Imago pulcra Est. picta sculptoris manu▪  
At pulcriorem dat libris Autor suis▪  
Hic Corpus▪ Illis ipsa Mens depingitur  
Imo Vniversi Mens & Ipsius simul  C. B.    

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL, Demonstrated by the Light of NATURE.  
In Two DIALOGUES.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Arist. 2▪ de Generate. Animal. 
LONDON, Printed by William Wilson for Henry Herringman, and are to be sold at his shop, at the sign of the Anchor in the Lower-walke, in the New-Exchange. 1659.   

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE, The Lord Marquis of DORCHESTER, EARL of KINGSTON, VISCOUNT NEW ARK, LORD I'IERPOINT, and Manvers, etc.  
My most Honoured Lord,  
AS in the Firmament, or Aethereal region of the Great World, the Creator hath placed two great Lights, the one to rule the Day, the other to rule the Night: So, (to constitute a perfect Analogy or correspondence) in the Firmament or Celestial part of the Lesser World, Man, hath He placed two great Truths (the proper Lights of the Soul) the one to rule the Day, or Life of Man; the other to dispel the horrid darkness of his Night, Death. And these are those twinlike proleptical Notions of the Being of the Deity, and of the Immortality of the Human Soul. I call them Twinlike Proleptical Notions, because, as the Sun and Moon were made together, so were these implanted at once in the Mind of the First Man, and have as constantly shined in the region of every man's Soul since, as those have done in the Heavens, however the opacity of terrene Objects and Corporeal Affections may seem sometimes to eclipse them: and because, as the Sun doth communicate its light to the Moon, so doth the Former of these superexcellent Notions, illuminate the Latter; the knowledge of the Immortality of the Soul, receiving illustration, if not absolute dependence, from the knowledge of the Existence of God.  
The Consideration hereof (may it please your Lordship) as it engaged me, some years since, to endeavour the Demonstration of the Existence of God; so hath it now of late importuned and prevailed upon me, to attempt the Demonstration of the Immortality of men's Souls, by pure and sincere Reason: To the end, that such as doubt of either, may be convinced of the extreme folly and absurdity of their unbelief; and such as firmly believe both, may be corroborated in their true persuasions, observing the Testimony of the Light of Nature to make a perfect Symphony and concordance with thatof Authority Divine. A Design, certainly, neither inconsistent with the genuine zeal of a Christian, nor unworthy the most serious speculation of a Philosopher: And were I as well assured, that I have not fallen much short of what might be expected from me, in the capacity of the Latter, as I am, that I have not in the least transgressed the sacred bounds of the Former; I should with more reason hope your Lordship's Approbation of my performance therein, than the sense of my own insufficiency will permit me now to entertain. And, therefore, though perhaps my Reasonings have not attained to that perfection and exquisite Rigour, as to satisfy those immoderately Curious Wits of our Age, who think it much beneath them, to acquiesce in any other Evidence but that of Demonstrations Geometrical (of which notwithstanding, the Argument of these my Discourses is absolutely uncapable; as I have therein manifested, by clear and undeniable reason); Yet I may comfort myself with this, that my present Undertaking will be Acceptable to as many, as reflect upon the Piety and Good Intention of it; and my Proofs sufficiently Persuasive for all such, who come not to examine the force of them with invincible Prejudice, and resolution not to be convinced.  
But, lest I should seem to anticipate your Lordship's judgement, which being most profound, cannot but be also most Equitable; it becometh me rather to excuse this my exceeding Presumption, in daring to invoke the Patronage of so Illustrious a Person as your Lordship, to so ill-composed a work▪ as this is; which (with all conceivable Humility and Devotion of Spirit) I here lay at your feet. Truly, My Lord, I have so many Reasons to allege, in defence of this my Ambition, that, should I insist upon but the one half of them, this sheet would swell into a Volume greater than the Book itself, which it now ushers to your View. Let it suffice, therefore, I most humbly beseech you, that, had I had no inclinations in myself to this way of testifying my Reverence and Admiration of your Lordship's Eminency, both in the Quality of your Person, and Perfections of your Mind; yet the very rules of common Prudence, and Law of Decency would not have permitted me to make this Address to any other, but yourself▪ For,  
When I reflect upon Greatness of Condition; instantly my thoughts fix upon your Lordship as one, whom your high Birth, and higher Merits (assisted by the favour of Heaven) have elevated to a sublime sphere of Honour, wherein, among the Nobility of the First Magnitude, you shine with dazzling lustre, such as strikes the eyes of all below with solemn Veneration, and excites a noble Emulation in those Few that move in the same orb of Dignity with you.  
If I consider greatness of Virtue; I need look no further then upon your Lordship, in whom all Heroical Virtues are so transcendently conspicuous, that they seem to be Essentially concentred in your very Nature, and as if they were therein met together, on purpose to show the world, How glorious a thing may result from such a Conflux of Great and Good.  
If I respect Greatness of Judgement; whither, even in this Age of Light, should I go but to your Lordship? Who, having with continued industry cultivated that fertile and capacious field of your Mind, and planted it with all the most useful Notions in Theology, Metaphysics, Physics, Medicine, Law Civil and Common, the Mathematics, and other Arts and Sciences; have at length reaped so rich a Harvest of General Knowledge, as might alone plentifully maintain the whole Commonwealth of Letters. Insomuch as all men are ready to confess, that if there be an Universal Oracle in the World, for the solving all Difficulties in Learning, You are it: Nor doth any thing restrain them from accusing you of Engrossing all Science to yourself, but your rare Affability, and promptness to impart it to others.  
Should I look forth for the Chiefest Patron of Learned Men; the Common People themselves, daily observing so great a Confluence of men of the Long Robe, to the place of your residence, and those too the most eminent in their several Faculties, would soon direct me to your Lordship: And your Favour of Scholars is become so notorious, that I have heard it urged as a chief Cause, why Learning hath of late found such admirable Advancement in our Nation, notwithstanding the check of our unhappy Civil Wars.  
In fine, should I consult my own particular Obligations; Gratitude itself would rise up and enjoin me to make this Oblation only to your Lordship; since from you alone I have received more both of Encouragement and Assistance in my studies, than from the whole World beside; so that, indeed, your Right to this Homage I now make to your Lordship, doth wholly take away the Freedom of it.  
What I have said, My Lord, though (I fear me) scarce agreeable to your severe Modesty; is yet fully agreeable with Truth, and as well known as your Name; and therefore, without offending the Law of Decency (as I said afore) I ought not to have permitted this Treatise to venture abroad into the common Aer, without that Advantage and Protection, which your, and only your Patronage can give it▪ Nor would Policy have advised me otherwise: for, albeit among my Readers, many may chance to dislike the Book itself; yet, sure I am, most will like it much the better, for carrying so illustrious a Name in the Epistle; and the severest Critics cannot but commend my judgement in the Dedication.  
Notwithstanding all these Inducements alleageable in favour of my Boldness, I think it safer to cast myself entirely upon your Lordship's Charity, for a Forgiveness of it, than to trust in their importance, how great soever it may seem. And therefore, without being further rude, in disturbing your thoughts from things of more weight and concernment; ay most humbly beg your Lordship's gracious Acceptance of this public acknowledgement, I here make, of that infinite Observance and Thankfulness, which is due to you from,  
My most Honoured LORD your Lordship's most humble, most obedient, and most faithful Servant W: CHARLETON:   

The Errors of the Press, that have escaped the Eye of the Corrector, though but few and venial, are yet not so soon excused, as mended, by reading  
Affectation for affection, in the 10. line of the 10. page.  
And, for ane, in 22. l. of the 25. page.  
Coppices, for Copies, in the 2. l. of the 30. page.  
Silence, for silense, in the 1. l. of the 62. page.  
Contrast, for Contract, in the 9 l. of the 71. page.  
Demonstrateth itself, for demonstrate thits self in the 19 l. of the 72. page.  
Immaterial, for immortal, in the 1. l. of the 85. page.  
Nightly, for mightly, in the 14. l. of the 127. page.  
No other encouragement, for no other other, & in the 1. l. of the 138. page.  
Obelisckes, for obeliks', in the 1. l. of the 139. page.  
Contrast, for Contract, in the 18. l. of the 153. page.  
Make, for moke, in the 22. l. of the 165 page▪   

An Advertisement to the READER.  
AMong the Ancient Philosophers (as you may remember) nothing was more frequent, than to deliver their opinions and documents, as well Physical as Moral, in the plain and familiar way of Dialogue; and the Reasons, that induced them thereunto, are not unworthy consideration. For, besides the opportunity both of commemorating their worthy Friends, and of introducing several occasional and digressive speculations, that might be, perhaps, nor less grateful, nor less useful, than the principal Argument proposed; they thereby gave themselves the advantage of freely alleging the various and different Conceptions and Persuasions of Men, concerning the subject, which they had designed to discuss: Which in the stricter method of Positive and Apodictical Teaching, they could not with equal conveniency do; And how much better we may judge of the truth of any Theorem, when we have heard as well the principal Reasons that impugn, as those that assert it, is obvious to common observation. Hereunto may be added, that a Discourse digested into the form of a familiar Conference, doth by its variety delight, and by its natural freedom and familiarity more gently insinuate itself into the Mind; as is assured by Experience. New, when you have reflected upon these Considerations, you clearly understand what were the main Motives, which induced the Author of this Treatise, to dispose his Collections and solitary Meditations, on this excellent subject, the Immortality of men's Souls, into a Dialogue consisting of Three Persons, the one Propugning, another Impugning that most comfortable Tenent, and the third impartially Determining their Differences. But yet (as I have heard) He had one inducement more to this manner of writing; and that was, that being not long since in France, and invited to discourse of the same Argument, He delivered the substance of all that is here spoken by one of the Interlocutors (viz. Athanasius) in a free Colloquy, betwixt Himself and two of his honoured Friends, as they were recreating and reposing themselves in Luxenburg Garden in Paris. So that in the Circumstances of this Confabulation, there is nothing of Fiction, besides that of Names proper to each of the Speakers. And, as for those; the Parts they bear in the Discourse, sufficiently discover their Derivations.  
Henry Herringman.   

The Contents in Scheme.  

The Immortality of the Human Soul is Demonstrated by Reasons.  
1 Physical, desumed from her 

1 Operations, viz 

1. Volition or Willing 

1 Her proper & most agreeable Object, which is Bonum Honestum, repugnant (for the most part) to Bonum Delectabile & Sensibile.  
2 Freely, and upon deliberation.    
2 Intellection 

1 Pure, or distinct from Imagination  
2 Reflex, in which she understands herself to be Intellectual, and her own Intelligence.  
3 Of Universals, abstracted▪ from 

Singularity▪  
Matter.        
2 Objects which are all things 

Corporeal.  
Incorporcal, & those most properly▪      
2 Moral, desumed from the 

1 Univerall Consent of all Men, of all Ages, Nations▪ Religions.  
2 Appetite of Immortality naturally inherent in all men.  
3 Necessity of Justice Divine.     
Haec ipsa Philosophorum Meditatio est, Animum à corpore solvere▪ atque segregare. Plato in Phaedo.   

THE IMMORTALITY, OF THE HUMAN SOUL, Demonstrated by the Light of Nature.  

DIALOGUE THE FIRST.  
The Interlocutors. LUCRETIUS, ATHANASIUS, ISODICASTES.  Lucretius. 
WEll met, my dear and honoured Athanasius; Thus to encounter you, I am sure, is more than a good omen: It is a happiness in present.  Athanasius. 
I wish it may be so, Lucretius; but, when I reflect upon my own unworthiness, and want of power to be serviceable so my Friends, in any proportion to my respects, or the honour I receive in their commands; I cannot easily be so vain, as to conceive, I can be an occasion of Happiness to you, in any kind. However, let me assure you, both of my joy to see you, and my readiness to serve you.  Lucretius. 
Ah! Athanasius, I am already convinced of both. I am not so unacquainted with the exterior Characters of the Passions, as not plainly to perceive the evidences of joy in your countenance. The serenity of your aspect, the pleasant smoothness of your forehead, the vivacity and lustre of your eyes, and the unusual sanguine tincture of your cheeks, are perfect demonstrations of that Passion within you, which with a sudden yet grateful violence causeth an effusion of blood and spirits towards the habit of the body; as if the Soul, impatient of delay and distance, dispatched those her Emissaries to meet and bring in her beloved object. And, as for your singular Humanity, and generous inclination to oblige, by doing good offices; the happy experience I have had of that, hath long since confirmed me, that, if there be any such thing as a perfect Friend left in the World, certainly you are that thing, where once you are pleased to profess a Dearness. But, why do I injure myself, in deferring that content, this fair opportunity offers me, in your conversation; while I endeavour to prevent your further profession of that sincerity and truth, I long ago knew to be inherent and essential to your very Souls Pray therefore, let me borrow you, for an hour or two, from your meditations or other serious employments, that we may not only solace ourselves, with recalling to mind our ancient Caresses, in the days of youth, innocence and peace, and mutually congratulate each others health and safety, after so many troubles, dangers, and changes of Fortune, as the late Civil Wars in England hath driven us upon: but also revive that quondam custom of ours, when we were Fellow-Collegiates in Oxford, of discoursing freely and calmly of some Argument or other in Philosophy. For, though I have not been so good a husband of my time, as I might have been, nor improved the several opportunities of augmenting my small stock of learning, that some years travel towards the South, and frequent hearing the most eminent professors of all Arts & Sciences, in foreign Universities offered me; yet, let me tell you, I have not been altogether a stranger to study, nor utterly lost my familiarity with the Muses. Nay more, since the day I first ventured abroad into the World, I have had no Mistress that held any considerable room in my thoughts, but One, and that the very same I have many times observed you to court, with the strongest desires and strictest devotion imaginable.  Athanasius. 
Who I? pray Sir, who was that? I do not remember I ever took Cupid for any other than an imaginary Deity, or that I resigned up the rains of my will and Affections into the unsteady hands of a Woman. Sometimes perhaps, I have so far complied with the incitements of my youth and blood, as to seek to please myself in the company and favour of a handsome Woman, for divertisement▪ But I was always too well aware of their Tyranny, ever to put myself seriously and durably under their government.  Lucretius. 
Alas Sir, you mistake me. I do not mean a Woman; but Her, upon whom women usually transfer the blame of all their imperfections, Nature.  Athanasius. 
Her, indeed, I have courted long and zealously, and intent to die her Admirer. For, though it be a great while since I became conscious of the vast distance betwixt us, and of my incapacity to satisfy my desires in the knowledge of so much as the least part of Her; yet my desires are still the same, and I discover such an infinite variety of fresh beauties & excellencies in her every day, that but to gaze upon them at distance, & view Her in the weak and pale reflections made in the glass of my own Reason, I find the most pleasant & ravishing employment, my mind is capable of, and which me thinks sufficiently compensates all the Labours and Difficulties I meet with in my pursuit of her. And if this be that Mistress, you have so long affected, I esteem you singularly happy in your Choice, and myself happy in having such a Rival, as may promote my Addresses, and yet at the same time further his own.  Lucretius. 
And I believe I shall likewise die, as I have lived, Her humble Admirer too. For, I have more reason than you, considering the vast advantage you have over me, in Wit, perspicacity, and judgement; and that your profession daily furnisheth you with variety of fresh observations and useful experiments (for, the Art of Medicine is the best, if not the only Practical Philosophy we have, and who so inquires into the operations of Nature, by no other light than that of Books and solitary speculations, shall in the end find his head full of specious Terms, but empty of true and solid Science.) I say, considering this, I have more reason than you to despair of ever attaining to the least degree of Familiarity and privacy with so divine a Model, as she is. And I confess ingenuously to you, that after all my studious applications to Her, for so many years together, and all my best endeavours to insinuate myself into her nearer acquaintance, I can get no further then to discover, that she is like the Sun, the more we fix our eyes upon her, still the less we discern of her; that she is an immense Ocean, too deep for the sounding line of Man's reason ever to reach Her bottom: and (in a word) that betwixt Us, who call ourselves Philosophers, Secretaries of Nature, etc. and the Illiterate, who calmly acquiesce in the simple information of their senses, thereiss no other difference, but what consisteth wholly in Opinion: We flatter ourselves with a belief, that we know more than really we do; and they remain free from the disquiet of that curiosity, which occasions our delusion; they neither know nor believe they know; we only believe we know. And yet, for all this discouragement, I am still constant in my affections to Her, and my Soul as eager and hot in the pursuit, as if it expected to carry Her clearly in the end. So that I cannot but stay here a little, and wonder at the strange temper of my Mind, which is still possessed with a strong desire of what I see no possibility ever to enjoy; especially when I reflect upon what I have been taught, by such as were well skilled in the nature of Passions, that Love is always accompanied with Probability of Fruition, which is the reason we much oftener observe persons of high rank to become enamoured on their inferiors, than the contrary. This I am sure of, that this uncessant desire of knowledge must be Natural, and coessential to the Soul of Man; or else it must be a Production of Opinion, as sundry other Appetites are. And, if it be engrafted into our minds, by Natures own hand, methinks it should be more capable of satisfaction; for, Nature doth never institute any thing in vain, but commonly provides means for the expletion of each Appetite she createth. But, if it be not Natural, and the effect only of Presumption; how comes it to be so Universal? there being no man, though ne'er so rude and savage, who doth not perceive his Mind to be under the sovereignty of this Affection, more or less: nay, as I remember, I have read a discourse of yours, wherein you have proved that all the Actions of our lives are in some sort or other the effects of this Tendency to Science. And thus you see, Athanasius into what a labyrinth I have unexpectedly brought my thoughts; nor can I hope to extricate myself, unless you shall please to lend me the Clue of your stonger and more decisive reason.  Athanasius. 
Lend you the clue of my Reason, say you? Alack, alack, Lucretius, I well perceive, your long conversation which the French, hath infected you with the humour of saying a great deal more than you think, and tempting your Friend's modesty with attributes of more value▪ than you know belongs to them, as if I could be so arrogant as to undertake the solution of a Riddle, which Lucretius really finds too hard for him. No, Lucretius, no, I am too conscious of my own dulness and ignorance, ever to entertain a conceit so extremely vain. But, come, I perceive your drift. I know you to be one of Epicurus' Disciples, and indeed the most eminent amongst them; and having long since digested and heightened all your Master's Arguments, for the Mortality of the Human Soul; knowing me to be irreconcilable to that uncomfortable and dangerous Opinion, you would now take the opportunity of experimenting the force of them upon so weak an Adversary as myself. Not that I think a person of your wit and acuteness can be so insensible of the admirable and almost divine operations of that noble Essence, even while she is lodged in Walls of clay, as to be seriously of his persuasion, That she is only a certain Contexture or disposition of thinnest and sublilest Atoms, and so upon the change of that disposition by death, is immediately dissolved, and those Atoms again dispersed in the infinite Inanity or Space; but, that you would willingly hear what I am able to allege to the contrary.  Lucretius. 
Will you believe me, Athanasius? I had no such design upon you: Nor can I easily conceive, how you could from that doubt I proposed to you, draw any such suspicion.  Athanasius. 
No? Whither then could that discourse of yours tend? Is it not plain that the Soul's insatiate and unlimited desire of knowledge, is a good Argument of her being Immaterial, and consequently indissoluble?  Lucretius. 
O, now I apprehend you. I remember indeed I have heard that urged, and as a mighty Argument in the Schools, but at present I had no reflection thereupon. However, I thank you for giving me the hint, and humbly beg your pursuit of it. 'Tis a Theme worthy so strong a brain as yours, and (pardon my freedom) I think you are obliged to satisfy the expectation of the World, by divulging your Conceptions concerning that Subject. For, as I remember, in the Conclusion of your Physiology (which I had the good fortune not long since to see and peruse, in the jesuits Library here in Paris, and with more content and benefit to my mind, than your modesty will permit me to express to you) you promise a second part thereof, in way of discovery of the Nature and Immortality of the Reasonable Soul of man.  Athanasius. 
Truth is, I there said somewhat of my Hopes and willingness to finish that structure (how slight and confused soever it were) by addition of what seemed requisite to make it entire, which is the Consideration of the nature of Souls; as well those of Unreasonable, as those of Reasonable Creatures: And this some, and you among the rest, have been pleased to interpret for a promise. But, grant it be so; Yet, sure I am, it was only Conditional, and in case I should receive the friendly Approbation of such judicious persons as had surveyed the first Story of that building, for my encouragement, and obtain Leisure and Quiet, for my better effecting the rest. And how far I have been from receiving that, or obtaining these, I suppose you cannot be ignorant.  Lucretius. 
Yes really I am.  Athanasius. 
That's somewhat strange. Why then give me leave to tell you, that, instead of that Candour in the forgiveness of my lapses, and that approbation of my toil and industry, which I looked for from my Readers; I have reaped no other fruit of all my labours in that long and difficult Work, but most severe, inhuman, uncharitable, unjust Censures. Some condemning me of too much youthful Height and Affection in the style; others accusing me of usurping other men's Notions, Maxims, and Experiments for my own, without so much as naming the Authors, to whose bounteous Wit and Industry I was beholding for their discovery and communication; a third sort reproaching me with inconsideration, in assuming a task of weight so vastly disproportionate to the slender nerves of my judgement; and a fourth scandaling me with negligence in the duties of my Profession, and invading the certainty of all its Rules and Maxims, while I wholly addicted myself to the Innovation of its Fundamentals. Now if you can allow this for encouragement, I shall the less wonder at your expectation of my proceeding to the accomplishment of that work, which (I call Heaven to witness out of pure devotion to knowledge; and commendable ambition to be serviceable to the Commonwealth of Learning in proportion to my talon) I had proposed to myself to enterprise: Otherwise, I hope, you will not envy me, the Peace I aim at, in being henceforth silent, and employing all my Collections, Observations, and Speculations Philosophical, only to the furnishing the little Cabinet of my own brain. I have now at length learned, that Sapere domi, to endeavour the acquisition of Science in private, aught to be the principal scope of a Wise man: Nor shall I easily suffer myself to be diverted from the resolution I have taken, constantly to put that excellent Lesson in practice.  
And as for Leisure and Quiet (without both which, you well know, no man can compile a work of any solidity and accurateness, in any part of Learning whatsoever) I have been so far from enjoying either of them, that on the contrary, from the time I first published that Physiology you mentioned, even to this very day, I have been embroiled in as many troubles and distractions, as malice, persecution, and sharp adversity could accumulate upon me. I have been driven from my Country, House, Family, Books, Friends, and Acquaintance; and wholly deprived of all the chief endearments of life; insomuch that I am a perfect stranger to any such thing as comfort, but what I sometimes form to myself out of the assurance of my Innocence, and the hope of that compensation that is ordained for Patience in unjust sufferings. In a word, Lucretius, (for as it sharpeneth the sense of my afflictions in myself, for me to recount them; so I know it cannot be, but very unpleasant to you, to hear the miserable adventures of your Friend) for almost these two last years, I have been continually tossed up and down by a Tempest of Calamity, which is yet so violent, that the dangers, which threaten me, seem to despise the prevention of that small skill I have in the use of my Compass: My Anchors are lost, my Vessel leaks, the Winds hurry it from land, and I hourly expect to sink downright. Nor can I see how it is possible for me to avoid it, unless relief suddenly come from that Divine Power; by whose permission (for my chastisement) it is, that the cruelty and rage of my Enemies have raised this storm against me. Consider, then, whether this be a Condition fit to study in, or whether you could forbear to have an indignation against this folly; who, being in such a case, should hope to write any thing worthy so judicious and curious an eye, as yours is? If not, pray cease to reproach me, with having been wanting as well to myself as to the World, in not making good the Promise you urge; And rather give me your advice how to deport myself as becomes a Philosopher, with Constancy and tranquillity of mind, than strive to aggravate my disquiet, by engaging me to write on so abstruse and difficult a Subject.  Lucretius. 
You have told me enough to change my Curiosity into Sadness and Commiseration. I shall not be so rude to exasperate the smart of your wounds, by pressing you further to disclose them to me, nor am I so good a Physician for the Mind, as to prescribe you any more sovereign remedies against Discontent, than what I am sure you well know already. But since you require my advice, I shall bid you look into that Magazine of choice Moral Precepts, which you have been long collecting, and treasuring up in your own breast: For, there, I am sure, you will find such Cordials, and virtuous Antidotes, as will secure your Soul from being discomposed at the worst that evil Fortune can do against you, and heighten your thoughts and Resolutions to a generous defiance of temporal crosses, and a perfect Contempt of the World. And among the rest, as you meet with it, be sure to dwell longest upon this rule, Never suffer your Spirit to sink; still remembering, that Virtue is like precious Odours, most fragrant, when incensed or crushed; and that the extremities of worthy Persons are usually annihilated in the consideration of their own deservings, but always overcome in the end, by their bravery and magnanimity showed in the entertainment of them. Which I the rather point at, because I know you to be of a Melancholy disposition, and such commonly suffer adverse accidents to make too deep impressions upon their mind, which is thereupon apt to dejection, which some have defined to be the first step to final Despair; And how difficult a thing it is to raise him up, who helps to depress himself; I need not tell you. It will not be amiss also for you, often to have recourse to gentle and Philosophical Divertisements, and to admit conferences with your Friends, touching some Argument or other, that you are able to discourse of familiarly, and without torturing the brain, and putting your Imagination upon the rack: For, by this means, you shall insensibly wear out the Characters your misfortunes and distresses have stamped in your Soul, and find a pleasure in taking occasional reviews of the several useful Notions filled up in the rolls of your Memory, and at the same time, both benefit and endear your company.  Athanasius, 
Sir, your Counsel is excellent, and I shall make it my chief care to let you see how much I prise it, by my endeavours to follow it precisely. But, know withal, Lucretius, that the foresight, I tell you, I have of my approaching ruin, as to all that Fortune lays claim to as hers, doth not imply either my Fear of it, or want of resolution to sustain that, and even Death itself, in what shape soever it shall present itself, without stooping one hair's breadth below that pitch of spirit, that belongs to an honest Mind to conserve in all encounters. 'Tis one thing to previse a danger, and another to be startled and grow pale at the stroke of it: I well understand the value of the goods of the Mind above those of Fortune: And if I can be so much in favour with Heaven, as to be endowed but with the least portion of the Former, I shall easily part with the Latter, and account myself rich enough in the exchange. Be confident therefore, that so long as I can conserve my integrity, and the peace of my Conscience entire, I shall also keep my Spirit from dejection, nor will it be in the power of my Adversaries ever to depress it, with all the weights of adversity they can heap upon me.  
As for that way of Divertisement, by free and unbiased Philosophical Conferences you speak of; I approve it as very available both to the gentle weaning of the Mind from sad apprehensions, and the exercise of its more agreeable Habits. But, I fear me, you do as that Physician, who prescribed his Patient a dose of the grand Elixir, in the yolk of a Phoenix egg; You refer me to a Medicine I cannot possibly obtain. For, though among the French there be many excellent Wits, and men eminent for their abilities in all kinds of Learning; Yet I observe them generally to be of a temper more fit for hot and testy Disputes, then calm and peaceable Debates, in way of Disquisition: and commonly, they are so fierce and ardent in defence of their own preconceived opinions, that they account it a piece of disrespect and incivility in any man that seems to doubt, or call the verity of them in question. So that a Noble person of our Nation, who hath lived long in this City, and is able to give a true Character of the French Genius, as to this particular, was pleased to tell me within these few days, that their humour of prejudice to all that is not their own, though really much better than their own, extends also to their Tenants in Arts and Sciences; And that it would be hard for me to find a Scholar among them, who would not rather lose the opportunity of investigating a truth, by an equitable and patient comparing of the strength of other men's reasons with his own, than not appear to have clearly understood the full nature of the thing, before it was proposed. Now, how highly disagreeable this would be to my Genius, which is so averse to all contests and passionate Altercations, and which always brings me to Philosophical Discourses only as to Inquiries, not final Determinations, and with perfect indifferency to either side, not caring at all whether my Allegations, or my Opponent's, give the greater light to certainty, so I attain to any degree of certainty in the end: I say, how disagreeable this Overweening of the French, would be to me in Conversation, you may easily conjecture. Besides I am yet but beginning to speak their Language, and so am uncapable of the benefit and pleasure of their Colloquies. And though many of them are very great Masters of the Latin, and write very elegantly therein; Yet when they come to speak it, you may perceive such a tedious redundancy of words flowing from their tongues, as will sufficiently convince you, that they cannot suddenly translate the conceptions of their minds into another Language, without retaining the verbosity of their own. Which I find exceedingly troublesome to me, in respect of the narrowness of my capacity, that causeth me many times to lose the notion and sense, in the long and strict attention to the expressions; Just as when we meet some person in brave and gaudy clothes, the waving of his Feather and Ribbons, and the Lustre of his Lace, so distract and take off our sight, that we see the less of his Face; and when he is passed by us, we remember more of his dress, than his stature, complexion and aspect. And thus you see how unlikely it is for me to meet with the Physic you prescribe me, here among the French.  
And as for the English that now reside here; I am not acquainted with any one (except yourself) who makes it his business to pursue the favour of those severe and reserved Muses, that you and I so much adore. Some doubtless there are of the same contemplative inclination; But (as I tell you) I have not encountered so much felicity as to know any one of them; and if I did, without good experience of his candour, and some degree of intimacy, I should think it an unpardonable Solecism in good manners, to molest him with the importunity of my Conversation, which savours of nothing so much as of sourness and melancholy. So that unless you please to be the remedy you advise, I see no probability of my obtaining it, till I return into England.  Lucretius. 
What you have now remarked of the French's being generally great Opinionators, my observation also confesseth to be altogether true. Nor are there among our Countrymen, in this place, many of those we call Votaries of Nature; Yet I can introduce you to the knowledge of a Person, noble by Birth, and of high condition, but infinitely more noble by the Heroic endowments of his better part, and the large measure of Knowledge he hath acquired in all things of most use, to the well government of ourselves, in all the various occurrences of life. He is a prudent Estimator of men's actions and opinions, but no rigid Censor of either. A valiant Assertor of truth, yet far from Tyranny; where he finds an error, as always reflecting on human frailty, and the obscurity of things in themselves. He well knows how to overcome, but not at all to triumph; And when he hath overcome, you can hardly perceive he ever contended. For, he doth not seem so much to refute, as to teach, rather gently insinuating verity, then struggling in the detection of falsehood. Curious in the collection of Books, diligent in reading them, accurate in examining what they deliver, & always more favourable to Reason, then to Authority, unless in matters of Faith. A great Lover of Experiments in Physic and Chemistry; Yet no ways infected with the vanities of the one, or frauds of the other. A friend to all learned & judicious men of your Profession, he meets with; and a Patron to the Art itself. Witness the vast pains and cost he hath lately bestowed upon his Garden, wherein are now growing more than two thousand six hundred Plants, of different sorts; Each of them being, according to admirable method, disposed into a particular Classis, containing all the species referrible to their proper Genus or Tribe: So that considering the great variety, and orderly ranging of the Plants, I cannot think it much inferior to the famous Seminary of Vegetables at Bloys, belonging to the Duke of Orleans. Witness likewise the spacious Elaboratory, he hath caused to be erected in his house, and furnished with Furnaces, Vessels, and Instruments of all sorts; Which he employs rather for his recreation, and the extraction of the most virtual and purest parts of Herbs, and other medicinal Simples, and the distillation of choice Cordial Waters and Spirits, for the conservation of health, than in practising the impostures of Pseudo▪ chemists, that pretend to the mysterious Art of Transmutation of Metals, and making the Philosopher's stone, as they call it. And yet I have known when he hath permitted one of those Bastards of Hermes, therein to run through a whole Progress, or course of Spagirical operations, in order to the production of the Seminal tincture of Gold: But, it was only, that the man himself might be the better convinced, and the World satisfied of the folly and knavery of such attempts, by the constant unsuccessefullness of them. In a word, Athanasius; he is a perfect Virtuoso, one infinitely above the best Character I can give him: Nor do I herein aim at praising him, but assuring you, that in him you may meet with the most pleasing and satisfactory Conversation in the World.  Athanasius. 
Even now you mentioned the Philosopher's stone, Lucretius, and sure this excellent Person you describe, is it: For if the Elixir be only Virtue in a Parable, as I know some wise men have affirmed, why may not I think him so? But who is it, I pray?  Lucretius. 
I am sure you have often heard his name, and perhaps seen him too: 'Tis IS ODIC ASTES.  Athanasius. 
I know him both by sight and fame. He was with us in Oxford, in time of the late Wars, and in great favour and trust with the King his Master. And now I am confirmed of the truth of all you have said of him, having heard as much from sundry others of worth and Credit. But will you adventure the reputation of your Judgement so far as to commend me to his notice? I fear, you dare not.  Lucretius. 
Yes I do, and doubt not to receive his thanks for my Labour, for I know you to be singularly able in your Profession, and as free in the communication of any thing you have found conducible to the advancement of it, or any other part of Learning: And either of those two qualities (if you had no other that were commendable) is sufficient to endear you to him in a short time.  Athanasius. 
When will you permit me to wait upon you to him?  Lucretius. 
Even when you please: What say you of going thither this present evening? For his house is not far off this place, and about this hour of the day he is usually at leisure, and disposed to admit visits. We shall find him, I suppose, viewing his Nursery of Plants, and keeping a Diary of their short lives; recording in the margin of his Catalogue, which of them are now in their youth or immaturity, which in their full vigour and growth, and which beginning to decline; And noting also which is in the blossom, which in the Flower, which in the Seed, which fit to be cropped, that so he may be exact in knowing the true season when each kind attains to its pride and perfection of Virtue. For, at this time of the year, and till the latter end of August, this commonly is his recreation every evening, in case the weather be favourable. So that if you think fit, I will conduct you thither instantly.  Athanasius. 
With all my heart; I am not for deferring happiness one moment.  Lucretius. 
Content; But let me advertise you of one thing before we go: Though you are a stranger to him in person; yet he is acquainted with your Genius, by your Writings. You know the saying, Oratio indicat virum. And it is not many days since I heard him commend your Physiology, and wish you would proceed to publish the remainder of it, concerning the Immortality of the Reasonable Soul. So that assure yourself, he will soon find occasion to draw you on to discourse of that subject: Nor can you with civility decline it. Therefore, provide yourself for the ambush, by turning over the records of your memory, and rallying your scattered notions, in as good order as you can, upon so short warning.  Athanasius. 
Hear you, Lucretius; doth this consist with the counsel you gave me, even now, to divert myself from the sense of my misfortunes, by entertaining frank and familiar conferences with ingenious company, without torturing my brain, and racking my imagination? You are like a Physician, who forbids his patient Wine, and yet can be content to see him drunk, so it be in his company. Do you think I can discourse any whit tolerably of so difficult an Argument, and in such a presence, without great labour of the Mind?  Lucretius. 
Why not? having profoundly considered, and frequently revolved the matter in your Mind, before hand, as I am confident you have, or otherwise you would not have given us hopes of your writing a particular Treatise thereupon. Pray, deal ingenuously with me, have you no Adversaria, no First-Draught of that piece you intended, among your Papers?  Athanasius. 
Some few sheets I have, in which I hastily scribbled over my Collections, and First Thoughts, as they chanced to occur: But disjointed, without Form, and wanting the decency of connexion and language. But what of that? Would you have an Architect acquaint you with his design, only by showing you his Materials lying confusedly congested together in a heap?  Lucretius. 
From a view of the Materials, I can guests at the strength and firmness of the building intended, though not at the Model or Platform. Therefore, without any further excuses or evasions, be pleased to comply with the desires and expectation of your Friends, either by affording us the liberty of perusing those memorial of your thoughts; or by abstracting the substance or marrow of them yourself, and infusing it into our ears in a brief discourse.  Athanasius. 
I perceive, Lucretius, you well understand the unlimited power you have over me; otherwise you would not thus have put me upon such a Demonstration of it, as requires me, at the same time, to lay aside my Reason, and resign up my discretion wholly to the conduct of your importune Curiosity. But, that you may see I am all obedience and complacency, where I have once entered into a league of amity; I will no longer consider the hazard of my reputation, in exposing to your Examination (which I am sure, will be strict enough) a Summary of those Reasons, which I conceive sufficiently strong and evident to evince the Immortality of the Human Soul, while they yet want due Connexion, and such illustration of Art and Language, as they deserve, and as perhaps I could have bestowed upon them, at my better leisure, and vacancy from solicitude of mind: I say, I will no longer keep my reputation in the balance against your Commands, but freely deliver you an Abbreviate of my Notes, touching the subject mentioned. Nor will I defer your satisfaction longer than until to morrow, about this time; When, if you please to meet me here in this cool Cypress Walk, in Luxemburgh Garden, you shall hear what I am able to say, concerning that particular. In the mean time, I will go home and look over my papers, and digest the contents of them into the most natural method I can, upon so short premeditation. If they answer not your expectation, be just in imputing it to your own unreasonable haste; Which would not allow me convenient time, to cast them in a more uniform mould: If they do, be not so much a Courtier, as to ascribe it to any thing, besides the Goodness of the Cause, in defence whereof they are alleged.  Lucretius. 
My dear Athanasius, my heart is too narrow to contain the joy you have infused into me; Nor can I express the smallest part of that content, which redounds to me from this your most affectionate condescension. And yet I would urge your kindness to a further grant.  Athanasius. 
Of what?  Lucretius. 
Of something, that will conduce to your own advantage, in the end.  Athanasius. 
I shall have but little regard to that, if what you require may but be really grateful to yourself. Pray, therefore, cease henceforth to estimate my readiness to serve my Friend, by the proportion his requests hold to my own utility an emolument: And freely speak your desire.  Lucretius. 
It is no more, but that you would permit me to interrupt you, now and then, in your discourses, to morrow, when we meet, in case I see occasion of Doubting, or Objecting any thing that seems material. For (as you know) I am somewhat strict in examining the force of all Arguments proposed to me, especially of such as pretend Evidence and Certitude requisite to full Conviction. I would not willingly admit any Position into my belief, but what hath past the severest trial of my Reason, I can put it to.  Athanasius. 
Nor shall you, Lucretius, be circumvented or ensnared into an error, by any sophistry of mine. If what I shall urge, in favour of the Soul's Eternal subsistence after death, shall appear to you to be less clear or solid, than I apprehend; pray, detect the invalidity thereof and spare not. Where I am once assured of Candour, I love to be opposed. But since you intent to raise Scruples and Objections out of what I shall deliver, and that it is easily possible for you and me to descent about the pre-eminence of each others reasonings: me thinks, it were but just, we had some Third person present, whose judgement and equity may qualify him to play the Arbiter betwixt us, and unto whose decisive Verdict we ought equally to submit our Differences.  Lucretius. 
You have prevented me: Isodicastes, I am confident, will do us the honour to be the Man. I know none so fit, in respect either of the admirable perspicacity of his understanding, or the sincerity and uprightness of his judgement: As no Fallacy can escape his remark, so the whole world cannot bribe him to a partial suffrage. And if you approve the choice, I will undertake to prevail upon him to be present at our conference, and do us that noble office.  Athanasius. 
Pray, let him know withal how far I was from seeking this occasion of his trouble, and that I am not so vainly conceited of the worth of my notions, as to promise to myself they shall compensate his patience, by adding one mite to that large magazine of knowledge, He is already master of. All I hope for at his hands, is a charitable forgiveness of my Audacity, in daring to enter the list against so potent an Opponent, concerning so difficult and sublime an Argument, and before so discerning a Judge; and that with such blunt weapons, as your unexpected and sudden compulsion of me to the encounter, enforceth me to make use of.  Lucretius. 
Fear not my justice, either in owning the violence I have used, to draw you to comply with my desires, or saving your modesty the labour of prepossessing him with the extreme diffidence you have of your own Abilities. And now we are agreed upon the manner and circumstances of our Duel, pray, let us a little solace ourselves with a turn or two in this cool and fragrant walk, into which the neighbouring Orange trees so plentifully transmit the grateful odour of their flowers. How like you this so much admired Garden? Doth it not clearly demonstrate to you, how great the additions are, that the beauties of Nature are capable of receiving, from the hand of Art?  Athanasius. 
I think it worthy as great a share in the spectators wonder, as the vast and magnificent Fabric to which it is adjoined. And if it be lawful for us to guess at the Greatness of Prince's Minds, as well as at that of their wealth, by the amplitude and sumptuousness of the structures they have reared; I may conjecture, that the Foundress of this prodigious Palace, had a Soul in all things equal to the height of her Dignity, and the largeness of Empire, she once enjoyed; For, otherwise her subtle Favourite whom she had raised to that immoderate sublimity of power, as made him fit to be her Competitor for Sovereignty in dominion; would not have conceived himself unstable in his unlimited sway, till he had clipped the wings of her aspiring Soul, and left her embroyld in the jealousy of the King, her Son: who being persuaded, that the lustre of his Diadem was eclipsed by her shining in the same Sphere; readily embraced their counsel, who suggested that the greatness of her policy and aims, was never to be obscured, but by removing her into another climate, by a kind of gentle Banishment. Had she been of as soft and flexible a spirit as the King was, whose power he employed to her suppression; doubtless, monsieur the Cardinal had never thought her worthy the honour of his Fears. Great envy is always a certain sign of great Merit. But to leave my unseasonable reflection on the Queen, who raised this stupendious Building, and answer your demand of my opinion of the Garden; I tell you, in a word, it is the most Princely I ever saw, for the largeness of the ground or Contents, for the uniformity it holds to the design of the House, for the freedom of Prospect from all the principal rooms thereof, and for the variety of entertainments it affords, according to the several seasons of the year. Here are Grotta's, Groves, and places of shade, for Estivation; and artificial Fountains perpetually spouting up streams of water, to attemper the fervour of the air, in heat of Summer: Spacious and open walks to take in the more temperate and refreshing breath of the Spring: and arched Piazza's that afford equal shelter from Sun, cold or rain. Here is a peculiar Garden for each month in the year, in which things of beauty and sweetness are then in season. Here is variety well sorted, Magnificence and Curiosity gracefully united; and yet a Natural wildness so well imitated in all, that the loveliness & perfection of the whole, seems to consist in the neat disguise of the symmetry of the parts: so that Art is almost lost in the excellency of itself, & visible only in dissembling a confusion. Here Palates & Noses of all sorts are exactly accommodated and strangers usually dispute, whether the sight or Taste, or Smell be the better provided for: nor is it easy to decide the controversy, where each sense is feasted even to satiety. Here are little Copies of Orange trees, environed with hedges of Jasmine; as if the Planter had respect to the mixture of odours in the aer, and intended—  Lucretius. 
Hold, Athanasius, if the distance doth not deceive me, yonder comes ISODICASTES, the wise and good— Yes it is He, I am sure. I can distinguish him thus far off, by the gravity of his Habit, and the sober evenness of his pace, with a natural decorum and comeliness, expressing the majesty and serenity of that noble Principle, which gives motion to his body from within.  Athanasius. 
Pray put me not out of countenance, by telling him before my face, how inconsiderate I have been, in accepting your challenge against to morrow. Do not insult over the facility and good nature of your friend, by boasting the force of your influence upon him.  Lucretius. 
I do consider your excess of modesty, and, therefore, will not touch upon our appointment, while you are present. But, now he draws near, let us not be rude in seeming insensible of the singular respect due to his quality and worth: but mend our pace, and, by our speed to meet him civilly, confess our transport of joy to have the happy opportunity— Noblest and worthiest Isodicastes, your most humble servant.  Isodicastes. 
Witty Lucretius, I am yours, and glad to encounter you thus unexpectedly.  Lucretius. 
I ask your leave Sir to present to your knowledge, this friend of mine here, a Person of more than common merit, which is more than I need tell you, when you have heard me name him.  Isodicastes. 
I remember, I have seen this Gentleman's face often, or one extremely like him, at least: But cannot, on the sudden recall to mind, or where, or when.  Lucretius. 
In Oxford, Sir, in time of the Wars, doubtless, if at all. For, He was scarcely arrived at the twentieth year of his age, when the flames of our intestine commotions first broke forth into open hostility: And since they were extinguished in the ruins of the Royal party, you have been constantly resident here in France, whither he is but lately come. But, not to hold you longer in suspense, This is Athanasius, of whom I have heard you speak, upon occasion of some new opinions and experiments, in the Physiology he not long since published.  Isodicastes. 
Worthy Athanasius, fortune could not have brought me to the knowledge of any Person, who had aforehand a greater share in my esteem then yourself. I am an honourer of your Art, and so cannot but have a singular value and respect for any, that endeavours by his studies and writings to contribute towards the advancement of it, as I am satisfied you have done.  Athanasius. 
Most honoured Sir, I am not conscious to myself of any thing in me, worthy the honour of your slightest notice, but barely my goodwill to Learning, and the sincere Devotion and reverence I bear toward your noble self, who are both so great an Ornament, and Patron of it. And if you shall vouchsafe to admit me to the lowest degree in your good Grace and favourable regard, upon so small an account as that: You will demonstrate the vast extent of your Charity, in obliging a poor and inconsiderable thing, and one that hath nothing but the simplicity of his Zeal, to qualify him for your service.  Isodicastes. 
You are unreasonably modest, thus to diminish yourself, Athanasius: And as immoderate in your overvaluation of my Capacity to express my affection to Learning and Learned Men, otherwise than only by the content I take in their conversation. But, let us leave this formality of Compliments to young Courtiers, as savouring of less plainness and freedom, than aught to be amongst the Votaries of Truth and Science, when they meet together: And give me leave to inquire of you (for, it seems you came but lately thence) somewhat concerning the state of Learning now in England. I have been told of great Discoveries made, by men of your Faculty there, in Anatomy, Diseases, and their ways of Cure; Far different from the Principles and Doctrine of the Ancients. I have heard also, that the Mathematics are in high reputation among you, and have received much, if not of improvement, yet of illustration, from the happy industry of some, in our Universities. Pray, therefore, let it not be troublesome to you, to give us some hints of the particulars, wherein the Wits of our Nation have of late been so highly beneficial to the Commonweal of Philosophy.  Athanasius. 
Sir, you have laid a command upon me, which is impossible for me to obey, without shamefully betraying my own ignorance, and (by a disadvantageous representation of them) much disparaging the noble successes of those Heroical Wits among our Countrymen, who have addicted themselves to the Reformation and Augmentation of Arts and Sciences, and made a greater Progress in that glorious design, than many ages before them could aspire to, notwithstanding all their large hopes, specious promises, and manifold attempts. Nevertheless, being your command, I shall strive to yield obedience to it, so far forth at least, as to recount to you in brief, what upon the sudden I can call to mind, of the most considerable Novelties in Natural Philosophy, Medicine, the Optics, Astronomy and Geometry, found out by the ingeny and labours of men now living in England, & as yet in the prime of their strength and years.  
In the College of Physicians in London, (which without offence to any thing, but their own Modesty, I may pronounce to be the most eminent Society of men, for Learning, Judgement and Industry, that is now, or at any time hath been, in the whole World) you may behold Solomon's House in reality. Some there are, who constantly employ themselves in dissecting Animals of all kinds, as well living as dead; and faithfully recording all singularities that occur to their observation, both in the several species, and individuals: That so they may come to know, what is perfectly natural, what preternatural, what rare and monstrous among the parts of them; And also what resemblance there is betwixt the Conformation of the parts in the body of Man, and those in the bodies of other Animals, ordained by Nature to the same, or like and equivalent uses. So that it will be hard for any man to bring thither any Fish, Bird, or Insect, whose Emtrails these genuine Sons of Democritus are not already intimately acquainted with; or, at least, which they will not with admirable dexterity and skill anatomize without confusion of the smallest Organ, and instantly explore the proper office of each Organical part, by remarking the Figure, Substance, Vessels, and situation of it. And, I have some reason to put you in hope, that ere long you may see a Collection of most of the Anatomical Experiments that these Men have made, in the bodies of Beasts, Birds, Fishes, and Infects of various sorts; together with the Figure of each, and all its principle Organs, expressed to the life in Copper-Cuts; and an exact account as well of the Analogy, as Dissimilitude that is betwixt them and others of consimilar uses in Man, the grand Rule or Prototype to all inferior Creatures. Which is a Method, certainly, of inestimable use towards the compliment of Natural History, and the only way to perfect that Comparative Anatomy, whose defect the Lord St. Alban so much complained of, in our Art.  
Others there are, who daily investigate arguments to confirm and advance that incomparable invention of Doctor Harvey, the Circulation of the Blood; And have already brought the Doctrine thereof to so high a degree of perfection, that it is not only admitted and admired by all the Schools in Europe, but the advancers of it also are able to solve most of the difficult phaenomena in Pathology, only by that Hypothesis; And frequently effect such Cures, by having respect thereunto in their intentions and prescripts, as well in Cronique, as Acute Diseases, as could not be hoped from any other groundwork, or supposition formerly laid; At least not with equal correspondence to the true method of Healing, which ought to be deduced from Principles of the greatest evidence and certainty in Nature, among which certainly this of the Circulation is the chiefest. And though I deny not, but the like Cures may have been performed by Physicians, who never dreamt of any such thing, as the continual motion of the blood from the heart, by the Arteries to the outward parts of the body, and thence back again, by the veins?, into the heart; but rested in the Antique opinion of a difference betwixt Arterial and Venal blood, both as to substance and uses: Yet I may safely affirm, that the Remedies used by them, wrought the effects aimed at, by ways altogether accidental, and beside the direct scope of those, who gave them; And to do a cure only by Accident, you well know, is much below the ambition of a Rational Physician, who ought to have a firm and well-grounded Theory of the Faculties and Virtues proper to each particular Instrument he is to make use of, in rectifying the disordered Oeconomy of nature in man's body. For my own part (I speak ingenuously) I am so well satisfied of the Verity of this Harvean Circulation, and have so seriously considered the great advantages that may be made of it, in order to the ennobling the Art of Medicine, by reducing the maxims of it from obscure and conjectural, to evident and demonstrative; And by accommodating the same to the explanation of most of the Apparences in Pathology: That I have had some thoughts of undertaking to justify all the Aphorisms of Hypocrates, which concern the Nature and Sanation of Diseases, by reasons and considerations deduced merely from this one Fountain, the Hypothesis of the Circulation of the blood; And if my troubles had not deprived me of leisure, I had ere this made some progress in that enterprise. But, I have digressed, and ask your pardon for it.  
There are, moreover, among the members of this venerable Society, who pursuing the hint, some few years since, given them by jacobus Mullerus, a Germane, in an Academical exercise, of the nature of Animal and Voluntary Motion; have gone far toward the explication of the reasons and manner of the Motions of the Muscles, by the principles of Mechanics: An enterprise of great difficulty, and long desiderated, as leading us to understand the Geometry observed by the Creator in the fabric of the Microcosm, and the verification of Anatomical assertions by demonstrations Mathematical. The same persons likewise have demonstrated, that we go, because we fall, i. e. that each step we advance, is but a shifting the body to a fresh Centre of Gravity; And our Rest but a remaining or fixing of it upon the same: As also that in progression, the Head of a man is moved through more of space, than his feet, by almost one part of four, in respect of its greater distance from the Centre of the Earth; which indeed was touched, and only touched upon, by that prodigy of Mathematical subtleties, Galileo, in his Second Dialogue de Mundo.  
There are also of these Miners of Nature, who have found out more probable and commodious Uses for the Glandules, or fatty Kernels situate in divers parts of man's body, than were assigned unto them by all antecedent Anatomists. For, whereas Those generally conceived them to have been intended by Nature to no nobler an end, than either for the Imbibition or draining of superfluous humours inundating the parts adjacent to them; Or for the sustaining of Veins, Arteries, and Nerves in their progress from part to part; These have discovered, that some Glandules serve for the preparation of the Succus Nutritius, or juice that nourisheth the whole body; That others are official to the sequestration of some less profitable and disagreeable parts of the same nutritive juice, or Vital Nectar; And that a third sort of them are ordained for reduction of those same less profitable parts, after their separation or streining, back again into the mass of blood, by the small veins that are contiguous to them. And among these likewise there is one (A person of singular note, for his Universal Learning, and indefatigable industry in Disquisition) who aiming to promote the certainty of these New Tenants: (1.) That, according to the Anatomical observations of joh. Pecquet, a young Physician of Diepp in Normandy, the Chylus is conveyed from the stomach, by the Venae Lacteae, or Milky Veins, into a certain Receptacle, or common promptuary situate at the bottom of the Mesentery; and thence transmitted upwards, by a conduit running all along on the inside of the Spine of the back, to the subclavian veins, and so delivered into the right Ventricle of the heart, there to be turned into blood: (2.) That the Liver is not the immediate instrument of Sanguification, but inservient only to the sequestration of the Choleric parts of the blood, and the conveying the same into the Gall, to be thence excluded into the Duts: (3.) That there is no Anastomosis, or mutual Inosculation betwixt the small branches of the Vena Portae, and those of the Vena Cava, in the substance of the Liver; as was generally believed from the infancy of Physic, till of late years, when this Gentleman was so happy as to evince the contrary, by ocular demonstration: (4.) That there are certain thin, slender and transparent Vessels, for the most part accompanying the veins, & especially in the liver, (named Vasa Lymphatica, by Thomas Bartholinus, who seems first to have discovered them, and Lymphducts, by others since) containing a clear liquor, like water, which they exonerate into the common Receptacle of the Chyle, newly mentioned; to the end, that being again infused together with so much of the Chyle as enters the veins, into the blood, it may both prevent the Coagulation of it, and also (in respect of its predisposition to Volatility) associating itself to the Vital spirits in the Heart and Arteries, promote the Mication, or boiling motion of the blood: And (5.) That the solid parts of the body are not, in the general, nourished by the blood (which He conceives to be only the fuel of the Vital Flame, or Heat; and in regard of its great Volatility, and harsh and grating nature, more likely to pray upon and consume, than feed and repair the substance of the solid parts) but by the sweeter and more unctuous part of the Chylus, drawn up by the mediation of the Nerves (especially those of the sixth Conjugation, called the Recurrent Nerves) into the brain, and there elaborated, and afterward transmitted by the Nerves, to all parts of the body: This worthy Person, I say, aiming to promote the certainty of these recent Opinions, hath collected, illustrated and disposed them into one Systeme; Hoping thereby to declare their mutual Consistence, as well each with other, as with the demonstrative doctrine of the Circulation of the blood; And at the same time put an end to all disputes, concerning the Milky veins, the use of the Spleen, of the Capsulae Atrabilariae, or Renes succenturiati, Deputy Kidneys (as Casserius Placentinus called them) and sundry other Difficulties in Anatomy. But, whether or no he hath attained to the full pitch of his hopes, in that design; you will be best able to judge, when you have read and examined the weight of his experiments and discourses, delivered in his excellent Book, de Anatomia Hepatis: In the mean time, give me leave to advertise you, that his modesty is so great, as that he expressly professes his own want of full satisfaction concerning the truth of sundry particulars therein contained; And therefore presents them to the World, as positions, not of apodictical evidence, but great probability, and worthy to be embraced, only till time shall have brought more credible ones to light.  
Furthermore, among these Merchants for light, we have some so excellently well skilled in all sorts of Medical Simples, that they know, not only the names, but the faces also and virtues of most of the Plants in Europe; And can, besides that, give you a better account of the American drugs, than Piso Margravius, and others, notwithstanding the large volumes they have compiled concerning that subject. They likewise so well understand all Fossilia, and the several kinds of Minerals, precious Stones, Salts, concreted juices, and other subterranean productions; That even Lapidaries and Miners come to learn of them. We have others, who inquire into the mysteries of Refiners, Belfounders, and all others that deal in Metals. Others, who search out the frauds and sophistications of Wine-coopers' and Vintners, in the brewing, feeding, stumming, and adulterating of Wines. Others, who can inform you exactly of the several hurtful Arts of Brewers, Bakers, Butchers, Poulterers, and Cooks: All which are of very great detriment to the health of men, though the danger be commonly undiscerned; And, were the civil Magistrate but half so careful to reform, as these Doctors have been in detecting those public abuses, the City of London would soon find, by happy experience, that Physicians are both as willing and able to preserve health, as to restore it. In a word, there is nothing escapes their examination, which may any way concern the safety of man's life; or the knowledge whereof can conduce to make themselves every way accomplished in their Profession.  
And as for Chemistry (which I had almost forgotten) in the whole world there are none who know better how to distinguish betwixt the impostures and truths of it, than these Men do: or how to make use of all the secrets thereof, towards the preparation of noble and generous Medicaments. Witness that plenty of choice Chemical remedies, daily confected in the Elaboratory belonging to the College, by the directions and prescripts of the Fellows; and the care they constantly take, to diffuse those safe and excellent preparations among all their Apothecaries, that so the lives of their Patients be not endangered by the false and poisonous wares of Pseudo-chymists. A course, certainly, that occasions great readiness and security in their Practice; and satisfies the World both of their singular Judgement, and constant Integrity in discharge of their trust. And thus, most honoured Sir, I have hastily, and slightly run over a few of those particulars, wherein Natural Philosophy, and the Art of Medicine have, of late, received such notable advancement, by the Inventions and Disquisitions of this Venerable Society; which for the Knowledge of Nature, well deserves to be esteemed the Great Luminary of the World, from whence there constantly stream rays of light, for the dispelling the thick and long congested clouds of ignorance. But, before I pass to the remainder of your demand, permit me to observe to you; that though the Fellows of this College apply themselves severally to this or that particular Province, each one according to the inclination & delight of his own private Genius; Yet, when they meet together in Consultations, they are so candid and liberal in the communication of their single observations and discoveries, that no one of them can long be ignorant of the notions of all the rest: And the noble Emulation that hath equally inflamed their ingenious breasts, makes them unanimous in cooperating toward the Common design, the erecting an entire and durable Fabric of solid Science; such as posterity may not only admire, but set up their rest in.  
And now Sir, if you please to go along with me to Oxford, you shall there also find as great Benefactors to Learning, as those were, who founded and endowed their Colleges; and some, who for the excellency of their Inventions, will have their Memories fresh and verdant, when Time hath made those stately buildings confess their brittleness, and reduced them into Quarries again. I could bring you to One there, who hath excogitated a Method, whereby the Astronomy of the primary Planets may be Geometrically explained: & that as well according to the Elliptical, as to the Circularway. A thing of stupendious difficulty, requiring universal knowledge in the Mathematics; & of inestimable benefit toward the Certification of Celestial Science: and which, being judiciously prepended, seems to be of equal weight with the merits of even the Great Hipparchus, who (you know) made the first Catalogue of the Fixed Stars, observed their several Magnitudes, and marked out their particular Stations, both according to longitude and latitude; without which there could be no certain observation of the motions of the Erratic ones. So that if Hipparchus may be deservedly named Atlas the Second, for relieving the wearied shoulders of that Great Grandfather of Astronomy; and if the glorious Tycho Brahe may be called Hercules the Second, for relieving Hipparchus, long languishing and ready to sink under so prodigious a burden, as the whole mystery of the Heavens: I see no reason, why the Author of this admirable Invention, which seems to assure the truth of all the rest, may not be called Tycho the Second. For my part really, were I worthy to have this Gentleman's Picture in my study, I should desire to have it drawn in this manner. I would have Hipparchus, Ptolemy, and Tycho, standing in a triangle, and supporting the whole Celestial Machine on their heads; on one side, Copernicus turning all the Orbs about with his right hand; and this Heros on the other side, with a Table in his left hand containing the Figures in Euclids Elements, and with the Forefinger of his right, pointing to the Planetary Spheres, as demonstrating the theory of their Motions, by the maxims of Geometry. And sure I am, He deserves to have his name assigned to some honourable place, among the worthy Advancers of Astronomy, in the Selenographicall map of Ricciolus. I could bring you to Another, who hath likewise discovered a Method, whereby the Parabola, Circle, Ellipsis, and Hyperbola really are (and most, if not all other regular Curve-lined Figures, may be) squared: A Problem that hath long perplexed the thoughts of the greatest Geometricians, and of late very near turned the brains of even the great Leviathan himself, who arrogating the solution of it to himself, thought thereby not a little to justify his pretences to the Monarchy of Knowledge, and Reformation of not only the Arts and Sciences, but also of the Universities that teach them.  
Here are some, who perceiving the great advantage arising to Students from the use of Symbols (whereby the understanding is exempted from the encumbrance of words, and brought, as it were, with one glance to behold the long continued series of complex and intricate ratiocination, which would otherwise oppress the memory, and confound the strongest imagination to sustain it) invented by Vieta, and brought to perfection by Mr. Oughtred and Des Cartes, for the more compendious tradition of the Mathematics; and considering that the same way was capable of being accommodated to the Facilitation of discourses in Philosophy, Physic, and other parts of Learning; have made a very considerable progress toward the invention of Symbols, or Signs, for every thing and notion: insomuch that one of these Wits hath found the variety of many millions of Signs, in a square of a quarter of an inch, as himself professeth, in a most ingenious discourse of his, entitled Vindiciae Academiarum. Which perhaps you have read; and if you have, I need not tell you how little he wants of finishing that so long talked-of and desired design of an Universal Character and Language.  
And as for the Optics, show me the men in the whole World, who have more illustrated the nature, affections, and motions of that most subtle and glorious Creature, Light; Or given clearer demonstrations of their Knowledge of all sorts of Radiations, and the manner and reasons of Vision, than some Mathematical Wits, now flourishing in this University, have done. It is their usual recreation, to practise all Delusions of the sight, in the Figures, Magnitudes, Motions, Colours, Distances, and Multiplications of Objects: And, were you there, you might be entertained with such admirable Curiosities, both Dioptrical and Catoptrical, as former ages would have been startled at, and believed to have been Magical. They will represent to you, the Images of Things and Persons entire, and to the life, from Tables whereon the naked eye cannot discern so much as one part of them, unless in fractures and seemingly confused divisions; and this by collected reflections from mirrors Conical, Cylindrical, Concave, Convex, Multangular, etc. They will imitate Nature to the height of perfect resemblance, in counterfeiting Rainbows, Halo's, and Circles of various Colours about Lights, by artificial Refractions of their beams. They have all the several ways of Multiplying and Corroborating Light, and transmitting it in concourse to very great distance; And this, as well by conveying the dispersed rays through Diaphanous bodies, of convenient figures, and reuniting them in a cone or point, after their various refractions, for the increase of their force; Or by repercussion from Concave (Elliptical, Parabolical, Circular) superficies of polite Indiaphanous ones. Insomuch, that if Niceron, Kircher, and other great Masters in the Art of Light and Shadows, would see the errors of their Optical Theory amended; and all the secrets of Catoptrical Magic, familiarly reduced into practice: hither and only hither they must come. And, were Friar Bacon alive again, he would with amazement confess, that he was canonised a Conjurer, for effecting far less, than these men frequently exhibit to their friends, in sport. They have, moreover, Optic Tubes, or Telescopes, in such perfection, that they magnify more, and take in more of the rays proceeding from illuminate Objects, than any other of the same length, that ever were made before: And have brought them also to as great a length, as can well be managed. These they use for observations of Eclipses of Sun and Moon, of the several Phases or Apparences of the Moon, of Saturn, and other Planets, both primary and secundary, of the Galaxy, the magnitudes and figures of the fixed stars, and other Celestial Speculations. They have likewise Microscopes, that magnify the dimensions of minute and otherwise undiscernible bodies, even to an incredible rate, and bring the sight to a familiar acquaintance with the shapes of not only whole small Flies and other Infects, but also of the smallest part of them. Insomuch as there is hope, if this Invention go on toward perfection as fast as it hath begun, within this last four or five years; that the eye ere long may be enabled to distinguish even the Seminal Figures of things, which seem to regulate them in their productions and growth; and to behold the originary Schematisms of Nature, drawn on the smallest Moleculae, or first collections of Atoms concurring to determinate the Figures of Concretions.  
And thus, Noblest Isodicastes, have I essayd to yield you some satisfaction, concerning the state of Learning, now in England; And the chief Particulars, wherein it hath received Advancement, by the prosperous endeavours of our Countrymen, since your retirement here in France. I need not intimate to you, how imperfect and rambling an account I have given you of these Novel Inventions; and am sufficiently conscious, that I rather ought to excuse myself, by the frailty of my Memory, and want of judgement, how to represent such excellent and useful Discoveries, in descriptions correspondent to their Natures: And ask your pardon for thus abusing your patience, and lessening the merits of those worthy Authors, who have thus enriched the Commonwealth of Philosophy.  Isodicastes. 
Good Athanasius, how well you have deserved both of those Authors and myself, in this your learned Harangue; I must forbear to speak, till you are absent. In the mean time, give me leave, a little to wonder, how it comes about, that Apollo, who seldom plants his Laurel in a Land yet wet and reaking with blood, and delights to reside only where Peace and Plenty have long had their habitations; should thus take up his mansion in a Nation so lately oppressed by the Tyranny of Mars, and scarce yet free from the distractions of a horrid Civil War. Pallas and Bellona I know to be one and the same Goddess: Yet I do not remember, I ever saw her pictured (like Caesar) with a Spear in one hand, and a Book in the other. When I view the train of sad and heavy Calamities, that commonly attend the Sword; I should rather have expected the encroachment of Ignorance and Barbarism upon our Island, than the increase of Letters and growth of Knowledge there.  Athanasius. 
You have reason for your wonder, Sir, I must confess; Yet when you have considered, that every Age hath its peculiar Genius, which inclines men's Minds to some one study or other, and gives it a dominion over their affections proportionate to its secret influence; and that the vicissitudes of things ordained by Providence, require a general predisposition in men's hearts, to cooperate with Fate, toward the Changes appointed to succeed in the fullness of their time: You will think it less strange, that Britain, which was but yesterday the Theatre of War and desolation, should to day be the School of Arts, and Court of all the Muses. Omnia secula suum habent Genium, qui mortalium animos in certa studia solet inflectere. Quaedam aetates praecipuè armis exercitae; mox omnia in quietem composita; tum Regnorum, tum Rerum publicarum in populis amor; nunc veluti in barbariem homines nasci, deinde facilioribus animis mansuescere; & post secula aliquot ad stipatum prima caligine ingenium redire: was the observation of a Modern Writer, and hath been frequently verified. Besides, our late Wars and Schisms, having almost wholly discouraged men from the study of Theology; and brought the Civil Law into contempt: The major part of young Scholars in our Universities addict themselves to Physic; and how much that conduceth to real and solid Knowledge, and what singular advantages it hath above other studies, in making men true Philosophers; I need not intimate to you, who have so long tasted of that benefit.  Lucretius. 
I guess the Author of that observation you allege; and that put's me in mind of another remark of his, perhaps not altogether unseasonable. In his Character of the English Genius, he hath this saying: In Philosophia autem & Mathêsi, terrarumque & astrorum scientiis, nulla iam prodigiosa est Sententia, quae non ex hac regione Authores invenerit, vel turbam amatorum, vividam quidem, sed modum subtilitati per innumeras disputationes effusae non invenientem. Now, if this be true, why may we not refer these Innovations in Philosophy, Physic, and the Mathematics, you have here recounted, rather to the English Humour of affecting new Opinions, than to any real defects or errors in the Doctrine of the Ancients?  Athanasius. 
How now, Lucretius; you an Epicurean, and yet against liberty of judgement among Philosophers? It seems you have forgotten your Master's Rule; Quoties aliqua sunt in natura, quae pessunt multis peragi modis (uti eclipses syderum, uti eorundem ortus, occasus, sublimiaque caetera) tunc unum aliquem modum ita probare, ut improbentur caeteri, ridiculum profecto est. Pray, do but proceed to the words immediately subsequent to that passage in Barclay, concerning the proneness of the English Genius to Novelties; and you will soon find, that he reflected chiefly on the Copernican Systeme, which in his days began to grow into high repute, and obtained many Sectators among the learned of our Nation. So that confirming that Reproach, he endeavoured to fix upon our ingenious Spirits, by no better an instance, than that of our admission and promotion of the Pythagorean Hypothesis, of the Motion of the Earth, revived and adorned by Copernicus (which all Astronomers now allow to be the most intelligible and most convenient, that ever was invented) it easily appears, with how much more justice himself may be accused of gross ignorance in matters Astronomical, which yet he would pretend to judge of; than we can be of Levity and affected Innovation, for embracing and cultivating an opinion, of whose singular probability and excellency we are fully convinced. And as we have not submitted to that change in Astronomy, but upon grounds of as much certainty and clearness, as the sublime and remote nature of the subject seems capable of: So neither have we introduced any Alterations in Natural Philosophy, Physic, and other parts of Human Learning, but what carry their utility with them, and are justifiable by right reason, by autoptical or sensible demonstration, and by multiplied experience. So that every intelligent man may easily perceive, that it hath been the Reformation, that drew on the Change; not the desire of Change, which pretendeth the Reformation. Did you, Lucretius, but know the Gravity, Solidity, and Circumspection of these worthy Reformers of the state of Learning now in England; you would not suspect them of incogitancy, or too much indulgence toward the Minerva's of their own brain: but confess that they have precisely followed that counsel of the Scripture, which enjoins us, to make a stand upon the Ancient way, and then look about us, and discover, what is the strait and right way, and so to walk in it.  Isodicastes. 
For my part, truly, I conceive it fitting, that all Scholars should have a reverend esteem of Antiquity, as a good guide of our younger Reason into the ways of Nature; Yet I think it scarce safe for any man to follow it implicitly, and without examination, as if it were impossible for him to err the while, or as if the light of his own understanding were given him to no other use, but to be set in the drak-lanthorn of Authority. The Ancients indeed, (thanks be to their bounteous industry) have left us large and noble Foundations; but few complete Buildings: and who so intends to have his understanding seated commodiously, and in a pleasant Mansion of Science, must advance superstructures of his own; otherwise he will lie open to the weather of Doubts, and Whirlwinds of various Difficulties, nor will he be ever able to entertain his friends with decency and satisfaction. It was gravely and wittily said of the Lord Bacon, that those who too much reverence Old times, often become a scorn to the New. But, Gentlemen, I perceive the evening hastens upon us, and I have already detained you longer, then suits with the civility of an accidental encounter; Pray, therefore, let me beg the favour of your company to a light Collation of a Salad and a bottle of good Wine, at my House: Or, if your occasions have otherwise preingaged you, let me resign you to the pursuit of them, with thanks for the content your learned conversation hath given me, and hopes of enjoying the like again, as often as your vacancy from serious affairs will permit.  Athanasius. 
Noblest Sir, I most humbly thank you for the honour of your invitation; and would attend you home, with all joy and gratitude imaginable, would the urgency of a business I have appointed to dispatch, this evening, dispense with me.  Lucretius. 
I can assure you Sir, Athanasius is preingaged, and upon a matter of some moment; but for myself, I am at liberty to meet the happiness you are pleased to offer me.  Isodicastes. 
I love not to hinder business; nor to importune a friend to his disadvantage. And so adieu, worthy Athanasius. Come Lucretius, I will bring you the shortest way; I have a key will let us forth at yonder Privy door, that opens into the fields, that lie within the prospect of my house.  Athanasius. 
Honoured Isodicastes, farewell.   

DIALOGUE THE SECOND  LUCRETIUS. 
I See you are very precise in keeping your time prefixed, Athanasius; And I hope, I have not made you stay, many minutes, for me. If I have, you must impute it to the disagreement of our Watches, not to any tardiness in myself; For, I assure you, I was here before you, in my desires.  Athanasius. 
I love always to be punctual in my appointments, and rather to prevent my Friends, than put them to expect me. But, have you acquainted this Noble person Isodicastes, with the occasion of our present meeting?  Isodicastes. 
Yes, Athanasius, he hath; and I acknowledge myself singularly obliged to him for importuning you to a divertisement, than which none could be more agreeable to me, as well in respect of the Argument you have promised to discuss, as of yourself, whose Writings and yesterdaies Conference have created in me a desire of conversing with you, oftener than (I fear me) your studies and affairs will permit. And now we are convened, let us lose no time, but repose ourselves upon this shady Seat, and omitting all Compliments and Prologues; address immediately to the Subject intended. For my part, I promise you all attention of Mind possible, and as much Equity in judgement, as my slender stock of reason can attain to.  Athanasius. 
Among Us, who are so happy, as to be Sacramentally engaged to fight under the Standard of the Crucified God, I observe, in the general, two different persuasions concerning the nature of Faith. Some there are, who seem to have so active and long-winged a power of belief, as that they can mount up to an easy and quick apprehension of all the Mysteries of the Christian Doctrine; and are ready to complain, that they want Difficulties enough to exercise the strength of their Belief. Others there are, who though their Faith be lively and strong enough to embrace even the most sublime Article of the Creed; and estimate the Verity of each Religious Principle only by its dependence on Authority Divine: are nevertheless so sensible of the frailties of Human Nature, as that they think it necessary to have often recourse to that Pathetical Ejaculation of the man in the Gospel, Lord I believe, Lord help my unbelief. The First, wholly refuse the assistance of their Reason, even where it offers itself and the subject is capable of illustration by the discourses it might raise thereupon; as judging any Fundamental of Religion much debased, and in a manner profaned, if once it be brought to the Test of the Light of Nature, though merely for Confirmation and more familiar admittance. The Others, humbly resign up their Assent to all Positions contained in Sacred Writ; and yet are glad, when they can bring up the Forces of their Reason to assist them in the conquest of their fleshly oppositions: And conceive they then make the best use of the talon of their Understanding, when they employ it toward the ratification of Divine Traditions.  
Now, albeit I admire, and could most willingly emulate the perfection of the Former sort; Yet, I confess, I am not ashamed to rank myself among the Latter. For, although (thanks be to the Mercy of God) I do not find myself subject to diffidence in any point of the Christian belief, taught me by that Oracle of Sacred wisdom, the Word of God: Yet me thinks I perceive my faith somewhat Corroborated and Encouraged, when to the evidence thereof I can superadd also the concurrent testimony of my Reason. Nor do I fear the frowns of Theology, if I adventure to affirm, that that Soul must have a clearer preception of the Excellency of Objects Supernatural, who can attain to speculate them both by the light of Grace and that of Nature together. I am very far short of their Audacity, who are so conceited of the subtlety of their Wit, as to permit it to fly at all that a Christian is bound to believe; insomuch as even the Arcana Deitatis, the Mysteries of the Trinity, of the Hypostatick Union, and other the like Divine Abstrusities (which poor Mortality is unqualified to contemplate; and, indeed, which Cherubins themselves cannot look into, without raptures of holy wonder) have hardly escaped their profanation. No, far be it from me, to entertain a thought of so wild and dangerous a presumption. All I durst ever aspire unto, is only with pious humility to apply my Reason to such of the Articles in my Creed, as seem to be placed within the Sphere of its comprehension: Of which sort I conceive the First and Last Article to be, viz. the Being of God, as Father Almighty, and Maker of Heaven and Earth; and the Immortality of Man's Soul, or Life everlasting. Nor, indeed, need I seek further for my Confirmation in the belief of all the rest, when once I have advanced my Understanding to that due height, as clearly to behold the Verity of these two Positions, that are the Pillars and supporters of all the others. Nay, I have sometimes thought the Single position of the Immortality of the Human Soul, to be the grand Base of Religion, and like the Key, or middle stone in an Arch, which bears the weight of all others in the building. For, if the Soul be mortal, & subject to utter dissolution with the body; to what purpose doth all Piety and Religion serve? What issue can we expect of all our Prayers, of all our Adorations, of all our Selfdenying acts of obedience, of all our unjust Sufferings? Why should we worship God at all? Nay, more, why should we consider whether there be a God or no? For, the assurance of his Being could not much conduce to increase our happiness in this transitory life; since that would then consist only in the full fruition of Sensual pleasures: And as for future expectations after death, there could be none at all; For, absolute Dissolution imports absolute Insensibility; and what is not, cannot be capable of Reward or Punishment, of Felicity or Misery.  

What hath not an Existence, can ne'er know  
The want of Bliss; Nothing can feel no Wo.   
And from this Consideration was it, that I began first to apply myself to search for other Reasons, for the eviction of the Souls Eternal subsistence after death, besides those delivered in Holy Scripture; that conjoining the evidence and certainty of those desumed from the Light of Nature, to that of my former belief arising from the Light of Grace: I might be the better able to withstand the Convulsions of my own frailties, and convince others, who are so refractory, as to submit their assent to no inducement of persuasion, but what is drawn merely from Natural Reasons.  
Now, for my encouragement and justification in this design, I need not go far; it being well known, that many Doctors of the Church, and those of the best note both for Learning and Piety, have exercised their wits and pens in the same subject: and have unanimously concluded, that though in the Christian Creed there be sundry Articles, concerning the Condition of Man's Soul, after its separation from the body, which by infinite excesses transcend the capacity of his reason; Yet that general one of the perpetual existence of it after death, may be satisfactorily evinced by the same reason. To mention all the excellent Discourses written by these Churchmen and others, upon this Argument; would be both tedious and unnecessary: Especially to you, who I presume have perused the greatest part, if not all of them. It may suffice, that I have them for my Precedents, both for the warrantableness, and probability, of this my undertaking. However, if you require farther justification of me; I refer you to the undeniable Authority of the Lateran Council, held under Pope Leo the tenth. Which having decreed the Anathematization of all Atheists, who durst question the Being of God, or the Immortality of the Human Soul; in the close of the Canon not only exhorteth, but expressly commandeth all Christian Philosophers to endeavour the demonstration of those sacred Truths, by solid and Physical Arguments. And, certainly, so pious and prudent an Assembly would never have prescribed that task, in case they had not conceived it both commendable and possible to be effected.  Lucretius 
As for the Goodness and Piety of your Undertaking, truly I think few understanding men will question it; and, on the other side, I fear me, you will meet with as few, that will acknowledge the Possibility of your accomplishing it. For, if I am not much mistaken, the greatest number of those eminent Doctors of the Church, and chiefest of the Schoolmen, whom you intimated to have been your examples, in this particular, do, after all their labours and subtle disputes, ingenuously confess, that the best of their Arguments are not rigorously Convincing, or such as constrain assent as inevitably as Mathematical Demonstrations. And, if so, though I expect to receive as high satisfaction from you, as from any, who ever gave me the same hopes: Yet I humbly beg your excuse, if I suspend my belief of your ability to prove the Immortality of man's Soul, by Reasons of evidence & force requisite to the Conviction of a mere Natural man (such as I, for this time at least, suppose myself to be, and such as indeed all men would, when they come to examine the strength of Discourses of this nature) until you shall have given me more pregnant testimonies thereof, than any Author; whose writings I have read, hath hitherto done, touching this subject. In a word, I believe the Soul to be Immortal, as firmly, as you, or any person living can; Yet I should account it no small felicity, to see a perfect Demonstration of it; such as might for ever silense all Doubts and Contradictions, and make a Convert of my old Master Epicurus, in case he were now among the living: And any thing less than that, would hold no proportion to my expectation.  Athanasius. 
I will not deny, Lucretius, but some of those Schoolmen, who have alleged congruous and sinewy Reasons, in favour of the Souls Immortality, did afterward themselves confess, they were not completely apodictical: But, you may be pleased to remember also, that some others of them stiffly maintained the contrary; and all of them unanimously concur in this, that howbeit those Reasons do not ascertain equally with Geometrical Demonstrations; yet they are such as import either a Physical or Moral evidence, sufficient to persuade a mind well affected toward truth, and free from the obstruction of prejudice. Nor should I fear to obtain the Cause, however the Arguments I shall bring, to assert the Immortality of the Soul, arise not to the height of absolute Demonstrations: Provided they be found of greater certainty, clearness, and consequence, than those that have ever yet been urged by those of the contrary persuasion; and such as being superadded to the Authority of Holy Writ, become ineluctable. And more than this, (Lucretius) considering the singular obscurity and abstruse condition of the subject, you have no reason to expect at my hands. Pray, do but reflect a little on the modesty of that great man, Aristotle, declared in sundry places of his Writings, but more especially in the beginning of his Ethics, where he saith, Hominis probe instituti est, tantam in unoquoque genere subtilitatem desiderare, quantam rei ipsius natura recipit. A man of Erudition, and a sound Judgement; aught to require only so much subtlety and exactness in any kind of Argument, as the nature of the thing treated of, will admit, and no more. And, having observed the same unreasonable humour of curiosity in others of those times, that now possesseth you, and too many of the sublime Wits of the present age, who look for nothing below Demonstrations, though in the Metaphysics, and other Sciences that are really incapable of them; he addeth this positive rule, Mathematica certitudo non est in omnibus quaerenda; Mathematical Certitude is not to be required in all things. To convince you the more clearly of the Unreasonableness of what you would exact from me in this case; let me a while divert you to the consideration of the nature of a Demonstration. The Method of Demonstration, you know, is twofold; the one by Analysis, the other by Synthesis.  
The Analytical teacheth the true way, by which the truth of a thing may be found out Methodically, and as à priori; so that if the Reader or Hearer shall strictly follow the same, and attentively heed all the Antecedents and Consequents therein propounded, he shall come at length to understand the thing demonstrated as perfectly, and make it as much his own, as if himself had first found it out. But yet it contains nothing, whereby either the heedless, or dissenting reader may be compelled to assent; For if any one of the least Propositions therein delivered, be not exactly and fully noted, the necessity of its Conclusions doth not sufficiently appear.  
The Synthetical, by a way opposite to the former, and as it were sought à posteriori (though the Probation itself be oftentimes more à priori, than in the former) doth clearly demonstrate, what is concluded, and useth a long series of Definitions, Postula es, Axioms, Theorems, and Problems, that if any thing be denied of the Consequents, it speedily showeth the same to be comprehended in the Antecedents, and so extorts belief from the Reader, though formerly repugnant and pertinacious. Nevertheless, this doth not satisfy, nor fill the mind of him who comes to learn, so amply as the other: Because it teacheth not the way or manner, how the thing proved was first found out. And this Latter is that, which the Ancient Geometricians generally made use of in their Writings; not that they were ignorant of the other: But (as I conceive) because they valued it so highly, as that they desired to reserve it to themselves, as a great Secret, and too noble to be profaned by vulgar communication. Now, this is that strict and vigorous Method, upon which I suppose you reflect, when you say; you would gladly meet with a perfect Demonstration of the Immortality of Man's Soul: And I must therefore advertise you of the Incompetency thereof to Metaphysical subjects. And the reason doth consist in this Difference; that the First Notions, which are presupposed, in order to the demonstration of things Geometrical, agreeing with the use of the Senses, are most easily and promptly admitted by all men; & so there is no difficulty, but only in deducing right Consequences from them, which may be done only by remembering the Antecedents: And the minute distinction of propositions is therefore made, that each of them may, upon occasion, be quickly recited, and so recalled to the memory of even the most heedless Reader: But on the contrary, in things Metaphysical, all the difficulty lies in clearly and distinctly perceiving the First Notions; For, though of their own nature they be not less known, or, even more known, than those considered by Geometricians: Yet, because many prejudgements of the Senses, to which from our infancy we have been accustomed, seem repugnant to them; therefore cannot they be perfectly known, but by such as are very attentive to them, and withal abstract their Minds from the Images of Corporeal things, as much as is possible; and being proposed alone by themselves, they might easily be denied, by such as delight in contradiction. But, as for the Analytical method; I would not have you despair of seeing it in some measure accommodated to the subject, of which we now discourse. Provided you shall first tune your Mind to a fit key, to bear a part in the harmony of truth, when it resounds from the strings of all the Antecedents and Consequents propounded. Which you must do, both by abstracting your thoughts many times from the gross representations of Corporeal things, that hold no commerce of proportion or similitude with the Incorporeal Nature of the thing enquired into: and by wholly divesting yourself of all prejudice, and inclination to impugn truth, when it presents itself clad in sufficient evidence. For, whosoever comes to the examination of an intricate truth, with the cloud of inveterate aversion, and mask of affected contradiction, before his eyes; doth thereby make himself the less fit to perceive it: because he diverts his mind, from the due consideration of those reasons that might convince him, to the hunting after such as may dissuade him.  Lucretius. 
You do well, Athanasius, thus to prepare my belief beforehand, by telling me, how necessary it is, that I should abstract my Mind, as well from the Images of Material Objects, as from prejudice; when it remains on your part, first to show me the way of that Abstraction, and then to divest me of prejudice. For, for my own part, I confess ingenuously, I can speculate nothing, without the help of my Imagination; so that whatever I can think upon, comes to my mind in the dress of Magnitude, Figure, Colour, and other the like conditions of Matter. Truth is, I have often heard, among your soaring and long-winged Wits, of Abstracted and Unbodied Notions; and have sometimes perplexed my mind, and almost cracked the membranes of my brain, in striving how to comprehend them: And yet I always found my Fancy so inseparably conjoined to my Intellect, as if they were both one and the same Faculty. Nor am I yet able to distinguish betwixt my Imagination and Intellection: And when once you shall have satisfied me of a real Difference betwixt them; I shall soon confess, you have gone very near the Demonstration of the Souls Immortality. Because, if the operations of the Intellect be clearly distinct from those of the Fancy, which is a Corporeal Faculty, and therefore limited to the perception and representation of only Corporeal Natures: It will almost follow, that the Intellect, which is capable of knowing Incorporeals, is a substance clearly distinct from the body, and so Immaterial; since different effects must have different Causes. And, as for your other Postulate, viz. the exemption of my mind from contrary prejudice; This also is what I should expect from the efficacy of your intended Arguments. For, (as I told you before) I believe the Immortality of the Soul; but cannot persuade myself of the possibility of its Demonstration, by any other but Divine reasons: And it must be your work, to convince me of the error of that persuasion. Nevertheless, I will assure you of my best Attention, and that I come not with a resolution not to be satisfied.  Athanasius. 
Dear Sir, have patience a while, and you shall soon perceive both the Necessity and Equity of what I require: And in the mean time, do not take occasion to anticipate my Notions, but leave me to deliver them in their due places and order.  Lucretius. 
I shall punctually observe your commands; and therefore, if you think fit, immediately address yourself to your Demonstration.  Athanasius. 
First, it will be convenient, in order to the prevention of all Equivocation and Logomachy, that may arise from the various use of the word, Soul; that we insist a little on the examination of that vulgar Opinion, which admitteth a real distinction betwixt Animus and Anima, the Mind and the Soul: In regard it seems to be the very same, according to which many Doctors of the Church have conceived the Soul to have Two Parts, a Superior and Inferior; the one being the Mind, Intellect, or Reason; the other comprehending the Sense & Appetite Natural and Brutish.  
There are (you know) many eminent men, as well Theologues, as Philosophers, who, as they hold Man to be composed of two parts, a Soul and a Body; so do they conceive, that his soul is likewise composed of a twofold substance, the one Incorporeal or Immaterial, immediately created by God, and infused into the body, at the instant of its Empsychosis or first Animation, in the Mother's Womb: The other Corporeal or Material, originally contained in the Parent's Seed, and derived ex traduce, from the Seminalities of Male and Female commixed in coition; which is as it were the Medium or Disposition, by the intermediate nature whereof the Diviner part is conjoined and united to the Elementary, or Body. And this Opinion they ground chiefly upon that speech of the Apostle, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: I perceive a Law in my members warring against the Law of my Mind, etc. For (say they), since it is impossible, that one Simple Essence or thing should war against, or have contrariety to itself; from this Repugnancy betwixt the Sense, and the Mind or Reason, it seems necessarily consequent, that the Sensitive and Rational Soul are things essentially different each from other. Whereunto they superadd also, that unless this Distinction be admitted, we can never well understand, how Man, as a living Creature, can be said to be, in one part, little lower than the Angels: and in another, to be like the Horse or Mule, that have no understanding. How, in respect of one part, he is made after the Image of God: and in respect of another, he is compared to the Beasts that perish. How, in one respect, he acknowledgeth God to be his Author and Principle: and in another, he owns his production upon his Parents. How, in one relation, he is said to be Immortal: and in another, subject to death equally with the smallest worm.  
Notwithstanding, it is not either the Authority, or Arguments of these Men, that seem prevalent enough to bring me to be of their persuasion. For as to their Authority; I could thereunto oppose that of some Fathers, yea and Councils, who not only reprehend, but condemn all such, as make a duality of Souls in man: were not the thing already well known to you. However, suffer me to put you in mind, that the pious and learned Conimbricenses (who certainly, have most profoundly and judiciously, of all others, handled this Question) though they proceed not so far, as to censure this conceit to be Heretical (as some others before them had done) yet they expressy declare their Dissent from it. And as for their Reasons alleged; I think them likewise insufficient. For all that Psychomachy, or intestine Conflicts which these men imagine to be betwixt the inferior part of the soul which is called the sensitive, and the superior called the Rational, or betwixt the Natural Appetites and the Will; do arise only from the repugnancy or contrariety which is between those motions of the spirits, which are on one side caused by the senses affected by external objects; and those motions of the spirits which on the other side are caused by the will, after the soul hath deliberated upon their conveniency and utility. And, in truth, each individual man hath one and only one soul; in which is no variety of parts: that which is the Sensitive is also the Rational, and all her Appetites are absolute Volitions. The cause of these men's error seems to be this, that they could not well distinguish the Functions proper to the soul, from the Functions proper to the body; to which alone we ought in right to ascribe whatever we observe in ourselves to be repugnant to our Reason. So that in Man, there is no other Contract or Contrariety of Affections, but what consisteth in the contrary motions caused by the spirits and purer part of the blood, in that part of the body, in which as in its principal and more immediate organ, the soul is enthroned and exerciseth her faculties; whether that be the Plexus Choroides in the brain, as most Physicians conceive; or the Heart, as the Scripture seems to intimate; or the Glandula pinealis, in the centre of the brain, as Des Cartes affirmeth; or any other part whatsoever: one of these motions arising from the determination of the spirits by the will one way; and the other, from the determination of them by the corporeal Appetite, another way. And hence it comes often to pass, that these impulses being contrary each to other; the stronger doth impede and countermand the effect of the weaker. Nor is it difficult to distinguish these two kinds of impulses or motions, made by the mediation of the spirits upon the principal sensory, or chief seat of the soul. Forasmuch as some of them represent to the soul, the Images of objects either at that time moving the senses, or the impressions formerly made and remaining in the brain; but offer no force or violence to it, so far as to engage the will toward their prosecution: and others prove so effectual, as to dispose the will accordingly; as may be observed in all those, which produce passions, or such motions in the body, as usually accompany passions. As for the former, though they often impede the actions of the soul, and are again as often impeded and suppressed by them; yet, because they are not directly opposite each to other, we can observe no conflict or wrestling betwixt them; as we may, betwixt the latter sort of Motions, and acts of the will or Volitions that oppose them, as (for example) betwixt that impulse, by which the principal organ of the soul is disposed to affect her with the cupidity or desire of any one particular object; and that, by which the will counterdisposeth her to an aversation from, or avoidance of, the same. And this Conflict chiefly demonstrate thits self hereby, that the will being not able to excite passions directly, and immediately, is constrained to cast about and use a kind of art, in order thereunto; and to apply itself to the consideration of several things successively, or one after another; whereupon it comes to pass, that if any one of those things occurring, chance to be prevalent enough to change the course or current of the spirits, at that instant; yet another that follows next after it, be not powerful enough to second the former in that change, the spirits then immediately again resume their first course or motion (the precedent disposition in the nerves, heart, and blood, being not yet altered) and thereupon the soul perceives herself to be impelled to pursue and avoid the same object, almost in one and the same moment. And this alone was that, which gave occasion to men, to imagine Two Distinct and mutually repugnant Powers or Faculties in the soul. Nevertheless, we may conceive another sort of Conflict consisting in this; that many times the same cause, which exciteth a passion in the soul, doth, even in the same moment, excite also in the body, certain motions, to which the soul doth not at all conduce, and which she suppresseth or at least endeavours to suppress, so soon as she observes them to be begun. For instance, whatsoever causeth Fear, doth at the same instant cause also the spirits to flow into those muscles, which serve to move the thighs and legs to flight or avoidance of the terrible object; but if the Will suddenly rise up, and determine to exercise the virtue of Fortitude, and oppose the danger threatened, the soul than giveth check to that motion of the spirits, and converts them to the heart and arms the better to make resistance.  
And here I ask leave to make a short Digression, while (with the excellent Des Cartes) I observe to you; that it is from the Event of these inward Conflicts, by which a man may come to understand the strength or weakness of his own soul. For such persons, who have their wills sufficiently strong to subdue passions, and countermand those sudden motions in the body which accompany the passions; are without doubt, endowed with Noble and Generous Souls: And those who have their wills subject to the impetuosity of passions, and cannot check the motions of the spirits resulting from them, must be men of abject, effeminate and pusillanimous ones. Not that every man can make this Experiment of himself, as to Weakness or Fortitude; because many and indeed most men come to these Duels, armed, not with the true and proper weapons of the mind, but with false ones borrowed from some contrary Affection: so that the conflict may seem to be rather betwixt two opposite Passions, than betwixt the Will and either of them; and the Will may be said to follow the fortune of the conquering passion, rather than to be itself the conqueror. By the true and proper weapons of the Mind, I mean certain right and firm judgements concerning the knowledge of Good and evil; according to which it hath decreed to regulate itself in all the actions and occurrences of life. And, certainly, of all Souls, those are the most weak and feminine, which have not their wills thus determined to follow certain settled Judgements, but suffer them to be drawn aside by present Affections; which being many times contrary one to another, and equally prevalent, counter-incline the Will alternately, and so keep it on the rack of suspense. Thus, when Fear representeth Death, as the worst of evils, and which cannot be otherwise avoided, but by flight; if on the other side, Ambition step in, and represent the infamy of flight, as an Evil worse than Death: these two contrary Affections variously agitate and distract the Will, and by putting it to a long conflict and irresolution, render the soul most servile and miserable.  
Now from this consideration it is manifest, that there is no such necessity, as hath been imagined, of allowing a distinction of the soul into Animum and Animam, or making the Reasonable soul and the Sensitive two distinct beings, in order to the explanation of that Psychomachy, or Contest betwixt Reason and Sense, or the Superior and Inferior Faculties, of which the Apostle complained, and indeed which every man feels within himself: all that repugnancy consisting in a Contrariety, not of the soul to itself (which in a Simple Essence is impossible) but only of the Motions of the spirits; caused by the Senses, on one side, and those caused by the Will, on the other, as hath been declared. And, as for the other Reasons that remain; what I have now said, may be easily extended to the solution of them also: for, that Man is composed of a Reasonable Soul, and a Body; is sufficient to our understanding him to be, in one respect, little lower than the Angels, made after the Image of God, and Immortal; and in another, like the Horse and Mule, that have no understanding, and subject to death equally with the beasts that perish.  Isodicastes. 
By your favour, good Athanasius. You were saying even now, that there were some Fathers and Councils, who condemned all such as maintained a Duality of Souls in Man: But, if I am not mistaken, that condemnation doth chiefly concern the Manichees, who held two distinct Souls in every man; the one derived from an evil Principle, and so contaminated with the tincture of Vices; the other immaculate, pure, and having its origine immediately from God, yea being a certain Particle of the Divine Essence itself; And, perhaps, it may be extended also to the Platonist and Averrhoist, who affirm the Ratitional Soul not to be the Forma informans, and so make two forms in every individual person; both which opinions, are erroneous and heretical. But, that it doth include also those, who distinguish the Soul into a Superior and Inferior part; the one comprehending the Mind Intellect or Reason only; the other the Sensitive Faculties and Appetites: I am yet to learn. Which I advertise you of, not that I am unsatisfied with the reason you have given of those Conflicts we daily have within us; For, in truth, it seems conveniently to explain the mystery of that Repugnancy betwixt our Rational and Corporeal Appetites: but, to intimate to you, that I see no reason, why the Human Soul may not be admitted: to consist of two parts, the one Immaterial and Intellectual, called the Mind, or Understanding, and (by way of excellency) the Human Soul; the other Material, and only Sensitive, by the mediation whereof that Divine part is united to the body during life. And, without admitting this Distinction, I do not understand the meaning of that Sentence of Plato, Mentem recipi in Anima; Animam, in corpore: nor of that of Trismegistus (or whoever was the Author of Poemander) Mentem in Animam, Animam in Spiritu, Spiritum in corpore vehi: Both which not obscurely intimate a certain Third Nature in Man, intermediate between that Divine essence, his reasonable Soul, & that Material or Elementary one, his body; which can be no other, but what we call the Sensitive part of the Soul.  Athanasius. 
Whether that condemnatory Sentence mentioned, doth extend to such, as hold the Reason to be one part of the Soul, and the Sensitive power to be another, in this moderate sense you are pleased to state it; I will not much contend, it being the proper business of Divines to determine that doubt: But, thus much I am certain of, that it expressly toucheth all, who assert a Duality of Souls Coexistent in man; and that is enough, I presume, to justify my quotation of it, against them. As for those remarkable texts of Plato, and the great Hermes, which you allege; I answer, that it is very probable, that those Philosophers, who held the Soul to be Composed of two different Natures, as these seem to have done; had for their principal argument that intestine Repugnancy, we have explained, and that nothing can be contrary to itself. Now, their ground or Supposition that this Repugnancy is in the Soul itself, or betwixt the Reasonable part and the Sensitive, and not betwixt the Soul and Body only (as I have clearly proved it to be) being manifestly erroneous: Assuredly, their Inference cannot be longer considerable. Nevertheless, if what I have already urged, be not sufficiently clear and valid; rather than show myself so vain an Opiniator, as to put my judgement into the balance against so solid a one as yours, I am content, you should continue the possession of your present persuasion, till you shall please to afford me some other opportunity of demonstrating the Unity and Simplicity of the Soul: My present undertaking being only to evince the Immortality of it; and this more out of compliance to Lucretius importunity, than any confidence of singular ability in myself, to manage so noble and weighty an Argument. If therefore I have not already discouraged your patience; permit me now to apply myself wholly to that Province.  
The Considerations which I have designed to allege, at this time, in favour of the Souls Immortality, are either Physical, or Moral; And the Physical, or such as arise from the Nature of the Soul itself, seem all to refer themselves to this one Capital Argument.  
The Reasonable Soul of Man is Immaterial; and therefore Immortal.  
Here, notwithstanding the main Difficulty be concerning the Antecedent, yet convenience of Method requires me first to manifest the Force or Necessity of the Consequence. The Reason therefore, why what is Immaterial, must also be Immortal, is deduceable from hence; that what wants Matter, wants likewise parts, into which it might be distracted and dissolved: and what is uncapable of being dissolved, must of perfect necessity always continue to be what it is. For, whatever is of a nature free from the conditions of Matter or Body; doth neither carry the principles of dissolution in itself, nor fear them from External Agents: and by pure consequence, cannot but perpetually last, or (which is the very same) be Immortal. And this Reason seems to me, both most evident and ineluctable.  Lucretius. 
I perceive no such unavoidable Necessity. For, though an Immaterial thing cannot perish by the Exsolution of parts, which is the only way, by which all Corporeal natures are destroyed: yet it is not impossible, but the same may be destroyed some other way proper to incorporeals, and unknown to us. Forasmuch as what ever is Principiate, or once produced, must have some cause of its production; and then why may it not be again destroyed by the self same Cause, or by an action of that Cause, contrary to that action by which it was at first produced?  Athanasius. 
There are but two ways, comprehensible by the Understanding, how any thing, that hath existence in nature, can perish: the one is (as I have already expressed) by the Exsolution and Dissipation of its parts, of which it was composed; the other by absolute Adnihilation of its Entity, as the Schoolmen phrase it. Now, though I confess, that as the former way of destruction is peculiar to Corporeal natures; so I know nothing to the contrary, but the Latter may be competent to Incorporeals, which are produced ex nihilo; for, every dependent, or what hath not its Being from its self, but deriveth it from another, is liable at the pleasure of that, on which it doth depend, to be deposed from that essence or state of Being, in which it was, by the same, created: yet, that there is any such thing as Adnihilation though consistent with the Omnipotence of God, is hardly conceivable, without derogation from his wisdom, which pronounced all to be good that he had made, and the formal reason of the Creatures goodness doth consist only in this, that it seemed good to the Divine will so to make them; and to argue à posse ad esse, that God doth or will annihilate any thing, because it is in his power to annihilate, is much below so good a Logician, as Lucretius is. Nor are we to suppose any Innovation in the general state of things; but that the course of the Universe or Nature, doth constantly and invariably proceed in the same manner or tenor of method, which was at first instituted by the wisdom of the Creator. There is, you know, a twofold Immortality, the one Absolute, the other only Derivative. That the First is competent only to God, cannot be denied; since it is impossible that that essence, which is Non-principiate, or never had beginning, nor any Cause of its production, should be determined, or ever cease to be, or meet with any cause of its destruction. And that the latter may be competent to the whole Genus of Immaterial Essences, notwithstanding the power of God, which can reduce them to Nothing, as well as it hath educed them from nothing; is likewise undeniable: for, supposing (as we ought) that God doth nothing contrary to the established Laws and decreed order of Nature, and that this General state of things doth continue still the same, which his Wisdom at first instituted; it doth evidently follow, that what He hath once made Incorporeal, shall persever to be the same to all eternity. I remember a passage in Scaliger (Exercit. 307. sect. 20.) that most fitly expresseth the sum of this consideration, and therefore shall recite it to you. Solus Deus est verè immortalis & incorruptibilis, quia solus exse suum esse habet, atque à nullo dependet; Dei verò respectu omnia creata mortalia & corruptibilia sunt, quae â Creatoris nutu deponi possunt ab essentia illa, in qua constituta sunt. Non corumpuntur tamen quaedam, ut Angeli & Anima Rationalis, quia Creator non vult ea corrumpi, & nihil contrarii ipsis, à quo corrumpantur, condidit, nec eas ita materiae immersit, ut extra eam nec subsistere, nec operari possint. And this I conceive sufficient to manifest the necessity of Immortality from Incorporiety.  Lucretius. 
But I am not satisfied of any necessity, why you should have recourse to Immateriality, for the proof of Immortality; seeing that even among the Father▪ there are some who maintain Immortality to be consistent with Corporality: and amongst the best Philosophers, some assert the Celestial Bodies to be Incorruptible, and deduce that their incorruptibility from the nature of their Form, which nevertheless they account not incorporeal.  Athanasius. 
Those Fathers held some Corporeal natures to be Immortal, not ex ratione essentiae, but ex Divina Gratia, only from the decree of the Divine beneplacet; otherwise than I affirm of Incorporeals, and particularly the Soul of man. And as for that opinion of some Philosophers, it is enough that it doth not oppose our Consequence i. e. that granting some bodies to be Incorruptible, it follows not, that therefore Incorporeals are the less, but rather the more inccorruptible. Whatever becomes of that Opinion, I say, that because there is no Body, which is not in process of time, exsoluble into such parts, of which it doth consist: in as much as whether their principles be Atoms, which by their natural agility and contrary impulsions always cause intestine commotions, and a constant civil war in the very entrails. of Concretions, or whether they be Elementary Qualities, active and reciprocally repugnant, which cannot be idle, but unnecessantly act one upon another; they carry the possibility of Dissolution in their own Composition: I say, considering this, it is clearly necessary, that all bodies, according to the Fundamental Laws of Nature, be subject to Dissolution, their parts being at length exturbed from their primary site, or Position and Union, and a total resolution succeeding thereupon. Besides, you well know, that that Tenent of Aristotle, of the Incorruptibility of Celestial Bodies, hath been exploded long since: And that what his Interpreters have so magnificently talked, of the Nature of the Celestial Form, is a mere dream, a chimaera of immoderate subtlety, and worthy only to be laughed at; especially after those many observations of changes in them, made by the Modern Astronomers, evincing the contrary.  Lucretius. 
But, do not you incur an Absurdity, in supposing that there is any substance Immaterial, or produced-Nature Incorporeal; when as the Fathers many of them have judged, that what is not a Body, is Nothing; and that my Tutor, Epicurus hath expressly taught, that in Nature, nothing is Incorporeal beside Space or Inanity?  Athanasius. 
I know no Father, but only Tertullian (whom St. Augustine doth smartly reprehend for asserting it) of that unsound opinion; and to him we may oppose the Authority of all, at least of most the others, who solidly justified the contrary. And to Epicurus, I oppose Plato, Aristotle, and sundry others, who would not admit any such thing as Emptiness in the Universe; but expressly affirmed, that there were [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] Substances separate, incorporeal, and destitute of parts. What if there were a few, who could not elevate their minds so high, as to conceive any thing Incorporeal, besides Inanity; doth it therefore follow, that those many, and great men, who did conceive the contrary were fools, and that I, who likewise affirm the existence of Incorporeal Natures, do run myself upon an Absurdity? I hope, Lucretius, you will be more favourable to yourself, than to own the impertinence of any such Sequel.  Lucretius. 
To deal freely with you, I find the Notion of Immaterial Substance, to be somewhat too sublime for the comprehension of so humble and unbiased a reason as mine is. But, perhaps, you may assist it with the Telescope of yours, upon occasion of somewhat or other in the process of your discourse: And, therefore, go on directly to the conviction of your Antecedent, viz. that the Rational Soul is Immortal; for, upon that hang's all the weight of the business.  Athanasius. 
The Antecedent, viz. that the Reasonable Soul is Immaterial, is evident from the Nature and Manner of its Operations. For, since it is a certain rule, that every Agent is known by its Effects, and that all Forms reveal themselves by their peculiar and distinct energies, and ways of Operation; and as certain, that the Actions of man, as a Cogitating and Intellectual Essence, are of so noble and divine a strain, as that it is impossible they should be performed by a mere Material Agent, or Corporeal substance, however disposed, qualified, or modified: What truth can be more perspicuous, more strong, than this, that the Soul of man, by which alone he is impowered to think and understand, is an Immaterial Substance?  
Now, all the Actions of the Human Soul, are referrible to two General Heads or Fountains; whereof the one is Perception, or the single Operation of the Intellect; the other, Volition, or the single Operation of the Will: For, to be sensible, to Imagine, and purely to understand, are only divers manners of Perceiving; and to desire, to hate, to affirm, to deny, to embrace, to refuse, are only divers manners of Willing.  
To examine these Actions, therefore, more particularly; let us in the first place, turn our eye, for a glance or two, upon the Will, which though but a branch of the Soul, and as it were a secundary Faculty, in respect of the Intellect, doth clearly show the Immateriality of the Soul, whose Faculty it is. For, insomuch as the Will doth by Natural and Congenial tendency, prosecute Bonum Honestum, which is for the most part repugnant to Bonum Delectabile, or such Good, as is only Sensual and Corporeal: It is a good Consequence, that the Will is an Incorporeal Faculty; it being impossible for a Corporeal Faculty to apprehend an Incorporeal Object, such as Good abstracted from all relations of the Sense.  
Again, forasmuch as the Will is absolutely Free, to elect, or refuse what Objects she pleaseth; and such a Freedom cannot consist with an Appetite immersed in Matter and obliged thereunto inseparably (because all Dispositions of Matter are determinate and necessary, and the effects resulting from those certain dispositions, are likewise determinate and necessary:) therefore is the Will Superior to all Conditions and Obligations of Matter. And, that the Will hath this arbitrary Liberty of Election or Refusal, is demonstrable from hence; that it is in the power of every man living to suspend or withhold his assent to any proposition whatever, until he is able to make a certain judgement of the Verity or Falsity, convenience or inconvenience thereof: Which reason is so manifest, out of our own experience, that Des Cartes (and He, you will confess, was a man of admirable circumspection and strictness in examining Fundamental and Proleptical Notions) doth securely account it among the First and most common Notions, that are Congenial and Innate in the Mind of every man. But, because the Will is only the Branch, and the Understanding the Root, upon which it grows, and by which it is to be regulated; and that what I shall say of the Intellect, may be easily accommodated to the Will, with equal competency: I shall no longer insist upon the consideration of the Will, but fix my discourses wholly upon the Intellect, as the Principal and Primary Faculty, for proof of the Souls Immateriality; drawing my Arguments first from the Actions of the Understanding, and then from its proper Objects.  
The Operations of the Intellect, which give evidence of the Souls Immateriality, may be reduced to Three distinct Orders or Classes: The First consisting of such, by which it may be evinced, that Intellection and Imagination are Acts perfectly distinct each from other: The Second of such, as are called Reflex Acts, by which the Intellect doth understand itself, and its own proper functions, and perceiveth that it doth understand: The Third of those, by which we do not only form Universals, or Universal Notions of things; but also understand the very reason of Universality itself. And of each of these, I intent to speak plainly and succinctly, according to this method.  
I begin with Acts of the First Classis; not that they are of any singular dignity or excellency above the rest, but that I may seasonably remove that obstacle of common prejudice, which men generally have (and you, Lucretius, among the rest, as yourself professed even now) that the Intellect is not a Faculty distinct from the Fancy or Imagination; as if, what we call Imagination in Beasts, were really the very same with that, which we call Understanding in Men, and only different from it, secundum magis & minus, according to the degrees of more and less, strength and acuteness.  
In Man we cannot but observe a certain sort of Intellection, by which the soul exercising her Faculty of Ratiocination, doth advance herself to the assured and distinct knowledge or understanding of some things, which is impossible for the Imagination ever to have any apprehension of, in regard there can be no Images or representations of them in the Fancy, though we should with never so much intention or earnestness employ our mind to frame such resemblances. For example, when considering the Magnitude of the Sun, we follow the conduct of our Reason, and deduce inferences from sound premises (which is Discourse) we soon come to know most certainly, that the magnitude of the Sun is at least an hundred and sixty times greater than that of the Earth: Yet, do what we can, we can never bring our Imagination to apprehend any such vastness, but shall find it to consist only in such a small representation of the Solar Globe, as the Sense hath delivered into the brain. Nay, if we set ourselves to meditate well and seriously upon the matter, we shall soon be satisfied, that we cannot imagine the Globe of the Earth (which is yet vastly short of that of the Sun) to be near so great, as Demonstrations Geometrical convince it to be; forasmuch as the Imagination (which doth no more but copy out the pictures drawn on the tables of the Senses, and that as well in dimensions, as figure, colour, etc.) conceiveth the Vault or Arch of the Heavens to insist upon the limits of the visible Horizon, on every side, and that the Clouds, Sun, Moon, Starrs, and whatever else we behold within that Arch or Semicircle, are not more distant from us, than the Horizon is. So that you see plainly, how little the Imagination doth apprehend the Heavens, and the whole World to be; and how vastly short we come of imagining the Sun (a small part only of the Heavens, and of the Universe) to be so great, as really it is; while we cannot imagine the whole World to be as great, as the Earth really is: But, if we appeal to our Understanding; that doth instantly assure us, by irresistible demonstrations, that the World, Heavens, Sun, and Earth are of certain magnitudes incomparably greater, than those to which the Fancy can possibly extend its power of comprehension. Which I think, Lucretius, doth not obscurely import, that there is more than an imaginary difference between the Understanding and the Fancy.  Lucretius. 
I do not think so, Athanasius. For, though perhaps I cannot so extend my Imagination, as to bring it to fathom or grasp so great a magnitude, as that of the Sun, all at once: Yet I can imagine a greater and greater magnitude by degrees, till at last I come to equal the whole real magnitude thereof. Nor is it necessary, that I should have in my Fancy an Image of greatness equal thereunto, while that small one exhibited to me by my sight, is sufficient to make me conceive, that the real magnitude is greater than the apparent: which I can do, only by comparing the several apparent magnitudes of one and the same Object, at several distances from the eye.  Athanasius. 
Hear you, Sir. That Addition you make of one degree of magnitude to another successively, till you attain to an apprehension of the real magnitude of the Sun; is not an act of your Imagination, but purely of your Reason, which finding the Image of the Sun's greatness in your Fancy to be incomparably too small, to answer to that immense distance that you understand to be betwixt the Sun and your eye, doth, by its own proper Faculty, supply that disproportion, not by enlargement of the Image, but by inferring, from Geometrical Maxims, that a visible Object at that supposed distance, though it seem to be no bigger than a Coach-wheel, must yet in reality be by vast excesses greater. For, if you had no other Conception of the Sun's Magnitude, but what is deduced from the sight; how could it ever enter into your mind, that the Sun is really so much larger than it appears to be? Manifest, therefore, it is, that that enlargement of your conception of the Sun's Magnitude, beyond that of its appearance, is an act of your Intellect, wholly above the power of your Imagination. So likewise is your Comparing the several apparent magnitudes of one and the same Object, at several degrees of distance. Where give me leave to observe to you, that the Imagination or common sense can have no Idea of Distance, beyond one or two hundred feet: as is evident from hence, that the Sun and Moon, which are amongst Objects of the greatest remoteness from the eye, and whose Diameters are to their Circumference, as one to an hundred, or thereabouts, seem to us to be at most two feet over; though Reason doth assure us, that they are very great and very far distant. And nothing is more certain, than that we estimate the magnitude of a thing, from the cognition, or opinion at least, which we have in our mind of the Distance of it comparatively to the magnitude of the image of it drawn in the bottom of the Eye, and not absolutely by the magnitude of that image; as I have amply and demonstratively declared in my discourse of the Manner of Vision, and as Des Cartes also hath demonstrated, in the sixth Chapter of his Dioptrics: Both which I am sure you have perused. However, because it conduceth somewhat to our present argument, permit me to give you this evident reason thereof; that though the Image of an Object may be an hundred times greater, when the Object is very near, than when the same is removed to a distance ten times greater: yet the Object itself doth not therefore appear to us an hundred times greater, but almost equal. So that the Comparation of Magnitude and Distance, is an act of the Understanding, not of the Imagination, as you presume.  Lucretius. 
If all our Cognition doth proceed originally from our Senses, as all men concede, and Aristotle affirms in that Maxim, Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuit in sensu; and that Intellection is made by Analogy, by Composition, Division, Ampliation, Extenuation, and the like ways of managing the Species or Images of things immitted into the Common Sense, by the External Senses: Then certainly can we have no knowledge of any thing, whereof we have no Image; and consequently without Imagination there is no Intellection, so that in fine to Imagine and to Understand a thing will be all one.  Athanasius. 
Your Inference is not justifiable. For, the Common Notions, that are as it were engraven on our Minds, and that are not derived originally from the Observations of things by ourselves, or the Tradition of them by others, do undeniably attest the contrary. Nor can any thing be more absurd, than to say, that all those Proleptical and Common Notions, which we have in our Mind, do arise only from impressions made upon the Organs of our Senses, by the incurse of External Objects; and that they cannot consist without them: Insomuch as all sensible Impressions are singular, but those Notions Universal, having no affinity with, no relation unto, Corporeal motions or impressions. And, if you think the contrary, pray oblige me so far, as to teach me, what kind of Corporeal impression that may be, which forms this one Common Notion in our Mind, Quae sunt eadem uni tertio, sunt eadem interse. Not that I am afraid, to question the truth of even your Supposition, notwithstanding the general allowance of that Maxim of the Philosopher. For, whoever dothwel observe, how far our Senses extend themselves, and what that is, which can arise from them, in order to our Faculty of Cogitating; will easily be brought to confess, that they exhibit to us no such Ideas of things, as we form of them in our thoughts, and that in those Ideas we form, there is nothing, which is not Innate and Congenial to our Mind or Faculty of Cogitating, except only those Circumstances, which relate to experience, or whereby we judge, that those Ideas, wehave now present to our Cogitation, may be conveniently referred to those external Objects, which we speculate. Not that those Objects have immitted those very Ideas into our Mind, by the Organs of the Senses; but because they have immited somewhat, which hath given occasion to the Mind to form such Ideas, by its own Innate and proper Faculty, at this time rather than at any other. For, nothing comes to the Mind, from External Objects, by the mediation of the Senses, besides certain Corporeal Impressions; and yet neither those Impressions, nor the Figures resulting from them, are such as we conceive in the Mind; as Des Cartes hath amply proved in his Dioptrics: Whence it follows, that the Ideas of Motions and Figures are innate to the Mind; that is, that the Mind hath an essential power to form them: for, when I say that such an Idea is in the Mind, I intent that it is not always actually there, but Potentially, and the word Faculty will justify that manner of speaking. I add moreover, that no Corporeal Image or Species, is ever received into the Mind; and that pure Intellection, as well of a Corporeal, as an Incorporeal thing, is made without any Material Species or Image at all; but, as for Imagination, to that, indeed, is required the presence of some Corporeal Image, to which the Mind may apply itself; because there can be no Imagination but of Corporeal things; and yet nevertheless that Corporeal Image doth not enter into the Mind. For instance, the Intellect or Mind hath no material Species of that Magnitude, which it understands the Sun to be of: but comprehends the same to be in the Sun, by its own proper Virtue or Faculty, i. e. by Ratiocination. Whence we may securely conclude, that the Intellect, understanding a thing without a Material Image, must itself be immaterial: as on the contrary, the Imagination confesseth itself to be Material, because it is obliged to the use of Material Images. Truth is, the Intellect also makes use of Images conceived by the Fancy (and therefore they are called Phantasms) yet only as certain Means, or Degrees, that progressing through them, it may at length attain the knowledge of some things, which it afterward perceives as sequestered, and in a manner sublimed from those Phantasms: But this is that, which doth sufficiently argue its being Immaterial, because it carrieth itself beyond all Images material, and comes to the Science of some things, of which it hath no Phantasms.  
And thus you may perceive, that we do not owe all our Cognition to our Senses: And consequently, that to Understand and to Imagine is not (as you would infer) all one thing.  Lucretius. 
I know not, what singular Faculty you may have, of abstracting your Understanding from all commerce with the Senses, in its negotiation for knowledge; but sure I am, that the most learned and most subtle among the Peripatetics have unanimously held, that all our Cognition is made by the working of our Fancy; and that the Soul doth not understand, but by the Speculation of Phantasms. Nay, Pomponatius and Sir K. Digby (both which flew up to an admirable sublimity in their Contemplations, concerning the nature and operations of the Soul) openly profess the Verity of that Axiom, from their own experience. So that unless you can give me some more pregnant testimony, of the Intellects knowing, without the immediate help of Images, pre-admitted by the Senses, than yet you have done: you must pardon me, if I believe, that in this point you affect to be paradoxical.  Athanasius. 
The Sum of what I have said, of this Argument, is this; that though the Intellect doth come to understand Corporeal Natures, by the mediation of Phantasms: Yet the Notions, which it frameth it to self of them, are Different from those Phantasms; and that it hath the Knowledge of some things, whereof the Fancy can have no Images. And for Confirmation hereof, since you seem to desire it, I shall offer you this one Argument more.  
All the particular Knowledges, that man hath, or can have, concerning finite and complete Entities (except only the Notion of Being) are only certain Comparisons or Respects between particular things: But of Respect, there can be no Image or representation at all, in the Fancy: and therefore our Knowledge is without Images.  
The truth of the Major proposition is evident from hence; that of all the particular Notions we have (except that of Being) there is no one, which doth belong to some one of the Ten Predicaments; all which are so manifestly Respective, that no man doubteth them to be so. In particular, Substance hath a respect to Being; Quantity doth consist in a respect unto Parts; Quality hath a respect unto that Subject, which is denominated from it; Action and Passion result from the Union of Quality and Substance; Relation denoteth the respect betwixt the Relatum and Correlatum; Ubi & Quando, or Where & When, arise from substance considered with the circumstances of Place and Time; Situation is from the respect of Parts, to the Whole; Habit is a respect to the Substance wherein it is, as being the propriety, by which it is well or ill, conveniently or inconveniently affected, in regard of its own Nature. Forasmuch, therefore, as all the Ten Predica-; ments do consist only in diversity of Respects, and that each one of all the particular Notions which man is capable of, in this life, doth naturally fall under the comprehension of some one of those Predicaments: What Consequence can be more genuine, more manifest, than this, that all our Cognition is drawn from Comparisons or Respects.  
For the Minor; if you question the verity thereof, pray, exercise your mind in seriously reviewing all things that have been derived from the Senses, and see if you can find among them any such thing as what we call a Respect. It hath neither Figure, nor Colour, nor Sound, nor Odour, nor Taste: and so cannot possibly be represented to the Sense, nor Imagination. And, if you cannot either meet with any Image of Respect, or frame one in your Imagination; nor deny that all the Negotiation of the Intellect is in and by Respects: I hope, you will have little cause left for your suspicion, that I affect to be Paradoxical, in that I affirm, that the Notions of things in the understanding, are extremely different from whatsoever is immitted into the Mind by the mediation of the Senses; and so, that the Intellect hath a knowledge of some things, whereof the Imagination can have no Phantasms.  Lucretius. 
But, all this while, you give me no Criterion, or certain Rule, by which I may be able to discern betwixt mere Imagination, and pure Intellection, within myself; so as to know when I apprehend a thing by my Common Sense or Imaginative Faculty alone, and when by my Intellect alone, and without the immediate concurrence of my Imagination. Pray, therefore, assist your alleged argument, by prescribing me some such infallible Note of Distinction: And then perhaps, I shall submit to your opinion.  Athanasius. 
In simple Imagination, the Mind doth always apply itself to the Image of the thing speculated; and in pure Intellection, it quitteth the Image, and converteth itself upon itself: The former act being still accompanied with some labour, and contention of the Mind; the latter free, easy, and instantaneous. As in this Example. When I think upon a Triangle, I do not only instantly conceive it to be a Figure comprehended in three lines, but I also behold those three lines, with the eye of my Mind, as if they were really present; and this is that I call Imagination. But, when I think of a Chiliogon, or Figure with a thousand Angles; albeit I as well understand, that the same is a Figure consisting a thousand sides, as I do a Triangle to be one of only three sides: Yet I cannot as well imagine all those thousand sides, or behold them distinctly and at once, with the eye of my Mind, as if they were really present; for, though then, because of my custom of always imagining something, I have some certain Figure confusedly represented to me; yet that that is not the representation of a Chiliogon, is manifest from hence, that it is no whit different from that, which I should represent to myself, in case I thought upon a Myriogon, or any other Figure with more sides: nor doth it help me at all to the knowing of those proprieties, by which a Chiliogon differs from other Polygon Figures. And, if the question be of only a Pentagon, I can understand the nature of that Figure (as of a Chiliogon) without the help of my Imagination; and I can also imagine the same, by applying the acies of my Mind, to the five sides thereof, and to the Area contained in them: But, here, I plainly perceive, that to imagine thus, there is required a certain peculiar strife, or Contention of my Mind, such as I use not in the mere understanding of that Figure, or any other Polygon; which new Contention and Labour of my Mind doth clearly show the Difference betwixt Imagination and pure Intellection: And this is the best Note or Character of Distinction, I can in the present think upon to give you. But, it requireth strict and profound Meditation to observe it; and therefore let me desire you to consider what I have said of this Difference betwixt Imagining and Understanding, to morrow morning, in your bed, when your Spirits are clear and active, your Faculties vigorous, and your Mind quiet and serene.  Isodicastes. 
You say very well, Sir▪ For, notwithstanding you have argued with singular subtlety, in defence of this Distinction; yet, until a man shall find his own Experience give light and Confirmation to your Reasons, the thing will remain involved in much obscurity. And, therefore, since frequent and calm Meditation is so necessary, to the habituating our Mind to speculate abstractedly, without material Phantasms, and to know when it doth so: Lucretius and I, will take some time, to meditate as seriously and profoundly, as we can, upon this Nicety, before we decalre our final determination thereupon; and in the mean time leave it tanquam Problema utrinque disputatum, as a Problem well disputed on both sides, but not fully decided by either. And so, if you please, you are at liberty to proceed to some new Argument of the Souls Immateriality.  Athanasius. 
The Second Branch of the Method I proposed, ariseth (as you may remember) from that kind of Operation in the Soul, whereby the Intellect, Reflecting upon itself, doth become its own Object, and so understand itself, and its own Functions, and know itself to be an Intellect, or thinking and discerning Nature. If therefore we well consider these Reflex Acts of the Understanding; we can no longer doubt its being Immaterial. That the Intellect doth thus reflect upon its self, and discern its own knowledge, needs no other testimony but that of a man's own Experience; it being impossible for any person living not to know, that he knows what he knows, as is implied in that common Proverb, I very well know what I know. And, that this Operation is far above the power of whatsoever is Material, deriveth its evidence from hence; that every Material thing or Agent is so strictly obliged to some certain place, either permanently or successively, as that it cannot move toward itself, but if moved at all, is moved toward some thing divers from itself. Which truly is the Reason of that Canon Law in Nature, that Nothing can act upon itself. For, however one and the same thing may sometimes seem to act upon itself; yet really it is only one part of that thing act's upon another part of the same thing: As when one of a man's hands striketh against the other, or the end of one finger against the palm of the hand, but the end of the same finger cannot strike upon itself. And hence comes it, that the Sight cannot see itself, nor the Hearing hear itself, nor the Imagination perceive that it doth imagine, nor any Corporeal Faculty whatever perceive its own Functions. We know, indeed, when and what we see, or hear, or imagine, etc. but that Knowledge is the sole and proper effect of that Power or Faculty within us, which being Superior to all Sense and Imagination, and so comprehending all their activity in its own, doth perceive them, their Objects and Operations, judge of them, and reflect upon both those judgements, and itself that frames them. And the Reason, why the Imagination cannot perceive itself, or its own actions, is because the Act of the Fancy tendeth only to the Image of the thing imagined, not to the perception of that Image; for, of a Perception there can be no Image. It being then most certain, that the Intellect doth familiarly reflect upon itself, and understand its own Intelligence; and as certain, that such a power doth transcend the capacity of any thing inseparably immersed in Matter, and confined to the conditions of Matter: I cannot see how it is possible for you to avoid or decline the necessity of the Consequence, viz, That the Intellect is a Faculty Immaterial. And here I dare you, Lucretius, or the subtlest Epicurean in the World, to try the strength of your Philosophy, upon this Argument; for to me, I profess, it seems not much inferior to a Demonstration.  Lucretius. 
Why Sir, do you conceive, that what you affirm of the impossibility of internal Reflection, in any but an Immaterial Agent, is of Universal truth?  Athanasius. 
Seriously I do, and upon the Authority of that Reason, I now alleged, I think it justifiable to persevere in that persuasion, until yourself, or some other person shall offer me an Instance, wherein that General position doth admit of an Exception.  Lucretius. 
What think you, then, of sundry admirable actions of some Brute Animals, which seem to imply Dubitation, Resolution, Invention, and the like effects of a discursive and self-knowing Principle within them? For example, when you observe a Dog in hunting to cast about, try the ground, stand still, run sometimes forward, sometimes turn aside, and then on a sudden change his course and return back; will you not allow this to arise from a kind of Examination of the actions of his Sense? And doth not that Examination import a Reflection of the discerning Faculty both upon itself, and its action of discerning?  Athanasius. 
Alas, Lucretius, this is so light an Objection, that I cannot but wonder, that it should retard your assent to a position of so much weight, as that, that no Material thing can act upon itself; especially since you have read the excellent discourses of Monsieur Des Cartes, and Sir K. Digby; wherein they have so clearly solved all the most seemingly rational actions of Beasts, by sensible motions and corporeal principles. However, that you may no longer be deluded, in conceiving, that the sudden stopping, turning aside, returning, etc. of a Dog, doth argue this eminent Reflection of a Faculty upon itself, which I attribute to a Man, as the propriety of his Intellect; be pleased to know, that the most it doth import, is only Reminiscence in the Dog, by reason of some new Species in his Fancy, accidentally intercurrent, and diverting him from the pursuit of that other, which immediately before possessing, and as it were beating upon his Fancy, had engaged him to a different course: For, as often as the Species that move and affect his Sense, and so his Imagination, are changed, so often doth he change his course and vary his pursuit. And certainly nothing comes nearer to a manifest absurdity, than to suppose, that a Dog can, as it were, say within himself, I imagine that I do imagine; or I perceive that I am a perceiving essence, and the like; which is an action of such singular eminence above all what we observe to proceed from Dogs, or any the most docible and cunning Beasts in nature, that it ought not to be imputed to any thing below an Immaterial and self-Cognoscent Being, such as the Reasonable Soul of Man is.  
And it was upon this essential prerogative of the Human Soul, that Des Cartes seemeth to have reflected, when under the term Cogitation, he understood all things that are done in us, cum Conscientia, with knowledge that we do them; so as that not only to understand, to will, to imagine; but also to have the sense of a thing, is the same as to Cogitate, or Think. For (saith he) if I argue thus with myself, I see, or I walk; therefore I am; and understand this only of that Vision, or walking, which is performed by the help of my body, than the Conclusion is not absolutely certain, because it often happens that in my sleep, I dream that I see, and walk, when in truth I do neither: But, if I understand it of my Perception, or Conscience of my seeing or walking, with reference only to my Mind, which alone doth perceive or think, that it doth see or walk; then the Conclusion is most certain, because it is of the nature of my Mind to be Conscious of its own actions. Which Description of Thinking, I the rather commemorate, because I have observed many to quarrel at it, as incompetent and somewhat extravagant; not comprehending the Author's principal Ground, the constant Reflection of the Mind upon its own Operations.  Lucretius. 
So that I perceive, you wholly exclude all Animals (except Man) from being conscious of their own actions: But with how much reason; I shall beseech Isodicastes here to judge, who cannot but frequently have remarked the contrary, nothing being more common, then to see a setting Dog to come creeping and trembling with fear and shame to his Master, when either through too much speed in hunting, or the averseness of the wind carrying away the scent from him, he hath chanced to spring the Partridges, which he ought to have set: And on the other side, when he hath made a fair Set, and the game is taken, you shall have him leap and exsult for joy, and run confidently to his Master for his reward. And what can his fear and shame be referred unto, but his being conscious that he hath committed a fault, and so deserves to be beaten for it? or his exultation in his own cunning, but to his being conscious that he hath done well, and so ought to be encouraged and recompensed with some share of the Prey?  Athanasius. 
I thought I had prevented your recourse to all Objections taken from the actions of Brute Animals, that carry a semblance of Reason in them; by remitting you to your remembrance of what you have read in the satisfactory Discourses of Des Cartes, and Sir K. Digby concerning them: but seeing you will not acquiesce in that reference, let me tell you briefly, that what you now urge of a Dogs owning his faults, and exultation in his own skill and cunning, is not sufficient to entitle him to that transcendent capacity of acting with Knowledge, and Reflection, which I affirm to be the propriety of Man's informing Principle within him. For, the Dog having been used to be beaten, as often as he springs the game; no sooner see's the Birds upon their wings, but instantly the image of the smart he hath formerly suffered from his Master, upon the like occasion, recurrs to his Fancy, and affecteth him with fear: As on the other side, the sight of the birds in the Net, brings afresh into his memory the Image of that pleasure, wherewith his Sense was affected, in eating the heads of the Partridge, and strongly possessing his Imagination, causeth that passion of joy in him, which betrayeth itself by his leaping and skipping. For, in the Fancy of Beasts there is always a conjunction of the Image of that particular good or harm they have formerly received from such or such things, with the Images of the things themselves: which is, indeed, the cause of all those so much admired effects, called Sympathies and Antipathies, amongst Animals of different kinds, as I have more particularly declared in my Physiology, where I treated of the Manifestation of Occult Qualities. And this reason may serve to solve what you object, concerning Beasts being Conscious when they have pleased, or displeased their Masters; without entrenchment upon the Prerogative of Man, whereby he is capable of acting with knowledge, and reflecting upon that knowledge, as part and the principal part of his Essence. But, since you have appealed to the judgement of Isodicastes, I humbly expect his Verdict.  Isodicastes. 
That many Brute Animals, especially such as are made tame and domestic, and frequently conversant with men, are conscious of their faults; daily experience doth testify: But, that they are therefore animated with a Soul capable of knowing itself, and its actions, by reflecting upon itself: seems to me to be altogether inconsequent; because, as Athanasius hath explained the reason and manner of that particular action in them, it doth import no more than what belongs to a mere Sensitive Soul. So that, Lucretius, unless you can impugn his Argument now alleged, for proof of the Immateriality of the Human intellect by some more important Objection; I should be unjust not to allow it to be strongly persuasive.  Athanasius. 
Being free, then, from any impediment of further Contradiction to this Argument of the Intellect's being an Immaterial Faculty, from its Reflex acts; I come now to the Third sort of its Operations, which testify the same, viz. those whereby we do not only form to ourselves Universals, or Universal Notions, but also understand the reason of Universality itself.  
In Universal Notions we are to observe Two considerables; (1.) their Abstraction; (2.) their Universality: And either of these Conditions is alone sufficient to enforce a persuasion of the Immateriality of that Faculty, the Intellect, which doth so apprehend them.  
For, as to the First; it being evidently impossible, that any Corporeal thing should be exempted from all Material conditions, and differences of singularity, as Magnitude, Figure, Colour, Time, Place, etc. and undeniably certain, that the Understanding hath a power to divest them of all and every one of those conditions, and circumstances, and to speculate them in that abstracted state, devoid of all particularities; it followeth of pure necessity, that the Understanding, which hath this power so to abstract them, must itself be exempt from all matter, and of a Condition more eminent, than to be confined to material Conditions.  
And, as to the Other, viz. their Universality; this addeth to their abstraction one admirable particularity more, which is, that they abstract in such sort, as to express at the same time the very thing, they abstract from. Which is not a little wonderful; since it is not easy to conceive, that the same thing should be, and not be, in one and the same Notion. And yet if we seriously reflect upon what we mean, when we say thus, Every man hath two hands; we shall soon perceive, that we therein express nothing, whereby one individual man is distinguished from another: though that very word Every, doth import that every single person is distinct from another; so that here is (as Sir K. Digby most wittily saith) Particularity itself expressed in Common. Now, this being impossible to be done, in any Corporeal representation whatsoever, it is a necessary consequence, that the Intellect, which hath this singular propriety of thus comprehending and expressing Universals, is itself Incorporeal.  
Now, if you should require of me to declare, how the Understanding doth frame to itself Universals, when there are no such things in Nature; I shall explain the Manner of that transcendent Operation to be thus. When we Cogitate or think upon Individuals, that have resemblance each to other; we accommodate one and the same Idea to all particulars comprehended under that one General notion: and so using to impose one and the same name upon all the things represented by that Common Idea, that name becomes Universal. Thus, when we see two stones, and apply our Mind to consider, not their Nature, but only that they are Two; we form to ourselves an Idea of that Number, which we call a Binary, or Two: And afterward, when we see two Birds, or two Trees, and consider not their Nature, but only that they are two; we repeat the same Idea we had before, which comes thereby to be Universal, and we call this number by the same Universal name. After the same manner, when we behold a Figure comprehended in Three lines, we form in our Mind a certain Idea thereof, which we call the Idea of a Triangle; and we afterward always use the same Idea, as an Universal one, to represent to us all other Figures consisting of three lines. Again, when we perceive, that among Triangles there are some, which have one right angle, and others which have not; we form in ourselves the Universal Idea of a rectangle Triangle, which in relation to the former Idea, as more General, we call a Species: And that rectitude of the Angle, is the Universal Difference, by which all rectangle Triangles are distinguished from others. Further, that in all such Triangles, the Basis is in power equal to the powers of the sides; this is a Propriety competent to all such, and only to such Triangles. And lastly, if we suppose that some of these Triangles are moved, and others not; this will be in them an Universal Accident. And after this Manner doth the Understanding frame those Five Universals, Genus, Species, Difference, Propriety, and Accident: which really are but so many several Modes, or Manners of our Cogitating, or Thinking; and having no existence in Nature, but only in Man's Understanding, do bear pregnant testimony of its being Immaterial.  Lucretius. 
Here you say, it is undeniably certain, that the Understanding hath a power to abstract things from all conditions of Matter, and all Particularities; when for my part, I profess, I can find no such power in myself. For, after many the most serious essays I could make, I could never yet conceive an Universal, but there doth always occur to my Mind somewhat of Particularity, and that under some certain Magnitude, Figure, Colour, and the like adjuncts of Body. So that it seems, either I have not an Understanding as Active and Comprehensive, as other men have: or else those Unbodied and Universal Notions; of which you and other Philosophers talk so solemnly, are mere Chimeras, invented by curious and wanton Wits, to amuse such vulgar heads, as mine is.  Athanasius. 
You cannot be ignorant of that power in yourself, as you pretend, Lucretius. For, though your Mind is not capable of divesting Objects of their particular Magnitude, Figure, Colour, and the other concomitants of Matter, altogether, and at once: yet it can easily do it successively, or one after another; and that is sufficient to attest and manifest, that the Intellect hath this power of Abstracting, and forming Universals; as I have explained.  Lucretius. 
I have read a certain book, written by one Hieronymus Rorarius, a learned Prelate, containing a collection of all Arguments commonly urged to prove, that many Brute Animals have the use of Reason not only aswell as, but in a greater proportion than Man himself hath: and among the rest He affirms, that they also frame Universals, as in particular the species of Man, according to which as often as they see a two-legged and erect Animal, they take it to be a Man, and not a Lion, or Horse, or the like: And if so, what becomes of this Prerogative of the Human Intellect, you so much depend upon, for testimony of its Incorporiety?  Athanasius. 
If this were true, yet doubtless Brutes can have no knowledge of the Universality of that Species, or universal Nature of Man, viz. Humanity, as abstracted from every degree of singularity. But, we have no reason to grant the Supposition; for, as Brutes do not apprehend things abstracted, but concrete, as not Colour, but a body coloured, not a sapour, but a body sapid, &c: so ought we to conceive, that there is nothing else in a Dog (for instance) but only the Memory of singulars, or of those single men, whom he hath seen, and taken notice of; and when he meets a man, whom he hath not seen afore, his fancy instantly presents him the image of some one he hath seen afore, and so he takes him to be a man. Nor can you recur to that vulgar subterfuge, that we are not so well acquainted with the nature of Beasts, as to understand what is done in the secret cells of their brains, and after what manner they apprehend objects: seeing it is not difficult for us, to infer as much, from their operations or external actings. For, in case they could aspire to so much perfection, as to frame Universal Notions of things, as we do, and reason upon them, as we do; it were not to be doubted, but it would come into their minds, to inquire into the acts of their progenitors, what they knew before them; how they might signify to others at distance, what themselves have thought and done; and how they might devolve memorials to their posterity. They would likewise attempt to frame Arts useful in their lives, and do many noble actions; of which it is impossible they should have the least hint or notice. For as much, therefore, as no age can give us an Example of any such action done by any Beast whatever; we may safely conclude, that they have no notion of Universals, as Rorarius and you from him seem to suppose. So that this prerogative of Man's Understanding in framing Universals, remains entire and untouched: and while it doth so, I need not fear the stability of what I have founded thereupon, viz that the. Human Intellect is Incorporeal. And therefore, if you have no more to object against this my reason; I doubt not but Isodicastes will give his vote on my side.  Idosicastes. 
I should, be grossly partial, Athanasius, if I did not confess, that you have foiled your adversary at this weapon: yet I am sure Lucretius is so candid an Antagonist, as to account it no dishonour to be overcome by Truth; and I presume He doth contend, only to make your conquest the more absolute.  Athanasius. 
To these few Reasons of the Immateriality of the Human Soul, desumed from the excellency of her operations, I might here add a multitude of others, of the same extraction and equivalent force, as in particular, that of the existence of Corporeal natures in the Soul, by the power of apprehension; that of her drawing from multitude to unity, her apprehension of Negations and Privations; her containing of Contraries without opposition; her capacity to move, without being moved herself; the incompossibility of opposite propositions in the understanding; and sundry others: the least whereof is of evidence and vigour sufficient to carry the cause against all those Enemies to her Immortality, who would degrade her from the divine dignity of her nature, to an equality with the souls of Beasts, that are but certain dispositions of Matter, and so obnoxious to dissolution upon change of the same by contrary agents. But, considering that the certainty of truth ought to be estimated rather by the weight than number of testimonies; and that the discourses I have already framed concerning some of the Soul's proper operations, are clear enough to give light to any judicious and well disposed person, how to infer the like conclusion from those other of her operations, which I have not insisted upon: I shall now withdraw my own and your thoughts from her operations, and convert them, for only a few minutes upon her Objects, that so we may examine whether they be such, as that it is possible for them to fall under the apprehension of any, but a faculty superior to Materiality.  
Concerning the Objects, therefore, of the Understanding, they are all things in the Universe, and so not only Corporeal and sensible natures, but Incorporeals also, and such as are many spheres above the utmost capacity of the Sense. That Corporeals belong to the Cognisance of the Intellect, I think no man will dispute: and that this knowledge doth prove it to be incorporeal, is manifest from hence, that it knows the formal reason of Body, or Corporiety itself, and that it doth consist in extensibility: which it could no more do, unless itself were above Corporiety, than a man could see the amplitude of the sea if he were immersed into the bottom of it. Nay I might hence deduce it to be Inorganical; insomuch as it knows not only corporeal organs, but comprehends also the very reason and form of an Organ. For, since an Organ is always somewhat intermediate betwixt the Faculty and the Object, or thing for the perception of which it was made; and therefore cannot act upon itself, or be that thing on which the Faculty worketh by an Organ: The Intellect could no more be exercised in knowing an Organ, or the reason of it, if itself were an Organ, or Faculty Organical, than one Instrument, or tool of an Artist can employ itself upon another Instrument, or serve to that end, for which it was framed, without the help of the Artist.  Lucretius. 
You say here, Athanasius, that no man doubteth of the knowledge of Corporeal Natures, by the Understanding; when you cannot but remember that Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus have many Disciples in the World, who renounce all Knowledge whatesover, unless it be that of their own invincible ignorance: And for my own part, though I shall not go so high, as to say, we know nothing at all; yet sure, I am, we do not know the intimate Nature of so much as the smallest Plant that grows upon the ground. And if so, I cannot see how you will avoid the blame of begging the Question.  Athanasius. 
How dangerous a Doctrine that of the Sceptics is, as to the regulation of our Minds, in all the Actions and Occurences of our lives, by certain settled Judgements in the Understanding, drawn from Philosophical Maxims, and confirmed by experience; I have professedly declaclared else where, and therefore shall not now repeat. But, as to your Objection, that we do not know the intimate Natures of even Corporeal things; I answer, that though there be nothing in the World, to which the capacity of man's Understanding is not extensible, yet there are sundry things, which by reason of many impediments, it doth not actually know. But is this, think you, to be charged upon a defect in the Understanding; or upon the obscurity of the things themselves? Do you but find a Cause, that may reveal these things, and as it were draw them out of that obscurity, wherein they are so deeply involved; and the Intellect, I will undertake, shall soon discern and know them to the full. The Eye doth not perceive what is at the Centre of the Earth; will you therefore conclude an absolute incapacity therein, of perceiving what is there concealed, in case there were some Cause found out, which should unlock the bowels of the Earth, and lay open whatever is therein contained? I believe you will be more advised; considering that the drawing of a Curtain betwixt a visible Object and the sight, doth not diminish the power of the sight, but only render the Object inconspicuous. However, therefore, our Reason be not so perspicacious, as to transfix the Essences of things, and discern what is the intimate Nature of Objects; yet by ratiocination we advance so far toward it, as to know, that besides all those qualities, and accidents, which are obvious to the Sense, and to the imagination, there is yet somewhat more remaining, which is not obvious to either the Sense, or Imagination. And to understand thus much, is enough to exalt the Understanding many degrees above all Sense and Imagination; and consequently above all Corporeal Conditions. Whereunto I shall add, that there is no Corporeal Faculty, but is confined to the perception of only some one certain Genus of things; as in particular, the Sight to Visibles, the Hearing to Sounds, etc. and though the Imagination seems to be extended to very many kinds; yet all those are contained under the Classis of Sensibles; and thence it comes, that all Animals, which are endowed only with fantasy, are addicted to only Sensibles, no one affecting the Knowledge of any thing which falleth not under the Sense. But the Intellect alone is that, which hath for its Object, omne verum, and (as the Schools speak) Ens ut Ens, every Being in the Universe; and therefore hath no mixture of matter, but is wholly free from it, and Incorporeal. A truth so clearly revealed by the Light of Nature, that Anaxagoras said, and Aristotle subscribed, Esse Intellectum necessariò 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Immistum, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quoniam intelligit universa.  
And as for Incorporeals, that they likewise are within the Orb of the Intellects activity; and do not escape the apprehension of this unbounded and Universal Capacity; needs no other proof, besides that of our own sublime speculations concerning the Nature of God, of Intelligences, of Angels, of the Human Soul, and whatever else belongs to the Science of Metaphysics▪ which teacheth us to abstract from all Matter and Quantity. Nor doth the Understanding rest in the investigation of all substances immaterial, but flieth out of Trismegistus' Circle, and breaks through the battlements of the World into the Extra-mundan Spaces, and there finds the notion of a certain Being, which belongs not to the category either of Substances, or Accidents, but is independent even upon God himself: and that is Space, and to this it gives Imaginary Dimensions. Nay, I presume it will not be accounted paradoxical in me to affirm, that Immaterial Objects are most genuine and natural to the Understanding; especially since Des Cartes hath irrefutably demonstrated, that the Knowledge we have of the existence of the Supreme Being, and of our own Souls, is not only Proleptical and Innate in the Mind of man, but also more certain, clear, and distinct, than the Knowledge of any Corporeal Nature whatever: according to that Canon of Thom. Aquinas and most of the Schoolmen, Nullares, qualiscunque est, intelligi potest, nisi Deus intelligatur prius. However, this is most indubitable, that the principal and most congenial Motives or incitements of the Soul, are abstracted Considerations; as hope of what is to come, of Eternity, Memory of what is past, Virtue, Honour, and the like, which arise not from material principles, and have no commerce with Elementary compositions. Now, if the Understanding were not itself purely Immaterial, it would be absolutely impossible for it ever so much as to suspect, much less to know assuredly, that there were any such things as Incorporeals in the Universe: The Reason being obvious from that rule of Aristotle, juxtim apparens prohibet alienum. For, as the eye when discoloured with a yellow humour in the jaundice, can see no Object, but it appears tincted with the same colour: So could not the Intellect perceive any other but Corporeal Natures, if itself were not only perfused with, but wholly and entirely immersed into, Corporiety; so that of necessity it must be Incorporeal.  Lucretius. 
Me thinks now, you might with equal reason infer the quite Contrary, viz. that the Intellect could not have any perception of Corporeal Natures, if▪ itself were not likewise Corporeal; there being required some kind of proportion and compossibility betwixt the Faculty percipient, and the Object perceptible, as is exemplified in each of the Senses: which is the sole reason of their opinion, who contend, that the Sensitive part of the Soul is Material.  Athanasius. 
I positively deny that, Lucretius. For, since the Order or Degree of Incorporeal is superior to that of Corporeal; thence it follows, that by virtue of that its superiority or excellency, it possesseth all the perfections of the inferior, and that in a more eminent manner. So that as the degree Animal, being nobler than the degree merely Vegetable, doth in a more excellent proportion and manner, comprehend Vegetation, or Nutrition, Accretion, and Generation, which are the functions of the Vegetable: In like manner, doth the degree Spiritual or Incorporeal, being more noble and perfect than the mere Animal, and Corporeal, comprehend cognition Corporeal, or Sensation and Imagination, which are the functions proper to the degree Animal. And thus you see, that my inference of the Intellect's capacity to know Incorporeal essences, from its own being a Spiritual Faculty, is genuine and orderly: but yours, of its being Corporeal from its capacity to know Corporeals, is false and preposterous.  Lucretius. 
But may not I lawfully object, that we do not conceive God, or Angels, or Intelligences, as Immaterial Substances; when we find in ourselves, that the mind doth always speculate the Divine Essence itself under some Species of a Body, and though not of a Human Body (which yet is most usual) yet of an aereal, or ethereal one, or somewhat more fine and subtle, if any such there be?  Athanasius. 
You may make this Objection, there is no doubt; but it will not be sufficient to prevail against what I have urged, concerning the Intellect's extensibility even to God and other Intellectual essences. For the understanding, though it make use of those Phantasms, that are proper to the Imagination, as the means or degrees, by which it mounteth itself up to a sublimity above all Corporeal species; doth yet, by ratiocination, at length attain to that height, as to be ascertained; that, beside all body of whatsoever thinness purity and subtlety, there is moreover a certain supereminent substance, which hath nothing of Corporiety in it. The Intellect, I confess, doth not positively or intuitively (as they say) know this Substance: but, since this is its condition, while immersed in a body, which doth as it were infect it with corporeal representations or Phantasms, and eclipse its power of Intuition; it is abundantly sufficient to our Conclusion, that even in this mortal body it doth retain and conserve its incorporeal nature, that it doth understand that substance Negatively or Abstractively. For, this investigation or search after God, and our concluding him (out of the force of contradiction, or by way of Negation) to be Eternal, Infinite, Omnipotent, Omniscient, Immutable, with all other perfections imaginable essential to his nature; doth clearly demonstrate, that though the Intellect be obliged to make use of Corporeal images, in order to its knowledge; yet it is not obliged to acquiesce in them, so as to inquire no further, but hath such a liberty and energy, as that it doth ratiocinate beyond them, and conclude, that there is somewhat else in being, which cannot be represented by any Corporeal Image or species; and which though it cannot understand what it is in the fullness of its nature, yet is it certain that such a nature there is; and more than that, is not required to justify my Assertion. You may remember, how Aristotle and other great Philosophers asserted the existence of Celestial Intelligences, Abstracted Movers, and Immaterial Substances; not that they could see them, with the eye of the body, or frame any Ideas of them in their Imagination: but that by profound reasoning, from the magnitude, form, situation, motion and duration of the Celestial bodies, they came to understand, that in nature there could not but be such Abstracted and Immaterial Movers, which governed and continually regulated those vast and glorious Orbs, in their Admirable and well ordered Motions.  Lucretius. 
If what you say, were true; it would follow, that in diseases of the brain, and such as cause a depravation of the Fancy; the Intellect, as being more at liberty to exercise its faculty of pure and abstracted intellection, would arise to the cognition of Immaterial things with more facility and promptness, than at any other time. But we daily see, that men of disturbed Fancies, and alienated minds (as the vulgar phrase is) are so far from understanding more clearly and distinctly, than before, that they cannot reason at all; and it was not without cause, that some Philosophers have held, that a man deprived of any one of his senses, can not rightly discourse of that sense, or the objects belonging to it.  Athanasius. 
You have no reason to urge this upon me; for I formerly rejected that error of the Averrhoist, that the Soul is a Form merely Assistant, and in its functions altogether independent upon the body; and what I aver is this, that the soul of Man doth truly and entirely inform the body, and to that purpose nature hath added senses and Imagination, as handmaids to attend it in its operations, and to give it opportunities of reasoning from what they bring in. So that it ought not to seem strange, that upon the loss of a sense, or perturbation of the Fancy, men cannot reason so exactly as before: and it sufficeth, that when the whole oeconomy of man's nature is in tune and order, his understanding is capable of reasoning so as to advance itself above the body, as far as is permitted to its nature, and at length to conclude, that there is somewhat Incorporeal. And now I have recited all the Arguments, which I thought most material towards the proof of the Soul's Immortality, drawn from considerations Physical, and in particular from the souls Operations and Objects: I refer myself to the Noble Isodicastes here, who is pleased to assume upon himself the trouble of acting the part of an Arbiter betwixt us in this dispute, whether you have been able to dissolve them.  Isodicastes. 
How unfit I am, to have the casting and decisive voice, in a matter of this high and abstruse nature, I am sufficiently conscious. But, since you are both pleased to create me judge of this your Debate, I shall adventure to give you my sentiments briefly and clearly upon this last Argument of the Soul's being Immaterial, drawn from the unboundedness of the Intellect, as to its Object (for, of the rest, I delivered my opinion freely, as they were alleged). Truly, I judge it to be as highly convincing, as any of which the subject is capable. And, for my own part, I derive to myself from thence, a full confirmation of my belief; that there is nothing in the world too vast for the comprehension of man's understanding, nothing too small for its discernment: and whether such a divine Capacity be competent to any but an Immaterial Essence, is not hard to determine. Now, the Intellect being thus found to be above all conditions of Matter, I doubt not but Lucretius will readily allow, what you have so learnedly concluded upon, viz, that the Human soul, whose Faculty it is, is above all possibility of Dissolution, at least from Natural Agents. And therefore, Athanasius, if you are not already weary with discoursing so long and strictly, be pleased to proceed to those Moral Considerations importing the souls Immortality, which I remember you promised, in the beginning.  Athanasius. 
The Moral Considerations usually brought in defence of the Souls Incorruptibility, are Principally Three: (1) The Universal Consent of Man kind. (2) Man's Innate and Inseparable Appetite of Immortality. (3) The justice of God, in rewarding Good men, and punishing evil, after death.  
Concerning the First; howbeit there ever have been, and still are among men, some differences about the state of the Soul, after death; about the place of its posthume Mansion; and other circumstances: Yet there ever hath been and still is an Universal concurrence among them in this Tenent, that it doth survive the body, and continue the same for ever. Now, as Cicero judiciously observeth, Omni in re Consensio omnium gentium, Lex Naturae putanda est, in every thing the general consent of all Nations is to be accounted the Law of Nature: And consequently the Notion of the▪ Soul's Immortality must be implanted, by Nature's own hand, in the Mind of every man; and who so dares to deny it, doth impugn the very principles of Nature.  Lucretius. 
Your Assumption here, that all Nations conspire in the belief of the Souls Eternal subsistence after death; is contradicted by many good Authors, who writing of certain savage and barbarous Nations discovered in the New World, say of them, that their rudeness and ignorance approacheth so nearly to that of Beasts, that they have not the least thought or conceit of any such thing as the Souls being a distinct substance from the Body, or that it is indissoluble. And, as I remember, Pliny affirms the same of the Calaici, a wild and Atheistical people of Old Spain.  Athanasius. 
Granting these relations to be true, yet if we profoundly examine, whereupon their idolatrous devotion (and there never was any Nation without some kind of Religion and Veneration of a Deity) is grounded, and what dark belief lies blended under their ridiculous worship, we shall soon find, that those Indians have some implicit belief of the Eternity of their Souls, as may appear from hence, that they assign the Soul some certain place of residence after its separation from the body, and that either beyond the Sea, or beyond great Mountains, or the like. Again, being observed, to stand in awe of Devils, to be terrified with mightly Spectrs and apparitions, and to be astonished at Magical impostures: it is evident, that if we dissect all their persuasion to the bottom, we shall detect it to contain an opinion of the Souls Immortality. But, though it may be true, that there are now, or formerly have been any such Savage people, as were wholly destitute of any the least thought or hint of the Souls superviving the funerals of the body; yet we may return the same Answer, concerning them, that is due to those, who should object, that there always have been, and now are some particular Persons of all Nations, with whom the belief of the Souls Immortality can find no entertainment or credit: which is, that therefore it doth not follow, that the persuasion of its Immortality ought not to be reputed General; and that the dissent of a few persons doth not make a General Consent not to be Natural. For, as, though some men are born only with one foot, and some lay violent hands upon themselves; it is not lawful for us thence to argue, that it is not natural to men to have two feet, or that the desire of life is not natural to all men: So, though some are so unsound and monstrous in their judgement, as to persuade themselves, that their Souls are Mortal; yet is not the contrary persuasion of all other men, therefore to be esteemed Non-natural.  Lucretius. 
You cannot be ignorant, that there have been not only rude and vulgar heads, but even Philosophers, and those of sound judgement too, who have positively denied, and strongly impugned the Immortality of the Soul; and among therest, my Master, Epicurus, who hath the reputation of one of the most piercing and sublime Wits among all the Ancients: and therefore this position of the Soul's Incorruptibility▪ seems not to be so Universal, as you presume.  Athanasius. 
But, pray, consider; these Philosophers were but Men, and so might err, in their solitary conceits and opinions, as well as the most rude and illiterate among the vulgar; as is evident from hence, that the same persons held many other opinions of things more obvious and familiar, which yet are highly absurd and manifestly ridiculous. And what though Epicurus and some few other of the Grecian Scholiarches asserted the Mortality of the Soul; are there not ten times as many others, as high in esteem for Solidity and Wit, who have with excellent arguments defended the Immortality of it?  Lucretius. 
Let us leave your Assumption, and reflect upon the validity of your Inference. Though all men living should be persuaded of the truth of this opinion, That the Soul is Superior to death and corruption; yet would it not follow, that therefore that persuasion is Natural and Congenial to our very Essence, as you conclude. For, it is not impossible that an Universal persuasion may be erroneous, every man living being, by the imperfection of his Nature, obnoxious to Error; and Cicero (deriding the vanity of Auspexes, which in his time were in great esteem among all Kings, People, and Nations) saith, quasi quicquam sit tam valde, quâm nihil sapere, vulgar; Is any thing so perfectly common among men, as to have foolish opinions?  Athanasius. 
Most evident it is, that there is no better Criterion, or truer and safer rule, whereby to examine and confirm the truth of any thing belonging to Men in the General, than the General Consent of Mankind concerning it. For, as when it is enquired, what belongs to jus Animales (vulgarly called jus Naturale) we perpend the matter by the observation of such things, as are common to all Animals: Even so, when we inquire, what is jus Humanum, or what by special right doth belong to Men, as Men, we must direct our judgement, by what is allowed of by all Men. And doubtless this is to be accounted Lex Naturae, the Law of Nature, or vox Naturae, the voice of Nature; or else there is none at all. And, as to Cicero's smart saying; I confess, nothing is more common with the multitude, than to be deluded with false opinions: But that is only in things Arbitrary, and such whereof Nature hath implanted no settled Sense and Notion in their Minds. And, in such things, erroneous conceits many times spread themselves abroad, and diffuse by what subtle contagion I know not; especially when they have been first taken up upon presumption of Authority, Antiquity, Utility and the like inducements to belief: but it is observable, that such fallacies, as they had no ground in Nature, so by degrees, in process of i'm, they decay insensibly, and at length come ttobe totally obliterated and forgotten. Of which sort, was that of the usefulness of Auspexes, and other ways of Divination, against which the Orator pleaded; all which are long since laid aside, and laughed at by every one. But, as for such things, of which Nature herself hath implanted a certain Knowledge in our Minds; it is not vulgar for men to be mistaken in them: unless you will affirm that this natural Maxim, That every Father ought to take care of his Children; or this, That every man is bound to endeavour his own preservation, and the like coessential Notions, are vulgar mistakes. And of this sort, certainly, is the opinion of the Soul's Immortality, as may be deduced from hence, that it seems to have been connate to the first man; and confirmed from the great antiquity of the opinion of Hell; and from hence, that it is so far from decaying, by length of time, that on the contrary it grows every day more strong and lively.  Lucretius. 
This Tenent of the Soul's Immortality which you aver to be as ancient as Humanity itself, and implanted by Naturein the Mind of every man, may have been, for aught we know, the politic invention of the First Lawmakers: who, observing that the punishments denounced upon capital Delinquents in this life were not sufficient to deter them from committing enormities destructive to the common right and safety of Societies; prudently persuaded men that their Souls were not obnoxious to dissolution together with their bodies, but Immortal, and so capable of torment, after death, for their evil deeds; and of Felicity, by way of reward for their good. Than which, there could be no more powerful consideration to coerce men, who were not sensible of the present benefits of Virtue: it being in all times true, that such audacious Malefactors, as are not moved by the whole arm of the Civil Magistrate, will yet tremble at the finger of Divinity. And this opinion could not but take so much the deeper root in men's breasts, by how much the more agreeable it is to that desire and love of life, which is natural to us all: so that being the most grateful and correspondent to our nature, the promise of Eternal existence in our better part, found a general belief; and, by common tradition, came at length to be in a manner naturalised. But, how it is otherwise Natural, I profess, I do not yet comprehend.  Athanasius. 
That this persuasion of the Soul's Eternity, was the invention of the primitive Legislators, the better to keep men in obedience to their Laws; hath, I confess, been often said, but never proved: and what the first supposers thereof have told us, of the manner of men's being convened into common societies, after they had long lived abroad in the fields, and upon mutual spoils, rapine and slaughter, after the manner of wild Beasts; is altogether fabulous and unreasonable. Whereas, on the contrary, we are able to prove, by those memorial that remain to us, of the First Lawmakers we read of in History; that they found this Tenent of the Soul's Immortality settled and radicated in the hearts of the people, from the very beginning of Mankind. I conceive it probable enough, that the wisdom of these Lawmakers might teach them to make use of this persuasion, in order to their more facile governing and restraining the vulgar, otherwise more prone to all kind of exorbitancy and violence; and it was a piece of eminent prudence in them so to do: but I have no reason, to allow, that therefore it is a mere politic Fiction; unless you think it lawful to conclude, that because an Husbandman doth turn the streams of a river upon his grounds, to make them the more fruitful, therefore the river is only a Fiction. Again, though I concede, that the belief of Immortality is very conformable and grateful to our Nature, which by instinct inclineth us to abhor Dissolution: yet this conformity and gratefullness doth not arise to us from hence, that Immortality is offered to us as undue by Nature (as Poets report of Chiron the great Chirurgeon, who refused Immortality, when proffered him by the Gods: and of Prometheus, who exclaimed against jupiter, for exempting him from death) but, on the contrary, because it is Natural, and that we have the assurance of it engraven on our very essence; and therefore it can be no Fiction, as you would seem to imagine.  Lucretius. 
It is possible (and experience saith, frequent) that an Opinion may be General, and possess the minds of all men, for many ages together without dispute; which yet at length may be discovered to be false and absurd, and the quite contrary succeed into the room thereof: as may be exemplified in that of the Antipodes, and the Circumvolution of the Earth; both which till of late years were held wholly unreasonable and Fantastical. And perhaps this of the Soul's Eternity may have the same fate.  Athanasius. 
If there be any Opinions, which all men at some time maintain; we are to judge of the Verity or Falsity of them, by this general rule. If they be confirmed by the judgement of all ages; and that the Mind find itself carried and inclined to them, by secret assent and complacency, as to things generally concerning every man alike: Then, without doubt, those Opinions are sound, natural and congenial to man. But, if otherwise there be a tacit Reluctancy in the Mind against the admission of them; and that their importance or concernment is not equally diffusive to all men: they are false, arbitrary, and such as may be embraced, or rejected indifferently; for of themselves, they neither promove, nor impede Man's felicity (unless only by accident, or as their speculation may be pleasant, for the time) and it little relateth to man's happiness, whether there be Antipodes or not, for we in our Hemisphere can live without commerce with them; or whether the Earth, or Sun be moved since all the Apparences are the same, either way. But, as for the Opinion of the Soul's surviving the body; it is not indifferent, wheit be true or not: Nor is Man destitute of a Natural propension to believe it, when it relateth to his Supreme and everlasting Felicity.  Isodicastes. 
From the Antiquity, Universality, and Perpetuity of any Opinion, I think we may safely conclude upon the Verity of it. From the Antiquity of it; because, according to that Rule, Idem esse verum, quodcunque primum; id adulterinum, quodcunque posterius, that which is the most ancient, is likely to be the most true, in respect of the purity and sincerity of men's Minds in the Primitive Age of the World, their Understandings being then more clear & perspicacious, and their judgements less perverted by irregular Affections and temporal Interest. From the Universality, because it seems inconsistent with the Goodness of God, to have made us of a Nature so subject to error, as that All Mankind should be deluded. From the Perpetuity, because, as Cicero worthily noteth, Opinionum commenta delet dies, Naturae judicia confirmat, Time destroyeth all those fancies, which have no other ground, but only human opinion; but it strengtheneth all those judgements, which are founded upon Truth and pure natural Reason. And therefore, this Notion of the Souls Immortality, being so Ancient, as that it seems to have entered into the World together with the First Man, and what Plutarch (out of Sophocles) saith of the Antiquity of Religious principles,  

Non nunc enim, neque heri sunt ista prodita,  
Semper valuere, nec, quando inierint, liquet;   
may be most aptly accommodated thereunto: and so Universal, as that the apprehension of a Deity (without which no man ever lived, for, as Tully remarketh, Multi quidem de Diis prava sentiunt, omnes tamen esse vim & Naturam Divinam arbitrantur) seems not to have been more Common: And lastly so Perpetual, as that Time doth rather confirm, that decay it; I must judge it, to be a sound and proleptical truth, especially when I reflect also upon that other Character Athanasius hath given of the verity and naturalness of a General Tenent, viz. that the concernment of it, is equally diffusive to all men. And did I not know, Lucretius, that your present business is Contradiction; I should a little wonder, how you could allege that so in-considerable an Objection, of the opinion of the Soul's Immortality being a Fiction of the First Lawmakers. For, you well understand from what incredible Authority that impious Whimsy was derived, even from Euripides the Poet; who suborning the Person of Sisyphus, in his Tragedy, to speak such Atheistical conceits, as otherwise he durst not vent, introduceth him telling this formal tale. That the life of men in old time, was savage and barbarous, like that of Wild Beasts; the stronger, by violence oppressing the weaker, until at last, men were necessitated to devise certain severe Laws, for the suppressing of mutual slaughter, and other acts of injustice. But, when they found (after long experience) that all those Laws were ineffectual to the coercing men from enormities and outrages; because they could take hold of only open and public offences, and reached not to close and secret ones: There arose up among them a certain subtle and politic Governor, who invented a mean to provide against that mischief also, and to prevent clandestine and secret violations of common Right and Justice, as well as manifest and notorious. And that was, by insinuating into the people's heads,  
Quod sit perenni vita vigens aliquis Deus,  
Qui cernat ista, & audiat, atque intelligat, etc.  
that there was an Immortal Power, or Deity above them, who took notice of all their most secret actions, and designs, and would most severely punish all injustice, in another life, which was to succeed this, and to continue eternally. The like to which is very solemnly told by Cicero, in the person of Cotta, in his first Book de Natura Deorum; and also by Seneca, in his second Book of Natural Questions: But, how contrary to Reason, as well as to the authentical Monuments (both Divine and Human) of Ancient times, and the first foundation of Republics, or Societies; is too well known, even to yourself, Lucretius, to need my further insisting thereupon. However, this praise is due to you, that you have omitted nothing, that might impugn Athanasius his Argument of the Soul's Eternity, desumed from the Universal belief of it by men of all Nations, and in all Ages.  Athanasius. 
Having received not only your Approbation▪ Noble Isodicastes, but your Assistance also, in this my First Moral Argument; I need no other other encouragement to proceed to the Second; which ariseth from Man's inbred, or rather innate, and inseparable Appetite of Immortality.  
For, there is no man who doth not desire to subsist Eternally; nay, not those very persons, who seem to impugn and disavow that desire, by a contrary opinion (as Epicurus and all his Sectators) could ever▪ suppress or extinguish it from glowing perpetually in their breast, notwithstanding all their pretences of being free from any such expectation: as may be inferred from hence that they endeavoured to perpetuate their names and memories to all posterity, by their Books and opinions. And, therefore, it is not needful for us to confirm this Assertion, by the Example of Cleombrotus, and the Disciples of Hegesias, who were so far transported with the force of Plato's and His discourses of the Souls eternal state after death, that they could not forbear to lay violent hands upon themselves, that so they might set their impatient souls at liberty from the wearisome prison of Flesh, and emancipate them into that their more proper and delightful mansion. All we shall urge, is only this, that There is no man, who thinks himself unconcerned in Futurity. Witness that general ambition all men have, to perpetuate their names in the records of immortal Fame; some, by the founding and institution of Commonwealths, Sects, Societies, and the prescription of Laws for the continuation of them; others, by valiant acts in war, even to the loss of health, limbs, and life itself; others, by erecting pyramids, obeliks', Tombs, statues, and other monuments of their greatness and heroical achievements; others, by writing learned and useful Books, and even such as import the contempt of posthume Glory and fame; others, by begetting of children, adoption of heirs, public legacies of piety, and the like: all which are strong and lively testimonies, that this Appetite of surviving their funerals, is implanted in their Minds, by Nature's own hand, and so impossible ever to be totally eradicated. Now, forasmuch as Nature doth institute nothing in vain; and that it is unreasonable to conceive, that she would infuse into us a continual desire of, and providence for, such things in the future, whereof we shall then have no sense: it is more than probable, that our souls shall after death be invested in that state of Immortality, which we so uncessantly aspire unto, and to which we are carried by a secret and insuppressable tendency. To this purpose Cicero, in the first of his Tusculans, hath a remarkable saying, which I shall therefore rehearse, Nescio quomodo inhaereat in mentibus quasi seculorum quoddam augurium, idque in maximis ingeniis altissimisque animis existit maximè, & apparet facillime: quo quidem dempto, quis tam esset amen, qui semper in laboribus & periculis viveret. etc.  Lucretius. 
This Affectation of Immortality, I confess, is very frequent, and almost General; yet doth it not appear to be so Essential or Natural, as that it may not be vain, and so Nature no ways obliged to provide for its satisfaction. For, we have other Appetites, that seem as Universal, and consequently as Natural as this; which yet import no necessity of satisfaction, but rather an impossibility thereof. For example, who doth not desire and wish perpetuity of youth, strength, and health; and to be exempted from the stroke of that common enemy, Death? and yet 'tis well known to themselves, that these desires are vain, and such as Nature hath ordained an absolute impossibility of their satisfaction. Wherefore, you cannot argue a necessity, nay not a probability of the Soul's being Immortal, from her affectation of Immortality.  Athanasius. 
But, pray, observe the Disparity; and let the institution of Nature itself be your rule, in discerning, what Appetite is vain, and what capable of satisfaction. Some Appetites there are, and those almost General too, which yet are not inserted into us originally by Nature, but arise from the presumption of some profit, or pleasure: such is the desire of being able to fly in the air like Birds, which every man hath; for, who would not carry himself with all possible expedition to the place whither he intends to go? yet, because Nature hath not furnished man with wings to that purpose, it is manifest, she did not implant that desire in our Minds, and so is not bound to satisfy the same. Other Appetites there are, which no prejudicated opinion, or presumed cogitation, but Nature herself hath created together with us; and at the same time ordained means for our attaining to the fruition of them: such is our Appetite of constant Health and Indolency, which as Nature hath implanted, so doth she endeavour to satisfy, and would really satisfy, if it were not for our own Intemperance and other Accidents, that frustrate those her endeavours. Now of the Former sort, are those Appetites of wealth, power, eternal youth, exemption from death, and the like: of the Latter sort, is that of the immortal state of the Soul. For, there being a twofold Immortality, at which we aim, the one of the Species or Kind, the other of the Individual; and we being certain that Nature hath provided for the satisfaction of the First, by the Faculty of Generation: why should we not conclude, that she hath likewise provided for the satisfaction of the other, by giving our▪ Minds, by which we are what we are, an inexsoluble or incorporeal substance?  Lucretius. 
But, do we not all abhor Death?  Athanasius. 
Yes, generally we do.  Lucretius. 
Is that Abhorrence Natural, or not?  Athanasius. 
Suppose it to be Natural; what would you infer?  Lucretius. 
Why then, certainly, Nature hath instituted two Affections in us, the one point blank repugnant to the other; For how can it consist with our desire and hope of Immortality, that we should so much fear and abhor Death, which must put us in possession of it?  Athanasius. 
The fear of Death, Lucretius, and the desire of Immortality, seem to be rather one and the same natural Affection, than two contrary ones; for, to desire Eternal subsistence, is to covet Immortality. But, our fear of Death ariseth only from our being more concerned in, or moved by things present, than by things to come. Which, indeed, is the main reason, why men generally offend not only in the inordinate love of this life, but in most other things appertaining to the same. Thus, meeting with occasions of intemperance, or incontinence; we weigh not the loss of our health, abbreviation of life, and other evils consequent thereupon, because our thoughts are wholly intent upon the present pleasure that offers itself to our sense: So that, as this our pursuit of sensual and hurtful pleasures, doth not hinder the desire of health and long life from being Natural to us; so doth not our desire of perpetuity in this life, hinder our desire of a better life after this, from being likewise natural.  Lucretius. 
The Induction you have here made, seems to prove no more than this, that men generally affect posthume Fame, or Glory; which may indeed be accounted a kind of life in death, according to that of Ovid,  

Ore legar populi, perque omnia secula famâ,  
Si quid habent veri vatum presagia, vivam.   
But, this is far from amounting to a real Immortality.  Athanasius. 
It is enough, if my Induction declare, in the General, that in this life, we have a presension of some certain future state after death, in which we shall have some sense of what we have been in this life, and that accompanied with pleasure or pain. For, as Hunger is an Appetite, not of this or that particular dish of meat, but only of meat in the General; so though our opinion determine that general appetite to some one particular dish before all others, which yet may be in itself less grateful and wholesome; yet that is evidence enough that we have an appetite to meat in the general, and that our affecting a deceitful dish, doth not exclude our capacity of affecting a wholesome and more nutritive dish. In like manner, it is apparent, we have an Appetite of Immortality in the General, or without determination to this or that particular state or condition therein. And though the mind perchance may pitch upon Immortal Fame, as the most grateful means to satisfy that appetite, which in itself is a mere vanity and deceitful: yet that is sufficient to testify, that we have radicated in our Mind an Appetite of Immortality in the General, and such a one as is true and german. Whence, that you may not urge the examples of Epicurus and others, who believing the Souls of men to be Mortal, did yet long labour in composing Books, that might commend them to posterity after their death; I say, that these men did indirectly, and upon consequence give testimony of the true Immortality, in regard they were carried on, by the secret impulse of nature, to affect that vain and false one of Glory or Renown. For, Nature hath not implanted in us any desire of things vain; but it is our own folly and indiscretion, which permitting our mind to be too deeply infected with things of this life; averteth our studies and endeavours from the true and genuine scope of nature, to erroneous hopes, and delusive expectations. And now, I hope, you have not much left to say against this Argument of the Souls Immortality, from our Appetite thereof.  Isodicastes. 
Whether Lucretius be convinced of the force of this Reason, or not; it appears by his silence, that he intends no longer to oppose it, but is willing you should think you have made him your proselyte, and so proceed to your last Moral consideration that remains.  Athanasius. 
That may be desumed from the Necessity of Divine justice; for, as certain as God is, so certain is it, that He is just: and since it doth evidently consist with the method of God's justice, that it should be well with Good men, and ill with evil men; and we do not observe Good and Evil to be accordingly distributed in this life, but rather the contrary; Good men generally being even overwhelmed with afflictions, and wicked men as generally swimming in pleasures: It follows, that there must be another life, wherein Virtue is to receive its reward, and Vice its punishment. And, if it were otherwise, the gates of Piety would be shut up, and those of Impiety opened; all Religion be subverted, all honesty destroyed, and all Human Society dissolved.  Lucretius. 
If this Reason be conclusive, as to Men, methinks, it should be no less conclusive concerning Beasts also. For, why should the harmless and patient sheep be worried by the noxious and bloody Wolf? Or the innocent Dove become a prey to the greedy Falcon? and no state remain after death, for the reward of the sufferings of the one, and punishment of the cruelty of the other? How can this consist, I pray, with the method of Divine Justice: All Animals being the Creatures of God, as well as Men; and (for aught we know) as much the subjects of his Providence and Justice.  Athanasius. 
Forasmuch as of all Animals, Men only are capable of knowing, revering, worshipping and serving God; it is manifest, that They are as the principal care of his Providence, so the only Object of his Justice. And though this be sufficient, yet I shall add two other Reasons of weight and evidence enough to exclude the pretence of Brutes to a concernment in justice divine. The one is, that among men in Societies, there is a mutual Communion, such as cannot be instituted among Beasts, in regard they want reason to understand the benefit of such Communion: And, that by this common compact, men are obliged to do good and not harm each to other, living in that communion; but Beasts are not reciprocally obliged by any compact, and so are incapable of doing or suffering injury (rightly so called) one from another. And, therefore, the actions of Men one towards another, belong to the cognizance of God's special Providence; but not the actions of Beasts. The other is, that it is Nature's own institution, that some Brute Animals should be Carnivorous, some feed upon Herbs, some upon fruits, etc. and so such as are Carnivorous must destroy other weaker Animals, or else they cannot subsist. To these, if you please, you may add also a third consideration, which is, that Man hath sentiments of a state after death, and desires to be happy in that state, and seems convulst at the fear of the contrary: But, Beasts have no such thoughts, no such desires, no such fear; so that it is no wonder, that the provident Justice of God doth distribute Rewards and punishments to Men, and to no other of his Creatures.  Lucretius. 
As to this last Consideration; is it not possible, that Men, casting about for various devices and imaginations to palliate and sweeten the sourness of their Miseries, in this life, may have both invented this comfortable opinion of a state of future Immortality; and introduced the supposition of this provident justice of God, relating only to men's actions, on purpose to support it: when other Animals, being destitute of the like use of reason, could have no such conceit?  Athanasius. 
Impossible; because the opinion of Immortality was before any sense of Misery, and elder than all Memory; and as it came into men's minds, at first, upon more weighty considerations, than any temporal concernment: so must it have been, as soon as there were men to entertain it. Wherefore, as it is true, that men who live in misery, do more frequently fix their thoughts upon Immortality, than those who live in happiness: So is it equally true, that not only miserable, but many of the most prosperous and flourishing persons in the World, do nevertheless contemn the delights and pleasures of this transitory and umbratil life, and account it the only satisfactory and comfortable entertainment of their thoughts, to be constantly meditating upon that state of Immortality, which shall receive them, when all the pageant pleasures of the present life shall be▪ vanished away and come to nothing.  Lucretius. 
But, is not Virtue, on one side, a sufficient recompense to itself? and Vice, on the other, a sufficient punishment to itself? and such, than which no Executioner can inflict a more grievous and horrid? What need, therefore, of any such state to come, until which the reward of Virtue, and punishment of Vice, is imagined to be deferred?  Athanasius. 
That virtue is not a sufficient recompense to itself, may be naturally collected from hence; that all virtuous persons have an eye of Affection constantly leveled at somewhat beyond it. For, though the Stoics affected this high-strained expression of the exceeding amiableness of virtue; yet could they never persuade themselves, or others, but that Glory and Honour, at least, were looked upon, as the Consequents of Virtue: nor can it be affirmed, that Glory doth always seek out and court virtue, of its own accord; forasmuch as really those persons were ever the most covetous of Glory, who have pretended the most to decline and avoid it. Yea, the most Heroical among the Ancients seem to have proposed Glory, and not barely Virtue itself, as the guerdon of their most difficult enterprises and achievements; which Cicero fully expresseth (pro Milone) in these elegant words: Ex omnibus praemiis virtutis, amplissimum est praemium Gloria, quae vitae brevitatem posteritatis memoriâ consolatur; & (pro Archippus) nullam virtus aliam mercedem laborum, periculorumque desiderat, praeter hanc Laudis & Gloriae; quâ detractâ, quid est in hoc tam exiguo vitae curriculo, & tam brevi, quod tantis nos in laboribus exerceamus? I add, that according to this dry and uncomfortable lesson of the Stoics, a Prince would be unjust to expect honour from his subjects, for his prudent and happy government; a soldier unreasonable, in hoping for any recompense for his valour and wounds; an Artist worthy of blame in demanding a valuable price for an excellent piece of work; a Physician unconscionable, in receiving a fee for a Cure, and the like: For if virtue, or the doing of a good action be a competent reward to its self; it must be (as I say) manifest injustice to require or receive any other. The same likewise may be said of Vice. For, no man, that doth an ill action, fears only lest that ill should torment him: but fears something beyond it, and consequent upon it, as infamy, imprisonment, torture and death. And these, truly, are more congruous punishments for vice, than vice itself; otherwise all Laws would be unjust, that inflict them. We may conclude, therefore, that since virtue doth frequently want its due reward, in this life; and vice as frequently go without its due punishment: it follows, that after death, there is to succeed a certain immortal state, in which both shall receive their due.  Lucretius. 
Granting all this to be necessary, in respect of Justice Divine; yet I can see no necessity, why the Rewards of the Virtuous, and Punishment of the Vicious, should be Eternal. For, no Human action, though highly good and commendable, can yet be so meritorious, as to deserve an Eternal recompense from God: as, on the other side, no action, though superlatively criminal and detestable, can yet be so bad, as to require an everlasting punishment; because neither the one, nor the other is any thing but natural, transitory, and definite, and so can hold no proportion to what is infinite.  Athanasius. 
Though a Good action, and so Virtue and Honesty, considered Physically, be but a slender thing; yet, because the worth or Merit of it is to be estimated according to the rule of Morality, it comes to be of such excellency, as that the Doer thereof, freely and upon election endeavouring to compose and regulate himself, by the best rules prescribed, and so ennobling his actions with divine perfection, as much as the frailty of his nature will permit; may in justice hope for a reward proportionable i. e. an Eminent, and Divine one, such to which the Soul, by its inherent appetite and tendency, doth continually aspire. And this reward cannot be other but Everlasting; because, if it were only Temporal and Finite, it could not deserve the name of a reward, insomuch as the Fear of being once deprived of it again, though after many myriads of years, would destroy the pleasure of enjoying it. And the like may be said of the perpetuity of Punishments due to vicious persons so that there is no such disproportion as you surmise.  
And here, if you please, let us set bounds to our Debate concerning the Immortality of that noble Essence, the Human Soul. For having run over the principal Physical Arguments, that arise from the Operations of the Soul, aswell in Volition, as Intellection, and also from the Nature and Universality of her Objects; and added thereunto other Moral Considerations, of high importance, in order to the Conviction of this most comfortable and sacred Truth, whose Assertion, in obedience to your yesterday commands, I assumed upon myself: I find the clue of all my Notions and Collections concerning this sublime subject, now wholly unravelled. Nor, after my solution of all your Scruples and Objections, doth any thing remain for me longer to exercise your patience withal, but only that I beg of you both your forgiveness, in that I have thus long abused it already; and that I render my thanks to you Lucretius, for the advantage you were pleased to give me, by your most ingenious and learned Opposition, as you saw occasion, in the process of my Discourses; and to you, Isodicastes, for your most impartial and judicious turning the scales on the side of truth, as often as Lucretius thought, or seemed to think them▪ equilibrated betwixt his reasons and mine.  Isodicastes. 
If I have been so happy, Athanasius, as to judge according to truth; I assure you, it was the clearness of your Reasonings alone, that gave me light so to do: and therefore, instead of that Forgiveness of your exercise of my patience, (as you call it) which your modesty makes you require of me; I must return you infinite thanks, for your so fully compensating my patience and attention with such satisfaction, as greater ought not to be expected, concerning an argument of so much abstrusity and difficulty, as this whereupon you have discoursed. And for Lucretius, I think it now time for him, to lay aside his disguise of a Contrary opinion which he put on only to experiment the strength of your Allegations; for I must declare, that in my judgement (which yet I do not take to be definitive) he hath been too weak for you, in all the passages of this contest; yet rather from the weakness of the Cause he undertook, than from any want of skill in himself to manage it to the utmost of its merit.  Lucretius. 
We have yet an hour good, before supper time; and you were both pleased to devote this whole Evening to this particular Divertisement: And therefore, if Athanasius be not tired with speaking, nor you, Isodicastes, with hearing; let me beseech you to continue your places a little longer, while I propose some certain Objections, long since made by Epicurus and some of my Fellow-Disciples, against the Immortality of Man's Soul. For, until Athanasius hath perfectly refuted them also; if he thinks to Triumph, it will be before he hath completed his Victory.  Athanasius. 
You are a politic Enemy, Lucretius, it seems: like experienced Generals, you place your chiefest strength in a Reserve. But, come, draw up the remainder of your forces; I doubt not of as good success in the second charge, as I have had in the first.  Isodicastes. 
But, pray, Gentlemen, let me conjure you both, not to extend your Contract, beyond eight a clock; for, at that hour, I have appointed my Cook to furnish us with a short repast; and my Watch saith, it is almost seven already.  Lucretius. 
Less than an hour will conclude our quarrel, I promise you, Isodicastes: but lest we lose time in preparatory circumstances, I immediately address to the proposal of my intended Objections, which have always hitherto been accounted of of moment.  
The First is this, that the Soul is generated, grows up to maturity, than again declines, grows old, and at length wholly decays, together with the body: So that, if that Axiom be true, quitquid natum est, possit interire, the Soul being produced, must be subject to dissolution.  Athanasius. 
This Argument hath two parts; the one supposing, that the Soul is Generated: The other, that it grows old and languid, and decays, as the body doth; and therefore I shall divide my Answer accordingly. To the First part I reply, that that Axiom, quicquid natum est, possit interire, is true indeed concerning all things Corporeal and Compound; but not concerning things Incorporeal and Simple, such as I have already demonstrated the Soul to be: so that the Production of the Soul doth not necessitate her Dissolubility. That Incorporeal Natures are incapable of destruction, I have formerly deduced from their want of parts into which they might be dissolved: all exsolubility consisting wholly in Partibility. And, that Simple Natures are likewise incorruptible, is manifest even from hence, that the General and First Matter, though Corporeal and produced from nothing by God at first, doth persevere the very same for ever. So that Dissolubility belonging neither to Incorporiety, nor Simplicity; it is purely consequent, that the Soul, which is an essence Incorporeal and Simple, cannot be obnoxious to Dissolution. And as to the Production of it, though it be not easy for us (especially at the first thought) to conceive how an Incorporeal can be produced, without perfect creation, from which we have good cause to believe that God long since desisted; yet that the Soul is produced, we have the persuasion of sundry good reasons: As if it were improduct, or eternal à parte ante, it would and must be so, either as Coherent by itself, and a substance sejoined or severed from all other things; or as a part adhaerent to another, and deduced from that other, when it is induced into the body. But, that it is not a substance coherent per se & ab aeterno, may be inferred from hence, that there is remaining in us no memory of any such eternal state; that the University of things would want beginning, and so could have neither Author, nor Governor, which is monstrous and absurd, as I have demonstrated in my Book against Atheism; that if Men had been from all Eternity, they must have been Infinite, and so either there must have been an infinite multitude of Souls, before all excogitable time, or the same numerical Souls must have, by transmigration, been inservient to, or informed successively, not only many, but infinite persons; when yet it is repugnant, that there should be an infinite number (lest therein should be admitted as many Binaries, Denaries, Millenaries, etc. as Unities: and so something be allowed more infinite than an infinite, which is absurd) And that our Souls were formerly in other men, who lived before us, we have no monument, no record, but those Fables of Pythagoras, Empedocles, and the like. And, that it is not a Particle desumed from another incorporeal, is demonstrable from hence, that an Incorporeal is uncapable of division into parts: Which reason is so plain and obvious, that I cannot but wonder that Plato, having asserted God to be a Mind Divine and Incorporeal, should nevertheless contradict himself in affirming, that Man's Soul was a Particle taken from the substance of God himself; or how he could imagine the Soul to be Inexsoluble, which he thought a part of an exsoluble nature. Wherefore, seeing the Soul cannot possibly be Improduct, either of these two ways (and certainly there can be no other) it must of necessity be Product, whatsoever the Manner of its Production be. And here I might (as I suppose you expect I should) take occasion to engulph myself in that bottomless Sea of Difficulties, concerning the Original and Extraduction of Man's Soul; but being digressive from my present Theme, and such whereof I am not yet able to give any other account, than what you have met with, in Sennertus, Harvey, and other modern Physicians, who have more expressly addicted themselves to inquire into the mysteries of Generation; I think it prudence to wave the opportunity. Only thus much I may adventure to say, and it is pertinent to my business in hand, that the Production of the Soul cannot be from Matter, because she is herself Immaterial; nor from an Incorporeal, by way of desumption or partition, because Incorporiety and Divisibility are incompatible: So that they are not altogether destitute of reason, who conceive that it is produced ex Nihilo, and by such a Cause, whose power is immense, and superior to all the Energy of of Nature, which must be God, the Author of Nature. But, however it is plain, that though it hath its beginning and origine together with the body; yet being Incorporeal, it is not capable of perishing together with it, as you would conclude. And thus much for the First part of your Argument.  
As for the Remainder of it; to that Aristotle hath long since provided an Answer to my hand, in the fourth Chapter of his first Book de Anima, which is a Text very apposite, and memorable (however it either import a Contradiction in the Author himself, or seem capable of their interpretation, who allege him as a defendant of the Mortality of the Soul) and therefore I shall recite it. Innasci autem Intellectus videtur, & substantia quaedam esse, nec corrumpi; nam si corrumperetur quidem, id maximè fieret ab hebetatione illa, quae in senectute contingit: nunc autem res perinde fit, ac in ipsismet sensuum instrumentis. Si enim Senex oculum juvenilem reciperet, non secus ac ipse juvenis videret. Unde & senectus non ex eo est, quod quidquam passa Anima sit; sed quod simile aliquid, ac in ebrietate morbisque eveniat: ipsaque intelligendi & contemplandi functio propter aliquid aliud interius corruptum marcescit, cum ipsum interim, cujus est, passionis expers maneat. Which words considered, we have good reason to afffirm, that all that change, which the Epicurean would have to be in the Rational Soul, or Mind, during the growth of the body in youth, and decay of it in old age; doth not proceed from any mutation in the Soul itself, but in some other interior thing distinct from it, as the Imagination, or Organ of the Common Sense, the Brain, which being well or ill affected, the Soul itself suffereth no whit at all, but only the Functions of it flourish or decay accordingly. For, since the Intellect is enshrined in the body, for only this end, that it might collect the Knowledge of things, by the intercession of the Fancy, into which the images of things are conveyed through the Senses; and that in order to its reasoning concerning them, it might receive hints from those images, which residing in the Fancy, are therefore (as we have said) called Phantasms: hence is it, that the Soul, in the beginning of its age, or during Childhood, doth reason but little, because it hath then but few images or phantasms in store, from which it might take occasion of composing discourses: but, in process of time, it comes to ratiocinate more copiously and perfectly, as having then both more, and more clear and ordinate Phantasms; and lastly in decrepit old age, it again falls to reason but little and brokenly, because, by reason of the dryness of the brain, the Phantasms are then either wholly, or for the most part obliterated, and those few that remain, are represented both obscurely and perturbedly. So that (as Aristotle saith) if it were possible to give an old man a young Eye, and a young Imagination; his Soul would soon declare, by exquisite vision, and quick reasoning, that it was not she, that had grown old, but her Organs; and that she is capable of no more change from the impairment of the body by old age, than is usually observed to arise (pro tempore) from a fit of drunkenness, or some disease of the brain. For, as when the malignity of the Spirits of Wine is overcome by sleep, and dispelled by sweat; or the violence of a disease possessing the brain, or seat of reason, is abated; a man doth no longer suffer a delirium, but returns to the clear use of his reasoning Faculty, as before his head was disordered: So, if the Brain and Fancy were youthfully affected in an old man, the Soul would no longer seem to dote, but reason as perfectly as ever before in the vigour and flourishing state of youth. From whence it is evident, that whatever of change men have thought to be in the Soul, by reason of that great decay generally attending old age; is not really in the Soul, but only in the Imagination, and the Organ thereof, which is not so well disposed, as in the vigour of life. And this might be conveniently explained by the similitude of a Scribe, who cannot write so smooth and fine a hand, with an old and blunted pen, as with a new and sharp one: But the thing is of itself too clear, to need the illustration of Comparisons. And this may suffice to dissolve your mighty Argument objected.  Lucretius. 
My SECOND Argument is desumed from hence, that the Soul is not only distempered and misaffected with diseases of her own, but infected and touched also by those of the body: and what is capable of disease or misaffection, either protopathically, or sympathically, is doubtless capable of dissolution. This you may remember, was long since urged by Panaetius of Epicurus sect; for, Cicero (primo Tuscul.) speaking of him, saith; alteram autem rationem affert, nihil esse quod dole at, quin id aegrum esse quoque possit: quod autem in morbum cadat, id etiam interiturum; dolere autem Animos, ergo etiam interire.  Athanasius. 
As for such Diseases of the body, which you suppose extend to the discomposure of the Soul, by way of sympathy; as particulary the Frenzy, Madness, hypochondriacal Melancholy, the Lethargy, Hydrophobia, and others which work upon the brain, and perturb the Animal Faculties: the same Answer will serve to exempt the Soul from suffering any detriment from them, which I just now alleged against her decay in old age. For, though in truth the Mind cannot exercise its proper functions duly and rightly, in fits of Delirium, the Frenzy, and the like; nor at all in Lethargies, and Apoplexies: yet this ought not to be ascribed to any depravation or change in the substance of the Mind itself, but only to an indisposition in the Fancy and Animal Organs.  
And, as for Passions of Grief, Fear, Remorse etc. which are reputed the proper Diseases of the Mind; in the first place, we may derive our Answer concerning them, from the place of Aristotle newly cited. For, he there subjoins, Amores, odium, & alia, passiones esse non intellectûs, sed corporis ipsum habentis; esse enim fortè Intellectum aliquid divinum & passionis expers. By which, his meaning is, that the proper Function of the Intellect, is to understand and reason (though he was pleased to reckon Cogitation among the Passions) and that all Passions belong to the Appetite either Concupiscible or Irascible, which is a Corporeal Faculty. For, though Passion be posterior to Cognition, and dependent thereupon; so that it may seem to be received in the subject, to which Cognition doth belong, that is to the Mind: nevertheless, because the Mind, while resident in the body, doth make use of corporeal Images pre-admitted into the Imagination; and in the mean while the Fancy, in imagining what things are, doth cooperate together with the Mind, and the motion of the Corporeal or Sensitive Faculty followeth after the perception of objects by the Fancy; thence it comes, that the whole Commotion, or Passion doth belong to the Appetite and Body, the Mind all that while remain free and unmoved, after the same manner, as a Master and servant travelling together, the servant carries the burden, and the Master goes light and free, and unconcerned in the weight and trouble thereof. But, forasmuch as we must admit a certain Appetite properly competent to the Soul itself, viz. the Rational Appetite (from the name of its action, usually denominated the Will) by which we find ourselves secretly inclined and carried towards things Honest and Divine, and which ought to remain in the Soul even after death, since it must then be sensible either of pleasure in the state of felicity, or of pain in the state of misery: therefore, I confess, we cannot deny but there are some certain Motions in the Soul itself, which in respect of the analogy they seem to hold to those of the sensual or Corporeal Appetite, and that we cannot otherwise express them, may well enough be called Passions, yet these are not to be conceived to arise from any dilatation, compression, solution of continuity, and the like violent motions, that might adferr any harm or detriment to the substance of the Soul. Nor, indeed, ought this to seem strange or difficult, in a thing that is Incorporeal; since even among Corporeals, we observe some, that have a substance unalterable, and so inconsumable, by the most violent motions in Nature, as Gold, Amianthus, and the like; and that Aristotle makes the substance of Heavenly bodies, such as that it cannot be altered, heated, or dissolved by the heat of the Sun, as all sublunary bodies are.  Lucretius. 
What think you then, Athanasius, of Drunkeness, wherein both the Rational Faculty is highly perturbed, and the Motive as much enfeebled: neither of which could be, if the Soul did not suffer from the violence of the wine; and what is capable of suffering such damage from external causes, cannot be incapable of total dissolution from the same, in case their force and activity become more intense. Therefore the soul is Mortal.  Athanasius. 
Why, truly, I think this Argument as light and trivial as your former, and that the same solution will serve to both. For, it is not the Mind, which is overwhelmed with the deluge of Wine, but the brain and seat or instrument of the Fancy, whose images being beclouded and confused by the fumes or spirits of the wine, brought thither by the arteries; it is impossible the Mind should make use of them with that clearness and distinction, as when they were pure and in order. And, as for that general weakness, which remains for a while after the drunken fit is over, in all the members of the body; this is not to be referred to the Mind neither, but to the Motive-Faculty, whose instruments, and principally the Nerves, are then misaffected, and in a manner relaxed, so as they become indisposed to the regiment of the Mind.  
The best Lutenist in the world, you know, cannot play a tune upon a Lute, whose strings are relaxed by moisture, or otherwise altered from their requisite temper: and yet his skill in music never a whit the less: why then should you conceive, that the soul should be able to conserve the harmony of voluntary motions in the sinews, muscles, and members of the body, when the requisite tenor of those her instruments is depraved, by the stupefactive and relaxing force of the Wine, drank in excess? The Members of the body are fit instruments▪ to execute the motions by the Soul impressed upon them; but when they are surrounded with the malignant and Narcotical vapours of Wine, and thereby relaxed or oppressed; they become uncapable of the Souls mandates and government, till those vapours being again discussed, they have recovered their natural temper, and due disposition: and yet the Soul itself all that while remain vigorous and strong, as in Sobriety; contrary to what this your Objection supposeth.  Lucretius. 
Since you so easily expede yourself from the Objections drawn from Diseases, and Ebriety; I shall urge you with one, that seems more tough and knotty, and that is this. As the Body, so also the Soul or Mind is capable of being cured or rectified by the Art of Medicine; and if so, there must be either an addition to, or a detraction of somewhat from the Soul; Physic being a Detraction of what is superfluous, and an addition of what is deficient in man's Nature: And therefore the Soul, being capable of addition and detraction, is capable likewise of destruction.  Athanasius. 
Alas, Lucretius, this is still a branch of the same stock; and to it I may easily accommodate an Answer, out of what I even now replied to your supposed sympathy of the Soul with the body, in some Diseases. For, albeit, it be most true, that by Hellebor and other Antimelancholical remedies, we Physicians usually cure Madness, called Insania, and Amentia, Unsoundness or Distraction of the Mind: Yet is it as true, that this Cure is wrought only upon the brain, or seat of the Imagination, which being purged of that adust and blackish humour, which oppressed it, and altered from the distemper therein caused by the noxious and intoxicating qualities of that humour; the Mind doth soon return to perform all its proper Functions as regularly and exactly, as at any time before the patient was invaded with that distemper of his brain, and depravation of his Fancy. So that, as when a man goes halting, because one of his shoes is higher than the other, we may well enough say, that man doth halt, though all the cause of his halting be only the inequality of his shoes; and to make him go right again, there needs no more, but to moke his shoes equally high: So, when a man haults, as it were, in his Reason, or fails in the evenness and decorum of his Discourse; we may say, that man is Unsound or lame in his Mind, though that unsoundness consist only in his Brain or Imagination, and to restore him to the right and becoming manage of his reason, there needs no more, but to rectify his Fancy or Brain, in whose preternatural distemper alone his madness doth consist.  
Again, forasmuch as there are (as it were some certain diseases peculiar only to the Mind; at lest in that Metaphorical sense, I have already explained: And that these depravities, commonly called Diseases of the Mind, are capable of cure by, that which is truly the Physic of the Mind, viz. Moral Philosophy: Therefore ought we to conceive, that as the Mind is subject to those its Affections, without any the least detriment or alteration of its substance; so also may it be cured of them again, without any alteration, addition, or detraction substantial. For, since the Diseases of the Mind are nothing else but certain Evil or vicious Habits, contracted by custom; and those Habits are nothing else but certain Modes or Manners of its standing affected to such or such objects: Thence comes it, that those Vicious Habits may be sensibly expelled by the induction of contrary Habits, that is of Virtuous ones; like as a Crooked staff may be made straight, only by bowing it the contrary way. And though no similitude be exactly congruous in this case, because the Affections of Corporeal Natures hold no correspondence with those of Incorporeals: Yet I choose to make use of this, of the rectification of a crooked staff, because the Crookedness of the staff doth in some sort represent the Curvity of a Mind misaffected by vicious Habits; and the Rectitude of a staff, equally represent that rightness of the Mind, which is acknowledged in the Sovereignty and Habit of Virtue. And thus you see, that the Curability of the Mind by the prescripts of Morality, doth not import its dissolubility, as you infer, but rather the Contrary; for no Moral precept can be applied to, or work upon a Corporeal or Dissoluble essence.  Lucretius. 
From Diseases and Remedies both of Body and Mind, let us have recourse to Death, and see if from the manner of its Tyranny we can raise an Objection or two against your opinion of the Souls being naturally exempted from the same. It is observed, that Men generally die Membratim, limb after limb, death advancing by sensible degrees from the extreme parts to the Central and more noble: as if the Soul were not a substance entirely collected into itself, or resident in any one particular place of the body (as you seem to conceive) but diffused and scattered in several pieces, and so subject to dissipation part after part.  Athanasius. 
The Solution of this is far from being difficult. For, conceiving the soul, as Incorporeal, to be diffused through the whole body, not by Extension of bulk, but by Replication, or (as the Schools speak) by position of the same Entity in each part of the body; it is easy to understand, that the soul, when the members grow cold and mortified, doth then, indeed, instantly cease to be in them: yet is not cut off piece-meal, or diminished, and so sensibly or gradually dissipated, as you suppose; but the whole of it remains in so much of the body, as yet continues warm, and perfused by the vital Heat, until ceasing longer to animate the principal seat or throne of its residence (whether the Brain, or Heart) it at length bid adieu to the whole, and withdraw itself entire and perfect. What I here say, of the Constitution of the whole Soul in the whole body, and the whole Soul in every part of the body, by way of Replication, or Position of the same Entity in divers places at the same time; is, I confess, some what obscure, and the imperfection of our knowledge in the affections of Immaterial natures, will hardly permit us to illustrate it: yet, lest you should think it merely imaginary and sophistical, I may assert the possibility and reasonableness of it, by a similitude of an intentional species, or visible Image; Which all men allow so to be diffused through the whole medium or space, as that it is at the same time whole in every part of that space: because in what part soever of the space the eye of the spectator be posited, the whole Image is still visible therein. Now, if this manner of total diffusion, without fraction or division, be competent to the visible species, which is Corporeal, as I have amply proved in my Physiology, where I treated expressly of the nature of Vision: certainly it must, with more reason, be competent to the Soul, which is Incorporeal. And as for what you observe, of the gradual encroachment of Death, and the sensible mortification of one limb after another, beginning at the feet and other extremities of the body, and creeping along to the heart; the reason thereof is only this, that the Vital Heat or Flame, being almost either suffocated by putrefaction of the blood (the only fuel by which it is maintained) in Diseases, or exhausted by old age, goes out, like a Lamp, by degrees; ceasing first to enliven or irradiate the parts that are most remote from the Focus, or Heart, and then failing in its conserving influence more and more, until at length suffering a total extinction in the very Heart (as it were in the socket) it leave that also cold and liveless. So that Death is an extinction only of the Vital Flame, not of the Soul, which as Solomon calls it, is the brightness of the Everlasting Light, the unspoited mirror of the power of God, and the Image of his Goodness; and being but one, she can do all things, and remaining in herself, she maketh all things new.  Lucretius. 
There is another Argument of the Soul's Mortality drawn from hence; that the Soul is as well a part of the Body, as the Eye, Ear, or the other Sensitive Organs: But these are no sooner separated from the whole, than they become incapable of all Sense; And therefore the Soul, when once separate from the Body, must likewise become destitute of Sense.  Athanasius. 
The Mind or Soul cannot, without great impropriety, be said to be a part of the Body, as the Eyes and Ears, and other Organs of Sense are; insomuch as these belong to the Integrality of the Body, and the Soul belongs to the Integrality of the Totum Compositum, and is the Essence or Form of Man: And the Soul, indeed, is in them all, and in all the rest of the Body, but none of them is in the Soul. So that for this reason alone, you ought not to conceive a parity betwixt the Soul and the Instruments of sense, as to their incapacity of Sensation, after their division from the body: being the Soul is the very Principle of Sense, and the Organs can have no Sensation without Her. But, not to insist upon this, I deny the Soul to be a part, as the instruments of sense are; because, otherwise than those all are, she is Incorporeal, and is to herself, and hath, both in herself, and from herself, the principle of all her actions and energy, which none of those can pretend to. For, she doth not borrow or derive from any other principle her power of Understanding or Reasoning, as the eye doth its Faculty of seeing, & the Ear its faculty of Hearing: but hath it immediately and solely from herself; and therefore it is no wonder, if the Eye or Ear, once disjoined from the body, can see, nor hear no longer, etc. but the Soul, when separated from the body, can understand and Reason of and within herself.  Lucretius. 
But, pray Sir, reflect a little upon this; that the Soul and Body are mutually connected and as it were United by so near a relation or Necessitude, as that look how the body, being once destitute of the soul, can no longer perform any vital Action: so neither can the soul, when once departed from the body, and mixed with the Aer, perform any action vital, or Animal; unless you please to give yourself the liberty of imagining, that she doth then animate that part of Aer, in which she doth take up her new lodging, and of that form herself instruments fit for the execution of her faculties.  Athanasius. 
However the Conjunction of the Soul and body be very intimate; and the most part of vital and Animal actions belong to the Totum Compositum, or whole Composition: yet from thence it doth not follow, that though the body be incapable of any of those actions, without the Soul; therefore the in capacity is reciprocal, and the soul can do no actions, without the body; because the soul is the Principle of life and activity to the body, but not the contrary. When we behold a soldier fight with a sword or other weapon, we cannot justly say, that when he is deprived of those weapons, he can no longer strike a blow: because, though his weapons be gone, he hath still his arms and hands, wherewith he can strike, when and as often as he pleaseth. So, when the Soul is every way provided of Members and Organs, as it were with a panoply or complete armour, and therewith performs several actions, vital, and Animal; we cannot say, that if once it divest itself of that armour, and become naked, it can no longer exercise its proper functions of Intellection and Ratiocination; because, though the instruments, by the mediation whereof she doth commonly understand and reason in the body, be taken away, yet still she retains her Faculties. Nor will it be therefore necessary, that when the soul is departed from the body, and breathed forth into the Aer (as you, with the vulgar, seem to conceive) that aer should be thereby Animated: because it is essential to it, then to act, i. e. to understand and reason, without the mediation of any organs at all; and neither in the aer, nor any other body whatever can the soul either meet with, or create those dispositions, that are requisite to vital information. This Comparison, I have here made betwixt the Soul and a Soldier, is I confess incongruous, as to the point of Information; yet it holds with conveniency enough, as to the point of Operation (and your question doth chiefly concern that): the weapons of the soldier are as much dead and useless instruments, without the hands, that are to manage them, as the members of the body are without the Soul; and as these are Animated by the soul, so are those in a manner, Animated by the hands of the Soldier. And this may be extended also to the solution of that so famous an Objection of Aristotle (1. de Anim. 8.) where he saith; Esse quidem Animam separabilem, si aliquam functionem habeat, quam sine corpore exerceat, v. c. Intellectionem, quae est ipsius maxime propria, si modo ea quaepiam Imaginatio non sit, aut sine Imaginatione fiat: necesse autem est, eum, qui speculatur, speculari simul aliquod phantasma; Ergo etc. The soul is to be accounted separable, if it hath any function, which it can exercise without the body, namely Intellection, provided that be not a certain kind of Imagination, or can be performed without Imagination: but experience testifieth, that no man can speculate, or understand, without Phantasms; and therefore it is not likely, that the soul is a distinct substance and separable from the body. For, the ground hereof is false, viz that there is no Intellection, but what is either direct Imagination, or done by Imagination; as we have formerly proved; and that with no sparing hand, so that we need not here repeat it. Nor had I here remembered this Argument of Aristotle, but that this you now urge is very near of kin thereunto, as to its force and importance, and so put me in mind of it afresh.  Lucretius. 
An Eighth Objection may be made from hence; that the Soul being once expired, the body soon corrupts, stinks, and resolves to dust: I say, expired, or like a vapour exhaled through the conduits and pores of the body; and therefore so divided into small portions or particles, as that in that very Egression or Expiration, it must be wholly comparated to Dispersion; and what is capable of such dispersion, is capable of total dissolution.  Athanasius. 
You might well, Lucretius, have spared yourself and me the trouble of this impertinent objection, had you thought my Answer to your Fifth, worthy your memory. For, since you could not then deny, that the soul, as Incorporeal, is diffused through the whole body; and therefore may issue out of it entire and unimpaired, as possessing no place, and in that respect, as capable of passing through the solid and compacted parts, as through the conduits and pores: why should you now resume that gross conception, of the Souls expiring from the body, like a vapour, or exhalation? And, as for the Putrefaction of the Body, after the Soul hath withdrawn itself from it (though it nothing at all concern the buisiness in hand) I say, the Cause thereof is the defect of that vital Agitation of the Heart, Blood, and spirits, by which the Humours most prone to putrefaction, were partly kept from subsiding and fermenting, and partly so extenuated, as to be discussed and expelled.  Lucretius. 
A Ninth from hence; that in Lipothymies or swooning fits, the vigour of the Soul is so much abated and brought low, as that it would be totally dissolved and extinguished, in case the Causes of those its Failings or Dejections, were yet more violent, as frequently they are, and then they cause sudden death.  Athanasius. 
Here you recur to the Symptoms of bodily Diseases again; but I wish I could as easily remove them from the body, as you from defending the Mortality of the Soul, by any considerations drawn from them, and their most fatal effects. For, as to Lipothymies, which according to the Etymology of the word, you call Failings of the Soul; they are in truth only Failings of the Heart, or vital influence; arising from the preclusion or stopping of those passages, ordained for the continual transmission of vital Spirits; which as servants, the Soul makes use of to Life, Sense, and Motion. And, therefore, reflecting upon what I have already said, it is obvious to conceive, that the whole Soul being diffused through the whole body; all the failing in Swooning fits doth fall, not upon herself, but upon the Vital Organs, which at that time are rendered unfit for the uses and actions, to which they were framed and accommodated. And, if the Causes of such Failings should chance to be so violent, as to induce sudden death; then the Soul, indeed, would and must wholly depart: yet not by reason of any dissolution of its substance, or exceeding imbecility in itself; but only for want of those Dispositions in the Organs of life, by which she was enabled to enliven the body. And here I could mind you of a certain sort of Lypothymies, that happen in Ecstasies of some Holy men, when the Soul being transported with the superlative beauty and excellency of Divine Objects, in abstracted contemplations, doth so much neglect her inferior functions, as that the body all that while seems senseless and liveless: And yet this an argument rather of the strength of the Soul, than of any Failing or Defection in itself. I could also insist upon this, that in sleep there is a kind of Defection of the influence of the Soul upon her corporeal Organs, especially those inservient to Sense and Motion▪ and yet the Soul is then most herself, as Cyrus long since observed, in one of Xenophons' Orations, in these most elegant words; Dormientium Animi maximè declarant Divinitatem suam; multa enim, eum remissi ac liberi sunt, futura prospiciunt: ex quo intelligitur, quales futuri sint, cum se planè corporis vinculis relaxaverint. But the Objection, being otherwise refuted, doth require neither.  Lucretius. 
Experience teacheth, that no man, when dying, findeth his Soul to depart out of his body whole and at once; but rather to fail by degrees within his breast, just as he doth his Sense, in each proper Organ: Which he would not do, in case his Soul took her flight whole and entire, out of his breast, as a bird out of a Cage; and therefore it is probable that the Soul, being dissolved at the instant of death, is breathed out in dispersed Atoms together with the Aer expired from the Lungs.  Athanasius. 
You must needs be straightened for Objections, Lucretius, when you fly to uncertain Experiments, and incompetent conceptions of vulgar heads; and therefore I hope, you cannot much longer hold out against truth. I say, to uncertain experiments; because, since it is impossible that any man, in the extreme moment of life, wherein his Soul ceaseth to be either in his breast, or any other part of his body, should say to the standers by, Now I am sensible of the egress or flight of my Soul, and I perceive how it departs; because while he is able to speak, or be sensible of any thing, the Soul is still in the body, and at the instant of its departure, the Speech & all Sense fail for ever: The experience you allege is uncertain and so no experience at all. To incompetent Conceptions of vulgar heads; because the common people, not being able to understand the nature of an Incorporeal; and how possessing no place, no body can hinder its passage or trajection; have a certain gross apprehension, that the Soul must issue out of the breast, the same way that the breath doth out of the lungs. And as for its Dispersion into Atoms; you do ill to suppose it to be Corporeal, when you have been so often beaten from that starting hole. These Impertinences are much below so great a wit, as yours, Lucretius; and I should very much wonder how you could fall upon them, but that I ascribe it to your present humour of Contradiction, which doth many times transport even wise men themselves to gross extravagancies.  Lucretius. 
If the Soul were Immortal, and conscious of its Immortality, as you have affirmed; certainly it would not grieve to leave the body, which is rather its prison, than delightful Mansion; but rather rejoice to be set at liberty, and exult, as a snake doth to cast her slough, or a stag his old horns.  Athanasius. 
To this I prepared a Solution, when I proved the Appetite of Immortality to be Natural to the Soul, however this present life cause in us a love of itself, above that we ought to have of our future state; just as the Appetite or love of Health doth not cease to be Natural, however the blandishments of Sense, and flattering baits of some present pleasure, that impugns health, may create in us a stronger desire, for the time: and therefore you might have well omitted here to argue the Mortality of the Soul, from its reluctancy against death, and unwillingness to leave its old companion, the body. However, without insisting upon this, that many men even in this life, long used to a mean and turbulent state or condition, become so depraved and abject in their judgement and affection, as to refuse to change it for a better, if they might: To what I have said formerly of the Universal desire of Immortality, I shall annex this one both pertinent and memorable consideration, out of Cicero (in Catone majore) Quid, quod sapientissimus quisque aequissimo animo moritur, stultissimus iniquissimo? Nun nobis videtur Animus is, qui plus cernat, & longiùs, videre se ad meliora proficisci: ille autem, cujus obtusior sit acies, non videre? Equidem efferor studio patres vestros quos colui, & dilexi, videndi. Neque verò eos solùm convenire aveo, sed illos etiam, de quibus audivi & legi, & ipse conscripsi. Quò quidem me proficisceutem, haud scio quis facile retraxerit, & tanquam Peliam recoxerit. Quod si quis Deus mihi largiatur, ut ex hac aetate repuerascam, & in cunis vagiam, valde recusem; nec verò velim, quasi decurso spatio à calce ad carceres revocari. Doth not every wise man die with extreme content and serenity of mind; and only Fools with disquiet, impatience, and reluctancy? Is not that mind to be accounted the most clear sighted, which seeth things afar off, and discerns that it is to be translated into a better state: and that dim and weak, which doth not look beyond things present, and discern nothing of its future condition? For my part, truly, I am even transported with vehement longing to behold again the faces of those brave men, your Fathers, whom, in their lives, I so much loved and honoured. And not only them, but some other worthy persons also, whose fame I have heard and read of, and celebrated in my own writings. And, if I were so happy once, as to be on my journey toward those Heroes; I know none, that should easily draw me back again, or retard my speed, by restoring my youth, like Pelias. If any of the Gods should think to do me a favour, in making me young again, now after I have attained to this my declining age: I profess, I would refuse the proffer; nor would I, having run over the stage of life, be brought back again to the post, from which I first set forth. Hereunto I might add also that pathetical Exclamation of that Emperor of wisdom, Marcus Antoninus; Ecquando futura es, O Anima, bona simplex, una, nuda, corpore te ambiente dilucidior? Ecquando dispositionem dilectioni et affectui genuino deditam degustabis? Ecquando futura es plena, rei nullius indiga, nihil desiderans ulterius, nihil expetens etc. As if He were angry, and passionately expostulating with his soul, that she stayed so long in the indigent and vexatious condition of this life, and had omitted opportunities of translating herself into a better, in which she would be entirely Herself, and enjoy those pleasures, that are more genuine and agreeable to her immortal nature. But, so clear a truth, as this of the Souls desire of an Immortal state, after death, notwithstanding the unwillingness of some abject minds (loaden with earthy and base affections) to submit to the stroke of Death, which alone can transport them into that state: doth need no further testimonies, or illustration.  Lucretius. 
If the Soul survive the body, and be Cognoscent or Knowing, after death; doubtless it must be furnished with senses, that so she may see, hear, etc. in order to her knowledge: but, when once divorced from her Copartner, the body, she neither hath, nor can have Organs for any such uses at all; and therefore she can have no knowledge.  Athanasius. 
Here again you touch upon that so often rejected confusion of Knowledge and Sensation, as if they were one and the same thing; when from sundry passages in my precedent discourses, you might have easily collected, that the sense ascribed to the Soul, is neither Hearing, nor seeing, nor etc. but the very power of Understanding, or Intellection itself: which is indeed called many times [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] Sense, in a general acceptation of the word; because Cognition is a Perception, and because it comprehends, in way of Eminency, all the subordinate senses, or Faculties of sensation, i. e. by itself it knows Colours, as the Eye; sounds, as the Ear; and so of the rest. And this is the proper prerogative of superior Faculties, that besides their own higher and nobler Functions, they comprehend likewise all the Functions of Inferiors, and that in a transcendent and more excellent manner, as I have already explained. But, as for the particular manner of the Souls Knowledge, after death; I remit you to Sr. Kenelm Digbies sublime Speculations concerning the condition of a separate Soul; in which, though perhaps you may not meet with such satisfaction, as you expect: yet you will meet with more than I can now give you, without repeating his notions.  Lucretius. 
Well, Athanasius, you would not have referred me to another, but that you are almost exhausted and wearied with speaking thus long yourself; and therefore it becomes me in civility to consider the weakness of your lungs, and slowness of your tongue (of both which I remember, you have many years since often complained) and to ease you of this penance my curiosity put upon you, as soon as I have proposed one Objection more, which wiser men than myself have thought not a little difficult to be solved; and that, in short, is this. Considering the vast disparity and (in truth) absolute incompossibility betwixt the affections of a Corporeal and Incorporeal Nature; it seems unreasonable to conceive, that they can be conjoined in one Composition, such as Man is, if (as you affirm) his soul be an Immortal substance, and his Body a Mortal. Pray, therefore, make good the possibility of such a Conjunction: and, if you can, explain what is the common cement or Glue, that unites and holds them together; and then I have done opposing you.  Athanasius. 
You very well understand Epicurus doctrine of an Eternal and Incorporeal Inanity, or space diffused through the world, and commixed with all Bodies or Concretions, which are yet dissoluble: and do you pretend after this, that you cannot conceive it reasonable, that an Incorporeal should be conjoined to a Corporeal? But, suppose you really cannot conceive it reasonable; must it therefore be unreasonable, when so many and so eminent Philosophers have understood, and allowed the reasonableness of this Conjunction? What think you, in the first place, of Plato, Aristotle, and all their sectators, who unanimously held the Anima Mundi, or Universal Soul, and that being diffused through all parts of the Universe, it associateth and mixeth itself with all things, and totam intus agitat molem? And then what think you of those words of the great Hermes, quoted by Lactantius; when discoursing of the Nature of Man, and how he was Created by God, he saith: Ac idem ex utraque natura, immortali putà, ac mortali, unam hominis naturam texebat, ipsum quadamtenus immortalem, quadamtenus mortalem faciens; ac eundem accipiens, in medio quasi interstitio, heinc divinae, immortalisque; illeinc mortalis obnoxiaeque mutationi naturae constituit, ut in omnia intuens, omnia miraretur. And thus Trismegistus; from whence it came, that Man was esteemed as it were the Horizon of the Universe, in whom Supreme natures are joined to the most Low, and the Heavenly to the Earthy: and this with admirable correspondency, and as beseems the perfection of the Universe; because, since there are some Natures purely Incorporeal and Immortal, and others purely Corporeal and Mortal; that these Extremes might not be without a Mean, nothing seems more congruous, than that there should be a certain sort of third Natures, so mixed and compound of both the others, as to be Incorporeal and Immortal, on one part, and Corporeal and Mortal, on the other. Again, whereas you imagine it absurd, that natures so extremely different should concur to constitute one Composition; I beseech you, Lucretius, are not Heat, and Cold, white and black, as different each from other, as Immortal and Mortal? and yet you see, they are often conjoined together, so as that a Middle or Third nature doth result from their union, as in particular, warm, from Heat and Cold, and Grey or brown, from white and black. Nay, there seems so much the less repugnancy betwixt Immortal and Mortal, Incorporeal and Corporeal natures; by how much they are the less Different and Incompossible because they are only as it were Disparate among themselves, and capable of conserving a whole nature: but Heat and Cold, Whiteness and Blackness, are absolute Contraries, and cannot consist together, without reciprocal destruction, or maintain a durable Union. And thus much for the First part of your Demand, viz, the Possibility of a Conjunction betwixt an Incorporeal and a Corporeal Nature.  
As for the remainder, viz, what is the Common Medium, Cement or Glue, by which two such different natures are married and united into one Compositum; I Answer, that I conceive it to be the Blood, especially the spiritual and most elaborate or refined part thereof: according to that ancient opinion of Critias, Sentire, maximè proprium esse Animae; atqe hoc inesse propter sanguinis naturam; commemorated by Aristotle (though with dissent) in the 2 Ch. of his 1. Book de Anima; and with the testimony of sundry admirable Experiments, both revived and asserted by our perspicacious Contryman, Dr. Harvey, in his Exercitations concerning the Generation of Animals. For, since the visible observations of the Manner and process of Nature, in the production of the Chicken in and from the Egg, do assure that the Blood is the part of the body, which is first generated, nourished, and moved; and that the Soul is Excited and as it were Enkindled first from the blood: doubtless, the blood is that, in which the operations vegetative and sensitive do first manifest themselves; that, in which the vital Heat, (the primary and immediate instrument of the Soul, especially as to Animation) is innate and congenial; that, which is the Common Vinculum, or Cement of the Soul and body; and that, by the mediation whereof, as a vehicle, the Soul doth transmit her conserving and invigorating influence into all parts of the body. Nay, considering that the Blood, by perpetual Circulation, doth flow (like a river of Living water) round the body, penetrating into and irrigating the substance of all the parts, and at the same time communicating to them both Heat and Life; and that the Heart is framed for no other end, but that by perpetual pulsation (together with the concurrence of the veins and arteries) it may receive this blood, and again propel it into all the body: I say, these things duly considered, it can be but a Paradox at most, to affirm, that the Soul having its first, and perhaps principal residence in the Blood, may very well be conceived to be, in respect thereof, Tota in toto, and tota in qualibet parte. And, lastly, concerning the Manner of this Conjunction of the Soul and body, by the Mediation of this vital Nectat, the Blood; it is not necessary, with the Vulgar, to imagine, that they should mutually touch, and by hooks take reciprocal hold each of other, in order to Cohaesion and constant Union; for, that is competent only to Corporeals; but that Incorporeals should be conjoined either one: to another, or to Corporeals, no more is required but an Intimate presence, which is yet a kind of Contact, and so may serve in stead of mutual Apprehension and Continency. So that this special Manner of presence is that and only that, by which an Incorporeal Entity may be united to a Corporeal. And now I have explained those difficulties concerning the Conjunction of the Soul and Body, the one an Incorporeal and Immortal Being, the other Corporeal and Mortal▪ which you seemed to think in-explicable. I expect you should be as good as your promise, no longer to oppose me, but hereafter concur with me in opinion, that The Soul is an Immortal substance: and that its Immortality is not only credible by Faith, or upon Authority Divine; but also Demonstrable by Reason, or the Light of Nature.  Lucretius. 
You may remember, Sr: I told you in the beginning, that though I am an Epicurean, in many things concerning Bodies; yet, as a Christian, I detest and utterly renounce the doctrine of that Sect, concerning men's Souls: and that I asked your permission to interrupt you sometimes in your discourses, by intermixing such Doubts, and Objections, as seemed to render the Demonstration of the Souls Immortality, by meet▪ Reason, exceeding difficult, if not altogether impossible; to this end only, that I might the more fully experiment the strength of your Arguments to the Contrary. So that notwithstanding all my Contradiction, you ought to believe me still as strongly persuaded of the truth of what you have asserted, as if I had acted your part, and undertaken the assertion of the same myself: my diffidence being not of the Souls Incorruptibility, but of the possibility of its Demonstration, by you or any man else. And now, though you have brought, I confess, most excellent Arguments to prove it, and both satisfied all my Doubts, and solved all my Objections: yet whether you have so Demonstrated it, as to exclude all Dubiosity, and compel assent (which is the propriety of perfect Demonstration) in a pure Natural Philosopher, who refuseth to admit any other conviction, but from the Light of Nature; I must leave to the judgement of our Arbiter, the noble Isodicastes, who will not, I am well assured, deliver any but an equitable Censure in the Cause.  Athanasius. 
And you may remember too, Lucretius, how in the beginning I advertised you of the Unreasonableness of such overcurious Wits, as expect Mathematical Demonstrations in Metaphysical Subjects, which are really incapable of them; and gave you an undeniable Reason thereof. So that considering my timely prevention of your expectation in that kind; and your own confession that I have satisfied all your Scruples, and solved all your Objections: I cannot but wonder at your obstinacy in your old opinion, that it is not possible to convince a mere Natural man, of the Souls Immortality, by the testimony of pure Reason. Nevertheless, I freely join with you, in your Appeal to the verdict of Isodicastes, than whom certainly no man can be more judicious, no man more just.  Isodicastes. 
The matter now at last in dispute betwixt you, seems to be this; whether in a Thesis, or Proposition, which is not capable of being evinced by a Geometrical Demonstration (as this of the Souls Immortality seems not to be) there can yet be expected such substantial and satisfactory Reasons, Physical or Moral, or both, as may suffice to the full establishment of its Truth, in the mind of a reasonable man? And therefore (that I may give you my opinion, in a word) I say; that though in things belonging to the eognizance of a pure Philosopher, every one ought to seek for the best assurance, of which the nature of that thing, into which he enquireth, will possibly admit; and that the way of Demonstration, More Geometrico, is of all others the most convincing and scientifical: yet, since many things not only in Metaphysics, but even in Physics, are of so retired and abstruse a nature, as not to be brought under the strict laws and rules of Geometry, of which notwithstanding we may acquire a competent certitude, by well examining their Effects and constant Operations; as on one side, we ought not to require absolute Demonstrations, where the Condition of the subject doth exclude them; so on the other, we ought not to deny the force of all other testimonies, that right Reason offereth in evidence of its verity asserted, especially when all that can be said against it, shall be found vain and light, in comparison of what is alleged in defence of it. This considered, though Athanasius hath not precisely (according to the rigorous acceptation of the word) Demonstrated the Immortality of Man's Soul; yet forasmuch as He hath proved it by good and important Reasons, aswell Physical as Moral, such as are not much inferior to absolute Demonstrations, and such as by vast excesses transcend the weight of all your opposite Allegations, Lucretius: truly, I think you aught to rest satisfied, that He hath discharged himself of his Undertaking to the Full; especially since it would be a very hard task for you to maintain, that all the beams of the Light of Nature do concentre only in Mathematical Demonstrations, and that we can know nothing, which is not Demonstrable. And now Gentlemen, if you please, let us be going towards my house, where I am sure we were expected at least an hour ago, and where I shall have leisure to thank you more solemnly for the infinite content I have received from your Conversation.  Athanasius. 
We are ready to attend you, Noblest Isodicastes; and shall ever be as ready to acknowledge the singular Honour you have done us, in losing this Evening upon persons so unable to merit your attention, as we have now shown ourselves.   
FINIS.