A Brief DISCOURSE Concerning the Different WITS of MEN: Written At the Request of a Gentleman, Eminent in Virtue▪ Learning, Fortune. In the Year 1664.  
And now Published with Consent of the Author.  
LONDON, Printed by R. W. for William Whitwood at the Sign of the Golden-Lion in Duck-Lane, near Smithfield, 1669.   

THE CONTENTS.  

SECT. I. ARticle 1. The Occasion of this Discourse. 2. The Difficulty, and 3. Usefulness of the Argument. page 1.  
SECT. II. Art. 1. What is meant by Ingenium. 2. What by Docility, and the three Parts thereof. 3. The Difference betwixt Docility and Wit. 4. The Ambiguous signification of our English Word Wit. 8  
SECT. III. Art. 1. The Faculty of the Mind named Judgement, and its proper Act described. 2. Of Imagination, and its difference in respect of Celerity and Tardity. 3. The different proportions of Judgement and Imagination required in Poets, in Historians, in Panegyrists and Satirists, in Orators, in Philosophers and Counsellors. 4▪ A constant Prosecution of their End or Scope, required in all, for prevention of Extravagancy. 5. Wherein Prudence consists. 6. And wherein Cunning an● Evasion. 7. The Difference betwixt Natural and Acquired Wit. 1  
SECT. IV. Art. 1. The Author's conjecture concerning the Final Cause of the grea● diversity of Wit observed in Men. 2. The great obscurity of the Natural Causes of that diversity, in respect of our Ignorance of the Oeconomy of the Brain, and of the nature of the Mind. 3. Men of Sanguine and hot constitutions generally Acute, and those of the contrary Temperament, Dull; upon the authority of Hypocrates, and of Reason. 35  
SECT. V. Art. 1. Why the Author here attempts to describe only the most remarkable Differences of Wit, as the Sources of many Virtues and Vices. 2. The First General difference, or Ready Wit characterised. 3. A subdivision of the same. 4. And its Defects. 52  
SECT. VI Art. 1. The Character of the Ranging Wit, its Vanity and Levity. 2. With their proper Remedies. 62  
SECT. VII. Art. 1. The Third general Difference, or Slow but Sure Wit, and its Character. 2. The Obscurity to which it is subject. 3. And the way to overcome that obscurity. 74  
SECT. VIII. Art. 1. The Fourth general difference, or Ample Wit.. 2. And its distinction from the Narrow Wit.. 3. The use of that Distinction. 4. An Error of some Learned men, who hold, that no Wit can be great and of Public use, without the help of Scholastic Erudition. 5. The Refutation of that Error. 6. The Advantages arising to the Ample wit from solid Learning. 7. Self-confidence an impediment to the Best-tempered Wit.. 8. And Study a help even to Barren ones. 9 The Finest wits most impatient of Study, and why. 10. The Cure of that impatience. 79  
SECT. IX. ●rt. 1. A character of the sixth general difference, or Malignant Wit, with some of its disingenuous Artifices. 2. Three eminent examples of this Malignant Wit, viz. Cratinus, 3. Aristophanes, 4. And Tacitus. 5. Whence it comes, that the most abject Spirits are most prone to Mali●● worthy Men. 6. Mali●●nity of wit derived fr●● Ill-nature or Perversi●● of Disposition. 7. The difference betwixt Malignity and Festivity; with justification of innocent Jests. 8. The Conclu●●on. ¶.    

OF THE DIFFERENT WITS OF MEN.  

SECT. I.  

ARTICLE 1.  
Noble Sir,  
IF I have taken a whole Month to answer your last Letter, it hath been only because I ●ould not so much as show my willingness to do it in less time: the Command You were pleased therein to send me, being of so abstruse and difficult a nature, that to perform it with accurateness in any proportion correspendent to either its own dignity, or Your Curiosity, would require not one, but many Months, yea Years, though my Abilities were much greater than even the Ignorant and Envious believe them to be. You have, therefore, more of reason to blame me for Haste, than for Delay; in that I now render You so negligent an account of my diligence in managing the Province You assigned me: and if this Paper bring rather an end to Your Expectation, than satisfaction to Your Judgement; You are obliged in Equity to look upon it as a Specimen rather of my Obedience, than of my Learning. For, ●ad I not preferred the suggestions of my Duty, as a friend, to the counsel of my Reason, as an Inquirer into Nature; You may assure Yourself, it would have been very long, before I should have been brought thus freely to expose my Weakness to You, who are so well able to discern it. But my comfort is, though You are sharp-sighted, You are also Good-natured: not more apt to discover than to conceal men's infirmities and failings. Having then the same excuse both for my Tardity and for my Haste; and confiding entirely in Your Candour: behold, I put into Your hands the following Discourse, to which Your Command gave the first and sole Occasion, and in which I have plainly and briefly delivered both my thin Collections, and present Thoughts, concerning the Different Wits of Men.   

ART. 2.  
For, though Wit, or Natural Capacity of Understanding, seems to be the only thing wherein Nature hath been equally bountiful to all Mankind; every one thinking he hath enough, and even those who in their Appetites and Desires of other things are insatiable, seldom wishing for more of that excellent Endowment: Yet nothing is more evident than this, that some have more Wit than others, and that Men are thereby no less distinguishable each from other, than ●y their several Faces and Tem●ers.   

ART. 3.  
To enumerate, then, all these Differences, would be a work almost infinite; to define where●n they generally consist, extremely hard; to select and describe the most remarkable of ●hem, highly useful. For, when Men should by the help of such Descriptions be brought to see the Principal and Ruling Inclinations (for the most part the inseparable Concomitants of their Wits) that advance or depress their Estimation and Fortunes in the World, reduced to a few Heads or Kind's: it would be no hard matter for them to find out the several Advantages deducible from thence. First, every one might contemplate, as in a Mirror, some part at least of his own Image, and know in what Classis to rank himself. Then; by observing what is beautiful or deform in the picture of another, he might the better judge of what himself either desires or fears to be. Again, since Virtues and Vices mutually encroach upon each others confines, and that no Ingeny is so propense to Vices, but that it▪ retains a capacity of being kept from Exorbitancy, and by the strict rains of Prudence inflected to their neighbouring Virtues; and on the other side, none is so nearly allied to this or that Virtue, but may by imprudence be corrupted, so as to swerve toward some bordering Vice: it could not be unprofitable to view the Copies of such Inclinations, attended by their good or evil Consequents, and from thence to collect how far they might benefit or hurt, if followed. In fine, by such general Characters, we might learn how to moderate our Praises of some Persons, and our causeless Aversation from others; than which nothing is more necessary in Conversation, especially in election of a Friend.  
But, alas! Sir, such a Work as this doth yet remain among the Desiderata in Philosophy, and so is likely ever to do for me, who am so conscious of the many Herculean Difficulties therein to be encountered and overcome; that I find myself more inclined to wish, than capable to perform it. You ought not, therefore, to wonder, if instead thereof I adventure to present You this rude Essay.    

SECT. II.  

ART. 1.  
THat Faculty of the Mind, which is commonly understood by the word WIT, being a thing whereof Men have form to themselves various Conceptions, and for which they have accordingly invented various Names; it must needs be difficult to determine what is thereby meant, and what denomination is most agreeable and pro●er thereunto. Nor is it less difficult to investigate the Nature ●hereof, and wherein it doth ●hiefly consist: the Oeconomy of the Brain of Man being one of those Arcana of Nature, whose knowledge the wise Creator seems to have reserved to Himself.  
As for the several Names or Words by which it is most usually expressed; I am obliged to recount and explain them to you briefly, that so being delivered from Ambiguity (one of the greatest impediments to Science) You may soon be able to judge which of them is Equivocal, which Adequate and proper.  
The Latin word, Ingenium though sometimes used even by the best and most accurate Writers, and who lived in the Golden Age of that Language, to signify the power of Understanding proper to Mankind; as may be instanced in that memorable sentence of Sallust, (in initio Belli Catilinarii) Mihi rectius esse videtur, ingenij, quam virium opibus gloriam quaerere: Yet we find it most frequently used to denote a man's natural Inclination or Propension to some things or actions more than to others, whether virtuous or vicious; as may appear, among a thousand other instances, from that saying of the same judicious Historian, in his Character of Catiline; Fuit magnâ vi & animi & ●orporis, sed ingenio malo, & pravo; ●nd from that of Suetonius, re●ating that Tiberius connived at ●ome youthful debaucheries of Caligula, Si per has mansuefieri posset ●erum ejus ingenium.   

ART. 2.  
Sometimes by Wit is understood Aptness to Discipline, or Promptitude to learn: which the ancient Grecians, both Philosophers and Orators, called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; the Latins, Docilitas, & bona indoles, to which our Language hath no word answerable, but Towardliness, now almost obsolete. If you inquire wherein this happy Faculty doth consist, they tell you, that it is not simple, but composed of three others.  
The First of which is named 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Acumen, & (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) celeritas discendi, or, as Xenophon, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a quick or nimble apprehension of what is taught: though I remember the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be not seldom applied to Acerbity and Cruelty of disposition; as by Arrianus in that phrase, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
The Second, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (ab 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, propè, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, animadverto, cogito, inspicio) which is defined to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Faculty whereby a man, from what he hath learned, hunts after what he hath not learned: the same with that the Romans termed Sagacitas, and our incomparable Mr. Hobbs renders Ranging.  
The Third, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Memoria; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Retention of what is learned.   

ART. 3.  
Here, Sir, You have both the true Notion and Parts of Docility conveniently expressed; but yet you are to seek, whether Wit and Docility be always one and the same thing. For, Docility, if restrained only to Arts and Sciences, though it necessarily implies a good capacity of understanding in the Person, by the bounty of Nature, therewith enriched: yet can it not be thence inferred, that all men who want this Docility, want also wit; because than none could have wit, but Scholars alone, and because Experience sufficiently demonstrates that many laudable Wits are naturally averse from the study of Letters, and in that respect perhaps also incapable of proficiency in them. So that what Anatomists generally say of the signs of Virginity, namely that the appearance of them is a certain evidence of the Bride's Chastity; but the non-appearance, no proof of her deflowerment before Marriage; may with equal truth be said of this Docility; it cannot be without a good Wit, but a good Wit may sometimes be without that. Learning, You know, is but Wit cultivated; the seeds thereof are Natural, and grow up of themselves, and many times bring forth fruits both pleasant and useful, without the help of Art, especially where their Luxuriancy is prevented by virtuous education, and their maturity promoted by ingenious conversation. If wit, then, may subsist without Learning, certainly it may subsist without Docility, i. e. a facility of learning Arts and Sciences.  
Besides, if we divide Docility into its three parts newly described, and distribute them among three Men, allowing to one quickness of Apprehension, to the second Sagacity in hunting after consequences, and strength of Memory to the third: this will not be sufficient to direct us to make a judgement, which of the three ought to have the praise of the best Wit: because therein they may all be Equal. For, we want not the testimony of daily observation, that many excellent Wits have but weak Memories, and as many of admirable Memories are yet dull of Apprehension; and again many, who are good at Ranging after Consequences, though it be necessary that they remember well (because it is from the reminiscence of what they have known, that they infer what they seek) are yet but slow of Conception. Hereupon I am of opinion, that Wit and Docility, though frequently Concomitant, are yet distinct Faculties, and therefore require both Names and Notions distinct.  
Many other words there are used also by the Romans to signify Wit; as perspicacia, solertia, subtilitas, dexteritas, felicitas ingenij, etc. but these being all Metaphorical, are therefore Ambiguous, nor worthy a particular examination.   

ART. 4.  
Nor is our English word, Wit, (which some of our Glossaries derive from the Teutonic Witz, to understand; and others from the Latin Videlicet contracted into viz. because instead thereof we say to wit) altogether exempt from Ambiguity: as being indifferently used to signify either the Faculty of understanding itself, or the Act or Effect of that Faculty, in the former sense, whe● we say, such a man hath a great Wit: in the latter, when we give the name of Wit to a jest, pleasant conceit, or facete expression, such as the Latins call sales, lepores, facetiae; the Italians, Scherzo, givoco, burla; and the French, raillery and gaudisserie.    

SECT. III.  

ART. 1.  
FRom the recital of the Names, we pass to the consideration of the Nature of Wit.  
The Understanding of a Man. (You know, Sir) is commonly measured either by the rectitude of his Judgement, or the celerity of his Imagination.  
By Judgement, we distinguish subtlety in objects nearly resembling each other, and discerning the real dissimilitude betwixt them, prevent delusion by their apparent similitude. This Act of the Mind the Grecians term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Latins, Judicium and Dignotio; and we, Discretion. The Faculty itself, Aristotle (Ethic. 6. c. 7.) names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Latins, subtilitas ingenij; from them the Italians, sottigliezza, and sottilitá; the French, subtilitè; and we, subtlety, which is no other but a certain perspicacity of the Mind, whereby it is able to compare things one with another, and discern the difference betwixt them, notwithstanding they appear very much alike. Herein Old men (caeteris paribus) usually excel Young; because by long Experience (which is nothing else but Remembrance of what Antecedents have been followed by what Consequents) they have learned the Marks or signs, by which things are to be compared and distinguished: and Men of nimble Apprehension (caeteris paribus) have the advantage of those who are of slow; because they observe more signs of difference in less time.   

ART. 2.  
By Imagination, on the contrary, we conceive some certain similitude in objects really unlike, and pleasantly confound them in discourse: Which by its unexpected Fineness and allusion, surprising the Hearer, renders him less curious of the truth of what is said. This is very evident in the use of Similes, Metaphors, Allegories and other Tropes and Figures of Rhetoric; which are therefore called the Ornaments of speech, serving rather for plausibility, than for demonstration. And, indeed, their power over the Affections of the greatest part of Mankind, whether by the word Affection we understand what the Grecians call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Passion, or what they term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Moors, Manners; is so great, that the whole Art of Oratory is grounded thereupon, and he is the most Excellent in that Art, who by the help of those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Images, of things absent form in his Imagination, doth represent them in so lively colours, that they appear present. Hereupon doubtless it was, that Quintilian (institut. Orator. lib. 6. cap. 11.) saith, a good Orator must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 qui sibi res, voces, actus, secundum verum optimè fingat.  
Now the Imagination be in common to all Men (yea and to Brute Animals also) yet is it not equal in all Men. Some are naturally endowed Celeritate imaginandi, with a quickness of imagination, that is, an easy succession of one thought upon another: others are but slow of imagination, which defect of the Mind is called Tarditas ingenij, dulness, and if great, stupor, stupidity or sottishness.  
From Celerity of Imagination there ariseth a twofold difference of Wit. Some are naturally inclined to indulge their thoughts the liberty of Ranging, and love not to confine them: Others delight in fixing their mind upon one object, and narrowly examining it. The former sort are allowed to have Laudabilem Phantasiam; and have a Genius disposed to Poësy and Invention: unless their Fancy be immoderately quick and ranging; for than it passes into Folly, such as theirs, who are not able to finish the discourse they have begun, being suddenly taken off and carried away by new thoughts altogether impertinent. Which undecent shifting of thoughts is properly named Extravagancy. The Latter are said to have Judicium probabile; and therefore are fit to study Philosophy, Civil Law, and Controversies.   

ART. 3.  
For the most part both these Virtues of the Mind are indeed conjoined in the same Persons; but seldom equally eminent: and the several degrees of pre-dominion of the one over the other, constitute the chief differences of Men, as to Wit or Understanding. Fancy without moderation of Judgement, seldom attains to commendation: but judgement or Discretion, though unassisted by Fancy, always deserves praise.  
In Poets, both Fancy and Judgement are required; but Fancy ought to have the upper hand, because all Poems, of what sort soever, please chiefly by Novelty.  
In Historians, Judgement ought to have the chair; because the Virtue of History consisteth in Method, Truth, and Election of things worthy narration: nor is there need of more Fancy, than what may serve to adorn the stile with elegant language.  
In Panegyries, and Invectives, Fancy ought to take place; because they have for their end not truth, but praise or dispraise, which are effected by comparisons illustrious, or vile or ridiculous: and Judgement doth only suggest Circumstances, by which the action is rendered laudable or unblamable.  
In Hortatives and Plead of Causes, according as verity or simulation doth principally conduce to the advantage of the Argument; so Judgement, or Fancy is to have pre-eminence.  
In Demonstration, in Counsel, and in all severe investigation of Truth, only Judgement is required; unless perhaps sometimes there be occasion for some convenient similitude, to illustrate what is alleged. But as for Metaphors, they are wholly to be excluded, as equivocal and introductory to fallacy: and therefore to admit them in grave Counsel, or strict Ratiocination, is no less than manifest folly and impertinency. In all serious discourse, if there appear want of Discretion, however pleasant Fancy shall show itself, yet Wit will be defective: but if Judgement be manifest, though the Fancy be but vulgar, the Wit shall be commended.   

ART. 4.  
But in all, besides that discretion of times, places and persons, which renders Fancy commendable, and wherein Civil prudence and the good Menage of affairs doth principally consist; there is required also Constant Prosecution of the Scope or End proposed, that is frequent application of our thoughts to the subject about which we are conversant. For, so there will occur to us apt similitudes, such as will not only illustrate, but also adorn our discourse, and excite pleasure in the hearers by the rarity of their invention. Whereas if there be not a constant regulation of thoughts to some certain End; the more we are conducted by heat of Fancy, the nearer we come to Extravagancy, which is a degree of Madness; such as is observed in those Rambling Wits, who (as we said even now) having entered into discourse of one thing, are by every new hint, however remote and impertinent, transported from their subject into so many digressions and Parentheses, that not recovering what at first they intended to speak, they lose themselves, as in a Labyrinth. The Reason of which Error seems to be grounded upon defect of Experience, which makes them imagine that to be new and remarkable, which to more knowing heads is really stale and trivial; and that to be great and considerable, which to others of more observation is not so. For, whatever is new, great and memorable, if it occur to the Mind of one speaking of another subject, is wont to seduce him from his purpose.   

ART. 5.  
When a man, therefore, having proposed to himself some certain End, and in his thoughts running over a multitude of things, as means conducible thereunto, doth quickly perceive which of them is most probable, and how it may be brought to effect his design: this man is said to have a good Wit, and the Habit hereof is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Prudence. Which depends upon Experience and Remembrance of many the like Antecedents, with the like Consequents. But herein men differ not one from another so much as in Judgement and Fancy; because men of equal age, may not be very unequal in Experience, as to the quantity, though one hath more of experience in some things, and another in others; since every one hath his particular affairs, concernments and ways of managing them: and a Husbandman, though rude and illiterate, is yet wiser in his own business, than a Philosopher in another man's. Whence that rule, Cuique in sua arte credendum.   

ART. 6.  
To this Prudence if there be conjoined the use of Means unjust, or dishonest, such as Fear, or Poverty doth too often suggest: than it degenerates into that sinister Prudence, which is called Astutia, Craft or Cunning; which is for the most part a sign of Pusillanimity or poorness of Spirit. For, a great Mind scorns unjust and dishonest helps to bring him to his aims. There is also another sort of Cunning, called Versutia, Evasion; which is deferring or putting off for a little time some danger or incommodity impendent, by running into worse: and the word seems a derivative from Versura, which signifies borrowing of one, to pay another.  
Having given You, Noble Sir, this short and imperfect account of what I have collected concerning the Nature and divers Notions of those Intellectual Faculties, which are vulgarly comprehended under the name of Wit; and deduced, according to probability, the principal Differences thereof from the various degrees of Eminency of Judgement and Fancy: the remaining part of the Task You have been pleased to assign me, is to inquire briefly into the Causes of those Differences, as well Final as Efficient; and then describe each of them singly with as much truth and evidence, as my small observation, and less Learning shall enable me to do.   

ART. 7.  
But, to prevent mistake, I am obliged first to advertise You (what I had almost forgotten) that by the Wit I have hitherto spoken of, I mean that which is Natural, or which grows up together with us, accrueing only from Use and Experience, without the help of Method, culture or Doctrine. For, as to that which they call Ingenium Acquisitum, acquired by study of Learning and polite Education; I conceive it to be no other but Reason, which arising from the right use of speech, produces Arts and Sciences; and seems to be only an Effect or Product of the former cultivated by industry.    

SECT. IV.  
THus freed from all Ambiguity of Words and Notions commonly applied to Wit, which otherwise might perhaps have led us out of our right way, or at least darkened the prospect of our Reason; let us proceed in our Disquisition softly and fairly to prevent stumbling: following the conduct of the Method newly proposed. Which brings us in the next place to consider the Final Cause of the great Diversity of Wits observed in Men.  

ART. 1.  
What was the End, which the Omniscient Creator designed to Himself, when He was pleased to constitute this so great and admirable variety; You, Sir, (I know) are too wise, too conscious of the immense disparity betwixt a Finite Nature and an Infinite, to expect I should be able to determine: all His Counsels being to us, poor ignorant things, impervestigable, as His Perfections are incomprehensible. However, since we are not forbidden with due reverence to conjecture; You (I hope) won't refuse to hear my foolish sentiments concerning this problem: especially while I offer them rather to Your Examination, than to Your belief.  
When, therefore, I observe, that Men are no less discriminable each from other by the various Inclinations, Affections and Capacities of their Minds, than by the dissenting features, lines and airs of their Faces; I am apt to persuade myself, that God Almighty, in making so vast dissimilitude, and in that distribution of His several Donatives among Individuals of the same Species, intended thereby to accommodate Mankind to a Civil life: it being no more possible for a Society of Men, or Commonwealth, to be composed of Members all of the like endowments of Mind; than it is for an Animal to exercise various Functions with many Organs all of the same parts, shape and fabric; or for Musical Harmony to result from a multitude of Unisons. I am not ignorant, that even the best Philosophers, when they contemplate the diversity of Nature's Endowments, and the most probable Reason thereof, modestly bound their Curiosity with this clause, that Nature delights herself in variety, as well in this as in all other kinds. Nor do I deny what they here say to be thus far true, that Nature, as being the Art of God, can have no other perfection, but what is derived from her Author and Governor, whose Goodness cannot be terminated but in itself; and consequently all Emanations and Effects of that Goodness must redound to the delight of their first Fountain. Yet this (methinks) doth not oblige us to acquiesce in that consideration alone, without all reflection upon ourselves; there being perhaps some other Reason or End of such Variety, wherein Mankind may be highly concerned. I conceive, then, that the Creator having one Eye directed to the pleasure redounding to Him from the manifestation of His Power and Goodness; aimed with the other at some general benefit and favour to Man, to whom He purposed to be singularly indulgent and gracious in all things: and that foreseeing how much more securely, commodiously and happily Men might live in Societies, than single and dispersed, as wild Beasts; He ordained this great diversity of Ingenies among them, as a means to accommodate them to mutual assistance and association. But this I deliver as only probable, not definitive: and leaving it to Your better judgement to be approved or rejected, I pass on to the Natural Causes of the diversity under enquiry.   

ART. 2.  
Wherein I meet with no less obscurity, than in the former. For, though it be sufficiently evident, especially to Physicians conversant about diseases of the Head, that the Seat and principal Organ of the Intellectual Faculties is the Brain; and that they are more or less perfect in their Operations, according to the divers temperament, magnitude, figure and schematism of that noblest Organ; and to the greater or less Mobility of the Animal spirits (if any such there be) contained and exercised therein: though thus much (I say) be sufficiently manifest, yet what temperament, what magnitude, figure and Schematisme of the Brain produceth Acuteness of Wit, and what causeth Dulness, is hitherto unknown. Nor have Anatomists, even in this dissecting and most curious Age, been yet able certainly to inform themselves, in what part of the Brain that Celestial Guest, the reasonable Soul, keeps her Court of Judicature; what part she makes use of in Sensation, what in Imagination, what for Memory, or what for Ratiocination. Vesalius (I remember) the Prince of Anatomists in the last Age, expressly, nor without derision of those who believed and taught the contrary, affirms, that the Fabric of Man's Brain is not in the least different from that of the Brains of Brutes. The Text is remarkable, the great Authority of the Man considered; and therefore I will here transcribe it. (de Corpor. Human. fabric. lib. 7. cap. 1.)  Qui in Imaginatione, Ratiocinatione, Cogitation, Memoria, Cerebrum suo fungatur munere; haudquaquam ex sententia apprehendo: neque quicquam insuper ab Anatomico, vel Theologorum omnem rationis vim, ac totam ferè Principis nobis vocatae Animae facultatem, Brutis Animalibus adimentium occasione, indagandum puto. Quum Cerebri nimirum constructione Simia, Canis, Equus, Felis & Quadrupeda quae hactenus vidi omnia, & Aves etiam universae, plurimaque Piscium genera, omni propemodum ex parte Homini correspondeant: neque ullum secanti occurrat discrimen, quod secus de Hominis quam de illorum Animalium functionibus statuendum esse praescribat. 
To this You'll answer perhaps, that such indeed was the judgement of Vesalius; but You are not obliged to acquiesce therein, because You have lately not only read a certain Book, de Proprietatibus Cerebri Humani, wherein the Author observes many considerable Differences betwixt the Humane Brain, and those of all other Animals; but also with Your own eyes behold those Differences demonstrated by the same Author, in some Dissections for that end made by him at the command of the Royal Society: and that therefore You hope, if Anatomists proceed in their discoveries, with the same accurate scrutiny, and the like happy success, as of late Years they have done; some one of them may at length be so fortunate, as to find out the true uses of all the several parts of the Brain of Man, and so solve all the difficulties that now amuse those, who profoundly consider the wonderful Oeconomy thereof.  
I reply, therefore; that granting Vesalius to have been much mistaken in that his Opinion concerning the Brain; and that there really are those Differences betwixt Man and all other Animals, which the Book you mention declares: Yet (Sir) what I have here said concerning the abstrusity of the Nature, immediate Instruments, and ways of operation of the Intellectual Faculties, is nevertheless too true. For, You cannot but remember, that even the Author of that Treatise himself doth in the end of it ingenuously confess, that notwithstanding his frequent observation of those Differences, he was still as ignorant of the principal seat of the soul, and what parts she made use of in her several Functions, as before he first entered into the Anatomic Theatre. And were it not a Parergon, I could collect, and here recount many observations, recorded by Eminent Physicians, of such, who retained the use of their Senses, Imagination, Memory and Reason, without any the least defect, even to the last minute of life; and yet in their Heads opened after death, there was found (as in most Fishes) but very little of Brain, and that little altogether confounded and dissolved in Water. For a memorable Example of this astonishing Phaenomenon, I take liberty to refer You to lib. 1. cap. 24. of the Medical observations of Nich. Tulpius, a late learned and judicious Physician, and Senator of Amsterdam: who relating the various Conjectures of some of his Colleagues thereupon, gravely concludes with this free confession of his ignorance; Quantum est, quod nescimus! Velut namque in aliis, sic certè credibile est, potissimùm nos coecutire in genuino Cerebri regimine: cujus opera multo fortassis sunt diviniora, quam quispiam hactenus suo comprehendit captu. As for Your expectation of further discoveries from Anatomy, that may afford more light to direct the Virtuosos in their researches into this dark Argument; I cannot indeed divine what time may bring forth: but am of Opinion, that there is less reason for Your Hope, than for Your Wish for any such discovery; the nature of Man's Mind being such, that it cannot understand itself.  
Adeò Animo non potest liquere de caeteris rebus, ut adhuc ipse se quaerat: Senec. Natur. Quaest. lib. 7. cap. 24.   

ART. 3.  
You are not then to wonder, if I acknowledge myself unable to define from what various Constitutions of the Brain the Differences of Wit arise, as from their proxime Causes. All I dare observe to You, concerning that Aenigma, is only this; that for the most part Men of hot and sanguine Constitutions, caeteris paribus, are more ingenious and acute; and those of cold, gross and Phlegmatic, are more dull and slow of Imagination. If for this You require Authority, I can allege that of Hypocrates himself, who hath two texts expressly favourable and pertinent to the same: one concerning the Sanguine; the other, the Phlegmatic Temperament. The first is this; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: quod humidissimum est in igne, & siccissimum in aqua, si in corpore temperamentum acceperint, sapientissima sunt. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lib. 1. sect. 29. The other, this; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: porro si in aliqua Anima defectuosiorem vim ignis accipiat quam aqua, eam tardiorem esse necesse est; & appellantur tales Stolidi. Ibidem Sect. 32. If Reason; it is obvious, that the Blood being the fountain of Natural Heat, and in truth the only Calidum innatum, by which all parts of the body are perpetually warmed, enlivened and invigorated; and out of whose purest and agilest parts the Animal Spirits are supposed to be extracted: by how much more copious and pure the Blood is, by so much more of heat is thence communicated to the Brain and its Appendix of Nerves (thereby made more firm and apt both to receive and retain the Images or impressions of external Objects; and more pervious to the Animal spirits) and a greater supply of Spirits generated out of it, for the uses of the Animal Faculties therein residing, and thereon depending, and è contra. Hence doubtless it was, that Empedocles held the Blood to be both the seat and cause of Sapience: and that Dr. Harvey, somewhere in his Book of the Generation of Animals, affirms it to be of no small advantage to the Brain, that Students and contemplative Men preserve their mass of Blood pure and uncorrupt.  
But I remember that my present task belongs rather to Morals than to Physic, and therefore superseding all further enquiry concerning the diversity of constitutions from whence the diversity of Wits may arise; and remitting You to the serious consideration of what that Excellent Man, Mr. Hobbes hath delivered (lib. de Homine, cap. 13.) concerning the Mutation of men's Ingenies by Passions, Custom, Experience, the goods of Fortune, Opinion of ones self, etc. I pass to the principal Differences themselves, and their Descriptions; which animated by Your Command, I proposed to myself chiefly to handle in this hasty exercise of my blunt and unequal Pen.    

SECT. V.  

ART. 1.  
TO go about to describe the great variety of Ingenies among Men, though of but one and the same Nation, were an attempt equally vain with his, who should endeavour to number the Sands; nor less impossible than for a Painter to pourtrey all the several faces in an Army upon one table. As it is sufficient, therefore, to a well-drawn Landscape, to contain the most eminent hills, buildings, trees and other objects situate in the prospect of the Eye within that Horizon: so may it be some satisfaction to You, if among a vast number of different Wits I select the most Eminent, such as appear to be the springs or Sources of many Virtues, and not fewer Vices; and then represent them in Colours so suitable to their several Natures, that You may be able to discern and distinguish each from the rest, notwithstanding the near affinity and resemblance, which some of them have with others. I call them the Sources of many Virtues and Vices; because this may pass for a Maxim, Ingenia quando assuescendo ita confirmata sunt, ut facilè, nec reluctante ratione, suas edant actiones, dicuntur Mores: qui si boni sunt, Virtutes; sin mali, Vitia appellantur.   

ART. 2.  
To address then to their Descriptions. That which occurs in the first place is the READY or nimble Wit. Wherewith such as are endowed have a certain Extemporary acuteness of conceit, accompanied with a quick delivery of their thoughts, so as they can at pleasure entertain their Auditors with facetious passages, and fluent discourses even upon very light occasions. They have indeed much of that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sive habilitas in promptu excogitandi quid dicto sit opus, formerly described; and are therefore excellent at sudden Repartés: but being generally impatient of second thoughts and Deliberation, they seem fitter for pleasant Colloquies and Drollery, than for Counsel and Design. Like Fly-boats, good only in fair weather and shallow waters: and then too more for pleasure, than traffic. If they be, as for the most part they are, narrow in the Hold, and destitute of Ballast sufficient to counterpoise their large Sails; they reel with every blast of Argument, and are often driven upon the sands of a Nonplus: but where favoured with the breath of common Applause, they sail smoothly and proudly, and, like the City Pageants, discharge whole Volleys of Squibbs and Crackers, and skirmish most furiously.   

ART. 3.  
Of these You meet with two sorts. Some carry away the bell in Table-talk and familiar conversation, with short, but piquant touches of Fancy, such as plays chiefly upon the defects or misfortunes of others in the company, yet without gall: their teeth are sharp, but not venomous: and they rather nibble, than by't. Others, approaching nearer to the dignity of Eloquence, are provided, whenever they please to employ their talon, either in public or private, to speak volubly, and to the purpose; yet not so much from solidity of Judgement; as strength of Memory, which instantly supplies them with whatever they have heard or read agreeable to their Theme. The fine descants and poignant remarks of both sorts are commonly admired not only by ignorant Ears, but also by some of Scholastic Erudition; who observing the facility of their vein in breaking sharp jests, and pouring forth a torrent of not undecent expressions, are apt to grow out of love with themselves, and to be offended with their own flowness of Conception, which permits them not to do the like without premeditation and pumping. And they have reason. For, what can You imagine more speciously resembling true industry, and graceful Elocution, than the opportune and pertinent Hits of these facetious Spirits? what more Elegant, than to make acute reflections upon every occurrent; and to give hometouches with gentleness; which are the less resented, because they appear sudden and jocular. If to this Promptness and Jocundity of Wit, either Nature hath been so liberal as to add comeliness of Person, or Fortune so propitious as to conjoin dignity of Condition; especially if it be animated by great and secure Confidence: then is their liberty of jesting as it were authorized in all places, nor ungrateful to those whom it provokes: yea oftentimes, by its very Galliardise, it wins the Palm from solid and exact Prudence, if lodged in Men of excellent abilities, but slow Expression. Of the advantages rebounding to a ready Wit from that Gracefulness of Person, which the Grecians termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the Latins, dignitas oris; You have an eminent Example in Dion the Syracusan, who thereby much ingratiating himself to the people, was so prosperous in his ambition, that he ruined Dionysius, and succeeded him in the Sovereignty of Sicily: and Corn. Nepos puts the same in his Character; where among his natural Endowments he reckons as chief, ingenium docile & come; magnamque corporis dignitatem, quae non minimum commendatur.   

ART. 4.  
But this so charming swiftness of both Fancy and Tongue is not exempt from its Failings, and those shameful ones too sometimes. For, take them from their familiar and private conversation, into grave and severe Assemblies, whence all extemporary flashes of Wit, all Fantastic allusions, all Personal reflections are excluded; and there engage them in an encounter with solid Wisdom, not in light skirmishes, but a pitched field of long and serious debate concerning any important question: and then You shall soon discover their weakness, and contemn that barrenness of understanding which is uncapable of struggling with the difficulties of Apodictical knowledge, and the deduction of truth from a long series of Reasons. Again, if those very concise sayings, and lucky Repartés (for the Court hath now naturalised that Word) wherein they are so happy, and which at first hearing were entertained with so much of pleasure and admiration; be written down, and brought to a strict examination of their Pertinency, Coherence and Verity: how shallow, how frothy, how forced will they be found! how much will they lose of that Applause, which their tickling of the ear, and present flight through the Imagination had gained! In the greatest part therefore of such Men You ought to expect no deep and continued River of Wit; but only a few Plashes, and those too not altogether free from mud and putrefaction.    

SECT. VI  

ART. 1.  
IN the second place comes the RANGING Wit, whose Pregnancy is so diffused, that it flies at all things; and commonly assisted with prolix Eloquence, discourseth copiously rather than closely; without premeditation supplying itself with words and sentences, as out of a treasury inexhaustible. Men of this Talon are usually in high esteem with the People, if of such Professions as give them opportunities to show their Copiousness in public Assemblies or Councils: nor ungrateful in private Conversation, at least when once they have learned as well to be silent at some times, as to speak profusely at others. Which they cannot easily do. For, as all Brute Animals know, by natural instinct, in what part their chief power lies, and delight in the frequent use of that part above all the rest of their members: so these Men, highly delighted with their faculty of Eloquence, wherein alone they excel, are hardly brought to observe Decorum, and opportunities when to contract or expatiate, when to speak or hold their peace; but carried violently on by an itch of declaiming on every subject, how trivial or impertinent soever, often entangle themselves in Arguments above their understanding, and so satiate, but not satisfy their Hearers. So that even a Wise man may justly wonder, their imprudence considered, how they are able to speak so much and so little at once, so well and to so little purpose. Having at length ended (not finished) their fine Harangues, they scarcely refrain from openly applauding themselves: and if their Auditors show any signs of Complacency and good Humour, they are apt to refer it only to a satisfaction of judgement resulting from the Elegancy of their discourses, though the same ariseth rather from Joy that they are at length delivered from the importunity of them. Notwithstanding this Vanity it must be confessed, these Wits have long wings▪ and incited by a secret impetus of Nature, delight to fly abroad▪ and range over the whole field of Sciences: but then again such is their speed and praecipitancy, they stay no where long enough to examine, select and gather; like Bees in a windy day, they take only a superficial taste of various flowers, and return to their hives unloaded. Whence it comes, that while they are discoursing of one part of Learning, if a new hint chance to arise and intrude itself into their Imagination, instantly quitting their former Theme, they as ardently pursue the new one; and so often divert▪ to fresh Arguments, till they have wholly forgotten the question first started; as unstanch Hounds, meeting with a new scent, follow it with full cry, and lose the Beast first chased. And this is that Defect of Mind, which is commonly called Levity: arising perhaps chiefly from an excessive Mobility of the Animal spirits in the seat of Imagination.  
No wonder, then, if these Rambling Heads be so far from attaining to sublime and extraordinary Wisdom, that for the most part they come short of even Vulgar ones in ordering their affairs according to the rules of Domestic Prudence. Some of them becloud themselves with the Vapours of Philauty, self-love, and overvaluation of their own Opinions, and hu●●ing after Praise: Others lose their credit by too-visible Affectation: Others attempt things above their reach, and sink themselves by aspiring: and Most prove wanting to themselves and Friends in such offices, where constant sedulity, and steady adherence to one purpose is required. For, they are naturally light, unconstant even to their own Hopes, variable in their Designs, fixed to nothing but their own Opinions, in which they so absolutely confide, that they look not into the advantages of others proposals and counsels. And yet for all this some of them so dazzle weaker Eyes with the polish and lustre of their superficial Parts, that they pass for Accomplished Persons, and are at length admitted to reap that harvest of Fame and Wealth, which ought to be the reward of solid and profound Abilities: especially when they have acquired the Art of understanding as well how to conceal their Defects, as how to set forth their good Qualities.   

ART. 2.  
This Art consisteth principally in moderating their fervency of speaking; in frequent change of Arguments; and always choosing such, in which they may most easily impose upon their Hearers. For instance; among Military men, let them discourse of matters of Religion, of the rites and customs of the Ancients, of the Origines and Migrations of Nations, and such like Themes, wherein Soldiers generally have but little knowledge, among men bred up in the shades of the Schools, and unconversant in Polities; let them discourse of the foundations and periods of Empires, of the Fates of Kingdoms, of the revolutions in Commonwealths, of the Virtues and great actions of particular Princes, of State Maxims, etc. In a word, Let them provoke none in his own Way or Art. For, in familiar conferences, and sociable Colloquies, it is not ungrateful, so it be dextrously done, to divert to things of which the Company is ignorant: both because Errors then escape discovery, and because Novelty begets pleasure, and by how much more we esteem things of which we never heard before, by so much more do we admire him who delivered them. But above all let them take heed of Writing; which to Roving and Superficial Wits is as difficult, as their Gift of speaking fluently is easy, and for the most part proves no less destructive to their Fame, than their ex tempore Oratory hath been favourable. For, that which gives due sharpness and grace to the Style of a writer, and recommends it to the present and succeeding Ages, is exquisite and elaborate Judgement; which is very rarely conjoined with natural fluency of speech. The Reason may be this; that a prompt, but turbulent Mind, when in retirement (which all know to be necessary to a Writer) it comes once to reflect upon itself, and examine its own strength; burdened with multiplicity of things together offering themselves, and confounded with variety of thoughts, soon faints under the weight: and having neither judgement to select, nor patience to digest, falls at length into Distraction, or Despondency. In fine, the Faculty of writing well is so different from that of talking volubly, and requires so much more of both Attention and Deliberation; that most of your Fine Speakers, when once they find the wings of their Fancy clipped, and their understanding entangled in strong and knotty Reasonings, are miserably at a loss how to extricate themselves, and despairing of success, return to their former liberty. Yet some of this Classis, either blinded with self-conceit, or deluded by adulation of their Admirers, have adventured to publish Books; and out of vain Ambition to enlarge and eternize their Reputation by their Pen, have utterly ruined what they had acquired by the nimbleness of their Tongue. My advice, therefore, to such shall be this; that they raise in the World an Expectation of some considerable Volume from them, and keep that expectation alive as long as they can: but be so wise as never to satisfy it with so much as a single Sheet. But Wits of this temper are commonly too Hot to moderate their Efforts; too opinionated to take caution from the Counsel of even their truest Friends: and therefore I leave them to please themselves.    

SECT. VII.  

ART. 1.  
YOu have beheld the Ready, and the Roving Wits, together with their Advantages and Defects; be pleased now to remove Your eye to the Image of a Third sort, which seeming contrary to both, and yet more useful than either, may therefore not unfitly be called the SLOW, but SURE Wit. Some Heads there are of a certain close and reserved Constitution, which makes them at first sight to promise as little of the Virtues wherewith they are endowed, as the former appear to be above the Imperfections to which they are subject. Somewhat Slow they are indeed of both Conception and Expression; yet no whit the less comparated to solid Prudence. When they are engaged to speak, their Tongue doth not readily interpret the dictates of their Mind; so that their Language comes as it were dropping from their lips, even where they are encouraged by familiar entreaties, or provoked by the smartness of jests, which sudden and nimble Wits have newly darted at them. Costive they are also in their Invention; so that when they would deliver somewhat solid and remarkable, they are long in seeking what is fit, and as long in determining in what manner and words to utter it. But, after a little consideration, they penetrate deeply into the substance of things, and marrow of business, and conceive proper and Emphatic words, by which to express their Sentiments. Barren they are not, but a little Heavy and Retentive. Their Gifts lie deep and concealed; being furnished with Notions, not aery and umbratil ones, borrowed from the Pedantism of the Schools, but true and useful: and if they have been manured with good Learning, and the habit of exercising their Pen; oftentimes they produce many excellent Conceptions worthy to be transmitted to Posterity.   

ART. 2.  
Though they have no reason to accuse Nature of any unkindness to them; yet they have just cause to complain of the iniquity of Fortune, in this respect; that having an Aspect very like to narrow and dull Capacities, at first sight most Men take them to be really such, and strangers look upon them with the eyes of neglect and contempt. Hence it comes, that Excellent Parts remaining unknown, often want the favour and patronage of Great Persons, whereby otherwise they might be redeemed from obscurity, and raised to employments answerable to their Faculties, and crowned with honours proportionate to their Merits: as the most precious wares seldom invite buyers, if kept in darksome corners, nor decently exposed, and adorned with splendid titles.   

ART. 3.  
The best course, therefore, for these to overcome that Eclipse, which prejudice usually brings upon them, is to contend against their own Modesty, and either by frequent converse with noble and discerning spirits, to enlarge the Windows of their Minds, and dispel those clouds of Reservedness, that darken the lustre of their Faculties: or by Writing on some new and useful subject, to lay open their Talon, that so the World may be convinced of their intrinsic value.    

SECT. VIII.  

ART. 1.  
IN the middle betwixt the two Opposites, too much Heaviness, and too much Lightness, Nature seems to have placed the most happy Indoles or AMPLE Wit: which is seldom out of love with itself, yet never too indulgent to itself, and often advanceth its possessors to the highest honours and dignities, of which Subjects are capable. This usually is attended with no more of Eloquence than decency allows, or occasion requires; and that, if cultivated by Erudition, or matured by Time, is always neat and graceful even in familiar Conversation; neither precipitate, nor slow in delivery: as guided by a Judgement, though not sharp on the sudden, yet strong and solid after a little recollection. In fine, this is the Man most fit to harbour all Virtues; as by Nature's benignity comparated to great Prudence, as well Public as Private: and if touched with a Temperamental Propensity to some certain Vice, yet seldom tainted with any evil Habit.   

ART. 2.  
Betwixt these Ample Wits and the Narrow ones, Nature herself hath a certain Criterion or Character of Distinction, easily discernible: and it is this. The Former, being duly conscious of their own dignity, do all things with a Bon Mine or good Grace, and becoming Freedom, far from the vices of Affectation and Constrained Formality: as being actuated by Spirits not bold, but Generous and Erect, always addressed to noble Ends, and contemplating somewhat diffusive and above vulgar aims. And this is that Semi-divine Temper of the Mind, which Aristotle calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Latins, Felicitas ingenit; and we, an Universal Capacity. On the contrary, Narrow and Grovelling Wits condemn themselves to abject Cogitations and low Counsels, never daring to aspire above the common suggestions of their pusillanimous Humility: yet in little matters, and such as transcend not the Sphere of their Capacity, they often proceed with exact diligence, and sometimes also with good success; there being annexed to them a certain Astutia, sinister or spurious Wisdom called Cunning and Wisdom for ones self, such as is common also to weak and timorous Animals, which keeps them intent wholly upon their own safety, and (as we have before deduced it) ariseth only from diffidence of sufficiency in themselves; than which there can be no greater Enemy to noble and generous Undertake. Besides, if they at any time (as sometimes, puffed up with prosperity of their Crafty and undermining designs, they will) offer at ingenuity; it is with so much constraint, formality and starch'dness, that they expose themselves to the smiles and contempt of Judicious Men.   

ART. 3.  
This Thou or Mark of difference is well worthy Your observation, because these Half-witted or Cunning Men for the most part make advantage of even their Inability, building rather upon deceiving others, who confide in them, than upon any soundness of their own proceedings: and because (as the Lord Chancellor Bacon most judiciously observes) nothing doth more harm in a State, than that Cunning men pass for Wise men; like Empirics in Physic, they may indeed have a great Collection of Experiments, but not knowing the right and seasonable use of them, pervert them to base and sinister Ends.  
Leaving them therefore as unworthy further consideration, let us return to our Bon. Esprit, and for a few minutes entertain ourselves with contemplating the excellency thereof.   

ART. 4.  
There are among the Literati, who misled either by too much favour to their own Disciplines, or by an immoderate esteem of the advantages of Scholastic Sciences (which were never denied to be very great by any but the Barbarous) allow no Wit to be Happy and of Public use, but that which is not only capable of, but also naturally addicted to Letters; none to have attained to the just height of Prudence, that was not advanced thereto by the Scale of various Learning. Thus Men eminently fruitful in Public Virtues, and as it were constellated for Polity or the great Art of Governing the Multitude, they exclude from the Senate, and from true Greatness, by a Prejudice more allied to Envy than to Discretion. For,   

ART. 5.  
On the contrary, it is much more reasonable to hold, that none are so fit for affairs of State, as those blessed Favourites of Nature, upon whom she hath accumulated her noblest and richest Donatives: Since that Sagacity of Spirit which enableth a Man not only to know the Resorts and Opportunities of Business; but also to sink into the Main of it; and then to form Counsels both for Conduct and Dispatch (the two Principal Virtues in a Statesman) is rather the free Gift of Heaven, than the purchase of Labour and Study. Which seems to be no more than what the great Roman Orator averrs, upon his own observation. Ego multos homines (saith he) in Orat. pro Archia Poëta) excellenti animo ac virtute fuisse, & sine doctrina, naturae ipsius habitu propè divino, per seipsos & moderatos & graves extitisse fateor: & illud adjungam, soepius ad laudem, atque Virtutem naturam sine doctrina, quam sine natura valuisse doctrinam. Again, Time hath furnished us with Examples of some, who had acquired high estimation in the Schools by extraordinary acuteness in sundry kinds of Learning, and yet proved very weak, when they were transplanted into the more subtle and fine region of Prince's Courts and Councils: their Reason then confessing itself too dull-sighted to discern the Finesses of Civil Prudence, to which all other Learning must give place.  
You will not, Sir, I presume, be long in determining which is the truer Wisdom, his, who can foresee discontents and Motions of a Nation, and provide seasonable and safe Remedies for them; or his, who, after long contemplation, is able to predict Eclipses of the Sun and Moon, and to calculate the journeys and returns of all the Planets; but cannot presage what dangers threaten the Commonwealth, what Changes and Revolutions are impendent over the State.  
Besides, those very Men, who thus cry up the usefulness of Languages and Sciences, restrain not the title of Learned and Polite to him alone, who hath with equal felicity run through the whole encyclopedy or Round of Arts and Sciences: but think it sufficient, if a Man acquire excellency in any one of them: for instance, if an Orator singularly dextrous in managing Arguments, and happy in all the Exornations of speech, be yet dull and heavy in comprehending the secrets of Natural Philosophy; or if a profound Philosopher be yet destitute of Eloquence, or unconversant in History, and Politics and other parts of Learning; they nevertheless deny him not the Honour of an Eminent Wit. That Pre-eminence therefore, which is due from any one part of Learning, why are they so partial, so unjust, as to detract from that Science, which is conversant in the regulation of whole Societies of Men, and which in that very respect ought to be preferred to all other Human Knowledge? Think they, that Wisdom speaks to her Disciples only in Greek, or Latin, or Hebrew; and not rather in a secret Vivacity of Spirit, and a piercing Judgement or Reason that understands all Languages? To be born with a pregnant Wit, is no such high indulgence of Nature, if no more be required therein, than a Propension to, and Capacity of Erudition Scholastic. Those of the Ancients, whom we acknowledge to have been the Patriarches of Sciences, and great Examples of Wisdom, never consumed much of oil and sweat in the shades of the Schools: and yet certainly they were born under Stars highly propitious. To found Republics, to make wholesome Laws for conservation of public Peace, to support their Country by wise Counsels, to observe the Constitutions, Rites and Customs of other Nations, and transferr into their own whatever they found worthy imitation; so far to note and register the motions of Celestial Bodies, as to keep a a true account of Time, and accommodate their negotiations both at home and abroad to the most convenient seasons of the year, and benefit of the People: This, this was chiefly called Science in those elder and purer Times.  
To be a little more particular; while those Primitive Sages laboured to reclaim savage and rude Multitudes, and mollify their iron Minds by mansuetude and other Virtues necessary to common safety and the maintenance of Right in Civil Societies; by little and little there grew up that Knowledge, which is called Moral Philosophy. And while, being disjoined by mutual emulation and contention, they endeavoured to persuade the People to favour and adhere to one or the other side, they made speeches to them to move their Affections accordingly; that gave the first beginning and credit to Eloquence or Oratory. In a word, the Monuments of History have conveyed down to us the Prudence and Artifices of those Ancients, so as to be Precedents to our Modern Literati; at least if they be able to bear the like weight of cares: if not, the best use their weaker Heads can make of such Monuments, will be only to boast of their Reading, by showing them to others; as Priests show Relics of Saints, but want the power of working Miracles; or as keepers of antic and magnificent Structures can perhaps name the Founders and Architects, but imitate neither. For, to read History only for Contemplation, is a vain and idle pleasure, that leaves no fruit behind: but to imitate the glorious actions and achievements of such worthy Patriots, that's true and noble Erudition. This was the use Cicero made of his vast readings, as appears by that profession of his (in Orat. pro Archia Poëta.) quam multas nobis imagines, non solùm ad intuendum, verum etiam ad imitandum, fortissimorum hominum expressas Scriptores & Graeci & Latini reliquerunt? quas Ego mihi semper in administranda Rep. proponens, Animum & mentem meam ipsa cogitatione Virorum excellentium conformabam, etc.   

ART. 6.  
Nevertheless it is not to be doubted, but the most Absolute Wit is that, which (like the First Matter of the Aristoteleans) is capable of any Form, and can with equal facility employ itself in all kinds of Studies; having an Universal Acuteness, and strength as well to grasp the difficult and slippery Mysteries of State, as to unravel the knotty Methods of Arts and Sciences professed in Universities. For, Studies perfect Nature; and both are perfected by Experience: natural Abilities being like Fruit-trees, that need pruning and culture by learning; and Studies themselves giving forth directions too much at large, except they be bounded by Experience. All together make the happiest conjunction, and by mutual assistance advance their Owner to the pinnacle of Humane Wisdom and Honour: that sublime Sagaicty of judgement requisite in a Statesman, and conformed to the Genius of the present Age, and comporting with the constitution of Affairs, so governing Learning, as that it can neither degenerate into Pedantism, nor rust in vain and solitary Speculation: and Learning, on the other side, so supporting and enriching the Judgement, as that it need not rely only upon single Experience and Observation of its own time, but may have recourse also to the Oracles of all former Ages, and furnish itself with Examples out of the treasury of Antiquity.  
Yet if any Man (as many such there are) naturally addicted to Public business, and fit to serve his Prince and Country in quality of a Counsellor, be not equally in favour with the Muses, nor prosperous in Scholastic speculations; I hope, Sir, You will not stick to allow him to be a Person of a more erect Mind, and nobler Parts, than a mere Contemplative Bookman; who though perhaps skilful in Languages, and Logician enough to unriddle and impose Sophisms, and to dispute long and formally about Nonentities, is yet too narrow of understanding to measure the vastness of Civil Prudence, which is founded upon mature observation, and built up of solid Experiences, squared by exact Judgement, and adjusted to present Emergencies in State. So that I am apt to believe, that Favorinus was in very good earnest, though he seemed to jest, when he measured the Knowledge of Adrian the Emperor by the greatness of his Power. The Story is in short this. Adrian, not a little ambitious of the fame of extraordinary Learning, accidentally meeting Favorinus, an eminent Philosopher, fell instantly upon him with a whole Volley of Syllogisms, and pressed him with Sophistical Arguments: to which the wary Philosopher made but sparing and modest answers, such as intimated his being overcome, and left the Emperor to please himself with his imaginary victory. Soon after, to his Friends reprehending him for making so weak defence, he returned this vindication: I were to blame (said he) if I should not grant him to be the most learned, who hath daily twenty Legions at his command. Which I understand to be more than a Compliment; the Regiment of so many Millions being a piece of greater skill, and sublimer Science, than to manage a disputation with Dialectical subtlety, and argue in Mode and Figure.  
Having thus in a short digression, endeavoured to refute the Error of such who hold, that no Wit, however Ample and Happy in its native capacity, can yet attain to solid Prudence, without the improvement of Scholastic Erudition: it follows, that we observe briefly both the Vice, to which even the Best tempered Wits sometimes are prone; and the principal Remedy thereof.   

ART. 7.  
As Pusillanimity or Self-diffidence makes of Narrow Wits Cunning men: so self-confidence, if immoderate, often checks the growth, and hinders the fertility of even the Best Wits. For, some of greatest hopes, too soon trusting to the native pregnancy of their Mind, and desisting from Lecture, Meditation and all other labour of the Brain, as not only unnecessary, but also burdensome, and expensive of time: thereby clip their own wings, render themselves unfit for any generous flight, and ever after flag; so far from aspiring above others, that they come short even of themselves, and suffering those igniculi aetherei or Celestial sparks of Wit, by which they were in their Youth actuated, to languish and go out for want of industry to fan them, degenerate into a barren dulness, so much the more difficult to be overcome, by how much the longer ere acknowledged. Whereas Others, conscious of their native imbecility, endeavour with labour and sweat to acquire what the austerity of Nature denied them; and by continual culture of Study, and seeds of good Discipline, so every the field of their Understanding, that at length they exceed in fertility of Science not only their former selves, but others also to whom Nature hath been much more bountiful. By which it is manifest, that,   

ART. 8.  
The proper Remedy for this Obstruction, that not seldom brings an Atrophy or defect of nourishment upon the best tempered Wit, can be no other but constant Study and Meditation, by which the Faculties of the Mind are exercised and kept in vigour. Not that it is requisite Men of this order should over-curiously search into each punctilio or nicety of the thing they contemplate: for, though that be the way to attain exactness in some Particulars; yet it would at the same time greatly retard their progress in the Main, and make it long before they advance so far, as to make a liberal and genuine inspection into the whole of that very Science, which they so ambitiously affect. Besides the same would habituate them to confine their Cogitations within too narrow a compass; by impaling their Curiosity upon Notions, though perhaps of great subtlety in speculation, yet of little use in the occurrents of life: nor could they easily let lose their thoughts to other things, which though sometimes of an inferior nature, yet may be more necessary to be looked into. To these therefore I am bold to prescribe Study as a daily Exercise, not as their sole employment.   

ART. 9  
Nor do I condemn those Fine Wits, that spend most upon the Stock of Nature; because they have this for excuse, That all Heads are not equally disposed to patience in Study, and diuturnity of labour. For, the finer and acuter the Wit is, by so much the more easily indeed doth it penetrate into things difficult, and divide things involved; but then again it grows the sooner blunt with length of labour and intention. The Reason perhaps is this; that Nature doth rarely commit such Fine Wits to the custody of gross and robust Bodies; but for the most part chooseth to lodge them in delicate and tender Constitutions, such as produce the purest and sublimest spirits: which as by their greater Mobility they conduce to quickness of Apprehension; so are they for the same cause more prone to Expense or Exhaustion, upon continued intention of the Mind, nor capable of reparation unless after due repose and pleasant divertisement. Again, not only the Labour of these Ethereal Wits, but even their Relaxation and Leisure is therefore precious; because no sooner are their Brains at liberty, but they acquire new Vigour, and their Acuteness spontaneously ranging abroad, brings in fresh Hints, and replenishes them with serious reflections, and useful cogitations: as rich ground, when left a while fallow, of its own accord puts forth abundance of Excellent Plants, in nothing inferior to the best cultivated Gardens. This seems pathetically expressed in that Apothegm of Cosmus de Medicis, the Politic Founder of the flourishing Dukedom of Florence. When in a morning he had lain long in bed, as wholly resigned up to an incurious repose, one of his Favourites coming into his Bedchamber, salutes him with this Compliment; Sir, (said he) where is Cosmus the Great, to whose Vigilance, as to a Pilot, we have all entrusted the conduct of our State? are not his eyes open at high noon? I have been abroad some hours since, and dispatched much business. The Duke smartly returns; boast not Your diligence thus, Sir; my very Repose is more profitable, than all Your pains and industry.   

ART. 10.  
Nor is this Delicacy of Constitution, which hinders the Choicest Wits from undergoing the hardship of constant Study and long watchings, so Universal, but that some are exempted from it. But these are, I confess, very rare, and as the noblest Presents Nature can make to Kingdoms and States, seldom produced by her: being of that most happy temper, that they can stoop their lofty Parts to the anxiety of tedious Meditations, and drudgery of vast Readins and Collections. To this they bring themselves chiefly by Resolution and Custom: whose Effects are no less admirable in the Faculties of the Mind, than in those of the Body. Hence our incomparable Mr. Hobbes (who was pleased not long since to tell me, that he was in the fortieth Year of his age, when he first began to study with due intention of Mind) speaking of the power of Custom upon the various Ingenies of Men, hath this remarkable sentence: Quae nova offendunt, eadem saepius iterata naturam subigunt; & primo quidem ferre se, mox autem amare cogit. Id quod in regimine corporis maximè, deinde etiam in operationibus Animi perspicuum est. de nature. Homin. cap. 13. sect. 3. When they have thus conquered themselves, than it is they make the truly Brave Men. When Time, Perseverance in Study, and Experience have brought them to Maturity; You may worthily call them Living Libraries, walking Epitomes of all Sciences, and Magazines of Knowledge. For, in them may be found the Piety of Divines, the Wisdom of Histories, the Wit of Poets, the Solidity of the Mathematics, the depth of Natural Philosophy, the Gravity and Uprightness of Moral, the wariness of Logic, the strength and sweetness of Rhetoric, the distinguishing subtlety of the Schoolmen, the Exactness of Critics, and the right Use of all. And when they are fixed in Public employments, abeunt Studia in mores, they become fit to bare a continual load of cares; not prone to be confounded with Multiplicity of affairs, nor discomposed with the divers aspects of Occurrents, nor startled at unexpected and cross Events; but constantly calm, and equally sedulous, and what more can be expected from Humane frailty?  
In this rude Draught of the charming Beauties of the Ample and Studious Wit, more of art might have been shown, and better Colours used. But, considering that it contains, tanquam in compendio, all the several Virtues that lie dispersed and single in the precedent sorts; and that You (Noble Sir,) are so happy as to need no more lively Image thereof, than what You may daily contemplate (the curtain of Your great Modesty withdrawn) by reflecting upon Your Own: I thought myself at liberty to run the same over only with light touches, and a hasty Pencil. Which I now▪ remove to a work much less grateful both to Your Genius and my own, namely the Character of the Malignant Wit: which I therefore reserved for the last place, that the Deformity thereof might set off the Beauties of those already described; as Satyrs and Negroes painted by fair Ladies make them appear more amiable.    

SECT. IX.  

ART. 1.  
BY the MALIGNANT Wit, then, I understand that which is indeed quick of Apprehension, but void of Humanity: being prone to exercise itself chiefly in re-searching into the Defects, Errors, and even the Infortune's of Others, such especially who by their Virtues have rendered themselves Conspicuous; and to delight in both aggravating and publishing them to their dishonour. Wits of this evil temper may not unfitly be resembled to Chemical Spirits, which are subtle and penetrating, but they also corrode: and the Spirits by which they are actuated, seem to be extracted, not out of the purest parts of their Blood (as other men's are) but from their Gall; as if they desired to verify the new opinion of Silvius de la Boe, that that bitter and acrimonious Excrement is the Natural Ferment of the Blood, and necessary to not only the Vital, but also the Animal actions, in all living Creatures, in which it is found. Out of Self-conceit, they affect to be thought highly Ingenious; because nothing is more nearly allied to Reason, the proper good of man, than Ingeny: whence that of the Poet, Qui velit ingenio cedere rarus erit. Whereupon Claud. Donatus, relating how one Filistus, a Favourite to Augustus, used to cast reproaches upon Virgil, and carp at all he said, even in the Emperor's presence; adds that he did it, non ut verum dignosceret, quod Socrates facere consuevit; sed ut eruditior videretur. But conscious of their own Vices, and studious to conceal them; they endeavour by detraction to make it appear, that others also of greater Estimation in the World, are tainted with the same or greater: as infamous Women generally excuse their personal debaucheries, by incriminating upon their whole Sex, calumniating the most chaste and virtuous, to palliate their own dishonour. To this base end, they rejoice to expose the secret faults of men any way renowned: which being no otherwise so easily effected as by the Pen, they addict themselves mostly to Writing, among all Sects choosing that of Critics, that so under the innocent liberty of judging, they may usurp the most pernicious licence of Censuring. In which inhuman practice they are sure to make use of one, or more of these cunning artifices. Having found an opportunity to mention some evil, whether true or only suspected, in the Person, whose Merits they intent to disparage; either they industriously pretermit what they know, and aught to conjoin towards the excuse thereof; or they pretend (forsooth) not to believe it, when yet they revive the memory of it for no other end, but that it may be more firmly believed by others. Where they meet with notorious failings, there they seem to extenuate, and as it were to compensate them with slight Commendations, only to disguise their detraction: as I have heard of a certain Courtier, who desirous to obstruct the preferment of a poor Country Vicar, and yet not daring to oppose his Master, King James his charitable inclination thereunto; said to the King, Your Majesty may do well to give him a better Living, for though he hath not much of Learning, he is a very good Fellow, too hard for all his Parishioners at Cudgels, and hath a singular knack in catching Dotterels. Another of their tricks is this; where they cannot blame the Fact itself, they suggest sinister Motives or inducements to the doing of it, and deprave the Counsel and intention. To these may be added one more, no less detestable; where rumour hath dispersed various conjectures concerning one and the same action of some Eminent Man, omitting or suppressing the more benign and favourable, they select the worse and more derogatory, and largely comment thereupon; with design to pervert the belief of their Hearers, or Readers, in deteriorem partem. Thus drawing suspicions from the crooked rule of their own insincere Mind and depraved inclinations; they labour to persuade themselves and others, that there is among Men no such thing as true Virtue, but only a Shadow or artificial representation of it: thereby vainly promising to themselves the reputation of singular acuteness of judgement, and more than vulgar Wisdom. If they can Eclipse the glory of Worthy Men, by fomenting obscure and uncertain rumours concerning their Achievements, or by maliciously ascribing the same, not to prudent Counsels and honourable Motives, but to Ambition, or Avarice, or Hypocrisy, or Simulation; or Captation of popular favour, or any the like sinister aims: they then imagine they have raised to themselves a Monument of Honour out of the ruins of theirs, whom they thus inhumanly calumniate.   

ART. 2.  
To this Classis may be referred all the ill-natured Disciples of Momus, Derisores, Scoffers, such who, like Beetles, seem hatched in dung, or Vermine bred out of Ulcers; perpetually feeding upon the frailties and imperfections of Human nature. Nor will it be easy for Satirists and Comical Poets, those especially of the more licentious and railing sort, to exempt themselves from the same Tribe. This Sir, perhaps You'll think to be a little severe: but it is not my judgement alone; for among the ancient Comical Wits of Greece, You may find more than one deservedly accused, and clearly convicted of uncivil obtrectation. In one or two of the most famous I shall instance, for justification of what I here say.  
Cratinus, one of the Triumvirate, which first reform Comedy from its primitive rudeness, and began to purge the Stage from obscenity and personal invectives; is nevertheless noted by the Great Scaliger (Poëtices lib. 1. cap. 7.) to have been not only sharply censorious, but bitterly Malignant also, and grossly inurbane: insomuch that at last it cost him his life. For, having in one of his Comedies, entitled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (unduly ascribed to Eupolis, by Politian, Miscellan. cap. 10.) too palpably inveighed against, and personated some of eminent Quality, and exposed them to the derision of their Fellow-citizens, the Athenians (described by Aelian (2. variar. Historiar. cap. 13.) to have been naturâ invidiosi, & ad detractandum optimis quibusque proclives) he thereby so far provoked them, that in revenge they bound him hand and foot, and cast him into the Sea, in the manner of his Death alluding to the Title of his Play, which signifies one drenched or dipped in water. An Example well worthy to be remembered by his Sectators in this uncharitable Age.   

ART. 3.  
To this Cratinus I take liberty to conjoin another of the same Triumvirate, his Equal, the so much celebrated Aristophanes: and this I do, as well because of his most inhuman persecution of the Divine Socrates, both in that Fable, which he called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Clouds, and which he invented only to render that best and wisest of Mortals odious to the base Vulgar; as because he was one of the Conspirators against his life: being thereto suborned partly by private Hate (because Socrates frequented and applauded the Tragoedies of Euripides, but would hardly be brought to honour with his presence any one of Aristophanes his Satirical Comedies) partly by Anitus and Melitus, who not long after by false accusations robbed the innocent Philosopher of his life, and the world of its richest Treasure. Again, all the rest of Aristophanes' Comedies are more or less besprinkled with the venom of Detraction and Dicacity. It was not then without just cause, that Plutarch, a most grave and judicious Philosopher, in his Comparation of Aristophanes with Menander, among many other Criminations of the former, gives him this Character: Aristophanis Sales amari sunt & asperi; acrem & mordentem, adeoque exulcerantem vim habent.— Nulli enim moderato videtur is homo suum poëma scripsisse, sed turpia & libidinosa intemperantibus, maledica & acerba invidis atque malignis hominibus, etc. Nor doth that most Learned Man, Nicodemus Frischlinus, who wrote his Life, together with a defence of him against the faults objected by Plutarch, vindicate him from inhonest Acerbity and Malignity; otherwise than by transferring it upon the licentiousness of the Times in which he wrote, and use of ancient Comedy: his words are these, Equidem non inficior, rem ita esse, ut ille [Plutarch] dicit. Sed vitio temporum illorum potius quam Poëtae hoc, quicquid reprehensionis est, ascribi debet; & ita ferebat Comoediae veteris consuetudo, ut omnia argumenta essent salsa, festiva, mordacia, maledica; nec quicquam diceretur à quoquam, quod non ad perniciem alicujus accommodaretur. Which You have the more reason to believe, because in Your travels You have sometimes resided in a certain City, much more populous, under a better Government, and more civilised than ever Athens was, yea more inhabited by such as make profession of Christianity; in which notwithstanding that scandalous Licence of exposing well-deserving and honourable Men upon the public Stage, and dashing even Virtue itself out of Countenance, by the scurrilous reproaches and mimical actions of Comedians, seems to be revived; so many Ages after it hath been condemned by Wise Princes, polite Nations, and by the best of Modern Comical Poets themselves, as a thing not only inconsistent with Humanity and Christian Charity, but pernicious to the public peace of Societies, by raising discontent, animosities, quarrels and factions. But being long since returned into your own native Country, You are here out of danger of suffering by any such undecent licence: our Theatres being regulated by stricter Laws, and our Poets for the most part Gentlemen of liberal Education.  
In this short reflection upon the Malevolence of some Modern Poets, I have rather stood still a while, than gone out of my way: their Example serving no less to justify my ascribing Wits immoderately Satirical to this Order, whereof I am now treating, than those of the Grecians I have named. However, that I may hasten to the end of our walk, especially now You are tired with the uneveness of the way, and my dull company; I proceed.  
This virulent Humour of disgracing the Merits of Others, seems to have poisoned the Pens, not only of some Poets, but many also of other sorts of Writers, who yet had not so specious a pretext for the liberty they therein took; and who undertook by their Works to teach Men good Manners and Civility. So that I might, without much exercise of my Memory, call to mind Examples thereof among Authors of no obscure fame in all Arts and Sciences; not excepting the graver, even Historians, Philosophers and Divines. But lest, by making a Catalogue of such, I should bring myself also under the same condemnation; I leave them to Your own Collection.   

ART. 4.  
Only I think it no offence briefly to observe, that even Tacitus himself, esteemed the Prince of Latin Historians, and the Oracle of Politicians, hath been accused of Malignity, in not only censuring the Counsels and Affections of all Great Men, whose most memorable Actions, together with their several Successes and Events, he recordeth in his Histories; but also in interpreting the same according to his private Conjectures, and wresting them for the most part to sinister and ungenerous ends or intentions: thereby depriving those Heroes of the best part of their Glory, Virtue; and leaving to Posterity both Maxims and Precedents rather of Cunning and Violence, than of true Wisdom and sound Policy. Whether this Venerable Author, to whom the World is in other things so highly obliged, hath deserved this accusation, or not; I leave to Your judgement, who are sufficiently conversant in his Writings to direct mine. In the mean time, I am obliged, in my own defence, to produce one of his Accusers at least. Permit me, then, to refer You to that famous Critic, and excellent Grammarian, Gaspar Scioppius, who in many parts of his Writings, but more expressly in his Dissertation de Historici Officio, delivers a charge against Tacitus of this among other faults. You'll object perhaps, that Scioppius himself is generally condemned for the same Vice of Malignity: and I think not without desert; but yet you cannot deny him to have been a man of admirable acuteness in discerning the faults, errors and lapses of other Writers; nor have I any where observed him to want reason for his Animadversions. So that though I am always offended at his bitter invectives, yet I confess, I am often pleased with the Sagacity of his Criticisms.   

ART. 5.  
Now if such Men, who had ground enough within the compass of their own great Parts, whereon to build to themselves perpetual Monuments of Fame, were not altogether free from this malignant Humour; what may we think of those poorer Spirits, those Sons of Earth, who dream of erecting Obelisks to their own obscure Names, only out of the ruins of others? and like the Soldier Crabb, which Aldrovand calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Eremita, have no Mansion for their credit, but that from whence they have extruded the right owner? These certainly have the Cancer of Envy rooted in their very breast: it being an Aphorism of daily Experience; that the more imperfect men are in themselves, the more prone they are to defame and scoff at others. The Reason of which, because I know You to be a great lover of the Philosophy of Monsieur Des Cartes, 
Lib▪ de Passion. part. 3▪ art. 179.  I shall give You in his Words; quia cupiunt caeteros omnes in pari secum gradu videre; since they are unable to raise themselves to the height of their Superiors in Virtue and honour, they endeavour, by calumny and derision, to bring them down to the same ignoble level with themselves.   

ART. 6.  
This disease, therefore, of the Mind being almost Epidemic; and the Cause thereof consisting in a certain Perversity of disposition, whereby the Patient is strongly inclined to be inwardly vexed and troubled at the Virtues or Felicities of others, and to do all he can to diminish their credit and estimation: the Cure of it, I fear, is above the Art which I profess.   

ART. 7.  
By this, Sir, You plainly discern the great Difference betwixt Malignity, and Festivity of Wit. For, as to this latter, which the Greeks name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the French, Raillery, and we Jesting; whereby a Man modestly and gently touches upon the Errors, Indecencies, or Infirmities of another, without any suspicion of hate or contempt of his Person, pleasantly representing them as only ridiculous, not odious: I do not think it ought to be condemned as a vice of the Mind, but allowed as a Quality consistent both with Honesty and good Manners, as denoting the Alacrity of his Disposition, and Tranquillity of his Spirit (both signs of Virtue) and often also the Dexterity of his Wit, in that he is able to give a delightful and new colour to the absurdity at which he moves his company to smile. Nor is it disingenuous to laugh, when we hear the Jests of others: nay some jests are so facete and abstracted from Persons, that it would savour of too much dulness or Morosity, not to be affected with their elegancy. But when we ourselves break a jest, it is more decent to abstain from Laughter, as well lest what we say seem to occur to our imagination unexpectedly, and by chance rather than choice; as lest we be thought to admire the felicity of our own Wit, in finding out that allusion, which had escaped the notice of others present: both which are obnoxious to dispraise; the former, as a mark of slowness of Conception; the latter, as an evidence of Self-love. To which may be added two other Reasons. First, whoever laughs at his own jest spoils it, by rendering it less apt to surprise the Hearers. Then again he puts all the company into jealousy and examination of themselves. Besides all this (as Mr. Hobbes excellently observes, in his Book of Humane Nature) it is Vainglory, and an argument of little worth, to think the infirmity of another sufficient matter for his Triumph.   

ART. 8.  
But I have too long detained Your curious Eyes upon an object, in which You can take no other delight, but what must redound to You from Your observation of the vast disparity betwixt the Deformities of it, and the charming beauties of Your own Candid and sweet Disposition. And being ashamed, that I have led you all this while in a path so much trodden by others; I wish, the Province You were pleased to assign me, had lain somewhat farther from the road, wherein most Philosophers have traveled before me, that I might have entertained You with remarks less obvious and common; whereas now I have been rather Your Remembrancer than Guide. Having at length waited on You to the End of it, good Manners oblige me, without desiring You to turn about and review the little things observed as You passed along (for that were to disparage Your excellent Memory, as well as to abuse Your Patience) to resign You up to Your own more useful speculations, and the pursuit of that Generous Emulation, which incites You to Studies worthy Your choice, native Endowments, the Eminency of Your Condition, and the Place to which not Fortune, nor popular Favour, but Your own great Merits have raised You in the grand Council of this Kingdom.    
THE END.