Imprimatur,  
November 23, 1677.  
Guil. Jane, R. P. D. Hen. Episc. Lond. à sacris domest.   

Organum Vetus & Novum: OR, A DISCOURSE OF REASON AND TRUTH.  
WHERE IN The Natural Logic common to Mankind is briefly and plainly described.  
By RICHARD BURTHOGGE M. D. In a Letter to the most Honoured Andrew Trevill Esq. of Èthe in the County of Cornwall.  
Marc. Ant. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. l. 7. 1. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
LONDON: Printed for Sam. Crouch, at the Prince's Arms a Corner-shop of Popes-head ally in Cornhill. 1678.   

FOR The most Honoured ANDREW TREVILL Esq AT E'the in the County of Cornwall.  
SIR,  
THat of making many Books is no End, was truly said by the wisest man that ever was: Not in this sense only, that multitudes of Books, begetting in the minds of those that read them infinite Distractions, deprive them of the Benefits they might receive from fewer; but in another, that there is a Prolifickness in Books, that one produces another, and this a third, and so on without End; and consequently that the labour men are at in making them, is not only Useless, but Endless.  
You will have reason to believe this second Sense to be as just and true as the first, when you consider that I, who lately wrote an Apology for the Deity, am obliged by the Reflections made upon it, now to write Another to defend it; and no question (but) the Latter may be as obnoxious to Unjust Exceptions as the Former: So that if Occasion given, be also taken, there will never be an End of writing, but by what gives End to the Writer.  
However, having received an Invitation to add something to the former Essay, I am (at last) resolved, both in justice to myself and to my Book, to comply with it, and to enter into thoughts of the Causes that not irrationally may be presumed to have had an Influence on the Objectors, and into most of the Objections; and then to offer to them (by way of Obviation) such Considerations as (it may be) will not prove unuseful to Rectify Mistakes in other Matters, as well as in this.  
And the main Causes I intent to touch on (not to mention Envy, etc.) are Three: Proud Ignorance, Ignorant Zeal, and Impertinent Reasoning.  
1. Proud Ignorance consists in a man's presumption of his own Omniscience, (for the Sciolist is ever most conceited) so that he presently and peremptorily condemneth that for Error, which himself hath never learned for Truth; as if there were no growth in Knowledge, or that any Humane Understanding were adequate to Verity: Whereas Capacities of the largest size are yet but narrow; and they that know most, do but the better know how little it is they know, and how much they are to seek. The most the Wisest know, is, that their own and others Ignorance is the surest Object of Knowledge. True Knowledge is not conceited; it is humble, and aspireth after more. If any man think that he knoweth any thing, he knoweth nothing yet as he ought to know.  
2. Ignorant Zeal, (a cause of very general influence into many Mistakes, not only in matters of Religion, but also in points of Philosophy) what is it but a Horse of high metal without eyes? Indeed, nothing is more commendable in Religion, or administers a better Argument of Sincerity in its Professors, than fervency of Zeal; but than it must be Zeal according to Knowledge, and managed with discretion, or else it is but Rage and Fury, not Zeal. Zeal regulated by the Holy Scriptures, that is, Zeal according to Knowledge, and governed with Wisdom, is Fire from the Altar: but then Irregular Zeal, Zeal without Knowledge, Zeal without Wisdom, is Wildfire, which (as the corruption of the best is worst) hath nothing more pernicious than itself to Church or State.  
Zeal without Knowledge may be styled Blind Zeal, and is that when men are passionately concerned for or against an Opinion and Practice, from a strong, but groundless and unwarranted persuasion, that what they do, and what they are for, is highly to the honour and glory of God, and what they oppose, is against it: as if they knew abstractly of themselves, and by their own discourse, what is for God's Glory, or what is otherwise, further than it hath pleased God himself in his Word to reveal it. That only is for God's Glory, which is grounded on God's Word. The Word of God is able to make the Man of God perfect. The Corinthians had a Zeal for God, but not according to Knowledge: and so had the Jews, who persecuted and murdered the Christians, but thought they did God good service. What manner of men they were, who among them called themselves the Zealous, Josephus hath left on Record. Yes, the Disciples of Christ, in Zeal too, they would have Fire from Heaven, and cite an Example; but our meek and blessed Saviour tells them, they knew not the Spirit they were of. They took it to be a Spirit of Zeal, but He knew it to be a Spirit of Passion. A persecuting furious Spirit is none of Christ's; it is Antichrist's. The Wrath of man worketh not the Righteousness of God.  
Zeal without Wisdom may be called Imprudent Zeal, and is Zeal unseasonably and unsitly shown in circumstances of time, place, and persons that will not bear it; as when men shall take their Pearls, their Reprehensions, Counsels, Instructions, or whatever other instances a Zeal is shown in, and cast them before the Swine; and that though they have a Prospect themselves, or an Advertisement from others, of the probable ill success, both that the Pearls shall betrodden under foot, and they themselves be rent; This is not to employ and use Zeal, but to lose it. There is a time for every Purpose, and every thing is beautiful only in that time. Pearls so cast, are cast away.  
3. Impertinent Reasoning, (the third Cause I mentioned, and a Cause of all others of most general influence into Errors and Mistakes) I call not only that which of the Logicians is named 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a passing and arguing from one thing to another, when yet there's no Agreement, no Connexion between them; but that also which is bottomed on single Mediums, and runs on in a long, but simple line and train of Consequences, from thing to thing; or else is founded but on second Notions, and inlaid with them: which way of Reasoning must be showed to be Impertinent, and that by showing a better, pertinent one.  
Thus, Sir, I am arrived to what I principally designed; and I crave your pardon if, for my Readers satisfaction as well as for mine own, I now enlarge, and take the boldness to let him understand my apprehensions of Reason, both as to its nature, and the interest it hath in Religion, and how (I think) it must be circumstanced and conditioned, to assure us of Truth. By which Performance if I gain no more, I shall this; that as well the persons that approve my former Essay, as those that cavil it, will know the Rule and Method I proceeded by (in framing it;) which, to the former will afford a greater Confirmation, if it be Right; and to the latter, a fairer rise of Assaulting (me) if it be not.  
1. Before I can proceed to show what Reason is, I am first to show the many senses the Word is taken in; which, not done by most, is one occasion of the great Confusion in their talks about it. And Reason (to omit some other senses not so necessary here) is in ordinary Language taken either largely, or strictly, or appropriately and most strictly.  
2. Reason largely taken, is the same with Mind or Understanding, and so is commonly affirmed to exert itself in three Acts; the Apprehension of simple Terms, the Composition of those Terms by way of Affirmation and Negation, and Discourse, or illation of one thing from another. Reason strictly taken, is the Understanding as it issues out in its third Act, not in the Apprehension of simple Terms, nor in the Composition of them, but in Discourse and Illation; and so Reason is the Understanding as it argues, discourses, infers. But Reason is appropriately taken, or most strictly, as it is opposed to Faith and Revelation, of which hereafter.  
3. Reason taken for the Mind or Understanding, is that Faculty whereby a man is said to be Reasonable, Intelligent, Understanding; as Sight is that Faculty whereby an Animal is said to be Seeing: or 'tis that Faculty whereby a man is said to Elicit Acts of Reason, or to Understand; as Sight is that Faculty whereby an Animal is said to See. I so define it by the Act, for that the Act is better known than the Faculty. To Understand (as well as to see) is a first Notion, and he must be very simple that understands not what is meant by it; nor are there any Notions more intelligible, whereby to mark Faculties, than those of their Acts. Acts we see, being conscious of them when we exert them; but Faculties we see not, we know not but by their Acts.  
4. The Acts of Reason in this large sense (as the same with Mind or Understanding) to speak of them as they offer and present themselves to mine (without confining of myself to Notions of the Schools, or common Logicians) are Two; Apprehension and Judgement.  
5. Apprehension is that Act of Understanding whereby it is said to See or Perceive things, and is the same in relation to the Mind, that Seeing is in relation to the Eye.  
6. Apprehension is Conversant with things either as in themselves, or as they are noted; and they are noted either by simple words, or else by Propositions, which are words joined by way of Affirmation or Negation; both which the Mind sees or apprehends but as it hath the Sense of them. Sense or Meaning is the Motive and immediate Object of Apprehension, as Colour is of Seeing. The Eye sees nothing but under Colour; the Mind apprehends nothing but under Sense.  
7. I know well that Truth is usually affirmed the proper, adequate, immediate, formal Object of the Intellect; but (it) is not so. Not Truth, but Sense or Meaning is the proper, adequate, immediate Object of the Mind, as to its first Act [that of Apprehension;] Truth is only the proper, adequate, immediate Object of it as to another, which is called Assent, and is a kind of Judgement. I understand and apprehend a Proposition which is false, that is, I have a Sense and Meaning of it, though when I Understand or Apprehend it, I refuse my Assent. So that it is not Verity that is the Motive and immediate Object of Understanding in its Acts of Apprehension, but Sense or Meaning.  
8. Sense or Meaning is that Conception or Notion that is form in the Mind, on a proposal to it of an Object, a Word, or Proposition; as Colour is that Sentiment begotten, and caused in the Eye, upon the impression of its Object on it.  
9 To understand this, we are to consider, That to us men, things are nothing but as they stand in our Analogy; that is, are nothing to us but as they are known by us; and they are not known by us but as they are in the Sense, Imagination, or Mind; in a word, as they are in our Faculties; and they are in our Faculties not in their Realities as they be without them, no nor so much as by Picture and proper Representation, but only by certain Appearances and Phaenomena, which their impressions on the Faculties do either cause or occasion in them.  
10. Every Faculty hath a hand, though not the sole hand, in making its immediate Object; as the Eye makes the Colours it is said to see, the Ear the Sounds, the Fancy the Idols, and so the Understanding the Conceptions or Notions under which it apprehends and sees things. So that all the immediate Objects of Humane Cogitation (to use the word in its largest sense) are Entia Cogitationis, All Appearances; which are not properly and (may I use a School-term) formally in the things themselves conceived under them, and consequently conceived as if they had them, but so only in the cogitative Faculties. No such thing as Colour but in the Eye, nor as Sound but in the Ear, nor as Notion, Sense, or Meaning, but in the Mind. These, though they seem in the Objects, and without the cogitative Powers, yet are no more in them than the Image that seemeth in the Glass is there indeed.  
11. So that all immediately cogitable beings (that is, all immediate Objects of Humane Cogitation) are either Entities of Sense, as the immediate Objects of Sense, Colour, Sound, etc. or of Imagination, as the Images therein, the Idols it frames; or of Reason and Understanding, Mental Entities, the Meanings or Notions under which the Understanding apprehends its Objects; which (Notions) though they seem to the Understanding to be without it, and to be in the things understood, yet (as I said before) are no more without it or in the things themselves, than Colours are without the Eye, or Sounds without the Ear, or Sapours without the Tongue, although they seem so to Sense.  
12. Faculties and Powers, Good, Evil, Virtue, Vice, Verity, Falsity, Relations, Order, Similitude, Whole, Part, Cause, Effect, etc. are Notions; as Whiteness, Blackness, Bitterness, Sweetness, etc. are Sentiments: and the former own no other kind of Existence than the latter, namely, an Objective (one.) A Notion that will free the Mind of much Intanglement in framing Notions. We generally conceive Faculties, Good, Evil, and other Notions (under which the Mind apprehends things) to be Realities, and to have an Existence of their own without the Mind, and though there were no Mind to think of them, when indeed they are but Noemata, Conceptions, and all the formal being any of them have, is only in it. And no wonder if he that takes Noemata to be Realities finds himself confounded by that mistake, in forming his Conceptions about them. Notions therefore are very aptly, though somewhat barbarously, styled by the Schoolmen, Conceptus Objectivi; Notions of the Mind, but yet seeming to be in the Object. He that looks for Notions in Things, looks behind the Gláss for the Image he sees in it.  
13. Such Cogitable Being's aś have no foundation, no ground in Realities, that is, in things without the Cogitative Faculties, but are mere effects of the Faculties, are called Chimerical (Entities;) and in the Imagination are Fictions, in the Understanding mere Notions; as in the former a Golden Tree, in the latter a Philosophical Romance, or Groundless Hypothesis. But such as have Foundation in Realities, are called Real, [Real Notions] not that in their own nature they are in Realities themselves, but that they have their Grounds in those that are; they are real (as a School-man would express it) not formally, but fundamentally; they are inchoately and occasionally in the things, but not consummately and formally but in the Faculties; not in the things, but as the things relate to our Faculties; that is, not in the things as they are Things, but as they are Objects.  
14. Those Words or Propositions any one hath a sense of, those things to which the Words or Propositions relate, he hath a Notion of. Sense is Notion; only it is called Sense as it relates to the Words or Propositions, and Notion as it relates to the Things; but indeed Sense is Notion, and to have the sense of a Word or Proposition, is to frame a Notion of it, or of the thing signified by it.  
15. 'Tis as impossible to apprehend a Word or Proposition one hath no notion, no sense of, as to see an Object that maketh no impression of Colour on the Eye; for what Colour is to the Eye, that Sense, Meaning, or Notion is to the Mind.  
16. Sense, Meaning, or Notion arises from a Congruity in the Object to the Faculty; so that to inquire why one cannot understand or apprehend a Nonsensical Proposition or Word, is to inquire why he cannot see or hear Tastes, or taste and smell Sounds, or taste, hear, and smell Colours, or see an Object hath none.  
17. That Congruity in the Object to the Faculty, whereby it either actually moves it, or is capable to move it to frame a Notion or Sense, aught to be distinguished from that Congruity which is in the Object within itself, or with other Objects: The former (for distinction sake) I call a Congruity to the Faculty; the latter a Congruity in Things. The harmony of Objects to their Faculties, and that of them within themselves, or one to another, are distinct Harmonies. I can make sense of a Proposition that is not true, so that 'tis Congruous to the Faculty, it moves that; when yet (it being false) the Parts of it are Incongruous one with another.  
18. To understand and apprehend a Proposition or Discourse, it sufficeth not to have a Perception of the sense and meaning of the words; those words as in Conjunction, and tied together, aught to make such an impression on the Mind, as moveth it to make a Notion of them in that Relation. One may have a sense of the words in a Discourse, when yet he cannot make any of the Discourse itself, because he cannot frame a Conception, a Notion of them in the Composition that is given them in it. He cannot see how they are joined.  
19 There are a thousand Instances of Discourses of this kind in Jacob Behmen, but I need not go so far as Germany to seek some; I might have many nearer home within the compass of our own time and observation; but I decline them as Invidious; I will only point to one in Dr. Fludd, a person that could speak as good Sense (if he listed) as another, but I could never make any of many Passages I find in him, and of one particularly, namely, that in his Mosaic Philosophy, Book 3. sect. 1. Chap. 4.  
20. Those Discourses in which nor Words nor Propositions are sensible, or wherein the Words are sensible but not the Propositions, and yet are taken by those that make them for High Sense, may be called Enthusiasm. Of the former sort I apprehend the Whims of Basilides, of Valentinus, and the Gnostics; and of the latter, those of the Familists, and of others of late.  
21. Enthusiasm either may proceed from a spirit, or from Complexion and a certain temper of Mind; the former I call Demoniacal, the latter Complexional; and not unlikely but in most Enthusiasts it comes from both: whereof an Upstart Sect among us, in its first appearing, afforded strong Evin●cments.  
22. That there are Philosophical Enthusiasts, is as certain as that there are Theological; Enthusiasts in matters of Philosophy, as well as Enthusiasts in matters of Divinity. Paracelsus, Helmont, and many other Chemists, are Examples of the first sort; as H. nicols the Father of the Familists, and others, are of the second: Jacob Behmen and Dr. Fludd may pass for Examples of both.  
23. When Enthusiasts think they understand one another, (as they All pretend to do, and that seriously, and therefore must have some impression to justify that Pretention, whereas yet no sober man can understand Any of them;) I conceive it not to be by Apprehension, but Sympathy; not Intellectually, by Apprehending, that is, by framing just, steady, distinct Notions of what is said; but Sympathetically, by having excited in their mind on such Expressions, Motions, conformable to theirs that use them; for they all being of the same frame and temper of Mind or of Imagination, whatever touches One agreeably, also moves the Rest; as in Unison-Lutes, or other Instruments fitly tuned, but to strike One, is (at once) to move All.  
24. Notions of the Mind are bottomed on Sentiments of Sense; so that as Realities are Grounds to Sentiments, so Sentiments are Grounds to Notions: the impressions of things without upon the Sensories, produce or occasion in them the Cogitations which we call Sentiments, as Colours, Sounds, Sapours, etc. And Sentiments (again) impressing of the Fancy, and so the Mind and Understanding, beget or occasion in it those higher Cogitations which we call Notions, Apprehensions of Reason, or Ideas. Idols or Phantoms are in the Fancy, Ideas in the Mind.  
25. The nearer our Sensories are unto the Objects impressing them, (if not too near) the clearer and distincter is the Sensation made by them; as we more clearly and distinctly see an Object at a nearer than a remoter distance: so the nearer the Mind and Understanding is to Sentiments, the more clear, distinct, and evident its Perceptions are; I mean, the more sensible Notions are, and the nearer to their Grounds, the more effective, more impressive, and consequently clearer and more evident they be.  
26. Hence Knowledge and Apprehension of things is better both acquired and conveyed by first Notions, which are next to Sentiments, than by second which are more remote: The Knowledge which is had of things by first Notions, is more real, evident, clear, distinct, than that which is by the second. First Notions are founded immediately on things; Second Notions are Notions concerning Notions: These are not so impressive and effective as the first. By first and Second Notions, I both understand Terms or Words, and the Notions signified by them.  
27. So much for the Object of Apprehension, which is Sense and Notion; and for the Grounds of that Object, which is Sentiment: Now for the Affections of Apprehension (if a good one) and they are two, namely, Cleverness and Distinctness.  
28. Cleverness of Apprehension, which is in the Mind the same that Cleverness of Seeing is in the Eye, is opposed to Obscurity and Darkness, and presupposes Light.  
29. Light is that which manifests, and consequently Intellectual Light is that means whereby the Understanding comes to See and Apprehend its Objects; or that which manifests them to it: and is either Light of Revelation, which is also called Light of Faith; or Light of Nature, which is also called Light of Reason; where Reason is Appropriately taken, and most strictly.  
30. The Light of Revelation is that Discovery or Manifestation God himself is pleased to make of things by his Spirit, and is chief in the Holy Scriptures. The Light of Nature is All other Light whatever but that of Revelation, whereby we See and Apprehend things, and is that we have by Sense and Discourse.  
31. Some things there are that may be seen in both Lights, in that of Nature, and that of Revelation, though more clearly in the latter than in the former; as that God is Good, and that he is the Maker and Conserver, and supreme Director of All things: Other things are only to be seen in the Light of Revelation, being of a nature not to be discovered but in and by it; as the Mysteries of Christian Religion, the Doctrine of the Trinity, the Incarnation of God, etc.  
32. The Lights of Faith and Nature, of Revelation and Reason, though they be not the same, yet are not contrary; I mean, that what is shown or seen to be true in one Light, can never be shown or seen to be false in the other: What is Apprehended by Sense rightly circumstanced and conditioned, to be This, or to be That, or else by Reason rightly acting to be so, or so, it is never contradicted by Revelation. Things are nothing to a man but as they stand in his Analogy: for him to believe against his Faculties, is to believe a Contradiction. If in the Holy Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, the Elements first and last are Bread and Wine to Sense, and to Reason judging according to Sense, I cannot hold myself obliged by (any) Revelation to believe them Flesh and Blood, but in a Notion consistent with the judgement Sense and Reason make of them; that is, not flesh and blood substantially, but sacramentally; not flesh and blood really, but only by signification. Else Truth might be Incongruity, Inconsistency. Transubstantiation is to me a Mystery; I am so far from making truth of it, that I cannot make any sense of it; I might as well believe that two and two make not four, or three and three six, as that it is not Bread, or Wine, which to my Eye, my Taste, my Touch, in a word, which being an Object of Sense, to all Examinations of my Sense is so. What is against Sense, is against Knowledge.  
33. An Object only to be seen by the Light of Faith, may be said to be seen by Reason above Reason, by Reason assisted with the Light of Revelation, above Reason not so assisted, but acting only by the Aids of Nature; but still it is Reason sees in both: As I can see an Object with a Tube, that with my naked and unarmed Eye I cannot: or see in the Sun-light an Object that I cannot by Moonlight; but still it is the Eye that sees in both; the Organ is the same, although the Lights be not. It is the same Reason and Understanding, the same Faculty that sees in the Light of Revelation, as it is that sees by the Light of Nature; and the same that Argues and Discourses in the one, as by the other.  
34. The great Design of God in all the Doctrines, and even in the highest and most sublime Mysteries of our Religion, is to affect the hearts of men: and therefore as (1.) He represents and reveals them in first Notions; so (2.) He also doth it in sensible and comparative ones; and usually (3.) He representeth one thing by many Notions. (1.) To make it more Affective; and withal (2.) to signify, that no one Notion he represents the thing in, is adequate and just to it. Thus he represents the great Mystery of our Union unto Christ, and our Communion with him, by that between the Vine and Branches, between the Husband and Wife, between the Head and Members: As also the great work of Conversion that passes upon Men in the change he makes on them, from their Darkness into his most marvellous Light, He compares it to Generation, to Adoption, to Creation: In fine, the New Covenant is not only styled a Covenant, but also a Testament, and a Promise. All which resembling and comparative expressions may and aught to be employed and used for the apprehending of the things they are designed to signify, and the making of them more affective; but neither of them so (to be insisted on) as if it were adequate, or just.  
35. The Light of Faith and Revelation, must not be confounded with that of Reason and Nature; I mean, we ought not to consider points of mere Revelation in the light of mere natural Reason: Spiritual things cannot be discerned but spiritually, and therefore must not be compared but with Spirituals. In Points of (mere) Revelation, we ought entirely to confine ourselves to the Notions, Comparisons, Similitudes and Representations God himself hath made of them, without pretending to be wise above what is written, and to say or understand just how in themselves the things are, abstractly from the Dresses Revelation puts them in.  
36. He that pretends to understand the Mysteries of Christian Religion, or any Point of mere Revelation stripped of those Notions, Resemblances, and Comparisons, when they be not revealed or discovered but in them; as he looketh not on these things in the Light of Faith and Revelation, but in that of Reason or Nature; so not looking on them in their own Genuine and Proper Light, no wonder if he either err or trifle about them.  
37. Justly liable to this Reproof I judge them that are not content to think and speak of God (the proper Object as well as Author of Revelation) in that manner that he speaks of himself; who Reveals himself to us men in Analogous and Comparative Notions, not in such as adequate and adjust him, but such as do proportion and suit with us; as if he had an Understanding, Will, and Affections; and did purpose Ends, and elected Means to compass them; did consult and decree, and were touched with the Affections of Joy, Grief, Love, Hatred, Anger, Revenge, etc.  
38. They that tell us that he is not angry, that Revenge is an Imperfection not to be imputed to him, and pretend to tell us just what's meant by it, they might as well tell us that he doth not love nor hate; that he doth not propose Ends to himself, nor design Means; that he doth not consult nor decree; that he hath no Providence, no Foresight, there being Imperfection in all those Notions; and yet without them, and the like, you can nor Think, nor Speak of God. Abstract the Deity from these and other Comparative Notions, Notions of Him, which are not in Him, and yet wherein He pleases to Reveal Himself, and you will soon make Him such an one as Epicurus fancied, an Infinite Excellency, but unknown, not concerned, nor concerning of Himself with things below Him.  
39 It seems to me, that he that would abstract God, or any matter of Religion, from the Notions or Comparisons which He or That is represented in, would do like one that would consider the World only in its Realities of Matter, Figure, Texture, and Motion, abstractly from those Phaenomena and Appearances occasioned by them in our Senses and Minds: And if the latter may be thought to have but an Empty, Dry, and Barren Notion of the World, the former would not have a much better of God (whom now we cannot know as He is) or of any Subject of Revelation, that should so consider it.  
40. Whoever well attends, will find that all the Notions under which we apprehend God, are Notions of Him, like those we have of the World, not as He is in Himself (for so we know him not;) but as He stands in our Analogy, and in that of the World; which Notions are very fitly styled Attributes, not Accidents, as not speaking things Inherent Really in Him, but things ascribed by the Mind, or attributed to Him; as Colours, which but in the Eye, are yet ascribed to the Object; and Sounds, that indeed exist but in the Ear, are attributed to the Air: For we regarding God in that Relation that He bears to the world, and to ourselves, and so considering Him, have excited in us such Notions by the impressions the things we look on, and God himself as interested in them, make upon us. The Attributes of God are but (as) so many Aspects. Much Obscurity and many Errors in forming Notions about God and his Attributes, are owing to an Unacquaintance with this Truth.  
41. Having spoken of Clearness of Apprehension, and of the Lights that make it, I will only add a Consideration, which though obvious enough, is not reflected on as it should; namely, that the Lights are gradual; [even that of Revelation] and that all things are not equally clear (in them:) so that we ought to put a difference, as between Philosophical and Theological Points, and Points unrevealed and revealed; so in those revealed between Fundamental Points (which are but few and plain) and Superstructures upon them; between what is in Scripture in express Terms, and what is there but by Consequence; and in Consequences, between those that are immediate and next to Principles, and those that are remote and further off. As there are weighty Points of the Law, so there are Tythe-mint, Anise, and Cummin; he that makes no difference, takes not his measures by Jesus Christ's. As it is inept and foolish, so it is inhuman and bloody, not to distinguish Errors from Heresies. Heresy in Religion, is as Treason in the Law, a subversion of Fundamentals; and it must be plainly and directly so, and not by Consequences and far-fetched Deductions: For Heresy, it must be eradicated; but as for Errors, he that is exempt from them, let him throw the first stone at the guilty. But this is not intended as a Plea for Error, God forbidden! but for Humanity.  
42. I proceed to the second Affection of Apprehension, which is Distinctness. And to apprehend a thing distinctly, is to form such a Notion and Conception of it, and to have such a sense as doth distinguish it from all things else.  
43. Distinctness of Apprehension is acquired by Distinction, and by Definition. Distinction, as I take it, is of Words; Definition of Things. To make a Distinction is, when a Word hath many Significations, to determine, fix, or define the Sense it is taken or used in, and by certain Marks and Tokens to distinguish it and circumscribe it from all the others (it hath.) Definitions of things are properly Descriptions. To describe, is to notify, mark, and represent a thing in and by its Attributes, that is, according to the impressions that it makes upon our Faculties, and Conceptions it occasions in them. Essential Definitions are Nonsense. Things are not Explicable, but as they are to us in our Faculties.  
44. The more particularly any thing is marked, the more distinct is the knowledge we have of that thing.  
45. Most Errors in Divinity as well as in Philosophy, own their being to confused Apprehensions, and confused Apprehensions their's to the Ambiguity of words, and the uncertainty of their Signification. He that uses words of many Significations without distinctly marking them, and without particularly noting what Sense he takes the word in when he uses it, may easily be apprehended to take it sometimes in one Sense, sometimes in another, that is, to take one Sense for another; and he that takes one Sense of a word for another, mistakes, and confounds things. To confound things, is to take one for another. Confusion of things comes from Ambiguity of words. A Word in one of its Senses may belong to a thing, when in all it cannot.  
46. Caution. Take heed of being abused with the Agreement of Words, into a belief of answerable Agreement in Things.  
47. Direction. To avoid confusion of Apprehension, the best way is to look beyond the words we hear or read, or have in our minds, unto their Senses and Meanings: for Words may be uncertain and equivocal, whereas Sense and Notion is not so, but certain and fixed.  
48. Having treated of Apprehension in the general, of its Object, and of its two Affections, Clearness and Distinctness, it remaineth to speak of those Conditions which are requisite to the forming of a clear and distinct Apprehension; and they are four: a Due Illumination or Illustration of the Object; a Right Disposition of the Faculty; a Due Distance from the Object; and a Due Attention to it. The same Conditions in Apprehension as in Vision.  
49. A Due Illumination of the Object; by which I mean here but Perspicuity of Expression: a Representation of things unto the Mind in plain, apt, and significant Words, and in a plain and instructive order and method. Plainness of Expression and Method is the Light of a Discourse; he that uses it is Didactical, [apt to teach,] but he that will clearly and methodically express his Thoughts to others, must first conceive them so himself: so that here I might say over again what I have already about Clearness and Distinctness of Apprehension.  
50. A Right Disposition of the Faculty; a Right Temper of Mind, [Rectitude of Mind] consists in a full and perfect Exemption of it from all the prejudices that either Education, Custom, Passion, or false Reasoning have imbibed it with. Prejudices are erroneous (or false) Anticipations, and are in the Mind as Tinctures in the Eye, which falsify its Vision. Other Diseases of the Mind there are besides Prejudice, as Levity, Curiosity, Scepticism, etc. in an Exemption, from which also Sanity of Mind consists; but the principal is Prejudice. And besides Sanity of Mind, there is (for the apprehending of some particular Objects) necessary also a Sanctity of Mind. The pure in heart [only] see God.  
51. A Due Distance from the Object; not to look too near, nor at too Remote a Distance.  
52. Not too near. Too near looking is a cause of much entanglement and error, both in forming of Philosophical and Theological Notions; he that looks too near, doth either see nothing at all, or but confusedly: he looks too near to things, that not contented with common Notions of them, wherein all the world agrees, will have more exact ónes; or that not contented with the knowledge of things according to appearances, as he may see them, is always attempting to know them in their Realities, in which he cannot; As in Quantity the common Notion of it, how evident is it! 'Tis evident to all men, and none but knows what is meant by it; and he that looks on Quantity but so, observes a due distance; but whosoever looks nearer, looks too near, and is confounded with the composition of the Continuum [and well he may that takes a Phaenomenon, a Spectrum, an Appearance for a Reality.]  
53. Not at too remote a distance. He considers Objects at too remote a distance, that looks on them but in second Notions, or contents himself with general ones, which at best are but confused and uncertain; and being so, no wonder if they cause mistakes: the more particular and distinct, the surer the knowledge is: we are often deceived with appearances, and take one thing and person for another, when we only see them afar off.  
54. Due attention is a fixed and steady beholding of the Object, in order to a framing clear and distinct conceptions about it; and 'tis opposed to Inadvertency, or a precipitate and hasty skipping from thing to thing, without a due considering of any: A Distemper of Mind, to which Youth and warm Complexions are subject, which though they may be more ingenious and witty, and more prompt and ready, are yet for that reason seldom so judicious, prudent and weighty, as those of cooler Tempers and of more Age.  
55. So much for Apprehension, the first Act of Understanding; I now pass on to the second, which is Judgement.  
56. Judgement is that Act of the Understanding whereby it having compared and considered things (presented to it, and apprehended by it,) comes in the end and upshot, either to Assent, or Dissent. So that Judgement is a compounded Act, and (as it were) made up of two; one of which is Mediate and Inchoate, the other Ultimate & Complete; the first is Comparing and Considering; the second, Resolving and Decreeing: That the Premises; this, the Conclusion. The former properly is Reasoning; the later, Resolving according to Reason.  
57 Reasoning is (a) producing or showing of (a) Reason. (A) Reason is the Ground of Intellectual Judgement; or the Cause why the Understanding either assents, or dissents. Assent is the Approving Judgement of the Understanding; Dissent is the Disproving Judgement of the Understanding. To show Reason for a thing, is to prove it: to show Reason against a thing, is to disprove it. Plain Reason is that which convinceth: Forced Reason is that which only confutes. To confute is, so to entangle a person that he cannot answer: To convince is, so to show him Reason, that he cannot deny it to be so. A man is often confuted, when yet he is not convinced.  
58. Method of Reasoning is called Logic; and is either Artificial or Natural. Artificial is the Logic of Schools, of which the chiefest is Aristotle's: and is useful many ways, but among others, mainly (as a Whetstone) to acute and sharpen the Wit; and to render it more sagacious, circumspect and wary, both in making and admitting Deductions and Consequences. Natural Logic, that of plain and illiterate men, of which I design to discourse, is the natural method of Reasoning; in relation whereunto the Scots are said to have a Proverb, That an Ounce of Mother-wit is worth a Pound of Clergy.  
59 Natural Logic is universal, a Logic of the whole kind; so that what in Natural Logic is reason to one man, is so to all; for all having the same Faculties, and using them in the same Method, must needs come to the same issue, and by the same Principles arrive to the same Conclusion.  
60. As one naturally by often seeing and attending to his own acts, acquires a method how to look to see to the best advantage, as also Optical Rules by which he judges of Objects; which Method and which Rules are [to speak generally] the same among all men: So may he by frequent reasoning, and attending to his own and others reasonings, easily and insensibly acquire a Method [which as reasoning itself will for the general be the same with all men] how to use his Reason to the best advantage, to reason out things. This common method of Reasoning, (which because common, and in some measure acquired without assistances of Art, I call natural) is natural Logic.  
61. All Reasoning is either Speculative or Practical. Speculative Reasoning is showing a thing is true or false: Practical Reasoning is showing a thing is to be done, or not to be done. (A) Speculative Reason is the ground of Speculative Judgement. (A) Practical Reason, the ground of Practical Judgement. Speculative Judgement is judgement that a thing is true or false: Judgement that it is true, is Speculative Assent; that 'tis false, Speculative Dissent. Practical Judgement is Judgement or Decree that a thing is to be done, or not to be done. Judgement that a thing is to be done, is Judgement for it, or practical Assent: Judgement that a thing is not to be done, is Judgement against it, or practical Dissent.  
62. Speculative Reasoning is either Proving or Disproving. To prove, is to show a thing to be true; to disprove, is to show a thing to be false. So that in natural Logic, [as to speculative Reasoning,] there are but two Topics, or principal places of Arguments, and those are Verity and Falsity: The one affords us a medium of Proving, the other a medium of Disproving: I prove what I say, by showing the Truth; I disprove what another says, by showing the Falsity of it.  
63. Truth and Falsity are to the Mind, as white and black to the Eye; as these are kinds of Colours, and so the objects of the Eye; so the former are kinds of Sense, and consequently objects of the Mind: And as the Eye rightly circumstanced and conditioned sees white to be white, and black to be black; so the Understanding sees Truth rightly shown to be Truth, and Falsity to be Falsity.  
64. Wherefore to prove a Truth to be one, is but in a right method to show it to the Mind, the Understanding apprehending a thing to be true when rightly showed, as the Eye doth see the show to be white that is duly held before it. A Notion may be true, yet not acknowledged to be so, because not rightly apprehended, or seen; and it is not rightly seen or apprehended, because not rightly showed: Then Truth is rightly showed, or shown to be Truth, when 'tis showed Systomatically, or Harmonically. The like is to be said of Falsity. But to enlighten this Point, I am to show at large what Truth, and consequently, what Falsity is.  
65. Truth, in the apprehensions of some of the Schoolmen and of others, is that conformity which is in things to their original Ideas in the Divine Intellect. All second Being's are but Copies of the Mind of the first, in which they have their Exemplars: and wherein doth the verity, the truth of Copies consist, but in a conformity to their Originals?  
66. But this notion of Truth (however true it may be) is not pertinent to us; 'tis Metaphysical Truth that it relates unto; a Truth of things as standing in the Analogy of God: but the Truth we treat of, and whose notion we are enquiring after, is Logical, a Truth of things as standing in our Analogy, and which is the ground of Assent. Certain it is, this notion that the Schools afford us, is not (nor can it be to us) a Medium of Reasoning; since we cannot say what is conformable or what is not unto the divine Exemplars. He must see the Original, and compare the Copy with it, that on knowledge will affirm this to be true.  
67. Of late the old Catalepsis has seen the light again, that comprehension discoursed of by Cicero in his Lucullus. The meaning of which is, that there is no other Criterium, no other judicial note of Truth, no other Rule, Mark, or Measure whereby to know a thing to be true, than clear and distinct Perception. And thus also the Cartesians.  
68 But on the contrary, clear and distinct Perception is not the Cause and Ground of Assent, but only a Condition of causing; Truth is the only Adequate and effectual Motive or Reason of Assent; but to be so, it must be clearly and distinctly perceived. Truth (as whiteness) is something in the Object that invites Assent: clear and distinct Perception is not in the Object, but of it; and consequently is not Truth, but conversant about Truth. Sight is not Colour, but of Colour; so neither is Perception Truth, but of Truth. Besides, that cannot be a certain mark of Truth, which may be affirmed as well of Error as of Truth. I may as clearly and distinctly perceive a thing to be false, as to be true. A thing may be evidently false, as well as evidently true.  
69. If any say (as doubtless some will) that by clear and distinct Perception, they mean nothing but a clear and evident apprehension of the truth of things; I answer, That then either they know what Truth is by its mark and definition, and by the impression that it makes on the Mind, as well as what Whiteness (is) by the impression made thereby on the Eye; or they do not. If they do not, how can they say they clearly and distinctly perceive a thing to be true, who know not Truth? They might as well say, they clearly and distinctly see a thing to be white, when they know not whiteness. Or if they know what Truth is, than that Impression, that Form, that Notion of Truth they have, ought rather to be insisted on, and not the (bare) Perception. They should say, The thing is true, we see clearly the Form and Notion of Truth in it. For indeed, nothing makes a thing true, but the Form and Notion of Truth therein: For did I apprehend a thing to be true never so clearly and distinctly, yet if I did but apprehend it so (as I may, and many do) and that the Notion and Form of Truth were no wise in it, it were not true by virtue of the Apprehension I had of it, but only seemed so. As I clearly and distinctly see an Image in the Glass, when indeed it is not there; or an Oar in the Water bowed and crooked, when indeed it is not so. It is an Error (and a most dangerous one too) to assert, that seeming or intellectual sense (for clear and distinct Perception signifies no more) is the measure of Truth: There are so many ways wherein a thing may be seen clearly and distinctly, that is, may seem true, and yet not be so. No convincing Heretics, or opinionate Philosophers, if Seeming be the mark of Truth.  
70. To this Opinion, I am now to add another much of kin to it; That of the truly-Noble and Learned the late Lord Herbert, namely, That Truth consisteth in the Analogy, Agreement, Harmony of things to our Faculties, inviting a most free and full Assent: Or, in his own Terms; Veritas est Harmonia inter object a & Facultates, habens sensum gratissimè & lubentissimè sine ulla haesttatione Respondentem.  
71. All the difference between the Former and the Latter Opinion is, that in the former Apprehension clear and distinct, in the latter Assent Free and Full, is made the Mark and Measure of Truth. Of this (Latter) Opinion, as that eminent Person (last mentioned) among the Moderns; so among the Ancients were a many noble Philosophers; in Tully it is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. and as described by him, it hath the same Foundation that his Lordship builds on, namely the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Truth. That Truth is so Domestical and Congruous to the Faculty, so Analogous and fit to it, that the Inclination of the Mind thereto, in Nàture and Necessity, resembles that of a Stone, or whatever or other heavy Body you'll imagine, to the Centre.  
72. But (1) a bare Congruity between the Object and the Understanding is not the ground of Truth, but of Sense or Intelligibility; and though there be a Congruity in all Truth, because there is a sense in it, and happily more Congruity because a more agreeable Sense; Yet since that Congruity is unobservable, unremarkable but by Assent, and Assent (of itself) is no sufficient Evincement of Truth; I lay it by as Illogical and useless. (2) Nor doth the Understanding blindly incline to Truth, and as it were by Sympathy, or a natural Motion of Aggregation; its Assent is (an act of) Judgement: The Mind proceeds therein judicially upon Allegations and Proof; judging a thing to be true, that is, assenting to it, only because it sees therein the Form, Notion, and Mark of Truth, as it judges a thing to be white wherein the Eye assures it there is the form of Whiteness. And (3) one may readily and cheerfully assent to Falsities and Errors, and mistake them for Truths; and therefore free and full Assent is no sufficient evincement of Truth. Not to urge that cheerfulness of Assent, that readiness and promptness we many times observe in it, is oftener an effect of a Passion bribing of the Understanding, than of a pure clear impartial Reason.  
73. Wherefore, others of the Ancients, as well as of the Moderns, abundantly convinced of the insufficiency both of Perception clear and distinct, and of Assent free and full to ascertain them of Truth, and yet unwilling to have Nature (so liberal in other matters) exposed to the reproach of Deficiency in One so important as intellectual Judgement; They have conceited humane understanding furnished by her with certain [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] Anticipations, that is, with Connatural and Engrafted Notions; Principles designedly implanted in the Mind, to be a rule to it to direct it. Thus in the speculative Understanding they have set up a habit, which they call Intelligence; in the Practical another which is called Synteresis; in both, a Constellation of Principles, shining with their own Light, and imparting it to others that want it; not much unlike to what is affirmed of Dionysius in his Celestial Hierarchy concerning Spirits, that those of superior Orders enlighten all beneath them in the inferior.  
74. But were there really such a System of Notions and first Principles engrafted in the Mind by Nature, in whose Light all others were to shine and to be seen, it would follow that Contemplation of our own minds, acquainting us with the Chain, Concatenation, and Sorites of the Principles therein, and Propositions deducible therefrom, would more import to the rendering us Philosophers (not to say Divines also) than observation of the World and Experience; and so the greatest Schoolmen (those Metaphysical Alchemists) that insisted much on this Method, and spun out all their notions of their own Bowels, should have been the wisest and most fruitful of men. Whereas we know the men, and the manner of their Communication; all their Discourses are indeed subtle and acute; but also empty and barren, and no more agreeing with Realities (and in our Analogy) than Light with Darkness.  
Again, the Soul in its state of Union and Conjunction with the Body, is so dependent on it in all its Operations, that it exercises none without the Aids of it. Ratiocination itself it is an Animal act; not an abstract Action of the Soul, but a (Concrete) act of the Animal; it is the Man reasons. And in the ordinary method of Nature, we receive into our Minds no Impressions, no Images, but what are handed to them by our Senses. I am apt to think that person who should never have seen, nor heard, nor tasted, nor smelled, nor felt any thing, would have his mind as little furnished with Ideas or Notions, as his Memory with Images, and would understand as little as he had sensed. Besides, those very Principles themselves we call First ones, or Anticipations shining with their own lustre and light, Propositions which we cannot but assent to assoon as we hear them, or mind them; It will appear, if we reflect warily on what doth pass in our Minds, that even these are not assented to, but on the Evidence they bring; I mean not assented to naturally, but (as other Propositions are) judicially. For instance, that the whole is greater than the part, we assented not unto it on the first hearing, but first considering what was meant by Whole, what by Part, what by Greater, what by Lesser; and then having sensibly, either by Eyesight, or by Imagination, compared one unto the other, we evidently saw it to be so; that the Notion of Greater, even to Sense, ever agreed to the whole; and that of Less, to the Parts. The like that Two and Two make Four. This is the way we first admitted to belief the Propositions which are called Principles; and it is no other than that wherein we admit all others. Only the Propositions (which are) called Anticipations, or first Principles, are Propositions of so easy, sensible, and plain an evidence, and so obvious, that we early admitted them, so early, that we cannot well remember when we first did so; and therefore they are styled Anticipations, or proleptick Notions: for being of so early an admission and existence in our Minds, they preceded all our (after) knowledges, whose acquirement we well remember.  
Further, Being's are not to be multiplied without Necessity, and there is none of feigning such Anticipations and Habits of Principles to direct the Mind in inquisitions after Truth, since all acknowledge there are no such principles in the Eye, the Ear, the Nose, the Tongue to direct them, and why then in the Mind? Besides, Reflection on our ordinary reasonings, evinces that in them we seldom attend to such Principles, but to the Object discoursed of; nor need we to do otherwise, if it can be evidenced that there is a certain Notion, Form, Ground of Truth that runs through all things true; which Form or Notion of Truth, assoon as the Understanding rightly circumstanced and conditioned, apprehends in an Object, it cannot but acknowledge it to be true, as it would another to be white or black, wherein it is assured by the Eye rightly circumstanced and conditioned, that there is the Form of Whiteness or Blackness. As for Anticipations, they are too particular, and not of a nature so large and comprehensive as to be the Rules and Measures of Truth, which is infinite. Let those Anticipations be reckoned, and then Experiment be made upon comparison with the immense Latitude of Questions, and of Truth relating to them.  
75. Thus I have shown the Indications, Marks, and Notions of Truth that (in my judgement) are not proper, adequate, or useful; it now remaineth that I show one (that) is. And Truth, as it is the Ground, Motive, and Reason of Assent, is objective Harmony, or the Harmony, Congruity, Even-lying, Answerableness, Consistence, Proportion, and Coherence of things each with other, in the Frame and Scheme of them in our Minds. Truth is universal and exact Agreement or Harmony.  
76. On the other hand, Falsity (as the ground, motive, and reason of Dissent) is Objective Disharmony, or the disharmony, incongruity, inequality, unanswerableness, inconsistence, disproportion, and incoherence of things, in the Frame and Scheme of them in our Minds. Any Disagreement or Disharmony is Falsity.  
77. Probability or Likelihood of Truth, is an appearance of Congruity. A thing is probable, when it hath some consistence and agreement; it Quadrates and lies even with what we do know; but in regard there are particulars relating to the same Systemes and Frames of Thoughts which yet we do not know, therefore we know not if it will lie even and square with them. Improbability is apparent Incongruity.  
78. That Truth is Harmony and Proportion, and consequently that Probability is apparent Harmony, apparent Proportion; and Falsity, Disharmony, Disproportion cannot be but very evident to him that shall consult with Nature and common sense.  
79. In Nature it is plain: For Harmony, it is the Reason of the World; the World was made by it, cannot be known but by it. The rule of Proportion is the King-Key, unlocking all the Mysteries of Nature. The Great Creator framed all things in the Universe in Number, Weight, and Measure: Extremes in it are united by participating Middles; and in the whole System there is so admirable Uniformity as ravishes every one that beholds it: every thing in its place is aptly knit with what is next it; and all together into one most regular Frame of most exact Proportions. Every thing we look on affords Examples; and Galen in his Books of the use of Parts, has a Thousand, to whom (if in so plain a matter it be necessary) I remit the Learned Reader.  
80. And 'tis a common sense, that what is congruous is true, and what is true is congruous; so common, that none ever fancied any notion of Truth but in Congruity: some Schoolmen, in Congruity to the Divine Intellect; Others in Congruity to our Faculties; and all men (though they speak not out, and it may be mind not that they do so) in Consistence and Congruity of things with one another; all generally concluding that Narration (for instance) to be probable, which seems consistent; and Probability being appearance of Truth, if what seems consistent be probable, what is so is true. But to give a Mechanical instance; one that would repair a broken China-dish, or make up a Watch or other Engine taken abroad, what Measures doth he naturally take to do so? what Rule proceeds he by? None verily, but by that of Congruity; he makes no question but that when he hath found a place for every part wherein it lies consistently and aptly with others, so that in the whole there is exact Coherence and Congruity, no Flaw, no Unanswerableness, it is truly set together, and every part in its place. Truth is Harmony.  
81. And seeing Truth is Harmony, and the Universe itself, as it consists in our Analogy, is but one System; it follows that properly there is but one Science (which some will call Pansophy) one Globe of Knowledge, as there is of Things: As also that the partition of Sciences, or rather the crumbling of them into so many, hath been a great impediment of Science; the dependency of Things, and their Relations one to another, thereby becoming unobserved and unconsidered. And in fine, that the more large, general, and comprehensive our Knowledge is, the more assured and evident it is. It is in Science as it is in Arch-work, the Parts uphold one another, and mutually contribute strength and beauty. The consinement of the Understanding to particular Knowledges, as also the limiting of it in any unto certain Methods and Terms of Art, is like too strait a swathing of the Child, and spoils its growth.  
82. So much for the two Topics of natural speculative Reasoning, namely, Truth and Falsity. It now lies on me more expressly to describe How Reasoning is performed in reference to them, and so what the Nature of it is. And natural speculative Reasoning is Systematical, and Harmonical; it is a showing, an evincing the Truth or Falsity of a thing, by conferring and comparing thing with thing; it is a showing a Notion to be true or not true, by representing of it in a Frame, a Scheme of real Notions, with all its Relations in it; and so by Comparing, Evidencing how it squares, agrees, and harmonizes, or otherwise.  
83. That Natural Reasoning is Harmonical, Systematical, that it is conferring, comparing, is evident in the Natural Reasonings of Plain and Illiterate, but Understanding men; who not having other Logic but that of kind, to verify their Tales, desire but to have them heard out from end to end; and who no otherwise confute their Adversaries, than by telling over again in their own way the whole Relation, that so both may be compared. Besides, the comparative method of Reasoning, used by the Mind in intelligible Objects, is no other than that we naturally use in those that are sensible: For, be it a visible Object we enqure into, and examine the truth of, we turn it every way, and into all postures, so to make a certain judgement of it; and Circumspection, (which is Cicero's word for it) or the Minds comparing and conferring of things is no other. And if Truth indeed be Harmony, Proportion, Congruity, an Object cannot be evinced true, but by being evinced Harmonical, Congruous, Proportionable; and it cannot be evinced Harmonical, Congruous, Proportionable, but by being conferred and compared, and upon collation and comparison shown to be so.  
84. To prove Harmonically, is in a Scheme and Frame of Notions bottomed on things, to show the thing to be proved, to quadrate, lie even, and to be entirely congruous and answerable. To disprove a thing Harmonically, is in a Frame and Scheme of Notions bottomed on things, to show it not to quadrate, but to be incongruous, unanswerable, and unadequate.  
85. The best way of Confuting Error, is to do it by showing the Truth: There is so great a delicacy in Proportions, that a Scheme of Thoughts may seem congruous and agreeing by itself, which compared with another, is observed no longer so; as two pieces of fine Cloth looked on at a distance, and not compared together, may be judged equally fine, and one no better than the other; whereas when put together and felt, and so compared, the difference is plain and discernible.  
86. The Effect of Reasoning, (and as it were the Conclusion) is Assent, or Dissent, according to evidence. Evidence is the Assurance we have a thing is true or false, and so is either of Truth or of Falsity, and answerably bottoms either Assent or Dissent.  
87. Assent is the judgement of the Mind upon evidence of Truth, that the thing is true. Dissent is the judgement of the Mind upon evidence of Falsity, that the thing is false.  
88 Evidence of Truth is either certain or probable. Certain Evidence is full Assurance. Probable Evidence is good Assurance, but not full. Certain Evidence is evidence of certain Truth. Probable Evidence is evidence of probability. Probable Evidence is now a-days termed a Motive of Credibility.  
89. In Proportion, as the Evidence is, so is the Assent. If the Evidence be certain, that is, indubitable and unquestionable, [and that is to be understood to be so, of which there is no cause to doubt, or make any Question] then the Assent is firm and certain, and without doubting; (but) if the Evidence be but probable, the Assent than is infirm, and with doubting more or less, as the Evidence is lesser or greater. To Doubt, is to fear lest the thing to which Assent is given should not be true.  
90. Evidence of Certainty, is to the Mind (as to its Assent) all as much as Evidence of Infallibility: For the Mind as firmly adheres to what it hath all reason for, and no reason against; all reason to believe it to be so or so, and no reason to believe it to be otherwise, as to what it apprehends impossible to be otherwise; seeing it were unreasonable and contradictious for Reason any wise to doubt, when it hath no reason at all to do so. I am as sure that once there were such persons as William the Conqueror and Henry the Eight, and that there are or lately were such Cities as Rome and Constantinople, as I am that Two and Two make Four, or that the Whole is greater than the Parts.  
91. Firm Assent in matters in themselves mutable and of a contingent nature, may be called Confidence; but in matters of a necessary, firm, and immutable nature, it is Science. Infirm Assent, or Assent with Dubitation, is called Opinion. Suspicion is a beginning Assent, or an inclination to believe a thing, and is short of Opinion. Suspicion on grounds is called just suspicion. Suspicion on no grounds is mere suspicion. Probability is appearance of Truth: And ground of Suspicion is Appearance of Probability. Suspicion is also called Presumption.  
92. Assent on Evidence by the testimony of our own Senses rightly circumstanced and conditioned, is as firm as firm can be, and is called Knowledge. Assent to a thing upon another's knowledge and not our own, is called Belief. To Believe, is to take a thing upon another's word; and if that word be divine, the belief is called Faith; or if but humane, it is called simply Belief or Credit. Belief is grounded on the wisdom and veracity of the person believed: for he that believes another, believes him to have wisdom enough not to be imposed upon or deceived himself; and Veracity or Truth (which among men is called Honesty) enough not to impose upon or to deceive him. The Word of God therefore is the most proper object of belief, God being so wise he cannot be deceived, and so true he cannot deceive. Notoreity of a thing [of a fact] is the certainty of it on Common Knowledge: It is not Presumption, nor Probability, but Certainty.  
93. Assent to Falsity under the notion of Truth, if it be firm, is called Error: If infirm, and with dubitation, it is erroneous Opinion.  
94. Ratiocination Speculative, is either Euretick or Hermeneutick, Inventive or Interpretative; and this latter again is either interpretative of the World, the Book of Nature; or of the Scriptures, the Book of God. But of these perhaps, another time, as also of the method of Reasoning which I called Practical, and is either that of Prudence (1. Humane, or 2. Christian) or of Conscience.  
Now on the whole Matter, who seethe not the share and interest (that) Reason hath in matters of Religion? Men are reasonable Creatures, and therefore their Religion must be reasonable: Every Tree must bring forth Fruit in its kind. Faith itself it is a rational Act [If I have any reason to believe Men, I have all reason to believe God] and Ratiocination is as much employed in points of Revelation, as in points of mere Reason. Truth is the immediate reason of Assent in matters of Revelation as well as in others; and there is an Analogy of Faith as well as of Nature; the Mediums are different; but Ratiocination is the same in both: We are as well obliged to compare Spiritual things with Spiritual in the one, as Natural things with Natural in the other. Thus are the Bereans applauded as persons of nobler and more generous Minds than those of Thessalonica, because they took not all on trust as these did, but examined the things were told them, and compared them with the Scriptures.  
It is easy also to infer, that if any person shall give himself the trouble of disproving what in my Apology I presented to the World; to do it to Conviction, he must produce a frame and Scheme of Thoughts more Congruous and Harmonical than mine, and must account for those Phaenomena which I therein essayed to solve, in a method more perspicuous and natural, and with more agreeableness and uniformity of Notions than I have; or else he will not Confute, but confirm it.  
I say this, to show the fairer play to those that undertake to answer me, if after I have said it any shall resolve to do so; and I say no more, to show the Opinion I yet avow to be mine of all the Objections whispered up and down, that in themselves they have as little force and evidence, and as little conviction, as those that make them have yet had either Courage to own them to the world, or Candour to own them to me.  
Thus, Sir, I have performed what I principally designed. I have showed the nature of Reason: I have showed the true method of Reasoning; as also the nature of Truth, and (up and down my Discourse dispersedly) the causes of Error: and I have showed the extent of Reason. In which performance, whatsoever other Incongruity or Error I may have been guilty of, sure I am I have committed none in dedicating it: For to whom could I address a Discourse of Reason and of Truth more properly, than to a Person who is so great a Lover and owner of both? and withal who is so perfectly honoured as you are by all that have the happiness to know you: But by none more than  
Sir, Bowdon, Aug. 14. 1677. Your most humble Servant and Son, Richard Burthogge.   

BOOKS Printed for, and sold by Samuel Crouch in Popes-head-ally.  
FEltham's Resolves, Divine, Moral, Political, with new Additions.  
Clark's martyrology.  
— His Lives of the Fathers.  
The Sabbath of Rest, to be kept by the Saints here. By N. Smith Master of Arts.  
Cole's English Dictionary.  
Dr. Thomsons method of Curing.  
— His Epilogismi Chymici.  
Sleepy spouse of Christ alarmed; in several Sermons. By J. B. Recommended in a Preface, by Mr. Nath. Vincent.  
Purchasers Pattern, much enlarged.  
The English Tutor: or the plain Pathway to the English Tongue; with examples of most Words from one to six Syllables, both in whole Words, and also divided: with Rules how to spell them, by way of Question and Answers.