A royal POSITION, Whereby 'tis proved, that 'tis against the Common Laws of ENGLAND TO Depose a KING: OR, AN ADDITION TO A BOOK, entitled, RESOLVED UPON THE QUESTION: OR, A QUESTION RESOLVED  
Concerning the Right which the KING hath to Hull, or any other Fort or place of strength for the defence of the Kingdom.  
By PETER BLAND of Grays-inn, Gent.  
London, Printed for JOHN FIELD. 1642.   

To his ever Honoured Uncle, HENRY SHELLY Esquire, one of the Members of the Honourable House of COMMONS in PARLIAMENT Assembled.  
SIr, 'twas not the hope of adding either to your honour, or my own profit, (but my certain knowledge of the encouragement which any pious endeavours shall receive from your religious self) that made me not hazard, but presume on your acceptance: were my Position contrary to what it is, I might then be sensible of a fear, and suspect its welcome; because I am confident that nearness of relation cannot bribe your judgement, no not to purchase but a slight view from your observing eye. But being as it is, no way contradictory to what I affirmed before: I hope it will not breed in you the least suspicion of a change in my affections: Sir my hope of your acceptance, is not grounded upon the agitation of so poor a principle, as that of Kindred, for I am sure that your judicious and always just censure, will not be pleased with that from me, which from another would prove distasteful; therefore (for my part) I shall not be refractory, but submit to your profound judgement, and whether you approve or disprove, I shall still remain what I ever was,  
Your faithful Servant and Nephew, PETER BLAND.   

A royal Position.  
I must confess 'tis no way pleasing to me to dispute the power of a KING, for had I fortunes of my own, so far as those would reach, I would ne'er urge property against my sovereign's Commands, and no man ought to complain of my grievance but myself, and if I were content to lose that which the Subjects Liberty calls Meum, I hope 'tis no prejudice to that it calls Tuum: But when I look upon the general cause (as at this time) 'tis otherwise; therefore now I hold every man bound to lay particular cases aside, and sacrifice his best endeavours, for a timely composure of these general and unseasonable distractions, and the best way I could think on is this, viz. Neither for private ends on the one side, to flatter the King, by giving him more power than the Law hath settled in him; nor for by-respects on the other side, to abate of the King's due, and give it to the Parliament; but with Allegiance to the one, and submission to the other (as near as I can) give both their right.  
And truly I cannot be made sensible that I have done otherwise, only 'twas my misfortune to fall under the misapprehension of divers, who (from an Argument I used in the former Impressure) have raifed a consequence as dangerous, as the Subject of discourse was nice.  
The Accusation against me is, that I did implicitly hold it lawful to Depose a KING: the ground of their Accusation is this:  
In the former Impression, Fol. 13. this objection was urged, viz. The KING hath the kingdom by way of Trust, now by Law a Trust cannot be Countermanded; therefore Sir John Hotham's keeping of Hull against the King's Command was illegal.  
To which my Answer was thus, viz. I do confess that by Law a Trust cannot be Countermanded; but yet I shall take a difference between the Trust of a private man's estate, and the trust of a kingdom, and if that difference should not hold, I showed the mischief that would ensue, for then our case were in short but thus:  
We have entrusted the King with the whole kingdom, and this trust cannot be in any part countermanded by us again, and if so, than the King's estate is as good as absolutely his own (I mean) for his commanding power, though not for his disposing power; and if so, than we cannot make use of our own staff, when we are in fear of being beaten by a foreign Force, because by that means, that is, by the Kings Commanding Power, the Parliament; that is, the whole kingdom may be bound to the peace.  
But now some will here object that we ought not to have such a thought of the King, as to think that he would by his commanding power bind us to the peace, when a foreign Force is coming against us.  
To this I answer, that 'twere poor policy for him to do it, but that 'tis no dishonour to the King for me to suppose, that some traitorously minded favourite, may at such a time persuade him to use his Commanding power, pretending some advantage to the crown (as all traitors do) when nothing is more intended than their own traitorous ends; therefore 'twas the wisdom of our ancestors the Law makers, to keep the power out of his hands, not so much for fear what he would do of himself, as what others might possibly persuade him to do.  
I must confess I might have answered the objection, with the authority of Parliament who did employ Sir John Hotham, but not imagining any would draw that consequence (they accuse me with) from the difference I answered with, I waved that answer I might have given from the power which the Parliament have above the Law, If the Law had been so, that in case of the trust of the Kingdom, it could not be in any part countermanded.  
But truly I cannot have any ground in that difference for that conclusion: For I took the difference in answer of an objection, concerning a particular place, as Hull, not concerning the whole Kingdom; and though it may be lawful in that particular case (by reason of some great mischief or inconvenience which might otherwise ensue) yet it may not be lawful in the general; for who knows not but the Law will rather suffer a particular inconvenience than a general mischief.  
Besides, I meant not an absolute and perpetual Countermand of that particular place neither; for that were utterly to extinguish and take away the Kings Right for ever; but I meant a temporary Countermand only, that was, as long as (in the judgement of that Great counsel the PARLIAMENT) the urgency of the necessity did require it: and many things we find are and may be done for a certain time, which cannot be done for ever; as in case of the Peers of the realm, 'tis the birthright of a Baron to Vote in the House of Lords in time of Parliament; yet we see and find it adjudged, that a Baron or an Earl or any Peer of the Land, may be disabled to sit during his life, or during such a time, but yet his heirs cannot be disabled so long as their veins are filled with Noble blood.  
Besides, I meant that that temporary Countermand can never be done but by the Parliament neither; and if they should not have power to do it being the Kingdom representative, than the King had more power than the Kingdom, which is absurd saith Fox, Vol. primum. Fol. 879.  
And thus I have explained myself, sufficiently I hope to prevent farther mistakes, and to show that for my part, I shall for ever pray that the Crown may stand as firm upon His majesty's Head as ever 'twas, and may it long continue there, and for ever to his Posterity after him.  
And yet I fear there are many fiery zealous spirits who embrace the tenet, and are glad to find any premises from whence they may but with some colour draw their conclusion: nay and such as may have honest hearts too, and be earnestly desirous of a Reformation, only the zeal of their houses may eat them up; but for such as do hold the opinion, I am sure they have no encouragement from the Parliament, neither can any thing that the Parliament hath done be any ground for their vulawfull hopes, and from me they shall have no more fuel to increase their flames then this, viz. 'Tis against the Common laws of England to Depose a King, a thing that was held damnable by no less than two Acts of Parliament, the one in Edward the seconds time, the other in Edward the thirds time.  
Had I had the gift of foretelling the divers objections and conclusions, that would have been raised (by the several Readers) from my Arguments, I would have laid them so, that no Conventicling Tubman should have made my words his text, raising from thence so damned a Doctrine; but that was impossible, and therefore seeing I could not then avoid it, let me now labour to clear myself by striving to convince others that hug the tenet, which I shall do by two Arguments:  
First, from the Common Law of England, which says the KING can do no wrong, the reason is good, because all his active Offices are disposed of, and he never executes none of them Himself, and therefore what ever wrong is done, 'tis done by his Officers, and they are to answer for it, and therefore the Parliament lays the fault upon his evil councillors, not upon the King himself: now than I say, if the King can do no wrong, than you must allow that he does none; and if so, how then can any man hold it lawful to Depose him; surely you will not be so unjust as to hold that he may be deposed without a cause, and suppose a cause you cannot, for the Law will not allow of such a supposition.  
Again, 'tis a rule in Law, that unumquodque ligamen eo ligamine disolvitur quo ligatum fuit, now that Ligamen of institution or ordinance of royal Dignity (as you say yourself) was not only human but partly divine, for as you say jure Coronae, the King was man's appointed, so you likewise say, that jure personae, he was God Anointed; now if it be so that he be as well Divine as human, how then can human Laws undo any more than what human Authority did at first institute? now according to this argument if you Depose a King, you must thwar● that rule in Law, and contra principium negantem non est disputandum.  
The next argument is from God's Law, which is the better way for weak man, either to humble himself under the affliction God lays upon him, or stoutly to his power oppose him; surely you will grant that to stand on tiptoes against God, is not the safest way; why then for arguments sake, let us supponere quod non est supponendum, admit that a King himself be as bad as bad may be; or which is most usual, admit that he be drawn and persuaded by his councillors to do that which is illegal, and to the great prejudice of his Subjects, why now is not this a scourge laid by God upon the Kingdom, to suffer the King to be thus persuaded and possessed? Surely yes, why then do you think it the best way to Depose that King presently, as if you would have the Land flow with milk and honey in despite of God? or as if God did not know whether he sent him when he first bestowed him upon this Kingdom at his Birth; or whose child he should be when he first framed him in the womb; in my opinion (I am sure I myself am) you may be zealous against the Cavaliers, and yet not envy the King, and certainly you may worship God aright without crucifying his Son, you may honour God and not dishonour the King.  
Again, if God punish a Son with a sharp and cruel father, were it fit for that son (thinking to enjoy a greater liberty than before) to kill his father, and so Depose him as I may say (for every man is a King in his own family) as if God could not whip him with another lash: apply it to yourselves.  
Yet mistake me not, I blame you not for your good affections, and for being assistant to the Parliament, but rather for commendation tell you, that if any thing can be meritorous (in my opinion) that is, only this caveat I give to the vulgars (for knowing and learned men▪ I hope will not entertain a thought of it) that their private hopes or inward thought reach not beyond the intent of the Parliament, for fear lest their honest endeav should fail (notwithstanding your large contributions) by reason of your unjust intents. You do well to stand for your Mother England's right, yet take heed you destroy not your Fathers the Kings; for God's command of obedience to your Parents, doth not except against the honour you owe your Father.  
And thus I have discharged my own conscience concerning that point, whether I have pleased others or not I know not, and indeed care not; I could never yet study to please the roving fancies of the giddy multitude any farther than truth and that little knowledge I have would guide me; no, though the greatest recompense of a glorious, but fading world, were by my own thoughts presented to me.  
And now seeing I am upon publishing an addition, I shall correct some of the chiefest faults of the last impression, so pass by the rest being but faults of the press.  
The chiefest was indeed occasioned by my own neglect in leaving a whole leaf out of the Printers copy, and it was this:  
In the 7. leaf of the first impression there was an objection raised; but the answer was omitted, the objection was this:  
Some that endeavour to destroy the trust, and maintain that the King hath his right to Hull, et per consequens, to all the kingdom by descent, do urge the place in Calvins' case, where 'tis said the King holds the kingdom of England by birthright inherent by descent from the blood royal, whereupon succession doth attend.  
To which objection I answer, that those words whereupon succession doth attend, is a direct comment upon that place; for the King is the heir apparent of King James his Father, now being so, he is capax coronae, that is, he is his father's successor too; and so he holds the kingdom by succession: now the successor is the Heir of the Kingdom, Dan. fol. 28. not the heir of the King only, and that is the reason 'tis usually said, To the King, his heirs and successors, where the word heirs is first named, because he is first heir to the King, by title of descent before he can be heir to the kingdom, that is, before he can be his successor; so that there is a difference between Haereditas and successio, for they signify two several capacities, the first signify his natural capacity as he is King jure personae, that is, as God's Anointed, the other signifying his politic capacity, or his jus corona, that is, as he is man's appointed.  
Bracton speaking of the King and his Oath, and how that he swears to administer Justice to all his Subjects, to the utmost of his power; go; forward and says, Et ad hoc creatus est & electus, which two words, creatus & electus, do fully prove the former Distinction; that is, they prove him to be God's Anointed, jure personae, and man's appointed, jure coronae; Bracton, cap. 9  
I find the same Distinction made good too, out of holy Writ; Saul and David were both Anointed by Samuel, but yet the people's consent was so necessary, that they had not the Crown till they consented to it, for David was twenty years without the Crown after he was anointed, and the text saith, Saul fought a Battle before his creation, 1. Sam. 11. 5. and yet he was anointed before the Battle: so that the word creation in that text, justifies what Fortescue says, Fol. 31. the intent of the people is the primum vivens, having within it blood, that is to say, politic provision for the utility and wealth of the same people, which it imparteth as well to the head (that is) the King, as to the Members.  
There are some that have gotten a new objection, which is not without some ground I must confess, and 'tis this; 'Tis said in Calvins' case, Cook Lib. 7. Fol. 13. A. that before any judicial or municipal Laws were, Kings did dare jura of themselves, and decide causes according to natural equity, and were not tied to any rule; or formality of Law, and yet they were Kings, and then say they could not have any politic capacity, for that being but fictio juris, can be no ancienter than the Law whose fiction it was.  
To which I answer, that the very place my Lo: Cook there citys for his proof is a sufficient comment upon that place, for he there quotes Fort. cap. 12. & 13. which very places are quoted in the former impression of this book, Fol 10. by which you may see that he spoke of other kingdoms, not of Kingdom of England, who raised themselves into a Body, and so got the start of other Nations.  
Many other things I should also correct of the former impressions, but I cannot in regard I am forced to print this addition by itself; otherways I should have corrected them all, and have brought the additions in their right places; but that Printers must now be pleased, who like Players touch nought but what will take: Newly revived, is quite forgotten with them, nay and with the Stationers too, but when they cheat a Puisne with a new cover upon an old book, with leaves pasted together to conceal an aged blot, never Printed but once before, is not for their turn, they abhor the beast, yet est natura hominum novitatis avida is their Creed though the Beasts language: An ingenious Stationer told me 'twould not sell without a new Title, (which made me change the dress of this addition) yet he may be none of those that can find no ears for a Sermon at the second preaching unless the text be changed.  
And thus I am willing to submit to an inconvenience for their profits, rather than my words should be made the ground of Arguments so terrible as to shake a Crown, and so maliciously envious and irreligous, as to strike at royal Dignity.  
FINIS.