THE DUKE OF Buckingham's SPEECH In a late CONFERENCE▪ LONDON, Printed for M. I. 1668. The DUKE of BUCKINGHAM'S SPEECH Gentlemen of the House of Commons. I Am Commanded by the House of Peers, to open to You the Matter of this Conference; Which is a Task I could wish their Lordships had been pleased to lay upon any Body else, both for their own sakes and mine: having observed, in that little experience I have made in the World, there can be nothing of greater difficulty, Then to Unite Men in their Opinions, whose Interests seem to disagree. This, Gentlemen, I fear is at present our Case; but yet I hope, when we have a little better considered of it, we shall find, that a greater Interest does oblige us at this time, rather to join in the Preservation of both our Privileges, then to differ about the violation of either. We acknowledge it is our Interest to defend the Right of the Commons; for, should we suffer them to be oppressed, it would not be long before it might come to be our own case: And I humbly conceive it will also appear to be the Interest of the Commons, to uphold the Privilege of the Lords; that so we may be in a Condition to stand by and support them. All that their Lordship's desire of you upon this occasion, is, That you will proceed with them as usually Friends do, when they are in Dispute one with another; That you will not be impatient of hearing Arguments urged against your Opinions, but Examine the Weight of what is said, and then impartially consider which of us two, are likeliest to be in the wrong. If we are in the wrong, we and our Predecessors have been so for these many hundred of years: and not only our Predecessors, but yours too; This being the first time that ever an Appeal was made in point of Judicature, from the Lords House to the House of Commons. Nay, those very Commons which turned the Lords out of this House, though they took from them many other of their Privileges, yet left them the constant practice of this till the very last day of their Sitting▪ And this will be made appear by several Precedents these Noble Lords will lay before you, much better than I can pretend to do. Since this business has been in Agitation, their Lordships have been a little more curious than ordinary, to Inform themselves of the true nature of these Matters now in Question before Us; which I shall endeavour to Explain to you, as far as my small Ability, and my aversion to hard words will give me leave. For howsoever the Law, to make it a Mystery and a Trade, may be wrapped up in Terms of Art, yet it is founded in reason, and is obvious to Common Sense. The power of Judicature does naturally descend, and not ascend; That is no inferior Court can have any power, which is not derived to it from some power above it. The King is by the Laws of this Land, Supreme Judge, in all Causes Ecclesiastical and Civil. And so there is no Court, High or Low, can Act, but in subordination to Him: and though they do not all Issue out their writs in the King's Name, yet they can Issue out none but by virtue of some Power they have received from him. Now every particular Court has such particular power as the King has given it and for that reason has its bounds: But, the Highest Court in which the King can possibly Sat, that is, His Supreme Court of Lords in Parliament, has in it all his Judicial Power, and consequently no bounds: I mean no bounds of Jurisdiction; for the highest Court is to Govern according to the Laws, as well as the Lowest. I suppose none will make a question, but that every Man, and every Cause, is to be tried according to Magna Charta; That is, by Peers, or according to the Laws of the Land. And he that is Tried by the Ecclesiastical Courts, the Court of Admiralty, or the High Court of Lords in Parliament, is Tried as much by the Laws of the Land, as he that is Tried by the King's Bench, or Common-Pleas. When these Inferior Courts hap to wrangle among themselves, which they must often do, by reason of their being bound up to particular Causes, and their having all equally and earnestly a desire to try all Causes themselves, than the Supreme Court is forced to hear their Complaints, because there is no other way of deciding them. And this under favour, is an Original Cause of Courts, though not of men. Now these Original Causes of Courts, must also of necessity induce Men, for saving of Charges, and dispatch sake, to bring their Causes Originally before the Supreme Court. But then the Court is not obliged to receive them; but proceeds by Rules of Prudence, in either retaining, or dismissing them as they think fit. This is under favour, the sum of all that your Precedents can show us; which is nothing but what we practise every day: That is, that very often, because we would not be molested with hearing too many particular Causes, we refer them back to other Courts. And all the Argument you can possibly draw from hence, will not in any kind lessen our Power, but only show an unwillingness we have, to trouble ourselves often with matters of this Nature. Nor will this appear strange, if you consider the constitution of our House; it being made up, partly of such whose Employments will not give them leisure to attend the hearing of Private Causes; and entirely of those that can receive no profit by it, And the truth is, the Dispute at present is not between the House of Lords, and the House of Commons, but between us and Westminster-Hall. For as we desire to have few or no Causes brought before us, because we get nothing by them; so they desire to have all Causes brought before them, for a reason a little of the contrary nature. For this very reason, it is their business to invent new ways of drawing Causes to their Courts, which ought not to be pleaded there. As for example, this very Cause of Skinner that is now before us, (And I do not speak this by Rote, for I have the opinion of a Reverend Judge in the Case, who informed us of it the other day in the House.) They have no way of bringing this Cause into Westminster-Hall, but by this form; the reason and sense of which I leave to you to Judge of. The Form is this, that in stead of speaking as we ordinary Men do, that have no Art, That Mr. Skinner lost a Ship in the East Indies: to bring this into their Courts, they must say, That Mr. Skinner lost a Ship in the East-Indies, in the Parish of Islington, in the County of Middlesex. Now some of us Lords, that did not understand the refineness of this stile, began to examine what the reason of this should be; and so we found, that since they ought not by right to try such Causes, they are resolved to make bold not only with our Privileges, but the very Sense and Language of the whole Nation. This I thought fit to mention, only to let you see, that this whole Cause, as well as many others, could not be tried properly in any place but at our Bar; Except Mr. Skinner would have taken a fancy, to try the Right of Jurisdictions between Westminster-Hall and the Court of Admirallity, instead of seeking Relief for the Injuries he had received in the place only where it was to be given him. One thing I hear is much insisted upon, which is, the Trial without Juries; to which I could Answer, That such Trials are allowed of, in the Chancery and other Courts: And, that when there is occasion for them, we make use of Juries too, both by directing them in the Kings-Bench, and having them brought up to our Barr. But I shall only crave leave to put you in mind, That if you do not allow us in some Cases, to try Men without Juries, you will then absolutely take away the use of Impeachments; which I humbly conceive you will not think proper to have done at this time. FINIS.