THE Practical Divinity OF THE PAPISTS Discovered to be Destructive of Christianity AND men's SOULS.  
And for this cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie; that they all might be damned who believed not the Truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness.  2 Thess. 2. 11, 12. 
LONDON, Printed for Tho. Parkhurst and Nath. Ponder at the Bible and Three Crowns at the Lower End of Cheapside near Mercer's Chapel; and at the Peacock in Chancery Lane near Fleetstreet. MDCLXXVI.   

AN Advertisement.  
I Have always thought, since I considered and understood what Popery was, that the knowing of it would be a sufficient Dissuasive from it, to those that regard God and their Souls. This persuasion, together with compassion for those that are seduced, and desire to secure those that are in danger, engaged me in this present Undertaking: Wherein I have discovered what the Practical Divinity of that Church is, how pernicious and inconsistent with the way to Salvation declared in the Scripture. I have herein the concurrence of some (few in comparison) of that Church, who are sensible of such Doctrine prevailing amongst them, as they say, is 
(a) Representation of Curez of Paris. p. 3.  absolutely opposite to the Rules and Spirit of the Gospel: Such as 
(b) Pag. 4.  no man that hath never so little tenderness of his own salvation, but must conceive an horror at: such as they call a 
(c) Their Remonstrance. p. 2.  Poisonous Morality, more corrupt than that of Pagan's themselves: and 
(d) Their Answer maintaining the Factum. p. 8.  which permits Christians to do, what Pagans, Jews, mahometans, and Barbarians, would have had in execration: such as is, in their Style, the most palpable 
(e) Ibid.  darkness that ever came out of the bottomless pit: such as 
(f) Ibid. p. 12.  overthrows the Essential Points of Christian Religion, and the Maxims that are most important, and of greatest necessity, in order to the salvation of man. Of this they have given the World notice in several Discourses, 
(g) Provincial Letters, Jesuits Morals.  two of which I have seen (though unhappily not the latter, till I had gone through the greatest part of what I intended.) As to the extent of this Execrable Divinity, they declare, That whole Societies 
(h) Remonstrance of Curez of Paris.  would have these Extravagancies accounted Roman Traditions; that, The Church is overgrown with this poisonous Morality; that, 
(i) Answer maintaining th● Factum.  It is ready to be overwhelmed with the deluge of these Corruptions; that, The Church is filled with this most palpable darkness. Elsewhere they seem to fix this Charge upon the Jesuits principally, as if they would have it thought not to reach much further; but withal tell us, that the Jesuis 
(k) Ibid.  are the most numerous and the most powerful body of men in the whole Church, and have the disposal of the Consciences of all the greatest. So that I can represent them no worse, than some of themselves do; and the worst that can be said, falls by their own acknowledgement, upon the most considerable part of their Church. That they should so far accuse the whole, cannot be expected (whatever occasion there be for it) so long as they think fit to continue in its Communion. But then, if we regard those who are so great a part of that Church upon the account of their numbers, and more in respect of their Authority and Influences the Maxims, so branded, 
(l) Supra.  are Roman Traditions, 
(m) Defence of the Factum.  the true Doctrine of Faith, the true Morality of the Church, not asserted by that Society alone; but equally (if not more) by Catholic Writers of all sorts; and those that quarrel thereat, are factions spirits. Hereby so far as the testimony of Adversaries against themselves can clear a matter in question, there is evidence, both that the Practical Doctrine amongst them is pernicious and damnable; and also that it is common and generally followed.  
I intent not here to impeach any Maxim peculiar to the Jesuits, but that Doctrine of the Romanists which is far more extensive, delivered by Canonists and Divines Secular and Regular of every sort, and in part by the Canon Low and their Councils (who sometimes glance at this Subject, though they make it not their business;) that which in most particulars, and those of greatest moment, is ancienter than the Society; and in many points such, as the Censurers of the Jesuits Morality do not touch, but either approve themselves, or dare not condemn, lest they should involve the whole Church in the Condemnation. I cannot discern that the Practical Divinity of the Jesuits is more corrupt, then that of other Romish Writers, their Contemporaries: And those that view the Moral Discourses of both, and compare them, will (if I much mistake not) discern no other. I never yet met with any Author of that Order, so intolerably licentious, but might be matched, if not out-vied by others: there is no need to except Esc●bar or Bauny (though most branded) nor do their keen Antagonists do it, when they speak of others, whom they know to be no Jesuits 
(n) Remonstrance of the Curez of Paris.  as the most extravagant that ever were. There is no reason why the Odium which a Community incurs, should be appropriated to a party: nor that the Society only should be noted as the sink, when the corruption is apparent every where. So far as the Jesuits are concerned herein, it hath been sufficiently exposed by others; upon which account I decline those of that Order, not putting the Reader, to rely upon any Evidence from their Writing. Only because it is requisite to show their concurrence in some Points, which otherwise might not pass for the Common Doctrine, I make use of Bellarmine freely (whom none can count a Corrupter of Popery, however Christianity hath been treated by him:) and of Suarez sometimes (whose Judgement alone is counted equivalent to a thousand others, by some 
(o) Vid. J●. Sanc. Disp. 44. n. 4●.  that are none of the Society.) I allege beside; though rarely, one or two more of those Fathers, of like eminency and authority, in that Church: but none of them, save in such points wherein they have not been noted for extravagancies by others; or in such wherein those of other Orders concur with, or go beyond them. The greatest advantage I make of them, is, to represent the opinions of others, not their own; and most herein of Suarez, who usually gives an account of the Common Doctrine out of unexceptionable Authors: Those whom I principally rely on to make good the Charge, are the ancienter and better sort of their Divines and Casuists (the strictect of them in points of Morality that I could meet with) such as are so far from being Disciples of Ignatius, that most of them are Dominicans (most opposite of all Orders to the Jesuits, and said to be the least tainted with these Corruptions) and the greatest part of them were Writers before their Order was founded, or appeared to the World on this Subject. To these I have added other Casuists of this last Age, not that there is need to produce any worse than the former, but to show that time hath made little or no alteration amongst them for the better.  
The Romanists when they are ashamed of their Doctrine, or think the World will cry shame of it, are wont to disown it. It is like they may do so here, and tell us that these points not being determined by Councils, are not the Doctrine of their Church, but the opinions of particular Doctors. This serves them for a shift in other cases with some colour, but it will be absurd to offer at it here. For though this be not their Doctrine of Faith, which with some generals most about the Sacraments (reflected on in the sequel as there is occasion) is the business of their Councils: yet it is the Practical Doctrine of their Church, if it have any, and f they think their Catholics concerned to be Christians more than merely in opinion. And this under several Heads, I have collected out of such Writings, as are the proper place of it. Therefore to say that this is not the Doctrine of their Church, because the particulars are not found decided by Councils, is to tell us, that they are not charged with it, unless we can find it, where they know it cannot be found, and where with any reason, it cannot be looked for. It is no more reasonable, than if one who hath taken a purse, should plead, though it be found in his hand, that he is not to be charged with it, unless we can spy it in his mouth, when yet he never opens it. That Councils should give particular Directions for Conscience and Practice, in Cases innumerable, was never attempted, nor ever can be expe●…ed. Their Church leaves this to her Divines and Casuists; and that nothing may pass them but what is agreeable to her sense, no Books are to be published, but with the approbation and authority of such as are counted competent Judges hereof. So that the Doctrine of their authorised Writers, that especially wherein they commonly agree; is the Practical Doctrine of that Church, or else she hath none such, and consequently no care of the lives and consciences of her Members. And though this be not Infallible, or de fide, as they count the Decisions of Councils; yet is it as certain they say, as the nature of the subject requires; nor do they pretend to have any infallible Doctrine, for particular directions herein. Which yet may justly seem very strange to any man that considers that gross faults in Life and Practice are more infallibly damnable than errors in Faith and Speculation. Now upon this their Common Doctrine the substance of the Charge ensuing, and the principal articles thereof are grounded. As for the opinions of particular Doctors, wherein there is no such common concurrence, though they be not so certain as the other, yet they are (even the worst of them) safe in practice; any of their people may follow them without danger, and with a good conscience: for this (as will appear hereafter) is the common judgement of their Schools and Doctors, and so far the Doctrine of their Church. And if that Church did no farther own these opinions, common or particular, then under this character; this is enough for our purpose (when the question is of the danger of Popery in reference to men's Salvation) that she counts such rules of life safe, and publicly allows them as direction for practice, which tend to ruin Religion and men's Souls. If they were not counted safe, that Church which pretends to so much care of Souls, since all in her Communion are exposed to the Danger, would be concerned to give warning of it, and brand these Maxims as pernicious: but this was never yet done, not ever like to be. These opinions, all, or the greatest part of them; were taught and published in that Church, before the Council of Trent, there was time enough in Eighteen years, to take cognizance of them and their pernicious consequence: Yet when they bestowed Anathamas so liberally, where there was occasion (and for the most part) where there was none; they thought not fit to bestow one Curse upon these Doctrines, how execrable so ever: yea some part thereof of worse consequence, had there an express Confirmation. Their Popes since, though they could see occasion to condemn such Propositions as the Five ascribed to Jansenius, and those of Baius, White, and many others: could not, by the help of a judgement counted infallible, discern any thing in the worst of these Doctrines, worthy of or fit for their Censure. The Cardinals of the Inquisition at Rome, and their Setters in other Countries, whose business it is to spy whatever (in Books particularly) is against Faith and Good Manners; see nothing of this nature in that which destroys both. No Expurgatory Index (what havoc soever has been made by those Tools in their best Authors) hath, so far as I have observed, touched the Common Opinions here exposed. It's true, some others have been expunged, and I find above Forty Opinions of the late Casuists censured by Alexander the Seventh, and the Cardinals of their Sacred Congregation 
(p) Index Expurg. sub Alexand. VII. An. 1666. : but hereby more authority is added to those I insist on; being thought good enough to pass, untouched: which must therefore be counted sound Doctrine and safe for Practice in the Judgement of their Virtual Church, and the chief parts of their Church Representative.  
There is no ground to expect that this Doctrine, as to the principal and most pernicious parts of it, will ever be condemned by any Popes or Councils of such Complexion and Principles as that of Trent, where it was a Maxim observed religiously, that no Determination should pass, which either in matter or form, would disoblige any considerable Party among them, much less all: the Roman interest is supported by such Politics, and must be secured whatever become of Souls or Saving Doctrine. There are indeed some Dissenters amongst them (as there are elsewhere) who complain of their Moral Divinity; but they are such, whose power and interest, can reach little further than Complaints; and these are so far from being the Voice or Sense of their Church, that their Writings which exhibit such Complaints, are condemned at Rome 
(q) Ibid.  by the Supreme Tribunal (as they call it) of the Inquisition.  
In short, by the known Custom and settled Order of the Roman Church, the people for regulating of their Hearts and Lives, are to be directed by their Confessors, their Confessors have their direction herein from their Casuists and Practical Authors: both Priests and People must believe this to be safe; because the Church hath made this provision for them, approves the course, and obligeth them to take no other. And thus that Doctrine, the deadly Venom whereof I here discover, must be conveyed from their Casuists to all sorts amongst them; nor must they fear any danger in it, unless they will question the wisdom and goodness of their Church. There can be no question, but that this Doctrine is thus far owned by the Church of Rome, whether it be delivered fallibly or infallibly, by Councils or without, is not at all here considerable: It is enough that such is the Conduct provided for Roman Catholics, and that it is to be followed without apprehension of danger, and cannot be declined by those that will keep the ordinary road of that Church, though it lead directly to destruction.  
When no other shift will serve, to hinder those from being undeceived whom they would delude, it is usual with them, to make loud out-cries of false Citations, and that their Doctrine is misrepresented. I have been very careful to give no just occasion for this; being apprehensive that he who doth it, wrongs not them more than he doth himself and his Cause. The places cited I have viewed again and again, where there might be any doubt of misconstruction; and set down their own words where it might seem scarce credible that Christians and Divines (directing Conscience) should speak at such a rate; and where that would have been too tedious, have given their sense faithfully, so far as I could discern it, and directed the Reader where he may find and judge thereof himself. Yet, if notwithstanding all the care and diligence I could use, it hath been my unhappiness, any where to mistake them, upon notice from any I shall do them right: and am capable to give them further satisfaction, knowing well, that I am yet far from representing their Doctrine fully so bad as it is. Large Volumes might be filled with the corruptions of it, I have but pointed at some; and contented myself with few Authors in many particulars, where plenty might have been produced. I designed briefness, and have waved much that was ready, lest I should be tedious: considering that some who are most concerned in such Discourses, will have nothing at all, when they think too much is offered.  
I have been less solicitous about the Style, it doth not always satisfy myself, so that I can allow others to find fault with it: It may be thought sometimes less grave, elsewhere too sharp and vehement. I suffered it to be, what the subject would have it; and the quality thereof now and then overruled me, somewhat against my own inclination. Only I make nothing ridiculous, but find it so; and should scarce do it right, if I represented it otherwise than it is. Where I seem too sharp or severe upon any occasion, I found something in the nature of the Subject that forced me to it. And it is not easy (if it be congruous or just) to speak of what is monstrously extravagant, or pernicious, with such calmness as we treat indifferent things.  
It will be enough for me, if (through God's blessing) people will hereby be brought to understand, that Popary designs not to trouble them, either with the reality of Religion, or the happiness which Christ has entailed thereon. And that their Practical Doctrine is contrived accordingly, will, I doubt not, be hereby manifest to all such as have a mind to see, and are not wilfully resolved to lose the way to Salvation, and their souls together, by shutting their eyes against so plain a discovery of so great a danger.   

THE CONTENTS:  

CHAP. I.  
BY the Doctrine of the Romanists it is not needful to worship God really, in public or private. True Religion will have God to be worshipped really. Real worship requires the concurrence of mind and heart. In their Divine Service they require no act of the Will, but an Intention beforehand to attend their service is enough, though they be not Attentive when they are at it. An in tentionto worship God there is scarce needful. Their intention may be effectual, though they act contrary to it. They may employ both Soul and Body about other things when they are at their Prayers. The act of the mind which they seem to require is Attention; but this need not be either Spiritual or Rational; So that they need not mind God in their Prayers, nor the things to be prayed for, nor the sense of the words they use; but only the pronouncing of them, nor need they actually mind that. The Church's holiness supplies their Defects, and makes those pass as such that pray devoutly, who pray not at all. All due Attention in Worship is not only unnecessary, but impossible in their way. As Attention, so inward Reverence and Devotion likewise is not necessary in their Service. Hereby their Worship is no better than a Profane irreligious exercise; They seem satisfied with less Worship for God, than for their Images, Sect. 1. to page 27.  
In the Mass by their Doctrine God may be less minded, than in their Canonical hours, where they tell us he need not be minded at all. No inward Worship requisite in the Mass. It is enough if their attendance there be but an humane act. Nay the use either of Sense or Reason is not there required. They may busy themselves in other employments while they are at Mass. They may sleep a while, or laugh if they be not too loud. Or talk of their worldly affairs all the while say some; others would not have their Discourse so serious: yea it may be immodest without transgressing the Precept. And lascivious or very profane Tunes to the Organ at Mass may be a small fault. The Precept for Mass (the chief part of their Religirn) may be fulfilled by mortal wickedness, Sect. 2. page 37.  
Of their ends in Worship; They may lawfully Worship God for their own ends. Sin may be their end in Worshipping, and that without sin, if not principally intended. It is but a small fault to Worship God principally for vain Glory. He that comes to Mass or Prayer with a design to satisfy his Lust, or other mortal wickedness, satisfies the command of the Church, Sect. 3. to page 43.  
How unnecessary Preaching is counted in their Church, and hearing the word in such circumstances, where it would be accounted needful, if ever, Sect. 4. to page 45.  
In their Sacraments no good motions or actual dispositions (such as are necessary in real Worshippers) are required by that Church in any that Administer or partake thereof. This shown as to Baptism and Penance the Sacraments for the Dead. Also in the other five for the living. In all, the precepts of the Church may be fully accomplished by impious and wicked acts, Sect. 5. & 6. to page 48.  
Even as to the Eucharist (for which they profess they have the highest veneration) they may partake worthily, who are without any the least good act of mind or heart. And to shut out good motions from their Souls, on set purpose, when they are communicating, is but a venial fault; such as will not hinder the effects of the Sacrament. Those vagaries which are inconsistent with Attention and Reverence, if they be not taken notice of, will be no fault at all; if they be deliberate, will but be slight ones. Not only Reverence and Devotion are accounted needless at this Sacrament; but Sobriety and the use of Reason. To communicate out of ostentation and vain glory is but a peccadillo. And all holy fervour being excluded by voluntary distraction; to employ their Souls vainly or wickedly, during the Celebration is no fault at all, in reference to the Sacrament. Those that communicate unworthily, to such a degree as is counted most horridly impious; do fully satisfy the precept of their Church for the Communion, Sect. 7. to page 52.  
Their Doctrine doth not more oblige them to Worship God in private. Meditation not necessary, no not on the holiest seasons, or occasions. Reading the word of God scarce tolerated in the people, and that not so freely as the Stews, Sect. 8. & 9 to page 53.  
Private Prayer rarely a duty with some, never a duty with others. Not at all by their common Doctrine, but by accident, in the Article of necessity, which many never meet with: so that many may never pray while they live, and yet be innocent. Some say there is no Divine precept for Prayer; Others who ackowledg a precept, will not have it oblige them, at such times and occasions when, if ever, it would oblige. Even in their Article of necessity when it comes, they have ways to excuse them easily from the obligation, and to make it no special sin to neglect this duty all their life, Sect. 10. to page 59  
Their Church obliges not any to private prayers, not to the least, or those of most account among them. When ever they use private prayer upon any account, as required by precept, or enjoined for penance (for Prayer passes commonly with them as a punishment), or voluntary as a work of Supererogation: there is no need by their principles to worship God therein. Seeing they are to Worship him no more any where, the World may judge what Religion they have; since that Worship is as essential to Religion, as a Soul to a man, Sect. 11. & 12. to page 63.   

CHAP. II.  
CHristian knowledge is not necessary for Romanists by their Doctrine They need not know what they are to pray for. Many of their Priests, yea of their Popes understand not their common prayers. Sect. 1. to page 66.  
They need not know what they are to believe. The knowledge of all the Articles of the small Creed, nor of the Trinity, and incarnation of Christ, scarce necessary for all Christians. Ignorance and error in points of faith may not only be innocent, but meritorious, Sect. 2. to page 72.  
They need not know what they are to do. They may merit Heaven by following their Leaders out of the way. That's the most complete and perfect obedience, which is next to brutish, without knowledge and judgement, when they obey their Leaders, as a Beast doth his owner, Sect. 3. to page 76.  
The knowledge of the Scriptures (to which their Doctrine and Worship is confessed to be repugnant) unnecessary in a manner for all sorts; not only for the People and monastics, but their Confessors and Preachers. Their Bishop's afraid to look into the Bible, lest it should make them Heretics. Therefore very few of their Bishops in the Council of Trent (who decreed so many new Articles of faith) had knowledge in Theology. Their Popes commonly no Divines, many of them understood not Latin, though not only their Church-service and Laws, but their authentic Edition of the Scripture be confined to that Language. The People the further they are from knowledge the more excusable; if they take no care nor pains to get it, Sect. 4. to page 87.   

CHAP. III.  
THeir Doctrine makes it needless to love God. There is no command for habitual love to God. The acts of this love are as unnecessary. The imperate acts thereof not enjoined; neither God nor the Church requires any to observe the commands of God, out of love to him, Sect. 1. & 2. to page 91.  
How needless the Elicit acts of this love are. Some hold there is no command for this actual love (any inward act of it) that binds them, or no special command. Others who acknowledge a precept, will not have it to bind them upon any occasion, when, if ever, it would oblige. Not when they have sinned against him. Not when he expresses his love. Not when he discovers his infinite Excellencies to them. Not when they are to worship him. Not at any Sacrament, no not the Eucharist. It is too much to love God once a Week, or once a Year, or once in Four or Five Years. One act of love once in a life may be enough; yea and more than needs too, for when that time comes (if ever it come) when they will have any obliged to an act of love; yet they then assign something else, which will serve instead of it, and so render it needless still. A love which is the issue of nature unsanctified may suffice. Or to love God less than other things, only more than mortal crimes, may be enough. Or to do nothing against this love, though there be no acts of it or from it, may be sufficient. Or external acts may satisfy. Or if a man believes that he loves God above all, though indeed he daes not, it may serve the turn. Or Attrition (which includes something repugnant to this love) with their Sacrament of Confession, may excuse him from loving of God at the point of death; though he never once loved him in his life before. How extremely pernicious and ridiculous this their Doctrine is, Sect. 3. & 4. to page 109.   

CHAP. IU.  
BY their Doctrine no faith is necessary, but that which is neither justifying nor saving. That which they will have necessary for the ignorant is what they call implicit. A faith which they may have without actually believing any one Article of the Christian faith. And is consistent with the belief of what is quite opposite to the Christian belief. And is but such a faith as Jews, Turks, and Pagans have. This was not thought sufficient for Christians, till they were thought something like Asses, and so expressed by some of their great Saints and Doctors. How many ways they have to exempt the people from the obligation of all precepts for any other than this brutish faith, Sect. 1. to page 114.  
The faith requisite in the more intelligent to justifiethem they call explicit. This, as described by them in its object, includes things uncertain impertinent, false, impossible, and ridiculous, as points that must be certainly believed unto justification. This of itself (as themselves say) deserves not the name of a virtue, is an idle dead thing, may be found in the worst of men, and in the Devils too. Yet it is with them the Christian, the Catholic faith, Sect. 2. to page 116.  
They see no great necessity of faith. The Pope (the Head of their Church) needs it not. And the Body may make a shift without it, if any one among all the Members have it but. And one act of it in a whole life may serve. The ruder sort may be helped to this act (which will serve once for all) by making the sign of the Cross, as their grave Divines direct them, Sect. 3. to page 119.   

CHAP. V.  
NO necessity of true Repentance for any sort of sins by their Doctrine. Of original sin, or the corruption of our natures no man can be obliged to Repent, Sect. 1. to page 121.  
It is as needless for those many (and divers of them horrid sins,) which they count venial. What pretty expedients they have to expiate these, without Repentance, Sect. 2. to page 123.  
For mortal sins some teach there is no Divine command to Repent. And so to live and die impenitently, will be no Transgression. No need of it any way, either as a duty enjoined, or as a Medium, Sect. 3. to page 125.  
Others who confess there is a command for it, will not have it oblige any sinner presently. No sin nor danger to defer Repentance. Nor will they have it needful at such times and occasions, which, if any, would be the necessary seasons for it. Not at solemn times of Worship. Not on days of fasting. Not when visited with great calamities. Not when sins are brought to their Remembrance. Not when they address themselves to their Sacraments, no not that of Penance, Sect 4. & 5. to page 131.  
No need to Repent till one be at the point of death. Nor is it so needful then, or any time before, but something else may serve without it. A Repentance without any sensible sorrow for, or actual resolution against sin is sufficient. Or a penitence merely natural may suffice. Or a slight remorse in the lowest degree possible, one act of it, dispatched in an instant, and never repeated, will be enough. Or if a man conceive that he truly reputes, though really he does not, this may serve the turn. Or if he know that he does not repent sufficiently, yet if he signify that he would grieve more, and is sorry that he does not, this will be effectual. Or attrition with the Sacrament will unquestionably justify him. Attrition with them far distant from true Repentance. Several sorts of it. Any of them seem sufficient by the Council of Trent. The general concurrence of their Divines for the sufficiency of Attrition; yet the best sort of it confessed to be morally evil, Sect. 6. & 7. to page 144.  
When they have excluded true Repentance by Attrition, they reduce Attrition to nothing; yet will have it still sufficient. The least servile dislike of sin in the lowest degree, though it be gone in a moment, though it be merely natural, is enough. Or if there be but a dislike, that this dislike is wanting. Or a willingness to have it, in those who have it not. Or a man's thinking probably that he hath it, when he hath it not. Or a willingness without it to receive the Sacrament, will serve the turn. Yea even without their Sacrament of Penance, Attrition with the Eucharist; or extreme unction, or the Mass, or without any Sacrament at all, may procure pardon. What ways Attrition may secure them, when they cannot have a Priest, or the Rites proper to Priests, while they live, or after they are dead without them, Sect. 8. to page 148.  
This Doctrine which makes saving saith, love to God, and true Repentance needless, is established by the Council of Trent. Their Sacrament of Penance hath no ground in the Word of God. And being taught to depend on it for pardon, and to neglect the things of most necessary importance to salvation; it proves a most damning Imposture. Their Doctrine thus making Repentance needless; plainly destroys Christianity, debauches the Lives, and ruins the Souls of sinners. And is one of the most pernicious Heresies, that ever was broached, Sect. 9 10. & 11. to page 152.   

CHAP VI.  
THeir Doctrine leaves no necessity of Holiness of life. It is enough to denominate their universal Church holy, if there be but one holy man in it. One act of charity, the least of all, may make one a holy man. Other Maxims of this tendency. How they destroy the necessity of holy life, by making it needless to exercise virtue, and avoid sin, Sect. 1. to page 154.  
How they make the exercise of Christian virtues unnecessary in general, more particularly hope (one of the three Divine virtues) fares no better, than faith and love. They leave themselves no good ground of hope. Their hope a Conjecture, founded upon a delusion. The precept for hope obliges not, but in the more grievous assaults of despair. So that not one of a Thousand in Popery need have any hope in God. No not any, since the command for it may be satisfied by other acts, Sct. 2. & 3. page 157.  
Their Doctrine leaves no room for, no ground of Humility, no sense of sinfulness, weakness, unworthiness. 'Tis pregnant with Pride and Arrogance, Sect. 4. to page 159.  
Brotherly love unnecessary by their Doctrine. No need of love to any, unless in necessity. Nor then, though the necessity be extreme, if we help them, though not out of Christian love. This extended not only to external, but spiritual necessities. If the acts whereby we should relieve their Souls be neglected, it may pass for a small fault. Those who have no Christian love, if they believe they have it, may be excused from sin. No precept requires any special act of love to our Brethren. No affirmative command for such love. 'Tis enough that we do nothing against them, Sect. 5. to page 162.  
In destroying the necessity of those radical Grace's instanced in before, they root out the rest. Particularly those that depend upon love to God, viz. Delight in God, desires to enjoy him, hatred of sin, sorrow for it as an offence to God, and filial fear. By their common Doctrine there's no special command for any fear of God. So that the want of all fear of God, filial or servile, is no special sin. Since they need not act out of love, they exempt themselves from all acts truly Christian, and any other Christianity than honest Heathenism. All exercise of virtues opposite to acts accounted but venially evil, is with them needless. The monstrous consequences of this, Sect. 6. 7. & 8. to page 164.  
A special expedient, whereby they make the exercise of Christian virtues unnecessary, is their turning the commands of God into Counsels, such as need not be observed. Such they count many of those excellent rules in Christ's Sermon on the Mount. These and many others specified. More instances in virtues, which concern our selves, God and others, in acts of temperance and contentment, in acts of Religion, and in acts of Righteousness and Mercy. Also Mortification, crucifying the World, self-denial, taking up the Cross, and all growth in grace is but matter of Counsel. So is every degree of grace, above the lowest of all. Yea all commands for good acts are no more than Counsels, but only in the article of necessity. And all acts that have more than moral goodness. And all actings in a virtuous manner, and from a good principle. Exercise of virtue not necessary either in Worship, or common conversation. Not in those cases, where, if in any at all it would be needful. A way they have for any man to turn whatever precept pinches him, into a Counsel. There is no danger, nor any sin at all in rejecting the counsel of God. No not when Conscience dictates that it is good to follow them. No nor when God further calls thereto by inspirations or motions of his Spirit. They may be neglected out of Contempt. And with some abhorrence of them. They may boast and glory in such neglects. They may bind themselves by Oaths not to observe God's Counsels. Sect. 9 to page 181.  
No exercise of virtue necessary, but only during the Pope's pleasure, for if be should forbid virtue (as he hath done already in divers instances) the Church would be bound to believe those virtues to be evils and so to avoid them. Further, their Doctrine incourages the continual practice of such wickedness, as is inconsistent with all holiness of life, reduced to three heads. Sect. 10. to page 183.   

CHAP. VII.  
MAny heinous crimes are virtues, or necessary duties with them. Their Blasphemies waved, because insisted on by others. Also a great part of their Idolatry. Their Plea in excuse of this Crime, from the distinction of terminative and transient worship, removed by their own Doctrine formerly opened. Sect. 1. to page 185.  
Their Idolatry as to Relics. These are to be Religiously worshipped, though many of them be ridiculous and loathsome, though many Thousands be confessed to be counterfeit, and great and detestable impostures be therein acknowledged. To worship false Relics, or the Devil upon a mistaken belief, is meritorious. What worshipful things miscarriages in the Mass furnish them with, Sect. 2. to page 188.  
They give Divine worship to Relics, though they give it not the name. They give both name and thing expressly to vast multitudes. All which they count Relics of Christare to have Christ's honour. Among these they reckon all thidgs that were near him, or touched him on earth, even the earth, water, stones, etc. Not only the things, but persons that touched him, thereby become his Relics, and are to have his worship. The Virgin Mary expressly, and Thousands more may have it by the same reason, they will not absolutely except the Ass on which he road. Yea all the Relics of such persons may have it. For they commonly teach that the Relics may have the same worship with the person, whose they are. The best of their Relics impostures, that which passes for the foreskin of Christ, his Shirt, Coat, Blood, the Crown of Thorns, lance, Nails, Cross, and its Liquor. Their Relics numerous beyond account. How they came to be so, their own Authors tell us. The Devil furnished their Church with some of them, and crafty knaves with others. Yet their whole Religion in a manner consists in worshipping such things as these, as some of themselves tell us. Sect. 3. to page 203.  
Perjury necessary by their Doctrine. If a Prince swear solemnly not to prosecute his supposed heretical subjects; unless he break his Oath, he is in danger to be damned. No faith to be kept with Heretics. Their Doctrine ruins all securities that Popish Princes, or Subjects can give to Protestants. These can with prudence trust to nothing, but what will keep them out of the Papal reach. Sect. 4. to page 205.  
Robhery and Murder as necessary a Duty. To deprive Heretics of Estate or life a meritorious act. All Papists Princes, or others, are bound in Conscience by that which is most obliging in their Religion, utterly to root out all they account Heretics, and to seize on all they have. A decree of a general Council for it, which incourages the execution with promises of the greatest rewards, and enforces it with threaten of most dreadful import. They must not be counted Catholics, unless they do it. It hath been effected or attempted in all Countries where the Papists had power to do it, or but thought that they had it. The reason why they do it not in England and some other places, is, as themselves declare, because they have not yet power enough. Sect. 5. to page 210.  
Sorcery and Conjuration part of their Religion. This manifested in their Sacramentals, where, by their own rules there is a tacit invocation of the Devil. Their excuses here insufficient. Even their mode of praying too like conjuring. Sect. 6. to page 215.  
The chief act of their Religion is to destroy Christ, by Sacrificing him daily in the Mass, which they maintain they do truly and really. Sect. 7. to page 220.   

CHAP. VIII.  
THeir Doctrine tends to destroy holiness of life, by encouraging the continual practice of all sort of wickedness under the notion of venials. What hatred of God. What acts of Infidelity and Idolatry. What distrustful cares. What irreligiousness in all Religious exercises. What use of Witches. Or dealing with the Devil. What irreverence towards God in adjuration. Sect. 1. to page 213.  
What impious Swearing, almost at every word. In horrid terms. Without offering to break off this ungodly custom. Binding themselves by Oaths, and threatening God, that they will sin against him. And never comply with his will, in things which he commends to them as most excellent. What fraudulent Oaths. What Perjuries of all sorts, both as to assertory and promissory Oaths, not worse for being most frequent and customary, Sect. 2. to page 221.  
What Blasphemies. Out of levity, passion, or inconsiderateness. Or from wicked custom, and contempt of a man's own Salvation. The more habitual and customary Blaspheming is the better, Sect. 3. to page 223.  
What Profaning of holy time. Where it is manifest, that little or nothing at all of Religion need be made Conscience of amongst them; even at the only time set apart for the acts and exercises of it, Sect. 4. to page 228.  
What irreverence in Children to Parents. They may be ashamed of them. And curse them as Parents may curse them again. What unaffectionateness. They may desire the death of their Parents for some outward advantage. Or by accusations procure their death. What disobedience in all things out of negligence or sensuality. And in matters of greatest importance as to this life. Or in matters which concern their Salvation. Parents have no right to oblige their Daughters not to be Whores, Sect. 5. to page 231.  
What Murder of Soul or Body. As to acts inward and outward. What hatred. What outrageous anger. What revenge. Desires of the death, not only of Enemies, but nearest Relations, because they are poor, or not handsome, may be innocent. Actual killing them without deliberation is no fault; when not fully deliberate (when ordinarily many things may hinder it from being so) is but little worse, Sect. 6. to page 233.  
What uncleanness. Fornication in its own nature not evil with some. Adultery one of the lesser sins. To seek or receive hire for whoredom scarce a fault, even in a Nun. The conjugal act before marriage venial. And also to lie with one contracted privately, after a public contract with another. A woman whose chastity is attempted with some force, need not cry out, nor make any resistance, but may take natural pleasure in the act. How excused when drawn to it by courtship. Those who are disposed to Fornication may innocently be invited to it. Self pollution may be desired or delighted in as past or future for a good end. To venture upon the occasions. To use hot, provoking meats. Carnal touches. To expose themselves to place, company, sights, persuasions, opportunities that are ensnaring. To use filthy discourse, or a tempting garb, all venial, Sect. 7. to page 238.  
What Stealing in all sorts, Children, Servants, Wives. Mortal theft is so stated that they may make it venial when they please. They may steal little or much. Of these many instances. What cheating in false measures. Or the quality, or substance of what they sell. They may promote the cheat with lies, or worse. And defraud those who intrust them. Their Church-laws allow cozening, so it be but as to half of the worth of the commodity, Sect. 8. to page 245.  
What lying. They may lie merrily and do it customarily out of mere pleasure in telling lies, yea out of malice. They may lie when ever it will be for their advantage, if it do no great mischief, or they do but think so. To tell lies for their Religion is piety. No sort of lies mortal but by accident, when they do great mischief, as speaking the truth may do. Nor in many cases when they do such mischief. They may use lies in commerce, and confirm them with Oaths, both together may be but venial. Also in Courts of judicature. How both judge and witnessss may lie there. They may bear false witness in favour of one another. They may delude the Court by equivocation or mental reserves. Even a Priest may swear he knows nothing of what he has heard in confession, with this reserve, he knows it not as man, but as God. They have lies in their Divine Office. Abundance of such stuff or worse is confessed to be there. Nor would they have all purged out, lest none of their old service should be left. They may tell lies in the Pulpit. But some of them would have such rank ones avoided as the hearers may smell out. They may do it even in Confession, and delude the Priest with lies, in much variety. And he may delude them likewise, pretending that he absolves them, when he neither doth it nor intends it. Since they have such liberty to lie every where when can they be trusted? Sect. 9 to page 259.  
What perfidiousness venial. How they may be perfidious for delight, or advantage. They may make promises outwardly, without intention to be obliged. Yea they may deny with Oaths too, that they promised. Internal promises though made in the form of a vow, or with an Oath added, oblige them not. How easily they may excuse the worst perfidiousness. The firmest promises bind not, but under venial guilt, unless they be in writing, or with an Oath. Nor then if they intended not thereby to be obliged; Sect. 10. to page 264.  
What Hypocrisy. To make false shows of Sanctity for a good end is no sin. Bare Hypocrisy venial, though one delight to play the Hypocrite. Ye● when it is for a bad end, though the fault be doubled 'tis venial still. They reverence Hypocrisy as a holy art. 'Tis amongst the commendations of their great Saints, and recommended by them to their Religious. If they feign more holiness than they have, to edify others, 'tis rather meritorious then faulty. Their Church much concerned for the honour of Hypocrisy, Sect. 11. to page 268.  
What Calumniation. How many ways they have to ruin the Reputation of others without mortal guilt. Amongst others, if one speak ill of them or their Church, though truly, they may charge him with false crimes. A small fault for one to defame himself, Sect. 12. to page 271.  
What Flatteries venial. To praise one for the virtues he never had, or the good he never did. Yea to applaud him for his sins, to gain something by such flatteries. Cursing may be their usual practice. It is scarce any fault, when used for honest Recreation, Sect. 13. to page 273.  
What capital sins are with them venial. All covetousness unless injustice be added. Yea and with injustice too. They allow them to gain unrighteously. They may gain out of excessive desire of Lucre, and make it their principal end, and turn it into a Trade. They need not restore what they win by unlawful or what they call Diabolical games. But the loser may steal it from him that wins. Or refuse to pay, though he have sworn to do it, his Oath may be easily dispensed with. They may take hire for acting the most abominable wickedness or unjust judgement, or false depositions, or murder, or consulting with the Devil. But then they must be sure to do the fact. No restitution to the poor a duty. Hard heartedness and unmercifulness to the poor venial. Pure Prodigality a less fault than covetousness, though this be next to none, Sect. 14. to page 280.  
All Pride venial, but such as it scarce to be found in the Christian World. The numerous issue of this Queen of mortal sins (as they style it) to which they are so favourable. To ascribe what they receive from God to their own merits, is confessed to be mortal pride; yet they make it part of their Creed. Arrogance commonly a venial fault, Sect. 15. to page 283.  
Ambition venial, unless one would be honoured for a crime, or counted a God, Sect. 16. to page 284.  
Vain glory regularly a venial, it imports nothing contrary to the love of God or man. It may be their principal end in all things ordained for the honour of God. Otherwise their whole Clergy, they say, would be in a dangerous condition. They may take livings and spiritual promotions principally for honour, or temporal profit. So we have an account, why they may make Religion, all along, subservient to a worldly interest, Sect. 17. to page 287.  
Loathing of Spiritual and Divine things venial, unless it be on such an account as rarely happens. All in a manner that is requisite for a true Christian may be abhorred without mortal guilt. Rancour and indignation against any, who would draw them to spiritual, and Divine things, a venial, Sect. 18. to page 290.  
Anger though extravagant and revengeful may be venial. That more excessive it is, the more mischief it may do and be innocent. Disdain of others. Audaciousness; immoderate fear; or wrath. Fool hardiness. Incontinent desires, and lust. Love of the flesh or the World, venial. Envy scarce any worse, Sect. 19 to page 293.  
Intemperance comprising Gluttony and Drunkenness in its own nature a venial. When they play the Epicures like Dives and resolve to give up their whole life to Gluttonous pleasures, it is but near to a motal sin. When it proceeds to beastliness, and the Glutton so burdens nature that 'tis forced to ease itself, by vomiting, or other nasty loathsome ways, it is still venial. When he eats, till he vomit on purpose, that he may be ready to eat again, it is no worse. Drinking till the house in the Drunkard's fancy run round, is venial. Nor will it be worse till reason be totally drowned. The rare virtues of Drunkenness, complete drunkenness will make any wickedness, then acted to be no sin at all. And half-drunkenness will make it to be but a venial, Sect. 20. to page 297.  
The multitude of particular crimes which issue from these seven Capitals need not be taken notice of as mortal. They have no warrant from Scripture to count any sin venial. Yet they venture to reduce to this account what the law of God forbids, not only when it is of less, but greatest importance. To make a sin mortal requires so very much, that the sinner may easily miss some of it, and so venture upon it, without fear that it is deadly. This declared particularly. They show them a Way to pass any mortal crime, as venial. How they represent venials as so very harmless, that all have encouragement enough to practise them continually all their life, and even when they are dying. Though some few of them may make any look like Monsters, in the judgement of a sober Pagan, Sect. 21. to page 305.   

CHAP. IX.  
THey conclude many crimes (inconsistent with holiness of life) to be no sins at all, and so warrant all to live in the practice of them. Some particulars of this nature before insisted on, here only pointed at. It is no sin to quench the motions of God's Spirit, drawing them to the observance of his Will, any way. Yet may they invite others to wickedness when they are ready for it. They may lawfully deal with the Devil divers ways, Sect. 1. to page 306.  
It is sufficient to pray with the mouth, without the heart, Sect. 2. to page 308.  
How it is no sin to worship the utensils of worship. Or the word Jesus pronounced, or written. Or the accidents of Bread and Wine in the Eucharist. Or the picture of the Manger, Thorns, or Spear which touched Christ. Or the Ass he road on, or the lips of Judas for kissing Christ, though to betray him. Or the imaginary blood of a Crucifix. Or to worship any person whatever as the image of God, or any other Creature in the World, Toad, Serpent, or a wisp of Straw. Or the apparition of the Devil himself in a beam of light, or the form of a Crucifix, Sect. 3. to page 314.  
Perjury no sin. When one takes an Oath and intends not to swear. Or swears and intends not to be obliged. Or swears in another sense, than be knows is intended in the Oath. So they may use equivocation, or mental restrictions in swearing. And think this lawful either to gain some advantage, or to avoid any damage. Many instances of such artifice of words or inward reserves, which they may use to elude Oaths. They may swear with such ambiguities or reserves, when they are swearing not to use them. No Oath can be contrived, which they may not thus elude, Sect. 4. to page 322.  
The irreligion of the Roman Church palpable, in the observance required of the Lords Day, and others set a part for holy employments. When the people are discharged from Religious duties at other times, nothing is enjoined them on these days, but presence at Mass. At Mass they need neither mind God nor Divine things. It would be no sin to employ themselves in servile works on these days, if it were but the custom. Nor to give them no observance at all after Mass. This may be dispatched before Sun rise. These days are not profaned by any acts of wickedness. So that all the Religiousness which that Church requires of their Catholics, when they make the best show of it, is consistent with the lewdest acts of ungodliness and debauchery, Sect. 5. to page 328.  
In reference to those whom they count Heretics, all relatives are discharged from their respective duties, Subjects, Wives, Children, Servants, yea debtors too. It is no murder to kill a Heretic or those that are excommunicated, Sect. 6. to page 329.  
Upon what occasion they may kill one another. A man may with impunity kill his Wife taken in Adultery, or his Daughter, or Sister, or his own Mother: and this thougb they be big with child. A woman married or unmarried being unlawfully got with child, may procure Abortion; not only to secure her life, but her state and credit. It is lawful to cut up an honest Mother quick, and she bound to procure it, that the child in her womb do not want Baptism. They may without sin kill any one assaulting them unjustly, not only to secure their life, but to avoid a wound or a blow (a Priest may do it while he is Celebrating) though the Aggressor be frantic or in drink, or asleep. Or though he have had intolerable provocation, and be the sufferer. They may kill an innocent to escape themselves. They may kill one before he actually assaults them (though his Soul be like to perish with his life) if they know he is prepared for it, or does but design it. So the Adulteress may prevent her Husband, and kill him first, with the poison or weapon prepared for her. They may kill one to secure their Goods, or recover them, when they may be recovered in a legal way. Yea though they be of small value, worth but three or four Ducats, yea but one Crown or less. They may kill men for their Reputation. If he sees one approach to assault him he may kill him, rather than retire. A blow with a Cudgel, or a light Switches, yea or a box on the ear, is a just ground to kill him that gives it; yea or does but offer at it. They may kill men for ill language, though they allow it to be as common, as any they speak. Yea for an affront by mere signs, though he that gives such an affront runs for it. They speak favourably of Duels. But allow them to kill men more privily, and by surprise, when they impeach their Reputation publicly or privately; yea or do but threaten to do it. Jesuits scarce so extravagant here, as some of other Orders. If the civil law did but give so much liberty to murder, as their rules for Conscience, no man near them, could have security for his life, Sect. 7. to page 337.  
How indulgent their doctrine is to uncleanness. They oblige them not to avoid such occasions of this sin by which they very frequently fall, unless they fall thereby in a manner always. Divers instances. What liberty they give to unclean thoughts. Obscene words. Lascivious writings. Filthy Songs. Such ditties sung to the Organ at Mass. Offered to God in the person of the Church for divine praises. This was the custom every where in Caietan's time, and since. As intolerable obsceneness in their penitential confessions. What licence they give to use such things as provoke lust. Also to immodest touches, and shameful sights. No need to be resolute in resisting Temptations. How servants may minister to the lust of their Superiors. Actual whoredom hath excessive encouragement. The Pope builds Stews for prostitutes. They pay him a weekly tribute for liberty and accommodation to drive their Trade. This condemned as m●st abominable to God and man, even Barbarians: but the Pope consenting to it, it is no sin, not indecency for his holiness to be maintained by the hire of whores. Many things concluded by their Divines in favour of them. How punctual in deciding, at what rates all sorts of women may set themselves to sale. They oblige them not to restitution, but when their Religious make use of them, who are to have it gratis. Public prostitutes compelled by law, to commit lewdness with any that will hire them. Hence the people (instructed in their Religion) know not that such Fornication is a sin. He that keeps a Concubine at home is not to be denied the Communion. Nor will they oblige him to put her away, if that would impair his Estate, or Delight, or his Reputation, yea or hers either. It is enough if he promise not to sin with her, though he keep not promise. Adultery no sin in divers cases. For the Clergy, Adultery, nor unnatural uncleanness not so much a sin as Marriage. Burning lust, innocent. Better to burn than to marry, whatever the Apostle with their Adversaries say. The admired chastity of their votaries consists well enough with whoredom, and is only violated by Marriage. Their Priests have been allowed to keep whores at home, paying a yearly Rent for it. And those were to pay it who took not the liberty, because they might. Votaries incur excommunication for laying aside their habit, but not if they lay it aside to commit Fornication more readily. Priests in no wise to be obliged by Oath to forsake their Concubines. Extremely few chaste, by their own confession, of those innumerably many that profess it. A Priest not to be deposed for Fornication, because there are very few not guilty. Priests who keep many Concubines not irregular. How they favour Sodomy. Married persons may practise much of it together. Their Clergy may act it to the uttermost, and be neither suspended, nor irregular, unless they make a Trade of it, and do that so publicly and notoriously, as they can scarce do (by their description hereof), if they had a mind to it. Mere mental Heresy a greater crime than Sodomy with them. Yea petty Thievery a more heinous sin, with some of them expressly, and in consequence with most. Sodomy hath ecclesiastical immunity. All sorts of Religious places amongst them, are Sanctuaries for Sodomites, all sorts of uncleanness having such free and favourable entertainment in their Church, no wonder if it be the sink of the Christian. World, Sect. 8. to page 360.  
'Tis no sin to take from Protestants or any counted Heretics, all they have. All their Estates are confiscated immediately, before any Declarative sentence, from the first day of their pretended Heresy. Though the Papists make not seizure presently, yet those Heretics are in the interim responsable for the mean profits. And they cannot any way alienate or dispose of their Estates. All Wills, Sales, Contracts for this purpose are null and void. All may be taken from the purchaser, without restoring the price he paid. Children though R. Catholics lose their portions. Liberty given to all to spoil and bereave them. All rules of righteousness which concern propriety are void here, Papists own them no observance. 'Tis no sin to burn their houses. To deprive a Protestant Prince of his Throne. To draw his Subjects into War against him. To betray Garrisons to the Romanists. To pay us no debts. To detain what is deposited with them in trust. There can be no lawful Parliament among Protestants. No King. No Peers. No freeholders'. No laws that are valid can be enacted. No Aids or Subsidies can be granted. The fundamentals of the government in England, and other such like Countries, quite blown up by their principles, Sect. 9 to page 365.  
'Tis no sin with them to bear false witness against Protestants, when their life or estate is concerned. Or to use fraud and deceit in bargains to cheat them of all they have. Or perfidiousness in promises, compacts, etc. They leave little that can be sin in Papists towards themselves; less towards Protestants, Sect. 10. & 11. to page 367.  
An aversation and contrariety to God and holiness, a propensness and inclination to all ungodliness and unrighteousness in the horriddest instances; when it is habitual, reigning, impetuous, active is no sin at all in the temper and habit; no nor in the acts and motions, without consent, Sect. 12. ibid.  
What expedients they have to justify all sin in the World, or make it no sin. The Pope's power herein. If he command vice, their Church is is bound to practise it. He can make sin to be no sin. He may dispense in all positive laws, and in the divine law (and against the Gospel) at least where God can dispense, particularly with Oaths and Vows, such as are best, and most inviolable. With the observance of the Lords day, so as to turn it into a working day. With all public worship amongst them, both Mass and Divine service. And against the universal state of the Church. He can discharge them from righteousness towards men. Take from any man his right. Dissolve marriages. Legitimate Adultery. Licence persons to be married for a while, and not during life. Authorise incest, (dispensing with marriage betwixt any but Parents and Children) and Sodomy. He can dispense with any Divine law when the reason thereof ceaseth, and can declare it to cease when he pleaseth. If he should err in dispensing, yet he that makes use of his licence to sin, sins not, He can free any from the obligation to fruits meet for Repentance. Thus can he discharge all from acts of Religion, Righteousness, and good works, Sect. 13. to page 376.  
He is excused from sin, who ventures on it upon some probable reason, though it seem but probable to him out of affection to the person that offers it, and there be more reason against it, Sect. 14. to page 377.  
Custom will excuse from sin, and make it no sin. Divers instances. The sense of Scripture must be conformed to the custom of their Church, and vary from what it was, as they change fashions, Sect. 15. to page 380.  
He sins not who does what is sinful, following the judgement of a grave Doctor. One such Doctor may suffice (as multitudes of their Divines conclude). And will secure him in following his opinion, though both less safe and less probable. This granted to be the common Doctrine of their Church. So it is unreasonable to except against our alleging the opinion of particular Doctors against them, since their common Doctrine allows any to follow the opinion of particular Doctors, as to belief or practice. Hereby a way is opened to leave no conscience of sin amongst them, Sect. 16. to page 384.  
Their directions for the scrupulous of like tendency. He sins not who breaks the law in a strict sense, if he observe it in some benign sense. He may make the interpretation himself, and so such as will please him, or choose that of others which is best for his purpose, though he fear it is not probable, and it be false indeed. Or when the observance of the law is very difficult or incommodious. And ordinarily he is like to judge it so. Or when the observance of it is ridiculous, as the observing of the Divine rule has been (by their acknowledgement) long since in their Church. Or when there is apprehension of danger in complying with it. Or when he observes it but according to the common usage of good Catholics, when amongst the most eminent of their Catholics, it is confessed, there is little or no worship of God, no regard of good life, Righteousness or Godliness. Their devices for justifying so much wickedness (to the excluding all holiness of life) where founded, Sect. 18. to page 390.   

CHAP. X.  
GOod works not necessary by the Roman Doctrine. This shown in Fasting, Prayer, Alms-deeds, to which they reduce all good works. They do not, they need not fast on their fasting days. Their Church requires the observance of none of those things, which they say are necessary to the being of a fast. They may eat a Dinner, a full meal at noon, may be excessive therein, so as to transgress the laws of Sobriety, and to excite and cherish lust, instead of repressing the flesh; and yet fulfil the precept. They may break their fast in the morning (and yet keep it) with Ale, Wine, Bread, or other things. They may eat a Supper too, and that excessive great, as big as custom will have it, when they tell us, it is their custom to sup with notorious excess. They may sup out of sensuality. And may take their supper in the morning. And drink and eat every hour. The quality of their fasting meat most delicious. They may drink at any time and Wine too (though that is confessed to be more contrary to a fast than flesh). They may drink it till they be drunk, and yet not break their fast. Nothing Religious in their fast. Neither Religious ends nor employments. And so it can be no good work nor necessary in their account. Those that have tired themselves with Gaming or Whoring are excused. Yet this piece of mockery passes with them as satisfactory and meritorious, Sect. 1. to page 397.  
Their praying no good work. The people pray not in the Mass. They neither express nor conceive any Petitions. Nor concur with the Priest, but by presence and posture of the body, as an image may do, or by virtually wishing the Priest's prayers may succeed, which they may do, when they are asleep. Nor do their Priests pray better in their public service, unless the bare pronouncing of the words (which is all they count necessary) be praying. How far they acknowledge this, Sect. 2. to page 401.  
Acts of mercy or charity not necessary with them, but in two cases, which seldom or rather never occur, at least together. One is when they have superfluities both in respect of nature and state, but, they say, it cannot easily be judged, that any secular person (no nor Kings and Princes) have such superfluities. The other is when the necessity is extreme (except it be such if any had superfluities, they would not be obliged to part with any thing.) When it is extreme, they allow the poor to steal. So charity is not needful but when stealing is lawful. Or then he may be excused so many ways, that he need never find himself obliged to relieve any gratis. Good works not neceslary with them, because to act from a good principle, and for a good end, is needless. Their design to satisfy justice, and merit grace and glory by what they do, makes their pretended good works, deadly evils. No necessity of good works upon the account of their being enjoined for penance. So they are not done as good, but suffered as evils. Besides the Priest need not enjoin such. Or the sinner need not submit thereto, or need not perform it. But may be released many ways. Especially by Indulgencies. 'Tis counted better to give money for these, than in ways of charity, Sect. 3. & 4. to page 408.  
The conclusion where from the premises in brief, is inferred, that the practical Doctrine of the Romanists tends to ruin Christianity, and the Souls of all that follow it.   
FINIS.   

Books Printed for Tho. Parkhurst at the Bible and Tbree Crowns at the lower end of Cheapside, near Mercers-Chappel.  

1. SErmons on the whole Epistle of the Collossians, by John Dally, Author of the Right use of the Fathers, Translated into English by F. S. with Dr. goodwin's, and Dr. Owen's Epistles before it.  
2. Exposition of Christ's Temptation, and Peter's Sermon to Cornelius, and a Discourse of Circumspect walking, by Tho. Taylor D. D.  
3. An Exposition on the Third Chapter of the second Epistle to the Corinthians, with a Treatise of the Godly man's Choice, by Anthony Burges.  
4. Forty six Sermons on the whole 8 th'. chapter to the Romans.  
5. An Exposition on Four select Psalms, viz. The Fourth, the Forty second, the Fifty first, the Sixty third, in Forty five Sermons, both by Tho. Horton late of St. Helen's London.  
6. The Morning-Lecture against Popery, wherein the principal Errors of the Church of Rome are detected and confuted in several Sermons, at a Morning-Lecture Preached by several Ministers of the Gospel in or near London.  
7. An Apology for Religion, by Math. Pool.  
8. The Fiery Jesuit, or an Historical Collection of the Rise, Increase, Doctrines, and Deeds of the Jesuits.  
9 The Plain man's defence against Popery, wherein many Popish Doctrines are proved to be flat against Scripture.  
10. The immortality of the Soul, explained and proved by Scripture and Reason, by Tho. Wadsworth.  
11. A Disputation of Original Sin, by Rich. Baxter.  
12. Reformation or Ruin, by Tho. Hotchkis.  
13. A Discourse of Excuses, their nature, and danger are discoursed, by John Sheffield.  
14. The life of John Jeneway.  
15. Saint's encouragement to diligence in God's service, by James Janeway.    

A Catalogue of some Books Printed and Sold by Nat. Ponder at the Peacock in the Poultry near Cornhill, and in Chancery-lane near Fleetstreet.  

EXercitations on the Epistle to the Hebrews; also concerning the Messiah: wherein the promises concerning him to be a spiritual Redeemer of mankind, are explained and vindicated, etc. With an Exposition of, and Discourses on the two first Chapters of the said Epistle to the Hebrews, by John Owen D. D. in Folio.  
Exercitations on the Epistle to the Hebrews, concerning the Priesthood of Christ; wherein the Original, Causes, Nature, Prefigurations, and discharge of that holy Office, are explained and vindicated. The nature of the Covenant of the Redeemer, with the call of the Lord Christ unto his Office, are declared: and the opinions of the Socinians about it are fully examined, and their oppositions unto it, refuted: with a continuation of the exposition on the third, fourth, and fifth Chapters of the said Epistle to the Hebrews, being the second Volumn, by John Owen D. D. in Folio.  
ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΟΛΟΓΙΑ: Or, A Discourse concerning the Holy Spirit, wherein an account is given of his Name, Nature, Personality, Dispensation, Operations, and Effects: his whole work in the old and new Creation is explained, the Doctrine concerning it vindicated from Oppositions and Reproaches. The nature also, and necessity of Gospel-Holiness; the difference between Grace and Morality, or a spiritual Life unto God in Evangelical Obedience, and a course of Moral Virtues, are stated and declared, by John Owen D. D. in Folio.  
A discourse of the Nature, Power, Deceit, and Prevalency of the Remainders of Indwelling-Sin in Believers; together with the ways of its working, and means of prevention, by John Owen D. D. in Oct.  
The unreasonableness of Atheism made manifest; in a discourse to a Person of Honour, by Sir Charles Wolseley Baronet, Third Impression.  
The Reasonableness of Scripture-belief. A discourse, giving some account of those Rational Grounds upon which the Bible is received as the Word of God, written by Sir Charles Wolsely Baronet.  
Anti-Sozzo, sive Sherlocismus Enervatus: In Vindication of some Great Truths Opposed, and Opposition to some Great Errors Maintained, by Mr. William Sherlock.    


Introduction.  
THe danger of Popery in points of Faith hath been sufficiently discovered to the world, by the Divines of the Reformation; but their Doctrine which concerns Life and Practice, hath not been so much insisted on. And yet there is as much occasion for this; for here the mischief is as great; an unchristian heart and life being at least as damning as erroneous belief: and hereby the great Apostasy and degeneracy of the Papal Church is as apparent: and herein they have proceeded with as much disregard of Christ, and the souls of men. Their design in this, seems to have been, not the promoting of Christ's interest (for that is manifestly prostituted;) but the securing and greatning of a Faction, which under the profession of Christianity, might be false to all its realities. And their rule is the corrupt inclinations of depraved nature, to which they have throughly conformed their practical Divinity; which easeth it of the duties for which it hath an aversation, how much soever enjoined; and clears its way to those sins, to which it is disposed, as though there were no need to avoid them. This Rule serves their design with great advantage, but souls are more endangered hereby, and their principles become more pernicious, because they are so taking. Persuade a man, that he may safely neglect the duties, which he owes to God, his own soul, and others; and may gratify the lusts he is addicted to; and give him the maxims of Religion, and the Authority and Conclusions of Divines, and the Teachers whom he trusts, for it: and he will like that Religion, because he loves his sin, and is in danger to follow both, though he perish for it eternally. And indeed this is it which makes the condition of Papists deplorable, for though the principles of their belief, as it is Popish, be mortally poisonous; yet there might be some Antidote in the practicals of Christianity, retained, and followed, by those who are unavoidably ignorant of the danger of their more speculative errors; and so some hopes of such: but their Practical Doctrine being no less corrupted, the remedy itself becomes poison, and their condition, who freely let it down, hopeless. Whether their errors in matters of Faith be directly fundamental, hath been, with some of their Opposers, a question; but those who well view their practical Doctrine, may discern, that it strikes through the heart of Christianity, casting off the vitals of it as superfluities, and cuts of those who will believe and follow it, from the way of life: not only by encouraging them, with security to live and die in all sorts of wickedness; but also by obliging them to neglect, as needless, the greatest, and most important concerns of Christians, without which God cannot be honoured by us, nor Salvation attained. This will be apparent, by observing what is determined in that Church, by those who have the conduct of their lives and Consciences, concerning the Worshipping of God, Christian knowledge, Love to God, Faith in Christ, Repentance from dead works, and Holiness of life; as to the Exercise of Christian Virtues, the Abandoning of sin, and the Practice of good works; of all which in particular the following discourse gives an account.   

CHAP. I. Real Worship of God not necessary in the Church of ROME.  

THere is nothing wherein the Honour of God, and the Happiness of men is more concerned, than Divine Worship. Religion provides for these great ends, by obliging us to worship God: this it doth indispensably, and can do no less, without abandoning itself; for this is essential to it, 
(a) Religio est Virtus per quam homines D●o debitum cultum et reverentiam exhibent— Tullius dicit 2. Rhet. quod religio est virtus, quae superiori cuidam naturae (quam divinam vocant) cultum caeremoniamque affert. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 81. Art. 1.  and gives it being. And the truth, and goodness of it depends as much thereon; for no Religion is true and saving, but that which obligeth to worship God really. Now worship is not real, unless mind and heart concur in it: whatever it hath without this, it wants 
(b) Nam spiritus interior adorationis, qui est ipsa vita et anima adorationis exterioris, apellatur quoque ipsa veritas adorationis. Vasquez de Adorat. l. 1. Disp. 1. cap. 2 p. 18.  its life and soul; and is no more worship really, than a picture is a man. Hence Christ brands those, who draw near to God with their lips, without their hearts, for hypocrites Matth. 15. 7, 8. Mark 7. 6. Such as pretend to be what they are not; and to do, what really they do not: who are but worshippers in show, and fiction; no more so indeed than the Stage-Player is the Prince, whose part he acts. The Romanists seem to acknowledge all this, and therefore ought not to deny, but that it is as necessary, that God should be really worshipped; as it is needful, that he should have any honour in the world, or that there should be any true Religion amongst men, or Salvation for them. Yet notwithstanding, their practical Doctrine makes it needless to worship God really. That this may be fully and distinctly manifested, let us observe First, what they count requisite in Divine Service, and in their Mass: the former is their worship for every day, (which goes under the name of Canonical hours and the divine office) and is the proper Service of their Clergy and monastics: the latter is for holidays, and is common to the People with the Religious; and the only public Service they are ordinarily obliged to. Afterwards we may reflect upon, what else passeth under the notion of worship in public; and also take some notice of their devotions, or religious employments, in private.  
For the first of these their Divine Service, if there were any thing of religion or religious worship counted needful amongst them, it would be required of their Clergy, and those whom by way of eminency they call Religious, in their Divine office especially (if any where): but by their doctrine it is not needful for them to worship God really there; unless he can be said to be worshipped where both himself and all that concerns worshippers indeed, may (as it may by their leave) be quite neglected, and no way actually minded. They seem, at least some of them, in their discourses of worship, and prayer particularly, to require as necessary thereto, both an act of the mind and of the will (attention and intention they call them): but proceed with them a little, and you will find the former of these, quite lost in the latter; and the latter, as they order it, dwindling into nothing. It is the common determination of their Schools and Doctors, that actual attention of mind is not necessary when they recite their Canonical hours, that is, they need not mind God in their service, nor the matter of it more than the object, nor the sense of what they say, nor the words they use; not any of these need be actually minded. A purpose or intention to do it is sufficient, though that purpose be not at all performed. This is the Doctrine of their great Aquinas 
(c) Ad hunc effectum (viz. mereri) non ex necessitate requiritur quod attentio adsit orationi per totum: sed vis primae intentionis, qua aliquis ad orandum accedit, reddit totam orationem meritoriam, sicut in aliis meritoriis actibus accidit. 2. 2. q. 83. art. 13.  concerning Prayer in general, whom the 
(d) Ut officium ipsa attentio comitetur actualiter, nec in officio, nec in aliis orationibus, vel bonis operibus requiritur. Sylvester. sum. v. hora n. 13. Edit. Lugdun. An. 1572. D. Thom. quem omnes sequuntur, affirmat (impetrationem) non pendere ex actuali attentione, sed virtualem ad illam sufficere, et videtur certa sententia. Suarez lib. 3. de orat. Vocal. c. 5. n. 5.  rest commonly follow. Attention is not necessary all the while, but the virtue of the first intention, with which a man comes to prayer, renders the whole prayer meritorious, as it falls out in other meritorious acts. And this first intention also is enough to make the prayer prevalent. So he explains his main conclusion, viz. 
(e) Attentare saltem in prima intention, oportet esse orationem, si meritoria, si impetratoria sit fu●…ra, mentemque spiritualiter refectura. Ibid.  Prayer ought to be at least attentive in respect of a previous intention. So that they may be attentive enough, by virtue of this first intention, though they do not at all mind afterwards what they are doing▪ when they should be worshipping: Which is just as if they should say, a man that goes to Church, with an intent to join in their service, but falls fast asleep when he comes there, serves God effectually, and is attentive enough, by virtue of that former intention, though he sleep all the while. It seems it is sufficient in the Church of Rome, and effectual even to a degree meritorious, to worship God as one that is asleep may worship him, if he falls asleep after a good intention. However hereby it is manifest that with them it is not needful to worship God at all, even in their most solemn service, but only to intent some such thing. If there be a purpose of worship, though God be never worshipped indeed, by their doctrine, it is enough for him. I suppose his Holiness would not think himself well served at this rate. The common women at Rome are to pay him a julio a head, weekly for the liberty he gives them to drive their there trade; now if instead of payment, they should allege an intention of it, and declare this is all they are obliged to, and that they ought to be acquitted upon that account, though they never laid it down, he would think himself not paid hereby, but scorned; he looseth his sacred Reverence, and is affronted into the bargain: yet at this rate will he have God served by Roman Catholics. Well, but if God need not be worshipped but in purpose only, and the intention may serve without the act: yet sure it must be an actual intention, or at least a purpose to worship God. If it be not the worship of God, that they need intent; divine worship is clearly abandoned, both in deed, and in purpose: if it must not be actual, there need be actually no thought of worshipping God. But I cannot discern that they count either of these necessary. They declare plainly that an actual intention is needless; in this they generally agree, though they differ in the terms, by which they use to express it. They call it an habitual, or a virtual, or an implicit intention; in opposition to that which is express or actual: So that actually either to worship God, or to have an intention of worshipping him, is more than needs. But since they will not have it actual, let it be what sort of intention they please otherwise; yet sure the thing intended should be the worshipping of God: So that they may be said to worship in purpose, though they think it needless to do it in deed. Whether they count this necessary, may be best discerned by their own expressions, which they use in some variety. Commonly they say 
(f) Ad horas Canonicas recte pronunciandas requiritur propositum intendendi & attendendi, & sufficit virtuale. Martin. Navar. Manual. Confess. cap▪ 1. num. 13. ut c. 25 n. 105. Edit Antuerp. an. 1608. Jac. de Graffies. Decision. aurear. l. 2. c. 51. n. 4. Edit Antuerp. an. 1596. Sylvest. Sum. v. hor. n. 14.  a virtual intention may serve. Now this is not an intention indeed, to worship God, but supposeth a former act, by virtue of which, one is said to have an intention, when really he hath none. As they call that a virtual attention to worship, when a man had a purpose to attend; though he do it not at all: Answerably, a virtual intention to worship, will be a purpose or thought to have such a purpose; though he never have it. Let those, who can, apprehend, how they may be said to worship God so much as in purpose, by virtue of a purpose to worship him, which they have not, but only intent to have, without effect. But it may be, there is no such intention needful with them, for custom may serve, to this purpose, Soto: 
(g) Preceptum attentionis in divino officio Canonice persolvendo, duo includit: videlicet, ut orandi initio quisque attendat quid agere aggreditur— quia vero ad prius membrum satis est, ut virtute alicujus praecedentis intentionis & consuetudinis fiat. Ut si quis dum signum ad horas datur, ad chorum de more vadit,— per illud satisfacit praecepto. De Justitia & jure. Lib. 10. quaest. 5. art. 5. Edit Lugdun. an. 1582.  The precept for attending the performance of divine service canonically, includes two things: First, that at the beginning of Prayer every one mind what he is going to do.— But for this former it is enough, that it be done by virtue of some former intention and custom: as if one when the sign is given for Prayers, go as is the custom, to the Quire-by this he satisfies the precept. Now this he may be accustomed to do, without any thought of God, or of worshipping him: yet by virtue of that custom, wherein God is quite neglected, he will have their virtual intention to worship him: all the intention that they require, that is, plainly none at all; unless by virtue of neglecting God, he may be said to mind him.  
Or an habitual intention may serve, they sometimes tell us. Sylvester 
(h) Quantum ad intentionem vel attentionem, quilibet ad officium obligatus tenetur in principio officii habere intentionem satisfaciendi, ita quod officium ab intellectu & non ab imaginativa proficiscatur secundum, Petr. de Pal.  expresseth it thus, after Paludanus, He is bound in the beginning of the service, to have an intent to perform it, so that the service may be from his reason, and not from his imagination only. i e. he must go about it like a man, and not like a beast. But lest it should seem too hard for a man to go about their service, with an intention so much distinguishing him from a Bruit; he adds a favourable gloss. 
(i) Quod intellige actu, vel habitu seu virtute. Sum. v. hor. n 14.  This is to be understood, saith he, either in act, or habit, or virtue. So that if it be but an habitual intention, it may suffice. 
(k) Ibid. c. 25. n. 106. Juxta ea quae post alios presertim Majorem scripsimus. vid. Jac. Graff. ibid.  Navarre explains it by this conditional (and others with him) if one be asked, why he takes his Breviary, he would answer, that he doth it to say Service. 
(l) Navarre explicat virtualem intentionem per illam conditionalem: quia si interrogaretur quare accipit Breviarium, responderet se id facere ad recitandum. Veruntamen hoc modo magis explicatur habitualis quam virtualis intentio. Suarez. l. 3. de Orat. c. 3. n. 6.  Now hereby we are told, that, rather an habitual than a virtual intention, is expressed, and they acknowledge that such an intention is not sufficient 
(m) Actus autem humanus non potest esse ab intentione tantum habituali ut omnes supponunt & per se constat. Idem l. 4. de horis. c. 26. n 3. Actus inde procedens non est humanus, & deliberatus. Bellarm. de Sacramentiss l. 1. c. 27. p 92. edit. Lugd. an. 1599  for a humane act; much less therefore for an act of worship; Since than they think, that such an intention will suffice; a purpose to worship God is not needful with them: unless they can make divine worship of that which is less than humane; or will have the Bruits to be Catholic worshippers. They tell us also that this habitual intention, is in those that are asleep. 
(n) Nec habet tantum intentionem habitualem, quod talem habet dormiens. Scotus m. 4. dist. 6. quaest. 6. qualis etiam in dormiente inesse potest. Bellarm. ibid.  So Scotus the first founder of this distinction (and herein that which they call virtual agrees with it; indeed Aquinas 
(o) 3. quaest. 63. art. 8.  saw no cause to distinguish them, and 
(p) Macor. Navar. Soto. Graff. g.  others who affect Scotus his subtlety, use the terms as if they were distinct, yet confound them in their instances). And thus when all the worship which they think needful, is shrunk up into an intention; yet that intention is no other, than they may have in a dead sleep, when they dream of no such thing. So that their souls need be no more concerned in worshipping God, either when they are at service, or when they are addressing themselves to it, than if their Church were in mount Celius with the seven sleepers: When they are coming to it (as we see here) they need have no more purpose to worship God, than if they were asleep: and when they are at it (as we said before) they need no more attend to what they are a doing, than if they were not yet awake. They say also an 
(q) Jo. Macor. Navar. in Suar. de Orat. l. 3. c. 3. n. 6.  implicit intention will suffice; which is, as they explain it, when a man hath not expressly any thought of praying or worshipping God, when he is to read service; but only intends 
(r) Certum imprimis est, satis superque esse, si in principio accedatur ad recitandum cum proposito implendi praeceptum, etiamsi in disoursu orationis in mentem non veniat, satis enim est quod non retractetur, quia manet virtus prioris attentionis. Praeterea ut censeatur quis accedere ad recitandum cum proposito implendi praeceptum, satis est quod ex consuetudine quadam velit illam actionem tanquam expletivam sui muneris & obligationis, vel quod in actu exercito (ut sic dicam) velit eam facere, ut solet, quia eo ipso vult illam ut impletivam praecepti. Ita sumitur ex Macor, Navar. & aliis. Idem. l. 4. de hor. c. 26. n. 6.  to accomplish the precept of the Church, or to perform his task, or to do as he is wont to do. As when a man first takes Orders or enters into a Monastery, understanding that the Church injoines all in that capacity daily to recite their canonical hours; if he than have an intention to perform this task, to do as the Church requires, or as others of that quality are wont to do, and accordingly say his hours as the fashion is, though he have not once a thought of God or worshipping him all his life after, either when he is going to service, or when he is reading it; yet that first intention may suffice; yea it is of such sufficiency, that any other act of mind or heart, either in worship, or in order to it becomes needless: it is of such admirable efficacy, that by virtue of it, they can worship God, when they mind no such thing as God, or worshipping him, no nor ever intent it otherwise, Let us suppose that they thought it requisite to renew this implicit intention frequently, yet would it not necessarily amount to a purpose of worshipping God; for not only their task, and what they are wont to do, but the precept of the Church, may be (as we shall hear them by and 
(s) Soto, Canus. Medina. Corduba. Navar. Covarruv. Bonacina. infra.  by declare) accomplished by acts of wickedness: which sure cannot be acts of worship, nor a design to do them, an intention to serve God. Yea, they may satisfy the Church's injunction for Divine service, though they have an express intention not to fulfil it, all the while as 
(t) In Suarez Ibid. n. 8. & Tom. 3. disp. 88 Sect. 3. There are near 30. Doctors produced for this by John Martinez de Prado, a Dominican. Tom. 2. Theol. Moral. c. 30. q. 8. Sect. 1. n. 1.  (Arragon & their Divines of greatest Reputation determine.) So that if the Church did enjoin them to worship God, yet no intention to worship him would be needful, because they can satisfy the Church with a contrary intention: Finally a sinful intention will serve their turn: This passeth for their common Doctrine. 
(u) Haec est communis sententia— Omnes fatentur Idem Sua l. 3. de Orat. c. 3. n. 5. vid. infra.  If a man intent principally his own praise or worldly advantage, and so design to serve himself, and not God; this cannot with any reason be counted an intention to worship God: yet such a design will suffice for the worship they require, and it will be substantially good in their account, only a little tainted with a venial speck, which though it may hinder it from being meritorious of Eternal glory: yet he that never otherwise intends to Pray or Worship cannot be Damned, and so will be Saved notwithstanding. In short, the Lord requires the heart in Worship, without this, nothing else can please him, nothing in his account will be a real honour or worship of him, but only in appearance and fiction. The Romanists teach, that God need not have any thing of their hearts in their Service, not any one act or motion thereof, while they are at it, only some sort of intention before, while they are going about it; but this no act of will or heart neither, but only a virtual, or habitual, or implicit something; they have minced it so small, that an ordinary eye cannot discern in it so little, as a purpose to serve God; yea in fine, they have reduced it to that which is worse than nothing: and if the heart must be cumbered with any such thing, as an intention about serving God, yet a sinful intention may serve: this satisfies their holy Church and her Precept fully; she doth not, she cannot require any more for God, what burdens soever in other cases she lays upon the Consciences of men. But though the heart, and every act of it be thus discharged from any concern in their service, yet it may be, they will have the mind more engaged. One act thereof, and but one (mental attention) they seem to require; and its true, some of them make show of calling for it, but as soon as ever it appears, it is dismissed immediately, as needless; for they conclude generally, that a purpose to attend will serve, though they attend not, and this purpose too by their handling (as we have seen) comes to nothing, or worse. But suppose they did (though they do not) account an intention to worship God needful, and that actual, express, and well qualified, yet they confess 
(x) Licet velle attendere, non sit attendere in re, ut vere dixit Cajetanus. Suar. de Orat. l. b. 3. c. 4. n. 7.  an intent to worship, or wait on God, is not to worship him really: no more than a man is Sober when he is Drunk, because he intended to be Sober. But they leave us no ground for this supposition, yet ascribe as much to their intention, and more, than the best imaginable will bear; after they have reduced it to as bad, as nothing. However since all the worship they count necessary is included in this purpose, and all their pretensions depend on it; they are concerned to have it though to be something, and they will seem cautious about it, as a thing material, so this proviso they lay down. 
(y) Facillimum huic precepto obedire, nam nihil aliud exigit, nisi quod quis animo vacandi Deo horas inchoet, & in contrarium animus iste non mutetur, dum exolvit divinum officium. Cajetan. Sum. verb. horae Canon. Edit. Lugdun. An. 1545.  It must not be changed into a contrary purpose, if that should fall out, it will lose its wonderful virtue, and not make those worshippers, who mind not what they are doing, when they should be praying. But there is no great danger of this, nor need they be solicitous about it: for (as they tell them) they change not their purpose, though they do nothing that they intended; or do what is quite contrary to it, viz. Though if they purposed to attend, yet they attend not at all, but turn their minds to other things, if they act cross to the supposed intention; yet so long as they assume not a contrary purpose, they must be thought to mind what they are about, though they mind it not one moment: And there need be as little care, as there is danger of changing their purpose, for 
(z) Mutari autem in contrarium est impossibile, ex inadvertentia. Cajetan. Ibid.  carelessness cannot do it. It cannot be changed, unless a man designedly, and on set purpose, will turn his mind from what he is about to other things. Since then a Person who doth not mind God, or any thing that concerns his worship, when he seems engaged in it, doth not worship God at all, as is evident in itself, and they confess it, in case he mind not this on set purpose: therefore though he doth not worship God at all, yet he worships him as much as the Romanists require; unless he wills not to worship him on set purpose: yea though he voluntarily mind nothing that concerns a worshipper; though he deliberately, and willingly let his mind run upon other things: yet so long as he is so regardless of God, and what he is about, as not to take notice of this extravagancy, he fulfils the precept of the Church, and minds Divine service, as much as is required. 
(a) Si quis advertit se cogitare haec vel illa, quae debent esse extranea tunc a sua meditatione, sed non advertit quod ab officio Divino distrahitur; quamvis voluntarie ea meditetur; non tamen voluntary animus ab officio Divino distrahitur: ac per hoc animus vacandi Deo a principio officij habitus, non est mutatus in contrarium. Cajetan. ibid. Etsi ultro & voluntary alia cogitet (ut bene ait Cajetenus) quousque inspiciat se distrahi, semper reputatur inadvertenter divagari, atque adeo excusatur ab omissione praecepti de attentione, impletque adeo subinde orandi mandatum. Soto ibid. p. 341. Sic explicant Caietan. Soto presertim Medina vide & Gabriel. in Suar. 3. Thom. Tom. 3. disp. 88 Sect. 3.  Thus Cajetan, Soto, and others; so that by their Doctrine, if they do not worship God, and voluntarily neglect it, yet they do as much as the Church enjoins, so long as they take no notice, that they do not worship him. And as they may voluntarily employ their minds about other things, when they should be worshipping, so may they on set purpose, busy the outward man about other Employments, when they are saying their service. They can perform their best Devotions, while (to give their own Instances) they are 
(b) Hujusmodi sunt lavare manus, se endure, pennam temperare, aut id genus similia, qui quidem actus quandoque non sunt peccata neque venialia (verbi gratia) in ordine Praedicatorum. Jac. de Graff. ibid. l. 2. c. 51. n. 10. Talis est actio vestiendi se, vel lavandi manus & ora, vel sternendi mensam, aut lectum. Fill. Tract. 23. n. 260. vid. Soto ubi supra vid. Bonacin. Divin. Offic. d. 1. q. 3. p. 2. Sect. 2. n. 12.  washing themselves, or putting on their Clothes, or mending Pens, or laying the Cloth, or making Beds, or any thing else, which requires no more Attention. Nor dare they count this a venial fault, because the 
(c) vid. infra.  Dominicans are enjoined by the Rules of their Order, to say their service, while they are doing something else. That which would spoil the Devotion of others, gives no impediment to theirs, and good reason, for how can that be disturbed, that is not; or lessened, when it is already nothing? This is to worship God after the Roman mode, when neither body nor mind is taken up with the service, but both deliberately employed about something else.  
But that by their principles they need be no better worshippers, will yet be more manifest, if we view their Doctrine concerning Attention more distinctly. Aquinas, and Bonaventure (whom the rest follow) give an account of three sorts hereof, according to the Severals which may be minded in prayer.  

(d) Sciendum tamen quod triplex est attentio, quae orationi vocali potest adhiberi: una quidem qua attenditur ad verba, ne aliquis in eyes erret: secunda qua attenditur ad sensum verborum: tertia qua attenditur ad finem orationis, sc. ad Deum, & ad rem pro qua oratur. Aquin. 22. q. 83. a. 13.  The first is Attention to the Words, so as not to err in pronouncing them.  
The second, To the sense of the Words.  
The third, To the Person prayed to, and the things prayed for.  
Bonaventure calls Attention to the first Superficial; and that to the second literal (we may as well call it humane, or rational); That to the third Spiritual (Divine or Christian Attention others call it.) 
(e) Opusc. de process Religionis l. 7. c. 3.   
Now (which is to be observed, as that which unvails the whole mystery) they hold, that any one of these is sufficient; not only the third, or the second, but even the first, though it be the worst, and of least importance. So 
(f) Quocunque istorum modorum adsit intentio, non est inefficax oratio ad satisfaciendum. Et ego dico nec ad impetrandum vel reficiendum. Sum. Angel. v. oratio. n. 11.  Angelus, 
(g) Quaecunque harum adsit, oratio non est censenda inattenta Sylvest. sum. v. orat. n. 6.  Silvester, 
(h) Una istarum attentionum sufficit. Cajetan. sum. ibid.  Cajetane, 
(i) Quaelibet vero harum trium sufficit Bellarm. de bon. Operib. l. 1. c. 18. p. 1026. Edit. Lugd. An. 1599  Bellarmine, 
(k) Secunda attentio non est necessaria— Tertia etiam attentio non est necessaria. Tolet. In struck. l. 2. cap. 13. p. 449.  Tolet. So 
(l) Consequenter D. Thomas, Cajetan, Soto, & saepe Navar. asserunt, quamcunque ex dictis attentionibus sufficere ad probitatem Orationis & implendum praeceptum Suar. de Orat. vocal. l. 3. c. 4. n. 18.  Aquinas, Soto, Navarre, so all of them, it is (they tell us) 
(m) Communis est, quia Omnes dicunt minimam attentionem sufficere. Idem ibid. n.  the common Doctrine universally received And this clears all, and leads us directly through their reserves and concealments, and the ambiguity of their expressions (apt to misled an unwary eye, and abuse a charitable mind, loath to think them so bad, as they speak themselves) into the open view of their irreligious (not to say Atheistical) Doctrine. This makes it very evident, that, with them it is not needful, either to worship God, or intent it. For since they agree, that any one of the several sorts of Attention is sufficient; the first, which concerns the bare words, is enough in their account; and the other are needless. It is not requisite that they should mind, either the things to be prayed for, or the God they should pray to, or the sense of the words they pronounce; it will suffice that they mind the words to them senseless, and therein the empty and insignificant figure and sound. Now words without sense are in themselves neither good nor bad; no worship, sure, can be imagined in them, they are no better, (but less tolerable) in the mouths of men, than the sound of Bruits. And the mere figure and sound of Letters, can make men no more worshippers, than Conjurers; yet such is all the worshipping or praying that they count necessary. But if they had a mind to Supererogate, and their Catholics were to do more than their Duty, i. e. Act as becomes Men in their service, taking the sense along with the words: yet the third sort of Attention, which concerns God, is still unnecessary, there need be no application of the mind unto God in their prayers; Surely in any Religion, but that which will have men abandon both Sense and Reason in matters plain and obvious to either; God would not be thought to be worshipped, when he is not at all minded. By their common Doctrine now mentioned (wherein all sorts of their Authors conspire) first their minds, may in their Divine service, not only departed from God by natural, or inadvertent vagaries, but they may dismiss them from God on set purpose. For they may voluntarily, and upon deliberation decline in their service, what is more than enough; and the attendance of the mind upon God in prayer, is plainly with them, more than enough: seeing they declare, that their attending to the bare words alone is sufficient. If they mind but to pronounce the words entire, no more is needful, God may be left out of their minds, during their whole service: and they may be as much without God in their worship, as others are said to be without him in the World, deliberately and out of choice. They leave us not to rely for this upon consequences, how evident and undeniable so ever, they stick not to declare 
(*) Ut adverterem sufficere attentionem ad verba, vel ad sensum verborum— ex quo fit ut recitans divinum officium, non teneatur meliorem attentionem querere, sed satisfacere quam libet ex dictis eligendo. Bonacin. divin. off. disp. 1 q. 3. p. 2. sect. 2. n. 5. cum multis aliis.  that they may without sin voluntarily abandon the better sorts of Attention, viz. both that which is Rational, and that which is Spiritual: this will be no fault at all, if done upon a reasonable account, for example, if any one decline these 
(n) Infertur primo quamcunque attentionem ex dictis sufficere, ut oratio sit honesta. Et siquidem voluntaria omissio melioris attentionis, sit rationabilis, ut si quis nolit attendere ad perfectiorem, ne caput de fatiget, vel quid simile, non impediet quo minus honesta sit. vid. Suarez. de orat. l. 3. c. 4.  that he may not tyre his head therewith, or any thing of like nature. It seems reasonable with them not to trouble their heads with minding God, or what becomes men in their worship of him. The reason is, because 
(o) In eo modo orandi nullum est peccatum per se loquendo, & ex vi naturalis legis ob solum defectum voluntarium melioris attentionis— quia homo non tenetur orare meliori modo quam potest. etc. Idem ibid.  they are not obliged to serve God as well as they can: it is a received maxim amongst them, that they 
(p) Vid. Melch. Canum Prelec. de penitent. part. 3. p. 841. Edit. Colon. Agripp. an 1605.  are not bound to do their best 
(q) Angel. sum. v. Orat. n. 11. Sylvest. sum v. Orat. n. 6. Navar. ibid. c. 25. n. 105. Graff. ibid. l. 2. c 51. n 9 Molanus Theol. Pract. Tract. 3. c. 8. n. 14.  The third sort of Attention is better than the second, and the second is better than the first (that is worst of all): but when there are better and worse ways of serving God before them, they may choose the worse. The worst attendance of all it seems is good enough for God, even that wherein he is not at all regarded. This Doctrine is so common, that I find but two who demur on it, and one of them (Cajetan) but drawn in by consequence. Only Navarre though he, as the rest, counts the first and worst sort of Attention sufficient: yet thinks it may be a venial fault to retain it, so as voluntarily to exclude, or hinder the better. Yet both 
(r) Cajetan. supra Navar. c. 25. n. 106.  these hold, that they may voluntarily want the better, and may without fault turn their minds from God to other things, so long as they observe it not, or if they do observe it, yet so long also, as they do not reflect upon it as a Vagary. And both maintain 
(s) Quod possit quis sine peccato orare dum se induit, aut aliam similem actionem exercet— quae actio licet admittat inferiorem attentionem, tamen sine dubio impedit perfectiorem, & maxim spiritualem & elevatam— non licere tales actiones exercere— est falsum, & contra usum omnium piorum, & Cajetan. & Navar. etiam fatentur. Suarez ibid. n. 12.  that any one may pray whilst he is dressing himself, or is taken up with any other like employment. And such action though it be consistent with the worse Attention, yet undoubtedly (they say) it hinders the better, especially that which is spiritual and elevated. So that herein, these Authors are either reconciled to the common opinion, or fall out with themselves. And that such employments (though inconsistent with spiritual Attention, i. e. with minding God) are lawful while they are at their service, is not only the sense of these two Casuists; but to deny it is against the usage of all the Pious (it seems the Roman Piety is without regarding God, even in his worship) All the Domicans are particularly obliged to it (as we saw before) and have a visible demonstration for it from the 
(t) Dixerim forsan venialiter, quoniam non semper est peccatum, immo in ordine nostro praeceptum nobis est, ut surgentis officium virginis dicamus: & ut antiqua indicat dormitorij dispositio: inter induendum se fratres illud in●hoabant. So●o ibid. l. 10. q. 5. art. 5. Graff. ibid. l. 2. c. 5▪ 1. n. 10.  ancient form of their Dormitories. Thus one way or other all agree, that God may voluntarily be neglected in their worship without sin.  
Secondly, as it is not necessary by their Doctrine to worship God, so neither is there any necessity to intent it. When they have encouraged all, even their Religious, not to pray at all; by assuring them they need not mind God at all, whilst they should be praying to him: yet they would persuade them notwithstanding that they may pray, by virtue of a former intention. The vanity of this is showed already (where we prove both, that this is not enough, and that indeed they require not so much) but because it is the only pretence, that such can be worshippers of God, who think it needless to mind him, even in the most solemn addresses amongst them; it will not be amiss to see it again p●f● quite away, by their own Doctrine. What must be designed in that previous intention (upon which not only the efficacy, but the reality of their prayers, and solemn worship depends)? must they intent, when they are going about it, to mind the things they are to pray for, or the God they should worship or the sense of the words they utter? No, as it is not necessary to mind any of these, when they are at their worship; so neither is it needful to intent it beforehand: it will be sufficient if they do but intent to mind, the senseless pronounciation of the words; and neither God nor any thing else which becomes Christians, or Men in acts of worship; nothing but what Bruits or Birds are capable of, the mere uttering of the words. This is very manifest by their common Doctrine, now before us, concerning attention in Prayer. Attendance to the words without the sense is sufficient, but they need not purpose beforehand, to have any sort of Attention more than that which is sufficient: for they will not imagine there is any need of a purpose to do that, which is not needful to be done; and they declare expressly this is all which is requisite, that they come to their service with a purpose to have any sort of Attention, that is 
(u) Attentio necessaria consistit in habendo a principio horarum proposito actuali, vel virtuali ad eas attendendi, & postea actualiter, aut virtualiter attendendo aliqua attentione sufficienti, quae est triplex, etc. Navar. ibid. c. 2●. n. 165. Vid. supra. Ad implendum prae●…ptum orandi vocaliter supradicti authores asserunt, sufficere attentionem ad literam. S. Thom. Cajetan. Sotus. Gabriel. Navar. Vasquez Opusc. Moral p. 444. dub. 5.  sufficient (telling us withal, that attendance to the bare words will suffice.) So that in the issue the worship of God (his and our greatest concern in this world) is reduced to this. There is no need to mind God, and so not to worship him at all, either actually, or virtually; since it is neither needful to to do this, nor intent it. He is not worshipped in that remote and minute way, which they call virtual (which is not indeed the doing of it, but a purpose only to do it), but by virtue of a former intention; where this intention is not, it can have no virtue: but with them there need be no intention to mind God, and so by their Doctrine it is not necessary to worship him one way or other.  
Thirdly, since with them it is not needful to mind any thing in their service, for which they can be counted worshippers, nothing but the words; it will not be very material, to take notice what attention they must give to these: yet seeing the senseless recital of the words, is all that they would have them mind in Divine service; one would think, that this should be attended to purpose, at least actually. No, it is enough, if their Attention be but virtual, i. e. 
(x) Est autem attentio illa verborum— virtualis, cum incepit animo dicendi officium, & attendendi, & postea non mutat animum, quamdiu non attendat Tolet. ibid. l 2. c. 13.  if they have a purpose to mind them, when they are going about their worship, and change it not while they are at it, though then they mind them not (for as they generally hold, that Attention to the words is sufficient; so none question 
(y) Actualis vel virtualis intentio suffi it ex omnium sententia ad implendum praeceptum hoc Suar. de hor. l. 4. c. 26. n. 3. D. Thom. quem omnes sequuntur, etc. Supra Bonacin. tom. 1. divin. offic. disp. 1. q. 3. punct. 2. n. 15. Communis Doctorum sententia.  but a virtual Attention thereto will serve.) It may seem strange that one should be said to attend, when he attends not, but they will satisfy this with something that is as odd: they would have them think their heedlessness is excused, by being more heedless: and so the more careless they are in their worship, the better. For if they mind not what they are doing, when saying Divine service; 
(z) Cajetan. Soto. & alij. Supra.  yet if they do this without reflection, and take no notice that they mind it not at all; they therefore mind it well enough. Such is the Attention which the strictest of their Authors require and judge sufficient; even such as is as good as none, and about that which is nothing worth. Now this Doctrine hath such an Atheistical aspect, that they (who profess themselves to be, and would have the World think that they are worshippers of God) seem concerned not to expose it commonly bare-faced. And indeed they give it some disguise, when they declare so much for Attention of mind in worship, as that which is of the substance of worship, so essential thereto, that without this it is no worship of God, no praying at all; but a mere clamorous noise, yea a mocking of God, and taking his Name in vain. 
(a) Vid. Vasquez. de Adorat. l. 2. disp 8. c. 12. n. 361. etc. 15. n. 396. Suarez. de orat. l. 3. c. 4. n. 4. & n. 5. & l. 4. c. 14. n. 12.  The Jesuits forbear not frequently to acknowledge this. Who would not think hereupon, that they count it most necessary for the mind to attend God in worship? Oh! but the Vizour falls off, when we understand, that attention of mind to nothing else, but the bare words, stripped of their sense, and all respect to God, is enough with them, and that virtual only, and in purpose, though they never actually mind so little. They themselves assure us that the attending to the words only (if that were to be done indeed) is no attending God: for they make these distinct things, and will have one of them suffice without the other: and it is against the resentments of all Religion, and common sense too, that God should be said to be worshipped, when he is not at all minded. And therefore in fine, when they teach (as the best of them do, so that it passeth for their common Doctrine) that superficial attention in their service is sufficient: they declare plainly enough, th●… in the Church of Rome, there is no need to worship God, no not for their Religious, in that which they call Divine service.  
But if we would have a plainer acknowledgement hereof than is needful, we may have it from those who declare, that no Attention of mind is needful in worship, and these are the greatest part of their A ●…bours, which I find alleged in this question (taking none into the account neither, but those that are ancienter than the foundation of the Society). They determine without distinguishing that all attention is needless actual, or virtual. If the words are pronounced entire, and no external action admitted, to hinder that; it is no crime with them, if as nothing else; so neither the bare words be further minded, but the thoughts be quite dismissed from them. Sylvester the Master of the Sacred Apostolical Palace, and their prime Champion against Luther, in his Book Dedicated to Pope Leo the Tenth, determines expressly, 
(b) Attente orare in horis Canonicis, non est de jure divino Sum. v. horae. n. 13.  That to pray with attention in their Canonical hours, is not required by Gods Law. If he had said, the Church had not required it, he had spoke within compass; and said no more than many others before and after him: but he says that too, for having told us that Hostiensis, Antoninus, Summa rosellae, do all hold, that the Church enjoins not attentiveness, but only saying the service, he adds, 
(c) Sed isti licet verum dicunt, quantum ad hoc quod attentio non est sub praecepto— Idem. ibid.  that they say true, as to this, that attention is not under the precept of the Church. Of the like persuasion are Durandus, Paludanus, Angelus de Clavasio, and others. 
(d) Clericum qui distracto animo, horas recitat non peccare mortifere aiunt Durandus, Paludanus, Angelus, Sylvester, & alij quidam non improbabiliter: quia attentio (in cap. dolentes de celebr. miss.) est in consilio. quia cum ecclesia internos ●animé actus non paniat, mentis attentionem non videtur praecipere. Victorel. add. Tol. l. 3. c. 13▪ Glossa tenet quod sufficit dicere ore, licet non cord, & cum ea concurrunt multi Canonistae. Sum. Angel. v. Oratio. n. 9  For attention, as they say, is not a command of their Church, but a counsel only, which may be neglected without sin. Others, who make the best of it, deliver it thus. 
(e) 
Evagatio quae est advertentis & solum secundum actum interiorem, licet sit temeraria & gravis sort: non tamen est mortale, nisi propter contemptum quoniam ecclesia non habet judicare de interioribus actibus mere. Propter quod Minister ecclesiae licet dicendo officium aliud cogitet, non videtur transgressor Praecepti ex natura facti. Angel. sum. v. horae: n. 27. Sic & Sylu. sum. v. hor. n. 13. Non tenetur autem quovis praecepto esse attentus, sed sine culpa mortali potest evagari, etiam a proposito Idem. ibid. n. 14.  
Non est peccatum mortale sine attentione recitare etiamsi ex pura negligentia, & cum advertentia fiat (ita) Hostiensis Jo. Andr. Anchoranus, Antoninus citans Umbertum & alios. Rosell. Summa Pisana. Angelic. Durandus, Paludanus, Sylvest. Turrecremata, Medina in Suarez l. 4. de horis Can. c. 26. n. 1. &. 2.  
Qui officium divinum voluntarie distractus recitat praecepto satisfacit. Joh. Valerus alleges for this Aquinas, Paludanus, and Twenty other Doctors, vid. Acacium de Velasco To. 2. res. mor. v. hora. res. 54.   The Church doth not command internal acts, no more than judge of them, therefore requires not attention in worship: the precept is fully accomplished without it, by the external act alone; the want of attention is no fault, unless upon the account of the natural precept; and in reference to that, it is no worse than venial. They are herein opposed by some later Casuists and Jesuits (however these come to be counted more licentious.) But the differing parties fully agree, in making it needless to worship God. For both hold, that they need not mind either God, or the matter, or the sense of the words in their service, either actually or virtually: and both conclude, that the words without the sense (and all else for which they can be considerable) need not be minded actually. All the difference is about a virtual attention to the bare words, whether the want of that (which is no attention indeed) be a mortal crime. It is just, as if when they had concluded it lawful to murder a Man, they should fall into a hot debate, whether it were a deadly crime, to disorder his hair. But so it becomes those who make no scruple, to destroy Religion Body and Soul; to make a zealous stir about the sleightest appurtenances of it. Something must be done with some show of Conscience too about its appendices, that the world may not think, they retain nothing of it amongst them. And yet how palpable is the irreligion of these Sophisters, who will have it a damnable crime, to neglect their empty words; but no fault at all, wholly to neglect the Great God, even when if ever, the whole Soul should attend him. Here is evidence too much, that the Church of Rome, so far as we can know her sense by her Doctors the most, and best of them; if she think it fit, that God should be worshipped; yet thinks it not needful, that he be minded i e. though it be convenient to pretend worship; yet it is not necessary to worship him indeed. Medina is so ingenuous as to tell us, that since the Church requires not attention in their service, 
(f) Praeceptum Ecclesiae non obligat homines ad orandum cum praecipit 7 horas recitare. de oratione q. 16. ibid.  she doth not oblige them to pray, when she enjoins them to say their Canonical hours. So that all in the Church of Rome are discharged, from any obligation to worship God at all, even in their most solemn service; they need not pray, when they are at their Church-prayers. Not only he, but all of them must acknowledge this, who will yield to that Reason or Authority which they count best. Their Law saith, 
(g) Nec oratur Deus o●e sine cord C. C●ntantes d. 92.  God is not prayed to with the mouth without the heart. And 
(h) Naturale & evidens principium est quod vocalis prolatio, non est oratio nisi cum aliqua attentione fiat Suar. de horis Can. l. 4. c. 26. n. 13.  it is a natural and evident principle (as themselves tells us) that vocal pronouncing of the words, is not prayer, unless it be done with some attention, whereas most of them say no attention is requisite in their service; and that virtual attention which the rest are for, themselves say, is no attention indeed; no more than the purpose is the act, when not performed. But what then becomes of their pretences to Worship or Devotion, may they be wholly without this? Medina easily resolves this difficulty; 
(i) Quod si Minister non apponat devotionem, Ecclesia apponit, cujus verbis orat & Minister est ibid.  though he who useth their service, hath no Devotion, yet the Church in whose words he prays, and whose Minister he is, brings her Devotion. So that the Church brings Devotion still, though none in the Church, no not the Clergy, not the Religious have any. The Church prays effectually, in the words of those who say service, though these should Blaspheme God in their hearts, while they utter the words of a prayer; and they pray in the person of the Church by their common Doctrine. So 
(k) Si ille est in statu peccati mortalis, nihil meretur vel satisfacit, & tamen vere implet prae●…ptum, & munus suum, solvendo pensum orationis suae, vereque impetrat, seu impetrare, pote●…, non tam attenta conditione personae suae, quam spectata ecclesiae sanctitate in cujus nomine orat. Suar. ibid. c. 18. n. 9 vid. Bellarm. de missa. l. 2. c. 27. p. 837. quatenus nomine ecclesiae offertur prodest quia sanctitas ecclesiae supplet ●ecitantis defectum Bonacin. de offic. divin. disp. 4. punct. 1. n. 3. dignitas orationis sumenda est ex dignitate ecclesiae, cujus nomine ●ffertur & recitatur, non ex dignitate improbi Ministri ita S. Thom. Navar. Nugnus. Soto. Medina. Covarravias' & alij apud Carolum Macignum. Bonacin. ibid. punct. n. 12.  that though they be in mortal sin (suppose Atheists or Debauchces) their prayers prevail in regard of the Church's Holiness. Happy persons they are, as ever any were in a dream; who can pray effectually when they pray not at all; and be Devout with another's Devotion, and why not saved too by the Church's Holiness? But then since this is applicable to all particular persons, what is that Church, by which they may have such advantages? it must be something not made up of particular persons, something abstracted from subsistence, and refined above the grossness of any reality: and the structure, their Devotion and worship must be answerable, and as much beholding to imagination for a being. Not to disturb their fancies further, it is enough that they acknowledge (what cannot be denied) that they are not obliged to worship God in their Divine service; being there is no worship without attention, and no attention with them necessary; or only that which is in effect none.  
But it is no wonder they make attention at their Divine service not necessary; since being in Latin, it is to far the greatest part concerned in it, impossible. The first sort of it, which they call superficial Attention, none are capable of effectually, but those, that are well acquainted with that language: so as not only to understand, but duly pronounce it: which few of their monastics are, indeed it is not the talon of many of their Priests. The lowest degree of attention, 
(l) Prima puta attentio ad verborum prolationem, infimus est attentionis gradits: quem habere non potest, nisi qui linguam norit de just. & jur. l. 10. q. 5. art. 5. p 340▪  saith Soto, none can have, but he that knoweth the tongue. The second, which they call literal attention, fewer can arrive at, it is only for expert Divines. 
(m) Secundus autem gradus puta ad sensa attendere, non omnibus Latinis congruit, nisi Theologiae peritis. ibid.  To attend to the sense is not for all Latinists, but only for those that are expert in Divinity (saith the same Author) which is so far from being the attainment of monastics, and common Priests; that many of the chief of their Clergy cannot pretend to it. It was necessary for them to conclude (since they will have their own way, what ever the Scripture saith against it), that it is no sin for the Clergy not to understand what they say when they say Service, 
(n) Indignum enim est, ut altissima tractet mysteria, & eorum ignarus existat: nullum enim gustum inde potest percipere. Tolet. ibid. l. 1. c. 93.  though they confess they can have no relish of what they understand not. As to the third, which they call spiritual attention, they cannot mind the things prayed for, who know not what they are; and apprehend nothing of the contents of their prayers: Mor can they mind the God, that is to be prayed to, when they know not whether they pray to God or no: for they understand not to whom the prayer is directed, to God or to a Creature; to an Angel or a Saint; to a Man or a Woman.  
Now seeing attention to what they do at their service, is impossible to most, and unnecessary to all: it may seem superfluous, to show, that with them Reverence and Devotion is also unnecessary. (And what Religious worship there can be without these; let those who have any tolerable notion of Religion judge.)  
For Reverence and Devotion are included in attention, or necessarily depend on it, and unavoidably fall with it. No man will imagine, that there can be any Devotion or Reverence toward God, when he is not so much as minded, when he is not before their eyes, when the mind is voluntarily turned from him, and wholly taken up with thoughts, which are inconsistent with observance of him. And this is the plain import of that non-attention, which they allow in their service. When the mind departs, the heart follows it (since 
(o) Bellarm. de Baptism. l. 1. c. 11. p. 244.  it moves by its conduct, and acts not otherwise) and when these are gone, 
(p) Opus ergo advertere ut dicatur moraliter praesens esse rei quae sit. Tol. ibid. l. 6. c. 6.  the man is morally absent: and worships God no more, nor hath any more Devotion or Reverence for him, (if these be so much as moral acts) than if he were not in the place where he is worshipped. And seeing (as 
(q) Cum exterior cultus sit signum interioris cultus. Aquinas. 2. 2. q. 94. art. 2. ea quae exterius aguntur sunt signa interioris reverentiae Angel. sum. v. adora. n. 3. sine quo (sc. submissionis effectu) nota exterior non esset adoratio & cultus. Vasquez de adorat. l. 2. disp. 8. c. 12. n. 361. Nec signum nisi ex affectu tali (interiori▪) nasceretur, adorationis opus esset, sed commentitium, seu irrisionis potius nota judicaretur. Idem. ibid. c. 15. n. 396.  themselves tell us) outward acts in worship are not considerable, but as signs of inward motions: all external shows of Devotion, or Reverence, when there is none of these in the Soul, will be but hypocritical significations, denoting that to be there, which the Lord discerns is not there: and so tend to affront him, instead of approaching him with Reverence, Worship or Devotion. But there's no need of a proof, where the thing is confessed: they tell us plainly, that neither Reverence, nor Devotion is necessary.  
Reverence (saith the Graff●is in his time the grand Penitentiary at Naples) consists in this, that the body be in a composed temper, otherwise it signifies an incomposed mind, they ought therefore reverently, and humbly to pray, for such prayers penetrate the Heavens. But this is only counsel and advice, it is not commanded, as he tells us immediately, 
(r) Non tamen talis reverentia est de praecepto, ita ut si minus reverenter officium dicatur, tamen praecepto satis sit,  such Reverence saith he is not required by any precept, though the service be said irreverently, yet the command is satisfied. Here is encouragement enough for irreverence inward, or outward. All the danger follows; 
(s) Verum possit esse peccatum veniale quando magna est irreverentia, juxta Innoc. in c. 1. de celebr. miss. Ibid. l. 2. c. 52. n. 10.  but possibly it may be a venial fault, if the irreverence be great according to Pope Innocent. And if great irreverence will in the Pope's judgement, prove but a small fault, they may venture on great as well as little freely: for neither Pope nor Penitentiary, thinks any much concerned to avoid a venial sin. Sylvester tells us 
(t) Nec valet dici quod est ibi irreverentia, quia ipsa semper non est mortale. Sum v. Baptism. 3. n. 6.  that irreverence is not always mortal. But it will ever be so, or when? It is not so when instead of worshipping God, 
(u) Qui orat sine attentione, & qui laudes Deo canit, nihil de illo cogitans, in vanum nomen Dei assumit, at non propterea mortaliter peccat. Suar. de juram. l. 3. c. 16.  they take his name in vain, how severe so ever the terms be, in which the Lord hath forbidden this, and thereby signified the heinousness of it. Yea that irreverence to God which is injurious to his Divine Majesty and Excellency may not be big enough to be counted mortal: 
(x) Irreverentia quae fit Deo non implendo promissionem juratam, non destruit aliquod attributum Dei in se, etiam in affectu hominis, ergo non est unde illa irreverentia ex suo genere tanta sit; ut minui non possit usque ad venialem culpam ex levitate materiae Ibid. n. 17.  unless it be so outrageous as to destroy the Majesty of God, or some of his perfections, it may be venial. The little account they make of Reverence is the more considerable, because as themselves describe it, 
(y) Consistit reverentia. 1. in dilectionis affectu. 2. in obtemperationis obedientia, etc. Angel. sum. v. reverentia.  it compriseth all love and observance of God.  
For Devotion, Aquinas tells us, 
(z) Quantum ad fructum spiritualis devotionis, privatur qui non attendit ad ea quae orat, seu non intelligit. Comment in 1 Cor. 14. fol. 100  as to the fruit of spiritual Devotion, he is deprived of it, who doth not attend to the things he prays for, or doth not understand. So that Devotion is lost (by the Oracle of their Schools,) on a double account: both when prayer is not attended, as it needs not be with them; and when it is not understood, as it cannot be. He that is negligent both as to Attention, and Devotion offends venially. 
(a) Qui vero negligenter se habet circa executionem attentionis & devotionis venialiter peccat. Sum. v. hor. Can.  Thus Cardinal Cajetane, after he had told us that Devotion consists in every holy affection. So that he who through negligence wants all holy affection (what ever is included in Attention or Devotion) incurs but a slight fault. And it may be, not so much. 
(b) Debet esse devotio, ut animus noster inflammetur amore dei, quem laudamus; & ardeat desiderio videndi quem fide cernentes preconijs extollimus: quamvis si haec desit absque contemptu, non sit peccatum mortale ibid. l. 2. c. 13.  There aught to be Devotion (saith Cardinal Tolet) and he sets it out by love to God, and desires of seeing him; but adds, if this be wanting without contempt, it is no great sin. Whether he thought it a little one, he saith not, but if he had so hard thoughts of it, the Jesuit is more severe than those of other Orders. Graffius after he had described Devotion, concludes, 
(c) Qui autem hac (sc. devotione) caret, non peccat. ibid. n. 11.  he that wants Devotion, sins not, not so much as venially it seems. Lopez and Metina in him, censures 
(d) Quarto animadverterit contra opinionem Cajer. asserentis ad dignam sumptionem hujus Sacramenti requiri actualem devotionem, h. e, actualem considerationem qua considerat actu se suscipere Christum; ut ejus fructum percipiat, sine qua actuali devotione peccatum mortale esset Christi corpus sumpsisse: falsam esse & durissimam hanc opinionem. Lopez. Instruct. par. 1. c. 11. q 80.  that opinion as false and cruel, which will have actual Devotion requisite for receiving of the Eucharist; though that Devotion be no more, than an actual consideration, that they are there to receive Christ. Indeed they generally count Devotion needless there, where, if ever, it would be counted requisite. To 
(e) Facilimum est homini, ita distrahi, at nullam actualem attentionem, vel devotionem habeat; aut omnino sive culpa, aut certe ex levi culpa, quae non satis est ad impediendum fructum Sacramenti Suar. in 3. Thom. tom. 3. disp. 63. sect 3. vid. Durand. Paludan. Antonin. Soto. Ledesma. Catharinum ibid. sect. ●.  be destitute of it & attention too, at the Eucharist, is either but a small fault, or none at all. Sylvester saith inward Devotion is not enjoined by the Church, 
(f) Interior tamen devotio, quae in attentione consistit, non cadit sub humano praecepto. Sum. v. Miss. 2. n. 6.  but as to outward Devotion, he will not exempt it from the command; and what that is he, lets us understand by the undevoutness which is forbidden. 
(g) Qua aliqui pro notabili parte missae nugantur cum socio scandalizantes alios, & sacerdotem vexantes. ibid.  When they make sport with one another for a great part of their worship, so as to scandalise others, and disturb the Priest. It seems they may be as Devout as their Church would have them, when they play the wag's one with another at Divine service, so that their sport be but thus qualified. If it be not so uncivil as to offend the people; or so boisterous, as to disorder the Priest; or so long, as to take up a considerable part of their worship: Their Church who requires no inward Devotion at all, will not burden them much, we see, with that which is outward. So little Devotion serves their Mass, their Divine service requires no more. 
(h) Ibid. v. neglegentia. Si ista negligentia esset circa omissionem horarum, esset mortalis: secus, si circa omissionem devotionis in dicendis horis, quia illa devotio non est sub praecepto.  Devotion there, saith he, is not commanded. Others amongst which the same Author names Hostiensis, Antoninus, and Summa Rosellae, hold, that in the Orders for Divine service 
(i) Alij dicunt quod sub praecepto ibi cadit horas dicere: caetera vero, quae in devotione consistunt, suadendo dicuntur. ibid. v. hora. n. 13.  the bare saying of it, is commanded: but all that consists in Devotion, is no more than Counsel. (Which by their principles may be neglected without sin.) The ground of their persuasion is considerable: to enjoin Devotion (say they) 
(k) Quem sensum primo videtur habuisse Host. & sequitur eum tanquam benigniorem Archi. & sum. Rosel. quia Ecclesia non inijcit laqueum, nec homines alligare debet oneribus importabilibus.  had been to lay a snare for men, and impose intolerable burdens on them. So that it seems the Church had been wicked, and unmerciful; if she had but obliged their Clergy and Religious, to be Devout in their worship. And by this reason, neither God nor Man can make Devotion a Duty, to any sort of roman-catholics. Hereafter we must not wonder if they neither enjoin, nor observe it. And though their reason may be singular, yet the opinion is the common Doctrine, since all are discharged from Devotion, or Reverence, who are not obliged to Attention. Such therefore, and no other is the worship which the Church of Rome makes needful for the Clergy and Religious. Such as it can be, without Attention, without holy fear or affection: it is not the thing they call it, it deserves not the Name of worship, or the Title of Holy or Religious: it must be a profane and irreligious exercise, it can be no better without Reverence, and without Devotion; it cannot but be without these, whilst it is without Attention, which they oblige all to neglect, by declaring it needless. Durandus maintained that Images are 
(l) Quod est incidere in opinionem Durandi ab omnibus damnatum, dicentis, imaginem non proprie, sed abusive adorari, non enim alia ratione illam vocavit abusivam adorationem imaginis nisi quia licet fiat coram ipsa vel juxta ipsam, tamen animus adorantis, ut sic, long est ab ipsa Suar. Tom. 3. disp. 81. sect. 8. p. 1075.  not to be worshipped properly, but only Abusively, that is, as they explain it, though worship be exhibited before, or about the Image, yet the mind of the worshipper is far from it. This his opinion is now damned, as little less than Heretical; being in their account, no less than a denial, that, any worship is to be given to an Image. Yet this Abusive worship is all that they make necessary for the God of Heaven: for requiring no Attention of Mind, no Devotion of Soul in their service, they allow both mind and heart to be far from him, while they do something before or about him, which they call worship. So that what worship they count intolerably too little for a senseless Image (not to say a detestable Idol); they think enough in conscience for the true and living God. I have not observed that any Idolaters in the world, were ever so gross and stupid, as by their avowed Doctrine, thus to advance, what they look upon as a mere Image; and so to debase what they took to be the true God. However hereby it appears, that they count no worship at all needful for God; since worship without the heart, will by their Doctrine serve the turn: which 
(m) Quamvis exterior actus rationem adorationis non habeat, nisi ut est ab interiori, seu ut manat a praediclo affectu, nam si ab illo non oriatur; non est adoratio, sed irrisio potius, seu fictio quaedam Idem. Tom. 1. disp. 51. sect. 1. p. 757.  in reference to an Image is, with them, no worship at all. It is not true honour or worship, but fiction and mockery. This is their own Character of such worship when Images are concerned, and under it I leave their Divine service.   

Sect. 2. Let us in the next place view their Mass, this is for the people 
(n) Sola missa communiter est in pracepto. Cajetan. sum. v. fest. Est communis sententia, vid. infra.  and is the only public worship enjoined them, in any of their days for worship. They call it 
(o) Bellarm. l. 1. de Missa c. 1. p. 679.  the chief part of their Religion, and this summons us to expect, that herein, if at all, they will show themselves Religious, and worship God indeed; however they think not themselves obliged to it in their Divine Office. But all expectation hereof is quite blasted when they tell us, 
(p) Attentionem vero quae necessaria est sub praecepto ad audiendam Missam, dicimus non esse tantam quanta est in officio Divino. de Graff. ibid. l. 2. c. 34. n. 8 Neque in audienda missa requiritur tanta attentio sicut in recitatione horarum. Lopez. ibid. c. 52. p. 271. Ut Soto, & Navar. etiam annotant, minor attentio in missa necessaria est, quam in horis Canonicis recitandis:  that less attention is required at the Mass, than at their canonical hours; yet so they commonly determine, and their reason is, 
(q) Quia oratio est actio magis rationalis, quam illa moralis praesentia, quae necessaria est ad implendum praeceptum de audienda missa Suar. Tom. 3. disp 88 sect. 3. Ex quo fit majorem attentionem requiri ad horas quam ad missam— Ita Nugnus. S. Antoninus, Navarre, Sylvester, Graffius, Sotus, Angelus, Barthol. ab Angelo, Henriq. in (& cum) Bonacin. de Sacrament. disp. 4. q. ult. punct. 11. n. 20.  because prayer is a more rational act, than that moral presence required at Mass. So that their hearing Mass, is a less rational act, than that which is performed without understanding: and requires less Attention of mind, than that, to which none at all, is actually needful. And we can not yet apprehend how that can be Divine worship; which is so far from being reasonable service: or how God can be thought to be worshipped; when the Soul which is to worship him, doth not take any notice of him. The servant of servants at Rome would not think himself honoured, if the holding out of his Toe, were not regarded by such as have access to him. But roman-catholics may, it seems, mind God less at their Mass, than one that minds him not at all; and yet worship him well enough, after their mode.  
Besides all inward worship is clearly discharged, for when they teach, that the Mass is for the people the only worship on the Lords days, or any other day set a part for worship: they tell us expressly, no inward worship is the duty of those days, external worship alone is commanded: 
(r) 
Ex praecepto colendi Deum homo tenetur duntaxat cultum externium ei exhibere Petr. a S. Joseph de 1 precept. art. 5.  
Aquinas 22. q. 122. art. 4. Cajetan. sum. v. fest. p. 305. Navar. cap. 13. n. 2. Lopez c. 52. p. 266. de Graff. l. 2. c. 33. n. 8. ibi. Covarravius. ver. resol. l. 4. c. 19 n. 6.   So Aquinas Cajetan, 
(s) Cum ergo Ecclesia cultum hoc praecepto inclusum perinde suo statuto exprimeret— & hoc suo praecepto ad cultum nos tantum arcte●, palam est jure Divino non esse illic alium contentum; quoniam alias nisi illum explicaret, non fuisset fida juris Divini interpres. Soto. de Just. & jur. l. 2. q. 4. art. 4.  so Navarr, so de Graffijs, so Lopez, Dominicus a Soto also, who asserts it with many reasons, amongst which this is one, because the Church requires no other than this external worship, and if God had required more, the Church had not been fida Divini juris interpres, a faithful expounder of the Divine Law, which rather than they will yield they will admit any thing, though it be, that God should never have any true worship amongst them.  
Particularly and expressly they deny all acts of Contrition for sin to be the duties of Masse-dayes. So 
(t) Sum v. Domin. n. 8.  Sylvester, 
(u) v. Feriae.  Summa Rosellae, 
(x) Prae●ect de poeniten. pars 4. p. 864.  Melchior Canus, and all the other Authors 
(y) Cajetan. ibid. Soto. ibid. Navar. c. 13. n. 17. Lopez c. 52. p. 271. de Graff. ibid.  last mentioned. Likewise all acts of Love to God 
(z) De cult. Sanctorum l. 3. c. 10. p. 1609.  Bellarmine, and in him Aquinas, so 
(a▪ Cap. 11. n. 19 etc. 21. n, 7.  Navarre and Pope 
(b) Ibid.  Adrian, de 
(c) Ibid.  Graffis and Soto 
(d) Ibid.  who would maintain this with many arguments, one of the chief of them (he calls it ingentissimum argumentum) is, 
(e) Esset enim hoc Christianorum animos irretire, & in arctissimas angustias conjicere: nempe quod tam crebro ad rem tam arduam teneremur. ibid.  that this would be to ensnare Souls, and cast them into grievous straits, if so harsh a duty as an act of love to God were enjoined so frequently. Another is 
(f) Ejusmodi praecepta non obligant ad charitatis modum, sed possunt quantum ad substantiam operis, extra charitatem impleri ibid.  that all the commands of God as to the substance of them, may be fully accomplished without love to God, and therefore this.  
It is good Divinity with them, That we are not bound to worship God out of love. The Mass saith Navarre 
(g) Nam missa quam in illis diebus praecipimur audire, recte audiri potest, sine tali amore actu concepto, unde ra●i vel nulli se hujus omissionis accusant. Cap. 11. n. 7. fest. de vid. Suar. l. 2. c. 16.  which we are commanded to hear on those days (and nothing else) may be heard well enough without any such act of love: So Bellarmine, 
(h) Non tenemur in dicbus festis ex praecepto peculiari, ad non peccandum sive ad actum contritionis, vel dilectionis Dei. ibid.  we are not bound on these days by any particular precept not to sin, or to have any act of contrition, or any act of love to God: what, not one act of love to God? no, he will prove it, one of his arguments is, 
(i) Ecclesia determinavit tempus & modum observandi jus divinum de observatione praeceptorum: at Ecclesia nusquam praecipit actus illos interiores. Ibid.  because the Church hath determined the time and manner how Divine Law is to be observed in keeping this command: but the Church no where requires inward acts; she thinks, it seems, that God may be served sufficiently with the Mass without any sense o● sin, or love to God. And thus all those other graces and affections that flow from Repentance, or love, or necessarily depend thereon; as filial fear, spiritual desires, delight in God, etc. will be no duty on their Masse-dayes, their Mass hath nothing to do with them. Confessions of sin there may be well enough without Godly sorrow; and Petitions without desires; and Praises without complacence or ingenuous gratitude: because all is well enough without love to God, or grief for offending him; and that, on all these days wherein they are obliged to hear Mass.  
If you would see any thing of the worship of God in the Mass, it is as if you look for the life and nature of a man in a Picture: and such an one, as will not so much as show you his colour or figure, but very rudely.  
The precept for observing Masse-dayes, as Sylvester 
(a) Non est simpliciter de sine i. e. ipsa vacatione circa Deum, vel necessario requisitis ad illam: sed de abstinentia a servilibus, & auditione missa v. Dominic. n. 8.  tells us, requires not the end, that is, waiting upon God, nor what is necessarily requisite thereto, but the hearing of Mass: Not waiting on God, but hearing Mass! These are distinct things, and disjoined in the sense of the Roman Doctors, the one is commanded, the other is not; so that they may duly hear Mass all their lives: and yet not wait on God one moment, the former they must do, the latter they are not obliged to regard, nor any thing that necessarily belongs to it. 
(b) Quamvis finis hujus praecepti sit, ut homo Deo vacet, ipsoque fruatur, & in eo quiescat, ut docuit. S. Thomas: quando tamen finis praecepti est aliud a re praecepta, tunc non cadit sub praeceptum sicut idem S. Thomas Communiter receptus. c. 13. n. 2. p. 198.  Navarre asserts this, and would prove it by reason and the Authority of Aquinas herein generally followed. In short, if there be any worship required in the Mass it is merely external, and that disjoined from the inward service of the Soul, is, but a mere show or vizour of worship, as they themselves confess in their lightsomer intervals. well, but is it worship in any sense? is there any thing Religious required of the people herein? for this they tell us it is enough, if it be an humane act, no more is enjoined, 
(c) Neque tale praeceptum obligat ad alium actum interiorem, quam ad illum qui propter exteriorem est necessarius, scil. vere audire missam ea attentione, ut sit actus humanus Soto. ibid. p. 51.  the precept obligeth not, but to hear so, that it may be an humane act, saith 
(*) Praeceptum audiendi missam non obligat nisi taliter, audire ut sit actus humanus. Idem. l. 10. q. 5. art. 5. p. 341.  Soto, and 
(d) Sa● est, quod sit actus humanus. Jac. de Graff. l. 2. c. 34. n. 8. Satis est, sit actus humanus. Lopez. c. 52. p. 271.  others, and if it suffice that it be a humane act, it needs not be Religious. Let it be deliberate, that is enough to make it a humane act; and than though there be no Religious motion or intention in it, the precept is fulfilled. Sylvester confirms us herein, the precept (saith he) is given unto men, and therefore the work must not be the issue only of the imagination, which is common to us with Beasts, it must proceed from deliberation, which requires some attention. 
(a) Praeceptum datur hominibus, ideoque oportet ut non procedat opus ex sola imaginatione quae communis nobis est cum bestiis sed ex deliberatione quae attentionem requirit, etc. v. hora n. 13. vid. Angelus v. hor. n. 27.  So that there is something more required of one that goes to Mass than of a Beast; but that is before he comes there, if he advance but to it as a man, he may be excused even from humane acts, when he is at it, he needs neither exercise his understanding nor his senses. He needs not 
(b) Nemo teneatur ex praecepto audire, & minus intelligere verba sacerdotis, quia satis est vel ex longinquo missanti adesse Navar. c. 21. n. 8.  understand it, that is far from being a duty, they have made it impossible, it's no sin either for Priests 
(c) Clerici vel laici qui Divinis intersunt, si non intelligunt quae dicunt, non peccant Jac. de Graff. l. 2. c. 51. n. 12.  or people not to know what they do; so reasonable is their service. The Latin makes it unintelligible enough, but if it were in a Language less known, if in 
(d) Si audiret missam Mocaravem, compleret. Lopez. c. 42.  Mosarabike or Greek, those who are present without any but their Mother-Tongue, fulfil the precept. As 
(e) Qui Graecam missam audiret, satisfaceret praecepto, etiam si non intelligeret. Addit. ad l. 6. c. 7. Tol. instr. vid. Bonacin. de Sacram. d. 4. q. ult. punct. 11. n. 12. & ibi plures.  Victorel tells us after Soto and others. He needs not see 
(f) Non est videre ea quae in missa aguntu●. Tolet. l. 6. c. 6.  what is done, he may do all that is requisite in the Mass blindfold. He needs not hear it, as 
(g) Utram autem audiatur vel non, utrum sit missa propria vel non, sub praecepto non cadit. Cajet. sum. v. Fest. p. 306. Navar. c. 21. n. 8. supra de Graff. l. 2. c. 34. n. 8. Satis est praesentem esse missa, ad impletionem praecepti, licet non audiat sacerdotem secundum Sotum. Lopez. ibid. Bonacin. ibid. n. 20. ibi S. Autonin. Nagnus, Narar. Sylvest. Henrique Graff. Sot. Angelus Barthol. ab Angelo.  Cajetane and others tells us, and this is much, he is enjoined only to hear Mass, and yet doth all that he is enjoined if he hear it not, if not one syllable of it reach his ears: it seems with them, to hear, is not to hear. Just by the same figure that they say they worship God, when in truth they do not worship him at all.  
He needs not be sensible of any thing about it, to hear Mass saith Tolet is not to use any of his senses about what is done in the Mass. 
(h) Secundum Antoninum, non est necesse sentire & distinct audire verba missae, etc. Sylvest. v. miss. 2. n. 6. Audire Sacrum— non est uti aliquo sensu erga ea quae in missa guntur. l. 6. c. 6.  And if this be their worshipping God, a man may worship him as much as the Church of Rome requires, not only without Reverence and Devotion, without heart and affection: but without the use of sense or Reason. A Bruit may do more at Mass, than they require their Catholics to do, no wonder that Church enjoins no Attention, Devotion or Reverence, nor counts them needful (as we have already manifested) for can there be any pretence to require these, when both sense and understanding are superseded? or can there be any thing that deserves the name of worship without these?  
They themselves cancel and overthrow all their own Pleas and pretences for their offering God any thing of worship in the Mass. For, they say, he doth not worship there, who is not present, and they cannot deny that in God's account he is absent whose mind is not present; and yet they justify 
(a) Sponte inter sacrum audiendum, vana cogitantem praecepto satisfacere— affirmant. Sylvest. Jo. Medina, Paludanus, Azor. in Victorel. addit. Tol. l. 6. c. 6.  voluntary departures of mind and heart, when they should be worshipping, and those who would not seem to do this, do it really; when they conclude it no fault to employ themselves about other things when they are at Mass. They allow them 
(b) 
Vera resolutio est— posse quem eodem tempore satisfacere praecepto de audienda missa, & de dicendis horis Canonicis, aut alijs votis, juratis, vel in paenitentiam injunctis, modo non adeo uni rei intendat, ut alteri necessariam attentionem adimat, quod fieri potest, cum nemo teneatur ex praecepto audire, & minus intelligere verba sacerdotis. Navar. c. 21. n. 8.  
Vid. Adrian. de satisfact. q. 7. Medina. tract. 2. de paenit. Cajetan. v. fest. Soto. 4. dist. 13. q. 2. art. 1. Lopez. c. 52. in Victorel. ibid. besides the Jesuits, Tolet. Suarez. S●. Azorius. Comitolus, etc.  
So they may hear 3 Masses at once, when said in one Church at the same time, and thereby satisfy, when their Penance is 3 Masses, as Bonacin. and in him Rodriquez, Graffius Scor●i●, and others, de Sacrament disp. 4. q. ult. p. 11. n. 13.   to say their hours (and so neglect the Mass, out of a neglect of their Divine office) or to recite what is enjoined them by way of Penance (and so prefer a punishment before the chief part of their Religion) or other voluntary performances (so they may do what they will, rather than mind what they are about.) They know they cannot do two things at once, especially in Divine worship, which should take up the Soul. Though in their worshipping, where the Soul is not concerned they may attend a hundred acts at once; as much as they are obliged to mind the Mass, that is, actually not at all. They admit them also not only to 
(c) Peccat mortaliter— in aliqua ejus parte notabili colloquendo, pingendo, scribendo, dormiendo N●v. c. 21. n. 6. parvit as in omni muteria excusat a mortali n. 2.  read, or write what they please; but also to sleep part of the time: so that they take not too long a Nap. It should not last above a third part, or half the Mass (for that is 
(d) Secundum Archidiaconum praeceptum non observat. qui partem notabilem amittit, puta medietatem aut tertiam partem: secus qui modicam, Sylu. v. miss. 2. n. 1.  pars notabilis) if it be but less than that, it passeth for nothing. 
(e) Modicum enim pro nihilo reputatur. Cajet. v. Fest.  Or if they be too brisk to sleep, they may entertain themselves with familiar 
(f) Nonnulla modica misceantur colloquia, Lopez. c. 52. p. 271.  chat. Medina 
(g) (h) Medina docet, si quis missae interest semper tamen confabulatur, aut alia negotia futura cum mercatoribus tractat, nihilominus implere praeceptum. in Suar. tom. 3. disp. 18. sect. 3. Respondetur autem ex Cajetano una cum Soto, quod sufficiat missae esse praesentem, unde qui longe stat, eam non audience, vel cum alio loquens, non propterea est praecepti transgressor. Corradus in Resp. quaest. 198.  concludes, that he who is at Mass may spend the whole time in discourse about other things, Merchant affairs, or making Bargains, and yet fulfil the precept. They must it seems demean themselves at Mass altogether as Religiously, as at the Exchange; and no more is required. Suarez would have the Discourse neither so long, nor so serious, there should be some intermissions to attend. But what attention can be mean? He (with the rest) tells us, that to the Mass, less attention is requisite than to their Divine office; and to that office, he and they say, a virtual intention is sufficient, and this is the least of all that can be: So that to the Mass, less attention than the least of all, will suffice, and this to common apprehension is none at all. Others of them (as we saw before) will have no attention of mind needful for their office; and so with them, none will serve the Mass. Their Catholics may have their choice here, and satisfy their Devotion at Mass, either with the attention of this Doctor and some other late Authors, which is none at all: or (if this seem too much) with that of their ancienter Doctors, which is less than none. And what must they attend to, who need neither hear, nor see, nor understand what is said, or done? It would puzzle one as subtle as himself, to tell one how he can attend to that, which is neither offered to his senses, nor his intellect. And therefore the Jesuit though he seems more strict, yet herein is less rational, than Medina, and not so consistent with himself or their common Doctrine. Also he would not have the Discourse at Mass so grave and serious, as that of Merchants, 
(h) Qui voluntary confabulatur— non satisfacere, nisi vel confabulatio esset discontinua, partim scil. loquendo, partim attendendo ut communiter fieri solet: vel non de re seria, sed levi, etc. Idem. ibid.  it should be more light, more idle than that about Trade and Business. It seems the levity of the Stage suits with the Mass better than the seriousness of the Exchange. Answerably if their 
(i) Soto m 4. dist. 13. q. 2. art. 3. dicit quod licet indecentia sint colloquia inter audiendam missum, non tamen propterea fit transgressor praecepti. Ibid.  Discourse be not decent, nor the Subject of it very modest, the Mass will comport with it, and the Church's precept will bear it without a breach. And no wonder, since it hath been the custom of that Church (as many of their 
(k) Cornelius Agrippa, de vanit. Scient. cap. 17. Cajetan. Sum. v. Organ. Soto. de just. & jur. l. 10. q. 5. art. 2. p. 336. Navar. Cap. 13. n. 87. Lopez. cap. 51. p. 263.  Writers inform us) to sing, not only profane, but filthy Songs at high Mass; and that to the Organ, that the people might not only be refreshed by their own private immodest Discourse, but edified more effectually this way, by the louder voice of the Church. And how, we learn by a grave Cardinal (though little herein more rigid than others) who tells us, that the 
(m) In cujus signum, audientes ex illo sono excitantur ad illa profana seu turpia, ut experientia testatur: ita quod non est inficiationi locus. Cajetan. ibid.  hearers were thereby excited, to what was profane and filthy, as experience witnessed. And still notwithstanding any pretence of Reformation, tunes to the Organ at Divine service or Mass, though lascivious and very profane, will pass for a small fault 
(n) Canticus— ratione soni quia est lascivus aut valde saecularis— potest esse venialis culpa, vel ratione materiae minimae, vel ex bona intentione vel inadvertentia ut Cajetanus dixit in Suar. de horis Can. l. 4. Cap. 13 n. 17. materia parva— si organista loco kyrie eleison, cantilenam profanam organo canat, Villalobus in Dian. v. Blasph. n. 4.  (in the judgement of those who seem most severe in the case) if either the matter be slight, or the intention good, or the Actors inconsiderate. Here's provision enough, that the Scenes in their Mass may not be dull and heavy. Yet further they may laugh, and be pleasant, and when the Music (which sounds not always) doth it not, they may make themselves merry in the height of their worship. But this with some caution, 
(o) Sed possent voces & risus in tantum prorumpere, quod esset peccatum irreverentiae & scandali; Lopez. c. 52. Soto in 4. dist. 13. quaest. 2. art. 1.  their talk, and laughter may break out into such noise, that possibly it may prove a sin of irreverence. Here is some show of danger, but it will vanish presently; For if it should be a very loud extravagance, and the irreverence great; 
(p) Jac. de Graff. l. 2. c. 52. Supra.  yet great irreverence may, with them, be but a small fault, and they have the authority of a Pope to warrant this. Nor must this seem strange to us, since they will not have all contempt 
(q) Contemptus ille qui continetur in irreverentia Dei per se, & ut talis est, non semper est formalis sed materialis, qui non semper sufficit ad malitiam mortalem. Nos autem loquimur de contemptu formali, quo ipsa Dei irreverentia intenditur, Suar. de juram. l. 3. c. 12. n. 4. & 6. vid. Cajetan. sum. v. Contempt. vid. Bonacin. de legibus disp. 2. q. 3. p. 5. n. 10. l. 15.  of God criminal; that which is material may be venial; and it is not formal, unless besides the contempt of God, there be also an intention to contemn him. Such is the most solemn worship in the Roman-Church, and so is God worshipped amongst them; and that not by the unwarranted presumption of the profane multitude: but by the Rules and Conclusions of those, who direct their worship and guide their Consciences. Here we may see in the Mass the Religion of roman-catholics, they call it 
(r) In qua (sc. missa) praecipua pars Religionis nostrae, Bellar. de miss. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 679.  the chiefest, the best part of their Religion, that we may not look for any thing better amongst them, nor any thing Religious, if it be not found here, yea it is all (better and worse) that the people are obliged to in public (and in private their Church doth not trouble them with any.) He that views it well, and believes he hath a Soul, and that there is a God; must have little, or no regard of either, if he do not bless himself from it, as a thing which hath nothing of Religion, but the name, and that merely usurped. A Religion which needs nothing, by the Doctrine of its chief Professors, that is either Godly, or so good as humane: no regard of God at all, so much as in one thought of him; nor any act of Reason, yea or of sense either about any thing Religious or Divine; yet allows a free exercise of both, about that which is profane and irreligious. He that counts this Religion indeed, must stifle the common notions of Religion and Christianity: and he, that understanding it, makes choice thereof; had need first be very indifferent, whether he have any Religion, or none. Had the ancient Fathers talked after this senseless, lewd, extravagant rate, concerning the worship of God, how would Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian have Triumphed over them? nay, they might justly have challenged them to have instanced in any one that bore the name of a Philosopher, that ever treated of the worship of God with so little Reverence and Discretion. Had such lose and wild Doctrines been broached by the first Teachers of Christianity, the Heathens needed not have raised so fierce a persecution against it, they might with ease have hissed it out of the World.  
But this is not the worst, they encourage that in the Mass which they cannot but condemn as wicked; and maintain that the precept for hearing Mass may be satisfied by such wickedness. Melchior Canos to this Objection (that the Command of God, or the Church, cannot be fulfilled by sin) answers according to the opinion commonly maintained amongst them. 
(a) Nos cum communi opinione in praesentia teneamus, non esse transgressorem praecepti, qui actui bono ex genere suo quem lex praecipiebat, apponit aliquam malam circumstantiam, Relect, de paenit, part. 4. p. 936. vid. Bonacinum de legibus disp. 1. q. 1. punct. 9 n. 1. ibi. S. Thomas, Soto, Navarre, Medina, & plures alij.  That he is no Transgressor of the precept, who to the Act enjoined, and good, in its kind, adds something sinful. He supposeth that the Act commanded by the Church, is some way good; but withal, that the precept may be satisfied, though it be done wickedly, and that by their common Doctrine. Whether the circumstances may be venially or mortally wicked, he saith not, but leaves us to understand it of either. Dominicus a Sato, tells us expressly, that though what is added to the Act 
(b) Quamvis simul habeat propositum aliud mortale, satisfaciet praecepto quantum ad substantiam. Ibid. l. 10. q. 5. a. 5.  enjoined, be a mortal wickedness, yet the Precept may thereby be satisfied substantially. With these Divines of greatest reputation amongst them, concurs Navarre 
(c) Non tamen est tenendum illud Antonini — quia praesupponit, malo praesertim mortali non posse adimpleri praeceptum, quod esse falsum, late probavimus. c. 21. n. 7.  no less renowned (and none of them Jesuits) the opinion of Antoninus (which he is disproving) presupposeth, saith he, that by a sinful Act, especially if it be a mortal sin, the Command of the Church cannot be fulfilled; but that this is false we have largely proved. He would have us know that he hath fully demonstrated, that the Precept for hearing Mass, may be entirely accomplished by deadly crimes. This is the judgement of the most eminent Doctors amongst them, such as are not of the Society; and (if they will believe their famous Bishop of the Canaries) the common Doctrine in the Roman Church: and by this, the world may judge what a Church it is, what her Religion, what her Worship, what her Precepts for it are: When all that she requires for that worship, which is the principal part of her Religion, may be satisfied by acts of wickedness, such as are mortal and damnable to the Worshippers, and most (of all others) dishonourable to God, whom they pretend to worship: And let those that are seduced, or may be tempted by Seducers, seriously consider, whether they can wisely trust their souls to such a conduct, or be safe in such a communion, where there is no more tenderness for the salvation of souls, than to be satisfied with such a worshipping of God as will confessedly damn them.   

Sect. 3. Thus much for the manner of their public worship, all of it, who ever amongst them it concerns; whereby it appears that they count it not necessary that God should have any real worship from them. This will be further manifest by what they teach concerning the end of it.  
They maintain, that it is lawful for their Clergy and monastics too (who profess perfection) to serve God for their own ends, viz. to get preferment, or compass a dignity, or gain some worldly advantage, and so to prostitute the Honour and Worship of God to such low, earthly, sordid designs, as Religious persons would never appear to own; but that Irreligion is grown too monstrously big for its vizard. He that riseth to their morning Service for this end, that he may have his daily devidend, if it be not principally for this, he sins not. So their glossa celeberrima, the two Popes Vrbane & Celestine determine that it is lawful for their Clergy to serve God in their Churches for this design, and hope to get Ecclesiastical dignity in 
(d) Glossa illa celeberrima ait peccare quidem eum, qui surgit ad matutinas preces principaliter propter distributiones quotidianas, non autem illum, qui surgit principaliter ut Deo inserviat, & minus principaliter, & secundario, ut eas lucretur— Urbanus Papa & Coelestinus determinarunt licere clericis servire Deo in Ecclesijs ob spem ascendendi ad dignitates illarum. Imo Gelasius dixit eos ad hunc ascensum spe maioris commodi compellendos— Glossa recepta dicit expresse per illum textum, licere clerico servire in Ecclesia ad quaerendam aliquam dignitatem, modo principaliter ob id non serviat. etc. cap. 23. n. 101.  Navarre. But then this great Casuist, (of so high esteem amongst them, that he was sent for from Spain to Rome, to give advice and direction to the old Gentleman there, that cannot err) understands (after 
(a) 
Ut probavimus non est bona definitio illa Bartoli, qua definit causam principalem esse causam qua cessante cessat effectus id. ibid.  
Ut aliquis finis sit principalis non sufficit quod ille non fieret sine illo, sed oportet, quod pluris vel tanti aestimetur, ac alius finis, propter quem ille fit. id. c. 17. n. 209. etc. 20. n. 11. p. 459.   Aquinas & Jo. Major. as he pretends) the principal end to be something else than others do. It is not that which so much moves the Agent, as that without it he would not be drawn to act by any other end and accordingly he will have the premised testimony to be understood. 
(b) Per supra dictos textus & glossas, quae habent locum etiam in his, qui non servirent, Ecclesijs vel praelatis, nisi sperarent beneficia. c. 23. n. 101.  So that one of their Perfectionists, who riseth to morning prayer for this end, that he may have his dividend; & would not stir 
(c) Surgens ad matutinas ob distributiones, alias non surrecturus. ibid.  out of his Bed to attend the Worship of God for God's sake, or any other end beseeming a Religious person, if the consideration of his daily allowance did not rouse him: yet he serves God so well herein, as that he is sinless, and not so much as venially tainted. Likewise the Clergy who address themselves to the Worship of God, moved thereto, more by hopes to gain preferment and dignity than any respect to God, yet they sin not. That is, they worship God well enough, though they respect themselves and their own ends more than him: or which is all one, though they serve themselves rather than God whom they are to worship. They are all concerned to maintain this: for he tells them, if 
(d) Alioqui enim omnes fere actus nostri essent vitiosi; quia paucissimi fiunt pure propter solum Deum, & solam virtutem, etc. ibid. p. 590.  such acts of Virtue, or Worship, were Vicious, all their acts in a manner would be stark naught, since there are extremely few amongst them that are purely done for God. They are a Church in the mean time that worthily profess godliness, since nothing is done, or needs be done by them, even in the worship of God, for him, so much as for themselves; and indeed Sylvester deals ingenuously when he tells us plainly, without the cover of any pitiful shift 
(e) Licitum est etiam aliquid operari principaliter propter propriam u●ilitatem. Sum. v. charitas. n. 5. and that of Navarre is plain enough, diximus quod falsum est, esse mortale facere ordinata ad cultum principaliter ob bona temporalia cap. 23. n. 14. p. 555. etc. 13. n. 14. Solet circa hanc voluntatem inquiri, an debeat esse honesta; & specialiter, an voluntas confitendi propter humanum motivum, scilicet inanem gloriam, vel commodum temporale, sufficiat ad valorem Sacramenti: nam in caeteris Sacramentis certum est sufficere; in hoc— affirmant Soto. dist. 18. q. 3. art. 3. Navar. c. 21. n. 40. Negant enim illam voluntatem ex illo fine, esse peccatum mortale, sed veniale tantum: quod non repugnat valori Sacramenti. Quae sententia per se loquendo, vera mihi videtur. Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 20. sect. 3. n. 4. p. 273.  that it is no sin to serve God principally for their own profit.  
Moreover, and yet worse, They teach it is no sin to worship God for an end that is in itself a sin, if it be not principally intended, it is lawful by their doctrine to Preach, to Pray, say Mass, etc. for praise of men (though Christ will have those that designed it as 
(f) Sum. v. praedicat. p. 480.  Cajetane notes, even when he is excusing this to have no better reward:) or for vain glory (though they reckon this amongst 
(a) Aquinas. 22. q. 132 art. 1. (in eo) Gregorius. 31. Moral. numerat inanem gloriam inter 7. vitia Capitalia. ibid. art. 4.  capital crimes) only he must not make so wicked a thing his chief end, and then he is innocent enough, though sin against God be his design in worshipping him. 
(b) Nullum autem peccatum immo meritum est facere illa (viz concionare, missam celebrare, precari & id genus alia) principaliter propter Deum, & secundario propter vanam gloriam, vel laudem humanam, in finem aptum relatum per ibi dicta post S. Thomam. c. 23. n. 13.  It is no sin, yea, it is meritorious to do these things, viz. to Preach, and say Mass, and to do other things of like nature principally for God, and secondarily for vain glory and praise of men, aptly directed as our end. Thus Navarre determins after their great Saint and Doctor, Aquinas. Now he had taught us before, that these acts of worship are but done secondarily (and so unlawfully) for these criminal ends when they so much sway a man, as that he would not worship God unless he were excited by them; and that vain glory is not his principal end, even when he is so much influenced thereby, as that he would not Pray or Preach, etc. if this were not his motive, this in the judgement of others, as he acknowledgeth is to make sin his principal end, and to advance wickedness above God, even when he pretends to worship him. But let us not interrupt this great Doctor in his way, it is soul enough as himself makes it; for hereby a man may serve God, and that meritoriously (after the Roman mode) though he never would let him have an act of worship, if pride and vain glory did not set him awork. He would never Pray or Preach, etc. if he were not more moved to it by sin, and out of regard to some wickedness, than out of respect to God.  
Further yet: They hold it is but a venial fault to worship God principally for vain glory, and other designs of like quality. 
(c) Ex quo infert quod mortale est praedicare aut missam celebrare, & hujusmodi, propter inanem gloriam, quod verum est solum ut dicit S. Thom. Simo in ea ponatur ultimus finis, ita quod ipsa intenditur principaliter actu & habitu, secus si actu tantum, ut iste intendit Sum. v. vana gloria. n. 2.  Aquinas, as he is represented by Sylvester determining that it is no mortal sin to serve God principally for vain glory; if that be one's chief end actually only, and not both habitually and actually. 
(d) Ex quibus patet, quod Sum. Ang. contra. S. Thom. & veritatem dicit, quod est mortale, quando ea quae ordinata sunt ad Dei gloriam, facit ad gloriam suam, ut Sacramenta & Scripturae Sacrae. ibid.  Sylvester declares it as his own persuasion, that it is both against Aquinas and the Truth, to hold it is a mortal sin, when those things which are ordained for the glory of God, are used principally for a man's own glory. He instances in the Sacraments, saying Mass, the Scriptures and Preaching.  

(a) Veniale autem si vane propter gloriam aut spem quaestuariae eleemosynae praedicaretur, receperunt enim mercedem suam. Sum. v. praedicat. p. 480.  Cardinal Cajetan declares himself thus in one instant, which involves the rest: It is but venial to Preach for vain glory, or hopes of a gainful alms, signifying, that he means such vain glory as Christ condemned in the Pharisees, when he told them this was like to be their reward.  

(b) 
Peccat, qui res principaliter institutas ob honorem Dei & cultum ejus, & salutem animarum, principalius, vel aeque principaliter ob vanam gloriam facit: quale est concionari, missam celebrare, precari & id genus alia secundum Abulensem & Angelum, quod post 〈◊〉 efficaciter confutavimus, dicentes esse solum veniale. c. 34. n. 13. p. 554.  
Dicendum est intentionem bonam simpliciter non esse de substantia orationis vocalis. Itaque si quis habet intentionem orandi, & exilla proferet ve ba de se sufficientia ad orandum, & consentanea laudi, vel reverentiae divinae, licet hoc faciat ex intentione laudis humanae, vel alicujus commodi temporalis in illud principaliter intuendo, vere orat, quamvis non bene orat. Haec est communis sententia.— Talis oratio est sufficiens ad implendum praeceptum ecclesiasticum recitandi horas, ut omnes fatentur. Suar. de orat. l. 3. cap. 3. n. 5.   Navarre affirms, that to Preach, or say Mass, or Pray, and such things as are instituted for the Honour and Worship of God, and the Salvation of Souls, for vain glory principally, or more than principally, is but a venial fault; and that such as gainsay this (who are but two) have been confuted by others, and by himself after them. These are the chief of their Doctors, whom the rest commonly follow, (and none of them Jesuits) who unanimously assert this. Now it is not necessary with them, for any man to avoid a venial sin, since by their doctrine a world of them can never damn a man: and therefore it is not necessary for any Papist, to worship God otherwise, than principally for vain glory, or ends equally criminal, i. e. it is not needful for them to worship him at all; for no man can imagine, that he is worshipped, when he is in the highest degree dishonoured and affronted: and what greater affront can be put upon him, than under a pretence of worship to debase the great God, and thrust him lower in our designs, not only than ourselves and earthly trifles, but lower than sin, the vilest thing on Earth, yea, or in Hell? and this is evidently done when vain glory (a capital sin) hath the pre-eminence of God in addresses to him, and is regarded as principal: when the Lord of Heaven and earth hath no regard at all, or only in a lower place. It is not worshipping of God, but a horrid impiety, for men to serve themselves instead of God; but more intolerably impious to worship sin: and that hath the worship and is honoured in the place of God, which hath the highest advancement, and is principal in Religious addresses; yet no better than this is all the worship, which by the Roman Doctrine is necessary from their Catholics.  
In short, whereas by their Doctrine of non-attention formerly exaamined, it is so evident that they discharge themselves from all real worship, as they have no colour to hid it, no shift to evade it; but a supposal of some praevious intention to serve God, when they are addressing themselves to their service: this their last reserve they themselves ruin, by their Doctrine concerning the end of worship. For they teach (besides what is premised) that a man who comes to Mass, or Divine service; with a purpose not to worship God, but to serve his Lusts, doth satisfy the Precept. 
(a) Praeceptum audiendi missam non obligat, nisi taliter audire, ut sit actus humanus: qualis esse potest, etiamsi aliud simul ad sit sinistrum propositum. de just. & jur. l. 10. q. 5. art. 5.  We are not obliged (saith Soto) to hear Mass but only so, that it may be a humane act, which it may be, though there be a sinister intention in it. Yea though the thing intended be a sin, and that highly criminal, for he adds 
(b) Quod si quis attente oret, quamvis id faciat adjunctam habens vanam gloriam, imo quamvis simul habeat propositum aliud mortale, satisfaciet praecepto, quantum ad substantiam: ita ut non teneatur officium iterare. Ibid.  if one attend prayer, though he do it for vain glory (that is a small matter to stick at) yea though it be with a purpose mortally wicked, yet he fulfils the precept substantially. Such are the commands of the Church of Rome for her most Sacred worship, they may be fully satisfied by deadly wickedness, there needs no purity of heart or hand for her Devotions; a design damnably evil will serve the turn. 
(c) Non tamen est tenendum illud, S. Antonini, scilicet, eum qui ecclesiam a lit princi●… litter ad videndum, aut alloquendum faeminam pulchram, aut ob aliud quodvis illi●i●… non satisfacere huic praecepto. cap. 21. n. 7. with him concurs Medina. Addendum 〈◊〉 est pravam intentionem adjunctam voluntati audiendi missam, non esse contrariam impletioni hujus praecepti. Itaque quamvis quis eat ad ecclesiam ex libidinosa intentione videndi faeminam, vel etiamsi officio missae cum eadem intentione ass●stat, tamen si non excludat voluntatem implendi hoc praeceptum; & sufficientur sit attentus, implet illud. It a Medina in Suarez. tom. 3. desp. 88 Sect. 3.  That of Antoninus (saith Navarre) is not to be maintained, that he doth not satisfy the precept, who comes to Church principally to look on a handsome Woman, or to talk with her, or for any other sinful thing. If a man in going to Mass, designs to satisfy his curiosity, or his lust, or any thing else which is wicked: that Church is so good natured, she will be satisfied with it, and think her precept for worship well observed, and you must believe (if you can) that the is a good Christian-Church, that will have Christ worshipped at this rate. He adds reason for it, a 
(d) Potest quis malo fine ecclesiam adire, & been in ea missam audire. Ibid. p. 469.  man may come to Church for a wicked end, and yet hear Mass well enough there.  

(*) Qui ecclesiam adit causa videndi, vel etiam concupiscendi libidinose faeminas— satisfacit. De legib. Disp. 1. q. 1. p. 9 n. 1.  Bonacina, instances in several sorts of wickedness, whereby the command for worship may be fulfilled. This is one amongst the rest, if a man go to Church on purpose to gaze on, or to lust after Women lecherously, he satisfies the precept, and for the general Rule vouches not only Sotus, Navarre, Medina, and others of greatest Reputation in their Church; but also their Angelical Saint Thomas.  
I need not censure these things, let those that are impartial consider the premises, and see if this be not their sense, that the people in the Papacy, by its order, do not, or are not obliged to give God any real worship in public: and by their leaders, are taught and encouraged instead of worship, to present him with gross wickedness. If the measures of Religion may be best taken by its worship, what can any indifferent person judge of Popery; where a service so palpably irreligious, is the best and the most excellent worship they have? if this were duly considered, I think it alone, might be sufficient to reduce those, that are deluded; and to secure those against Temptations, who are not yet ensnared.   

Sect. 4. There is another public exercise which Christ makes as necessary, as any Evangelical service , and that is Preaching and hearing the word of God. But the Romanists are not of his mind, in this. 
(e) Cum missa sit sub praecepto, non praedicatio. Sum. v. Domin. n. 8. Audire missam est in praecepto; audire autem concionem non ita. Suar. 13. tom. 3. disp. 88 Sect. 1. vid. v. 2. defess.  The Mass is commanded, but not Preaching saith Sylvester, and he one of the order of Predicants. Accordingly hearing Mass is commanded, but hearing Sermons is only matter of Advice (saith 
(f) Audire praedicationem in festis non est de praecepto simpliciter, patet per praedicta; ac etiam nullo jure cavetur, sed solum de missa, Sum. Rosell. Dominic. n. 4.  another) which may be neglected without imputation of sin, and if observed, is an act of Supererogation.  
They conclude it no duty in such circumstances where it would be counted necessary, if ever; it is no duty on the Lord's day, 
(g) 
Jac. de Graff. l. 2. c. 33. n. 8. 16. Sotus & Covarruvias. Navar. c. 21. n. 1. Missa audienda diebus festis ex praecepto, non tamen concio, non preces fundendae; non exercendus alius actus cultus divini, ex praecepto. (excipe diem paschatis, quo sumenda est Eucharistia) Victorel ibid. ad. l. 4. c. 25. p. 693.  
Dico nullum esse praeceptum, quod obliget in rigore, ac per se ad audiendam concionem in die festo. Ita supponunt ut clarum Doctores Omnes, & constat ex communi usu, & sensu fidelium. Item quia nullib extat hoc praeceptum, praeterea est optimum argumentum, quia si fideles tenerentur audire concionem sacram, pastors ecclesiae tenerentur providere, ut omnibus diebus Dominicis & festis fieret concio in ecclesia. pastors autem ad hoc non tenentur, nec de facto ita fit. Suar. l. 2. de fest. c. 16. n. 6.   or any other time set apart for the public worship. Mass must be heard then, but no need to hear a Sermon. If it were any man's duty in their account, it would be so in that case, when one wants the knowledge which is necessary to Salvation, and hath opportunity to get it by hearing: but even then they declare him not obliged. Sylvester propounds the case in these terms. 
(h) Quaeritur, utrum peccet mortaliter, qui ignorat communia necessaria ad salutem, & potest audire praedicationem, & non audit? Et dico quod sic, si hoc facit ex contemptu vel ex scandalo notabili: non autem semper si omittit ex negligentia, quia secundum S. Thom. 22. q. 54. negligentia non est mortale, nisi omittatur aliquid, quod sit sub praecepto vel ratione contemptus. v. praedicat. n. 6. quando hoc sit, non potest sermone determinari. Ibid.  Doth he sin mortally, who is ignorant of those common things, which are necessary to Salvation; and may hear Sermons, but doth not? he answers. He so sins, who omits it out of contempt, or with notorious scandal, but not always, when it is out of negligence; because according to Aquinas▪ negligence is not mortal, unless something be omitted which is under precept, or with contempt. Adding, such negligence may possibly be a mortal sin, but when it is so, it cannot be determined. It seems no man can tell when it will be a crime, for a person damnably ignorant, to neglect the means of instruction; but more briefly, and positively he resolves it elsewhere, that he is not commanded to hear a Sermon upon the Lordsday; 
(i) Etiamsi talis habeat ignorantiam necessariorum ad salutem, quia alias poterit implere praeceptum de addiscendo. v. Dominic. n. 8.  although he be ignorant of those things which are necessary to Salvation, because he may otherwise satisfy the precept for learning.   

Sect. 5. As to the Sacraments, and the worship in them, the dispatch may be quick, there are none considerable here, but Baptism and the Eucharist, for their other five are not of Divine appointment, nor the worship of God, but their own inventions, and therefore how needful so ever they count them, thereby they make no true worship necessary. But indeed none of them are in their own account necessary to Salvation; save only Penance, and that we shall meet with hereafter. What worship they will have in the Eucharist is sufficiently discovered, by what they are satisfied with in the Mass, where we have found them contented with none at all, or that which is worse than none. Neither do they account this Sacrament simply necessary, for although it be required that they Communicate once a year; yet that is but by humane Law or Custom as they teach. 
(k) Sermo est de Eucharistiae Sacramento, quod non est Sacramentum necessitatis. pars. 5. relict. de paenit. p. 892. Many of them count it not necessary by virtue of any Divine Precept, and so not requisite jure divino. Est prima opinio negans esse praeceptum jure divino quam tenuit, Alexander Alensis, D. Thomas Carthusianus, Palacius, Bonaventura, Gabriel. Sylvester, Ferrariensis, Cajetan. in Suarez. tom. 3. disp. 69. Sect. 1. p 879.  The Sacrament of the Eucharist saith Canus, is not a Sacrament of necessity.  
For Baptism, if they account any worship necessary, it must be either in respect of the Administrator, or the Baptised, as to the former none with them is needful. 
(a) 
Sum. v. Baptism. 3. n. 1. Secundum omnes Doctores precip●e. S. Thom. & Pet. de Pal omnis homo dare potest Baptisma— si sit clericus aut laicus, vir aut mulier, aut uterque simul i. e. Hermaphroditus.  
Etiamsi esset infidelis, i. e. Judaeus aut paganus.  
Dicit S. Tho. quod quamvis ille qui non credit baptisma esse Sacramentum, aut habere aliquam spiritualem virtutem, non intendat dum baptizat conferre Sacramentum, tamen intendit facere quandoque quod facit ecclesia; etiamsi illud reputet nihil esse.   For by their Doctrine it may be validly Administered by any Man, or Woman, or one that is both; yea or by a Child, by those also that are strangers, or enemies to all Christian worship, by Jews, Pagans or Infidels of any sort, by such as worship not the true God (as Sylvester tells us out of Aquinas, Paludanus and their Churches Law.) By such as believe that Baptism is good for naught, and minister it in scorn. By such as believe that it is not a Sacrament, that it hath no spiritual virtue, and intent not, while they Baptise, to Administer a Sacrament, but only think to do, as the Church does; although they account that to be nothing at all, so 
(b) Ibid. n. 2. Innocentius dicit, quod baptismus habebit effectum, etiamsi baptizans nec sciat nec credat, quid sit baptismus, sed hoc reputet truffem, & etiamsi non sciat quod sit ecclesia, nec gerat in ment facere, quod facit ecclesia: immo si gereret contrarium scil. non facere quod facit ecclesia sed tamen facit & formam servat, etc.  Aquinas, and Pope Innocent saith it will be effectual, though the Baptizer neither know nor believe what Baptism is, but counts it a trifle, though he neither know what the Church is, nor minds to do what the Church doth, but means to do the contrary. No other worship is necessary upon the account of the Ministers, but what might be expected from such as these. Nor any more upon the account of the persons Baptised. For as to the Adult (there being no pretence in reference to infants) they think it sufficiently administered by force, to those who would not endure it, but for fear of death 
(c) Id ibid. 4. n. 10. Si consentit quis per minas vel poenas habendo volunt atem coactam, coactione conditionali, cligendo scil. potius baptizari quam mori vel aliud pa●i. & n. 3. Si oporteat eos ligari.  if they did not yield: to such as make all the resistance they can 
(d) Vel etiam si faciant injuriam Sacramento, ut mingendo in aquam vel hujusmodi et 
(e) Si vero usum rationis nunquam habuit, Baptizatur in intention parentum etc.  n 10. Si Baptizetur infidelis non quia credat sed ut sanetur, vel careat foetere, aut vexatione diabolica— aut propter quaestum, ut faciunt crebro Judaei.  and offer foul injury to the Sacrament, and defile the water: to those who receive it, not for the purpose for which it is intended, but for quite 
(e) Si vero usum rationis nunquam habuit, Baptizatur in intention parentum etc.  other ends than ever it was designed for: yea to those that are Frantic and never had the use of Reason, or are 
(f) Si autem usum rationis habuit aliquando, sed non quando baptizatur, propter phrenesim vel amentiam vel dormitionem & hujusmodi, requiritur intentio quae praesuerit, tempore usus rationis. n. 3.  stark mad, and that in the height of their madness: to those also 
(g) Dicit de dormientibus quod ratione pericult baptizari possunt, si prius in iis apparuit voluntas baptismi: sicut de amentibus dictum est.  that are fast a sleep, if they had a mind to it when they were waking. Since they think it duly administered, to such as these, they cannot count any worship necessary herein, upon the account of the partakers, but what such as these now mentioned may offer.   

Sect. 6. For fuller and more particular satisfaction, it is observable, that they divide their Sacraments into some for the Dead, and some for the Living: those for the Dead are Baptism and Penance. As to these two, some count no disposition requisite, 
(h) Scotus quem sequitur Sylvester sum. v. confess. 1. n. 24.  but only a willingness to receive them. Others (who would seem to be more severe) count Attrition sufficient; (which is a slender dislike of sin, not as it is an offence to God, but out of some other consideration Humane, Natural, or Servile.) And the lowest degree of this possible; and that dispatched in a moment; and this moment need not be, while they are at these Sacraments, but either 
(i) Suar. tom. 4. disp. 20. Sect. 4. n. 29. Sylvester, ibid.  before or after. Their Penitents 
(*) Judicandum non erit dolore carere ob risum, potuit enim domi de illis dolere, & postea ad Sacramentum accedens, actualem poenitentiam non adducere. At ad valorem & fructum percipiendum Sacramenti confessionis non requiri actualem dolorem, sed virtualem sufficere veram esse sententiam quis dubitet? Jo. Sancius select. disp. 31. n. 8.  may make their Confession with laughter instead of grief; yet have as much grief at their Sacrament of Penance as they require, this is past doubt with them. So that it is their common Doctrine that no good act, or motion at all, no not so little, and low as that of Attrition (much less any ingenuous Reverence or Devotion; any act of grace or holy affection) is needful, while they are at the Sacrament, either of Baptism, or their Penance.  
The Sacraments of the living are their other five, Confirmation, Orders, Matrimony, extreme Unction, and the Eucharist: these they say were instituted for the increase of Grace, this is their proper effect; and that they may have their effect, there is not requisite in the partakers any actual disposition at all, not the least inward act or motion that is good; no, not so little as that of attrition, which in their account is of all others 
(k) Est minima & imperfectissima dispositio quae in ordine supernaturali requiri potest.  the least and lowest disposition. And well may they count it so, since the best sort of it, with them, is but the issue of servile fear; which, as such, is below the least degree of moral goodness; and so far from being supernaturally good, that it is morally evil, as we shall see hereafter. All that is needful, is only that the partakers be in a state of Grace, (such as a Priest may put a sinner into who is impenitent, and never truly contrite) though he show it not by any act in the Sacraments where, if ever, it should appear. 
(l) Ut Sacramenta conferant augmentum gratiae solum requirunt habitualem gratiae dispositionem, id est, quod in statu gratiae recipiantur. Haec est sententia D. Thom. Scoti & aliorum in Suar. tom. 3. disp. 7. Sect. 4. All that is required to put them into this state, and free them from conscience of mortal sin, (and so to give them all the disposition necessary for the Eucharist, and so for the other Sacraments) is their ritual confession: yet even this they may neglect lawfully, or without any great fault, as divers amongst them (and those Dominicans) determine. Cajetan. sum v. communio. Fumus v. Paludanus, Sylvester in Ledesma de Eucharist. C. 11. Jo. de la Cruz de Eucharist. q. 5. concl. 2.  That the Sacraments may confer an increase of Grace, they only require an habitual disposition, i. e. that they be received in the state of Grace: this is the judgement of Aquinas and Scotus, whom the rest generally follow. So that to partake worthily of these Sacraments, no actual disposition, no act of reverence or devotion, not any inward motion (such as should be in true worshippers) is more required or expected than in the senseless Statues which they idolise. Their souls need act or move no more as worshippers of God herein, than if they were neither Christians nor men; than if they were so far from having grace, as to have no souls. Yea, these Sacraments may be valid, and duly celebrated, as their Church requires they should be; while the partakers are, not only void of all good motion towards God; but while their souls are in motion against him, and all that is divine and sacred. Their minds and hearts may, during the celebration, be taken up with acts, not only of folly and vanity, but of pride, or lusts, or revenge, or infidelity, or atheism, or what is most contrary to the most holy God and his worship, and yet partake as well as the Church requires. 
(m) 
Praeceptum adimpleri potest peractum ex aliqua circumstantia malum ita S. Thom. Medina, Navarre, & alii in Bonac. supra.  
Nam alia praecepta tum sacramentorum tum in aliis materiis, impleri possunt per actum p●cc●minosum Suar. ibid. disp. 70. Sect. 3. after Corduba, Soto, Covarruvius, whether it be less or more wicked, is all one, disp. 88 Sect. 3.   For the precepts of their Church, concerning the administering of the Sacraments, and all other things by her enjoined, may be entirely satisfied by acts of wickedness. So notoriously holy is that Church, by the report of their chief Writers.   

Sect. 7. If they count any of their Sacraments more worthy of holier treatment than that now mentioned, it will be the Eucharist; for this they count more worthy than the rest, and have it in such veneration, as not only to worship Christ in it; but to worship it even as Christ himself; and therefore here, if ever, they will judge it requisite to show themselves worshippers indeed. Yet for all this,  worship of this Sacrament they count needful, they conclude no true worship of Christ necessary; no, not so much as the least inward act of reverence, devotion, or honour: for this is their common Doctrine, 
(n) 
Praeter dispositionem gratiae habitualis, nullam actualem requiri ex rigoroso praecepto ad dignam sumptionem bujus sacramenti, it a ut illius omissio peccatum mortale sit. In quo conveniunt omnes Theologi. Et a fortiori patet ex eo, quod supra diximus, ad effectum hujus sacramenti nullam actualem dispositionem requiri. Ibid. disp. 66. Sect. 1.  
Those who seem to require some actual devotion, yet count it but a venial fault to want it, Alexander, Antonin, Sylvester, Paludan, Cajetan, in Vasquez in 3. tom. 3. disp. 206. c. 1. Not only attention and devotion are accounted needless for Communicants, but sobriety, and the use of reason: for they teach, that not only young children, and such as are half fools; but also persons so frantic, as it will be necessary to have them bound, and those also who are possessed of the Devil, and whom he has seized on for their enormous wickedness, may partake of this Sacrament, and have it duly administered to them, and that even when they are blaspheming. Jo. Sanc. disp. 38. Imo licet arreptus quis sit a daemone ob mores depravatos, & quia viveret in lenocinio,— non minus talibus ministrare tenebitur parochus Eucharistiam, n. 7. praeterea ministrare tenebitur parochus licet videat obsessum sive insanum blasphemantem; n. 8.   that besides the disposition of habitual Grace, there is no precept so rigorous as to require any actual disposition for the worthy receiving of this Sacrament, so as that the omission of it can be a mortal sin. In this all their Divines agree: so that any one may partake worthily of this Sacrament, and be free of mortal guilt, without any actual reverence or devotion, any act of grace or holy affection, while he is communicating. This one Maxim (wherein they all concur) quite stifles the spirit of Christianity, and bereaves it of its life and soul; it leaves nothing that can honour or please Christ, or be of any advantage to souls, needful in any Christian duty. For no good motion of mind or heart, being needful in the celebrating of this Sacrament, which requires it more, they cannot imagine it necessary in any other duty, of less consequence. And the want hereof being but a venial fault, there is no more necessity to have it, than there is to avoid a venial sin, which they make nothing of. In this very case, they hold that 
(o) Peccatum veniale actu concomitans sumptionem hujus sacramenti, non impedit gratiae & charitatis augmentum; ita de Thom. Alensis, Gabriel. Adrian. Soto, Ledesma, Victoria, Corduba, Concil. Trident. sess. 13. (7. Suar. ibid. disp. 63. Sect. 3.  a venial sin, even in the act of communicating, will not hinder the effect of the Sacrament. Yea, it may not be so much as a venial fault, if the vagaries of the mind, which exclude attention and reverence due to such a religious act 
(p) Excusabitur tamen homo, ab hujusmodi culpa veniali, si fortasse ex naturali tantum distractione hujusmodi attentionem omittat, ibid. disp. 66. Sect. 1.  be natural. But will it not be more than so slight a fault, voluntarily to abandon every good motion in the celebrating of this Sacrament? No, to decline every good act of mind or heart, and that voluntarily, it can be no worse, 
(q) Talis culpa (scil. voluntaria carentia actualis dispositionis) non est mortalis, secluso contemptu ex omnium sententia, ibid. disp. 63. Sect. 3.  if it be without contempt, it will be no mortal fault; & that also in the judgement of all their Divines. But though there be not any good disposition in the soul towards Christ, in partaking of his Supper, yet is it not necessary that vile and wicked dispositions should be excluded? No, there is no more need of this than the other. The mind and the heart may actually entertain such as are sinful; without any more danger than it rejects those that are good. It is but a slight fault 
(r) Dicendum videtur, si peccatum veniale sit aliquando circumstantia ipsius actus communicandi, peccatum esse veniale sic communicare v. g. si quis communicat propter ostentationem seu vanam gloriam; vel certe si actu sit in ipso peccato veniali, ut in vana aliqua cogitatione aut delectatione, & ea ratione accedat distractus, & sine debita attentione & devotione, ibid. disp. 66. Sect. 1. Ostentation and vainglory are here counted venial faults, because they are directly opposite to the act of communicating: and so is outward irreverence, vain prating, and gestures, inconsistent with modesty, while they are at the Sacrament, for the same reason. But other sins, not so opposite to the act, as studying a lie, or revenge, or detraction, (or uncleanness, or any the like in venial degrees) while they are communicating (though the distraction there be voluntary, and all holy fervour be thereby hindered,) are no faults at all in reference to the Sacrament. Jo. Sanc. disp. 23. alleging for it Scotus, Richardus de St. Vict. Mayor, Adrian, Margarita Casuum, Soto, Marcelia, Ledesma, Vivaldus, Coriolanus, and divers others, n. 20. 21.  to communicate out of ostentation and vain glory; and so to nourish pride while he should be feeding upon Christ; and to design his own honour without any act of reverence for Christ: he may let his thoughts run out upon vanity, or entertain his soul with vain delights, without the least motion of love, or delight, or desire for Christ, without the least act of Faith in him: and may be pleasing himself with sin, in stead of grieving for it; when he hath the greatest advantage to look upon him whom he hath pierced. And all this he may do without any guilt, that need be repent of, or regarded. This is all the worship and honour that it is needful their souls should give to Christ, even in the Sacrament of his body and blood; who will have others cursed to hell, and burnt beforehand, for not giving divine worship to a Wafer. But this is not all, their Church will be satisfied with greater indignity offered to Christ than this: for they teach, that those who communicate unworthily, to such a degree as they count sacrilege, (and that so heinous, as they question whether it be not as tolerable, to cast that which they count their God, to be devoured by dogs; or throw it into the dirt to be trampled on; and 
(t) An hoc peccatum sit gravius homicidio— aut adulterio, vel omnibus peccatis contra naturam: quidam enim Theologi ita existimant, ut Gabriel. Petr. Soto, Ledesma, Dominic. Soto, Suar. ibid. Sect. 2.  many of them are positive, that it is greater wickedness than murder or adultery, or that uncleanness against nature, which is most abominable) 
(u) Dicendum est cum qui voluntarie suscipit sacramentum Eucharistiae, etiamsi indigne sumat, implere praeceptum communicandi; etiamsi alias peccet mortaliter per sacrilegium indignae sumptionis. Ita tenet in specie Corduba in genere Soto, Covarruvius, qui alios referunt, ibid. disp. 70. Sect. 3.  do fully satisfy the precept of the Church for this Communion. Thus Soto, Corduba, Covarruvius, and others alleged by them. And this is all derived from their St. Thomas, that Maxim of his so generally received. 
(x) Ratio autem sumitur ex principio generali quod tradit D. Thom. 1. 2. q. 101. art 9 quia lex praecipiens actum, praecipit substantiam ejus non autem modum. Ibid. vid. Bonacin. and in him, besides the principal of the society, (Azorius, Valentia, Suarez, Sanchez,) Aquinas, Sotus, Navarre, Medina, qui vero indigne, & sine devotione communicat tempore Paschatis, satisfacit praecepto de leg. d. 1. q. 1. p. 9 n. 2. & 3.  The Law commanding an act, enjoins the substance of it, but not the manner. By which we must understand, that the Church would have the thing done, but regards not how they do it, whether as Christians or as Atheists. She is indifferent as to devotion or sacrilege in her Catholics, having something else in design, than to be concerned in the honouring of God, and the happiness of men, which so much depends upon the manner of worshipping. It is too plain to be denied, that such a treatment of holy things (to use their own words) is not at all for the worship of God, or the salvation of souls, but opposite to both; yet their Church's precept is entirely thereby fulfilled. So that if God have no worship, and men no salvation, yet the Church is satisfied. This and other outward acts must be visibly done, that the World may not think but they have something like Religion amongst them: but though in stead of the worship due to the Divine Majesty, they perform the acts of it in such a manner, as no less dishonours and provokes him, than the crying sins of Murder or Sodomy; their Church hath full contentment, it's all she requires.  
Thus we have surveyed the Church-service amongst the Romanists in the several parts of it, and cannot discern any real worship therein, to which they are obliged: but rather that all such worship of God in in public is by their rules and orders rendered either impossible, or unnecessary.   

Sect. 8. Let us inquire in the next place, whether they count it needful that God should have any worship from them in private: and this we may discover by what they determine concerning Meditation, reading the Scripture, and private Prayer. For Meditation, the Casuists speak little of it, nothing at all (that I have met with) of its necessity; it is like they reserve it for their contemplative persons, as a degree of perfection, to which others need not aspire. 
(*) Si patres, theologi— meditationem laudant & consulunt, non tam●n docent esse omnibus praeceptam.  
(*) Ecclesiastici, Clerici, religiosi non tenentur ex vi sui status & juris divini, ad hunc meditandi, recogitandi, aut mentaliter orundi usum, vid. Suar. de Orat. meant. l. 2. c. 4. n. 7. Navar. Enchirid, de Orat. l. 20. n. 61.  The Perfectionists themselves may wave it, but when they will be so overgood as to supererogate, and do better than God commands them; if they judge it necessary at any time, sure it would be on those days, when such acts are most proper and requisite. But they conclude it no duty upon the Lordsday, or any other devoted by them, as they pretend, to the observance of God. For they generally agree that no inward worship is then required, and 
(a) Neque praecipitur cultus divinus internus qui in meditando & colendo Deo consistit. Navar. Manual. C. 13. n 2. Non praecipitur cultus divinus interior, qui in meditatione interiori de Deo consistit, Lopez. C. 42. p. 266.  meditation is discharged by name: now if they need not think of God on his own day, or any other, wherein a particular observance of him is requisite, it is ground enough to conclude, they do not count it needful to think of him at all. Who can imagine that they judge it necessary to think of God at any time, who count it needless to have God in their thoughts, when they are at his worship?   

Sect. 9 As for the reading the Word of God in private, they are so far from esteeming this a duty, that they will scarce excuse it from a crime: all that can be obtained for it, is only a toleration, (as a thing that passeth under an ill character,) and that but in some places, and there but for some persons; with more restriction and caution than the public Stews are tolerated by their holy Bishop in Rome. So much friends are they to the Word of God, or so little do they judge it a friend to them; they are the best Catholics in their account, who do not desire to look into it, or to understand from God what he would have them to be: they think it advisable 
(b) Consil. de stabiliend. Rom. sede p. 6.  that no mortal should be acquainted with more of the Scriptures than is in the Mass; where they can understand nothing, and need hear nothing of it at all.   

Sect. 10. For private Prayer, it is either vocal or mental: 
(a) Vid. Suarez the Oration. l. 3. cap. 6. n. 3. 5. 8. ut ibi Medina. Uldericus dicit— ad orationem vocalem ex divino praecepto non tenetur; sed ex statuto Ecclesiae, quae ministris suis missas, & horas canonicas indixit, vel etiam ex injunctione confessoris—, & hoc sequitur sum. confess. & Pisa. in Sylu. v. Orat. n. 8. ut Angelus sum. v. Orat. n. 20.  that which they call vocal, they generally count not necessary by any Law, either of God, or Nature, or the Church; and so all praying with Families is quite cashiered from the rank of Christian duties; there, to call upon God's name together they are not concerned, though some think the Heathen are: they count it not a duty to say so much as the 
(b) Videtur tamen sufficere si quis sciat— quod debemus a Deo petere omnia bona corporis & animae, & hujusmodi, licet nesciat pater noster idem v. scientia, vid. sum. Angel. v. scientia, & Suarez ibid. n. 8.  Lords Prayer, (if they understand but otherwise what is to be prayed for:) this is the common opinion in Suarez; nor do they think an 
(c) Idem multo magis dicendum est de salutatione Angelica vel Salve Regina, idem, ibid. n. 11.  Ave Mary (though these are the Prayers most in request with them) more needful: they are not obliged to say it, when the public sign is given at night for that purpose; nor need they use any vocal prayer at all, no, not so much as on the solemn days for worship. 
(d) Diebus autem festis neque est obligatio ad orationem vocalem, n. 13. nec in principio aliquarum actionum n. 14. nec hora prandii, ne clericis quidem, n. 16. Nec quando datur signum publicum— consuetudo recepta est ratione devotionis, non obligationis, ibid.   
But is mental prayer a duty when the other is not used? So it seems: but the question (as in all affirmative precepts) is when? 
(e) Addit Lessius obligari nos, ut non multo tempore abstineamus ab oratione: ut verbi gratia, ad mensem unum vel alterum: alioquin esset signum magnae negligentiae propriae salutis in Fill. t. 23. l. 2. n. 44.  Lessius thinks it should not be put off above a month or two, that would signify too much neglect of our Salvation. It seems those that pray but once in two months do not much neglect it; but this Jesuit is too straight laced: that opinion is probable enough, saith one of the greatest Casuists of this age, which 
(f) Videtur tamen salis probabilis ea sententia, quae tria tempora assignat: primum est circa initium morale perfecti discursus, secundum articulus mortis: tertium aliquoties i● vita: ut diximus de praecepto claritatis. idem. n. 43. vid. tr. 22. c. 9 n. 290. & tr. 6. c. 8. n. 208. in universum intra annum non videtur obligare, quolibet septennio est probabale.  assigns 3 times for prayer, once when we come to the perfect use of Reason (suppose 
(g) Communiter theologi tenent quod usque ad vigesimum: alij vigesimum primum excusantur (a jejunio). Secundum alios ad 25. annum. sum. Angeli. v. jejunium. n. 15.  when they think him capable of fasting, about 21 years of age); and again at the point of death, and in the interval, when we are obliged to love God (that is once in five, or once in seven years). But is not this Jesuit too severe also? It may be those of other Orders will not oppress us so much, or wish us so unlike to Atheists, as to have us pray once in seven years. The Jesuits, though accounted most licentious, yet seldom exceed, and sometimes fall short herein of their other Divines. Sylvester, a Dominican of greatest reputation amongst the Casuists, thus determins the question after Aquinas, 
(h) Quod tempus videtur determinatum, quantum ad instans quo quis incipit uti ratione in quo tenetur se dirigere & ordinare in Deum: &, ut videtur, ejus auxilium precari, si hoc suae menti inspiretu●. sum. v. orat. n. 8.  When one first comes to the use of Reason, he should pray for God's assistance, (videtur) he is not peremptory that he must, and speaks but conditionally too; for he adds, If he be thus inspired, otherwise he is not determined to that time. When then? 
(a) Alias vero determinate non potest, sed divina providentia ad hoc movet, quando est necessarium. ibid.  Why the providence of God moves him to it, when it is necessary. Thus he leaves it, and finds no other time, when a man is obliged to pray once for himself, but when he sees his soul in greatest danger, 
(b) Quum homo videt seipsum in gravi tentatione, & periculo animae suae, ibid.  which it may be he will never see. Their common doctrine is yet worse, thereby we are not bound to pray, but in the Article of Necessity; and that is, when we are in such extremity, as there is 
(c) Idem dicendum est de illo qui preces ad Deum facere praetermisit eo tempore, in quo nullum aliud remedium suae salutis aut proximi esse videbatur. Tunc enim lex divina naturalis ad id nos obligat, ut probavimus secuti mentem Paludani & Sylvestri  no other remedy for us: if we judge that we can any way else obtain what we would have, we need not pray: The Law of God, or Nature makes it not then our duty. They help us to understand this by two instances, the one to show when it is requisite to pray for ourselves; the second, when for others. 
(d) Ubi posuimus exemplum de illo qui in gravissimam tentationem impatientiae aut libidinis injectus, judicat nullum aliud remedium ad victoriam superesse, praeterquam speciale auxilium Dei oratione impetrandum.  When a man falls into most grievous temptations, to Impatience or to Lust, if there can be no other remedy against it, but the grace of God, to be ohtained by prayer, than it may be his duty. But it seems, if he can rid himself of it any other way, or but think he can, then though the temptation be never so violent or dangerous, he needs not pray. 
(e) 
Et de illo qui eminus intuens duos in duello conserturos manus, existimat nullum aliud esse remedium nisi speciale auxilium Dei oratione impetrandum ad dirimendum illud duellum injustum, in his enim casibus id a Deo petere tenetur. Navar. cap. 13. n. 18.  
Lex naturalis quae obligat aliquem preces ad Deum fundere & tempore, in quo nullum aliud remedium suae salutis aut proximi esse videtur secundum Sylvestrum. Eadum obligat ad idem positum in tentatione impatientiae, aut libidinis, cui videtur nullum aliud suppet●re remedium nisi oratio, etc. Lopez. c. 52. p. 272.  
Est communis sententia, quod obligat solum pro articulo necessitatis. Duplex autem necessitas communiter proponitur: prima est propria ipsius hominis, ut si aliqua tentatione vehem●nt●r pulsatur, quam sine auxilio divino vincere non potest.   
(e) Alia est necessitas proximi ut si quis videat aliquos ad duellum properare, nec possit eos aliter impedire.— D. Tho. Paludan. Sylvest. Navar. Abulens. vid. Suar. l. 1. de Orat. c. 36.  The other is, when a man at a distance sees two ready to sight a Duel, and makes account there is no remedy, but the help of God for parting them, than he is to seek it (which is not the case of one in a thousand). 
(f) Nisi forte posset aliter melius, quam per orationem suffragari Sylvest. ibid.  Yet if perhaps he can any otherwise more help them than by praying, he may let it alone. So that private prayer needs not be their daily practice, nor used as a Christian exercise in ordinary; but in extremity only, and cases otherwise desperate, and as the last remedy, and when there is no other indeed, or in their apprehension; it will not be a duty, but in such circumstances as do very rarely, if ever, concur. They are not to use it as their common repast, but as physic; not for prevention neither, but when they are already surprised with extreme danger. And if such extremity occur not once in seven years, they need not pray for so many years; nay, perhaps it may not befall them, or they may not be apprehensive of it, while they live, and then they need not pray at all. This is not my inference only, it is their own, and acknowledged to be the consequence of their common doctrine. 
(g) One of their greatest Divines, having acknowledged this to be their commo● Doctrine, thus argues, Hoc est obligare quasi per accidens propter necessitatem conting●…tem & ext insecam— qui nunquam sentiret illam vehementem & urgentem tentation●… nec videret proximum in simili necessitate, nunquam teneretur orare,  Thereby there is no divine precept for prayer, which can oblige any directly; only by: accident it may happen sometimes to be a duty, but such an accident as few may meet with. It's said expressly, that from thence it follows, 
(h) possent ergo m●… totam vitam sine oratione transigere, absque gravi peccato, Suar. l. 1. de Orat. cap. 30●  that many may pass their whole lives, without ever praying to God, and this without any great fault. It should be said, without the least fault, for where there is no obligation, there is no duty at all; and then no sin great, or little in the want of performance.  
This is some of their Church's sense, but they speak it more fully who tell us, that mental prayer is to be reckoned amongst Counsels 
(i) Vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. 7. n. 10.  (which none are obliged to observe) and this by the common consent of Aquinas and their other Doctors. And accordingly, that there i● 
(k) Nullum invenitur praeceptum divinum, seu naturalis juris obligans per se ad ment●lirer orandum, meditandum, seu recogitandum. Quod ita censeo verum, ut contrarium ●ne temeritate doceri nen possit, quia est contra communem usum, & sensum totius Ecclesia Suar. de Orat. l. 2. c. 4. n 5.  no Divine Precept, or of natural Law, of itself, obliging to ment● prayer, meditation, (some peculiar engagements or occasions set apart wherein mental prayer is not concerned) and this is counted so certain, that to teach the contrary is temerarious, because against the comm● use and sense of the whole Church. So that they are not far from the sense of the Church, who (without excepting public or private, mental or vocal) deny 
(l) Quidam negant dari praeceptum divinum speciale de oratione, Ibid. ●. c. 28. n. 1.  that there is any Divine Precept in special for Prayer. And these are not only their modern Divines, but some of the Ancienter also, particularly Alexander Alensis 
(m) Alex. Alensis in rigore videtur negare proprium praeceptum jure divino datum de oratione proprie sumpta, sed solum largissime pr●ut pia operatio vel bonum desiderium dicitur oratio. Ibid. l. 28. n. 2.  (the Prime of all their School Doctors) in strictness seems to deny, that there is any proper command by Divine Law for Prayer, taking it properly, but only in a most large sense, as any pious act, or good desire may be called Prayer. And those who would not seem to like this in general, yet allow it when they come to particulars, since they teach, that the Precept obligeth not at any such particular time, or occasion, when it would oblige, if ever. There is no command they tell us, which binds them to pray in private at any set time 
(n) Idem Ibid. t. 1. c. 30. n. 4.  what ever. They are not obliged to Pray when they first come to the use of Reason 
(o) Ibid. n. 9 : Nor on common days afterwards, not the least Prayer, not a Pater Noster, not once a day, no, not at their Meals, 
(p) n. 5. & 7.  even their Clergy need not do it. Nor on holidays neither, 
(q) l. 3. c. 6. n. 16. n. 12.  no, not when they have quite neglected their service in public. 
(r) Antonius, Adrian. infra. Navar. cap. 21. n. 7. Bonacina de Sacrament. d. 4. q. ult. p. ult. n. 16. ibi. Barthol. ab Angelo & alij comuniter. Qui non potest aut non vult, missam eo die (festo) audire, non tenetur recitare alias orationes.  Nor on their Fasts, though Scripture still joins these, as all Christians, who minded Religion, were wont to do of old. Their Fasts are no more Religious for Prayer or any holy exercise, than the abstinence of their Cattle. Nor to prepare themselves for sacred or solemn employments, for their Sacraments of Penance, or else for the Eucharist (though this would but trouble them once a year), 
(s) Nulla obligatio orandi in principio aliquarum actionum, Suar. ibid. 14.  not at the beginning of any service or undertaking . To pray at such times and occasions is mere matter of Counsel, 
(t) Haec omnia esse consilia, n. 1. 5. &. 16.  which none can be blamed for neglecting: Nor when a man hath Vowed, and solemnly promised to God, and sworn too, that he will pray, even then If it be but a little prayer, 
(u) A mortali excusantur— qui precationem Angelicam, & alia similia parva pollicentur, etiamsi juramento, aut voto id ipsum confirmassent. Navar. c. 18. n. 7. Secundum alios.  it will be but a small fault to omit it, for all this. In short, which compriseth all, there 
(x) Non potest aliud certum tempus assignari in quo ex praecepto religionis teneamur Deum colere, & auxilium ab eo per actum orationis implorare, ut in simili dictum est de actu contritionis & charitatis, Bonacina, tom. 1. divin. offic. disp. 1. q. 2. p. 1. n. 12.  can be no certain time assigned (unless the hour of death) in which, by any precept of Religion, we are bound to worship God, or seek his help by an act of prayer, as in like case is said of an act of contrition and love to God. So Bonacina. No time for Prayer certain, none determined; but as they conjecture, perhaps, it may be a duty, when they apprehend themselves under grievous and dangerous temptations, and judge there is no remedy but prayer. This, or none at all, is the time for it by their common doctrine; and this is in effect to say, it is a duty at no time, for no person. For those under temptation may not apprehend it dangerous, or a remedy needful; as all will be ready to do, who either regard not temptations, or are pleased with them, or what they lead to. And neither these, nor any else can judge there is no other remedy but prayer; if they believe their doctrine, which offers them divers other remedies, and those more relied on than this. To mention none else, almost any of their Sacramentals (of which they have multitudes) will serve their turn, even a little Salt, 
(y) Exorciso te creatura salis, etc. I conjure thee Creature Salt— that thou mayest be hallowed— to drive away all the temptations of the Devil.  conjured after the mode of holy Church, may do it. Thus we see these Catholics secured from all divine obligations to pray while they live. But they have another way to do it; for, if any apprehend themselves in dangerous temptations, and also that there is no other remedy against it but prayer, they determine; 
(z) Quando tentationes ingruunt cum periculo succumbendi, tunc enim medium ad peccatorum veniam & auxilium impetrandum adhibendum est— quanquam a peccato multi excusantur, ignorantes, vel non advertentes ad hanc obligationem, Bonacina divin. offic. disp. 1. q. 2. p. 1. n. 12. ibi Medina. Navar. Malderus, Sylvester, & alij.  that if such be ignorant that it is then a duty; or if they know it, but do not consider it, they are excused from sin, though then they neglect to pray. Now the people may well be ignorant, that they are in such case obliged, when their learned men scarce know it. And for those that do know it, the violence of the temptation (and the case supposeth it violent) may leave no place for consideration. However, no man considers this or other things, unless he will: and so it will be no sin to neglect prayer at that time, when only they count it a duty, unless he list. Yea, 
(a) Utrum excusetur a peccato, qui praeceptum aliquod non implet ob inadvertentiam, vel ignorantiam, quae ipsius culpa contigit?— Respondeo excusari a peccato. Idem de peccat. disp. 2. q. 8. p. 3. n. 28. ibi Clavis Regia & alij.  though the ignorance, or inconsiderateness be culpable, and through his own default; yet the neglect of the duty, which is thereby occasioned, they can excuse from sin. Besides, if 
(b) Scientes vero & advertentes graviter peccant, utpote negligentes medium ad vincendas tentationes— omissio tamen orationis tunc temporis non habet malitiam distinctam ab eo peccato quod cavere tenemur. Idem. De divin. offic. d. 1. q. 2. p. 1. n. 12. ibi (besides the chief of all the Jesuits). Medina, Sylvester, Navarre, Malderus.  they should both know and consider that prayer is then their duty, yet they teach that the omission of it is then no special sin: i. no other sin then that which they should seek to avoid by praying. Whereby they plainly declare that there is in their account no special precept for prayer, no, not in that case wherein alone they would have it thought a duty, otherwise they would judge it a special sin then to neglect it.   

Sect. 11. But though their Catholics be thus sufficiently eased of all Obligations to private prayer, all their lives, by virtue of any Divine command, it may be there is some precept of the Church for it. Can she be content that they should live so much without God, or any acknowledgement of their dependence on him, more like Atheists than Christians? yes there's not any thing for private addresses to God amongst all her precepts; she is too indulgent to trouble them with any such thing; she requires not of them the least prayer, or such as are accounted best, not so much as a Paternoster, there is no Ecclesiastical precept for this, to make it so much as a venial fault, not to use it, says 
(c) Nullum esse de hac re praeceptum etiam Ecclesiasticum vel sub veniali, Medina de Orat. q. 10. in Suar. de Orat. l. 3. c. 6. n. 7. Solum tradidit Christus formam, non vero dedit praeceptum obligans ad exercitium, n. 5.  Medina, not a Salve-Regina, no nor an Ave-Mary. They have indeed a special respect to this last, and prefer it Ten to one before any other (though they might use this every minute, without ever praying once to God all their life.) And Pope John the 22. ordained, that thrice every Evening the Bell should sound, that every one might say an Ave-Mary thrice; and since it is grown a custom (and a Church custom usually stands for a Law with them) that not only at Evening, but at Noon and Morning too, a Bell should sound for the same purpose. So that this, if any, is under injunction: There is a fair show for it, but it is no more than a show, for they assure us, this is only a 
(d) Consuetudo recepta est ratione devotionis, non obligationis— si haec nunquam recitet, magnum indicium est, ipsum non recte vivere, etiamsi omissio illa speciale peccatum non sit. Idem. ibid.  voluntary Devotion, and hath nothing of Obligation in it: Those that never use this and such prayers, it is, they say, a shrewd sign, they do not live well, but the omission thereof, is no special sin with respect unto any precept either of God or the Church.  
And is not this a very pious concession, that they are pleased to grant, that for a man never to say his prayers is a general bad sign, that he does not live as he ought, though they will by no means allow it to be any special sin? Oh! the Piety and tenderness of this Mother and head of all Churches!  
If for all this, any of them should conceive themselves obliged to pray sometimes; or if without such opinion, they should find some season for private prayer, though God (as they dream) and the Church (as they know) hath prescribed none: as when a Confessor enjoins it for Penance; or out of voluntary Devotion, when they have a mind to Supererogate, and do better than God requires, upon which accounts, some of them may be found now and then very busy with their Beads: yet in these cases, there is by their principles no more need to worship God in their private, than in their public prayers, where (as we have showed) they account no actual observance of God at all necessary: As for the prayer enjoined them by way of Penance, these are not necessary for them, but as their punishment; and then they pray not, for that is an act of the Soul, but this a suffering of the outward man. The Church as (they say) it cannot judge of inward acts, so it cannot order them to be penal. And the Malefactors here being their own executioners; as there is no need, so there is no fear, that they will punish their Souls; but leave them untouched, unconcerned, what ever their lips, or fingers, or Beads may suffer, by that grievous penalty of praying. But it were well, if God did not suffer more by such abuse of his name and worship, than those malefactors, who count i● a suffering to do any thing like his service. And it sounds not well, that prayer must pass for a punishment. It is as Damascen defines it, and they after him, the ascent of the mind unto God. 
(e) O●at●o in genere sumpta est a●…ensus mentis ad Deum & hoc essentialiter includit Idem. ibid. c. 4. n. 4.  Now is the approach of the Soul to God a punishment? One would think the Devils should think better of it; for the misery of Hell is distance from God, without hopes of having access to him. But they can solve the difficulty well enough; for they mean not do any such thing as praying in the case, but only to suffer some thing, which they call so. Their care and pains is about their Beads, not their Souls: if they keep but count, and bring in the full tale which the Confessor enjoins: though in as many Crowns and Rosaries, as there are Ave-maries', in each Ten thousand times over, they have not one thought of God, nor the least motion of mind or heart towards him: yet they give full satisfaction, and undergo all they were adjudged to.  
In their voluntary prayers, there is less of worship required than the other, if there can be less than none. For 
(f) Orationes voluntariae— cum penitus omitti possent, consequitur quod evagatio mentis Tollens attentionem non indu●it peccatum mortale. Graff. part. 1. l. 2. c. 51. n. 11.  when they need not use such prayers, unless they please, they may do it as they list: it being no duty enjoined, the manner of performance is arbitrary, and wholly at discretion. Hence those who think something (of some sort) of attention requisite in commanded prayers count none at all necessary in these; no not that which is Superficial, not so little of that as they call virtual. So that if herein, they mind nothing at all, wherein worshippers at prayer are concerned, not so little as the bare words; yet they acquit themselves well enough, yea if this neglect of all be wilful, 
(g) Ubi autem libere & citra obligationem oratur, Sola est culpa venialis indecenter orare: quare distractio etiam meditata, nisi contemptio adsit, nunquam erit mortalis. Soto de just. l. 10. q. 5. art. 5. in fin. Graff. p. 1. l. 2. c. 51. n. 11. Gabriel. ibi. Angel. v. hor. n. 27. Bonacin. de divin. offic. disp. 1. q. 3. p. 2. Sect. 2. n. 7. ibi. Maldarus & alij.  and the mind not only run of its own accord, but be sent away and employed about something else on set purpose; it will but be at worst a slight fault.   

Sect. 12. In this fashion they would have us suppose that God may be worshipped, when there is neither inward nor outward Observance of him. Inward he hath none, when the mind is departed from him, and the heart with it. Outward he hath none, unless merely in show, when the mind directs it not to, and designs it not for him: which is never done, when he is not minded. In fine by the Doctrine of the Romanists (to say nothing of the Idolatry or Superstition of their service) it is unnecessary that God should have any real worship either public or private: unless God can be said to be truly worshipped, without the love or fear of God, without acts of wisdom or affection, without Reverence or Devotion, without sincere or honest intentions; or with designs of wickedness; without knowing what they do, or heeding what they are about; without mind, or heart, yea or body either, unless in mere show, this is apparent by the premises. The people (as they think) worship God well enough at this rate; their leaders teach them, no more is needful; their Church by confining their service to an unknown Tongue, makes it necessary for their Divines thus to teach, and unavoidable for the people to worship no otherwise. Now what a Church is this, or of what Religion that makes the real worship of God, and of Jesus Christ to be needless, and takes an effectual course, that he should have none? Let those who are of their Communion, or tempted to it, consider it seriously, and in the fear of God. Is it the way to Salvation to be without Religion? is there any Religion indeed, where it is made needless to worship God really, when worship is as essential to Religion, as a Soul is to a man? They may by joining with them, greaten a party and promote the interest of a faction, which carries on other designs under Religious pretences, without regard of God, as to his worship and honour, or to the Souls of men, as to their happiness, and the true way to it: but if they follow the conduct of the Roman Doctrine, and worship of God no otherwise than these would have them; they may be of the Roman Profession, and yet of no Religion. If a man have a mind to trouble himself with none of the realities of Christianity, and yet to pass for Religious enough, in the opinion of so much of the world as is Papal, and will hang his Soul upon so common Reputation, Popery is contrived to allure and gratify him; and he may safely venture on it, if Damnation be not dangerous, or if he can escape it by an opinion or show of worshipping God, and being Religious without reality.    

CHAP. II. Christian knowledge is not necessary for Romanists by their Doctrine.  

Sect. 1. KNowledge is the foundation of almost all that is saving: of Faith, Holiness, Obedience, Worship: it is the groundwork, without which scarce a stone can be laid in the whole structure of Salvation. No saving faith without it, Rom. 10. 14. There can be no love to, or hope in an unknown object. There can be no fear, no desire of what we know not. There can be no true worship of God, unless that of the Samaritans was such, who worshipped they knew not what. There can be no obedience without knowing whom, what, why, and for what end we obey: in brief without knowledge there is no eternal life, Joh. 17. 3. nothing but ruin and eternal destruction, Hosea 4. 6. 2 Thess. 1.  
Yet for all this, Popery decries knowledge, as that which is unnecessary for the people, and extols the want of it, as that which is essential to their faith 
(a) Per hoc fides distinguitur contra scientiam, & melius per ignorantiam quam per notitiam definitur. l. 1 de justif. c. 7. p. 706. Sect. judicium.  (Bellarmine saith faith is better defined by ignorance) as that which is the Mother of their Devotion (so others declare it:) as that which is the excellency of their obedience; none comparable to that which they call blind obedience, as Cardinal Cusanus tells us. 
(b) Consummatia ut prefectissima obedientia. (infra)   
It sufficeth the people to know that their Church hath knowledge; and their sight is good enough, in that their Teachers have eyes, so one of their Authors. 
(a) Laicos ad dogmata fidei quod attinet, non proprijs sed praelatorum suorum oculis, videre oportet.  In matters of faith, the people ought not to see with their own eyes, but the eyes of their Superiors. They need not know what they pray for, nor what they are to believe, nor what they are to do.  
1. They need not know what they are to pray for, or to whom, or whether they pray or not; all is muffled up in an unknown Language, and they are to venture at they know not what, nor how, nor whither. 
* Vid. Navar. de Orat. c. 10. n. 36. etc. 18. n. 32. Spotsw. Hist. l. 2. p. 92. Molanus Theol. pract. tr. 3 c. 9 n. 6.  No wonder if they direct the Lords prayer to Saints, Male or Female; and say our Father, to the Virgin Mother: and in like manner direct Ave-Marie's to Christ, as if they took him to be a Woman, or to be with Child (and with himself too) to be the fruit of his own Womh; or to be his own Mother, which the words so applied signify. This ignorance is the dam of such Devotion, such as is both horrid and blasphemous to the highest degree of horror. And yet their great Clerks will countenance it. The wisdom of their Church hath thought it fit, that they should not be so wise, as to understand what they do, when they are serving God. The Counsel of Trent ●ulminates a Curse against those, who hold that the Mass ought to be celebrated in a known Tongue: that is, they curse those, who approve not that mode of service, which the Apostle condemns as 
(b) 
Omnis Sermo qui non intelligitur barbarus judicatur. Jerom. in 1 Cor. 14.  
In Navarre de horis. Canon. cap. 13. n. 4.  
They are directed to address themselves to God or the Virgin Mary th●…. Grant O Lord, or Lady what I ask, though I know not what.   Barbarous, 1 Cor. 14. such as is not fit for God or man, they curse those who will not offer a blind Sacrifice, or blindfold. As if one under the Law ought not to have seen, whether that which he offered, were a Hogg, or a Sheep; whether he Sacrificed a Lamb, or cut of a Dog's neck; whether he presented an Oblation, or offered Swine's blood. They think not only the people, but even the Clergy unconcerned, to know what they say, when they speak unto God. 
(c) Clerici aut laici qui Divinis intersuet, si non intelligunt quae dicunt, non peccant l. 2. c. 51. n. 12. p. 291.  The Clergy (saith Jacobus de Graffiis) or the Laity when they are at Divine service, if they understand not what they say, they sin not. It is so far from being their duty to serve God as Christians, that they need not act as Men in his service. If the words be but said, though with no 
(d) Quid hoc sit intelligere debemus uti humana ratione, non quasi avium voce cantemus. Name & m●rul● psi●aci & corvi & picae & hujusmodi volu●res, saepe ab hominibus docentur s●nar● quod nesciunt, scienter auter● cantare non avi sed homini, divina voluntate concessum est. Augustin. in ps. 18. exposit. secunda p. 103. t. 8.  more understanding, than Magpyes are taught to sound them: it's as reasonable service as their Church requires; what God requires, with them is no matter. They expect not, that any should understand their service, but expert Divines, as 
(a) Supra. l. 10 q 5. art. 5.  Soto tells us. Now it is a very small part of their Clergy that pretends to be Divines, and a small part of those few that are expert therein; it is an attainment which most of their Bishops fall short of: their common Priests are sufficiently qualified with the art of reading, nor need they be masters of that neither, the Masse-book is almost taught to read itself. For in the Missals established by Pius the 5th. and recognized by Clement the Eighth, every syllable is diversely marked, whether it is to be sounded long or short. What do we speak of Clergy or Priests? it is not necessary for their Popes to be able to understand, or to read their common prayers, themselves spare not to divulge this. It is manifest, saith Alphonsus a Castro; 
(*) Cum constet plures Papas adeo illiteratos esse ut Grammaticam penitus ignorent. l. 1. adeurs. Haeres. cap. 4. Edit. Paris. 1534.  That many Popes are so illiterate, that they are utterly ignorant of the Grammar. It seems, he may be universal Pastor, and the Teacher of the whole World, who hath not learned his Grammar: and the infallible Guide of all mortals, who understands not his own language, wherein the Articles of faith, their Laws, Ceremonies, and Church-service is delivered. And is it not very much that two things so different as ignorance and infallibility, should have the good hap to meet together in the same person.   

Sect. 2. Secondly, They need not know what they are to believe, they tell us they are obliged under pain of Damnation, to believe whatsoever the visible Church of Christ proposeth, as revealed by Almighty God. Now their Church proposeth for points of faith so revealed, not only what they have in Scripture; but what they have by Tradition, or by the custom of the Church in former ages; or by the consent of the Fathers; or by the decrees of Councils, or by the determination of Pope's è Cathedra, whereby points of faith become infinitely numerous, beyond all account, which the learned amongst them can give, either to satisfy themselves or others. Yet all must be believed, and that under pain of damnation, when as it is but a very small part of them, that can be commonly known. The Articles of the Creed called the Apostles, are not the hundred part of those points, that must be believed by all, that will not be damned: and yet they generally conclude, that it is not necessary for the people to know all of those few Articles. How to believe the rest (and it may be five hundred times more) which they know nothing of, nor ever once came into their thoughts, they must make what shift they can.  
However, they need not know all the Articles of the small Creed, as the chief of them teach. Not all saith Aquinas 
(a) Nec tamen necesse est cuilibet explicite credere omnes articulos fidei, sed quantum sufficit ad dirigendum in ultimum finem. dist. 25. q. 2. art. 1. vid. Sylvest. v. fides.  but what is sufficient to direct to the last end. Not all saith 
(b) Maxim ad illa quae sunt grossa ad capiendum, sicut quod Christus natus est & passus, & alia quae pertinent ad redemptionem vid. Sta. Clara, probl. 15. p. 94.  Scotus, but the gross things, as, that Christ was born and suffered, and others belonging to Redemption. Not all saith Sylvester (and many with him) 
(c) Ut quae solemnizantur in ecclesia quantum ad omnes Catholicos. v. fides. n. 6.  but those particularly, for which the Church hath public Solemnities. Not all saith Bonaventure 
(d) Quas cognoscere potest ex ipsis solennitatibus, quas ecclesia celebrat, & actibus sacerdotum. 3. dist. 25. n. 26.  but those which we have notice of by the Church-Solemnities, or acts of the Priests, and these in him are four, that of the Nativity, Passion, Resurrection, and Remission of sins, to which he adds another, which the sign of the cross teacheth, and wherein 
(e) De Unitate & Trinitate quam ex signatione noscere possunt, cum dicunt in nomine Patris & filij, etc. item de nativitate, passione & resurrectione quae festa praedicant: & remissione peccatorum quam ex actu presbyterorum noscere possunt. Sum. v. fides. n. 7.  Angelus follows him; so that the half and more, needs not to be known; for they reckon fourteen in all.  
Others there are who require not this little, nor think it needful to know these Articles more than implicitly, that is without understanding them; so Gulielmus Parisiensis, and Altissiodorensis in 
(f) If a man were demanded whether Christ were born of the Virgin, and whether there were one God and three persons, he might sufficiently answer I know not: but I believe as the Church holds. Bann. in 22. q. 2. art. 8. Sect. dubitatur.  Bannez, Summa Rosellae, after others holds 
(g) 
Dicens quod simplicibus, & forte omnibus laicis discernentibus & adultis, sufficit credere Deum esse praemiatorem omnium bonorum & malorum omnium p●nitorem. Alios autem articulos sufficit credere implicit, credendo scil. verum quicquid ecclesia Catholica docet. Post. dic. l. 1. in Sylu. v. fides. n. 6.  
Baptista Trovamala herein followed Peter Casuille and says this is fidei mensura ad quam quilibet tenetur & quae sufficit simplicibus & forte omnibus laicis. Sum. Rosel. v. fides. n. 1.   it enough for the simple, and perhaps all discerning people to believe, that God is the Rewarder of the good, and Punisher of the evil. A compendious Creed truly, and that which will never trouble the Conscience of a Turk, or a Heathen, the knowledge and faith of a Barbarous insidel is enough, it seems, to make a Papal Christian. Accordingly others teach, that such as are educated amongst Catholics, and are ignorant of the Trinity; are excused from the explicit knowledge thereof, especially if they want a Teacher; so Bartholomew, Medina, and Immanuel say, who gives this reason for it. 
(h) Quid enim dicemusne perire infinitam Christianorum, alioquin bonorum, multitudinem, qui de mysterio etiam Trinitatis, & incarnationis, vix quidquam norunt recte, immo perverse sentiunt, si interrogas? v. fides. n. 1. Ita Ferr. Medina. l. 1. c. 14. Sect. 2.  We cannot say, that an infinite number of Christians, otherwise good people do perish, that scarce know any thing aright of the mystery of the Trinity, and incarnation; yea judge perversely of these points, if you ask them. And yet without the knowledge of the incarnation of Christ, there is no knowledge of the Creed, or of the Gospel. Sancta 
(i) Deus, natura, gratia Problem. 15.  Clara is of the same mind too, and quotes others for it.  
So that by this Doctrine a man needs not know the persons in the Godhead, nor the incarnation of Christ, upon which his Birth, Life, Death, Resurrection and Intercession depends, which are the sum of the Gospel. Yea, he may not only be ignorant of these Truths, the knowledge of which (if of any) is necessary to Salvation: but he may have false and perverse apprehensions of them, and yet be secure from perishing. According 
(k) In 4 sentent. Sum. fol. 75. p. 2. quando quis laborat ignorantia invincibili fidei explicitae incarnationis & Trinitatis, quia cum esset educatus in montibus, caruit praedicatore, ipsum de ipsa instruente secundum veram sententiam, cum sola fide implicita hoc est sine explicita salvabitur, si moriatur in gratia, ad quam assequendam secundum Doctores nobiles sic ignoranti explicitam satis est cum caeteris requisitis fides implicita Lopez. c. 7. p. 45.  to Soto and Metina, he that is ignorant of the Incarnation, and Trinity, because he was educated in the Mountains, without a Preacher to instruct him, will be saved, if he die in grace (which they suppose he may have without knowledge) for an implicit faith (that is, without knowledge) will then serve his turn Secundum Doctores nobiles, as noble Doctors conclude, saith Lopez. So that, they may have eternal life, without knowing the true God or Jesus Christ, whom he hath sent. Ignorance hereof will be invincible, that is, both inculpable in itself, and sufficient to justify the criminal issues of it, if they want a Teacher: that is, not only, if it be not possible, but if it be 
(l) Vid. Sylu. v. ignorantia. n. 5 & v. impossib. Impossibile dicitur. 1 quod simplicitur fieri non potest. 2 quod fieri potest sed cum difficultat. Juridico dicitur. 1 quod non potest fieri just. 2 quod non potest fieri commode.  difficult, or inconvenient to have one.  

(m) Addit. to provincial Letters. p. 100 etc. c. 2. n. 17.  The Cardinals of the Inquisition at Rome, will have such Confessors allowed, who hold, that persons are capable of absolution (and so supposed to be in a state of Salvation) how palpable soever their ignorance might be of the mysteries of faith; nay, though out of pure negligence, they know nothing of the mystery of the most blessed Trinity or of the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ. Medina teacheth, that if one when he is dying, acknowledge that he hath been very negligent to learn Christian Doctrine, and would not hear it, and thereby, wants the knowledge of the mystery of the incarnation, and Trinity, and the Articles of faith: yet to deny him Absolution would be impious So 
(n) Instruct. c. 7. p. 45.  Lopez reports him, and himself 
(o) p. 50. Talis est absolvendus.  says, such an one is to be Absolved. Here is encouragement more than enough, to live and die in gross ignorance, and those who have a mind to continue, without the knowledge of God under the name of Men; or of Christ, under the profession of Christians, have a general warranty by their Doctrine to do it.  
For, the former sort of their Divines, who seem to require a knowledge of some Articles, do indeed make no more knowledge necessary, than those who require it not. For when they explain themselves, commonly such a knowing is sufficient, as is without understanding, a dark conceit, that such things there be, though they apprehend not at all what they are. Such mysterious subtleties their Doctors are pleased with: as, they have a sort of faith without knowledge, or any thought of what they believe; so a knowledge without understanding.  

(p) Qui non possit concipere quid est natura & quid person a, non est necesse quod habeat actum explicitum, de articulo pertinente ad essentiae, & personarum Trinitatem distinct, sicut habent clerici literati, sed sufficit talibus credere, sicut ecclesia credit. vid. Sta. Cla. ibid.  Scotus thinks they have sufficient knowledge of the Trinity (Three persons and one nature) who can neither apprehend what a person, or a nature is. Accordingly Bonaventure saith, 
(q) Possunt nosse ex ipso actu consignationis, consignant enim in nomine patris, etc. Cognoscere possent ex ipsis solennitatibus. ibid. n. 26.  the people may know the Trinity, by crossing themselves, since they do it in the name of the Father, etc. And by the festivals they may know the rest which is necessary to be understood. And when it is argued, that there are few but such as are expert in Divinity, who know how to distinguish, and number the Articles of the Creed, and therefore if all were bound to know them distinctly, and explicitly (id est, to know what they mean) few or none would be saved, which is an extreme cruel saying; he in his answer grants 
(r) Ibid. n. 27.  it all.  

(s) Et sane ita esse, experientia testatur, cum maxima pars fidelium, vel propter aetatem puerilem, vel propter sexum muliebrem, vel propter ingenij hebitudinem, vel propter imp●ritiam literarum, & scientiarum, quales sunt pene omnes rustici, non solum non intelligant mysteria Trinitatis, & incarnationis, & similia neeessaria ad salutem, sed vix quidquam animo concipiant, praeter sonum verborum; & tamen inter sideles merito numerantur. De justif. l. 1. c. 7. p. 705.  Bellarmine seems to make some knowledge of the Articles of the Creed necessary, but what it is, he signifies elsewhere, when he tells us that experience witnesseth that the greatest part of the faithful, and in a manner all the Country people, are so far from understanding the mystery of the Trinity, and the Incarnation, and other such points necessary to Salvation, that they scarce apprehend any thing besides the mere sound of the words, and yet are deservedly counted believers.  
So Cardinal Tolet requires in those that are to be absolved, a kind of acquaintance with some prime Articles of faith; but signifies, it will be sufficient if hearing them rehearsed, 
(t) Sciat respondere esse mandatum vel articulum, quae sunt; non autem esse, quae non su●t. Instruct. l. 3. c. 17.  they can tell us, which is an Article, and which not, and this they may do by the sound, though they understand nothing of the sense. 
(*) Decis. p. 1. l. 1. c. 24. n. 3. vid. infra.  De Graffijs is confident, that a Confessor may make an ignorant person understand all that is necessary to Salvation, by making the sign of the Cross. And Angelus, who would have 3 or 4 Articles of the Creed to be known; yet concludes, if one 
(u) Idem possit dici de a iquo qui nescit Credo parvum, tamen si interrogaretur Deus est unus? responderet, quod sic— & sic de caeteris responderet, quod sic. Quod sufficeret si●i, licet nesciret praefatum Credo. Sum. v. scientia.  can answer of this or that Article decently, quod sic, it is so; it will be sufficient for him; though he know not the Creed.  
Sylvester pretends to make more knowledge requisite than Rosella, but yet he determins, 
(x) 
Privatio ipsa scientiae secundum se non sit peccatum v. ignorant. n. 8. est peccatum ratione negligentiae ibid. negligentia addiscendi necessaria ad salutem, quae aliquando est mortale, licet hoc judicare sit difficile. v. acedia. n. 3. non potest sermone determinari. v. praedicat. n. 7. Supra.  
Ipsamet ignorantia vincibilis non est formaliter peccatum nec commissionis, nec omissionis, etc. Bonacina de peccat. d. 2. q. 8. p. 3. n. 31. After Corduba, and many others.   That mere want of knowledge is no sin; that it is not a sin to be ignorant of what he ought to know, but upon the account of negligence; that negligence to know things necessary to Salvation may be a mortal sin sometimes, but when, it is hard to tell, yea impossible. So that here is encouragement enough to continue carelessly in ignorance of things necessary to Salvation, and to neglect saving knowledge; for when this is a mortal sin, no man can tell; and a venial fault, no man needs avoid. In short, they not only justify simple ignorance, how gross soever, but that which has a worse character (ignorantia pravae dispositionis): and count it no crime not only to want the knowledge of the Articles of Faith, but out of Ignorance to entertain opinions contrary thereto. He that believes an Heresy, saith Navarre, 
(a) Idem ibid. n. 9 Si prae simplicitate aut ignorantia id credit, quia sibi videtur ecclesia ita tenere, & est paratus errorem deponere quandocunque veritatem fuerit edoctus— nec peccat mortaliter regulariter, l. 11. n. 22. p. 141.  out of simplicity or ignorance, because he thinks the Church holds it, and is ready to relinquish it when the Truth shall be discovered, regularly he sins not mortally. And with Alphonsus a Castro, no kind of Heresy is a sin, if it be out of ignorance, & without pertinacy, 
(b) Lib. 1. advers. Haeres. c. 9  If their Teachers instill such Errors into the People, and they through Ignorance, receive impressions contrary to points of Faith, and follow such Guides blindfold; therein they sin not. 
(c) Immo plus dico, quod aliquando talis error possit esse meritorius, ut puta; aliquis audit aliquem praedicatorem famosum, vel Episcopum praedicasse aliquim errorem, & simplex credit animo obediendi fidei, paratus tamen corrigi. Nam ex intentione opera judicantur cum voluntate. de sent. excom. sum. Angel. v. fides. n. 6.  Yea, I say more, saith Angelus, Sometimes such an error may be meritorious; for example, One hears a famous Preacher or a Bishop preach some Error, and he simply believes it, with a mind to be obedient to the Faith, but ready to be reduced; for things are to be judged of by the intention. But 
(d) Aliquando cum peccato veniali, ut puta, vetula credit Trinitatem esse unam faemiram: & quoniam credit Ecclesiam sic tenere, sic credit, ib. ibid.  sometimes it may be a venial fault, as when an old Woman believes the Trinity to be one Woman; and because she thinks the Church so holds, therefore believes it.  
To recite the names of those who assert that the people, through ignorance, may safely follow their Teachers in Errors, would be tedious, they are so many: for shortness, let us take Sancta Clara's word, who tells us 
(e) Et videtur hodie communis sententia Scholarum & Doctorum, quod laici errantes cum suis Doctoribus aut pastoribus omnino ob ●mni culpa excusentur, immo multoties sic material●ter errando, ob actum obedientiae, quam pastoribus suis debent, Merentur, Problem. 15. p. 99  It is now the common Opinion of their Schools and Doctors, that people erring with their Teachers or Pastors, are wholly excused from all fault, yea, many times by so erring materially, for this Christian obedience which they own their Pastors, they merit. So that Ignorance of points, whose belief is with them necessary to Salvation, is so far from being a sin, that it can render Heresy sinless; yea, make the entertaining of damnable Errors, to be a meritorious belief.  
We cannot expect that knowledge should be accounted necessary, where the worst sort of ignorance hath such excess of honour and privilege. It is no more necessary, nor more of it (according to their principles) necessitate praecepti, by virtue of any command, than we have showed out of their best Writers. But then the necessitas medij, needfulness as a means or way to life, that is none at all. For as the same Author tells us, and brings us abundant evidence of it, it is the 
(f) Put●m pla●e hanc esse sententiam Doctoris, & communem. ibid. p. 90.  common doctrine of their more grave Divines, that men may now be saved; and the more 
(g) Et haec est communior in Scholis, ibid. p. 89.  common Tenet of their Schools, that they may be justified without the explicit belief, and so without the knowledge of Christ himself. So that those who hold the knowledge of Christ unnecessary to Salvation, are many, & their most grave Divines; those that count it unnecessary to Justification, are the greatest number of their Doctors: put these both together, and there will be few left amongst them, and these little considerable in comparison, for number or gravity; but such as judge the knowledge of Christ needless to bring men into a saving state, for this, it will not be needful to be Christians, unless any can be Christians without the actual belief or knowledge of Christ.   

Sect. 3. Thirdly, they need not know what they ought to do; they may be without sin, ignorant of what the Lord hath made their duty. Adrian, Corduba, Herrera determine, and it is the more common and received opinion, that men may be inculpably ignorant of the Law of Nature, and the ten Commandments, 
(h) Communior tamen & recepta sententia post Adrianum, & est nostri Corubae & Herrerae & aliorum communiter, quod potest dari ignorantia invincibilis respectu legis naturae & decalogi, Probl. 16. initio.  as Sancta Clara informs us. But then, since they need not know the Rule, what have they to follow? why, the direction of their Teachers; and these they must follow blindfold, right or wrong: It is one of the qualifications required in the obedience of others, but especially of the Religious (which they would have us think to be best of all) that it be 
(i) Obedientiam Caecam, promptam, fortem esse par est, de his conditionibus in obedientia religiosa praesertim requisitis bene, P. L. Victorel. ibid. ad l. 8. c. 14. p. 11●8.  blind: Nor should Fear of going wrong, move them to open, or use their own eyes; for if they do wander out of the way of God, after such Guides, yet they are right, and do their duty. Those who managed 
(k) Hungerus. Velserus. Hannemannus. Oretzerus. Tannerus.  the conference for the Romanists at Ratisbon, Anno 1601. maintained that the people are so subjected to the government of their Teachers; that if they err, the people may and aught to err with them. And they are not only excused from all faults, when they thus wander with their Teachers, but their obedience to their Pastors herein, is many times meritorious. This is the judgement not only of Valentia, Angles, Vasquez, but the common determination of their Schools in 
(l) Vid supra.  Sancta Clara. It seems a man may deserve eternal life by leaving the way to it; and may come to Heaven meritoriously by wand'ring from it. What a strange thing is it, that they will not let their Catholics be certain of Salvation, since they cannot miss it, no not by going out of the way that leads to it? When they follow their Guide into the ditch, yet they are safe; but that's a small matter: by being willing to be led by such as see not, or mind not the way, they merit, and spring up to Heaven marvellously, even when they are falling from a precipice, and tumbling headlong after their Leaders.  
The same Author tells us 
(m) Immo aliqui doctores tantum tribuunt instructioni pastorum, quibus incumbit cura ovium, quod si docerent hic & nunc, Deum velle odio haberi, quod teneatur Parochianus rudis eis credere. ibid. Probl. 15. p. 97.  that some Doctors ascribe so much to the instruction of Pastors, who have care of the Flock, that if they should teach that now and then God would have them to hate him, a simple Parishioner is bound to believe them. All think not fit to give so broad instances, but whether all have not warrant to do it by their common Tenet, let others judge.  
However, if the people (content to trust, and not to see, what so much concerns them) suffer themselves to be deceived, they sin not, their ignorance will save them harmless. And what could any Impostor desire more than to have those whom he hath a mind to abuse to the uttermost, possessed with such a confidence, that however they be deluded, it will not hurt them? Now what an admirable expedient is ignorance for the Children of this Kingdom, when by virtue of it, the Leaders may carry the people whither they list, without suspicion, the people may follow in the dark without danger? No wonder if ignorance be nourished in them by all means, when they are not concerned to know whether that which they are led to, be good, or evil, just, or unjust, against God, or for him;  it be, they ought to obey at a venture. 
(n) 
Non oportet, quod sciat id ab eo juberi posse. Nau. l. 23. n. 37.  
Affirmant in omni dubio parendum esse praeposito Bonavent. Paludan. Sylvest. Angelus. Sotus in Vasquez. in 1. 2. tom. 1. disp. 66. l. 9   They need not so much as know whether their Leaders have power to require what they enjoin.  
If they be in doubt whether that they are led to, be against the Law, yet on they must go, for they all agree here, to drive them; 
(o) Secundum omnes si ●st de hoc dubius (illud esse contra legem Dei)— tenetur obedire: Sylvest. v. consc. n. 3. Et generaliter ubi est dubius an debeat obedire necne, tenetur obedire. Idem v. relig. 6. n. 6▪ Quid si praelatus praecipiat aliquid quod conscientia subditi dictat esse contra legem Dei Resp. secundum Bonaventuram quod tenetur eam deponere, nisi clarum sit illud fore contra legem Dei. Sum. Angel. v. Conscient. n. 2. Quid debet facere inferior, quando dubius est, an quod ei praecipitur est peccatum? di●o debet obedire. Ita tenet, Sylvest. & habetur hoc express,  secundum omnes, saith Sylvester, if he doubt of this, whether it be against the command of God, yet he is bound to obey, he may venture safely. It seems, that is no danger which the Apostle speaks of, He that doubteth is damned▪ Rom. 14. 23. They allege 
(p) 23. q. 1. Can. quid culpatur ubi statuitur, cum non est certum, superiorum factum esse malum, esse obediendum: in dubiis ●nim debet inferior credere superiori. Tolet. Instr. l. 8. c. 15.  an express Text for this▪ in their Law, which will carry it against the Apostle.  
And as that evil which God forbids, may be done by him that doubts lest God hath condemned it, so 
(q) Immo aliquando etiam bonum, sine quo potest esse salus propter obedientiam, debet omitti. Sylu. v. obedient. n. 2.  that good which he hath enjoined (if Salvation can be had without it) may be neglected when Superiors will have it so; 
(r) 11. q. 3. quid ergo. ibid.  their Canonical Text saith it, which must be regarded  becomes of that other, Whether it he better to obey God or men, judge you, Act. 4. 19  

(s) 
Si vero opinatur, ita quod n●scit, nec dubitat, sed credit, distinguendum est: quia si credit ex levibus, tenetur tale judicium deponere, etc. & obedire: & similitur si credit probabiliter, & excusatur propter obedientiae bonum. Sylvest. v. consc. n. 3.  
Si non scit pro certo sed ex levi & temeraria credulitate, tunc ad consilium sui praelati, deponat. Si vero habeat credulitatem probabilem & discretam, quamvis non manifestam & evidentem: tunc propter obedientiam, faciat quod sibi praecipitur, quoniam tenetur in tali dubio, & propter bonum obedientiae excusatur, Sum. Angel. v. consc. n. 2.   Yea, if they be passed doubt, that what is required is against God, if they think, if they believe it to be against his Command, yet if they believe it but upon weak grounds; yea, or if upon probable grounds (if they be not more certain thereof than they ought to be of their Salvation), they are to suppress their own judgement, and will be excused for the goodness of such Obedience, i. e. for obeying men rather than God, and that against their own judgement.  
Such art is used to persuade the people, that they need see nothing they are to do, further than their Leaders would have them; if they doubt, or if they believe; if their eyes be opening, or if they be opened; they must shut them close, and obey men blindly, without discerning what God forbids or requires. And it is not for nothing that they deprive them of their eyes, for thus they can make them grind. Such Ignorance is the way to have them in more subjection, and that they account the most perfect obedience, which is next to brutish, without knowledge, and without judgement; that they need not have, and this they must not use: a judgement of discretion must by no means be left the people, that is a point they would maintain against us: but as to their own followers, they put it out of question beforehand; for by keeping them without knowledge, they leave them no judgement, but such as one may pass on colours in the dark. Ribera expresseth their sense significantly. 
(t) Omnes qui parent & praesertim religiosi homines debent esse sine capite, Comment in Amos, p. ●69.  All who are to obey, especially Religious persons, aught to have no head of their own, (i. e.) they are to obey as if they were without eyes or brains. So he explains this worthy expression, non suo sed rectoris sui consilio duci. Let me but add the pregnant words of Cardinal Cusanus, which comprise all that I charge them with in this particular, 
(u) Nemo decipi potest etiam per malum praesidentem: si dixeris, Domine, obedivi tibi in praeposito, hos tibi sufficiet ad salutem: tu enim per obedientiam quam facis praeposito quem Ecclesia tolerat, decipi nequis, etiamsi praeceperit injusta: quare sententia pastoris ligat te pro tua salute propter bonum obedientiae, etiamsi injusta fuerit: nam ad te non attinet cognoscere quod sententia sit injusta, nec conceditur tibi ut non obedias, si tibi injusta videatur: obedientia irrationalis est consummata obedientia & perfectissima, scilicet quando obeditur, sicut jumentum obedit Domino suo. Epist. 2. ad Bohemos & Excitat. l. 2. & 6.  No man (saith he) can be deceived by an ill Pastor; if thou say, Lord, I have obeyed thee in him, whom thou hast set over me, this will be sufficient for thy Salvation; for thou by obedience paid to a Teacher whom the Church tolerates, cannot be deceived, although he command what is unlawful: wherefore the opinion of the Pastor binds thee upon thy Salvation for the good of obedience, although it be unjust; for it belongs not to thee to take notice whether it be unlawful or not, neither haste thou leave not to obey, if it seem unlawful to thee; for that obedience which is irrational is the most complete, and most perfect obedience, to wit, when one obeys, without the use of Reason, as a beast obeys his owner. A speech fit only for the mouth of the Beast and the false Prophet.  
The sum of their doctrine concerning ignorance, is little less than this; they need not be Men; as to their obedience; they need not be Christians, as to the knowledge of Christ; they need scarce be either, as to their worship.   

Sect. 4. The ground of all this, is, that they judge the knowledge of the Scriptures unnecessary, in a manner to all sorts; yea count it necessary to keep as many as they can possibly from acquaintance therewith. They are highly concerned for this, even as much as those who have villainous designs, and would accomplish them without observance and control, are concerned to shun the light. They know full well the Scripture condemns Popery, we may well say they know it, when themselves confess 
(x) Consil de stabilienda Rom. sede p. 6.  that both their worship and their doctrine is contrary and repugnant to Scripture, and allege this as the Reason, why they would have as little of the Scripture, as can be, known to any. From their own mouths we have the reason, why they would never have suffered the Bible to be exposed in a vulgar Tongue, if it could have been avoided. The Protestants Translations made that impossible, and the Papists among them, who had a mind to look into the word of God, might have made use of these, if no other had been provided: to prevent which, they were forced to translate it, and yet their own Translations (which are so strange a disguise of Scripture) they dare not trust to the common view; they are in the Index of forbidden Books, put out by Pius the fourth, and an unpardondable sin they make it for any to read them, but such as can procure a Licence for it from a Bishop or Inquisitor; that is, none but those who, they are confident, will not be moved by what they meet with there against Popery: and yet (as if so great restraint were too much liberty for so dangerous a thing as the Word of God) in the after Edition 
(*) In indice recens edito jussu Clementis 8. cirea praedictam quartam regulam— nullam per hanc impressionem & editionem de novo tribui facultatem Episcopis vel inquisitoribus, aut regularium superioribus concedendi licentiam legendi biblia in vulgari lingua edita: cum bactenus mandato & usu S. R. E. & universalis inquisitionis, sublata eis fuerit facultas concedendi hujusmodi licentias in Azor. Instit. Mor. pars. 1. l. 8. cap. 26.  of the Index, by Clement the Eight, he declares, That no new faculty is granted to Bishops or Inquisitors to grant any Licence for reading the Bible; since by the Mandate and usage of the Church of Rome, and the Universal Inquisition, all power of granting such Licences is taken away. So far are they from thinking the knowledge of the Scriptures needful for the people; that they count it Heresy to affirm, the Scripture ought to be in a Language which they know (how can it be less than Heresy to think that needful to be known, though it be the Revelation of God which discovers Popery to be an Imposture?) It is a sin from which they shall never be absolved, if they read any thing of the Word of God in a Language which they understand, without a Licence from a Bishop or Inquisitor, by Pius his Rule; and no Bishop or Inquisitor hath any power to grant any Licence, by that of Pope Clement.  
Knowledge of the Scripture is no more needful for Monks than other people; it is equally necessary, that they should be ignorant of the Word of God, they are under the same restraint, and 
(a) Regulares vero, non nisi facultace a praelatis suis habita ea legere aut emere possint. Index lib. prohibit. a Con. Trid. 4. regula. 1. ita Pius 4. Sublata est regula●ium superioribus facultas concedendi licentiam. ita Clemen. 8. id. ibid.  are no otherwise permitted to read or buy it. Ignorance is proper for this kind of Creature, 
(b) Contemplatione magis indigent quam scientia, Sylu. v. Clericus. 2. n. 1. Graff. l. 1. c. 15. n. 5.  they are for contemplation, not for knowledge. It seems they may employ their heads in contemplation of they know not what: To be sure they need neither Sacred, nor any kind of literature. 
(c) Potest monachus esse illiteratus. ut not. per gloss. 16. q. 1. ca legi versic. instructio. Graff. ibid. facit quod legitur 16. q. 1. ubi dicit Joann. quod sufficit monacho si sit bonus, licet sit illiteratus, Sylvest. ibid.  A Monk may be illiterate (say they) they have that privilege by their Cannon Law there quoted by Sylvester and others, and they generally make use of this Indulgence: For their Clergy, six parts of seven, need no more be acquainted with the Scripture than the black Art. The four first Orders are sufficiently accomplished, if they 
(d) Name in minoribus constitutis, sufficit scire legere, & commode pronunciare; & juxta Conc. Trid. Sess. 23. c. 11. Saltem Latinam linguam intelligere diacono, & subdiacono sufficit intelligere quae Latine legit, licet mysteria non ita calleat, Tolet. Inst. l. 1. c. 93.  are able to read, (according to the Council of Trent) the two next should understand Latin, i. e. the words, but not the matter, yet no necessity of either; it is not of necessity to their 
(e) 
Ordines autem majores etiam Presbyteratum posse conferri infantibus, est communis Doctrina theologorum & Canonistarum, S. Tho. Bonavent. Richard. etc. Idem. ibid. cap. 61.  
S. Tho. tenet & probat quod in solo Episcopatu requiritur usus rationis in suscipiente de necessitate consecrationis Episcopalis, Sylu. v. ordo. 4. n. 1. vid. Angel. v. ordo. 3. n. 1.   Sacrament of Order, that any below a Bishop should have the use of Reason, when he enters into Orders.  
Yea, their Priests need not have any knowledge of the Scriptures. It is no part of their 
(f) Ad Presbyteratum sufficit scire canon's communes paenitentiales & caetera de quibus dist. 38 quae ipsis. Sylu. v. Cleric. 2. n. 1. Graff l. 1. c. 15. n. 5. Angelus reduces their Canons to 20 (none of which have any ground in Scripture). Sam. v. confess 6. n. 5.  qualification; nor doth their Office, by the Roman constitution, require it; 
(g) Primum & secundum officium (viz. divinum officium & missam celebrare) commune est omnibus, reliqua viro quae ad praxim pertinent, non nisi iis, quibus ex munere particulari incumbunt, Tol. ibid. l. 1. c. 3.  all that belongs commonly to a Priest, is only to say Service and to say Mass; there 
(h) Sunt autem infiniti, qui tantum celebrandis missis, quas dicunt, operam daunt, & ejus rei causa sacerdotes sunt, perinde quasi in ea omne consistat officium. de invent. rer. l. 4. c. 7.  are infinite numbers made Priests, merely to read Mass (as Polydore Virgil tells us): and 
(i) Sacerdos in quantum deputatus est ad officium divinum tenetur scire tantum dè Grammatica, quod sciat verba congrue proffer, & accentuare, & quod intelligat saltem literaliter quae legit, Graff. pars. 2. t. 1. c. 11. n. 19  this they may do completely, though they cannot so much as read without a Fescue, such as the Missal hath ready for every syllable.  
But if the Priest have a special cure, & so be a Preacher or Confessor, yet may he be both good enough without any acquaintance with the Scripture; he may Preach the Gospel after the Roman mode, without knowing the Word of God; for with them it belongs both to Deacons and Monks to Preach; yet 
* Angel. sum, v. praedic. Sylvest. sum. v. Diaconus, n. 3. ex Paludano. Gratian. in Navar. c. 27. n. 259.  those need not understand any thing of Scripture, and these must not read it in a Language they understand, without a Licence.  
The Priests in Scotland 
(*) H●st. of. Ch. of Scot l. 2. p. 75.  were accounted sufficiently qualified, who, it is said, did think the New Testament to have been composed by Martin Luther.  
The Priests even in Italy, 
(k) Pudeat Italiae sacerdotes, quos ne semel quidem legisse constat novam legem: apud Thaboritas vix mulierculam invenias, quae de novo & veteri testamento respondere nescit. Comment de dict. & fact. Alsonsi regis li●. 2. Apophtheg. 17.  if they had more notice of the Author, yet scarce more acquaintance with the Contents of the New Testament, they never read it, and were much more ignorant thereof, than the silly Women amongst the Thaborites, as Aeneas Silvius, afterward Pope Pius 2. writes.  
Knowledge of the Scriptures 
(m) Et non curent nescientes literas, literas discere.  was not counted necessary for their Preachers either Regular, or Secular. The chief of their Regulars were the Franciscans and Dominicans. In the rule of Friar Francis, approved by several Popes, the Minorites (one sort of Preaching Friars) are, amongst other other vices, to avoid learning, if they were illiterate  
And those of the Dominicans 
(n) Illi rudes & illiterati praedicabant. urspergens in Cent. 13. Magd. Cap. 6.  (the other of Friars Praedicant) who were rude and illiterate, did Preach notwithstanding.  
As for their other Doctors 
(o) Si vero sacerdos est Doctor, tenetur scire saltem rudimenta sidei. Graff. decis. pars. 2. l. 1. c. 11. n. 19  or Teachers, that which they are bound to know, is, the rudiments of faith (such as our Children (who can scarce read) will give an account of.  
The Papacy had no Doctors or Divines more eminent than those of the Sorbon; 
(p) Si illud apud Hieronymum aut in decretis legisse; quid vero novum Testamentum esset, ignorare. Rob. Steph. Resp. ad Censur. Theol. Paris. in Praefat.  yet they seem little beholding to the Scripture for their Divinity. Robert Stevens in the last age conversing with those Doctors, would be ask in what part of the New Testament such or such a thing is written, but had such answers returned. They had read it in Jerom, or the Decrees, but what the New Testament was they knew not.  
For a Confessor he is sufficiently qualified according to Aquinas, Bonaventure and Albertus, as Sylvester collects 
(q) 
Secundum istos sufficientem credo, qui at●ente legit & intellexit Defecerunt: nisi sit aut naturaliter stultus, aut praesumptu●sus, ut non sciat dubitare, vel nolit interrogare Sylu. sum. v. Confessor. 3. n. 2. vid. Tol. ibid. l. 3. c. 15.  
That which a Confessor is to know, is, which sins are mortal, which venial. Now this they cannot learn from Scripture, as themselves go near to acknowledge. Valent. Tom. 2. disp. 6. q. 18. And so no need of Scripture for them. vid. Angel. s●m. v. confess. 4. n. 3. Sylvest. ibid.   if he have but read and understand (not the Bible) but Antoninus his Book entitled, Defecerunt; unless he be a mere natural or presumptuous fool: And neither will doubt of any thing (when he knows nothing,) nor inquire of others. So that he may be a complete Confessor and guide of consciences, who knows nothing of Scripture, and little else; if he have but the wit to discern his own ignorance, and a will to learn of those that are wiser, when he can meet with them. Thus we see a Roman Priest is furnished for all points of the Office common or special, without any acquaintance with the word of God.  
As to Bishops, they seem to agree, that some knowledge of the Scripture is requisite in them, and some venture to say a full and perfect knowledge of the old new Testament signified by their Mitres; the two Horns whereof mystically demonstrate, that they understand the two Testaments both alike. And indeed since their Praelates Secular and Regular, have honour, power and plenty by the Papal contrivement, and hopes of more and greater than other professions can offer: their interest ties them so fast to it, that they may trust them (if any) with the sight of the word of God securely; and not fear that any discovery of Popish corruptions, through such a Medium, will make any impressions on them to their prejudice; or move them to believe, or act any thing against that which is so much themselves; there is no such danger in admitting these to some acquaintance with Scripture as others, who have no expectations from Religion, but for their Souls and Eternity. Nevertheless their Rules which seem to make this knowledge necessary for Bishops; are rather Counsels, than precepts, they are cautious, and will not press this too much: (for conscience enlightened sometimes proves too hard for secular interest.) And their Praelates may be easily dispensed with, if they be ignorant of Scripture, or have little notice of it. It's one of Sylvesters and Angelus questions 
(r) Utrum peccet mortaliter Episcopus ignorans respon lendo in ordinatione sua cum interrogatur utrum sciat novum & vetus Testamentum: quod scit. Resp. secundum Rich. quod sic. si est ita ignarus quod nesciat in generali. mandata Dei, articulos fid●i, virtutes & vitia, e●iam sacramenta, quoniam tunc mentitur perniciose. Angel. sum. v. episc. n. 26. Sylu. ibid. n. 5.  whether an ignorant Bishop sin mortally, if in his Ordination being asked whether he understand the whole Bible, he should affirm he does? this he so resolves after Richardus a Sancto victore. If the Bishop be so ignorant, that he knows not in general the Commands of God, the Articles of faith, what are virtues & vices, and which the Sacraments; then he so sins, he lies perniciously. Leaving us to judge that he doth not thus lie; when he solemnly affirms, that he hath as much knowledge of the old and new Testament, as the Church of Rome requires in a Bishop: if he do but know the Creed, the Ten Commandments; which are virtues and vices, and which are Sacraments, and have but some general perception of these. They will not have the Bishop's burdened with too much Scripture-learning, since every Child they confirm, should have no less than this. This may pass for perfect knowledge of the Scripture, and of an Episcopal pitch, with those, who count it no imperfection, to be ignorant of that which they say, 
(a) I● indice lib. prohibit. Regul. 4. Pij. 4.  doth more hurt than good, for so they are wont to blaspheme the Scriptures, or the Holy Ghost, whose inspiration they are. The Bishop of Dunkeld 
(*) Putant peccatum esse si scripturas legerint, & in lege Domini meditabundos, quasi garru os inutilesque contemnunt. Espencaeus in 1. Tim. digress. l. 2. c. 2. p. 180. &. in Tit. c. 1. p. 486. Edit. Paris an. 1619.  thought he had enough of it, when he said, I thank God I have lived well these many years, and never knew either the old or new Testament. I content me with my Portuis, and Pontifical. Hist. of Ch. of Scotl. l. 2. p. 66. The Bishops in other countries' thought themselves bound in conscience, to be as ignorant of the Scriptures, when they counted it a sin to read them.  
Yea he that wants a sufficiency of this knowledge, though so very little or nothing be sufficient, may be dispensed with upon the account of some other quality. As for example, 
(b) Magnitudo Charitatis supplet imperfectum scientiae. Sylvest. sum. v. Cleric. 2. n. 1.  Charity they say, will make up want of knowledge in those, who have not sufficient to make them capable of any place or dignity amongst them. Yea they may be dispensed with, though they have no better qualities than in Gerson's time, when he tells us 
(c) Nullibi Episcopos bonos & opere & doctrina praeditos eligi; sed homines carnales & spiritualium ignaros Gerson declare. defect. Eccles.  there were none any where, that were good, or approvable for Doctrine or Practice: but all chosen were both carnal persons, and ignorant of spiritual things.  
So he in the Fifteen age, and about the same time Clemangis says, there were scarce any advanced to the Pontifical dignity, who had so much as superficially either read or heard or learned the Scriptures; or who had ever touched any thing of the Bible, except the cover. Quotusquisque hodie est ad Pontificale culmen evectus qui sacras vel perfunctorie literas legerit, audierit, dedicerit; imo qui sacrum codicem nisi tegumento tenus unquam attigerit? De corrupt. Eccl. Statu.  
In the age after wherein the Council of Trent was held, we have (in Papyrius Masson de Episc. Vrbis) The Character of the Roman Praelates, by Pasquil begging the next Cardinal's Cap, as being more capable thereof than the Bishops then created. 
Si imbelle sum atque rude marmor,  
Complures quoque episcopos creari  
Ipso me mage Saxeos videbis.   
And the same age, in the Council of Trent where (as they boast) was the flower of all the Roman Praelates in Europe, 
(d) 
The Bishops, amongst whom very few had knowledge in Theology. Hist. Counc. Trent. lib. 2. p. 179. It is not strange they had no skill therein. For the Italian Praelates who carried all in that Council (being many more than two to one) neither studied nor read the Scriptures (lest the word of God should seduce them from Popery) nor was Divinity their study, but the civil and Canon law, as one of them informed Espencaeus. M●mini Episcopum Italum nobilem, nec vero imperitum, mihi dicere, conterraneos suos a study Theologico deterreri, & quodammodo abhorrere, ne sic fiant haeretici, quasi vero ●aereses ex scripturarum studio nascantur.— Quam igitur artem vestrates (aio) profitentur? juris (ait) utriusque sed in primis Canonici in Tit. cap 1. p. 486.  
Dudithius an eminent Bishop in that convention, calls the Praelats who prevailed there indoctos & stolidos, sed tamen impudentia & audacia utiles. Epist. ad Max. 2.  
Yea the whole Sorbon determine, that it is not requisite to inquire concerning those who sit in Council, utrum sint docti & utrum habeant scientiam sacrarum literarum. In  Epist. de Conc. Trid. Sect 22.  
Duarenus, who writ while that Council was sitting, lets us understand how ignorant all their Bishops then (few only excepted) were of the Scriptures, not only in Italy, but other countries'. Hoc seculo Episcopatus & sacerdotia indoctissimis hominebus, & a religione alienis deferri solent. Hodie Episcopi nostri (paucis exceptis) sacrarum literarum scientia caeteris ex populo longe inferiores sunt. De sac. Eccles. Minist. & Benef. lib. 1. cap. 11. in fin.  
Some thought it strange, that Five Cardinals and 48 Bishops should so easily define the most principal and important points of Religion, never decided before. Neither was their amongst these Praelates any one remarkable for learning; some of them were Lawyers, perhaps learned in that Profession, but of little understanding in Religion; few Divines, but of less than ordinary sufficiency. Hist. of Council of Trent. l. 2. p. 163.   very few of the Bishops had knowledge in Theology, as Father Paul tells us; yet these only had decisive voices in that Council, and all was concluded by plurality of their Votes: when far the major part understood not the matters concluded; so that the Articles of the Roman faith were Voted blindfold. And yet all must be damned who believe not these points of faith: when those who made them so, were ignorant of them, and knew not what they did, when they decreed them. Such is the Roman charity, and knowledge; so burning and shining are their best lights, they will have all burned here, and in Hell too for not believing that, which the Council (for the greater part of it) understood not.  
But sure, the knowledge of the Pope must be transcendent, especially, as to the Scripture, his place and office requires it, being accounted head of the whole Church (which ought to have good eyes;) and teacher of Christians (as much or more, than Peter was); and Judge in all controversies which concern Religion; and Interpreter of all difficulties in Scripture, and a more lively Oracle of God, than the Scripture itself in the things of God. Yes say they 
(e) Papa debet habere longe majorem scientiam alijs, cum sit praepositus curiae toti Christianae reipublicae. Pro eo tamen sufficit praesumptio juris, quod papa praesumitur habere omnia in scrinio pectoris. Graff. l. 1. c. 15. n. 3.  the Pope ought to have far more knowledge than any other, being the Precedent of the whole Christian Common wealth, so de Graffijs. But then he adds as to him the presumption of the Law is enough for all this, and that presumes, that all is in the Cabinet of the Pope's breast (as it may well be presumed, that a skill beyond that of all Physicians is in a bold Mountebank) 
(f) 
Licet de facto quandoque possit contingere contrarium: cum memoria hominis sit labilis. id. ibid.  
Quum hoc tempore nullus sit Romae, qui sacras literas didicerit, qua fronte aliquis eorum docere andebit, quod non didicerit? Arnulph. in Concil. Rhem.   although indeed what is quite contrary, may prove true. Accordingly the Pope may be all that they style him, without the knowledge of a Novice in the Scripture, without any such acquaintance with it, as to pretend to the name of a Divine (though acquaintance with it be expected from none but Divines) and many that have the name, have little or nothing of the thing. The Popes think not themselves concerned at all to trouble their heads with Divinity. 
(*) The study of the Laws, the Canon Law especially, is the nearest way (breve compendium) to the highest dignities in their Church, even the Popedom itself, scarce any thing being left for Divines, but Curacies. Theologis nihilo pene praeter curata, quae vocant sacerdotia, reliquo facto: as Espencaeus informs us. in Tit. c. 1. p. 486. And the Praelate or Pope that hath studied the Laws, needs no Divinity, because the Law is learning enough, immo ju●ium (aiunt isti) bonus interpres Theologia non eget: Cur ita? quod in jure omnes disciplinae includuntur. Idem. ibid. p. 487.  If he be but a Canonist (as Peter no doubt was) he is the Apostles undoubted Successor: though he be no more a Divine than his Chair is, or can make him; and why may not the Chair inspire him with knowledge, as much as holiness? Pope Innocent the Tenth in our days (since they have been more concerned for the Reputation of the Vatican Throne, than as before to let Monsters of debauchery and ignorance ascend it) declared 
(g) S. Amour part. 3. cap. 12.  that he had never studied Divinity, nor was it his profession. Pope Clement the Eighth, began to study it when he was very old; and then not to much purpose it seems: for he could not at last decide the question that he had studied, how much soever their Church was concerned in it.  
None can understand their Church prayers but expert Divines, as Soto tells us, he means the matter of them indeed, but Popes need not understand the words neither; for many of them do not, who pass for lawful Popes, and such can neither understand the subject nor the words of the Bible, for it is in Latin. 
(h) Castrens. haer. c. 4. edit. Paris 1534.  And if Alphonsus deceives us not, many of them have not gone so far as their Grammar; 
(i) Adeoque plerique literarum ignari sunt, ut vix sciant nomen suum Latine exprimere Platina in Jul, 1. vid in Johann. 24.  yea very many of them have been so ignorant, as they could not speak their own name in Latin. Yet such knowledge of Scripture is enough in the Roman account for the infallible Interpreter of Scriptures, the supreme Judge in all matters of faith, and the teacher of the Universe. When we are ready to wonder at this, they stop us presently, by telling us, 
(k) Bosius de sign. l. 16. c. 9  that God did make Balaams' Ass speak.  
They seem to grant as much stupidity in a Pope, as can be imagined, but then the miracle of making an Ass speak, does patly answer that objection. Had the Bishops of Rome anciently been such ignorant dull Creatures, as many of their later Popes, and yet adored at that rate; the Heathens might have had some colour for charging the Christians with worshipping an Ass' head.  
As for the people, they are so far from obliging them to get knowledge, that they either make it impossible for them to attain it, or encourage them never to look after it. They cannot attain it, but either by reading or hearing: They must not read the Scriptures (as before;) and they cannot, or need not hear. If the Priests be ignorant (as they are allowed to be) 
(l) 
The Generals of the Regulars, and others declared to the faces of the Bishops in the Council of Trent, That the Bishops and Curates had wholly abandoned the Office of a Pastor, so that for many Hundred years the people remained without Sermons in the Church, and without the Doctrine of Divinity in the Schools Hist. of Council of Trent. l. 2. p. 169.  
And there also against the Regulars and Friars (the only Preachers, beside those who had abandoned the Office) it was a general complaint. That though they were severely forbid to Preach and Teach; yet they assumed the power— And so the flock remained without either Shepherd or Hireling— because those Preachers knew neither the need nor the capacity of the people, and least of all the occasions to teach and edify them. Besides, the end of these Preachers, is not to edify, but to take Alms, either for themselves or their Cloistets: which that they may obtain, they aim not to benefit the Soul, but to delight the ear, and sooth men in their pleasures, that thereby they may draw more profit: and the people in stead of learning the Doctrine of Christ, learneth either novity, ●… vanity at the least— That it is aclear case, that they exhort the people to nothing but to give, ibid.  
How these things were reform by that Council, in the Praelates, who would have the other severely forbidden to Preach, appears by Esp●n●aeus. Quotu● quisque praelatorum majorum, minorumve populum suum docere videtu●? an illi ipsi decreti hujus authores unquam docu●runt, quorum exemplo alij ad docendum, aliaque munera s●… facienda excitarentur.— Ludimusne in re adeo serca? an potius hac decreto●um sp●…i● reformationem poscentibus, illudimus? Quid emendationis sperari potest a nobis, nostra tam recens edita non observantibus? in 1 Tim. l. 2. c. 2. p. 179.   they are not able to instruct them: if they be able they need not preach that's sub consilio; or the people need not hear, no nor inquire of them, in private, no, not those that are most ignorant. The further they are from all knowledge, the more excusable, if they take no care, nor pains about it. Sancta Clar●… makes this Query. 
(m) Petes, anon tencantur saltem ad faciendam diiigentiam, ut ignorantia talium expungatur? Ad quod dico primo, quod si aliquis fuerit, qui nullam de his notitiam habeat, unde moveretur ad quaerendam de illis doctrinam, certum esse, nullam requiri industriam & sollicitudinem, saltem si nullatenus dubitavit: quia non tenetur ad id quod est impossibile: est autem impossibile, quod quis quaerat aliquid, quod nunquam ipsi in mentem venit. ut recte Angles Probl. 15. p▪ 95. vid. Bonacin. de peccat. d. 2. q. 8. p. 3. n. 3. etc.  Are they not bound at least to some diligence, to free themselves from this ignorance? he answers if it be one, who hath no knowledge of these things, which may move him to seek instruction; it is certain that no diligence, or care is required of him, especially if he do not at all doubt (i. e.) if he be confident, that he knows well enough, and his ignorance makes him so senseless, that he discerns it not. His Reason is, because he is not obliged to that which is impossible, and it is not possible that one should seek that, which never came into his mind (as Angles also determins with him.) So that if knowledge never came into his mind, there is no need, that it ever should come there; and he is not bound to take the least care, or pains to make way for it.    

CHAP. III. Their Doctrine makes it needless to love God.  

LOve of God, or (as they had rather call it) Charity is in their account, as they seem sometimes to express themselves of greatest moment. Regeneration and spiritual life (they say) consists in it; without it no man is in the state of grace, or favour with God. This is the righteousness whereby they are justified, and their sins pardoned, i. e. abolished (for that is pardon with them:) and their Souls sanctified (for justification and sanctification is all one in their reckoning.) This is it, which is the life and spirit of all other graces and virtues (say they) without which, the best of them, are dead and unactive things, and deserve not the name of virtues. 
(a) Nulla virtus nec ejus actus acceptatur sine charitate; quae sola dividit, inter silios regni & perditionis. Sta. Clar. probl. 35. p. 244.  And though they look not for Heaven, unless they deserve it, by their own works: yet their works they say are of no worth, without this. 
(b) Nam opera quantumcunque moraliter bona, si siant extra charitatem in statu peceati mortiferi, absque dubio pereunt, & mortua reputantur, quantum attinet ad gratiam & gloriam promerendam. Nau. c. 1. n. 29.  Yea their indulgencies will not avail any thing without it. 
(c) Bellarm. de paen tent. l. 2. c. 14. p. 95●.  So far therefore as love to God is unnecessary; so far Regeneration, and spiritual life, a saving state and reconciliation with God; justification, pardon; all graces and virtues; all their own good works, or their Church's indulgencies are unnecessary. No further need of what, either God or themselves have made necessary to salvation.  
One would think, if they had any desire of Heaven, or fear of Hell, or dread of their own Purgatory: if they had any design for the salvation of Souls or any regard of what is saving: they should be tender in this point above all, and not abate any moment of its necessity. But what they do herein, let us see. Indeed they make both the habitual and the actual love of God unnecessary. First for habitual love, they teach, the Lord hath not at all commanded us to have the habit or principle of this love: he not where requires that we should love him habitually. 
(d)  non praecipit ut diligamus ex habitu infuso— leges enim de actibus dantur, non de habitibus. De great. & lib. arbitr. l. 6. c. 7. p. 664.  certainly, saith Bellarmine, the Lord hath not commanded that we should love him from an infused habit, for Laws do not require habits. Add to him one of the most eminent amongst the Dominicans, 
(e) De am●citia habituali Dei, nullum est praeceptum affirmativum, pars. 4. relect. de penitent. p. 870.  there is no affirmative precept for habitual love to God; saith Melchior Canus. I need allege no more, I find none of them questions it.  
Now in that they do not make this love necessary as a duty they cannot account it necessary as a means. For they 
(f) Aquinas 2. 2. q. 3. art. 223. Ea quae sunt necessaria ad salutem cadere sub praecepto Canus ibid. p. 857. Ea omnia quae necessaria sunt necessitate medij, censentur necessaria necessitate praecepti, licet non quaecunque necessaria sunt necessitate praecepti, sint etiam necessaria necessitate medij. Bellarm. de paenit. l. 2. c. 8. p. 935. Suarez. l. 1. de Orat. c. 29. n. 2. ex D. Thom. 2. 2. q. 2. art. 5. & q. 3 art. 2. & 3. q. 68 a. 1.  hold that all means necessary to salvation are commanded. So that the habitual love of God by their Doctrine is no way necessary.  
And this they teach not only of the habit of love, but of all other graces the 
(g) Praeceptiones legis non sunt de habitibus— non enim jubemur persolvere debita ex habitu justitiae, aut liberalitatis sed tantum persolvere ad justum. Nat. & Grat. l. 1. c. 2●. p. 57  precepts of the Law are not for habits saith Soto, we are not (as he adds) to pay what we own from a habit of justice or liberality. 
(h) Cum praecipit Deus ut just, sobrieque vivamus, non imperat ut ista faciamus ex habitu, sed tantum ut faciamus. De great. & lib. arb. l. 6. c. 7. p. 664.  When we are enjoined to live soberly and righteously, we are not required to do so out of habit, but only to do it, saith Bellarmine; and these instances they bring to show, that we are not obliged to do any thing out of a habit or principle of love to God.   

Sect. 2. Secondly, for actual love, how can they account the acts of it needful, when they make the habits or principle from whence the acts must flow, to be unnecessary? But let us view their Doctrine about this more distinctly. The acts of love are either more foreign and remote, which they call Imperate: or native and proper which they call Elicite acts.  
For the former, all acts of Religion and Righteousness, that they may be truly Christians such as the Gospel requires in order to Salvation; that they may have a real tincture of Divine and supernatural goodness, and be advanced above the pitch, at which Heathen, or graceless persons may arrive: they must proceed from love to God, and be ordered and directed by it. This they sometimes not only confess, but assert. And yet notwithstanding they teach, 
(*) Utrum tenemur conformare voluntatem in modo volendi cum Deo? Resp. secundum Alexand. & Lombard in 1 dist. 48. quod non absolute: quoniam si homo honorat patrem suum, non ex charitate, sed ex benevolentia, non peccat: sed tenetur conditionaliter scil. si vult mere●i vitam aeternam. Angel. sum. v. voluntas n. 6.  that it is not needful to perform any such acts, or to observe any commands of God out of love to him. 
(i) Praecepta D●i non obligant, ut perficiantur in charitate: non enim peccat, nec a Deo punitur, qui debitum honorem impendit parentibus, quamvis non habeat habitum pietatis, ergo multo minus ecclesia obligat quenquam, ut illud impleat in charitate. Decis. Aur. pars. 2. l. 3. c. 17. n 10. p. 176. Non tamen tenemur semper operari ex charitate, sed satis est operari ex aliqua honestate morali. Suarez. l. 1. de orat. c. 30. n. 3.  The commands of God, saith the Graffijs, do not oblige us to perform them in love, he clears his meaning by an instance. For he sins not, nor is punished of God, who gives due honour to his Parents; although he have not the habit of piety (and so though he do it not out of such a principal) much less (adds he) doth the Church oblige any one to observe the command in love 
(k) Non enim si finis praecepti charitas est, tenemur pro●inus omnia praecepta legis implere ex charitate— Ex D. Thomae, & graviorum autorum sententia ad finem legislatoris minime teneamur, sed ad media, quae lex finis gratia consequendi praescribit. pars. 4. relect. de paenit. p. 871.  for if the end of the precept be love saith Canus, we are not forthwith bound to observe all the commands out of love. The reason is premised, for in the opinion of Aquinas and the most grave Authors, we are not bound to observe the end or intention of the Lawgiver (i. e. of Christ) but the means which the Law prescribes in order to it. Soto discourseth this at large, and concludes. 
(l) Actus charitatis consideratur ut est universalis conditio, & modus omnium virtutum— Modus talis cha itatis non cadit sub praecepto: quod est dicere, in hoc praecepto Honora patrem & matrem, non includitur ut sint parentes ex Dei charitate honorandi: sed quod exhibeatur eye exterior reverentia. De just. & jur. l. 2. q. 3. art. 10. p. 44.  Love being considered as the universal condition and mode of acting all virtues, and performing all obedience; such a mode of acting out of love is not commanded as when we are enjoined to honour Parents, the precept binds us not to honour them out of love to God. This he delivers as the Doctrine of Aquinas, and finds but 
(m) Dionysius Cisterciensis.  one Doctor amongst them of opinion, that we are bound to do all out of love to God; but 
(n) Haec autem opinio non solum falsa, verum & errori quam proxima est Trid. Synodo Can. 7. adversus Lutheranos damnata, nempe cuncta opera, quae extra Dei gratiam fiunt, esse peccata. ibid.  condemns this as false and very near the Lutheran error condemned by the Council of Trent, because then all acts done without grace would be sins. So we must believe (if we will not venture to fall under the condemnation of their Council) that it is no sin not to obey God, out of love to him; that all acts of virtue and obedience whatsoever, may be performed without sin, though they be done without love to God; that any man Baptised may be saved, though he never act out of love to God (no, not so much as once while he lives); though he perform not one act of a true Christian while he is on earth. He can never perish for want of love to God, in any, or all the acts of his life; for he will never be damned but for sin; and to act without love to God is no sin. Thus their chief Doctors determine, and this they must all do, in conformity to the decrees of their infallible Council, and be deluded infallibly in a matter of no less consequence than the way to Heaven; believing that they may arrive there without acts of love, filial obedience or ingenuous observance of God in any thing that he hath commanded, without ever acting as (and so without being at all) true Christians.   

Sect. 3. But though they do not transgress other commands, when they observe them without Love; yet they may violate that special command, which requires inward acts of Love, if at that time when this obligeth, they do not act out of Love. Some of them seem to say this, and we shall see what they make of it in the next place,  
The nature and proper issue of Love, is its internal act, when the heart being possessed with a principle of divine Love, to God in Christ, actually loves him above all. If this actual Love (the inward act of it,) be not necessary; as there will be no need of the habit, (that being but in order to acts;) so there will be no place for the Imperate Acts; for those who would have us sometimes observe other commands out of Love, yet never think this requisite, but when the precept obligeth us to actual Love. 
(o) 
Neque hoc praeceptum universum obligat ad suum ipsius modum, sed quando occurrit articulus interne diligendi. Soto. ibid.  
Tenemur secundum Bonaventur. — pro loco & tempore, quum viz. tenemur exire in actum charitatis. Angeli. sum. v. voluntas. n. 6. & hoc si habemus Charitatem Si autem non habemus, non tenemur ad hoc, sed ad aequivalens: quoniam tenemur facere quod in nobis est, ut eam habeamus, ibid.    
Now whether there be any command for this act of Love, or whether it oblige, or when, they are not agreed; only in the issue, they conspire to make the Commandment of no effect.  
Some of them determine, that the command to Love God with all our mind, is not obliging; which is all one, as if they should say, there is no command for it at all; thus Stapleton, one of the greatest Divines amongst them in his time, 
(p) Hoc praeceptum diligendi Deum ex tota ment, doctrinale est non obligatorium. De Justific. l. 6. t. 10.  The precept of loving God with all our mind is dectrinal, and not binding.  
To the same effect others conclude there is no special precept of Love to God. So Joh. Samcius 
(q) (Disp. 1. n 21.  There is no special command in the Law of God for this, but general, says he. By which he would have us understand, that there is no Precept in particular for loving God, none besides those Commands that require other things; which if they be done, we are discharged from any act of Love, or inward Affection to him. Aquinas is vouched for this, and much alleged out of him, 
(r) 2. 2. q 44. art. 1. ad 3. & art. 4. ad 2. & art. 6. ad 2. & 484. art. 3. ad 2.  to show he was of this persuasion. If there be any special Precept for this affection to God, it is that which requires us to Love him with all the heart and soul, and strength: But this (as Cardinal Cajetan 
(s) Comment in Deut. 16. in Catherine adv. Cajet. p. 268.  declares) does not oblige to the love of Charity. And Bannez 
(t) Sanctus, ibid.)  teaches, that for natural Love, there is no special command; and so amongst them they leave no such command for any sort of Love to God at all. The command to God with all our hearts, Maldonat 
(u) Respond●o illud non speciale said generale praeceptum esse, in Luc. 17. 10. Dr. Smith against Pet. Martyr, so understands it. And Sancta Clara, quoting him, approves it as being agreeable to the Sentiment of his great Master Scotus, Probl. 12. p. 68  will have to be a general, no special Precept.  
Others of them confess there is a special command obliging us to Love God actually; but they put such a construction upon it, that it signifies little or nothing more, than if there were no such thing. They say it is requisite, that we should Love God one time or other; but what time this is needful, you will never learn of them; what period one fixeth, another unfixeth: and while they find no certain time for it, in the end they leave no place for it.  
They all agree in this, that we are not bound to Love God always actually; for say they, the Precept for it, is affirmative, and such Precepts bind not at all times.  
But since we are not obliged to Love God at all times, at what determined time is this required of us? Are we to Love him after we are fallen into sin, is that the Article of Necessity? No, Canus 
(x) Pars. 4. relect. de paenit. p. 863.  supposeth that this will be generally denied; that a man is obliged to Love God soon after he hath sinned.  
Are we to Love Him when he vouchsafes some special favour; when he discovers his infinite goodness and amiableness, and makes the most lovely representations of himself to us? one would think, then, if any time at all, we should be obliged to Love him actually. No, saith the same Bishop 
(y) Nec peccat mortaliter, qui non diligit Deum, quantumcunque divina bonitas proponatur, omne dilectione dignissima, nisi necessitatis articulus intercedat. idem de praecepto fidei & spei videre licet. Melch. Canus. ibid.  and he no Jesuit or late Casuist) he sins not mortally, (i. e. he transgresseth no Command of God) who loves him not, how much so ever he discovers his divine goodness, and most inamoring loveliness, unless it be when it is necessary to love him. And when shall we ever meet with the time when it is necessary, if not in such circumstances as these? if it be not needful to Love him, either when we disoblige him, or when he most obligeth us to acts of Love; if neither when he is angry with us, nor when he is well pleased, when will, when can it ever be needful?  

(y) Idem affirmat, unumquemque quoties insigne aliquod beneficium a Deo consequitur, ten●ri ad illud explendum, quod tamen nulla lege, neque ratione efficaci evinci posse videtur, & ita non est asserendum, Navar. c. 11. n. 7.  Let us see if any others amongst them can neck this Article of time, when this Love will be necessary. Are we bound to put forth an act of Love on Holidays; so Scotus thought: The time, saith he, for observing this Command, is on holidays, than we are to recollect ourselves, and ascend in mind unto God. He would have had this Love to be a Holiday habit at least, if not fit for every days wearing. But this is too much (say others) nor do they find any reason why this imagination should come in the subtle Doctor's head, Canus saith, 
(s) 
Libere possum sine omni dubitatione negare, ibid. p. 871.  
Dura videtur Scoti sententia, a quo recedit Adrianus, nempe, nos, omnibus festivis diebus teneri ad illud, quia nul●us est textus, nec ulla ratio, quae id necessario concludat, & ita non videtur asserendum Nau. c. 11. n. 7. Sententia negans necessitatem hujus actus in die festo, & vera & communis est: & sumitur ex D. Thom. 2. 2. q. 122. act. 4. quatenus ait per praeceptum de observatione sabbati non fuisse mandatum cultum init●…u● per orationem, vel devotionem internam, nam eadem est ratio de amore, ut Cajetan. Navar. Soto, & caeteri communiter. Suar. l. 2. de fest. c. 16. n. 13. Aquinas 2. 2 q. 122. art. 4. Bellarm. de cult. Storum. lib. 3. c. 10. p. 1609. Graff. l. 2. c. 33. n. 8. Covarruvias, l. 4. varia. resol. c. 19 n. 6. Soto de just. & jure. l. 2. q. 4. art. 4.   without all doubt it is to be rejected, and so they do. Scotus herein is borne down by the full torrent of their Doctors. I find none now that will have us obliged to Love God so often.  
But since they think it too much to Love God every Holiday, are we bound to Love him upon his own day? No, not once a week neither. 
(t) Quamvis finis Ecclesiae obligantis nos interesse sacris fuerit, ut superna animo meditantes, immortali Deo, tum ob infinitam suam divinitatem, laudes dicamus, tum de sua in nos beneficentia habeamus gratias: tamen finis praecepti non cadit sub praecepto. Nat. & gr. l. 1. c. 22. p. 57  For though the Church oblige them to be present at his Worship, to mind things above, to praise his infinite Divinity, and to give thanks for his bounty towards them; yet in all this they are not bound to any act of Love; and Soto gives this reason for it, The end of the Commandment (which is Love) is not commanded. The assertion is hardly so absurd as the reason given for it; that the end, which is the principal in moral actions, should not be commanded. This is to say, that the Law does not require to be fulfilled; for Love, which is the end of the Commandment, is by the Apostle expressly said to be the fulfilling of the Law. But notwithstanding all this, in this Maxim, (which is one of their chief Engines, whereby they demolish Christianity in the practice of those who profess it; make void the Commandments of God depriving them of their life and spirit, and leave nothing of the whole body of Religion, but the mere superficies:) 
(u) Theologi consentienter agnoscunt cum S. Thoma. ibid. c. 22. p. 54.  Their Divines (he tells us) unanimously agree with Aquinas. So that it seems the worship of God may be sufficiently discharged without any love to him. We may serve him well enough (as far as the Command for his Service will have us) without any affection. In all acts of worship, there needs not any act of Love (by their doctrine) in any part, or any of the times of worship, either their own holidays, or the Lords. They have no more respect to his than theirs, nor for him in either, but serve them and him all alike; and think they hollow them, and honour him enough, without any motion of love in their hearts, when, (if ever it were needful in their account,) it should be most in motion. Certainly those that think not this Love due to God in his worship, think it not due to him at all.  
But if it be more than needs to love God 
(*) Vid. Suarez. Tom. 3. disp. 63. Sect. 3. p. 801. in 3. Thomae.  once a week, are they obliged at least to love him once a year, if not at ordinary times, yet upon extraordinary or special occasions, such as more particularly seem to call for some act of Love? When they are to partake of some Sacrament, when they come to the Eucharist, or to the Sacrament of Penance (as they are to do once yearly by their Church orders)? No, it is not then necessary neither; 
(a) 
Eadem ratione teneremur implere hoc mandatum quotiescunque aliquod Sacramentum recipimus— quod falsum est: satis enim est, ut non simus in mortali peccato aut probabiliter id credamus, quamvis hujusmodi adeo excelsum amorem actualem animo non concipiamus. Navar. c. 11. n. 9  
Non tamen ad id tenemur quoties administramus aut accipimus Sacramenta— quia non tenemur tunc habere contritionem, ibid. n. 8.   it is false saith Navarre, that we are bound to fulfil this Command, when we receive any Sacrament; for it is enough, that we be not in mortal sin, or that we probably believe so, although no such actual Love be conceived in the heart. We are not bound to that Love (saith he) when we minister, or receive the Sacraments; because we are not then bound to have contrition. Those that make such hard shifts to discharge themselves from the obligation of loving God, when ever occasion is offered, will scarce think it needful to love him upon no occasion: and what occasion can we think of, upon which it will be counted requisite, if not on these already specified? if not after sin, if not upon the receipt of mercy, if not on any day of worship, if not in any part of worship; if these be not occasions for it, who can hope they will ever meet with any? if an act of Love be not requisite once a week, or once a year, on such an account as would make it so, if any imaginable could do it; it will not be a duty in any week, or any year, in a whole life; those that discharge themselves of it, in such circumstances, do plainly enough discharge it for ever.  
But since they would make a show of finding some time for it, (though their determinations all along are pregnant with a denial of any); let us proceed with them a little further. If an act of Love be not due to God once a year, yet may it be a duty once in four or five years? Soto and Ledesma in Filliutius ventured to think it may be requisite once in five years, and he gives this reason for it; 
(b) Quia cum determinatum tempus non sit, relinquitur arbitrio sapientum. Sic autem sapientes theologi arbitrati sunt, ut Soto & Ledesma, etc. tr. 22. l. 9 n. 290. aliqui p●tant satisfieri praecepto, si semel in anno eliciatur actus amoris Dei; alij si tertio quoque anno, alij si non differatur ultra quinquennium, Petr. a S. Joseph. Sum. de 1. precept. art. 4.  Because the time is not determined, but left to the judgement of the wise; but (saith he) thus wise Divines have thought.  
Thus Love to God, the greatest duty that we own the Divine Majesty, and that which is the sum of all the rest, is left to men's arbitrement; and if two or three reputed wise, shall judge that God is to have no love at all, or but one act of Love in a whole life; that must be the rule, God and man must be determined by it: Man will owe no more, and the Lord must have no more. Those of their Divines have had the repute of wise, who thought it enough to love God once in a life time, as well as such who conceive it probable, that he should have an act of love once in five years, or once in seven, for thither it may be adjourned by our Author's leave.  
The Jansenists charge this opinion upon the late Jesuits, and would have all the odium cast upon them: but they go about to lead us into a mistake, if they would have us believe that these, and other horrid conceits concerning an actual love to God, are confined to that Society; they are too common amongst those Doctors who are of greatest repute, and judged free from extravagancies in their morality, and more tenacious of what they would have accounted the genuine doctrine of their Church.  

(c) Tr. 6. n. 208.  There were many in the time of the Council of Trent, when Jesuitism was but in its Infancy, who held it enough to love God actually but once in a life time. One act of love 
(d) Semel in vita, quod quidam satis arbitrantur. de nat. &. great. l. 1. c. 22. p. 58.  once in a life, which some count enough, saith Soto, and these some, he tells us afterwards, were very many.  
In the time of Francis de Victoria, who lived till the Council of Trent had sat a year, this was the common doctrine, that a man is but obliged to love God once in his life. For upon the question, when the Precept for love obligeth? he says, Nec videtur sufficiens solutio communis, quod tenetur semel in vita Relect. part. 3. n. 11. The common answer, that one is bound to it once in a life, seems not sufficient; he speaks modestly, as one loath to descent from the common doctrine. (that Council (who if it had been concerned for God and men's souls, as it was for other things, would have appeared in all its thunder against such an error) mends this, as it did other matters, by establishing a doctrine which makes it needless to love God so much as once in a life: of which hereafter.)  
But when is that once? They leave us at liberty for the time, so it be but before we die. Suarez was not alone in this, as he wants not followers, so he had many that went before him in this conclusion, and those not Jesuits only; for it is grounded upon the notion which the Romish Doctors have of affirmative precepts, when the time for their accomplishment is not expressed. They teach, that such divine commands, divers of them are fulfilled, and have sufficient observance, if they be but obeyed semel in vita, once in a life-time. Those that are very cautious, express it with a saltem, once at least in a whole life, intimating that though more may be better, yet once is as much as is precisely needful; and this they extend to such things, as by the Lord's constitution, are means necessary to salvation. 
(e) Alia vero praecepta sunt sine determinatione temporis, quae videlicet nos obligant, ut aliquando impleantur, saltem semel in vita, ut sunt media ad salutem necessaria, pars. 4. relect. de paenit. p. 968.  There are Precepts, saith Canus, without determination of time, which oblige us to observe them some times, at lest once in our life, such as are the means necessary to salvation. But in what part of our life must it be, that the Lord must have this act of Love from us, which is enough once in the whole? Why since neither the Scripture nor the Church, say they, hath determined the time, there is no reason for one time more than another; it is left to a man's own discretion 
(*) 
Sed quaeras tandem, quodnam sit tempus illud quo divina charitas obligat ante mortem ad babendam Dei dilectionem: hoc est enim, quod oppositum sentientes maxime movet; & nos etiam plurimum torquet, quia non possumus tempus hoc in particulari certo & definite designate— Illud vero tempus, si non sit positiva lege praescriptum, prudenti arbitrio ipsius hominis, vel alterius, qui (ejus conscientia cognita) possit auxilium praestare, committendum est.  
Neque aliquam regulam certiorem, aut magis particularem assignare possum, tam in hoc praecepto, quam in aliis affirmativis, praesertim circa actus, qui ad Deum ordinantur, sola a●…uda ratione naturali perspectis. Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 15. Sect. 6. n. 20.   to love God when he thinks fit; let him but do it before he die, and he may take his own time, so some leave it.  
But Vasquez would not leave it at such uncertainty, so he fixeth the period; and that is the period of a man's life: he determins, 
(*) Merito ergo diximus esse praeceptum dilectionis, & solum extrema necessitate obligare, sicut praeceptum contritionis, sed non quemcunque, sed tantum existentem in mortali, non supple●tem suam justificationem per Sacramentum, in 3. Th. tom. 3. q. 90. art. 1. dub. 4 n. 40. So that the Command to Love God, does not oblige any but at the point of death; nor any than who are justified; nor any other in the state of sin, unless they cannot have the Sacrament.  the time for loving God is when a man is at the point of death: Nor is this the doctrine of a Jesuit only; for before his time, and before the Society was founded, it was the common opinion of the Romish Doctors; so Dominicus Soto informs us, 
(f) 
Plerique aiunt, tempus hujus praecepti, illud maxime esse, quod est articulus mortis. ibid. quando jam nullum superest tempus bene merendi de Deo. ibid.  
Besides these many in Soto, others determine with Vasquez, that Love to God is never a duty but at the point of death. So Jo. Sancius haec videtur verior sententia, disp. 1. n. 21. & ●n Antonin. Dian. alij velint solum obligare in articulo mortis, Verb. Charitas. And before them, others in Bonacina, alij dicunt obligare solum tempore mortis, 1 precept. d. 3. q. 4. p. 2. n. 1. And we must take it to be the Opinion of all, who hold that this Precept obliges not, but when we are bound to an act of Contrition; and they commonly maintain that none are obliged to this before the approach of death, nor any that are in the state of grace then; no nor any that are in mortal sin, if they will use those other expedients which their general Council or other Doctors have devised, to discharge them from the obligation of a duty, to which not only the Gospel, but the law of nature binds all rational Creatures eternally.   very many hold that the time for the observing of this Command, is at the point of death; that is (as he explains it) when there is not any time left for deserving aught of God. Now every act of Love being meritorious with them, either they contradict themselves, or by this opinion they are not bound to love God actually, till there be no time left for any acts of Love. We are not by this doctrine obliged to love God, till we can live no longer, and are past acting at all.  
But are we then bound to love him, is it then necessary? may not a man be saved, who hath continued without Love to God all his life, if he love him not actually, neither, when he is a dying? For this observe what Aquinas tells us, 
(g) Qui in via hoc praeceptum non implet (viz. pefecte). Nihil contra divinam dilectionem agens. 22. q. 44. art. 6. ad 2dum, non peccat mortaliter.  That we do not break this Command, but fulfil it, so, as to be free from all mortal guilt, if we do nothing against the Love of God; that is, if we run not into mortal sin, and so hate him; as a Soldier satisfies his Captain's command, who, though he get not the Victory, yet doth nothing against Military discipline; or as Bonaventure explains it, 
(h) In 3. dist. 27. n. 58.  Per exclusionem affectus contrarij, by the exclusion of the contrary affection, as if it were sufficient that he do not hate him.  

(*) Marsilius vir profecto inter theologos egregie doctus, l. 2. q. 18. tenet, lege hac dilectionis obligari homines, servare gratiam & amicitiam Dei, & perditam recuperare, Soto De nat. & Grat. l. 1. c. 22. p. 57  Marsilius (of great renown for learning amongst their Divines,) will have that which the command for love enjoins, to be the keeping of Grace and Friendship with God, and the recovering of it, when lost. So that it doth not oblige to actual love, but only to the avoiding of habitual enmity and hatred of God.  
But what if he hate God, and persist therein? is it not absolutely necessary, that he should beware of that? it seems not, for saith one of their Doctors, There is no Precept that a Sinner should not persevere in enmity against God; there is no negative Command which forbids him to persist in such hatred. It may be you do not read this (no more than I could) without some horror and trembling; and I confess, when I found Reginaldus quoted for this, I was ready to think, it was but the extravagancy of some singularly bold Jesuit: but upon further enquiry, I find it asserted by such whose writings have the greatest approbation of the Romish Church. Melchior Canus, a Dominican, a Bishop, cried up as a most elegant, Judicious, and cautious Writer too, and inferior to none of that Order, their Angelical Doctor only excepted, clearly delivers this doctrine, 
(i) At ne simus inimici Dei secundum reatum; nullo negativo praecepto simus astricti. Sicut enim de amicitia habituali nullum praeceptum affirmativum est, sic de inimicitia, quae secundum reatum est, quasi habitualis, nullum est negativum. pars. 4. relect. de paenit. p. 870.  We are not bound by any negative Precept that we should not be Enemies of God, in respect of guilt. He adds, for as there is no affirmative Precept, requiring habitual friendship with God, so for habitual enmity against God in respect of guilt, there is no negative Precept that forbids it. So that to persist in Enmity and Hatred against God, by their approved doctrine, is no sin, it is against no Command.  
We need not allege the words of any other, since this is the plain and necessary consequent of their common doctrine: and we must take it to be the judgement of all, who hold that it is no sin to delay contrition (i. e. Repentance and turning to God) in which both their Ancienter School Doctors, and modern Divines agree. For while it is no duty to turn to God, habitual enmity and hatred of him will be no sin. Now contrition (and so conversion to God) they say may be deferred till death. Indeed by their doctrine it will never be a duty; for even at death the last Attrition with their Sacrament of confession, is all that is needful.   

Sect. 4. However, they make it unnecessary to love God, either living or dying. For though they pretend that there is a time, some or other, when the Precept for it is obliging; and make a show, as if then unavoidably, he that will be saved, must have an act of love for God in his heart: yet when ever that time comes in life or death, to which their several fancies have determined it; they discover to them many ways, whereby the Precept may be satisfied, without any act of love that it requires: and those which have a mind to be deceived with hopes of Heaven, without ever loving God while they live, may have their choice, which way they will be deluded, for they present them with variety. First, a natural love will serve the turn, such as a graceless man may have. 
(k) Non est impossibile hoc praeceptum observare, quod est de actu charitatis: quia homo potest se dispanere ad charitatem habendam, & quando habuerit eam, potest ea uti. 1. 2. q. 100 art. 10. Corp.  For Aquinas determines after others, that he that hath no love to God, may observe the Precept of loving him actually, by disposing himself to receive this grace; and whereas some think, that this great Precept of loving God, since Adam's sin cannot be fulfilled, but in the state of grace, 
(l) Contra quod tamen facit, quod homo sola virtute naturali, etiam existens in peccato mortali, potest concipere, imo concipit, partim Deum esse super omnia diligibilem, & finem omnium ultimum, & consequenter eum ut talem diligere potest. Deinde quod datur dilectio Dei super omnia, sine gratia, ut probat Cajetanus. Praeterea, quod ipsemet, S. Thomas affirmat posse quem sine gratia implere praeceptum diligendi Deum quoad substantiam actus, licet non quoad meritum beatitudinis, cap. 11. n. 7. V Soto de just. & jur. l. 2. q. 3. art. 10. p. 44. Col. 2.  Navarre asserts the contrary, both upon Reason and authority; because a man, by his natural power, remaining also in mortal sin, may and doth conceive God to be amiable above all, and the last end of all, and consequently can love him as such; as also, because there may be a love for God, above all, without grace, as Cajetane proves; moreover, because St. Thomas affirms that one may, without grace, fulfil the command of Loving God, as to the substance of the act, though not as to the meriting of blessedness.  
Elsewhere he affirms 
(m) Universa ista 10. praecepta & alia omnia, possunt impleri ab illo, qui est in peccato mortali, quoad substantiam actus & praecepti, & effectum evitandi novum peccatum, quod incurreret si non adimpleret illud, juxta definitionem Aquinatis communiter recepti quod Conc. Trindentinum sensit, etc. ibid. n. 17.  that all the Ten Commandments, and all other Precepts, may be fulfilled by him who is in mortal sin, as to the substance of the act, so as to avoid all sin that would be incurred, if they were not fulfilled; and this, according to the judgement of Aquinas, commonly 
(*) Deum ab homine posse diligi super omnia, vi●ibus propriis, sine auxi●io gratiae (dicunt), Scotus, Cajetan. Nominales, Petr. Alliaco, Ocham, Almain, Major, Durandus, apud Vasq. in 1. 2. disp. 194. cap. 1.  followed, and the sense of the Council of Trent. They assign (we see) two ways whereby the divine Precept may be fulfilled. One as to the substance of the act, so as sin is avoided, and the other as to the end of the Lawgiver, so as to deserve Heaven. And they teach that any Precept may be accomplished the former way, by such as are destitute of grace. Now to observe the Command of loving God, so far as not to sin against it, is all that is required, if Beauties arguing be good. 
(n) Si non pecco, ex sententia S. Thomae, si amem Deum, nisi uno gradu amoris, c●…e non teneor in rigore amplius amare:— ergo si addam alterum gradum amoris, amopl●… quam teneor. De Monach. l. 2. c. 13. p. 1162.  If I sin not, fiath he, when I love God, without degree of Love (in the judgement of St. Thomas,) certainly I am not bound in strictness to love him more: therefore, if I add another degree, I love him more than I am bound to do. So that an unsanctified man loving God in such a degree, as not to sin against the Precept of love, hath all the affection for God that it requires: and none will be obliged to any love, but such as is natural, and may be found in a graceless heart.  
Secondly, an inferior degree of love will satisfy the Command, such as is far short of what it enjoins. 
(o) Non est trausgressor praecepti, qui non attingit ad medios perfectionis gradus, durmodo attingat ad infimum. 2. 2. q. 184. art. 3. ad secundum.  He is no transgressor (saith the Oracle of their Schools) who attains not the intermediate degrees toward perfection, if he reach but the very lowest of all. To 
(p) Sufficit autem quilibet charitatis gradus ut quis servet verbum, i. e. praecepta Domini. De Purgat l. 2. c. 3. p. 1381.  keep the divine Precepts (saith Bellarmine) any degree of love whatsoever, is sufficient. 
(q) 
Quemlibet actum charitatis quantumlibet remissum, sufficere ad implendum omni● praecepta: neque ullam determinatam intensionem requiri, ut aliquis in hac vita adi●pleat praeceptum dilectionis Dei, in 2. 2. q. 44. art. 5.  
Dilectionis mandatum in quolibet gradu intentionis impleatur, for this Jo. San. alleges Aquinas, and near 20. more of their Divines, besides Jesuits. Disp. 1. n. 21.   Any act of Love (saith Bannes) how remiss soever, is sufficient to fulfil all the Commands of God; neither is there any certain intenseness requisite, that one in this life may accomplish the Precept of Love to God. The Lord requires that we love him with all our hearts, i. e. with all the affection our hearts can contain: they say that any the smallest degree will suffice. He enjoins us to love him with all our might, i. e. as much as we can: They say it is enough to love him ●… little as we can; we need not love him as much as we might if we would; no more is commanded, but as little as is possible. The lowest degree of all will serve; and if we advance but another step, we supererogate, and God is beholding to us for more than is due.  
Their gross mistake about the perfection of obedience in this life, entangles them in a necessity to maintain this and other impious absurdities. For if every just person perfectly observes the Law, the least degree must be sufficient for such an observance; and when this command declared, with such circumstance of loving God with all our hearts, mind, and strength, doth especially puzzle them; they are concerned, either to deny its obligation, as some of them do, or to interpret it so as to make it signify that which is next to nothing, as others. All of them are obliged to deface it one way or other, that it may not appear to confound them.  
But to go on. If we are not bound to love God, save in the lowest degree, yet that degree sure should exceed our affection to all other things. No, not so neither, for they tell us commonly, We are not obliged to love God more intensely than other things: So Cardinal Tolet, 
(r) Quantum ad intentionem vero non tenemur sub praecepto illum plus diligere: imo aliquando ferventius amamus res sensibiles & creaturas, Instr. l. 4. c. 9 p. 614.  Yea, saith he, sometimes we more fervently love things sensible, and the Creatures. 
(s) Cap. 11. n. 6. & cap. 1. n. 4. p. 57 Gabriel, Major, Jo. Medina. Domin. Sotus. Navar. Sylvester. Paludanus in Vasquez in 1. 2. tom. 1. disp. 194. cap. 3. n. 13.  Navarre, after Aquinas, and their Divines ancient and modern concur herein.  
It's true, they say, God should be loved appreciatively (as to valuaation, and in esteem) above all: but then by, All, they understand, not simply all things but the worst things of all. In those, (the worst of evils) he is to have the pre-eminence: but the Creatures are not such evils, and they may be preferred before God in most cases. By their doctrine, we may preser the judgement of others, or our own before the advice of God in all matters of mere Counsel, and to this they have reduced the greatest part of Christian duties; and we may follow our own wills, or the will of others, rather than Gods continually, and make this the constant practice of our lives, in all those innumerable evils which they count venial. And so in the most instances by far, we may love and esteem ourselves and others more than God, and yet love him enough, and not transgress the Precept. We need not love him more than all Creatures, we may love any Creature more than him, even in way of valuation; only he is to have this honour, and this will be enough, to love him more than deadly crimes; such as declare open hostility against God: this is all the import of that great precept, which concerns us in this life, as it is expressed after Aquinas by 
(t) 
Nihil divinae amicitiae contrarium admittat juxta Evangelicam vocem ex toto cord●, etc. contrarium inquam: quoniam venialia non obstant dilectioni Dei super omnia. De nar. & great. l. 1. c. 22. p. 56.  
Ex toto cord, idem sit quod nihil charitati adversum mentis assensu concipere. idem de just. & jur. l. 7. q. 5. art. 1. p. 244.  
Ut transgressionis delictum quis evitet, satis est ut nihil contrarium charitati ejusq●e praeceptis committat, idem ibid. p. 242.  
Non tamen peccamus, dummodo nihil divinae dilectioni contrarium agamus, Sylvest. v. Charitas. n 3. Vid. Bonaventur 3. dist. 27. n. 58. Graff. l. 1. c. 3. n. 9 Sta. Clar. Probl. 12. p. 67.   Soto and others.  
Yea, to admit mortal sin, and so to love the Creature more than God, in that respect, in which alone, they say he is more to be loved, is not against this Precept. So Navarre informs us, 
(u) Admonemus item indirecte diligere c●eaturam amplius quam Deum non esse contra h●…. praeceptum, quoniam quicunque peccat mortaliter, indirecte plus diligi aliud quem Deumattamen hujusmodi delinquens, non ideo peccat contra istud praecep●um, quoniam directe non facit contra ipsum, neque aliquid operatur, quod secundum se & suam naturam separet a Deo, sed secundum accidens. juxra S. Thom. & Scotum Cap. 11. n. 19  Indirectly, saith he, to love the Creature more than God, is not against this Command (of Love): because whoever sins mortally, indirectly loves something more than God— yet such a Delinquent doth not therefore sin against the Precept; because directly he doth nothing against it, nor acts what in itself, and in its own nature separates from God; but by accident, according to Aquinas and Scotus. So that to love the Creature more than God, and to show it in a way, which themselves say is most repugnant to the love of God, is no transgression of this Command. To say he doth nothing against it directly, is no salvo, when that he doth, is all, which they count (if they count any thing) inconsistent with the Love commanded. He tells us further, 
(*) Licet diligere Deum comparative minus quam illum, vel aeque ac illum, sit malu●: diligere tamen eum absolute, aeque vel minus absque ulla comparatione, non est malu●. c. 11. n. 10. & n. 18. & cap. 1. 8. Ut facile colligat quis ex dicto, Conc. Trident. Lopez. Cap. 40. p. 217.  and Lopez after him, That absolutely to love God, but so much, or not so much as other things, without making any comparison, is not evil. So that if God have some affection from us, though we love him less than other things, it is no sin, no transgression of the Precept; and if this be not transgressed in the instant, when it calls for performance, it is fulfilled.  
Thirdly, it will suffice, if nothing be done against Love, as we heard before out of Aquinas. So that when the Precept of love obligeth, if we then do nothing contrary to that love, we may be excused from the act itself, or from acting any thing out of Love. For that which they count contrary to it, may be avoided out of fear, or other considerations foreign to Love; and so the Command may be satisfied at the instant, when (if ever) it requires actual Love, without any act either of love, or from it.  
Fourthly: External acts may satisfy. The precept of Love, saith Soto, 
(a) Praeceptum dilectionis non praecise ad internum affectum obligat, sed certe ad externum opus. De just. & jur. l. 2. q. 3. art. 10. p. 44. Col. 2. Cum vero dicitur diliges, non tam exigitur dilectio affectus, quam charitas operis Molanus. Theol. pract. Tract. 3. c. 16. n. 5.  doth not oblige precisely to inward affection, but certainly to some outward act; so elsewhere he explains this loving God above all, by doing his 
(b) Diligere Deum super omnia, est omnia in ipsum refer, puta, omnia praecepta ejus facere, De nat. & great. l. 1. c. 22. p. 57  Commandments; to the same purpose, 
(c) 
In Luc. 17. 10. p. 305. (d) Vid. S. Clara. Probl. 12. p. 68  
So Bannes concludes that the Precept for Love is fulfilled by receiving the Eucharist once a year: Absque scrupulo credi potest, quod qui digne sumit Eucharistiam semel in anno, adimplet simul speciale praeceptum charitatis, in 22. q. 44. art. Yet (as we saw before) it is their common doctrine, that the Eucharist may be worthily received without any act of love, or other grace, or any actual disposition that is gracious.   Maldonate and others. Now if the precept of Love may be fulfilled by external acts, or by endeavours to observe the other commands of God, than it requires not the exercise of the inward act of love to him, and so there will be no command, for that, at all, nor will it be a duty; and all these other commands may be satisfied without any act of love to God in the heart, and we shall love him enough, though we never conceive any actual love for him in our souls.  
Fifthly: It will satisfy the precept, if a man believe that he loves God above all, though indeed he do not. So Lopez. 
(d) Satis est ad evitandum peccatum omissionis hujus praecepti, probabiliter quis credat, se illud implere tempore, quo occurrit ejus obligatio. cap. 40. p. 217.  It is enough to avoid the sin of neglecting this Precept, for one to believe probably that be fulfils it at the time when its Obligation occurrs. Navarre had concluded this before him. 
(e) ●…de, eum qui diligit Deum, probabiliter cred ns se esse in statu gratiae, subindeque suum amorem esse amorem Dei super omne aliud, quamvis in rei ve●itate non sit hujusmodi, n●q●e sit in codem statu; nihilominus tamen adimplere hoc praeceptum, quoad effectum evitandi no●um peccalum quod admitteretur ob omissionem implementi ejus, quoniam sine speciali revelatione scire non potest quis, quando est in statu gratiae ut definite Conc. Trident. Et ●…a nisi hoc teneamus, nequiremus scire quando hoc praeceptum impleremus. Cap. 11. n. 10.  He that believes God, probably believing that he is in the state of Grace, and that his Love is a love of God above all, although in Truth it is no such thing, nor he in such a state; nevertheless, the Precept is fulfilled by him so far, that he is not then guilty of no sin for omitting the observance of it; he adds this reason for it, Because without special revelation, no man can know when he is in the state of Grace, as the Council of Trent determines; and so unless we maintain this, we cannot know when we fulfil the Precept. Thus, though his determination seem strange and desperate, yet the ground he proceeds on, is a principle of their Faith, and obligeth all to be of his persuasion, who submit to that Council. He declares himself further to this purpose. 
(f) Peccat mortaliter, qui eo tempore Deum amare negligit, quo sub peccati mortalis reatu t●netur, veluti quando mórtis periculum, vel necessitas recipiendi vel administrandi aliquod Sacramentum se obtulit, nisi probabiliter crederet se gratiam vel charitatem, habere. idem ibid. n. 20.  He sins mortally, who loves not God at that time when he is bound to do it, under the pain of mortal sin, that is, when there is danger of death, or necessity of receiving, or administering a Sacrament, unless he probably believe that he hath Grace or Charity; For then, he would have us believe it is not sin, as his limitation shows. Here we have the times specified, wherein the Precept of loving God obligeth, and these are but two, and the latter of them himself expungeth, concluding it false, that we are bound to love God at a Sacrament. 
(g) Ibid. n. 8. & 9 supra.  So that a man is never bound to love God, but when he apprehends death approaching: no, nor at the point of death neither, if then he probably believe that he hath Grace and Charity, though he have it not; for such a presemption will excuse him from sin, if he love not God, (as all his life before, so) even when he is dying. Thus is the case resolved according to their common principles, by the most learned, and the most pious of their Casuists, as 
(h) Martinus, Aspilcaeta, Navarrus, vir doctissimus, & Pijssimus. De script. Eccles. p. 313.  Bellarmine honours him, though he was none of the Society.  
Sixthly, attrition, with the Sacrament of Penance will excuse any from loving God actually, living or dying: and will secure him from perishing eternally, though he never entertain an Act of love for God in life or death. The Doctrine of their Church obligeth them all to believe this, and if any of their Doctors seem to say otherwise, they contradict either that, or themselves. For their Church requires nothing precisely, to put a man into the state of Grace and Salvation living, or dying (how long so ever he hath persisted in enmity against God; how highly so ever he hath expressed his hatred of him); but only a due partaking of the Sacrament of Penance: and he is sufficiently qualified for such a participation, if he be but attrite, that is, as they explain it, if he have but some remorse for sin out of servile fear, not out of love to God. (For 
(i) In quantum servilis est contrariatur charitati. So Aquinas. 2. 2. q. 19 art. 4.  that fear as servile, is contrary to the love of God:) so that for this (which they count sufficient to secure his eternal state) even at last gasp, he needs not any act of love to God, and this is not only the opinion of particular Doctors, but (as I shall show hereafter) the Doctrine of the 
(*) Sess. 14. c. 4.  Council of Trent, and so not only probable with them, but certain.  
If a man at the point of death, who never had an act of love for God in all his life, do thou ask his Confessor, whether such an act be needful for him before he die; if the Priest tell him it is not necessary, he may safely give up the Ghost, and die as he lived without any actual affection for God: (for though he be deluded by his Confessor, yet consulting him he has done his endeavour, and so his 
(*) Sum. Rosel. v. ignorunt. n. 1. Bonacin. de peccat. disp. 2. q. 8. punct. 3. p. 16. Sta. Clara. Problem. 15. p. 87. Doctores communiter.  ignorance (they say) is invincible, and will excuse him.) And the Priest must tell him, that it is more than needs, if he believe the Council of Trent, since there it is declared, that the Sacrament. with attrition (though this include something repugnant to such love) is enough to justify, and pass any into a state of grace, and consequently is sufficient for Salvation. And thus they argue, 
(*) Dicendum quod gratia est sufficiens causa gloriae, unde omne illud sine quo obtineri po●est ●ratia, non est de necessitate salu●is. Aquinas. in 4. dist. 9 art. 1.  Grace is a sufficient cause of glory, hence whatever it is, without which grace may be obtained, that is not necessary to Salvation. By which account no act of love (nor of any other grace) will be needful for them, that they may be saved.  
Thus in fine, here's a Religion which pretends to be Christian, but excuseth, and disingageth all that profess it, from the love of Christ; a Doctrine which bereaves Religion of that which themselves count its life, and quite stifles all the spirits of Christianity; chaps off all Christian virtues, all gracious acts and qualities, in this one neck, and leaves nothing but a ghastly Carcase. For obliging them to neglect love as needless, it makes the rest impossible; without it, there can be no saving faith, no godly sorrow, no filial fear, no delight in God, no desire to enjoy him, no genuine gratitude. When the life of a true Christian should be made up of these; they leave it not possible for him to have one act of true Christian virtue: for without love, they say themselves there cannot be any one true virtue. Here is a way to Heaven for those that never loved God in life or death, a path that pretends to Heaven, but lies quite Cross to the way of Christ, and leads directly to outer darkness. A Doctrine that encourageth them to live in hatred of God all their days, and in the end sends them out of the World under the dreadful sentence of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 16 22. If any man love not the Lord Jesus, let him be Anathema, Maranatha. To conclude this head; It is a Doctrine which is damning, not only meritoriously, but effectually; and will certainly ruin eternally all that believe and practise it, and hath in it the mortal poison and malignity of a hundred such speculative Opinions, as pass for Heresies.  
And beside the danger, and horrible impiety of this Doctrine, it is ridiculous to the very highest degree. For can any thing be more senseless, than to ask how often a man ought to love his best friend and Benefactor? whether once in his life be not enough in all Conscience? nay, whether it be not very fair not to hate him? And indeed they state the business all along in such a manner, and manage it with such nicety and caution, not as if they were afraid lest men should love God too little, but as if all the danger lay on the other hand; and their great care were that no body should love him too much, or love him at all. I do not believe that things so palpably impious and ridiculous, were ever so solemnly debated by men of any Religion whatsoever.    

CHAP. IU. There is no necessity of saving or justifying faith by the Romish Doctrine.  

Sect. 1. THat no man can be justified or saved without faith, is so evident in Scripture, that none but an Infidel can question it. The Romanists do not express any doubt of it; and yet they make no other faith necessary, than that which is neither justifying, nor saving. They have two sorts of faith, one for the unlearned and ignorant, which they call Implicit: The other for the learned and more knowing, which they say should be Explicite.  
The former as they describe it, is an assent to some general including many particulars, with a mind to believe nothing contrary thereunto, the general is this. That what ever the Roman Church (which cannot err) believes, is true, the particulars included, are they know not what, for they are supposed ignorant. Now, this we say, is no Christian faith; and make it apparent, that it is no such thing. For first, it is no belief of any one particular, or article of the Christian faith. It is only a belief of a general, which is no truth at all, much less Christian (that the Church of Rome cannot err, or believe any thing but what is true) when the ignorant person neither knows what this Church is, nor what she believes, nor why he should give her such credit. So that the act is a blind conceit unworthy of a Man, or a Christian; and the object, a general error.  
And then as to the particulars which are necessary for Christians to believe, this implicit faith doth not actually believe any of them at all; if it did, it would not be what it is, implicit. It apprehends them not, & therefore cannot believe them, for as themselves acknowledge 
(a) Neque enim credi potest quod non cognoscitur. Fill. tr. 22. n. 39  That cannot be believed which is not known. To render this clear to us, they thus explain it. When 
(b) Bannes. 22. q. 2. art. 8. Sect. dubitatur secundo. Sum. Rosel. verb. fides. n. 1.  a man is asked, whether Christ were born of the Virgin Mary, and whether there be one God, and three persons; and he answers that he knows not, but believes touching these things, as the Church holds, this is to believe implicitly. So that a man may have this faith completely, and yet not believe an article of the Creed, and if this be Christian faith, a man may have it, who believes nothing of Christ. They are believers at this rate, who have a mind to hold, what the Church doth, concerning Christ, or the Creed; though they never know, what that is. They know not what the Church holds; unless the Churches knowing, be their knowledge; and so believe nothing, unless the Church's believing be their faith; and so have no faith to save them, unless it be saving faith, to believe by an Attorney.  
Secondly, as this faith may be without the knowledge and belief of any of the particular Articles, which are necessary to be believed by Christians; so (which is yet more strange) it may be with the belief of what is opposite, and repugnant to the Christian faith. This they acknowledge and clear it to us by instances. A man may be disposed to believe what the Church holds, and yet may believe that God the Father, and God the Son are not equal, but one greater, and elder than the other, or that the persons in the Trinity are locally distant. Such is the virtue of implicit faith faith 
(c) In tantum valet fides implicita, quod si quis habens eam falso opinaretur, ratione naturali motus, Patrem majorem, vel priorem Filio: vel tres personas localiter distare, a● simile quid, non sit haereticus, non peccet: dummodo hunc errorem pertinaciter non defendat, & hoc ipsum credat, quia credat ecclesiam sic credere. Verb. Credere. Sum, Rosel v. fides. n. 2. After Pope Innocent and Hostiensis.  Altenstaig, that, if he who hath it believes these errors, or any like them, he would be no Heretic he would not sin; provided he doth not maintain his error pertinaciously, and that he believes, because he thinks the Church believes it. Or such a Catholic may believe 
(d) Ut puta vetula credit Trinitatem esse unam Faeminam, & quoniam credit ecclesiam sic tenere, sic credit: & tamen non est haeretica: quia conditionaliter credit, si ecclesia sic tenet & credit. Verb. sides. n. 6.  that the three persons in the Godhead are one Woman, it would be but a small fault with Angelus to believe this, thinking the Church believes the same. 
(e) Siquis non crederet Christum esse verum Deum & hominem, & idem sentiret papa, eum non iri damnatum. Cardin. St. Angeli. ad legaros Bohem. an. 1447.  Or he may believe, that Christ is not true God and Man; and yet not be condemned for it, if the Pope believed it too. 
(g) Rusticus & imperitus qui suo Parocho fidem habens, credit aliquid contra articulos fidei, excusatur a peccato. Probl. 15. p. 98.  If trusting a Priest (who tells him the Church holds it) he believes any thing against the Articles of faith, he is excused saith Sancta Clara after Scotus and Gabriel and others 
(h) Licet alicui articulo fidei discredat explicit, credit tamen implicite eidem in generali fide, etc. ibid. Corduba.  Though he expressly disbelieve any Article of faith, yet he may be said to believe it implicitly. So that he may believe that the Creed or the Gospel is not to be believed, he may count it a Fable (as Pope Leo called it) and yet be a Christian, as to his belief, if this be the Christian faith. He may be expressly an Heretic or a monstrous mis-believer, and yet implicitly be a faithful Roman-Catholick.  
Thirdly, such a faith as this, Jews, and Turks, and Pagans have, even the worst of these, who do but acknowledge a God of truth. For they believe what this God reveals is true, and this general involves all the particulars of the Christian belief; so that if the belief of such a general without other faith as to the particulars, may be sufficient for Papists; such Infidels may pass for as true believers, as roman-catholics. Yea the faith of such Catholics will be so much worse, than that of these Infidels; as it is better to believe God's veracity and Revelation, than to believe the infallibility of the Roman Church, or the truth of all therein believed.  
Indeed such a faith was not counted sufficient for Christians, till Christians were thought to be something like Asses. Aquinas inquires, whether all be a like obliged to have an explicit saith? He answers negatively, and the ground of his conclusion is, Job. 1. 14. The Oxen were ploughing, and the Asses were feeding beside them: From whence he argues gravely. 
(i) Quia videlicet minores qui significantur per asinos, d●bent in credendis adhaere●… majoribus, qui per boves significantur ut Gregorius expovit in 2 moral. Aquinas. 2. 2. q. 2. art. 6.  That the people who are signified by Asses, are to lie down in the faith of their Superiors, who are signified by the Oxen, as Gregory expounds it. But what if the Oxen go a stray, what must become of the Asses then? Why, they may follow them without hurt, believing that they are right, when they are in a wrong way (for they must not have their names for nothing?) So he resolves this difficulty. 
(k) Humana cognitio non sit regula fidei, sed veritas Divina; a qua si aliqui majorum dificiunt, non praejudicat fidei simplicium qui eos rectam fidem habere credunt. Aquinas. ibid. ad tertium.  Human knowledge is not the rule of faith, but Divine truth: from which if some of the Superiors (the Oxen) make defection, that hurts not the faith of the simple (the Asses) who believe them to have the right faith. After these two Saints, their best Pope, and their Angelical Doctor, (that we may see we own not this rare notion (where their whole Church is so subtly divided into Oxen and Asses) to any lower, than the most eminent amongst them.) Cardinal 
(l) De justific. l. 1. c. 7. p. 706.  Bellarmine their great Champion makes use of the same exposition of that Text, to maintain the sufficiency of such a faith.  
Stapleton, would have us believe, that they admit not of this implicit faith, save in points of less moment, but herein he misrepresents them, and would delude us. For it is the common Doctrine of the Romanists, That an implicit faith in Christ, (such as Pagans may have, and for which none should have the name of Christians) is sufficient under the Gospel, to pass any into 
(m) For these are alleged. Altisiodorensis, Gulielmus Parisiensis, Richardusde Media villa, Scotus. Bradwardin, Gabriel, Baptista Tro●amala, Vega, Medina, Corduba, Faber, Patigianis Herrera, etc. Victoria, Soto, Canus, Bannes, Alvarez, in Sta. Clara. Probl. 15. & in Bannes in 22. q. 2. art. 8.  a justifying or saving state.  
This is it which our Divines commonly teach saith 
(n) Vega pro conc. Trident. l. 6. c. 15. p. 92.  Vega, when they say, the faith of one Mediator either explicit or implicit, is enough for justification. And 
(o) Probl. 15. p. 89. & haec est communior in Scholis, ut declarat & sequitur Herrera, etc. So Bartholom. de Ledesma sum. de sacram. paenit. cum ad primam justificationem sides explicita Christi non requiratur, ut supponimus, tanquam magis probabile, & commune in Scholis, etc.  Sancta Clara, with others, tell us, this is the more common tenet in their Schools. And whereas they make some difference between justification, and salvation in this point: Bannes helps to remove it 
(p) 
in 22. q. 2. art. 8. dub. ult.  
Dicendum quod gratia est sufficiens causa gloriae, unde omne illud sine quo obtineri potest gratia, non est de necessitate salutis. Aquinas. in 4. dist. 9 art. 1. vid. Soto. in 4. dist. 5. q. unica. art. 2. dub. ult.   It is neither Heresy, saith he, nor Error, nor Rashness. nor Scandal, to assert, that a man may also in the same manner he saved; because justification being the last disposition to glory: it is very probable, that he which is justified by an implicit faith; may also by the same faith, without alteration be saved.  
It is true, they say there is a precept for a more express faith, though no more than this implicit belief in Christ be needful, necessitate medij. But they have so many ways to exempt Infidels (even under the profession of Christians) from its obligation; that few in comparison will be culpable for not observing it: By their Doctors they are excused, if they 
(q) Fill. tr. 22. n. 40. &  be dull or gross-witted If they be 
(r) n. 54. Dico secundo obligationem praedictam esse sub peccato mortali, nisi ignorantia aut impotentia excuset. Communis doctorum.  ignorant or impotent, or 
(s) Probabilis est (ignorantia) quando quis habit fundamentum probabile; ut dum rusticus credit aliquid ductus testimonio sui Parochi aut parentum— sic doctores Communiter. Sancta. Clar. ibid. p 87.  if their Priest or their Parents misled them; or 
(t) Quando articuli fidei non modo debito proponuntur; ut rationibus frivolis, vel ab hominibus impijs: tunc enim credere esset actus imprudentiae, secundum D. Tho m. 22. q. 1. art. 4. ad secundum. idem. ibid. vid plures in Jo. Sanc. d. 19 n. 3. & 4.  if the object of faith be not duly proposed, if by slight reasons, or by impious persons (than it would he imprudence to believe;) or 
(u) Id. ibid. p. 95.  if they do not doubt of their faith; or if their Teachers be fallacious or erroneous; or if the proposal 
(x) Arragon. in 2. 2. q. 11. art. 2. dub. ult. ibid. p. 01.  be not enforced with reasons, with holiness of life, with the confutation of the contrary, and with some wonders. In short, if they have not had sufficient instruction (in this all agree.) And this alone will excuse a great part of their Church, who for want of such instruction, are acknowledged by themselves, to be Infidels. Thus Navarre delivers it. 
(y) In universa Christiana republica, circa haec tanta est socordia, ut multos passim invenias nihil magis in particulari & explicit de hisce rebus credere, quam Ethnicum quendam Philosophum, sola unius veri Dei naturali cognitione praeditum. Cap. 11. n. 22. p. 142.  In the whole Christian Commonwealth (he means the Roman Church) there is so great neglect as to this, that ye may find many every where, who believe no more of these things (i. e.) of Christ and the most necessary Articles of the Christian faith) in particular and explicitly, than some Heathen Philosophers, who have only the natural knowledge of the one true God.  
But if the precept could reach any through all these securities, (which we cannot easily imagine) yet there is one way to clear them all of it: so that they may live and die Infidels, without danger from any command requiring faith in Christ. For he that hath not that express faith which is commanded in the Gospel, but only what is requisite necessitate medij, is living or dying, if he be sorry for his negligence, and purpose to amend (which may be in their sense without true Repentance) capable of absolution, without any instruction from his Confessor 
(a) Imo in rigore, non tenetur confessarius, etiamsi sanus sit paenitens, eum instruere ante absolutionem; aummodo enim doleat de preterita negligentia, & proponat emendationem in futu●um, capax est absolutionis, sola fide explicita circa mysteria necessario credenda ex medio. Fill. tr. 28. n. 58. vid. Jo. Sanc. d. 9 n. 18. . And by virtue of that he may live in a justified state, or if he die, he passeth out of the World, as a very good Christian, though he believe in Christ, no more than a Heathen.   

Sect. 2. Pass we to their other sort of faith, which they call explicit, it is, as they define it. An actual assent to the particulars, which the Church propounds, as revealed by God. This with them is justifying faith requisite in the learned, and more intelligent amongst them. As to the object of it, if we view it well, it looks untowardly for a thing by which a sinner is to be justified. For it is prodigiously extended, and takes in things uncertain, false, impossible, impertinent, and ridiculous; as points that must certainly be believed unto justification. For their Church propounds as things revealed by God (and so objects of justifying faith) not only what is delivered in Scripture; but ●nwritten Traditions concerning matters of faith and manners, and ●hese, if they will be justified, they must believe; though they know ●ot what they are, nor where to find them, but in the Church's uner●ing fancy. She propounds also, the unanimous consent of the Fathers, ●n several points; and though this never was, or is impossible to be known: yet it must be believed, by those that mean to be justified. She propounds the decrees of Councils to be believed as Divine truths; 
(b) Omnia concilia post Chalcedonense potissimum instituta fuerunt, non ut erueretur veritas, sed ut roboraretur, defenderetur, atque augeretur semper ecclesiae Romanae potestas, & ecclesiasticorum libertas. Aeneas Silvius. l. 2. de gest. conc. Basil.  when it is acknowledged, that the design in Councils, for many hundred years; was not to discover truth, but to promote the Roman greatness. She propounds also the determinations of Popes, these must be believed as infallible, when ordinarily they were neither persons of common truth, or honesty, and we must be justified by believing the dictates of Atheists or 
(c) Canus. loc. Theol. l. 6. p. 243. 344.  Heretics; of 
(d) Sylvest. 2. Platin. Chron. Martini Poloni. Hildeband. Binno Cardin.  Conjurers, 
(e) Faex vitiorum & Diabolus incarnatus Constan. council. Sess. 11. art. 5. Benedict. 9 vid. Baron. an. 1034. n 3.  or incarnate Devils; of vicious Beasts, 
(f) Sunt qui scribunt hunc sceleratissimum hominem, seu monstrum potius Platina. vi●a. Joh. 13.  and wicked Monsters. For those who cry up ●is Holiness, have adorned him also now and then with these other Sacred Titles.  
I know not whether these things are more ridiculous, or more horrid; how ever letting them pass as they are: let us take their faith at best, and make it better than they will have it. Suppose it rested in the Scriptures, and had no thing for its object but Revelation, such as is truly Divine: yet even so they give such Report of it, as will scarce suffer us to think, that they can expect to be justified by it. Considered in itself they 
(c) Dominic. a Soto. de nature. & great. lib. ●…●. 7. d. 79. & 81.  count it not worthy the name of a virtue. They 
(d) Concil. Trident. Sess. 6. c. 7  call it a dead, idle thing, and though they would have it to be an infused habit, and the gift of God (because the Scripture so calls that which is justifying faith indeed) yet they say a 
(e) Scotus in 3. dist. 23. air. fide humana, (quam ipse appellat acquisitam) hominem posse assentiri toti praedicationi Christianae. Imo ita inquit, credimus authoritate ecclesiae (quam ipse putat humanam & institutione parentum)— Cui sententiae adhuc explicatius subscribit Durandus q. 1. in 2. sent. d. 28. Dicens fidem infusam non esse necessariam, nisi u● facilius credamus. Soto. ibid. l. 2. c. 8. p. 81.  mere humane quality acquired without any supernatural assistance; may perform its proper act and office, by actual assent to the whole Christian Doctrine. They confess it is commonly found in the worst of men (in perditissimis hominibus) such as are neither acted nor possessed by the spirit of God; such as live and die in mortal wickedness, 
(f) Bellarm. de Baptism. l. 1. c. 14.  and are damned for it. Yea some of them confess that it is in the Devils. This faith, saith Cardinal 
(g) Fi●es haec non est ea tantum qua credimus Deum esse, & qua credimus vera esse quae dicit Deus, haec etenim est etiam in Daemonibus & perditissimis hominibus. Confut. artic. Lutheri. art. 1.  Contarenus is not it, by which we believe, that there is a God, or by which we believe that the things are true which God speaks: For this also is in the Devils, and the most wicked men. Yet at other times this is with them, THE CHRISTIAN THE CATHOLIC FAITH, as if it were enough, to make them true 
(*) Concil. Trident. Sess. 6. c. 28.  Christians and Catholics: but sure they will not seek for their Christianity, and Catholickness in a Room lower than Purgatory. However instead of a faith which the Scripture calls for, as saving and justifying; they commend to Christians a faith, which hath no connexion at all, necessary or probable, with Salvation or Justification. All they have to say, is, That it must necessarily be joined with love: but when they have said this, they undo it, and all, by making love itself unnecessary, as we saw before.   

Sect. 3. In fine, they seem little concerned for faith who hath it, or hath it not, or how little it be, or how seldom acted. It is not 
(h) Non enim fides interior Romani Pontificis ecclesiae est necessaria. Canus, loc. Theol. lib. 6. c. ult. p. 344.  necessary that the Pope himself should have this faith (though the Devils want it not) yea or any other virtue for all his Holiness: the Body may do well enough, though the Head of it be an Infidel. They are obliged to maintain this, because their Popes often have been no better. And the body may shift pretty well without it too. This may be the true Catholic Church made up of the whole company of believers, when not one amongst them all hath faith, for time was, say they, 
(i) Abbas in Sylvest. sum. v. Concil. n. 3.  when none at all had faith, but only one Woman, and it may be so again.  
As for the exercise of it Hurtado thinks an act of faith may be requisite once in a year; 
(*) Existimant aliqui precepeum eliciendae fidei obligare singulis annis— ve●u● hoc communiter negatur. Petr. a S. Joseph. sum de 1. praecep. art. 1. p. 6.  but the Jesuit may seem to deal unmercifully with them, putting them to believe some of their Creed once in Twelve months: those of other Orders would not have them so much oppressed, once in 12 years will be enough, Bonacina 
(k) Tom. 2. in 1. precept. disp. 3. q. 2. punct. 2.  saith 4 or 5 moments in a whole life may suffice for this and specifies them; but because this may seem too hard, he signifieth withal, how they may he eased in a manner of them all. For once (though that be at the point of death) an 
(l) n. 12.  implicit act may serve. At an other time or two the precept for faith doth not of itself oblige to the act, only 
(m) n. 9 & 11.  it is requisite by accident; and so the neglect of it then, will be no special sin, nor need be confessed. At another time (or more if there were occasion) ignorance, or want of consideration may 
(n) n 8.  excuse them (for these two, though they ruin the greatest part of the World eternally, yet are the greatest security of roman-catholics: and not only exempt them from that which is most the duty of Christians, but will not suffer them to sin, at least mortally, do what they can.) So that after all, one act of their faith once in a life time will be enough. 
(o) Existimo tamen sufficere, ut isti rudes semel assensum explicite praebuerint articulis ad salut●m necessarijs dum sibi proponebantur a confessario, vel ab alio. Ibid. n. 14. ibi. Malderus & alij Peter a S. Joseph reduces all the moments and occasions where an act of faith may be thought requisite to six heads: and then declares upon each severally, either that the precept doth not of itself oblige, or that they may be excused from sin in neglecting it, at any of them. Sum in 1. precept. art. 1. p. 3. 4, 5, 6.  I think it sufficient (saith he after many others) for those that are rude, to give an explicit assent once, to the Articles necessary to Salvation, while they are propounded by their Confessor, or some other. But how must the Confessor propound these Articles to them, so as they may pass this one act of faith upon them once for all? Why the best way 
(p) Bonacin. ibid. n. 16.  he tells us, is by a mode of forming the sign of the Cross, as it is described for this purpose, by Graffius, Bellarmine, and other great Divines. I had the curiosity to see how a Confessor can make the most ignorant persons true believers by the sign of the Cross; and so effectually, as they never need more believe than once, while they live, and found it lying thus; 
(q) Graff. decis. part. 1. l. 1. c. 24. n. 3.  let the Confessor teach him to form the sign of the Cross with three singers, to signify the mystery of the most Sacred Trinity. But first it must be drawn from the top of the head, or front to the Navel, to show that the Son of God descended from the highest Heavens into the bowels of his Mother: then draw the cross line from the left Arm to the right, so the cause of the Incarnation is expressed, He came from Heaven to Earth, that we who were to be placed amongst the Goats at his left, might be removed to his right hand amongst the Sheep. This is the admirable expedient: the grave Benedictine reflecting on it, was put into a transport; for he adds 
(r) Ecce quanta nobis fidei nostrae mysteria unica formandae crucis ratione Mater Ecclesia docuit, ut si nihil praeterea sciret rudis homo, vel hoc solum ad salutem illi sufficere queat. ibid.  behold what great mysteries of faith Mother-Church hath taught us by one mode of forming a Cross, so that a rude person needs know nothing besides this, even this alone may be sufficient for his Salvation. Here is a compendious way indeed to Salvation, and all the knowledge and faith needful for it: he that can be satisfied with it (and give himself up to absurd and ridiculous delusions (against all the evidence of God's word) may in few minutes with once making the sign of the Cross, get all the faith requisite for a Roman-Catholick: and when by such admirable conduct of the Cross he hath but once believed; he need never more trouble himself with faith, while he lives. 
(s) Praeceptum fidei non obligat pierce, nisi semel forte in vita. vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. 41. n. 32. Advertant praeceptum fidei non obligare per se, nisi tempore usus rationis advenientis, vel postea, si tunc non est impletum taliter, quod post semel elicitum actum fidei raro vel fortasse nunquam occurrat dicta obligatio exercendi actus fidei, sic express Suarez, Arragon, etc. ibid.  The precept for faith (saith another) obligeth not, but perhaps once in a life, and it is delivered as the judgement of Arragon Torres, and other their chief Divines, that of itself it binds not, but when one comes to the use of reason, or if it be not then performed, afterwards: but after one act of faith once put forth, the obligation to exercise more acts do rarely or may be never occur. Such is their faith, and thus you must conceive if you can, how they live by it. They can make a life of faith of one act alone in a whole life. No wonder they presume, that they can so perfectly fulfil the whole Law, yea and pay God much more than his due: when they make the greatest commands (the sum of the Law and Gospel) to amount to little or nothing; and instead of a Hundred set down not Fifty, but a fraction, or a cipher: when in the case before us, they take no more notice of the faith which the Gospel calls for, yea make bold in a manner wholly to neglect that of their own making.    

CHAP. V There is no necessity of true Repentance for Romanists by their Doctrine.  

Sect. 1. IF any thing be absolutely and indispensably necessary to Salvation, it is Repentance. Christ himself declares it, Luk. 13. 13. The doctrine of Repentance from dead works, is a fundamental, and so made expressly by the Apostle, Heb. 6. 1. So that without the belief and practice of it, no Sinner can possibly be saved, nor have any hopes of it, but such as are delusions. Thus necessary hath the Lord made it, and yet by the Roman Doctrine, it is more than needs for any sort of sins.  
As to Original sin, (the corruption of our natures) those of them who hold there is any such thing within us; yet declare that, if it be any sin at all, it is the least of all sins. Andradius employed by the Council of Trent to write, tells us, that their Divines so determine. Bellarmine saith, 
(a) After Aquinas 3. q. 1. art. 4. De amiss. great. l. 1. c. 10. p. 226. Inter om●i● pe●cata minimum habet de voluntario & ideo minus grave est in ratione voluntarij qua● quodlibet veniale.  that amongst all sins it is the least voluntary, and on that account is less than any venial sin; and it must be little indeed, that is, less than any venial; for that, as another Cardinal 
(b) Modicum pro nihilo habetur, Cajetan. Sum. v. fest. (& saepius alibi) secundu● quoque common, est, modicum pro nihilo reputari, p. 310.  tells us, passeth for nothing. And that which hath so little, or nothing of sin in it, needs no repentance. So 
(c) 
Haud tamen huic homini, ulla est paenitentia necessaria. De nat. & Grat. l. 2. c. 12. p. 92.  
Contritio cum sit dolour, voluntatis duritiem ex peccato contractam comminuens ●… proprie est de peccato Originali, Aqu●n. supplem. q. 2. art. 2. Sylvest. v. contritio; n. 4. Graff. l. 1. c. 4. n. 2.   Soto concludes, A man that hath no guilt but that of Original sin, hath no need of any Repentance. Thus they represent Original sin, as it is in them before Baptism: but after they are Baptised, they all agree that it is no sin at all. The Council of Trent hath determined it (and so it is now with them an Article of Faith) 
(d) In Baptismate— non modo remitti reatum originalis peccati, sed totum id auserri, quoad veram at propriam rationem peccati habet, Sess. ●. c. 4.  That in Baptism, not only the guilt of Original sin is remitted, but what ever of it hath any thing of the true and proper nature of sin, is totally taken away; and they curse 
(e) Ibid. ca 4.  those who hold that it is only pardoned or impaired, and not all the sin of it quite abolished by Baptism. 
(f) Innocentes, puri, immaculati, inno xij.  They say they are become Innocent, Pure, Harmless, Spotless; without the least speck of Original sin; and so without any need of Repentance, upon that account, 
(g) Tantum abest ob igari quempiam ad originalis culpae paenitentiam, ut neque poss●…. Soto ibid.  They are so far from being actually obliged to repent of any natural corruption, that they cannot be obliged to it, God himself cannot bind any one to Repent of it. So that if there be in our natures any defectiveness, as to the Image of God, any averseness to God, and that which is good, any propenseness to evil; we are not to take notice of it, or grieve for it as a sin: for how ever the Apostle frequently calls it so, it is none; no more to be repent of, than an innocent harmless thing. Thus Original sin is quite discharged from any concern in our Repentance.   

Sect. 2. There are other evils which make up the far greatest part of actual sins, which by their doctrine are but Venial. Of this quality are not only those which they count small in their own nature; and those which are small in respect of the matter of them: but likewise all (how heinous so ever, as to the nature of them, how great soever as to the matter of them) that are acted without perfect deliberation, and are not completely voluntary. And by favour of their describing this third sort of minute evils, the most enormous wickednesses that can be acted against God or Man, may come under the notion of Venial faults, (of which hereafter.) Blasphemy, Perjury, Adultery, Murder, etc. when without perfect deliberation will be no worse.  
However these with them are light faults, and lightly canceled (as they tell us) by the Bishop's blessing, by Holy water, by knocking the breast, by saying a Paternoster; by extreme Unction, (so 
(h) In Matth. 10. 12.  our Rhemists. Aquinas adds) by the Eucharist, by any of the seven Sacraments 
(i) 3tia. q. 87. art. 3. Taceri citra culpam, multisque aliis remediis expiari possunt, Conc. Trident. Sess. 4. Can. 5. , by any Sacramental Unctions, by Prayer in a Holy place; yea, or by but entering into a Consecrated Church.  
So that by these, and other such means & si aliqua alia sunt hujusmodi (saith Aquinas) Pardon of Venial sins may be obtained, yea any one of them will quite 
(k) Vid Aquinas ibid. 3tium.  abolish the fault, if not the whole penalty, particularly Holy water, which (as Canus 
(l) Peccatorum paenas solvit culpas etiam veniales, De Sacrament, pars. 1. p. 752. vid. p. 751.  teacheth) takes away the punishment of sin, and also the faults that are Venial. No wonder if they determine that the Sacrament of Penance is not needful for these, not so much as their ritual Repentance, and that there is no necessity they should be so much as confessed, 
(m) 
Council Trident. Sess. 4. Can. 5.  
Ad venialia in confession expl●canda teneri, qui solis venialibus urgetur— negat communis opinio cum D. Thoma Scoto, Durando. Major. Victorell. ad Tol. l. 6. c. 11.  
Utrum peccata venialia necessario sint confitenda? Resp. secundum Scotum, quod non, etiamsi nullum habet mortale: quoniam per peccatum veniale etiam in proposito, homo non potest damnari nec pe●iclitari, & paenitentia est secunda tabula pro periclitantibus, igitur non obligatur ad eam nisi habens mortale. Immo dicit Petrus de Palude in 3. quod nec etiam Papa possit ad hoc obligari. Angel. sum. v. Confess. n. 25.  
Cum dolor de venialibus non sit necessarius, ne confessio quidem venialium necessaria est. Canus. pars. 6. relect. de penitent p. 955. Secundum S. Thom. in 4. dist. 17. homo tenetur habere istum delorem (contritionis) de peccato actuali, non de originali— & de mortali non de veniali, quia cum ejus complacentia mori potest, ac salvari, Sylvest. v. contrite. n. 4. vid Navar. c. 1. n. 24.   nor any remorse or grief required for them; nor that any should be 
(n) Non est necessum habere propositum nunquam peccandi venialiter, Navar. c. 1. n. 10.  relinquished so much as in resolution only. Contrition is so far from being requisite for Venial sins, that with them attrition is not needful; for that is a displicence arising from shame or fear; but these sins are (in their account) 
(*) Conc. Trid. Sess. 14. 4.  neither shameful (its no crime (they say) to glory in them) nor dangerous; no man can be condemned for them. 
(*) Vid Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 20. Sect. 6. n. 3.   
Thus their Doctrine giveth them all abundant encouragement to live and die impenitently in these sins; in all of them, 
(o) Etiamsi omnia venialia peccata simul colligerentur in unum, nunquam efficerent id, quod facit unum lethale peccatum. Bellarm, de amiss. great. l. 1. c. 13. p. 91.  for all of them in the World, if found in one man together, amount not to so much as one mortal sin. All the penitence for these that is required by the precisest of them, is no more than one act of Charity contains, i. e. such a 
(p) Aquinas, 3. l. 87. art. 1. c.  Virtual dislike, as a man may have of that, which he was never actually displeased at, no, nor so much as thought of.  
It may seem strange (the operation of spirit of delusion not considered) how such a conceit could ever possess the fancies of rational persons, and of some acquaintance with the Scriptures; that their Sacramental, (Holy water, and the like trifles) should have the virtue to procure pardon of sins, even without Repentance: Aquinas would have us satisfied with this, 
(q) Ideo ista dicuntur specialiter dimittere, non quia remittunt per se, sed quia sunt excitativa fervoris per quem sit remissio. D. Th. in 4. art. ad 2 dum.  that they do not remit sins of themselves, but are said to do it, because they may excite that fervour by which they are remitted; but this fervour is not Repentance, and  it be, it ought to be excited, that it may remit sin, since this admirable virtue is ascribed to it on that account. No, say his followers, 
(r) Sed adverte quod responsio D. Thom. quod ideo ista dimittunt venialia, quia excitant fervorem, intelligenda est, non quod semper requiratur illa excitatio, sed quod de se haec Sacramentalia ad hoc sint instituta. Quare illa suscipere, tanquam ad illum effectum ab ecclesia accommodata censetur actus paenitentiae, & acquirit remissionem venialium, etiamsi nullatenus excitetur ad devotionem, nec memoriam habeat venialium, vel displicentiam, nam si illa requireretur, profecto Sacramentalia non essent, cum sola displicentia sufficeret. Sotus dist. 15. q. 2. art. 1. modo tunc non habeat complacentiam, Graff. t. 1. c. 16. n. 9 p. 13. Victoria, Canus, Major Cajetan. Ledesma & alij in Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 12. Sect. 2.  We must understand him so, that it is not always requisite, it should he excited, but that these Sacramentals are instituted for this end. Wherefore to receive them as accommodated by the Church to this effect, is an act of Repentance, and procures remission of Venial sins; although there be no way, any excitement of devotion, nor any repenting of these sins, nor any dislike of them; for if this were required, truly, they would not be Sacramentals, since this dislike alone would be sufficient; so de Graffiis after Soto. Here is pardon of sin by an excitement of fervour, though it be not excited; that must be the implicit Repentance, sufficient for the pardon of Venial sins; and the Explicite very like it, an act of Repentance (such as is receiving of Holywater) without any remembering the sins to be repent of, or any dislike of them. They had need believe, that these sins are no transgressions of the Law, since they expect to be secured from its penalty by that which is no repentance.   

Sect. 3. Hereby it is too manifest that they make Repentance needless, both in reference to Original sin, and likewise to all those which they count Venial. If they will have it needful for any sin at all, it must be for those they call Mortal; but then these are b●t few in comparison. They have reduced them to seven, 
(*) The particular sins contained under these 7 Capitals (as their Offspring) the people need not trouble themselves about them; for common Confessors are not obliged to know whether they are mortal or no. Angel. sum. v. Confess. 4. n. 3.  and none pass for deadly, but s●ch as quite extinguish spiritual life, and kill the soul immediately.  
Well, but is Repentance necessary for these? As to this, divers of great eminency amongst them 
(s) Sunt enim Theologi & suerunt, quorum opinione de actu paenitentiae speciali praeceptum nullum est, hanc vero sententiam in primis suadent testimonio, D. Thomae, etc. Canus pars. 4. relect. de paenit. p. 856.  conclude, that there is no divine precept for Repentance. God hath not commanded any to Repent: Now if he command it not, it is not necessary; and if it be not a necessary duty, it is no mean necessary to Salvation: for, as 
(t) 
Aquinas & Bellarmin. supra. Media necessaria ad salutem sunt nobis divino jure precepta quod tradit, D. Tho. 2. 2. q. 2. art. 5. etc. & est quasi axioma communiter receptum, Suar. l. 1. De Orat. c▪ 29. n▪ 2.  
In hac controversia Praeceptor meus olim. F. Franciscus Victoria, vir nostra aetate literis, inenio, religioneque clarissimus, ibid. fuere Catholici quidam, ut resert. Jo. Medina & Vega, & quidem ex schola, D. Tho. ex quibus suit Victoria, qui dicebant paenitentiam non esse in praecepto ullo, idque ex D. Thom. videbantur probare, & meo judicio satis effi●aciter, Vasq. in 3. ●hom. tom. 3. q. 86. art. 2. dub. 2. n. 1.   themselves tell us, Though all that is commanded be not necessary to Salvation, yet all that is necessary to Salvation is commanded. That there is no special precept which requires Repentance, was the opinion of their famous Franciscus de Victoria, (in his time the great Master of Divinity in Spain) and of other Divines both before and after him, as Melchior Canus (sometimes his Scholar) tells us. And when that of Christ, Luk. 13. Except ye Repent, ye shall all likewise perish, is objected, they Answer, the meaning is, They shall perish for preceding sins, not for impenitence. By their doctrine there is no danger that any should perish for that, though persisted in unto death: and they had some reason to allege Aquinas (the Angel of their Schools) as of their judgement herein; for he saith plainly, 
(u) Permanere in peccato usque ad mortem, non est speciale peccatum, sed quaedam peccati circumstantia, 22. q. 14 art. 2. Corp. & tamen si esset de paenitentia speciale praeceptum, omissio illius specialis culpa sine dubio esset, as they argue in Canus, ibid.  That impenitency continued in till death is no special sin, but a circumstance of sin. By this doctrine, it is no sin, no transgression of any divine precept to be impenitent, or to persevere therein to the end.  
Those who will be concluded by the Council of Trent, must believe that there is no divine precept which requires Contrition or true Repentance precisely, but only disjunctively, either that, or what is there declared to be sufficient without it. And they must take it for certain, that it is not a medium necessary to Salvation, since that Council has determined, that something else will suffice for pardon without it; and so they declare it expressly. 
(*) Contritio proprie accepta, in lege nova, non est necessaria simpliciter necessitate medij ad justificationem & salutem, Bonacin. de Sacram. disp. 5. q. 5. p. 2. n. 1. ibid. Petigianus, & alij.    

Sect. 4. But let us take notice of those who seem more severe. Many there be, who think that Repentance is under a Divine command; yet these in the issue make it no more necessary than the other, who find no precept for it. For they determine that we are not obliged to Repent presently; that it may be deferred till the approach or danger of death; and in fine, that it is needless, even when a man is dying.  
For the first, They teach that a Sinner is not bound to Repent presently, it is lawful to defer it. So their Doctors of all sorts, so all the faithful (say they) so the whole Church, 
(a) Non illico ut homo se reum sentit culpae, paenitentiae lege paenitere constringitur. Haec profecto conclusio more & usu ecclesiae satis videtur constabilita. Soto in 4. dist. 1●. q. 2. art. 6.  That a man is not bound to Repent presently is a conclusion, saith Soto, established by the practice and the usage of the Church. Canus 
(b) 
Ut mea fert & communis opinio non protinus tenetur homo paenitentiam agere. Atque haec assertio non alia ratione potiore ostendi possit, quam quod sidelium omnium consensus facile admittit, etc. nec aut paenitentes in consessione hujus criminis se accusant, aut sacerdotes id curant— Cum nulla idonea ratio sit, nullave authoritas qua praeceptum adeo durum asseratur, etc. Melch. Canus. pars. 4. relect. de paenit. p. 862. 863.  
Licet toto tempor, qevo quis agnoscit se lethali peccato mortuum, de bono consilio debeat curare, ut a tam gravi morbo resurgat; periculumque mortis jubitae atque aeternae effugiat, juxta illud, Ne tardes converti ad Dominum, & ne differas de die in diem, Eccl. 5. — non tamen ad id tenetur praecepto, ad novum peccatum mortiferum obligante; nisi ea temporis parte, qua memoriae occurrit quoad usum— secundum communem opinionem. Imo neque tunc, ob ea per quae id affirmavit Adrianus, & ob ea, quae nos addimus Navar. cap. 1. n. 27. & n. 29.  
Alensis, Bonaventura, Durandus, Aquinas, Adrianus, Angelus, Medina Viguerius, etc. vid. in Suarez. 4. 4. disp. 15. Sect. 5. n. 2. Praeceptum non obligat ad agendam paenitentiam statim, etiamsi opportunitas occurrat, seu licet facile fiere possit, Vid. Vasq. in. 3. Th. ibid. dub. 5. n. 9 Est Verissima opinio praeceptum contritionis non obligare statim. Alexand. S. Thom. Angelus. Jo Medina, Sotus, Durand. Canus, Navarre. Paludan Adrian, Viguerius, merito ergo omnes in hoc conveniunt.   tells us, it is his own, and the common opinion, That a man is not obliged to Repent forthwith; and this he saith is confirmed by best Reason, viz. The consent of all the faithful, both Priests and People; and adds, That to make the precept so rigid as to require present Repentance, hath no probable reason, no nor any Authority.  
Now this Doctrine concerning Repentance, in this first step of it, where it appears more modest and innocent than in its further advance, is yet very horrid and desperate. For it is all one as if they had said, That they may, notwithstanding any command of God, continue (for some time at least) in their hatred of God, and state of enmity against him, since that is confessed, the temper and state of the impenitent. Besides, it emboldens Sinners, and giveth them confidence to leave their souls at a desperate venture; presuming they may Repent time enough hereafter, when they can have no assurance of any time at all for the future. And it is the more dangerous, because their doctrine takes away all apprehension of danger, leaving them no fear, either of penalty, or sin in putting off Repentance. No danger of suffering by present neglects or delays, for they are told that they may Repent when they please. The Lord, saith one 
(c) Vega in Conc. Trid. lib. 13. cap. 11. Molina. concord. great. & lib. arb. q. 14. art. 13. disp. 10. Valent. tom. 2. disp. 8. q. 3. Semper quoad se habet oportunitatem, quia semper est in suo arbitrio positum conteri Filliuc. tr. 6. c. 8. n. 202. Cum q●ilibet possit ope divina (quae nunquam facient quod in se est) suorum peccatorum paenitere, & corum veniam consequi. Nau. cap. 24. n. 14.  part of their Divines, is every moment ready to help them to Repentance; or say 
(d) Cum non potest sine conversione vitare peccatum. Bellarm. de great. l. 2. c. 5. etc. 8. Becan. de auxil. great. cap. 6. Alvarez de auxil. great. l. 11. disp. 112. n. 5. concls. 2  the rest, He will help them to it (if they please) in the Article of necessity; when ever the precept makes it their duty. And what should hinder them upon such encouragement to defer it, even to the point of death? they need not fear that they shall perish, nor need they fear they shall sin by thus putting it off. Some of their Doctors make it no sin at all, others as good as none. 
(e) Neque enim praeceptum de paenitentia agenda quovis tempore obligat, cum sit affirmativum, sed solum certis temporibus, ut cum versamur in periculo mortis, cum ad confessione● est accedendum, (but for this, he says attrition will suffice, l. 2. c. 18. p. 974.) c●… Deus peculiari inspiratione ad paenitentiam nos invitat. At extra ejusmodi tempora impaenitentia non tam peccatum novum, quam peccati patrati circumstantia est. De paeni●. l. 2. c. 9 p. 938.  Bellarmine determines, That it is not a sin, but only a circumstance of sin, when the command doth not oblige; and that, it doth not presently, but only at a certain season. 
(f) Non est dubium, quin id licitum sit, de panit. tr. 1. q. 6. p 18.  Medina affirms, That without all doubt it is lawful. 
(g) In 4. dist. 17. q. 2. art. 6. Relect. de paenit. pars. 4. p. 866.  Soto saith, it is but a Venial sin. Canus takes a course to reconcile them, he concludes it is no sin at all not to Repent presently; and that it is but 
(h) Ibid, p. 863. supra.  a Venial sin to Will (or resolve) not to Repent. Now if it be no sin at all, there is no danger at all; if it be but a Venial sin, there is very little or none to be regarded, no necessity upon any account to Repent of it; and he saith the people never confess this in order to Repentance, the Priests never require it, nor regard it; by the consent of all we are not obliged to it.  
Now that which a man is not bound to Repent of, he may still continue in, and so he may still continue resolved to put off Repentance, yes, so he may safely, say they, till the Article of necessity.   

Sect. 5. But when is that? Let us next inquire after it, and in the pursuit thereof, we shall discover the second point I charge them with. That a man, by their doctrine, needs not Repent all his days, till he be in danger of death.  
This is their common doctrine, since the command to Repent is Affirmative, 
(i) Quantum autem ad vitandum novum p●ccatum transgressionis praecepti de contritione, tempus est determinatum ad articulum necessitatis: sicut in aliis affirmativis praeceptis contingit. Cajetan. Sum. v. contrite. p. 104. Canus, ibid. p. 863.  it doth not oblige but in time of necessity, even as other affirmative precepts do. All the question will be, When is this time of necessity, when it will be necessary to Repent without longer delay? Now their Doctors are agreed in no other Article of time, except it be the point of death, or when a man's life is apparently in danger. There is no other time in a man's whole life, wherein it is likely that Repentance should be requisite, but they deny it to be then necessary; and offer arguments to prove, that it is not needful in any other, however probable seasons. Let me show this in some instances.  
Is it necessary to Repent at solemn times of worship, when we address ourselves in a more particular manner to a Holy God? No, say they 
(k) 
Aquinas 2. 2. q. 122. art. 4.  
Cajetan, ibid. p. 105, Soto de just. & jur. l. 2. q. 4. art. 4. supra Bellarm. de cult. Storum. l. 3. c. 10. supra. Sylvest. sum. v. Domin. n. 8. Graff. lib. 1. cap. 5. n. 14. Navarre, cap. 13. n. 17. Sum. Rosellae, v. feriae n. 2. Lopez, cap. 12. p. 85.   generally: and Canus 
(l) In diebus festis non obligari homines ad ageudam paenitentiam aut divino praecept●●ut humano, praeceptum emim de colendo Deo, quo festis diebus astringimur, opera religion●… praescribit: at paenitentia religionis opus non est, sed vindicationis, Canus ibid. p. 864. Ita Cajetan. Soto, Navarre, Armilla, Rosell. & alij communiter, Suar. l. 2. de fest. c. 16. n. 14.  giveth this reason for it. Though acts of Religion be then required, yet Repentance is not an act of Religion, but of Revenge.  
Is it needful on days of Fasting? It may seem so, because the main and proper end of Fasts, is the exercises of Repentance and Humiliation. No, say they, It is not needful then; for if this were the intention of God, or the Church, in enjoining Fasts, yet the intention of the Lawgiver doth not bind us. 
(m) Ex D. Thomae & graviorum autorum sententia ad finem legislatoris minime teneamur, Canus ibid. p. 871.  No exercise of Repentance is with them, requisite on their Fasts, but what they may perform in a Dream: for if they sleep the whole Fasting day, yet they fulfil the Precept for Fasting 
(*) Si aliquis dormiret pro totum diem qua observari praecipitur jejunium, praeceptum jejunij impleret, Jo. Sanc. disp. 5●. n. 2. . To their Fasts they require nothing but abstinence from some sort of meat, not any Religious act at all: and if with them the Precept for the Mass, or Prayer, could not be fully accomplished without some penitent sense of sin, as it may; yet neither the Mass, nor Prayer public, or private, is requisite to their Fasts. Yea, in extraordinary times for Prayer, upon occasion of some great calamity befallen them for their sins; they think not contrition for sin needful: the peopls 
(n) 
Vid Bonacin. de Sacram. d. 5. q. 5. p. 2. n. 6.  
Quia non constat privatis hominibus tempore u●gentis necessitatis oraturis pro populi necessitate, quod contritio de suis peccatis sit remedium solitum ab ipsis adhiberi, & qui● ignorant id remedij esse necessarium, neque de hoc tanquam de re necessaria solent admontri a confessoribus vel praedicatoribus: ideo peccatorem privatum tempore calamitatis magna, qua premitur respublica, orantem Deum pro reipublicae liberatione sine praevia contrition, ad peccatum mortale non ideo damnarem, etc. Lopez, cap. 16. p. 97.   know not there is then any necessity thereof; their Confessors and Preachers are never wont to mind them of this as a thing necessary; and therefore Lopez saith, He would not condemn any private person, that neglects it in these circumstances, and so concludes he after others. As for their common Fasts, these (no more than their Festivals) require not abstinence from acts of wickedness, much less Repentance for them.  
Is it necessary when sins are brought to our remembrance, and when our minds dictate to us, that they are to be hated and Repent of? It seems then needful, if ever, seeing a practical judgement obligeth even in things lawful, though they be not otherwise necessary. 
(o) Ex hoc autem quod peccata memoriae occurrunt, sicut non tenetur ad tunc confitendum, ita nec ad tunc conterendum Cajetan. sum. v. contrite. p. 105. Non autem quandocunque occurrit memoriae peccatum tenetur conteri— nec etiam si practice occurrant memoriae peccata extra tempus praecepti, quia tunc secundum Sotum, neque placere neque displicere, sed neutro modo se habere, non est contemptus. Lopez. cap. 12. p. 85. vid. Navarre (after Adrian) cap. 1. n. 27.  No, not then, 
(p) Non tenetur homo paenitentiam agere, quoties peccata memoriae occurrerint, sive speculative si●e practice occ●rerint. Canus. ibid. p. 863.  a man is not bound to Repent when his sins are offered to his mind, either speculatively or practically. One would think if a sinner needs not repent, when he is mindful of his sins, it could never be needful, since he can never repent but when he is mindful of them.  
Is it necessary when a sinner comes to their 
(q) 
Non tamen ad id tenemur quotres Ministramus, vel accipimus Sacramenta— quia non tenemu tune habere contritionem Navar. cap. 11. n. 8. vid. Lopez. cap. 10. p. 70.  
Their common Doctrine, as we saw before, requires nothing but attrition for Baptism and Penance, no actual disposition at all for their other 5 Sacraments.  
Baptizans autem in necessitate non tenetur ad hoc (viz. Contritionem) Sylvest. v. Baptism. 3. n. 6. neque Baptizandus. vid. Soto. de Nar. & great. l. 2. c. 15. p. 101.  
Si attritus suscipit Sacramentum Paenitentiae & Ench●ristiae, satisfacit praecepto ecclesiae. Cajetan. sum. v. contrite. p. 104. Sacramentum Baptismi & penitentiae, licite sumi possint ab his qui habent conscientiam peccati mortalis, modo habeant attritionem qua tollitur obex & complacentia in peccatum commissum. Canus. ibid. pars. 6. p. 932.   Sacraments; particularly to that of Penance? This must be the time for it (as we may well conceive) if there be any time for it at all, in the Romish Church. Then a sinner is to survey his life, to find out his sins, and as a Penitent to make particular confession of them, and is to have pardon of his sin, as one that truly Reputes; being absolved by a judicial sentence, as 
(r) Neque aliter est accipienda vox sacerdotis peccata condonantis quam vox Christi, qui ait paralytico, Mat. 7. Confide fili, remittuntur tibi peccata. Catechism. Trident. de paenit.  valid, as if Christ himself did pass it immediately. If Repentance be not needful, when a sinner is to have pardon, than the Lord never required it, nor can it ever be made necessary by man.  
This notwithstanding, Repentance, they say, is not necessary, no, not for the Sacrament of Penance. Attrition will serve for that, which is but a 
(*) Aquinas asserit attritionem esse displicentiam imperfectam. Can. ibid. p. 935.  slender 
(s) Attritio est dolor peccatorum, non qua ratione sunt offensa Dei, sed quatenus nobis nocua. Nimirum quia sunt causa paenae aut in hoc, aut in futuro saeculo. Soto de nat. & great. l. 2. c. 14. p. 99  dislike of sin, because it is hurtful to a man's self, without respect to God, as it is offensive to him. This, 
(t) Concil. Trident. sess. 14. cap. 4. vid. Cajetan. Navar. Canum. Lopez. supra. Bellarm. de paenit. l. 2. c. ult. p. 974. Sacramenta novae legis conferunt gratiam attritis. Canus de Sacramentis. pars. 5. p. 797.  though short of true Repentane, is sufficient to qualify a man for the Sacrament of Penance, by the Doctrine of their Church. For they hold the Sacrament is not only duly administered; but 
(u) Concil. Trident. Sess. 7. c. 6. Sacramentum gratiam confert omni adulto offerenti se, non pon●ndo obicem. Cajetan. sum. v. absolute. p. 12. Canus pars. 3 Relect. de paenir. p. 844. Angel. sum. v. confess. 7. Secundum Scotum & S. Thom. si praecedens dolor non suffecisset ad contritionem, etc.  effectual for all its ends and purposes, when there is no obstacle in the receiver; 
(x) Idem. ibid. p. 932. supra.  the obstacle in this case is complacency in mortal sins, 
(y) Complacentia vero satis tollitur per quemcunque dolorem. Soto. de nat. & great. l. 2. c. 15. p. 101.  the complacence is gone, when sin is disliked or displeasing out of any respect, and so the obstacle is removed by the dislike of sin, which is in attrition.  
Thus comes Attrition to be sufficient, and 
(z) That which we, with the Scripture, call true Repentance, they call Contrition. As for attrition, it is so far from being true Repentance, that, with the Council of Trent, they all acknowledge, it is not of itself sufficient for pardon. Attritio— quamvis sine penitentiae Sacramento poe rse adjustificationem peccatorem perducere nequeat. Concil. Trid. Sess. 14. c. 4.  true Repentance not needful, no, not for the Sacrament of Repentance.  
This is not only concluded by the generality of their Doctors, but by the Council of Trent. And by these particulars we may discern, That Repentance with them, is not necessary, at any season of a man's life, when it would be counted so, if they did judge it needful at all, before the approach of death.   

Sect. 6. But indeed there needs no induction of particulars to prove this, for they declare plainly that by the command of God, it is not necessary to repent till one be at the point of death. This is said to be the judgement of Aquinas, Soto, Navarre, Durandus, Medina, Cajetan and others in Suarez. The ground of it is, 
(b) In qua re est multorum opinio hoc praeceptum (penitentiae) per se & natura suatantum obligare pro articulo mortis, ita sentit. D. Thomas & Durandus — Et eodem modo sumitur haec opinio ex Cojetano, Medina, Soto, Navarr, etc. Et fundamentum— quia supposito, quod praeceptum non statim obliget ante articulum mortis; nulla est major ratio designandi unum tempus, quam aliud: imo neque est ratio designandi aliquod, quia in nullo est vera necessitas: praeceptum autem affirmativum tantum obligat p●o articulo necessitatis. Suarez. Tom. 4. disp. 15. Sect. 6. n. 2.  because the reasons brought to prove that it doth not oblige presently; prove it as much of any other certain time in our life, except tbat only when a man is dying.  
It is to the same effect that others say, the precept does but oblige in danger of death, or perpetual madness. So Bonacina and in him (besides Jesuits) Medina, Sotus, Angles, Zerola Pitigianus, Sayrus, Molfesius, and others. De Sacram. ibid. n. 5. So that while a man is like to live, and be sober, he need not repent: but if he be in danger to die, or run mad, he should be so wise as to repent first, but how he shall know when he is like to run mad, or that his madness will be perpetual, is a hard question; and till he can resolve it, they will go near to excuse him. And if he can have a Confessor, though he be at the point of death and distraction too, he need not trouble himself with repenting, that proviso they still add (saltem quando non adest copia confessarij, cui fiat confessio cum attritione) this indeed is it, that their Confessors serve, for to save sinners the labour of going to Heaven, by turning them out of the only way to it.  
However by this it appears, that any Papist hath warranty by their Doctrine to live impenitently, till he be in danger to live no longer. He need not grieve for offending God, till he be dying, nor resolve upon that account to forsake any sin, till there be reason to think, that he can live no longer to commit it.  
What a Temptation is here for all wicked persons to turn Papists, if they could but prevail with themselves to believe in this particular, as the Church believes, against all that God hath declared concerning repentance? And since men easily believe, what they desire should be true though against the word of truth: how strange would it be, if the World did not wonder after the Beast?   

Sect. 7. But though they excuse a sinner from repenting all his l●…e before, yet when he comes to die, do they not then make it needful? they make some show of it indeed, but it is a mere delusive show; & they are therein as false to their own pretensions, as they are to the Souls of sinners. For at the approach of death (as at any period before, wherein some of them seem to make Repentance necessary, yet) even than they abuse them with conceits, that something else will serve without it. The expedients which they have provided, thus to delude perishing Souls all their lives, and even when they are passing into eternity, are many and various; that those who do not like to be ruined one way, may be taken with another; and so, that repenting, which alone can secure them, may be declined by all.  
First, Repentance without any sensible sorrow for sin, will serve the turn. This is the way of Scotus, and Vega and others. A will not to have sinned, though it be without any 
(c) In N●var. cap. 1. n 3  grief for sin, or without any actual consideration, that he hath sinned, is sufficient for pardon. Such an act of the Will is the essence of that contrition which procures forgiveness, 
(d) Ex ment Navarri, Soti, Paludani, Scoti est, quod contritio quoad suam essentiam est iste actus nollem peccasse. Lopez. cap. 10. p. 68 & cap. 6. p. 38. vid. D. Thom. Paludan, Soto, Navarre, Ledesma, Cajetan. Concil. Trident, and others in Jo. Sanc. disp. 1. n. 8.  as not only Scotus, but Paludanus, Cajetane, Soto, Victoria and Navarre in Lopez.  

(e) Per supradicta constet (contritionem) non esse dolorem essentialiter; sed causam, ex qua, & alijs ad id necessarijs nascitur dolour, si aliunde non impediatur. Nau. ibid. n. 14.  Sorrow is not essential to Repentance, but an effect; and such a one as is contingent and separable, and doth not necessarily follow it. Correspondent to this is their Doctrine who teach, that a virtual Repentance is sufficient, 
(f) Sufficit actus qui licet non sit paenitentia talis formaliter, est tamen virtualiter secundum Scotum communiter receptum. ibid. n. 5.  any act whatever, which may be counted penitence virtually; though it be no such thing actually, or formally; is enough by their common Doctrine, any 
(g) n 30.  love to God above all is such a virtual Repentance, though without 
(h) Imo quilibet amor Dei, quo plus quam omnia alia diligitur, vid tur virtualis peccatorum paenitentia, secundum communem quam sequitur. Jo. Medina. ibid. n. 5.  any remembrance of sin, this is not only the opinion of Medina, but that which is commonly received. Any kind of love will serve for this, though it be but natural, and such as may be had without the grace of God, as 
(i) Cap. 11. n. 7. ●. 13●. Supra.  Navarr expresseth it. And the limitation which he would seem to add, that such a virtual Repentance is but sufficient when there is no time for a formal Repenting, is excluded by their common Doctrine. For he and others with him generally teach, that there is no space of time requisite for this, but it may be sufficiently dispatched in a 
(k) Cap. 1. n. 38. Paenitudo momentanea— ad remissionem pecca●i juxta comnunem susficiat.  moment.  
And some of their chief Divines hold, that a sinner being pardoned upon this virtual penitence, if he remember his sins afterwards, is not bound to repent of them. So Corduha, Sotus, Vega, Bonacin. ibid. d. 5. q. 5. p. 2. n. 1.  
Thus we have Repentance sufficient to Salvation in the Roman Church without any sorrow, without any sense or remembrance of sin. And how can they count any more sorrow for sin necessary? who hold 
(l) Nullus est adeo imprudens qui tempore confessionis peccata sua non detestatur formaliter vel virtualiter. Major & Victoria in Lopez. c. 17. p. 100  That no prudent person doth confess his sins to a Priest, but he detests them formally or virtually, and so some way sufficiently: when it is known to be their common practice to confess sins, without any sorrow or detestation thereof? Yea even in the hour of death, ask God forgiveness without any remembrance of sin or actual Repentance, is enough for pardon. So Joseph the Minorite teacheth, favouring their conceit (as Lopez observes) who think it repentance 
(m) Sufficere ad contritionem, tunsionem pectoris, aut prolationem Miserere mei— Cap. 13 p. 90. Instant mortis prae angustia tollente recordationem peccatorum, si quis toto corde petat veniam, sine actuali paenitentia p●r orationem justificabitur.  enough, to beat their breasts, and say Lord have mercy. Nor doth such pernicious presumption find encouragement only in the Minorites Divinity; Pope Clement the 8th contributes more to it, when in his indulgences sent to Poland he promiseth pardon, to any one whoever that is dying, if he have but the name Jesus once in his thoughts, though he cannot express it.  
As there can be no true Repentance without sorrow for sin; so neither without Resolution to forsake it: and yet they teach, Repentance may be as well without this as the other. 
(n) Non est necessarium ad remissionem peccatorum formale propositum vitandi peccatum. Vega. Concil. Trident. l. 13. cap. 21.  a virtual resolution may serve i. e. such a purpose to abandon sin, as he may have, who never thought of leaving it. 
(o) Cap. 1. n. 6. Sicut actus, qui est paenitentia virtualis, sufficit, ita eadem ratione sufficere videtur, quod eam comitetur id, quod est propositum virtuale confitendi, satisfaciendi, & amplius non peccandi. n. 11.  Navarre tells us that the sufficiency of such a purpose is learnedly and magnificently asserted by Vega. He 
(p) n. 12. vid. Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 20. Sect. 4.  himself explains it and defends it, without any limitation, but, that the vanity whereof appears before; and 
(q) Graves Doctores existimant sufficere virtuale propositum, ita Major, Almain, Vega, Medina, Petrus, Soto, Navar. Adrian. idem. ibid. disp. 4. p. 3. n. 2.  tells us the Council of Trent requires not a formal purpose, but thinks that sufficient which is only virtual. And their Divines whom they call Nominals, deny that any purpose to forsake sin is necessary to Repentance, as Soto 
(r) 
Ex nominalibus quidam addubitant, nam in ratione contritionis necessarium sit propositum cavendi a vitijs in futurum. Atque id negant Soto De nature. & gr. l. 2. c. 14. p. 99 vid. Canum, Cordubam qui refert Durandum, Paludanum, Capreolum & Antoninum pro tali sententia in Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 20. Sect. 2. n. 6. Non esse necessariam detestationem efficacem cum absoluto dolore & proposito non peccandi, sed displicentiam quamcunque, cum velleitate non peccandi, sufficere ad valorem Sacramenti, tenet Cajetan. Victoria, Canus, Ledesma, Sicut Paludanus, Sylvester, ibid. Sect. 4. Aquinas, Capreolus, Thom. Hurtado. Tom. 2. tr. ult. n. 501.  
Neque oportet, ut confessor sibi persuadeat, & judicet etiam probabiliter, ita esse futurum ut paenitens a peccando abstineat, sed satis est, ut existimet tunc habere tale propositum, quamvis post breve tempus illud sit mutaturus. Ita docent omnes auctores. Idem disp. 32. Sect. 2. n. 2. p. 426.  
Scotus in 4. dist. 14. q. ult. art. 3. and Sylvester after him, sum. v. confessio n. 24. hold that neither sorrow for sin, nor resolution against it (no, not so little as they ascribe to attrition) is needful: but that a willingness to partake of their Sacrament is sufficient for justification by it.   informs us. So that by the Doctrine of all sorts of Divines amongst them, a repenting, which wants the essentials of true Repentance, will suffice in life or death.  
Secondly, A Repentance or sorrow for sin, which is merely natural is counted sufficient. The Apostle to true Repentance requires Godly sorrow. 2 Cor. 7. 9, 10. but they, many of them, think it not requisite that it should be Godly, no not in respect of its original. That will serve, which is not from God, but from nature. Scotus a leader of one mighty Squadron of their School-Doctors determines, 
(s) Express ipse (Scotus) in 4. dist. 14. q. 2. ait. quod ex puris naturalibus, cum communi influentia, potest esse attritio, quae sit meritum de congruo ad deletionem peccati mortalis— adeo pro constanti ubique habet, quod naturaliter possumus disponi de congruo ad justificationem: quam solam dispositionem ipse docet. Atqui Adrianus, Durandus, & ferme Nominales, & ita illum sentire indubie putant, & sentiunt ipsi. Soto. ibid. l. 2. c. 4. p. 68  That such a sorrow may be had by the power of nature, as will in congruity merit pardon of sin. And Adrian, Durandus with all the Nominals in a manner, take that to be his judgement, and are of the same persuasion themselves. The Franciscans maintained it 
(t) That a man by natural power only, may feel a sorrow for sin, which is a disposition, and merit of congruity to abolish it. Hist. of Counc. of Trent. l. 2. p. 198.  in the Council of Trent. Aquinas 
(u) Ibid. & Soto. ibid. l. 1. c. 2. (Aquinas) opinionem commun●m insecutus affi●masset, tum quod homo ex naturalibus posset se disponere ad gratiam, tum quod dispositio illa esset meritum de congruo. p. 66.  whom the rest of their School Divines generally follow, was of that opinion too. And the chief of the Dominicans his modern followers (even those of them, who are loath their Angelical Doctor should appear to be so much a Pelagian) do hold; that such a sorrow as is merely from nature (without either habitual grace, or special assistance) is enough, to justify him, who through ignorance thinks it enough. So Canus and Soto in 
(x) Quaestio oritur, an cum attritione orta solum ex viribus naturae sim●l cum Sacramento in re, possit paenitens justificari. Et quidem quaestio est, quae nobis Thomistis facit negotium, propterea quod Scotus & Canus Clarissimi Thomistae, videntur hic affirmativam tenere. Cap. 8. p. 53.  Lopez, from whence Lopez infers 
(y) p. 55. , That in their account such remorse for sin, as requires special assistance, is not necessary to the justification of a sinner: but that may suffice, which is had from the power of nature, though the ground of it be but outward disgrace. Thus if we will believe the Roman Doctors, Thomists or Scotists (the Jesuits who serve themselves of both as they see occasion, I need not mention; since of their concurrence herein there is no question): a sinner may be saved by such a sort of Repentance, as is not the gift of God; but the pure issue of corrupt nature.  
Thirdly, a slight and inconsiderable sorrow (such as falls short of what the Scripture calls for) will suffice instead of true Repentance. One act of grief, they tell us, is enough for the sins of a whole life, one only, there needs not two. So 
(a) 
S. Thom. Nugnus, Navarre, Victoria, Sotus, Pitigianus, Zerola, Cajet. Palatius, Canus, (in) Bonacin●. ibid. l. d. 5. q. 5. p. 5. n. 1.  
Satis est si paenitens peccatis omnibus memoratis, unam detestationem applicet. in Lopez c. 6. p. 39   Soto, 
(b) Neque illud exigitur ut tot sint actus contritionis, quot sint peccata— est concedendu● hominem unica actione peccata omnia, quae memoriae forte occurrunt, detestari, atque ob●… commissa dolere: alioquin enim falsum esset, quod paulo ante demonstravimus, in momento posse hominem converti, & justificari. De paenit. l. 2. c. 11. p. 944.  Bellarmine, etc. One act will serve for all sins in general and together, remembered or not remembered, in which sense they say a 
(c) Cajetan. sum. v. contrite. p. 103, 104. Soto dist. 17. q. 2. art. 3. Tol. l. 3. c. 15. p. 516.  general Repentance will suffice. Their sense de Graffiis thus Reports. 
(d) 
Non requiri singularem sed quod sufficiat una generalis, quae saltem virtualiter se extendat ad omnia peccata mortalia, etc. l. 1 c. 5. n. 5.  
Satis est ut concipiat generalem ejusmodi paenitudinem quae virtute se extendat ad omnia mor●…fi●a. Navar. c. 1. n. 22. quod tenendum est cum Jo. Majore & Cardinale S. Sixti alij communiter in Bonacin. ibid. punct. 6.   A particular Repentance is not required, but one general will serve, extending itself, at least virtually, to all mortal sins, both which he remembers, and remembers not; with a will to abstain from all; this is enough for Remission of sins.  
Further, this one act of grief needs be but very little and slender, the very lest remorse in the lowest degree that can be, will serve.  
When they require no sensible sorrow at all to Repentance, but only a dislike of the will, or a will not to have sinned; the best and weakest motion of the will that way (against past sins) will suffice.  
To 
(e) Ad perfectionem paenitentiae requiritur tenuis quidam dolor internus. sum. q. 16 ●…t. 1. Contritio una licet remissa. l. 3. c. 5.  the perfection of Repentance, a certain slender inward grief is requisite saith Maldonat, one act of Contrition, though it be remiss, is enough, saith Tolet. These two are Jesuits, but speak more modestly than others of their Doctors. Let us hear Canus 
(f) Praeceptum de actu fidei & de actu spei homo implet, etiamsi non agat ex toto conatu; ergo & praeceptum de charitate & contritione: non ergo contritio totum animi conatum exigit— Quod autem nullum ejusmodi esset praeceptum, patet, esset enim stultum praeceptum, quod semper invincibiliter ignoratur. Relell. de paenit. pars. 3. p. 841.  we need not grieve for sin as much as we can, such an endeavour is not required in any other precept for Love, Faith, Hope, or Righteousness. Yea they would be foolish precepts, if they enjoined a certain degree. But if we need not grieve so much as we can, how then? Why, as little as can be: or if that will not satisfy, As little as we will. Quantumcunque sit remissa 
(g) Quantumcunque sit remissa— satis est ad crimina diluenda Cap. 1. n. 31 S cundum mentem communem Doctorum.  saith Navarr, Penitence be it never so little, it is sufficient for the washing away of all crimes, according to the common sense of the Doctors, 
(h) 
Secundum. S. Thom. quaecunque contritio vera, quantumvis remissa, etiam in instanti concepta satis est ad remittenda omnia mortalia. Cap. 15. p. 94.  
De paenit. l. 2. c. 11. p. 943. Contrite. n. 106.   quantumvis remissa, Be it as little as you will, says Lopez after Aquinas. 
(k) Dicendum est ad rationem contritionis nullam definitam intensionem requiri, sed sufficere substantiam actus, in quocunque gradu fiat. Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 4. Sect. 4. Ita express Gabriel, Soto, Medina, Vega, Navarrus. ibid. n. 9 vid. plures in Bonacin. ibid. punct. 7. n. 3.  No certain degree, none that can be assigned, above the least of all, is requisite in Bellarmine, Victoria, etc. But should there not be a degree, more than the least, for the more grievous sins? No, no more for them than the less. In 
(i) (l) Licet de graviori peccato gravior requiratur paenitentia sive paenitudo, hoc tamen intelligendum est de consilio & honestate, non autem de necessitate. Navar. c. 1. n. 31.  honesty we may grieve more for the greater, to comply with the advice of God, but there is no necessity for it; it's only matter of Counsel, and so left to our pleasure. But must we not grieve for sin, as those who conceive it to be hateful above all, and most to be avoided? No, 
(m) Detestari peccatum supra omne malum paenae, non necessarium. Cajetan, Navarre, Vega, in Suarez. ibid. disp. 3. Sect. 9 n. 8.  not that neither: Lopez 
(n) (Nullum concilium, nec Sancti, nec Scriptura Sacra, id supra omne odibile, dolorem necessarium esse expressere. c. 15. p. 92.  tells us, that neither Council, nor Scripture have declared it necessary to grieve for sin, as that which is most hateful: and (which is more than all,) that the Council of Trent requires it not. Navarr 
(o) Cap. 1. n. 25.  had said as much before him, only the former thinks, it may be requisite that the penitent do not expressly or positively form in his mind a Resolution not to grieve for sin above all that is hateful. Thus is Repentance reduced in a manner to nothing: in respect of Appretiation, it is too much to grieve for sin, as that which is most odious: in respect of intenseness, it is enough to grieve less for it, than other grievances, the least degree of all is sufficient, and that which is next to nothing may serve.  
Moreover, this one act so extremely little, may be dispatched 
(*) Sufficit, si fiat in instanti Bonacin. ibid. punct. 8. ibi. Nugnus, Molfesius & alij.  in a moment. The least degree of it is enough, but the least continuance is too much; all the Repentance that is a Sinners duty, may be perfectly finished in the twinkling of an eye; an indivisible instant can serve all the exigencies of it, and it may be as soon over as a man can say peccavi. It's such an act as vanishes so soon as ever it appears, and is come and gone before there is time to observe it; they allow not the least space, the least particle of time to be necessary for it: And it is so in Faith, Hope, Love, and other virtues; no man ever required any space of time for this; so Bellarmin, 
(p) Non requiritur certus gradus intensionis, neque mora ulla temporis ad veram contritionem— Quis unquam in Praeceptis fidei, spei, dilectionis, aliarumque virtutum istas mensuras excogitavit, etc. De paenit. l. 2. c. 11. p. 943.  Canus 
(q) Canus. pars. 3. Relect. de paenit. p. 842.  de Graffiis; 
(r) Graff. l. 1. c. 5. n. 7.  so Navarre, 
(s) Secundum mentem communem Doctorum, quam explicat Jo. Major, paenitudo circumamicta debitis circumstantijs & supradictis, quantumcunque remissa, & brevissimo tempore, etiam in instanti concepta, satis est ad crimina diluenda, Cap. 1, n. 31. & n. 22. & n. 38.  so all in a manner; for he tells us, it is the common sense of their Divines. The least penitence that may be, in the shortest time that can be, yea, in that which is less than any particle of time, even in an instant, is enough to blot out all crimes. And Scotus, for saying that penitence dispatched in a moment, is not sufficient for pardon, had like to have suffered shrewdly, every one almost being ready to fall foul upon him; 
(t) Vid. Lopez. cap. 15. p. 94. alij Scotislae videntur Scotum salvare ejus sensum & mentem interpre●ando— Nam culpam posse remitti per contritionem etiam remissam, & habitam in instanti, non dubitavit, etc.  but his followers have compounded for him, and brought him off with a distinction, which makes him say as the rest do, whether he thought so or no. And now it passeth currently, that all the sorrow which any need have for all his sins, may be over in less than a minute, and may be begun, perfected, and ended in less time than you can pronounce the least syllable of miserere; and this they restrain not to extraordinary cases, but conclude it as common to all. Finally,  
This one little act so suddenly dispatched, need never return: Do it but once, and no need to do it again. The act, though next to nothing in degree; though nothing at all, as to continuance, is not necessarily to be repeated, or the defect of it to be supplied by another act, though there be time and occasion for it; all exercise of Repentance for sin, supposed to be thus pardoned, upon any occasion, is altogether unnecessary. Having passed one act of grief so extremely slender, & so suddenly over, he needs never trouble himself with it further; 
(u) Non est praeceptum quod nos obligat ad eam habendam bis speciatim de eodem, Navar. c. 1. n. 28. vid. Sylvest. Sum. v. contrite. n. 4. He is not obliged afterwards when he remembers his sins, Aquinas, Navarre, Sajirus, Angles, Pitigianus, Molsesius, etc. Bonacin, ibid. punct. 2. n. 9  There is no command that can oblige us to have it twice for the same sin. Such is the Repentance which in the Church of Rome is counted sufficient for salvation, even in ordinary cases; how agreeable it is to that which the Scripture makes necessary, let others judge? to me it seems calculated for the humours of those who would be saved with a conceit of Repenting, without troubling themselves with the thing; yet this is not the worst. For,  
Fourthly: When they have commended to Sinners a sort of Repentance, which is not sufficient to save them, they take it for granted that it is insufficient; and yet maintain that it is enough, if the Sinner do but think so, yea, or do not think the contrary. He that thinks he is contrite, saith Soto, when he is not; 
(x) Tum enim licet attritio interna non sufficit, tamen quia ille bona fide accedit, recipiet gratiam per Sacramentuni, De nat. & great. l. 2. c. 15. p. 101.  though his inward remorse be not sufficient, yet because he means honestly, he shall receive justifying grace by the Sacrament. Navarre tells us that Soto herein followed Aquinas commonly received; and he 
(y) 
Cap. 1. n. 42. & n. 35  
Quando non habet signa sufficientia doloris, potest & debet interrogare paenitentem, ●… ex animo detestetur peccatum, cui affirmanti credere tenetur. Et hoc idem dicendum est de proposito in futurum— I●a docent omnes authores. Suar. tom. 4. disp. 32. Sect. 2. n. 2.   after Franciscus Victoria judgeth it to be the plain sense of the Council of Trent, 
(a) Victoria. Soto. Ledesma. Vega. Corduba in Suarez. l. 4. disp. 20. Sect. 1. n. 7.  Carduba, Canus, and 
(b) Quando saltem concipitur ob amorem Dei— cum credulitate quod habeat sufficientem dolorem, licet revera illum non habeat, l. 1. c. 2. n. 8. & n. 6.  de Graffiis, with others, concur herein. As for the followers of Scotus, amongst them it is taught, That whosoever thinks he is contrite, hath really obtained pardon; and therefore none, who make account they bring contrition to the Sacrament, do by it receive the first Grace, because they are possessed of it already, by thinking so well of themselves, 
(c) Neque vero ignoro Nominalium quorundam opinionem docentium, quod quicunque existima●, se esse contritum, revera obtinuisse jam veniam, atque adeo quod nullus cogitans contritionem se adferre ad Sacramentum, per ipsum recipit primam gratiam: quin vero jam recepit per suam bonam illam cogitantiam, ibid. p. 102.  as Soto reports them. Add but Cardinal Tolet (that we may see how all Orders conspire herein) 
(d) Aliquando homo dolet de peccato, dolore qui per se non sufficeret delere peccatum, & tamin accedente Sacramento deletur, Just. l. 2. c. 16. p. 460.  Those who come with remorse (which they think to be contrition) receive the first Grace. He thus explains it: Sometimes a man hath some grief for sin which is not sufficient for pardon; but the Sacrament being added, he is pardoned.  
Thus all sorts agree in this conceit, which I know not, whether it be more ridiculous or pernicious, that a man's, thinking he hath true Repentance, when he hath it not, is enough (at least with the Sacrament of Absolution) to save him. Let any man but delude himself, or be deluded by others, with a false conceit that he truly Reputes, when he doth not; and any Priest can let him, in his impenitence, into Heaven; if the best of the Roman Guides may be believed, or those Impostors regarded, who hereby make it plain, (if they did it no other way,) that they are given up to strong delusions.  
Fifthly: If a man want that penitent sorrow which is sufficient, yet if he signify, that he would have it, or that he is sorry that he hath it not, it is as effectual, as if he had it. 
(e) Secundum Pet. de. Pal. a paenitente requirendum est, si paenitet: & si non sufficienter dolet, an hoc sibi displicet, & vellet sufficienter dolere. Et hoc inquit sufficit, quod valde nota, quia sic dispositus est contritus vel saltem attritus, ut possit absolvi— & est mens S. Thom. S. Bonavent. & omnium Theologorum, Sum. v. contrite. n. 2.  The Penitent is to be asked (saith Paludanus) whether he Repent; and if he do not grieve sufficiently, whether this do not displease him, and whether he would not grieve sufficiently; and this (saith he) is sufficient, which Sylvester would have well observed, because one so disposed may be absolved; (i. e. though he want that Repentance which is sufficient, yet he hath enough to put him into a saving state) and this he tells us, is not only the sense of Peter Paludanus, but of Aqninus and Bonaventure, and all their Divines. 
(f) Cap. 1. n. 18. & cap. 10. n. 4.  Navarre saith as much approving it as the opinion of all their Doctors. And yet this willingness which they will have to supply the want of sufficient Repentance, is but a conditional Velleity, such as Lopez observes, 
(g) Secundum Doctores & ipsum Navarrum paenitentia de praeteritis habetur per islum conditionalem actum nollem peccasse, sed cum istis conditionalibus nolleitatibus aut velleitatibus, stare potest propositum absolutum de sibi contrario. Ut cum nolleitate qua ingruente procella mercator nollet projicere merces fuas in mare secundum, Aristot. stat. absolutum propositum, eas projiciendi. Et cum villeitate quam meretrix in lupanari tenet inde exeundi, stare potest absoluta voluntas ibi manendi, Cap. 15 p. 91.  may stand with an absolute unwillingness to Repent sufficiently; such a Will as a Whore may have to leave the Stews, when she hath an absolute purpose to stay there; and yet he himself 
(h) Non sufficit cum Sacramento Paenitentiae ad salutem, nisi saltem attritio adsit, ibid. vid. Suarez.  will have such a Velleity with attrition (which is far from true Repentance) to be sufficient, in the want of it; and this leads us further.  
Sixthly: Attrition, though known by the Sinner to be short of true Repentance, is sufficient without it, to pass him into a saving state, if the Sacrament be added. Betwixt Contrition (which with them is true or complete Repentance) and this Attrition, the distance is great; they give an account of it in 
(i) Vid. Soto in 4. sent. dist. 17. q. 2▪ art. 3. Grasf. l. 1. c. 2. n. 3.  many particulars. THAT is a grief for offending God, THIS for temporal or eternal punishment, as the greatest evil. THAT proceeds from filial, THIS from slavish fear. THAT cannot be had without supernatural assistance, THIS may be had by the power of nature, say many of them. THAT is an act form by Grace and Love, THIS an act unformed, destitute of Grace and Love. THAT can pass one into the state of Grace, with a desire only of the Sacrament, THIS cannot, without an actual partaking of it. So in fine, THAT is complete Repentance, THIS but a defective remorse, 
(k) Idem ibid. C. Judas. C. Sceleratior de paen. dist. 3.  such as was in, Antiochus and Judas. Attrition, we see by their own account, is very far from true Repentance, yet being held sufficient for a saving state without it, if the Sacrament be added, by virtue hereof, Repentance is most evidently rendered needless. And such Attrition they think sufficient for this purpose, as either ariseth from the turpitude of sin, as it is disagreeable to reason, or from fear of Hell, or apprehensions of temporal punishments and damage, as loss of Health, Credit, Estate, etc. The Council of Trent admits of any of these. 
(l) Quinimo minime malum est paenitere solum metu paenae, infamiae vel alterius mali: modo voluntatem peccandi excludat, luculenter declarat, Concil. Trident. Sess. 14. c. 4. Navar. cap. 1. n. 8. Vega lib. 13. in Trident. c. 14. Concedit detestationem ob metum aliarum paenarum, esse attritionem, & contineri sub primo membro: nam Conci●ium utrumque conjunxit, scil. ex metu gehennae & paenarum, in Suar. tom. 4. disp. 5. Sect. 2. n. 15. vid Bonacin. ibid. punct. 3. n. 3. Zerola. Chamerota, Pirigianus, & alij ibid.  For Attrition by their declaration, is either 
(m) Illam vero contritionem imperfectam, quae Attritio dicitur: quoniam vel ex turpitudinis peccati consideratione, vel ex gehennae & paenarum metu communiter concipitur, Sess. 14. cap. 4.  that which proceeds from consideration of the turpitude of sin, or fear of Hell, or other punishment. And such Attrition is, with the Sacrament, sufficient for pardon, as is determined by that Council in these words, 
(n) Quo paenitens adjatus viam sibi ad justitiam parat, & quamvis sine paenitentiae Sacramento per se ad justificationem peccatorem perducere nequeat: tamen eum ad Dei gratiam in Sacramento paenitentiae impetrandam disponit. ibid.  Hereby he makes his way to Righteousness, and although without the Sacrament, it [Attrition] cannot by itself bring a Sinner to justification; yet it disposeth him to obtain the grace of God in the Sacrament of penance: So that by their doctrine, Attrition so disposeth a Sinner for Justification, that their Sacrament being added, it actually justifies, i. e. puts a Sinner into a state of Grace and Salvation. From this sentence of the Council, as Bellarmine tells us, 
(o) Et de eo loquuntur theologi, cum dicunt, attritionem ex timore conceptam, dispositionem esse ad justificationem, & Sacramento accedente, revera justificari, ut perspicuum est ex concilio Tridentino, Sess. 14. c. 4. de paenit. l. 2. c. 18. p. 972.  the Truth of what their Divines hold, is conspicuous, viz. That Attrition arising out of fear, is a disposition to Justification; and the Sacrament being added, doth truly justify. How generally they hold (with some difference of notion) the sufficiency of Attrition with their Sacrament, we may see in such as give an account of their Opinions distinctly (not taking any of the Society into the reckoning): it will be enough but to name some of them, since their suffrages after the determination of a Council are less needful. 
(p) Vid Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 20. Sect. 1. n. 5.  Some are for Attrition improved, as Henricus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, Petrus, Soto. Some for Attrition, mistaken for Contrition, 
(q) n. 7.  as Victoria, Soto, Ledesma, Vega, Corduba. Some for Attrition known to be so, 
(r) n. 9  as Aquinas, Scotus, Paludanus, Capreolus, Durandus, Adrian, Antoninus, Sylvester, Canon, & some 
(s) Soto, Canus, Vega, n.  for the opinion of Attrition, without the reality. But this is enough to show, that by the doctrine of their Church, Attrition with the Sacrament, is sufficient to put a Sinner into a saving state at any time living or dying. Thus is true Repentance reduced to Attrition, and this made enough to qualify an impenitent Sinner for pardon, so as he cannot fail of it; and yet Attrition, of what kind so ever, can scarce pass for a good quality. That sort of it which is rational (a dislike of sin, because it disagreeable to reason) is not so good in their account as that which is (servile); because as such, 
(t) Detestatio peccati quia est contra rationem non est sufficiens, quia non respicit Deum ipsum, nec peccatum, ut est offensa ejus— tum quia ex vi illius motivi non est supernaturalis, Idem ibid. disp. 4. Sect. 2. n. 11. Primum itaque genus imperfectae displicentiae est, cum quis dolet de peccato propter humana naturaliaque motiva, ut quia turpe est & contra rationem, Canus, Relect. de paenit. pars. 3. p. 836.  it is but a mere natural act, and hath no respect to God, and so hath nothing in it which looks like Godly sorrow. As for that which is servile, (a dislike of sin only, or principally for fear of punishment temporal or eternal) this is so far from being spiritually good, that it is morally evil. So bade it is, by the Authority and reason of their own Divines. Thus Gregory, Almain, and Adrian conclude 
(u) 
Nonnuli Catholici— operari ex timore tanquam ex fine proximo, judicant esse malum ut Gregorius, Almain, Adrian, Suar. ibid. disp. 5. Sect. 2. n. 3. p. 65.  
Vid Angel. Sum. v. Timor.  , that it is evil to act out of fear of punishment, as the next end or motive. It is no better by the reasoning of others, who would have us think better of it. A Sinner thereby prefers himself before God (and that sure is a sin (in any, unless they will except his Holiness) not any repenting of sin); for he that dislikes sin for punishment principally, or as the greatest evil, 
(x) Si paena timeatur tanquam maximum, supremum, pessimumque malum, tunc est pra●us timor, nam per illum prefert homo malum suum, malo Dei: unde in se non in Deo constituit finem ultimum. Idem. disp. 1. de spe. Sect. 4. n. 6. Valent. tom. 3. disp. 2. q. 2. punct. 3.  regards more (as themselves argue) that which is evil to himself, than that which is evil to God, and so placeth the ultimate end in himself, not in God.   

Sect. 8. Having thus reduced Repentance to a thing no better than we see Attrition is, as though it were yet too good and too much; they bring Attrition down to nothing. It is but as they describe it, a dislike of sin, not as that is offensive to God, but out of other respects, wherein 
(*) Aquinas 2. 2. q. 19 art. 6.  self-love is most concerned, and slavish fear is most operative. The least dislike of this nature will serve, and in the lowest degree that can be: 
(y) Nulla intentio vel duratio est de ratione contritionis (Gabriel, Soto, Medina, Vega, Navar.) & idem est de Attritione propter easdem rationes, Suar. ibid. disp. 5. Sect. 1. n. 6.  Nor need this continue any longer than the least moment.  
And it will be sufficient, say some, though it be but 
(z) Ad effectum hujus Sacramenti sufficere Attritionem naturalem, i. e. solis viribus naturae elicitam: sive illa sit concepta ex motivo aeterno & honesto, ut est fugere paenas inferni, vel turpitudinem peccati, sive ex motivo temporali & indifferent, ut est vitare infamiam, vel aliud temporale detrimentum, Soto & Canus, ibid. disp 20. Sect. 2. n. 7.  merely natural, excited by some natural or human motive, without the grace of God, or his Divine assistance: So Canus and Soto. Or it will serve if there be but a dislike, that this dislike of sin is wanting 
(a) Satis est, ut quidam dicunt, quod paenitens displicentiam habeat, quod de peccato non dolet, Ibid. Sect. 1. n. 2. . So Paludanus, Navarre, and others. Or it will be enough if there be a willingness to have it in those who have it not, 
(b) Sufficit, si quis vellet habere displicentiam, & Dei gratiam cavendi in posterum: quia talis est Attritio virtualiter secundum doctrinam Sanctorum, maxim, S. Thom. & Rich. Sylvest, Sum. v. Confess. 1. n. 24.  according to the Doctrine of their holy men Aquinas and Richardus especially. Or a man's thinking probably, that he hath it when he hath it not, 
(c) Aliqui sentiunt ad hunc effectum non esse necessariam veram Attritionem, in re existentem, sed inculpabiliter & probabiliter putatam sufficere, quod sensit, Canon & Vega. l. 13. c. 34. Suar. ibid. Sect. 2. n. 2. & alij in Bonacin, ibid. q. 5. p. 3. n. 6.  will serve the turn; so Canus and Vega. 
(d) 
Imo dicitur fortius secundum Scotum, quod sufficit, quem velle talem displicentiam non solum formaliter, sed etiam virtualiter, eam volendo in sua causa, i. e. in Sacramento paenitentiae justificante, quia in 4. dist. 14. q. ult in art. 3. tenet, quod ad consequendam gratiam per hoc Sacramentum, non requiritur attritio: sed sufficit voluntas suscipiendi hoc sacramentum, etc. Sylvest. ibid.  
Imo aloqui Doctores asserunt hoc valere (viz. attritionem putatam) etiamsi omissa sit, vera attritio ob negligentiam in praeparatione facienda, Bonacin. ubi supra de paenit. d. 5. q. 5, Sect. 1. p. 3. n. 6.   Or if he neither have it in reality nor in conceit, it will suffice, if he be but willing to partake of the Sacrament; for so they tell us, he is virtually willing to be attrite, and this qualifies him for pardon, though he neither actually hath Attrition, nor desires it; so Scotus and Sylvester after him. Thus after Attrition hath swallowed up true Repentance, yet it still becomes more lank by their handling, and in fine, shrinks quite away. But whether it be little or nothing, it will serve to justify them, yea, and that too, without their ritual penance; other Sacraments, or rites, with this, will do it. They advance the sufficiency of Attrition, for all the purposes of true Repentance, even without their penance. This, with the Eucharist, will serve, not (say they) that there is need of true contrition, a conceit that he hath it, with this and the Eucharist, 
(r) Aquinas 13. q. 79. art. 1. 2. in Tol l. 6. c. 16. Halonsis in Victorell, ibid. Soto d. 12. q. 1. art. 4. dicit hanc esse D. Thomae sententiam, & omnium. Suarez says, omnes theologi ita docent, Tom. 3. disp. 63. Sect. 2.  will procure him pardon. This with extreme Unction will serve, as 
(s) Sum. v. Sacram. n. 4. Navar. juxta opinionem, S. Thom. communiter receptam c. 23. n. 13. this may (as they say of all their Sacraments) ex attrito facere contritum, infundendo gratiam primam, ut communiter tenent omnes, in Jo. Sanc. d. 27. n. 8.  Sylvester tells us; yea, this may be enough without any Sacrament at all; as if a man in mortal sin, and so (with them) not in the state of grace, be killed, because he is a Christian, while he is a-sleep; if he was Attrite, and willing to suffer before, by virtue hereof his sins are pardoned; so Cajetan, Sotus, and Lopez 
(t) Cap. 12. p. 83. & hoc videtur sentire, D. Thom.  after them.  
In short, the Mass may serve their turn; for divers of them hold, that this being offered for such as are Attrite, by virtue thereof (ex opere operato) immediately, and without more ado, they have pardon of mortal sins, and habitual grace; so Catharinus (in Canus; loc. Theol. l. 12. c. 13. p. 693.) and others.  
Here is competent provision made, that Sinners may perish securely, and never look after true Repentance, living or dying. There is but one thing which may seem to give some check to this great encouragement. These administrations, whereby they will have the Impenitent saved, depend upon a Priest; and the Sinner may be in such circumstances (though this be very rare) wherein a Priest cannot be had, and then if he should chance to die without Contrition, he will perish. But this need not disturb any in their course of impenitence; for in case of necessity, where a Priest cannot be had, another may serve in his stead, though he be a Laic, Confession may be made to him, and God will supply the want of a Priest; so Aquinas (in 4. dist. 17. q. 3. art. 3.) or he may have the Eucharist administered to him without a Priest: and it is their common doctrine, that the Eucharist justifies one that is in mortal sin, if he be attrite, and thinks but himself contrite. yea, he may administer it to himself with the same effect, in case of necessity: divers of all sorts amongst them are of this opinion. The Authority of Aquinas is alleged for it, (3. q. 82. art. 3.) and Cajetan in Matth. 26. The example of the Queen of Scots, (commonly produced) who having the Sacrament by her, administered it to herself, is highly approved by all.  
Thus far Satan has prevailed with them, to promote the Damnation of Sinners, by hardening them in impenitence, even when the interest of their Priests seems a little concerned. But what if a Catholic Sinner, relying upon such Impostors, still neglect true Repentance, and death surprise him so suddenly, as to render these other devices unpracticable, is not his case then desperate? No, he may have as good hopes of Salvation as other Catholics have, a probable ground for his hope (and none must have any certainty.) Such a ground is the judgement of their Angelical Doctor, who declares, that if one sick desires penance, and before the Priest comes, he dies, or is speechless; the Priest may look on him, as if he had confessed, and may absolve him, being dead, (Opusc. 63. de offic. Sacerd.) Accordingly Clemens 8. Absolved one whom he saw falling from St. Peter's Church in Rome, (Molfes. t. 1. tr. 7. c. 5. n. 48.) So that any may be Absolved, i. e. Pardoned and Sanctified (for the sense of the Priests Absolvo, is, I give thee grace which pardons thy sins, Impendo tibi gratiam remissivam peccatorum ut communiter Doctores, in Jo. Sanc. disp. 27. n. 18.) even after they are dead, if they did but desire confession before. Now those amongst themselves, who do not desire confession while they live, are such only as will not have Salvation if they might, upon the most trivial terms, and so none need fear Damnation, how impenitent soever; otherwise they live and die but such as are worse than any Devil now in Hell. And who can accuse them as too rigid, if they make true Repentance unavoidably necessary for such as these, since this doctrine makes it needful for none besides?  
All these ways any man may be saved without true Repentance, if he will believe the Roman Doctors (though if we believe Christ, he shall certainly perish that reputes not,  course he takes besides.) Any of these are probable, and may be by their principles (having grave Doctors, more than enough, to authorise them) safely followed; but that of the Councils prescribing is infallible, and will not fail to secure those who practise it, if any thing in their Church may have credit; nor can fail to ruin those who follow it, if the word of God may be trusted. Thus while they would increase their party, by having it thought, that in their way, scarce any Roman Catholic will be Damned; they take the course (in this, as in other particulars) that none, who w●ll follow them, can be saved, unless salvation be for the impenitent.   

Sect. 9 By this it is also manifest, that the charge brought against them in the three last Articles, for making Saving Faith, Love to God, and true Repentance needless in life or death, is not founded only upon the opinion of their private Doctors, or the greatest part of them, but hath that which they count the surest ground of all, the determination of a general Council confirmed by the Pope. For if Attrition be sufficient, as that Council declares, then true Repentance is not necessary. If grief for sin, out of slavish fear, or shame only, without any love to God, be enough, then Love to God is needless; and if Love be not needful, than Faith, which works by Love, and is the only saving Faith, is needless, till there be no time for it to work.  
But is it credible, that they who sometimes seem to lay so great stress upon these graces, as necessary to salvation, should contradict, not only the Scriptures, but themselves, and make them needless, not only all a man's life before, but even when he is dying? sure, they must have some device, to supply, in pretence at least, the want of these; if not before, yet at the point of death, and will substitute something in their stead, of supposed equivalence to them. Indeed they are fruitful in inventions tending to ruin souls, and subvert the doctrine of salvation: and one particularly they have in this case; and that is, what we before mentioned, their Sacrament of Penance. When a man is near death, if he be Attrite, and confess his mortal sins to a Priest, and be absolved; by virtue thereof, he hath remission of sins, and together therewith infusion of grace, particularly of Faith, Hope, and Charity. Thus they come to have grace in a moment, who lived graceless all their days before; and had died so if such a Rite had not been provided for their relief. By virtue of this Sacrament Love is planted in their heart, and their Faith in God, and sorrow for sin, is form by Love, and becomes saving; so that if they die presently in that state, their salvation is secured. But what if they live, must not these habits be afterwards exercised? must not there be some act of contrition in those who never had any before? No, by their doctrine there is no necessity for it, though there be no true actual Repentance without it. The question is in one of their greatest Divines, Whether 
(u) An etiam in lege gratiae post obtentam justificationem per Sacramentum paenitentiae cum sola attritione, maneat haec obligatio habendi contritionem? Dicendum est, per se loquendo, non manere in lege nova obligationem hanc post praedictam justificationem. Ita sentiunt omnes, qui putant Sacrameneum paenitentiae justificare cum sola attritione cognita Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 15. Sect. 4. n. 12. & 13.  in the Law of Grace, after justification obtained by the Sacrament of Penance with Attrition alone; there remain any obligation to have Contrition? and it is resolved, that there is no such obligation, and that this is the judgement of all those who hold that the Sacrament of penance doth justify with Attrition alone, known to be so; and 
(x) Aquinas, Scotus, Paludanus, Capreolus, Durandus, Adrian, Antoninus, Sylvester, Canon, ibid. disp. 20. Sect. 1. n. 9 Corduba, Vega, Soto, in Vasquoz. (Corduba docet, quod qui justificatus est Sacramento paenitentiae, cum contritione tantum existimata, non tenetur eorundem peccatuo●m contri●ionem veram habere; & eam aperte colligere licet ex Soto. & ita Vega.) in 3. Thom. q. 86. a, 2. d. 2. n. 11.  these are the most for number, and the most considerable for authority in their Church and Schools, Aquinas and Scotus, both, whom the rest most commonly follow, concurring in it, besides their great Council.   

Sect. 10. This then is the doctrine of their Church introduced there, instead of that of the Gospel: the Habits must serve to save them without their Acts, and the Sacrament of Penance, will help those that are attrite, to those Habits. Here's all the hopes they have for sinners, whom they have encouraged to continue all their days, without Repentance, saving Faith, or Love to God, even to the very Article of death. If this Sacrament do not perform all this for them, they will not deny, but they are certainly damned? But what ground have they for this, upon which their everlasting estate depends? None at all, but their own opinion, and the opinion of such men as themselves, without any support from the word of God. If their own word will secure them for Eternity, they are safe enough; otherwise trusting to this, they are lost for ever, the whole weight of their salvation hangs upon a Spider's Web, spun out of their own conceits. For this Sacrament of Penance, upon which all depends, is a mere invention of their own; there is no divine institution for it, it was never authorized by God, he never promised any thing to it, or any part of it upon their terms, much less any such thing as they expect.  
And who but they who are under the power of strong delusions, would trust to any thing for Salvation, without a word from him; who is the absolute Disposer of grace, and the Sovereign Lord of life, and death? Some of themselves acknowledge that their Sacrament of penance 
(x) Glossa quam nonnulli Canonistae secuti sunt. Erasmus, B. Rhenanus, Bonaventure Alexander Alensis, Hugo Victor, Jansenius, in Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 17. Sect. 1. n. 9  was never instituted by Christ. And many 
(y) 
The essentials of this pretended Sacrament are with them, it's matter and form. The matter of it consists in contrition, confession, and satisfaction; each of these are acknowledged by their own Authors, to be either unnecessary any way, or at least by Christ's institution. Contrition, and therewith true Repentance is dismissed as unnecessary to this Rite, not only by their other Doctors, but by the Council of Trent, and another thing assumed instead of it, as we saw before. Satisfaction is as unnecessary in their account. There's no need, either that the Priest should enjoin it (D. Thomas, Petrus Paludanus, Petrus Soto, Victoria, Ledesma Cajetau, Navarre, ibid. disp. 38. Sect. 3. n. 2. & 4.) or that the confitent should submit to it. Scotus, Gabriel, Medina, Sylvester, Armilla, Navarre, Hostiensis, Panormitan, Cajetan. ibid. disp. 38 Sect. 7. n. 1. Thus all material in it, is reduced to Confession, and so the Rite has almost lost its name, being now commonly styled the Sacrament of Confession. Yet confession is acknowledged not to be of Divine institution by all their Canonists. Sunt inter Catholicos qui putant nullum esse Divinum praeceptum de confession, ut omnes decretorum interprete, & inter Scholasticos Scotus. Maldonat. Sum q. 18. art. 4. And their best Divines deny the necessity of it, as to this Rite. Hunc modum Secretae confessionis non esse de necessitate hujus Sacramenti. Ita docent frequentius Scholastici. Alensis, D. Thomas, Major, Richardus de Sancto Victore, Paludanus, Soto, Adrian, Richardus, Medina, Pet. Soto, Vega, Castro, Cajetan. (Christum non instituisse auricularem confessionem) Canus. Et nunc censeo hanc doctrinam certam ex concilio Tridentino (viz. quoth) neque in institutione posuit Christus Dominus modum Secretae confessionis. Suar. ibid. disp. 21. Sect. 2. n. 9 p. 290.  
Yea the form of it (their mode of Absolution) is denied by their Divines, who hold that the Priests cannot forgive sins properly as to the fault, and eternal punishment. Qui negant potestatem clavium extendi ad remissionem culpae mortalis. So Magistersentent, Hugo, & Richardus de Sancto Victore. Alensis & Bonaven●ura, Gabriel, Major, Supplementum Gabr. Medina, Adrian, Petr. Soto, Altisiodorensis, Abulensis. ibid. disp. 20. Sect. 1. n 3.   of them hold that the material parts of it have no such institution: Now to trust to any device of man for spiritual effects, of so high a nature, is impious folly; but to lay their Salvation on it is prodigious madness. They may with as much reason, expect the infusion of grace from the sprinkling of holy-water; or the cleansing of a Soul at death from the guilt and stain of sin, by a Priest's spittle; the Lord hath given them no more ground to expect any more from the one, than from the other.  
But I need not insist upon any thing which they may have the confidence to deny. It will be plain enough by what they cannot but acknowledge, that neither pardon, nor grace can be expected from their Sacrament of Penance as ordered by them. For, they assert 
(z) 
Unde in ipsa justificatione cum remissione peccatorum haec omnia simul infusa accepit homo per Jesum Christum cui inseritur, fidem, spem, charitatem. Concil. Trident. Sess. 6. c. 7. Gratia non praecedit sed simul infunditur cum remissione peccatorum Bellarm. de penitent. l. c. p. 954.  
Sperare a Deo remissionem peccatorum sine paenite●tia— modus praesam●pionis conjunctis cum haeresi. Pet. S. Joseph. De 1. precept. art. 4. A●u●nas, Arragon, Bannes, Malderus, & alji in & cum Bonacin. in 1 precept. q. 3. p. 1. n. 4.   that pardon and grace are always inseparably conferred together; So that he hath no infused grace, that hath not pardon. And it cannot be denied, but that pardon can never be had, without true Repentance, in Scripture nothing is more evident. He therefore that comes to the Sacrament of Penance with Attrition only, and so without true Repentance; he gets thereby nothing at all: neither pardon, which cannot be had without Repentance; nor infused grace, which is never had, without pardon; neither Love, nor Faith working by love, nor Godly sorrow, nothing that is saving; unless he can have it without God, or against what he hath expressly declared. So that if he comes to this their Sacrament in a damnable condition, he certainly dies so, for any relief that Rite will afford him. And therefore their Doctrine which encourageth sinners, to live all their life, without saving Faith, or Love, or Repentance; in confidence that this rite will help them to these graces, when they are dying, is a damning imposture; and their Sacrament of Penance, a most pernicious trap to draw sinners (as they set and bait it) out of the way of Salvation, whilst they live; and to plunge them into Hell, when they die, without any apprehension of their danger, till there be no way to escape it.   

Sect. 11. Hereby they manifestly declare themselves to be enemies to Christianity, and the Souls of men. For what more effectual course could they take to destroy these, and root out that: than by concluding it certain (as certain as they would have a decree of the Council of Trent accounted) that though sinners neglect the great Duties, and Acts of Christians, and live in any wickedness opposite to the rule of Christ: yet the Church hath a device to save them; and by it they may be sure to escape Hell without true Repentance? What is this, but to declare, that the most damnable neglects and practices shall never damn them, though they never repent thereof, the Church hath a trick to secure them notwithstanding? What is this, but to proclaim that the Laws of God, and the rules of the Gospel are unnecessary impositions, without the observance whereof Salvation may be had? The knowledge of Christ, explicit faith in him, actual love of him (which comprise all the rest) as they teach, are not necessary as means, Salvation may be had without them: and as for a necessity hereof by virtue of any Precept, that is not considerable, but in reference to the danger of not observing the precept; and there's no danger in this, though the neglect hereof were in their account a mortal sin, no more than in Venials (or no sins at all); if it will not damn those, who never truly repent of it. So that plainly by excusing sinners from Repentance, they make all sins safe, and all duties needless: and give men assurance, that they may live and die impenitently, in the neglect of all, even the most important duties; and in the practice of any, the worst wickedness, and yet be saved. There never was any Heresy broached in the World, more monstrous and pernicious than this which the Council of Trent hath brought forth, it hath all the damnable wickedness, both as to judgement and practice, that ever was or can be on Earth, in the bowels of it. It promotes the Birth, the Growth, the continuance thereof: for it promiseth safety to impenitency therein, yea Salvation too, by a knack of a very easy use, and new invention. It hath in it the venom of all damning opinions, practices and neglects; for that which makes them all deadly is impenitency; not would they without this be finally and avoidable destructive. But this would have impenitency itself swallowed.    

CHAP. VI Their Doctrine leaves no necessity of Holiness of life, and the exercise of Christian Virtues.  

Sect. 1. HOliness of life, is needless by the Popish Doctrine, though the Lord hath made this every way necessary both as a duty, which he indispensably requires: and as a means, without which he ordinarily will save no man, it is declared necessary both ways at once, Heb. 12. 14. The Papists indeed boast much of it, and seem sometimes to lay great stress on it, as if they would have it to be a character of the true Church; concluding theirs is the only true Church; because there is no Holiness to be found in the World, but amongst them only. Thus they pretend it to be of greatest consequence, but this is but to serve another turn, the design is not for Holiness of life, for their Doctors count that more than needs. And really they are extreme good Husbands here, and make a little Holiness go a great way: for it is enough to denominate the Universal Church holy; if there be but one holy person in it, so Costerus. 
(a) Tametsi ejus plurima membra sint emortua & impia, non amittit tamen Sancti nomen, quamdiu vel unus pietatem ex animo colens, retinet sanctitatem. Enchirid. l. 3. c. 8. Possibile est, quod tota fides remaneret in uno solo: & verum esset dicere, quod fides non deficit in ecclesia. Abbas in Sylvest. v. Concil. n. 3.  How many soever of its Members be dead, and impious; so long, as there is any one man, that retains Holiness, the Church must be called holy. And then to make this one man holy, one act of virtue is enough; and that a very slender one too, for saith Bannes. 
(b) Quilibet actus charitatis, quantumlibet remissus, sufficit ad implendum omnia praecepta in 2. 2ae. q. 44. a 5.  Any one act of Charity how weak soever it be, is enough to fulfil all the commandments of God. Now he is doubtless a holy man, who fulfils all those Commandments. Further, this one act he need but do once, and that not all his life, he may defer it, till he die, if he have no mind to trouble himself with it in any part of his life before, as we have already showed. Yea, and he may be excused from it, when he is a dying too, as well as whilst he lives, if he can but get a Priest to absolve him: and 
(c) Vid. above 40 Doctors for this in Jo. Sanc. disp. 44. n. 34. Sacramenta Baptismi & absolutionis posse conferri, etiam ijs qui in periculo vitae sunt, licet ipsi vi morbi oppressi non habeant usum rationis aut sensuum: modo constét eos antea desiderasse ejusmodi Sacramenta. Bellarm. de effect. Sacrament. l. 2. c. 8. p. 121. Actus charitatis semper requiritur ad justificationem seclusis tamen Sacramentis: Sacramenta autem in non ponente obicem, eundem habent effectum, quem haberet charitas & contritio sine Sacramento. Canus. Relect de paen t. pars. 3. p. 844. Thus, though an act of charity, or repentance be requisite always where the Sacraments cannot be had; yet the Sacraments in him that gives no obstruction (as he does not, who has neither the use of sense or reason) have the same effect, that love to God, or Repentance would have, without the Sacrament. i e. the Sacrament will justify and save them, who have no act of love to God, or true Repentance.  the Priest must absolve him, if the dying man give but any sign, which may be interpreted a desire of it. And their Sacrament he must have and be absolved absolutely when speechless and senseless, if any can but witness that he desired Confession. Antonin. 3. part. tit. 10. c. 2. Sylvest. v confess. 3. n. 16. Paludan. didst 21. q. 2. a. 2. Concl. 2. Yea if he did not desire it, nor ever give any sign of Repentance; he may be conditionally absolved, Rituale Pauli. 5. And though he have lived wickedly without restraint all his days, if at last gasp he be attrite, and have but (though it never appear) the virtue of Judas (●only hoping better i e. presuming more than he did) by virtue of such absolution, he will be as certainly saved, as other good Catholics: though the other unfortunate wretch for want of a Priest (as virtuous as himself) to absolve and give him hope, was unhappily damned.  
See here a most compendious way to be holy! who can imagine any other, but that such principles as these, make holiness of life extremely needful? But more particularly, we may discover how necessary they judge it, by what they determine concerning the necessity of exercising Christian virtues; and the forsaking of sin. There is no need of either of these by their Doctrine.   

Sect. 2. It is not necessary to live in the exercise of such virtues (though one would think, that Religion could not be Christian, which obligeth not the professors of it, to Christian virtues; and excuseth them from the most proper Character of true Christianity) yet those who have the confidence, to account themselves the only true Christians, do this. For they teach, that the acts of these virtues are required by affirmative precepts; and such commandments oblige not at all times; no nor always when there is occasion, and opportunity for the exercise of them: but only in the Article of necessity, and when this is, it is not certain, there's no determination of it, it must be left to discreet men to judge: and being left to men, either they find no time for it at all; or none that will signify it needful, to live in the exercise of such virtues. To exert an Act of virtue once a year, or once in many years, or once in a whole life, or at the hour of death, is far enough from the daily exercise of Christian virtues; or an intimation, that it is needful in their account, who so determine. But indeed their Church is more indulgent, and assures them all (that have no more regard for their Souls, than to believe it): That at the hour of death, one act of slavish fear (though themselves count not that so much as a 
(d) Aquinas. 2. 2. q. 19  moral virtue) with confession, will excuse the neglect of every Christian virtue, all their lives; and make their way at last into Heaven, though they never had one act of virtue, any one character of a Christian all their days. A pleasant doctrine indeed, and greedily to be swallowed by those, that have an Antipathy to a holy life; if the Gospel, and the Doctrine of Christ, concerning Hell and Heaven and the way to it, could be counted but Fables.   

Sect. 3. They reckon but Three Theological or Divine virtues; all the other they call moral, of which the Divine are the 
(e) Virtutes Theologicae quae sunt circa ultimum finem— sunt causae omnium aliarum virtutum. Aquinas. 2. 2. q. 161. art. 4. ad primum.  foundation; and so all the rest must stand or fall with them. Now two of these three they make needless (as is before declared) and without these two, Hope, which is the third, is so far from being needful, that it is not possible to have it, as themselves 
(f) Fides & spes— sine charitate, proprie loquendo, virtutes non sunt, nam ad rationem virtutis pertinet, ut non solum secundum ipsam aliquod bonum operemur, sed etiam bene. Aquinas. 1. 2. q. 6●. art. 4.  acknowledge. A lively hope, with them, is needless, till they 
(g) Tempus quo obligan t praecepta fidei & spei esse idem, quod tempus charitatis. Fill. tr. 22. n. 293.  be dying; and than it can but be like the giving up of the Ghost. For to all that follow their Doctrine, and look after no more than that makes necessary: their hopes at last can be no better, no other, than the expectation of such a pardon of sin; as a Priest can give to an impenitent person, one to whom the Lord, did never give hopes of pardon. And this is a hope, than which despair itself is more hopeful: for this leaves no sense of danger, (which despair retains;) and so leaves no desire, nor endeavour to avoid it, even when they are sinking into bottomless misery. Hope is no more needful with them, than a House is to him, who thinks himself concerned, to dig up the foundation of it; and counts it enough that he hath a Castle in the Air. And when they have left nothing that can be a real ground of hope; they found it upon that, which is worse than nothing, their own 
(h) Actus spei est expectare futuram beatitudinem a Deo, qui quidem actus perfectus est, si fiat ex meritis quae quis habet, quod non potest esse fine charitate. Aquin. 1. 2. q. 65. art. 4 c. Propria certitudo spei est ex meritis. Certitudo quae non est praesumptio, ex meritis est, & meritis se cometitur. Alex. Alensis. q. 65. in 3.  merits: that which is inconsistent with the free grace of God, and the merits of Christ, without which Sinners are hopeless. It is a conjecture, founded upon a delusion, upon merit, which no man can have, and themselves say, none of them know they have, and so upon they know not what. Oh! wretched hopes, that have not so much for their foundation as the Sand, that have nothing to bear them up, but a proud and groundless fancy; that we might count ridiculous, if it were not too horrid to be the matter of sport. Can they blame those, who doubt, whether they will be saved; when they themselves have no better hopes of their own salvation?  
How much they are concerned for hope, they declare, when they tell us, that the precept for hope does but, of itself, oblige, when the soul is tortured with the more grievous assaults of despair. 
(†) Quando graviores desperationis impetus animum vexant Victorel. ad Tol. l. 4. c. 7. and Bonacin (with others) in 1. praecep. d. 3. q. 3. p. 2. n. 2.  It seems, unless they be violently tempted to despair, they need not hope. This rarely falls out as to any, and is scarce the case of one in a thousand, so that there is not one of a thousand in Popery, who would have any hope in God, or of mercy from him. No not any at all, as others teach; for the command for hope is satisfied both by grief for sin, and also by a purpose against it (Dian. after others, v. Spes.) So that either of these, or both at lest, will supersede all acts of hope for ever, and make them needless. And indeed he that considers what sorrow and purposes they count sufficient, may believe them, when they teach, that these leave them without hope.   

Sect. 4. The next in excellency to the divine graces, by 
(i) Post virtutes Theologicas— humilitas est virtutum excellentissima, & potissina. Aquinas. 2. 2. q. 161. art. 5.  their account, is humility, and for this their doctrine makes excellent provision, as a virtue most necessary, by quite sweeping away the true ground of it. It leaves them without sense of any sinfulness, weaknesses, or unworthiness, to make, or keep them humble. Being baptised, by virtue thereof, all the sinfulness of their natures is not only pardoned or weakened, but quite washed away, and utterly abolished. 
(k) Concil. Trident. sess. c. supra.  So that they are Pure, Immaculate, Innocent, even as our first Parents were in the state of Innocency; not any thing left in the least, that can be truly counted sin. So that it would be very absurd and irrational, for them to be humble under the sense of any remaining sinfulness, since they believe really there is none. But if they sin mortally afterwards (for Venial sins they make no account of, and think that the Lord herein, is such an one as themselves) they may be presently restored again by their Sacrament of Absolution, to a perfect Righteousness, without the least mixture or allay of what is faulty. A perfection short of Heaven, because not so firm and fixed, but not wanting a hair of what is due; having not only all the parts, but every degree of what is required for their present state. 
(l) Soto De nature. & great. l. 3. c. 4. p. 134. Bellarm. de purgat. l. 2. c. 3. p. 1381. de justificat. l. 2. cap. 10. p. 794.  And by the power hereof they can fully and perfectly fulfil the whole Law in every Precept, without any culpable defect; they can fulfil it very easily 
(m) Idem. cap. 1.  facili & parvo negotio. Yea 
(n) Possumus facere plusquam debemus, si consideremus legem nobis a Deo imposi an, & proinde possumus facere plusquam debemus. Idem de Monach. l. 2. c. 13.  they can do much more, than the Law requires, or the lord hath made their duty: so far are they bereft of all sense of any weakness, that might humble them. And their righteousness is not only spotless, but meritorious; there is such a transcendent worth and sufficiency in it (as they improve it) that they need not (at least after they are justified) ask any thing of God, but what they fully deserve at his hands. All that God doth for them, is but the paying of his debts, his bounty is prevented, his grace is quite excluded; it is not in his power to bestow any free gift: all is due to the meritorious excellency of their performances, beforehand. They can merit the first grace 
(o) Vid. Soto ibid. l. 2. c. 3. p. 65. & 66. Bellarm. l. 2. de paenit. c. 12. p. 945. Sancta Clara. Deus. Nat. Gr. Probl. 21. p. 125.  in congruity, 
(p) Conc. Trident. sess. 6. Ca 32. & Ca 16.  the second grace by way of condignity: and Heaven and Glory is as due to them, as a penny for a pennyworth; or Hell is due to proud presumptuous sinners. God would be unjust, and not pay what he oweth them, on their own just account, if he should not let them have all the glory of Heaven and Eternity. They can merit the pardon of Mortal sins before 
(q) Potest homo nodum reconciliatus per opera paenitentiae impetrare & mereri de congruo gratiam justificationis. Bellarm. de just. l. 5.  they have grace; pardon of venial sins before, or after; they can merit 
(r) Reparationem post lapsum & perseverantiam usque in sinem, non cadere sub meritum de condigno, sed solum de congruo. Idem. ibid. cap. 22. tit.  the continuance of grace while they have it: and the restoring of it, when they have lost it. They can merit not only for themselves, but for others; and deserve for them, not only pardon, but 
(s) Sicut certum est non posse unum alteri ex condigno gratiam mereri, ita non dubium est, posse id ex congruo fieri. Idem. ibid. cap. 21.  grace: such grace as will enable them, to set up, and merit Heaven for themselves. They can merit not only habitual grace for them: 
(t) De congruo potest unus alteri mereri primam gratiam, non solum sanctificantem, sed etiam p●imum auxilium supernaturale, & alia dona. S. Thom. 1. 2. q. 114. art. 7. vid. Fill. tr. 21. n. 498.  but the Divine assistance, whereby the Lord works it. They can merit for them not only while alive; but when they are dead: and by their merits, bring them out of those torments which are equivalent to the pains of Hell, but only for the continuance, which their deserts hinder from being everlasting.  
Here's a Doctrine as proper to nourish humility, as poison is to make a man fat and healthful; however this, as that, is apt to swell them big; and mount them upon the heights of boasting and glorying. 
(u) Absit ut justi vitam aeternam expectent, sicut pauper Eleemosynam.  It is far below persons of such Dignity, to receive eternal life at God's hands, as a poor man receiveth an Alms: absit, far be it from them, it moves their indignation to think of it; that they should expect eternal glory for God's sake. They will not so disparage themselves as to have it in such a beggarly way: They will have it for their own sake, as that which they fully deserve, or else be without it. They will have it in a way more glorious, becoming persons of such transcendent worth, as Conquerors and Triumphers 
(x) Tanquam palmam suis sudoribus debitam.  as a Laurel which they have sweat for, and is due to their merit. The Lord must treat them as persons of such high quality, and in a way that suits their honour: 
(y) Magis honorificum est habere aliquid ex merito, quam ex donatione.  Now it is much more honourable saith Bellarmine, to have a thing by his own merit, than another's gift (though God be the giver) And the Lord (adds he) to honour them, would have them get Heaven by their own deserts. Oh! humble Doctrine, and that which is as like the Gospel, as the Apostle St. Paul was to the King of Pride. Can they think Humility needful, who plucking away the true grounds of it instead thereof, instill those principles, than which Hell can scarce hatch any prouder?   

Sect. 5. As for those virtues which concern men, they are all comprised in love, that love which assects others as capable of eternal happiness, and so desires it for them. Thus they describe Christian love (as for humane or natural, we are not here, concerned in it) and tell us, it is this the Scripture speaks of Joh. 15. Colos. 3. and cannot deny, but it is called for in the New Testament most frequently, and with greatest importunity, and yet their Doctrine makes it needless. We are not bound saith Sylvester 
(a) Motu dilectionis— nec tenemur moveri ad quoslibet homines, nisi secundum preparati●nem animi— si necessitas occurreret. Sylvest v. charitas. n. 3. Sum Rosel v. charitas. n. 5. both of them in the words of Aquinas.  to be moved with love towards any men whatsoever, but only in preparation of mind, if necessity occur. This seems to dissolve the obligation of this great command, and turn it into a mere Counsel; For in these very terms they describe a Counsel to us, 
(*) Praeceptum differt etiam a consilio— quia consilium non est de necessitate ad salutem nisi secundum praeparationem animi, si oporteret (S. Tho.) 1. 2. q. 108. Idem: ibid. v. praeceptum. n. 1. Gratian & Aquinas in Navar. Cap. 20. n. 21.  and thereby distinguish it from an obliging precept: But are we bound to love our Brother, when there is necessity? No, not when he is in such necessity as is extreme (and consequently never) for though it be requisite, that we help him in that condition; yet we sin not, if we do not help him, out of Christian love; it is enough to avoid sin, if we relieve him out of natural affection. Thus Navarre. 
(b) Putamus non peccaturum eum, qui hunc amorem charitativum non conciperet erg● eum, qui eam pateretur extremam necessitatem vitae corporeae, si modo alio amore natura● inferiore, di●ino— ei opitularetur. Navar. cap. 14. n. 9 Lopez. cap. 53. p. 274.  And this holds, not only in the external necessities of others, but also in those that are spiritual, only he saith, that it very rarely falls out, that one can relieve spiritual necessities, without this Christian love, but he tells us also, 
(c) Cap. 24. n. 9 Raro tamen ejusmodi necessitatem patitur Christianus, quum p● contritionem, absque alia ope salvari possit.  That a Christian is rarely in such necessity. So that though it cannot be done without Christian love, but very seldom; that will not make such love a duty at any time; because the external act needs not be done, but seldom. Yea if the external act also, whereby we should relieve the Soul of our Brother, be neglected, it's with them, no great matter. For as Cajetane determines 
(d) Pusillanimitas quando retrahit ex alijs utilibus proximo, & praecipue saluti anim●rum; licet veniale sit, grave tamen est. Sum. v. pusillan. p. 485.  That weakness of mind, which witholds us from those things which are profitable to our Neighbour, especially for the Salvation of Souls, though it be grievous, it is but a venial fault. In short, what ever be the circumstances of our Brother; yet we may be excused from loving him indeed, if we do but think, we do it. For Navarre 
(*) Lopez. cap. 53. p. 275. Satisfacit praecepto de diligendo proximum, qui ext●… statum gratiae, putans se verisimiliter in eo statu gratiae esse.  and others tell us, that he who honestly thinks himself to be in the state of grace, when he is not; may satisfy this command for Christian love, by some other kind of affection, so that it is enough to think that we have this love, when we have it not; and this is confirmed by a Reason 
(e) Videtur nobis non peccare neve il'um, qui bona side credens se esse in statu gratiae, cum tamen non sit, adimplet praeceptum de diligendo Deum ex charitate, quando ad id est obligatus; ita a fortiori satisfacere videtur praecepto de diligendo proximo ex charitate, qui extra statum gratiae, illud implet, putans verisimiliter se in co esse. Navar. ibid.  a fortiori, because it is so, in our obligation to love God. Thus one dangerous error is grounded upon another, and by such arts we are discharged from all Christian affection to God or Men. But we need not stay longer here. All necessity of this love they quite take away, by making it needless to love God; the connexion between these, being indissoluble, by their own account 
(f) Amor supernaturalis & divinus seu charitativus, vel charitas infusa, qua proximum amamus, est ejusdem generis & naturae, cujus est amor Dei charitativus, seu charitas secundum. S. Thom. Nam licet objectum materiale amoris charitativi proximi sit idem proximus, objectum tamen formale, sive ratio vel causa amoris, est ipsa divina & infinita bonitas quae nihil aliud est quam ipse Deus— ut idem S. Thom. explicatus ibi a Cajetano. Idem. ibid. n. 6. Charitas est dilectio qua diligitur Deus propter se, & proximus propter Deum, vel in Deo. Pet. Lombard. dist. 27. Dilectio proximi nihil aliud est quam quidam Dei amor Soto de Just. l. 7. q. 5. a. 1. p. 242. vid. Suar. tom. 3. disp. 81. Sect. 8. p. 1078. .  
If any will not rely upon consequences, Cajetan tells them 
(1) Catherine annot. adv. Cajet. p. 268.  that the command to love our Neighbour as ourselves, obliges not to a love of charity, i. e. to that special love which was always thought, (till the Roman Doctors taught otherwise) to be the great duty required of all Christians by the Gospel. By the Doctrine of Aquinas 
(2) 2. 2. q. 15. a 8. Quodl. 4. art. 24. ad 1.  The precept requires, no special act of love to our Brethren, no formal or 
(3) Suar. de Charitate disp. 5. Sect. 4. n. 4. Jo. Sanc. disp. 1. n. 21.  internal act at all, nor any exterior, that will signify more than the want of hatred. This is the common Doctrine amongst his devoutest followers, the Dominicans 
(4) Vid. Acacium de Velasco in Guinen. p. 139.  Others express it thus. 
(5) Vid Vasquez in 3. tom. 3. q. 90. art. 1. dub. 40. dilectionis proximi ex cbaritate, cujus praecepti affirmativi ego nullum tempus video. Satis est nihil contra ipsum facere. vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. 1. n. 21.  There is no affirmative precept for love to our Neighbour, no time for it: it is enough that we do nothing against him. Thus, so great a part of the whole sum of the Law and the Prophets, and all the rules of the Gospel, leading us to Brotherly love and the special expressions of it, are snapped off short; and we reach all that they oblige us to do, by doing nothing: we love them well enough, though we neither will, nor do them good, if only we do them no mischief; or do no more for them than may be done, without inward affection, or any Christian Charity.   

Sect. 6. It would be tedious to pursue this in all particular virtues. The generals, which they acknowledge, will serve for the rest. They confess 
(g) Cognitio apprehensiva praeexigitur quidem ad fidem. Bellarm.  that knowledge must go before faith, and that faith is 
(h) Fides est fundamentum spei & charitatis. Idem. Fides generat spem & spes charitatem. Aquinas. 1. 2. q. 65. art. 4.  the foundation of Charity, and that charity (or love to God which hath its rise and being from faith) 
(i) Charitas est forma & radix omnium virtutum. Aquinas. ibid. q. 62. art. 4.  is the form and root of all virtues. They all agree in it, nor is it only evident by their own confession, but also by the nature of the things themselves; that other virtues depend upon Knowledge, Faith, and Love, for their being or exercise. For example, without love to God proceeding from faith, there can be no delight in God, nor desires to enjoy him. Delight and desire are but love in several postures; Desire is love in its motion, and delight is love in its rest. There can be no 
(k) Spirituale gaudium quod de Deo habetur ex charitatis dilectione oritur. Aquin. 2. 2. q. 28. art. 1.  delight in enjoying that which we love not; nor can the enjoyment of it, be desirable. So also there can be no filial fear without love, for love is essential to it, and thereby it is distinguished from that which is slavish. Ingenuous 
(l) Timor castus sive amicalis quo timemus ne Sponsus tardet, ne discedat, ne offendamus, ne eo careamus, timor iste de amore venit. Mag. sentent. 3. dist. 34. Timor ex amore generatur. Bonavent. 3. dist. 34. n. 83. quanto aliquis plus habet de spiritu amoris, tanto plus habet de spiritu timoris. Idem. ibid. n. 87. vid. Aquin. 2. 2. q. 19  fear springs from love, and is nourished by it, and increaseth or declines with it. It cannot be, nor act; but when, and where love is, and is acted. So that together with love the fear of God, and the acts of it are cashiered; even all due Reverence of him, and care not to offend him.  

(*) Licet nonnulli existiment dari speciale praeceptum horum timorum, ita ut eorum defectu speciale peccatum committatur; oppositum tamen docetur communiter, longeque est probabilius. Pet. S. Joseph de 1 praecepto. p. 55.  It is their common Doctrine, that there is no special command, either for servile or filial fear of God; so that the want of it need neither be confessed, nor repent of.  
So likewise, There can be no hatred of sin, or sorrow for it, as it is an offence or dishonour to God, 
(*) Nulla virtus est vera virtus sine charitate. Aquinas.  nor any true virtue at all without love; nor love without faith, nor faith without knowledge. Now these radical graces being rendered needless by their Doctrine (as I have declared before): They hereby stubb up all the rest by the Roots; so that neither sprig, nor bud thereof can be expected. To tell us after this, that they count any exercise of Christian virtue needful; is as if a man should take the spring out of his watch, and then persuade us seriously that he counts it very necessary, it should still go, and the Wheels be always in regular motion.   

Sect. 7. But let us stay here a little longer, and observe how their principles (concerning love particularly) disengage all from any exercise of virtue, and every act that is truly Christian. They take notice in virtue, of a goodness that is merely Moral, such as may be found in Heathens; and of a goodness that is Divine and supernatural, such as ought to be in Christians. This latter (they tell us) is derived from their end, when in the exercise of them, they are referred to God, as our supernatural end, and acted for his sake, 
(m) Vid Navar. cap. 14. n. 7.  with an intent to please him. They 
(n) Convenit inter omnes, ut opus referri debeat in Deum, ut finem supernaturalem, si futurum sit meritorium vitae aeternae, at opera virtutum caeterarum non referuntur in Deum, ut finem supernaturalem, nisi a charitate imperentur & dirigantur, etc. Bellarm. de justific. l. 5. cap. 15. p. 958.  declare further, That they cannot be thus referred to God without affection for him; nor done with a design to please him, unless they be done out of love to him: and so must be at least IMPERATE acts of love that they may be Choistian acts; and any thing better than nature in the Heathen might reach. And yet they conclude (as appears before by variety of Testimonies) that we are not obliged to observe any command, or act any other virtue out of love to God. They find no 
(o) Non obligat pro semper, sed certis opportunisque temporibus; extra quae ideo tempora, non est cur obligemur, caetera ex charitate praestare. Soto de Just. l. 2. q. 3. art. 10.  time at all, when we are obliged to this, unless it be when we are bound to have an inward act of love for God; but when this is, they never agree, except in this, that it may be never. For those who seem to say that it should be sometime, though but seldom, or but once for all; in other words signify it need not be at all: since they assign something else, which may serve instead of it, when ever it may be thought requisite. Thus (according to their Rule in indefinite precepts) their wise men have determined; if their School-Doctors or Casuists, or their Council of Trent, will pass for wise. Now being thus discharged from doing any thing out of love; They are thereby exempted from all Christian acts, and any other Christianity, as to the exercise of virtue, their honest Heathenism. It's true, They hold, they cannot be saved without meritorious acts, and cannot well think them meritorious, if they be no better than merely Heathenish: they should, (one would think) have some Christian character upon them and this of love 
(p) Vid. Bellarm. Supra.  particularly, that they may merit Salvation, and if they disengage their Catholics from this, they make it not needful for them to be saved. But I cannot help that, seeing they will have it so.  
If they think there is no necessity their Catholics should be christian's (as they do, when they make no Act truly Christian needful for them); they conclude it not necessary for them to be saved, unless they believe, that such as are no Christians can be heirs of salvation. Their Church (Pope, or Council, or  it is) must provide them some other Heaven, since that which is prepared for Christians they need not; no one step of the way to it being needful for them. All the necessity laid upon them by the Popish profession, is not for salvation, but for something else: they must be Roman Catholics, but they need not be true Christians; they must be the Pope's subjects, but they need not be Christ's Disciples; and this (and the rest) because they need not learn of him one Christian act while they live.   

Sect. 8. Moreover, all exercise of Virtues so opposite to Acts in their account, but venially evil, is with them unnecessary. And this goeth near, not only to discharge all acts of Virtue, which are required of Christians, but such also as were found even in Pagans. This is grounded upon their doctrine concerning venial sins; these with them are not necessarily to be avoided, being either not prohibited by any command (as most of them hold), or by no command necessary to be observed (as some of them had rather express it), and therefore no need, that the virtuous acts opposite to them should be practised. Upon this account, no exercise of Virtue will be necessary, but what is consistent with the vicious acts contrary thereunto, in any degrees of wickedness which they think Venial; no acts of Temperance, Sincerity, Righteousness, Truth, or Faithfulness, Chastity, Liberality, etc. will be needful, but what is consistent with all the Intemperance, Hypocrisy, Unrighteousness, Perfidiousness, etc. which by their doctrine is Venial. So he may be temperate who still loads his stomach till he Vomits, and is daily half drunk. He may be sincere enough, though he always design to seem better than he is, or good when he is not. He may be a man of Truth and Roman faithfulness, though his constant practice be telling Lies, or breaking promises, or swearing falsely, so all be but in venial measures. He may be just enough, though in all his deal, he be continually wronging others in lesser matters. He may be  enough, though he be unclean in thought, word, and deed venially. And he may be liberal enough, though he constantly practise all the covetousness which is opposite to every degree of liberality, so it be no worse. He may be Religious enough, though his soul never actually worship God; and Devout enough without any inward devotion, and Reverend enough, though greatly irreverent, even in the worship of God; and though at other times he be still profaning the Name of God with vain Oaths, and divers sorts of Blasphemies: Holy enough also, though he never have one act of inward holiness, no not on those days which either God or themselves have made holy. And in short, he may be Godly enough, though he never love, nor fear God till he die. (Some of these particulars are plain by the premises, the rest will appear so when we present their account of Venial sins): So that, though a man were so far from expressing any Christian Virtue, that he should be instead thereof, continually acting the contrary sins in all degrees not mortal, yet he would not be condemned: For by their doctrine, 
(q) Etiamsi omnia peccata venialia, simul colligerentur. in unum, nunquam efficerent id, quod facit unum lethale Bellarm. De amiss. great. l. 1. c. 13. p. 91. Non est meae mentes hic asserere, quod veniale possit fieri mortale per multiplicationem actuum venialium, etiamsi in infinitum multiplicarentur, Lopez. cap. 2. p. 12.  all the venial sins in the world that a person can be guilty of (though every hour, every minute of a whole life, how long soever, should bring forth one or other of them), cannot possibly damn him. And since whosoever shall not be condemned, will be saved, (which themselves also maintain), consequently, he that after Baptism, acts not one virtue Divine, or Moral, whose whole life hath nothing of a Christian in it, but less and worse than a Pagan, will yet be saved. Thus may they be deluded, who will trust their souls in this infallible Church. They may be true Catholics, though they be not Christians, so much as to one religious Act; and may pass currently to Heaven, though they never move one foot in the way. Such a thing we must take Christianity to be, and with so ghastly and frightful a face will it look upon the world; if Popery have not thus far abandoned it, and obtruded upon us a Changeling, instead of what Christ left us; there will be no lineament of virtue in the visage of it, not one of necessity; nor needs there be more in the lives of those, who would be counted the only true Professors, and faithful embracers of it.   

Sect. 9 They have other ways to make the exercises of Christian Virtues unnecessary. They do it especially by turning the commands of God into Counsels. Of those things that are required in Scripture, some, they say, the Lord only adviseth and commends; others he commands and enjoins. Those which he adviseth, they call Evangelical Counsels; the other are divine Precepts. Now the precepts, they say, are necessary to be observed, sometimes at least; the Counsels are not needful to be observed at all, any man may be saved without complying with them, they are matters of supererogation, more than we need to do. So that all those Virtues, which they make but matter of Counsel, are unnecessary, the acts & exercise of them more than needs. And those which they make so expressly, are not small nor inconsiderable in themselves; and in consequence little less than all. Many of those admirable rules which Christ giveth us in his Sermon on the Mount, wherein the singular and divine excellency of that Religion, to which he calls the world, is so very conspicuous, they will not have to be Laws, obliging all Christians, but dissolve the obligation of them by declaring them mere Counsels; though they were ratified by our great Lawgiver with those universal Sanctions, Matth. 7. 21. Not every one that saith unto me Lord, Lord, shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven, but he which doth the Will of my Father, which is in Heaven; and v. 26. Every one that heareth these say of mine, and doth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man, who built his House upon the Sand; Maldonate giveth that as the account, why he is said, chap. 5. v. 2. THAN TO OPEN HIS MOUTH, because he 
(r) Quod nunquam ante, sublimem illam de Evangelica perfectione doctrinam proposuisset, Comment. in Matth. p. 99  never before propounded that sublime doctrine of Evangelical perfection. Of this nature in 
(s) Vid. Joh. de Combis. in compend. Theol. l. 5. cap. 70. Ludolph. de vita Christi, par. 2. cap. 12. Angel. Sum. v. & v. precept. n. 17. Sylvest. Sum. v. praeceptum, n. 2. Soto de Just. l. 2. q. 9 art. 3. Navarre, c. 24. n. 5. Soto, de nat. & great. l. 3. c. 2. p. 126. Jo. Sanc. disp. 7. n. 10.  their account, is trusting in God such as frees us from solicitousness, about the things of this life, chap. 6. v. 31. 34. Sincerity of intention in doing good, such as is enjoined, v. 1. Patient digesting of injury, such as is commanded, v. 39 Relieving others freely, such as is required, v. 42. Innocent Communication, such as is specified, v. 37. Avoiding occasions of sin, such as are meant, v. 29, 30. Exemplary walking 
(t) Unde statim Christus in solenni illa legis promulgatione, ante necessaria praecepta proposuit perfectorum consilia Beati pauperes spiritu— Beati qui lu●ent, & his similia. Et ideo subdit vos estis lux mundi: quasi quibus competit non solum jestitiam ●ulgariter colere, sed egregi● usum etiam rerum licitum abjicere, Idem. ibid.  intended, v. 14. Poverty of spirit, v. 3. Spiritual mourning, v. 4. Christian meekness, v. 5. The three last, saith Soto, 
(u) Quod si trinum hoc consiliorum votum, quod uno hoc loco stabilitur, etc. Idem. de just. & jur. l. 7. q. 5. art. 1. p. 243.  are Trinum Consiliorum votum. We must take them to be the peculiar concerns of votaries. Righteousness 
(x) Idem. ibid.  likewise, as to earnest desires after it, v. 6. 
(y) Ibid.  Mercifulness, v. 7. 
(z) Ibid.  Purity of heart, v. 8. as it is the height of Charity, 
(a) Ibid.  Peacefulness also, v. 9 Love to Enemies, v. 44. more pressed by Christ than the rest, v. 45, 46, 47, 48. And before Popery, taken to be the proper character of Christians; but with them 
(b) Quae ad cumulatiorem virtutum perfectionem ornatumque attinet, sub forma consilij admonet, qualia sunt illa quae pertinent ad inimicorum dilectionem, Prov. 25. Si es●rierit inimicus tuus, ciba illum.  it is no duty, nor any thing of like nature, as that Prov. 25. If thy Enemy hunger, feed him, etc. Yea, 
(c) Et reliqua praecepta misericordiae, Ut cap. 3. Idem. ibid. l. 2. q. 3. art. 2. p. 37.  Acts of Mercy are no more our duty, for these are another instance of the same Author, immediately adding, Et reliqua praecepta misericordiae; not only that, Prov. 3. 4. Honour the Lord with thy substance; but all the rest in Scripture of like nature. So likewise, not only 
(d) De magnificentia & de magnanimitate, non fuerunt danda praecepta, sed magis consil●a, Aquinas 2. 2. q. 140. art. 2. ad primum.  Magnificence, and magnanimity, but 
(e) Dico virtutes Evangelicas dici illas, quae colliguntur ex consiliis Evangelicis traditis a Chrisio Domino— ducentes hominem ad perfectionem supra communem bonitatem— potissimum Sex. 1. pauperas spiritus. 2 Castitas virginum, 3. Obedientia, praesertim religiosa, 4. Hamilitas qua ita animi nostri comprimitur elatio, ut ad altiora non se erigat— 5. Paenitentia qua pro commissi● culpis Deo satisfacimus, 6. Simplicitas quae posita est in quadam facilitate & synceritate morum juxta rationis praescriptum, Fill. tr. 21. n. 194. 195.  humility also, with sincerity of Conversation, and Christian simplicity, or plain dealing. If these be not enough, all good works are in danger to become no duties. Dominicus a Soto, tells us, 
(f) V●nam gloriam a tribus operum generibus expulit, ad quae cuncta officia reducuntur— ex his enim tribus, eo quod opera sunt supererogationis, solent homines mundi auram ambere, Ibid. l. 2. q. 9 art. 2. p. 66.  there are three kinds of good works, to which all Christian Offices are reduced: One respects a man's self, the quelling of his own pleasures, signified by fasting; the other respects the Love of our Neighbours, of which kind is Almsdeeds; the third respects God and divine Worship, denoted by Prayer: and all these three with him are works of supererogation. When they come to an account in particulars, they vary not: As to what concerns ourselves, 
(g) Licitis voluptatibus abstinere ad consilium continentiae attinet, Idem. ibid. art. 3. p. 67. Consilia vero ea rescindunt, quae etsi licita sint, nec Charitati prorsus inimica, tamen non nulla sunt ad culmen progredientibus obstacula, l. 7. q. 5. art. 1. p. 242.  to abstain from our lawful pleasures, even when they may be an impediment to holiness, is but advice, we need not follow it. Also to avoid worldly cares, to be content with Food and Raiment, not to be eager after superfluities, not to be too solicitous for the body; not to affect dignities, are but matter of Counsel by their common doctrine, in Jo. Sanc. disp. 7. n. 10.  
As for the concerns of God, 
(h) 
Ex praecepto colendi Deum homo tenetur duntaxat cultam externum ei exhibere, S. Joseph. Sum. de 1. precept. art. 5.  
Attentio ad Deum non est necessaria; this is commonly asserted, even when it is acknowledged that all inward worship is included in it; sub hac autem attentione ad Deum ineluditur omnis interior reverentia & cultus, omnis oratio & petitio, ut eleganter describit Gregorius 10. in c. Decret. de immunitat. Eccl. in 6. Suarez. tom. 3. disp. 88 Sect. 3. p. 1146. Solus exterior cultus cadit sub hoc praecepto— sola missa communiter est in praecepto.— Utrum autem audiatur (missa) vel non— sub praecepto non cadit, Cajetan, Sum. v. fest.   no inward worship in public is under command, nor any outward, but the Mass; and for the hearing of that, no divine precept. No more are we obliged to worship in private, 
(i) Meditatio Scripturarum— perfectionis instrumentum, Soto, ibid.  Meditation is reckoned among Counsels of perfection. 
(k) Uldericus. Sum. confess. & Pisan. & alij in Sylvest. v. orat. n. 8. supra.  Vocal prayer is not enjoined by God, and so all public prayer in Christian Families and Assemblies, are under no divine injunction. Mental prayer may be a duty, 
(l) Supra.  when it is our duty to Love God; but when that will be, is not 
(m) De praecepto diligendi Deum & aliorum, nempe fidei & spei— non satis certo constat quando obligent, & quando violentur, Fill. tr. 22. n. 297.  well known: So mental prayer will be a duty, no body well knows when. But this is a Jesuit who minces the matter too precisely. In the judgement of Aquinas, 
(n) Ut orent mentaliter— solum sub consilio— ut tenet D. Thom. 2. ●. q. 32. & communiter, Doctores, Jo. Sanc. ibid. Oratio mentalis, in qua omnes actus interni religionis comprehenduntur, Suar. de Orat. l. 2. c. 7. n. 10.  and the generality of their Doctors, mental prayer is under Counsel only. And it is the more considerable, because they tell us, that in mental prayer all the internal acts of Religion are comprehended; so that hereby the very soul of Religion is dismissed as a thing of no necessity among Roman Catholics. And since in all worship, public or private, they will have spiritual attention and devotion to be but matter of Counsel, (without which all that they call Worship is but a Cipher, or a blot rather); they leave no worship of God at all necessary. Cardinal Tolet gravely distinguisheth 
(o) 
Adverte, festum posse sanctificari, & posse bene sanctificari. Ad sanctificandum du● sunt necessaria— id est, sacrum audire— & abstinere ab opere servili & prohibito, l. 4. c. 24. p. 685. ad bene autem santificandum, ultra hoc, aliud est necessarium, puta, ut qui est in mortali, tunc conteratur, & ad Dominum converti studeat: qui vero est in gratia, divinae vacet contemplationi, & bonis operibus, uterque autem a novo peccato abstineat. Adverte tamen, quod homo, tenetur sub mortali ad sanctificandum festum, sed non tenetur sub mortali ad bene sanctificandum.  
Ita solum obligor ad illa duo in festo praestanda, non ad sinem, quamvis consilium sit optimum, omnia ista exequi in die festo, vid. Soto, Navarre, Cajetan, qui nobiscum sentiunt, ibid. p. 687.   of a SANCTIFYING the Lords day, and all other holy days (for which presence at Mass, and abstaining from servile work is sufficient); and of a sanctifying them WELL, (to which it is necessary, that he who is in mortal sin, should be contrite, and turn to God; and he that is in Grace, should give himself to divine Contemplation and good works, and both of them should abstain from new sin). Yet observe (saith he) that a man is bound under mortal sin to SANCTIFY the day, but not to Sanctify it WELL. And after concludes, So I am only obliged to these two things, viz. (presence at Mass, and avoiding servile works) but not to the end (to wit, sanctifying it well); although it be very good Counsel to perform all the other upon this day. Thus with him it is no necessary duty, to which any are obliged on Lords days, or any other days for worship; to repent of sin, and turn to God, to meditate on divine things, and do good works, and abstain from any wickedness; all these it seems are only matter of Counsel; and herein he saith, Soto, Navarre, and Cajetan concur with him. And if they be only Counsels on all these days, the world will scarce find a day, when they will be duties. However with them, to do a thing, is commanded; to do it well, is not necessary. On all the days which either God or themselves would have kept holy, it is mere Counsel, either to do that which is good, or to think of it, either to be sorry for past wickedness, or not to commit more. And since it is no more on the holiest, it may seem not so much as a Counsel on profane and common days. The means of honouring God, being thus by them made unnecessary, no wonder if they discharge us from the due use of them; 
(p) Pia sedulitas inter consilia recenset Hunnaeus in Catechism. ad finem Sum. Aquin.  pious sedulity (diligence for Heaven and our souls) is but matter of Counsel, we need not trouble ourselves with it. No more scarce with any thing else, for 
(q) Evitatio otij non est in praecepto, Soto, ibid. l. 7. q. 5. art. 2. p. 243. add sin.  the shunning of Idleness is but Counsel, yea, and such as doth not oblige the Monks themselves, though they will have none else obliged by Counsels; in reference to them, Soto says, the avoiding of Idleness is not commanded.  
Acts which concern others, are either those of Righteousness or Charity; for the former, how favourable they are, we saw before, they 
(*) Quaecunque vultis ut faciant vobis, &c Scil. necessario, aliter consilium est, Angel. Sum. v. praeceptum, n. 17.  discharge us from such desires thereof as Christ encourageth to the uttermost, Matth. 5. 6. The latter they make corporal or spiritual. That Mercy or Charity which affords outward relief, even their 
(r) Eleemosynas erogare non est in religiosis virtus. Soto, ibid.  Religious are not obliged to. Nor need others exercise it, by 
(s) 
In quibus vero duobus non est de praecepto subvenire donando; sed satis est subvenire commodando vel mutuando, Navar. cap. 24. n. 5. Non semper est necesse donare, sed tunc solum, cum egenti neque per mutuum, neque per venditionem, neque alia ratione succurri potest— quamvis haec doctrina vera sit, & non solum a S. Thoma. in 2. 2. q. 32. art. 6. sed etiam ab alijs Theologis communiter tradi soleat, Bellarm. de bon. Operib. l. 3. c. 8.  
Consul, castiga, remit, solare, fer, ora.   GIVING any thing, no, not to those that are in greatest necessity, how much soever themselves have, how extremely soever others want. Spiritual relief, in affording of which, the exercise of mercy consists, they give an account of in many particulars, viz. advising those that want Counsel, teaching the Ignorant, comforting the Dejected, correcting Offenders, remitting Offences, bearing those that are burdensome, and praying for others. Now all these (and as many more belonging to the other branch) 
(t) Misericordia seu Eleemosyna sive sit spiritualis, quae melior est corporali, sive sit corporalis, est de consilio; vel saltem non de praecepto obligante ad mortale, exceptis duobus casibus, Idem. ibid. subvenire necessitatibus proximorum corporalibus, sicut propriis necessitatibus, pertinet ad consilium, vid. Aquin. Quodl. 4. art. 24. ad. 1. Misericors cor proximi necessitatibus communibus praestare, infaeticesque eventus corum condolere— consilium, in Jo. Sanc. disp. 1. n. 1.  are no necessary duties, or (which is all one in effect) under no precept obliging to mortal guilt, except in two cases only, saith Navarre, and those two concern only corporal relief; so that all the other duties which we own to the souls of men, are left arbitrary, as mere roatters of advice without exception. 
(*) Glossa in loc.  That of the Apostle, 1 Pet. 2. 13. For subjection to Governors is with them a Counsel. No more is that rule of Christ for Church Discipline & government, Math. 18. 15, 16, 17. if thy Brother shall Trespass against thee, etc.  
Mortification can scarce with them be so much as a Counsel, for their doctrine will have nothing in us to be mortified; that which is to be so treated, is sin in us; but they maintain, that in a just man there is no sin after Baptism. Carnal concupiscence itself is sinless; it is natural to us, and so innocent. 
(u) Concupiscentia carnis naturalis nobis est— Igitur cum ea quae nobis insunt a natura, nec loude digna sint nec vituperio, quis vel caecus, dixerit concupiscentiam illam, esse peccatum? nisi forsan material●ter ante baptismum. Ut superius explicatum est. Revera qua ratione id dixeris, sequenter compulsus confiteberis, & visum, & auditum, & reliquos sensus qui nobis post peccatum Adae instrumenta sunt delinquendi, delicta & ipsos esse. Quin vero & aurum & honores, & muliebrem formam, & quicquid nos pellicit, pellitve ad malum, Soto, de nat. & great. l. 1. c. 12. p. 24.  That which is in us by Nature, they say, is neither worthy of praise or dispraise: Hence they conclude, he is blind, who will say, concupiscence is a sin. They grant it induceth us to sin, but it is no more sin upon that account, than hearing, seeing, or other of our senses; than Gold, or Honour, or Beauty, or any thing else that may draw us to evil; and so plainly, we are no more bound to mortify it (if sin only is to be mortified) than we are obliged to ruin our senses, to destroy gold, or to spoil the beauty of a handsome Woman. And the same must be said of other vicious habits, contracted by a continued practice of sin; for though they call these Vices, yet Vices with them are no sins, no more than Virtues are duties; 
(*) De habitu constat non esse peccatum, How they would prove it, see in Suar. l. 3. de Juram. c. 6. n. 1. Non sufficit habitualis affectus seu dispositio ad peccandum, sed requiritur actualis affectus seu dispositie, ut peccatum reipsa contrahatur, Bonacina, de peccat. disp. 2. q. 3. p. 5. n. 3. alij communiter.  the Law of God is not concerned in any habits, as it commands not those that are good, so it forbids not those that are vicious; and no reason to mortify that which is not condemned by the Law. However, they retain the word, but little else we meet with in them, about this great concern of a Christian; and a very odd object they find for it, instead of that which the Scripture assigns; it is the natural body that is to be afflicted and macerated, not the body of sin; and so they are not concerned to get the work of the Devil destroyed; it is the work of God that must be mortified. They may be excused, if they make not this so much as a Counsel. But they say the meceration of the body is in order to the bridling of concupiscence: It seems, as Innocent as it is, it may need a curb, yet they take care to leave it lose enough, for those severities which should hamper it, they say are not commanded. 
(x) Afflictio corporis non est in praecepto, de just. & jur. l. 7. q. 5. art. 2. Mortificationis operibus sedulo esse addictos, consilium, in Jo. sanc. disp. 1. n. 1.  Afflicting of the body is under no precept, saith Soto and Sylvester, having told us out of Aquinas, that a Vow is properly of a work of Supererogation, acceptable to God; he adds, the 
(y) Sum. v. Votum. 1. n. 4.  maceration of the body, as such, for the bridling of Concupiscence, falls under Vows. And so how unruly soever the flesh is, they may choose, whether they will use the bridle or no. Yea, if the Priest should be so rigid as to enjoin severities of this tendency, the Sinner needs not submit to them.  
Nor will they have us more engaged against the world than against the flesh; all the evils of the world are by the Apostle reduced to three heads, 1 joh. 2. 16. but the Oracle of their Schools tells us, that to relinquish these three wholly, 
(z) Haec autem tria totaliter derelinquere secundum quod possibile est, pertinet ad consilia Evangelica, Aquinas 1. 2. q. 108 art. 4. Corp.  as far as we can, belongs to Evangelical Counsels. Soto herein follows him, and tells us 
(a) 
Temporalium tria sunt genera, scil. concupiscentia carnis, concupiscentia oculorum, & superbia vitae— animos vero ab illis prorsus evellere, non est cunctis, immo neque multisin ho saeculo possibile. Quare sub consilio Christusid cuique reliquit, ut qui capere posset, caperet, Ibid. l. 2. q. 9 art. 3. p. 67. vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. 7. n. 10.  
Huc emim (viz. ad votum religionis) attinet Paulinum illud verbum ad Gal. 6. mihi absit gloriari nisi in cruse Domini, etc. per quem mihi mundus crucisixus est, & ego mando, Ibid. l. 7. q. 5. art. 1. p. 242   that Christ left this unto every one under Counsel. So to be crucified to the world, and to get the world crucified to us, Gal. 6. is matter of advice with him, nor are we obliged thereto, in reference to those things, 
(b) Non possunt non multa alendae charitati creare pericula, Ibid,  or Lusts, which very much endanger our souls.  
Self-denial also hath the same measures from them. Bellarmine, by those words of Christ to the young man, Matth. 19 21. Fellow me, understands self-denial, explaining it by Matth. 16. If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, it is nothing else, saith he, 
(*) Abnegare se nihil est aliud, quam valedicere suo judicio, & suis affectibus, & accommedare se alterius judicio & voluntati.  but to renounce ones own judgement and affections, and to accommodate himself to the judgement and will of other; this the young man should have done, but it was not his duty, it was only a Counsel of perfection, (as he and all of them conclude) to subject himself thus to the will and judgement of Christ. He distinguisheth indeed, and will have submission to the will and judgement of Christ in things necessary to salvation, to be a common duty enjoined, Matth. 16. and Luk. 9 But such a subjection of our wills and judgements to Christ in things not of themselves necessary to salvation, to be only a Counsel; 
(c) Solis ijs consulitu● qui volunt esse perfecti, de qua agitur, Matth. 19 Luc. 18. de Monach. l. 2. c. 9 p. 1151.  it is advice for those alone that would be perfect. This is bad enough, for thus it will not be a duty to subject ourselves to Christ in most things; or to deny ourselves in any thing, which is not in their sense a deadly evil. But Soto, than whom there was no Divine more considerable in the Council of Trent, advanceth farther, and concludes that self-denial, not only which is required, Matth. 19 Luk. 18. But that also commanded, Luk. 9 Matth. 16. (which the Cardinal understood to be a subjecting of our wills and judgements to Christ in things necessary to salvation) is but a Counsel; and tells us 
(d) Luc. 9 — Idem est se hominem ipsum abnegare, quod propriam libertatem alterius arbitrio voti nexu subdere. Ibid. p. 248. Abnegare seipsum, est propriam voluntatem, per quam homo est bomo, abnegare: quod revera nisi obligatario vot● alteri eam sic tradas, ut in tua non supersit facultate eandem rersus tibi usurpare, fieri non potest. Ibid. art. 4. p. 24●.  for a man to deny himself, is by Vow to give up his liberty to another's will; and so Christ no where enjoins other self-denial, than what their Perfectionists voluntarily oblige themselves unto by Vow, and the main duty of Christians is confined to Cloisters; that self-resignation, wherewith Christ should be honoured, being transferred to an Abbot.  
There is one thing more remains, which Christ requires of those, who will be his Disciples, that is, Christians (and but one where he gives us the sum of all) and that is suffering for him. It would be strange, if when they have eased themselves of the rest, they should leave their Catholics obliged to this. The device of Evangelical Counsels had not been so useful a tool, though it freed them from the rest of Christ's Yoke, if it would not have served to cast off the heaviest part of it; but hereby they can cast off Sufferings, greater, or less. Martyrdom they reserve for those who receive the truth in Love; for themselves it is only a Counsel 
(e) Est autem solum in Consilio, quando ex eo nihil amplius quam Dei gloria, vel fidei exaltatio consequitur; secundum mentem ejusdem Doctoris. Navar. c. 12. 11. 40. Lopez. c. 41. p. 224. Si adest solum oportunitas manifestandi Divinam gloriam & aedisicandi ecclesiam, martyrium est supererogationis, & non necessitatis. Angel. sum. v. charit. n. 5. Sylvest. sum. v. Martyr. Secundum Bonavent. & S. Thom. sum. Rosel. v. charitas. n. 10.  when it serves for nothing more than the glory of God, and the advancing of the Faith; and this according to the judgement of Aquinas. If it be no more than an opportunity of manifesting the divine glory and edifying the Church, it is a work of supererogation, and of no necessity, saith another. 
(f) Math. 19 Omnis qui reliquerit Domum vel fratres, etc. Vide quam cu●ctis rebus eum denudet, qui optaverit esse perfectus. Soto. ibid. art. 2. p. 244. Religio— nihil aliud significat, quam quod Christus Evangelicum adolescentulum docuit: Sivis perfectus esse, vade & vend, etc. Et sequere me.  Parting with other things for Christ is no more a duty; to forsake Brethren, or Sisters, or Father, or Mother, or Wife, or Children, or Lands, for Christ's sake, Matth. 19 29. is not a duty of any Christian, but only such as profess perfection, such forsaking all for Christ, to follow him, is more than needs, it was so in 
(g) Et quod subinde Petrus subjunxit: ecce nos reliquimus omnia, & secuti sumus te. Ibid. art. 3.  the Apostles. In short, taking up the Cross is more than is commanded, when it is joined by Christ with self-denial, and following him, as the best character of his Disciples, Luk. 9 
(h) De voto obedientiae intelligit. Luc. 9 Si quis vult post me venire, abneget semeipsum, & tollat crucem suam quotidie, & sequatur me. Ibid. art. 1. p. 243. vid. art. 4. p. 247.  They take it to be but matter of Counsel, and so quit themselves of the full character of Christians at once.  
If there be any virtue left, requisite for the practice of a Christian, which this Engine hath not yet demolished and brought to discretion, by working it otherwise, it will make clear work. The least degree of virtue, they say, is all that is necessary; 
(i) Bellarm. de paenit. l. 2. c. 11. supra.  none can be assigned above the lowest (in Faith, Hope, Love, Repentance, or other Virtues) which is enjoined. Now that which is lowest of all, is next to nothing; and that which is no more, can act no further; so that all exercise of Virtue which their doctrine makes needful, is either nothing, or next to it. All growth in grace, with them, is 
(k) Nisi forte in religioso, qui tenetur habere propositum proficiendi: quia nullibi est praeceptum, ut istam curam habeamus, sed consulitur tantum, Sylvest. v. peccat. n. 4. etc.  needless, for the first degree they attain is not only a sufficiency, but all the perfection that is necessary; 
(h) (l) Perfectio una necessaria ad esse, altera necessaria ad bene esse, quae consistit in consilijs. Bellarm. de Monach l. 2. c. 12. p. 1158.  what is more, may be profitable, but not simply needful. The first and least degree of Virtue in every kind satisfies the precept, and that being satisfied requires no more. So all other degrees will be but under Counsel; it will be no duty to look after more than the least, nor will the grossest negligence, as to endeavours for more, be any sin.  
And since increase of Virtue is by the exercise of it, where the increase is not necessary, the exercise is needless. Further, no Act of Virtue in any degree is requisite, but only in the article of necessity; for then only affirmative precepts oblige, at all other times, they bind no more than mere Counsels, nor than neither, unless it can be known when this Article occurs; and how shall it be known? the Scriptures have not declared it, they say, nor Counsels neither, why they have a rule in the case. 
(m) Quae indefinita relinquuntur a lege, arbitrio boni viri sunt definienda, Navar.  Things not determined, are left to the Arbitrement of an honest man; & so it is left to every man's will, who can suppose himself honest; if he never find time for any act of virtue, he will not be obliged to any: or if he will be so cautious to consult their Divines in the case, some of them declare, that such a virtuous Act is rarely needful, nor can they certainly tell when: others conclude there is no necessity of it all. Now he may follow which please him best, even those (if he list) which discharge him from all obligations to the acts in question; and this he may do safely, not only by their doctrine of probability, but by the determination of their Oracle. The Council of Trent will secure him, though he never perform one act of Virtue all his life, nor repent thereof at his death, by a fine device, which is neither Repentance nor a Virtue, of which before.  
Besides, all acts which have more than moral goodness, seem by their doctrine to be under Counsel, and all acts supernatural and truly Christian more than needs. They are not truly Christian, unless they be done out of respect to God, with an intent to please and honour him, as the Apostle requires, 1 Cor. 10. 30. But this rule, as Soto tells us, 
(n) Potest tamen accipi in sensu, ut sit consilium: & hic videtur propinquior literae, scilicet sive comeditis sive bibitis, etc. omnia actu referatis in Deum. De nat. & great. l. 1. c. 23. p. 60.  taken in that sense which is nearest to the letter, that all be actually referred to God, is but a Counsel. But may not a virtual intent to glorify God be necessary, though an actual respect thereto be but advice? No, not that neither, for without such a virtual reference, the acts we speak of, may be morally good, (as they say they were in those that knew not God) and so no sin. Now in any degree above this (viz. wherein they are more than not sins, or any thing better than merely inculpable) 
(o) Si addam alterum gradum (viz. praeter eum quo non pecco) eo modo facio actum supererogationis & consilij. De Monach. l. 2. c. 13. p. 1162.  they are works of supererogation, if their great Cardinal be not mistaken.  
There is yet another Maxim pregnant for this purpose; 
(p) Modus virtutis non cadit sub praecepto neque legis divinae neque legis humanae.  The mode of Virtue falls not under the Precept; that is, we are not enjoined to act in a virtuous manner, or as becomes virtuous persons, viz. out of a virtuous habit or principle. Aquinas, who delivers and maintains this maxim, explains it by this instance: 
(q) Neque enim ab homine neque a Deo punitur tanquam praecepti transgressor, qui debitum parentibus honorem impendit, quamvis non habeat habitum pietatis, 1. 2. q. 100 art. 9 c.  He is neither punished by God, nor men, as a transgressor of the Precept, who pays his Parents due Honour, though not out of a habit of piety. Such Honour, though it be no act of that Virtue (Piety they call it) from whence proceeds what we own to Parents, doth satisfy the Precept, so that the person is free both from sin and the punishment. Accordingly Soto, 
(r) De nat. & great. lib. 1. c: 22. p. 57 supra.  We are not commanded to pay what we own, out of the habit of Righteousness, or liberality, but only to pay it to the full. By this one instance he would have us judge of all other Precepts concerning Virtues: The habits, i. e. the virtues need not be exercised; let the thing be done, and it is all, the command of God requires, though it be not done out of a virtuous principle, nor be any act or exercise of it. So Bellarmine 
(s) De great. & liber. arbitr. l. 6. c. 7. p. 664. supra. , When God commands that we live righteously and soberly, he commands not that we do this from a habit, but only that we do it. The external acts which Pious, Sober, and Righteous persons do, are requisite; but the exercise of any virtues therein, whether they concern God, others, or ourselves, is not commanded: 
(*) Per virtutem intel igimus habitum bonum, Nau. c. 23. n. 1.  The habit is that, which they count the virtue; since therefore they say, that nothing need be done out of habit, they thereby declare that no exercise of virtue is enjoined; nothing that we do, need be the act or issue of a virtuous principle; this will be but matter of Counsel, and not under any obliging command. Indeed they make the exercise of virtue universally needless, since they declare it not requisite in all those cases, where if in any at all, it would be needful, they find no necessity for it, either in worship, or common conversation; all may be done very well, without any act of grace or virtue. They may pray effectually; they may celebrate or hear Mass meritoriously (and these are the sum of all their ordinary worship); they may partake worthily of all their Sacraments; they may obtain all the effects of Sacraments or Sacramentals (these are evident by the premises); they may satisfy all the commands of God, and peecepts of their Church, so as to free both from sin and punishment in the judgement of Aquinas and his Followers; yea, they may merit too, not only other things, but grace and glory: this is the point more stuck at than the rest, but the 
(t) 
Non desint gravissimi authores, qui sentiant, omne opus bonum hominis justi, & habitu Charitatis praediti, vitae aeternae meritorium esse, Bellarm. de Justif. l. 5. c. 15. p. 957.  
Ad meritum imperium charitatis non est necessarium proprie & in rigore, sufficit enim, ut ab habente charitatem proficiscatur, vid. Suar. tom. 4. disp. 37. Sect. 3. u. 3.   gravest of their Authors maintain, that it is sufficient for merit, that a man be in the state of grace, though he do not act it; and this state consists but in that imaginary grace, to which a Priest can help an impenitent Sinner. It will be hard to divine, for what ends the exercise of virtue can be by them counted needful, since without it, all the ends specified may be accomplished, the chief not excepted. However here's enough to enter the exercise of virtue amongst mere Counsels.  
If we should take into this account all these rules in Scripture, the transgression of which is by their doctrine but Venial, as Scotus, Gabriel, and others, would have us, (Scotus & Gabriel, asserunt peccata mortalia esse contra praecepta; venialia vero contra consilia, Vasq. in 1. 2. tom. 1 disp. 143. c. 4. n. 7.) the number of Counsels would swell infinitely, and all Conscience of the exercise of Virtue would be in a manner stifled under that notion: but of Venials hereafter. They have, without this, yet another expedient ready to do them universal and effectual service this way, for by their principles any one may turn what divine precept soever pinches him, into a Counsel, and make no more Conscience of it, if he have but some Doctor's opinion for it (ad praeceptum non teneris, si te non teneri probabilis Doct. est sententia, Medina, Soto, in Victorell. ad Sa. v. dubium, n. 2.) Yea, though he have but the opinion of some one Doctor, that's enough to secure him, as Angelus, Sylvest. Navarre, Sairus, Victorel, (ibid. & in Jo. Sanc. d. 44. n. 61.) and above 20. of their Authors conclude (vid. infra). So far is it from being the singular conceit of some Jesuits, yea, though that Doctor therein be opposed by all others, idem. ibid. after Lorca, Villalobos, and many more.  
Not to be tedious; where Christ intimates, Math. 5. 19 that some of the commands are greater, and some less; the great commands some of their Writers will have to be Evangelical Counsels, because they are better, more meritorious, and tend to greater perfection: 
(u) Vid. Soto, ibid. l. 3. c. 2.  others will have the less commands to be but such Counsels, because they are not necessary to be observed. Now betwixt these two, both the great commands, and the less, will be dissolved into Counsels, and what then becomes of the exercise of Christian virtues? If this be but matter of Counsel, there is no necessity that any should trouble themselves about it. For this is the difference, saith Aquinas, betwixt a Precept and a Counsel 
(x) Praeceptum importat necessitatem, consilium autem in optione ponitur ejus, cui datur, 1. 2. q. 108. art. 4. . A Precept imports necessity, Counsels are left to the free choice of him, to whom they are given: So that he may mind or not mind them, as he lists: if he observe them not, there is no fear of penalty, either eternal or temporal: 
(y) Consilium si non servetur, nullam habet paenam, De Monach. lib. 2. c. 7.  There is no punishment saith Bellarmine, if a Counsel be not observed. 
(*) Operari vero contra consilium licet altissimum, peccatum non est: nullus enim Theologorum concedit fractionem consilij puniendum fore a Deo, Jo Sanc. disp. 7. n. 5.  They all maintain this. Not one of their Divines will yield, that God may punish any one for acting against his Counsel, though of the highest importance. And no wonder, for by their doctrine he no way sins mortally or venially, that doth not observe it. Though it may seem strange, that it should be no sin to neglect Counsels given us from Heaven, and not to follow the advice of the Alwise God; yet it is passed all doubt by their principles. 
(z) Intermittere consilium, nullum peccatum est, Vega. de Justific. l. 14. c. 12. Nec ulla (leges) divinae consultoriae etiam ad veniale obligant, Navar. c. 23. n. 49. etc. 21. n. 43. Inobedientia aut est contra consilium, & tunc si sit consilium perfectionis, non est peccatum, Sylvest. v. inobedient. n. 2. ut enim optime ait Suarez, operari contra consilium, nulla nece minima Christi offensio est, Jo. Sanc. ibid.  A neglect of Counsel is no sin at all. It is not only no sin to neglect these Counsels at other times, but also when God calls us to comply therewith by divine inspirations and motions of his Spirit; to disobey these calls, and resist these inspirations is no fault at all. Cardinal Tolet is rejected as too rigid, for counting it so bad as a venial fault, not to yield to these divine inspirations, (Jo. Sanc. disp. 7. n. 4). So that if the great God calls to us, either by his Spirit, or by his Word, or both together, as our Counsellor; we need not regard it, we may resist both, and yet be innocent. Herein others concur; Aquinas himself counts it no sin to neglect Counsels, even against Conscience dictating, that it is good to follow them, (2. sentent. didst 39 q. 3. art. 3. ad. 6.) They may refuse the observance of them with some contempt, a presumptive contempt (i. e. a continued neglect thereof) passeth without control, as innocent. 
(a) Contemptus negativus est peccatum mortale, si Dei lex quam violate, est praeceptiva: aut veniale, vel nullum, si est consultoria tantum Sylvester, v. contempt. n. 3.  A negative contempt hereof is justified, as either a small fault, or none at all. And some of them exclude not a positive contempt of these Counsels of perfection, but allow a contemptuous neglect of them as sinless. 
(b) Si vero non contemnit autoris potestatem, sed observantiam consilij seu exhortationis: & sic solum peccat venialiter, si consilium est reverentiae— si vero est consilium perfectionis, nec etiam venialiter peccat & tunc est perfectionis quum licite potest dimittere, Sit Archi. 6. dis. & sic intellige Gloss. & jura quae alligat Sum. v. contempt. n. 1. omittere rem levem ex contemptu formali non est mortale, vid. plures in Dian. p. 3. tr. 6. res. 72.  So Angelus, after their Law, and Gloss, and their Saint Antoninus. They may glory in their neglect of these divine Counsels, and make their boast thereof; this will be but a slight fault at most; for they may glory in any thing but mortal crimes, and this is not so much as venial. It will be no worse if they not only neglect, 
(c) Et ex hoc patet, quid dicendum de eo qui attediatus abhominatur divina & spiritualia: quoniam nisi sint necessaria ad salutem, & ea demittat: vel deliberate disponat dimittere, non peccat mortaliter, Angel. Sum. v. accidia. n. 1.  but abandon them with some abhorrence too. They may bind themselves by Oath, not to observe them; it will be but a small fault at worst, to Swear, and call God to witness that they will not follow his Counsels. 
(d) Non est peccatum mortale per se loquendo jurare aliquid contrarium consilij, Glossa, Tabien. Cajetan, Navarre, c. 12. n. 16. Antoninus, Soto, & alij in Suarez, de Juram. l. 3. c. 18. n. 6. Graff. l. 2. c. 15. n. 6. etc. 18. n. 11.  So they commonly determine; and 
(e) Hujusmodi juramenta sine peccato observari poss●nt, Navarre, ibid.  if they be true to their Oath, it will be no fault at all: So that if we be loath to believe, that they abandon holiness in the exercise of Christian virtues, as a thing superfluous, and more than needs, under this notion of Counsels; to put us out of doubt, they are ready to Swear it, and their Doctors assure them they may do it safely.   

Sect. 10. But if all this were otherwise, and any exercise of virtue were needful by their doctrine; yet would there be no necessity of it, but only during the Pope's pleasure. For by their principles, if the Pope should determine, that any Virtue were a Vice, all Romanists are bound in Conscience to conform to his judgement, and Virtue must be avoided as if it were a Vice indeed. Bellarmin, their chief Champion (who is wont with so much confidence to deny, or with so great Artifice to hid or disguise any thing in Popery which may render his party either odious or ridiculous) delivers himself plainly to this purpose. 
(f) Si autem Papa erraret praecipiendo vitia, vel prohibendo virtutes, teneretur Ecclesia credere vitia esse bona, & virtutes malas, nisi vellet contra conscientiam peccare, De Rom. Pontif. lib. 4. cap. 5. p. 721. Sect. secunda.  If the Pope, saith he, should mistake in commending Vices, and forbidding Virtues, the Church would be bound to believe those Vices to be good, and those virtues to be evil, unless she would sin against Conscience. The Cardinal would have us think, that he proceeds herein upon an impossible supposition, and that the Pope cannot thus mistake, as to commend Vices, or forbidden Virtues; but the world knows, that this is so far from being impossible, that he hath already actually done it, and this in such instances as may well persuade us, that it is not only possible, but likely; that there is not any Virtue, but (if occasion serve, and his interest requires it) he may forbid it, and declare it a sin, yea, and bind the Church in Conscience to avoid it, as if it were a Vice.  

(*) He may bind the Catholic Church in Conscience to believe a Lie, and to call good evil, and evil good. This is to speak home: and now let Bellarmin say a worse thing of Antichrist if he can, and show us what the Gates of Hell can be imagined to design or attempt more destructive to the Christian Church and Religion, than what he supposes the Pope to have full power and authority from Christ to do.  He may do it with as much demonstration of Reason, Holiness, and Infallibility, in any case, as he hath already done it in too many. Since then, that Church hath so far subjected all the Conscience and Reason they have unto him, as they cannot without sin but believe him, if he should determine, that light is darkness, and good is evil; he may take away all Conscience of Virtue, and the exercise of it, when ever he pleaseth; there will be no need of any act of Virtue for any Papist, if he list but out of his Chair to say so; they cannot without sinning against Conscience, practice any, if he do but the same thing in the rest, as he hath done in a great many already.  
This is enough to show how needless they count the exercise of Christian Virtues, and so how unnecessary they make all holiness of life; but it will be yet more evident, if their doctrine allow them to live in a course of sin, and make it not necessary to forsake wickedness and abandon such evil ways, as are condemned by the Holy God. For continuance in sin is as inconsistent with holiness of life, as it is with hopes of Salvation; and this is as clear in Scripture, as if it were described with a Sun beam, 1 Joh. 3. 8. Act. 3. 26. 2 Timoth. 2. 19 Gal. 5. 16. & 19, 20, 21. 1 Cor. 6. 11. 9 etc. Notwithstanding, by their doctrine it is not necessary to forsake sin; this will be manifest, if we take notice, that there are many sins that they count Virtues, and so not to be avoided; and many which they call sins, but think it not necessary for the Salvation of any man to abandon them; and many sins also, which they have made to be no sins at all.    

CHAP. VII. Many heinous crimes are Virtues, or necessary Duties by the Roman Doctrine.  

THere are many horrid sins, which they have transformed into virtues, or count high strains of Piety and Devotion: and thereby, are so far from being concerned to forsake them, as they are obliged to live in the practice of them, I might instance in Blasphemy, Idolatry, Perjury, Robbery, Murder, etc.  
Their Blasphemies, in ascribing the peculiar excellencies of the Divine Majesty, and the prerogatives of our Lord Jesus Christ to the blessed Virgin, and other Creatures, and to their Popes (though divers of them, as themselves acknowledge, were Monsters and incarnate Devils) have been sufficiently discovered by others, and therefore, designing brevity, I here wave them.  
For the same reason, I will not insist upon their Idolatry in invocating Saints, adoring the Host, and worshipping Images, only as to this last, let me observe what is less taken notice of, that their own Doctrine before opened, quite shuts out the best, and only considerable plea, they make use of, to excuse themselves from this Crime. It is their common Doctrine, that the same Worship is to be given to the Image, and the exemplar, id est, the Worship of God to the Images of the Trinity, the Worship of Christ to a Crucifix, or a Cross, or the Image of the Cross. They also define Idolatry, to be, a giving the Worship of God, to any thing else besides God. Who would imagine, but they had hereby fastened the charge of Idolatry upon themselves avoidable? yet they make account to escape by pleading that the Worship they give to Images is Transient, not Terminative, id est, it stays not in the Image, but passes from it to the exemplar, the mind of the Worshipper directing it to God. There's no need to ask what ground they have to imagine, that their giving the Worship of God to an Image Transitively, is not Idolatry; it is enough that they acknowledge it to be Idolatry, if it be not Transient: since whatever they pretend when they are pinched, yet they count it not requisite, that their worship should pass from the Image unto God; but think it safe to let it stop, where it first fell, and terminate in the Image. For they confess it passeth not to God, without an act of the mind directing it to him; this is not, nor can be, when in the Worship God is not minded: and they generally agree (as was showed before) that they need not mind God in their Worship. So the result of their own Doctrine is, that they need be no better than Idolaters. I know not what they will say here, unless as Cajetan, that a virtual termination will suffice, id est, when they have an intention, to terminate their Worship on God, without doing it actually, and indeed. But if no more be necessary, the Worship need not pass to God really, but may rest in the Image, and actually terminate there: and so they will be real, and actual Idolaters, whatever their intention be. Yea as to that, by their Doctrine it is not needful, to intent to Worship God, as we saw before. Answerably in their prayers to Saints, before their Relics, or before an Image; (which is their usual practice) since by their common Doctrine, the person prayed to, whether God, or a Creature, need not be minded, the address may be actual to the Image, and to that only; the mind not transferring the prayer, so much as by one thought, towards the Saint, it will terminate in the Image, if any where, and be as senseless Idolatry, as the most stupid amongst the Heathen were guilty of. Thus what they say, many of them do; 
(a) Sunt bene multi rudiores qui imagines colunt non ut signa, sed perinde quasi ipsae se●sum habeant, magisque eis fidunt quam Christo. Polyd. Virgil de invent. rer. l. 6. c. 13.  by their common Doctrine, all may do, viz. apply themselves to a senseless Image, as though it heard their prayers, and searched their hearts, and were no less than God.   

Sect. 2. There is another branch of this crime, which I shall stay a little on, viz. Their worshipping of Relics. Herein they are so liberal, as to give Religious Worship to such things, which they do but fancy to be Relics; yea such as it is absurd, and ridiculous to imagine, they are Relics. For who can imagine (at least when he is waking) how they could catch, or keep St. Peter's shadow; or bottle up joseph's hough, his toilsome breathing, when he was at his Carpenters work? yet both these, with others of like quality, are among the Relics, which they count worthy of such Worship. 
(b) Umbra vero non est maxima inter alias reliquias, etc. Vasquez de adorat. l. 3. disp. 3. c. 2. n. 8●.  The shadow of St. Peter, says one, is not the greatest among Relics, and therefore if that be adored, why are not the rest to be honoured and Worshipped? Bellarmine 
(c) Quae reliquia viliores umbra (Petri) cogitari possint? de imagine. cap. 3. p. 1494.  asks, what Relic can be imagined to be meaner, than the shadow of Peter? possibly he might be resolved, near Blois in France, where joseph's hough is Honoured, and Worshipped as a Relic. 
(d) An. 34. in Spondan. n. 77.  Baronius ascribes much to the shadow of Peter, for he makes it the ground, not only of their Worship of Images, but also of the honour and power of the Popes. Who can doubt hereafter, but that the weightiest things in Popery have a substantial foundation? They Worship their Relics, not only when they are whole and sound, but when they are corrupted, and reduced to dust; or nothing else of them left, but the vermin bred in them; not only the ashes, but the Vermin too may be Worshipped, though some stick at the latter. Henricus one of their School-Doctors concludes, that the Relics in the form of Dust and Ashes, may and aught to be adored, but not under the form of vermin, and gives some reason for it; but their great Vasquez rejects this scruple, and the ground of it, as vain and frivolous; and concludes they may be Worshipped, as well when they are vermin, as when they are Ashes. 
(e) Recta intention & sincer a side, possit quis in vermibus sanctum apprehendere, & venerari. Ibid. cap. ult. n. 113. 114.  A man, saith he, may with right intention, and sincere faith, apprehend a Saint, and Worship him in Worms. If the question had been, of the little Worms in the Ulcer of St. Harry of Denmark, 
(f) Engl. Martyrol. Jan. 16.  for which he had such Saintlike love, as when they crept out of his Knee, to put them in again, that they might be nourished, where they were bred; Or of the Lice of St. Francis, 
(g) Canus. Loc. Th. lib. 11. c. 6.  for which he had such a holy tenderness (it is Recorded as an argument of his holiness) that when they were shaked off, he gathered them up, and put them in his Bosom: I suppose Henricus himself could scarce have denied, but those Sacred Creepers (having so near Relation to, and being sanctified by such extraordinary contact, of so great Saints) might have been adored.  
It cannot be denied, but they are liable to gross mistakes, about the object of their Worship here; and some of them acknowledge, that the people herein are deluded with great and detestable 
(h) Ingentes & detestandae imposturae patefierent. Cassand. Consult. c. de reliquijs.  impostures. What if the Tooth which they Worship for St. Christopher's (as big as a man's 
(*) L. vives in August. de civet. Dei l. 15. c. 9 Dens molaris pugno Major.  fist) should prove the Tooth of a Beast? or the Hair, which they Worship as part of St. Petes Beard, should be the excrement of some Malefactor? or the shift which they Worship as the Virgin Maries, should be the covering of some Harlot? or the dust, or the Vermin which they Worship, as the remains of some Saints, should have been in their original, no more holy than a Bruit or a damned sinner? as great mistakes as these about their Relics, the World has discovered, and themselves have been convinced of. Valla, a person of great learning, and eminency amongst them, says plainly, 
(i) Decem millia talium rerum Romae sunt. De Constant. donat.  There are ten thousand such things (counterfeit Relics) in Rome itself. And if the seat of infallibility be so well stored with cheats, what shall we think of other places? They say indeed they have the attestation of Visions, Revelations, Miracles to insure them: but these they have, and produce as well for those that are confessed to be counterfeits, as for them which they take to be true. So that they are proved beyond all question, to be all alike: the true ones, as very counterfeits as any; and the counterfeit, as true as the best. Now, may they with safety venture to Worship them for all this? Yes, their Devotion is maintained to be not only safe, but meritorious, however they be deluded about the object of it. They may worship at all adventure, what they take to be a Relic, though it be indeed no such thing: and yet be so far from Idolatry or any sin, that they deserve highly at God's hand by so doing. If 
(k) Si quis putans aliquam esse particulam sancti, quae non est, merito suae devotionis non caret. Vasque ibid. cap. ult. n 114.  any man think, says one, that to be a Relic of a Saint, which indeed is not so, he is not frustrate of the merit of his Devotion. Yea a man may merit by a mistaken belief, though he should worship the Devil, says another. 
(l) Holcot infra.  So that they have not only a fair excuse, but great encouragement to venture; though they may happen to Worship the Devil himself, and not only some limb of him, instead of Christ, or his Saints, or their remains. When the Lord declares Deut. 32. That his Wrath should burn to the bottom of Hell, for that the Israelites Worshipped Devils instead of God: they might, if Baronius had been their Advocate, have come off well enough with his Plea, fides purgat facinus. The Israelites believed as firmly as roman-catholics (only they were mistaken) that they did not Worship Devils, but that which was a proper object of Worship: therefore they were so far from the bottom of Hell, or any danger of it; that hereby they might merit Heaven and Glory.  
Let me add, that the miscarriages in their Mass furnishes them with many Sacred Relics, and their orders about the disasters there, create for them divers objects of Worship; and help them to many right Worshipful things, of the vilest Vermin, and that which is more loathsome. If the body or blood of Christ (so they will have it to be) fall to the ground; it must be licked up, the ground is to be scraped, and the scrape reduced to ashes, are to have place among the Relics. If the blood be spilt upon the Altar-cloathes, those  are to be washed, and the Sacred wash, is to be enshrined. If a fly, or a Spider fall into the blood, it is to be taken out, and burnt; and the ashes put into the holy shrine: But if the blood of Christ be poisoned, it is to be kept in a clean vessel among the Relics; and so poison becomes a very Worshipful thing. If a Mouse, or a Spider, or a Worm eat the body of Christ; (I must desire pardon for mentioning such horrid things) these Vermin in their ashes, are to have the same preferment, and be put into shrines for Relics. If a Priest or other person do vomit up the Host, even that (if no man's Stomach will serve him devoutly to lick it up) being turned into ashes, is to be honoured among the Relics. All these and more particulars are ordained and provided for in the Cautels of the Mass: and thereby we see what order is taken by holy Church, that dirty water, the scrape of the ground, Venomous or loathsome Vermin, yea the Vomit of a weak or gluttonous Stomach, casting up that which they call Jesus Christ; may be enshrined among the Relics, which they adore. They tender Worship to all, under the Altar promiscuously: yea their very prayers are so directed thereto, that you cannot discern, whether it be more to the Relics, or the persons they relate to, for example, when they say, 
(l) Pontific. Roman. Sect. de consecr. Eccles.  O you that are seated under the Altar, intercede ye to God for us. For they may as well believe, that these Relics can intercede as that Christ, or the glorified Saints, are seated under their Altar.   

Sect. 3. Some of them would have us believe, that they give not Divine honour to Relics, but a sort of Religious Worship, which they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: but the Scripture (and secular Authors too, 
(m) Secundum profanos Authores idem significant. Bellarm. de sanct. l. 1. c. 14. p. 1463.  as is acknowledged) make no difference between the terms of their distinction, but appropriate both to God. And the people make no difference in their practice, as is confessed, but Worship Saints, (and so their Relics,) even as they Worship God. And their Teachers, and learned writers encourage them to give that to Relics, which is Divine Worship indeed, viz. To put their trust in them, to swear by them, to bring them oblations, to burn incense, and pray to them. So they are taught to give them the thing, which is confessed to be Divine Worship, only they will not give it the name (for though they be real Idolaters, yet it is not convenient to be called so). Nor is this all, there are a world of Relics, to which they will have thing and name given, even 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 expressly. For it is their common Doctrine 
(*) De fide esse adorandum (signum crucis) adoratione latriae sicut adorantur spinae, lanciae, clavi, praesepe & aliae reliquiae quae Christum tetigerunt— ita S. Thou. — & alij communiter. Bonacin. tom. 2. disp. 3. q. 1. punct. 3. r. 6.  That the Relics of Christ, are to have the same Worship with Christ himself. And under the notion of these Relics, they take in (as of the Saints also) not only the parts of his body, but all that belonged to him, yea all that touched him, or was touched by him. Accordingly Aquinas (whose Doctrine is highly approved, not only by all the Jesuits, but in a manner by all their Universities 
n Possevin. Biblioth. Select. l. 1. c. 10. ) teaches 
(o) Crux Christi— propter membrorum Christi contactum latria adoranda est— Dicendum quod quantum ad rationem contactus membrorum Christi adoramus non solum cru●em sed etiam omnia quae sunt Christi par. 3. q. 25. art. 4.  that, not only the Cross is to have Divine Worship, because it touched Christ, but all things else, that belong to Christ, by virtue of this contact, and Damascen (whom he quotes) will have all things near 
(p) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Orthod. sid. l. 4. c. 12.  to Christ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Worshipped on that account. 'Tis true they distinguish here, some things touched him innocently, others injuriously. Waldensis seemed loath to grant, these latter should be Worshipped; lest he should be brought to adore, the lips that betrayed him, or the hands that buffeted him: but he is run down by the stream, both of their Doctrine, and practice. For the things which they worship especially, and will have worshipped as Christ himself, are the instruments of his sufferings. The knife, wherewith he was circumcised; the Pillar, at which he was scourged; the cord, wherewith he was bound; the 28. steps of white marble, up which he was led, in his passion, to Pilat's house; the purple Robe, and the white one too, which he wore in derision; the Keys, and stones of the Sepulchre, the Sponge, the Reed, the Vinegar, the Crown of Thorns, the Lance, the Nails, and (which may serve for all) the Cross, which is never the less, for the loss of so many pieces, as are Ten thousand times more than the whole: all these, (and who can tell how many more?) though they ministered to his pain, or reproach in his passion, have Divine worship. But the things which they will have worshipped, for the innocent contact might suffice, being numerous beyond account. To wave the rest, Damascen (whom Aquinas follows) of this sort reckons, not only his Clothes, and Tabernacles, the Cave, the Manger, and Sepulchre: but also Golgotha, and Zion 
(q) Golgotha. Zion & fimilia. ibid.  and the like. Wherein may be included Galilee, Samaria, Judea and Egypt, the Earth where he trod in every place, being (if not deified yet) sanctified by such contact. There is a divine virtue therein, says 
(r) Vid. Spondan. An. 34. n. 41.  Baronius, and they were wont to bring Earth from those parts, for the working of Miracles. And amongst the Relics at Venice, they had a stone translated from Chio thither, whereon 'tis said, he 
(s) Platin vit. Caelestin. 2.  sat at Tyre. The water also of the River Jordan, at least, after it comes to the place where he was Baptised; and there that was taken up, they say, 
(t) Gent. 11. p. 305. Chronic. Cassinen. ibi.  which is enshrined at Cessino. And why not the air too, when it comes to any place, where ever it touched him? that so every Element might furnish them with objects of Divine worship; and they might have no need to content themselves with such petty Idols as the Heathen had: but have them in such extent, and largeness, as is proportionable to the vast improvement of this kind of Devotion in the Church of Rome.  
Moreover by virtue of this Contact, not only things, but persons, are capable of Divine worship, and such as touched Christ may be thus worshipped. The blessed Virgin in the first place. Cajetan declares 
(u) Cajetanus, — Cessante (scandalo & periculo) fatetur, posse B. Virginem adorari adoratione latriae, ratione solius contactus. Alij vero recentiores Theologi, non solum ratione contactus existimant, adorari posse adoratione latriae, sed etiam ratione maternitatis, propter sanguinis conjunctionem. Vasq. ibid. l. 1. disp. 8. c. 1. n. 195. 196.  that in secret, where it can be done without scandal, and danger; she may have Divine worship on this account, and tells us this is the sense of Aquinas. Later writers determine, that she may be so worshipped, as Christ himself, either upon the account of Contact, or Consanguinity. Upon the same ground Simeon may have Divine honour, for he once embraced Christ: and Joseph his foster Father, for he had him oftener in his arms, which their Church has taken notice of in a prayer on his holiday 
(x) Sicut B. Joseph unigenitum tuum— suis manibus reverenter tractare meruit & porta●…. . The Apostles, and Seventy Disciples did probably sometimes touch him, and so, by the same reason, may have the same worship, with their Lord. And no wonder, seeing they tell us, the lips of Judas, 
(y) Idem. ibid. l. 3. disp. 2. c. 6. n. 76. vid. infra.  for but touching him with a treacherous kiss, may be thus worshipped. The woman also with the bloody issue, and those many of the multitude that pressed him, Luk. 8. 45. Marry Magdalen especially, she has double honour, seeing they worship more bodies than one for hers. But this is common, and they had need of a prodigious faith to believe (if any of them believe) that the things they worship are not counterfeit: since the most of them may be convicted of imposture, even by their own practice, and approved writings. They must either believe themselves deluded, or believe that one person had more bodies, and one body more heads than one, yea more than two or three. Many of their most eminent Saints are thus turned into Monsters, but I instance only in those, who may challenge Divine worship upon the common ground of Contact. John who touched Christ when he Baptised him, had three or four heads, if he had as many as they worship: for they worship his head in so many 
(z) Vid. Fulk on Math. 14. 2.  several places, and when they have it whole in some shrines, yet they will have several pieces of it in others. So that Herod had not beheaded him when one head was quite cut off: and when the Damsel had it in a charger, it might be still on his shoulders. Longinus also, who they say pierced Christ's side, and had his eyes cured with a touch of his blood, must have four bodies: 
(a) Vid. Bolland. act. Sanct. ad Jan. 13. p. 912. Jacobus de voragine. cap. 95.  for in so many, very distant places, they worship it; and yet this their Saint had never one body, nor being in the world. As for St. Christopher (who must needs touch Christ too, if as they say, he carried him over an arm of the Sea on his Shoulders) there was no need to make him so many bodies, since they have made him one as big as many, and worship for him an Effigies, more like 
(b) Erasmus Colloq. Naufrag. & peregrin. monti justo par.  a Mountain than a Man. I need not mention those many thousands besides, who had an occasion to touch Christ for the space of Three and thirty years, while he was on Earth; the meanest of these might have Divine worship, by that Doctrine which makes Contact a sufficient ground for it. Nor must this seem strange, since 
(c) V sq. ubi supra. Those that stick at this, believe there is in the Ass a sufficient ground for Divine Worship, only they say it is is not decent. Respondeo ●… Suarez contactum Christ esse causam sufficientem adorationis, aliquando tamen non exp●dire, vel non decere, ut omnia, quae Christum tetigerunt adorentur. Propterea asina, q●… Christum detulit non esset adoranda, quia non decet. Bonacin. ibid.  the very Ass he road on, when it could be done without scandal, might upon this account be Religiously adored. Yet all these, are not all, that may have the honour of Christ, if we follow their Doctrine whither it leads us. Hereby not only these persons, but their Relics too, are capable of Divine worship. For they commonly teach, 
(d) Eadem adoratio tribui potest reliquijs, quae tribuitur personae cujus sunt reliq●i●. Idem. ibid. punct. 4. n. 4.  that the Relics may have the same worship, with the persons whose remains they are. Those are in the right, says (one of their most absolute Divines) Doctor Stapleton, 
(e) Promptuar. part. 1. p. 29●.  who confer the like honour on the Relics, as on the Saints; since from both they hope to receive the like advantage. Thus they have huge Shoals of objects, fit for divine worship. Those multitudes of Relics which pass for the blessed Virgins, and all accounted to be the Apostles, and the other persons forementioned. They say they have the blessed Virgin's hair in several places, which is no such wonder, since a Monk could show some of the hairs, 
(f) V●d. Vergerium annot in Catalogue. haeret. p. 17.  which fell from a Seraphim, when he came to imprint the five wounds in Friar Francis his body. Her Milk 
(*) Quid dicturus si videat bodie passim ad quaestum ostentari lac. Mariae, quod h●… propemodum aequat corpori Christi consecrato? Erasm. Annot in Math. 23.  too, kept from souring by a continued miracle Sixteen hundred years, and so much of it, as if with their St. Catherine, she had had nothing, but milk in her veins. Nor is this so wonderful, seeing an Image 
(f) (g) M. Paris. in anno. 1099.  of hers, could let forth of its breast such a Liquor in great plenty. Her Nails too, or rather the parings of them (worthy enough of divine worship) for the nails themselves she could not spare at her assumption. (That one story, has prevented a hundred other Fables, if they had not believed the assumption of her body, 'tis like we had heard of as many bodies of hers in several places, as Geryon had, twice or thrice over: and more heads than they were wont to show of St. Barbara). Her wedding Ring 
(h) Vid. Rivet. Apol pro Virg. M. l. 2. c. 9 p. 281.  too (though they used none in her Country), and her attire Cap-a-pee, from her vail, even to her Petticoat and 
(2) Erasmus ibid.  Shift too. Whether she wore any or no is not material, the Archbishop of Chartres 
(i) Gaguinus. l. 5. de gestis Franc.  wore it, and was thereby inspired with such courage, in a Battle against Rollo, that the dagger wherewith St. Michael combated the Dragon (if he had borrowed it of his Neighbours in Normandy) could not have performed braver exploits, nor made greater slaughter, than his Grace did: though some will ascribe less to his prowess, because being harnessed with such a shift of mail, he might think himself unvulnerable. Her Slipper also, and Shoe; yea the 
(k) Vid. Rivet. ibid. p. 295.  figure also of the sole of her Shoe, is to be adored. Yet this is at a pretty distance from Christ (though it's prime virtue be from Contact) and derives from him, like the Feathers of the Hen, which were of the brood of the Cock, that crowed when Peter denied him. They have Simeon's arm (mentioned in the Gospel) at Aken, 
(l) Ranulphus. l. 5. c. 26.  which hinders not, but they may have it at Hartsburg, and other places too. They have not only joseph's Him, but his Breeches. 
(*) Erasmus Annot. in Math. 23.  And I hope kept less nastily, than Thomas Becket kept his; which yet were worshipful, Vermin and all, and that not per accidens (it may be) since it is one commendation of his Saint-ship, 
(m) Engl. Festival. in S. Thom. Episc. Cant.  that his Breeches ran quick. They have some remains of all the Apostles, though no body could tell them where divers of their bodies were interred, but things of this nature, they still have by Revelation; and how can such as these want Revelations, who in pilgrimage to holy Relics, declared 
(n) Aventinus. lib. 5.  that a Goose carried before them, was the Holy Ghost. They have Peter's Keys, his Sword, his Staff, his Coat, his Garment besides, and his Girdle, part of his body is at Constantinople, half of it at Rome in one place, and yet the whole in another. 
(o) Vid. Reinold. de Idololatr. p. 59  They have martyred him over again (or some other bodies for his) and torn him into more pieces than their St. Hippolytus, was torn with Horses. They have his head (or some of it) in Seven several places in Rome, only they want his brains, which were reserved in another place, and worshipped (or a Pumice-stone instead thereof). And there may be some mystery in that; for they speak of some time, under Peter's Successors, when their Church should have Caput sine cerebro. 
(p) Ibid. p. 515.  Setting that aside, we may be sure they have missed nothing that belonged to St. Peter, since they could catch his shadow, and hold it as fast, as they do his Keys. And why might not this be done, as well, as the Monk could bring with him from Palestine, 
(q) Vid. Vergerium ubi supra.  the sound of the Bells that hung in Solomon's Temple. I have not yet in their Sacred lists discerned the lips of Judas, but they have his Lantern, which showed him the way to apprehend his Master; and thereby perhaps in time they may discover the other. They want nothing for this, but some of the Oil of the Candle of the Sepulchre, which can light itself, and this the Monks at Cassino 
(r) Chronic. Cassinon. lib. 3. cap. 38. in Cent. Magd. 11. p. 305.  can help them too. If they have not the Ass upon which Christ road to Jerusalem, they missed it narrowly, when they caught the Palm 
(s) Ibid. lib. 4. cap. 24.  he then had in his hand (whether he had any or no) and a worshipful Relic of the Ass some show, 'tis said, 
(t) Vid. D. Hall. No peace. Sect. 21.  his tail is enshrined in Liguria. And who can think but that may be as proper an object of adoration, as the Hay, wherewith Friar Francis his Ass was saddled. And every hair in that tail, may make a complete Relic, as worshipful as the whole: for by their Divinity, 
(*) Eandem virtutem in exigna parte reliquiarum, quae in toto sit corpore, experimento probatum. Baronius. an. 55.  the virtue of the whole, is in every part. If it were but well distributed, this one, might serve to furnish a hundred shrines: and entertain the Devotion of as many votaries, and Pilgrims, as come to worship at Loretto.  
But I need not insist on such Relics, as are to have Divine worship by consequence: those which they say expressly should be so worshipped, are enough, and as many as they please to imagine. For though they have no good ground to believe, that they have any one true Relic of Christ, or the least part of one: yet imagination is enough with them, both to give them being, and to multiply them in infinitum, and to warrant their worship of each of them, as of Christ himself: even such imaginations as interfere, and confute one another, and are each of them confuted by such miracles, as are the ground of the whole imposture. The foreskin of Christ is more Religiously worshipped among them, than Christ himself, as 
(u) Alibi Christi praeputium cum sit res incerta religiosius adorant, quam totum Christum. Annot. in Math. 23.  Erasmus observed. It is kept and exposed, in at least 
(x) Vid. Rivet. ibid. l. 1. c. 17. p. 132, etc.  four several Countries, and miracles brought to confirm the truth of its being there: and yet while it is seen, and adored in so many places on Earth, some of their chief Writers say it is no where on Earth, but in Heaven; and must be so, otherwise the glorified body of Christ would be imperfect, and not entire. His Shirt, and besides that (though he had no other Shirt) his Coat, which the Soldiers disposed of at his death, was not found till the year 593: 
(y) Baronius. an. 593.  yet they had it elsewhere, and greatly worshipped it long before in a City of Galatia, says 
(z) Vid. Spondan. an. 593. n. 11.  Gregory of Tours. 'Tis much that they should have it, before it was found, and something strange too (that as it was without seam so) it should be without Rent, though afterwards they they found it, in several places at once, many hundred miles distant. They have it in Germany, and they have it in France, and they may have it in all parts of the World at once, as certainly as they have it there: but whether they have it or no, that which they take to be it, must have the same worship and honour with Christ. And we must not think it strange, that it should be in so many places, since, they say, 
(a) Lud olphus de vita Jesus part 2. cap. 63. p. 221.  it grew on his back, and so not unlikely might multiply itself since. About the blood of Christ there is no less imposture, and as great Idolatry. They pretend to have much of it in parcels, that which Nicodemus saved in his Glove, that which Longinus brought in a Vessel to Mantua, that which Joseph of Arimathea brought into England in two Silver Vessels, that which is kept at Venice with the Earth it fell on, that which is showed at the Holy Chapel in Paris; that which is adored at Rome on Easter-day; that which may be seen in every Country, where Popery hath left people no eyes: yet the Angel of their Schools (whose Doctrine they say was approved by a miracle, and which they must not question, if they believe their portess) is 
(b) Sanguis autem ille, qui in quibusdam ecclesijs pro reliquijs conservatur, non fluxit de latere Christi, sed miraculose dicitur effluxisse de quadam imagine Christi percussa. 3. q. 54. art. 2. ad 3. An autem extet aliqua portio sanguinis— dissentio est inter Doctores; aliqui enim negant. Bonacin. ubi supra punct. 3. n. 6.  positive, that all the blood of Christ that was shed before, was in his body at his Resurrection, and so ascended with him into Heaven: and that the blood which is showed in Churches for Relics, did not flow from Christ's side, but miraculously from a certain wounded image of Christ. So that the blood which they worship as God, is no better, than that which an Image can bleed, and this will scarce prove so good in England, as the blood of Hales, which (how much soever worshipped) was discovered to be but the blood of a Drake.  
They have the Reed, the Sponge, the Crown of Thorns in so many places as gives them reason enough to believe, they have it in none, and yet they worship these in all. We must imagine (to have such things go down smoothly) that they grow more than any Thorn hedge does, not only in length, but in number. And something towards this, Gregory of Tours 
(c) Vid. Spondan. an. 34. n. 27.  writes of those Thorns, they are green still, and though the leaves whither sometimes, yet they revive again, and flourish. But the old Bishop had not the good hap to see this, he had it only by rumour, and such rumours their Annalist is wont to make much of; for it is not amiss to abuse others into a belief of that, which they cannot believe themselves. The Lance which pierced Christ's side, was got into the West, before it had left the East (its proper place). Otto the great, presented Athelstane King of England with it, and other rarities in the tenth age 
(d) Ranulphus, lib. 6. cap. 6. . Yet the Dominical Spear (the same we may suppose, though some question it) was the same age in the possession of Rodulphus, Duke of Burgundy, 
(e) Luit prandus, l. 4. c. 12. Otho Frisingensis, l. 9 c. 8. in Cent Magd. 10. p. 336. vid. & Spondan. an. 929. n. 2.  of which, Harry, Emperor of Germany, was so covetous, that he threatened the Duke to destroy his Country with Fire and Sword, if he would not give it him; and in fine, gave him a good part of his Country for it. Much worship it had, and brave feats it played then, and I know not how long before; for Charles the Great, they say, had it too 
(f) Spondan. ibid. ; yet for all this, it was still in Asia (if any where) and not found there, till two hundred years after; for the Latins having taken 
(g) Baron. an. 1099. Bellarm. de imagine, l. 2. c. 27. out of Guliel. Ty●ius, P●ulus, Aenilius, Dodechinus, etc.  Antioch, were blest with the Revelation of it in St. Peter's Church (for holy relics was the adventure which those Knights errand sought, and they were concerned in point of honour, either to find or make some); but this was confirmed by miracle (else it had not been worth a rush); Peter, the finder of it, to prove the truth thereof, 
(h) M. Paris, in an. 1099.  walked through a mighty fire with the Lance in his hand. 'Tis like, this Champion had something of the metal of that 
(i) Gregor. Turonens. de glor. confess. c. 98.  Hermit's marvellous pot; in which, though it was of wood, he boiled his Meat constantly, how hot soever the fire was, without burning; but that of the pot it seems, was better tempered, for that endured many years, do the fire what it could; but the man could not long survive that hot brunt, dying shortly after. The Nails wherewith Christ was fastened to the Cross, were three or four at most 
(*) Sententiam de tribus tantummodo clavis Christi recentior probavit usus, Spondan. an. 34. n. 35.  Barronius dare not say they were four, though he does not always speak with the least in this matter of Miracles. These, as the rumour was, being sent by Helena to Constantine, lost quite the form of Nails, being used for the making of a Bridle and a Helmet for the Emperor. In this 
(k) Lib. 1. c. 18.  Theodoret 
(l) l. 2. c. 1.  Sozomen, and 
(m) l. 1. c. 13. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Socrates agree, (but they tell us not how the Nails which pierced Christ, were known, from those which fastened the two Thiefs to the other Crosses. If they had foreseen that such things should have been worshipped equally with Christ himself, they would have thought this necessary (or rather to have said nothing at all without better ground) lest the Nails of the Thiefs might have divine worship for those of Christ's). Gregory of Tours, who will have a fourth Nail, 
(n) De glor. Martyr. cap. 6.  says, one was thrown into the Adriatic Sea, where it seems it Spawned, and from thence came the multitude of Nails which were showed and adored for the true one: (This is as satisfactory, as the shuffling account which their great Annalist gives thereof.) If Constantine had lived in times of Popery, his Horse had been in danger of divine worship, for his Bridles sake, and his Helmet could scarce have defended itself from being made an Idol: but seeing his Religion was of another strain, than that now in request with Romanists, 'tis well if he escape reproach for converting that, the Counterfeit of which they think worthy of the worship of God, to a profane use. However, they would not long endure such abuse, for upon a time, one of them (whether reassuming its old form or no, I know not) skip'd out of the Bridle (or Helmet, as you please) into Constantine's Sword hilt, and that from thence, sword and all, into these Western parts; and that we may not question this, it was given by Otho the great to our Athelstan 
(o) Ranulphus, l. 6. c. 6. . But this was nothing to the Spear which Count Samson gave to Rodolph of Burgundy; and which Harry the Emperor (or King, as Baronius calls him) forced from Rodulphus; for there were I know not how many of these Nails artificially fastened to the Spear, 
(p) Otho frisingen's. l. 9 c. 8.  say some; 
(q) Sigebert & alij in Spondan, an. 929. n. 2. lancea ex Christi clavis consecta.  others will have it wholly made of them, and then these Nails had need be twenty times more than ever touched the Cross, or else they must be such as were fit only for the use of their Giant Christopher, whose Saintship they make full twelve els 
(*) Baptista Mantuan. fast. lib. 7.  high. For all this they had still many of these Nails at their Shrines and Altars. To wave the rest, the Bishop of Mets officiating at Tryers 
(z) (r) Catalogue. Trevirens. in Cent. Magd. 21. p. 308.  for Poppo, who was turned Pilgrim, slily filches away from the Altar one of those sacred Nails▪ conveying another very like it into the place; and he had carried it clearly, but that as ill luck was, the holy Nail fell a bleeding (and it is like the Nail had more tenderness than the Consciences of those who coined such stories). However, this holy Bishop, who had so dear a love for Relics, must not suffer under the bad Character of a Thief, much less as Sacrilegious, for stealing of Relics was then the practice of the best (and no wonder if Theft got reputation, when Cheats were in so much request): besides, there was something more than ordinary in the case, for such Thiefs with the Receivers, cheated themselves most of all; and those that were Rob, made account (as they had reason) that they lost nothing, but worshipped what was gone, as still in their possession. So they at St. Dennis believe they have still the body, as well as the name of St. Dennis the Areopagite, though 
(*) Baronius, an. 1052.  Pope Leo the Ninth declared by an authentic Bull, that it was stolen from thence, and carried to Ratishone in Germany. And no wonder if the French will not be baffled out of their Faith by the Pope: for is it likely that he who carried his head in his arms 
(s) Breviar. Sarum & breviarium Roman. nov. Lesson. 6.  (after it was smitten off) for two or three miles together, and would not die till he came to the place where his body should rest, would not keep it from being carried from that place, signalised with such a miracle? And the remains of St. Bennets body were stolen from Cassino in Naples, and carried, as they say, to Fleury in France, and the Monks there offer proof of it by 
(t) Sigebert, an. 753. Vincentius, lib. 23. c. 155.  Miracles; and yet those at Cassino believe they have it, and accordingly worship it still, confirming themselves and others in that confidence by Miracles 
(u) Vid. Spondan. an. 1088. n. 1.  too. Whereby the world may judge of their Miracles, for since God works none upon such occasions, to be sure, not for the confirming of contradictions: these must be the fictions of cheating Knaves, or the feats and illusions of Satan. And some of themselves 
(x) Aliquando maximam deceptionem fieri in Ecclesia per miracula ficta a sacerdotibus, Nic. Lyran. in cap. 14. Daniel. Cassander, consult c. de reliquijs infra. Vincentius, l. 26. cap. 21. dicit suisse quosdam qui quaestus gratia per magiam haec miracula fi●… aperte contestati sunt.  confess, that multitudes of them are no better as to their original. Indeed they make such use of their Miracles, that it is enough to blast the credit of a thing, to have a Miracle alleged by them for it, since it is their common practice to confirm one lie with another; and the confirmation is more intolerable than the first fiction, because they will have the Divine power interposed thereby to delude the world.  
Not to digress further, they tell us of the Oil, 
(y) Spondan, an. 598. n. 4. & an. 633. n. 1.  or Liquor which drops from the knots of the true Cross: No wonder if this be thought worthy of no less worship than the rest, since they ascribe to it a divine power. Besides many marvellous feats, it can cast out Devils; for it must be of no less Virtue than the Oil of the Sepulchre of St. Martin; which duly administered to a man possessed, gave him such a purge, 
(z) Gregor. Turon. de glor. Confess. cap. 9 Daemonem per fluxum ventris egessit.  that he squirted out a foul Fiend behind, and voided the Devil for a Stool. In short, that the Cross itself should have divine worship is their 
(a) Aquinas 3. q. 25. art. 4. asserimus cum sententia communiori & in Scholis magis trita, crucem colendam esse latria hoc est cultu divino, etc. Gretser. l. 1. c. 49. Est de fide Bonacin. supra.  common doctrine; this at first was no more than one man might well bear, but by the good Housewifery of that Church (who scruples not Cheats in this sacred traffic) it is retailed out for worship in so many pieces, that together would sink a Ship of a good burden 
(b) Fragmentula ligni crutis tam multa, ut si in acervum redigant, vix vel navis oneraria v●…a●, Erasm. Annot. in Math. c. 23. ; so that there are many, many Cart loads of Roman gods, which are really no better than common chips. In all this, there is not any one bit, which they can upon good ground believe to be part of the true Cross. They cannot be more confident of any, than that piece which with pilate's inscription on it, they say is reserved and worshipped at Rome; but that is detected to be a counterfeit by Baronius 
(c) Baron. an. 16. n. 8.  his own words; for he says, that on the true Cross the Latin inscription was first (and so the Greek next, and the Hebrew last), and confirms it by no less Authority than that of a Pope, Nicholas 1. whereas in that piece at Rome, the Hebrew is first, and the Latin last. By this we may judge of the slories concerning the invention of the Cross by Helena. This now mentioned, was a considerable piece of the discovery, nor would the Cardinal himself have us believe, that what is said to be sent to Constantinople, or reserved at Jerusalem, were more real parts of the true Cross than that at Rome. However, true or false, here's enough, one would think, to glut the most ravenous devotion of any Egyptian. But when they will have this worship given to the Images of the Cross, 
(d) Vid. Gretsor ubi supra, Utraque crux adoratur adoratione latriae, Bonacin. ibid.  in any matter whatsoever, or immaterial either, they give warranty to turn all things in the world into Idols, any sticks, or straws, yea, a man's own fingers laid , may be worshipped by him; or let him but move one finger  in Water, or Oil, or the Air, any where, and instantly he has of his own creating, what he may worship as God.  
For those relics, to which they give divine worship under another name, they are yet more numerous. So that upon the whole, if the Philistines had worshipped not only 
(e) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 rendered by 70 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  the god of flies, but the flies themselves too, they would scarce have out-vied these in numbers. The Idolatrous Israelites, who worshipped the Host of Heaven, had a fair company of Idols; but the Egyptians might have more, who could sow gods in their Gardens, and make them spring up on their backsides; but both put together, would come short of the Romanists herein, both for number and quality, though they of Egypt became the scorn of the world, for the vileness of what they religiously worshipped. How they came by so many, when for three hundred years after Christ, we hear of none; we have an account from their own Authors: 
(f) Avaritiae causa ad simplicem populum illiciendum falsae reliquiae supponebantur, & f●cta praedicabantur miracula— nonnunquam autem astu & illusione Daemonis hominum superstitione abutentis, per insomnia & visa novae reliquiae revelabantur, & ejusdem operatione miracula edi videbantur, Consult. c. de reliquijs.  out of Covetousness, says their Learned and Ingenuous Cassander, False relics were daily forged, feigned Miracles were published, Superstition thereby nourished; and sometimes by the illusion of the Devil, new relics were revived. So that in brief (to use the language of their own Author) the Devil helped their Church to some of them, and covetous Knaves to others. This stuff might be had cheap, and sold very dear; this encouraged many to take up the trade, and Monks are noted as prime Merchants for this traffic. They were such, who in Austin's time, 
(g) Augustin. de opere Monach. c. 28. tam multos hypocritas sub habitu monachorum usau quaque dispersit Satun— alij membra martyrum, si tamen martyrum venditant.  being employed, as he says, by Satan (whose Factors they were, and for whom the trade was driven,) sold the members of Martyrs, or what they pretended to be so. He was of the same profession 
(h) Gregor. Turon. hist. Franc. l. 9 c. 6. , who declared he came out of Spain into France with relics; which being looked into, proved to be roots of Trees, the teeth of Moles, the bones of Mice, and the claws and fat of Bears. And they were Monks, who, as the same Author tells us, were found at Rome, near Paul's Church, digging up bodies, and confessed their design was to make relics of them. As for him, whom Glaber speaks of, 
(i) Vid. Spondan. an. 1027. n. 3.  who furnished France with innumerable relics, it may seem strange that he should be counted a Cheat, when he was thus trading in another Country, since his stuff had the very same mark, which makes their other relics currant as good ware, unquestionably good, and than which their best have no better; for he wrought wonders, (or the Devil for him) and by one Carcase which he feigned to be a Martyrs, 
(k) Multos infirmos varijs morbis liberasse, ibid.  he freed many that were sick, from variety of Diseases. But I suppose he was not free of the Company, and they like not Interlopers. The Court of Rome can furnish Altars with holy Relics out of common Graves, and none must count them Cheats for it. And if this Huckster had but procured a Commission from thence, he might have transsubstantiated the bones in any Church yard; yea, those of a Sheep, or a Hog, either into the bones of Martyrs, or Apostles, as well as others. By this we may judge what their relics are, the best of them mere cheats; and consequently, how criminal it will be to give them worship, the highest of all; 
(*) In bonis quoque viris, pio zelo praeditis, summa quasi religionis in hujusmodi reliquijs, etc. Cassander, Consult. c. de reliquijs.  & yet they are so far from abandoning this, that it is in a manner, the sum of their Religion. And so it is expressed by some of their own Communion 
(l) Huc fere summa religionis vocatur avaritia sacerdotum, & Monachorum quorundam hypocrisi, quos alit populi stultitia, in Math. 23.  The whole of Religion is almost brought to this (to wit, their Religious treatment of relics) through the Covetousness of Priests, and the Hypocrisy of Monks, fed by the foolishness of the people: Thus their great Erasmus, in his Annotations, approved by Pope Leo 10. his Breve. 
(m) Hist. of Counc. of Trent, p. 473.    

Sect. 4. Let us see in the next place, if Perjury may not prove as blameless, and as necessary. Breach of Oaths is no less with them than a virtue, or a necessary duty in many cases, (of which a further account hereafter) let me now instance but in one. Suppose a Prince that has Protestant Subjects, should for their satisfaction, give them the security of his most solemn Oath, that they should not suffer for their Conscience, either in Life, Estate, or Liberty; that Religion does oblige the Prince to break all such Oaths, or to count himself no ways obliged by them, because they are against the Laws of the Church; against that particularly of the general Council of Lateran under Pope Innocent. 3. which forbids all favour to be showed to Heretics under ●h● severest penalties, and decrees that favourers of Heretics are under Excommunication. So that in this case it must be the Prince's duty to be perjured, and to break his Oath made in favour of his heretical Subjects, & that by the sacred decree of the Church. He must forswear himself, if he will not be Excommunicated and consequently deposed, and thereby exposed to the violence of every hand. Yea he puts himself into the state of Damnation, and sins mortally, if he be true to his Oath. So Pope Martin, 5. Declared in writing to Alexander Duke of Lithuania, 
(n) Sci●… te ●o●taliter peccare, si servabis fidem datam Haereticis. Apud Cochlaeum. l. 5. hist. ●u●fitarum.  know, says he, that thou sinnest mortally, if thou keep thy Oath with Heretics. Hereby it appears that no Papists, Princes or Subjects, can possibly give any security which may be trusted, that Protestants shall enjoy any thing, which is in their power to deprive them of, for the greatest securities that can be given in this case, are engagements of faith and truth, God being invocated for confirmation in solemn Oaths: but by the principles of their Religion, they are so far loosed from all such Bonds, that they are not at all to be trusted by any, but credulous fools; unless it can be supposed, that they will act as other men than Papists, and contemn all the Authority of that Church, which leaves no hopes of salvation but in obedience to it. For another general Council, that of Constance has determined, that no faith is to be kept with Heretics. In the nineteenth. Session of that Assembly it was decreed, that no safe conduct given by Emperor, King, or secular Prince to Heretics, or any defamed 
(o) Quocunque vinculo se astrinxerint concesso.  for Heretics, though with a design to reduce them, by what engagements soever they have obliged themselves: shall hinder those Heretics from being prosecuted, unless they recant; 
(p) Etiams● salvo conductu confisi, ad locum venerin: judicij, alias non venturi, nec sic p●omi●tentem— ex hoc in aliquo rema●sisse obligatum. in Crab. Tom. 2. p. 1111.  though they come to the place of Judgement relying upon such security, and would not have come otherwise. And it is declared further, that one thus bound by promise, was not hereby in the least obliged. And what they decreed and declared they immediately practised, for the Emperor Sigismond, having given safe conduct to John Huss, and so engaged the public faith, and his own honour, that he should come and go safe to and from the Council; and Pope John 22. then present in the Council, having given his promise and engaged his faith (if he had any) for his safety: yet the honour and faith of the Emperor, was born down by the principles of their Church; and the Pope (as soon as the poor man was drawn into danger past escaping) made nothing of his promise, pretending, when he was urged with it, that he was overruled; and so notwithstanding all the security an Emperor and a Pope had given him, he was first miserably imprisoned, and after cruelly burnt to ashes. Hereby the world, Protestants especially, have this plain and useful admonition, that they must trust to nothing among Papists (those that will be true to that Church), but what will keep them out of their power. The principles of their Religion (for such are determinations of General Councils) bind them to observe no faith, or truth or common honesty with those, whom they count Heretics, no not when life is concerned. Their Religion obliges them, to violate the most sacred Oaths, and the most solemn engagements of faith and truth; rather than an Heretic shall be safe, in any of his concerns, where they can reach him. It is a virtue, a duty in that Religion, to snap asunder all securities (by which the world and humane society hath hitherto been preserved) to ruin a Heretic: no fear of perjury, or any other perfidiousness, must be a hindrance in the case. Nor is perjury so necessary or innocent only, when it is mischievous to us, but when it does mischief to themselves, and the world also. The practice of their Popes for many ages, may satisfy us herein, and to those who are acquainted with Htstory, which gives an account thereof, it is no improbable observation, that the bloody Wars and Massacres, that have been for many Hundred years in those places, which the Papal influence could reach; cannot be imputed to any thing more, for the most part, than the Perjuries of the Popes themselves; and of those whom they involved in that guilt, by discharging them from the obligation of their Oaths.   

Sect. 5. And this brings me to some other Crimes forementioned Robberies, and Murders, which the wonderful power of Papal holiness, hath transformed into Christian, and virtuous acts. By the Doctrine of their Church to deprive those whom they count Heretics, of their Estate and Lives, is a virtue, and a meritorious act. There is too good evidence for this. A decree of Pope Innocent, 3. Recorded in the Tomes of their Councils by their own Writers, as an authentic act of the general Council of Lateran under that Pope, and, inserted by Gregory, 9 into the Decretals, which is the Law of their Church, and part of that which passes with them for Divine Law. There is, there can be no act of their Church more Authoritative, and obliging, than such a decree as this. There first of all 
(q) Cap. 3. Concil. Later. sub Innocent. 3. in Crab. Tom. 2. p. 947, 948. Excommunicamus & Anathematizamus omn●m Haerisim— condemnantes universos haeretic●s quibuscunque nominibus censeantur— ita quod bona damnatorum, si laici fuerint, confiscetur.  Heretics are Excommunicated and condemned, and then it is decreed, that the Estates of those condemned are confiscated. But that's not all, the secular Princes or Lords, are to be compelled (if they will not do it otherwise,) and bound with a solemn Oath to endeavour to the utmost of their power utterly to destroy them all. 
(r) Quod de terris suae jurisdictionis subjectis, universos haereticos ab ecclesia denotatos, bona fide pro viribus exterminare studeant.  They are to labour in good earnest with all their might, to root them all out. And further, if any temporal Lord proceed not to such ruining execution within a year, 
(s) Ut tunc ipse vasallos ab ejus fidelitate denunciet absolutos, & terram exponat Catholicis occupandam, qui eam, exterminatis haereticis, sine ulla contradictione possideant.  The Pope is to absolve those that are under him, from their allegiance, the Land is to be seized on by Catholics, who having exterminated the Heretics, are to possess it without control. Here it is plain, that by the highest Authority the Roman Church pretends to, (that which is no less with them than Divine) the Papists are bound to destroy all whom they count Heretics, and to take possession of their Estates. And this Barbarous decree, (which has so much force with them, 
(t) Consiliorum decreta sunt spiritus sancti oracula. Staplet. Relect. contr. 6. q. 3.  as the word of God with any,) was put in execution in the days of that very Pope; For he employed Armies against the Albigenses (the Predecessors of the Protestants in France) who destroyed above 
(*) Vid. Jo. Paul. Perin. de Albigen. , Two hundred thousand in the space of some months. It was executed in the age before this, in France; 
(u) Thuanus Hist l. 53.  where so many Thousands were treacherously and cruelly Murdered, that the channels run down with blood into the River: and this magnified as a glorious action, honoured with a Triumph at Rome, and the unparallelled Butchers rewarded with his Holiness blessing. We have known it executed in our days upon some Hundred thousands of the Protestants in Ireland, where that bloody Tragedy was acted by the Pope's excitement and concurrence, just according to the tenor of that decree: the Irish Papists endeavouring with all their might, utterly to destroy all the Protestants, that their Estates, and the whole Land, might be in the possession of roman-catholics. And in all Countries about us, where ever they have been powerful enough, or but thought themselves so: they have effected, or attempted it. Such outrages were, and are to be committed by warrant of the Romish Doctrine; They are bound to act thus by all the Authority of that Church; which not only enjoins this by her decrees, but gives all encouragement thereto; such Robberies and Butcheries are virtuous, yea meritorious acts. Those that will engage therein to the utmost, (as their Church requires) are assured by the Pope, 
(x) Qui-ad haeriticorum exterminium se accinxerint, illa gaudeant indulgentia ●illoque privilegio sint muniti, quod accedentibus in terrae sanctae subsidium conceditu●. p. ●48. ibid. p. 967.  of those indulgences and privileges, which were granted to the Adventurers for the recovery of the holy Land, and these are expressed, in an Appendix to that Council, to be full pardon of all their sins here, and a greater measure of glory hereafter. At no less rate do they value the blood, and utter destruction of such as we (whom they count Heretics): with such, and no less hopes, do they engage all Papists; to endeavour, as far as is possible, our utter extermination. 'Tis true, there are good natured persons amongst them, as there are amongst other sorts of men, and such as have a great aversation to such Barbarous cruelty: but their Religion tempts them to it, not only with hopes of Heretics Estates, but of the greatest rewards that can be propounded; yea and forces them to it, even beyond their inclination, with threaten of the most dreadful import, expressed in that Decree; which signifies also, that they must act at this rate of inhumanity 
(y) Etiam sicut reputari cupiunt & haberi fideles. p. 948.  if they will be counted Christians; and must not expect to pass for faithful Romanists, unless they will act as monsters. But if it be their duty, as they are roman-catholics; and they bound in Conscience, as far as their Religion, and all the power of it can bind them, to destroy the Protestants amongst whom they live, and seize upon what they have: why do they not fall to work, and make an end of us, that all may be their own? how is it that they live quietly and peaceably in this, and some other places? to satisfy us here they use plain dealing (though we must not always expect it) and tell us in express terms, they do it not, merely because they have not power to do it. Though the Church have made it their duty to destroy Protestants, yet when they are not strong enough to do it, and where the attempting of it, because they are a weaker party, would endanger them: there they are excused, they may wait the happy hour, till they have sufficient power, to show their obedience to the Church, in executing her exterminating decrees, without apparent hazard of their own interest. So Bannes a Dominican determines 
(z) Sequitur primo excusandos esse Anglicanos & Saxonicos fideles, qui non se eximunt a potestate superiorum, nec bellum contra eos gerunt. Quoniam communiter non habent facultatem ad haec bella gerenda contra Principes & imminent illis gravia pericula. In 2. 2. Thom. q. 12. art. 2.  that Catholics in England, and Saxony, are excused from rising up against their Protestant Princes with their Subjects, because they commonly are not powerful enough; and the attempt in such circumstances, would expose them to great danger 
(a) Haeritici— siquidem potest fieri, sunt proculdubio extirpandi, si autem non possunt quia— sunt fortiores nobis, & periculum est, ne si eos bello aggrediamur, plures ex nobis cadant quam ex illis; tunc quiescendum est. De Laicis. lib. 3. Cap. 22. p. 1319.  Bellarmine speaks it as plainly, if it were possible to root out the Heretics, without doubt they are to be destroyed Root and Branch: but if it cannot be done, because they are stronger than we, and there be danger if they should oppose us, that we should be worsted, than we are to be quiet. So that the reason why Protestants in such places are not presently ruined, is because the Papists are not there strong enough, we and others have the privilege to Live: because they are not yet able to Kill us, and to seize on what we have. When they have once power enough (or but think they have it) let us look to ourselves; for if Papists have any Conscience, that any thing in their Religion can touch: they must then destroy us utterly, and leave us neither Liberty, Estate, nor Being; unless they will resist Conscience, and rebel against the Authority of that Church, which they count most Sacred and Sovereign, or which is all one in their Catholic sense, they must either exterminate us, or be damned themselves. And to deal thus with us, would be so far from being a sin, that by their most infallible Doctrine (the decrees of Popes and Councils) it would be an act highly meritorious; though in the common sense of mankind, it be Robbery and Murder. They may become the best Catholics, by abandoning Justice, Mercy, and Humanity itself; and procure pardon of all other sins, by the most detestable injustice and cruelty; and obtain higher degrees of glory by such crimes, as (to use their own expression) deserves all the fires of Heaven and Earth and Hell. If Satan could inspire all other Sects with this Catholic Doctrine, it would be an expedient to satiate his enmity to mankind: this would turn the world into a shambles, and no sort of men should escape unbutchered, but such who could find no party able to force them to the Slaughter-house; yet this is the way to Heaven, and transcendent glory, for those who will follow the Roman conduct, and believe what passes for most infallible amongst them.   

Sect. 6. There is another crime which passes for an eminent virtue with them, and is so esteemed and practised, that is, Sorcery and Conjuring. In the Books of Devotion published, for the use of their Exorcists, there are such horrid practices in and upon the Devil, as fully answers the Titles of the Books, one of which is called Horrible Conjuration, and another Devilish Exorcisms. He that has not seen them can scarce believe, that such things should be practised by any that bear the name of Christians; nor can they be heard without conceiving a horror at them. But they have been mentioned by others, I will only insist on that which may seem more innocent, but has indeed too much of Sorcery and Enchantment, and that is their Sacramentals with things of like nature and supposed virtue. Of this quality is their Consecrated water, Salt, Oil, Bread, Waxen-Tapers, Branches of Trees, Roses, Bells, Medals and Agnus Dei's. To such things as these, they ascribe marvellous and supernatural effects, a virtue to save and sanctify Souls, to blot out sins, to expel Devils, to cure Diseases, to secure Women in Travel, to preserve from Burning and Drowning. Pope Alexander in the decrees which they ascribe to him, asserts, that water mixed with salt, and Consecrated; does 
(b) De consecr. D. 3. cap. aqua.  Sanctify the people, Purify the unclean, break the Snares of the Devil, and bring health to Body and Soul. The form of exorcising salt, which we have in their authorised Books, tells us, it is exorcised, that it may be to all that take it 
(c) In salutem credentium ut sit omnibus sumentibus sanitas animae & corporis.  both health to Body and Soul. The exorcised water is to 
(d) Ad effugandam omnem potestatem inimici.  chase away all the power of the Devil, and root him out. The virtues of an Agnus Dei are described by urban 5. in verse, wherewith he sent some of them to the Greek Emperor. If you will believe a Pope, who may be infallible in Rhyme, as well as in Prose, 
(e) — Omne malignum  it drives away lightning, and all malignancy, delivers pregnant Women, destroys the force of fire, secures from Drowning, and which is more, destroys sin, even as the blood of Christ does. Bellarmine says, 
(f) De cultu sanct. l. 3. c. 7. p. 1594:  they are of power for the blotting out of Venial sins, for the chase away Devils, for the curing of Diseases. Others ascribe to 
(g) Tribuitur Thomae, Cajetan, Soto in Suar. Tom. 3. disp. 15. Sect. 4.  them, a power to excite gracious motions, even ex opere operato. Now it is acknowledged, that the natural power of these things, cannot reach such effects; and that there is no virtue in, or of themselves, to produce them; no more than there is in such things, by which Magicians and Conjurers work their strange feats. Nor has the Lord instituted them, or any where promised to empower them, for such purposes; no more than he has promised, to make the charm of any Sorcerer effectual for marvellous operations. Bellarmine confesseth, 
1 Vim habent ejusmodi res non ex pacto Dei expresso. ibid. . that such things have their force not by any promise of God expressed. And Suarez 
2 Non est fundatus in speciali aliqua Dei promissione, quia ut dixi, de tali promissione non constat. ibid. p. 187. . says the effect thereof is not founded in any special promise of God, because (as he had said) it does not appear there is any such promise. And they confess there's a tacit invocation of the Devil, in using things for effects, to which they have no power natural, or divine. There is such an invocation of the Devil, says Cajetan, 
(h) Sum. verb. divinatio.  when one uses any thing, or word as having power for such an effect, for which it appears not to have any virtue, either natural or divine: for than he tacitly consents to the aid of the Devil. And so 
(i) Sum. v. superstitio. n. 10.  Sylvester after Aquinas If the things made use of for such effects, appear to have no power to produce them, it follows, that they are not used for this purpose, as causes, but as signs (or Sacramentals): and consequently they belong to some compact with the Devil. And this, even the Jesuits will acknowledge. Thus Cardinal Tolet, 
(k) Instruct. Sacerd. l. 4. c. 14. p. 634.  it is to be generally observed, that there is a tacit invocation of the Devil, when a man attempts to do any thing, by that, which neither of itself, nor by Divine power produces such effects. And Filliucius, declaring the several ways whereby a Magical operation may be discerned, (most of which are applicable to their Sacramentals) gives this as the reason of them all, 
(l) Tract. 24. cap. 7. n. 170. p. 82.  because when the effect cannot be expected from the power of such causes, since they have it not; neither from God, who has not instituted them; it follows, that it must be expected from the Devil, who is therein tacitly invocated. They take it for evident, that the efficacy of such things is not from God, if he did not institute them, 
(m) Nec a Deo, qui eorum institutor non est. ibid.  not from God (says Filliucius) since he was not the institutor. So 
(n) Siqua sunt supervacua cum non sunt Divinitus instituta, sicut sunt Socramentalia, & consequenter pertinent ad pacta quaedam significationun cum daemonibus. ibid.  Sylvester will have the Magical signs, referred to Diabolical compact: because (having no such power of themselves) they are not of Divine institution, plainly signifying, that if their Sacramentals were not instituted of God, they could be no better, than what he refers to the Devil. Now what evidence is there that their Sacramentals are of Divine institution; and appointed by God for such purposes? they say so, and that's all, and so may the Magicians say, if they please, and prove it as well too; for from the word of God (the only proof in this case) neither of them have a syllable. The Author and Original of this strange power, may hereby be discerned; and the means they use to derive it, helps the discovery. They have it they say by virtue of their exorcisms; but if they can consecrate or exorcise, a thing into a power which is above itself, and yet comes not from God, their Consecrations hereby will prove no better, than Conjuring. And indeed he that reads but their Consecrations, may have cause to think they are no other, for instance, their form of Consecrating salt, in these words. 
(o) Exorcizo te creatura salis per Deum verum, etc.  I conjure thee Creature of salt by the living God, the true God, the Holy God, that thou mayest be made a conjured salt, for the Salvation of believers. And the like conjuring they use, for the making of holy water, and other things. There is a charm in Alexander Trallianus a Magical Doctor, which is exactly like these, (in what the form of an enchantment requires) to convey a virtue into an Herb, for the cure of a Disease. 
(p) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Vid. annot in Orig. p. 17.  I exorcise, or conjure thee, by the great Jah, and Sabaoth, the God that founded the Earth, etc. Take the Spirit of thy Mother-earth and its virtue; and dry up the Flux of feet and hands. He that will count this a charm, will have no reason to deny but the Papists form of Consecration is an enchantment, and indeed the common notion of enchantment is applicable hereto. They define it to be the conveying of a marvellous power into a thing, by virtue of the words of the enchanter. Now it is a marvellous power which they will have conveyed by their Consecration, since it is a power above the natural capacity of the things, and such as inables them for spiritual and supernatural effects: and they think it conveyed by virtue of the words of the Consecrator, as in the other case by the words of the Magician; for as soon as the words are pronounced, they believe the things so Consecrated, are endowed with the power. They will say indeed, that they expect the power from God, and use his name accordingly in their Consecrations. And so might Enchanters and Magicians say, with the like reason: for they were wont to use the name of God in their charms and incantations as Origen assures us. Many says he, 
(q) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Contr. Celsum. lib. 1. p. 17.  of the Egyptians when they are conjuring Devils, insert in their incantations, the God of Abraham, and he says, not only the Jewish exorcists did invocate the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob: 
(r) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. lib. 4. p. 184.  but almost all others who meddled with Conjuration and Magic. O! but this virtue comes from the Church's prayers, says Bellarmine, by these prayers I suppose he means, their forms of Consecration; yet in them there's no praying, but rather plain conjuring, for the words are all of them directed to the things Consecrated, and not at all to God, as is evident to any that reads them. And if they should use some prayers besides the forms of Consecration; a Magician may do so too besides his charm, and yet be no less an enchanter. Origen tells us, 
(s) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ibid.  that some invocation of God, and use of his name, is often found in conjuring Books. And what would it mend the matter, for either of them, to pray to God to bless an enchantment, or make his conjuring effectual? if the Ephesian Magicians should have invocated God at the recital of their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
(t) Clemens Alexandr. Strom. l. 1. c. 18.  Or the Conjurers among Jews or Gentiles, in the use of their Suffumigations, 
(u) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Just. Martyr. dial. ad Tryph. p. 91. Edit Steph.  and other Magical tricks. Or the Simonians 
(x) Exorcismis & incantationibus utuntur. Amatoria quoque & Agogima apud eos stud●ose exercenturr. Irenaeus. l. 1. 20. p. 76.  for their Agogima. Or Eleazar in the application of his Ring and Root: 
(y) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Joseph Antiq. l. 8. c. 2. p. 25●.  the practice had been no better on this account, it would be still, at least, a tacit invocation of the Devil; from whom alone such virtue must be expected, as is neither in the nature of the thing, nor from God's appointment; yea it would have been worse, to make so bold with God, as to invocate him for the service of the Devil. But indeed Popish prayers themselves, as they use them, are as like charms at they can look. In their prayers there are barbarous, i. e. unintelligible words (like those of the Magician in 2. Pausarias') which the people, or Priests many times, understand no more, than the hard words in the charms of Conjurers, were understood: 
(z) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. lib. 1. Eliacor.  such as Jab, Zebaoth, Elohim, Sadai; or those which Cato says 
(a) Cato de re rustica luxata membra hac cantione sana fieri tradit. Danata daries dardaries astararies, etc. Polyd. Virgil. de prodigijs lib. 1,  were used in a charm, for curing members out of joint; or the name Abraham, which though the Conjurers in other countries' used, yet they knew not what it meant 
(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ibid. lib. 1. p. 17.  says Origen. They are tied to the same syllables as Conjurers are in their charms; and that they may not vary, must, as the Persian Magician, 
(c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pausan. ibid. vid. Soto de Justit. lib. 10. q. 5. art. 3.  read all out of a Book, yea though they have it by heart. It is not requisite by their Doctrine (as we saw before) to mind the God of Heaven in their prayers, more than the Prince of darkness. The mere muttering of the words they count effectual, as in charms and inchauntments, yet have they no promise from God, that the bare recital of their forms, without any inward Devotion or Attention, shall prevail more than a Magician has, that such a pronouncing of the words he uses in Conjuring, will be prevalent: or more, than that the words of a prayer, which one carries in his pocket 
(e) Vid. Horae B. Virg. Paris edit. an. 1526. p. 63.  (another charm in use amongst the Papists) will be effectual. So that Salmeron had more reason than he expressed, to say, that their prayers, were like the words of a charmer. They had need first excuse their prayers from this crime: before this will serve, to excuse their Sacramentals.   

Sect. 7. There is another crime, no less heinous than the former; and yet in their account, it is a necessary duty, and a most excellent service, and that is the destroying of Christ, which by their doctrine and Laws of their Church, they are to do daily in the Mass. To clear this, take notice of these severals: They teach that Christ is really in the Mass, not only as he is God, (and so every where) but as he is Man, Soul, and Body, Flesh and Blood, and there not only mystically in signs and representations, or spiritually in virtue and efficacy; but as to the very substance of his body, some say Corporally, others after t●e manner of a Spirit; but all say the true substance of his Flesh and Blood, is as really on the Altar, as his Body was on the Cross, when nailed to it; yea, that it is there visibly, and may be (though it be not ordinarily) seen. 2. They hold that Christ is truly and properly Sacrificed in the Mass, and his Body and Blood there offered, as much as any Bullock or Lamb was Sacrificed under the Law. The Council of Treat 
(f) Sess. 6. cap. 2.  declares that the Sacrifice in the Mass, and that offered on the Cross, is the very same for substance, and differs only in the manner of Offering, and denounces a Curse against any that shall say, 
(g) Can. 1. & 2.  that it is not a true and proper Sacrifice, or that Christ in these words, do this, did not command the Disciples and Priests after them, to Sacrifice the Body and Blood of Christ. 3. They maintain, that in every true and proper Sacrifice, that which is Sacrificed, is really destroyed. So Bellarmine, to a true Sacrifice, it is required 
(h) Et omnia omnino, quae in Scriptura dicuntur sacrificia necessario destruenda er●…; si viventia per occisi nem, etc. De Miss. lib. 1. c. 2. p. 685. ad verum sacrificium requiritur, ut id quod offertur Deo in sacrificium, plane destruatur, ibid. p. 688. vid. lib. 1. cap. 27. p. 760.  that what is offered to God in Sacrifice, should be plainly destroyed. And if it be a live thing that is offered, that it may be a true and real Sacrifice, it must of necessity be slain and deprived of Life. A true and real Sacrifice, says he, requires the true and real killing of it, since in the kill of it, the essence of the Sacrifice consists. Hence it clearly follows, and it is their own inference, that Christ being truly and properly Sacrificed in the M●se he is there really consumed, killed, or destroyed; he is as really consumed in the Mass, as Incense, when it was burnt for an Oblation: 
(k) Christi corpus ad Dei honorem super mensam ponitur ut consumetur.  The Body of Christ, says the Cardinal, for the honour of God, is laid upon the Table, that it may he consumed. He is as really destroyed, as the whole  offering was destroyed when it was totally burnt. The consumption of the Sacrament, says the same Author, as it is done by a Sacrificing Priest, is an essential part of the Sacrifice, for it is a real destruction of the Sacrifice, 
(l) Consumptio quae fit a sacerdote sacrificante— proprie combustioni holocausti respondere censetur, ibid. p. 759.  and is counted correspondent to the burning of the Holocaust. He is as really killed in the Mass by their doctrine, as a Bullock that was slain for a Sacrifice. If in the Mass, says he, 
(m) Vel in missa fit vera, & realis Christi mactatio & occisio vel non. Si non sit, non est verum & real sacrisicium: Sacrificium enim verum & real, veram & realem occesionem exigit, quando in occisione ponitur essentia sacrificij, ibid. p. 760. Sect. denique.  there be not a true and real kill and slaying of Christ, it is not a true and real Sacrifice; adding this reason, because the essence of a Sacrifice consists in the kill of it. So also Doctor Allen 
(n) De Euchar. Sacrific. c. 10, 11, 12.  says, Christ is killed there indeed, and sacrificed to God: And Vegad 
(o) De miss. Thes. 22, 23.  Christis as truly slain, and offered in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, as he is truly in the Sacrament; and they think him to be as truly there, as they believe him to be in Heaven. 
(p) In Suarez. Tom. 3. in 3. Thom. disp. 75 Sect. 5. ratio praecip●a hujus sententiae est quia de essentia sacrificij est, & praesertim holocausti at tota victima consum●tur— nam hoc sacrificium est holocaustum, in quo victima debet perfecte consumi, etc.  Aquinas favours this Opinion, and Gabriel insinuates it; Soto, Ledesma, Canus, and the modern Thomists, do plainly deliver it, besides Bellarmine and other Jesuits. Canus says, 
(q) Loc. Theol lib. 12. p. 675, 676.  they believe that to the perfect sacrificing of an Animal, it ought to be destroyed and slain, if it be truly Sacrificed. He says also, that the Body of Christ, in the Mass, is a living and breathing Body, even the very same that is in Heaven, and that it is truly Sacrificed. What then can follow from hence, but that the living and breathing Body of Christ in the Mass, is truly killed. This is not denied, only they say it is an unbloody death. And this indeed is their doctrine, Christ is put to death in the Mass, as he was upon the Cross; it is the same death for the substance, that he dies by the Priest, as he died by the Jews and Romans, only with some difference in the manner of it: It was a bloody death on the Cross; it is an unbloody death in the Mass, but he is put to death in both: and why should they say it is an unbloody death that he suffers by the Priest, since they profess that his blood is there shed and poured forth 
(r) The blood is shed in the Mass, but it is shed unbloodily, Hart in Rainold Confer. p. 618. , the very same blood that was shed on the Cross? This may seem strange, and they cross themselves here sometimes; but nothing must seem strange in the Mass, for it is such a heap of absurdities and contradictions, as never entered into the fancy of any men waking, and in their wits; nor could have entered into theirs, if the spirit of delusion, and the dream of infallibility had not distracted them. However, this they do, and must hold whatever come of it, that Christ is killed or destroyed in the Mass; they are as much concerned to do it, as all their Religion comes to; for if Christ be not really destroyed in their Mass, they have no true and proper Sacrifice; and they tell us (to prove us altogether irreligious) 
(s) Nulla unquam fuit religio, sine externo sacrificio.  Where there is no proper Sacrifice, there can be no Religion Hereby it is very manifest that the Office of their Sacrificing Priest, is, daily to offer deadly violence to Christ: That Christ in their Mass is every day slain or consumed, and that the highest devotion of the Romish Church is the destruction of Christ. 'Tis true, Christ is above their reach, whatever they fancy, they cannot offer him this violence, or destroy him as they do his Members; but they really design to destroy him, when they would make a Sacrifice of him; and they verily believe they do it, and they do all which they count requisite in order to it; and therefore they are destroyers of Christ by their own Rule, 
(t) Voluntas faciendi & ipsum factum sunt ejusdem malitiae.  to will to do it, is t●e same wickedness with the doing of it. The horridness of this will be more apparent if we take notice, wherefore they will thus use Christ. Their Church does it for the honour of the Saints, and of his Mother. In that part of the Mass, which is called the Offertory, they say, we offer thee this Oblation in honour of the blessed Mary, for ever a Virgin, and of all the Apostles, and of all the Saints, that it may be for their honour 
(u) Ut illis praefieiat ad honorem. . So that they Sacrifice the Son to honour the Mother, and destroy the Lord in honour of his Servants. If one under the Law, had but offered a Pigeon, or the meanest Sacrifice, in honour of Abraham or Moses, it would have been counted a Crime worthy of the worst of deaths; for this had been an advancing them into the place of God; and yet to Sacrifice the Son of God, that is, to destroy him in honour of a Saint of the Pope's making, is a meritorious act. Further, the Priest will not venture on such a fact for nothing; he has no reason to destroy Christ, more than Judas had to betray him, without some valuable consideration. He is to Sacrifice Christ for the living and the dead: For those that are dead, if they have bequeathed any thing to the Church for this purpose, or if their Friends hire him to do it. For the living, those that are frugal, may be secretly mentioned in the momento of a common Mass for a piece of money; but if any will go to the price of a particular Mass, the Priest is ready to Sacrifice and destroy Christ on purpose for them in particular. 
(x) pro incolumitate, says the Missal. pro bonis temporalibus, says Innocent 3.  In fine, they do not offer this to Christ for spiritual respects only; but for temporal and worldly advantages, and such often as are of no great moment 
(*) pro qualibet necessitate, says Lindanus. . Christ is to be destroyed for the health and safety of any body that is Catholic; yea, for the curing of a diseased Horse, or the recovery of a sick Pigg, or the preserving of their Fruit from frost, or a blast. They think it not amiss for such matters as these, to make a Sacrifice of Christ, and to destroy him, it is done amongst them many thousand times daily. And though the Apostle seems to make it a horrid crime for one to Crucify again the Son of God, yet for them to do that daily, which for the substance of the thing is as destructive to Christ as the first Crucifying was, is the principal part and office, and the most eminent and meritorious act of their Religion.  
These and such like are the prime Virtues of the Romanists, most needful to be observed and practised: And if things of such a quality be so far from being relinquished, where shall we find any thing which God hath made a sin, that can be thought worthy to be forsaken? But I have stayed long enough here, let me proceed to the next head propounded, to satisfy us that they count it needless to forsake sin.    

CHAP. VIII. Crimes exceeding great and many, are but slight and Venial faults by the Popish Doctrine.  

SECT. I.  
THere are innumerable Evils which they call Sins, yet they count it not necessary in point of Salvation, for any to forsake them; but give all encouragement to live and die therein, as sins for which they can never be condemned. Such are those which they count Venial. Let me show you what sins they are, which they reckon to be of such a quality: and thereby it will be discerned how far their Doctrine gives warranty to sins of all sorts, and to continue in the violation of all the Commands of God. And this I shall do out of their own Authors, such as are unexceptionable, declining the Jesuits: and thereby it will be more manifest how little reason there is to excuse the practical Doctrine received in their Church, by charging their impious and licentious Principles upon the Society.  
To hate God, 
(y) Navar. Manual. cap. 11. n. 18.  if it be out of inadvertency, and not with deliberation, is no mortal sin, and this they say of actual hatred; for habitual enmity against God is, with them, no sin at all. Acts of infidelity, when they are led thereto by fear; 
(z) Angel. sum. verb. sides, n. 9  or worshipping an Idol, (such as not only we, but themselves count Idols), are no worse than Venial. 
(*) Idem verb. solicitud.  Unbelief and perplexing distrustfulness of God, about the things of this life, is as innocent. To present the body only before God, in all religious Exercises, in Prayer, the Sacraments, yea the Eucharist itself; without any actual disposition suitable to the nature of the duties, without any good motion in mind or heart; without any inward Attention, Reverence, or Devotion; without any act of Faith, Fear, Love, Desire, or any other Grace or holy Affection, though the want of these be voluntary, is but a Venial fault. It is no worse, not only to make base and earthly things, the end why we worship God; but to make that which is a sin, our design in any part of his Service: yea, to propose it as the chief and principal end, why we worship him. Though this be no less than to prefer sin, and the pleasure of the Devil before God, and his honour. 
(a) Si est aliquis dispositus actualiter facere aliquod maleficium ut aliud destruat, possum illo uti ad honum meum, Petr. Aurcolus in 4. dist. 34. q. 2. Angelus sum. v. superstit. n. 13.  To make use of a Witch to dissolve some witchcraft, is scarce so much as a Venial sin. And so to use the Devil's assistance instead of Gods; and employ others disposed thereto, to act as Witches, and to practice with the Prince of darkness by a deputy in Diabolical Arts, is not unlawful. To deal with the Devil for to get some knowledge by him, or obtain other things of him, by such converse; is but a Venial fault: for Example. 
(b) Si autem exorcizator imperet daemoni, ut dicat curiosa, et nihil ad expulsionem facientia, non quia illi credat, sed quadam levitate et curiositate ductus; est peccatum grave, licet illud non videatur mortale. Silvest. sum. v. adjurat. n. 3. Graff. l. 2. c. 7. n. 4. Sotus, the just. et jur. l. 8. q. 3. art. 2. Cajetan. & Navar. in Suar. l. 4. the Adjurat. cap. 2. n. 9  If an Exorcist require the Devil to satisfy him in some curious questions (such as tend nothing to the expessing of him:) if he believe him not, but does it out of lightness and curiosity; he offends but venially. To use 
(c) Si (adjuratio) fiat ad Deum, vel homines, vel Angelos, vel Daemons, aut irrationabilia leviter, i. e. sine reverentia divini nominis, aut necessitate— modo septimo videtur veniale, sicut et juratio levis. Sylvest. ibid. n. 5.  adjurations to God, or Man, or Angels, or Devils, or irrational Creatures lightly, without reverence of the Name of God, or any necessity; is but a slight fault.   

SECT II.  
BY virtue of their Doctrine concerning Venial sins, they have form Rules, to encourage men in the practice and constant use of all sorts of profane and wicked Oaths. They 
(d) Vid. Bonaventur. 3 dist. 19 art. 2. Angelus sum. v. Jurament. 3. n. 8.  acknowledge that the Oath is sinful, unless it be made in truth, and judgement and righteousness; when that which is sworn is not true, or not just and righteous, or not with Reverence and Discretion; yet they teach, it is but a Venial fault, to swear without 
(e) Veniale est regulariter dum deest judicium, vel reverentia. Lopez, cap. 42. p. 225. Veniale vero cum non deest nisi judicium, sive reverentia, vel justitia levis. Navar. cap. 12. n. 3. Juramentum assertorium cui deest tantum justitia, quatenus contra religionem est, regulariter est veniale.— Est affertio communis & facilis. Suar. de Juram. l. 3. c. 12. n. 7.  reverence or discretion, or without righteousness also, if that be not much. So that though Swearing be an Act (as they tell us) of God's Worship wherein Divine Honour is given to him, whom we swear by: yet this may be done without reverence, and discretion, (as the rest of their Worship is,) and God may be solemnly called to witness, that the man intends to sin against him, if it be not much; and this without any great fault. 
(f) Malus jurandi habitus non est mortale peccatum, quia non est actus, Victorel. ad Tol. l. 4. c. 22. p. 681. Praecepta non dantur de habitibus. Aquinas 22. q. 31. art. 4. Vid. Suares de Juram. l. 3. c. 6. n. 1.  A habit of Swearing thus, or worse, is no sin, (for habits of what wickedness soever, are not forbidden); to use this habit 
(g) Utrum jurans sine judicio discretionis peccet inortaliter, sicut faciunt illi qui in quolibet verbo jurant?— Si jurat verum, sic non erit mortale peccatum. Angel. sum. v. Juram. 3. n. 10. Lopez & in eo Jo. de la Pinna & Metina, cap. 42. p. 226, 227. Cajetan, sum. v. precept. p. 475.  frequently so as to swear Customarily, almost at every word, (tertio quoque verbo); unless he regard not at all, whether he swear true or false, yea though he regard not that, as much as he ought; is no more a fault. So to swear 
(h) Qui in re levissima, atque inani jurant, sive etiam frequenter, et absque necessaria causa, sicut ementes & vendentes saepe facere novimus, peccant quidem, sed venialiter lantum, si veritas non desuerit. Graff. l. 2. cap. 15. n. 5. Sotus. ibid. l. 8. q. 2. art. 3. Sylvest, ibid. v. juram. 2. n. 8. secundum o●nes doctores.  out of lightness and vanity, upon any the slightest occasion, without any advantage, or the least necessity; is as innocent a practice according to all their Doctors. 
Juramentum assertorium cui inest vertas sufficienter cogitata & cognita, solumque illi deest necessitas vel utilitas, nunquam est in individuo peccatum mortale, dummodo absit contemptus. Assertio est communis omnium theologorum & summistarum. Suar. l. 3. de juram. c. 12. n. 3.  And the common practice of their Catholics, is correspondent to these conscientious Rules: You can scarce find any one (says 
(i) 
De justit, & jur. Ibid. p. 270.  
Non tamen peccat mortaliter, qui non conatur ijusmodi consuetudinem eve? ere, eo quod ipsa non est occasio nisi labendi in veniala. Pet. a S. Joseph, de 2. precept. art. 1. p. 85. approved by the Doctors of Paris.   Soto) who will either begin; or end the least discourse without an Oath: for they use Oaths for Ornaments of speech, at every word. But should they not at least endeavour to leave this Custom of Swearing? No, never to endeavour it, is but a small fault. Although (says one of their most approved Casuists,) he sins venially who swears true without any necessity, and so the custom of swearing be evil and pervicious: yet be sins not mortally who labours not to break off that Custom, because it is but an occasion of falling into venial faults. Hereby they have encouragement, not only to accustom themselves to this impious practice, (wherein so much prosaneness, irreverence, and contempt of God, is expressed,) but also never to give it over, yea never to endeavour it. And the reason whereby they warrant this, reaches all the wickedness which by those conscientious, Divines is counted Venial: they may commit it customarily, continually, and need never go about to do better; all will be but a fault so smallas is next to nothing. They need not regard in what terms their Oaths are dressed. They may swear body; on blood of God, by Catetans' 
(k) Dicere ad sanguinem Dei, vel ad corpus Dei, sive invocando sive resonaudo in rixa anturbatione,— peccatum est grave non tamen mortale, quia non contra, sea praeter Deum est▪ Sum. v. Blaspheme. p. 49.  leave: yea, Though they swear, by such parts of Christ's body, or such members of the Saints, or the Virgin-mother, as are not to be named (per 
(l) Qui per Christi inhonesta membra jurat, si contemptus desit & scandalum, venialiter tantummodo peccare credendus est. Graff. l. 2: c. 14. n. 10. Sylvest. sum. ibid. n. 10.  inhonesta membra); it is but Venial, if without contempt and scandal, which will make an act in itself lawful, to be criminal. And though they seem to give caution, that what is sworn be not false; since this cannot be excused by any Artifice, from being damnable: yet they try, what may be done, to make this go down as easily as the rest. If the thing sworn be false and he knows it, yet swears it by his faith, or ●roth, or this Fire: such per jury is Venial, non peccant mortaliter cum perjurant Angel. after Aureolus v. perjurium: 
(m) Gofredus asserit perjurium jocosum esse peccatum veniale: et Angelus v. Perjur. non esse amplius quàm veniale jurare falsum jocandi gratiâ. Solennis gloss. cap. veniens de jurejur. et gloss. in c. unum. nunc.  To swear that which is false injest, is a harmless Venial, by the Gloss upon their Law. 
(n) 
Communiter jurare falsum, non considerando an illud sit falsum, vel an juret, non est amplius quàm veniale secundùm S. Thom. et communem opinionem. Navar. c. 12. n. 6. Lopez. c. 42. p. 226. Graff. lib. 2. c. 16. n. 7.  
Scotus 3. dist. 39 art. 1. dicit communiter concedi, quòd unicum perjarium leve, non est peccatum mortale: in Suar. l. 3. de juram. cap. 4. n. 1.   Commonly to swear that which is false, without considering whether it be false, or no; or whether be swear or not; is as harmless. This is the judgement of Aquinas and their common Doctrine; so that if a man heed not what he does, he may do what he will; and as it were wink a damnable crime into a slight fault. By this expedient he may swear false, as commonly as true, without any considerable hurt; this is enough one would think to render their worse sort of swearing, perjury itself, practicable, in ordinary, with ease and safety: Yet as an overplus, they add, he that swears what is false through gross or careless ignorance, thinking it to be true, though if he use due diligence, he sins not at all; yet if he used some diligence, but not enough; he offends no more than venially, if Aquinas or the common Doctrine may be credited; for this is it, saith 
(o) Qui per ignorantiam quam crassam vel supinam vocant, jurat falsum, credens se jurare verum, quamvis si debitam adbibet diligentiam, nihil peccat, si tamen aliquam adhibet, sed non quantam debet, non amplius quàm venialiter delinquit, secundùm eosdem c. 12. n. 7. (Aquinas, Soto et alii in Suar. ibid. c. 5. n. 3.)  Navarre. And that, which way soever a man turns himself, he may have liberty to be perjured; they teach, that, 
(p) Qui jurat veritatem credens esse falsum quod jurat; si quod jurat advertit, non advertendo se jurare illud, vel contrà advertit se jurare non advertendo quid jurat, non peccat mortaliter. Si autem neque hoc neque illud advertit, immo utrunque sine deliberatione et consideratione facit, peccat quidem, sed. tantùm veniale leve. Idem ibid. n. 7.  He that swears the truth believing it to be false, and taketh notice that he swears, but minds not what he swears, sins not Mortally: Or if he neither regard the one, nor the other, but does both without consideration; it is only a little little fault, unless this inconsiderateness was wilful, and out of contempt, for then perhaps it may be worse, upon the account of contempt; probable error will excuse perjury from mortal guilt, as if one appeals, thinking there is reasonable cause for it, though he has sworn before not to appeal. So, Panormitan. and Angel. Sum. v. Perjur.  
He that hears a thing from a person of credit, may swear it is true, only not in Court, unless he express his reason. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 4. q. 1. punct. 3. n. 7. But as if it were not sufficient, for a man to swear false himself; they conclude he may without harm draw others to do it also; for, 1. They say he may induce others to swear; when he is not satisfied, whether they will swear true or false; that's the opinion of Aquinas, and 
(q) in Suares. Jurament. l. 1. c. 14. n. 9  their common Doctrine. Further, he that knows another will swear false, may yet put him upon it, if he be a public person, that's also the opinion of Aquinas, and 
(r) Ibid. n. 10. et 11. Richard de St. victor. in Angel. sum. v. juram. 3. n. 11.  commonly embraced by their Doctors; yea moreover any 
(s) Non credo tamen mortaliter peccare eum qui dat juramentum, etiam ut persona privata, illi, quem scit falsum juraturum; quum ille est jam dispositus jurare. Angel. ibid. Graff. ibid. c. 16. n. 10. Turrecremata in cap. quamvis. 22. q. 1. 161.  one whosoever, may put him to swear whom he fears, or knows will forswear himself, if he be disposed to swear. Let us see in the next place, whether they may not be as perfidious in promissory Oaths, as they may be false in others; and upon as easy terms: In all cases good or bad, or in different. He that swears he will not go to or pass by such or such a place, though he do it for no end, that is honest or profitable; 
(t) Non peccaret mortaliter contra faciendo, quia juramentum esset vanum, juxta Cajetanum et mentem St. Antonini. Nau. c. 12. n. 12. Graff. l. 2. c. 15. n. 7. et c. 18. n. 3.  sins not mortally, if he go contrary to his Oath. 
(v) Ubi minimum est quod promittitur, tunc non observare, non erit saltem mortale peccatum— Idem quando id quod jurat est indifferens, ut not at D. Ant. de Eutrio. Idem ibid. S. Antonius, Sylvest. Sotus, Corduba, alii in Suar. ibid. c. 16. n. 4. et in Navar. ibid. n. 10. Tenendum videtur cum communi, peccare quidem venialiter, qui jucamentum de re parva et levi non implet, non autem mortaliter, quod ipsum de voto rei levis dicemus. Cum parva res est pars minima materia juramenti, non implere potest esse veniale— Ut qu● promisit non ludere, et parum temporis in parva quantitate ludit. Cajetan. Covarruv, Corduba, Philiarchus in Suar: l. 3. c. 16.  He that swears he will do a thing lawful, and does it not, sins but venially, if it was a small matter; this is the common opinion, which Navarre attempts to prove with several reasons. 
Quando est tota materia est veniale. Antonin. Silu. Angel. de Butrio, Graff. Soto, Navarre, Joh. Andr. Hostiensis, Panormit. Aureolus. ibid.  As, if a woman swears she will give her Children Apples to quiet them, and gives them none; or swears to chastise them, and does it not (which are Cajetans' instances, though he vary from the rest in the general conclusion,) or if a man swear he will say 
(y) Idem ibid. c. 18. n. 7.  an Ave-Mary, and says it not; or swears to say a 
(z) Graff. ibid. n. 14. et n. 17.  Paternoster, or to give a small matter, and gives it not; or not to take place of his friend, and yet does it; or to game no more, and plays a little: In such cases any breach of promises, confirmed by Oaths, is but a small fault. And consequently it will be no worse, in all matters not only small but great; for the obligation of an Oath, rises not from the quantity of the matter sworn, but from the concern and interest of God in an Oath, he being invocated therein as witness. Now this is always the same, whether the matter be less or more; and so if they be not obliged, to keep Oaths in less matters, neither are they bound in greater. But by their rules of Conscience, they are set at liberty to break all: He that swears to give a Whore 100 Crowns for the act of fornication, is only bound to give her that part of it, which persons of his condition are wont to give such Women; Because a Prodigal engagement confirmed by Oath obliges only to that proportion in which there is no profuseness. Bannes' et alii in Diana, v. promise. If a man swear to be true to a whore, and she to be faithful to him, so as to entertain no other, the Oath doth not oblige either of them to such honesty. Idem, v. juram. n. 10. Whether the matter be small or great, when one is drawn by fear, or brought by law to swear, if he break his Oath that is promissory: he sins but venially. Pet. Aureolus Job. Andrea's, et multi alii et places Angel. sum. v. Perjur. n. 7. He that swears he will not observe some 
(a) Qui jurat se non facturum aliquid ad quod non tenetur, est tamen secundum se melius facere quam non facere; si forsan erit aliquid ad consilia evangelica pertinens— neque S. Thom. neque S. Antoninus dicunt hoc esse mortale. Cajetanus Jo. Tabienna, et glossa communiter recepta, tenent mon esse lethale. Nau. ibid. c. 12. n. 16.  evangelical counsel (that which is not only lawful, but excellently good, and better in their account than what the Law of God requires,) offends but venially: so their Authors 
(b) Cajetan. sum. v. perjurium, p. 464. perjurium secundùm quid incurritur. Graff. ibid. c. 15. n. 6. qui jurat eleemosinam non dare, vel aliud superogationis opus non fac●…, venialiter tantummodo peccat: et c. 18. n. 11. Nau. ibid. vid. plures in Suar. ibid. cap. 18.  generally. And yet to these Counsels they have reduced a great part, almost all, which God has made our duty, as we showed before; so that a man may call God to witness, that he is resolved not to do, what he has made his duty. 
(c) Docuit S Thom. hujusmodi juramentis Spiritui sancto apponi obstaculum. Idem Navarre. ibid.  As for one to bind himself by Oath, that he will not lend to his Neighbour, nor be surety for any, nor give alms to any in great necessity, nor do any of those important things, which they count works of supererogation; is but a small Venial. Such Oaths, they say, do give obstruction to the Spirit of God, yet they may be kept without sin. 
(d) Qui juravit redire ad carcerem, si carcer est injuriosus, non tenetur redire— est ver●… quando vult evadere illud quod indebito sustinet, et sic ut evadat jurat, non intendens se obligare. Angel. sum. v. juram. 5. n. 37. Nau. ibid. c. 12. n. 18. Graff. ibid. c. 18. n. 25. secundum glossam communiter approbatam. Sylu. sum. v. juram. 4. n. 26.  He that swears he will return to prison, and does not; is no more guilty, if he was not duly imprisoned. 
(e) Cum jurat quis, se facturum aliquid quod solum est illicitum venialiter: Non eni● erit tunc amplius quàm veniale secundum communem sententiam a Cajetano optimè et a ●…bis explicatum. Navar. ibid. n. 3. Cajetan, sensible that this is capable of great aggravations, mentions some, but concludes, though it seem, and be a grievous sin, yet it is but a venial. Unde grave videtur et est hoc peccatum, non tamen mortale. sum. v. perjur p. 464.  He that swears he will commit any sin, if it be but a venial; offends but venially, this is the common Doctrine well declared by C●jetan and Navarre, as he tells us. As if a man should swear, that he would never use to speak without an Oath; or never avoid any of those horrid acts, which they mince into Venials; to call-God to witness, that he purposes thus to dishonour him; is it seems, no great contempt of him, or else a great contempt of God with them is but a trifle. This is to threaten God to his face, and call upon him to take notice of it, that they will do these evils against him. Soto and others say, it is such a threatening of God, when they swear to commit mortal sin: and no difference can possibly be here discerned, but that the one is a threatening God with a greater evil, the other with a less. However this is their common Doctrine, Assertio posita communis est. They give as much liberty for fraudulent Oaths, whereby God and man are abused; to swear with equivocation or mental restriction, so as those to whom Oath is made, are deluded, is with them, in many cases, not so bad as a venial Evil; of which in due place. To take an Oath outwardly, 
(f) 
Sotus in Suar. ibid. c. 17. n. 6. quando juramentum i●just● exigitur, vel qu●ties, voluntary, & sine obligatione, & sine alio nocumento vel injuria tertii, non esse mortale, Soto tenet, et multi sequuntur.  
Juramentum simulatum, etiamsi promissorium sit, intrinsece non continet perjurium, non grave peccatum; si absque injustitia et ex honesta causa fiat.— Conclusio est communis. Angelus. Navar. Lud. Lopez in Suar. ibid. n. 12.   without an intent to swear, is but a small fault, though it seem a mocking of the Divine Majesty, and is cross to the end of an Oath; if it be unduly required. So they determine also in case one swear without an intention to oblige himself. Angelus inquires, whether he sins, who takes an Oath, with a mind not to be obliged; he tells us, 
(g) Dicit Panormitan. quod, si est homo perfectus peccavit venialiter; sed ego dico, quod nec perfectus nec imperfectus peccaverit etiam venialiter. sum. v. jurament. 5. n. 9  Panormitan affirms, that if he be a perfectionist (id est, a Votary) who so swears, he sins venially, otherwise not: but himself says, Whether he be perfect or imperfect, he sins not so much as venially, and proves it by their Law. He takes an Oath, which in its own nature obligeth, without an intention to be obliged; he calls God to witness when he is deluding men; he abuses the Name and Authority of God, for a cheat; and yet offends but venially whoever he be, says one; and sins not at all, says another: but then he explains it, 
(h) Intellige hoc quum j●…ando habet animum solum ind●cendi juramentum ad reverentiam dei, non ad obligationem suam. ibid.  Understand this when in swearing, he had a mind to use an Oath, for reverence to God, but not for obliging himself. So that must be for reverence to God, which mocks him; and he must be invocated, in a way that is most obliging, without any intent to be obliged. And further to prevent falseness (where there is nothing but fraud) he must swear, with a mental reservation. For example, I 
(i) Et in ment habuit aliquam circumstantiam debitant quâ verum jurabat; puta promitto quod dabo tibi centum, cum ista subauditione, scil. si sum tibi obligatus ex debito: licet hoc non exprimat ut hujusmodi, quoniam sic utitur silatione licitâ quod licet, ut in c. utilem 22. q. 2. ibid.  promise thee an hundred (pound), with this inward reserve, not expressed: If I be bound to pay it for such concealments, says he, are lawful, and quotes their Church-Law for it, as allowing that, which all other Laws of God, or honest men condemn. 'Tis plain by the Premises that their Doctrine encourages the Roman Catholics to venture upon all sorts of Oaths, in many cases, whether they be rash or injurious, or fraudulent, or false; as slight and trivial faults. No more do they make of perjury, though it be frequent and customary. If more evidence be desired, take notice only of the determination of Dominicus Soto (a grave and learned Doctor, and one who was a principal Divine in the Council of Trent:) he having premised something concerning the heinousness of Perjury, that the 
(k) De just. ●… jur. l. 8. q. 2. art. 3. p. 269.  Lord forbids it, with a particular EMPHASIS more than other sins; that it is a greater crime than murder, and is most grievously punished both by God and man; his tamen non obstannibus, all this notwithstanding he lays down two Conclusions, in which he maintains Perjuries of all sorts, id est, both in promissory, and assertory Oaths, to to be no worse than Venial. 
(l) Non om●e juramentum assertorium, licèt sit vanum atque illicitum, et subinde quodammodo perjurium, est pecoatum mortal: Sed crebro veniale. Plura sunt promissoria perjuria quae non sunt gravioris culpae quàm venialis. ibid.  1. Every assertory Oath though it be vain and unlawful, and in a sort perjury; is not a mortal sin, but oftentimes venial. 2. There are many promissory perjuries, (promissoria perjuria) which are no greater faults than Venial; and reduces these Perjuries to four general Heads, (under which many thousands of particular cases may be contained): and all must pass for Venial. Then, for customariness of such Perjuries, how commonly, how often soever a man is guilty thereof, that makes them not mortal, he speaks of some mentioned by Scotus, who thought that a light Perjury was no worse than venial; but if it were customary, it would be mortal: But he confutes this opinion, by a Principle generally received, 
(m) Cum frequantatio actuum non sit distincta ab ipsis actibus, non est per se peccatum ultra numerum multiplicatarum actionum: consuetudo speciem juramenti nec mutat nec aggravat, ibid. p. 270. col. 2.  that a multiplication of the same acts, do not change the nature thereof; that is, ten thousand Venials acts, do not make one mortal sin: and concludes 
(n) 
Si perjurium fuerit leve ut veniale— quantumcunque fiat ex habitu et consuetudine non efficitur mortale. ibid.  
Juramentum prolatum sine advertentia formali— non est in se novum & proprium et speciale mortale peccatum, propter solam pejerandi consuetudinem, etiam non retractatam. D. Thom. Bonavent. Durand. Major, Scotus, Sylvest. Navar. in Suar. l. 3. de jurament. c. 7. n. 3.   if the purjury be but Venial, (as it may be by his determinations now mentioned, in many thousand instances) how habitual and customary soever it be, it is not thereby mortal. So that if a man, how calkative soever, should neverspeak while he lives, but with an Oath, or such Perjury as he here excuses: yet all the Perjuries of a whole life, would not be a mortal sin.   

SECT. III.  
THey determine in their Schools, 
(o) Vid. Suarez, tom. 3. disp. 66. sect. 2.  that of all sins those are the greatest and most heinous, that are against the Theological Virtues and Religion; of those against Religion (which are counted sacrilege) there are three degrees, and in the highest of all, (containing crimes against the Deity and being of God:) as the most grievous they place Perjury, Blasphemy, and the sins against the Holy Ghost, (and those in the same rank with these;) yet for practice how little they make of Perjury we have seen. Blasphemy meets with the same measures: they teach it may be but a Venial fault, in any of those cases, wherein they describe it: whether by denying Gods infinite perfections, his Wisdom, Goodness, Justice, Providence, etc. or by charging what is reproachful to him, as Injustice, Partiality, Impotency, Cruelty, Ignorance, etc. or by ascribing his incommunicable Excellencles to others, as calling a friend our God; or attributing the divine Perfections to the Devil; or else by way of detestation, decrying, renouncing, cursing God, with imprecations against his Blessedness, or Being; or else by way of derision, etc. Now it will be but a Venial fault to Blaspheme the divine Majesty in such a manner, 
(p) Blasphemia si ex levitat● animi, esset tantum veniale. If a man blaspheme God, so it be in jest, that makes it so small a matter, that it may pass for Venial. vid. Bonacin. Tom. 2. p. 211.  when it is out of lightness of mind; or (2) when it is sudden from passion: so Sylvester, 
(q) Cum quis subito ex passione in verba contumel●osa prorumperet quorum significationem non considerate, et tunc est veniale. sum. v. Blaspheme. n. 4. Aquinas 22. q. 13. a. 2. Lopez c. 15. p. 260.  after Aquinas. And 
(r) Neque quidquum ad rem facit, an subitanea illa ira ex injusta causa originem habeat, vel ex ludo, ebrietate, vel aliqua occupatione circa rem illicitam secundum Angelum. cap. 12. n. 84.  Navarre after, Angelus adds, that it is not material though the passion be without just cause, or in gaming, or from drunkenness, or any unlawful employment; such passion and excess, will be so far from being great sin, that they will lessen the greatest, or (3) 
(s) Si Blasphemia procedat ex quadam consuetudine depravata, cum contemptu salutis animae: si inconsideratio sola fuit causa prolationis blasphemiae, taliter quod si adverteret non proferret, non erit mortale tunc secundùm Cajetanum ità est, et in hoc consentit Sotus, Lopez, ibid. Noque satis est ad peccandum mortaliter quod talis inconsideratio, ex depravata quadam consuetudine, cum propriae salutis contemptu, vel ex culpa lata procedat, juxta Syl. vestrum, dummodo illa inconsideratio prolationis talis Blasphemiae causam de derit. Navar. ibid. Cajetan. sum. v. Blaspheme. Graff. l. 2. c. 19 This caution rejected as impertinent, Suar. l. 3. de Juram n. 7. c. 7.  when it is from wicked custom, with contempt of ones own Salvation. When one is so habituated in the practice of reproaching God, that Blasphemies break from him, without observance or consideration. So Cajetan and So us, and Navarre after Sylvester. Thus by their rules, the more a man 〈◊〉 in the most horrid instances, the less will his sin be. To blaspheme God customarily may be a slight fault, when to do it rarely, will be a most deadly crime. Here's a course described, to make such blaspheming of God, as a Soul that has any sense of his Majesty, can neither think nor speak of without horror, to be familiar, and practicable, without danger; let him, then blaspheme God at first out of levity or passion; he may do it thus customarily, with safety: and the oftener he does it, the more he secures himself, for when he hath so perfected this habit of wickedness by custom, that Blasphemies 〈◊〉 ●ssue from him, without his notice or observance; he may, even when he is not heated by passion, repreath God at every word, while he lives; and breath out his Soul with Blasphemies, when he dies; and yet be saved, for all this will amount to no more than such faults, as never endanger the Soul of a Roman Catholic. There needs no more to make mortal sins Venial, but to get the perfect habit of them, that is, if a man be but wicked enough, there is no great danger.   

SECT. iv  
FOR the sanctifying the Lords day, or any other which they count holy, all that is necessary, is the worship of the Mass only, with abstaining from servile works: 
(t) Licet cum abstinentia a servilibus, solius missae cultus sufficiat in festo ad evitandum mortale peccatum. Cajetan. sum. v. fest. p. 316. Regula generalis est; hoc praeceptum colendi deum in die sesto, quatenus affirmativum est, non obligare ad exercendum intra illum diem alium actum divini cultus, sive internum sive externum, praeter missam— Assertio est communis— Ratio unica est, quia ecclesia nihil aliud praecipit. Suur. l. 2. de festis, c. 16. n. 1.  this is enough on any festival for the avoiding of mortal sin. It is their common Doctrine, and there is not any thing wherein they more generally agree. So it is to be observed, that the total sum of all the holiness, which is necessary for these Catholics; even at those times, when it should appear if ever, and all which they themselves are obliged to exercise, consists in their being at Mass, and evoiding servile work. What holy attendance at the Mass they count necessary, we saw before, they may spend the time in sleeping, or talking, or laughing, or scoffing; only with some little intermissions; that they may stand at the Gospel, and kneel at the Consecration, and how at the Elevation; but therein no inward 
(u) Vid. Bellarm. de miss. l. c. p. 837.  act being necessary, all the holiness requisite, lies in their legs, which should be ordered, as the Priest gives the signal; yet even this, they are not obliged to, who neither hear, nor see what is done; and it is not needful at the Mass, for any of the people, so much as to use their senses. When the Mass (which 
(x) Secundum Paludanum semper licet. missam facere, ita ut finis missae incidat in initium aurorae. vid. infra.  may begin at break of day or before) is dispatched in such a holy manner, (with such attendance as would scarce be counted civil, at least sufficient, at a stage-Play) they may spend the rest of the day, according to this beginning. Th●… (says Cajetan) 
(y) Qui festos dies post missam vanè consumunt ludendo, jocando, otioseque vagando, ●… venando, sportaculis intendendo, et hujusmodi, licèt ex ipsis operibus, utpote non ser●…libus, mortale non incurrant, sum. v. fest. de actibus corporalibus Musicae— ut agitationibus corporum, quae in saltationibus, choreis & tripudiis fiunt. Vid. Angel. Sylvest. Rosal. Abulens. Suarez, l. 2. the fest. c. 27. n. 4. aliqui addunt, si totus dies festus, etiam auditâ missâ, in his actibus consumatur, graviter peccare, quia festa Christiana ridiculo exponuntur.— non intelligunt autem esse mortale, sed veniale, ut disertè declarant— non refert quod intentio est vana, vel turpis, vel principalis, ibid.  who after Mass vainly consume the rest of these d●… in sports, in jesting, in idle vagaries, in hunting, in seeing Shows ●… Plays, and any thing of this nature: by such acts, because they are ●… servile works, (upon which account they say, that no other acts of, wickedness are a profaning of these days, or a breach of that Precep●… they incur no mortal sin. But then he (who is more precise herein, that the generality of their Divines), brings an after-reckoning: Yet, say● he, 
(z) Ex omissione tamen divini oultûs ad quem festa instituta sunt graviter peccant: quia non redaunt quae sunt Dei Deo; & quia quantum in se est, ridiculo exponunt Christiana festa: juxta illud, viderunt cam hosts, & direserunt sabbata ejus. Ibid. Armill. v. fest. n. 23.  hereby because they neglect that divine Worship, for which these days were instituted, they sin greatly; How can that be, since he said immediately before, that they sin not mortally? why there is a latitude in their venial Faults, some are great, and some less; and so wi●… him, to neglect all Worship but the Mass, is a great sin of the little size: he gives the reason, because hereby they give not to God the things that are Gods, and as much as in them lies, make the Festivals ●… Christians ridiculous, according to that Lam. 1. 7. So that by him, those who after Morning-Service, spend this day in such Pastimes, they rob God of his due, and they render Christians, in their pretences to the sanctifying of the Lords day or others, ridiculous to the World: and yet, this is but a Venial Sin: or at worst, but a gre●… little-Fault, not so great, as any man need fear; no not he, who is most afraid of damnation. Navarre adds another reason, why it should be a sin though but a Venial, to consume these days in Recreations; 
(a) Quia in hujusmodi occupationibus, multa occurrunt peccata mortalia secundùm S. Antoninum. ubi ait omnium lachrymis deflendam esse Christianorum Caecitatem, qui graviùs Deum offendunt diebus festis ejusdem divino cultui dedicatis, quàm tota hebdomada ad vitam parandam instituta. Cap. 13. n. 15.  because in such Employments many mortal sins occur, according to Antoninus, who says, The blindness of Christians is to be lamented with the tears of all men, who more grievously offend God, on the days appointed for his Worship, than the whole week besides. Notwithstanding this is their way of sanctifying the Lords Day, and all other times, for Devotion, of their own; with profane and irreligious Divertisements, such as render their pretences to Religion ridiculous (as the Cardinal notes): accompanied with such debaucheries, as make their holidays the profanest, of all other. It is but a Venial fault at most (for many count it not so much) to consume the whole day herein without any other religious Act, or Exercise of any sort whatever: 
(b) 
Vid. suprà cap. 1. et Suarez. l. 2. the fest. c. 16. & Victorall. infrà.  
Q●i audit missam in contemptum diei festi— satisfacit-praecepto. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 1. q. 1. punct. 9 n. 1.   they need hear no Sermous, nor attend their Vespers, nor use any Prayers public or private, nor read the Scriptures, nor sing the praises of God, nor meditate on him; nor have any one act of Love, or Contrition, nor any other act of inward Worship at all; nor of outward Worship either, but only part of the Mass: this will serve for all, so highly divine and religious a Service it is; though they declare themselves not obliged therein, either to mind God, or divine things: yea though they hear Mass (when nothing else is needful for the sanctifying of the Day) out of contempt of the day; yet the Precept is satisfied. But if they be not at Mass on those days, (though presence at Mass may make all other holy Duties unnecessary in other cases, yet) should they not make up that defect with some other prayers, or religious Exercise; lest God should have no service at all, nor show of it, in public or private, on those days which alone are set apart for that purpose? no, 
(c) Qui absque excusatione, ut peccando mortaliter, omisit sacrum, non tenetur eodem ●i● aliis actibus colere & orare Deum; ergo multo minùs tenebitur qui excusatur: est 〈◊〉 optimum consilium, nullum tamen est latum ea de re praeceptum, & latius docent, Navar. cum Antonine, Adriano, & aliis, Suarez. Tom. disp. 88 sect. 6. p. ult. ) if they neglect Mass, either upon reasonable or damnable occasions (to wit, if they spend the time when they should be at it, in any other wickedness); yet are they not obliged to Prayer, or any other act of Worship, on those days afterwards. This is the Doctrine not only of their famous Navarre, but of Pope Adrian, and their Saint Antoninus, with others: Yea after all other holy Exercises are cashiered as needless on any of their holy times; the Mass itself may be dismissed too for company. And because all their Religion necessary for the people, consists in this, at all times, when any thing religious is by their Doctrine needful for them; it will not be amiss, to observe, how easily they may be excused from this: thereby we may discern, of what moment it is in their account, to have nothing at all of Religion amongst them. Cardinal Cajetan will satisfy us herein; he determines, that 
(d) Quia sola missa communiter est in praecepto, ideo sine rationabili causa, omitt●… missam in festo, peccatum mortale reputatur. Et hîc esto prudens, admittendo pro ●…tiona●ili ca●sa omne motivum rationi humanae consentaneum, etiamsi non fuerit urg●…. Ibid. p. 304. Angelus v. Feria, n. 42. Citans Richardum, quodl. 1. q. 19 negat omissionem missae in die festo esse peccatu● mortale, nisi ex contemptu formali vel virtuali fiat, quod etiam affirmavit Sum. Rosellae. v. miss. & Turrecremata, Suar. ibid. sect. 1. initio. Sequitur posse Pontificem in hoc praecepto (de missa audienda) dispensare, e●… Ecclesiasticum sit, only to dispense with one, that he should not all his life hear Mass, when no reasonable occasion hinders him, is not expedient. Idem ibid. i● fine, vid. Bonacin. infra.  it is no mortal sin, to neglect the Mass on a reasonable occasion, though it be but such an occasion as is not urgent. Yea, he says, 
(e) Quamvis si minus sufficien● sit ratio, peccatur venialiter. Et universaliter sic est, q●ando quis bonâ fide putat se excusari ab auditione missae, & ideo omittit illam. Cajetan. ibid. Et simile est, si praeter intentionem ex aliqua negligentia missa omittitur. Ibid.  It is but a Venial fault to omit it, upon no sufficient reason, and universally it is no great fault to neglect it, if a man thinks really he may be excused from hearing i●, or if besides his intention, out of some negligence it be omitted. Yea, they may be excused by custom; for so he says 
(f) Hinc anim excusantur puellae, non euntes ad missam, quia sic est consuetum. Ibid. p. 305.  Maids are excused from hearing Mass, till they be married, (and their Mothers too who are obliged to stay at home with them) because so is the custom. If so were the custom, it seems, all the rest might be excused. So many ways at least, may these Catholics be excused from all their Religion: by custom, or necessity, or opinion, or (which alone may suffice) by an insufficient reason; it will but be a Venial fault at most, together with all religious Exercises, to omit the Mass too; and that at those times, when alone (if ever) they are obliged to them. Such being their Doctrine, we need not wonder, if Religion be starved to death among them, the life of it cannot be sustained (no more than God can be honoured by mankind) without some acts of Worship and religious Exercises in ordinary practice: their Teachers assure them, that they are not ordinarily obliged to any of these, on common days; and to none of them all, but the Mass, on their days for Worship; nor to any religious attendance on God or their Souls, in that; nor to any attendance on it at all, but what they may decline, without mortal sin. If the life of Religion be preserved amongst any, without its necessary supports, and proper nourishment, it must be by a Miracle: but they seem so far from regarding the life, or the power of it (on which the honour of God, and the salvation of Souls depends); that they are not concerned for the carcase of it, in exterior acts, no, not that of the Mass (when they have reduced all to that) further than the fear of a Venial sin will oblige; ten millions of which cannot as they teach, damn a man. As for servile works, abstaining from which they make the negative part of this Precept; the avoiding of these is but, that we may with more leisure attend on divine Worship: it cannot be expected they will much insist on the means when they have overturned the end. In short, they determine that 
(g) Sive id quod committitur, sit opus servile, sive ab Ecclesia prohibitum si vero nec intentio suit violandi festum— non incurritur peccatum mortale. Cajetan. ibid. p. 310.  they who do any servile or forbidden works, on the Lord's day; if they do it not, with a design to profane it, offend but Venially. Thus if they never all their life, perform one religious act which God has commanded, on his own day or others, they scarce sin Venially; or if they neglect that, which themselves have made the religious Duty of these days, they may do it without greater fault or danger. And for the negative part, if they consume these days in servile works (without an intention needlessly perverse); or which is worse, in profane divertisements; yea, or in acting the most enormous wickedness (as we shall see in its place): yet by their Doctrine they do nothing, against this Precept, or nothing which any of them need regard. Thus their Doctrine of Venial sins, is improved to possess them with a conceit, that they may make what breaches they will upon the Commandments of God, without doing any thing at all (or any thing dangerously) against them; and so to render all sorts of ungodliness practicable with safety. We have seen it in instances against precepts of the first Table; let us see if those, who make so bold with God, in the Duties which more immediately concern himself, will be more tender, as to those which respect man.   

SECT. V  
THE Duties which Children own their Parents, (to instance for briefness only in those which the Lord hath made the exemplar of the other; and by which we may pass a judgement on the rest): they reduce to those three, Reverence, Love, and Obedience. In reference to the first, They conclude that those who have no more respect for their Parents, 
(h) Filius qui— sibi dedecori & contumeliae futurum esse existimaret se pro silio illorum haberi— si absque contemptu id facit ad vitandum aliquod incommodum sinistrae opinionis, vel ob aliam hujusmodi causam, non peccaret mortaliter, maxim si parents  vel express in eo consentirent. Navar. c. 14. n. 12. Graff. l. 2. c. 51. n. 12. Lopez. c. 54. p. 279.  thou to count it a disgrace and a shame to be counted their Children; if it be for the inconveniences of a sinister opinion, or suchlike cause, sin not mortally: and the fault may be less still, if the Parents consent to it expressly, or tacitly, to avoid some inconvenience. It seems, the Command calls for no such Reverence from Children; but they may be ashamed of their Parents, if they be poor, and low in the World. 
(i) Filius qui ex animo maledicit, sive vivis, sive jam saeculo defunctis, ●… ta●en o'er tenus tantum maledicit, non amplius quam venialiter offendit. Navar. ibid.  Children may curse their Parents if they do it but with their lips, and this whether they be alive or dead, the offence is but Venial. And indeed, they allow Parents, to give their Children occasion enough to curse them: when they will not have them obliged under mortal sin, to teach them any more 
(k) Sylvest, Sum. v. Scientia. Graff. l. 2. c. 58. n. 14. Ea quae parentes tenentur facere sub peccato mortali, ut filii addiscant, est signum crucis, ut Credo parvum, et Paternoster.  than the sign of the Cross, the small Creed, and Paternoster; nor teach them these in a language 
(l) Navar. Cap. 11. n. 22.  they understand. However Parents may come even with their Children, and if they love and reverence their Father and Mother so much as to curse them; their Parents may 
(m) Idem Cap. 23. n. 117.  curse them again, upon as easy terms, only they should not desire mischief to them in their heart, though their words express that desire. When Parents curse their children, having no inward desire of their mischief, it is never a mortal sin, says Soto. 
(n) Cum parentes fillis maledicunt, nullum intus habentes mali desiderium, nunquam est peccatum mortale: quamvis consuetudo profecto pessima est: de just et Jur. l. 5. q. 12. art. 1. Graff. l. 2. c. 58. n. 20.  (and it may seem strange considering the account of it immediately added,) Although it be indeed a wicked custom, and not at all for correction, besides that the heat of cursing, often raises anger into hatred, and so altars the mind, that they often desire, that all the mischief imprecated may befall them: besides the appellation of the Devil, can scarce be excused from a mortal Evil, for it is a kind of blasphemy and scandal, to wish eternal death to any. Yet all this it seems may be excused from deadly sin, though not very easily.  
For Love, they may rejoice at the death of their Father 
(o) Navar. C. 15. N. 10.  because of some outward advantage they gain thereby: They 
(p) Si filius scit patrem esse haereticum, & non solum sibi ipsi, sed & aliis prava sua doctrina nocere potest debet eum accusare. Alexand. Alensis. fecundum eum Graff. l. 2. cap. 55. n. 8. quamvis tenetur filius ad denuntiandam haeresim patris, & ad testificandum de illa, Nou. c. 25. n. 50.  may accuse their Parents of Heresy, though the effect of that will be a cruel death to those, who gave them life. As to Obedience in things that pertain not to 
(q) Idem ibid. C. 14. N. 12.  paternal government, it is no mortal sin to disobey them. In any things whatsoever, 
(r) Circa rem familiarem— in necessariis ad salutem sicut sunt spectantia ad bonos more's.— est veniale non obedire ex negligentia vel sensualitate, Sylvest. sum. v. filius n. 25.  it is but a Venial fault to disobey them, out of negligence, or sensualness. And so there's room enough for a continued disobedience, while they live. In matters of great importance, where, if ever, disobedience would be mortal; they exempt it from such guilt. 
(s) Quaeritur, utrum intrare possint pueri vel puellae in anno pubertatis? Et dico quod sic, etiam parentibus prohibentibus. Sylu. v. Relig. 1. n. 12.  They may enter into a Manastery, before they are at age, though their Parents charge them, not to do it: They may dispose 
(t) 
Utrum filius potest nubere sine licentia patris? Resp. quod sic, tam masculus quam foemina: quamvis non expediat. Angel. sum. v. filius n. 24.  
In electione statûs filius vel filia, non subjitur parentibus secundum S. Thom. 22. q. 104. art. 5. In Tabienna. v. filius n. 14. Vid Aquin. 3. q. 45. art. 5. addit Aquinas puella sicut potest monasterium ingredi absque parentum consensu, cum sit persona libera, sic & nubere, vid. Gratian, Petr. Lombard, & alios in Espencaeo de Clandest. matrim. C. 9 &. 10.   of themselves in marriage, without their Parents consent: because according to Aquinas, in the choice of their condition, they are not subject to their Parents, and their Parent's concurrence herein is for decency not out of necessity. Not only in things of great consequence as to this life; But in matters necessary to their Salvation, it is but a venial fault if they disobey them; so it be not out of contempt, that is, out of obstinacy and pertinaciousness. 
(v) Sum. v. filius u. 25.  Thus Sylvester and others, de Graffiis is more particular herein, 
(x) Inobedientiae crimen filtus incurrit in iis, quae pertinent ad res familiares, & ad salutem animae, ut fugere noxia sodalium contubernia, ludos prohibitos, & meretrices, modo non obediat ex contemptu, per contemptum hîc intelligo, obstinationem & pertinaciam animi, unde non obedire ex inadvertentia, aut negligentia, vel sensualitate, esset veniale. Sylu. v. fill. q. 22. Nau. c. 14. n. 12. Graff. l. 2. c. 55. n. 15.  a Son should not be disobedient to his Father in things which belong to the Family, and his salvation, as in avoiding pernicious company, and unlawful games, and Whores, he should not disobey him herein out of contempt, by which (says he) I understand obstinacy and pertinaciousness, so that, not to be obedient (herein) out of inconsiderateness, or negligence, or sensuality would be Venial. They encourage a Maid not only to dispose of herself in marriage without consent of Parents, but also to give up herself to uncleanness. If she willingly be deflowered, 
* Pet. a S. Joseph. de 6. praecepto art. 1. (& alii). Cum illa habeat dominum in suum corpus non parents, vel futurus sponsus; ideoque illa possit tibere licet non licite to uti ad explendam tibidinem.  they conclude it is no injury to her nor to her future Husband, nor to her Parents. Their reason is because she has the disposing of her own body, and so may use it freely for the satisfying of lust, though not lawfully; yet lawfully too so fat that they will have this lewdness to be no wrong at all to the party, most concerned, herself or others. If she be unchaste herein, yet not unrighteous; She owes not so much obedience to her Parents as to keep herself honest; nor have they authority to oblige her not to be a Whore, no more than not to be a Nun. By this we may take an estimate, of the honour which other Superiors must expect, by their rules of Morality. I must not descend to other particulars, fearing tediousness.   

SECT. VI  
THey hold that 
(y) Non autem (infringit illud) qui vult, precurat aut operatur detrimentum animae, ut ipsummet concilium sensit. Nau. c. 15. n. 1.  he breaks not the sixth (in their account the fifth) Commandment, who desires, or procures, or does any mischief, to another's Soul. It seems it is no murder, to kill the Soul. It is a rule with them that 
(z) Aquinas, 1. 2. q. 72. art. 7.  sins in heart, word and deed, are of the same kind. So they yield to Christ in this, that anger and hatred, may be a kind of murder: yet they think fit to exempt these, for the most part, from mortal guilt. When there has been such hatred and enmity betwixt two, as neither of them will be induced to speak to the other; yet both are to be absolved (says 
(a) Graff. l. 2. cap. 71. n. 6.  the Graffiis). When there is such indignation, that will admit of no affability, or converse. It is a fault, says 
(b) Peccatum est propter inordinatam passionem: & communiter veniale. Sum. v. Indignatio.  Cajetan, for the inordinacy of the passion, yet commonly Venial. They would reconcile us to anger when both the measure, and the effects of it, seem intolerable; when 
(c) Quando est inordinata quantum ad modum irascendi, non habet ex suo genere, eationem peccati mortalis. Sylvest. v. Ira. n. 4. potest à recta ratione, ità discordare quantum ad modum irascendi puta, quia nimis ardenter intus quis irascitur, aut secundum exteriores motus nimis excandescit. Et sic si excessivus modus sit nudus, peccatum est veniale. Cajetan. Sum. v. ira.  it is so extravagant, as that it both burns excessively within, and flames out no less in external significations of its excess; yet such an excess, is a small fault. It will be as harmless though it be revengeful too, if it seek not a great revenge; yea a man as innocently seeks and takes the greatest revenge, if he do it inconsiderately. 
(d) Posset est veniale, propter imperfectionem actus, quia scil. praevenit deliberationem; vel est de aliquo modico, ex S. Thom. Sylu. v. ira n. 4.  This they deny not, when they tell us withal, that the passion may be but Venial, when it makes a person inconsiderate: So that a man may destroy all that he is angry at, if his passion be but quick, and great enough. 
(e) Licè mihi optare, ad bonum, mortem alicujus. Idem v. maledicit mortem ali●…i optare possumut, licè nobis conde● via, n. 2. perditioois ingressum ire. Soto, de Just. & Jur. l. 5. q. 12. art. 1. Nabar. c. 21. n. 25. Lopez. Cap. 64. p. 321, 322. (Bonac●…. t. 2. de leg. disp. 3. q. 4. p. ult. n. 7.)  To desire that he whom we count our enemy, were killed; or to rejoice that he is murdered, if it be for some good that ensues upon it, is no Crime. No more it seems than it is for the Cannibals, to delight ●o▪ have others killed; it is for the good they reap thereby, they have the advantage to feed on them. They will scarce be able to persuade one, that it is unlawful to act, what he may lawfully desire; yet they count it no sin to desire the death, not only of those that are mischievous, and do or may do them hurt, but of such as are innocent: not only of strangers, or such as they count enemies, but even of their nearest Relations. A Woman may desire the death of her daughters, because they are unhandsome, or poor; so that she cannot marry them according to her mind. And the reason (which must clear this from guilt) is because, this is not a hatred of enmity to their persons, but only a hatred of abomination, as to their unhandsomness and poverty. Thus she may hate her own Children to any degree of abhorrence, so far as to will them the grandest evil in this world, death itself, because they are not rich; or because they are not comely, she may kill them so far as her mind and heart can do it, upon this account; and sacrifice them inwardly to her covetousness or ambition, or curiosity; and this very innocently. 
(f) Affectus ad occidendum inimicum absque consensu rationis. Gum. v. Votum.  A● affecting to kill one's enemy without consent, is but a Venial fault with Cajetan. If he actually kill him, so it be done indeliberately, he does no great harm. The rule received by them without exception, will warrant it, 
(g) Infer notabile damnum in proximi personam— subreptio & inconsideratio ejus quod aggrediebatur ipsum excusare possit à mortali: Navar. c. 15. n. 8.  surpise and inconsiderateness excuses from mortal sin. Thus if a man kills any he meets with, without any deliberation at all, through natural hastiness, drink, or passion, 'tis no mortal sin; yea it may be done as easily, with some deliberation, if that be not full, and perfect: and there are so many things, which they tell us of, to hinder it from being full; that killing of others may be a common practice, with little or no fault. But when it is more voluntary, there are more cases wherein they make murder no sin at all, than so much as a Venial fault, of which in its proper place.   

SECT. VII.  
PRoceed we to the next command. Some of their Doctors have determined, that fornication is not intrinsically evil, nor forbidden, because it is evil, but only evil because it is forbidden. 
(h) Affirmat Martinus — quod fornicatio non est sua natura mala, et ideo prohibita, i●… vero ab id tantum est mala, quia prohibita nempe lege veteri— & codem applaudit Durandus, 4 dist. 33. q. 2. Soto de. Just. & jur. l. 5. q. 3. art. 3.  So Martinus a Magistris, and after him Durandus, held, that fornication is not condemned by the law of nature, as a sin deserving eternal death; but is only prohibited by a positive law, Deut. 23. Eph. 5. And so it will be no worse, nor deserve any more than a Venial fault; since a positive law neither adds to the penalty, nor makes it a greater evil, but only declares the native evil of it, more expressly. Not only fornication, but also adultery, even in the Clergy, has passed amongst them as a lesser sin, and is so expressed in the Pontifical Law. For some crimes Clergymen were to be deposed, for others the Bishop might dispense with them, to wit, when they were lesser faults. 
(i) Decretal l. 2. tit. 1. c. 4. de adulteriis vero & aliis criminibus, quae sunt minora, potest Episcopus post peractam poenitentiam cum cleritis dispensare. Alexander 3. Saknlitano Archiepiscopo respondens de adulteriis ut aliis criminibus minoribus, Episcopo●um clericis poenitentibus dispensandi jus fecit, Espnc●aeus, de digam. l. 2. c. 7. ●, 714.  Amongst these lesser Pope Alexander 3 reckons adulteries; but for Adulteries, says he, and other lesser crimes, the Bishop after they have done penance, may dispense with the Clergy. They teach, that for a whore, though she be a married woman, or a Nun, to seek or receive a reward for prostituting herself, is but a Venial fault, if any. Only they differ how she should have it. 
(k) Medina, Navar. c. 17. n. 39  Some say as a gift or gratuity; but 
(l) Cajetan, Soto de Just. l 4. q. 7. a. 1. Graff. l. 2. c. 123. n. 2.  others as a hire, legally due in justice. By which it is evident, that either they must think such uncleanness not to be intrinsically evil; or else, that it is as warrantable to seek and receive rewards for other such acts of wickedness (as for slandering, robbing, assasinating men, or firing houses, etc. The 
(m) Si tamen defit contemptus, non est peccatum mortale consummare matrimonium ●… benedictionem: quia nec statuti nec consuetudinis violatio ex infirmitate passionum, i●fere peccatum mortale. Cajet. Sum. v. matrimon. Angelus, v. debitum Sylvest. (after, Aquinas and others) v. debet, sect. 11.  use of matrimony, before the marriage be solemnised, if it be without contempt, is no mortal sin, says Cajetan; because neither the violation of rules, nor of custom, through the weakness of passion, can be mortal: others concur with him her in. Nor do Antonin●… and John Tabienna much mend the matter; who will have the first act to be a sin, but none of the rest after. 
(n) Non tamen peccaret qui absque scandale cam (rem) haberet (cum priori), tenetur ●tem posteriori convivere Ecclesia id jubente, si absque periculo habendi rem cum ea vel ●…, id facere potest. Idem ibid. n. 39  He or she who first contracts marriage with one privately, and after with another publicly, sins not mortally, if they lie with the former, without scandal; but is bound to live with the latter, the Church commanding it, if there be no danger of coming together. As though they could cohabit together, as man & wife, without such danger. This is in effect to determine, they may lie with both, and they that have a mind to it, may have warranty from the 
(o) In 4 dist. n. 28.  Master of Sentences for the latter; and from the Master of the sacred Palace 
(p) Sum. v. dubitum. n. 14.  and others, for the former. A woman whose Chastity is attempted with some force, 
(q) Neque clamore se defendere— suis propriis, membris se defendere sed immota manens nihil agate— etiamsi de actu ipso delectationem aliquam percipiat, modo neque in ipsum actum, Neque delectationem voluntate deliberata consentiret. Nam talis delectatio non esset voluntaria sed naturalis— quamvis quoad forum exterius presumeretur consensisse. Soto. de Just. & jur. lib. 5. q. 1. art. 5. p. 141. Navar. cap. 16. n. 1. Graff. l: 2. c. 77. n. 10. Vega in Jo. Sanc. disp. 10. n. 17.  though she cry not out, though she call not for help when it may be had, though she make no resistance at all with any part of her, though she do not so much as any way move to hinder it; yea though she take natural pleasure in the act: yet if her will, do not deliberately consent (though they say) in any court, she could not in such circumstances, but be presumed to consent;) she sins not mortally: thus Soto with others. They confess that 
(r) Credo paucas honestas repertum iri, quae aliquo modo non resistant, saltem sine clamore, etc. ibid.  a woman can scarce ever do this and be honest, and yet give this encouragement, to all, to doit. Here's a way to have all women corrupted, that are but attempted with eagerness, if the rules of those, who have the guidance of their practice and Consciences be but complied with: impetuous lust may make the essay upon any, without fear of so much as a check, or any resistance: and those who are engaged by the Laws of nature, God, and man, to make opposition; may innocently give place to it, without struggling; yea they may be chaste enough though they yield to such lust with pleasure; so it be no more than sensual, and these delights be not jumbled together in practice, which in the Doctrine of their Teachers is sufficiently distinguished and parted for them. They bid fair also to make that uncleanness to which persons are drawn by the power of Courtship and insinuation, pass as innocent; for they say, that is no sin which is involuntary, and that is not voluntary to which we are necessitated; and Cajetan 
(s) 
Passiones nostrae ab extrinseco suasore illate quasi vim faciunt— meretricum blandae valde extorsiones supra debitam mercedem— omnis similis actio causans involuntariam dationem rei suae quia non minus necessitatur ex hujusmodi humanus animus, etc. Sum. v. restitut. p. 509.  
Ex sententia Cajetani (& Navarri) sequitur licitum esse invitare ad fornicationem, eum qui paratus est alias fornicari in Vasq. opusc. moral. dub. 3. p. 24.   tells us (in a case much akin to this) that our passions excited by exterior persuasion, do as it were, offer us violence; after he had informed us, that what Whores extort by flatteries more than their hire, is an involuntary gift, the mind being this way necessitated: and sure, flatteries in reference to the act, as well as the reward, may as much necessitate, and make the one as involuntary, as the other; further, if man or woman need neither force nor importunity, but be ready to commit uncleanness without more ado, one may without sin invite them to it. 
(t) Antoninus, Sylvester, Cajetan. in Navar. in Lopez. c. 74. p. 252. tenent quod ita licet cupere et ita complacere. Vid. Navar. Cap. 16. n. 7.  Self pollution is no mortal sin, in any that desire, it may befall them in their sleep for the ease of nature: nor is it a sin to be pleased with it when it is 
(u) Ibid. S. Thomas, Paludanus ut communes asserunt non esse peccatum complacere sibi de praeterita pollutione ob sanctum finem. Vid. Sylvest. v. pollutio post placentia non faciat praeteritam pollutionem esse peccatum.  passed for a good end, and so Aquinas, Paludanus, and the common Doctrine: Nor to be pleased with it as future, if the pleasure do not cause it: Nor to be pleased with it when it befalls them awake, 
(x) Non est autem peccatum saltem mortale, pollutio illa, quae incipit evenire alicui, dum dormit, & finitur postquam est experrectus, si voluntas superior, sive rationalis deliberata, in illam non consentiat quamvis sensualitas ea delectetur, etc. Navar. ibid. n. 8. & Cardin Turrecremata.  if the pleasure be but sensual, and not rational. Under the favour of this distinction they may act uncleanness, either natural, or against nature, and that with delight too: for though the lower faculties take pleasure therein, yet if the superior either check it, or run not into a full compliance there with, they are safe. They encourage them to venture upon, and continue in such occasions of uncleanness; as those who think it needful to avoid the acts, cannot but judge necessary, to be abandoned. They 
(y) Non esse peccatum mortale, comedere nimis, aut calida edusia, ob quod pollutio evenit, dummodo non comedat ea eo fine, sed solum ut suae gulae satisfaciat. Navar. C. 16. n. 8. Si non intenditur, sed quid tale fiat propter gulositatem aut aliam causam, cum dubio tamen secuturae pollutionis, esset veniale. Sylu. v. Pollut. Lopez. Cap. 74. p. 354.  that eat hot meats, such as provoke and cause uncleanness; or otherwise eat excessively: if they do it not with such an intention, but to satisfy their gluttony, or for other cause: yea though they doubt uncleanness will be the issue of it, offend but Venially. Carnal 
(z) Martinus de Magistris, Gabriel, Javellus, Navarre, Soto, Nider, Antoninus, & alii in Sanch, l. 9 de matr. disp. 46. n. 6. & Bonacin. Tom. 1. p. 318.  touches used, for sensual pleasure, without designing the act of uncleanness, or the delight of it (though it be confessed, that of all other occasions, this leads most directly, and most dangerously to the consummation of the act): yet are they but Venial faults, with many of their Writers. 
(a) Ire ad locum sive ad societatem, ubi est periculum peccandi mortaliter propter aspectum, persuasiones, commoditates, aut aliquid bujusmodi, non est ex suo genere peccatum mortale, licet sine urgenta necessitate fiat, ad peccatum incantelae spectet. Haec est Cajetani, & probatur, quia in suae libertatis arbitrio restat non peccare mortaliter, etiam praesentibus talibus occasionibus. Lopez. cap. 20. p. 112.  To go to the place, or company, where is danger of sinning mortally, by reason of the sights, persuasions, opportunities, or any thing of this nature, though it be done without any cogent necessity, is not a mortal sin with them; and the reason is, because it rests in the man's free will, not to sin mortally, thoughsuch occasions of sinning be offered. Filthy 
(b) Antoninus de Graff. Cajetan. & alii in Sanch. ibid. n. 39 Cajetan. Navar. Graff. Rebellus (in) Bonacin. Tom. 1. p. 318. n. 18.  discourse when it is out of lightness and curiosity, without any other ill design; or when it is merely for the pleasure taken in the obscene talk, without any further intention; is no worse than a Venial fault. The filthiness which the Apostle forbids, Eph. 5. 4. Bellarmine 
(c) De Amiss. Grat. l. 1. cap. 9 p. 78. Docere volebat tria posteriora (turpia verba stultiloquia & scurrilitatem) debere quidem esse aliena ab ore sanctificato fidelium, non tamen ex genere suo talia esse, que excludant ab haereditate Christi & Dei.  understanding thereby filthy words, will have it be but a Venial, and the same he determines, not only of filthy talking, but scurrility; and Cardinal Cajetan 
(d) Scurrilitis qui homo ad risum provocat inverecande— non est mortalis ex suo genere, Sum. v. Scurril.  before him, says, in its own nature it is not a mortal sin, though he describes it to be shameless mirth; and Alensis 
(e) secundem Halensem resertur ad lasciviam affectionis. Angelus. sum. v Scurril.  refers it to lascivious affection; and in Angelus 
(f) Non peccat mortaliter ab hoc solum mulier, quae vanae gloriae et venialis desiderio tacta, absque alio fine mortali se fucat et ornal, licet credat aliquos, qui ipsam sic sucatam & ornatam videbunt, in ejus concupiscentiam mortalem exarsuros. Attamen certum est, eam absque in commodo verecundiae, et dedecore suo, posse ab hujusmodi ornatu temperare. Navar. cap. 14. n. 27.  it is a provoking others to laughter, either by idle or obscene words. A woman sins not mortally, who being moved with the affection of a little vain glory, without any other deadly intention; does paint or adorn herself, although she believe, that some who see her in such a dress, will be inflamed with mortal lust: when it is certain also, that without any disparagement or inconvenience, she might abstain from such a garb; 
(g) Non autem (peccat mortaliter) si facit illud, ut ametur honest, licet carnaliter— imo neque si id facit quo ametur inhoneste, sed non mortaliter ad luxuriam videlicet tantum venialem. Idem c. 16. n. 14.  yea though she so tr●ck up herself, that some may be induced to love her honestly but earnally; or with a dishonest affection either, only not beyond the bounds of Venial uncleanness. This being their Doctrine, no wonder if Christian purity be abandoned in their practice. Navarre tells us, 
(h) Cap. 16. n. 3. — diluvium tam effrenatae luxuriae, etiam inter cognatos adeo propinquos & affines, ut non audeamus exprimere & inter conjugatas et virgines tam sacratas quam non sacratas, etc.  there's such a deluge of unbridled luxury amongst them, who are so near a kin, that he dares not express it; and amongst the married, and unmarried; amongst Virgins consecrated, and not consecrated: that divine and immense goodness, may send upon them a horrible deluge, of all calamities, not only corporal but spiritual. And because it is not lawful for one to take the profession of a Nun, if she have committed uncleanness before; he says, 
(i) Ob quod forsitan paucis grandiorum sine cautela licite consecrare possunt. ibid.  that there are few grown up that without caution can be lawfully consecrated for Virgins.   

SECT. VIII.  
FOR theft, they teach, that to steal any thing of small value is but a Venial fault; for this is the Rule they universally proceed by, 
(k) Aquinas 1, 2. q. 88 art. 5. & 6. & 22. q. 3. art. 5. & q. 59 art. 4, 5. Antoninus. 2. per tit. 4. c. 5. Sect. 7, & 8. Adrian. quodlib. 8, in Navar. c. 17. n. 2.  the smallness of a thing in all causes, excuses from mortal sin; and thus far all are encouraged to stcal, not only strangers, but Children from 
(l) Cajetan sum. v. furtum. Adrian in 4. de restit. Navar. c. 17. n. 138. Sylvest. sum. v. surtum. n. 16. Graff. l. 2. cap. 92. n. 25.  their Fathers, and Wives from their Husbands, and Servants from their Masters.  

1 Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. 10. punct. ult. n. 2.  A Servant may be excused from mortal guilt, if he steal from his Master by little and little; though in time it come to a considerable sum; provided he convert it to his own use; he should not, it seems steal for others too, unless he do it out of Charity.  

2 Pet. Navar. et Bonacin. ibid. punct. 1. n. 5. long majorem summam.  A Son may steal more from his Father, than strangers or servants may do; he must be regulated herein by his father's Estate; this love and indulgence to him, the greater that it is, the more he may steal from him. They excuse him if he steal from his Father the sum of three Crowns; they say not, that it may not be a greater, but only it should not be a far greater sum.  

3 Lopez. Navar. & alii in Bonacin. ibid. n. 6. in ludos— recreationem etiam luxuriosam.  Accordingly he may spend what he gets from his Father, in gaming, or in recreations, not only such as are honest, but also luxurious, without any more guilt.  

4 Sairus Saeonius & alii cum Bonacin. ibid. possit filius clam accipere juxta prudentis confessarii arbitrium.  If his Father allow him not, what others of his condition do, he may filch from him privily, what a prudent Confessor thinks fit. Thus men's Estates will be at the Confessors discretion, and as much may be stolen from them, as their Priests please.  

5 Angelus. Navar. Bartolus. Baldus & alii in Bonacin. ibid. n. 8:  Or if he do business for his Father, his expenses deducted, he may keep to himself as much as a stranger would have for such Service.  
Now that we may know, when theft will be a mortal crime, it must be known of what value the thing stolen must be, to make it so: and this not being determined by any law natural, divine or humane; they agree, that 
(m) Quae tamen parvitas excusat a peccato mortale, communis est opinio, standum esse arbitrio boni viri. Graff. ibid. n. 20. vid. Navarre cap. 17. n. 2.  this must be determined by the judgement of a good man; and who better than the Casuists since they ought, and are presumed, to be, both knowing and Conscientious? let but them conclude (and they have done worse, in many cases) that things of great worth are not of value sufficient, to make the stealing thereof, to be a mortal sin, and then theft neither little nor great will be criminal. Thus this command of God (as the rest are) will be made of none effect by this distinction. An engine which (as they work it) serves to destroy both Law and Gospel; and to sink Christianity, in morals, many degrees below Heathenism. Let us see what progress they have made herein, and whether they have not done it in effect already. They teach, 
(n) Navarre ibid. Graff. ibid. n. 16.  that to steal any thing, though in itself small, yet of great value in the account of the owner, and of much consequence to him; so that the damage he suffers by it, and the trouble it gives him, is really great: yet if the thief did not, or could not know it, it is but Venial. Yet the reason, why they count the stealing of a small thing, to be but a little fault; is 
(o) Si minimi erit pretii-nemo mortalem esse culpam affirmabit ex D. Thom. et ratio est quia praesumitur non esse omnino contra voluntatem ejus qui hoc patitur. Graff. l. 1. c. 14 n. 5. Nau. ibid. n. 5.  because, the owner is presumed, not unwilling, the stealer should have it, it being no considerable loss, or trouble to him: but this cannot be presumed in the now mentioned cases. And if theft whether of small or great consequence, whether with or without that, which makes little theft to be Venial, be still no worse than Venial, than will no theft be mortal. They also teach, that 
(p) 
Tradunt Medina. Angelus. Pet. Navarre Malderus & Plures alii in Dian. p. 2. l. 3. mis. res. 29.  
Quamvis non sit in necessitate extrema excusari tamen potest a toto, furtive subripiendo Sylvest. sum. v. futum. n. 10. Navar. ibid. vid. Angelum. One in extreme necessity may kill the owner if he would hinder him from stealing, si a domino impediatur potest se tueri et occidere impedientem. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 1. q. 8. punct. 3. n. 4.   those who are in need, though it be not extreme, but such only, as would be counted great, may steal from others for their relief: 
(q) Communis est opinio quam re●ert Sylvest. quod non teneatur ad restitutionem si ad pinguiorem fortunam pervenerit is— qui in magna necessitate surripit. Graff. l. 2. c. 93. n. 11.  nor are they bound to make restitution, when they have got a good estate. Thus theft will be made as common as moderate indigence: and the practice being continued, as long as there is need, it may amount in a while, to a considerable sum; yea when the necessitous are grown rich, those whose estates are impaired by such thefts, shall have no reparation. Thus a wide door is opened, for common thievery in considerable quantities; without any restraint, either from respect to sin, or to satisfaction. Further, 
(r) Corduba. Navar. Lopez. pars. 2: Cap. 93. p. 414.  when so many persons in no necessity, take each of them a little fruit from a Vineyard or an Orchard, or a little corn from a field, that there is nothing at all left for the owner: yet if they did not conspire together to do this, it is a small fault. And thus any men of estates, (since it holds in other cases, no less than those specified) may be utterly impoverished; and yet those that ruin them, be guilty of nothing that they need regard. Moreover, when any one without any need, continues so long in the stealing matters of less worth, from one person or many, that in time they rise to a great value; and the thief thrives into a good estate thereby, without designing it: this altogether, is no more than a Venial fault; nor will it be worse, though he never make restitution, if there was any considerable interval betwixt the acts of theft 
(s) Navar. c. 17. n. 139. Graff. l. 2. c. 92. n. 18.  (say some); no, nor if there were no such intervals (say 
(t) Angestus in Lopez. ibid. p. 416.  others.) The consequences of which is, as Lopez observes, 
(u) Tabernarius seu quilibet negotiator posset ditescere sine mortal, et statum decentem fundare, et singulos emptores in modico mensuras curtando defraudare, totam civitatem sic depilando. ibid. p. 14.  that any Innkeeper or Tradesman may grow rich, and raise a fair estate, without mortal sin, by defrauding all that buy of them, a little, in false measures, and so fleecing a whole Town. And why might not they as well conclude, that he who beats another, so it be but with little blows, though he beat him to death, offends but Venially? these of old were thought 
(x) Nihil resert, an paulatim, an simul aliquem interimas, vel spolies. Jerom. ibid.  alike. They conclude also, that such a quantity may be stolen, as is sufficient to make it a mortal sin, without sinning mortally, if it be for a good end. These are some of the instances they give. 1. A 
(y) Communis sententia ampliatur, ut non tantum pro se, sed etiam pro alio existente in extrema necessitate quis occulte subtrahere possit. Graff. c. 93. n. 12. Navar. c. 17. n. 118. If a man be in mortal sin, his Wife may take of his goods privily, and give them away in Alms, for his conversion. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. 10. punct 2. n. 9  man may steal to give Alms; We need not wonder at this, since they think not much to rob Christ of his honour in all their good works: and so commit the worst kind of robbery (the highest Sacrilege) in their best acts; arrogating that to them, which is Christ's peculiar; satisfaction and merit. And then, that the Charitable thief, if he become rich, is not bound to restore what is stolen, is the 
(z) in Navar. ibid.  common opinion. Also one may steal 
(a) Antoninus quem sequitur. Nau. ibid. n. 5. p. 282.  money from another, rather than he shall venture it in gaming; for it it is good divinity with them (whatsoever it was with the Apostle) that one evil may be done to hinder another, 
(b) 
Licet inducere ad minus malum, paratum jam ad majus malum: ut si quis proponit interficere, aut adulterari quis, licet ei persuadere percutere aut fornicari, contra fratrem Josephum, qui limitat hanc sententiam ad peccata quae non sunt intrinseca mala sed cense● sententiam hanc generaliter esse tenendam, prout eam tenet Navarrus, et Cajetanus, Lopez. pars. 1. cap. 58. p. 297. Adrianus, Cajetan. Sotus. quos sequitur Navar. cap. 14. n. 40.  
Luxurioso sancte consulitur ut non adulteretur, sed fornicetur. Cajetan. sum. v. Tyrannis. Medina, Sotus, Adrian existimant— non tantum licere suadere minus furtum latroni, sed etiam ipsum comitari, imo etiam adjuvare. in Vasq. opusc. Moral. p. 24. dub. 2. Bonacin. de rest disp. 1. q. 2. punct. 7. n. 9   and that not only in other sins (as Friar Joseph would limit it) but such as are intrinsically evil: for example; If one be about to commit adultery, it will be a lawful (a holy act) to beseech, and persuade him to commit fornication. Or nearer the matter in hand; if one be ready to steal an hundred pounds, I may advise him to steal fifty; and so persuade to a mortal sin with some moderation. They think it not only lawful to persuade a thief to a smaller robbery, but also to accompany and assist him therein. Further, a 
(c) Sylvest. v. furtum. n. 15. Navar. cap. 17. n. 154. Graff. l. 2. c. 92. n. 26:  woman if her Husband be profuse, may against his command take away his goods, and conceal them, to provide for the future. If a man be distracted, or if he be absent, his Wife may spend more of his estate than he would do, if he were sober or present. Bonacin ibio. Finally, they all agree, that to steal any thing of what value soever inconsiderately, that is, without full and perfect deliberation, is but a Venial Trespass. And how he can be obliged to restore, it by their Principles, I understand not: since they hold that 
(d) Adrian. 4. de restit. fam. ad 8. Sylvest. v. culpa. q. 4. in Fill. tr. 32. n. 32.  no man is bound to make restitution, but for a mortal offence. If in a matter that is weighty, the ●…ult be Venial, for want of full consideration, it will not be so much as 
(*) Sylvest. & alii ibid.  a small fault, not tomake restitution, how much soever be stolen inconsiderately. By these and such like rules, they have opened a way, to make thievery small or great, practicable; without any sin or danger, but what is small and inconsiderable in their account. Scholars and those who count good Books their treasure, are by their Doctrine exposed more particularly, for they teach, that to take away haeretical Books, from such as have not Licence to read them, is no theft; Bonacin. de restit disp. 2. q. 8. punct. 1. n. 1. So that it will be no fault at all, to rob one of the best part of his Library, how valuable soever.  
They open as wide a gap, and give as much encouragement to ●…eating, and like unconscionable practices. They teach there is no necessity to be regulated in bargaining, by the just value of things: but they may sell for as much as they can extort, and buy answerably; and this they take for a general Rule; 
(e) Justum praetium reputatur quod absque fraude extorqueri potest. Ità, Bannes, Medina, Arragon, Villalobos, Bonacina, & alii in Dian. 1. p. tr. 8. res. 55.  a thing is worth so much as it can be sold for. Hence Sylvester concludes it lawful, 
(f) Res tantum valet quantum vendi potest— Et secundum hoc licet cuilibe● carius vendere, aut vilius emere quantum potest. Sumv. Emptio. n. 10.  for any one to sell as dear, and buy as cheap as he can, which unlimited, gives liberty to all to pray upon one another, without equity or conscience. So one may buy a thing of great value 
(g) Vid. Cajetan. Sum. v. Emptio, p. 138.  though he knows it and the owner understands it not, for a small matter, nor 
(h) Emptor non tenetur ei explicite affirmare quantum valet: quam habeat alios, unde possit inquirere et scire. ibid.  needs be declare it, when he apprehends that it is much more worth; since that may be enquired of others. They conclude, that false measures and weights may be used, though the buyer be hereby deceived and damnified, and the custom itself to be a corruption: yet they are excused who use them, 
(i) Tabernarii dantes vini mensuram diminutam secundum Arc. non excusantur: quia decipiunt & damnifiant emptores, non obstant● contra●… consuetudine, quae est corruptela: nisi hoc faciunt ad suam indemnitatem, vel lucrum moderatum: puta, quia si darent plenas, oporteret pretium augere, ut consequenter n●llos aut paucos invenirent emptores. Sylu. Sum. ibid. n. 20. Vid. Soto, the just. & jur. lib. 6. q. 3. art. 2.  if they do it for their own security, or for moderate gain; as if in case, they should give full measure, the price would be greater, and consequently they would have few or no Customers. So, by their Rules, they may further deceive those that deal with them, by selling one thing for another, or adulterating what they sell; and so cheat them not only in the measure, but in the quality, yea or the substance of the Commodity. Instances hereof we have in Soto: Corn or Wine, when it is more worth than the set rate, the Merchant may fallen it 
(k) Soto, ibid. p. 198.  by false measure, thereby to get his price. If a 
(l) Ibid.  man have very good Wine, but people, if they did not take it for Rhenish, would not give so good a price for it; he may sell it at the rate they would g●ve for Rhenish, though it be not. So he may 
(m) Eadem ratione, & aqua possit vinum diluere. Idem ibid.  mix his Wine with water, and sell it for pure, taking but a just price; as for example; 
(n) Ibid.  In case Wine were so dear, that scarce any would buy it at the price it is worth; he may mix it with water, and sell it at the rate they will give. So 
(o) Idem ibid.  Cloth or Silks may be sold for that of such a Country which is most esteemed, though it be of another. These conclusions, he says, are collected out of Aquinas, and to complete these Cheats, he tells us 
(p) Forsan venditoris mendacium in talibus casibus, si alioqui praedicto modo servetur justitia, non est pernitiosum. Idem abide. p. 199. quem sequitur in his omnibus, Tol. instr. l. 8. c. 49.  that if perhaps the Seller should lie too, in these cases (for example, if he should affirm, that to be Rhenish Wine which is not, or that to be pure which is adulterated, or that to be full measure which is short of it, etc.) it would not be a mortal sin. And Sylvester determines, that a man with perjuries and lies, denying the badness of his Commodities, or making them better than they are; 
(q) Sum. Ibid. n. 22.  the lies, if they do not much damnify the Buyer, are but Venial. They allow persons also to deceive those who intrust them to dispose of their Estates, or Goods. As, if one be employed to sell what is another's 
(r) Si accipit certo pretio ven dendum, retinere potest id quo pluris illud vendiderit, nisi excesserit pretium rigorosum. Navar. c. 23. n. 97.  at a certain price, if he sell it for more, he may keep the overplus to himself; yea, say 
(s) Angel. Sum. in Sylu. ibid. n. 25.  some, though he had a reward for his pains in selling, yet he may retain to himself the overplus of what is sold.  
Further, Panormitan 
(t) Dicit etiam Panormitan quod jura Canonica permittentia deceptionem usque ad dimidium, intelligi debent quando venit deceptio reipsa, in Silu. ibid. n. 9  takes notice, that their Canon-law allows of deceit, if it be not extended beyond half the worth of the thing bargained or, (that is, if a man be not cozened of above fifty per Cent. in a bargain) But then to salve the reputation of the Law (which he like a true Canonist, says, was form by the instinct of the holy Ghost), he will have it understood of deceit in the thing, not of fraud in the persons, and others after him; but Sylvester who sees no ground for that, uses another shift; 
(u) Ego dico quod loquitur in foro contentioso, sive deceptio sit ex re, sive ex dolo: non quia illum approbat, sed quia tolerat. Ibid.  he says it may be understood, either of deceit in the thing, or fraud in the persons, which their Law tolerates, but approves not. Cajetan grants so great deceit 
(x) Jure humano dicitur licitum decipere citra dimidium justi pretii: sed lex domini immaculata est, etc. Sum. v. emptore.  is lawful, by humane constitution: but says, it is condemned by the law of God; and so we leave this shameful Deceit, lawful by the Pope's Decrees, but damnable by God's Word.   

SECT. IX.  
LET us see, in the next place, what truth may be expected in Popery, or those that profess it: and whether their Rules, tend not to leave, neither truth in the world, nor amongst themselves, by giving liberty to all falseness, and lying in words and deeds: A lie, as they define it, 
(y) Aquinas, 2. 2. q. 110. art. 1.  is an asserting of what is false, with an intent to speak falsely, and to deceive others. Now they teach that to deliver 
(a) Si dicatur falsum sed defit voluntas dicendi falsum— non est mendacium proprit aut perfect, & si diligentia esset adhibita, non esset peccatum, & si non sit adh●bita, est veniale, 2. 2. q. 2. C. homines in Sylu. Sum. v. mendacinm. n. 1.  what is false, if not on purpose, though it he without any care whether it be true or false; if it be a fault, is such, as needs not be regarded; unless, where it is in testimony, or upon Oath (and there they will excuse it too, by and by): because this is but a material lie, and not in its formal perfection. But then, a perfect lie with a design to speak what is false, and to deceive the hearers, is as innocent if it be for pleasure or in sport, ridentem dicere falsum quis ●etat? to make a sport of violating truth, or in offering it such injury, to please himself, or others; any one may do it out of habit, and make a practice of it, and tell 
(b) Quod fit sola mentiendi libidine quod procedit ex habitu: nam mendax ex to quod talis est secundum habitum ipso mendacio gaudet, 4 Ethic.— reducitur ad jocosum, cum sit delectabile mentienti. Idem ibid. nec mendacium erat mortale ut in jocoso & officios●, ibid. n. 3.  lies when he list, out of mere pleasure to be telling lies: yea 
(c) Contingit tamen propter imperfectionem actus esse veniale peccatum ex malitia: ●… si quis vana mendacia eligit dicere ex intentione hujus mali, quod est vane mentiri, & non propter aliud. Cajetan. Sum. v. malitia.  or out of malice (though that be the highest aggravation of sin). An officious lie is with them as harmless, they have warrant enough for the most complete and perfect lies, 
(d) Officiosum (mendacium) quod fine alicujus injuria dicitur, ut alicui prosit, & hoc etiam est veniale. Cajet. ibid. v. Mendac.  when they are of any advantage to some, and no hurt to others; how much soever truth be injured, or others deceived thereby. So that their true Catholics, need leave no place for truth, either in their heart or words; when the excluding of it from both, will, without hurt, serve either their pleasure or profit. However, herein they use true and plain dealing, in letting the world know, that in these cases, they are never to be trusted, either in matters of Conversation, or Religion. This being their Principle, 
(e) Lex de non mentiendo jocose aut officiose sine dumno alterius— (ejus) transgressio est solum venialis, secundum omnes Catholicos. Navar. c. 23. n. 5.  received by all Catholics, and universally acknowledged; we need not wonder, that it hath been their common practice in several ages, and that they make no conscience of it still, to counterfeit false miracles, to forge false stories, to show false Relics, to divulge false Visions, and Revelations, to obtrude on the world supposititious Writings; to corrupt the Monuments of former times, and expunge out of them all the truth that makes against them; to make even the dead speak lies, or disguise the truth. For, all this falseness is officious, it serves the interest of the Church, it is to commend her Doctrine, and to maintain her authority over men's Consciences; and it does the world no hurt; For it is (they say) the duty of all men, and would be their advantage, to entertain her Doctrine, and subject themselves to her Authority. Now if the rest of mankind, Jews, Turks, Heathens, had retained no more conscience nor reverence for truth, than these Catholics: if upon their supposition (that their way was the best), they had proceeded by their rules and methods to broach any lies for them, or falsify any Records against them: who sees not, that this had been a direct course to have left no truth at all in the world, nor means to come to the knowledge of it? yet this practice with the Romanists (so great friends are they to Truth), is but a Venial fault. Did I say they count it so bad? I do them wrong; it is a great piece of piety, to make lies for their Religion, as some 
(f) Fuerunt qui magnae pietatis loco ducerent mendaciola pro religione confingere. Ludovicus Vives, & Espensaeus, Com. in Tim. l. 1. c. 11. p. 156.  of themselves do acknowledge it has been accounted. To proceed, 
(g) Sylvest. ibid. n. 5.  there are five or six several sorts of lies, (that they may have room enough still to avoid truth), which they may make their practice without danger. It is the pernitions Lie only that need be avoided, that which wrongs others, and is against justice; and thus no violation of truth, no injury to it, how great soever (so tender they are of it) will be a crime, unless withal, it be against Justice: and a Lie, (be it as gross as can be) will not of itself, 
(h) Mendacium si aliam non habet maculam quam falsitatis, non est genere suo mortale, patet, quia neque est contra religionem (Romanam) neque contra justitiam. Soto, ibid. l. 5, q. 7. art. 4. p. 168.  and in its own nature, be more than Venial, but only by accident; when it so falls out that it does mischief: And it may be as innocent to tell lies as truth, and as criminal to speak truth as lies; there will be no difference as to mortal guilt in their own nature: and by accident they may do hurt alike. However, considering that Truth and their Religion are so much at odds, the world is obliged to them for being so indifferent as to truth and lies, and that these have no more the preference. But then, though none but pernicious Lies need be shunned, yet not all of this sort neither: they give liberty to tell mischievous lies, as many and as oft as you please, so the mischief they do be not great, though it prejudice others in spirituals or temporals: or though ye do the 
(i) Mortalis autem est omnis, & sola illa, quae fit animo notabiliter nocendi in bonis spiritualibus aut temporariis, quamvis non noceat, et illa quae fit nocendo notabiliter, aut dando causam ita nocendi sine tali animo, advertendo tamen, aut advertere debendo per illam notabiliter nocere, aut causam notabilis nocumenti dando, alias non, quamvis injuria gravissima sit juxta mentem. S. Thom. declaratam utrobique per Cajetan. Navarre. c. 18. n. 1.  greatest mischief that can be done, yet if you did not intent it to be great; or if you should not, or did not observe and consider that it would be so; in such cases even pernicious lies will be harmless Venials. They may by their Rules, lie to the prejudice of others in Soul, Body, or Estate, and that deliberately, and with design to do it, provided the damage be not great; but when it will be great, their Casuists cannot well determine; this is not confined to a point, there's a fair latitude, and liberty enough given for less or more, it is much left to discretion: and if he do much mischief instead of little, the Liar caunot be charged with mortal guilt; for who can condemn any for transgressing bounds that are not set? and how can they think, that any injury done by lying, can be great, who count it better than innocent (as we saw before) to abuse the world with lies in point of Religion? Sure if the injury be not great there, any will be small. And in other matters, they have fair leave to do great hurt by lying, so they do it but by degrees, and be not so hasty as to do it all at once. Take but an instance of it in commerce. 
(k) 
Mendaciis uti eo fine in venditione, ut pervenire possit ad justum pretium, vel ipsis uti tantum ad decipiendum in modico, peccatum veniale est, quamvis illis assidue utatur: licet Hostiensis dicat esse mortale, si assidue fiat, quod falsum est, quia veniale de se, quantumcunque multiplicatur & continuetur, nunquam fit mortale, ut Doctores notant, etc. Graff. l. 2. c. 118. n. 10.  
Excusari tamen à mortali eum qui utitur amphibólogia in contractu cum juramento, etc. Idem. Tom. 2. disp. 4. q. 1. punct. 12. n. 7. ubi Sayrus & alii.   To use lies, says the Graffiis, in bargaining, to get a good price, or the using of them to deceive others in a little, is but a Venial fault, though it were a daily practice. Hostiensis thought that this lying to cheat others, if it were their continual practice, might prove mortal: but he is confuted by the common judgement of their Doctors, who hold, that a Venial▪ how much soever multiplied or continued, can never become mortal. We see they may lie, and deceive those that deal with them, if they wrong them but a little at once, this they may do daily and continually; and so in time, that little will be much, yet the sin will be no more; the pernicious Lie which does great injury, will be as innocent as any.  
Others teach, that lying is Venial in Trading; for Example, if one affirm falsely, that his Wine is so many years old, or of such a Country, which if the Buyer know to be a lie, he would not buy it at all, or would not give so much for it, this seems no mortal sin, provided all circumstances considered it be as good, and as much worth, or not much less. Bonacin. de contract. disp, 3. q. 1, punct. 2. sect. 2. n. 7. Or if the Sellers affirm with a lie, that the thing cost so much, or was sold to others at such a rate, that they may draw the Buyer to a rigorous price: by thus lying for the most part they sin but Venially, and regularly they are not bound to restitution: because such lies are customary, and men commonly know that these are the tricks of Sellers, to which those who deal with them give no credit; and for the same reason the same must be said of Buyers, who affirm (falsely) that they bought the thing cheaper, or had it offered them for less; that they may get it at the lowest rate. Idem ibid. disp. 3. q. 2. punct. 4. n. 3 1▪ after others; yea, if they not only lie but swear false too with some equivocation, they may be probably excused from mortal sin, if no great damage be done thereby to another. But though they have no more regard of truth in common conversation, or in commerce; yet it may be expected that they will be more tender of it in Judgement, and Courts of Judicature; since they cannot but acknowledge that the perverting of truth in Judgement is destructive of humane Society, and tends to throw the World into confusion. Notwithstanding they maintain lying there also, and that in many cases, I shall but mention some of them. 1. To lie in Court, if the end of it be but delight, 
(l) Durandus & Sylvester. ibid. n. 5.  is harmless. Also, Witnesses may lie there seriously, if they do it not as Witnesses, and in 
(m) Navar. secundum Cajetanum. cap. 18. n. 3.  matters judicial: and 
(n) Mortalia sunt judicis ut ●…c mendacia, reliqua sunt per accidens & ideo venialia. Cajetan. Sum. v. Mendac.  the Judge too, if he lie not as a Judg. Further, 
(o) 
Testimonium falsum in favorem proximi, non est mortals: neque adeo quando dicitur, ut idem impediatur injuriam facere: quoniam neque hoc est contra ipsum. Praeceptum Ex. 20. sub illa forma constituitur. Non loqueris contra proximum tuum falsum testionium. Soto, ibid. l. 5. q. 7. art. 4.  
Victoriae visum est non esse damnondum de mortali falsitate— qui ut suum tueatur innocentiam, utitur testibus se ultra offerentibus ad testificandum salsum— jurando. Vid. Lopez. pars 2. c. 44. p. 264.   they may bear false witness in favour of another; a false testimony for my Neighbour, is not mortal with them; and the reason is, because the Precept forbids false Witness against another, not for him. And upon the same account, Soto says, a false testimony may be excused, when it is to hinder one from doing injury. Likewise, when the matter in Judicial process, is not of great consequence, a lie is Venial, whether it be for, or against another. So Navarre 
(p) Concludendo nullum mendacium esse mortale, to solo, quod, in judicio exteriori, vel interiori dicatur, quod extra illud dictum tale non esset. Navar. cap. 18. n. 3. Censeo in judicio mendacium circa rem ad id pertinentem levissimam tamen contingens, non esse mortale crimen quod— ostendunt. Domin. a Soto, Covarruvius, Navar. Graff. l. 1. c. 14. n. 6. & l. 2. c. 143. n. 7.  and in him Ledesma, (whom he calls the Glory of the Dominican Order) with Soto, (of the same Order and no less renown) maintain, that no lie is mortal in any Court exterior (that of the Judge) or interior (that of the Confessor); which is but Venial, out of Court. So that if the lie be not signally injurious, it is not mortal, however or wherever it be delivered, though by a Witness in a Trial before a Judge▪ in the face of the Country. Moreover, it is as innocent in all those cases, wherein the Liar is not obliged to speak truth, which are not few. A Lie, says Sylvester 
(q) Mendacium de his quae ad judicium pertinent est perniciosum & mortale: quia subvertit veritatem judicii, quod tendit, in perniciem universitatis, quod limita quantum ad ea, in quibus qui mentitur, tenetur dicere veritatem, non aliter. Ibid. n. 3.  in judicial matters, is pernicious and mortal; because it subverts the truth of Judgement, which tends to the ruin of the Universe. But then he adds, this is to be limited to things, in which the Liar is bound to speak the truth, and not extended to any other. Now they hold, there are very many cases in which they are not obliged to speak the truth, no not in Courts: and in all these by their common Doctrine (not that of the Jesuits only) either they may lie plainly; or (which is all one as to the justice of the practice, and as to the subverting of Judgement), secretly, by equivocation or mental reservation. Antonius Corduba determines, that a person other wise virtuous, being unduly interrogated, whether such a thing was done, which, confessed, might endanger him; he and the Witnesses too, if they cannot otherwise evade, (by saying 
(r) Liceret sibi & testibus injustè interrogatis sic respondere: (quando tunc respondere nescio, non recordor non prodasstt) non furatus sum, intelligendo, ad jure revelandum tibi.— alias tenemur per verba, & modos assuetos, licèt aequivocos , interroganti, respondere. Lopez. cap. 51. p. 264.  I know not, or I remember not); may say, though it be false, that it was not done, with this reserve, To discover it unto thee; and says, such Interrogatories may be answered or evaded, by any, with equivocal words, in usual 
(*) Angel. Sum. v. Confess. n. 1.  form. So that he is not bound to tell the truth, though he be sworn to declare it. Navarre holds that not only virtuous, but any person whatever, may so answer in like case; denying that to be done, which was done, secretly meaning, In such a Month; and this he asserts after Gabriel, Paludanus, Adrian, Vincentius Justinianus, and 
(s) Intelligendo intra se quod isto vel illo mense non fuerit id res furatus— Navarre opinio testimoniis Gabriel Adriani, Paludens & Vincent. Justiniani, rata habetur. Ibid.  Lopez after him. Sylvester 
(t) Quum juridice non procedet, vel quia accusatus non est ei subjectus simpliciter vel in hoc casu, aut quacunque alia causa, tune licèt mendacium sic illicitum, non est tamen mortale— Immò non erit etiam veniale, si respondendo cautelose, &, ut aiunt Sophistice, dicat aliquid salsum, apud sensum judicis, & apud suum verum; quia eo casu cum non sit ejus subditus, non tenetur dicere veritatem ad ejus intentionem. Rationem dictorum assignat. Hen. de Gan. Sylu. Sum. v. accusatio. n. 10.  concludes, when the process is not judicial, or the aceused not subject to the Judge; in this case mentioned, or any other cause whatsoever, though a lie he not lawful, yet it is not mortal, yea it will not be so much as Venial, if answering cautiously, and, as they say, sophistically, he speak that which is false in the Judge's sense, 
(u) Licèt ei uti aequivocatione, Soto the just. l. 5. q. 6. art. 2. Adrian dicit, talem reum posse dicere non seci, & Cajetan. Opusc. 16. q. 5. Dicit posse respondere se non habuisse complices, quamvis habuerit, in Tol. Instr. l. 5. c. 58.  and true in his own; 
(w) Non tenetur respondere etiamsi jurasset dicere veritatem secundum, Henr. de Gand. — sed dicetne mendacium? Resp. quod non sed utetur aliis verbis duplicibus & silatis. Angel. Surn. v. Confess. n. 1.  since not being under him, he is not obliged to speak truth in his sense, and alleges Henricus de Gandavo, with his reason for it. Soto allows him to use Equivication. Cajetan permits him to deny his Complices, though he had them. If the Judge demand of a Priest upon Oath, whether he knew such a thing by confession? 
(y) Quid. si judex instat, vel exigit juramentum à sacerdote an per confessionem sciat aliquid de tali facto? Et dico quod secundum, S. Tho. & omnes doctores, sacerdos si ab eo quaeretur, de aliquo absent, an aliquid sciat quod audivit in confession jurare potest, se nescire illud: quia non scit illud in quantum homo— Secundùm Vervec, si alio modo iniquum judicem declinare non potest: respondere potest se nihil scire quia subintelligiter ut homo— & consentit Rich. Bonav. Scot & Pan. Sylvest. v. confessio 3. n. 6.  AQVINAS, and all the Doctors conclude, that he may swear he knows it not, though it hath been confessed to him, Because he knows it not as a man. And according to V●r●…cellus, if he cannot otherwise decline the Judge, he may answer be knows nothing, with this inward reserve, AS A MAN; and in this Richard. de Sancto Victore, Bonaventure, Scotus and Panormitan agree; yet Angelus thinks when he swears, he knows it not, it had better be with this reserve, TO DISCOVER IT, because it cannot be denied, but that he knows it AS A MAN: 
(z) Quod ejus dictum est contra omnem doctrinam suorum Doctorum et contra C. si sacerd. intellectum juxta communem doctrinam: quia ibi dicitur sacerdos hoc scire ut Deus.  but this, says Sylvester, is said against the judgement of all his Doctors, and against the Canon Law, understood according to their common Doctrine, because the Priest is there said, to know it AS GOD. This needs no aggravation; a Priest rather than speak the truth (though 
(a) Certum est obligationem hujus precepti tantum esse, ut in nullo casu, & propter nullum finem, etiam pro tuenda tota republice ab ingenti malo temporali aut spirituali, violare illud liceat. Ita docent theologi omnes contra unum Altisiod tenet. D. Tho. S. Bonav. Richard, Scotus, Durand. Palud. Major. Capreol. Gabriel. Alensis. Adrian. Medina. Viguer. Sylu. & alii summistae, omnes Pet. Soto. Domin. Soto. Navar. Covarruv. Simanca. Cajetan. Ledesma in Suar. Tom. 34. disp. 33. sect. 1. n. 2.  the discovery of it may be necessary to secure a Prince or a Nation from ruin), may with mental reservation delude Authority, and blaspheme God, and lie, and swear falsely in open Court; and be justified in all, by the authority of the chief Saints and Doctors that Church has had, and such as she gloried in, before Ignatius had any disciples.  
But though truth suffer so much by them in civil things; it may be she may find sanctuary in their divine Offices, and be secured there from such shameful violations: no, even there she is prostituted before their Astars, in their Pulpits, and their penitential Tribunals. Their Liturgies have been stuffed with Fables, and Lies made both the ground and part of their public devotion. Their own 
(1) Vid. Espenc. come. in 2 Tom. c. 4. digr. 21.  Writers take notice of 
(2) Nuper Raphael. Volateranus ausus est scribere dolendum, aperta in horis Canonicis legi mendacia. Ibid. p. 424.  plain lies recited in their daily Prayers. And what store of them there were in the whole, we may guests by a part. 
(3) 
Nosti quantum me pigeant falsa in Ecclesia Dei cantica, quantum nugae canorae mihi odibiles, inter quas, nam plurimae sunt— mendacia ad minus 24 canticum id, citato percurrens animo, reperi. Ibid. p. 433.  
In res sacras hanc quoque mentiendi licentiam irrepsisse, seu potius aperte invectam esse. Ludovic. Vives, l. 2. de corruptis artibus, Espens. in 1 Tim. digr. l. 1. c. 11. p. 156.  
Quae in Ecclesia legi solent— quanquam nonnulla ex his incerta sunt, apocryphas levia, falsa. Loc. Theol. l. 11. c. 5. p. 911.  
In his prudentia desideratur. Quidam namque dum reduviam curant, capiti incommodant, videlicet historias graves pro apocryphis reddunt quidem, sed divinum Ecclesiae officium usque eo praeter solitam immutant, ut vi● ulla antiqu● religionis forma in quotidianis precibus relicta esse videatur. Ibid. p. 910.   Peter Abbot of Clunie declares, that in a Church hymn in praise of Saint Benet, though reading it cursorily, and not marking all; yet he found 24 lies at least. Some reformation hereof was thought repuisite, for shame of the World. But though the old sore smelled noisomly even to the sense of those amongst themselves who had any; yet it must be touched tenderly, and not all the corruption let out, lest nothing at all of the old Service should be lest. Melchior Canus, (a Bishop from whom better things might be expected than most in the Council of Trent where he sat), acknowledged some years after, that there are things read in their Church-Service that are uncertain, counterfeit, frivolous and false too; but yet he thought it not adviseable, to have this throughly purged. Those that attempt it, in his account want prudence. They cure a sore nail, but mischief the head; They bring in grave stories instead of what were false, but they change the Church-Service so far from what it was, that scarce any show of the old Religion seems less in the daily Prayers: whereby he lets us understand what their old Religion or religious Service is, since so little or nothing of it would be left, if no lies or forgeries were left therein. Another learned Bishop of their Church, who survived the Trent-Council, and all the Orders there made for Reformation, not only complains still of false and foolish things there; but of something worse too, in these words: 
(b) Episcopus ille Lugdunensis qui dixit se in missaltbus & antiphonariis superflu●, levia falsa ridicula; blaspheme phantastica multa correxisse; si nunc viveret & ea con●iceret Deum immortalem! quo ea nomine depingeret? sunt (enim) preces (nostrae) turpissimis mendis conspurcatae: come. in Tim. 1. l. 1. 157. Espencaeus, in the words of Lindanus.  if the Bishop of Lions, says he, who declared that he had corrected superfluous, and ridiculous, and blasphemous things, in their missals and Antiphonaries; were now alive, and did behold them: Oh with what terms would be set them out? for our prayert are defiled with most filthy corruptions; but the rest will admit of no reformation, through the fault of the Bishops. He signifies, that there was something worse in their Service-Books, than that idle, false, ridiculous, and blasphemous stuff, which that ancient Bishop Agohardus corrected, in the old Missals and Antiphonaries: declaring expressly, that their prayers now were polluted with most filthy Corruptions, and that without hope of amendment. Nor is truth more secure amongst them, in the Pulpit, though that (where is bears any sway at all) is its Throne. A Preacher may lie, by Cajetans' 
(c) Sam. v. mendicium, p. 437. omne mendacium predicatoris contra veritatem spectantem ad predicatoris officium (est mortale)— quoniam haec tantum sunt predicatores ut sic— mendacia: reliqua sunt per accidens, & ideo venialia: nisi rationes scandali aliud occurrat censendum.  leave, if he does it not as a Preacher, or in things which belong to him as such. In other matters, it seems, he may take his liberty; and lying when he is Preaching, will be but Venial, unless it be scandalous. He may lie in the Pulpit, if he can do it wittily; 
(d) Quaeritur utrum fit peccatum mortale predicatori mentiri in ambone? & dico quod non, in eyes quae non spectant ad doctrinam puta, ●… dicat aliqua jocosa. Sylu. v. Mendac. n. 4. Graff. l. 2. cap. 143. n. 5. S. Thom. in opusc. 4. precept. 8.  he may min his Sermons with false stories, (if they be facetious) to please his auditory, 
(e) Immiscere predicationi facetas fabellus delictaudi gratia quod B. Ambrose reprehendit quia non debent, in tam gravi actione de rebus tam arduis qualia sunt divina verba, immisceri jocosa & ridicula. Communiter tamen est hoc veniale. Cajetan. sum. v. predicat: p. 481.  that's commonly a Venial- He may 
(f) Qui concioni fabulam & facetias, aut aliquid ridiculum miscet, peccat quidem juxta S. Antoninum & Cajetanum, sed commaniter non plusquam venialiter, juxta ●undem, imo non semper venialiter, ut cum ad hilaritatem honestam breviter dicuntur, ut tradit, Augustin. Triumphus Navar. c. 25. n. 142-  tell a tale in his Sermon, or any thing ridiculous, if he do it with some wit this is commonly no worse than Venial; no nor so bad, if it be done succinctly, to make the people merry, so the mirth be honest. He may lie too, as a serious Divine; and instill false Doctrine into the people without any fault but what is Venial, if it be done without contempt or scandal, so Summa Angelica, and Rosella, with others, conclude. 
(g) In pertinentibus ad doctrinam tenent. Sum. Angel. & Rosell. quod non sit mortale, nisi ratione scandali vel contemptus doctrine annexi: vel nisi in his que sunt de necessitate facienda, intellige etiam omittenda, secus si ex consilio, Sylvest. v. mendac. n. 4.  They limit it indeed, to matters under Counsel; but this does not much straiten them; for practical Divinity being the most proper Subject for Sermons, and virtues, with Christian duties, (and the opposite sins,) being, by their common Doctrine, in a manner all reduced to Counsels, some way or other (as we have showed before): they have liberty enough left them, to do nothing else but lie instead of Preaching. But in any matters of Divinity whatsoever, speculative, or practical; enjoined, or but advised; they may lie at as easy a rate, if 
(h) Peccat qui mentitur in materia fidei, sacrae scripturae vel morum— quod limitat Cajetanus, non procedere quando id fit per solum multiloquium, vel alias sine animo & periculo nocendi notabiliter. Navar. c. 18. n. 4.  it be but done out of a fluent faculty, or without danger, and design of doing signal mischief. Their practice publicly allowed, has outdone their rules; for these, though licentious enough, must have now and then some show of modesty, and caution. Sylvester takes notice of those, who held it was no mortal sin to lie in the Pulpit, and acted accordingly; 
(i) Credunt non esse mortale mentiri in ambone, nisi ut illi dicunt, predicant maximas falsitates, quae deinde à saecularibus deprehenduntur. Ibid.  and thought themselves concerned, only to avoid such monstrous lies as the people would smell out. But this cautiousness, was not always thought needful; he that reads the Legends, which served the people heretofore for Sermons: will find there multitudes of such stories, so absurdly, ridiculously, horridly false; as may fully convince him, that the Spirit which acted them, was seven times worse, than that which inspired Ahabs Prophets. And where they are now disused: it's not with any acknowledgement, that such notorious lies, were not fit to be Preached; but for shame of that part of the world, which they could no longer delude, and abuse. And even after their reformation, they could not quite leave their old habit; their Priests since, have this testimony from one of their own Doctors: 
(k) 
Verum lex periit à sacerdotibus; recitant pro Historia fabulas, pro seriis joca, pro veritate mendacium,— pro virtute Dei fictitia miracula ne dicam portenta Dae●…niorum. Espencaeus, Serm. 1. De officio pastorum.  
After he hath premised something of the preaching and writing of false Miracles, he adds: At facilius Augia stabulum, quam talibus fabellis multorum tam libros, tam concio nes repurges, in 2 Tim. c. 4. digr. 21. p. 424.   The law says he, is perished from Priests; for History, they recite fables; for serious things, jests; for truth, lies; for the power of God, feigned miracles, not to say the prodigies of Devils. That such Doctrine, should have some confirmation, is no more than needs: they provided such as was answerable to it, such are their false miracles, which their (now mentioned) Espenceous calls, Devilish prodigies. And 
(l) Peccat qui utitur falsis reliquiis aut veris, causa turpis quaestus. Navar. cap. 17: n. 169. Graff. l. 2. c. 134. n. 30. Idem dic de illo, qui utitur falsis reliquiis, Si causa turpis quaestus fiat, id est, eo fine aliquid accipiendi pro ostensione earum.  false relics, or miracles, they allow to be showed, or published; it is not a mortal sin with them, unless it be done for filthy lucre; and it is not filthy lucre, 
(m) Navar. Ibid.  if it be done principally for a good end, and less principally for gain.  
And now I cannot devise where there can be any expectation, that they will be restrained from lying; unless in their Sacrament of Penance: that is, in their account, the holiest Rite, wherein the partakers have liberty of speech: Here they confess sin, and profess to do it with a sincere abhorrence of it, as before God, in order to pardon, which they then expect; one would think, in this act at least they should count themselves obliged, to be far from such a crime, as offering violence to truth; but hereby it appears, that truth can in no wise be fastened to any part of their Religion; they let us know that there is nothing so holy amongst them, where they will not find a place for lying and deceit: and that wherever they have liberty of speech, they must have leave to lie. 'Tis the 
(n) 
Angelus, v. Confess. Sylvest. v. Confess. 1. n. 9 Nau. c. 21. n. 37. Graff. l. 1. c. 14. n. 6. Covarruvius. Petr. Soto in Victorell. p. 530. Bannes, Salonius, etc. in ●…ll●…r. 4. n. 44. alii in Suar. Tom. 4. disp. 22. sect. 10.  
Circa eas circumstantias, quae nullo modo pertinent ad materiam confessionis— non est peccatum mortale miscere aliquod mendaciam, sive affirmando sive negando; sed est veniale g●avias quam esset simile mendacium extra illum actum. In hoc conveniunt omnes doctores citandi, (viz. Richardus Paludan. Bonavent. Cajetan. Ledesma, Armilla, Angel●…, Sylvest. Soto, Navar. Pen Soto.) Idem ibid. n. 3▪ & 6.   common Doctrine, that they may lie in confession, which yet they say, is directed principally to God; and they look upon the Confessors chair as the Divine Tribunal. The confient may deny 
(o) Navar. ibid. n. 37. Soto in opusc. d● secret memb. 2. q. 7. Sylvest. ibid. Est cert●… mentiri in materia non necessaria negando factum, non esse peccatum mortale, in quo etiam omnes conveniunt quos statim referemus (viz. jam laudati). Suar. ibid. n. 4.  that ever he committed those Venial sins which he is guilty of, 
(p) Mendacium affirmativum de peccato veniali— non esse peccatum mortale per se l●quendo, hoc est secluso scandalo & contemptu, tenet Angelus, Sylvester, Soto, Pe●…, Soto, Navar. Idem ibid. N. V.  or affirm he is guilty when he is not, or he may deny either Venial or mortal sin, to his Confessor, 
(q) Sylvest. ibid. vel affirmando. Idem in Suar. ibid. n. 10.  if he be not sufficient. Or he may deny 
(r) Non peccare mortaliter, ut dirimus, confitentem negantem se admisisse peccatum mortale, alias ligitime confessum. Navar. ibid. n. 38.  that ever he acted those mortal sins which he has committed; if he has confessed them to another. And thus he may without mortal sin delude and cheat his Confessor, even when he is upon his knees before him and looks upon him as God, and not as man (for so they are taught to do, as we said before.) To this purpose, when their wickedness is too shameful to be made known to a sober Priest; a person may have 
(s) Unde sequitur non peccare mortaliter eos, qui ne suam existimationem honestam a●ittant, confessario cuidem familiari suo confitentur omnia peccata sua, etiam obscaema, & postea alteri probo & gravi solum leviora,, quod de se non est malum, & si sinis verialls fuerit, peccatum veniale erit, & si mortalis, mortale, & si bonus qualis frequen●…r est, sanctus & probus, immo interdum necessarius. Idem ibid. n. 40. Vid. Sylvest. ibid. n. 8. Bonacina, (& in eo Victoria cum aliis) Tom. 1. disp. 5. q. 6. sect. 2. punct. 2.  two Confessors, one a lewd fellow like himself, to whom he may, without shame, confess the worst debauches; and the other more civil, to whom he may confess his lesser sins: denying, if he be asked, that he is guilty of any greater. And as they may abuse their Confessors with plain lies, so likewise with equivocations. Joh. Sanchez (not Jesuit) offers us several instances; Select. disp. 9 He that is not able to make restitution, may affirm he has done it; if he think his Confessor be ignorant, and would not absolve him without it. He that is accustomed to some wickedness, and thinks the Confessor would not absolve him if he confessed it; may with equivocation deny it is his custom; to this sense, I have no such custom, not absolutely, but which I will confess at present. n. 7. yea he may deny it, though he believe the Priest would absolve him, n. 8. Also he that is in the next occasion to sin, which he cannot avoid without great inconvenience or scandal; may, using equivocation, deny it, n. 9 Or if the penitent be known to the Confessor, who well understands that he has a Sister with whom he commits uncleanness, not removed out of his house, and so will not believe but he is in such occasion to sin: he may feign himself to be another, changing his voice, habit, name, Country, and the like, without plain lying; yet using equivocation (n. 10. after Navarre) yea though he be a Religious person, he may do thus, and deny his order with equivocation (ibid.) And as the penitents may thus delude their Confessors, so they may have their satisfaction on them, and delude them likewise: pretending to absolve them, when they neither do it, nor intent it, Idem disp. 35. n. 1. n. 7, & 8. Antonin. Dian. resol. v. equiv. Let the world judge where we may be assured of truth and honesty in Romanists, that walk by these rules (which the holiest of their Doctors give them); since they think not themselves obliged thereto, in any of the cases specified. If by their Doctrine, they may without danger be false to private persons, to Magistrates, to their Priests, to their God: where can they have credit? if they may practise lying and deceit in common conversation, in commerce, in Doctrine, in Worship, in Courts of Justice, and before that which they count God's Tribunal; where may they be trusted?   

SECT. X.  
THey give as much liberty to violate Faith, as truth; and no less encouragement to perfidiousness, and breach of promises: either where faith is engaged mutually, as in compacts, and agreements; or singly as in pollicitations. They distinguish perfidiousness as they do lying, and accordingly make the like decisions for both. There is a pleasant perfidiousness, another which they call officious, and a third pernicious: to be perfidious merely for delight, is Venial; to deal perperfidiously, if it be for the advantage of any, and no great hurt to others, is as harmless; and they have ways enough to make that which is pernicious, to pass for innocent. 
(t) Perfidia quidem jocosa & officiosa venialis est; quoniam ex simplici promissione non nascitur majus debitum, quam sit naturale debitum non mentiendi: nam utrumque debitum est debitum morale, sine quo morum honestas salvari nequit: & ad eandem virtutem reduci creditur, scil. ad virtutem veracitatis: & utrumque ad alterum est, pro convictu, utilitate & conversatione humana. Sum. v. perfidia. p. 460.  Cajetan gives this reason, why the two former sorts of perfidiousness, are but Venial; because from a simple promise no duty ariseth, but that natural duty of not telling a lie●: for in each is a moral duty, without which moral honesty cannot be preserved, and both are reduced to the same virtue, to wit, that of veracity: and both respect others, being for the society, and advantage, and conversation of mankind. One would think, those who regard natural duty, moral honesty, or veracity, and humane society; should for this reason rather judge both to be great crimes, than either of them petty faults. But let us take notice of their rules for conscience in this matter; 
(u) Navar. c. 18. n. 6. Sylvester, v. pact. 4. Angelus, Sum. v. pactum.  To make a promise, without an intent to ●e obliged, is but Venial, if no great hurt be done or intended to others. He promiseth, but while he is doing it, intends not to perform, though he make others believe so; nor to be obliged to it, by that which should engage any one who has faith and honesty; and yet offends but Venially. If all men should take the liberty, which this rule gives Roman Catholics, 
(x) Nisi fide stet respublica ●pibus non stabit. Liv. 3. doc. l. 1. Fides haec non solum ad justitiam attinet, verum est ipsissimum justitiae sundamentem. Cicer. 1. de off. periret convictus humanus & fides, si sibi persuaderent hominus, in promissis frauger● fidem, & verba dare non esse genere suo plusquam veniale. Lopez. p. 2. c. 30.  humane society would disband; all confidence on promises and assurances vanisheth; thereby I can never be sure of another, nor he of me. That which Navarre after many others, determines else where, does it more fully. He 
(y) Qui promisit exterius aliquid absque intentione promittendi, si interrogatur, an promiserit, negare potest, intelligendo, se non promisisse, promissione obligante, & sic etiam jurare, Vid. Navar. in C. humanae aures 22. q. 5. q. 1 & 2. pro hoc doctrine adducit, S. Thom. Scotum, Paludan. Ricard. de Sancto Victore. Major. Adriau & alios.  that promiseth any thing outwardly, without any intention to promise; if he be asked, whether he promised, he may deny it, understanding that he made not any promise, that was obliging; and he may swear it too. He may promise, and yet not intent to promise, and so cheat; he may deny that he promised, and so lie; and swear that he did it not, when he did it, and so be perjured innocently, because he promised, as a peefidious knave. Sylvester inquires, 
(z) Quaeritur utrum ex sola promissione sive ex pacto, quis obligetur in conscientia: & dico quod sic sub peceato mortali in rebus scilicet alicujus importantiae. Ibid.  whether one by a promise alone or a compact, be obliged in conscience? he answers, he is bound under pain of mortal sin, if it be of important matters signifying that in other matters, it is no mortal sin to break promises or agreements. And Navarre expresses their common opinion, when he tells us, 
(a) Nec violatio promissae rei exiguae erit mortalis, quamvis venialis sit. c. 18. n. 7. Soto, Canus, Victoria, Sylvester, in Lopez. pars 2. c. 30.  that the violation of a promise in a small matter is not mortal, though it be Venial. But why should perfidiousnness be a crime in great things, and not in lesser; since it is no less perfidiousness in one than the other, and faith and truth is equally violated in both? The reason they give is, because in great matters there is injustice, 
(b) Quando non per se est persidus, non iucurret mortale, nisi per accidens, hoc est, propter notabile nocumentum sen ●eandalam. Caietan. v. perfidia.  great wrong is done, and so by accident perfidiousness becomes criminal, from whence it follows, that perfidiousness, how great soever, without the addition of injustice, is no crime, a man may be as treacherous, and faithless as he will, if he be not withal unjust too, there's no danger. And so the world must believe, that they would oblige men to be just, though not to truth or faithfulness: as if those who may by their rules, without scruple be false and faithless; will make any conscience, or find any more reason, to be just and righteous. However they teach, 
(c) A mortali excusantur qui— parva pollicentur (& non implent) etiamsi juramento, aut v●to id ipsum confirmassent secundum eos quos sequimur, (viz. Antonin. Sylvest. Soto,) Navar. c. 18. n. 7. c. 12. n. 10.  that they who promise but small things, and perform not, are excused from mortal sin; though they confirm the promise with an Oath or a Vow. Whether the thing promised be little or great, if it be an internal promise, though an Oath be added not to revoke it; yet it obliges not, but may be revoked, without mortal sin. Panormitan. Jason. Rebellus & alii cum Bonacin de contract. disp. 3. q. 12. punct. 2. n. 1. & 3. yea, if it be made in the form of a Vow, yet when it is of a thing indifferent or less good; as if a man inwardly promise to marry such a woman, and promise it to God too, it does not oblige him. Idem ibid. n. 2. And how can it be expected they should be faithful, as to any engagement to man, who think, they are not bound to observe truth or faith with God, how much soever concerned, either as a witness (in Oaths) or as a party (in Vows)? Well but when the matter is of great importance, may they not then break promises, bargains, or compact; may not perfidiousness, which themselves account pernicious, pass commonly for an innocent Venial; yes, they have ways enough ready to make this currant, at so easy a rate. The worst perfidiousness in the world, may be excused from mortal guilt, according to Cajetan, 
(d) Excusatur à mortali— ex parte formae, hoc est quia non per se, seu ex intentione peccatum illud fit— sed ex oblivione, aut ignorantia fucti, aut ex fiducia quam accipit de eo cui promisit, aut ex causa quae sibi videtur rationabilis. Sum. v. perfidia.  through ignorance of the fact; or through forgetfulness (if one forget to be honest, he may be innocently a knave); or out of confidence in him, to whom he is engaged (the good nature of one party concerned, may be a warrant to the other to break faith with him); or for any cause, which he thinks reasonable. He need have said no more than this, any one may violate all truth, and faith; not only, when there is some reasonable cause; but when there there is any that seems but so to him: when any thing will seem so to him, who is disposed to play the knave. This is enough to Licence a world of perfidiousness; but this is not all. Sylvester after others tells us, a 
(e) Est Theologorum doctrina (quod obligatur) si habuit animum se obligandi see●s si habuit animum essendi liber usque ad redditionem: vel si habuit animam fing●…di: quia licet peccet non obligatur tamen, nisi subesset causa de se ex praecepto obligans: puta, si promissa est patri vestis, & frigoribus alget. Ibid. n. 4. Alias si non habuit animum obligandi, non tenetur subpoena mortalis peccati ad pactum nudum servandam: nisi subesset causa quae ad hoc obligaret de necessitate precepti, puta, promisi patri meo vestem, qui moritur ex frigore, quoniam tenetur quamvis non habuerit animum obligendi se. Angel sum. v. pactum n. 4.  man is not obliged to perform, promise or compact, if he had not a mind to oblige himself thereby; yea or if he had a mind to dissemble, (to feign that he is engaged, when he did not mean it): for, says he, though he offend, yet he is not obliged, unless there was a cause from some command, which, of itself, would oblige him: as for Example, if he had promised  to his Father, and he is now starving for cold, in such a case (would ye think it?) one may be bound to keep his promise, to wit, when he would have been a monster, if he had not done the thing, though he had never promised it. He tells us elsewhere, 
(f) Utrum autem quis obligatur ex pollicitatione? & dico quod sic quando pollicetur civitati, universitati, clero Ecclesiae, vel pauperibus alicujus loci, & ex causa: puta, ad honorem Dei & hujusmodi: secus si fiat praedictis sine causa: vel aliis à praedictis etiam cum causa: quia non obligatur, nisi praetextu promissionis aliquid caeperit. Ibid v. pollicitatio. Ità & eisdem verbis. Angelus sum. v pollicitatio.  that a promise does oblige, when it is made to a City, or an University, the Clergy, the Church, or the poor of a certain place, in case it be for some cause, to wit, for the honour of God, or the like: but if there be no cause, it does not bind, though it be made to those foremenrioned; and it does not bind, when it is made to any other besides tbose, though there be cause for it. Others maintain 
(g) In Sylvest. ibid. v. pactum n. 4. promissio sive pactum obligat in conscientia— hoc antem sum. Aug. & Rosell. & est limitatio Coll. quem sequitur Panor. quando exprimitur causa promittendi.  that a promise or compact does not oblige in conscience to performance, if the cause why it is made be not expressed; so Panormitan, Angelus and Rosella, with others: so that if a man forbear but to mention the cause (which is most commonly done, and may be always), though he bind himself with ten thousand promises or covenants, he may with a safe conscience break them all, by their rules. They hold that the firmest promise does but bind under Venial guilt. Cajetan, Armilla, Rebellus, Garzias, in Bonacin. ibid. n. 12. Or if it did of itself oblige further, yet he that intends to bind himself no otherwise, may break any promise without any more than Venial guilt, whether the matter be small, or great, which is promised. ibid. n. 11. 
(h) Ut sit vera requiritur primo quod adsit animus in promittente, dum promittit obligandi se ad mortale. Et sic inter promittendum, nisi adhibuerit juramentum promissionis confirmatorium, vel scripturam ut pro more hominum contingit, fit ut non se censeant obligare ad culpam mortalem. Hinc tollitur scrupulorum multitudo. Pars 2. cap. 30. p: 175.  Lopez, that a promise may bind under mortal guilt, concludes it requisite; that he who makes it, should have a mind to be so bound by it: and so in promising (as he says), unless there be an Oath to confirm the promise, or a writing, as is usual: they are not thought to oblige themselves to mortal sin, and by this, says he, a multitude of scruples is removed. And he says true, for hereby a man may without any scruplc, break any promises that are not under 
(*) Promissio obligat nisi non habuisti animum te obligandi, sed solum proposuisti facere. Navar. Garzias in Sa. v. promise. Vix autem quis promittentium obligari intendit, nisi juret aut faciat instrumentum. Idem ibid.  his hand or Oath. But what if he had no mind so to oblige himself by his Oath, or writing? why then, by his own rule, he is no more bound by his written or sworn promise, than by any other. To this purpose he concludes again, that 
(i) 
Qui dum aliquid promittit verbo tenus, animo & intention se obligandi caret, non fit reus in conscientia obligationis promissi. Idem ibid. p. 176.  
Secundum cummuniter theologos, nemo ex quacunque promissione obligatur●, nisi qui habuit animum obligandi se. Angel. sum. v. puctum. n. 4.   he who promises in word, without mind, or intenion to oblige himself, is not bound in Conscience to perform it: and this is their common Doctrine. So that if a man intent not to be honest, he need not be so, whatever he promise. These rules observed, are more than sufficient to excuse men from all saith and honesty in contracts, and promises of all sorts; to fill the world with cheats and perfidiousness; to take away all confidence and security from men in dealing one with another; to ruin humane society; and to render Roman Catholics less conscientious, and more faithless and intolerable to mankind, than sober Heathens; nor are they more like the rules of Christianity, than those which bid defiance to it.   

SECT. XI.  
HItherto, thus much of deceit and lies, in word and promises, etc. Hypocrisy is a lie indeed, both are equally sinful. 
(k) 
Paria esse factis aut verbis mentiri, Vid. Navar. cap. 18. n. 8.  
Non solum in verbo sed etiam in facto mendacium consistit, cum in utroque sit eadem intentio fallendi, uterque aequaliter peccat, quia verbum & factum assumuntur ut instrumentum fallendi: nec refert quantum ad peccatum, verbo, nutu, vel facto mentiri; sicut nec quantum ad homicidium, uti gladio vel securi. Sylvest. sum. v. mendacium. n. 5.   Aquinas after some of the Ancients asserts, that it is all alike to lie in deeds, as in words: as that is a composing of words, so this of acts, to signify and make one believe what is false: both are used as instruments of deceit, and it is all one which way you cousin another, so he be but cheated (as it is all one whether you kill a man with a Sword, or an Axe, as they express it): and both by their Doctrine are made Venial. Sylvester inquires 
(l) Sum. v. simulatio n. 4. ut pallietur iniquitas, & ipso bonus putetur, quod est peccatum— ad honorem Dei, & proximorum aedificationem— & hoc non est peccatum.  whether to make a false show of sanctity be a sin? he answers that if is he for the Honour of God, and the profit of others, it is no sin: but if it be to palliate his own wickedness; and that he may be accounted good, than it is a sin; because it is a false ostentation of fanctity. But so is the other too, which yet with him, is no sin: either both must be acquitted, or neither. So Cajetan 
(m) Si f●nis ille sit bonus (puta, ad aedificationem aliorum) nihilominus peccatum est, quia non sunt facienda mala ut-bona eveniant. Sum. v. hypocris p. 340.  will have it to be evil, though the end be good; because we must not do evil, that good may ensue. But they agree, and it is their common Doctrine that 
(n) Solummodo intendit simulare se bonum seu meliorem quam sit, & hoc hypocrisis si nuda sit, licet non sit peccatum mortale, est tamen peccatum quia mendacii vim haber. Cajetan. ibid. Sylvest. ibid. Navar. c. 18. n. 8.  bare Hypocrisy, when one feigns he is good, and is not, or better than he is; is no mortal evil, though it hath the force of a lie, and be designed to deceive others, 
(o) Facere opera quibus, bonus appareat, cum non sit, sine intentione ostendendi se bonum, non est etiam veniale, juxta mentem omnium. Idem ibid.  otherwise it would not be so bad as a Venial. 
(p) Alias erit veniale, puta, cum in ipsa fictione delectetur,— magis vanus videtur quam malus. Sylvest. ibid.  Although he delight in thus playing the Hypocrite, it will not be worse; this is but vanity, not wickedness, unless it be for an end mortally wicked, such as will make an act, otherwise indifferent, to be criminal. But if he made this false and deceiving show, 
(q) Si a●…m finis ille sit vana gloria, non tamen ita quod in ea ponatur ultimus finis, peccatum est veniale quidem sed duplicatum. Cajetan. ibid.  for an evil end; to wit, for vain glory, so long as it is not made his last end (to wit, his God); such vain glorious Hypocrisy will be no worse: for though the sin, says Cajetan, be here doubled; yet the double sin is but a single Venial. And if he do those works, 
(r) 
Qui opera ad Dei, servitium naturaliter ordinata (●ut sunt jejunium oratio eleemosyna) facit ex intentione non serviendi Deo, sed ob gloriam humanam, hypocrisis peccatum incurrit formaliter, implicit tamen. Cajetan. ibid. p. 341.  
Nonnunquam etiam fratres suos admonuisse, ut aliquam ostenderent virtutis, apparentiam in abstinentiis, vigiliis, verborum ac gestorum disciplina, quum apud saeculares essent; & sic eos sancta quadam hypocrisi, ad fidei reverentiam, & virtutis amorem propensius invitarent. Specul. histor. l. 29. c. 105.   which are naturally ordained for the service of God, with an intention not to serve him, but for glory from men, it is but such Hypocrisy, and that with some extenuation, it is not so bad explicitly, seeing the intention to deceive, is but implicit. They have a reverence for Hypocrisy as a holy art: they honour it and their Church with the same title, both being holy alike (so much alike, some will think, that it is hard to know the one from the other). They extol their great Saints for their holy Hypocrisy. It is amongst the commendations of Saint Deminick himself. Vincentius Bishop of Beauvois, in his praises, spends one Chapter upon this Subject de sancta ejus hypocrisy, showing that it was not only the practice of their Saint, but that he commended the holy thing to his Brethren (the Friars Praedicaut). Hypocrisy being such a holy quality in their account, and a special ornament of their greatest Saints; no wonder if they be so far, from branding it as a crime, that they declare it meritorious. A Religious person that feigns himself to have more holiness than he hath, that others may be edified, sins not, but rather merits (so Rosella v. Hypoer. n. 1.) Thus they give us warning not to trust any shows of sanctity or mortification amongst them; since they are so far from counting it a sin, that they conclude it meritorious, even for their Religious to deceive others with Hypocritical ostentation of what holiness they have not. Indeed the Romanists are concerned to speak favourably of Hypocrisy, and treat it with kindness; for since they require no more truth and sincerity in their deal with men, and make no more than exterior shows of piety, (if so much) needful in the worship of God; and yet would be accounted the best, or only true Christians on earth: if they should condemn Hypocrisy as a mortal sin, that Religion and Righteousness; which their Church counts sufficient, would be branded by themselves, as damnably criminal.   

SECT. XII.  
DIsgracing and defaming others to their face by contumelies, or behind their backs by detraction; reproaching them with charges true or false, to the impairing or ruining of their esteem or credit (though some of them say this is worse than theft or robbery, and others make it worse than adultery; and in the Canon Law, such are called murderers; yet) is allowed under the notion of a Venial, in so many cases, that he who is addicted thereto, may satisfy his humour fully in the practice of it without scruple. 'Tis a Maxim with them, that the 
(s) Aquinas, & Alexander, Alensis, in Sylv, sum. v. contumel. n. 2.  quality of sins in words, is regulated by the intention. 'Tis this that gives this sin, and others besides, their formality, (which Cajetan often inculcates) and without that, they are no sins, or but Venial. Hence he tells us, that the contempt 
(t) Hinc patet quod contemptus proximi est peccatum mortale formaliter loquendo, hoc est ex intentione contemnendi. Nullus enim formaliter contemnit proximum, nisi qui speruit proximum ut spermat proximum: sicut nullus detrahit formaliter, nisi qui detrahit ut detrahat. etc. Cajetan. sum. v. contemptus.  of our Neighbour is a mortal sin, speaking formally, that is, with an intention of contemning him: for no man formally contemns another, but he that despises him, that he may despise him; so no man is a detractor formally, but he that back-bites, that he may backbite; and no man is formally contumelious, but he that speaks reproachfully, that he may reproach. So that if he intent not thus to sin, let him say what he will against his Neighbour, he is not guilty of the sin formally, and in deed. Accordingly he tells us, that 
(u) Materialiter (hoc est non ex intentione dehonorandi) possunt verba contumeliosà etiam absque ullo peccato dici. Ibid. v. contumelia, Soto de Just. l. 5. q. 10. art. 2.  materially, (i. e. without intention of dishonouring another) contumelious words may be spoken, either without any sin, or any but what is Venial. 'Tis true, some of them say, words may be a crime, if they grievously defame a person, though they be uttered without a design to do it; but then withal they allow of such reproaches as Venial, which are of no better consequence, but tend to disgrace him effectually. To reproach him with natural defects of mind, or body, or birth, is regularly but Venial; all agree in this says 
(x) 
Lib. 11, c. 6. n. 4.  
Detegere falsos defectus naturales, puta quod▪ est Luscus, Claudus, Mancus, Gibbosus, Ignarus, & alia hujusmodi, que non pertinent ad bonam famam morum, non est suo genere, nec regulariter mortale. Navar. cap. 18. n. 23. Vid. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. 4. punct. 2.   Sairus: To charge him with ignorance, to say he has little wit, and small jugment, to call him a fool, or an Hermaphrodite, or a Bastard, though the charge be false. To report one to be infected with the French-disease is but Venial, because that is no great disgrace. Pet. Navar. Sairus, & alii communiter in Bonacin. ibid. n. 9 
(y) Imponere vel detegire veniale, non est de se mortale. Idem Navar. ibid. n. 24: Sylvest. sum. v. detractio n. 2. non esse mortale in his quae sunt modicae importantiae, ut venialia quae communiter non infamant secundum Antoninum, & Angelus sum. v. detract. n. 2. Pet. Navar. Arragon. in Bonacin. ibid. n. 6. alii communiter.  Also to charge him falsely with any wickedness, which they count Venial. Thus they may calumniate any man, and without crime charge him falsely, as a Blasphemer, a Thief, a Liar, a Perjured Person, a Cheat, &c, since they count these, in many degrees, Venial: and if they be consistent with the Honour and reputation of Roman Catholics, yet others, either Christian or Heathen, will think their credit blasted with such imputations. Likewise to 
(z) Qui ex loquacitate profert ea, quae & pro mortali & pro veniali possunt accipi, ut dicendo talis est magnus superbus avarus iracundus, vel hususmodi quae sumi possunt & pro naturali inclinatione & motu primo, non peccet mortaliter quia audientes debent in meliorem partem interpraetari. Sylvest. secundum Antoninum ibid. Angelus, ibid. Graff. l. 2. cap. 137. n. 26. Pet. Navar. Sayrus, Arragon, & alii communiter in Bonacin. ibid.  revile one in such terms as may signify either great or lesser crimes, to accuse him as one greatly proud, covetous, wrathful: or any thing whatsoever, which may denote either the natural inclination, and first motions, or the outward acts; this is not mortal; because the hearers are to put the better construction on it. And here is liberty enough, to calumniate in such terms as may ruin any person's reputation; upon a presumption, that all who hear the slander will be always so wise, and good, as any rarely are. Or, 
(a) Si ille cui dicit habebat eum pro scelerato: quia jam infamatus erat apud eum de alîis, & si non de isto. Angelus, ibid. Idem est in mortalibus notoriis secundum Archiepiscopum quia non laeditur fama jam laesa. Sylvest. ibid.  if a man be noted for wickedness already, you may charge him with crimes that are not known, and yet offend but Venially: because you cannot hurt his reputation, which is hurt already. As if when a man has dangerously wounded himself, you might give him more wounds, and dispatch him; when life and same are of like account. Or you 
(b) Mentitus es meretricem tali nocte admisisse lenonem, eo casu non restituere famam, non est peccatum mortale. Graff. ibid. n. 22. secundum Cajetanum. Excusatur à peccato mortali, qui aliquem infamavit cum secundum suum existimationem illa non esset infamia. ibid.  may charge those falsely for committing a crime, when they did it not; if it hath been their practice before. Or you 
(c) Idem esset in criminibus mortalibus etiam occultis, si sunt minora notoriis, sicut non est infamia notorio homicidae & furi, quod sit fornicatus. Sylvest. ibid.  may charge them with any crimes that are secret, if they be less than those that are known; as if one had been guilty of murder, you may accuse him of theft, and if he hath stolen, you may accuse him of fornication, and if he be a Heretic, you may charge him with any thing, since with them nothing is worse than what they count Heresy. Or you may accuse others of any 
(d) Si sunt personae quarum famam simplex fornicatio in nullo laedit, ut juvenes saeculares— quod simile est de adulterio apud multos. Graff. ibid. (juxta Cajetanum) n. 28.  wickedness, which such sort of persons seem to make nothing of: as some young men, of fornication, and others of adulteries. Further, any terms tending to defame others may be used in passion, such as hinders full deliberation: for these will excuse blasphemy against God, much more the worst reproaches of men. Or you may do it in jest 
(e) Respondetur quod convitiari, secundum Arist. 4. Ethic. c. 8. eatenus est vertutis Eatrapeliae, quatenus intra limites moderatae facetiae continetur: quando scil urbanitatis venustas in convitio adest. Soto de Just. l. 5. q. 9 art. 2. p. 172.  with moderate facetiousness, when the reproach is set off neatly, than it is a virtue with those, who learn their Divinity of Aristotle rather than the Apostle: and think if a man have wit, he needs herein have no conscience. Or you may do 
(f) Si autem ex animi levitate loquendive libidine ore labatur in summa propter aliquam causam non necessariam fiat: peccatum est plurimum ucniale. Idem ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Cajetan. sum. v. contumel.  it out of levity, or pleasure in tattling; unless the words be so exasperating, as to occasion some other deadly evil. Or it may be done 
(g) Idem esse (veniale) secundum Scotum, quum ex loquacitate dicuntur infamatoria recitative. Sylvest. ibid. Cajetan. in 22. q. 73. art. 2.  by way of recital, suggesting what tends to blast them, as reported by others. Or when the defamer 
(h) Quoties non dedit justam causam credendi, vel non fuit ei adhibita sides. Graff. ibid. n. 23.  is not believed or gives no just cause of belief. Or 
(i) Nec qui per fraternam correctionem aliquem infamavit, & ad majorem emendam, etc. Idem ibid. n. 24. Soto, ibid. q. 9 art. 2.  for correction; for they may defame others to amend them; and reform them, by making them worse than they are. Or 
(k) Ubi vero nonnullus est cautelae defectus, plurimum consuevit esse veniale, ut saepe inter mulierculas contingit, & homines infimae Classis, qui invicem se convitiis conspergunt, ut in buccam veniunt. Soto, ibid. Graff. ibid. n. 9  through some want of cautiousness, as amongst women and persons of inferiors rank, who vent what reproachful language comes next, how injurious soever. Or when their reputation does hurt, and may seduce others; to defame them, is absolutely lawful eos defamare esse licitum, absolute respondet. Adrianus. in Soto. ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Or (to add no more) if one accuse others, whom they think he ought not, though he impute nothing to them but what is true; they may charge him with false crimes, this will be no worse than a Venial fault. Bannes' 22. q. 70. art. 3. p. 2. Thus as in other cases, so when any thing is said or writ, to the disparagement of their Church or themselves, how justly and truly soever: if they fix upon the Authors the most odious imputations that can be invente● (such as Bolsec and Cochleus would have fastened upon Luther and Calvin) and divulge them with a design to delude the world into a belief thereof, though their own consciences tell them there is not a syllable of truth therein; yet they incur no fault thereby, that a good Catholic need fear, or make conscience of. This is not only the opinion of the Jesuits, but the common Doctrine of Aquinas his Disciples, as Ledesma a Dominican assures us; and so we may spare those more than 20 Doctors, which Caramuel says, assert it. Hereby they give warning to mankind, that they are no more to be trusted in their charges against their opposers, to vindicate the reputation of themselves or their Church, than such persons will be trusted in a Court, which openly sentenced them to the pillory for false testimony; yea, in this maxim they have as good as set themselves upon a Pillory, and done that justice to the world, as to fix this Inscription upon their own Foreheads: We are they who declare it no crime to caluminate most odiously and falsely, who ever speak ill (how truly soever) of us and our Church. These are some of their methods for destroying, the honour and reputation of others without any fault which they regard; they deliver them in great variety, so that every one so disposed, may serve himself of such as suit his humour. And as a man may defame others, so he may do the same good office for himself; 
(l) Detegere propria peccata vera & secreta, & imponere sibi falsa suo genere & regulariter non est nisi veniale quamvis per illud notabiliter fama laedatur, aut omnino amittetur, ut Magister Sotus explicuit, & multo ante Adrianus sensit Navar. cap. 18. n. 27. & 24. & 28. prodigalitas regulariter non est peccatum mortale, ut S. Thom. & detectio proprii peccati non est injustitia, sed prodigalitas samae. ibid.  not only by blazoning his secret wickedness, but by charging himself falsely with crimes he never acted: thus to impair, or utterly ruin his own credit, is but regularly a Venial fault according to Adrian, and Sotus, and others; for prodigality is but a Venial, and this is but to be prodigal of one's credit.   

SECT. XIII.  
FLattery also (that falseness of every sort, even the vilest, may not miss of their favour and encouragement) is reconciled to common practice under the notion of a Venial. To 
(m) Est adul●tio prima, quando quis adulatur, vel attribuit alicui bonum virtutis, quod ille non habet. Secunda quando nimium vel ultra debitum extollit bonum, quod habet, & utrumque istorum est veniale. Graff. decis, pars 2. l. 3. c. 3. n. 5.  praise one for the virtue which he has not, or the good that he does not; is little or no fault. To extol the good he does above measure and desert, is as innocent, yea 
(n) Quam aliquis debet ex officio aliquem de bono aliquo opere laudare etiamsi si stiat laudatum in superbiam mortalem se elaturum, non tenetur propterea desistere à debito officio: potest tamen & debet deponere hujusmodi scientiam de futura ruina illius, quia 12 horae su●t diei, & potest in instanti homo illuminari, & mutari à divina miserecordia. Cajet. Sum. v. adulatio.  when a man is to to be praised for a good work, though you know he will thereby be transported with deadly pride, such as will destroy his Soul; yet you should not desist, hut may and aught to lay aside the sense of his future ruin: because (says Cardinal Cajetan) there are twelve hours in the day, and a man may in an instant be illuminated and changed by Divine mercy. To 
(o) Est autem peccatum veniale quando vel laudatur aliquis de malis venialibus, vel de bonis, sola complacendi intentione absque ruina, vel etiam ob aliquem utilitatem consequundam, vel non impediendam, ut de se patet. Cajetan. ibid. Graff. p. 1. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 1. 161. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 115. art. 2. Sylu. v. adulat. n. 4.  applaud one for his sins, if they be not mortal, is as harmless; when it is out of a design to please the sinner, without ruining him; or to gain some advantage by such flattery. So that when it is both wicked and sordid at once, yet will they scarce count it a fault. There's no more hurt in giving flatterers reward, and encouragement. Sylvester inquires if this be 
(p) Utrum dare adulatoribus sit peccatum mortale? & dicit S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 168: quod non: nisi nimius appetitus vanae gloriae— sicut delectabatur Herodes, quum ei Dei & non hominis, laudes dabantur: vel nisi intendat quis & cupiat laudationem de peccatis— Et hoc est quod dicit Alexand. de Alis, quod tale peccatum est ista datio, quaele adulatio propter quam dat, id est si venialis veniale, etc. Sum. v. adulatio. n. 6.  a mortal sin? and in him Aquinas answers, no, unless a man affect, as Herod, to be extolled as a God; or design and desire to be magnified for mortal crimes. But 
(q) Imo virtus est consentire laudi, sive se false laudanti, de virtute tamen suo statui necessaria, exemplum de uxore occulte adultera, quae de fidelitate laudatur, non eo intuitu ut laudetur, sed ut per bonam opinionem, quam alii habent scandalum evitetur. Graff. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 2. Navar. cap. 23. n. 13.  it is a virtue to give consent to false flattery, as when a woman who is secretly an adulteress, is praised for faithfulness to her Husband, that scandal may be avoided, and others deluded, by a good opinion of her. And so we may understand how the praises of the Church of Rome for her faithfulness to Christ, come to be a virtue. Or if one be not in so complacent a humour as to flatter others; he may curse them at as easy a rate, for, for it is but a Venial fault 
(r) o'er tantum maledicere non est mortale, ut communiter maledicunt parentes siliis, & colon●, & muliones bobus, & mulis. Idem ibid. n. 117.  to curse in words (if not from the heart) any thing, any person (one's own Father not excepted); to imprecate any mischief or misery to them; to 
(s) Vid. Soto de Just. l. 5. 5. q. 12. art. 3. Navar. ibid.  wish God's curse on them, or an ill end might befall them, or the Devil might have them. And when he is at it, he may curse the Devil too. 
(t) Peccat qui maledicit diabolo ratione suae naturae quia illa bona est & a Deo facta secus si ratione suae culpae, & tradit S. Thom. modo nec plus nec aliter quam meretur. Idem. ibid. Cajetan. sum. v. maledictio.  'Tis no sin at all, if it be for his fault, and gives the Devil but his due. Cursing 
(u) (Quum) malo usu bujusmodi profert & est veniale peccatum. Cajetan. ibid.  may be ones usual practice as innocently. It is scarce so bad as a Venial, 
(x) Contingit tamen inquit (S. Tho.) quod aliquando sit veniale— vel propter affectum proferentis, dum ex levi motu vel ludo— talia verba profert, quia peccata verborum ex affecta pensantur. Sylvest. v. maledict. n. 3. sit veniale— quod ex levi motu seu lusu. Soto, ibid. Aliquando etiam culpa veniali carere possit, ut si fiat joco & ludo, vel causa recreationis honestae.  when cursing is used for honest recreation. And he may 
(y) Si paenitens dicat se maledixisse creaturam irrationalem vel elementa interrogare debet confessarius maledixerit ne ore tantum, vel ore & animo, nulla ratione Dei vel proximi habita, quia in his casibus est tantum veniale peccatum. Graff. l. 2. c. 72. n. 3. Navar. ibid. n. 117.  curse the irrational creatures, or the Elements, and if he do it with his mouth only, or with both mouth and heart, without respect either to God or man: in these cases, it is only a Venial fault.   

SECT. XIV.  
I Have been long in viewing their account of Venial sins; the pernicious use made of it to corrupt the whole body of practical Christianity, and to give liberty to the acting of all sorts of wickedness, with this modification; Will excuse me. They venture hard, to leave in a manner no mortal sin; and so none needful to be avoided. This will be further manifest, by what they determine concerning those few sins, which they style mortal, or capital: they are reduced, in their ordinary reckoning, to seven. Some of these they conclude to be in their own nature, or regularly Venial; in others of them, they state the mortalness so high, that those who will be satisfied with wickedness, which is not rare, and prodigious, may live in the sins, and not reach the mortalness; and so wickedness which is deadly, in their speculative account, may be practised without mortal danger.  
Covetuousness is one of these capital crimes, which in general they heavily aggravate, and inveigh against, as most pernicious: yet when they come to direct conscience, and give particular rules for practice; it is shrunk into a harmless Venial. Covetousness says Cajetan 
(z) Simplititer & absolute non est peceatum mortale ex suo genera quiá non est contra, sed prater charitatem. Sum. v. Avaritia.  simply and absolutely, is not a mortal sin in its own nature, because it is not against, but besides chartty. To deliver themselves more distinctly, they consider this sin, either, as it is opposed to liberality, or to justice: as it is opposite to the former virtue, they generally determine, it is but a Venial fault; so the same Cardinal, 
(a) Ut contrariatur liberalitati, & sic significat inordin●…um oppetitum pecu●ia: & sic communiter est peccatum veniale. ibld.  as it is contrary to liberality, and signifies an inordinate desire of money, so commonly it is a Venial sin: thus Navarre 
(b) Cap. 23. n. 70.  and Sotus 
(c) De Just. l. 4. q. 5. art. 2. p. 11 ●…  and all after Aquinas. 
(d) 2● q. 118. art. 4.  So that by their Doctrine, if a rich man should be so sordidly so monstrously tenacious, as not to perform one act of liberality to himself or others, in all his life; yet would not this be a mortal sin, since the vice which is opposite to all liberality, and wholly exclusive of it, is but a Venial fault. Only when it is opposed to injustice, it may be a mortal sin, that is, when a man gets riches by unjust practices and methods; or detains what he has, unrighteously. Thus covetousness, however it comes into the account of mortal sins; yet it will stand there as a cipher, and signify no such thing, unless injustice be added to it. Let a man have the most extravagant passion for riches, let him be as greedy as Hell, or the Grave; and penurious, as the worst of misers can be: yet if he be not withal, a thief, or a cheat, and attempt not to get or keep an estate by fraud or violence, there's no guilt upon him, that he need regard: 
(e) Ut opponitur justitiae & sic significat injustam voluntatem accipiend● sen retinendi alienum, & est  mortale peccatum, et juxta hunc sensum, usurarios, sures, latrones, negotiatores fraudulentoes, etc. avaros dicimus. Cajetan. ibid.  In their sense only thiefs and robbers, extortioners or cheats, are covetous, when covetousness is a crime. They speak of covetousness as little worse than an indifferent thing: injustice added to an act, otherwise lawful, will make it criminal; and this vice will be no crime, upon easier terms. But is covetousness a mortal sin, indeed, with them, when it is accompanied with injustice? they would seem to say so sometimes; but then they unsay it again in their other decisions. They allow men to gain unrighteously, and to keep what they have so gained. They declare them not obliged to restitution of what they have got by sinful practices, yea, and such as are most abominable. I have showed before what unjust and fraudulent methods of gaming they encourage under the favour of Venial faults; let me here instance in gaming only. This with them is 
(f) Multi ludo qui recreationis causa licitus & Sanctus est abutuntur, ut negotiatione ad lucrum— ludunt principaliter propter lucrum. Et hoc semper est peccatum: quoniam est dare operam turpi lucro, si tamen nulla alia deformitas immisceatur, non est peccatum mortale. Cajetan. sum. v. Ludere. p. 410. Na●ar. cap. 20. n. 3. Lopez. pars 2. c. 31. p. 183.  Venial, though it be not only out of an ordinate, but an excessive desire of gaining, if there be no other mortal ingredient; yea, though not only the subservient, but the principal end, be lucre; and so that which is only for recreation, be turned into a trade. And this is not only the opinion of some particular Doctors, but seems to be the persuasion of them all: for says Navarre, 
(g) In omnibus mundi partibus cujusque ordinis laicos videamus magnam pecuniarum summam, & maximam eorum partem principaliter propter lucrum ludere, & à confessariis, sine proposito nunquam ita ludendi absolvi quod sacere nequirent, si in eo mortaliter peccar●nt. Navar. ibid. n. 11.  we see in all parts of the world, all sorts of people play for great sums of money, and the greatest part of them principally for gain; and yet the confessors absolve them, though they signify no intention to give over the practice, which they could not do, if there were any mortal sin in it. And 
(h) Q●eritur utrum & quomodo ludus diabolicus alearis sit peccatum? & dico quod hic l●dus non ●…st pecca●um, vel est veniale quum luditur aliquid modicum, etc. Sylvest. sum. v. ludus. n. 4.  such gaming is allowed, even that which they call Diabolical, in any place, though in their account 
(i) Navar. ibid. n. 3.  sacred; at any time, for whole days, even the holiest, that little time excepted which will suffice the people to hear the chief parts of the Mass, or in any person, even their cloistered pretenders to perfection, so they omit not divine service. Their mode of devotion needs be no hindrance, for with them it is lawful to make a game of their Prayers. Lopez inquires (an licitum fit ludere preces sacras) if it be lawful to play at Prayers. He says it is the practice of devout persons, and that Navarre seems to approve it, part 2. c. 32. so does Bonacina after Navar. Rebellus and others, de restit. disp. 2. q. 3. punct. 1. n. 8. and not only at Ave Mari's but other prayers also; and that it will be no irreverence against God to play with their prayers, if they do it reverently, ibid. To say nothing that 
(k) Peccat clericus vel monachus quiludum mortaliter malum spectat, si multo tempore spectat, saecus si parvo. Navar. ibid. n. 14.  their Clergy and Monks may be spectators of games and shows that are mortally wicked, if they continue not a long time at it; and yet offend but Venially. They teach further, that it is not needful to 
(l) Nullus tenetur cum famae periculo rem alterius restituere. Est communis sententia. Cajetan. v. restit. Navar. c. 19 n. 90. (Tol. l. 5. c. 27.) This will go near to excuse most, if not all: dicitur non posse— qui commode non potest. Cap. 17. n. 56.  restore what is wickedly gained. Sylvester after others, says 
(m) Non tamen necessario tale turpe lucrum est restituendum secundum. Rodofred, s●d de consilio solum. Sum. v. Emptio, n. 10. Vid. Lopez. ibid.  that filthy lucre (that is, dishonest or shameful gain,) is not necessarily to be restored, 'tis but matter of counsel. But he that hath lost much at unlawful games, may take another course for his satisfaction; for Pope Adrian and others, allow him to steal it from him that has won it, Vid. Lopez. ibid. Or to save himself the trouble of stealing, he may refuse to pay, what he loses; or if he have bound himself by Oath to pay it (not only the Pope, but) any Bishop may release him from the obligation of his Oath, and that without the citation of the party. So Navar. Corduba. Sotus. Penna. & alii in Bonacin. ibid., punct. 3. n. 2. Yea, they will not have those obliged to make restitution who have received any thing for acting enormous wickedness, for example, a Judge for passing an unjust Sentence, or a witness for false testimony and perjury, or a man for satisfying the lust of a lewd woman, or any sort of women for prostituting themselves, or an assassinate for murdering, or a rogue for firing Houses or Towns: all are comprised in this conclusion, 
(n) Acceptum voluntarie ab alio, ità ut ab utraque parte admittittur turpitudo, nulli est de precepto restituendum, S. Antoninus Monaldus, Angel●s, Sylvester, (in) Navarre. c. 17. n. 36. & n. 30. Sensit Thom. & Cajetan. quod quicquid turpiter accipit contra legis prohibitionem— ut in Simonia — lucro meretricis, (& idem diceret de datis & acceptis ob alia quaecunque crimina) quod non sit restituendum, nec pauperibus, vid. Vasq. opusc. moral. p. 134. dub. 9 n. 84.  that which is unjustly received, freely of the giver, where there is wickedness on both parts (as in giving, so in receiving), is not, by virtue of any command, to be restored to any. Only (for the encouragement of covetousness, and injustice together) where money is given for the perpetrating of such crimes, if they be not acted, it is to be restored: but if the wickedness be done, the villainous actor may conscientiously detain it. As the Judge that receives a bribe for a false Sentence, 
(o) Quando malum ob quod datum fuit, non consequitur, ut si datum est judici quo inique judicaret, & recte judicavit, etc. datori, & non pauperibus restituendum est ut doctiffimus Medina, efficaciter probat. Navar. ibid. n. 30. p. 295. etc. 25. n. 45.  if he pass a just one, he is obliged to restore; but not if he make an unjust award. And 
(p) Peccat qui mercedem accipit, ut verum testetur, cum obligatione restituendi ei qui dedit; & qui accipit, ut falsum testetur, sine tamen necessitate restituendi, vid. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 1. q. 3. punct. 2. n. 6. & punct. 3. n. 8.  a witness if he receive money for a true testimony, is bound to restore it; but not for a false deposition. He that is promised a reward for murdering a man, may not receive or keep it before he kill him: but after the murder is done, he may take it (and need not restore it) upon the account of his labour and hazard in killing him, and because therein he has done a sact profitable and delightful to him that hired him, Idem ibid. n. 5. Pet. Navar. & ali●. So an ginger who takes money for telling things, which he cannot know but by the help of the Devil, is not bound to restore it, after diligence and pains to get the Devil's assistance therein; because that diligence and pains (with the Devil) is valuable, though it prove ineffectual. But he that pretends but to this skill, and makes no use of the Devil, is bound to restore; Pet. Navar. & alli cum Bonacin. ibid. n. 10. And that the poor may be cut off every way by covetousness, whether it be with injustice, or without it; though they say, what is received for the perpetrating of wicked acts, may be restored to the poor: yet it is a rule with them, 
(q) Est regula Vervecelli, recepta à. S. Antonino, Angel. Sylvest. & ab aliis complurimis, quod restitutis, quae non est facienda alicui certae personae, sed pauperibus non debetur ex praecepto, sed solum ex consilio. Navar. ibid. c. 17. n. 30.  that restitution to the poor in this, and other casts, is only a counsel, not a command; so that he who is hired to de villainy, may restore what he received to the poor, if he will; but if he will not, he needs not; he may conscientiously enjoy the fruits of his villainy, and the poor have nothing. In short, not only disquietment of mind 
(r) Cajetan. sum. v. inquietudo.  through the tumult of worldly distracting cares, and the restless agitation of a covetous humour; but also hardness of heart 
(s) Per duritiam cordis, & inquietudinem mentis peccant qui non subveniunt pauperi, quoties t●nentur de precepto obligante ad mortale— alias enim hac venialia tantum sunt. Navar. c. 23. n. 76.  against the poor, and unmercifulness to them in their distress, (the natural effect of extreme covetousness) is as innocent ●s its cause, no worse than Venial, unless, when one is obliged ●…der pain of mortal guilt to afford relief, And when is that? only 
(t) Idem. Cap. 24. n. 5.  in extreme necessity, when the starving man may 
(u) Idem C. 23. n. 95.  sell his own child to get bread; or when it will be lawful 
(x) Vict. supra.  to steal from him who would otherwise part with nothing; or when he may be compelled by Law 
(y) Glossa communiter recepta. Ibid. n. 74.  to part with something; then his heart must relent so far, as to let go what he cannot keep: but it is like he may never meet with such a case while he lives, and then the miser is excused; no moment of his life, need be embittered with one act of charity; he may enjoy the felicity of a petrified heart all his days, and not suffer by one dint in it. Or if he should unhappily meet with one in such extremity, yet may he escape without giving a farthing; it will be enough to exchange, or to lend: 
(x) (z) Idem ibid. n. 95.  yea he may be excused from either giving or lending, 
(a) Idem c. 24. n. 5.  if it be but likely that any other may do it. In fine, this unmercifulness, which admits no compassion from the distress of others, 
(b) Quia haec fere nunquam sunt mortalia nisi conjungantur aliis actibus mortalibus, ●… sunt necessario confitenda, quia satis est confiteri illa mortalia, quae per predictam duritiam & inquietudinem admittuntur. Idem c. 2●. n. 76.  is scarce ever mortal; unless it become so (accidentally) by some other mortal acts, and so there is no need to confes● it as a sin. How well does this indulgence to such monstrous covetousness as quite swallows up at once Christian charity, mercy, and morality, become those, who cry up themselves as the sole Assertors of the necessity of good works?  
But that they may not be partial, they show themselves as favourable to the crime in the other extreme; 
(c) Prodigalitas non est mortale peccatum si pura est ● quiae minus peccatum est, quam avaritia liberalitati contraria; quum sipura est, constat non esse mortalem. Et utriusque ratio est quia neutra, agit contra charitatem Dei aut proximi, sed pr●…er. illam. Cajetan. sum. v. Prodigal.  pure prodigality is no mortal sin, because i● is a less fault than covetousness, contrary: to liberality; which is manifestly of itself no mortal sin, and the reason of both i●▪ neither of them is against charity to God or others, but only besides it. So Cajetan and others. So 
(d) Cap. 18. n. 28. supra.  Navarre, prodigality (including both th●… of a man's credit and his estate) is regularly no mortal sin; and this after 
(e) 22 q. 120. art. 2. & 3.  Aquinas.   

SECT. XV.  
PRide is another capital crime, they style it 
(f) Ipsa vitiorum regina, superbia. Gregor. moral. 31. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 162. art. 8.  the Queen of mortal sins; but then they will have it advanced so high, before it be mortal, that the proudest person amongst Christians can seldom reach it; and so all pride which is not of an extraordinary size, and such as is rarely found, must pass for Venial. In Aquinas 
(g) Exparte aversionis superbia habet maximam gravitatem, quia in aliis peccatis homo à Deo avertitur vel propter ignorantiam vel propter infirmitatem, sive propter disiderium cujuscunque alterius boni. Sed superbia habet aversionem à Deo ex hoc ipso qui non vult Deo & ejus regulae subject— cujus natus est Dei contemptus. Aquin. 22. q. 162. n. 6.  it is an aversion to God, in that he will not be subject to him ●…d his will; not upon other accounts (to wit desire of pleasure or profit, etc.) but out of contempt. So 
(h) Sum. v. superbia, vid. Sylvest. v. superbia.  Cajetan also, ●… others after him. Navarre says 
(i) Requirunt uterque Thomas communiter recepti ad ejus essentiam actualem contemptum subjiciendi se Deo & legi ejus— cum id (Gratia Deo) pauci Christiani faci●… & v●r● omnes aliquo modo superbiamus, c. 23. n. 5. certe paucissimi Christiani, etc. 2. 6.  they make it an actual conte●… of being subject to God, and adds, thanks be to God, this is but 〈◊〉 in few Christians, though all are truly proud; so that mortal pride, by that account which the Oracle of their School, and his followers give of it; is rarely to be found in the Christian world, 'Tis questionable whether Scotus did count that pride mortal, which Aquinas judged to be so, he says 
(k) Quilibet tenetur vitare omne peccatum mortale, tamen non tenetur scire in quo grave, superbia est peccatum mortale, quia nec multi experti sciunt. Scotus, in St. Cl●r. Probl. 15. p. 94.  few learned men know in what degree it is deadly, and others are not bound to know it. However 
(l) Sum. v. superbia.  Cajetan ventures to tell us what pride is Venial; and his account is worth our view. It is thus at large: He that shows himself so irreligious and ungrateful, as if he had not received all from God, is proud (says he) in the first kind; for of a like effect the Apostle says, what hast thou which thou hast not received? why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received? where by glorying, as the effect, the inward pride is manifested, as though he had not received it. Likewise when one is so affected, as to be secure concerning the good he hath, or querulous for the good which is lost; or wonders that he is not heard of God, this is the second kind of pride: because such a one makes account that such things are due to him. But he that prefers himself before others, and is prone to spy in his mind or fancy, the defects of others or to excuse his own naughtiness, and to aggravate that of others, has a third sort of pride; when he will have himself to be great, as if he alone were great. Further, he who caring little for the Hvaeenly country; for the members of Christ, for the expiation of his sins, passing his days as one dreaming, or scarce ●…ake, has a fourth kind of pride: for he presumes he is a Heavenly Citi●…h, a friend of God, a Son, a Member; when such negligence and carelessness are no evidence of his favours: the love of God where it is produeing (those) great things. And likewise in reference to his Neighbour's crudeness of mind, and incompassionateness to others, counting injuries intolerable, impatience, not enduring to be slighted, indignation, and the like, do show, that the man thinks better of himself than he is, etc. So great a littler of this monster he exposes to our view, telling us its issue is much more numerous; and then strokes all gently over, calling them Venials. 
(m) Sunt autem haec & multa alia, quae imperfectae sunt superbiae, communiter venialia peccata propter imperfectionem actus, dum per modum passionum occurrunt absque injuria Dei & proximorum. Impediunt autem hujusmo li peccata valde vitam spiritualem: utpote ex genere superbiae existentia: quum scriptum sit superbis Deus resistit. Ibid. p. 548.  These, says he, and many others are a sort of imperfect pride, and are commonly Venial sins for the imperfectness of them, since they occur in the manner of passions, without injury to God or others. Yet (that we may be the more amazed, to see all this pass for a little fault) such sins (he adds) hinder spiritual life exceedingly; being of the stock of pride; when it is written, that God resists the proud. As for that pride which they count mortal, and grown to its full height; 
(n) 22 q. 142. art. 4.  Aquinas out of Gregory, and 
(o) Angelus, v. superb. Sylvest. v. superb. Navar. c. 23. n. 7. alii communiter.  others after both, give an account of it in some particulars; the prime are these, 
(p) Secundum hoc sumuntur duae primae superbiae species, scilicet cum quis à semet ipso habere aestimat quod à Deo habet, vel oum propriis meritis sibi datum desuper credit.— Sic est tertia species superbiae cum scilicet aliquis jactat se habere quod non babet. Aquinas, ibid.  When o●… thinks that good he has, is from himself. When he thinks that what he has from God, is for his merits. And when he boasts that he hath what he has not. If their great Azpilcue●a could see none of this most deadly crime amongst Christians, having the merit of congruity and condignity before him; either his sight failed him, or his Church was not visible. Others, with his eyes, can see not only mortal pride, but (as deadly a sin) infidelity, 
(q) Credere id (viz. predicta) in genere est actus— infidelitatis. Navar. ibid. n. 8. In universali dicere— bonum aliquod habere à se & non à Deo, vel suis meritis, hoc p●rtinet ad infidelitatem & est mortale peccatum infidelitatis. Angel. sum. v. super●i●.  where this is part of a Creed: To make up one article, of two deadly sins, must be a sure mark of the only Church. Seriously, finding so many of their Authors on this head, charging the opinion of merit, with mortal pride; and therein following not only the greatest of their Doctors, but the most infallible of their Bishops; I have wondered why they did not either make that none of their faith, or this no such sin. What sal●… they will find against deadly sin, when it is in their faith, I know not: but if part of their belief had proved arrogance (though that found'st like the worst of pride) they might have come off well enough, for arrogance is a Venial sin, except in some rare cases. It is says Cajetan, 
(r) Est autem frequenter venialis arrogantia dum absque prejudicio proximi astimat quis▪ se plus scientiae, aut bonitatis aut authoritatis habere, quam habet Sum. v. arrogantia peccatum est quia contra rectam rationem est. Sed mortale non est nisi vel id quod sibi usurpat, sit contra divinam reverentiam: ut Rex Tyri, Ego Deus Sum. aut contra proximum: ut tyrannis, vel finis ultimus in bujusmodi elatione ponatur. Ibid.)  frequently Venial, when without prejudice of others, a man values himself as having more knowledge, or goodness, or authority than he hath; and again, it is a sin, but it is not mortal, unless when it usurps against God, as the King of Tyre, when he said, I am God (now none are observed to do this, except the Pope, who has the Law in his own hand); or against others by Tyranny (which is so odious as all disclaim it: and affecting it, is no worse than affecting to kill men without consent; which, with him is 
(s) Ibid, v. vovendi conduit.  not deadly): or unless it be made ones ultimate end (which none will own). Accordingly, Angelus determines, that 
(t) Utrum sit mortale peccatum? Resp. quod sic, quum ex tali superbia vel contentione fit quae sit mortalis— alias communiter peccatum veniale erit. Sum. v. arrogantia.  arrogancy is commonly a Venial fault, unless upon the account of something else that is mortal, as when it arises from mortal pride; but that (as he and others define it, we heard before) is scarce to be found amongst Christians.   

SECT. XVI.  
AMbition was wont to be counted a deadly crime; the world and the Church too, has reason to judge it so, since the most of their miseries and ruins, may be imputed to it; but the Church of Rome and her Champions are concerned not to think so ill of it; stilo curiae, in the sense of the Court, it may pass for Venial. Angelus inquires, 
(u) Utrum ambitio sit peccatum mortale? Resp. quod non simpliciter sed pro ratione finis— vel secundo ratione rei quae appetitu. Sum. v. ambitio.  whether ambition be a mortal sin? he answers▪ negatively it is not so simply, but may be so, in respect of its end (and so may any thing in itself lawful be, if its end be criminal); or it may be so, if the thing affected be▪ a crime; but that is accidental, and still ambitiousness; the inordinacy of the affection is excused, and may transgress all bounds, if the honour and power affected, be lawful. Thus Cajetan he will yield it more than 
(x) Non est autem mortale peccatum, nisi vel ex parte rei in qua appetitur honour: puta, si quis vult honorari ob crimen aliquod; vel ex parte finis— quia vult haheri ut Deus. Cajetan. v. ambit.  Venial, when one will be honoured for a crime, or would be counted a God; accordingly it is resolved by Sylvester, 
(y) Sum. v. superbia. n. 7.  with Navarre, 
(z) Quamvis regulariter, appetitus inordinatus honoris, non excedat metas culpae venialis, Cap. 23. n. 15.  regularly an inordinate appetite (or greediness) of Honour, exceeds not the bounds of a Venial fault. Indeed if pride and ambition had been branded as damnable; two Cardinal virtues had been concerned; and, which is more, the Vatican Throne, both in its foundation and supports.   

SECT. XVII.  
VAin glory is another capital crime in their account, and pregnant with many other; they define it to be an inordinate affecting of humane glory; and yet determine, that an 
(a) Appetitus eorum etiam inordinatus regulariter est venialis. etc. Idem ibid. n. 9  inordinate affecting of praise, or favour, or honour, or reverence, or glory, is but regularly a Venial sin; only it may happen to be mortal in some case, as when one would inordinately have glory from others for a deadly end, or for a mortal sin, or that which he makes his last end; in all other cases, this capital evil is but a slight fault. According to their common Doctrine, Cajetan will have it to be mortal 
(b) Solum peccat mortaliter, qui gloriatur de aliquo quod est peccatum mortale: secundo qui ponit suum finem ultimum in gloria humana. Sum. v. glor. van.  then only, when one glories in mortal sin (but to glory in Venials they count it a small fault) or sets his ultimate end in vain glory. 
(c) Colligo ex Alex. in 2. 2. & Thom. 2. 2. q. 132. & Henr. de Gandavo in quodl. 1. q. 24. quod vana gloria de se non dicit aliquid quod sit contra charitatem Dei aut proximi. Sum. v. van. glor. n. 1.  Angelus collects out of Alexander and Aquinas, that vain glory of itself imports not any thing contrary to the love of God or man. Aquinas himself says, 
(d) Inanis gloria non est mortale peccatum, visi charitati perfecte adversatur. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 132. art. 3.  that if love of humane glory, though vain, be not perfectly repugnant to charity, it is not Mortal. And Sylvester 
(e) Intendit ergo S. Tho. quod appetitus vanae gloriae ex suo genere non sit mortale. Sum. v. van. gl. n. 2.  delivers this as the sense of their Oracle, that the desire of vain glory in its own nature is not mortal. Angelus 
(f) Si aliquid aliud quod non pertinet ad divinam scripturam vel sacramenta propter gloriam faceret, peccaret venialiter. Sum. ibid.  concludes, that this may be a man's end in all things, but the Scripture and the Sacraments; but this limitation is too strict in the judgement of their Doctors which are of greatest repute: for they determine, that he who does those things which are 
(g) Navar. Cap. 23. n. 13. supra. Quamvis eximius vir ille Angelus teneat, concionari, missam celebrare & alia principaliter divino cultui dedicata facere propter honorem aut inanem gloriam, esse mortale, contrarium tamen tenendum est, ut latissime demonstravimus. Idem c. 21. n. 40. Vid. Soto, in Suarez. supra.  principally instituted for the honour and worship of God, and the Salvation of Souls for vain glory as his chief end, as for example, he that in Preaching, or Praying, or celebrating, makes vain glory his Principal end, and aims at nothing higher, sins but Venially. Angelus had made it worse, but others had confuted him effectually, and Navarre after them. Aquinas the Angel of their Schools, was it seems of this persuasion, that vain glory may be actually our principal end in worshipping God, without any mortal sin: for Sylvester tells us, that Angelus did 
(h) Contra S. Tho. & veritatem dicit quod est mortale quando ea quae ordinata sunt ad gloriam Dei quis principaliter facit ad gloriam suam, ut sacramenta & scripturae sacrae. Sum. v. van. glor. n. 4.  contradict, not only the truth, but Saint Thomas, in saying it is a mortal evil when those things which were ordained for the glory of God, are done principally for a man's own glory, as the Sacraments and the Scripture. And they are highly concerned to maintain this, for says he, if 
(i) Alias si is qui gloriatur de sacris vestibus, aut cautu divivorum, vel conditions theologica, actualiter nullum allum finem intendens, peccaret mortaliter, totus poene clerus esset in malo statu.  this were a mortal sin, the whole Clergy in a manner were in an ill condition; he means they were in a state of damnation. So that it was high time for the Roman Doctors to form a Divinity of new Maxims, since those of Scripture and Antiquity, left them in a damnable condition. One would think, that to count it but a peccadillo, to make vain glory the cause or motive without which a man would not Preach, or pray, or perform any worship, should be a prodigious thing for any that calls himself a Christian: but he that will allow it, under no greater censure than that of a petty fault, to be the principal end of worship, and the great concern of Salvation, 
(k) Vid. Navar. c. 20. n. 11. etc. 21. n. 40. etc. 23. n. 101.  advances it higher. He 
(l) Peccat. Qui accipit beneficium Ecclesiasticum spirituale principaliter propter honorem aut utilitatem temporariam secundum S. Antonin. Quod limito procedere in eo qui est eo indignus ob ignorantiam, vel alium defectum: Nam supra diximus, quod falsum est esse mortale facere ordinata ad cultum divinum principaliter ob bona temporalia. Idem c. 23. n. 15.  that takes a Church-living or Spiritual benefice, principally for honour or temporal profit offends but Venially, unless he be unworthy because of his ignorance, or other defect. So that in their Church, for any or all of them, from the Pope to the meanest officer, to make honour and profit their chief end, in taking the charge of Souls, or other place or employment, which concern the worship of God, or the Salvation of the people, is so slight a thing as needs never trouble them; ten thousand faults of this nature, ten thousand times▪ over▪ would never hazard their Souls. These two last conclusions; will help us to discern of what complexion Popery is upon what it is founded; for what ends they may think it safe to maintain it, and persist in it, without, or against any conscientious or Spiritual consideration: And why they may make Religion all along serve a worldly interest and truckle under it. There's no danger in all this; it's a harmless Venial by their Doctrine, to thrust the great God and his glory into an inferior place, below their honour and profit; even in those things which they say were principally instituted for his Sovereign Honour; this is a fault, with them, next to nothing. If they should in the worship of God, aim at him in the first place, and at their own glory and profit in the next, there might be some danger, lest they should too much oblige him: for thus to join God and their carnal interest together, as their end in any religious concern, is, 
(m) Nullum autem peccatum immo meritum est sacere illa principaliter propter Deum, vel quia honesta sunt & Sancta, & secundario propter gloriam, vel laudem humanam in finem aptum relatum. Idem ibid. post Sanctum Thomum.  a meritorious act, according to Aquinas. Further 
(n) 
Peccat.  
Qui per jactantiam se aut suos laudat cum irreverentia notabili Dei, aut cum injuria vel scandalo proximi notabili: alias enim solum est veniale juxta S. Tho. receptum. Alexand. Allens. Idem ibid. n. 16.   vain glorious boasting, though it be with irreverence to God, and injury and scandal to others, if that be not much; is only Venial, according to Aquinas and Alensis. And a man may vaingloriously praise himself for something that is good, though it be false; or something that is evil, 
(o) Idem ibid. n. 13. Cajetan. sum. v. jactantia, Angel sum. v. van. glor. n. 1.  if it be not deadly; and yet offend but Venially, when he does no great mischief to others.   

SECT. XVIII.  
AVersation to, or grief at Spiritual and Divine things, is another capital crime in their reckoning, which is called Acedia. The object is God, as to man's friendship and communion with him, and the spiritual acts and duties requisite thereto: the act they express by sloth, and lothness to meddle with these things, coldness tepidness about them, not caring for them, nausiating and accounting them a grievance▪ This some of them do not deny to be a mortal sin, but they will have it mortal only upon such strange terms, that any one may have a great aversation for God, and the things of God, without danger of deadly guilt; for they define 
(p) Definiri potest, esse vitium inclinans ad tristandum de bono spirituali divino, quatenus est divi●um secundum mentem utriusque Thomae. 2. 2. q. 35, art. 2. Navar. cap. 23. n. 124. Tristitia de bono spirituali in quantum est divinum. Sylvest. sum. v. Acedia. n. 1.  it by an agrievedness at what is Spiritual and Divine, quatenus est divinum, as it is Divine, and not otherwise: not 
(q) Non prout est laboriosum vel molestum corpori aut delectationis ejus impeditivum. 22 q. 35. art. 2.  because it is laborious or troublesome to the flesh, or any impediment to its pleasures, which are Aquinas words; but under that formality, in that it is divine, 
(r) Navar. ibid. Sylvest. ibid.  as his followers understand it. So that the greatest disaffection to spiritual things, if it be because they are unsuitable to corrupt nature, not agreeable to the flesh it's ease and pleasure (which is the common and ordinary cause of it), if it be not on an account 
(s) Peccatom est valde grave, generoque suo mortale, cum deliberato, & advertente animo admittitur, quod raro videtur contingere. Navar. ibid.,  that rarely falls out, as they acknowledge, and which a man can scarce ever deliberately be subject to; it brings him not under this guilt. So Cajetan tell us, 
(t) Si vero de hoc (ut sit civis sanctorum & nomesticus Dei, etc.) non tristatur secundum affectum, sed secundum effectum, quia parum de hujusmodi amicitiae bono curate; negligens adipisci illum, quia vacat delectabilibus humanis, peccatum Acediae non incurrit. Cajet. sum. v. Acedia.  if a man not as to his affection, but in effect, be grieved at this (viz) that he is to be a Citizen with the Saints and one of God's family); because he little cares for the happiness of this Divine friendship, neglecting to attain it, because, he gives up himself to other delights; he is not guilty of this sin. Angelus, that he may discover when this disaffection to Spiritual and Divine things is mortal, and when Venial, tells us, that 
(u) 
Aut (consistit) in omissione eorum quae non sunt necessaria & sic est veniale peccatum. Sum. v. Acedia. n. 1.  
Si omittit ea quae sunt de necessitate salutis, peccat mortaliter: si vero alias debita peccat venial●ter. Cajetan. sum. v. Inconst.   when it consists in the omission of things not necessary to Salvation, it is Venial; that is, it is little or no fault, if all the duties of real worship, all the acts of grace and Christian virtues, are omitted: for we cannot yet discern that they account any of these necessary to Salvation, and by the premises it appears that they do not. It is Venial, says Sylvester, 
(x) Est autem veniale, quando homo quidem in operando attaediatur, sed tamen ea ad quae tenetur, non omittit. Ibid. n. 2.  when a man counts the doing of it grievous, but yet omits not what he is bound to. Angelus expresseth it more significantly; by this it appears 
(y) Et ex hoc patet quid dicendum de eo qui attaediatus abhominatur divina & spiritualia: quia nisi sint necessaria ad salutem, & ea dimittat vel deliberate disponat dimittere non peccat mortaliter. Sum. ibid.  says he, what is to be said of him, who counts grievous, and abominates Divine and Spiritual things, since unless they be necessary to Salvation, and he declines them or is deliberately disposed to decline them, he sins not mortally. So that Spiritual and Divine things (all that they count not necessary; that is, all in a manner which is requisite for a Christian) may be abhorred, without any mortal guilt. And herein the two sums agree well enough, though they seem to be at some odds. It is false, 
(z) Falsum est, quod dicta abominatio (spiritualium) semper sit peccatum mortale. Sum. v. malitia.  says Sylvester, (not limiting it to things necessary) that abominating of Spiricual things, is always a mortal sin. Accordingly he determines, that 
(a) 
Rancour 1. displicentia hominum inducentium ad spiritualia & est veniale. v. Acedia n. 4.  
Neque mortaliter peccat, qui fastidiam, indignationem, & quandam aversionem concipit in eos, qui spiritualiae consulunt, ut in concionatores, aut alios. Bonacin. 1. praeeept. d. 3. q. 4. p. ult. sect. 1. n. 6.   rancour against those who would induce us to Spiritual things (that is, would draw us to God or the things of God), is a Venial fault. It is no mortal sin (say others) to conceive an indignation and loathing of those who persuade to what is Spiritual (so as not to endure to hear or see them), whether Preachers or others. We see by this (as by other instances) that sins so stated, as they are scarce ever practicable, they can be content to have them counted mortal; but common provocations, and such of which there is most danger, must pass for Venials; yea, there are some amongst them, who will have this capital crime, though it have such a deadly aspect, both in itself, and in its effects, to be no mortal sin. Laisius' Turrian. ibid. sect. 3. n. 2.   

SECT. XIX.  
ANger stands in their general account, as another capital crime. I have touched it before; but here let us see how criminal they make it, when in particulars they bring up their reckoning. It is considered in respect of the mode or degree; and the tendency or effects of it. As to the degree of it, how high soever it rise, to what excess soever it transport one, inwardly or outwardly, 
(b) Attenditur orde rationis in ira— ut scil. motus irae non immoderate fervescat interius vel exterius, qui ordo si praetermittatur non erit fine peccato— sed non erit mortale ex genere suo: sed possit esse mortale peccatum, puta si ex vehementia irae excidat à dilectione Dei vel proximi. Angel. sum. v. ira. n. 1. Sylvest. ibid. n. 4. Cajetan. sum. v. ira.  it is not in its own nature mortal, unless it be so vehement as to bear down both love to God and man, and leave the passionate person, neither which yet it will not do, though it sally out furiously into curses or blasphemies against God or man, if this be but merely Verbal, as 
(c) Navat. c. 23. n. 117. & alii supra.  we saw before. The tendency of it, that which it leads to, is revenge; and as to that, it will be Venial if the revenge be but little, or it may be great when it can be taken legally; or it may be great and illegal too if the passion he but quick and great enough. The more excessive it is, the more mischief it may do, and be innocent, if the passion 
(d) Passiones nisi ad deliberatum consensum vindictae inducant, veniales sunt. Cajetan. v. rixa. possit esse veniale propter imperfectionem actus, quia praevenit deliberationem. Sylu. v. ira n. 4. Angelus ibid.  prevent deliberation when it comes, and hinder it while it stays: both it, and the effects of it, how horrid soever, will be Venial. So that if one be angry enough, he may Blaspheme God, renounce Christ, perjure himself, kill or burn whom or what he will, with little, or no fault. Thus by their Doctrine, this capital crime seems more like a virtue, than a vice, since the greater is the better; or at least the less it has to do with reason, the more excusable and Venial. Other extravagant passions meet with as favourable measures. 
(e) Indigratio (qua ex ira afficitur homo proximo tanquam indigno sua affabilitate, corversatione & hujusmodi), peccatum est propter inordinatam passionem; & communiter veniale. Cajetan. Sum. v. Indignatio. Sylu. v. Indignatio. Angel. sum. v. diligere. n. 2.  Indignation, which makes a man disdain others, as unworthy of his conversation or affable treatment, it is commonly Venial. 
(f) Audacia si pura est communiter est, peccatum veniale: Sicut immoderata iracundia, & immoderatus timor; quia non contrariantur charitati, sed a recta exorbitant rationis regula. Cajetan. v. audacia.  Audaciousness, in itself, is no worse; nor excessive wrath and immoderate fear, because they are not contrary to Charity, but exorbitant from the right measures of reason. So Intimidity, or 
(z) (g) Veniale autem peccatum hoc est, quando ex stultitia excusabili procedit— tantaque possit esse stoliditas, quod nullum esset peccatum.  Fool-hardiness is Venial, when it proceeds from tolerable foolishness; but the folly may be so great, that the fault will be none. Also 
(h) Idem. ibid. v. Incontinentia.  incontinent desires, or Lusts: Love likewise, whether of the Flesh, or the World. Of the former thus Angelus; 
(i) Amor sui est, quum quis nimis diligit seipsum quaerendo delectationes corporis nimis, & quietem carnis, & procedi ex luxuria, quod est peccatum mortale solum, si propter eum non implet praecepta aut facit contra: aliter communit●… est veniale, Sum. v. Amor sui.  Immoderate self-love, when one excessively seeks the delight of the body, and ease of the flesh, it proceeds from Luxury, yet it is commonly Venial, when it causes not other mortal acts, or neglects. As for love of the world 
(k) Diligitu● ad necessitatem, & sic non est peccatum— Est etiam diligere mundum i. e. longo tempore velle stare in mundo propter delitias, & sic est veniale peccatum. Idem. ibid. v. diligere. n. 3.  to love it for necessity, is nosin, and to love to stay a long time in the world, for the pleasures of it, is but a venial fault.   

Sect. 19 Envy is another capital crime, and in general they inveigh against it, as 
(l) Soto de Just. & jur. l. 4. ar. p. 176.  a Devilish wickedness; yet when they come to give particular rules for Conscience and practice, they leave room enough for the entertainment of it in the hearts and lives of their Catholics: the general notion of it, is an excessive grief at the good of others, but all are acquitted from mortal quiet, who grieve at others good, because it may be prejudicial to themselves, or because they want it. So far a man may envy all in the world, who have more worth, honour, or power, or prosperity than himself. 
(m) Si vero sit cirea temporalia, potest esse cum peccato vel sine, eo modo, quo & appetitus temporalium. Sylu. v. Invidia. ut si mediocris homo tr●stetur, quia non est rex, quia non est papa: & hoc veniale est ex se. Vid. Cajetan. v. Invid.  This may be good or evil, but evil in no other degree, than the desire of temporals, which when it is excessive, is of itself, by their doctrine, but Venial. Or they may grieve at others good, 
(n) Idem. ibid. n. 2. quia indignus est tali bono, hujusmodi indignatio, ut dicit S. Thom. & Cajetan. — mala est & ex se veniale; Nam cum id, de quo dolet, nec sit malum culpae, nec paenae, videtur quodammodo arguere Deum, & dolere, quasi injustitia sit ex parte Datoris, in Tol. l. 8. c. 65.  because they think those who have it, unworthy of it. Grief or Indignation at the outward happiness of others, upon this account solely, is of itself a Venial fault with Aquinas and Cajetan. But why evil at all? the reason is because, since that which is grieved at, is neither an evil of sin or punishment, it seems in a manner to reprove God, and to grieve, as though there were injustice in the Dispenser of these things. All the envy in the world may find shelter and security in these decisions as a harmless Venial. If this last mentioned be not Envy, what is? why a grief at the good of others, as it lessens and obscures our proper worth or excellency. But he that thinks others more unworthy, and himself far better, will think it a lessening and obscuring his own worth, to have it so overlooked; and that which they distinguish and mince in speculation, will go down together in practice. However, two limitations they add, which will commonly excuse Envy: it must be betwixt equals 
(o) Invidia qua homo tristatur de prosperitate alterius similis sen aequalis, Cajetan. Sum. v. Invid. , and so Grief at the prosperity of Inferiors, or Superiors at least, will be acquitted. Also, if it be for little things, 
(p) 
Nec etiam (est mortale) si bonum de quo dolet, sit quid minimum, Sylu. ibid. n. 2. (Cajetan. ibid.)  
Possunt magna videri non aspicientibus aeterna. Idem. ibid.   it is Venial. Now all Temporals are little things to him who has the Eternal in his prospect; so way is made to acquit all envy for outward prosperity, which yet they make the only 
(q) Cajetan. ibid.  object of envy. And if envy, upon a small ground, may be excused as a little fault, envy upon a great occasion, will be excusable, as less; except when they derive the sinfulness of an act from its exorbitancy as to reason; that will be less sinful which is more unreasonable. They might as well have concluded directly, and without circumlocution, as Lorca the Dominican doth, that Envy is no more a mortal sin than Vainglory or Covetousness, which they count Venial, unless heightened with some such circumstance, as will make an act otherwise good to be a deadly evil 
(*) Vid. Bonacin. 1 precept. d. 3. q. 4. p. ult. Sect. 2. n. 3. .   

Sect. 20. Intemperance, which they call Gula, comprising both Gluttony and Drunkenness, may well pass for a Cardinal crime, yet both together, by an after reckoning, make but a poor Venial 
(r) In general with them, all sins against temperance and modesty are regularly Venial, vid. Nau. . They define it an inordinate appetite of eating and drinking, (viz.) to excess, not for necessity but for pleasure. This when it is excessive every way in the charge, the time, the quality, the pleasure, the quantity, 
(s) Dico secundum S. Thom. (2. 2. q. 148. art. 1.) & secundum mentem ejus in multis lecis, quod (Gula) non est mortale ex suo genere, licet sit vitium capitale, id est, ex quo vitia multa nascuntur, Sylu. v. Gula. n. 2.  is not in its own nature a mortal sin, according to the doctrine of Aquinas, though it be a Capital Vice, and the cause of many other. But than it may be deadly by accident, 
(t) Quando quis scienter comedit vel bibit, in grave corporis nocumentum secundum, S. Thom. Idem. ibid.  if it be grievously hurtful to the body. So it becomes those to determine, who are more tender of the concerns of the body than of the soul. Yet that we may understand how the pleasure of sensuality may be preferred before either soul or body, they tell us, that if the damage done to the body by intemperance, be not grievous, 
(u) Si hoc (grave nocumentum) fiat inadvertenter, non est mortale, nisi adeo frequenter fiat, quod tenetur advertere, sicut de ebrietate dictum est. Similiter nec si nocumentum sit modicum, Idem. ibid.  or if it prove so great, yet if the Glutton do not observe it; or if the great prejudice done to his health be not so frequent, that he is bound to observe it, it will be Venial still. But Cajetan troubles us not with this respect to health, but concludes 
(x) Frequenter autem est veniale & quandoque valde grave, ut cum delectatio cibi allicit ad comedendum usque ad vomitum, aut alia inconvenientia, & similiter cum inducit ad alia peccata: puta ad nimium sumptum, vel ad nocendum propriae sanitati, & ad quaecunque alia peccata, Cajetan. v. Gula.  it may be Venial (and of a large size sometimes), not only when it brings upon us other inconveniencies, but other sins; and particularly when it is prejudicial to health. He has but one case wherein it will be more than Venial; 
(y) Tunc solum est mortale, quando delectationem cibi habet quis pro ultimo fine juxta il●u●; qu●rum Deus venter est: hoc autem cognoscitur ex hoc, quod homo ob delectationem in com●dendo, non curat transgredi praeceptum Dei aut Ecclesiae: ut si propter hoc furetur, &c Idem. ibid. vid. Sylu. ibid. Angelus. v. Gula. n. 2. paratus facere quaecunque ut eam consequatur.  then only is it mortal, says he, when this pleasure in eating is a man's chief end, and his belly his God; that is, when for the pleasure of it, he (not only transgresses all rules of temperance, but) has no regard of any command of God, or the Church; as if a man will Steal to play the Glutton, etc. It seems this sensual Lust will never be criminal, unless one be so much at its devotion, 
(z) Sylvest. ibid.  as to contemn God, and make nothing of any other wickedness to gratify it. And though there be no danger here, but when one makes his belly his God; yet there's no great danger of that, since a man may be a perfect Epicure, like the rich Glutton in the Gospel, and yet escape. 
(a) Quum propter talem delectationem appetitus, ducit totam vitam hujusmodi delectation bus deputare, sicut Dives qui epulabatur quotidie. Et hoc est multum vicimum mortali. Sum. abide. n. 2.  When one, says Angelus, for delight of his Appetite, resolves to give up his whole life to such (Gluttonous) pleasures as Dives, etc. this is near to mortal sin. It seems than it is not deadly, but only near it; though it brought the Epicure, not only near Hell, but into the torment of its flames. Yea further, if Intemperance proceed to beastliness, and pollute not only the soul, but the body loathsomely, if the Glutton load himself with more than he can bear, and so burden nature, that it is forced to ease itself in nasty ways, this will be no more a fault, 
(b) Gula regulariter est venialis, etiamsi absque u●ilitate usque ad vomitum, etiam intentum sese quis cibo & potu ingurgitet, Ut sentit Cajetan. Cap. 23. n. 119.  Intemperance, says Navarre, is regularly Venial, though without any profit. and out of design, one stuff himself so full with meat and drink, even to Vomiting. If he eat so much till he Vomit, on purpose that he may be at it again the sooner, and so may be still gormandizing, it is no worse Uncleanness, says 
(c) Immundicia est filia gulae, quum quis provocat se ad vomitum, ut saepius comedere possit: vel tantum comedit quod necesse habet evomere, communiter est veniale peccatum, Sum. v. Immundicia.  Angelus, which is the issue of Intemperance, when one provokes himself to Vomit, that he may eat the oftener; or when he eats so much, that he must of necessity Vomit, is commonly a venial fault. 
(d) Usurpatur pro peccato inordinatae emissionis superfluorum, ut cibi per vomitum, & similium ex gula procedentium, & sic ponitur filiagulae, frequenter est peccatum veniale, utpote nec contra Dei nec proximi dilectionem: turpe tamen, utpote etiam corporalem immunditiam inferens, Sum. v. Immunditia.  Cajetan more fully. Uncleanness is used for the sin of voiding Excrements excessively, as of meat by Vomiting, and the like, proceeding from Intemperance; it is frequently a Venial sin, since it is neither against the love of God nor man; yet it is filthy, since it brings with it even bodily nastiness. So that intemperance, even when it bewrays itself, and vents it filth, by all the passages, that oppressed Nature can find in the Gluttons body, is but a small fault. To be half Drunk is no mortal sin. So Lopez 
(e) Quando aliquis bene potatus, ita bene confo●tatus est capite quod rationis incompos non est factus, & tamen sibi videtur quod domus moveatur, haec semiplena ebrietas, sicut non est mortalis, licet sit grave peccatum, quia secundum m●ntem.  after 
(f) D. Tho. & Cajet. ibi. ratio non obumbratur, cap. 2. n. 11. 22. q. 150. art. 1. & 5.  Aquinas; herein they all agree, says a learned 
(z) (g) Quando ebrietas non est perfecta, sed imperfecta, quae turbat aliquo modo rationem, sed non omnino, tunc est grave veniale. In his omnes conveniunt, Tol. Instr. l. 8. c 61.  Cardinal. Take their sense in the words of Cajetan 
(h) Ebrietas non plena (quando aliquis potu vini redditur nimis laetus, aut turbatur in phantasia, dum videtur ●i quod d●mus gyretur, aut hujusmodi aliquid incurrit: non tamen perdit usum rationis) peccatum proculdubio grave est, nisi causa medicinae fiat: quia immoderatus est potus secundum quantitatem vel qualitatem, & hoc si advertenter aut negligenter accidit. Pejus tamen, si ex intention: est enim tunc prope mortale: non tamen est mortale, quia nec attingit ad completam ebrietatis rationem; nec notabile damnum rationis eligitur, Sum. v. Ebrietas. . Drunkenness not complete, (when one by drinking Wine is made too merry, or is disturbed i●… his fancy, so that the House seems to whirl round, or the like effect of intoxication befalls him, but he does not quite lose the use of Reason), without doubt is a great sin (but not big enough to be feared) unless it be done for medicine; because it is excessive drinking in quantity or quality, when fallen into it knowingly or negligently: But it is worse, when it is out of design (when one drinks too much, with an intention thus to disorder himself); because than it is almost mortal (there's no danger in all this, since he adds) but yet it is not mortal, since it reaches not the complete notion of Drunkenness, and is wothout signal damage to reason. So that if a man be not dead Drunk, and utterly deprived of the use of reason, he falls short of that perfection which is requisite to make this a deadly evil. In fine, however the Scripture, ancient Christians, and all that are sober, brand Drunkenness as a most deadly Vice; yet the Roman Doctors have discovered two admirable Virtues in it; one is that the full dose, (perfect Drunkenness) will make the highest impieties the greatest Outrages and Villainies to be no sins at all. So 
(i) Quoad culpam excusat a toto quod fecit in ebrietate ex quo est sine usu totali rationis. Sum. v Ebrictas. n. 3.  Angelus, who proves it by the Canon Law. So likewise Rosella 
(k) 
In Sylvest. v. Ebriat. n. 5. Tol. l. 5. c. 10. Rosella, v. Ebriat. n. 2.  
Actus vel omissiones contra praecepta contingentes tempore somni, vel Ebrietatis, etiamsi fuerint voluntarii in causa, non denominari tunc peccata, sed tantum effectus peccati praecedentis; ut late defendit Vasquez referens pro ea sententia, Paludan, Major, Gabriel, & Adrian. Suar. de Juram. l. 3. c. 7. n. 7.   after others. Those of their Writers which seem most cautions, 
(l) An actus ma●i, quos Ebrius facit in ebrietate existens, sint peccata, si fornicetur, si occidat, etc. ad hoc Respondent, S. Tho. 2. 2. q. 150. art. 4. Cajetan. Sylvest. & responsio in his consistit— quando culpabilis suit ebrietas— quando non erat Solitus talia mala facere, nec timebantur, tunc non sunt nova peccata, in Tol. l. 8. c. 61.  except culpable Drunkenness; as to this only, when such outrages are the usual effects of it. So that unless both Drunkenness, and the criminal issues of it, be customary, this will not be sin, or imputable to the Drunkard. Hereby they furnish the Christian world with a new Argument, to prove Mahomet a false Prophet, seeing he was so greatly mistaken in making his Law so severe against wine; which in its greatest abuse, is of such sovereign efficacy, as to drown so much mortal sin, and to make all crimes , lose their deadly quality. But that Impostors head was not so intoxicated, but he might discern, that such who are guilty in the cause, are chargeable in the effects; nor was he so much a Prophet, as to foresee, that in aftertimes, any thing under the disguise of Divinity, should stumble at this. The other virtue of this sin, is, that the moiety of it (half Drunkenness) will make any the most horrid crimes to be but small faults. 
(m) Parvitas judicii, qualem habent semidormientes & semiebrij vel adeo turbati, licet sufficiat ad veniale, non tamen ad mortale, Navar. praelud. 9 n. 12.  Weakness of judgement (says one) such as they have who are half asleep, or half drunk; though it be enough to make a sin venial, yet not mortal. When those, says 
(n) Quando semidormientes, vel semiebrij quidvis patraverint, cum parvitate judicij aperte laborent, & lethali culpa redduntur immunes. Graff. l. r. cap. 14. n. 4. Bonacin. de Matrim. q. 4. punct. 7. n. 6. ubi. Navar. Cajetan. & alij Communiter.  another, that are half asleep, or half drunk, perpetrate any wicked thing , since they are plainly under weakness of judgement, they are quitted of mortal guilt. So that if any one will but make himself half Drunk, every morning early (and it will be no worse than a venial to do it purposely); he may,  wickedness he acts, be free from mortal sin all his life: and thus, he that lives all his days like a Devil, may escape Hell notwithstanding, and be saved by being daily half Drunk.  
There are multitudes of particular sins which they comprise under these seven Capitals, and call them their Daughters, after Gregory and Aquinas; but they need not be taken notice of as mortal, by common Confessors, much less by their Consitents; for such Confessors need not know whether they are mortal or no; 
(o) (n) Ali sunt peecata, quae sunt filiae peccatorum Capitalium, & de talibus non— ordinarius non tenetur scire, utrum sint mortalia vel non. Sed curatus Ordinarius, ut Episcopus, Archiepiscopus & caeteri alij superiores ten●ntur scire. Sum. v. confessio. 4. n. 3.  as Angelus tells us after Henricus, and so must Absolve Sinners, though they never resolve, or think of leaving their sins.   

Sect. 21. By the premises we may see what, and how many sins may pass for Venial in the Church of Rome, and they have presumed to make them so without evidence from Scripture, as even a 
(p) Ex Scripturis divinis quamvis de multis peccatis constat, quod sunt mortalia, tamen vix de ullis expresse satis videtur constare, quod sint tantum venialia, Greg. de V●lent. Tom. 2. disp. 6. q. 18.  Jesuit will acknowledge. The Maxims they proceed on therein (though eternal life or death depend on it) are purely their own conceits; no wonder if they leave them at great uncertainty. 
(q) Multa enim creduntur esse venialia, quae mortalia sunt, & difficillimum est in talibus discernere, 2. dist. 24. n. 53.  Many sins are believed to be venials, which are mortal, says Bonaventure, and it is most difficult to discern them. So that they have no sufficient direction from any rule, no not their own, but they are encouraged to venture upon all this wickedness in the dark and blindfold. The instances I have given, may serve for a taste, there is a world more, nor have I picked out all the worst, more time and diligence may discover more, as bad or worse. But by these we may discern, that  the Lord hath forbidden in his Law, they have ways to reduce it to the rank of Venials; for the whole matter of the divine Law, is, in itself, either of less, or greater weight; if it be small, or they please to count it so, they conclude presently upon that account, it is not mortal:  appears not to be a grand enormity, whether it be against God, others, or ourselves, must be venial, according to that of Richard de Sancto Victore. 
(r) Mortal non potest a quoquam committi sine grandi corruptione sui, aut contemptu Dei, aut gravi laesione proximi; & reliquaomnia esse venialia, vid. St. Clar. Probl. 14. p. 8●.  Mortal sin cannot be committed by any, but by a grand corrupting of himself, or contempt of God; or grievous mischief of others; all the rest are Venial. Whatever is not in their apprehension, grand and grievous, is next to nothing. Yea, one Member of the three, is in a manner, wholly shriveled away into Venials. 
(s) Quando sunt contra bonum proprium tantum, sunt magna ex parte venialia.  A man can scarce do any thing against himself, which will be big enough to make a mortal sin of. Indeed, it may seem no more than requisite to make it no crime for a man to damn himself, when they animate him to venture on so many damnable things, as if they were nothing. Thus they serve whatever the great God hath forbidden, which they have the confidence to count small; but if they cannot choose but think it great, they have other expedients to levelly it (according to the exigence of men's Lusts), and diminish it into a Venial. To make it more, they require so very much, that a Sinner may make shift enough to be without some of it, and so scape the mortalness (as they will have him dream) though he practise the wickedness. That any sin may be mortal, there must be judicium integrum 
(t) Ad constituendum peccatum mortale judicium integrum requiritur, Navar. cap. 16. n. 8. Ad constituendum peccatum mortale integrum judicium requiri debet, cap. 1. de delict. puer. Graff. l. 1. c. 14. n. 4. requiritur plena advertentia, & non sufficit semiplena, qualis in semiebrijs, semidormientibus, & eye qui alio distrabuntur ut Cajetan, Navarre. & alij communiter cum Bonacin de Matr. q. 4. punct. 7. n. 6. p. 313.  an entire judgement, not distracted, not weakened, not disturbed, as they prove out of their Canon Law: Also there must be 
(u) Vid. St. Clar. Probl. 14. p. 79. & Tol. l. 4. c. 12. Cajetan. Sum. v. delect. mores. p. 112.  perfect deliberation, 'tis venial (how grievous soever otherwise), where there is not perfect deliberation: If by any means, deliberation not only in itself, but in its perfection, be either prevented (and the thing be done before the mind take due cognizance of it,) or hindered (while it is under debate) it cannot be mortal. And that deliberation may be perfect, there must be a 
(x) Veniale ex imperfectione operis, licet in re gravi, ubi deest perfecta deliberatio, vel presentatio sufficiens malitiae in objecto, etc. St. Clar. ibid.  sufficient presenting of the evil in its object, and its circumstances. If the mind only consider the advantage, or pleasure, and not the sinfulness and danger; 'tis but a semi-deliberation, and not full enough to make a sin mortal. Besides it will require 
(y) Per sufficientem deliberationem intelligit (Bonaventura) tempus sufficiens ad deliberandum postquam ratio advertit. Sylvest. v. Consens. n. 1. Intelligitur si advertentia sit satis deliberata. Nam si est motus surreptitius, adeo ut sit subita deliberatio non autem plena, poterit esse veniale (perjurium): scilicet si tempus non suppetebat ad plene deliberandum, Soto de Just. lib. 8. q. 2. are 3. p. 271. sufficiens advertentia & deliberatio non habetur sine discursu: discursus autem in tempore sit, Suar. de Vot. l. 1. c. 9  time to perfect it, and here they may favour the Sinner as much as they please by determining what time is sufficient for humane frailty; but if he be in haste, and do not stay this time, because he is so forward to sin, he will but sin Venially. Finally, there must be full consent of will. If the inferior and sensual part take never so much complacency in a wicked thing; yet so long as the Superior takes no notice of it, there's no harm 
(z) Contingit igitur delectari ad apprehensionem delectabilis, ante adversionem delectationis, & hoc est sensualitatis, & absque dubio est veniale peccatum. Bonaventura 2. dist. 24. n. 74. , 'tis certainly no more than a Venial: Or if the superior part takes cognizance of it, and be some way inclined to the wickedness, yet that may not make it criminal, for every 
(a) Vid. Bonavent. ibid. n. 64.  inclination is not sufficient for this purpose, but full consent of will, such as is perfectly deliberate; neither is a tacit and constructive consent sufficient. 
(b) Negligentia repellendi complacentiam, cum displicentia rationis de ea secundum Bonaventur. est consensus interpretativus: quod non est mortale▪ peccatum secundum multos magistros, Sylu. v. Consensus▪ n. 1. Necessaria est positiva complacentia— & non sufficit consensus interpretativus, Cajetan. & alii in Bonacin. ibid. n. 8. Vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. 21. n. 3. & ibi. Adrian. Cajetan. Armilla. Navar. D. Thom. D. Bonavent. & 30. alij.  A neglect to repel or suppress the delight in sin, with some reluctancy of reason, is with Bonaventure constructive consent, which in the opinion of many Doctors is no mortal sin. Now if there be not a concurrence of all these, the horridest crime that can be perpetrated will be a Venial. If a man should Blaspheme God, or Curse Christ, or renounce the Faith, or Murder his own Father, or Ravish his own Child, or Mother, or fire Cities and Countries; yet if he did it not with such perfection of judgement, deliberation, and consent, as is expressed; it would be a petty fault. And he may be easily furnished with many things, which will any of them so weaken this, as not to hurt him. Ignorance, drowsiness, disorder by drink, inconsiderateness, negligence, forgetfulness, precipitancy natural or accidental, levity, passion, custom, or habit, and the like, will serve to excuse any wickedness from mortal guilt. Let me but add one more (which serves to make clear work) the opinion of their Doctors, one or more, will make any crime not to be mortal to him that follows it; any person upon this ground may venture upon the most deadly sin, as if it were Venial. It will be no more dangerous, for he is to be Absolved by their Doctrine, though he declares, that he will not forsake such a sin. 
(c) Si paenitens nollet agnoscere tale quod peccatum, nihilominus absolvat eum, etc. quia ex quo ille credit opinionem quam sequitur esse veram, innixus authoritate probabili, non videtur peccare mortaliter: & sic debet absolvi. Sylvest. secundum Gofredum. v. Confess. 3. n. 11. Si diversitas esset inter Doctores, & paenitens ex aliqua rationabili causa vult adhaerere uni opinioni, non est sibi denegenda absolutio: sed suae conscientiae relinquenda. Caveat igitur confessor, ne sit praeceps in dando sententiam de mortali, ubi sunt variae opiniones doctorum Angel. Sum. v. Confess. 4. n. 3. & 13.  The Confessor ought to Absolve him, though in his own opinion, and the judgement of other Divines also, it be a mortal crime. This is their common doctrine delivered 
(d) 
Gofredus, Antoninus, Rosella, Armilla, Angelus, Sylvest. Conradus, Ledesma, Soto, Medina, Navar. in cap. 23. n. 31. & in Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 32. Sect. 5. & Victorel, l. 3. c. 20.  
Near 50. of their Authors are produced for this by Jo. Sancius, disp. 33. n. 54. p. 223, 224. Vid. Bonacin, & in eo alios, Tom. 1. disp. 5. q. 7. punct. 4. n. 26.   by multitudes of their Writers. So that hereby a fair way is opened to leave no mortal sin in the world, at least in the Consciences of all that will regard their Doctors. In the mean time, the far greatest part of sins the world is guilty of, are by this and their other maxims, become peccadilloes, and they bid fair for all. The principles, by virtue of which they have done so much already, a little improved (though extended no further than they will reach) would go near to leave no deadly sin at all. To be sure, he that will regulate himself by their maxims, may act any wickedness in the world without fear of deadly guilt. And hereby it appears plainly, how very needless holiness of life is in that Church (which pretends to a Monopoly of all the holiness on earth) since by their doctrine they may not only neglect acts of Piety, Righteousness, and common Honesty; but may live securely in practices opposite to, and inconsistent therewith. They may continue in customary Blaspheming of God, in common Swearing and Perjuries, in Perfidiousness to God and Men, in a neglect of all that is acceptable in divine worship, In a total profanation of all time which is indeed, or in their account holy, in impiousness and disobedience to Parents or Superiors, in divers degrees of uncleanness and Murder, in variety of Cheats and Stealing, in Unfaithfulness as to breach of Promise and compacts, in all Falseness and Lying; every where and upon all occasions; in Slandering or Detraction, in Covetousness or Prodigality, which they will; in Unmercifulness and Outrageous passions; in Pride and Ambition; in Vainglory and Hypocrisy; in Flattery or Cursing; in Gluttony and Drunkenness, etc. In Sins against God and Man, against Godliness, Righteousness, Mercy, Charity; in any of these, a little modified▪ in all of them, and many more than I can reckon. They may persist in them impenitently to the death, and yet (if Impostors may be trusted rather than the Word of God) not fall short of Salvation; their doctrine gives them encouragement to live in them without Conscience, and die in them without Repentance. It takes off the motives which might work upon either fear or love (the main principles of such motions in us) to forsake them. They are taught by their best Authors that these sins may stand well with their love to God, that they do not so much as 
(e) Ex consensu omnium neque tollunt neque minuunt habitum charitatis, Bellarm. de Amiss. great. l. 1. c. 13. p. 91.  impair the habit of Charity; that they do not hinder the increase of 
(f) actuale peccatum veniale non esse obicem in— Eucharistia (docet) D Thomas, unde à fortiore idem diceret de caeteris Sacramentis quae aninus digna sunt, de Baptismo affirmat Scotus, — frequentiores Theologi, Suar. tom. 3. disp. 7. p. 132.  Grace, or the effects of their Sacraments; that they do 
(g) Aquinas proprie loquendo peccatum veniale non causat maculam in anima, 1. 2. q. 89. art. 1.  not slain the soul; that they hazard not God's favour thereby, 
(h) Bonavent. 2. dist. 42. Soto de nat. & gr. l. 1. c. 4. p. 132.  that they displease not God, that they are not against his will; that they are 
(i) Neque obstant quo minus justi, perfecti etiam dicantur, Soto, ibid.  consistent with a perfect fulfilling of the Law; that 
(k) Non habet perfectam rationem peccati, Aquinas 1, 2. q. 88 art. 1. ad 1mum.  they have not perfectly the nature of Sin; that they are not 
(l) Non est contra legem sed praeter legem. Idem. ibid. Lombard. 2. Sentent. dist. 35. Bonaventur. 2. dist. 43. Scotus a quo vocatur consilium, quod infringitur per peccatum veniale, in St. Clar. ibid. p. 79. Bellarm. de Justific. l. 4. c. 14.  against the Law, but only beside it; or if they be against it in any respect, as some of them think, 
(m) Durandus, Major, Vega Rada. Herrera.  yet against no precept; the observance of which, is necessary for salvation, or 
(n) Estius. Becanu.  not against the end of the Law, which is Charity; 
(o) Iste ergo vitiorum atque lapsuum quotidiani naevuli licet Christiani hominis vitam quasi pulvisculo aspergant handquaquam tamen defaedant turpiter Lindanus,  that they are but as specks or motes, 
(p) Modicum pro nihilo censetur Cajetan.  we may look on them as nothing, that without the interposal of mercy, they are 
(q) Bellarm. De Amiss. great. l. 1. c. 14. p. 95.  such in their own nature, as aught to be passed by, they 
(r) 
Veniale ex se venia dignum, Aquinas 1. 2. q. 88 art. 1. Veniale dicitur quod est venia dignum, Bellarm. ibid. p. 81. Cajetan.  
Estius 2. sent. dist. 42. Sect. 6.   deserve pardon. They do not (as they teach) deserve eternal punishment; 
(s) Negamus— posse Deum juste punire peccatum quodlibet etiam veniale, poena omnium gravissima, quae est mors aeterna, Bellarm. ibid. p. 92. & de Purgat. l. 1. c. 7. p. 1359.  and the Lord (as they Blaspheme) would be unjust, if he should condemn any for them. So that not only as long as God is merciful, but while he is just, the practice of these sins is safe. Neither love to God, nor fear of his displeasure, nor dread of Hell, nor desire of Heaven, nor a design for perfection, need move them to abandon any one of these sins. They need not fear, how much soever they multiply, or abound in them: if they should commit millions of them in a day, and continue the practice all the days of a long life; this would not damn them: 
(s) Etiamsi omnia peccata Venialia simul colligerentur in unum, nunquam effi●erent id, quod facit unum lethale, Bellarm. ibid. p. 91  for all the Venial sins in the world, if they meet in one man, would not amount to so much as one damning sin. They may commit them not only out of ignorance or infirmity, but with a high hand 
(t) Non quasi ipse contemptus & vilipensio venialium sit mortale— quia nullibi est praeceptum ut istam curam habeamus, sed consulitur tantum, Sylvest. v. peccat. n. 4. peccare venialiter ex contemptu infra limites venialis, non est peccatum mortale, Cajetan. Sum. v. contemptus, Lopez. cap. 1. p. 8. Metina ibi. Graff. l. 1. c. 14. n. 8. ibid. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 107. art. 3.  out of contempt. They 
(u) Navar. cap. 23. n. 13. & 16.  may praise themselves or others for them; they may 
(x) Secus etiamsi gloriaretur de repeccati Venialis solum, quoniam sic nou esset mortalis vana gloria, Angel. Sum. v. van. Gl. n. 1. Cajetin. Sum. v. glor. vana. Est mortale cum— laudant aliot & jactant de peccatis mortalibus quae fecerunt, secus esset de Veniali, quoniam non est contra Deum. Angel. v. Jactantia, n. 1.  boast of and glory in them; they may perpetrate them 
(y) Contingit tamen propter imperfectionem actus, esse Veniale peccatum ex malitia: ut siquis vana mendacia eligit dicere ex intentione bujus mali, quod est vane mentire, & non propter aliud, Cajetan. Sum. v. malitia.  out of malice. They may be so far from resolving to leave them, as it will be but a small fault 
(z) Juramentum de peccato Veniali peccatum est, si tamen fiat cum proposito implendi illud, non est mortale, Cajetan, Soto, Antoninus, Sylvest. Tabien. Navar. in Suar. de Juram. l. 3. c. 19 n. 3. , to bind themselves by Oath to commit them, and call God to witness, that they will thus sin against him. They 
(a) Potest quis dum moritur, habere voluntatem permanendi in peccato Veniali, Bellarm. de Purgat. l. 1. c. 7. p. 1359.  may die with resolution to continue therein, if they might live; yea, they may breathe out their souls with delight 
(b) Potest quis mori in complacentia peccati, Idem. ibid. cap. 10. p. 1370. Cum Venialis complacentia potest mori ac salvari, Sylvest. Sum. v. Contritio. n. 3.  and complacency in these sins, and yet be saved. To conclude, mark how they may act and multiply, and persist in them, and then view the nature and quality, and number of them, or guests thereat by the severals premised; and then suppose a man living after the rules of these conscientious Doctors, and Casuists, and taking but part of that liberty which the Roman Divinity allows; such a man would pass for a good Catholic with them, and be holy enough, according to the Holiness left among them, and made necessary by them; yet even by the rules of Heathen morality, he would appear little better than a Monster. So faithfully do they retain, and so much do they regard the rules of Christ in forming the Maxims of their new Divinity, that sober Heathenism would be ashamed thereof; and so like is practical Popery to true Christianity, in that wherein the reality, and triumphant splendour of it consists, Innocency and Purity. If an Atheist had a mind to render the Christian name odious, and to represent Christianity with a black and detestable visage to the sober part of the world; if he had a design to make men believe that Christ was a Minister of Unrighteousness, and the Gospel a licentious doctrine, tending to debauch mankind; he would need no more, but persuade them that the maxims of the Roman Divines were conformed to the rules of the Gospel; but then, if he should attempt to prove this conformity, he might as easily demonstrate that darkness is light, or the Alcoran the Christian Gospel.    

CHAP. IX. Many enormous Crimes are no Sins at all in the Roman account.  

SECT. 1.  
I Proceed to those sins which they will have to be no sins, but need not stay long here, having given a large account of those which they make Venial; since betwixt these, and no sins, there is little difference in their Doctrine, and none in their practice. I need not stay to show, how it is no sin with them to vilify the Scriptures (the written Word of God), or to rob him of the sole glory of his Mediation, and to give much thereof to others, in all its parts and specialties, merit, satisfaction, intercession; or to put their trust in others besides God, for things which he alone can give, and for which he only is to be relied on; and this not only in Saints and Angels, but their Images, and their imaginary Relics. And how it is no sin in their account to abide in ignorance, unbelief, impenitency, or to live without the love and fear of God, and the exercising of other graces: by what is already premised, this is sufficiently manifested.  

(*) Si tamen contingat speciales inspirationes dari a'Deo, quando se off●rt occasio frangendi aliquod praeceptum, & homo resistens inspirationibus praeceptum transgrediatur; nullo modo speciale peccatum committit, quia resistit inspirationi, Jo. Sanc. select. disp. 7. n. 11. p. 36.  To resist the inspirations of God, drawing us to the observance of his commands, or withdrawing us from wickedness, is no special sin, i. e. we contract no other kind of guilt thereby, than if we had sinned, without any such inspirations to withhold us from it. Thus it will be no fault at all to quench the motions of God's spirit, inducing us to turn to him, to love him, to repent, etc. or dissuading us from Blasphemy, Perjury, Adultery, Murder, or any other crime. And yet if a man be ready to commit any wickedness, it will be no sin for another to invite him to do it. Thus far men may promote all sin in others, & resist the spirit of God, moving against it. As for evil Spirits, they conclude it no sin, 
(a) Sylvest. Sum. v. adjurat. n. 2.  for good men, by special instinct or revelation to make use of the ministry of Devils: they tell us that to apply themselves to Devils 
(b) Si quis eos adjuret— ad aliquid ab ijs sciendum, aut ad aliquod obsequium per eos consequendum, est illicitum 1. quia hoc pertinet ad quandam societatem, vel familiaritatem cum ipsis, Sylvest. Sum. v. adjura. n. 2. Licite adjuramus in omnibus ut de corpore expellatur, utputa, quod suum nomen fateatur— similiter ut dicat causam vexandi hominem— licet non credamus, etc.  to know, or obtain any thing of them, is to have some familiarity and society with those damned Spirits (unless it be the better to expel them out of the possessed) yet they teach it is no sin to inquire of the Devil in a possessed person; what his name is, and wherefore he vexes that person, and what Devils are his associates, and the like. But he must not believe the Devil, though he tell him 
(c) Quod si ei crederet, ut necromantici, credo esse mortale, quia pertinet ad amicitiam, ibid. n. 3.  for this would be as bad as Necromancy): yet if he believe him not, none can tell how the Devils answering him in those inquiries can contribute any thing to his expulsion. They declare also 
(d) Hac etiam ratione non solum licet adjurare Daemones non obsidentes, ne adjuvent obsidentes: sed etiam superiores, ut expellant inferiores, id. ibid.  that it is lawful to use adjurations to the Devils, who possess no person, not to assist those that do, or to apply themselves to the great Devils, to cast out the less.   

Sect. 2. So far we see (and further) they may deal with the Devil; how they may deal with God we saw before; though the whole body of Popery be corrupt, yet there is nothing more leprous than their worship; they think it not needful that it should be conformed to the divine 
(*) Ex sententia Cajetani & Navar. in Vasquez, Opusc. moral. dub. 3. p. 24.  rule in any thing, either as to the End, or Manner, or Matter, or Object; yet it is transcendently good in their own eyes, no sin in it, even when there is nothing else. For what fordid and wicked ends they think it fit to worship God, we have discovered already, and also in what an irreligious manner. To this latter let me add, what I meet with in Angelus, 
(e) 
Quod attentionem vel devotionem Quaeritur utrum peccent mortaliter non dicen●… officium devote & studiose? Resp. Glossa tenet, quod sufficit dicere ore, licet non cord, & cum ea concurrunt multi Canonistae in c. dolentes. Angel. Sum. v. horae. n. 27.  
Similiter non peccat mortaliter qui verba quidem dicit, sed ad illa non attendit: quoniam cum praeceptum de dicendo horas sit de jure positivo, non refertur nisi ad ea, quae sub judicio humano cadere possunt: & ista sunt quae exercentur per actus exteriores, non autem interiores— Et hoc idem videtur voluisse Scotus in 4.— Hostiensis etiam— Idem. Pet. de Palud. Sum. Rosel. v. Horae.   when he is enquiring, whether attention, or devotion be necessary in their divine service (a strange question it might seem among any called Christians, if their divine Service were the worship of God) he tells us their Gloss maintains that it is sufficient to say it (their Service) with the mouth, though not with the heart, and that many other Canonists agree therein. Thus it seems they understand the Pope's Law for divine worship; so as to approve that in plain terms which Christ expressly, and the Prophets before him, condemns; so as to declare to the world, that the Church of Rome makes no other worship necessary, than what Christ hath openly branded as vain, false, and hypocritical, Isa. 29. 14. and Matthew 15. 7, 8, 9  
The sense of their Divines agrees so well with the Canonists, and as little with Christ (though it be expressed in other terms): that the contradiction to him, is not so open, though it be as full. 
(f) Verb. horae. n. 27. supra.  Angelus himself, and 
(g) Evagatio autem advertentis secundum actum interiorem solum, licet sit temeraria & gravis forte, non tamen est mortale, nisi propter contemptum, Sylu. v. horae. n. 13. Rosella. v. horae. secundum, Petr. Paludan.  Sylvester after him, with others, determine that wand'ring in one that observes it, when it is but as to the inward act, though it be temerarious and grievous, is not mortal, unless it be out of contempt; the plain English of which, is this, the departing of the mind and heart from God in worship, willingly and wittingly, how great soever it be, is a small fault, if any, unless to this neglect of God, a greater contempt be added; whereas the contempt of God herein is very great: his reason is, that which others give, 
(h) Quia Ecclesia non habet judicare de actibus interioribus mere, Uterque, ibid.  because the Church is not to judge of mere inward acts; and therefore 
(i) Propter quod Minister Ecclesiae, licet dicendo officium aliud cogitet; non videtur transgressor praecepti ex natura fact●, Angelus, ibid. Rosella. ibid.  if a Minister of the Church, when he is at Service, mind something else, he seems to be no transgressor of the Precept by that act.  
He tells us out of Aquinas (what we saw the rest of them do before) that they need not continue actually attentive in worship, but only virtually; id est 
(k) 
Tunc videtur manere secundum virtutem, quum accedit ad orationem cum intentione aliquid impetrandi, vel Deo debitum obsequium reddendi: etiamsi in prosecutione mens ad alia rapiatur, idem. ibid.  
Adverte tamen quod intentio debita & actualis, si adsit in principio vocalis orationis licet postea mens evagetur (nisi talis evagatio interrumpat primam intentionem per contrariam intention●m) sic est meritoria & impetrativa oratio vocalis sine attentione per virtutem primae intentionis, idem. v. oratio. n. 10. Rosella, v. hora. Scotus, ibid.   if they intent to perform Service when they are going about it, that will make them pass for attentive enough all the while, though their minds be carried away after other things, when they are at it, and never heed the worship in hand. This is the common sense of their Authors, as if they should gravely tell us, that a man who goes into company with some intent (actual or virtual) to be sober, but presently falls to his Cups, is overcome and continues Drunk divers hours; yet he may be said to be Sober all the while he is Drunk, by virtue of his first intention. And so we should wrong the Romanists, if we did not think they would have as much of true Worship and Religion in their Service, as that man has of Sobriety, all the time he is dead Drunk.   

Sect. 3. But there is not any more horrid abuse of divine worship, than that which they are guilty of in reference to its object: for besides what they determine concerning divine worship, to be given to other things, besides God, it is no sin with them to worship the Utensils of their worship, the Vessels, Books, Tables, Linen and Priestly Vestments, being once dedicated to divine Service, and made holy by the charm of a Consecration. Antonius Corduba says, they are to be worshipped 
(l) Vasquez de adoratione l. 2. disp. 8. c. 10. n. 342. posse secundum se, cultum deferri rebus sacris, sic docet Antonius de Corduba, & alij recentiores.  for themselves, and in the judgement of 
(m) Vasis & al●js rebus sacris inanimis concedit cultum aliquem distinctum a cultu illius, in cujus honorem dicatae sunt. idem. ibid. c. 11. n. 360.  Clychtovius they are to have a worship, distinct from his worship, to whose honour they are dedicated. Vasquez 
(n) Ibid. c. 10. n. 344.  will have them worshipped relatively (as Images to whom he gives Divine adoration) with respect to him, in whose service they are used.  
'Tis no sin to worship the word Jesus, whether it be pronounced or written, and some will have honour given to the word for itself, so 
(o) Ipsi etiam voci secundum se, c●nset honorem aliquem tribui. Ibid. n. 342.  Corduba and others. 
(p) Simul— cum Christo quem significat vox illa. Ibid. n. 343. Idem quod de imagine, de voce quoque Jesus & alijs rebus inanimis,  sequitur & quamvis diceremus, quia imagines exemplaribus substituuntur, ideo cum ipsis adorari; quis audeat asserere, vocem Jesus aut sc●iptam aut prolatam, in locum significati non subrogari? etc. Ibid. n. 344.  Some will have the word worshipped together with him, that it signifies: as the Image and the exemplar are both worshipped together; So that they will have the word Jesus to be worshipped, as the Image of Jesus.  
'Tis no sin to worship the Accidents of Bread and Wine in the Eucharist, where the object worshipped is not only Christ there, nor is it the substance of Bread and Wine (for they say there is no substance left): but that which they worship, is the colour, figure, or taste of the Elements. The colour, when there is nothing that is coloured: the tartness, when there is nothing that is tart: the roundness, when there is nothing that is round. To these wonderful (not to say monstrous) accidents, some will have a single 
(q) Alij vero recentiores— eodem modo de speciebus Sacramentalibus atque de imaginibus docent: nempe eas adorari posse eodem motu, & adoratione l●triae cum Christo s●b ipsis contento: p●sse etiam secundum se, propria adoratione coli, quae non reseratur in Christum ibi contentum si●ut in terminum proximum adorationis: sed tanquam in motivum remotum sicut de imaginibus, & de nomine Jesus, docuerunt. Idem. Ibid. c. 11. n. 360.  worship due, but that, the very same worship that is due to Christ, and besides that Divine adoration, which is common to them with Christ, will have also a proper worship given, without reference to Christ: but all of them agree, that they are to be adored with 
(r) Eandem adorationem qua Christum ibi colimus, ad eas terminari, dicendum est (ut docet Claudus Cello. 6.) Sed per accidens, sicut adoratio exemplaris in imaginem quoque terminatur. Id expresse tradit. Algelus. l. 2. de Euch. c. 3. idem. ibid.  Divine worship, and some say that this adoration is terminated on them, as the worship of the Exemplar upon the Image. They will not only have the Manger wherein Christ lay, and the Thorns wherewith he was Crowned, and the Spear that wounded him, to be worshipped: 
(s) Si autem pingeretur Sacrum praesepium, vel lancea, vel spinea corona, vel aliquid simile, non minus quam ipsa crux in veneratione esse debere. Id vero quod de pictura vel sculptura dicimus, de ijsdem rebus naturalibus dicendum esset, si in ornamentum crucis, & monimentum passionis, vel alterius mysterij, publice ponerentur, etc. Idem. ibid. l. 3. c. 6. disp. 2. n. 73.  but the Picture of these, when they are but painted, they are to have the same worship which the true Cross has, that is, Divine Adoration; and so are natural Thorns, or a common Manger or Spear to be worshipped, when they are made use of to adorn the Cross, or to set off the passion of Christ, as they are wont Theatrically to represent it.  
'Tis no sin to worship any thing that Christ touched, or that touched him, how injuriously soever. Therefore they teach that the Ass upon which Christ road is to be worshipped, hereby it appears, says 
(t) Ind etiam constat, quo pacto recte possit asinus, cui Christus insedit, adorari. Ibid. n. 76.  Vasquez, how rightly the Ass upon which Christ did ride may be worshipped; and that the very 
(u) Nil tamen obest, quo minus aliquis sincera fide, & recta intention, affectum & animum solum in Christum intendens, labia Judae, & alia quae injuste Christum tetigerunt, reverenter osculetur. ibid.  lips of Judas (that Traitor and Devil as Christ calls him) for kissing Christ, when he betrayed him; for that very act wherein he showed himself a Traitor and Devil, are to be worshipped. If they had but those Traitor's lips, they would reverently and devoutly kiss, that is, adore them; and it is strange if they have them not among their Sacred Relics, since they say they have the 
(x) Ex dictis infertur Christi praeputium & sanguinem relictum in terris, sive sit sub for●a sanguinis, sive sub alia, non secundum se, hyperdulia, sed ex affectu latriae circa Christum eodem motu adorationis cum ipso, sicut alias ejus reliquias, adorandum esse, ut notavit Corduba & Sylvest. Idem. ibid. disp. 4. n. 125.  foreskin of Christ, cut off at his circumcision, and his very 
(y) Antiqua etiam traditione constat vultum sanctum Domini, tempore passionis suae in linteo expressum fuisse. Qualis Romae — & in Hispania ostenditur— Taurius vero magna cum veneratione servatur, & nec minori religione colitur sindon, qua Christus in Sepulchro fuit involutus: cui impressam reliquit sui corporis siguram. Idem. ibid. l. 2. disp. 3. c. 1. n. 29.  countenance impressed by him upon a white cloth; for one would think these as hard to come by, however in divers places they worship something at a venture, which they count so.  
It is no sin to worship the imaginary blood, which flows from a Crucifix or Image of Christ, when it is wounded, for they being given up to believe the most ridiculous lies, 
(a) Vid. Aquinas 3. q. 54. art. 2.  do believe, that such blood hath issued from a mere Picture or Image, 
(b) One at Berytus in Syria, pierced by a Jew, related in a Book, ascribed to Athanasius falsely (as Bellarmine confesses the script. Eccles. p. 78.) of which our Author l. 2. disp. 3. c. 1. n. 29.  they keep it as a most Sacred Relic, and it is to be 
(c) Idem dicendum de sanguine, qui ex aliqua imagine Christi fluxit, nisi quod ille non ratione contactus, sed repraesentationis tantum adorandus est, idem ibid. l. 3. disp. 4. c. 2. n. 125.  worshipped with the same worship they give to Christ himself.  
It is no sin to give Divine worship to any man, not only the Saints in Heaven, or holy persons on earth, but any men whatever in the world (the wickedest not excepted) may together with God, have divine worship, as the Image has with the Exemplar, 
(d) De homine qui est viva Dei similitudo & imago, nec aliqua institutione in cultum Dei dedicata docent Alexander, Waldensis & Cajetan, cum posse esse adorationis materiam, sicut de imagine picta dixerunt: hoc est, in illo & per illum ita Deum adorari posse, ut ipse etiam homo, eodem motu, & signo submissionis colatur sicut imago cum exemplari: atque idem de Angelo dicere debent. ibid. disp. 1. c. 1. n. 4. & cap. 3. n. 17.  since every man is the living Image of God. This is not only the doctrine of Vasquez, but of Alensis, of Waldensis, and of Cardinal Cajetane. only in the practice of this there must be caution for Albertus Magnus and Aquinas say, there is danger lest a man, being of more excellency than an Image, divine worship should be given him, not for God's sake, but his own dignity: 
(e) Ubi periculum non esset, non negarent adorari posse sicut imaginem pictam. ibid.  but where this danger is not, they would not deny but any man may be so worshipped; even with divine worship. So that if Paul and Barnabas, with the Lycaonians, Act. 14. had but proceeded with the caution of these Doctors; and taken care, that those people should so worship them only for God's sake; they might lawfully have admitted the worship offered them, though they (not learned in this kind of Doctrine,) chose rather to be stoned than so honoured.  
It is lawful to worship not only rational Creatures, 
(f) Quaevis etiam alia res mundi sive inanima, & irrationalis, sive rationalis, ex natura rei & secluso periculo, rite cum Deo, sicut imago ipsius adorari potest. Hanc opinionem tradit. Cajetan. 2. 2. q. 103. art. 3. ad dub. 4. id docuit. Leontius. ibid. c. 2. n. 5.  but any thing else in the whole world, whether living or liveless. Any beast or creeping thing may be worshipped as the Image of God, which they hold is to be honoured with divine worship. So that not only the Planets, Stars, the Queen and the Host of Heaven, may be thus adored (for which the Lord condemns Israel and Judah as Idolaters): but the vilest Creature that lives on Earth, a Fly, or a Frogg, or a Serpent, or a Toad may be thus worshipped. Yea meaner Creatures than any that have life, any inanimate thing whatsoever, though it be but a wisp of Straw; that is our Authors own instance, whereas, says he, 
(g) Frustra igitur Wiclesistae objiciebant Christianis imagines colentibus, ipsos quoque modulum straminis adorare posse— idem enim Leontius, de modulo straminis, quod de quacunque re mundi, libenter fateretur; tantum abest, ut absurdum judicari debeat. ibid. n. 10.  the Wickliffites object, that Christians who worship Images, may as well worship a wisp of Straw (modulum straminis the same Leontius (upon whose Authority he grounds all) would as freely grant this, of a bit of Straw; as he does it of every thing else in the World, so far is it from being counted absurd; yea, they may worship not only vile but sordid things, 
(h) In brutis animantibus & rebus sordidis, Deo exhibere notam submissionis primo aspectu indecens apparet: id tamen non obest, quo minus suapte natura in qualibet re mundi Deum ipsum adorare liceat: imo & sanctos homines seu Angelos, si eos cum rehus illis cogitatione nostra possimus conjungere. ibid. n. 11.  and not only God, but Angels and Saints in them, quaevis alia res mundi, any thing  in the World, whether liveless, unreasonable, or rational; may rightly have divine worship with God. And this is not only the judgement of their famous Vasquez, but of Cardinal Cajetan, and in consequence, of them all; for those great wits, well discerned, that the adoration of other things, approved and practised by the Romanists, could never be defended without extending their principles to such a Latitude. Thus it is manifest, that whatsoever the Apostate Israelites adored, or the Egyptians worshipped, or the Laplanders do worship, or the grossest and the most ridiculous Idolaters in the World, ever made an Idol: all that, with much more and worse, may lawfully be worshipped by Popish principles; there never was any Idolatry so absurd or horrid in the World, but may have Patronage, or excuse by this doctrine.  
And now Heaven and Earth being furnished with their Idols, one would think they need go no further, but be satisfied, without seeking Hell for any: yet there is an inquiry which reaches that too. 'Tis a question amongst them, if 
(i) An sit peccatum adorare radium luminis, vel speciem Crucifixi, sub qua Daemon delitescit. ibid. disp. 1. c. 5. n. 30. vid Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 3. q. 1. punct. 4. n. 5.  the Devil should appear in a beam of light, or the form of a Crucifix, whether that apparition may be worshipped? Antisiodorensis, Alexander, Aquinas, Marsilius, Adrian and others, will not allow it should be worshipped, unless conditionally, and with a condition expressed: but Vasques is for adoration hereof absolutely, 
(k) Quare nec conditionem expresse addere oportet, ut recte & legitime adoratio fiat; & multo minus ea exprimenda est, quando Eucharistiam adoramus; ut optime tradunt Alexand. S. Thom. Bonaventura: qui cum dicant, necessariam esse expressam conditionem, quando adoratur Christus in specie Crucifixi, ubi Daemon delitescit: affirmant tamen, eam non esse necessariam, ut adoretur in hostia consecrata. Idem sensi● Gabriel. Quinimo ut Cajetan. Hosselanus & Claudius Sajnctes, docent, male faceret qui adderet conditionem, ut securus adoraret. ibid. n. 34.  no condition expressed, and he has those, who are otherwise minded, at a great advantage; because they conclude for worship absolutely, in a parallel case: for they will have a consecrated Host to be worshipped, without condition, though the Devil were in it, or lurked under it; and if they think he would be worshipped in the former, without the interposal of a condition; he will be worshipped in the later, where they will have no condition to exclude it. I conclude this with what 
(l) Hominem posse mereri per fidem erroneam, etsi contingat ut adoret Diabolum. Resett. Humphed de vita . p. 120.  Holcott determines, a man may merit by a mistaken belief, although it so fall out, that he worship the Devil.  
These decisions were necessary to justify their devout persons, who have met with such adventures. A great part of Popery is grounded upon Visions and Apparitions; these were much affected and admired by their reputed holy Men, and Women too, who were admired and adored for them. Satan in the darkness (wherein this mystery did best thrive) had the advantage to put store of Cheats upon them. Many Monks and Heremites (says a Lapide) were deceived by him. Particularly among the rest Valens the Monk was thus deluded, the Devil frequently appearing to him as an Angel. In fine, Satan in an apparition feigned himself to be Christ, and the Monk went, and for Christ worshipped the Devil (Idem in 2 Cor. 11. 15.) They are concerned to plead for that worship, which had the same original with much of their Religion.   

Sect. 4. For Oaths or Perjury, I will only instance in those which are Fraudulent. First, they determine, that he who 
(m) Quid ergo si quis exterius juret proferendo verba, & tangendo evangelia, intus tamen non habeat jurandi animum? Respondetur in illo casu, non esse verum sed fictum juramentum. Sed nunquid in conscientia qui sic jurat, tenebitur adimplere? Respondetur minime quidem, etc. Soto de just. & jur. l. 8. q. 1. art. 7. p. 262. Graff. decis. aur. l. 2. c. 17. n. 5. Ut obligationem inducat necessarium est, ut ab intentione jurandi procedat, hoc c●rtum est apud omnes. D. Thom. Cajetan, Soto, Covarruvias, Panormatan, Glossa in Suar. l. 2. de Jurament. c. 7. n 2. Necessarium est ut intentio jurandi sit sufficienter libera. Communis est. Idem ibid. n. 3.  takes an Oath, and intends not to swear, the Oath binds not, it is no sin to go against it.  

(n) Tenet S. Bonaventura quod universaliter non obligat juramentum si jurans animum se obligandi non habuit. Sylvest. jurament. 4. n. 19 vid. plures ibid. u. 7. & n. 17. Nec qui sic jurat, peccat. Angelus v. juram. 5. n. 9 & Sylvest. v. juram. 4. n. 7. Qui jurat cum intentione non se obligandi, non obligatur ex vi juramenti. Ita— D. Thom. Bonaventur. Scotus. Gabriel. Richard. Sylvest. Angelus Medina. Gutierrez. Navar. Gloss. Felinus. Abbas. Jo. Andr. in Suar. l. 2. de juram. c. 7. n. 9 Hos & alios vid. in Bonacina. Tom. 2. disp. 4. q. 1. punct. 7. n. 3.  Secondly, when a man intends to swear, but intends not to be obliged by swearing; there he is not obliged, but may lawfully break it, as the ancienter Casuists and School-Doctors generally determine.  
There is real evidence for the practice of this from the Conclave: for, as their excellent Historian tells us, 
(*) Hist. of Counc. of Tr. l. 1. p. 71.  in the Vacancies of the Sea the Cardinal's use to compose certain capitulations, to reform the Papal Government, which all swear to perform, if they be assumed to the Popedom; though it appear by all precedent examples, that every one sweareth with a mind not to keep them, in case he shall be Pope. For so soon as he is Elected, he saith, herald not bind himself, and that he is at liberty by gaining the Papacy. This was remarkably exemplified in Paul 4. who resolving to break one of the Capitulations he was sworn to a little before, and some of the Cardinals being ready to put him in mind of his Oath, he declared in Consistory, 
(†) Ibid. l. 5. p. 396.  that it is an Article of Faith that the Pope cannot be bound, and much less can bind himself, that to say otherwise was a manifest Heresy: and threatened the Inquisition to any that hold it. It seems it is damnable error, deserving something like a Hell upon Earth, to believe that his Holiness intends to be honest, whatever he swear. It's true, every one has not the privilege of a Pope, to have it counted Heresy for any to believe that he can be bound to keep any Oaths, or ever to intent it: but all have this liberty by their Doctrine, that they may take Oaths without any intention to keep them; and are not bound to keep them, if they do not intent it.  
Thirdly, to elude an Oath, and deceive those who give it, or are concerned in it, by aequivocation, or other artifice of words; yea, or by mental Reservation, is no sin: and that in 
(o) Si judex juramentum exigens talis (competens) non fuerit, vel esto quod sit competens, interrogat tamen contra juris ordinem, vel est alius homo privatus, qui per metum aut importunitatem juramentum extorquet, tunc jurare poterit quod secundum suam mentem est verum, falsum autem secundum mentem alterius, cui exhibit juramentum. Sicuti fecisse B. Franciscum ferunt, qui rogatus qua perrexisset quidam bomicida, respondit, non transisse illac, intelligens, per illas manicas— Cum Adriano qui sic inique interrogatur, potest optime respondere, quod nescit, intelligendo, non eo modo se scire, quo illud dicere teneatur. Navar. cap. 12. n. 8.  many cases. As when a man has no mind to swear, and thinks he is not bound to do it; when he is drawn to it by force, or induced by fear, or brought to it by importunity; or when the Judge is incompetent (as they count all that are Heretics or Excommunicate: and that have not lawful jurisdiction); or if the Judges are competent, yet when 
(*) Vid Navar. c 18. n. 57  they proceed not juridically. In these and other cases; either 
(*) 
Qui alio sensu ju at quam alter intelligat, non peccat, modo justam habeat causam ita jurandi— justa autem causa utendi his verbis (amphibologicis) est necessitas aut utilitas corporis, aut honoris, aut rerum familiarium— Ex quo sequitur, non esse illicitum uti verbis amphibologicis, addendo restrictionem aliquam in ment retentam, quoties aliquid incommodi, vel injuriae nobis impendet loquendo ad mentem interrogantis, adest en●m justa causa ita loquendi. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 4. quest. 1. punct. 12. n. 2. 3, 4.  
Ejusmodi autem aequivocationibus uti, addito etiam juramento absque causa, non est peccatum mortale, modo ne id fiat in fraudem tertij, aut in judicio, dum judex juridice interrogat. Ibid. vid. Dian. v. aequivoc.  
Videtur esse communis sententia juramentum simulatum, id est, cum justa & prudenti amphibologia factum, non obligare. D. Tho. Cajetan. Soto. Abbas. Tabiena. Covarruv●as. Navar. in Suar. l. 2. de juram. cap. 8. n. 2. Juramentum autem dolosum cum injustitia obligare— sed tantum secundum proprium sensum. Scotus, Bonavent. Richard. Gabriel. Sylvest. Angelus. Antoninus. ibid. n. 5.   for avoiding harm, or inconvenience; or when it may be for their advantage in any respect, they think it lawful to use these methods of deceit in swearing. Indeed the reason they give to justify the practice ●n these cases, will make it as lawful in any other: for they say what is so sworn is true, in their own sense, though not in the sense of the hearers; and so they will have it in strictness to be neither Lie nor Perjury, nor any mortal sin, even when there is no honest, nor reasonable occasion, for swearing or promising, in this fraudulent manner.  
And that you may perceive the Jesuits are not the prime Masters of these Arts; I shall instance in other Authors, who were either before them, or not addicted to the Society.  
For equivocations, or other slight of words in swearing, they are justified by 
(*) Licet jurare cum aequivocatione. D. Tho. Scotus, Paludanus, Richard. Major. Adrian. Navar. Covarruvias. Sylvest. Gloss. Ibid. l. 3. cap. 9  multitudes of their Writers, viz. Sairus after Aquinas, and their Gloss, Paludanus, Gabriel, Johannes Major, Adrian, Hen. Gandavensis, Angelus, Sylvester, Soto, etc. The instances which Soto gives, may serve for a taste; as for example 
(p) Si injurius ille nequam sic rogaret, juras mihi tantam numerare pecuniam? & alter responderet, sic uro (absque j) non esset peccatum mortale, sed simplex mendacium: quia forte tunc nihil ureret. Soto. ibid. p. 263.  when one instead of saying I swear, uses a word which signifies another thing: but so pronounces it as the difference is not discerned. Or if the 
(q) Item si Dei nomen lingua illa qua sit juratio, diversum quoque aliud habuisset significatum, liceret illud intelligendo, dicere testis mihi est Deus, quamvis alter Deum coeli intelligeret. ibid.  word GOD in the language wherein the Oath is taken, may signify some other thing; he that swears may mean something else by it, when he that gives the Oath, understands the God of Heaven. 
(r) Aut si altero interrogante, juras mihi numerare pecuniam? alter responderet, tibi juro numerare, non esset sensus, numerare tibi, hoc est solvere aut tradere, sed tibi juro apud me pecuniam recensere, quandoquidem numerare utrumque significat.  Or if the Oath be form in this order, I swear to you to pay so much Money, he that swears may mean not to pay him, but some other: when he to whom the Oath is made, understands it, intended for himself. Such an 
(s) Quare tale juramentum esset verum, justum & prudens quoniam tunc simulatio (quoniam absque falsitate fieret) utilis esset.  Oath says Soto is true, just, prudent, because then simulation is profitable; having said before 
(t) Quando vero vi illata petitur, licitum est eafraude petentem deludere. Ibid. Similis est aequivocatio quam in verbo est ponit Glossa in cap. neque. 2. 2. q. 2. & quam in nomine sororis notavit Glossa in c. ult 2. 2. q. 2.  that it is lawful, with such fraud to deceive one who forces him to swear, since he who puts him to swear, hath no right to do it; and these forementioned, are the very same instances which Sanchez 
(u) Opp. Mar. l. 3. c. 2. n. 37.  uses; by which we see, the Jesuit was not the inventor hereof, but learned them of a Dominican.  
Of mental-reservations justified by their chief 
(*) Navarre, Sylvest, Angelus, Lud. Lopez. Tabien. Armilla, etc. And among those who seem to dislike it. Soto fatetur licitum esse alicui jurare, se nescire quod revelare non potest, aut non tenetur; subintelligendo, nescio ut tibi dicam— quando judex non potest legitime interrogare de occultis recte illi responderi, non feci, subintelligendo publice, etc. Et ita etiam concessit aperte Cajetan. & Adrian. in Suar. ibid. cap. 10. n. art. 3.  Authors, who were no Jesuits, instances might be given in abundance; for example, if 
(a) Sylvest. sum. v. jurament. 3. n. 2. Navar. cap. 12. n. 18. quia id  agit, potest illa jurare, quod secundum suam intentionem verum est, falsum autem juxta mariti mentem & Angelus. v. juram. 4. n. 1. Nam cum talis inique a tali confessionem exigat, poterit jurare secundum suam intentionem, quod verum est: licet secundum intellectum audientis sic falsum, secundum Rodo. quem sequitur Astensis:  a man will have his Wife swear, that she is not an Adulteress, though she be guilty, she may deny it with an Oath, and swear what is false in his sense, if it be true in her own, by the addition of some secret reserve. 
(b) Si maligno sensu intendebat facere, quod jurabat, licet non in sensu ejus, cui jurabat: ut quia juravit dare centum, subaudiendo in animo suo, si debuero: tunc non peccat: quia non tenetur jurare secundum intentionem ejus, cum non sit suus judex: sed utitur simulatione licita, quae licet: ut in c. utilem 2. 2. q. 2. Sylvest. ibid. 4. n. 7. Navar. c. 12. n. 14. Neque peccaret jurando, neque etiam non implendo amplius quam ipse intellexit; quoniam non tenetur aliquis jurare secundum intentionem illius qui perperam ipsum ad jurandum cogit.  If a man swear to give another a Hundred Crowns, with this inward reserve, If he own it him: he sins not, though he swears false, in the sense of him, who is to have the money. 
(c) Aquinas & Jo Major. in Navar. c 12. n. 9 Sylvest. ibid. 3. n. 2. Angelus. Sum. v. juram 4. n. 1. Quum quis ex juramento exigit ab aliquo quod ipse non potest sine peccato implere: potest habere intentionem, cum jurat illud facere scil. Quantum poterit sine peccato. Sic & Sylvester. Sic secundum Rich. de St. Victore obstetrices non peccassent, licet non respondissent ad intentionem Pharaonis, quia non fuit ei data Authoritas ad aliquid agendum contra Deum. Secundum Innocent. in c. veniens de curia. in juramento determinato super aliquo singulari, sic interpretatur in foro animae, secundum intentionem jurantis. Angel. ibid.  A Woman who because of some secret impediment will not live with her Husband, and is Excommunicated for it, she at the point of death, that she may be absolved; being put to swear, that if she recover, she will live with him, may swear it absolutely in show, with this conditional reserve, If she may do it without sin; yet if she do it not, she is not forsworn. So Sylvester and Navarre, according to the determination of Aquinas, and Jo. Major. He 
(d) Sylvest. v. juram. 3. n. 2. Navar. c. 12. n. 19 Bonacin. ubi supra.  that in the time of Pestilence comes to a Town, where the Officers, before they admit him, will have him swear, that he came from no infected place; though it be not true, he may swear it, if he think himself have got no infection. If 
(e) An qui jurat se non habere rem aliquam ab alio petitam, ut ab ea danda vel accommodanda se excuset, peccet? responderi enim debet, piccare si mens ejus verbis consonat: sed non, si non tenetur ad dandam vel accommodandam, neque respondendum juxta mentem petentis, & ea ment juret, quod non habant illam, ad eam illi dandam aut accommodandam. Navar. c. 12. n. 18. Bonacin. ibid. Idem. c. 8. n. 19 Lopez. cap. 37. p. 211.  you have not a mind, or are not bound to give or lend any thing in your possession, which another desires; you may lawfully swear that you have it not, with this inward reserve, That you have it not, to give or lend. 
(f) And this they maintain not only in this case, but as to all sins confessed. Quod si judex instat vel exigit juramentum a sacerdote, an per confessionem sciat aliquid de tali facto? Dico quod secundum S. Thom. & omnes doctores. Sacerdos si ab eo quaeratur de aliquo absent, an aliquid sciat, quod audivit in confession: jurare potest se nescire illud: quia non scit illud in quantum homo, etc. Sylvest. v. confess. 3. n. 6. Sic Angelus. v. confess. 8. n. 4. secundum Scotum & Richardum, etc. Graff. l. r. c. 23. n. 2. For the Seal of Confession must not be violated; no, not to secure the soul of the penitent, or the life of a King, or a whole Commonwealth from temporal or spiritual destruction. Vid. ibid. n. 4. & 20. auctores contra unum Altisiodorensem in Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 33. Sect. 1.  If a man threaten to kill a Confessor, if he will not tell him, whether his Wife hath confessed her Adultery to him; though she have confessed it to him, yet the Priest may absolutely say, and swear, that she has not; with this reserve, So that he should be bound to tell it. 
(g) Quamvis juret se dicturum, quod scit, vere respondere potest se illa nescire absque perjurij metu, intelligendo intra se, illud se non ita scire ut detegere teneatur. Navar. c. 18. n. 61. vid. cap. 17. n. 116.  He that is examined upon Oath, concerning crimes that he knows, and swears to declare all he knows; may concerning some that are not known to others, though they be to him; swear without Perjury, that he knows them not, with this secret reserve, He knows not to discover them.  
If one promise to another, or contract with a Woman outwardly, without an intention of promising; and is demanded of a Judge upon Oath, whether he promised or contracted: he may plainly deny it, because he may have this sense, I promised not with a promise obliging me, and he has just cause so to answer, because since he cannot otherwise prove his want of intention, he will be condemned to pay what he owes not, or to cohabit with her, whom he truly contracted not 
(*) So Navar. in cap. humanae aures. 2. 2. q. 5. q. 1. & 2. alleging for this Doctrine. Aquinas. Scotus. Paludanus. Richard. Major. Adrian. and others, vid. Suar. l. 3. de Juram. cap. 9 n. 5. . A witness, either when he is not interrogated juridically, or when he has good occasion not to bear witness in judgement, as if he fear great damage to himself thereby; may answer, that he knows not, or saw it not, or the like, with a mental Reservation 
(*) Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 4. q. 1. punct. 12. Clavis Regia. Navar. & alij. ibid. . He that out of necessity, or for any profit, offers himself to swear of his own accord, may therein use such fallacy 
(*) Idem. ibid. . He that hath good occasion to hid his goods, lest they should be seized by his creditors, being for his livelihood, and to keep him from beggary; may swear that he has not hid any, understanding not any that he could not hid, or any that he is bound to discover. The same may the witnesses swear for him (viz. That he hide none) knowing that he hide them lawfully 
(*) Idem. ibid. & alij. . Such fallacious Oaths may be used also in Contracts and Bargaining. Those who cannot otherwise get a just price of the buyer, may swear, in a sense that he perceives not, that the Commodity cost them so much 
(*) Idem. ibid. Sayrus. Rebellus & alij. .  
Here are a few instances, but they have rules (some of them are premised) which Licence it in cases innumerable: so that it may be a common practice, and they may use it, upon any occasion which they think reasonable.  
These things considered, with others Authorized among them. I cannot devise what course can be taken to bind those who follow their doctrine; or to get from them the least security by an Oath. They have declared, that if you put an Oath upon them, which they think, ought not to be imposed, they may lawfully deceive you if they can, and put a cheat upon you, even in a Solemn Oath. Contrive then what Oath you will for your security, they will take it, so far as you can judge, as much as any man in the world takes an Oath; yet if they did not intent to Swear (which none can tell but themselves) by taking this Oath; they have not Sworn, they are not obliged. Or if they had a mind to swear, as well as to make you think so, yet if they did not intent to oblige themselves thereby, their Conscience by their principles is free, the Oath does not touch them; or if they have a mind to be obliged by that Oath, yet need they not bind themselves to that, it was designed for; but to quite another thing: for they may swear in a sense, vastly distant from what you intent or imagine; and thus they are taught to do: and it is practicable, either by the fly and undiscerned change of one letter in a word, as they may pronounce it, which will turn the sense as far from yours, as burning is from swearing, which is plain in a former instance. Or else by the ambiguousness of some word in the Oath, affording another sense than you are ware of; they may fix upon that, and leave yours to yourself, and so bind themselves to nothing you are concerned for, when you think you have them fast bound to all. Or if such care be taken, that in the Oath there be no ambiguous terms, which may give them the advantage to delude you by a sense foreign to your intendment; yet, do what you can, they may put forth a sense upon it by a mental restriction; for thereby adding something reserved in their mind to what is expressed in the Oath; the sense is quite changed, and the thing they swear is nothing at all, of what you would have sworn.  
Yea, or if they swear, that they will observe the contents of your Oath, according to the plain and natural meaning of the words, without any equivocating or mental restriction; yet at the same time they may mean, without any mental restriction, that they will tell you of; and so delude you with a mental reservation, when they are swearing against it: nor is this an imaginary supposition of a thing that they never practised; for thus their Priests and others have taken the Oath of Allegiance, and by this art eluded it; 
(*) Quando quis inique interrogat excludendo omnem aequivocationem, posse interrogatum uti aequivocatione, apponendo aliquam particulam in ment, etc. Idem dic de teste. Bonacina. Tom. 2. disp. 4. q. 1. punct. 12. & ibi plur●s. Quoties gravis causa occurrit, obquam licet uti verbis ambignis, vel mentali restrictione, ejusmode usum esse licitum, etsi interrogans urgeat, ut sine amphibologia, aut restrictione loquaris. Pet. a S. Joseph. de 2 precept. art. 1.  and so they are instructed, and may do still, and defeat any Oath that can be devised. Yea, by their doctrine they may do it lawfully, and without sin; for in all this juggling, they teach, that they do not swear false, but by the artifice specified, it's true in their own sense, though not in theirs who give the Oath. Indeed this is a cheat (where God is called to witness) nor do they deny it: But they say such deceit is lawful, as in many other cases so, always when the Judge is incompetent: And that is our case in England, we have none from the Throne to the lowest Bench, that, in their account, have any jurisdiction 
(h) Judex haereticus aut schismaticus amittit omnem jurisdictionem. Vid. Conc. Lateran. sub Innocent. 3. in Crab. Supra. ; we have none that have power to put an Oath upon them; they may choose whether they will swear or no, or whether they will cheat them all in swearing. No Oath which can be given them, can oblige them, but in their own sense, how distant soever from the true sense of the Oath, or of the Imposer of it. This our Roman Catholics were assured of long since, by 
(i) Juramentum exactum a judice non competente (quales nunc omnes sunt in Anglia) in jurisdictione Ecclesiastica, non obligat nisi secundum intentionem jurantis in Abb. de mendacio. p. 40.  instructions sent them from Rome in Queen Elizabeth's time. So that they need make no Conscience (if they will follow the best Guides of their Consciences) to practise all their contrivance upon us in Oaths: (much more in promises, contracts, etc.) even such as the light of Nature has ever condemned in the world, as not only impious in point of Religion, but destructive to human society, and those which tend to subvert the main grounds and foundations of it. We can never oblige them by Oath at any time, but when they please, nor any further than they list: we can never tell when they swear, though they take Oaths, nor when they are obliged, though they swear: we cannot possibly know when we may be sure of them. When we think them fast, by all the rules that men of Conscience and common Honesty proceed by; yet they can juggle themselves lose by the Roman rules, at pleasure, and make sport with God and man, even in Oaths where God himself is a Witness, and the greatest of men concerned as Parties.   

Sect. 5. There needs no other demonstration of the Irreligion of the Roman Church, and its utter regardlesness of God and the souls of men, than their doctrine concerning the observance of the Lords day, and all other which they pretend to be set apart for holy employment. If any man would understand what Religion is left among them, he may see it there in short, and needs look no further; since there he may be satisfied that they have no design for the honour of God, or the salvation of souls. For when they have discharged the people from all duties of Religion, at any other determinate times 
(k) Vid. supra. cap. 1. , and reserved all which they make necessary for them, to holidays; yet even on these days, by their doctrine, nothing is made their duty, to which any regard of God, or of their souls, is needful. All that they are obliged to, is only to be present at 
(l) Sola missa communiter est in praecepto. Cajetan. sum. v. fest. p. 304. Missa audienda Diebus festis ex praecepto, non tamen Contio, non preces fundendae; non exercendus alius actus cultus Divini ex praecepto (excipe diem paschatis, quo sumenda est Eucharistia) Victorel. addit ad Tol. l. 4. c. 25.  Mass, no other act, or duty of Religion or Worship is necessary; no internal 
(m) 
Aquinas. 2. 2. q. 122. art. 4. Cajeran. Sum. v. fest. p. 305. Soto. de justit. & jur. l. 2. q. 4. art. 4. Navar. c. 13. n. 2. etc.  
No act of love Bellarm. de cult. Sanct. l. 2. c. 10. Nau. c. 11. n. 7. Soto. ibid. or contrition. Soto. ibid. Sylu. Sum. v. Dominic. n. 8. Canus. relect. de paenit. pars. 4. p. 864. or sincerely no need to have that Devotion in the heart, which they outwardly make show of. No necessity of a good end in their worshipping. For that they commonly maintain after Aquinas that the end of the command for worship, is not under command vid. supra.   act at all, nor any 
(n) Not hearing Sermons. Sylu. sum. v. Dominic. n. 8. Victorel. Supra. Nor other prayers, private Sylu. ibid. Navar. c. 21. n. 6. vid. Suar. de fest. l. 2. c. 16. n. 4. or public. Vesperas caeteraque Divina officia, Diebus festis, non audire, non est peccatum mortale, neque veniale; nisi ratione voti aut juramenti. Graff. l. 2. c. 34. n. 12. Nemo jure communi regulariter tenetur audire de praecepto alia Divina officio, etiam vesperas Navar. c. 21. n. 1. They are not obliged to any prayers, but those in the Mass; which indeed are not theirs, nor need they concur in them, otherwise than by a virtual wish, that the Priest may be heard, satis est vel ex longuiquo missanti adesse, & surgendo, genua flectendo, vel alias actualiter vel virtualiter exoptare, ut sacerdos, qui pro omnibus loquitur, orat & sacrificat, a Deo exaudiatur. idem. ibid. n. 8.  external, either public or private, but only the Mass: And that may be so external, that neither God, nor any divine thing, need to be minded in it. For this I have produced evidence enough already, let me only add this; they are wont to speak of a threefold attending at Mass (as before was showed at their divine Service.) One 
(*) This all the praying of the people (when they have reduced all their Religious acts to this) in Popery. All that the Church makes necessary, or leaves possible to them in public, which yet is no praying, otherwise, than one while he is at Paris, may be said to be praying at Rome; because he virtually wishes success to a Priest saying Mass there: Or then one in their Purgatory, may be said to be praying at the same time in Heaven; because he would have the supposed intercession of the Saints there, to be successful.  to what is said and done by the Priest, as Sacred: A second, to the meaning of what is said or done: And the third, to God and divine things. Now the first of these, they say, 
(o) Haec satis est, licet omnium imperfectissima. Fill. tr. 5. n. 214. Suarez. Having, premised, that he believes, there is no dissension or difficulty amongst them concerning attention at the time of Mass: reckons after Aquinas the 3. sorts of attention and adds of the first. Haec attentio est infima omnium, tamen sufficiens: quia illa sa●is est, ut illa missae auditio seu praesentia sit bumana, moralis, & ex objecto religiosa. Tom. 3. disp. 88 sect. 3. This being sufficient, the Second and Third are more than needs: and yet in the third (this excluded as needless), he acknowledges all inward reverence and worship is included. Sub hac autom attentione ad Deum omnis interior reverentia & cultus, omnis oratio & petitio includitur, ut eleganter describit Gregorius 10. in c. decet. ibid.  is enough, though it be the worst of all: therefore the second (to regard the meaning of what is said or done); and the third (to mind God or Divine things) is more than needs. So that plainly, all that is required of a Papist, by their Doctrine, in order to the honour of God, and the salvation of his soul, on any of those days, when these aught to be most minded, is only, being present at Mass, without understanding what is said, or done; and without minding God or any thing divine. Such is their worship of God, and care of souls, in the Church of Rome; this is the sum of their Religion, when it appears set forth to greatest advantage in its solemn exercises; he that understands it, and can be in love with it, must be under the power of some other consideration, than that of God and his soul.  
Having, seen how these days are sanctified, or profaned rather, by their worship, we might view, what observance they have in reference to servile works. And here they have little, but what may be done without sin; and indeed, as they order the matter, it may seem less sin to follow the works of their callings, than to forbear them, since their abstinence from them, is not, that they may better attend the worship of God; (for they think it not needful to worship him, unless he can be said to be worshipped when he is not heeded) but that they may be idle, or worse employed than in their daily business. However, whether it be to indulge their ease, or serve their lusts, or to make show of some rest, (though far enough from a holy rest) they will have some works forborn; but herein they will be regulated by 
(*) Dicendum consuetudine fieri posse, ut aliquae personae licite possint in Die festo aliqua opera servilia, vel aliter in festo prohibita, exercere. Antoninus. Slyvester. Cajetan. Soto. Tabiena. Armilla. Navar. in Suar. l. 2. de fest. c. 33. n. 12.  custom, not the divine Law. Paludanus 
(p) Per (Dominicum) intelligitur generaliter omnis Dies festus de praecepto, secundm Pet. de Balude, quod sentire videtur ●etiam. 1. Jo. Andr. & doctores dicentes aliquos in Diebus festis excusari, nisi missam omistant. Et. est rationabile; quia consuetudo legum interpres, ita habet. Sum. v. missa. 2. n. 1.  and others will have them excused, who use manual labours on these days, if they omit not the Mass. And Sylvester says, this is reasonable, because Custom, the interpreter of Laws, will have it so. This may so far regulate them, that every 
(q) Unaquaeque provincia, aut civitas, observare teneturilla, eo modo, & tantum, quae, quomodo, & quantum consuetudo ipsius praecepit observari. Navar. c. 13. n. 5. Si usus haberet, ut solum serventur usque ad meridiem, vel usque ad solemnia missarum peracta, postea possent opera servilia fieri. idem. ibid.  Province and City must observe those days, and those alone, in that manner, and so far only, as custom requires. Yea, it must so far prevail, that if it were the custom to observe these days, no longer than till Noon, or only till Mass were ended, (which may be dispatched in half an hour, and that before 
(*) Gabriel cum Scoto dicunt, licitum esseincho are missam, una hora & quarta partè alterius ante ortum solis— Non erit peccatum hora & dimidia ante ortum folis sacrificare: Imo addit Paludanus & clarius Victoria posse licite inchoari missam dimidia hora ante crepusculum, ita ut finis missae sit sub initium crèpusculi, plus minusve. Et hoc est in praxi servandum Suarez. tom. 3. disp. 80. sect. 4. So Mass may be ended, not only before Sun-rise, but about break of day, above an hour before the Sun is up.  Sun rise) the rest may be spent in servile works. They account it worse to spend these days in servile labour, than profane divertisements (for this, with them, is only a Venial fault, or 
(*) Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 5. p. 277. n. 25. p. 274. n. 3.  none, but that may be a mortal sin); yet they declare there is no sin in the worst, but what custom makes (they are like to make Conscience of it, when their own wills and practices are their rule. This (as many other by their doctrine, which makes void the commands of God at pleasure), is but a sin at discretion; they may make it none when they please, and render all days alike, as easily as they can bring up a custom 
(*) Observatio Diei Dominicae non est de jure Divino, sed Canonico, ut aiunt communiter Doctores— & consequenter posse consuetudine, vel humana potestate abrogari. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 5. n. 4. p. 272. Sayrus & alij ibi. , such a one, to which nature is forward.  
But no wonder, they think not these sacred days violated by working, since they teach, they are not profaned by any acts of wickedness. Their Divines 
(r) Cajetan. Soto. Sylvester. Victoria. Navar. Covarruvius & alij, quosirefext & sequitur Suarez. de fest. l. c. 18. n. 3. inter quos etiam recenset S. Thom. vid. Bellarm. de cultu sanct. l. 3. c. 10. Graff. l. 2. c. 33. n. 8.  generally agree herein; 
(s) Non continetur sub hoc praecepto contritio peccatorum, nec vitatio aliorum peccatorum. Sum. v. fest. p. 305.  Contrition for sins, and the avoiding of other sins is not enjoined, says Cajetan. The day is not profaned by Fornication 
(t) Non quod per fornicationem violetur festum. de just & jur. l. 2. q. 4. art. 4.  says Soto; nor by Lying, Murder, or Blaspheming, says Bellarmin 
(u) 
Non enim viola●ur tempus sacrum per quaecunque peccata, sed solum per ea, quae opponuntur ipsi tempori sacro, qualia sunt non audire sacrum, & operari corporaliter. Ibid. l. 3. c. 10. p. 1610.  
Secunda opinio asserit— peccatum etiam mortale in Die festo commissum, non habere ex illa temporis circumstantia special●m malitiam, quae in confession necessario operienda sit: illam docent Cajetan, Corduba. Soto Victoria. Almayn. Sylvester. Armilla. Tabiena. Angl. Navar. Covarruvias. Gutier. pro hac etiam sententia potest referri. D. Thomas. in 4. dist. 32. art. 5. q. 1. Suarez. l. 2. de festis. cap. 18. n. 3. vid. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 5. p. 274.  ; nor by any wickedness whatsoever, is holy time profaned, but only by those opposite thereto (viz.) not hearing Mass and bodily labours. So that the days may be sanctified well enough, according to the holiness of that Church, if after an irreligious presence at Mass for half an hour; (the precept for which may be satisfied without minding God, or abstaining from wickedness, while they are at it) the rest thereof be spent in beastly Drunkenness or Gluttony, in Perjuries, Blasphemies, or Cursing God or Man; in Murders, Whoring, Sodomy, or Bestiality, or the most enormous debauches. And though they are not bound, as they teach, to be at the pains of one good act of mind, or heart, in serving God, at the only time set apart for his Service (Scotus is almost worried by the Herd of their Divines 
(x) Scotus sentire videtur hoc nos praecepto juberi, diebus festis bonum habere mentis actum circa Deum. Soto de just. & jur. l. 2. q. 4. art. 4. p. 51.  for seeming to think that a good act of mind towards God was enjoined on these days), yet they may spend their bodies, and toil themselves more in the service of their lusts, without profaning them, than in servile works. The reason why they hold, that no excess of wickness does profane these days, is 
(y) Nec valet dicere inter ista servilia computari peccatum: quia hoc falsum est. Sylu. Sum. v. Dominic. n. 8. — nisi esset opus servile in festis prohibitum, quale non est peccatum juxta S. Thomam. in 3. sent. dist. 37. art. 5. q. 2. Navar. c. 6. n. 10. probatur a Cajetano & caeteris — quia opus peccati ut sic non est servile Suar. ibid. n. 6.  because wicked acts are not servile works. It seems, slavery to Satan, and the service of the vilest lusts is not servile, whatsoever Christ or the Apostle thought thereof, John 8. 34. Rom. 6. 16. that is consistent enough, with the liberty and honour of such Christians as they are. However, hereby it is manifest, that their Religious observation of all holy times (and so all the Religiousness which that Church requires of her Catholics) is consistent with the lewdest acts of ungodliness and debauchery.  
In fine, God can have no honour from men, nor they salvation from him without Religion; this cannot be kept up in the world, without the solemn exercises of it; these cannot, (or will not) be performed without time for that end; therefore hath the Lord appointed time to be set apart for these purposes; the Church of Rome hath reduced all religious Exercises at the times appointed by God, or themselves, to the people's hearing of Mass, and there will not have the precept oblige them to any real Religiousness, not so much as to a thought of God, or any thing Divine; yea, or the forbearance of wicked thoughts and acts, while they are at Mass. Thus far is Religion (upon which the interest of God and Man so much depends) sunk among them. And it must of necessity sink (all but the shadow or froth) in any part of the world, where these principles prevail. But though they declare them not obliged to serve God any better at this, or at any other time, yet they maintain for them as much liberty to serve the Devil and their Lusts on these Holy times, as any other. Let all concerned, judge of the Roman Religion and Holiness hereby; if there were nothing else, by which the measures thereof could be taken, this would suffice.   

Sect. 6. In the next place, in reference to Heretics; to go no further (for that is far enough, since in their Charity the far greatest part of Christians are no better) all Relatives are discharged of their respective duties enjoined them by the Laws of God or Man. Their Decretal (the Law of their Church which presumes to overrule all other Law, Natural, Divine, or Civil) deprives Heretics immediately of all 
(a) Ipso jure privatos esse haereticos omni debito fidelitatis, Dominij, obligationis, & obsequij, quo illis quicunque tenebantur astricti— Decretal. Gregor. 9 l. 5. c. ult. de haeret.  due fidelity, right, duty, observance, which any whosoever do owe them: 
(b) Amittunt omnia quae juris civilis sunt. Graff. l. 2. c. 11. n. 12. privantur j●…e Dominij naturalis, oeconomici & civilis vid. Ovandus in 4. dist. 13. p. 347.  They lose all which they have by civil right. 
(c) Eorum vassalli absoluti sunt a debito fidelitatis & totius obsequij— & idem de vassallis Dominorum, qui contra haereticos sunt negligentes. Sylvest. v. haereses 1. n. 14. Angelus v. haeret. n. 15.  Subjects own no Allegiance or duty at all to Princes or Magistrates. 
(d) Perdunt patriam potestatem, quia non habent filios in potestate. Graff. ibid. Fillj haereticorum ipso facto quo sententiatum est contra eorum parentes de haeresi, efficiuntur s●i juris, & effecti intelliguntur a Die commissi criminis. Angel. ibid. n. 10. Sylvest. ibid.  Children own no duty to their Parents; they have (by their Law) no power over them, and this from the first day of their Heresy. 
(e) Viro debitum reddere non tenetur. Simanca. Instit. Cathol. c. 45. n. 27.  Wives own not conjugal duty to their Husbands; and if 
(f) Uxore● scienter cum haereticis contrahentis perdunt ipso facto dotem. Sylvest. ibid. Angelus. ibid. n. 11.  they knew they were not Papists, when contracted, they lose their Dowry. 
(g) Et quicunque alij aliqua obligatione adstricti: ut famuli, liberti, & hujusmodi. ipso facto liberantur. Ut dicitur & notatur in c. fi. eo. ti. Angelus. ibid. n. 15. Sylvest. ibid.  Servants are freed from all Fidelity to, and observance of their Masters. 
(h) Omnes haereticos obligatos ex juramento, fidelitate obsequij, pactione vel promissione, liberari, ita habetur c. ultimo de Haeret. Propterea si aliquis promisisset haereticis solvere sub paena vel juramento certo Die, non tenetur, ut notat Glossa ibid. Ego teneo quod eo ipso quod est manifestum in haeresin incidisse tales absoluti sunt, quantumcunque sententia non feratur contra eos. Angel. ibid. n. 15. Sylvest. ibid. n. 14. Armilla. v. haeres. n. 11. Ovandus in 4. dist. 13. propos. 30. p. 348.  Yea, Debtors are freed from paying what they own to Heretics, though bound thereto, either by Penalty or Oath. They hereby oblige their Followers to make nothing of such duties, without the observance of which, Mankind would become worse than Bruits.  
But this may seem a smaller matter to them; they go higher, and allow any one to kill a Heretic, as though Murder were no sin; 
(i) Possunt etiam impune occidi. Facit. Gloss. sing. in Capital. faelic, etc. Graff. l. 2. c. 11. n. 12.  they may be killed with impunity, says the Graffiis, and proves it out of their Church Laws. Pope 
(k) 
Non enim eos homicidas arbitramur, quos adversus excommunicatos, zelo matris Catholicae Ecclesiae ardentes, aliquos eorum trucidasse contigerit. Refert ex Ivo & laudat Baronius. an. 1089. n. 11.  
Omnis haereticus sive occultus sive manifestus, est ipso jure excommunicatus. Rosel. v. haeret. n. 14. Quoting their Law for it.   Vrban 2. declared that they are not guilty of Murder, who kill any that are Excommunicate: Now all Heretics are Excommunicate by the Council of Lateran, under Innocent the third; and the Sentence which lies dormant there, is roused once a year. The Pope in person denouncing it in a solemn manner, and very gravely with a Peacock-tail on either side his head. We in England particularly are under Excommunication to this day; and Cardinal Barbarin thought fit, not long since, to give special notice of it in a Letter to some of the Irish. They forget not how obnoxious we are, and we may remember, how much we are obliged by them, that any of us are suffered to live, when they may kill us without Murder.   

Sect. 7. But we may the better bear with them in this, because they seem not very tender of killing one another. A man is not to be punished who kills his Wife, taken in Adultery, and the Adulterer together with her. 
(l) Pet. a. S. Joseph. de 5. praecepto art. 6. p. 258. 259.  He may Kill his own Daughter in like case, or his Sister, yea, or his own Mother, if his Father give order for it; and he may do it as safely though these his Female Relatives be quick with child. For the Child in the Womb (say they) being the same morally with the Mother; he that may kill the Mother, may kill the Child too. Thus a private person may be judge in his own cause, and proceed to mortal execution without Trial, and sacrifice the guilty and innocent, both at once; to his own or another's passion, and destroy together the Body and Soul of his nearest Relations; and all this with impunity. They deliver it for certain, that a mother in danger, may lawfully use a Medicine which tends directly to her cure, though it be probable that it will make her miscarry. 
(m) Videtur etiam satis certum. etc. Idem. ibid. art. 2. p. 218. vid. Corduba. Pet. Navar. Arragon. Lopez in Fill. tr. 29. n. 104.  And because she may take such a course to secure her life, or recover her health: they conclude it lawful to do this, to preserve her state, or reputation. 
(n) Liceret etiam procurare abortum nondum animatum cum ad famam & statum conservandum opus erit. Basil. de Leon, de matrim. l. 10. c. 13. n. 2. Liceret etiam faeminae nuptae, aut virgini fornicanti idem efficere, quando nullo alio quaesito medio sibi consulere possint, ne crimine detecto, famae vitaeque jacturam facerent. Pet. Navar. l. 2. de Restit. c. 3. diff. 2. n. 130.  So that if a Maid or married Woman, have prostituted herself to another's lust, she may procure abortion, when otherwise the Crime might be discovered, and her life or credit in hazard. Thus neither Families, nor Parishes, nor Monasteries need be pestered with natural children, how many soever be got: the shame of their birth, and the pain too, may be prevented, and the trouble and expense of their education avoided, by a receipt approved by the Roman Doctors, if it be but taken in time. As for the censures of their Church in this case, or worse, there's no fear, for even 
(o) Secundum Sylvestrum Monialis solicitans aborsum non est excommunicata, quia non injuriam sibi sed proli facit. Lopez. cap. 64. p. 322. vid. Nald●m in Bonacin. de restit. d. 2. q. ult. p. 7. n. 6.  a Nun got with Child may procure abortion, and not be Excommunicate (so much more favourable is New-Rome to her Vestals than the old was, though their crimes be doubled.) Any who are so disposed, have encouragement enough, to venture upon both. For as to the murder, they are secured from the Laws of God by this Doctrine, which makes it no sin; from the Laws of the Church by her natural indulgence; and may be from those of the state, by their own private conduct: And as to the Whoredom, they may be quitted upon as easy terms, as they would wish. For the the Priest, if he get the child, is impowered to absolve the Mother; and he need not be so strict, as to enjoin for penance, the avoiding of the sin. Yet for all this, they seem so tender (which may amuse us) of unborn Infants in other cases, thus they will have 
(p) Aliqui affirmant non tantum id licere, sed ●tiam matrem teneri talem sectionem procurare, & far, ne illius infans sine Baptismointereat. Pet. a S. Joseph. ibid. p. 220.  it lawful to cut up the Mother quick, and she obliged to suffer, yea procure it, that the child in her Womh may not perish unbaptised. Thus their Doctrine will have them more regard the Reputation of a Whore, than the life of an honest Woman; yea the child may perish without regard of its wanting Baptism, when the credit of a Strumpet is concerned: but a chaste Woman must be killed in the other case, that the Infant in her Womb may have it. Yet one would think the issue of Whoredomin as much danger for want of Baptism, as the fruit of lawful Matrimony.  
They teach further, that a man may kill another, either to secure his own person, or his Goods, or his Reputation. In defence of his person they hold it lawful to slay any one; 
(q) Bonacin. ibid. punct. 8. n. 4. ubi Sylvester, Julius Clarus & alij communiter.  a Servant may kill his Master assaulting him unjustly, or a Monk his Abbot, or a Subject his Prince, or a Child his own Father. This is their common Doctrine, and thereby there is warranty for it, not only to secure one's life, but to avoid a wound or a blow 
(r) Si non ●ossum effugere quiu me percu●ias, nisi te interficiam, licite te interficio. Angel. Sum. v. defence. n. 4. ibi Bartolus, Florianus, Navar. cap. 15. n. 4. Lopez part 1. c. 62. Pet. a S. Joseph. ibid. p. 221. Bonacin. ibid. n. 3. & alij communiter. . Any one may do this at any time, 
(s) Angel. Sum. v. homicide. 3. n. 2. Sylvest. v. homicide. 1. n. 13. Graff. l. 2. c. 64. n. 8.  even a Priest while he is celebrating, may kill one that invades him: and when he has shed his blood, may go on with his other Sacrifice, which will be unbloody notwithstanding. If he that 
(t) Bonacin. ibid. n. 5. ibi. Bartolus, Gomez. & alij.  assails him be Frantic, or in Drink, yea or asleep, and has no sense that he offers any wrong; he may innocently kill him for all that, whoever he be, if he cannot otherwise avoid the injury; yea though the aggressor have had the highest provocations, 
(u) Pet. a S. Joseph. ibid. p. 222. & 230. Bonacin. ibid. n. 3. ubi Pet. Navar. Sotus, Julius Clarus, Rodriguez.  by intolerable reproaches, or the loss of his Estate, or the defiling of his bed: yet in this case he that has given the occasion, and done the wrong, may kill the sufferer; the Thief may lawfully slay him whom he has Rob; and the Adulterer may kill the Husband, after he has abused the Wife, or deflowered his Sister, or Buggared his Child. He may not only kill the aggressor, but an innocent person also to escape himself 
(x) Petrus a S. Joseph. de 5. precept. art. 2. p. 223. Pet. Navar. de restit. l. 1. c. 3. n. 147. Bonacin. ibid. punct. 7. n. 1. ubi Julius Clarus. Corduba. Cajetan. & alij. . As if he cannot be secured from Peter, without killing Paul, he may be the death of them both; or state it thus, and they cannot stick at it, if he cannot escape his Father without killing his Mother, he may slay both Father and Mother at once. Thus they may deprive any of life, not only when they are actually assaulted, but before any blow is given. 
(y) Graff. l. 2. c. 64. n. 4. Soto de Just. & jure. l. 5, q. 1. art. 8. p. 143.  When a man perceives one coming towards him with his Weapon ready, and fears he is not able to deal with him, he may shoot him dead at a distance. Nor need he be hindered by the consideration, that killing him in such circumstances (since he is in mortal sin) will be the destruction both of Body and Soul together. Soto objects this to himself, but abates nothing of his conclusion notwithstanding. Yea he answers, that to hold it not lawful to kill in this case (with the destruction of the slain man's Soul too) is both to pervert the Law of nature, 
(z) Ibid.  and to render the sweet and easy yoke of Christ intolerable. They give further instances wherein they will have it no sin to kill a person, that has not yet touched them; it is sufficient, in their account, if they know that he is prepared for it, yea or does but design it. 
(a) Graff. l. 2. c. 64. n. 5.  In case one be shut up in a House or a City, so that he cannot get out, and knows there is one in the Town that designs upon his life, and waits but an opportunity to execute it: he may prevent the designer, and fall upon him unawares, and kill him. They declare it lawful for a man to kill his Wife taken in Adultery: but then they allow the Adulteress to be beforehand with her Husband, and kill him first if she can; 
(b) Navar. c. 15. n. 3. Lopez. c. 62. p. 311. Bonacin. de restit. d 2. q. ult. p. 9 n. 2. Ubi Julius Clarus, Bannes, Rodriquez, Corduba & alij.  she may dispatch him with the poison prepared for her, or stab him with the Weapon he has ready, and so secure her Adultery by Murder, and yet be innocent.  
They maintain it is lawful to kill others to secure their goods. 
(c) Soto. ibid. Graff. ibid. n. 17. Lopez. Cap. 62. Navar. c. 15. n. 2. ibi Cajetan. Antoninus, Silvester.  So it is no sin with them, to take away the life of him, that would take away part of their Goods by night or day; yea if he that steals makes no resistance, or defence, but flies, he may be pursued and slain, to recover what he has taken. And although the Goods may be recovered otherwise, and in a legal way, 
(d) Non licet furem occidere— si spes esset certissima quod facilimo negotio recuperari posset— ubi autem res esset dubia, posset liberum esse Domino jure uti suo, Soto. ibid.  yet if it be not certain, that he may get them with the greatest ease, but doubtful that it may give him some trouble, he may use his liberty, and send him to Hell to save himself a little trouble. But of what value must the Goods be? (that we may discern at what rate they set the life and Soul of a man). It must not (says Soto) be a vile thing, it should not be so little worth as 2 or 3 ducats 
(e) Ibid. p. 144. . So that it seems, if what is stolen, be of the value of about Twenty shillings, a man may be killed for it, and his Body and Soul destroyed together. And since a Crown or a Shilling may be more to some than Twenty to others; those who follow him, might well infer from hence, that a man's life might be taken away for a Crown or less: yea for an Apple, since to some persons that may be of more value, than the sums mentioned. Accordingly, they conclude expressly, 
(f) Etiamsi res sit valoris unius aurei aut minoris— videtur posse occidi Bonacin. de restit. d. 2. q. ult. p. 10. n. 1.  that he who takes a thing, the owner or keeper of it seeing, and offering to hinder him, may be lawfully slain for it; though it be but of the value of one Crown or less either, because thereby he offers an affront. That's another ground of their Lawful murder. 
(g) Comuniter omnes docent, Vid. Victorel. add. Tol. l. 5. c. 6. famam suam— negligere & prodigere potest sine peccato. Pet. S. Joseph, de 8. precept. art. 2. vid. Navarre. c. 18. n. 27.  A man, they avow, may kill others for his Honour or Reputation; for though it be so slight a thing, that it will be scarce a fault in a man to throw it away himself (as we heard before): yet they will have him maintain it at the expense of the blood, and life of others, and his own too. For example, 
(h) Soto ibid.  If he sees one approach to assault him, though he might avoid the danger by retiring, yet he may kill him rather than so avoid it; because it would be a disparagement to him to fly, and so rather than suffer the least, in the repute of the injudicious Rabble, he may be the death of any person; and be a man of blood, that he may be the Master of such honour, as a truly generous spirit must despise. They advance further yet; if one should offer to 
(i) Si quempiam aggrederetur, ut eum fuste levissime percuteret, posset id alter etiam hostem interimendo repellere. ibid. Victoria. Navar. & Sylvester in Fill. tr. 29. n. 50.  give a person a blow with a Cudgel, or a light Switcb; he that is offered such an affront may lawfully kill him for it, especially in Spain, where this is counted a great injury says Soto. And elsewhere a box on the ear may be resented, as such an injury. Accordingly others determine, that he who gives it, may lawfully 
(k) Ad vitandum vulnus vel alapam— potest occidere. Navar. c. 15. n. 4. Lopez. p. 1. c. 62. p. 316. Bonacin. ibid. n. 6. & alij.  be slain for it, yea or he that does but offer it. If he be any person of any moment that is thus attempted, he need not stay till he feel it, but may prevent it by killing him that offers it, if there be no other honourable way to avoid it. He need not fly to avoid it, if that would be a disgrace, for he is not obliged to suffer such an inconvenience, though by retiring he might save both his own life, and the aggressors, says Bonacina after others. In this manner when one smites them on the Cheek, do they turn the other; and thus do they comply exactly with Christ's advice by stabbing him to the heart, who smites their Cheek, or does but offer at it.  
The same they determine of ill-language, that is with them a sufficient ground to kill men. In the judgement of all 
(l) Ex omnium sententia licet contumeliosum occidere, cum aliud non manet remedium eam injuriam arcendi. de restit. l. c. 2. 3. n. 376. vid. Bonacin. & apud eum plures infra.  (says Navarre) it is lawful to kill him that gives reproachful words, when there is no other way to avoid the injury (and the words being once past, there's no preventing them). Thus killing men may be as common as provoking language, when such language by their Doctrine may be as common as any they speak. They teach that it is but a venial fault (10000 of which he may commit every day, or every hour without endangering his Soul) to give one the , to call him a Fool, a Bastard. 
(m) Vid. Navar. c. 18. n. 23. 24.  etc. And then they declare it lawful to slay men for such words: as if it were their design to have it thought tolerable for men to do nothing else but kill one another; and shedding man's blood were no more to be avoided, than such faults as they encourage the continual practice of. They proceed further yet, and conclude it lawful to kill one, not only for contumelious words, 
(n) Posse occidi qui afficit contumeliis atrocibus sive per verba sive per signa, Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. ult. p. 10. n. 7. ibi. Gomez. Rodriguez, Lopez. Pet. Navar. Julius Clarus & alij.  but for mere signs of such import, when an ill word is not spoken (suppose such motion of the tongue, or lips, or nose, or fingers as are accounted an affront). This is after the Roman mode to imitate Christ, and comply with the Apostles rule in laying down their lives for their Brethren; when they take away their lives, for a foul word, or an untoward gesture. But what if one who gives such a blow, or such language, or the like affront, should run for it, when he has done; is it lawful to pursue him to force satisfaction from him, though it be by the loss of his life? yes say they, the person affronted, may pursue him, and strike him till he have reparation of his honour, though it be by killing him 
(o) Posset eum persequi, & percutere tantum, quantum ad sui honoris defensionem opus esset— etiam occidendo. M. Navar. c. 15. n. 4. Pet. Navarra. ibid. n. 380. Rodriguez Lopez, & alij in Bonacin. ibid. n. 8. plurime apud Henriquez. Sum. l. 14. c. 10. .  
They speak favourably of Duels. Cajetan says 
(p) Sum. v. duellum.  Princes may permit them lawfully among their Subjects; as the Stews are permitted upon reasonable considerations. So that it seems, they may farm out this liberty, as the Pope does the other. Bannes determines, that an innocent person may either accept, or offer combat; not only to secure his life or estate, but his Reputation, when he cannot otherwise do it. 
(q) In n. 2. q. 64. art. 7. dub. 4. concl. 2.  Such a person, when one goes about to acouse him falsely before a Judge, and he is like thereby to be defamed, may challenge him and kill him lawfully. This he reports as Cajetan's opinion, and counts it more than probable; But there's no need of Duels in the case, they discover a way to dispatch men more effectually with less notice, and less hazard to the murderers, allowing them to kill any privily, to secure their Repute. The same Dominican in the case mentioned concludes, that 
(r) Ibid.  if the accuser being admonished will not desist, the aggrieved person in defence of his concerns, may kill him. Not only judicial accusations, but more private aspersions, are counted a sufficient ground to kill men. 
(s) Q●i murmuratione, & detractione injuriam, maculamque inferre conatur, licebit, si aliter infamiam & dedecus fugere non potest occidere. De restit. l. 2. c. 3. n. 376. Calumniatorem occulte occidere licet, Duvallius Doctor Sorbonicus de Charit. q. 17. a. 1. Sayrus. Cas. Consc. c. 17. n. 22, 23.  He who by whispers and detraction endeavours to wrong, and bespot another, if the infamy and disgrace cannot otherwise be avoided, it will be lawful to slay him. So Pet. Navarre, who gives reasons why he thinks it more adviseable to kill a defamer privily, than in a Duel. Nor need he stay till he be actually aspersed, but when one threatens, or signifies he will do it, he may lawfully prevent it, by killing him. Forty nine Doctors are produecd in favour of this. Prado 
(t) Theol. Moral. tom. 2. c. 10. q. 4. n. 14.  an eminent Dominican says it is the common Doctrine of Aquinas his followers.  
These are some of the Maxims, which serve so much to furnish those who design upon men's lives, with lawful occasion to murder; and tend so plainly to fill all places with blood, and slaughters, without leaving any man security of his life: that even some Jesuits, though they deny not that they may be probable in speculation, yet sem shy to allow their common practice. But this is rejected by others, (and so the Jesuits cautiousness and moderation counted unreasonable) seeing 
(*) Opinio speculative probabilis, est practiee probabilis Serra, Leander, Spinola, Jo. Henriquez, Narbona, Aversa, Machado, in Diana, part. 10. tr. 11. Resol. 47.  that in matters of morality, what is speculatively probable i. e. safe and lawful, in point of Conscience, must, as such, be admitted in practice 
(*) Vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. 44. n. 63. & disp. 54. n. 11. . Indeed though there be no charge more odious upon the Society, than their Doctrine of murder; yet so far as I can discern, they are outdone here by others, both in numbers and extravagancy. However the Maxims, to diminish the horror of which the Jesuits seem solicitous, are now the common Doctrine in that Church: the Divinity of her Schools and Doctors generally, being advanced to such a pitch, as to bid defiance to common humanity. And if the civil Laws did give as much liberty to murder, as their rules for Conscience do; Desolation would soon be brought upon the face of the Earth.   

Sect. 8. For uncleanness they are very favourable to it, they seem to condemn the consummation of the act; but scarce any thing else, and not that neither in every kind. They give up the outworks, which should secure them from this sin, they admit its approaches, they encourage Sinners to venture upon the occasions, even such as have very often ensnared them in this wickedness. Any Consitent (they teach) ought to be absolved, though he do not purpose to avoid any occasions which lead to it; unless they be such, 
(a) Quae credit, vel credere debet confessarius vel paenitens nunquam vel raro, usurum ea, sine peccato mortali, Navar. c. 3. n. 14.  as he does or aught to believe he can seldom or never use, without perpetrating the deadly act. So that though he very frequently fall thereby into uncleanness; yet unless he believe that they will quasi semper 
(b) Non vitare hujusmodi occasionem est peccatum mortale, at talis est occasio, qua credit se fere semper ad sic peccandum impulsum iri. ibid.  in a manner always overthrow him, he may make bold with them. To 
(c) Enndo ad locum sive societatem ubi est periculum peccandi mortaliter propter aspectum, persuasiones, opportunitates aut aliquid hujusmodi. Et hoc quidem si sine vegente necessitate sit, ad incautelae peccatum spectat— Si experientia teste didicit se non subsistere in hujusmodi, sed statim aut quasi statim cadere, nulla necessitate vincatur, ut illuc eat, aut ibi moretur, Sum. v. peric. peccandi.  go into place or company, where the sight of any, their persuasions, or opportunities, expose him to danger of sinning, though he do it without necessity, is of itself no great fault says Cajetan and if he find, that he can for some time withstand the Temptation, and do not in a manner presently fall (d) (statim aut quasi statim) though he find himself weak, yet he may venture on them, without any necessary occasion, as the Cardinal leaves us to conclude, from what he there adds. A 
(e) Recte faciunt confessarij absolvendo multos adolescentes, qui versantur inter mulieres, emendo, vendendo, laborando & conversando absque cohab●tatione in eadem domo: licet non proponant perpetuo abstinere ab occasione peccandi, quam id illis praebet, quamvis saepius peccent voluntate, verbo, aut tactibus impudicis, & etiam copula, quia occasio quae ex hoc praebetur ad peccandum, non est ex se peccatum mortiferum neque hujusmodi, ut fere semper faciat mortaliter peccare eos qui ea utuntur, Navar. ibid. n. 17.  Confessor does well, who absolves those, who will not express any purpose to avoid converse with such Women, by which he hath very often sinned every way, both by desire, words, shameful touches, yea and the very act of uncleaness: because this is such an occasion, as is not deadly in itself, nor does make them fere semper commit deadly sin. Those 
(f) Possunt absolvi, sine separatione, cognatae, ancillae, ac famalae, que rem habuerunt cum suis consanguineis Dominis vel his in quorum domo degunt, concurrentibus 4 predictis: quorum quartum scil. causa notabilis, est quod non possunt sine magno incommodo, & detrimento separari, n. 21.  Women or Servants who have committed lewdeness with their Masters, or others in the house, yea though they be their Kinsmen: may be absolved, though they still live together; if they cannot leave them without great inconvenience or damage, provided 
(g) ●. Vera paenitudo praeteritorum. 2. Verum propositum non peccandi. 3. Credulitas qurd Deo juvante non peccabit. n. 15.  if they be truly sorry for what is past, and intent to sin no more, and think they shall not, yea though after this, 
(h) An possint absolvi praedictae iterum absque separatione si reciderint? videtur nobis posse concurrentibus praedictis 4. E● idem dicendum arbitror de tertia & quarta vice, quia non solum semel aut bis, vel septies, sed etiam septuagies sexties est parcendum. ibid. n. 21.  they fall many times into the same wickedness (of Fornication, Adultery or Incest) and do not avoid the occasion; yet still they may be absolved. And this liberty is not restrained to houses where they live together; 
(*) Those that keep Concubines, may be rightly Absolved upon the same terms, without parting from them. n. 19  he extends it to other houses also. 
(i) Idem dicendum est de illo, qui occulte rem, aut impudicos tactus habet cum aliqua consanguinea, aut alia sibi amica in alia domo agente scil. cum absolvi posse, sine proposito nunquam ingrediendi eam. n. 22.  He that hath secretly committed filthiness divers ways with a Friend or a Kinswoman in another house, may be absolved, though he do not intent to forsake that house. Or if the occasions he meets with in private houses, do not satisfy him; he may venture into the common Stews, but than it ought to be with a good intent. A 
(k) Si quis certus esset de convertenda a muliere prostituta, si accederit ad persuadendum illi viam salutis, potest juquit accedere, etiamsi ex tali accessu, immineat sibi probabile periculum peccandi cum illa. Soto, in Lopez. cap. 53. p. 275. prudentis charitatis servor nonnunquam hominem animat, ut ad convertendas perditas mulieres, cum aliquo suo periculo earum colloquium adeat. Soto de Just. l. 5. q. 1. art. 6. vide plurimos sequentes D. Thomam dicentem, quod exponens se periculo peccandi, causa urgente, non peccat, Navarre. Cordub. Cajetan. Armill. Castro. etc. in. Jo. Sanc. disp. 10. n. 8.  man may go to a common Whore, with confidence that he may convert her, though there be danger, and it is probable that he will commit filthiness with her. And so any (their Religious Brothers or Fathers not excepted) may seek the Conversation of common Whores, though they see imminent danger that they shall make no better use of the Strumpets, than those who come to them, with the worst design.  
They are as indulgent to unclean thoughts, as to lewd and ensnaring company. To 
(l) Si quis de modis & inventioni●us fornicandi ●peculetur, sola quadam novitate, & curiositate intelligendi hos modos adductus, non erit mortale, Lopez. c. 74. p. 355.  entertain filthy thoughts, to delight in those thoughts, and 
(m) Non tamen est peccatum mortale consentice in delectationem cogitationis, que est de peccato mortali, sed est Veniale quando cogitatio est inutilis: vel nullum, puta cum quis utiliter cogitat, Sum. v. delect. n. 2. Lopez. ibid.  to consent to that delight; is either no sin, or but venial says Sylvester and others. They distinguish betwixt the unclean act, and the thought of it. Cajetan 
(n) 
Si delectatio sit de miris & similibus modis, non est delectatio morosa: quam mod isti sint admirabilos, & naturaliter delectabiles cogitanti animae. Sum. v. delect. moros.  
Sicut nec est (mortale) delectari in modo operandi scelus aliquod: licet non in ipso scelesto opere, ut in modis occupandi regnum— sicut etiam in speculatione variorum modorum coituum, dum absil periculum consentiendi. Lopez. c. 75.   though he would not have the act to be the object of the delight; yet he allows any to take pleasure, not only in the thought, but in the special manner of the act. If 
(o) 
Si circa id non adverteret, quamvis diem integrum delectatio perduraret, non peccaret mortaliter. Neque satis est advertere nisi integre advertat secundum Cajetanum. Navarre. c. 11. n. 12. Cajetan. Sum. v. delectat. p. 112. Graff. l. 2. c. 77. n. 2.  
Si vero advertere incepit & praevalente impetu concitatae passionis non plene advertit: sed antequam plene advertit delectatio facit suum cursum, peccatum non mortale sed veniale intervenit, Cajetan. ibid. Non sit signum sufficiens ad probandum consensum tacitum, sola perseverentia delectationis post advertentiam. ibid.   a man do not observe what he is delighting in, while he is pleasing himself with such thoughts, yea if be do not fully consider it, though he entertain himself with this mental pleasure a whole day together, it will not be sinful delight. Lust with an imperfect inadvertency will not be mortal, when the delight of it so invades the mind says Lopez, 
(p) Ad mortale requiritur advertentia plena, quia non satis est imperfecta, quae ex praevalente impetu passionis solet causari, libido cum tali inadvertentia imperfecta non erit mortalis, quando sic ejus complacentia impetit mentem, cap. 85. p. 359.  nor needs he resist such delight or repel these thoughts, if 
(q) Navarre, cap. 11. n. 12. Lopez. ex ment Cajetani & Metinae. ibid. Graff. l. 2. c. 77. n. 3, 4, 5. Cajetan. ibid. p. 113.  he believe they will not engage him further; or if he thinks that by resistance they will grow upon him; or 
(r) Non esset culpa— si delectationem illam omisisset expellere, ne suam occupationem honestam & necessariam, aut utilem derelinqueret, quale est studium & lectio rerum impudicarum, ad hujusmodi delectationes provocantium, Navar. ibid.  if it would hinder him from some necessary, or profitable, or honest employment, such as the study, or reading of filthy things, which provoke such delight, is in their account. They are no more rigorous as to obscene words, filthy Songs, lascivious Writings, and Discourses. They sin not says Navarre 
(s) Qui ad praedicandum, etc. aut alloquendum faeminas ex causa honesta cum sint ipsi viri, vel contra viros, cum sint ipsae faeminae, vident, legunt, audiunt, aut dicunt aliqua turpia, aut talia, quae illam provocant. Ji enim quamvis possint, non sunt tam●n obligati ad omittendum id quod faciunt, quo pollutionis eventum impediant. Idem. c. 16. n. 7.  whether they be Men or Women, who see, or read, or hear, or speak any filthy things, Men to Women, or Women to Men, such as provoke to uncleanness, if it be upon an honest occasion; now it must needs be an honest occasion when this is done, while they are at Church for Divine service, and there they have used it. Church 
(t) Hodie vero tanta est musicae licentia ut etiam una cum missae ipsius canone obscaenae cantiunculae, etiam in organis pares vices habeant, Corn. Agripp. de Vanit. Scient. c. 17.  Music is now so licentious (says one) that filthy ditties, are sung to the Organ, and keep time even with the Canon of the Mass (the most sacred part of that which they count most sacred) and Cajetan informs us, that in their Church, this is the practice (u) every where, to sing to the Organ amorous and filthy 
(x) Turpes & amatorias cantilenas—  songs; and that such cleanly stuff is in the person 
(y) loco antiphonarum & divinae laudis offeruntur, ex ipsius Ecclesiae persona, prophana haec a falsariis ministris, Sum. v. Organ. p. 453.  of the Church offered to God, instead of Reponsals and Divine praises, 
(a) Audientes ex illo sono excitantur ad illa prophana su● turpia ut experientia testatur, ita quod non est locus inficiationi. ibid. 454.  and that experience witnesses that the hearers are thereby excited to profane and filthy things, he allows not this indeed, but in some, and with limitation; laying the blame of the rest, upon 
(b) Quia e●clesiastici pastores non quaesierunt quae Jesu Christi sunt.  the Pastors of their Church, who seek not (as he says) the things of Christ, and would have us believe, the Church approves it not, when yet he allows it, to be the common practice 
(c) Ubique sic vident fieri.  every where. It seems, she does but tolerate filthiness in the Church, as she does in the Stews; that she may be holy uniformly every where. 
(d) Si aliquis rustica simplicitate putaret licere dicino cultui recreandi animi gratia, miscere cantilenas profanas & turpes, quia videt communiter in his usum invaluisse: excusaretur a mortalis ita Navarrus cujus sententiam esse veram judico, si loquatur de simplicibus rusticis, etc. cap. 51. p. 263.  However, if any one should out of simplicity, think it lawful, to mix profane and filthy Songs, with Divine Worship for Recreation sake; because he sees, that this custom hath commonly prevailed; Navarre would excuse him from mortal sin, as Lopez tells us.  
And so will Lopez excuse him too, provided the Songs mixed with Divine service, be not too grossly filthy and excessively lascivious. 
(*) Dummodo talis cantus non sint adeo patenter turpes, & nimis lascivi. part 2. cap. 31. p. 188.   
And so he may well excuse those 
(e) Addit vero Navarrus, non esse lthale crimen, sic extra divinum officium cantare in ecclesia cantilenam turpem & lascivam, videtur que excusare contra Sotum rithmos turpes sibi occinentes in nocte nativitatis Domini, tempore quo petunt benedictiones, licet non aperte eos excuset. ibid. p. 264.  who sing obscene and lascivious songs in the Church, but not in Divine service, as he seems to do those who sing to one another filthy rhimes on the Evening of the Nativity, when they are ask benedictions. It seems that's the usual way to get their Church blessings, but the custom of that Church needs no timorous advocate, this can plead for itself, and is wont to stand as good as any Law , that of God, 
(f) The custom of the Church is of equal Authority, and to be received with the same pious affection with the Scripture. Counc. Basil. resp. Synod. tom. 4. Surg.  not excepted.  
Their Sacrament of penance, also is an honest occasion and there in confessions, as one of their Bishops informs us, the Priests inquire after such obscene and shameful things (instilling thereby into their ears, unheard of filthiness and lasciviousness) as cannot without the blushing of the confitents of either Sex, and without provoking the wanton appetite of the Confessor, be well expressed in any words. 
(*) Quibusdam interrogationum formulis, circa scrupulosas peccatorum differentias, obstaena & impudica quaedam exquirunt, quae sine utriusque sexus interrogati (cujus auribus inauditae turpitudines & lasciviae instllantur) rubore, & interrogantis inbonesti appetitus ti●illatione, vix ullis verbis, aut ne vix quidem, enuntiari possint. Pontius. Tyardaeus. Episc. Cabilon. p. 35.   
Further they allow persons to entertain themselves with pleasure conditionally, upon supposal that they were 
(g) Cajetan. Sum. v. delect. p. 116. Metina & Victoria in Lopez. c. 75. p. 356, 357.  married together; if the act be not respected as present. They grant liberty to make use of such things as provoke lust. He 
(h) Absolvi potest ille, qui ob esum rerum calidaram incidit in adeo graves carnis tentationes, ut eum aliquando impulerint ad consentiendum pollutioni vel sornicationi, sine proposito nunquam in posterum sic edendi. Concurrentibus 4. praedictis. Navar. c. 3. n. 25.  may be absolved, who by eating of hot meats, hath fallen into grievous Temptations of the flesh, and has been drawn to consent to pollution or fornication; though he hath no purpose to avoid such provoking meats, this being done, with the provisoes . They are no more severe against immodest touches or shameful sights 
(i) Non peccat mortaliter, quae patitur tactus vel oscula ab eo, quem credit moveri honesto amore, secus vero si ab eo quem credit moveri libidinoso amore ad actum venereum, vel delectationem morosam. Quod procedit, quando potest vitare sine scandalo eorum, qui de libidine non suspicantur. Graff. l. 2. c. 74. n. 11. Lopez. cap. 75. p. 360. Neque pati tactus impudicos licitum est faeminae, quando sine scandalo potest eos vitare.  to suffer such touches, from one who is thought to do it out of honest love, or custom, is no great fault: but if it proceed from lust, in order to the act of uncleanness or impure delights, she sins if she avoids them not; and this holds, if she can avoid them without scandal (say they) which signifies they account it no sin, to yield to this impure treatment: since none are obliged to give way to sin, for the avoiding of scandal. He 
(k) Idem dicendum est (i. e. absolvi potest) dè p●rsona. Qui— quia videt lavantes faeminas in flumine, aut viros natantes, aut ex aspectu pedum, crurium; pectorum, etc. aut aliorum ejus generis, saepe peccavit. Navar. ibid. n. 27.  that by ensnaring sights, viewing another's nakedness, etc. hath been often drawn to sin; may be absolved, though he do not purpose to avoid such Temptations, with the forementioned cautions.  
Men and Women viewing one another's nakedness (pudenda vel: parts vicinas) may be excused, if it be but for curiosity, and a short time, without danger of great commotion. 
(*) Bonacin. Tom. 1. p. 3. 8.   
The 
(l) Cajetan. Navar. Medina. in Fill. tr. 30. n. 215. Videre faeminas aut viros— ad solam delectationem carnalem, quae ex visione insurgit, solum est veniale ut notat Cajetan Idemque dicendum de auditu & locutione rerum veneriarum, si delectatio non transit ad res ipsas in Tol. l. 5. c. 14.  beholding of filthy sights, for natural or sensual pleasure, when there is no danger of passing into unclean thoughts (id est, passing through the mire, when there is no danger of being dirtied) is no crime. Those 
(m) Quid de his qui sub specie spiritualis mortificationis faciunt mulieres coram se nudare ut disciplinas inferant? Et dico quod non est dubium, eos peccare mortaliter, si libido sit principaliter in causa. Sum. v. delect. n. 7.  who upon pretence of spiritual mortification, make Women strip themselves naked, to discipline them; sin mortally, if lust were the principal cause of it, says Sylvester, leaving us to think, that, if lust be but a less principal motive to do it; it is but a small fault, or none. In fine they account it no crime, to offer no hearty opposition unto Temptation. 
(n) Non peccat mortaliter is qui tom tepide resistit tentationi, ut secundo & tertio regrediatur ad pulsandam mentem, eo quod solum tepide resistit, secluso periculo consentiendi. Sylu. v. delect. Graff. l. 2. c. 77. n. 9  He (says the Graffijs) who coldly resists Temptation, so that it returns upon him, and invades his Soul, a second and a third time, because he resists so coldly; sins not mortally, if there be no danger of consenting; as if there could be no danger to consent, when there is little or no mind to resist.  
They teach that a man suspecting his Wife is an Adulteress, may with a good intent, offer her the occasion to commit Adultery, without sin. 
(*) Jo. Sanc. disp. 35. n. 12.  Also that a servant is excused (when declining it would be a great inconvenience) if he accompany his Master when he goes a whoring: because here's a just occasion, and the action is of itself honest. And a Maid too if she go along with a Whore to the house of her lover, to act filthiness with him, or opens the door for him on such occasion. And so is a servant likewise to be excused, when he is sent to bring a Whore to his Master's lodging, or carries presents, or an Epistle, or a Message, or writes Letters, when the contents are to have a Whore come to him, at such a time; or any such (with them) indifferent thing; unless there be an express desire of the filthy act. 
(*) Bonacin. Tom. 1. p. 323. ibi. M. Navar. P. Navar. Zerola. Rebinus. & 7.   
Such encouragement they give to use the preparatives, and play with the incentives, and dally with the Temptations to lust and actual uncleanness; for the act itself, how little they make of self-popution we have seen before, they conclude that single pollution (though a sin against nature) is of itself, 
(o) Non est in se peccatum secundum omnes. Navar. c. 16. n. 7.  no sin at all, and so they may 
(p) Cajetanus. Sylvester. & alij ibid.  desire it beforehand, or 
(q) Aquinas. Paludanu● & Communis. ibid. Si autem placeat ut est exoneratio naturae non creditur peccatum— appetere pollutionem in somnis sine omni delectatione propter alleviationem naturae, non est peccatum; sed dare operam, utendo calida, vel alio modo, esset mortali peccatum, si propter hoc facit, Secus si faceret propter gulositatem, dubitando nihilominus de ea, quia sic esset veniale peccatum. Angel. sum. v. pollut. n. 2.  delight in it when it is past, for an honest end, and use the incentives, if it be but for gluttony. Moreover Whoredom itself has excessive favour and encouragement, from this holy Church. This is too plain by their Authors, and their practice, to be denied; and too heinous to be excused by any, but those, who have a mind to have mortal sins, to pass for small, or no faults. It seems it is no sin to build Stews for the entertainment of common Whores, and the best accommodation of them for their Trade of uncleanness. Pope Sixtus did it, as Cornelius Agrippa 
(q) Recentioribus temporibus Sixtus Pontifex maximus nobile admodum lupanar Romae extrux●t. de vanit. scient. cap. 64.  tells us, and they were so multiplied long since, that as one of their Doctors observes, 
(r) Nunc vero sub Christi vicarijs & Petri successoribus, ut alius quidam cecinit— Urbs est jam tota Lupanar. Espencaeus de continent. l. 3. c. 4.  under Christ's Vicars, and Peter 's Successors, urbs est jam tota lupanar, Now the whole City is one Whore-house. 'Tis no sin to farm out Whoredom 
(s) Romana scorta in singulas hebdomadas julium Pontifici pendunt. Agrippa. ibid.  and to take so much a head of the Strumpets weekly, for their practice: the Pope's Holiness hath done it long at Rome, and does it to this day; and the Whores daily commit lewdness, not only for themselves, but for the Pope their Benefactor's advantage, who is to share in their gain; they drive this Trade for him. And the number of his Farmers was so great long since, that they brought him in yearly an intrado of above Twenty thousand Ducats, a great sum then, and probably very much improved since. Such an abominable Tribute nature, even corrupted, blushes at: but that Holiness at Rome, thinks it no shame, to maintain his honour and state, as Christ's Vicar, by the hire of Whores. Evagrius extolling Anastasius the Emperor for abolishing such a detestable practice, brands it, 
(t) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. l. 3. cap. 39 p. 567. Hist. Eccles.  as a wretched Tribute, abominable to God, and shameful to the most barbarous people; as that which was a Reproach to nature itself, and the civil Government; as that which did, as it were, by a law Authorise this wickedness. Nor do the Popish Writers deny, that it is as bad, as he represents it; and yet since the Pope hath made it a custom, they have the confidence to justify it. Here one of their prime Penitentiaries, 
(u) Lucrum vel tribu●um ex meretricum opera quaerere, inspecto jure communi peccatum mortale est, & a Nicephoro. l. 16. c. 40. Hist. Eccl. dicitur vertigal impurum, detestabile, absurdum Deoque invisum, seris quibusque barbaris indignum & execrandum piaculum.  the gain says he, or Tribute for Whoredom, is by the common Law, a deadly crime, and Nicephorus says it is a filthy gain, detestable, absurd, hateful, and which the most savage Barbarians may be ashamed of, what then? is he or the great Bishop ashamed of it? you may know how, by what he adds immediately, 
(*) (x) Ratione tamen consuetudinis, quae pro lege habetur & consentiente rege in terris suis, & Papa in terris ecclesiae, non est peccatum, ideo est solvendum. Graff. l. 2. c. 123. n. 5.  yet says he, because of the custom, which passes for a Law, the Pope consenting to it in the Lands of the Church, non est peccatum, it is no sin, it ought to be paid. So that the Pope's will, and interest, passing into custom can make that to be no sin; which Nature, Law, History, and their own Consciences condemn, as a most horrid crime, and that well becomes his Holiness, which the worst Barbarians would detest. No wonder then, if they conclude it lawful, for any to let their houses to Harlots, though they know they take them for the practice of Whoredom; the Trade is so good, they can pay higher Rents than others. No wonder their Casuists and Divines determine so many things in favour of Whores; what they receive for their detestable practice, is not to be accounted 
(y) Meretricem promissam, ob turpem usum corporis, mercedem tanquam debitam posse petere, negat Navar. aiunt probabilius Lopez. Soto. Cajetan. Covarruvias. — nam pretium illud debitum est jure naturae: dolendum tamen est, debitum esse ob scelus putatum. Victorel. in Tol. l. 5. c. 19 vid. Soto. de just. & jur. l. 4. q. 7. art. 1. p. 128.  a Reward only, but a lawful Debt; thus their Divines conclude, while their Conscience extorts this from them, dolendum tamen est, debitum esse ob scelus putatum. And so they may demand it, and recover it, and have Patrons and Officers for their assistance; that Whoredom may be practised by rules of Justice, and they may 
(z) Qui illis statum pretium non solveret, cogeretur in foro judiciali idem. ibid. Graff. ibid. n. 3. n. 8. potest illud meretrix petere in judicio. Illis solis lege decreta sunt pretia. Soto. ibid.  force the payment, though there was no price agreed on, 
(a) Graff. ibid. n. 2. Navar. c. 17. n. 34.  nor is the Whore bound to make restitution, though she take more than her due, 
(*) Graff. ibid. n. 2.  nor is it necessary she should give any of it to the poor. And they are as punctual in resolving prostitutes and their customers, about the price of this 
(*) Ratio Cajetani, viz. quod usus meretricis est materia vendibilis & non rei Sacrae: quam Sotus & recentiores magni facere videntur. in Navar. c. 17. n. 35.  staple Commodity; as about the lawfullest negotiations in the World. Who may sell themselves to serve the lusts of others, at what Rate, what Liberty they have to take a price, answerable to the just value, how the value may be computed, and how they may improve it, etc. 
(b) Licet turpiter faciat quod sit meretrix non tamen turpiter accipit. Aquinas. in Nau. ibid. Soto. ibid. Graff. ibid.  Though filthiness in a Woman be a fault; yet it is no fault, filthily to set it to sale. A 
(c) Imo utraque ratione posset etiam masculus a faemina pretium recipere: quin vero aequius, quia plus praebet: sicuti Alexander in jure naturae potuit a duce illa Amazone quae illum gratia recipiendae prolis invisit, quod & prece & pretio, ut fertur, impetravit. Nam illi faeminarum generi in more erat, pretio accersere viros qui ad illas ingrederentur. Soto. ibid. Graff. ibid. n. 7.  man may satisfy the lust of a female, at a price: and he is so far from being obliged to 
(*) (a) Qui a faemina propter opus libidinosum accipit pretium non tenetur illud restituere, quin vero aequius est ut illud accipiat, cumplus praebeat sicut Alexander, etc. Item si causa salutis quispiam emissione illa egerit, posset amplexum illum pretio coemere. Soto ibid.  restitution, that it is more than equal it should be paid him; he parts with more for it, (there is not only Justice, but Equity, and Conscience for him, in the case) and there is invincible proof for it, since Alexander himself took hire upon this account, and the Amazons were wont of old, to hire men to do this work.  
Any Whore's  may retain the price of their filthiness 
(*) Adrian. Sylvest. Covarruv. Soto. Medina. Corduba. Navar. Antoninus in Vasquez. Opusc. Moral. p. 124. dub. 2.  only a Whore is bound in Conscience to restore what is given her by their Religious persons 
(*) Idem. ibid. . This it seems is the peculiar privilege of their Votaries, that Harlots must serve their turn gratis: and they have so much encouragement more than others to practise Whoredom, since in Conscience it must cost them nothing. But if a Saecular person give a Religious man money, or any thing else for the Religious man's Whore, that is not to be restored 
(*) Ibid. . It would be too hard to part with his Whore for nothing. Yet one encumbrance there is, but very gently laid on them. If the Religious man have goods in his power to dispose of, he may (it is not said he must) satisfy a Wench when he has deflowered her, etc. for this is a pious use 
(*) Paludan. Paluc. ibid. .  
A 
(d) Porro antem crediderim has multo justius posse recipere pretium: quip quae ob majorem honestatem pluris sunt aestimandae. Idem. ibid. Graff. ibid. n. 6.  Woman that commits lewdness secretly, may take the price of Fornication, more justly than a common Harlot (though she does it justly enough) because in her it is more valuable, the price may rise, being an honester Whore. If a married Woman fall into 
(e) Quod si de alijs scisciteris quae sunt puillae aut maritatae quae semel aut bis collabuntur— & illis quoque liceret pretium recipere: tenebiturque in foro conscientiae, qui illis promisit solvere, nisi excessus justae aestimationis pro ratione personarum immodicus esset. Et ratio est eadem S. Thomae. Nam licet flagitia illa sint lege vetita, datio tamen non est probihita. Et ideo juri naturali standum est: quo utique jure concessio illa corporum aestimabilis est pecunia. Soto. ibid. potest nupta quae semel aut his collapsa est pretium recipere absque●exu restitutionis, & adulter tenetur judicio animae illi solvere, etc. Graff. ibid. n. 8. & Covarruvias ibi.  Adultery once and again, she may take her price without charge of restitution (it is more lawful gain than to have any such burden annexed) and the Adulterer is bound upon his Soul, to lay it down; for though Adultery be illegal, yet to buy and sell it, is no sin; if the price be not excessive, and much above the just value of the thing, the quality of the persons considered. And it must not be forgotten, 
(f) Soto. ibid. idem esse judicium atque de alijs, quae operis manuum suarum acquisierint, etc. & Graff. ibid. n. 9  that the Adulteress is not to be accountable to her Husband, for what she gains by this Traffic; or a Maid to her Parents, when she prostitutes herself for hire in her Father's house: but may convert it to their own use, as that which they earn by hand-labour; unless they grow very wealthy by the Trade. And if these 
(g) Si res est modica pro qualitate personae, etiamsi a silio-familias recipiat, retinere potest. Nam praesumitur pater scire, ratasque subinde habere ejusmodi expensas. Soto. ibid. Graff. ibid. n. 10.  Women do but take moderate sums for this filthy Traffic, of those who are not at their own disposing, they are not bound to restitution: because it is presumed that those who have the charge of those Minors, do allow such expenses. This was necessary to be added, that Harlots might not be discouraged, from admitting Boys under age, among their Customers. Lastly, a 
(h) Quinimo ut inquit Covarruvias, Nec monialis pecuniam recipiens ob mercedem sui coitus tenetur illam restituere in foro animae. Idem. ibid. n. 10.  Nun playing the Whore, may both do it for hire, and with a good Conscience keep it when she hath done. It had been hard measure for their Votaries, if some provision had not been made for them, that their Trade might be gainfuln, ●hen their own Authors tell us, it is so common. There was no reason to be partial, and make much difference betwixt them, and other prostitutes, when their 
(i) Nihil distinguit inter sui temporis virginum monasteria, & meretricum lupanaria. Espenc. de contin. l. 2. c. 12.  Clemangis could see no difference, betwixt their Nunneries, and the common Stews. But to proceed with the latter, while they are giving rules for Conscience, they tell us 
(k) Et in tantum lex tolerat hujusmodi fornicationes, ut et iam cogat publicas meretrices ad fornicandum qum quocunque juxta tamen mercedem. Graff. l. 2. c. 74. n. 4.  the Law countenances Fornication so very much, that it compels public Whores to commit lewdness with any one whomsoever, giving her her hire. And so indulgent is the Church to Whoredom, that Harlots who live there many years. (even as long as they can get Custom), do incur no 
(l) Though one continue a Whore for Twenty years, yet doth she not incur the censures of the Church. Vid. Vivaldus candelabr. aur. tit. de confess. n. 60.  Ecclesiastical censure. So that at Rome, made so purely Christian by its Popes, Whoredom is as lawful, as when it was most Heathenish, and is objected as the shame of it, by St. Augustine, 
(m) Tu tu sancte pater Augustine. Quid vero terrenae civitati velut exprobas, quod scortorum usum licitum fecerit, ut quem nulla ejus lex vindicet, cum eadem turpitudo in nostra, hoc est Dei civitate, neque minus permittatur, neque magis puniatur. Fspencaeus de contin. l. 3. c. 4. Ratio vero quam praedictus Segobiensis, (Soto) secutus aliquot alios sentit, viz. quod lex permittit, & facit justam operam meretricis, non tamen alias praedictorum operas, etc. Navar. c. 17. n. 35.  that there the use of Whoredom was a lawful practice. Hereby the People under Popery are so well edified, that they cannot easily know whether Fornication committed with common prostitutes be a sin, as one of their 
(n) Fill. tr. 30. c. 2. n. 51. p. 203.  Doctors tells us; for many of the common people (says he) who know not how to distinguish betwixt sin permitted, or not forbidden as to the punishment, and not as to the sinfulness; because that simple Fornication, is not punished, and Whores have the privilege of impunity: they make account it is no sin to deal with them (at the Pope's rate) and this is very common in Cities, otherwise well instructed in the Faith and Religion (of Rome) as those who hear Confessions well know 
(*) It is not the common people only that have this good opinion of it. Nec hodie Aristippei quidam desint, qui simplex hoc stuprum pro crimine non habeant. Espenc. de contin. lib. 3. cap. 4. Utinam non essent in orbe atque nomine Christiano, qui libellis publice editis, quasi quibusdam fornicandi Isagogis, mulieres, & quidem omnes, nihil aliud in vita communi esse putarent, quam rem explendae libidini natam, Idem. ibid. . It seems Confessors have something to do, to persuade the People, that, that is a sin, which the Pope publicly allows: and they mig●d have more to do, if the People did not suspect, that the Pope is a man like themselves, and for all his infallibility, may in matter of Whoredom err, as they usually do.  
But if any man be not disposed to take this liberty so freely offered, of haunting the common Stews; he has encouragement by the Law of their Church to have a Concubine at home, and that without any great hazard, it will not cost him so much, as the loss of the Communion, for the Canon Law provides. 
(o) Decret dist. 34. c. 4. Is qui non habet uxorem; & pro uxore concubinam habet, a communione non repellatur. Rabanus. l. paenit. c. 10. alleges a Spanish Canon for this. And Gratian. dist. 34. and Espencaeus de contin. l. 2. c. 7. Jacobus Curio. l. 2. Chron. says of Gregory 7. Quasi caelibatum perpetuum concubinatus temperamento mitigarit, sacerdotem unius concubinae societate contentum ab officio non repellendum statuens. Vid. ibid.  That he who has not a Wife, but instead of a Wife a Concubine, shall not be kept from the Communion: So that he be satisfied with one Woman, either a Wife or a Concubine. Now since they tell us sometimes, that none who are in mortal sin, may partake of the Communion; it should seem, that with them, to live in Fornication, is either no sin, or none that is mortal.  
Their Doctrine is as indulgent to those who will not put away their Concubines, as such persons need desire. Absolution is not to be denied him, who having lent his Concubine whom he keeps in his house 100 Crowns, has no hope to recover it, if he put her away. Or on the contrary, if the Woman be not like to recover the like sum owing her, if she leave the house of the Whoremaster. For, as was said before, none are bound to avoid the next occasion of sin, to their great loss. 
(*) Jo. Sancius. disp. 10. n. 20.  Nor is he bound to put away his Concubine, if she be very useful for the gaining of temporal goods by way of Traffic.— It is enough that he intends not to sin hereafter. Yea if the Concubine be very serviceable for the delight of the Whoremaster, so that his life would scarce be pleasant without her, and other Cates would be very distasteful to him, and another Woman, so much for his purpose, would hardly be found: the Whoremaster will not be obliged to put her away 
(*) Ibid. . Neither is absolution to be denied, if he might lose his Reputation by quitting his Whore: Yea or if the Concubine would be disgraced thereby; It is enough if he firmly promise, not to sin more with her, since it is in his power not to sin, although there be present danger of it, while she stays in his house. 
(*) n. 21.   
But what if he sin with her still, after such promises to the contrary? That will not hinder, if he repent still, and he may truly repent (in their way) and be absolved when there is no appearance of amendment. So he determines in a like case, after others 
(*) Absolvendum fore toties quoties vere paenituerit, non solum quando aliqua emendatio notatur ut tenent. Suar. Graff. Navar. Coriolan. Lopez. — quod possit absolvi paenitens, etiamsi nullus appareat profectus, tenet. Vivaldus. ibid. n. 16.  Accordingly Bonacina determines, a Confessor may absolve one, who keeps a Whore, and will not put her away; if he cannot do it without much disgrace or scandal, or other great inconvenience 
(*) De Matrim. disp. 4. punct. 14. n. 11. . And him also, who sins but seldom with his Whore, 3 or 4 times in a year (or thereabouts), and hopes he may not relapse further 
(*) Ibid. n. 12. juxta Graffium & alios. . And so may a youth be absolved who keeps a Whore in his Father's house, with whom he sins customarily, though he put her not away, so that he have a firm purpose to desist. 
(*) Ibid. n. 13. ita Graffius. Lopez. & alij.  But what if after such a purpose he relapse still? he may be absolved still (as we heard before) even innumerably innumerable times, because so oft we are to forgive our Brother 
(*) Jo. Sanc. ibid. n. 16. .  
Or if a Concubine at home will not satisfy an unclean person, but he commit Fornication with others, yet if he make but himself drunk before: that Fornication will be no sin; or but an inconsiderable fault, if he be but half drunk.  
Nor will Adultery be a sin in that or many other cases; Christ teaches, that he who puts away his Wife, saving for the cause of Fornication, causeth her to commit Adultery, Matth. 5. 32. Yet they teach that where the marriage is both firm and consummated by conjugal enjoyment; yet the parties may be separated as to cohabitation, and as much divorced as they can be for Adultery (by their Doctrine): 
(p) Vid. Sylvest. Sum. v. divort. n. 10. & n. 2. Quantum ad vinculum, matrimonium ratum salvi potest per mortem civilem i. e. professionem tacitam vel expressam religionis approbatae: ita quod remanens in saeculo potest libere cum alia contrahere. ibid. (vid. Maldonat. Summ. quaest. 14. art. 13.)  either for outward danger, or when one tempts the other to mortal sin, or for that which they call Heresy, or if either of them will enter into a Monastery. And if there had not been carnal knowledge after the marriage, though it be firm and valid; yet if either of them will make the Monastic profession: the other is at liberty to marry another, and live together as Man and Wife, the parties whom they first married still living. So that if a wife will turn Nun, she may put away her Husband (doing 
(q) Idem. ibid. n. 6.  it, eo ignorante vel invito) and he may marry another Wife.  
The Council of Trent confirms this to purpose, when it curses those who hold that lawful Matrimony not consummated, is not dissolved by a solemn Religious vow. 
(*) Sess. 8. Can. 6.  It is acknowledged by 
(1) 6 Decret. l. 3. tit. 15.  Boniface 8. and 
(2) In bulla ascendente Domino)  Gregory 13. that this of Matrimony is a bond made firm and indissoluble by God himself; and the other of a vow, but a Church Constitution: yet (as was observed long since), the Trent Prelates will not only have a humane bond to dissolve a Divine; but will have those accursed, who will not believe, that an institution of man, born many hundred years since the Apostles, should prevail against a Divine institution, made at the Creation of the World 
(*) Vid. Histor. of Counc of Trent. l. 8. p. 790. . Thus in behalf of their pretended chastity, they have opened a broad way for real Adultery, and who could expect more reasonable decrees in such a case.  
This for their Laiety, then for their Clergy and monastics, their Doctrine is, 
(r) Marriage of them who have vowed chastity, is the worst sort of incontinency. Rhem. Annot. in Cor. 7. 9  that Adultery is not so much a sin as marriage; no nor Incest or Sodomy, or Bestiality, so that they may better venture upon any of these abominations, than upon that state which the Lord hath authorized and honoured. And he is more capable of orders amongst them, 
(s) Aq●inas, Comment. in Tit. 1.  who hath kept two Whores; than one who hath been twice Married, or but once Married a Widow. An incestuous person (says 
(t) Annot in 1 Tim. 13. admittitur incestus, admittitur homicida, admittitur pirata, admittitur Sodomita, Sacrilegus, parricida; denique quis non? solus digamus excluditur, qui solus nihil admisit.  Erasmus) is admitted to be a Bishop, a Murderer, a Robber, a Sodomite, a Sacrilegious wretch, a Parricide is admitted, and who not? Solus digamus, one that has been twice Married is only excluded from this honour, though he alone be blameless. The Apostle commends Marriage to prevent the heats of Lust, which he calls burning; but burning Lust is with them innocent. 
(u) Uri non idem significat quod flamma libidinis uri; hoc enim per se malum non est, imo materia potius victoriae. l. de. Coelibat. Cap. 6.  To burn (says Valentia) does not signify to burn with the flames of Lust, for this in itself is not evil. The Apostle determines it better to Marry than to burn: but Bellarmin says 
(x) Non utrumque est malum, & nubere & uri; imo pejus est nubere, quicquid reclament Adversarij, presertim ei, quae habet votum solemn, De Monach. l. 2. c. 36. p. 1213.  it is worse to Marry, however our Adversaries gainsay (where he puts the Apostle with us, amongst his Adversaries) especially for her who is under solemn Vow; and a little after he tells 
(y) Quae autem nubit post votum simplex, illa verum matrimonium contrahit, tamen aliquo modo magis peccat, quam quae fornicatur, quia reddit se impotentem ad servandum votum, quod non facit quae fornicatur, ibid. p. 1214.  us, she that Marrys after a simple Vow, in a manner sins more than she that commits Fornication: his reason is, because the one makes herself uncapable of keeping her Vow, which she does not, who plays the Whore. Where we see what their Vow of Chastity is (the argument wherein they triumph, to prove the holiness of their Church); it's a Chastity which consists well enough with Whoredom, and is only violated by Marriage. Accordingly the Clergy have liberty to haunt the public Stews. It is in reference to those who are 
(a) Mirum certe tales tantosque viros consuluisse, minuendum modo scortorum fastum & luxum, non-etiam ea semel ei jcienda, an vero propter tam multos ibi caelibes necessario retinenda? O rem horrendam! Espencaeus de contin. l. 3. c. 4. p. 734.  Unmarried, (to wit, the Clergy) that the Stews are held to be so very necessary; that no consideration could move the Pope or his Council, to think any thing more fit to be done against the common Whores; but only some diminution of their Pride and Luxury, as one of their Doctors intimates. And as if that would not serve, they have been heretofore allowed 
(b) Turpissimum est quod (Officiales) permittant (Clericos) cum concubinis, moretricibus, & pellicibus habitare, liberosque procreare sinunt, accepto ab ijs certo quotannis censu: atque adeo alibi a continemibus. Nam habeat (inquiunt) si velit. Et quoties enim quisque talis, cum tales tam multi sint, hodie aliter punitur? Idem in Tit. c. 1. p. 479. Corn. Agrippa de Vanit. Scient. c. 64.  to keep Whores at home, paying a yearly Rent for that liberty: Yea, those Priests that would not keep whores (that they might not want temptation to it) were forced to pay the Rent, because they might have bad the liberty if they pleased. For a Monk or Friar to lay aside his habit is a crime, by which he incurs Excommunication, and yet if he lay aside his habit, that he may commit Fornication the more expeditely, without the encumbrance which his Monkish weeds would give him in the act, they declare him upon that account freed from censure. 
(c) Non incurritur etiam ob quamlibet dimissionem temereriam mortiferam, quia non incurritur, ob dimissionem ut expeditius fornicationi indulgeat, Navar. c. 17. n. 131.  Excommunication is not incurred, says Navarre) for every leaving of his habit, which is temerarious, or deadly, because he incurs it not by laying it aside, that he may the more readily indulge himself in Fornication. Sylvester had made such a decision before him, so understanding Paludanus, that he is under Excommunication, 
(d) Si quis habitum dimittat ut fornicetur secundum Pet. de Pal. sine dubio est Excommunicatus, quod ego verum crederem quando habitum dimittit relative ad alios, puta ne cognoscatur: secus relative ad se, puta propter voluptatem. Sum. v. Excom. 9 n. 53. Non affici excommunicatione qui se vestibus spoliat— vi liberius & voluptuosius peccet Bonacina Tom. 3. de Excom. disp. 2. q. 8. punct. 6. n. 3. Sayrus & alij quos magno numero refert Sanctarell. ibid.  who puts off his habit to disguise himself in reference to others, that he may not be known; but not be, that lays it by, with a respect to himself, (viz.) for the pleasure (of Fornication). So that the censured dismissing of habit, is, as he distinguishes, 
(e) Unde dico illam dimissionem debere intelligi, quando babitus demittitur dolose cum assumptione alterius ad utendum eo, secus ubi dimitteretur ad horam voluptuose, nullo alio sumpto. ibid.  that which is fraudulent, so as to put on another, but not that which is for an hours pleasure, while he is quite stripped. Panormitan concludes that an Oath is never 
(g) In c. Clericus. de coha. Cler. & muli. Concludit quod nunquam est deferendum juramentum illi, contrá quem est vehemens suspicio de transgressione, & deferens peccat mortaliter & facit optimo textus dicti, c. Cleric. Ubi non vult clericos cogi jurare dimittere concubinas, Angel. Sum. v. juram. n. 11. Navar. c. 12. n. 20. ne in fornicationem reversus perjurij quoque reatum incurreret, Espenc. de Cont. l. 2. c. 7.  to be given to him, of whom there is vehement suspicion, that he will not observe it, and he that gives it in that case, sins mortally. Hence Pope Alexander would not have Priests bound by Oath to forsake their Concubines; because, it seems, there was strong presumption, they would venture on perjury rather than leave their Whoredom. 
(h) 
Cum ubique tam ingens sit sacerdotum turba, quorum quotus quisque castam agit vitam? de conscrib. Epist.  
Si quis prependat horum temporum statum, quotam hominum portionem monachorum gregis occupent, quotam sacerdatum & clericorum collegia: deinde perpendat quam pauci in●anto numero viri servent c●stimoniam, tum in quae libidinum genera quam innumeri divergant, quanto cum probro complures palam incesti sint, & impudici, etc. Annot. in 1 Tim. 3.   Hence Erasmus had so much cause to complain, that among so vast multitudes, who were unmarried, and under the Vow of Chastity; so exceeding few did live Chastely, so innumerable many did wallow in Uncleanness. And Cassander 
(i) In concilio Neocaesar, magis punitur sacerdos qui fornicatur quam qui publice contrahit— jam eo res rediit ut vix centesimum invenias, qui ab omni commercio faeminarum abstineat, Consult. art. 23.  (another moderate Papist) says, that a man could not find scarce one in a hundred of them, that abstained from Women.  
Before these, the Gloss on the Canon Maximianus, dist. 81. tells us, 
(k) Communiter dicitur quod pro simplici fornicatione quis deponi non debet, cum pauci sine illo vi●io inveniantur. dist. 81.  it is the common opinion that no Priest should be deposed for simple Fornication, because there are but few Priests free from it. If all Fornicators had been deprived, their Church would have been made desolate, and left in a manner Priestless. This was a great reason then, and is, it seems, of the same force still; for at this day, a Priest is not to be deprived for simple Incontinency. The Congregation of Cardinals (much concerned for the propagation of the holy Church) declared it to be Law 
(l) Quae tamen paena privationis beneficij non procedit in simplici incontinentia, absque qualitate concubinatus, ut constat ex declarat. adducta a Garcia. Jo Sauc. disp. 50. n. 10.  that the paenalty of deprivation proceeds not for simple incontinency, as Garzias observes; only they must not keep Whores in the capacity of Concubines. It may be that came too near Marriage, to have so much favour as vagrant Whoredom. Yet if a Priest keep a Whore at Bord and Bed, and use her constantly, as if she were his Wife, he is not therefore irregular: Indeed if he Mary her, or an honester Woman, all the world cannot excuse him; for though such Whoredom never disables a Priest, yet chaste Marriage utterly spoils him. Yea, if he keep in that capacity more Whores than one (I know not how many more, for they are not limited to numbers) yet still he is not irregular (as innocent Bigamy would make any one, though he were an Apostle) but the Bishop may dispense with him. So Pope Innocent 3. determined, and it is now as good Law as their Church has any; and the more remarkable, because the Doctor's Gloss on it, would have it noted as admirable, 
(m) Si presbyteri plures concubinas habentes— poteris cum els tanquam simplici fornicatione notatis, quod ad executionem sacerdotalis officij, dispenfare, Extra. de Bigam. tit. 22. c. quia circa.  that Whoredom has, with them, more privilege than Chastity. Where we may suppose the Gloss speaks the sense of such as are Strangers to Rome; for that Uncleanness should be preferred before Chastity, is in that Church nothing wonderful nor strange at all, but ordinary and obvious. That Pope (whom they magnify as the singular glory of their Law), decrees 
(n) Notandum mirabile quod plus hic habet luxuria quam castitas.  that the Bishop may dispense with Priests who keep many Concubines, to exercise their Office, as he doth also with those who are noted for simple Fornication. And how the Bishops were wont to dispense with them, is known, their own Writers declaring, it the custom, as before, to let out those Women to them at a yearly rent; and that they were so hard— Lords, that if a Priest had no mind to the Bishop's Tenement, and did not take it, yet he must pay for it no less than the forwardest Farmer.  
Sodomy abounds most in Italy (for it was requisite that Rome should be, as it is in the Prophetic style, Sodom; and not incongruous, that the vilest wickedness should thrive best under his Holiness wing), yet as if they would have it as common every where, and more there than it is, their decisions are exceeding favourable to it, and treat it very indulgently. Married persons may practise Sodomy together, the beginnings of it, all of it, bating the last compliment of the act, without mortal guilt 
(o) Zerola Graffius. & alij apud Dianam. 2. p. tr. 3. res. 37. Angelus, v. debitum. n. 25. vid. Navar. c. 27. n. 250. . Unmarried persons, their Clergy, may act it without restraint to the uttermost, and be neither suspended nor irregular. There 
(p) Bonacina de Matrim. q. 4. punct. 11. n. 2. ibi. Navar. Quaranta. Riccius. Mattha. Duardus Garzias, & alij.  is no danger of it, if they do it but 2 or 3 times now and then, yea, they are safe, unless they make a custom of it. The strictest decree that we find any Pope ever made against Sodomy, is that of Pius 5. which yet was form in such terms, on purpose that it should not reach any ecclesiastics, but such only as made a trade of it by continual practice. This Navarre had from the mouth of Gregory 13. 
(q) Cap. 27. n. 249. vid. Bonacin. ibid. n. 3. ibi. Navar. Rodriquez Lazarius.   
And if they do make a trade of it, yet still they are secure, if it be not notorious and public: and it 
(r) Navar. ibid. n. 248. publicum definitur esse, quod patet omnibus, Bartol. ibid. n. 255.  will not be counted notorious, though it may be proved; though it be commonly reported, though it be confessed; nor public, unless it be manifest to all. Thus if any Ecclesiastic will practise Sodomy, provided he do it not continually; or if he will make a daily trade of it, yet so he do not keep an open Warehouse; the Pope has taken special care (even in the severest order, that his Zeal against this wickedness could ever be brought to make) that the Sodomite shall have his liberty without any fear of losing Office or Benefice in holy Church.  
Further they declare that mental Heresy 
(s) Navar. Manual. c. 27. n. 249. , is a greater crime than Sodomy. As suppose a man should believe that the public worship of God ought to be in a known tongue (such a Heresy as they cannot acquit the Apostle Paul of) the secret belief of this, though never manifested by expression or practice, is in their account, worse than Sodomy. What Conscience are they like to make of this, while such is their judgement? Moreover, some of them 
(t) Vid. Vasq. 1, 2. q. 71. art. ult. Montesinum 1, 2. tom. 1. q. 73. art. 3. d. 5.  say, that the stealing of 30. Rials (about 15. shillings) is a greater sin than Sodomy. Yet Theft is wont to be counted one of the lest crimes, and this is none of the greatest Theft. Of what value the thing stolen, must be to make Theft a mortal sin, is, they say, to be determined by the judgement of a prudent man. 
(u) Arragon & alij in Pet. Navar. vid. Bonacin. de Restit. d. 2. q. 3. p. 2. n. 7.  Those who have the reputation of great prudence amongst them, declare, that to steal 100 Crowns, in some case is no mortal crime. If they should any of them determine that the stealing of 29. Rials, or there abouts, is but venial; there will but be about six pence difference betwixt Sodomy and a Venial fault. It's true, they do not commonly deliver this conceit in the terms expressed; but it is clearly inferred from the doctrine of Aquinas (and Scotus too) generally embraced; for he concludes that 
(x) Justitia major virtus quam Castitas 1, 2. q. 66. art. 4.  Justice is a more excellent Virtue than Chastity; and that the sin is more heinous, which is opposite to the nobler Virtue 
(y) Quod majori virtuti opponitur, gravius peccatum, q. 73. art. 4. : upon which ground, not only Sodomy, but Copulation with a Brute or a Devil will be a less sin than petty Theft. In short, if their Divines (whether followers of Thomas or Scotus, betwixt whom they are all in a manner parted) will be true to these principles, since they cannot deny but there is injustice in stealing one Rial; they must hold that Sodomy is no more a sin, nor more Conscience to be made of it, than of stealing , when their doctrine of Theft has left no Conscience of that. Thus far they have advanced to secure Sodomy against the Laws of God, and by those of the Church: as for any secular Laws, they may laugh at them, for Sodomy has Ecclesiastical immunity. 
(z) Bonacin. in 1. precept. d. q. 7. p. 5. n. 14. colligitur reos Sodomi●i●i criminis immunitatis privilegio non privari, quia in bulla Gregorij non exprimuntur.  By the special care of Pope Gregory, Sodomites were not mentioned amongst those who are excluded from that privilege. The civil Law (I suppose, before the Unmarried Clergy were Lawgivers) Ordains that Sodomites should be burnt, but the Church has provided that no fire may touch them, if they can escape that from Heaven. Besides other Sacred places, the Palaces of Cardinals and Bishops, all Monasteries, yea, the House of every Parish Priest and Ecclesiastic, are all Sanctuaries for Sodomites. They could not well proceed further in favour of this crime, since the eyes of the world was open about them. It is not now so seasonable for the Pope's Legate (as he did before) to praise Sodomy in Print, as a pious act. These rules and examples considered, who can think that they count Uncleanness of any sort, a sin much to be avoided? Or who can wonder, if Rome became hereby, in a literal sense, the Mother of Harlots and Ahominations? Or yet think strange, that they should be most taken with Papal holiness, who are most addicted to Whoredom and Uncleanness?   

Sect. 9 Further, it's no sin for the Romanists to take from those whom they count Heretics (from Protestant's particularly) all that they have: This will not be Theft or Robbery, but an act justified by the Laws of their Church, which oblige them to do it; for this is one of those many punishments, which that Law will have inflicted on us; 
(k) Concil. Later. sub Innoc. 3. bona ipsorum ipso facto applicantur fisco, Angel. Sum. v. haeret. n. 5. sunt ipso jure, vel ipso facto confiscata Sylvest. v. haeret. c. 1. n. 12.  the goods of Heretics are by sentence of Law immediately confiscated. There is no question of this amongst them; only as to the execution, there is some doubt, whether Heretics are bound in Conscience, as soon as they are such, to give up their possession themselves, and deliver all they have to Roman Catholics; or whether they may not without mortal guilt, keep possession, till the Papists see it fit to put them out, and seize on all they have. Their famous 
(l) Cujus regula est, quod ille cujus bona sunt ipso facto confiscata, non potest illa cum bona conscientia retinere, quia statim sunt acquisita fisco, in Soto de Just. & jure l. 3. q. 6. art. 6. p. 21.  Panormitan concludes that the Heretics are bound, under the pain of deadly sin, to do this execution upon themselves, not expecting any other Sentence, or Executioner. And there is a pretty Army of Doctors (longa Doctorum phalanx) do maintain this with him: but Soto and some others determine, that they need not be so hasty to give up all they have of their own accord, but may stay for a declaratory sentence, and seizure upon it; but then a 
(m) Sylvest. ibid. n. 12.  general sentence will serve, without particular process or examination who are personally guilty, and a 
(n) Idem. ibid. & Angel. ibid. n. 5.  sentence by some Ecclesiastical person may suffice.  
But all of them agree in this, that Heretics lose all title and property in  they possess, and that for them and their heirs; and this before any declaratory 
(o) Idem. ibid. v. paena. n. 3. Graff. l. 2. c. 11. n. 10, fine.  sentence, even from the first day of their pretended heretical pravity, as the 
(p) 
Ut etiam tenet Director. l. 3. tit. 9 qui etiam dicit, quod dicta bona damnatorum propter haeresim, vel bujusmodi ad fiscum pertinent a Die commissi criminis, Sylvest. ibid. n. 13.  
Condemnatio illa vetro agitur usque ad articulum quo haereticus omni ignorantia nudatus, haeresim study ass●ruit. Assertio est Jo. Aud. Sed nulla opus est authorum citatione: nam lex est expressa.— Et universalis usus & practica St. Senatus inquisitionis sic habet nempe secundum normam directori. l. 3. tit. 9 Soto. ibid. p. 23. vid. Sylu. ibid. n. 14. Graff. l. 2. c. 21. n. 17.   Directory for the Inquisitors determins.  
To lose all title to their Estates, may seem a small matter, considering that they lose all power and jurisdiction, all right to Honour and Fame, (they and theirs being infamous) to Liberty also, and Life itself: But because loss of Property is great in consequence, let us stay a little on it. All that these pretended Heretics have, being confiscated, they are liable to a Seizure presently; and though their convenience will not serve them to seize on all, a long time after; yet in the interim, the poor Heretics are responsible; for all the 
(q) Talis clausula ipso jure vel facto, operatur restitutionem fructuum medij temporis— n●ma Die commissi criminis, non facit fructus suos, sed statim debentur fisco Fel. in cap. Rodolphus the rescript. Graff. ibid. n. 21.  mean profits (it may be in our case, for a hundred, or two hundred years past); and all this while, they have no power to alienate or dispose of their Goods or Estates, by Gift; Sale, Will, or otherwise; yea, not of any of it, by way of Charity, for they are not their own to dispose of. Hence all Wills, Sales, Contracts, for this purpose, (it may be for some ages together) are 
(r) 
Dona●io vel alienatio facta per haereticum ante damnationem non tenet— sicut facta damnatione bona alienare non possunt, sic nec ante illam a die commissi criminis, Sylu. ibid. n. 14.  
Habetque eousque vim talis sententia, ut omnes contractus, nempe donationes, venditionis, atque alij, etiam causa dotis, quos haereticus ab illo articulo secerit, hab●antur pro infectis, Soto. ibid.   null and void. And if the Heretic will venture to alienate any thing he has, he that buys it, does it at his peril 
(s) Navar. c. 17. n. 106. ; for though it pass from hand to hand many years, yet it may be taken away from the Purchaser, with whom it is found, 
(t) Si haereticus alienavit, fiscus vel inquisitores non tenentur restituere pretium emptori, quia ●ff●ctus damnationis re●ro trahitur, Sylvest. ibid. fiscus nullo emptoribus restituto pretio sibi adjudicat dicta bona. Soto. ibid. res quaelibet per delinquentem ali●nata a fisco vindicari possit a die commissi criminis, pretio ipsi emptori minime soluto. Graff. ibid. n. 17. Non solum revocabit rem▪ pretio non restituto emptori, qui emit ab haeretico: verum etiam nec ●i qui emit, quantumcunque per plures manus transierit, a qui non habuit jus vendendi, haec Jo. Manald. Archidiaconus, & Jo. Andreus & idem. Directorium in Sylvest. ibid.  without restoring the price that was paid for it: and he that sells it, is a Cheat, and 
(u) Navar. c. 23. n. 89. Sylu. ibid.  sins mortally, if he gives not the Purchaser notice of the hazard, and tell him, that when he sells his Estate, or Goods, he has no right to sell them. If the pretended Heretic die, and leave what he has to his 
(x) Nihil habebunt de bonis parentum filij, nec etiam agnati Angel. ibid. n. 7. Si aliquis sit declaratus haereticus, statim potest sieri executio in bonis ejus, exclusis filijs, etiam de legitima. Graff. ibid. n. 10.  Children, it is no better than if he left them another man's Goods which he had no title to. Yea, though the Children be 
(y) 
Si habue●int Catholicos silios nibilominus confiscantur secundum Gloss. in. Sylvest. ibid. Angelus. ibid.  
Quinimo veniunt privandi ipsi filij Catholici etiam legitima ita notatur per Genzelinum — quem sequitur, Zabarella & ratio est, quia legitima est quota bonorum, quae pater habebat tempore mortis, sed pater eo in tempore nihil habet quando bona sunt confiscata, Graff. ibid. n. 9   Catholics, they lose their portion. But who are those that may take from Protestants (or others whom they count Heretics) what they possess? why, any that will: Authority is given to all  to Rob, spoil, or bereave us. So Sylvester, and others, quoting the Rabbis of the Pontifical Law for it. It is their determination, that in point of Law and Conscience, 
(z) Si aliter fieri non potest, manu armata sunt eis omnia bona auferenda ut, 23. q. 3 c. 1. Sicut tamen dicit Raynuc. & Gosredus licet Ecclesia videatur dare generalem authoritatem Omnibus expoliandi eos: tamen satis videtur tutum, quod non fiat nisi speciali edicto, vel principis vel ecclesiae: ne aliter videatur quis potius ex cupiditate vel ultione, quam ex justitia & obedientia pugnare, Sylvest. ibid. n. 13. Infidelitas haereticorum est pessima, utrum infideles qui non recognoscunt dominium Ecclesiae licite possint suis rebus spoliari? Resp. Hostiensis, quod sic per illud Mat. ult. data est mihi omnis potestas, etc. quam quidem transtulit in vicarium suum, Angel. Sum. v. infidel. n 3. & n. 7.  all that will, have Authority to spoil us of what we have. What he adds, is matter of caution for more plausible proceed in the spoil and robbery. It seems safe that this be not done but by special edict of the Prince, or of the Church; this is convenient, lest otherwise one might seem to do it, rather out of Covetousness or Revenge, than out of Justice and Obedience.  
By this we may understand in what condition Protestant's are, by the Laws of the Romish Chuich, and how Papists are obliged to look upon us, and demean themselves towards us. No Protestant from the 
(*) A Constitution of Pope Paul 4. subscribed by all the Cardinals, declares that all Prelates and Princes, even Kings and Emperors fallen into Haeresy, should be, and should be understood to be deprived of all their Benefices, States, Kingdoms and Empires, without farther declaration, and uncapable to be restored to them, even by the Apostolic Sea●; and their Goods, States, Kingdoms, and Empires shall be understood to be common, and to belong to those Catholics who can get them, Hist. of Counc. of Tr. lib. 5. p. 409.  Prince to the meanest Subject, has any Title to Lands, Houses, Money, or any thing else which they possess; or can justly call it their own. All rules of Righteousness, which concern property, are void: Papists own them no observance. In reference to us, we are not capable of Injury upon this account; whatever they do against us, in respect of our Estates, they wrong us not, they sin not, for we have no Title. If they take from us any thing, or all we have, they steal not aught from us, they rob us not, because they take nothing from us that is our own. If they burn our Houses over our heads, and fire Towns and Cities (as they have done, and their famous 
(a) Institut. Cathol. Tit. 45. Sect. 13.  Simanca says they may do) they do us no injury, they sin not on this account, because the Houses and Goods consumed, are none of ours. If they deprive a Protestant Prince of his Throne and Dominions, they sin not; he is by their Law and doctrine but an Usurper, and had no just 
(b) 
Tenens regnum contra formam juris & mentem papae dicitur tyrannus, Mascon. de imper. Reg. pars. 1. c. 2.  
Propter haeresin rex non solum regno privatur, sed & filij ejus a successione regni pelluntur. Simanc. ibid. tit. 9 Sect. 259. Post latam sententiam declarativam de crimine haeresis,  princeps possidet regnum, & principatum, & excercet jurisdictionem in subditos: tenenturque subditi eximere se ab ejus obedientia, & bellum gerere contra illum, si vir●s illis suppe●ant, Bannes in 22. q. 10 p. 614. Yea, Bannes says, it is the more common opinion with Aquinus and his followers, that before the sentence declaratory, Subjects may lawfully, if they have strength, exempt themselves from the power of the Prince. p. 590.   title to his Crown. If they draw any of his Subjects into war against him, at home or abroad, they do him no wrong; for they are 
(c) Vassalli haereticorum ipso facto liberantur, Angel. Sum. v. haeret. Sylvest. ibid. n. 14. principibus apostantibus a fide non est obediendum, Aquinas 2. 2. q. 10. Concil. Lateran. cap. 3.  not his Subjects, no more than the Popish Clergy, who are sworn to another Sovereign. Or if he intrust them with the commands of Forts 
(d) Absoluti sunt subditi a debito fidelitatis etiam custodes arcium Simanca, ibid. tit. 46. Sect. 73. Concil. Lateran. ibid.  or Garrisons, they may betray them to the Romanists, and not wrong him, because they were not his. If they take all 
(e) Angelus. Sum. v. haeret. n. 8. Sylvest. ibid. n. 14. Concil. Lateran. infra.  places of trust, or profit, from Nobles or Commons, they do them no wrong, because they had no right to them, nor have their Children after them any, for some generations. If they pay no 
(f) Si quis promisisset eis solvere certo die sub juramento, vel paena, non tenetur ut ibi notat gloss. Sylu. ibid. Angel. ibid. n. 15. Armilla. v. haeret. n. 11. Ovandus. infra.  Debts to Protestants though they were not only under the obligation of a promise, but of solemn Oath, they may justify it, they own them nothing. If Trust be reposed in them, or any thing be 
(g) Simanca. ibid. tit. 45. Sect. 27.  deposited in their hands, or they borrow any thing of us, they may detain it; they need not restore it, for they have nothing of ours. In a word, there can be no Parliaments, or Convention of the three Estates of a Nation, because there are none in that capacity. As there are no persons of Honour for Peers, all being 
(b) Ipso jure sunt infames, ut neque ad publica offi●ia sen consilia seu ad eligendos ad hujusmodi aliquos; neque ad testimonium admittuntur. Sunt intestabiles etiam, nec ad successiones admittuntur, Angel▪ Sum. n. 21. ibid. For this there is a decree of one of their general Councils (that of Lateran under Innocent. 3) involving not only Heretics themselves, but expressly all the receivers, defenders, and favourers of such. Ex tunc ipso jure sit factu● infamis, nec ad publica officia seu consilia, nec ad eligendos aliquos ad hujusmodi, nec ad testimonium admittitur, sit etiam intestabilis, etc. cap. 3. in Crab. Tom. 2. p. 948.  infamous, so can there be no Freeholders' to choose, or to be chosen for Commons, since there are no Proprietors. And as no Laws can be made, can be valid, there being none who have any power to make them: so there can be no Aids or Subsidies granted, or required, since they cannot be given or required of those who have nothing of their own to give.  
Thus by the Popish principles, the foundations of the civil constitution in England, and other Countries in like circumstances, are quite blown up, as if they had been at the mercy of Faux. And those who will follow their conduct, must hold, that we have no Government, no King, no Subjects, no Parliaments, no Laws, no Liberties, no Property; and indeed, none of the rest, because not this last. And all that will be true to the Doctrine and Laws of Popery, must believe this, and may lawfully deal with us accordingly; they sin not if they do, there is no Conscience in the case to hinder them, or secure us; nay, they are bound to do it, if that which they account most sacred, can oblige them, and that as soon as they can. That which restrains them, is not the fear of God, but of the penalties of our Laws, which yet are of no more force by their determination, than the agreement of a company of Robbers, or the constitutions of mere Usurpers, which will stand in their way no longer than till they can master the power which bears them up; against that which the Roman Decrees and Edicts have made equity and justice, in despite of the Laws of God and Nations.   

Sect. 10. Moreover, they may bear 
(i) Soto. de. just. & jur. l. 5 q. 7. art. 4. supra.  false witness, either privately, or in open Court, for their advantage; and if it do not much wrong another, it is but a small fault; so that if it do no wrong at all, it will be less than a small fault. On this account they may bear false witness against a Protestant, or any other, whom they count Heretics, even when Estate or Life is concerned; for by their Laws and Doctrine his life is forfeited, and his goods confiscated, and so though by false testimony he lose both, yet he has no wrong, because he had no right to either. They may use fraud and deceit in bargains, to get what a Protestant sells, for little or nothing, yea, or to cheat him of all he has; for the deceit is not considerable in point of Conscience, but for the wrong it does; and here is no wrong in the case, for he cheats the Heretic of nothing that was his own, and so does him no injury. They may use perfidiousness in breaking Compacts, Agreements, or Promises; for Perfidiousness, when it is 
(k) Cajetan. Sum. v. perfidia.  officious, and does but a little injury to those concerned, is one of the least sorts of faults by their doctrine; therefore, when it does no injury at all, it is less than the least: but by breaking promises, or any such Bond of faithfulness, which concerns the Estate of a Heretic, they do him no injury, because he has no Estate of his own, by their account. So that if a Papist should make a thousand promises, and confirm each of them with an Oath to a Heretic, that he will pay what he owes him, or restore to him what is his own, he sins not, though he never pay, nor restore a farthing of it; because nothing is due to a Heretic, nor is there any thing he can call his own. And this is not my inference only, but they themselves declare it to be the consequence of their principles; and what they 
(l) Si aliquis promisisset eis haereticis solvere sub paena vel juramento certo die, non tenetur ut Gloss. Et hoc intellige, si est manifestum ipsum in haeriticam incidisse perfidiam, & dicit Phil. ide● etiamsi est occultus; dummodo probari possit— Panormitan. ibid. vult, quod a die commissi criminis sunt liberi, Angel. Sum. v. haeret. n. 15. Armilla. v. haeres. n. 1. Sylvest. v. haeret. n. 14. He that fails, being bound by Oath or otherwise, to make payment, sins not, because the Creditors Heresy hath discharged him. So Ovandus in 4. dist. 13. prop 30.  deliver in express terms, amounts to as much as this charge comes to.   

Sect. 11. Thus they leave little that can be sin in Papists, one towards another, but less towards Protestants. 'Tis no sin not to keep Peace or Faith; not to observe either Truth or Honesty towards Heretics. 'Tis no deceit to equivocate with them in private dealing, or public transactions; 'tis no Dishonesty to cheat them of what they have; 'tis no Perjury to break Oaths with them; 'tis no Theft to rob or spoil them; 'tis no Inhumanity to burn their Houses over their Heads; 'tis no Murder to kill them; in a word, 'tis no sin for all Relations to deny them, what God hath made their respective duties.   

Sect. 12. Finally, natural Corruption, after Baptism, has nothing in it that can be charged with sin, no, not in wicked men, who afterwards by mortal sin, are quite destitute of grace. So that by their doctrine, a fixed averseness and contrariety to God and holiness, an habitual enmity against him, 
(*) Qui ita est habitualiter dispositus, ut adveniente occasione, committeret peccatum mortale, non peccat mortaliter— non sufficit habitualis aff●ctus ad p●ccan●u●— ut peccatum reipsa cont●ahatur, Bonacin. de peccat. d● 2. q. 3. p. 5. n. 3. i●i. alij commun●ter.  a propensness to all ungodliness and unrighteousness, is no sin; an inward temper and disposition, though it be most Impious, Atheistical, Rebellious, Filthy, Treacherous, and Bloody, has no sin in it; an inclination to deny God, to speak all evil of him, to depose him, to advance Lusts and the Devil before him; an inclination to Adulteries and beastly uncleanness, to murder and barbarous cruelty, to the most prodigious wickedness against God or man, is no sin. Yea, though it be not transient, but constant and habitual, though it be strong and impetuous; though this corruption be reigning not subdued or mortified; though it be active and fruitful in all the powers of the soul; though it hurry the lower faculties into rebellious commotions, and follow the superior with frequent and strong impulses, and exert its power and malignancy both in thoughts and affections; yet if the inward motions have not consent, there is no more sin in their acts, than in their principles.  
In all these evils Papists may live and die, and in many more, which I purposely wave, lest, I be too tedious; and many more too, than I have taken notice of, even in plain violations of every part of the Divine Law, the rule of Righteousness and Holiness; and yet wipe their mouths, and say they have no sin at all, but are as holy as their Church requires them, and as sure of salvation as their doctrine, and the power of delusion can make them. Though any Protestant, who allows himself but in a very small part of these enormities; we will give them leave (or they may take it from Scripture) to count him an ungodly and unrighteous wretch, who can have no good Conscience towards God or man, nor any hopes of Heaven (continuing so) but such as will delude him.   

Sect. 13. But if they have not legitimated wickedness enough already, they have expedients at hand to do it, for much more; they are furnished with devices to justify all the sin in the world, or at least in their Church, when they please to use them: Let us instance in two or three.  
That power which they challenge for the Pope herein, is notorious. We heard Bellarmin tell us before, that if the Pope should command Vice, the Church must practise Vice, or else sin against her Conscience. And he says expressly elsewhere, that 
(m) In bono sensu Christus dedit Petro potestatem faciendi de peccato non peccatum; & de non peccato peccatum, in Barkla. c. 13.  in a good sense, Christ gave to Peter a power to make that which is sin, to be no sin; and that which is no sin, to be sin: and what he gave to Peter, they will have us believe he gave to Popes. So that it seems, Christ hath given Peter, and consequently his Successors, the Popes, power to Authorise any sin and wickedness: only we are to understand this in a good sense, which let any man do if he can. They declare, that he can dispense not only with positive but divine Laws, and so make the transgressions thereof to be no sin. To omit the many testimonies for this, produced by others (and which some of themselves count extravagant) let us hear Sylvester (who seems modest in comparison) 
(n) Sicut habet papa (potistatem) in omnibus pure positivis, & in quibusdam pertinentibus ad jus divinum, quomodo dicitur omnia jura habere in scrinio pectoris sui de const. licet. l. 6. quantum scil. ad interpretationem & dispensationem. Sum. v. dispens. n. 7.  the Pope has power in all things purely positive, and in some pertaining to divine Law, because he has all Laws in his own breast, as to interpretation and dispensation. Where what in his assertion seems restrained, in the reason of it (fetched from the Canon Law) is unlimited, he has all Laws in his own breast, it seems to import that they are all in his power, and at his pleasure; so as he may either interpret them, or dispense with them, as he thinks fit. Some of them, in reference to natural and divine Laws, make show of denying this in general; but then they grant in particular instances, what is sufficient to make good the general charge. There is no command of the first or second Table, wherein they do not hold the Pope may dispense, unless it be the first; and to question his power of dispensing there, is no great disparagement to him, since they deny it to God himself. There is no doubt amongst them, but he can dispense with 
(o) In votis autem & juramentis dispensat it, ac poterat quidem, quod erat in aedisicationem. Canus. pars. 6. Relect. de paenit. p. 371.  Oaths, and make it no sin to break them, though they acknowledge the 
(p) Reddere vota, juramenta servare, juris est divini & naturalis, idem. ibid. p. 370.  obligation of an Oath to be by divine Law. And no wonder it has been so ordinary a practice, since they hold that this condition is still presupposed in 
(q) Subintelligitur— si placuerit papae ut in D. C. Venientes. de jurjur. immo in omni juramento excipi ur authoritas superioris, Sylu. v. juram. 3. n. 1.  the Oaths, If it shall please the Pope. And though they conclude Vows to be more obliging than Oaths, yet they 
(r) Canus. supra.  teach, the Pope may dispense with the accomplishment of solemn promises made to God, and so can make both Sacrilege and Perfidiousness to God lawful enough. The Pope can dispense not only with rash Oaths or Vows, but those that are best, and their obligation most unquestionable. If any (says Rosella, after others) do Vow or Swear any thing, that may lawfully be observed, the Pope should not alter it, when there is no cause; yet if he do release such (though without cause) the release holds good, because he is above positive Law, and also can dispense against the divine Law, so that he dispense not against the Gospel, and Articles of Faith (Sum. v. juram. 1. n. 4.) But if he do that too, he may stand to it, for many teach that the Pope is not forbidden to dispense against the Gospel, but only not to destroy the Gospel. (v. papa. n. 3.) and we must conceive (if we can) that he may take away the obligation of the rules of the Gospel, without destroying it.  
However, as to Oaths and Vows, he can totally (they say) dissolve the Obligation, Quem admodum potest ipse Deus, even as God himself can; because it is likely that God, as he had cause, gave his own power to bis Vicar; etherwise he had not been a good Father of his Household, if he had left his Flock without a Shepherd, who could, as occasion serves, provide for them in all (even to licence: Perjury and Perfidiousness to God himself) as Pope Innocent argues, but whether with more reason or Blasphemy, let others judge. Whereupon, Hostiensis saith, that seeing God and his Vicar have the same consistory, the Pope can do in a manner all that God can do, the Key not erring; for Christ says generally to Peter, Whatever thou shalt bind; and saying whatever, he excepts nothing. ibid. n. 1.  
There is not any thing in the world which they count more inviolable than their Vow of Religion; yet he may dispense with this, and the reason is considerable, Because Religion derived its being from the Authority of the Roman Bishop; he therefore who gave it, may take it away: So P. Innocent and their Canonists generally, ibid. n. 4. Hostiensis and others, seem to speak extravagantly, when they say, the Pope can do as much in a manner as God himself: But this may pass for a modest speech, if they will have him to do more; and more he can do, if he can make contradictions to be consistant. One instance of it we have in the question, whether the Pope can dispense with a Monk to have secular propriety. Rich. de S. Victore says, it is essential to a Monk to want it; and so a contradiction to be a Monk; and have it: yet others say the Pope can do it, and render those consistent enough, and so make one to be a Monk, while he is none. Idem. ibid.  
So for Sanctifying of the Lords day, there can be no doubt of the Papal power herein, since they count the command for it 
(s) Dicimus omnia Christianorum festa, etiam dies dominicos solo humano jure— id quod etiam sent it, Turrecrementa, Archidiaconus, S. Thomas, Waldensis, Navar. c. 13. n. 1.  positive; for that he can dispense in all 
(t) Quae sunt de jure positivo, potest summus Pontifex, etiam sine causa tollere & abrogare, & quamvis male faciat, factum tamen validum sit, Canus. ibid. p. 972. Sylvest. juxta mentem, S. Thom. v. papa. n. 15. vid. Angel. Sum. v. papa. n. 3. Universaliter potest dispansere— contra statum universalem Ecclesiae.  positives, is with them unquestionable. Nothing is necessarily required by the Precept for Sanctifying of this day, but the hearing of Mass, and abstaining from servile works: The Pope, if he please, may turn these into working days, for he can Abrogate them. And since the people, by their Divinity, are not obliged to any other public worship, but the Mass, and that only on these days, he may discharge them from all Conscience of public 
(u) Sequitur posse pontisicem in hoc praecepto (de missa audienda) dispensare, cum Ecclesiasticum sit, he adds only dispensare cum aliquo ut nunquam in toto vita missam audiat, etiamsi possit, neque ulla rationabili causa impediatur, non potest esse expediens, Suarez. tom. 3. disp. 88 Sect. 2. p. 1140. Hinc patet summum Pontisicem posse dispensare in praecepto audiendi missam, Tom. 1. disp. 4. q. ult. punct. 11. n. 6. Bonacina. aiunt communiter Doctores posse consuetudine vel humana potestate abrogari, Idem. in 3. precept. q. 5. n. 4.  worship, and disengage them from tendering any unto God, for he can dispense with the Mass. They make it indeed, sometimes, a character of Antichrist, to put down the Mass: But it is not fit the Pope should want power to be Antichrist at pleasure; and why should they be angry with us for thinking him so already? since with them, herein, he may lawfully be Antichrist when he list. And he may do as much for the Clergy and monastics: All the solemn worship necessary and proper for them, is that of their Canonical hours; but 
(x) Quarta causa (a recitando divinum officium excusans) est dispensatio papae juxta Cardinalem Turrecrematam, neque aliud sentit Cardinalis Florentinus. Navar. c. 25. n. 102.  the Pope can order that they shall not be obliged to say their Service. 
Utrum papa facere possit quod praedicti non teneatur ad horas? Laud. & Jo. de Lig. senserunt quod papa hoc potest, etc. Sum. v. hor. n. 9  So Sylvester after others concludes; he adds indeed, that though the Pope can discharge them from this Service, yet he cannot disoblige them from making some recompense to their Benefactors for not praying for them; 
(y) Sed circa istam suppletionem non oportet esse multum scrupulosum, quia consurgit ex naturali lege potius quam Ecclesiae praecepto; ut reompensetur benefactoribus: quod etiam per minimam orationem fieri potest, ibid. n. 5.  but for this (he says) they need not trouble themselves for the least prayer that can be, will sufficem for that. So an Ave Mary may serve (that serves generally on all occasions) a prayer (if it may be so accounted) of one petition to the Virgin, and not a word to God, not a syllable for their Benefactors; they may be as well without it. And so others leave them determining without any reserve, that the Pope may dispense with their divine Service, and may do so validly, without any cause too. So that the Pope, when he list, may leave no public worship of God in the whole Roman world; and when he does this, it will be no sin wholly to neglect it. He can dispense against the universal state of the Church, so the Law of their Church will have it. Only says Panormitan, he should not deface it; but there's no danger of that, though he should destroy it (as he has done indeed; they ascribe no power to him in this, but what he has given the world proof of effectually) for he cannot deface it, unless he change the universal state of it, without reason; and this he can never want, so long as his will is good reason, as they say it is. 
(*) Bonacin. Divin. Offic. disp. 1. q. 6. p. 3. n. 1.  
(*) Sum Rosell. v. papa.   
He can as easily discharge them from all Righteousness towards men; he can make it lawful for a Son to calumniate his Father, or covet all he has, or to wrest it from him by force, yea to attempt his life; and when he hath reduced him to want and misery, to leave him perishing for want of relief: this office he did for the Emperors heretofore, and is 
(z) So the Emperor Henry 4. was used by his own Son, excited by the Pope; and Baronius will have it past denial, an eminent work of Piety, Annal. tom. 12. an. ●1●6. n. 14.  commended for it. He can take away any 
(a) In omnibus & per omnia potest facere & dicere quicquid placet auferendo etiam jus suum cui vult. Specul. Guliel. Durand. l. 1. par. 1. de legit. Sect. 6. n. 51.  man's right, and dissolve all Bonds, Contracts, Obligations, whereby one man is bound to another 
(b) Utrum possit aliquem absolvere ab obligatione, qua tenitur alteri homini? & dico secundum Innocentium quod hoc potest, de plenitadine potestatis, Sylvest. v, papa. n. 13. ; and so can make it lawful to act against all Faith, Truth, Justice, and common Honesty. Further, those whom God hath joined together in lawful Matrimony, the Pope (they say) hath power to separate, and sometimes, so, as to Marry others, and so live in Adultery without sin, as he did with the Son of the Conde D'Olivares.  
If there have been no Carnal knowledge they make no bones at all of the Pope's dissolving Marriages, how firmly soever contracted, or solemnly celebrated: No, nor if they have had that full consummation with reluctancy. But there is one rarer feat that the Pope can do, he has power to dispense with persons to Marry and continue so, not during life, but for such time as they desire, a year or two, or till they can have a Child, and then be Unmarried again, and freed from all bonds of that state, without any Divorce or occasion for it. Jo. Andreas (a principle Rabbi of their Church Talmud) says, he had disputed this question, whether the Pope might not dispense with a King's only Son, being a Monk, to Marry for a while, till he could get a Boy, and after return to his Monastery and Unmarried condition? He answers, That the Pope, whose power is disputed, may resolve it himself, yet he may be advised to forbear: but many maintain, that if he should dispense, the dispensation would stand good, (according to whom, the Pope is not forbidden to dispense against the Gospel, when he sees cause, but only not to destroy it, as before,) and this holds especially, if the party would be content to be Married for a while, rather than for ever. So Andreas, and the same, it seems, is defended by Jo. Antonius, Bishop of Alexandria (in Milan) by Baldus, by Fulgosius, and Baptista Toruamala, Our Author will not grant, that the Pope cannot dispense with a Religious person to be Married a little, but makes it a question whether he can let him Marry during life 
(*) Sum. Rosell. v. papa. n. 3. &. 4. . 
(*) So Aquinas (in Dian. v. matrim. n. 56). Bonaventur, Scotus, Durand. Alensis, Richard. Augustinus Triumph. Cajetan, Roffensis, (in Victorell. ad Tol. l. 7. c. 9)   

(c) Fere omnes gradus Mosaica lege prohibiti, sunt etiam prohibiti naturali, Sylu. v. papa. n. 17.  Moreover, he cannot only legitimate Adultery, but Incest; for they teach that he can dispense with Marriages in those degrees which Gods Law forbids, even such as are acknowledged to be against the dictate of Nature. They except no degree of Consanguinity, but only the first in a direct line, viz. Marriage betwixt Parent and Child; they say he can licence it in the first degree in the collateral line, viz. betwixt Brother and Sister.  

(d) Reperitur tamen Martinus 5. ut Archiepiscopus, (viz. Antoninus) resert dispensasse cum eo, qui cum sua germana contraxerat, & consummaverat, habito consilio cum peritis theologi, & Canonistis. Idem. ibid. & Angelus. v. papa. n. 1.  Some indeed stick at this, because they observe not that the Pope has dispensed in this case. But the credit of their, St. Antoninus will not be questioned, who tells us, that Pope Martin the fifth, dispensed with one who had Married his own Sister. Yea, he takes upon him to dispense with Sodomy. Sixtus the Fourth, 
(e) Vid Myster iniquitatis 1310.  gave Licence to the whole Family of Cardinal St. Lucy, that they should use Sodomy in the three hotter Months, June, July, and August. And Alexander the Sixth, 
(f) Ibid. 1328.  gave the Cardinal De Valentia leave to Buggar the Marquis De Zaneta, his own natural Son.  
The most modest opinion at first, blush (which yet ends little better than the worst) that I have observed amongst them, concerning the Pope's power, i● reference to the Laws of God, is that of Richard De Sancto Victore, as Angelus reports it, 
(g) Si occurreret casus particularis in quo deficeret ratio legis— tunc papa posset dispensare aliter ut dicit Ricar. non videretur Deus fuisse bonus pater-familias. v. papa. n. 1.  That the Pope can dispense with the divine Precepts, when the reason of them ceaseth; otherwise, says he, God (if he had not so impowered him) would not seem to be a good Master of his Household (not wise, say some; not diligent say others; for this is a common Argument for the Papal prerogative). We must take heed how we question the Pope's power herein, for if we do, they may question the Government of God. And herein he is followed by 
(h) V papa. n. 16.  Sylvester a Dominican, and Angelus 
(i) Ibid.  a Franciscan (though in other things they often clash) who tell us that besides Divines, 
(k) Et in praedicta opinione concurrunt omnes Canonistae, si bene intelligantur. Idem. ibid.  all the Canonists agree in it, if well understood. And this, the former 
(l) Potest ea interpretari in dubio authoritative, scil. utrum in aliquo determinato casu, habeat locuni ratio divini, aut naturalis statuti, vel non, Sylvest. ibid.  extends to particular cases, whether in the natural or divine Law, and the latter concludes it, 
(m) Et quod dico de praeceptis secundae tabulae, idem dic de omnibus praeceptis veteris & novi Testamenti, Angelus. ibid.  not only as to to the Precepts of the second Table; but as to all the commands, both in the Old and New Testament. All the question is, 
(n) Sed quis poter it scire quando ratio legis deficit in aliquo casu? Resp. quod istud aliquando habemus ex exemplo Dei, qui multoties dispensavit in sua lege.  how one may know when the reason of God's Law ceaseth in any case? to which he answers, that this we sometimes may learn by the examples of God himself, who many times dispensed with his own Law. So that in such cases, it seems, the Pope may do as much as God himself. But this may not prove enough to serve the Pope's turn. So he adds, 
(o) Sed quum talis dispensationis vel similis non habemus exemplum i● scriptu●a, tunc ad solum pnpam pertinet ipsius declaratio. Idem. ibid.  When we have not an example of that, or the like dispensation in Scripture, the declaration of it (that is, when the reason of the Law fails) in any other case, belongs to the Pope alone. Accordingly 
(p) Supra.  Sylvester, He may, when there is any doubt, Authoritatively explain whether or no in any certain case the reason of the divine or natural Precept takes place. The Pope, if he were God (as they too often call him) needs not herein, desire more power than this; he may declare that the reason of the divine Law ceases when he pleases, and so he may dispense with it when he list. Thus the Pope might discern the reason of the Law for Marriage to cease, when Olivares had declared Julian Valeasor his Heir, & so gave him leave to Marry another Wife, when he had one already, lawfully Married: (yet his Holiness might be hastier herein than some Doctors would have him, who though they hold the Pope can dispense with one to have two, or more Wives at once; yet think it not so very fit to be done, whole Catholics are so plentiful 
(*) Vid. Sum. Rosell. v. papa. n. 5. . And he would have seen something more in Harry the Eights case, than he let the world know, if the Emperor Charles the Fifth had not stood in his light. And so in that against Perjury, Clement the Seaventh saw the reason of it cease, when he saw it his interest, that Francis the First should break his Oath. And Sixtus the Fourth could well see that the reason of that Law against Sodomy, ceased in the hotter months, and so dispensed with it then, though not in cooler seasons.  
But what if the Pope should mistake in his Declaration about the Law, and the reason of it, and so err in dispensing with it? this must not easily be supposed. I firmly believe says Angelus 
(q) Ibid. n. 2.  that if any one seeking a dispensation, in any case against the Law of God, not interposing the importunity of gifts and solicitations; do put himself simply into the Pope's hands, with a Declaration of his case: that God will not suffer his Vicar to err, in dispensing. Yet if the worst should come to the worst, and the Pope should err herein, that will make no alteration in the case, before us: for though it may be a fault to dispense, yet the crime he dispenses with, may be no sin to him, who has his holinesses leave to commit it. 
(r) Arbitror autem, quod licet dispensator peccet: tamen dispensatus, si bona fide nixus authoritate super ioris, putat eam justa de causa esse datam, excusatur donec satis noverit, eam non fuisse sic datam. Ibid. praelud. 9 n. 13. 14.  I judge, says Navarre, that though the dispenser may be in fault, yet he that is dispensed with, is excused; if relying honestly upon the Authority of his Superior, he thinks it was granted upon just cause: till he be convinced, that it was not justly granted. For all this, Bellarmine has the confidence to affirm, that no Catholic ever held, that the Pope could dispense any way, with the Divine commands; and yet what is it less that himself ascribes to the Pope, when he says, by his Indulgencies, 
(s) Indulgentiae— faciunt tamen, ut pro ijs paenis, quae nobis per indulgentiam condonantur, non teneamur praecepto illo de faciendis dignis paenitentiae fructibus. De paeni●. l. 4. c. 13. p. 1068.  we are disobliged from the command of bringing forth fruits worthy of Repentance? These fruits are by their own account; all good works. And so in fine, the Pope can make it to be no sin, to live without the worship of God, righteousness towards men, and good works, which respect either.   

Sect. 14. But they need not make use of the Pope's Authority for this purpose; there are other expedients nearer hand, will serve, to make any sin lawful. One is probable ignorance, and that, when upon a probable ground, error is conceived to be truth; and that which is sin indeed is taken to be no sin. When upon such a ground one ventures upon a crime, it will not be criminal. Now they give an account of several things, each of which will serve them herein for a probable ground.  
First a probable Reason, 
(t) Quando homo occurrentibus rationibus in utramque partem suo judicio probabilibus, eligit ●os quae sibi videntur probablliores quae tamen revera sunt contra veritatem, cui ipse alias bene aff●ctus ●st: tunc isle (licetcontra veritatem erret, & sic laborei ignorantia contraria) nulla culpa errat: sic Doctores Communiter. Sancta Clara. Deus. nat. gr. problem. 15. p. 87.  when there are Arguments pro and con, all probable in his judgement that views them, if he follows that which seems to him most probable; he sins not, though it lead him into sin. They lay great weight upon Authority, and think it safe to follow the herd, in a common opinion: yet one good reason 
(u) Navar. cap. 3. n. 8.  they say) is to be preferred, before the common judgement of their Writers; and one may venture against the stream, being backed with it. Nor is there need to be very scrupulous about the probability of a reason; 'tis enough, if it seems but probable, to him that weighs it: yea 
(x) Ignorantia excusat— etiam cum quis in affectione ad suum Doctorem, judicat probabiliter ut sibi videtur, esse verum, quod est falsum. Sylvest. sum. v. opinio. n. 1.  though it seem but so, out of affection to him that offers it. And that may as well pass for more probable, which is more favourable to the inclination of the Inquirer; and he may be his own Judge in the case, and act against the scruples of his Conscience, when he has probable reason. But when there are more reasons against it, and but one probable for it, must not the more sway us; since that is safer, and that which is safer is to be chosen according to the common Rule? no, we are not obliged, for that rule even in matters of faith and practice, is 
(y) Navar. c. 27. n. 281.  only a Counsel, not a precept: we are only enjoined to do what is safe, not to what is safer, and a practice upon a probable reason, is 
(z) Hoc potest facere (viz. crebro contra scrupulos) tuta conscientia ex consi●io proprio, quando habet probabilem rationem. Sylvest. v. scrupul. n. 3. Regul. 5.  safe enough.   

Sect. 15. Secondly, custom is another probable ground, which (with them) will secure a person from sin in doing what is unlawful. It is ordinary with their Casuists to conclude a practice innocent, when there is custom for it; though otherwise they condemn it as a sin. So Navarre 
(a) Cap. 13. n. 5.  determines, that if it were a custom, to observe the Lord's day only till noon, or till Mass were ended in the Morning: it would be no sin, to spend the rest of it in servile works. And that of Cajetan is observable, he takes notice that it is a practice in the Church of Rome, to sing to the Organ profane and filthy Songs, when they are at Church for worship; This the Cardinal reflects upon severely, condemns it as a mortal sin, and a crime of Sacrilegious Superstition: yet in the conclusion, thinks something of it 
(b) Excusandos tamen illos crediderim, qui simplici corde credentes licere non turpia, sed vana, quasi pro recreatione pulsare, pro eo quod ubique sic vident fieri, erraverunt— tales enim ex ignorantia probabili erraverunt. Sum. v. Organ.  excusable, upon the account of custom, and probable ignorance. 
(c) Qui habitu, gestu, cantu, notabiliter lascivo, in ludo chorearum utitur, sicut faeminae inverecundae pectora lascive nudant, viri partes inverecundas indecenter coopertas ostendunt, peccant mortaliter.  Those who in dancing use Habit, Gesture, or Songs which are notoriously lascivious; as immodest women who wantonly lay open their Breasts; and men, who expose without due covering, their shameful parts; they sin mortally. So de Graffijs had concluded (as any person that is not past shame would do); but then he presently corrects himself; 
(d) Verum de hoc pro certo judicare non possumus, sed standum est consuetudini patriae l. 2. cap. 120. n. 16.  yet of this, says he, we can pass no certain judgement, but must stand to the custom of the Country. Though so much wantonness seem a mortal sin, yet if it be the custom; he cannot certainly judge it any. In like manner 
(e) Sum. v. Ornar. n. 7.  Sylvester determines of a Habit, that will not suffice to hid their shame, if it be a custom, though not laudable, and without ill intention; no general rule, can be form against it. In 
(f) In his quae ideo sunt mala quia prohibita, ut communiter positiva praecepta, excusat consuetudo praescripta, quia tollit legem, & est legum interpres: Imo hac ratione dico, quod excusat etiamsi non sit praescripta, modo sit rationabilis, & scienter tolerata, etc. Idem. ibid. v. scrupul. n. 4. reg. 5.  positive precepts, where things are evil because prohibited, custom will excuse. And so Fornication which in the judgement of 
(g) Supra.  Durandus and some others, is of this nature: needs nothing but custom, to excuse it from being a sin. So much they ascribe to custom, that they will have the Scripture not to direct, and regulate it; but to follow it, and be conformed to it, even in its changes; so that the sense and obligation of the Divine Rule, shall be changed as the Romanists change fashions. This Cardinal 
(b) 
Scripturasque esse ad tempus adopt atas, &  intellectas, ita ut uno tempore secundum currentem universalem ritum exponerentur, mutato ritu iterum sententia mutaretur. Epist. 2. ad Bohem. de usu Com.  
Nec mirum si praxis ecclesiae uno tempore interpretatur scripturam uno modo, & alio tempore alio modo: intellectus enim currit cum praxi. Idem. epist. 7.   Cusanus affirms, the Scripture (says he) is fitted to the time, and variably understood; so that at one time, it is expounded according to the currant fashion of the Church: and when that fashion is changed, the sense of Scripture is also changed; and again no wonder if the practice of the Church, do take the Scripture, one time one way, and another time another; for the sense of it keeps pace with the practice. This was urged in the Council of 
(k) History of Council of Trent. l. 2 ●. 159.  Trent, and judged to be the meaning of the Lateran-Council; when it decreed that the Scripture should be expounded according to the Doctors of the Church, or as custom has approved. Thus it must come to pass, that what the word of God, in its true meaning, did once condemn as a sin; if it become the Roman practice, the Divine precept will change its sense, and the act will be no sin. It was a sin once by the word of God, to deprive the people of the Cup in the Eucharist: but since it was the custom of Rome, the Scripture has changed its meaning, and it is now no sin. To worship Images, was a crime condemned in Scripture, as that which God most abhorred; but being once the practice of the Romanists, the Scripture renounced its former sense, and it is now far from being criminal. It has not only made a change in the word of God, but in the nature of the thing; and the same thing which was Idolatry, is now no such matter. Of 
(l) Quaeritur quid juris de idololatria? Et dico supersedendum esse hic: quia jam per gratiam Christi, non est in usu v. Superstitio. n, 3.  the Law against Idolatry (says Sylvester) nothing must be said, because now by the grace of Christ, it is not in use. It is not in use, because it is their custom: it is not the same thing, that it was to all the world besides, because they use it. And what custom has done in these instances, it may as well do in any other: when all sin is once the practice of that Church (as the worst is already) there will be no sin in it.   

Sect. 16. Thirdly, another probable ground is a considerable Authority, or the opinion of one whom we may trust; hence this is their Doctrine, that he who does what is sinful following the judgement of an able Doctor, is excused from sin. This principle is without ground appropriated to the Jesuits, with the pernicious consequences of it: it was currant in the Church of Rome, before the Fathers of that Society where infants. Panormitan thus determines 
(m) Panormitan. in C. Capillan. de feri. dicit quod sequens opinionem alicujus Doctoris non subtiliter investigatam, quae postmodum apparet f●lsa, excusatur a peccato quamdtu non apparuerit falsa. Sylu. v. opinio. n. 1. & Angel. Sum. v. opin. n. 2. Ubi Glossa cum textu. Innocentius. Gofredus, & alij.  he that follows the opinion of any Doctor, not curiously examined, which afterward appears false, is excused from sin; so long as it appears not to be false. In Sylvester, this is confirmed, and he directs to several proofs, out of their Law, for it; 
(n) Ibid. secundum Antoninum.  removes what, by mistake, is alleged out of Aquinas against it; and shows, that both their great Saint, and their great Abbot agree with others, that this is safe, in points, which concern either faith or manners, when they are not evident (not clearly and manifestly determined). To him, 
(o) Opinio probabilis erit, si illam affirment boni nominis Doctores, imo & si unus Doc●t. Angelus. Sylvester. Navarre, etc. Jo. Sancius. disp. 44. n. 61. Bonacina. Tom. 2. disp. 2. q. 4. punct. 9 n. 1. & alij ibid. For this 24 Doctors are produced by Verricelli. Q. moral. Tom. 1. tr. 2. q. 5.  one Doctor may be sufficient. In morals we must be satisfied with probabilities, and according to the rule amongst them, 
(*) Probabiliter quis sequitur opinionem sui Doctoris: sed neque ex multitudine authorum quid melius & aequius est, judicato; cum possit unius, & forte deterioris sententia muitos in aliqua parte superare.  a man may probably follow one Doctor. And by a multitude of Authors we are not to judge, what is better, or more equal; the opinion of one, and he worse than the rest, may be preferred before many in some particular. So 
(p) Ibid. n. 2.  he and Angelus 
(q) Ibid. n. 1.  before him, after others. They conclude 
(r) Multo mogis excusatur sequens opinionem Doctoris non reprobatam, cum voluntate non adhaerendi, si vera non apparet, uterque ibid.  in reference to Joachim, who was not accounted a Heretic (though his opinions were against the faith) because not condemned by the Church: that he is much more to be excused, who follows the opinion of a Doctor, not rejected by the Church, and if he thought it not true would not adhere to it. 
(s)  in isto non potest esse contem●tus, & sic nec peccatum inobedientiae. Ibid.  Certainly (says Angelus) in him, there can be no contempt, and so no sin of disobedience. 'Tis true, that which is maintained by more and better Authors, seems more probable; but they will not have us always bound to follow that which is more probable: for though this be more secure, yet the rule, that what 
(t) Nec obstat, quod in dubijs tutior pars est eligenda— ut videtur se exponere periculo, qui in diversitate opinionum non eligit tutiorem: quoniam hoc verum esset quum proprie dubium est, sed quum est opinio secus est, quia nec tunc sumus in dubio: nec consequenter exponit sè quis periculo. Angelus. ibid. n. 2. & Sylvest. n. 1.  is safest is to be followed holds not (they tell us) but in points, that are properly dubious; and where there is opinion, we are not properly in doubt. Thus Navarre also explains it, 
(u) Rectus intellectus illius vulgati tutior pars est eligenda in dubio, nempe in eo quod est proprie dubium, quale non est, cum suffi●ienti authoritate, aut ratione altera pars creditur, neque cum ex multis opinionibus una pro vera eligitur. cap. 27. n. ●84.  having told us, 
(x) Non semper esse necessarium, partem tutiorem eligere, quia satis est quoad praecep●i implementam tutam eligere, ut late probavimus, etiam in his quae ad fidem & mores pertinent: in alijs enim, nec de consilio quis tenetur eligere tutiorem. n. 281. Vid. Autoninum. Angel. Sylvest. Navar. Gutier in Jo. Sanc. disp. 42. n. 12.  that it is not always necessary to choose what is safer, because it is enough for the fulfilling of the precept, to choose that which is safe, even in those things which concern faith and manners: for in other things, it is not so much as under Counsel, to follow the safest. Accordingly Metina (in 
(y) Dicit opinionem posse teneri sine peccato, quae est peritorum virorum, licet contrarium si● planius & securius. cap. 52. p. 271.  Lopez) says, the opinion of expert Divines, may be held without sin, although the contrary be more clear, and more safe. In short, that an opinion which is less probable, may be followed; is asserted (we are told) both by the greater part, and the graver sort of their Divines. 
(z) 
Licitum esse sectari opinionem minus probabilem, relicta probabiliori, docent Mercado, Medina, Sairus, (naming 20 besides, and adding, & alij plures) Jo. Sauc. disp 42. n. 12.  
Possumus ubsque peccato sequi opinionem probabilem, relicta probabiliore, & tutiare. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 2. q. 4. punc. 9 n. 4. Clavis Regia, & alij communiter. ibid. n. 5. For this Barnabas Gallego a Dominican produces near Fifty of their Doctors, many of them of the same order, and says it is sententia communior inter Thomistas. tract. de conscient. dubi. de consc. probabili. So that if we may trust those whom who we see no reason to think partial to the Society, this is not a singular conceit of the Jesuits; but the opinion of their other Divines generally, and the more common Doctrine of Aquinas his Disciples, otherwise most opposite to the Society.   above Forty of their grave Doctors are alleged for it, and amongst them, Martin Navarre, Medina, Peter Navarre, Arragon, Bannes, Du Vallius, with others, besides Jesuits. A● present take only the words of Navarre, who speaks fully. 
(a) In foro tamen conscientiae ad effectum non peccandi sufficit eligere pro vera ejus opinionem, quem merito censemus esse virum idonea & scientia & conscientia praeditum. cap. 27. n. 288.  In the Court of Conscience (says he) it is enough for the avoiding of sin, to take his opinion for true, whom we probably think, to be a man of sufficient knowledge, and Conscience; and quotes their Gloss and Panormitan for it. To whom let me add Sancta Clara, who, not only tells us (as we have heard before 
(b) Deus. nat. gr. probls. 15. p. 99 supra.  that at this day it seems to be the common opinion of their Schools and Doctors; that the people erring with their Teacher, or Pastor, are wholly excused from all fault: but also, when any has a probable ground for what he does: 
(c) Probabilis est quando quis habet fundamentum probabile; ut dum rusticus credit aliquid esse licitum, ductus testimonio sui parochi vel parentun:— tunc iste (licet contra veritatem erret) nulla culpa errat: sic Doctores communiter, secundum illud: ignorantia justa & probabilis excusare debet. ibid. p. 78.  as when a Countryman believes any thing to be lawful, induced thereto, by the testimony of the Parish-Priest, or of his Parents: although he mistake, yet his mistake is void of sin; according to the rule in Law, just and probable ignorance ought to be excused. So that to make a sin to be no sin, not only the judgement of a grave Doctor so determining, but of a Parish-Priest (who are known to be sufficiently ignorant); yea of Parents also (more ignorant than they) will suffice, and herein (says he) the Doctors generally concur. In fine, if it be the common opinion, that invincible (as Divines) or probable ignorance (as the Canonists call it), is excused from all sin: and that it is an instance hereof, 
(d) Durandus— cum excuset probabilis ignorantia, puta, si habet aliquem Doctorem authenticum & famosum, cujus opinioni n●titur in Sylvest. v. confess. n. 2. Vervec. dubitans & consulens viros Doctos falso consul●n●…s, laborat ignorantia invincibili. ibid. v. Ignor. n. 5. Justa ignorantia— qualis est, cum quis petit consilium a viris habitis pro praeditis scientia & conscientia in id sufficienti, qui falso ei consulunt, & haec omnino excuset. Navar. c. 23. n. 46. Graff. l. 2. c. 131. n. 2●. & l. 4. c. 9 n. 8. Sancta Clara. ibid. p. 96. Herrera & Faber. ibi. ●onacina. de peccat. d. 2. q. 8. p. 2 n. 9 & 16.  when one is misled by a sufficient Author; then this is the common Doctrine of the Romanists, and not the extravagancy of some particular Sect, or Order amongst them.  
If then this principle be so destructive to Religion, the Souls of men, and humane Societies, as some of the French Romanists brand it, in reference to the Jesuits: the charge falls upon the common Doctrine of the Roman-Church; for there it is generally taught and received, and was so, before Ignatius had founded his Order. And this prevents their ordinary exception, against our alleging particular Authors against them; they cannot with reason or modesty make use of this shift longer: for a single Doctor is so far Authorized, by the common Doctrine of their chief Writers (and so of their Church); that any, or all in their Church, have warrant to rely on him. And so, in producing a particular Author, in esteem with them; we do, in effect, allege their common Doctrine. And indeed by the premises, the opinion of a grave Doctor, is the Doctrine of their Church so far, that any of their Church are allowed to follow it, both as to belief, and practice. Their Church (if we know her sense, by the declaration of the generality of her approved Authors) does allow all Romanists, to follow the opinions I have charged them with; though they be plainly destructive, of worship, faith, and holiness, both of heart, and life. For I have charged them with nothing, without a considerable Author; and what is so grounded, is with them probable, and what is probable is safe, and allowed both as to faith and manners. Or if there be any particular in the charge, in which there is not a common concurrence, or which is contradicted, though by a multitude of their Writers: yet since there is at least one grave Doctor for it, it is in their account safe; and any Romanist has liberty by the Doctrine now insisted on to follow it (if he please); rather than that which upon the account of more Assertors may be thought safer.  
But as to the purpose for which I now take notice of it, this Principle serves to rid their Church of all sin; that is, of all Conscience to avoid any. For if that be safe which is probable, and that will be probable, which is countenanced by the opinion of particular Doctors: then all the sins which they, or any of them, have already concluded to be no sins (and these are an infinite number) may be safely committed: and all that any of them hereafter may determine to be no crimes, may be practised with as little Conscience, and as much security. So that a Train is laid hereby to blow up the whole rule of Christianity, and all innocency and holiness, which consists in conformity thereto: It has done horrible execution already, and what has hitherto escaped, is at the mercy of it; being wholly under the Mine, and may be dispatched, when ever the Casuists (their Engineers) who are daily at work about it, shall think fit.   

Sect. 17. Let me but add some of the Rules they lay down for the direction, and relief of scrupulous Consciences. They must 
(e) Sexta (medicina) usus aequitatis circa leges de qua S. Thom. persuadendo sibi non p●ccare— qui (legem) in sensu benigniori servet, quamvis in dariore violet. Navar. c. 27. n 283. Caeteris paribus inter sententiam benignam & duram circa praecepta potius benigna inter pretatio facienda est, secundum. Jo. de Amb. Vervec. & Archi. & ratio est, quia praecepta Dei & ecclesiae non suat ad tollendam dalcedinem, quam aufert interpretatio serupulosa. Sylvest. v. Scrupul. n. 4.  persuade themselves that they sin not, though they break the Law in a strict sense, if they observe it, according to some complaisant interpretation. A benign sense, is rather to be put upon any precept, than that which is strict: for the precepts of God and the Church, are not against that pleasantness, which a scrupulons interpretation takes away. And that a person may the better be pleased, he may make the interpretation himself, and so make it as benign as he desires; and as favourable as his inclination and interest would have it. 
(f) Interpretando discrete praecepta non solum humana, sed & divina, maxim affirmativa: quae interpretatio licet in foro contentioso ad eum spectet ad quem & editio legis: t●m●n secundum Archi. in foro conscientiae, pertinet ad qu●mlib●t pro facto suo. Idem. ibid. n. 3.  For though in other Courts, the interpretation belongs to him who makes the Law; yet according to their St. Antoninus in the Court of Conscience, it belongs to every one to do it for his own practice. Or if he will be so over cautious, as not to rest in his own sense, but inquire the opinion of others (and he may easily meet with those amongst them, who will either make that which he has a mind to, no sin; or will mince it for him so small, that it may go down without hurt) yet 
(g) Septimum est eligere opinionem magis facientem ad propositum proprium. Ibid.  he may choose that opinion which is most for his purpose (that which is most complaisant, and so will best serve his turn). And 
(h) Si credat probabiliter sic esse faciendum, etiams● sit ●um formidine alterius partis, non peccat illud agendo, etiamsi falsa esset ejus opinio. Sylvest. Autoninus. in F●ll. tr. 21. n. 182 Sylu. ibid. n. 3. ad. ob. 2.  if he thinks it probable, though he fear the contrary, and it be false indeed; yet he may act according to it, and sin without fault. Nor is he concerned, whether the Doctor's opinion be true or no; for 
(i) Excusatur, ●…iam si sequatur consilium falsum, quia fecit quod potuit. Sylu. ibid. n. 5.  though it be false, he may notwithstanding thereupon cast off all scruple, and break the Law without sin. Thus if either himself, or any other will give him liberty to sin, when the Law gives it not; yet he may take it, and his sin will be no sin.  
Secondly, he must persuade himself he sins not, when he breaks the Law, not only if it be impossible, but if it be 
(k) Non peccare— qui eam non servat, ubi & quando est impossibile aut val●… difficile. Navarre ibid. Nec Deus nec ecclesia intendit obligare ad vix possibile alicui, secundam Jo. de Amb — illud esse impossibile dicatur quod vix est possibile: utputa nimiam habens difficultatem— Vid. supra. v. potent. Sylu. ibid.  very difficult to keep it; now it may be very difficult to avoid sin, when his employment leads, or when his complexion inclines him to it, or when he has got a habit of sinning, or otherwise, when he is under Temptation: and if it will be no sin to break the Law in these, and the like cases; he may make wickedness his daily practice without danger of sinning. But they seem to take difficult, or impossible in a great latitude, as though in might be no more than incommodious, and so Sylvester explains it in the place to which he here refers 
(l) Aliquid dicitur ali●ui possibile, quia potest illud commode— eodem modo dicitur impotentia, scil. quia non est aliquid possibile de jure, vel commode vel honest. Idem. v. potentia.  us. Now it may be judged incommodious, to observe the commands of God, when they suit not his fancy, or humour, or inclination, or interest, that of his ease or advantage: and if then it will be no sin, not to obey the Divine commands; a man may go near to be excused from sinning all his life, though he do little or nothing else but sin. The obligation of the whole Law and Gospel too, will be superseded by our conveniencies, he may omit what is enjoined, or practise what is forbidden, and it will be no sin; if he judge the observance of the Rule too difficult or incommodious.  
Thirdly, He must make account, that he sins not by breaking the Law, when he may be thought a fool for keeping it, 
(m) Neque cum non servat, ut pro stulto non habeatur. Navar. ibid. Nec Deus nec ecclesia intendit obligare ad hoc, ut quis appareat fatuus, & ridiculo sit. Sylu. ibid. secundum. Jo. de Amb. Gloss. Innocent. Antoninum. v. Scrupul. n. 4.  or when the observance of it may he ridiculous. Now when sin is general, and the common usage of the times and places where he is; it may be as ridiculous to avoid it, as to be out of the fashion, or to appear in an Antic garb. And those who reap pleasure and advantage by sin, will be ready to account them fools, who abstain from it.  
As Nic. de Clemangis says, they did in his time 
(*) De corrupt stat. eccles. Cap. 25.  a blessed time when their could be no sin, because Piety and Virtue were grown ridiculous. He must not think he sins who observes the Law according to the common usage of good (Catholics) 
(*) Navar. ibid. Sylvest. ibid.  and makes that his example and rule, and what Conscience he is like to make of sin by this rule, we may understand by the Character which the Count of Mirandula gave of the good Catholics (the chief of them) to Pope Leo. Amongst the most (says he) of the most eminent in our Religion, to whose example the silly multitude should be conformed, there is either no worship of God, or certainly very little, no regard at all of good life, no shame, no modesty: righteousness is declined into hatred or favour, and Godliness even sunk into Superstition 
(*) 
Franciscus Picus Mirandula de reformand. moribus. Apud plerosque religionis nostrae primores, ad quorum exemplum componi atque formari plebs ignara debuisset, aut nullus aut certe exiguus Dei cultus, nulla bene vivendi ratio, atque institutio, nullus pudor, nulla modestia: Justitiavel in odium vel in gratiam declinavit: pietas in superstitionem pene procubuit.  
Quamobrem dico & exclamo, (neque enim metuo homines, Deo fretus) neminem mea aetate fuisse fidelem dispensatorem, imo Papa ipse pacatis populis bella infert, opes alienas sitit, & suas exsorbet, nulla sanctitas, nulla religio, nullus Dei timor, & quoth horres● referens, omnium scelerum, impij homines a papa sumunt excusationem. Valla de donar. Constant.  .  
And if there be danger, it will be accounted folly indeed, to expose himself; and whether it be accounted so or not, the apprehension of danger may excuse a man from sin in any case, So Sylvester 
(n) In quolibet casu pretermittens facere quod lex imponit. Excusari potest a peccato, si hoc facit per virtutem Epikeiae, sine contempts, ratione alicujus periculi considerati. Joh. de Amb. Antoninus. in Sylvest. ibid.  after others.  
There's no need to insist upon their other Rules, as that the scrupulous aught to exercise himself, in choosing what is less safe (more dangerous) amongst probable opinions; and not to regard (though he cannot answer) the arguments against it; it is enough that he believe what another says. Or this, 
(o) Bonacin. de peccat. disp. 2. q. 4. punct. 8. n. 3. ubi Sayrus. & alij & n. 4.  the Confessor may tell him, that he should count no sin mortal, but what is manifest to be such; and so manifest sometimes, that he cannot swear it is not: or any else, though they have store of like nature; the former are sufficient to leave no Conscience of sin amongst them in ordinary practice; and to encourage sinners commonly to venture upon any violation of the Divine Rule, with warrant from their Doctrine, that it will be no sin to them. Thus they take a course to ease men's Consciences, by leaving them none. And what clearer way can there be to remove scruples, than to persuade them (who would retain some Conscience, if they would suffer them) that there is little or no sin to be scrupled at.   

Sect. 18. This is abundantly sufficient, to make it apparent, that the Popish Doctrine is destructive to holiness of life: since they have warranty thereby, not only to neglect the proper acts and exercises of holiness; but to give up themselves to practices of all sorts, which are directly opposite thereto. 'Tis true they do not acknowledge those practices to be sins or dangerous; but they may with as good reason justify such acts, which they cannot but condemn for crimes, as they go about to excuse these from being criminal. A son of Belial, that has lived in the neglect of holiness, and in the practice of ungodliness and unrighteousness all his time, will scarce pass at the day of Judgement, for one that is holy, or innocent; because he has had the confidence to think so, or has found out some shift to support his presumption; or because others like himself, were of the same mind; nor is he like to escape, because he had wit enough to cousin his Conscience, or boldness to stifle it, or wariness to keep out the light, which would have informed it, or self-love to believe those who flattered him, in what his corrupt inclination led him to; or facilness to follow those blindfold who had no mind to see. Those devices which they have found out to justify innumerable Transgressions of the Divine Law (and may serve as well to justify them all): have no countenance from Scripture, nor from Antiquity faithfully following it. This is not only acknowledged, but charged home by some of the French Romanists, upon a supposition, that these pernicious Artifices are peculiarly the Jesuits: but since it is apparent that the Divines and Casuists of all Orders, and those of Universal repute, are no more excusable; the charge is justly fixed upon their Church, and practical Doctrine in general. Nor is their acknowledgement needful, it is plain in the Writings of those, who have the conduct of their Consciences, that they consult not with Scripture in these determinations, no more than with ancient Writers: you shall find them very rarely meddle with either. An allegation out of their Canon Law, is an authentic Authority that passes for the Text, a Schoolman or Casuist of note, that went before them, is a sufficient conduct; if there be a concurrence of Five or Six, it is then the common opinion, and they are as secure in it as if they marched with a Caravan; but if they have a mind to be singular, and have but something like a reason for it; they Supererogate, though the reason be such, that the next who examines it, puffs it away as a trifle. Such are the foundations of their practical Divinity; the Masters of it (the Casuists) are followed by the Priests and Confessors, and the Priests are followed by the people: and so the blind follow the blind; and those that see not, those that will not see. But it may be, there was less need to be so long and particular, in showing how unnecessary it is with them to forsake sin. It is manifest enough by their Doctrine of Repentance, before insisted on, that there's no necessity they should break off their sins, till they be obliged to be contrite: and their Doctors cannot agree upon any time for this (though some of them specify the point of death, though then indeed they do not account it indispensably necessary): the people may think themselves excused, if they do not resolve to leave their sins till their Teachers agree, that they must do so; and so live in them, till they can live no longer. If any particular Doctor fix a more early period, and bring some reason for it (though they may if they please, yet) they are not obliged to believe him, for no reason is brought by any of them; for a more timely turning from sin, but is confuted and rejected by some or other among them, as slight and insufficient: and 'tis no sin not to believe him, who proposes to them upon frivolous reasons; yea it would be an act of imprudence to do it, as 
(p) Quando articuli fidei non modo debito proponuntur, ut rationibus frivolis— tunc enim credere esset actus imprudentiae, secundum D. Tho. 2. 2. q. 1. art. 4. Deus. Nat. Gr. Probl. 15. p. 87.  Sancta Clara assures us, out of Aquinas and Victoria, so they may hereupon go on in their sins, till the approach of death, and he, whom they worship as a Saint, and Reverence as the Angel of their Schools, may encourage them herein: since he declares, 
(q) Permanentiam in peccato usque ad mortem, non esse speciale peccatum, sed quandam peccati circumstantiam. Aquinas. 2. 2. q. 14 a. 2.  that continuance in sin unto death, is not a special sin, but only a circumstance of sin. Nor need they be afraid of this circumstance, as though it would make their case worse; for by their Doctrine, to sin (and so to continue in sin) upon confidence, that they shall have pardon by Confession, is so far from aggravating sin, that it extenuates it. So Cajetan and Navarre 
(r) Peccans ob fiduciam, quod postea pro confessionem veniam obtinebit, non tenetur d● necessitate id confiteri: quia non est circumstantia adeo peccatum aggravans; imo potius minuit, ut inquit Cajetanus in 2. 2. q. 21. art. 2. Nau. cap. 6. n. 3. p. 98.  after him. And that nothing may discourage them from continuing in wickedness, the Council of Trent declares (without excepting the sinner's perseverance in sin unto death) that if he be attrite, the Sacrament of Confession will secure him; though attrition is confessed, not to import so much, as any pious or ingenuous purpose to forsake sin.    

CHAP. X. The Roman Doctrine makes good works to be unnecessary.  

SECT. 1.  
BUt their good works possibly may satisfy for their other defects, and extravagancies, and in these they glory above all, and have the confidence to condemn us, upon a pretence (though utterly false and groundless) that we deny the necessity of good works. Is it imaginable, that after this, they themselves should hold them to be unnecessary; and so run into the Heresy, which they charge upon others? I will not desire any to believe this, unless I let him see it, but their Writings make it visible to any, who have a mind to see. They reduce all good works to Fasting, Prayer, and acts of Mercy, or alms-Deeds. For their fasting I shall only say this, It is no fast, it is no good work, nor is it in their account necessary. To the making of a Fast, there must (as they tell us) be the concurrence of these severals. First, there must be no more than once eating. Gregory 
(s) Unica demum comestio, nisi ad jejunium necessaria sit, mentitur Gregorius. Sum. v. jejunium. p. 344. Unica comestio est de essentia jejunij. Navar. cap. 21. n. 14. Sane si in jejunio bis cibum capere fas esset, ecquae hic abstinentiae forma, vel species quidem foret? parvi enim refert, quo vescaris cibo, si modo te ad summum satiaveris. Polyd. Vergil. de suvent. rer. lib. 6. cap. 16. p. 372.  lies (though both a Pope and a Saint with them) if this be not true, says Cajetan. Secondly, This eating must not be a Dinner. Bellarmine makes this good 
(t) Unicam igitur refectionem, eamque caenam esse debere, nec prandium; cum jejunio datur opera, facile probari potest, extant enim exempla scripturarum, testimonia patrum, & perpetua consuetudo fidelium. De Jejun. l. 2. c. 2. p. 1034. Apud veteres inauditum est prorsus, ut ante horam nonam, quae est tertia post meridiem, jejunium quodcunque solvatur. Quemadmodum etiam nulla est apud veteres mentio binae refectionis, cum de jejunio agitur. ibid. p. 1035. vid. Victorel. ad Tol. l. 6. c. 2. p. 992.  by Scripture, a Troop of Fathers, and the perpetual custom of the faithful; concluding that it was never heard, in the ancient Church, that they did eat (either till night, or,) before Three at afternoon. Thirdly, what they take must be less nourishing, and delicious, than their ordinary fare. And so the Church forbids, that 
(u) Certum genus cibi probibuit jejunaturis, illud videlicet quod ex genere suo, & ut plurimum magis nutrit & magis delectat. Idem. ibid. cap. 5. Nam finis jejunij est corporis concupiscentias edomare, & in servitatemredigere. Ibid. p. 1043.  which in its nature, and for the most part, is more nourishing and more pleasing, the end of fasting requires it, which is (says he out of St. Austin) to tame and subject the concupiscence of the body. All these are necessary to the being of a Fast as they affirm; and yet not one of these is observed in their Fasting. For first they eat a Dinner, a full meal at Noon, or an hour or two sooner if they please at the same time, and in as great quantity, as they do any other day; yea if they eat to great excess at a fasting Dinner, yet they keep the fast. 
(x) In continua autem quantitate prandij, non est certa mensura ratione jejunij: sed quamvis aliquis multum excedat, non ob id solvit jejunium, peccat tamen contra sobrietatem— licet tamen tempore jejunij, aliquid plus accipere in prandio. Instruct. l. 6. c. 2. p. 990. Qui intemperanter comedit, dum prandet Die jejunij— satisfit praece●…o. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 1. q. 1. punct. 9 n. 1.  As to the quantity (says another of their Cardinals, who can best tell what belongs to fasting) of a Dinner at a fast, there is no certain measure: but though one be very excessive, and transgress the Law of Sobriety, yet he fasts well enough; and adds, it is lawful to eat more than ordinary at Dinner upon a Fast day. Others not of the Society, may hit the sense of the Church herein more unquestionably, when they teach, that one who observing the quality of the meat, stuffs his Belly so full, as to be so far from any sense of the hardship of fasting, or from repressing the sins of the flesh, that he rather excites, and cherishes lust thereby: yet fulfils the precept for fasting. So Covarruvius, Abulensis, Medina, Cajetan, and others in Bonacina and he after them 
(*) De precept Eccles. ult. disp. q. 1. punct. 2. n. 6,  where by the help of a distinction or two, intemperance both in quality and quantity, is made perfectly consistent with the fast and temperance of holy Church.) So that they Fast, though they Dine, and that lustily; whatever the Scripture, or the Fathers, or all the faithful (in Bellarmine) say of the inconsistence of a Dinner with a Fast. But this is too little for a Roman Fast (though many that never dream they Fast, eat constantly less); they may eat a Breakfast too, and yet keep a Fast after they have broke it. They may drink Ale or Wine, and eat Bread after it, that the strong drink may not 
(y) 
Licitus est mane potus etiam vini sine fraude etiam licitum aliquid sumere pro stramento, potus ne obsit Sylu. v. jejun. n. 9 & hoc expresse tenet. S. Thomas.  
Nec sumere in serotino jentaculo parum panis, frangit jejunium: quia ad hoc videtur serotinum ientaculum reductum ut non referat quid quisque sumat, si modum non excedat. Cajetan. Sum. jejun. it holds as well of a breakfast early as later.   hurt them; or if Bread will not serve them (though these together may make a Breakfast for a Festival) they may eat other things else after their Morning's draught, if it be not beyond measure and these both at their first and second Breakfast. O! but thus they eat twice, that the Cardinal was ware of, where's then their Fast? when it is (as they affirm) essential thereto, not to eat twice? why (says he 
(z) Sumere vero jentaculum serotinum ad sustentationem naturae, est proculdubio iterum comedere. ibid. Pie interpretandum est: ut scilicet fiat ne potus noceat. ibid.  a pious construction must be put upon it, it is that the drink may not hurt them; and so taken it seems, either they eat not twice, when they eat once and again, or they fast by a pious interpretation, when in the sense of the universal Church and the World too, they fast not. Thus, that they may be sure to afflict the flesh, with a severe abstinence, they may eat a Supper too. And no wonder, for if they can excuse the second eating, it will be (as they conclude 
(a) Sola autem secunda comestio peccatum est: non autem tertia neque quarta, vel ulterior: quia illa sola jejunium frangit secundum Durandum quam sequuntur recte Angelus, & Sylvester. Navar. c. 21. n. 14. Vid. Cajetan. Sum. v. jejunium. p. 392.  no fault, to eat a Third or a Fourth, or a Fifth time, or as often as they please, but Three meals may serve them for a Fast; and so one Supper may suffice. Indeed they call it but Caenula, and will have it pass under a little name; though the quantity allowed be great, even full as big as custom will make it, for that's their rule, for fasting-suppers 
(b) Quanta tamen debet esse, consideranda est consuetudo communis patriae— non enim est pecca●um mortale talem consuetudinem servare, licet quantitas sit aliquantulum grandis. Unde Armilla probat collationes, quae fiunt Romae secundum consuetudinem tenelli ob consuetudinem, & quia Pontifex tolerat, cum sciat: nec ego auderem damnare, quamvis isti sunt abusus hominum parum timeratorum. Tol. ibid. , not to eat by any certain measure, but so much as others are wont to do: if it be excessive great that which custom introduces, will justify it. And those that tell us custom is their rule, acquaint us also; 
(c) Navar. c. 21. n. 14. collatio notabiliter immoderata— frequenter praesertim in Lusitania.  that it is the custom in divers Countries, to Sup with notorious excess. And so they may eat at Supper, not only for hunger, but out of sensuality, as Panormitan and others after him. And thus sensuality, and the severity of a Popish Fast, are perfectly reconciled.  
Such a Supper these Fasters may eat in the Morning, if they please. This will be but a small fault, though they do it when there is no occasion for it 
(*) Bonacin, de precept. Eccles. q. 1. p. 3. n. 6. ibi. Angles. Naldus, & ali● vid. p. 1. n. 8. : and they may the better fast after, upon a full Stomach, till noon at least; but they need not stay so long, for they may drink every hour, or oftener if they will, and when ever they drink, they may eat something too, that the drink may not hurt them; and thus may break their fast every hour of the day, or more, and yet keep it the whole day well enough.  
For the quality of their fasting, meat (to say nothing that some flesh is allowed) they may use the most delicious, that they can compass; the most curious sweet meats, the choicest Wines, the rarest Fish, and that dressed after the most delicate mode, and this at Dinner, the meal most repugnant of all to fasting. O how gladly would Thousands of our People be condemned to such a maceration of the Flesh, for more days in a year, than the Romanists are, thus pitifully mortified; and never trouble Pope or Prelate for a dispensation? nay they would purchase a licence to fast, if any would accommodate them 
(d) Immo et si ex sensualitate— secundum mentem Panormitani, quia sufficit non exire t●rminos consuetudinis. Sylu. ibid. n. 10.  with expedients to do it at such a rate. Besides their meats, they may drink freely; not only 
(e) Utrum pluries bibere vinum vel aquam frangit jejunium Resp. Innocentius & Ricar. quod non, sive ante pastum sive post. Angel. sum. v. jejun. n. 4. They may drink it and that often for hunger as well as thirst. Navar. cap. 21. n. 13.  at meals, but before or after, though they need it not, and be not thirsty, the drinking of Wine out of sensuality, breaks not the fast says Sylvester 
(f) Potus etiam vini & electuaria, etc. De quibus intelligitur, quod ex sensualitate sumpta, non frangunt jejunium. Ibid. Sylvest. . And thus they may drink, before the meat they fast on be digested: for though that be intemperance in other cases, as Navarre 
(g) Esto, quod venialiter peccaret, qui coepta & nondum finita digestione biberet, non quidem quod jejunium frangat, sed quia actum inordinatum agit, Navar. ibid.  tells us, it breaks not the fast. 
(h) Licitum est jejunantibus pluries intra diem unam Potare, licet immoderantia circa hoc posset ●sse peccatum. Sylu. ibid. n. 9 secundum S. Thom. idem dicit Albertus. Paludan. Richardus. quod po●us non solvit jejunium sive post, sive ante prandium. ibid.  Sylvester thinks it possible, that intemperance in drinking may be a sin: however it is lawful for those that fast, to drink often, on the same day; for drinking breaks not the fast, either before or after Dinner, so he after others. A man may wonder what can break this fast, since neither drinking nor eating so often, and so much, even to excess, and the gratifying of sensuality, in so high a degree can do it. It is Wine that they may drink so often when they fast; and yet they acknowledge that Wine is more contrary to the nature and end of a fast than flesh. Though Wine (says De 
(i) Etsi vinum sit nutritivum, & ad concupiscentiam magis provocet potus vini quam esus carnium, secundum illud Prov. 20. Luxuriosa res est vinum & ad Eph. 5. Nolite inebriari vino, in quo est luxuria, tamen qui Die jejunij saepius biberent vinum, aut aquam, & mane & vespere, jejunium non frangunt, quamvis hoc facerent ad sustentan●ium se, & famem sedandam. ita D. Th. 2. 2. q. 147. art. 6. ad 2. qui inquit, quod bene possunt peccare & meritdm jejunij perdere sicut si immoderate cibum sumerent; sed non ut j●junium frangatur; & ratio est quia jejunium est abstinentia a cibo tantum. Graff. l. 2. c. 36. n. 21. p. 215.  Graffijs) be more nutritive, and the drinking of Wine do more provoke to concupiscence, than the eating of Flesh according to that, Proverbs 10. Wine is a luxurious thing, and Eph. 5. Be not drunk with Wine in which is luxury: yet (says he) he that on a fastday often drinks Wine or Water, either sooner or later, does not break the fast.  
Thus as they may eat like gluttons, so (by the Doctrine of their chief Authors) they may drink till they be drunk, and yet not break their fast, for no drinking (how excessive soever) can break it. The Church-fast (they tell us) consists not in abstinence from drink:— consequently be that drinks Wine, or other liquor before or after Dinner, breaks not the precept for fasting, though he sin against temperance, and drink excessively. So Bonacina after Aquinas. Abulensis. Navarre and others, telling us it is their common Doctrine 
(*) Non violate praeceptum jejunij— quamvis peccet contra temperantiam, bibendo intemperanter. Tom. 2. p. 337. n. 7. & alij communiter. .  
I suppose this fast can never be broke, it will be a fast for ever, do what they can; if all they are allowed to do against it, cannot make it to be no fast: for so far as I can perceive, they may break their bellies, and yet not break their fast. If one in the ancient Church had spoke of his fasting after three such meals, and so much drinking, yea, or but eating a Dinner; he would have been thought out of his wits: yet they must not be accounted ridiculous, who tell us gravely, that this is fasting; and that they break not a fast, unless they 
(k) Innocent. & Richard. (dicunt) quod prandere pluries in Die jejunij est contra consuetudinem probatam ecclesiae. Angel. sum. ibid. n. 3. Semel esse in Die prandendum seu manducandum: qui vero pluries, solvit jejunium. Tol. l. 6 c. 2. p. 989.  Dine twice on a fasting day. And indeed some of their Writers 
(l) Jejunia nostra, quae in vini copia natan●, & piscium varietate carnis delicias superant— veteribus omnibus non modo fuisse incognita, sed & intolerabilia adeoque abhominanda, constat. Lindan. Panopl. l. 3. c. 11. inanem tantum veri jejunij retinet umbram. Cassand. defence. lib. de Offic. viri. p. 119. , seem ashamed of this good work, as they do it in their Church. But suppose this were a fast (when indeed it is no such thing), and observed by them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (as Epiphanius 
(m) 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Compend. Doctrine. Cathol.  
If they sleep the whole day, yet they accomplish the precept. Jo. Sanc. disp. 51. n. 2.   explains it) and so that they tasted nothing till Three a clock, or till evening, as of old: yet by the Roman Order, it would be no good work. That it may be such, there must be something Religious (formere abstinence has no more goodness in it, than eating); it cannot be Religious, unless it be subservient to some Religious design or employment: but they disjoin it from all things of that nature; we hear not a word from them, of their taking notice of their sins, or confessing them, or afflicting their Souls for them, they need not so much as pray when they fast, either in public or private: yea they are not obliged to hear 
(n) Dixi festo: quia nemo ullo alio Die hoc praecepto (de audienda missa) tenetur, etiam clericus vel monachus, imo neque Episcopus— Nullo inquam, alio Die etiam jejunii & quadragesimae, etc. Navar. cap. 21. n. 2. Rosel. v. miss. n. 13. Sylvest. v. miss. 2. n. 1.  Mass, though that be the employment of every day for worship; So that their fasts are no days for worship, or any religious exercise. They are discharged also from religious ends, two are commonly assigned, the taming of the flesh; and the elevating of the mind to God: but though the flesh be more unruly, and the mind move not in the least towards God on a fasting-day; though they never mind these ends in their abstinence, yet they entirely fulfil the precept of their Church for fasting, as they commonly 
(o) L●x quae praecipit aliquid, non obligat ad finem, sed ad media tendentia ad finem D. Tho. 1, 2. q. 100 art. 9 & 10. Unde lex non obligat ad carnis petulantiam compescendam, sed ad media quibus comprimi possit, sicuti est jejunium. Graff. l. 2. c. 36. n. 20. Licet ecclesia nos quadrigesimali observatione extenuare in carne intendat, ut liberior mens spiritualibus accommodetur, tamen finis ille non est in praecepto, sed tantum ciborum abstinentia Soto. de nat. & gr. l. 1. c. 22. p. 57 Finis praecepti jejunij est elevatio mentis: si tamen quis jejanat & non elevatur ment, non est transgressor praecepti. Cajetan. Sum. v. matrim. p. 430. Nec si lex jubet quadrigesimae jejunium ut, mens elevetur in Deum; astringimur proinde ex hujus praecepti vigore mentem in Deum elevare. Canus. Relect. de p●nit. pars. 4. p. 871. vid. Tol. instr. l. 4. c. 12. p. 623.  conclude upon this ground, because the end of the precept is not commanded. So that this practice which they call fasting, is a mere bodily exercise amongst them, and thus it is represented by Cajetan 
(p) Sum. v. jejuniurn. p. 348. opera utriusque misericordiae meliora sunt quam jejunii: juxta illud Apostoli, corporalis exercitatio ad modicum utilis est: pietas autem ad omnia valet.  applying that of the Apostle to it, 1 Tim. 4. 8. Bodily exercise profiteth little, etc.  
Where he denys it the character of a good work. And since it is neither a true fast, nor a good work, if they made it never so necessary, it would be no proof, that by their doctrine, there is any necessity, either of real fasting, or any good work. But indeed they declare their pretended Fasts needless; for their best Writers 
(q) Quantum est ex jure scripto nullum cognosco intervenire mortale peccatum in fractione jejunij Ecclesiae, si contemptus desit. Cajetan. ibid. p. 352. vid. Aquin. Antoninum. Archidiac. Paludan. Angelum. & alios in Sylvest. v. Jejun. n. 21. Communis opinio.  conclude it to be but a Venial fault not to observe them; so that there is no more necessity with them to Fast after their mode, than there is to avoid a Venial sin, which is none at all. 
(*) So Jo. Sancius afters others; Liberos a jejunio existimo, qui culpa sua ita defatigati redduntur— quod j●junare non valeant; ut qui defatigatus esset ludo pilae, aut nimis esset deditus faeminarum commistioni— docent Medina. Diana. Ledesma, Montesin, etc. disp. 54. n. 20. Nonnulli doctores ex●endunt ad eos qui defatigantur in ludis, aut in quaerenda meretrice, etc. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 2. q. 8. punct. 1. n. 16.  They have so many ways to excuse men from Fasting, as leave no necessity of it. This one may serve any that have no mind to fast: If a man have tired himself with any employment (lawful or damnable) not only with honest labour, but with too much gaming; yea, or with excessive Whoreing; he is thereby exempted from the obligation to Fast, though he so wearied himself on purpose, that he might be excused. But one thing herein is more intolerable, that this ridiculous piece of mockery, which they call Fasting, has the glory given it, which is peculiar to Christ alone, and is thought sufficient both to satisfy the Justice of God, and to merit by way of condignity, not only grace, but eternal glory. An opinion of such malignancy, as is enough to poison the best work in the world into deadly guilt. To hold that a person, because he eats not two Dinners, or abstains for a day from flesh, though he stuff himself with other delicacies; even to excess, should be worthy of the glorious prerogative of Christ, is a conceit to be entertained with scorn and laughter, if the horror of it did not call for another passion. Yet such are points of Faith in that Church. And this surely is enough to cloy any man with their Fasting.   

Sect. 2. Come we to the next of their good works, that is Prayer; this unquestionably is a good work, but then sure it must be good praying; but they are so far from judging it necessary to pray well, that they conclude it sufficient to employ themselves about this work, in such a manner, as cannot upon a just account, be called praying at all. The only public prayers necessary for the people by the Roman orders, are those of the Mass, but how they pray therein, I cannot apprehend. They use not the words, they need not hear them, they cannot understand them; now can it be imagined that he prays, who neither expresses, nor conceives any Petitions? they do it not themselves, they join not with the Priest, for no man can possibly concur with the words, or the sense of him whom he neither hears nor understands. They cannot concur with the Priest as men, with rational acts, much less as Christians. The Church of Rome has made it not only needless, but impossible for the people to pray in their public Service, they must think something sufficient for them, which is not praying. Let us see what account their Authors give of this. Sylvester proving that it is not needful to pray on the Lord's Day, or any of their days, for public worship, tells us what will serve the people instead thereof. 
(r) Unde sufficit astare oranti sacerdoti in missa, quantum est exvi hujus praecepti. Sum. v. Dominic. n. 8.  It suffices that they stand by the Priest praying in the Mass, and that's all that is requisite, by virtue of this Precept. So that the Church requires no more than the presence and posture of the body. And they that can make a prayer of this, may make an Image in the Church to pray: and if this would be a miracle, it would be as wonderful that the other should be praying; but thus it becomes those who will worship Images, as if they were God; to worship God, as if themselves were Images. Oh but they must concur with the Priest, 
(s) Cum nemo teneatur ex praecepto audire, & minus intelligere verba sacerdotis, quia satis est, vel ex longinquo missanti adesse, & surgendo, genua flectendo, vel alias actualiter vel virtualiter exoptare, ut sacerdos qui pro omnibus orat & sacrificat, a Deo exaudiatur. Navar. cap. 21. n. 8.  so far, as either actually or virtually to wish that his prayers may be heard. And if this be praying, a man may pray in the Church, while he is in his Bed at home; for actually he may wish this, if he be awake; and virtually, though he be asleep. There is no prayer, but what is either vocal or mental; what the people do in the Mass, is neither, they say nothing, nor do they understand any thing, nor need they mind any thing, of what is said; and it is much, if a man's mind can be employed about that, which he not only understands not, but minds not at all. The mind must necessarily attend actually 
(t) Cum ipsa eadem attentio sie ipsissima oratio. Soto de just. & jur. l. 10. q. 5. art. 5. p. 340. , in mental prayer; but actual attention is not necessary to what they call praying. So it is neither vocal nor mental, not any at all, unless they can devise a mode of prayer without either voice or mind. They know not what to mind, nor whom, person or thing: they understand net whether the Priest be in confession, or at prayer, or in his laud's; no, nor whether he be praying or reading, unless the dumb signification of a posture tell them; nor that way neither, for they need not see no more than hear the Priest. They know not whether he be addressing himself to God, or to a Creature, whether to another divine person than the Father (for they have prayers in the Mass to Christ and the Holy Ghost, though an ancient Council forbids it); they know not whether he be praying to an Angel or to a Saint; to a Man or to a Woman; to an Image or to a Crucifix; for they have addresses to all. They can in no wise be thought to pray, who do not, who cannot so much as say Amen to a prayer; and this they cannot say, who understand not what is prayed for, as 
(u) Quomodo enim dicet Amen cum quid orat nescit? quia non potest intelligere quid boni dicas. Comment. in 1 Cor. 14. Manifesta sunt verba Apostol●, cum qui ●… imperitiam, quod dicitur, non intelligit, fieri non poss●, ut ad alterius gratiarum ac●ionem Amen. respondeat. Cassand. Defence. lib. offic. pij▪ viri.  Aquinas himself assures us from the words of the Apostle.  
But the Priest, who celebrates, seems to pray, though the people at at Mass do not. He seems so, but the Church of Rome obliges not him to pray, unless he can be said to pray, who only reads the words of a form, without minding any thing else which they must necessarily be concerned in who pray indeed. Of the several sorts of attention, requisite in prayer, none, with them, is necessary, but that which respects the pronouncing of the words right. If the Priest mind but this only, so as to read the words right, it is sufficient, he does all the Church requires, and fully satisfies the Precept of saying Mass; this is their common doctrine. So that unless he can be said to pray, who neither minds the God he should pray to, nor the things to be prayed for, no nor the sense of the words he uses; their Church requires not the Priests to pray, even when they are saying their Mass-Prayers. Nor is it more needful on the same account, in the Canonical hours, as we have seen before. So that praying indeed is not necessary for Priest or people, in all the public Service of the Romish Church, much less is it 
(x) Ubi autem libere & eitra obligationem oratur; sola est culpa venialis indecenter orare: quare destractio, etiam meditata, nisi contemptio adsit, nunquam erit mortalis, Soto de just. & jur. l. 10. q. 5. art. 5. p. 341. fine. vid. Angel. Sum. v. horae. n. 27. Gabriel de Can. Miss. Lect. 22. Graff. l. 2. cap. 51. n. 11.  needful in their private devotions, which are not enjoined; for there they declare it Lawful to be more neglectful of all the necessary concerns of prayer, than in public. Now that they who mind nothing but the bare saying the words of a prayer, do not pray indeed; they themselves will acknowledge, in their lucid intervals. Cajetan tells us, 
(y) Si quis corporaliter praesens sit missae, sed mentem advertenter a missa divertat ad al●a, non satisfacit praecepto missae: quoniam ita ibi est, ac si voluntarie ibi dormiret, paria namque sunt long a missa fieri per voluntarium somnum, & per voluntariam diversionem mentis ad alia. Sum. v. fest. p. 305.  that if one be corporally present at Mass, but lets his mind considerately wander after other things, he satisfies not the Precept, because he is but so there, as if he voluntarily slept at it; for to be far from the Mass by voluntary sleeping, and by voluntary wand'ring, are both alike. Hence it is clear, that Priest or people, whose minds voluntarily wander at Mass, do no more pray there than if they were voluntarily asleep; and consequently, if they wander carelessly, without observing it, they pray no more than if they were carelessly asleep: Yet many of them think the Church forbids not voluntary wander; he himself thinks, she forbids not careless wander; therefore all of them must believe that she thinks it sufficient to pray as they may do, who are fast asleep, one way or other: And yet none that are awake can well count sleeping to be praying. 
(z) Alia est oratio tantum mentalis, alia mentalis simul & vocalis, neque debet addi tertium membrum (id est) vocalis tantum. Ea siquidem non est utilis ad placandum Deum, sed magis ad provocandum ad iram, juxta illud, Populus hic labiis me honorat, cor autem eorum. long est a me, Is●i. 29. De bonis oper. l. 1. cap. 2. p. 974.  Bellarmine reckoning the several sorts of prayer, one, (says he) is mental, another is both mental and vocal. But when he would add that which is vocal only, he will not have that accounted prayer: a third member of the division ought not to be added, to wit, that which is Vocal only: and gives good reason, for that, says he, is of no use to please God, but rather to provoke him to anger, according to that Isaiah 29. This people honour me with their lips, etc. Yet such is the praying in the Roman Church, and no other needful in their divine Service, as the Cardinal himself declares sufficiently in the same Book. And if no other praying be needful, no prayer that is a good work is necessary by their doctrine.   

Sect. 3. Proceed we to the last sort of their good works, to wit, acts of Mercy, or Charity, comprised in Alms-deeds for the relief of the Indigent; and we can scarce discover, that these will ever be necessary by their doctrine. Cardinal Cajetan (one represented as more favourable to these acts of Charity than divers others) tells us, 
(a) Eleemosynam non facere est peccatum morale in duobus solummodo casibus, primus est si quis habet de superfluo naturae & personae— secundus est quum apparet pauper in extrema necessitate constitutus, juxta illud. Pasce fame morientem, Sum. v. Elemos. p. 134.  that to omit them is no mortal sin, (and therefore to do them,, will not be necessary by any command) but only in two cases: First, when one hath superfluities, both in respect of nature and state; that is, more than either nature, or the quality of the person requires. Secondly, When the Poor are in extreme necessity (not in common want only, but such as is extraordinary). And these two are so described to us, that themselves confess they very seldom fall out, and we may think, hardly ever; so that rarely, or never will this good work be necessary. For the former, that a person 
(b) Superfluum in tali latitudine consistens, judicandum est consideratis sumtibus honaribilibus etiam filiorum, familiae, status munificentia, magnificentia, communibus eventibus, haeredibus, & aliis ejusmodi: ita ne raro videatur contingere, ut homo secundum st●tum gloriose vivens, superfluum habeat. Idem. ibid.  may be judged to have any thing superfluous, (without which he is not bound to relieve others) it must be considered what is requisite for the honourable expenses of himself, his Children and Family, and what for the munificence of his state and magnificence too; what for common events and casualties, to provide against them, and other things of this nature. Upon which he concludes, it will rarely fall out that a man living splendidly, according to his quality, will have any thing superfluous. And so very rarely, (if he had said never, the premises would have borne it) will it be the duty of such as have enough to live gloriously, to spare any thing for the poor. Less pride and vainglory, or prodigality, than they allow them to have without any mortal guilt, will leave nothing superfluous, and so quite excuse them from these good works. Navarre is of the same mind, and tells us, 
(c) Sequitur item Rosellam sine justa ratione dixisse, paucos divitum confessarios salvatum iri, si eleemosyna in praedictis duobus casibus de praecepto foret; non enim ●ot sunt, quot putat, hujusmodi divites, quibus sit superfluum status, cum nec reges & magni principes— superflua habere censeantur cap. 24. n. 6. Facile judicandum non esse, aliquem Jaecularem plura, quam quae suo statui necessaria sunt, habere. Cum etiam ille qui ad aliquod dominium emendum, & mutandum suum statum in alium majorem, ad quem idoneus est, pecunias congerit, non habet plus quam suum statum deceat, ibid.  there are few rich men who have any thing superfluous, since neither Kings, nor great Princes can be thought to have superfluities; having said a little before, that it cannot easily be judged that any secular person hath more than is needful for his condition. For he may heap up moneys to purchase more, or to advance his condition higher; and so still have no more than is requisite for his state, and nothing at all will be due for charitable acts. He expresses it more fully 
(d) Cap. 23. n. 74. Nec ob id dicitur habere tale superfluum, quod de praecepto pauperibus teneatur erogare.  elsewhere, and concludes for all this, he cannot be said to have any such superfluities, that he should be obliged by any command to give to the poor. So that unless a man have so much as he neither has at present, nor may have for the future occasion to use; that is, unless he has so much, as no man will, or can believe he hath; an act of Charity will not be his duty. If he do but desire to have more than he now has; or do but design to rise any higher than he now is; though but in such a degree as is found in all, and may innocently be in any: at least, if he have but any thing of Covetousness or Ambition, though far less than they determine he may have, without any deadly guilt (and so without any considerable danger) he is discharged from all obligation to this good work.  
The other case will make Charity no more necessary; it is when the Poor are in extreme necessity; and this is 
(*) 
In sententiam Cajetan. & Navar. inclinant Sotus & Sarmientus. Vasques. Opusc. Moral. de Eleemosgu. dub. 3. n. 20. Asserunt non esse praecepti obligationem ullam, extra tempus extremae necessitatis proximi, quantumvis divitiae superfluant non tantum naturae, sed statui etiam congruae sustentationi, Gabriel, Alexander, Major, Gerson — reputant probabilem Antoninus, Conradus, Durandus.  
Durandus asserit se non audere dicere esse aliud tempu● praecepti extra extremam necessitatem, ne ●ot divites condemnet, Idem. ibid. n. 11. & Jo. Medina. in Sa. v. Elecmosyn.   only when it is apparent they will die for want of necessaries, if we relieve them not. Now such a case rarely happens, and a man may never meet with one in such extremity, all his life; but if he do, yet he may be excused for want of evidence that his necessity is so great, he need not take the party's word for it, no, not though in public places there seem to be also clear signs of it; he need not take the word of any other, no not. the judgement of his parish Priest, or Confessor (though upon their opinion he may safely venture upon acts of wickedness) unless they can assure him thereof as eye witnesses, 
(*) Bonacin. 1. precept d. 3. q. 4. p. 6. n. 3.  or if he be morally certain of the extremity; yet if there be a probability that any other will relieve the person ready to starve, he may leave him to the mercy of others, without doing any thing himself towards his relief (for that is another limitation 
(e) Extreme egere dicitur, non solum qui jam animam agit vel spirat: sed etiam cum indicia probabilia apparent eo deventurum, nisi ei subveniatur, & non se offert nec expectatur probabiliter alius, qui ei subveniat, juxta S. Thom. & declarat Cajetan. Idem cap. 24. n. 5.  which they add in the case). For example, if he thought it likely, that a Protestant would relieve the perishing party, a Papist by their doctrine of good works might reserve his Money and Charity for another world; nor would it be necessary to exercise one act thereof while he lives. Or amongst themselves, while each one expects that another may do it, the Poor may perish, and all that might relieve them are excused. Besides, in this case, they conclude it lawful for the person in extremity to 
(f) Soto de just. & jur. l. 4. q. 7. art. 1. Licet alienum arripere sine peccato in extrema necessitate. Sotus, Cajetan, Navarre, Adrian. Armilla. Covarruvius. Et in urgenti Sylvest. Angelus. in Vasq. ibid. dub. 7. n. 28. in gravi licitum esse. Sylvest. Medina. Angel. Navar. Pet. Navarra, Malderus & plures alij apud Dian. p. 2. tr. 3. Res. 29. Bannes in 2. 2. q. 66. art. 7.  Steal, either secretly or openly from those that have enough; so that acts of Charity will not be necessary among them, but when Theft is Lawful; and no man need to relieve the Indigent with any thing he hath, till they may justly take it from him. But if it were possible, in these cases, whereto they confine it, to find any place for the necessity of this duty; yet one thing more, added by their prime Doctors, dashes all, for they teach that it is not required to relieve the Necessitous, 
(g) Adrian 4. de restit. Navar. cap. 17. n. 61. & cap. 24. n. 6. In quibus tamen duobus non est de praecepto subvenire donando, sed satis est subvenire commodando vel mutuando, Vid. Bellarm. de bon. operibus, l. 3. c. 8. haec doctrina vera & non solum a S. Thom, sed etiam ab aliis Theologis communiter tradi soleat. Vid. plures in Vasq. ibid. dub. 6. n. 50.  by giving them any thing; but it is sufficient to Let, or Sell, or Lend to them. Navarre concludes it lawful 
(h) Licet eos emero & illis emptioni suae consentire, c. 23. n. 75. quia pater tempore famis extremae fi ium vendere potest— tum quia nemo tenetur ad gratis subveniendum, egenti etiam extreme, modo commodando, vel mutuando satis ei succurrat. ibid.  to buy persons in extreme Necessity, and lawful for them to consent to it; his reasons among others, are, because a Father in time of extreme Hunger, may sell his Son; also, because no man is bound to relieve one, though in extreme Necessity gratis, if he can do it sufficiently by loan, exchange, etc. So that if a man were in such extremity for want of Food, that he might sell his Son to get it, for the saving of his Life; yet no Christian, in that case, were bound to give him relief freely; by their doctrine it would suffice to let him have Money, or Meat by the sale of his Child. We cannot expect they will ever find it a duty, To give to the Indigent, if not in such circumstances, and 'tis a plain case, where there is no obligation to give, there's no necessity to give Alms.  
But if they did make it necessary to give Alms, yet is it not needful by their doctrine to do it so, as it will be a good work (or so, to Fast, or Pray, or do any other act, which have any goodness in them, or pretend to it) so good works will, by their principles, be still unnecessary. For that any work may be good, it must be from a right principle, and for a good end; but both these they make needless. As to the former, there's no necessity, as they teach, to act out of 
(*) Alexander Alensis. Petr. Lombard. Aquinas. Angelus. Sylvester. Canus. Soto. Jac. de Graffiis, etc. supra.  love to God; for though this be the intention of God, and the design of the Law in all good acts, as they acknowledge from that Tim. 5. Rom. 13. yet they have a maxim generally received, 
(i) Ex D. Thom. & graviorum autorum sententia, ad finem legislatoris minime teneamur, sed ad media, etc. Canus, Relect, de paenit part. 4. Soto de nat. & gr. supra.  the intention of the command is not commanded; herein they follow Aquinas: and hence they conclude that 
(k) Modus talis charitatis non cadit sub praecepro, etc. Soto de just. & jur. lib. 2. q. 3. art. 10.  such a mode of acting out of love to God, is not required in any command of the divine Law; but the whole, and every part of it, may be fulfilled, & sin avoided; if 
(*) Hinc ergo patet adimplentem praeceptum per actum ex aliqua circumstantia malum satisfacere praecepto, etiamsi non adimpleat Modum, aut etiam sinem a legislatore intentum. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 1. q. 1. punct. 9  that which is required be done, though not out of Love to God at all. And particularly, Soto takes much pains to argue us out of the love of God in all our actings, and to prove that it is not necessary. And all generally conclude that it is not needful in any acts of Piety, Mercy, or Charity, required on their days for worship; since there, they determine that there is no need of any act of love, as was showed before.  
'Tis no wonder therefore, (as to the second,) if they conclude it needless to act for God, in what we do, and make him alone our chief end. In the Theory indeed, they determine that an act is not good, unless there be a concurrence of all conditions requisite thereto, and that the end is the principal (as much in morals, as the form is in naturals); so that without 
(l) Omne opus cujus finis est malus, ipsum quoque malum est, Navar. cap. 12. n. 30.  a good end, that act must be naught, and no end good where God is not chief; yet for practice, they discharge them from any necessity to make God their principal end; they conclude it lawful for a man to act 
(m) Sylvest. Sum. v. Charitas. n. 5. Navar. supra.  principally for his own advantage; yea, they account it but a Venial fault to do the best act, principally, for 
(n) Cajetan. Sylvest. Navar. supra. The precept may be fully accomplished where the manner and end is naught, Bonacin. ibid. & apud eum, Aquinas, Sotus, Navarre, Medina, & alij.  a sinful end. Now to avoid a Venial sin, they hold it not necessary, by any command of God; and therefore it will not be needful to do any thing but principally for an end so far sinful; and consequently, unless the work can be good, whose principal end is sin, no good work at all will be necessary. But it is a more wicked end, which they openly avow; when they design by what they do, to merit grace and glory, and make satisfaction to divine justice. This is to make Christ a leg, while they attempt his Crown; and to offer him a Rush, with an intent thereby to invest themselves in his prerogative. They should show us how it is possible such acts can be good before they pretend to account good works necessary.   

Sect. 4. But though they find no necessity of good works, by virtue of any divine Precept ordinarily; yet they seem to make some when they will have the Priest to enjoin them for Penance; (and 'tis like, in this, as in other cases, they leave so little or nothing needful that God has commanded, to render their own devices more necessary.) But good works, being enjoined as penance, become punishments; and it signifies, the Church of Rome is no good friend to good works, when she counts or makes them punishments; for punishment is properly evil to us, and not to be done, but suffered; and thus she will have good works neither to be good, nor to be done. To be sure, thus they cannot be done so as to be good, or as becomes Christians to do them; for he that must think it a suffering to do them, does them with the spirit of a Slave, not of a Christian. But let us suppose they may be good works, and well done too by way of Penance, yet they are not necessary at all in their Church, upon this account, and so no way. For first, the Priest 
(o) Vid. Sylu. v. Confess. 4. n. 2. Suarez. 3. tom. 4. disp. 38. Sect. 6. n. 4.  needs not enjoin good works as penance, he may enjoin 
(p) Cajetan. Navar. ibid. Sect. 3. n. 4.  nothing at all if he pleases, or some 
(q) D. Thomas, Soto. & alii communiter, ibid. Sect. 4. n. 4.  slight thing, that which is good for nothing, or that which is worse; or 
(r) Ibid. Sect. 6. n. 5.  what the Confitent must have done if he had not sinned; or he may dismiss him with this general 
(s) S. Thom. Paludanus. Petr. Soto. Navar. ibid. Sect. 6 n. 6.  all the good thou dost, or evil thou sufferest, let it serve for satisfaction; or he may commend something by way of 
(t) D. Thom. Paludanus, Petr. Soto. Victoria. Ledesma. ibid. Sect. 3. n. 2.  Counsel, without obliging him by any injunction; or he may require him only to avoid the sin he confesses for a while 
(u) Ibid. Sect. 6. n. 2.  (and when he shrives the woman that he has 
(x) Vid. Angel. sum. v. confess. 5. n. 8.  sinned with, it is like he may not prove very rigorous this way): Or Secondly, if he should enjoin this, or any good work, the Confitent 
(y) Scotus, Gabriel. Hostiensis, Panormitan. Medina. Sylvester. Armilla. Navarre. in Suar. ibid. Sect. 7. n. 1.  need not accept of, or submit to it, as many of their chief Doctors determine: Or Thirdly, if he do accept it, yet he needs not perform it for all that; he may be released by himself. 
(z) Omittere satisfactionem est peccatum sed non mortale, si desit contemptus: quia non omittitur aliquid necessarium ad salutem, Cajetan. Sum. v. satisfact. p. 520.  To omit it will be but a small fault (such as he needs not regard, be the good work little or great), if it be not out contempt. Or 
(a) Communis sententia theologorum est, poss● paenitentem implere per alium satisfactionem sibi impositam. Ita D. Thom. Paludanus, Sylvester, Alensis in Suar. ibid. Sect. 9 n. 1.  another may undertake it, and satisfy by suffering it for him. Or a Priest may release him, either he that enjoined it, 
(b) Opinio communis est quam tenet Sylvest, Angelus, Navarre, Rosella, Victoria, Le desma, Medina, ibid. Sect. 10. n. 4.  or another. However, Indulgences will do it effectually; these serve to sweep away all good works, (all necessity of them), on this account, for ever. This is their special use, to release the Pope's Subjects from the sad penalty of good works; for though they have dealt hardly with good works, to make them a punishment, yet they will not deal so hardly with Catholics as to have it necessary that they should be thus punished. And therefore to ease them of this grievous suffering, of doing good, the Church in great tenderness has provided Indulgences, which they may have at easy rates; and thereby an acquittance discharging them from the good works they were to suffer. And if the Priest should be so rigorous as to enjoin a Sinner to be doing good all his life; or so impertinent, as to require it for a hundred years, he may meet with Indulgences, will quit him of it, every moment of his life, and if he will, many thousand years over and above. And if this cannot be had unless he pay for it, yet for his encouragement, they teach 
(*) An sit melius dare argentum in Eleemosgnam, quam dare in subsidium ad consequendam indulgentiam?— loquendo ex genere censeo esse melius, subsidium facere ad consequendam indulgentium, Idem. ibid. disp. 49. Sect. 5. n. 7. p. 633.  that it is better to lay out his money for an Indulgence, than in deeds of Charity. So that there is no such goodness, or necessity in the best work a Priest can enjoin; but it may be better, and more necessary to give the Pope money; and this done, through his Indulgence, there may be no need to do any more.    

The Conclusion.  

BY the Premises, it is manifest that Popery by its practical principles, is destructive to Christanity and the souls of men. As to Christianity, whether we consider it in general, as Religion; or in its specialties, as the best Religion, it is both ways by the Popish-doctrine ruined. This plucks up the Fundamentals of it, and dissolves the whole structure, and buries and confounds both the necessary materials, and the peculiar excellencies thereof in its rubbish. There can be no Religion in reality without real worship, this being essential to it; yet their doctrine declares it needless, either for Clergy or People to be real worshippers of God, being so far from engaging them to be reverend or devout, or sincere, or affectionate towards God in Religious addresses; that it will not have them obliged so much as actually to mind God when they pretend to worship him. There needs not so much as one act of true and real worship to make them as Religious, and as much Christians, as is necessary by their Divinity. So that Christianity, as they form it, is a Religion regardless of God, even when, if ever, he should be most observed and honoured, and thereby sunk lower than Heathenism, and the notions of natural Religion retained by Infidels. Further, it discharges those acts and duties of Christianity which are necessary and essential to it; and allows and incourages all that it forbids and condemns, even what is most repugnant to, and inconsistent with it. It makes all Christian acts and duties needless, and all wickedness, opposite thereto, safe and practicable, without fear of condemnation, and there needs no more to ruin the Religion of Christ. A great part of those duties are by this doctrine mere matter of Counsel, and thereby they are made no duties, all obligation to perform them, being in that notion, quite dissolved. The remnant (all conscience of which is not swallowed up in Counsels) which they cannot but acknowledge to be duties; yet they will have them to be so but sometimes, and that very rarely, and when that is they cannot tell; it is not certainly known when, and the observance thereof must be correspondent, no body knows certainly when. Or if they guess at the time, and point some out as probable, yet when the time comes, the acts (though the life of Christianity consists therein, and the salvation of the persons depends thereon) need not to be done, something else will serve instead thereof, some natural act, or faint wish, or false conceit, something or other, though neither truly Christian nor Virtuous (with the Sacrament at least) will excuse them from all other Christian acts. It is not the Accessaries of Religion only that they make thus bold with; but thus they handle the very vitals of Christianity, and make them unnecessary for Christians. The very acts of Faith, and Hope, and Love, yea, Repentance itself, and all the rest with these, are thus made needless, and they may be true Christians (at their rate) and saved (in their conceit) without ever exerting in a whole life so little as one act of grace or Christian virtue. The world never saw Christianity, into what hands soever it fell, more clearly stripped, not only of its lustre and ornament, but of its life and being. If this suffice not to make an end of all Religion truly Christian, they not only dismiss as more than needs, what the doctrine of the Gospel makes most necessary, but advance and encourage what is most opposite to it, not only ignorance, unbelief, disaffection to Christ, impenitency; but therewith all disobedience unto the Gospel. Instead of the holy rules thereof, they have form a doctrine of licentious Maxims, which give security to the practice of any wickedness, and take away (when they had left no other restraint) the fears of Hell from those who live and die in damning sins. Whatever it is that Christ forbids, it is with them either no sin, or not dangerous, or (the worst of all by virtue of some devices of their own) not damning. So that they may venture upon any wickedness freely, and persist therein securely till death, and yet by some evasions which they tell them of, escape the wrath to come (whatever Christ say to the contrary), without either the fruits or acts of Repentance. There are many sins, and amongst them horrid and enormous crimes condemned by the Law of God and natural light, and such as the practice of them is reproachful to the Christian name, which yet, with them, pass for no sins; and they are furnished with expedients to make any other so too, when they see occasion, and in these they will discern no shadow of danger. There is a world of wickedness, which by their doctrine is Venial, abundance more than enough, utterly to deface Christianity, and to make any (who takes but part of the liberty given by their Divines) to look more like an Atheist, or a Bruit, a person of no Religion, Conscience or Honesty, than a true Christian. They can gratify any vicious disposition, which way soever it leads, with impiety and debauches enough to fill up a whole life; and yet (if he will be satisfied with any thing, but the highest degrees of wickedness) promise him security.  
If he could swallow ten millions of their Venials, every minute at a gulp, they would not (by their divinity) endanger him, though one that will follow the rules of Christ, must choose death, rather than venture upon some one of them. There is with them no danger in thus sinning, though the Christian doctrine never discovered any thing else in sin. Or if their Catholics will be outrageously wicked, and cannot be satisfied with less than the practice of the most mortal crimes, they will not disoblige them (the party must be kept up, though their souls sink) they shall have their liberty upon easy terms; deadly sins shall be as free for them, and in a manner as safe as their harmless Venials. That which makes Venial faults seem less dangerous than mortal; is because they will not damn a man, though he never repent of them; but even herein they have made venial and mortal alike safe; for by their doctrine, he may he live in all sorts of deadly wickedness, & die therein without any act of true Repentance, and yet escape damnation. They commend to them several evasions to secure impenitent Sinners, how damnable soever their neglects or practices have been to the last. But that of the Trent Council must not be doubted of; attrition (which they confess alone to be no sufficient, no saving Repentance) with the Sacrament of confession will pass any Sinner into a saving state. This one device of their own, will serve instead of all that Christ hath prescribed; if this be observed, though they live and die in the neglect of all Christian virtues, and in the practice of all wickedness which Christ condemns; they need not fear, this alone will secure them. The lest natural, or slavish remorse, and a Priest, is all the Christianity that a Papist need trouble himself for: if he can but make sure of these at last gasp, he is safe, though all his life he be more like a Devil incarnate than a Christian. By this alone Christianity is utterly subverted, all the Laws of Christ in effect repealed, and their observance rendered needless, the whole Gospel made a cipher, and a way to salvation opened by bold Impostors, not only without, but against the Gospel, and quite cross to the Way, the Truth, and the Life.   

Sect. 2. No more is needful to manifest that the practical part of Popery (however it hath passed for more harmless than the other more insisted on) is destructive to the souls of men. It leads them out of the way of salvation, if real Christianity be the way. It obliges them to neglect as needless not only the lesser, but the principal parts of that way, without which Heaven is altogether inaccessible, They that have discovered another Hell, may as well fancy another Heaven: but they way to that Heaven, which Christ hath prepared for his people, lies through the knowledge of Christ, Love to him, Faith in him, that Repentance from dead works, and exercise of Christian virtues, that Mortification of sin, Holiness of life, and real Worshipping of God; which by this doctrine is abandoned as unnecessary. It tempts them into the way of destruction, incourages them in such practice of wickedness as Christ hath declared to be the broad way. It promises safety therein, and hides the danger from their eyes; it covers the pits (whose descent is into that which is bottomless) with Spider's webs, and persuades them it is firm ground. It leaves them no sense, nor notice of many sins; no Conscience of far the most; no fear of any, no not of the worst, such as themselves call deadly crimes. It gives as much security to such wickedness, as a heart that has sold itself to it, need wish. For what need he desire more than assurance, that after a whole life spent therein, there is a very easy way for him to be saved, so easy that he need not trouble himself so much as truly to repent? Such grace as any Priest can help a Sinner to (an impenitent Sinner) at last gasp, will bring him to Heaven, though he never once thought of the way to it all his life.  
Such being the rules which Roman Catholics have for the conduct of their hearts and lives; and the worst sort of them being as much approved by their Church, as any practical doctrine currant amongst them; let it be considered what regard that Church hath of Religion or Salvation, which leaves them to such doctrine as is so inconsistent with both, and what regard they have of their souls, who after notice hereof will trust them to such a conduct. It gratifies the lusts and corrupt inclinations of the seduced, and serves the interest of the contrivers (drawing the world into the bosom of the Pope's Church, and entangling it there by all the charms of such a Religion as dissolute persons would make for themselves): but if the God of infinite Goodness & Truth, have given us any certain notice of the ways of eternal Life and Death, those that believe and practise it will certainly destroy these own Souls.    
FINIS.   

ERRATA.  

PAge r. r. The introduction, p. 5. l. 18. r. their trade there, p. 6. l. 3. r. worship God, p. 9 l. 12. r. cannot for that, p. 22. l. 25. r. will it, p. 33. l. 24. r. less than none, p. 34. l. 19 r. a little, p. 38. l. 9 r. testimonies. p. 39 l. 20. for unlawfully r. lawfully, p. 40. l. 12. r. determin's, l. 19 r. instance, p. 80. l. 5. deal other, p. 92. l. 7. r. Sancius, l. 19 r. command to love, p. 100 l. 16. r. lest attrition, p. 102. l. 1. for without r. with one, p. 106. l. 3. for believes r. loves, l. 6. r. of new sin, p. 107. l. 23. for thou r. then, p. 112. l 6. deal? p. 117. l. 4. r. one man, p. 123. l. 10. for repenting r. remembering. p. 111. 113. 115. 117. 119. in the Title, for Church r. doctrine, p. 136. l. 21. for best r. lest, p. 147. l. 21. deal; p. 156. It 29. for would r. need, p 164. l. 12. for their r. then, l. 32. deal So, p. 196. l. 25. for it r. them, p. 217. l. 12. r. Vega p. 217. l. 17, for. r., but for: r. He, p. 222. l. 6. r. sins, p. 239 l. 5. r. his love, p 254. l. 2. for less r. left, p. 265. l. 21. r. hypocrisi, p. 275. l. 22. for gaming r. gaining, p. 290. l. 8. r. neither: l. 21. r. greater it is, p. 291. l. 20. for quiet r. guilt, p. 305. l. 13. for him r. Christ, p. 110. l. 18. r. that Traitors, p. 321. l. 20. for forth r. such. p. 324. l. 1. deal *. p. 331. l. 2. for thus r. that. p. 341. l. 17. for he r. she. p. 380. l. 7. r. were.   

In the Citations.  
Page. 5. l. 1. r. attentam. p. 7. l ult. p. 8. l. 1. & 8. r. Major. p. 15. l. 7. r. surgentes. p. 17. l. 2. for quamdiu r. quamvis. p. 28. l. 7. r. cultum externum. p. 31. l. 15. r. missae. p. 49. l. 17. r. ita D. Tho. p. 68 l. 9 r. simpliciter, ibid. r. juridice. p 71. l. 8. r. C. cum voluntate. p. 80. l. 5. r. se. p. 89. l. 1. r. art. 2. & 3. p. 92. l. 4. r. q. 84. p. 93. l. 3. r. omni. p. 103. l. 1. r. intensionem. p. 122. l. 8. r. obligare. p. 143. l. 2. r. justificare. p. 168. l. 10. r. pauperias. p. 213. l. 4. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 224. l. 2. r. spectaculis. l. 11. r. deriserunt. p. 230. l. 16. r. dominium. p. 232. l. 3. r. licet. l. 4. r. licet nobis constet viam perditionis. l. ult. r. Sum. p. 233. l. 4. r. ob. p. 237. l. 11. r. scurrilitas qua. l. 3. urgenti. p. 243. l. 7. r. quum. p. 248. l. ult. r. Bonacin. p. 251. l. 6. r. id rei. p. 252. l. 9 r. subintelligitur. p. 254. l. 8. r. praedicatoris. ibid. r. ratione. p. 257. l. 6. r. gravius. p. 260. l. 7. r. pro hac. p. 262. l. 6. r. servandum. l. 8. r. obligandi. p. 271. l. 9 r. Quum. p. 272. l. 2. r. aliquam. p. 273. l. 8. r. affectu. p. 288. l. 8. r. genere. p. 289. l. 10. r. fastidium. p. 301. l. 5. r. deneganda, p. 316. l. 4. r. exhibet. p. 319. l. 5. r. habet. p. 323. l. 10. r. sincerity. p 335. l. 10. r. plurimi. p. 338. l. 12. r. famulae. p. 346. l. 4. r. Vectigal. p. 356. l. 11. r. perpendat. l. 12. r. greges. p. 361. l. 7. r. retro. p. 362. l. 13. for a qui r. quia. p. 370. l. 7. r. dispensare. p. 390. l. 1. r. per. p. 310. l. 2. deal Cello. 6. p. 311. l. 6. r. Taurini. p. 318. l 11. for maligno r. in aliquo. p. 354. l. 7. for non r. nam.