The LEARNED READING Of Sir Francis Bacon, One of her majesty's learned counsel at Law, upon the Statute of USES: Being his double Reading to the Honourable Society of Gray's inn.  
Published for the Common good.  
LONDON: Printed for Matthew Walbancke, and Laurence Chapman. 1642.   

The Learned Reading of Sir FRANCIS BACON, upon the Statute of uses.  
I Have chosen to Read upon the Law of uses made 27. Hen. 8; a Law whereupon the Inheritances of this realm are tossed at this day like a Ship upon the Sea, in such sort that it is hard to say which bark will sink, and which will get to the Haven, that is to say, what assurances will stand good, and what will not; whether is this any lack or default, in the Pilots their grave and learned Judges: but the tides and Currents of received errors, and unwarranted and abusive experience, have been so strong, as they were not able to keep a right course according to the Law, so as this Statute is in great part, as a Law made in the Parliament, held 35. Reginae, for in 37. Reginae, by the notable judgement upon solemn Arguments, of all the Judges assembled in the Exchequet Chamber, in the famous case between Dillon and Fraeyne, concerning an assurance by Chudley; this Law began to be reduced to a true and sound Exposition, and the fall and perverted Exposition, which had continued for so many years, but never countenanced by any rule or authority of weight, but only entertained in a popular conceit, & in practice at adventure grew to be controlled, since which time (as it cometh to pass always upon the first reforming of inveterate errors) many doubts, and perplexed Questions have risen, which are not yet resolved nor the Law thereupon settled: The consideration whereof moved me to take the occasion of performing this particular duty to the House, to see if I could by my travel, bring to a more general good of the Common wealth.  
Herein though I could not be ignorant of the difficulty of matter, which he that taketh in hand shall soon find, or much leffe of my own unableness, which I had continual sense and feeling of; yet because I had more means of absolution than the younger sort, and more leisure than the greater sort, I did think it not impossible to work some profitable effect, the rather because where an inferior wit is bent, and conversant upon one Subject, he shall many times with patience and meditation dissolve, and undo many of the knots which a greater wit, distracted with many matters would rather cut in two then unknit, at the least if my intention or judgement be too barren, or too weak; yet by the benefit of other Arts, I did hope to dispose or digest, the authorities or Opinions which are in Cases of use in such order and method, as they should take light one from another, though they took no light from me and like to the matter of my Reading shall my manner be, for my meaning is to revive and recontinue the ancient son of Reading which you may see in Mr. Frowickes', upon the Prerogative, and all other Readings of ancient time, being of less ostentation and more fruit, than the manner lately accustomed, for the use than was substantially to expound the Statutes, by grounds and diversities, as you shall find the Readings still to run upon case of the like Law, and contrary Law, whereof the one includes the learning of a difference, and not to stir concise and subtle doubts, or to contrive tedious and intricate Cases, whereof all saving one are buried, and the greater part of that one case which is taken, is commonly nothing to the matter in hand, but my labour shall be in the ancient course, to open the Law upon doubts, and not doubts upon the Law.  

Expositio Statuti.  
THe Exposition of this Statute consists upon the matter, without the Statutes, upon the matter within the Statute.  
Three things concerning these Statutes, and all other Statutes which are helps and inducements to the right understanding of my Statute, and yet are no part of the Statute itself.  
The consideration of the Statute at the Common Law. 
1.   
The consideration of the mischief which the Statute intendeth 
2.  to redress, as any other mischief, which an Expositor of the Statute this way or that way may breed.  
Certain maxims of the common Ley, touching Exposition of Statutes: having therefore framed six divisions according 
3.  to the number of Readings upon the Statute itself, I have likewise divided the matter without the Statute into six Introductions or Discourses, so that for every days Reading I have made triple proposition.  

1. Vn Preface, or Introduction.  
2. Vn Division upon the Law itself,  
3 A few brief Casas, for Exercise and Argument.   
The last of which I would have forborn, and according to the ancient manner, You should have taken some of my points upon my Divisions, one, two, or more as you should have thought good, save that I had this regard, that the younger sort of the bar were not so conversant, upon matters upon the Statutes, and for that Case I have interlaced some matters at the Common Law that are more familiar within the books,  
The first matter I will Discourse unto you, is the nature and 
1.  definition of an use, and his Incession and Progression before the Statute.  
The Second Discourse shall be of the second spring of this 
2.  Tree of Uses since the Statute.  
The Third Discourse shall be of the Estate of the assurance 
3.  of this realm at this day upon Uses, and what kind of them is convenient and reasonable, and not fit to be touched, as far as sense of Law and natural construction of the Statute will give leave, and what kind of them is convenient and meet to be suppressed.  
The Fourth Discourse shall be of certain Rules and Expositions 
4.  of laws applied to this present purpose.  
The Fifth Discourse shall be of the best course to remedy 
5.  the same inconveniences now a foot, by construction of the Statute, withoutoftering violence to the letter or sense.  
The Sixt and last Discourse shall be of the best course to remedy 
6.  the same inconveniences, and to declare the Law by Act of Parliament, which last I think good to reserve and not to publish.  
The nature of a use is best discerned by considering what it is not, and than what it is, for it is the nature of all human Science, and knowledge to proceed most safely by Negative and exclusive.  
First, use is no right, title, or interest in Law, and therefore Master Attorney who read upon this Statute said well, that there are but two rights.  

Ius in Re.  
Ius ad Rem.   
The one is an Estate which is Ius in Re, the other a demand which is Ius ad Rem, but a use is neither, so that in 24. H. 8. it is said that the saving of the Statute of I. R. 3. which saveth any right or interest of entail, must be understood of entails of the possession, and not of the part of the use, because a use is no right nor interest; so again, you see that Littleton's conceit, that an use should amount to a Tenancy at will, whereupon a release might well enure, because of pravity is controlled by 4. Et 5. H. 7. and diverse other books, which said that Cesty que use is punishable in an Action of trespass towards the Feoffees only 5. H. 5. seemeth to be at some discord with other books where it is admitted for Law, that if there be Cesty que use of an Advowson, and he be outlawed in a personal Action, the King should have the presentment, which Case Master Evans in the argument of Chudley's Case did seem to reconcile this where Cesty que use being utlaird, had presented in his own name, there the King should remove his incumbent, and no such thing can be collected upon that book, and therefore I conceive the error grew upon this, that because it was generally thought, that a use was but a penancy of profits, and then again because the Law is that upon Utlayers, upon personal Actions, the King shall have the penancy of profits, they took that to be one, and the self same thing which Cesty que use had, and which the King was entitled unto which was not so, for the King had remedy in Law for his penancy of profits, but Cesty que use had none, the books go further and say, that a use is nothing, as in 2. H. 7. Dett fuit Port, and counted Sur leas for years rent &c. the Defendant pleaded in bar, that the plaintiff Nihil habuit tempore divisionis, the plaintiff made a special replication, and showed that he had no use and issue joined upon that, wherefore it appeareth, that if he had taken issue upon the defendants Plea, it should have been found against him: So again in 4. Reginae, in the Case of the Lord Sands, the truth of the case was a Fine levied by Cesty que use before the Statute, and this coming in question since the Statute upon an averment by the plaintiffs Quod partes finis nihil habuerint, it is said that the Defendant may show the special matter of the use, and it shall be no departure from the first pleading of the same, and it is said further that the averment given in 4. H. 7. Quod partes finis nihil habuerint, nec in possessione, nec in usu went out upon this Statute of 27. Hen. 8. and was no more now to be accepted; but yet it appears, that if issue had been taken upon the general averment, without the special matter showed, it should have been found, for him that took the averment because a use is nothing, but these books are not to be taken generally or grossly, for we see in the same books, when an use is specially alleged, the Law taketh knowledge of it, but the sense of it is, that use is nothing for which remedy is given by the course of the Common Law, so as the Law knoweth it, but protects it not; and therefore when the question cometh whether it hath any being in Nature and Conscience the Law accepteth of it, and therefore Littleton's Case is good Law, that he which hath but forty shillings freehold in use, shall be sworn in an inquest, for it is ruled Secundum dominium laterale, and not Secundum deminium legitimum, nam natura dominus est quia fructum ex re percipit. And some doubt upon Subsidies and Taxes Cesty que use should be valued as an owner: So likewise if Cesty que use had resolved his use unto the Feoffee for six pound, or contracted with a stranger for the like some, there is no doubt but it is a good construction, whereon to ground an Action upon the Case, for money for release of a suit in the Chancery is a good quid pro quo therefore to conclude, though a use be nothing in Law to yield remedy by course of Law, yet it is somewhat in reputation of Law and Conscience, for that may be somewhat in conscience which is nothing in Law, like as that may be something in Law which is nothing in Conscience; as if the Feoffees had made a feoffment over in Fee, Bona fide, upon good consideration, and upon a Subpoena brought against them, he pleaded this matter in Chancery, this had been nothing in Conscience, not as to discharge them of damages.  
A second negative fit to be understood is, that a use is no Covin, nor it is no collusion, as the word is now used, for it is to be noted, that where a man doth remove the state and possession of Land, or goods out of himself unto another upon trust, it is either a special trust, or a general trust.  
The special trust is either lawful, Or unlawful.  
The special trust unlawful, is according to the Case provided, for by ancient Statutes of the profits, as where it is to defraud Creditors, or to get men to maintain suits, or to defeat the tenancy to the precipe, or the Statute of mortmain, or the Lords of their wardships or the like, and those are termed Frauds, Covins, or Collusions.  
The special trust lawful is, as when I enfeoffee some of my friends, because I am to go beyond the Seas, or because I would free the Land from some several Statute, or Bond which I am to enter, into or upon intent to be enfeoffed, or intent to vouched, and so to suffer a common Recovery, or upon intent that the Feoffees shall enfeoffee over a Stranger, and infinite the like intents and purposes, which fall out in men's dealings and occasions, and this we call Confidence, and the books do call them intents, but where the trust is not special, nor transitory, but general and permanent, there it is a use; and therefore these three are to be distinguished, and not confounded by Covin Confidence, use.  
So as now we are come by Negatives to the Affirmative, what a use is agreeable to the definition in Plowden, 352. De Lamers Case, where it is said:  
Use is a trust reposed by any person in the Terre-tenant, that he may suffer him to take the profits, and he that will perform his intent. But it is a shorter Speech to say, that Vsus est dommium fiduciarium: use is an owner's life in trust:  
So that Vsus est status, sive possessio totius, differ, secundum rationem fori quàm secundum naturam rei, for that one of them is in Court of Law, the other in court of Conscience, and for a trust which is the way to an use, it is exceeding well defined by a Civilian of great understanding: Fides est obligatio Conscientiae unjus ad intentionem alterius.  
And they have a good division likewise of Rights. Ius precarium, Ius fiduciarium. Ius legitimum,  
A right in courtesy, for the which there is no remedy at all. 
1.   
A right in trust for which there is a remedy, only but in 
2.  Conscience.  
A right in Law. 
3.   
So much of the nature and definition of an use.  
It followeth to consider the parts and properties of an use wherein by the consent of all books, and it was distinctly delivered by Justice Walmeley, in 36. Elizabeth.  
That a trust consisteth upon three parts.  
The First, that the Feoffee will suffer the Feoffer to take the profits.  
The Second, that the Feoffee upon request of the Feoffer, or notice of his Will, will execute the Estates to the Feoffer, or his heirs, or any other by his direction.  
The Third, that if the Feoffee be disseised, and so the Feoffer disturbed, the Feoffee will re-enter, or bring an action to recontinue the possession, so that those three, pernancy of Profits, execution of Estates, and defence of the Land, are the three points of trust.  
The properties of an use they are exceeding well set forth, by former Justice in the same Case, and they be three,  
Uses (saith he) are created by Confidence. 
1.   
Pressed by privity, which is nothing else but a continuance. 
2.   
Of the Confidence without interruption and ordered and guided by Conscience: either by the private Conscience of the Feoffee; Or the general Conscience of the Estate which is Chancery.  
The two former of which (because they be matters more throughly beaten, and we shall have occasion to handle them) we will not now debate upon.  
But the third we will speak somewhat of both, because it is a key to open many of true reasons, and termings of uses, and because it tendeth to decide out great and principal doubts at this day.  
Cook solicitor entering into his Argument of Chudley's Case, said sharply and fitly, I will put never a Case but shall be of an use, for a use in Law hath no fellow; meaning that the learning of uses is not to be matched with other Learnings: Anderson chief Justice in the Argument of the same Case, did truly and profoundly control the Vulgar opinion collected upon the fifth E. 4. that there might be Possessio fratris of a use, for he said that it was no more but that the Chancelee would consult with the Rules of Law, where the intention of the parties did not specially appear, and therefore the private conceit which Glanvile Justice cited in the 42. Reginae in the case of Corbet, in the Common Plea of one of Lincoln's inn, whom he named not, but seemed to allow is not sound, which was, that a use was but a limitation, and did ensue the nature of a possession.  
This very conceit was set on foot in 27. H. 8. in the Lord Darcies Case, in which time they began to heave at uses, for there after the realm had many ages together put in ure the passage of uses by Will, they began to argue that an use was not deviseable, but that it did ensue the nature of the Land, and the same year after this Statute was made; so that this opinion seemeth ever to be, and for ever to an Act of Parliament touching uses; and if it be so meant, now meant I like it well: but in the mean time the Opinion itself is to be recited, and because in the same Case of Corbet 3. reverent Judges of the Court of Common Pleas, did deliver and publish their Opinion, though not directly upon the point adjudged, yet obiter as one of the Reasons of their judgement, that an use of Inheritance could not be limited to cease, and again, that the limitation of a new use could not be to a Stranger, ruling uses merely according to the ground of possession, it is worth the labour to examine, that learning by 3. Hen. 7. You may collect that if the Feoffees had been disseised by the Common Law, and an Ancestor collateral of Cesty que use had released unto the disseisor, and his warranty had attached upon Cesty que use, yet the chancellor upon this matter showed, would have not respect unto it, to compel the Feoffees to execute the Estate unto the disseisor, for there the case being that Cesty que use entail having made an assurance by fine and recovery, and by warranty which descended upon his issue, two of the Judges held that the use is not extinct, and Bryan and Hussey that held the contrary said, that the Common Law is altered by the new Statute, whereby they admit, that by the Common Law that warranty will not bind and extinct a right of a use, as it will do a right of possession, and the reason is, because the Law of collateral guarantee is a hard Law, and not to be considered in a Court of Conscience, in 5. Edw. 4. It is said that if Cesty que use be attainted, quaere, who shall have the Land, for the Lord shall not have the Land, so as there the use doth not imitate the possession, and the reason is, because the Lord hath a Tent is by Title, for that is nothing to the Subpoena, because the Feoffees intent was never to advance the Lord, but only his own blood, and therefore the quaere of the book ariseth what the trust and confidence of the Feoffee did tie him to do, as whether he should not sell the Land to the use of the Feoffees Will, or in pious uses, so favourably they took the intent in those days, as you find in 27. H. 6. that if a man had appointed his use to one for life, the remainder in Fee to another, and Cesty que use for life had refused, because the intent appeared not to advance the heir at all, nor him in reversion, presently the Feoffee should have the Estate for life of him that refused some ways to the behoof of the Feoffer: But to proceed in some better order towards the disproof of this Opinion of limitation, there be four points wherein we will examine the nature of uses.  

The raising of them. 
1.   
The preserving of them. 
2.   
The transferring of them. 
3.   
The extinguishing of them. 
4.    
In all these four, you shall see apparently that uses stand upon their own reasons, utterly differing from Cases of possession, I would have one Case showed by men learned by the Law, where there is a deed, and yet there need a consideration, as for parole, the Law adjudgeth it too light to give a use without consideration, but a deed ever in Law imports a consideration, because of the deliberation and Ceremony in the confession of it, and therefore in 8. Reginae it is solemnly agreed, that in the Queen's Case a false consideration if it be of Record, will hurt the Patent, but want of consideration doth never hurt it, and yet they say that a Case is but a nimble and light thing, and now contrariwise it seemeth to be weightier than any thing else, for you cannot weigh it up to raise it, neither by deed, nor deed enrolled without the weight of consideration, but you shall never find a reason of this, to the world's end, but in the Law, but it is a reason of Chancery, and it is this:  
That no Court of Conscience will enforce Omnium gratuitum, though the intent appear never so clearly where it is not executed, or sufficiently passed by Law, but if money had been paid, and so a person damnified, or that it was for the establishment of his House, than it is a good matter in the Chancery: so again I would see in the laws, a Case where a man shall take by a Conveyance, be it by Deed, Livery, or Word that is not party to the grant, I do not say that the delivery must be to him that takes by the Deed, for a Deed may be delivered to one man to the use of another; neither do I say that he must be party to the delivery of the Deed, for he in the remainder may take though he be not party, but he must be party to the words of the grant; here again the Case of the use goeth single, and the reason is, because a conveyance in use is nothing but a publication of the trust, and therefore so as the party trusted be declared, it is material to whom the publication be so much for the raising of uses.  
There is no Case in the Common Law, wherein notice simply and nakedly is material to make a Covin, or particeps Criminis, and therefore if the heir which is in by descent, enfeoffee one which had notice of the disseisin, if he were not a Disseisor de facto, it is nothing: so in 33. H. 6 if a Feoffment be made upon collusion, and feoffee makes a feoffment over upon good consideration, the collusion is discharged, and it is not material if they had notice or no, so as it is put in 14. H, 8. if a sale be made in a Market over upon consideration, although it be to one that hath notice that they are stolen goods, yet the property of a Stranger is bound, though in the book before remembered 35. Hen. 6 some opinion to the contrary, which is clearly no Law, so in E. 3. if assets discend to the heir, and he alien it upon good consideration, although it be to one that had notice of the Debt, or of the Warranty it is good enough. So if a man enter of purpose into my Lands, to the end that a Stranger which hath right, should bring his Praecipe and evict the Land, I may enter notwithstanding any such recovery, but if he enter having notice that the Stranger hath right, and the Stranger likewise having notice of his entry, yet if it were not upon Confederacy or collusion between them it is nothing, and the reason of these Cases is, because the Common Lawlooketh no furtherthen to see whether the Act were merely Actus fictus in fraudem legis, and wheresoeverit findeth consideration given it dischargeth the covin.  
But come now to the Case of use, and there it is otherwise, as it is in 14. H. 8. and 28. H. 8. and diverse other books, which prove that if the Feoffee sell the Land for good consideration to one that hath notice, the Purchaser shall stand seized to the ancient use, and the reason is because the Chancery looketh further than the Common Law, to the corrupt Conscience of him that will deal in the Land, knowing it in equity to be another's, and therefore if there were Radix Amaritudinis, the consideration purgeth it not, but it is at the peril of him that giveth it, so that consideration, or no consideration is an issue at the Common Law, but notice on notice is an issue in the Chancery, and so much for the preserving of uses.  
For the transferring of uses there is no case in Law whereby an Action is transferred but the Subpoena, in case of use was always assigneable, nay further you find twice 27. H. 8. Fol. 10. Pla. 9 Fo. 30. and Pla. 21. that a right of use may be transferred, for in the former case Montague maketh the objection and saith, that a right of use cannot be given by Fine, but to him that hath the Possession, Fitz Herbert answereth, Yes well enough; quaere the reason saith the book.  
And in the latter Case where Cesty que use was enfeoffed by the Disseisor of the Feoffee, and made a Feoffment over: Englefield doubted whether the second Feoffee should have the use, Fitz Herbert said, I marvel you will make a doubt of it, for there is no doubt but the use passeth by the Feoffment to the Stranger, and therefore this Question needeth not to have been made; so the great difficulty in 10. Reginae, Delamers Case, where the case was in effect Tenant in tail of an use, the remainder in Fee, Tenant in tail made a Feoffment in Fee, Tenant, by the Statute of I. R. 3. and the Feoffee enfeoffed him in the remainder of the use, who made it over, and there question being made whether the second Feoffee should have the use in remainder, it is said that the second Feoffee must needs have the best right in Conscience, because the first Feostee claimed nothing but in trust, and the rest que use cannot claim it against his sale, but the reason is apparent (as was touched before) that a use in Esse was but a thing in action, or in suit to be brought in Court of Conscience, and where the Subpoena was to be brought against the Feoffee out of possession to recontinue the Estate, always the Subpoena might be transferred, for still the Action at the Common Law was not stirred, but remained in the Feoffee, and so no mischief of maintenance or transferring rights.  
And if a use being but a right may be assigned, and passed over to a Stranger, a multo fortiori, it may be limited to a Stranger upon the privity of the first conveyance, as shall be handled in another place, and as Glanvile Justice said, he could never find by any book, or evidence of antiquity, a continge use limited over to a Stranger, I answer, First it is no marvel that you find no Case before E. 4. time of contingent uses, where there be not six of uses in all, and the reason I doubt was, men did choose well whom they trusted, and trust was well observed, and at this day in Ireland, where uses be in practice, Cases of uses come seldom in question, except it be sometimes upon the alienations of Tenants in tail by Fine, that the Feoffees will not be brought to execute Estates, to the disinheritance of ancient blood, but for experience, and the conveyance there was nothing more usual in Obysts, then to will the use of the Land to certain persons and their heirs, so long as they shall pay the Chancery Priests their Wages, and in default of payment to limit the use over to other persons and their heirs, and so in case of forfeiture, through many degrees, and such conveyances are as ancient as R. 2. time.  
Now for determining and extinguishing of uses, I put the case of collateral garranty before, and to that the notable case of 14. H. 8. Hautsemmes Case, where this very point was in the principal case, for a Rent out of Land, and the Land itself in case of possession cannot stand together, but the rent shall be extinct, but there the case is, that the use of the Land, and the use of the Rent shall stand well enough together, for a Rent charge was granted by the Feoffee to one, that notice of the use, had and ruled, that the Rent was to the ancient use, and both uses were in Esse simulet semel, and though Brudnell chief Justice urged the ground of possession to be otherwise, yet he was overruled by the other three Justices, and Brooke said unto him, he thought he argued much for his pleasure; and to conclude, we see the thing may be avoided and determined by the Ceremonies and Acts, like unto those by which are created and raised, that which passeth by Livery ought to be avoided by entry; that which passeth by Grant, by claim; that which passeth by way of charge, determineth by way of discharge: and so a use which is raised but by a declaration or limitation, may cease by words of Declaration or Limitation, as the civil Law saith, in his magis consentaneum est, quàm ut ijsdem modis res dissolvantur a quibus constituantur: for the conception and progression of uses, I have for a precedent in them other laws, because States and commonwealths have common accidents, and I find in the civil Law, that that which cometh nearest in name to the use, is nothing like in matter, which is Vsus fructus, for Vsus fructus et dominium is with them, as with their particular tenancy and inheritance, but that which resembleth the use most is fidei Commissio, and therefore you shall find in Ius Lib. 2. That they had a form in Testaments, to give Inheritance to one to the use of another. Heredem constituo Cajum rogo antem te Caie, ut hereditatem restituas, and the Text of the Civilians saith, that for a great time if the heir did not as he was required Cesty que use, had no remedy at all, until about the time of Augustus Caesar, there grew in custom a flattering form of trust, for they penned it thus: Rogo te per salutem Augusti, or, Per fortunam Augusti &c. whereupon August us took the breach of trust to sound in derogation of himself, and made a Commission to the Praetor to give remedy in such Cases, whereupon within the space of a hundred years, these trusts did spring and speed so fast, as they were forced to have a particular Chancellor only for uses, who was called Praetor fidy Commissarius, and long after the inconvenience of them being found, they resorted unto a Remedy much like unto this stature, for by two Decrees of Senate, called Senatus consult. Frebesianum et Pegasianum, they made Cesty que use to be heir in substance. I have sought likewise, whether there be any thing which maketh with them in our Law, and I find the Persian chief Baron in the Argument of Chudley's Case compareth them to copyholders, and aptly for many respects.  
First, because an use seemeth to be an hereditament in the L. Court.  
Secondly, this conceit of Limitation hath been troublesome in copyholders as well as in uses, for it hath been of late days questioned, whether there should be Tenancy by the courtesy, discontinuances, and recoveries of copyholders, in the nature of Inheritances at the Common Law, and still the judgements have weighed, that you must have particular customs in copyholds, as well as particular Reasons of Conscience in use, and the limitation recited.  
And Thirdly, because they both grew to no remedy at all against the Lord, and were as tenancy at will, afterwards it grew to have remedy in Chancery, & afterwards against their Lords by trespass, at the Common-Law, and now lastly the Law is taken by some, that they have remedy by Ejectione firma without a special custom of leasing, do no doubt in uses, at the first the Chancery made question to give remedy, until uses grew more general, and the Chancery more eminent, and then they grew to have remedy in Conscience, but they could never obtain any manner of Remedy at the Common Law, neither against the Feoffee, nor against Strangers, but the Remedy against the Feoffee, was best by Subpoena, and the remedy against Sttangers to the Feoffee.  
Now for the Cases whereupon uses were but in practice, Cook in his Reading doth say well, that they were produced sometimes for fear, and many times for fraud; but I hold that neither of these Cases were so much the reasons of uses, as another reason in the beginning, which was, that Lands by the Common Law of England were not Testamentary, or deviseable, and of late years since the Statute, the Case of the conveyance for sparing of Purchases, and Execution of Estates, and now last of all express liberty of Will in men's minds, affecting to have the assurance of their Estate, and Possession to be revokeable in their own times, and irrevocable after their own times.  
Now for the Commencement and proceeding of them, I have considered what it hath been in course of Common Law, and what it hath been in course of Statute for the Common Law, the conceit of Shelly in 24. H. 8. and of Polard in 27. H, 8. seemeth to me to be without ground, which was that the use succeeded the Tenure, for that the Statute of Quia emptores terrarum, which was made 18. E. 1. had taken away the Tenure between the Feoffer and the Feoffce, and left it to the Lord Paramount, they said that the Feoffment being then merely without consideration, should therefore intend an use to the Feoffer, which cannot be, for by that reason if the Feoffment before the Statute had been made Tenendum de Capitalibus Dominis, as it must be; there should have been an Use unto the Feoffer before that Statute. And again, if a Grant had been made of such things as consists not in Tenure, as Advowsons, Rents, Villeins' and the like, there should have been a Use of them, wherein the Law was quite contrary; for after the time that Uses grew common, it was nevertheless a great doubt whether things that did lie in Grant, did not carry a consideration in themselves because of the Deed.  
And therefore I do judge that the intendment of a Use to the Feoffer where the Feoffment was made without consideration grew long after when Uses waxed general; and for this reason, because when Feoffments were made, and that it rested doubtful whether it were in use or in Purchase, because Purchases were things notorious, and Uses were things secret. The Chancellor thought it more convenient to put the Purchasor to prove his consideration, than the Feoffer and his heirs to prove the trust, and so made the indentment towards the Use, and put the proof upon the Purchasor.  
And therefore as Uses were at the Common Law in reason, for whatsoever is not by Statute, nor against Law may be said to be at the Common Law, and both the general trust and the special, were things not prohibited by the Law, though they were not remedied by the Law; so the Experience and practice of Uses were not ancient, and my reasons why I think so, are these.  
First, I cannot find in my Evidence before King R. 2. his time, the clause ad opus et usum, and the very Latin phrase was much purer, as you may see by Bractons' Writing, and by ancient Patents and Deeds, and chiefly by the Register of Writs, which is good Latin; wherein this phrase (ad opus & usum) and the Words (ad opus) is a barbarous phrase, and like enough to be in the pennin of some chaplain that was not much past his grammar, where he had found Opus & usus, coupled together, and that they did govern an Ablative case, as they do indeed since this Statute, for they take away the Land and put them into a conveyance.  
Secondly, I find in no private Act of Attainder in the clause of Forfeiture of Lands (S) which he hath in possession or in Use, until Ed. 4. his reign.  
Thirdly, I find the Word (use) in no Statute until 7. Rich. 2. cap. 11. of Provisoes, and in 15. Ric. 2. of Mortmame.  
Fourthly, I collect out of cook's speech in 8. Edw. 4. where he saith that by the advice of all the Judges, it was thought that the Subpoena did not lie against the heir of the Feoffee which was in by Law, but Cesty que use was driven to his Bill in Parliament, that Uses even in that time were but in their infancy; for no doubt but at the first the Chancery made difficulty to give Remedy at all, but to leave it to the particular Conscience of the Feoffee: But after the Chancery grew absolute, as may appear by the Statute of 15. Hen. 6. that complaints in Chancery should enter into Bond to prove their suggestions, which seemeth that the Chancery at that time began to embrace too far, and was used for vexation; yet nevertheless it made scruple to give remedy against the heir being in by Act in Law though he were privy, so that it cannot be that Uses had been of any great continuance when they made a question: As for the Case of Matrimony, Prelomti, it hath no affinity with Uses, for wheresoever there was remedy at the Common-Law by Action, it cannot be intended to be of the nature of a Use.  
And for the book commonly vouched of Ass. where the Earl calleth the possession of a Conizee upon a Fine levied by consent an entry in Auterdroit and 44. of E. 3. where there is mention of the Feoffors that sued by petition to the King, they be but implications of no moment. So as it appeareth the first practice of Uses was about Richard 2, his time, and the great multiplying and overspreading of them was partly during the Wars in France, which drew most of the Nobility to be absent from their Possessions, and partly during the time of the Trouble and civil War between the two houses about the Title of the crown.  
Now to conclude the Progression of Uses in course 
1  of Statutes, I do note three special points.  
That a Use had never any force at all, at the Common-Law, 
2  but by Statute Law.  
That there was never any Statute made directly for the benefit of Cesty que use, as that the descent of an Use should toll an Entry, or that a Release should be good to the partner of the profits or the like; but always for the benefit of Strangers and other persons against Cesty que use, and his Feoffees: For though by the Statute of Richard 3. he might alter his Feoffees, yet that was not the scope of the Statute, but to make good his assurance to other persons, and the other came in Et obliquo.  
That the special intent unlawful and covinous was 
3  the original of Uses, though after it induced to the lawful intent general and special; For 5. Edward 3. is the first Statute I find, wherein mention is made of the taking of profits by one, where the Estate in Law is another.  
For as to the opinion in 27. Henr. 8. that in case of the Statute of Marlebridge, the Feoffors took the profits, it is but a conceit; for the Law is this day, that if a man enfeoffee his Eldest son within age, and without consideration, although the profits be taken to the use of the son; yet it is a Feoffment within the Statute of Religiosis; and as for 7. Edward 1. which prohibits generally that Religious persons should not purchase Arte vel ingenio, yet it maketh no mention of a use, but it saith, Colore donationis termini vel alicusus tituli, reciting there three forms of conveyances, the gift, the long Lease, and feigned Recovery, which gift cannot be understood of a gift to a Stranger to their use, for that came to be holpen by 15: Richard 2. long after, but to proceed in 5. Edward 3. a Statute was made for the relief of Creditors against such as made covin gifts of their Lands and goods, and conveyed their bodies into Sanctuaries there living high upon others goods, and therefore that Statute made their Lands liable to their Creditors Executions in that particular Case, if they took the profits: In 5. Richard 2. a Statute was made for relief of those as had right of Action, against those as had renounced the tenancy of the Praecipe from them, sometimes by infeoffing great persons, for maintenance, and sometimes by secret Feoffments to others, whereof the Defendants could have no notice, and therefore the Statute maketh the recovery good in all Actions against the first Feoffees as they took the profits, and see that the Defendants bring their Action within a year at their expulsion 2. Richard 2. Cap. 3. Session 2. an imperfection of the Statute of 50. Edward 3. was holpen, for whereas the statute took no place, but where the Defendant appeared, and so was frustrated, the Statute giveth upon Proclamation, made at the Gate of the place privileged, that the Land should be liable without appearance, in 7. R. 2.  
A Statute was made for the restraint of Aliens, to take thy Benefices, or dignities ecclesiastical, or farms of Administration to them, without the King's special licence, upon pain of the Statute of Provisors, which being remedied by a former Statute, where the Alien took it to his own use: it is by that Statute remedied, where the Alien took it to the use of another, as it is said in the book, though I guess, that if the Record were searched, it should be if any other purchased to the use of an Alien, and that the words (or to the use of another) should be (or any other to his use) 15. Rich. 2. Cap. 5. a Statute was made for the relief of Lords against Mortmayne, where Feoffments were made to the use of Corporations, and an Ordinance made that for Feoffments past, the Feoffees should before a day, either purchase licence to amortise them, or alien them to some other use, or other Feoffments to come, they should be within the Statute of Mortmayne, 4. Hen. 4. Cap. 7. the Statute of 17. Richard 2. is enlarged in the limitation of time, for whereas the statute did limit the Action to be brought within the year of the Feoffment: This Statute in Case of a Disseisin extends the time to the life of the Disseisor, and in all other Actions, leaves it to the years, from the time of the Action grown 11. Henry 6. Cap. 3. that Statute of 4. Henry 4, is declared, because the conceit was upon the Statute, that in Case of Disseisin the limitation of the life of the Disseisor went only to the assize of Non et disseisin, and to no other Action and therefore that Statute declareth the former Law to extend to all other Actions, grounded upon Novel disseisin 11. Henry 6. Cap. 5. A Statute was made for relief of him in remainder against particular Tenants, for Lives, or years, that Assigned over their Estates, and took the profits, and then committed wast against them, therefore this Statute giveth an Action of wast, being provisors of the profits, in all this course of Statutes no relief is given to purchasers, that come in by the party, but to such as come in by Law, as Defendants in Praecipes, whether they be Creditors, Disseisors, or Lessors, and that only of Mortmayne, and note also that they be all in Cafes of special Convenous intents, as to defeat Executions, tenancy to the Praecipe, and the Statute of Mortmayne, as Provisors from 11. Henry 6. to 1. R. 3. being the space of fifty years, there is a silence of uses in the Statute book, which was at that time when no question they were favoured most, in 1. Richard 3. Cap. 1. cometh the great Statute for relief of those that come in by the party, and at that time an use appeareth in his likeness, for there is not a word spoken of taking the profits, to describe a use by, but of claiming to a use, and this Statute ordained that all Gifts, Feoffments, Grants, &c. shall be good against the Feoffors, Dowers and Grantors, and all other persons claiming only to their use, so as here the Purchasor was fully relieved, and Cesty que use was obiter enabled to charge his Feoffees, because there were no words in the Statute of Feoffments, Grants, &c. upon good consideration, but generally in Henry 7. time, new Statutes were made for further help and remedy to those that came in by Act in Law, as first 11. Henry 7. Cap. 1. a Formedon is given without limitation of time against Cesty que use, and obiter, because they make him a Tenent, they give him advantage of a Tenant, as of age and voucher, quaere 4. Henry 7. 17. the Ward-ship of the heir of Cesty que use, is dying, and no Will declared is given to the Lord, as if he had died seized in demean, and Action of wast given to the heir against the guardian, and damages, if the Lord were barred in his writ of Ward, and relief is likewise given unto the Lord, if the heir holding the knight's service, be of full age 19 Henry 7. Cap. 5. there is relief given in three Cases, first to the Creditors upon matters of Record, as upon Recognizance, Statute, or Judgement, whereof the two former were not aided at all by any Statute, and the last was aided by a Statute of 50. E. 3. and 2. Richard 2. only in Case of Sanctuary men. Secondly, to the Lords in foccage for their relief, and Herriots upon death, which was omitted in the 4. Henry 7. and lastly to the Lords of Villeyns', upon a purchase of their Villeyns' in use, 13. Henry 8. Cap. 10. a further Remedy was given in a Case, like unto the case of Mortmayne, for in the Statute of 15. Richard 2. remedy was given where the use came, Ad manum mortuam which was when it came to some Corporation: now when uses were limited to a thing. Act, or work, and to a body, as to the reparation of a Church, or an Abbot, or to a guild, or Fraternities, as are only in reputation, but not incorporate, as to Parishes, or such guilds or Fraternities as are only in reputation, but not incorporate that Case was omitted, which by this Statute is remedied, not by way of giving entry unto the Lord, but by way of making the use utterly void, neither doth the Statute express to whose benefit the use shall be made void, either the Feoffor, or Feoffee but leaveth it to Law, and addeth a proviso, that uses may be limited twenty years from the gift, and no longer.  
This is the whole course of Statute Law before this Statute, touching Uses, thus have I set forth unto you the nature and definition of an use, the differences and trust of an use and the parts and qualities of it and by what Rules and termings Uses shall be guided and ordered, by a precedent of them in our laws, the causes of the springing and spreading of Uses the continuance of them, and the proceedings that they have had both in Common Law, and Statute Law, whereby it may appear, that a use is no more but a general trust, when any one will trust the Conscience of another better than his own Estate and Possession, which is accident or event of human Society, which hath been, and will be in all laws, and therefore was at the Common Law, which is common reason. Fitz Herbert saith in the 14. Henry 8. common reason is Common Law, and not Conscience; but common reasons doth define that Uses should be remedied in Conscience, and not in Courts of Law, and ordered by Rules in Conscience, and not by straight Rules of Law; for the Common Law hath a kind of a Rule and survey over the Chancery, and therefore we may truly conclude, that the force and strength that a use had or hath in Conscience, is by Common Law, and the force that it had or hath by Common Law is only by Statutes.  
Now followeth in time and matter, the consideration of this Statute of principal labour, for those former considerations which we have handled serve but for introduction.  
This Statute (as it is the Statute which of all other hath the greatest power and operation over the Heritages of the realm, so howsoever it hath been by the humour of the time perverted in exposition, yet in itself is most perfectly and exactly conceived and penned of any Law in the book, induced with the most declaring and persuading Preamble, consisting and standing upon the wisest and fittest Ordinances, and qualified with the most foreseeing and circumspect savings and promises, and lastly the pondered in all the words and clauses of it of any Statute that I find, but before I come to the Statute itself, I will note unto you three matters of Circumstance.  

The time of the Statute. 
1.   
The Title of it. 
2.   
The precedent or pattern of it. 
3.    
For the time of it was in 27. Henry 8. when the King was in full peace, and a wealthy and flourishing Estate, in which nature of time men are most careful of their Possessions, as well because Purchases are most stirring: as again, because the Purchasor when he is full, is no less careful of his assurance to his Children, and of disposing that which he hath gotten, than he was of his bargain for the compassing thereof.  
About that time the realm likewise began to be enfranchised from the Tributes of Rome, and the Possessions that had been in Mortmayne began to stir abroad, for this year was the suppression of the smaller Houses of Religion, all tending to plenty, and purchafing, and this Statute came in consort with divers excellent Statutes, made for the kingdom in the same Parliament, as the reduction of Wales to a more civil Government, the re-edifying of diverse Cities and towns, the suppressing of depopulation and enclosures.  
For the Title, it hath one Title in the Role, and another in course of Pleading, the Title in the Role is no solemn Title, but an Act title (5) an Act expressing an Order for Uses and Will, the Title in course of Pleading is, Statutum de usibus, in Possessionem transferendis, wherein Walmsly justice noted well 4. Reginae, that if a man look to the working of the Statute, he would think that it should be turned the other way, De possessionibus ad usus transferendis, for that is the course of the Statute, to bring Possession to the use, but the Title is framed not according to the work of the Statute, but according to the scope and intention of the Statute. Nam quod primum est in intentione, ultimum est in operatione, the intention of the Statute by carrying the Possession to the use, is to turn the use to a Possession, for the words are not De possessionibus ad usus transferendis, and as the Grammarian saith, Praepositio ad, denotat notam actionis, sed prepositio (in) cum Accusativo denotat notam alterationis, and therefore Kingsmill Justice in the same Case saith, that the meaning of the Statute was, to make a transubstantiation of the use unto a Possession; but it is to be noted, that Titles of Acts of Parliament, severally came in, but in the 5. Henry 8. for before that time that was but one Title of all the Act, made in one Parliament, and that was no Title neither, but a general Preface of the good intent of the King, but now it is parcel of the Record.  
For the precedent of this Statute upon which it is drawn, I do find by the first Richard 3. whereupon you may see the very mould whereon this Statute was made, that the said King having been enfeoffed (before he usurped) to Uses, as it was ordained that the Land whereof he was jointly enfeoffed as if he had not been named, and where he was solely inseoffed, it should be in Cesty que use, in Estate as he had the use.  
Now to come to the Statute itself, the Statute consisteth as other laws do upon a Preamble, the Body of the Law, and certain saving, and premises. The Preamble setteth forth the inconveniences, the Body of the Law giveth the Remedy, and the savings and Provisoes take away the inconveniences of the remedy; for new Lands are like the apothecary's drugs, though they remedy the Disease, yet they trouble the body, and therefore they use to correct with Spices, so it is not possible to find a Remedy for any mischief in the Common Wealth, but it will beget some new mischief, and therefore they spice their laws with Provisoes to correct and qualify them.  
The Preamble of the Law was justly commended by Popham chief Justice in 36. Regine, where he saith, that there is little need to search and collect out of Cases before the statute, what the mischief was, which the scope of the Statute was to redress, because there is a shorter way offered us, by the sufficiency and fullness of the Preamble, and therefore it is good to consider it, and ponder it throughly.  
The Preamble hath three parts.  
First a recital of the principal inconveniences, which 
1.  is the root of all the rest.  
Secondly, an ennumeration of diverse particular inconveniences 
2.  as branches of the former.  
Thirdly, a taste or brief note of the remedy that the 
3.  Statute meaneth to apply; the principal inconvenience which is Radix omnium malorum, is the directing from the grounds and principals of the Common Law, by inventing a mean to transfer Lands and Inheritances without any solemnity, or Act notorious, so as the whole Statute is to be expounded strongly towards the extinguishment of all conveyances, whereby the Free hold, or Inheritance may pass without any new confections of Deeds, Executions of Estate or entries, except it be where the Estate is of privity and dependence one towards the other, in which Cases Mutatis mutandis, they might pass by the Rules of the Common Law.  
The particular inconveniences by the Law rehearsed may bereduced into four heads.  
First, that these conveyances in use are weak 
1.  for consideration.  
Secondly, that they are obscure and doubtful 
2.  for trial.  
Thirdly, that they are dangerous for want of notice 
3.  and publication.  
Fourthly, that they are exempted from all such Titles 
4.  as the Law subjecteth Possessions unto.  
The first inconvenience lighteth upon heirs.  
The second upon Jurors and Witnesses.  
The third upon purchasers.  
The fourth upon such as come in by gift in Law.  
All which are persons that the Law doth principally respect and favour.  
For the first of these are three impediments (to the judgement of man) in disposing justly and advisedly of his Estate. (5)  
First, trouble of mind. 
1.   
Secondly, want of time. 
2.   
Thirdly, of wise and faithful counsel about him. 
3.   
And all theso three the Statute did find to be in the disposition of an Use by Will, whereof followed the unjust disinheresin of heirs, now the favour of Law unto heirs appeareth in many parts of the Law, as the Law of descent privilegeth the Possession of the heir, against the entry of him that hath right by the Law, no man shall warrant against his heir, except he warrant against himself, and diverse other Cases too long to stand upon, and we see the ancient Law in glanvills' time was, that the Ancestor could not disinherit his heir by Grant, or other Act executed in time of sickness, neither could he alien Land which had descended unto him, except it were for consideration of money or service, but not to advance any younger Brother without the consent of the heir.  
For trials, no Law ever took a straighter course, that Evidence should not be perplexed, nor Juries inveigled, than the Common Law of England, as on the other side, never Law took a more precise and straight course with Juries, that they should give a direct verdict, for whereas in manner all laws do give the triers, or Jurors (which in other laws are called Judges De facto) to give no liquet, that is, to give no verdict at all, and so the Case to stand abated; our Law enforceth them to a direct verdict, general or special, and whereas other laws except of Plurality of voices, to make a verdict, our Law enforceth them all to agree in one, and whereas other laws leave them to their own time and ease, and to part, and to meet again; our Law duresse and imprison them in the hardest manner, without light or comfort, until they be agreed, in consideration of straightness and cohersion; it is consonant, that the Law do require in all matters brought to issue, that there be full proof and evidence, and therefore if the matter in itself be of that surety as in simple Contracts, which are made by parole, without writing, it alloweth wager of Law.  
In issue upon the mere right (which is a thing hardly to discern (it alloweth wager of battle to spare Jurors, if time have wore out the marks and badges of truth: from time to time there have been Statutes of limitation, where you shall find this mischief of Perjuries often recited; and lastly which is the matter in hand, all Inheritances could not pass but by Acts overt and notorious, as by Deeds, Livery, and Records.  
For purchasers (Bona fide) it may appear that they were ever favoured in our Law, as first by the great favour of Warranties, which were ever for the help of purchasers, as whereby the Law in 5. Edw. 3. time, the Disseisor could not enter upon the Feoffee in regard of the Warranty, so again the collateral garranty which otherwise as a hard Law, grew in doubt only upon favour of purchasers, so was the binding of Fines at the Common Law, the invention and practice of Recoveries, to defeat the Statute of entails, and many more grounds and learnings are to be found, respect the quiet of the Possession of purchasers, and therefore though the Statute of 1 Richard 3. had provided for the Purchasor in some sort; by enabling the Acts and conveyances of Cesty que use, yet nevertheless the State did not at all disable the Acts or charges of the Feoffees, and so as Walmesly Justice said 42. Regine, they played at double hand, for Cesty que use might sell, and the Feoffee might sell, which was a very great uncertainty to the Purchasor.  
For the fourth Inconvenience towards those that come in by Law, conveyances in Uses were like privilege places or liberties, for as there the Law doth not run, so upon such conveyances the Law could take no hold, but they were exempted from all Titles in Law, no man is so absolute Owner of his Possessions, but that the wisdom of the Law doth reserve certain Titles unto others, and such persons come not in by the pleasure and disposition of the party, but by the Justice and consideration of Law, and therefore of all others they are most favoured, and also they are principally three.  
The Kings and Lords who lost the benefit of 
1.  attainders, Fines for alienations, Escheates, aids, Herreots, reliefs, &c.  
The Defendants in Praecipes either real or personal, 
2.  for Debt and Damages, who lost the benefit of their Recoveries and Executions.  
Tenants in Dower, and by the courtesy, who lost 
3.  their Estates and tithes.  
First for the King, no Law doth endow the King or sovereign with more from suits and Actions, his Possessions from interruption and disturbance, his Right from limitation of time, his patents and Gifts from all deceits and false suggestions: Next the King is the Lord, whose duties and rights the Law doth much favour, because the Law supposeth the Land did Originally come from him, for until the Statute of Quia emptores terrararum, the Lords was not forced to distrust or dismember his Signiory or service, so until 15. Henry 7. the Law was taken that the Lord upon his Title of Wardship should be put to a conizee of a Statute or a Termor, so again we see, that the Statute of mortmain was made to preserve the Lord's Escheats and Wards: the Tenant in Dower is so much favoured, as that it is the common by word in the Law, that the Law favoureth three things.  

1. Life.  
2. Liberty.  
3. Dower.   
So in Case of Voucher, the Feme shall not be delayed, but shall recover against the heir incontinent; so likewise of Tenant by courtesy it is called Tenancy by the Law of England, and therefore specially favoured, as a proper conceit and invention of our Law, so as again the Law doth favour such, as have ancient Rights, and therefore it telleth us it is commonly said, that a Right cannot die: and that ground of Law, that a Free hold cannot be in suspense showeth it well, insomuch that the Law will rather give the Land to the first comer, which we call an Occupant, then want a Tenant to a stranger's Action.  
And again, the other ancient ground of Law of Remitter, showeth that where the Tenant faileth without folly in the Defendant, the Law executeth the ancient Right: To conclude therefore this point, when this practice of Feoffments in use did prejudice and dampnifie all those persons that the ancient Common Law favoured, and did absolutely cross the wisdom of the Law, to have conveyances considerate, and not odious, and to have trial thereupon clear and not inveighed, it is no marvel that the Statute concludeth, that their subtle imaginations and abuses, tended to the utter subversion of the ancient Common laws of this realm.  
The third part of the Preamble giveth a touch of the Remedy which the Statute intendeth to minister, consisting in two parts.  
First, the expiration of Feoffments. 
1.   
Secondly, the taking away of the hurt, damage, and 
2.  deceit of the Uses, out of which have been gathered two extremities of opinions.  
The first Opinion is, that the intention of the Statute was to discontinue, and banish all conveyances in Use, grounding themselves both upon the words, that the Statute doth not speak of the extinguishment or extirpation of the Use viz. by an unity of Possession, but of an extinguishment or extirpation of the Feoffment &c. which is the conveyance itself.  
Secondly, out of the words (abuse and errors) heretofore used and accustomed, as if Uses had not been at the Common Law, but had only an erroneous device or practice.  
To both which I answer.  
To the former, that the extirpation which the Statute meant was plain, to be of the Feoffees Estate, and not to the form of conveyances.  
To the latter I say, that for words (Abuse) that may be an abuse of the Law which is not against Law, as the taking long Leases at this day of Land in Capite, to defraud Wardships is an abuse of the Law, which is not against Law, and by the words (Error) the Statute meant by it, not a mistaking of the Law, but wandering or going astray or digressing from the ancient practice of the Law unto a buy course, as when we say (Erravimus cum patribus juris) it is not meant of ignorance only, but of perversity, but to prove that the Statute meant not to suppress the form of conveyances, there be 3. Reasons which are not answerable.  
The first is, that the Statute in the very Branch thereof hath words, De futuro (s.) (that are seized, or hereafter shall be seized) and whereas it may be said that these words were put in, in regard of Uses suspended, by disseisins, and so no present seisin to the use, until a regress of the Feoffees, that intendment is very particular, for commonly such Cases are brought in by Provisoes, or special Branches, and not intermixed in the body of a Statute, and it had been easy for the Statute to have, or hereafter shall be seized upon any Feoffment &c. heretofore had or made.  
The second Reason is upon the words of the Statute of enrolments, which saith, that no hereditaments shall pass, &c. of any Use thereof, &c. whereby it is manifest, that the Statute meant to leave the form of conveyance with the addition of a further Ceremony.  
The third Reason I make is cut of the words of the Provisor, where it is said, that no primer Seisin, Livery, no Fine, nor Alienation, shall be taken for any Estate executed, by force of the Statute of 27. before the first of May 1536. but they shall be paid for Uses, made and executed in Possession for the time after, where the word (made) directly goeth to conveyances in use, made after the Statute, and can have no other understanding for the words (executed in Possession) would have served for the Case of regress, and lastly which is more than all, if they have had any such intent, the Case being so general and so plain, they would have had words express, that every limitation of use made after the Statute, should have been void, and this was the Exposition, as tradition goeth, that a Reader of Gray's inn, which Read soon after the Statute, was in trouble for, and worthily, who as I suppose was Boy, whose Reading I could never see; but I do now insist upon it, because now again some in an immoderate invective against Uses, do relapse to the same opinion.  
The second Opinion which I called a contrary extremity is, that the Statute meant only to remedy the mischiefs in the Preamble, recited as they grew by reason of divided Uses; and although the like mischief may grow upon the contingent Uses, yet the Statute had no foresight of them at that time, and so it was merely a new Case not comprised. Whereunto I answer, that it is the work of the Statute to execute the divided Use, and therefore to make an Use void by this Statute which was good before, though it doth participate of the mischief recited in the Statute, where to make a Law upon a Preamble without a perview, which were grossly absurd. But upon the question what Uses are executed, and what not; and whether out of Possessions of a disseisor, or other Possessions out of privity or not, there you shall guide your Exposition according to the Preamble, as shall be handled in my next day's Discourse, and so much touching the Preamble of this Law.  
For the Body of the Law, I would wish all Readers that expound Statutes to do as scholars are willed to do, that is, first to seek out the principal verb, that is to note and single out the material words, whereupon the Statute is framed, for there are in every Statute certain words, which are as veins where the life and blood of the Statute cometh, and where all doubts do arise, and the rest are Literae mortuae fulfilling words.  
The Body of the Statute consisteth upon two Parts.  
First, a Supposition, or Case put, as Anderson 361. Reginae calleth it.  
Secondly, a Perview or Ordinance thereupon.  
The Cases of the Statute are three and every one hath his purview.  
The general Case.  
The Case of Cofeoffees to the use of some of them.  
And the general Case of Feoffees to the Use or percemen of Rents or profits.  
The general Case is built upon Eight material words.  
Four on the part of the Feoffees.  
Three on the part of Cesty que use, and one common to them both.  
The first material word on the part of the Feoffees is the word (Person) This excludes all aliances, for there can be no trust reposed but in a person certain, it excludes again all Corporations, for they are evalled to a Use certain, for note on the part of the Feoffer over the Statutc insists upon the word (Person) and in the part of Cesty que use, that added body politic.  
The second word material is the word (Seized) this excludes chattels, the reason is, that the Statute meant to remit the Common Law, and not the chattels might ever pass by Testament or by parole, therefore the Use did not pervert them, it excludes Rights, for it is against the Rules of the Common Law to Grant, or transfer Rights, and therefore the Statute would execute them.  
Thirdly, it excludes contingent Uses, because the seisin cannot be but to a Fee-simple of a Use, and when that is limited, the seism of the Feoffee is spent, for Littleton tells us that there are but two seisins, one in Dominio ut de feodo, the other Vt de feodo et jure, and the Feoffee by the Common Law could execute, but the Fee-simple to Uses present, and not Post Uses, and therefore the Statute meant not to execute them.  
The third material word is (Hereafter) that bringeth in Conveyances made after the Statute, it brings in again conveyances made before, and disturbed by disseisin, and recontinued after, for it is not said infeofted to Use hereafter seized.  
The fourth word is (Hereditament) which is to be understood of those things whereof an Inheritance is in Esse, for if I grant a Rent charge de novo for life to a Use, this is good enough, yet there is no Inheritance in being of this Rent, this word likewise excludes Annuities and Uses themselves, so that a Use cannot be to a use.  
The first word on the part of Cesty que use, is the word (Use, Confidence or Trust) whereby it is plain that the Statute meant to remedy the matter, and not words, and in all the Clauses it still carrieth the words.  
The second word is the word (Person) again which excludeth all aliances, it excludeth also alldent Uses which are not to Bodies, lively and natural, as the building of a Church, the making of a Bridge, but here (as noted before) it is ever coupled with body politic.  
The third word is the word (Other) for the Statute meant not to cross the Common Law, now at this time Uses were grown to such a familiarity, as men could not think of Possession, but in course of Use, and so every man was seized to his own Use, as well as to the Use of others; therefore because Statutes would not stir nor turmoil possessions settled at the Common Law, it putteth in precisely this word (Other) meaning the divided Use, and not the communed Use, and this causeth the Clause of joint Feoffees to follow in a branch by itself, for else that Case had been doubtful upon this word (Other.)  
The words that are common to both, are words expressing the conveyance whereby the Use ariseth, of which words, those that bred any question are (Agreement, Will, otherwise) whereby some have inferred that Uses might be raised by agreement paroll, so there were a consideration of money, or other matter valuable, for it is expressed in the words before (Bargains, Sale, and Contract) but of blood, or linned; the error of which Collection appeareth in the word immediately following (s. Will) whereby they might as well include, that a man seized of Land might raise an Use by Will, especially to any of his sons or Kindred, where there is a real consideration, and by that reason mean betwixt this Statute, and the Statute of 32. of Wills, Lands, were deviseable, especially to any man's Kindred, which was clearly otherwise, and therefore those words were put in, nor in regard of Uses raised by those conveniences, or without, or likewise by Will might be transferred, and there was a person seized to a Use, by force of that agreement or Will (s.) to the Use of the assign, and for the word (Otherwise) it should by the generality of the word, include a Disseisin to a Use, but the whole scope of the Statute crosseth that which was to execute such Uses as were confidences and trust, which could not be in Case of Disseisin, for if there were a commandment precedent, than the Land was vested in Cesty que use upon the entry, and if the Disseisin were of the Disseisors own head then no trust, and thus much for the case of Supposition of this Statute, here follow the ordinance and purview thereupon.  
The Purview hath two parts, the first Operatio Statuti, the effect that the Statute worketh, and there is Modus operandi, a fiction, or explanation how the Statute doth work that effect. The effect is, that Cesty que use shall be in possession of like Estate as he hath in the Use, the fiction quomodo is, that the Statute will have the Possession of Cesty que use, as a new body compounded of matter and form, and that the Feoffees shall give matter and substance, and the Use shall give form and quality, the material words in the first part of the purview are four.  
The first words are (Remainder) and Reverture, the Statute having spoken before of Uses in Fee-simple, in tail, for life, or years addeth, or otherwise (in Remainder reverture) whereby it is manifest, that the first words are to be understood of Uses in Possession, for there are two substantial and essential differences of Estates, the one limiting the times, (for all Estates are but times of their continuantes) the former maketh little difference of Fee-simple, Fee tail for life or years, and the other maketh difference of Possession as remainder, all other differences of Estate are but accidents, as shall be said hereafter, these two the Statute meant to take hold of, and at the words, Remainder, and Reverture it stopps, it adds not words, (Right, Title, or possibility) nor it hath not general words (or otherwise) it is most plain, that the Statute meant to execute no inferior Uses to Remainder or Reverture, that is to say, no possibility or contingences, but Estates, only, such as the Feoffees might have executed by Conscience made: note also the very Letter of the Statute doth take notice of a difference between an Use in Remainder, and an Use in Reverture, which though it cannot properly, because it doth not depend upon particular Estates, as Remainders do, neither did then before the Statute draw any Tenures as Reversions do, yet the Statute intends that there is a difference when the particular Use, and the Use limited upon the particular Use are both new Uses, in which Case it is a Use in Remainder, and where the particular Use is a new Use, and the remnant of the use is the old use, in which Case it is a use in Reverter.  
The next material word is (from henceforth) which doth exclude all conceit of relation that Cesty que use shall not come in, as from the time of the first Feoffments, to use as Bradnells' conceit was in 14. Henry 8. that is, the Feoffee had granted a Rent charge, and Cesty que use had made a Feoffment in Fee, by the Statute of 1. Richard 3. the Feoffee should have held it discharged, because the Act of Cesty que use shall put the Feoffee in, as if Cesty que use had been seized in from the time of the first Use limited, and therefore the Statute doth take away all such ambiguities, and expresseth that Cesty que use shall be in Possession from henceforth, that is, from the time of the Parliament for Uses then in being, and from the time of the execution for Uses limited after the Parliament.  
The third material words are (Lawful seisin state and Possession) not a Possession in Law only, but a seisin in tail, not a Title to enter into the Land, but an actual estate.  
The fourth words are of and in such Estates as they had in the Use; that is to say, little Estates, Fee-simple, Fee tail, life for years at Will and Possession, and Reversion, which are the substantial differences of Estates, as was said before, but both their latter Clauses are more fully perfected and expounded, by the branch of the fiction of the Statute which follows.  
This branch of Fiction hath three material words or Clauses: the first material Clause is, that the Estate, Right, Title, and Possession that was in such person &c. shall be in Cesty que use, for that the matter and substance of the Estate of Cesty que use is the Estate of the Feoffee; and more he cannot have, so as if the Use were limited to Cesty que use and his heirs, and the Estate out of which it was limited was but an Estate for life, Cesty que use can have no Inheritance so if when the Statute came the heir of the Feoffee had not entered after the death of his Ancestor, but had only a Possession in Law, Cesty que use in that Case should not bring an Assize before entry, because the heir of the Feoffee could not, so that the matter whereupon the Use must work is the Feoffees Estate: but note here, whereas before when the Statute speaks of the Uses, it spoke only of Uses in Possession, Remainder and Treverter, but not in Title or Right, now when the Statute speaks what shall be taken from the Feoffee, it speaks of Title and Right, so that the Statute takes more from the Feoffee than it executes presently in Case, where there are uses in contingence which are but Titles.  
The second word is (Clearly) which seems properly and directly to meet with the conceit of Scintilla Iuris as well as the words in the Preamble of extirping and extinguishing such Feoffments, so is their Estates is clearly extinct.  
The third material Clause is after such quality, manners, form and condition as they had in the use; so as now as the Feoffees Estate gives matter, so the use gives form; and as in the first Clause the use was endowed with the Possession in points of Estate, so there it is endowed with the Possession in all accidents and Circumstances of Estate, wherein first note that it is gross and absurd to expound the form of the use any whit to destroy the substance of the Estate as to make a doubt, (because the use gave no Dower or Tenancy by the courtesy) that therefore the Possession when it is transferred would do so likewise: no, but the Statute meant such quality, manner, form and condition, as it is not repugnant to the corporal presence and possession of the Estate.  
Next for the word (Condition) I do not hold it to be put in for Uses upon condition, though it be also comprised within the general words; but because I would have things stood upon learnedly, and according to the true sense, I hold it but for an explaining or word of the effect, as it is in the Statute of 26. of Treasons, where it is said, that the Offender shall be attainded of the evert Fact by men of their condition (in this place) that is to say, of their degree or sort, and so the word Condition in this place is no more, but in like quality, manner, form, and degree or sort, so as all these words amount, but to (modo et forma.) Hence therefore all circumstances of Estate are comprehended as sole seisin, or jointly seisin, by entireties, or by moieties, a circumstance of Estate to have age as coming in by descent, or not age as Purchasor, or circumstance of Estate discendable to the heir of the part of the Father, or of the part of the Mother. A circumstance of Estate conditional or absolute, remitted or not remitted with a condition of inter-marriage, or without all these are accidents and circumstances of Estate, in all which the Possession shall ensue the nature and quality of the Use, and this much of the first Case which is the general case.  
The second Case of the joint Feoffees needs no Exposition, for it peruseth the penning of the general case, only this I will note, that although it had been omitted, yet the Law upon the first Case would have been taken as the case provided, so that it rather in explanation than an addition, for turn that Case the other way, that one were enfeoffed to the Use of himself, I hold the Law to be, that in the former Case they shall be seized jointly, and so in the latter Case Cesty que use shall be seized solely; for the word (Other) it shall be qualified by the construction of Cases, as shall appear when I come to my Division; but because this Case of Cofeoftees to the use of one of them was a general Case in the realm, therefore they foresaw it, oppressed it precisely, and passed over the case E converso, which was but especial; and care, and they were loath to bring in this Case, by incerting the word only unto the first Case (S) to have penned it to the use only of other persons, for they had experience what doubt the word only bred upon the Statute of 1. Richard 3. after this third Case, and before the third Case of Rents comes in the second saving, and the reason of it is worth the noting, why the savings are interlaced before the third Case, the reason of it is, because the third case needeth no saving, and the first two Cases did need savings, and that is the reason of that again.  
It is a generhll ground, that where an Act of Parliament is Donor, if it be penned with an (ac si) it is not a saving, for it is a special gift, and not a general gift, which includes all Rights, and therefore in 11 Henry 7. whereupon the alienation of Women, the Statute entitles the heir of him in remainder to enter, you find never a Stranger, because the Statute gives entry not (Simpliciter) but within an (ac si) as if no Alienation had been made, or if the feme had been naturally dead, Strangers that had right might have entered, and therefore no saving needs, so in the Statute of 32. of Leases, the Statute enacts, that the Leases shall be good and effectual in Law, as if the lessor had been seized of a good and perfect Estate in Fee-simple, and therefore you find no saving in the Statute, and so likewise of divers other Statutes do likewise, where a Statute doth make a gift or Title good, specially against certain persons there needs no saving, except it be to exempt some of those persons, as in the Statute of 1. R. 3. now to apply this to case of Rents, which is penned with an (ac si) (s.) as if a sufficient grant, or lawful conveyance had been made, or executed by such as were seized, why if such a grant of a Rent had been made, one that had an ancient Right might have entered and have avoided the charge, and therefore no saving needeth, but the second first Cases are not penned with an (ac si) but absolute, that Cesty que use shall be adjudged in Estate and Possession, which is a Judgement of Parliamènt stronger than any Fine, to bind all Rights, nay it hath further words (s.) in lawful Estate and Possession, which maketh it the stronger than any in the first Clause, for if the words only had stood upon the second Clause (s.) that the Estate of the Feoffee should be in Cesty que use, than perhaps the gift should have been special, and so the saving superfluous, and this note is material in regard of the great question, whether the Feoffees may make any regress, which Opinion (I mean that no regress is left unto them) is principally to be argued out of the saving; as shall be now declared: for the savings are two in number, the first saveth all Strangers Rights, with an exception of the Feoffees: the second is a saving out of the exception of thefirst saving (s.) of the Feoffees in case where they claim totheir own proper use: it had been easy in the first saving out of the Statute) other than such persons as are seized, or hereafter should be seized to any use) to have added to these words (executed by this Statute) or in the second saving to have added unto the words (Claiming to their proper use) these words (or to the use of any other, and executed by this Statute, but the regress of the Feoffee is shut out between the two savings, for it is the right of a Person claiming to an Use, and not unto his own proper use, but it is to be added, that the first saving is not to be understood as the letter implieth, that Feoffees to use shall be barred of their regress, in Case that it be of another Feoffment then that whereupon the Statute hath wrought, but upon the same Feoffment, as if the Feoffee before the Statute had been diseised, and the disseised had made a Feoffment in Fee to I. D. his use, and then the Statute came, this executeth the Use of the second Feoffment, but the first Feoffees may make a regress, and they yet claim to an Use, but not by that Feoffment upon which the Statute hath wrought.  
NOw followeth the third Case of the Statute touching execution of Rents, wherein the material words are four:  
First, whereas divers persons are seized, which hath bred a doubt that it should only go to Rents in Use, at the time of the Statute; but it is Explained in the Clause following (S) as if a grant had been made to them by such as, are, or shall be seized.  
The second word is (Profit) for in the putting of the Case, the Statute speaketh of a Rent; but after in the Purview is added these words (or profit.)  
The third word is (ac si) (S) that they shall have the (S) as if a sufficient grant or lawful conveyance had been made and made unto them.  
The fourth words are the words of Liberty and Remedies attending upon such Rent (S) that he shall distrain &c. and have such Suits Entries, and Remedies relying again with an (ac si) as if the grant had been made with such collateral penalties and advantages.  
Now for the Provisoes, the Makers of this Law did so abound with policy and discerning, as they did not only foresee such mischiefs as were incident to this new Law immediately, but likewise such as were consequent in a remote degree, and therefore besides the express Provisoes, they did add three new Provisoes which are in themselves substractive laws, for foreseeing that by the Execution of Uses, Wills formerly made should be overthrown: They made an ordinance for Wills, foreseeing likewise, that by execution of Uses, women should be doubly advanced: They made an ordinance for Dowers and Jointures, foreseeing again, that the execution of Uses would make franktenement pass by Contracts paroll. They made an ordinance for enrolments of bargains and Sales, the two former they inserted into this Law, and the third they distinguished into a Law apart, but without any preamble as may appear, being but a Proviso to this Statute, besides all these provisional laws; and besides five Provisors, whereof three attend upon the Law of Jointure, and two borne in Wales, which are not material to the purpose in hand. There are six provisoes which are natural and true members and limbs of the Statute, whereof four concern the part of Cesty que use, and two concern the part of the Feoffees: The sour which concern the part of Cesty que use, tend all to save him from prejudice by the execution of the estate.  
The first saveth him from the extinguishment of any Statute or Recognizance, as if a man had an Extent of a hundred Acres, and an Use of the inheritance of one. Now the Statute executing the possession to that one, would have extinguished his Extent being entire in all the rest: or as if the Commissioner of a Statute having ten Acres liable to the Statute had made a Feoffment in Fce to a Stranger of two, and after had made a Feoffment in Fce to the use of the Conuzec and his heirs: And upon this Proviso there arise three Questions: First, whether this Proviso were not superfluous, in regard that Cesty que use was comprehended in the general, saving though the Feoffees be excluded.  
Secondly, whether this Proviso doth save Statutes or Executions, with an apportionment and Entire.  
Thirdly, because it is penned indefinitively, in point of time, whether it shall go to Uses limited after the Statute, as well as to those that were in being all the time of the Statute, which doubt is rather enforced by this Reason, because there was for Uses at the time of the Statute, for that the Execution of the Statute might be waived, but both possession and Use since the Statute, may be waived.  
The second proviso saveth Cesty que use from the charge of primer Seisin liveries Ouster le manes, and such other duties to the King, with an express limitation of Time that he shall be discharged for the time past, and charged for the time to come in a King S: May 1536. to be communis terminus.  
The third proviso doth the like for Fines, reliefs, and Herriots, discharging them for the time past, and speaking nothing of the Time to come.  
The fourth proviso giveth to Cesty que use all collateral benefits of Vouchers, aids, priers, Actions of wast, trespass, conditions broken, and which the Feoffees might have had; and this is expressly limited for Estates executed before 1. May 1536. and this proviso giveth occasion to intend that none of these benefits would have been carried to Cesty que use by the general words in the body of the Law (S) that the Feoffees estate, right, Title, and possession, &c.  
For the two provisoes on the part of the Tertenant, they both concern the saving of strangers from prejudice, &c.  
The first saves Actions depending against the Feoffees, that they shall not abate.  
The second saves Wardships, Liveries, and Ouster Le manes, whereof Title was vested in regard of the heir of the Feoffee, and this in case of the King only.  

What Persons may be seized to an use, and what not.  
What persons may be Cesty que use, and what not.  
What Persons may declare an use, and what not.   
THough I have opened the Statute in order of words, yet I will make my Division in order of matter, viz.  

1. The raising of Uses.  
2. The interruption of uses.  
3. The Executing of uses.   
Again, The raising of Uses doth easily divide itself into three parts.  
The persons that are Actors to the Conveyance to Use.  
The Use itself.  
The form of the Conveyance.  
Then it is first to be seen what persons may be seized to an Use, and what not, and what persons may be Cesty que use; and what not.  
The King cannot be seized to an Use; no not where he taketh in his natural body and to some purpose as a common person, and therefore if Land be given to the King, and I. D. per term de lour vies, this Use is void for a moiety.  
Like Law is, if the King be seized of Land in the right of his duchy of Lancaster, and covenanteth by his letters patents under the duchy seal to stand seized to the use of his son, nothing passeth.  
Like Law, if King R. 3. who was Feoster to divers uses before he took upon him the crown, had after he was King by his Letters patents granted the Land over, the uses had not been renewed.  
The Queen (speaking not of an imperial Queen by marriage) cannot be seized to an use, though she be a body enabled to grant and purchase without the King: Yet in regard of the government and interest the King hath in her possession she cannot be seized to an use.  
A Corporation cannot be seized to an use, because their capacity is to a use certain; again, because they cannot Execute an Estate without doing wrong to their Corporation or Founder; but chiefly because of the letter of this Statute which (in any clause when it speaketh of the Feoffee) resteth only upon the word (person.) but when it speaketh of Cefty que use, it addeth person, or body politic.  
If a Bishop bargain or sell Lands whereof he is seized in the right of his Sea; this is good during his life; otherwise it is where a Bishop is enfeoffed to him and his Successors to the use of I. D. and his heirs, that is not good, no not for the Bishop's life, but the use is merely void.  
Contrary Law, of Tenant in Taile, for if I give Land in tail by Deed since the Statute to A. to the use of B. and his heirs; B. hath a fee-simple determinable upon the death of A without issue. And like Law, though doubtful before the Statute was, for the chief reason which bred the doubt before the Statute was, because Tenant in tail could not Execute an Estate without wrong; but that since the Statute is quite taken away, because the Statute saveth no right of entail, as the Statute of 1. R. 3. did, and that reason likewise might have been answered before the Statute, in regard of the common recovery.  
A feme Covert and an Infant, though under years of discretion, may be seized to an use; for as well as Land might descend unto them from a Feoffee to use; so may they originally be enfeoffed to an use; yet if it be before the Statute, and they had (upon a Subpoena brought) executed their Estate during the coverture or infancy they might have defeated the same, and when they should have been seized again to the Use, and not to their own use, but since the Statute, no right is saved unto them.  
If a feme Covert or an Infant be enfeoffed to an Use precedent since the Statute, the Infant or Baron come too late to discharge or root up the Feoffment; but if an Infant be enfeoffed to the Use of himself and his heirs, and I. D. pay such a sum of money to the Use of I. G. and his heirs, the Infant may disagree and overthrow the contingent Use.  
Contrary Law if an Infant be enfeoffed to the Use of himself for life, the remainder to the Use of I. S. and his heirs, he may disagree to the feoffment, as to his own Estate, but not to divest the remainder, but it shall remain to the benefit of him in remainder.  
And yet if an Attainded person be enfeoffed to an Use, the King's Title after Office found, shall prevent the Use, and Relate above it but until office the Cesty que use is seized of the Land.  
Like Law of an Alien, for if Land be given to an Alien to an Use, the Use is not void ab initio: Yet neither Alien or Attainded person can maintain an Action to defend the Land.  
The Kings Villeine if he be enfeoffed to an Use, the King's Title shall relate above the Use, otherwise in Case of a common person.  
But if the Lord be enfeoffed to the Use of his Villeine, the Use neither riseth, but the Lord is in by the Common Law, & not by the Statute discharged of the use.  
But if the husband be enfeoffed to the use of his wife for years, if he die, the wife shall have the term, and it shall not enure by way of discharge, although the Husband may dispose of the wife's term.  
So if the Lord of whom the Land is held be enfeoffed to the Use of a person Attainded, the Lord shall not hold by way of discharge of the Use, because of the King's Title, An. diem & vastum.  
A person uncertain is not within the Statute, nor any Estate in nutibus or suspense executed, as if I give Land to I. S. the remainder to the right heirs of I. D. to the use of I. N. and his heir, I. N. is not seized of the Fee-simple of an Estate per vit. of I. S. till I. D. be dead, and then in Fee-simple.  
Liker Law if before the Statute, I give Land to I. S. per auter vie to an Use, and I. S. dyeth, leaving Cesty que use, whereby the freehold is in suspense, the Statute cometh, and no occupant entreth; the Use is not executed out of the freehold in suspense. For the occupant the Disseissor the Lord by escheat: The Feoffee upon consideration, not having notice, and all other persons which shall be seized to Use, not in regard of their persons but of their Title. I refer them to my division touching disturbance and interruption ofUses.  
It followeth now to see what person may be a Cesty que use, the King may be Cesty que use; but it behooveth both the declaration of the Use and the conveyance itself, to be matter of Record, because the King's Title is compounded of both, I say, not appearing of Record, but by conveyance of Record. And therefore if I covenant with I. S. to levy a Fine to him to the King's use, which I do accordingly: And this deed of Covenant be not inroled, and the Deed be found by office the use vesteth not, Econverso inroled. If I covenant with I. S. to infeoff him to the King's use, and the Deed be inroled and the feoffment also be found by office, the use vesteth.  
But if I levy a fine, or suffer a Recovery to the King's use, and declare the use by deed of Covenant enroled, though the King be not party, yet it is good enough.  
A Corporation may take an Use, & yet it is not material whether the feoffment or the Declaration be by deed; but I may enfeoffee I. S. to the use of a Corporation and this use may be averred.  
A Use to a person incertain is not void in the first limitation, but executeth not till the person be in (esse,) so that this is positive, than an Use shall never be in Obeyance, as a Remainder may be, but ever in a person certain upon the words of the Statute, and the Estate of the Feeoffees shall be in him or them which have the Use: The reason is because no confidence can be reposed in a person unknown and uncertain; and therefore if I make a feoffment to the use of I. S. for life, and then to the use of the right heirs of I. D. the remainder is not in Obeyance, but the Reversion is in the Feoffer, (quousque.) So that upon the matter all persons uncertain in Use, are like conditions or limitations precedent.  
Like Law if I Enfeoffee one to the use of I. S. for years, the remainder to the right Herres of I. D. This is not executed obeyance, and therefore not void.  
Like Law, if I make a Feoffment to the use of my wife that shall be, or to such persons as I shall maintain, though I limit no particular Estate at all; yet the use is good, and shall in the interim return to the Feoffor.  
Contrary Law, if I once limit the whole Fee-simple of the Use out of Land, and part thereof to a person incertain, it shall never return to the Feoffer by way of fraction of the Use; but look how it should have gone unto the Feoffer; if I begin with a contingent Use, so it shall go to the remainder; if I entail a contingent Use, both Estates are alike subject to the contingent use when it falleth; as when I make a Feoffment in Fee to the use of my wife for life the remainder to my first begotten son; I having no son at that time the remainder to my brother and his heirs if my wife die before I have any son, the use shall not be in me, but in my brother. And yet if I marry again and have a son, it shall divest from my brother, and be in my son, which is the skipping they talk so much of.  
So if I limit an Use jointly to two persons; not in (Esse) and the one cometh to be in esse, he shall take the entire Use, and yet if the other afterward come in esse, he shall take jointly with the former, as if I make a Feoffment to the use of my Wife that shall be, and my first begotten son for their Lives, and I marry my Wise taketh the whole Use, and if I afterwards have a son, he taketh jointly with my Wife.  
But yet where words of obeyance work to an Estate, executed in course of Possession, it shall do the like in Use, as if I enfeoffee A. to the use of B. for life, the remainder to C. for life, the remainder to the right heirs of B. this is a good remainder executed.  
So if I enfeoffee A. to the use of his right heirs A. is in the Fee-simple, not by the Statute, but by the Common Law.  
Now are we to examine a special point of the disability of persons as to take by the Statute, and that upon the words of the Statute, where divers persons are seized to the use of other persons, so that by the letter of the Statute, no use is contained, but where the Feoffor is one, and Cesty que use is another.  
Therefore it is to be seen in what Cases the same persons shall be both seized to the use and Cesty a que use, and yet in by the Statute, and in what Cases they shall be diverse persons, and yet in by the Common Law, wherein I observe unto you three things: First, that the letter is full in the point. Secondly, that it is strongly urged by the Clause of joint Estates following. Thirdly, that the whole scope of the Statute was to remit the Common Law, and never to intermeddle where the Common Law executed an Estate, therefore the Statute ought to be expounded, that where the party seized to the use, and the Cesty que use is one person, he never taketh by the Statute except there be a direct impossibilty or impertinency for the use, to take effect by the Common Law.  
And if I give Land to I. S. to the use of himself and his heirs, and if I. D. pay a sum of money, then to the use of I. D. and his heirs, I. S. is in of an Estate for life, or for years, by way of abridgement of Estate in course of Possession, and I. D. in of the Fee-simple by the Statute.  
So if I bargain and sell my Land after seven years, the Inheritance of the Use only passeth, and there remains an Estate for years by a kind of substraction of the Inheritance or occupyer of my Estate, but merely at the Common Law.  
But if I enfeoffee I. S. to the use of himself entail, and then to the use of I. D. in Fee, or Covenant to stand seized to the use of myself in tail, and to the use of my Wife in Fee, in both these Cases the Estate tail is executed by this Statute, because an Estate tail cannot be reoccupied out of a Fee-simple being a new Estate, and not like a particular Estate, for life or years, which are but portions of the absolute Fee, and therefore if I bargain and sell my Land to I. S. after my death without Issue, it doth not leave an Estate tail in me, nor vesteth any present Fee in the bargains, but is an use expectant.  
So if I enfeoffee I. S. to the use of I. D. for life, and then to the use of himself and his heirs, he is in of the Fee-simple merely in course of Possession, and as of a Reversion, and not of a remainder.  
Contrary Law, if I enfeoffee I. S. to the use of I. D. for life, then to the use of himself for life, the remainder to the use of I. N. in Fee, now the Law will not admit fraction of Estates, but I. S. is in with the rest by the Statute.  
So if I enfeoffee I. S, to the use of himself, and a Stranger, they shall be both in by the Statute, because they could not take jointly taking by several Titles.  
Like Law if I enfeoffee a Bishop and his heirs to the use of himself, and his successors, he is in by the Statute in the right of his Sea.  
And as I cannot raise a present use to one out of his own seisin, so if I limit a contingent or future use to one being at the time of limitation not seized, but after become seized at the, time of the execution of contingent use, there is the same reason and the same Law, and upon the same difference which I have put before.  
As if I covenant with my son, that after his Marriage I will stand seized of Land to the use of himself and his heirs, and before Marriage I enfeoffee him to the use of himself and his heirs, and then he marryeth, he is in by the Common Law, and not by the Statute, like Law of a bargain and sale.  
But if I had let to him for life only, than he should have been in for life only by the Common Law, and of the Fee-simple by Statute. Now let me advise you of this, that it is not a matter of subtlety or conceit to take the Law right, when a man cometh in by the Law in course of Possession, and where he cometh in by the Statute in course of Possession, but it is material for the deciding of many Causes and Questions, as for Warranties, Actions, Conditions, Wayners, suspicions, and divers other Provisoes.  
For example, a man's Farmer committed wast, after he in the Reversion covenanteth to stand seized to the use of his Wife for life, and after to the use of himself and his heirs, his Wife dies, if he be in his Fee untouched he shall punish the wast, if he be in by the Statute he shall not punish it.  
So if I be enfeoffed with Warranty, and I covenant with my son to stand seized to the use of myself for life, and after to him and his heirs; if I be in by the Statute, it is clear my Warranty is gone, but if I be in by the Common Law it is doubtful.  
So if I have an eigne Right, and be enfeoffed to the use of I. S. for life, then to the use of myself for life, then to the use of I. D. in Fee, I. S. dyeth, if I be in by the Common Law, I cannot waive my Estate having agreed to the Feoffment: but if I am in by the Statute, yet I am not remitted, because I come in by my own Act, but I may waive my Use, and bring an Action presently, for my Right is saved unto me by one of the savings in the Statute. Now on the other side it is to be seen, where there is a seisin to the use of another person, and yet it is out of the Statute which is in special Cases upon the ground wheresoever Cesty que use had remedy, for the Possession by course of Common Law, there the Statute never worketh, and therefore if a disseisin were committed to an Use, it is in him by the Common Law upon agreement, so if one enter as occupant to the Use of another, it is in him till disagreement.  
So if a feme infeoff a man (Causa matrimonij pralocuti) she hath remedy for the Land again by course of the Law, and therefore in those special Cases the Statute worketh not, and yet the words of the Statute are general, (where any person stands seized by force of any Fine, Recovery, Peostment, bargain and sale, agreement or otherwise) but yet the feme is to be restrained for the reason aforesaid.  
It remaineth to show what persons may limit and declare an Use, wherein we must distinguish, for there are two kinds of Declarations of Uses, the one of a present Use upon the first conveyance, the other upon a power of revocation or new declaration, the latter of which I refer to the division of revocation, now for the former.  
The King upon his Letters patents may declare an Use, though the patent itself implieth an Use, if none be declared.  
If the King gives Lands by his Letters to I. S. and his heirs to the use of I. S. for life, the King hath the Inheritance of the use by impliation of the patent, and no Office needeth for impliation out of matter of Record, amounteth ever to matter of Record.  
If the Queen give Land to I. S. and his heirs to the use of all the churchwardens of the Church of Dale, the Pattentee is seized to his own use, upon that confidence or intent, but if a common person had given Land in that manner, the use had been void by the Stat. of 23. H. 8. and the use had returned to the feoffor & his heirs, A Corporation may take an Use without deed as hath been said before, but can limit no Use without Deed.  
An Infant may limit an Use upon a Feoffment, Fine, or Recovery, and he cannot Countermand or avoid the Use, except he avoid the conveyance, contrary if an Infant covenant in consideration of blood or Marriage to stand seized to an Use, the Use is merely void.  
If an infant bargain and sell his Land for money, for Commons, or Teaching, it is good with averment, if for money otherwise, if it be proved it is avoidable, if for money recited and not paid it is void, and yet in the case of a man of full age the recital sufficeth.  
If Baron and feme be seized in the right of the feme, or by joint Purchase during the Coverture, and they join in a Fine, the Baron cannot declare the Use for longer time than the Coverture, and the feme cannot declare alone, but the Use goeth according to the limitation of Law, unto the feme and her heirs, but they may both join in Declaration of the Use in Fee, and if they sever, than it is good for so much of the Inheritance as they concurred in, for the Law avoucheth all one as if they joined, as if the Baron declare an use to I. S. and his heirs, and the Feme another to I. D. for life, and then to J. S. and his heirs, the use is good to I. S. in Fee.  
And if upon examination the Feme will declare the use to the Judge, and her Husband agree not to it, it is void, and the Barons use is only good, the rest of the use goeth according to the limitation of Law.  
FINIS.