The Common Interest OF KING & Kingdom, In this Confused Conjuncture, Truly Stated: And to consist in the Speedy Calling of A Free Parliament.  
IT is a frequent Observation upon Polemical Debates, whether they be in the Philosophical Speculations of the Schools, or what's almost the same, in the Scholastic Disputes among the School-Divines; That when the Disputants come to understand one another, they are soon agreed. This, tho' but a Theorem among the Scholars, may pass for a good Maxim among Politicians too, and in this juncture very applicable to our present Perplexities, and the Differences and Disagreements that the State lies under; it has been Agreed on all hands, that a Parliament can only Compose the Distractions of the People; and yet some People seem as much Distracted at the Apprehension of this Parliament, and perhaps for that reason have influenced the King so long from Calling Any: This certainly was No kindness to the Crown, to reduce it to those Extremities, which with more Honour to itself, and Safety to them, it could have granted before: For as Necessity, in Matters of Right, is said to have no Law, so in respect of Favours it will have no Thanks too. And this I urge only as an Error that has been observable in our late Councils, which I am persuaded the Inclinations of the King would have otherwise rec●ity'd, and for which the Unhappy Advisers will hardly have reason to thank themselves.  
On the other hand, the Declaration of the Prince of Orange has no other Pretence, but the Calling of this Parliament; which (upon the Faith of a King, that aught to be esteemed Inviolate) has been 〈◊〉 to the People, shall be Called; and the difference all the ●●●le consisting only in this, That His Majesty would willingly Callose ●●e assoon as the Prince with his Forces was retired out of England, ●ut this Prince was unlikely to leave this England, with his Forces, till this parliament was Called.  
I do with all the regard and tenderness to the Crown, presume to offer, That a Speedy Parliament, in spite of these Pretensions of the Prince, (which I hope are not to attempt it) is the only Expedient to Preserve its just Rights, and to pacify the People's Rage.  
I. It is a Parliament that will certainly consist of the same Loyal Persons, that against so much Opposition, A Resistance, even to Blood, placed this Crown upon the Head of the Prince that wears it, and who, I am persuaded, will never suffer an Hair of That Head to fall to the Ground.  
II. It is a Parliament that will do His Majesty more Service in this Conjuncture, than those Military Men that have Deserted him by what I see, ever designed to do; and instead of his Standing Army, I hope he'll have Reason to make This his Standing Parliament.  
The First Proposition I shall thus plainly prove: Those Persons that Adhered to the Crown, and its unalterable Succession, are men of the best Fortunes and Estates that their Counties can afford us, and who, 'tis known, by that Interest they had in them, Established the Throne; by this their Interest they will as certainly be elected again, and for aught I see, the P. of O. proposes it as his Interest to have them chosen too; so that here is a Common Interest again, in which we all agree, if People would without passion give themselves up to understand it.  
To these men this dreadful Declaration of the P. must be entirely submitted, and he himself determined by it▪ Their Ordered and Resolved will certainly be the Decretum Finale; and as it is the hig●●●● Court, from whence there is no Appeal, so has the Prince oblige himself by Appealing to it.  
To this can only be Objected these two things: 

1. That the Prince's Army may hinder the Election of these Men.  
2. That he may influence their Debates when Elected.    
That it cannot, and will not do either of these, will appear not only probable, but plain; he has no Power to regulate Corporations, and must ruin the very Foundation of his Design if he pretends to it; 'tis a contradiction to what he declares, and a Design upon the Crown which he renounces, and which is his visible Interest not to Attempt He knows too well the Temper of those Men, whom only the common Cause of Religion, has made his Adherents, to be no D●po●er▪ of Crowns and Sceptres; which like the King's Heart, are said to b● only in God's Hand, and who have asserted too much of a Divin● Right, to set up now for the Doctrine of Deposing. He must need▪ know too, that the offering to exclude such Men from being duly Elected, would raise the just Indignation not only of these Men, (upon whom some will say he has most depended) but of the whole Kingdom, of which they make the greatest part, and in all probability make a greater Defection in his Army, than his Cause has done in the King's.  
In the next place, If Elected, he cannot influence their Debates. He has no Ministers of State to make their Courts to the House of Commons; and I am persuaded is too thrifty to allow any Pensions to purchase their Votes. The Members that will be chosen, will be too Wealthy for a Bribe, and will no more Sell their King, than they would their Country; and in what concerns Succession, and a Right Heir, have given such proofs of their Sincerity, that as it is the most ungrateful Distrust, where the Descent is owing, so to Contradict it, is to deny a Postulate, or a Piece of Demonstration.  
And since of these Men the Parliament must cons●●, it's ea●●e to prove, that His Majesty, Their Anointed cannot be touched; and ●om● wi●h I could add, they would do his Prophets no harm. The 〈◊〉 tive has been Advanced by them, as some think, even to a 〈◊〉 as themselves find, to their own damage and Danger; ●o that 〈◊〉 such Members, his Sacred Person, as well as his just Rights, must meet with the greatest Security.  
The Second Proposition is, That such a Parliament in this very Juncture, will do the King more Service than any Army, or his own has done.  
The Foreign Forces that were brought into the Kingdom were not so few, but what without such a Defection might have shaken the Throne, I dare not say overturned it; I shall not insist upon any Excuse or Justification of what some will call a Revolt from Allegiance, others only an Asserting of Religion; but take the matter as it stands, we'll suppose it once for Fact; That what for foreign Troops, and the Defection of his own, the King's Affairs in his Army are very declining, and Himself unlikely to keep the Field: What is there possible, left to oppose the unlimited Demands of the Prince (should he extend them to Extravagancy) but such a Parliament, to which even a sort of Conquerors seem to submit? The Nation has such an expectance from it, that it unanimously agrees to be guided by it; and should it disagree with this so Powerful Prince, (as certainly it will, if he designs the least Alteration of Government, or any Injury to the Crown, much more to the Person of the King) its Resolutions would soon make him find a Force within those Walls, to transcend even that he has in the Field, and even those he has there as soon to forsake him. This is no piec●●●●eculation in Politics, but what the event will as certainly prove to be Matter of Fact: if Futurity can have any relation to what is past? if we'll only believe with our Ears, what our Eyes have seen● if the Relating Precedents be any probable Proof of a things possibility? I can give some instances, where Parliaments have helped to oppose even the Violence of Arms; which tho' they use to silence Laws, such Laws at any time may here turn to flight an Army of the Aliens.  
It was a Parliaments pure Interest with the People, that had Power enough upon the Restoration of the late King, to Disband all the Forces then, tho' much more formidable than what are now afoot, and under such an Engagement, that their Oaths as well as their Interest, had obliged all the Officers of that Army, never to forsake one another, or suffer themselves to be Disbanded; and that when Religion was as much the cause, and they had Sworn to fight the Battles of the Lord, whereas the Princes Promises here supersede the pains of such a proof, declare he'll never bring it to that Extremitv, but send away of his own accord, all his Foreign Troops assoon as this Parliament shall be called; and I am sure 'tis his Interest to be as good as his Word.  
For another Instance, That Votes of Parliament are sometimes as good as Canon proof: and it is that more modern Experience we had of their efficacy in Influencing the People upon Monmouth's Rebellion; I am sure His Majesty found no little benefit then from their Sitting, their Attaindure, and setting so much upon his Head, did not a little help to bring it in, and kept numbers out, that otherwise would have made his Army much more formidable; and tho' the King's Forces had then the Good Luck to Defeat them, yet I crave leave to observe, that the Army Conquered by chance, but the Parliament by Deliberation.  
To this Parliament, (and what should endear it the more to all Men) to the very same Persons that composed it, (who for the most part will certainly be returned) are all Matters on all sides agreed to be referred; the Prince Declares for it, the Lords Petition for it, and the King as passionately desires for it? and what then, for God sake, should hinder the calling for it; if it be answered, that the Evil Counsellors, whom the Prince so Criminates, only oppose its Sitting: I will satisfy them, it is not their Interest so to do, they being already made so Obnoxious, (if they have not made themselves so) will by opposing this the general desire, only incense the People more, make them to be believed Guilty of all those Crimes for which they stand accused, some of which, perhaps, they are Innocent of, and will have a fair opportunity, when it is assembled, to clear themselves from I have observed upon several of our Revolutions, that nothing has made our Ministers of State more odious, than their being thought guilty of putting off Parliaments; that occasioned the Act in Ed. 3. for their Sitting once a year at least; that the Triennial in Car. 1. that at last the unhappy, and Perpetual one in the same Reign, that was made Matter of Impeachment in Rich. 2d's Reign; that was one of the Articles that cost Strafford his Head in Car. 1, that was the Clamour of all the Discontented Party in Car. 2. And since its Sitting now is so generally desired, and the King's Safety, and the People's Peace seem to depend upon it; the Nations resentment will certainly fall more heavy upon their Heads that are thought to have opposed it, and aggravate those Crimes, of which they only may be mistrusted; insomuch, that I seriously profess, were I a Public Minister, that was certainly designed for a Public Sacrifice; for the King's sake, for the People's satisfaction, and for the only Expedient to divert somewhat of that Odium I lay under; I would zealously be concerned for its Sitting, tho' I were sure to suffer when it Sat.  
Neither can I see what His Majesty can reasonably fear at present from such a Loyal Assembly's being legally convened, they will certainly (and of which I am in my Conscience persuaded) resolve to retain to themselves all the Liberty of Debate, since they'll be now more than ever disengaged from any Merit they may expect from Compliance and Obedience; they'll be so far from being Influenced by the Prince of O. or his Army from being free, that the first thing they'll consider, will be the Establishing of the King's Throne, which no confidence can deny, but that the Persons who will compose it, have always been ready to support; they'll confirm, that Established Religion, which the King has so often promised to maintain: And to come to the only two tender Points, that some People will think can touch the King, or the Court; or what has occasioned much (perhaps) this Attempt of the Prince of O. and his States;  
They'll be the best Arbitrators in the Birth of our Prince of Wales. And the greatest Opposers of the Growth of the King of France.  
In both these Points, with all submission, I did ever conceive, and shall now as humbly show, It is His Majesty's Interest to admit them to be Judges.  
First, he cannot have better Judges of a Royal Descent, and a right Line, than those that so Loyally maintained his own against so much Opposition, and who must be as much engaged to maintain it in his Lawful Issue, as ever they did in his own Person and Blood; the perpetuating of this Line, and the Derivation of this Blood depends in all probability, upon an Heir Male, and a Prince of Wal●s; of whose Birth, when once they are satisfied, they'll certainly be the best of Asserters. To this very Parliament the Prince of O. has fairly, even in this very Point Appealed, and so by his own Act concluded himself. So that if this Legitimacy which he Questions, should by them be affirmed, he must and will acquiesce; and His Majesty can desire nothing more, than such an affirmation; now there are probable reasons to induce us to believe, that this Parliament may affirm this Son to be his, which the King, with a great many Witnesses has averred to be His own: No Man can Condemn the Prince of O. for doubting it, since it concerns himself, and especially his Consort, so near; but it may be observed, That when his Declaration was penned, (as himself there says) tho' many People doubted of the Queen's Bigness, and the Birth of the Child, there was not any one thing done to satisfy them, or to put an end to their Doubts; so that we cannot tell how far the Prince now may be satisfied himself, or a Parliament think it satisfactory, since so much has been done of late in the Council Chamber, as may perhaps give the great Council of the Nation much of satisfaction; and they that stood up so stoutly for the Succession of the Duke of ●ork, may not be so soon brought to disinherit a Prince of Wales.  
Secondly, what concerns the Growth of France, I always thought must very much affect England, and none sure then so proper to Judge of the Nations safety, as those who are sent to be her People's Representatives: 'Tis certain, or at least very probable, that the same Justice by which he detains Lorraine, and has seized the Palatinate; the same power by which he defies all the Electoral Princes, and all the Forces of the Emperor, will one time warrant him to claim Holland, as one of the Appendancies to his Pays Conqui de Flandre, and the Chamber of Metz can always give even faster than he Conquers; and then perhaps it may be too late for England to look about for herself: and 'tis plain, 'tis for this reason the Dutch, (' though I believe truly in the first place for their own Preservation,) would now engage the English into a War with the French; and tho' that I think too would have been more honestly done, if it could have been compassed without force of Arms, and to be wished the P. might have had no need of his; 'Tis granted on all sides, that the King is the sole Arbitrator of War and Peace: But yet it has been as constant a Practice in Parliament, to move the King to the one, and incline him to the other, and to offer one thing more, it is known, that their Growth of France, and our Growth of Popery, has for above this Ten Years been so beaten into people's Heads to be the same thing, that nothing almost but a Breach with that Crown, can make them think well of our Court, and I think that has broke with us; and made already a War, if we are any thing concerned in a late famous Peace; and 'tis but with an ill Grace that this French Declaration reminds the Dutch of the Treaty of Nimmeguen; which by their Invading the Palatinate, they first took care to violate: I am not infatuated with those Foolish Fears that affect the Vulgar; no more afraid at present of the French Army here, than the Spanish Pilgrims; but will not promise for futurity, should their Growth meet with no opposition, and (unless it be Religion) I could never apprehend what should incline our Ministers so much to that Government, since that very thing, has created so many Disturbances in our own, much less should it influence the King, or the Court at this time, since the only season, to recover some of that Kingdom, of which His Majesty's Ancestors were once possessed in another Field, than that of a Coat of Arms.  
These I think are the chief things that will come before this Parliament, of which they'll bethe most Competent Judges, even to the Composing of the Distractions between King and People; and this Parliament will be more conveniently now called than ever, since nothing less than that Convention can Compose them; and therefore those rude Reflections in a Late imprudent paper (that were so uncharitably made upon the Worthy Lords that so conscientiously Petitioned for it) were very unseasonably, very unadvisedly set forth; especially since it appeared, His Majesty was pleased to receive it so Graciously, as to tell them, he passionately desired it; and since all sides, after so much Alteration seem now to agree in this one thing necessary, may it answer too the expectation of all, may their moderation be known to all Men, may People be surprised to see their prudent Administrations, and that this Revolution alone is that which will not run into Extremes: Lastly,  
May the King's Enemies be clothed with shame, but upon his Head let his Crown flourish.   
FINIS.  

LONDON, Printed by T. M. 1688.