Man in Paradise: OR, A Philosophical Discourse vindicating The Soul's Prerogative in discerning the TRUTHS OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION with the EYE of REASON.  
Printed at London by James Cottrel.   

Man in Paradise.  
SUch is the excellency and original of Man's Soul, brooded and hatched by the all-enlivening breath of God, fashioned by Divine artifice after the Idea and most perfect exemplar, conceived first in the mind of God, whose architype it doth faithfully resemble: such, I say, is its excellency and noble extraction, that the contemplation hereof cannot choose but heighten our serious thoughts into admiration, and translate the considerate mind into an ecstasy. For whatsoever excellencies the Great Monarch of Heaven and Earth hath scattered and diffused amongst the lower species and degrees of creatures; all these hath he concentred, collected, and moulden together in man's Soul; that by union, whose property it is always to add virtue and efficacy to the things united, they might become more perfect here, then in the creatures singly, and, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, superexcellent.  
The natural abilities, which are the meanest of the Souls endowments, and as it were, the dregs of all the rest, what lustre and splendour do they show in their sweet harmony, order, disposition, and sufficiency to attain the end for which they were bestowed?  
No sooner hath the Embryon all its parts and Organs woven of fine spermatical threads, by the industry of the plastic or formative virtue, but it receives from this divine particle of Air, vim nutritivam, a nutritive faculty, to maintain the substance then begun: vim auctricem, an augmentative power, to increase and bring it to a just quantity and bulk, that the Palace wherein this noble Prince, the Soul, is to reside, may be completely built, and furnished with necessaries fit to entertain so great a Majesty.  
These powers have other subordinate faculties, as careful and thrifty Handmaids, waiting upon them; wherein you may see the oeconomy of a well-ordered house. There is an attractive faculty, as a hand, to pull nourishment in; and a retentive, to keep carefully what is gotten. A concoctive, to fit and prepare what is so retained, for the use of the whole body; which concoctive hath also a distributive faculty, as another subordinate Handmaid under her, whereby there is performed a just anadosis, or distribution of matter to each several part according to its particular exigency. And under all these, there is an expulsive faculty, which serves as a drudge to carry out of the body the feculent part, or caput mortum, wherein there is no convenient chyle remaining; as also, to make way for new matter to be contained, and then concocted, as was the former.  
Thus have we that pattern and Idea which all well-ordered Families, and well-composed Commonwealths do imitate and follow.  
Yet notwithstanding, the fabric of man thus kept, would in time decay, and the species utterly perish, unless to prevent this, a generative power were also implanted in him. In this the Philosopher acknowledgeth, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Spice of Divinity; in emulation of whose eternal continuance, Nature, whose strength cannot maintain a solitary individuum to eternity, by this help preserveth the specifical unity, and so compleateth her desire.  
Here I would ask, With what curious Pencil this plastic power draws forth the lineaments & features of that body whose structure drew the Psalmist into such admiration? Wonderful hast thou made me behind and before. With whom doth it consult, to assign a due station and place for every member, leaving no chasm or gap unfilled, and superadding nothing superfluous or in vain? what Euclid or Master-Geometrician doth it ask counsel of, to give a fit proportion, a just dimension, and perfect Figure to every part? by what Arithmetic doth it count the number of the parts, and then by certain paralellisms of extuberances behind and before, doth so counterpoise the whole body, that the countenance of man, and only man, may be erected towards Heaven, there to behold his image as in a glass; whilst all other Creatures look prone upon the Earth, out of which their earthy souls were first extracted?  
Pronaque cum spectent animalia caetera terram,  
Os homini sublime dedit: calumque tueri  
Jussit, & erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.  
The sensitive faculties are sublimed to a higher pitch, and may elevate our minds to a higher degree of admiration. Who cannot but wonder at the swiftness of the sensible species posting with all speed to the sense, and the quickness and readiness of the sense to receive it? here you may see a vast mountain in a moment of time, contracted into a small model, and dwelling in an angle and corner of the eye. Who cannot but admire the faithfulness of the sensitive Organs? who no sooner receive, but transmit their respective species, sending them immediately to the common sense, as into some Common-councel-house, where the busy imagination, by spelling, joining, and compounding them together, reads a Lecture to the appetite to prove its assent or descent, whilst other species are commanded to their Cells, and reserved in the store-house of memory till need require them? Look back, and you may see the pellucid coats wherewith the eyes are covered, the clear waters wherewith they are bedewed, the winding labyrinth wherein the sound received into the ear must wander, till, beating upon that drum-like membrain which through the ingenite Air propagates the continued sound, the sense, by a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, interceding, is married to the object: look forward, and you shall see the appetite no sooner awaked, but the locomotive faculty, a most obedient servant, puts the decree in execution; earnestly prosecuting that good, or flying that evil, which the affection for that time precedent shall dispose unto. In the mean time the passions, as love, joy, hope, anger, fear, grief, etc. as Handmaids, are subservient, according as they are respectively concerned in the object apprehended, whether good or evil, past, present, or to come. In this sweet agreement, we may compare man's Soul to an artificial Lu●e, and these to be the strings of it, upon which it plays such ravishing Tunes, as would drive the considerate ear to an astonishment or plain ecstasy. Anima creaturarum inferiorum compendium: centrum in quod omnes perfectionun lineae concurrunt: speculum in quo suam quaeque creatura faciem, sed longè pulchriorem, contempletur: echo mirabilis, quae solitarias nudasque voces a creaturis, aliis sigillatim expressas, multiplicato & suaviori sono refert. The Soul is an abstract of inferior creatures: a centre wherein all the lines of perfections meet: a glass wherein each creature may behold its face, but much fairer: an admirable echo which carries back the naked and solitary voices of other creatures, by them singly expressed, in a multiplied and sweeter sound.  
But what are all these, compared with the rational powers of the Soul? what is the sense, which traffics only with gross bodies, and quailities from thence emergent, compared with reason, by which the Soul negotiates with Angels and immateriate beings, and by metaphysical and and abstruse notions, wings itself up into the arms of him who breathed it first into the body of man?  
In this upper room and higher loft of the Soul's residence, we may contemplate the Soul, as a Monarch, wisely restraining or giving liberty to the misunderstanding affections according to the rule of right reason. Here have we man ruling in man, dressing and cultivating man, as another Paradise, wherein is all possible variety, yet no confusion, no ataxy or disorder, no passions contradicting one another, or tyrannising over reason; no disturbance of mind, no distemper of body, but a most admirable harmony of all things in the whole universe of man.  
Reason is that Sceptre whereby the Soul doth rule without tyranny, the will and affections. Reason is that rod wherewith the Soul is kept in awe to obey without servile fear, the great Monarch of Heaven and Earth.  
By reason, the Soul discerns that there is a God; drawing one Argument from the Creation of the World, which either did exist of itself, or was produced by another: but it could not give a being to itself, seeing that it is repugnant that any thing should be the cause of itself. Therefore the consequence is necessary, that the World was made by another; and; such another, as was the efficient cause thereof; not produced by any other former efficient cause, but was of himself, and by himself from eternity: which can be no other but God.  
Another Argument the Soul: draws from the necessary dependence of a finite being upon an infinite: for every thing in the World is finite, both in respect of its essence and efficacy. Now every thing that is finite must necessarily be limited by another, seeing it is impossible that any thing should give bounds to itself: and there being not in things finite a progress to infinity, we must at length come to some certain being which is not limited by another, but is of itself essentially and virtually infinite: which can be no other but God.  
A third Demonstration is taken from the necessary dependence of a secondary cause upon a first: for unless we do here also grant a progress to infinity, which is absurd; in ascending the scale of subordination of causes, we must at length meet with one primary both efficient and final cause, having no other cause superior or before it; which is only God.  
A fourth Demonstration is taken from the necessary dependence of a contingent and temporal being, upon an absolutely necessary and eternal being: for that which is temporal and contingent, was not always, but commenced in time, and had a beginning of its duration. Wherefore seeing it is absurd, to grant that there was once nothing, and that which afterwards was, gave unto itself a beginning to be; we must conclude, that there was always an absolutely necessary, and eternal being without all beginning; which is only God.  
A fifth Argument the Soul useth to prove a Deity, is the necessary dependence of all things that are good in an inferior order, upon some primary and chief good: for we see amongst all things in the world which are good, some are more, and others less good. Now seeing that all things are such more or less, according as they do more or less participate of that which is most of all such; it follows from hence, that there must necessarily be some Fountain of good, from whence all other goods do flow, as offsprings thereof; by which they are also measured: and this can be none other than only God.  
Not only these, but many other rational Arguments the soul useth, to satisfy herself fully in this Truth; as, the general consent of all people and Nations; the dictate of Conscience, when there is none to accuse; the goodly fabric of the world; and, the continued Order of all things preserved in their first station, through all the vicissitude of generation and corruption; intimating a wise rector and Governor upon whose nod and direction all things depend.  
No sooner doth the Soul by suchlike Arguments thoroughly convince herself that there is a God, but this heavenly creature, winged with Reason, soars yet higher, endeavouring to see God's face, and to know what God is. Here she approaches: but such is the transcendent splendour of his bright Majesty, that she judgeth it impossible to look God in the face, or to know a priori what God is, as Cicero saith in his first Book De naturae Deorum, under the person of Cotta: Rogas me quis & qualis sit Deus: auctore utar Simonide, de quo cum quaesivisset hoc idem tyrannus Hiero, deliberandi causa sibi unum diem postulavit: cum idem ex eo postridie quaereret, biduum petiit. Cum saepius duplicaret numerum dierum, admiransque Hiero, quaereret cur ita faceret? Quia, inquit, quantò diutius considero, tantò mihi res obscurior videtur. You ask me who and what is God: I will use the speech of Simonides, who, when King Hiero asked him the same question, desired a days time to deliberate concerning it. The day after, when he asked him again, he desired two days. Having in this manner divers times doubled the number of days, Hiero wondering at him, asked, Wherefore he did so? Because, saith he, the longer time I take to consider upon this matter, the more obscure it appears unto me. And indeed, those Arguments are infallible which are usually brought for this Opinion, viz. that it is impossible for the Soul to know God a priori.  
Yet though she cannot see his face, she hath leave granted her to behold his backparts: though she cannot strictly define the Deity, yet she may in some manner describe it: though she cannot attain to any knowledge of God by fetching Arguments a priori ad posterius, from that which went before to that which follows after, from the cause to the effect, from that which is insensible to that which is sensible; yet she may argue a posteriori ad prius, from that which follows after to that which went before, from that which is corporeal to that which is incorporeal, from that which is compound to that which is simple, from that which is temporal to that which is eternal, from that which is finite to that which is infinite, from that which is natural to that which is supernatural, from the effect to the first efficient cause. By this way of argumentation the Soul makes a description of the Godhead, and, either by way of negation or transcendence, attributes that unto God, which can in no wise, without absurdity, be attributed to any of the creatures: as, that he is actus purus, a pure act, without all potentiality; simplicissimus, most simple, without all composition; foelicissimus, most happy: with many other. The very Heathen Philosophers, as Cicero, Aristotle, and Plato, by the only light of nature, have left such sentences in their writings, as may clearly demonstrate the Soul's abilities in this kind. Aristotle in his twelfth Book of Metaphysics, saith, That God is vivens, aeternus, & optimus; living, eternal, and transcendently good: and a little after, That he is substantia aeterna, immobilis, magnitudinis expers, indivisibilis, infinita, impassibilis & immutabilis, a sensibus separata. An eternal substance, , without bulk, indivisible, infinite, not capable of suffering or of alteration, separted from the senses. Plato likewise in Timaeo, and in his Book De Legibus, saith of God, That he is Genitor Universitatis, the Begetter of this Universe: bonus, & causa bonorum omnium; good, and the cause of all good things.  
That very Attribute which Christians do, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, after a more special manner ascribe unto God, Cicero hath left in his writings, saying, as we say, That God is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the knower of the heart. He saith in 
* 3 De nat. Deorum.  one place, Obscurum Deo nihil potest esse: and in 
* 2 De Divin.  another place, Ignorare Deus non potest, quâ quisque ment sit. The same Author, by the only light of nature, hath contemplated God in the most happy fruition of himself, as also in his providence towards the world, and hath expressed himself in a most Christianlike manner in both these respects. As touching the fruition of himself, he saith, Ea est Dei vita, quâ nihil beatius, nihil omnino bonis omnibus affluentius cogitari potest: nihil enim 
* Cicero nullus intellexit Deitatem absolute nihil agere: sed nostro more non agere, sc. cum labour & molestia.  agit, nullis occupationibus est implicatus, nulla opera molitur: sua potentia & virtute gaudet, habet exploratum fore se semper tum in maximis, tum in aeternis voluptatibus. Such is the life of God, than which nothing is more happy, nothing in the world can possibly be thought to abound with more good things: for he doth nothing; he is implicated in no businesses, he undergoeth no labour, but enjoyeth his own power and virtue; and knoweth certainly, that he shall always be in transcendent and eternal pleasures. As concerning God's providence, he saith thus: In mundo Deus est aliquis, qui regit, qui gubernat, qui cursum astrorum, qui mutationes temporum, rerum vicissitudines ordinesque conservat; terras & maria contemplans, hominum commoda vitasque tuetur. In the world there is a God which ruleth, governeth, and preserveth the course of the stars, the mutations of times, and the vicissitudes and orders of things; who beholding both Sea and Land, doth defend the goods and lives of men. I could produce a large Catalogue of suchlike expressions from the mouths of Heathens: but presuming that what I have already enumerated, may suffice to vindicate the Soul 's Prerogative, as touching the knowledge of God in his Attributes; I shall wave all manner of enlargements, and pursue my intended brevity.  
To know God in his Attributes, is a near approach to the Deity; yet the rational Soul comes still nearer: first, prying about his essence, then returning to herself, and contriving which way she should know more; at length she saith within herself, Operatio sequitur esse; action depends upon being. Then she busies herself in the contemplation of God's actions, which, saith she, are either immanent or transient: the immanent actions of God, are such as are performed within himself without respect had to the creatures, whereby he is said to know himself, and to love himself; as Scaliger saith, Deus generat ex seipso, in seipso suiipsius intellectionem, eodem modo, eandem aequalem sibi. God doth from himself begat an understanding of himself in himself, after the same manner, the same equal to himself. Here the Soul takes notice of a reflection of the Deity upon itself, and is sublimed into the supposition of a Trinity: for whereas God doth conceive and know himself, he doth beget a most perfect image of himself, from whence also proceedeth a most perfect love of himself. Now seeing there is nothing in God, which is not God; both the image of God, and the love of God seem to be distinct 
* Vocabulum Graecum, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, multisariam accipitur; & inter varias ejus acceptiones aliquando sumitur pro essentia entis: quo sensu Patres Concilii Sardiensis censuerunt, ut est apud Theodoretum in Ecclesiastica Historia, lib. 2. cap. 8. unam esse hypostasin Patris, Filii, & Spiritus sancti. Verum enim vero 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pro supposito naturae intelligentis haud obscuri Authores accipiunt: quo sensu Graeci Patres in divina essentia tres hypostases esse asserunt; & Dionysius Areopagita, qui Apostolorum coaetaneus fuisse perhibetur, in lib. De Caelesti Hierarchia, vocat divinam essentiam unitatem, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, hoc est, in tribus hypostatibus subsistentem.  Hypostases or subsistences of the same essence with him from whom they do proceed, as if an eye should see itself: there is first the eye seeing; secondly, the eye seen, or at least, the image or species of that eye seen: from which action of seeing, there must necessarily proceed a desire of enjoying; for every action hath its end. This comparison of the eye doth in some sort adumbrate the Trinity; yet by showing how far short the comparison is, the true notion of the Trinity may be more clearly demonstated. The Eye cannot see itself, but the Deity cannot but behold itself; there being no object beyond it, or extraneous to it. God doth primarily see and know himself: But secondarily, the creatures, who live, move, and have their being in him.  
The Eye doth not always see, but doth in time begin, and afterwards cease to see: but the Deity cannot but always behold and know itself; and cannot but subsist in the eternal contemplation of itself.  
If we should grant that the eye could see itself; yet in propriety of speech, we must deny our supposition; for the Eye sees not the naked essence of any thing, but a certain accident, viz. the intentional species: but the Deity is essentially beheld of itself, reflecting no other species or image from it then its naked essence, whose perfection is such, that it cannot but subsist eternally beheld and contemplated by itself.  
From the reflection of the Eye upon itself, there can proceed only an appetite of enjoying: but from the reflection of the Deity upon itself, there cannot but proceed an absolute fruition. Actiones feruntur in bonum, saith the Philosopher: from the reflection of an eye upon itself, there can only proceed bonum desiderii, a good of desire: but from the reflection of the Deity upon itself, there cannot but proceed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or bonum complacentiae; a good of complacency. After this manner doth the Soul discourse freely & ingenuously within herself; I mean the rational Soul not clouded with sensuality, nor straightened and girt with prejudice. Then doth she conclude, that there are three necessary distinct subsistences, yet but one essence of the Deity; or that the Deity, which is essentially one, is subsistentially three. The Deity doth necessarily subsist, first, in the eternal contemplation of itself; secondly, it doth subsist eternally, contemplated by itself; and thirdly, it doth subsist in an eternal complacency of itself: yet are there not three eternals, but one eternal; because the notion we have of eternity excludes plurality: neither do we conceive the first, second, and third subsistence, to be one before another in time or duration, because eternity is indivisible, having neither priority nor posteriority; but only by a priority of order or disposition of their relation. When we say that God is merciful, or that God is just, we speak improperly or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, after the manner of men; there being no real distinction betwixt God's mercy and his justice. But when we denominate the Deity to subsist contemplating or contemplated, etc. we speak 
* Scientia seu contemplatio proprie competit divinae naturae, & improprie tribuitur creaturis: notitia enim nostra est obscura & imperfecta, divina vero est perfecta & ●bsoluta. Multo magis ab aeterno in aeternum scire & contemplari Dei proprium est, quod nullo modo de creaturarum perfectissima predicari potest.  properly and absolutely. Wherefore, although these three subsistences be all concentred in the Deity; yet they are 
* Distinguntur ab invicem, quia ad invicem referuntur. Ratio enim formalis relationis est semper supponere aliud cui unumquodque rela●orum referatur. Quemadmodum Aristoteles, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Et infra subjungit, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  distinct each one from the other. In that they do susibst invisible in themselves, and really distinct from each other, we may properly call them persons: 
† Persona est substantia individua, intelligens, incommunicabilis. Haec definitio a Zanchic, lib. 1. De tribus Elohim, & uno Jehova. cap. 2. ex communi Patrum Latinorum consensu affertur.  for a person according to Philosophers, is a rational or intelligible subsistence distinct from others, and indivisible in itself.  
Hither is the Soul arrived, viz. to the knowledge of three persons in one essence of the Deity; or, to the acknowledgement of a Trinity in Unity, by the consideration of God's immanent actions. Now doth she pass from hence, unto his transient actions, which are the Creation of the World, and the preservation thereof. Here she doth premise, that the world was not from eternity, but did commence with time; as also, that there could be no first matter 
* Absurdum enim esset 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, absolutam aeternitatem & essendi necessitatem ali●ui nisi soli Deo tribuere.  eternally coexisting with the Deity. Moreover, she doth presuppose that it would be absurd either to affirm or grant that the Deity did act positively upon nothing; although before the Creation of the world, there was besides God, privatively, not any thing. There was before the Creation of the world, one only absolutely necessary infinite Being, viz. God, who by reason of his infinity and absolute perfection, could perform no action absolutely transient: neither had he any object besides himself to act upon. Time, and place, or finity might have then been denominated nothing, it being contradistinct to infinity, or a negation of that infinite being, which did only then exist. Wherefore, time and place before the Creation of the World, could never have been 
* Nihil non est intelligibili nisi per notionem alterius de quo simplicitur negatur: sed tempus & locus ante creationem mundi nihil erant: Ergo.  conceived or willed by the Deity; unless he had conceived and willed himself, together with time and place. So that it seems to the rational Soul, that time and place had its being by the Deities conception and volition of himself, together with time and place; which was the position of the word of his mind in time and place.  
Here is also so clear a Demonstration of the Trinity in the Creation of the world, that it seems impossible to the rational Soul to have the true notion of Creation without the conceit of the Trinity: Insomuch, that the Ancients, who were more profound Philosophers, did express the word create by an Hebrew word consisting of three Letters, viz. א Aleph, ב Beth, and ר Resch, which signify the Father, the Son, and the Spirit: which three Letters, by addition of their proper Vowels, either expressed or understood, are a Verb of the Preterperfect tense, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, signifying, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit have jointly acted, or, they have conspired to act. This word, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, creavit, doth in itself sufficiently express the action of the Deity, subsisting in a threefold manner: yet the Ancients go farther, putting to it a word expressing the Deity in the Plural Number, saying, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Elohím bara, the Gods have created, or rather, God as he is personally three hath created. Hermes a most profound Rationalist, who was therefore called Trismegistus, in his Book entitled Pimander, hath ●eft a sentence to posterity, relating to the Creation of the World, as some do interpret; but as others do construe it, it doth only express the Trinity. In this ambiguity, it is not difficult to decide the controversy, by affirming that Mercurius Trismegistus did, by one and the same sentence, primarily adumbrate the Trinity, and secondarily the Creation of the World. For God, who is himself a pure and most simple act in the eternal contemplation of himself absolutely infinite, doth necessarily contemplate himself, coexisting with the world, or time and place: the World being an inclusion or parenthesis of infinity. The sentence is this: Monas genuit monadem, & in se suum reflexit ardorem. 
In 1 Part summae theolog. quaest. 32. art. 1.  Thomas understands it to be only related to the production of the world, supposing it to be analogical to these words of his, viz. Unus Deus produxit unum mundum propter suiipsius amorem: but most Philosophers say, that Hermes by ratiocination came to the knowledge of the Trinity, and expressed it after the aforesaid manner. He saith not, Monas produxit monadem; but, Monas genuit monadem. Now the world may not properly be said to have been begotten: for in the Creation of the World by his will, the World can in no wise be called verbum mentis, the Word of his mind; in that the world being nothing, could not have been conceived in the mind of God, had not he conceived himself together with the World: so that God himself, being primarily conceived of himself, is verbum mentis Dei, the word of his own mind; by whom all things were made, and without whom there could nothing have been made, which was made; who, as he is conceived, is personally distinguished from himself conceiving, although he be essentially the same. The Soul, whose property it is to try all things, and by discourse, either to reduce her superficial conceits into impossibilities, and so pass them by as phantasms, or else to prove them necessary, and then to retain and embrace them as eternal Truths, doth, by suchlike preceding discourse, prove an absolute necessity of the eternal being of one God, whose every action is but one action, and that eternal: in which eternal action, which is also himself, who is actus purus, he hath eternally subsisted personally three; in which personal subsistency, he hath eternally created the World.  
The Soul having contemplated the World in fieri, comes now to take a survey thereof, as it doth exist in facto esse.  
In this place she doth not consider it, as consisting of such and such parts, or containing such and such particular creatures; but she only looks upon it as a finite being, contradistinct to infinity: and first she discourseth the nature of time, defining it, according to common Philosophy, to be mensura motûs Coeli per prius & posterius. But being jealous, lest she should impose upon herself, by a paralogism, and so be mistaken in the finding out of that most precious Jewel, which she so earnestly seeks after, viz. Truth; she rests not contented with this definition, but convinceth herself of the nature of time, by comparing it with Eternity.  
Eternity is a duration without either beginning or ending, having neither priority nor posteriority, but indivisible.  
Time is a duration having both beginning and ending, and is in itself divisible into priority and posteriority. Time, as time, whether we look upon all time, or the least particle thereof, doth consist of these two essential parts, viz. the later, and the former; which have their dependence upon a point or moment, in the midst thereof. If then; before all time, there was one only infinite being, who by the position of his Word in time, caused time to be; the rational Soul collects from hence, together with what is premised, that the Word of God was, in the fullness or midst of all time, to impose a period to the former, and a commencement to the later time; or to constitute the essential parts of time, viz. priority and posteriority, by being in the midst thereof. And seeing it is that middle point, which doth, by disjoining duration, give a being to priority and posteriority; we must necessarily conclude, that the Word of God, which is the second Person in the Trinity, not only in his eternal essence, but also in his existence, in the fullness of time, was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the beginning of the creation of God.  
Now the Soul comes to examine the nature of place; which, saith she, is that determinate and circumscribed ubi, wherein a body is contained; which can neither be named, nor rightly understood without the presupposition of a body; 
* Corpus a Philosophis dicitur esse in loco bifariam, sc. vel circumscriptive, quatenus ab alio corpore extrinsecus ambiente continetur: vel repletive, quatews sua m●le occupat & replet certum spatium locale. Priori modo quicquid est corporum excepto Caelo supremo, localitatem habet. Posteriori autem modo de omni cor●ore simpliciter localitas praedicatur. Omne enim corpus est, quantum, & quatenus quantum, est extensum in longum, latum, & profundum: & quatenus est extensum, habet certum situm & distantiam partium: ac proinde certum spatium locale replet ac occupat.  insomuch, that it is impossible there should be a body which is not in place, as also, that there should be place which doth not contain a body: so that a body and place have a relative convertibility, the one to the other; and are so mutually reciprocated, that the one being granted, the other is necessarily presupposed.  
The Soul from hence collects, that if the Word of God did so exist in place as to give a being thereto; the Word of God did assume a body, which being from eternity conceived in the mind of God, as the only Idea and platform of the whole creation, must necessarily be of the nature of the perfectest of bodies; which is flesh.  
The Soul is now arrived to the incarnation of the Word. The Word, saith she, became flesh and dwelled amongst us; yet in such a Tabernacle as might be the pattern of the great Temple, the World, as also of other living Temples of the Holy Ghost. Here she conceiveth, that though flesh in the general be the perfectest of bodies; yet not any manner of flesh could make a fit Tabernacle for the Word to dwell in, but such only, as should contain all the variety of the whole world; which is the humane nature.  
Here the Soul contemplates the Word incarnate to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, both God and Man, having a perfect humane body, and rational Soul personally united with his Divinity. This personal Union of the divine and humane nature of the Word, must necessarily be the immediate act of God; and consequently, that body which the Word did assume (although, as it was perfectly humane, it should necessarily consist of flesh and blood, & other such essential parts as do constitute an absolute humane body) could not be produced by generation according to the will of man, having no need of seminality to contribute unto it its plastic or formative virtue; not only in that it was eternally conceived in the mind of God, as the Idea of the whole Creation; but also, in that it did exist in the fullness of time, which is the beginning of all time, according to the true notion thereof. In this moment or middle point, which gave time a being, which doth divide and couple time with eternity, and doth disjoin and unite priority with posteriority, which is in a several respect, both time and eternity: I say, in this both temporal and eternal duration was the light created; in this fullness of time, was the Word incarnated; which Word incarnate is both God, and Man; the image of God, and the light of Man; and Man is the image or shadow of that light.  
This at the first view may seem mysterious and profound: yet after a more inward scrutiny, it squares with the humane intellect, being pure quintessentiated and sublimed reason: for time is so included in, interwoven with, and as it were strung upon eternity, that eternity is both the centre and the circumference, the poles and the axletree of all time: and according to the notion we have of time, together with its dependence upon, and connexion with eternity; we must necessarily grant some duration to be both time and eternity; wherein we imagine the first act of the Creation to have been performed. Which first act of the Creation, the rational Soul demonstrates to have been the incarnation of the Word, as a cause; and the Creation of light, or the angelical nature, under the notion of an immediate effect: for even as the Word by existing in time and place did give a being thereto, and by assuming a most complete and perfect body, which being both elementary, vegetative, sensitive, etc. he did contribute essence to the Elements, Vegetables, living Creatures, etc. even so by the personal union and perfect conjunction of his divine and humane nature, (which personal union is to be considered before the humane nature alone, or those other subordinate natures comprehended in it, viz. sense, vegetation, corporeity) he hath created the Angels, which are a middle nature betwixt God and Man: so that the whole Creation seems to be a most perfect Scheme, Image, or Shadow of the Word incarnate; and all the variety thereof, in each particular, analogically received from his fullness. Although, quoad nos, the Word incarnate may seem to be the second Adam, who may seem to us to have existed in the world before him; yet quoad Deum, he is the beginning of the Creation of God, and the protoplast of mankind, after whose image Man was made. Who by the conjunction of his divine and humane nature, is the Supporter and Bearer of the whole world; to whom, each Creature owes its being; by whom, as an efficient cause; by whom, as a final cause; and by whom, as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the world was made: and without whom, in each of these respects, was not any thing made, that was made. Who in his divine nature is ubiquitary; and in his humane nature, was, in the midst of time generally taken, conversant in the midst of the then habitable world; and in the very midst of time strictly taken, did, without doubt, locally descend, together with all the immateriate powers of the humane nature, into the bottom, centre, or midst of all circumference; which could not be, 
* Si unum corpus per aliud penetraret, sequoretur corpus non esse corpus, sed substantiam incorpoream quantitatis expert●m: quod absurdum est, & manifestam implicat contradictionem. Quemadmodum Damascenus l. 1. Orthodoxae fidei, cap. 3. ait, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  except he should have put off the material and corporeal part of his humanity, not reassuming the same until his assent from the infernal pit. Now such must necessarily have been the 
* Rationi consentaneum est eam fuisse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, corporis illius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ut si omnia ossa ejus fracta fuissent, statim conglutinarentur. Probabile autem est tam balsamica polluisse vi humores illius corporis; ut vulnera in exterioribus inflicta mortem non conciliassent: sed innato corporis balsamo, humoribus, sc. illuc deflu●ntibus sanari potuissent. Methodum igitur isthanc frustrancam frangendi ossa ejus omniscia recusavit providentia. Et ad vulnera quod attinet: previdit, ut non tantum exteriora infligerentur, sed ut ipsum cor lancea perfoderetur: ita ut ex ipso corde sanguis efflueret, & ab ejusdem capsula, sc. pericardio aqua dimanaret.  exact crasis or temperament of that most perfect and complete body which the Word did assume; that it is conjecturable, that it might suffer and be deprived of its form, by solution of continuity, rather than from any internal principles proceeding from a depraved habit or evil constitution: and being deprived of its form, it is probable it should be incapable of corruption, in that it is impossible it should have been produced by generation.  
The Soul is ravished with the contemplation hereof, being not able to express a tithe of what she cannot but conceive: being so oppressed and overwhelmed with reason, that she cannot possibly utter her notions herein, except she had cloven tongues to multiply her expressions. For the Word incarnate is that All in All, both of finity and infinity, wherein are all the reasons of things, together with their beings, concentred: whereby corruption hath a possibility to put on incorruption, and mortality to put on immortality. For, as his being in the world, caused the world to be; so the perfect conjunction and personal union of his divine and humane nature, which can never be disjoined, giveth an eternal precarium esse to the whole humane nature; or a possibility to all mankind to enjoy an eternal being: yet must the whole world besides necessarily return unto its first nothing, whose existence is but as a parenthesis in infinity; in which parenthesis the two extremes, viz. Creation and Annihilation must necessarily be equally distant from that point in the midst, wherein the Word did exist, to give an absolutely finite being thereto. At the dissolution whereof, it is necessary that the Word incarnate do actually exist in the world, to impose a period thereto (whose commencement did depend upon his actual existence therein) by recollecting into himself that scattered light, which is tutelary to the world, which was at first from him dispersed: before whom the whole world must necessarily be collected, together with the angelical nature, which is the next and immediate supporter thereof, and must be rolled up as a Book; and then being deprived of its tutelary light, must pass away as a Scheme; the glory whereof shall no sooner be reassumed into the Word, then reflected upon the humane ashes, to revive the same into an incorruptible and eternal being.  
After this manner doth the rational Soul ascribe the Creation of the World to God, as the first efficient cause thereof: which one God, she doth demonstrate by reason to have subsisted personally three, in the very act of Creation: but in a more special manner, she doth ascribe the Creation to the Word, which is the second Person in the Trinity, whose actual existence in the world, gave a being thereto. In the contemplation whereof, she cannot but discern with the Eye of Reason, that all those mysteries which the holy Scriptures hold forth unto us, are not at all repugnant to Reason: As, that the Word was incarnated in the fullness of time, having been eternally conceived by the Holy Ghost: that he took upon him the humane nature: that he died by a violent death: that he descended into hell; with many others.  
Having found out in the Book of Nature those mysteries which are expressed in the Scriptures, she comes in the next place to observe whether those things less mysterious in the Scriptures, be not also written in the Book of Nature. In the holy Scriptures, which are the written Word of God, the Soul conceives herself chief concerned, as a rational creature: for there is no other creature in the whole world, except man alone, to whom the Scriptures do properly belong: before whom God hath set the way of good and evil, upon the only account of rationality; having breathed into him the breath of life, whereby he became a reasonable Soul: although all other inferior creatures do owe continual praises to God for their being; whereupon, they are commanded to observe the Sabbath, which is by God an appointed time of thanks to him for their Creation, wherein he is said to have rested; and is in the course of nature a pause, period, or full stop, wherein most actions do commonly terminate; according to the observation of Philo Judaeus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. I say, although all Creatures do owe continual praises to God for their Creation, and do in an obscure manner perform their service therein, having also certain secret Sabbatisms in all their actions; yet man, in a more especial and particular manner hath an Engagement to perform an immediate service to God, being the world's high Priest, to offer sacrifice not only for himself, but also for all other Creatures which are subjected under him; according to that of Mr. George Herbert, sometimes Orator of the University of Cambridge: 
Man is the World's High Priest; he doth present  
The Sacrifice for all, while they below  
Unto the Service mutter an assent,  
Such as Springs use that fall, and Winds that blow.   
Man, who is the High Priest of the World, hath the Scripture as a Light to direct and guide his Soul to the high Altar, the Word, who is also the High Priest of mankind.  
Now it is necessary, that there be some proportion betwixt the Light and the Eye; otherwise the Light would rather dazzle and blind the Eye, then help it in its performance. If the Holy Scripture were not rational, and in some sort proportionable to the humane intellect, it might rather induce incredulity, then enlighten the understanding. Thus doth the Soul discourse. Then doth she attempt by reason, to understand the written Word of God: conceiving it a contradiction, that any thing should be presented, as an adequate object of the humane intellect, not under the notion of rationality.  
Herein she first observes the goodly order of the Creation, according to the description of Moses, to be much conformable to Reason. As, that the Elements should be created before mixed bodies; and, that out of the Elements there should be procreated all mixed bodies in such an order and method, as doth correspond the logical series in the predicament of substance: that Creatures more perfect should require greater time for their production out of the Earth, than Creatures more imperfect: That first vegetables should be produced, then living Creatures, viz. those endued with sense; & last of all Man, who is the most perfect of all living Creatures: and that in the Creation of each species, there should be also a gradual ascent answerable to the scale of Nature: as of Animals, first the Fish, than the Fowl, afterwards, the fourfooted Beasts: and so of Vegetables, first Grass and Herbs, than Shrubs and Trees. That Man should be at first made up of such matter contained in the Bowels of the Earth, as is the Embryon in the Womb, viz. of red slime, which is analogous to Blood, the thinner parts whereof are, by virtue of its innate heat, resolved into Spirits; whilst the grosser are converted into flesh: and so all the diversity of parts made up answerable to the heterogeneity of the matter.  
After the Heaven and the Earth were finished, and all the Host thereof, the Scriptures tell us, That God saw every thing which he had made, and behold it was very good. The very same we read in the Book of Nature. For Reason doth dictate unto us, that all things are good, not only because every thing in the whole world beareth some proportion or similitude with God, who is the original of its being; but also because there is no one thing in the whole world which is not agreeable and convenient to some other thing. Wherefore seeing that goodness is defined to be the congruity of one thing with another, it follows that every thing in the world is good.  
There was not written, positive, or Moral Law given for the space of above two thousand years after the Creation: then afterwards the Law was given by God unto Moses, and from him delivered unto the Children of Israel. There was reason wherefore the Law should be so long omitted; and afterwards there was reason wherefore it should be then given. Why it was so long omitted, may appear by the Contents thereof: for he that reads the Moral Law, and considers all the particulars therein, may observe, that the main scope thereof, was to establish the Children of Israel into a Commonwealth; and to preserve the same Commonwealth, by defending each man 's propriety: that so they might, as a peculiar people, comfortably serve the Lord, who had delivered them out of captivity. Now there are three things required to a Commonwealth: first, that there be a competent number of people; secondly, that this people be entire and free, neither scattered at a distance, nor intermixed with other people; and thirdly, that there be propriety of possessions, whereby one man may call something his own which is not another man's. Before the Posterity of Jacob had these three Conditions, it was impossible they should be capable of that whole Law which was afterward given unto them. Although, when they were in Egypt they did increase, and became numerous; yet they could have no Law unto themselves, in regard they were not of themselves a free People, but were strangers in the Land of Egypt, and consequently Servants unto the Egyptians, who had Task Masters over them, as the Scriptures do inform us.  
And afterwards, when they were delivered from the Egyptian slavery, although they were, in the wilderness, not only numerous, but also a free People, and entire to themselves; yet the whole Law could in no wise belong unto them, because they had no propriety of possessions.  
To impose a Curse upon him that should remove his Neighbour's Landmark, would have been nonsense to the Children of Israel before they had marked out their Lands, and taken to themselves proper possessions: and so to impose proportionable penalties, if peradventure their Oxen should hurt or gore one another, or hurt a man; would have been absurd, before they had any Oxen belonging unto them. By this may appear the necessity wherefore the Law was so long omitted.  
Now although the Law was written whilst the Children of Israel were yet in the Wilderness; yet it could not be in force until their Commonwealth began; but so soon as they had a Commonwealth, they could not possibly be without a Law; for the Law is the Soul thereof, which doth both constitute and preserve the same: whereby their confused multitude was digested into a Republic; and their Republic was continued entire without division or confusion. The multitude indeed might have been continued entire, without so much circumstance of Law, whilst it did subsist as an Army, and was preserved by one common food, Manna, which did cost them only the taking up; yet could it not possibly have subsisted as a Commonwealth, wherein there is propriety of possessions, without the Law, which doth, by defending each man's propriety, preserve the whole Commonwealth in the same state and condition wherein it was first established.  
If we look into the Law, we shall find it to be nothing else but a Systeme of rational precepts, commanding or forbidding upon such proportionable penalties or rewards as are agreeable to the dictate of Nature, or the Law of Reason. Here we have an Eye for an Eye, and a Tooth for a Tooth, etc. Double restitution is enjoined for Theft; and Murder is forbidden upon penalty of Death. And in like manner for Trespasses committed, we find in the Law such rational proceed, as honest and understanding men would contrive for the due administration of a Commonwealth: as for example: If men strive together and one smite another with a stone, or with his fist, and he die not, but keepeth his bed: if he rise again, & walk abroad upon his staff, then shall he that smote him be quit: only he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed, Exod. 21.18, 19 If a man shall cause a field or vineyard to be eaten, and shall put in his beast, and shall feed in another man's field; of the best of his own field, and of the best of his own vineyard shall he make restitution, Exod. 22▪ 6. Who can be so ignorant, as not to understand this to be reason?  
If we look into other Precepts of the Law, which do not concern any private controversy betwixt man and man, nor are related to the happiness of any particular Commonwealth, but only to the beatitude of mankind in general; we may observe the like rationality: as for example: Thou shalt not see thy Brother's Ox nor his Sheep go astray, and hid thyself from them; thou shalt in any case bring them again unto thy Brother: and if thy Brother be not nigh unto thee, or if thou know him not, than thou shalt bring it unto thine own house, and it shall be with thee until thy Brother seek after it; and thou shalt restore it to him again. In like manner thou shalt do with his Ass, etc. Deut 22.1, 2. Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him; for ye were strangers in the Land of Egypt. Ye shall not afflict any widow or fatherless child, Exod. 22.21, 22. Suchlike Sentences of Humanity and Charity, are so sweetly intermixed with the other precepts of Equity throughout the whole Law, that the Law of Nature, and the Moral Law, seem both to intimate the same thing, and both to be summed up in this rational Precept: Quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri ne feceris: Do not thou unto another, that which thou wouldst not have another do unto thee. As concerning those Meats which are forbidden in the Law to be eaten, they are also such, most of them, as even Nature would admonish all people to refrain; of which sort are Eagles, Ravens, Kites, Hawks, Owls, Bats, Cuckoos, etc. and on the contrary, those Meats which are tolerated, are, for certain Physical Reasons, the wholesomest food; and also by natural instinct are suggested unto mankind as esculent: of which sort are the Ox, the Sheep, the Goat, the Hart, the Ro-Buck, the Fallow Deer, the Wild Goat, etc.  
Some may object, That if the Moral Law be the same in effect with the Law of Nature, the said Moral Law must necessarily have been observed by other Nations before it was given by Moses unto the Children of Israel. To which I answer affirmatively: for it is not hard to prove by Scripture, that almost every punctillo of the same Law, though not as positive but as natural, was observed before it was given unto Jacob's Posterity.  
Murder was punishable by the Egyptian Laws, as may appear by the second of Exodus, where we read that Moses looked this way and that way, and when he saw that there was no man, he slew an Egyptian which was smiting an Hebrew, one of his Brethren: and so soon as he had done it, expecting nothing but death if he had been found out, he hide himself in the sand for his own safety: and afterwards, when Pharaoh heard of it, he fled from Pharaoh, out of Egypt, into the Land of Midian, because. Pharaoh sought after him; being the chief Magistrate to punish suchlike offenders.  
Adultery was also accounted an offence as heinous before the Law, as it was afterwards; which is manifest by the story of Abraham and Abimelech in the twentieth of Genesis, where we read, That Abraham supposing that the fear of God was not in the Land of Gerar, denied his Wife because he knew that Adultery was so odious even in those places where the fear of God was not▪ that they would rather slay him, and then take his Wife, then take his Wife he being alive: they would rather do Murder, then commit Adultery.  
Another example we have in Gen. 39 of Joseph, who would by no means sin against God in committing Adultery with Potiphar's Wife: although there was no Moral or Positive Law to make Adultery a sin; but only the Law of Nature, or the Rule of right Reason.  
How severely simple Fornication was punished before the Law, by Jacob's two Sons Simeon and Levi, we may read in the 22 of Genesis.  
That Theft was made a Crime by the Law of Nature, may be collected out of Gen. 44. from the passage of Joseph and his Brethren concerning the Cup which was put into Benjamin's sack, etc.  
Add to all these, Jacob's vow of the tenth of all he had unto God, and his obedience to his Father and Mother, which is in the 28 of Genesis. By all which it is evident, that the same Law which was afterwards given by Moses unto the Israelites, had been anciently practised both by the Hebrews and the Egyptians: which was at first written in the Heart of Man, and was connatural unto him; but, by degrees being obliterated, & in process of time almost wholly defaced, it was afterwards engraven upon Tables of Stone; whereby it did change its property: being before, the Law of Nature, which did sweetly incline, and was more arbitrary; but afterwards, it became a positive or Moral Law, strictly commanding, and leaving without excuse. Thus much shall suffice to have spoken concerning the Precepts of Holy Writ. I come now in the last place to demonstrate the rationality of Miracles.  
A Miracle is an effect produced out of the ordinary course of Nature.  
From the notion we have of a Miracle, or from its definition, we may collect, that it is not in the power of any Creature to perform a Miracle: for the course of Nature is a Decree gone out from God; which Decree it is impossible that any should have power to alter, but he that made i●: so that the exhibition of a Miracle, is a rational demonstration, that he that performs the same i● sent of God, and hath hi● power from above. From the observation of the act, we come to the knowledge ●f the agent. We say, That to produce such or ●uch an effect, immediately to turn Water into Wine, or the like, is an action not natural, but supernatural: wherefore the agent cannot possibly be any of the Creatures, but must necessarily be the Creator. Now when the Soul is convinced in Reason, that God is the Agent of Miracles, a Miracle seemeth not strange unto her. For, saith she, He that in the beginning, by hover upon the Waters, could hatch them into Elements, and afterwards could gi' e power and desire to the Elements to sy●●gi●e and copulate, whereby they did generate a●l other Creatures: H● that without materials could erect so stately a Fabric a● is this Universe, may very well in Reason be conceived to be able to perform suchlike actions as are recorded in Scripture by the names of Miracles.  
By this way of argumentation, which is called Regression, even Miracles do melt into Reason, and do become so familiar to the rational Soul, that when she doth consider the circumstances thereof, viz. first, that all Miracles are performed by the Finger of God; and secondly, that there is no Miracle recorded in Scripture which doth imply a contradiction; she ceaseth to admire the same: but wondereth rather, that there should be an Infidel left in the World, or any Soul so dulled with sensuality, or deadened with prejudice, as to lose her Prerogative in not discerning the Truths of Christian Religion with the Eye of Reason.  
FINIS.   

Literato Lectori.  
INterrogas forsan, Lectorum Literatissime, cujus ergo publicitus ederem naucipendulum isthunc De Signaturis Tractatulum: quasi sagacissimos moderni seculi Medicos lateret quicquid est, in re Medicâ, aut notatu dignum, aut observatu insigne.  
Nullus equidem eo inficias versatiores esse nunc dierum omnes in polydaedalae Naturae latifundio, quam olim fuisse, Imò lubens agnosco nunc tandem eò culminis evasisse Artes Scientiasque: ut, si in hâc mundi senectute in vivis superessent qui in Infantiâ ejus vitam traduxerunt, mirarentur valdopere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prae omnibus autem, non mediocre additamentum sortita est Medicina, Scientiis, ex quo cumprimis Aesculapius divi honorem adeptus est tradendo confusa quaedam, & incerta, procul methodo, curandi Morbos programmata. O quam, tunc temporis, tenellula, & in cunis vagiens, Medicina, impos erat peragendi e● quae indies hodie peragu●tur! plurima Galenus & Hypocrates habuêre comperta quae praecedentibus non nota fuerunt: & multa sapuêre Successores eorum quae non innotuerunt illis. Nonnulla nobis patesiunt quae proximum abhinc retrò seculum latuerunt. Verum enim verò, non eam adhuc Medicina tetigit perfectionis metam, ut ulterius perfici nequeat: sed, ut sensim & pedetentim Corpora humana vacillant indies & labascunt; ita paulatim nova suppullulant, ad supplendos Naturae defectus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Sic visum est Providentiae, cui mortalium neminem penes est refragarier. Omnia quidem Naturae sunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sed non nobis omnia. Circulum sang●inis, novum illud chyli receptaculum, ductus lymphaticos, & quicquid est istiusmod●; quicquid casus reperit, aut ingenium invenit, antiquitus Natura tenuit: estò quodlibet Naturae munus suo tempore Mens humana persentiscit. Ad eundem planè modum Natura primitus indidit Corporibus simulachra quaedam, non frustra quidem, sed ut ad vivum depingeret cui inserviunt usui, & quibus pollent facultatibus. Natura primitus sanxivit ut unumquodque Corpus ageret in subjectum sibi Naturà proximum.  
Omnia Corpora semper habuerunt attractricem cum magnete communem, & vice versâ. Natura semper fuit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; quo Nomine nunquam non potis erat indigitandi quomodo Edulia, quomodo pharmaca, quomodo venena vires suas exerunt: viz. eodem ipsissimo modo, putà similitudine quâdam substantiae inter agens & subjectum.  
Haec esse, & semper fuisse, Naturae munera agnoscimus; horum verò observamen quantulumcunque vocamus nostrum: quod non inexperti scripsimus: quare idem tum Rationis, tum Experientiae specillo audacter credimus.  
Ad hanc posteriorem quod attinet, quae j●m pr●ma in lucem prodit, opellam: nemo asserat Theologi magis interesse quam referre nostrâ: Non enim Rationis extravagamur terminos. Quod si Ratio nostra cum fide coinciderit, nihil nobis imputandum esse speramus. Imò potius summae sunt agendae D.O.M. gratiae, qui Animam humanam tam splendide ornavit & i●struxit, ut tam Divinae quam humana sapiendi par esset.  
Hoc unicum, literate Lector, perpendas obsecro: sc. aequè absurdum esse Rationem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 damnare, & Rationem improbandam esse Ratione probare. Vale.  
R. B.   

ERRATA.  
PAg. 7. l. 1. for amalgamated, read amalgamates. p. 10. l. 4. for and, read that. p. 24. l. 18. for acquainued, read acquainted. p. 30. l. 3. for Senicus, read Seincus. p. 51. l. 6. for Gatiopsis, read Galiopsis. p. 60. l. 23. for Figure from, read Figure proceed from. p. 61. l. 1. leave out Bodies.  
Page 5. l. 8. for mortum, read mortuum. p. 24. l. 20. for separted, read separated. p. 25. l. 11. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 32. l. 19 (and in other places) for then, read than. p. 36. l. 6. for invisible, read indivisible. p. 58. l. 5. for assent, read ascent.