REMARKS UPON AN ESSAY CONCERNING Humane Understanding:  
IN A LETTER Addressed to the Author.  
LONDON, Printed for M. Wotton, at the Three Daggers in Fleetstreet. 1697. Price 3 d.   

REMARKS UPON AN ESSAY CONCERNING Humane Understanding.  
SIR,  
I Am always best pleased with that Philosophy, and those Spec●…tions, that have the fairest Aspect upon Morality and Religion, and so I know you are. You know also, that Principles, not inconsistent with these Sacred Things, may yet fall short, or lay no good Foundation for the Proof of them. I should be very willing to be convinced that the Principles of Humane Understanding, as you have represented them in your ingenious Essay, are not of this Nature. I know they are not so intentionally; but according to the best Improvements that I can make of them, I do not find that they will reach so far, as to give us a firm and full Basis for Morality, the certainty of Revealed Religion, and the Immortality of the Soul of Man. I say, I do not find: for it does not follow from thence, that the learned Author cannot make better Deductions from them than I can, and extend them farther, and with more Force. I know, and see by daily Experience, that a Person that hath a particular Genius and Inclination for such and such Principles, or such an Art or Science, can carry it farther than another that has not that Talon. If I had all the Tools and Materials fit for making a good Watch, I cou●…d not make it like an Artist: And therefore I never judge of another Man's Abilities by my own, but by the Proof he gives of his Art and Judgement.  
Your general Principle of picking up all our Knowledge from our ●…ve Senses, I confess does not si●… easily in my Though●…s, tho' you join Reflection to ●…lp us. I think the illiterate part of Mankind (which is far the greatest p●…rt) must have more ●…mpendious ways to know ●…heir Duty, than by long and obscure Deductions. But that is not the Business of this Letter. My Intention, at present, is only to be informed how far all the Principles of that ingenious Essay taken together, will give us a sure Foundation for; Morality, Revealed Religion, and a future Life. As to Morality, we thi●…k the great Foundation of it is, the Distinction of Good and Evil, Virtue and Vice, Turpis & Honesti, as they are usually called: And I do not find that my Eyes, Ears, Nost●…ils, or any other outward Sense●…, make any Distinction of these Things, as they do of Sounds, Colours, 〈◊〉, or other outward Objects; nor from any Ideas taken in from them, or from their Reports, am I conscious that I do conclude, or can conclude, that there is such a Distinction in the Nature of Things; or that it consist, only in Pleasure and Pain, Conveniency 
〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 §. 2  and Inconveniency. I allow that you may infer from Observation and Reason, that such a Distinction is useful to Society and Governments: but so the Politicians say, and that this is the only Bottom of Morality and Religion. Both Divines and Philosophers, you know, make a more immutable and intrinsic Distinction, which is that I cannot make out from your Principles. If this Distinction be a Delusion to us, 'tis such a one as I cannot help or discover: This I am sure of, that the Distinction, suppose of Gratitude and Ingratitude, Fidelity and Infidelity, Justice and Injustice, and such others, is as sudden without any Ratiocination, and as sensible and piercing, as 〈◊〉 difference I feel from the Scent of a Rose, 〈◊〉 of Assa-foetida. 'Tis not like a Theorem, which we come to know by the help of precedent Demonstrations and Postulatums, but it ris●…s as quick as any of our Passions, or as Laughter at the sight of a ridiculous Accident or Object. But I will leave this to your farther Explication: And you having signified, in several parts 
Pag. 294. §. 16.  of your Treatise, that you think Morality as capable of Demonstration, as Mathematics; this gives 
Pag. 314. §. 18.  me reason to suspect that it is not the deficiency 
Pag. 369 §. 8.  of your Principles, but my own short-sightedness, that makes me at a loss, how to discern that Evidence, or make out that Demonstration, from your Grounds.  
You allow, I think, Moral Good and Evil to be such 〈◊〉 to all Human Laws: but you suppose them to be such (if I understand you right) by the Divine Law. To know your Mind farther, give me leave to ask, What is the Reason or Ground of that Divine Law? Whether the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of God. The good of Men, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nature of the Thing●… themselves: If I knew upon which of these three Grounds you 〈◊〉 build ●…our Demonstration of Morality, I could better m●…ke a 〈◊〉 of it. You seem (p. 192. §. 5.) to resolve all into the Will and Power of the Lawmaker: But has the Will of the Lawmaker no Rule to go by? And is not that which is a 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 Will, a Rule also to our●…, and indeed the Original Rule?— But I can 〈◊〉 in this no ●…arther till I see more fully wh●…t your Notion of 〈◊〉 is, and in what Method you pursue it to a Demonstration.  
A●… to Revealed Reli●…, my Diffi●…ulty is only this, how it can be prov●…d from your ●…rinciples, that the Author of the R●…velation i●… 〈◊〉. The Truth of the Revelation, ●…ou know, depends upon the Vera●…ity of the Reveal●…r, and this I think our outward Senses cannot t●…ll us, nor any reflection upon their Ideas. You will say possibly, that Miracles and the completion of Prophecies, are sensible Effects which accompany the Revelation; and from these we infer that the Author of them and it, is powerful and knowing. I allow the Inference so far as it goes, but how do we know from these Effects, That Being to be Veracious as well as Powerful and Knowing? I mean Veracious in all things proposed to us in this way, and in all the Parts and Promises of the Revelation.  
To consider and propose this Matter more at large, 'Tis not enough (as I judge) for our satisfaction, and to establish the certainty of Revealed Religion, that we know the Physical or Metaphysical Attributes of the Divine Nature: we must also know its Moral Attributes, as I may so call them; such as Goodness, Justice, Holiness, and particularly Veracity. Now, these I am not able to deduce or make out from your Principles. You have proved very well an Eternal, All-powerful, and All-knowing-Being: but how this supreme Being will treat us, we cannot be assured from these Attributes. If you say we know that by Revelation, than the Question returns, How do we know the Truth of that Revelation? We must not take it from the Report of that Revelation itself, for than we argue in a Circle: And it must be collected from some other Attributes, than the bare Power and Knowledge of the Revealer.  
If you say Veracity is a Perfection, and consequently must belong to the Nature of God: I think so too according to my Principles: but I do not find that you make use of that Argument, nor do I remember, amongst those many Ideas and Significations of Words, which you have stated and defined, that you have any where told us what Perfection is; what its Idea or Definition. If it be from this Head that you would deduce the Veracity of God, 'tis necessary you should tell us what is to be understood by Perfection in your Way: how it is derived from the Senses, and how it includes Veracity.  
Where you mention the perfections of God, you take no Notice of Veracity. And in that long Catalogue of Ideas, you have given an Account of, I do not perceive, as I said before, that you have any where told us what is the Idea of Perfection, what it contains, or how it is form: though it be a Name and Notion generally received, and of more Importance than many of those Ideas you have so curiously anatomised. And to add that in the last place, not only the Truth of Revelation, but also of our Faculties in other Things, depends upon the Varacity of their Author.  
The Immortality of the Soul, was a third Thing which I could not clear to myself, upon your Principles. You suppose that the Soul may 
〈…〉  be sometimes absolutely without thoughts of one kind or other; and also that God may, if he pleases, 
〈…〉  (for any thing we know by the Light of Nature) give, or have given to some Systems of Matter, a Power to conceive and think. Upon these 
〈…〉  two Suppositions, I could not make out any certain proof of the immortality of the Soul, and am apt to think it cannot be done.  
As to the First: I wonder how you can observe that your Soul sometimes does not think; for when you do observe it, you think. If a man could think and not think at the same time, he might be able to make this Observation. But howsoever that be, I do not understand how the Soul, if she be at any time utterly without Thoughts, what it is that produces the first Thought again, at the end of that unthinking Interval. You say Matter cannot produce a Thought; and you say an unthinking Substance cannot produce a Thought: and I know nothing in (unthinking) Man, but one of these two. What is it then that lights the Candle again, when it is put out? Besides, I am utterly at a loss how to frame any Idea of a dead Soul, or of a Spirit without Life, or Thoughts. What is the Soul when she does not think? what Idea or Definition can you give of her in that State? she must be actually something if she exist. She must then have some Properties whereby she may be defined of described; something whereby she is distinguished from Nothing, and from Matter. Then after all, What Security can we have upon this Supposition, that we shall not fall into this Sleep at Death? and so continue without Life or Thought? And bore being is but the immortality of a senseless Stone. You think also which is more surprising, that Angels sleep by fits. If Angels have Bodies, there may 〈…〉 retence for this: but if they have no Bo 〈…〉 can have no Fumes or Vapours that cause Sleep, nor any waist of Spirits to be recruited. Besides, according to your Opinion we know nothing of Angels but by Revelation, and where does that Revelation tell you that these active Spirits sleep or slumber? or dream, as you and I do sometimes. And after all, the common Difficulty still returns; How they awake, and how they pass from their unthinking State, to a thinking State again; which i●… always to be considered. 
〈…〉  You compare Cogitation in a Spirit, to Motion in a 〈◊〉, and so C●…ssation from Thought in a Spi●…it, mus●… answer to R●…st in a Body. Now, ●…n a 〈◊〉 i●… in R●…st, there must be some Cause to put it into Motion; I inquire therefore ●…t th●… 'Cause i●…, which in the quietism of a .  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…l, I am 〈◊〉 that it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to prove that we have al●… 〈◊〉; for the same thing happens an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for the Actions and ●…hich w●…●…ou'd not fill up with Thoughts, nor ca●…l to mind what we did or mused upon ev●…ry Minu●…e or ●…ur. Many ●…leeting Thoughts pass th●…gh the Soul without Observati●…n, and leave we 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in a sometimes what we had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. I'm sure in one 〈◊〉 this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉, I 〈◊〉 go 〈◊〉 wind up m●… W●…h 〈◊〉, wh●…n I had wound it up not t●…n 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And the same thing may ●…e ob●… in many other 〈◊〉. ●…ay, ●…ven in Matt●…r of imm●…diate s●…nsation, we sometimes do not perceive that which plainly is exposed to our Senses; we overlook a thing that lies before our Eyes, and we seek for that which we hold in our Hands. What does not strike us with some Brisknes●…, we little min●… when 〈◊〉, and les●… remember when past and absent. If while we are awake these things happen to us, methinks it cannot be exp●…cted, that we should att●…nd and re m●…mber all our sl●…py Thoughts, when the In pressions are more dull and faint: The Though●… wand'ring, fortuitous, and commonly inconn●… one with another. When the Impressi●…ns happ●…n to be strong, so as to excite Pain, or Pleasure. o●… any Passion, we remember them, an●… many time●… they awake u●…. But if th●…y are weak, a●… 〈◊〉 they are in Sl●…ep, we think no more of them. But yet it often happens that next Day, or some Days after, some Accident or Discourse brings to our Mind such a Dream; which, without that Occasion, would have q●…ite slipped our Memory, and would never have been recalled or thought of ag●…in. This shows that we may dream of many thi●…g, that we do not remember, without so●…e particul●…r Occasion. The Brain in Sleep i●… moist, something like that of Infants or Children: And you would put a Child to a hard Task, to tell you at Night, all that had passed that Day in his Play or h●…s Talk, and much more in his Thoughts. So I should think you a hard Taskmaster, if you should put us to count to you all the childish Thoughts we had in the silent Night, and in a sound Sleep.  
But to return to the Soul and its Immortality, which is our great Concern. Whether the Soul be, or be not, a distinct Substance from the Body, I do not perceive that her Immortality can be proved by your Principles. If she be not distinct from the Matter of the Body, when that is corrupted and dissolved, 〈◊〉 manifest she must be dissolved also. And if she be a Substance, distinct from Matter, however you say she is sometimes without Thoughts, or any manner of Operation; why then may she not be so (according to this Doctrine) after Death, thoughtless and senseless, and so without Life? 'tis some comfort indeed that we shall at length return to Life at the Resurrection: but I know not how you explain that; nor how far you allow us to be the same Men, and the same Persons then that we are now: If our Bodies be changed, from what they are now, both as to Particles, Shape and Consistency: Unless, I say you will allow the same Soul, with the same Habits and Dispositions, to be the same Man, the same Person, whether its Body be the same or no, I know not how you conceive the Resurrection. But I confess I do not understand what that Discourse about the Identity or Non-identity of the same Man, sleeping and 
pag. 44. 45. 〈◊〉.  waking, and about Castor and Pollux, what I say, it aims at and tends to. You seem to be very 
lib. 2. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉.  nice and scholastic, about the Notions of Homoneity, as I may so say; Personality, and individual Identity or Non-identity: but not seeing what that Discourse drives at, I say no more of it till I have farther Light.  
I proceed now to the second Supposition, which I think weakens the Proof of the Immortality 〈◊〉 the Soul: when you say God may give and may have given, for any thing we know, a thin●…ing Power to Matter, or Perception and Co●…ion to some Systemes of Matter. If thi●… m●…y be don●…, How do we know that it i●… not done? or that our Soul is not Matter? If Matter be capable of such a Power, I do not see w●…y it shou●…d not have it, that every thing ma●… be improv●…d according to its best Capaci●…. And by this means, that Order of Being's, which we call Spirits, wou●…d be superfluous, seeing Matter alone may perform all their Operation, That a Spirit of higher or lower Degree, may think in Matter, all will grant: but that Cogitation shou●…d be a Property or Modi●…ication of Matter itself, that is to me unconceiveab●…e. I can conceive no●…hing in Matter (at present) nor any other ●…inite Being, but Substance, M●…, or Relations; and how Cogitation, or vis Cogit●…, should be (in Matter) any of these, I cannot appreh●…nd, according to the Idea I ●…ve, ●…ither of Matter or Cogitation.  
But there is still a farther Doubt or Difficulty in this Case, even as to the Nature of God and his Immateriality. I'm afraid the Materialists will profit too much from that Notion or Concession, that Matter may think: For, say they, if Matter be capable of thinking, it may have Will and Understanding, and any other Faculty of a thinking Substance, and in any Degree of spiritual Perfection, and consequently may be God; at least we have a fair Chance for it; what it is capable of, it may have fatally, or it may be connate for any thing we know; there being no Contradiction in the Case. You seem to think that Matter is as truly capable of Cogitation, as of Notion: and if one be connate, as we think it may be, the other may be so also.  
They will further argue with you thus. You say you have no Idea of the Substance of Matter, nor know what Properties may flow from it: you do not know then, whether it includes Cogitation, or excludes it? So we have, say they, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a fair Chance for it, seeing you acknowledge that we have no Idea of the Substance of Matter that excludes Cogitation, and consequently the supreme Cogitant-Being may be Matter, for any thing we know.  
Upon the whole, as you seem to acknowledge that ●…our Proof of the Immateriality of the Soul, does 〈◊〉 no higher than Probability; so I'm afraid your Proof of the Immateriality of God, or any Proof that can be deduced from your principles, will rise no higher than Probability. Tho' I think you some where say, that you have demonstrated that God is immaterial. I hearty wish it, and that the Doubts I have suggested only to provoke a clearer Proof, may be effectually satisfied.  
Sir, These are some of those Reflections I made in reading your learned Treatise, and if I have mistaken or misrepresented your mind in any thing, 'tis, I'll assure you, not willingly, nor for want of Respect to the Author,  
SIR, Your most Humble Servant.  
Memorandum,  
I always cite the Third Edition.  
FINIS.   

Printed for Matt. Wotton, at the Three Daggers in Fleetstreet.  
THE Occasional Paper: Number I. Containing an Account of the Author's Design. Together with some Reflections on a Book, Entitled A Letter to the Deists. In a Letter to a Friend.  
The Occasional Paper: Number II. Concerning the late Unfortun●●● Death of J. H—en, Esq With a short Character of him 〈◊〉 Reflection upon the heinousness of the Sin of Self-murder.  
The Occasional Paper: Number III. Being Reflections upon 〈…〉 land's Book, called Christianity not Mysterious: With some Considerations about the Use of Reason in Matters of Religion. In a Letter to a Friend.  
The Occasional Paper: Number iv Containing Reflections on a Book, Entitled, The Lady's Religion; addressed to the Honourable the Lady Howard.  
The Occasional Paper: Number V Containing a Defence of the Ministry and Ministers of the Gospel; against the Suggestions of some late Writers. With a Postscript relating to the Author of The Reasonableness of Christianity.