A SHORT CONSIDERATION OF Mr ERASMUS WARREN's DEFENCE of his EXCEPTIONS Against the THEORY of the EARTH.  
SIR,  
I Have read over Mr. Er. Warren's Defence of his Exceptions against the Theory of the Earth: which, it may be, few will do after me; as not having curiosity or patience enough, to read such a long Pamphlet, of private or little use. Such altercations as these, are to you, I believe, as they are to me, a sort of folly; but the Aggressor must answer for that, who makes the trouble inavoidable to the Defendant. And 'tis an unpleasant exercise: a kind of Wild-goose-chase; where he that leads must be followed, through all his extravagances.  
The Author of this Defence must pardon me, if I have less apprehensions both of his judgement and temper, than I had before. For, as he is too verbose and long-winded ever to make a close reasoner: So it was unexpected to me to find his style so captious and angry, as it is in this last paper. And the same strain continuing to the end, I was sorry to see that his blood had been kept upon the fret, for so many months together, as the Pamphlet was a-making.  
He might have made his work much shorter, without any loss to the Sense. If he had left out his popular enlargements, juvenile excursions, stories and strains of Country-Rhetorick, (whereof we shall give you some instances hereafter) his Book would have been reduced to half the compass. And if from that reduced half; you take away again trifling altercations and pedantic repartees, the remainder would fall into the compass of a few pages. For my part, I am always apt to suspect a man that makes me a long answer: for the precise point to be spoken to, in a multitude of words is easily lost: and words are often multiplied for that very purpose.  
However if his humour be verbose, it might have been, at least, more easy and inoffensive: there having been no provocation given him in that kind. But let us guests, if you please, as well as we can, what it was in the late Answer, that so much discomposed the Excepter and altered his style. Either it must be the words and language of that Answer: or the Sense of it, without respect to the Language. As to the Words, 'tis true, he gives some instances of expressions offensive to him; yet they are but three or four, and those methinks, 
P. 31.  not very high: tho' he calls them 〈◊〉 of passion; they are these indiscreet, rude, injudicious, and uncharitable. These characters, it seems, are applied to the Excepter, in some part of the answer, upon occasion offered. And whether those occasions were just or no, I dare appeal to your judgement. As to the word Rude, which seems the most harsh, I had said indeed, that he was rude to Anaxagoras: and so he was, not to allow him to be a competent witness in matter of fact, whom all Antiquity, sacred and profane, hath represented to us as one of the greatest men amongst the ancients. I had also said in another place, that, a rude, and injudicious defence of Scripture by railing and ill language, is the true way to lessen and disparage it. This I still justify as true, and if he apply it to himself, much good may it do him. I do not remember that it is any where said that he was rude to the Theorist; if it be, 'tis possibly upon occasion of his charging him with Blasphemy, horrid blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, for saying, the Earth was dissolved at the Deluge. And I appeal to any man, whether this is not an uncharitable, and a rude charge. If a man had cursed God, or called our Saviour an Impostor, what could he have been charged with more, than Blasphemy, horrid blasphemy? And if the same things be charged upon a man, for saying, the Earth was dissolved at the Deluge, either all crimes and errors must be equal, or the change must be rude. But however it must be rude in the opinion of the Theorist, who thinks this neither crime nor error.  
What says the Defence of the Exceptions to this? 
p. 1●▪  It makes use of distinctions for mitigation of the censure: and says, it will indirectly, consequentially, or reductively, be of blasphemous importance. Here blasphemy is changed into blasphemous importance, and horrid blasphemy into consequential, etc. But taking all these mitigations, it seems however, according to his Theology, all errors in Religion are blasphemy, or of blasphemous importance. For all errors in Religion must be against Scripture one way or other: at least consequentially, indirectly, or reductively: and all that are so, according to the doctrine of this Author, must be blasphemy or of blasphemous importance. This is crude Divinity, and the Answer had reason to subjoin what we cited before, That, a rude and injudicious defence of Scripture, is the true way to lessen and disparage it.  
Thus much for rude and uncharitable: as for the other two words, indiscreet and injudicious, I cannot easily be induced to make any apology for them. On the contrary, I'm afraid, I shall have occasion to repeat these characters again, especially the latter of them, in the perusal of this Pamphlet. However they do not look like brats of passion, as he calls them: but rather as cool and quiet judgements, made upon reasons and premises. I had forgot one expression more. The answer, it seems, somewhere calls the Excepter a Dabbler in Philosophy, which he takes ill. But that he is a dabbler, both in Philosophy and Astronomy, I believe will evidently appear upon this second examination of the same passages upon which that Character was grounded. We will therefore leave that to the trial, when we come to those passages again, in the following discourse.  
These, Sir, as far as I remember, are the words and expressions which he hath taken notice of, as offensive to him, and effects of passion. But, methinks, these cannot be of force sufficient to put him so much out of humour, and change his style so much, as we find it to be in this last Pamphlet. And therefore I am inclinable to believe, that 'tis the sense rather, than the words or language of the Answer, that hath had this effect upon him: and that some unhappy passages, that have exposed his mistakes, were the true causes of these resentments. Such passages I will guests at, as well as I can, and note them to you as they occur to my memory.  
But give me leave first, upon this occasion of his new way of writing, to distinguish and mind you of three sorts of arguing, which you may call, Reasoning, wrangling, and scolding. In fair reasoning, regard is had to Truth only, not to Victory: let it fall on whether side it will. But in wrangling and scolding, 'tis victory that is pursued and aimed at in the first place, with little regard to truth. And if the contention be managed in civil terms, 'tis but wrangling: if in uncivil, 'tis scolding. I will not so far anticipate your judgement as to rank this Arguer in any of the three orders: if you have patience to read over his Pamphlet, you will best see how and where to set him in his proper place.  
We now proceed to those passages in the answer, which probably have most exasperated the Author of the Exceptions and the Defence. 
Exe. p. 77. etc.  In his Exceptions he had said, The Moon being present, or in her present place in the Firmament, at the time of the Chaos, she would certainly trouble and discompose it, as she does now the waters of the Sea: and, by that means, hinder the formation of the Earth. To this we answered, that the Moon that was made the 4th. day, could not hinder the formation of the Earth, which was made the 3d. day. This was a plain intelligible answer: and at the same time discovered such a manifest blunder in the objection, as could not but give an uneasy thought to him that made it.  
However we must not deny, but that he makes some attempt to shift it off in his Reply: 
Def. p. 12.  For he says, the Earth form the 3d. day, was Moses' Earth, which the Excepter contends for: but the Earth he disputes against, is the Theorist's, which could not be form the 3d. day. He should have added, and therefore would be hindered by the Moon: otherwise this takes off nothing. And now the question comes to a clear state: for when the Excepter says, the Moon would have hindered the formation of the Earth, either he speaks upon Moses' hypothesis, or upon the Theorist's hypothesis. Not upon the Theorist's Hypothesis, 
Ex●. p. 77, 78.  for the Theorist does not suppose the Moon present then. And if he speaks upon Moses' Hypothesis, 
Def. p. 73. lin. 12, 13.  the Moon that was made the 4th. day, must have hindered the formation of the Earth the 3d. day. So that the objection is a blunder upon either Hypothesis.  
Furthermore, whereas he suggests that the Answerer makes use of Moses' hypothesis to confute his adversary, but does not follow it himself: 'Tis so far true, that the Theorist never said that Moses's six-days Creation was to be understood literally, but however it is justly urged against those that understand it literally, and they must not contradict that interpretation which they own and defend.  
So much for the Moon, and this first passage, which I suppose was troublesome to our Author. But he makes the same blunder, in another place, as to the Sun. Both the Luminaries, it seems, stood in his way. In the 10th. Chapter of his Exceptions, he gives us a new Hypothesis about the Origin of Mountains: which, in short, is this, that they were drawn or sucked out of the Earth by the influence and instrumentality of the Sun. Whereas the Sun was not made, according to Moses, till the 4th. day, and the Earth was formed the 3d. day. 'Tis an unhappy thing to split twice upon the same rock, and upon a rock so visible. He that can but reckon to four, can tell whether the 3d. day, or 4th. day, came sooner.  
To cure this Hypothesis about the Origin of Mountains, 
P. 97, 98, 99▪ 100, 101▪  he takes great pains in his Defence, and attempts to do it chiefly by help of a distinction: dividing Mountains into Maritime and Inland. Now 'tis true, says he, These maritime Mountains, and such as were made with the hollow of the Sea, must rise when that was sunk or depressed: namely, the 3d. day. Yet Inland ones, he says, might be raised some earlier, and some later: and by the influence of the Sun. This is a weak and vain attempt to defend his notion; for, besides that this distinction of Maritime and Inland Mountains, as arising from different causes, and at different times, is without any ground, either in Scripture or reason: if their different origin was admitted, the Sun's extracting these Inland Mountains out of the Earth, would still be absurd and incongruous upon other accounts.  
Scripture, I say, makes no such distinction of Mountains, made at different times and from different causes. This is plain, seeing Moses does not mention Mountains at all in his six-days Creation: nor any where else, till the Deluge. What authority have we then to make this distinction: or to suppose that all the great Mountains of the Earth were not made together? Besides, what length of time would you require, for the production of these Inland Mountains? were they not all made within the six-days Creation? hear what Moses says at the end of the 6th. day. Thus the Heavens and the Earth were finished, 
Gen. c. 21.  and all the host of them. And on the 7th. day, God ended his work which he had made. Now if the Excepter say, that the Mountains were all made within these six-days, we will not stand with him for a day or two: for that would make little difference as to the action of the Sun. But if he will not confine their production to Moses' six days, how does he keep to the Mosaical Hypothesis? or how shall we know where he will stop, in his own way? for if they were not made within the six days, for any thing he knows, they might not be made till the Deluge; seeing Scripture no where mentions Mountains before the Flood.  
And as Scripture makes no distinction of Maritime and Inland Mountains, so neither hath this distinction any foundation in Nature or Reason. For there is no apparent or discernible difference betwixt Maritime and Inland Mountains, nor any reason why they should be thought to proceed from different causes, or to be raised at different times. The Maritime Mountains are as rocky, as ruderous, and as irregular and various in their shape and posture, as the Inland Mountains. They have no distinctive characters, nor any different properties, internal or external: in their matter, form, or composition: that can give us any ground to believe, that they came from a different Original. So that this distinction is merely precarious, neither founded in Scripture nor reason: but made for the nonce to serve a turn.  
Besides, what bounds will you give to these Maritime Mountains? are they distinguished from Inland Mountains barely by their distance from the Sea, or by some other Character? If barely by distance, tell us then how far from the Sea do the Maritime Mountains reach, and where do the Inland begin, and how shall we know the Terminalis Lapis? Especially in a continued chain of Mountains, that reach from the Sea many hundreds of miles Inland: as the Alps from the Ocean to Pontus Euxinus, 
Def. p. ●●●.  and Taurus, as he says, fifteen hundred miles in length, from the Chinese Ocean to the Sea of Pamphylia. In such an uninterrupted Ridge of Mountains, where do the Land-Mountains end, and the Sea-mountains begin? Or what mark is there, whereby we may know that they are not all of the same race, or do not all spring from the same original? Such obvious inquiries as these, show sufficiently, that the distinction is merely arbitrary and fictitious.  
But suppose this distinction was admitted, and the Maritime Mountains made the 3d. day, but Inland Mountains I know not when: the great difficulty still remains, How the Sun reared up these Inland Mountains afterwards. Or if his power be sufficient for such effects, why have we not Mountains made still to this day? seeing our Mountain-maker the Sun is still in the Firmament, and seems to be as busy at work, as ever. The Defender hath made some answer to this question, 
Def. p. 99  in these words, The question is put, why have we no Mountains made now? It might as well have been asked, says he, why does not the fire make a dough-baked loaf swell and ●uff up? And, he says, this answer must be satisfactory to the question propounded. It must be, that is, for want of a better: for otherwise this Dowe-comparison is unsatisfactory upon many accounts. First, there was no ferment in the Earth, as in this Dowe-cake: at least it is not proved, or made appear, that there was any. Nay, in the Exceptions, when this Hypothesis was proposed, there was no mention at all made of any ferment or leaven in the Earth: but the effect was wholly imputed to Vapours and the Sun. But to supply their defects, he now ventures to add the word fermentive, as he calls it. 
Ibid lin. 19  A fermentive, flatulent principle, which heaved up the Earth, as Leaven does Dowe. But, besides, that this is a mere groundless and gross Postulatum, to suppose any such leaven in the Earth; if there had been such a principle, it would have swollen the whole mass uniformly, heaved up the exterior region of the Earth every where, and so not made Mountains, but a swollen bloated Globe.  
This Sir, is a 2d. passage, which I thought might make the Defender uneasy. We proceed now to a 3d. and 4th. in his Geography and Astronomy. In the 14th. 
P. 289.  Chapter of his Exceptions, speaking of the change of the situation of the Earth, from a right posture to an oblique, he says, according to the Theory, the Ecliptic in the Primitive Earth, was its Equinoctical now. This, he is told by the Answer, is a great mistake; namely, to think that the Earth, when it changed its situation, changed its poles and circles. What is now replied to this? He speaks against a change, says the Defence, in the poles and circles of the Earth; A needless trouble, and occasioned by his own oversight. For had he but looked into the Erratas, he might have seen there, that these parentheses, upon which he grounded what he says, should have been left out. So this is acknowledged an Erratum, it seems, but an erratum Typographicum; not in the sense, but only in the parentheses, which, he says, should have been left out. Let us then lay aside the Parentheses, and the sentence stands thus, For under the Ecliptic, which in the primitive situation of the Earth, according to the Theory, was its Equinoctial: and divided the Globe into two Hemispheres, as the Equator does now. The dry ground, etc. How does this altar or mend the sense? It is not still as plainly affirmed, as before, that, according to the Theory, the Ecliptic in the Primitive Earth was its Equinoctial? And the same thing is supposed throughout all this Paragraph. 
Ex●. p. 289, 290.  And if he will own the truth, and give things their proper name▪ 'tis downright ignorance or a gross mistake in the doctrine of the Sphere, which he would first father upon the Theory, and then upon the parentheses.  
And this leads me to a 4th. passage, much-what of the same nature, where he would have the Earth to have been translated out of the Aequator into the Ecliptic, and to have changed the line of its motion about the Sun, when it changed its situation. His words are these, 
Ex●. p. 158, 159.  So that in her annual motion about the Sun, she, namely, the Earth before her change of situation, was carried directly under the Equinoctial. This is his mistake. The Earth moved in the Ecliptic, both before and after her change of situation: for the change was not made in the Circle of her motion about the Sun, but in her posture or inclination in the same Circle. Whereas he supposes that the shifted both posture, 
Ibid. p. 159.  and also her circuit about the Sun, as his words are in the next paragraph. But we shall have occasion to reflect upon this again in its proper place. We proceed now to another Astronomical mistake.  
A 5th. passage, which probably might disquiet him, is his false argumentation at the end of the 8th. chap. concerning Days and Months. 
Exc. p. 187.  He says there, if the natural days were longer towards the Flood, than at first: (which no body however affirms) fewer than thirty would have made a month: whereas the duration of the Flood is computed by months consisting of thirty days apiece: therefore, says he, they were no longer than ordinary. This argumentation the Answer told him, was a mere paralogism, or a mere blunder. For 30 days are 30 days, whether they are longer or shorter: and Scripture does not determine the length of the days. There are several pages spent in the Defence, to get off this blunder: 
P. 78, 79, 80, 81.  Let's here how he begins: Tho' Scripture does not limit or account for the length of days expressly, yet it does it implicitly, and withal very plainly and intelligibly. This is denied, and if he make this out, that Scripture does very plainly and intelligibly determine the length of days at the Deluge, and makes them equal with ours at present, then, I acknowledge, he hath removed the blunder: otherwise it stands the same, unmoved and unmended. Now observe how he makes this out; For, says he, Scripture gives us to understand, that days before the Flood were of the same length that they are of now, BY INFORMING US, that months and years, which were of the same length then, that they are of at present, were made up of the same number of days. Here the blunder is still continued, or, at best, it is but transferred from days to months, or from months to years. He says, Scripture informs us that months and years were of the same length then, that they are of at present. If he mean by the same length, the same number of days, he relapses into the old blunder, and we still require the length of those days. But if Scripture informs us that the months and years at the Flood, were of the same length that they are of now, according to any absolute and known measure, distinct from the number of days, than the blunder is saved. Let's see therefore by whether of these two ways he proves it in the next words, which are these, For how could there be just 12 months in the year, at the time of the Deluge: and 30 days in each of those months, if days than had not consisted, as they do now, of 24 hours a piece. We allow a day might then consist of 24 hours, if the distinction of hours was so ancient. But what then, the question returns concerning the length of those hours as it was before concerning the length of the days: and this is either idem per idem, or the same error in another instance. If you put but hours in the place of days, the words of the Answer have still the same force: Twenty four hours were to go to a day, whether the hours were longer or shorter: and Scripture does not determine the length of the hours. This, you see, is still the same case, and the same paralogism hangs upon both instances.  
But he goes on still in this false tract, in these words: And as Providence hath so ordered nature, that days (that depend upon its diurnal motion) should be measured by circumgyrations of the Earth.— So it hath taken care that each of these circumrotations should be performed in 24 hours: and consequently that every day should be just so long that 30 of them (in way of round reckoning) might complete a month. Admit all this, that 30 days complete a month. Still if Scripture hath not determined the length of those days, nor the slowness or swiftness of the circumgyrations that make them, it hath not determined to us the length of those months, nor of the years that depend upon them. This one would take to be very intelligible: yet he goes on still in the same maze, thus, But now had the circumgyrations of the Earth grown more slow towards the Deluge (by such causes as the Excepter suggested) so as every day had consisted of 30 hours, etc. But how so, I pray? This is a wild step: why 30 hours? where does Scripture say so: or where does the Theorist say so? We say the Day consisted then as now of 24 hours, whether the hours were longer or shorter: and that Scripture hath not determined the length of those hours, nor consequently of those days, nor consequently of those months, nor consequently of those years. So, after all this ado, we are just where we were at first, namely, That Scripture not having determined the absolute length of any one, you cannot by that determine the length of any other. And by his shifting and multiplying instances, he does but absurda absurdis accumulare, ne perpluant.  
We offered before, in our Answer, to give the Excepter some light into his mistake: by distinguishing in these things, what is absolute from what is relative: the former whereof, cannot, under these or any such like circumstances, be determined by the latter. For instance; A man hath ten children, and he will not say absolutely and determinately what portion he will give with any one of them: but he says, I will give my eldest child a tenth part more than my 2d, and my second a 9th. part more than my 3d, and my third an 8th. part more than my 4th; and so downwards in proportion, to the youngest. Not telling you, in any absolute sum, what money he will give the youngest, or any other: you cannot by this tell what portion the man will give with any of his children. I leave you to apply this, and proceed to a nearer instance, by comparing the measures of Time and Longitude. If you know how many inches make a foot, how many feet a pace, how many paces a mile, etc. you cannot by these numbers determine the absolute quantity of any one of the foresaid measures, but only their relative quantity as to one another. So if Scripture had determined, of how many hours a Day consisted: of how many days a Month: of how many months a Year: you could not by this alone determine the absolute duration or quantity of any one of these, nor whether they were longer or shorter than our present hours, days, months, or years. And therefore, I say still, as I said at first, 30 days are 30 days, whether they are longer or shorter: and 30 circumgyrations of the Earth, are 30, whether they be slower or swifter. And that no Scripture-proof can be made from this, either directly or consequentially, that the days before the Flood, were or were not, longer than they are at present. But we have been too long upon this head.  
We proceed now from his Astronomy to his Philosophy. 
P. 38.  'Twas observed in the Answer, that the Excepter in the beginning of the 9th. Chap. supposed Terrestrial Bodies to have a nitency inwards, or downwards towards the Centre. This we noted as a false principle in Philosophy: and to rectify his mistake, he now replies, That he understood that expression only of self-central and quiescent Bodies. 
Def. p. 82.  Whereas in truth, the question he was speaking to, was about a fluid Body turning upon its Axis. But however let us admit his new sense, his principle, I'm afraid, will still need rectification; namely, he affirms now, that Quiescent Earthly Bodies are impregnated with a nitency inward, or downward towards the Centre. I deny also this reformed principle; if Bodies be turned round, they have a nitency upwards, or from the Centre of their motion. If they be not turned round, nor moved, but quiescent, they have no nitency at all, neither upwards nor downwards: but are indifferent to all lines of motion, according as an external impulse shall carry them, this way or that way. So that his impregnation with a nitency downwards, is an occult and fictitious quality, which is not in the nature of Bodies, whether in motion or in rest. The truth is, The Author of the Exceptions makes a great flutter about the Cartesian Philosophy, and the Copernican Systeme, but the frequent mistakes he commits in both, give a just suspicion that he understands neither.  
Lastly, we come to the grand discovery of a Fifteen-Cubit-Deluge, which, it may be, was as uneasy to him upon second thoughts, as any of the rest: at least one would guests so, by the changes he hath made in his Hypothesis. For he hath now, in this Defence, 
P. 181, 182.  reduced the Deluge to a destruction of the world by Famine, rather than by drowning. I do not remember in Scripture any mention made of Famine in that great judgement of water brought upon mankind, but he thinks he hath found out something that favours his opinion: namely, that a good part of mankind at the Deluge, were not drowned, but starved for want of victuals. And the argument is this, because in the story of the Deluge, men are not said to be drowned, but to perish, die or be destroyed. But are they said any where in the story of the Deluge, to have been famished? 
Gen. 6. 17.  And when God says to Noah, I will bring a 'slud of waters upon the Earth, to destroy all flesh, Does it not plainly signify, that that destruction should be by drowning? But however let us hear our Author: when he had been making use of this new Hypothesis of starving, to take off some arguments urged against his fifteen-cubit Deluge (particularly, that it would not be sufficient to destroy all mankind) he adds these words by way of proof. 
Def. p. 182.  And methinks there is one thing which seems to insinuate, that a good part of the Animal world might perhaps come to an end thus: by being driven to such straits by the over flowing waters, as to be FAMISHED or STARVED to death. The thing is this, in the story of the Deluge, it is no where said of men and living creatures, that they were drowned, but they died, or were destroyed. Those that are drowned are destroyed, I imagine, as well as those that are starved: so this proves nothing. But that the destruction here spoken of, was by drowning, seems plain enough, both from God's words to Noah before the Flood, and by his words after the Flood, when he makes his Covenant with Noah▪ in this manner: 
Gen. 9 ●●  I will establish my Covenant with you, neither shall all flesh be cut off any more by the waters of a Flood. Now to be cut off, or destroyed by the waters of a Flood, is, methinks, to be drowned. And I take all flesh to comprehend the Animal World, or at least, all mankind. Accordingly our Saviour says, Matt. 24. 39 in Noah's time, the flood came, and took them all away: namely, all mankind.  
This is one Expedient our Author hath found out, to help to bear off the inconveniences that attend his fifteen-cubit Deluge: namely, by converting a good part of it into a Famine. But he hath another Expedient to join to this, by increasing the Waters: and that is done, by making the Common Surface of the Earth, or the highest parts of it, as he calls them, to signify ambiguously, 
Def. 165. & 180.  or any height that pleases him; and consequently fifteen Cubits above that, signifies also what height he thinks fit. But in reality, there is no surface common to the Earth, but either the exterior surface, whether it be high or low: or the ordinary level of the Earth, as it is a Globe or convex Body. If by his common surface he mean the exterior surface, that takes in Mountains as well as Low-lands, or any other superficial parts of the Earth. And therefore if the Deluge was fifteen Cubits above this common surface, it was fifteen Cubits above the highest Mountains, as we say it was. But if by the common surface he mean the common level of the Earth, as it is a Globular or convex Body, than we gave it a right name when we called it the ordinary level of the Earth: namely, that level or surface that lies in an equal convexity with the surface of the Sea. And his fifteen Cubits of water from that level, would never drown the World. Lastly, If by the common surface of the Earth, he understand a 3d. surface, different from both these, he must define it, and define the height of it: that we may know how far this fifteen-cubit Deluge rise, from some known basis. One known basis is the surface of the Sea, and that surface of the Land that lies in an equal convexity with it: tell us then if the waters of the Deluge were but fifteen Cubits higher than the surface of the Sea, that we may know their height by some certain and determinate measure, and upon that examine the Hypothesis. But to tell us they were fifteen Cubits above, not the Mountains or the Hills, but the Highlands, or the highest parts of the common surface of the Earth, and not to tell us the height of these highest parts from any known basis: nor how they are distinguished from Hills and Mountains, which incur our senses, and are the measures given us by Moses: This, I say, is but to cover his Hypothesis with ambiguities, when he had made it without grounds: and to leave room to set his Water-mark higher or lower, as he should see occasion or necessity. And of this indeed we have an instance in this land Pamphlet, for he has raised his Water-mark there, more than an hundred Cubits higher than it was before. In his Exceptions he said, 
P. 300.  not that the waters were no where higher than just fifteen Cubits, above the ground, they might in most places be thirty, forty, or fifty Cubits higher. But in his Defence he says, 
P. 180.  the Waters might be an hundred or two hundred Cubits higher, than the general ordinary plain of the Earth. Now what security have we, but that in the next Pamphlet, they may be 500 or a 1000 Cubits higher than the ordinary surface of the Earth.  
This is his 2d. Expedient, raising his Water-mark indefinitely. But if these two methods be not sufficient to destroy Mankind, and the animate World, he hath yet a third, which cannot fail: and that is, Destroying them by Evil Angels. 
Def. p. 90.  Flectere si nequeo. This is his last refuge; to which purpose he hath these words, When Heaven was pleased to give Satan leave, he caused the fire to consume Job's sheep, and caused the wind to destroy his Children. And how easily could these spirits, that are ministers of God's vengeance, have made the waters of the Flood fatal to those Creatures that might have escaped them, if any could have done it? As suppose an Eagle, or a Falcon: The Devil and his crew catcht them all, and held their moses under water. However, methinks, this is not fair play, to deny the Theorist the liberty to make use of the ministry of good Angels, when he himself makes use of evil Spirits.  
These, Sir, and such like passages, where the notions of the Excepter have been exposed, were the causes, I imagine, of his angry reply. Some Creatures, you know, are more fierce after they are wounded: and some upon a gentle chase will fly from you, but if you press them and put them to extremities, they turn and fly in your face. I see by our Author's example, how easily, in these personal altercations, reasoning degenerates into wrangling, and wrangling into scolding However, if I may judge from these two Hypotheses which he hath made, about the rise of Mountains, and a fifteen-cubit Deluge, of all trades I should never advise him to turn Hypothesis-maker. It does not seem at all to lie to his hand, and things never thrive that are undertaken, Diis iratis, genioque sinistro.  
But as we have given you some account of this Author's Philosophical notions, so it may be you will expect that we should entertain you with some pieces of his wit and eloquence. The truth is, he seems to delight and value himself upon a certain kind of Country-wit and popular eloquence, and I will not grudge you the pleasure of enjoying them both, in such instances as I remember. Speaking in contempt of the Theory and the Answer, (which is one great subject of his wit) he expresses himself thus: But if arguments be so weak, 
Def. p. 48.  that they will fall with a fillip, why should greater force be used to beat them down? To draw a Rapier to stab a Fly; or to charge a Pistol to kill a Spider; I think would be preposterous. I think so too, in this we're agreed. In another place, being angry with the Theorist, that he would not acknowledge his errors to him, he hath these words, 'Tis unlucky for one to run his head against a post: 
P. 108.  But when he hath done, if he will say he did not do it, and stand in and defend what he says: 'tis a sign he is as senseless as he was unfortunate: and is fitter to be pitied than confuted. This wit, it may be, you'll say, is downright clownery. The truth is, when I observed, in reading his Pamphlet, the courseness of his repartees, and of that sort of wit wherein he deals most and pleases himself, it often raised in my mind, whether I would or no, the Idea of a Pedant: Of one that had seen little of the World, and thought himself much wittier and wiser than others would take him to be. I will give you but one Instance more of his rustical wit: Telling the Theorist of an itch of writing: 
P. 214.  Methinks, says he, he might have laid that prurient humour, by scratching himself with the briers of a more innocent controversy: or by SCRUBBING SOUND against something else than the holy Scripture. He speaks very sensibly, as if he understood the disease, and the way of dealing with it. But I think Holy Scripture does not come in well upon that occasion.  
All this is nothing, Sir, in comparison of his popular eloquence. See with what alacrity he runs it off hand, in a similitude betwixt Adam and a Lord Lieutenant of a County. 
P. 113.  When the King makes a Gentleman Lord-Lieutenant of a County, by virtue of his Commission is he presently the strongest man that is in it? Does it enable him to encounter whole Regiments of Soldiers in his single person? Does it empower him to carry a Cannon upon his neck? Or when the great Gun is fired off, to catch the Bullet as it flies, and put it up in his Pocket? So when God gave Adam dominion over the Fowls, did he mean that he should dive like a Duck, or soar like a Falcon? that he should swim as naturally as the Swan, and hunt the Kite, or Hobby, as Boys do the Wren? Did he mean that he should hang up Ostritches in a Cage, as people do Linnets: or fetch down the Eagles to feed with his Pullen, and make them perch with his Chickens in the Hen-roost?  
So much for the Fowls, now for the Fish. When God gave Adam dominion over the Sea, 
〈◊〉  was he to be able to dwell at the bottom, or to walk on the top of it? To drain it as a Ditch, or to take all its Fry at once in a Dragnet? Was he to snare the Shark, as we do young Pickarels: or to bridle the Sea-Horse, and ride him for a Pad? Or to put a slip upon the Crocodile's neck, and play with him as with a Dog? etc. Sir, I leave it to you, as a more competent Judge, to set a just value upon his gifts and elocution. For my part, to speak freely, Dull sense, in a fantastic style, is to me doubly nauseous.  
But lest I should cloy you with these luscious harangues, I will give you but one more: and 'tis a miscellany of several pieces of Wit together. Should twenty Mariners, 
Def. p. ●.  says he, confidently affirm, that they sailed in a Ship from Dover to Calis, by a brisk gale out of a pair of Bellows: Or if forty Engineers should positively swear, that the Powder-mill near London, was late blown up, by a Mine then sprung at Great Waradin in Hungary, must they not be grievously perjured persons?— Or if the Historian that writes the Peloponnesian war, had told that the Soldiers who fell in it, fought only with Sun beams, and single Currants which grew thereabouts, and that hundreds and thousands were stabbed with the one, and knocked on the head with the other: who would believe that ever there were such weapons in that war; that ever there was such a fatal war in that Country? even so, etc. These, Sir, are flights and reaches of his Pen, which I dare not censure, but leave them to your judgement.  
Thus much is to give you a taste only of his wit and eloquence: and if you like it, you may find more of the same strain, here and there, in his writings. I have only one thing to mind him of, That he was desired by the Theorist to write in Latin (if he was a Scholar) as being more proper for a subject of this nature. 
Eng. Theo. p. 287.  If he had owned and followed that character, I'm apt to think it would have prevented a great many impertinencies: His tongue probably would not have been so flippant in popular excursions and declamations, as we now find it. Neither is this any great presumption or rashness of judgement, if we may guests at his skill in that Language by his translations, here and there. Cum plurimâ religione is rendered with the principles of their Religion. 
Excep. p. 293.  And if he say he followed Sir W. Raleigh in his translation, he that follows a bad translator without correction or notice, is supposed to know no better himself. And this will appear the more probable, if we consider another of his translations, in this present work. Rei personam he translates the Representation of the things: instead of the person of the Guilty: or the person of him that is Reus not Actor. And in this, I dare say, he was seduced by no example. But lest we should be thought to misrepresent him, take his own words, 
Def. p. 168, 169.  such as they are. Yea, though it was spoken never so positively, it was but to set forth REI PERSONAM: to make the more full and lively representation of the supposed thing. Here, you see, he hath made a double blunder, first, in jumbling together person and thing: then, if they could be jumbled together, rei persona would not signify the full and lively representation of the thing, but rather a disguise or personated representation of the thing. However I am satisfied from these instances, that he had good reason, notwithstanding the caution or desire of the Theorist to the contrary, to write his Books in his Mother's tongue.  
Thus we have done with the first part: which was to mark out such passages, as we thought might probably have inflamed the Author's style in this reply. When men are resolved not to own their faults, you know there is nothing more uneasy and vexatious to them, than to see them plainly discovered and exposed. We must now give you some account of the contents of his Chapters, so far as they relate to our subject. Chap. 1st. Nothing. Chap. 2d. is against extraordinary providence: or that the Theorist should not be permitted to have recourse to it upon any occasion. This recourse to extraordinary providence being frequently objected in other places, and of use to be distinctly understood: we will speak of it apart at the latter end of the Letter. Chap. 3. is about the Moon's hindering the formation of the Earth before she was formed herself, or in our neighbourhood; as we have noted before. Another thing in this Chap. is his urging, Oily or Oleagineous particles not to have been in the Chaos, but made since. I'll give a short answer to this: Either there was or was not, Oleagineous matter in the new-made Earth, (I mean in its superficial region.) when it came first out of a Chaos? If there was, there was also in the Chaos, out of which that Earth was immediately made. And if there was no oleagineous matter in the new-made Earth, how came the soil to be so fertile, so fat, so unctuous? I say not only fertile, but particularly fat and unctuous: for he uses these very words frequently in the description of that soil. 
Exc. p. 211.  And all fat and unctuous liquors are oleagineous: 
Def. p. 69, & p. 98.  and accordingly we have used those words promiscuously, in the description of that Region: (Eng. Theor. Chap. 5.) understanding only such unctuous liquors as are lighter than water and swim above it, and consequently would stop and entangle the terrestrial particles in their fall or descent. And seeing such unctuous and oleagineous particles were in the new-made Earth, they must certainly have been in the matter out of which it was immediately formed, namely, in the Chaos. All the rest of this Chapter we are willing to leave in its full force: apprehending the Theory, or the Answer, to be in no danger from such argumentations or reflections.  
The 4th. Chap. is very short and hath nothing argumentative The 5th. Chap. is concerning the cold in the circumpolar parts, which was spoken to in the Answer sufficiently, and we stand to that. What is added about extraordinary providence, will be treated of in its proper place. The 6th. Chap. is also short, against this particular, that it is not safe to argue upon suppositions actually false. And I think there needs no more to prove it, than what was said in the Answer. Chap. 7. is chiefly about texts of Scripture, concerning which I see no occasion of saying any more than what is said in the Review of the Theory. He says (p. 49.) that the Theorist catches himself in a trap, by allowing that Ps. 33. 7. is to be understood of the ordinary posture of the waters, and yet applying it to their extraordinary posture under the vault of the Earth. But that was not an extraordinary posture according to the Theorist, but their natural posture in the first Earth. Yet I allow the expression might have been better thus, in a level or spherical convexity, as the Earth. He interprets 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (p. 53.) which we render the Garden of the Lord, not to be Paradise, but any pleasant Garden; 
Gen. 13. 10.  yet gives us no authority, either of ancient Commentator or Version, for this novel and paradoxical interpretation. The Septuagint render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The Vulgate, Paradisus Domini: and all ancient Versions that I have seen render it to the same sense. Does he expect then that his single word and authority, should countervail all the ancient Translators and Interpreters? To the last place alleged by the Theorist, Prov. 8. 28. he says the Answerer charges him unjustly that he understands by that word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no more than the rotundity or spherical figure of the Abyss. Which, he says, is a point of nonsense. I did not think the charge had been so high however, seeing some Interpreters understand it so. But if he understand by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the banks or shores of the Sea, than he should have told us how those banks or shores are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 super faciem Abyssi, as it is in the Text.  
Pag. 59 He says the Excepter does not misrepresent the Theorist when he makes him to affirm the construction of the First Earth to have been merely mechanical; and he citys to this purpose two places, which only prove, that the Theorist made use of no other causes, nor see any defect in them, but never affirmed that these were the only causes. You may see his words to this purpose expressly, Engl. Theor. p. 65. whereof the Excepter was minded in the Answer, 
P. 60.  p. 3. In the last Paragraph of this Chapter, if he affirms any thing, he will have the Pillars of the Earth to be understood literally. Where then, pray, do these Pillars stand that bear up the Earth? or if they bear up the Earth, what bears them up? what are their Pedestals, or their foundations? But he says Hypotheses must not regulate Scripture, though in natural things, but be regulated by it, and by the letter of it. I would gladly know then, how his Hypothesis of the motion of the Earth, is regulated by Scripture, and by the letter of it. And he unhappily gives an instance just contrary to himself, namely, of the Anthropomorphites: for they regulate natural reason and philosophy by the letter or literal sense of Scripture, and therein fall into a gross error. Yet we must not call the Author injudicious, for fear of giving offence.  
The 8th. Chap. 
Ibid.  begins with the Earth's being carried directly under the Equinoctial, before its change of situation: without any manner of obliquity in her site, or declination towards either of the Tropics in HER COURSE. Here you see, when the Earth changed its situation, it changed, according to his Astronomy, two things: its site, and its course; its site upon its axis, and its course in the heavens. And so he says again in the next paragraph, put the case the Earth shift her posture, and also her CIRCVIT about the Sun, in which she persisted till the Deluge. Here is plainly the same notion repeated: that the Earth changed not only its site, but also its road or course about the Sun. And in consequence of this he supposes its course formerly to have been under the Equinoctial, and now under the Ecliptic: it being translated out of the one into the other, at its change. Yet he seems now to be sensible of the absurdity of this doctrine, and therefore will not own it to have been his sense: 
P. 61.  and as an argument that he meant otherwise, he alleges, that he declared before, that by the Earth's ritght situation to the Sun, is meant that the axis of the Earth was always kept in a parallelism to that of the Ecliptic. But what's this to the purpose? This speaks only of the site of the Earth, whereas his error was in supposing its course or annual orbit about the Sun, as well as its site upon its own axis, to have been different, and changed at the Deluge: as his words already produced against him, plainly testify.  
What follows in this Chapter is concerning the perpetual Equinox. And as to the reasoning part of what he says in defence of his Exceptions, we do not grudge him the benefit of it, let it do him what service it can. And as to the Historical part, he will not allow a witness to be a good witness as to matter of fact, if he did not assign true causes of that matter of fact. To which I only reply, tho' Tiverton Steeple was not the cause of Goodwin sands, as the Kentish men thought, yet their testimony was so far good, That there were such Sands, and such a Steeple. He also commits an error as to the nature of Tradition. When a Tradition is to be made out, it is not expected that it should be made appear that none were ignorant of that Tradition in former Ages: or that all that mentioned it, understood the true grounds and extent of it: but 'tis enough to show the plain footsteps of it in Antiquity, as a Conclusion, tho' they did not know the reasons and premises upon which it depended. For instance, The Conflagration of the world is a doctrine of Antiquity, traditionally delivered from age to age: but the Causes and manner of the Conflagration, they either did not know, or have not delivered to us. In like manner, that the first age and state of the world was without change of Seasons, or under a perpetual Equinox, of this we see many footsteps in Antiquity, amongst the Jews, Christians, Heathens: Poets, Philosophers; but the Theory of this perpetual Equinox, the causes and manner of it, we neither find, nor can reasonably expect, from the Ancients. So much for the Equinox.  
This Chapter, as it begun with an error, so it unhappily ends with a paralogism: namely, that, because 30 days made a month at the Deluge, therefore those days were neither longer nor shorter than ours are at present. Tho' we have sufficiently exposed this before yet one thing more may be added, in answer to his confident conclusion, in these words; But to talk, as the Answerer does, that the Month should be lengthened by the Days being so, is a fearful blunder indeed. For let the days (by slackening the Earth's diurnal motion) have been never so long, yet (its annual motion continuing the same) the Month must needs have kept its usual length: only fewer days would have made it up. 'Tis not usual for a Man to persevere so confidently in the same error; As if the intervals of time, hours, days, months, years, could not be proportionably increased: so as to contain one another in the same proportion they did before, and yet be every one increased as to absolute duration. Take a Clock, for instance, that goes too slow: The circuit of the Dial-plate is 12. hours, let these represent the 12▪ Signs in his Zodiac: and the hand to be the Earth that goes through them all: and consequently the whole circuit of the Dial-plate represents the Year▪ Suppose, as we said, this Clock to go too slow, this will not hinder but still fifteen minutes make a quarter, in this Clock: four quarters make an hour, and 12. hours the whole circuit of the Dial-plate. But every one of these intervals will contain more time than it did before, according to absolute duration, or according to the measure of another Clock that does not go too slow. This is the very case which he cannot or will not comprehend: but concludes thus in effect, that because the hour consists still of four quarters in this Clock, therefore it is no longer than ordinary.  
The 9th. Chapter also begins with a false notion▪ that Bodies quiescent (as he hath now altered the case) have a nitency downwards. Which mistake we rectified before, if he please. Then he proceeds to the Oval figure of the Earth. And many flourishes and harangues are made here to little purpose. For he goes upon a false supposition, that the Waters of the Chaos were made Oval by the weight or gravitation of the Air. A thing that never came into the words or thoughts of the Theorist. Yet upon this supposition he runs into the deserts of Bilebulgerid, 
Def. p. ●● 86.  and the waters of Mare deal Zur: Words that make a great noise, but to no effect. If he had pleased he might have seen the Theorist made no use of the weight of the Air upon this occasion, by the instance he gave of the pressure of the Moon, and the flux of the waters by that pressure. Which is no more done by the gravitation of the Air, than the Banks are pressed, in a swift current and narrow channel, by the gravitation of the water. But he says rarefied Air makes less resistance than gross Air: and rarefied water in an Aeolipile, it may be, he thinks presses with less force than unrarefied. Air possibly may be rarefied to that degree as to lessen its resistance: but we speak of Air moderately agitated, so as to be made only more brisk and active. Moreover he says, the waters that lay under the Poles must have risen perpendicularly, and why might they not, as well, have done so under the Equator? The waters that lay naturally and originally under the Poles, did not rise at all: but the waters became more deep there, by those that were thrust thither from the middle parts of the Globe. Upon the whole I do not perceive that he hath weakened any one of the Propositions upon which the formation of an Oval Earth depended. Which were these, First, that the tendency of the waters from the centre of their motion, would be greater and stronger in the Equinoctial parts, than in the Polar: or in those parts where they moved in greater circles and consequently swifter, than in those where they were moved in lesser circles and slower. Secondly, Agitated Air hath more force to repel what presses against it, than stagnant Air: and that the Air was more agitated and rarefied under the Equinoctial parts, than under the Poles. Thirdly, Waters hindered and repelled in their primary tendency, take the easiest way they can to free themselves from that force, so as to persevere in their motion. Lastly, to flow laterally upon a Plain, or to ascend upon an inclined Plain, is easier than to rise perpendicularly. These are the Propositions upon which that discourse depended, and I do not find that he hath disproven any one of them. And this, Sir, is a short account of a long Chapter, impertinencies omitted.  
Chap. 10. Is concerning the original and causes of Mountains, which the Excepter unhappily imputes to the heat and influence of the Sun. Whether his Hypothesis be effectually confuted, or not, I am very willing to stand to the judgement of any unconcerned person, that will have the patience to compare the Exceptions and the Answer, in this Chapter. Then as to his Historical arguments, as he calls them, to prove there were Mountains before the Flood, from Giants that saved themselves from the Flood upon Mount Zion: and Adam's wand'ring several hundreds of years upon the Mountains of India; These, and such like, which he brought to prove that there were Mountains before the Flood, he now thinks fit to renounce, 
Def. p. 9●.  and says he had done so before by an anticipative sentence. But if they were condemned before by an anticipative sentence, as fables and forgeries, why were they stuffed into his Book, and used as Traditional evidence against the Theory?  
Lastly, he contends in this Chapter for Iron and Iron-tools before the Flood, and as early as the time of Cain● because he built a City; which, he says, could not be built without Iron and Iron-tools. To which it was Answered, 
Ans. p. 49, 50.  that, Cain's, like Paris or London, he had reason to believe that they had Iron-tools to make it. But suppose it was a number of Cottages, made of branches of Trees, of Osiers, and Bulrushes: or, if you will, of mud-walls, and a roof of straw, with a fence about it to keep out Beasts: there would be no such necessity o● Iron-tools. Consider, pray, how long the world was without knowing the use of Iron, in several parts of it: as in the Northern Countries and America: and yet they had Houses and Cities, after their fashion. And to come nearer home, consider what Towns and Cities our Ancestros, the Britain's, had in Caesar's time: more than two thousand Years after the time of Cain. 
Com. li. 5.  Oppidum Britanni vocant, cum Sylvam impeditam vallo atque follâ munierant: quò incursionis hostium vitandae causâ, convenire consueverunt: Why might not Henochia, Cain's City, be such a City as this?  
And as to the Ark, which he also would make a proof that there were Iron and Iron-tools before the Flood, 
Ibid.  'twas answered, that Scripture does not mention Iron or Iron-tools in building of the Ark: but only Gopher wood and Pitch. 
Def. p. 103.  To which he replies, If Scriptures silence concerning things be a ground of presumption that they were not, what then shall we think of an Oval and unmountainous Earth, an enclosed Abyss, a Paradisiacal world, and the like: which the Scripture makes no mention of. I cannot easily forbear calling this an injudicious reflection, tho' I know he hath been angry with that word, and makes it a brat of passion. But I do assure him I call it so coolly and calmly. When a thing is deduced by natural arguments and reason, the silence of Scripture is enough. If he can prove the motion of the Earth by natural arguments, and that Scripture is silent in that point, we desire no better proof. Now in all those things which he mentions, an Oval and unmountainous Earth, an Enclosed Abyss, a Paradisiacal world, Scripture is at least silent: and therefore 'tis natural arguments must determine these cases. And this ill-reasoning he is often guilty of, in making no distinction betwixt things that are, or that are not, proved by natural arguments, when he appeals to the interpretation of Scripture.  
Chap. 11. Is to prove an Open Sea (such as we have now) before the Flood. All his Exceptions were answered before, 
Answ. c. 11.  and I am content to stand to that answer: reserving only what is to be said hereafter concerning the literal sense of Scripture. However he is too lavish in some expressions here, as when he says, (p. 115.) that Adam died before so much as one Fish appeared in the world. And a little before he had said, For fishes, if his Hypothesis be believed, 
P. 114.  were never upon this Earth, in Adam's time. These expressions I say cannot be justified upon any Hypothesis. For why might not the Rivers of that Earth have Fish in them, as well as the Rivers of this Earth, or as our Rivers now? I'm sure the Theory, or the Hypothesis he mentions, never said any thing to the contrary: but rather supposed the waters fruitful, as the ground was. But as to an open Sea, whether side soever you take, that there was, or was not, any, before the Flood: I believe however Adam, to his dying day, never see either Sea or Sea-fish: nor ever exercised any dominion over either.  
Chap. 12. Is concerning the Rainbow: and hath no new argument in it, nor reinforcement. But a question is moved, whether as well, necessarily signifies as much. The real question to be considered here, setting aside pedantry, is this, whether that Thing (Sun, or Rainbow, or any other) could have any significancy as a sign, which signified no more than the bare promise would have done without a sign. This is more material to be considered and resolved, than whether as well and as much signify the same.  
Chap. 13. Is concerning Paradise, and to justify or excuse himself why he balked all the difficulties, and said nothing new or instructive, upon that subject. But he would make the Theorist inconsistent with himself, in that he had said, 
Def. p. 125.  that neither Scripture, nor reason, determine the place of Paradise: and yet determines it by the judgement of the Christian Fathers. Where's the inconsistency of this? The Theory, as a Theory, is not concerned in a Topical Paradise; and says moreover that neither Scripture, nor reason, have determined the place of it; but if we refer ourselves to the judgement and tradition of the Fathers, and stand to the majority of their Votes, (when Scripture and reason are silent) they have so far determined it, as to place it in the other Hemisphere, rather than in this: and so exclude that shallow opinion of some moderns, that would place it in Mesopotamia. And to baffle that opinion was the design of the Theorist; as this Author also seems to take notice. 
P. 131.   
After this and an undervaluing of the Testimonies of the Fathers, he undertakes to determine the place of Paradise by Scripture, and particularly that it was in Mesopotamia, or some region thereabouts. And his Argument is this, because in the last verse of the 3d. chap. of Genesis, the Cherubims and flaming sword are said to be place 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which he says is, to the East of the Garden of Eden. But the Septuagint (upon whom he must chiefly depend for the interpretation of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the first place, ch. 2. 8.) read it here 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And the Vulgate renders it, ante Paradisum voluptatis: and according to the Samaritan Pentateuch 'tis rendered ex adverso. Now what better authorities can he bring us for his translation? I do not find that he gives any, as his usual way is, but his own authority. And as for the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the 2d. chap. and 8th. ver. which is the principal place, 'tis well known, that, except the Septuagint, all the ancient Versions, Greek and Latin, (besides others) render it to another sense. And there is a like uncertainty of translation in the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as we have noted elsewhere. Lastly, the Rivers of Paradise, and the countries they are said to run through or encompass, are differently understood by different Authors, without any agreement or certain conclusion. But these are all beaten subjects, which you may find in every Treatise of Paradise, and therefore 'tis not worth the time to pursue them here.  
Then he proceeds to the longevity of the Antediluvians: which, so far as I can understand him to affirm any thing, 
P. 139.  he says was not general: but the lives of some few were extraordinarily lengthened by a special blessing; the elongation of them being a work of Providence, not of nature. This is a cheap and vulgar account, (and so are all the contents of this Chap.) proved neither by Scripture, nor reason: and calculated for the humour and capacity of those, that love their case more than a diligent enquiry after truth. He hath indeed a bold assertion afterwards, that Moses does distinguish, as much or more, betwixt two races of men before the Flood: the one long-livers, and the other short-livers, As he hath distinguished the Giants before the Flood, from the common race of mankind. 
P. 141.  These are his words, Is not his distinction equally plain in both cases? speaking of this formentioned distinction. Or, if there be any difference, does he not distinguish better betwixt long-livers and short-livers, than he does betwixt men of Gigantic and of usual proportion? Let's see the truth of this: Moses plainly made mention of two races of mankind: 
Gen. 6. 4.  the ordinary race, and those of a Gigantic race, or Giants. Now tell me where he plainly makes mention of short-livers before the Flood. And if he no where make mention of short-livers, but of long-livers only, how does he distinguish as plainly of these two races, as he did of the other two? for in the other he mentioned plainly and severally both the parts or members of the distinction, and here he mentions but one, and makes no distinction.  
Then he comes to the Testimonies cited by josephus for the longevity of the Antediluvians, or first inhabitants of the Earth. And these he roundly pronounces to be utterly false. This Gentleman does not seem, to be much skilled in Antiquity, either sacred or profane: and yet he boldly rejects these Testimonies (as he did those of the Fathers before) as utterly false: 
P. 142.  which josephus had alleged in vindication of the History of Moses. The only reason he gives, is, because these Testimonies say, They lived a thousand years: whereas Moses does not raise them altogether so high. But the question was not so much concerning the precise number of their years, as about the excess of them beyond the present lives of men: and a round number in such cases is often taken instead of a broken number. Besides, seeing according to the account of Moses, the greater part of them lived above nine hundred years, at least he should not have said these Testimonies in josephus were utterly false, but false in part, or not precisely true.  
Now he comes to his reasons against the Ante-diluvian longevity; which have all had their answers before, and those we stand to. But I wonder he should think it reasonable, that mankind, 
P. 144, 145.  throughout all ages, should increase in the same proportion as in the first age: And if a decuple proportion of increase was reasonable at first, the same should be continued all along: and the product of mankind, after sixteen hundred years, should be taken upon that supposition. I should not grudge to admit that the first pair of Breeders might leave ten pair: but that every pair of these ten, should also leave ten pair, without any failure: and every pair in their children should again leave ten pair: and this to be continued, without diminution or interruption, for sixteen hundred years, is not only a hard supposition, but utterly incredible. For still the greater the number was, the more room there would be for accidents, of all sorts: and every failure towards the beginning, and proportionably in other parts, would cut off thousands in the last product.  
Chap. 14. Is against the Dissolution of the Earth, and the Disruption of the Abyss, at the Deluge: such as the Theory represents. Here is nothing of new argument, but some strokes of new railing wit, after his way. He had said in his Exceptions that the Dissolution of the Earth was horrid blasphemy: now he makes it Reductive Blasphemy, as being indirectly, consequentially, 
P. 153, 154.  or reductively, contrary to Scripture. But this rule, we told him, all errors in Religion would be blasphemy, and if he extend this to errors in Philosophy also, 'tis still more harsh and injudicious. I wonder how he thinks, the doctrine, which he owns, about the motion of the Earth, should escape the charge of Blasphemy: that being not only indirectly, but directly and plainly contrary to Scripture. We thought that expression, the Earth is dissolved, being a Scripture expression, would thereby have been protected from the imputation of blasphemy: and we alleged to that purpose, (besides, Ps. 75. 3.) Isa. 24. 19 Amos 9 5. He would have done well to have proved these places in the Prophets Isaiah and Amos, to have been figurative and tropological, as he call it: for we take them both to relate to the dissolution of the Earth, which literally came to pass at the Deluge. And he not having proved the contrary, we are in hopes still that the Dissolution of the Earth may not be horrid blasphemy, nor of blasphemous importance.  
Then having quarrelled with the Guard of Angels which the Theorist had assigned for the preservation of the Ark, in the time of the Deluge: he falls next into his blunder, that the Equator and Ecliptic of the Earth were interchanged, when the situation of the Earth was changed. This error in the Earth is cousin-germain to his former error in the heavens, viz. that the Earth changed its tract about the Sun, and leapt out of the Equator into the Ecliptic, when it changed its situation. The truth is, this Copernican Systeme seems to lie cross in his imagination. I think he would do better to let it alone. However, tho' at other times he is generally verbose and long-winded, he hath the sense to pass this by, in a few words: laying the blame upon certain parentheses or semicircles, whose innocency notwithstanding we have fully cleared, and showed the poison to be spread throughout the whole paragraph, which is too great to be made an Erratum Typographicum.  
Then after Hermus, 
P. 160, 161.  Caister, Menander and Caicus: Nile and its mud: Piscenius Niger, who contended with Septimus Severus for the Empire, and reprimanded his Soldiers for hankering after wine. Du Val, an ingenious French writer, and Cleopatra and her admired Antony: he concludes, that the waters of the Deluge raged amongst the fragments, with lasting, incessant, and unimaginable turbulence.  
And so he comes to an argument against the Dissolution of the Earth. 
P. 16●  That, All the buildings erected before the Flood, would have been shaken down at that time, or else overwhelmed. He instanced in his Exceptions, in Seth's pillars▪ Henochia, Cain's City: and joppa; these he supposed such buildings as were made before, and stood after, the Flood. But now Seth's pillars and Henochia being dismissed, he insists upon joppa only; and says, This must have consisted of such materials, as could never be prepared, form, and set up, without Iron tools. Tho' I do not much believe that joppa was an Antediluvian Town, yet whatever they had in Cain's time, they might, before the Deluge, have Mortar and Brick; which as they are the first stony materials, that we read of, for building: so the ruins of them might stand after the Deluge. And that they had no other materials is the more probable, because, after the Flood, at the building of Babel, Moses plainly intimates that they had no other materials than those. 
Gen. 11. 3.  For the Text says, They said one to another, go to, let us make Brick, and burn them thoroughly; And they made Brick for stone, and slime had they had mortar. But now this argument, methinks, may be retorted upon the Excepter with advantage. For, if there were no dissolutions, concussions, or absorptions, at the Deluge, instead of the ruins of joppa, methinks we might have had the ruins of an hundred Antediluvian Cities. Especially, if, according to his Hypothesis, they had good stone, and good Iron, and all other materials, fit for strong and lasting building. And, which is also to be considered, that it was but a fifteen-cubit Deluge, so that Towns built upon eminences or highlands, would be in little danger of being ruined: much less of being abolished.  
His last argument (p. 163.) proves, if it prove any thing, that God's promise, that the world should not be drowned again, was a vain and trifling thing, to us, who know it must be burnt. And consequently, if Noah understood the conflagration of the World, he makes it a vain and trifling thing to Noah also. If the Excepter delight in such conclusions, let him enjoy them, but they are not at all to the mind of the Theorist.  
Chap. 15. Now we come to his new Hypothesis of Fifteen-cubit Deluge. And what shifts he hath made to destroy the World with such a diminutive Flood, we have noted before: First, by raising his water-mark, and making it uncertain. Then by converting the Deluge, in a great measure, into Famine. And lastly, by destroying Mankind and other Animals, with evil Angels. We shall now take notice of some other incongruities in his Hypothesis. When he made Moses' Deluge but fifteen Cubits deep, we said that was an unmerciful Paradox, and asked, whether he would have it received as a Postulatum, or as a Conclusion. All he answers to this is, That the same question may be asked concerning several parts of the Theory: 
P. 166.  particularly, that the Primitive Earth had no Open Sea▪ Whether is that, says he, to be received as a Postulatum, or as a Conclusion? The answer is ready, as a Conclusion: deduced from premises, and a series of antecedent reasons. Now can he make this answer for his fifteen-Cubit Deluge? Must not that still be a Postulatum, and an unmerciful one? As to the Theory, there is but one Postulatum in all, viz. That the Earth rise from a Chaos. All the other Propositions are deduced from premises, and that one Postulatum also is proved by Scripture and Antiquity. We had noted further in the Answer, that the Author had said in his Exceptions, that he would not defend his Hypothesis as true and real: and we demanded thereupon, Why then did he trouble himself or the World with what he did not think true and real? To this he replies, Many have written ingenious and useful things, which they never believed to be true and real. Romances suppose, and Poetical fictions: Will you have your fifteen-cubit Deluge pass for such? But then the mischief is, where there is neither Truth of Fact, nor Ingenuity of invention, such a composition will hardly pass for a Romance, or a good fiction. But there is still a greater difficulty behind: The Excepter hath unhappily said, 
Exc. p. 302.  Our supposition stands supported by Divine Authority: as being founded upon Scripture: which tells us as plainly as it can speak, that the waters prevailed but fifteen Cubits upon the Earth. Upon which words the Answerer made this remark, 
Answ. p. 67.  If his Hypothesis be founded upon Scripture, and upon Scripture as plainly as it can speak, Why will not he defend it as TRUE and REAL? for to be supported by Scripture, and by plain Scripture, is as much as we can allege for the articles of our Faith. 
Des. p. 168.  To this he replies now, that he begged allowance at first, to make bold with Scripture a little. This is a bold excuse: and he especially, one would think, should take heed how he makes bold with Scripture: lest, according to his own notion, he fall into blasphemy or something of blasphemous importance; indirectly, consequentially, or reductively, at least. However this excuse, if it was a good one, would take no place here: for to understand and apply Scripture, in that sense that it speaks as plainly as it can speak, is not to make bold with it, but modestly to follow its dictates and plain sense.  
He feels this load to lie heavy upon him, and struggles again to shake it off, with a distinction. When he said his fifteen-cubit Deluge was supported by divine authority, etc. This, 
Ibid.  he says, was spoken by him, in an Hypothetick or suppositious way: and that it cannot possibly be understood otherwise by men of sense. Here are two hard words, let us first understand what they signify, and then we shall better judge how Men of sense would understand his words. His Hypothetick or suppositious way, so far as I understand it, is the same thing as by way of supposition; Then his meaning is, he supposes his fifteen-cubit Deluge is supported by divine authority: And he supposes it is founded upon Scripture as plainly as it can speak. But this is to suppose the Question, and no Man of sense would make or grant such supposition. So that I do not see what he gains by his Hypothetick and suppositious way. But to draw him out of this mist of words, Either he affirms this, that his Hypothesis is supported by divine authority: and founded upon Scripture as plainly as it can speak: or he denies it, or he doubts of it. If he affirm it, than all his excuses and diminutions are to no purpose, he must stand to his cause, and show us those plain Texts of Scripture. If he deny it, he gives up his cause, and all that divine authority he pretended to. If he doubt of it, than he should have expressed himself doubtfully; as, Scripture may admit of that sense, or may be thought to intimate such a thing; but he says, with a plerophory, Scripture speaks it as plainly as it can speak. And to mend the matter, he unluckily subjoins in the following words, 
P. 16●, 16●.  Yea, tho' it was spoken never so positively, it was but to set forth REIPERSONAM: to make a more full and lively representation of the supposed thing. He does well to tell us what he means by Rei Personam, for otherwise no Man of sense, as his phrase is, would ever have made that translation of those words. But the truth is, he is so perfectly at a loss how to bring himself off, as to this particular, that in his confusion he neither makes good sense, nor good Latin.  
Now he comes to another inconsistency which was charged upon him by the Answer: Namely, that he rejects the Church-Hypothesis concerning the Deluge, and yet had said before, 
Exc. p. 300.  I cannot believe (which I cannot well endure to speak) that the Church hath ever gone on in an irrational way of explaining the Deluge. That he does reject this Church-Hypothesis was plainly made out from his own words: because he rejects the Common Hypothesis: The general standing Hypothesis: 
See the Citations in the Answ. p. 68  The usual Hypothesis: The usual sense they put upon Sacred story, etc. These citations he does not think fit to take notice of in his reply: but puts all upon this general issue, which the Answerer concludes with: The Churchway of explaining the Deluge, is either rational or irrational. If he say it is rational, why does he desert it, and invent a new one. And if he say it is irrational, than that dreadful thing, which he cannot well endure to speak, That, the Church of God hath ever gone on in an irrational way of explaining the Deluge, falls flat upon himself. Let's hear his answer to this Dilemma. 
Def. p. 170.  We say, says he, that the Churchway of explaining the Deluge, (by creating and annihilating waters for the nonce) is very rational. Then say I still, why do you desert it, or why do you trouble us with a new one? Either his Hypothesis is more rational than the Church-Hypothesis, or less rational? If less rational, why does he take us off from a better, to amuse us with a worse? But if he say his Hypothesis is more rational than that of the Church's, Then Woe be to him, in his own words, 
P. 171.  that so black a blemish should be fastened upon the wisest and noblest Society in the World, as to make himself more wise than they, and his Hypothesis more rational than theirs. The truth is, This Gentleman hath a mind to appear a Virtuoso: for the new Philosophy, and the Copernican Systeme: and yet would be a Zealot for orthodoxy, and the Churchway of explaining things. Which two designs do not well agree, as to the natural World; and so betwixt two Stools he falls to the ground, and proves neither good Churchman, nor good Philosopher.  
But he will not still be convinced that he deserts the Church-hypothesis, and continues to deny the desertion in these words, 
〈◊〉.  We say that we do not desert or reject the Church way of explaining the Deluge. Now to discover, whether these words are true or false, Let us observe, First, what he acknowledges to have said against the Church-Hypothesis: Secondly, what he hath said more than what he acknowledges here. He acknowledges that he said the Church-Hypothesis might be disgustful to the best and soundest Philosophic judgements. And this is not good Character. Yet this is not all, for he hath fairly dropped a principal word in the sentence, namely, justly. 
Exc. p. 312.  His words, in his Exceptions, were these, such inventions (which he applies to the Church-Hypothesis) as have been, and, JUSTLY may be disgustful, not only to nice and squeamish, but to the best and soundest Philosophic judgements. Now judge whether he cited this sentence before, truly and fairly: and whether in these words, truly cited, he does not disparage the Church-Hypothesis, and justify, those that are disgusted at it.  
He furthermore acknowledges that the usual ways of explaining the Deluge seem unreasonable to some, and unintelligible to others, and unsatisfactory to the most. But, it seems, he will neither be of these some, others or most. Lastly, he acknowledges that he had said, 
Def. p. 171.  The ordinary supposition, that the Mountains were covered with waters in the Deluge, brings on a necessity of setting up a new Hypothesis for explaining the Flood. If so, what was this ordinary supposition: was it not the supposition of the Church? And was that such, as made it necessary to set up a new Hypothesis for explaining the Flood? Then the old Hypothesis was insufficient, or irrational.  
Thus much he acknowledges: but he omits what we noted before, his rejecting or disapproving the common Hypothesis, the general standing Hypothesis, the usual sense they put upon the sacred story, etc. And do not all these phrases denote the Church-Hypothesis? 
Exc. p. 325.  He further omits, that he confessed, he had expounded a Text or two of Scripture, about the Deluge, so as none ever did. And deserting the common received sense, puts an unusual gloss upon them. And is not that common received sense, the sense of the Church? and his unusual gloss contrary to it? Lastly, he says, by his Hypothesis, we need not fly to a new Creation of Waters, and gives his reasons at large against that opinion, which you may see, Except. p. 313. Now those reasons he thought either to be good reasons, or bad reasons: if bad, why did he set them down, or why did he not confute them? if good, they stand good against the Hypothesis of the Church: for he makes that new Creation and Annihilation of waters at the Deluge, to be the Hypothesis of the Church. Defen. p. 170. I fear I have spent too much time in showing him utterly inconsistent with himself in this particular. And I wonder he should be so solicitous to justify the Hypothesis of the Church in this point, seeing he openly dissents from it in a greater: I mean in that of the Systeme of the World. Hear his words, 
Def. p. 136.  if you please, to this purpose. And what does the famous Aristotelian Hypothesis seem to be now, but a mass of Errors? where such a Systeme was contrived for the Heavens, and such a situation assigned to the Earth, as neither reason can approve, nor nature allow. Yet so prosperous and prevailing was this Hypothesis, that it was generally received, and successfully propagated for many ages. This prosperous prevailing error, or mass of errors, was it not espoused and supported by the Church? And to break from the Church in greater points, and scruple it in less, is not this to strain at Gnats, and swallow Camels?  
So much for his inconsistency with himself. The rest of this Chapter in the Answer, shows his inconsistency with Moses; both as to the waters covering the tops of the Mountains, which Moses affirms and the Excepter denies; and as to the decrease of the Deluge, which Moses makes to be, by the waters retiring into their channels, after frequent reciprocations, going and coming. But the Excepter says, the Sun sucked up the waters from the Earth: just as he had before sucked the mountains out of the Earth. These things are so groundless, or so gross, that it would be tedious to insist longer upon them. And whereas it is not reasonable to expect, that any others should be idle enough, as we must be, to collate three or four Tracts, to discern where the advantage lies in these small altercations: I desire only, if they be so disposed, that they would collate the Exceptions, Answer and Defence, in this one Chapter, which is our Author's Masterpiece: And from this I am willing they should take their measures, and make a judgement, of his good or bad success in other parts.  
What shifts he hath used to make his fifteen-cubit Deluge sufficient to destroy all mankind and all animals, we have noted before: and here 'tis (p. 181, 182.) that he reduces them to famine. And after that, he comes to a long excursion of seven or eight pages, about the imperfection of Shipping after the Flood: 
Def. p. 183, 184, 185, etc.  a good argument for the Theorist, that they had not an open Sea, Iron-tools, and materials for shipping, before the Flood. For what should make them so inexpert in Navigation for many years and ages after the Flood, if they had the practice and experience of it, before the Flood? And what could hinder their having that practice and experience, if they had an open Sea, and all Iron and other materials, for that use and purpose?  
Lastly, he comes to his notion of the Great Deep, or Tehom-Rabbah. 
Def. p. 191.  Which he had made before, in express words, to be the Holes and Caverns in the Rocks; I say, in express words, such as these, 
Exc. p. 312.  Now supposing that the Caverns in the Mountains were this great Deep: speaking of Moses' Great Deep, according to this new Hypothesis. He says further (p. 105.) In case it be urged, 
Ib. p. 105.  that Caverns, especially Caverns so high situate, cannot properly be called the great Deep. Where you see, his own objection supposes that he made those caverns the Great Deep. And in the same page, speaking of the Psalmists Great Deeps (in his own sense of making them holes in rocks) and Moses' Great Deep, he says, the same thing might be meant by both. By all these expressions one would think it plain, that by his Great Deep he meant his caverns in rocks: yet now, upon objections urged against it, he seems desirous to fly off from that notion. But does not yet tell us plainly what must be meant by Moses' Great Deep. If, upon second thoughts, he would have the Sea to be understood by it, why does he not answer the objections that are made by the Theorist against that Interpretation? 
Engl. Th. p. 81, etc.  Nay, why does he not answer what he himself had objected before (Except p. 310.) against that supposition? He seems to unsay now, what he said before: and yet substitutes nothing in the place of it, to be understood by Moses' T●hom-Rabbah.  
Chap. 16. Is a few words concerning these expressions of Shutting the windows of Heaven and the Fountains of the Abyss, after the Deluge. And these were both shut alike, and both of them no less than the Caverns in the Mountains.  
Chap. 17. Hath nothing of argumentation or Philosophy: but runs on in a popular declamatory way, and (if I may use that forbidden word) injudicious. All amounts to this, Whether we may not go contrary to the letter of Scripture, in natural things, when that goes contrary to plain reason. This we affirm, and this every one must affirm that believes the motion of the Earth, as our Vertuoso pretends to do. Then he concludes all with an Harmonious close, that he follows the great example of a R. Prelate, 
Def. p. 215.  and militates under that Episcopal banner. I am willing to believe that he writ at first, in hopes to curry favour with certain persons, by his great zeal for Orthodoxy; but he hath made such an hotchpotch of new Philosophy and Divinity, that I believe it will scarce please the party he would cajole: nor so much as his R. Patron. I was so civil to him in the Answer, as to make him a Saint in comparison of that former Animadverter: but, by the style and spirit of this last Pamphlet, he hath forfeited with me all his saintship, both absolute and comparative.  
Thus much for his Chapters: and as to his reflections upon the Review of the Theory, they are so superficial and inconsiderable, that I believe he never expected that they should be regarded. I wonder however, that he should decline an examination of the 2d. part of the Theory. It cannot be for want of good will to confute it: he hath shown that to the height, whatsoever his power was. Neither can it be for want of difference or disagreement in opinion, as to the contents of this later part: for he hath reckoned the Millennium amongst the errors of the ancient Fathers, (Def. p. 136.) and the Renovation of the World he makes Allegorical. (p. 224. etc.) It must therefore be for want of some third thing: which he best knows.  
But before we conclude, Sir, we must remember that we promised to speak apart to two things, which are often objected to the Theorist by this Writer, and to little purpose; namely, his flying to Extraordinary Providence, and his flying from the literal sense of Scripture. As to Extraordinary Providence, Is the Theorist alone debarred from recourse to it, or would he have all men debarred, as well as the Theorist? If so, why doth he use it so much himself? And if it be allowed to others, there is no reason it should be denied the Theorist, unless he have disowned it, and so debarred himself that common privilege. But the contrary is manifest, in a multitude of places, both of the first and second part of the Theory▪ For, 
Eng. The. p. 105. etc.  besides a discourse on purpose upon that subject, in the 8th. Chap. of the first Book, in the last Chapter and last words of the same book (Latin) he does openly avow, both Providence (natural and moral) and miracles: in these words, Denique cum certissimum sit, à divinâ Providentiâ pendere res omnes, cujuscunque ordinis, & ab eâdem vera miracula edita esse, etc. And as to the second part of the Theory, the ministry of Angels is there acknowledged frequently, both as to natural and moral administrations. From all which instances it is manifest, that the Theorist did not debar himself, by denying either Miracles, Angelical ministry, or extraordinary Providence; But if the Excepter be so injudicious (pardon me that bold word) as to confound all extraordinary Providence with the Acts of Omnipotency, he must blame himself for that, not the Theorist. The Creation and Annihilation of waters is an act of pure Omnipotency, This the Theorist did not admit of at the Deluge: and if this be his fault, as it is frequently objected to him (Def. p. 9 66. 170, etc.) he perseveres in it still, 
Eng. The p. 18, 19  and in the reasons he gave for his opinion, which are no where confuted. But as for acts of Angelical power, he does every where acknowledge them in the great Revolutions, 
The. Lat. p. 53. Eng. p. 107, 108.  even of the natural World. If the Excepter would make the Divine Omnipotency as cheap as the ministry of Angels, and have recourse as freely and as frequently to that, as to this: If he would make all extraordinary Providence the same, and all miracles, and set all at the pitch of Infinite power, this may be an effect of his ignorance or inadvertency, but is no way imputable to the Theorist.  
In the next place it may be observed that the Theorist hath no where asserted, that Moses' Cosmopoeia (which does not proceed according to ordinary Providence) is to be literally understood; and therefore what is urged against him from the letter of that Cosmopoeia, is improperly urged and without ground. There are as good reasons, and better Authorities, that Moses' six-days Creation should not be literally understood, than there are, why those Texts of Scripture that speak about the motion of the Sun, should not be literally understood. And as to the Theorist, he had often intimated his sense of that Cosmopoeia, that it was expressed more humano, & captum populi: as appears in several passages; In the Latin Theory, speaking of the Mosaical Cosmogonia, he hath these words: Constat haec Cosmopoeia duabus partibus, 
Theor. li. 2. c. 8.  quarum prima, massas generales atque rerum inconditarum statum exhibet: sequiturque eadem principia, & eundem ordinem, quem antiqui usque retinuerunt. Atque in hoc nobiscum conveniunt omnes ferè interprete Christiani: nempe, Tohu Bohu Mosaicum idem esse ac Chaos Antiquorum. Tenebras Mosaicas, etc. hucusque convenit Mosi cum antiquis Philosophis,— methodum autem illam Philosophicam hic abrumpit, aliamque orditur, humanam, aut, si mavis, Theologicam: quâ, motibus Chaos, secundum leges naturae & divini amoris actionem, planè neglectis, & successivis ipsius mutationibus in varias regiones & elementa: His, inquam, posthabitis, popularem narrationem de ortu rerum hoc modo instituit. Res omnes visibiles in sex classes, etc. This is a plain indication how the Theorist understood that Cosmopoeia. And accordingly in the English Theory the Author says, 
P. 288.  Moses's Cosmopoeia: because I thought it delivered by him as a Lawgiver, not as a Philosopher. Which I intent to show at large in another Treatise: not thinking that discussion proper for the vulgar Tongue. The Excepter was also minded of this in the Answer, p. 66. Now, 'tis much, that he, who hath searched all the corners, both of the English and Latin Theory, to pick quarrels, should never observe such obvious passages as these. But still make objections from the letter of the Mosaical Cosmopoeia: which affect the Theorist no more than those places of Scripture that speak of the motion of the Sun, or the Pillars of the Earth.  
In the last place, the Theorist distinguished two methods for explaining the natural World: that of an ordinary and that of an extraordinary Providence. And those that take the second way, he said, might dispatch their task as soon as they pleased if they engaged omnipotency in the work. But the other method would require time: it must proceed by distinct steps, and leisurely motions, such as Nature can admit; And, in that respect, it might not suit with the busy lives, or impatient studies, of most Men. Whom he left notwithstanding to their liberty to take what method they pleased: provided they were not troublesome in forcing their hasty thoughts upon all others. Thus the Theorist hath expressed himself at the end of the first Book: 
C. 12.  Interià, cum non omnes à naturâ ità compositi simus, ut Philosophiae studiis delectemur: Neque etiant liceat multis, propter occupationes vitae, iisdem vacare, quibus per ingenium licuisset: iis jure permittendum est, compendiariò to sapere; & relictis viis naturae & causarum secundarum, quae saepe longiusculae sunt, per causas superiores philosophari; idque potissimùm, cum ex piis affectibus hoc quandoque fieri possit: quibus velmalè fundatis, aliquid dandum esse existimo, modò non sint turbulenti. Thus the Theorist, you see, sets two ways before them, and 'tis indifferent to him whether they take, if they will go on their way peaceably. And he does now moreover particularly declare, That he hath no ambition, either to make the Excepter, or any other of the same dispositions of will, and the same elevation of understanding, proselytes to his Theory.  
Thus much for Providence; As to the literal sense of Scripture, I find, if what was noted before in the Answer, 
P. 82, 83. etc.  had been duly considered, there would be little need of additions upon that subject. The matter was stated freely and distinctly, and the remarks or reflections which the Excepter hath made in his Defence, upon this doctrine, are both shallow & partial. I say, partial: in perverting the sense, and separating such things as manifestly depend upon one another. Thus the Excepter falls upon that expression in the Answer, 
Def. p. 202.  Let us remember that this contradicting Scripture, here pretended, is only in natural things: where he should have added the other part of the sentence, And also observe how far the Excepter himself, in such things, hath contradicted Scripture. Here he makes an odious declamation, as it the Answerer had confessed that he contradicted Scripture in natural things: whereas the words are contradicting Scripture, here pretended: and 'tis plain by all the discourse, that 'tis the literal sense of Scripture that is here spoken of, which the Excepter is also said to contradict. Such an unmanly captiousness shows the temper and measure of that spirit, which rather than say nothing will misrepresent the plain sense of an Author. In like manner, when he comes to those words in the Answer, The case therefore is this, whether to go contrary to the letter of Scripture in things that relate to the natural world, be destroying the foundation of religion, affronting Scripture, and blaspheming the Holy Ghost. He says, this is not to state the case truly, 
Def. p. 206.  for it is not, says he, going contrary to the letter of Scripture that draws such evil consequences after it, but going contrary to the letter of Scripture, where it is to be literally under stood. And this the Theorist does, he says, and the Excepter does not. But who says so besides himself? This is fairly to beg the question, and can he suppose the Theorist so easy as to grant this without proof? It must be the subject matter that determines, what is, and what is not, to be literally understood. However he goes on, begging still the question in his own behalf, and says, those Texts of Scripture that speak of the motion and course of the Sun, are not to be understood literally. But why not? because the literal sense is not to his mind? Of four Texts of Scripture which the Theorist alleged against him, for the motion of the Sun, he answers but one, & that very superficially, to say no worse. 'Tis Ps. 19 where the Sun at his rising is said to be as a Bridegroom coming out of his Chamber, and to rejoice as a strong man to run his race. And his going forth is from the end of the heaven, and his circuit to the ends of it. 
P. 207.  Which he answers with this vain flourish: Then the Sun must be a man, and must be upon his marriage; and must be dressed in fine clothes, as a Bridegroom is. Then he must come out of a Chamber, and must give no more light, and cast no more heat than a Bridegroom does etc. If a man should ridicule, at this rate, the discourse of our Saviour concerning Lazarus in Abraham's bosom, and Dives in hell, with a great gulf betwixt them, yet talking audibly to one another; And that Lazarus should be sent so far, 
Luk▪ 16.  as from heaven to hell, only to dip the tip of his finger in water, and cool Dives his tongue. He that should go about thus to expose our Saviour's parable, would have a thankless office, and effect nothing: for the substance of it would stand good still: namely, that men's Souls live after death, and that good Souls are in a state of ease and comfort, and bad Souls in a state of misery. In like manner, his ridiculing some circumstances in the comparison made by the Psalmist, does not at all destroy the substance of that discourse: namely, that the Sun moves in the firmament, with great swiftness and lustre, and hath the circuit of its motion round the Earth. This is the substance of what the Psalmist declares, and the rest is but a similitude which need not be literally just in all particulars.  
After this he would fain persuade the Theorist, that he hath excused the Excepter for his receding from the literal sense, as to the motion of the Earth: 
Def. p. 208.  Because he hath granted, that, in certain cases, we may and must recede from the literal sense. But where, pray, hath he granted, that the motion of the Earth was one of those cases? yet suppose it be so, may not the Theorist then enjoy this privilege of receding from the literal sense upon occasion, as well as the Excepter? If he will give, as well as take, this liberty, let us mutually enjoy it. But he can have no pretence to deny it to others, and take it himself. It uses to be a rule in writing, that a man must not stultum fingere Lectorem. You must suppose your Reader to have common sense. But he that accuses another of blasphemy for receding from the literal sense of Scripture in natural things, and does himself, at the same time, recede from the literal sense of Scripture, in natural things: one would think, quoad hoc, either had not, or would not exercise, common sense: in a literal way.  
Lastly, He comes to the common known rule, assigned to direct us, when every one ought to follow, or leave, the literal sense: which is, not to leave the literal sense, 
p. 215.  when the subject matter will bear it, without absurdity or incongruity. This he repeats in the next page thus, The rule is, When no kind of absurdities or incongruities accrue to any Texts, from the literal sense. If this be his rule, to what Texts does there accrue any absurdity or incongruity, by supposing the Sun to move? for Scripture always speaks upon that supposition, and not one word for the motion of the Earth. Thus he states the rule, but the Answerer supposed, that the absurdity or incongruity might arise from the subject matter. And accordingly he still maintains, that there are as just reasons (from the subject matter) and better authorities, for receding from the literal sense, in the narrative of the six-days Creation, than in those Texts of Scripture, that speak of the motions and course of the Sun. And to affirm the Earth to be moved, is as much Blasphemy, and more contrary to Scripture, than to affirm it to have been dissolved, as the Theorist hath done.  
Sir, I beg your excuse for this long Letter, and leave it to you to judge whether the occasion was just or no. I know such jarrings as these, must needs make bad music to your ears: 'tis like hearing two instruments play that are not in tune and consort with one another. But you know self-defence, and to repel an assailant, is always allowed: and he that begins the quarrel, must answer for the consequences. However, Sir, to make amends for this trouble, I am ready to receive your commands upon more acceptable subjects.  
Your most Humble Servant, etc.  
FINIS▪