THE Arraignment and Conviction OF ATHEISM: OR, An Exact and Clear Demonstration by Natural Arguments, that there is a GOD.  
Presented to the View of All, but especially the LEARNED.  
By JOSHVA BONHOME, Rector of Calstock in the County of Cornwall: And Chaplain in Ordinary to His MAJESTY.  
LONDON, Printed by Tho. J●●nes for Dorman Newman at the King's Arms in the Poultry. 1679.   

IMPRIMATUR.  
GVIL. JANE. 14 Aug. 1677.   

TO THE Right Reverend Father in God, HENRY, By the Providence of God, Lord Bishop of LONDON.  
My Lord,  
THese Arguments and Reasons were the Shield wherewith Derodon Public Professor in Philosophy, in the Academy of Aurange withstood the Assaults of Atheists, which swarmed in several places of Europe, about the time that this Land was full of them; which they themselves made plain and evident to all the World, when by an Example, without example, they made a mock at Laws, Justice, Religion, and God himself, by Embruing their profane hands in the never enough lamented blood of the true Protector of Laws, Justice and Subjects, the Pattern of Religion and Piety, and Gods true and lawful Vicegerent in these Three great Kingdoms. He delivered first in his School Disputations, the Objections of Atheists, and furnished his Auditory with Mediums wherewith they might in a Syllogistical way Encounter these Monsters; and afterwards Imparted them to his Country in his own Tongue: In the which, being fallen into my hands, I looked upon them as a Jewel, which I have since kept close by me, both beyond Sea, and here at home. And now seeing we live in an Age wherein we may very well take up the Prophet's complaint, The wicked walk on every side, Ps. 12. v. 8. and say of most men in this our British Israel, what the Apostle of the Gentiles said concerning the Cretians, That they are unruly, vain Talkers, and Deceivers, who subvert whole houses, (and if they could whole Kingdoms) teaching things which they ought not; and that they profess to know God, but in works deny him; being abominable and disobedient, and unto every good work reprobate, Titus 1. v. 10, 11, 16. I have thought it my Duty to frame these Arguments in a known Tongue, to the People of this Land, that first both they and myself, may use them against this wicked brood, as Phinehas did his Javelin against the wicked and profane Zimri, and impudent and brazen faced Cozbi, Numbers 25. v. 7, 14. And secondly, that both all debauched and ignorant persons, if they will take the pains to read over this small Tract, being convinced by the truth and solidity of these Reasons; the one, that there is a glorious God, before whose Judgment-Seat they must (one day) all appear, and in whose hands it is a fearful thing to fall, they may receive Instruction rather than Silver, and Knowledge rather than choice Gold, Prov. 8. v. 10. and so grow in grace and in the knowledge of God and our Lord Jesus Christ. And the other, that they may no more look upon the Heavens and the Elements, as bodies of eternal duration and continuance; nor live in this present world as if there were no death to cut off the thr●● of their sensual Lives; no Graves wherein the●● pampered Carcases must be turned into dust a●● ashes, and become the meat of worms; nor 〈◊〉 Judgment-day, wherein they must all stand befor● the Throne of that God, who is a consuming fire Hebr. 12. v. 20. but have grace, whereby they ma● serve God acceptably with reverence and godly fear: and like the Thessalonians, from their I dolls they may be turned to God, and from their Errors and wilful blindness, to serve and adore the true and living God, 1 Thess. 1. v. 9, 10.  
If these two sorts of men, who dote and rely too much upon Nature, may be convinced of their Errors, ignorance and lewd life, by casting their eyes upon, and seriously considering the weight of these Natural Reasons: like Galen, who was wrought upon by an Anatomical Observation, I have attained half the end I intended in this Work: But if these Arguments, with the blessing of him whose Being they demonstrate, may dis-thronize out of the hearts of others (I mean the refined and professed Atheists) that grand Impiety of theirs; so that (whether publicly or privately) they may fall down before the Throne of God, and trembling and astonished, cry out with Saul, Lord, what wilt thou have me to do, Acts 9.4, 6. Then shall I have reaped the fruit I expect of this Labour.  
My Lord, I hope this small Tract will be useful to all sorts of persons, but especially to the young Plants, in the two famous Nurseries of this Kingdom, OXFORD and CAMBRIDGE, woe are every day fitting themselves for the Work of the Sanctuary. For if they will seriously consider the necessary Conclusions of these Arguments, they shall clearly see the invisible things of God, even h●s eternal Power and Godhead, and understand t●em from the Creation of the world, Rom. 1.20. and so be brought to remember their Creator in the days of their youth, Eccl. 12.1. and withal shall be furnished with such weapons as will conquer both Scepticism, sometimes too too much entertained in the Schools; and the foulest of all Impieties Atheism: which though not taught and defended openly, yet by a subtle pretended way of arguing, Cognitionis causa, and sometimes by a cunning railing at the holiest things, is unhappily instilled in the hearts of young people.  
My Lord, I will not excuse myself for the undertaking of this small Work, for I have learned this true Position, among other Axioms in the Universities, both here and beyond Sea, Non nobis solum nati sumus, We are not born for ourselves alone, but our Country challengeth an Interest in us, our Friends and our Posterity, do lay claim to us: Yet such wicked days are come upon us, though a man for glory to God, love to his Posterity, good will to his Country, or other honest motives, makes private things public, for the common good of the Church and State, he is seldom praised of any, but reproved of many, and condemned or censured of all malicious persons. Bonum quo communius, eo melius, hath been and will be a true Moral Principle, though some scorn to put it in execution: We know the best Master that ever man served did reprove and condemn him for an evil and ungracious Servant, that hide his Talon in a Napkin, refusing to put it forth to his Master's use and advantage.  
My Lord, I humbly beg your Lordship's pardon for assuming perhaps more liberty than is fit, in presenting this short Treatise to your view, and to your Lordship's patronage, yet trusting upon your Lordship's goodness for a liberal acceptance. Nature and your Noble Birth, hath taught you. that to be generous is to be virtuous: but sure it is, that Wisdom, Learning and Piety have perfected Natural Disposition in you; so that I may say, the slenderer the Present, and the meaner the Giver is, the more will it commend the favourable Acceptance, and the noble Receiver. To such Eminent persons as your Lordship is, both by Birth, Dignity, and Virtue, men do not so much give the Thing itself which they present, as in it make tender of their hearts, love, duty and dearest regards. All which I here humbly present to your ships goodness, Commending you to the goodness of Him that so highly hath honoured you, and besceeching Him to heap up more and more all his Blessings upon your Person, Place and Relations, to the glory of his Name, the good of our Church, and the encouragement of Learning and Piety; the Joy and Comfort of your heart in this life: which I earnestly pray may be long and happy, and to the Eternal peace and joy of your Soul, in the day of the great Shepherd and Bishop of our Souls.  
Thus prays Your Lordship's Most humble. Most obedient, & Most obliged Servant, Joshua Bonhome.   

TO THE Christian READER.  
BEfore I proceed to the main Matter of this Treatise, I hold it necessary to disabuse some Pious and Religious Persons, who having never met nor meddled with the profane and ungodly Men (confuted and convinced in this Book) do verily think and imagine that there is never a Man so desperately Wicked, at to deny and dis-affirm a Godhead. Inorder to that, let these godly Persons know, that there are in the World three sorts of Atheists; viz. 1. The subtle and wilily, 2. The lewd and debauched; and 3. The ignorant.  
The first of these, are they who having gotten a way of discoursing cunningly, with the help of their empty knowledge of natural Philosophy, do undertake to frame Arguments against the Godhead, endeavour to answer the Reasons which prove its Existency and Being; and conversing with good and honest men, convey subtly into their minds, the Vennom themselves were infected and corrupted withal. I have spoken with one that had written a Dialogue against all Religions, who objected to me the first and sixth Reason or Answer, confuted in this Book, but soon after he grew Frantic, and died in a sad and lamentable condition.  
I met once with another, who urged very fiercely the second Reason they use to justify their Impiety (which reason is propounded and fully answered in this Treatise) and disdainfully scoffed at my reply; this also a while after fought a Duel, and died upon the place.  
I have disputed against another, who made use of the first and fifth Arguments of theirs (in this Tract propounded and overthrown:) This on a day of fearful Thunder and Lightnings, made it his Bravado to speak Execrable Blasphemies against the Divinity; but in a short time he died (fearfully mad) with the Plague.  
I have seen several others that would Allege all the pretended Reasons, which in this Book will appear to be full of Absurdities, and they for the most part have died very strangely, and the rest have suffered violent Death.  
It will not be amiss to Associate with these Monsters, a certain other dangerous sort of Men; who protest themselves to be Sceptics, and hold it lawful to doubt of all things, that they may also speak dubiously of the Divinity; against such Men, it were well if an Inquisition of Spain were set up all the World over.  
The Lewd and Debauched Atheists, are for the most part young Men of great and Rich Families, who having had a bad Education, are easily drawn away, both by the frequenting and keeping company with the subtle and cunning Atheists; and by giving place to all the Charms of Sport, and Play, Drunkenness and Women: do insensibly abandon themselves to the most abominable Vices that Hell and the Devil can Devise. These are in greater number than theresined Atheists (as some call them) seeing they swarm in great number in the Courts of most Princes, and the greatest Cities in Europe.  
The ignorant Atheists, which exceed in number the two former sorts, are they who professing indeed that there is a God; have notwithstanding but a light Opinion of the same: grounded only either upon the Hear-say of their Parents, or the General Consent of them that are daily conversant withal: Neither are they persuaded of this truth by the Creation of the World, nor by the admirable and wonderful Disposition and Symmetry of the parts of it; nor by any of the Reasons and Arguments which are to be seen in this Book. These are of the vulgar and common sort of People, who being loath to give themselves the trouble to be instructed in the ways of Salvation, never believe that there is a God, but because they are born and bred among those that believe it. Such are they also, who being drawn away of their own Lusts, and Enticed, fall into grievous and horrible sins, without the least sorrow, or reluctancy. For I cannot be persuaded, that a man who believes that there is a God Almighty, Creator of Heaven and Earth, and who is within him, without him, and about him, and every where; and who can cast him for ever into the bottomless Pit of Hell for his sins: I cannot be persuaded, I say, that such a man will sin willingly and wittingly, against a God so great, and so puissant, without horror and resistance.  
For if the presence of a King, a Lord, or a Judge, will keep back the most wicked from Committing their Villainies; much more, if one were persuaded there is a God Almighty, King of Kings, Lord of Lords, and Judge of all the Earth; his presence would keep Man back from Committing Adulterses, Robberies, Murders, Buggeries, and all other abominable Crimes, which are so frequent in the World.  
Therefore let the Devout and Religious Persons, who think well of all Men, never find fault with me; if my zeal to the glory of God hath caused me to present the World with the Arguments here contained against this profane and ungodly Brood the Atheists. And I hearty wish that all young People may so Arm and Fortify themselves with these my Reasons, that they may keep themselves from being seduced by such Devils.   

A TABLE of the Principal Matters contained in this BOOK.  

CHAP. I. 1. THat the World not being from all Eternity, one must necessarily conclude there is a God that Created it. 2. That the Sun hath not been from all Eternity. 3. That the Earth hath not been from all Eternity. 4. That the Day hath not been from all Eternity. 5. That neither Day nor Night have been from all Eternity. 6. That the Moon hath not been from all Eternity. 7. That the Sea hath not been from all Eternity. 8. That Men have not been from all Eternity. 9 The First Confirmation. 10. The Second Confirmation. 11. The Third Confirmation. 12. That Alteration, Generation, and Corruption, are not from all Eternity. 13. That neither Movable Things, nor Time, have been from all Eternity. 14. A General Proof that the Bodies have nor been from all Eternity, nor (consequently) the World.  
CHAP. II. 1 THE first Answer of Atheists, that Successive Things may have been from all Eternity, collectively & not distributively. 2. How many ways a Thing may be related to, or agree with, another Distributively, or Collectively. 3. That Successive Things cannot be from all Eternity Collectively. 4. That Old Men, Young Men, and Children, Collectively, or taken together, cannot have been from all Eternity. 5. That the Dead have not been from all Eternity. 6. That all men Collectively, having been begotten, cannot have been from all Eternity.  
That the right understanding and apprehension of the distinction of Atheists, is a sufficient refutation of the same.  
CHAP. III. 1. THE second Answer of Atheists, viz. That as in the After-Eternity, that is to say, in the Future, there will be no last or furthermost; so in the Fore-Eternity, that is is to say, in time past, there hath been no first or foremost. 2. That Atheists compare unlike things, and the disparity explained. 3. That reascending towards the time past, one may run through it; and so 'tis not Infinite. 4. That the Succession of things cannot be Eternal, and why.  
CHAP. IU. 1. THE third Answer of Atheists, concerning the Infinite Number. 2. Three Arguments of Atheists, whereby they strive and endeavour to prove that one Infinite is greater than another. 3. That those men which have been in time past, make up some number. 4. That in whatsoever number of Men, there is as much, or more, or less. 5. The Refutation of the Atheists Argument, That one Infinite, is greater than another, Materially, and not Formally. 6. That it is a Contradiction to grant or make one Infinite to be greater than the other. 7. That the Answer of Atheists doth not at at all hurt or touch our choice and indissoluble Reason, drawn from the distance of Men. 8. What the space is not, and what it is proved. 9 The Answer to the Atheists First Arguments, drawn from the infiniteness of the Oriental and Occidental space. 10. Another Answer to their Second Argument, drawn from the infiniteness of the thoughts both of Men and Angels. 11. Another to their third Argument, drawn from the pretended infiniteness of Men and Lions possible, that is to say, that God may produce and create.  
CHAP. V 1. THE Fourth Answer of Atheists, saying, That from all Eternity there was a Chaos. 2. That the Heavens and the Elements did not by degrees disentangle, and resolve themselves from all Eternity. 3. That they did not remain a finite time to resolve or clear themselves. 4. That they did not remain an infinite time to clear and resolve themselves. 5. A Digression, wherein the two first Verses of the first Chapter of Genesis are explained; and shown that there is no mention made of a Chaos, and that they do not contain a Proposition of all those things God Created in Six days; and that light was not the first Creature.  
CHAP. VI 1. THE Fifth Answer of Atheists, saying, That there hath been, from all Eternity, Matter without Form. 2. The Proof, That there hath not been from all Eternity a Matter without Form; and that the Matter could not produce the Forms. 3. That the Eternal Atoms, by a casual concourse, have not made and disposed the World. 4. That the Forms cannot have been produced, but by God.  
CHAP. VII. 1. THE Sixth Answer of Atheists, saying, That men have their Original and beginning from the Tritons and Sirens, commonly called Mairmaids. 2. The Refutation of this Answer.  
CAHP. VIII. 1. THE Seventh Answer of Atheists, saying That men have been produced by, or proceeded from, the Eternal Earth, or from all the Elements together. 2. Reasons alleged, or Evidence produced against the falsehood of this Answer. 3. That the Earth, nor the other Elements, cannot have been naturally disposed to produce Men. 4. Other Reasons, proving, That Men have not been produced by the Earth, nor the other Elements.  
CHAP. IX. Other Reasons proving that there is a God. 1. THE First Reason drawn from the Order of the Universe. 2. The Second from the General Consent of all People and Nations, whoever acknowledged a Godhead. 3. The Third from the fear of the Judgements of God, because of Sin. 4. The Fourth from the Existency of Devils. 5. The Fifth is drawn from the First Mover and the First Cause. 6. The Sixth from the Novelty of Histories. 7. And the Seventh from the Consideration that the Sea hath not submerged the Earth.    

CHAP. I. 1. That the World not being from all Eternity, one must necessarily conclude there is a God that Created it. 2. That the Sun hath not been from all Eternity. 3. That the Earth hath not been from all Eternity. 4. That the day hath not been from all Eternity. 5. That neither Day nor Night have been from all Eternity. 6. That the Moon hath not been from all Eternity. 7. That the Sea hath not been from all Eternity. 8. That Men have not been from all Eternity. 9 The first Confirmation. 10. The second Confirmation. 11. The third Confirmation. 12. That Alteration, Generation, and Corruption, are not from all Eternity. 13. That neither movable Things, nor Time, have been from all Eternity. 14. A general proof that the Bodies have not been from all Eternity, nor (consequently) the World.  
THe Knowledge of Causes by their Effects, is the best and most certain part of Philosophy. Fire is known by Burning, Water by its Moistening and Cooling quality; Men are known by Reasoning and Discoursing, Lions by their Roaring; and all other Things by their Operations. Now if second Causes, which for the most part may be apprehended by humane sense, cannot be better known than by their Effects; much more the first Cause dwelling in an inaccessible Light, is to be known by his Works. The Holy Apostle of Christ, St. Paul, teaches this very clearly in his Epistle to the Roman, Chap. 1. v. 20. when he says, That the invisible Things of God, even his Eternal Power and Godhead, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. Showing thereby, that Naturally, by the Contemplation of the Creatures, a man may attain to the Knowledge of the Creator; and by the consideration of the glory of this beautiful Universe, may be led and induced to the admiration of its Creator. Following the steps of this Holy Doctor, I will demonstrate by the Creation of the World the Existence of the Godhead, against those whom Debauchery, ill Company, and want of Learning, hath so horribly corrupted, that they dare publicly deny him, in whom even they move and live, and have their being. I reason thus:  
1. If the World hath not been from all Eternity, it follows it hath had a beginning; and having not had that beginning of itself, seeing nothing can produce itself, it must needs be granted necessarily that another hath given it that beginning, and consequently hath created it. But the Creator of the Universe and God, are one and the same thing. That the World hath not been from all Eternity, will appear, in running through the chiefest parts of the same. I will begin with the Sun, the most glorious of all Soul-less Creatures, and which Astronomers hold to be one hundred and sixty times bigger than the whole Earth.  
2. The Sun was never without Lighting the Earth, as the Atheists themselves grant, who say that the World hath been from all Eternity in the same being and case it is now; but the Sun hath not Lightened the Earth from all Eternity; therefore the Sun hath not been from all Eternity. The Assumption or second Proposition is demonstrated thus: If the Sun hath Enlightened the Earth from all Eternity, either it hath Enlightened from all Eternity our Hemisphere only; or that of our Antipodes only, or both, Now the Sun hath not Enlightened from all Eternity our Hemisphere only, nor that of our Antipodes only, nor both, which is proved thus: If the Sun from all Eternity hath Lightened our Hemisphere only, it follows that the Hemisphere of our Antipodes hath not been Lightened by the Sun from all Eternity, though there have been wanting but very few hours; seeing the Sun having Lightened our Hemisphere, goes and Enlightens that of our Antipodes some few hours after: just so, If the Sun hath Enlightened from all Eternity the Hemisphere of our Antipodes only, it follows that our Hemisphere hath not been Lightened by the Sun from all Eternity, though notwithstanding there have been wanting but a very few hours; seeing the Sun having Lightened the Hemisphere of our Antipodes, comes and Enlightens ours some few hours after.  
Now was there ever a man so void of reason and understanding, to believe, that betwixt that which is from all Eternity, and that which is not from all Eternity, the difference is only of few hours; and that there is but half a days distance betwixt that which is finite, and that which is infinite, Time and Eternity? Finally, If both the Hemispheres have been Enlightened by the Sun from all Eternity, either it was all at once, or one after another; not all at once, else it would have been Day every where at once, and the Sun would have been in two places at the same time, which is impossible: nor one after another, because that which hath been Lightened from all Eternity, cannot have been Lightened after another, nothing having been before that which is from all Eternity. But Atheists do hold that our Hemisphere hath been Enlightened from all Eternity; then our Hemisphere hath not been Lightened after another: and so consequently not after that of our Antipodes. They hold also that the Hemisphere of our Antipodes hath been Lightened from all Eternity, than it hath not been Enlightened after another, and consequently not after our Hemisphere; from whence one may infallibly conclude that both the Hemispheres have not been Lightened from all Eternity one after another. Finally, Two Eternal Things cannot be but together, and consequently one cannot be after another; there being nothing before that which is Eternal. Therefore if the two Illuminations, to wit, that of ours and that of our Antipodes Hemisphere, have been Eternal, they necessarily must have been together, and not one after another; which is impossible, as above I have proved I conclude then that the Sun, not having Enlightened our Hemisphere from all Eternity only, nor that of our Antipodes only, nor both, either at once, or one after another; that the Sun (I say) hath by no means Enlightened the Earth from all Eternity; And seeing that the Sun (as Atheists themselves say) never was without Lightning the Earth, it follows that Illumination not being from all Eternity, the Sun also is not from all Eternity, but hath had a beginning; and having not that beginning of itself, seeing nothing is the cause of itself, it follows, that another hath given it a beginning, and consequently hath created it: Now the Creator of the Sun, and God are the same. As to that as is objected by Atheists, concerning the Eternal Collection of all Illuminations, or their Eternal Succession, shall be fully confuted hereafter in our Replies to their Answers.  
3. The same reason that proves that the Sun hath not been from all Eternity, proves also that the Earth hath not been from all Eternity, thus: The Earth (as Atheists say) never was without being Enlightened by the Sun; now I have showed already that the Earth hath not been Enlightened by the Sun from all Eternity, therefore it hath not been from all Eternity. If you observe the last Parenthesis, you will see that this Argument is form from the Atheists own Doctrine; for should I reason according to Holy Scripture, which is infallible, the very first verse of Genesis would prove to them that the Earth was Created before the Sun, and consequently was not always Enlightened by the Sun.  
4. The same reason may also be confirmed thus, Either there hath been some Day from all Eternity or not; if not, it follows that all Days have had a beginning, and therefore that the Day hath not been from all Eternity. If the Day hath not been from all Eternity, neither the Sun hath been from all Eternity, seeing the Sun never was without Light and Day. If there hath been some Day from all Eternity, either there hath been one only or many; if one only, it will follow that all other Days have had a beginning, and that there wants but one Day to the Eternity of the second Day, which is most absurd: Seeing betwixt that which is finite and that which is infinite; betwixt Time and Eternity; betwixt that which hath had a Beginning, and that which never had a Beginning, there is more than a Days distance. If there have been many Days from all Eternity, either it were all at once, which is repugnant to the common sense; seeing Days succeed one the other, or one after another, which is repugnant to Eternity; for that which is from all Eternity and without Beginning, is not after another; as I have proved already.  
5. This Reason may be confirmed again, thus: When two Men have been at some place, suppose a Town or City, they must needs have been there, either at the same time, or one after another; so, seeing that Day and Night have been in our Hemisphere, they must needs have been in it, either at the same time, and at once, or one after another, not at the same time and at once; else it would have been Day and Night in the same place at once, which is impossible; not also one after another, for it would have been the Day after the Night, or the Night after the Day: If the Day hath been after the Night, it follows that it hath not been from all Eternity, seeing that which is Eternal is not after another; and moreover, there will have been very little wanting to the Eternity of the Day; seeing the Day is few hours after Night, which is said to be Eternal by Atheists: If the Night hath been after the Day, it follows that it hath not been from all Eternity (that is in our Hemisphere) seeing that which is Eternal, is not after another; and moreover there will have been very little wanting to the Eternity of the Night, seeing the Night is few hours after the Day, which is said to be Eternal by Atheists: Therefore I conclude that the Day hath not been from all Eternity, nor consequently the Sun, which never was without the Day. Finally, Two Eternal Things cannot be but together, and consequently one cannot be after another; there being nothing before that which is Eternal: But the Day and the Night cannot be together, therefore the Day and the Night are not Eternal Things.  
6. By the like reason one may prove that the Moon hath not been from all Eternity, thus: If the Moon hath been from all Eternity, either it hath been from all Eternity, only Full, or only New, or both. If it hath been from all Eternity only Full, it follows it hath not been New from all Eternity, though notwithstanding there have been but few days wanting; seeing the New Moon is few days after the Full Moon. And so if the Moon hath been from all Eternity only New, it follows it hath not been Full from all Eternity, though notwithstanding there have been but few days wanting; seeing that the Full Moon is few days after the New Moon. And if it hath been both New and Full from all Eternity, it were either at once, which is repugnant to common sense and experience, or one after another, which is opposite to Eternity; for that which is Eternal, cannot be after another; as above I said: Therefore the Moon having never been without being either Full or New, or wanting but very little, and having been neither Full nor New from all Eternity, it is evident it hath not been from all Eternity; for two Eternal Things cannot be but together, as above I have proved. Now the Full Moon and the New Moon cannot be together; therefore the Full Moon nor the New Moon can be Eternal.  
7. The same way of arguing may be used against the Eternity of the Sea, If the Sea hath been from all Eternity, either it hath been from all Eternity with the Flowing only, or with the Ebbing only, or with both: If it hath been from all Eternity with the Flowing only, it follows that it hath not been from all Eternity with the Ebbing, though there have been but very few hours wanting; seeing the Ebbing of the Sea is six hours or well near, after it hath begun Flowing: So if it hath been from all Eternity with the Ebbing only, it follows it hath not been from all Eternity with the Flowing, though there have been but very few hours wanting; seeing the Sea hath its Flowing six hours or thereabouts, after the beginning of its Ebbing. And if it hath been from all Eternity with its Flowing and Ebbing, it must be all at once, which is impossible; seeing it cannot go backwards and forwards, Flow and Ebb at the same time, or one after another, which is opposite to Eternity: for as I have said above, two things Eternal cannot be but together, and consequently cannot be one after another; there being nothing before that which is Eternal. But the Flowing and Ebbing cannot be together, therefore not Eternal. And so seeing the Sea never was without Flowing or Ebbing, and that neither the Flowing nor Ebbing have been from all Eternity, it is evident that the Sea is not from all Eternity. As for the Eternal Collection of all Flow and Ebb, or the Eternal Succession of the same, it will be confuted hereafter.  
8. Now let us come to the Consideration of other Creatures, and let us show that Men have not been from all Eternity, and that they never succeeded one another by an Eternal Generation; my reason is this: If Men had been from all Eternity, and had been one after another by an Eternal Succession of Generations, it would follow that the number of those Men which have been in time past till now, should be infinite; for it is evident that if the number of them were finite and determined in itself, there would have have been some first and some second, etc. and at this day some last; and where some may be said to be first, there is a beginning, and consequently no Eternity; but the number of Men which have been in time past till now, is not infinite; therefore Men have not been from all Eternity. The second Proposition is proved thus, An infinite number admits no greater number, but a greater number than that of Men which have been in times past till now can be given; seeing there have been more Hands, more Fingers, more Hairs, and more Beasts than Men; therefore the number of Men which have been in times past till now, is not infinite. The first Proposition of this last Syllogism, to wit, that an infinite number admits no greater number, is made good thus: If the infinite number could admit a greater number, or a greater number than the infinite could be given, it would follow that an infinite number should be exceeded by a greater number; seeing that of two numbers the greater exceeds the other: But the infinite number cannot be exceeded, seeing that which is exceeded is finite or termined, where it is exceeded; and the infinite cannot be finite; therefore the infinite number cannot admit a greater number.  
9 Moreover, Either there hath been some Man from all Eternity or not; if not, it is evident that Men have not been from all Eternity; if any was from all Eternity, it follows that he shall not have been made or begotten by another; seeing that which is made or begotten of another, is after another: But that which is Eternal is not after another, there being nothing before that which is Eternal.  
10. Again, Men which are said (falsely) to have Lived from all Eternity, did not yet Live an Eternity, else they had Lived longer than a thousand times one hundred millions of thousands of years, which is against the common sense; and therefore they have Lived but a finite time, that is on hundred or a thousand years only; from whence I reason thus: Betwixt that which is from all Eternity, and that which is not from all Eternity, there is a greater distance than of some few years; but betwixt the Life of Men, which are falsely said to have Lived from all Eternity, and their Death, which is not from all Eternity, there is but a few years' distance; therefore their Death, not being from all Eternity, it is impossible their Life should have been from all Eternity.  
11. Besides, The Men which have Lived in time past till now, are distant one from another, with an infinite distance of time only, or with a finite distance only; or some are distant with a finite distance, and others with an infinite distance: If they are all distant with an infinite distance of time, it will follow, that betwixt Jesus Christ as Man, and we that Live at present, there will be an infinite distance, and consequently an infinite space of time, which is false; seeing there is but one thousand six hundred seventy seven years, according to the common supputation: It will follow also, that betwixt K. Charles the First and K. Charles the Second, there will be an infinite distance of time; which is absurd. If they are all distant with a finite distance of time only, it follows that their duration contains a finite time only, and consequently are not Eternal, which is most true: If some are distant with a finite distance, and others with an infinite distance; and that of all them which are only distant, with a finite distance, one takes the two remotest: For example, Peter who Liveth at this day, and then remounts towards them, that have preceded Peter, and from whom he is descended; if one takes (I say) him who in a finite distance is the farthest, tow it, John; I say that if one remounts a little higher, that is unto William the Father of John, it will follow that Peter and William, will be distant one from another, with an infinite distance of time; seeing they are more distant and farther removed in a finite distance: so that it will follow, that betwixt the finite distance, which is between Peter and John, and the infinite distance between Peter and William, there will be but very few years' difference, that is so many years (and no more) as are betwixt William the Father and John his Son; which is altogether absurd.  
12. Add hereto, That every Generation presupposeth some Alteration, that is some convenient Disposition of the Matter, for the introduction of the Form, and Generation of the Composed: From whence I dispute thus, That which is Eternal is not preceded, but Generation is preceded by Alteration, since it presupposes it necessarily: therefore Generation is not Eternal; and consequently Men have not succeeded one another by an Eternal Generation.  
By the same reason one proves that Corruption is not Eternal, thus: That which is Eternal is not after another, seeing nothing is before, or precedes that which is Eternal; but Corruption is after Generation: Seeing one and the same thing cannot be at the same time begotten and corrupted, produced and destroyed; therefore Corruption is not Eternal. In one word, Eternal Things cannot be but together, and cannot be one after another; seeing nothing precedes, or is before that which is Eternal: But Alteration, Generation, and Corruption, cannot be together, but are necessarily one after another; that is, Corruption after Generation, and Generation after Alteration: Therefore Alteration, Generation and Corruption are not Eternal; and consequently Men have not been begotten from all Eternity, nor have succeeded the one the others, by an Eternal Generation. Moreover, The Generation of the Thing, and the Thing begotten, cannot be but together: But the Thing begotten is not Eternal, seeing it is after another; to wit, the begetting, at least in the Generations of Men, of whom we speak: Therefore Generation is not Eternal.  
13. Another general reason may be added to what hath been said hitherto, proving that all Movable Things have had a Beginning, and that there is none which may have been from all Eternity: Thus, If Time is not Eternal, it follows that Motion is not Eternal, seeing that Time is nothing else but the duration of Motion; but Time is not Eternal, therefore Motion is not Eternal; nor consequently the Sun, Moon, and Stars, which never were without Motion, that is without moving from East to West; nor the Sea, which never was without Motion, that is, without Flowing or Ebbing; nor Men which never were without motion, that is without pulse or respiration, nor without some Motion of the Vital or Animal Spirits. That Time hath not been Eternal, appears, because Time Eternal is a Time infinite; Seeing the Time finite hath a beginning and an end, and the Eternal hath neither beginning nor end. Now Time hath not been infinite; Therefore it hath not been Eternal. That Time hath not been infinite, is clear, because time infinite comprises a number infinite of years; Seeing a finite number of years, cannot make an infinite time: but there is not an infinite number of years, therefore Time hath not been infinite. That there have not been an infinite number of years, is clear also; because there cannot be a greater number, than an infinite number: else the infinite number should be exceeded by this greater number: Seeing that of two numbers, the greatest exceeds the other. And if an infinite number were exceeded, it would be finite and terminate, where it is exceeded, which is impossible; Seeing that to be infinite and finite are contradictories: But a greater number may be given than that of the Years which have been, seeing there have been more Months and Days than Years. Moreover the Year is always after the Month, the Month after the Day, the Day after the Hour, and the Hour after the Minute, and consequently the Year, the Month, the Day, the Hour, in the whole, are not from all Eternity; seeing that which is Eternal is not after another. Moreover, We may say of Years, what we have said of Men; viz. That the Years that have been in time past, either are all distant, with an infinite distance of time, or are all distant with a finite distance: If they are all distant with an infinite distance, it will follow that betwixt the Year One thousand six hundred and seventy, and the Year One thousand six hundred seventy seven, there is an infinite distance, and consequently an infinite time, which is absurd: If they are distant with a finite distance, it follows that they comprise but a finite time, and consequently are not Eternal. Again, If some Years be distant with a finite distance, and others with an infinite distance, and that of all the Years which are only distant with a finite distance, one takes the two remotest: for example, This Year One thousand six hundred seventy seven, marked A, and reascending with a finite distance to the remotest Year from the same, and that Year be marked B; I say that if one remounts a Year higher marked C; it will follow that the Years C and A, will be distant with an infinite distance, seeing they are more distant and remote than B and A; which are the remotest in a finite distance: so that it will follow that betwixt the finite distance B and A, and the infinite distance C and A, there will be but a years difference; and that the year C which is a finite time, added to the distance of B and A, which is also a finite time, will be an infinite time; such as is the distance of C and A, and that the time infinite, viz. the distance of C and A, by the detraction of a finite time, viz. the year C, will become finite; which is absurd and contradictory.  
Lastly, All things pretended to be Eternal, as well permanent as successive, either have been from all Eternity without action, or with action: If they have been from all Eternity without action, it will follow that the Sun hath been from all Eternity, without lighting, the Fire without burning, and Men without breathing, etc. which most part of Atheists themselves deny, seeing they say, that the World hath been from all Eternity in the same case it is now. Besides, all things pretended to be Eternal, either have been from all Eternity without action, during a finite time or during an infinite time. If they have been without action during a finite time only, it will follow that betwixt that thing which hath been from all Eternity, without action, and its action which is not from all Eternity; the difference will be only of a time limited and finite; and consequently that betwixt that which is Eternal, viz. the thing without action, and that which is not Eternal, to wit, its action, there will be but a finite time: and that to make its action Eternal, which is not Eternal, there will be wanting but a finite and determined time; and also that there will be but very little lacking, lest that which is finite, viz. the time since the action of the thing, added to the finite, viz. the time the thing hath been without action, will make up an infinite time, such as is the Eternity of a thing; which is absurd and contradictory. If all things have remained without action during an infinite time, it will follow that the Sun, the Moon, and other Stars, have been longer than a hundred thousand millions of thousands of years, without moving and giving any light; Men and Beasts have lived longer than a hundred thousand millions of thousands of years, without seeing, breathing, etc. which Atheists themselves deny, when they affirm that the World hath been from all Eternity in the same case it is at present. Moroever, it is a Maxim received of all men, That Idem quâ Idem, semper facit Idem. For example, Fire that burns wood, coals, straw, etc. will always burn, if it be constantly supplied with fuel. Therefore if the Heavens, the Stars, and the Elements, have been without action during an infinite time, from whence did it come to pass, that they have acted afterwards? Certainly it cannot be of themselves, no new thing being come to pass, and having always remained in the same state: and if it be of some other, it cannot be but of God If all things have been from all Eternity with action; for example, the Sun with motion and illumination, Men with ratiocination, Oxen with bellowing, Lions with roaring, etc. they must needs necessarily have acted without ceasing, during a finite, or an infinite time: If they have acted during a finite time only, it will follow that betwixt their action which is from all Eternity, and the cessation of their action, which is not from all Eternity, the difference will be of a finite and limited time only. And consequently that betwixt that which is Eternal, and that which is not Eternal, betwixt that which is infinite, and that which is finite, the difference or distance will be of a finite and limited time, only; and that there will be wanting, but a certain finite time, lest the cessation of their action, which is not Eternal, be Eternal; and that the finite time, to wit, the time since the cessation of their action, added to the finite time of the duration of the action, will make up an infinite time, such as is the Eternity of a thing; which is absurd and contradictory. If they have acted without ceasing during an infinite time, it will follow that a man hath spoken, an Ox bellowed, a Lion roared, longer than a hundred thousand millions of thousands of years, which is ridiculous, and Atheists themselves deny, when they affirm that the world hath been from all Eternity in the same case it is now. Besides all this, The motion of the Sun, the word of Man, the roaring of a Lion, etc. have certain parts which cannot be Eternal; because those things that are Eternal cannot be but together, as hath been proved already: But the parts of the motion of the Sun cannot be together, because they succeed one another; therefore they cannot be Eternal. Neither can the parts of the speech of a Man be together; for when he pronounces one word, he doth not pronounce another; and when he utters a Syllable, he doth not utter another. For Example, If one supposes that a man from all Eternity hath pronounced this word (glory) it is evident that the Syllable (ry) was uttered after the Syllable (glow) and consequently that the prolation of the Syllable (ry) is not Eternal, seeing that which is Eternal is not after another, though there have been wanting but very little, to wit, as much time only, as one needs to utter the Syllable (glow) which is absurd and contradictory.   

CHAP. II. 1. Wherein one may see the first Answer of Atheists, saying, That Successive things may have been from all Eternity collectively, and not distributively. 2. How many ways one thing may be related to, or agree with another, distributively or collectively. 3. That Successive things cannot be from all Eternity collectively. 4. That old men, young men, and children collectively or taken together, cannot have been from all Eternity. 5. That the dead have not been from all Eternity. 6. That all men collectively having been begotten, cannot have been from all Eternity. 7. That the right ●●derstanding and apprehension of the distinction of Atheists, is a sufficient refutation of the same.  
1. THe first Answer of Atheists to all our former Arguments, is to be seen in Oviedo his Natural Philosophy, in the Nineteenth Controversy, in the second and third Propositions; where having said, That Time, Motion, and all Successive Things may have been from all Eternity; and having cited for his warranters, Thomas Vasquez, and Pererius, and several others, at last he Answers our Arguments and Reasons thus: All Generations and Corruptions (saith he) all Days and all Nights, all the Flow and Ebb of the Sea, all the Full Moons and the New Moons, all Men and all Beasts, etc. if they be taken and considered particularly, have had a beginning, and none of these things in particular is from all Eternity.  
But all Generations taken together, or the Collection of all the Generations that have been in time past, all Days taken together, or the Collection of all the Days that have been in time past, all Men taken together, or the Collection of all the Men that have been in time past, etc. all these Collections (saith he) may have been from all Eternity.  

The Reply.  
2. Against this Answer, I say, That one thing may be related to, and affirmed of another, four ways chief: First, When it agrees with, or belongs to all together, and to every one in particular: in this manner one may say that all men are rational; because all Men taken together are so, and every man taken in particular is rational. Secondly, One thing may be related to and affirmed of another, when it agrees with, or belongs to every one in particular; and not to all together: and in this manner one may say that all men do occupy a certain place, and are not in several places at once, because every man in particular is in a certain determined place, and cannot be in divers places at once; but all men taken together are in divers places at once, viz. In England, France, Spain, Italy, etc. Thirdly, One thing is related to, or affirmed of another, when it agrees with it because of some one, but yet not with every one in particular. In this manner one may say that the Kings of France are from the year Four hundred and twenty, or thereabouts; because Pharamont, who is thought to have been the first King of France, began to reign about that time; but every King of France is not from the year Four hundred and twenty: Likewise, One may say that the Romans did sometime Conquer the Gauls, because Julius Caesar a Roman, with the help of some Roman Legions did subdue the same; but every Roman Soldier did not do that Exploit or Achievement. Fourthly, One thing agrees with, or is related to another, when it belongs to all taken together; but neither to some one, nor to every one in particular. Thus one may say that the Kings of France have reigned above Twelve hundred years; which is only to be affirmed of all the Kings of France taken together in their succession, but not of some one King, nor of every King of France in particular. So it may be said that the Apostles have preached the Gospel throughout the whole World, which must be said of all the Apostles taken together, yet dispersed, seeing every Apostle did not Preach the Gospel in every part of the World.  
3. This being granted (as it must needs be) let us see which of these four ways, Atheists may understand the Proposition in question, viz. That Generations and Corruptions, Days and Nights, Men and Beasts have been from all Eternity. And first, I say, that it cannot be understood, according to the two first ways, which require that one thing be related to, and agree with another in respect to every one in particular, as hath been said: for every Generation, every Day, every Man in particular, hath not been from all Eternity; else we that live at this Day should have been from all Eternity; which is absurd. Secondly, I say, It cannot be understood in the fourth manner; for when one thing is related to, or agrees with all taken together, only, and not with every one in particular, nor because of some one; then all are so necessary to establish the truth of the Proposition, that if you except or take one away, the Proposition will be false: For Example in this Proposition, The Kings of France have reigned twelve hundred fifty six years; the Reign of twelve hundred fifty six years are so to be applied to, and affirmed of all the Kings of France taken together, that if one or two were not numbered with the rest, they would not have reigned so long, and consequently the Proposition should be false. Thus in this Proposition, The Apostles are in number twelve, the number twelve belongs to all the Apostles taken together so necessarily, that if one should be taken away, or deducted out of that number, the Apostles should not be in number twelve, and consequently the Proposition should be false. Therefore in this Proposition, Men have been from all Eternity; If to have been from all Eternity, is proper to, and to be affirmed of all men taken together, only, and not of every man in particular, nor because of some one that hath been from all Eternity; it follows that all men are so necessary to establish the truth of the said Proposition, that if one or two are taken away, men shall not have been from all Eternity, and consequently the Proposition will be false: but according to the confession of Atheists, Though one should take away all the men that have been four thousand years since, yet nevertheless they might have been from all Eternity and without beginning. Therefore in this Proposition, Men have been from all Eternity; to have been from all Eternity, doth not belong to, nor is to be affirmed of all men taken together, only. Finally, since all men taken together, or the collection of all men, is not only two days since, much less from all Enity and without beginning: It must then be concluded, that the Proposition in hand, viz. That Generations and Corruptions, Days and Nights, Men and Beasts have been from all Eternity; must be understood by Atheists, in the third way or manner; that is to say, because of some Generation, some Day, some Man, etc. that may have been from all Eternity: But I have proved already, that there hath been no Generation, no Day, no Man, etc. from all Eternity; and Atheists themselves confess it in their first Answer Therefore it must be concluded, that Generations and Corruptions, Days and Nights, Men and Beasts, etc. have by no means been from all Eternity.  
4. Moreover, All the Old men which have been in time past, taken together, either have been from all Eternity, or not: if they have been from all Eternity, it follows that their Old age is Eternal, which is impossible: Seeing that which is Eternal, is not after another, there being nothing before that which is Eternal: But their Old age is after another; to wit, after their Youth: Therefore their Old age is not Eternal. A man's Young age may well be with the Young age, or after the Old age of another man; but the Youth of a Man, cannot be with, or after the Old age of the same Man, and Old age must necessarily be after: Now we speak here of the same Men, that is, the same Old men; and consequently the Old age of all Old men, ought necessarily to be after the Young age of the selfsame Old men that have been Young: If they have not been from all Eternity, it will follow that men will have been from all Eternity without Old age, or Old men; which is denied by Atheists themselves, who affirm the World to have been from all Eternity in the same state it is now, and consequently with Old men. And moreover, Either men have been from all Eternity without Old men, during a finite time, or during an infinite time: If during a finite time, it will follow that betwixt that which is not from all Eternity, viz. Old men, and that which is not from all Eternity, viz. other men taken together, there is but a finite and limited time; and that the finite time, such as is the time, since the which there are Old men, added to the finite time, such as is the duration of Men, without Old men, will make up an infinite time, such as is the pretended Eternity of Men; which is absurd: If they have been from all Eternity without Old men, during an infinite time, it will follow, that Men will have been without Old men above a thousand thousands millions of thousands of years; which is ridiculous, and denied by these profane Atheists themselves.  
By the same Reason one may prove, that all young men taken together, which have been in time past, have not been from all Eternity; seeing their Young age is after their Infancy: and one may prove also that all Children taken together, which have been in time past, have not been from all Eternity: Seeing their Infancy, is after their Birth and Conception. But if the Collection of all Children that have been, the Collection of all Young men that have been, and the Collection of all Old men that have been; If (I say) all these Collections have not been from all Eternity, it is evident that the Collection of all men which have been in time past, is not from all Eternity; since it comprises only the Collection of Children, of Young and Old Men that have been.  
5. Again, either all men which have been dead in time past, being taken together, have been dead from all Eternity, or not: If they have been dead from all Eternity, it follows that their death is Eternal, which is impossible; seeing that which is Eternal is not after another, there being nothing before that which is Eternal, and without beginning: but their death is after another, viz. their life; seeing the death and life of the same men cannot be together; but their death ought to be necessarily after their life; therefore their death is not Eternal: If all men which have been dead taken together, have not been dead from all Eternity, it will follow, that men have been from all Eternity, without having any dead men; which is denied by Atheists, who affirm, That the World hath been from all Eternity, in the same state it is now; and consequently with dead men. And moreover, either men have been from all Eternity, without dead men, during a finite time, or during an infinite time: If during a finite time, it will follow that betwixt that which is not from all Eternity, to wit, dead men, and that which is from all Eternity, viz. the living Men taken together, there is but a finite and limited time; and that the finite time, that is to say, the time since the which there have been dead men, added to the finite time, such as is the duration of living men only, will make up an infinite time, such as is the pretended Eternity of men; which is contradictory. If during an infinite time, it will follow, that men will have been above an hundred thousand millions of thousands of years without dying, which is ridiculous, and denied by Atheists themselves.  
6. To this may be added this Argument, That which is begotten, is begotten of another, seeing nothing begets or produces itself: But all men which have been in time passed taken together, have been begotten; seeing that according to the opinion of Atheists, in the Collection of all men which have been in time past, there is never a man not begotten: Therefore all men which have been in time passed taken together, have been begotten of another. From this Argument I form another, thus, Whatsoever is begotten of another, is after that other; seeing that a man who begets another man, did exist before he begat him: But all men taken together have been begotten of another, as I have proved: Therefore all men taken together have been after another. From this last Syllogism, I will also form this, That which hath been from all Eternity, hath not been after another, seeing there is nothing before that which is Eternal: But all men taken together have been after another, as I have proved; Therefore all men taken together have not been from all Eternity.  
7. Lastly, The serious consideration of the very terms of this distinction of Oviedo, will cause any rational men to reject it as ridiculous: Men (saith he) have been from all Eternity; but no man hath been from all Eternity; the collection of men which have been in time past, is from all Eternity; but there is never a a man in all this Collection, from all Eternity: The Collection of Days is without beginning; but there is never a Day in all this Collection without beginning: as if one should say the King's Successors of William the Conqueror have been ever since the year One thousand fourscore and seven, but there was never a King in that year.    

CHAP. III. 1. The second Answer of Atheists, viz. that as in the After-Eternity, that is to say, in the future, there will be no last or farthermost; so in the Fore-Eternity, that is to say, in time past, there hath been no first or foremost. 2. That Atheists compare unlike things, and the disparity explained. 3. That reascending towards the time past, one may run through it, and so 'tis not infinite. 4. That the Succession of Things cannot be Eternal; and why?  
1. BEfore I proceed any farther, one must take notice, that for the right understanding of these unusual words, the Fore-Eternity and the After-Eternity; one must conceive that this day is the tie that knits and joins them both together; so that the Fore-Eternity is a duration, from this day reascending upwards or through the time past, even to the infinite; and the After-Eternity is a duration from this day toward the future, even to the infinite.  
This kind of Riddle being now clear, let us come to their Answer. As in the After-Eternity (say they) the Day shall Eternally be after the Night, and the Night after the Day, so that there shall never be a later Day, nor a later Night; our Hemisphere will be Eternally lightened, after that of our Antipodes, and the Hemisphere of our Antipodes after ours; so that there shall never be a later illumination: The Flowing of t●● Sea will be Eternally after the Ebbing; and the Ebbing after the Flowing; so that there will never be a later Flowing or Ebbing: The New Moon will be Eternally after the Full Moon, and the Full Moon after the New Moon, without ever being a later New Moon, or a later Full Moon; one part of Time or Motion will be Eternally after the other, without ever being a later part of Time and Motion, etc. So in the Fore-Eternity, the Day hath been Eternally before the Night, and the Night before the Day; so that there was never a first Day or a first Night: and consequently the Day and the Night have been from all Eternity, one before another, as they will be Eternally one after another: Likewise our Hemisphere hath been Enlightened Eternally before the Hemisphere of our Antipodes, and that of our Antipodes before ours, without ever having been a first illumination; and consequently illumination is Eternal successively, and the two Hemispheres have been Enlightened from all Eternity, one before the other, as they shall be Enlightened Eternally one after another: So the New Moon hath been Eternally before the Full Moon, and the Full Moon be●●re the New Moon, without ever having been a first New, or Full Moon; and consequently the Full and the New Moon have been from all Eternity, one before the other, as they shall be Eternally one after another. Item, The Flowing of the Sea, hath been Eternally before the Ebbing, and the Ebbing before the Flowing, without ever having been a first Flowing or Ebbing; and consequently the Flowing and the Ebbing have been from all Eternity, one before the other, as they shall be Eternally one after after the other, Finally, Every Day, every Illumination, every Flowing, every Man, have indeed had a Beginning, so that there is none of these in particular, that ever hath been without Beginning, and from all Eternity: But the Succession of Days, Illuminations, Flow, and Men, etc. is without Beginning and from all Eternity.  

The Reply.  
2. Against this Answer I say, That the comparison is to no purpose, because things altogether unlike are compared in it, viz. that which hath been and that which never shall be totally; that which is totally passed, and that which never shall pass away: For the Full and the New Moon, the Day and the Night, the Flowing and Ebbing of the Sea, the Illumination of both Hemispheres, Men, and suchlike Successive things, that are pretended to have been from all Eternity, have been indeed, but are no more, and consequently are passed; and therefore the pretended Fore-Eternity, being of this nature, is certainly passed. To make then a true and even comparison of Equal things, one should suppose of the After-Eternity, that which is most certain of the Fore-Eternity, to wit, that it is altogether past. Now if the After-Eternity should come to pass away, and have an end, it would be finite, and consequently there would be a later Day, and a later Night, a later Flowing and Ebbing, etc. and which is more than that, the After-Eternity should be limited on every side, that is to say, by this Day, and by the later Day, because it should be passed as the Fore-Eternity: Sith then, that the pretended Fore-Eternity is past, it must be also finite, and consequently there hath been a first Day, a first Flowing, a First Man, etc. and which is more, it is limited on every side, to wit, by this Day, and by the first Day as well as the After-Eternity would be, if it were passed.  
3. From this Reply it is evident, That though one descending towards the future, might go or reach to the infinite; yet reascending towards that which is past, one could notreach to the infinite: because in every progression to the infinite, there is always something to be taken in, so that one cannot run through such an infinite: Now reascending from this Day to the time past, there is not always something to be taken in, but one must stop at a first thing, and so by ascending to the time past, all the time past must be taken in: Therefore in ascending to the time past, there is no infinite to be reached unto.  
That there is not always something to be taken in, in ascending to the time past; and that from this Day, ascending to the time past, all that time past may be taken in, it is evident; because to descend by the time passed to this Day, and ascend from this Day towards the time past, are one and the same thing, or at least are things alike; as the way from Thebes to Athens, and from Athens to Thebes, is one and the same way, and all the time past either in ascending, or descending, is always the same. Therefore since that descending by the time passed to this Day, all the time past is taken in; it is evident that ascending from this Day towards the time past, all the time past may be taken in, and consequently there is no progression to the infinite that way.  
4. Finally, One cannot conceive, that there was never a Man, a Day, a Flowing of the Sea, etc. from all Eternity, and that notwithstanding, the succession of Men, Days, and Flow, be from all Eternity, and without Beginning; for if there be no Men, no Days, from all Eternity and without Beginning, it is impossible the succession of the same should be from all Eternity, and without Beginning. Seeing the Succession of things cannot be without the things, whereof it is Succession: And moreover it is certain and undoubtable (and in this case is very considerable) that every Succession comprises Essentially many things, whereof one is after another; so that Succession, not only, cannot have a Being, but which is more cannot be conceived, without such things as are one after another: Now that which is after another cannot be Eternal: there being nothing before that which is Eternal, and without Beginning: Seeing then that Succession comprehends Essentially such a thing as is after another, it follows necessarily that Succession in itself cannot be Eternal; for if it be said to be Eternal, it must be in relation to some one thing which is not after another, but without Beginning and from all Eternity, which is denied by Atheists themselves; for they profess to believe, That there was never a Man, never a Day, etc. but they have been after another (and by consequence cannot have been without Beginning) lest they be forced to confess that there hath been a first Man, a first Day, a first Flowing, etc. and consequently a Beginning, and so no Eternity of Men, Days, and Flow, etc.    

CHAP. IU. 1. The third Answer of Atheists concerning the infinite number. 2. Three Arguments of Atheists, whereby they strive and endeavour to prove, that one infinite is greater than another. 3. That those Men which have been in time past, make up some number. 4. That in whatsoever number of Men, there is as much, or more, or less. 5. The refutation of the Atheists Argument, that one infinite is greater than another, materially, and not formally. 6. That it is a contradiction to grant, or make, one infinite to be greater than the other. 7. That the Answer of Atheists, doth not at all hit or touch our chief and indissoluble Reason, drawn from the distance of Men. 8. What the Space is not, and what it is proved. 9 The Answer to the Atheists first Argument, drawn from the infiniteness of the Oriental and Occidental Space. 10. Another Answer to their second Argument, drawn from the infiniteness of the Thoughts, both of Men and Angels. 11. Another to their third Argument, drawn from the pretended infiniteness of Men and Lions possible, that is to say, that God may produce and create.  
1. THe third Answer of Atheists is, that there having been in time past an infiniteness of Men, Days, and Generations, etc. one cannot say that there hath been a number of them, either finite or infinite, seeing every number is called number, because it may be numbered: Now the infiniteness of Men, Days, &c. cannot be numbered, and therefore these terms, number infinite, are contradictory; that is, one must confess, that Men, Days, etc. are in some number; they say that number is an infinite number; but that in the infinite number there is neither as much, nor more, nor less; seeing these particles, as much, more, and less. belong only, and are solely related to finite numbers. And that if they be compelled by force of Reason to acknowledge that these particles belong to all numbers, either finite or infinite: they Answer that in the infinite number of Men (for Example) that have been in time past, there have been so many Men as Hands and Fingers; and that all infinite Numbers are equal. And if they be forced to confess that one infinite number is greater than the other, they understand it materially, that is in reference to the parts of it, and not formally, that is to say, in reference to the infiniteness of the same. And finally, if they be constrained to grant, that one infinite is greater than the other, both materially and formally; they say there is no absurdity to grant one infinite to be greater than the other; and they endeavour to prove it by these three Reasons. The first is drawn from the infinitenss of the space in this manner: If from the City of London, drawing perpetually Eastward, or to the Orient, there is no end to be attained unto, and consequently the Oriental space is infinite, and so are the parts of the same in infinite number; for as to have an end and to be finite, is one and the same thing; so not to have an end and to be infinite is one and the same thing. Item from the City of London, drawing perpetually Westward, or to the Occident, there is no end, and consequently the Occidental space is infinite, and so are the parts of the same in infinite number, by the same reason: Now the Oriental and Occidental space together are greater than the Oriental space alone; seeing the Oriental and Occidental space together, is as an All, whereof the Oriental space is but one part, and totum est Majus sua parte. Therefore one infinite, such as is the Oriental and Occidental space together, is greater than another infinite, such as is the Oriental space alone; and an infinite number, such as is that of the parts of the Oriental and Occidental space together, is greater than another infinite, such as is that of the parts of the Occidental space alone.  
2. Their second Reason is drawn from the infiniteness of the Thoughts of Men and Angels, thus: The Thoughts Men shall have hereafter, in the after-Eternity, whether in Earth or in Heaven, are in number infinite; for if they were in number finite, it would follow that Men being come unto that finite and limited number of Thoughts, would think no more, and so would no more know God, nor any other Thing; seeing one cannot think on something without knowing the same in some manner: Item, The Thoughts Angels shall have hereafter in the After-Eternity, are in number infinite, else at least there would be a time wherein the Angels should think no more: Now the Thoughts of Men and Angels together are in greater number than the Thoughts of Men alone: Therefore a number infinite, such as is that of the Thoughts of Men and Angels together, in the After-Eternity, is greater than another infinite, such as is that of the Thoughts of Men alone, in the same Eternity.  
Their third reason is drawn from Men and Lions possible; and thus they argue. Men possible, that is to say, that God may produce, are in number infinite; for if they were in number finite, for Example, One hundred thousand millions, it would follow that God could not produce one more, seeing that one Man would be over and above all Men possible: Item Lions possible, or that God may produce and create, are in number infinite for the same reason: Now the number of Men and Lions possible is greater than the sole number of Men possible: Therefore a number infinite, such as is that of Men and Lions possible together, is greater than another infinite, such as is that of Men possible only.  

The Reply.  
3. Against this Answer, I say first, That all Men which have been in time past are many, that is to say, are more than one, and consequently make up a multitude, which in itself is either numerable and finite, or innumerable and infinite: If it be numerable and finite, it follows that there hath been a certain number finite and determined in itself; and so that there have been some first, some second, etc. And therefore that they have not been from all Eternity: If it be innumerable and infinite, my argument is entire and sirm: which is thus: One cannot give a greater multitude than an innumerable or infinite multitude, else it should be exceeded, by this greater multitude: Seeing that of two multitudes the greater exceeds the lesser, and consequently should be finite and limited; seeing that which is exceeded is finite and determined, where it is exceeded: But one can give a greater multitude than that of Men, which have been in time past; to wit, the multitude of Eyes, Fingers, Hairs, and Beasts: Therefore the multitude of Men, which have been in time past, is not infinite, but finite and termined, and consequently hath not been from all Eternity, And here observe that in this place I use the words of multitude and number for one and the same thing.  
4. Secondly, It is false, That in an infinite multitude, or an infinite number, there is neither as much, nor more, nor less; for in whatsoever multitude of Men, either finite or infinite, it is certain that there are as many Noses as Mouths, as many Hearts as Heads, as many Hands as Feet; and it is undoubtable that in the multitude of Men, which have been in time past, there have been more Hands and Fingers than Men; seeing there is no Man in the Collection of all Men, which have been in time past (Monsters excepted) but he hath had two Hands and ten Fingers; and no Man can deny that the Collection of all Animals which have been in time past, is greater than the sole Collection of all Men which have been in time past; seeing the Collections of all Animals contains the Collection of all Men, and of all Beasts. But the Collection of all Men and of all Beasts, is greater than the Collection of all Men only; else the whole, to wit, the Collection of all Men and of all Beasts, should not be greater than the Parts; to wit, the Collection of all Men only. By the same reason one may prove that the Collection of all Days, and of all Nights, is greater than the Collection of all Days only: and that the Collection of all Generations and Corruptions is greater than the Collection of all Generations only; and consequently, that the Collections of Days and Generations which have been in time past, are exceeded, and so finite and determined, where they are exceeded; and therefore are not from all Eternity, but have had a Beginning: Finally, In whatsoever greater multitude, or whatsoever great number, either finite or infinite, there are more binaries than quarternaries, seeing every quarternary contains two binaries.  
5. Thirdly, It is in vain to say that one infinite is not greater than another formally, that is to say, in respect to the infiniteness; but that it is so materially, that is to say, in respect to the Parts; because it is evident that the parts properly make the infinite; and therefore if one infinite hath more parts than another infinite, it will be greater than that, even as an infinite; and moreover, though one infinite should be greater than another materially, that is to say, in respect to the parts, it will follow that the lesser shall not be truly infinite; seeing it will finish and be determined, where the other will begin to exceed it.  
6. Fourthly, it is false, there is no absurdity of two infinites to make one greater than the other: for from thence will follow an apparent contradiction, to wit, that one and the same thing, will be finite and will not be finite; seeing the lesser infinite will be exceeded by the greater infinite, and consequently will be finite; seeing that which is exceeded, is finite and determined where it is exceeded: And it will not be finite, seeing it is supposed infinite, and that which is infinite is not finite: Therefore the same thing, to wit, the lesser infinite, will be finite and not finite, which things are contradictory.  
Fifthly, The Answer of Atheists doth not at all hit or touch our chief and indissoluble Reason, drawn from the distance of men, thus: The men which have lived in time past till now, are all distant one from another with an infinite distance of time only, or with a finite distance only; or some are distant with a finite distance, and others with an infinite distance; if they are all distant with an infinite distance of time, it will follow, that betwixt King Charles the First, and King Charles the Second, there will be an infinite distance of time; which is altogether absurd: if they are all distant with a finite distance of time only, it follows that their duration contains a finite time only, and consequently are not Eternal, which is most true: If some are distant with a finite distance, and others with an infinite distance, and that of all them which are only distant with a finite distance, one takes the two remotest; for Example, Peter who liveth at this day, and then remounts towards them that have preceded Peter, and from whom he is descended, if one takes him (I say) who in a finite distance is the remotest, to wit, John, I say, that if one remounts a little higher, that is to say, unto William, the father of John; it will follow that Peter and William will be distant one from another, with an infinite distance of time; seeing they are more distant and farther removed than Peter and John, which are the farther removed in a finite distance: So that it will follow, that betwixt the finite distance, which is between Peter and John, and the infinite distance which is between Peter and William, there will be but a very few years' difference, that is to say, so many years (and no more) as are between William the father, and John the son; which is altogether absurd.  
This Reason may be confirmed thus: Every multitude actually existing, or having actually existed, if it be actually finite, it may be told; seeing that which cannot be told is necessarily infinite: therefore if from this day, remounting towards the time past, one gins to tell those men which have been successively one before another; the whole finite multitude of those men, will at last be told and numbered; so that beyond that multitude there will remain never a man to be numbered, that may with the said multitude, make a finite number: Therefore if to the finite multitude of all men, which have been in time past, one adds only a man, the result of it will be an infinite multitude; seeing the precedent multitude, without that man added, was the greatest of all finite multitudes passed; nay, even the whole finite multitude of men which have been in time past; and so that man added to the whole finite multitude of those man, making the same greater, it must necessarily be infinite: Moreover, it cannot be infinite, seeing a finite thing, to wit, a man added to another finite thing, as the whole finite multitude of men, cannot make an infinite: and though never one man should be added to the said multitude, there would follow an evident contradiction; for there being as many more feet as men, it will follow that the feet will be finite, and not finite in number; they will be finite, because one finite, to wit, the whole finite multitude of men, and the double of this finite, to wit, the feet of these men, do not make one infinite; Also they will not be finite, because the number of feet is greater than the whole finite multitude of men, which is supposed to be the greatest number of all finite things.  
And it is no strong Argument, to say, as Oviedo in his Natural Philosophy, Controu. the 14th. Propos. 3. Paragraff 9th. There is never so great a finite number, but a greater may be always given, in infinitum; so that one cannot cannot properly say, the greater of finite numbers: for though it be true in things possible, that is to say, that God may produce and create, seeing God having created, for Example, a great number of men, may create and produce still a greater number, and always, a greater; but also always finite in infinitum; nevertheless in things actually existing, or having actually existed, as the Question is now, it is certain that there is a finite number, which is the greatest of all finite numbers; and it is false that in a multitude actually present or past, there is no number finite, but will always admit of a greater number, and always greater, in infinitum; seeing if there were always a greater, and always a greater finite number, it would follow that the actual finite number could never be told, and consequently should be infinite; for that which is finite only cannot be told.  
Further, All men which have been in time past are not distant one from another, with an infinite distance of time, else my Father and I should be infinitely distant one from another; therefore all men must be distant one from another, with a finite distance, and consequently must have lasted but a finite time, and must have made up but a finite multitude, or some must be distant with a finite distance, and others with an infinite distance; in which case those that are distant with a finite distance only, taken together, will have lasted but a finite time, and will make up but a finite multitude, and will make up the whole multitude finite, so that there will be no greater multitude, as I have showed already. And it signifies but little, to say with Oviedo in the  place, that all these things are true of a finite number, when it is determined and specified; as for Example, of the number of an hundred thousand, or an hundred thousand millions, or a thousand times an hundred thousand millions, etc. but are not true of a finite number uncertain, undetermined, and not specified; for in those things which actually exist, or have actually existed, as the Question is at present, the number is always certain and determined; and if it be uncertain and undetermined, it is not in itself, but in respect of ourselves who cannot determine it, because it is too great.  
To this you may add this consideration, That that which is Eternal and without Beginning, is not after another; there being nothing before that which is Eternal: Now the Sons have been after the Fathers, Death after Life, Old Age after Young Age, Young Age after Infancy, Infancy after Birth, and Birth after Conception: Therefore Sons, Dead Men, Old Men, Young Men, Children; all Men Born are not from all Eternity and without Beginning.  
8. Now I must answer at large the three Objection; mentioned in the third Answer of Atheists, by which they pretend to prove, not only that there is an infinite, but that an infinite is greater than another; for at first sight they appear so strong, that they must needs be examined narrowly, to take away the offence they might otherwise give to the weak.  
The first Objection drawn from the infiniteness of the Oriental and Occidental space cannot be well resolved, until we have first taken a view, and attained to some knowledge of the essence of place or space: Therefore I shall show first of all, what the space is not, and what it is, than I shall answer the objection.  
For the first, I say, That the place or space must of all necessity be something or nothing at all: Now one cannot truly say that the space is nothing at all, or a mere nothing; therefore it must be something. That the space is not a mere nothing, appears, because a mere nothing is capable of nothing, and can do nothing; because a mere nothing and an impossibility do not differ: Now the space is capable of something and can do something; seeing it is capable to receive the Bodies, and truly it is the receptacle of all Bodies; since that all Bodies occupy some space: therefore the space is not a mere nothing. Moreover, Betwixt two nothings there is no difference; but the space and that which is between two Bodies, touching one another, do differ greatly: therefore the space and that which is between two Bodies touching one another, are not two nothings; and since that which is between two Bodies touching one another, is a mere nothing; the space ought necessarily not to be a mere nothing: Now that the space and that which is between two Bodies touching one another, do greatly differ, appears, because a Body cannot be put between two Bodies touching one another, but a Body may be put in the space.  
Having showed that the space is not a mere nothing, but that it is something; it must necessarily be something real, or something feigned and imaginary; but the space is not something feigned and forged by humane wit, seeing that the space hath existed, and hath been occupied by the Heavens, the Earth, the Sea, before ever Man was; so far it is from being feigned and forged by Humane Wit; and all Bodies occupy a space, though we do not observe it, or think of it: Therefore the space is something real.  
Again, Every real being is either a substance or an accident; because every real being is either inherent to some subject, and depending of the same, that is to say, so tied and fastened to the subject, that it cannot be without it, and so is an accident, or is not inherent, and tied to some subject, and depending on the same, but may exist alone, and so is a substance: But the space is not inherent and tied to some subject, and consequently is not an accident: Therefore the space is a substance. That the space is not inherent to some subject, for Example, to some Body, appears, because that which is inherent and tied to the Body, moves with the Body, or according to the motion of the Body: So the Colour of a Horse moves according to the motion of the Horse; the Blackness of a Crow moves according to the motion of the Crow; and the Figure of a Man, moves according to the motion of a Man, etc. But the space occupied by the Body, doth not move with the Body; or according to the motion of the Body: Therefore the space occupied by the Body, is not inherent and tied to the Body.  
That the space does not move according to the motion of the Body, appears, because a Body by its motion, leaves one place and takes another, and having occupied one place, occupies another presently; besides if place or the space should move according to the motion of the Body, it would follow that a Body going from London to Oxford, should not stir nor budge from its place, and would always be in the same place; seeing the place or space would always accompany him. Nay, Aristotle and all other Philosophers before and after him, did all confess that place or the space was altogether . And it is in vain to say, that in the same time that a Body leaves the place or space, it did occupy; another Body succeeds, to which the space is inherent and tied: for besides that the general Maxim received of all, should be destroyed: That an accident never passes from one subject to another, and that it cannot be separated from its subject, but by perishing; it is evident that the place or space is no more inherent to the Body, than a Chamber to those Men that are in it; than the Ocean to Fishes, the Air to Birds, and the Firmament to the Stars; all which notwithstanding are substances: It is evident that the Bodies leave places, and tend to places, and that place or space is indifferent to all sorts of Bodies, and never ties itself to any.  
Add hereto, that the place or space was before the Body, and that if there had not been a space before the World, it would have been impossible to make the World; and if there were no spaces beyond the World, it should be impossible to put a Body there: and therefore seeing the space was before the Body, one cannot say it is an accident of the Body; for an accident is never before its subject. If any one say that God created the space with the World; and if he would create some other Worlds, he would also create other Spaces with them; and that beyond the World there is no space: Against that I say that where there is nothing at all, one cannot create neither Body nor Space: For Example, Between two Bodies touching one another, there is nothing at all; so that neither Body nor space can be created there: therefore, if beyond the World there is nothing at all, God cannot create there, neither Body nor Space; and if before the Creation of the World, there was nothing at all where the World is, God could not have created there neither Body nor Space; because that betwixt two mere nothings there is no difference; and we are to judge alike of things that do not differ: Therefore if the mere nothing that is between two Bodies touching one another, is capable of nothing, and neither Body nor Space can be created there; neither the mere nothing, that these Men say is beyond the World, and the mere nothing, that they say was where the World is before the Creation of the same, will be capable of nothing, and one cannotcreate there neither Body nor Space.  
Moreover, God is not in a mere nothing, and one cannot say, that God is where there is nothing at all; for Example, God is not between two Bodies touching one the other totally, because between such Bodies there is nothing at all: But God is beyond the World, and before the World, he was where the World is: Therefore one cannot say, that beyond the World there is nothing at all; and that where the World is before the Creation of the same, there was nothing at all; so that there was something, which can be no other than the space. That God is beyond the World, and that before the Creation, he was where the World is; appears, because nothing can act, where it is not, neither by itself, nor by its virtue and power: But God did act where the world is, in creating the same there, and God can act beyond the World, creating there other Bodies, and other Worlds: Therefore God is beyond the World, and before the World was where the World is, both by himself and by his power; Seeing the Power of God is nothing else but God himself. For God being most simple, all that is in God, or can be conceived to be in God, ought necessarily to be God himself. And certainly, if God were only in the World, he should be finite, as well as the World, and so should not be God; for by the word, GOD, Men have always understood an infinite Being.  
Finally, To speak absolutely, and without any respect to God's will to create but one world; I think God may create another World, distant from this; in which case there would be an interval or space between the two Worlds, in which space God should be, else he would be divided from himself, seeing that he should exist in the two Worlds, without existing between both.  
Having proved that place or space is not an Accident, it is easy to show, that it is not the Superficies, or Surface of such a Body as compasses another. First, Because according to the common opinion of Philosophers, the Superficies is an Accident: But we have sufficiently proved, that place or space is not an Accident; therefore it is not a Superficies. Secondly, The higher Heaven occupies a place and a space, and the World is necessarily in one place, and occupies and fills necessarily some space, and yet the World and the higher Heavens are compassed with no Superficies nor any other Body.  
Thirdly, The Superficies or Surface of that Body that compasses another, is , as it may be seen in a Tower, agitated with great Winds, in a Tree in the midst of a River, etc. But place or space is wholly , as I have proved already; which may be confirmed thus: If place were an external Superficies, it would follow, that a Body that stirs not, yet should move, and that a Body that moves, should not stir from its place: That it would follow, that a Body that stirs not, yet should move locally, appears; because a Tower, a Castle that stirs not, changes its external Superficies when it is agitated with great winds; and a Tree, that is in the midst of a River, without budging, changes its external Superficies; and therefore if place is an external Superficies, to wit, the Surface of a Body that compasses another; It is evident, that a Body that budges not, receiving any change or alteration of Surface or Superficies, will also change its place, and move itself locally, which is altogether absurd: That it would follow also, that a Body which should move itself locally, should not budge out of its place, appears, because a Body which moves itself locally, may retain the Superficies of the Body that compasseth it, and consequently may retain its very place; but that which is in one and the same place, does not budge at all out of it.  
Fourthly, It is certain that by local motion, one leaves one place, and passes unto another, since, a local motion, is nothing else, but a motion towards another place: now by the local motion, a Body does not necessarily leave a Superficies, and necessarily acquire another; for Example, If God should move a Body beyond the World, in the inanity, or in an empty place, that he should have made, that Body should not be compassed with any Superficies: Therefore, the Superficies of a Body that compasses another, is not a true place to speak  
Finally, The Superficies of a Body is a kind of quantity, and quantity is a property of the Body, or the Body itself; and therefore since a Body is in a place, the quantity and consequently the Superficies also, must be in a place, and not place itself; else place should be in another place, and this other place in another place, in infinitum; which is absurd. They being not able to obtund the edge and force of these Arguments, their refuge is to say, that place is not simply the Superficies of a Body that compasses another; but that it is such a Superficies, as is joined with order and relation to certain fixed Points of the World, as are the Centre of the World, and the Four Cardinal Points of it, to wit, the East, and the West, the North, and the South: for the Superficies retaining the said order and relation to these fixed Points, is said to be : and by this means they pretend to explain the manner in the which a Body changes place, to wit, whether it draws near to, or leaves, that is to say, departs from these fixed Points of the World: For Example, If a Body ascends, they say it moves, because it departs from the Centre of the World; if it descends, it moves, because it draws near to the Centre of the World, which is the Centre of the Earth; if it goes towards the Pole Arctic, it moves, because it draws near to the North, and departs from the South.  
Against this Answer, I say, first, That a thing which should not move nor stir from its place, would nevertheless change place; for if God should move the Heavens with a direct Motion, the Earth remaining , it would follow that the Earth which should not move, would change the Order and Relation (according to these men's Doctrine) it hath to those fixed Points of the World, and should be either nearer or farther from them; Seeing these fixed Points being in the Heavens, should move with the Heavens: and therefore if place should consist and reside in such a relation to the fixed Points of the World, the Earth having no more the said relation, should have the said place no more; and consequently would change place, without budging and stirring from the same place, and without moving locally; all which is absurd.  
Secondly, It would follow that a Body should move locally, without ever changing place; for if God should move locally the whole World, with a direct motion, and that all the parts of the World should remain in their proper situation, it would follow that the Earth should move locally, with the whole World, and yet retain the same order and relation it hath, to the fixed Points of the World; and therefore if place should reside and consist in such a relation, the Earth retaining the same relation, should also retain the same place, and consequently would not change place in moving locally; all which is impossible.  
Thirdly, If God should reduce or bring back all things to nothing, one stone excepted, it is certain this stone should exist in a place, and occupy a space; and yet it would have neither order nor relation, to these fixed Points of the World, seeing there would be none, and consequently place and space, do not consist in a certain order or relation, to the fixed Points of the World, seeing that place and space may be without them.  
Finally, This superficies and relation to the fixed Points of the World, according to the opinion of Atheists, is an accident: but I have fully proved above, that place or space is not an accident: from all which it do appear, that place or space being not an accident, it must necessarily be a substance: Now all Substance, according to the common Opinion of Philosophers, is either Corporal or Uncorporal, that is, either a Body or a Spirit: Seeing then that place or space is not a Body, it must necessarily be a Spirit: That place or space is not a Body, appears; because a Body is impenetrable with another Body; but the place or space is penetrable, with all sorts of Bodies: Moreover, Every Body may move, for moveableness is the property of the Body; but the place or space is , as I have proved already. In one word, Every Body is in a place, and occupies a space: but place is not in a place, else there would be progressus in infinitum, and a space doth not occupy another place by the same reason; therefore place or space is not a Body. Since that place or space, is not an accident, but a substance, and that 'tis not a Body as I have proved just now, it must necessarily be a Spirit: Now every Spirit is either Humane, or Angelical, or Divine; that is to say, it is either a reasonable Soul, or an Angel, or a God. Therefore place or space being a Spirit, must be one of the three: But it is easy to show, that place or space, is neither a reasonable Soul nor an Angel; because reasonable Souls and Angels are in some sort movable, for they are sometimes in a place, and sometimes in another; but the space is wholly . Moreover, Souls and Angels are finite, and are only in the World, but Space is infinite, and is beyond the World; as I have proved above.  
Besides, There being never a drop of the Ocean, never so small parcel of the Air, Fire, or Earth, but it doth occupy a place: And there being never a part of the World, let it be never so small, but it does occupy a space, it would follow, that there would be never a bit of Sand, never a Drop of the Ocean, never a Leaf of a Tree, never so small a parcel of the Air, and Earth, but therein would be a reasonable Soul, or an Angel, and all the World would be filled, with Angels or reasonable Souls, which is altogether absurd. Upon this ground, some conclude that place or space is nothing else but the Immensity and Infiniteness of GOD, and consequently GOD Himself; and so proceed to answer the Arguments of Atheists drawn from the infiniteness of the Oriental and Occidental Space: thus:  
One must argue and discourse of the Immensity of God in respect to Bodies, as of his Eternity, in respect to Times and Ages. Therefore as Eternity, which is the Divinity itself, being indivisible, and without parts, is always the same, before Ages, with Ages, and after Ages, if they come to pass away: So that the Eternity, which was before time, and that which is with time, the Eternity which was in the time of Adam, of Noah, and of Jesus Christ, and that which is in this present time, are not many Eternity's, nor many parts of Eternity, but one and the same Eternity of God, which is as the receptacle of all Ages and Times; So that the Age of Adam, the Age of Noah, the Age of Jesus Christ, and all other Ages and Times whatsoever, are in the same Eternity, and do not differ in duration, in respect to Eternity, which remaining always immutable, corresponds to all things and to all Ages; but they do differ in themselves, in that Times and Ages being necessarily and essentially Successive, cannot be together, So Immensity, which is the Divinity itself being also indivisible and without parts, remains always the same, before the Bodies, with the Bodies, and after the Bodies, if they should happen to be destroyed; So that the Immensity which is beyond the World, and that which is where the World is; the Immensity wherein the Sun is, and the Immensity wherein the Earth is, are not many Immensities, nor many parts of the Immensity, but one and the same Immensity, which is the receptacle of all Bodies: So that Heaven and Earth, the Sea and all other Bodies whatsoever, are in the same Immensity, and do not differ in internal place, in respect to Immensity, which is the true and proper place of all Bodies; but differ in external place in themselves, in that being necessarily extended and impenetrable, they cannot be together, and cannot be compassed of the same Superficies.  
And though Philosophers (for the most part) do attribute to the Eternity and Immensity of God, Virtual Parts, and a Virtual Extension, as well to distinguish the Eternity from the moment of time, and the Immensity from the indivisible Point, as because they hold the frailty of humane Spirit to be so great, that it cannot conceive so long a duration as Eternity is, nor so long a space as Immensity is, without parts and extension: Nevertheless it is most certain, that God knows all things as they are, and he that knows perfectly his Eternity and Immensity, conceives them without parts and extension; and yet he knows Eternity distant from the moment of time, and Immensity distinct from the invisible Point.  
And it is to no purpose to say, That by these Virtual Parts, Philosophers meant not true parts; but only somewhat equivalent to these parts: So that Eternity hath somewhat equivalent to the actual parts of time, which have or may have run during Eternity; and Immensity hath somewhat equivalent to the Bodies or parts of the Bodies, which are in the Immensity: For as it cannot be truly said, that a Rock standing in the midst of a River, hath so many virtual parts, as there are actual parts of waters, that run and beat it, whilst the Rock stands and remains always the same, in its firmness and unmoveableness: So it cannot be truly said, that the Eternity of God, hath so many virtual parts, as there are actual parts, which run and as it were slide away, whilst Eternity remains always the same in its Immutability: neither can it be said that the Immensity of God hath so many Virtual parts, as there are actual parts of the Bodies, that are in this Immensity.  
It is safer than to call things by their own name, and not give them that, which they have not; and therefore parts must not be attributed to the Eternity and Immensity of God, seeing they can have none: but one must say only, that the Eternity of God, being indivisible and without parts, was necessarily before time, and is now with time, and shall ever be the same, with or without time. So that the whole single Eternity corresponds to all times; and that the Immensity of God, being also indivisible and without parts, was necessarily before the Bodies, and is now with the Bodies, and shall ever be the same with or without Bodies; so that the whole single Immensity, corresponds to all the parts of all the Bodies, that are in this Immensity.  
They do not absolutely deny, That humane Spirit, because of its great weakness, in so high mysteries, cannot conceive the Eternity and Immensity of God, without attributing to them somewhat equivalent to the actual parts of Times and Bodies: That it cannot conceive the duration of God, since six thousand years and very near that the World lasteth, without attributing to thesame somewhat equivalent, to the six thousand years; and that it cannot conceive the Divinity co-existent with all the Bodies of the World, without attributing to the same somewhat equivalent to the actual extension of all Bodies.  
If God should abolish and reduce this World to nothing, and should also create another, but not immediately after, they assure that the Spirit of Man cannot conceive the duration betwixt the two Worlds, without conceiving some space of time, or somewhat eqvivalent to the space of time: And if God should create another World, which would not touch this, they think that the Spirit of Man, cannot conceive the interval, that would be between the two Worlds, without conceiving some corporal extension, or somewhat equivalent to this extension. But they think also, that God conceiving the duration or interval, that should be between the two Worlds, would conceive them otherwise, without space of time or corporal extension. And that if any will attribute to the Eternity and Immensity of God, some virtual parts, that is to say, equivalent and correspondent to the actual parts of Times and Bodies; They say, that the same is so far from blunting the edge and force of their Arguments, that it favours them greatly, as will appear anon.  
And so answering the Objection precisely, they say, That the Oriental space, and the Occidental space, are nothing else, than Oriental Immensity, and the Occidental Immensity: and therefore as the Oriental Immensity, and the Occicidental Immensity, really and in themselves, are not two Immensities, nor two parts of Immensity, but are really one and the same Immensity, which is called Oriental and Occidental, only in respect to the Oriental and Occidental Bodies, that are or may be in this Immensity. So the Oriental space, and the Occidental space, are not really and in themselves two different things, but one and the same thing, which is called Oriental space, and Occidental space, in respect to the Oriental and Occidental Bodies, that are or may be in the same.  
Moreover, as Immensity, though Infinite, is Indivisible, and without Parts, as the Divinity from which it it is not distinct. So Space being nothing than the Immensity of God, though it be infinite, is also Indivisible and without Parts.  
Finally, Even as a man, and a rational Animal, are not greater, and have no more parts than man alone; because a man and a rational Animal are one and the same thing: So the Oriental and Occidental Immensity, or the Oriental and Occidental Space, are not greater, and have no more parts, than the Oriental Immensity alone, or the Oriental Space alone, because the Oriental and Occidental Immensity, or the Oriental and Occidental Space, are one and the same thing.  
And if one will allow, or suppose some virtual parts in the Eternity and Immensity of God, and says that the Eternity and Immensity of God have some virtual Replications, according to the multitudes of Times and Bodies, to the which the Eternity and Immensity of God correspond. They say, that as the Age of Adam was in a part or virtual Replication of Eternity, and the Age of Noah in another: So Heaven is in one part, or virtual Replication of Immensity, and the Earth in another; and that we are thus to argue of other Times and Bodies.  
And if any say, That all things propounded hitherto, are incomprehensible, and altogether incredible: They answer, That God dwelling in an Inaccessible Light, one must not wonder, if Incomprehensibility is one of his Properties and Attributes; And seeing the Eternity and Immensity of God are nothing else than God himself, one must not think it strange, that they are incomprehensible, and cannot be perfectly conceived by humane Spirit. Therefore (say they) all things propounded hitherto, concerning the Eternity, the Space, or Immensity of God, are indeed incomprehensible; but they have this advantage, that they are not contradictory: whereas all other ways of Arguing, concerning Eternity, Space, or Immensity, seem to involve many absurdities and contradictions, alleged in this Tract. For my part, I think this Answer ought to satisfy any one that is not contentious; but because it is not common, and may be accused of Novelty; and indeed is not without difficulty, I submit to the Judgement of my Betters and Superiors.  
But if this Answer does not satisfy, one must say, That space or the place of Bodies is the Eternal, without action, and infinite Inanity of Ancient Philosophers, which is neither Body or Spirit, nor Accident, nor active Substance; but only such a thing as is capable to receive all Bodies, and which having them, is always infinitely beyond them. And yet this Inanity must necessarily be supposed without parts really different; Else the Objection of our Adversaries will remain in its full force: for the Oriental and Occidental Inanity being infinite and greater than the sole Oriental Inanity, it would follow, that an infinite should be greater than another; which is absurd. And because such an Inanity, without parts, will hardly please, and receive admittance amongst sober, judicious, learned Men; I return to the first Answer, and ground my Arguing upon it, yet submiting it to the judgement and censure of those that have attained to a deeper knowledge of these matters.  
10. Their second Objection, drawn from the pretended infiniteness of the thoughts, both of Men and Angels, for the time to come may be resolved two ways:  
First, In saying that God will give to every Man, and to every Angel in particular, one only light and brightness of Glory, by which he shall possess and enjoy God Eternally; and consequently that every Man and every Angel, shall have but one only thought, by which he shall be fastened as it were, upon God Eternally: Therefore seeing that all Men and all Angels will be in number finite; so the thoughts of Men and Angels will be in number finite.  
Secondly, Since I think that the thoughts, or the repetition of the same thoughts, shall always be divers in number; I answer that the thoughts of Men and Angels for the time to come, shall be finite to the infinite, that is to say, shall increase always, and perpetually be in greater number, and always in greater number, but always also in finite number: And though to every Day, to every Month, to every Year: to every Age, and to every Time whatsoever in particular, this finite number of Thoughts be definite and determined, so that God may assign and determine the number of the Thoughts of Men and Angels, which have been in time passed to that Day, that Month, that Year, that Age, and that time inclusively: nevertheless if one speaks indefinitely, without specifying, neither Day, nor Month, nor Year, nor Age, nor any other Time in particular, but asks simply, in what number will the Thoughts of Men and Angels be for the time to come? No other answer can be given, but that the number of their Thoughts, shall be finite to the infinite, or that their number, is finite indefinitely, and undeterminedly; for, because of the perpetuity of Thoughts one cannot assign or determine a certain number, beyond which one shall have no more Thoughts.  
And if one demands further, The Collection of all the Thoughts which shall be for the time to come, supposed they have never an end, what number is it of? I answer, That Collection is impossible, and consequently a mere nothing, because all future Thoughts, taken distributively, are future, but not taken collectively, seeing they shall never be collected and gathered, and that there will be still some to come to pass; and consequently to be collected and gathered: One may also demand whether the number of the future Thoughts of Men and Angels, which God knows is finite or infinite? To which I answer, That God knows Things as they are in themselves, and that he knows future Things not otherwise then they shall be in themselves; for the knowledge of God is always true, and consequently always conformable to the things known. Therefore seeing that the Thoughts of Men and Angels, shall always be finite to the infinite, and that their number shall always be finite indefinitely; it is evident that God knows them not otherwise, then as finite to the infinite, and that he knows certainly, that their number is finite and indefinitely, which will appear more plainly in our Answer to the third Objection.  
11. Their third Objection drawn from the pretended infiniteness of Men and Lions possible, that is to say, that God may produce and create, may be resolved the same way as the first; to wit, saying that Men and Lions possible are finite to the infinite, and that the number of them is finite, not definitely and determinedly, so that one may assign a certain number, beyond which none will be possible; but is infinite indefinitely, because there is never so great a nmmber of Men and Lions, but God may produce and create a greater, and always a greater, and still a greater, but notwithstanding always finite. If it be objected that the Collection of all Men possible, comprehends an infinite number: I answer, That such a Collection is impossible, and consequently a mere nothing; because all Men taken distributively, are indeed possible, but taken collectively are a mere impossible, and consequently a mere nothing; because God can never produce so great a number of Men, but he may always produce a greater, and agreater again; so that it is impossible that God may not always produce some Men; and consequently the Collection of all Men possible is impossible, and a mere nothing.  
If it be farther objected, That there are as many Men possible, as God knows are possible; and that God knows a number infinite of possible; seeing that if he should know only a finite number of Men, he should see the last Man possible, and should know he could not create any more, and should see the end of his Power, and consequently his Power should be finite: I Answer, That the number of Men possible, that God knows, is not infinite, nor also finite definitely and determinedly: So that one may assign and determine a certain number, beyond which God knows no more; for there is never so great a number but God may see and know a greater, and always a greater, and still a greater, but notwithstanding always finite; because God knows things no otherwise than they are in themselves: And therefore seeing that Men possible are in number finite indefinitely; God also knows certainly, that the number of Men possible is finite indefinitely, and from thence it doth not follow, that the power of God is finite and limited in itself, or that he sees the end of his power, since he may always produce and create other Men, though always in a finite number; but at the most it may be said to be finite, in respect to its objects, or its effects, which cannot be but finite; as the knowledge God hath of this World, though infinite in itself; because it is not distinct from the Divinity, may be said to be finite, in respect to its objects, to wit, the World that is finite.  
And now I will conclude this Chapter, desiring the Reader to take notice that when I have spoken of the Eternity of God, of his Immensity, of his Power, and of his Knowledge, he must not imagine, nor conceive, that I put or suppose, divers things, or divers qualities in God; but he must believe with me, that there is one and the same thing, to wit, one and the same Divinity, to which divers names are given and attributed, according to the divers respects, to which it is considered. For the same Divinity, in as much as it contains all Ages, and corresponds to every one of them, and is infinitely before them, is called Eternity: Seeing that it is the receptacle of all Bodies, corresponds to every one of them, and is infinitely beyond all the Creatures of the World, is called Immensity; as it gives being to every thing, and protects and preserves them; is called Omnipotency; as it places and disposes them together, according to the dignity of each of them, is called Wisdom: as it bestows all sorts of good things upon the Creatures, is called Goodness. And for as much it decrees, foresees, and rules all the Events in the World, is called Providence. And thus must we speak of all his other Attributes.  
The Answer of Julius Scaliger, in his Exercitations against Cardanus, to Algazel his Argument, and which the African maintained to be most sound and solid, hath been sufficiently refuted, when I have proved that an infinite is not greater than another; neither materially nor formally.    

CHAP. V 1. The fourth Answer of Atheists, saying, that from all Eternity there was a Chaos. 2. That the Heavens and the Elements did not by degrees disentangle and resolve themselves from all Eternity. 3. That they did not remain a finite time, to resolve or clear themselves. 4. That they did not remain an infinite time, to clear and resolve themselves.  
A Digression wherein the two first Verses of the first Chapter of Genesis are explained, and is showed that there is no mention made of a Chaos, and that they do not contain a proposition of all those things, God created in six days, and that Light was not the first Creature.  
1. The fourth Answer of Atheists is, That the World hath not been from all Eternity in the state it is now; but that from all Eternity there was a Chaos; that is to say, that the Heavens, the Stars, the Elements, and all other things, have been from all Eternity, pell-melled and confused together; and that having resolved themselves, they have framed and disposed the World in the state it is now; that it was the opinion of Euripides, and divers Ancient Philosophers; as of Drodorus in the First Book of his History.  

The Reply.  
2. Against this Objection or Answer, I say that if the Chaos, that is to say, the Heavens, the Stars, and the Elements, pell-melled and confused together, had been from all Eternity, it would follow, that either by degrees they had resolved themselves from all Eternity, or that a time finite or infinite would have passed before they had resolved themselves: But they did not resolve themselves by degrees from all Eternity, and a time finite or infinite did not pass, before they did resolve themselves: Therefore they have not been confused from all Eternity, and consequently the Chaos was not from all Eternity. The Minor or second Proposition, which is the only one that may be questioned, is verified thus:  
First, That the Heavens, the Stars, and the Elements, pell-melled togethar, did not by degrees resolve and separate themselves from all Eternity, appears; because the separation of corporal things, mixed together, is not made without the local motion of some of them: But nothing did move locally from all Eternity, as I have showed in the first Chapter; where I have proved that time and motion have not been from all Eternity.  
Secondly, Those things which did by degrees separate themselves from others, from all Eternity by local motion, they have remained, either a finite time, to separate themselves, or an infinite time; if a finite time, it will follow, that betwixt the mixture, and the perfect separation, the difference and interval will be but a finite and limited time; and consequently that betwixt that which is from all Eternity; to wit, the mixture and that which is not from all Eternity, to wit, the perfect separation, the difference will be but a finite and limited time, which is impossible. And moreover, It would follow that a finite time, such as the duration of those things, since their perfect separation, added to a finite, such as is the time that passed in their separation, would make up an infinite time, such as is the pretended Eternity of the mixture; all which is against this true Maxim, that one finite added to another finite, does not make up an infinite.  
If they have remained an infinite time to separate themselves, it will follow that they will have run, through an infinite space in their separation; seeing that a finite space may be run through in a finite time: and truly, since time is the measure or duration of motion, it will follow, that if time be infinite, the motion will be also infinite; and if the motion is infinite, the place or space wherein things did move, will be infinite, either really or equivalently. But they have not run through an infinite space, either really or equivalently; else they would have run through a space, an hundred thousand millions of thousands of times, and a space a thousand millions of times greater than this World, really or equivalently; which is absurd. And besides, It would follow that an infinite, would be greater than another; seeing the space that they would have run through; until their perfect separation, and that which they would have run through since their perfect separation, should be greater than the sole space, they should have run through until their separation: For a farther confirmation, look back upon the first Chapter, wherein I have proved that time and motion cannot be infinite.  
3. Secondly, That the Heavens, the Stars, and the Elements, have not remained a finite time, before they have resolved and separated themselves; appears, because it would follow, that betwixt the mixture, and the beginning of their separation, the difference would be but of a finite time; and consequently that betwixt that which is from all Eternity, as their pretended mixture; and that which is not from all Eternity, as their separation, or the beginning thereof, the difference would be but of some limited time; and there would be wanting but a finite and limited time, lest that their separation, which had a Beginning, should be Eternal; and that one finite added to the other finite, should make up an infinite, which is impossible.  
4. Thirdly, That the Heavens, the Stars, and the Elements, have not remained an infinite time before they have resolved and separated themselves, appears, because it is a Maxim received of all, that Idem qua Idem, semper facit Idem, at least when 'tis not a free and intellectual Agent. Therefore, If the Heavens, the Stars, and the Elements, have been confused and pell-melled together, during an infinite time, or during Eternity; how came it to pass that they have resolved and disintricated themselves at last? certainly it cannot be of themselves, having remained in the same case and condition, above an hundred thousand millions of thousands of years: and if another has thus separated them (as it is most true) it cannot be aught else but God.  
5. It will not be out of purpose to add to this Reply, The true sense of the two first verses of the first Chapter of Genesis, which are conceived in these words: In the beginning God created the Heaven and the Earth; and the Earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the Deep; and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the Waters.  
Because, out of these words some Christians have imagined a Chaos, saying, That God created first a Chaos, that is to say, the Heavens and the Elements mixed confusedly together; and afterwards in six days did draw all Creatures out of the same; and others in greater number, say, that in the two alleged verses, Moses makes a general Proposition of all things created, in these two words, Heaven and Earth; and that in the following verses, he specifies the Creatures as God created them every day.  
Against that I say, That the true sense of the words of Moses, is, that in the beginning of the first Day, which was the beginning of the first Evening, and the beginning of Time, God created the Imperial Heaven, which should be the Mansion and Dwelling Place of God and the Blessed; the Earth which should be the residence of Men during this momentary life, and the Waters which did then cover the whole face of the Earth. The chief reasons of my Assertions are these:  
First, It is certain that the first day of the Creation, as well as the five others, is divided in Evening and Morning, and that the Evening is put before the Morning: For Moses saith, And the Evening and the Morning were the first Day; and from thence it is that the Jews ever began their Natural Day, with the Evening. From which Consideration I frame these two Arguments:  
That which is part of the part, is also part of the whole: For Example, The Finger which it part of the Hand, is also part of the Arm, and of the whole Body; but the Evening is part of the Day, which is also part of Time: Therefore the Evening is also part of Time; and so when the Evening was, Time was also, or began to be. From this Argument I frame another thus: Time never was without some Corporal Creatures; seeing that Time is the duration of Corporal Things, or of their Motion; but in the Evening of the first Day, Time was or began to be; for the Evening, being part of the Natural Day, is also part of Time: Therefore in the Evening of the first Day, there were some Corporal Creatures: Now what other Corporal Creatures were in the Evening of the first Day, but the Heaven, the Earth, and the Waters, whereof mention is made in these two first verses of the first Chapter of Genesis. Wherefore it appears evidently that in these words, In the Beginning God Created the Heaven and the Earth; these two words (in the Beginning) are to be explained thus: In the beginning of Time, in the beginning of the first Day, in the beginning of the Evening of the first Day, God Created the Heaven and the Earth.  
Secondly, After that Moses hath said, In the beginning God Created Heaven and Earth; he adds immediately, and the Earth was without form and void, that is to say, the Earth that God created with the Heavens, was then without an external form or appearance of Earth, because than it was all covered with Water, and was void of the Ornaments, which now enrich and adorn it; for then the Earth had neither Flowers nor Fruits, nor Herbs, nor Corn, nor Trees, nor Living Creatures, etc. Now when was it that the Earth was covered with Water, without appearance of Earth, without Beauty, and without Ornaments, but only during the two first Days, unto the third exclusively; in which God separated the Waters from the Earth, and beautified it with all sorts of Plants.  
Thirdly, I say that in all the History of the Creation, described by Moses, no mention at all is made of the Creation of the Imperial Heaven, of the Earth, and of the Waters, but in the two first verses alleged. For though the Firmament, which was Created the second Day, be called Heaven, v. 8. yet it must not be understood of the Imperial Heaven, which is the Throne of God, and the Dwelling place of the Blessed; because it is said of this Firmament, v. 7. That God divided the Waters which were under the Firmament, from the Waters which were above the Firmament; that is to say, this Firmament divides the Earthly and the Heavenly Waters; and at verse the 14. that in this Firmament God placed the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars; and at v. 20. that Fowls were appointed to fly towards it; all which cannot be understood of the Imperial Heaven, which is above all other Corporal Creatures, but only of the Element of the Air.  
Moreover, Though in the work of the third day, mention is made of the Separation of the Earth, and of the Sea; yet there is no mention made of their Creation; an evident proof that they had been Created before. And indeed Moses describing the work of the second Day, speaks in this manner: And God said, Let there be a Firmament in the midst of the Waters, and let divide the Waters from the Waters: and God made the Firmament, and divided the Waters which were under the Firmament, from the Waters which were above the Firmament. Now how would God have divided the Waters, if they had not been before? and how would he have created a Firmament between the Waters, if there had been no Water be-before? Therefore let us conclude that in these two first verses, and no where else, mention is made of the Creation of the Imperial Heaven, of the Earth, and of the Water, that God made before the Light, whereof it is spoken in the third verse.  
Fourthly, Immediately after these words, In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth, and the Earth was without form and void; it is added, And Darkness was upon the face of the Deep; as if he should have said, when God created the Heaven and the Earth, and the Earth was covered with Water, without Beauty or Ornaments; then the vast and spacious Waters, or the spaces between Heaven and Earth, were covered with Darkness, because there was yet no Light, as appears by the Text; and God had not yet created that great body of Light, which he created afterwards; to wit, in the Morning of the same first Day; and whereof probably, in the fourth Day he made the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars, which may be very well thought to be the Element of Fire, seeing it hath all the effects and properties of it; and that in the whole History of the Creation, mention is made no where else of the Element of Fire; but when God said, Let there be Light. Moreover, It is certain that Darkness is nothing else but the privation of Light: now privation differs from a mere negation; in that privation supposes a subject capable to receive that whereof it is privation; and a mere negation supposes none: For Example, Blindness is the privation of Sight, which supposes a Creature capable to receive Sight, Death is a privation of Life, that supposes a Body susceptible of Life, etc. Now seeing that Darkness which was before Light, as appears by the Text, is nothing else but a privation of Light, it is evident that Darkness supposes some Bodies susceptible of Light, which as well as Darkness have been before the Light; but these Bodies can be no others, but those mentioned in the two first verses, to wit, the Heaven, the Earth, and the Waters, which were created the Evening of the first Day.  
But I suppose it will be objected, that the form ought always to be before the privation: For Example, The Sight before Blindness, Life before Death; and that consequently the Light was before Darkness: But I answer, first, That all Philosophers agree, that all Physical Privations, are before the Forms, whereof they are privations; because they are privations of future forms, as logical privations, are privations of forms past. And thus the seminal matter hath the privation of the Soul, before it hath the Soul itself; and every physical matter hath the privation of the essential form, before it hath such a form; and in the Example alleged above, it may happen that Blindness is before the Sight, Deafness before Hearing, and the privation of Life before Life. So the Born Blind and Deaf Man that Jesus Christ healed, were Blind and Deaf, before they received either Sight or Hearing. And the Embryo, that is to say, the Infant in the Mother's Womb, before it hath got perfect shape, hath the privation of rational Life, before ever he receives the said rational Life.  
Secondly, It is must true, that when a Subject is equally susceptible of the Form and the privation of it, if the Agent may produce the Subject and the Form, it is then in the power of the Agent, if it be a free Agent, to produce the Subject with the Form, or with the Privation thereof: But the Earth, and the Waters are Bodies equally susceptible of Light and Darkness: Therefore God who is a most free Agent, and who hath created the Earth, the Waters, and the Light, may have produced the Earth, and the Waters, with, or without Light. So then seeing that by the Text it appears, that Darkness was before Light, we must conclude, that the Earth and the Waters were produced tenebrous. Finally, It is most true, that the Light God created, is a most bright and shining Body, and not an accident, as I might make it appear, were not the Digression too long already. Now who seethe not, that God may have created the Earth, and the Waters before this bright and shining Body, seeing he can create one Body before another.  
By the consideration of these things, it is clear, that in the two alleged verses, Moses doth not set down a general Proposition, of all those things God was to create afterwards; but that he describes particularly, the creation of Heaven, of the Earth, and of the Waters, which were produced the Evening of the first Day. Moreover, It is evident, that in the said verses, Moses speaks not one word of a Chaos, containing all Creatures, pell-melled and confused together; seeing there is no mention made of the Firmament, nor of the Element of Fire, nor of the Stars, nor Plants, nor Living Creatures, but only of the Imperial Heaven, of the Earth, and of the Waters; and yet there is never a word of the Heaven and the Earth being mixed together; and in the whole History of the Creation, there is no mention made of the separation of Heaven from the Earth, as there is of the separation of the Earth, from the Waters that covered it. But enough of this matter, it is time to come to the Consutation of other Objections and Answers of Atheists.    

CHAP. VI 1. The Fifth Answer of Atheists, saying, That there has been from all Eternity a Matter without Form. 2. The proof that there hath not been from all Eternity a Matter without Form, and that the Matter could not produce the Forms. 3. That the Eternal Atoms, by a casual concourse, have not made and disposed the World. 4. That the Forms cannot have been produced but by God.  
1. THe Fifth Answer of Atheists is, That indeed the World has not been from all Eternity in the case and state it is now; and that from all Eternity there hath been no Chaos, but that there hath been from all Eternity a Matter without Form, and that afterwards out of this Matter, all Forms have been produced, which being joined with the Matter, have framed all Corporal Creatures, and made the World in the case and state it is now. The Epicures following the Opinion of their Masters Democritus and Epicurus, have specified and determined what that Matter was, to wit, the Atoms, which in time by a casual and accidental concourse have made up the World in the state it is now.  

The Reply.  
2. Against this Answer, I say, That if there had been from all Eternity a Matter without Form, it would follow, that the pretended Forms of Heaven, the Stars, and the Elements, as well as the Forms of Plants and Living Creatures, should have been after the Matter, and consequently would have had a beginning; and having not had beginning of themselves, seeing that nothing produces itself, they would have been necessarily produced in time by another, and that other would be necessarily, either the the Matter or some other thing, differing from the Matter. Now these Forms cannot have been produced in time, neither by the Matter nor by any other thing differing from the Matter, unless it be by God himself; which I prove thus:  
If any Eternal Matter had produced these Forms in time, it would follow necessarily, that before the product●● of the same, a time either finite or in●●nite, should have passed: not a 〈◊〉 time, because betwixt that which is from all Eternity, as the Matter (is supposed by them to be) and that which is not from all Eternity, as these Forms or the Productions of the same, the difference is greater than of a finite time And Moreover, It would follow, that a finite time, such as that which should have passed since the productions of these Forms, added to a finite time, such as that which should have passed before the production of these Forms, would make up an infinite time, or an infinite duration, such as the Eternity of the Matter would be; which is impossible. Neither did an infinite time pass before the production of these Forms; for how should it come to pass, that the Matter having been an infinite time all alone without acting, would produce them afterwards? Is it not a constant and true Maxim, that, Idem qua Idem semper facit Idem; when it is not a free and intellectual Agent, when there is no impedement, and the subjects which it works about are not different. Now Matter being not a free and intellectual Agent, and finding no impediment nor different subjects, seeing it is supposed to be all alone, before the productions of these Forms; it follows necessarily it hath always done the same thing; and consequently that it hath not remained a time, either finite or infinite to produce these Forms, if it may have produced them. Moreover, All Men know that Causa naturaliis agit a dextremum suae potentiae; that is to say, Natural Causes act and work as much as they can: For Example, The Sun shines as much as it can, the Fire heats with all its strength; and 'tis most true, that, Causa necessaria, positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, & sublatis impedimentis, necessario agit. That is to say, Necessary Causes, all things required, granted, and having no impediments, act and work necessarily, and cannot keep back, nor suspend their action. Now then, seeing that Matter is a Natural and not a Voluntary Cause, a necessary and not a free Cause, and that there is no impediment, being supposed all alone; it follows that if it may have produced these Forms, it must necessarily have produced them before (or without remaining) an infinite time.  
3. Against the Epicures, teaching that the Eternal Atoms by a casual concourse, have made and disposed the World, in the same case and state it is at present; I say that this concourse of Atoms, to frame and fashion the World, cannot have happened without the local motion of some of them: From whence I argue thus, If the Atoms or the parts of the Matter had concurred, and consequently had moved themselves locally to frame and fashion the World in the case and state it is at present, it would follow that they would have moved themselves locally from all Eternity, or that they would have remained, either a finite or an infinite time without moving, and then afterwards would have framed and fashioned the World in the case and state it is at present: but they have not moved themselves locally from all Eternity, neither have they remained a finite or an infinite time without moving; as I have sufficiently proved in the precedent Chapter, Num. 2, 3, 4. for the same things I have said there of the Heaven and the Elements, may be said likewise of the Atoms.  
4. Finally, That these Forms have not been produced by any thing differing from the Matters, but by God himself, appears; because the Agent who should have produced them, would have been Eternal or not: if not Eternal he would have had a Beginning, and consequently, would have been produced of another; of whom I would ask, Whether he be Eternal or not, and so always inquire, until one should come to such an Agent, as would not have been produced by another, and consequently would be Eternal. If Eternal, he should be either a necessary and natural Agent, or a free and voluntary Agent: If a natural and necessary Agent, he would have forthwith produced these Forms; for a natural and necessary Agent, acts, and works, as much as it can, and cannot suspend his action; and consequently these Forms would have been from all Eternity, and consequently the World in the case and state it is at present; which I have demonstrated already to be altogether impossible: And if a free and intellectual Agent, it can be no other but God; seeing that by the word GOD, we mean and conceive nothing else, but a free and intellectual Agent, who hath produced the world, in the state and case it is at present.    

CHAP. VII. 1 The Sixth Answer of Atheists, saying, That men have their Original and Beginning from the Tritons and Sirens, commonly called Mairmaids. 2. The Confutation of this Answer.  
1. THe Sixth Answer of Atheists is, That though men had not been from all Eternity, it would not follow, that they had been produced by some Divine and Superior Cause; for one might say, That their Original is from some Tritons and Sirens, who after the Universal Floods, lived both in the Waters, and on the Land, and so in time became terrestrial. And they say, that some Historiographers relate several things, which seem to justify their allegation. Herodotus in the Fourth Book of his History relates that Jason being carried away by a storm into Libya, in the Country of the Lotophages, in the dangerous places of the Tritonide Fens and Marshes, there appeared to him a Triton, who demanded of him a Trevet, promising to reward him, with the discovery of the means, whereby he might come out of that place; which being performed by Jason, the Triton shown him the way, and saved him. Lewis Guicharden writes, that in the year 1403 they brought to Harbem in Holland, a Siren, commonly called a Mair maid, which by degrees learned to eat bread, milk and other meat, to spin, and to make the Sign of the Cross. Acosta in the Third Book, Chapter the 18th of his Relations, describes the Vros as a kind of men living in the waters, and observes that they themselves said they were no men. Nicolo Conti in Ramnusio, relates, That in the River of Cochin, there are Fishes to be found with a humane Form and Resemblance, that being taken, the difference of Sex is to be seen both in Male and Female, altogether like ours; and further he saith, that they are so industrious, as to come out of the water at night, to strike fire with flints they find there, to make a fire with wood, at the light whereof they catch all other fishes that come near them.  

The Reply.  
2. Against this Answer, I say, First, That there is no Author, let him be never so fabulous, that ever dreamt or writ, that men have their Original from the Tritons and Sirens. And Besides, my reason respecting all terrestrial Creatures, it would follow that Elephants, Lions, Bears, Oxen, and other terrestrial Creatures, would have had their Original from the like Marine Creatures.  
Secondly, It is a Moral Maxim, That every thing seeks and endeavours to better its Condition: Now either it is better for waterish Creatures, to become terrestrial, or not: If it be better for them? how came it to pass that they do not seek after it? And if it be not better for them, why have they done it in time past.  
Finally, If they are become terrestrial in times past, why do they not do the same now? And if such a thing has happened heretofore, some where, why does it not come to pass again, either there or in seem other place of the World?  
Thirdly, Histories make mention but of three Floods only, to wit, that of Noah, that of Ogyges, and that of Deucalion; now these two last have not been universal, for they happened only in one part of Greece; so that it was an easy thing to furnish it again, with neighbouring People. And as for the first, it cannot be believed, except one believes a Divinity, whether we respect the Miracles that went along with it, or the Holy Man that writ the History of it; who saith positively that God sent it, and commanded Noah to build the Ark, to save in it all kinds of Terrestrial Creatures; so that it is needless to have recourse to Waterish Creatures  
Fourthly, The Examples of Herodotus, Guicharden, and others, prove indeed that there are Tritons and Sirens, but they speak never a word, concerning Men having had their original from them. And as for the strange things they writ of them, it is certain they had them by hear-say from others, who might have been deceived in the Narration, and by the Declarer, as well as themselves. And this will soon appear to be true, if we judge impartially of the Writings of Herodotus; for most part of what he writes from others, is so far from being a true History, that it savours the Romance altogether: As when he saith in his Second Book, That Rampsinitus King of Egypt, went down into Hell, and there played at Dice with Ceres; That the Sun did rise twice in the West, and did sit twice in the East: That Sennacherib King of Assiria and Araba, being in his March towards Egypt to War against Setho King of that Country, his Bows and Quivers were gnawed by Cats, so that he was fain to go back again into his own Country with shame. That the Daughter of Cheopes King of Egypt, did prostitute herself to every Man that would give her but a Stone, whereof was made one of the Pyramids, which made one of the seven Wonders of the World. That Phero became blind for having shot an Arrow in the River Nilus; and ten years after recovered his sight by Washing his Eyes with the Urine of a Woman, that never lay with any Man but her Husband: And truly Diodorus in the Fourth Book of his History, observes, That Triton who shown Jason and the other Argonauts, the way to avoid the Quicksands of the Sea, was a King of Lybia and not a Fish. Acosta speaking of the Vros, does not affirm that they are Waterish Creatures, but only a rude and unpolished People. These are are his very words, These, Uros (saith he) are so rude and blockish a People, that they do not repute themselves to be Men. And as for the Fishes of the River of Cochin whereof Nicolo Conti speaks, I say that in matter of Narrations and Histories, we ought not to believe whatsoever every one relates, who for to humour himself, writes the Imaginations of his own Brain, or the Stories of others that deceived him; but we must believe only, that which is related to us by such Men as have traveled in those countries'. Now many Hollanders, and Portugals, that have been at Cochin; and have seen the River and the Fishes in it, make no mention of such Fishes, and hold it as a Lie and a Fable, whatsoever Nicolo Conti writes of this matter.  
Finally, If whatsoever is written concerning the Tritons, should be true, and that Men should be originary of the pretended Eternal Tritons; yet my Reason would remain whole and entire; and my Arguments against the Eternity of Men, may be applied to the Tritons: And I may argue thus again, If the Tritons have been from all Eternity, the number of these Tritons which have been in time past is infinite: That the Tritons which are pretended to have Lived from all Eternity, yet have not Lived an Eternity, but only a certain limited time: And that the Tritons which have been in time passed unto this very day, are all distant with a finite distant of time, or all with an infinite distance, or some with a finite, and others with an infinite distance: And so applying to the Tritons what I have said of Men in the First Chapter, it will clearly appear that the same absurdities do follow.    

CHAP. VIII. 1. The Seventh Answer of Atheists, saying, That Men have been produced by, or proceeded from the Eternal Earth, or from all the Elements together. 2. Reasons alleged, or Evidence produced against the Falsehood of this Answer. 3. That the Earth, nor the other Elements cannot have been naturally disposed to produce Men. 4. Other Reasons proving that Men have not been produced by the Earth, nor by the other Elements.  
1. THe Seventh Reason of Atheists is, That Men have been produced by, or proceeded from the Eternal Earth, or from all the Elements together, which have been Eternal, and in time have produced the first Men, by which all others have had their original by way of Generation; in a manner as Rats, Frogs, Flies, and other Creatures of this kind are form at this time, out of a Terrestrial Matter.  

The Reply.  
2. Against this Answer, I say, That if the Eternal Earth had produced in time, the first Men, or if the Sun, or any other Eternal Agent, had produced them out of the Eternal Earth; it would follow that the Eternal Earth would have remained, either a finite or an infinite time, before their production; but neither can be said without absurdity: not a finite time, else it would follow that betwixt the Earth and the Production of the first Men, the difference would be only of a finite and limited time; and consequently that betwixt that which is from all Eternity, as the Earth, and that which is not from all Eternity, as the Production of the first Men, the difference would be only of a finite and limited time, which is impossible. And besides, it would follow, That a finite time, such as should be that which should have passed, since the the Production of the first Men unto this day, added to a finite time, such as should be that which should have passed since the existence of the Earth, unto the Production of the first Men, would make up an infinite time, such as is the pretended Eternity of the Earth; all which is against this true Maxim: That a finite added to another finite, doth not make up an infinite. And further, That there would be wanting but a finite and limited time, lest that the production of the first Men, which hath had a Beginning should be Eternal, to wit, that finite and limited time that would have passed, since the existing of the Earth, unto their production. Not an infinite time also, else it would follow, that the Earth would have remained above an hundred thousand times, a hundred millions of years, without having produced Men; and that after an infiniteness of years, it would have produced them; which is absurd: because natural and necessary causes, such as the Earth is, all things remaining in the same state, do act always the same thing. Now what I say concerning the Earth, may be said of all Elements together.  
3. And it is to no purpose, to say, That after an infiniteness of time, the Eternal Earth is (as it were) become apt, and disposed to produce Men; and so consequently hath produced them; but before was not disposed, and consequently could not produce them. For against that I say, That such an aptness or disposition of the Earth, must needs have come to pass, either by degrees, from all Eternity; so that after an infiniteness of time, it hath been perfected and accomplished; or that after an infiniteness of time, it is come to pass, either all at once, or successively: now neither of these can be said without absurdity. Not that it is come to pass by degrees, from all Eternity, else that disposition or alteration of the Earth, would have had parts succeeding one another, from all Eternity; and so succession, motion, and time, would have been from all Eternity: which I have showed above to be altogether impossible. Not also that after an infiniteness of time, it is come to pass, either all at once, or successively; for if it were so, it would have been the act and work, either of the Earth itself, or of another natural and necessary cause, such as are the other Elements; or of a free and intellectual Agent. Not of the Earth, or of any other natural and necessary cause; because natural and necessary causes, all things remaining in the same state, act and work always the same things, and act as much as they can, without having power to suspend their action; and consequently would not have remained more than an hundred thousand times an hundred thousand millions of years, to produce this aptness and disposition, much less an infiniteness of time. If this Disposition hath been produced by a free and intellectual Agent, it cannot be but by the Creator of the Universe, who is the great and glorious God whom we adore.  
4. Now add to what hath been said, this true Maxim of Philosophers, Natura progreditur ab imperfectionibus ad perfectiora. Nature proceeds from things more imperfect, to the more perfect: That is to say, Natural causes in their operations, produce first imperfect things, which afterwards become more perfect in time: So the Earth breeds first Shrubs, which in time become great Trees; and produces Frogs, and Worms, and Flies, and other small and weak infects, which in time become great and strong. Therefore, If the first Men have been produced by the Earth, or the other Elements, they cannot have been produced but very little and most weak, as they that are newly born, and do but come out of the Mother's Womb; in which case Men would have been almost Dead as soon as Born, there being no succour nor help for them, and so there would be never a Man left at this time. For it were to overthrow the order of Nature, to imagine that the Earth, or the other Elements, should have produced the first Men, as perfect as they are at this time, at Five and twenty, or thirty years of Age. And besides, Our Reason extends itself to all sorts of Animals, as well Terrestrial, as them that live in the Waters; so that it would necessarily follow, that the Earth, the Air, the Water, and the Fire, or all the Elements together, should have produced, not only the first Men, but also the first Lions, the first Elephants, the first Whales, the first Dolphins, and the like, in their perfection, Male and Female, for the propagation of the same; which is altogether against the Order of Nature.  
Moreover, If the Earth, or the other Elements, have heretofore produced some Men, why do not they produce no more at this time? and if they have produced Lions, Whales, and other Animals, how comes it to pass that they produce none at this time, in some parts of the World? Surely, men's Wits must be strangely perverted and overturned, to suppose such Extravagances and Dreams. Therefore since for the propagation of the humane kind, the first Men must necessarily have been in a perfect Age and State, and that Nature could not make them such; one must believe that as it is related by Moses in the Book of Genesis, to wit, that there is a God, who out of the Earth, mixed with the other Elements, hath framed end fashioned a perfect humane Body, and having breathed in his Nostrils the breath of Life, he became a living Soul. Finally, It is an undoubted Truth, That none can give that which he hath not: Therefore, Seeing that the Earth, and the other Elements, destitute of understanding, and much more imperfect than Men, neither contain, nor enjoy, either formally, or in eminency and virtue the excellent perfections of the reasonable Soul; it is evident they cannot produce it, nor consequently Man, whose chiefest and noblest part is the reasonable Soul.    

CHAP. IX. 1. The Eighth Answer of Atheists, saying, That there have been many Worlds, which have been produced the one by the other, and not by a Superior Spirit. 2. The Confutation of this Answer.  
1. THe Eighth Answer of Atheists is, That this World hath not been from all Eternity, and yet hath not been created by any Superior and Almighty Spirit; but that it hath been produced out of the Matter of another World, which was before, and that that other hath been produced out of the Matter of another, which was also before it, and so there have been many Worlds which have succeeded one another; the World that perished being the Matter of the Generations of the new produced World; and that this World which we see now, shall perish one day, and out of the Matter of it another shall be produced, and out of the Matter of that another shall be produced again, and so consequently.  
2. Against this Answer, I say, That the Worlds which are pretended to have been in time past, are either finite or infinite in number; if finite in number, it follows that there hath been a first World, which was never produced out of the Matter of another World, else it would not have been first; nor out of any Chaos or Eternal Matter, as I have sufficiently proved, in the Fifth and Sixth Chapters; and consequently the first World must needs have been created by a Superior and Almighty Spirit, who is the great God whom we adore. If infinite in number, the same absurdities which follow the infiniteness of Men, which we have showed heretofore, will also follow of the infiniteness of Worlds; for there is no greater number than an infinite number; else the less infinite number would be exceeded by the greater, and consequently should be finite and termined, seeing that which is exceeded is termined where it is exceeded. Now there is a greater number than that of the Worlds, which are pretended to have been in time past; to wit, the number of Stars, the number of Plants, the number of Animals, or the number of all Things in particular, which have been in all those pretended Worlds. Therefore the number of those Worlds (pretended to have been in time passed) is not infinite. Moreover, All those pretended Worlds were distant one from another, with a finite distance of time only, or with an infinite distance only, or some were distant with a finite distance, and others with an infinite distance: If they all have been distant with a finite distance of time only; and since a finite distance of time cannot comprehend Eternity, or infiniteness; it follows necessarily, that they have not been from all Eternity, that they have been in a finite number, and that there hath been one first, which having not produced itself, nor having been produced by a Chaos, or an Eternal Matter, as I have showed above, it must have been created of God, necessarily. If they have been all distant, with an infinite distance of time only, it follows that there hath been an infinite time, betwixt the two nearest Worlds, as well as betwixt the two remotest, which is contradictory: And if some have been distant with a finite distance of time, and others with an infinite, and one takes the two remotest Worlds in the finite distance, it will follow that one only World, to wit, the nearest, beyond one of them two, being removed from them, but with a finite distance of time, will make up an infinite distance of time, and that one finite added to another finite, will make up an infinite; which is absurd.  
I might use several other Arguments to refute this Answer of Atheists, were it not that it is sufficiently confuted in the first and second Chapters; where I have showed that Men have not been from all Eternity. I will add only, That every thing follows its natural inclination, and that which is best for it: Now if the natural inclination of Bodies, is to make a World, and that it is best for them; the World having been made, cannot have been destroyed naturally; and the Bodies did never reduce, nor resolve themselves into a Chaos: but if their inclination, and the best for them, is, not to make a World, and to remain in a Chaos; it is evident that the World cannot have been produced naturally, and that the Bodies would have remained always separate or in confusion. And besides, I have sufficiently demonstrated already, that no succession is Eternal, and consequently that of the pretended Worlds and Chaos cannot be Eternal.   

CHAP. X. 1. The Ninth Answer of Atheists, saying, That Christians confess that the World may have been from all Eternity. 2. Their Reasons to prove that the World may have been from all Eternity. 3. The Confutation of their Answer. 4. An Answer to the Reasons alleged for the possibility of the Eternity of the World.  
1. THe Ninth and last Reason of Atheists, is, That Christians confess that God may have created the World from all Eternity, though they believe he hath created it but in time. Now (say they) it is a true Axiom, that Posito possibili, nihil sequitur absurdi. That is, If one lays or supposes actually a thing possible, there follows no absurdity. And therefore seeing that the World may have been from all Eternity, there is no inconvenience nor contradiction, to suppose it actually from all Eternity.  
2. Their Reasons to prove that the World may have been from all Eternity are these. 1. All things are possible to God, Matth. 10. Therefore the Eternity of the World is possible to him. 2. God hath never been without power to create the World, but God hath been from all Eternity; therefore he may have created the World from all Eternity. 3. One ought not to deprive God of any of the perfections, which belong to the Creature, when this perfection is not accompanied of any imperfection, as is the power of Acting. Now if the Creature, for Example, the Sun, were from all Eternity, it would act and work from all Eternity, in Lightning and sending forth its Beams: Therefore God having been from all Eternity, hath acted, or may have acted from all Eternity, and consequently hath created, or may have created the World from all Eternity. 4. That which is once impossible, cannot be made possible, but always remains impossible: For Example, It is impossible that a Man should be a Beast; so it hath been and ever will be impossible for a Man to be a Beast.  
Therefore, If the World hath been sometimes impossible, to wit, from all Eternity, it follows that it never hath, nor never will be possible, and consequently hath not been created. 5. If the World hath been impossible from all Eternity, either it nath been impossible during a finite time or during an infinite time; if impossible during a finite time only, it will follow that betwixt that which hath been from all Eternity, as the impossibility of the World, and that which is not from all Eternity, as the possibility of it; the difference will be but of a finite and limited time: and besides it will follow that a finite time, such as that as is past, since the possibility of the World, added to another finite time, such as is the duration of its impossibility; will make up an infinite time, such as is the Eternity of the same impossibility; which is contradictory. And if the World hath been impossible, during an infinite time, seeing that an infinite Time, and Eternity are one and the same thing, and have neither beginning nor end, it is evident that the World shall have been Eternally impossible, and never could be produced.  
6. One must reason of the Fore-Eternity, as of the After-Eternity, seeing that of things alike the same judgement is to be made. But the World may be Eternal of the After-Eternity, seeing that God may preserve, and cause it to be and exist Eternally: therefore it may have been Eternal of the Fore-Eternity, and consequently may have been from all Eternity. 7. God might create the World before the time he created it, and before again, and always before to the infinite: therefore he may have created it from all Eternity, for to go forward to the infinite, or to Eternity, is the same thing.  

The Reply.  
3. Against this Answer, I say, That very few Christians say that the World may have been created from all Eternity, in the state it is now, because of the contradictions that would follow, the which (I hope) I have sufficiently noted already: for the same contradictions and absurdities, which follow from the existence of the World, do also follow from its creation from all Eternity. Therefore when some Christians by reason of a pious zeal, being willing to exalt the Omnipotency of God, have written, that God may have created the World from all Eternity; that is understood by the Learned of the World in another state, to wit, in a state of immobility. For Example, If God had created the Sun from all Eternity, it would have remained infinitely without motion; if God had created the Sea from all Eternity, it would have remained infinitely, without Flowing and Ebbing. If God had created Men from all Eternity, they would have remained from all Eternity, without Pulse, without Breath, and without Motion of the Animal and Vital Spirit; and without Dying; and if God had produced all other Creatures from all Eternity, they would have remained infinitely without Motion, and without being capable to be Destroyed; and during this infiniteness of time, God would not have had an obsolute Dominion and Sovereignty over them, seeing that during this infinite time he could not have destroyed them. But seeing such an Answer is repugnant to right Reason, and neither favours nor countenances Atheists; seeing it grants a Godhead, and supposes the World in another state than Atheists do; I will insist upon it no longer, but will come to the Answer of their Reasons alleged in their Answer.  
4. To their first Reason, Drawn from that excellent Truth, That all Things are possible to God: I Answer, That God may do all Things possible; but he cannot do those Things that are impossible and contridictory. For Example, God cannot Die, nor Lie; because to be God, and to be a Liar, or Mortal, are things contradictory. But the Eternity of the World is a thing impossible, and that involves and implies many absurdities and contradictories; as I have showed heretofore. I Answer again, That all Things are possible to God, but that the Eternity of the World is not a Thing, because it is impossible, and that which is impossible is nothing, and consequently may not be called a Thing.  
To the Second Reason, to wit, That God hath never been without Power to create the World, and that having been from all Eternity, he may have created the World from all Eternity: I Answer, That God hath never been without Power to create the World, when it may have been created; but the World cannot have been created from all Eternity, but only in time: Therefore God hath never been without Power to create the World in time, but he hath been from all Eternity, without having power to create the World from all Eternity. It is most true that God hath never been without his Omnipotency, and consequently hath never been without the Power to create the World; but he could not exercise and execute from all Eternity, the Act of his Omnipotency, to wit, the Creation; but only in time: Not that this proceeds from any Defect or any Impotency in God; but because the Creature cannot concur and agree with Eternity, because of the contradictions that would follow, and which I have set down already in this Tract. And as the Soul of an Infant, which is still in the Mother's Womb, hath the power to reason, in that he hath the principle of ratiocination, that is the understanding, but cannot exercise the act of that power; to wit, ratiocination; but only after his Birth and Childhood: not that such a thing proceeds from any defect in the Soul; but because the Organ, whereby ratiocination is exercised, is not yet disposed as it ought: So God hath had indeed from all Eternity the Power whereby he hath created the World, but he could not exercise from all Eternity the act of this Power; that is the Creation of the World: Not that it proceeds from any Defect in God, but because the World cannot be Eternal; as I have already sufficiently demonstrated.  
To the Third Reason drawn from this Example, That if the Sun had been from all Eternity, it would have acted, that is Enlightened from all Eternity; and likewise that God being from all Eternity, hath acted, or may have acted from all Eternity, and consequently hath created or may have created the World from all Eternity. I Answer, That to suppose the Sun-Eternal is to suppose a thing impossible. Now one must not wonder, if supposing a thing impossible, to wit, the Sun Eternal; one supposes another impossible also, viz. the Eternal illumination: For if one Creature be Eternal, the other must also be the same. But in supposing God Eternal, one supposes a thing, not only possible, but which is so actually; and from thence they infer and conclude, without ground or reason, that he may create the World from all Eternity, seeing that Eternity of this World is impossible, as (I hope) I have sufficiently proved. Therefore as God, though he be infinite, cannot produce an infinite effect; and though he be immutable, cannot produce an immutable effect; so though God be Eternal, he cannot produce an Eternal effect: because Eternity as well as infinity and immutability, are attributes incommunicable to the Creature.  
To the Fourth Reason, That if the World hath been sometimes impossible, to wit, from all Eternity, it will have been alw●●●●●possible; and consequently will not have been created. I Answer, That in the same manner, it hath been impossible, it will always be impossible; now it hath been impossible from all Eternity: therefore it will be impossible to all Eternity. And as it is not absolutely impossible, that Man should be; but it is impossible that Man should be a Beast: So it is not absolutely impossible that the World should be; but it is impossible that the World should be Eternal: and as Man never was, nor never will be a Beast; so the World never was, nor never will be Eternal.  
To the Fifth Reason, That if the World hath been impossible from all Eternity, it hath been impossible, during a finite time, or during an infinite time; which is absurd, etc. I answer, That Time and the World are always necessarily together; seeing that Time is nothing else but the continuance of Corporal Things, whereof the World is made, or the continuance of their Motion. And therefore, Since that Eternity is before Time, it is evident that, that which is from all Eternity, is before whatsoever Time, be it finite or infinite. Now it is ridiculous to ask, whether that which hath been before Time, whilst it hath been before time, hath continued and lasted, a finite or infinite Time. Moreover, I Answer as before, viz. That the World hath not been absolutely impossible, seeing it hath been possible in time, but that it hath been impossible from all Eternity; and that this impossibility of the World from all Eternity, hath been; is, and shall be to all Eternity.  
To the Sixth Reason, That the World may be Eternal of the After-Eternity, and consequently that it may have been Eternal of the Fore-Eternity, and so from all Eternity. I Answer, That Eternity being an attribute of the Godhead, incommunicable to the Creature, is not different from the Godhead: and therefore as the Godhead is always the same, indivisible and without parts, though its immensity, which is not different from it, be without Limits, and cannot be measured, by any greatness; all Bodies being but a point of this Immensity; So Eternity hath been, is, and always shall be the same, indivisible and without parts; though it cannot be measured by Ages, which always will be no more than a point of this Eternity. From whence it follows, That those Men, which divide it, in the Fore and After-Eternity, do not at all understand the nature of Eternity; seeing that these words, Before and After, belong only to such things, as are subject to Time, Motion, and Succession, and whereof the Parts perish one after another; and not to Eternity, which is before Time, and without Parts, and whereof nothing can perish. Besides, There is a vast difference betwixt these two pretended Eternity's, as I have amply demonstrated, in my Reply to their second Answer; chief in that the Fore-Eternity is all past; and that the After-Eternity shall never pass, nor end. And if one should suppose of the After-Eternity, that which is most true of the Fore-Eternity, to wit, that it is all past; it is evident it should be finite and limited on all sides, viz. By this Day, and by the last time of this Eternity, which should pass, and end. And if it be finite, it cannot be a true Eternity; for a true Eternity is an infinite continuance.  
To the Seventh Reason, That God might create the World before the time he created it, and before again, and always before, to the infinite, and consequently from all Eternity. I Answer, That though the World in its total, may have been created in less time; seeing that God who created it in six days, might have created it in one day, yea, in a moment. Nevertheless it is most true, That the World, if we have a regard to the first Creatures, which are the chiefest parts of the same, to wit, the Heavens and the Earth, could not be made sooner than it hath been made, and could not be created, before the time it hath been created; because before the time, that the World hath been created, there was no other continuance than Eternity: but the World cannot have been from all Eternity, as I have demonstrated: Therefore the World cannot have been before the time it hath been created. And indeed these words of Before and After, Sooner and Later, cannot belong but to time, that hath Parts, whereof some are Sooner, some Later, some Before, and some After. But Eternity being indivisible, and without Parts (as I have proved) can have neither Before nor After; and consequently, though Eternity, may have been before the World and before Time, nevertheless there was in it neither Before nor After. Therefore one cannot say, That the World may have been Before, and Before again, and always Before to the infinite: because where there is a Before, and again another Before, and always a Before, to infinite, there are many Befores (if I may so speak) whereof one is Before, and the other After; but in the Eternity before the World, and before Time, there have been neither Before nor After.  
And if any one objects. That the Heaven and the Earth which have been the first Creatures, may have been created later; and consequently may have been created sooner: I Answer, That Heaven and Earth may be considered, either as Creatures, or as the first Creatures. If they be considered as Creatures, I say that they might have been created later, seeing that God, who created them the first day, might have created them the second day, and some others the first day: But if they be considered as the first Creatures, I say they could not be created later; because they could not be created later, but in creating them after some others. Now if they had been created after others, they should not have been the first Creatures. Moreover, Though the Heaven and the Earth, which have been the first Creatures, might have been created later, in the manner aforesaid; yet it doth not follow that they may have been sooner than they have been: because that before the Time, or before the first Creatures, there have not been, nor could have been any continuance, but Eternity. Now the first Creatures, and so consequently the World, cannot have been from all Eternity, as I have sufficiently proved. Therefore the World, or the Creatures, cannot have been before the time they have been; and consequently cannot have been sooner than they have been.  
Finally, According to the common Opinion, one might say, That though the World might have been created before, and before again; and always before to the infinite; yet it would not follow that the World might have been from all Eternity. For though a Body may be supposed greater than another, to the infinite, yet it does not follow, that there is a Body actually infinite; seeing that this progression to the infinite, doth not reach farther, than to an infinite in power (i.e. Potentia; as they speak in the School) which is always actually finite: So though the World might have been before, and always before, to the infinite; it does not follow that the World may have been from all Eternity; seeing that this progression to the infinite, does not reach further than to all infinite in power, which is also actually finite, and comprehended, and included in the temporal continuance.  
And now Courteous Reader, I shall end this Chapter, together with this long, but (I hope) solid Disputation, against the most profane and ungrateful Men that ever were, I mean the Atheists, with this advice, That if ever thou chancest to dispute with them, to make use of the Reasons set down in this Chapter, especially the first in the Reply, as being the chief that proves demonstratively that there is a GOD; and so forcibly convinces Atheists, that they are not only without Answer, but even without Evasion.    

CHAP. XI. Other Reasons proving that there is a God.  
1. The First Reason is drawn from the Order of the Universe. 2. The Second, From the general Consent of all People and Nations, who ever acknowledged a Godhead. 3. The Third, From the fear of the Judgements of God, because of Sin. 4. The Fourth, From the existence of Devils. 5. The Fifth, Is drawn from the first Mover, and the first Cause. 6. The Sixth, From the Novelty of Histories. 7. And the Seventh, From the Consideration that the Sea hath not submerged the Earth.  

First Reason.  
THe First Reason that proves a Godhead, Is drawn from the Disposition and admirable Order of the Universal World: thus, Order admits and presupposes Intelligence and Wisdom; for Order being a convenient Disposition of Things, according to the dignity of each; that they may be conveniently disposed, they ought to be first compared among themselves, and one must know their Dignity, which is proper to Intelligence. And Secondly, They must be placed and disposed, according to their Rank and Dignity, which is proper to Wisdom. Therefore seeing that Order presupposes Intelligence and Wisdom; a most excellent and most perfect Order, presupposes a Sovereign and most perfect Intelligence and Wisdom; but the Order and Disposition of all the parts of the World, is most perfect and most excellent: Therefore there must needs be a most Sovereign Intelligence, and a most perfect Wisdom; that may have given this admirable Order and Disposition: Now this sovereign Intelligence, and this perfect Wisdom, we call Divinity.  
Now that the Order and Disposition of the Universe is most perfect and most excellent, appears, if one takes a view of all the Parts thereof: In the Heavens you see the Stars of the Firmament twinkling and sparkling as so many petty Suns, and always keeping the same distance among themselves: The Sun that never goes beyond the Tropikes, and other Stars, having their Motion so excellently regulated, that they were never seen out of their ordinary course, but by a Miracle. Now from whence may come this uniformity of Motion, but from the first Mover; who always remaining firm and , moves all things according to his will? From whence comes it to pass, That the Motions of the Sun is so moderate, that it rules and directs all other Motions here below? Why does it rather move from East to West, rather than from the North to the South? And why, being come to a certain Point, it never goes any farther? but because there is a Sovereign Moderator of this Universe, who hath assigned to all Things Bounds and Limits, beyond which they cannot go? Descend from the Heavens to the Elements, and you shall see that though they be totally contrary one to the other, yet they all enter in the composition of all Bodies: and as sometimes a sweet Harmony is caused by different Sounds, so from the contrariety of the Elements, is made up that Temper and Proportion which is to be seen in all mixed Bodies. Now from whence may proceed this mutual Agreement of Countraries, whose property it is (if we believe Philosophers) to destroy one another, or expel one another; but from a superior Spirit, who hath made them subject to his Will? Consider the Earth in particular, you shall find it almost every where differing and unlike: Here it is Slimy and Muddy, in another sort Dry and Sandy; in some places it will breed Fruits only, in another Vines and Corn: Hic segetes illic veniunt felicius uvae, Arborei faetus alibi, etc. In Peru there are Mines of Silver and Gold; in Swedeland Mines of Iron and Copper; in Cornwall are the Mines of Tynn; and in other Countries of other Minerals. Egypt and Sicily are fruitful in Corns; Numidia in Dates, Tunis in Olive-trees; the Island Madera in Sugar; and most part of the Countries in Europe in Wines. In Arabia are Flying Serpents; in Egypt Crocodiles, in England Coursing Horses, fierce Mastiffs, etc. In Scotland Tracing Dogs, in Africa are Lions, in Asia Elephants; and in other Countries are sundry sorts of divers Animals. Now from whence comes this diversity and variety of Lands and Soils, but from him who created and produced them? Who gave to so many differing and unlike Creatures, those Verrues and Properties which they have, but him, who communicated them unto them when he created and gave them their Being's?  
Cast your Eyes upon the Waters, and consider the sweet Fountains springing out of the Salt Sea, the Springs and Sources of several Rivers bubbling out of the Tops of the highest Mountains, and yet proceed from the Sea, a great deal lower than they. The Rivers, Nilus, Miger, and Paraguez, which at their appointed time, never fail to overflow the Lands to fatten them: Some Waters will presently congeal and kill them that drink of them, and some others are Healthful, and will cure the most inveterate Maladies. There are some Springs Hot and Scalding Water; others whose Waters are turned into Flints: But above all other Things, admire that so well ordered Flowing and Ebbing of the Sea, whereof the certain cause is unknown to this very day; the great Whales and others Marine Monsters that are in it; and so many other Wonderful Things, that point out (as it were with the Finger) the infinite Power, and the Eternal Wisdom of a Divinity.  
Finally, Let us consider ourselves, and observe the Frame of our Bodies, so admirably ordered, that the best understanding Men do greatly wonder at it: Nay look upon the wonder of our Eyes and Ears, the Ability and Nimbleness of our Hands, the Dispensation of Spirits, for the Motions of our Members, and the Functions of our Senses, the Light of our Understanding, its Prompt and Nimble Actions, its Conduct and Guiding so excellent, its great Capacity to Reason of all Things: And after all that we will be worse than the Beasts of the Fields, and all Creeping Things upon the Earth, if we do not confess and acknowledge that there is a GOD, in whom we Live, and Move, and have our Being; and all these things, that the more clear sighted Fathers, must acknowledge, they can in no ways communicate to their Children.   

The Second Reason.  
The Second Reason, Which proves a Divinity, is drawn from the general Consent of all People and Nations of the Earth, who ever acknowledged a Divinity. For a Tully saith in the First Book of his Laws, There is never a People so Rude and Barbarous but confesses that a God must be said (that is acknowledged.) Seneca in 117. Epistle saith, That there is no People so perverted but believes there are Gods: And Aristotle in the Third Chapter of the First Book of Heaven, writes, That all Men one way or other acknowledge a Divinity. Now seeing that as Tully saith, in the First Book of his Question. Tusc.) The Consent of all People is to be esteemed a Law of Nature: One must believe that Naturally some Knowledge and Apprehension of a Divinity is (as it were) printed and stamped in the Heart of every Man; and certainly the belief Men have of a Divinity, is most considerable in this, That no Man can bring any solid Reasons against it; that it is spread all the World over; that it hath been received in all Ages; that it hath constantly maintained itself amidst all the Revolutions of Humane Sensuality; that it hath been found in the remotest Islands, and in those Lands which are separated from us by such a most unconceivable vastness of Seas; that they have been discovered but in later Ages. And it is a wonderful thing, that those Men, which have almost, if not altogether, lost the knowledge of their Original, and of the straits through which the Colonies they are de●●●●ded from; and have almost lost all Hum●●ity 〈…〉 and Devouring one another, 〈…〉 this belief, That there is some, Superior Spirit over them. Not that there is not always some Fools, which say, There is 〈◊〉 as it is said in the Psalms: But they commonly are Men abandoned to their Pleasures, and devoted to all Wickedness, who endeavour to persuade themselves against their own Light and Conscience, that there is no Judge to punish their Impiety and Ungodliness; or they are Men of a mean Learning, who yet will go under the Notions of Wits, in receding as much as they can from the universal Belief of the World, assaulting (if one may so speak) him who so glorioufly appears by his Works, and Shows himself to all Eyes in the World; or lastly, they are poor simple and ignorant Fellows, who are seduced to Atheism by their frequenting with these Impious and Profane Men. And if any Rude and Savage Nation is guilty of some strange and monstrous Mis-apprehensions of the Divinity, that I say is no more to be inferred against the general Consent of all Nations, than Monsters and Prodigies, which are Born against the Natural course of Nature, and the ordinary way it follows in the production of its works.   

The Third Reason.  
The Third Reason, Is drawn from the terrors of Conscience, because of Sin, for those Fears and Terrors which Men feel after the Commission of some Wickedness, show evidently that there is a God that terrifies them by the inward threats of his Vengeance: and it is to no purpose to say that the fears of the Penalties of the Laws breeds these Terrors within them; seeing that Supreme Magistrates, to wit, Princes and Kings, who are not subject to these Laws, are troubled with these Terrors as well as others: witness, Emperor Caligula, the most furious and raging of all Men, against God; who yet when it thundered, as if the Living God had spoken from Heaven, would hid himself under his Bed, as if he would have made with it a shield against the Thunderbolts. And though in some Men, the Pleasures and Sensualities wherein they drown themselves, do for a time blunt the sense of these Terrors; yet it is to be believed certainly, that in that case it is with them as with those Prisoners. Which will be Drunk and Merry for all their Shackles and Fetters; but when once the fumes are puffed out, and they begin to reflect upon their Crimes and their Judge; the very Idea and Representation of a Gibbet, will make them shake and tremble: so I say it is with these Impious Men; for being forced to leave their Pleasures and Sensualities, and particularly when Death draws near unto them, they reflect upon the Justice of God, and tremble at the Idea and Horrors of Hell, which is prepared for them.   

The Fourth Reason.  
The Fourth Reason, Is drawn from the existence of Devils, who being men's Mortal Enemies and mightier than they, would have already destroyed them were there not a God, who holds their Bridle so fast, that they can do nothing without his permission. Now that there are Devils, appears by the woeful confession and condition of so many Witches and Magicians Condemned to Death; for having given themselves to the Devil, and committed a world of Wickedness by his Instigation; as also by so many Men, who by the just Permission of God, and that for their Sins, have been possessed with the Devil. And by so many true Histories, received by the most excellent Wits; which tell us that very prodigious things have been acted by Devils, which exceeded the strength of all other Creatures: See d' Assigni in the Preface Porphir. etc.   

The Fifth Reason.  
The Fifth Reason, Is drawn from the first Mover, and grounded upon this Principle, That whatsoever Moves, is moved by another, and that other is moved again by another, and so consequently till one stays at last to a first  Mover of all Things, which is God; else one would proceed to the infinite, and consequently there would be an infiniteness of Movers, which is impossible.  
The same may be said of the First Cause, and may be grounded upon this Principle, That whatsoever is produced, is produced by a Cause, and this Cause is again produced by another, and so consequently till one comes to a first Cause of all Things, which is God; else one would proceed to the infinite, and there would be an infiniteness of Causes, which is impossible.  
Another Reason may be drawn from the independency of the first Being, thus: Either all Things that have a Being, have their Being of another, or there is some one which hath not, its Being of another, but of itself: Now all Things have not their Being of another; else it would follow, that that other Thing should have its Being of itself; seeing it is comprised under this Word, All Things: Therefore there is something which hath not its Being of another but of itself; and that Thing cannot be no other but God.  
Thus again, I may reason from the necessity of the first Being, Either all Things are contingent, or there is one necessary: Now all Things are not contingent; else they might not have been; and suppose they had not been, it would have been impossible that they should have been afterwards; seeing that nothing produces itself, and that there would never have been any Agent, that might have produced them, every Agent being comprised and included, under this word, All Things: therefore there hath been a necessary Thing which hath produced all contingent Things; and that Thing can't be no other but God.  
Lastly, I may make use here of another Reason, drawn from the excellency of the first Being; in this manner: The Things which are more or less, such, or like, are related to one that is chief and principally such: For Example, Things more or less hot, are related to that which is most hot, viz. to the Fire; Things more or less white, are related to that which is most white, viz. to Snow, or any other whiter Thing, if there is any; and Things more or less Bright are related to that which is most Bright and Shining, viz. to the Sun: There are Things more or less perfect and excellent, therefore they are related to a thing most perfect and most excellent, viz. to GOD; seeing that by the word GOD, we conceive, mean, and understand the most excellent, and the most perfect of all Things.   

The Sixth Reason.  
The Sixth Reason may be deduced from the Novelty of Histories, for it is most true that the most Ancient profane Histories, reach very little beyond the War of Troy, that is about Three thousand years; seeing that since the Destruction of Troy, unto the Foundation of Rome, Men reckon but Four hundred thirty two years; and since the Foundation of Rome to the Nativity of Christ, 〈◊〉 be is but Seven hundred and fifty years: and from Jesus Christ unto this day, we commonly reckon but One thousand six hundred seventy eight years; and the Holy History written by Moses, the most Ancient of all Histories, does not go beyond Five or six thousand years. Now it is not likely that if Men had been from all Eternity, we should have the Histories but of Five or sixthousand years. For as if the World should still continue, Two or three hundred thousand years, Men would surely have all that time the Histories of above Six thousand years: So if Men had been from all Eternity, and that there were above an Hundred thousand times, an Hundred millions of years since they had had a Being, certainly we should reckon above Six thousand years; and the Memory of all Men would not only extend itself to so few years as it does.  
If any object, That some Nations have reckoned Twenty thousand years, and others Fifty thousand, or more; I say that those Books which relate these Things are fabulous, and their Authors had no ground for what they writ; or one may say, That those Nations which have reckoned Twenty thousand years, did reckon their years by the seasons of each year; and those that have reckoned Fifty, did reckon the years according to the course of the Moon, and did reckon months for years. Therefore one must say, That Men have had a Beginning, and that not having had it of themselves, seeing that nothing produces itself; they have had it of another, to wit, of God, the most wise Creator of the Universe, as I have proved sufficiently. Add to this reason that the invention or finding out of Arts and Sciences, is since five or six thousand years, which doth evidently show a Beginning, being not likely that Men would have remained an infiniteness of time, before the finding out of the same.   

The Seventh Reason.  
The Seventh Reason is drawn from the Consideration, That the Sea hath not submerged the Earth: I reason thus, If the Earth and the Sea had been from all Eternity, it would follow that the Channels of the Sea should have been filled long ago; and consequently that the Sea would have covered the face of the whole Earth. which yet is not come to pass. To verify and make that good, one must suppose a thing, which I hold to be most true, and which cannot be denied, to wit, that Rain and Floods troubling and thickening in Rivers, by the Earth they carry away with them; and these Rivers carrying again these troubled Waters into the Sea, do bring in it more Earth than comes out of it. From whence I frame this Argument: If by reason of Rain or Floods, a little quantity of Earth enters into the Sea, without coming out of it again, it follows that within an infinite time, such as Eternity is, the Channels of the Sea should be filled: for if but one Corn of Sand or Earth should enter into the Sea every year, Eternity comprehending an infiniteness of years, it is evident that an infiniteness of Earth should have entered into the Sea, and would have filled not only the Channels of the Sea, but an hundred millions of others, if there were so many; and so the Sea would have covered the face of the Earth. But by reason of Rain and Floods, a little quantity of Earth enters into the Rivers, and from thence into the Sea, without ever coming out of it again. Therefore within an infinite time, such as Eternity is, the Channels of the Sea would be filled; and consequently if the Earth and the Sea had been from all Eternity, the Channels of the Sea being filled, the Sea would have covered the whole Earth. By this Reason, Polybius in the Fourth Book of his History, proves that the Euxine Sea, and other places, shall be filled at last: And Herodotus in the Second Book, uses the same Reason, to prove, that sometimes Egypt was a Sea. Seeing then that the Sea hath not covered the Earth, Let us conclude that neither Sea nor Earth have been from all Eternity, but have had a Beginning; and having not had it of themselves, seeing that nothing is the cause of itself, they must necessarily have had it of another, and that is the great and glorious God, whom we adore; to him be Praise, Honour, and Glory, from Everlasting to Everlasting. Amen.  
FINIS.