, in others they will not read the Scripture; In others these can be endured, but not the use of the Creed, Lords Prayer and Decalogue: In others that much, but no Forms of Prayer of man's devising: In others, the Ministers own self-imposed Form, but none imposed by Superiors: In one Congregation they are commonly for Universal Redemption and freewill, and in another commonly against it: And why then would you persuade us, that in such things as these, the common sense of the faithful goeth all one way, when they usually are carried down the stream of pious reputation where they live? And indeed you have small reason to be glad, that Ministers have the temptation of popular esteem or censure to conflict with, or that so many are conquered by it. Is it a lovely thing to hear silly women (ever learning, or rather hearing, but never coming to a competent knowledge of such matters) to cant out against their Teacher's [Antichristian] and [Popery] upon words or actions not understood, which suit not with their vain conceits? S. It is one of the artifices of the Papists which you have learned: when they would draw men to set light by the purity of Religion and the Worship of God, to cry up Love and Concord and Peace instead of it, and so to tie all men's tongues and hands from resisting their wicked Church-pollutions, by the fear of Schism, or being uncharitable to the polluters. And so you will draw men to an indifferency in Religion on pretence of Peace and Charity. P. I am certain that the Wisdom from above is first pure, and then peaceable, and gentle, etc. James 3. 17. and it ever takes in both. And I am sure that Christ first and his Apostles after him make Love the sum of our Religion. I think it not amiss to tell you, of this, what an old Nonconformist saith in a Latin Treatise called De vera & genuina Jesu Christi Religione, Authore Ministro Anglo, p. 36, 37, 38, 39 The words are too large to recite, but in short he laboureth to prove, that next Faith in God and the Redeemer, Love is the Christian Religion itself, and set up instead of Ceremonies and penal Jewish Laws, as the Great Law of Christ, and the fulfilling of all Laws, answering his own Office, and so his new and great Commandment and the Character of his people, and so the Communion of the Saints is our faith and life. And that to believe in God the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, and Love him and one another, is the Gospel, and our true Religion: And that when it cometh to Ceremonies, Rituals and externals, this still is Christ's voice, [Go learn what this meaneth, I will have Mercy and not Sacrifice.] But know you not that you come up to the worse part of Popery, when you imitate the bloodiest men among them in your degree, by pleading for Sacrifice against Mercy? A cruel Religion, and burning and destroying men, and setting Kingdoms on fire, on pretence of keeping out Heresy and Schism, and preserving the right Faith, and Government, and Worship, is the malignity of Popery. When either They or You grow wrathfully zealous against your Brethren on pretence of purity of Faith or Worship, and to make you a Religion which quencheth Love, you know not what manner of Spirit you are of. S. Is not the Church of Ephesus commended, Rev. 2. 3. that could not bear them that were evil, and that tried false Apostles and found them liars; and are they not blamed that did bear with the woman Jezabel and the doctrine of the Nicolaitans? And if God hate such doctrine, so must we. P. All this is true and good; but do not you misapply it to defend your uncharitableness, or error? I am not persuading you to Indifferency as to truth and falsehood, good and evil, nor to abate your hatred of Idolatry or such doctrine of wickedness and uncleanness as the Nicolaitan's was; nor yet to corrupt the Churches by neglecting Discipline. We would have a man that is an Heretic rejected after the first and second admonition: Bear not with any such evil in your Church Communion which should be cast out, and maketh men uncapable of Communion, (so far as it is in your power regularly to cast out such.) But as you must not take such for enemies, but still afford them a common sort of Charity, so you must not on this pretence, in your ignorance and rashness rave against truth or harmless things, or your Brethren that think not in all things as you do; nor call that Popery which sober wiser men than you, (yea, almost all Christ's Church on earth) do take to be sound doctrine, or laudable practice. It is the shame of the party among us that most inclineth to separation, when sober understanding men shall hear an ignorant fellow or woman with confident boldness, rail at a controverted Doctrine, or a Form of Prayer, or Ceremony as Popery, and admonish their Teachers not to receive the Mark of the Beast, when they do but show their pride and ignorance, in overvaluing their own conceptions and unfurnished understandings, and vilifying the knowledge of others in their dark presumption. If you would bring such lesser errors under Church Discipline or Separation, on pretence of not bearing with them that are evil, it is you yourselves that would soon be found worthy to be separated from or cast out, who credit Popery by placing it in sound, good, decent or harmless things, and corrupt Doctrine and Worship by your▪ Errors and Superstitions, which you run into on the contrary extreme. S. Your lax and lose principles would cast out all Discipline out of the Church. P. You know not how much in your pretences to overmuch strictness of Discipline, you agree with those Papists and Prelatists whom you seem to be most averse from. How hath the Pope subdued Emperors and Princes to himself, and captivated the World, but by the pretence of Discipline, by his Excommunications and Absolutions? How else have his Prelates disturbed this Kingdom in former Ages? And I myself had lately to do with one of the greatest Clergymen that hath had a hand in our ejection, silencing and present Church-state, against whom I am fain to defend, that Kings and Chief Magistrates are not to be excommunicated: And I find the aforesaid English Nonconformist in the said Latin Tract. de Vera & Genuina Relig. pag. 280, 281. put upon the same task, and performing it by the same arguments which I used. I confess, the Papists and Worldly Tyrannical Clergy do corrupt Discipline, and cast out the true cleansing useful exercise of it; but for so much and such use as is conducible to maintain the interest of their Sect and Party and Carnality, no men are more hot: and is it not so with you? FINIS.