CASTIGATIONS OF Mr. HOBBES HIS LAST ANIMADVERSIONS, IN The case concerning LIBERTY▪ and Universal NECESSITY, Wherein all his Excep●…ions about that Controversy are fully satisfied.  
By john Bramhall, D. D. and Bishop of Derry.  
Prov. 12. 19 The lip of truth shall be established for ever, but a lying tongue is but for a moment.  
London, Printed by E. T. for I. Crook. 1657.   

An Answer to Mr. Hobbs his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and first to his Epistle to the Reader  
CHristian Reader, thou hast here the testimony of Mr. Hobbs, that the questions concerning Necessity, Freedom, and Chance, are clearly discussed between him and me, in that little volume which he hath lately published. If they be, it were strange, whilst we agree not much better about the terms of the controversy, than the builders of Babel did understand one another's language. A necessity upon supposition (which admits a possibility of the 
Mr. Hobbs mistake of the question.  contrary) is mistaken for an absolute and true necessity. A freedom from compulsion is confounded with a freedom from necessitation, mere spontaneity usurpeth the place of true liberty; no chance is acknowledged, but what is made chance by our ignorance or nescience, because we know not the right causes of it. I desire to retain the proper terms of the Schools: Mr. Hobbs flies to the common conceptions of the vulgar, a way seldom trodden, but by false Prophets, and seditious Orators. He preferreth their terms as more intelligible; I esteem them much more obscure and confused. In such intricate questions, vulgar brains are as uncapable of the things, as of the terms.  
But thus it behoved him to prevaricate, that he might not seem to swim against an universal stream, nor directly to oppose the general current of the Christian World. There was an odd fantastic person in our times, one Thomas Leaver, who would needs publish a Logic in our mother's tongue. You need not doubt but that the public good was pretended. And because the received terms of art seemed to him too abstruse, he translated them into English, styling a Subject an Inholder, an Accident an Inbeer. A Proposition a Shewsay, an affirmative Proposition a Yeasav, a negative proposition a Naysay, the subject of the Proposition the Foreset, the predicate the Backset, the conversion the turning of the Foreset, into the Backset, and the Backset into the Foreset. Let M. Hobbs himself be judge, whether the common Logical notions, or this new gibberish were less intelligible. 
Haec à se non multum abludit imago.   
But Reader, dost thou desire to see the question 
Mr. Hobbs his principles refuted by his practice.  discussed clearly to thy satisfaction? observe but Mr. Hobbs his practics, and compare them with his principles, and there needs no more. He teacheth that all causes, and all events are absolutely necessary; yet if any man cross him, he frets and fumes and talks his pleasure; jussit quod splendida bilis. Doth any man in his right wits use to be angry with causes that act necessarily? He might as well be angry with the Sun, because it doth not rise an hour sooner, or with the Moon because it is not always full for his pleasure. he commands his servant to do thus, to as much purpose if he be necessitated to do otherwise, as Canutus commanded the waves of the Sea to flow no higher. He punisheth him if he transgress his commands, with as much justice if he have no dominion over his own actions, as Xe●…xes commanded so many stripes to be given to the H●…llespont, for breaking down his Bridge. He exhorts him and reprehends him; He might as well exhort the fire to burn, or reprehend it for burning of his clothes. He is as timorous in a thunder, or a storm, as cautelous and deliberative in doubtful cases, as if he believed that all things in the World were contingent, and nothing necessary. Sometimes he chideth himself; how ill advised was I, to do thus or so? O that I had thought better upon it, or had done otherwise. Yet all this while he believeth that it was absolutely necessary for him to do what he did and impossible for him to have done otherwise. Thus his own practice doth sufficiently confute his tenets. He will tell us that he is timorous and solicitous because he knows not how the causes will determine. To what purpose? Whether their determination be known or unknown, he cannot alter it with his endeavours. He will tell us that deliberation must concur to the production of the effect. Let it be so but if it do concur necessarily, Why is he so solicitous and so much perplexed? Let him sleep or wake, take care or take no care, the necessary causes must do their work.  
Yet from our collision some light hath proceeded towards the elucidation of this question, and much more might have arisen, if Mr. Hobbes had been pleased to retain the ancient School terms, for want of which his discourse is still ambiguous and confused. As here he tells thee, That we both maintain that men are free to do as they will, and to forbear as they will. My charity leads me to take him in the best sense, only of free acts, and then with dependence upon the first cause. That man who knows not his idiotismes, would think the cause was yielded in these words, whereas in truth they 
Freedom to do and not to will, refuted.  signify nothing. His meaning is, He is as free to do and forbear, as he is free to call back yesterday. He may call until his heart ache, but it will never come. He saith, A man is free to do if he will, but he is not free to will if he will. If he be not free to will, than he is not free to do. Without the concurrence of all necessary causes it is impossible that the effect should be produced. But the concurrence of the will is necessary to the production of all free or voluntary acts. And if the will be necessitated to nil, as it may be, than the act is impossible: And then he saith no more in effect but this. A man is free to do if he will, that which is impossible for him to do. By his doctrine all the powers and faculties of a man are as much necessitated and determinated to one, by the natural influence of extrinsical causes, as the will. And therefore upon his own grounds, a man is as free to will as to do.  
The points wherein he saith we disagree are set down loosely in like manner. What our Tenets are, the Reader shall know more truly and distinctly, by comparing our writings together, then by this false dim light which he holds out unto him.  
He is pleased, if not ironically, yet certainly more for his own glory, than out of any respect to me, to name me a learned Schoole-Divine, An honour which I vouchsafe not to myself. My life hath been too practical, to attend so much to those speculative Studies. It may be the Schoolmen have started many superfluous questions, and some of dangerous consequence; But yet I say the weightier Ecclesiastical controversies will never be understood and stated distinctly, without the help of their necessary distinctions.  
Reader, I shall not in this rejoinder abuse thy patience with the needless repetition of those things which thou hast seen already, nor quest at every lark which he springs; but wheresoever he hath put any new weight into the scale, either in his answers or objections, I shall not omit it in due place.   

AN ANSWER TO HIS RELATION Of the Occasion of the Controversy.  
HEre is nothing of moment to advantage his cause. Another man would say, Here is nothing alleged by him which is true. Whereas he saith, That the question disputed among the old Philosophers was, Whether all things that 
1. Eleven gross mistakes in a few lines.  come to pass, proceed from necessity, or some from chance? It was as well debated among the old Philosophers, Whether all things come to pass by chance, and nothing proceed from necessity? And likewise, Whether some events proceed from necessity, and some come to pass by chance? as that which he mentions, Whether all events proceed from necessity, or some come to pass by chance? That is the first error.  
His second error is, That he opposeth chance to necessity, as if all things came to 
2.  pass by necessity, which come not to pass by chance: whereas those ancient Philosophers, (of whom he speaks) did oppose contigency to necessity, and not chance alone. Chance is but one branch of contingency. Free acts are done contingently, but not by chance.  
Thirdly, He is mistaken in this also, that he saith, Those ancient Philosophers did never 
3.  draw into argument, the almighty power of the Deity. For we find in Tully, and in Chrysippus, (as he is alleged by Eusebius) That one 
De praepar. Evang. l. 4. c. 11.  of the main grounds of the Stoics was the prescience of God; and that the predictions of their Oracles and Prophets could not be certain, unless all things came to pass by inevitable necessity.  
Fourthly, he erreth in this, That liberty is a third way of bringing things to pass, distinct 
4.  from necessity and contingency: For liberty is subordinate to contingency. They defined contingents to be those things, which might either come to pass, or not come to pass, that is, either freely, or casually: and in all their questions of contingency, liberty was principally understood.  
His fifth error is, That freewill is a thing that was never mentioned among them. I believe 
5.  it was never mentioned by them in English, by the name of free will; but he may find 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Let him read Aristotle alone, and he shall find not only this free elective power of the will, but also the difference between voluntary or spontaneous 
Ethic. l. 3. c. 3. 4, 5.  (which is all the liberty he admitteth) and free, or that which is elected upon deliberation. Here Calvine, Semper apud Latinos liberi arbitrii nomen extitit, Graecos vero non puduit arrogantius usurpare vocabulum, seiquidem, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, dixerunt, 2 Instit. cap. 2. Sect. 4.  
Sixthly, he erreth yet more grossly, in saying, 
6.  That free will was never mentioned by Christians in the beginning of Christianity, but, for some ages brought in by the Doctors of the Roman Curch. Whereas it is undeniably true, That sundry ancient fathers have written whole Treatises expressly of free will, that there is scarcely one father that doth not mention it; and sundry of the first Heretics, as Simon Magus, the Manichees, the Marcionites, etc. and their followers, have been condemned for maintaining absolute necessity against freewill.  
His seventh error is, That St. Paul never 
7.  useth the term of free will, nor did hold any doctrine equivalent to it. Hear himself, Am I not 
1 Cor. 9 1, 5, 6.  an Apostle? Am I not free? Have we not power to lead about a sister, a wife, as well as the othor Apostles? Or I only and Barnabas, have not we power to forbear working? St. Paul did those things freely upon his own election, which he was not necessitated to do; and did forbear those things freely, which he was not necessitated to forbear. This doctrine is equivalent to ours of the freedom of the will from necessitation. Take another place, wherein you have both the name and the thing; Nevertheless, he that standeth steadfast in his heart, having no 
1 Cor. 7. 3.  necessity, bu●… hath power over his own will. The words in the original are a plain description of the old 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (which name Calvin did so much dislike) or free will, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Here is not only freedom, but power and dominion. Mr. Hobbes teacheth us, That a man is free to do, but not free to will. St. Paul teacheth us, That a man hath power over his own will: If he have power over his own will, than he is free to will, than his will is not extrinsecally predetermined.  
Eighthly, he wrongs the Doctors of the Roman Church, as if they exempted the will 
8.  of man from the dominion of Gods will. They maintain, That the freedom of the will of man is expressly from the will of God, who made it free. They reach that God can suspend the act of the will, can determine the will, can change the will, doth dispose of all the acts of the will, can do any thing but compel the will, which implieth a contradiction.  
Ninthly, (to let us see what a profound 
9,  Clerk he is in Ecclesiastical controversies) Mr. Hobbes thinks he hath hit the nail on the head, of the difference between the Church of Rome and us, concerning free will, in this disputation, Just as the blind Senator in Juvenal made a large encomium of the goodly Turbot which lay before Caesar, but (as ill luck would have it) turned himself the quite contrary way: At illi dextr●… jacebat Bellua. The controversy lies on the other side, not about the freedom of the will in natural or civil actions, which is our question, but (if it be not a logomachy) about the power of free will, in moral and supernatural actions, without the assistance of grace.  
In the tenth place, he misinforms his Readers, 
10.  That this opinion (of freedom from necessitation and determination to one,) was cast out by the reformed Churches, instructed by Luther, Calvine, and others. Where have the reformed Churches, or any of them in their public confessions cast out this freedom from necessitation, whereof we write? Indeed Luther was once against it, and so was Melancthon, but they grew wiser, and retracted whatsoever they had written against it. And 
Visitat. Saxon. Loc. come. edit. poster.  so would Mr. Hobbes do likewise, if he were well advised: Either he did know of Luther's retraction; and than it was not ingenously done to conceal it, or (which I rather believe) he did not know of it, and then he is but meanly versed in the doctrine and affairs of the Protestants.  
Lastly, he accuseth Arminius to have been 
11  a restorer or reducer of the Romish doctrine of free will, by a postliminium. I do not think that ever he read one word of Arminius in his life, or knoweth distinctly one opinion that Arminius held. It was such deep Controvertists as himself, that accused the Church of England of●… Arminianism, for holding those truths, which they ever professed before Arminius was born. If Arminius were alive, Mr. Hobbes out of conscience, aught to ask him forgiveness. Let him speak for himself, De libero hominis arbitrio ita sentio, &c, In statu vero lapsus, &c, This is my sentence of free will, That man fallen, can neither think, nor will, nor do that which is truly good, of himself, and 
Declar. Sententiae. Arminii ad Ord. Hollandiae.  from himself, But that it is needful, that he be regenerated, and renewed in his understanding, will, affections, and all his powers, from God, in Christ, by the Holy Ghost, to understand, esteem, consider, will, and do aright that which is truly good. It was not the speculative doctrine of Arminius, but the seditious tenets of Mr. Hobbes, and such like, which opened a large window to our troubles.  
How is it possible to pack up more errors together in so narrow a compass? If I were worthy to advise Mr. Hobbes, he should neve●… have more to do with these old Philosophe●… (except it were to weed them for some obs●…lete opinions: Chrysippus used to say, He sometimes wanted opinions, but never wanted arguments) but to stand upon his own bottom, and make himself both Party, Jurer, and Judge in his own cause.  

Concerning the stating of the question.  
THe right stating of the question, is commonly the mid way to the determination of the difference, and he himself confesseth, that I have done that more than once, saving that he thinketh, I have done it over cautiously, with as much caution as I would draw up a lease. Abundant caution was never thought hurtful until now: Doth not the truth require as much regard as a lease? On the other side, I accuse him to have stated it too carelessly, loosely, and confusedly. He saith, He understands not these words, [the contversion of a 
The conversion of a sinner concerneth not this question.  sinner concerns not the question] I do really believe him: But in concluding, That whatsoever he doth not understand, is unintelligible; he doth but abuse himself and his readers. Let him study better what is the different power of the will, in natural or civil actions, which is the subject of our discourse, and moral or supernatural acts, which concerns not this question; and the necessi●…y of adding these words, will clearly appear to him.  
Such another pitiful piece is his other exception, 
A wilful cavil.  against these words, [without their own concurrence] which he saith are unsignificant, unless I mean that the events themselves, should concur to their own production: Either these words were unsignificant, or he was blind, or worse than blind, when he transcribed them. My words were these, [Whether all Agents, and all Events be predetermined:] He fraudulently 
Num. 3.  leaves out these words, [all Agents,] and makes me to state the question thus, Whether all Events be predetermined without their own concurrence. Whereas those words, without their own concurrence, had no reference at all to all Events, but to all Agents; which words he hath omitted.  
The state of the question being agreed upon, it were vanity, and mere beating of the air in me, to weary myself and the reader, with the serious examination of all his extravagant and impertinent fancies: As this, Whether there be a moral efficacy which is not natural? which is so far from being the question 
Difference between natural & moral efficacy.  between us, that no man makes any question of it, except one, who hath got a blow upon his head with a mill-saile. Natural causes produce their effects by a true real influence, which implies an absolute determination to one: as a father begets a son, or fire produceth fire. Moral causes have no natural influence into the effect, but move or induce some other cause without themselves to produce it: As when a Preacher persuadeth his hearers to give alms; here is no absolute necessitation of his hearers, nor any thing that is opposite to true liberty.  
Such another question is that which follows, Whether the object of the sight be the cause of seeing? meaning, (if he mean aright,) the subjective cause. Or, how the understanding doth propose the object to the will? which though it be blind, as Philosophers agree, yet not so blind as he, that will not see, but is ready to follow the good advice of the intellect. I may not desert that which is generally approved, to satisfy the fantastic humour of a single conceited person. No man would take exceptions at these phrases, the will willeth, the understanding understandeth, the former term expressing the faculty, the later, the elicit act, but one who is resolved to pick quarrels with the whole World.  
To permit a thing willingly to be done by another, that is evil, not for the evils sake which 
Not to will is a means of abnegation between willing and niling.  is permitted, but for that goods sake which is to be drawn out of it, is not to will it positively, nor to determine it to evil by a natural influence; which whosoever do maintain, do undeniably make God the author of sin. Between positive willing, and nilling, there is a mean of abnegation, that is not to will.  
That the will doth determine itself, is a truth not to be doubted of; what different degrees of aid or assistance the will doth stand in need of in different Acts, natural, moral, supernatural; where a general assistance is sufficient, and where a special assistance is necessary; is altogether impertinent to this present controversy, or to the right stating of this question.  
In the last place, he repeateth his old distinction, between a man's freedom to do those 
His distinction between free to will, and free to do, confuted.  things which are in his power, if he will; and the freedom to will what he will, which he illustrateth (for similitudes prove nothing) by a comparison drawn from the natural appetite, to the rational appetite. Will is appetite, but it is one question Whether he be free to eat that hath an appetite; And another question whether he be free to have an appetite. In the former, he saith, He agreeth with me, That a man is free to do what he will. In the later he saith, He dissents from me, That a man is not free to will, And (as if he had uttered some profound mystery) he addeth in a triumphing manner, That, if I have not been able to distinguish between th●…se two questions, I have not done well to meddle with either. And if I have understood them, to bring arguments to prove that a man is free to do if he will, is to deal uningenuously and fraudulently with my readers.  
Yet let us have good words. Homini homino quid praestat? What difference is there between man and man? That so many wits before Mr. Hobbes in all Ages should beat their brains about this question, all their lives long, and never meet with this distinction, which strikes the question dead. What should hinder him from crying out 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. I have found it, I have found it. But stay a little, the second thoughts are wiser, and the more I look upon this distinction, the less I like it. It seemeth like the log in the fable, which terrified the poor Frogs with the noise it made at the first falling of it into the water, but afterwards they insulted over it, and took their turns to leap upon it. Some take it to be pure nonsense; Whether a man be free in such things as be within his power: That is, whether he be free wherein he is free, or that be within his power, which is in his power.  
I have formerly showed, and shall demonmonstrate further as there is occasion, that this distinction is contradictory and destructive to his own grounds, according to which all the other powers and faculties of a man are determined to one, by an extrinsical flux of natural causes, equally with the will. And therefore a man is no more necessitated to will, or choose what he will do, than to do what he wills. Secondly, I have showed, that this distinction is vain and unuseful, and doth not hold off, so much as one blow from Mr. Hob●…es and his bleeding cause. All those gross absurdities which do necessarily follow the inevitable determinations of all actions and events by extrinsical causes, do fall much more heavily and insupportably upon the extrinsical determination of the will. So he sticks deeper, by means of this distinction in the same mire. All the ground of justice that he can find in punishments, is this; That though men's actions be necessary, yet they do them willingly. Now if the will be irresistibly determined to all its individial acts, than there is no more justice to punish a man for willing necessarily, than for doing necessarily. Thirdly, I have showed already in part, that this distinction is contrary to the sense of the whole World, who take the will to be much more free than the performance: Which may be thus enlarged.  
Though a man were thrust into the deepest dungeon in Europe, yet in despite of all the second causes, he may will his own liberty. Let the causes heap a conglomeration of diseases upon a man, more than Herod had, yet he may will his own health, Though a man be withheld from his friend by Seas and Mountains, yet he may will his presence. He that hath not so much as a cracked groat towards the payment of his debts, may yet will the satisfaction of his Creditors. And though some of these may seem but pendulous wishes of impossibilities, and not so compatibile with a serious deliberation, yet they do plainly show the freedom of the will. In great things (said the Poet) it is sufficient to have willed, that is, to have done what is in our power. So we say, God accepteth the will, that which we can, for the deed, that which we cannot. If there be first a willing mind, it is accepted according to that a man hath, that is to will, And not according 
2 Cor. 8. 12.  to that he hath not, that is to perform. And yet more plainly: To will is present with me, but 
Rom. 7. 18.  how to perform that which is good, that find I not. Yet saith T. H. A man is free to do what he wills, but not to will what he will do.  
To come yet a little nearer to T. H. For since he refuseth all humane authority, I must stick to Scripture. It is called a man's own will, and his own voluntary will. If it be determined 
Levit. 1. 3. and 19 5.  irresistibly by outward causes, it is rather their own will, than his own will. Nay to let him see that the very name of freewill itself is not such a stranger in Scripture as he imagineth, it is called, a man's own free will. How often do we read in the books of Moses, Ezra, and the Psalms, of freewill offerings? 
Ezra. 7. 13.  This freewill is opposed not only to compulsion, but also to necessity, not of necessity but willingly. And is inconsistent with all extrinsical 
Philem. 14.  determination to one, with which election of this or that indifferently is incompatible. Is not the whole land before thee (said Abraham to Lot?) If thou wilt take the left hand, 
Gen. 13. 〈◊〉.  than I will go to the right; or if thou depart to the right hand, than I will go to the left. God said to David, I offer thee three things, choose one of them. And to Solomon, Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked long life, or riches. And Herod to his daughter, Ask of me whatsoever thou wilt. And Pilate to the Jews, Whether of the twain will ye that I release unto you? And St. Paul unto the Corinthians, What will ye? shall I come unto you with a rod, or in love? Both were in their choice. Yet T. H. doth tell us, That all these were free to do this or that indifferently if they would, but not free to will. To choose and to elect, is, of all others, the most proper Act of the will. But all these were free to choose and elect this or that indifferently, or else all this were mere mockery: And therefore they were free to will.  
The Scripture koweth no extrinsical determiners of the will, but i●…self. So it is said of Eli's sons, Give flesh to roast for the Priest, for he will not have sodden flesh of thee, but raw. And 
1 Sam. 2. 15.  if thou wilt not give it, I will take it by force. Sic volo, sic jubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas. Here was more will than necessity. So it is said of the rich man in the Gospel. What shall I do? This I will do, I will pull down my barns and build greater, and there will I bestow all my fruits and 
Luke 12. 17.  my goods. And I will say to my soul, take thine ease, eat, drink, and be merry. Both his purse and person, were under the command of his w●…ll. So St. james saith, Go to now, ye that say to day, or tomorrow we will go into such a City, 
Jam. 4. 13.  and continue there a year, and buy and sell, and get gain: whereas ye know not what shall be to morrow, etc. for that ye ought to say, if the Lord will we shall live, and do this, or that. The defect was not in their will to resolve, but in their power to perform. So T. H. his necessity was their liberty, and their liberty was his necessity.  
Lastly, the Scriptures teach us, that it is in the power of a man to choose his own will for the future; All that thou commandest us we will do. And whithersoever thou sendest us we will go. 
Josh. 1. 16.  As we harkened unto Moses in all things, so will we hearken unto thee. So saith St. Paul, What I do, that I will do. And in another place, I do rejoice, 
2 Cor. 11. 12.  and I will rejoice. And they that will be rich. When Christ inquired of his Disciples, Will ye also go away? According to T. H. his principles he should have said, Must ye also go away?  
We have viewed his distinction, but we have not answered his comparison. Will is an appetite; And it is one question whether he be free to eat, that hath an appetite? And another, Whether he be free to have an appetite? Comparisons are but a poor kind of reasoning at the best, which may illustrate something, but prove nothing. And of all comparisons this is one of the worst, which is drawn from the sensual appetite, to the rational appetite. The 
The sensual and rational appetite very different.  rational appetite and the sensual appetite, are even as like one to another, as an apple and an oyster. The one is a natural Agent, the other is a free Agent; The one acts necessarily, the other acts contingently, (I take the word largely.) The one is determined to one, the other is not determined to one: The one hath under God a Dominion over itself, and its own acts; The other hath no Dominion over itself, or its own acts. Even the will itself, when it acts after a natural manner, (which is but rarely, in some extraordinary cases, as in the appetite of the chiefest good being fully revealed, or in a panical terror, which admitteth no deliberation,) acts not freely, but necessarily. How much more must Agents merely Natural, which have neither reason to deliberate, nor dominion or liberty to elect, act necessarily and determinately? So to answer a comparison, with a comparison, his Argument is just such another as this; The Galleyslave which is chained to the oar, is a man, as well as the Pilot that sits at the stern, therefore the Galleyslave hath as much dominion in the ship as the Pilot, and is as free to turn it hither and thither. So falls this dreadful engine all in pieces, which should have battered down the Fort of Liberty.  
His gentle reprehension, That if I have not been able to distinguish between these two questions, I have not done well to meddle with either. And if I have understood them, I have dealt uningenuously and frandulently, would better become me, who defend liberty, than him who supposeth an irresistible necessity of all events. If he think I have not done well, yet according to his own grounds, he may rather blame the causes that do necessitate me, than blame me, who am irresistibly necessitated to do what I do. Fraud and deceit have no place in necessary Agents, who can do no otherwise then they do. He might as well accuse the Sea to have dealt fraudulently with him, because he mistook the tide, and could not pass over the Foard at an high water, as he purposed. Such is the power of truth, that it comes to light many times when it is not sought for. He doth see in part already that I understand the vanity of his distinction: and shall see it better yet before this Treatise be ended. Yet if I would be so courteous as to forgive him all this, his distinction would not prejudice me. The places of Scripture alleged by me in my former defence, do not only prove that a man is free to do if he will; but much more, that a man is free to choose and to elect, that is as much to say, as to will, and determine itself.   

An answer to his Fountains of Arguments in this Question.  
IT is a certain rule, Contraries being placed one besides another, do appear much more clearly. He who desires to satisfy his judgement in this controversy, must compare our writings one with another without partiality, the Arguments, and Answers, and pretended absurdities on both sides. But T. H. seeketh to ingratiate himself and his cause before hand; and, if it be possible, to anticipate and preoccupate the judgements of his readers, with a Flourish or Praeludium, under the specious 
Mr. Hobbs his Flourish.  name of Fountains of Arguments. So before a serious war, Cities use to personate their adverse party, and feign mock-combats and skirmishes, to encourage their friends; wherein (you may be sure) their own side shall conquer. As Players make their little puppets prate and act what they please, and stand or fall as they lend them motion: which brings to my mind, the Lion's answer in the Fable, when the picture of a man beating a Lion was produced to him; If a Lion had made this picture, he would have made the Lio●… above, and the man beneath. It is a sufficient answer to this prologue, That Mr. Hobbes (that is an adversary) made it. 
Nihil est, quin male narrando possit, depravarier.   
What had he to do to urge arguments fo●… me? or to give solutions for me? or to pres●… the inconveniences and absurdities which flow from fatal destiny on my behalf? I ga●… him no commission. I need none of his help▪ yet by this personated conflict, he hoped to have stolen an easy victory, withou●… either blood or sweat.  
I will not tyre out myself and the reader, with the superfluous repetition of those things which we shall meet with again much more opportunely in their proper places. Some Authors are like those people, who measuring all others by themselves, believe nothing is well understood, until it be repeated over and over again. 
Qui nihil alios credunt intelligere, nisi idem dictum est centies.   
But whatsoever is new in this Preface, if it have but any one grain of weight, I will not fail to examine and answer it, either here or there.  
And first, I cannot choose but wonder at his 
His presumption.  confidence, that a single person who never took degree in schools, that I have heard of, (except it were by chance in Malmesbury) should so much sleight, not only all the scholars of this present Age; but all the Fathers, Schoolmen, and old Philosophers, which I dare say he hath not studied much, and forget himself so far, as to deny all their authorities at once; if they give not him satisfaction, to make his private and crazy judgement to be the standard and seal of truth, and himself an universal dictator among Scholars, to plant and to pull up, to reform and new modulate; or rather turn upside down, Theology, Philosophy, Morality, and all other Arts and Sciences, which he is pleased to favour so much, as not to eradicate them, or pluck them up root and branch, as if he was one of Aesop's fellows, who could do all things, and say all things. He is not the first man in the World, who hath lost himself by grasping and engrossing too much. As the Athenians used to say of Metiochus. Metiochus is Captain, Metiochus is Surveier, Metiochus bakes the bread, Metiochus grinds the 
Plutar●…h.  Corn, Metiochus doth all; an evil year to Metiochus. He mentioneth the Scriptures indeed, but his meaning is to be the sole Interpreter of them himself, without any respect to the perpetual and universal tradition of the Catholic Church, or the sense of all ancient Expositors. Well, for once, I will forbear all the advantage which I have from the authority of Counsels, Fathers, Schoolmen, and Philosophers, & meet him singly at his own weapon, yet with this protestation, that if he value his own single judgement above all theirs, he comes within the compass of Solomon's censure, Seest thou a man wise in his own eyes? there is more hope of a fool than of him.  
He telleth us, That the Attributes of God 
The attributes of God argumentative.  are oblations given only for honour, but no sufficient premises to infer truth, or convin●… falshhood. Let them be Oblations, or Sacrifices of praise if he will; but are they not likewise truths? Hath not God given the same attributes to himself every where in holy Scripture? Doth God stand in need of a lie, to uphold his honour? It is true, they are not perfectly conceivable by mortal man. The goodness, and justice, and mercy, and truth of God, are transcendent above the goodness, and justice, and mercy, and truth of men, and of a quite different nature from them: As St, Austin said, God is good without quality, great without quantity, a Creator without indigence, every where without place, eternal without time. But yet we do understand these attributes so far, as to remove from God all contrary imperfections. He that is good, or goodness itself, can not be the author of evil. He that is true or truth itself, cannot lie or dissemble. He that is merciful or mercy itself, cannot be guilty of tyranny or cruel. He that is just or justice itself, cannot do unjust actions. And thus far the attributes of God are argumentative, That be far from thee, to slay the righteous with the 
Gen. 18 25  wicked, Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?  
I come now to his Texts of Scripture, and 
His texts of Scripture cited impertinently.  first to those which he saith do make for him: To which I answer, first in general, That there is not one of them all pertinent to the present question, they concern not true liberty from extrinsecall necessity, but the power of free will in moral and supernatural acts, wherein we acknowledge, That the will of man hath not power to determine itself aright, without the assistance of Grace: His arguments tend rather to prove that God is the author of sin, or that he saves men without their own endeavours, than to disprove true liberty.  
Secondly, I answer, That though his allegations were pertinent, yet they come all short of his conclusion: He should prove that all acts of free Agents are necessitated antecedently, and extrinsecally: and he endeavoureth only to prove that some particular acts of some particular persons were not free from necessity. Which Thesis we do not simply disapprove, though we dislike his instances. God may and doth sometimes extraordinarily determine the will of man to one; but when it is so determined, the act may be voluntary, not free: So he concludeth not contradictorily.  
Concerning his places in particular. To his first place, Gen. 45. 5. I answer, That 
All his arguments out of Scripture answered.  we ought to distinguish between the action of joseph's brethren which was evil, and the passion of Joseph which was good. God willed and predefined the suffering of Joseph, and disposed them to his own glory, and the good of his Church. God sent Joseph before, how? dispositively, to preserve life. But he willed not, nor predefined the action of his brethren, otherwise than permissively, or at the most occasionally, by doing good, which they made an occasion of doing evil, or in respect of the order of their evil act. The very same answer serveth to Acts 2. 23. and Acts 4. 27, 28.  
To his instances of Gods hardening the hea●…t, Exod. 7. 3. and Deut. 2. 30. and to Rom. 9 16. he hath had a large answer in my former defence.  
To Shimei's cursing David, 2 Sam. 16. 10. 
Num. 12.  I answer three ways, first, That God is often said to do, or will those things, which he doth only will to permit, and dispose. All that was acted against Job, is ascribed to God, The Lord hath taken away: yet it is as clear as 
Job. 1. 12.  the noonday sun, That God's concurrence in the determination of Jobs sufferings, in respect of Satan, was only permssive. Secondly, God was the cause of Schimeis cursing David occasionally, by afflicting David for his sins, which exposed him to Shimeis curses. So we say, occasion makes a thief, and gifts blind the eyes of the wise. Thirdly, God was the cause of Shimeis cursing David, not as the author of that evil, but as the author of the order in evil, that is by restraining Shimeis' malice from breaking out at other times, and in another manner, and letting him loose to vent his vindictive thoughts at that time, in that manner. So he who shuts all the doors and windows in a Chamber, and leaves only one open, is in some sort, the cause why a desperate person throws himself down headlong from that window, rather than from another. In the same sense, the cause of Rehoboams obstinacy is said to be from the Lord, 1 Kings 12. 15. God is not obliged to confer prudence and other favours upon undeserving persons. So likewise God is said to lay a stumbling block before a wicked person, Ezek. 3. 20. and therefore this note thence, That the sins of the wicked are not the cause of their punishment, is a mere collusion. The order in evil is Gods, the sins are their own, what he objecteth out of Job 12. 14. etc. and likewise out of Isaiah 10. 6. concerning the King of Assyria, deserveth no answer, God may freely and justly withdraw his protection and his other graces and favours from his creatures, and leave them to be afflicted for their offences by evil Agents and Instruments, and dispose the sins of others to be their punishments, without necessitating them to acts morally evil. Job is as far from disputing our question in that place, as these places by him alleged are from making God the author of evil by a physical determination.  
The Prophet Jeremy saith, Jer. 10, 23. O Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself, it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps. Most true, man is not secured from danger by his own wisdom and care, but by God's providence and protection, nor preserved from all sin and utter destruction by the power of his own free will, but by the special grace of God, which doth freely prevent us, pursue us, excite us, assist us, operate in us, cooperate with us, by permanent habits, by transient motions, sufficiently, effectually, according to his good pleasure, whose grace is the only fountain of salvation. If we fancied an all-sufficient or independent power to ourselves, this text were to the purpose; now it signifies nothing.  
Our Saviour saith, John 6. 44. No man can come unto me except the father which hath sent me draw him. Scis tu simulare cupressum, quid hoc? He knows how to paint a Cypress tree, but what is that to the question of liberty and necessity? The coming unto Christ is a ●…upernaturall action, and requireth the preventing or preparing grace of God, which is called his father's drawing. But this drawing is not such a physical determination of the will, as to destroy liberty in the very act of conversion, but an inward calling in an opportune time, a persuading of the heart, an enlightening of the mind, an inspiring of the ●…eed of good desires, yet withal, leaving to ●…he will its natural freedom to elect, and will actually, and to consent to the calling of God, that is to determine itself by the power of grace.  
To 1 Cor. 4. 7. I answer, whether we understand the text of saving grace, or of graces freely given, both ways it is the grace of God that makes the discrimination. But all the debate is of the manner how it is made, whether morally by persuasion, or physically by determination of the will to one, and destroying the liberty of it: Of which this text is silent.  
The next place, 1 Cor. 12. 6. is understood of those miraculous graces freely given, such as the gift of tongues, of healing, of prophesying, etc. and if it were understood of saving grace, yet it did not at all exclude our cooperation. The same Apostle who teacheth us, that it is God who worketh in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure, in the same place exhorteth us to work out our own salvation with fear 
Phil. 2. 12. 13.  and trembling. God worketh in us both the will and the deed, not by physical determination of the will, not by destroying the nature of his Creature, but sweetly, morally, by illumination, persuasion and inspiration.  
We are said to be the workmanship of God created in Christ jesus unto good works, 2 Eph. 10. because without Christ we can do nothing. No man can have the actual will to believe and to be converted, but by the preventing grace of God. Our indeavous are in vain, except he help them, and none at all except he excite them. God's calling and illumination, and inspiration is not in our power; and we are brought by his grace, as it were for nothing, to a new being in Christ; in which respect a regenerated Christian is called a new Creature. Metaphors do not hold in all things: when David prayed, Create in me a new heart, O Lord, his meaning was not that his heart should be annihilated, and a new substance crated, but to have his heart purged and cleansed.  
The main body of his forces is dispersed, yet his reserve remains untouched; Even all the places, that make God the Giver of all graces, and wherein men are said to be dead in sin, for by all these (saith he) it is manifest, That although a man may live holily if he will, yet to will is the work of God, and not eligible by man. Let him reduce his argument into what form he will, there is more in the conclusion, than in the premises; namely, these words, and not illigible by man. Who ever argued from the position of the principal cause, to the removal of all second Agents and means? It is most true, That all grace is from God, but it is most false, that God hath not given man a will to receive it freely. This is plain boys play, to jump over the backs of all second causes. As all grace is from God, so the elective power to assent to the motions of grace is from God likewise. To show him the weakness of his consequence, he argueth thus, All light is from the sun, therefore, though a man may see if he will open his eyes, yet to open his eyes is the work of God, and not eligible by man.  
It is usual i●… Scripture, to call an habitual 
How sinners are said to be dead.  sinner a dead man, but it is a weak argument which is drawn from a metaphor, beyond the scope of him that useth it, And if it be insisted upon too much, involves men in palpable contradictions, as not to step aside from the same metaphor, This thy brother was dead, 
Luke. 15. 32.  and is alive again, and was lost, and is found. If he was but lost, than he was not absolutely dead: If he was absolutely dead, than he was more than lost. So in another place, Awak●… 
Eph. 5. 14.  thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead. To sleep and to be dead are inconsistent: but sleep is an image of death. So is idleness, Hic situs est Vaccia, Here lieth Vaccia, was written upon an idle persons door. So is old age, He considered not his own body now dead, nor the 
Rom. 4. 19  deadness of Sarahs' womb. So is habitual sin, And you hath he quickened, who were dead in 
Eph. 2. 1.  trespasses and sins. In some, wheresover there is no appearance of life, (as in the trees in winter) there is an image of death.  
To leave Metaphors, this death in sin is not a natural, but a spiritual death, and therefore no utter extinction of the natural powers and faculties of a man. Such are the understanding and the will, which though they were much weakened by the fall of Adam, yet they were not, they are not utterly extinct, either by original or actual sin, but being excited, and, as it were, enlived by preventing grace, they may and do become subservien●… to grace; the understanding being illuminated by those rays of heavenly light, and the will enabled to consent as freely to the motions of grace, in supernatural acts, as it did formerly to the dictates of reason in natural and civil acts. So every way T. H. is gone. First, the will is able and free without preventing grace, to determine itself in natural and civil acts, which is enough to prove my intention, against the universal necessity of all Events. Secondly, the will being excited and assisted by grace, hath power to put in practise its natural freedom in suprernatural acts: as to consent to the motions of grace, and to reject the suggestions of the flesh & the devil, without any physical determination of itself without itself. Even as the dead body of Abraham, & the dead womb of Sarah, being, as it were; new quickened by God, did truly beget Isaac; so even in the act of conversion itself, the will is free from physical determination.  
That Physical determation of all causes and events whatsoever to one, by an outward 
Man is more free to will than to do.  flux of natural causes, which T. H. maintains, doth as much necessitate all the actions of free Agents as their wills, or more; because volition is an inward immediate act of the will, but all other acts of a free Agent are external and mediate acts of the will, over which the will hath not so absolute a dominion as over the volition: whence it followeth irrefragably, That if there be no freedom to will, much less is there a freedom to do. He saith a man may live holily if he will, but to will is the work of God, and not eligible by man. Can a man then live holily without the grace of God? Or is not an holy life the work of God as much as a sanctified will. If he can not show this, let him never mention this vain distinction any more, of freedom to do, without freedom to will. May not a man be so bold to put him himself in mind of that jargon, which he objected to the Schoolmen? unless perhaps he thinks nonsense is more intelligible in English than in Latin.  
Hitherto I have traced T. H. his steps, though he be wandered quite out of the lists, or rather, in plain terms, fled away from his cause, to take sanctuary under the sacred name of God's grace, which will afford no shelter for his error. Our question was not about the concurrence of grace and freewill in the conversion of a sinner, but merely about the liberty or necessity of all natural and civil events: when he hath acquitted himself like a man in the former cause, than he is free to undertake the second.  
The next collection is of such places of Scripture as say there is election, of which T. 
His second sort of texts do confute him unanswerably.  H. is pleased to affirm, That they make equally for him and me. I do not blame him if he desire that all places which maintain Election, and that all natural and civil events, should quite be sequestered from this controversy. For it is not possible to reconcile these places with fatal necessity. All choice or election is of more than one, but there can be no choice of more than one, where there is an extrinsical determination of all particular events with all their circumstances, inevitably, irresistibly to one, by a flux of natural causes. So they leave no manner of Election at all, no more freedom to choose a man's actions, than to choose his will. But all these places, and many more, prove expressly, that a man is free, not only to do it if he will, but to will: The reason is evident, because to choose is to will, the proper, elicit, immediate act of the will, and to choose one thing before another, is nothing else, but to will one thing before another. But all these places say, that a man is free to choose; that is, to will one thing before another. Choose life, saith one place, Choose whom ye will serve, saith a second place; Choose 
Defence, Nu. 6. 7, 8, 9  one of three, saith a third place: and so of the rest. But I have pressed these places formerly, and shall do further, if there be occasion.  
His third sort of Texts, are those which seem to make for me against him. But I am at age to choose and urge mine own arguments for myself, and cannot want weapons in this cause. Therefore he may forbear such a thankless office. He telleth us of a great apparent contradiction, between the first sort of Texts, and the last; but being both Scripture, 
T. H. First woundeth the Scripture, and then giveth it a plaster.  they may and must be reconciled. This is first to wound the credit of the Scriptures, and then to give them a plaster. The supposed contradiction is in his own fancy. Let him take them according to the analogy of faith, in that sense wherein the Church hath ever taken them, and there is no show of contradiction. The Scripture consists not in the words, but in the sense, not in the outside but in the marrow.  
He demands, Whether the selling of joseph 
God's prescience doth not necessitate.  did follow infallibly and inevitably upon the permission of God? I answer, If we consider God's permission alone, neither inevitably nor infallibly: If we consider his permission jointly with his prescience, then infallibly, but not inevitably. Foreknowledge doth no more necessitate events to come to pass, than after-knowledge. God's prescience did no more make Judas his treason inevitable to him, than my remembrance now of what was done yesterday, did make it inevitable then to him that did it.  
He urgeth further, So the prescience of God might have been frustrated by the liberty of humane 
Yet is infallible.  will. I answer nothing less. The natures and essences of all things come to pass, because they were foreknown by God, whose knowledge was the directive cause of them. But the acts and operations of free Agents are therefore foreknown, because they will come to pass. If any thing should come to pass otherwise, God had foreknown from eternity, that it should have come to pass otherwise, because his infinite understanding doth encompass all times and all events in the instant of eternity. And consequently he beholds all things past, present, and to come, as present. And therefore, leaving those forms of speech, which are accommodated to us and our capacities: To speak properly there is neither foreknowledge nor after-knowledge in God, who neither knows one thing after another, nor one thing by deduction from another.  
He asks, Whether the treachery and fratricide of Joseph's brethren were no sin? I answer, yes; and therefore it was not from God positively, but permissively, and dispositively; Ye thought evil against me, but God meant it unto good, to save much people alive. But (he urgeth,) Joseph said, Be not grieved, nor angry 
Gen. 50. 20.  with yourselves that ye sold me hither: Ought not a man to be grieved and angry with himself for sinning? Yes, but penitent sinners such as joseph's brethren were, have great cause of joy and comfort, when they understand that God hath disposed their sin to his glory, their own good, and the benefit of others.  
He demands further, Doth God barely permit corporal motions, and neither will them, nor nill them? Or how is God the cause of the motion, and the cause of the law, yet not of the irregularity? It were a much readier way to tell us at once directly, That either there is no sin in the World, or that God is the author of sin, than to be continually beating the bush after this manner. But I answer, All corporal motion in general, is from God, not only permissively, but also causally; that is, by a general influence, but not by a special influence. The specifical determination of this good general power to evil, is from the free Agent, who thereby doth become the cause of the irregularity. There is no contrariety between motion in general, and the law, but between the actual and determinate abuse of this good locomitive power, and the law.  
He demands, Whether the necessity of hardness of heart be not as easily derived from God's 
Hardness of heart not derived from God's permission.  permission, that is from his withholding his grace, as from his positive decree? This question is proposed in a confused blundering manner, without declaring distinctly, what grace he meaneth. I answer two ways. First we are to distinguish between a necessity of consequence, or an infallibility, and a necessity of consequent or a causal necessity: Supposing, but not granting, that hardness of heart is as in●…allibly derived from the one, as from the other, yet not so causally, nor so culpably in ●…espect of God, who is not obliged in justice ●…o give his free grace to his creature, but he is ●…bliged by the rule of his own justice, not to determine his own creature to evil, and then punish him for the same evil.  
Secondly, I answer, that even this supposed necessity of infabillity can no way be imputed to God, who never forsakes his creature by with holding his grace from him, until his creature have first forsaken him; who never forsakes his creature so far, but that he may by prayers, and using good endeavours, obtain the aid of God's grace, either to prevent or remove hardness of heart. When God created man, he made him in such a condition, that he did not need special exciting grace to the determination of his will to supernatural good. And to all that are within the pale of his Church he gives sufficient grace to prevent hardness of heart, if they will. If man have lost his primogenious power, if he will not make use of those supplies of grace which Gods mercy doth afford him, that is his own fault. But still here is no physical determination to evil, here is no antecedent extrinsical determination of any man to hardness of heart, here is nothing but that which doth consist with true liberty.  
Lastly, he saith, We make God only to permit evil, and to will good actions conditionally and consequently, 
God's hand in good and evil actions.  if man will them. So we ascribe nothing at all to God, in the causation of any action, good or bad. He erreth throughout, God is the total cause of all natures and all essences. In evil actions God is cause of the power to act, of the order in acting, of the occasion, and of the disposition thereof to good. In good actions freely done, he is the author & original of liberty, he enableth by general influence, he concurreth by special assistance and cooperation to the performance of them, and he disposeth of them to good. He doth not will that merely upon condition which himself hath prescribed, nor consequently which he himself hath antecedently ordained and instituted.  
Now having cleared all his exceptions; it remaineth next to examine, how he reconcileth the first and the third sort of Texts. The will of God (saith he) sometimes signifieth the word of God, or the commandments of God, that is his revealed will, or the signs or significations of his will. Sometimes it signifieth an internal act of God, that is, his counsel and decree. By his revealed will God would have all men to be saved, but by his internal will, he would not. By his revealed will he would have gathered jerusalem, not by his inward will. So when God saith, [What could I have done more to my vineyard?] that is to be understood outwardly, in respect of his revealed will. What directions, what laws, what threatenings, could have been used more? And when he saith, [It came not into my mind,] the sense is, to command it. This I take to be the scope and sum of what he saith. Thus far he is right, that he distinguisheth between the signifying will of God, and his good pleasure, for which he is beholding to the Schools: And that he makes the revealed will of God, to be the rule of all our actions; And that many things happen against the revealed will of God, but nothing against his good pleasure. But herein he erreth grossly, that he maketh the revealed will of God and his internal will to be contrary 
God's revealed will and his secret will, not contrary.  one to another; as if God did say one thing, and mean another, or command one thing, and necessitate men to do another, which is the grossest dissimilation in the World. 
Odi illos seu claustr●… erebi quicunque loquu●…nr  
o'er aliud, tacitoque aliud sub pectore condunt.   
He saith, It is not Christian to think, if God had a purpose to save all men, that any could be damned, because it were a sign of want of power to ●…ffect what he would. It is true, if God had an absolute purpose to work all men's salvation irresistibly, against their wills, or without themselves. But God hath no such absolute will to save all men. He loves his creatures well, but his own justice better: And he that made men without themselves, will not save them without themselves. He co-operates with all his creatures according to their distinct natures which he hath given them, with necessary Agents necessarily, with free Agents freely. God hath given men liberty to assent to saving truth, They abuse it. He hath proposed a condition under which they may be saved, They reject it. So he willeth their salvation by an antecedent will, and their damnation by a consequent will: which two wills in God, or within the Divine Essence, are no way distinct; for they are the same with the Divine Essence. But they are distinguished only in order to the things willed of God; Neither is there the least contradiction between them. The one shows us what God would have us to do, The other is, what God himself will do. The one looks upon man as he was created by God, or as he should have been or might have been without his own fault; The other looks upon man as he is with all circumstances. The one regards only the order of the causes and means designed by God for our salvation; The other regards also the application or misapplication of these means by ourselves.  
In answering to these words, Say not thou it is through the Lord I fell away, Say not thou, he hath caused me to err. He distinguisheth between say not, and think not; as if it were unlawful to say so, but not unlawful to think so. Curse not thy King (saith Solomon) no not in thy thought, much less thy God. Thought is free from man, but not from God. It is not honourable (saith he) to say so; No more is it to think so.  
It is not lawful (saith he) to say that any action can be done, which God hath purposed shall not 
The doctrine of universal necessity taketh away all care of doing well.  be done; that is, in his language, which shall not actually come to pass in due time. Our Saviour was of another mind. Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my father, and he shall presently give me more than twelve Legions of Angels? He knew some things can be done, which never will be done.  
Next he proceedeth to touch those inconveniencies, which flow from the opinion of universal necessity, but very gently and sparingly. Arts, and arms, and books, and consultations, and medicines, etc. are not superfluous, though all events be necessary, because the means are equally necessitated with the event. Suppose it were so, so much the worse. This must needs utterly destroy all care and solicitude of free Agents. He is a madman that will vex and trouble himself, and take care, and consult, about things that are either absolutely necessary, or absolutely impossible; as about the rising of the Sun, or about the draining of the sea with a sieve. Yet such are all events, and all the means to effect them in his opinion, either as absolutely necessary as the rising of the Sun, or as absolutely impossible as the draining of the Ocean with a sieve. What need he take care for a Medicine, or a Physician, who knows that if he must recover, and if a Medicine or a Physician be a necessary means for his recovery, the causes will infallibly provide him one, and it may be a better Medicine, or a better Physician, than he should have used? If a man may recover or not recover, both means, and care to use means, do well: But if a man must recover, or not recover; that is, if the end and the means be both predetermined, the means may be necessary, but all care and solicitude is altogether vain and superfluous  
But he telleth the Reader, that this absurdity followeth as much from my opinion, as 
That which shall be shall be; a poor fallacy.  from his. For as I beli●…e that what is, is, and what hath been, hath been; So I hold this for a certain truth, that what shall be, shall be. And therefore the argument holds as strongly against me, as against him; If I shall recover I need not his unsavoury potion; If I shall not recover, it will do me no good. In all my life I never heard a weaker or sillier Sophism, urged in earnest, by a rational man. That which is, is necessary to be, upon supposition that it is: That which hath been, is necessary to have been, upon supposition that it hath been; So that which shall be, shall be necessarily; that is, infallibly upon supposition that it shall be. And the event cannot be supposed, except it be supposed that the free Agent shall determine itself in such manner, and except all necessary means be likewise supposed. Such a necessity upon supposition is very consistent with true libery, but T. H. his necessity is of another nature, an antecedent extrinsical necessitation and determination to one, which is altogether inconsistent with election, and true liberty. According to my opinion we say, That which may be, may be; but that which may be, may not be. According to his opinion we say, That which must be, must be; but that which must be, cannot be otherwise. According to my opinion, I am free either to walk abroad, or to stay within doors, whethersoever I do this is true, that which shall be, shall be, But if I walk abroad, (as I may do) than my stay within doors shall not be. And on the other side, If I stay within doors, (as I may do likewise,) than my walking abroad shall not be. The event hath yet no determinate certainty in the causes, for they are not yet determined. The Agent may determine itself otherwise, the event may come otherwise to pass, even until the last moment before the production. And when the event is actually produced, and is without its causes, it hath a determinate certainty, not antecedent, not from extrinsical determination, not absolute; but merely hypothetical or upon supposition; the not distinguishing aright of which two different kinds of necessity, makes the reader and us all this trouble.  
It follows, Laws are not superfluous, because by the punishment of one, or a few unjust men, they 
Num. 14.  are the cause of justice in a great many. This answer hath been taken away already, and shall be further refelled if it be further pressed. But he willingly declineth the main scope of my argument, which reflected more upon the unjustice, than upon the superfluity of human laws, if his opinion were true. Those laws are unjust which punish men for not doing that which was antecedently impossible for them to do, and for doing that which was impossible for them to leave undone. But upon supposition of T. H. his opinion of the absolute necessity of all events, all humane laws do punish men for not doing that which was antecedently impossible for them to do, and for doing that which was antecedently impossible for them to leave undone. Here we have confitentem reum, our adversaries confession within a very few lines. It is true that 
T. H. His confession that no man is justly punished, but for crimes he might have shunned.  seeing the name of punishment hath relation to the name of crime, there can be no punishment but for crimes that might have been left undone. This is the first ingenuous confession we have had from T. H. I hope we shall have more: From whence it followeth, First, that there neither is, nor can be any crime deserving punishment in the World, that is to say, no such criminal thing as sin; for nothing by his doctrine was ever done, that could have been left undone. Secondly, it followeth hence, that no punishment is just, because nothing can be left undone that is done. And that all men are innocent, and there is no such thing as a delinquent in the World. How saith he then, That the laws are the cause of justice in many, by punishing one or a few unjust men? Upon his principles, the Laws and Judges themselves are unjust, to punish any men. If this be not a contradiction, I have lost my aim.  
And if punishments are not just, then neither are ●…ewards just. Thus by his doctrine we have lost the two great pillars or preservatives of all well-ordered Societies, as Lycurgus called them, the two hinges whereupon the Commonwealth is turned, Reward, and Punishment. Yet St. Peter doth teach us, That Kings and Governors are sent from God, for the 
1 Pet. 2. 14.  punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of them that do well.  
The last inconvenience which he mentions, (of those that were urged by me) is this. God in justice cannot punish a man with eternal torments for doing that which never was in his power to leave undone. To which admitting (as you have heard) that there can be no punishment but for crimes that might have been left undone, he gives two answers: The first is this. Instead of punishment if he had said affliction, may not I say that God may afflict, 
No proper punishment but for sin.  and not for sin? Doth he not afflict those creatures that cannot sin? And sometimes those that can ●…n, yet not for sin; as Job, and the blind man in the Gospel? This is still worse and worse. He told us even now, that nothing which is dishonourable aught to be attributed to God: And can there be any thing in the World more dishonourable, than to say, That God doth torment poor innocent creatures in hell fire, without any fault of theirs, without any relation to sin, merely to show his dominion over them? The Scripture teacheth us clear otherwise, That a man complains for the punishment of his sins. Sin and punishment are 
Lam. 3. 39  knit together with adamantine bonds. He phrases it for the manifestation of his power. If it were true, it was the greatest manifestation of cruelty and tyranny that is imaginable.  
I confess, that chastisements ioflicted after the sin is forgiven, are not properly punishments, because they proceed a patre castigant●…, non a judice vindicante, from a father correcting, not from a Judge revenging. Yet even these chastisements are grounded upon sin, The Lord hath put away thy sin, thou shalt not die, Howbeit, because by this deed thou hast given 
2 Sam. 12. 13. 14.  great occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, the child that is born unto thee, shall surely die. But what place have such chastisements as david's were in hell? Is any man bettered by his sufferings there? What place have probations and trials of men's graces (such as Jobs were) in hell, where there are no graces to be tried. Jobs trial, and David's chastisements, and the poor man's blindness, were the greatest blessings that ever befell them; For their light afflictions which were but for a 
2 Cor. 4. 17.  moment, did work out unto them a far more excellent and eternal weight of glory. But the pains of hell are heavy, and endless, and work out nothing but torment: In a word, these afflictions we now treat of are downright punishments. So the Holy Ghost styles them, everlasting punishment: he doth not afflict the children of men willingly, except it be for sin, 
Matth. 25. 46. joh 37. 23. Lam. 3. 33. Psal. 107. 17.  Fools are afflicted because of their transgression. The afflictions (as he calleth them) of those creatures that cannot sin, that is, brute beasts, are altogether of another nature. They were created for the use of man, they were given for the sustenance of men, every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you, even as 
Gen. 9 3.  the green herb, have I given you all things. But the tormenting even of the brute creatures needlessely for the pleasing of our sensual appetites, or the satisfaction of our humour, is not only unchristian, but unhuman, A 
Prov. 12. 10.  righteous man regardeth the life of his beast, but the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel. God hath made two covenants with man, none with the beasts.  
He saith, It is no more cruelty to afflict a man with endless torment for sin, than without sin, when he might without trouble have kept him from sinning. Is it not great pity, that T. H. was not of God Almighty's council, when he ordered the World? that he might have 
Why God did not make man impeccable.  advised him to have made man impeccable, which he might have done without any trouble, or that otherwise his fall, and consequently his punishment, might be justly imputed to God himself. It was well enacted in the laws of the twelve tables, Ad divos adeunto caste, pietatem adhibento, qui secus faxit Deus ipse vindex erit, our addresses to God ought to be pure and devout, they who do otherwise, will find God himself the revenger. Doth T. H. believe St. Judas, That God hath reserved the Angels, that kept not their first 
Judas v. 6.  estate, in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgement of the great day? God could by his absolute power have kept them in their first estate, yet he would not. By his absolute power, he can do all things which do not implic imperfection or contradiction: but by his ordinate power he cannot change his decrees, nor alter whathe hath ordained. Acts of grace may be free, but punishments must be always just. That King who doth not pardon a wilful traitor, is not equally guilty of murder, with him that hangs up an innocent Subject. Then to answer fully to his question, Why God suffered man to sin, having power to withhold him? To preserve that order and course which he had established in the World, and to draw a greater good out of evil, for the further manifestation of his own glory, First, the manifestation of his power, as St. Austin saith, He that created all things very good, and did foreknow that evil would arise from good, knew likewise that it appeerteined rather to his most Almighty goodness, to draw good out of evil, than not to suffer evil. Secondly, the manifestation of his providence, in suffering man, whom he had endowed with freedom of will and power, sufficient to resist and overcome Satan, either to conquer or yield at his own choice. Thirdly, the manifestation of his justice and mercy, by punishing some out of the corrupted mass justly, and saving others out of his mere mercy. If T. H. thinks vainly, that the only manifestation of God's power, is a sufficient ground for the punishment of men in hell fire, without their own faults or crimes, how much better may good Christians conclude, That the greater manifestation of God's power, and providence, and justice, and mercy, is a sufficient ground for the punishment of men with the like torments, for their own crimes.  
His second answer is set down by way of interrogation, What infallible evidence hath the Bishop, that a man shall be eternally in torments, & never die? Even the authority of our Saviour and the Holy Scriptures, which call it an everlasting 
Matth. 25. 41, 46. Mar. 9 44, 45. Jud. v. 6, 7.  fire, an eternal fire, a fire that is not quenched, everlasting punishment, everlasting chains, the worm that never dyeth, and the fire that goeth not out, Go ye cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels. The Bishop hath the testimony of the Athanasian creed, that 
Punishments of the damned are eternal.  they who have done good, shall go into life everlasting, and they that have done evil, into everlasting fire. He hath the testimony of the universal Church of all ages, except a few Originists. If T. H. have no more than his own single private authority to oppose against all these, he is a bold man. They who question everlasting torments, will not stick to question everlasting life. To his demand, about the second death, I answer, This is the second death, if he could see wood for trees.  
In the next place, he urgeth how that inconveniencies 
God's prescience proveth infalliblity, not necessity.  follow from our opinion. First, That man's liberty to will, quite takes away the prescience of God; for if man have it in his power to will or not to will, it cannot be certainly foreknown what he will will. The second, That God's prescience doth take away liberty, by making all events necessary from eternity, for it is impossible that that should not come to pass, or come to pass otherwise than it was foreknown, which God foreknoweth shall come to pass; And if it be impossible that it should not come to pass, than it is necessary that it should come to pass. This is too severe, first, to make us take prescience quite away, and yet with the same breath, to argue against us from prescience. But for once, I will give him a clea●… solution to both his pretended demonstrations, and let him see that there is no necessity, that men must either turn blocks without liberty, or sacrilegious to rob God of his prescience. But I give him it upon a condition, That hereafter, before he take away either prescience or liberty, he will first take away this answer, and not repeat us the same thing over and over again, to no purpose.  
To the first inconvenience I answer, That a thing may be said to be foreknown two ways; either as it is in its causes, before it be produced, and so I confess, That if the free Agent have it in his power, to will or not to will, there is no determinate truth of future contingents, that is, in their causes, and consequently no prescience or foreknowledge in that respect; or else a thing may be said to be foreknown, as it is or shall be in itself, in the nature of things, after it is produced. And thus every particular event, that shall be until the end of the World is foreknown, or, to speak more properly, is known to God from all eternity. For in God's knowledge there is neither before nor after, past nor to come. Those things which are past or to come to us, are always present to God, whose infinite understanding (that is himself) doth encompass all times and events in one instant of eternity, and so doth prevent or anticipate all differences of time. Time is the measure of all our acts; but God's knowledge, being infinite, is not measured but by eternity; so that which is a prescience, or a beforehand knowledge (as he calleth it) to us, is a present intuition with God. And therefore as my present beholding of a man casting himself down headlong from some precipice, whilst ●…e is in the act of casting himself down, is not ●…he cause of his precipitation, nor doth any way neccessitate him to precipitate himself, yet upon supposition, that I do see him precipitate himself, it is necessarily, that is, infal●…ibly true, that he doth precipitate himself, but not necessarily true, by any antecedent and extrinsecall determination of him to do that act, nor so necessarily true as to exclude his freedom or liberty in the act. Even so God's knowledge of future contingents, being a present intuition or beholding of them, by reason of his infinite intellect, doth not at all determine free Agents, nor necessitate contingent events, but only infers an infallibility, that is, as we use to call it, an hypothetical necessity, or a necessity upon supposition, which doth consist with true liberty.  
Much of this is confessed by Mr. Hobbes himself, That the foreknowledge of God should be the cause of any thing, cannot be truly said, seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge dependeth on the existence of thing known, and not they on it.  
I desire to know whether God do his own works, ad extra, as the creation and destruction of the World freely or necessarily? a●… whether he was necessitated to create the World precisely a such at time, in such a manner? Certainly God foreknoweth his own works, as much as he foreknoweth the determinate acts of free Agents. Yet his foreknowledge of his own works, ad extra, doth not necessitate himself. If he say that God himself determineth his own acts, ad extra, so I say doth the free Agent also, with this difference, That God is infinite and independent upon any other, but the free Agent is finite and dependent upon God, both for his being, and for his acting. Then if God's freedom in his own works, ad extra, doth not take away his prescience, neither doth the liberty of free Agents take it away.  
To his second inconvenience, That it is impossible that that which is for: known by God should not come to pass, or come to pass otherwise than it is foreknown, I answer, That God's foreknowledge is not such an act as T. H. imagineth, that is, an act that is expired, or an act that is done and passed; but it is always in doing, an eternal act: a present act, a present intuition: and consequently, doth no more make the Agent unfree, or the contrary event impossible, until it be actually produced, than my knowing that such a man stabbed himself upon such a day, made it then impossible for him to have forborn stabbing of himself, or my seeing a man eat in present, made it impossible for him before he did eat, to have forborn eating. God is the total cause of all natures and essences, but he is not the total cause of all their acts and operations. Neither did he create his Creatures to be idle, but that they should each of them exercise such acts, as are agreeable to their respective natures, necessary Agents, necessary Acts, free Agents, free Acts. And until the free Agent have determined itself, that is, until the last moment before production, the contrary Act is not made impossible, and then only upon supposition. He that precipated himself, until the very moment that he did precipitate himself, might have withheld himself. And if he had withheld himself, than I had not seen him precipitate himself, but withhold himself.  
His frequent invectives against unsignificant words are but like the complaints of that old Belldam Harpaste in Seneca, who still cried out against the darkness of the room, and desired to be brought into another chamber, little believing that her own blindness was the true cause of it. What Suares saith, As I know neither what, nor where, so neither doth it concern either me or the cause.  
His last assault against liberty in his fountains of Arguments is this, Certainly to will is impossible without thinking on what a man willeth, but it is in no man's election what he shall at any named time hereafter think on. A man might well conjecture by this very reason that his fountain was very near drying up. This Argument is levied rather against the memory, or against the understanding, than against the will, and may serve as well against freedom to do, as against freedom to will, which is contrary to his principles. It is as impossible to do without thinking on what a man doth, as it is to will without thinking on what he willeth, but it is in no man's election what he shall at any named time hereafter think on: Therefore a man is not free to choose what he will do. I know not what this word [to think] signifies with him, but I know what other Authors make it to signify, to use reason, to understand, to know, and they define a thought to be the understanding actually employed, or busied about some object. Hath not he spun us a fair thread? He undertaketh to show a defect in the will, and he alleadeth a defect in the understanding. Is a man therefore not free to go to his dinner, because perhaps he thinks not on it just at dinner time? Let the free Agent be free to will or nill, and to choose which part he will, without necessitation or determination to one, when he doth think on it, and we shall not want true liberty.   

An Answer to the Animadversions upon the Epistle to my Lord of Newcastle.  
IT was no passion but a sad truth, To call the opinion of fatal destiny blasphemous, which maketh God to be directly the author of sin, which is a degree worse than Atheism; and desperate, which taketh away all care and solicitude, and thrusts men headlong without fear or wit, upon rocks and precipices; and destructive, which turneth all government divine and humane off from their hinges: the practical consequences whereof do utterly ruin all societies. Neither am I guilty (that I know of yet) so much as of one uncivil word, either against Mr. Hobbes his person or his parts. He is over unequal and indulgent to himself, who dare assume the boldness to introduce such insolent and paradoxical opinions into the World, and will not allow other men the liberty to welcome them as they deserve. I wish he himself in his Animadversions, and his parasitical publisher of his former treatise, had observed the same temper and moderation: particularly towards the lights of the Shools, whom he slighteth and vilifieth every where, as a company of pedantic dunces, who understood not themselves, yet held the World in awe under contribution, by their ●…stian jargon, until a third Cato dropped down from Heaven, to stand up for the vindication of Christian liberty from Scholastic tyranny, and Stoical necessity, from natural and moral liberty. But this is certain, if these poor despised Schoolmen were necessitated by antecedent and extrinsecall causes, to speak such gibberish and nonsense, and the Christian World to receive it, and applaud it, they cannot be justly blamed. And if that great assertour were necessitated in like manner, he cannot justly be praised, any more than we praise a Conduit for spouting out water, when the cock is turned.   

An answer to the Animadversions upon the Bishop's Epistle to the Reader.  
I Am well contented to believe that the Copy of T. H. his Treatise was surreptitiously gained from him. Yet he acknowledgeth, that he showed it to two, and if my intelligence out of France did not fail, to many more. I am well pleased to believe that he was not the author of that lewd Epistle, which was perfixed before it; but rather some young braggadochio, one of his disciples, who wanted all other means to requite his Master, for his new acquired light, but servile flattery: whom he styleth the great Author, the repairer of our breaches, the Assertour of our reputation, who hath performed more in a few sheets, than is comprehended in all the voluminous Works of the Priests and Ministers; yea, as if that expression were too modest, in all the Libraries of the Priests, Jesuits, and Ministers, or in the Catechisms and Confessions of a thousand Assemblies. On the other side, he belcheth out reproaches against the poor Clergy, as if they were a pack of fools and knaves. For their folly, he sticks not to style the blackcoats, generally taken, a sort of ignorant tinkars, etc. And for their knavery, he saith, they make the Scriptures, (which he setteth forth in as graceless a dress, as he can imagine) the decoys of the people, to advance themselves to promotions, leisure and luxury. And so he concludeth that this little Treatise of Mr. Hobbes, will cast an eternal blemish on all the corn●…rd caps of the Priests and jesuits, and all the black and white caps of the Ministers. Herein I cannot acquit Mr. Hobbes, That being in London at the same time when this ridiculous Epistle was printed and published, he did not for his own cause, sooner or later, procure it to be suppressed.  
Concerning myself, I can safely say, That I was so far from intending my defence for the press, that since it was perfected, and one only Copy transcribed for the Marq. of Newcastle and himself, it hath scarcely ever beheld the Sun. Questions may be ventilated, and truth cleared from mistakes privately between particular persons, as well or better, than publicly in print.  
As touching my exceptions to his book de Cive, he saith, He did indeed intend to have answered them, as finding them neither political, nor Theological, nor that I alleged any reasons by which they were to be justified. The inference would have holden more strongly the contrary way; that because they were neither Theological, nor Political, and destitute of reasons to support them, they were fitter to be despised, than to be answered. But why did he then intent to answer them, and thought himself so much concerned in it? Surely he hath forgotten himself; for there was never a one of those exceptions, which was not backed with several reasons. But concerning them and his Leviathan, I shall be sparing to speak more in present. Peradventure I may reserve two or three Chapters; one to show him his Theological errors, another how destructive his Political errors are to all Societies; a third of his contradictions: out of all which, if my leisure serve me, I may chance to gather a posy, and present it to him.  
He chargeth me to say, That there were two of our own Church answering his Leviathan: It may be so; but it is more than I know. I said one of our own Church, and one stranger.  
In the conclusion of my Epistle to the reader, I used this innocent form of valediction, So God bless us, a form of all others most usual for shutting up our Epistles, So God bless us, or So God bless you, or So I commit you to God, or Commend you to the protection of the hig hest Majesty. But it seemeth, he, misapprending it to be a prayer for protection or deliverance from his opinions, styles my well-meant prayer, a Bouffonly abusing of the name of God t●… calumny. How, am I charged with Bouffonery, and calumny, and abusing of the holy name of God? And all this for saying, God bless us? Is this a fit man to reprehend others for uncivility? Did he learn this high strain of courtesy at Malmsbury? I confess, I do not dislike a little toothless jesting, when the subject will bear it. 
— Ridiculum acri  
Fortius & melius magnas plerumque secat res.   
But I do not like jesting with edge-tools, nor jesting with God Almighty, much less bouffonly abusing of the holy Name of God to calumny. He need not fear any such reviling terms from me; But if his cause meet now and then with an innocent jerk for it, Sciat responsum, non dictum esse. He that knoweth not the way to the Sea, must get a River to be his guide.   

An answer to his Animadversions upon my Reply. Num. 1.  
I Said I was diverted from reading his defence by business: Hence he inferreth, that the will is not free; for nothing is free that can be diverted by any thing but itself. I deny this Proposition, and he will prove it at the Greek calends. There is a great difference between diversion, and determination. Diversion is but an occasional suspension of the exercise of liberty; but physical determination to one, is a compulsion of the will, so far as the will is capable of compulsion, that is, necessitation. The will doth choose its own diversion, but there is no choice in necessitation. And therefore necessitation to one is opposite to liberty, but diversion is not, nor moral efficacy.  
Out of his very first words [I had once resolved, 
Resolution proveth election and liberty.  etc.] I urged two arguments against him. Frst all resolution presupposeth deliberation: So much is acknowledged by himself, That to resolve, is to will after deliberation, (he knoweth no difference between willing and electing,) But all deliberation of that which is inevitably determined without ourselves, (as all events are determined according to his opinion,) is vain. As it is vain for a condemned person to deliberate whether he should be executed, it is vain for a man to deliberate whether he should grow in stature, or whether he should breathe. The only thing questionable in this argument, is the truth of the assumption, whether it be vain to deliberate of that which is already inevitably determined? to which he answereth not one syllable in terminis, but runs away with a false sent, altogether wide from the purpose. A man (saith he) may deliberate of what he shall do, whether the thing be possible or not, in case he know not of the impossibility, though he can not deliberate what another shall do to him. And therefore my three instances are impertinent, because the question is not what they shall do, but what they shall suffer. And here he vapoureth marvellously, supposing that he hath me at an huge advantage. Such are commonly all his advantages; much good may they do him. First he erreth grossly in affirming, that all deliberation is only of what a man will do, or not do; And not at all of what a man will suffer, or not suffer. Deliberation is as well about evil to be eschewed, as about good to be pursued. Men deliberate equally of their doings and of their sufferings, if they be not inevitably determined; but if they be, then neither of the one nor of the other. A Martyr or a Confessor, may deliberate what torments he will suffer for his Religion. Many of those acts whereabout we do usually deliberate are mixed motions, partly active, and partly passive, as all our senses. Secondly, it is a shame for him to distinguish between actions and sufferings in this cause, when all the actions of all the free Agents in the World, by his doctrine, are mere sufferings. A free Agent is but like a bullet rammed up into the barrel by the outward causes, and fired off by the outward causes; the will serves for no use but to be a touchhole; and the poor Agent hath no more aim or understanding of what he doth, than the arrow which is forced out of the bow towards the mark, without any sense or concurrent in itself. A condemned person may be reprieved, and deliberate about that, but the sentence of the causes produceth a necessity from eternity, (as he phraseth it) never to be interrupted or altered.  
Thirdly, he erreth in this also, That he affirmeth all my three instances to be only of passions or sufferings; Growing up in stature is a vegetative act, Respiration is a sensitive act, or an act of the moving and animal faculty. Some question there hath been, whether respiration were a natural motion, or a voluntary motion, or a mixed motion; but all conclude, that it is an act or motion, which is performed whilst we sleep, when we are uncapable of deliberation.  
Lastly, to say that a man may deliberate of a thing that is not possible, if he know not of the impossibility, will not advantage his cause the value of a rush; for supposing an universal necessity of all events from eternity, there can be no such case, seeing all men know, that upon this supposition all acts and events, are either antecedently and absolutely necessary, or antecedently and absolutely impossible, bo●… which are equally uncapable of deliberation. So the impertinence will prove to be in 〈◊〉 answer, not in my instances.  
My second argument out of his own word●… was this. To resolve a man's self, is to determine his own will, and if a man determine his own will, than he is free from outward necessity. But T. H. confesseth, that a man 〈◊〉 resolve himself: I resolved once, etc. And 〈◊〉 further to resolve is to will after deliberation. Now to will after deliberation, is to elect, but that he hateth the very term of electing or choosing, as being utterly destructive to his new modelled fabric of universal necessity. And for that very reason, he confounds and blunders together the natural, sensitive, and intellectual appetites. Either the will determineth itself in its resolution, or both will and deliberation and resolution, are predetermined by a necessary flux of natural causes; if the will determine itself in its resolution, than we have true liberty to will or nill: If both the will, and the deliberation, and the resolution, be predetermined by outward causes, than it is not the resolution of the will itself, nor of the Agent, but of the outward causes; than it was as much determined, that is to say, resolved before the deliberation, as after, because the deliberation itself and the whole event of it, particularly the last resolution, was outwardly predetermined from eternity.  
To this he answereth nothing, but according to his usual manner, he maketh three objections. First, No man can determine his own will, for the will is an appetite, and it is not in man's power to have an appetite when he will. This argument would much better become the kitchen than the Schools: to argue from the lesser to the greater negatively, which is against all rules of Logic. Just thus, A brute beast cannot make a Categorical Syllogism, thererefore a man cannot make one. So here, the sensitive appetite hath no dominion over its own acts, therefore neither hath the rational appetite any dominion over its own acts. Yet this is the only pillar that supporteth his main distinction, which must uphold his 
In the answer to the stating of the question.  Castle in the air, from tumbling down about his ears. But be what it will be, it hath been sufficiently answered already.  
His second oblection hath so little solidity in it, that it is ridiculous, Over whatsoever things there is dominion, those things are not free; but over a man's actions there is the dominion of his wil What a medius terminus hath he light upon? This which he urgeth against liberty, is the very essence of liberty. If a man's actions were under the dominion of another man's will, or under the dominion of his extrinsecall causes, than they were not free indeed; but for a man's own actions to be in his own power, or in the power, or under the dominion of his own will, that is that which makes them free.  
Thirdly he objects, If a man determine himself, the question will yet remain, What determined him to determine himself? If he speak properly in his own sense of physical determination, by outward causes, he speaketh plain nonsense; for if he was so determined by another, than he did not determine himself. But if he mean only this, What did concur with the will in the determination of itself, I answer, That a friend, by persuasion, might concur morally, and the understanding, by representing might, concur intrinsically, but it hath been demonstrated to him over and over, that neither of these concurrences is inconsistent with true liberty from necessitation and physical determination to one.  
Something I say afterwards which doth not please him, which he calleth a talking to myself at random; My aim in present is only to answer his exceptions, a little more punctually, than he hath done mine: not at all to call him to an account for his omissions; that part I leave to the Readers own observation. 
What is necessary.   
He telleth me plainly, That I neither understand him, nor what the word (necessary) signifieth, if I think he holds no other necessity, then that which is expressed in that old foolish rule, what soever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is. If I understand him not, I cannot help it, I understand him as well as I can, and wish that he understood himself a little better, to make him speak more significantly. Let us see where the fault lies, that he is no better understood. First he defineth what is necessary; That is necessary, which is impossible to be otherwise. Whence he inferreth, That Necessary, Possible, and Impossible, have no signification in reference to the time past, or time present, but only the time to come. I think all men will condescend to him thus far, That possibility hath only reference to the time to come. But for necessity, and impossibility, he overshooteth himself beyond all aim. If an house do actually burn in present, it is necessary, that is, infallible, that that house do burn in present, and impossible that it do not burn. If a man was slain yestarday, it is necessary, that he is slain to day, and impossible that he should nor be slain. His own definition doth sufficiently confute him, That is necessary which is impossible to be otherwise, but it is impossible, that that which is doing in present, or which was done yestarday should be otherwise. How hang these things together? Or this that he telleth us, That his necessary is a necessary from all eternity, which with him is an everlasting succession. And yet he telleth us, That necessary signifieth nothing in reference to the time past; then how is it necessary from all eternity? And here he thrusteth out for rotten, a great many of old Scholastic terms, as empty words. As necessary when it is, or absolutely and hypothecally necessary, and sensus compositus & divisus, and the dominion of the will, and the determining of its self. I must put him in mind again of the good old woman in Seneca, who complained of the darkness of the room, when the defect was in her own eyesight. I wonder not that he is out of love with distinctions, more than I wonder why a bungling workman regards not a square or a plum. But if he understood these distinctions a little better, he would not trouble his reader with That which shall be shall be, and a bundle of such like impertinencies.  
He acknowledgeth, That my Lord of Newcastle desire, and my entreaty were enough to produce a will in him to write his answer. If they were enough, than he was not necessitated, nor physically predetermined to write it. We had no more power than to persuade, no natural influence upon his will. And so he was, for us, not only free to write, but free to will also. But perhaps there were other imaginations of his own, that contributed their part. Let it be so, yet that was no extrinsecall or absolute determination of his will. And so far was our request from producing his consent, as necessarily as the fire burneth, that it did not, it could not produce it at all, by any natural causal influence and efficacy, The sufficiency and efficiency and productive power was in his will itself, which he will not be brought to understand.   

An Answer to his Animadversions upon the Reply, Num. 2.  
HEre is nothing of moment to detain the Reader. He saith, Whosoever chanceth to read Suares his opuscula, shall find the greatest part, if not all, that I have urged in this question. Said I not truly? Give Innovators line enough, and they will confute themselves? whosoever chanceth, etc. And why chanceth? 
Chance is from accidental concurrence, not from ignorance.  By his doctrine, it was as necessary for him that readeth to read, as it is for the fire to burn. Doth the fire sometimes burn by chance? He will say, That where the certain causes are not known, we attribute Events to Chance. But he sticks still in the same mire, without hope ever to be freed; who knoweth the certain reason why the needle touched with the loadstone pointeth always towards the North? Doth it therefore point by chance? How many thousands are ignorant of the true causes of Comets and Earthquakes and Eclipses? Do they therefore attribute them to chance? Chance never hath place, but where the causes concur accidentally to produce some effect, which might have been produced otherwise. Though a man strive to expel these common notions with a fork, yet now and then they will return. And though I could not surprise him, yet the truth can. Thus, Penelope like, he hath undone that in the dark, which he hath been weaving all this while in the light. It were more ingenuous to say it was a slip of his pen.  
It is indifferent to me, whether the greatest part of what I urge in this question, or all that I urge, or perhaps more than I urge, be contained in Suares his Opuscula. So the truth may prevail, I care not who have the honour of the achievement. But Suares understood himself better, then to confound two such different questions, namely, that of the necessity or liberty of all Events, natural and civil, which is our question, with the concurrence of grace and freewill, in moral and supernatural acts, which he saith is the subject of Suares his discourse in that place. In all my life, that I do remember, I never read one line of Suares his Opuscula, nor any of his works, the sixteen years' last passed. I wish he had been versed in his greater works, as well as in his Opuscula, that he might not be so averse from the Schools, Ignoti nulla cupido. Then he would have known the terms and arguments used in the Schools as well as others. It is no blemish to make advantage of other men's pains and experience. Dies diei eructat verbum, & nox nocti indicat scientiam. But Mr. Hobbes, trusting over much to his own particular abilities, presumeth to stand upon his own bottom, without any dread of solomon's ve sol●…, Woe to him that is alone when he falleth, He scrupleth not to remove the ancient 
Eccles. 4. 10. Prov. 22. 28. Jer. 18. 15.  landmarks which his fathers had set, nor to stumble from the ancient paths, to walk in a way that was never cast up. It were mere folly to expect either a known ground, or a received term from him. Other men are contented to learn to write after a Copy, but he will be printed a Philosopher, and a Divine of the first edition by himself: and, Icarus like, find out a new way with his waxen wings, which mortals never knew, though he perish in the attempt. Such undigested fancies may please for a while, during the distemper and green-sickness fit of this present age, as maids infected 
Ex Plutarchi Polit. ad Trajan.  with that malady, prefer chalk or coals in a corner, before healthful food in their father's house, but when time hath cured their malady, and experience opened their eyes, they will abominate their former errors, and those who were their misleaders.  
He had slighted whatsoever I produced as common and trivial, having nothing new in it, either from Scripture or reason, which he had not often heard. I replied only that then I might expect a more mature answer, and advised him, under the similitude of Epictetus his sheep, rather to show his reading in his works, than to glory of it. And where I said, that great recruits of reasons and authorities did offer themselves to me in this cause, he threateneth before he have done with me, to make it appear to be very bragging, and nothing else, Adding, That it is not likely, that Epictetus should take a metaphor from lamb and wool, because he was not acquainted with paying of tithes. I could not suspect that a poor similitude out of Epictetus should make him so passionate. But tange montes, & fumigabunt; touch the high mountains, and they will fume and smoke. It seemeth strange to me, that he should be so ignorant in Epictetus a Stoic, one of his principal friends, of so great fame, that his earthen lamp was preserved as a relic, and sold for three thousand Drachmas, whom, even Lucian, that great scoffer, calleth, an admirable old man, as to say, That it is not likely, that Epictetus should take a metaphor from lamb and wool, he meaneth from sheep. To inform 
Encheiridion. c. 16.  him better; let him hear his words, For sheep do not bring their grass to their shepherd, to show him how much they have eaten, but concocting their meat inwardly, do bring forth wool and milk. This might be pardoned, but his scoffing at payment of tithes, and particularly, lamb and wool, being an institution of God himself, and established by the laws of our own realm, cannot be excused. I appeal to all those who have read any thing upon this subject, whether I might not have added many more reasons, and produced the authority of the Christian World against him, in this cause of liberty, with the suffrages of the Fathers in all successive ages. But I remember that of our Saviour, Cast not your Pearls before swine lest they trample them under their feet. 
Math. 7. 6.    

An answer to the Animadversions upon Num. 3.  
HE is displeased that I do not set down the difinitions of necessity, spontaneity, and liberty, without which (he saith) their difference cannot possibly appear: Yet formerly, and again in this very Chapter, he confesseth, that the question is truly and clearly stated by me.  
The question which the Bishop stateth in this place, I have before set down verbatim, and allowed. What a trifling humour is this? Many things are not capable of perfect definitions, as (to pass by all others) accidents, and modes, or such terms as signify the manner of being. And in such things as are capable of definition, yet essentials (whereof a definition must consist, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Exact definitions not frequent.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) are neither so obvious nor so useful, to common capacities. I believe that all the perfect definitions which T. H. hath made in his life in Philosophy or Theology, may be written in one little ring; whereof I shall be bold henceforth, now and then as I find occasion, to put him in mind. Nay even in Mathematics, which by reason of their abstraction from matter are less subject to error, he can miss the cushion as well as his neighbours, and be contented sometimes to acknowledge it; not because those errors are greater, or so great as his errors in Philosophy or Theology, but because their conviction is more easy, and more evident. And therefore for the most part a plain description must serve the turn; sometimes from the etymological unfolding of the name, sometimes by the removing of what is opposite or contrary, sometimes by a periphrastical circumlocution, sometimes by instances and examples. And thus, by his own confession, the question is cleared between us.  
Yet, to satisfy him, I will describe them more formally. To begin with liberty. Liberty 
What liberty is.  is a power of the will, (or free Agent) to choose or to refuse, this or that indifferently, after deliberation, free from all antecedent and extrinsical determination to one. Election is the proper act of the will; and without indifferency or indetermination and deliberation, there can be no election, which is a consultative appetition. And they, and they only, are free Agents, who (supposing all things to be present that are requisite to action,) can nevertheless either act, or forbear to act, at their own choice: Which description hath already been explained, and shall be further in due place.  
Secondly voluntary or Spontaneous, is that which hath its beginning from an inward principle, 
What is spontaneity?  (that is the will) with some knowledge of the end. Such are the acts of children, fools, and madmen, whilst they want the use of reason; And the sudden acts of passionate persons, whensoever the violence of their passion doth prevent all deliberation. Such are many actions of brute beasts, as the spiders making of her webs to catch flies; the birds building of her nest therein to lay her eggs; both which proceed from an inward principle, with some knowledge of the end. So then this is the difference between that which is free, and that which is voluntary or spontaneous; that every free act is also a voluntary or spontaneous act, but every voluntary or spontaneous act is not a free act. The reason is evident, because no act is free, except it be done upon deliberation: But many voluntary or spontaneous acts are done without all deliberation, as the acts of brute beasts, fools, children, madmen, and some acts of passionate persons. Secondly, there is no liberty but where there is a possibility towards more than one, and freedom to choose this or that indifferently. But in all those other kinds of voluntary or spontaneous acts, there is an antecedent determination to one, and no indifferency of election. So spontaneity is an appetite of some object, proceeding either from the rational or sensitive will, either antecedently determined, or not determined to one, either upon deliberation or without deliberation, either with election, or without election.  
The last term is necessity; He himself hath defined necessary, to be that which is impossible 
What is necessity?  to be otherwise. Here is a definition without either matter or form, genus or differentia, without any thing in it that is essential, or so much as positive, a very periphrase or circumlocution, and (which is worst) not convertible or reciprocal with the thing defined. Many things may be necessary respectively, which are not impossible to be otherwise: as to let blood in a Ple●…risie; A horse is necessary for a long voyage: yet it is not impossible for a man to perform it on foot. And on the other side, Many things are impossible to be otherwise, which are not necessary in that sense wherein we take necessity in this question, as that which is necessary upon science or prescience; and that which is necessary upon condition or supposition. As if Thomas write, than he lives; Yet neither his writing, nor his living, is absolutely necessary. So whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is, or impossible to be otherwise. None of these necessities have any place in this controversy. None of these sorts of necessity are opposite to true liberty. By the way, T. H. calls this rule Whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is; and old foolish rule, (yet it is delivered by Aristotle, and received ever since in the World,) upon his own authority, without 
De interpret. l. 1. c. ultimo.  ever examining it, or understanding it. Satis pro imperio. So then necessity (as it is proper to this question) I conceive may be thus fitly described, Necessity is a manner or propriety of being, or of acting, whereby that which is, or acteth, cannot possibly but be and act, nor be, or act otherwise then it doth, by reason of an antecedent extrinsical and inevitable determination to one. I say of being, or of acting, because there is a double necessity, in essendo, & in operando, 
Necessity of being and acting distinguished.  and both considerable in this cause. That which is necessarily, may act freely, as God Almighty without himself; And that which is freely or contingently, as fire kindled by the help of a tinderbox, or by the stumbling of an horse upon the pavement of a street, may act and burn necessarily. Here he may see if he please, how necessity and will, or spontaneity may meet together, because that which is antecedently and extrinsecally determined to one, may agree well enough with my appetite, or the appetite of another: But necessity and liberty, can never meet together; because that which is antecedently and extrinsecally determined to one, cannot possibly be free; that is, undetermined to one, nor capable of election, which must be inter plura, nor a fit subject for deliberation.  
He urgeth that, seeing I say necessity and spontaneity may meet together, he may say that necessity and will may stand together. He doth but betray his own ignorance, and intolerable boldness, to censure all the World for that which he never read nor understood. We all say in like manner, That necessity and will may stand together, for will and spontaneity a●…e the same thing. But necessity and liberty, can never stand together. If he will shut his eyes against the light, he may stumble as often as he pleaseth.  
He saith, He doth not fear that it will be thought too hot for his fingers, to show the vanity of such words as these, Intellectual appetite, Conformity of the appetite to the object, Rational will, Elective power of the rational will, Reason is the root of liberty, Reason representeth to the will. Reader, behold once more the unparalelled presumption of this man. Words and terms are not by nature, but by imposition. And who are fit to impose terms of Art, but Artists, who understand the Art? Thus were all these terms imposed. Again, verborum ut nummorum, words are as money is; The most current is the best. This was the current language of all Schools of learning, which we learned from our Tutors and Professors: But a private man starteth up, not bred in the Schools, who opposeth his own authority to the authority of the whole World, and cries down the current coin, that is, the generally received terms of Art; Where is his commission? What is his reason? Because he doth not understand them, he guesseth that they did not understand themselves. Is his private understanding (which is filled up to the brim with prejudice and presumption) fit to be the public standard and seal of other men's capacities? They who will understand Schoole-terms, must learn and study them; which he never did. Those things that are excellent and rare, are always difficult. He who shall affirm that all the famous Divines and Philosophers in the World, for so many succeeding Ages did speak nonsense, deserveth to be contemned. His respect to weak capacities must not serve his turn, Nullae sunt occultiores insidiae, quam hae quae latent in simulatione 
Tull.  officii. If he could show any author before himself, wherein these terms were not used, or wherein his new terms were used, it were something. There is no Art in the World which hath not proper terms, which none understand but they who understand that Art.  
But cui bono? If we should be so mad to quit all received Schoole-terms, and distinctions, and lose all the advantage which we might reap by the labours and experience of so many great wits, What advantage would this be to him? None at all at long running. Whatsoever be the terms, the state of the question must be the same: And those very reasons which convince him now in the old language of the Schools, would convince him likewise in the new language, which he desireth to introduce, after it was form and generally understood. All the benefit that he could make of it, would be only a little time between the suppression of the one, and the introduction of the other, wherein he might jugle, and play hocus pocus, under the cloak of harmonymies and ambiguous expressions. And that is the reason why he is so great a friend to definitions, and so great an enemy to distinctions.  
Whereas I affirmed that necessity of supposition 
Necessity upon supposition, what it is.  may consist with true liberty, he objecteth, That all necessity is upon supposition; as the fire burneth necessarily, upon supposition that the ordinary course of nature be not hindered by God, for the fire burned not the three children in the furnace: And upon supposition that fuel be put unto it. His supposition, if the ordinary course of nature be not hindered, is impertinent and destructive to his own grounds. For though it be true, that those things which are impossible to the second causes, as to make a Camel go through the eye of a needle, are all possible with God: Yet upon his opinion that all things are necessary from eternity, God hath 
Mark 10. 27.  tied his own hands, and nothing is possible to God, which is not absolutely necessary and impossible to be otherwise. His other instance of putting fuel to the fire, is a necessary supposition, to the continuance or duration of the fire, but not to the acting or burning of the fire. So long as there is fire, it doth and must burn. When all requisites to action are present, the will is still free to choose or refuse. When all things requisite to action are present to the fire, it cannot choose but burn, and cannot do otherwise.  
Thirdly I answer, That there is a twofold necessity upon supposition; the one a necessity upon an antecedent extrinsecall supposition. This cannot consist with liberty, because it implieth an antecedent determination, and the thing supposed was never in the power of the Agent. The other is a necessity upon a consequent supposition, where the thing supposed is in the power of the free Agent, or depends upon something, or supposeth something that is in his power; this is very well consistent with true liberty. As for example, If T. H. do run, than it is necessary, that he moves. This necessity is no impediment at all to liberty, because the thing supposed, that is to run or not to run, is in the power of the free Agent. If a man's will be determined antecedently by extrinsecall causes, to choose such a woman for his wife, and her will to choose him for her husband, than it is necessary, that they elect one another. This necessity is upon an antecedent supposition, and is utterly destructive to liberty, because the determination of the extrinsecall causes, is not in the power of the free Agent.  
Lastly, T. H. his two instances of the fire are altogether impertinent. For first, The fire is a natural necessary Agent; and therefore no supposition, antecedent or consequent can make it free. Secondly, God●… hindering the ordinary course of nature is an antecedent supposition, And if the fire were a free Agent, it were suffi●…ient to destroy the liberty thereof, as to that act.  
He saith, That it seemeth I understand not what these words free and contingent mean, because I put causes among those things that operate freely. What doth the man mean? Are not free Agents causes? If they be not, how do they act? I understand these words, free and contingent, as they ought to be understood; and as the World hath understood them for two thousand years. As for his new nick-naming of free and contingent Agents, I heed it not.  
He hath showed, That this liberty, whereof we treat, is common to bruit beasts, and inanimate creatures with man, as well as he could show it, or can show it, or ever will be able to show it: that is, just as much as he hath showed that the sea burneth. If it were not for this confounding of terms, and a company of trifling homonymies, he would have nothing to say or do.  
When a man (saith he) doth any thing freely, many other concurrent Agents work necessarily. As the man moveth the sword freely, the sword woundeth necessarily. A free Agent may have concurrent 
Man is not a passive instrument as the sword in his hand.  Agents: but his instance in a sword is very impertinent, which is but an instrument, yea, a passive instrument, and though it have an aptitude in itself, from the sharpness and weight thereof, yet the determination of the action, and the efficacy or causation ought to be ascribed to the principal Agent. The sword did not wound, but the man wounded with the sword. Admit the sword may be said in some sense to concur actively to the cutting, certainly it concurs only passively to the motion.  
But he would make us believe that the man is no more active than his sword, and hath no more power to suspend or deny his concurrence, than the sword, because a man doth not move himself, or at least, not move himself originally. I have heard of some, who held an opinion, that the soul of man was but like the winding up of a watch, and when the string was run out, the man died, and there the soul determined. But I had not thought before this, that any man had made the body also to be like a Clock, or a Jack, or a Puppet in a play, to have the original of its motion from without itself, so as to make a man in his animal motion, to be as mere a passive instrument, as the sword in his hand. If by originally he do understand independently, so as to suppose that a man hath his locomotive faculty from himself, and not from God, we all affirm, That the original of a man's locomotive faculty is from God, in whom we live and move and have our being. But if he understand originally, 
Act. 17. 28.  not in relation to the faculty, but to the act of moving (as he must mean, unless he mean nonsense) than we affirm, that a man doth move himself originally, and desire not to taste of his paradoxical knowledge of motion. It is folly to dispute with such men, and not rather to leave them to their own fantastical Chimeras, who deny all principles and rules of art, whom an adversary cannot drive into greater absurdities, than they do willingly plunge themselves into. Thus they do on purpose put out the lights, and leave men to fence in the dark; and than it is all one, whether a man have skill at his weapon or not.  
That he would have contingency to depend upon our knowledge, or rather our ignorance, and not upon the accidental concurrence of causes; That he confoundeth free causes, which have power to suspend or deny their concurrence, with contingent causes, which admit only a possibility to concur, or not concur, rather out of impotence than power; That he maketh free causes, which are principal causes, to be guided by inferior and instrumental causes, as if a man should say, That a man is guided by the sword in his hand, and not the sword by the man, deserves no other answer, but contempt; or pity, that a man should so poison his intellectuals, and entangle himself in his own errors.  
Such another mistake is his argument to prove that contingent causes could not have concurred otherwise then they did, I know no●… whether more pedantical or ridiculous. For I conceive not (saith he) how when this runneth this way, and that another; they can be said to concur, that is, run together. Wheresoever there are divided parties, as in a Court or a Camp, or a Corporation, he who concurreth with one party, doth thereby desert the other.  
Concerning his instance of the necessity of casting ambs ace, If he can show that the caster, was antecedently necessitated to cast, so that he could not possibly, have denied his concurrence, and to cast so soon, so that he could not possibly have suspended his concurrence, and to cast just with so much force, so that he could not possibly have used more force or less force, and to cast into that table, and that very individual place, (it may be whilst he winked, or looked another way) I say, if he can show that all these contingent accidents were absolutely predetermined, and that it was not at all in the Casters power to have done otherwise than he did, than he hath brought contingency under the jurisdiction of fate. But if he fail in any one of these, (as all men see that he must fail in all of these) than I may have leave to tell him, that his casting of ambs ace, hath lost him his game.  
But now Reader, I desire thee to observe his answer, and to see him plainly yield the 
The instance in ambs ace hath lost T. H. his game.  cause. Though the subject [ambs ace] be mean and contemptible, yet it yieldeth thee light enough to see what notorious triflers these are. Thus he saith, The suspending of the casters concurrence, or altering of his force, and the l●…ke accidents, serve not to take away the necessity of ambs' ace, otherwise then by making a necessity of deux ace, or some other cast that shall be thrown. This is ingenuously answered, I ask no more of him. He confesseth, That the caster might have suspended his concurrence, or have altered his force, or the accidents might have fallen out otherwise than they did. And that if these alterations had happened, as they might have happened, then there had been as great a necessity of deux ace, or some other cast, as there was of ambs' ace: where he saith, That the alteration of the accidents serveth not to take away the necessity of ambs' ace, otherwise than by making a necessity of deux ace, or some other cast, he confesseth, That by making a necessity of deux ace, or some other cast, they might serve to take away the necessity of ambs' ace. What is now become of his antecedent determination, of all things to one from eternity? and of the absolute impossibility that any Event should come to pass otherwise than it doth. If this be all his necessity, it is no more than a necessity upon supposition, where the thing supposed was in the Agents power: And where the contrary determination by the Agent being supposed, the Event must necessarily have been otherwise. And so he is come unwittingly under the protection of that old foolish rule, which even now he renounced, Whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is.  
I said most truly, That that is not the question which he maketh to be the question. For although at sometimes he assent to the right stating of the question, yet at other times, like a man that doth not understand himself, he varieth quite from it. And in the place of an absolute antecedent necessity, he introduceth a consequent hypothecal necessity. As we have seen even now in the case of ambs' ace: and where he argueth from prescience; and where he reasoneth thus, That which shall be, shall be, as if the manner how it should be, were not material: and where he maketh deliberation and persuasion to determine the will. All these do amount to no more than a necessity upon supposition. The question is as much or more of the liberty of doing what we will, as willing what we will. But he makes it to be only of willing.  
He proceedeth like another Jehu, He that cannot understand the difference between free to do, if he will, and free to will, is not fit to hear this controversy disputed, much less to be a writer in it. Certainly, I think he meaneth by himself, for he neither understandeth what free is, nor what the will is. A bowl hath as much freewill as he, the bowl is as much an agent as he, neither of them, according to his his opinion, do move themselves originally. The bias is as much to the bowl, as his will is to him. The bias is determined to the one, so is his will. The bowl doth not bias itself, 
T. H. his will is no more than the bias of a bowl.  no more hath he the government of his own will, but the outward causes. It is not the fault of the bowl, if it have too much bias, or too little bias, but his fault that bias it: So if he choose evil, it is not his fault, but the causes which bias him over much, or over little, or on the wrong side. And this is all his freedom; a determinate propension to one side, without any possibility to incline the other way. As a man that is nailed to a post, is free to lay his ear to it. Then as Diogenes called a displmued cock, Plato's man, a living creature with two feet, without feathers. So I may call a bowl Mr. Hobbes his free Agent.  
And yet he glorieth in this silly distinction, and hugs himself for the invention of it. It is true, very few have learned from tutors, that a man is not free to will, nor do they find it much in books, Yea, when I call shepherds, Poets, Pastors, Doctors, and all mankind to bear witness for liberty, he answereth, That neither the Bishop nor they ever thought on this question. If he make much of his own invention, I do not blame him, The infant will not live long before it be hissed out of the World. In all my life, I never saw a little empty boat bear so great a sail, as if he meant to tow the World after him: but when the sun is at the lowest, it makes the longest shadows. Take notice (by the way) that his freedom is such a freedom, as none of mankind, from the shepherd to the Doctor, ever dreamt of before himself. This vain unprofitable distinction which wounds himself and his cause more than his adversary, and leaves him open to the blows of every one that will vouchsafe to assault him, which contradicts both the truth and itself, hath been twice taken away already in a voider, (whither I refer the Reader) and ought not, like twice sodden Coleworts, to have been served up again in triumph so quickly, upon his single authority, & before this Treatise be ended. I shall meet with it again to some purpose, I wonder whether 
See stateing of the question & answer to Num. 1.  he do never cast away a thought upon the poor woman that was drowned bymischance, whose dead body, whilst her neighbours sought for down the river; her husband, who knew her conditions better than they, advised them to seek up the river; for all her life long she loved to be contrary to all others, and he presumed she would swim against the stream being dead. Is it not hard that he who will not allow to other men any dominion over themselves, or their own acts, will himself needs usurp an Universal Empire over the wills and understandings of all other men.  
Is it not freedom enough (saith he) unless a man's will have power over his will, and that his 
St. Austi●… more to be credited than T. H:  will must have another power within it, to do voluntary acts? His error proceedeth from the confounding of voluntas and volitio, the faculty of the will, and the act of willing. Not long after he reiterateth his mistake, taxing me for saying, that our wills are in our power, adding, that through ignorance I detect the same fault in St. Austin. If he mean my ignorance to mistake St, Austin, let St. Austin himself 
De lib. Arbit. l. 3. c. 3.  be Judge, Voluntas igitur nostra nec voluntas esset nisi esset in nostra potestate, etc. Therefore our will should not be our will, unless it were in our power. Because it is in our power, it is free to us, for that is not free to us which is not in our power, etc. If he mean that it is an error in St. Austin, he showeth his insolence and vainglory. If this be an error in him, it is an error in all the rest of the Fathers; I will not bate him one of them in this cause. Mr. Calvin (whom he citeth sometimes in this Treatise) professeth, that he will not differ a syllable from St. Austin; I do not say in this question of natural necessity or liberty, which no man then doubted of, but even in that higher question of the concurrence of grace with freewill. So here is neither error in St. Austin, nor ignorance in me.  
Whereas I demanded thus; If whatsoever a man doth and willeth be predetermined to one precisely and inevitably, to what purpose is that power whereof T. H. speaketh, to do if he will, and not to do if he will, which is never deduced into act indifferently and in utramque partem, and consequently frustraneous? He answereth, That all those things may 
To give liberty to two, and limit to one, is a contradiction.  be brought to pass, which God hath from eternity predetermined. In good time; he might as well say, that God hath given man a liberty to both parts, to do or not to do, to choose or to refuse, and yet hath limited him punctually and precisely to one part; which is a pure contradiction, to give him choice of two, and yet restrain him to one.  
He addeth, that though the will be necessitated, yet the doing what we will is liberty: Yes, it is the liberty of a bowl, it is his mock liberty, but it is no wise man's liberty, where all deliberation is vain, and all election is impossible.  
I argued thus, If a man be free to act, he is much more free to will, because quod efficit tale illud magis est tale. To which he answereth with an ignorant jeer, As if he should say, if I make him angry, than I am more angry. Pardon me, I will free him from this fear: I see nothing in him that should move a man to anger, but rather to pity. That Canon holdeth only in causis pierce, such causes as by nature or the intention of the free Agent, are properly ordained to produce that effect, such as his outward causes are; supposed by him to be, in the determination of the will. And therefore my instance was proper, Not in causis per accidens, where the effect is not produced naturally, or intentionally, but accidentally, as in his ridiculous instance.  
My last argument, which he vouchsafeth to take notice of, was this; If the will be determined, than the writing is determined: And then he ought not to say, he may write, but he must write. His answer is, It followeth that he must write; but it followeth not that I ought to say, he must write, unless he would have me say more than I know, as he himself doth. What poor crotchets are these, unworthy of a man that hath any thing of reality in him? as if my argument did regard the saying of it, and not the thing itself. If it follow precisely that he must write, than he hath no freedom in utramque partem, either to write or not to write, than he is no more free to do, than to will; both which are contrary to his assertion.  
I demanded, if a man's will be determined without his will? Why we do ask him, whether he will do such a thing or not? His answer is, because we desire to know. But he wholly mistaketh the scope of the question. The emphasis lieth not in the word we, but in the word his; how it is his will? For if his will be determined by natural causes without his will, than it is the will of the causes, rather than his own will.  
I demanded further, why we do represent reasons to men, why we do entreat them? He 
According to T. H. his principles all persuasions are win.  answereth, Because we think to make them have the will they have not. So he teacheth us, First that the will is determined by a necessary influence of natural causes; and then prateth of changing the will by advice and moral persuasions. Let him advise the clock to strike sooner or later than it is determined by the weight of the plumb, and motion of the wheels. Let him dissuade the Plants from growing, and see how much it availeth. He saith the will doth will as necessarily as the fire burneth. Then let him entreat the fire to leave burning at his request. But thus it falleth out with them who cannot, or will not, dishinguish between natural and moral efficacy.  
I asked then, why do we blame free Agents? since no man blameth fire for burning Cities, nor accuseth poison for destroying men. First he returneth an answer, We blame them because they do not please us. Why? may 
We can blame no man justly.  a man blame every thing that doth not please his humour? Then I do not wonder why T. H. is so apt to blame others without cause. So the Scholar may blame his Master for correcting him deservedly for his good. So he who hath a vicious stomach may blame healthful food. So a Lethargical person may blame his best friend for endeavouring to save his life.  
And now having shot his bolt, he begins to examine the case, Whether blaming be any more than saying the thing blamed is ill or imperfect? Yes, moral blame is much more, It is an imputation of a fault. If a man be born blind or with one eye, we do not blame him for it: But if a man have lost his sight by his intemperance, we blame him justly. He inquireth, May not we say, a lame horse is lame? Yes, but you cannot blame the horse for it, if he was lamed by another without his own fault. May not a man say one is a fool or a knave (saith he) if he be so, though he could not help it? If he made himself a sot, we may blame him, though if he be a stark sot, we lose our labour. But if he were born a natural idiot, it were both injurious and ridiculous to blame him for it. Where did he learn, that, a man may be a knave, and cannot help it? Or that knavery is imposed inevitably upon a man without his own fault? If a man put fire to his neighbour's house, it is the fault of the man, not of the fire. He hath confessed formerly, that, a man ought not to be punished but for crimes; The reason is the very same that he should not be blamed for doing that which he could not possibly leave undone; no more than a servant whom his Master hath chained to a pillar, aught to be blamed for not waiting at his elbow. No chain is stronger than the chain of fatal Destiny is supposed to be.  
That piece of eloquence which he thinks I borrowed from Tully, was in truth taken immediately out of St. Austin, who applieth it most properly to this case now in question. He urgeth, That a man might as well say, that no man halteth which can not choose but halt, as 
A lame comparison.  say, That no man sinneth in those things which he cannot shun; for what is sin but halting? This is not the first time that he hath contradicted himself. Before he told us, that there can be no punishment but for crimes that might have been left undone: Now he telleth us, that a man may sin who cannot choose but sin; Then sin is not a punishable crime. He might even as well say, that there is no such thing as sin in the World; Or if there be, that God is the author of it. Reader, whosoever thou art, if thou reverence God, eschew such doctrines. His comparison of halting is frivolous and impertinent. Halting is not against the eternal rule of God's justice, as sinning is. Neither doth a man choose his halting freely, as he doth his sinning.  
In the conclusion of his Animadversions upon Num. 3. there is nothing that is new, but that he is pleased to play with a wooden top. He calleth my argument from Zenos cudgelling 
T. H. maketh himself no better than a wooden top.  of his man, a wooden argument. Let him choose whether I shall call his a wooden, or a boyish comparison. I did never meet with a more unfortunate instancer than he is. He should produce an instance of natural Agents, and he produceth an instance of voluntary Agents. Such are the boys that whip his wooden top. He should produce an instance of a natural determination; so he affirmeth, that the will is determined; and he produceth an instance of a violent determination, for such is the motion of his top. I hope he doth not mean that the will is compelled; if he do, he may string it up with the rest of his contradictions.  
Hath not he brought his hogs to a fair market, when God hath created him a free man, a noble creature, to make himself like a wooden top? Deserveth not he to be moved as the top is with a whip, until he confess his error, and acknowledge his own liberty. If this wooden top should chance to hit T. H. on the shins, I desire to know whom he would accuse: The top? That were as mad a part, as it is in the dog to run after the stone and bite it, never looking at the man who did throw it. What then should he accuse the boys that whipped the top? No, that were equally ludibrious, seeing the boys are as much necessitated; and to use his own phrase, as much lashed to what they do by the causes, as the top is by the boys. So he may sit down patiently, and at last think upon his liberty which he had abandoned, and if the causes will give him leave, get a plantin leaf to heal his broken shin.  
Such an unruly thing as this top which he fancieth, is he himself, sometimes dictating errors, sometimes writing paradoxes, sometimes justling out Metaphysics, sometimes wounding the Mathematics; And in a word, troubling the World, and disordering all things, Logic, Philosophy, Theology, with his extravagant conceits. And yet he is offended that men will go about to keep possession of their ancient Principles against his upstart innovations, and is ready to implead them (with that quarrelsome Roman) because they would not receive his weapon fairly with their whole bodies. It were a much more Christian contemplation to elevate his thoughts from this wooden top; to the organical body of a man, wherein he may find God an hundred times, from the external form or figure of the one, which affords it only an aptitude to move and turn, to the internal and substantial form of the other, which is the subordinate beginning of animal motion, from the turning of his top, which is so swift, that it prevents the discovery of the sharpest eyesight, and seemeth to stand stock still, to the eternity of God where motion and rest do meet together, or all motion is swallowed up into rest; Lastly from these boys who hold the top up by their continued lashings, to the infinite power of an Almighty God, who is both the procreating and conserving cause of all our life, being, and motion, and to magnify him for his wonderful works, wherein he hath manifested to the World his own power and wisdom.   

An answer to his Animadversions upon Num. 4.  
THese Animadversions will produce no great trouble either to me or the Reader. I did demonstrate in this Section the difference between liberty of exercise or contradiction, and liberty of specification or contrariety. He only takes notice of it, and calls it Jargon; and so without one word more, shaketh hands and withdraweth himself.  
I said it was a rule in art, that homonymous words, or words of a double or doubtful signification, ought first to be distinguished, that Disputants may understand one another rightly, and not beat the air to no purpose.  
I showed out of the Scriptures, that the word liberty or freedom, was such an ambiguous word, and showed further what this liberty is whereof we dispute: A liberty from necessitation or determination to one by extrinsical causes. He confesseth, that this is the question; adding, That he understandeth not how such a liberty can be. Then what remained 
T. H, his deep skill in Logic.  but to go to our proofs? Yet here he raiseth a storm of words upon the by, and foameth out his own disgrace. He denieth that there is any such rule of Art. I am sure (saith he) not in the art of reason which men call Logic. And all Logicians are sure of the contrary who give not only one but many such rules, in treating of simple terms, of complex terms, of fallacies. They teach that an ambiguous term before it be distinguished, signifieth nothing; That it cannot be placed in any predicament; That it cannot be defined nor divided: And they give this general Rule, Distinctio vocis ambiguae prima sit in omni rerum consideratione. Either this man never read one word of Logic in his life, or it is most strange how pride hath defaced all Logical notions out of his mind.  
He telleth us, that the signification of an ambiguous word may be rendered perspicuous 
His silly definitions.  by a definition. But Logicians teach us better, that it cannot be defined before it be distinguished. How should a man define he knoweth not what? Suppose I should ask him the definition of a degree, Can he or any man define a degree, before they know what degree is to be defined? whether a degree in the Heavens, or a degree in the Schools, or a degree of Consanguinity, or a degree of Comparison? He may as well define a crab before he know whether it be a crabfish or a crabbe-fruit. The definition and the thing defined, are the same thing. But ambiguous words have several significations, which cannot be of the same thing.  
His definition of liberty is this; Liberty is the absence of external impediments to motion. Before I have done, I shall make him out of love with his definitions. Liberty is an absence; If liberty be an absence, than liberty is nothing, for an absence is nothing in the nature of things; but a mere privation. An absence of impediments; Impediments may take away the liberty of execution, not the liberty of election. There may be true liberty where there are impediments; and there may be no impediments, yet without liberty. An absence of outward impediments: And why of outward impediments? may not inward impediments withhold a man from acting freely as well as outward? May not a fit of sickness keep a man at home, as well as a shower of rain? A man may be free, and act freely, notwithstanding impediments. Many impediments are vincible: A man may go out of his house though there be a great log laid at his door. Lastly an absence of impediments to motions. Election is the most proper intrinsecall act of liberty, which may be without local motion.  
I durst not style my poor description by the name of a definition. Yet it set down the right nature of liberty, and showed what was the difference between us. His definition hath nothing to do with liberty, and cometh not near our question by twenty furlongs.  
Our controversy is, Whether the will be antecedently determined by extrinsecall causes, we have nothing to do with impediments of motion. But to let him see the vanity of his definitions, I will demonstrate out of them, That the most necessary Agents are free Agents, and the most free Agents necessary Agents, that the will is free, and necessity is liberty. First, when a stone falleth from a steeple to the ground, or when a fire burneth, there is an absence of all external impediments to motion: yet by his own confession, these are not free, nor so much as voluntary, but natural necessary actions. The stone falleth necessarily, not freely. The fire burneth necessarily, not freely. So his definition fitteth a necessary Agent, as well as a free Agent. On the other side, he defineth necessary to be that which is impossible to be otherwise. But by this doctrine, it is impossible for any free or voluntary Agent to be otherwise than it is, or act otherwise than it doth. Therefore by his definition, all free and voluntary Agents are necessary Agents. Secondly, if an absence of external impedements to motion be a true definition of liberty, than the will is free, for the will hath no external impediment to motion. external impediments may hinder action, not election, which is the proper act of the will.  
Lastly, by his definition, liberty itself is necessity, and necessity is liberty, as is made evident thus. The absence of outward impediments to motion is the definition which he giveth of liberty, and therefore must be reciprocal or convertible with liberty itself. But necessity is much more an absence of outward impediments to motion. For if there were any impediments that could hinder the production of the effect, there could be no necessity. Thus he confoundeth all things with his definitions, free Agents with necessary Agents, and necessary Agents, with free Agents: necessity itself with liberty, and liberty with necessity. And now learning is well reform.  
He is displeased at me for calling him a particular man, as if (saith he) I or any other was an universal man; and he conceiveth that I mean a private man. I mean as I write, a particular man is not opposed to an universal man, but to mankind, though he maketh his City, to be a kind of universal man. My meaning was, a particular man, that is, not a Church, not a Council, not so much as a company of men, but one single man, and it may, an handful of his seduced disciples. There is neither a Church, nor a Council, nor a company of men, but they may justly challenge more respect than one single man.  
Here he boasteth of his constant meditations, That he hath done almost nothing else 
Medition li●…tle worth without making use of other men's experience  but to meditate upon this and other natural questions. Still he forgetteth Epictetus his rule, that the sheep should not brag how much it hath eaten. If he had meditated to any great purpose, we should have found it in his works. For my part, I do neither believe, that he had so much spare time from other employments, to bestow upon his meditations. Nor that private meditation, without making use of the studies and experience of other men, is so ready a way to attain to perfection in such hidden learning. If he had spent all his time in meditating how to become a good Physician, and had never read a line of Hypocrates or Galen, or any other learned Author, the meanest of which, had more knowledge, than he is able to attain unto with all his meditation, during his whole life, What would it have availed him? Facile est inventis addere, It is much easier to top a stately edefice, then to build it up from the very foundation. Lastly, I do not believe that he was capable of meditation, upon those high subjects, which he never understood, as appeareth plainly by his writings. How should a blind man judge of colours?  
Yet he will not give over, until he have had another fling against School terms, because he findeth it easier to censure, than either to confute or understand. He hath been answered formerly, and shall receive a further answer in due place. For the present, I shall only put him in mind of two sayings, the one of Schaliger, Voces didacticae rudibus ingeniis acerbae, delicatis ridiculae sunt, Terms of art devised 
Terms of art are unungrateful to rude persons.  for instruction, are unpleasant to palates not exercised in them, and ridiculous to nice and delicate ears. There is a double perspicuity, the one vulgar to common people, the other more intellectual to Artists. In vulgar appellations (saith Aristotle) we are to speak as the 
1 Top. c. 2. ss. 2.  common people, but in terms of art, we are to follow the most approved Artists.  
He asketh with what patience I can hear Martin Luther and Philip Melancthon, speak against School Theology, whereof he giveth some instances, but without citing the places. So he must receive an answer without perusing of them. If they have condemned all Schoolmen and School-learning, it is for him to defend them, not for me. If they did so, I should not much value their judgement in that particular. But I do not believe that any who made so great use of School-learning, did condemn all Schoolmen in general. Luther stinted his accusation to under 300 years. It may well be, That in that time some Schoolmen, in some questions were too licentious. But T. H. condemneth not only the men, but the learning, all their grounds, all their terms, and more particularly in this very question of the liberty of the will, he censurureth and contemneth all Fathers, Philosophers, and Classic Writers. I trow, Martin Luther and Philip Melancthon did not so.  
He pleadeth, That he doth not call all School-learning jargon, but that which they say in defence of untruths, and especially in the maintenance of freewill I believe he hath read very little School-learning, either upon that subject, or any other; if he have, we find very little fruit of it in his writings. But if that be his quarrel against the Schoolmen, for maintaining of freedom of will from antecedent and extrinsecall necessitation in natural acts, if he will stand to authorities, I am contented to join issue with him, that not only all the Schoolmen, but all Fathers, Philosophers, and Chassick Writers were propugners of this freedom or liberty of will; and particularly his two witnesses, whose words he citeth in this place, Luther and Melancthon, whereof the former saith, That he and his party speak undiscreetly, and the other (that is, Melacthon) calleth his opinion of universal necessity, a Manichean opinion, and an horrible lie.   

Castigations upon the Animadversions, Num. 5.  
IN this fifth Section there are no Animadversions, and so there is no need of Castigations.   

Castigations upon the Animaversions, Num. 6.  
THere is no occasion offered to make any long stay upon this subject. I produced three places of Scripture to prove, That men have liberty, or power of election. He answered, That men are necessitated to what they do choose by antecedent causes. I took away this answer three ways. First by reason. To this he is silent. Secondly by instances. Thirdly by the texts themselves. To this he rejoineth. That these texts and instances do only prove, that a man is free 
Ans. to the stat. quest. fount. of Argum. cast. Num. 1, 3. def. Num. 3.  to do if he will, which he denieth not. But they do not prove that he is free to will. And in the second instance, The Seniour of the mess, chooseth what he hath an appetite to, but he chooseth not his appetite. This is all he answereth.  
This distinction hath been already sufficiently refuted, as contradictory to his own 
Freedom to do if one will, without freedom to will, a vain distinction.  grounds, which do as much necessitate a man to do, as to will. Secondly, as unprofitable, the necessity of willing being much more subject and obnoxious to all those blows, and all those absurdities, which flow from fatal destiny, than the necessity of doing. Thirdly as contrary to the sense, and meaning of the whole world. Fourthly as contrary to the Scriptures. Lastly, I have demonstrated the unreasonableness of his comparison between the intellectual and sensitive appetite, both as it is a comparison, Theologia Symbolica non est argumentativa. As also as it is an inference from the lesser to the greater negatively.  
Now I add, That that gloss is accursed, which doth corrupt the text, as this gloss of his doth, That a man is free to do if he will, but not free to will. Election is that very thing which he saith is not free, that is the appetite; and it is thus defined, Electio est appetitus rei praeconsileatae, Election is an appetite of some thing, that hath been predeliberated of. But the texts alleged do demonstrate that to choose or elect is free, and undetermined to one. Therefore they do demonstrate that it is not free only to do, but much more to will or to choose. It is in the husband's choice, either to establish the vow of his wife, or to make it 
Num. 30. 14. Josh. 24. 15.  void. Here is a liberty of contradiction or of exercise. Again, Choose ye this day whom ye will serve, whether the gods of your fathers, or the gods of the Amorites, and, I offer thee three 
2 Sam. 24. 12.  things, choose the which of them I shall do. Here is a liberty of contrariety or specification. And in all these places, here is a liberty of election, to will, to desire, to choose their own appetite.  
Secondly, the same is demonstrated from the definition of freewill, to be a free power given of choosing one thing before another, or accepting or rejecting the same thing indifferently, given to the intellectual nature for the glory of God, in order to some end. But all these texts by me alleged, and many more do attribute unto the will, a power of choosing one thing before another, or of accepting or rejecting the same thing indifferently. Therefore all these texts do demonstrate that the will of man is free, not only to do if he will, but to will, that is, to, choose or to elect. Wheresoever, whensoever and howsoever the will acteth, it is volition, but election is the proper formal act of the will, as it is free. And it is altogether impossible there should be any election, without a freedom to will. The will employeth the understanding to consider of the most convenient means to attain some desired end. The understanding doth return its judgement, which is like a bill presented to the King by the two houses. The will is free either to suspend its act, or deny its approbation with la volonte s'advisera, The will will advise better, or else to consent, with la volonte l●… vent, the will approveth it, which consent to the judgement of the understanding is properly election, as it were the conclusion of a practical Syllogism, an intellective appetite, or an appetite intellect.  
If a great Prince should offer to his poor subject three distinct gifts, & bid him take his choice of them, having underhand given away two of them before to another from him, Were it not an abuse, and a mere mockery? God offered David in like manner his choice of three things; I offer thee three things, choose which of them I shall do. Did God openly offer to David the free choice of three things, and had secretly determined that two of them should never be? Far be this from God. Especially to do it so seriously, and with such solemn protestations, as I call heaven and earth this day to record against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing, therefore 
Deut. 30. 19  choose life, that both thou and thy seed may li●…e. Can any man who hath but so much reverential fear of God, as a grain of mustardseed, which is the least of seeds, harbour such an unworthy thought in his breast, that truth itself should be guilty of such gross dissimulation? It is a decided case in law, that he who hath granted to another liberty of election, cannot before his election, dispose of that which he hath granted away to another. He who hath a right to elect, if he choose an unworthy person, by the sentence of the law forfeits his right to elect, for that turn. Why so, if he was necessitated without his will to choose as he did? We say truly, consent taketh away error. That man is not wronged, who consents to his own wrong: how so, if his consent be against or without his own will? If the will be not free ●…ut necessitated, than nothing is unlawful. That which is not lawful by the law, necessity maketh lawful. In case not only of absolute, but even of extreme necessity, meum and tuum ceaseth, and that which otherwise had been plain the●…, becometh just. He who necessitateth all events, taketh sin out of the World.  
One of my instances was in the election of the King of the Romans, to which he answereth as formerly, That th●… electors are free to name whom they will, but not free to will. If they be not free to will, than they are not free to elect, for election is the proper formal act of the will; and then the electors are no electors. There is one contradiction. Neither are they free to name whom they will indifferently, if they be determined necessarily and antecedently to name one. Possibility of more than one, and a precise determination to one, (that is, may name and must name,) are likewise contradictories in adjecto. This is not all: We see by the golden Bull 
Bulla Caroli. 4.  what care there is to bring the electors together to Frankfort, and to secure them there. Every one of them must take a solemn oath upon the Gospel of St. john, that according to his faith which he oweth to God and the Roman Empire, to the best of his discretion and understanding, he will choose [volo eligere] with the help of God a King of the Romans, that is, fit for it, and give his voice and vote without all pact, stipend, price, or promise. And if they do not accord actually within thirty days, they are thenceforth to have nothing but bread and water until they have made their election. If it was antecedently determined by extrinsical causes who should be chosen, and no other; What needed all this trouble and charge to so many great Princes, when they might as well have stayed at home, and have set seven ordinary Burghers to have drawn lots for it? Do men use to swear to choose that which (it may by) is not in their power to choose, and to refuse that which (it may be) is not in their power to refuse. The belly is a vehement orator; but if it be absolutely determined whom they must choose, and when, they might as well give them mosel, wine, and the best meat the Country affords, as bread and water. Here we have expressly volo eligere, I will choose, which is as much as to say, vollo velle, I will will: Which phrase T. H. esteemeth an absurd speech: But Julius Scaliger thought otherwise, Dicimus & 
Exercit. 307.  vere, & ex omnium gentium consensu, vollo velle. The very words cum adjutorio Dei, with the help of God, might teach them, that God is neither the total cause, nor the determining cause of man's election.  
Lastly, this distinction maketh T. H. worse than the Stoics themselves; for the soics 
And maketh T. H. a degree worse than the St●…cks.  together with their Fate, did also maintain the freedom of the will. And as we find in many Authors, both theirs and ours, did not subject the soul of man nor the will of man to the rigid dominion of destiny. The Stoics substracted some causes, and subjected others to necessity. And among those which they 
Aust. de civet. de●… l. 5. c. 10.  would not have to be under necessity, they placed the will of man, lest it should seem not to be free, if it were subjected to necessity. Chrysippus made two sorts of causes, principal causes which did necessitate and compel all things, except the will of man, and adjuvant causes, as objects, which did only excite and allure. These (said he) do awaken the mind of man, but being awakened it can move of itself: which he setteth forth by the comparison of a wherlegigge, and a roller cast down a steep place, which have the beginning of their motion from without themselves, but the progress from their own form and volubility. So T. H. is worse than a Stoic in this respect, and extendeth fatal necessity 
Apud Gellium.  further than they did. I have done with this distinction for this time; I say nothing of the bird, but the egg is bad.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 7.  
IN these Animadversions there is nothing contained which is material, either for necessity or against liberty, but passion and animosity. Where it is said, that the will doth perpetually follow the last dictate of the understanding, or the last judgement of right reason: He excepteth that I am mistaken, for the will followeth as well the judgement of an erroneous, as of a true reasoning. First his exception is improper, it is the judgement of Reason, not of reasoning. Secondly it is impertinent, the only question here is, whether the will do follow the last judgement of reason, not whether the reason be right or not. Thirdly it is false, whilst the will doth follow the erroneous judgement of reason, yet it followeth it as the judgement of right reason: When the judgement of Reason is erroneous, the will followeth it only de facto, but when it is right, it followeth it both de facto and de jure.  
His second exception is, that I make the understanding to be an effect of the will. Good words. I said not the understanding, but the act of the understanding; that is, the deliberation or judgement of the understanding, which is so far truly said to proceed from the will, because the will employeth the understanding to deliberate and judge. How the understanding moveth the will, and the will moveth the understanding mutually, is a superfluous question, seeing they do not differ really, but rationally. The understanding is the essence of the soul as it knoweth, the will the same essence of the soul as it extendeth itself to enjoy the thing known. Neither am I obliged to read Lectures. It is sufficient to know that the will is moved to the specification of its act, only by the understanding, or which is all one, by the object known and represented. But the will is moved and doth move the understanding to the exercise of its act by itself, except only in that motion which is called motus primó primus, that is the motion of the will towards the last end, which it is not in the power of the will to will, or not to will, as its other motions are, but requireth the excitation of the first cause. The will moveth both the understanding and itself effectively. The understanding moveth the will objectively, by making those things to be actually known, which were only potentially intelligible. As the light of the Sun maketh those things actually visible, which before did lie hid in darkness.  
If he will not understand those things, which all old Divines and Philosophers do assent unto, (choosing rather to be a blind leader of the blind, than a follower of them who see) nor the command of the will, nor the difference between natural and moral efficacy; If he understand not what is the judgement of the understanding practically practical, he must learn, and not adventure to censure before he 
judicium practicé practicum explained.  knows what he censures. What he is not able to confute, he should not dare to sleight. I do not justify all the questions, nor all the expressions of all Schoolmen: But this I will say, There is often more profound sense and learning in one of these obscure phrases, which he censureth as jargon, and unintelligible, than in own of his whole Treatises.  
And particularly, in this which he sleighteth more than any of the rest in a domineering manner; that is, The judgement of the understanding practically practical. A country man (saith he) will acknowledge there is judgement in men, but will as soon say, the judgement of the judgement, as the judgement of the understanding. Then, shall country men be Judges of terms of Art, who understand not any one term of any Art? much less the things intended by those terms, and the faculties of the soul with their proper acts. But such a silly Judge is fittest for T. H. I will not cite a Schoolman, but contain myself within the bounds of Philosophy.  
Philosophers do define the understanding by its subject, proper acts, and objects, to be a faculty of the soul understanding, knowing, and judging, things intelligible. If to judge of its object, be the proper act of the understanding, then there must needs be a judgement of the understanding. Every sense judgeth of its proper object, as the sight of colours, the hearing of sounds. Shall we grant judgement to the senses, and deny judgement to the understanding? Now this judgement is either contemplative, or practical. Contemplative is when the understanding aimeth only at knowledge, what is true, and what is false, without thought of any external action. Practical judgement is when the understanding doth not only judge what is true, and what is false, but also what is good, and what is evil, what is to be pursued, and what is to be shunned. So we have the practical judgement of the understanding. Yet further, when the understanding hath given such a practical judgement, it is not necessary that the will shall follow it: but it may suspend its consent and not elect. It may put the understanding upon a new deliberation, and require a new judgement. In this case the judgement of the understanding is practical, because it intends not merely contemplation, what is true and what is false, but also action, what is to be pursued, and what is to be shunned: But yet it is not practically practical, because it takes not effect, by reason of the dissent of the will. But whensoever the will shall give its free assent to the practical judgement of the understanding, and the sentence of reason is approved by the acceptation of the will; then the judgement of the understanding becomes practically practical. Then the election is made, which Philosophers do therefore call a consultative appetition. Not that the will can elect contrary to the judgement of reason, but that the will may suspend its consent, and require a new deliberation, and a new judgement, and give consent to the later. So we have this seeming piece of nonsense judicium intellectus practice practicum: not only translated, but explained in English, consonantly to the most received opinions of Classical Authors. If he have any thing to say against it; let him bring arguments, not reproaches: And remember, how Memnon 
Plut.  gave a railing soldier a good blow with his Lance, saying, I hired thee to fight, and not to rail.  
The absurdity which he imputeth to me in 
How the object is, and how it is not the cause of seeing.  natural Philosophy, That it is ridiculous to say, that the object of the sight is the cause of seeing, which maketh him sorry that he had the ill fortune to be engaged with me in a dispute of this kind, is altogether impertinent and groundless. The cause of seeing is either the cause of the exercise of seeing, or the cause of the specification of the act of seeing. The object is the cause of the specification, why we see this or that, and not the cause of the exercise. He that should affirm, that the object doth not concur in the causation of sight, (especially going upon those grounds that I do, that the manner of vision is not by sending out beams from the eye to the object, but by receiving the species from the object to the eye,) was in an error indeed. For in sending out the species there is action, and in the reception of them passion. But he that should affirm, that the object is the cause of the exercise of sight, or that it is that which maketh that which is facultate espectabile to be actu aspectabile, or that it is that which judgeth of the colour or light; or (to come home to the scope of the place,) that the object doth necessitate or determine the faculty of sight, or the sensitive soul to the exercise of seeing, were in a greater error. Among many answers which I gave to that objection, that the dictate of the understanding doth determine the will, this was one, That supposing it did determine it, yet it was not naturally, but morally, not as an efficient by physical influence into the will, but by proposing and representing the object, which is not my single opinion, but the received judgement of the best Schoolmen. And in this sense, and this sense only, I said truly, that the understanding doth no more by proposing the object determine and necessitate the will to will, than the object of sight doth determine and necessitate the sensitive soul to the actual exercise of seeing: whereas all men know that the sensitive Agent (notwithstanding any efficacy that is in the object) may shut his eyes, or turn his face another way. So that which I said was both true and pertinent to the question. But his exception is altogether impertinent, and if it be understood according to the proper sense and scope of the place, untrue. And this is the only Philosophical notion which hitherto I have found in his Animadversions.   

Castigations of his Animadversions, Num. 8.  
WHosoever desireth to be secure from T. H. his arguments, may hold himself close to the question, where he will find no great cause of fear. All his contention is about terms. Whatsoever there was in this Section which came home to the principal question, is omitted, and nothing minded; but the meaning or signification of voluntary and spontaneous acts, etc. which were well enough understood before by all Scholars, until he arose up like another Davus in the Comedy, to trouble all things. So he acts his part like those fond Musicians, who spent so much time in tuning of their Instruments, that there was none left to spare for their music.  
Which are free, which are voluntary, or 
Num. 3.  spontaneous, and which are necessary Agents, I have set down at large, whither (to prevent further trouble) I refer the Reader: And am ready to make it good by the joint testimonies of an hundred Classic Authors, that this hath been the common and current language of Scholars for many Ages. If he could produce but one Author, Stoic or Christian before himself, who in the ventilation of this question did ever define liberty as he doth, it were some satisfaction. Zeno, one of the fairest flowers in the Stoics Garland, used to boast, that he sometimes wanted opinions, but never wanted arguments. He is not so lucky; never wanting opinions, ever wanting proofs. Hitherto we have found no demonstrations, either from the cause or from the effect; few topical arguments, or authorities that are pertinent to the question; except it be of country men and common people, with one comparison.  
But to come to the Animadversions themselves. 
Spontaneity.  He chargeth me, or rather the Schoolmen, for bringing in this strange word, Spontaneous, merely to shift off the difficulty of maintaining our Tenet of freewill. If spontaneous and voluntary be the same thing, as we affirm, and use them both indifferently; I would gladly know how the one can be a subterfuge more than the other? or why we may not use a word that is equipollent to his own word? But to cure him of his suspicion, I answer, That the same thing and the same term of spontaneous, both in Greek and Latin, in the same sense that we take it, as it is distinguished from free, and just as we define it, was used by Philosophers a thousand years before either I, or any Schoolmen were borne: as we find in Aristotle. That is spontaneous [or voluntary, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] whose beginning 
Ethic. l. 3. c. 2.  is in itself, with knowledge of the end, or knowing every thing wherein the action doth consist. And the same Author in the very next Chapter, makes the very same difference between that which is voluntary, and that which is free or eligible, that we do.  
His second exception is against these 
Num. 3. Conformity signifieth agreeableness as well as likeness.  words, Spontaneity consists in a conformity of the appetite, either intellectual or sensitive to the object, which words (saith he) do signify that spontaneity is a conformity or likeness of the appetite to the object, which to him soundeth as if I had said, that the appetite is like the object, which is as proper, as if I had said, that the hunger is like the meat. And then he concludes triumphantly, If this be his meaning, as it is the meaning of the words, he is a very fine Philosopher. All his Philosophy consists in words: If there had been an impropriety in the phrase, (as there is none) this exception had been below an Athenian Sophister. I had almost said, (saving the rigorous acception of the word, as it was used afterwards) an Athenian Sycophant. Conformity signifies not only such a likeness of feature as he imagineth, but also a convenience, accommodation, and agreeableness. So the savoury meat which Rebeckah made for her husband, was conform to his appetite. So Daniel and his fellows conformed their appetites to their pulse and water. Thus Tully saith, Ego me comformo ad ejus voluntatem, I conform myself to his will. Where there is an agreeableness, there is a conformity; as to conform one's self to another man's humour, or to his council, or to his commands. He resolveth to have no more to do with spontaneity: I thought that it had not been himself, but the causes that resolved him, without his own will. But whether it be himself, or the causes, I think, if he hold his resolution, and include liberty therein for company, it will not be much amiss for him.  
Here he readeth us a profound Lecture, what the common people, on whose arbitration dependeth the signification of words in common use among the Latins and Greeks, did call all actions and motions, whereof they did perceive no cause, spontaneous and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, And in the conclusion 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, what they are.  of his Lecture, according to his custom he forgetteth not himself. The Bishop understanding nothing of this, might if it pleased him, have called it jargon. What pity is it, that he hath not his Gnatho about him, to ease him of this trouble, of stroking his own head? Here is a Lecture, able to make all the Blacksmiths and Watchmakers in a City, gape and wonder, to see their workmanship so highly advanced.  
Thus he vapoureth still, when he lights upon the blind side of an equivocal word. For my part, I not only might have called it, but do still call it mere jargon, and no better.  
To pass by peccadilloes, First he telleth us, How the common people did call all actions spontaneous, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. How doth he know what the common people called them? The books which we have, are the books of Scholars, not of the common people.  
Secondly he saith, That the signification of all words dependeth upon the arbitration of the common people. Surely he meaneth only at Athens, where it is observed, That wise men did speak, and fools did judge. But neither at Athens, nor at any other place were the common people, either the perfecters or arbitrators of language, who neither speak regularly nor properly, much less in words that are borrowed from learned languages.  
Thirdly, he supposeth, that these words liberty, necessity, and spontaneity, are words in common use, which in truth are terms of art. There is as much difference between that liberty and necessity, which ordinary people speak, and the liberty and necessity intended in this question, (whereof we are agreed) as there is between the pointing out of a man with ones finger, and a logical demonstration, or between an habit in a Tailors shop, and an habit in Logic or Ethics.  
Fourthly, He confoundeth spontaneity and chance comprehending them both under the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I confess that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Poets and Orators, is a word of very ambiguous signification; sometimes signifying a necessary; sometimes a voluntary, or spontaneous; sometimes a casual; sometimes an artificial Agent or Event. Such equivocal words are his delight: But as they are terms of art, all these words are exactly distinguished, and defined, and limited to their proper and certain signification. That which is voluntary or spontaneous, is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as we see plainly in Aristotle. That which 
Eth. l. 3. c. 1, 2. l. 3. c. 3, 4.  is freely elected, is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and that which is by chance, is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as he may see in the places cited in the margin, 
Phys. l. 2. c. 6.  where all these words are exactly distinguished and defined.  
Fifthly, He saith, the Latins and Greeks did call all actions and motions, whereof they did perceive no cause, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which according to Aristotle and other Philosophers, doth signify things done by chance. And in his reason whereof they did perceive no cause, He is mistaken on hoth sides. For first the causes of many things are apparent, which yet are said to be done by chance, as when a tile falleth down accidentally from an house, & breaketh a man's head. And on the other side, many things whereof the causes were not known, as the ebbing and flowing of the sea, were not said to be done by chance.  
I shall not need for the present to make any further inquiry into his extravagant interpretations of words, which he maketh gratis upon his own head and authority, and which no man admitteth but himself. Rectum est Index sui & obliqui.  
Sixthly he saith, Not every appetite, but the 
A true will may be changed.  last is esteemed the will, when men do judge of the regularity or irregularity of one another's actions. I do acknowledge, that de non apparentibus, & non existentibus eadem est ratio, If it do not appear outwardly to be his will, man cannot judge of it as his will. But if it did appear to be his will, first or last, though he change it over and over, it was his will, and is judged by God, to have been his will, and may be justly judged so by man, so far as it did appear to have been his will by his words and actions. If he mean his last will and testament, that indeed taketh place and not the former; yet the former will was truly his will, until it was revoked. But of this, and of his deliberation, I shall have cause to speak more hereafter.  
I come now to his contradictions. His first contradiction is this, All voluntary acts are deliberate: Some voluntary acts are not deliberate. The former part of his contradiction is proved out of these words, Voluntary 
Num. 8.  presupposes some precedent deliberation, that is to to say, some consideration and meditation of what is likely to follow, both upon the doing, and abstaining from the action deliberated of. The second part is proved as plainly, When a man hath time to deliberate, but deliberates not, because 
Num. 25.  never any thing appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the action follows his opinions, of the goodness or harm of it. These actions I call voluntary, etc. because these actions that follow immediately, the last appetitite are voluntary. And here, where there is one only apppetite, that one is the last. To this he answereth, Voluntary presupposes deliberation when the judgement whether the action be voluntary, or 
voluntariness doth not descend on the judgement of other.  not, is not in the Actor, but in the judge, who regardeth not the will of the Actor, when there is nothing to be accused in the action of deliberate malice, yet knoweth, that though there be but one appetite, the same is truly will for the time, and the action, if it follow, a voluntary action.  
To which term doth he answer? Of what term doth he distinguish? Some have been observed to have lost the benefit of their Clergy, at their deaths, because they despised it in their lives. It is no marvel, if he receive no help from any distinction now, who hath ever been an enemy to distinctions, and a friend to confusion. If his answer have any sense at all, this must be it. That an indeliberate act may be in truth, and in the judgement of the Agent himself a voluntary act: yet, in the common or public judgement of other men, it may be esteemed and pass for an involuntary and unpunishable act. But first, neither the questionn nor his assertion was, what is to be judged a voluntary act by men, who neither know the heart of man, nor are able to judge of his will, but what is a voluntary act in itself; and what is the essence and definition of a voluntary act. I argue thus, That which is essentially a voluntary act, cannot by any thing that is extrinsecall and subsequent, and which perhaps may never be, be made no voluntary act. But the judgement of other men is extrinsecall and subsequent to the act, and may perhaps never be. How many thoughts of every man every day pass unknown, unjudged whether they were regular, or irregular.  
Secondly, God Allmighty, who is the only searcher of hearts, is the proper and only Judge of the will, If the act be truly voluntary, he judgeth it to be truly voluntary, whether it be for the Agents advantage or disadvantage: man cannot judge what acts are voluntary, and what are not, because he doth not know the heart. If one perform outward obedience to the law against his will, man judgeth it to be willing obedience, and cannot do otherwise. If a man do an evil act, man must needs judge it to be a voluntary act: And indeed so much more voluntary, by how much it was less deliberated of, because the will is less kerbed, and must have less reluctation. How much doth he err, who prefers the judgement of man before the judgement of God?  
Thirdly, according to T. H. his principles, all acts of free Agents, whatsoever are voluntary, and cannot possibly but be voluntary. For so he teacheth, That a man is free to do if he will, but he is not free to will: Would he have men to judge that to be unvoluntary, which cannot possibly but be voluntary? If he will, with him is a necessary supposition.  
Lastly, Judges do esteem rash unadvised acts, not to be so irregular, or so punishable as other acts, not because they are less voluntary, for they are more voluntary, but because the carefullest man breathing, cannot arm himself sufficlently against all occasions, but that he may be surprised by sudden passion. But if after the first fit of passion, he had time and means to cool his heat, and to deliberate of his duty, before the fact committed, and yet he continued obstinate, the law looks upon him without pity, not only as a willing, but as a wilful offender, though there was no malice nor inveterate hatred in the case, but perhaps a quarrel upon some punctilio of honour, But for persons uncapable of deliberation, as natural fools, mad men, and children, before they have use of reason, though there may be hatred and malice, as experience hath taught us, yet the law doth not punish them in the same nature, because it supposeth them uncapable of deliberation, and unable to consider seriously and sufficiently, either of their duty, which they owe to God and man, or of the dangers which they incur by that act, and because it is not their fault, that they are uncapable. So the judgement of men is no saveguard to him from his contradiction. For Judges go upon our grounds, which deny all liberty and power of election, to such as have not sufficient use of reason, without their own fault. But he goeth upon contrary grounds to us and to the law, holding fools, mad men, children, yea, even bruit beasts, to be capable of deliberation and election, and thereupon, supposing all voluntary acts to be deliberated, in vain doth he seek shelter under our practice, who is an enemy to those principles, whereupon our practice is grounded.  
His second contradiction, which he relateth 
Num. 33.  amiss, is this, All spontaneity is an inconsiderate proceeding. This is plainly set down by himself, By spontaneity is meant inconsiderate 
Num. 8.  proceeding, or else nothing is meant by it. To which this is contradictory, Some spontaneity is not an inconsiderable proceeding, affirmed by him likewise, When a man giveth money voluntarily to another for merchandise, etc. he is said to do it of his own accord, which in Latin is sponte, and therefore the action is spontaneous. From whence I argue thus, All giving of merchandise for money is a spontaneous act, but all giving of merchandise for money, is not an inconsiderate act, therefore all spontaneous acts, are not inconsiderate act. To this he answereth nothing.  
His third contradiction is this, That having undertaken to prove that children, before they have the use of reason, do deliberate and elect, yet he saith by and by after, That a child may be so young as to do what he doth, without all deliberation.  
I acknowledge this to be no contradiction, as it is here proposed. The acts of reason, as deliberation, do not come to a child in an instant, but by degrees. A child is fit to deliberate of his childish sports, or whether he should cry or not, before he can deliberate of matters of greater moment. Bu●… if the contradiction be proposed, as I proposed it, and always intended it, of young suckling children, soon after their birth, I see not how he can excuse his contradiction. For they have spontaneity the first hour: And yet by his confession, they are too young to deliberate. But if deliberation were no more than he maketh it, a demurring upon what they should do, out of sensitive hope, to suck the breast, and sensitive fear of some strange figure: 
Num. 8.  Or as he calleth it elsewhere, An alternate 
Num. 26.  appetite to do or to acquire an action, they may deliberate well enough.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 9  
TO that place by me alleged, Because 
1 King. 3. 11.  thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for thyself long life, etc. He answereth thus, How doth he know (understanding power properly taken) that Solomon had a real power to ask long life? No doubt Solomon knew nothing to the contrary: Yet it was possible that God might have hindered him. For though God gave Solomon his choice, that is, the thing that he should choose, it doth not follow that he did not also give him the act of election. It is no new thing with him to confound the act and the object, choice, and the thing chosen; election, which is always of more than one, and the thing elected, which is precisely one.  
I doubt not, but Solomon had his power to 
Election of more than one.  elect from God, I doubt not, but the grace of God did excite Solomon, and assist him in his election to choose well. But that Solomon was necessitated by God to ask wisdom, and not to ask long life, or riches, or the life of his enemy, is clearly against the text.  
First God said to Solomon, Ask what I shall 
Verse 5.  give thee. If God had predetermined precisely what Solomon must ask, and what he must have, and what he must not ask, and what he must not have: it was not only a superfluous, but a ludicrous thing, to bid him ask what gift he would have from God. Then followeth Solomon's deliberation to enable him to choose what was most fit for him. If God had 
Ver. 6, 7, 8, 9  predetermined what he would give, and what Solomon must ask, how ridiculous had it been for him to deliberate of what God had done.  
Thirdly it is said, The speech pleased the Lord, that Solomon had asked this thing. There is no 
Ver. 10.  doubt but all the works of God do please him, God saw all that he made, and it was very good. But what had Solomon done to please God, if God did necessitate Solomon irresistibly, to do what he did?  
Then follow the words alleged by me, Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not 
Ver. 11.  asked for thyself long life, etc. which words, if this opinion of universal necessity were true, can bear no other sense but this, Because thou hast done this which was inevitably imposed upon thee to do, and hast not done that, which was altogether impossible for thee to have done. As if a master should first bind his servant head and foot, head and heels together, and chain him fast to a post, and then tell him, Because thou hast stayed here, and didst not run away.  
He urgeth, That Solomon knew nothing to the contrary, but that it was in his power to have done otherwise. If Solomon the wisest of men did not know it, there is little probability that T. H. should know it. But he must know, that it is not Solomon who speaketh these words, but God; I hope he will not suspect God Almighty, either of ignorance or of nescience. Lastly, we see what a corollary God gave Solomon for ask well, about that which he did ask, riches and honour. No man 
Ver. 13.  deserveth either reward or punishment, for doing that which it was not in his power to leave undone.  
I urged these words of St. Peter, After it was sold, was it not in thine own power? to show 
Acts 5. 4. Was it not in thy power? Explained.  that power which a man hath over his own actions. He answereth, That the word power signifieth no more than right, not a real natural, but a civil power, made by a Covenant, or a right to do with his own what he pleased. I answer the word power doth not, cannot signify any such right to do with his own as he pleased in this place. For that which St. Peter complaineth of, was Annanias his unjust and sacrilegious detention of part of that which he had devoted to God, when it was in his power to have offered the whole, that is, to have performed his vow: If sacrilege be right, than this was right: If that which he had purloined sacrilegously were his own, than this was his own: If Ananias had been necessitated by external causes, to hold back that part of the price, it had been no more sacrilege, than if Thiefs had robbed him of it before he could offer it. The reason is thus made evident, If it was in the power of Ananias to have done that which he did not do, and to have offered that according to his vow, which he did detain contrary to his vow, than all actions and events are not necessitated: and it is in men's power to do otherwise than they do, But St, Peter saith it was in Ananias his power to have offered that which he did not offer, etc.   

Castigations upon the Animadversions, Num. 10.  
MY reason against universal necessity in this Section was this. To necessitate all men to all the individual actions which they do, inevitably; And to expostulate with them, and chide them, and reprehend them, for doing of those very things which they were necessitated to do, is a counterfeited hypocritical exaggaration. 
Out of hatred to true liberty T. H. makes God hypocritical.  But according to T. H. his doctrine, God doth necessitate all men inevitably to do all the individual actions which they do; and yet expostulates with them, and chides them, and reprehends them for doing of those very things which he did necessitate them inevitably to do. This assumption, which only can be questioned, is proved by the expostulations and objurations and reprehensions themselves contained in holy Scripture. Therefore, according to his opin●…on, God himself is guilty of counterfeited, hypocritical exaggarations.  
It were more ingenuous to confess that this is not to be answered, than to bustle and keep a coil, and twist new errors with old, and tax others ignorantly of ignorance, and say nothing to the purpose.  
His first answer is generally, That I would have men believe, that because he holds necessity, therefore he denies liberty. A dangerous accusation, to accuse him of a matter of truth. But he saith, He holds as much that there is true liberty, as I do, or more. Yea, such a liberty as children, and fools, and madmen, and brute beasts, and rivers have; A liberty that consists in negation, or nothing. He saith indeed that he holds a liberty from outward impediments. But it is not true, for external causes are external impediments. And if he say truly, all other causes are hindered from all other actions than what they do by external causes. But true liberty from necessitation and dtermination to one, he doth not acknowledge, and without acknowledging that, he doth acknowledge nothing. I wonder to which of my Propositions, or to what term in them, this answer is accommodated.  
His second answer is particular to the expostulations themselves, That these words spoken by God to Adam; Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded that thou shouldest not eat, do convince Adam, that notwithstanding that God had placed him in the Garden a means to keep him perpetually from dying, in case he should accommodate his will to obedience of God's Commandment, concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil, Yet Adam was not so much master of his own will, as to do it. What ridiculous, or rather deplorable stuff is this? How should it be expected that Adam should be master of his own will, if God did necessitate his will without his will? and determine him inevitably to what he did? If his doctrine were true, this doth not convince Adam, but God Almighty, who did first necessitate his will, and then chide him for that which was Gods own act. Can any man be so blind as not to see the absurdity of this doctrine? That God did place in the Garden a means to keep man perpetually from dying, and yet did deprive him of it inevitably without his own fault? And this is all that he answereth to the other places; as that to Eve, Why hast thou done this? And to Cain, Why art thou wroth? And, Why will ye die, O ye house of Israel?  
I urged this Argument further. Doth God reprehend man for doing that which he had antecedently determined that he must do? He answereth, no. How, no? Are not these reprehensions? Or doth not he maintain, that God had determined man antecedently to do what he did? yes, but he saith, God convinceth man and instructeth him, that though immortality was so easy to be obtained, as that it might be had for the abstinence from the fruit of one only tree, yet he could not obtain it thereby. If God would only have convinced man, certainly he would have convinced him by fitter, & juster means than hypocritical exaggerations. But how doth he say that, immortality was so easy to be obtained? which by his doctrine was altogether impossible to be obtained by man, by that means? It is neither so easy, nor possible to oppose and frustrate the Decrees of an infinite God.  
I shall reserve his errors in Theology for a fitter place. Whosoever would trouble himself with his contradictions, might find more than enough. Here he telleth us that the dependence of the actions on the will, is that which properly and truly is called liberty; elsewhere he told us, that Rivers are free Agents, and that a River hath true liberty, which if my ignorance do not misled me, have no wills.  
That God hath a secret and revealed will 
God's secret and revealed will not contrary. And why.  no man denieth. To say that these wills are opposite one to another, all good men do detest, because as I said formerly (which he taketh no notice of,) they concern several persons. The secret will of God is what he will do himself. The revealed will is that which he would have us to do. He objecteth, God commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, yet his will was he should not do it. jonah by Gods command denounced the destruction of Nineveh, yet it was Gods will it should not be destroyed. Doth not he see that the person is varied in both these instances? God would prove Abraham's faith by his readiness to sacrifice his son upon his command. He did it. He would have Nineveth prepared for repentance by jonahs' denunciations of his judgements; His will was accomplished. But it was not God's will that Isaac should be sacrificed, or Nineveh destroyed. All denunciations of God's judgements are understood with exception. He who phansieth any contradiction in these two instances, understandeth little of the rules of contradictions. There is great difference between that which God will have done by others, and what he will do himself. There was just reason for what Abraham did, and what jonah did; but there can be no reason for God to contradict himself.  
If God had reprehended Abraham or jonah for what they did in obedience to his own commands, and punished them for it, and justified it by his omnipotence, which is T. H. his inexcusable error, (as I have showed him already, and shall show him further in due place, if there be occasion,) this had been something to his purpose; now all that he saith is wholly impertinent.  
Likewise, whereas he saith, that the expostulation of man against God will be equally just or unjust, whether the necessity of all things be granted or denied, because God could have made man impeccable and d●…d not. He doth but betray his own weakness and presumption, to talk of any just expostulation with God in any case, I have showed him already what a vain recrimination this is, and given him just reasons why God Almighty did not 
Fount. of Arg. in fine.  make men impeccable.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 11.  
IN these Animadversions is contained, first a repetition of my Argument, to which he answereth nothing but this, That liberty is to choose what we will, not to choose our will, which he saith no inculcation is sufficient to make me take notice of. I know not what he calleth taking notice. I have confuted it over and over again, both in my defence formerly, and now in these Castigations; And showed it to be a vain, silly, unprofitable, false, contradictory, distinction. What he would have me to do more for it, I understand not: But I observe that he never mentioneth this distinction, but he is presently up upon his tippetoes. He will find by degrees how little ground he hath for it.  
Then he proceedeth to my Reply, to which he giveth two Answers. First, that if you take away these words from it, Knowledge of approbation, practical knowledge, heavenly bodies act upon sublunary things, not only by their motion, but also by an occult virtue; which we call influence, moral efficacy, general influence, special influence, infuse something into the will, the will is moved, the will is induced to will, the will suspends its own acts; which are all nonsense, unworthy of a man; nay, if a beast could speak, unworthy of a beast. There is an hundred times more sense in these phrases, than there is in his great Leviathan put altogether. He who dare abuse and so much vilify many of the Ancient Fathers, and all the lights of the Schools for so many successive ages, and all Philosophers, natural and moral, who have written any thing, as to style them all without exception beasts, and worse than beasts, deserves no other answer, but contempt of his ignorant presumption, or pity of his bold blindness. He saith This malady happened to us by having our natures depraved by doctrine. We say, His malady happened to him, because his nature was never polished with doctrine; but he would needs be a Master in all Arts, before he had been a Scholar in any Art. The true reason why he sleighteth these words, is because he understandeth very little of them: and what he doth understand, he is not able to answer. So it fareth with him as with one that hath a politic deafness, who seemeth not to hear, what he knoweth not how to answer; as I could show him by many and many instances, but that I dare not tell him, that any thing is too hot for his fingers.  
I said that the heavenly bodies do act upon 
Occulte virtue, or influence.  sublunary things, not only by their motion and light, but also by an occult virtue, which we call influence. Against the matter he excepteth not, but against the expression, an occult virtue, whereas I should have said, I know not how. If he alone be so happy as to know distinctly the causes of all acts, it is well for him, but if this be nothing but bold presumption, it is so much the worse. I have good ground for the thing itself; Canst thou bind the sweet influences of the Pleyades? If he be so much 
Job 38, 31.  more skilful than all other men, about the influences of the Stars, I desire to know of him a natural reason of that peculiar virtue which the Moon hath of moistening, and Saturn of cooling, and Mercury of raising winds, etc. I fear when all is done, he will prove to be but one of Aesop's companions, who pretended to know all things, and did know nothing.  
I argued from his principles, that if God by special influence did necessitate the second causes to operate as they did, and if they, being thus determined, did necessitate man inevitably, unresistably, by an essential subordination of causes to do whatsoever he did; then one of these two absurdities must follow, either, That there is no such thing as sin in the World, or, That God is more guilty of it than man; as the motion of the watch is more from the Artificer who makes it and winds it up, than from the watch itself. To this he answereth only this, That my consequence is no stronger than if out of this, That a man is lame necessarily, one should infer, That either he is not lame, or that his lameness proceeded necessarily from the will of God. And is it possible that he doth not see that this inference followeth clearly and necessarily from his principles? If he doth not, I will help his eyesight. All actions, and accidents, and events, whatsoever, do proceed from the will of God, as the principal cause determining them to do what they are, by a natural necessary subordination of causes. This is the principle. I assume that which no man can deny; But the lameness of this man (whom he mentioneth) is an accident or event. Therefore this lameness (upon his principles) is from the will of God, etc.   

Castigations upon the Animadversions, Num. 12.  
IN this Section, he behaveth himself as the Hound by Nilus, drinketh and runneth, as if he were afraid to make any stay; quite omitting the whole contexture and frame of my discourse: only catching here and there at some phrase, or odd ends of broken sentences. The authority of St. Paul was formerly his Palladium, the fate of his opinion of Fate, or his sevenfold shield which he bore up against all assailants. And now to desert it as the Oestredge doth her eggs in the sand, and leave it to the judgement of the Reader, to think of the same as he pleaseth, seemeth strange. That man usually is in some great distress, who quitteth his buckler. I desire but the judicious Reader upon the By, to compare my former defence with his trifling exceptions, and I do not fear his veredict.  
He saith it is blasphemy to say that God can sin, so it is blasphemy also to say that God is 
It is blasphemy to say that God is the cause of sin.  the author or cause of any sin. This he himself saith, (at least implicitly) and this he cannot but say, so long as he maintaineth an universal antecedent necessity of all things flowing from God by a necessary flux of second causes. He who teacheth that all men are determined to sin antecedently, without their own concurrence, irresistibly beyond their own power to prevent it, and efficaciously to the production of sin: He who teacheth that it is the antecedent will of God, that men should sin and must sin: He who maketh God to be not only the cause of the act and of the law, but likewise of the irregularity or deviation, and of that very anomy wherein the being of sin (so far as sin hath a being) doth consist; maketh God to be the principal cause and author of sin. But T. H. doth all this.  
He saith it is no blasphemy to say that God hath so ordered the World, that sin may necessarily be committed. That is true in a right sense, if 
Or to say that sin is efficaciously decreed by God.  he understand only a necessity of infallibility upon God's presence, or a necessity of supposition upon God's permission. But what trifling & mincing of the matter is this? Let him cough out, and show us the bottom of his opinion, which he cannot deny, that God hath so ordered the World, that sin must of necessity be committed, and inevitably be committed: that it is beyond the power of man to help it or hinder it; and that by virtue of God's omnipotent will, and eternal decree. This is that which we abominate.  
Yet he telleth us, That it cannot be said that God is the author of sin, because not he that necessitateth an action, but he who doth command or warrant it, is the author. First I take that for granted which he admitteth, that by his opinion, God necessitateth men to sinful actions, which is a blasphemy as well as the other. Secondly his later part of his assertion is most false, That he only, who commandeth or warranteth sin, is the author of it: He who acteth sin, he who necessitateth to sin, he who first brings sin into the World, is much more the author of it, than the bare commander of it. They make God to be the proper and predominate cause of sin, by an essential subordination of the sin of man, to the will of God, and in essential subordinates always the cause of the cause, is the cause of the effect. If there had never been any positive commandment or law given, yet sin had still been sin, as being contrary to the eternal law of justice in God himself. If an Heathen. Prince should command a Christian to sacrifice to Idols or Devils, and he should do it; not the commander only, but he who commits the idolatry, is the cause of the sin. His instance in the Act of the Israelites robbing the Egyptians of their Jewels, is impertinent: For it was no robbery nor sin, God who is the Lord Paramount of Heaven and Earth, having first justly transfered the right from the Egyptians to the Israelites, and in probability, to make them some competent satisfaction for all that work and drudgery which they had done for the Egyptians without payment. This is certain, if God necessitate the Agent to sin, either the act necessitated is no sin, or God is the principal cause of it. Let him choose whether of these two absurdities, this Scylla, or that Charybdis, he will fall into.  
The reason which he gives of God's objurgations, to convince men that their wills were not in their own power, but in God's power, is senseless, and much rather proveth the contrary, that because they were chidden, therefore their wills were in their own power. And if their wills had not been in their own power, most certainly God would not have reprehended them for that which was not their own fault.  
He saith, That by interpreting hardening to be a permission of God, I attribute no more to God in such actions, than I might attribute to any of Pharaohs servants, the not persuading their master, etc. As if Pharaohs servants had the same power over their master, that God Allmighty had, to hinder him, and stop 
〈◊〉 no ●…d per●…ssion.  him in his evil courses: As if Pharaohs servants were able to give or withhold grace, as if Pharoahs' servants had divine power to draw good out of evil, and dispose of sin, to the advancement of God's glory, and the good of his Church: As if an humble petition or persuasion of a servant, and a physical determination of the will, by a necessary flux of natural causes, were the same thing. He who seeth a water break over its banks, and suffers it to run out of its due channel, that he may draw it by furrows into his meadows, to render them more fruitful, is not a mere nor idle sufferer. His absurdities drop as thick as Sampsons' enemies, heaps upon heaps.  
He objecteth, That I compare this permission of God, to the indulgence of a parent, who by his patience encourageth his son to become more rebellious, which indulgence is a sin. Arguments taken from a parable or similitude, are of force no further than they pertain to the end of the parable, or that resemblance for which things are compared. The labourer's penny doth not prove an equality of glory in Heaven. Nor our Saviour's commendation of the unjust Steward, justify his cheating of his Master. Christ proveth the readiness of God to do justice to his servants, upon their constant prayers, by a similitude taken from an unjust Judge. So here the end of the similitude was only to show that goodness may accidentally render evil natures more obdurate and presumptuous. Neither was there any sinful indulgence, either intended or intimated in my words, like that of Eli to his sons, but only patience, and innocence, gentleness of a tender father, such as God himself doth vouchsafe to own, Despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance, and long suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance? But after thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thyself wrath.  
He urgeth, That whether it be called an antecedent, or a consequent will, an operate or a permissive will, it is enough for the necessity of the thing, that the heart of Pharaoh should be hardened. An antecedent will is without prevision of sin; A consequent will is upon prevision of sin: Is it all one whether God do harden men's hearts for sin, or without sin, for his fault, or without his fault? An opperate will produceth an absolute necessity, an antecedent necessity: A permissive will inferreth no more at the highest, but a consequent necessity upon supposion, which may consist with true liberty, as hath been made clear to him over and over.  
He desires the Reader to take notice, that if I blame him for speaking of God as a necessitating cause, and as it were a principal Agent in causing 
The difference between general and special influence.  of all actions: I may with as good reason blame myself, for making him an accessary by concurrence. And here he vapours, Let men hold what they will contrary to the truth, if they write much, the truth will fall into their pens. I desire the Reader likewise to take notice, and observe, what silly cavels he brings, commands for exceptions, and how vainly he puffeth up himself, like the Frog in the fable, with his abortive conceptions: Where did I ever use the word [accessary] or any thing in that sense? Mala mens malus animus. If he knew the difference between general and special influence, he would be ashamed to infer a particular guilt from a general occurrence, A general and special influence, is no nonsense. A Prince giveth commission to a Judge, thereby enabling him to determine criminal and capital causes; that is a general influence of power. By virtue of this commission he heareth causes, and abusing this general power, taketh bribes, giveth unjust sentences, and punisheth innocent persons. Is the Prince that gave him the commission and judiciary power, accessary to his fault? Nothing less, But the Judge abuseth his commission, and misapplyeth his just power. But if the Prince had given him a special commission, like that of jezabel, Proclaim a fast, set Naboth on high, and let two men of Belial bear witness against 
1 King. 21. 9  him, saying, Thou didst blaspheme God and the King, and stone him that he may die. This had been special influence indeed; and the Prince had not only been an accessary, but a principal in the murder. By which we may see how God concurreth to the doing of evil by a general, not by a special influence.  
I exemplified this distinction of general and special influence to him in the earth, which concurreth to the nourishment of all plants by a general influence, but that one plant converteth this nourishment to healthful food, another to poison, that is, not from the general influence of the earth, but from the special quality of the root. But quite contrary, both to my words, and to my sense, he misapplieth it to the operative and permissive will of God, without head or foot. It seemeth (saith he) that he thinketh that God doth will but permissively, that the hemlock should poison a man, but operatively, that the wheat should nourish him, Risum teneatis amici?  
I cleared this likewise to him in his instance of the murder of Uriah, showing him that David's power was from God, but the misapplication of that power was from David himself, As if (saith he) there were a power that were not the power to do some particular Act, or a power to kill, and yet to kill no body in particular. He might even as well say, as if there were a commission or a power given by the Prince to hear and determine causes in general, o●… to arraign and try malefactors in general, and not to sentence this man, and hang that man in particular. Every general commission o●… power doth justify particular Acts, whilst they, who are impowered do pursue their commission, and not abuse their power, but if they abuse their power, neither will their general power justify their particular misdeeds, nor their particular faults render the Prince accessary, who gave them their general power.  
In this impertinent instance of the divine. right of Bishops to ordain Ministers, which he bringeth in by the head and shoulders, he showeth nothing but his ignorance and his teeth. Every man who hath an undoubted right to do some act, hath not presently a right to exercise it promiscuously, when and where, and upon whom he will, without any respect to those who had a precedent right before himself. Let him inquire further into the difference between an actual and habitual power, and it will save him the further labour of enquiring, and me of informing him. Qui pauca consider at facile pronunciat.  
He demandeth, Did not God foreknow that Uriah in particular, should be murdered by David in particular? And what God for knoweth shall come to pass. Yes, God doth know in eternity; for with God, properly, there is neither foreknowledge nor afterknowledge, neither past, nor to come, but all things present always. Or if he will have us speak after the manner of men, God did foreknow that David should kill Uriah with the sword of the children of Ammon. And God did likewise foreknow that T. H. should maintain this Paradox so dishonourable to his Majesty, that God did necessitate David to kill Uriah: But knowledge of what kind soever it be, taketh away no man's liberty. Uriah might have gone to his own house upon David's entreaty: and then David had not killed Uriah upon any necessitation from God's foreknowledge. Uriah might have killed David, and then God had foreknown that, not this. But this objection 
Fountains of Arg●…ments.  hath been formerly fully answered: whither I refer the Reader.  
He chargeth me to say, that the case agitated between us, is Whether God's irresistible power, or man's sin, be the cause why he punisheth one man more than another? whereas the case agitated between us, is, Whether a man can now choose, what shall be his will anon. There are several cases or questions between us. First the general or main question which is already stated by consent, Whether the will of man be free from extrinsical determination to one antecedently? and not as it is here proposed by him fond and ambiguously, Whether a man can now choose what shall be his will anon. For first a man is not certain that he shall live so long, to be able to choose his will. And althought he were certain to live so long, yet 
jam. 4. 13, 14.  succeeding time may make such a change of affairs, that he may have just reason to choose otherwise. 
Quemquam posse putas more's narrare futuros?  
Dic mihi si fias tu leo qualis eris.   
But besides the main general question, there are likewise many particular subordinate questions, as this in this Section, whether this opinion of universal necessity do not make all punishment to be unjust, because if a man be necessitated antecedently and unavoidably to do what he doth, he is punished without his own fault, and consequently unjustly. To escape this argument he is driven to seek shelter under the omnipotence of God. Power irresistble justifieth all actions really and properly in whomsoever it be found. And when God afflicted job he did object no sin to him. That which he doth is justified by his doing it. So the present dispute was, Whether man's sin or God's omnipotence were the just ground of punishment? This was all I said, and more than I said. But he can set down nothing without either mistaking it, or confounding it. God's Power is not the rule of his Justice, but his will; not because his will maketh that to be just which otherwise was unjust, but because he can will nothing, but that which is just. But he addeth not one grain of weight more in these Animadversions about this subject, to what he had formerly said; all which hath been fully and clearly satisfied in 
Num. 12.  my former defence, to which he hath replied nothing.  
That which I said of the Jews, that it was in their own power by their concurrence with God's grace to prevent those judgements, and to recover their former estate, is so true, and so plainly affirmed by St. Paul, that no man but himself durst have cavilled 
Rom. 11. 23.  against it, But he who knows no liberty but from outward impediments, no general power of motion without a necessitation to kill Uriah, no grace but that which is irresistible, who hath never heard of the concurrence of grace and free will in the conversion of a sinner, it is no marvel if he think that God will save men without themselves, as well as he made them without themselves.  
I said God may oblige himself freely to his creature. Who ever doubted of it before him? 
God may oblige himself.  What doth he think of God's promise to Abraham; I will be the God of thee, and of thy seed after thee? Or of the legal Covenant, Do this and thou shalt live? Or of the Evangelical Covenant; He that believeth and is baptised, shall be saved? But he saith, He that can oblige, can also release when he will; and be that can release himself when he will is not obliged. Is not this comfortable doctrine, and suitable to the truth and majesty of Almighty God, in whom there is no variableness nor shadow 
Jam. 1. 17.  of turning? Nothing is impossible to God's absolute power: But according to his ordinate power, which is disposed by his will, he cannot change his own decrees, not go from his promise. If God's decrees were changeable, what would become of his universal necessity? But he shooteth at random, not much regarding so it fit his present humour, whether it make for his cause or against it.  
But now I am to expect an heavy charge. Hitherto he hath been but in jest, That I am 
God cannot do any unrighteous thing.  driven to words ill becoming me to speak of God Almighty, for I make him unable to do that which hath been within the ordinary power of men to do. How is this? I said God cannot destroy the righteous with the wicked, which nevertheless is a thing done ordinarily by armies. The great mountain hath borough forth a little mouse. Might not I say, that God cannot sin, though mean men can do it? Why might not I say that God cannot do unrighteous things, or God cannot be unrighteous, which is the same thing in effect? as well as the Scripture saith, God cannot lie, God cannot repent, God cannot 
Tit. 1. 2. Num. 〈◊〉. 19 2 Tim. 2. 13. Hebr. 6. 10. Mich. 6. 2.  deny himself? And God is not unrighteous to forget your works. As if he should say, If God could break his promise, God could be unrighteous, but he cannot be unrighteous. Yea the Lord doth submit himself, as it were, to a trial upon this point; The Lord hath a controversy with his people, and he will plead with Israel. And he doth challenge them upon this very point. Hear now, O house of Israel, is not my way equal? are not your ways unequal? 
Ezek. 18. 25.  And in the same Chapter he protesteth, As I live s●…h the Lord, ye shall not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel; the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge: But the soul that sinneth shall die. And Abraham saith the same that I say, (thought he deny it,) by way of intrrogation indeed, but with much more vehemency; Wilt thou also destroy the righteous with 
Gen. 18. 23, 25.  the wicked, & c? That be far from thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, and that the righteous should be as the wicked, that be far from thee. Shall not the judge of all the Earth do right? Neither can he except, because it is not said, Canst thou? but Wilt thou? for we speak of the ordinate power of God which is ordered by his will.  
That which he saith of an army, weigheth less than nothing. For first that destruction which an army maketh, is not like that destruction whereof Abraham speaketh, which fell upon Sodom and Gomorrah, which the Apostle calleth the vengeance of eternal fire. 
jud. 7.  The destruction made by an army may be a punishment to some, a chastisement or a blessing to others. Jeremy the Prophet was involved with the rest of the Jews in the same Babylonian Captivity; but the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, was an express punishment for sin. Thirdly, an army acteth by way of public Justice, regarding the justice of the cause, not of particular persons; for it is not possible in the height of war to do justice according to the particular merits of single persons. But after this necessity is over, and particular Justice can take place, than no man ought to suffer, but according to his guilt: Then it is no more lawful to destroy the righteous with the wicked. Necessity may justify the sufferings of innocent persons in some cases. But no necessity can warrant the punishment of innocent persons. Innocentium lachrimae diluvio periculosiores.  
Whether they did well or ill for the manner of the act, who put out their bodily eyes, because they supposed them to be an impediment to the eye of the soul, is not pertinent to our purpose, yet was apt enough to prove my intention, that bodily blindness may sometimes be a benefit.  
His instance in brute beasts which are afflicted, yet cannot sin, is extravagant. I did not go about to prove that universal necessity doth take away afflictions, it rather rendereth them unavoidable. But I did demonstrate (and he hath not been able to make any show of an answer to it,) that it taketh away all just rewards and punishments, which is against the universal notion and common belief of the whole World. Brute beasts are not capable of punishment: They are not knocked down out of vindictive justice for faults committed, but for future use and benefit. I said there was a vast difference between the light and momentany pangs of brute beasts, and the intolerable and endless pains of Hell. Sure enough. Dionysius the Tyrant seeing an ox knocked down at one blow, said to his friends, What a folly it is to quit so fair a command for 
Plut.  fear of dying, which lasts no longer a space. He himself, when his wits are calmer, doth acknowledge as much as I, and somewhat more. Perhaps (saith he) if the death of a sinner 
Num. 10.  were an eternal life in extreme misery, a man might as far as Job hath done, expostulate with God Almighty, not accusing him of injustice, etc. but of little tenderness & love to mankind. But now he is pleased to give another judgement of it, As if the length or greatness of the pain, made any difference of the justice or unjustice of inflicting it, yes, very much. According to the measure of the fault, aught to be the number of the stripes. If the punishment exceed the offence, it is unjust. On the other side, it is not only an act of justice, but of favour and grace to 
It is just to afflict innocent persons for their own good.  inflict temporary pains for a greater good. Otherwise a Master could not justly correct his Scholar. Otherwise a Chirurgeon might not launce an imposthume, or put a man to pain to cure him of the stone. If God afflict a man with a momentary sickness, and make this sickness a means to fit him for an eternal weight of glory, he hath no cause to complain of injustice.  
He is angry that I would make men believe that he holds all things to be just, that are done by them who have power enough to avoid punishment. He doth me wrong, I said no such thing; If he be guilty of this imputation, either directly, or by consequence, let him look to it; he hath errors enough which are evident. I did indeed con44te this tenet of his, That irresistible power is the rule of justice, of which he is pleased to take no notice in his Animadversions. But whereas he doth now restrain this privilege to that power alone, which is absolutely irresistible, he forgetteth himself over much, having formerly extended it to all Sovereigns and Supreme Counsels, within their own dominions. It is manifest therefore, that in every Commonwealth there 
Lib. de cive tit. Imp. c. 6. n. 18.  is some one man or Council which hath, etc. a Sovereign and absolute power, to be limited by the strength of the Common wealth, and by no other thing. What neither by the Law of God, nor nature, nor nations, nor the municipal laws of the land, nor by any other thing but his power and strength? Good doctrine, Hunc tu Romane caveto.  
Lastly, to make his presumption complete, he indeavoureth to prove that God is not only 
●…n is properly irregularity.  the author of the Law: which is most true, and the cause of the act, which is partly true, because he is the only fountain of power, but that he is the cause of the irregularity, that is, in plain English, (which he delighteth in) the sin itself. I think (saith he) there is no man but understands, etc. That where two things are compared, the similitude or dissimilitude, regularity or irregularity that is between them, is made in, and by the things themselves that are compared. The Bishop therefore that denies God to be the cause of the irregularity, denies him to be the cause both of the law, and of the action. This is that which he himself calleth blasphemy elsewhere, that God is the author or cause of sin. Sin is nothing, but the irregularity of the Act. So St. John defineth it in express terms, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sin is an anomy, or an irregularity, or a transgression of the law. For sin is nothing else but a declination from the rule, that is, an irregularity. Another definition of sin is this, Sin is that which is thought or said or done against the eternal law. Still you see the formal reason of sin, doth consist in the contrariety to the law, that is, the irregularity. Othets define sin to be a want of rectitude, or a privation of conformity to the rule, that is, irregularity. An irregular action is sin materially, Irregularity is sin formally. Others define sin to be a free transgression of the commandment. Every one of these definitions demonstrate that Mr. Hobbes maketh God to be properly the cause of sin.  
But let us weigh his argument, He who is the cause of the law, and the cause of the action, 
God no cause of irregularity.  is the cause of the irregularity; but God is the cause of the law, and the cause of the action. I deny his assumption, God indeed is the cause of the law, but God is not the total or adequate cause of the action: Nay, God is not at all the cause of the action qua talis, as it is irregular, but the free Agent. To use our former instance of an unjust judge; The Prince is the author or cause of the law, and the Prince is the cause of the judiciary action of the Judge in general, because the Judge deriveth all his power of judicature from the Prince. But the Prince is not the cause of the irregularity, or repugnance, or nonconformity, or contrariety which is between the Judge's actions and the law, but the Judge himself, who by his own fault, did abuse and misapply that good general power, which was committed and entrusted to him by the Prince; he is the only cause of the anomy or irregularity.  
Or as a Scrivener that teacheth one to write, and sets him a copy, is both the cause of the rule, and of the action, or writing, and yet not the cause of the irregularity or deviation from the rule. Sin is a defect, or deviation, or irregularity. No defect, no deviation, no irregularity can proceed from God. But herein doth consist T. H. his error, that he distinguisheth not between an essential and an accidental subordination. Or between a good general power, and the derermination or misapplication of this general power to evil. What times are we fallen into! to see it publicly maintained, That God is the cause of all irregularity, or deviation from his own rules.   

Num. 13.  
HEre is no need of Castigations, there being no Animadversions.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 14.  
IN the beginning, he repeateth his empty objections, from what shall be, shall be, and from foreknowledge, and that a man cannot choose to day for tomorrow: and thence concludeth, (nemine consentiente) That my deductions are irrational and fallacious, and that he need make no further answer. As if he should say, I sent forth two or three light horsemen to vapour, who were sound beaten back, and made their defence with their heels, therefore I need not answer the charge of the main battle. He told me that I did not understand him, if I thought he held no other necessity, than that which is contained in that old foolish rule, Whatsoever is, when it is, it is necessarily so as it is. But I see, when all is done, he must sit down and be contented to make his best of that old foolish rule, For prescience, and what shall be shall be, do imply no more.  
In the next place, he chargeth me with three great abfurdities. The first that I say, A law may be unjust. The second, That a law may be 
Laws may be unjust.  tyrannical. The third that I say, It is an unjust law which prescribes things impossible in themselves to be done. A grievous accusation. These absurdities are at age, let them even answer for themselves.  
He saith, Civil laws are made by every man that is subject to them, because every one of them consented to the placing of the Legislative power. I deny his consequence. Indeed in causes that are naturally, necessarily, and essentially subordinate, the cause of the cause is always the cause of the effect, as he that planteth a vineyard, is the cause of the vine. But in causes that are accidentally or contingently subordinate, as the people electing, the lawgiver elected, and the law made are; the cause of the cause is not always the cause of the effect. As he that planteth a vineyard, is not the cause of the drunkenness. The King's commission maketh a Judge, but it is not the cause of his unrighteous judgement. Two Cities in Italy contending about their bounds, chose the people of Rome to be their Arbitrators; they gave either City a small pittance, and reserved all the rest to themselves, Quoth in medio est, populo Romano adjucetur. The two Cities did not so much like their Arbitators at the first, as they detested the Arbitrament at the last. And though they had contracted a necessity of compliance by their credulous submission, yet this did not free that unconscionable Arbitrament from palpable injustice; no, nor yet so much as from palpable injury: for though a man is not injuried, who is willing to be injuried, volenti non fit injuria; Yet he who doth choose an Arbitrator, doth not choose his unjust Arbitrament; nor he that chooseth a Lawgiver, choose his tyrannical Law. Though he have obliged himself to passive obedience, yet his obligation doth not render either the injur●…ous Arbitrament of the one, or the tyrannical law of the other to be just. So the main ground of his error is a gross fallacy, which every Sophister in the University is able to discover.  
I answer secondly, That though every subject had actually consented, as well to the laws, as to the Lawgiver; yea, though the law were made by the whole collective body of the people in their own persons; yet if it be contrary to the law of God or nature, it is still an unjust law. The people cannot give that power to their Prince, which they have not themselves.  
Thirdly, many laws are made by those who are not duly invested with Legislative power, which are therefore unjust laws.  
Fourthly, many laws are made to bind foreigners: who exercise commerce with subjects, which if they be contrary to the pacts and capitulations of the confederate nations, are unjust laws. Foreigners never consented to the placing of the Legislative power.  
Fifthly, no humane power whatsoever, judiciary or Legislative, civil or sacred, is exempted from excesses, and possibility of doing or making unjuct acts.  
Lastly, the people cannot confer more power upon their Lawgiver, than God himself doth confer; neither is their election a greater privilege from injustice, than Gods own disposition: but they, who have been placed in sovereign power by God himself, have both made unjust laws, and prescribed unjust acts to their subjects.  
I said those laws were unjust, which prescribed 
Impossibilities made b●… ourselves, may be justly imposed, not impossibilities in them, selves,  things impossible in themselves. Against this he excepteth, Only contradictions are impossible in themselves; all other things are possible in themselves, as to raise the dead, to change the course of nature. But never any Tyrant did bind a man to contradictions, or make a law, commanding him to do and not to do the same action, or to be, and not to be in the same place, at the same moment of time. I answer first, That Tyrants may command, and by their Deputies have commanded contradictory Acts, as for the same Subjects to appear before several Judges, in several places, at the same time. And to do several duties inconsistent one with another, which imply a contradiction: and have punished Subjects for disobedience in such cases.  
Secondly I answer, That when we say Lawmakers ought to command things possible, it ought to be understood of things possible to their Subjects, upon whom they impose their commands; not of such things as are possible to God Almighty. To make a law that subjects should raise the dead, or change the course of nature, (which he reckons as things possible in themselves) is as unjust a law, as a law that should enjoin them contradictions, & the acts as impossible to the Subject.  
Thirdly, these words, [impossible in themselves] which he layeth hold on, have a quite contrary sense to that which he imagineth, and are warranted by great Authors, Some things are impossible to us by our own defaults, as for a man to hold the liquor firmly without shedding, who hath contracted the Palsy by his own intemperance. These impossibilities may justly be forbidden and punished, when we have had power, and lost it byour own fault. Secondly, there are other impossibilities in themselves, such as proceed not from our own faults, which never were in our power, as those which proceed from the antecedent determinatioo of extrinsecall causes. To enjoin these by law, and to punish a man for not obeying, is unjust and tyrannical.  
Whereas I called just laws the ordinances of right reason, he saith It is an error that hath cost many thousands of men their lives. His reason is, If laws be erroneous shall they not be obeyed? Shall we rather rebel? I answer, neither the one one nor the other. We are not to obey them actively, because we ought 
Acts 5. 29.  to obey God rather than man. Yet may we not rebel, Submit yourselves to every ordinance of 
1 Pet. 2. 13  man, for the Lords sake. Passive obedience is a mean between active obedience and rebellion. To just laws which are the ordinances of right reason, active obedience is due. To unjust laws which are the ordinances of reason erring, passive obedience is due. Who shall hope to escape exception, when this innocent definition is quarrelled at. I wish his own principles were half so loyal.  
He saith I take punishment for a kind of revenge, 
Proper punishment is ever vindictive in part.  and therefore can never agree with him, who takes it for nothing else but for a correction, or for an example, etc. I take punishment in the same sense, that all Authors both sacred and civil, Divines and Philosophers, Lawyers, and generally all Classic Writers have ever taken it. That is, for an evil of passion which is inflicted for an evil of action. So to pass by other Authors, as slighted by him, the holy Scripture doth always take it. As wherefore doth a living man complain? for the punishment 
Lam. 3. 39  of his sins. And this is an heinous crime, 
Job. 31. 11.  yea it is an iniquity to be punished by the judges. And thou hast punished us less than our iniquities 
Ezra, 9 13.  deserved. Yea, punishment doth not only presuppose sin, but the measure of punishment, the degree of sin. He that despised Moses law, 
Heb. 10. 28.  died without mercy; of how much sorer punishment shall he be thought worthy, who hath trampled under foot the son of God? The Judge was commanded to cause the offender to be beaten 
Deut. 25. 2.  according to the fault. This truth we learned from the ferulas and rods which we smarted under when we were boys. And from the gibbets and axes, and wheels, which are prepared for offenders. Omnis paena si justa est, peccati paena est.  
That the punishment of Delinquents hath other ends also, there is no doubt, Nemo prudens punit quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur. Punishment respects the Delinquent in the first place, either to amend him, or to prevent his doing of more mischief. Secondly, it regardeth the party suffering, to repair his honour, or preserve him from contempt, or secure him for the time to come. Lastly, it respects other persons, that the suffering of a few may be ex●…mplary, and an admonition to many. But herein lies his error, That punishment is for nothing else but for correction or example. God spared not the Angels that sinned, but cast 
1 Pet. 2 4.  them down into Hell. That was no correction. And at the last Judgement, Go ye cursed into everlasting fire: there is neither correction nor example, but in both instances there is punishment. Whence it is apparent, that some punishment, especially divine, doth look only at the satisfaction of justice.  
I gave five instances of unjust laws; Pharaohs law to drown the Israelitish children; 
Yet further of unjust laws.  Nebuchadnezars' law to cast them who would not commit idolatry, into the fiery Furnace; Darius his law that whosoever prayed to God for thirty days, should be cast into the Den of Lions; Ahashuerosh his law to destroy the Jewish Nation root and branch; The Pharisees law to excommunicate all those who confessed Christ. To all these he answereth nothing in particular, but in general, he giveth this answer; That they were just laws in relation to their subjects, because all laws made by him to whom the people have given the Legislative power, are the acts of every one of that people: and no man can do injustice to himself. But they were unjust actions in relation to God. He feareth the Bishop will think this d●…scourse too subtle: Nay rather the Bishop thinketh it too flat and dull. Dii te Damasippe deaeque Tale jud●…cium donent tenere. I have answered his reason before, that it is a Sophistical fallacy, flowing from the accidental subordination of the causes. A man may will the Lawgiver, and yet not will the Law. That is one reply to his distinction.  
Secondly, I reply, That when the people did give them the Legislative power, they gave a Kingly power to preserve and protect their Subjects: they meant not a power to drown them, to burn them, to cast them to the Lions, to root them out from the earth by the means of unjust, bloody, tyrannical laws, made on purpose to be pitfalls to catch Subjects. Hear himself: No man can transfer or lay down his right to save himself from death, 
L. 1. 14.  wounds, and imprisonment. If the right be not transferred in such cases, than the law is groundless and unjust, and made without the consent of the Subject. They did not give, they did not intend to give, they could not give them a divine power, or rather a power paramount above God: To command idolatry, to forbid all prayer and invocation of God's holy Name; And therefore, though such laws do not warrant rebellion, because it is better to die innocent, than to live nocent; yet that hindereth not but such laws are un-just, both towards God, and towards man.  
Thirdly, if these laws had been just in relation to the Subjects, than the Subjects had been bound to obey them actively, but they were not bound to obey them actively; yea they were bound not to obey them. The Midwives 
Exod. 1. 17.  feared God, and did not as the King of Egypt commanded them. The three children answered; Be it known unto thee, O King, that 
Dan. 3. 18.  we will not serve thy gods, nor worship thy golden image, which thou hast set up. The Parents of 
Heb. 11. 23.  Moses are commended for their faith, in saving Moses contrary to the King's commandment.  
Fourthly, Subjects have given to their Sovereigns, as well Judiciary as Legislative power over themselves; but their Judiciary power doth not justify their unjust acts or sentences, even towards their Subjects. Elias 
1 King. 21.  accused Ahab of murder. And Elisha called his son Joram, The son of a murderer. Saul's injustice towards the Gibeonites, did draw the 
2 King. 6. 32.  guilt of blood upon his House. And the Lord was not satisfied until the Gibeonites had received satisfaction. He himself styleth David's act towards Uriah murder. Certainly murder is not just, either towards God, or towards man. Therefore neither doth the Legislative power justify their unjust laws.  
Fiftly, of all Lawgivers, those who are placed freely by the people, have the least pretence to such an absolute and universal resignation of all the property and interest of the Subject. For it is to be presumed that the people who did choose them, had more regard to their own good, than to the good of their Lawgiver, and did look principally at the protection of their own persons, and the preservation of their own rights, and did contract accordingly. As we see in the most flourishing Monarchies of the World; as that of the Medes and Persians: They had their fundamental laws, which were not in the single power of the present Lawgiver to alter or violate by a new law or command, without injustice. 
Dan. 6. 8.   
If a pupil shall choose a Tutor or Guardian for himself, he investeth him with all his power, he obligeth himself to make good all his acts. Nevertheless he may wrong his pupil, or do him injustice: There is only this difference, that a pupil may implead his Guardian, and recover his right against him; But from a Sovereign Lawgiver there lies no appeal, but only to God. Otherwise there would be endless appeals, which both nature and policy doth abhor. As in the instance of the Roman Arbitrament, formerly mentioned. An arbitrary power is the highest of all powers: Judges must proceed according to law, Arbitrators are tied to no law, but their own reason, and their own consciences. Yet all the world will say, that the Romans dealt fraudulently and unjustly with the two parties.  
Lastly, the holy Scriptures do every where 
Mich. 6. 16. 2 K. 17 19 Isay 10. 1. The authority of the Scripture, not dependent on the printer.  brand wicked Laws as infamous. As the Statutes of Omr●…, and the Statutes of Israel, and styleth them expressly unjust laws, or unrighteous decrees.  
He asketh to whom the Bible is a law? The Bible is not a law, but the positive laws of God are contained in the Bible. Doth he think the Law of God is no Law without his suffrage? He might have been one of Tiberius his Council, when it was proposed to the Senate, Whether they should admit Christ to be a God or not. He saith, I know that it is not a law to all the World. Not the facto indeed. How should it? when the World is so full of Atheists, that make no more account of their souls, than of so many handfuls of salt, to keep their bodies from stinking? But de jure, by right it is a Law, and aught to be a Law to all the World. The Heathens, and particularly the Stoics themselves, did speak 
Ammon. in lib. de Interpret.  with much more reverence of the holy Books, of which to suspect a falsehood, they held to be an heinous and detestable crime. And the first argument for necessity, they produced from the authority of those Books, because they said that God did know all things, and dispose all things.  
He asketh, How the Bible came to be a Law to us? Did God speak it viva voce to us? have we seen the miracles? have we any other assurance than the words of the Prophets, and the authority of the Church? And so it concludeth, that it is the Legislative power of the Commonwealth, wheresoever it is placed, which makes the Bible a Law in England. If a man digged a pit, and covered it not again, so that an ox or an ass fell into it, he was obbliged by the Mosaical Law, to make satisfaction for the damage. I know not whether he do this on purpose to weaken the authority of holy Scripture, or not. Let God and his own conscience be his Triers: But I am sure he hath digged a pit for an ox or an ass, without covering it again, and if they chance to stumble blindfold into it, their blood will be required at his hands. If a Turk had said so much of the Koran at Constantinople, he were in some danger.  
If it were within the compass of the present controversy, I should esteem it no difficult task to demonstrate perspicuously, that the holy Scriptures can be no other than the word of God himself; by their antiquity, by their harmony, by their efficacy, by the sanctity and sublimity of their matter; such as could not have entered into the thoughts of man, without the inspiration of the Holy Ghost: By the plainness of their stile so full of Majesty, by the light of prophetical predictions, by the testimony of the blessed Martyrs, by a multitude of miracles, by the simplicity of the Penmen and Promulgers, poor fishermen and shepherds, who did draw the World after their oaten reeds; and lastly, by the judgements of God that have fallen upon such Tyrants and others, as have gone about to suppr esse or profane the Sacred Oracles. But this is one of those things de quibus nefas est dubitare, which he that calleth into question, deserveth to be answered otherwise than with arguments.  
But that which is sufficient to confute him, is the law of nature, which is the same in a great part with the positive Law of God recorded in holy Scriptures. All the ten Commandments in respect of their substanrials, are acknowledged by all men to be branches of the law of nature. I hope he will not say, that these laws of nature were made by our Suffrages, though he be as likely to say such an absurdity, as any man living. For he saith, the law of nature is the assent itself which all men give to the means of their preservation. Every law is a rule of our actions; a mere assent is no rule. A law commandeth or forbiddeth, an assent doth neither. But to show him his vanity; Since he delighteth so much in distinctions, let him satisfy himself out of the distinction of the law of nature. The law of nature is the prescription of right reason, whereby through that light which nature hath placed in us, we know some things to be done because they are honest, and other things to be shunned because they are dishonest. He had forgotten what he had twice cited and approved out of Cicero, concerning the law of nature, which Philo calls, The law that cannot lie; not moral, made by mortals, not without life, or written in paper or columns without life, but that which can not be corrupted, written by the immortal God in our understandings.  
Secondly, if this which he saith did deserve any consideration, it was before the Bible was admitted, or assented unto, or received as the word of God. But the Bible hath been assented unto, and received in England sixteen hundred years. A fair prescription; and in all that time, I do not find any law to authorise it, or to underprop heaven from falling with a bulrush. This is undeniable, that for so many successive ages, we have received it as the law of God himself, not depending upon our assents, or the authority of our Lawmakers.  
Thirdly, we have not only a national tradition of our own Church, for the divine authority of holy Scripture, but which is of much more moment: we have the perpetual constant universal tradition of the Catholic Church of Christ, ever since Christ himself did tread upon the face of the earth This is so clear a proof of the universal reception of the Bible, for the genuine Word of God, that there cannot justly be any more doubt made of it, than whether there ever was a William the Conqueror or not.  
But this is his opinion, That true religion in every Country is that which the Sovereign Magistrate doth admit and enjoin. I could wish his deceived followers would think upon what rock he drives them. For if this opinion be true, then that which is true religion to day, may be false religion tomorrow, and change as often as the chief Governor or Governors change their opinions. Then that which is true religion in one Country, is false religion in another Country, because the Governors are of different opinions; then all the religions of the World, Christian, Jewish, Turkish, Heathenish, are true religions in their own Countries: and if the Governor will allow no religion, than Atheism is the true religion. Then the blessed Apostles were very unwise to suffer for their conscience, because they would obey God rather than man, Then the blessed Martyrs were ill advised to suffer such torments for a false religion, which was not warranted, or indeed which was for bidden by the Sovereign Magistrates. And so I have heard from a Gentleman 
Mr. R. H.  of quality, well deserving credit, that Mr. Hobbes and he talking of self-preservation, he pressed Mr. Hobbes with this argument drawn from holy Martyrs. To which Mr. Hobbes gave answer, They were all fools. This bolt was soon shot: but the primitive Church had a more venerable esteem of the holy Martyrs, whose sufferings they called palms; their Prison a Paradise, and their death-day, their birthday of their glory: to whose memory they builded Churches, and instituted festivals, whose monuments God himself did honour with frequent miracles.  
He asketh why the Bible should not be canonical in Constantinople, as well as in other places, if it were not as he saith? His question is Apocryphal, and deserveth no other answer, but another question, Why a ship being placed in a stream, is more apt to fall down the stream, than to ascend up against the stream? It is no marvel if the World be apt to follow a sensual religion, which is agreeable to their own appetites. But that any should embrace a religion which surpasseth their own understandings, and teacheth them to deny themselves, and to sail against the stream of their own natural corruptions, this is the mere goodness of God.  
He saith, That a Conqueror makes no laws over the conquered, by virtue of his power and conquest, but by virtue of their assent. Most vainly urged like all the rest. Unjust Conquerors gain no right, but just Conquerors gain all right, Omnia dat qui justa negat, Just conquerors do not use to ask the assent of those whom they have conquered in lawful war, but to command obedience. See but what a pret●…y liberty he hath found out for conquered persons, They may choose whether they will obey or die. Una salus victis, nullam sperare salutem, What is this to the purpose, to prove that Conquerors make laws by the assent of those whom they have conquered? nothing at all. And yet even thus much is not true upon his principle: Conquered Persons are not free to live or die indifferently, according to his principles; but they are necessitated either to the one or the other, to live slaves, or die captives.  
He hath found out a much like assent of 
T. H. a fit Catechist for disloial and unnatural persons.  children, to the laws of their Ancestors, without which he would make us believe that the laws do not bind. When a child cometh to strength enough to do mischief, and to judgement, that they are preserved from mischief, by fear of the sword that doth protect them, in the very act of receiving protection, and not renouncing it, they oblige themselves to the laws of their protectors. And here he inserteth further some of his peculiar errors, as this, That Parents who are not subject to others, may lawfully take away the lives of their children, and Magistrates take away the lives of their Subjects, without any fault or crime, if they do but doubt of their obedience. Here is comfortable doctrine for children, that their parents may knock out their brains lawfully. And for Subjects, that their Sovereigns may lawfully hang them up, or behead them, without any offence committed, if they do but doubt of their obedience. And for Sovereigns, that their Subjects are quitted of their allegiance to them, so soon as they do but receive actual protection from another: And for all men if they do receive protection from a Turk, or an heathen, or whomsoever; they are obliged to his Turkish, Heathenish, Idolatrous, Sacrilegious, or impious laws. Can such opinions as these live in the World? surely no longer ●…han men recover their right wits. Demades●…hreatned ●…hreatned Photion, That the Athenians would destroy him, when they fall into their mad fits. And thee, Demades, (said Photion) when they return to their right minds.  
He saith, That I would have the judge to condemn no man for a chrime that is necessitated. As if (saith he) the judge could know what acts are neressary, unless he knew all that had anteceded both visible and invisible. If all acts be necessary, it is an easy thing for the Judge to know what acts are necessey. I say more, that no crime can be necessitated; for if it be necessitated, it is no crime. And so much all Judges know firmly, or else they are not fit to be Judges. Surely he supposeth there are, or have been, or may be, some Stoical Judges in the World. He is mistaken, no Stoic wss ever fit to be a Judge, either Capital or Civil. And in truth, Stoical principles, do overthrow both all Judges and Judgements.  
He denieth that he ever said, that all Magistrates at first were elective. Perhaps not in so many words, but he hath told us again, that no law can be unjust, because every Subject chooseth his law in choosing his Lawgiver. If every Lawgiver be elective, than every Sovereign Magistrate is elective, for every Sovereign Magistrate is a Lawgiver. And he hath justified the laws of the Kings of Egypt, of Assyria, of Persia, upon this ground, because they were made by him, to whom the people had given the Legislative power.  
He addeth, That it appears, that I am of opinion, that a law may be made to command the will. Nothing less, if he speaks of the law of man. My argument was drawn from the lesser to the greater, thus, If that law be unjust, which commands a man to do that which is impossible for him to do, than that law is likewise unjust, which commands him to will that which is impossible for him to will. He seeth I condemn them both, but much more the later. Yet upon his principles, he who commandeth a man to do impossibilities, commandeth him to will impossibilities, because without willing them, he cannot do them. My argument is ad hominem, and goes upon his own grounds, That though the action be necessitated, nevertheless, the will to break the law, maketh the action unjust. And yet he maintaineth, that the will is as much or more necessitated than the action, because he maketh a man free to do if he will, but not free to will. If a man ought not to be punished for a necessitated act; then neither ought he to be punished for a necessitated will.  
I said truly, That a just law justly executed, is a cause of justice. He inferreth that he hath showed that all laws are just, and all just laws are justly executed. And hereupon he concludeth. That I confess, that all I reply unto here is true. Do I confess that all laws are just? No, I have demonstrated the contrary: or do I believe that all just laws are justly executed? It may be so, in Plato's Commonwealth, or in Sr. Thomas Mores Utopia, or in my Lord Verulam's Atlanteis. But among us Mortals, it is rather to be wished, than to be hoped for. He who builds partly upon his own principles, and partly upon his adversaries, is not very likely to lay a good foundation.  
He accuseth me of charging him falsely for saying, That God having commanded one thing openly, plots another thing secretly, which he calleth one of my ugly phrases. I did not charge him for saying that God did so, but that he might do so, without injustice. Whether the charge be true or false, let his own words bear witness, That which God does, is made just 
Num, 12.  by his doings: Just I say in him, not always just in us by the example. For a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if he punish him, he so commanded for not doing it, is unjust. I wish him a better memory.  
I said there was never any time when mankind 
Mankind never without laws.  was without Governors, Laws, and Societies. He answereth, That it is very likely to be true; That since the Creation, there never was a time in which mankind was totally without Society. And confesseth further, That there was Paternal government in Adam. But he addeth, That in those places where there are Civil wars, there is neither Law nor Commonwealth, nor Society. Why then doth he teach the contrary with so much confidence, That it cannot be denied, but that the natural state of men, before they en●…red into Society, was a war of all men against all men. Why doth he say here, 
De cive c. i Num, 12.  That where there is no law, there no kill or any thing else can be unjust. And that by the right of nature we destroy (without being unjust) all that is noxious, both beasts and men. Where there was paternal government from the beginning, there were Laws, there were Societies, there was no war of all men against all men. Then the natural state of men was never without Society. Doth he call a civil war the natural state of men? neither was Adam alone such a Governor, but all heads of families. Neither the whole World, nor the tenth part of the World, was ever since the Creation without Society. The World was long without war, what need had they to war one upon another, who had the sharing of the whole World among them? And when there was war, it was not civil war: And when and where there are civil wars, yet there are laws, though not so well executed; and a Commonwealth, though much troubled and disordered. For him to make the natural and primogenious state of mankind to be a war of all men against all men, to be lawless without government, barbarous without Societies or civility, wherein it was lawful for any man to kill another, as freely as a Wolf or a Tiger, and to enjoy whatsoever they could by force, without further care or conscience, reflects too much, not only upon the honour of mankind, but likewise upon the honour of God himself, the Creator of mankind.  
He chargeth me to say, That there never 
Never lawful for private men ordinarily to kill one another.  was a time, when it was lawful ordinarily (those were my words) for private men to kill one another, for their own preservation, I say the same still in that sense, wherein I said it then, and I think all the world may say the same with me, except himself.  
In cases extraordinary, as when a man is assaulted by Thiefs or Murderees, I said expressly then, and I say the same now, That it is lawful to kill another in his own defence, cum mother a'mine inculpatae tutelae, And this is all which the Laws of God or nature do allow: which Cicero in his defence of M●…lo pleadeth for, as the words following do abundantly testify, ut si vita nostra in aliquas insidias, si in vim, in tela aut latronum aut inimicorum in cidisset, omnis honesta ratio esset expediendae salutis. And again, Hoc & ratio doctis, & necessitas barbaris, & mos gentibus, & feris natura ipsa praescripsit, ut omnem semper vim quacunque ope possent, a corpore, a capite, a vita sua propulsarent. I wonder he was not ashamed to cite this place so directly against himself. He saith the same words in general that I say, but in a quite contrary sense, that by the law of nature any man may kill another without scruple, if he do but suspect him, or if he may be noisome to him, as freely as a man might pluck up a weed or any herb, because it draws the nourishment another way. And this ordinarily, though the other do not offer to assault him, and though his own life be in no manner of peril. This he maketh to be the first, and to be the natural state of mankind, before they had entered into any pacts one with another. In this sense I did deny, and do still deny, that it either is, or ever was, ordinarily lawful for one private man to kill another, though he plead his own preservation and well-being never so much: and although T. H. telleth us here, without either reason or authority, that it seemeth to him, that God doth account such killing no sin. An excellent Casuist.  
All creatures forbear to prey upon their own kind, except in case of extreme hunger, 
— Parcit  
Cognatis maculis similis fera. Quando leoni  
Fortior eripuit vitam lo? Quo nemore unquam  
Expiravit aper majoris dentibus apri?  
Indica tygris agit valida cum tygride pacem  
Perpetuam. Saevis inter se convenit ursis.  And were mankind only made to murder one another promiscuously? That is to be worse than wild beasts, or savage Cannibals.  
We beheld him even now more bold than welcome with the holy Scriptures, saving only that he abstained from the imputation of Jargon. Now he jests with the pulpit, as well he may, considering what small benefit he hath received from it. Then he laughs at cases of conscience, not in his sleeve, or through his fingers, although God Almighty was more careful in stating the cases of blood-guiltiness punctually. But he loves a distinction 
Numbers 35.  worse than manslaughter. After the man is killed (saith he) the Bishop shall be judge, whether the necessity was invincible, or the danger extreme, as being a case of conscience. If he had writ this defence of wilful murder, as Demosthenes did the praise of Helen; or Erasmus the commendation of folly, only to try his wit, it had been too much to jest with the blood of man; but to do it in earnest, contrary to the Law of God and nature, without any authority, sacred or profane, without reason, nay without common sense, is his own peculiar privilege.  
And yet before he leave this Subject, he must needs be fumbling once more upon the old string, That in the natural state of man, every man might lawfully kill any man whom he suspected, or who might be noisome to him. And so taking this for granted, he concludeth, that he might lawfully resign it up into the hands of the Magistrate. I was the more sparing in confuting this point, because it is so absured, that the very repetition of it is a sufficient consutation, it being an opinion so barbarous, and so brutish, fitter for a bloody Cannibal, one of the African Anthropophagis, than one who hath born the name of Christian, or been a member of any civil Society. Such an opinion, as, if it had not all laws of God and man against it, yet the horrid consequences of it, if it were once entertained, would chase it out of the World, with the propugner of it. I would not cast away one Text of Scripture upon it, but that he admitteth that proof, and rejecteth all humane 
Fount. of Arg.  authority.  
My first reason is demonstrative, because all kill of men by private men was forbidden to all mankind by the positive law of God, presently after the flood, before there were ever any such pacts as he imagineth in the World. Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the Image of God made he man. That which he makes lawful in 
Gen. 9 6.  the natural state of man, and only prohibited by covenant between man and man, was declared unlawful by the positive Law of God, to Noah and his posterity, from whom all the Cities, and Societies, and Commonwealths in the World, are descended.  
Secondly, this Law of God was no new Law then, but a declaration of the law of nature, which was imprinted in the heart of man from the beginning, as appear evidently by the reason annexed to the Law; for in the Image of God made he man. Either in the family of Adam was the natural state of man, or there never was any natural state of man in the World, before any such Commonwealths as he imagineth could be gathered, or any such pacts or covenants made. Yet even then the kill of those whom they judged noisome to them by private persons, was not only esteemed an ordinary sin, but was a crying sin, for which we have the testimony of God himself to Cain, What hast thou done? the voice of thy brother's blood cryeth unto me from the ground?  
Thirdly, private men never resigned up into 
Gen. 4. 10.  the hands of the Sovereign Magistrate the power of defending their own lives in case of extreme necessity, though it were with the death of the assailant, for that power they hold still. Let him not confound two different powers together. This power which he challengeth, affirming that the people did resign it to the Magistrate, which we deny with detestation, is a right to destroy what soever a man thinketh can annoy him, (they are his own words in this place) or a general power of killing their enemies; that is, of killing whomsoever they will; for all men by their doctrine are their enemies, seeing he maketh it a war of all men against all men. Now if private men had once such a right and did resign it up into the hand of the Sovereign Magistrate, than the Sovereign Magistrate may use the same right still, and kill whomsoever he thinketh may annoy him, without sin: But this he cannot do. Saul sinned in killing the Gibeonites, and the Priests. Wherefore wilt 
1 Sam. 19 5.  thou sin against innocent blood? David sinned in killing Uriah. It is said of Manasseh, that 
2 King. 24. 4.  he filled jerusalem with innocent blood, which the Lord would not pardon. Ahab is styled a murderer. Hast thou killed, etc.  
Lastly, the exaggarations of this sin in holy Scripture, and the incredible ways which God useth to find it out, and those blind blows & ghastly horrors of conscience which do ordinarily accompany it, do proclaim to all the World, that there is more in it than an offence against mutual pacts and covenants between man and man. He that doth violence 
Prov. 28. Deut. 10. 11. Exod. 21. 14. Gen. 9 6.  to the blood of any person, shall flee to the pit, let no man slay him. The wilful murderer must be pulled out of the City of Refuge; yea, God's Altar must yield him no protection. This sin is a defacing of the Image of God; It defileth a whole land, and proceedeth from the special instigation of the Devil, who was a murderer from the beginning. O how heavy 
Joh. 8. 44.  (said one) is the weight of innocent blood? How much do all Authors Sacred and Civil, inveigh against the shedding of innocent blood? Some have apprehended a fishes head in the platter for the head of him they had murdered. Others after a horrid murder had been observed to have their hands continually upon their daggers. This opinion of his, takes away all difference between nocent and innocent blood. This inward guilt, these fears of vengeance, and the extraordinary providence of God in the discovery of murders, do proclaim aloud, that there is more in bloodguiltinesse, than the breach of mutual pacts between man and man.  
In the next place, he maketh us an elaborate 
T. H. Attorney General for the brute beasts.  discourse of a Lion, and a Bear, and an Ox, as if he stood probationer for the place of Attorney General of the brutes. This is evident, he hath deserved better of them, than either of his God, or of his Religion, or of the humane nature. In the first place, he acquitteth the beasts from the dominion of man, and denieth that they owe him any subjection. He that shall use T. H. his books as the countrymen did his prognostication, write down every thing contrary, fair for foul, and foul for fair, true for false, and false for true, if he could get but a good wager upon each opinion, would have advantage enough. I hope he doth not understand it of a political dominion or subjection, but only that the other creatures were designed by God for the use and service of men, in the same sense that Virgil saith, 
Sic vos non vobis veller a fertis oves.  
Sic vos non vobis fertis aratra boves.   
When God had created man male and female, after his own Image, he gave them his benediction. Sub due the earth and have dominion 
Gen. 1. 28.  overthe fish of the sea, and over the fowls of the air and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. And this very dominion was a part of the Image of God, wherein man was created. Therefore God brought all the creatures to man as to their Lord and Master under himself, to give them names, which is a sign and a proof of dominion. Therefore said the Kingly Prophet, Thou madest him [man] to 
Gen. 2. 19  have dominion over the works of thy hands; Thou hast put all things in subjection under his 
Psal. 8. 6.  feet: All sheep and oxen, etc. Here is but an harsh beginning of his Attorny-ship.  
Secondly, he maintaineth, that the Lion hath as much right, or, as he calleth it, liberty to eat the man, as the man hath to eat the Ox. I hope he will not deny that the Creator of all things had right to the donation of his own creatures. Man hath God's deed of 
Gen. 9 3.  gift. Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you. Even as the green herb have I given you all things. Can he show such another grant for the Lions to devour men? When God said, Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the Image of God made he man. Was it intended only that his blood should be preserved for the Lions? or do not their teeth deface God's Image, as much as man's weapons? But the Lion had liberty to eat man long before. He is mistaken, the creatures did bear a more awful respect to the Image of God in man, before his fall. But man's rebellion to God, was punished with their rebellion of the creatures to him. He saith, it was impossible for most men to have God's licence to use the creatures for their sustenance. Why so? as if all the world were not then comprised in the family of Noah. Or as if the Commandments and dispensations of God were not then delivered from father to son by tradition, as they were long after by writing. He asketh how I would have been offended if he should have spoken of man as Pliny doth, Than whom, there is no living creature more wretched or more proud. Not half so much as now. Pliny taxeth only the faults of men, he vilifieth not their humane nature. Most wretched; What is that but an argument of the immortality of the soul? God would never have created the most noble of his creatures for the most wretched being. Or more proud; that is, than some men. Corruptio optimi pessima. The best things being corrupted, turn the worst  
But he acknowledgeth two advantages which man hath above other creatures, his tongue and his hand. Is it possible that any man who believeth that he hath an immortal soul, or that reason and understanding are any thing but empty names, should so far forget himself and his thankfulness to God, as to prefer his tongue and his hands, before an immortal soul and reason? Then we may well change the definition of a man which those old dunces the Philosophers left us, Man is a reasonable creature, into this new one; Man is a prating thing with two hands. How much more was the humane nature beholden to Tully an Heathen, who said, That man differed from other creatures in reason and speech. Or to Ovid, who styleth man, Sanctius his animal ment●…sque capacius altae. If he have no better luck in defending his Leviathan, he will have no great cause to boast of his making men examples.  
And now it seemeth he hath played his masterprise. For in the rest of his Animadversions in this Section, we find a low ebb of matter. Concerning consultations he saith nothing but this, That my writing was caused physically, antecedently, extrinsecally, by his answer. In good time. By which I see right well, that he understandeth not what a physical cause is. Did he think his answer was so Mathematical to compel or necessitate me to write? No, I confess I determined myself. And his answer was but a slender occasion, which would have had little weight with me, but for a wiser man's advice, to prevent his 
Prov. 26. 5.  overweening opinion of his own abilities. And then followeth his old dish of twice sodden coleworts, about free, and necessary, and contingent, and free to do if he will, which we have had often enough already.  
His distinction between seen and unseen necessity, deserveth more consideration. The 
Seen and unseen necessity.  meaning is, that seen necessity doth take away consultation, but unseen necessity doth not take away consultation or humane endeavours, Unseen necessity is of two sorts, either it is altogether unseen and unknown, either what it is, or that it is; Such a necessity doth not take away consultation or humane endeavours. Suppose an office were privately disposed, yet he who knoweth nothing of the disposition of it, may be as solicitous and industrious to obtain it, as though it were not disposed at all. But the necessity which he laboureth to introduce, is no such unseen unknown necessity. For though he know not what the causes have determined particularly, or what the necessity is, yet he believeth that he knoweth in general, that the causes are determined from eternity, and that there is an absolute necessity.  
The second sort of unseen necessity, is that which is unseen in particular what it is, but it is not unknown in general that it is. And this kind of unseen necessity doth take away all consultation, and endeavours, and the use of means, as much as if it were seen in particular. As supposing that the Cardinals have elected a Pope in private, but the declaration of the person who is elected is kept secret. Here is a necessity, the Papacy is full; and this necessity is unseen in particular, whilst no man knoweth who it is. Yet for as much as it is known that it is, it taketh away all endeavours and consultations, as much as if the Pope were publicly enthroned. Or suppose a Jury have given in a privy veredict: no man knoweth what it is until the next Court-day; yet it is known generally that the Jurers are agreed, and the veredict is given in. Here is an unseen necessity: Yet he who should use any further consultations, or make further applications in the case, were a fool. So though the particular determination of the causes be not known to us what it is, yet if we know that the causes are particularly determined from eternity, we know that no consultation or endeavour of ours can alter them.  
But it may be further objected, that though they cannot alter them, yet they may help to accomplish them. It was necessary that all who sailed with St. Paul should be saved from 
Act. 27. 22. V. 30.  shipwreck: Yet St. Paul told them, that except the shipmen did abide in the ship, they could not be saved. So though the event be necessarily determined, yet consultation or the like means may be necessary to the determination of it. I answer, the question is not whether the means be necessary to the end, for that is agreed upon by all parties: But the question is to whom the ordering of the means which are necessary to the production of the event doth properly belong; whether to the first cause, or to the free Agent. If it belong to the free Agent under God (as we say it doth) than it concerneth him to use consultations and all good endeavours, as requisite means to obtain the desired end. But if the disposition of the means belong solely and wholly to God, (as he saith it doth) and if God have ordered all means as well as ends and events particularly and precisely, than it were not only a thankless and superfluous office, to consult what were the fittest means to obtain an end, when God hath determined what must be the only means, and no other; but also a sauciness, and a kind of tempting of God, for a man to intrude himself into the execution of God Almighty's decrees; whereas he ought rather to cast away all care and all thought on his part, and resign himself up wholly to the disposition of the second causes, which act nothing but by the special determination of God.  
Concerning admonition, he saith less than 
If all things be absolutely necessary, admonitions are all vain.  of consultation. The reason (saith he) why we admonish men of understanding rather than children, fools, and madmen, is because they are more capable of the good and evil consequences of their actions, and have more experience, and their passions are more conform to their Admonitors; that is to say, moderate and stayed. And then after his Bragadochio manner, he concludeth. There be therefore reasons under heaven which the bishop knows not of. My one reason [because they have the use of reason, and true liberty, with a dominion over their ownactions, which children, fools, and madmen have not] includeth more than all his three reasons put together. What is it that weigheth the good and evil consequences of our actions? Reason, What is it that preserveth us from being transported with our passions? Reason, And what is experienced of good and evil? Reason impoproved by observation. So we have gained nothing by the change of my reason, but three cracked groats fore one good shilling.  
But he hath omitted the principal part of my answer, that is, the liberty and dominion over their actions, which men of understanding have much more than children, fools or madmen. Without which all his capableness of good and evil consequences, all his experience of good and evil, all his calmness and moderation, do signify just nothing. Let a man have as much capacity as Solomon, as much experience as Nestor, as much moderation as Socrates; yet if he have no power to dispose of himself, nor to order his own actions, but be hurried away by the second causes inevitably, irresistiblity, without his own will it is to as much purpose to admonish him, as when Icarus had his wings melted by the Sun, and was tumbling down headlong into the Sea, to have admonished him to take heed of drowning. A seasonable admonition may do much good, but that is upon our principles, not upon his. If all events, with all their circumstances, and the certain means to effect them, were precisely determined from eternity, it were high presumption in us to interpose, without special warrant. Those means which we judge most convenient, are often not looked upon by God Almighty, who doth use to bring light out of darkness, and restore sight by clay and spittle, and preserve men from perishing by perishing. No Perigraph escapeth him without some supererogatory absurdities. As here, that a man may deliberate without the use of reason, that bruit beasts may deliberate, that madness or frenzy is strength of passion.  
He insisteth longer upon moral praise and dispraise, or moral goodness or badness, but speedeth worse, entangling himself in twenty errors, as these which follow: Metaphysical 
A litter of absurdities.  goodness is but an idle term. That is good wherewith a man is pleased. Good is not of absolute signification to all men. Nothing is good of evil, but in regard of the action proceeding from it, and the person to whom it doth good or hurt. Satan is evil to us, but good to God. If there were laws among Beasts, an Horse would be as morally good as man. The difference between natural and moral goodness, proceedeth from the [civil] law. The law is all the right reason that we have. We make it right reason by our approbation. All actions of Subjects, if they be conformable to the law of the land, are morally good. Moral praise is from obedience to the law. Moral dispraise is from disobedience to the law. To say a thing is good, is to say, It is as I, or another, or the state would have it. That is good to every man which is so far good as he can see. All the real good which we call honest and morally virtuous, is that which is not repugnant to the law. The law is the infallible rule of moral goodness. Our particular reason is not right reason. The reason of our Governor whom we have set over ourselves is right reason. His Laws whatsoever they be, are in the place of right reason to us. As in playmorality consisteth in not renoncing the trump, So all our morality consisteth in not disobeying the law. Is not here an hopeful litter of young errors, to be all form out of three penfulls of ink? as if he had been dreaming lately in errors den. One Antycira will not afford Hellebore enough to cure him perfectly. I was apt to flatter myself a while, that by the law he understood the law of right reason. But I found it too evident, that by right reason he understands the arbitrary edicts of an elective Governoour. I could not choose but call to mind that of our Laureate Poet, God help the man so wrapped in errors, endless train.  
The Reader might well have expected 
What is morally good.  matter of more edification upon this Subject. As wherein the formal reason of goodness doth consist, in convenience, or in the obtainining of all due perfections. As likewise the distinction of good; either subjectively, into the goods of the mind, the goods of the body, and the goods of fortune. Or formally, into bonum honestum, utile & delectabile, or honestly good, profitably good, and delightfully good. That which is honestly good, is desirable in itself, and as it is such. That which is profitably good, is that which is to be desired, as conducing to the obtaining of some other good. Thirdly, delightfully good is that pleasure which doth arise from the obtaining of the other goods desired. But he hath quite cashiered the two former sorts of good, That which is honestly good, and that which is profitably good; and acknowledgeth only that which is delightfully good, or that which pleaseth him or me. So as if our humours differ, goodness must differ; and as our humours change, goodness must change; as the Chamaeleon changeth her colours. Many things are good that please not us, and many things please us that are not good. Thus he hath left no real good in the World, but only that which is relatively good. Thus he hath made the Devil himself to become good, and which is yet worse, good to God. Thus he hath made horses to be as capable of moral goodness as men, if they had but only laws. I wonder why he should stick at that: laws are but commands, and commands may be intimated to horses, as we might see in Banks his horse; which we might call (upon his principles) an honest virtuous and morally good horse. There is a woe denounced against them who call evil good, and good evil. 
Isa. 5. 20.   
This is not all, he confesseth that lawmakers are men, and may err, and think that law good for the people, which is not: yet with the same breath he telleth us, That there is no other right reason but their law, which is the infallible rule of moral goodness. So right reason and erring reason; a fallible rule, and an infallible rule are all one with him. What no other rule but this one Lesbian rule, the arbitrary dictates of a Governor? What is become of the eternal law, or the rule of justice in God himself? What is become of the divine positive law recorded in holy Scriptures? What is become of the law of nature, imprinted naturally in the heart of every man, by the finger of God himself? What is become of the law of nations, that is, those principles which have been commonly and universally received as laws, by all nations in all ages, or at least the most prudent pious and civil nations? What is become of that Synteresis or noble light of the soul, which God hath given mankind to preserve them from vices? Are they all gone, all vanished, and is no rule remaining but only the arbitrary edicts of a mortal Lawgiver, who may command us to turn Turks or Pagans to morrow, who by his own confession may err in his law-giving? Than not only power absolutely irresistible, doth justify whatsoever it doth, but also the power of mortal man may justify the violation of the laws of the immortal God. But I have showed him sufficiently, that there are unjust laws, not only towards God, but likewise towards men: That unjust laws do not acquit our active obedience to them from damnable 
Exod. 1. 21  sin: That it is not only lawful, but necessary to disobey them: That God himself hath approved such disobedience, and rewarded it. To conclude, it is not the pleasing of him or me, or some private benefit that may redound from thence to him or me, that makes any thing to be truly good, but the meeting of all perfection in it, whereof that thing is capable. Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quolibet defectu; all requisite perfections must concur to make a thing good, but one only defect makes it evil. Nothing is morally good, nothing is praiseworthy, but that which is truly honest and virtuous. And on the other side, nothing is morally bad, nothing is dispraise worthy, but that which is dishonest and vicious.  
To wrangle everlastingly whether those encouragements which are given to Setting-dogs 
Rewards of bruits and men differ.  and Coyducks and the like be rewards, were a childish fight with shadows, seeing it is confessed that they are not recompenses of honest and virtuous actions, to which the laws did appoint rewards. Swine that run by a determinate instinct of nature to succour their fellows of the same Herd in distress, do not desire a civicall crown; like him who saved the life of a Citizen. Nor the Spiders, whose fancies are fitted by nature to the weaving of their webs, deserve the like commendation with Arachne, who attained to her rare arts of weaving by assidious industry. There is a great difference between natural qualities, and moral virtues. Where nature hath bestowed excellent gifts, the chief praise redoundeth to the God of nature. And where the bruits have attained to any such rare or beneficial qualities by the instruction of man, the chief praise redoundeth unto him that taught them. The Harp was not crowned in the Olympian Games, but the Harper, nor the Horses, but the Charioteer. And though the encouragements of men and bruits be sometimes the same thing materially, yet they are not the same thing formally.  
But where he confoundeth a necessity of specification with a necessity of exercise, and affirmeth that the Bees and Spiders are necessitated by nature as well to all their individual actions, as to their several kinds of works, it deserveth no answer but to be slighted. His opinion doth require that he should say that they are determined to their individual actions, by the second causes and circumstances (though it be untrue;) but to say they are determined by nature to each individual act admitteth no defence.  
In the last Paragraph, I am beholden to him, that he would instruct me: but I am of his mind, that it would be too great a labour for him. For I approve none of his new-fangled principles, and think he might have spent his time better in meditating upon somewhat else, that had been more proper for him. I see that where the inferior faculty doth end, the superior doth begin. As where the vegetative doth end, there the sensitive doth begin, comprehending all that the vegetative doth, and much more. So where the sensitive ends, the intellectual begins. And should I confine the intellectual soul which is inorganical, immaterial, impassable, separable, within the bounds of the sensitive, or to the power and proceedings thereof, when I see the understanding doth correct the sense, as about the greatness of the Sun? Sense hath nothing to do with universals, but reason hath. Even in memory which he mentioneth, the intellectual remembrance is another manner of thing than the sensitive memory. But this belongs not to this question; and therefore I pass by it, and leave him to the censure of others.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 15.  
IN this Section he chargeth me first with a double breach of promise, yet there is no promise; & if they had been promises, both are accomplished. One of my promises was, That I would not leave one grain of his matter unweighed, yet I leave these words unanswered. Our Saviour bids us pray thy will, not our will be done; and by example teacheth us the same; For he prayed thus: Father if it be thy will, let this cup pass. First this was no promise, but mine own private resolution, which I might lawfully change at any time upon better grounds. Secondly, it had been an easy thing to omit two lines in a whole discourse unwillingly. Thirdly, the intent was only to omit nothing that was material; but this was merely impertinent. Lastly, without any more to do, it was fully answered in my defence in these words. [In the last place he urgeth, That in our prayers we are bound to submit our wills to Gods will. Who ever made a doubt of this? We must submit to the preceptive will of God or his commandments. We must submit to the effective will of God, when he declares his pleasure by the event, or otherwise. But we deny, and deny again, that God wills ad extra necessarily, or that it is his pleasure that all second causes should act necessarily at all times, which is the question. And that which he aledgeth to the contrary comes not near it. Where were his eyes? That inference [which seemeth at least to imply that our prayers cannot change the will of God] is now first added. And if it had been there formerly, is answered abundantly in the same Section.  
The second breach of promise is this; that I said [hear is all that passed between us upon this subject, without any addition or the least variation from the original.] But I have added these words [Yes, I have seen those silliest of creatures, and seeing their rare works, I have seen enough to confute all the boldfaced Atheists of this Age, and their hellish blasphemies.] What a stir is here about two lines, which contain neither argument, nor answer, nor authority, nor anything material. I did not apply these words to him, nor gave the least intimation of any such thing. If he be wronged, he wrongeth himself. I am as much offended with the Theists of this Age, as with the Atheists, who are convinced that there is a God and profess it, yet never do him any service or worship, not so much as ante focum si frigus erit, by a warm fires side in a winter's day: who when they know God, do not glorify him as 
Rom. 1. 21.  God. But to deal clearly with him; I profess I do not know either when any such words were added, or that any such words were added: Neither ever had I any other copy but that original which was sent to the press: and that copy which was transcribed for him, and sent to him at the first. If the Amanuensis did omit two lines either in the margin (which is most likely by what he saith) or otherwise, I could not help it: My asseveration (for it was no promise) was true, that I sent the original itself, as it had lain long by me without any variation.  
When he is afraid to be hard put to it, than he layeth in the other scale to counterbalance those new reasons which are brought against him, either prescience, or what shall be, shall be: Or a man cannot determine to day, what his will shall be to morrow. All which are impertinent to the question, and have been abundantly answered in these Castigations. His instance of a debtor who intended first to pay his creditor, than thought to defer it, and lastly resolved to do it for fear of imprisonment, is remote from the question. The determination of the debtor is not antecedent, but concomitant, not extrinsical by the creditor, who perhaps never thought on it, but intrinsical by the dictate of his own reason, which he calleth thoughts, lest he should seem to attribute any thing to reason. What are thoughts, but intellectus actu circa res occupatus? The understanding actually employed about something. If he hold no other necessity but this, which no man opposeth; Why doth he trouble the World with his debtor and creditor about nothing?  
I did not accuse him for making all piety to consist in the estimation of the judgement: 
What it is to honour God.  he still mistaketh; but I did, and do accuse him, for placing all the inward piety of the heart in the estimation of the judgement. So he saith expressly, That to honour any thing, is nothing else but to think it to be of great power. If it were nothing else, the Devil honours God as much as the best Christian; for he believeth a God as much as they: and he cannot believe a God, but he must believe him to be omnipotent. Thou believest there is one God, thou dost well, the devils also believe and tremble. 
Jam 2. 19  I showed him that inward piety doth consist more in the submission of the will, than in the estimation of the judgement, But I may not say that it was too hot for his fingers. He urgeth, That the devil cannot esteem God for his goodness: Let it be so. Neither is there any need that he should to make him devoute, if his ground were true, That to honour God is nothing else, but to think him to be of great power.  
But to make amends for this oversight, he hath found us out two sorts of Devils. The one 
What are devils in his judgement.  (and indeed all the devils that are in his creed) are wicked men, to whom he applieth the name of diabolus, and Satan, and Abaddon in holy Scripture. The other are heathen gods, mere fancies, or fictions of terrified hearts; or as he styleth them out of St. Paul, Nothings. What he will do with Heaven, I know not; but he hath emptied Hell at once, and swept away all the devils, except wicked men. He might do well to acquaint the Judges with it, to save the lives of so many poor old melancholic women, who suffer as witches for confederacy with the devil. I desire to know of him, whether those devils which our Saviour cast out of the possessed, or those devils which hurried the swine into the Sea, or that devil who took our Saviour up to the Pinnacle of the Temple, were heathen gods, or wicked men? Or how a legion of heathen gods or wicked men could enter into one possessed person, without crowding one another to death? But this belongeth to another speculation. He asketh in what classis of entities I place devils? Will he learn to speak jargon? I answer, with Angels, among spiritual substances. He hath as much authority to empty Heaven of good Angels, as to empty Hell of bad Angels.  
To cover his former error, that the honour of God is nothing else but the estimation of his power, he hath devised another error, That all the Attributes of God are included in his Omnipotence. I confess, that the Attributes of God are transcendents above our capacities, and are not of the same nature with the same attributes of mortal men. I confess further, that all the Attributes of God, and whatsoever is in God, is God, or is the Deity itself. But to confound all these distinct Attributes in one, to no purpose, without any ground is absurd, and serveth only to make those notions which were piously invented to help our understandings, to be the ready means to confound our understandings.  
In the next place I showed, that to command one thing openly, and to necessitate another thing privately, destroyeth the truth of God, the goodness of God, the justice of God, and the power of God. This is an heavy accusation, and he had need to acquit himself like a man. But I believe he will fail. Here he bringeth in the prescience of God again twice, to seem to stop a gap with it. But it will not serve his turn. Where the 
God doth not hinder privately what he commands openly.  soldiers are mustered over and over, it is a sign the companies are but thin. First to save the truth of God he saith, That truth consisteth in affirmation and negation, not in commanding. The sense is, That God who is truth itself, may will onething, and command another, and hinder that act which he commandeth. Mark but his reason. The Scripture which is his word, is not the profession of what he intendeth, but an indication what those men whom he hath chosen to salvation or destruction, shall necessarily intend. This is the same which he renounced formerly, as one of my ugly phrases, That God should command one thing openly, and hinder the same privately or underhand, Reader, if thou delightest in 
His opinion destroyeth the truth of God.  such a god who will command one thing publicly, and hinder it privately, choose Mr. Hobbes his God. God forbid we should attribute any such double dealing to our God, who is truth itself. Some contraries, as heat and cold, may meet together in remiss degrees; but truth and falsehood, an habit and privation, can never meet together. There is a truth in being; the picture of a man cannot be the man himself. There is a truth in knowing, if the understanding be not adequate to the thing understood, there is no truth in it. There is a truth in saying, which is a conformity or an adaequation of the sign to the thing said, which we call Veracity. When one thing is commanded publicly, and the same is hindered privately, and the party so hindered is punished for not doing that which was impossible for him to do; Where is the veracity? where is the conformity and adaequation of the sign to the thing said? I dare not tell Mr. Hobbes that he understandeth not these things, but I fear it very much: If he do, his cause is bad, or he is but an ill Advocate.  
Next to reconcile the goodness of God 
And his goodness.  with his principles, he answereth first to the thing, That living creatures of all sorts are often in torments as well as men, which they could not be without the will of God. I know no torments of the other creatures but death, and death is a debt to nature, not an act of punitive justice. The pangs of a violent death are less than of a natural, besides the benefit that proceedeth thence for the sustenance of men, for which the creatures were created. See what an Argument here is, (for all his answers are recriminations or exceptions,) from brute beasts to men, from a debt of nature, to an act of punitive justice, from a sudden death, to lingering torments, ut sentiant se mori, from a light affliction producing great good, to endless intolerable pains; producing no good, but only the satisfaction of justice. Then to the phrase of Gods delighting in torments: He answereth, That God delighteth not in them. It is true. God is not capable of passions, as delight or grief; but when he doth those things that men grieving or delighting do, the Scriptures by an anthropopathy do ascribe delight or grief unto him. Such are his exceptions, not to the thing, but to the phrase, because it is too Scholastical, or too elegant. I see he liketh no tropes or figures. But in all this, here is not one word of answer to the thing itself. That, that which is beyond the cruelty of the most bloody men, is not agreeable to the Father of Mercies, to create men on purpose to be tormented in endless flames, without their own faults. And so contrary to the Scriptures, that nothing can be more, wherein punishment is called Gods strange Work, his strange Act, For God made not death, neither 
Isa. 28. 21.  hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living, 
Wisd. 1. 13.  but ungodly men with their works, and words, called it unto them. It this place seem to him Apocryphal, he may have twenty that are Canonical. As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but 
Ezek. 33. 11.  that he turn from his way and live: Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways, for why will ye die, O house of Israel?  
That his opinion destroyeth the justice of God, by making him punish others for his own acts, is so plain, that it admitteth no defence. And if any further corroboration were needful, we have his own confession, That 
Fount of Arg.  there can be no punishment but for crimes, that might have been lest undone. Yet he keepeth a shuffling of terms, afflictions, and bruit creatures, which by his own confession are not capable of moral goodness or wickedness, and consequently, not subject to punishment, and quite taking away the proportion between 
And his justice.  sin and punishment, only to make a show of answering to them, who do not or cannot weigh what is said. Among guilty persons, to single out one to be punished for examples sake, is equal and just, that the punishment may fall upon few, fear to offend upon all. But to punish innocent persons for examples sake, is only an example of great injustice. That which he calleth my opinion of the endless tormenrs of hell, I learned from Christ himself, Go ye cursed into everlasting fire, and from my creed. When Origen and some others, called the merciful Doctors, did endeavour to possess the Church with their opinion of an universal restitution of all creatures, to their pristine estate, after sufficient purgation, it was rejected by the Church. Without doubt, a sin against infinite majesty, and an aversion from infinite goodness, do justly subject the offenders to infinite punishment. But he talketh as though God were obliged to do acts of grace, and to violate his own ordinances, that he might save men without their own wills. God loves his own creatures well, but his own justice better.  
Whereas I showed, That this opinion destroyeth the omnipotence of God, by making 
And omnipotence making the cause of sin.  him the author or cause of sin, and of all defects; which are the fruits of impotence, not of power. He distinguisheth between the cause of sin and the author of sin, granting that God is the cause of sin. He will say, That this op●…nion makes him [God] the cause of sin. But does not the Bishop think him the cause of all actions; And are not sins of commission actions? Is murder no action? Doth not God himself say there is no evil in the City which I have not done: And was not murder one of those evils? But he denieth that God is the author of sin, that is, God doth not own it, God doth not give a warrant for it, God doth not command it. This is downright blasphemy indeed. When he took away the devil, yet I did not suspect, that he would so openly substitute God Almighty in his place. Simon Magus held that God was the cause of sin, but his meaning was not so bad: He only blameth God for not making man impeccable. The Manichees and Marcionites did hold, that God was the cause of sin, but their meaning was not so bad; they meant it not of their good God, whom they called light: but of their bad God, whom they termed darkness. But T. H, is not afraid to charge the true God, to be the very actor of all sin. When the Prophet asketh, Shall there be evil in a City, and the Lord hath not done it? He 
Amos 3. 6.  speaketh expressly of evil of punishment, not at all of the evil of sin. Neither will it avail him in the least, that he maketh not God to be the author of sin. For first it is worse to be the physical or natural cause of sin, by acting it, than to be the moral cause of sin, by commanding it. If a man be the Author of that which he commandeth, much more is he the author of that which he acteth. To be an author, is less than to be an actor. A man may be an author by persuasion, or by example; as it is said of Vespasian, that he being antiquo cultu victuque was unto the Romans praecipuus astricti moris author, by his observing of the ancient diet of the country, and the old fashion of apparel: He was unto the Romans, the principal author of their frugality. Hath not he done God Almighty good service, to acquit him from being the author of sin, which is less, and to make him to be the proper cause of all sin, which is more. Thus to maintain fate, he hath deserted the truth of God, the goodness of God, the justice of God, and the power of God.  
In the next place I demanded how shall a man praise God, who believeth him to be a 
A right Hobbist cannot praise God.  greater Tyrant than ever was in the World, creating millions to burn eternally without their own fault, to express his power. He answereth, That the word Tyrant was sometimes taken in a good sense; A pretty answer, and to good purpose, when all the world sees that it is taken here in the worst sense. And when he hath fumbled thus a while after the old manner, all his answer is a recrimination. How can the Bishop praise God for his goodness, who thinks he hath created millions of millions to burn eternally, when he could have kept them so easily from committing any fault. I do not believe that God created millions, nor so much as one single person to burn eternally, which is as true as his other slander in this place, That I withdraw the will of man from God's dominion. Both the one and the other are far from me. His principles may lead him upon such precipices, mine do not. God created not man to burn, but to serve him here, and to be glorified by him and with him hereafter. That many men do miss this end, is not God's fault, who gave them sufficient strength to have conquered, and would have given them a larger supply of grace, if they had sought it, but man's. God was not bound to reverse his own decrees, or change the order of the government of the World, which he himself had justly instituted, to hold up a man from sinning against his will, when he could by his Almighty power draw good out of evil, and a greater degree of glory out of the fall of man. Concerning the number of those who are reprobated for their sins, I have nothing to say, but that secret things belong unto the Lord our God, and things revealed to us and to our children. 
Deut. 29. 29.   
My next demands were, How shall a man 
Nor hear the Word, or receive the Sacrament worthily,  hear the Word of God with that reverence and devotion and faith that is requisite, who believeth that God causeth his Gospel to be preached to the much greater part of Christians, without any intention that they should be saved?  
Secondly, How shall a man prepare himself for the receiving of the Sacrament with care and conscience, who apprehendeth that eating and drinking unworthily, is not the cause of damnation, but because God will damn a man, therefore he necessitateth him to eat and drink unworthily. To which two demands, he giveth one answer, That faith is the gift of God, if they have faith, they shall both hear the Word, and receive the Sacraments worthily: and if they have no faith, they shall neither hear the Word, nor receive the Sacraments worthily. There needeth no more to be said to evidence to all the World, that he doth utterly destroy, and quite take away all care, all solicitude, all devotion and preparation of ourselves for holy duties. If God give us faith, we can want nothing; If God do not give us faith, we can have nothing. We use to say truly, That God doth not deny his grace to them who do their endeavours, The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force, and how much more shall 
Matth. 11. 12. Mat. 7. 11.  your father which is in heaven, give good things to them that ask him? St. Paul maketh hearing to be the way to obtain faith, How shall they believe on him of whom they have not heard? 
Rom. 10. 14.  And exhorteth Christians to work out their own salvation with fear and trembling. Devout prayers, and hearing, and reading, and participating, did use to be the way to get faith, and to increase faith. As in our natural life. so in our spiritual life, we must earn our bread in the sweat of our brows. Such desperate opinions as these, which are invented only to colour idleness and quench devotion, are the pillows of Satan. We believe none are excluded from the benefit of Christ's passion, but only they who exclude themselves. Absolute exclusion is opposed to exclusion upon supposition, which useful and necessary distinction (if he do not, or will not understand) we have no reason to fancy it one jot the worse, for his supercilious censures.  
My next demand was, How shall a man make a free vow to God, who believes himself 
Nor vowas he ought.  to be able to perform nothing, but as he is extrinsecally necessitated. To this he answers, That the necessity of vowing before he vowed, hindered not the freedom of his vow. This itself is absurd enough, but whether it be his misapprehension or his cunning to avoid the force of an argument, he comes far short both of the force and of the hope of this reason, which was this. If a man be not left in any thing to his own disposition, and have no power over his own future actions, but is antecedently determined to what he must do, and must not do, and yet knoweth not what he is extrinsecally determined to do, and not to do; than it is not only folly but impiety, for him to vow that which he knoweth not whether it be in his power to perform or not, But upon his grounds every man is antecedently determined to every thing he shall do, and yet knoweth not how he is determined. Universal necessity, and free vows cannot possibly consist together  
My last demand was, how shall a man condemn 
Nor repent of his misdeeds.  or accuse himself for his sins, who thinketh himself to be like a watch wound up by God? His answer is, Though a man think himself necessitated to what he shall do; yet if he do not think himself necessitated and wound up to impenitence, there will follow no impediment to repentance. My argument looketh at the time past, his answer regardeth the time to come; both ways he is miserably entangled. First for the time past, If a man was wound up as a watch by God, to all the individual actions which he hath done, than he ought not to accuse or condemn any man for what he hath done: for according to his grounds, neither he nor they did any thing, but what was the secret and irresistible will of God, that they should do. And when the secret will of God is made known by the event, we ought all to submit unto it. Much less can any man accuse or condemn himself without, hypocrisy for doing that, which if his life had lain a thousand times upon it, he could not have helped, nor done otherwise than he did. The very same reason holdeth for the time to come. There is the same necessity in respect of God's decree, the same inevitability on our parts for the future, that is, for the time past. The same submission is due to to the secret will of God, when it shall be declared by the event. How ill he hath been able to reconcile his principles, with the truth, and goodness, and justice and power of God, and with those Christian duties which we owe unto God, as vows, repentance, and praising of God's Holy Name, the hearing of his Word, the receiving of his Sacraments, I leave to the judgement of the Reader.  
The next thing which I disliked was his 
What repentance is.  description of repentance. It is a glad returning into the right way, after the grief of being out of the way. Who ever heard before this, of gladness or joy in the definition of repentance? he telleth us, That it is not Christian repentance without a purpose of amendment of life. That is true, a purpose of amendment was comprehended in the old definition of repentance, A godly sorrow for sins past, with a steadfast purpose to commit no more sins to be sorrowed for, St. Peter found no great sense of joy, when he went out and wept bitterly. And some tell us, that so long as he lived, he did the same, so often as he heard the cock crow. Nor Mary Magdalene, when she washed the feet of Christ with her tears, and wiped them with her hairs, yet she was a true penitent, and purposed amendment. Nor David, when he washed his bed night by night, and watered his couch with his tears. St. Paul reckoneth all the parts of the repentance of the Corinthians, Godly sorrow, carefulness, clearing of themselves, indignation, fear, vehement desires, 
2 Cor. 7. 11.  zeal, revenge, here is no word of joy or gladness in all this. Joy is a consequent of repentance after reconciliation, but it is not of the essence of repentance, no more than a succeeding calm is of the essence of a storm, or the prodigals festival joy after his readmission into his father's house, was a part of his conversion. He is afraid that this doctrine of fasting and mourning, and tears, and humicubation, and sackcloth, and ashes, pertaineth to the establishment of Romish penance. Or rather they were natural expressions of sorrow, before Rome was builded. Turn ye to me with all your heart, with fasting, and weeping, 
Joel 2. 12.  and mourning. Neither the Ninevits, nor the Tyrians and Zidonians, did learn their sackcloth and ashes at Rome. But many men love to serve God now adays with as much ease as they can; as if God Almighty would be satisfied with any thing, vel uva, vel faba, either with a grape, or with a bean. And with the same measure they meet to God, he measureth to them again.  
He chargeth me that, I labour to bring in a 
Man's concurrence with God's grace.  concurrence of man's will with Gods will, and a power in God to give repentance if man will take it; but not the power to make him take it. Hola. It is one question utrum possit, what God can do, another, utrum sit, what God will do. God can determine the will irresistibly, but he doth not do it ordinarily. Ye stiff necked and uncircumcised in heart, ye do always resist the 
Act. 7. 51.  Holy Ghost. And I have called and ye refused, etc. The concurrence of God and man in 
Prov. 1. 24.  producing the act of our believing, or conversion to God, is so evident in holy Scripture, that it is vanity and lost labour to oppose it. If God did not concur, the Scripture would not say, It is God that worketh in us, both the will and the deed. If man did not concur, the Scripture would not say, Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling. If our repentance were God's work alone, God would not say to man, Turn ye unto me with all your heart: And if repentance were man's work alone, we had no need to pray, Turn us O Lord, and we shall be turned. We are commanded to repent and to believe. In vain are commandments given to them who cannot at 
Mark 1. 15.  all concur to the acting of that which is commanded. Faith and Repentance are proposed unto us as conditions to obtain blessedness and avoid destruction, If thou shalt confess with thy mouth, & believe with thy heart, etc. thou shalt be saved. And, except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish. To propose impossible conditions, which they to whom they are proposed have no power either to accept or to refuse, is a mere mockery. Our unbelief and impenitence is imputed to us as our own fault, Because of unbelief thou wert broken off. And 
Rom. 11. 20. Rom. 2. 5.  after thy hardness and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up unto thyself wrath. Their unbelief and impenitence were not their own faults, if they neither had power to concur with the grace of God to the production of faith and repentance, nor yet to refuse the grace of God. The holy Scripture doth teach us that God doth help us in doing works of piety. The Lord is my helper: And the Spirit helpeth our infirmities. If we did not cooperate at all, God could not be said to help us. There is, therefore there must be, co-operation, Neither doth this concurrence or co-operation of man, atall, entrench upon the power or honour of God, because this very liberty to cooperate is his gift, and this manner of acting his own institution.  
Those words, Behold I stand at the door and knock, are not understood only of the Ministers 
Rev. 3. 20.  outward knocking at the door of the ear with persuasive words, but much more of God Almighty's knocking at the door of the heart, by his preventing grace. To what end doth he knock to have it opened, if he himself had shut it by an irresistible decree? God first knocks at the door of our hearts by his preventing grace, without which we have no desire to open unto Christ: And then he helps us by his adjuvant or assisting grace, that we may be able to open. Yet the very name of God's adjuvant, or assistant, or helping grace, doth admonish us, that there is something for us to do on our parts; that is, to open, to consent, to concur. Why should our co-operation seem so strange, which the Apostle doth assert so positively? We are labourers together with God. And I laboured more abundantly than 
1 Cor. 3. 9  they all; yet not I, (that is, not I alone) but 
1 Cor. 15. 10.  the grace of God which was with me.  
The last part of his Section is concerning prayer, which he mesnageth no better than the rest.  
First he accuseth me for saying that prayer 
Confidence in prayer, and the efficacy of it.  is a signification that we expect that which we pray for from God, which he calleth a presumption in me, and a detraction from the honour of God. But it is so far from being a presumption, that it is a necessary requisite in prayer. S. James will have us pray without wavering: Let him ask in faith nothing wavering. S. Paul 
Jam. 1. 6.  will have men to lift up holy hands without wrath or doubting. And our Saviour commands, 
1 Tim. 2. 8.  What things soever ye desire when ye pray, believe that ye shall receive them, and shall have 
Mark. 11. 24.  them.  
I cited many Texts of Scripture to prove the efficacy of prayer, whereof he is pleased to take notice of three; and to deny that helping, means, efficacy, availing, do signify any causation; contrary both to the words and scope of those Texts, and contrary to the tenor of the whole Scripture.  
The prayer of faith shall save the sick. And I know that this shall turn to my salvation through 
Jam. 5. 15.  your prayers. Hannah prayed and the Lord 
Phil. 1. 19  granted her request. We see the like in Achab, in Zachary, in Cornelius, and many others. Hezekias' prayed, and the Lord said, I have heard thy prayer, I have seen thy tears, Behold I will add unto thy days fifteen years. 
Isay 38. 5.  Nothing can be plainer than Solomon's prayer at the dedication of the Temple. If there be famine in the land, if there be pestilence, etc. If 
1 King. 8. 37. 2 Chron. 7. 12.  their enemy besiege them in their Cities, whatsoever plague, whatsoever sicknesses there be, what prayer or supplication soever be made by any man, or by all thy people Israel, etc. and spread forth his hands toward this house, hear thou in Heaven thy dwelling Place, and forgive, and do, etc. To all which, God himself condescended and promised to do accordingly.  
His reason to the contrary, That no creature living can work any effect upon God, is most true; but neither pertinent to his purpose, nor understood by himself. It is all one as to the efficacy of prayer if it work upon us, as though it had wrought upon God himself, if it render us more capable of his mercies, as if it rendered him more merciful. Though the Sword and the Crown hang immovable, yet prayer translateth us from one capacity to another, from being under the sword, to be under the Crown.  
Lastly, he telleth us in great sadness, That though our prayers to man be distinguished from our thanks, it is not necessary it should be so in our prayers and thanks to God Almighty. Prayers and thanksgiving are our acts, not Gods acts, and have their distinction from us, not from God. Prayer respects the time to come, thanksgiving the time past. Prayer is for that we want, thanksgiving for that we have. All the ten Lepers prayed, Jesus, 
Luk. 17. 13. & 18. 2 Cor. 1. 11.  Master have mercy on us; but only one of them returned to give God thanks. S. Paul distinguisheth prayer and thanksgiving, even in respect of God. By granting the prayers of his people, God putteth an obligation upon them to give thanks. He might as well have said, that Faith, Hope, and Charity, are the same thing.  
He passeth over the rest of this Chapter in silence. I think him much the wiser for so doing; If he had done so by the rest likewise, it had been as much credit for his cause.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 16.  
Here are three things questionable in this Section; First, whether he who maketh all things, make all things necessary to be, or whether it be a contradiction of me to myself to say so? First, this is certain, there can be no formal contradiction where there is but one proposition; but here is but one proposition. Secondly, here is no implicit contradiction; First because there is a vast difference between making all things necessary to be, and making all things to be necessary Agents. The most free or contingent Agents in the World when they are, are necessarily such as they are; that is, necessary to be; But they are not necessarily necessary Agents. And yet he is still harping upon this string, to prove such a necessity as no man did ever deny. Thirdly, I told him that this which he contends for here, is but a necessity of supposition. As supposing a garment to be made of the French fashion, when it is made it is necessarily of the French faction. But it was not necessary before it was made, that it should be made of the French fashion, nor of any other fashion; for it might not have been made at all.  
He excepteth, That the burning of the fire is 
T. H. Still mistaketh necessity upon supposition.  no otherwise necessary then upon supposition. That is, supposing fuel be cast upon the fire, the fire doth burn it necessarily. But herein he is altogether mistaken. For that only is called necessary upon supposition, where the thing supposed is or was in some sort in the power of the free Agent, either to do it or to leave it undone, indifferently. But it is never in the power of the fire to burn or not to burn indifferently. He who did strike the fire out of the flint, may be said to be a necessary cause of the burning that proceeded from thence upon supposition, because it was in his power, either to strike fire, or not to strike fire. And he who puts more fuel to the fire may be said to be a necessary cause of the continuance of the fire, upon supposition, because it was in his choice to put to more fuel, or not. But the fire itself cannot choose but burn whilst it is fire; and therefore it is a necessary cause of burning, absolutely and not upon supposition. What unseen necessity doth prejudice liberty, and what doth not, I have showed formerly. How mean an esteem soever he hath of the Tailor, either he, or his meanest apprentice have more sense than himself in this cause. The Tailor knows that there was no necessity from eternity, that he should be a Tailor, or that that man for whom he made the garment, should be his customer; and much less yet of what fashion he should make it. But he is still fumbling to no purpose upon that old foolish rule, as he pleased once to call it, Whatsoever is when it is, is necessarily so as it is.  
The second question is, Whether there be any Agents in the World which are truly 
There is more in contingency than ignorance.  free, or truly contingent Agents, according to his grounds? And it is easily demonstrated, that there are not: Because he maintaineth that all Agents are necessary, and that those Agents which we call free Agents and contingent Agents, do act as necessarily, as those Agents which we see and know to be necessary Agents: And that the reason why we style them free Agents, and contingent Agents, is, because we do not know whether they work necessarily or not. He hath told us hitherto that all Agents act necessarily, otherwise there could not be an universal necessity. Now he telleth us that there be sundry Agents, which we know not whether they work necessarily or not. If we do not know whether they work necessarily or not, than we do not know whether there be universal necessity or not. But we may well pass by such little mistakes in him. That which I deduce from hence is this: That the formal reason of liberty and contingency according to his opinion doth consist in our ignorance or nescience; and than it hath no real being in the nature of things. Hitherto the world hath esteemed nothing more than liberty; Mankind hath been ready to fight for nothing sooner than liberty: Now if after all this, there be no such thing as liberty in the world, they have contended all this while for a shadow. It is but too apparent what horrible disorders there are in the world, and how many times, right is trodden under foot by might, and how the worst of men do flourish and prosper in this world, whilst poor Hieremy is in the Dungeon, or writing books of lamentation. If there be true liberty in the world, we know well whereunto to impute all these disorders; but if there be no true liberty in the world, free from antecedent necessitation, than they all fall directly upon God Almighty and his Providence.  
The last question is concerning his definition of contingent, That they are such Agents as work we know not how. Against which I gave him two exceptions in my defence. One was this. Many Agents work we know not how, as the Loadstone draweth iron, the Jet chaff; and yet they are known and acknowledged to be necessary, and not contingent Agents. Secondly, many Agents do work we know how, as a stone falling down from an house upon a man's head, and yet we do not account it a necessary, but a contingent event, by reason of the accidental concurrence of the causes. I have given him other instances in other parts of this Treatise; And if need be, he may have twenty more. And yet though his definition was showed formerly to halt downright on both sides, yet he, good man, is patient and never taketh the least notice of it: But only denyeth the consequence, and overlooketh the proofs.  
His objection about the indetermination of the causes, That indetermination doth nothing, because it maketh the event equal, to happen, and not to happen, is but a flash without any one grain of solidity. For by indetermination in that place, is clearly understood, not to be predetermined to one by extrinsical causes, but to be left free to its own intrinsical determination, this way, or that way, indifferently. So the first words By reason of the indetermination, have reference to free Agents and free Events, And the other words, Or accidental concurrence of the causes, have reference to casual Events. And both together, referendo sigul●… singulis, do include all contingents, as the word is commonly and largely taken by old Philosophers.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 17.  
REader, I do not wonder now and then, to see T. H. sink under the weight of an absurdity, in this cause. A back of steel were not able to bear all those unsupportable consequences, which flow from this opinion of fatal destiny. But why he should delight to multiplle needless absurdities, I do not know. Almost every Section produceth some new monster. In this seventeenth Section, I demonstrated clearly, that this opinion of universal necessity, doth take away the nature of sin. That which he saith in answer thereunto, is that which followeth.  
First; it is true, he who taketh away the liberty 
Def. Num. 3. stat. of quest. cast. Num. 1. & 3. etc.  of doing according to the will, taketh away the nature of sin, but he that denieth the liberty to will, doth not so. This answer hath been sufficiently taken away already, both in the defence, and in these Castigations. Inevitable and unresistible necessity doth as much acquit the will from sin, as the action.  
Again, whereas I urged, That whatsoever proceedeth essentially, by way of physical determination from the first cause, is good, and just and lawful; he opposeth, That I might as well have concluded, that what soever man hath been made by God, is a good and just man. So I might, What should hinder me to conclude that every man, and every creature created by God is good, qua talis, as it is created by God: but being but a creature, it is not immutably good as God himself is. If he be not of the same opinion, he must seek for companions among those old Heretics the Manichees or Marcionites.  
So he cometh to his main answer, Sin is not a thing really made. Those things which at first were actions, were not then sins, though actions of the same nature with those which were afterwards sins. Nor was then the will to any thing a sin, though it were a will to the same thing, which in willing now we should sin. Actions became then sins first, when the Commandemen came, etc. There can no action be made sin, but by the law. Therefore this opinion, though it derive actions essentially from God, it derives not sins essentially from him, but relatively, and by the Commandement. The first thing I observe in him is a contradiction to himself. Now he maketh the anomy, or the irregularity and repugnance to the law to be the sin, before he conceiveth the action itself to be the sin. Doth not the Bishop think God to be the cause of all actions? And are not sins of commission actions? Is murder no action? And doth not God himself say, there is no evil in the City which I have not done? And was not murder one of those evils, etc. I am of opinion, that the distinction of causes into efficient and deficient is Bohu, and signifieth nothing. This might have been pardoned to him.  
But his second slip is worse, That the World was I know not how long without sin. I did 
Sin in the world before the civil law.  demonstrate, That upon his grounds, all sins are essentially from God, and consequently are lawful and just. He answereth, That the actions were from God, but the actions were not sins at the first, until there was a law. What is this to the purpose? It is not material, when sin did enter into the World early or late, so as when it did enter, it were essentially from God, which it must needs be upon his grounds, that both the murder and the law against murder, are from God. And as it doth not help his cause at all, so it is most false. What actions were there in the World, before the sin of the Angel? He charged the Angels with folly. And if God spared 
Job 4. 18. 2 Pet. 2. 4.  not the Angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell; and the Angels which kept not their first estate. What were those first actions 
Judas 6.  that were before the sin of Adam? By one man sin entered into the World, and death by 
Rom. 5. 12.  sin.  
Thirdly he erreth most grossly, in supposing that the World at first was lawless. The World was never without the eternal law, that is, the rule of justice in God himself, and that which giveth force to all other laws, as the Divine Wisdom saith, By me Kings reign, and Princes decree justice. And sin is 
Prov. 8. 15.  defined to be that which is acted, said, or thought against the eternal law. But to let this pass for the present, because it is transcendentally a law. How was the World ever without the law of nature? which is most properly a law, the law that cannot lie, not mortal from mortal man, not dead, or written in the paper without life, but incorruptible, written in the heart of man, by the finger of God himself. Let him learn sounder doctrine from St. Paul, For when the Gentiles 
Rom. 2. 14. 1●…. 15.  which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having not the law, are a law unto themselves, which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts, the mean while, accusing or excusing one another. I pass by those Commandments of God, which were delivered by tradition from hand to hand, from Father to Son. This, That mankind was ever without all law, is the most drowsy dream that ever dropped from pen.  
Whereas he saith, That I allow that the nature of sin doth consist in this, that it is an action proceeding from our will against the law, and thence inferreth, That the formal reason of sin lieth not in the liberty of willing, he doth wrong himself, and mis-inform his Reader; for I never allowed it, nor never shall allow it in that sense, but said expressly the contrary. My words were these. [which in our sense is most true, if he understand a just law, and a free rational will] And then I added further, That the law which he understandeth is a most unjust law, & the will which is intended by him, an irrational necessitated will. Where did he learn to take that for granted, which is positively denied? He saith indeed, if the Reader could trust him, That he hath showed, that no law can be unjust. But I expect arguments, not his own authority, which I value not. He neither hath showed that all laws are just, nor ever will be able to show it, until the Greek Calends. Likewise where he seemeth not to understand what the rational will is, I do think there is scarcely any one Author, who did ever write upon this subject, but he hath this distinction between the rational and the sensitive appetite. And hath particularly made this main difference between them, that the rational appetite is free, but the sensitive appetite is necessary. If he alone will not understand that which is so evident and universally received by all Scholars, it is no great matter.  
It is as unjust to command a man to do that which is impossible for man to do, as to 
To command impossibilities is unjust.  command him contradictions. This silly evasion will not serve his turn. Those things are said to be impossible to us in themselves, which are not made impossible to us by our own defaults. And those things which we make impossible by our defaults, are not impossible in themselves. Those impossibilities and only those which we by our defaults have made, may lawfully be punished. Where he confesseth, That lawmakers not knowing the secret necessities of things to come, do sometimes enjoin things that are made impossible from eternity, it cometh every way short of the truth. First in limiting it to humane lawmakers, who only know not the necessities of things to come; for my Argument, That law which commandeth impossibilities is an unjust law, doth hold as well of God's law, as of man's law, not that we believe any law of God can be unjust, God forbid: but to demonstrate to him undeniably, that all those things which he conceiveth to be impossible from eternity, are not impossible from eternity, because the contrary is commanded from God, and God never commandeth impossibilities. Secondly, he cometh short of the truth in this also, That he saith human lawgivers do sometimes enjoin impossibilities; for by his leave upon his grounds, they do always enjoin either absolute impossibilities, or absolute necessities, both which are equally ridiculous. Lastly, whereas I argued thus, If the will of man be determined by God, without the will of man, than it is not man's will, but Gods will, he denieth my consequence, because it may be both Gods will and man's will. I answer, It is Gods will effectively, because he maketh it necessarily; and subjectively, because he willeth it; but upon his grounds it is the will of man only subjectively, because he is necessitated to will it, but not effectively, because he had no hand in the production of it, and therefore how faulty soever it may be, yet it cannot be imputed to man.  
Concerning his instance in a civil Judge. Fist I showed that it was impertinent, because neither is a civil Judge the Judge of sin, nor the law of the land the rule of sin. To my reasons he answereth nothing in particular, but in general, That whereas I said that the law cannot justly punish a crime that proceedeth from necessity, it was no impertinent answer to say, That the judge looketh no higher than the will of the doer. Here are so many imperfections, that I scarcely know where to begin.  
First, I never said that the law cannot justly punish a crime that proceedeth from necessity; I always said, and do still say, That if it be antecedently necessitated, it is no crime, either punishable, or unpunishable. Secondly, he did make the civil Judge to be the Judge of sin, and the law of the land to be the rule of sin in express terms, A judge in judging whether it be sin or not, which is done against the law. Thirdly, That will which the law and the Judge do regard, is not his brutish necessitated irrational appetite, but our free rational will, after deliberation, determined intrinsically by the Agent himself.  
Secondly I showed, That his instance in a civil Judge was against himself, because this which he saith, That the judge looketh no higher than the will of the doer, doth prove that the will of the doer did determine itself freely, and that the malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would. To this he answers, That it proveth indeed that the malefactor 
Yet further against his silly distinction, free to do if he will, not free to will.  had liberty to have kept the law if he would, but it proveth not that he had the liberty to keep the law. Hath not this silly senseless distinction been canvased sufficiently yet, but it must once more appear upon the stage? Agreed. Thus I argue; first, If the Malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would, than the Malefactor had liberty to have contradicted the absolute will of God, if he would; then he had liberty to have changed the unalterable decrees of God, if he would. But he had not liberty to have contradicted the absolute will of God, if he would; he had not liberty to have changed the unalterable decrees of God, if he would. The assumption is so evident, that it were great shame to question it. The consequence is as clear as the Sun. For upon Mr. Hobbes his grounds, it was the absolute will of God, and the unalterable decree of God, that the Malefactor should do as he did, and not do otherwise. And therefore if the Malefactor had liberty to have kept the law, and to have done otherwise if he would, he had liberty to have contradicted the will of God, and to have changed the decree of God, if he would. But this is too absurd.  
Secondly to have liberty to have kept the law if he would, implieth necessarily a conditional possibility. But the will of God and the decree of God, that the Malefactor should do as he did, and not keep the law, implieth an absolute impossibility. Now it is a rule in Logic, that impossibile habet in se vim Adverbii universaliter negantis. An impossibility hath the force of an universal negative. But an universal negative and a particular affirmative are contradictory. That it was impossible for the Malefactor to have kept the law, and yet he had liberty to have kept the law if he would. There is not the least starting hole for him through which he can endeavour to creep out of this contradiction, but by making this supposition [if he would] to signify nothing, and to affirm that it was equally impossible for the Malefactor to will otherwise, and to do otherwise. Then see what a pretty liberty he hath left us, even a mere impossibility. If the Sky fall, than we shall catch Larks. Observe further the vanity of this distinction, between liberty to do if we will, and liberty to will. When both the one liberty and the other are equally impossible, upon his own grounds. And yet with this mock-liberty which signifieth nothing, he is fain to answer all the texts of Scripture which are brought against him, and all the absurdities which are heaped upon him.  
Lastly, to say a man is free to do any thing if he will, implieth that he hath power enough, and there is nothing wanting to the doing of it, but his will. Otherwise if there be not power enough to do it (as in this case upon his grounds there is not) it is as ridiculou to say a Malefactor was free to have kept the law if he would, as to say, a man is free to jump over the sea if he will, or to fly in the air if he will.  
Yet still he saith, The will of the Malefactor did not determine itself. Then by his own confession, the Malefactor had the more wrong to be punished, for that which was avoidable and irresistibly imposed upon him. If the Malefactor was necessitated from God by an essential determination of extrinsecall causes, both to will as he did, and to do as he did, he was no more a malefactor than his Judge.  
I have no reason to retract any one syllable 
Of monsters.  of what I said concerning monsters, But he had need to retract his ordinary falsifying, and dismembering, and misinterpreting of my sayings. I affirmed (as all sound Philosophers do affirm) That nature never intendeth the generation of a monster, but that every monster is a deviation from the law of the first institution, that every creature should beget another in his own likeness. Which proceedeth sometimes from the defect or inordinate force of the plastical or forming virtue, sometimes from the excess or defect of the matter, sometimes from the fault of the womb, wherein the conception is perfected, sometimes from other lesser reasons; and therefore that the universal causes, as God and the Sun, are not to be blamed for monstrous births, but that particular cause from which the excess or defect, or distortion did proceed. What was herein to derogate from the God of nature, who permitteth and disposeth of such irregularities in nature, as he doth of sins in morality, but with this difference, That moral aberrations are culpable and punishable, but aberrations in nature are only deformities, not sins. When Philosophers do say that nature intendeth any end, they do not mean that nature doth deliberate or resolve this or that, but that nature doth act for an end, which no man can deny with any credit. The Spider makes her webs to catch flies, there is nature's end. The Ant gathers provision in Summer, for winter sustenance. The Bee makes Cell●…s for a depository for honey, and receptacles for young bees. The Vine brings forth leaves, flowers, and grapes, one in order to the production or preservation of another. And lastly followeth the wine which is the end of all the rest, which being the last, was the first or principal end of nature. It is not the part of a real Scholar to except against evident truth, upon Grammatical Scruples.  
In the last Animadversion of this Section, nothing is contained that is either new or requireth an Answer.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 18.  
I cited Lipsius, only to show that the distinction of destiny into Christian and Stoic destiny was not mine. And though Lipsius incurred some dislike by reason of some inusitate expressions; yet there is no cause why T. H. should please himself so much, as to think that Lipsius was of his opinion. He was no such friend of any sort of destiny, as to abandon the liberty of the will. The Stoics themselves came short of T. H. his universal necessity. Yet I do not blame him if he desire to have one partner in such a desperate cause as this is.  
That which concerneth him in the second distinction, is this; That though he acknowledge a mock-liberty, that is, a will or an appetite of the object, yet he maintaineth that this appetite is neither moved, nor excited, nor determined to its act or appetibility of this or that, less or more, by the free Agent, but altogether by extrinsical causes. And so the pretended free Agent is no more free, than a bird which a man holdeth fast in his hand is free to fly whithersoever she will.  
I said, Those things which God wills without himself he wills freely and not necessarily, which he censureth in this manner. He says rashly and untruly: Rashly, because there is nothing without God, who is infinite, in whom are all things, and in whom we live, move, and have our being. And untruly, because whatsoever God foreknew from eternity, he willed from eternity, and therefore necessarily. What should I do? 
What is said to be in deo, and what extra deum.  should I fall down and thank this great Mogul (as the Aethiopian slaves do their Emperor when they are lashed) for thinking on me? Although I know his Thrasonical humour very well, that his animal spirits are mere bubbles of vainglory; & that he knoweth right well that he cannot reign securely whilst there is one of a different opinion surviving; yet I am persuaded that if he had been so well read, or so much versed in the writings of other men, as to know how many he wounded rashly and untruly, in this rash and untrue censure, he would have forborn it for his own sake. Hath he never heard of a common rule in Theology, that Opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa, The works or acts of the Trinity without itself are undivided? Or hath he never heard of that common distinction between a necessary being, and a necessary acting? The most perfect manner of being is necessary, and therefore God is a necessary being, and that which he willeth within himself he willeth necessarily, because whatsoever is in God is God; But the most perfect manner of acting without the Deity is freely, and therefore the Schools do agree, that God is a free Agent without himself.  
These free acts are princially two. The first is the Creation, whereby things created do pass from a not being to a being. The second is Government, by which all things created are moved and ordered to their ends. All men acknowledge that the D●…ity filleth all places by its Essence, by its Presence, by its Power, being within all places and things but not included, and without all places and things, but not excluded. They acknowledge that all things which have a real being do depend upon God for their being, for their making, for their conservation. And therefore when we speak of any thing that is without the Deity, we do not intend, that any thing is without the Essence, or the Presence, or the Power, or the circumference of it; God is a Circle, whose Centre is every where, the Circumference no where. But by the works of God without himself, we understand the Creation, and the Government of the World, which are not terminated in the Deity itself, but in the creatures, which are from God as their efficient, and for God as their end, and in God or thorough God in respect of their necessary and perpetual dependence upon him, who is the Original Essence of all things, I am hath sent me unto you: yet they are not of God as particles of 
Exod. 3. 14.  the Divine Essence, nor in God in that sense wherein we use to say, Whatsoever is in God is God. And so they are his works ad extra, without the Deity.  
To make good the second part of his censure that it was untruly said, he produceth nothing but his old threedbare argument taken from the prescience of God, which hath been answered over and over. Neither the prescience of God, nor the will of God upon prescience, do imply any more than a mere hypothetical necessity, which will do his cause no good.  
In the conclusion of this Section he confesseth, 
To will & do in God the same thing. He willeth not all he could will.  That God doth not all things that he can do if he will; but he saith, God cannot will that which he hath not willed from eternity, understanding by eternity, an everlasting succession; whereas in eternity, nothing is past or to come. I have showed often in these Castigations, the falsity, uselessness, and contradiction, of this absurd silly senseless distinction, in respect of men. But being here applied by him to God, nothing can be imagined more absurd; for to will efficaciously, and to do, in God are the same thing. What he doth, he doth by his will. To imagine that many things are free to God to do, which are not free to him to will, showeth that his meditations upon this Subject were either none at all, or worth nothing.  
But it shall susfice for the present, to show how absurd and how unappliable this exposition is to the two places by me produced. John Baptist told the Jews, that they might not flatter themselves with this, that they were the posterity of Abraham, that though all they should prove impenitent and unbelievers; yet God was able to raise up children to Abraham of stones. If it were impossible 
Lu●…. 3. 8.  for God to will the doing of any such thing, How was this truly said? And how could this afford any supply to the seed of Abraham, in case his carnal posterity should continue obstinate? In the other place S. Peter drawing his sword in defence of his Master, Christ reprehended him, and told him that he could have a better guard to secure him from all the attempts of the Jews, if it pleased him not to lay down his li●…e freely. Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and he shall give me presently more than twelve legions of Angels? He saith not, I can if I would, but positively, I can. Neither speaketh he of remote possibilities, but he shall give me presently. Christ would show by these words, that if it had not been his own will freely to suffer for the Redemption of mankind, he could have prayed to his Father, and he would have sent him a Guard of more than twelve Legions of Angels, and that presently, without delay. If it was impossible for God to will any such thing, than our Saviour's plea to S. Peter was but a vain pretence, and had nothing of reality in it. If T. H. regarded the honour and veracity of Christ, he would not impose such a juggling delusory sense upon his clear assertion: As if our Saviour should have said, Peter, I have no need of thy endeavours to defend me, for I could pray to my Father, & he would immediately send me a Guard of twelve Legions of Angels. But to say the truth, he is not willing to do it, and to say the whole truth, it is not possible for him to be willing.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 19  
HE professeth that he never said the will is compelled, but doth agree with the rest of the World that it is not compelled. But to let us see that he understandeth not what the World meaneth in saying, the will is not compelled, twice or thrice in the same page he maketh it to be compelled. Many 
T. H. make the will to be compelled.  things (saith he) may compel a man to do an action in producing the will. If a man can be compelled to will, than the will can be compelled. This appeareth yet more plainly a little after, where he maketh the casting of ones goods into the sea in a storm, to be a voluntary free elective act: And yet he confesseth that terror was a necessary cause of the election. To which if we add what he saith in his answer, A man is then only said to be compelled, when fear maketh him willing to it, it appeareth that (according to his grounds) it is a compulsory action also. If voluntary actions may be compulsory actions, than the will may be compelled. To help to bear off this blow, he distinguisheth between the compulsion of the will, and the compulsion of the voluntary Agent, denying the former, but acknowledging the later. That is, not a compulsion of the will, but of the man. The very same he hath again in these words, The necessitation of the will is the same thing with the compulsion of the man. If this be not plain Jargon, and Bohu (as he phraseth it,) let him tell me what is the compulsion of a man to will, but the compulsion of his will. Whether by the will he understand the soul as it willeth, or the faculty of the will, or the act of willing; every way, he that compelleth a man to will, compelleth his will. Let him call it what he please, either to compel a man to will, or to compel the will: by his leave, it is a gross contradiction; for to compel implieth reluctance and opposition, and to will implieth inclination and appetition. To necessitate the will (as he doth) is to compel the will, so far as the will in the elicit acts of it is capable of compulsion.  
That is properly said to be compelled, which hath its beginning from an extrinsical cause, 
Arist. Eth. lib. 3. c. 1.  that which suffereth contributing nothing to it, but resisting as much as he can. But he hath devised a new improper kind of compulsion, which is caused only by fear, which is not properly a compulsion, and such as it is, common to many other causes with fear: As to persuasion; So Saul's servants compelled him 
1 Sam. 28. 23. Est. 1. 8. 2 Cor. 12. 11.  to eat. To command, So the drinking was according to law, none did compel. To occasion, So S. Paul saith, I am become a fool in glorying, ye have compelled me.  
I pass by his uncouth term of creation of the will, in every single act of willing. And his extravagant exception, If the same individual man who did choose to throw his goods overboard, might choose not to throw his goods overboard, than he might choose to throw overboard, and not throw overboard. As if the liberty to throw or not to throw, and the liberty to throw and not to throw; that is, the liberty to do either part of the contradiction, or to do both parts of the contradiction were the same liberty. And secondly, as if a man who hath actually chosen, were as free to choose now, as he was at the same time when he did choose. I see if he cannot find a knot in a bulrush, he will do his endeavour to make it. If a man (saith he) by force seize on another man's limbs (as suppose his hand) and move them as himself, not as the other man pleaseth, the action so done is not the action of him that suffereth, but of him that useth the force: But if he that useth the force shall give a third person a box on the ear with that hand which he forceth, than it is the action of both; but with this difference, that it is the voluntary action of the one, and the forced or compelled action of the other. But supposing the first man had the will of the second as much in his power as his hand, (as God Almighty hath) and should necessitate him to beat the third person willingly; certainly the second person being so necessitated, could be no more blamed for willing in such a case, than for striking unwillingly.  
That motions proceeding from Antipathies 
Motus primó primi, and antipathies.  are primó primi, such as surprise a man and prevent not only all actual deliberation, but all advertence of reason, there is no doubt. But he who knoweth no other motus primo primos but only Antipathies, is like to prove some such rare Divine or Philosopher, as Megabyses showed himself a Painter by his ignorant discourse. Whilst thou was silent (said Apelles) thou seemedst to be some body, but now there is not the meanest boy that grinds ochre, but he laughs at thee. The difference between necessity upon antecedent supposition, and necessity upon a consequent supposition, hath been sufficiently cleared several times in these Castigations, and in my Defence in this very Section, to which I remit the Reader. Whosoever shall tell us that he who hath chosen to himself the profession of a Romish Priest, is still no more necessitated to take the oath of caelibate, than he was before he made choice of that office; and that the action of him who runs away upon the first view of a Cat, by reason of an antipathy which he cannot help, before all advertence of reason, is as free as a man casting his goods into the sea, to save his own life, after a sad and serious deliberation. And that he who takes Physic out of wantonness, was as much necessitated to stay within doors, as he who lay bedrid of an hectic fever. And that balam's blessing of Israel against his purpose and desire; And by Caiaphas his Prophecy which he spoke not of himself, but necessarily by the special determination of the Holy Ghost, were altogether as free as jacob's blessing of his sons upon election; I say, he who shall tell us all this in earnest upon his own word without any reason or authority, had need to meet with very credulous disciples, who judge of Colours winking.  
It is true, we who see but through a glass 
To search too boldly into the nature of God is a fault.  darkly, do not in this mortality comprehend exactly the nature of God and of the holy Angels, partly by reason of the weakness of our understanding: The water can ascend no higher than the Fountain's head; and partly for want of Revelation: Not to know what God hath not reve●…ed, is a learned ignorance. And therefore he who searcheth presumptuously 
But the greater fault is negligence  into the Majesty of God, is oppressed deservedly by his glory. But the much greater offence doth lie on the other side, that men do not endeavour to know God so much as they ought, and might by the light of nature, the contemplation of the Creatures, and the Revelation of God's holy Word, nor to serve him according to their knowledge. How shall we serve God if we do not know God at all? The least means of the knowledge of God is by the contemplation of the Creatures: yet even that doth render men without excuse. No man but himself would have objected it as a presumption to any man 
Rom. 1. 20.  to have said, That God was freer to do good than mortal man, and uncapable of doing evil. Yet this is that which those dreadful terms employed. We measure liberty by the degree of rationability, and the power of reason over passion; he by the largeness or straightness of the prison. Ours is a liberty of men, his is a liberty of Blackbirds. If I were disposed to cavil at words as he doth, I could show him out of Scaliger, That one heat is not more intensive than another, any 
Exer c. 12. d. 2.  more than one liberty is more intensive than another. Both phrases are metaphorical. Intention is properly the drawing out of the two extremes, the one further from the other, as in the string of a bow by bending it, and in a cord by stretching it out. But I forbear.  
He had said in his first answer, He that can 
T. H. his liberty omnipotence in show, in deed nothing.  do what he will, hath all liberty possible; And he that cannot, has none at all; I answered, That he who can do what he will, hath not only a liberty, but omnipotence. To this he replieth, That it is one thing to say a man hath liberty to do what he will, and another to say that a man hath power to do what he will. This is very true, but it helpeth not him at all. He spoke directly of power, He that can do what he will, and he that cannot do what he will. Thus I argue, Either a man can do what he will, or he cannot do what he will, If he can do what he will, than he is not only free, but omnipotent; If he cannot do what he will, than he hath no liberty at all. So he hath made men to be either Almighty Gods, or senseless logs, both ways he erreth. If he that can do what he will be not omnipotent (in good english) I have forgot my mother's tongue. He that is bound hand and foot, may wish that he were loosed; and he that is so sick that he cannot stand, may wish that he were in health, that they might both be able to walk; but to elect walking in that state and condition wherein they are, without supposition of the losing of the one, or the recovery of the other, they cannot, for both want power, and election is of things actually possible. There is only this difference, That in probability the bound man may be loosed, before the sick man recover his strength. But yet it may so fall out, that the sick man may be restored to his health, before the other be loosed from his bonds. Therefore he saith amiss, That the sick man wanteth power, not liberty, and the bound man liberty, not power. If he understood the difference between the Elicite & Imperate acts of the will, he would be able to judge of such cases better than he is. I have only one more Advertisement to the Reader, that after all this glorious ostentation, He that can do what he will, hath all liberty possible, he leaveth man as poor and bare and helpless as a grasshopper in winter, without any liberty to will, and consequently without any liberty to do.  
He nameth two Schoolmen, I think by the matching of them, they be a great part of his 
He dare not refer himself to his own witnesses.  store, Suares and johannes a Duns. So he is pleased to call that honour of our Nation, and one of the subtlest writers, that these last ages have afforded: and four later Divines, Luther, Melancthon, Calvine, Perkins, whom he always much admired. If he did so, they are the more beholden to him, for a man may see by his Treatises, That unless he meditated of them sometimes, he hath not been much acquainted with them. He dare not refer his two sorts of devils, or his temporary pains of hell, or his lawless state of mankind by nature, or his necessity of active obedience to all human laws, or his inefficacy of prayer, or his infallible rule of moral goodness, or his universal necessity of all events, by the physical determination of the second causes; or any one of his hundreds of Paradoxes, to their determination.  
Room for a great Censor, not an old Roman 
Terms of Art.  Censor, but a new English Censor, who cometh armed with his own authority, to reform not only Authors, but the Arts and Sciences themselves, after he hath been dreaming, I should have said meditating, some years upon the top of Parnassus, and now cometh forth suddenly Grammatticus, Rhetor, Geometres, Pictor, Alyptes. To stay there were to do him wrong; a Pentametor added will not contain half his exploits: a Poet, a Logician, a Philosopher Natural and Moral; an Astronomer, a Mathematician, a Theologian. To what purpose did our Universities nourish so many little Professors? one great Professor is best, as the Cat in the Fable said of one great way. But forget not Epictetus his rule, Remember to distrust. We have seen a Mountebank, or Quacksalver, or Operator, or Charlatan, call him what you will, vapour upon a Stage, and slight the good old Physicians for poring upon Galen and Hypocrates, to learn a company of senlesse Aphorisms, whilst they by their own meditation and experience, had found out remedies more easy, more effectual, more universal. We blame the Court of Rome for their Index expurgatorius: It is a shrewd sign when litigants are forced to cut out the tongues of their own witnesses; yet they purged out but words, or sometimes a sentence; rarely prohibited one of their own Authors. Here words and sentences and whole Authors, and Arts, go to wrack together, much like the Mahometan reformation, when they sacrificed the most part of their Interpreters of the Koran to the fire, without ever reading them; yet what they did, they did by public authority, and spared some as Genuine Expositors. But what this our new Censor doth, he doth upon his own head, and like death sparing none; so did not they.  
Down goes all Astrology and Metaphysics. The Moral Philosopher must quit his means and extremes in order to virtue, his liberty of contradiction and contrariety, his necessity absolute & hypothetical, his proportion Arithmetical and Geometrical, (I hope the Geometrician may have leave to hold it still) his principia congenita and acquisita, his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and most of his terms of Art, because Mr. Hobbes hath not read them, It is well if Moral Philosophy escape his censure. For if the law of the land be the only infallible rule of right reason, than the knowledge of actions, morally good and morally bad, belongeth properly to the common lawyer. The Moral Philosopher may put up his pipes. The same Arbitrary power he assumeth to himself in natural Philosophy, rejecting all the common terms used by Philosophers, euphoniae gratia, because they sound not well in his ears, for other reasons he hath none. Let the natural Philosopher no more mention his intentional species, his understanding Agent and Patient, his receptive and reductive power of the matter, his qualities Symbolical and dissymbolicall, his temperament ad pondus and ad justitiam, etc. I would have him fling away his Sympathies and Antipathies, his Antiperistasis and the like. Whether it was Astronomy or Astrology in my original, I do not know, nor have means to see, both may signify the same thing. I am sure, I neither said nor meant Judiciary or Genethliacal Astrology, as my instances do evidence. The truth is, there are so many mistakes in that impression, that sometimes I scarcely know myself what to make of them.  
But he is more propitious to the Astronomer. His Apogeum and Perigeum, Arctic, Antarctick, Aequator, Zodiac, Zenith, Horizon, Zones, are not so much as terms of art, but are as intelligible as an hatchet or a saw. What imaginary circles, and lines, and poles, and points, and an imaginary Axletree, and Ram, and Bull, and bears, and Dragon, and yet no terms of art? What are they then, Let him put it to a Jury of Malmsburians themselves, whether they understand these so well as an hatchet or a saw, and he is gone.  
The like favour he shows to Logicians, Their words of the first and second intention, their Abstracts and Concretes, Their Subjects and Predicates, Their Modes and Figures, Their Method Synthetick and Analytick, Their Fallacies of Composition and Division, are no terms of Art, but plain intelligible words. He that can say this without blushing, may dispute with any man. Porphyry makes the five predicables to be five terms of Art. Are not the predicaments and post-predicaments and demonstrations a priore and a posteriore terms of Art? who made a Mode and a Figure to signify what they do but Artists? Let all the world hear them, or read them, who have not learned Logic, and they shall understand no more of them, then of his Jargon. Why is not an Antecedent and Hypothetical necessity as intelligible as a categorical and hypothetical Syllogism. An Individuum vagum, if it were not a term of Art, should signify rather an atom, or a Rogue, than an honest person. Though he be so favourable to Logic here, he is as little beholden to it, as to the other Arts, who knows no better what are terms of Art. One of the first distinctions which we meet withal in Logic, is between the first and second notions. The second notions, such as all these are, are called expressly terms of Art, or Logical Notions, or Logical Organs, which they define to be images or representations, whereby the understanding doth form to itself real notions. And they compare them to brazen weights, of no value in themselves, whereby nevertheless, all sorts of gold are weighed. There can be nothing more certain and evident than this, That all these Logical and Astronomical terms, be second notions and terms of Art.  
Nay, so extremely blind and partial he is, that he approveth of Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, which he maketh terms of Art, as a good invention to help the apprehension of young men: and yet with the same breath, rejecteth these most excellent and most significant distinctions and expressions, which have been received in a manner universally, some of them for two thousand years, all of them for divers Centuries of years, in the Church, and in the Schools, as well of Theology, as Philosophy, which were invented for remedies against confusion, and helps to the clearer, and more distinct understanding of high and difficult notions, upon this false and slanderous pretext, that they were invented to blind the understanding, because he presumed to condemn them, before he took pains to understand them.  
He addeth, That I cite no terms of Art for Geometry, saying, he was afraid I would have put in lines, or perhaps equality, and unequality, for terms of Art. To free him from this fear, I put in their numbers numbering and numbered, their superficies, concave, and co●…vexe, their triangles, ambligone, and oxygone, their cones, cubes, cylinders, their parallels and parallelogrammes, their proportions, superpartinent, and superbipartinent, etc. their rules of Algebra and Helcataim, their Integers, and Numerators, and Divisors, and Denominators, and fabricall figures, their proportionality Arithmetical and Geometrical, continual and discontinuall, direct, conversed, alternative, inversed, compounded, parted. Geometry hath its words of Art and proper expressions, as well as all other Arts and Sciences. So hath Physic, Chirurgery, Law. So have Soldiers, Mariners, Hawkers, Hunters.  
But of all others he hath the least favour for the Divine, whom he will not permit to use a word in preaching, but such as his Auditors, nor in writing, but such as his common Readers may understand. I do not like it any more than he, that a Divine should affect uncouth words, to make his ignorant Auditors to gape, I had rather speak five words in the Church 
1 Cor. 14. 19  with understanding, etc. than ten thousand in an unknown tongue. But doth he make no distictian between the Church and the Schools? Doth he think that Theology, which hath the sublimest subject, doth not require as high, as learned, and as distinct expressions, as any Art or Science whatsoever? All hearers and readers are not novices, nor of the vulgar or common sort. There are those who have been brought up at the feet of Gamaliel, and have been admitted into the innermost Closet of the School learning. The holy Scripture itself, though it affect plainness, is not always such a stranger, either to learing or elegance. The only answer I shall give him to this, is, That he is beyond his Last.  
In the last part of this Section, he troubleth himself more than he needeth about a testimony, which I cited out of his book De Cive, not out of any esteem I had for it, for I condemned it; but to let him see his contradiction. 
A contradiction.  There he made the Ecclesiastical Doctors to be infallible, here he maketh them to be fallible. There he made their infallibility to be a peculiar privilege derived to them by imposition of hands from the Apostles, whom they succeeded, and from the promise of Christ: Here he attributeth it wholly to that power which is committed to them by the civil Magistrate. And what if the civil Magistrate commit no power to them? then by his doctrine, Christ breaketh his promise, and this privilege ceaseth. Infallibilitatem hanc promis●…t servator noster in iis 
c. 17. d. 28.  rebus quae ad salutem sunt necessariae Apostolis usque ad diem judicii, hoc est Apostolis & pastoribus ab Apostolis successive per manuum impositionem consecrandis. He answereth, That the infallibility of Ecclesiastical Doctors doth not consist in this, that they cannot be deceived, but that a Subject cannot be deceived in obeying them, when they are lawfully constituted Doctors. A pretty fancy, If the blind lead the blind, both fall into the ditch, Doctor and Subject together. If the Doctors be deceived 
Matth. 15. 14.  themselves, they must needs deceive the Subjects, who trust to their interpretation. Secondly, he waveth now the two grounds of their infallibility, that is, the promise of Christ, and the privilege conferred by imposition of hands; and ascribeth all their infallibility to the constitution of the civil power, which may render their expositions legal, according to the municipal laws, but cannot render them infallible. Thirdly, If Ecclesiastical Doctors lawfully constituted, be so far infallible, that they cannot deceive the Subject, why did he vary so much notoriously from their expositions at that time, as he hath done in his book De Cive, when they had both imposition of hands, and approbation from supreme authority? Why doth he now, wanting both the promise of Christ, and imposition of hands, take upon him to be the tryer and examiner of the exposition, not only of single Prophets, but of whole convocations.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 20.  
IF Mr. Hobbs did understand what true 
Election and compulsion inconsistent.  election and true compulsion is, it were evident that election of one out of more than one, cannot consist with antecedent determination to one; much less with compulsion or force, where he that is compelled opposeth and resisteth as much as he can. That the same act should be both voluntary that is with our will, and compulsory, that is, against our will, not in part but in whole, is impossible. But as the Sepia to preserve herself undiscovered doth shed forth about her a quantity of black inky blood, to hide herself from the fisher; So T. H. for fear to be catched in palpable errors, doth confound and blunder all things, making a new election, a new compulsion, a new liberty. There is not a word of moment here that hath not been discussed formerly in this Treatise. And I do not esteem his raw meditations worthy of repetition over and over. What is new in them I shall cull out from the rest.  
He telleth us, that when a stone is thrown upwards, the external agent giveth it a beginning of motion: So far we agree, whatsoever gives it the continuance. He saith further, That when the stone falleth it is moved downward by the power of some other Agent, which though it be imperceptible to the eye, is not imperceptible to reason. Herein we differ, wherein all the world hitherto have agreed. But it was very meet that he should deny the stone the determination of its natural motion, who had denied the intellectual soul the determination of its own will. Yet since he is pleased to conceal his new Agent, I have no desire to scrape acquaintance with it, especially upon such terms, to relinquish that intrinsical principle which all the World hitherrto hath received.  
So passing by his spiritual court unsaluted, (he loves to show his teeth, though he cannot bite) and leaving counterfeiting in hope of quarter, to himself as a person much more capable of that design; the next new Subject that presenteth itself is, Whether there be any mixed actions, partly voluntary, partly unvoluntary. 
There are mixed actions.  He denieth it positively, upon this ground, That one and the same action can never be both voluntary and unvoluntary. I answer first to his argument, That voluntary and unvoluntary are not opposed contradictorily, so as to admit no mean, but privatively, which do admit a mean, as the dawning of the day, or the twilight, is a mean between light and darkness, when it may be truly said, it is, partly light and partly dark. Melancthon hath an excellent rule to this purpose. Privative opposita nequeunt esse in eodem subjecto gradibus excellentibus. Privative opposites cannot be in the same subject in eminent degrees, but in remiss degrees they may. As to avoid importunity, a man may do a free act with reluctance; All reluctance is a degree of unwillingness. When Nero in the beginning of his Quinquennium was to sign the condemnation of a malefactor, he used to wish that he had never learned to write; to show, that though he did it willingly to satisfy Justice, for otherwise he might have pardoned him, yet he did it unwillingly in his own nature. And with this Aristotle agreeth fully. There are some actions which are neither properly voluntary, 
Eth. l. 3. c. 1.  nor unvoluntary, but of a middle kind, (or mixed actions) as things done for fear of a greater evil, or for some honest cause. And he giveth two instances. This is one, of a man who throws his goods into the sea, willingly in respect of the end to save his life, but the action being simply considered in itself unwillingly. The other instance of one commanded to do some dishonest act by a Tyrant, who hath his parents and children in his power. And so he concludeth truly, That they are mixed actions, but participate more of the voluntary than of the unvoluntary.  
Whereas I urged that election of one out of more could not consist with determination to one; he answereth, That a man forced to prison may choose whether he will walk upon his feet or be haled upon the ground. Which as it is false, as I have showed in my former defence, so it is wholly wide from his purpose. There is no doubt but he who is necessitated in one particular, may be left free in another; as he who is appointed the time and place for a Duel, may choose his weapon. But in that particular wherein he is necessitated he cannot choose. If they will tie him to an horsetaile, he must be tied: If they will fasten him to a sled and draw him to prison, he must be drawn. There cannot possibly be any election, where there is, and so far as there is, an antecedent determination to one.  
He disliketh the term of rational will, saying, There is nothing rational but God, Angels, 
Rational will.  and men. I hope he is not in earnest. Surely he believeth there is a reasonable soul, or otherwise he deserts his Athanasian creed; that is, The soul of a rational man, as a will, is the will of a rational man. Whether he make the will to be a faculty of the reasonable soul, or to be the reasonable soul as it willeth, I am indifferent. As the appetite of a sensitive creature is called the sensitve appetite; So the appetite of a rational or intellectual creature, is called the rational or intellectual will. He saith he would not have excepted against this expression, but that every where I speak of the will and other faculties, as of men, or spirits in men's bellies. I do not confine the reasonable soul to the belly: but it is a spirit in a man's body. If it be not, let him say what it is. The will is either a faculty of the reasonable soul, or (which is all one) the reasonable soul itself, as it dischargeth the duties of such a faculty. Sometimes he confesseth as much himself. Indeed as the will is a faculty or power of a man's soul, so to will is an act of it, according to that power. He jesteth at my five terrible things, saying, I had no more reason for five than fifteen. It seemeth that when he should have been reading Authors, he was meditating upon a dry Summer. Let him consult with Aristotle 
Eth. l. 3. c. 6, 7, 8.  and his Expositors. That which determined the three children, was no antecedent extrinsical cause, but conscience and their own judgement, which dictated to them their duty to their God.  
He seemeth to be troubled at sundry passages in my former defence, as ex●…mpting 
Passive obedience.  Subjects from active obedience to unjust laws, which (he saith) makes it impossible for any nation in the world to preserve itself from Civil wars. Whether was it want of memory, or rather subtlety in him, among these passages to omit that, Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye. 
Act. 4. 19  It is hard that we who have formerly been accused to maintain blind obedience, should now be charged with seditious principles, which our souls abhor. But we sail securely between this Scylla, and that Charybdis, by steering the ancient and direct course of passive obedience. We justify no defensive arms against a Sovereign Prince. We allow no Civil wars for conscience sake. When we are persecuted for not complying with the unlawful commands of a lawful Sovereign, we know no other remedy but to suffer or to flee, according to that memorable example of the Thebaean Legion, consisting wholly of Christians of unmatchable valour, and such as might in probability have defended themselves from the Emperor's fury. Yet when Maximian commanded them to sacrifice to Idols, they refused, suffering every tenth man of them to be slain without a blow smitten; And when the bloody Emperor came among them again to renew his command, and to see them decimated the second time, they cried out with one voice, Cognosce O Imperator, etc. Know, O Emperor, that we are all Christians, we submit our bodies to thy power, but our free souls flee unto our Saviour. Neither our known courage, nor desperation itself, hath armed us against thee, because we choose rather to die innocents', than to live nocents. Thou shalt find our hands empty of weapons, but our breast armed with the Catholic Faith: And so having power to resist, yet they suffered themselves without resistance to be cut in pieces. They are T. H. his own principles which make no difference between just and unjust power, between a sword given by God, and a sword taken by man, which do serve to involve Nations in Civil Wars.  
He saith it seemeth that I call compulsion 
Compulsion what it is.  force, and he calleth it a fear of force. I called it, as all the World called it, and as it hath been defined in the Schools for two thousand years. Yet I do not believe that it is always necessary to all sorts of compulsion, that the force be actually exercised, as it is when a man is driven hither and thither with the wind, (there is no fear in that case) yet there is compulsion. But it sufficeth sometimes to compulsion, if the force be present, such as cannot be resisted, and ready to be put in execution if there be need. As a man that will not appear freely upon summons, is forced by Pursuivants and Sergeants, although they do not carry him upon their backs, nor drag him upon the ground. It sufficeth that they be Masters and able to compel him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But according to his Heterodox principles, every remote fear doth make compulsion. As if a man should say that a child was compelled to run away from a mouse, or a coward was compelled to wink when a man holds up his hand at him, or a man is compelled to throw his goods overboard, which he himself confesseth to be freely and deliberately elected.  
From this first mistake of what compulsion is, proceedeth a second, That the actions of men compelled, are nevertheless voluntary: And a third, That compulsion doth not justify the party compelled: all which are mere Logomachies or contentions about words, which he is fallen into, either ignorantly by not understanding what compulsion is, or cunningly and deliberately to have a pretext of excepting against former Authors; although it be but like the dogs barking at the moonshine in the water. Force actually exercised did acquit Tamar and the betrothed Damosel from all guilt. But Herod's fear of a successor did not excuse the murder of the innocents'; Nor the fear of his Master's severity, excuse the unprofitable servants hiding of his Talon in a napkin. But I leave these contentions about words which signify not so much as the shadow of an ass.  
He hath plunged himself here into two real errors. The one is, That if the fear be allowed, the action which it produceth is allowed also. Abraham's fear was just, The fear of 
Fear of hurt doth not abrogate a law.  God is not in this place, they will murder me for my wife's sake. But the action which it produced, that is, the denial of his wife, is not allowed. Peter's fear was allowed, but the denial of his master was not allowable. The other and more dangerous error is, That fear doth abrogate a law, and make it to be no law in some cases. Take the larger exposition of this out of his book De Cive. No man is bound by any pacts or contracts whatsoever, not to 
Cap. 2. d. 18.  resist him who goeth about to kill him, or wound him, or to hurt his body. Mortem vel vulnera vel aliud damnum corporis inferenti, nemo pactis suis quibuscunque obligatur non resistere. So a Scholar may resist his Master when he goeth about to whip him; So a company of traitors or other capital malefactors may lawfully resist the Sovereign Magistrate. This is seditious indeed, and openeth a large window to civil war. This is directly contrary to what he said in his book De Cive. In every perfect Commonwealth the right of the private 
C. 6. d. 13.  sword is excluded, and no Subject hath right to use his power to the preservation of himself at his own discretion. Judge, Reader, whether we or he be better Subjects, he who holdeth that in case of extreme danger a Subject hath no obligation to his Sovereign, or we who hold it better to die innocents', than to live nocents. His reason because we bind or guard capital malefactors, showeth a distrust of what they may do de facto, not a doubt of what they ought to do de jure. I alleged, That the omission of circumcision in the Wilderness was not sin; to show, that though no fear or necessity can justify the breach of the negative Laws of God or nature; yet in some cases it may justify the transgression of the positive Law, or the omission of a duty enjoined by affirmative precepts.  
To my instance of two servants, the one spending his Master's money in a Tavern, the other having it taken away from him by force, or yielding it up upon just fear, he answereth nothing; the scope of them being to show, that strength of temation doth not justify an act, so much as extrinsical necessity. If the second causes were as rackets, & men as tennis balls, or foot balls, To what purpose did God give men reason to govern themselves, and to bridle their passions, who are tossed to and fro inevitably, irresistibly, as the rackets please? Reason had been a fitter gift for the rackets, than for the balls, if his opinion were true. That upon the planting of a Canon against a wall, the battery is necessary before 
Natural Agents act determinately.  the bullet arrive, is true, but there is no such necessary connexion between free or contingent Agents and their acts as there is between the Canon and the Battery, which he might have easily perceived, if he had been pleased to have enlarged his meditation a little further. It was in the power of the Cannoneers not to have charged the Canon, or to have given it but half a charge, or to have given no fire, or to have turned the mouth of it another way, higher or lower, to the right hand or to the left. In all these cases what had become of his Battery?  
If he hath such a conceit that no man doth or can determine himself, contrary to the sense of the whole World, let him enjoy it. Some men have conceited themselves to be Urinals, and suffered none to touch them for fear of breaking them, but he must not think to obtrude his phlegmatic fancies upon all other men, who understand themselves better. If he were not resolved to oppose all the World without any ground, he would never 
Not voluntary.  have denied a moral efficacy, or metaphorical motion, or have affirmed that motives, that is to say, persuasives or reasons, weighed in the understanding, do determine the free Agent naturally. Is the persuading of a man to eat, and the thrusting of it down his throat the same thing? Do an argument and a Canon bullet work after the same manner? Did he ever hear a bullet called a motive to the beating down of the wall, or flowers called motives to the production of the fruits, or meat a motive to nourishment? Natural efficay is always necessary, and determinate, and active to the height of its power; But moral Agents act not necessarily, nor determinately, nor always to the height of their power. The Lawyer that he speaketh of may refuse to plead, or delay his pleading, or plead better or worse; and when he hath done his uttermost, it may so fall out that he effecteth nothing for his Client. I am ashamed of such silly verbal objections, contrary to the known Principles of Arts. He complaineth that I put his notions oftentimes into mine own terms. I had thought I had done him a favour to tender him more intelligible, and put his sense into the common language of Scholars.  
The understanding being the root of liberty, and the will being but intellectus extensus 
Seal. exerc. 307. d. 3.  ad habendum aut faciendum quod cognoscit: the understanding extended to enjoy, or do that which it knoweth, it must needs be, that the more reason, the less passion, the less reluctance, and consequently the more liberty. He saith, When we mark not the force that moves us, we think that it is not causes but liberty, that produceth the action. I rendered him thus, The ignornnce of the true causes and their power, is the reason that we ascribe the effect to liberty. Where lieth the fault? that which he calleth force and strength, I call power: and for that which moves us, I say causes, as he himself doth exexpresse himself in the same place. Where I say the will causeth, he saith the man chooseth. As if there were any difference between these two, the eye seeth, and the man seeth. This and a confounding of voluntas with volitio, the faculty of willing with the act of willing, and a young suckling contradiction which he hath found out, That the will hath power to refuse what he willeth, that is, before it have willed it, not after, is the substance of this Animadversion, which deserve no other answer, but that a man should change his risibility into actual laughter.  
I produced two reasons to prove that true liberty is a freedom, not only from compulsion, but from necessity. The former drawn from the nature of election, or the act of the will which is always inter plura, the later, which I called a new Argument, because it had not formerly been touched in this Treatise, taken from the nature of the faculty of the will, or of the soul as it willeth, which is not capable of any other compulsion, but necessitation. And if it be physically necessitated, it is thereby acquitted from all guilt, and the fault transferred upon those causes that did necessitate it. This argument indeed began with a distinction, but proceeded to a demonstration, which was reduced by me into form in my defence, to which he hath given no show of satisfaction, either in his first answer, or in these Animadversions, except it be a concedo omnia, or a granting of the conclusion.  
The same ground which doth warrant the names of Tyrant, Praemunire, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, that is, Use, Quem penes arbitrium est, & vis & norma loquendi, doth likewise justify these generally received terms, of the Elicite and Imperate Acts of the will, there being scarcely one Author, who hath written upon this subject in Latin, that doth not use them, and approve them. In the council of Dort (which he himself mentioneth) he may find this truth positively maintained that voluntas elicit actum suum. Where he may likewise find what moral persuasives or motives are, if he have a desire to learn.  
Although he be convicted that it followeth from his principles, That God is the cause 
T. H. maketh God the cause of sin.  of all sin in the world, yet he is loath to say so much, for that is an unseemly phrase to say that God is the cause of sin, because it soundeth so like a saying that God sinneth; yea, it is even as like it, as one egg is like another, or rather it is not like it, for it is the very same. Nullum simile est idem; He that is the determining cause of sin in others, sinneth himself. It is as well against the eternal law, that is, the rule of justice which is in God himself, to make another to sin, as to sin. Yet though he will not avow such an unseemly phrase, That God is the cause of sin. Yet he doth endeavour to prove it by four texts of holy Scripture, which are altogether impertivent to his purpose. The first is that of the Prophet Amos, Shall there be evil in a City, and the Lord hath 
Amos c. 3. 6.  not done it? But that is clearly understood of the evil of punishment, not of the evil of sin. To the three other places, That the Lord said unto Shimei, curse David; and that the Lord 
2 Sam. 16. 10. 1 King. 22. 23. 1 King. 12. 15.  put a lying spirit into the mouth of ahab's Prophets; And that of Rehoboams not harkening to the people, the Reader may find a satisfactory answer formerly. But because he seemeth to ground much upon those words which are added to the last place, for the cause 
Fount. of Argu.  was from the Lord, conceiving some singular virtue to lie in them, and an ovation at least to be due unto himself, (I will not say lest the Bishop exclaim against me) applauding himself like the fly upon the Cartwheel, See what a dust I do raise, I will take the liberty to tell him further, That there is nothing of any cause of sin in the text, but of a cause of Jeroboams advancement, as he might have perceived plainly by the words immediately following, The cause was from the Lord, that he might perform his saying, which the Lord spoke by Ahijah the Shilonite, unto jeroboam the son of Nebat. Which saying was this, I will rend the kingdom out of the hand of Solomon, and will give ten tribes to thee. So he hath produced an evil effect of punishment, for an evil effect of sin; and a cause of advancement, for a cause of sin, and a permitting or ordering or disposing of sin, for a necessitating or determining to sin.  
Yet he produceth six witnesses to prove that 
Six witnesses for universal necessity answeted.  liberty is not opposed to necessity but to compulsion. Luther, Zanchy, Bucer, Calvin, Moulin, and the Synod of Dort. First, Reader, I desire thee to judge of the partiality of this man, who rejecteth all humane authority in this cause (as he hath reason) for it were an easy thing to overwhelm and smother him and his cause, with testimonies of Counsels, Fathers, Doctors, of all Ages and Communions, and all sorts of Classic Authors: and yet to seek for protection under the authority of a few Neoterick Writers. A double weight and a double measure, are an abomination. 
Aut haec illis sunt habenda, aut illa cum his amittenda sunt,  
Harum duarum conditionum nunc utram malis vide.   
If he will reap the benefit of humane authority, he must undergo the inconvenience also. Why may he use the testimony of Calvine against me in this cause, and I may not make use of the testimonies of all the Ancients, Greek and Latin, against him? whom Calvine himself confesseth to have been for liberty against necessity. Semper apud Latinos liberi arbitrii nomen extitit, Graecos vero 
Cal. Instit. l. 2. c. 2. d. 4.  non puduit multo arrogantius usurpare vocabulum, siquidem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dixerunt, acsi potest as suiipsius penes hominem fuisset. But I am able to give him that advantage in this cause.  
Secondly, a man may see by his citing of these testimonies, that he hath taken them up upon trust, without ever perusing them in the Authors themselves. I demand therefore, whether he will be tried by his own witnesses, in this case, in difference between him and me, that is, concerning universal necessity, in natural, civil, and external actions, by reason of a necessary connextion of second causes, and a natural determination of the will? If he will not, he doth not deserve to have so much as one of his testimonies looked upon.  
Thirdly I answer, That supposing (but not granting) that all his testimonies were true as he citeth them, yet none of them will advantage his cause at all. Luther his first witness disclaimed it, and recanted what he had said. And the necessity which he speaketh of, is only a necessity of immutability: And the 
Visit. Saxon.  Synod of Dort speaketh only of a necessity of infillability, both which do imply no more than a consequent hypothetical necessity, which we also maintain. Zanchy, Bucer, Calvine, Moulin, speak of a necessity of sinning, in respect of our original corruption. This concerneth not the liberty of the will, whether it be free or not free, but the power of freewill, whether it can without grace avoid sin, and determine itself to moral or supernatural good, which is nothing to the question between him and me.  
And for an essay what he may expect from his witnesses, Calvine, who is the least disfavourable to him of them all, saith no more but this, Deum quoties viam facere vult suae providentiae, etiam in rebus externis homiwm voluntates 
Cal. Instir. l. 2. c. 4. d. 7.  flectere & versare, nec ita liberam esse ipsorum electionem, quin ejus libertati Dei arbitrium dominetur. That God (not always but) as often as he will make way for his providence, even in external things, doth bow and turn the wills of men, neither is their election so free, but that the good pleasure of God hath a dominion over their liberty. Calvine did know no universal determination of all external acts by God, but only in some extraordinary cases. He acknowledged that the will of man was free to elect in external things, but not so free as to be exempt from the dominion of God, which two things none of us doth deny. So we may conclude from Calvine, That God doth not ordinarily necessitate external events: that is, as much as to say, there is no universal necessity.  
He will yet have less cause to please himself with the Council of Dort, when he 
judic. Theol. Lorit de lib. A rb. Thes. 4.  shall see what was said there by our British Divines, and approved by the Synod. That God made our wills and endowed them with liberty. That he leavs to every thing its proper manner and motion in the production of Acts, and to the wills of men to act after their native manner, freely. That in vain are punishments threatened to Malefactors by the laws of men, if no man could leave undone that which he doth. They ask, who in his right wits will say, that David could not but have committed adultery, or after that could not but have murdered Uriah. They condemn his opinion positively as an error. Hominem non posse plus boni facere quam facit, nec pluus mali omittere quam omittit, That a man cannot do more good, or leave more evil undone, than he doth.  
Still he is about his old quarrel concerning the Elicite and Imperate acts of the will, not against the thing, for it is as clear as the daylight, that there is a ground in nature for such a distinction; and that external Agents have not so much power over the will of man, to make him choose what they think fit, as over the locomotive faculty and other members, to make a man move them at their pleasure. But all his contention is still about the words, Imperate, or commanded Acts; As if (saith he) the faculties could speak one to another. I answered him that there were mental terms as well as vocal, by which the soul being willing, may express itself to the locomotive, or other inferior faculties. As the Angels do understand one another, not by speech, but as we behold one another in a glass. Here he is out again, quite mistaking the plain and obvious sense of my words, showing that in his long and profound meditations, he did never meet with this subject. And telling us, That by mental speech I understand only an Idea of the 
Mental terms.  sound and of the letters, whereof the word is made. And charging me most untruly to say, That when Tarquin commanded his son, by striking off the tops of Poppies, he did it by mental terms. This I said truly, That howsoever a Superior doth intimate his commands to his Inferior, whether it be by vocal terms, as ordinarily, or by mental terms, as it is among the Angels; or by signs, as it was between Tarquin and his sons, it is still a command. And in this case of the souls employing the Inferior faculties, it is without dispute. But I never said that the striking off the tops of the Poppies with his rod, was mental language, or the terms of his mind. It seemeth he hath never heard of mental terms or mental prayer. The conceptions of the mind are the natural representations of things. Words are Signs or Symbols of the inward conceptions of the mind, by imposition, What way soever the inward conceptions are intimated, it is the same that speech is in effect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an instrument or means of Communication. As a sign is an intimation to a Traveller where he may find an harbour.  
He saith, No drawing can be imagined but of bodies, and whatsoever is drawn out, is drawn 
Metaphorical drawing.  out of one place into another. He knoweth no drawing, but drawing of wire, or drawing of water, or drawing of Carres. St. James saith, Draw nigh to God, and he will draw nigh to you; 
Jam. 4. 8. Joh. 6. 44. Joh. 12. 32.  and no man can come unto me except my father draw him: and if I be lifted up from the earth, I will draw all men unto me. In all these drawings, here is no drawing out of one place into another. A fair object draws men's eyes, A good Orator draweth them by the ears. There is metaphorical drawing. Take but one place more, Counsel in the heart of a man is like 
Pro. 20. 5.  deep water, but a man of understanding will draw it out.   

Castigations of the A nimadversions, Num. 21.  
A Paradox is a private opinion of one 
Paradoxes what [they are.]  man, or a few factious men, assumed or maintained sometimes out of error of judgement, but commonly out of pride and vain glorious affectation of singularity, contrary to the common and received opinion of other men. Such Paradoxes were the Stoical opnions, (Stoics were fruitful in producing Paradoxes) That all sins are equal, and that a wise man is all things, a good King. a good Captain, a good Cobbler. I hope he will be better advised, than to condemn all those of ignorance, who out of civility styled those new fangled opinions Stoical Paradoxes, rather than Stoical errors. He saith, Christiaen religion was once a Paradox. Never; A Paradox is a private opinion, contrary to the common opinion. Points of faith are more than opinions. Faith is a certain assent grounded upon the truth and authority of the revealer. Opinion is a certain assent grounded upon the probable conjectures of reason. We do not use to call Turkish, Heathenish, or Heretical errors by the name of Paradoxes. I confess there may be opinions, and consequently Paradoxes in religion, that is, in such points: the truth or falsehood whereof is grounded more upon the probable discussion of reason, then upon the evidence of divine revelation, but errors in essentials of faith, are not Paradoxes. He who disbelieves any Article of his Creed, is not Paradoxical, but Heretical. Such another mistake is his other, That but for Paradoxes we should be now in that savage ignorance, which those men are in that have not, or have not long had laws and Commonwealth. Politic precepts, and civil institutions, and practical instructions which consist not in Theory or Speculation, but in the application of practical truths, neither are nor ever were called properly either opinions or Paradoxes.  
But to come to the purpose, I did not, I do not, deny that there may be some true Paradoxes, and rather in such things as are found out by reason, than in such as depend upon Revelation, which are delivered from age to age by universal tradition. An able industrous person by constant meditation, and the help of other men's experience and observations, may sometimes find out a latent truth, or vindicate one from the oppressive tyranny of prejudice or custom. But this is rarely, God and nature do not give all their gifts to one man, lest he should grow proud. But when men are composed of Paradoxes, that as Ovid could not express himself without a verse, so they cannot speak without a Paradox, when they take upon them to censure all ancient truths in Divinity and Humanity, and seek to obtrude their brainsick conceptions upon all other men as Oracles, I think he who telleth them only of their Paradoxes, dealeth gently with them. Zeleucus was more severe against Innovators, who enacted, That if any man made a proposition for a change in their policy, he should make it with an halter about his neck, that if he failed to justify it by reason, he should justify his attempt by suffering.  
I leave his Paradoxes, and come to his Subtlety, That there is hardly any one action, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is in rerum natura: And that there cannot be a motion in one part of the World, but the same must be communicated to all the rest of the World. That is to say, in plain English, That there is nor a Pie that chattereth, nor so much as an Aspen leaf that waggeth here in England, but it maketh some alteration in China and Peru, and the efficacy of it, like Drake or Cavendish doth encompass the Globe of the Earth, and mounteth to Heaven, and (if there be any such thing) helpeth to make the eighth Sphere tremble. I thought it had been a modest expression to call this a Paradox.  
To prove this, he maketh a Narration what a Scholar maintained to him, That if a 
Whether a feather make a Diamant yield.  grain or a feather be laid upon an anvil of Diamant, at the first access it maketh it yield, which he demonstrated thus, That if the whole World would do it, the least part thereof would do its part. Wherewith he rested convinced. But his relation is doubly impertinent. First, we speak of voluntary Agents, and he instanceth in a natural Agent, we speak of the yielding of the will, and he instanceth in the yielding of an anvil. Secondly, it doth not come home to his assertion, because when a feather is laid upon an anvil of Diamant, yet it toucheth it, and by assiduous touching, something may be done. As we see how drops of rain do wear the heard stones. And Pliny telleth that flints have been worn with the feet of Ants. But to think the chattering of a Pie, or the shaking of an Aspen leaf should move the whole World, when the greatest Earthquakes are not felt many leagues, is incredible.  
Neither do I believe that the first touch of his feather doth make an anvil of Diamant to yield. I believe the Scholar put a fallacy of composition and division upon him. All the parts being conjoined do make the whole, and so have their proportionable part of the efficacy in the production of all effects, which are produced to the whole, be it the breaking of an anvil of Diamant, or whatsoever else. But the parts being divided and subdivided into grains and lesser quantities, though they still have their proportionable weight towards the producibility of the same effect, if they were conjoined; yet it is not necessary that being so divided they shall actually produce the same part or proportion of the former effect. It is not universally true, that the patient suffers so much as the Agent acts. The reason is because quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis; That which receiveth doth not receive according to the force of that which makes the impression, but according to its own capacity of receiving. The first drop of water taketh away part from a piece of clay, but an hundred drops fall before a stone doth yield, or actually lose the least particle, though the first drop may affect the stone and prepare it. Suppose one scale of a balance to have a weight in it of a pound, which depresseth the scale to the ground: Put into the other scale a weight of two pounds, it lifteth up the other scale and sinketh that down: But take away the two pound weight, and put into the place of it a feather or a grain, and try if it will lift up the scale proportionably. Not at all, no more than if it were nailed to the ground. It were not well argued to say, An Elephant can carry a Castle a league, therefore a fly can carry it such a proportion of the way; yet I commend his discretion for choosing such an instance, wherein he cannot be contradicted by experience. If a man could live until the revolution of Plato's year, and the feather not be consumed in all that time, he might still plead as he may do now, that the feather had worn the Diamant something, but it was invisible.  
To make his new paradox good, he telleth us a tale of a tub, That if a great tun (suppose 
Or a falling drop move the whole World.  the great tun at Heydelberg,) were filled with water, one little particle (suppose a drop, or the hundredth part of a drop) being moved, all the rest would be moved also, but the greatness of the tun altereth not the case. And therefore the same would be true, if the whole World were the tun. I answer first, The case is not like. A tun of water is one continued body apt for motion, but the World is full of contiguous bodies of all sorts, which are more apt to terminate an easy motion, than to continue it. Secondly, I deny that the least particle of water, suppose the hundredth part of a drop, falling into a great tun of water, doth move all the water in the tun. The first particle moves the second, but more weakly than itself was moved, the second moves the third, yet more weakly, the third moveth the fourth still more weakly, and so successively, until the motive power cease altogether, before the hundredth, or it may be the thousandth part of the water in the tun be moved. As we see in a stone thrown upwards, the motion is swifter or slower, of longer or of lesser continuance, according to the degree of the first impression of force, and the figure of the thing cast upwards, which ceasing by continued diminution, the motion ceaseth. Violent motioris are vehement in the beginning, remiss in the middle, and cease in the end. Lastly I answer, That the case of a great tun and the whole World, is not the same: The World is too large a Sphere, and exceedeth the activity of poor little weak creatures, which are not able to leave such an impression of might, as should move upwards to the convex superficies of Heaven, and downwards to the centre of the Earth, and round about to the extremities of the World. If this were true, the fly might say in earnest, See what a dust I do raise. It hath been given out that the burning of our heathes in England did hurt their vines in France. This had been strange, yet not so strange as his paradox, That the least motions that are, are communicated to the whole World. But wise men looked upon this pretence as a mere scarecrow or made dragon: The hurt it did was nearer home, to destroy the young moorepowtes, and spoil some young Burgesses game.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 22.  
HE cannot imagine how the question, Whether 
Power of objects concerneth the moral Philosopher.  outward objects do necessitate or not necessitate the will; can any way be referred to moral Philosophy. That is his fault. If the objects do necessitate the will, they take away both virtue and vice; that is, moral good and moral evil, which consist in pre-election, and cannot stand with antecedent necessitation to one. To reform his error, let him consult with Aristotle. Those things that are fair and pleasant do seem to be violent after a sort, because being without us, 
Eth. l. 3 c. 2.  they move and necessitate Agents to act with their beauty and delight; but it is not so. What he addeth that the Principles of moral philosophy are the laws, is an absurd supposititious obtrusion of the municipal law, in place of the law of right reason, which error hath formerly been sufficiently refelled. And to his horse that is lame from some cause that was not in his power; I answer, That the lameness is a natural or accidental defect in the horse; but to instance in an horse as a fit subject of virtue or vice, is a moral defect in him. If he desire to speak to the purpose, he must leave such impertinencies.  
In the next Animadversion, I meet with 
Still he seeketh to obtru de hypothetical necessity for absolute.  nothing but a mere sawing of the wind, or an altercation about nothing. All the difference between him and me is, concerning an antecedent necessity, but of a necessity of consequence, that when a thing is produced it must necessarily be so as it is, there can be no-question between us. He himself confesseth as much, If the Bishop think that I hold no other ne 
Num. 1.  cessity than that which is expressed in that old foolish rule [Whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is,] he understandeth me not: And he confesseth that the necessity which he maintaineth is, an antecedent necessity, derived from the beginning of time. And yet nevertheless, 
Num. 3.  a great part of that altercation which he makes in these Animadversions, is about such a necessity. Socrates confesseth that naturally he had vicious inclinations. This is no more than a proclinity to evil. If by his own condescension he fall into sin, this is but an hypothetical necessity, yet he maketh it an antecedent necessity. Socrates by his good endeavours reformeth his vicious propensions, and acquireth the contrary habits or virtues. This is but an hyothetical necessity, yet he pretendeth it to be antecedent. Lastly, Socrates by the help of these habits which he himself had acquired, doth freely do virtuous actions. Still here is no necessity but consequents, and still he pretendeth to Antecedent. Either (saith he) these habits do necessitate the will, or the will followeth not. If these habits or somewhat else do not necessitate the will, it may follow freely. But saith he, If they do only facilitate men to do such acts, than what they do they do not. I deny his consequence, acquired habits are not solitary, but social and adjuvant causes of virtuous actions.  
His next error is yet more gross, making the person of the Preacher, and not the sound 
Hearing & speaking all one with T. H.  of his voice, to be the object of hearing: Adding, that the Preachers voice is the same thing with the hearing, and a fancy of the hearer. Thus (as commonly their errors spring from confusion) he confoundeth the images of sounds with sounds themselves. What then is the report of a Canon, or the sound of a Trumpet turned to a mere fancy? By the same reason he may say, that the Preacher himself is nothing but a mere fancy: There is as much ground for the one as for the other. If he go on in this manner, he will move me beyond smiling, to laugh outright. In what sense the object of sight is the cause of sight, and in what sense it is not the cause of sight, I have showed distinctly. Here he setteth down another great paradox, as he himself styleth it out of gallantry, That in all the sens●… the object is the Agent. If he had not said the Agent, which signifieth either the sole Agent, or the Principal Agent, but only an Agent, we had accorded so far. But the Principal Agent in all the senses is the creature endowed with sense, or the sensitive soul perceiving and judging of the object by the proper Organ. The Preachers voice and the Auditos hearing have two distinct subjects, otherwise speaking should be hearing, and hearing speaking. I conclude this Castigation with the authority of as good a Philosopher as himself, That it is ridiculous to think 
Eth. l. 3. c. 2.  external things either fair or delightful to be the causes of humane actions, and not rather him who is easily taken with such objects.  
In the later part of this Animadversion his errors are greater, and more dangerous 
There are other motions than local.  than in the former. He affirmeth that the will is produced, generated, and form, in such sort as accidents are effected in a corporeal subject; and yet it (the will) cannot be moved. As if generation, and augmentation, and alteration, were not kinds of motion or mutation. But the last words, because it goeth not from place to place, do show plainly, that he acknowledgeth no motion but local motion. What no other natural motion but only local motion? no metaphorical motion? that were strange. We read in holy Scripture of those who have been moved with fear, moved with envy, moved with compassion, moved with choler, moved by the Holy Ghost. In all these there is no local motion. Outward persuasives, inward suggestions, are all motions. God moveth a man to good by his preventing grace. The devil moveth a man to sin by his temptations. There are many kinds of motions, besides moving from place to place. He himself confesseth in this Section that we are moved to prayer by outward objects.  
In the next place, supposing there were no 
Spirits moved as well as bodies.  other motions than local motions, yet he erreth in attributing no motion to any thing but bodies. The reasonable soul is moved accidentally, according to the motion of the body. The Angels are spirits or spiritual substances, no bodies, by his leave, and yet move locally from place to place. Jacob sees the Angels of God ascending and descending. The Angels came and ministered unto Christ; The Angels shall gather the elect from the one end of Heaven to the other. The soul of Lazarus was born by the Angels into Abraham's bosom. God sent his Angel to deliver Peter out of prison, and every where useth his Angels as ministering spirits.  
Thirdly, he erreth in this also, That nothing 
Both bodies and spirits move themselves.  can move, that is not moved itself. If he mean that all power to move is from God, he speaketh truly, but impertinently: But if he mean (as he must mean if he mean sense) that nothing moveth which is not moved of some second cause, he speaketh untruly. The Angels move themselves; all living creatures do move themselves by animal motion. The inanimate creatures do move themselves, heavy bodies descending downwards, light bodies ascending upwards, according to their own natures. And therefore nature is defined to be an internal cause or principle of motion and rest, etc. And even they who held that whatsoever is moved is moved by another, did limit it to natural bodies, and make the form to be the mover in natural motion, and the soul in animal motion.  
His last error in this Animadversion (and a dangerous one,) is, That it is not truly said, 
Quality infused by God.  that acts or habits are infused by God, for infusion is motion, and nothing is moved but bodies. I wish for his own quiet and other men's, that he were as great an enemy to errors and innovations, as he is to metaphors and distinctions. Affectation of words is not good, but contention about words is worse. By such an argument a man might take away all Zones and Zodiac in Astronomy, Modes and Figures in Logic, Cones and Cylindres in Geometry; for all these are borrowed terms, as infusion is. What Logician almost doth not distinguish between acquired habits and infused habits? If all infusion be of bodies, than he never infused any paradoxical principles into his Auditors. When any difference doth arise about expressions, the only question is, Whether there be any ground in nature for such an expression. He himself telleth us, That faith and repentance are the gifts of God. To say they are the gifts of God, and to say they are infused by God is the same thing, saving that to say they are infused by God, is a more distinct, and a more significant expression. I hope he will not control the language of the Holy Ghost, I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh. No, 
Joel 2.  (saith T. H.) that cannot be, nothing can be poured out but bodies. Saint Peter telleth us otherwise, This jesus being exalted by the 
Acts 2. 33.  right hand of God, hath shed forth this which ye now see and hear. That was the gift of tongues, an act or habit infused. That which was shed forth or effused on God's part, was infused on their part. So saith Saint Paul, The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts 
Rom. 5. 5.  by the Holy Ghost: Again, He saveth us by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the 
Tit. 3. 6.  Holy Ghost, which he shed on us abundantly through jesus Christ, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the word is still the same, signifying an effusion from God, and an infusion into us. All those graces freely given which were infused by the Holy Ghost, and are recited by the Apostle to the 
1 Cor. 12.  Corinthians, are either permanent Habits, or transient Acts.  
In the remainder of this Section, is contained nothing but relapses, and repetitions of his former Paradoxical errors, still confounding the intellectual will, with the sensitive appetite, Liberty with Spontaneity, the Faculty of the will, with the Act of willing, the liberty of reasonable Creatures, with the liberty of mad men and fools. Before he told us, 
Num. 9  That he that can do what he will, hath no liberty at all. Now he telleth us of the liberty of doing what we will, in those things we are able to do, Before he limited the power by the will, now he limitteth the will by the power. I affirmed most truly, That liberty is diminished by vicious habits; which he saith cannot be unnderstood otherwise, than that vicious habits make a man less free to do vicious actions. There is little doubt but he would expound it so, if he were my Interpreter. But my sense and my scope is evident to the contrary, that vicious habits make a man less free to do virtuous actions. He will take notice of no difference between the liberty of a man, and the bias of a bowl.  
Yet in the midst of all these mistakes and Paradoxes, he hath not forgotten his old Thrasonical humour. Where I say liberty is in more danger to be abused, than to be lost; he telleth me, It is a mere shift to be thought not licenced. I had not thought him such a dangerous Adversary, metuent omnes jam te, nec immerito, well, if it be a shift, it is such a shift as all conscionable men do find by experience to be true. And for his silencing of men, impavidum ferient ruinae. I do not fear silencing by him, except his arguments have some occult quality, more than he or I dream of. If a fish could speak, a fish would not be silenced by him in this cause.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 23.  
THere is a double question discussed in this Section. First, Supposing that the will doth always follow the last judgement of the understanding, whether this do take away the liberty of the will. Secondly, Whether the will doth always follow the last judgement of the understanding: both which questions have formerly been discoursed of in this Treatise. For clearing of the former question, it ought to be considered, That although men do ordinarily speak of the understanding, and of the will, as of two distinct Agents, or individual substances, subsisting by themselves; whereof the one understandeth, and the other willeth, partly for the eminence of these two powers, and partly for the clearer and more distinct conception and comprehension of them. And although the practice of all former Divines and Philosophers do warrant us in so doing, yet if we will speak properly and in rigour of speech, the understanding and the will are but two powers, flowing from the reasonable soul. And that the acts of willing 
The understanding and will two powers of the reasonablesoul.  and understanding are predicated most properly of the man, whilst the soul and body are united, Actiones sunt suppositorum, and of the reasonable soul after its separation. And because he suggesteth that this is done for advantage: and that it is not without cause, men use improper language, when they mean to keep their errors from being detected, to let him see that this is the sense of all men, and that this assertion will advantage his cause nothing, I am contented to answer his Animadversions upon this subject in the same phrase that he proposeth them.  
He pleadeth that the election of the free Agent doth necessarily follow his last judgement, and therefore his election is not free. My first answer to this is that determination which he maintaineth, and which taketh away freedom and liberty, is extrinsical and antecedent. But the determination of the Agents election by his judgement, is intrinsecall, made by himself, and concomitant, being together in time with the election. To this now he replieth, That the will and the last dictate of the understanding, are produced in the same instant; but the necessity of them both was antecedent before they were produced: At when a stone is falling, the necessity of touching the earth is antecedent to the touch itself, unless it be hindered by some contrary external motion, and then the stop is as necessary as the proceeding would have been.  
To this I give three clear solutions. First, That his instance of the stone is altogether 
Man's willing is not like a falling stone.  impertinent, the stone is a natural Agent, the man is a voluntary Agent; Natural Agents act necessarily and determinately; Voluntary Agents act freely and undeterminately. The stone is determined to its motion downwards, intrinsically by its own nature, that is, by the weight or gravity of it, but he maketh the will of the free Agent, to be determined extrinsecally by causes without himself.  
Secondly, There is not the like necessary or determinate connexion, between the will and its antecedent causes, as is between the stone falling, and its touching the ground. It was in the power of the man to deliberate or not deliberate, to elect, or not elect, but it is not in the power of the stone, to fall, or not to fall. So the motion of the stone was determined to one antecedently in its causes, but the elective will of man is not determined to one antecedently in its causes, until the man determine himself by his choice.  
Thirdly, Though the stone be not such a free undetermined Agent as the man is, and therefore this concerneth not liberty: yet he himself confesseth, that casually it may be hindered from touching the ground, unless it be hindered by some contrary external motion. So the stones touching of the ground, is necessary only upon supposition, unless it be hindered. But that necessity which he maintaineth, is a necessity antecedent, which cannot possible be otherwise. But there is this difference between the man and the stone, That the thing supposed [to deliberate or not deliberate] is in the power of the man, but the thing supposed [to be hindered or not hindered] is not in the power of the stone.  
He pleadeth further, That supposing the 
Absolute necessity admitteth no contrary supposition.  stone be hindered, than the stop is necessary. So still there is necessity. Nay by his favour, if the event be necessary to fall out this way upon one supposition, and necessary to fall out another way upon a contrary supposition, than there is no absolute or antecedent necessity at all, for absolute necessity admitteth no such contrary suppositions, absolute or antecedent necessity, being that which cannot possibly be otherwise.  
My second answer was negative, That the free Agent in electing doth not always choose what is best or most convenient, in his judgement. He affirmeth that I say this is but a probable opinion, nay I said it was probable at the least: and if he press me further, I say it is 
A man may will contrary to the dictate of reason.  but too evident. Otherwise there should be no sin against conscience, for what is conscience but the practical judgement, or dictate of reason, concerning things to be done, or to be shunned, here and now, with these or those circumstances. And such a man is truly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 condemned by himself. A man who hath two dishes of meat set before him, the one more agreeable to his health, the other more pleasing to his palate, may, and, many times, doth choose the later and the worse, his judgement at the same time disallowing it. Saint Paul confesseth that he had done that which he 
Rom. 7. 15.  allowed not. He saith it is impossible for a man to will any thing which appeareth not first in his understanding to be good for him. That is very true, but it cometh not home. If he would speak to the purpose, he should say, It is impossible for a man to will any thing which appeareth not in his understanding to be best for him. But this is false. As suppose one thing appear to a man to be honest, that is one good: Another thing appeareth to be delightful, that is another good. Every man knoweth in his own judgement and conscience, That that which is honestly good, is better than that which is delightfully good; yet men often choose pleasure before honesty, their conscience at the same time accusing them for it.  
I said a man is bound to follow his conscience, as the last practical dictate of reason. There is no doubt of it. The Scripture is plain, He ihat doubteth is damned if he eat, because 
Ro. 14. 23.  he eateth not of faith, for whatsoever is not of faith (that is to say, is not done upon a firm resolution that it is lawful) is sin. Reason is as plain, all circumstances must concur to make an action good, but one single defect 
An erroneous conscience obligeth, first to reform it, then to follow it.  doth make it evil. The approbation of conscience is required to every good action, and the want thereof maketh it sinful; not simply in itself, but to that person, at that time. He excepteth That a man ought not to follow the dictate of his understanding when it is erroneous. That is most true with this limitation, Wherein it is erroneous, or as it is erroneous. But there is an expedient for this in Case-divinity, which I easily believe he did never meet with. He who hath an erroneous conscience is doubly obliged: first to reform it, and then to follow it. The dictates of right reason ought ever to be followed, and erroneous reason ought ever to be reform, and made right reason.  
I said that reason was the true root of liberty, 
Reason is the true root of liberty.  That is plain, The object of the will is good, either real or apparent. And a man cannot will any thing as good, but that which he judgeth in his understanding to be good. Nothing can affect that which it doth not know. And therefore reason must of necessity be the root of Liberty. This he taketh to be contradictory to what I say here, That actions and objects may be so equally circumstantiated, or the case so intricate, that reason cannot give a positive sentence, but leaves the election to liberty or chance. How then (saith he) can a man leave that to liberty when his reason can give no sentence? And if by chance I mean that which hath no causes, I destroy Providence; if that which hath causes, I leave it to necessity. So where I say That reason cannot give a positive sentence, he maketh me say, That reason can give no sentence. There is a great difference between these two. The Judge's name three men to the Sherifwick of of a County, Here is a nomination or judgement, but not yet positive. The King picks one of these three, than the nomination or judgement is positive. So reason representeth to the free Agent, or the free Agent judgeth in his understanding three means to obtain one end, either not examining, or not determining any advantage which one mean hath above another. Here is an indefinite judgement for three good means, though it be not positive for any one more than the rest. In this case the will or the free Agent chooseth one of these three means as good, without any further examination which is best. Reason is the root of liberty in representing what is good, even when it doth give no positive or determinate sentence what is best. I am neither so vain to think there is any thing that hath a being, which hath not causes, nor so stupid on the other side, as to think that all causes are necessary causes. Chance proceedeth neither from the want, nor from the ignorance, but from the accidental concurrence of causes.  
His next charge is, That it is false that 
Actions may be equally circumstantiated.  actions may be so equally circumstantiated that reason cannot give a positive (that is, a determinate) sentence. Yet he confesseth, that in these things elected, there may be an exact equality. If he did not confess it, it is most evident in itself, as appeareth in my former instance of two plasters of equal virtue: Or if he please in two pieces of gold of the same stamp, weight, and alloy, sent to one man upon condition to choose the one, and leave the other. He judgeth them both to be good, and is not such a fool as they are who say, that he would hang in a perpetual equilibrium, and could choose neither, for want of determination, which was best. Therefore he chooseth one of them, without more to do. But he saith, There may be circumstances in him that is to elect, that he do not spend time in vain or lose both. It is true there are reasons to move him to elect, because they are both good, but there are no reasons to move him to elect the one rather than the other, this rather than that, or that rather than this, but only the will of him that electeth, all things being so equally circumstantiated, that reason can give sentence for them both as good, but not for the one positively and determinately, as better than the other. Whatsoever is good is the object of the will, though it be not always the best.  
I said that reason doth not weigh every individual object or action to the uttermost grain. He pleadeth in answer, True, but does it therefore follow, a man gives no sentence? The will may follow the dictate of the judgement, whether the man weigh or not weigh all that might be weighed. I acknowledge it, but he mistaketh the scope of my argument. The less exactly that reason doth weigh actions or objects, the less exactly it doth determine the free Agent, but leaveth him as in a case of indifferency, or having no considerable difference, to choose what he will as being not much material, or not at all material, whether he choose the one part or the other.  
Passions and affections (saith he) prevail often against wisdom, but not against the judgement 
Passions often pre●…ile a●…inst rea●….  or dictate of the understanding. The will of a peevish passionate fool doth no less follow the dictate of his nuderstanding, than the will of a wiser man. He must pardon me, passions prevail not only against wisdom, but against the dictates of reason. It was Medea's passion which dictated to her, that to revenge herself upon her husband was more eligible than the lives of her children: Her reason dictated the contrary. 
— Aliudque cupido,  
Mens aliud suadet; vidio meliora proboque,  
Deteriora sequor.—   
It was St. Peter's fear, not his judgement, which dictated to him to deny his Master. Every man is tempted when he is drawn aside of his own lust, not of his intellectual 
Jam. 1. 13.  judgement. Jacob did not curse his misunderstanding of Simeon and Levi, but their passion. Cursed be their anger, for it was fierce, and their wrath, for it was cruel. As the law is silent among arms, so is reason silent among passions. Passion is like an unruly passenger which thrusts reason away from the rudder for the time. Therefore they use to say that the dominion of reason, or of a reasonable man, over his sensitive appetite, is not despotical, like the government of a Master over his slave, but political like that of a Magistrate over the people, which is often disturbed by seditious tumults and rebellions. Passion is an eclipse of reason, a short madness, the metamorphosis of a man into a wild beast that is gored, which runneth upon every thing that comes in her way without consideration, or like a violent torrent descending down impetuously from a steep hill, which beareth down all respects before it, Divine and humane. Whilst passion is at the height, there is no room for reason, nor any use of the dictates of the understanding, the mind for the time, being like the Cyclopian cave, where no man heard what another said.  
The last part of this Section is not concerning the fortunes of Asia, but the weighing of an horseload of feathers, a light and trivial subject, wherein there is nothing, but a contempt of Schoole-termes without any ground, bold affirmations without any proof, and a continued detraction from the dignity of the humane nature, as if a reasonable man were not so considerable as a Jack-daw. When God created man, he made him a 
Man was created to be Lord of the creatures. Psal. 8. 6.  mean Lord under himself, to have dominion over all his creatures, and put all things in subjection under his feet. And to fit him for this command, he gave him an intellectual soul. But T. H. maketh him to be in the disposition of the second causes; sometimes as a sword in a man's hand, a mere passive instrument; sometimes like a top that is lashed hither and thither, by boys; sometimes like a football, which is kicked hither and thither by every one that comes nigh it; and here to a pair of scales, which are pressed down now one way, than another way, by the weight of the objects. Surely this is not that man that was created by God after his own Image, to be the Governor of the World, and Lord and Master of the creatures. This is some man that he hath borrowed out of the beginning of an Almanac, who is placed immovable in the midst of the twelve Signs, as so many second causes. If he offer to stir, Aries is over his head ready to push him, and Taurus to gore him in the neck, and Leo to tear out his heart, and Sagittarius to shoot an arrow in his thighs  
Yet he tells us boldly, That no man can 
How the understanding giveth to objects their properweight.  understand that the understanding maketh any alteration of weight or lightness in the object; or that reason lays objects upon the understanding. What poor trifling is this, in a thing so plain and obvious to every man's capacity? There can be no desire of that which is not known in some sort; Nothing can be willed but that which is apprehended to be good either by reason or sense, and that according to the degree of apprehension. Place a man in a dark room, and all the rarest objects in the World besides him, he seeth them not, he distinguisheth them not, he willeth them not. But bring in a light and he seeth them, and distinguisheth them, and willeth them, according to their distinct worths. That which light is to visible objects, making those things to be actually seen, which were only potentially visible, that is, the understanding to all intelligible objects, without which, they are neither known nor willed. Wherefore men define the understanding to be A faculty of the reasonable soul, understanding, knowing, and judging all intelligible things. The understanding than doth not alter the weight of objects, no more than the light doth change the colours, which without the help of the light, did lie hid in the dark. But the light makes the colours to be actually seen; So doth the understanding make the latent value of intelligible objects to be apprehended, and consequently maketh them to be desired and willed according to their distinct degrees of goodness. This judgement which no man ever denied to intelligible creatures, is the weighing of objects, or attributing their just weight to them, and the trying of them as it were by the Balance and by the Touchstone. This is not the laying of objects upon the understanding. The understanding is not the patient but the judge, but this is the representing of the goodness or badness of objects to the will, or to the free Agent willing, which relatively to the will, giveth them all their weight and efficacy.  
There may be difference between these two Propositions, Repentance is not voluntary, and by consequence proceedeth from causes; And Repentance proceedeth from causes, and by consequence is not voluntary; if his consequence were well intelligible, as it is not: All acts both voluntary and involuntary do proceed from causes. He chargeth me to have chopped in these words [And therefore.] The truth is, his words were, and by consequence, which I expressed thus [and therefore.] Therefore and by consequence are the very same thing, neither more nor less. Is not this a doughty exception? But the other is his greater error, That Repentance is not voluntary. No Schooleman ever said that the faculty of the will was voluntary, but that the Agent was a voluntary Agent, and the act a voluntary act.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 24.  
HE accuseth me of charging him witly Blasphemy and Atheism. If he be wronged in that kind, it is he who wrongeth himself by his suspicion. 
Blasphmy in the abstract, and in the concrete differ much.  Spr●…ta exolescunt, si irascare, agnita videntur. I accused him not either of Blasphemy or Atheism, in the Concrete. One may say a man's opinions are Blasphemous and Atheistical in the Abstract; without charging the person with formal Atheism or blasphemy. The reason is evident, because it may be, that through prejudice he doth not see the consequences, which other men, whose eyes are not blinded with that mist, do see, and if he did see them, would abhor them as well as they. For this reason, he who chargeth one with speaking or writing implicit contradictions, or things inconsistent one with another, doth not presently accuse him of lying, although one part of a contradiction must needs be false, because it may be the force of the consequence is not evident to 
Aman may know a truth certainly, yet not know the manner.  him.  
A man may know a truth certainly, and yet not know the formal reason or the manner of it so certainly. I know that I see, and I judge probably how I see; yet the manner how I see, whether by sending out beams, or by receiving in the species, is not so evident as ●…he thing itself, that I do see. They who do not agree about the manner of vision, do all agree about the truth of vision. Every man knoweth certainly, that he can cast a stone up into the air, but the manner how the stone is moved after it is separated from the hand, whether it be by some force, or form, or quality impressed into the stone by the caster, or by the air; & if it be by the air, whether it be by the pulsion of the air following, or by the session of the former air, is obscure enough, and not one of a thousand who knoweth the certainty of the thing, knoweth the manner how it cometh to pass. If this be true in natural actions, how much more in the actions of God, who is an infinite being, and not comprehensible by the finite wit of man? The water can rise no higher than the fountains head: A lookingglass can represent the body, because there is some proportion between bodies; but it cannot represent the soul, because there is no proportion between that which is material, and that which is immaterial. This is the reason why we can in some sort apprehend what shall be after the end of the World, because the soul is eternal that way: but if we do but think of what was before the beginning of the World, we are as it were presently swallowed up into an Abyss, because the soul is not eternal that way. So I know that there is true liberty from necessity, both by Divine Revelation, and by reason, and by experience. I know likewise that God knoweth all events from eternity; the difficulty is not about the thing, but about the manner, how God doth certainly know things free or contingent, which are to come in respect of us, seeing they are neither determined in the event itself, nor in the causes thereof. The not knowing of the manner which may be incomprehensible to us, doth not at all diminish the certain truth of the thing. Yet even for the manner sundry ways are proposed, to satisfy the curiosities rather than the consciences of men. Of which this is one way which I mentioned. It were a great madness to reject a certain truth, because there may be some remote difficulty about the manner; and yet a greater madness for avoiding a needless scruple, to destroy all the attributes of God, which is by consequence to deny God himself. His proof of necessity drawn from God's eternal knowledge of all events, hath been sufficiently discussed and satisfied over and over.  
I pleaded that my doctrine of liberty is an 
The Doctrine of liberty an ancient truth.  ancient truth generally received; His opinion of universal necessity, an upstart Paradox, and all who own it may be written in a ring. So I am an old possessor, he is but a new pretender. He answereth, That he is in possession of a truth derived to him from the light of reason: And it is an unhandsome thing for a man to derive his opinion concerning truth by succession from his Ancestor. I answer, That just possession is either by law, or by prescription. I have all laws Divine and Humane, Ecclesiastical and Civil, and a prescription of two thousand years, or at least, ever since Christianity came into the World, for liberty. His opinion of universal Destiny, by reason of a necessary connexion of the second causes, was never the general, nor the common, nor the current opinion of the World; and hath been in a manner wholly buried for sixteen hundred years, and now is first conjured out of its grave by him, to disturb the World. If this be just possession, an Highway robber may plead, possession, so soon as ever he hath stripped an honest Traveller. It is not only no unhandsome thing, but it is a most comely and commendable thing, for a man to derive his religion by the universal approbation of the Christian World, from the purest Primitive Times, throughout all ages, and never to deviate further, from the steps of his Ancestors, than they had first degenerated from their predecessors. And where he telleth us, That the first Christians did not derive Christianity from their Ancestors, It is very true, but very impertinent. For they had not their religion from their own invention or presumption, as he hath his opinions, but by Divine Revelation, confirmed with miracles. When he is able to produce as authentic proof for his Paradoxes, as they did for their religion, he saith something.  
That which he calleth my sc●…rrilous argumentation, he that drinks well, sleeps well. etc. is none of mine, but a common example used in Logic, to show the weakness of such forms of arguings as his is, when the dependence is not necessary and essential, but contingent and accidental; as it is in his argument here. All actions are from God by a general power, but not determinately. The like contingent connexion there is between action and sense: sense and memory, memory and election. This is enough to show the weakness of his argument. But he hath one main fault more, he hath put more in the conclusion than there was in the premises.  
He saith, If by liberty. I had understood only liberty of action, and not liberty of will, it had 
Liberty to will more reconciliable with prescience than liberty to do.  been an easy matter to reconcile it with prescience and the decrees of God. I answer first, That liberty of action, without liberty of will, is but a mock liberty, and a new nothing, like an empty bottle given to a child to satisfy his thirst. Where there is no liberty to will, there is no liberty to act, as hath been formerly demonstrated. Secondly, The liberty to will is as reconciliable with the prescience and decrees of God, as the liberty to act. God's decrees do extend at least as much to acting as to willing. Thirdly, This liberty of acting, without a liberty of willing, is irreconciliable, with all the other attributes of God, his truth, his justice, his goodness, and his power, and setting the decrees of God in opposition one with another. How should a man have a liberty to act, and have no liberty to will, when he cannot act freely, except he will freely, because willing is a necessary cause or means of acting? That which followeth about God's aspect and intuition, is merely a contention about words, and such words as are received and approved by all Authors. God's intuition is not of the same nature with ours; we poor Creatures do stand in need of organs, but God who is a pure simple infinite essence, cannot be made perfecter by organs, or accidents. Whatsoever he seeth or knoweth, he seeth or knoweth by his essence. The less T. H. understood the terms of Aspect and Intuition, the more apt he was to blunder them.  
He pleadeth, If liberty cannot stand with 
How the will of God is the necessity of all things.  necessity, it cannot stand with the decrees of God, of which decrees necessity is a consequent. And he citeth some body without name, who said, The will of God is the necessity of all things. I deny his consequence. Liberty is consistent with God's decrees, though it be not consistent with universal necessity. The reason is plain, because liberty is a consequent of God's decrees as well as necessity. He who said that the will of God was the necessity of all things, was St. Austin. I wish he would stand to his 
Dei. Gen. ad lit. l. 6. c. 15.  judgement, or to his sense of those words. The meaning of those words is not that God doth will that all things should be necessary. But that whatsoever God doth will, that must necessarily be. If he will have all things necessary, than all things must be necessary, If he will have all things free, than all things must be free: If he will have some things necessary, and somethings free, than some things must be necessary, and some things free. When God form man of the dust of the earth, he might have form him either a child or a man, but whether he should be form the one or the other, it was not in the condition of the Creature, but in the pleasure of the Creator, whose will is the necessity of things. What doth this concern the liberty of man? Nothing. It concerned him more to have understood St. Austin's distinction, between 
Ibid. c. 17.  God's will, and his prescience in the same place, What God willeth shall necessarily be, (that is according to an absolute antecedent necessity) What God foreknows, shall truly be, (that is only by a necessity of infallibility) I might produce the whole world against him in this cause. But because he renounced Rumaine authorities, I have been sparing to allege one testimony against him. But to free Saint Austin from all suspicion of concurring, in such a desperate cause, I will only cite one place of an hundred, Neither is that necessity to be feared, which the Stoics fearing, were careful to distinguish 
De Civit. Dei c. 5. c. 10.  the causes of things so, that some they substracted from necessity, some they subjected to necessity. And in those which they would not have to be under necessity, they placed our wills, lest they should not be free if they were subjected to necessity. For if that be to be called our necessity, which is not in our power, but effecteth what it can all though we will not, such as is the necessity of death: it is manifest that our wills, whereby we live well or ill, are not under such a necessity, etc. Here he may find the two sorts of necessity, which we have had so much contention about, the one in our power, which is not opposed to liberty: the other not in our power, that is an antecedent extrinsical necessity, which destroyeth liberty: but he saith that it is manifest, that our wills are not subject to such an antecedent necessity. Here he may see that his friends the Stoics, the great Patrons of necessity, were not for universal necessity as he is, nor did countenance necessity to the prejudice of the liberty of the will.  
Only to permit, and to permit liberty, do not 
What it is to permit only, and to permit barely.  signify the same thing in this place. Only to permit, is opposed to acting, to permit barely, is opposed to disposing. There are many things which God doth not act, there is nothing which God doth not dispose. He acteth good, permitteth evil, disposeth all things both good and evil. He that cutteth the banks of a River, is the active cause that the water floweth out of the Channel: He that hindereth not the stream to break the banks when he could, is the permissive cause; And if he make no other use of the breaking out, it is nuda permissio, bare permission, but if he disposeth and draweth the water that floweth out by furrows, to water the Meadows, then though he permit it, yet he doth not barely permit it, but disposeth of it to a further good, So God only permitteth evil, that is, he doth it not, but he doth not barely permit it, because he disposeth it to good.  
Here he would gladly be nibbling at the questions, Whether universals be nothing but only words, Nothing in the World, saith he, is general, but the significations of words and other signs. Hereby affirming, unawares, that a man is but a word, and by consequence, that he himself is but a titular, and not a real man. But this question is altogether impertinent in this place. We do not by a general influence understand some universal substance or thing, but an influence of indeterminate power, which may be applied either to good or evil. The influence is a singular act, but the power communicated is a general, that is, an indeterminate power, which may be applied to acts of several kinds. If he deny all general power in this sense, he denieth both his own reason, and his common sense.  
Still he is for his old error, That eternity is 
Eternity is no successive duration.  a successive everlasting duration. But he produceth nothing for it, nor answereth to any thing which I urged against it. That the eternity of God is God himself, that if eternity were an everlasting duration, than there should be succession in God; then there should be former and later, past and to come, and a part without a part in God; then all things should not be present to God; then God should lose something, namely; that which is past, and acquire something newly, namely, that which is to come: and so God, who is without all shadow of change, should be mutable, and change every day. To this he is silent, and silence argueth consent.  
He saith, Those many other ways which are proposed by Divines for reconciling eternal prescience with liberty and contingency are proposed in vain, if they mean the same liberty and contingency that I do, for truth and error can never be reconciled. I do not wonder at his show of confidence. The declining sun maketh longer shadows; and when a Merchant is nearest breaking, he maketh the fairest show, to preserve his reputation as long as may be. He saith he knoweth the loadstone hath no such attractive power. I fear shortly he will not permit us to say that a plaster or a plantine leaf draweth. What doth the loadstone then, if it doth not draw? He knoweth that the iron cometh to it, or it to the iron. Can he not tell whether? This is worse than drawing, to make iron come or go. By potentiality he understandeth power or might: Others understand possibility or indetermination. Is not he likelely to confute the Schoolmen to good purpose?  
Whereas I said that God is not just, but 
Why God is said to be justice itself, etc.  justice itself, not eternal, but eternity itself; He telleth me, That they are unseemly words to be said of God, he will not say blasphemous and Atheistical, that God is not just, that he is not eternal. I do not fear that any one Scholar, or any one understanding Christian in the World, should be of his mind in this. If I should spend much time in proving of such known truths, approved and established by the Christian World, I should show myself almost as weak as he doth show himself, to talk of such things as he understandeth not in the least, to the overthrowing of the nature of God, and to make him no God. If his God have accidents, ours hath none; If his God admit of composition and division, ours is a simple essence. When we say God is not just, but justice, not wise but wisdom, doth he think that we speak of moral virtues? or that we derogate or detract from God? No, we ascribe unto him a transcendental justice and wisdom, that is not comprehended under our categories, nor to be conceived perfectly by humane reason. But why doth he not attempt to answer the reasons which I brought, That that which is infinitely perfect, cannot be further perfected by accidents. That God is a simple essence, and can admit no kind of composition; That the infinite essence of God can act sufficiently without faculties; That it consisteth not with divine perfection to have any passive or receptive powers. I find nothing in answer to these, but deep silence. Attributes are names; and justice and wisdom are moral virtues: but the justice, and wisdom, and power, and eternity, and goodness, and truth of God, are neither names nor moral virtues, but altogether do make one eternal essence, wherein all perfections do meet in an infinite degree. It is well if those words of our Saviour do escape him in his next Animadversions, I am the truth, Or St. Paul for making Deum and Deitatem, God and the 
Joh. 14. 6. Act. 17. 29. Prov. 8. & 9  Godheads or Deity, to be all one; Or Solomon for personating God under the name of Wisdom in the abstract.  
To prove eternity to be no successive duration, but one indivisible moment. I argued thus: The divine substance is indivisible, but eternity is the divine substance. In answer 
God is indivisible.  to this in the first place, he denyeth the Major, That the divine substance is indivisible. If he had not been a professed Christian, but a plain Stoic, I should not have wondered so much at this answer, for they held that God was corporal. If the divine substance be not indivisible, than it is materiate, than it is corporal, than it is corruptible, than the Anthropomorphites had reason to attribute humane members to God. But the Scriptures teach us better, and all the World consenteth to it, That God is a 
Joh. 4. 24. 1 Tim. 1. 17.  Spirit, that he is immortal and invisible, that he dwelleth in light which no man can approach unto, whom no man hath seen, nor can see. It is inconsistent with the nature of God to be finite; It is inconsistent with the nature of a body to be infinite. The speculations of Philosophors, who had only the light of reason, were not so gross, who made God to be a most simple essence, or simplicity itself. All matter which is the original of divisibility: was created by God, and therefore God himself cannot be material nor divisible.  
Secondly he denyeth the minor, That 
God is eternity itself.  the eternity of God is the divine substance; I proved it from that generally received rule, Whatsoever is in God, is God. His answer is, That this rule hath been said by some men, thought by no man; for whatsoever is thought is understood. Said by some men? Nay, said and approved by all men, that ever had occasion to discourse upon this subject, and received without contradiction as a received principle of Theology. They who say against it, do, wittingly or unwittingly, destroy the nature of God. That which followeth is equally presumptuous, Thought by no man; for whatsoevor is thought is understood. It was too much to censure all the Shoolmen for Pies or Parrots, prating what they did not understand. But to accuse all learned Christians of all Communions, throughout all ages, who have either approved it, or not contradicted it, of not understanding themselves, is too high an insolence. God being an infinite essence, doth intrinsically include all perfection, and needeth not to have his defects supplied by accidents.  
Where I say to day all eternity is coexistent with this day, and to morrow all eternity will be coexistent with to morrow; he inferreth, It is well that his eternity is now come from a nunc stans to be a nunc fluens, flowing from this day to to morrow. It were better, if he would confess that it is a mere deception of his sight, like that of freshwater passengers when they come first to sea, terraeque urbesque recedunt, who think the shore leaveth them, when they leave the shore. It is time that floweth and moveth, not eternity,  
Non tellus Cymbam tellurem, cymba relinquit.  
To conclude this point of eternity and this Section, God gave himself this name, I am 
Exo. 3. 13.  that I am, to show the truth, the simplicity, the independence, and immutability of his essence; wherein there is neither fuit, not erit, hath been, not shall be, but only present, I am. Eternity, only eternity is truly simply, independently, immutably.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 25.  
HIs first contradictions have been handled before, whither I refer the 
Num. 8.  Reader; but because he expresseth his sense more clearly here than there, I will take the liberty to add a few words. I charged him with contradictions, in making Voluntary to presuppose deliberation, and yet making many voluntary acts to be without deliberation. He distinguisheth between deliberation, and that which shall be 
What a Judge judgeth to be indeliberate is impertinent.  construed for deliberation by a judge. Some voluntary acts are rash and undeliberate in themselves; yet the judge judgeth them to be deliberate, because they ought to have deliberated, and had time enough to deliberate, whether the action were lawful or not. First, This answer is a mere subterfuge. The question between us is not what actions are punishable by law, and what are not, but what is deliberation in its own nature, and whether all voluntary actions be deliberate or not; not in order to a trial before a Judge, but in order to the finding out of the truth.  
Secondly, Many of these rash actions do imply no crime. nor are cognoscible before a Judge, as tending only to the Agents particular prejudice, or perhaps no prejudice but advantage. In all these cases, the sentence of the Judge cannot help to reconcile his contradiction.  
Thirdly, The ground of his distinction is not true. The Judge doth not always judge 
And his assertion false.  of such rash acts to be deliberate acts, but judgeth them to have been indeliberate acts, whensoever he findeth them to have been justly destitute of all manner of deliberation. From whence did arise the well known distinction between Manslaughter and Wilful murder in our law. Murder committed upon actual deliberation is held to be done maliciously, [ex malitia sua] But if it proceed out of sudden passion, it is found only Manslaughter. The same equity is observed in the Judicial law. He who did kill another suddenly without enmity, was allowed the benefit of the City of refuge. 
Num. 35.   
Lastly, In many cases the Judge cannot 
A man cannot predeliberate perfectly of contingent events.  judge that the Agent had sufficient time to deliberate, nor that it was his fault that he did not deliberate, for really he had not sufficient time to deliberate. And where he talketh that the judge supposeth all the time after the making of the law to have been time of deliberation, he erreth most pitifully. There needeth little or no time to deliberate of the law. All the need of deliberation is about the matter of fact, and the circumstances thereof. As for example. A sudden affront is put upon a man, which he did not expect, nor could possibly imagine, such as he apprehendeth, that flesh and blood cannot endure, and conceiveth himself engaged in honour, to vindicate it forthwith. This is that which required deliberation, the nature and degree of the affront; the best remedies how to procure his own reparation in honour, the inconveniences that may arise from a sudden attempt, and the advantage which he may make of a little forbearance, with all the circumstances of the accidents. How could he possible deliberate of all these things, before any of these things were imaginable? He could neither certainly divine, nor probably conjecture that ever such an accident should happen. And therefore it remaineth still a gross contradiction in him, to say that voluntary always supposeth deliberation, and yet to confess that many voluntary acts are undeliberate.  
Whereas he saith, That he always used the word spontaneous in the same sense; He mustexcuse me if I cannot assent unto it. In one place he telleth us, That by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding, or else nothing is meant 
Num. 33.  by it. In another place, he telleth us, That 
Num. 8.  to give out money for merchandise is a spontaneous action. All the World knoweth that to buy and sell, doth require consideration.  
He defineth liberty to be the absence of all extrinsical impediments to action: But extrinsical causes are extrinsical impediments, and no man is free (according to his grounds) from the determination of extrinsical causes; Therefore no man is free from extrinsical impediments.  
His answer is, That impediment or hindrance signifieth an oppsition to endeavour; and 
Endeavour is not of the essence of liberty.  consequently extrinsical causes that take away endeavour are not to be called impediments. He is very seldom stable to his own grounds, but is continually interfereing with himself. Now he telleth us that an impediment signifieth an opposition to endeavour; Elsewhere he telleth us, That a man that is tied is not free to walk, and that his bonds are impediments, without any regard to his endeavour. It were mere folly for him to endeavour to walk, who can neither stir hand nor foot. This is not all; He telleth us further, That an inward impediment is not destructive to liberty, 
Num. 29.  as a man is free to go though he be lame. And men do not say, that the river wants liberty to ascend, but the power, because the water cannot ascend. And is not want of endeavour intrinsecal, as well as lameness? Or did he ever hear of a river that endeavoured to ascend up the channel? It is not true therefore that endeavour is of the essence of liberty, or that impediment always signifieth opposition to endeavour. Lastly, extrinsical causes do not always take away endeavour, but many times leave men free to endeavour to obtain those things, which they never do obtain. If extrinsical causes do take away all endeavours but such as are successful, then there should never be any labour in vain. It remaineth therefore upon his own grounds, that extrinsical causes whensoever they do not take away endeavours, are extrinsical impediments and destroy liberty.  
He saith, One may deliberate of that which is 
There may be impediments before deliberation be done.  impossible for him to do. True, if he apprehend it as possible, and judge it to be possible; Or otherwise he is stark mad to deliberate about it. The shutting of the door of the Tennis-court is no impediment to play, until a man have a will to play, and that is not until he have done deliberating. Yes even in the act of deliberation, the finding of the door of the Tennis-court shut, determineth the deliberation, changeth the will, and may be the only impediment which hindereth a man from playing. One may have a will to play before deliberation, sometimes more absolute, out of humour, than after. Many times the last judgement is conditional, as to play if the door be open, and if the court be not taken up beforehand; And if it be shut, or the place taken up, then to go to bowls, or some other exercise.  
Wheresoever the judgement is so indifferent, 
And liberty when it is ended.  to do either this or that, or conditional to do this upon such conditions, it is not the deliberation, or the last judgement that doth determine the liberty of the free Agent, but leaveth him free to choose either part, or to suspend his consent to both parts, pro re nata. So liberty may remain after deliberation is done. Although he did not use these words, sensitive appetite, rational hope, rational fear, irrational passions, nor confound the terms of sufficiency and efficiency, or beginning of being and beginning of working, yet he might confound the thing whereof these terms are but notions; And so he doth.  
All men do understand well enough what secret sympathies and antipathies are, except such as are captious, though men understand not usually why they are, as why one man gapeth at a custard rather than at a pie, and runneth away from a cat rather than from a mastiff. When, I say, it is thus far true, that the action doth follow the thought necessarily, (namely in antipathies and violent passions, which admit no deliberation.) He demandeth how far it is false? I answer, It is false in ordinary thoughts, which are not accompanied with such violent passions. A man thinketh a thousand things in a day accidentally, which he never putteth in execution, nor so much as thinketh them worthy of deliberation.  
No man would have denied that habits do facilitate actions, and render them less difficult and cumbersome, and consequently more easy and more free, but he that meant to make himself ridiculous. He might even as well tell us, That he who gropeth in the dark for every step, is as free to walk, as if it were fair daylight, or that a foundered horse that is afraid to stumble every foot, is as free to go, as he which is sound, and goeth on boldly without fear. But all this abuse groweth from the misunderstanding of liberty. I take it for a power to act or not to act, and he taketh it for an absence of outward impediments. This confounding of words, and the heaping together of Scholastical terms with scorn, because he never understood them, are the chiefest ingred ents in his discourse. I am not ashamed of Motus primó primi, or judicium practicé practicum, or actus elicitus and imperatus; But he hath great reason to be ashamed of his slighting them, which he would not do, but that he never learned them, and so would make a virtue of culpable necessity. He saith he will not contend with one who can use motus primo primi, etc. He is the wiser, to have as little to do with Scholars as he can. His best play is in the dark, where there is no fenceing.  
We both agree that some sudden undeliberated 
Some undeliberated acts may be punishable.  acts are justly punished. His reason is because the Agent had time to deliberate from the instant that he knew the law, to the instant of his action. But I have showed the vanity of this reason, and that it was impossible to deliberate of sudden affronts and injuries which could not be expected or foreseen. But if the occurrences or accidents were such as were foreseen, or whereof the Agent was premonished, and he did deliberate of them; or if it was his own fault or improvidence that they were not foreseen nor deliberated of, than he is punishable, because his predeliberation about some such accident as might probably happen, was a virtual deliberation about this very act, which did afterward happen, though it were not then acted, but only expected; or because he refused or neglected to forearm himself by deliberation against a surprise.  
Here he cavilleth about terms of actual and virtual deliberation, as his manner is. 
Virtual deliberation.  If virtual deliberation be not actual deliberation, it is no deliberation; Adding that I call virtual deliberation, that which ought to have been and was not. He mistaketh the matter. I call virtual deliberation a former deliberation about this very act feared or expected out of providence or premonition, before it was acted, or about some act of the like nature. So it was an actual deliberation; yet not about this very act. But it might have served to have prevented the Agents being surprised, and have had the same virtue as if it had been an actual deliberation about this very accident. Did he never learn nor hear of the distinction in Philosophy between contactus verus, and contactus virtualis, true touching and virtual touching? True touching when the superficies of two bodies are together, so as they can move and be moved mutually. And virtual touching, when the virtue of one body doth extend itself to another. As it is between the Sun and the Earth, the Loadstone and the Iron, the hand of the Caster and the Stone moving upwards in the Air. His argument holdeth as much in all the cases as in this of deliberation. If virtual touching be not true touching, it is no touching: And if virtual motion be not true motion, it is no motion. I shall find English enough at all times to answer him.  
Concerning my instance which he saith, pleasantly, doth stink to the nose of the understanding, I desire him only to read the fifteenth Chapter of Leviticus. I am sure he 
Children not punishable with death.  dare not call that a stinking passage.  
He saith, The Bishop mould make but an ill judge of innocent children. And that he hopeth we shall never have the administration of public justice in such hands as his, or in the hands of such as shall take counsel from him; because I said that if a child before he have the use of reason shall kill a man in his passion, yet because he wanted malice to incite him to it, and reason to restrain him from it, he shall not die for it, in the strict rules of particular justice, unless there be some mixture of public justice in the case. 
— Siego dignus hac contumelia  
Sum maxim, at tu indignus qui faceres tamen.   
If I deserved a reproof, he was a most unfit man to be my reprover, who maintaineth, That no law can be unjust, That in the State of nature it was lawful for any man to kill another, and particularly, for mothers to expose or make away their children at their pleasure. Ita ut illum vel educare vel exponere suo arbitrio & jure possit. De Cive, c. 9 d. 2. That Parents to their children, and Soverigns to their subjects, cannot be injurious, whether they kill them or whatsoever they do unto them. But what is it that I have said? I have delivered no judgement or opinion of mine own in the case. I know what hath been practised by some persons, in some places, at some times. I know what reasons have been pretended for such practices. Sovereign dominion, The law of retaliation, Psal. 137. 8, 9 The common safety, The satisfaction, or contentment of persons or families injuried. But if I have delivered any opinion of mine own, it was on the contrary. Though I affirm not but that it may be sometimes lawful to punish Parents for acts truly treasonable in their posterity with lesser punishments, as loss of liberty, or the loss of the father's estate, which was at the time of the delinquency in the father's power to dispose, that they who will not forbear to offend for their own sakes, may forbear for their posterities sakes. Though I know the practice of many Countries, even in this, to be otherwise. But for death, I know no warrant. Pliny observeth of the Lion, that he preyeth first upon men, more rarely upon women, and not upon children, except he be extremely pressed with hunger.  
Private right and private justice, is between particular men; Public right and public justice, is either between Commonwealths, as in foreign war, or between Commonwealths and Subjects, as in case of Law-giving or civil war. Many things are lawful in the way of public justice, which are not lawful in the way of private justice. But this inquisition hath no relation to our present controversy. My exception, Except there be some mixture of public justice in the case, is as much as to say, Unless there be some thing more in the case, that doth nearly concern the safety of the Commonwealth. It is not impossible but before the ordinary age of attaining to the perfect use of reason, a child may be drawn into very treasonable attempts, so far as to act a ministerial part. And in such cases there is a rule in law, Malitia supplet aetatem. He hath confessed here enough to spoil his cause, if it were not spoiled already. That want of reason takes away both crime and punishment, and maketh agents innocent. If want of reason do it, without doubt antecedent extrinsical necessity doth much more do it. How then hath he taught us all this while, That voluntary faults are justly punishable though they be necessary? A child's fault may be as voluntary as a man's. How a child may justly be put to death to satisfy a vow, or to save a great number of people, or for reason of State, I know not. This I do know, That it is not lawful to do evil, that good may come of it.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 26.  
IT seemeth by the Animadversion which T. H. hath in this Section, wherein he maketh, Consideration, understanding, reason, and all the passions (or affections) of the mind to be imaginations. And by some other passages in this Treatise, where he attributeth to bees and spiders, not only election, but also art, prudence, policy, very near equal to that of mankind: And where he denieth to man all dominion over the creatures, making 
Num. 8.  him like a top, or a football, or a pair of scales, and his chiefest difference from brute beasts to consist in his language, and in his hand; And his liberty to consist in an absence 
He knoweth no reason but imagination.  of outward impediments, ascribing to brute beasts deliberation, such as if it were constant, there were no cause to call men more rational than beasts; That he maketh the reason and understanding of men to be nothing else but refined and improved sense, or the sense of brute beasts to include reason.  
It was an old Stoical opinion, that the affections were nothing else but imaginations; but it was an old groundless error. Imaginations proceed from the brain, affections from the heart. But to make reason and understanding to be imaginations, is yet grosser. Imagination is an act of the sensitive fantasy, Reason and understanding are proper to the intellectual soul. Imagination is only of particulars, Reason of universals also. In the time of sleep or some raging fit of sickness, when the imagination is not governed by reason, we see what absurd and monstrous and inconsistent shapes and fancies it doth collect, remote enough from true deliberation. Doth the Physician cure his Patient by imaginations? or the Statesman govern the Commonwealth by imaginations? or the Lawyer determine differences by imaginations? Are Logical arguments reduced into due form, and an orderly method, nothing but imaginations? Is prudence itself turned to imagination? And are the dictates of right reason which God hath given as a light to preserve us from moral vices, and to lead us to virtuous actions, now become mere imaginations? We see the understanding doth often contrary and correct the imaginations of sense. I do not blame the puzzled Schoolmen if they dissented from such new-fangled speculations.  
And the ground of all these vain imaginations is imagination. As any man may perceive as easily as he can look into his own thoughts. His Argument may be thus reduced, That which we imagine is true, but we imagine all these to be imaginations. I deny both his propositions.  
First, Our imaginations are not always true, but many times such as are suggested to us by our working fantasies upon some sleight grounds, or by our fond or deceitful instructers, or by our vain hopes or fears. For one Whittington, that found his imagination to prove true, when the Bells rang him back to his Master, Turn again Whittington, thou shalt be Lord Mayor of London, a thousand have been grossly abused by their vain imaginations.  
Secondly, No man can imagine any such thing who knoweth the difference between the reasonable and the sensitive soul, between the understanding and the fantasy, between the brain and the heart, but confident assertions & credulity may do much among simple people. So we have heard or read of some who were contented to renounce their eyesight, and to affirm for company, that they saw a Dragon flying in the air, where there was not so much as a Butterfly, out of a mannerly simplicity, rather than to seem to doubt of the truth of that, which was confirmed to them by the testimony and authority of such persons, whose judgement and veracity they esteemed.  
We have had enough of his understanding understandeth, and will willeth, or too much unless it were of more weight. What a stir he maketh every other Section about nothing? All the World are agreed upon the truth in this particular, and understand one another well. Whether they ascribe the act to the Agent, or to the form, or to the faculty by which he acteth, it is all one. They know that actions properly are of Individuums. But if an Agent have lost his natural power, or acquired habit, (as we have instances in both kinds) he will act but madly. He that shall say that natural faculties, and acquired habits are nothing but the acts that flow from them, That reason and deliberation are the same thing; (he might as well say that wit and discourse are the same thing) deserveth no other answer but to be slighted.  
That a man deliberating of fit means to obtain his desired end, doth consider the means singly and successively, there is no doubt. And there is as little doubt that both the inquiry, and the result or veredict may sometimes be definite, or prescribe the best means, or the only means, and sometimes indefinite, determining what means are good, without defining which are the best, but leaving the election to the free Agent.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 27.  
I Do not know what the man would have done, but for his trifling homonymy about the name of Will, which affoardeth him 
The faculty of willing is the will.  scope to play at fast and loose between the faculty and the act of willing: We ended with it in the last Section, and we begin again with it in this Section. The faculty of the will (saith he) is no will, the act only which he calleth volition is the will. As a man that sleepeth hath the power of seeing and seeth not, nor hath for that time any sight, so also he hath the power of willing, but willeth nothing, nor hath for that time any will. 
— Quantum est in rebus inane?   
What profound mysteries he uttereth, to show that the faculty of willing, and the act of willing, are not the same things? Did ever any Creature in the World think they were? And that the faculty doth not always act. Did ever any man think it did? Let him leave these impertinencies, and tell us plainly, whether the faculty of willing, and the act of willing, be not distinct things; And whether the faculty of the will be not commonly called the will by all men but himself; and by himself also, when he is in his lucidae intervalles. Hear his own confession, To will, to elect, to 
Num. 20.  choose, are all one, and so to will is here made an act of the will; and indeed, as the will is a faculty or power of a man's soul, so the will is an act of it according to that power. That which he calleth the faculty here, he calleth expressly the will there. Here he will have but one will, there he admitteth two distinct wills. [to will is an act of the will.] Here he will not endure that the faculty should be the will, there he saith expressly, That the will is a faculty. All this wind shaketh no Oats. Whatsoever he saith in this Section, amounteth not to the weight of one grain.  
If he had either known what concupiscence doth signify, which really he doth not, or 
Of concupiscence.  had known how familiar it is (both name and thing) in the most modest and pious Authors, both Sacred and profane, which he doth not know, he would have been ashamed to have accused this expression, as unbecoming a grave person. But he, who will not allow me to mention it once to good purpose, doth take the liberty to mention it six times in so many lines to no purpose. There hath been an old question between roman-catholics and Protestants, Whether concupiscence without consent, be a sin or not. And here cometh he, as bold as blind, to determine the difference, committing so many errors, and so gross, in one short determination, that it is a shame to dispute with him; thrashing those Doctors sound, whom he professeth to honour and admire, not for ill will, but because he never read them. He maintaineth that which the Romanists themselves do detest, and would be ashamed of: As first, That concupiscence, without consent, is no sin, contrary to all his much admired Doctors. Secondly, That there is no concupiscence without consent, contrary to both parties, which we use to call the taking away the subject of the question. Thirdly, That concupiscence with consent, may be lawful, contrary to all men. Though the Church of Rome do not esteem it to be properly a sin, yet they esteem it a defect, and not altogether lawful, even without consent, much less with consent. Fourthly, That concupiscence makes not the sin, but the unlawfulness of satisfying such concupiscence, or the design to prosecute what he knoweth to be unlawful. Which last errors are so gross, that no man ever avowed them before himself. When lust hath conceived, 
Jam. 1. 15.  it bringeth forth sin, that is, when a man hath consented to the suggestion of his own sensuality. Though he scorn the Schoolmen, yet he should do well to advise with his Doctors, whom he professeth to admire, before he plunge himself again into such a Whirly-pool.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 28.  
IF I should give over the well known terms of the rational or intellectual will, so well 
Of the intellectual●… and sensitive appetite.  grounded in nature, so well warranted by the authority and practice of all good Divines and Philosophers, to comply with his humour or distempered imaginations, I should right well deserve a Babble. The intellectual appetite, and the sensitive appetite, are both appetites, and in the same man they both proceed from the same soul, but by divers faculties, the one by the intellectual, the other by the sensitive; And proceeding from several faculties, they do differ as much as if they proceeded from several souls. The sensitive appetite is organical, the intellectual appetite is inorganical; The sensitive appetite followeth the judgement of the senses; The intellectual appetite followeth the judgement of the understanding: The sensitive appetite pursueth present, particular, corporal delights; The intellectual appetite pursueth that which is honest, that which is future, that which is universal, that which is immortal and spiritual. The sensitive appetite is determined by the object. It cannot choose but pursue that object which the senses judge to be good, and fly that which the senses judge to be evil. But the intellectual appetite is free to will, or nill, or suspend, and may reject that which the senses say to be good, and pursue that which the senses judge to be evil, according to the dictate of reason.  
Then to answer what he saith in particular. The appetite and the will are not always the same thing. Every will is an appetite, but every appetite is not a will. Indeed in the same man, appetite and will is the same thing. (secluding natural appetite which concerneth not this question) but the sensitive appetite, and the intellectual appetite are not the 
Not the same thing.  same thing, following several guides, pursuing several objects, and being endowed with several privileges. He demandeth whether sensual men and beasts do not deliberate and choose one thing before another, in the same manner that wise men do? Although he hath found out a brutish kind of deliberation; if we take the word in the right sense, beasts cannot deliberate. Sensual men may deliberate, but do not deliberate as they ought. And by consequence beasts act necessarily, and cannot choose: Sensual men do choose, or may choose, but do not choose as they ought, not as wise men do. He saith it cannot be said of wills that one is rational, another sensitive. Not very properly; but it may be said of appetites, That one is rational, another sensitive. And why not a rational will, as well as a rational discourse. The will of a rational Creature, rationally guided, is a rational will; And so will be when we are dead and gone.  
He concludeth, If it be granted that deliberation is always, (as it is not) there were 
His deliberation is no deliberation.  no cause to call men rational more than beasts, for it is manifest by continual experience, that beasts do deliberate. Such a deliberation as he phancieth is not worth contending for, good for nothing but to be thrown to the Dogs, or the Swine, An alternate imagination, alternate hope and fear, an alternate appetite. Here is an heap of alternates, every one unlike another, and all of them as far distant from deliberation, as reason is from sense. Imagination is seated in the head, fear and hope in the heart: Appetite is neither the one nor the other. Yet this is all the deliberation, and all the reason which he attributeth to man; and he attributeth the same to bruit beasts, but not at all times. If they had this deliberation at all times, there were no cause to call men rational more than beasts. So the difference between a man and a beast is this, That men, or rather some men, are reasonable Creatures at all times, thanks to their own industry: and bruit beasts are reasonable creatures at some times. If he had said that some men are but reasonable Creatures at sometimes, I should rather have believed him for this discourse.  
He is beholden to his Catachrestical expressions, for all the rest of his discourse in this Section. I take Liberty to be a power of the rational soul, or of the free Agent to choose or refuse indifferently, upon deliberation. And he maketh liberty to be no more than the bias of a bowl, a strong inclination to one side, affixed by deliberation. And by this abusive expression he thinketh to avoid the two arguments which were brought against him in this Section.  
The former argument was this, If every Agent be necessitated to act what it doth 
His liberty no true liberty.  act by extrinsecall causes, than he is no more free before deliberation, than after, which is demonstratively true of true liberty, but applying it to his new-fangled acception of liberty; He answereth, He is more free, but he is no less necessitated. Yet withal he confesseth that he is necessitated to deliberate as he doth, and to will as he doth; That is to say, He is necessitated to be free. This is a freedom of a free stone, not of a free man. If this be all the freedom which a man hath, we must bid adieu to all election. Then there is neither freedom of our will, nor of our actions, more than an inclination extrinsecally necessitated. And then all those absurdities which he hath sought so earefully to avoid, tumble upon his head thick and threefold.  
The second argument was this, Deliberation doth produce no new extrinsecall impediment, therefore either the Agent is free after deliberation, or he was not free before. He answereth, That he cannot perceive any more force of inference in these words, then of so many words put together at adventure. I wonder at his dulness. He defineth liberty to be an absence of extrinsical impediments. If this definition be true, then wheresoever there is the same absence of extrinsical impediments, there is the same liberty. But if deliberation produce no new extrinsical impediments, there is the same absence of extrinsical impediments, after deliberation which was before. Therefore upon his grounds there is the same liberty after deliberation which was before.  
What he telleth of thoughts that arise in him that deliberateth, is nothing to the purpose, The last judgement is more than bare thoughts. But this maketh but an intrinsical determination, and a necessity upon supposition, not an extrinsical determination, and an antecedent necessity, of which the question is between him and me. A man cannot have liberty to do or not to do, that which at the same time is already done. But a man may do that which he doth freely from all antecedent necessity; and necessity upon supposition, is not destructive to liberty. He profaneth the name of God, who maketh him to be corporal and divisible, to be compounded of substance and accidents, to be mutable, and to aquire and lose daily; not he who argueth soberly and submissively from the attributes or works of God.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 29.  
HE hath given a proof lately of his Theology, now he pretendeth to show his skill in Logic and Philosophy. 
His definition of liberty.  He needeth not to tell us that he acquired his knowledge by his own meditation, he is so long fumbling and spelling of every word. In the first place he giveth us the definition of a definition. A right definition is that, (what? a right definition without a Genus?) which determineth the signification of the word defined. This definition agreeth as much to a Lexicon, as to a definition. By his leave, a right definition is an explication of the thing defined by the essential terms; those are the Genus and the difference.  
His definition is but a poor description. He confesseth, That the rule is good in defining to use first some general term, and then to restrain the signification thereof, etc. He is but learning to spell in Logic, and yet is already censuring. It is no marvel if he never thrive of the trade. It is not only good, but a necessary rule, that in every perfect definition there be two notions; the one more common, wherein the thing defined doth agree with other things, the other more distinct, wherein it differs from all other things. This was Plato's doctrine, and Aristotle's, and received by all Logicians ever since; and now he taketh upon him to be Judge of it, as Midas judged of Apollo's music.  
He dislikes the terms, Genus and Difference, as too obscure for English Readers, and fitter for Schoolmen, comprehending all Logicians old and new under the name of Schoolmen. Then why doth he himself use the term of Logic, and not rather witcraft, or definition, and not rather declaring? The vulgar Reader will understand his General term no better than genus, nor his new restraint; better than the old difference, but be ready to mistake his restraint of a general term, for the imprisonment of some Commander in Chief. But thus it must be done; first to render the people more benevolent to a man who studieth nothing but their edification, and then to hide his own ignorance.  
He pleadeth, That some words are so general, that they cannot admit a more general. Yea, hath he found out that with his meditation? Every freshman in the University could have told him that, and much more, That omne quod perfecte definitur est species. He saith. I shall give him leave to cite some passages out of his book, de corpore. And he shall give me leave to slight them and let them alone. If he will admit of humane authority, I am ready to bury him and his destiny in an heap of authorities. But for his own authority, I do not esteem it (more than he produceth reason) the value of a deaf nut.  
At length he hath found us out a Genus and a Difference in his definition of liberty, but that I am such a beetle that I cannot see them. His genus is absence of impediments to action. Let him peruse all the tables of the predicaments and predicables, and if he find any such genus there, either summum or sub alternum, he shall be my great Apollo. To make a genus of a privation that is an absence, nay an absence of impediments, was never heard of before, unless it be true in this case bina venena juvant, unless two privatives make one positive, and two negatives one affirmative. His difference or restriction is worse, if worse may be, not contained in the nature of the Agent. So the essential difference is a negative also. His liberty must needs be a rare Jewel, which consisteth altogether of negatives.  
He chargeth me, That I require the matter and the form of the thing in the definition, but 
Analogical matter.  matter is a corporeal substance, and cannot be part of a definition. Whensoever he meddleth with these things, he doth but show his weakness; It were better for him to let them alone. I do not say that genus and materia are all one; But I say that genus hath a great analogy with the first matter, and so may be materia analogica, which Porphyry upon the 
〈◊〉. 4. d. 7.  predicables might have taught him. The first matter is indeterminate to any form, so is the Genus to any difference; The matter is susceptible of opposite forms, so is the Genus of opposite differences. His reason That matter is corporeal, is as silly as his exception, and showeth what a novice he is in Logic. There is intelligible matter, as well as sensible. As three lines are the matter of a triangle, and three propositions of a syllogism.  
He telleth us confidently, That a very absence is as real as a very faculty. If he told it twice so confidently, we could not believe it, that a privation which is nothing, and out of all predicaments, should be as real as a quality. Potential qualities ought to be defined by their efficients and proper acts, not by privations. But saith he, What if the word (defined) do signify absence or negation? Then it cannot be defined, but only described. And this description must not be by heaping together more negatives or privations, but by mentioning the habits or powers whereof they are privations. What is this to liberty which is a potential quality?  
I urged that by his definition of liberty a stone is tree to ascend into the air, because 
By his definition a stone is free to ascend.  there is no outward impediment to hinder it. He answered, That the stone is stopped by external impediments, otherwise it would either go upwards eternally, or it must stop itself; but it doth not ascend eternally, and I have confessed that nothing can move itself; And therefore he doubts not but I will confess that nothing can stop itself. First his memory is very slippery. I never said that nothing can move itself: But if that will do him any good, I have often said the contrary. Secondly, he doth but flatter himself with vain hopes to think, that I will say nothing can stop itself. Although there were no resistance in the air, when the casters force is ceased, the weight of the stone alone is sufficient to stop it. Thirdly, there have been those who have thought themselves as good Philosophers as he, who affirmed that the stone did find no resistance in the air, but was driven forwards by the following air towards the air before it to prevent a Vacuum: That is far from resistance. Fourthly, Why might not I say as well, that upon his grounds, a stone is free to ascend into the air, because there is no outward impedidiment to hinder it, as he might say, that the water is free to ascend up the channel; Men never say that the water wanteth liberty to ascend, but power. Yet the water hath greater impediments to ascend up the channel, than the stone hath to ascend in the air. Lastly, this is without all doubt, that though a stone be not capable of moral liberty, yet if liberty were such a thing as he imagineth, by his definition, a stone hath as much liberty to ascend up the air, contrary to its natural appetite, as it hath to descend downwards according to its natural appetite, there being no extrinsical impediment in the one motion more than in the other, the air being more easily, or at least as easily driven upwards as downwards. Yet the stone stoppeth in its ascent, but not in its descent, (except it be accidentally) until it come to the earth.  
To the rest of this Section he maketh an easy reply, That I talk so absurdly of the current of Rivers, and of the motion of the Seas, and of the weight of water, that it cannot be corrected otherwise then by blotting it all out. He mistaketh but one word. It should have been, It cannot be answered by him otherwise than by blotting it all out.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 30.  
ALthough his Paradoxes be contrary to the opinion of the whole World, yet in these five last Sections he hath not brought one argument to prove them, but only explained his meaning, as if his own authority were proof sufficient. Now at last he bringeth two silly arguments. The first is this. Nothing taketh beginning from itself; 
Beginning of motion from the mover.  Therefore the will taketh not beginning from itself, but from something without itself. I answered by distinguishing a beginning into a beginning of being, and a beginning of working or action. No creature taketh its beginning of being from itself, because the being of all creatures is a participated being, derived from the infinite and original being of God, in whom we live and move and have our being. But if he understand a beginning of action, it is a gross error to say, That nothing hath a beginning of its own actions or operations within itself. This is all I said, and this I said constantly. Then how uningenuously did he charge me in the last Section to have confessed, That nothing can move itself? And in this Section accuse me of contradiction, for saying, That when a stone descendeth, the beginning of its motion is intrinsecal. Now to justify himself, he saith, that from this which I did say, That finite things cannot be produced by themselves, he can conclude that the act of willing is not produced by the faculty of willing. If he could do as much as he saith, yet it was not ingenuously done, to feign that I had confessed all that which he thinketh he can prove, & that I contradicted myself, when I contradicted his conclusions. But let us see how he goeth about to prove it. He that 
The same faculty willeth or nilleth.  hath the faculty of willing, hath the faculty of willing something in particular. In good time. This looketh not like a demonstration. But let that pass; And at the same time he hath the faculty of nilling the same. How, two faculties, the one of willing, the other of nilling?. Hola. He hath but one faculty, and that is a faculty of willing or nilling something in particular, not of willing and nilling. He proceedeth, If therefore the faculty of willing be the cause he willeth any thing whatsoever, for the same reason the faculty of nilling will be the cause at the same time of nilling it; And so he shall will and nill the same thing at the same time, which is absurd. I deny his consequence. It doth not follow that because the Agent hath power to will or nill indifferently, therefore he hath power to will and nill contradictorily. He may choose indifferently, whether he will write or not, but he cannot choose both to write and not to write at the same time contradictorily. It doth not follow that because the Agent hath power to will or nill indifferently, before he do actually either will or nill, therefore when he doth will actually, he hath power to nill at the same time. Hath he forgotten that old foolish rule, Whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is? How often must I tell him, that in the place of an absolute antecedent necessity, he seeketh to obtrude upon us hypothetical necessity?  
He proceedeth, It seems the Bishop had forgotten that matter and power are indifferent to contrary forms and contrary acts. No I had not forgotten it, but he had fogotten it: To say that the matter is indifferent to contrary forms, and yet necessitated antecedently to one form, or that power is indifferent to contrary acts, and yet necessitated antecedently to one act, is a rattling contradiction. He saith, That it is somewhat besides the matter that determineth to a certain form, and something 
Other causes concur with the will.  besides the power that produceth a certain act. I acknowledge it, and it is the only piece of sense that is in this Section. I made this objection to myself in my defence, and answered it in these words.  
Yet I do not deny that there are other beginnings of humane actions, which do concur with the will, some outward as the first cause by general influence, which is evermore requisite, Angels or men by persuading, evil spirits by tempting, the object or end by its appetibility; some inward, as the understanding by directing; so passions and acquired habits. But I deny that any of these do necessitate or can necessitate the will of man by determining it physically to one, except God alone, who doth it rarely in extraordinary cases; And where there is no antecedent determination to one, there is no absolute necessity, but true liberty.  
Where he maketh, The beginning of motion in a stone thrown upwards, and a stone descending downwards, to be both in the stone; it is but a poor trifling homonymy, as the most part of his Treatise is. The beginning of motion in a stone ascending is in the stone subjectively, but not effectively, because that motion proceedeth not from the form of the stone. But in the descent of the stone, the beginning of motion is both subjectively and effectively in the stone. And what he telleth us of a former motion in the ambient body, air or water, to make the stone descend, is needless and frustraneous. Let him but withdraw the pin that holdeth the slate upon the house against its natural inclination, and he shall see presently there needeth no motion in the ambient body to make the stone drop down.  
He adviseth me to consider with what grace 
Necessary causes do not always act necessarily.  I can say, that necessary causes do not always produce their effects, except those effects be also necessarily produced. Rather let him consider with what grace he can mis-recite that which I say, by leaving out the word necessary. I said necessary causes do not always produce necessary effects; and I can say that with better grace than he can deny it. When necessary Agents and free Agents are conjoynt in the production of the same effect, the effect is not antecedently necessary. I gave him an instance. Protagoras writ a book against the gods, De dis utrum sint utrum non sint nihil habeo dicere. The Senate ordered his book to be burned for it. Although the fire be a necessary Agent, yet because the Senators were free Agents, the burning of his book was not antecedently necessary.  
Where I say that the will is not a necessary cause of what it willeth in particular action●…, He inferreth, That there are no universal actions, and if it be not a necessary cause of particular actions, it is the necessary cause of no actions; And again, he would be glad to have me set down what voluntary actions (not particular) those are which are necessitated. It is scarcely possible for a man to express himself more clearly than I did, but clearly or unclearly, all is one to him, who is disposed to cavil. I did not oppose particular acts to universal acts, but to a collection of all voluntary acts in general, qua tales, as they are voluntary. It is necessary, That all acts generally which proceed from the will, should be voluntary; and so the will is a necessary cause of voluntary acts, that is, of the voluntariness of them. But the will is not a necessary cause of the particular acts themselves. As upon supposition that a man be willing to write, it is necessary that his writing be voluntary, because he willeth it: But put the case without any supposition, and it is not necessary that he should write, or that he should will to write, because it was in his own power, whether he would write or not. So the voluntariness of all acts in general, proceeding from the will, is necessary, but the acts themselves were not necessary before the free Agent had determined himself; and then but upon supposition.  
His excepting against these common expressions, The will willeth, or the will may either will or suspend its acts, is but seeking of a knot in a bulrush. It is all one, whether one say the will willeth, or the man willeth, or the will may will or suspend its act, or the man may will or suspend his acts. Scaliger saith that volo velle is a proper speech, I will will, and received by the common consent of all nations. If he had any thing of moment to insert into his Animadversions, he would not make use of such Leptologies. Canting is not chargeable upon him, who useth common and known terms of art, but upon him who deviseth new terms, as Canters do, which die with their inventors. He asketh, How can he that willeth at the same time suspend his will? Rather why doth he insert into his demand at the same time. It is enough to liberty, if he that willeth could have suspended his will. All this answer of mine to his second argument was illustrated by the instance of the election of a Pope, to which he opposeth nothing but It may be, and it doth not follow, and I would be glad to know by what arguments he can prove that the election was not necessitated. I have done it sufficiently all over in this Treatise. I am now answering to what he produceth, not proving. If he have any thing to demand, let him go to the Cardinals, and inquire of them, whether they be such fools, to keep such a deal of needless stir, if they were atecedently necessitated to choose one certain man Pope, and no other.   

Castigations of the Animadversion, Num. 31. and Num. 32.  
I Join these two Sections together, because they concern one and the same thing: namely, Whether every sufficient cause do necessarily effect whatsoever it is sufficient for: Or which is the same in effect, Whether a free Agent, when all things are present which are needful to produce an effect, can, nevertheless, not produce it. Which question may be understood two 
Two sor●…s of sufficiency.  ways, either inclusively, or exclusively, either including and comprehending the will of the Agent, under the notion of sufficiency, and among things requisite to the producing of the effect; so as the cause is not reputed to be sufficient, except it have both ability and will to produce the effect, and so as both requisite power, and requisite will, do concur; and then there is no question but the effect will infallibly follow, Posita causa ponitur effectus; or else it may be understood exclusively, not comprehending the will under the notion of sufficiency, or not reckoning it among the necessary requisites to the production of the effect; so as the Agent is supposed to have power and ability to produce the effect, but no will. And then it is as infallibly true on the other side, that the effect cannot be produced. Thus far this question is a mere Logomachy or contention about words, without any real difference. And T. H. doth but abuse his Readers, to keep a jangling and a stir about nothing.  
But in truth the water stopeth not here. If he should speak to the purpose, he should leave these shallows. If the will of the free Agent be included under the notion of sufficiency, and comprehended among those things which are requisite to the production of the effect, so as both sufficient ability, and sufficient will, are required to the making a sufficient cause. Then it cometh to be considered in the second place, whether the will in things external be under God, in the power and disposition of the free Agent himself, which is the common opinion of all men, who understand themselves. And then the production of the effect is only necessary hypothetically, or upon supposition, that the free Agent is willing. Or else, Whether the will of the free Agent be not in his own power and disposition, but determined antecedently by extrinsical causes, which is the paradoxical opinion of T. H. and then the production of the the effect is, absolutely, and antecedently, necessary.  
So still the question is where it was, and all his bustling about sufficiency and efficiency, and deficiency is but labour in vain. If he would have spoken any thing at all to the purpose, he should have attempted to prove that, every sufficient cause (excluding the will) that is, every cause which hath sufficient power and ability, doth necessaryly produce whatsoever it is able to produce, though the Agent be unwilling to produce it; or that the will of the Agent is not in his own power and disposition. We expect proofs, not words. But this he could not do, for he himself in this very Treatise, hath several times distinguished between liberty and power; telling us that a sick man hath liberty to go, but wanteth power; And that a man who is bound hath power to go, but wanteth liberty. If he that is bound hath power to go, than he hath sufficient power to go, for unsufficient power cannot produce the effect. And so by his own confession an Agent may have sufficient power, and yet cannot necessarily, nor yet possibly, produce the effect.  
I urged, That God is sufficient to produce many Worlds, but he doth not produce them; therefore a sufficient cause dorh not necessarily produce all those effects which it is sufficient to produce. He answereth, That the meaning is that God is sufficient to produce them if he will. Doth he not see that it followeth inevitably from hence, That there may be a sufficient cause without will? Doth he not see likewise from hence plainly, that for those things which are within the power of man, he is sufficient also to produce them if he will. So still he would obtrude a necessity of supposition; If a man will, for an absolute necessity. That which is but necessary conditionally, If a man will, is not necessary absolutely. And he confesseth that without this supposition, If he will, a man is not sufficient to produce any voluntary action.  
I added other instances, as this, That the passion of Christ is a sufficient ransom for all mankind, and so is acknowledged by all Christians, yet all mankind shall not be saved by virtue of his passion, therefore there may be a sufficient cause without production of the effect. This is the language of holy 
Luk. 14. 28.  Scripture, Which of you intending to build a Tower, sitteth not down first and counteth the cost, whether he have [sufficient] to finish it? That is, as our Saviour expoundeth himself in the 
2 Cor. 2. 16.  next verse, whether he be able to finish it. So St. Paul saith, Who is sufficient for these things? that is, Who is able for these things? When God 
Isa. 5. 4.  saith, What could I have done more for my vineyard, that I have not done? God had given them sufficient means, and could have given them more, if they had been more capable; but because they were wanting to themselves, these sufficient means were not efficacious. I looked for grapes, saith God; How could God look for grapes, if he had not given them sufficient means to bring forth grapes? yet these sufficient means were not efficacious.  
These things being premised, do answer whatsoever he saith; as this, The Bishop thinks two Horses may be sufficient to draw a Coach, though they will not draw, etc. I say they may be sufficient in point of power and ability, though they will not draw. Many men have sufficient power to do what they will not do. And if the production of the effect do depend upon their wills, or upon their contingent and uncertain endeavours, or if their sufficiency be but conditional, as he maketh it, if they be not lame or resty, than the production of the effect is free or contingent, and cannot be antecedently necessary. For otherwise all these conditions and suppositions are vain.  
Where he chargeth me to say, That the cause of a Monster is unsufficient to produce a Monster, he doth me wrong, and himself more. I never said any such thing. I hope I may have leave to speak to him in his own words. I must take it for an untruth, until he cite the place, where I have said so. I have said, and I do say, That the cause of a Monster was unsufficient to produce a man, which nature and the free Agent intended, but it was sufficient to produce a Monster, otherwise a Monster had not been produced. When an Agent doth not produce what he and nature intend; but produceth a Monster instead of a Man, it is proof enough of his insufficiency to produce what he should, and would have produced, if he could. Where he addeth, That that which is sufficient to produce a Monster, is not therefore to be called an insufficient cause to produce a Man, no more than that which is sufficient to produce a man, is to be called an insufficient cause to produce a Monster, is even as good sense, as if a man should say, He who hath skill sufficient to hit the white, is insufficient to miss the white.  
He pretendeth that sensus divisus, and compositus is nonsense, (though they be Logical terms of art) And what I say of the power of the will to forbear willing, or the dominion of the will over its own acts, or the power of the will in Actu primo, he saith are as wild words, as ever were spoken within the walls of Bedlam, though they be as sad truths as the founders of Bedlam themselves could have uttered. And the Authors who used them, the greatest wits of the World, and so many, that ten Bedlams could not hold them. But it may be he would have the Scene changed, and have the wisest sort of men thrust into Bedlam, that he might vent his Paradoxes more freely. So Festus accused Saint Paul of madness, Paul Paul, much learning hath made thee mad.  
In the definition of a free Agent, Which when all things needful to the production of the effect are present, can nevertheless not produce it. They understood all things needful in point of ability, not will. He telleth us gravely, That Act and Power differ in nothing but in this, That the former signifieth the time present, the later the time to come. As if he should tell us, That the cause and the effect differ nothing, but that the effect signifieth the time present, and the cause the time to come.  
Lastly he saith, That except I show him the place where he shuffled out effects producible, and thrust into their place effects produced, he will take it for an untruth. To content him I shall do it readily, without searching far for it. My words were these, [The question is whether effects producible be free from necessity: He shuffles out effects producible, and thrusts in their places, effects produced.] Now that he doth this, I prove out of his own words in the Section preceding. Hence it is manifest, That whatsoever is produced, is produced necessarily: For whatsoever is preduced, hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had none been. Let the Reader judge if he have not here shuffled effects producible out of the question, and thrust into their places effects produced. The question is whether effects producible be necessarily produced; He concludeth in the place of the contradictory, That effects actually produced, are necessary.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 33.  
HE saith, That to define what Spontaneity, 
Our conceptions are not the touchstone of truth.  Deliberation, Will, Propension, Appetite, a free Agent, and Liberty is, and to prove that they are well defined; there can be no other proof offered, but every man's own experience and memory, what he meaneth by such words. I do readily believe all this to be true, in order to his own opinions; That there neither is, nor can be any proof of them but imagination. But his reason was shot at random; For definitions being the beginning of all demonstration, cannot themselves be domonstrated, that is proved to another man. Doth he take all his particular imaginations to be so many definitions or demonstrations? He hath one conception of Spontaneity, of Deliberation, of a free Agent, of Liberty, I have another. My conception doth not prove my opinion to be true, nor his conception prove his opinion to be true; but our conceptions being contrary, it proveth either his, or mine, or both to be false. Truth is a conformity, or congruity of the conceptions of the mind with the things themselves, which are without the mind, and of the exterior speech as the sign, with the things and conceptions, as the things signified. So there is a threefold truth; The first is objective in the things themselves; The second is conformative in the conceptions of the mind; The third is signative or significative in speech or writing. It is a good proceeding to prove the truth of the inward conceptions of the mind, from their conformity with the things themselves; but it is vain and ridiculous to prove the truth of things from their agreement, with the conceptions of my mind, or his mind. The Clocks may differ, but the course of the Sun is certain. A man's words may not agree with his thoughts, nor his thoughts agree with the things themselves.  
But I commend his prudence in this, and in this only, That he hath chosen out a way of proof that cannot be confuted without his own consent, because no man knoweth another man's inward conceptions but himself. And the better to secure himself, he maketh his English Reader judge of Latin words, and his ignorant Readers judge of words of art. These are the fittest Judges for his purpose. But what if the terms be obscure? He answereth, If the words be unusaal, the way must be to make the definition of their signification by mutual consent. What mutual consent? The signification of these words was settled by universal consent and custom; And must they be unsettled again, to satisfy the homour of every odd Paradoxical person, who could find no way to get himself reputation, but by blondring all things? He telleth us that the Schoolmen use not to argue by rule, but as Fencers use to handle weapons by quickness of the hand and eye, The poor Schoolmen cannot rest quietly in their graves for him, but he is still persecuting their ashes, because they durst presume to soar a pitch above his capacity. The Scool-men were the most exact observers of rules in the whole World, as if they had been composed altogether of rules. But they observed not his rule, That whatsoever any man imagineth a word to be, that it is. Much good may his Lesbian rule do him, which he may bend this way or that way at his pleasure. It is just such another rule as the Parish Clarks rule of the time, who preferred the Clock before a Dial, because he set it according to his own imagination.  
He asketh me (for he is much better at making knots than losing them) what I will answer if he shall ask me how I will judge of the causes of things, whereof I have no idea or conception in mine own mind? As if there were no mean, but either a man must want all inward notions and conceptions, or else he must make his own imaginations to be the touchstone of truth. Nulla lux, and nimia lux, no light, and too much light, are both enemies to the sight. So to take away all inward conceptions, and to ground the true being and nature of things upon our fallible conceptions, are both enemies to the truth.  
Albeit, He dare say (as he is bold enough, whilst the danger is but in words) that if one should ask an ordinary person whether our Antipodes should have their heads upwards or downwards, they would tell him as significantly as any Scholar, that their heads were upwards, because they are towards Heaven; And that when they say there is no body in that room, they mean no more but there is no body that can be seen; Or when they say that vessel is empty, they do apprehend it to be full of air: Yet neither I, nor these ordinary persons themselves do believe him. How should they apprehend such things rightly, until they be better informed both of the figure of the earth, and the nature of the air, than they are by their senses. He saith, The question is not, Whether such and such Tenets be true; but whether such and such words can be well defined, without thinking on the things they signify? I should be glad to find him once stating of a question truly. The question is not whether such and such words can be well defined without thinking on the things they signify; but whether every thought or every imagination of every odd fantastic person, or of the common people, be a right determination of the true sense and signification of every word. They who do not understand the distinct natures of things signified, cannot understand the right significations of words, which are but signs of things.  
Right discipline or learning and good instruction, doth not only enable a man to reason truly in more numerous or various matters, but to reason more truly and exactly in all matters. Yea, even in those things which we have learned from our own senses and memories. As I showed him before in the instance of the Sun, which sense judgeth to be no greater than a ball, but learning and reason do convince us that it is many times greater than the Globe of the Earth. If he will not admit this to be matter of fact, let him try if he can persuade us that it is matter of right. A man's sense and memory doth teach him, that the lightning is long done before the thunderclap begin, but being better instructed we know it to be otherwise. In vain were so may rules and precepts in Logic, if they did not teach us to reason better, as well as to reason in more numerous and various matters.  
He inveigheth against Impostors as bad masters, deceivers or deceived, that teach for truth all that hath been dictated to them by their own interest; And doth not see or will not see, that no man is so much concerned in this reprehension as himself, who without these Paradoxes had continued still a cipher and signified nothing. If there be any changelings, it is no other than himself, not by any enchantment of words not understood, but by his own overweening and vainglorious conceits. He reciteth it as a saying of mine that [matter of fact is not verified by sense and memory, but by Arguments.] I never said so, And until he produce my words, I must put it into the catalogue of his untruths. Neither did I, nor any Schooleman ever say, That the testimony of a witness is the only verifier of matter of fact, or that it doth not consist in sense and memory, or that it doth consist in Arguments and Syllogisms. These are his own collections and consequences, which hang together like ropes of sand.  
He asketh, How can an unlearned man be brought to think the words he speaks aught to signify, when he speaks sincerely, any thing else but that which he himself meaneth by them? Right, he cannot be brought to think that they do signify otherwise than they do signify. But although he meant never so sincerely, he may be brought to think that the signification by him used was improper, and that which he said according to the right sense of the words was untrue. As a man might say sincerely enough, that water is moister or more humid than air, by the seeming warrant of his sense. And yet upon better instruction reform his judgement, and acknowledge that then he did not understand truly what moist or humid did signify.  
To that which I urged, That to love any thing and to think it good, is not the same thing; He answereth no more but this, That he doth not think so: As if he were some oracle of truth, or some great Lawyer declaring his opinion to his poor ignorant Clients. Let him reserve his thoughts for his credulous Scholars. His next mistake is much worse. This was but in a word, but that is in a thing, eternity. He would have his Reader believe, that some body holdeth, That eternity is this 
His gross mistakes about eternity.  present instant of time; And that the next instant is eternity after this: And consequently, that there are as many eternities as there be instants in time. He doth but dream waking. Surely never any man since the beginning of the World did hold any part of this. That eternity should be a part of time; Time is but the measure of motion, eternity was before motion. Time succeeding doth repair the losses of time passing. But God who is infinite can acquire nothing, can lose nothing. Suppose a body to be infinite actually, it could have no middle, no extremities, but every point of it should be a centre. So in the infinite eternity of God, there can be no extremities of past or to come, but a present interminable possession of life. His ignorance is his best plea●…. Let him learn to cite his Adversaries sayings more ingenuously, or hold his peace for ever, and keep his Paradoxes to himself. And not show himself like the Athenians, who being well beaten by the Cretians, and having no other way to revenge themselves, invented feigned stories of Bulls and Minotaures.  
Being taken tripping in an apparent contradiction about Spontaneity, making it to be considerate proceeding, and inconsiderate proceeding, or nothing, he hath no more mind to meddle with it, but quitteth his hands of it in these terms. It is no English; But let it signify what it will, provided it be intelligible, it would make against me. Had not this man need to have credulous Readers, who before he knoweth what the word signifieth, knoweth by instinct that it would make against me. Just like that Mountebank, who having made a long Oration to his hearers of the rare virtues of a feather, which he affirmed to have dropped from the wing of Michael the Archangel; And the feather being stolen from under his sleeve out of drollery, and a cinder put in the place of it, to try his humour, he went on confidently with his discourse; telling them that though it was not the feather which he had mentioned, yet it was one of the coals which S. Laurence was broiled with, and had all those virtues which he had formerly ascribed to the feather. So whether Spontaneity be a feather or a coal, it hath still the same virtue. And if it be any thing it would make against me. If it be all one to consider of the fittest means to obtain a desired end or object, and consider of the good and evil sequels of an action to come, Why did he change the definition generally received, to make a show of difference where there is none by his own account?  
I was willing to have brought him to his right wits, that he might have acknowledged himself a reasonable man; but seeing he is so peremptory that all the reason and understanding which man hath is but imagination; And weighing his ground, that he finds it so in himself by considering his own thoughts and ratiocinations, and, which worketh with me more than all his confidence, finding his writings more full of fantasy than of judgement; I begin to relent, and am contented to come to an accord with him, that he, and such as he can gain to be of his mind, shall have the privilege of phantastics, provided that other men may still retain their old reason. Moreover I confess that when I left other business to examine his writings, I did meet with greater trifles than I did before.  
I would gladly save his credit, but he plungeth himself into so many gross errors, that 
What is his deliberation.  Ipsa si cupi at salus servare prorsus non potest. Now he telleth us that deliberation is nothing else but so many wills alternatively changed, as if deliberation was but the measuring of a rod by inches, with his thumbs alternatively; he wills, he wills not, he wills, he wills not, etc. And as the last thumb-breadth happeneth, So the Agent either willeth or nilleth. Before he made but one will, now he maketh I know not how many alternate wills. Before he made deliberation to be a consideration of the good or evil sequels of an action. The will is an appetite, not a consideration. The will is blind and cannot consider. Wise men use to look before they leap, and consider before they will. But he may have the privilege to have his will stand for his reason, Stat pro ratione voluntas. So whilst the bias of his bowl is changing from the one side to the other alternatively by extrinsical causes, the bowl is deliberating.  
I confess I wondered at his definition of a free Agent, He that can do if he will, and forbear if he will; not that I did not foresee what paradoxical sense he would give it; but why he should retain the ancient terms. I remember well his distinction between freedom to do if a man will, and forbear to do if he will, and freedom to will if he will, and to nill if he will. And have made bold now and then to represent what a vain, false, useless, contradictory distinction it is, and I believe it lieth at the last gasp. But I might have saved my labour. I used but one short argument in this place; either the Agent can will and forbear to will, or he cannot do and forbear to do, and it driveth him into a contradiction. There is no doubt a man can will one thing or other, and forbear to will it. If a man can will 
Man is free to will, or he is not free to do.  and forbear to will the same thing, than he can will if he will, and forbear if he will. Where he maketh the state of the question to be, Whether a man to day can choose to morrows will? either he feigneth or mistaketh grossly. I will never trust him with stating of questions, or citing of testimonies.  
Although it be his turn now to prove, and mine to defend myself, and my cause, from his objections, yet he is still calling for proofs; And which is worse, would have me to prove negatives, when he himself cannot prove affirmatives. How doth it follow 
He maketh a stone as free to ascend as descend,  (saith he) that a stone is as free to ascend as descend, unless he prove there is no outward impediment to its ascent, which cannot be proved, for the contrary is true? Or how proveth he that there is no outward impediment to keep that point of the Loadstone which placeth itself towards the North, from turning from the South? First for the stone the case is clear, there is no other extrinsical impediment to the stone ascending or descending, but the Medium through which it passeth. Now the Medium is supposed to be the same, that is, the air equally disposed. The air is as easily driven upwards as downwards; And therefore though the air give some impediment to the motion upwards, yet it giveth the same impediment at least to the motion downwards; And therefore the impediment being as vincible upwards as downwards, if the cause of motion were the same, and the presence or absence of extrinsical impediments being the same, it followeth clearly upon his grounds, that the stone is as free to ascend as descend. Next for the Loadstone, I prove that there is no extrinsical impediment which holdeth it from turning to the South, by sense and reason; both mine own, and all other men's, by the common consent of the World, and by his silence who is not able to pretend any impediment that is probable, without the stone, except it be in some other body far distant, which will render the difficulty the same.  
His next passage is ridiculous. An Hawk 
A Hawk, saith he, is free to fly when her wings are plucked.  wants liberty to fly when her wings are tied, but it is absurd to say, she wants liberty to fly when her wings are plucked. So she wanted no liberty to fly when she was naked and newly hatched; So he himself wanteth no liberty to fly from hence to China. He saith, Men that speak English, use to say when her wings are plucked, that she cannot fly. So they use to say likewise when her wings are tied. He demandeth, Whether it be not proper language to say a bird or a beast are set at liberty from the cage wherein they were imprisoned? What it may be at another time, when men are discoursing upon another subject, is not mateterial at this time, and as to this subject which we are about, it is most impertinent and improper. He himself as partial as he is, cannot think that this liberty is any thing to that moral liberty which renders a man capable of reward or punishment, any more that a Tailor's measure is to the measure of motion.  
I said and say again, That nothing can begin to be without a cause, and that nothing 
Abegining of being & acting.  can cause itself. Yet I say many things do begin to act of themselves. This (he saith) is to contradict myself, because I make the action to begin without a cause. This is not the first time that he hath noted this for a contradiction. I shall sooner salve the contradiction, than he save his credit. As if the Agent and the Action were the same thing? Or as if the Agent was not the cause of the Action? Or as if there were any consequence in this; The Agent cannot begin to be of himself, therefore he cannot begin to act of himself? Or he cannot cause himself, therefore he cannot cause his action. Nothing can cause itself, but that which is caused by one thing, may cause another. Whereas he addeth, That it hath been proved formerly, that every sufficient cause is a necessary cause, and that is but jargon to say free causes determine themselves, it is but a puff of his vain glorious humour. He hath made nothing to appear but his own ignorance and mistakes.  
In the later end of this Section, I made 
His answer to some demands.  bold to make some serious demands to Mr. Hobbs, which did not at all reflect upon him in particular, but at those natural notions which are common to all mankind.  
The first demand was, Whether he doth not find by experience that he doth many things which he might have left undone if he would, etc. He answereth, Yet if he would, but he maketh it impossible for him to have had any other will. So he doth as good as tell us, that he might have done them upon an impossible condition or supposition; as he himself might have flown over sea if he had had a pair of wings. This is a contradiction indeed implied; first to say he might have done otherwise, and then to add an impossible condition which makes his proposition negative. I am sure it is not fairly done to avoid the scope and meaning of the demand.  
The second question was, Whether he do not some things out of mere animosity and will without regard to the direction of right reason, etc. He answereth, This question was in vain, unless I thought myself his confessor. No, it is enough, I desire not to intrude into his secrets.  
My third demand (as he saith) was, Whether he writ not this defence of necessity against liberty, only to show that he will have a dominion over his own actions. He answereth, No, but to show that he had no dominion over his will, and this at my request. My request was, That what he did upon this subject, should rather be in writing than by word of mouth. It seemeth that I had the dominion over his will. So might I come to be questioned for all his Paradoxes. The truth is, This was no distinct question, but a Corollary of the second question.  
My third demand was, Whether he be not angry with those who draw him from his study, or cross him in his desires, and why he is angry with them, (if they be necessitated to do what they do) any more than he is angry with a sharp winter, etc. This is wholly omitted by him.  
The last demand was, Whether he do not sometimes blame himself, and say, O what a fool was I, to do thus, or thus; Or with to himself, O that I had been wise, and why he doth this if he were irresistibly necessitated to do all things that he doth. He might as well have wished, O that I had not breathed, or O what a fool was I to grow old. To this he answereth nothing, but subtle questions, and full of Episcopal gravity; And that he thinks in this question, I will appear the greater fool; supposing that I meant to put the fool upon him, which I profess myself to be innocent of; as he might have found by these words inserted among the questions, Which wise men find in themselves sometimes. Though I jest sometimes with his cause, or his arguments, I do not meddle with his person, further than to condemn his vainglorious presumption, to arrogate so much to himself. Though I have not half so great an opinion of him as he hath of himself, yet I wish his humilility were answerable to his wit. Thus of four questions he hath quite omitted one, neglected another, refused to answer a third, and answered the fourth contrary to the scope of the question.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 34.  
HIs bragging humour will not leave him, he still forgetteth Epictetus his sheep. He saith When I shall have read over his Animadversions, Num. 31. I will think otherwise, whatsoever I will confess. Male ominatis parcito verbis. I should sooner turn Manichee, and make two Gods, one of good, the other of evil, than to make the true God to be the cause of all evil. But there is no danger either of the one or of the other. I have read over his Animadversions, Num. 31. I have weighed them, and I profess I find nothing in them worthy of a Divine, or a Philosopher, or an ingenious person, who made a sad inquisition after truth, nor any thing that doth approach within a Germane mile of the cause in controversy. And so I leave him to the Castigations.  
That his two instances of casting ambs ace and raining to morrow, are impertinent, appeareth by these two reasons, First the question is of free actions, these two instannes are of contingent actions. Secondly the question is of antecedent necessity, these instances are of an hypothetical necessity. And though I used the beauty of the World as a Medium to prove liberty, wherein contingency is involved, yet this doth not warrant him to give over the principal question, and to start and pursue new questions at his pleasure. But let him be of good comfort, be they pertinent or impertinent, they shall not be neglected.  
Because I would not blunder as he doth, I distinguished actions into four sorts. First, The actions of free Agents. Secondly, The actions of free and natural Agents mixed. Thirdly, The actions of bruit beasts. Fourthly, The actions of natural inanimate causes. Of these four sorts the first only concerneth the question, and he according to his custom quite omitteth it; yet it was of more moment and weight, than all he saith in this Section put together. [A man proportioneth his time each day, and allotteth so much to his devotions, so much to his study, so much to his diet, so much to his recreations, so much to necessary or civil visit, so much to his rest. He that will seek for I know not what necessary causes of all this without himself, (except that good God, who hath given him a reasonable soul) may as well seek for a necessary cause of the Egyptian Pyramids among the Crocodiles of Nilus.] This distinction of a man's time, is an act of dominion, done on purpose to maintain his domion over his actions, against the encroachments of sensual delights.  
He saith here upon the by, That he knoweth no action that proceedeth from the liberty of 
Free to do if he will, yet not free to will is against law and Logic. Num. 3.  man's will. And again, A man's will is something, but the liberty of his will is nothing. Yet he hath often told us, That a man is free to do if he will, and not to do if he will. If no action proceed from the liberty of the will, then how is a man free to do if he will. Before he told us, He is free to do a thing that may do it if he have the will to do it, and may forbear it if be have the will to forbear it. If the liberty of the will be nothing, than this supposition, If he have the will, is nothing, but an impossibility. And here to all that I have said formerly against that frivolous distinction, I shall add an undoubted rule both in law and Logic. A conditional proposition, having an impossible condition annexed to it, is equipollent to a simple negative. He who is free to write if he will, if it be impossible for him to will, is not free to write at all, no more than he is free to will. But this Castle in the air hath been beaten down often enough about his ears.  
Where I say that [contingent actions do proceed from the indetermination or contingent concurrence of natural causes] my intention was not to exclude contingent determination, but necessary determination according to an antecdent necessity, which he hath been so far from proving unanswerably, that he hath as good as yielded the cause, in his case of Ames ace, by making the necessity to be only upon supposition. 
Num. 3.   
Concerning mixed actions partly free and partly necessary, he saith, That for proof of them, I instance in a tile falling from an house which breaketh a man's head, How often must I tell him, that I am not now proving, but answering that which he produceth? He may find proofs enough to content him, or rather to discontent him, in twelve Sections together, from the fifth to the eighteenth: And upon the by throughout the whole book. He who proveth that election is always inter plura, and cannot consist with antecedent determination to one, proveth that that man who did elect or choose to walk in that street, at that very time when the stone fell, though he knew not of it, was not antecedently necessitated to walk there: And if any one of 
A necessary effect requires all necessary causes.  all those causes which concur to the production of an effect be not antecedently necessary, than the effect is not antecedently necessary, for no effect can exceed the virtue of its cause.  
He saith, I should have proved that such contingent actions are not antecedently necessary, by a concurrence of natural causes, though a little before I granted they are. First he doth me wrong, I never granted it, either before or after. It is a foul fault in him to mistake himself, or his adversary, so often. Secondly, it is altogether improper and impertinent to our present controversy. Let him remember what he himself said. If they (the instances of casting ambs ace and raining to morrow) be impertinent to his opinion of the liberty of man's will, he doth impertinently to meddle with them. Not so neither by his leave. Though I refuse to prove them formally, or write Volumes about them, yet I do not refuse to answer any thing which he doth or can produce. Such is his argument which followeth immediately. Whatsoever is produced by concurrence of natural causes, was antecedently determined in the cause of such concurrence, though contingent concurrence. He addeth, That though I perceive it not, concurrence and contingent concurrence are all one. It may be in his Dialect, which differs from the received Dialect of all Scholars, but not in the Dialect of wiser and learneder men. To his argument, (pardoning his confounding of natural and voluntary causes) I answer, That if he speak of the immediate adequate cause as it is a cause in act, without doubt he saith truth, Causa proxima in actu posita, impossible est non s●…qui effectum. But he told us of a necessary connexion of all causes from eternity, and if he make not this good, he saith nothing. If he intent it in this sense, I deny his assertion, That whatsoever is produced by concurrence of natural causes, was antecedently determined from eternity. As for instance that the generation of a monster which nature or the Agent never intended, was necessary from eternity, or necessary before the contingence was determined.  
Concerning the individual actions of brute beasts, that they should be necessitated to every act they do from eternity; As the be (for example) how often she shall hum in a day, and how often she shall fly abroad to gather thyme, and whither, and how many flowers precisely she must suck, and no more, and such like acts; I had reason to say I see no ground for it. Yet the least of all these acts is known to God, and subject to his disposition. He telleth us, That he hath pointed out the ground in the former discourse. If he have, it is as the blind Senator (of whom I told him formerly) pointed the wrong way. All his intimations have received their answers. But whereas I made an objection to myself, Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? 
Math. 10. 29.  and one of them shall not fall to the ground without your father. He doth not deal clearly to urge mine own objection, and conceal my answer. He doth not say, which your father casteth not down, or which your father doth not necessitate to fall, but without your father; That is, without your father's knowledge, without his protection, without the influence of his power, or which is exempted from your father's disposition.  
The last sort of actions are the natural actions of inanimate creatures, which have not the least pretence to liberty, or so much as spontaneity, and therefore were declined by me as impertinent to this question. Out of my words concerning these he argueth thus. If there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning, then there is no doubt but that all things happen necessarily: But there is a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning.  
First I deny his consequence, and by it, he (who is so busy to take other men's heights in Logic, wherein he never meddled yet but he was baffelled) may have his own height taken by them that are so disposed. There is scarce a freshman in the University but could have taught him the difference between causa efficiens physica, and voluntaria, the one acting by necessity of nature, the other freely according to deliberation. The former cannot defer nor moderate its act, nor act opposite actions indifferently, but the later can. So though a necessary connexion of all natural causes were supposed, yet it inferreth not a necessary connexion of all voluntary causes.  
Secondly, I deny his assumption, that there is a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning, for proof whereof he produceth nothing, nor is able to produce any thing. All he saith he allegeth out of me, That it deserveth further examination. And from thence according to his wild roving imaginations, he draweth consequences from the staff to the corner, that have not the least grain of salt, or weight in them. As these, Hitherto he knows not whether it be true or no. And consequently all his arguments hitherto have been of no effect, nor hath he showed any thing to prove, that elective actions are not necessitated. Thus his pen runneth over without time or reason. He that would learn to build Castles in the air, had best be his Apprentice. The truth is, I was not willing to go out of mine own profession, and therefore desired to hold myself to the question of liberty, without meddling with contingency; But yet with the same reservation that the Romans had in their Military Discipline; nec sequi, nec fugere, not to seek other questions, nor yet to thu●… them, if they were put upon me.  
And now we are come to his two famous 
His instance of Ambs' ace Num. 31, 32.  instances of casting ambs ace, and raining or not raining to morrow. I said that I had already answered what he produceth to prove all sufficient causes to be necessary causes. Now saith he, It seemeth that distrusting his former answer, he answereth again. O memory! he did not urge them in that place, neither did I answer them at all in that place. But though he had urged them, and I answered them there, yet he repeating them, or enforcing them here, would he not have me to answer him? It is true that in another Section, upon the by, he hath been gravelled about his ambs' ace, and therefore he treadeth tenderly 
Num. 3.  still upon that foot. He saith, I bring no other argument to prove the cast thrown not to be necessarily thrown, but this that the caster did not deliberate. By his leave it is not truly said. I showed undeniably, that the necessity upon which he buildeth is only hypothetical. I enumerated all the causes which were or could be recited to make the necessity, As the dice, the positure of the casters hand, the measure of the force, the positure of the table, etc. And showed clearly that there was not the least grain of antecedent necessity in any of them, which he is not able to answer, and therefore he doth well to be silent.  
But if I had urged nothing else, This alone had been sufficient to prove the caster a free Agent from his own principles. A free Agent (saith he) is he that hath not done deliberating. He who never began to deliberate hath not done deliberating. There can be no necessity imaginable why the caster should throw these dice rather than those other, or cast into this table rather than that, or use so much force and no more, but the casters will, or mere chance. The caster never deliberated nor so much as thought, of any one of these things: And therefore it is undeniably apparent, that there was no necessity of casting ambs ace, but only upon supposition, which is far enough from antecedent necessity.  
But he pleadeth further, That from our ignorance of the particular causes that concurring make the necessity, I infer that there was no such necessity at all, which is that indeed which hath deceived me and all other men in this question. Whose fault was it then first to make this an instance, and then to plead ignorance? Before he was bold to reckon up all the causes of the antecedent necessity of this cast, and now when he is convinced that it is but a necessity upon suppositon, he is fain to plead ignorance. He who will not suffer the Loadstone to enjoy its attractive virtue, without finding a reason for it in a fiddlestring, as Scoggin sought for the Hare under the leads, as well where she was not, as where she was, is glad to plead ignorance about the necessary causes of ambs ace. Whereas my reasons did evince not only that the causes are unknown, but that there are no such causes antecedently necessitating that cast. Thus, If any causes did necessitate ambs ace antecedently, it was either the caster, but he thought not of it; or the dice, but they are square, no more inclinable to one cast than another, or the positure of the table, but the caster might have thrown into the other table, or the positure of the hand, but that was by chance; or the measure of the force, but that might have been either more or less, or all of these together. But to an effect antecedently necessary, all the causes must be antecedently determined; where not so much as one of them is antecedently determined, there is no pretence of antecedent necessity: Or it is some other cause that he can name, but he pleadeth ignorance. Yet I confess the deceit lieth here, but it is on the other side, in the ignorant mistaking of an hypothetical necessity, for absolute antecedent necessity.  
And here according to the advice of the Poet, 
Nec deus inter sit nisi dignus vindice nodus  
Inciderit—  He calleth in the fore knowledge of God to his aid, as he doth always when he findeth himself at a loss; but to no purpose. He himself hath told us, That it cannot be truly said, that the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of any thing, seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, 
Num. 11.  and knowledge dependeth on the existence of the thing known. God seeth not future contingents in an antecedent certainty which they have in their causes, but in the events themselves, to which Gods infinite knowledge doth extend itself. In order of time one thing is before another, one thing is after another, and accordingly God knoweth them in themselves to be one before another. But his knowledge is no beginning, no expiring act. Nothing is passed, nothing is to come, but all things present to his knowledge, even those things which are future, with the manner of their futurition.  
His casting ambs ace hath been unfortunate 
His other idstance of raining or not raining to morrow.  to him, he will speed no better with his shower of rain. In the entrance to my answer, and as it were the stating of the cause, I showed that rain was more contingent in our Climate, than in many other parts of the World, where it is almost as necessary as the seasons of the year. I do not find so much weight in his discourse, as to occasionme to alter one word, for which I could have produced authors enough, if I had thought it needful; 
Deut 11. 14. Jer. 5. 24. Host 6. 3.  but I alleged only the Scriptures, mentioning the former and the later rain. And even this is objected to me as a defect or piece of ignorance. I thought (saith he) he had known it by experience of some Travellers, but I see he only gathereth it from that place in Scripture; as if the Scripture alone were not proof good enough, except it be confirmed by the experience of Travellers.  
From this preparatory discourse he frameth two Arguments, and puts them into my Character, as if they were my Reasons. In our Climate, the natural causes do not produce rain so necessarily at set times, as in some Eastern Countries, therefore they do not produce rain necessarily in our Climates, then when they do produce it. Again, We cannot say so certainly and infallibly, it will rain to morrow, or it will not rain to morrow; therefore it is not necessary either that it should rain, or that it should not rain to morrow. Such reasons as these do become him better than me; I disclaim them, and to use his own phrase, must take them for untruths, until he cite the place where I have made any such ridiculous inferences, which conclude against hypothetical necessity, which we ourselves do establish.  
But I come to his arguments, which I shall set down in his own words, for it cannot be worse disposed, to let us see the great skill of this new controller in Logic; It is necessary that to morrow it shall rain or not rain, if therefore it be not necessary that it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain; otherwise it is not necessary that the proposition it shall rain, or it shall not rain, should be true. To this I answered, That it was most false, that the proposition could not be necessarily true, except one of the members were necessarily true, which is a truth evident and undeniable. This answer I illustrated thus; A conjunct proposition may have both parts false, and yet the proposition be true, As if the Sun shine, it is day; is a true proposition at midnight. Logicians use to give another example, If an Ass fly, than he hath wings: The proposition is true, but both the parts are false: Neither doth the Ass fly, neither hath he wings. To my direct answer he replieth not a word, either by denial or distinction; and so by his silence yieldeth the controversy. But to my illustration he excepteth thus. First, What hath a conjunct proposition to do with this in question, which is disjunctive? By his good favour, there are two propositions in his argument, the former is disjunctive, which is not questioned at all by either party, either for the truth of it, or the necessity of it, namely, Either it will rain to morrow, or it will not rain to morrow. His second proposition is conjunctive, and not disjunctive, namely, If therefore it be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary that it shall not rain. This conjunctive proposition I deny; and I deny it upon this evident ground, because as in a conjunctive proposition, both parts of the proposition may be false, and yet the proposition true, or both parts true, and yet the proposition false, because the truth or falsehood of the proposition, dependeth not upon the truth or falsehood of the parts, but only of the consequence. So in a disjunctive proposition, the disjunction may be necessarily true, and yet neither member of the disjunction, be necessarily, because the truth or falsehood of a disjunctive proposition dependeth not upon the necessary truth of either member distinctly considered, but upon the necessary truth of the disjunction. The reason is evident; in a disjunctive proposition, nothing is affirmed or denied, either of the one member, or the other, but only the necessary truth of the disjunction. According to that rule in Logic, In propositione disjunctiva affirmatio & negatio aestimatur ex sola conjuctione disjunctiva, cui necesse est addi negationem si debet negativa esse propositio. Now the disjunction of contradictories is most necessary, Either it will rain to morrow, or it will not rain to morrow, though neither part of the contradiction be necessarily true. As for example, A man is to pay a sum of money, Either he will pay it in gold, or he will not pay it in gold, is necessarily true, but it is not necessary that he shall pay it in gold, neither is it necessary that he shall not pay it in gold. Seeing he hath it in his choice to pay it in gold or in silver, or any other coin which is current. This is so clear, that no man can seriously oppose it, without his own discredit.  
Secondly he saith that a conjuctive proposition is not made of two propositions, as a disjunctive is. What then? First this is altogether impertinent, and nothing to his purpose. Secondly it is also false. Every compounded proposition (such as a conjunct proposition is) doth either actually or virtually include two propositions. Indeed, an hypothetical proposition may sometimes be reduced to a cathegorical, that is, when there are but three terms; for when there are four terms, it is hardly reducible. What is this to the question, or to any difference between us? Just which is the way to London? A sack full of plums. He might do well for his reputation sake, to reduce his argument into any Scholar like form, either Cathegorical, or hypothetical, or disjunctive, or any thing. But then the ugliness of it would straight appear. This is the nearest to his sense that I can contrive it; Either it is necessary that it shall rain to morrow, or it is necessary that is shall not rain to morrow; Or this proposition, Either it will rain to morrow, or it will not rain to morrow, is not necessarily true. I deny the disjunction. Pono quartum, Or the one of these two (raining or not raining) will happen contingently. The disjunction is always necessarily true, before either of the members be determinately or necessaly true.  
Whether this proposition, I know that either it will rain to morrew, or it will not rain to morrow, be a disjunctive proposition, or not, is not material. It includeth a disjunctive proposition in it; and showeth plainly that the certainty of a disjunctive proposition doth not depend upon the certainty of either of the members determinately, but upon the certainty of one of them indifferently.  
He taketh great exception at my manner 
God's decree consideredactually and passively.  of expression, that God made his own decrees freely, because whatsoever was made had a beginning, but God's decrees are eternal. Besides, God's decree is his will, and the Bishop said formerly, that the will of God is God. Although God being a simple and infinite essence (to speak properly) is not capable of any manner of composition, or of being perfected any further than he is: Yet to help our conception, we use to attribute to God such acts and qualities and perfections, which being spoken after the manner of men, are to be underood according to the Majesty of God. Such is the notion of God's decrees. More particularly, the decrees of God may be taken, and is taken in the Schools two ways, actively or passively. Actively as it is an act immanent in God: and so the decree of God is nothing else but Deus decernens, God decreeing. Or else the decree of God may be taken passively for the execution of this decree, or the order set by God for the government and disposition of the World, which is an act done in time, and ad extra, or without the Deity. This executive decree was that which I intended, as he might easily have perceived if he had pleased. He himself 
Num. 11.  saith the same, which he dislikes in me; This concourse of causes, whereof every one is determined to be such as it is, by a like concourse of former causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the decree of God. What difference is there, whether one say this decree was made, or it was set and ordered, as he himself saith? My argument holds as well the one way as the other. God was not necessitated to set this order, and yet this distinctive proposition was always necessarily true, either God will order it thus, or he will not order it thus.  
To my last argument used in this Section, 
God knows all future possibilities.  he answereth nothing but this, If God had made either causes or effects free from necessity, he had made them free from his own prescience, which had been imperfection. Which reason besides all the inconsequences thereof, and all the other absurdities which flow from it, doth deny to the infinite knowledge of God, the knowledge of possibilities and future contingents: Whereas it is most certain, That God doth perfectly know, not only all future contingents, (not in their causes only, but in themselves) but also all possibilities, upon supposition of a condition, such as were never to be actually produced, Woe unto thee Chorazin, 
Math. 11. 21.  Woe unto thee Bethsaida, for if the mighty woks which were done in you, had been done in Tyre and Sydon, they would have repent long ago in sackcloth and ashes. To know certainly future possibilities which shall never come into act, is more than to know future events, though never so contingent, and void of necessity. Take another instance, Will the men of Keilah deliver me up? Will Saul come 
1 Sam 23. 11.  down? He will come down, they will deliver thee up: And again, He was speedy by taken away, least wickedness should alter his understanding.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 35.  
HIs first endeavour in this Section is to reduce his argument into better form; 
His argument to prove universal necessity answered.  and when all is done, it proveth but a Sorites. The only commendation that I can give it, is this, That the matter and form are agreeable, both stark naught. Thus he argueth, That which is an Agent, worketh; That which worketh, wanteth nothing requisite to produce the action; and consequently is therefore a sufficient cause, and if a sufficient cause then also a necessary cause. I deny his first proposition, That every Agent worketh. There are causes and Agents in power as well as in act: But it may be he meaneth an Agent in act; then he proveth the same by itself, That which acteth worketh; and when they returned, than they came home again. He taketh pains to prove that which no man in his right wits can doubt of.  
His second proposition containeth such another sublime point of Apodeictical learning, called idem per idem, the same by the same; That which worketh wanteth nothing requisite to produce the action or the effect it produceth. It may want truth that is requisite to the production of that which it ought to produce. But it can want nothing to produce that which it doth▪ produce. Whatsoever acteth when it acteth doth necessarily act what it doth act. He is still stumbling upon that old foolish rule. What is all this to his antecedent necessity?  
His third proposition follows, And consequently is thereof a sufficient cause. Yes in his canting language, which makes deficience and sufficience to be all one. Whereunto tendeth all this? Hitherto he hath not advanced one hairs breadth. But now he uniteth all his force to pull down the Castle of Liberty. And if a sufficient cause, than also a necessary cause. I denied his consequence: And gave him a reason for it; otherwise God himself should not be all-sufficient. He replieth, That God's allsufficience signifieth no more than his omnipotence, and omnipotence signifieth no more than the power to do all things that he will. Yes Gods infinite power and sufficience ought not to be limited to those things which he doth actually will, or which have actual being; No more than his eternity is commensurable by time. He was sufficient to raise up children to Abraham of stones, which he never did, and probably never will do. If God did all which he could do, and could justy do, who was able to abide it? we were in a wretched condition. A covetous person may have more than sufficient for his back and his belly, and yet no will to bestow it upon himself. So he hath proved himself a sufficient Agent, sufficient to make this Sorites, though very unsufficient to prove his intention.  
But I took pity on him to see him toil himself to no purpose, and was contented out of grace and courtesy to admit these two things. First that every effect in the World hath sufficient causes. Secondly, that supposing the determination of the free and contingent causes, every effect in the World is necessary, that is necessary upon supposition. But this will do him no good. Necessity upon supposition is far enough from antecedent necessity. He objecteth, That necessity is only said truly of somewhat in future. I deny i●…. He proveth it thus. Necessary is that which cannot possibly be otherwise. And possibility is always 
Possible and impossible all one with T. H.  understood of some future time. Good: Where are his eyes that he cannot distinguish between possible and not possible? If necessary had been that which could possibly be otherwise: or if impossibility had always reference to the future as well as possibility, he had said something. By this argument he might prove that yesterday is not past, but to come, because it is not possible to bring back yesterday, and possibility is always understood of the time to come.  
But out of pure necessity he is contented to make use of my courtesy. Seeing he granteth so favourably that sufficient causes are necessary causes, I shall easily conclude from it, that whatsoever those causes do cause are necessary antecedently. He may easily prove it, if he can make possible and impossible all one. I gave him an inch, and he takes an ell. I admitted that every effect in the World is necessary upon supposition, and he taketh it for granted, that they are necessary without supposition. But that is more than I can yield him. If that be his meaning, he had best stick to his own grounds: But they will afford him no more relief than my concession. Howsoever thus he argueth.  
If the necessity of the thing produced, when 
Remote causes are not together with the effect.  produced, be in the same instant of time with the existence of its immediate cause, than also that immediate cause was in the same instant with the cause by which it was immediately produced. The same may be said of the cause of this cause, and backward eternally. From whence it will follow, that all the connexion of the causes of any effect from the beginning of the World, are altogether existent in one and the same instant. It is well that I meet with a beginning of the World, for I was afraid of those words and so backwards eternaly. If his Mathematical engines be such as these, he will never prove so terrible an enemy as Archimedes. He proveth that all immediate causes and their particular distinct effects successively, were together in time at the very instant of their causation successively since the beginning of the World. But he lets the question alone, as bad Archers do the But; Whether the first cause did determine the second to every individual act which it doth, necessarily and without any supposition, and the second the third, and so downward to the last? Of this he saith not a word. Where there is no need of proof he swelleth with arguments, where the question is, he is silent. I will show him the palpable absurdity of his argument in an instance. When Mr. Hobbs made his Leviathan, his Leviathan, and he were necessarily coexistent in the same instant of time: So likewise when his father did beget him, his father and he were necessarily coexistent in the same instant of time. The like may be said of his grandfather, and his great grandfather, and so upwards to the beginning of the World. Therefore adam's begetting of Seth, had a necessary connexion with his writing of his Leviathan, so as to necessitate him antecedently and inevitably to write it, and stuff it with Paradoxes. Or thus, A man kindles a fire to warm himself, The fire and he are necessarily coexistent, and there is necessary connexion between them; Another man steals part of the fire and burns an house with it, the fire and the conflagration are together, and have a necessary connexion; therefore the kindling of the fire had a necessary connexion with the burning of the house, to render it inevitable. See with what doughty arguments they use to catch Dotterels.  
From hence he concludeth, That consequently all the time from the beginning of the 
Nor doth all time make one instant.  World, or from eternity to this day, is but one instant. Better and better. Why doth he not infer likewise that the sea burneth? His premises will sustain the one, as well as the other. Why will he lose his cause for want of confidence? If God who is an infinite Essence be free from all variableness and succession of time, Must he who is but a turning shadow upon the old Exchange of this World, challenge the same privilege? Because eternity is a nunc stans, must successive parts of time make one instant or nunc stans? But he addeth, That by this time I know it is not so. He hath been spinning a fair thread, and now like a cursed Cow casts down his meal with his foot. First to endeavour to prove that it is so, and then confess that it is not so. Neither can he say, that he proceedeth upon my grounds, whilst his own grounds are so much higher than mine. I make but an hypothetical necessity, which implieth only an accidental connexion; He maketh an absolute antecedent necessity, which implieth a necessary connexion of the whole conjoinct series of causes and effects.   

Castigations upon the Animadversions, Num. 36.  
I Cited his sense, that he could add other arguments if he thought it good Logic. He complaineth that I mis-recite his words, which are I could add if I thought it good Logic, the inconvenience of denying necessity, as that it destroys both the Decrees and Prescience of God Almighty. And are not these reasons drawn from the Decrees and Prescience of God Arguments? or are they not his prime arguments? How glad would this man be to find any little pretence of exception? He distinguisheth between absurdities and inconveniences: Absurdities (he saith) are impossibilities, and it is a good form of reasoning 
T. H. admitteth no absurdities but impossibilities.  to argue from absurdities, but not from inconveniences. If all absurdities be impossibilities, than there are no absurdities in rerum natura, for there can be no impossibilities. This it is to take the sense of words not from Artists in their own Arts, but from his own imaginations. By this reason there never was an absurd speech or absurd action in the World, otherwise absurdities are not impossibilities. But he hath confuted himself sufficiently in this Treatise. One absurdity may be greater than another, and one inconvenience may be greater than another; but absurd and inconvenient is the same thing. That is absurd which is incongruous, unreasonable, not fit to be heard. Truth itself may accidentally be said in some sense to be inconvenient to some persons at some times. But neither absurdities nor inconveniences in themselves do flow from truth. Now let us see what are those incoveniences which he mentioneth here. To destroy the decrees and prescience of God Almighty. There can be no greater absurdities imagined, than these things which he calleth inconveniencies. He himself hath at the least ten several times drawn arguments in this Treatise from the prescience of God. Where was his Logic then? or his memory now? And in this very place where he condemneth it as no good form of reasoning to argue from inconveniences, yet he himself doth practise it, and argues from inconveniences. But he hath worn this subject so threadbare, without adding either new matter or new ornament, that I will not weary the Reader with a needless repetition, but refer him to my defence, which I dare well trust with his Animadversions.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, Num. 37.  
IT is vain to talk any longer of keeping this controversy secret. Neither do I regard whether it was made public by his fault or his friends, or who it was that hanged out the Ivy-bush before it, to beg custom, and procure utterance for his first fardel of Paradoxes. He thinketh it is great confidence in me to say, that the edge of his discourse was so abated, that it could not easily hurt any rational man, who was not over much possessed with prejudice. But I have much more reason to wonder at his transcendent confidence. The people of China did use to brag that they only had two eyes, The Europaeans one eye, and all the rest of the World no eyes. But he maketh himself to be a very Argus, all eye, better sighted than either Eagle or Serpent, and all the rest of the European World to be as blind as Moles or Beetles, like so many changelings or enchanted persons that had lost their senses. For my part I am more confident since I see his Animadversions than before. And why should I not be confident in this cause? Grant me but that there is a God, that he is just, and true, and good, and powerful, that there is an Heaven, and an hell, and a day of judgement, that is, rewards and punishments; That good and evil, virtue and vice, holiness and sin, are any thing more than empty names, That there is any election in the World, That admonitions and reprehensions, and praises and dispraises, and laws and consultations do signify any thing, That care and good endeavours are to be cherished; That all motives to godliness and religious piety are to be maintained, and I cannot fall in this cause. There is no doubt 
Abuses do not flow essentially from good doctrines, as from universal necessity.  but the best doctrines may be abused, as the doctrine of God's providence to idleness, and his patience to procrastination, and his mercy to presumption. But such abuses do not flow necessarily and essentially from good doctrines, as they do from universal necessity. He telleth us how God dealeth with those whom he will bring to a blessed end, and how he hardeneth others: but he telleth us of nothing that is in man's power under God to do, either to prevent this hardening, or to attain this blessed end. He talketh of a man's examining his ways, but he teacheth withal that a man is either necessitated unresistibly to examine his ways, or otherwise it is impossible for him to examine them. He mentioneth some who reason erroneously, If I shall be saved, I shall be saved, whether I walk uprightly or no. But he teacheth also that they are necessitated to reason erroneously, and to walk uprightly, and that they cannot avoid it by all the endeavours which are in their power. For according to his principles, nothing at all is in their power, either to do, or to leave undone, but only to cry patience, and shrug up their shoulders, and even this also is determined antecedently and inevitably to their hands.  
So he maketh man to be a mere football or tennis ball, smitten to and fro by the second causes, or a top lashed hither and thither. If the watch be wound up by the Artist, what have the wheels to do to be solicitous about any thing, but only to follow the motion which it is impossible for them to resist? When he first broached this opinion, he did not foresee all those absurd consequences which did attend it, which might easily happen to a man, who buildeth more upon his own imaginations, than other men's experience, and being once engaged, he is resolved to wade through thick and thin, so long as he is able.   

Castigations of the Animadversions, upon the Postscript. Num. 38.  
WE are now come to his last Section, which is as full of empty and unsignificant vaunts, as any of the former. True real worth useth not to send forth so many bubbles of vainglory. The question is not whether persons once publicly engaged in the defence of an opinion, be more tenacious of their errors, than those who have no such prejudice; which his own example doth confirm sufficiently, and no rational man can doubt of; but whether solid substantial proofs do work sooner 
Solid reasons work soon upon solid judgements.  upon persons of wit and learning, then upon those who are ignorant, whose judgements are confused and unable to distinguish between feigned shows, and real truths. How should he who understandeth not the right state of the question, be so likely to judge what reasons are convincing, and what are not, as he who doth understand it? Or he who knoweth not the distinction between that necessity which is absolute, and that which is only upon supposition; be a competent Judge, whether all events be absolutely necessary? He might even as well tell us that a blind man is more likely to hit the mark, or judge rightly of colours, than he that hath his sight.  
He himself doth half confess as much, I confess the more solid a man's wit is, the better will solid reasons work upon him. What is it then that disgusteth him? It is the addition of that which I call learning, that is to say, much reading of other men's doctrines, without weighing them with his own thoughts. When did either I or any man else ever call that learning, to read Authors without weiging them? Such extravagant expressions become none but blunderers, who are able to say nothing to the question when it is truly stated. But I wonder what it is which he calleth learning. Nothing but a fantastic opiniastratie, joined with a supercilious contempt of all other men that are wiser or learneder than himself, making the private thoughts of ignorant persons to be the standard and public seal of truth. As the Scholar thinketh, so the bell clinketh. If there were nothing else, this alone (to except against them who should be both his Jurers and his Judges) were enough to render him and all his Paradoxes suspected. Let him remember who said, Learning hath no enemy, but ignorance.  
If he had ever read those Authors whom he condemneth, namely, The Fathers and Doctors of the Church, his presumption had been somewhat more tolerable, though too high, But to condemn them all before he ever read any of them, requireth a prophetical light, to which he is no pretender. In the mean time he would have his Readers believe that what is done by him upon design, merely to hide his own ignorance, is done out of depth of Judgement. Like the Fox in the Fable, which having lost his tail by mischance, persuaded all his fellows to cut of theirs, as unprofitable burdens. The Philosopher divided them into three ranks: 
Three sorts of men.  Some who knew good and were willing to teach others, these he said were like Gods amongst men. Others, who though they knew not much, yet were willing to learn, these he said were like men among beasts. And lastly, some who knew not good, and yet despised such as should teach them. These he esteemed as beasts among men.  
Whereas he talketh of such as requite those who endeavour to instruct them at their own entreaty, with reviling terms, although he dictate more willingly than dispute, where no man may contradict him; yet neither do I take him to be of the rank of Instructers, before he himself hath first learned; nor is he able to bring so much as one instance of any reviling, or so much as discourreous language throughout my defence. If his back was galled before, and that make him over-sensible, and suspicious of an affront, where none was intended, who can help it? But now he himself having showed so much scorn and pe●…lance in his Animadversions, though I have abstained from all reviling terms, yet I have tempered my stile so, as to let him plainly see, That he is not so much regarded, not half so formidable an adversary, as he vainly imagineth.  
In the next place he setteth down eight conclusions which he dreameth that he hath proved in this Treatise. It is good beating of a proud man. Though he be thrown flat upon his back at every turn, yet he hath the confidence to proclaim his own achievements with a silver trumpet, when they do not deserve to be piped upon an oaten reed. I will make him a fair offer, If he have proved any one of them, or be able to prove any one of them, I will yield him all the rest. Besides the notorious falsehood of them all, the two last are apparently ridiculous, That the doctrine of liberty is an error that maketh men, 
The doctrine of liberty maketh no ●…man careless or thankless.  by imagining they can repent when they will, neglect their duties; and moreover makes them unthankful for God's graces, by thinking them to proceed from the natural ability of their own will. The doctrine of liberty from superstoical necessity, doth neither make men truncos nor sacrilegos, neither stupid blocks void of all activity, nor yet sacrilegiously to rob God of his honour. We know and acknowledge, that both free will, and the good use of free will in repentance and all other acts of gratitude towards God, is from God, and proceedeth from grace. These inferences which he makes are no consequences of our doctrine, but his own drowsy dreams. All men that are not blinded with prejudice, do see clearly, that it is his desperate doctrine of inevitable necessity, which maketh men to neglect their duties, by teaching them to belive, that though they be impenitent or unthankful, yet it was not at all in their power to have been otherwise, they are as they must be, and as God hath ordained and necessitated them to be.  
He taketh me up for saying unskilfully, that 
God hath no faculties.  they who dispute philosophically of God, ascribe unto him no proper faculties. Indeed I do not wonder if he who ascribes to God potentialities 
Num. 24. Q. & 1. Levi. c. 38.  and successive duration, who denies that the divine substance is indivisible, and saith that actus simplicissimus signifieth nothing, who makes an incorporeal substance to be a contradiction, do make him likewise to be compounded of substance and faculties. But they who penetrate deeper into the ugly consequences of these bold and blind assertions, who considered that whatsoever is truly infinite, is not capable of any variation or shadow of turning by change; and that whatsoever is infinitely perfect in itself, cannot be further perfected by the supplimental addition of any faculties or accidents, will not judge my assertion to be unskilful, but his paradoxes to be dishonourable to the divine nature, and derogatory to the Majesty of God.  
His reason of this reprehension is, Because to dispute philosophically is to dispute by natural reason, and from principles evident from the light of nature, and to dispute of the faculties and proprieties of the subject whereof they treat. What, whether they have any faculties or no? that were very hard. It seemeth that Christian Philosophers are not Philosophers with him. And why may not a Philosopher make use of Divine Revelation? but let him not trouble himself about this. This truth hath been sufficiently cleared already by the light of natural reason. Either the divine essence is infinitely perfect in itself, or God is not God. And if it be infinitely perfect in itself, it cannot be further perfected by any faculties.  
He saith he would fain know of me what improper faculties I ascribe to God, I ascribe no faculties at all to God, except it be anthropopathetically, as the Scripture ascribes eyes and hands to God, which must be understood as is beseeming the Majesty of God. He addeth, That I know not how to make it good that the will and understanding of God are faculties, and yet will have these words [his understanding and his will are his very essence] to pass for an axiom of Philosophy. It is true, I know not how to make them faculties in God, speaking properly; and yet I doubt not of this truth, that God's understanding and his will are his very essence. And this very objection showeth clearly, that he neither understandeth me, nor himself. This axiom that the will and the understanding of God are his very essence, is a fit medium to prove they are no faculties, not to prove they are faculties. Quicquid est in Deo est ipse Deus, Whatsoever is in God, is God; If he have any thing to say against it, why is he silent?  
That God is incomprehensible, and that 
God is incomprehensible.  his nature can neither be expressed nor conceived perfectly by mortal men, is a truth undeniable, not to be doubted of. How should finite reason be able to comprehend an infinite perfection? And therefore they who do search too curiously into the Majesty of God, or define his nature too saucily and presumptuously, are justly to be reprehended. The pipe can convey the water no higher than the fountains head. But on the other side, seeing the invisible things of him, that is, his eternal power and Godhead are clearly seen 
Rom. 1. ●…0.  from the creation of the world. And seeing he 
Psal. 119.  hath given us his word to be a light unto our 
Yet so far as we can, we are obliged to search after him.  feet, and a lantern unto our paths, not to endeavour soberly and humbly to know God, so far as he is represented to us by the Creatures, and revealed unto us in the Scriptures, to the end we may glorify him as God, and help others to know him and glorify him aright, is inexcusable ingratitude. It is not then simply the enquiring into, or discoursing of the nature of God, but the transgressing of the right manner and due bounds of our enquiry, which is unlawful. The fathers disputed well from the nature of God against the Anthropomorphites. So did St. Paul against the idolatrous Athenians, For as much as me are the off spring of God, and live 
Act. 17. 24.  and move and have our being in him and from him, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold and silver, or stone graven with art. I acknowledge that though all possible perfection ought to be ascribed to God, yet the 
To admit that God is infinite, is enough to confute T. H.  safest way to express him is by negative attributes. Admit but one negative attribute, which all men must admit, and do admit, that believe a God; and I will easily evince all the rest from thence, that is, That he is actually infinite, or an indivisible unity of infinite perfection. If Gods being be infinite, than it is not by successive duration. In successive duration, something is added every minute; but to that which is infinite, nothing can be added. Again, if God be actually infinite, than he is not divisible nor materiate, nor corporal, nor hath parts without parts: An aggravation of finite parts, cannot make up an infinite being. If God be actually infinite, than his understanding and his will are not distinct faculties, than his goodness and his wisdom, and his justice, and his truth, are not distinct qualities. For if his will be without his understanding, or his justice without his wisdom, than his understanding and his wisdom are not infinite, for that only is infinite, without which nothing is or can be. It is not therefore enough to ascribe unto God whatsoever is honourable, unless we do it in an honourable manner, that is, infinitely; and that we can never do, but by making him an indivisible unity of infinite being and perfection. Not accidental, but essential, or transcendent perfection. He who calleth God most perfect, (though T. H. see it not) comes short of that honour which is due to God. Most perfect is but a degree of comparison. But he who calleth him perfection itself, acknowledgeth that all the perfection of the Creatures is by participation of his infinite perfection. Such errors as these formerly recited, do deserve another manner of refutation; and when he is in his lucide intervalles, he himself acknowledgeth what I say to be true, That God is incomprehensible and immaterial. And he himself proveth so much from this very attribute of God, that he is infinite, Ci. c. 15. s. 14. Figure is not attributed to God, for every figure is finite. Neither can he be comprehended by us, for whatsoever we conceive is finite; nor hath he parts, which are attributed only to finite things; nor is be more than one, there can be but one infinite.  
Whereas I called hell the true Tophet, he telleth us gravely, That Tophet was a place 
Tophet.  not far from the walls of Jerusalem, and consequently on the earth; Adding after his boasting manner, That he cannot imagine what I will say to this in my answer to his Leviathan, unless I say that by the true Tophet in this place, is meant a not true Tophet. Whosoever answereth his Leviathan will be more troubled with his extravagancies, than with his arguments. Doth he not know that almost all things happened to them as figures? There may be a true mystical Tophet as well as a literal; And there is a true mystical Gehenna or Valley of Hinnon, as well as a literal. He that should say that Christ is the true Paschal Lamb, or the Church the true Jerusalem, or John Baptist the true Elias, may well justify it, without saying, That by the true Paschal Lamb is meant no true Paschal Lamb, or by the true Jerusalem, no true Jerusalem, or by the true Elias, no true Elias. What poor stuff is this?  
And so he concludeth his Animadversion with a rapping Paradox indeed. True religion 
True Religion consisteth not in obedience to Princes.  consisteth in obedience to Christ's Lieutenants, and in giving God such honour both in Attributes and actions, as they in their several Lieutenancies shall ordain. That Sovereign Princes are Gods Lieutenants upon earth, no man doubteth, but how come they to be Christ's Lieutenants with him? who teacheth expressly, that the 
Leu. c. 42.  kingdom of Christ is not to begin till the general Resurrection? His errors come so thick, that it is difficult to take notice of them all; yet if he had resolved to maintain his Paradox, it had been ingenuously done to take notice of my reasons against it in this place.  
First, what if the Sovereign Magistrate shall be no Christian himself? Is an Heathen or Mahometan Prince the Lieutenant of Christ, or a fit infallible Judge of the controversies of Christian Religion? Are all his Christian subjects obliged to sacrifice to idols, or blaspheme Christ upon his command? Certainly he giveth the same latitude of power and right to Heathen and Mahometan Princes that he doth to Christian. There is the same submition to both, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, whom he 
Leu. c. 17, 18.  maketh to be a mortal God. To him alone he ascribeth the right to allow and disallow of all doctrines, all forms of worship, all miracles, all revelations. And most plainly in the 42. and 43. Chapters of his Leviathan, where he teacheth obedience to infidel Princes in all things, even to the denial of Christ, to be necessary by the Law of God and nature.  
My second reason in this place was this. What if the Magistrate shall command contrary to the Law of God? must we obey him rather than God? He confesseth, That Christ ought to be obeyed rather than his Lieutenant upon earth. This is a plain concession, rather than an answer. But he further addeth, That the question is not who is to be obeyed, but what be his commands? Most vainly. For if true Religion do consist in obedience to the commands of the Sovereign Prince, then to be truly religiou●… it is not needful to inquire further than what he commandeth. Frustra fit per plura quod fier●… potest per pauciora. Either he must make the Sovereign Prince to be infallible in all his commands concerning Religion, which we see by experience to be false, and he himself confesseth, that they may command their subjects 
Leu. c. 42.  to deny Christ; or else the authority of the Sovereign Prince doth justify to his subjects whatsoever he commands, and then they may obey Christ's Lieutenant as safely without danger of punishment as himself.  
My third reason was this. If true Religion do consist in obedience to the commands of the Sovereign Prince, than the Sovereign Prince is the ground and pillar of truth, not the Church. But the Church is the ground and pillar of truth, not the Sovereign Prince. These things write I unto thee, etc. that thou 
1 Tim. 3. 14.  mayest know how thou oughest to behave thyself in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God, the power and ground of truth. What the Church signifieth in this place may be demonstratively collected, both from the words themselves, wherein he calleth it the house of God, which appellation cannot be applied to a single Sovereign, much less to a Heathen Prince, as their Sovereign then was. And likewise by the things written, which were directions for the ordering of Ecclesiastical persons.  
The last Argument used by me in this place, was ad hominem, Why then is T. H. of a different mind from his Sovereign and from the laws of the Land concerning the Attributes of God, and the religious worship which is to be given to him? The Canons and Constitutions and Articles of the Church of England, and their Discipline and form of Divine Worship, were all confirmed by Royal authority. And yet Mr. Hobbes made no scruple to assume to himself, that which he denieth to all other subjects, the knowledge of good and evil, or of true and false religion, And a judgement of what is consonant to the Law of Nature and Scripture, different from the commands of his Sovereign and the judgement of all his fellow Subjects, as appeareth by his book De cive, printed in the year 1642. Neither can he pretend that he was then a local Subject to another Prince, for he differed more from him in Religion, than from his own natural Sovereign.  
This Paradox hath been confuted before, 
Num. 14.  and some of those gross absurdities which flow from it represented to the Reader, to all which he may add these following reasons.  
First, true Religion cannot consist in any thing which is sinful; But obedience to Sovereign Princes may be sinful. This is proved by the example of Jeroboam, who established idolatry in his kingdom. And the Text saith, this thing became a sin. It may be he will say, 
1. King. 12. 30.  this idolatrous worship was a sin in Jeroboam, not in the people, who obeyed him. But the Text taketh away this evasion, branding him ordinarily with this mark of infamy, Jeroboam the son of Nebat who made Israel to sin. 
1 King. 22. 52.   
Secondly, true Religion cannot consist in obedience to contradictory commands. But the commands of Sovereign Princes are often contradictory one to another. One commandeth to worship Christ, another forbiddeth it. One forbiddeth to offer sacrifice to idols, another commandeth it. Yea the same person may both forbid idolatry in general, and yet authorize it in particular. Or forbid it by the public laws of the Country, and yet authorize it by his personal commands.  
Thirdly, true Religion is always justified in the sight of God. But obedience to the commands of Sovereign Princes is not always justified in the sight of God. This is clearly proved out of his own express words. Whatsoever is commanded by the Sovereign power, is 
●…ev. c. 22.  as to the Subject, (though not so always in the sight of God) justified by their command. Whence it is evident by his own confession, that the wicked commands of Sovereign Princes are not justified by their Royal authority, but are wicked and repugnant to the Law of God. And consequently that of the Apostle hath place here, Whether it be right 
Act. 4. 19  in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye. True Religion hath always reference unto God.  
Fourthly, true Religion doth not consist in obedience to any laws whatsoever which are repugnant to the Moral Law of God, or to the law of Nature. This Proposition is granted by himself. The laws of nature are immutable 
De Cive e. 3. Num. 29. & 31. Leu. c. 29. etc. 26.  and eternal. And all Writers do agree that the law of nature is the same with the moral Law. Again Sovereigns are all Subjects to the law of nature, because such laws be Divine, and cannot by any man or Commonwealth be abrogated. And in all things not contrary to the moral Law, that is to say, to the law of nature, all Subjects are bound to obey that of Divine Law, which is declared to be so by the laws of the Commonwealth. But the commands of a Sovereign Prince may be repugnant not only to the Moral Law, or the law of nature, but even to the laws of the Commonwealth. This assumption is proved four ways. First by his own confession, It is manifest enough that when a man receiveth two contrary commands, and 
Leviath. c. 34.  knows that one of them is Gods, he ought to obey that and not the other. If there can be no such contrary commands, than it is not manifest, nor yet true. Secondly, this is p●…oved by his resolution of two queres. The fist is this; Whether the City (or the Sovereign Prince) be to 
De Cive c. 15. Num. 18.  be obeyed if he command directly to do any th●…ng to the contumely of God, or forbid to worship God. To which he answereth directly; non esse obediendam, that he ought not to be obeyed. And he gives this reason, Because the subjects before the constitution of the Commonwealth had no right to deny the honour due unto God, and therefore could transfer no right to command such things to the commonwealth. The like he hath in his Leviathan, Actions which do naturally 
C. 31.  signify contumely, cannot by humane power be made a part of Divine Worship. As if the denial of Christ upon a Sovereign's command, (which he justifieth) were not contumelious to Christ, or as if subjects before the constitution of the commonwealth had any right themselves to deny Christ. But such palpable contradictions are no novelties with him. How doth true Religion consist in obedience to the commands of a Sovereign, if his commands may be contumelious to God, and deny him that worship which is due unto him by the eternal and immutable law of nature, and if he be not to be obeyed in such commands?  
His second question is, If a Sovereign Prince should command himself to be worshipped with Divine Worship and Attributes, whether he ought to 
Ibidem.  be obeyed? To which he answereth, That although Kings should command it, yet we ought to abstain from such attributes as signify his independence upon God, or inmortality, or infinite power, or the like; And from such actions as do signify the same. As to pray unto him being absent, to ask those things of him which none but God can give; as rain, and fair weather, or to offer sacrifice to him. Then true Religion may sometimes consist in disobedience to the commands of Sovereign Princes.  
Thirdly, that the commands of Sovereign Princes in point of Religion may be contrary to the law of nature, (which needeth no new promulgation or reception) doth appear by all those duties internal and external, which by his own confession nature doth enjoin us to perform towards God, and all which may be, and have been, countermanded by Sovereign Princes, as to acknowledge the existence of God, his unity, his infiniteness, his providence, his creation of the World, his 
De cive, c. 15.  omnipotence, his eternity, his incomprehensibility, his ubiquity, To worship him, and him only with Divine worship, with preys, with thanksgivings, with oblations, and with all expressions of honour.  
Lastly, this is proved by examples. Nebuchadnezar 
Dan. 3. 4.  commanded to worship a golden image. And Darius made a decree that 
Dan. 6. 7.  no man should ask any petition of any God or man for thirty days, save of the King only. Yet the transgression of both these commands of Sovereign Princes was justified by God as true Religion.  
Fiftly, Christ will deny no man before his Father for true Religion; But those who deny Christ before men, to fulfil the commands of an earthly Prince, he will deny before his father which is in Heaven. And therefore Christ 
Math. 10. 33. & 27.  encourageth his Disciples against these dangers, which might fall upon them by disobedience to such unlawful commands. Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both body and soul in hell. But Mr. Hobbs hath found out an evasion for such Renegadoes. Whatsoever a Subject is compelled to, in obedience to his Sovereign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the laws of his country, that action is not his, but his Sovereigns, nor is it he that in this case denieth Christ before men, but his Governor, and the law of his Country. If this Figleaf would have served the turn, Shedrach, Meshach and Abednego, needed not to have been cast into the fiery Furnace. For though they had worshipped the golden image, by this doctrine they had not been idolaters, but Nebuchadnezar only and his Princes. If this were true, Daniel might have escaped the Lion's Den: If he had forborn his praises to God, Darius had been faulty, and not he. But these holy Saints were of another mind. I hope though he might in his baste and passion censure the blessed Martyrs to be fools, (which were so many, that there were five thousand for every day in the 
Hierome Epist. ad Chromat.  year, except the calends of January, when the Heathens were so intent upon their devotions, that they neglected the slaughter of the poor Christians,) yet he will not esteem himself wiser than Daniel. Behold thou art 
Ezek. 28. 3.  wiser than Daniel, was an hyperbolical, or rather an ironical expression. With the heart man believeth unto righteousness, and with the 
Rom. 10. 10.  mouth is confession made unto salvation. If a man deny Christ with his mouth, the faith of the heart will not serve his turn.  
Sixthly, Christ denounceth damnation to all those who for saving of their lives do deny their Religion, and promiseth eternal life to all those who do seal the truth of their Christian faith with their blood, against the commands of heathenish Magistrates. Who soever will save his life shall lose it, and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it. Christ doth not promise eternal life for violation of true Religion.  
Lastly, no Christian Sovereign or Commonwealth did ever assume any such authority to themselves; Never any subjects did acknowledge any such power in their Sovereigns; Never any Writer of Politics, either waking or dreaming, did ever fancy such an unlimited power and authority in Princes, as this which he ascribeth to them, not only to make, but to justify all doctrines, all laws, all religions, all actions of their Subjects by their commands; as if God Almighty had reserved only Sovereign Princes under his own Jurisdiction, and quitted all the rest of mankind to Kings and Commonwealths. In vain ye worship me, teaching for doctrine the commandments of men, that is to say, making true religion to consist in obedience to the commands of men. If Princes were heavenly Angels, free from all ignorance and passions, such an unlimited power might better become them. But being mortal men, it is dangerous, least Phaeton-like, by their violence or unskilfulness, they put the whole Empire into a flame. It were too too much to make their unlawful commands to justify their Subjects. If the blind lead the blind, both fall into the ditch. He who imposeth unlawful commands, and he who obeyeth them, do both subject themselves to the judgements of God. But if true religion do consist in active obedience to their commands, it justifieth both their Subjects and themselves. True religion can prejudice no man.  
He taketh upon him to refute the distinction of obedience, into active and passive, As 
De Cive c. 14. Active and passive obedience.  if a sin against the law of nature could be expiated by arbitrary punishments imposed by men. Thus it happeneth to men who confute that which they do not understand. Passive obedience is not for the expiation of any fault, but for the maintenance of innocence. When God commands one thing, and the sovereign Prince another, we cannot obey them both actively; therefore we choose to obey God rather than men, and yet are willing for the preservation of peace to suffer from man, rather than to resist. If he understood this distinction well, it hath all those advantages which he fancieth to himself in his new platform of government, without any of those inconveniences which do attend it. And whereas he intimateth that our not obeying our Sovereign actively is a sin against the law of nature, meaning by the violation of our promised obedience, it is nothing but a gross mistake; no Subjects ever did, nor ever could make any such pact, to obey the commands of their Sovereign actively, contrary to the law of God or nature.  
This reason drawn from universal practice was so obvious, that he could not miss to make it an objection, The greatest objection is that of the practice, when men ask where and when 
Leu. c. 20. Universal practice against him  such power has by Subjects been acknowledged. A shrewd objection indeed, which required a more solid answer, then to say, That though in all places of the World men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred that so it ought to be. As if there were no more difficulty in founding and regulating a Commonwealth, then in distinguishing between a loose sand and a firm rock, or as if all Societies of men, of different tempers, of different humours, of different manners, and of different interests, must of necessity be all ordered after one and the same manner. If all parts of the World after so long experience do practise the contrary to that which he fancieth, he must give me leave to suspect that his own grounds are the quicksands, and that his new Commonwealth is but a Castle founded in the air.  
That a Sovereign Prince within his own 
The just power of Priences.  dominions, is custos utriusque tabulae, the keeper of both the Tables of the Law, to see that God be duly served, and justice duly administered between man and man, and to punish such as transgress in either kind with civil punishment; That, he hath an Architectonical power to see that each of his Suctjects do their duties in their several callings, ecclesiastics as well as Seculars; That the care and charge of seeing that no doctrine be taught his Subjects, but such as may consist with the general peace, and the authority to prohibit seditious practices and opinions do reside in him; That a Sovereign Prince oweth no account of his actions to any mortal man; That the Kings of England in particular have been justly declared by Act of Parliament Supreme Governors in their own kingdoms, in all causes, over all persons, as well Ecclesiastical as Civil, is not denied, nor so much as questioned by me. Otherwise a kingdom, or a Commonwealth should be destitute of necessary means for its own preservation. To all this I do readily assent, all this I have vindicated upon surer grounds than those desperate and destructive principles which he supposeth.  
But I do utterly deny that true religion doth consist in obedience to Sovereign Magistrates, or that all their injunctions ought to be obeyed, not only passively, but actively, or that he is infallible in his laws and commands, or that his Sovereign authority doth justify the active obedience of his Subjects to his unlawful commands. Suppose a King should command his Judges to set Naboth on 
1 King. 21. 9  high among the people, and to set two sons of Belial before him, to bear witness against him, saying, Thou didst blaspheme God and the King, and then carry him out and stone him, that he may die. The regal authority could neither justify such an unlawful command in the King, nor obedience in the Judges. Suppose a King should set up a golden Image, as Nebucadnezar did, and command all his Subjects to adore it, his command could not excuse his Subjects from idolatry, much less change idolatry into true religion.  
His answer to the words of Peter and John do signify nothing. The High Priest 
Acts 4. 19  and his Council commanded the Apostles not to teach in the name of Jesus. Here was sufficient humane authority, yet say the Apostles, Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye. The question was not what were the commands, that was clear enough, what God commanded, and what man commanded, but who was to be obeyed, which could admit no debate. He asketh What has the Bishop 
He confesseth that Ecclesiastical persons have a privilege above himself.  to do with what God says to me when I read the Scriptures, more than I have to do with what God says to him when he reads them? unless he have authority given him, by him whom Christ hath constituted his Lieutenant. First I answer his question with a question, What if the Bishop have such authority, and he hath not? He cannot deny but the Bishop had such authority, when he had not. And yet he doubted not even then to interpret the Scriptures contrary both to the Bishop, and to Christ's Lieutenant. Secondly I answer, That by his own confession there is a great difference between him and me in this particular, Our Saviour hath promised this infallibility in those 
De Cive. c. 17.  things which are necessary to salvation to the Apostles, until the day of judgement, that is to say, to the Apostles and to Pastors to be consecrated by them by imposition of hands. Therefore the Sovereign Magistrate, as he is a Christian, is obliged to interpret the holy Scriptures, when there is question, about the mysteries of faith by Ecclesiastical persons rightly ordained. Unless he have such ordination by imposition of hands, I am better qualified than he is for the interpretation of Scripture, by his own confession.  
But he supposeth that a Bishop or a Synod of Bishops, should be set up for our civil Sovereign. A likely thing indeed. Suppose the sky fall, than we shall have Larks. But to gratify him, let us suppose it. What then? Then that which I object against him, he could object in the same words against me. So he might, if I should be so fond as to say that true religion did consist in obedience to that single Bishop, or that Synod of bishops, as he saith that it doth consist in obedience to the Sovereign Prince. He deceiveth himself, and mistaketh us, if he think that we hold any such ridiculous opinions. If he could show that Bishops do challenge an infallibility to themselves by divine right, and which is more than infallibility, a power to authorize all their commands for true religion, he said something to the purpose.  
He telleth us that he remembers there have been books written to entitle the Bishops to a divine right underived from the Civil Sovereign. Very likely if the law of nature do make a divine right. Perhaps a locomotive faculty, or a liberty of respiration, which all other men do challenge as well as Bishops. But he meaneth no religion, Why not? They have their holy orders by succession from the Apostles, not from their civil Sovereigns. They have the power of the keys by the concession of Christ, Whose sins yet remit they are remitted, whose sins ye retain they are retained. None can give that to another, which they have not themselves. Where did Christ give the power of the keys, to the civil Magistrate?  
I was far enough from thinking of Odes, when I writ my defence of liberty. That which he calleth my Ode, was written about a thousand years before I was born. I cited it only to show the sense of the primitive Christians, concerning obedience to the unlawful commands of Sovereign Princes, that we ought to obey God rather than them. And to that it is full. 
jussum est Caesaris ore Gallieni,  
Princeps quod colit ut colamus omnes,  
Aeternum colo principem dierum;  
Factorem dominumque Gallieni.  This put him into such a fit of versifying, that he could not forbear to make a Parode, such as it is, wherein out of pure zeal (if it were worth taking notice of) he retaineth the errors of the press.  
And so confounding Regal Supremacy with a kind of omnipotence, and the external Regiment of the Church with the power of the keys, and jurisdiction in the inner court of conscience, and foreign usurpations with the ancient rights and liberties of the English Church, and a stipendiary Schoolmaster (who hath neither title nor right, but the mere pleasure of the master of the family) with Bishops, who are the successors of the Apostles in that part of their office which is of ordinary and perpetual necessity, and the King's proper council in Ecclesiastical affairs. He concludeth his Animadversion with this fair intimation to Doctor Hamond and me, That if we had gone upon these his principles, when we did write in defence of the Church of England, against the imputation of Schism, quitting our own pretences of jurisdiction and jus divinum, we had not been so shrewdly handled, as we have been by an English Papist. I hope neither the Church of England, nor any genuine son of the English Church, hath complained to him, that the Church hath suffered any disadvantage by our pains; nor our adversaries in that cause boasted to him of any advantage they have gained; I do rather believe that it is but his own imagination, without ever reading either party. Why should he interrupt his sadder meditations with reading such trifles? But for his principles (as he calleth them) I thank him, I will have nothing to do with them, except it be to show him how destructive they are both to Church and Commonwealth. But this I believe in earnest, that if we had gone upon his principles, we should not have made ourselves the object of our adversaries pity, but well of their scorn.  
In his conclusion, or in his postscript (choose whether you will call it) first he setteth down his censure of my defence, with the same ingenuity and judgement that he hath showed hitherto, that is none at all, which I esteem no more than a deaf nut. Let the book justify itself. And to the manner of writing, he bites first, and whines; doth an injury and complains. The Reader will find no railing in my Treatise, nor any of those faults which he objecteth; I rather fear that he will censure it as too complying with such an adversary. But he had not then given me so much occasion, as he hath done since, to make him lose that pleasure in reading which he took in writing.  
In the next place he presenteth to the Readers view a large muster of terms and phrases, such as are used in the Schools, which he calleth nonsense, and the language of the kingdom of darkness, that is all the confutation which he vouchsafeth them. He hath served them up oft enough before to the Readers loathing. Let him take it for a warning, wheresoever he reneweth his complaint, I shall make bold to renew my story of old Harpaste, who complained that the room was dark, when the poor Beldame wanted her sight. There is more true judgement and solid reason in any one of the worst of those phrases which he derides, than there is in one of his whole Sections.  
Thirdly, he cavilleth against a saying of mine which he repeateth thus, He hath said that his opinion is demonstrable in reason, though he be not able to comprehend how it consisteth together with God's eternal prescience, and though it exceed his weak capacity, yet he ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest. Whence he concludeth after this manner. So to him that truth is manifest and demonstrable by reason, which is beyond his capacity. Let the Reader see what an uningenuous adversary he is. In my first discourse of Liberty I had these words, [we ought not to desert a certain truth because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner] To which he answereth, And I say the same. In my defence I repeat the same words, adding these, [Such a truth is that which I maintain, That the will of man in ordinary actions is free from extrinsical determination. A truth demonstrable by reason, received and believed by all the World. And therefore though I be not able to comprehend or express exactly the certain manner how it consists with God's eternal prescience and decrees, which exceed my weak capacity, yet I ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest.] So first he quarrelleth now with that truth which formerly he yielded. Secondly, that which I spoke upon supposition [though I be not able,] he setteth down positively in his collection, which is beyond his capacity. Thirdly, he leaveth out the word [exactly.] A man may comprehend truly that which he doth not comprehend exactly. Fourthly, he omitteth fraudulently these words [the certain manner] A truth may be certain and demonstrable, and yet the manner of it not demonstrable, or a man may know several ways of reconciling two truths together: And yet fluctuate in his judgement to which of them certainly and expressly he ought to adhere. It is certain that by the force of a man's arm a stone is thrown upwards; And yet the certain manner how to reconcile this with another truth, That whatsoever acteth upon another body, acteth by a touching, is not so easily found out. The incarnation of Christ is certain, yet the certain manner passeth both my capacity and his. Lastly, I do not say (as he suggesteth,) that that truth which is demonstrable by reason passeth my capacity, but the certain and exact manner how to reconcile this truth with another truth. Yet there are sundry ways of reconciling of them; And I have showed him one in the same Section, which he is not able to refute. See how his discourse hangs together like ropes of sand. The prescience and decrees of God pass the capacity of mortal man, therefore the liberty of the will is not demonstrable by reason.  
From the hard words and nonsense of the Schools, he passeth to my little Logic and no Philosophy. It skilleth not much what he saith, unless he were a greater clerk. He hath passed over a great part of my defence untouched; But I have not omitted one sentence throughout his Animadversions, wherein I could find any one grain of reason. And among the rest, have satisfied his silly censures, or ignorant exceptions, in their proper places, and the splinters of those broken reeds stick in his own fingers.  
Before he concludes, he draweth up a summary of what he and I have maintained, very confusedly, most imperfectly, and in part falsely. Methinks it resembleth that unskilful Painter who durst not leave his pictures to the free judgement of the beholders, unless he writ over their heads, This is a dog, and this is a bear; we had such a summary or draught of the Controversy in his Fountains of Arguments, before his Animadversions, as a Proem. And now we have such another breveate in the conclusion by way of Epilogue after his Animadversions. He is very diffident of his cause who standeth in need of such Proemes and Epilogues, and dare not trust the indifferent Reader to choose his own diet, unless he do first chop it and chew it for him, and then thrust it down his throat. The last word may be efficacious with an ignorant multitude, who are like a ship at Hulle, every wave puts it into a new positure. But more accurate palates do naucitate and loath such thrice sodden coleworts. I leave the Reader to compare plea with plea, and proof with proof. And let truth overcome.  
Thus he concludeth with a short Apology, lest the Reader should think that he hath not used me with that respect which he ought, or might have done without disadvantage to his cause. His only reason is, because divens in their books and sermons, without answering any of his arguments, have exclaimed against him, and reviled him for some things delivered by him in his book De Cive. What doth this concern me? No more than the man in the Moon. Yes he saith, whereof the Bishop of Derry is one. Most falsely. I never preached against him, nor write against his book De Cive, but privately to himself, and then with more respect than either he or it deserved. But his meaning was not by this Apology to make me any reparation, but to deter others from meddling with him, lest he should make examples of them as he boasteth that he hath done of me. Beware Reader he beareth hay on his horn●…. If he have gained any thing by his disrespect, much good may it do him. I do not envy him. Let the Reader judge. And if he have any spark of ingenuity left in him, let himself judge, whether he hath made an example of me or of himself. Or if he like it better, let him thrust his head into a bush, and suppose that no body seeth his errors, because he is not willing to take notice of them himself.    

The catching OF LEVIATHAN, OR THE GREAT WHALE.  
Demonstrating, out of Mr. Hobbs his own Works, That no man who is throughly an Hobbist, can be a good Christian, or a good Commonwealth's man, or reconcile himself to himself.  
Because his Principles are not only destructive to all Religion, but to all Societies; extinguishing the Relation between Prince and Subject, Parent and Child, Master and Servant, Husband and Wife: and abound with palpable contradictions.  
By john Bramhall, D. D. and Bishop of Derry.  
Prov. 12. 19 The lip of truth shall be established for ever, but a lying tongue is but for a moment.  
London, Printed by E. T. for john Crook, at the sign of the Ship in Paul's Churchyard. 1658.   

TO THE Christian Reader.  
CHristian Reader, this short Treatise was not intended, or sent to the Press, as a complete Refutation of all Mr. Hobbs his errors in Theology and Policy: but only as an Appendix to my Castigations of his Animadversions, to let him see the vanity of his petulant scoffs and empty brags, and how open he doth lie to the lash, whensoever any one will vouchsafe to take him in hand to purpose.  
But some of my good friends have prevailed with me to alter my design, and to make this small Treatise independent upon the other. He who clasheth ordinarily with all the Churches in the World, about the common principles of Religion: He who swerveth so often, so affectedly, from the approved rules, and healthful constitutions of all orderly Commonwealths: He who doth not only disturb, but destroy all humane society, and all relations between man and man: He who cannot preserve unity with himself; but ever and anon is inferring, and tripping up his own heels by his contradictions, needeth no just confutation, or single, or other Adversary than God, and himself, and all mankind.  
If he did ground his opinions upon any other authority than his own dreams; If he did interpret Scripture according to the perpetual tradition of the Catholic Church, and not according to his private distempered fantasies: If his discourse were as full of deep reasons as it is of supercilious confidence, so that a man might gain either knowledge or reputation by him, a great volume would be well bestowed upon him, Digna res esset ubi quis nervos intenderet suos. But to what purpose is it to draw the cord of contention with such a man, in such a cause, where it is impiety to doubt, much more to dispute? 
Quid cum illis agas qui neque jus, neque bonum aut ●…quum sciunt?  
Melius pejus, profit obsit, nihil vident, nisi quod lubet.   
For mine own part, as long as God shall furnish me with ability and opportunity, I will endeavour to bestow my vacant hours upon a better subject, conducing more to the advancement of primitive Piety, and the reunion of Christendom, by disabusing the hood-winked World, than this doth tend to the increase of Atheism and destruction of ancient truth; unless the importunity of T. H. or some other divert me to look to my own defence. I desire thy Christian prayers, that God who hath put this good desire into my mind, by his preventing grace, will help me by his assisting grace, to bring the same to good effect.   

The Preface.  
HItherto I have made use only of a buckler to guard myself from Mr. Hobbes his assaults. What passed between him and me in private had been buried in perpetual silence, if his flattering Disciples (not without his own fault, whether it were connivance or neglect is not material to me) had not published it to the World to my prejudice, And now having carved out mine own satisfaction, I thought to have desisted here, as not esteeming him to be a fit adversary, who denieth all common principles, but rather to be like a pillar of smoke breaking out of the top of some narrow chimney, and spreading itself abroad like a cloud, as if it threatened to take possession of the whole Region of the air, darkening the sky, and seeming to pierce the heavens. And after all this, when it hath offended the eyes a little for the present, the first puff of wind, or a few minutes, do altogether disperse it.  
I never nourished within my breast the least thought of answering his Leviathan, as 
D R. C. P. I. S.  having seen a great part of it answered before ever I read it, and having moreover received it from good hands, that a Roman Catholic was about it: but being braved by the author in print, as giving me a title for my answer, Behemoth against Leviathan. And at other times being so solicitous for me what I 
Qu. p. 20. ibid. p. 340.  would say to such a passage in my answer to his Leviathan, imagining his silly cavils to be irrefragable demonstrations; I will take the liberty (by his good leave) to throw on two or three spadefulls of earth, towards the final interrement of his pernicious principles and other mushroom errors, And, truly, when I ponder seriously the horrid consequences of them, I do not wonder so much at his mistaken exception to my civil form of valediction, [So God 
Qu. p. 20.  bless us,] miscalling it A buffonly abusing of the Name of God to calumny. He conceived me amiss, that because in times less scrupulous and more conscientious, men used to bless themselves after this form at the naming of the devil; therefore I did intend it as a prayer for the deliverance of all good Christians from him, and his blasphemous opinions.  
I do believe there never was any Author Sacred or Profane, Ancient or Modern, Christian, jew, Mahometan, or Pagan, that hath inveighed so frequently and so bitterly against all feigned phantasms, with their first devisers, maintainers, and receivers, as T. H. hath done, excluding out of the nature of things the souls of Men, Angels, Devils, and all incorporeal Substances, as fictions, phantasms, and groundless contradictions. Many men fear the meaning of it is not good, that God himself must be gone for company, as being an incorporeal substance, except men will vouchsafe by God to understand nature. So much T H. himself seemeth to intimate. This concourse of causes, whereof every one is determined to be such as it is by a like 
Qu. p. 80.  concourse of former causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the Decree of God. If God's eternal Decree be nothing else but the concourse of natural causes, then Almighty God is nothing else but nature. And if there be no spirits or incorporeal substances, he must be either nature or nothing. T. H. defieth the Schools, and therefore he knoweth no difference between immanent, and emanant or transient Actions, but confoundeth the eternal Decrees of God before all time, with the execution of them in time, which had been a foul fault in a Schooleman.  
And yet his Leviathan, or mortal God, is a mere phantasm of his own devising, neither 
Leviathan a mere phantasm.  flesh nor fish, but a confusion of a man and a whale, engendered in his own brain: not unlike Dagon the Idol of the Philistims, a mixture of a god and a man and a fish. The true literal Leviathan is the Whale-fish. Canst thou 
Job 41. 1. Psal. 104. 25.  draw out Leviathan with an hook? whom God hath made to take his pastime in the great and wide sea. And for a metaphorical Leviathan, I know none so proper to personate that huge body as T. H. himself. The Levia 
T. H. The true Leviathan.  than doth not take his pastime in the deep with so much freedom, nor behave himself with so much height and insolence, as T. H. doth in the Schools, nor domineer over the lesser fishes with so much scorn and contempt, as he doth over all other authors; censuring, branding, contemning, proscribing whatsoever is contrary to his humour; bustling and bearing down before him whatsoever cometh in his way, creating truth and falsehood by the breath of his mouth, by his sole authority without other reason; A second Pythagoras at least. There have been self conceited persons in all Ages, but none that could ever King it like him over all the children of pride. Ruit, agit, rapit, tundit & prosternit. 
Job 41. 34.   
Yet is not his Leviathan such an absolute Sovereign of the Sea as he imagineth. God 
1 Cor. 1. 27.  hath chosen the weak things of this world to confound the mighty. The little mouse stealeth up through the Elephant's trunk to eat his brains, making him die desperately mad. The Indian rat creepeth into the belly of the gaping Crocodile, and knaweth his bowels asunder. 
Leviathan no Sovereign of the sea.  The great Leviathan hath his adversaries; the swordfish which pierceth his belly beneath, and the thrasher-fish, which beateth his head above: and whensoever these two unite their forces together against him, they destroy him. But this is the least part of his Leviathans sufferings. Our Greenland fishers have found out a new art to draw him out of his Castle, that is, the deep, though not with a fish-hook, yet with their harping-irons, and by giving him line and space enough to bounce and tumble up and down, and tyre himself right out, and try all his arts, as spouting up a sea of water out of his mouth to drown them, and striking at their Shallops with his tail to overwhelm them: at last to draw this formidable creature to the shore, or to their ship, and slice him in pieces, and boil him in a Cauldron, and tun him up in oil.  
I have provided three good harping-irons for myself to dart at this monster, and am resolved to try my skill and fortune, whether I can be as successful against this fantastic Leviathan, as they are against the true Leviathan.  
My first dart is aimed at his heart, or Theological part of his discourse, to show that his principles are not consistent either with Christianity, or any other Religion.  
The second dart is aimed at the chine, whereby this vast body is united and fitted for animal motion, that is, the political part of his discourse; to show that his principles are per nicious to all forms of Government, and all Societies, and destroy all relations between man and man.  
The third dart is aimed at his head or rational part of his discourse; to show that his principles are inconsistent with themselves, and contradict one another. Let him take heed, if these three darts do pierce his Leviathan home, it is not all the Dittany which groweth in Crect that can make them drop easily out of his body, without the utter overthrow of his cause.  — haerebit lateri lethalis arundo  

CHAP. 1.  
That the Hobbian Principles are destructive to Cristianity and all Religion.  
THe Image of God is not altogether 
Nature dictates the existence and worship of God.  defaced by the fall of man, but that there will remain some practical notions of God and goodness; which, when the mind is free from vagrant desires, and violent passions, do shine as clearly in the heart; as other speculative notions do in the head. Hence it is, That there never was any Nation so barbarous or savage throughout the whole World, which had not their God. They who did never wear clothes upon their backs, who did never know Magistrate, but their father, yet have their God, and their religious rites and devotions to him. Hence it is, That the greatest Atheists in any sudden danger do unwittingly cast their eyes up to Heaven, as craving aid from thence, and in a thunder creep into some hole to hide themselves. And they who are conscious to themselves of any secret crimes, though they be secure enough from the justice of men, do yet feel the blind blows of a guilty conscience, and fear divine vengeance. This is acknowledged by T. H. himself in his lucid intervalles. That we may know what worship of God natural reason doth 
C. c. 15. s. 14.  assign, let us begin with his attributes, where it is manifest in the first place; That existency is to be attributed to him. To which he addeth infiniteness, incomprehensibility, unity, ubiquity. Thus for attributes, next for actions. Concerning external actions, wherewith God is to be worshipped, the most general precept of reason is, that they be signs of honour, under which are contained Prayers, Thanksgivings, Oblations, and Sacrifices. Yet to let us see how inconsistent 
T. H. no friend to religion.  and irreconciliable he is with himself; elsewhere reckoning up all the laws of nature at large, even twenty in number, he hath not one word that concerneth religion, or that hath the least relation in the World to God. As if a man were like the Colt of a wild Ass in the wilderness, without any owner or obligation. Thus in describing the laws of nature, this great Clerk forgetteth the God of nature, and the main and principal laws of nature, which contain a man's duty to his God, and the principal end of his creation. Perhaps he will say that he handleth the laws of nature there, only so far as may serve to the constitution or settlement of a Commonwealth. In good time, let it be so. He hath devised us a trim Commonwealth, which is neither founded upon religion towards God, nor justice towards man ' but merely upon self interest, and self preservation. Those rays of heavenly light, those natural seeds of religion, which God himself hath imprinted in the heart of man, are more efficacious towards the preservation of a Society; whether we regard the nature of the thing, or the blessing of God, than all his pacts, and surrenders, and translations of power. He who unteacheth men their duty to God, may make them eye-servants, so long as their interest doth oblige them to obey, but is no fit master to teach men conscience and fidelity.  
Without religion, Societies are but like soapy bubbles, quickly dissolved. It was the judgement of as wise a man as T. H. himself, (though perhaps he will hardly be persuaded to it) that Rome ought more of its grandeur to religion, than either to strength or stratagems. We have not exceeded the Spaniards in 
Cic. Har. Respons. Orat. in P. Clod.  number, nor the Galls in strength, nor the Carthaginians in craft, nor the Grecians in art, etc. but we have overcome all nations by our piety and religion.  
Among his laws he inserteth gratitude to 
C. c. 3. s. 8.  man as the third precept of the law of nature, but of the gratitude of mankind to their Creator, there is a deep silence. If men had sprung up from the earth in a night like mushrooms or excrescences, without all sense of honour, justice, conscience, or gratitude he could not have vilified the human nature more than he doth.  
From this shameful omission or pretetition of the main duty of mankind, a man might easily take the height of T. H. his religion. But he himself putteth it past all conjectures. His principles are brim full of prodigious impiety. In these four things, opinions of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion to what men fear, and 
Le. p. 54.  taking of things casual, for prognostics, consisteth the natural seed of religion; the culture and improvement whereof, he refereth only to Policy. Humane and divine politics, are but politics. And again, Mankind hath this 
Ci. c. 16. s. 1.  from the conscience of their own weakness, and the admiration of natural events, that the most part of men believe that there is an invisible God, the maker of all visible things. And a little after he telleth us, That superstition proceedeth from fear without right reason, and Atheism from an opinion of reason without fear; making Atheism to be more reasonable than superstition. What is now become of that divine worship which natural reason did assign unto God, the honour of existence, infiniteness, incomprehensibility, unity, ubiquity? What is now become of that dictate or precept of reason, concerning prayers, thanksgivings, oblations, sacrifices, if uncertain opinions, ignorance, fear, mistakes, the conscience of our own weakness, and the admiration of natural events be the only seeds of religion?  
He proceedeth further, That Atheism itself, though it be an erroneous opinion, and therefore 
Excuseth Atheism. Ci. c. 14. s. 19  a sin, yet it ought to be numbered among the sins of imprudence or ignorance. He addeth, that an Atheist is punished not as a Subject is punished by his King, because he did not observe laws: but as an enemy by an enemy, because he would not accept laws. His reason is, because the Atheist never submitted his will to the will of God, whom 
Ci. c. 15. s. 7.  he never thought to be. And he concludeth that man's obligation to obey God, proceedeth from his weakness. Manifestum est obligationem ad prestandum ipsi (Deo) obedientiam, incumbere hominibus propter imbecilitatem. First it is impossible that should be a sin of mere ignorance or imprudence, which is dirictly contrary to the light of natural reason. The laws of nature need no new promulgation, being imprinted naturally by God in the heart of man. The law of nature was written 
Qu. p. 137.  in our hearts by the finger of God, without our assent; or rather the law of nature is the assent itself. Then if nature dictate to us that there is a God, and that this God is to be worshipped in such and such manner, it is not possible that Atheism should be a sin of mere ignorance.  
Secondly, a rebellious Subject is still a Subject, de jure, though not, de facto, by right, though not by deed: And so the most cursed Atheist that is, aught by right to be the Subject of God, and aught to be punished not as a just enemy, but as a disloyal traitor. Which is confessed by himself, This fourth sin (that is, of those who do not by word and deed confess one God the supreme King of Kings) in 
Ci. c. 15. s. 19  the natural kingdom of God is the crime of high treason, for it is a denial of divine power, or Atheism. Then an Atheist is a traitor to God, and punishable as a disloial Subject, not as an enemy.  
Lastly it is an absurd and dishonourable assertion, to make our obedience to God to depend upon our weakness, because we cannot help it, and not upon our gratitude, because we owe our being and preservation to him. Who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof? Or who feedeth a flock and 
1 Cor. 9: 7.  eateth not of the milk of the flock? And again, Thou art worthy O Lord to receive glory, and honour, and power, for thou hast created all things, 
Rev. 4. 11.  and for thy pleasure they are and were created. But it were much better, or at least not so ill, to be a downright Atheist, than to make God to be such a thing as he doth, and at last thrust him into the devil's office, to be the cause of all sin.  
For T. H. his god is not the God of 
Destroys God's ubiquity.  Christians, nor of any rational men. Our God is every where, and seeing he hath no parts, he must be wholly here, and wholly there, and wholly every where. So nature it self dictateth. It cannot be said honourably of 
Ci. c. 15. s. 14.  God that he is in a place, for nothing is in a place; but that which hath proper bounds of its greatness. But T. H. his God is not wholly every where. No man can conceive that any thing is all in this 
Le. p. 11.  place, and all in another place at the same time, for none of these things ever have or can be incident to sense. So far well, if by conceiving he mean comprehending; But than follows, That these are absurd speeches taken upon credit, without any signification at all, from deceived Philosophers, and deceived or deceiving Schoolmen. Thus he denyeth the ubiquity of God. A circumscriptive, a definitive, and a repletive being in a place, is some heathen language to him.  
Our God is immutable without any shadow 
His eternity.  of turning by change, to whom all things are present, nothing past, nothing to come. But T. H. his god is measured by time, losing something that is past, and acquiring something that doth come every minute. That is as much as to say, That our God is infinite, and his god is finite, for unto that which is actually infinite, nothing can be added, neither time nor parts. Hear himself, Nor do I understand what derogation it can be to the divine perfection, to attribute to it potentiality, 
Qu. p. 266.  that is in English, power, (so little doth he understand what potentiality is) and successive duration. And he chargeth it upon us as a fault; that will not have eternity to be an endless 
Le. p. 374.  succession of time. How, successive duration, and an endless succession of time in God? Then God is finite, then God is elder to day, than he was yesterday. Away with blasphemies. Before he destroyed the ubiquity of God, and now he destroyeth his eternity.  
Our God is a perfect, pure, simple, indivisible, 
His simpl●…city.  infinite essence; free from all composition of matter and form, of substance and accidents. All matter is finite, and he who acteth by his infinite essence, needeth neither organs, nor faculties, nor accidents, to render him more complete. But T. H. his god is a divisible god, a compounded god, that hath matter, and qualities, or accidents. Hear himself. I argue thus, The divine substance is indivisible, but eternity is the divine substance. The Major is evident because God is Actus simplicissimus; The minor is confessed by all men, that whatsoever is attributed to God, is God. Now listen to his answer, The Major is so far from being evident, that Actus simplicissimus 
Qu. p. 267.  signifieth nothing. The Minor is said by some men, thought by no man, whatsoever is thought is understood. The Major was this, The divine substance is indivisible. Is this far from being evident? Either it is indivisible or divisible. If it be not indivisible, than it is divisible, than it is materiate, than it is corporeal, than it hath parts, than it is finite by his own confession. Habere parts, aut esse totum aliquid, sunt uttributa finitorum. Upon this silly conceit, he 
Ci. c. 15. s. 14.  chargeth me for saying, That God is not just, but justice itself, not eternal, but eternity itself, which he calleth unseemly words to be said 
Qu. p. 266.  of God. And he thinketh he doth me a great courtesy in not adding blasphemous and atheistical. But his bolts are so soon shot, and his reasons are such vain imaginations, and such drowsy fantasies, that no sad man doth much regard them. Thus he hath already destroyed the ubiquity, the eternity, and the simplicity of God. I wish he had considered better with himself, before he had desperately cast himself upon these rocks.  
But paulo maiora canamus, my next charge is, That he destroys the very being of God, 
His existence.  and leaves nothing in his place but an empty name. For by taking away all incorporal substances, he taketh away God himself. The very name (saith he) of an incorporal substance, is a contradiction. And to say that an Angel or Spirit is an incorporeal substance, is to say in effect, that there is no Angel or Spirit at all. 
Le. p. 214.  By the same reason to say, That God is an incorporal substance, is to say there is no God at all. Either God is incorporal, or he is finite, and consists of parts, and consequently is no God. This, That there is no incorporal spirit, is that main root of Atheism, from which so many lesser branches are daily sprouting up.  
When they have taken away all incorporal spirits, what do they leave God himself to be? He who is the fountain of all being, from whom and in whom all creatures have their being, must needs have a real being of his own. And what real being can God have among bodies and accidents? for they have left nothing else in the universe. Then T. H. may move the same question of God, which he did of devils. I would gladly know in what classis of entities, the Bishop ranketh God? Infinite 
Qu. p. 160  being and participated being are not of the same nature. Yet to speak according to humane apprehension (apprehension and comprehension differ much, T. H. confesseth that natural reason doth dictate to us, that God is infinite, yet natural reason cannot comprehend the infiniteness of God) I place him among incorporeal substances or spirits, because he hath been pleased to place himself in that rank, God is a spirit. Of 
Joh. 4. 24.  which place T. H. giveth his opinion, that it is unintelligible, and all others of the same nature, and fall not under humane understanding. 
Le. p. 208.   
They who deny all incorporeal substances, can understand nothing by God, but either nature, (not naturam naturantem, that is, a real author of nature, but naturam naturatam, that is the orderly concourse of natural causes, (as T. H. seemeth to intimate) or a fiction of the brain without real being, cherished for advantage and politic ends, as a profitable error, howsoever dignified with the glorious title of the eternal causes of all things.  
We have seen what his principles are concerning the Deity, they are full as bad or 
The Trinity. Le. p. 268.  worse concerning the Trinity. Hear himself. A person is he that is represented, as often as he is represented. And therefore God who has been represented, that is, personated thrice, may properly enough be said to be three Persons, though neither the word Person nor Trinity be ascribed to him in the Bible. And a little after, to concludeth doctrine of the Trinity as far as can be gathered directly from the Scripture, is in substance this, that the God who is always one and the same, was he person represented by Moses, the person represented by his Son incarnate, and the person represented by the Apostles. As represented by the Apostles, the holy spirit by which they spoke is God. As represented by his son that was God and Man, the Son is that God. As represented by Moses, and the High Priests; the Father, that is to say, the Father of our Lord jesus Christ is that God. From whence we may gather the reason why those names; Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in the signification of the Godhead, are never used in the Old Testament. For they are persons, that is, they have their names from representing, which could not be, till divers men had represented God's person, in ruling or in directing under him.  
Who is so bold as blind Bayard? The emblime of a little boy attempting to lad all the water out of the sea with a Coccleshel, doth fit T. H. as exactly as if it had been shaped for him, who thinketh to measure the profound and inscrutable mysteries of religion, by his own silly, shallow conceits. What is now become of the great adorable mystery of the blessed undivided Trinity? it is shrunk into nothing. Upon his grounds there was a time when there was no Trinity. And we must blot these words out of our Creed, The Father eternal, the Son eternal, the Holy Ghost eternal. And these other words out of our Bibles, Let us make man after our image. Unless we mean that this was a consultation of God with Moses and the Apostles. What is now become of the eternal generation of the Son of God, if this Sonship did not begin until about four thousand years after the creation were expired. Upon these grounds every King hath as many persons as there be Justices of Peace, and petty Constables in his kingdom. Upon this account God Almighty hath as many persons as there have been Sovereign Princes in the World since Adam. According to this reckoning each one of us like so many Gerious, may have as many persons as we please to make procurations. Such bold presumption requireth another manner of confutation.  
Concerning God the Son, forgetting what he had said elsewhere, where he calleth him God and man, and the Son of God incarnate, he doubteth not to say that the word, hypostatical, 
Le. p. 21.  is canting. As if the same person could be both God and man without a personal, that is, an hypostatical, union of the two natures of God and man. He alloweth every man who is commanded by his lawful Sovereign, to deny 
Le. p. 271.  Christ with his tongue before men. He deposeth Christ from his true kingly office, making his kingdom not to commence or begin before the 
Ci. c. 17. s. 5. 6.  day of judgement. And the regiment wherewith Christ governeth his faithful in this life, is not properly a kingdom, but a pastoral office, or a right to teach. And a little after, Christ had not kingly authority committed to him by his Father in this World, but only consiliary and doctrinal.  
He taketh away his Priestly or propitiatory office; And although this act of our redemption 
Le. p. 248.  be not always in Scripture called a Sacrifice and oblation, but sometimes a price, yet by price we are not to understand any thing, by the value whereof he could claim right to a pardon for us from his offended father, but that price which God the Father was pleased in mercy to demand. And again, Not that the death of one man, though without sin, can satisfy for the offences of 
Le. p. 261.  all men in the rigour of justice, but in the mercy of God, that ordained such Sacrifices for sin, as he was pleased in mercy to accept. He knoweth no difference between one who is mere man, and one who was both God and man; between a Levitical Sacrifice, and the all-sufficient Sacrifice of the Cross; between the blood of a Calf, and the precious blood of the Son of God.  
And touching the Prophetical Office of Christ, I do much doubt whether he do believe in earnest, that there is any such thing as prophesy in the World. He maketh very little difference between a Prophet and a madman, and a demoniac. And if there were nothing 
Le. p. 36.  else (saith he) that bewrayed their madness, yet that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves, is argument enough. He maketh the pretence of inspiration in any man to be, and always to have been, an opinion pernicious to peace, and tending to the dissolution of all civil 
Le. p. 169.  government. He subjecteth all Prophetical Revelations from God, to the sole pleasure and censure of the Sovereign Prince, either to authorise them, or to exauctorate them. So as two Prophets prophesying the same thing at the same time, in the dominions of two different Princes, the one shall be a true Prophet, the other a false. And Christ who had the approbation of no Sovereign Prince, upon his grounds, was to be reputed a false Prophet every where. Every man therefore aught to consider who is the Sovereign Prophet, 
Le. p. 232.  that is to say, who it is that is God's Vicegerent upon earth, and hath next under God the authority of governing Christian men, and to observe for a rule that doctrine which in the name of God he hath commanded to be taught, and thereby to examine and try out the truth of those doctrines which pretended Prophets, with miracle or without, shall at any time advance, etc. And if he disavow them, than no more to obey their voice; or if he approve them, than to obey them as men, to whom God hath given a part of the spirit of their Sovereign. Upon his principles the case holdeth as well among Jews and Turks and Heathens, as Christians. Then he that teacheth transubstantiation in France, is a true Prophet, he that teacheth it in England, a false Prophet. He that blasphemeth Christ in Constantinople, a true Prophet, he that doth the same in Italy, a false Prophet. Then 
1 Sam. 15.  Samuel was a false Prophet to contest with Saul a Sovereign Prophet: So was the man 
1 King. 13.  of God who submitted not to the more divine and prophetic spirit of Jeroboam. And 
1 King. 18. 2 Chr. 18.  Elijah for reproving Ahab. Then Micaiah had but his deserts, to be clapped up in prison, and fed with bread of affliction, and water of affliction, for daring to contradict God's Vicegerent upon earth. And Jeremiah was justly 
Jer. 38.  thrown into a Dungeon, for prophesying against Zedekiah his Liege Lord. If his principles were true, it were strange indeed, that none of all these Princes, nor any other that ever was in the World, should understand their own privileges. And yet more strange, that God Almighty should take the part of such rebellious Prophets, and justify their prophecies by the event, if it were true that none but the Sovereign in a Christian (the 
Le. p. 250.  reason is the same for Jewish) Commonwealth can take notice what is or what is not the word of God.  
Neither doth he use God the holy Ghost more favourably than God the Son. Where S. Peter saith Holy men of God spoke as they were moved by the holy Spirit; He saith By 
Leu. p. 214.  the Spirit, is meant the voice of God in a dream or vision supernatural, which dreams or visions, he maketh to be no more than imaginations, which they had in their sleep, or in an ecstasy, 
Leu. p. 227.  which in every true Prophet were supernatural, but in false Prophets were either natural or feigned, and more likely to be false than true. To say God hath spoken to him in a dream, is no more than to say, He dreamt that God spoke to him, etc. To say he hath seen a vision, or heard a voice, is to say. That he hath dreamt between sleeping and 
Leu. p. 196.  waking. So S. Peter's holy Ghost is come to be their own imaginations, which might be either feigned, or mistaken, or true. As if the holy Ghost did enter only at their eyes, and at their ears, not into their understandings, nor into their minds; Or as if the holy Ghost did not seal unto their hearts the truth and assurance of their Prophecies. Whether a new light be infused into their understandings, or new graces be inspired into their heart, they are wrought, or caused, or created immediately by the holy Ghost, And so are his imaginations, if they be supernatural.  
But he must needs fall into these absurdities, who maketh but a jest of inspiration. They who pretend Divine inspiration to be a supernatural entering of the holy Ghost into a man, are (as he thinks) in a very dangerous dilemma; for 
Leu. p. 361.  if they worship not the men whom they conceive to be inspired, they fall into impiety; And if they worship them, they commit idolatry. So mistaking the holy Ghost to be corporeal, something that is blown into a man, and the graces of the holy Ghost to be corporeal graces. And the words, impowered or infused virtue, and, inblown or inspired virtue, are as absurd 
Leu. p. 17.  and insignificant, as a round qnadrangle. He reckons it as a common error, That faith and sanctity are not attained by study and reason, but by supernatural inspiration or infusion. And layeth this for a firm ground: Faith and sanctity are indeed not very frequent, but yet they are 
Leu. p. 169.  not miracles, but brought to pass by education, discipline, correction, and other natural waeyes. I would see the greatest Pelagian of them all fly higher.  
Why should he trouble himself about the holy Spirit, who acknowledgeth no spirit but either a subtle fluid invisible body, or a ghost, or other idol or phantasm of the imagination; who knoweth no inward grace or intrinsecal holiness. Holy is a word which in God's kingdom answereth to that which men in 
Leu. p. 220.  their kingdoms use to call public, or the kings. And again, wheresoever the word holy is taken properly, there is still something signified of propriety gotten by consent. His holiness is a relation, not a quality; but for inward sanctification, or real infused holiness, in respect whereof the third person is called the holy Ghost, because he is not only holy in himself, but also maketh us holy, he is so great a stranger to it, that he doth altogether deny it, and disclaim it.  
We are taught in our Creed to believe the Catholic or Universal Church. But T. H. teacheth us the contrary, That if there be more Christian Churches than one, all of them together 
De Cive, c. 17. s. 22.  are not one Church personally. And more plainly, Now if the whole number of Christians be not contained in one Commonwealth, they are 
Le. p. 206.  not one person, nor is there an Universal Church, that hath any authority over them. And again, The Universal Church is not one person, of which it can be said, that it hath done, or decreed, or ordained, or excommunicated, or absolved. This doth quite overthrow all the authority of general 
Ci. c. 17.] 〈◊〉. 26.  Councils.  
All other men distinguish between the Church and the Commonwealth: Only T. H. maketh them to be one and the same thing. The Commonwealth of Christian men and the Church of the same, are altogether the same thing, called by two names, for two reasons. For the matter of the Church and of the Commonwealth is the same, namely the same Christian men; And the form is the same, which consisteth in the lawful power of convocating them. 
Ci. c. 17. s. 21. Ci. c. 18. s. 1.  And hence he concludeth, That every Christian Commonwealth is a Church endowed with all spiritual authority. And yet more fully, The Church if it be one person, is the same thing with the Commonwealth of Christians, called a Commonwealth, because it consisteth of men united in one person their Sovereign; And a Church 
Le. p. 205.  because it consisteth in Christian men united in one Christian Sovereign. Upon which account there was no Christian Church in these parts of the World, for some hundreds of years after Christ, because there was no Christian Sovereign.  
Neither is he more orthodox concerning the Holy Scriptures, Hitherto, that is, for the books of Moses, the power of making the Scripture 
Le. p. 283.  canonical, was in the civil Sovereign. The like he saith of the Old Testament, made canonical by Esdras. And of the New Testament, That it was not the Apostles which made their own writings canonical, but every convert made them so to himself. Yet with this restriction, That until the Sovereign ruler had 
Le. p. 284.  prescribed them, they were but counsel and advise, which whether good or bad, he that was counselled might without injustice refuse to observe, and being contrary to the Laws established, could not without injustice observe. He maketh the Primitive Christians to have been in a pretty condition. Certainly the Gospel was contrary to the Laws then established. But most plainly, The word of the Interpreter of the Scripture is the word of God. And the same is the Interpreter of the Scripture, and the Sovereign judge of all Doctrines, that is, the Sovereign Magistrate, to whose authority we must stand no less, 
Ci. c. 17. s. 18.  than to Theirs, who at first did commend the Scripture to us for the canon of faith. Thus if Christian Sovereigns, of different communions, do clash one with another, in their interpretations, or misinterpretation of Scripture, (as they do daily) then the word of God is contradictory to itself; or that is the word of God in one Commonwealth, which is the word of the the devil in another Commonwealth: and the same thing may be true, and not true, at the same time: which is the peculiar privilege of T. H. to make contradictories to be true together.  
All the power, virtue, use, and efficacy, which he ascribeth to the holy Sacraments, is to be signs or commemorations. As for any 
Le. p. 22●…. Ci. c. 17. s. 7.  sealing, or confirming, or conferring of grace, he acknowledgeth nothing. The same he saith particularly of Baptism: upon which grounds a Cardinals red hat, or a Sergeant at arms his mace, may be called Sacraments as well as Baptism, or the holy Eucharist, if they be only signs or commemorations of a benefit. If he except, that Baptism and the Eucharist, are of divine institution: but a Cardinal's red hat, or a Sergeant at arms his mace are not: he saith truly, but nothing to his advantage or purpose, seeing he deriveth all the authority of the Word and Sacraments, in respect of Subjects, and all our obligation to them, from the authority of the Sovereign Magistrate, without which these 
Le. p. 133.  words repent and be baptised in the Name of jesus, are but counsel, no command. And so a Sergeant at arms his mace, and baptism, proceed both from the same authority. And this he saith upon this silly ground, That nothing is a command, the performance whereof tendeth to our own benefit. He might as well deny the Ten Commandments to be commands, because they have an advantageous promise annexed to them, Do this and thou shalt live; And cursed is every one that continueth not in all the words of this Law to do them.  
Sometimes he is for holy orders, and giveth to the Pastors of the Church the right of ordination and absolution, and infallibility, too much for a particular Pastor, or the Pastors 
Ci. c. 17. s. 24.  of one particular Church. It is manifest, that the consecration of the chiefest Doctors in every Church, and imposition of hands, doth pertain to the Doctors of the same Church. And it cannot be doubted of, but the power of binding and losing was given by Christ to the future Pastors, after the same manner as to his present Apostles. And 
Ibid. l. 28.  our Saviour hath promised this infallibility in those things which are necessary to salvation, to his Apostles, until the day of judgement, that is to say, to the Apostles and Pastors, to be consecrated by the Apostles successively, by the imposition of hands.  
But at other times he casteth all this meal down with his foot. Christian Sovereigns are the supreme Pastors, and the only persons whom 
Le p. 323.  Christians now hear speak from God, except such as God speaketh to in these days supernaturally, What is now become of the promised infallibility?  
And it is from the civil Sovereign, that all other Pastors derive their right of teaching, 
Le. p. 296.  preaching, and all other functions pertaining to that office, and they are but his Ministers in the same manner as the Magistrates of Towns, or judges in Courts of Justice, and Commanders of Armies. What is now become of their Ordination? Magistrates, Judges, and Generals, need no precedent qualifications. He maketh the Pastoral authority of Sovereigns to be jure divino, of all other Pastors jure civil. He addeth, neither is there any judge of Heresy among Subjects, but their own civil Sovereign.  
Lastly, The Church excommunicateth no man but whom she excommunicateth by the authorty of the Prince. And the effect of excommunication hath nothing in it, neither of 
Ci. c. 17. s. 26. Le. p. 277.  damage in this World, nor terror upon an Apostate, if the civil power did persecute or not assist the Church. And in the World to come, leaves them in no worse estate, than those who never believed. The damage rather redoundeth to the Church. Neither is the excommunication of a Christian Subject, that obeyeth the laws of his 
Le. p. 288  own Sovereign, of any effect. Where is now their power of binding and losing?  
It may be some of T. H. his disciples desire to know what hopes of heavenly joys they have upon their master's principles. They may hear them without any great contentment, There is no mention in Scripture, 
Le. p. 240.  nor ground in reason, of the coelum empyreum, that is, the Heaven of the blessed, where the Saints shall live eternally with God. And again, I have not found any text that can probably be drawn to prove any ascension of the Saints 
Le. p. 241.  into Heaven, that is to say, into any coelum empyreum. But he concludeth positively, that salvation shall be upon earth, when God shall reign at the coming of Christ in jerusalem. And again, In short, the Kingdom of God is a civil Kingdom, etc. called also the Kingdom of Heaven, and the Kingdom of Glory. All the Hobbians can hope for, is, to be restored to the same condition which Adam was in before his fall. So saith T. H. himself, From whence may be inferred, 
Le. p. 345. p. 30.  that the Elect, after the resurrection, shall be restored to the estate wherein Adam was before he had sinned. As for the beatifical vision he defineth to be a word unintelligible.  
But considering his other principles, I do not marvel much at his extravagance in this point. To what purpose should a coelum empyreum, or Heaven of the blessed, serve in his judgement, who maketh the blessed Angels that are the inhabitants of that happy mansion, to be either idols of the brain, that is in plain English, nothing, or thin, subtle, fluid bodies, destroying the Angelical nature. The unvierse being the aggregate of all bodies, 
Le. p. 207.  there is no real part thereof that is not also body. And elsewhere, Every part of the universe is 
Le. p. 371.  body, and that which is not body, is no part of the universe. And because the universe is all, that which is no part of it, is nothing, and consequently no where. How? by this doctrine he maketh not only the Angels, but God himself to be nothing. Neither doth he salve it at all, by supposing erroneously Angels to be corporeal spirits, and by attributing the name of incorporeal spirit to God, as being a name of more honour, in whom we consider not what attribute best expresseth his nature, which is incomprehensible, but what best expresseth our desire to honour him. Though we be not able to comprehend perfectly what God is, yet we are able to comprehend perfectly what God is not, that is, he is not imperfect, and therefore he is not finite, and consequently he is not corporeal. This were a trim way to honour God indeed, to honour him with a lie. If this that he say here be true, That every part of the universe is a body, and whatsoever is not a body, is nothing. Then by this doctrine, if God be not a body, God is nothing; not an incorporeal spirit, but one of the idols of the brain, a mere nothing, though they think they dance under a not, and have the blind of God's incomprehensibility, between them and discovery.  
To what purpose should a coelum empyreum serve in his judgement, who denieth the immortality of the soul? The doctrine is now, and hath been a long time far otherwise; namely, that every man hath eternity of life by nature, in as much as his soul is immortal. Who supposeth 
Le. p. 339.  that when a man dieth, there remaineth nothing of him but his carcase; Who maketh the word soul in holy Scripture to signify always either the life, or the living creature? And expoundeth the casting of body and soul into hellfire, to be the casting of body and life into hellfire. 
Le. p. 340.  Who maketh this Orthodox truth, That the souls of men are substances distinct from their bodies, to be an error contracted by the contagion of the demonology of the Greeks, and a window that gives entrance to the dark doctrine of eternal torments. Who expoundeth these words of Solomon, [Than shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return unto 
Eccl. 12. 7.  God that gave it.] Thus, God only knows what becomes of a man's spirit, when he expireth. He 
Le. p. 344.  will not acknowledge that there is a spirit, or any substance distinct from the body. I wonder what they think doth keep their bodies from stinking.  
But they that in one case are grieved, in another must be relieved. If perchance T. H. hath given his disciples any discontent in his doctrine of Heaven, and the holy Angels, and the glorified souls of the Saints, he will make them amends in his doctrine of hell, and the devils, and the damned spirits. First of the devils; He fancieth that all those devils which our Saviour did cast out, were frenzies, and all daemoniacks, (or persons possessed,) no other 
Le. p. 38. 39  than madmen. And to justify our Saviour's speaking to a disease as to a person, produceth the example of enchanters. But he declareth himself most clearly upon this subject, in his Animadversions upon my reply to his defence of fatal destiny. There are in the Scripture two sorts of things which are in 
Qu. p. 160.  English translated devils. One is that which is called Satan, Diabolus, Abaddon, which signifieth in English an enemy, an accuser, and a destroyer of the Church of God, in which sense the devils are but wicked men. The other sort of devils are called in the Scripture daemonia, which are the feigned gods of the heathen, and are neither bodies nor spiritual substances, but mere fancies and fictions of terrified hearts, feigned by the Greeks, and other heathen people, which St. Paul calleth nothings. So T. H. hath killed the great infernal devil, and all his black Angels, and lest no devils to be feared, but devils incarnate, that is wicked men.  
And for hell he describeth the kingdom of Satan, or the kingdom of darkness, to be a confederacy of deceivers. He telleth us that the places which set forth the torments of hell in 
Le. p. 333.  holy Scripture, do design metaphorically a grief and discontent of mind, from the sight of that eternal felicity in others, which they themselves, 
Le p. 244.  through their own incredulity and disobedience have lost. As if metaphorical descriptions did not bear sad truths in them, as well as literal, as if final desperations were no more than a little fit of grief or discontent; and a guilty conscience were no more than a transitory passion, as if it were a loss so easily to be borne, to be deprived for evermore of the beatifical vision: And lastly, as if the damned, besides that unspeakable loss, did not likewise suffer actual torments, proportionable in some measure to their own sins, and God's justice.  
Lastly for the damned spirits, he declareth himself every where, that their sufferings are not eternal, The fire shall be unquenchable, and the torments everlasting: but it cannot be thence inferred, that he who shall be cast into that fire, or be tormented with those torments, shall endure and 
Le. p. 245  resist them, so as to be eternally burnt and tortured, and yet never be destroyed nor die. And though there be many places that affirm everlasting fire, into which men may be cast successively one after another for ever: yet I find none that affirm that there shall be an everlasting life therein, of any individual person. If he had said, and said only, that the pains of the damned may be lessened, as to the degree of them, or that they endure not for ever, but that after they are purged by long torments from their dross and corruptions, as gold in the fire, both the damned spirits and the Devils themselves should be restored to a better condition, he might have found some Ancients (who are therefore called the merciful Doctors) to have joined with him, though still he should have wanted the suffrage of the Catholic Church.  
But his shooting is not at rovers, but altogether at random, without either precedent or partner. All that eternal fire, all those torments which he acknowledgeth, is but this, That after the resurrection, the reprobate shall be in the estate that Adam and his posterity were in, after the sin committed, saving that God promised a Redeemer to Adam and not to them: adding, that they shall live as they did formerly, 
Le. p. 345. 346.  marry, and give in marriage; and consequently engender children perpetually after the resurrection, as they did before, which he calleth an immortality of the kind, but not of the persons of men. It is to be presumed, that in those their second lives, knowing certainly from T. H. that there is no hope of redemption for them from corporal death upon their well doing, nor fear of any torments after death for their ill doing, they will pass their times here as pleasantly as they can. This is all the damnation which T. H. fancieth.  
In sum I leave it to the free judgement of the understanding Reader, by these few instances which follow, to judge what the Hobbain principles are in point of religion. Ex ungue leonem.  
First, that no man needs to put himself to any hazard for his faith, but may safely comply with the times. And for their faith it is internal and invisible. They have the licence that 
Le. p. 231.  Naaman had, and need not put themselves into danger for it.  
Secondly, he alloweth Subjects, being commanded by their Sovereign, to deny 
2.  Christ. Profession with the tongue is but an external thing, and no more than any other gesture, whereby we signify our obedience. And wherein a Christian, holding firmly in his heart the faith of Christ, hath the same liberty which the Prophet Elisha allowed to Naaman, etc. Who 
Le. p. 271.  by bowing before the idol Rimmon, denied the true God as much in effect, as if he had done it with his lips. Alas why did St. Peter weep so bitterly for denying his Master, out of fear of his life or members? It seemeth he was not acquainted with these Hobbian principles. And in the same place he layeth down this general conclusion. This we may say, that whatsoever a Subject is compelled to, in obedience to his Sovereign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the laws of his Country, that action is not his, but his Sovereigns; nor is it he that in this case denieth Christ before men, but his Governor and the law of his Country. His instance in a mahumetan commanded by a Christian Prince to be present at divine service, is a weak mistake, springing from his gross ignorance in case-divinity, not knowing to distinguish between an erroneous conscience, as the mahometans is, and a conscience rightly informed.  
Thirdly, if this be not enough, he giveth licence to a Christian to commit idolatry, 
3.  or at least to do an idolatrous act, for fear of death or corporal danger. To pray unto a King voluntarily for fair weather, or for any 
Le. p. 360.  thing which God only can do for us, is divine worship, and idolatry. On the other side, if a King compel a man to it by the terror of death, or other great corporal punishment, it is not idolatry. His reason is, because it is not a sign that he doth inwardly honour him as a god, but that he is desirous to save himself from death, or from a miserable life. It seemeth T. H. thinketh there is no divine worship, but internal. And that it is lawful for a man to value his own life or his limbs more than his God. How much is he wiser than the three Children, or Daniel himself? who were thrown, the first into a fiery furnace, the last into the Lion's den, because they refused to comply with the idolatrous decree of their Sovereign Prince.  
A fourth aphorism may be this, That which is said in the scripture, it is better to obey God, 
4. Leu. p. 193.  than men, hath place in the Kingdom of God by pact, and not by nature. Why? nature itself doth teach us that it is better to obey God, than men. Neither can he say that he intended this only of obedience, in the use of indifferent actions and gestures, in the service of God, commanded by the commonwealth, for that is to obey both God and man. But if divine law and humane law clash one with another, without doubt it is evermore better to obey God than man.  
His fifth conclusion may be that the sharpest and most successful sword, in any war whatsoever, doth give sovereign power and authority to him that hath it, to approve or reject all sorts of Theological doctrines, concerning the Kingdom of God, not according to their truth or falsehood, but according to that influence which they have upon political affairs. Hear him, But because this doctrine 
Le. p. 241.  will appear to most men a novelty, I do but propound it, maintaining nothing in this or any other paradox of religion, but attending the end of that dispute of the sword, concerning the authority (not yet amongst my Countrymen decided) by which all sorts of doctrine are to be approved or rejected, etc. For the points of doctrine concerning the Kingdom of God, have so great influence upon the Kingdom of man, as not to be determined, but by them that under God have the sovereign power. Careat successibus opto, Quisquis ab eventu facta notanda putat. Let him evermore want success who thinketh actions are to be judged by their events. This doctrine may be plausible to those who desire to fish in troubled waters, But it is justly hated by those which are in Authority, and all those who are lovers of peace and tranquillity.  
The last part of this conclusion smelleth rankly of Jeroboam, Now shall the Kingdom return to the house of David, if this people go up to 
1. King. 12. 26.  do sacrifice in the house of the Lord at jerusalem, whereupon the King took council, and made two calves of gold, and said unto them. It is too much for you to go up to jerusalem, behold thy Gods O Israel, which brought thee out of the land of Egypt. But by the just disposition of Almighty God, this policy turned to a sin, and was the utter destruction of Jeroboam and his family. It is not good jesting with edgtooles, nor playing with holy things: where men make their greatest fastness, many times they find most danger.  
His sixth paradox is a rapper, The civil laws are the rules of good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest, and therefore what the 
Ci. c. 12. s. 1.  lawgiver commands that is to be accounted good, what he forbids bad. And a little after, before empires were, just and unjust were not, as whose nature is relative to a command, every action in its own nature is indifferent. That it is just or unjust proceedeth from the right of him that commandeth. Therefore lawful Kings make those things which they command, just by commanding them, and those things which they forbid unjust by forbidding them. To this add his definition of a sin, that which one doth, or omitteth, saith or willeth contrary to the reason of the commonwealth, that is the [civil] laws. Where by the laws he 
Ci. c. 14. s. 17.  doth not understand the written laws, elected and approved by the whole commonwealth, but the verbal commands or mandates, of him that hath the sovereign power, as we find in many places of his writings. The civil laws are nothing else but the commands of him that is endowed with sovereign power in the 
Ci. c. 6. s. 9  commonwealth, concerning the future actions of his subjects. And the civil laws are fastened to the lips of that man who hath the sovereign 
Le. p. 109.  power.  
Where are we? in Europe or in Asia? Where they ascribed a divinity to their Kings, and, to use his own phrase, made them mortal gods. O King live for ever. Flatterers are the common moths of great palaces, where Alexander's friends are more numerous than the King's friends. But such gross palpable pernicious flattery as this is, I did never meet with, so derogatory both to piety and policy. What deserved he who should do his uttermost endeavour to poison a common fountain, whereof all the commonwealth must drink? He doth the same who poisoneth the mind of a sovereign prince.  
Are the civil laws the rules of good and bad, just and unjust, honest and dishonest? And what I pray you are the rules of the civil law itself? even the law of God and nature. If the civil laws swerve from these more authentic laws, they are Lesbian rules. What the lawgiver commands is to be accounted good, what he forbids bad. This was just the garb of the Athenian Sophisters, as they are described by Plato. Whatsoever pleased the great beast [the multitude,] they called holy, and just, and good. And whatsoever the great beast disliked, they called evil, unjust, profane. But he is not yet arrived at the height of his flattery. Lawful Kings make those things which they command just by commanding them, And those things which they forbid unjust by forbidding them. At other times when he is in his right wits he talketh of suffering, and expecting their reward in heaven. And going to Christ by martyrdom. And if he had the fortitude to suffer death he should do better. B●…t I fear all this was but said in jest. How should they expect their reward in heaven, if his doctrine be true, that there is no reward in heaven? Or how should they be Martyrs, if his doctrine be true, that none can be Martyrs but those who conversed with Christ upon earth? He addeth, Before Empires were, just and unjust were 
Le. p. 272.  not. Nothing could be written more false in his sense, more dishonourable to God, more inglorious to the humane nature. That God should create man and leave him presently without any rules, to his own ordering of himself, as the Ostridg leaveth her eggs in the sand. But in truth there have been empires in the world ever since Adam. And Adam had a law written in his heart by the finger of God, before there was any civil law. Thus they do endeavour to make goodness, and justice, and honesty, and conscience, and God himself, to be empty names without any reality, which signify nothing, further than they conduce to a man's interest. Otherwise he would not, he could not say, That every action as it is invested with its circumstances, is indifferent in its own nature.  
Something there is which he hath a confused glimmering of, as the blind man sees men walking like trees, which he is not able to apprehend and express clearly. We acknowledge, that though the laws or commands of a Sovereign Prince be erroneous, or unjust, or injurius, such as a subject cannot approve for good in themselves; yet he is bound to acquiesce, and may not oppose or resist, otherwise than by prayers and tears, and at the most by flight. We acknowledge that the civil laws have power to bind the conscience of a Christian, in themselves, but not from themselves, but from him who hath said, Let every soul be subject to the higher powers. Either they bind Christian subjects to do their Sovereign's commands, or to suffer for the testimony of a good conscience. We acknowledge that in doubtful cases semper praesumitur pro Rege & lege, the Sovereign and the law are always presumed to be in the right. But in plain evident cases which admit no doubt, it is always better to obey God than man. Blunderers whilst they think to mend one imaginary hole, make two or three real ones. They who derive the authority of the Scriptures or God's Law from the civil laws of men, are like those who seek to underprop the heavens from falling with a bulrush. Nay, they derive not only the authority of the Scripture, but even of the law of nature itself from the civil law. The laws of nature (which need no promulgation) in the condition of nature are not properly laws, but qualities which 
Le. p. 138.  dispose men to peace and to obedience. When a Commonwealth is once settled, then are they actually laws, and not before. God help us into what times are we fallen, when the immutable laws of God and nature are made to depend upon the mutable laws of mortal men, just as if one should go about to control the Sun by the authority of the clock.  
But it is not worthy of my labour, nor any part of my intention, to pursue every shadow of a question which he springeth. It shall suffice to gather a posy of flowers (or rather a bundle of weeds) out of his writings, and present them to the Reader, who will easily distinguish them from healthful plants by the rankness of their smell. Such are these which follow.  
1. To be delighted in the imagination only, of being possessed of another man's goods, servants, or 
Le. p. 151.  wife, without any intention to take them from him by force or fraud, is no breach of the law which saith, Thou shalt not covet.  
2. If a man by the terror of present death be compelled to do a fact against the law, he is totally excused, because no law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation. Nature compelleth him to the fact. The like doctrine he hath elsewhere. 
Le p. 157.  When the Actor doth any thing against the law of nature by command of the Author, if 
Le. p. 81.  he be obliged by former covenants to obey him, not he, but the Author breaketh the law of nature.  
3. It is a doctrine repugnant to civil Society, that whatsoever a man does against his conscience 
Le. p. 168  is sin.  
4. The kingdom of God is not shut, but to them that sin; that is to them who have not performed 
Ci. c. 18. s. 2.  due obedience to the Laws of God; nor to them if they believe the necessary Articles of the Christian Faith.  
5. We must know that the true acknowledging 
Ci. c. 17. s. 25.  of sin is repentance itself.  
6. An opinion publicly appointed to be taught cannot be heresy, nor the Sovereign Princes that 
Le. p. 318.  authorize the same heretics.  
7. Temporal and spiritual government, are but two words to make men see double, and mistake 
Le. p. 248.  their lawful Sovereign, etc. There is no other government in this life, neither of State nor Religion, but temporal.  
8. It is manifest that they who permit (or tolerate) a contrary doctrine to that which themselves 
Ci. c. 13. s. 5  believe, and think necessary, do against their conscience and will, as much as in them lieth, the eternal destruction of their subjects.  
9 Subject's sin if they do not worship God according to the laws of the Commonwealth. 
Ci. c. 15. s. 19 Ci. c. 18. s. 10.   
10. To believe in jesus [in Jesum] is the same as to believe that jesus is Christ.  
11. There can be no contradiction between the Laws of God, and the laws of a Christian Commonwealth. 
Le. p. 330.  Yet we see Christian Commonwealths daily contradict one another.  
12. No man giveth but with intention of good to himself, of all voluntary acts the object is to 
Le. p. 75.  every man his own good. Moses, St. Paul, and the Decii were out of his mind.  
13. There is no natural knowledge of man's 
Le. p. 74.  estate after death, much less of the reward which is then to be given to breach of faith, but only a belief grounded upon other men's saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally.  
14. David's killing of Uriah, was no injury to 
Le. p. 109.  Uriah, because the right to do what he pleased was given him by Uriah himself.  
15. To whom it belongeth to determine controversies which may arise from the divers interpretation 
Ci. c. 18. s. 14.  of Scripture, he hath an imperial power over all men which acknowledge the Scriptures to be the word of God.  
16. What is theft, what is murder, what is adultery, and universally what is an injury, is 
Ci. c. 6. s. 16.  known by the civil law; that is, the commands of the Sovereign.  
17. He admitteth the incestuous copulations of the Heathens according to their heathenish 
Ci. c. 14. s. 10.  laws, to have been lawful marriages. Though the Scripture teach us expressly, that for those abominations the land of Canaan spewed out her inhabitants, Exod. 18. 28.  
18. I say that no other Article of faith besides this that jesus is Christ, is necessary to a Christian 
Ci. c. 18. s. 6.  man for salvation.  
19 Because Christ's kingdom is not of this world, therefore neither can his Ministers, unless 
Le. p. 269. 270.  they be Kings, require obedience in his name. They had no right of commanding, no power to make laws.  
20. I pass by his errors about oaths, about vows, about the resurrections, about the kingdom of Christ, about the power of the keys, binding, losing, excommunication, etc. His ignorant mistakes of meritum congrui, and condigni, active and passive obedience, and many more, for fear of being tedious to the Reader. His whole works are an heap of misshapen errors, and absurd paradoxes, vented with the confidence of a Juggler, the brags of a Mountebank, and the authority of some Pythagoras, or third Cato, lately dropped down from heaven.  
Thus we have seen how the Hobbian principles do destroy the existence, the simplicity, the ubiquity, the eternity, and infiniteness of God, the doctrine of the blessed Trinity, the Hypostatical union, the Kingly Sacerdotal and Prophetical Offices of Christ; the being and operation of the Holy Ghost, Heaven, Hell, Angels, Devils, the immortality of the Soul, the Catholic, and all National Churches; the holy Scriptures, holy Orders, the holy Sacraments, the whole frame of Religion, and the Worship of God; the laws of Nature, the reality of Goodness, Justice, Piety, Honesty, Conscience, and all that is Sacred. If his Disciples have such an implicit faith, that they can digest all these things, they may feed with Oestriches.   

CHAP. 2.  
That the Hobbian Principles do destroy all relations between man and man, and the whole frame of a Common wealth.  
THe first Harping-iron is thrown at the heart of this great Whale; that is, his Religion; for with the heart a man believeth unto righteousness. Now let him look to his chine; that is, his Compage or Commonwealth. My next task is to show that he destroyeth all relations between man and man, Prince and subject, Parent and child, Husband and wife, Master and servant, and generally all Society.  
It is enough to dash the whole frame of his Leviathan or commonwealth in pieces, That he confesseth it is without example; as if the moulding of a Commonwealth were no more than the making of gunpowder, which was not found out by long experience, but by mere accident. The greatest objection (saith T. H.) is that of practice, when men ask when and 
Le. p. 107.  where such power has by subjects been acknowledged. It is a great objection indeed. Experience the Mistress of fools, is the best, and almost the only proof of the goodness or badness of any form of government. No man knoweth where a shoe wringeth, so well as he that weareth it. A new Physician must have a new Churchyard, wherein to bury those whom he killeth. And a new unexperienced Politician, commonly putteth all into a combustion. Men rise by degrees from common soldiers to be decurions, from decurions to be Centurions, from Centurions to be Tribunes, and from Tribunes to be Generals, by experience, not by speculation. Alexander did but laugh at that Orator who discoursed to him of Military affairs. The Locrian law was well grounded, that whosoever moved for any alteration in the tried policy of their Commonwealth, should make the proposition at his own peril with an halter about his neck. New Statesmen promise golden mountains, but like fresh flies they bite deeper than those which were chased away before them. It were a strange thing to hear a man discourse of the Philosopher's Stone, who never bestowed a groatsworth of charcoal in the inquiry. It is as strange to hear a man dictate so magisterially in Politics, who was never Officer nor Counsellor in his life, nor had any opportunity to know the intrigues of any one state. If his form of government had had any true worth or weight in it, among so many Nations, and so many succeeding Generations from the Creation to this day, some one or other would have light upon it. His Leviathan is but an idol of his own brain.  
Neither is it sufficient to say, That in long-lived 
Ibid.  Commonwealths the subjects never did dispute of the Sovereign's power. Power may be moderated, where it is not disputed of. And even in those kingdoms where it was least disputed of, as in Persia, they had their fundamental laws, which were not alterable at the pleasure of the present Prince. Whereof one was as we find in the story of Esther, and the book of Daniel, that the law of the Medes and Persians altered not: much less was it alterable by the only breath of the Prince's mouth, according to T. H. his Principles.  
He urgeth, That though in all places of the World men should lay the foundations of their houses 
Ibid.  on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be. He was a ashamed to make the application. So suppose all the world should be out of their wits and he only have his right understanding. His supposition is a supposition of an impossibility, which maketh an affirmative proposition to turn negative, much like this other supposition, If the sky fall we shall have larks; that is in plain English, We shall have no larks. His argument had held much more strongly thus, All the world lay the foundation of their houses upon firm ground, and not upon the sand; Therefore he who crosseth the practice of the whole world, out of an overweening opinion that he seeth further into a millstone than they all, is he that builds upon the sand, and deserveth well to be laughed out of his humour.  
But he persisteth still, like one that knows better how to hold a Paradox, than a Fort. The skill of making and maintaining Commonwealths consisteth in certain rules, as doth Arithmetic and Geometry, and not as Tennis-play, on practice only; which rules neither poor men had the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity or the method to find out. O excellent, how fortunate are we if we knew our own happiness, to have this great discovery made in our days? What pity it is that this new Mercury did not live in the days of the old Mercury, Qui feros cultus hominum recentum voce formavit catus, That the art of preserving the world in perpetual tranquillity, should not be discovered until the evening of the world. May we not hope (since he pleased to tell us that after the Resurrection, mankind shall be eternally propagated) 
Le. p. 346.  that these monuments of his may escape the last fire, as well as some others are supposed to have escaped the general Deluge, for the good of those successive generations, they being his own invention, as well as this frame of government.  
Yet his argument is most improper, and most untrue. State-policy, which is wholly involved in matter, and circumstances of time, and place, and persons, is not at all like Arithmetic and Geometry, which are altogether abstracted from matter, but much more like Tennis-play. There is no place for liberty in Arithmetic and Geometry, but in policy there is, and so there is in Tennis-play. A game at Tennis hath its vicissitudes, and so have States. A Tennis player must change his play at every stroke, according to the occasion and accidents: so must a Statesman move his rudder differently, according to the various face of heaven. He who mesnageth a Commonwealth by general rules, will quickly ruin both himself, and those who are committed to his government. One man's meat is another man's poison; and those which are healthful Rules for one Society at one time, may be pernicious to another Society, or to the same society at another time. Some Nations are like Horses, more patient of their riders than others; And the same Nations more patient at one time than at another. In sum, general rules are easy, and signify not much in policy. The quintessence of policy doth consist in the dexterous and skilful application of those rules to the subject matter.  
But I will not rest in presumptions. Concerning foreign States, and first such as are not only Neighbours but Allies, of a Commonwealth, such as have contracted friendship and confederated themselves together by solemn oaths, with invocation of the holy name of the great God of Heaven and earth: He teacheth, That such an oath doth 
Ci. c. 2. s. 22.  bind no more than nudum pactum, a naked Covenant. It is true, that every Covenant is either lawful or unlawful. If it be unlawful, an oath cannot be the bond of iniquity: If it be lawful, it bindeth in conscience, though it were never confirmed by oath. It is true further, That he who can release a naked promise, can release the same promise confirmed by an oath, because it was not made or intended as a vow to God, but as a promise to man. But yet to say that a naked Covenant bindeth no less than an oath, or that an oath addeth nothing to the obligation, or that the mere violation of a Covenant is as great a sin, as perjury and covenant-breaking twisted together, is absurd, and openeth a large gap to foreign war.  
Secondly he teacheth, That in all times Kings and persons of Sovereign Authority, because 
Le. p. 63.  of their indepency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiatours, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another. It is good for a Sovereign Prince to have his sword always by his side, to be ready to protect his Subjects, and offend those who dare invade him: but to put Princes in the posture of gladiators, watching continually where they may hit one another, or do one another a mischief, is dangerous. There can be no firm amity, where there is no mutual confidence. T. H. his perpetual diffidence and causeless jealousies, which have no ground, but an universal suspicion of the humane nature, (much like the good woman's fear, that the log would leap out of the fire, and knock out the brains of her child) do beget perpetual vexations to them that cherish them, argue a self-guiltiness, teach them who are suspected, often to do worse than they imagined, and ordinarily produce hostility and war. The state of Commonwealths among themselves is natural, that is, 
Ci. c. 15. s. 7.  hostile. Neither if they cease to fight, is it peace, but a breathing space; wherein the one enemy observing the motion or countenance of the other, doth esteem his security not from pacts, but from the forces and counsels of his adversary. He maketh confederacies to be but empty shows without any realty.  
But for all other neighbour Commonwealths, which are not confederates, but exercise commerce one with another, by the Law of Nations; he reckons them all as enemies, and in a state of nature, (the Hobbian nature of man, is worse than the nature of Bears, or Wolves, or the most savage wild beasts) and maketh it lawful to destroy them, nocent or innocent, indifferently. All men that are not Subjects, are either enemies, or 
Le. p. 165.  else they have ceased from being so, by some precedent Covenants. But against enemies, whom the Commonwealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawful, by the original right of nature, to make war wherein the sword judgeth not, nor doth the victor make distinction of nocent and innocent. Here is no precedent injury supposed, no refusal to do right, omnia dat qui justa neg at, nor the least suspicion of any will to wrong them, but only that the Commonwealth (that is, the Prince) judge them capable to do them hurt.  
Neither doth he hold it needful to denounce war in such cases, but maketh it lawful to suppress them, and cut their throats without any warning. From this [natural] 
Le. p. 61.  diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, by force or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. For in the state of mere 
Ci. c. 5. s. 2, 1.  nature, the laws of nature are silent, as to the actual exercise of them. And this he may do, vel palam vell ex insidiis, either by force or treachery. What is now become of the law of Nations? How much were the old Romans better neighbours than these new Hobbians? They did not so easily fall to the shedding of humane blood, but sent their Legate first to demand justice, and after three and thirty day's expectation in vain, to proclaim aloud upon the confines of the enemy's Country, Hear O jupiter, and thou Juno, 
Liv.  Quirinus thou, and all ye hods, that this people is unjust, etc. And then the Herald or Faecial lanced his Javeline into the enemy's Country, as a defiance, and beginning of war.  
Thus destructive are his principles to the public peace and tranquillity of the World, but much more pernicious to the Commonwealth itself. He did prudently to deny that virtue did consist in a mean, for he himself doth never observe a mean. All his bolts fly over or under, but at the right mark it is in vain to expect him. Sometimes he fancieth an omnipotence in Kings, sometimes he strippeth them of their just rights. Perhaps he thinketh that it may fall out in politics, as it doth sometimes in physic, Bina venena invant, Two contrary poisons may become a Cordial to the Commonwealth. I will begin with his defects, where he attributeth too little to Regal power.  
Fist he teacheth, that no man is bound to go to warfare in person, except he do voluntarily undertake it. A man that is commanded as a Soldier to fight against the enemy, may nevertheless in many cases refuse without injustice. Of these many cases, he setteth down only two. First, when he substituteth a sufficient 
Le. p. 112.  soldier in his place, for in this case he deserteth not the service of the Commonwealth. Secondly, there is allowance to be made for natural timorousness, or men of feminine courage. This might pass as a municipal law, ●…tc exempt some persons at some time in some places. But to extend it to all persons, places and times, is absurd, and repugnant to his own grounds, who teacheth that justice and injustice do depend upon the command of the Sovereign, that whatsoever he commandeth, he maketh lawful and just by commanding it. His two cases are two great impertinencies, and belong to the Sovereign to do, or not to do as Graces, whoso is 
Judg. 7. 3.  timorous or fearful, let him depart, not to the Subjects as right. He forgetteth how often he hath denied all knowledge of good and evil to Subjects, and subjected their will absolutely to the will of the Sovereign, The Sovereign 
Ci. c. 6. s. 13.  may use every man's strength and wealth at his pleasure. His acknowledgement that the Sovereign hath right enough to punish his refusal with death, is to no purpose. The question is not whether his refusal be punishable or not, but whether it be just or not. Upon his principles a Sovereign may justly enough put the most innocent Subject in the World to death, as we shall see presently. And his exception when the defence of the Commonwealth requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear arms, is no answer to the other case, and itself a case never like to happen. He must be a mortal god indeed, that can bring all the hands in a Kingdom to fight at one battle.  
Another of his principles is this, Security is the end for which men make themselves subjects to 
Ci c. 6. 〈◊〉. 3.  others, which if it be not enjoyed no man is understood to have subjected himself to others, or to have lost his right to defend himself at his own discretion. Neither is any man understood to have bound himself to any thing, or to have relinquished his right over all things, before his own security be provided for. What ugly consequences do flow from this paradox, and what a large window it openeth to sedition and rebellion, I leave to the reader's judgement. Either it must be left to the sovereign determination, whether the subjects security be sufficiently provided for, And then in vain is any man's sentence expected against himself, or to the discretion of the subject, (as the words themselves do seem to import,) and then there need no other bellows to kindle the fire of a civil war, and put a whole commonwealth into a combustion, but this seditious Article.  
We see the present condition of Europe what it is, that most sovereigns have subjects of a different communion from themselves, and are necessitated to tolerate different rites, for fear lest whilst they are plucking up the tares, they should eradicate the wheat. And he that should advise them to do otherwise, did advise them to put all into fire and flame. Now hear this merciful and peaceable Author, It is manifest that they do against conscience, and wish, as much as is in them, the eternal destruct on of their subjects, who do not cause such doctrine and such worship, to be taught and exhibited to their subjects, as they themselves do 
Ci c. 13. s. 5  believe to conduce to their eternal salvation, or tolerate the contrary to be taught and exhibited. Did this man write waking or dreaming.  
And howsoever in words he deny all resistance to the sovereign, yet indeed he admitteth it. No man is bound by his pacts whatsoever 
Ci c 2. s. 18.  they be, not to resist him, who bringeth upon him death or wounds, or other bodily damage. (by this learning the Scholar if he be able, may take the rod out of his master's hand, and whip him) It followeth. Seeing therefore no man is bound to that which is impossible, they who are to suffer death or wounds or rather corporal damage, and are not constant enough to endure them, are not obliged to suffer them. And more fully. In case a great many men together have already resisted the sovereign power unjustly, or committed 
Le. p. 112.  some capital crime, for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the liberty to join together, and assist and defend one another? certainly they have, for they do but defend their lives, which the guilty man may as well do, as the innocent. There was indeed unjustice in the first breach of their duty. Their bearing of arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act. Why should we not change the name of Leviathan into the Rebel's catechism? Observe the difference between the primitive spirit, and the Hobbian spirit. The Thebaean Legion of known valour in a good cause, when they were able to resist, did choose rather to be cut in pieces to a man, than defend themselves against their Emperor by arms, because they would rather die innocent, than live nocent. But T. H. alloweth Rebels and conspirators to make good their unlawful attempts by arms: was there ever such a trumpeter of rebellion heard of before? perhaps he may say that he alloweth them not to justify their unlawful acts, but to defend themselves. First this is contrary to himself, for he alloweth them to maintain what they had unjustly done. This is too much and too intolerable, but this is not all. Secondly, If they chance to win the field who must suffer for their faults? or who dare thenceforward call their Acts unlawful?  
Will you hear what a casuist he is? And for the other instance of attaining sovereignty by rebellion, it is manifest that though the event follow, 
Le. p. 73.  yet because it cannot reasonably be expected; but rather the contrary, and because by gaining it so, others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason. And had he no other reasons indeed against horrid Rebellion but these two? It seemeth he accounteth conscience or the bird in the breast to be but an Idol of the brain. And the Kingdom of heaven (as he hath made it not valuable enough to be balanced against an earthly Kingdom. And as for hell he hath expounded it and all the infernal fiends out of the nature of things, otherwise he could not have wanted better arguments against such a crying sin.  
Another of his theorems is, that no man is obliged by any pacts to accuse himself. Which 
Ci. c. 2. s. 19  in some cases is true, but in his sense, and in his latitude, and upon his grounds it is most untrue. When public fame hath accused a man before hand, he may be called upon to purge himself or suffer. When the case is of public concernment, and the circumstances piegnant, all nations do take the liberty to examine a man upon oath in his own cause, and where the safety and welfare of the commonwealth is concerned, as in cases of high treason, and for the more full discovery of conspiracies, upon the rack. Which they could not do lawfully if no man was bound in any case to discover himself. His reason is silly, For in vain do we make him promise, who when he hath performed we know not whether he have performed or not. And makes as much against all examination of witnesses as delinquents. In vain do we make them give testimony, who when they have testified, we know not whether they have given right testimony or not.  
But his next conclusion will uncase him fully, and show us what manner of man he is, If the commonwealth come into the power of its enemies, so that they cannot be resisted, he who had 
Ci. c. 7. s. 18.  the sovereignty before, is understood to have lost it. What enemies he meaneth, such as have the just power of the sword, or such as have not, what he meaneth by the commonwealth the whole Kingdom, or any part of it, what he intendeth by cannot be resisted, whether a prevalence for want of forces to resist them, or a victory in a set battle, or a final cenquest, And what he meaneth by losing the sovereignty, losing it the facto, or de jure, losing the possession only, or losing the right also, he is silent. It may be because he knoweth not the difference, Qui pauca considerat facile pronuntiat, He that considers little, giveth sentence more easily than truly, we must search out his sense some where else. The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them, etc. Wheresoever a man seeth protection either in his own or in another's 
Le. p. 114.  sword, nature applieth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintain it. By his leave this is right dogs play, which always take part with the stronger side. But yet this is general.  
The next is more particular, when in a war foreign or intestine the enemies get a final victory 
Le  so as the forces of the commonwealth keeping the field no longer, there is no farther protection of subjects in their loyalty, then is the commonwealth dissolved, and every man at liberty to protect himself, by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him. Yet these words final victory are doubtful. When David's forces were chased out of the Kingdom, so that he was not able to protect his subjects in their loyalty, could this be called a final victory?  
The next place is home, He who hath no obligation to his former sovereign, but that of an ordinary subject hath liberty to submit to a Conqueror, when the means of his life is within the guards and garrisons of the enemy, for it is then 
Le. p. 190.  that he hath no longer protection from him, [his sovereign] but is protected by the adverse party for his contribution. And he concludeth that a total submission is as lawful as a contribution. Which is contrary to the sense of all the world. If a lawful sovereign did give a general release to his subject, as well as he giveth him licence to contribute, he said something. And to top up all these disloyal paradoxes he addeth, That they who live under the protection of a Conqueror openly, are understood to submit themselves to the government. And that in the very act of receiving protection openly, and not renouncing it openly, they do oblige themselves to obey the laws of their protector, to which in receiving 
Q. p. 137  protection they have assented.  
Where these Principles prevail, adieu honour, and honesty, and fidelity, and loyalty: all must give place to self-interest. What for a man to desert his Sovereign upon the first prevalence of an enemy, or the first payment of a petty contribution, or the first appearance of a sword, that is more able to protect us for the present? Is this his great law of nature, pactis standum, to stand to what we have obliged ourselves? Then Kings from whom all men's right and property is derived, should not have so much right themselves in their own inheritance as the meanest subject. It seemeth T. H. did take his Sovereign for better, but not for worse. Fair fall those old Roman spirits who gave thanks to Terentius Varro, after he had lost the great battle of Cannae by his own default, because he did not despair of the Commonwealth. And would not sell the ground that Hannibal was encamped upon, one farthing cheaper than if it had been in time of peace, which was one thing that discouraged that great Captain from continuing the siege of Rome.  
His former discourse hath as many faults as lines. First all Sovereignty is not from the people. He himself acknowledgeth, That fatherly Empire or Power was instituted by God in 
Ci. c. 10. s. 3.  the Creation, and was Monarchical. Secondly, where the application of Sovereign power to the person is from the people, yet there are other ends besides protection. Thirdly, protection is not a condition, though it be a duty. A failing in duty doth not cancel a right. Fourthly, protection ought to be mutual. The subject aught to defend his King, as well as the King his subject. If the King be disabled to protect his subject, by the subjects own fault, because he did not assist him as he ought, this doth not warrant the subject to seek protection elsewhere. Fifthly, he doth not distinguish between a just Conqueror who hath the power of the sword, though he abuse it, and him that hath no power at all. I will try if he can remember whose words these are; They that have already instituted a Commonwealth, being thereby bound by covenant to own the actions and judgements of one, cannot lawfully 
Le. p. 88  make a new covenant among themselves to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever without his permission. And therefore they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy,, nor transfer their person from him that beareth it, to another man. This is home both for right and obligation.  
Sixthly, there are other requisites to the extinction of the right of a Prince, and the obligation of a subject, than the present prevalence or conquest of an enemy. Seventhly, nature doth not dictate to a subject to violate his oaths and allegiance, by using his endeavours to maintain protection wheresoeve he seeth it, either in his own sword or another man's. Eightly, total submission is not as lawful as contribution. Ninthly, actual submission doth not take away the Sovereign's right, or the subjects obligation. Tenthly, to live under the command or protection of a Conqueror doth not necessarily imply allegiance. Lastly, much less doth it imply an assent to all his laws, and an obligation to obey them.  
These are part of T. H. his faults, on the one hand against Monarches, opposite enough to peace and tranquillity, which none can approve who either have a settlement, or wish one. But his faults are ten times greater and grosser for Monarches, on the other hand, in so much as I have thought sometimes that he observed the method of some old cunning Parliament men, who when they had a mind to cross a bill, were always the highest for it in the House, and would insert so many and so great inconveniences into the act, that they were sure it could never pass. 
Tuta frequensque via est per amici fallere nomen.   
So he maketh the power of Kings to be so exorbitant, that no subject who hath either conscience or discretion, ever did or can endure, so to render Monarchy odious to mankind.  
I pass by his accommodating of the four first Commandments of the Decalogue to Sovereign Princes, which concern our duty to Almighty God. Let his first Paradox of this kind be this. A Monarch doth not bind 
Le. p. 177.  himself to any man by any pacts, for the Empire which he receiveth. And it is vain to grant Sovereignty 
Ci. c. 7. s. 11  by way of precedent covenants. The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his power by covenant; that is to say, on condition, (learnedly expounded) proceedeth from want of understanding 
Le. p. 89.  this easy truth, that covenants being but words and break, (mark that) have no force to oblige, etc. but from the public sword. What is now become of all our Coronationoathes, and all our Liberties and great Charters?  
Another Paradox is this. Every Monarch may make his Successor by his last will, and that 
Ci. c. 15. s. 19  which one may transfer to another by testament, that he may by the same right give or sell whilst he is living. Therefore to whomsoever he disposeth it either for love or money, it is lawfully disposed. And there is no perfect form of government where the disposing of the succession is not in 
Le. p. 99  the present Sovereign. The whole body of the kingdom of England were of another mind in King John's case; and if he had disposed the Sovereignty to a Turk, as some of our Historiographers relate that he made an overture, it is not likely that they would have turned Turkish slaves.  
Hear a third Paradox. The Sovereign hath so much power over every subject by law, as every 
Ci. c. 6. s. 18.  one who is not subject to another hath ever himself; that is, absolute, to be limited by the power of the Commonwealth, and by no other thing. What neither by the Laws of God, nor Nature, nor Nations, nor by the laws of the Land, neither co-actively nor directively? Would not this man have made an excellent guide for Princes? But more of this anon.  
I proceed. When the Sovereign commandeth any thing to be done against his own former law, the command as to that particular fact, is an abrogation 
Le. p. 157.  of the law. Parliaments may shut up their shops, there is no need of them to repeal former laws.  
His fifth excess is a grievous one, That before the institution of a Commonwealth, every 
Le. p. 161.  man had a right to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation, subduing, hurting, or killing any man, in order thereunto. And this is the foundation of that right of punishing which is exercised in every Commonwealth. And his sentence in brief is this; That if the Magistrate do examine and condemn the Delinquent, than it is properly punishment, if not, it is an hostile act, but both are justifiable. Judge Reader, whether thou wilt trust St. Paul or T. H. St. Paul telleth us, that the Magistrate is the ordinance of God, the Minister 
Ro. 13. 2, 4.  of God, the Revenger of God, the Sword-bearer of God to execute wrath upon him that doth evil.  
No saith T. H. punishment is not an act of the Magistrate as he is a Magistrate, or as he is an Officer of God to do justice, or a revenger of evil deeds; but as he is the only private man who hath not laid down his natural right to kill any man at his own discretion, if he do but suspect that he may prove noisome to him, or conceive it necessary for his own preservation. Who ever heard of such a right before, so repugnant to the Laws of God and Nature? But observe Reader what is the result of it, that the Sovereign may lawfully kill any of his subjects, or as many of them as he pleaseth, without any fault of theirs, without any examination on his part, merely upon suspicion, or without any suspicion of the least crime, if he do but judge him to be hurtful or noisome, as freely as a man may pluck up a weed, because it hinders the nourishment of better plants. Before the institution of a Commonwealth every one may lawfully 
Ci. c. 10. s. 1.  be spoiled and killed by every one, but in a Commonwealth only by one, that is the Sovereign. And by the right of nature we destroy without being unjust, all that is noxious, both beasts and men. He makes no difference between a Christian and a wolf. Would you know what is noxious with him, even whatsoever he thinketh can annoy him. Who would 
Qu. p. 116. & 140.  not desire to live in his Commonwealth, where the Sovereign may lawfully kill a thousand innocents' every morning to his breakfast? Surely this is a Commonwealth of fishes, where the great ones eat the lesser.  
It were strange if his Subjects should be in a better condition for their fortunes, than they are for their lives, no I warrant you: do but hear him. Thy dominion and thy property 
Ci. c. 12. s. 7.  is so great, and lasteth so long, as the Commonwealth (that is, the Sovereign) will. Perhaps he meaneth in some extraordinary cases? Tush, in all cases, and at all times. When thou didst choose a Sovereign, even in choosing him thou madest him a deed of gift of all thou hast, Et tu ergo tuum jus civitate concessisti, and therefore thou hast granted all thy right to the Commonwealth. 
Ibid.   
Yet some may imagine that his meaning is only that property may be transferred by Laws or Acts of Parliament from one to another. As the Lacedæmonians, when they permitted children to steal other men's goods, they 
Ci. c. 14. s. 10.  transferred the right from the owners to the children. No, no, T. H. is not for general laws, but particular verbal mandates. The King's word is sufficient to take any thing from any subject, 
Le. p. 106.  if there be need, and the King is judge of that need. If by need he did understand extreme necessity, for the preservation of the Commonwealth, it might alter the case. But his need is like Ahabs need of Naboths vineyard. There is neither necessity, nor Commonwealth in the case. The Lacedaemonian thefts were warranted by a general law, not only consented to universally, but sworn unto. And if it had been otherwise, the value was so small, and the advantage apprehended, to be so great to the Commonwealth, that no honest Subject would contradict it.  
Right and Title may be transferred by Law, and there can be no wrong, where consent is explicate and universal; such consent taketh away all error. But if the consent be only implicit, to the making or admitting of just laws, and unjust laws be obtruded in the place of just: the Subject suffers justly by his own Act: but he or they that were trusted sin. And if he be a Sovereign, oweth an account to God, if subordinate, both to God and man. But he justifieth the taking away of men's estates, either in part, or in whole, without precedent Law, or precedent necessity, or subsequent satisfaction. And maintaineth, that not only the Subject is bound to submit, but that the Sovereign is just in doing it.  
I cannot pass by his good affection to the Nobility of Europe: In these parts of Europe, it hath been taken for a right of certain persons, 
Le. p. 184.  to have place in the highest Council of State by inheritance, but good council comes not by inheritance. And the politics is an harder study than Geometry. I think he mistakes the Council of State for the Parliament. And who more fit to concur in the choice of Laws, than they who are most concerned in the Laws, than they who must contribute most, if there be occasion, to the maintenance of the Laws. No art is hereditary more than politics. A Musician doth not beget a Musician. Yet we see the father's eminence in any Art, begets a propension in his posterity to the same. And where two or three successive generations do happily insist in the steps one of another, they raise an Art to great perfection. I do easily acknowledge that Politics are an harder study than Geometry, and the practice more than the Theory, gained more by experience than by study. Therefore our Parliaments did prudently permit the eldest sons of Barons, to be present at their consultations, to fit them by degrees, for that person which they must one day sustain. But he had a mind to show the State's men his teeth, as he had done to all other professions.  
There are many other errors and mistakes in his Politics, as this, That Sovereignty cannot be divided, or that there cannot be a mixed 
Ci. c. 7. s. 4. Le. p. 170. etc.  form of government, which is a mere mistaking of the question. For though it be sometimes styled a mixed monarchy, because it doth partake of all the advantages of Aristocracy and Democracy, without partaking of their inconveniences: yet to speak properly, it is more aptly called a temperated or moderated Sovereignty, rather than divided or mixed. Neither did any English Monarch communicate any essential of Sovereignty to any Subject or Subjects whatsoever. All civil power, legislative, judiciary, military, was ever exercised in the name of the King, and by his authority. The three Estates of the Kingdom assembled in Parliament, were but suppliants to the King, to have such or such Laws enacted. What is it then that hath occasioned this mistake? though the King hath not granted away any part of his Sovereign power: yet he hath restrained himself by his Coronation-oath, and by his great Charters, from the exercise of some part of it in some cases, without such and such requisite conditions, (except where the evident necessity of the Commonwealth, is a dispensation from Heaven for the contrary) So he hath restrained himself in the exercise of his legislative power, that he will govern his Subjects by no new Laws, other than such as they should assent unto. It is not then any legislative power, which the two Houses of Parliament have either exclusively without the King, or inclusively with the King, but a receptive, or rather a preparative power, sine qua non, without which no new laws ought to be imposed upon them: and as no new laws, so no new taxes or imposition; which are granted in England by a Statute Law.  
But this it is evident how much his discourse of three souls animating one body, is wide from the purpose, and his supposition of setting up a supremacy against the Sovereignty, Canons against Laws, and a ghostly authority against the civil, weigheth less than nothing, seeing we acknowledge, That the civil Sovereign hath an Archirectonicall power, to see that all Subjects within his dominions do their duties in their several callings, for the safety and tranquillity of their Commonwealth, and to punish those that are exorbitant with the civil sword, as well those who derive their habitual power immediately from Christ, as those who derive it from the Sovereign himself. Then the constitution of our English policy was not to be blamed, the exercise of the power of the keys, by authority from Christ, was not to be blamed; but T. H. deserveth to be blamed, who presumeth to censure before he understand.  
Another of his whimsies is, That no law can be unjust; by a good law I mean, not a just law, 
Le. p. 182.  for no law can be unjust, etc. It is in the Laws of the Commonwealth, as in the laws of gaming. Whatsoever the Gamesters all agree on, is injustice to none of them. An opinion absurd in itself, and contradictory to his own ground. There may be laws tending to the contumely of God, to Atheism, to denial of God's providence, to Idolatry, all which he confesseth to be crimes of high treason against God. There may be Laws against the Law of nature, which he acknowledgeth to be the divine Law, eternally, immutable, which God hath made known to all men, by his eternal word born 
Ci. c. 14. s. 4.  in themselves, that is to say, natural reason. But this question, whether any law can be unjust, hath been debated more fully between him and me, in my answer to his Animadversions. The true ground of this and many other of his mistakes, is this, That he fancieth no 
Nu. 14.  reality of any natural justice or honesty, nor any relation to the Law of God or nature, but only to the Laws of the Commonwealth. So from one absurdity being admitted, many others are apt to follow.  
His Economics are no better than his Politics. He teacheth parents that they cannot be injurious to their children, so long as they are in 
Ci. c. 9 s. 7.  their power. Yes, too many ways, both by omission and commission. He teacheth mothers that they may cast away their infants, or 
Ci c. 9 s. 2.  expose them at their own discretion lawfully. He teacheth parents indifferently, that where they are free from all subjection, they may take away 
Qu. p. 137.  the lifes of their children, or kill them, and this justly.  
What horrid doctrines are these? It may be he will tell us, that he speaketh only of the state of mere nature, but he doth not, for he speaketh expressly of Commonwealths, and paralleth Fathers with Kings and Lords, to whom he ascribeth absolute dominion, who have no place in his state of mere nature. Neither can he speak of the state of mere nature, for therein, according to his grounds, the children have as much privilege to kill their Parents, as the Parents to kill their children, seeing he supposeth it to be a state of war of all men against all men,  
And if he did speak of the state of mere nature, it were all one. For first his state of mere nature is a drowsy dream of his own feigning, which looketh upon men as if they were suddenly grown out of the ground like mushrooms. 
Ci. c. 8. s. 1.  The primigenious and most natural state of mankind, was in Adam before his fall, that is, the state of innocence. O●… suppose we should give way to him to expound himself of the state of corrupted nature, that was in Adam and his family after his fall. But there was no such state of mere nature as he imagineth. There was Religion, there were Laws, Government, Society: and if there ever were any such barbarous savage rabble of men, as he supposeth, in the World, it is both untrue and dishonourable to the God of nature, to call it the state of mere nature, which is the state of degenerated nature. He might as well call an hydro●…ical distemper, contracted by intemperance, or any other disease of that nature, the natural state of men. But there never was any such degenerate rabble of men in the World, that were without all Religion, all Government, all Laws, natural and Civil, no, not amongst the most barbarous Americans, (who except some few criminal habits, which those poor degenerate people, deceived by national stome, do hold for noble) have more principles of natural piety, and honesty, and moralty, then are readily to be found in his writings. As for the times of civil war, they are so far from being without all pacts and governor's, that they abound overmuch with pacts and governor's making policy not only to seem, but to be double.  
This evident truth may be demonstrated from his own grounds. All those places of holy 
Ci. c. 4. s. 4.  Scripture by which we are forbidden to invade that which is another man's, as, thou shalt not kill, thou shall not steal, thou shalt not commit adultery, do confim the last of distinction of mine and thine. For they suppose the right of all men, to all things to bt taken away. How can that be, when he confesseth every where that these are the eternal laws of God and nature. But that which is much more true, they both suppose and demonstrate that there never was any such right of all men to all things. Let him call them laws or theorems, or what he please, they confute that state of mere nature which he maketh the foundation of his commonwealth  
Hitherto he hath been too high for the parents. Now they must expect a cooling card. The question who is the better man hath no place in the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal. Are the parent and child equal? Yes, they are equal who can do equal things one against another, But they who can do the greatest things, that is to kill, can do equal things. Therefore all men by nature are equal among themselves. If the son have as strong an arm, and as good a cudgel as his father, he is as good a man as his father.  
Another of his aphorisms is, paternal dominion is not so derived from generation, as if 
Le. p. 102.  therefore the parent had dominion over his child, because he begat him, but by the child's consent, either express, or by other sufficient arguments declared. And will you see how this consent is gained? The attaining to sovereign power is by two ways, one by natural force, as when a man maketh his children submit themselves and their children to his government, as being able to destroy 
Le. p. 88  them if they refuse. These principles are so false that the very evidence of truth doth extort the contrary from him at other times. The Bishop saw there was paternal government in Adam, which he might do easily, as being no deep 
Qu. p. 139.  consideration. And again, To kill one's parent, is a greater crime than to kill another, For the parent ought to have the honour of a sovereign, though he have surrendered his power to the civil law because he had it originally by nature. Great is 
Le. p. 160.  truth, and prevaileth.  
If this were no deep consideration, the more he deserveth to be blamed, who at sometimes robbeth both parents of their honour, some some other times the man only, as by the right of nature the dominion over an infant doth belong first to him who hath him first in his power. And it is manifest that he that is born is sooner in the power of his mother than of any other, so that she might either bring him up, or cast him out, at her 
Ci. c. 9 s. 2.  pleasure, and by right. Never without the father's licence, again, in the state of nature it cannot be known who is father of an infant, but by the relation of the mother. Therefore he is his, whom the mother would have him to be, and therefore the mothers. Doth this man believe in earnest 
Ibid. s. 3.  that marriage was instituted by God in Paradise, and hath continued ever since the creation, He might as well tell us in plain terms, that all the obligation which a child hath to his parent, is because he did not take him by the heels and knock out his brains against the walls, so soon as he was born. Though this be intolerable, yet there is something of gratitude in it, and in that respect it is not altogether so ill as his forced pacts.  
How repugnant is this which he saith of the mother's dominion over her children, to the law of nations? By the law of the twelve tables a father might sell his child twice, bis vaenum dicat. The mother had no hand in it. Neither doth the judicial law of the Jews, descent from this, If a man sell his daughter is 
Exod. 21. 7. Num. 30. 4.  be a maid servant. So likewise a child's vow might be invalidated by the authority of a father, but not of a mother.  
He aboundeth every where with such destructive conclusions as these, as to generation God hath ordained to man an helper, and there be always two that are equally parents, The dominion therefore over the child should belong equally to both, and he be equally subject to both, which is 
Le. p. 102.  impossible, for no man can obey two masters. Whether had he forgotten the commandment, Honour thy father and thy mother, or thinketh he that obedience is not a branch of honour?  
In the next place his principles destroy the subordination of a wife to her husband. The inaequality of natural strength is less than that a man can acquire dominion over a woman without 
Ci. c. 9 s. 3.  war? And he giveth this reason why the contrary custom prevaileth, because commonwealths were constituted by fathers of families, not 
Ibid. s.  by mothers of families, and from hence it is that the domestical dominion belongs to the man. The scriptures assign another reason of the subjection of the woman, and the rule of the man, namely the ordinance of Almighty God. Gen. 3. 16. And St. Paul secondeth it, Women are commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the law. 1. Cor. 14. 34. I trow that law was not made by fathers of families. Wives submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord. Eph. 5. 22. Why, because of the civil law? No such thing for the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the Church, v. 23. And the man is the image and glory of God, but the woman is the glory of the man, for the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man, neither was the man created for the woman, but the woman, for the man. 1. Cor. 11. 7. 8. 9 He would not suffer a woman to usurp authority over a man. 1. Tim. 2. 12. much less over her own husband. I might cite St. Peter to the same purpose, but I am afraid lest he should accuse both S. Peter and St. Paul of partiality, as well as the first founders of commonwealths.  
Upon his principles no man is sure of his own wife, if the sovereign please to dispose her to another. For although the law of nature do prohibit theft, or adultery. etc. Yet if the civil law command a man to invade any thing, that is not theft or adultery. And what is the civil law in his sense? the command of the lawgiver. 
Ci. c. 14. s. 10.  And his command is the declaration of his will. So if the lawgiver do but declare his pleasure that any one shall enjoy such a man's wife, or 
Ibid. s. 13.  that she shall no longer be his wife, according to his grounds, husband and wife must both obey. What is theft? what is murder? what is adultery? is known by the civil law, that is by the commands of him that is Sovereign in the commonwealth. And without the Sovereign's 
Ci c. 6. s. 16.  command, if either party do but suspect one another, the party suspected is disobliged, for there is no pact, where credit is not given to him that maketh the pact, neither can faith be violated where it is not had.  
The next political relation is between the Master and the servant, which the Hobbian 
Ci. c. 8. s. 9  principles do overthrow as well as the rest. One of these principles is, that a Master cannot do any wrong to his servant, because the servant hath subjected his will to the will of his Master. In all such submissions there is evermore either expressed or implied a salvo, or 
Ci. c. 8. s. 7.  a saving of his duty to God, and his allegiance to his Prince. If his master shall punish him for not doing contrary to these, or by menaces compel him to do contrary to these, he doth him wrong. No man can transfer that right to another, which he had not himself. The servant before his submission to his master, had no right to deny due obedience to god, or due allegiance to his Prince.  
Another of his Paradoxesis, that whosoever is obliged to obey the commands of any other, before he know what he will command, is bound to all his commands simply, and without restriction. Now he that is obliged, is called a servant, he to whom he is bound, a Master. What if the masters 
Ci. c. 8. s. 1.  command be contrary to the laws of God or nature? Or the laws of the commonwealth. In the presence of a greater authority, a lesser authority ceaseth. Such implicit obligations are ever to be understood, quantum jus fasque fuerit, according to law and equity.  
Hitherto servants have been grieved, but now they shall be relieved, if T. H. his authority can do it. Servants who are holden in bonds are not comprehended in the definition of servants, because they serve not by pact, but to avoid beating, And therefore if they fly away, or 
Ci. c. 8. s. 4.  kill their master, they do nothing contrary to the laws of nature. For to bind them is a sign that the binder did suppose them not sufficiently bound by any other obligation. His consequence is infirm, because the Master binds his servant therefore he distrusts him, therefore there were no pacts. A man may give his parole for true imprisonment, and having given it to a just enemy, is obliged to hold it, what if his conqueror or master did spare his life, upon condition that he should be true prisoner, until he could find out a fit exchange for him. This was a lawful pact. Then doth not T. H. instruct the prisoner well, to cut his conquerors throat, who spared his life, upon a lawful condition.  
But to dispel these umbrages, he teacheth that a servant who is cast into bonds, or any way 
Ibid. l. 9  deprived of his corporal liberty, is freed from that other obligation which did arise from his pact So as according to his principles, If a servant, (that is more than a captive,) having not only had his life spared by a just Conqueror, but also contracted and engaged himself to be a loyal servant, as firmly as may be, shall nevertheless be cast into any bonds by his master, or be restrained of his corporal liberty, upon delinquency, or just suspicion, he is acquitted of all his pacts and obligations, and as free to run away, or cut his master's throat, as if he had never pacted or engaged at all.  
His defaults come so thick, I am weary of observing them. Take an hotchpotch together.  
1. In the state of nature profit is the measure of right. 
Ci. c. 1. s. 10 Ci. c. 9 s. 3.   
2. Every one is an enemy to every one whom he neither commandeth nor obeyeth.  
3. Not only to contend against one, but even this very thing not to consent, is odious; for not to 
Ci. c. 1. s. 5.  consent with one in some thing, is tacitly to accuse him of error in that thing, as to descent in many things, is to hold him for a fool. In the name of God what doth he hold the whole World to be? I am sure he dissenteth from them all in many things.  
4. It is not reasonable that one perform first, if it be likely that the other will not perform afterwards, 
Ci. c. 2. s. 11.  which whether it be likely or no, he that feareth shall judge. It is true he addeth, That in the civil state, where both parties may be compelled, he who is to perform first by the contract, aught to perform first. But what if the civil power be not able to compel him? What if there be no witnesses to prove the contract? then the civil power can do nothing. May a man violate his faith in such cases upon general suspicions of the fraud and unfaithfulness of mankind?  
5. If a people have elected a Sovereign for term of life, and he die, neither the people before election, nor he before his death, having ordained 
Ci. c. 7. s. 16.  any thing about a place of meeting for a new election, it is lawful for every one, by equal, that is natural right, to snatch the Sovereignty to himself if he can. His opinion of the state of nature is a very bundle of absurdities.  
6. When a Master commandeth his servant to give money to a stranger, if it be not done, the injury is done to the Master, whom he had before 
Le. p. 74.  covenanted to obey, but the damage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no obligation, and therefore could not injure him. True according to his Principles, who maketh neither conscience nor honesty nor obligation from any one to any one, but only by pacts or promises. All just men are of another mind.  
7. Those men which are so remissly governed, that they dare take up arms to defend or introduce 
Le. p. 91.  a new opinion, are still in war, and their condition not peace, but only a cessation of arms, for fear of one another. Why is the fault rather imputed to the remissness of the Governor, than to the sedition of the people, and a state of war feigned, where none is? The reason is evident, because he had no hand in the government, but had a hand in the introduction of new opinions.  
8. In a Sovereign assembly, the liberty to protest is taken away, both because he that protesteth there, denieth their Sovereignty, and also whatsoever 
Le. p. 117.  is commanded by the Sovereign power, is as to the subject, justified by the command, though not so always in the sight of God. That is not taken away which all Sovereigns do allow, even in the competition for a Crown, as was verified in the case of the King of Spain and the House of Braganza, about the kingdom of Portugal. It is no denial of Sovereignty, to appeal humbly from a Sovereign misinformed, to himself better informed. The commands of a Sovereign person or assembly are so far justified by the command, that they may not be resisted; but they are not so far justified, but that a loyal subject may lawfully seek with all due submission, to have them rectified.  
9 If he whose private interest is to be debated and judged in a Sovereign Assembly, make as 
Le. p. 122.  may friends as he can, it is no injustice in him. And though he hire such friends with money, unless there be an express law against it, yet it is no injustice. It is to be feared that such provacations as this, are not very needful in these times. Is it not unlawful to blind the eyes of the wise with bribes, and make them pervert judgement? Others pretend expedition, or an equal hearing; but he who knoweth no obligation but pacts, is for downright hiring of his Judges, as a man should hire an hackney-coach for an hour. There is no gratitude in hiring, which is unlawful in the buyer, though not so unlawful as in the seller of Justice. If any man digged a pit, and did not cover it, so that an ox or an ass fell into it, 
Exod. 21 33.  he who digged it was to make satisfaction. He that hireth his Judges with money to be for him right or wrong, diggeth a pit for them, and by the equity of this Mosaical-Law, will appear not to be innocent.  
Thus after the view of his Religion, we have likewise surveighed his Politics, as full of black ugly dismal rocks as the former, dictated with the same magisteral authority; A man may judge them to be twins upon the first cast of his eye. It was Solomon's advice, Remove not the ancient land marks which thy fathers have set. But T. H. taketh a pride in removeing 
Pou. 22. 28.  all ancient landmarks, between Prince and subject, Father and child, Husband and Wife, Master and servant, Man and Man. Nilus after a great overflowing, doth not leave such a confusion after it as he doth, nor an hog in a garden of herbs. I wish he would have turned probationer a while, and made trial of his new form of government first in his own house, before he had gone about to obtrude it upon the Commonwealth. And that before his attempts and bold endeavours, to reform and to renew the policy of his native Country, he had thought more seriously and more sadly of his own application of the fable of Peleus his foolish daughters, who desiring to renew the youth of their decripit father, did by the counself Medea cut him 
Le. p. 177.  in pieces, and boil him together with strange herbs; but made not of him a new man.   

CHAP. 3.  
That the Hobbian Principles are inconsistent one with another.  
MY third Harping-Iron is aimed at the head of his Leviathan, or the rational part of his discourse, to show that his Principles are contradictory one to another, and consequently destructive one of another. It is his own observation. That which taketh away the reputation of wisdom in him that formeth a Religion, or addeth 
Le. p. 58.  to it when it is already form, is an enjoining a belief of contradictories, for both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true. And therefore to enjoin the belief of them, is an argument of ignorance. How he will free himself from his own censure, I do not understand; let the Reader judge.  
He affirmeth that an hereditary kingdom is the best form of government; We are made 
Ci. c. 10. s. 18.  subjects to him upon the best condition, whose interest it is that we should be safe and sound. And this cometh to to pass when we are the Sovereign's inheritance, (that is in an hereditary kingdom) for every one doth of his own accord study to preserve his own inheritance. Now let us hear him retract all this. There is no perfect form of government where the disposing of the succession is 
Le. p. 99 Ci. c. 9 s. 13. Le. p. 193.  not in the present Sovereign. And whether he transfer it by testament, or give it, or sell it, it is rightly disposed.  
He affirmeth, That which is said in the Scripture, It is better to obey God than man, hath place in the kingdom of God by pact, and not by nature. One can scarcely meet with a more absurd senseless Paradox, That in Gods own kingdom of Nature, (where he supposeth all men equal, and no Governor but God,) it should not be better to obey God than man, the Creator than the creator, the Sovereign rather than a fellow-subject. Of the two it had been the less absurdity to have said, that it had place in the kingdom of God by nature, and not by pact, because in the kingdom of God by pact, Sovereigns are as mortal gods.  
Now let us see him Penelope like, unweave in the night what he had woven in the day, or rather unweave in the day, what he had woven in the night. It is manifest enough, that when man receiveth two contrary commands, and knows that one of them is Gods, he ought to obey 
Le. p. 321.  that, and not the other, though it be the command even of his lawful Sovereign. Take another place more express, speaking of the first kingdom of God by pact with Abraham, etc. He hath these words, Nor was there any contract which could add to, or strengthen the obligation, 
Le. p. 249.  by which both they and all men else were bound naturally to obey God Almighty. And 
Ibid.  before any such Kingdom of God by pact, As the moral law they were already obliged, and 
Ci. c. 16. s. 2. s. 1.  needed not have been contracted withal. He fancieth that God reigneth by pact over Adam and Eve, but this pact became presently void. And if it had stood firm, what Kingdom of God by nature could have been before it? But he reckons his Kingdom of God by pact from Abraham, from him the Kingdom of God by pact takes its beginning. But in Abraham's time, and before his time, the World was full of Kings: every City had a King; was it not better for their subjects to obey God than them? yet that was the Kingdom of God by nature, or no Kingdom of God at all.  
Sometimes he saith the Laws of nature are Laws, whose Laws (such of them as oblige all mankind) and in respect of God, as he is the God 
Le. p. 185.  of Nature, are natural, in respct of the same God, as he is King of Kings, are Laws; and right reason is a Law. And he defines the 
Ci. c. 2. s. 1.  Law of nature, to be the deictate of right reason. Where by the way observe, what he makes to be the end of the Laws of nature, The long conservation of our lives and members, so much as is in our power. By this the Reader may see what he believes of honesty, or the life to come. At other times he saith that they are no laws. Those which we call the Laws of nature, being nothing else but certain conclusions understood by reason of things to be done; or to be left undone. And a law, if we speak properly and accurately, is the speech of him that 
Ci. c. 3. 〈◊〉. 33.  commandeth something by right to others, to be done, or not to be done, speaking properly, they are not laws, as they proceed from nature.  
It is true, he addeth in the same place, That as they are given by God in holy Scripture, they are most properly called Laws, for the holy Scripture is the voice of God ruling all things by the greatest right. But this will not salve the contradiction, for so the Laws of nature shall be no Laws to any but those who have read the Scripture, contrary to the sense of all the World. And even in this he contradicteth himself also. The Bible is a Law? to whom? to all the World; he knoweth it is not: How came it then to be a Law to us? Did God speak 
Q. p. 136.  it viva voce to us? Have we any other warrant for it than the word of the Prophots? Have we seen the miraoles? Have we any other assurance of their certainty, than the authority of the Church? And so he concludeth, That the authority of the Church is the authority of the Commonwealth, the authority of the Commonwealth, the authority of the Sovereign, and his authority was given him by us. And so the Bible was made Law by the 
Ibid.  assent of the Subjects. And the Bible is their only Law, where the civil Sovereign hath made it so. Thus in seeking to prove one contradiction 
Le p. 332.  we have met with two.  
He teacheth that the Laws of nature are 
Ci. c. 3. s. 29. Ci. c. 5. s. 2.  eternal and immutable, that which they forbid can never be lawful, that which they command never unlawful. At other times he teacheth, that in war, and especially in a war of hast men against all men, the Laws of nature are silent. And that they do not oblige as Laws, before there be a Commonwealth constituted. When a Common-weulth is once settled, then are they 
Le. p. 138.  actually Laws, and not before.  
He saith true religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's Lieutenants, and in giving God such 
Q●…. p. 334. p. 341.  honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their several Lieutenancies, shall ordain. Which Lieutenant upon earth is the supreme civil magistrate. And yet contrary to this he excepteth from the obedience due to sovereign Princes, all things that are contrary to the laws of God, who ruleth over rulers. Adding 
Ci. c. 6. s. 13.  that we cannot rightly transfer the obedience due to him upon men. And more plainly, If a sovereign shall command himself to be worshipped with divine attributes and actions, as such as imply an independence upon God, or immortality, or infinite power, to pray unto them being absent, or to ask those things of them which only God can give, to offer sacrifice, or the like. Although 
Ci. c. 15. s. 18.  Kings command us we must ab stein. He conefesseth that the subjects of Abraham had sinned, if they had denied the existence or providence of God, or done any thing that was expressly against the honour of God, in obedience to his 
Ci. c. 16. s. 7. Le. p. 192.  commands. And actions that are naturally signs of contumely, cannot be made by humane power a part of divine worship, cannot be parts of divine worship, and yet religion may consist in such worship, is a contradiction.  
He confesseth, That if the Commonwealth should command a Subject to say or do something 
Ci. c. 15. s. 18.  that is contumelious unto God, or should forbid him to worship God, he ought not to obey. And yet maintaineth that a Christian holding firmly the faith of Christ in his heart, if he be commanded by his lawful Sovereign, may deny Christ with his tongue, alleging, That profession with the tongue is but an external thing. And that it is not he in that case, who denieth Christ before men, but his Governor, and the law of his Country. Hath he so soon forgot himself? 
Le. p. 271.  Is not the denial of Christ contumelious to God?  
He affirmeth that if a Sovereign shall grant to a Subject any liberty inconsistent with Sovereign power, if the Subject refuse to obey the Sovereign's command, being contrary to the liberty granted, it is a sin, and contrary to his duty, for he ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with 
Le. p. 157.  Sovereignty, etc. And that such liberty was granted through ignorance of the evil consequence thereof. Then a Subject may judge not only what is fit for his own preservation, but also what are the essential rights of Sovereignty, which is contrary to his doctrine elsewhere. It belongs to Kings to discern what is good and evil; and private men, who take to themselves 
Ci. c. 12. s. 1.  the knowledge of good and evil, do covet to be as Kings, which consisteth not with the safety of the Commonwealth; which he calleth a seditious doctrine, and one of the diseases of a Commonwealth. Yet such is his forgetfulness, that he 
Le. p. 168.  himself licenseth his own book for the Press, and to be taught in the Universities, as containing nothing contrary to the word of God or good manners, or to the disturbance of public tranquillity. 
Le. p. 395.  Is not this to take to himself the knowledge of good and evil?  
In one place he saith that the just power of Sovereigns is absolute, and to be limited by the strength of the Commonwealth, and nothing else. 
Ci c. 6. s. 18.  In other places he saith his power is to be limited by the Laws of God and nature. As there is that in Heaven, though not on earth, 
Le. p. 167.  which he should stand in fear of, and whose Laws he ought to obey. And though it be not determined in Scripture, what Laws every King shall constitute in his dominions, yet it is determined, what Law he shall not constitute. And it is true, that Sovereigns are all subject to the laws of 
Le. p. 199. p. 169.  nature, because such laws be divine, and cannot by any man or Common-woalth be abrogated.  
In one place hemaintaineth that all men by nature are equal among themselves. In another place, that the father of every man was originally his Sovereign 
Ci c. 1. s. 3.  Lord, with power over him of life & death. 
Le. p. 178.   
He acknowledgeth that God is not only good, and just, and merciful, but the best. That nature doth dictate to us that God is to be honoured; and that to honour, is to think as highly of his power and goodness as is possible, and that nothing ought to be attributed 
Ci c. 15. s. 9 Le. p. 188.  to him, but what is honourable. Nothing can be more contrary to this goodness, or more dishonourable to God, than to make him to be the cause of all the sin in the World. Perhaps he will say that this opinion maketh God the cause of sin: But doth not the Bishop think him the cause of all actions? And are not sins of 
Qu. p. 175.  commission actions? Is murder no action? And doth not God himself say, Non est malum in civitate quod ego non feci? And was not murder one of those evils? The like doctrine he hath. Qu. p. 108. and 234.  
I chanced to say, that if a child, before he have the use of reason, shall kill a man in his passion; yet because he had no malice to incite him to it, nor reason to restrein him from it, he shall not die for it in the strict rules of particular justice, unless there be some mixture of public justice in the case, showing only what was the law, not what was my opinion. An innocent child for terror to others, in some cases may be deprived of those honours and inheritances, which were to have descended upon him from his father, but not of his life. Amazia slew the murderers of the King his father, but he 
2 Chro. 25. 4. Deur. 24. 16.  slew not their children, but did as it is written in the Law, in the book of Moses, The fathers shall not die for the children, nor the children for the fathers, And he presently taxed me for it, The Bishop would make but an ill judge of innocent children. And the same merciful opinion 
Qu. p. 277. Le. p. 165.  he maintaineth elsewhere. All punishments of innocent Subjects, be they great or little, are against the law of nature. For punishment is only for transgression of the law, and therefore there can be no punishment of the innocent. Yet within few lines after he changeth his note. In Subjects who deliberately deny the authority of the Commonwealth established, the vengeance is lawfully extended, not only to the fathers, but 
Ibid.  also to the third and fourth generation. His reason is, because this offence consisteth in renouncing of subjection: so they suffer not as Subjects, but as enemies. Well, but the children were born subjects as well as the father, and they never renounced their subjection, how come they to lose their birthright, and their lives for their father's fault, if there can be no punishment of the innocent, so the contradiction stands still.  
But all this is but a copy of his countenance, I have showed formerly expressly out of his principles, That the foundation of the right of punishing, exercised in every Commonwealth, is not the just right of the Sovereign for crimes committed, but that right which every man by nature had to kill every man. Which right he saith every Subject hath renounced, but the Sovereign by whose authority punishment is inflicted, hath not. So if he do examine the crime in justice, and condemn the delinquent, then is properly punishment. If he do not, than it is an hostile act, but both ways just and allowable. Reader, if thou please to see what a slippery memory he hath: for thine own satisfaction, read over the beginning of the eight and twentieth Chapter of his Leviathan. Innocents' cannot be justly punished, but justly killed upon his principles.  
But this very man, who would seem so zealous sometimes for humane justice, that there can be no just punishment of innocents', no just punishment, but for crimes committed, how standeth he affected to divine justice? He reguardeth it not at all, grounding every where God's right to afflict the Creatures upon his omnipotence: and maintaining that God may as justly afflict with eternal torments without sin, as for sin. Though God have power to afflict a man, and not for sin, without in justice: Shall we think God so cruel, as to afflict a man, and not for sin, with extreme and endless torments? Is it not cruelty? No more than to do the same for sin, when he that afflicteth 
Q. p. 13.  might without trouble have kept him from sinning. Whether God do afflict eternally, or punish eternally; whether the Sovereign proceed judciially, or in an hostile way, so it be not for any crime committed; it is all one as to the justice of God and the Sovereign, and all one as to the sufferings of the innocent. But it may and doth often happen in Commonwealths, that a Subject may 
Le. p. 109.  be put to death by the command of the Sovereign power, and yet neither do the other wrong; that is to say, both be innocent, for that is the whole scope of the place. It is against the law of nature to punish innocent Subjects, saith one place, but innocent Subjects may lawfully be killed or put to death, saith another.  
Sometimes he maketh the institution of Sovereignty to be only the laying down the right of Subjects, which they had by nature. For he who renounceth or passeth away his right, giveth not to any other man, a right which he had not before, because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature, but only standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his own original right, without hindrance from him, 
Le. p. 65.  not without hindrance from another. And elsewhere, The Subjects did not give the Sovereign that right, but only in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his own, etc. So it was 
Le. p. 162.  not given, but left to him, and to him only. And the translation of right doth consist only in not 
Ci. c. 2. s. 4.  resisting. He might as well have said, and with as much sense, the transferring of right doth consist in not transferring of right. At other times he maketh it to be a surrender, or giving up of the subjects right to govern himself to this man. A conferring of all their power and strength upon one man, that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices to one wil An appointing 
Le. p. 87.  of one man to bear their person, and acknowledging themselves to be the authors of whatsoever the Sovereign shall act, or cause to be acted in those things which concern the common safety; a submission of their wills to his will, their judgements to his judgement. And David did no injury 
Le. p. 109.  to Uriah, because the right to do what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself. Before we had a transferring without transferring, now we have a giving up without giving up, an appointing or constituting, without appointing or constituting, a subjection without subjection, an authorising without authorising What is this?  
He saith that it cannot be said honourably of 
Ci. c. 15. s. 14.  God, that he hath parts or totality, which are the attributes of finite things. If it cannot be said honourably of God, that he hath parts or totality, than it cannot be said honourably of God that he is a body; for every body hath parts and totality. Now hear what he saith, Every part of the Universe is body; And 
Le. p. 371.  that which is no body, is no part of the Universe. And because the Universe is all, that which is no part of it, is nothing. Then if God have no parts and totality, God is nothing. Let him judge how honourable this is for God.  
He saith, We honour not God but dishonour him by any value less than infinite. And how 
Le. p. 357. Qu. p. 266.  doth he set an infinite value upon God, who every where maketh him to subsist by successive duration. Infinite is that to which nothing can be added, but to that which subsisteth by successive duration, something is added every minute.  
He saith, Christ had not a Kingly authority committed to him by his Father in the World, but 
Ci. c. 17. s. 6.  only consiliary and doctrinal. He saith on the contrary, That the kingdom of judaea was his hereditary right from King David. etc. And when it pleased him to play the King, he required entire obedience, Math. 21. 2. Go into the village over against you, and straightway ye shall find an assetied, and a colt with her, lose them and bring them unto me. And if any man say aught 
Ci. c. 11. s. 6.  unto you, ye shall say, The Lord hath need of them.  
He saith, The institution of eternal punishment was before sin. And if the command be such as 
Ci. c. 4. s. 9 Le. p. 321.  cannot be obeyed without being damned to eternal death, than it were madness to obey it. And what evil hath excommunicatien in it, but the consequent, 
Ci. c. 17. s. 25.  eternal punishment? At other times he saith there is no eternal punishment. It is evident that there shall be a second death of every 
Le. p. 245.  one that shall be condemned at the day of judgement, after which he shall die no more. He who knoweth no soul nor spirit, may well be ignorant of a spiritual death.  
He saith, It is a doctrine repugnant to civil society, that whatsoever a man does against his conscience is sin. Yet he himself saith, It is a sin 
Le. p. 168.  whatsoever one doth against his conscience, for they that do that, despise the Law. 
Ci. c. 12. s. 2.   
He saith, That all power secular and spiritual under Christ, is united in the Christian Commonwealth; 
Ci. c. 18. s. 1.  that is, the Christian Sovereign: Yet he himself saith on the contrary, It cannot be doubted of, that the power of binding and losing; that is, of remotting and retaining sins, (which we call the power of the keys) was given by Christ to future Pastors in the same manner as to the present Apostles. And all power of remitting sin which 
Ci. c. 17. s. 25.  Christ himself had, was given to the Apostles. All spiritual power is in the Christian Magistrate. Some spiritual power (that is the power of the keys) is in the successors of the Apostles, that is not in the Christian Magistrate, is a contradiction.  
He confesseth, That it is manifest that from the ascension of Christ until the conversion of Kings, the power Ecclesiastical was in the Apostles, and so delivered unto their successors by 
Le. p. 267.  imposition of hands. And yet strait, forgetting himself, he taketh away all power from them, even in that time when there were no Christian Kings in the World. He alloweth them no power to make any Ecclesiastical laws or constitutions, or to impose any manner of commands upon Christians. The office of the Apostles was not to command, but teach. As Schoolmasters, not as Commanders. 
Ci. c. 17. s. 24. Le. p. 269.  Yet Schoolmasters have some power to command. He suffereth not the Apostles to ordain, but those whom the Church appointeth, nor to excommunicate, or absolve, but whom the Church pleaseth. He maketh the determination of all controversies to rest in the Church, not in the Apostles. And resolveth all questions into the authority of the Church. The election of Doctors and Prophets did rest upon the authority of the Church of Antioch. And if it be inquired by what authority it came to pass that it was received for the command of the Holy Ghost, which 
Ci. c. 17. s. 24.  those Prophets and Doctors said proceeded from the Holy Ghost, we must necessarily answer, By the authority of the Church of Antioch. Thus every where he ascribeth all authority to the Church, none at all to the Apostles, even in those times before there were Christian Kings. He saith not, tell it to the Apostles; but tell it to the Church, that we may know the definitive sentence, whether sin, or no sin, is not left to 
Ci. c. 17. s. 25.  them, but to the Church. And it is manifest, that all authority in spiritual things, doth depend upon the authority of the 
Ci. c. 18. s. 1.  Church  
Thus not contented with single contradictions, he twisteth them together; for according to his definition of a Church, there was no Christian Church at Antioch, or in those parts of the World, either then or long after. Hear him. A Church is a company of men professing Christian Religion, united in the person of 
Le. p. 248.  one Sovereign, at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble. Yet there was no Christian Sovereign in those parts of the World then, or for two hundred years after, and by consequence, according to his definition, no Church.  
He teacheth, That when the civil Sovereign is an infidel, every one of his own subjects that resisteth him, sinneth against the Laws of God, and rejecteth the counsel of the Apostles, that admonisheth all Christians to obey their Princes, and 
Le. p. 330.  all children and servants to obey their Parents and Masters in all things. As for not resisting, he is in the right, but for obeying in all things, in his sense, it is an abominable error. Upon this ground, he alloweth Christians to deny Christ, to sacrifice to idols, so they preserve faith in their hearts. He telleth them, They have the licence that Naaman had, and need not put themselves into danger for their faith. That is, they have liberty to do any external acts, which their infidel Sovereigns shall command them. Now hear the contrary from himself. When Sovereigns are not Christians, in spiritual things; that is, in those things which pertain to the manner of worshipping God, some 
Ci. c. 18. s. 13.  Church of Christians is to be followed; Adding, that when we may not obey them, yet we may not resist them, but eundum est ad Christum per martyrium, we ought to suffer for it.  
He confesseth, That matter and power are indifferent to contrary forms and contrary acts. 
Qu. p. 292.  And yet maintaineth every where that all matter is necessitated by the outward causes to one individual form; that is it is not indifferent. And all power by his Principles is limited and determined to one particular act. Thus he scoffeth at me for the contrary, very learnedly, as if there were a power that were not a power to do some particular act, or a power to kill, and yet to kill no body in particular. Nor doth power signify any thing actually, but those motions 
Qu. p. 108.  and present acts, from which the act that is not now, but shall be hereafter, necessarily proceedeth. If every act be necessary, and all power determined to one particular act, as he saith here, how is power indifferent to contrary Acts, as he saith there?  
He acknowledgeth, That though at some certain distance the real and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us, yet still the 
Le. p. 4. Qu. p. 245.  object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. And yet affirmeth the contrary, That the Preachers voice is the same thing with hearing, and a fancy in the hearer. Even so he might say, that the colour or the sight, is the same thing with seeing. Men utter their voice many times, when no man heareth them.  
He saith, Inspiration implies a gift supernatural, and the immediate hand of God. On the contrary he saith, To say a man speaks by supernatural 
Le. p. 324. Le. p. 196.  inspiration, is to say he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for which he can allege no natural and sufficient reason. He reckoneth this opinion, that faith and sanctity are not to be attained by study and 
Le p. 169 Le. p. 214.  reason, but by supernatural inspiration, among the diseases of a Commonwealth. And lastly he acknowledgeth no proper inspiration, but blowing of one thing into another, nor metaphorical, but inclining the spirit.  
He saith, Ordinary men understand the word body and empty, as well as learned men; And when they hear named an empty vessel, the learned as well as the unlearned, mean and understand the same thing, namely, that there is nothing in it that 
Qu. p. 307.  can be seen, and whether it be truly empty, the ploughman and the Schoolman know alike. Now hear him confess the contrary. In the s●…se of common people not all the Universe is called body, but only such parts thereof as they can discern by the sense of feeling to resist the force, or by the 
Le. p. ●…07  of their eyes to hinder them from a farther prospect, therefore in the common language of men, air and aerial substances, use not to be taken for bodies.  
He holdeth that no law may be made to command the will. The stile of law is, Do this, 
Qu. p. 138.  or do not this; or if thou do this thou shalt suffer this. But no law runs thus. Will this, or will not this; or if thou have a will to this, thou shalt suffer this. And yet he defineth sin to be that which is done, or left undone, or spoken, or willed 
De Ci. c. 14. s. 17.  contrary to the reason of the Commonwealth. Then the laws of men are made to bind the will, if that which is willed contrary to the laws be a sin.  
He saith, Necessary is that which is impossible to be otherwise, or that which cannot possibly be, 
Qu. p. 26. & p. 36.  and possible and impossible have no signification in reference to the time past, or time present, but only time to come. Yet in the very same paragraph he asserteth a necessity from eternity, or an antecedent necessity, derived from the very beginning of time.  
He saith, There is no doubt a man can will one thing or other, or forbear to will it. If a man 
Qu. p. 310.  can both will and forbear to will the same thing, than a man is as free to will as to do. But he teacheth the contrary every where, That a man is free to do if he will, but he is not free to will. 
Qu. p. 54.   
He saith, Though God gave Solomon his choice, that is, the thing which he should choose, it doth not follow that he did not also give him the 
Qu. p. 75.  act of election; that is, determine him to that which he should choose. To give a man choice of two things, and determine him to one of them, is contradictory.  
He confesseth, That it is an absurd speech to say the will is compelled, And yet with the 
Qu. p. 208.  same breath he affirmeth, That a man may be compelled to will. The reason why the will cannot be compelled is, because it implieth a contradiction. Compulsion is evermore against a man's will; How can a man will that which is against his will? Yet saith T. H. Many things may compel a man to do an action in producing his will. That a man may 
Ibid.  be compelled to do an action, there is no doubt, but to say he is compelled to do that action which he is willing to do, that is when a new will is produced, or that a will to do the action is produced then when the man is compelled, is a contradiction.  
He maketh the sovereign Prince to be the only authentic interpreter of Scripture, and to 
Ci. c. 17. s. 27. Le. p. 296.  have Pastor all authority jure divino, which all other Pastors hath but jure civili, yet in all questions of faith, and interpretation of the word of God, he obligeth the sovereign to make use of Ecclesiastical Doctors, rightly ordained by imposition of hands, to whom he saith Christ hath promised an infallibility, His gloss that this infallibility is not such an infallibility, that they cannot be deceived themselves, but that 
Ci. c. 17. s. 24.  a subject cannot be deceived in obeying them, is absurd, for such an infallibility (upon his grounds) the Sovereign had without their 
Qu. p. 214.  advice. To pass by his confused and party coloured discourse, how doth this agree with his former objection? which I shall insert here mutatis mutandis. That the right interpretation of scripture should depend upon the infallibility of Ecclesiastical Doctors, many incommodities and absurdities which must follow from thence, do prohibit, the chiefest whereof is this, that not only all civil obedience would be taken away, contrary to the precept of Christ, but also all society, and humane peace would be dissolved, contrary to the laws of nature. For whilst they make the Ecclesiastical Doctors the infallible judges, what pleaseth God, and what displeaseth him, the subjects cannot obey their Sovereigns, before the Doctors have judged of their commands, whether they be conformable to Scripture or not. And so either they do not obey, or they obey for the judgement of their Doctors, that is they obey their Doctors, not eheir Sovereign, Thus civil obedience is taken away. These are his own words with a little v●…iation, only putting in the Doctors for the subjects. I consider not what is true or false in them for the present, but only show the inconsistency of his grounds, how he buildeth with one hand, and pulleth down with the other.  
He saith it is determined in Scripture what laws every christian King shall not constitute in his dominions. And in the next words, Sovereigns 
Le. p. 199.  in their own dominions are the sole Legislators. And that those books only are canonical in every nation, which are established for such by 
Le. p. 169.  the sovereign authority. Then the determinations of Scripture upon his grounds are but civil laws, and do not tie the hands of Sovereigns. He teacheth us every where that the subsequent commands of a Sovereign contrary to his former laws is an abrogation of them. And that it is an opinion repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth, that he that hath the sovereign power is subject to the civil laws. The determinations of Scripture upon his grounds do bind the hands of Kings, when they themselves please to be bound, no longer.  
To conclude sometimes he doth admit the soul to be a distinct substance from the body, sometimes he denieth it. Sometimes he maketh reason to be a natural faculty, sometimes he maketh it to be an acquired habit. In some places he alloweth the will to be a rational appetite, in other places he disallows it. Sometimes he will have it to be a law of nature, that men must stand to their pacts, Sometimes he maketh covenants of mutual trust in the state of nature to be void. Sometimes he will have no punishment but for crimes that might have been left undone, At other times he maketh all crimes to be inevitable. Sometimes he will have the dependence of actions upon the will to be truly liberty, At other times he ascribeth liberty to rivers, which have no will. Sometimes he teacheth that though an action be necessitated, yet the will to break the law maketh the action to be unjust, at other times he maketh the will to be much more necessitated than the action. He telleth us that civil lawmakers may err and sin in making of a law, And yet the law so made is an infallible rule. Yes to lead a man infallibly into a ditch. What should a man say to this man? How shall one know when he is in earnest, and when he is in jest. He setteth down his opinion just as Gipsies tell fortunes, both ways, that if the one miss the other may be sure to hit, that when they are accused of falsehood by one, they may appeal to another. But what did I write in such a place.  
It was the praise of John Baptist, that he was not like a reed shaken with the wind, bending or inclining, hither and thither, this way and that way, now to old truths, then to new errors. And it is the honour of every good Christian. St. Paul doth excellently describe such fluctuating Christians by two comparisons, the one of little children, the other of a ship lying at Hull, Eph. 4. 14. That we henceforth be no more children tossed too and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, as a child wavers between his love and duty, to his parent or nurse on the one hand, and some apple or other toy which is held forth to him on the other hand, or as a ship lying at anchor changeth its positure with every wave, and every puff of wind. As the last company leaves them, or the present occasion makes them, so they vary their discourses.  
When the time was T. H. was very kind to me, to let me see the causes and grounds of my errors. Arguments seldom work on men of wit and learning, when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary opinion. If any thing will do it, it is the showing of them the causes of their errors. One good turn requireth another. Now I will do as much for him. If it 
Q. p. 334  do not work upon himself: Yet there is hope it may undeceive some of his disciples. A principal cause of his errors is a fancying to himself a general state of nature, which is so far from being general, that there is not an instance to be found of it in the nature of things, where mankind was altogether without laws & without governor's, guided only by self interest, without any sense of conscience, justice, honesty, or honour. He may search all the corners of America with a candle and lantern at noon day, and after his fruitless pains, return a non est invent us.  
Yet all plants and living creatures are subject to degenerate and grow wild by degrees. Suppose it should so happen that some remnant of men, either chased by war, or persecution, or forced out of the habitable world for some crimes by themselves committed, or being cast by shipwreck upon some deserts, by long conversing with savage beasts, lions, bears, wolves and tigers, should in time become more brutish (it is his own epithet,) than the bruits themselves, would any man in his right wits make that to be the universal condition of mankind, which was only the condition of an odd handful of men, or that to be the state of nature, which was not the state of nature, but an accidental degeneration?  
He that will behold the state of nature rightly, must look upon the family of Adam, and his posterity in their successive generations from the creation to the deluge, and from the deluge, until Abraham's time, when the first Kingdom of God by pact is supposed by T. H. to begin. All this while (which was a great part of that time the world hath stood) from the creation lasted the Kingdom of God by nature, as he phraseth it, And yet in those days there were laws and government, and more Kings in the world, than there are at this present, we find nine Kings engaged in one war, and yet all their dominions 
Gen. 14.  but a narrow circuit of land. And so it continued for divers hundreds of years after, as we see by all those Kings which Joshua discomfited in the land of Canaan. Every City had its own King. The reason is evident, The original right of fathers of families was not then extinguished.  
Indeed T. H. supposeth that men did spring out of the earth like Mushrooms or Mandrakes. That we may return again to the state 
Ci. c. 8. s. 1.  of nature, and consider men as if they were even now suddenly sprouted and grown out of the earth, after the manner of Mushrooms, without any obligation of one to another. But this supposion is both false and Atheistical, howsoever it dropped from his pen. Mankind did not spring out of the earth, but was created by God, not many suddenly, but one to whom all his posterity were obliged as to their father and ruler.  
A second ground of his his errors is his gross mistake of the laws of nature, which he relateth most impersectly, and most untruly. A moral Heathen would blush for shame, to see such a catalogue of the laws of nature.  
First he maketh the laws of nature to be laws and no laws: Just as a man and no man, hit a bird and no bird, with a stone and no stone, on a tree and no tree: not laws but theorems, laws which required not performance but endeavours, laws which were silent, and could not be put in execution in the state of nature. 
Ci. c. 14. s. 9  Where nothing was another man's, and therefore a man could not steal, where all things were common, and therefore no adultery, where there was a state of war, and therefore it was lawful to kill, where all things were defined by a man's own judgement, and therefore what honours he pleased to give unto his father: and lastly, where there were no public judgements, and therefore no use of witnesses. As for the first table he doth not trouble himself much with it, except it be to accommodate it unto Kings. Every one of these grounds here alleged, are most false, without any verisimilitude in them, and so his superstructure must needs fall flat to the ground.  
Secondly he relateth the laws of nature most imperfectly, smothering and concealing all those principal laws, which concern either piety, and our duty towards God, or justice, and our duties towards man.  
Thirdly, sundry of those laws which he is pleased to take notice of, are either misrelated, or misinterpreted by him. He maketh the only end of all the laws of nature to be the long conservation of a man's life and members, most untruly. He maketh every man by nature the only judge of the means of his own conservation, most untruly. His father and Sovereign in the weightiest cases, is more judge than himself. He saith that by the law of nature every man hath right to all things, and over all persons, most untruly. He saith the natural condition of mankind is a war of all men against all men, most untruly. And that nature dictateth to us to relinquish this feigned right of all men to all things, most untruly. And that nature dictateth to a man to retain his right of preserving his life and limbs, though against a lawful magistrate, lawfully proceeding, most untruly. I omit his uncouth doctrine about pacts made in the state of nature: and that he knoweth no gratitude, but where there is a trust, fiducia. These things are unsound, and the rest of his laws, for the most part, poor trivial things, in comparison of those weightier dictates of nature, which he hath omitted.  
All other Writers of Politics do derive Commonwealths from the sociability of nature, which is in mankind, most truly. But he will have the beginning of all humane society to be from mutual fear: as much contrary to reason as to authority. We see some kind of Creatures delight altogether in solitude, rarely, or never in company. We see others, (among which is mankind) delight altogether in company, rarely, or never in solitude. Let him tell me what mutual fear of danger did draw the silly Bees into swarms; or the Sheep and doves into flocks; and what protection they can hope for, one from another? and I shall conceive it possible, that the beginning of humane society might be from fear also.  
And thus having invented a fit foundation for his intended building, y●…leped the state of mere nature, which he himself first devised for that purpose, he hath been long moduling and framing to himself a new form of policy, to be builded upon it: but the best is, it hath only been in paper. All this while he hath never had a finger in mortar. This is the new frame of absolute Sovereignty, which T. H. knew right well would never stand, nor he should be ever permitted to rear it up in our European Climates or in any other part of the habitable World, which had ever seen any other form of civil government. Therefore he hath sought out for a fit place in America, among the Savages, to try if perhaps they might be persuaded, that the Laws of God and nature, the names of good and evil, just and unjust, did signify nothing but at the pleasure of the Sovereign Prince.  
And because there hath been much clashing in these Quarters about Religion, through the distempered zeal of some, the seditious orations of others, and some pernicious principles, well meant at first, but ill understood, and worse pursued: to prevent all such garboils in his Commonwealth, he hath taken an order to make his Sovereign to be Christ's Lieutenant upon earth, in obedience to whose commands true religion doth consist. Thus making policy to be the building, and religion the hangings, which must be fashioned just according to the propertion of the policy; and (not as Mr. Cartwright would have had it) making religion to the building, and policy the hangings, which must be conformed to religion.  
Well the law is costly, and I am for an accommodation, that T. H. should have the sole privilege of setting up his form of government in America, as being calculated and fitted for that Meridian. And if it prosper there, then to have the liberty to transplant it hither: who knoweth (if there could but be some means devised to make them understand his language) whether the Americans might not choose him to be their Sovereign? But all the fear is, that if he should put his principles in practice, as magistrally as he doth dictate them, his supposed subjects might chance to tear their mortal God in pieces with their teeth, and entomb his Sovereignty their bowels.  
FINIS.   

An Advertisement to the READER.  
BEcause I know but of one Edition of Mr. Hobbs his Leviathan, and of his Questions concerning Liberty; therefore I have cited them two by the page. Le. standing for Leviathan, and Qu. for Questions. But because there are suudry editions of his book De Cive, I have cited that by the Chapter and Section, according to his Paris Edition.