THE Christian Belief: Wherein is Asserted and Proved, That as there is Nothing in the GOSPEL contrary to REASON, yet there are some DOCTRINES in it Above REASON; and these being necessarily enjoined us to Believe, are properly called, MYSTERIES; IN Answer to a BOOK, ENTITLED, Christianity not Mysterious.  But we speak the Wisdom of God in a Mystery, even the hidden Mystery of God. 
LONDON: Printed by W. Onley, for Alex. Rosvile, at the Dial, against St. Dunstan 's Church, in Fleetstreet. MDCXCVI.   

THE CONTENTS, BEING ARTICLES, Most of 'em advanced In Opposition to the Positions of our Adversary.  

THe Measures and Extent of Human Knowledge, in Objects of Sense. Page 2.  
Transubstantiation, why to be rejected. p. 6.  
The Knowledge of Spiritual Objects. ib.  
Of Finite and Infinite Objects. p. 11.  
Of Matters of Revelation. p. 14.  
Three Inferences. p. 15.  
A Vindication of the Maxim in Adoring, when we cannot Comprehend. p. 18.  
The Use of Reason in Religion. p. 22, 23. 41, 42.  
Matters of Revelation not so easily nor clearly comprehended, as the Phaenomena of Nature. p. 23. 25.  
His Notion of Things contrary to Reason, rejected and disproved. p. 33.  
Two Limitations to be observed, before we can pronounce any thing contrary to Reason. p. 33, 34.  
Both confirmed and illustrated by the Article of our Saviour's Divinity. p. 40.  
The Difference between a seeming Contradiction and real one, asserted. p. 46  
Contradictions not to be pronounced in Matters of Revelation, because they do not comport with common Ideas in Objects of Sense. p. 47, 48.  
Revelation, a Motive of Assent, as well as mean of Information. p. 49.  
Matters of Revelation, how far intelligible and possible. p. 51.  
The Difference between Divine and Human Revelation on that account. p. 52.  
The true Notion of a Mystery, as applied to Things Incomprehensible, p. 56. 61.  
His Notion of a Mysteryexploded. p. 58.  
Mystery stated, with respect to Inadequate Ideas. p. 59 60; 62.  
And proved against him on his own Principles. p. 62.  
The Notion of comprehending Things stated. p. 67.  
The true State of the Controversy, with respect to Scripture. p. 73, 74.  
Authorities of Scripture, where Mystery is applied to Incomprehensible Truths, 1 Cor. 2. 7. p. 81. 1 Tim. 3. 10. p. 84.  
Doctrines, or Divine Truths, contained in Scripture, that are represented as Mysterious, and proved from Scripture to be so. p. 89.  
The first Instance from 1 Cor. 1. 23. 24. second Instance 1 Cor. 13. v. 9 p. 94.  
And 2 Cor. 12. 4. p. 96.  
And Col. 2. 23. p. 97. All which are expounded at large, and each Exposition ratified by the judgement of the Fathers.  
The Opinions of the Fathers for the three first Ages produced against him, even of those he has cited. p. 105, 106.  
How far the Knowledge of the Object is required in Faith. p. 118, 119.  
That Faith is opposed to Knowledge, or Science, and sometimes in Scripture, implys an Assent to revealed Truths, as they exceed the Sphere of Human Perception. p. 121, 122.  
This proved from Scripture, and the Authority of the Fathers. p. 123, 124.  
The Belief of the Creation instanced. p. 120.  
Mysteries proved from the Nature of Faith. p. 134.  
Miracles not to be admitted contrary to the Testimony of the Senses, and why. ib.  
Miracles an Argument, a majore, That there are Mysteries in the Christian Religion. p. 136, 137.  
His Historical Account of Mysteries exploded. p. 138.  
The Methods of Initiation in the Christian Faith, and the Discipline, Rites and Sanctions of the Primitive Church, cleared from the Imputation of Paganism, or Imposture. p. 140.  
These neither the Cause nor Product of Mystery. p. 143.  
The Lawfulness of Ceremonies, especially such as the Established Church of England enjoins. p. 145.  
The Authority of 'em asserted. p. 146.  
Not opposite to Christianity. p. 147.  
The pernicious Design of his Treatise detected. p. 149, 150.  
The Conclusion, in a Vindication of the present Methods of Answering by Instances. p. 151.   

Editions of the Fathers, Clemens, Alexandrinus, Ed. Par. 1629.  
Justin Martyr, Par. 1615.  
Irenaeus Ed. Erasmi, Basil. 1560.  
Tertullianus, Ed. Par. 1675.  
Origen contra Cels. Edit. Cant. 1677.  
Dionys. vulgo Areopag. Antw. 1634.  
Johan. Chrysost. Par. 1621.  
Isiodor. Pelysiot. Par. 1638.  
Theophilact, Lond. 1636.  
Origen Comment. Rothomag. 1668.  
Athanasius ex Officina, Commeliana, 1601.    

CERTAIN Christian Doctrines, Properly called Mysteries; And to be Esteemed Above REASON, etc.  
BEFORE I make any Formal Returns to the Positions advanced by this Zealous Advocate for REASON, I shall endeavour to fix or state the several Measures and Principles of Human Knowledge; I mean, with respect to the Objects of it, as it includes the Knowledge of Objects of Sense, of Corporeal and Spiritual Substances, of Finite and Infinite, and of Revealed Truths.  
And, first, I can freely grant (what has cost our Adversary some Pages to prove,) viz. [That nothing in Nature can come to our Knowledge, but by some of these four Means, viz. the Experience of the Senses, the Experience of the Mind, Humane and Divine Revelation, Sect. 1. Cap. 3.]  
But yet I think it very absurd, to advance one Rule or Standard for every Part or Branch of Humane Knowledge, and thereupon form Arguments, and charge Contradictions and Absurdities, without making the least allowance or distinction, with respect to the nature of the Object, or the methods of knowing it. Here is the Source of all our Adversary's Mistakes and Miscarriages, whereby (as will anon more fully appear) he has cast a Cloud upon Reason, rather than improved its Native Lustre and Glory.  
And, First, as for the Knowledge of Objects of Sense; it's certain the Mind of Man, the proper Seat as well as Principle of Humane Knowledge, is here entertained by the Objects of the Material World; for, Nothing but Matter in the ordinary course of Natural Knowledge make an Impression upon the outward Senses, so as to transmit, and fix an Idea in the Mind, suitable to the nature of the Object. And certainly here is the great original Stock of Humane Knowledge; for the Senses are not only the standing Vehicles to all those Ideas, that are lodged in the Mind, (since even Faith and Revelation come by Hearing) but these very Ideas, if positive, and form on Things and Substances, are little else but the Resemblances of material Sensations, or the Ideas of some Object of Sense. However, exalted and refined may be the Ideas of Angels and glorified Spirits, that have things presented to the view of the Mind by an immediate Intuition, it's manifest we that are clothed with Senses and Matter, and those of a very coarse allay, must have all our Ideas tinged with material Adumbrations: These are that Glass upon the Mind through which we see darkly, and that wonderfully incrassates and disguises the Images of Things. It's true, in Objects of Sense our Ideas must be comparatively clear and exact, because we are seated in the very heart or centre of the material World, where its Objects perpetually crowd in upon our Senses, and are continually presented to our view and observation: But yet, in Objects of Sense, which we daily see and converse with, we can by no means pretend an adequate Knowledge; for, we cannot comprehend or penetrate into their proper Essences, or radical Substances; no, we can go no further than Properties, Powers, or Faculties, that discover themselves in their Effects, strike the Senses, and leave an Impression, whence a distinct Idea is formed. Again, We cannot pretend to discover the true Modes of these Properties, Powers, or Faculties, so as to discern wherein the precise Nature of 'em consists; for, at least, we can only resemble it by some Ideas that are formed by the noblest of Senses, that of Seeing; thus of Smells, and Tastes, and the like: So that we see the highest Philosophical Exercitations, even in matters of Sense, are at last wrapped up in that we can justly call a MYSTERY. It's true, Objects of Sense, tho' formed from Effects and Properties, create a very certain and indisputable Knowledge, because confirmed by daily and continued Observation, and because the proper Objects of that part, which (as before concluded) is not only the Vehicle, but first Elaboratory of all Ideas; I mean the outward Senses. And therefore, in Objects of Sense, we must receive and embrace a Thing as it presents itself to the view of our Senses, since we are assured, that GOD has appointed no other way of communicating matters of this nature to Mankind. And to receive an Object of Sense contrary to the Testimony of all our Senses, (tho' upon the pretended Authority of Revelation) must overturn all the Measures and Principles of Humane Knowledge, obliterate the Notices and Distinctions of Truth and Error, raze the prime Faculties and Motrements of Reason, and reduce Man, the Glory of the Creation, and GOD's Image and Representative, infinitely below the level of Brutes that perish. For this reason we may reject the Doctrine of Transubstantiation, notwithstanding the highest Pretences to Miracle or Mystery, since it implies a Contradiction of the Testimony of all our Senses in matters of Sense.  
But, Secondly, let us consider Humane Knowledge as engaged about the Objects of the Spiritual World, or Spiritual or Immaterial Being's; for this must very much alter the Scene of Knowledges, and fix it upon new Measures and Principles.  
And, 1st, It's indisputably evident, that our Knowledge of Spirits is of a mixed nature, since it takes its rise partly from the Powers of Natural Reason, and partly from Revelation. The Knowledge of God and our own Souls, may in some measure be traced from the Powers of Natural Reason. The Frame of our own Being's, as well as that of the Universe, will instruct us, That there must be an Eternal, Alwise, and All-powerful Mover, agreeable to the Sacred Language: The invisible things of Him from the Creation of the World, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His Eternal Power and Godhead, Rom. i. 20. but as for the Existence of other Being's, we call Spirits, or their Orders and Societies, we must wholly receive it from Revelation. Again; As for the Nature and Ideas of a Spirit, this must certainly rest on the Instructions of Reason and Revelation; and after the best that can be given, God knows, our Attainments are very lame and imperfect; the excellency of our own Faculties and Operations tell us, That we are acted by a Principle within, that must be highly distinct from Matter, or least, that we see and handle much more from that Great GOD, whose Workmanship is this very Reason that thus dictates. This very Argument sufficiently instructs us, We ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto Gold or Silver, or Stone graven by Art and Man's Device, Acts xvii. 29.  
But now, tho' from good Arguments we may conclude, That a Spirit is a Being somewhat distinct from Matter, yet our most exalted Idea will be but a mere Negative, or if Positive, a Resemblance of a refined Aerial kind of Matter; so that our Ideas of a Spirit is much more abstruse, imperfect, and conjectural than that of a Body, notwithstanding the utmost assistances of Revelation.  
And here I'm obliged to make some Returns to what this Infallible Reasoner, with the Authority of a Great Man on his side (as he calls him), has delivered on the Subject; it amounts to this: We have as clear an Idea of Spirits as Bodies, since both are only to be known by their Properties, and the Properties of a Spirit are as clear as those of a Body. See Sect. 3. Cap. 2. N. 16, 17, 19 But, with Submission to the Infallible Chair, though some Properties which belong to those Being's we call Spirits, are clearly known and agreed upon, yet they are not so many, nor yet so distinguishing as those of Bodies; for, besides the Properties of particular Bodies, that distinguish each other, there are Properties certainly known, that belong to a Body as a Body, and distinguish it from Spirit, and every Being that can be imagined; such are extension of Parts, and a Faculty of possessing a Place in proportion to 'em. These are for the most part Objects of Sense, and Self-evident; but we cannot decipher or determine any peculiar Properties that belong to a Spirit as a Spirit, and distinguish it from Body or Matter, and every thing else. We may indeed conceive Spirits as Finite Being's, by the resemblance of Bodies, and consequently make 'em exist in a place, and possess sometimes one place, and sometimes another; but we can form no Idea how they exist in places, as we do of Bodies. As for Thinking, Reasoning, and Willing, these seem to be too remote, to be the distinguishing Properties of a Spiritual Substance as such, being Faculties that seem to slow after its Radical or Original Properties are given. I am sure they cannot be so in the Opinion of my Author's Great Man, since in one place he tells us, [It's impossible without Revelation to discover (whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of matter fitly disposed) a Power to perceive or think.— And again, I see no Contradiction in it, That the first Eternal Thinking, Being, or Omnipotent Spirit, should, if he pleased, give to certain Systems of created senseless Matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of Sense, Perception, and Thought.] Lock's Human Understanding, 
Lock 's Human Vnderst. lib. 4. cap. 3.  Lib. 4. Cap. 3. N. 6. And therefore I think it appears, there's a vast Difference between the Knowledge of Spirits and Bodies; insomuch that we may justly pronounce, That no positive Ideas can be form of Spirits, as Spiritual Substances, but what carry the resemblances of Matter in 'em; other Ideas must be formed by comparing 'em with Matter, and pronouncing what they are not, rather than what they are.  
But, Thirdly, let us examine the Measures and Extent of Humane Knowledge, with respect to the Object, as it is Finite or Infinite. As for the Knowledge of Finite Objects, an Estimate may be taken from what has been delivered on the two preceding Arguments, the Subject of which being chiefly Finite Objects: The present Enquiry then is, after the Knowledge of Infinite Objects; and here certainly the Nature of the Being that thinks and knows, will determine the Case, I mean, demonstrate the Imperfection of Humane Knowledge; for it's an Absurdity in Terms, as well as in the Nature of the Thing, to imagine that a Finite Mind should gain a perfect Comprehension of an Infinite Being; insomuch, that it seems no Presumption to affirm, That GOD, by virtue of His Omnipotence, after He hath instated us in the Beatific Vision, and discovered things that Eye hath not seen, nor Ear heard, nor Heart conceived; or, in a word, after we have seen Him as He is, cannot possess us with an adequate Idea of His Immense and Infinite Being: So that with respect to the Godhead we must affirm, That our Ideas are made up of Negatives, and consequently with Clemens Alex. affirm, That we rather know God by concealing what He is not, than what He is: 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Strom. lib. 5.  Or, at least, if we attempt any positive Conceptions, we are forced to shadow 'em forth by some Finite Ideas which we have taken up, and are already implanted in us. Thus the Divine Attribute of Wisdom we are forced to resemble by a Faculty of Discerning and Comprehending, infinitely surpassing the Sphere of Humane Knowledge. Thus the Immensity of God, by a vast space, or an Idea that is without Bounds or Limits, or is not to be circumscribed. Thus Eternity, by an endless Succession of Time. Thus we see, after our nicest Conceptions, and after the most accurate Characters and Descriptions from Revelation itself, we are forced to call in Finite Objects, and measure the Blessed Attributes of our Creator by Finite Ideas; an Undertaking so unworthy of him, that it seems to be a piece of petty Larceny, or rather a lesser sort of Idolatry, as 'tis a kind of Representation of the Invisible GOD, by things that are seen, by a kind of Gold, or Wood, or Stone, graved in the shallow Understandings of Impotent Men. Here our Weakness, our Blindness, plainly discovers itself;▪ for tho' Knowledge in Finite Objects may appear bright and shining, here it must suffer an Eclipse, and lie confounded in depth of Mystery; and, in a word, humbly make St. Paul's Recognition: O the depth of the Riches of the Wisdom, and Power, and Immenseness of God how unsearchable, etc.  
But, Fourthly, let us descend to the last Stage of Humane Knowledge, I mean that about matters of Revelation. And, first, it's certain that pure Matters of Revelation are things of which the Mind, by its own intrinsic Light, can form no Ideas; and consequently we cannot pretend to know any thing more of them, than GOD in a revealed way is pleased to communicate. It's true, He seems to be obliged to communicate Himself in such a manner, that His Revelations, at least, may bear a resemblance to some of those Ideas we have already conceived, or by the Power of Natural Reason can attain to. Thus does He reveal a Saviour that is GOD-Man, he's obliged to ascribe such Characters of Divinity to him, as are agreeable to the revealed Characters of the Godhead, and those Ideas we can form of it; and in like manner as to his Humanity; for otherwise I cannot conceive how any revealed Truth can be imprinted on the Mind, without Special Inspiration. But then, on the other hand, when God publisheth a revealed Truth in such Characters as suffice to inform us what he intends by it, viz. a Saviour that is GOD-Man, or the like, he is not obliged (neither is it any way requisite to the reception of a revealed Truth) to demonstrate the modus of the Union of the two Natures: First, Because the Subject of Revelation being Matters not attainable by Reason, and GOD the Author of them, as long as we have an Idea of the thing, or an Idea of what GOD proposes to be believed, the modus of it is to be placed on the Infinite Power and Veracity of God. Secondly, Because a leading Design of Revelation being to establish a Confidence in God's Power and Veracity, in order to an absolute Obedience and Worship, He did not intend to make us Philosophers, but revealed what was useful and necessary, and directs us to adore, when we cannot comprehend.  
From what has been delivered we may form two or three Inferences; 1st, With respect to this last Argument, Whatever our Attainments may be in Matters of Sense and Natural Reason, it appears, that pure Matters of Revelation lie at a great distance from us; and consequently Knowledge cannot penetrate much beyond the Surface, since they are not only things in their own nature profound and intricate, but all our Discoveries rest on the good Will and Pleasure of GOD, that communicates 'em. And therefore, if Revelation itself tells us, we know but in part, or imperfectly, we may safely affirm it, and place all Difficulties on the Imperfections of Humane Knowledge, or the Depths and Mysteriousness of Revealed Truths. 2dly, It's a notorious Absurdity to argue from Ideas of Objects of Sense, or Material Objects against Immaterial ones; or Finite against Infinite, much more against Revealed ones. For it manifestly appears, that the Measures of Humane Knowledge are to be taken from each respective Object; for, as every Object hath a distinct Essence or Nature, so it hath distinct Properties and Modes peculiar to its Nature; and the Ideas we conceive of the one, may not reach or measure the other. This is even so clear, that even in Properties that are common to several Objects, such as Spirits and Bodies, when applied to their respective Objects, carry no manner of Resemblance to each other.  
Thus it's an inseparable Property of a Spirit and Body to occupy a Place, and yet the manner of existing in a Place is, no doubt, vastly different; insomuch, that I cannot find how any Ideas of the Vbi of Bodies can conclude any thing against that of Spirits, much less measure or define it. And, by a Parity of Reason, we may say as much of the Unity of a Body, and the Unity of an Infinite Spirit; for the Unity of the Godhead or the Divine Essence may be preserved, and yet communicate itself to Three Personal Subsistences: and it must be absurd to deny this, because it will not comport with our common Ideas of the Unity of a Body. 3dly, In Matters of Revelation, it's as absurd to Argue against Revealed Truths, when the thing revealed is described in such a manner, that we may know what is intended by it, because we cannot comprehend the Modus of it; since this would oblige us to reject several things, even in Objects of Sense, that are hitherto Unquestionable. What I have hitherto delivered, is by way of Principle; and I shall stand by it as such, in defiance of the utmost Attempts of our assuming Reasoner; and having laid this Foundation, I promise myself Success, in unraveling his Arguments and Positions.  
And first, to take him in the order we find him, before he gives you a State of the Question, he begins with the main Burden of his Song, and introduces you with some Sarcastical Reflections, upon the Managements, and Maxims of Divines, about Religion. As if the generality of Christians had no Notion of Religion, but Mystery; and Divines unanimously owned their Ignorance about it, [Whilst they gravely tell us, we must adore what we cannot comprehend;] and yet majesteriously obtrude contradictory Comments, as infallible Demonstrations of an unfathomable Mystery.  
It's visible this whole Paragraph is spent upon the Clergy; for, who are to account for men's Ignorance or absurd Notions in Religion, but those whose Business it is to instruct and remove 'em? Again; Who are to answer for Contradictions, but the Clergy, that resolve all into unfathomable Mystery, and yet by their peremptory Comments pretend to unravel all to a Demonstration? This is a Strain of impregnated Malice, that runs through the whole Book; where the Clergy, by Insinuation, Consequence, or downright Assertions, are charged with Imposture, as if they had industriously combined to resolve all Religion into Mystery, even to the carrying on of Contradictions: For in one place he makes it an Asylum or Shelter to their Ignorance; in another, an Artifice of Usurpation, to oblige the Laity to admit nothing as a Branch of their Creed, till it hath been ratified from their Confessor's Chair. In a word, he represents 'em as Introducers of Deism; he might have added, as Subverters of all Religion too, since he makes 'em labour in nothing but Absurdities and Contradictions. And now you have the Character or Temper of the Man, and see where his poisoned Arrows are directed. I shall with Patience, or rather Contempt, pass by all Strictures of this kind, and content myself with the Confidence of wiping off his Calumnies by confuting his Positions. To return then,  
As for the Comments of some Divines, neither the Church, nor Body of the Clergy are to account for the Indiscretions which Heat or Passion has surprised some of them into; but, I'm persuaded, the Comments of others will stand the Test of Reason and Argument, to establish those Truths we call MYSTERIES, better than those of his Faction or Persuasion, to shake or overturn 'em.  
As for the Maxim that instructs us to Adore what we cannot Comprehend, I think it's extremely proper where we can prove a Mystery; for if God recommends an Article of Faith that exceeds the Comprehension of a Finite Mind, we may rest satisfied with an imperfect Idea, (even tho' it be no more than what is needful to point out to us what God intends by it) and then surrender our Judgements to His Infinite Veracity for the rest: A considerable Instance of Obedience (even the Obedience of Faith) as well as Adoration.  
After this, he presents us with the Opinions of some particular Persons, or, at least, the Fictions of his own Brain, concerning the Authority of Fathers, Counsels, and Scripture, and the Rules of interpreting it: But I'm concerned to assign what Deference is to be paid to Fathers or Counsels, or what Rules to be observed in interpreting Scripture, till he thinks fit to charge our Constitution with Error in these matters. This is foreign to the Argument we are now engaged in. The next thing he presents us with, is, Two Opinions of nameless Parties concerning the Use of Reason in Religion, and the Sense of Scripture; and, at last, makes all sides (that differ from his Notions) join in this Position, (for I can put no other gloss on his words, when he affirms) That both from different Principles agree, [That several Doctrines of the New Testament belong no further to the Inquiries of Reason, than to prove them Divinely revealed; and, that they are properly Mysteries still, Ib. N. 6.] That there are Doctrines in the New Testament that may be properly called Mysteries still, I do not question; but I can evince in the Sequel of this Tract. But I cannot find where the Church of England has declared herself, That Reason hath nothing to do with some Revealed Doctrines, but only to prove them divinely revealed; for, certainly, Faith itself is a rational Assent to a Divine Truth; and Reason will not only be concerned to inquire and prove, whether God hath delivered it, but to form some Idea (tho' an imperfect one) of the Nature of this Truth; at least, such an Idea as will convince us what it is God proposes to our Belief.  
Else we assent to we know not what. But after the utmost Researches of Reason, our very Reason may inform us, that there may be a great deal in this Truth or Doctrine, with respect to the Nature or Modes of the thing, which She can by no means comprehend, and consequently may still be justly accounted a Mystery.  
And now we come to his own Positions: [On the contrary we hold,— That nothing revealed, whether as to its manner or existence, is more exempted from its Disquisitions, than the ordinary Phoenomena of Nature; and that there is nothing in the Gospel contrary to Reason, nor above it, and that no Christian Doctrine can be properly called a MYSTERY. 
N. 7.  This he proposes as the State of the Question, agreeable to the Title of his Book, and consequently all that follows is only a confirmation or making good of this Position. I must confess, I should be so fair to him, as to wait his Arguments; but because nothing shall stick upon the Reader, I shall make something of a return to such Decretory Assertions, in the order we find them:  
And, First, this great Reasoner seems to play the Sophister, and express himself in a very ambiguous manner: He tells us, That no Revealed Truth is exempted from the Disquisitions of Reason. And truly, if he intends no more, than that the sublimest Revealed Truths may be examined by Reason▪ as far as she is able to comprehend them, we shall entirely join with him; for Revelation is thus far an Address to the Reason of Mankind, and she may lawfully endeavour to discover and conceive as much of their manner and existence as possible; Provided she does not reject what she cannot comprehend, and that too upon this very Argument, Because she cannot comprehend the whole Manner and Existence of them.  
Thus far Reason may be concerned, and yet Revealed Truths may be justly said to be above Reason, and mysterious, and consequently his Positions do by no means answer his Design, which is to prove, That Nothing is mysterious, or above Reason.  
But if he intends, that Matters of Revelation, both with respect to their Manner and Existence, may be scanned and comprehended by Reason, as easily as the Phoenomena of Nature; this we utterly deny, and with very good reason too: 1st, Because there's no connexion in the Consequence, the Phoenomena of Nature are often Objects of Sense, and of a finite nature: But there are revealed matters that are in their very frame spiritual and infinite, and consequently not to be comprehended by a finite Mind or Reason, much less with that ease and clearness that Objects of Sense are conveyed to the Mind. Again, Matters of Sense are knowable and comprehensible by the Powers of Natural Reason; but there are Matters of Revelation that are not only incomprehensible in their own nature, but knowable no further than God is pleased to communicate or impart to us. This is clear from what has been already laid down and concluded, and therefore this can be no Consequence; the Phoenomena of Nature are easily comprehensible, therefore all matters of Revelation are so. This is so absurd, that I do not question but I shall make it appear in the Sequel of this Discourse, That there are some Matters of Revelation, which if scanned by Ideas of Objects of Sense, carry the appearance of Contradictions; and yet this can be no Argument against the Truth of 'em, or that we are mistaken in the purport of the Holy Ghost, (as the Socinians would have it) when what we contend for is represented in the clearest Characters and Descriptions. And yet, this is the top of our Adversary's Reasonings. But, 2dly, as for Revealed Matters being mysterious, or above Reason, it's already concluded, That the radical Essence of Objects of Sense, and much more the Modes of their Properties, or their Existence, are above the Comprehension of Reason: If so, what hath been delivered upon Matters of Revelation, will oblige us to conclude, against our Adversary, That they cannot be fully comprehended in their Nature or Existence, much less in the Modus of it; and consequently, that they are in the highest sense mysterious, and above Reason.  
But to proceed, in the next place he entertains you, pursuant to the Notions of his great Man, with a large account what Reason is, and what she is not; the Means of Information, and Ground-Perswasion: And I must freely own, that I can for the most part agree with him, and his great Man; at least it is not requisite to enter upon a nice Examination of every Paragraph, because I find he makes no particular Application of what he has so elaborately delivered in several Chapters, to prove his main Design. He tells us, Chap. 4. Sect. 1. [That the Ground of Persuasion is Evidence, and Evidence he defines, an exact Conformity of our Ideas, or Thoughts, with their Objects, or Things we think upon.] The Description, I think, is well enough; but all this concludes nothing to prove what he contends for, viz. That nothing is above Reason; for the imperfect Ideas of Infinite and Incomprehensible Being's, must carry a Resemblance, or Conformity to the Object, or the Characters of an Incomprehensible Being; and yet it does not follow, but our Ideas are imperfect, and that there is a great deal in the Object, of which we cannot form any clear Idea. Indeed, if this were not so, he might justly infer, That there's nothing above Reason in Revelation. In a word, since he hath so industriously stated the Nature of Reason and Humane Knowledge, he should have proved, That there are no degrees of Evidence, or Knowledge, with respect▪ to the Nature of the Object, or Means of Information: That we have as clear and complete an Idea of Infinite Being's as Finite, of an Infinite Spirit as an Object of Sense: That revealed Objects occur by the same way as Objects of Sense do; or, That the Extent of revealed Knowledge, does not depend on the Good Will and Pleasure of God, in communicating what he pleaseth on every Object. This would have cleared off all Dispute, and proved what he thinks he's able to evince, viz. That the Evidence of all the Ideas of the Operations of the Mind, is as infallible as our own Being, Cap. 4. N. 14. That what is revealed in Religion, may be as easily comprehended, and found as consistent with our common Notions, as what we know of Wood or Stone, of Air, Water, or the like, Sect. 3. Cap. 2. N. 12.] Or, in a word, that there's nothing in Religion, or Revelation mysterious, or above Reason. The two latter of these Parodoxes will receive such Replies as are proper in the Sequel of this Discourse; but I cannot pass the first without a few Remarks: And, to put the most favourable Construction on an Ambiguous Assertion, I presume, he affirms, That the Evidence of our Ideas which we form of the several Acts or Operations of the Mind, (viz. Thinking, Contemplating, Knowing or Comprehending) are as infallible as that of our Being's. This is a Maxim advanced to prove, That we are to have the same Evidence in all speculative Ideas, and consequently in all Ideas of pure Matters of Revelation; for this is his Application of it: [Let us now but strictly require this Evidence in all the Agreements and Disagreements of our Ideas in Things merely speculative, etc. Ib.]▪ To show the Weakness or Inconclusiveness of his Arguments, and the Falseness of his Positions, I shall instance in the general Act or Operation of the Mind, that of Thinking. And,  
First, If he intends no more than that we have an Evidence (that we think, when we actually think, or that we have a Faculty to think) as infallible as that of our Being, I will easily join with him: But, can this be an Argument, that all our Ideas of Speculative Objects, particularly of all Matters of Revelation, (that are formed by Thinking) rest upon an Evidence as clear as that of our Being? Again, If he contends for an Idea of the Nature of Thinking, that carries an Evidence in it, as clear and infallible as that of our Being; I say, we cannot form an Idea of the Nature of Thought, but by retreating to some particular Instance or Object of Thought, and reflecting how the Mind exercises itself upon it; and before we can form a perfect Idea of the Nature of Thought, we must comprehend or discern the manner of the performance, and this will carry us into a great many Difficulties and Conjectures. We may indeed conclude, that Thought requires the application of the Object to the Mind, or rather the application of the Mind to the Object, which may justly be called Attention. Thus far the Idea of Thinking is clear and evident: But then, if we inquire into the manner how this or that Object is communicated or applied to the Mind, this seems to be inconceivable, even in Objects of Sense; for, who can pretend to describe how Material Objects are imprinted on an Immaterial Soul? Therefore we may conclude, that the Ideas we can form of the Nature of Thinking, and consequently of the Operations of the Mind, do not carry an Evidence in 'em as infallible as that of our Being.  
But further; Admit we, that we could describe the precise Modus of the Nature of Thinking, and consequently had an Idea that carries as much Evidence in it as that of our Existence, it's absurd to conclude, that the Mind can form Ideas of the highest Speculations equally evident and infallible. The Consequence, in plain terms, is no other than this, Because the Evidence of the Ideas of one particular Object is infallible, therefore the Evidence of the Ideas of every Object is so. And certainly this is a Position that must pronounce all our Ideas equally clear and perfect, and the Means of Information infallible, and consequently there can be no Objects falsely represented to the Mind, nor no Ideas false or imperfect. This is Mystery with a witness, or rather Positions that in his own Language are, [The Primary and Vniterical Origin of all his Errors, Ib.] But, I think, he sufficiently confutes himself in the following Paragraphs, when he pronounces some things dubious and obscure, and allows false Ideas may be contracted by Precipitancy or Inattention, by Affection and Prepossession, N. 18.  
And now for the Second, 
Sect. II.  where he introduces us with a Description of what is contrary to Reason, [viz. What is evidently repugnant to clear and distinct Ideas, or to our common Notions, is contrary to Reason.] Now truly this I think is a very lame, imperfect, or at least fallacious Description, unless it be balanced with some Limitations and Restrictions.  
As first, It can only hold in Objects of the same Species, or Nature; Thus we can only argue from Objects of Sense, against Objects of Sense, from Finite against finite, and from Matters of Revelation against pretended Matters of Revelation: For it's the greatest Absurdity in Nature, to conclude any thing against any revealed Truth, or Doctrine, whose Object is purely Spiritual, and absolutely Infinite; because it doth not accord with our Ideas in Objects of Sense; I'm sure the Holy Ghost instructs us better, in obliging us to compare Spiritual Things with Spiritual. A sufficient Inhibition truly against discarding revealed Truths by any other Ideas, then what are form from antecedent Notices of Revelation.  
Thus for our Saviour's Divinity, before we yield an Assent to it, it's requisite the Characters and Properties of the Godhead, which are in the Books of Revelation ascribed to the Father, with respect to the Godhead, should be ascribed to the Son But then when this is done, it's absurd to reject this great Truth, as contrary to Reason, upon the force of an unreasonable Consequence form by comparing the incomprehensible Godhead with Objects of Sense.  
Thus the Son cannot be God, because it must destroy the Unity of the Godhead; for the Unity of the Godhead must be destroyed: Why? Because such Unity and Plurality can never be admitted in Objects of Sense, and consequently not in the sublimest Matters of Revelation. But what is this but to prostitute the Glory and Majesty of the Invisible and Incomprehensible Godhead, by the vilest Representations? What is it but a making him like Gold, Wood or Stone, or Things graven by Man's Art. Certain I am, such Maxims as these are the highest Contradictions to Reason; for if they might take place, it must shake the Foundation of all Revelation, even those lively Characters which the Word of God hath given of the Godhead: If they must be scanned, or measured by common Notions, or Ideas that result from Objects of Sense.  
Secondly, Before we pronounce any thing contrary to Reason, we must be sure that we have a clear and perfect Comprehension of the Thing; for tho' our Ideas that are seemingly repugnant to it, be never so clear, how shall we judge of the Repugnancy, as long as we cannot pretend to a perfect Idea on both sides? This I'm sure is a very reasonable Injunction, between Objects of Sense, and Matters of Revelation; so that if God hath delivered any revealed Truth, and by comparing it with the Ideas and Characters of other revealed Truths, we must conclude, he intended such a particular thing, and at the same time discern the Incomprehensibleness of it; insomuch that we cannot form an adequate Idea; it's absurd to reject it, because this imperfect Idea will not comport with certain clear Ideas in Objects of Sense. Here if any Difficulties, Absurdities, or Contradictions arise, Reason will direct us to place 'em upon the Weakness of our Understandings, or our imperfect way of comprehending such unfathomable Objects; and with St. Paul, engage us to cry out, Who is sufficient for these things? And now if my Adversary will add these Limitations to his Definition (as I'm persuaded he'll be forced to do) I do not question, but I can wipe off all the Absurdities produced in the following Chapter, at least by showing their Impertinence to the Case before us. And on this account, I pass by 'em, as well as because there's nothing in 'em, that affects any thing already delivered, but either confirms, or may be fairly solved by it. I therefore proceed to his Argument, Sect. 2. Cap. 1. N. 4.  
The first thing I shall insist upon is, [That if any Doctrine of the New Testament be contrary to Reason, we have no manner of Idea of it: To say for instance, that a Ball is White and Black at once.] Here he sufficiently discovers himself; he tells us before, That whatever is repugnant to common Notions, is contrary to Reason; and what his common Notions are, the Instance before us, sufficiently informs; that is, in plain English, whatever does not comport with the most trite Ideas of Objects of Sense is contrary to Reason; and therefore the most sublime revealed Truths (whose Objects are Spirits, and Infinite Spirits, and consequently the Ideas we can pretend to, must be highly imperfect) because we cannot adjust them with the most common Ideas of Sense, are contrary to Reason. But the Absurdity of this Assertion, I hope, I have sufficiently exploded.  
But, to deliver my own Sentiments of matters of this nature once for all, I do believe there's an eternal and universal Harmony in Reason, as well as things both created and uncreated. The Reason of Mankind is certainly an immediate Transcript of Infinite Reason, and all the Counsels, Decrees, and Declarations of Heaven are the Dictates of Infinite Reason, and the Reason of Mankind must be established upon the unalterable Rules or Measures of Infinite Reason; and therefore there can be no Ideas of Infinite Truths or Objects (provided they are complete and perfect, such as GOD can conceive of Himself) which really contradict the Rules and Measures of Humane Reason, if she were enabled to comprehend 'em as clearly as her Maker.  
But yet, I think, I have made it appear, that after all the Researches of Reason, there are revealed Objects of which we can form but very imperfect Ideas, both with respect to their Nature, Existence, and Modus, and yet we may form such an Idea as instructs us what GOD intends we should believe.  
From hence we may conclude, That as their nature is peculiarly distinguished from all other Being's, so is the Modus of their Existence: So that it's highly absurd to deny our Assent to the Truth of it, because we can form no Idea that will comport with those we have formed on Objects of Sense, and consequently adjudge it to be contrary to Reason. This is a Contradiction to the Eternal Laws of right Reason, which, in Cases of this nature, direct us to fix the Absurdity or Contrariety on the Imperfections of our Understanding, or the Falseness of the Rule, in judging Matters of Revelation by Objects of Sense.  
In a word, from what hath been said, we may, in express terms, affirm, That we can form imperfect Ideas of Matters of Revelation, so far as to know what GOD proposes to our Belief: And yet, when we proceed to examine the Modus of their Existence, we cannot reconcile it with the Ideas of Objects of Sense; and, for all this, we must not pronounce any thing of this nature contrary to Reason; or esteem those imperfect Ideas, no Ideas at all.  
Give me leave to illustrate this matter in an Instance which the Socinian chooses to advance his own Hypothesis, by exploding it; I mean, the Divinity of our Saviour: We affirm him to be possessed with the Fullness of the Godhead, because his Divinity is described in Characters that are peculiar to the Godhead, and such as correspond with those Ideas of the Godhead as are formed by the Assistance of Revelation. He rejects his Divinity, because he proceeds further, and examines the Modus of its Existence, with respect to the Unity of the Godhead, and its Union with Humane Nature; and thereupon forms a Modus by some common Ideas or Notions, and then compares it with other Ideas of the same rank and quality, and rejects those Ideas which Scripture has given us of his Divinity, by pronouncing such a Revelation absurd and contrary to Reason, because the Modus of its Existence with the Unity of the Godhead and Humanity, (a thing formed and hammered out of his own shallow Understanding,) does not comport with common Ideas of Objects of Sense. Here, I think, is a Complication of Absurdities, or things that run counter to the eternal Measures of right Reason; the Godhead of our Blessed Saviour is rejected and denied, as contrary to Reason, not because we want Revelation for it, since we may read it in the clearest Characters; but we must expound these away, 1st, Because we cannot comprehend the Modus of its Existence (a thing that often exceeds our Comprehension) even in Philosophical Disquisitions. 2dly, Because we cannot form a Modus that comports with common Ideas or Notions in Objects of Sense. But, if Consequences of this nature are suffered to take place, against such legible Characters of Divinity, it must overturn those Ideas of a GOD, which Revelation and Natural Reason hath furnished us with, since the Characters of both are equally clear and undeniable.  
I have dwelled too long on this Argument, but not without Design, because I would not be obliged to make a formal Return to every little Passage that runs against us, or dispels every Speck of a Cloud that's raised upon Sophistry or False Arguing: I am sure I have offered enough to take off the Force of what he hath suggested in the following Paragraph, N. 5. for, he's a complete Conjurer, raises his own Devil, and then lays it, frames an Objection, and gives his own Answer to it; it's this: [If any will think to evade the Difficulty, by saying, That the Ideas of certain Doctrines may be contrary indeed to common Notions, yet consistent with 'emselves,— he's but just where he was.] Now, I have already delivered the Measures of forming revealed Ideas, not by comparing 'em with Objects of Sense, but Spiritual Things with Spiritual: I will admit, indeed, it may be done by common Notions; if he'll restrain his common Notions, as he does in the close of his Paragraph, or, at least, with some Improvement added to 'em; for I can freely subscribe: [That we cannot otherwise discern His Revelations, but by their conformity with our Natural Notices of Him,] GOD he means; or, at least, those Improvements we receive of Him from Revelation. And in this sense our Saviour's Divinity is not contrary to common Notions; for we can form an Idea of it agreeable to those Characters which Revelation and Natural Reason gives us of the Godhead; but, than the Difficulty lies in comprehending the Union and Existence of the two Natures together, which we call the Modus of the thing; and this, we say, is not to be measured by common Notices, for, to a Finite Mind, it's Incomprehensible: But than it is not a Doctrine of Christianity, that we should comprehend it; much less is it a Doctrine of Reason or Christianity that we should exclude or cashier the clearest Characters of our Saviour's Divinity or Incarnation from being a Doctrine of Christianity, because we cannot comprehend the manner of the Union of the two Natures, nor form any clear Idea of it, at least, such as will comport with common Notions. It's true, we may resemble it, as it is done in one of our Creeds. As the reasonable Soul and Flesh is One Man, so GOD and Man is One CHRIST; but we do not advance a Similitude into a complete Idea, or an Article of Faith.  
But, to offer a word or two more, if this method of Arguing may be admitted, I cannot conceive but it must explode the Belief of the Soul, or any Principle distinct from Matter, because we cannot fix the Modus of its Union, or conceive an Idea of the manner of its incessant Intercourses with the Body.  
To conclude this Argument, from what is said, I think here's enough to defeat our Adversary's Triumphs, even over his own Objection; for, we may safely affirm, That as the Nature of the Godhead is distinguished by Properties peculiar to itself, so we may justly conclude, that it has a manner of Existence with Humanity so peculiar to itself, that we must not pretend to comprehend it, by comparing it with Objects of Sense; and yet we can freely own, that there's neither Necessity nor Possibility of its being comprehended by us, or of determining what is the precise Modus of it.  
And thus much of his Notion of Self-consistence. And as for his Sarcastical profane way of Arguing, when he tells us, That Four may be called Five in Heaven; he might know, That Numbers are only empty Denominations, and no Arguments to be formed from 'em, but as applied to Things; and then, if we consider Heavenly Objects with respect to the manner of their Existence, a Unity and a Trinity may be consistent, for any thing he knows to the contrary. And this is sufficient to prevent any modest Man from pronouncing Contradictions upon such unfathomable Truths, by measuring their Modus by Common Notions, things that exceed our Comprehension as much as they are besides the Business of our Curiosity or Faith. Here we may discern the Origin of his ill Reasonings to be want of distinguishing Things, I mean the Being of a Thing, and the Manner of its Existence, with respect to itself, or as 'tis united to something else.  
From hence I pass to N. 9 for nothing intervenes that directly concerns the present Controversy, or, at least, has not had a Reply to it. And here I cannot join with him, when he affirms, That a seeming Contradiction, (even in Matters of Revelation) is to us as much as a real one; for, I think, the Difference is palpable in all cases, but especially in Contradictions upon the Nature of Things; for We call that a seeming Contradiction, when there's a Repugnancy discovers itself, but we have not a clear and perfect Conviction of it: And, I suppose, this must arise for want of a clear and perfect Idea of each Term, or rather Object, of the Contradiction; and, till this is gained, Reason must suspend, and neither determine that she is in the right or wrong, till fresh Evidence offers to turn the Scale. But now, a real Contradiction, or rather a clear Contradiction, (for it should pass under this Name with respect to our knowledge of it) is, When we have a clear and unquestionable Idea of both parts of it, or both Objects, and thence conceive an irreconcilable Repugnancy. But now, in matters of pure Revelation, whose Nature is spiritual and infinite, I cannot see how Reason can direct us to pronounce or determine real or clear Contradictions between them and Common Notions, because we cannot pretend to an adequate or clear Idea; I mean, that which is comparatively so, with respect to those of Objects of Sense, and consequently cannot decree what real Repugnancy lies between them: And therefore, if seeming Contradictions or Difficulties arise, by comparing revealed Truths with common Ideas or Notions, Reason cannot (as this Author would have it) pronounce a real Contradiction, and suspect there can be no revealed Truth, especially when there are the clearest Characters of the thing corresponding with Ideas of the same nature. Here Reason must oblige us to place the Contradictions on our Inabilities in comprehending Matters of this nature, and yield an Assent upon the Authority of Infinite Power and Veracity: For when Revelation has set forth the thing in the clearest Characters, and the very same in which the fundamental Article of all Revelation is represented to us, I mean that of the Godhead, if seeming Contradictions must be suffered to discard it, it's impossible we can yield any Assent to the Being of a GOD; for, where the Characters are as clear for one as the other, and both rest on the same Authority, that of Revelations to dispute the one, must call in question the other.  
Proceed we, in the next place, to consider what is delivered on the Authority of Revelation, he means that which is Divine, Cap. 2. N. 11. And here I cannot be reconciled to the Distinction he gives us: [Revelation is not a necessitating Motive of Assent; but a Mean of Information.] Now, truly I can see no Absurdity in saying, That the same thing may be a Mean of Information, and a Motive of an Assent too, for an Information carries an Assent along with it proportionable to the Credit or Authority of the Informer. Now Revelation is certainly a Mean of Information, since it presents us with new Objects, which Natural Reason could never discover: But, besides this, it is an Information that proceeds from Infinite Veracity, attended with Infinite Power, Wisdom, and Goodness: Herein it's distinguished from Human Revelation; And therefore, when once we are assured (so as to yield a firm Assent) that such a particular Article is revealed, it becomes the most necessitating Motive of Assent; I mean, to the Truth of it; because, this being granted, here's Infinite Veracity, Wisdom, Power and Goodness against our Imperfect Conceptions, and the seeming Difficulties founded in 'em. When once we assent or yield it to be Divine Revelation, I think, we may safely affirm, against this Reasoner, [We may believe purely upon his Word, without Evidence, (at least such as he requires) in the things 'emselves]. Here the Authority of him that speaks, not my Conception of the thing, or what he says, is the Ground of my Persuasion].  
But, to proceed, as for what this Reasoner says of GOD's Omnipotence and Contradictions, N. 13. no one is so silly to imagine, that real Contradictions are an Object of Omnipotence; but there may be Contradictions which we apprehend as real▪ that in truth are but seeming ones▪ and particularly when we cannot fully comprehend the nature of both the Terms or Objects; and it's already concluded, that in matters of Revelation Reason will often direct us to suspect our Judgements, and esteem 'em as such: And then, I hope, there's no Absurdity in Pronouncing, seeming Contradictions and Impossibilities, a proper Subject of God's Omnipotence: Thus far our Saviour will bear us out, for all things are possible with God, Matt. nineteen. 26.  
But, to pursue him a little further, he tells us, N. 16. speaking of GOD's Revelations, [His Words must be intelligible, and the Matter possible. And as for unintelligible Relations, we can no more believe them from the Revelation of GOD, than from that of Man, for the conceived Ideas of Things are the only Subjects of believing, and therefore all Matters revealed by GOD or Man, must be equally intelligible and possible: We are then to expect the same degree of Perspicuity (he means, with respect to the knowledge of the Object) from GOD as from Man, tho' more of Certitude from the first than the last: he means with respect to the Veracity of the Publisher.]  
Answ. What has already been delivered upon Matters of Revelation, I hope, will satisfy any reasonable Man, how far a revealed Truth is required to be intelligible. It's concluded, GOD has discovered so much of the Nature of revealed Truths as is useful or necessary; and consequently, He has, at least, discovered so much as is sufficient to inform us, upon Principles of Revelation, what He proposes to our Belief, but He did not intend to make us Philosophers, so as to enable us to comprehend the Modus of revealed Truths, or form an Idea of the Manner of Existence, in order to believe the Truth of 'em. This we cannot pretend even in Physical Disquisitions; nay, I think, it's justly concluded, that in Matters of Revelation, which are for the most part Spiritual and Infinite, we are not to dispute the Possibility of their Existence, by measuring 'em by Objects of Sense; for, in reality, this is the same with comprehending the Modus of their Existence, since we cannot absolutely declare against the Possibility of their Existence, without a Faculty of comprehending and determining the Modus of it, and passing an Estimate upon it as absurd and impossible: And therefore we say, That Matters of Revelation are to be understood so far as to conceive what GOD proposes to our Belief, but not to comprehend the Modus of their Existence; such Ideas are not the necessary Subjects of Faith.  
Again, In Humane Revelation the Object is Matters of Fact, and thing we attain to by the Testimony of our Senses, and consequently are things that lie within the proper Verge of Humane Understanding.  
Again, They are Discoveries made by Persons upon the same level with ourselves, and, consequently, such as are not only liable to be mistaken, but may sometimes industriously lead others into Mistakes. And both these are Arguments that will engage us to demand an absolute Comprehension of the Nature of the Thing, and all its Circumstances; so that before we can come to a final Datermination, or yield an Assent to the Truth of any such Relation, We must comprehend the Nature of it so exactly, as to be able to judge, not only of the Possibility, but Probability of it. And, I hope, no one can have the Face to demand all this Evidence from GOD. Therefore we may conclude, against our Majesterial Reasoner, That the same degree of Perspicuity is not required from GOD, as from Man. In a word, if we cannot form a perfect Idea of revealed Truths, much less of the Modus of their Existence, we cannot judge of the Possibility of 'em: If indeed we were able to form an Idea of the Modus of their Existence, that will comport with common Notions, tho' this be not the true Modus, we may safely pronounce them possible; but we cannot pretend to reject the Possibility of 'em, unless we could judge of the real Modus, and show, that it's absurd and impossible: Therefore we may conclude, that all Matters revealed by GOD or Man, are not required to be equally intelligible and possible.  
But, to proceed, as for those Instances of Scripture, that follow in this or the next Chapter, to prove Christianity a rational intelligible Religion; they only prove, That Reason is a concurring Instrument in embracing all religious Truths, not by teaching us to comprehend the Nature of 'em, but to engage our Assent, where we cannot fully comprehend upon rational Motives and Convictions: And we think we act upon rational Motives and Convictions in Matters of Revelation, when we know as much of the thing as satisfies us, what it is GOD proposes to our belief, and yet find some things contained in 'em incomprehensible in their own nature, and rely upon God's Veracity, Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, rather than reject the whole, because we know but in part. Nay further, in the case of Miracles, we grant, that Reason may judge of the reality of 'em, because they are Objects of Sense, and are to be examined by the Testimony of the Senses, by Ideas of Objects of Sense, and the Exercitations of Reason upon 'em, and because Miracles are the uncontrollable Demonstrations of the Spirit, or Means of Conviction, for proving the Divine Original of Revelation; And we can freely grant, that Reason must act by common Notions, to prove Revelation to be truly Divine: But when this is done, there's no Consequence that Reason must still measure revealed Truths by common Notions, and reject 'em if she cannot fully comprehend 'em, or if she cannot make 'em comport with common Notions; which is the thing our Adversary labours to prove.  
The remaining Instances, which only declare the Perspicuity of the Moral Law or Christian Precepts, an Ingenious Reader will presently discern how foreign and impertinent they are to his Design.  
At the same rate he trifles, when he raises an Objection from the Corruption of Humane Reason; as if, by making his own Answers and Objections, he had vanquished all our Arguments, gained the Field, and might triumphantly maintain, That there's nothing in the Christian Religion mysterious, or above Reason; for, I do not anywhere find the Ch. of England fixes the Controversy on this Bottom▪ and therefore this is Reply enough to two of his Chapters, viz. 3, 4.  
And now we come to the Third Section, 
Sect. III.  where we are introduced with an Account of what's mysterious and above Reason. I shall for the most part take his own Accounts of it, and therefore shall not much dispute any thing in the first Chapt. only I cannot forbear to remark, how lame or imperfect, or, at least, industriously equivocal, all his Descriptions are: He gives us two Significations of a Mystery, the first I shall not examine; his second is, (I suppose he speaks his own Opinion, else he should have declared the contrary) [It is made to signify a thing of its own nature inconceivable, and not to be judged of by our ordinary Faculties and Ideas, tho' it be never so much revealed.] Indeed, I think the first part of this Description is a Mystery; tho', I suppose, he means, in the nature of the thing, or by reason of its Immensity, it's inconceivable to us, or with respect to Humane Comprehension; but then, who knows how far he intends to carry this, I mean, represent a Mystery inconceivable? If he intends it so as that we can form no manner of Idea of it, than he imposes a manifest Absurdity upon the World; for no one ever called that a MYSTERY that we could have no Notion of; for, such a thing may be as well Nothing, as Mystery, for any thing we can tell. And therefore Mystery, at least, supposes an Imperfect or Inadequate Idea, (as appears from all those Instances I have hitherto produced) otherwise we could not know what God proposes to our Belief. But then, if we inquire further into the thing, and endeavour to unravel the Modus of its Existence, we can either form no distinct Idea, or, at least, none that will comport with common Notions. And thus far we affirm, That Mysteries are not to be judged of by our ordinary Faculties and Ideas, tho' never so clearly revealed. N. 1.  
I proceed to Chap. 2. where, after having promised a wonderful Perspicuity in the Case before him, he affirms, [That nothing can be said to be a▪ Mystery, because we have not an adequate Idea of it, or a distinct View of all its Properties at once; for then every thing would be a Mystery. 
Sect. 8. ] Now truly I'm much of his Mind, for I'm persuaded that no Finite Understanding can conceive all the several Properties of any one Being, at once in a distinct view: This is the Peculiar of an Alwise GOD; and if an adequate Idea must imply a distinct view of every Property at once, and Mystery opposed to it, every thing must be a Mystery to every intelligent Being but GOD: So that here's a Notion raised, that proves nothing, and no one requires it. We will therefore pass this as an Unphilosophical Blunder, and describe an adequate Idea to be what he aims at, viz. A clear and distinct Idea of the Nature and Properties of an Object. This (he contends) cannot be fairly opposed to MYSTERY, because, in the Knowledge of Humane Bodies, GOD has sufficiently answered the Ends and Designs of it, by enabling us to comprehend the principal Properties of Bodies, and the Uses of 'em: And therefore what remains cannot be MYSTERY, N. 19, 20. This is truly a Reason which is more cogent on the other hand, as well in Philosophical as Revealed Disquisitions: GOD has discovered, or enabled us to comprehend, as much as is useful or necessary in both these Cases; but, after all, we can pretend no further than some principal Properties: And since Reason tells us, there's a great deal undiscovered and incomprehensible, we may justly affirm, That there are Mysteries in Nature, as well as Revelation; so that we are beholden to him for his Argument, tho' he had no Friendly Design in it. Indeed, if he would be content to carry us no further than the force of his Argument naturally tends, we should presently join in an amicable Accommodation, which is in other terms no more than this: There can be no Mystery in Revelation, (he might have added, nor in rerum natura) I mean, in this Notion of it; because we know as much as our Finite Understandings are capable of, or as much as is necessary or useful. If this may be admitted, it's a substantial Reason to conclude against the Possibility of a Mystery.  
But we may say there are Mysteries, not because we know not as much as is necessary and useful, but because after we know the principal Properties of Things, or as much as is necessary or useful, we can discern a great deal which we cannot comprehend. And this holds good not only in Matters of Revelation, but Nature too. Our Adversary confesses as much; for tho' we have a competent Idea of the Properties of Bodies, that is, as far as they are useful to us, yet we are not able to comprehend the Modus of their Operations, nor indeed the true Causes of a great many obvious Effects.  
Again, In revealed Truths we can form, at least, an imperfect Idea of what GOD proposes to our belief. Thus we form an Idea of our Saviour's Divinity, from those Characters which Revelation and Natural Reason gives us of the Godhead. We believe him to be possessed with the fullness of the Godhead, because the same Characters are ascribed to him that are ascribed to the Father in respect of the Godhead; but we cannot form an Idea of the Manner of the Union of this Divinity with Humane Nature, nor its Consistence with the Unity of the Godhead, at least so as to make it comport with common Notions: So that in respect of the Modus of things, whether as to their Existence or Operations, even in those of Natural Bodies, as well as Matters of Revelation, there are Mysteries in Nature, (and that properly) as well as in Revelation.  
Our Adversary indeed would call this an Inadequate Knowledge, but nothing Mysterious or above Reason; but I hope to prove it a Mystery even in the received sense of the Word, as well as the reason of the Thing, and that too on his own Concessions and Principles. And,  
1st, It's certain his Evasions concerning Inadequate Ideas will do him no service, to take off the Denominations of Mystery, or above Reason; for we affirm, That Things are Mysterious, and above Reason, because we can form but very imperfect and inadequate Ideas of 'em. It's certainly absurd to imagine that any thing can be mysterious, or above Reason, which we are able fully to comprehend; and it's equally absurd to say, that things are mysterious, when we can form no Idea at all, since we can pronounce nothing when we know nothing: But, to confess, that of most things we can form but imperfect and inadequate Ideas, is to prove a thing to be mysterious; for, if we know and acknowledge, that our most improved Ideas are inadequate, we must conclude there's something behind, either as to the Modus or Rationale of Things, which Reason cannot comprehend. And I know no better denomination, than to say, That Things are in this respect mysterious, or above Reason.  
To make up the strict Notion of Mystery, we are not to consider the Necessity or Usefulness of what we cannot comprehend; but the grand Question is, Whether there are not Modes and Properties of Things, that by reason of the Imperfection of Human Understanding, or the Immensity or Intricacy of the Things 'emselves, cannot be comprehended by us? For it is the Abstruseness or Inaccessibility of Things that make the Mysteries, not the Necessity or Usefulness of what is incomprehensible. And therefore if there be Things in this material World which we cannot comprehend, we may truly affirm, That there's a Mystery in Nature, or that Natural Causes or Effects are thus far above Reason, or mysterious; much more may we affirm it of Matters of Revelation: And therefore, to use the Instance of a vain insulting Adversary, Tho' we live upon Water, and see and handle it daily, there may and is something in it mysterious, and above Reason, inasmuch as we cannot form an Idea of every thing that truly belongs to it. And yet no wise Man will be tempted to make such a practical Inference as this Reasoner hath suggested, that is, resolve never to inquire into its Nature, nor employ it in his House or Grounds 
* See Sect. 3. N. 10. . But, in Matters of Revelation, we know how inadequate our Ideas are, as much as Finite differs from Infinite, Negative from Positive, and Sense from Spirit: Must they not then contain things above Reason, because they are only thus inadequate?  
But further, As for the original Import of the word MYSTERY, I am not concerned to trace it in the primitive Uses of it, it's sufficient if by Custom it hath obtained another Import (it may be) every jot as proper as the former. Our Author owns, that in approved Classicks it's commonly taken for obscure and intricate Matters, such as cannot well be comprehended or seen into 
* See N. 5. Sect. 3. . And this, I think, is equally proper with that other described by him, which implies something beyond a Veil, not discernible till that is removed: And in this sense the Types under the Mosaic Law he accounts Mysteries; for those which through the Imperfections or Weakness of Reason, or the Immensity, Distance, or Intricacy of the Object, may be as little discerned as those that have a Veil over 'em; and then they seem to be equally mysterious, and above Reason. In a word, Mystery is something shut up from our View or Cognizance, and it is not material whether this be done by a Veil or other Impediments or Obstructions; and consequently Mystery and an Inadequate Idea may be very consistent; I do not mean, that which arises from affected Ignorance, but the Intricacy of the Object, and the Weakness of Humane Reason under its highest Improvements.  
But, to clear up his Understanding in this matter, by a few Arguments drawn from his own Positions, the Riches of his own inexhausted Brain, he tells us, Cap. 3. N. 27. That certain Gospel-Doctrines are called Mysteries, with respect to the Jews, [not▪ that they knew nothing of 'em, but they were not clearly and fully revealed till the New Testament-times, being veiled before by various Typical Representations, etc.] Well, you see he allows Mosaic Types to be Mysteries, and gives the reason, Because they saw 'em thro' a Veil; or, in St. Paul's Language, with respect to further Discoveries, thro' a Glass darkly: And what is this, but that they knew them in part, or by inadequate Ideas? I'm sure our Knowledge is as much cramped in several of those Instances produced by our Author, from the Intricacy and Immensity of the Things 'emselves, as those Gospel-truths shut up from the jews by the Mosaic Veil of Types and Figures: And consequently, why is not the one as much a Mystery to us, as the other to the jews, and for this very reason, because we know them inadequately.  
But, to go a little further with him, I remember, in the State of his Question, as well as in other places, he gives us to understand, That all Revealed Matters may be judged of even by common Notions, both as to their Manner and Existence, as easily as the ordinary Phoenomena of Nature; and therefore concludes, That there's nothing in the Gospel contrary to Reason, or above it; and, That no Christian Doctrine can be properly called a MYSTERY. This is the State of the Question; and what he asserts must be a Criterion, in judging what is mysterious or above Reason: So that we may hence conclude, and that upon his own Principles too, That that Thing whose Manner or Existence cannot be conceived, even with as much ease and clearness as the ordinary Phoenomena of Nature, is a Mystery, and above Reason. Certainly here is a fair Concession, and such as will make things mysterious, because we can but form inadequate, Ideas; for, as this Author confesses, we can form Ideas of the Being's of Things, and know as much as is useful from their Properties and Effects, whilst we are ignorant of the manner of their Existence or Production: See N. 8, 11.— (the one of Plants, and the other of Rain). Here he manifestly fixes our inadequate Ideas upon the Modus of Things, with respect to their Operations and Existence; that is, our Ideas are inadequate, because we cannot decipher wherein their Modus consists, tho' we know their principal Properties by their Effects and Uses.  
And now we may call in his own Principles to conclude against him, and affirm, That inadequate Ideas must necessarily imply a Mystery, for inadequate Ideas imply our Ignorance as to the Modus of Things, and that thing whose Modus cannot be comprehended, according to his own Principles, is mysterious, and above Reason. Here, I think, he pretends to Outdo the most improved Arts of Priestcraft, whilst he declares for nothing but Reason, and banishes Mystery out of the World, and yet imposes things that surpass the highest Mystery; since he labours to make the World embrace his Contradictions for the undoubted Decrees of Reason: [This is, in his own language, trifling with a witness, or pitiful shifting or fooling, or what not, and such as discovers a mighty Scarcity of good Arguments, N. 13.] But he hath not done with us yet, and therefore concludes with an obliging Proposal, [If they will still be fooling, and call these things Mysteries, I'm willing to admit as many as they please in Religion, if they will allow me likewise to make mine as intelligible to others as these are to me, Ib.]  
I hope I have made good the first part, That there are true and proper Mysteries, even in the Schools of Nature. And, if so, it's manifest, notwithstanding his vain Triumphs, we have an Argument à majori, That there are Mysteries in Revelation: I say, it's a majori to every one but him, that has the Face to assert, That an infinite incomprehensible Spirit is an Object equally intelligible with Objects of Sense, or with Wood or Stone. As for the last part of his Proposals, I believe every one will consent, That he shall make all those revealed Truths we call Mysteries, as intelligible as he's able, provided he'll promise not to reject 'em, because he fails in his Undertaking; or, in a word, because he cannot make them compare with common Ideas or Notions.  
And now, I hope, I have said enough to invalidate all the Arguments of this Chapter. But lest he should think me rude, or that I neglect him too much, I shall make some short Returns to a few Passages that are yet behind. And,  
1st, He instructs us what it is to comprehend a Thing, viz. [When it's chief Properties, and their several Uses, are known to us; for to comprehend, in all correct Authors, is nothing else but to know; and as of what is not knowable we can have no Idea, so is it nothing to us. I shall, for once, admit, that in the common Notion of Humane Perception or Comprehension, we think we know or comprehend a Thing sufficiently, when its chief Properties, and their several Uses, are known to us; but may we not at the same time discern, that there are others we cannot conceive, and that the Modus or precise Nature of those we know are inconceivable: And so we may, without Offence, or in a strict and proper way of Speech, affirm, That there's a great deal mysterious in the thing, and above Reason; and yet we do not pronounce it above Reason, (as he suggests, ib.) because we know no more than concerns us; but because there's something inconceivable, tho' to conceive it does not so directly concern us.  
But, 2dly, as for that which is mysterious even in Matters of Revelation, we do not pretend that it is any thing to us; I mean, as if we were obliged to comprehend or define the precise Modus of the thing; This is to be a Mystery and no Mystery. However, since we discern in certain revealed Truths something which we cannot comprehend, we may believe those revealed Truths to be so far mysterious, and they so far concern us, as to pay the Obedience of Faith to 'em, and not reject the Whole, because we cannot comprehend Every-thing that belongs to 'em. This aught to be an Eternal Rule to our Author in matters of Revelation, because it's founded upon his own Words and Principles: We believe the Divinity of our Saviour, because we have not only its Uses set forth, but we have it represented in the principal Properties of the Godhead, even such as are ascribed to GOD the Father; and consequently, in the Sense of this Author, we may be said to comprehend or know this Divine Truth. Therefore if any thing arises as to the Modus of its Existence, or otherwise, that is mysterious, (not knowable, or of which we can have no Idea) his own Rule directs him, that this is nothing to him, and consequently is by no means to be an Argument against this Divine Truth: I'm sure, if 'tis not ridiculous not to supersede our Disquisitions in matters that do not directly concern us, (another Assertion of his, ib.) it's undoubtedly ridiculous to make Disquisitions in such Cases, and make them an Argument for rejecting the clearest revealed Truths; which is the constant Practice of the Modern Reasoners or Disputers of this World, the Socinians.  
But, to proceed, the next thing remarkable is, a compendious Rule to acquire Useful Knowledge, N. 11. viz. Not to trouble ourselves nor others with what is useless were it known, or what is impossible to be known at all. Whereas in the Paragraph immediately preceding, he seems to charge us with saying, That Things are above Reason, because we know no more than concerns us, or is useful. And yet allowing this Notion, he tells us, that it is ridiculous to supersede our Disquisitions about it upon that Score; that is, according to his own Notion, tho' we know as much of it as concerns us, or is useful. A blessed Lawgiver truly, to institute Contradictions almost with the same Breath; for, I think, he cannot avoid the Charge, without flying to that which is as abominable in his very Thoughts as this reproachful to his Reason; I mean, by Pleading he intended a Mystery.  
And now, having given you enough of the Doctrinal part, he carries us to Application; but truly, I hope I have disabled him so visibly in the former, as supersedes the Necessity of a formal Reply to the latter. I shall only recite the Application he has made, and rather refer than answer; [1st, That no Christian Doctrine, no more than any ordinary piece of Nature, can be reputed a Mystery, because we have not an adequate or complete Idea of whatever belongs to it.] As for what may be attributed to inadequate Ideas, I have said enough in this Chapter; and tho' we may not say, That the want of an adequate Idea is the formalis ratio that constitutes a Mystery, yet our Inabilities in comprehending some things that are really lodged in it, or really belong to it, makes it a Mystery; and as is already proved with as good reason as those things he counts mysterious, viz. Intelligible Truths beyond the Veil.  
2dly, [What is revealed in Religion, as it is most useful and necessary, so it must and may be as easily comprehended, and found as consistent with our common Notions, as what we know of Wood or Stone, or the like.] We certainly agree, That GOD hath only revealed as much as is necessary or useful; and, in matters of pure Revelation, no more than will give us an Idea of the Thing, or what it is GOD proposes to our Belief; and therefore make this an Argument, that there are Things that belong to it, of which we cannot form a distinct Idea, and, consequently, from hence give it the Denomination of being Mysterious.  
Now, as for the mysterious part of any revealed Truth, we affirm, That it exceeds our Comprehension, otherwise the Mystery must cease: But, as it exceeds our Comprehension, so we say, it is not necessary to be comprehended; much less do we allow, that it may be comprehended by common Ideas or Notions, or scanned by those Ideas: So as that, in case it doth not correspond with 'em, we cannot call in question the Truth of what is revealed and comprehended.  
No, here, in case Curiosity tempts us to dive into the mysterious part of any revealed Truth, and upon the closest Researches, we find ourselves unable to comprehend; We are to adhere to the Substance of the Truth, where we cannot comprehend the Modus of it; or, in other Terms, adore, where we cannot comprehend. But as to our comprehending by common Notions, or, as easily as we can comprehend, Wood, or Stone, or the like, I observe,  
1st, This Gentleman makes all Objects of Humane Knowledge equally comprehensible. And,  
2dly, That we may take our Measures for comprehending any one, by those Ideas we have form of others; but I have elsewhere sufficiently discovered the Falseness of both these Assertions; and there I shall not enlarge, but rest upon the Conclusiveness of what hath been offered.  
3dly, When we do as familiarly explain such Doctrines as what is known of Natural Things (which I pretend we can) we may then be as 
* See N. 12. Sect. 3.  properly said to comprehend the one as the other. This is a very bold Undertaking, and not to be believed till he gives us good Reason, and nothing less than Matter of Fact for Demonstration, especially if he intends that part of those Doctrines we justly call mysterious. But then, in using this Familiarity, We must engage him not to explain away the Substance of any Doctrine, nor to reject the Doctrine, if he fails in his Explication. And now we come to attack him in his Strong-hold, that is, his Appeal to the Voice of Scripture: 
* See Cap. 3. Sect. 3.  And truly Scripture is an unquestionable Tribunal for the Decision of all Controversies in Matters of Revelation; and as to their present Controversies, as far as Scripture can determine, every one may desire to put the Case on this Issue, and Appeal to this Tribunal (as well as he) provided he is satisfied Scripture is on his side; and he may with greater satisfaction be reputed Orthodox with this on his side, than to pass for Orthodox with the whole World, and have it against him. But then in case he either mistakes the Sense of Scripture, or has recourse to it, to make it come up to the State of his Case, and prove more than what can be inferred from it; it's very bold to say, that Scripture has engaged him in this Error, if it be one: Hear I'm sure Scripture will be no Protection to him, against a just Charge of Error, because he makes an Appeal to her, and retreats under her Wing for Shelter; when in reality he charges his own false Reasonings, or the Arguments of some particular Passions, not to say unjust Propositions on Scripture, as if all were the unerring Counsels and Dictates of Divine Truth. And truly this Reasoner does little less, when he attempts to prove, that there are no Mysteries in Christianity, because he endeavours to show, that the word Mystery in the New Testament, is no where applied to the Thing we contend for, viz. a Thing that with respect to Humane Reason, contains something in it altogether incomprehensible: For is it not absurd to argue against a Thing from the signification of a Word, which might never have been used in Scripture, and yet the Thing found there? and tho' it is used, yet our Author, pursuant to the Mind of Scripture, fixes Three several Significations on it, and consequently it can be no Argument that it hath not a Fourth; because it does not appear in Scripture; unless he could prove that the Holy Ghost thought it necessary to reveal all the Notions or Acceptations of the word Mystery; therefore if this Advocate for Reason allows the whole Case, as he pretends, to be put upon this Issue, it will presently be given against him, for want of a good Consequence. So that in truth, if the Controversy is to be determined by Scripture, (as no doubt it ought) it must unavoidably turn upon this issue, Whether there are not Truths set forth in Scripture, in which, if we inquire into the Nature of 'em, a great deal is contained in 'em, which we cannot comprehend, and consequently are mysterious, and above Reason; whether Scripture deliver 'em under these Denominations or no.  
This may be true, tho' the Word Mystery were no where to be found in Scripture, or tho' Scripture had not so much as hinted, that there were any thing mysterious or incomprehensible. If this can be proved, our Adversary must acknowledge, that there are Mysteries in Christianity still. The Instances of our Saviour's Incarnation already produced, move upon this Supposition; and I shall be ready to prove it, whenever he shall think fit to impugn the Truth of it. But besides this, I shall in some measure condescend to his own Method, and tho' I shall not Examine every Passage of Scripture, to see whether he has rightly stated the Signification of the Word, yet I do not question, but we may offer as strong Arguments to apply it sometimes to the Sense we contend for, as he hath done for another; and besides this, I hope to produce some Passages of Scripture, that assure us there are still those things in Christianity, we properly call Mysteries; and if this be performed, I hope it may without Affectation be said, that his Appeal to the Tribunal of Scripture is defeated.  
And, 1st, because I do not design Opposition, or Disputes, for Opposition's sake; I shall own that the Word MYSTERY is used in the several Senses he hath put upon it.  
I. For the Gospel in general.  
II. For some unfolded Secrets. And,  
III. For things veiled by Parables: but this is by no means an Argument that there is no other signification to be found in Scripture: for I am persuaded, I can prove the contrary with as much Authority and Force of Reason as he can produce against it; I mean, that it's sometimes used to express the Incomprehensibleness of certain Truths, tho' revealed. And,  
1. That Mystery must imply something that is in the Nature of it to us incomprehensible, St. Paul seems to have assured us, But we speak the Wisdom of God in a Mystery, even the hidden Wisdom of God, 1 Cor. 2. 7. All sides agree, that the Apostle points at the Fundamental Articles of the Christian Faith, and particularly the Redemption of the World by Jesus Christ, and more primarily the most abstruse part of it, his Incarnation.  
2. It's visible the Apostle speaks of it as a Mystery, even when he reveals it; for he reveals the Wisdom of God in a Mystery. He now speaks to the Perfect, that had owned the Gospel, and the Divine Authority of his Preaching, as appears from the preceding Verse; and it's their peculiar to have the Meat of the Word, or the Mysteries of the Kingdom of GOD, communicated to 'em; and therefore, tho' this Wisdom of GOD be a Mystery, and consequently he delivers it as such, yet the Perfect believe, when they cannot comprehend, because it is the Wisdom of GOD: I am sure this Notion is agreeable to the Judgement of Clemens Alexandrinus; for he uses the very Word of the Apostle, and calls it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; nay, he makes this an Argument, why the Fundamental Truths of the Gospel should only be communicated to the Pure and Perfect, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. ut supra, Strom. Lib. 1. And therefore since the Apostle reveals it in a Mystery, it must be so, because it contains something in it that is incomprehensible. Hence we may justly Vindicate our English Translation, which does not join, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as our Adversary would have it; but makes it a Repetition, or Enlargement upon the Divine Wisdom, viz. even the Hidden Wisdom. It's true, our Adversary endeavours to evade this Exposition, because we are told in the 10th Verse, But God hath revealed them to us by his Spirit: But the Words manifestly refer to those Things, which, in the preceding Verse, God is said to have prepared for them that love him, which are chiefly the Benefits of our Redemption, and the Consequent of this fundamental Revelation; or at least, if it must be this fundamental Instance of Divine Wisdom, it is only revealed so as to let us know, what God intends by it, and assures us of the Truth of it, but not to comprehend the whole Nature of it; or in a word, it is so revealed, as any other thing is revealed in a Mystery; that is, when something remains in it, that is not to be comprehended; so that, in Truth, here's Mystery in two Senses:  
1st, With respect to the Incomprehensibleness of the Thing. And,  
2dly, With respect to the Thing before it was communicated to us.  
And thus far not only the Natural Construction of the Words, but the Authority of a Learned Expositor carries us, Vid. Theophilact. in locum, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
But Secondly, I shall insist on that noble Passage of St. Paul to Timothy, Ep. 1. Cap. 3. Ver. 10. And without Controversy, great is the Mystery of Godliness; God was manifested in the Flesh, justified in the Spirit, seen of Angels, preached unto the Gentiles, believed on in the World, received up into Glory. It's observable, our Adversary expounds as accurately, as he reasons; for he produces this for his eighth Passage, where Mystery is put for the Gospel in general, whereas it's manifest the Words cannot, without the greatest Violence, be applied to any thing but a Divine Person, represented under certain Divine Characters, and indeed to none but our Saviour, the Cornerstone of the Gospel, but not the Gospel; for truly the Apostle seems, in this place, to have given a description of his whole Mediation. I am sure the Current of the Fathers, as well as of after Commentators, apply it to none but our Saviour. But now since our Saviour's Incarnation is this Mystery of Godliness, it's evident the Apostle does not speak of what it was before it was revealed, but what it is after it is preached and believed on in the World, and therefore he calls it a Mystery, not because it was so before it was revealed, but because it still remains so; and thereupon he endeavours to represent it as such, by enlarging upon the Nature and Incomprehensibleness of it; God was manifest in Flesh, the Foundation of this Mystery, the following Characters being only their Appendages that take their rise and concentre in it. This is an Exposition that discovers itself so clearly, that we find our Adversary industriously huddling up this Passage, as it were, in a Mystery, without giving any tolerable account of it; and at last is forced to confess, That the gracious Manifestation of Christ and his Gospel, is to us wonderfully stupendous and surprising, N. 30. So that we plainly read Mystery in the very Sense we contend for: I am sure we have the Opinion of some Ancient Church-Writers to ratify it. Of this Opinion we find Athanasius in his Tract against Paulus Samosatenus de Incarnatione Verbi, where he gives his Judgement, è Cathedra, as Archbishop of Alexandria; for first he lays open the Attempts of this Heretic, in endeavouring to Subvert the Doctrine of our Saviour's Incarnation, and styles it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and to prove it such, citys this very place of our Apostle. Secondly, He represents the danger in attempting to unfold such profound Difficulties, that are only with safety to us believed, and in a word, enjoins us to adhere to the Apostolic Faith, without admitting new Terms or Notions, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and above all, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to dread the Disquisition of such a Mystery. But besides the Opinion of this great Man, we have the Comment of Isiodore the Pelusiote, and Theophilact, fixing the Mystery of Godliness in the Incomprehensibleness of it. Thus the former, Lib. 2. Ep. 192. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and pursuant to this, expostulates, Who can comprehend the Miracle of his Conception, transacted without Coition, or imagine how the Divine Nature can be circumscribed, that is Immense, and not to be circumscribed? And Theophilact proceeds in the same Strain thus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in Locum. And now this is something more certainly than calling it a Mystery, with respect to the Ages preceding the Gospel; for I think this Passage in itself admits of the Exposition before us more naturally, than that our Adversary contends for; besides we have the Authority of the Learned in past Ages. And since I have made it appear he has no advantage over us in his whole Hypothesis, I know not why we may not in his own Language pronounce against him, that Mystery in the New Testament, is sometimes put for a thing inconceivable in itself, and not to be judged of by our ordinary Notions, however revealed. This likewise calls to mind the Triumphs of our Adversary upon a Passage, which as we allow, styles the Gospel a Mystery, under this Notion; it's Rom. 16. 25.— But is now made manifest, whereupon he Expostulates, In what sense could this Secret be made manifest, if it remained still Incomprehensible? A mighty Favour indeed, to bless the World with a parcel of Unintelligible Notions. I confess, I incline to the former sense, I mean a Mystery, with respect to the Ages preceding the Gospel, but can see no foundation for Absurdities, no more than for his vain Triumphs, if we take it in the Sense he pretends to explode; for this Reasoner, had he not been too much used to confound things together, might have learned, that the highest Mystery is not wholly unintelligible; and it may be properly said, to be manifested in as much as God has communicated by the Apostle's preaching what's useful and necessary, and as much as will inform us what God proposes to our Belief: Again it's manifested, and that too to our unspeakable Comfort, since the vast Designs of Divine Love, and the unexpressible Benefits to us-ward in it, are abundantly laid open; and I think these are Favours or Blessings too rich to be exposed in Ridicule or Burlesque.  
But further, If the use of the Word in Scripture will not prove the thing we contend for, there are sufficient hints in Scripture to prove it: I shall first insist on St. Paul's Accounting the preaching of Christ unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto them which are called, the Power of God and the Wisdom of God, 1 Cor. 1. 23, 24.  
Now this place is generally interpreted of the Incarnation of Christ, or the Union of the two Natures into to one Divine Person: And those that embrace and believe it, must resolve it into the Infinite Power and Wisdom of God, not as a common, but special Act, and consequently a thing incomprehensible as they are; and on this account, it's to the Greeks, the great Masters of Reason, Foolishness; because, as it is represented to us, it contains in it, Things that can never be reconciled with common Notions, or Ideas. What common Ideas can satisfy us, that the Son of God should speak by a Man, or as the Sacred Canon hath it, in the form of a Man; that God should have a Son, and that he should suffer as the Son of God? What common Ideas can represent to us, that Christ could have a Being before the Worlds, as God; that he should be born a Man, and exist as such, and yet not as a Man, begotten of a Man? These things, the most improved Notices of Natural Reason cannot confirm, or warrant, no not our Adversary with all his Reason. If any thing, it's the Arian, or Socinian Hypothesis (tho' advanced contrary to the Current of Scripture) that may pretend most to be a Rationale in this matter. And yet our Adversary seems to explode this as much as that of the Trinitarians, because they are forced to allow Divine Worship to be paid him, [Cap. 1. Sect. 2. N. 2. I am mistaken if either they, or the Arians can make their Notions of a dignified, and Creature-God, capable of Divine Worship, appear more reasonable, than the Extravagancies of other Sects, touching the Article of the Trinity.] But to return, It's manifest here we learn how the Doctrines of Christianity came to be branded with the Imputation of Foolishness, viz. Because they will not comport with common Notices, or the received Principles of Natural Philosophy: for I have evinced it, upon the Objection of Trypho against justin, and St. Clement's Comment on the place, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Dial. cum Trypho, p. 269. And St. Clement, in locum, thus, Lib. 1. Stromat. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Here we see this great Man does not charge the Greeks with false Principles of Philosophy, as the Ground of their Error, for he represents the Thing as much inconsistent with such principles as they could, and makes this the Foundation of their unjust Charge, I mean in pronouncing the Doctrines of Christianity Foolishness; and indeed he calls 'em 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but it can be on no other account, than because they would admit of nothing but Natural Reason, and Philosophy, and thereupon would try all revealed Truths by common Notions, or Principles of Philosophy, and reject 'em as absurd and foolish, because they could not make these deep Things of God to comport with common Ideas of Objects of Sense. Indeed Celsus objects much the same things against Origen; for upon every turn, he endeavours to ridicule the Divinity of our Saviour, by representing it inconsistent with the Principles of Natural Reason: And now give me leave to make one single Remark, since it occurs so naturally: Are not these the very Principles which our Advocate for Reason moves upon? So that an unprejudiced Person might suspect that I'm dealing with a Celsus, or a Trypho; or that they were risen from the Dead. But to conclude this Argument, it's manifest St. Clemens must believe, That the Fundamental Doctrine of the Christian Religion, still contains in it something that cannot be comprehended by Natural Reason, that cannot be reconciled to common Ideas, or Principles of Natural Philosophy, and consequently something that's Mysterious and above Reason: And therefore if this Reverend Father is not mistaken in the purport of the Holy Ghost (as we have good Reason to conclude, he is not) the New Testament does contain the Thing (if not the Word) we contend for, I mean, proposes to our Belief, Things that are Incomprehensible, or above the Comprehension of Human Reason.  
The last Argument I shall produce, is two or three Passages of Scripture, which (because they bear an Affinity to one another) I shall examine and conclude them under one Argument.  
I begin with St. Paul's account of Humane Knowledge, even under this last State of Revelation; for he includes himself, and the whole College of Apostles, who undoubtedly enjoyed the Special Assistance of the Spirit of God; nay, St. Paul had been caught up into the Third Heaven, where he was almost overwhelmed with abundance of Revelations, 2 Cor. 12. And yet he tells us, We know but in part, and we Prophesy in part, 1 Cor. Cap. 13. ver. 9 and the Reason assigned is, We see through a Glass darkly, ver. 12. so that the Impediment seems to lie upon the Mind, or the Immenseness of the Object, not in God that denies us a competent Revelation; for this is the last Revelation of himself; and therefore this Glass argues an Imperfection, or Inability in comprehending some of those Truths that are revealed; but if this Glass be a Veil which God casts before our Eyes, like that upon the jews, in as much as he does not impart in this Life a clear Discovery of certain Gospel-truths', then, according to the Mind of our Author, there are still Mysteries in the Gospel, in the highest Sense; but truly St. Clemens fixes it upon the Imperfections of Humane Knowledge, since he represents the Mind in this Earthly Tabernacle, as viewing Things through Senses after a gross corporeal manner, whereas in another World our Knowledge will be highly enlarged, for than it will be Face to Face; or, as he expresses it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: That is, by a pure and naked Application of the Mind, or Intuition.  
Again, it's manifest the Object of this Imperfect Knowledge, is the deep things of GOD, or, in plain terms, the fundamental Revelations of the Gospel; for, the Apostle must at least comprehend, if not principally intend them, when he tells us, And we Prophesy but in part; that is, those Truths we publish to the World are only revealed in part, since we can only pretend to know or comprehend them in part. And truly St. Clement asserts as much of St. Paul himself, notwithstanding his abundance of Revelations, for thus, on his words 2 Cor. xii. 4. (where, no doubt, he received the chiefest Instructions of his Apostolic Office) He was caught up into Paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for Man to utter; he observes, that there was no Law nor Precept given that obliged him to stifle any of those Christian Truths GOD had committed to him; so that in saying, it is not lawful, he intended to represent the Ineffability of the Divine Nature, or the things of GOD; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And, to confirm this Notion, he citys three Passages that represent the Incomprehensibleness of the Divine Nature, Rom. xi. 33. Oh! the depth of the Riches both of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God And again, But we speak the Wisdom of God in a Mystery: [That is, even when we speak it, else it proves nothing in this place,] 1 Cor. two. 7. And lastly, Colos. two. Ver. 23. To the Acknowledgement of the Mystery of God in Christ, [as you have it in the Ancient Readins] in whom are hidden all the Treasures of Wisdom, or Knowledge. This is a very remarkable Passage, and therefore I must beg leave to enlarge upon it.  
As for the Sense of St. Clement, it's visible he looks upon it to be a Mystery, tho' revealed and acknowledged, and to be a Mystery because it contains something in it which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for otherwise it can be no Argument to prove what he had just before asserted. Indeed, our Adversary thinks he has evaded the Force of this Exposition, by telling us, (without any tolerable Proof) That the Words are to be understood of the Gospel of CHRIST; but if it be the Gospel of CHRIST, it may be styled a MYSTERY, in respect of its Fundamental Truths, inasmuch as they contain in 'em something that's hidden or mysterious; for thus much the following Verse apparently hints▪ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, [i. e. in which, if this Exposition obtains] are hidden 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: It's manifest the Apostle speaks of it as revealed, nay, as it is when acknowledged and embraced, and yet there is something hidden or mysterious. Thus we may conclude, against our Reasoner, that Mystery may be put for the Gospel, and yet called so, because it contains certain Truths, whose Nature cannot be fully comprehended, or certain Truths, that contain something in 'em that to us is incomprehensible. But yet, for all his majesterial decisive way of expounding Scripture, I think the words more naturally point at the Mystery of our Redemption, in the Incarnation of the Son of GOD, especially if we add hereto the ancient Reading used by these Fathers, St. Austin, and St. Ambrose, to the Acknowledgement of the Mystery [not Knowledge of Mystery, as this vain Disputer of this World would have it] of GOD in CHRIST, for, 1st, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which immediately follows, must more naturally be applied to Christ, not to Mystery, agreeable to our Translation, In whom all the Treasures, etc. This is agreeable to the Sentiments of Origen, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, In Hierom. Hom. 8. pag. 99 2dly, If the Gospel of Christ, and not Christ himself, was intended, it would be improper to say, that the Treasures of Wisdom are hid in it, being a revealed Institution: Therefore we may justly conclude, pursuant to the Mind of St. Clement, That the Incarnation of our Redeemer (the Foundation of our Redemption, and Fountain whence all the Treasures of Wisdom and Knowledge derive) is the Mystery of GOD in Christ, which is to be acknowledged, not unravelled or fully comprehended; for, since it is expressly proposed as a Mystery, and remains one when embraced or acknowledged, it must be so, because it carries in it something that is hidden or incomprehensible.  
Indeed Origen manifestly joins in this Notion; for, in his Comment on Matt. xiii. 44. he makes the Field to be the Holy Scriptures, that set forth all the Means of Salvation with the greatest clearness; but the Treasure to be CHRIST, because in Him all the Depths of Wisdom are hid, in Him, in a Mystery, citing this very Passage of St. Paul, by way of Proof, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [dissertis verbis] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
And now give me leave to make an Appeal, as he does, [to all Equitable Persons, N. 35.] Whether, by as good Reason and Authority, it does not appear, That not only the Sense of the Word, but the Things we contend for, are recorded in Scripture, as any he has produced to the contrary? So that, in truth, we are ready to [render up ourselves] to the Voice of Scripture, as well as submit the Merits of the Cause to it, without being influenced and carried away by such weak Practising as he has set forth, in a Dialogue that would merit some Stripes, if performed by a Schoolboy, rather than Applause, as 'tis the Product of a pretending Master of Reason. See Sect. 36.  
And now I have done with his Scripture-authorities, but cannot pass by one Remark of his, which I find to be the chief Improvement that graces his Second Edition: [Nor is it undeserving our particular Notice, that Mystery is here made the distinguishing Mark of the False and Antichristian Church; (See Rev. xvii. 5.) And no doubt but as far as any Church allows of Mysteries, so far it is Antichristian, and may, with a great deal of justice, tho' little Honour, claim Kindred with the Scarlet Whore.] Here is a very bold Stricture, and yet a Man with half an Eye may discern, that his Observation is as irrational and ridiculous as his Inference; for Mystery, in this place, I suppose, would not have passed for a distinguishing Mark, had not her Doctrines and Practices merited the other part of the Title, viz. The Mother of Harlots, and Abomination of the Earth; had she not held a golden Cup in her Hand, full of Abominations and Filthiness of her Fornication, Ver. 4. and been drunken with the Blood of the Saints, and with the Blood of the Martyrs of jesus. But as for his Inference, had he consulted St. Paul's Second Epistle to the Thessalonians a little better, he might have learned, that there's a Mystery of Iniquity as well as Godliness; but perhaps he was unwilling to be disappointed of a malicious, tho' illogical, Suggestion; he might there have informed himself, That it was always the Devil's Business to imitate the True Religion by mighty Signs and lying Wonders, if it were possible, to deceive the very Elect; nay, that Antichrist sitteth in the Temple of GOD, showing himself that he is GOD, and consequently he must pretend to Mystery with a witness: So that, upon the whole, this Gentleman may as well assign the Devil's Miracles for a distinguishing Mark of Antichrist, and prove the true Religion to be nearly related to Antichrist, the Scarlet Whore, and the Devil, because she proceeds upon the Authority of Miracles: Nay, rather we may upon his Argument affirm, That Miracles are a distinguishing Mark of the true Religion: And since Antichrist and the Devil pretend to Miracles, the Religion they pretend to must be true too. Whereas we know these to be Divine and Authoritative, those Diabolical and Usurped, so we pronounce this the Mystery of Iniquity, that the Mystery of Godliness.  
The next thing that offers itself, is, the Suffrage of the Primitive Church. It's true, there are a great many things intervene, wherein he labours more to give us a Specimen of his Wit, that Reason: But truly, I think, they are both of a piece, for I can discover nothing that deserves a single Reflection, much less a formal Reply. I proceed therefore to the Suffrage of the Fathers, to whom he makes an Appeal. He tells us indeed, [It is not out of any deference to their judgements, N. 40.] and therefore we must conclude he submits to it, because he's persuaded they peremptorily declare for his Opinion; but I hope to prove the contrary: For tho' he confesses he has bestowed a great deal of Pains upon 'em, yet this is so far from discouraging us from entering the List, that I hope to make it appear, that his Pains are either an Effect of his Ignorance in these Authors, or of his Dishonesty in suppressing their Opinions. And, first, all that he proves out of the Fathers is, That they have asserted other Notions of Mystery than what we contend for; whereas he himself assigns four or five different Notions; and if Classic Authors were consulted, we could produce some more: and therefore he might as well reject one of his own Notions, because the Fathers have not mentioned it. But I find this Author, upon every turn, shamefully betrays his Reason, for he knows not what is incumbent upon him to prove, and therefore we need not wonder if he proves not his main Design: I'm sure he's now to prove a Negative, (or that which amounts to it) if he proves any thing, viz. That the Fathers, he citys, no where apply the word MYSTERY to things beyond Humane Comprehension; or, that those Notions of the word Mystery, which he finds recorded, are delivered exclusively of all others; for, if he has neither cited all their Notions or Acceptations of the word, nor proved, that they are exclusive of all others, he proves nothing against the acceptation of the word we now contend for; and if so, the most cursory Reader will presently pronounce, That he must give up the Cause, in case he fixes it on this Issue, I mean the Authority of Fathers. But because I will take no advantage of his weakness, I will go along with him in his own Instances. And,  
1st, What he citys from Clemens Alexand. concludes nothing; for, I know no Christian that denys the Christian Religion to be [an Illumination, because it brought hidden things to light, and that with respect to the Mosaic Veil.] But this only proves one of his own Notions, that is indeed allowed by us. But to be short with him; Whereas he has the Face to tell us, That several of those Texts of Scripture alleged by him, are by this Father expounded on his side, and consequently against our Notion: I shall appeal to what has been already cited from him, to prove the quite contrary 
* See p. 46, 48. . Indeed I could add a great deal more to discover his Judgement of the Inconceivableness of certain Objects of Faith, or Matters of Revelation; and, because I'm engaged, I shall produce a few Instances: And, first, where he styles Christianity an Illumination, he speaks of the Fullness of Christ, as a Mystery revealed indeed, but the Nature of it known to a very few; and he proves it from the Incomprehensible Nature of GOD, Strom. lib. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and yet more fully on Moses' words, Exod. 33. ver. 18. Show me thy Glory; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 2. p. 365. Strom. lib. That is, by the Effects of his Power. Again, on St. Paul's words, 1 Cor. 5. Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us; Strom. lib. 5. he observes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Here it's evident he argues from the Incomprehensibleness of the Divine Nature, and consequently must fix the Mystery on this Bottom, as well as the want of Revelation. Indeed, we may justly argue à majori, from the Sense of this Father, if the Nature of the Godhead be, in the Opinion of this great Man, so highly incomprehensible, how much more must the Fundamental Article of the Christian Religion be so, the consists of the Union of the Divine with Human Nature, and consequently, in a proper sense, mysterious. See N. 42.  
Thus much for St. Clement; the next Authority is justin Martyr, which concludes nothing to his purpose: For, First, he only uses the Word in a loose Sense, and not exclusive of any other signification; and if this may be an Argument against that Sense which this Reasoner declaims against, it will be so against others, which he has expressly assigned. This may serve for a sufficient Return to the next Paragraph, where Tertullian styles all Religious Rites, or Acts of Worship, Mysteries; which among the Heathens were generally kept secret: yet, tho' this be an allowed Sense of the Word, it can be no Argument, but that Mystery, even in Tertullian's time, was applied to Things in 'emselves abstruse or incomprehensible. Of the same stamp are his Arguments from Origen, which prove no more than what all sides own, viz. that Mystery, in a vulgar, or more loose Sense, is put for Symbols, Types, or any abstruse or sacred Matter. N. 44.  
Certainly, had this Gentleman consulted any other Pieces of this Learned Father, he might have informed himself, that he uses Mystery even in Divine Matters, for Things that are to us incomprehensible. Thus, in the forecited Passage, speaking of the Thing as it now is, he expresses himself, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. [Vt Supra. See pag. 56.]  
Again, on the Words of our Saviour, Mat. nineteen. 24, 26. he observes, That GOD was able to make a Camel pass through an Eye of a Needle; and yet no one but God or Christ, or he to whom he shall reveal it, is able to comprehend it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Afterwards he challenges any Man to Illustrate or Explain such Mysteries; being Things only comprehended, as well as performed, by GOD, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Pag. 382. 1 Vol.  
But now in the close of this Paragraph, he thinks he sufficiently explodes our Notion of Mystery, when he tells us Origen [was far from thinking any Doctrine of our Religion a Mystery, in the present Sense of the Word, that he expressly affirms them to agree all with common Notions, and to commend themselves to the Assent of every well-disposed Hearer.] This truly looks very plausible; but I'm persuaded, Origen, in making good this Assertion, will run counter to the Notions of this Indefatigable Reasoner: For First, It's well known, who the Holy Father was engaged with, a Learned Heathen, who had form an Objection, That the Christians were to believe Things, tho' in themselves never so absurd or ridiculous; and therefore it was his business to take off the Objection, by shadowing forth the Reasonableness of every Doctrine: He begins with the Doctrines of Natural Religion, the Being of a God, and our Love towards him; but when he comes to the Mystery of our Saviour's Incarnation, he makes a stand, and repeats Celsus' Objection, viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The Answer is remarkable; for it evinces the Divinity and Incarnation of our blessed Saviour, as a standing Doctrine of the Christian Church, to the Eternal Confusion of all Socinian Pretences to Antiquity. Let our Accusers know, that we (as it were speaking the Sense of the Christian Church) do not only think, but are fully persuaded, that he is Originally, or in the Beginning GOD, and the Son of GOD; nay, he is the Substantial Word, Wisdom, and Truth; and as for his Mortal Body, and Human Soul, we attribute the greatest Things to it; in as much as a most exact and complete Union with his Divinity, it obtains a kind of Divinity; so that we may still treat our Blessed Saviour, GOD and Man, (as GOD) with the highest Acts of Divine Worship. His words are these: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
You see the great Design of the Apologist is to represent how such Honour and Dignity is derived upon the Humanity of our Saviour, and consequently the Reasonableness of paying Divine Worship to him even as GOD-Man, or GOD Incarnate; and pursuant to this, to justify those Honours that accrue to the Body of our Saviour, he appeals to the Natural Transmutations of Matter, whereby Bodies are often highly refined and improved, and then ingeniously concludes, Why should not the Infinite Power of GOD therefore be able to change the Mortal Body of jesus? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Thus we see how, out of Ignorance, or a worse Principle, the Disputer of this World (for the Title belongs to him, tho' not so deservedly as those on whom St. Paul bestows it) has Misrepresented the Sense of this great Man, whose main Design was, to show the Reasonableness of paying Divine Worship to the Blessed Jesus; and this he sufficiently performed, by asserting his Divinity, but he did not attempt to demonstrate the Modus of the Union of the two Natures by common Notions. He has indeed expressly asserted our Saviour's Divinity, as well as Humanity, in the highest Notion of it; and I defy this profound Reasoner to state the Union of both Natures by common Ideas or Notions, much less to give us as familiar an Idea of it as we have of Wood or Stone. Till he has done this, he trifles, and we shall still believe that our Saviour's Incarnation is thus far a Mystery. Thus we have turned those very Fathers he most relies on against him; and tho' he has the Confidence to fix a peremptory Challenge upon the Writings of the three first Centuries, I could produce as much more, had I not a regard to my own Time, and that of the Reader's, which ought to be a sufficient Consideration with every Man, to prevent him from engaging in Impertinences, or dwelling too long where Necessity does not require it: I shall therefore only beg Leave to add the Judgement of Irenaeus,— Si autem omnium quae in Scriptures requirantur absolutiones non possumus invenire,— credere autem haec talia debemus Deo, qui & nos fecit; rectissimè scientes, quia Scripturae quidem perfectae sunt, quip à verbo Dei & Spiritu ejus dictae: Nos autem secundum quod minores sumus & novissimi à verbo Dei & Spiritu ejus, scientiâ mysteriorum ejus indigemus; & non mirum est, si in spiritualibus coelestibus, & in his quae habent Revelari hoc patimur nos, quandoquidem eorum quae ante pedes sunt— quae & conteruntur à nobis, & videntur & sunt nobiscum, multa fugerunt nostram scientiam, & Deo haec ipsa committimus;— Si ergo & in rebus creaturae, quaedam quidem eorum adjacent Deo, quaedam autem & in nostram venerunt scientiam, quid mali est, si & eorum quae in Scriptures requiruntur, universis Scripturis Spiritualibus existentibus, quaedam quidem absolvamus secundum gratiam Dei; quaedam autem commendemus Deo, & non solum in hoc saeculo, sed in futuro, ut semper quidem Deus doceat, homo autem semper discat, quae sunt a Deo? [Here, by way of Confirmation, he citys St. Paul, 1 Cor. xiii. v. 13.] Semper enim fides quae est ad magistrum nostrum permanet firma, asseverans nobis, quoniam solus vere Deus, [and afterwards concludes] si secundum hunc modum quem diximus, quaedam quidem quaestionum Deo commiserimus, & fidem nostram servabimus, & omnis Scriptura ideo nobis data, consonans nobis invenietur. Lib. 2. Adu. Haer. cap. 47. Ed. Eras. I have cited this at large, because I find every thing agreeable to the Hypothesis I have hitherto advanced. As,  
1st, Mystery is indisputably applied to revealed Truths, beyond the reach of Humane Comprehension.  
2dly, Such revealed Truths, apparently delivered in Scripture, are not to be rejected; because we cannot resolve the Difficulties that seem to accompany the Belief of 'em, but to embrace 'em as the Word of GOD, and consequently as founded in infinite Wisdom and Veracity.  
3dly, Our Unskilfulness, not to say Inabilities, in comprehending Objects of Sense, or Physical Matters, is made an Argument, that there are Mysteries in Matters of Revelation.  
I have hitherto confined myself to his Rule, i. e. the Fathers of the Three First Centuries; but truly I can see no just reason why the Fathers of after-Ages may not be admitted into the present Controversy, at least as Witnesses, if not Judges. I'm sure there can nothing abstract, but his groundless Fiction of a general Combination, to resolve all Religion into Mystery: For, as for the received Use or Signification of the Word, certainly after-Ages may be as competent Judges as those of the First Century: And, as for the Controversy itself, Whether there's any Doctrine in Christianity mysterious, certainly that Age ought to be appealed to, that had a more special occasion to bring the Controversy upon the Stage, and this the Arrian Age, and those that followed it; for, in this Age it's well known, those Doctrines we contend, are mysterious, were more nicely controverted. I shall therefore add to those Passages already cited, a few more, which prove the Use of the word to be applied to things incomprehensible; and that there are Doctrines in Christianity pronounced Mysteries, and that too for the Incomprehensibleness of 'em. The first I shall instance in is Dionys. Areop. where in one place he describes our Saviour's Incarnation, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Cap. 4. the Coelest. Hierarch. In another place, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sect. 9 Cap. 2. de Divinis Nomin. The second Instance is from a Tract entitled, Expositio Fidei, rejected indeed as a Piece of justin Martyr; yet from Leontin's, and other concluding Arguments, justly esteemed to be the Product of the Arrian Age: He styles the Unity and Trinity, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and confesses it cannot be unfolded by Words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and upon the Incarnation of Christ, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: And in such deep Research, at last, concludes with this Rule: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
And now we may conclude this Chapter much in the same strain that he does N. 45. I do not find but [the Fathers of the three first Centuries have exactly the same Notions of Mystery, as well as those that follow them,] and for an Alloy to his Jealousies, I think they are pretty consistent as well as unanimous; but then this Consistency and Unanimity happens to be against a trifling Reasoner, and therefore I must take the Reverse to his concluding Period, [and justly hope, by this time, the Cause of Incomprehensible and Inconceivable, or Mysteries in Religion, will be more zealously maintained by all that sincerely respect Fathers, Scripture, or Reason.]  
I come now to the Fourth Chapt. Sect. 3. which is an Answer to some Scripture-Objections, and particularly from the Nature of Faith. I now find this Discourse swells upon me beyond Expectations; and therefore, as for the Scripture-passages cited by him, tho' there is more in 'em than he has suggested, yet I shall pass 'em, especially because I think the Merits of the Cause does by no means turn upon 'em: I shall therefore take up his Friend's Arguments concerning the Nature of Faith, and try if he may not be compelled by dint of Argument, since he would not embrace the Advice of his Friend, N. 51.  
And first, As for what he has delivered, N. 52, 53. I find nothing but what has already received an Answer, [particularly what is cited, Sect. 2. c. 2, & 7.] or at least, but what amounts to no more than will be concluded by what I'm going to offer; and therefore he may take it for a full, or competent Answer, viz. Reason is a necessary Handmaid, or Instrument of Faith; insomuch, that we must believe upon Rational Motives and Convictions: And thus far, I know no Son of the Church of England, that will descent from him. As for what is delivered, N. 54. [That Faith consists of two parts, Knowledge and Assent.] I think no one will be so absurd to deny it; for I'm persuaded there can be no Assent without Knowledge: Therefore, in a word, had I known his Design, I should have excused the labour of citing so many Texts to prove it, and in a few words grant, That in those things we call the pure Credenda of Religion, we are at least to know so much, as will enable us to form an Imperfect Idea of what it is God proposes to our Belief; but it does not imply such a Knowledge, as enables to unravel and comprehend the whole Nature of the Object, or the very Modes of its Existence, or Properties; or much less, give a Rationale of every thing that belongs to it, No, if we know as much as instructs us what it is God proposes to our Belief, we submit all the Difficulties that may arise from the Belief of it, to God's Power and Wisdom, and yield an Assent (notwithstanding some seeming Absurdities) upon the Infinite Veracity of God. This distinguisheth Faith from a bare rational Assent in common Matters; and all this is consistent with what he has delivered, N. 55, 56. and therefore I shall not engage in a particular Examination of what is there offered. To proceed then in order to a clear Demonstration of this Notion of Faith, I shall not consider the Case of Abraham's Faith (being the next thing that offers itself) but shall instance in the Belief of the Creation: Through Faith we understand, that the Worlds were framed by the Word of God; so that Things which are seen, were made of Things which do not appear, Heb. xi. v. 3. Here I think is a vast difference between God's creative Power, in raising the World out of nothing, and restoring a dead Person to Life again, before the corruptible part was any wise dissolved. Indeed I cannot conceive how we can form an Idea of the possibility of such a Production; that God should raise so vast a stock of Matter, even all created Nature, and every thing that we can form any tolerable Ideas of, and yet without any Materials to work upon, can never be comprehended. The Platonist supposed a Soul to the World, and the Aristotelian a first Mover, but could never give any tolerable account of the Rise of Mundane Matter, without making it eternal. In short, they always taught, That an Agent necessarily supposes a Patient really distinct from the Patient, especially in external Actions: And we know in Numbers it's universally true, Ex nihilo nihil est. And we can conceive no otherwise in Nature, at least the Reasoner cannot on his Principles pretend to it; for he tells us, we can form no manner of Idea of nothing; and therefore how it is possible to form an Idea of the Creation by common Ideas, when all our Ideas take their rise from Created Being's, even that of the Infinite and Eternal Being, are resembled by Objects of his own production. It's true, we say this is an effect of Infinite Power, but we have no notion of the Thing, unless we apply Infinite Power to that which is the Subject of it, which is nothing into every thing; and when all is done, we form an Idea of this Infinite Power, purely by the Effects of it in Finite Being's: So that upon the whole, it's evident, the Belief of the Creation, (that implys a Production of all things out of nothing) is an Object that exceeds Humane Comprehension; and consequently we may conclude, that Faith (which yields an Assent to the Doctrine of the Creation) often implys an Assent to a Thing that contains something in it, that is Incomprehensible. And indeed, that Objects of Faith contain Things that exceed Humane Comprehension, is a Truth so indisputable, that Faith in the Judgement of the Primitive Church-Writers, was on this account distinguished from Knowledge or Science. It's true; In all Objects of Faith, we are to know so much of 'em, as to direct us what it is God proposes to our Belief. And Secondly, We are to believe, That it is God that proposes 'em. Thirdly, In all Acts of Faith we are to yield an Assent to the Truth, or Being of Things; and this supposes, that we have form at least an imperfect Idea of their Nature; but for the Quomodo sint, that is, for the Manner of their Being, or Existence, that may be an act of Knowledge, or Science, but not of Faith; so that if seeming Contradictions or Absurdities arise on this account, and consequently are thus far justly Incomprehensible, Faith throws us upon the Infinite Veracity of God. All this I shall endeavour to confirm by the Authorities of the Primitive Church. And,  
First, The Passage already cited from Irenaeus manifestly instructs us, That there are Difficulties and MYSTERIES in Revealed Truths, which Humane Reason cannot comprehend, and obliges us to commit all such Matters to GOD, because they were delivered by his Word and Spirit; and what is this, but to embrace and believe upon his Infinite Veracity? And at last concludes, That if we observe the Method, Fidem nostram servabimus, & omnis Scriptura à Deo nobis data, consonans nobis invenietur: Does not this imply, that there are things contained in Matters of Faith, that are Incomprehensible? Yea, rather that all seeming Difficulties, or Absurdities that arise from 'em, when scanned by common Notions, or Ideas, are to be committed to God as the best Expedient to preserve a right Faith, see Pag. 64. But,  
Secondly, Clemens Alexand. seems to state the Notion of Faith more clearly, in opposition to Science: And first he fixes the Foundation of Faith in the Word of GOD, or the Holy Scriptures, and represents it as an Irrefragible Foundation, that carries the highest Demonstration in it; and that we are to inquire no further than Ipse dixit, upon which he advances this Maxim, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And to let us see how far he extends it, he instances in the forecited Passage to the Heb. Cap. xii. v. 12. and thence proceeds to state the Difference between Science and Faith, thus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Vid. Stro. Lib. 2. P. 362, 3, 4. and in his 5th Book he's more full, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Here we see, Faith is resolved into the Infinite Power and Veracity of GOD; insomuch, that we are obliged to believe, as soon as we know it to be the Word of GOD, or as soon as we know GOD proposes any thing to our Belief: Here we find Science and Faith opposed, the one requiring Demonstration or Arguments, drawn from the Nature of the Thing; the other, not so: Therefore we must conclude, That if GOD proposes any thing to our Belief, that contains Matters incomprehensible, or not reconcileable with common Notions; Faith, in the Opinion of this Father, will command an Assent; insomuch, that his Infinite Power and Veracity must overbalance all seeming Absurdities and Contradictions.  
But to conclude this Argument, I shall produce the Judgement of St. Chrysostom: Thus he assigns the Reason, why the Natural Man cannot receive the Things that be of GOD, 1 Cor. two. v. 14. viz. For the Immensity of the Things 'emselves, far exceeding the Comprehension of the most Improved Reason; and for the want of Faith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Hom. 7. And upon the Article of the Creation, Heb. xi. v. 3. he tells us, The Mind that is prepared for the Reception of Faith, must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; she must be elevated above Sense, and all sensible Objects, and pass over the Weakness of Humane Reasonings; and afterwards; Whereas, says he, Faith is vilified as a Thing that is void of Demonstration, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; or rather, a Thing full of Folly, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Apostle shows us in this one Instance, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; for the very Article, says he; is not established by Reason, but rather the contrary, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Hom. 22. In Epist. Heb.  
Again we find him describing Faith under the very same Notion, Hom. 23. in Ter. johan. where, upon Nichodemus' Words, How can a Man be born when he is old? v. 4. he observes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Upon which he enlarges, and tells us, It is the Question of Heretics upon the Incarnation of our Blessed Saviour, (demanding, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) that by the weakness of common Notions, or Reasonings, destroy his Immense Nature, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and at last concludes, That such Practices, or Questions, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And on the Second Part of the Question, about entering the Womb a Second time, he observes, When a Man proceeds upon common Notions, or Reasonings in Spiritual Matters, and does not receive the Dictates of Faith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. He talks like a Drunken or Madman, uttering the most absurd and ridiculous things.  
And now, certainly, we may conclude, what St. Chrysostom's Notion of Faith was, without drawing Inferences; and that it every way agrees with that of Clemens Alexandrinus: It's therefore manifest, Faith is distinguished from Knowledge, or Science, not only as the Objects of it are Matters of Revelation, but as they contain Things that are incomprehensible; and yet it yields an Assent upon the Infinite Veracity of the Word of GOD: I'm sure this Great Man has dropped such unlucky Words against our Adversary's Principles, or his Methods of Examining Divine Truths, as if he were risen from the Dead, and were preparing to accuse him of Heresy, or some sly Maxims that look that way. I should therefore advise him to weigh the Opinion of so Great a Person, before he advances too far: and yet, when I consider what severe Censures he has passed upon the Writers of this Age, I despair of Success in giving Advice in this kind; for I cannot think he'll ever be persuaded to take his Measures of Faith, from an Age, or any Writer in it, when he makes 'em, as it were, to have entered into a League to turn all Religion into Mystery, and this another to be Name for Imposture, or Priestcraft: If this be true, to be instructed by such a Race of Men, is, in plain English, to take up one's Faith from those that have fallen away from the Faith; but of this I shall say more in the last Chapter.  
To return then: It's now abundantly evident, that the Notion of Faith which we now contend for, is not a Thing contrived to advance a particular Hypothesis, or serve a particular Design, but by no means such a one as he suggests, viz. [To stop the Mouths of such as demand a Reason where none can be given, and to keep as many in Ignorance, as Interest shall think convenient. See N. 48.] But I hope an Impartial Reader will find it established upon a good Foundation, or in a word, upon such Reasons as he is not able to subvert or remove; beside, if it be a Contrivance, we have this Apology, that it is not a late Forgery, since we have traced it almost as far as any Ecclesiastical Records, (besides those of Scripture) admit of; and this is a considerable Presumption of the Injustice of such foulmouthed Aspersions, till he gives us a better Set of Arguments to remove it; which is the next Thing that should be examined: but truly there appears so little in 'em, that I think they scarce deserve a distinct Examination:  
The First is, [If Faith were not a Persuasion resulting from the previous Knowledge and Comprehension of the Thing believed, there could be no Degrees nor Differences of it.] Now First, It's manifest, the Argument is advanced on a false Supposition, (and that which runs through all his Observations) viz. That we deny all Degrees of a previous Knowledge of the Object; whereas we say, there must be at least such a previous knowledge of the Object, as instructs us what it is GOD proposes to our Belief; but there's no necessity of Comprehending the Absolute Nature of the Thing, so as to be able to give a Rationale of every Thing that really belongs to it; and that too, by trying it by common Notions. And moreover, we say, the different Degrees of Faith, do by no means rise from such a Comprehensive Knowledge: No, when once we know what GOD proposes to our Belief, the Degrees of Faith arise from the Application of GOD's Veracity to our Minds and Consciences; if the Mind is possessed with a deep Sense of it, as to engage us to place an absolute Confidence in it, tho' we cannot form a Rationale of the Thing, yet we may embrace it with the highest Degrees of Faith: I'm sure, this is the Doctrine which [this Man of Reason] might have learned from S. Paul, in the Case of Abraham, Who against Hope, believed in Hope,— and being not weak in Faith, he considered not his own Body now dead, nor yet the Deadness of Sarah's Womb: he staggered not at the Promise through Unbelief, but was strong in Faith, giving Glory to GOD, and being fully persuaded, that what he had promised he was also able to perform; and therefore it was imputed to him for Righteousness, Rom. iv. 18, 19, 20, 21.  
2d Arg. [The Subject of Faith must be intelligible to all, since the Belief thereof is commanded under no less a Penalty than Damnation.] As for the Intelligibleness of Objects of Faith, I have already stated how far that is necessary; but, with Submission, I think the Sin and Damnation of Unbelief, arises, not because GOD has furnished us with a perfect Rationale of the Nature of every Object of Faith, and we reject it; but because he hath furnished us with Means sufficient to know what he hath proposed to our Belief, and to know that he hath proposed them, and we will fully reject 'em; and consequently what he proposes: but more especially, because he hath asserted the Truth of 'em, by the highest Demonstrations of the Spirit, in mighty Signs and Wonders: This was the Case of the jews; but now ye say, Ye see, therefore your Sin remaineth.  
4th Arg. [Except Faith signifies an Intelligible Persuasion, we cannot give others a Reason of the Hope that is in us.] The Inference is apparently false; for we certainly give a Reason (and that too, according to the Mind of St. Peter) of any Article of Faith, when we prove that it is Revealed by GOD, and that we yield an Assent to the Truth of it (tho' we cannot remove every Difficulty that may arise from it) upon the Authority of Infinite Veracity.  
As for his Third, and Fifth Observations, I shall Appeal to any unprejudiced Reader, whether there's any thing in 'em, that deserves a particular Reply, more than in those Objections he first framed, and then answered: For as the former prove nothing against the Incomprehensibleness of Matters of Faith, so the latter were never advanced, to prove the Necessity of admitting such Objects of Faith. Upon the whole then, I think it appears, there are Matters of Faith that contain Things in 'em, which are Incomprehensible, and yet Faith yields an Assent upon the Authority of Infinite Veracity, and consequently it's an uncontrollable Argument, there are Mysteries in the Christian Religion.  
The next thing to be considered, is, his Reply to the Argument of Miracles, Cap. 5. Sect. 3. And, First, he entertains you with the Nature of a Miracle. And as for the Description he gives us, I find, in the Main, no Reason to except against it; after this, he guards it with some Limitations: The First of which is, That a Miracle is not to be admitted contrary to Reason; I suppose, he means contrary to common Notions, or those Ideas which Reason has form from Sense, Experience, or Instruction. And, no doubt, this is a very just Limitation: For a Miracle is performed upon Objects of Sense; and 'tis an Address to our Senses, or a Demonstration accommodated to the outward Senses, by some sensible Effects, or Operations; and consequently, nothing is to be admitted as a Miracle, that contradicts the Testimony of the Senses: and we are, at least, so far Judges of its possibility, that in Case it manifestly contradicts the Testimony of our Sense, we may justly rank it among Impossibilities, and reject it as such. But further than this, I cannot discern, that we are competent Judges of the Possibility of any Miracle; for to judge of its Possibility, supposes a knowledge of its Modus: But this our Adversary will not allow; [For the manner of Miracles, (says he) is not explicable. N. 77.  
Thus far we are agreed; but I know not how this Limitation, much less those that follow, affect the present Controversy. Indeed, he at last comes to the Point, and tells us, [Miracles are not above Reason, tho' we know nothing of the Modus.] But I would fain know, why a Thing that contains somewhat in the Nature of it, which exceeds Human Comprehension, is not as properly above Reason, or Mysterious, as a Thing (in itself intelligible) only it lies dormant, because shadowed thro'a Veil, I'm sure, Origen tells the contrary, Comment. in Mat. 19 24, 26. ut supra. See pag. 61.  
But I have exposed the Folly of this Assertion in another place. Indeed, I should have turned his own Arguments upon him, had he not prevented me, by reviving 'em in such a manner, as gives me a better advantage over him. We have it thus, [As the beginning of my Book, I maintained, the Manner, as well as the Thing was explicable. But of what? Of Miracles. No, surely; but of those Doctrines, in Confirmation of which the Miracles are wrought. See N. 77.] This is truly an unaccountable Paradox. Miracles are certainly the Demonstrations of Sense, and consequently are to be scanned and judged of by common Ideas, even the most clear and indisputable, such as result from Objects of Sense; but it's concluded, that Matters of Revelation are founded on Objects that are Spiritual and Infinite, and consequently are to us more abstruse and incomprehensible.  
Again, Miracles are a direct and immediate Address to the Sense and Reason of Mankind, and are designed to give an unquestionable Credit to every revealed Truth, since they procure the Testimony of Infinite Veracity in the behalf of it; and therefore, all the Reason and Arguments in Nature will direct, that they should pass the severest Scrutiny. But in Matters of Revelation it's concluded, that a great deal rests upon the Authority of Infinite Veracity, and this depends upon the Evidence of Miracles; and therefore it's absurd to demand a clearer and more precise Comprehension of the Nature of revealed Truths than of Miracles.  
This Gentleman owns, that Miracles are a Confirmation of revealed Truths; that is, at least, as they are an absolute Attestation of their Divine Original: And this is an uncontrollable Demonstration of the Truth of them. Indeed I'm persuaded the merest Novice in Logic will tell him, That we are to have, at least, as adequate a Knowledge of that which is to confirm, as that which is confirmed by it; or that the Premises are to carry as great Evidence in 'em as we expect in the Conclusion: Therefore it's absurd to say, that the Modus of Miracles is inexplicable, and the Modus of all revealed Truths not so. Indeed this Gentleman seems to have furnished us with Weapons to fence against him with the greatest Advantage; for if such Positions as these must pass for Truth, it must be Truth in a Mystery. And truly, we could not have desired a better Argument against him; for, if the Modus of Objects of Sense be inexplicable, certainly the Modus of revealed Truths are much more inexplicable; the Immenseness of whose Nature to a Finite Mind, renders them incomprehensible.  
Again, the Modus of Objects of Sense is not to be explained by Ideas of the same kind; much less, is the Modus of Infinite and Spiritual Objects to be explained by the Ideas of Objects of Sense: So that, in a word, since Miracles (as Objects of Sense, with respect to the Modus of 'em) are inexplicable, and by consequence justly to be esteemed above Reason, much more are Matters of Revelation, with respect to their Modus, to be esteemed inexplicable, above Reason, and consequently mysterious.  
I come now to examine, in the last place, his pretended Historical Account of the Rise of Mystery, and the Causes of it, under this Title, [When, why, and by whom were Mysteries brought into Christianity, Cap. 6. Sect. 3.] And truly I am persuaded what has already been delivered will be esteemed (by an impartial Reader) a sufficient Confutation to this whole Chapter, (at least if it answers the Title) without examining any Paragraph: However, I think it deserves no Answer, but a short Reply to the Title, and that is capable of no other, but such as we give to an impertinent Question of the Romanists, Where was your Religion before Luther? As to the time when Mystery was introduced, I hope it's sufficiently proved to be of the same Date with Christianity itself, being founded not in Names or Words only, but in Certain Truths, that are proposed as Objects of Faith. But, 2dly, for the Person by whom, or that introduced it, I'm persuaded there's enough offered to charge it upon the Blessed Author of the Institution. Lastly, For the Reason why Mysteries were introduced, I shall leave 'em to this notable Reasoner to dispute it out with the Infinite Wisdom of GOD, in not creating Man with larger and more comprehensible Faculties, or not contriving some more familiar Method of Redemption. And now, if what has already been delivered stands good against this Author, (there being as yet no reason to suspect it) I'll appeal to all the World, whether it does not destroy the malicious Suggestions of this Chapter, which make Mystery to be a Trick of Priestcraft, contrived for the support of Secular Grandeur and Dominion.  
But, to descend to a few Particulars; He observes, (and that too with a great deal of Contempt and Scorn) That the Christian Church initiated their Converts in a Way and Method not much unlike that of the Heathen World; which is the most he can make of all his Allegations. Now we own, the Christian Converts were gradually initiated, that they were ranked in several Classes, and had a Discipline, and Instructions, peculiar to each Class, and thereupon prohibited the publication of the sublimest Parts of Religion, to any but those that had gone through the inferior Classes; and truly, such Injunctions have not only the unquestionable Dictates of Prudence for their Vindication, but Apostolic Practice and Approbation; for 'tis the established Method with the Hebrew Converts, as well as those at Corinth; they were brought on gradually to Perfection, first by Milk, then by strong Meats, the one accommodated to Babes in Christ, the other to those of full age; see Heb. v. ver. 12, 13, 14. and 1 Cor. three 2. where its probable the jewish Converts were first instructed in those Scriptures that set forth the easiest parts of our Saviour's Offices, as Prophet, Priest, and King; but afterwards, those that asserted his Divinity. I'm sure St. Clement makes these Babes to be the Catechumen, or those that were instructed in the Catechistick Parts of Christianity; but the Perfect, those that were instructed in the sublimest parts of Religion; to wit, the Essence of the Divine Nature. But now the great Crime is, that all these Measures of Initiation were taken from the Heathens: And this is proved, because they are much the same.  
It is not now my business to examine the Parallel; tho' I must confess there are, in a great many things, very lively Resemblances: But as for the Crime, I cannot discern where that lies, since the Christians did not symbolise with any Design to form a Comprehension between Heathenism and Christianity; nor (as this Author suggests) out of an Opinion of any Religion contained in such Rites, see N. 97. but out of a Zeal for GOD, and the Souls of Men, they, in St. Paul's Language, became all things unto them, that if possible they might enlarge the Territories of Christ's Kingdom, and save some; for, as long as they acted on these Principles, I think there was no more Gild in 'em, than in St. Paul's occasional Compliances with jewish Rites. Indeed our Adversary elsewhere [Num. 78, 79.] gives this very account of these Initiations or Compliances; and therefore, I cannot conceive how he can justify so base an Aspersion, viz. N. 90. [Here is enough to show how Christianity became mysterious, and how so Divine an Institution did, through the Craft and Ambition of Priests and Philosophers, degenerate into mere Paganism.] It's well known there are other Accounts given of those Religious Rites that were introduced in the Primitive Church, than those already assigned; and those too, that are abundantly sufficient to vindicate the Lawfulness of 'em: I shall refer him to St. Cyril, the Author he has cited, who is very particular on this Subject.  
But, in a word, it's manifest they were in 'emselves the best Expedients to maintain the Discipline of the Church, and establish a regular and uniform Piety, as well as orthodox, clear, and well-digested Faith; so unjust is the Charge, that makes 'em Artifices to introduce Mystery, Ignorance, and Blind Obedience.  
2dly, As for those Emblematical Rites introduced in the Administrations of the Christian Sacraments, they might possibly contribute to the establishing Mysteries in a jewish Sense, as it is used for Typical Representations: but they seem to have no tendency to establish Mystery in the sense we contend for; I mean, as it is put for Incomprehensible Truths.  
But let us reflect a little on the Baseness of this Accusation: Here's a general Combination in the Pastors of the Catholic Church, and a great many Hellish Designs formed in the Womb of it; Ambition and Covetousness is the original Spring, Ceremony and a great many superfluous Rites the Instrument, and the grand Designs were to turn Religion into Mystery, even to that degree, that in the Opinion of this Author, it has made a Divine Institution degenerate into Paganism; N. 90. But, for what Reason? Purely because some Christian Rules of Discipline resemble the Religious Rites of Heathens; for, there can no other be fixed on those that are truly Primitive. If this be so, I'm sure the Censure is extravagantly absurd. What if a sober Heathen acts upon the strict Rules of Justice, and abhors Slander and Detraction, more than this Calumniator; must not a good Christian practice the same Virtue, for fear of being charged with Paganism? I'm sure the Case is the same where the Thing is innocent or lawful.  
Indeed, this Gentleman declaims against Mystery very heartily, but I am afraid he has too much dealing with one sort of it; for, such Illogical, such Groundless, such Vile Aspersions, must take their Rise from the Mystery of Iniquity, that reigns in the high places; for 'tis nothing else but the Language of him that is justly styled, the Accuser of his Brethren.  
But, to proceed a little further, I find he has an immortal Abhorrence of the Cross in Baptism, of Altars, of the Dedication or Consecration of Charches, Music, the Rites of Burial; and, in a word, of the Institution of National Churches, which he seems to call Human Faction, or Policy, in one place; [See pag. 172. Ed. 2. and Usurpations upon Mankind in another, N. 93.] Now these are Rites and Sanctions enjoined and practised in the Established Church of England; and when he thinks fit to discover wherein the Evil of them consists, or that the People of this National Church are not obliged to yield an Obedience to 'em, I promise an Answer, and such as will set him off in his own Colours and Language too; that is, prove him an impertinent Trifler. It's true, he seems to explode 'em, because [nothing like these are in the Writings of the Apostles, but they are all plainly contained in the Books of the Gentiles, and was the Substance of their Worship:] when we make such things the Substance of our Worship, then let him accuse us: But as for the Necessity of finding the particular Ceremonies in the Writings of the Apostles, we say there's none; it's sufficient we find 'em by a fair Consequence, inasmuch as we find an Ecclesiastical Power commissioned to enact prudent Laws for the Peace and Unity of the Church, for the maintenance of Decency, Order, and Uniformity in the Public Worship of God; and as long as Ceremonies are chosen, with respect to the Number, so as not to bring a Burden, and create Distraction in the Public Worship of God, and with respect to the Nature of 'em, inasmuch as they carry a manifest Tendency towards the Advancement of the Ends of Religion.  
Again, we say Apostolic Practice or Tradition, and an uninterrupted Custom of the Primitive Church, is certainly a considerable Argument not only of the Lawfulness, but Authority of 'em, especially so as that none shall dispute an Obedience, when once they are enjoined by our proper Ecclesiastical Superiors. I'm sure Tertullian makes this an express Rule of Obedience in these matters, tho' this Author, by the help of a false Citation, seems to insinuate the contrary: Harum & aliarum ejusmodi disciplinarum si legem expostules Scripturarum nullam invenies: Traditio tibi praetendetur [by way of Rule, whereas he reads it, praetenditur] Auctrix, consuetudo confirmatrix, & fides observatrix, Lib. de Coron. c. 4.  
But to draw towards a Conclusion, I do not now intent a formal Vindication of Ceremonies; however, I think I have offered enough to publish the Ignorance or Impudence of the Man; when he asserts, That [nothing is so naturally opposite as Ceremony and Christianity, N. 95.] What, even those that are appointed to determine (for Decency, and Uniformity's sake) the Natural Circumstances of Public Worship, such as Time, Place, and Manner? Let him make this out by dint of Argument, and I'll engage (as was offered before) he shall have a fair Answer. And now I have gone through a tedious Harangue, which whether it be more made up of Impotent Malice, or Illogical Conclusions, is disputable; and therefore, I think myself happy to arrive at his Conclusion, and more happy that I find little in it, that either deserves, or can justly provoke a Reply: for I find him either bantering the World with his own Objections, and Answers, which if placed in the Balance, will not weigh a Grain to effect the Merits of the Cause either way, or giving 'em an account of his next Undertake, tho' in his last Edition, he's so prudent to add a Reserve, that I'm much afraid will balk the Expectation of the Thing; for he let's us know, he'll take his own time for it, as a thing not in the Command of any Mortal; and I'm persuaded he'll prove the Maxim by experimental Demonstration; for, I believe, want of Health, or Business, or something else, will make it a good while before he puts his finishing hand to his new intended System of Divinity. One or two things, however, I cannot but remark, before I take a final leave. And,  
First; After all this Argument, the Reader may imagine that the Difference between us is not considerable; for he allows, That we cannot pretend to an Adequate Knowledge of Things; and we say, That Divine Truths are chiefly Mysterious, in respect of the Modus of 'em; and as it's impossible to comprehend the Mysterious part of 'em, so we grant it's not necessary to be known, or comprehended: But yet for all this, the Difference is very considerable; for this Gentleman peremptorily affirms, That the Modus of all Revealed Truths, is explicable; see Num. 77. Sect. 3. And in the Conclusion he tells us, If his Hypothesis stands good, [Whatever Instance can be alleged (he means in contradiction to it) must either be found not Mysterious, or if it prove a Mystery, not Divinely revealed;] so that he has form a most Compendious Rule for discarding the fundamental Doctrines of Christianity, if any be proposed, whose Modus he cannot comprehend, and that too by common Ideas, or Notions, his Hypothesis directs, That they are to be rejected as not Divinely revealed: Indeed, whosoever surveys his Hypothesis, may at the first glance discern this to be the Design, though he had not blabed out the Secret in the close of it; and certainly the Design is so pernicious, and (tho' form on a weak Hypothesis) liable to influence an unwary Reader, and cheat him out of the main of his Creed, that I wonder this Gentleman has escaped so long without being chastised by some Pen more accurate than I can pretend to.  
The Second thing I shall take notice of is, The Provisions he has made against an Answer; for he tells us, That [no particular Instances, or Doctrines of any sort, can serve for a proper Answer to this Discourse.] This is pretty well truly! He has been very Majesterial in advancing his own Positions, and will he be as absolute in prescribing to his Answerers? As if nothing must pass for an Answer, that is not form by his Model, or has not received his Imprimatur. As for the force of Instances, it's very well known, that an opposite Instance is perfect Demonstration against a peremptory, and universal Position in an Adversary; and the force of Positions, Arguments, or Notions that exist in Theory, or Universals, are best illustrated and imprinted by Instances. I'm sure he proceeds by these Measures in all his Reasonings, and will he debar others of those Privileges he allows himself? This is to make himself the absolute Sovereign of Reason and Argument; as if the rest of Mankind had no Right to use any more of either, but what he cantons out by his own Weights, and Measures. But he tells us, Instances can be no Answer to his Discourse, [As long as the Reasons of it hold good:] Very true, for if the Reasons hold good, the Instances alleged against 'em must be impertinent, or incompetent: But the Instances I have produced are levelled against his Reasons and Positions too, and, I hope, they sufficiently destroy both, and then the Method of Answering will justify itself without his Licence or Approbation.  
In a word, as for this Answer, I offer it to every candid impartial Reader with Deference and Submission, who, I question not, will pass over some little Slips or Blots that may arise through heat of Argument, if the main Lines are correct and clear. And as for this Gentleman, or his Zealous Admirers, I tender the Substance, or principal Parts of it, to be treated as he has peremptorily resolved at the foot of his Discourse; I mean, give it no more Quarter than he will to Error; but, according to his utmost Abilities and Opportunities, expose it in its true Colours, that he may not be charged as an Accessary against himself, in rendering his own Labours ineffectual, by weakly mincing or softening of any thing.  
FINIS.