Cicero's LAELIUS. A DISCOURSE OF FRIENDSHIP.  
Together with a Pastoral Dialogue Concerning FRIENDSHIP and LOVE.  
Licenced, Rob. Midgley.  
LONDON, Printed for William Crook, at the Green-Dragon without Temple-Bar, 1691.   

THE PREFACE.  
THE usual design of a Preface is either for an Introduction to the Book itself, or an Apology to the Reader for the Publication of it; the Former of these being the more pertinent and useful of the two, though 'tis partly done already by my Author, I shall insist most upon that.  
The following Discourse was written by Tully (as Himself observes) in his later years, which produced many excellent Treatises: in This particularly we find more of Majesty than Gaiety in his Style, we see the Philosopher joined to the Orator, and (which is somewhat rare) the Friend to the State's man; he being qualified, besides his own natural Abilities, by a long experience of Friendship in his familiarity with Pomponius Atticus, to treat of this Subject with great exactuess. The Discourse being occasioned by Scipio's Death, and his Character making so considerable a part of it, it will not be improper to set down some brief Memoirs of his Life, which may serve to explain several Passages in this Treatise.  
He was the Son of paulus Aemilius the greatest General of his time, from whom he was called Aemilianus, 
Plutarch. in Vit. pauli Aemilij.  and upon the Divorce that happened between his Parents, was adopted by the Son of Africanus major, his Cousin-german, and by him named Scipio. Plutarch says, that from his Youth he was endued above any of his Equals, with all the good Qualities requisite in a General or a Statesman. 
Ibid.  First, He served under his Father in the Macedonian War, and had a considerable share in the defeat of Perseus' Army. Afterwards, 
Oros. Lib. 4. Cap. 23.  in the Third Punic War (which began 606 Years after the Building of Rome, and lasted 4 Years) he overthrew Carthage, and from his Successes in afric, got the Title of Africanus Minor. About 15 Years after that, 
Oros. Lib. 5.  he reduced Numantia, after it had held out for 14 Years against the Romans. Whilst he lay with his Army before this Place, 
Plutarch. in Vit. Tib. Gracch. & Oros. Lib. 5. Cap. 8.  the Sedition of the Gracchis broke out at Rome, and Tiberius Gracchus, the Elder of the two Brothers, having endeavoured the establishment of some new Laws in favour of the Commons, which were against the interest of the Nobility, was slain in the Capitol, in his Second Tribuneship. Upon Scipio's return to Rome, he being asked by Caius Gracchus and Fulvius, 
Plutarch. in Vit. C. Gracch.  what he thought of Tiberius' Death, replied, That he always disliked Tiberius' way of Proceeding: This Answer, though 'twas delivered with a great deal of sincerity, lost him the affections of the Populace, and mightily iucensed Caius. Soon after this, 
Idem ibid. & in Vit. Romuh.  Scipio was found dead in his Bed, and no outward Cause of his Death appeared. Some said he died easily and suddenly, having been naturally sickly; others, that he poisoned himself; others, that his Enemies, who were supposed to be Caius Gracchus and Fulvius, broke in upon him in the night and stifled him: Certain it is, that they Two were suspected to be the Authors of his Death; and tho' his Body lay open to be seen of all, and gave some suspicion of a violent Death, yet there was no public Enquiry made into it; and 'twas thought the Rabble opposed all Proceed of Justice, for fear that Caius should be found accessary to the Murder. His Death happened in Caius' second Tribuneship, who pursuing the same measures with his Brother, suffered the same fate, and being forsaken by all his Adherents, was slain by his own Servant. 
Plutarch. in Vit. Paul. Aemil.  Scipio in his life-time was esteemed the Valiantest of the Romans, and had the greatest Authority among them: He was a strict abserver of Military Discipline, 
Flor. Lib. 2. Cap. 18.  and made a great Reformation in the Army: His vacant hours were employed in the Study of Philosophy and Politics, in which he had Panaetius and Polybius for his Masters. Thus was his Life divided between the Arts of War and Peace, in both which his Friend Laelius shared with him, who was no less famous for Wisdom than Scipio for Valour: 
In Vit. Ti. Gracch.  Plutarch gives us a remarkable Instance of his prudent management in the Divisions that happened in Rome about the Agratian Law, which gained him the Name of Laelius the Wise.  
Thus much by way of Introduction. As for the Apology, tho' I think the Translation wants it very much, (for really I don't know how to justify the Presumption of an attempt to express Tully's Conceptions in any other Language or Words than his own) yet I'm sure the Poem that follows, stands in most need of it, and being more my Own, must consequently be more obnoxious to Censure. However, I have ventured to place it at the End, as treating of the same Subject, tho' upon a different Occasion. I hope the Fair Sex will not think their Prerogative invaded, because in that Poem I prefer Friendship to Love; since the Love I condemn there, is a Passion, which, I dare say, the Best and Modestest part of them will not think themselves concerned to defend. As for Conjugal Love, I look upon it as a Union of Souls as well as Bodies, and a State so exactly conformable to all the Laws of Friendship, that, methinks, the Names of Friend and Wife should signify the same.  
They who will think it something unseasonable for Me to be giving Rules of Friendship when all the World is in Arms, may as well blame Laelius for making this Discourse when Rome was distracted by the Ambition of Gracchus, and Tully for publishing it at a time when all Italy was divided by the Factions of Pompey and Caesar; Certainly Remedies are never more Necessary, than when Diseases are most Epidemical.  
I hope the Reader is not curious to know, whether these Papers are published at the Importunity of Friends, by the Command of Superiors, or for the Prevention of false Copies: These are the common Topics which every Prefacer makes use of, to justify his intrusion into the Press. I shall therefore wave all Evasions, and boldly but myself upon my Reader's mercy; for I don't understand why an Author may not have the liberty of keeping his Reasons to himself, as well as his Name.   

CICERO'S LAELIUS: A DISCOURSE OF FRIENDSHIP.  

The Author's Prefatory Epistle To T. Pomponius Atticus.  
QVintus Mucius Scaevola, the Augur, would often talk of Caius Laelius his Father-in-Law with a great deal of pleasure, and in all his Discourses gave him the Title of Wise. As soon as I came to Age, my Father disposed of me so entirely to this Scaevola, that (unless some extraordinary occasion called me away) I was never from him. During this time I furnished my Memory with many excellent Say and useful Instructions of his, and made it my business to improve by so wise a Conversation. Upon his Death, I applied myself to Scaevola the Priest, whom I dare affirm for Learning and Justice to be the most excellent Person in Rome. But having spoken of Him in another place, I shall now return to Scaevola the Augur.  
Among other Discourses of his, I remember, when I and two or three of his most familiar Friends were sitting with him, he fell upon a Subject which was then in every Man's Mouth. For I suppose, Atticus, You who were so well acquainted with P. Sulpicius, can't forget how the mortal hatred he bore Q. Pompeius, (who was Consul when he was Tribune, and with whom he had formerly been very intimate) did amaze as well as trouble all the Town. Scaevola took occasion from this, to entertain us with a Discourse of Loelius' to Him and his other Son in Law C. Fannius (Marcus' Son) upon Friendship, which passed within a few days after the Death of Africanus. The Heads of this Discourse I remember very well, and have digested them into this Treatise after my own Method. For I have brought in the Persons speaking to one another, that I might avoid the troublesome repetition of [said I] and [said He,] and that they might seem to talk as if they were present.  
Now having been often desired by You to write something of Friendship, and looking upon it as a Subject that might be as worthy of every one's Knowledge, as of our Familiarity, I was the more inclined to contribute what I could to the public Good and your private Satisfaction. But as in that Dialogue of mine concerning Old Age, which was dedicated to You, I brought in the elder Cato discoursing, because I thought to Person fit to speak upon that Theme than one who had seen the World so long, and had flourished so eminently in his later years: So having understood from Tradition, that the Friendship between C. Laelius and P. Scipio was very famous, I judged it proper to make Laelius once more speak those things concerning Friendship, which Scaevola remembered to have been formerly said by Him. This way of Discourse seems to carry the more weight in it, when 'tis grounded upon the Authority of Men so Ancient and Illustrious; insomuch as in the reading over that former Treatise, I am sometimes so strangely affected with it, tho' 'twas written by myself, that methinks Cato speaks, not I But as in that Book, being myself an Old Man, I wrote to an Old Man concerning Age; so in this, being a Friend, I writ to a Friend concerning Friendship; there Cato spoke, than whom no Man of his time was Older or Wiser: Here Laelius, who always had the repute of the Wisest Man and the Faithsullest Friend, talks of Friendship. Therefore I must desire you to divert your thoughts from Me, that writ it, to Laelius, that speaks it.  
Caius Fannius and Quintus Mucius are supposed to come to their Father-in-Law, upon the Death of Africanus: They begin the Discourse with Laelius, who talks all the way of Friendship, and in whose Character of a Friend you will see your own.   
FANNIUS. 
What you say, Laelius, is true: for there never was a Man of greater Prudence or Renown than Africanus, but you must consider that the Eyes of all are now upon You; You only are called and counted Wise. This was lately the Attribute of Cato, and formerly of L. Atilius: But both of them had it in a different respect, Atilius for his knowledge in the Civil Law, Cato for his long Experience in the World, his Wisdom and Courage in the Senate, and his Wit and Eloquence at the Bar: So that when He came to be Old, the Epithet of Wise was in a manner become his Proper Name. But You are esteemed for another kind of Wisdom, which is no less owing to your Industry and Knowledge, than to your Nature and Manners: And that not as Wisdom goes among the Vulgar, but as the better sort describe a Wise Man, such as Greece never had; For the more exact Critics will not allow those Seven, who were called the Sages, to be perfectly Wise: we read of One only at Athens, and Him pronounced so by Apollo. Now the Wisdom which is held to be in You, is such as enables you to esteem all that can be called your own, as proceeding from yourself, and to look upon all humance Accidents as things beneath the thoughts of a Virtuous Man. Therefore several have enquired of Me, and I believe of Scaevola, how You bear the Death of Africanus: and so much the rather, because when we met last Nones (according to our custom) in D. Brutus' Garden, to discourse, You only were absent, who always used to observe that day and that Duty very punctually.  SCAEVOLA. 
'Tis true, Laelius; several (as Fannius says) inquire: But I answer them from my own observation, that You bear the loss of so great a Man and so good a Friend, with all the moderation that can be expected; that indeed a Man of your good Nature could not but be somewhat moved, but that your absence from Us was occasioned by your Illness rather than by any excess of Grief.  LAELIUS. 
You say well, Scaevola: No small Impediment should have kept me from an Office which I always attended when I was in health: For I don't think, that any Accident can excuse a Man of Resolution from the performance of his Duty. But you, Fannius, that attribute more to Me than I either desire or deserve, show more of your Friendship to Me, than of your Justice to Cato; for either no Man ever was Wise (which I am more inclinable to think,) or if ever Man was, He was. For (to omit other Instances) how bravely did he bear the Death of his Son? Paulus I remember, and Caius I have seen: but their Loss was not so great as Cato's, and consequently their Trial less; Their Sons died in their Childhood: Cato's was a Man not only of great Hopes, but of approved Virtues. Wherefore have a care of preferring even Him, whom you say, Apollo judged the Wisest of Men, before Cato; for if the Say of the First deserve our Praise, the Actions of the Last will challenge our Admiration. But now to deal freely with you Both, as to your Sentiments of Me.  
Whether I should do well or no in denying myself to be concerned for Scipio's Death, let the Learned determine: I'm sure I should not speak the Truth; for I must needs say, I am moved at the loss of such a Friend as I think there never will be, and I am certain there never was. But I want no Remedies: I am my own Comforter, and chief in this, that I am freed from an Error with which most Men are possessed upon the Death of their Friends; for I think not that any Harm has happened to Scipio, all that has happened, is to Me: Now to take one's own Misfortunes to heart, shows more like Self-love than Friendship. But who can deny that all is well with Scipio? For unless He expected an Immortality on Earth, (which I dare say He never did) what is there in the Ambition of Man that He did not obtain? who in his growing years not only answered, but outdid the mighty Hopes which all Rome had of his Childhood: who never sought the Consulship, yet was twice made Consul; once before the usual time, and again for his own sake at the usual time, tho' for the Nations sake not soon enough: who by conquering two Cities that were the greatest Enemies to this Empire, did not only put a stop to those Wars for the present, but prevented them for the future. What shall I say of his sweet disposition, his Dutifulness to his Mother, his Kindness to his Sisters, his Goodness to his Friends, his Justice to all the World? These you Both know; and how dear he was to Rome, their Sorrow at his Funeral sufficiently declares. Now what good could the addition of a few Years have done Him, since Age, tho' it is not grievous (as, I remember, Cato told Me and Scipio the year before he died,) yet it takes off from that Vigour and Activity of Mind which was yet alive in Scipio, whose Life, as well as his Fortune and his Glory, was already such as not to be capable of any improvement. The sense of his Death was lessened by the suddenness of it; what kind of Death it was is hard for me to determine: what others suspect, you hear. But this I may truly say for Scipio, that of all the glorious and happy days of his Life (and they were not a few) none was more remarkable than That on which, after the dismission of the Senate, He was attended to his House in the Evening by all the Senators, the Latins, and other Allies of Rome, which was the day before He died. So that from so high a pitch of Glory, He seemed fit to ascend to Heaven, than to descend so low as the Grave.  
I am not of their Opinion, who have undertaken of late to maintain, That the Soul is mortal as well as the Body, and that both are extinguished in Death; but am rather governed by the Authority of the Ancients, whether it was derived from our Forefathers, who performed such solemn Obsequies to the Dead, (which certainly they would never have done, had they thought they had no sense of them:) or from Those who were formerly of this Nation, and instructed the bigger Grecia (which then flourished, and is now destroyed) with their Precepts: or, whether we received it from Him whom Apollo declared the Wisest of Men, who never contradicted his own Assertions (as several have done,) but always taught, That the Souls of Men were Immortal, that upon their departure from our Bodies they were received into Heaven, and that the best and justest Persons had the easiest and quickest passage thither. This was Scipio's Opinion, who, as if he had foreseen his Death within a few days before it happened, when Philus and Manilius and myself, together with You, Scaevola, and some Others were with him, spent three days in a Discourse about the Commonwealth, and concluded with the Immortality of the Soul: all which he told us he had heard from Africanus in a Dream.  
Now if it be true, that every good Man's Soul is so easily loosened from the Prison and Fetters of his Body, who, think you, could have a freer passage to Heaven than Scipio? So that to Weep for his Fate I'm afraid would look more like Envy than Love. Nay, tho' I should suppose that all Sense is lost with Life, and that Body and Soul die together; yet as there is no good in Death, so certainly there can be no harm: For when Scipio loses all Sense, he is in the same condition as if he had never been born; for whose Birth not only I, but all Rome will rejoice as long as it is a City. Thus Heaven seems 〈◊〉 have dealt more kindly by Him tha● by Me, who, as I came first into th● World, aught to have gone first out of it: But the very remembrance of our Friendship is so delightful to me, that I esteem myself happy in having lived with Scipio, whose Care and mine (in the management of public and private Affairs) was always the same; our Life in Peace and War still the same: and (which is the very Soul of Friendship) our Tempers, Inclinations and Opinions ever the same. Wherefore I am not so much pleased with the Name that Fannius and the World give me of Wise, (which is false,) as with the hopes I entertain, that the memory of our Friendship will be Eternal; and I am so much the rather induced to flatter myself with this Opinion, because in all past Ages there are not mentioned above three or four pair of Friends, among whom I have some reason to hope, that the Friendship of Scipio and Laelius will be known to Posterity.  FANNIUS. 
That must needs be, Laelius: But since you were pleased to make mention of Friendship, and we are at leisure, you will mightily oblige Me, and (I hope) Scaevola, if as you used formerly to discourse upon other Subjects that were proposed; so you will now let us know what are your Sentiments of Friendship, how you would define it, and what Rules you would lay down for the establishment of it.  SCAEVOLA. 
'Twill be very acceptable to Me; and, I assure you, I was only prevented by Fannius from making the same Request: Therefore, Sir, what you please to say upon this Theme will oblige us Both.  LAELIUS. 
I should not be against it, could I think myself sufficient: For the Subject is noble, and we are at leisure (as Fannius says;) but who am I? Or, what is there in Me? 'Tis for the greatest Philosophers in Greece to speak Extempore upon every Argument; the Undertaking is great, and requires no small Preparation; therefore, if you would hear a formal Discourse upon this Subject, you must expect it from those whose Practice and Profession lay that way. As for me, I can only advise you, to prefer Friendship before all things in the World, since nothing is so agreeable to the Nature of Man, nothing so necessary in Prosperity or Adversity.  
My first Opinion is, that there can be no real Friendship, but between Good Men: Not to be so very nice as some, whose Notion of Goodness (tho' perhaps it is not altogether false) is very useless to, and destructive of Society; for they deny, that any Man can be Good, unless he be Wise. Be it so: But their Wisdom, as they define it, is such as never Man yet attained. Now the Wisdom I would look for in a Good man, is such as is useful and practicable, not an imaginary Virtue that is only to be wished for. According to their Rules, I shall never allow C. Fabricius, M. Curius, and T. Coruncanius to be Wise, tho' all our Fore fathers esteemed them so. Therefore let them keep to themselves their obscure and invidious definition of Wisdom, and grant that These were Wise Men; but they won't do that: They'll deny this to any one that is not their Wise Man. Then let us speak a plain Truth in plain English: They whose Life and Conversation is such, that their Honesty, Integrity, Justice and Goodness are generally approved: They that are neither Covetous, Lustful, nor Bold, and have but that Principle of Honour that was in the Persons I just now mentioned, they (I think) are and aught to be accounted Good Men: Who, as far as Man can go, follow the Dictates of Nature, the best and surest Guide. For (methinks) 'tis Natural to all Mankind to maintain a mutual Society, especially where there is a Relation; thus we find that our Country men are dearer to us than Foreigners, and our Kinsmen than Strangers: For Nature seems to have planted in us a kind of regard and tenderness for the former. But these are not always sufficient ties upon our Affections: For there is this difference between Affinity and Friendship, that the first may subsist without Love, whereas the last cannot; take away Love, and the very Name of Friendship is gone, tho' that of Affinity shall remain. How great the power of Friendship is, we may gather from hence, that of all the numerous and different Societies which Nature has appointed among Men, This alone is contracted into so narrow a compass, that Love is always limited to Two, or very few Persons.  
Now Friendship is an unanimous consent of Opinions in all Matters relating to Religion, or Civil Affairs, with all Love and Kindness: Which (next to Wisdom) I hold to be the greatest Blessing that the immortal Gods ever bestowed upon Man. Others may prefer Riches, Health, Power, Honour and Pleasure, (which, indeed, is the highest Bliss that Beasts are capable of attaining;) but these are frail and fleeting Enjoyments, whose possession lays not so much in our own power, as in the arbitrary disposal of Fortune. They that place the Supreme Good in Virtue are most in the right; but in the mean time, 'tis this very Virtue that creates and maintains Friendship, for there can be no such thing as a Friend without it. Let us now measure Virtue by the common Rules of Life and Conversation; not like some of our modern Virtuosos, by lofty Expressions; let us call them Good Men, who have always been reputed so; such as Paulus, Cato, Gallus, Scipio and Philus, who are the best Patterns to live by; and not seek after Others, who are never to be found. Among these Men there were more and stronger engagements of Affection, than I am able to number or express.  
First then, How can Life live (as Ennius has it) without an acquiescence in the mutual Love of some Friend? What is happier, than to have a Companion whom one may trust as one's self? Where were the pleasures and enjoyments of Prosperity, without a Friend, who shall rejoice for them as if they were his own? How hard is it to undergo the burden of Adversity. without one that shall take the greatest share upon himself? All other things that are desirable to Man, are proper only for one end or occasion; Riches serve for Use, Power for Respect, Honour for Praise, Pleasures for Delight, Health for Ease and Business: but Friendship is suitable to every occasion, wherever you go it follows you; it is neither to be excluded from any Place, nor unseasonable or troublesome at any Time; so that we have not more frequent occasion (as they say) for Fire, Air, and Water, than we have for Friendship. I am not now. speaking of the common and ordinary Friendship, (tho' that too is not without its Pleasure and Use) but of that which is more refined and perfect: That, I mean, which was between those few Persons I have mentioned. Such Friendship as this is an Ornament to Prosperity, and a Support and Comfort in Adversity.  
But amongst all the Conveniences of Friendship, (which are many and great) I hold this to be the greatest, that in the lowest ebb of Fortune, it still bears up with cheerful hopes of a better condition, never suffering the Mind to despond or be cast down. He that looks upon his Friend, sees Himself, as in a Glass: so that Absence cannot divide them, Want impoverish them. Sickness weaken them, nor (which is stranger) Death kill them; such esteem and honour for his Memory does a Man leave behind him to his surviving Friend, that the Life of the One is glorious, and the Death of the Other happy. Take away mutual Love from among Men, and you will find that neither Cities nor Families will stand, nay, not so much as Agriculture will last. If this does not serve to convince you of the efficacy of Friendship and Concord, you may learn to value it from the fatal consequences of Dissension and Discord. What Family is so strongly Allied, what City so well Fortified, that it cannot be utterly destroyed by Factions and Animosities? From hence (by the Rule of Contraries) we may easily gather the many benefits that arise from Friendship. A certain Philosopher 
* Empedocles. Vid. Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathem. lib. 8.  of Agrigentum, is reported to say in Greek Verse, That all things in Nature and in the Universe, whether they be fixed or movable, are kept together by Friendship, or divided by Discord; the Truth of this Sentence is evident to every Man from his own Experience. What Acclamations were there in the Theatre t'other day, when in my Friend Pacuvius' new Play, the King, not knowing which of the two Strangers was Orestes, Pylades avouched himself to be Orestes, that he might die for his Friend, and Orestes protested himself to be (what he really was) the true Orestes? Now, if the bare Representation of a Story was so generally applauded, by the Audience, what do you think they would have done, if it had been Matter of Fact? Here Nature plainly shows her power, when Men own that to be well done in another which they would not do themselves.  
Thus have I, as well as I could, declared my Sentiments of Friendship: If any thing more remains to be said, (as I believe there is much) you must expect it from those who handle this Subject more at large.  FANNIUS. 
But we had rather expect it from You; for tho' I have frequently desired it from others, and heard them with some satisfaction, yet we know, You have another way of Delivering yourself upon all occasions.  SCAEVOLA. 
You would say so indeed, Fannius, had you been present at the Debare which was held about the Republic, in Scipio's Garden, to hear how bravely he descended Justice against the subtle Objections of Philus.  FANNIUS. 
'Twas easy for so Just a Person to speak for Justice.  SCAEVOLA. 
Then, sure it must be as easy for him to discourse of Friendship, whose chief glory it is, that he has with all the strictest Methods of Truth, Constancy and Justice, observed its Rules and Precepts.  LAELIUS. 
Nay, now ye lay a Force upon me; no matter by what Arguments: 'tis enough that I am forced; for to deny so fair Request to one's Kinsmen, were not only unkind, but unreasonable.  
As often therefore as I think upon Friendship, this Consideration offers itself first to my thoughts, whether Weakness or Necessity should be any inducements to contract a Friendship, that so, whereas either Party would be helpless of himself, the Occasions of the one might be supplied by the other, and all kind Offices performed by both, in a mutual reciprocation of Benefits; whether (I say) this might properly be called Friendship, or whether there were not some other Motive of greater worth and beauty, which proceeds from Nature. And certainly Love (from whence the Name of Friendship is derived in Latin) is the first and strongest tye of our Affections. Some Men shall receive a good Turn from those whom they only flatter with an outward show of Friendship, and to whom they pay a Respect suitable to their present occasions: But Friendship will not admit of any Disguise or Dissimulation, whatever proceeds from That, must be sincere and voluntary. So that methinks Friendship arises rather from Nature than Want, and from a secret application of the Mind with a tender sense of Love, rather than from any consideration how to make it serviceable to our Interest. Experience shows us this in most Animals, who for a time love their Young so entirely, and are so well beloved by them, that one may easily perceive the force of Nature in these Creatures, which is more eminently apparent in Man: First, from the mutual Love between Parents and their Children, which nothing but some horrible Crime can destroy; and next, when there are equal grounds for Love on both sides; as when we light upon one of the same Temper and Disposition with ourselves, in whom we have discovered some eminent Ray of Goodness and Virtue. For nothing is more amiable than Virtue, nothing more attractive of our Affections. We find in ourselves an inclination for some Persons whom we never saw, merely upon the Report of their Virtue. Who has not an honour and esteem for the Memory of C. Fabricius and M Curius, tho' he never beheld them? Who does not at the same time detest Tarqvinius Superbus, Sp. Cassius, and Sp. Moelius? When the two Generals, Pyrrhus and Hannibal, strove for the Mastery in Italy, we had no great aversion to the former, because of his Generosity, the later Rome always hated for his Cruelty. Now, since the power of Virtue is so great as to render it lovely in a Stranger, and (which is more) in an Enemy, 'tis no wonder if we are affected with it, when we see it every day in an Acquaintance. Tho' I must confess, Friendship is mightily confirmed by receiving some demonstrations of Kindness, by an experience of Love, and by frequent Conversation: All which being added to that first Motive of Love, will flame out into a wonderful Endearment of Friendship; now if any one thinks this to proceed from a Weakness in ourselves, and a design to obtain private Ends and Interests upon others, he makes the Rise of Friendship mean and ignoble, by ascribing it to Necessity and Want, which at that rate would best qualify a Man for Friendship. But 'tis quite otherwise: For he that has most assurance in himself, and is endued with so much Wisdom and Virtue that he wants no Body, but has every thing that is needful within himself, this Man is worthiest to gain and preserve a Friend. How did Africanus want me? Not at all: Neither did I stand in need of Him; but as I loved him out of an Honour I had for his Virtue, so He regarded me for some little Esteem he had of mine; Time and Conversation increased our Affection: And tho' many and great Conveniences on both sides did arise from thence, yet we never made the hopes of them any Inducements to contract a Friendship. For as we are sometimes willing to assist and oblige one another, not through any hopes of Requital, (for that were to put a Benefit out to Use;) but because we are all naturally inclined to Humanity: So methinks we should cover Friendship, not for any expectation of an outward Recompense, but because it is always its own Reward.  
Some, who (like Brutes) place all Happiness in Pleasure, have a quite different Notion of Friendship; but 'tis no wonder if such as misplace their Affections upon so low and worthless an Object, can never raise them to the contemplation of any thing that is Sublime, Noble, and Divine. Such therefore we shall exclude from our discourse, and rest satisfied, that Nature creates in us all a propensity to Love, and that the appearance of Virtue begets a true and sincere Affection. This last Motive makes us place ourselves as near as we can to Him we love, that we may more freely enjoy the benefit of his Conversation and Manners, that there may be an equality and correspondence in love, and a readiness to oblige without the least expectation of a Return. From this kind Contention many Benefits will arise, and its Foundation will be stronger and surer than that of Weakness and Want: For if Interest were the only tye of Friendship, when one fails, the other cannot last; but because Nature cannot be changed, therefore true Friendship, which proceeds from Nature, is immutable and eternal.  
Thus have I shown you the Rise of Friendship: Would you know any thing further?  SCAEVOLA. 
Good Loelius, proceed; for Fannius, who is my Junior, I dare Answer.  FANNIUS. 
My Brother has spoken my Mind; therefore, pray Sir, let us hear you on.  LAELIUS. 
Hear then, gentlemans, what Scipio and I have often said of Friendship. He always thought, that nothing was more difficult than to preserve an inviolate Friendship till Death: For things may so happen, that the Interests of Friends will be distinct, or their Opinions in Matters of State different. We find (said He) every day, that the Humours of Men change with their Condition, or their Tears. An Instance of this he brought from Children, who commonly lay aside their greatest Friendships with their Play-things; or if they continued them till their Youth, they were generally parted by some dispute for a Pleasure or Advantage, that could not be obtained by both at the same time; but if any were so constant as to preserve their Friendship under these Trials, yet at last it would be violated when both were Competitors in Honour: For there is no greater bane of Friendship than among most Men, Avarice, among the Better sort, Ambition; these have too often proved the causes of great Enmities between the greatest Friends. Besides, (said Scipio) many, and sometimes just Occasions of Separation are given by some Ill Men, that expect to be gratified by their Friend in every unlawful Request; as that he should be an Instrument of their Lust, or an Assistant to their Injustice; which if he refuses to do, let his Refusal be never so well grounded, he shall be taxed with a breach of Friendship; tho' at the same time, when these Men have the confidence to require a Compliance with all their Demands, they seem to profess that They would do any thing right or wrong, to serve a Friend. But this is an old Complaint, which has not only parted Friends, but created Mortal and Implacable Enemies. These are the Inconveniences which Scipio thought so incident to common Friendships, that he who could conquer or avoid them, was to be esteemed not only a Wise, but a Happy Man.  
And now, if you please, let us consider how far Love ought to proceed in Friendship. If Coriolanus had Friends, ought they to have born Arms with him against their Country? Should the Friends of Viscellinus, or Sp. Moelius have assisted their Ambition in aspiring to the Empire? We saw but t'other day that Tib. Gracchus, when he disturbed the Government, was forsaken by Qu. Tubero, and all his Friends that were of any Quality. But C. Blossius of Cuma, an Acquaintance of your Family (Scoevola,) when he came to me to the Senate (Loenas and Rupilius being then Consuls) to sue for his Pardon, urged this Argument for his Excuse, Because he had so high an esteem for Tib. Gracchus, that he thought himself obliged to do whatever he desired: But what (said I) if he should bid you Fire the Capitol? He would never have proposed that (answered he:) Well, but what if he had? Truly (said he) I should have done it. You hear how Wickedly he spoke; and really he did as he said, or rather more: For he was no longer. the Instrument, but the Author of Gracchus' Rage, and was his Leader rather than his Companion in all his desperate Attempts; at last, the Hot brained Rebel being terrified by a heavy Accusation for fresh Crimes, fled into Asia and revolted to the Enemy, and in the end was overtaken by a severe, but just Punishment for all his Treasons.  
Therefore it won't excuse you from the Offence to say you offended for a Friend's sake; for Virtue being the very cement of Friendship, there is no preserving the one, if you forsake the other. Now, if we judge it very fit for us to comply with all the Desires of a Friend, and for him to do the same by us, we have Reason on our side, as long as the Matter of his Request is not unlawful. I speak here of such Friends as we have before our Eyes, such as we meet with in History or Conversation, Those we are to make our Precedents, and those chief who come nearest to the true Wisdom. We have heard of the intimate Friendship between Papus Aemilius and C. Luscinus, who (as Tradition tells us) were twice Consuls together, and twice Censors; and we find that M. Curius and T. Coruncanius were familiar with them, and between themselves. Now we can't suppose that any one of these would ever press the other to the performance of aught that touched their Honour, their Oath, or their Loyalty. No; they were Men of so much Virtue, that if such Demands were ever made, I dare say, they were never granted. Yet we see Tib. Gracchus was assisted by C. Carbo, C. Cato and his Brother Caius, who proves a greater Stickler for that Faction, since his Brother's Death, than he was before.  
Therefore we may take this for a general Rule in Friendship, Neither to make nor grant any dishonourable Request: For in all other Offences, but especially in those that are against our Country, 'tis a poor Evasion to cry, They were committed upon a Friend's account. Now we are fallen into such Times, (Fannius and Scoevola) that it concerns us to look as far as we can into the Future state of the Republic, especially since we have degenerated from the Customs and Manners of our Ancestors. Tib. Gracchus strove to obtain, or rather did actually usurp the Supreme Power for a few Months. Did ever any Roman see or hear the like? Yet even after his Death, his Friends and Adherents maintained what he had done; nor can I mention their usage of P. Nasica Scipio without Tears. Carbo (whom I named just now) we bore with, by reason we had punished Tib. Gracchus so lately. What will be the Event of C. Gracchus' Tribuneship, I shall not pretend to guests; that Affair grows daily upon us, and if it once gets a Head, will be very pernicious to the Republic. You may see by every Poll for Magistrates, what mischievous Consequences have attended the Gabinian Law, and that which Cassius brought in, two years after. And now, methinks, I see the Senate and People of Rome divided, and all things managed by a Headstrong Multitude, whilst some stand looking on, and are more curious to inquire what occasioned these Calamities, than how they should be remedied. But what's the Reason of all this? Truly, because no Body would dare to attempt such a thing without a Party. Therefore every Honest Man must be cautioned, that tho' his Friendship should betray him unawares into such Alliances, yet he must ot hold himself obliged to stand by his Friend, in any Design that tends to the subversion or prejudice of the Commonwealth: For all Offenders of this kind, some Punishment must be provided, and no less for the Adherents than for the Leaders of a Faction.  
Who in all Greece was more Renowned or more Powerful than Themistocles, who delivered that Nation from Slavery in the Persian War, where he was General? Yet after all, this Man, when he was Banished through the Jealousy of his Fellow-Citizen, knew not how to bear that Affront from his Ungrateful Country, (tho' 'twas his Duty to have born it;) but took the same course as Coriolanus had done here Twenty years before him, and Revolted: Neither of these could find a Friend that would assist them against his Country, and therefore Both killed themselves. Now, I say, such wicked Associations as these, must not only be denied the umbrage of Friendship for their Excuse, but should be made liable to some heavy Censure, that no Man may think it lawful upon any account to take up Arms with his Friend against his Country, which, for aught I can see, as things go now, may too frequently happen. For my part, I am no less concerned to think what the Condition of the Republic will be after my Death, than what is now in my Life time.  
Therefore this must be laid down as the first Maxim in Friendship, To request what is just of our Friends, and to perform what is just for them, scarcely respiting the performance so long as to be asked. Let us always be ready to oblige them, and exclude all delays from Friendship: Let us be willing and glad to give good Counsel, and let the Authority of a Friend, if his Advice be honest, go a great way with us; this Authority must extend itself not only to open Admonitions, but, where occasion requires, to severe Reproofs, and then it must be strictly obeyed.  
Yet some, who (I hear) are esteemed Wise in Greece, please themselves with strange and singular Opinions; but nothing can escape the nicety of their Distinctions. They (forsooth) will tell us, that we must not be over-stocked with Friends, for that's the way to involve one Man in the Cares of a Multitude, who at the same time has enough, and it may be too many of his own: That 'tis troublesome to have too great an Interest in other men's Concerns, and more convenient to have the Knot of Friendship as slight and as lose as we can, that upon occasion, we may straighten or slacken it, as we see fit: That Quiet is the readiest Means to obtain Happiness, which the mind can never enjoy, if it must be in continual labour for the Fortunes of so many several Men. Others, they say, are of a more selfish Opinion, (which I have hinted at already,) that Friendship was to be desired for Convenience and Interest, not for Love and Affection: And therefore the more helpless a Man is, the more reason he has to seek a Friend; from hence (say they) it comes to pass that, Women rather than Men, the Poor rather than the Rich, the Distressed rather than the Happy fly to Friendship as a Sanctuary. Brave Wisdom indeed! They may as well rob the World of the Sun, as Human Life of Friendship, the best and happiest Gift of Heaven. But what is that Quiet they talk of, which in appearance may be pleasant, but is really to be avoided in most cases? Would any Man in his Wits excuse himself from undertaking an honourable Action or Employment, or lay it down when he has undertaken it, merely because there is some trouble in the performance of it? He that would avoid all Care, must by the same Rule avoid Virtue, which cannot without some difficulty reject and hate its contrary, as Good does Evil, Temperance Lust, or Courage Cowardice. Thus, you see, Virtuous Men have the strongest aversion for those that are Vicious, the Valiant for those that are Fearful, and the Sober for those that are Lewd. 'Tis therefore essential to a well governed Mind to delight in all that is Good, and to be offended at all that is otherwise. Now since Trouble will sometimes befall the wisest Man, (which it must necessarily do, unless we can suppose him devested of all Humanity,) I see no reason why we should banish Friendship from our Life, because it may give us a little trouble. Take but away the Affections of the Soul, and tell me what difference there is, (I will not say between a Beast and a Man, but) between a Man and a Stone, a Stock or any senssess thing. We must not hearken to those, that will make Virtue so hard and cruel a Mistress, which in all things is easy and gentle, especially in Friendship, where she allows us a well to share the Comforts of our Friend's Prosperity, as the Sorrows of his Adversity. Therefore Friendship is not to be laid aside, because some trouble must be undergon for a Friend, no more than Virtue is to be neglected, because it is attended with some difficulties.  
Now Virtue being (as I told you) the very Cement of Affection, when That appears so eminently in one Man, as to create in another of the like disposition, a desire of being joined to him; when, I say, this happens, an Amity must necessarily follow. And methinks 'tis strange, that Men should take so much Pleasure in the Vanities and Superfluities of Life; as Honour, Grandeur, Building, Dressing and Beautifying the Body, and yet find no delight in a Mind enriched with Virtue, that knows where to bestow and how to return Affection. For certainly nothing can be more Charming than a Correspondence of Kindness, and a mutual intercourse of friendly Offices. Now if we add, what we justly may, that Likeness is so attractive of Friendship as nothing more, 'twill easily be granted that Virtuous Men love such as are Virtuous, and delight to associate with them, as if there were already some Alliance in Nature, and Affinity in Blood: For nothing is more desirous, and (I may say) greedy of its Like, than Nature.  
And now, (Fannius and Scoevola,) I hope I have demonstrated the necessity of a good Will between good Men, which is the natural spring of Friendship. But this Goodness is of a large extent: For Virtue is not so selfish, insociable or proud, but that she is equally communicative of her Benefits to every particular, and active for the public Good; which would never be, had she not an universal kindness for all. Therefore they that make Interest an inducement to Friendship, seem to me to loosen its most amiable Tie; for 'tis not so much the Advantages we receive from a Friend, as the Love he has for us, that aught to be valued; and than it is that a good turn is most acceptable, when it comes with a good will. Now 'tis so far from being true, that Friendship proceeds from Necessity, that they who abound most in the possession of Riches and Virtue, (which of all things has least need of any outward assistance) are generally the most liberal, and readiest to oblige. Yet I question, whether 'tis always necessary that nothing should be wanting between Friends: For if Scipio had never stood in need of my Service, Advice, or Assistance, neither at home nor abroad, what proofs had their been of our mutual Affection? Therefore Convenience and Interest ought not to be the causes, but the consequences of Friendship.  
We must not give ear to those Worldlings who entertain such notions of Friendship, as are grounded neither upon their knowledge nor their experience: For (God knows,) what Man living, would purchase the greatest Wealth and Plenty in the World at so dear a rate, as not to Love the rest of Mankind, nor to be beloved by them? This were to live the Life of a Tyrant, destitute of the least assurance of Kindness or common good Will, and so full of Jealousies and Distrusts, that there is no room for Friendship. For who can Love that Man whom he Fears, or by whom he thinks himself to be Feared? Tyrant's are flattered indeed for a while with an appearance of Friendship, but when they fall, (as commonly they do,) than they see too plainly how few Friends they have. 'Tis reported of Tarquin, that he should say in his Banishment, that now he could discern his Friends from his Enemies, when he was not in a capacity of being useful to the one, or hurtful to the other: Tho' I should wonder if so proud and cruel a Tyrant, could find one Friend in the World. Now as this Man's ill qualities, gained him no true Friends, so commonly the affluence of Wealth indisposes some Men for a real Friendship: For Fortune is not only Blind herself, but she hoodwinks her Favourites, so that they are generally puffed up with Pride and self-conceit; and certainly nothing is more unsufferable than a fortunate Fool. Of this we have frequent instances in some whose humour is at first not disagreeable, till Honour, Power and Prosperity make such an alteration in them, that they slight their Old Friends and grow fond of New. Now what can be a greater weakness, than for Men abounding in Riches, to lay out vast Sums upon Horses, Equipage, , Furniture, and twenty other Commodities that every Man may have for his Money, and yet not to be solicitous in the obtaining a Friend, the Richest Treasure and Loveliest Ornament of ones Life? For let a Man bestow never so much in the purchase of worldly Goods, yet he can't tell for whom they are purchased, or who shall enjoy the Fruits of all his Cost and Care, which may at last be snatched from him by some stronger hand; but a Friend is a sure and lasting Possession. Nay, tho' we should suppose ourselves absolute Masters of all that Fortune can give, yet even in that condition, a Life destitute of Friends would be Solitary and Uncomfortable.  
And so much for this Point. Let us now set some Bounds and Limits to Friendship, how far it should proceed in Kindness; concerning these, I find three several Opinions, none of which I approve.  

The First is, That we must stand equally affected to our Friends, as to our Selves.  
The Second, That our Returns of Friendship, must bear an exact proportion to the Obligations we receive from our Friends.  
The Third, That accordingly as a Man esteems of Himself, such he must be esteemed by his Friend.   
Of these three Assertions there is not one to which I can assent. First, It is not true, that a Man ought to stand equally affected to his Friend as to Himself. For how many things are there which we would never do in our own Case, and yet we are willing to do them for a Friend's sake? For instance, to sue to an unworthy Man, to be importunate, to reproach any one with some Bitterness and Passion, all which would not appear so well in our own behalf, yet might be excusable upon a Friend's account. Besides, there are many cases in which a good Man willingly neglects or quits his own Convenience, that his Friend rather than himself may enjoy it.  
The next Opinion limits Friendship to a mutual equality and exact Correspondence in all good Offices. This is to call Friendship to too strict and severe an account, by requiring that the Returns should be equivalent to the Obligations. True Friendship, methinks, is of a more generous and noble Nature, and scorns to be exact in observing whether more is returned than has been received; for we must not be afraid, lest any thing should fall to the ground and be forgotten, or lest our Friends should have too much of our Kindness.  
The last and indeed the worst is, that a Man must be esteemed by his Friend, as he esteems of Himself. We frequently see some Men dejected in Mind, and hopeless of mending their Condition: in such a case it will not become a Friend to entertain the same mean thoughts of his desponding Companion, as he has of himself; but rather to use all arts and endeavours to raise his drooping Spirits, and to animate him with better thoughts of himself and his Fortunes.  
But we shall find that true Friendship has a nobler End than any of these; if we remember what Scipio found so much fault with, when he said, there could be no Opinion more pernicious to Friendship than his, who said that a Man must love with this reserve, that he may one day hate. He could never be persuaded that this Sentence was spoken by Bias, who was one of the Seven, but rather by some Lewd ill-natured Fellow, that had a mind to subject all the World to his Interest and Ambition. For how can any Body be that Man's Friend, whose Enemy he thinks he may become hereafter? Besides, he must needs wish that his Friend may offend often, that he may find more Occasions to rebuke him; and he must as necessarily be displeased when he does well, or succeeds well. Wherefore this Doctrine (whoever was the Author of it) tends to the utter dissolution of Friendship. He should rather have advised us to use such Caution in choosing a Friend, as not to begin to love one, whom at some time or other we may hate; but if we are not so happy in our Choice as we could wish, 'twas Scipio's Opinion, that we must rather bear with it than ever think of a Separation.  
This, in my mind, should be the chief aim of Friendship, that the Manners and Dispositions of Friends should be good, and that there may be a Communication of all things between them, both of their Intentions and Thoughts, without any reserve. And tho' it should sometimes fall out, that a Friend's Request is less reasonable than it ought to be, yet if his Life or Credit lies at Stake, we may step a little aside to serve him, unless we foresee that some scandalous Consequence will attend our Compliance: For tho' there are some Allowances to be made in Friendship, yet we must not hazard our own Reputation, nor that necessary Instrument in all our Affairs, the good Will of our Neighbours, which to purchase by Fawning and Flattery, is base and mean. Above all things we must be mindful of Virtue, which is the Foundation of Friendship.  
Scipio (for I must often return to Him, who was always talking of this Subject) used to complain, that in all other Matters Men were more diligent than in this. Every one can tell you how many Sheep or Oxen he has; but ask him how many Friends, and he is silent: Most People are cautious and curious enough in the purchase of the first, but very negligent and indifferent in the choice of the last. All this proceeds from an ignorance of the true Marks and Tokens by which we may discern one that is well qualified for a Friend. We must therefore pitch upon those whom we think to be Men of a firm, steady, and constant Principle; there are so few of this sort, that we can hardly judge of them, but by making some Trial, and this Trial can't be made till we have entered into some Familiarity, which being antecedent to our Experience, seems to prevent our making a right Judgement of a Friend. Therefore a Prudent Man must know as well how to stop the Torrent of his Affection, as a good Rider how to check the Career of a head strong Jade. Friendship must be used like Managed Horses, the Humours and Dispositions of those we intent for our Friends must be observed by degrees. Some are tried in a little matter of Money how slight their Professions are; Others again, who are not to be tempted with a small Sum, will be proved in a greater. But if you can find a Man after all, that scorns to prefer your Money before your Friendship, where will you light upon one that will not value Greatness, Power, Wealth and Empire above his Friend, that, when These stand in competition with the Laws and Rights of Friendship, will not choose the first before the last? So hard is it for Flesh and Blood to resist the Temptations of Honour and Interest: And tho' they are purchased with the violation of Friendship, yet some Men shall think it very allowable to make bold with a Friend upon so great an account. So that true Friendship is hardly to be looked for from the Ambitious and Busy part of Mankind; for 'tis almost impossible to find One among them that will wish his Friend's Advancement before his own. To say no more of this— how grievous and intolerable is it to some Men, to bear the least share of their Friends Misfortunes? How few are there in the World that can submit to that? Now tho' Ennius was in the right when he said, Our cruelest Fortune shows our kindest Friends: Yet there are two Cases in which most Men show the levity and inconstancy of their Nature, namely when they slight a Friend in their Prosperity, or forsake him in his Adversity. He therefore that in both Conditions of Fortune is a constant, firm, faithful Friend, He (I say) ought to be esteemed as one of that Noble and almost Divine sort of Men. Now the main Foundation of that Stability and Constancy which is required in Friendship, is Truth; for nothing can be lasting that is not true. We must choose a Man that is Plain, Courteous, good Humoured, and of the same Mind with ourselves; these are the inseparable Marks of Fidelity; for a Heart that is various and full of doublings can never be faithful, nor can one that is of a Temper and Disposition different from ours be either cordial or constant. Give me leave to add this, That a Man must not be too forward in laying Faults upon his Friend of himself, nor in believing them from others: All this belongs to that Constancy which I mentioned just now.  
Thus have I proved what I told you at first, that there can be no Friendship, but between Good Men. For 'tis the part of a Good Man (whom I may justly call a Wise Man) to observe these two Rules in Friendship: 

First, That it be without any Deceit or Dissimulation; for 'tis more ingenuous to profess an open Hatred, than to disguise it under the Mask of Love.  
Secondly, Not only to defend his Friend against false Accusations; but to keep himself from suspecting that he violates the Laws of Friendship.    
'Tis necessary too, that there should be a sweetness of Temper, and a pleasantness in Conversation, which certainly gives a delightful relish to Friendship; Sullenness and Moroseness must be avoided by all means: For tho' Friendship admits of Gravity, yet it must always be remiss and easy, and disposed to all innocent Cheerfulness and Complaisance.  
Here some will think it a disputable Question, Whether a New Friend, if he deserves our Love, should not be preferred before an Old one; as we use to prise a young Horse above one that is past his Prime? This is an ill natured Doubt: For we must not think that Friendship (like the ordinary Pleasures of Life) is capable of Satiety; but rather that Old Friends (like Old Wine) are the better for their Age. 'Tis a true tho' common Saying, that One must eat many a Bushel of Salt with a Friend, before he can acquit himself in all the Offices of Friendship. Novelties indeed, like young Plants, if they give us any hopes of Fruit, are not to be rejected; but still that which is of an elder Date is to be cherished most: For certainly long Acquaintance and continual Use are strong Engagements upon our Nature. And if the Horse I was speaking of, has no great Faults, I know no Man that would not rather choose to Ride one that he has been long used to, than a skittish Colt that was never Backed. This power of Custom and Use is not only discernible in Living Creatures, but even in things Inanimate: 'Tis a common Observation, That Men take most Pleasure in those Places where they have dwelled longest, tho' they are never so Wild and Mountainous.  
'Tis a great Step to Friendship, when the Superior descends to an Equality with his Inferior: For many times there will happen a difference in Degree, as there was between Scipio and us that were his Friends; yet He never would esteem himself above Philus, Rupilius, Mummius, or any of his Friends that were of an Inferior Rank; but on the contrary always respected his Brother Q. Maximus, who was a Worthy Gentleman, but no way Scipio's Equal (for he was a great deal younger,) as if he had been his Superior, and looked upon all his Friends as Men that were his Betters in their intrinsic Worth. 'Tis pity but all Men should follow Scipio's Example in this; and if they have any Advantage above their Friends in the Gifts of Nature or Fortune, they should freely impart it to them, and share it with them. For Instance, If their Parentage be low, or their Endowments of Mind or Fortune mean, they should increase their Stock in both, and do them all the Honour and Service they can. As we read in Romances of some Heroes, who having been brought up in Mean Families, through the obscurity of their Birth and ignorance of their Parentage, and proving at last the Sons of some King or God, retain their first Affection to the Shepherds, whom till then they looked upon as their Natural Fathers. This Duty is much more incumbent upon us where our Real Parents are known: And then it is that the Fruits of Knowledge and Wisdom and every Excellence are most certainly enjoyed by ourselves, when they are communicated to Others.  
Therefore as they who are any way Superior to their Friends, should make them their Equals; so on the other side, they that are Inferiors must not be dissatisfied if they have a Friend that excels them in Knowledge, Fortune or Dignity. But 'tis the Humour of some to be always complaining of their Friends, or else upbraiding them, especially where they find any colour of saying, such a thing was done for their sake, and that they showed enough of their Kindness by serving them in an Affair, where none but a Friend would have given himself half the trouble. This sort of Men is intolerable, for they turn their very Favours into Reproaches; whereas the nature of an Obligation seems to require that it should be remembered by him that received it, not upbraided by him that gave it.  
Now as the Superior must submit himself, so must the Inferior in some sort raise himself to an Equality with his Friend. Some Men make their Friends very uneasy by thinking themselves slighted; tho' this seldom happens, but to such as are conscious of their own Demerits: such as these are to be won from their Opinion, not only by Persuasion, but by real Assistance. And here it might be proper to consider first how far it lays in our power to oblige, and secondly how far the Person we would oblige is qualified for the Character and Post we intent him. For 'tis impossible for a Man (let him be never so able) to advance all his Friends and Acquaintance. We see Scipio had interest enough to make P. Rutilius Consul, but he could not serve his Brother Lucius upon the same occasion. Nay, tho' we can do never so much for a Friend, yet (as I said before) we must consider whether he is fit for such or such an Employment.  
There is no true Judgement to be made of our Friendships, till they are confirmed by length of time, and maturity of understanding. If in our Youth, we had a Love for the Companions of our Recreations, this does not oblige us to contract a strict Friendship with them, in our riper Years; for at that rate our Nurses and Tutors might justly challenge the largest share in our Affection. Now tho' these are not to be slighted, yet they are to esteemed after another manner than our Friends, whom otherwise we can never preserve long. Different Manners create different Minds, and consequently dissolve Friendship: And the only Reason why Good Men can never Love those that are Bad is, because there is the widest difference imaginable in their Minds and Manners.  
'Tis a good Rule in Friendship, to take care lest the Intemperance and Extravagance of our Affection, should hinder the Occasions of our Friends, or prejudice their Interest. For (to return to Story,) Neoptolemus had never taken Troy, if he had harkened to his Father-in-Law Lycomedes, who had the Education of Him, and strove with many Tears to stop his Journey. Sometimes there will fall out pressing occasions, that must necessarily divide Friends; which he that goes about to obstruct, because he can't bear a Friend's absence, shows a weak impotent and unreasonable Friendship. Therefore we must always consider what we ought to ask of our Friends, as well as what we ought to grant them.  
Sometimes there falls out an unhappy necessity of a final Separation between Friends: For my Discourse descends now from the Friendship of the Wiser Sort, to that of the Vulgar. For Instance; Suppose a Friend of ours has done some great injury to a third Person, and that the Infamy of it is likely to extend to all that hold any Familiarity or Correspondence with him: In this case, we must let our Friendship cool by degrees, and discontinuance of Conversation, and (as Cato used to say,) rather untie it gently, than break it off abruptly; unless some intolerable enormity breaks out, so that we cannot with any appearance of Justice or Honesty, avoid an immediate Separation. Where we find an alteration in the Manners and Inclinations of our Friend, (which often happens,) or a difference between their Sentiments, and ours in matters of Government, (for as I told you, I am not now speaking of a Philosophical Friendship, but of that which is more ordinary:) There, I say, we must take heed lest instead of laying down our Friendship fairly, we take up a mortal Enmity: for nothing can be worse than to own an open Quarrel, where one has formerly used a Familiarity. You see, Scipio withdrew from Q. Pompeius' Friendship upon my account, and left off all Familiarity with my Colleague Metellus, because he was disaffected to the State: In both he used that Wisdom and Moderation, as to discover a Resentment free from Passion. Therefore it must be our first care, to have no variance between our Friends and ourselves, and where such a misfortune happens, to use that Temper in our demeanour towards them, that our Friendship may rather seem to die of itself, than to suffer any Violence from us. We must take heed, lest of intimate Friends, we become Irreconcilable Enemies: For this is commonly the occasion of Quarrels, Reproaches and Rail, which if they are by any means tolerable, must be born with; and we ought to have so much regard for our former Friendship, that he that does the Injury, may be more to blame, than he that receives it.  
Against all these Errors and Inconveniences, there is but one caution and remedy; and that is, not to begin our Friendship too soon, nor to misplace it upon such as do not deserve it. Now those are to be looked upon as most deserving, in whom we find such good Qualities, as seem to command our Affection. This sort of Men (as every thing that is excellent) is hard to be met with; and 'tis very difficult to find any thing that is every way Perfect in its kind. There are a great many that will allow nothing to be Good, but what is Profitable, and value their Friends as Graziers do their , accordingly as they think they will turn to account. Such as these want that generous and most natural Friendship, which is to be desired of itself, and for itself, and never understood by any experience upon themselves, how great the force and efficacy of Friendship is. For a Man loves himself, not because he expects any reward, or return of his own Affection from himself, but because every one is naturally dear to himself. Now he that does not find he stands thus affected towards another, can never be a true Friend: for a Friend is one's other Self. And since 'tis evident in Birds, Beasts and Fishes, and all Creatures Wild or Tame, First, how they love themselves, (for this affection is born with them,) and next, how naturally they apply themselves to others of their own kind, and that with a strange tenderness and emulation (as it were) of Human Love; we must certainly conclude, that these Inclinations are much more strongly imprinted in the Heart of Man, and that 'tis Natural for him to Love himself, and to seek some other, with whom he may so mingle Souls, as to unite Two into One.  
Yet some Ill-natured (not to say impudent) Men would have their Friends be such as they can never be themselves, and expect that from them, which was never done by themselves. 'Tis therefore necessary in the first place, that the Man who would be a Friend, should be a Good Man; and next, that he should find, and fix upon one of his own disposition; for than it is, that the Friendship I mentioned, is throughly established, when two Men equally affected to one another, have so entirely mastered those Appetites, to which the greatest part of Mankind is enslaved, as to find a Pleasure in Virtue and Integrity, and to delight in the mutual performance of all friendly Offices, neither party desiring any thing from the other but what is fair and honest, and Both having a Regard as well as a Love for each other: For he that would separate Modesty from Friendship, will Rob it of its greatest Ornament. 'Tis a great Heresy in Friendship, to think that it gives any encouragement to a lose and licentious Life: For certainly a Friend was designed by Nature, for an Assistant to Virtue, not for a Companion in Vice, that because a solitary Virtue would be helpless and unable of herself, to reach that degree of Perfection which she aims at, she might be enabled by the assistance of some Companion, to obtain her desires. If therefore this noble Association ever was, is, or can be found between any two Persons, they are to be looked upon as the best Guides, to this greatest Blessing of Human Nature. This, this is the Society in which is to be found all that Man can wish for, Virtue, Honour, Peace of Mind, Pleasure, and every solid Enjoyment that makes our Lives happy, and without which they cannot be comfortable. This, doubtless, is the highest consummation of Human Felicity; and if we would attain to it, we must make Virtue the means, without which we can never deserve a Friend, nor any thing that's worth our wishes; and which being neglected, they that think they have Friends will (too late) find their Error, when they have occasion to make use of them. Therefore (for I cannot repeat it too often) we must Try before we Love, and not Love before we Try. But as our neglect in other matters of moment is too visible, so is it chief  in the choice and management of our Friendships, in which many of us use very preposterous Methods, and (in spite of the Proverb) frustrate our own designs. For sometimes we suffer ourselves to be so encumbered with our own worldly concerns, or engage ourselves so deeply in public affairs, that upon the least distaste or disappointment in them, we immediately take pet, and fall out with our Friends.  
But nothing can excuse our want of Care in a matter of so great importance; for Friendship is the only thing in the World, concerning whose usefulness all Men agree. Nay, tho' Virtue itself is derided by some, and passes with them for Singularity and Ostentation, tho' many that content themselves with a little, despise Riches; tho' Honour and Greatness which inflame the Ambition of most Men, are so slighted by some, that nothing is thought more vain and empty, (and so for other things of this nature that are admired by some and contemned by others:) yet all Men have the same respect for Friendship; the Statesman and the Philosopher, the Idleman and the Man of Business, nay even those that mind nothing but their Pleasures will tell you, that there is no living without a Friend, if you mena to live happily. For Friendship runs through every Stage of our life, no Age or Condition is exempt from it: Nay, tho' a Man were of that morose and savage disposition as to hate and shun the conversation of Mankind, (as we read one Timon an Athenian to have done,) yet that very Man can't live without some body to whom he may vent his spleen and ill nature. This we should find by our own experience, if it were possible for some God to take us from the Society of Men, and to place us in a Solitude, there supplying with all the necessities of nature, and only debarring us of the power to see any of our Fellow-creatures: Is there any Man of so hard a temper that he could endure such a life, and to whom that Solitude would not render all Pleasures fruitless and insipid? 'Twas a very true Saying that, which we have received from our Forefathers and they from theirs, as spoken by Archytas of Tarentum, that if a Man were to ascend into Heaven, and there to contemplate the nature of the Universe and the beauty of the Stars, all that Entertainment would be ungrateful to him, which, if he had a Companion to speak to, would have been very acceptable and pleasant.  
Thus we see, Nature flies Solitude, and seems to seek some support and assistance from without, which every true Friend does with pleasure. But tho' Nature by so many tokens declares what she wants and requires, we stop our ears I know not how nor why, and will not hearken to what she suggests. Now as the usefulness of Friendship is various and manifold, so in it there are too many occasions given of suspicions and distastes, all which a wise Man will avoid, lessen, or bear. And without doubt, it requires a great deal of Discretion to preserve the Truth and Faithfulness of a Friend, without giving offence at some time or other. For our Friends must be often admonished and sometimes rebuked, both which, if they are wellmeant, are to be taken well. But 'tis too true, as my friend Terence says in a Play of his called Andria, Compliance gains Friends, and Truth Enemies: Truth is ungrateful, because it begets Hatred, which is the Bane of Friendship: But Compliance is infinitely worse, for that ruins a Friend by indulging him in his faults, and suffers him to run headlong into destruction. But he of all Men is most to blame, that both hates Truth, and suffers himself to be misled by Compliance. In this case, all possible care and diligence is to be used, that our Admonitions be without Severity, and our Reproofs without Scurrility: But let our Compliance (to use Terence's expression) be tempered with all Freedom, and void of Flattery, that Pander to Vice, which is misbecoming not only of a Friend, but of a Gentleman: For 'tis one thing to live upon equal terms with a Friend, and another thing to live under a Tyrant; but he that stops his Ears against the Truth, and will not hear it tho' it comes from a Friend, is certainly in a desperate condition, and must be given over. What Cato tells us, is infallibly true, that some Men are more beholding to their sharpest Enemies than to their smoothest Friends, for the first speak truth sometimes, but the last never. 'Tis very absurd in most Men, when they are admonished, to be troubled where they should not, and not to be troubled where they should: For usually they are not so angry with Themselves for committing a fault, as with their Friend for telling them of it; whereas on the contrary they should be sorry they have Erred, and glad they are Reprov▪ d.  
As therefore 'tis the property of cordial Friendship mutually to admonish and to be admonished, and as the one is to be done with all Freedom, but without any Sharpness, and the other to be taken with all Patience and without any murmuring: so we may be sure that there is no greater Canker to Friendship than Flattery, fawning and assentation. This Vice has too many Names as well as Shapes, and is the infallible symptom of a base deceitful temper, that speaks and acts every thing out of a love to Compliance more than Truth. But Dissimulation, besides that 'tis odious in all cases, (for it corrupts and destroys our Judgement,) is utterly inconsistent with Friendship, because it is repugnant to Truth, without which, the name of Friendship is but taken in vain. For since the End and Excellence of Friendship is to unite our minds, how can that be effected where one Man has not always one and the same mind, but is unsettled, inconstant, and inconsistent with himself? What can be so flexible and slippery as his mind, who conforms himself not only to the Will, but even to the very Looks of another? Does any one deny? I deny too: does he affirm? So do I; in short, I have that command over myself, as to be of every Man's mind, as Terence has it in another Play; this he applies wittily to Gnatho a Parasite, which would look very absurd in a Friend. There are too many in the World that resemble Gnatho in their Character, tho' they make a better figure than he did upon the Stage: Flattery in them is fullsome, when they think their Vanity authorised by their Greatness. But we may as easily discern a Flatterer from a Friend, with a little care, as we can distinguish false and sophisticated Ware from that which is right. The very unthinking Multitude (where one would little expect to find any Judgement) shall sometimes find the difference between a fawning Demagogue, that is, a Public Flatterer, and a wise and worthy Patriot.  
What fine arts did C. Papirius use to insinuate himself into the minds of his Auditors, when he endeavoured to bring in a Law for making the same Person Tribune of the Commons as often as they pleased? I opposed it; but I shall say nothing of myself, of Scipio I shall speak most willingly. Lord! what weight, what Majesty was there in his Oration? One would have thought he had been their Governor and not their Fellow-Citizen— But you were present, and his Speech is in every Man's hands. Thus through his means that popular Law was rejected by the unanimous Consent of the People: But to speak a word or two of myself. You may remember, when Q. Maximus (Scipio's Brother) and L. Mancinus were Consuls, how universally the Law that C. Licinius Crassus proposed concerning the Creation of Priests, had obtained among the Vulgar: Now the intent of this Law was to transfer the right of choosing Men into that Office, upon the Populace. 'Twas he that first brought up the Custom of Haranguing the People in Verse: But the Honour every one had for the immortal Gods, together with my best endeavours in their defence, did easily defeat his mercenary Oration. This was done when I was Praetor, five years before I was Consul; tho' I must confess, the success of that Affair is more owing to the Justice of the Cause, than to the Abilities of its Advocate.  
Since therefore upon so public a Stage as a Vulgar Audience is, where there is room enough for Shuffling and Prevarication, Naked Truth can prevail, when 'tis laid open and illustrated; how much more can it do in Friendship, which is wholly measured by it? For here, unless your Friend unlocks his Breast to you, and you do the same to him, there can be no Trust or Confidence between you; you cannot so much as Love or be Beloved, but will be forced to doubt the sincerity of each other's Affection. Now tho' Flattery is very pernicious of itself, yet can it hurt no Body but him that admits of it, and is pleased with it; from hence it comes to pass, that those Men are most exposed to the Flattery of others who are most apt to flatter themselves, and to have an overweening Conceit of their own Worth. 'Tis true, Virtue is lovely in her own Eye, for she best knows herself, and understands how Amiable she is to others: But I speak not now of Virtue, but of an Opinion of Virtue; for most Men desire not so much to be Virtuous, as to appear so: Such as these are pleased with Flattery; These, when they meet with some elaborate Panegyric that tickles the vanity of their Humour, shall think the fulsome Encomium to be a true Testimonial of their Merit. But this is not Friendship, where one does not care to hear Truth, nor the other to speak it. The Flattery of the Parasite in the Play would not seem so witty to us, unless there was such a Fop for him to work upon, as the Braggadocio. But does Thaïs' thank me kindly, d'ye say? One would have thought it enough for Gnatho to have answered, She does: But he cries, Oh! infinitely! Thus your right Flatterer always aggravates that which the Vainglorious Man desires should look Big. Now tho' this sort of Witchcraft has most power over such as invite and encourage it, yet the Wisest and Gravest Persons must be cautioned to take care lest they be overtaken by it some time or other. Any Man that has his Wits about him may quickly discern an open Flatterer: but we can't use too much Caution in arming ourselves against the subtle Insinuations of the sly undermining Sycophant, who shall then be most guilty of Assentation, when he seems the Spirit of Contradiction; who all the while he pretends to oppose you, shall only amuse you, and at last in Complaisance to you, shall suffer himself to be convinced; so that he who is most in the Wrong, shall seem to have the Better side of the Question: Now what is more gross than to be thus imposed upon? To prevent all this, we must take care (as the Poet says in his Epiclerus) lest we be bantered and bubbled worse than all the foolish Old Fellows in Comedies use to be: For even upon the Stage we think the Character of an improvident Credulous Dotard very ridiculous.  
My Discourse has deviated I know not how from the Friendships of the more Refined, that is, the Wiser sort of Men (I mean here such Wisdom as Man is capable of,) to those of smaller account; let us now return to the first Motive of Friendship, and end with it.  
'Tis Virtue, Virtue (C. Fannius and Q. Mucius) that creates and preserves Friendship; in That alone we shall find all that is agreeable, faithful, or constant. Virtue, having raised herself above the common Pitch, and showing her own Light, sees the same, and knows it in another, to whom she joins herself by a mutual giving and receiving of all that is needful for Both: From hence proceeds Love or Friendship, which are both derived from the same word (Amorett) in Latin. Now Love is nothing else but a well wishing to him whom you affect, without any inducement from Necessity or Interest; for the Later will naturally follow upon Friendship, tho' you do not think of it. This sort of Affection I had when I was young, for L. Paulus, C. Gallus, P. Nasica and T. Gracchus (my Friend Scipio's Father in-Law) who were all of them Old Men. This is more eminently perfect between those of the same Age, as between Me and Scipio, L. Furius, P. Rupilius and Sp. Mummius. Again, when we grow Old, we are pleased with the Conversation of Younger Persons; as I am with Yours and Tubero's: Nay, I take great delight in my familiarity with P. Rutilius and A. Virginius; tho' they are very young.  
Now, because the condition of our Life and Nature is so ordered, that one Age grows out of another; it might be wished, that as we began the Race of Life together with our Equals, so we might all along continue it and end it with them. But since all things in this World are so frail and uncertain, we must never be without some One whom we may love, and by whom we may be mutually beloved; for without Friendship, there is no Enjoyment of Life.  
Tho' Scipio was suddenly snatched from me, yet to Me he still does and always will live; for I loved his Virtue, and That can never die: That is not only continually before my Eyes, in whose Arms it sometimes was; but will be signally Famous to all Posterity. No man will think of any gallant and extraordinary Undertaking, but He will Copy out his Actions from Scipio's Life. Among all the Blessings that Fortune or Nature ever bestowed upon me, I know none that I can compare with Scipio's Friendship. With Him I advised and agreed in the management of all Public and Private Affairs; in Him was treasured up my Happiness. I never offended him (to my knowledge) in the least; I never heard any thing from him that I could wish un said. Our Lodging and Diet was in one House, and at one Table; and not only our Warfare, but our Travels and our Retirements were always together. Not to mention our Studies, which, having withdrawn ourselves from the Eyes of the World, we spent in the search of Knowledge?  
Now if the Remembrance of these things had died with Scipio, I could never have born the Loss of so dear and loving a Friend; No, that can never decay, but is rather continually strengthened and renewed by the frequency of my Thoughts, and the freshness of my Memory: Nay, tho' That too were gone, yet I should find some Comfort from my Age, for by the Course of Nature I cannot want Him long; and what is but short must be born patiently, tho' it be grievous.  
This is all I have to say upon this Subject; and let me advise you, gentlemans, to have that esteem for Virtue, without which there can be no Amity, as to think that (That only excepted) nothing is more excellent than Friendship.   
FINIS.   

A Pastoral Dialogue CONCERNING FRIENDSHIP AND LOVE.  
OCCASIONED By the DEATH of the Honourable J. T.  
Extinctum Nymphoe crudeli funere Daphnim Flebant—  Virg Eclog. 
Printed in the Year MDCXCI.   

A Pastoral Dialogue CONCERNING FRIENDSHIP AND LOVE.  
ALCON and LYCIDAS.  ALCON. 
SAy, Lycidas, why all alone?  
Is thy Dorinda false, or does she frown?  
Dost Thou to this dark Desert fly,  
To vent thy own, or blame her Jealousy?  LYCIDAS. 
No, Shepherd, no; the Maid was ever kind,  
Dear to my Eyes, and charming to my Mind;  
(Nay, I remember with her Parting Breath  
She blest our Loves, and smiled and kissed in Death.)  
But oh! She's gone! like a fallen Blossom cast  
From its fair Stalk, by some untimely Blast;  
For ever gone! whilst I distracted rove,  
Tell the sad Tale to every conscious Grove,  
And mourn the dear remembrance of our injured Love.  ALC. 
Look up, despairing Youth, and see  
With pitying Eyes, a sadder Wretch than Thee:  
My Friend, my Soul, my Daphnis is no more,  
Snatched, like an early Flower,  
Which some rude Hand had cropped before its hour;  
Whilst I through many a Pathless-way  
With heedless Sorrow stray,  
Led hither by my wand'ring Sheep  
With much more Tears a dearer Loss than Thine to weep.  LYC. 
A dearer Loss! Rash Swain, take heed;  
With emulous Grief you wrong the beauteous Dead:  
My Tears can brook a Rival now no more  
Than could my Flames (my Hapless flames) before;  
Fate has not killed my Passion, but improved,  
For Dead I worship what Alive I loved.  ALC. 
Fond Youth, in yon soft Myrtle Shades  
To amo'rous Boys and wanton Maids  
Tell thy sad Tale, whilst every conscious Grove  
With tattling sounds mocks thy unmanly Love;  
Be silent Here: where Reason holds the Scale,  
Thy Passion needs must yield, my Friendship must prevail.  LYC. 
Here then with mournful strife we'll Both contend;  
And let yon Swain our Fleecy Charge attend,  
Whilst I a Mistress weep.— ALC.) But I a Friend.  LYC. 
Come all ye Nymphs, a beauteous mournful Train,  
(Beauteous indeed now my Dorinda's gone,)  
Come All, and teach the listening Plain  
To tell Our loss, and weep Its own.  
Ye Nymphs that crowded round her graceful side,  
Whilst She, your Envy and your Pride,  
With all your Myrtles, all your Praises crowned  
In tuneful measures struck the gladsome ground.  
And all ye Swains, whose emulous Harmony,  
Taught by the Equal motions of her Feet  
Thence grew Artful, thence grew Sweet;  
Ye Swains that courted Her, and envied Me,  
Come all, with mingled Grief combine  
To mourn your own Despair, and pity Mine.  
O'er Her sad Hearse  
Pour out your Tears,  
And with them write this Melancholy Verse,  
Here fair Dorinda lies, Dorinda here did fall,  
Who One blessed Shepherd loved, Herself beloved of All.  ALC. 
Come all ye Youths, Ye dear Companions come,  
(Now dear indeed, since Daphnis is no more)  
With equal Tears Our common Loss deplore,  
And bless his Fame and beautify his Tomb.  
Ye Youths that round my Daphnis proudly road,  
Whilst He the Grace, the Terror of the Wood,  
With active Force and fatal Certainty  
By his own Shafts instructed Yours to fly.  
Ye Virgins too, that thronged the joyful place  
To seek the conquests of a nobler Chase;  
To seek indeed, but all in vain,  
Whilst Daphnis, Charms an unsought Triumph gain;  
As many Darts as the Loved Shepherd threw  
As many Cupid shot, as many wounded You.  
Come all, with mournful Care  
Your freshest latest Gifts prepare;  
Round his beauteous, his cold Head  
The short-lived Honours of mixed Garlands spread,  
And oh! a while their short-lived Honours cheer  
With many a Sigh and many a Tear,  
Alive ye loved Him all, All weep Him dead.  
Weep All, and say— Daphnis lies here,  
Whom every Maid did court, each Shepherd did commend,  
Daphnis the loveliest Swain, Daphnis the kindest Friend.  LYC. 
Flowers to the Vale are grateful, lofty Pines  
To the proud Mountain's head, embracing Vines  
To the rich Garden, Cypress to the Grove,  
To Me more grateful far Dorinda's Love.  ALC. 
Frosts to the Flowers are hurtful, the rude Storm  
To lofty Pines, to Vines the cruel Worm,  
Fire to the wasted Grove, to Me than those  
More hurtful far my much loved Daphnis ' Loss.  LYC. 

Oh! She was innocent, She was fair,  
As are those spotless Sheep  
The dying Dear wished me to keep,  
My wretched Wealth and my  Care.  
Was there a Youth o'er all the Plain  
But for Dorinda sighed, and sighed in vain?  
Gay Dorilas Old Melibaeus ' Heir,  
And rich Menalcas (rich indeed,  
His thrifty Father lately dead)  
With rival Arts and Presents courted Her.  
And one his Kids, and one his Fruits would bring:  
Both she refused, or deigning to receive,  
To me the Kinder Maid would give.  
One well could Play, and one could sweetly Sing:  
Deaf to their Arts, and with their Gifts unmoved  
She stood, and Me, even happier Me she loved.   

" Now all forlorn these pious Tears 1 shed  
" To Love deserted and Dorinda dead.   ALC. 

Daphnis was sweet and gentle as yon Flood,  
Whose listening Waters loved to crowd  
Towards the glad Shore, whilst His soft Melody  
Made them forget their Parent Sea,  
Admire his Music, and indulge their stay.  
The Swans too, gladly held by the late Tide,  
Herd his delightful Strains, then tried  
To imitate the Voice, and died.  
Daphnis was tall and graceful, as the Hart  
That wept the skilful anger of his Dart,  
Like our Melampus faithful, like him fleet,  
(If Little things we may compare with Great)  
Our poor Melampus wand'ring round the Plain,  
Hark! with shrill Howls laments his Master slain.  
Was there a Maid could hid her conscious flame,  
When some glad Tale was blest with Daphnis ' Name?  
Youthful Galatea, (Fair  
When your Dorinda was not there)  
Alcippe, Nysa, Chloë strove  
For the wished Triumph of his Love.  
Each her officious Presents would prepare,  
Fruits for his Scrip, and Garlands for his Hair;  
Each pressed with glad amazement to the Ring,  
And when He danced, each strove to sing.  
Their Gifts He would receive, their Music He would hear,  
Till wearied with their Praises He  
Thanked their Civility,  
Refused their Love, and hastened home to Me.  
There in a clasped embrace We lay,  
And with sweet Talk deceived the livelong day,  
Pitied the Wretches that in vain had wooed,  
Smiled at their Passion and our own pursued.   

" Now left alone, with hopeless Grief I moan  
" My ill-starred Friendship wronged, my Daphnis gone.   LYC. 
'Twas in a fatal Hour,  
When the loved Maid impatient of my stay,  
Had decked, and did forsake her Bower  
To chide my Sloth, whilst in the treache'rous way  
In fair deceit a murde'rous Viper lay:  
There as with eager hast she trod the ground,  
There her swift Foot received the sudden wound.  
In vain (alas!) the wondering Maid  
From the following Danger fled;  
Death proud of his fair Conquest grew,  
And all his cruel speed employed and hastened to pursue.  
" Now I these tributary Sorrows shed  
" To Love deserted and Dorinda dead.  ALC. 
Cursed be the deadly Steel  
By whose much lamented power  
In a black inauspicious Hour  
My dear, unhappy Daphnis fell.  
'Twas a sad Morn, when He the loved He risen  
From my unwilling Breast and his disturbed Repose;  
Back to my Arms the struggling Youth I pulled,  
Told Him how young the Day, the Air how cold,  
Asked Him what was th' unwonted Cause  
That broke our close embrace so soon?  
He told me, I should hear of Him  Noon,  
Fetched an ill-boding Sigh and said— He must be gone.  
What was the Cause (Ah Me!) too well I know,  
Too soon; for an ill Dream was scarcely passed,  
And waking Thoughts my sleeping Fears increased,  
When Every Tongue and every Eye spoke Woe,  
And every Maid and every Shepherd said,  
Oh cruel Fate! Oh Daphnis dead!  
Cursed be that Idol Honour; doubly cursed  
The Wretch that with its nice Exceptions first  
Stained the free Mirth of our infected Plain,  
And taught destructive Swords  
To be the Judges (how unfit!) of Words.  
For this even Me my Daphnis left  
Of Him and Happiness bereavest;  
For this the Youth with early brave Disdain  
Challenged, went forth, contended, and was slain.  
" For this sad I with hopeless Grief bemoan  
" My ill Starred Friendship wronged, my Daphnis gone.  LYC. 
Thy ill-starred Friendship, Swain, lament no more,  
I my deserted Love deplore.  ALC. 
Thy Love! the dying flames of lose Desire  
Look pale and tremble at my chaster Fire.  LYC. 
Then let just Pan our Cause's merit try,  
Whilst mighty Love I sing—.  ALC. 
Whilst mightier Friendship I.  LYC. 
I have a Pipe on which I've often played  
To the lovely listening Maid;  
None disliked my artless Lays,  
She'd find something out to praise.  
On this I'll play. " Ye mighty Powe'rs of Love  
" Inspire my willing Pipe, my happy Choice approve.  ALC. 
I have a Pipe on which my Daphnis played,  
Whilst every lovely listening Maid  
Would leave her Flocks to hear his artful Lays,  
And every wondering Youth his every strain would praise.  
To this I'll sing— " Kind Friendship bless my Choice,  
" Whilst to thy powerful Harmony I tune my willing voice.  LYC. 
Tell me what kind Power of Old  
Enriched the World, and named the Age from Gold?  
When every Nymph and every Swain  
Loved, and was beloved again.  
When Falsehood and Disdain were yet unknown,  
And Innocence and Love were One?  
Each amo'rous Shepherd chose a willing Maid  
Above the cares of Honour, Birth or State,  
And in Affection richly paid;  
The willing Maid his plain Address received,  
His unprotested Love believed,  
And neither vowed, yet neither was deceived.  
Then new Delight did each new Hour employ,  
Love was their Life, their Life one lasting Joy.  
" Assist, Almighty Queen of Heaven and Love,  
" Inspire my willing Pipe, my happy Choice approve.  ALC. 
Tell me,  all this beauteous World was framed,  
Or Your fond Age from glittering Gold was named,  
When Heaven and Earth were one rude Heap,  
And wild Confusion filled the pregnant Deep,  
What nobler Cause, what Kinder Power  
The Melancholy Mass did stir,  
And made the appeased Embryo's Friends?  
The appeased Embryo's never since  
Have to that Friendly Knot done violence;  
That Knot nor Chance nor Force can e'er destroy,  
Their very Being Friendship is, their Friendship one long Joy.  
" Almighty Friendship, bless my noble Choice,  
" Whilst to thy powerful Harmony I tune my willing voice.  LYC. 

Seest thou yon Bird, that in the Cypress Grove  
With busy flight from Tree to Tree  
And untaught Melody  
Calls his dear Mate, and says— I am in Love?  
And, Alcon, see! from yonder Bough  
His dear Mate flies and and answers— I love too.  
Their happy Care through all the Spring  
Is only how to Love, and how to Sing.  
Then look, grave Moralist, and learn from These  
To imitate their Flames, and to improve thy Bliss.   

" Assist, Almighty Queen of Heaven and Love,  
" Inspire my willing Pipe, my happy Choice approve.   ALC. 
Seest thou yon Oak, which many a Year has stood  
Gracefully firm, itself a Wood?  
Why does it raise its lofty Head,  
And all around diffuse a friendly shade?  
See, Lycidas, a circling Ivy joins  
Its mingled Root, and round the glad Trunk twines  
Its willing Leaves: Wind, Cold, and Age they scorn  
Whilst One can still defend, and One adom  
Thus their embracing Honours each extends,  
Both flourish, Both are happy, Both are Friends.  
Hence thy gross Joys, fond Amorist, improve,  
In Friendship's purer Flames refine thy drossy Love.  
" Almighty Friendship, bless my noble Choice,  
" Whilst to thy powerful Harmony I tune my willing Voice.  LYC. 
'Twas Love, Great Love that from his awful Throne  
Charmed the amo'rous Thunderer down;  
Love made the Horned Deity  
At fair Europa's feet submissive lie;  
Love taught the feathered God to go  
To Leda and a Happier Heaven below.  
Strange Power! that rules the noblest Souls  
And turns Divinities to Beasts and Fowls!—  ALC. 
To Beasts indeed! who blindly place  
In lawless Lust their sovereign Happiness.  
'Twas Friendship, nobler Friendship could inspire  
Leda's famed Sons with a much happier Fire  
Than e'er inflamed their wanton Sire.  
Friendship taught the Gene'rous Pair  
A mixed Divinity to share:  
And made them, that they might unite  
Their Souls, divide their Friendly Light.  
Then boast no more thy worthless Passion, when  
'Tis Love makes Beasts of Gods, but Friendship Gods of Men.  
" Almighty Friendship bless my noble Choice,  
" Whilst to thy powerful Harmony I tune my willing Voice.  LYC. 
Oft have I heard, and I remember well,  
When under our tall Poplar shade  
To Me and to the dear dead Maid  
Oft faithful Loves old Aegon used to tell:  
For faithful Love what Priam's Son could do;  
(Priam's Son a Shepherd too;)  
How Venus He did worthily prefer  
Or to the Queen of Heaven or to the Queen of War.  
Venus' recompensed his Voice,  
Venus blessed His noble Choice:  
Tho' Heaven and Greece his Choice denied,  
Venus gave the beauteous Bride.  
For Love's happy Violence She  
Despised the Dangers of the Sea,  
The Dangers of the Battle Herald  
Oft have I heard, how, when War's rude Alarms  
From chaste Penelope's unwilling Arms  
Her dear Ulysses forced, the Widowed Fair  
Sat pensive twice ten tedious Year;  
In vain at Troy unhappy Hector strove  
To reach the faithful Hero's guarded Head,  
At Ithaca in vain with hated Love  
His Rivals strove to slain Her spotless Bed.  
Love preserved the happy Pair,  
Eased his Toils and cured her Fear,  
Whilst He abroad maintained, whilst she at home a War.  
Aegon would oft the grateful Tale renew,  
And to it add some happy pleasant Truth  
That blessed the smiling Vigour of his Youth;  
Oft would He bid us these fair Tracks pursue,  
And told Us Love would bless Us too.  
But Oh! in moving Words He would relate  
Eurydice's untimely Fate,  
For whom sad Orpheus lest alone  
In sweet mournful Strains did moan,  
And echoing Rhodope was heard to groan.  
For whom (blest Power of Love!) his Harmony  
Changed arbitrary Fate's Decree,  
Broke wondering Death's till than resistless Chain,  
And to his longing Bosom did the joyful Nymph regain.  
Oh! that like Him (for I like Him have mourned)  
My dearer Loss I might retrieve!  
Oh! that like Her, the Maid might be returned,  
And (for like Her she died) like Her again might Live.  
" But Oh, in vain these fruitfuless Tears I shed  
" For Love Deserted and Dorinda dead.  ALC. 
I too have heard ('twere impious to forget)  
When beneath Yon spreading Tree  
To Daphnis dearly known and Me  
Of Faithful Friends wise Thyrsis would relate;  
How Sicily's envying Tyrant grieved to know  
That his delighted Realm could boast of Two  
Happier, happier far than He  
With all his Power and all his Royalty,  
Two for faithful Friendship famed,  
Damon (I think) and Pythias they were named:  
And One in cruel Fetters He confined,  
Tother disdained his useless Liberty  
To set his loved Companion free,  
He less afflicted that was left behind.  
This the wondering Tyrant saw,  
And owned the juster Power of Friendship's Law;  
Their blessed Acquaintance humbly He did woe,  
If haply of the strong-linked Chain  
The least kind Portion might remain,  
Which to the pleasing Yoke might join a Monarch too.  
Oft of the Grecian Pair our Priest would speak,  
Whose Friendship Fate itself could hardly break:  
How, when sad Garlands crowned Orestes Head,  
And with cruel Piety  
The destined Victim to the Shrine was led,  
His Pylades did all his skill employ  
With kind Deceit to frame the Gene'rous Lie,  
And for his dearer Self, Himself to die.  
Both strove to fall, Both happily in vain,  
The fatal Conquest neither could obtain;  
The Smiling Goddess did to Friendship give  
Its just Reward, and bade them Love and Live.  
With glad remembrance Thyrsis would commend  
The wondrous Faith of some old Friend,  
Whose strong surviving Love still warmed his Breast,  
Then bid Us thus be Friends, and thus We should be blest.  
But Oh! with strange concern the Bard would tell  
How, when his Loved Pirithous fell,  
To amazed Styx bold Theseus did descend,  
And lost Himself to find his Friend.  
How when the dear, the mournful Captives lay  
To Death's unpitying King a hopeless Prey,  
Both to redeem, the fair Alcmena's Son  
(Alcmena's Son did not disdain  
To feed his Herds and Love the Plain)  
To the frighted shades went down;  
Both He redeemed, from Both He did remove  
All Bonds but those of grateful Love.  
This noble Act his less famed Labours crowned,  
Made Him for Courage much, for Friendship more renow'd.  
Oh! that like Him, a meaner Shepherd I  
Can make the unrelenting Power  
My dear lamented Youth restore!  
Oh! that with Me He lived, or I for Him could die!  
Oh! that, like Them, He might return, for He  
Was dearer far than Both to Me.  
" But Oh! in vain with hopeless Grief I moan  
" My ill-starred Friendship wronged, my Daphnis gone.  LYC. 
Kind Friendship, Swain, has blessed thy noble Choice:  
Pan has inspired thy Pipe, and tuned thy Voice:  
Thy Voice at least this Conquest shall obtain,  
That, since the matchless Maid is slain  
I'll never, never Love again.  ALC. 
Oh! Yield a little farther yet,  
And make my Conquest and my Joy complete;  
For, since my dearest Daphnis bled,  
Too justly I despair to find  
A Youth so true, a Friend so kind,  
Unless to Daphnis Lycidas succeed.  LYC. 
Tho' all unworthy I,  
And rude in Friendship's well sung Mystery.  
Yet would Alcon deign to show  
The happy means, (for Alcon well does know)  
I fain would Learn (methinks,) and Practise too.  ALC. 
Then may all Strife in this blessed Union end,  
And Kindness only Here contend;  
So Thou a Mistress scarce hast lost—  LYC. 
— So Thou hast found a Friend.   

BOOKS Printed for WILLIAM CROOK, at the Green-Dragon without Temple-Bar.  
1. THE London practice of Physic, or the whole Practical part of Physic, contained in the Works of Dr. Thomas Willis, faithfully made English, and Printed together for the public good; To which is Bound His new Book, being a plain and easy Method for preserving from, and curing of the Plague, and all other contagious Diseases. In Octavo, price bound 7 s.  
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