AN ESSAY IN Morality. Written by G. B. to his Friend H. P. Esquire. In which the Nature of Virtue and Vice is distinctly stated, Their respective Reasonableness and Unreasonableness demonstrated, And several useful Conclusions inferred. LONDON: Printed for John Wright at the Crown on Ludgate hill. 1682. The CONTENTS. Artic. 1. WHatever is in the Soul● of Man reduced to two Heads, viz. Action and Passion. 2. Action in the Soul of two sorts, (1.) Assent or Judgement. (2.) Volition. 3. In Volition, Four things only to be considered. (1.) The Faculty. (2.) The Action. (3.) An Actual Inclination. (4.) An habitual Inclination. 4. Of the three last, the Perfection and Defect may be considered. 5. The Object of Volition at the same time but one. 6. The Object of Volition is only good of two sorts, viz. that of the end, or delectable good; and that of the means, or profitable good. 7. The goodness of the Means, is the goodness of the End. 8. The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a sort of profitable good. 9 Delectable good hath indefinite degrees in Extension, Intention, and Duration. 10. The greatest delectable good absolutely, is the Eternal Happiness of the whole Universe. 11. The first perfectionof Volition is to be directed to this absolutely greatest good. 12. That this is a perfection. 13. That it is possible, desirable, may be in the highest degree delightful. 14. To have a less good than absolutely the greatest, for the Object of our Volition, is a defect. 15. This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or relation of Volition to its Object, is Moral good and evil. 16. This Moral good is a kind of bonum utile. 17. Sin privately an infinite evil. 18. And it may be so positively. 19 A second perfection of Volition is strength, force, zeal. 20. A third, Constancy. 21. The just moderation of it seems a fourth. 22. Moral good and evil depend not upon any Beings' will. 23. Nor upon the freedom of Will. 24. Possible to will the rectitude of an action, and yet to sin. 25. A man to be estimated good or bad, according to his Habitual Inclination. 26. A general distribution of Virtues called inherent. 27. Another from the parts of the Universal good. 28. These to be all taken together, and considered as one. 29. Instrumental or eventual Virtues. 30. When it may be true, that Virtus consistit in medio. 31. The nature and degrees of this sort of Virtues. 32. It is not true, that Virtutes sunt connexae. 33. How to determine which Virtues and Vices are the greatest. 34. Actual inclinations and propensions may be sinful. 35. The reason for the manner of writing, and the Style of this Essay. To his Honoured Friend H. P. Esquire. Dear Sir, I Perceive your very inquisitive and searching Genius hath not permitted you to rest satisfied with what hath been commonly taught and received in many Questions which you think of the greatest concernment to be truly and clearly resolved: at least of much more than most of those which ordinarily now adays employ the busy thoughts and pens of Men. And as they have given you some trouble and care, so I understand by you, that they are likely to give me some too. For you are pleased to believe, that I may have been not altogether a stranger to thoughts about such matters; and that peradventure I may have fallen upon something either as to Matter or Method, or both, which might a little contribute to your light and ease: though I scarcely know any man who stands in less need of it than yourself. Perhaps our free and frequent mutual Entertainments with Discourses of such nature (the most delightful and profitable use of friendship) have given occasion to your kind opinion, and put you upon making further trial. Sir! I must own it to be my Persuasion also, that the Questions you proposed are all of them of importance, and some of them of absolutely the greatest; and that they ought to be determined with more clearness, certainty, and (which is hugely considerable to short-lived Mortals) with more brevity than hitherto for alled I know they have been. But I cannot own myself to be the person in Parts, Health, or Leisure, so happy, as to promise you the performance of any great matter at present, whereby I might be serviceable to you, and answer either your desire or expectation. Nevertheless, upon your Request and Command, which go a great way with me, backed I acknowledge with some suspicion and presumption that something might be done, I have attempted one of them, which I have been the most impatient to be satisfied in myself, as appearing to me of the vastest consequence, and yet delivered, as I thought (such was my unquiet curiosity if you please) with but too much mistake, confusion, and defect in the best Writers, and of greatest name: and therefore long and often before I received your command, it had been in my thoughts. The question is, what should be the perfection of our Active power or Will, of its Actions or Volitions, of its actual and habitual Inclinations, or in one word, of our Manners; and not only of ours, but of any intelligent being existent, and therefore even of the Divine Nature itself; I mean of its Volitions and Decrees, not of any inclinations, which including some imperfection, belong not thereunto. Many in my judgement have been the mistakes and errors in Divinity and Natural Philosophy, but especially in Morality and Politics, for want of a right understanding in this Question; some of which I am sure, upon perusal of this, will not escape your Observation. I have delivered what I had to say, in almost Mathematical Method, beginning at the most simple Notions, which are the most plain and undoubted, and then proceeding to what is more compounded; so that that which follows, generally depends upon and supposeth the knowledge of what is before. I have also endeavoured that my style be simple, short and clear, without any ornament or finery of words, which may darken the Sense, or divert the Attention; though it be not so common, and sometimes perhaps uncouth, for a reason which you'll meet withal at the end of the Essay. But I did not think it this time expedient to go any further, than to point out the way of composing a System of Ethics from these Principles; which I know at your leisure you can easily do yourself. As for what is done, I must request the favour of you to read over the whole, which is but short, before you pass judgement of any part, for the prevention of needless dissatisfaction and scruple. After all, I must crave leave to remember ourselves of that which we have often agreed in; namely, how little the clearest and most certain knowledge of these things will signify, without the practice; and that a generously honest man, whose Soul is animated and imbued with Virtue, acting according to these principles from a public and universalized spirit, though they lie not so neatly and orderly in his head, is infinitely to be preferred before a mere subtle, though most successful Speculator, which talks as high as Heaven, whose Law is such love, as is hereafter described, but lives as low as earth, where according to the Jewish Adage 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 All friendship is governed by self-interest, or rather, nothing is beloved but Self, and what ministers to its pleasure or advantage. Though it is not to be denied neither, that naked discourse and true reasoning is of very great use here too. For there are some men who believe all the various inclinations, affections, and tempers of Mankind, to be the effect only of divers bodily tempers and examples, not at all of Reason and Understanding; and that those to Vice (so called) as they are more general, so they are more necessary, natural, and reasonable too, than that to what we term Virtue; which, say they, is against Nature, and so far from being reasonable, that it is impossible. Now these men are to be convinced, if they be capable of it, or at least silenced and confuted. Others again there are, and that of the best sort of Men, who are great lovers of truth where they can discern it; who are strangely affected and transported with distinct and clear understanding; who desire to see why they should be more carried to one thing than another; who do not care to be born away blindly with great and swelling passions, without the guidance of calm Reason, seem they never so natural, and even Divinely inspired or impressed; who finally are very uneasy, slow, and dissatisfied, while they act ignorantly and blindly. In such persons, their approbation of and consent to Virtue will be more sincere and hearty, their bent and tendency to it more uniform, firm and constant, their love more deeply rooted and emboweled, when they shall see its nature and practice demonstrated and deduced from the most plain and evident truths. Nor are we finally to think that the principle or end of all our actions, the Universal Good so much insisted on in the following Essay, is such a highflown wide notion, and so much out of the view of the generality of men, as to be of no use or application in humane life amongst them. For contrariwise, every one may, and we see that plain honest men of all ranks and sorts do propound and pursue it in their little sphere of action and comprehension, as God himself doth in the immense revolution of his providence. He that knows no more than a Neighbour's Cottage or two, may have the same general end, namely, the greatest good he understands, with him who is able to comprehend the interest of a whole Nation, or of the whole World if it were possible. The poorest Vicar may understand as well as the pretended Pastor of the Universal Church, and perhaps better practice accordingly, that the only end of his Function and all his Actions, is not his own personal interest only, but the honour of God, the Salvation of Souls, or the good of his Church, (and how easy is it to extend his Notion to the whole world?) the faithful discharge of his duty and his reward altogether: and so the meanest Mechanic or dullest Ploughman may be easily taught to desire by all his life, and particularly in his honest Calling, to please and serve God, to support himself and Family, to supply and benefit his Neighbours, in hopes of Gods general blessing upon himself here, both in Soul and Body, and of his reward hereafter. Set but a man entirely free from himself, and he will have no other bounds than the most comprehensive good he can reach. Nor indeed is there any thing which lies nearer the Mind of Man, and which he hath a more natural inclination to believe, than that a public good is to be preferred before a personal, supposing them both equal in respect of intention or degree; and why not then the most public of all, viz. the good of the whole Universe, as it were one Corporation or Society? But I am going to prevent myself, and forget the bounds and design of a Prefatory Epistle. For the rest of your Questions (you were pleased to make out a score, and I doubt you may have more in your Budget) I must entreat you to stay your stomach a while with this Morsel, and to respite an answer to them. If what I now send you be acceptable to such a diligent, I had almost said troublesome enquirer, whom as I have observed nothing less will satisfy, than the utmost a man can know and say, you may hereafter command the like Essay upon some one or more of them; which I know your friendship and goodness will permit me to obey, when I find myself best able to serve you. 1. FIrst then be pleased to observe, That all that is in the Soul of Man, may be reduced, according to Des-Cartes, to two general things. (1.) Passion. (2.) Action. The first contains all sorts of Perceptions, viz. Sense, Memory, Imagination, Intellection, Passions, or Affections; although there seems to be somewhat of Action too in the Souls Perceptions. 2. And as for Action, there hath seemed to be of it in the Soul, these four kinds. (1.) Dubitation. (2.) Suspension. (3.) Assent. (4.) Volition. But I rather now think only two. (1.) Assent. (2.) Volition. For as for Dubitation, it seems to be nothing but Suspension; and Suspension seems only an act of Volition not to assent; and Nolition is but Volition of the absence of a thing. 3. To say nothing at this time of Assent; in Volition may be considered four things. (1.) The faculty of Volition, usually called Appetite; which is but one in Man, distinguished by its several Objects; as when it hath for its Object sensible and corporeal good, or certain agreeable motions of the Body which cause the perception of pleasure in the Soul, it is called the Sensitive Appetite: But when it hath for its Object that which can be apprehended only by the rational faculty of the Soul, or that faculty whereby the Soul perceives Spiritual Objects (which are but of two sorts; either absolute, as Spiritual Substances and their Attributes, such as Perception and Volition, Knowledge, & Power, and Goodness; or Relative, as the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 habitudes, and relations of things, such as Means & End, Likeness and Difference, and consequently Equality and Inequality) I say, than it may be called the Rational Appetite. Though indeed that only hath been used to be so termed, which hath for its object, Bonum honestum, the honesty, probity, rectitude of a man's actions, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which ought to be done, or is according to true reason. The second thing to be observed in Volition, is the Action; the third, An actual Inclination or Propension in the Soul; and the fourth, An Habitual Inclination. Of the first and second none doubts; and for the third, experience teacheth, that there is often this which I call an Actual Inclination of the Soul to a certain object; others a Propension, Velleity hankering, before there be any express Volition; that which is usually signified by such phrases; I could find in my heart to do such a thing; and that of Foelix to St. Paul, Thou hast almost persuaded me to be a Christian. And for the fourth, this one thing evinces it, viz. That there is a great difference between men in the facility, readiness, and strength to their actual inclinations, and Volitions, before they actually exist. Of this facility in one man, which is not in another, there must be some present cause in one man which is not in another; and this I call an Habitual Inclination or Volition. It is most certain, there is something in two men accustomed to two things with delight, when they have no actual Inclination and Volition in them; which upon the proposal of those two different objects, doth produce two different or contrary actual Inclinations and Volitions, and this not only in the Mechanisms of their Bodies, by which those objects excite corporeal passions of love or delight; but in the Soul too, and most often contracted by the frequent actual inclinations impressed upon the Soul by these passions, and sometimes without them. But it is enough, that it is agreed by all men, that there is an actual difference inherent and present in the Soul, between a Drunkard and an Ambitious man, even when they are asleep, or their Volition and actual inclination are employed about other things; which then appears, when the proper objects of their respective appetites and habitual inclinations are proposed to them. As for all other humane Actions, which have been called imperate, or Actions commanded by, and consequent upon Volition, except Volition itself, (for one Volition may have for its object another Volition) such as are Attention, Consideration, Judgement, motion of the parts of the Body, or Bodily Action, in which is Speech or Words; I meddle not at present with them, only suggest, that there is nothing of Moral good or evil, of inherent Virtue or Vice in them: they are indeed mostwhat (though they may be dissembled) signs thereof, and of its degrees; nor are they so much as what in the Twenty ninth Article or Paragraph we term instrumental or eventual Virtues or Vices, any further than they include Volition. For example, there is neither Virtue nor Vice in attention or judgement, which are actions of the Mind; nor in Speech, Gesture, Motion, which are actions of the body; but only in the Volition or act of the Will, which commands or effects them. 4. Now of these three last, viz. Actual Volition, Actual and Habitual Inclination, the perfection and defect may be considered: which perfection and defect (of Volition for example, and so of the rest) can be only in two respects, viz. (1.) Of the Object. (2.) Of the Action. 5. And first, concerning the Object of Volition, it is to be noted, that at the same time it can be but one, though that one may consist of several parts which may be successively regarded. For example, a man cannot will and regard at the same precise time his Neighbours good and his own Reputation, as two distinct separate things; but he may will them both together, as making up, or composing one entire Object; like as the Eye can see but one Object at the same time painted at the bottom thereof, consisting of many parts; the whole it may see together confusedly, and but one point distinctly. 6. Moreover, that the only Object of Volition, and so of the rest, is bonity or good only, not evil, is manifest from universal experience. All which goodness, or what is convenient, congruous, eligible, desirable, (for by all these may bonity or good be described) is of two kinds. (1.) That of the End, (2.) That of the Means. That of the End hath been usually called jucundum, delectable or pleasant good or pleasure, delight: although this very pleasure hath some further use, & is likewise a means to excite, encourage, and fortify the Operations of the Mind, which again mediately and immediately may produce new pleasure. That of the means is called bonum utile, or profitable good to obtain the end of delectable good, of which the kinds are numerous. 7. The goodness of the means is nothing but its Conducibility to, or Causality of the end; which indeed is the goodness of the end in the means; it is the same: there is nothing eligible in the means to obtain any end, but the goodness of the end itself. Of this profitable good, bonum honestum, or honest good, is one sort or kind, as we shall presently understand. 8. And to add this for the present, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or pulchritude and beauty of Virtue, in whatsoever it consists, talked of so much by Platonists, is another sort; and is only therefore good, because it is so congruous or delectable an object to the Mind, or some way or other hath in it some causality of pleasure or delight. 9 As for delectable good, which is, as hath been said, the only object of Volition, it is better understood by every man's experience, than by all the descriptions that can be given of it: such as Aristotle's perfection of the Minds Operation; and Eudoxus' perfect and grateful ascension and acquiescence; Plato's passion, affection, and diffusion of the mind, and the repose of the Will in some convenient good; and many others, some of which are contrary each to other: as when some say it is Motion, and some say it is the Rest and Repose of the Mind. It is more to our purpose to observe, that it hath indefinite degrees, and that in three respects only and no more; viz. (1.) In Extension as to Subjects. (2.) Intention. (3.) Duration. Of which (to take the extremes only) the lowest degree in the first respect is the good of one single Soul; the highest, that of all Spiritual Being's existant, usually comprehended under God, our Neighbour, and ourselves: where by Neighbour, we understand all Rational Creatures at least. We actually indeed know a most inconsiderable part of Mankind, only our own Family, Town, or Country; to whose greatest good notwithstanding if we direct our Volition, it is a sign we implicitly will that good which is absolutely the greatest; and that if any greater good were within our view and comprehension, we should will that expressly and actually. In the second respect, we want both conceits and words for the lowest and highest degree. In the third respect, the lowest degree is that good which is momentany, the highest Eternal. 10. Wherefore the greatest delectable good absolutely, is that which is so in extension, intention, duration; or the Eternal happiness of the whole Universe considered as one thing, and as Cartes considered Motion in the Material world. 11. After which it is easy to observe, that the greatest and first perfection of Volition in respect of the Object, is to be directed to this absolutely greatest good, or to have it for its Object: and contrariwise, the greatest defect thereof is to be directed to the least part thereof, in respect again of Extension, Intention, & Duration; for example, to the smallest momentany pleasure of any one single being, which is usually, if not always, one's self. 12. Nor is it less manifest, that this is a perfection, as it is the common sense of all men: for otherwise, to illustrate rather than to prove it, God would have been equally perfect if he had not, as if he had determined to make the Universe, and that in such a degree happy as it is: nay, if his nature had been such as to have been the most delighted with the eternal misery of all his Creatures, it would have been equally his perfection to have effected it for his own pleasure, as to have made it happy. Again, the Devil, or the most malicious, proud, revengeful, finally the most wicked of all Natures, is therefore the most imperfect, because he is the most pleased with others evil. 13. It hath indeed been taught by some of those who have deduced all our Offices and duties from self-love and interest, that this perfection is not compatible to any being whatsoever; at least not to men: that every nature is necessarily carried to its own proper good only; that it cannot be in the least moved with the good of another. But I contrariwise affirm in the first place, that this perfection is a thing possible to a reasonable Nature. Next, that there is in all men, among other innate appetites, this also of Universal Beneficence. And finally, that there is a Capacity in our Souls of being more pleased and delighted therewith, than any single Object in the world, and consequently it is improveable to a higher degree of strength and force (which may be called generosity) than any other appetite whatsoever. All which, because it is of greatest consequence, is thus proved. (1.) That it is a thing possible; if it be not, it is either because we cannot will another's good, or we cannot apprehend it. Not the first of these: for the Object of Volition is precisely good or bonum, not propriety; so that if we separate them two, we shall find propriety to have nothing of Eligibility in it; if there were, than there would be something of Eligibility too in our proper and personal evil as well as good. Nor is the second true, that we cannot apprehend another's good. For it is most plain, that we can in our conception conjoin pain or pleasure, good or evil, with any other Soul or Mind, as well as our own; or we can suppose the same evil we suffer in another person. Who is there who hath himself felt the torment of the Stone, that doth not well understand the same in another, and pity him too when he hears him making grievous outcries, or giving other such signs as he did himself, when he was under the same pain? Nay, though he was never in the same condition, yet he understands him to be affected with some great evil. It is true, ordinarily we do not apprehend one another's evil so clearly as our own; but the reason is, because the one is a matter of Sense, the other of Memory, or Imagination; the one is usually a present Object, the other an absent: and even our own absent evil we apprehend not so well as our present. Finally, all the pity and compassion and friendship we see in the world, confutes both these pretences; especially where our love to any person is great, which makes us to unite it to ourselves (the first and essential property of love.) And consider it but as a part of ourselves, and sometimes much the better (as it is in Wives and Children, and very dear friends) and consequently to be the most truly and inwardly affected with the evil or good they suffer or enjoy. And those happy Souls who have had clear and true apprehensions of the most perfect and amiable Nature of God, have experienced, I doubt not, that they have infinitely preferred the felicity of the Divine Nature before their own, his Will before theirs; and have thought and esteemed themselves not worthy of the least regard in compare with him; and which is still most of all, could have been content to sacrifice all Being and Happiness to his pleasure, if it were absolutely necessary. And we see the same frequently amongst Men one toward another, when a common Soldier, under an apprehension of the greater worth and bravery of his Commander, exposeth his own life to certain danger, and destruction too, to save the others. In the next place, that there is an innate appetite in all men after this perfection of beneficence and doing good, without any self-respect, I appeal to Universal Experience. Nor is there any man, who after he hath performed any such act, is not pleased therewith, and ready to brag of it. It is true, the gratification of this Natural Appetite, or the possession of such a good, cannot but be delightful: but even this delight springing therefrom, may not be any thing of the End or Object foreseen or proposed, but only consequent upon the action; as it is true it also may be. The pleasure of doing good, may be one distinct part of the End and Effect of ones beneficence, as well as the good done to others, when one takes a view of some particular good things which constitute the whole End and Object. Lastly, That this delight and pleasure, from this perfection of our Volition, or from Universal Benevolence, and in part consequent Beneficence, may be greater than from any other Object; and that there is a Capacity in our Souls to be more delighted therewith, than any other particular good, methinks is hence most evidently proved, viz. Because it is certainly the greatest good we can possibly possess, (greater than our own happiness, as much as the whole Universe is greater than ourselves) and because we are capable of seeing it to be so. Now certainly the Sense and Perception of our actual possession of the greatest good we are capable of; and that there neither is, nor can be any greater, must needs fill the Soul with the most complete intense satisfying delight. It cannot be the Nature of the Soul to be pleased as much with thep osse ssion of any other good, as with that which only she sees clearly to be absolutely the greatest she or any other Being can obtain. It is plain therefore, that our duty and our interest, our perfection and our happiness are inseparable, so long as God continues and preserves our nature such as he hath made it: nor can we easily conceive it, if at all, to be other than it is. 14. After this, I scarcely need mention so plain a consequence, as that if Volition hath any less good for its Object than absolutely the greatest, it is a defect therein, of which there are indefinite degrees, till we come to the lowest, which is mentioned before. 15. And it is this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or relation of Volition & actual and habitual inclination to their Object, which is called Moral Good & Evil, Holiness and Sin, bonum honestum & inhonestum, Virtue and Vice, and by an hundred other Names, viz. When Volition hath for its Object the greatest good, (actually or habitually known, immediately or mediately) then is that Volition Morally good, honest, or virtuous: but when it hath any other lesser delectable good for its Object, (and some good it must have) than it is Morally Evil, or a Sin. Whence it appears, that Sin is a Defect only, or a Negation: for the Defect of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or relation of Volition to its Object (which is always delectable good) is only this, that it hath not for its Object the greatest good. 16. I have before just hinted, That this Moral Good is also a kind of bonum utile, or profitable good; that is to say, it is a means of, or hath in it some degree of Causality of delectable good. For Volition of any good, hath at least a tendency to effect it, which is some degree of Causality; and in us it hath no more: like as the Nisus in Bodies to Motion is something, and is a tendency which hath some degree of Causality of Motion in it; as appears from this, that if you remove the impediment only, Motion presently follows; and that there is plainly difference between two Bodies, one of which hath, the other hath it not. But in God it always actually efeffects it; and God by his power doth generally upon occasion of our Volition, make actually existent delectable good, or those things which cause it: and in this consists all the goodness of Moral Good, or all its Eligibility, or that which makes it the Object of any Volition, or its perfection; for by perfection I mean bonum utile, or profitable good, that which doth perficere or effect delectable good. On the contrary, the evil of Sin, or that for which it is not eligible, and refusable, is the privation of a tendency to, or Causality of Delectable Good. Virtue therefore is a tendency to an infinite good, Sin a privation of it. 17. Sin then is no small or light thing, being in one respect plainly an infinite evil. For whereas our Volition may and aught to have for its Object an infinite Delectable Good, in respect of Extension, Intention, and Duration, the greatest Eternal Felicity of the Universe, and consequently tends to it, and hath some Causality thereof in it: When this our Volition is sinful, or hath any lesser good for its Object, there is a deprivation of all this. In this sense that of the Schoolmen is true, That Sin is a Conversion of the Will from an Infinite Good to a Finite one. 18. But this is not all: though the Evil or Mischief of Sin immediately be privative, yet often by necessary consequence it is positive also; as when one wills any Delectable Good to himself, which cannot be effected without the positive inconvenience, grief, hurt, misery of another. For example, if any one should be of such a temper, as to be delighted with another's pain or suffering, and consequently will and desire it in order to that end, which is called pure Malice: Or if unlimited power to do what he listeth, and consequently to do Mischief (called Tyranny) please him; or if being pleased with Superiority and Eminency in any thing, (as in Power, Riches, Knowledge, Happiness,) in order to this his Superiority, he takes away from any person what he hath of all these; and these appetites may be so boundless, that they cannot be satisfied but by an infinite mischief. As if any Being, that he might be infinitely superior to all in happiness, or in the possession of any good, should not only take from all, all they possessed, but make all besides himself the most extremely miserable. And there have been such Monsters among Men (some of the Roman Emperors, and others) who have advanced very far in this prodigious wickedness. Historians report Tiberius to have been so delighted with Cruelty, that he was termed Lutum sanguine maceratum, a lump of Clay soaked in Blood; after which he more thirsted, than strong drinks, notwithstanding that he loved them so well, as to have the Name of Biberius Caldius Mero, instead of Tiberius Claudius Nero. They tell us also, that Caligula made it the diversion of his Meals, to see men racked and Beheaded; and that Nero set the City of Rome on fire, that he might have the glory of Re-building it, and having it called after his own Name, Neropolis. Dangerous certainly it is, to begin to lay aside a certain tenderness of others good, and to be careless what mischief we do to any body, so we may gratify our own Appetites. Though our power may be short and insufficient, yet our Minds may be soon debauched to such a degree, as first to be content to molest or incommode our Neighbour, then to ruin him, then to undo and destroy whole Families, Cities, and Nations, for the sake of some small paltry pleasure of our own; and at last to delight in it. 19 A second perfection of Volition we have said to be, in respect of the Action, which is two fold. The first is Intention, Force, and Strength; of which it is certain there may be various degrees in the Actions of Spirits. The greatest good, viz. That of the whole Universe, aught to have the greatest strength of Volition that can be, which is no less than Infinite. And here is a necessary defect in all Finite Rational Being's whatsoever; only God, who is Infinite in Power, Force, Action, hath this; to his Nature alone it belongs; all other Being's fall infinitely short of him; and therefore may be said too to be faulty in compare with him. In the other perfection of our Volition, viz. the having its due Object an Infinite Good, God hath made us capable of being perfectly like himself: but here the most perfect of his Creatures are at an infinite distance from him. The greatest degree of this perfection, is to will the Universal good, or rather the greatest good, with all the vehemency, zeal, and force, our Minds are capable of; and contrariwise, a great degree of the opposite defect, is to will the Universal good the most remissly: but a greater degree, not to will it at all; and the greatest of all, it seems both in respect of the Action and Object together, to will the least good with the greatest force and vehemency. Of this intention and firmness of our Volition, and likewise our actual and habitual inclination to the Universal good, the passions of desire after, love to, and delight in so doing and being, are the causes and the effects too; and therefore signs, according to their respective degrees: and the being thus affected towards Piety, Charity, Humility, Spirituality, and all other instances thereof, is that which is signified by the phrases of Virtues being natural to us, it being the Temper, Complexion, Constitution of our Minds; it's being a living and vital principle, producing fruits and effects of outward good actions. In the Scripture it is the Spirit, living according to the Spirit, and being led by the Spirit, and delighting in the Law of God according to the inward man, and the new man created after God; because the Object that pleaseth is a Spiritual thing, and because it is according to the Word of God dictated by the Spirit of God, and from the influence or efficiency of God's Spirit in us. Here may be noted, that the degree of the strength of our Volition and inclination to the Universal good, and in order to that of our passions, aught at least to exceed that which is to any other particular good, or else it will be ineffectual. Whence it may be further usefully observed, That they are not always to be deemed or termed good men, who in Pulpit, Church, or private Conversation, not only appear, but really are very zealous and affectionate in Religion; because they generally are of passionate Tempers in other matters, and may perhaps have greater affections, and consequently inclinations to other Objects. A man of a more calm and sedate temper in Religion, provided that the greatest degree of affection he hath be directed to his duty, may be a good man; when one of a more boisterous and passionate one, whatever he is vulgarly taken for, may be indeed a bad man. The one shall more steadily and constantly do his duty than the other. In like manner, when a man sins deliberately, it is a sign of a greater bent, strength, and intention of the inclination of the Will to its undue Object, and of a less to Virtue; when he sins by surprise, or on a sudden, it is not so much a sign thereof. But these and many other things usually treated of in Morality, may with a little consideration be easily and distinctly determined from the foregoing Conclusions, and a wary observation and experience of the operations of our Minds. 20. The second Perfection of our Volition and inclination, in respect of the Action, is Constancy, Continuance, or Duration. So that in this respect, the highest degree is to have the Volition and Inclination perpetually and eternally directed to the absolutely greatest good; the lowest, to have them so directed but for one moment, or the least of time. This perfection of the Action of Volition, belongs only to God, who always actually so wills: (for he is always the same without any change) but of habitual inclination, may be in us and other rational Creatures. So that there are only these three general perfections of Virtue. The first, the direction of Volition and Inclination to their right Object; the second, that they be with the greatest force or strength any Nature is capable of; the third, that they be the most perpetual and constant, or continued and lasting; or in three words, Sincerity, Generosity, Constancy. 21. And yet there seems to be another perfection of Volition in respect of the Action; and that is, the just moderation of it to the various parts of this Universal good: i. e. When we will any part thereof knowingly, to will it more or less in due proportion to the share of goodness that is in it, compared with another part; and the defect contrariwise will be, to will a less good more than a greater; and the greatest defect is, when we will the least part more than all the rest; for example, a moment of the least pleasure to ourselves, before the Eternal Felicity of God and all the world besides. And this may be, not only when any two parts are inconsistent one with another, as when I will to gratify myself in that which displeaseth God, and is mischievous or hurtful to my Neighbour; but also when they are consistent, nay, conjoined together, and they are altogether the Object of my Will. Thus if a man builds an Hospital, or gives any Alms to the Poor, he knows this action will please God, benefit others, procure himself Reputation; and he doth it for all these reasons; he wills all this good together as one: but here that of these which he may most will, that which he chief intends, is his Reputation, and his own pleasure therefrom, which ought to be possibly without compare the least regarded, though somewhat. But in truth, this is but a sign of that perfection and defect of Volition, which is in respect of the Object or of the Action. For if a man wills only his own good, or only to please God, exclusively one to the other, the defect seems to be in not having the Universal good, but some particular good for the Object of his Volition, because both and more should be taken together: But if a man wills one good composed of more parts, and wills that part most which in truth is the least good, either he doth it knowingly, or ignorantly: if knowingly, (which is most frequent, whatever pretences men may make) than the defect is in not willing the greatest good; and consequently, it is a defect in respect of the Object ; for he cannot but know, that it tends to a lesser Good, to will a lesser more than a greater. If ignorantly and erroneously, judging that the greater Good, which is indeed the lesser, the ignorance is either through some present defect in the actual Volition, or habitual inclination to the Universal good, ones Duty, Right, Honest; or it is not: if it be, it is plain where and what the defect is, viz. in the Action or Inclination ; if it be not, then there is no defect in the present Volition at all, (whatever may have been in former Actions of the Will, by which such ignorance may be contracted) but only in the Understanding; the Volition may have for all that its due Object, viz. the greatest good. 22. From these propositions it follows, that the nature of this defect of Volition or of Sin, depends not upon any Law, or upon any Being's Will whatsoever, (though its existence doth, because it being only a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or relation, it cannot exist actually, unless the subject thereof do, namely some Will or other:) but though we suppose no other Being in the World besides one, and no antecedent Will, yet these which have been , would be perfections and defects whensoever it exists. It is true, that Laws may be the signs of what is just and unjust, right and wrong; but not the efficient causes, any otherwise than a Subject is the efficient cause of the existence of its property, as is but now said. These Laws also are sometimes necessary & inseparable signs, sometimes in several degrees contingent and probable only, according to the knowledge and justice of the Lawmaker. Those which are certainly Laws of God, who is infallibly wise, and immutably just, are most inseparable and certain signs of what is just and right: but those which are any other Creatures, are more or less probable ones. Laws do not make, but suppose the thing just which they command. It is true also what the Apostle St. Paul saith, That where there is no Law, there is no transgression; because God himself and his Volition of what is right and just are eternal: or the Apostle may mean by Law, not strictly an act of some Will concerning another's Action and Will, but an obligation to will or do any thing; a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Such there always is, whenever any will exist, being a relation between the Will and its due Object the Universal good. Besides, St. Paul may mean comparatively; the Transgression or Sin is much less, where there is no express known Law. 23. Nor doth the nature of Sin or Virtue depend upon liberum arbitrium, or ; for whether any Will hath power to determine its own Volition to the greatest, or any lesser good or no; (which I do not deny) yet most certainly, whenever there is a direction thereof to a lesser good, there is a defect in that Volition, come it from what cause it will; though it should be the effect of some other Being without it, which by his power was able so to determine it; or suppose any Nature should be eternally and necessarily so constituted. 24. It follows likewise, that supposing it possible for any Being to have for the Object of his Volition the rectitude the perfection thereof, and should not place it in the willing the greatest good, but in willing some particular, or (which is most common) some personal good, as self-preservation; this very Volition would have that defect in it we call Sin, and would not be capable of any reward, i. e. any thing which should maintain or encourage such an action. If it were possible for a man unfeignedly in his Conscience to judge it his bounden duty to desire and pursue always as his ultimate end, his own greatest personal good, without regard to God or others, and accordingly should Will and Act; this would be a vicious man. And whether God may not by way of punishment for pride, etc. permit a man so to err, is not here to be determined: and there have been two pernicious and foolish mistakes, if not wilful Errors, that men might securely indulge their lusts, of some late new Modellers of Morality; to which a great part of the ill-nature and debauchery of the Age is to be imputed: the one, the advancing of their personal good, to the place and dignity of the last end of all their actions; the other, the pitching upon no better than the preservation of life and limb, or (to enlarge their own Sense) the greatest measures of the Conveniencies, Comforts, and Pleasures proper to this bodily life. In these Opinions they have quite perverted the nature of things, and made Vice to be Virtue. Or because, according to the same men's Doctrine, every one is necessarily carried to his own greatest good or happiness in general, only through ignorance is oft out of the way, they have made no Vice at all, substituting in its room Folly and Imprudence. 25. What hath been said of Volition, may be said of Actual and Habitual Inclination; and because Volition and Actual Inclination are but sometimes existent in men, but Habitual Inclinations constant and perpetual; 'tis according to this a man is chief to be estimated, viz. by three things. (1.) It's direction to its right Object, the Universal Good. (2.) The force and strength thereof. (3.) It's constancy or frequency in the Soul: each of which hath degrees; so that it is easy to set down certain rules for the judgement of the goodness or badness of any man. For example sake only: He is the worst man in the first respect, who is habitually inclined to, and in love with the meanest or least delectable good; in the second respect, who is the most vehemently inclined thereto; in the third respect, who is perpetually or constantly so. Contrariwise, he is the best, who hath the greatest good absolutely, or the Eternal Felicity (for by Felicity I mean the greatest degree of delight or pleasure as to intention) of the Universe, or all Being's existent for the Object of his Habitual Inclination; or who is habitually inclined thereto, and that with the greatest force and strength of his nature, and then constantly and perpetually. It is easy to see, what an indefinite number of degrees there are between these two extremes, in all the three respects. The greatest difficulty is not to know these Rules of our Judgement; but to know ourselves, and consequently to apply them. And since Denominatio fit à Majore, he only is to be called a good man, who hath a stronger and more constant Habitual Inclination to the Universal good, than to any one or more particulars. And this was, or might have been, the reason why Martyrdom was so highly esteemed and magnified in the Primitive Church. A Martyr by his suffering for his Faith, even though he was not actually Baptised, was thought to expiate all former bad life, and to be undoubtedly saved, or to obtain a most glorious and blissful condition in Heaven: because such his suffering death, or parting with life itself, deemed the greatest personal good amongst men, rather than to deny that Truth which they supposed God had commanded to believe and profess, and consequently to disobey God, was a certain sign and argument of a stronger actual and habitual inclination at that time of his death to obey God, and consequently to that which was right, just, and good, than to any other thing in the world besides. Nor may it be here amiss, to hint how easy it is to understand it possible for this Habitual Inclination, Bent, and Propension to any certain Object, to be so forcible and strong, as to be inconsistent with an act of Free Will or choice about that Object: nor may a man be able to divert, suspend, or withhold his actual Volition, consent, or embrace from it when it is proposed. Though by prudent contrivance, these Habitual Inclinations generally, (I do not say all) may also by degrees be weakened, and at last quite extinguished and destroyed. 26. 'Tis as easy hence to deduce all particular virtues and vices, of which we shall find many to have as yet no Names. For one way, and the most common, is by distinguishing particular delectable Good or Pleasure (whether that particular Good be in a man's self, or in another as the Subject; whether it be mine or another's; but it is usually, if not always, a man's own) from its various Causes or Objects. And it seems there may be six general ones (I do but now suggest, not determine.) (1) The possession of any Good in general so esteemed; many things thus only please. (2) The pain, mischief, evil suffering of another: Whether any Being is of such a temper as to be delighted therewith, let others consider; but I see no reason why it is not possible. Now to will one's delight or pleasure from this Object or Cause, is called Malice; to be habitually inclined thereto, Maliciousness: but the renouncing of this, or the nolition of it, or the volition of its absence, and instead thereof the volition of the universal Good, may be called Charity, or if there be any fit Name. (3) The third Object causing delight to us, is power to do what one pleaseth, to make any thing consequent upon one's will; of which three degrees; Liberty, Equality, Superiority. Now to have pleasure arising from hence, the only Object of our volition, is an action of pride; the only Object of our habitual inclination, the vice thereof: To refuse it, as before, or will its absence, is Humility. (4) Mere Activity and Life, and that exerted in all the operations of our Souls; such as is, for example, mere Contemplation and Knowledge, Sense, Imagination, strong Passions, intense Volitions or Resolutions. And because Knowledge may be indefinitely divided according to its Objects, here alone may be almost an infinite number of particular Vices and Virtues. This Vice and contrary Virtue have no names, some kinds of it may. (5) Some certain agreeable corporeal Motions, or Motions of our Bodies, to which our Souls are united, suaves Corporis Commotiones, as some have called them, which I know no common name to signify them by, unless Titillation may be allowed. These (as Cartes thinks) create pleasure to the mind, as a natural sign of the health or good constitution of the Body: and the pleasures arising in the Soul from them, Plato calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Pleasures which are conveyed to the Soul by the Body. Of this sort are all Sensations; amongst which are those of Health, Calmness, and Serenity; other bodily tempers; many corporeal passions, such as Love, Joy, Hope, Acquiescence, etc. Nay, I may say all perhaps; for it may be that some Souls may be delighted with the corporeal passions of Sadness and Grief; though in these not only the Mechanical or Corporeal Vibrations and motions of Fibres, Nerves, and Spirits, delight and please; but also the Sense, Perception, Life, and some kind of action of the Soul. So that this pleasure is mixed from two very different Objects; one Corporeal, t'other Intellectual: and indeed, most of our pleasure or delight ariseth from several Objects mixed and blended together. Now to have the pleasure or delight arising from such motions of our Bodies, the entire Object of our Volition, is an act of Sensuality; and to be habitually inclined thereto, the Vice: But to refuse this Self-pleasure, or to will its absence, is Sobriety or Temperance, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. (6) The perfection of a man's nature, of all his Faculties, (which may be referred to the first) and amongst the rest, the Rectitude, Honesty, Probity of his Actions and Inclinations, or his Virtue, may be and is the cause of great pleasure and delight to him. Now even to have this delight; (usually called the satisfaction of a good Conscience) nay let me add, that pleasure which ariseth from hopes and assurance of a reward, and from the possession of it too: I say, to have this the entire Object of our Volition, Intention, Inclination, or in greater proportion to other parts of the Universal Good than it ought, is a sin and vice which wants a name, as doth its opposite Virtue. Finally, (not to insist upon this distribution I have made, which I brought only for example of some general Heads) as many as there are Objects which may please or delight us, and consequently correspondent Appetites, (which are numberless:) So many sorts of sins or vices may there be; they all may be reduced to some general heads, and those heads divided, and these again subdivided, etc. 27. Many other distributions of Virtue and Vice may be made; as from the parts of the Universal Good distinguished by its Subjects, usually comprehended under three, viz. God, All created or finite Being's besides ourselves, under the name of our Neighbour, (though we know little of any other, or what we can do to or for them besides Mankind) and last ourselves. The Volition of the Universal Good, our last end, therefore may be resolved into three parts, viz. The love of God; The love of ●ur Neighbour; The love of ourselves: Or, Piety, Charity, and prudent and sober care of our own greatest concerns. And by Love, I mean not Gratitude, but a Volition of the good of the Object beloved, whether the good be an absent or present good. To will an absent good, and desire it for the person we love, can only take place with respect to our Neighbour and ourselves, not to God, who we know cannot want any thing: But to will a present good, may be to God also. We may will, approve, rejoice, delight in the infinite perfection and happiness of his nature, which he always doth and cannot but possess. 28. But these three parts of the Universal Good are always to be intended together actually or habitually, although but one of them may be first regarded. As when we actually will any good to our Neighbour, we ought at least habitually to will it, not only because thereby we do good to him, but also because it pleaseth God, and it is our own perfection, and will be for our own greater good so to do; although that we first looked at was our Neighbours good. And these three parts are so necessarily and inseparably conjoined, that we may and ought always habitually to believe, when we endeavour to effect the one, the other will necessarily follow. Thus, for example, to love God, the Volition of good to him, or the rejoicing in the perfection and happiness of his Nature, hath necessarily consequent others and our own Good: Because all the happiness of Creatures depends thereon, and flows therefrom, (from his Being, and from his most perfect Nature;) and because it is and will be our greatest Perfection, Comfort, Reward. So again, if we sincerely love and do good to our Neighbour, we may be sure it pleaseth God, and is best for ourselves. And so Lastly, our own greatest good truly as to Intention, Extension, and Duration; or our greatest perfection and happiness, is in and by loving of God, and doing all the good we can to our Neighbour. 29. It may be further observed, that all actions and correspondent habits of the Will whatsoever, which do effect the Universal good, have been used to be called Virtues, without any consideration of the end of the Action, or the ultimate Object thereof; and for distinction-sake may be called instrumental or eventual virtues: The other sort of Volitions which have their due end, or due ultimate Object considered as such, having the name of principal or inherent Virtues. So, for example, to apply the mind to attention and consideration, pursuit after or love of the Truth, [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] are accounted Virtues, because they usually are the causes of good effects in the world more than hurtful ones. Such again are to judge rightly and truly, especially concerning other men; i.e. always only according to what really appears to us from things themselves, not because we imagine so: Although the end of these actions may be no other than the pleasure and delight a man takes in such conduct of himself in such temper and actions, or some personal and proper good, and therefore indeed are inherently vicious, according to our sense of Virtue and Vice. So likewise Liberality, or the distribution of many good things to others, considered without its end; I mean, the inward Volition of so doing, or the action of the Will, of which the outward bodily action is a Sign and Effect only, and belongs not to this present discourse. 30. And 'tis here only, that it is generally true, that Virtus consistit in medio, i.e. there may be too much or too little of such actions and habits, both which extremes do not effect the Universal good, but are of more ill than good consequence. Thus, for example, A man may attend too much sometimes and to some things, or too little; he may give too much or too little, the first of which is called prodigality, the second parsimony or covetousness. But it is false and absurd to say this of Virtue as it is before defined; for there can be no excess therein. Nay, some of these very actions may have no excess; as Justice rightly defined, and Faith. 31. Those of this sort of actions and habits are called Virtues, which are observed and believed to have more good effects than evil ones in the total sum. Insomuch that if they have very few more good than bad consequences, they are termed mean Virtues, as Frugality; if very many and great ones, than they are called great Virtues, such as Justice, or giving to every one his due, i.e. that to each particular, (and consequently to ones self also) as to quality, quantity, time, and all other respects of giving it, which is most for the Universal good; Meekness [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,] or slowness to be moved to anger, or returning evil when provoked by infirmities, ill actions, or injuries to ourselves or others; Clemency, or an omission of part of punishment; Forbearance and long sufferance, [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] a delay of punishment, or of returning evil for a long time after many injuries; Forgiveness, or an omission to punish, or return any evil for injuries at all; Bounty, Courage, Veracity, consent to the Constitution and Administration of Government, or entering into a Society, where some may be on purpose set apart and appointed for finding out and improving and securing what is for the common benefit of that Society, and particularly for the arbitration of all differences, which the Jews call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Judges or Government: and make it one of the seven Precepts of the Sons of Noah, or of those whose advantages of benefit to Mankind were so easily and well known, that all men who had the use of Reason and Natural light only, allowed and commanded them. But there is no greater instrumental or eventual Virtue than Christian Faith, or to be a Believer; by which I mean, Obedience to Jesus in God's Name, which consists of, or contains two things. (1.) An assent to all things Jesus, or those commissionated and inspired by him, taught and delivered, as infallibly true. And (2.) A practising all he hath commanded. Better words than these we have not to express these two particulars by, though both indeed are doing and practising commands. For the precepts of Christian Faith contain the most sincere, and generous, and constant inherent Virtue; as also the greatest instrumental or eventual ones. The very first part alone, or Assent, is generally in various degrees a great instrumental Virtue. Some habits again there are, whose advantage of good or bad effects is so uncertain, that it is disputed whether they be Virtues or not. Some at some times say they are, and others say not. For example, Facetiousness and Taciturnity. And for the same reason, it is hardly yet determined, or determinable, whether some dispositions and actions be Vices, or Vicious or no; viz. because the advantage or excess of good or bad consequences of either side is yet unknown. Such perhaps may be Scrupulosity, or an aptitude to examine the lawfulness of every the smallest action; not in respect of the end only, (for that is easily known) but of the effect, which is mostly difficult, often impossible to know. So also Separation from some particular corrupted Church. Some may think Separation, some Communion the greatest mischief. Such individual actions also may be called indifferent. These for their very being such, are not by any man to be done at all; and a man is always to do that which is not indifferent, or to act because he judgeth upon so much consideration as is fit to be allowed or sufficient for things of no more importance, that of his action there may be more good than bad consequences, and more good consequences than of his omission of it, or doing any other action at that time. Those actions also are by some termed indifferent, which though they are at one time in some circumstances of best effect, and therefore to be done; yet in others 'tis confessed they are not. If so, there may be a great many degrees of Indifferency. Some actions may be more, some less indifferent than others, in respect of frequency and number of conveniencies or good effects. Some may be for the most part of many and great good consequences and effects, but seldom of any hurtful ones, and those but small and few. On the contrary, some may more generally be very inconvenient and noxious, yet sometimes convenient and useful. Some lastly may be near equal. All which hindereth not, but that every one of these individual actions, according as with all their circumstances they are judged to be of most good or bad consequences, are as much to be done or not to be done at that particular time, as if they were of that sort of actions which were perpetually to be done or abstained from. And these are the things generally about which the World with an unproportionate confidence descent and quarrel, and contend unto wounds and death itself. 32. Many other are the useful inferences which may be made from these few Observations, and many the Questions determined thereby. As only for instance sake: It is an ordinary Question among the Writers of Ethics, and it may be of some importance, whether Virtutes sunt connexae, all Virtues are connected? so that if there be one in any Subject, there are all. To which it is easily answered, that they are not. For it is plain, that a man may have a more strong and prevailing habitual inclination to his duty, to that which is just and right, to please and obey God, to the Universal good, than to some one or more certain Objects, but not than to some other. So some men especially, if advanced in years, may prefer their duty and acting according to Conscience, before any sensual pleasures; but not before Riches, Reputation, Dignity, Power, Self-will, etc. They may have so little inclination to the former, as easily to subject it to their Conscience; but so violent and impetuous to the latter, that they are not to be governed or commanded by their Conscience, or a judgement of, and habitual inclination to their duty. They may be, as is usually said, perhaps, Covetous, Vainglorious, Ambitious, Proud, and Obstinate; but not Voluptuous: and on the contrary, (to speak in the received style) some may be very insensible of Glory or Greatness, but furiously carried to the pleasures of Sense. And hence it appears, that the Characters which Historians have given of some men, may be true, namely, that there was in them Magnae Virtutes, nec minora Vitia; great Virtues, and as great Vices. But it is as plain, that it is an ordinary mistake of some persons, who say, that every man hath the seeds and roots of all particular Vices in his nature; if by those words they mean, an inordinate and immoderate habitual inclination or appetite. And I know not what they can mean else, unless it be a bare capacity; but then there would be the seeds of all Virtues as well as Vices. For there may be so many sins as there are Appetites, and so many Appetites as there are Objects: and there are some objects from which the Souls of some men have a natural aversion; and this is to be understood, not only of individual objects, but also of some kinds of them, and consequently of some kinds of sins. 33. But it is a Question of much greater consequence, what Virtues and Vices are the greatest, and who are the most Virtuous or Vicious persons? For according to our right information and judgement herein, our Opinions and Actions, our Inclinations and Behaviour, our Rewards and Punishments towards men, ought principally to be directed and governed. Now Vices or Sins (to take only that part) are to be estimated either according to their principle and end, or according to their effect and consequence: or they are either inherent or eventual, as hath been before said. In respect of the principle or end, there is no one kind or sort of sin universally greater than another; for there may be as great an excess of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or self-love, in one sort as in another; and that is the greatest sin in this respect, in which there is a greater excess of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or habitual inclination to ones proper and personal good, above Universal Charity, or above the habitual inclination to the Universal good. Thus there may be as great excess of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in sensuality, as in pride or malice. I say it may be so, though more generally it is reasonably believed and supposed that there is more in these two last; and that because there are usually more and greater mischievous effects to others visible and known to him that is guilty of them, than in the first: whence one must needs have a less regard to the good of others compared with his own, than the other. But in respect of the effect or consequence, there is always a great difference between the kinds of sins, and one is much worse than another. Thus Malice and Ambition are much greater sins than Vainglory or Sensuality, especially some kinds of it, such as the immoderate love of Bodily Exercises, Divertisements, and Pastimes. In particular, or rather individual sins or ill actions, there may be always difference both in respect of the principle and the effect. So a particular sin of Malice, & Spite, and Revenge, may be much greater and more heinous than a sin of Intemperance or Fornication, both in respect of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or self-love, in opposition to the good of others, and in respect of the hurtful and noxious effects and consequences. Sometimes a particular sin may be greater in respect of the effect than another, but not in respect of the principle. Thus one act of Pride or Malice in any man, may have many more mischievous consequences upon it than an act of Intemperance or Fornication; but yet there may be less of the excess of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in that than in this; the man perhaps being ignorant of many of the ill Consequences thereof, whereas in this he saw them and yet committed the sin. We ought to distinguish between the greatness of a sin and of a sinner. He is not always in God's account (who knows the inclinations of the Soul certainly) the greatest sinner, who commits the greatest sin. I mean, he is not always the most guilty of an inherent sin, who is the most guilty of the greatest eventual sin: and on the contrary, one man may be inherently, or in respect of the principle, more sinful and vicious in the commission of a less eventual sin, than another in the commission of a greater. Thus ofttimes he may be a worse man, or a greater sinner inherently, who is guilty of Vainglory, (which seems to have so few more evil than good consequences upon it, and therefore to be a less Eventual sin than Fornication or Intemperance) than he who is guilty of Fornication or Intemperance. 34. So likewise it hath been disputed, whether actual inclinations and propensions, or (as some call them) appetites to sin, concupiscences without consent of the Will, or actual Volition, be sinful? To which it is to be answered, that it is plain they are sinful. But withal, that the Wills not consenting, or rather the actual nilling and refusing them because they are sinful, is a certain sign of the Superiority or Prevalency just at that time of its habitual inclination to that which is right and honest; as the not regarding at all, and not attending whether they be sinful, and not checking them if they seem so to be, is a sign of the contrary. For there may be not only divers, but contrary habitual inclinations in the Soul at the same time. But as for mere thoughts or suggestions of what is sinful or unlawful, as of Revenge, or Lust, or Vainglory, there can be no sin in them; And when they are assentedto, or delighted in, the sin is not in those thoughts, but in the actual Volition or Inclination of the Will. It is not a sin, for example, for a man to have such a thought as this: Mischief thou such a man because he once mischieved you: Do such a thing, because such persons will speak well of and applaud you for such a performance: For such a thought is but an Object of my Understanding, and proposed to my Will perhaps; it is not in my Will, in which only is sin. If it were a sin barely to have such a thought, than it would be so if I had it conveyed to me by reading or hearing of such words; which no man can think. Nevertheless, the emerging or springing of such thoughts from ourselves, is a very probable sign of habitual sinful inclinations in us. For it is a sign (though not a necessary one) of some corporeal Passion of Love, or Delight, or Desire, conjoined to such Thoughts and Objects; or of some such bodily disposition, and perhaps mental temper, which naturally impresseth or causeth such inclinations. The spontaneous emergency of certain thoughts in us, usually proceeds from such a disposition of the Body in us, as is the cause of delight and love to such Objects; and then those passions (if not hindered) impress on the Will actual and habitual inclinations. What is meant by sin, and sinful, hath been before laid down, viz. when the Inclination and Volition of the Will hath for its Object only some Particular good, and not the Universal (or that which God hath commanded by Revelation or Reason, that which pleaseth him, which is all one; because the Commands of God are, and are by all men taken to be an inseparable sign thereof) actually or habitually; i. e. actually perceived, or habitually and confusedly remembered. For it is of great moment to be observed, that when the Understanding actually takes notice of and regards, and the Will is carried to some particular good only, such as is one's daily food, sleep, etc. yet the Will may by an habitual memory be carried to, or have for its object the Universal good, and that which is right, just, honest: for the Understanding may have concluded generally from Revelation, or Reason, or the common uncontradicted practice of the world, that my particular use and enjoyment in such measure and seasons of such particular good things, is in such circumstances for the universal good; that it enables me to do more good, and consequently to please God and better my own condition: and the Will may act upon such an habitual Memory, without any actual perception preceding. 'Tis much like a man's habitual direction of all his steps to the end of his journey, though he doth not in every step, nay perhaps in very few, actually think thereof. And as it is a certain sign of this habitual direction, that the man attends and is sagacious as much as the danger of going out of the way requires; and that if he hath by another's admonition, or any other means, any suspicion that he is out of the way, he presently stops and inquires, and endeavours to be satisfied whether he be in the right way or no: So it is also a sign of the habitual inclination of the Will to that which is right, which is for the Universal good, (of which the indubitable commands of God are a certain mark) if in any such ordinary and common actions of life he be as wary and circumspect as the danger and the importance, compared with other matters, and the likelihood of his erring, requires: and when he hath any sufficient reason to suspect he doth or may err, to stop, to abstain, to consider. And this is all I have at present to return you in Answer to your first Question. 35. I have (Sir) in these Propositions made use of Scholastic terms, or suchlike, which I know are not much agreeable to the humour of this Age: but in truth I could not avoid it; ofttimes in the most received style either there wanted Words, as far as I know, or they being of confused, lose, and uncertain signification, sometimes signifying one thing, and sometimes another; sometimes more or less (as every one may inform themselves) they would not serve my purpose. And I thought it of grét pleasure and use, not only to conceive these things myself the most simply and distinctly, but also to be understood clearly by others of more close attention and reasoning; and therefore by yourself in the first place, whose Command I very well remember. If the Sense and Notions as they are here delivered be well comprehended, as I hope they may with a little use, it will be easy for men of Style, as they have occasion, to make for them, and put them into a more fashionable dress, and to express them by more tuneable talk, for the sake of those, who either wanting Ability, or shunning Pains, or admiring Eloquence, Fancy, and Wit, more than Truth and Distinctness and Usefulness of Knowledge, are content and best pleased with a general, confused, and figurative apprehension, or with a smooth, modish, and affectionate expression of things. Nor are they indeed to be neglected, being the generality of men, who though they have little Appetite to Naked Sense, and dry Reason, the food of strong and sound Minds; yet will very well receive, and digest it too, for use and action, when it is garnished and sweetened in such manner, as useth to be most acceptable and grateful to them. FINIS. These Books following are published by the same Author, G. Bright, D. D. A Treatise concerning Judging one another: Being several Discourses on the occasion of our Saviour's Precept, Matth. 7.1. Judge not, that you be not judged. in Octavo. A Treatise of Prayer, with several useful occasional Observations, and some larger Digressions concerning the Judaical observation of the Lords day, the external Worship of God. In Octavo. Tabulae Mosaicae Duae: Quarum Altera Precepta Legis Mosaicae commodâ Methodo Disposita; altera oblationum omnium, ex efficient, Materiâ, Consumptione, Personis significatu, Tempore, Distributiones varias continet. All Three sold by John Wright at the Crown on Ludgate-hill. ERRATA. PAge 8. line 14. read think it. Page 32. l. 16. r. kinds. Page 38. l. 11. r. Momentany. Page 39 l. 16. r. Momentany. Page 50. l. 16. r. Beneficence. Page 62. l. 9 r. Biberius.