THE CASE OF Disbanding the ARMY AT PRESENT, Briefly and Impartially Considered. Published by John Nutt, near Stationer's Hall, 1698. THE Case of Disbanding THE ARMY AT PRESENT, Briefly and Impartially Considered. I Shall reduce my Thoughts about this Matter within as small a compass as may be, and therefore shall not trouble the Reader with Histostorical Quotations either out of Ancient or Modern Authors, as altogether foreign to the Purpose, unless they are proved to agree with the present Conjuncture of Affairs in every Particular; and so far it may be owned, that Men in the same Circumstances will do the same Things; for 'tis a plain Case, that in taking true Measures for the Safety of any Government, Men must Examine the present State of Affairs both within and without it, and things that may happen hereafter; and always to provide against the most evident and likely Dangers I shall take it for granted, that an Army in time of Peace is consistent with our Constitution if the Safety of the Realm require it, and that it be with the Consent of the Parliament; And therefore if it be made appear, that the present Government, which (under God) is the best Security we have for our Religion, Liberty, and Property, is in evident Danger without an Army, and that in the present State of Affairs our Liberties and Properties cannot be infringed nor molested by one, this I hope will set this great Case in a true Light. First, That the present Government is in evident Danger without a competent Number of Land Forces for its Defence. The Posture of England at present is this, in relation to Safety, that there are Princes abroad that pretend a Right to wear its Imperial Crown, who are Protected and Supported by the most Powerful Monarch in Christendom, who is able enough still, notwithstanding his late Restitutions, to do what he pleases with the Empire, Spain, and Holland, unless England joins with them for the Common Liberty, in which its own is certainly involved. It is very well known, that this Powerful Monarch pretends in the behalf of the Princes that are descended from him a Right to the Crown of Spain, and all the Dominions thereunto belonging, upon the Death of the present King, which is a fair Step to Universal Monarchy: And it is as plain, that if this Monarch can once secure England, than he will be able to make good his Pretensions in spite of the rest of the Allies, and Portugal too if it joins with them. This demonstrates, that it is absolutely his Interest to have England at his Devotion, which he can hardly expect from the present Government: And if the Case be so, than the Question is, Whether it is Safe and Advisable to lay ourselves open to a Neighbour so Powerful both by Sea and Land, whose Interest it is to subdue us, who wants no Pretence for it, and who has seldom failed to prosecute his Interest when a fair Opportunity has offered for it? But they say, that a good Fleet, and a well Trained Militia, is sufficient to put us out of Danger. As to the first, it must be owned, that the Honour, Glory, and Safety of the Nation does chief depend upon our Fleet; but it is fit to consider at the same time, that the French King can put out all his Fleet whenever he pleases, and that he can pursue his Designs with more Secrecy and Expedition than the Constitution of this Government can admit: But the King of England cannot put out a Fleet without the help of his Parliament, which must meet together, and settle Funds for the setting out of the Fleet, without which the King cannot have a sufficient Credit. The Case being so, it cannot otherwise be, (or it is but too probable that it will be so) that the French King in time of Peace will put out his whole Fleet sooner than we can put out ours, even though His Majesty should immediately call a Parliament, and desire Supplies for a Fleet every time the French work in their Docks at Breast, Rochefort, and Dunkirk, as if they designed to set out their Fleet: Or the Parliament must of course allow the King every year a Fund for the setting out a Fleet, as in time of War: And besides, though we could be ready as soon as they, yet it is fit to consider, whether if they should Arm in these three Places at once, and the Hogue, we can, (considering the accidents of Wether) hinder their Landing upon us from every one, or any one of these Places. This seems to demonstrate, that it is very necessary to have another Defence ready in case the first should fail, which (as it appears from what has been said) may very well be: This Defence therefore must be a Land Force. That the Militia is not at present a competent Defence, is owned by those who propose Methods to render it serviceable. I would not be thought to undervalue Militia's, no doubt they could render Service, especially the Foot, being interlined with Regular Troops, or they may be put into the less exposed Garrisons, to draw out from thence the Regular Troops to reinforce an Army: But as for Horse, the Horse must be Trained as well as the Man, or else the Bravest Men in the World can render no Service upon Horses that are not Trained. But if the Militia can be rendered serviceable for our Defence against the Invasions of Disciplined Troops, as those very Persons that would Disband the Army must own that it is not at present, it is fit to consider, that a Militia under such Regulations as are proper to make it Serviceable, will then enter into the very Constitutions of the Kingdom, that it will be a very great and perpetual Expense upon the Subject, and that it must vest as great a Military Power in the King, as if he had an Army at his Command, or else it cannot be thought to make it Serviceable. This is the very Case of Sweden; Puffendorf tells us, that the King of Sweden pays no other Forces out of his Coffers but the Lifeguard and the Foot-Guards, I mean in Sweden; the rest is the Militia of the Country, maintained by Tenors from the Crown (which is the very Original of Militia's) and kept in constant Duty and Discipline: But pray, has this Militia preserved the Rights and Properties of the People? Is not the King of Sweden as Absolute a Monarch as any in Christendom? And on the contrary we find a Country in the World not for off, called Holland, where they maintain all the Liberty that can be imagined in a Commonwealth, with an Army and the King at the Head of it, without any such thing as Militia in its Constitution. But an Army, being required only during the present State of Affairs in Christendom, which (as Experience tells us) have never continued long in the same Posture, cannot enter into the Constitution of the Monarchy, nor can it be made a Precedent any longer than the Posture of Affairs is the same as 'tis now; It is a better Defence than a Militia, and infinitely Cheaper, and less Vexatious and Troublesome to the Subject; neither can a competent Number of Land-Forces for our Defence, I may venture to say a good Army, attempt in the least, during the present juncture of Affairs, to invade the Rights and Properties of the People of England, (the second Thing to be proved) which is the common Bugbear to put People out of conceit with what seems so necessary at present for their safety; and when the State of Affairs altars, it will consequently be as easy then to Disband them as it is now, and certainly much more proper. The Author or Authors of the History of Standing Armies, have already proved to our Hands, that no Kings of England either with or without Armies, have hitherto made any steps towards Tyranny and Arbitrary Power, but it has proved Fatal to them; and if this has been the success of their Attempts when they have had no jealousy of Competitors supported by Formidable Neighbours, it must be much more impossible for any King of England that comes in upon the present Settlement to set up for Tyranny and Arbitrary Power: And he cannot make any Steps towards it, as Affairs are now, without bringing evident Ruin upon himself; because the Competitors (being supported by the most powerful Prince in Christendom, whose Interest it is to have England at his Devotion) will take the Advantage of that great ferment in the Nation, which such an Attempt must produce, to assert their Claim. This is but too good a collateral Security for our Rights and Properties under the Present Settlement; and when it shall please God to put Affairs upon another Foot, and that we shall have no occasion for these Fears and Apprehensions, then let the Army be Disbanded, no True Englishman can plead for it; but whilst Affairs continue in the state they are in at present, it is a plain Case that our Liberty and Property can be in no Danger, but will rather be preserved by an Army ready for our Defence. Those that have writ against an Army during the present Peace, are pleased to Compliment His Majesty out of what seems so necessary for his and our Safety: They say, That indeed they are under no Apprehensions of such Attempts upon the Liberties of the People, during his Reign, and so far they are in the Right; but they are afraid of what may come hereafter, when the having an Army at present may serve as a Precedent for succeeding Monarches. To which it may be answered, First, That it cannot serve as a Precedent to succeeding Kings, unless the State of Affairs be the same as it is now; if they have not the same Occasion for their Defence, and that of England, they cannot draw our having an Army at present into a Precedent. Secondly, I answer, That whenever that unhappy Hour shall come which will deprive us of our King, (whom GOD long preserve to Reign over us) our present Constitution will then run the greatest Risk, if Affairs remain in the same Posture as they are in now; it will be the most favourable conjuncture for Competitors to the Crown, and their too powerful Protectors, to enter upon us: And therefore, since His Majesty's Life is such an Obstacle to them, is it not very much to Expose His Majesty's Person, and with it the Present Government, to have no Army on Foot in this Conjuncture? It is likewise very fit to consider, That in such a Case, besides the Danger on that Hand, we have Neighbours that need not Cross the Seas to come upon us, and who may be rempted to make us a Visit on the other. I may add as a collateral Argument, That those who have writ against the Army with so much Virulency and Malice, (for none have writ with Temper) have sufficiently discovered their ill Inclinations towards Monarchy and the Church of England, but more openly and expressly towards the Latter; which plainly shows, That their designs against both can hardly be compassed whilst there is an Army on foot for the Defence of the Present Government; and therefore 'tis to be hoped, that those who are Wellwishers to the Church and to the State, will take care not to be drawn into the Snare, under the plausible Pretext of Providing for the Liberty of the People, which, 'tis very Evident, cannot be invaded by an Army, during the present Conjuncture. FINIS.