A MANUEL OR, Brief Treatise of some particular Rights and Privileges belonging to the High Court of PARLIAMENT: Wherein is showed how of late times they have been violated.  
The true condition of the Militia of this Kingdom, so much now controverted both by King and Parliament, by the Positive Laws discussed and debated, with a brief touch of the Royal Prerogative.  
Neminem oportet esse sapientiorem legibus.  Job 8.8. 
Interroga pristinam generationem & investiga patrum memoriam.  
Ipsi docebunt te & loquentur tibi & ex corde suo proferent eloquium.  
Hesterni enim sumus, & ignoramus & vita nostra est sicut umbra super terram.  
By Robert Derham of Graies-Inne Esquire.  
London printed for Matthew Walbancke at Graies-Inne Gate. 1647.   

To the Honourable and truly religious, the Commons of England, now Assembled in Parliament at Westminster.  
May it please you:  
THis little Treatise (some may say) needs no Dedication, Res enim ipsa l●quitur: The subject and matter of this Discourse pointing like the Heliotrope to the Sun, unto the High and Illustrious Assembly of PARLIAMENT, whose influence and favour are alone sufficient; yet since it hath pleased God to raise you up in this distressed Kingdom, as blessed means an● instruments of his glory, and of the good of this Commonwealth (as it is certainly hoped) in composing these unhappy differences, by your eminent Wisdom and supreme Authority, and your fidelity and constancy in this great trust committed unto you, being so apparent unto all men; as also this work for the most part being extracted out of your own learned Declarations, and Remonstrances imparted to public view. I am upon these reasons emboldened to address myself unto you for protection against Calumny and detraction. And although I know nothing herein contained but what is warranted by the Laws of this Realm, and by the rules of truth, yet in as much as I am not hereby justified, I crave your favourable censure, concluding what I have written of your judicious view wholly unworthy, and the Author hereof in respect of your noble and high deserts shall ever remain,  
Your Honours in all duty and service obliged: Robert Derham.   

The Preface to the Reader.  
Courteous Reader:  
IT is a true saying, Pro captu Lectoris habent sua fata libelli, the capacity and apprehension of the Reader is fatal to every thing committed to public view; however this being a legal Treatise it must stand, or fall by the judgement of the wise and learned in the Laws of this Kingdom. The sum of this Discourse is grounded upon the Positive Laws, termed of late times the known Laws. I have chosen to enter into Combat with our Adversaries at their own Weapons, as they please to choose them, though happily it may prove disadvantageous; and this is done with moderation (I hope) to silence, if not satisfy the obstinate. Take this work out of the Loom, and withal Anatomize it, with all the curious and cunning dissections of Art and wit; spare it not, yet I am confident it shall abide firm against all opposition. I will conclude with this Corollary, Edicite mundo quod mundus est vanitas veritas autem est magna & prevalebit. Farewell.   

A Manuel or brief Treatise of some particular Rights and Privileges belonging to the High Court of PARLIAMENT.  
I Am enjoined out of my duty to my Country, and my zeal to the Public good, to compile this little Treatise; little in regard of the Author, great in regard of the Subject matter, wherein I protest before the Supreme Judge of Heaven and Earth to deliver the truth, and nothing but the truth, according to the Laws of this Realm established, whose unparallelled distractions both in Church and Commonwealth I cannot but with great grief consider: Quis talia fando temperet a Lachrymis.  
The Mother and Nurse unto us all this formerly most happy and blessed Nation, now personated in the sable habit of a most mournful widow: Quae corrupit ecusos fletu, which hath lost her glorious Lamps, even her eyes with weeping. Sparso quoque infanebrem modum crine terribilis. Terrible to beholders with dishevelled hair, making moan for her irreparable losses, attending the funeral Obsequies of her dear Children, requesteth, nay requireth us all to bewail her miseries, and to redress her desperate calamities.  
But to leave off preambles as tedious, and to come to the Discourse intended, I do with sincerity of heart, detesting the Doctrine and Practices of Brownists, Anabaptists, Sectarists, and as one that truly honoureth the true reformed Protestant Religion, lament and much deplore the sorrowful condition of this Kingdom, the amiable Laws and Government being now become despicable, through the violation or neglect at least of the fundamentals, I mean the just and due Rights and Privileges of that High and Supreme Court of Parliament, in whose safety and flourishing estate consisteth the happiness of this Commonwealth, and in the contempt of that illustrious Assembly, this renowned Nation will of freeborn Subjects become slaves, and degenerate from those noble resolutions which their Ancestors did inherit.  
For to let pass the disturbances in this Church of England, and the Government thereof, and the means to redress the same, being not properly within my cognisance or knowledge, and peradventure permitted by Divine Providence to evidence to the world the errors and folly even of his own Ministers, and the unsearchable Wisdom of God, even past man's finding our. My purpose is only at this time to treat of the High Court of Parliament, and the Laws and Liberties of the Subject in them represented, whose infallibility I shall nor labour to maintain, as being men of the like passions that we are; but the Venerable estimation which the wisdom of the Law hath evermore attributed unto them, not in respect of their Persons, but of the Government and Justice which in them primitively resides, whose gravity, prudence, and integrity hath been in all Ages much admired, and their judgements and resolutions (till these unhappy tim●s) held indisputable; for, inquire of your Ancestors, if the gray-headed Common Law (whose funerals are now in the judgement of man approaching through the popular dis-estimation of this High Court) did not here receive if not its first subsistence, yet its power and glorious estate even to these times? The King's just and due Prerogatives, if not here first framed, yet from time to time here strengthened and corroborated, witness that ancient Statute called Prerogativa Regis made Anno 17. E. 2. 
This Station is declaratory of the Prerogative, not Introductive.  wherein certain of the most weighty and great Prerogatives pertaining to the Crown are contained and declared, as saith that learned Judge Stamford. The rich Gems and inestimable treasure both in Church and State from this Fountain derivatively issuing and proceeding, and shall now the honour of this Court so ancient be deserted? And shall it not with the lives and estates of all noble minded Englishmen be maintained as sacred, and as just and lawful defended? For to come to particulars, wherein I will observe this order and method. 
The method of this Discourse.  First, I will present you with the Laws and Privileges of Parliament apart by themselves, and such of them only as are unanimously acknowledged for undoubted Rights and Privileges of that high Court. In the next place I will deliver unto you the Exposition of the said Privileges by the positive or known Laws, or parallel them with the rights and privileges of inferior Courts of Justice, as also show the violation of them briefly. And lastly, I will observe some particulars worthy the consideration both in Government and State, arising evidently from the premises, or not impertinently depending thereupon; where you shall likewise find some Laws and Statutes of this Realm remarkable for use incidently debated.  

Privilege of Parliament the law of Parliament.  But in the first place before the hardling of these, I would desire you to take notice that the Privilege of Parliament, and the Law of Parliament is of one sense in Law, Privilege quasi privata lex. Amongst the several Laws of this Kingdom, by Sir Edward Coo●e mentioned in his Jnstitutes, the Law of Parliament is one meaning, principally the privileges and proceed of that Court, mentioned in the Rolls and judicial Records thereof. For the Laws there enacted having no special relation to that Court, are not intended in this sense, the Law of Parliament; of which Law it is said, Ista l●x, 
Lex Parliament What it is.  & consuetudo Parliamenti est ab omn●bus quaerenda, a multis ignorata, a paucis cognita.  
This premised, the first Privilege of Parliament that I shall offer unto you is this, That if any of either Houses shall offend or commit any Crime, that they themselves shall have the censure and punishment thereof; yea, the ancient Custom of the House of Commons is, That if any shall chance of that House to offend, or not to do or say as becometh him, or if any shall offend them being called to that His Highness' Court, that they themselves (according to their ancient Custom) have the punishment of them; which last privilege of the House of Commons is very large, pointing out unto us, That this House of itself is a high Court of Justice, and extendeth as well to Strangers as Members of the same in their power of Judicature. And it appeareth that matters of Parliament are not to be ruled by the Common Law; as also that if they might have been else, where punished, it shall be intended that sometimes it would have been put in ure, and the Precedents that have been against the Law in this point, have been in all ages condemned as illegal. And for proof of these afore recited particulars, you may peruse that much to be honoured Lawyer Sir Edward Cook, in his Book called The Jurisdiction of Courts, tit. Parliament, as also Sir Thomas Smith in his Commonwealth of England, Fol. 18. a learned Gentleman in both Civil and Common Law, so that you see here a positive privilege belonging to the High Court of Parliament in Criminal matters, which no inferior Court of Justice can claim, which I shall likewise prove unto you a positive privilege without qualification, notwithstanding the ensuing Objection.  
Object. That to Cases of Treason, Felony, and the Peace, privilege of Parliament shall not extend, for the privilege of Parliament here intended is the privilege of that high Court in Civil Actions, which is an utter cessation of all proceed during Parliament, either in that Court or elsewhere in an ordinary course of Justice, and upon these words privilege of Parliament is a legal acception, 
Privilege of Parliament a legal acception.  having only relation to that high Court of itself, and to the proceed thereof, and to no other Court of Justice, and in this sense it is only taken by the words of this Law.  

Privilege of Parliament a legal exception.  Privilege of Parliament is likewise a legal exception, and so it hath a relation to other Courts of Justice, which exception any Member of Parliament may make use of, to quash all proceed against him in inferior Courts in Criminal matters; and as to that part of this privilege nothing is intended by this Law, for the Members of Parliament offending criminally shall be subject to the Censure of that Court, and not elsewhere without their leave, therefore the privilege before mentioned of this high Court in Criminal matters remaineth firm, and no ways nullified by the words of this Law. His Majesty in one of His Declarations laboureth much to disprove the sense and meaning of this Law to be thus taken.  
For than saith the penner thereof, Object. Where is the restriction of this Law, that to Treason, Felony, and the Peace, privilege of Parliament shall not extend. This privilege remaineth as large as any other privilege of Parliament notwithstanding this Law, if this be the exposition; for no privilege can intent a total Cesser of Justice.  
I answer: 
Sol.  These words are opperative of this Law, and yet they are mistaken in their explication of them, 
In Criminal matters ordinary and positive proceed in Parliament, in Civil not so.  for the privilege is not so large in Criminal matters as it is in Civil, and that by reason of these words restrictive, for in Criminal matters they shall be subject to Cen●ure in an ordinary course of proceed in that Court by Endictment, Bill, or otherwise by the meaning of this Law, whereas in Civil Actions it is not so, there is no positive course of proceeding against any Members of Parliament, they are only left to an extraordinary course of Justice. Petition, or otherwise as the pleasure of that great Court will permit. So you see this Law or privilege justified notwithstanding any Objection, and no Cesser of Justice.  
Object. It is further objected, that if this shall be the meaning and exposition of this privilege, than this mischief will follow, That if a Member of Parliament shall commit a Murder or Robbery at York, the Parliament sitting at London, than it he may not be questioned until the pleasure of Parliament be known he may escape; and so a heinous crime protected or permitted with impunity by this privilege.  
Sol. I answer; The Law is plain, and the privilege of Parliament just; this opposition notwithstanding; 
No Member may be Arrested by any, but as minister to that Court.  for he may be arrested, or his person secured by any Minister of Justice, to be delivered to the Justice of that Court upon notice of their pleasure, and so (I take it) the privilege of Parliament is no ways infringed; he cannot be imprisoned, or his person secured by any man as Minister of any inferior Court, but as Minister in this particular to the Court of Parliament, there to be censured and not elsewhere.  
Object. Hence happily it may be gathered, that before this Law restrictive afore specified in criminal matters, there was no proceed as in Civil, in Parliament against any Members thereof in an ordinary course of Justice, and therefore this Law was made somewhat to abridge this high privilege, namely in this, that any Member offending shall be subject to the censure of that great Court, in an ordinary course of Justice, which before he was not, but in an extraordinary way, by Petition or the like, in which condition he now stands as to civil actions.  
To this I can give no positive answer, but I rather incline to think that this Law was rather parcel of the privilege itself, or contemporary with it, and no subsequent Law, and so this collection formerly mentioned nor material. Also I conceive that if this Law before objected shall be found subsequent to the privilege of Parliament in this particular, which for my part I do not credit, yet before this Act or Law delinquent Members thereof were not exempt from Justice but only in a positive course of proceeding, they were still subject to the censure of that high Court in an arbitrary way, and so no Cesser or defect of Justice, which were a thing of so honourable a Tribunell not to be imagined.  
Thus you see the wisdom of the Law in the framing of these great privileges in Criminal matters, 
The Reason and ground of the Privilege of the Parliament both in Criminal and Civil matters. Nota.  because both God and man require, festinum remedium, the offences being exorbitant, Justice open and cannot be denied even in an ordinary Course. Also the House of Parliament being first acquainted therewith, and their leave obtained, Censure may be elsewhere, not otherwise: in civil actions not so, but an utter cessation of necessity of ordinary course of Justice, for if otherwise the Parliament would be filled with private Suits and Actions, and many of them frivolous; the many and weighty affairs of the Kingdom in the mean time neglected. To conclude, the Parliament you see hath that high Privilege in Criminal matters communicated to no other Court of Justice, 
The Privilege of Parliament paralleled with the privilege of inferior Court; in Civil matters  but in Civil Actions there are some footsteps of this great Privilege in inferior Courts; In the Common Pleas a Writ of Privilege or Supercedeas, to stay proceed against any member of that Court; and if the parry hath cause of Action, he ought to Sue in the Common Pleas: parallel this case with the Privilege of Parliament in Civil Actions, you will find it almost the same. The Supersedeas, or Writ of Privilege removeth not the Cause, no more is the Cause removed by claiming the privilege of Parliament, but a Cesset processus legis quousq. etc.  
If the Party hath cause of Action he must Sue in the Common Pleas, 
Privilege of Parliament in Civil Actions greater than of inferior Courts  so may he, I take it in Parliament by Petition, or otherwise as the pleasure of that Court will permit, but not in any course of Justice ordinary, as he may in the Common Pleas: here the privilege of Parliament exceedeth the privilege of inferior Courts.  
Likewise in Common Pleas privilege for Strangers, Eundo, redeundo concerning their Suits there, and this extends as well to their persons to free them from Arrest, as to their goods necessary for their Suit and Charges; privileges of Parliament (I take) the same, I need not use repetition.  
Now to hasten to an end of this, the reason why the Law hath given unto this High Court, this and many other privileges is for the public good, to the end that Parliaments which are to the State Tanquam medicus aegro, like the Physician to a sick person, should not be eluded or frustrated by suggestions of Crimes against any members thereof by the King, or any persons whatsoever, 
The very being of Parliaments depend upon the privilege in Criminal matters.  being taken away from the service of the Houses & tried elsewhere by inferior Courts, for so they might take away all, and consequently make a Parliament what they would and when they would; which is a breach of so essential a privilege, that even the very being of Parliaments dependeth thereupon.  
His Majesty in one of his Declarations saith, Object. That the Parliament themselves in the beginning of his Reign, in a Petition unto him presented by both Houses in the case of the Earl of Arundel, acknowledged their privilege not to extend to Treason, Felony, and the Peace; the words are, They find it an undoubted right and constant privilege of Parliament, 
The privilege of Parliament in express words by themselves presented to the King.  that no Member of Parliament (sitting in the Parliament, or within the usual times of privilege of Parliament) is to be imprisoned or restrained without Order or Sentence of the House unless it be for Treason, Felony, or for refusing to give Sureties for the Peace. I have faithfully and truly opened all matters that make any ways against me, and so I will (God willing) throughout this whole Discourse, let the Reader impartially judge.  

Sol. Privilege of the Parliament as large as before notwithstanding the words of this petition.  Although these words foregoing of this petition be very large, and seem much to abridge this privil dge, yet upon true examination they do not; for the words, That none shall be imprisoned or restrained, etc. plainly relate to civil actions or proceed; the words, Unless in case of Treason &c imply they shall be subject to imprisonment or restraint; but note the words, they do not say of any inferior Court, but still the privilege remaineth the same notwithstanding the words of this petition. But here it may be objected, that 〈◊〉 have left out that which makes most against me, viz. these words, Without order or sentence of the Houses, implying clearly, that in Cases of Criminal the order and Sentence of the House is not requisite, 
Sentence and Order of the Parliament an extraordinary course of Justice upon the words of this petition. Nota.  but they may be proceeded against without leave. But mark the words and then judge, it is plain by their sense and meaning, that in civil actions they cannot be proceeded against, without sentence and order of Parliament, no ordinary course of Justice. The order of Parliament upon petition or the like is an extraordinary and Arbitrary course of Justice; but in Criminal matters they may be censured without sentence and order of the House; that is, in an ordinary and positive way of Justice, but this must be in the h●gh Court of Parliament itself, and not elsewhere without their leave, and so is the sense of these words to any rational man well observing. There is no power given to inferior Courts by these words either express or employed, 
Nota.  but the privilege continueth the same it was, nothing diminished by the words of this petition.  
Further, 
The positive law in inferior Courts and the law of Parliament inconsistent and differing, yet both just in their proproper motion. Vide postea.  if we should admit the trial in inferior Courts this mischief would follow; that their Judgements might peradventure be legal yet not just, it being lawful for a man to open his Conscience here; so fare without dread or fear in any matter touching the Commonwealth, or any particular person in a Parliamentary way, which in other Courts would be held a crime, and by the positive Laws of this Kingdom punishable. This being so, the violation of this privilege rests to be proved, and truly I am sorry to enter into the proof of it, it reflecting somewhat upon the Kings most excellent Majesty, whose Royal Person I shall ever unfeignedly honour. But surely it is the unhappiness of Kings to be abused by evil Counsel, and the error is not to be imputed to the King, but to his Ministers. But since I must speak, it is Soli lucem infer, to hold a Candle before the Sun, so evident it is, it needeth no proof at all, for is not the breach of this privilege in fresh memory, when the now Members of both Houses should have been taken from them in an unusual way? I will not say by violence, if they had been there present, to the great fear and astonishment of that present Assembly; but I will say no more as supposing this Act unjustifiable, however not yet absolutely disclaimed for aught that I could ever yet see, but his Majesty hath declared in print, that he would proceed against them in an unquestionable way; 
(Unquestionable way) by these words, not pronounced innocent, but rather criminous. A general Declaration of the proceed of this Parliament.  which words in what sense they may be taken, I do not for my part certainly know, as being obscure to my understanding, and not to all intents satisfactory; which violation I take it hath been since pursued in his Majesty's Declaration of the twelfth of August, 1642. in offering to prefer an judictment upon the Statute of 25. E. 3. against divers Members of the House therein named, and I take it his meaning is not in Parliament, but of this I will speak no more.  
Another right of Parliament is this; That every Member of both Houses shall upon Summons come to the Parliament; unser the pain of Amercement, and other punishment, as of old hath been used to be done, as appeareth by the Statute of 5. R. 2. cap. 4. and also by the Statute made 6 H. 8. cap. 16. It is enacted, that no Member of the House of Commons shall departed from the Service of the House without leave of the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the Commons in Parliament Assembled; which licence shall be entered in the Book of the Clerk of the Parliament upon Record, under pain of losing those sums of Money which they should have had for their Wages; by both which Statutes it doth appear, that departure from the House of Parliament without leave is a Crime, and punishable of ancient times; 
5 R. 2. Of the Common Law declaratory.  for so it appeareeh by the first of these Statutes, which was but declaratory of the Law formerly used, and that the punishment was Fine and Imprisonment, and sometimes Arbitrary, appeareth by ancient Authority of Law. But it may be objected, Object. that by a clause in the Statute of 5 R. 2. before named, it is no Crime if the Member of Parliament so absenting himself, can reasonably and honestly excuse himself to our Lord the King: so that the King by this Statute is made the sole Judge of the offence, and if the King Licence or Command the absence of any Member of either Houses it is sufficient.  
To which I answer, 
Sol.  That the Statute is not to be intended in that sense, that all Parliaments may be made frustrate and void at the will and pleasure of the King, by his Licence, or Command of the absence of any Member of Parliament, without great cause for the same, for that were not reasonable and honest, as the words are, Et ve●ba accipienda cum effectu as the Law saith, and otherwise the very essence of Parliaments would be shaken by such exposition.  
But to make a full Answer to these words: Our Lord the King before mentioned in the Statute, are in Law taken for the King in his Politic Capacity, not in his Personal, and so it is no more than if the words had been to our Lord the King in his Court of Justice in his high Court of Parliament, and so the Court of Justice is the Judge, and not the King personally, and so is the Law frequently takan; for to give you an instance or two, and that in a Statute Law as this is, 
Merton, cap. 3. Dominum Regem the Kings Court of Justice.  in the Statute of Merton, cap. 3, are these words: Statim capiantur & in prisona Domini Regis detineanter quousque per Dominum regem, vel alio modo deliberentur. Here the words Dominum Regem, our Lord the King are intended the Court of Justice of our Lord the King, and not the King's Person; and so in the Statute of Marlebridge, 
Marl. cap. 8. Cum Domino ●ege. the King's Court of Justice. Perceptum Domini regis perceptum curi●.  cap. 8. the words there are, Et hoc per finem own Domino Rege faciend. per transgressione, etc. Here cum Domino Rege is intended the Court of Chancery or King's Bench, and so is perceptum Domini Regis, in that Statute taken for the command of the King's Court of Justice, and not for any other command of the King whatsoever.  

In miserecordia Domini Res. 1. curio Domini regis. Statute enacts that Fine and ransom shall be made at the King's pleasure intends the pleasure of his Court of Justice, not his person's pleasure.  The Law is clear in these Cases, which are the very same in these words, with the Statute 5 R. 2. before named. Further, (because this objection seemeth great) I will give you one instance more, in a Statute latter than any of these, the Statute of 25 E. 3. an Act so highly and worthily prised, and much made use of at this time by the King's Majesty, the words are these: Ou si home levira guerre counter nostre Seignior Le Roy en son, Realm, etc.  
Here the words (Nostre Siegnior Le Roy) are taken for the Laws of our Lord our King, and by good judgement likewise as to me it seemeth, not for any levying War against his Person, for that is included in the first branch of this Act; Si home compassa ou imagine, etc. The Laws, and the Courts of Law or Justice intent the same thing, therefore I conclude the words; Our Lord the King must necessarily be meant in this Statute of 5. R. 2. the King's Court of Justice, or the Laws of his Court of Justice, to wit, His high Court of Parliament, who only are the Judges of any crime committed in that Court, and no other inferior Court, as hath been proved at large. Also this latter Statute of 6 H. 8. 
6 Hen. 8. ca 16. A stricter law than 5. R. 2.  seemeth to conclude all Delinquents that have not Licence, as is before mentioned, although the occasion of their absence be great, and urgent affairs even in Law and conscience satisfactory.  
Now to deny unto the Parliament the dispensation of Justice against Offenders in this kind (as it is too apparent) and withal to protect them from the censure of that high and great Court, surely (I say no more) it is a violation of their Laws and Rights unto them anciently belonging.  
But that I may answer all Objections, Object. it is urged by the adverse party, that their departure from the service of the Parliament was forced by tumults and disorders of people, not without just fear and peril of their lives, and therefore their absence not within either of the Statures before named, but justifiable by the rules of all Law and Conscience.  
Sol. To which I answer (because it seemeth material) that first it must be granted, that those Members so departing were Summoned to return to the Service of the Houses, and their Answers (especially of divers of the House of Peers) were to this purpose; That by their duty of Allegiance they were bound to attend the King's Person, or that they were commanded to attend his Person, and therefore they held themselves excusable, which was in effect a plain denial; divers of which Answers I have seen in print. Now it must needs be inferred from hence, and it plainly appears to any man not devoid of reason, That if there had been really any such danger or cause as is objected, 
Nota.  they would have inserted the same in their Answers, and so reasonable and certain an Argument of their innocency would not have been omitted; as on the contrary, so high and contumacious a defence would not have been returned, such an affront and contempt of Justice that even a Court of Pye-powders would not have suffered. Also see their Answers what they are, their Allegiance is the ground of them, as if their attendance on the King's Person warranted them to do injustice, to violate the Laws of these Statutes before named; Is this their Allegiance to the King? Is not the Subjects Allegiance confired to the Laws? Is not the very Etymology of the word derived from thence? Legiantia, 
Allegiance the Etymology.  quasi legis essentia, therefore their answers not legal, 
Their answer no● legal, because they infringe the law, viz. 5. R. 2 & 6. H. 8. Tumult what it is.  as also the Objection of being driven from the Parliament frivolous, for than they would have made use of it in their answers. Further to question the word (Tumult) afore mentioned, do numbers of people with Petitions, no way disturbing the Peace make in Law a Tumult? Certainly no; likewise it appears by undeniable proof, that some of them were solicited away from Parliament by Letters, therefore the former allegation is idle.  
For the King's absence from the Parliament, in what condition it stands, 
The King's absence from the Parliament by the ancient law how fare justifiable.  I will offer you one of the ancient Laws of that pious Prince Edward, Sir named the Confessor, whose Laws the Kings of this Nation at their Coronation sweat to observe and keep: the words are these rendered in English; The King ought to be present at his Parliament, unless he be hindered by sickness, and then he ought to be in the same Town where the Parliament is held, and his sickness ought to be certified by twelve Members of the Parliament, a Committee for that purpose of the Lords and Commons. Here appears no cause of his absence but sickness justifiable, and of this he himself is not the Judge, it must be certified as you have heard. What, not peril of his life may some say? Is that no just cause of His absence? You hear the Law, I have nothing to say to questions. It seems in those days there were no such unworthy and dishonourable thoughts in the minds of men, as to doubt the security of Parliaments unto the Regal Person, since in judgement of Law, if Tumults or Disorders shall happen in the Commonwealth, Parliaments are best able to surprise them, and to protect both King and people from injury and wrong. Now Parliaments are the bane of Princes, as they are now to ●●ed, they are now corrosives, when as you see formerly they were the only curers of all Diseases in the Body Politic. The King formerly not any where safe but here, now the King in His own judgement safe any where but here, flying from them as from His enemy; when as it is not possible he should find any where, that which he desireth but under God even with them (peace and security.)  
Be not deceived, Great Prince, neither fly them that pursue you, not in any Hostile manner: The Parliament follow you with humble Declarations and Petitions for Peace, you mistake their sweet Compellations; put up your Sword into the Sheath, and let Peace be in our dwellings and amongst us.  
I have a little deviated, I will return unto myself, and I find the King still absent, notwithstanding all that hath been spoken, and justifying the same. Indeed there is a Statute in the time of King Henry the 8 via. 33. H. 8. cap. 21. 
33. H. 8. ca 21.  by which in the King's absence from Parliament, His Assent by his Letters Patents under the Great Seal, shall be sufficient.  
Here it may be alleged, Object. that the King's absence from Parliament is warranted by this Statute.  
I answer; Sol. This is nothing to make the ancient Law afore recited ineffectual, for his absence here upon this Law standeth as it did before this Act, not touched or meddled with by this Act, and therefore sickness continues still a cause of absence of the King's Person from his Parliament, and no other; and where he might legally justify his absence before this Statute he may still do the same, and no otherways. And although that the use now of late times hath been, 
Use of no force against a law. Vi. infra.  that the first and last day of Parliament is sufficient, yet that is but use which is of no force against a Law in being, as I conceive. Further, His Assent by this Act is limited, it is only to Acts of Parliament, and no other assent is warranted. Note also, that to disassent to any matter trans-acted in Parliament, it giveth him no power at all Thus you see, 
Ex libro de ordine Parlia. Editi, temp●re Edvardi filij Regis Ethel● redi.  the King's absence from his Parliament how it stands by the ancient Law, of which I have an extract; as also by latter Law you have heard likewise, the absence of the Members of the Houses debated.  
But we will (Argumenti gracia) admit their Allegation true, that they were driven from the Service of the Parliament by Tumults and disorders, which no man will (the premises considered) suppose, yet the objection is still frivolous, who shall judge them innocent or transgressors of the Law, shall not the Parliament? yes verily, as it is manifestly proved by the former discourse, so that in the confutation of this, we do but like Sysiphi sax●m voluere, labour in vain with multiplicity of words to answer a mere false and nugatory suggestion.  
Object. There is yet further opposition, and that is upon the Statute 6 H. 8. before named, That the penalty of that Law is but lo●se of their wages in case any of the Members of the said House of Commons shall departed from the Service of the House without leave of the House accordingly as that Act hath appointed, and so with loss of their wages upon the point that Statute is satisfied.  

Sol. 6 H. 8. More penal abrogateth no former Law.  To which I answer; First, that Statute extendeth not to the House of Peers, neither doth it take away the mulct or penalty of any former Law or Statute made in that behalf, but addeth a further punishment to the crime, abrogateth no former Law; so that Fine, Imprisonment, and Arbitrary Censure continue still in their force: and to conclude this point, they are by one Statute or the other, or by both transgressors of the Law, and liable to the judgement of that supreme Judicatory.  

The proceed of the Pa●liament not subject to any debate extrajudicial, nor to any deba●e judicial, but of itself.  Another right of Parliament is the sole trans-action of all matters even unto Judgement, or the Royal Assent; the proceed of this High Court being not subject to any extrajudicial debate of censure of any other Court or Authority whatsoever, but only of itself, and within itself having supreme Authority and Jurisdiction; and whereas I spoke before of their power of preparing and trans-acting all matters unto the Royal Assent; 
The transacting matters unto the Royal Assent doth not intent the royal assent Arbitrary.  I do not intent the royal assent Arbitrary, for the royal assent cannot in Justice be denied to any Bills preferred by the wisdom of Parliament for the public good; neither can any absolute, 
Negative voice no Prerogative.  negative voice of the King in this nature be any prerogative to him justly pertaining, although by a Proclamation, bearing date at Oxford, printed not long since, his Majesty claimeth an absolute negative voice in Parliament as his undoubted right.  
And likewise in one of his Declarations he justifieth it as his right for this reason, Object. That if he should only have a negative voice in Parliament, in matters of Grace and Favour, and not in matters of right and Justice, than matters of grace and savour would soon be brought within the compass of right and justice, if the Parliament sh●ll so declare them, they would soon interest the Republic in them also, and so exclude him from any negative voice at all.  
To answer this I need say no more but this, 
Sol. Matters of right and Justi●e, and of gra●e and favour legally differenced.  That these are thoughts dishonourable of a Parliament, to make the head and fountain of Justice a receptory of such impure streams as these (injury and injustice) besides these matters are in Law plainly and perspicuously differenced in the one, viz. matters of Right and Justice, the whole Kingdom is concerned, not so in the other as being private on particular in their nature, as Bills of Naturalisation, Indenization, 
General pardon how special.  grant of Franchises, on privileges to Corporations or private persons, general pardons or particular, for though the word general be here used, yet it operates, but especially it extends only to particular persons without you will make all the Kingdom delinquents unto Justice; it includes genera singulorum at the most, 
General statutes not national or public.  not singula generum. And so in Law divers Statutes are called general Statutes, of which the Judges are bound by Law to take notice of without special pleading, and yet the Public or the whole Kingdom are not concerned in them. For my part I shall need to say little herein, because it hath been formerly handled by others; 
Arbitrary Government grounded upon the negative voice.  also I take it to be a truth as clear as the noon day, that upon this Structure all Arbitrary Government is founded and maintained, which position standeth not with a mixed and Politic Government, as this of our Nation is, but with a Monarchical, where the will and pleasure of the Prince is a Law, as is known sufficiently to the learned.  

In inferior Courts no negative voi●e, no voice at all.  But a little to examine this particular, and let us look into the proceed of inferior Courts; Hath he there any negative voice? It appeareth he is so fare from having any negative voice, that he hath no Vote at all, but the voice of the Law pronounced by the mouths of the dispensers thereof, the reverend Judges is that which obligeth both King and people, neither can it be disannulled by any verbal Command of the King, or any other extrajudicial way, although under ●he Great Seal of England, although the Judgement be against the King himself. Nay further, I conceive the Law exerciseth a coersive power over all persons without exception, the King as well as the people, surely then the King hath no voice negative, yea, the compulsary proceed were the same anciently, though now dis-used; that is to say, Writs issued forth against the King as against the Subject: I have seen good Authority in print, that the form of the Writ in the times of Henry the 1. or thereabouts as I remember was thus: Precipe ●enrico Regi, etc. the power of the Law was here supreme but of late times, it is now by way of Petition if the Suit be against the King's Servants or incumbent, as in a Quare impedit, or the like, if judgement be once given (as it is usual) the Kings right is bound, and you see withal it is by Writ in that Case; now if Judgement be given, 
Judgement against the King by the positive laws, and with all compulsary.  surely even at this day the Judgement is not illusory, for every Judgement in its nature is an Act compulsary, Et judicium redili●us in invitum, as the Lawyers say; for execution may be demanded upon this Judgement, and cannot in Justice be denied; though against the King. These things thus premised I do reiterate my former question, where is now the King's negative voice; surely in inferior Courts he hath no voice at all; come we then to the right Court of Parliament, Hath he it there? without doubt he hath it not. It is an Opinion exployded by all good me●, unsound and rotten at the root if we but open it; 
The reason why the negative voice is not consistent with this government.  for if he hath a negative voice the Government is merely Arbytrary; inferior Courts may a while be refreshed herewith, but the fountain will soon dry up, and what then will become of the rivilets? If this may be defended De Jure to be done, that the King may deny his Assent to twenty Bills preferred unto him by the wisdom of his Parliament for the Public good, there will fall o●● a total defect of Justice in a short time, without God incline the hearts of Princes miraculously. And this admitted, how would it let lose the reins of Government? for if there were no supplement of new Laws, the old Laws would soon expire, diseases breeding in the Body Politic, even as in the natural, requiring new Laws, the ministration of new devised remedies to suppress the mischief, the which the Art of man cannot cure or prevent by provision of old Laws; therefore for this very reason the King's negative voice is inconsistent with Government. Further, to what end is the Oath so solemnly tendered and taken by the Kings of this N●tion at their Coronations? Is it merely superfluous, or is he bound now, and is he presently loosed in his practice and government? 
The King's Oath at his Inauguration against the negative voice.  How doth his negative voice in Parliament and this Oath stand together, in which Oath he swears to confirm, those Laws, Quas vulgus elegerit, which his people shall choose, 
Some material words in this Oath explained.  the true sense and meaning of the words extending only to future Laws, to be chosen by the people, as I take it clear without all question, for to laws already established precedent branches of this Oath do relate, else there must be a Tantology, which in an Oath penned with such wisdom and deliberation we must not conceive.  
The word (Consuetudines) joined with the words of this ●ranch of the Oath, Object. objected by his Majesty in ore of his Declarations, plainly to intent this branch of precedent Laws only, for Customs cannot commence at this day; is a word of large fence in Law, 
Sol. (Merchandises) vid. M●cae. ca 30 Note that this word (Consuetudines) is also taken for Statute law, as Centra consuetudinem communi concili● Regni edit. C●. M. C. f. 5. 6.  for Rents and Services due to the Lord are called Customs; be● sides, this wo●d (Consuetudi●es) in this very Oath plainly pointeth out Laws and Statutes, Franchises and Liberties: for, have the Kings of this Realm granted Customs in this sense to their people? as are the words of one branch of this Oath, they cannot be Customs, and yet have such denomination even at their very commencement as these words report, but of this enough.  
Now the people here intended in this Oath are the High Court of Parliament, for where can the people make election of wholesome Laws for themselves but here, 
The Commons are there representative, the Lords not so; but personally; that is the reason a Peer may make a Proxy, not the other.  where they are representatively assembled? for no legal Assembly or Convention totius populi can any History record, or antiquity of this Nation ever mention, but this convention of Parliament. I will say no more, in a truth so clear, to every capacity plain and obvious; but people dis-affected clamour much, and say, How can this be, since the King's dignity is above all Law, his presence suspends the Law, and surely if he may suspend the Law by his presence, and that a Law already made, and in being, then surely he may deny efficacy or force to any Law not in being by an explicit Act or denial of Assent; for the former case is but implicit, and for proof of this they may object that ancient Case of Law, Object. That a Villain, in whom his Lord hath both in person and estate, the inheritance, the absolute and free disposition of him by Law, so he doth not maihem him, if in the presence of the King he is a free man, he cannot be seized by his Lord, but it is for the time an Enfranchisement.  

Sol.  To which I answer, that this Case is ancient, and the Law in this particular is antiquated, not abrogated; howsoever it is pertinent to out present purpose: I say this Case stands upon its particular reason, for the King's presence is a sufficient Protection in favour of liberty against the Lord, who doth not agere civiliter against his Villain, that is to say, claim him in a course of Justice, for than if the proceed in a judicial way, 
The King's presence no Protection against the power and execution of the law.  where the power and authority of the Law appears, as he may, than I conceive the King's presence is no protection, but it is like the case of a man upon an Execution awarded against him, who flieth into the King's presence upon a Capias ad satisfaciendum directed to the Sheriff; for in that Case I take it, the Law is plain, the Sheriff must with the power of the County (if needful) apprehend him, and if he return the especial matter unto the Court without executing the Writ, the return of the Writ in this case is not good, and if the party escape, the Sheriff is subject to an Action at the Suit of the party, who is damnified thereby.  
Thus I have done with this particular, I mean the negative voice, and if there be no coersive power to rectify the abuse of Authority Regal, as some would have it, yet it remains still a transgression from the rule of Truth and Justice, and that is all that I desire at this time to prove. If there be no limits for the impetuous waves of the proud Ocean, God hath appointed the Sands to stand up, and choke them. Lo here God and Nature against exorbitant power, but of this sufficient. There yet remaineth the last part of this Privilege afore mentioned a little to be spoken of, 
The proceed of Parliaments paralleled with the proceed of inferior Courts.  viz. That the proceed of this High Court are not subject to any extrajudicial censure or debate, wherein I will briefly-parallel this with the proceed in inferior Courts, where you shall find, that they are not so much as to be retarded or delayed by any verbal command of the King, their judgements binding all, until by legal course reversed; no man, no not the King himself authorized to question, much less nullify their Acts in any extrajudicial way, so much aught the judgement of the Law to be had in reverence. The King cannot warrant the absence of any man in his service, 
The King cannot retard Justice but in a legal way.  either by any verbal, or Certificate by Letter to the Court of Justice, but it must be done legally by Writ under Scale, or otherwise it will turn to a default, he cannot retard Justice but in a legal way. And what is extrajudicial debate or censure, but a retarding of Justice. If Judgement be given against the King, he cannot examine this judgement in an extrajudicial way before himself, but it must he subject to censure or debate in a legal way, by Writ of Error or the like; 
An offence committed in the presence of a Court of Justice, great and more capital then in the presence of the King.  I need say no more for the proof of this. I will present you with the great Majesty that doth attend the administration of Justice, and that is this; An Offence committed in the presence of a Court of Justice, is a greater Crime and more Capital then in the presence of the King; killing the Chancellor or Judge of either Bench doing his office is High Treason; by the express words of 25. E. 3. not so, if from the Bench, though in presence of the King, striking any man in Westminster Hall in presence of the Courts of Justice, is the loss of a man's right hand, and his goods and chattels, not so in the Palace or presence of the King, unless blood shed ensue upon it, and that is specially by Statute, not by common Law; but because al● have touched upon this before, I will return to the discourse intended.  
It is manifest, that the Law is the square and rule by which both King and people are directed, and regulated in inferior Courts; What shall we then say to the high Court of Parliament, in comparison of which, all other Courts are but Tanquam viburna cupresso, like shrubs to the lofty Cypress or Cedar, from whose fullness and abundance all other Courts receive even their power and authority.  
There is an enemy at hand, Object. a strong objection, and that is, that this is no Parliament, they have no plenitude of power without the King, and the rest of the Lords and Commons now absent, and by this they think to invalide all that hath been formerly spoken.  
To which I answer, Sol. That first the Parliament must he admitted to be a Court of Justice, without the King's Personal presence, his legal presence being inseparable from this Court, like as from all other his Courts of Justice; and the contrary I suppose no man that is rational will affirm. Further, I conceive in inferior Courts his personal presence is against Law in point of Judgement in any matter between the King and his people, for then the King should be Judge in his own Cause, contrary to the rule of Law, 
Ministerial or judicial Acts not incident to the Regal dignity.  which saith, That the Kings cannot do any Act ministerial to himself, a● to take a Recogni●●nce pro securitate pa●is, or the like, much lord do any Act judicial betwixt himself and his people; yea not only so, but he might fit in one Court, and reverse a Judgement given against himself in another Court, which how injurious this same would be unto the subject, how dishonounourable and scandalous to the Court of Justice, I suppose the weakest capacity doth apprehend. Therefore the wisdoms of the 〈◊〉 hath appointed the sage and learned men, being sworn to administer Justice indifferently betwixt the King and his people. 
Court of B. Le R. B. C. Courts of Justice time out of mind, and Magna Cart. ca to did not ●reate and constitute the Court of C. B it did only settle it in Loc● c●●t●. No Courts of Justice at the first in the subject ●s now, but all dispensation of Justice in the Crown, viz. by the King's ministry.  And the Opinion of Fineaux chief Justice in the time of King Henry the 7▪ That all administration of Justice into at first in the Crown, is to be underst●●d with this distinction, it was not in that Regal period a● to the dispensation of it, but it was in the regal Ministers or the Judges, and so might be said to be in the Crown, according to the rule of Law; Qui ●er alium facit per seipsant fadere videni●. If so in inferior Courts, the same law ●●●●●●ed sway in that high Court of Parliament also, the practice and course of that Court showeth plainly, that they are a C●●rt of Justice, without the personal ●re●e●ce of the King Witness their rever●●●● erroneous judgements given in inferior ●●●rt, ●a●●ing illegal Parents, Monopolies granted by the King, and many other: might here be remembered. I have heard it formerly objected, that the House of Commons could not take a Recognizance Pro securitate pacis of themselves, but it was always transmitted to the Lords, therefore this House was no Court of Justice, for this is incident to every Court of Justice that is, of Record; yea a Commissioner of Oier and Terminer, may take a Recognizans as it seemeth, and for proof, the Case in the 1 H. the 7.19, 20. is urged, for there it is expressly said, That the transcript of a Writ of Error upon an erroneous Judgement in the King's Bench shall be brought into the House of Peers, Et per Dominos tantum, & non per communitatem assignabitur seneschallus qui cum Dominis spiritualibus & temporalibus per concilium Justiciar procedet ad errorem corrigendum. Hence it seemeth that the House of Commons of itself cannot examine any Judgement in inferior Courts, and therefore should seem to be no distinct Court of Justice of itself. As also that the House of Commons considered in relation to that joint power of Judicature, that it hath with the House of Lords, cannot take a Recognizans as is before objected, for so it may seem to be employed by this Case.  
I answer, 
Sol.  because the weight of this objection seemeth great, that this Case may be admitted for Law, and yet the power of that High Court of the House of Commons no whit diminished; for this Case must be intended of their joint and entire power of Judicature, 
Co●rts of Justice have no immediate cognizance of each others pro●eedings, but they must be certified hereof and that in a legal way. Certificate implies no immediate cognizans.  for otherwise the House of Lords could take no immediate cognizance or knowledge of the proceed of the House of Commons, nor è converso the House of Commons of the proceed of the House of Peers, but their proceed ought to be legally certified, and by the words in this Record you may see it was done, in relation to that joint power, for the words are, Per Dominos tantum & non per communitatem, etc. Here the Commonalty must plainly be intended as member or part of that High Court, or otherwise the words were merely nugatory; for what need this restriction if the House of Commons were not conjoined with the Lords in intercourse of Justice, but were a distinct Court and several from the House of Peers; it were as much as if the King's Beanch should be restrained from having any immediate Jurisdiction or Cognizans in matters pertaining to the Common Pleas, a thing ridiculous and superfluous, seeing by Law they are mere estranged from any knowledge in this nature of any proceed of each other interlocutory, until judgement given, and then it must legally be brought before them; 
Jurisdiction of Courts.  so that this Case is clearly meant of their joint power, wherein by custom (as saith Sir Edward Cook) the Lords only proceed to reverse or affirm any Judgement upon error, no whit diminishing the Power and Authority of the House of Commons by this, for divers matters may by custom be severally trans-acted by Persons having the same power and authority, 
Transaction by one done, by all representative.  and yet they are in Law trans-acted by all the Members or Judges of that Court representative. 
How the opinion of Sir E. Cook formerly is to be understood, viz. according to their joint power of Judicature.  But I doubt not but the transcript of any Judgement in the King's Bench may be commanded, and that legally too into the House of Commons, and that they may proceed thereupon either to affirm or reverse the Judgement, and that by the power of that high Court, as a several and distinct Court of Justice from the House of Peers, & this Case before remembered to be good Law notwithstanding, but this I leave to the learned. 
The House of Commons may take a Recognizance at a distinct court of Justice.   
Now concerning the Recognizance before touched, there is nothing expressed or employed in this Case, but that the House of Commons, as a several and distinct Court of Justice of itself may take a Recognizance, there is no question of that, for every Court of Record have that power unquestionably, yea, derivative Authority from Courts of Justice, as Commissioners of Oier and Terminer are invested with this Authority. Further, 
The House of Commons may take a Recognizance according to their joint power.  the House of Commons considered in relation to their joint power▪ may take a Recognizance, for so saith good authority, that reverend Judge Brooke, in abridging the said Case of 1 H. 7. before cited, Videtur quod tout un are his very words; besides, if there hath no such practice been or used in the House of Commons, that is no proof, it is no argument from a non esse to a non posse; an hundred precedents Sub silentio make not a Law, it was never yet upon contestation so determined, but of this sufficient. Thus I hope I have cleared this false aspersion, it plainly appearing that they are a High and Supreme Court of Justice, jointly and severally without the King's personal presence.  

The Assembly at Oxford no Parliament.  There hath of late been an Anti-parliament (for so I may term it) erected at Oxford, whereby they had thought to have weakened the power of this Parliament, by Voting their proceed as traitorous and illegal; but alas these are poor shifts and evasions, seeing there is an Act, unto which they themselves this very Session have assented; by which it appears, this Parliament cannot be held, prorogued, or adjournied elsewhere without the consent of both Houses of Parliament now assembled; so that this Assembly at Oxford is no Parliament, and consequently their proceed a mere nullity in judgement of Law, and withal subject to severe Censure, in regard they have assumed to themselves the Supreme Authority of the Kingdom without any warrant of Law so to do: and that spurious generation of Bastards, or illegitimate Children, which seek to sever and divide the Power and Authority of this High Court, by affirming any legal presence of this Assembly elsewhere; the wise salomon's of this Parliament will in their due time bring to condign punishment.  
Well then, they being in Parliament, and a high Court of Justice without the King● personal presence, 
Inferior Courts may command Posse comitatus.  what question can be made of their power, even as a Court of Justice to constrain and compel all persons, yea even by force of Arms, to submit to their supreme Authority; and in case of resistance, if inferior Courts may command Posse Comitatus to execute their Processes and Injunctions, as it is manifest they may, for in one common Case of Replevin from the Court of Common Pleas, the Sheriff of the County as Minister to the Court of Justice, if the party that hath taken a Distress carry the same to a Fort or Castle, to the end it may not be replevied, he may command the power of the County to attend him, and abate that Fortlet or Castle in case of resistance, delivering by Replevin the Cattles to the owner. Surely then the Parliament in case their Power be contemned and disobeyed, may command Posse Regni, and not only Posse comitatus, to bring all persons rebellious unto the Justice of that High Court, there to receive according to their merits. And th●s is the case of this present Parliament (as I take it) who have legally Summoned the Members of both Houses now absent, to attend the Service of the Houses, and they have not appeared, but absolutely refused to obey the Summons, Process, and Power of that Court; which for my part, what offence it is, and where Censurable, I leave it to the world to judge upon, wh●t hath been formerly spoken, there being no absolute case of necessity to plead for their absence (as I could ever yet perceive) and the Laws and Statutes of this Realm being peremptory in the mulct and penalty thereof.  

The King's presence representative by 33. H. 8. supra.  Now peradventure it is necessary to know in what the Royal Assent Personally or Representative is required, and that is plain, in enacting any Law or Statute to make it perpetual to oblige the people; I conceive the Royal Assent must precede, yet the Royal Assent cannot in Justice be denied, neither with a Le Roy s'duisera suspended, unless satisfactory reasons be given for the same unto the Parliament, for the public good, as also the confirmation of them is no act of transcendent grace, but of right and Justice, as hath been formerly spoken.  

The power of the Parliament to make Ordinances paralleled with this power in inferior Courts.  Nay further, it must be granted that as incident to this great Court, they may make Ordinances to bind the people, Sedente Parliamento without any royal assent, unto which Ordinances, although not grounded upon the positive Laws of this Kingdom, the people ought to yield obedience as well as to the Ordinances, 
Ordinances binds until definitive Judgement, though not transacted in plena cur.  Orders, and interlocutory Judgements in other Courts of Justice, unrill definitive or final Judgement, which is for the most part in Plena curia when the Court is full, but that other power is used, although but part of the Court be then sitting, and bindeth all persons until final Judgement; it is also plain, that in other Courts their Orders, Ordinances, 
Ordinances binding though not grounded upon the positive Laws.  and interlocutory Judgements are not grounded always upon the positive Laws, but upon intervenient accidents, arising upon material circumstances of time place, or other emergent causes, which Orders are held by the Sages of the Law agreeable unto equity and Justice, although no express Law to warrant the same. In Chancery many cross Orders, the one to the other in a cause there depending, yea almost seeming contradictory, yet in Law and conscience justifiable; and he that shall disobey those Orders is accounted a rebel unto the Law, the King, and his royal Government, 
Jurisdiction of Courts title Parliament.  as appeareth by the Writ of Rebellion usually in those cases issuing; and Sir Edward Coke affirmeth, this power of Ordinance anciently pertaining to this high Court of Parliament.  
And I know not but they may proceed to definitive Judgement in Causes notwithstanding any thing that hath been formerly spoken, 
The Power of Parliament to proceed unto final Judgement in case of wilful absence of any the Judges of this Court pa●alleld with this power in inferior Court. The Court full in Judgement of the law without those Judges which are wilfully absent.  if any Members of the Houses, who are by Law Judges of this high Court, shall refuse to discharge the trust committed unto them, as the case now is, and wilfully by absence or delinquency make themselves uncapable and unworthy of that great service, for than I conceive it clear that the Court is full in Judgement of Law without them; and under favour, there is no Law in point, but the remaining Judges may proceed by the same authority. For to examine a little the course of inferior Courts of Law, if any one or two of the Judges of the King's Bench, or Common Pleas, shall obstinately recede from that Court, and deny his attendance there for the public, shall not the residue of the Judges transact all matters there depending? Certainly they may, and further they ought so to do. And although for conveniency or conformity, or to the end the Judgement may be the more unquestionable being confirmed by the greater number, the weighty matters are agitated and determined in Plena curia for the most part, yet I take it clear in case of absence, especially wilful or obstinate, the remaining Court may debate and finally sentence all matters incident to their jurisdiction. Indeed in some particular cases, the chief Justice or Judge hath formerly had the sole power as concerning Writs of Error, viz. that the warrant for the issuing out the Writ of Error to the Chancery ought to be under the Teste of the chief Justice of the King's Bench, 
No judicial but ministerial acts by law transacted solely, by any one Judge in inferior Courts. vid. Sup●a.  but that Case or any of the like nature I conceive are only ministerial; but if a Writ be once returned in Court, and so the Cause there depending, no doubt the remaining Judges may judicially hear and determine. Now if so in these lower Courts, we cannot dis-affirme the same in this eminent Tribunal the Parliament, the Court being the model and pattern of all other Courts, the Gnomon that points out the course of the Sun, the course of Justice and equity to all the other Courts, there being no brightness or lustre of Justice in inferior Courts, but resides more fully and more abundantly in that high Court of Parliament.  
So that I conclude, the Parliament may make Ordinances, Orders, give Judgement and Sentence definitively in all matters whatsoever, without the King's personal presence, or any of the Members of either Houses, their absence being such as is formerly declared, and that upon the reason of Law in these riv●lets of Justice, their latitude of power, and the superlative authority considered in themselves and in their course of pr●ceedings, being not so much as intended to be here mentioned, but only by way of comparison or resemblance of the Law in inferior Courts, to make things more conspicuous, not any ways to dishonour this Court, as if it should emendicare justitiam, beg or borrow the rules of Justice from inferior Courts, who ar● but tanquam anc●lle, like handmaids to this Lady and Queen of Justice; as also it is done ea intention to inform vulgar capacities per notiora nobis, by things even subject unto sense, to the end they might (if possible) be satisfied.  
I should now enter into the proof of the violation of this privilege, almost forgotten by this digression, namely the transacting of matters belonging unto this high Court, by the new erect and pretended Parliament at Oxford a greater violation in this particular, then if any inferior Court of Justice in this Kingdom had assumed or arrogated this authority, 
The Assembly at Oxford unwarrantable by law even in their Session, much more in their proceed.  because this Assembly at Oxford have not so much as any colour of Law to warrant even their Session, much less their proceed; the matters there trans-acted and adjudged in derogation and dishonour of this high Court, being so many and numerous; as also the extrajudicial arraignment of the Votes and proceed of this Parliament, but I think it is manifest to all the world, and no man ignorant thereof.  
The many and weighty Remonstrances, Declarations, and Ordinances of this high Court declared, and pronounced null and void at Oxford and elsewhere, by Declarations of his Majesty extrajudicially framed. Much might be spoken herein with much sorrow, and peradventure not without offence, therefore I will desist, and close up my meditations on this particular, protesting nothing but the delivery of the truth with meekness and moderation; and my soul is full of heaviness and lamentation, that ever so unhappy an occasion should be ministered, beseeching God (if it may stand with his Will and Pleasure) to heal all our wounds, and to reconcile all differences with peace.  
There is another right of Parliament yet behind, which requires me not to be silent, as being of all one of the chiefest; by breach of which, the Sword is gone through our Land. Armies of men have been raised, whereby not only violation of Laws, Rights, and Justice, but even the destruction of all is at hand, unless God in his mercy prevent it. In brief, we have seen great forces raised and maintained by the King, without any Law or authority to warrant the same, being (as I suppose) misinformed and unadvised herein, 
The Privilege or right of Parliament.  it being directly against the right and power of Parliament which is this; That no Armies of men can he raised by the King, or any subordinate authority under him, but as the positive Law hath prescribed, unless by consent of Parliament. And here peradventure it will be expected I should speak of the Militia of the Kingdom, 
The Milita absolute or general. Vid. infra.  as being a matter at this time of the highest concernment, but I will refer it to a distinct debate by itself, as you shall perceive hereafter in this discourse; 
The Milita positive, or by the positive Law limited.  and here only that part of the Militia that hath relation to the positive Laws, I will open unto you, and show you even here the transgression of the Law positive, it being not only against the ancient Law of the Land, but llkewise against a Stature, unto which his Majesty hath given his Assent this very Sessions of Parliament.  
The ancient Law of this Land is mentioned in the Preamble of this Statute, viz. That none is compellable to go out of his Shire to the King's wars unless it be in case of necessity, of sudden coming in of strange enemies into this Land, as some Sratures recite the Common Law; and other Statures w● out the word (necessity) in the recitals ●ut, ●e Common Law, but it is not at all material, as you shall see hereafter. The body of this Statute is for the relief of Ireland against those Popish Rebels, 
An Act for the relief of Ireland.  who in a short time have made a populous and rich Kingdom even almost desolate. You have heard the Common Law, which was to secure the Kingdom in case a Parliament could not so speedily be called for the defence thereof; but it is plain, that hereby is intended, 
(Of necessity) some Statutes recite the Common Law thus, others not.  that no man is compelable to serve the King in his wars, against the representative Body thereof, for that is not for the defence of the Land, but for the ruin thereof, they being in no case to be conceived enemies unto the King, or the Realm, but as the supporters, pillars, and maintainers of all justice, and peace in this Commonwealth.  

The Common law now in force touching the Militia extendeth only to Tenors or Contra is.  It appeareth by this Law likewise, that none are compellable to go out of their Shi●es to the Wars, although a sudden incursion of strange enemies, but only those which are bound by Tenure or Contract, and that none others can be forced to serve the King in his wars, unless by grant of Parliament; 
The statute of Winchester seeing down an Assi●e for land, and goods, and that without relation to Tenors or Contracts is now not in force. Vid infra.  and this appeareth evidently by the Statute of 4. of H. 4. 13. a very weighty and worthy Act for our purpose, for that Statute reciteth and confirmeth all the Statutes formerly touching this particular, as namely, 1 E. 3. 5. 18. E. 3. 25. E. 3. which said Statutes recite the ancient Common Law; and this Statute with the others are but declarat● 〈◊〉 the Common Law, so that open t●● estrnce of this Statute, you open the Common Law, and Statute Law touching this particular. Now it appeareth plainly by the exception in this Statute, 
4 H. 4. 13. The exception of Services and Devoires other then Military was not of necessity, but to satisfy those who were not so conusant of the laws, for sure they had not been included, the stile of the Act, is of military services only.  and by the exception likewise in the Statute of 25. E. 3. that none shall be charged to find men of Arms, but only those that hereunto are bound by Tenure or Contract, for the exception always is parcel of the premises, and relateth in Judgement of Law thereunto, therefore the enacting part of these Laws must be only meant of Military services, in respect of Lands holden by such services or devories, and no otherwise; unless you will make the exceptions (which are as it were explanations of the minds of the Law makers) merely frivolous. 
Nota. The exception is of services due by Tenure, therefore so must be the body of this Act intended. This Assize was some ancient law antiquated or not in force, revived by Winchester, b●t Winchester being repealed this Assize is of no fo●●e.  It appeareth thus by the meaning of 1 E. 3. cap. 5. before spoken of, that the Common Law recited, must be intended only of Tenors or Contracts. And further, these words (otherwise then hath been done or used in times passed for defence of the Realm) do partly relate to the Statute of Winchester, which Statute sets down the Assize or proportion of Arms for Lands and goods, and withal is but declaratory of the Common Law or Statute in this, but it proportions the finding of Arms in a way compulsary, which before was not so, so that you see the result of all is this; none but those which are bound by Tenure or Contract are compellable to serve the King in his wars, within the Kingdom or without, and that they only in case of sudden invasion, 
Rebels are not enemies as the words of the common law are  so that it may be further urged upon this Law, viz. (the Common Law before recited) that not only against the Parliament, but even to suppress any private insurrection or rebellion of the Subject within the Kingdom, the King cannot force the Subject out of his Shire, for the words are as formerly you have heard them, unless in case of sudden coming in of strange enemies, etc. and to make the vigour and force of this Law, without doubt such is the judgement of this Parliament in recital of this Law as you may perceive. 

Instit. Sur. Littleton. The Tenure of those that hold by Escuage explained. (This law) viz. the common law recited in 1 E. 3. 5 Service by Escuage to be performed out of the Realm. Sir Edw. Coke, ibid. 1 E. 3. ca 5. good law, none shall be force●, etc. for Escuage, or foreign service is not compulsory by the positive law, but by Parliament; Sir Edw. Coke, f. 69. perhaps is misprin●ed in these words (if the Ten●re be t● go into William, Hiberniam, etc.) and the words should be thu● (if the Voyage Royal be to go, etc. I leave it to the judicious.  
The Law may see●e to include a general Tenure by Knight's service, as a special (as to me it seemeth) but if so, not material since Nulla sequatur pena Sir E. C. f. 69. in his Institutes, where he saith, that (Scocia is put but for example, seemeth to incline that the law is intended of a special Tenure.   Sir Edward Coke seemeth in his Institutes to say, That he that holdeth his Lands by Escuage, is bound to attend the King in his wars out of the Realm, contrary to this Law formerly recited; but his meaning must either be intended where the Tenure is expressed to that purpose, as to go in Scotiam, Hiberniam, Pictaviam, etc. and then it is nothing to impeach this Law, as being intended of general Tenors by Knight's service, etc. or otherwise if his intention be also of a general Tenure by Knight's service, such as draweth unto it Escuage, yet if the Tenant attendeth not Nulla sequatur pena by Law, until the penalty of Escuage for non attendance be assessed by Parliament, so that you see upon the point the Common Law formerly recited is still in force, viz. That none are bound to attend the King in his Wars, either within or without the Realm, unless in case of sudden invasion, unless by their Tenors, if by their Tenors bound to attend him in foreign service (as that is not clearly granted) yet you see no penalty ensues for default thereof, unless the high Court of Parliament impose it, a precedent of which Escuage assessed, 
Service not compulsary, in effect no service.  we have not had since 8. E. 2. no such service penal or compulsary without Parliament, which is in effect as if you should say, No such service at all without consent of Parliament.  
But I will leave the Common Law (I hope) vindicated from all objections, and come we to the Statute itself; and that is, that such number of Soldiers shall be impressed in all Counties of this Kingdom by the Committees for that purpose, as shall be appointed by the King and both Houses of Parliament. This is the substance of the Act, if not the words, and here you may see this Statute is tender of the ancient Birthright and freedom of the subject, for it reciteth it, and withal maketh but a temporary provision for Ireland, 
The statute for the releese of Ireland but temporary. The Common Law only in force for the Militia of thi● Kingdom against all persons except the high Court of Parliament. Vi. infra.  which occasion ceasing, the Common Law hath its force again, so that as to the Realm of England and elsewhere except Ireland, the Common Law hath its force, and is at present effectual against all power and authority either of the King or Subject, but only the supreme authority of Parliament.  
Object. But it may be hence objected, that since this Act extends only to Ireland, therefore the Militia for the service of this Kingdom rests as it did before, not within the letter or sense of this Act.  

Sol. (Implication) for sure the King would not have joined in an Act, if he might have done it legally before. Object.  I answer, if we should admit this which for Argument sake we only do (there being something to be gathered by implication from the words of this Law, touching the power of the Militiia, as appertaining to the Parliament) than the Common Law formerly recited must rule us; and here it is said, The Common Law, That none shall be forced out of their Shires etc. is intended without wages, and therefore if they have pay or wages they may be legally compelled by the King to attend his service in the wars, and so are the Statutes of 1 E. 3. 18. E. 3. and divers others, and the opinion of that reverend Judge Thirninge in the time of H. 4. is so to be intended.  

Sol. No (Innuendo) in private affairs much less in Acts of Parliament allowable.  I answer, first, if this should be granted, it is a strange and dangerous way to expound Laws and Statutes, and to enlarge the meaning of the Lawmakers with an Innuendo, a thing not permitted even in private affairs, much less to be allowed in general and public laws, viz. That they shall not be forced out of their Shires, etc. innuendo without wages, by this course Laws and Statutes shall be wrested, and made a no●e of wax, capable of any form or exposition; but there is one great reason which will make this Objection but mere cavillation, if I have not satisfy! it already, and that is this; That one Session of Parliament, viz. 1 E. 3. confirm; and makes both these Laws. 1 E. 3. ca 5. 
1 E. 3. ca 5.7. explained. 18. H. 6. 19 7. H. 7. 1 3. H. 8. 5●  recites the Common Law before remembered, and confirms it too, 1 E. 3. ca 7. and all other Statutes relating to this Law have these words, or to this effect: That Soldiers 
(a) Impressed, viz. Foreign service not compulsary by the law positive, penal by authority of Parliament,  supra, 1 E. 3. ca 7. may he● also intended of the Impressing that Militia, that was not hereunto bound either by Tenor or Contract; both branches of the Militia, intended by this law, legally raised or impressed, 1 E. 3. ca 7. intended most especially of that general and more absolute power of the Militia, not of the positive Militia, viz. of those that were bound by Tenure, etc.  impressed by the King 
(b) The word (Commission) in the statute of 1 E. 3. ca 7. must be intended, Commissioners derived from the authority of parliament, not any o●her regal Commission; so foreign service might be compulsary, even of those that we●e bound by their Tenors, viz. by such Commissions.  Commission for Scotland, or Gascoigne shall have wages, 
Or foreign service. f. 1. E. 3. 7.  the one Statute is general in the negative, That they shall nor be forced out of their Shires either with wages or without, as the sense is plain to any rational man. The subsequent Law saith, That the King's soldiers shall have wages, so that having wages allowed they may be compelled to serve. Here seems repugnancy or contradiction may be said.  
To reconcile this, and to manifest to the world the honour and wisdom of a Parliament, notwithstanding any aspersion; by the rule of law and reason you must make such exposition of any Law as in all parts may be operative and effectual if it may be, and that each Chapter of a Session of Parliament may have their genuine and proper operation; why then these Statutes Ex viso●ribus actus (an excellent way of expounding Statutes, by comparing and conferring one Statute with the other) are thus to be intended, 
1 E. 3. ca 5. & 7. Statutes differing in matter and substance.  viz. That 1 E. 3. ca 5. and 7. are Statutes differing in matter and substance, the one not having any relation to the other, though they may so seem upon the first view, for 1 E. 3. ca 5. extendeth only to the Militia limited by the positive Laws, cap. 7. to the Militia impressed by authority of Parliament for foreign service, which could not legally be door without this authority, as you have formerly heard, and so the one doth not cross or oppose the other (which of necessity they must do, if other constructions be made) for they treat of several matters, and the sense of Law makes a great disparity between them, though there be a sound of words seeming otherwise; so that 1 E. 3. ca 7. is thus to be intended. The King's Soldiers going in foreign service shall have wages, viz. The King's soldiers legally raised by authority of Parliament, and so there is no violence offered either to the letter or sense of either of these Laws. 
The power of the Militia to be employed by the King in Foreign service with wages, printed, in calvin's Case denied for law.  That which is printed in calvin's Case, a famous Case well known to Lawyers, was but the arguments of Judges, ●o resolutions in this particular, and i● they had been resolutions they had been erroneous, as it is manifest by what is formerly spoken, and by the judgement also of this Parliament, in reciting the ancient Common Law in this particular in force even at this day.  
Much labour hath been spent in one of the King's Declarations to put in (or) for (and) in the Statute of 1 E. 3. 
No necessity but foreign invasion upon the Common Law of the Statutes.  which recites the Common Law, and so to extend that Statute, and the Common Law likewise to home defence, but the truth of it is, there is neither (or) nor (and) in the Statute of 4 H. 4. which is a weighty Statute, and recites the Common Law in this particular, and the Statutes confirming it, for the words of this Statute are, 
Foreign service by statute, this Parliament enacted a f●●tio●●● Home defence.  None shall be forced out of his Shire to the King's Wars, unless in case of necessity of sudden coming of strange enemies into the Realm; thus you see all passages cleared. His Majesty in one of his Declarations saith. That he yielded more willingly unto thi● Act for relief of Ireland, it being no matter of home defence but foreign as being also formerly controverted how groundless the controversy was on the adverse part for disposition of the Militia, for foreign service by the regal authority, you may see by what hath been formerly delivered.  
Also we may reason thus upon this Statute, viz. The Statute for relief of Ireland, that if no forces can be raised by the, King for the defence of a foreign Kingdom, though subject to the Crown of England, a fortiori, they cannot be raised for home defence without consent of Parliament, and certainly if they might be raised, they must be maintained, and what provision hath the Law made for them, verily even none at all: than it follows, that Armies of men illegally raised must be illegally maintained, that is to say, By rapine and oppression.  

Object. Commission of Array.  But it is objected, That the King's forces are raised legally, viz. by a Commission under the Great Seal, commonly called The Commission of Array; 
Sol.  to which I answer, That the Commission of Array is against the fundamental Laws of this Realm, and is neither warranted, neither by Common Law or Statute, or precedent of former times, it being against them all directly forcing men to go out of their Counties, as it is now put in practice, against the ancient Common Law formerly remembered, and to find Arms contrary to the Assize limited in the Statute of Winchester, and subjecting men's bodies and estates to imprisonment, and other penalties imposed by Commissioners for refusal, things not warranted by any Law.  
Object. But it is urged, That the Law of 5 H 4. a Statute not in print, upon which his Majesty grounds his Commission of Array is in force. Indeed, that Statute the King hath made use of in print to public view, for his sole and only warrant of this Commission, but you shall see presently how unsafe a refuge it is, yea how upon the first trial of it, it will not endu●e.  
For in the first place I say, 
Sol.  It is absolutely repealed, and that by the Statute of 21. Jacobi, by which all former Statutes concerning the power of Arraying men are repealed, and then surely Statutes that concern the execution of this power must needs be also repealed, as this of 5. H. 4. is, 
5 H. 4. Depends upon Winchester.  as even reason teacheth; for how can any Statute touching Commissioners Arraying, or arming men stand in force, when the Statute of Winchester, the sole Statute concerning the power of Array is by the Law repealed; but to make it plain to every capacity, the Law of 5. H. 4. is only a Law for the indemnity of Commissioners, putting in execution the Statute of Winchester; Now if the Statute of Winchester be nor in force, this of 5. H. 4. 
5. H. 4. Temporary no statute.  must likewise fall to the ground, because it doth necessarily depend thereupon. Further, this Statute of 5. H. 4. was but temporary, and so expired long ago, or no Statute at all, but a Commission enrolled, or the like, never assented unto, in nature of an Act of Parliament, as is learnedly proved by the Remonstrance of Parliament. Concerning the Commission of Array, I will crave the patience to answer one Objection more particularly, because it seemeth material; and this is made by the Penner of one of the King's Declarations, Object. to wit, that 21. Jacobi repeals indeed the Statute of Winchester, but not 5 H. 4. 
Refutation of the Commission of At●●y by Parliament.  because Winchester is only for preservation of me peace at ordinary times, as also the Assize of Arms in that Act mentioned, a petty and small proportion not suitable or agreeable to extraordinary or great occasions, as sudden invasion, or the like; and therefore 5. H. 4. Authorising a large Commission for the raising and levying of Arms, agreeable to any occasion ordinary or extraordinary must needs be still in force, notwithstanding the repeal of Winchester, they are several Statutes to several ends and purposes; and therefore the repealing of the one repeaseth not the other.  

Sol. Winchester for dese●●e ordinary and extraordinary.  I answer, The Statute of Winchester is intended by the very words and sense of the Law, for defence ordinary and extraordinary, and so is the Judgement of a Parliament, in 3. R. 2. that Winchester was made for the defence of the Kingdom, and the small proportions of Assizes of Arms there mentioned, are but only mentioned for example; Ex●mpla illustrant non testringunt l●gem, Assizes or proportions other then in that Statute limited, and above those proportions are plainly collected from the very words of this Act; as also that Winchester did extend to other proportions was the judgement of the Parliament, 3. R. 2. before specified.  
Come we then to 5. H. 4. that recites the Statute of Winchester, and confirms it, as likewise that the Statute of Winchester was made for the defence of the Kingdom ordinary, 
The very words of 5. H. 4. shows that Winchester was for defence ordinary and extraordinary.  and extraordinary appears by the very words of this Act for defence of the Seacoasts, and that in that case the Statute of Winchester shall be observed: Are the Seacoasts defended but for fear of foreign invasion? which likewise was the cause of making this Act; for but the year before the French attempted to invade this Kingdom: It may be said then, Object. What needs this Act of 5. H. 4. if the Statute of Winchester provided sufficiently for defence of this Kingdom.  
I answer, Sol. That this Act was made to rectify illegal Commissions, not warranted by the Statute of Winchester, and this was the sole end of the making this Act. 
The true sense and effect of the statute, 5. H. 4.  The Commissioners putting in execution the Statute of Winchester, the ancient and only known Assize, 
No doubt the Military Tenure by common law was compulsary, viz. by Distress or the like, to services incident by law.  for Arms compulsary are saved harmless and inpemnified by this Law, notwithstanding their former large and illegal Commissions, and that they shall execute so much of their Commissions as was warranted by this Statute of Winchester and no more, and for not executing the other illegal clauses in their Commissions, at the making of this Act issued forth, the Commissioners are saved harmless and indemnified by this Act; so that you see 5. H. 4. depends upon Winchester notwithstanding the former objection. Eradicate a Plant you destroy the branch, so the repeal of the Statute of Winchester repeals 5. H. 4. as necessarily depending upon it.  

(Out of their shi●es) viz. unless in case of sudden invasion.  The conclusion of all is this; The ancient Common Law formerly recited is now in force, none could be forced to find Arms, or serve in person, but those that were thereunto bound by their Tenors of Contracts, nor those any further, or otherwise, that is to say, out of their Shires, or with proportions of Arms greater than they were bound unto, by their Tenors or Contracts; yea it appears that by the Common Law Arms were proportioned, he which held by a Knight's Fee was to find a man in Arms, and so proportionally De coeteris, and therefore Winchester did but affirm the Common Law in this, or further enlarge it, as also make the proportions of Arms more penal and compulsary then before. 
The statute of Winchester sets down an Assize for land; and goods, the common law extended only to lands, and only to such lands as were bound thereunto by Tenure: by this statute all lands are tied to find Arms proportional, but whether those that we bond by Tenure were to be Assessed by the Act, and so charged with a double proportion of Arms. In The ancient Assize in this statute mentioned, was surely some law antiquated or not in force, or at least not compulsary, therefore Winchester revives it, the common awe for Tenuures is now in force only.   
Now Winchester being repealed, there is neither Common Law nor Statute to force any man to the finding of Arms, but only those that are bound unto it by their Tenors or Contracts; and that thus the Law is taken, upon all these Statutes concerning finding of Arms appears by Sir Ed. Co●e, in the secon● part of his Instit. f. 528. in his Exposition of the Statutes of confirmations Chartarum libertatum, for he concludes the Law to be, that no man shall be charged to Arm himself or others, save such as hold by such service of the King, or other Lords, whereby they are bound to it, unless it be by consent of Parliament; and further saith, that that was the Common Law which these Statutes did affirm.  
There is one Objection more, Object. and it is strangely and much insisted upon by his Majesty, in one of his Declarations for he maintenance of his Commission of Array, and for the nullifying of all these positive Laws formerly spoken of, and that is upon a Statute in force, the Statute of 11. H. 7. ca 1. 
11. H. 7. ca 1.  a late Statute and subsequent to all these, by which the service of the Subject in the King's Wars, both within the Kingdom and without, is recited, and the Subject charged therewith, according to their duty of Allegiance.  
I answer, Sol. this opened will likewise prove nothing, 'tis but the preamble of the Act, and all the doubt will rest upon these words formerly mentioned.  
The Subject's attendance on the King in his Wars (either within the Kingdom or without) may plainly be intended according to the positive Laws formerly remembered; 
The words of the preamb e.  for some especially by their Tenors were bound to attend in foreign service, as where their Tenors were to attend in Scotiam Pictaviam, etc.  

Commandment of the King what it intends.  (The Commandment of the King) here mentioned, may either be intended according to their Tenors for foreign service, or otherwise the Commandment may be taken for his legal command, not his personal, and that you have heard what it is, the command of his high Court of Parliament, 
Nota.  and so what question of the Impressing men for foreign service; but the Regal command according to their special Tenors, is that, which in my judgement is full and satisfactory.  

According to the duty of their Allegiance explained. Alleg viz. natural, legal, local.  Come we then to those words (according to the duty of their Allegiance) the Subject's Allegiance is natural, local, and legal, but the natural and legal Allegiance is here intended, and what is the legal Allegiance, you shall see likewise is the natural; therefore the legal Allegiance opened ends all.  

Legal Allegiance what it is, viz. the positive Militia.  The legal Allegiance is that personal service which the Subject oweth unto his Sovereign by the municipal Laws of this Kingdom; and that you have heard at large formerly what it is, I need not use repartition. 
Legal Allegiance and natural agree.  Now the natural Allegiance and legal differ not, but rather the legal Allegiance is explanatory of the natural, for the Law saith, That the Subject shall serve the King in his Wars Salvo contenemento, viz. Secundum starum & facultates, a respect being had to every man's state, property, faculty, or ability; and to that purpose was the Common Law, and the Statute of Winchester limiting the Assize of Arms, viz. Secundum starum & facul●ates, what saith the natural Allegiance otherwise, but that every man shall attend the King's Pers●n in his Wars, according to his state and ability, if other construction should be made, the Law natural should be unjust, and without care and preservation of the Common Wealth, if the imposition of this charge were not ●●br●o respectu, to every man's property, state, and faculty. Thus you see what is meant by (the duty of their Allegiance within this Statute, 
Legalis ligeantia a●p●ex.  peradventure it may be urged, there is another branch of the legal) Allegiance also, viz. when men be impressed for the service of the King by the authority of the high Court of Parliament, without a●y such special relation to their Tenors, or Estates, or to the positive Laws. I grant, 
This Alleg●ance is likewise ●abito respestu ad statum, etc. agreeing with the ot●er legal, as also with the natural, for otherwise Acts of parliament should be unjust. One branch only of the legal Allegiance intended by 1. H. 7. ca 1. viz. the Allegiance due by the positive law.  this is the legal Allegiance likewise, but this Allegiance is not intended in the Act of 11 H. 7. before specified, for that Allegiance must necessarily be meant t●e Allegiance due by the positive Laws, and to other, because it is not the duty of the Subjects Allegiance, but what is positive or in esse; the other is not the duty of t●e Subject, neither is it any Allegiance at all until by Parliament it be so enjoined, but tests in the interim in nubibus, or in consideration of Law; therefore the llegall positive Allegiance, viz that which is due by the positive Laws ●●ely is intended by this Statute.  
If it were taken in the other sense in this Statute (as it is plainly otherwise) 
Nota.  yet it would not advantage the other part, 
All statutes penned in such general words, as this is, intent only the legal positive Allegiance as before.  but bring them a little nearer to the Parliament, and their power and authority, which they so much decline.  
What shall we then say unto Armies of men thus illegally raised by the King, viz. dirctely against all these positive Laws formerly remembered; Can we in Law or conscience aid or assist them? By Law we cannot as you see, then surely we cannot in conscience, 
Humane laws enjoined to be observed by Scripture,  the Law of this Land binding the conscience to obedience, and the observance of these humane Laws, being so often in the holy Word of God Commanded; and for this reason as I conceive, these forces thus raised, 
Rebels and Traitors not raised by lawful authority.  are termed by a Declaration of Parliament, Rebels, and Traitors, because not raised by lawful authority; and surely if Rebels and Traitors, they are to be suppressed, not assisted, and that men may be Rebels and Traitors, and decline from their duty of Allegiance, although they follow the King's Person in the Wars, appears by the foresaid Statute of 11. H. 7. ca 1. the words of the Statute are for defence of the King and the Land; and therefore if against the Land, as it must be, 
Traitors though att nding the King's Person in the Wars by 11. H. 7. ca 8.  if against the Body representative, the Parliament, it is Treason within thi● Law, although they attend the King's Person in the Wars; and this is that Statute which his Majesty hath frequently made use of in divers printed Declarations of his, whereby he would seem to exempt all those that attend his Person in the wars from any impeachment; but surely this Statute will not aid him, for it is apparent by the Proviso of this Statute, 
Proviso. Explanation of the Proviso.  that there is a declining from the duty of their Allegiance although they follow the King's Person in his wars, otherwise the Proviso were merely idle, but to explain it yet ●urther, 
Proviso relates always to the body of the Act in the judgement of the law.  The Proviso relates to the body of the Act, the body of the Act is only to exempt those that attend the King's Person in the wars, and do him true and faithful service for the defence of his Person, and the Land. 
Service done unto the King in defence of the land is the legal positive Allegiance within this Act.  Here you see Allegiance is meant in the Proviso, viz. the service done unto the King in defence of the Realm, provided, that none shall take benefit of this Act, that shall decline from the duty of his or their Allegiance; that is to say, that shall not do true and faithful service un●o the King, and the Land, as is mentioned in the Act; and the word (None) in the Proviso is plain, 
(None) relates to the body of the Act. No Traitor by law can have any benefit of law.  viz None that shall attend his Person in the wars shall take benefit of this Act, if he shall decline from the duty of his Allegiance, and in this sense it must be taken and in no other; for future crimes it cannot extend unto other then mentioned in this Act, since by Law they are made uncapable of the benefit of any Law, if transgressors of the Law; Frustra legis auxilium implorat, 
This Proviso but explanatory.  qui in legem committit, and therefore this Proviso idle, if so understood; unless you will tax a Parliament to be misconusant of the Laws. Further, this Proviso (as it seems to me) is but explanatory of the Act, and was not absolutely necessary to be inserted, 
This Allegiance upon this 〈◊〉 hath relation only to the positive law. Vi. ante. The subjects Allegiance unto the natural capacity of the King in respect of the politic.  for certainly they had been included in the body of the Act as uncapable of benefit thereby, if no such Proviso had been at all. What need I say more, the meaning of this Law is very well delivered by the Parliament in their Declaration concerning Hull. Here I might touch and that not extravigantly upon the Allegiance Royal, unto what capacity of the King it is due. You see a man may decline from the duty of his Allegiance, and yet follow the King's Person; therefore the Allegiance is not due unto the natural Person of the King only, but it is due unto the natural in respect of the politic capacity, and that you see is the Judgement of this Parliament. The Subject's Allegiance may be declined, and yet the natural Person of the King attended; and withal note, that in these times this is declaimed against as a Jesuitical distinction, and yet the judgement of a Parliament.  
Object. But it is further urged, That the penalty of this Law is remitted, and pardoned by the King.  
Sol. I answer, That the King's pardon availeth not here, 
Statute, made pro bono publico cannot be by any (non ●bstante) dispensed withal.  for the Proviso expressly excludeth all men from benefit of this Act, be it by the King's Pardon or otherwise, if they shall decline from the duty of their Allegiance, and this being an Act for the service and defence of the Realm cannot be dispensed withal by any, Non obstante, in the King's Pardon, as it is to those that pe●use the Laws, manifest. I will yet crave further patience in the aforegoing particular, in the arraying and arming of men, and show you how tender the Law is herein, in a Statute in 1 Mar. 12. 
No Warlike appearance without authority of la●, but pun shable.  (I take it) If an Assembly of men were made to do any unlawful Act, as to throw down Enclosures or the like, and did not departed within a short time after Proclamation, they were Ipso secto, without any further Act done, adjudged Relons by Law, and to suffer death; so tender is the Law of any Assembly, especially in any Warlike manner, to do any unlawful Act.  
Nay further, 
No Warlike appearance without authority of la●, but punishable.  it is a thing unlawful for any men to Assemble themselves together, or to go or ride armed in a Warlike manner, although no evil intention appears, unless they do it by lawful authority or command; to go or ride armed in Fairs or Markers is the forfeiture of their Armour, and the●r bo●y imprisonable by 2. E. 3. ca 3. 
2 E. 3. ca 3.  and yet to evil intention appears; and so are other Statures, that no man shall go or ride armed upon penalties of Fire and Imprisonment, except the King's Ministers in doing their Office, and (I take it) these Statutes last mentioned, 
The King lineal servants are here only intended; his ●●nisters of Justice are specially here named by themselves Vi. infra.  though ancient are still in force. Indeed the King's servants are there spoken of in one of these Statutes, and withal there are these words subsequent (in presence of the King) so that the King's servants in his prese●●e may go or ride ar●ed: but those either for their paucity were not then, nor are now considerable, or otherwise they were enabled in those times of danger for the preservation of the Peace and the King's Person against disturbers thereof.  
By the ancient Law and Custom of the Parliament, a Proclamation ought to be made in Westminster Hall, That no man, upon pain to lose all that he hath, should during the Parliament in London, Westminster, or the Suburbs thereof, wear any privy Coat of Plate, or go armed; and the reason hereof was, That the Parliament should not be disturbed, nor the Members thereof (who are to attend the arduous and urgent business of the Church and Common Wealth, should not be withdrawn from their service. Thus you see, how tender the Law is of any Warlike appearance. What shall we then think of great numbers of men in a Warlike Assembly armed, not in London, Westminster, and the Suburbs thereof, but even at the doors of the Parliament, environing the House of Commons, as it was since the Commencement of this Parliament  
Object. But it is urged, That the King is compelled to raise an Army for his own necessary defence, his Royal Person, Honour and Estate; all which are now endangered and exposed even to ruin and destruction.  
Sol. Admit the truth of these aspersions unquestionable, Who shall be Judges of these dangers, and the inevitable necessity of raising an Army? Surely no particular or private persons, 
No particular person. The Clergy no Judge.  no not the Clergy themselves, who have in these unhappy times (some few only excepted) broken down the wall of partition and separation; I mean have intruded upon the Civil Government, and have obtruded upon the People in their Writings and Sermons; those Positions and Maxims which admitted, would shake, if not ruin the very basis and foundation of this famous Government. 
The King n●●udge, or at least not sole Judge.  Many they are which I could here mention, but I conceive it done out of ignorance, being not willing to discover errors (as I hope) not wilfully committed. Nay, the King himself cannot be the sole Judge, so hath it been declared and adjudged in a like Case; the very same in Law and reason this Parliament in a full Session, when the King and all the Members were then present in M. Hampdens' Case concerning Ship-money, where the Opinion of the Judges, 
The King no sole Judge of the danger of the Realm.  together with the Judgement given in the Exchequer Chamber (That the King was sole Judge of the danger of the Kingdom, of sudden invasion of Enemies, or the like; and might compel his subjects to provide ships for so long time as he should think meet, whereby the subject was forced to contribute great sums of money) was reversed, damned, and sentenced as erroneous and illegal, destructive to the liberty of the subject, and contrary to the Fundamental Laws of this Realm.  
Now if any man shall say, Object. It is for the defence of the King's Person, and that even the Laws of Nature and reason warrant; and surely the Laws of this Kingdom repugn not the Laws of Nature and reason.  
Sol. I answer, that the Laws of this Realm provide sufficiently for the Person of the King, and for the security thereof, it being high Treason by Law to compass or imagine, by any overt Act the destruction of the King, although not effected, not so in the Case of the subject. Further, if you consider him according to the Law of Nature, than the case is no more but as the Case of a private man or person, who may Vim vi repellere, even by 2 multitude of persons.  

(King) intends the politic capacity, not the natural.  But our Inquisition at this time is not in this capacity, but our question is of a King constituted by Law, and the policy of man, and therein that capacity, he can do no more than what the Law doth warrant, Id Rex potest quod de jure potest, and therefore you see an end of this objection. Then to revert to our Discourse; by Law (it seems) the Parliament are the Eyes of the Body Politic, 
The King no Judge, or no sole Judge in Parliament by the law of inferior Courts proved.  and are the only great Counsel of the King and Kingdom, whereof the King is the head; and they are to Judge of all dangers to the King or Realm, and the King himself is not the Judge, and we see it is so in all other Courts of Justice; the King Judgeth not nor meddleth at all either in matters concerning himself or any other, there being Judges by Law appointed for that purpose, by whose Wisdom the King seethe, discerneth, discovereth, redresseth all errors, grievances or injuries, private or public, particular or general; how then can the King be sole Judge in this Case, of the necessity of raising an Army, although it were in his own just defence, without his Great and High Court of Parliament approve of the same? Is not this a violation of the Law and Government established? Ought not they at leastwise to concur in judgement before any such Forces or Armies of men can be raised, and this only by the Law of inferior Courts? The consideration hereof being of such high concernment, that the proceed and actions of all other matters seem in comparison hereof not at all material: nay, if the King might be sole Judge in this Case, although the danger real and just, this mischief and inconvenience would follow; 
Great mischief and inconvenience of the King should be sole Judge, viz. of the danger of the Realm.  That the King in an Act of such high consequence for the general good, contrary to his actions and proceed in all other Courts, even in matters of least moment, as is before mentioned, might upon surmise or suggestion of danger to his Royal Person, without any further consultation with his high Court of Parliament, raise, and maintain an Army of men how numerous soever, and justify the same as warranted by the Laws of this Realm, to the great impoverishment of the subject, and not without great peril (that I say no more) even to the very Principles of this well compacted government. Shall we imagine such a power and authority by Law vested in the King, in derogation of his high Court of Parliament, as makes the rules of Law and Justice merely Arbitrary, as in those particulars afore specified we must needs grant, and yet in inferior Courts, the same rules in Arbitrary Government, no where warranted or allowed; but contrary wise, their proceed obliging both King and people to a mutual observance, by a legal power and authority to that purpose settled in them? This were repugnant even to sense.  
Now to sum up this point, if the King cannot leavie or maintain any Forces by Sea or Land, as is formerly proved, though for defence of the Realm or his Person, upon his own Judgement or apprehension of danger; What shall we then say to this effusion of blood, the Authors and fomenters of this intestine War, shall they be protected? Surely at some men's hands this blood will be required; and though they may here escape, yet righteous judgement must be expected hereafter.  

Papists enabled, nay compelled to bear Arms contrary to the laws, viz. 3. Jacobi 5.  Also this matter seemeth more to be aggravated, since in this late great and numerous Army of the King, those persons who are prohibited by Law to come within ten miles of the Court, disabled by Law to bear Arms within this Kingdom, contrary to the Kings own solemn Protestations made unto his Parliament, are enabled, nay commanded to bear Arms to the destruction of the King's subjects; I mean the Popish Party in this Kingdom, whose doctrine and practices both to King and State, in most execrable Treasons; and impious Conspiracies, hateful both to God and man, are sufficiently manifest to all the world, and need not here to be remembered.  
Now there being such a cloud of Witnesses as is afore specified, 
Common Law Stat. judgement of this Parliament proving the Armies Illegal.  viz. the Common Law, the Statute Law, the Judgement of this Parliament in Master Hampdens' Case, the very same in Law and reason convincing any capacity in the certainty of this truth, that these Armies now maintained by the King are not warranted by Law. What shall I say more, yea, what shall we think of this Commission of Array, 
Commission of Array destructive of Parliaments.  upheld by our opposites? What is this likewise but a mere usurpation, a plain violation of the Laws; and what would follow if this doctrine should be admitted, but a final dissolution of Parliaments? For what would they then serve for, if Armies of men may (contrary to the positive Laws) be raised without them? They would be at the best but (as the tyrannical Bishop of Rome formerly boasted) Puteus inexhaustus, an ever springing Fountain, to satisfy the ambitious desires of the mighty with the riches and wealth of the people; nay, peradventure Aides, Taxes, and Impositions would be had at pleasure, and the people by force compelled to slavish obedience, as we have found by sad experience, too dear bought in a branch of these Dominions, the unfortunate Kingdom of Ireland, where the insolency of the Soldiers was such, yea, even in the times of Peace, in the time of the late Earl of Strafford, that the Laws were slighted and trodden under foot, and the Paper Decrees of the Castle Chamber put in execution by these Agents in Arms, forcing the poor subject to obey whatsoever was in this wicked and illegal manner commanded; what difference now betwixt the Turkish Government and this new devised Monarchy, of these Dreamers, the lives and estates of all men, being subjugated to misery and inevitable destruction; but God in his good time discover these evil instruments, and bring them to Justice, who labour to involve so great a Prince into inextricable error and calamity. I promised moderation, therefore I will say no more, but will divert my meditations to the period of this discourse, as thinking I have satisfied mine own conscience, it not others, in so large a debate hereof.  
Object. There is one great Objection made by the adverse part, which if answered, this particular is satisfied; And that is, By what authority are the forces of the Parliament raised? Seem they not as illegal, as unwarrantable? Sol. To which I answer, That the Parliament themselves in their Declarations which I have seen, make it only on their part defensive, there being an Army intended against them, full four years since the Army raised against the Scots, and afterwards for this purpose employed to awe this Parliament, and to force them to consent unto such Articles framed by evil persons, touching the Government of this Kingdom; which appears by the Depositions of divers persons of note and quality, annexed to a Remonstrance of Parliament, 19 Maii 1642. which sure was long before an Army raised by the Parliament, or thought upon, the King being then present at Parliament; and I will not say it was by his privity or knowledge: Only thus much I will say, That this Act was alone sufficient to breed jealousies and fears in the Parliament, and to provide further for their defence and security. Afterwards this was increased by the Kings coming to the House of Commons in that unusual manner to demand the Members, affrighting the Assembly there present, who upon request were denied a Guard. Afterwards his Majesty at York, at Nottingham, had a considerable Army of men, to the number of four or five thousand (as I have credibly heard by those that were then there present) and all this while no Army of the Parliament appearing, that I did hear of, only speeches to that purpose. Now upon all these proceed, the Parliament for their own defence, the King's Royal Person and Authority, the defence of the rights and liberties of the Subject, raised an Army, under the command of his Excellency Rob. Earl of Essex, which whether or no defensive, or justly done, I leave it to the world to judge upon, that which hath been formerly spoken. But to make a more full answer, and to square my course in these Treaties by the positive Laws, to stop the mouths of clamorous people. 
The raising of Forces by the Parliament justified as a Court of Justice.  The Parliament and either of the Houses must be admitted to have supreme power of Judicature, without the King's Personal presence, as the Rolls and judicial proceed thereof sufficiently manifest, as is formerly spoken; and if so, than they have power to Summon, Censure, and judge all Delinquents, yea, force them to submit to the Justice of that high Court upon contempt, by enjoining Posse commitatus, yea Posse Regni, to execute their Commands against all disobedient persons, unto the Justice and Government of this Kingdom, and this merely by the Law of inferior Courts, as I have formerly remembered; therefore this shall be sufficient.  

Object. Legislative power just.  There is one thing that scruples the minds of Malignants much, and that is, That the Parliament have hitherto proceeded by a mere legislative power, and not by the positive Laws, and that they instance in the Case of the late Earl of Strafford. 
Sol.  To which I answer, first, That if they did so it were but just, according to the Supreme power of that Court, but to descend to our Adversaries, and to search all the Foxes Holes, that they may have no refuge. I take it clear: that in the Case of the late Earl of Strafford, they did proceed against him, but according to the positive Laws in respect of the Crime, 
The Common law of this Realm is in force in Ireland, and all statutes enacted before 10. H. 7. in this Realm are in force in Ireland. vid. Poynin●● ley.  though his trial might seem somewhat differing, for surely either by the Common Law, or by the Statute of 25. E. 3. or by the Statute of 28. H. 6. as I remember, a Statute made and enacted in the Kingdom of Ireland, he was justly attainted of High Treason; as for the Act of Attainder, and the Proviso thereof, that it should be no precedent for the future, the meaning whereof I will open unto you hereafter; certainly it was not for want of Crime or Delinquency, as ignorant people and disaffected falsely say; For a little to debate this particular in mine own apprehension, and no further, because I have not lately seen this Act. 
(Act) vid. the act ●f Attainder of of the Earl of Strafford  He was at first by Bill in the House of Commons Voted a Traitor, which Bill was transmitted to the Lords for their concurrence therein; but the Lords being doubtful De jure not De facto, as they were at the first, in the Case of the late Prelate of Canterbury, to wit, whether he were guilty of high Treason by the Positive Laws or no, therefore for their satisfaction he was tried in Westminster Hall per pares, by his Peers upon their Honour, according to the course of the positive Laws; a L. Steward being appointed, & found guilty there of high Treason. Upon these proceed was the Act of Attainder drawn up, wherein the Clause afore mentioned was inserted, viz. That this Act of Attainder should be no precedent for the future, which I conceive must be intended either in respect of the Trial or Judgement itself; 
The Act or Judgement includes the trial or proceed in law.  and although the clause should mention the Act, and not the proceed thereupon, it is all one as if it had in sense of Law, for the proceed and the trial are included and involved in the Judgement, and therefore the Act of Attainder or Judgement comprehends all depending thereupon. Reverse a Judgement at Law, you reverse all the proceed without any mention of them, therefore they are included. Now the trial was unusual, for in the House of Commons, he was tried in a Parliamentary way in the House of Peers by the Common Law in Westminster Hall. Further, this Clause might have a retrospect unto the Act or Judgement, for the Judgement was unusual, at least not necessary in this respect, he was by the positive Laws proceeded against, Judgement might have been given against him by the Parliament; which Judgement should have been entered into the Rolls of Parliament, 
Unto a Judgement by Statute all men are privy.  according to the course of other Courts of Justice, but to be attainted by Act this was more full and satisfactory, both to the offender, and to others in this respect, that all men are privy and consenting unto this Judgement either personally or representatively, and therefore all men must rest satisfied: but to return to our former Discourse, and not to detain you any longer with mine own fancy, as some may say, This I will confidently aver, he was by the Law positive adjudged a Traitor for levying war in the Kingdom of Jreland, 
His person here subject for offending against a positive law, viz. 25. E. 3. as also for offending against a Statute there made, viz. 2●. H. 6. and his possessions in both Kingdoms clear liable by both statutes. The Act of 25. E. 3. is in force in Ireland, either by virtue of Poynings law, or else by the ancient common law of England which is in force in Ireland 25 E. 3. is b t of the ancient common law declaratory. C●m. ●lees of the Crown, Tit. Treason. Treason against the law.  against the very Law itself; for he that goeth about to alter the Law or Government, or to oppose it in any hostile or compulsary way, as it was proved manifestly he did, is a Traitor, within 25. E. 3. and leavieth war against our Sovereign Lord the King, as the words of that Statute are for levying war against the Person of the King, is included in the first branch of the Act, of compassing or imagining the King's death, as the learned know; therefore this Clause of levying war against the King, if taken in the literal sense, were not so necessary, but because of some great authority in this particular which I have seen; I will conclude, that if taken in the sense against the the Person of the King, yet it is also and most principally a levying war against the Laws and Government; a secret which ignorant people know not, for they think no Treason can be but against the Person of the King; now lest any man being impeached of High Treason, should claim the benefit of this Act, which peradventure would prove inconvenient; I conceive this clause for some of these reasons added unto this Act. But some will say, That his ignorance of the offence, Object. and his good intentions to his Majesty and the State were a sufficient Apology, the which he confirmed by his Speech unto the people at his death.  
I answer, If it were so admitted, Sol. yet ignoruntia juris non excusat, yea the meanest crime of the meanest person is not hereby extenuated in Law, but this was a crime of an eminent person, the highest offence in Law, and of dangerous consequence.  

All Courts of Justice have their Seals, viz. C. B. Ble●oy, this hath ●●one but this Ergo.  There are some Rights of Parliament yet behind, as namely, the attendance of the great Seal necessarily upon this Court, their claim and disposition likewise of the Militia, the Navy, Forts, and Magazines for the defence of the Kingdom; as also of the great Offices of the Realm, all these, nor any of them being the Kings unboubted right, Object. as he claimeth them. For to begin with the Militia, which (some may say, hath been formerly debated) in showing his Majesty's raising of Armies illegal and unwarrantable, and therefore here it will be but repartition.  

Sol.  I answer, if it were so, yet this being a matter now controverted of so high consequence, it should not seem ungrateful; Que repetita placent, decies repetita placebunt, but to dispossess you of this fancy, you shall find it not so, the discourse of it here you will find in a larger notion (though very brief) then before it was spoken of, as having in the former debate relation only to the positive Laws, viz, how those that were bound by Tenure or Contract to Military services could be enforced out of their Shires, 
Th● Commission of Array useth this power, Vi. ante.  which are but a paucity, in respect of those which are not impressed by a more absolute power, being neither by Tenure nor Contract bound thereunto, and this power hath been made use of both by King and Parliament, at this time most especially; therefore here I will speak of the Militia of the Kingdom in general, comprising those that are bound by Tenure, as others also; and show you in whom the disposition of the other branch of the Militia, 
No positive law vests the Militia of the Kingdom in the King personally. Vi. ante. Two branches of the Militia extraordinary, absolute ordinary, or limited by the positive law.  viz. that which is limited by the positive Laws, is vested and settled by Law, which (I take it) is not so plainly expressed before, The Militia therefore is apparent to be of a twofold consideration, extraordinary and absolute, or more general, ordinary and limited by the positive Laws. Object. But some may say, This will not be proper discourse here, the debate of this extraordinary and absolute Power of the Militia, it being out of the compass of the positive Laws, which I have promised should be the only square and rule of this discourse. 
Sol.  But you will find it here necessary to speak somewhat of this, as giving great light in this other branch of the Militia; and withal it is a rule in Law, that the best way to expound the meaning of any Law, 
Two parts of every statute or law remedial.  is to show you what the Law was before, for by that means you shall come to understand the two main parts of every Law remedial. The mischief usually mentioned in the Preamble, and the purview or enacting part specified in the body of the Act.  
It is conspicuous therefore enough, that this absolute and more general power of the Militia was always in the Parliament, only what was communicated by Parliament, 
Ratio. Why the absolute power of the Militia in Parliament, and not in the King, or any subordinate to him.  be it to the King or his subordinate Ministers, was always by positive Laws or Statutes limited; yea, to what purpose had been the many positive Laws concerning the Militia, viz. That none shall be compelled otherwise then the positive Laws, 
Nota.  prescribed to Military services, if this more absolute and supreme power of the Militia had rested still in the King; What had these Statutes enacted? Verily, even nothing at all: had they limited and restrained all persons without exception, 
Two estates of one thing, viz. absolute and limited in law repugnant and contradictory.  the King as well as his Ministers, and yet had this unlimited power remained in the Regal Authority, the King should have had in one right and capacity two Estates or Powers of one and the self same thing, viz. of the Militia absolute and limited, a principle so repugnant and contradictory, that even common sense rejecteth it; it is as if one should say, A man is restrained of his full liberty, and yet may make excursions abroad wheresoever he pleaseth.  
Further, if this absolute power of t●e Militia of this Kingdom had been an incident unto the Royal prerogative, 
No statute mention any thing in this nature, vi●. guest. or debate.  would his Majesty and his Royal Predecessors from time to time have divested themselves of this Royal Robe, and have yielded to have been limited by the positive Laws touching the Militia? yea, without any contradiction or reluctation, for aught that is apparent, if this absolute power of the Militia had been his undoubted Right and Prerogative? It is a thing so unquestionable it needs no further answer.  
But that which must stop all contradiction, 
Nota.  or cavillation rather in this particular is; That the King himself in none of his printed Declarations claimeth that absolute power in the Militia, but groundeth his Commission of Array, 
Vi. an●e.  as also all other his proceed in this nature upon the positive Laws, viz. upon the Statute of 5. 
Both these Statutes repealed, the common law only in force.  H. 4 formerly at large spoken of; by which Statute if it were in force at this day he had no power in the Militia, but as the Statute of Winchester had prescribed and limited, as formerly you have heard. Which Statute of Winchester would in no sort warrant this illegal Commission of Array, grounded upon 5 H. 4. as I take it clear.  
To give you an instance material by this Commission of Array, they may be forced out of their Shires, but not by Winchester, as I conceive, unless in case of sudden coming in to this Land of enemies according to the Common Law, for Winchester in this without question affirmeth the Common Law, 
Nota.  though it doth also enlarge the Common Law in the assize or proportion of Arms, making all estates both of lands and goods liable to the Assize there prescribed. By Winchester the assize is certain, 
Commissions of the King grounded upon Winchester formerly, for Arraying men according to the statute; no Commission at this day warrantable upon this statute, nor any other positive law. If any Regal Commission for Arraying men warrantable at this day, it must be only upon the ancient common law recited in stat. 1. E. 3. ca 5 relating only to Tenors. Nota.  no latitude to Commissioners to assess whom or how they please: But by this Commission of Array no certain. Assize of Arms, but left to the discretion of Commissioners. But to return to our former discourse, and to add one thing more; 
General laws Pro bono publico bind the King, though not expressly named, W. 2. 13. E. 1. Also the King by assenting to these laws, seemeth implicitly to acknowledge it in Parliament.  If this absolute power in the Militia had been his Majesty's ancient and undoubted Right, yet it is clear he had been debarred and foreclosed thereof by these positive Laws, yea and constant usage in all times hath manifested this as an undoubted truth, for Commissions Regal have for the most part issued forth upon these positive Laws, and where they have been unwarrantable, they have been in all ages complained of in Parliament, and rectified. Hence I conceive it is apparent, 
Ratio. Why the general or absolute Power of the Militia in Parliament, a Parte ante, viz. before the positive laws touching the Militia. Et nota.  that either a Parte ante, a part post, this absolute or general power in the Militia is vested in the Parliament, but I rather am persuaded to conceive it was vested in Parliament a Parte ante, viz, even before any of these positive Laws, otherwise so great a Prerogative (if it had been justly pertaining to the Regal Dignity, would not have been so easily parted withal. 
The positive or the Militia limited by the positive laws. The ancient common law is the only law positive now in force touching this Militia, for Winchester is repealed.  Then we will leave this branch of the Militia as pertaining to the high Court of Parliament only, and we will come to the other branch of the Militia, viz. that which is limited by the positive Laws, viz. the ancient Common Law, that being only in force at this day. For this Branch of the Militia therefore, and the constituting of the high Sheriff of the County, who hath the power of this Militia, so fare as it hath relation to the positive Law, yea and in some manner participating also of that great and absolute power, 
The positive Militia in the Sheriff, yea and some shadow of the absolute or general Militia in him also.  for he may compel any man within the County, but no further for the preservation of the peace thereof, to attend the defence thereof, even those that are neither bound by Tenure nor Contract, although the King hath used to constitute and appoint him by Patent. This is but usage clearly for what is not warranted by 9 E. 2 De vicecomitatibus is but usage, 
Nota.  therefore the election of such a number by the Judges in the Exchequer, the presenting them to the King, and his election of one of them, I leave unwarranted by this Law. Indeed the Letters Patents granted by the King unto this great Officer of his Office, I take it are warranted by this Statute Tacitè, or by way of incidence or dependency, for all great Offices are to be authorized under the great Seal by Law.  
But peradventure it may be objected, Object. that Sir Edw. Coke saith in his Magna Charta, f. 55. That the persons chosen by the Judges in the Exchequer, and the King's election of one of them, are warranted by some Statute in that behalf, and not by bare usage only.  
To which I answer, Sol. That it is of great weight, because it was the opinion of the Judges of England in H. the 6. his time; but note that Sir Edw. Coke delivereth no opinion upon it himself, neither is this Statute mentioned, either by the Judges at that time, nor by Sir Edward himself, but only so left; but certainly the Statute intended must be 9 E. 2. De vicecomi●: And it may further be said, That it is a rule of Law, that Optimus legum interpres es● consuetudo, and therefore this constant usage since the said Statute is an interpretation of it. But what if we should grant this, you are still never the nearer the purpose, 
The Militia positive in whom by law vested.  for here is only a bare nomination or election of the Sheriff, no right of the Militia. Concerning therefore the election of the high Sheriff of the County, there is no negative Law in point to take it from the Subject, and anciently I find clearly it did belong unto the Freeholders' of the County by Statute, and the Statute of 9 E. 2. 
28 E. 1. ca 8,  of election of the Sheriff in the Exchequer, as it is now used is but only affirmative.  
Object. But that I may not subject myself unto just censure, I will anticipate and prevent what may be objected by the adverse part. That these these two Statutes, viz. of 28. E. 1. commonly called by Legists Articuli supra Chartas, ca 8. by which the Subjects right in the Militia, and the election of the Sheriff the minister of the Militia appears, and the Statute of 9 E. 2. before named are the one contrary to the other in matter, and therefore within the rul● of Leges posteriores, priores contrarias abrogant, although they be both in the affirmative.  
To which I answer, that they are not contrary in matter, they differ only in circumstance, viz. 
Designation of other persons difference in circumstance no contrariety in matter. C●. 11. Re. Do●● Foster's Case. Stamfords' prerogative. f. 69. ●. Two statutes affirmatively autho●●●●e several persons; both statutes effectual. Cr●. Jurisdiction of Courts 200. ●. saith, That 32 H. 8. taketh away, 8. H. 6. It may be peradventure intended with this difference. 28 E. 1. 9 E. 2. design several persons to elect the Sheriff, both statutes shall be in force by law.  Designation of the Persons that are to elect the Sheriff, and the rule of Law is, That the designation of one person or persons in an Act of Parliament shall not exclude another person or persons, which had authority to do the same thing by an Act precedent, as to put you but one case instead of many, by 8. H. 6. ca 16. The Chancellor, Treasurer, and other Officers have power to demise Lands and Tenements; afterwards 32. H. 8. ca 46. gives authority to the Master of the Court of Wards, with the advice of one of the Counsel of the said Court to demise the said Lands and Tenements mentioned in the former Statute, yet this doth not take away the Statute of 8 H. 6. although that this last Act design other persons; for if before any Lease made by the Master of the Wards, the Chancellor and Treasurer make one according to the Statute. 8 H. 6. then the Master of the Wards cannot demise, and so if the Master of the Wards demiseth first, than the Chancellor and Treasurer cannot demise by 8 H. 6. Many more cases I might here insert to clear this particular, come we then to our two Statutes, the Statute of 28 E. ●. designs the Freeholders' of the County to choose their Sheriff. The Statute of 9 E. 2. 
Not material if 9 E. 2. nullify 28 E. 1. as you shall see hereafter.  appointeth the Judges in the Exchequer to choose him Several Acts affirmative design several persons to elect the Sheriff, both Statutes shall stand, saith the Law, if the one doth elect according to one Statute, the others are foreclosed, 
In statutes introductive the designation of the ●son, matter of ●stance not ●umstance.  and so è contrario, and the rule is true. The designation of one person is the exclusion of another in Statutes, which create a new Law, but neither of these Statutes of 28 E. 1. or 9 E. 2. create any new Law concerning the Militia, but in the designation of the persons which are to choose the Militia; this last Statute differs from the first, therefore we may safely conclude, Vbi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus.  
I have searched all the comers of my heart to avoid Hypocrisy, and of my understanding to avoid ignorance, and I cannot find but these cases are alike in Law; 
Negative words alter the law.  therefore the 28. of E. is still in force and not abrogated. Further, if the words of this Law had been that they should have been chosen in the Exchequer by the Judges, and by no other persons, or, and not elsewhere, then peradventure these negative words had utterly abrogated the first Statute. Many Cases might likewise be remembered to prove this; but in our Statute there are no words but affirmative only, therefore no question upon this rule in Law, so in the end you see these two Statutes are not the one contrary to the other. Also there is another reason which makes for us, and that is that 9 E. 2. is only affirmative, as you have heard, and by implication must nullify 28 E. 1. and that cannot be as I conceive.  
It is a high and great right of the Subjects this of the Militia, it is one of the chiefest flowers of the Garland of their Liberties, it cannot be divested out of the Kingdom but by express words; 
The Kingdoms right cannot pass by implication.  it is like unto Jus regale, or a Royalty of the Crown, which cannot pass by implication as the Sages of the Law know, for it is the Kingdom's case, and no particular Subjects case and right, 
One Act repealeth not an●ther by word● general and implicit  and therefore from all cases in Law that can be opposed differing, 10 R. 2. ca 5. doth not take away 13 E. 1. commonly called the Statute of Donis conditionalibus because the words are general and implicit, Statutes made by the venerable presence of three hundred men or more, equal to the Senate of Rome in wisdom shall not be disannulled by such ambiguous constructions, but I will leave this to the judgement of the learned. F●rther, if the disposition of this branch of the Militia were the Kings Right by this Statute before mentioned, 
If the Militia by the positive laws limited were vested in the King, yet he is not the sole proprietor, but entrusted with it Sub modo, a● the positive law hath appointed.  yet he it not the sole propr●etor thereof, but entrusted Sub modo to dispose of it as the Law hath appointed; and you see in what manner the Law hath settled it by this former discourse. The King cannot command the Militia, or raise an Army either by Sea or Land, without his high Court of Parliament approve of the same, they cannot be forced out of their Shires, but in case of sudden coming into this Land of strange enemies by the power of the King, or by his legal authority.  
But to lay aside all other weapon of defence and argument, 
Argument by admittance.  and to close with the adverse part upon this very Law of 9 E. 2. and the sense of Law upon this Act, and admitting 9 E. 2. to nullify 28. E. 1. which yet we do nor grant for a positive truth by admittance of it Argumenti gratia, only we will debate this Statute of 9 E. 2. and open it plainly to every capacity, whereby it shall appear here is no harbour for the Militia Royal, it will prove but Statio malificae carinis, an unsafe refuge.  
The words of the Statute which they surmise vest the Militia in the King are these, That the Sheriffs shall be chosen in every County by the Chancellor, Treasurer, Barons of the Exchequer, or chief Baron, as another Statute hath it, or by the Justices by one Statute, and by another Statute by the chief Justices of one Bench, and of the other; Parum differunt que re concordant: But to our purpose, In whom is the Militia settled by this Statute? It is apparent not in the King, but in the Sheriff elected by the Judges, who are sworn as well to the Kingdom and People as to the King, 
By 9 E. 2. a hare nomination no right of the Militia settled in any.  as appeareth by their Oath. But yet further, In what right hath the Sheriff the Militia of the County? I answer, Here is no right of the Militia vested in any by this Statute, only a bare nomination, than the right and power of the Militia rests where it did before by Law; and that if the very letter or sense of this Statute be urged, the right of the Militia is not in the King. Object. Why then a further question ariseth upon this Act, in whom is the right of the Militia, or in whom was it before this Statute, since this Law giveth no right to any?  
I answer, 
Sol.  The Sheriff had the possession of the Militia, 
The Sheriff of the Militia possessor by 9 E. 2. the law and Courts of justice Cestuy que use.  the Law was Cestuy que use, that is to say, had the right and interest of the same; the Sheriff had the disposition of it for the use, benefit, end behoof of the Law, for that you shall see plain enough, for the words of the Law are to this purpose, That the Sheriff is to dispose of the Militia to preserve the peace of the County, to suppress all Riots, Insurrections in disturbance of the peace, to execute the Judgements and Injunctions of the Law in the Courts of Justice. What is the peace of the County, but the Law of the County, or rather the fruit and effect of the Law? 
The peace of the County the law of the County, or rather the fruit and effect of the law.  Due observance and execution of the Law is the preservation of the Peace; whereas on the contrary, violation of the Laws brings Wars and Division with it. Not a word here but that the Law is Vsu fructuarius of the Militia, hath the right and power of it, the Sheriff the disposition as Minister and Servant of the Law. If it be objected that the Law saith, That to preserve the King's Peace the Sheriff hath the disposition of the Militia. 
The King's peace the King's laws, or the fruit and effect of the law.  That is true, and yet it is nothing to prove the right of the Militia in the King, for the King's Peace is meant, or the fruit and effect of the Laws, by which Laws the King enjoyeth his Peace as well as the Subject, so that still you do but labour in vain. The Law still hath the right of the Militia, also the Courts of Justice, especially the high Court of Parliament, where the law resteth as in the Centre.  

Usage Regal of no force in the Militia. Vi. infra.  For Usage, and the King's disposition of the Militia De facto, though it were since the Conquest, that is not material, as you shall see presently in the debate concerning the great Offices of the Kingdom, Vbi eadem ratio idem jus.  

The Militia of the Navy.  As touching the Navy Royal, the Forts and Magazines, it is apparent, that either they are included as parcel of the Militia of the Kingdom, or are as appendants thereunto, and therefore as to them, Nihil erit jam dictum, quod non dictum sit prius. But yet to say something of them though but repartition. The Navy, that is to say, the Ships are things in their nature transitory in Law, they may have existence or not, Diversis temporibus as occasion requireth, and so in the eye of the Law are not things so considerable as the Militia of the Kingdom, which is a thing permanent and abiding, and shall have a constant existence so long as England shall continue a Nation of people; and therefore the Law hath not taken such special care for this, 
The Militia of the Navy depends upon the Militia of the Land.  as for the Militia But to give you a full answer, and not to keep you in suspense: What is the Navy Royal without the Militia? How are the Seas defended unless the Militia of the Land be designed for that purpose. Goodly materials without any hand to move them for the public service, fit for prospect only, not for use; therefore you cannot consider them without the Militia of the Land to guard them, 
The Navy without the Militia of the land to guard it; not considerable.  unless they be furnished with men for public employment. Why then still all depends upon the Militia of the Land, and you see by the former discourse how that is settled, the King cannot dispose of it, otherwise then the Law hath appointed it; nay it seemeth that the positive Militia is not in him personally, but subordinately in his Ministers, and so it is said in Law to be in the King. Thus you see an end of this particular, the King may build Ships but he cannot make them, otherwise then as a liveless structure unuseful without the Militia.  
But to enlarge myself a little further on this particular, it appeareth that the Navy, that is to say, the disposition of men, 
Since this Act some Ordinances for the Navy no● Act or statute.  necessary for that service, is not in the King but Parliament, who made a temporary Act or Statute since the Parliament began, enabling the Lord Admiral for the time being, to impressed, raise, and leavie such number of men necessary for the service of the Navy, 
Ratio, why the Militia of the Navy must rest in the power of Parliament. Et nota.  as shall be requisite for that expedition. Hence it may plainly be collected, that since this Act is expired the Militia for the Navy must of necessity rest in the power of Parliament, since the King by implicit consent in enacting this Law so conceived, for otherwise he would not sure have assented unto such an Act, so derogatory to his Regality, if the Law had not been so at that time, but he would have authorized the Lord Admiral by Commission under the great Seal, and so no Act of Parliament had been necessary.  
Object. Further, if any man shall object and say, That the power of the Militia for the Navy was in the King before this Act, and that was the cause of making this statute but temporary, which also being expired, the Militia of the Navy is revested in the King again.  
Sol. The answer of this will be but Actum peragere, the Militia of the Navy depending upon the Militia of the Land before this Act, and therefore the Militia of the Land debated as formerly you have heard at large, both that general and absolute of the Militia, as also that which is limited by the positive laws, there needs no further answer.  

The Militia of the Navy in law the land militia.  Further, it is evident to me upon this very Act without any retrospect, to what hath been formerly spoken, that the Militia of the Land, the great matter now controverted, must of necessity rest in Parliament, for it is parcel of the Militia of the Kingdom, 
Sea and land incorporated in point of dominion, if the militia of the sea pertain to the Parliament, so must also the militia of the land, unless you divide the power of the militia.  the Militia of the Sea is also the Militia of the Kingdom, yea of the Land itself, for the Sea and Land are incorporated by Law in point of Dominion, and made one body subject to one head. The Militia therefore of the Kingdom, and the Militia of the Land are all one in Law, and in the Militia of the Kingdom you must include the Militia of the Navy, since the kingdom in judgement of law includeth both Sea and Land; Or otherwise, if we shall abandon all reason in the Exposition of this Statute it must at least be granted, 
Nota. Division of the power of the militia dangerous to government.  that the Militia of the Navy is in the power of the Parliament, even by the implicit judgement of the King and his great Counsel, and admit a fraction or division of this great power so dangerous to Government, and tending much to the weakening and enervating the great strength of this Kingdom, I mean the Militia thereof, and be occasion of perpetual intestine wars in this Nation; a position so inconsistent with Government, and dishonourable to the Wisdom of this State, that I think there needs no further confutation of it.  
The Forts and Magazines surely are as attendants and adjuncts unto the Militia, 
The militia of the Forts and Castles.  and that common reason teacheth the one to secure the Ammunition pertaining to the Militia, and as a receptacle for the same, commonly called the Storehouses for Arms, the other to employ the Militia in for the defence of the Land against the enemy, 
Rati●, why the Forts and Castles defensible pertain not to the King.  for surely the Forts and Castles defensible belong not unto the King in right for one special reason, because if they should belong unto the King, than you must grant him a power and right in the Militia, to be employed in the service of these Forts and Castles, for to what purpose hath the King these if he cannot command the Militia of the Kingdom to defend them; they are then in judgement of Law and reason houses or Princely Palaces only, nor Forts or Castles, so that you see in conclusion by Law and Reason we are come to this. The right and power of the Militia of the Kingdom rules all Forts, Ships, Navy, Magazines, Castles, all depend upon this; therefore I hope I have spoken of these particulars sufficiently.  
Object. It may be objected, that Sir Edw. Coke saith in his Institutes upon Littleton, That no man can build a Castle defensible or of Military strength without leave of the King; hence it may be inferred, Sol. the King may build, and consequently hold such a Castle or place of strength; 
The ancient Common Law for the land Militia rules the Militia for the Forts and Castles  but what of this, he hath nothing to do with the Militia, this notwithstanding. And if it should be granted otherwise, yet he cannot defend it with any other Militia then of those persons that are hereunto especially bound by Tenure or Contract, neither can any be forced out of their Shires contrary to the Law, to defend this place of strength, or Castle; also that the King may build and hold a Castle defensible, may thus be intended.  

The Sheriff's possession the King's possession of any Castle or Fort.  The Sheriff hath his authority from the King, viz. by Statute, 9 E. 2. unto which the King hath assented, to defend any Castle defensible with the Militia of the County, therefore if the Sheriff, or any such like subordinate authority from the King hold a Castle defenceable, it is in judgement and speech of Law the King's possession of the same, but of this sufficient.  
For the great Offices 
The great Offices.  of the Kingdom, the disposition of them did anciently belong unto the Parliament as their rights, and that Master Lambard a learned Lawyer in his Archeion of the Courts of Justice testifieth, whose words are these; 
The great Offices anciently pertaining to the Parliament.  That the Keeper of the great Seal was wont to be elected by Authority of Parliament; and he saith further, That he had read, that Ralph Nevil Bishop of Chichester, being Chancellor to King H. 3. being Commanded, refused to yield up his Seal unto the King when he required it, affirming that as he had received it by the Counsel of the Realm, so he would not without like warrant resign it again. And in the days of the same King, it was told him by all his Lords spiritual and temporal, That of ancient time the creation and disposition of the chief Justice, the Chancellor and Treasurer belonged to the Parliament. Thus fare Mr. Lambard, Dr. cowel also in his Book, called The Interpreter, whom I nominate at this time as a Royalist in this, yet he citeth a Precedent in the time of King H. the 6. who directing his privy Seal to Richard Earl of Warwick, thereby to discharge him of the Captainship of Calais, the Earl refused to obey, and continued forth the said Office, because he received it by Parliament; and the inference of cowel hereupon is false, that either the King must be above his positive Laws, or else he is no absolute King; for he is an absolute King, though not above the Laws, for his Government were then mere Tyranny; 
Vid. D●vant. f. 16. 6.  also the Kings of this Nation are nor in that sense absolute Monarchies, for this is a mixed Government, partly Political, partly Monarchical, as that worthy Knight Sir Thomas Smith, in his Common Wealth of England affirmeth, and this I have remembered before. Further, Sir Edward Coke in his Magna Charta, f. 558, 559. saith, That anciently Offices either for the preservation of the Peace, or execution of Justice, because they concerned all the Subjects of the County were not disposed of by the King, but by the Freeholders' of the County, chosen in every several Shire by the King's Writ; now if it were so for the publke Offices of the County, the same Law and reason telleth you, that it must be so for the public Offices of the Kingdom, either it must rest in the people, or their representative Body.  
Object. But it may be objected, That Sir Edw. Coke saith in the sam● place, that the Statute before named of the 28 E. 1. is altered by 9 E. 2. and so this Office of the Sheriff being a publikt Office for the preservation of the Peace: and execution of Justice also is not in the Subject, or their representative Body.  
Sol. To which I answer shortly, because it hath been formerly debated. 
(Altered) not abrogated or nullified.  That Sir Ed. Coke is thus to be intended, that it is altered partly as to the election of the Sheriff in the Exchequer, if the Judges pursue the same Statute, and the Free holder's of the County do not elect before them, and so that authority is good Law. We must make such interpretation that every learned man's judgement may be honourably esteemed and be effectual. It likewise appeareth by the same Author, that anciently the Conservators of the Peace, or Justices of the Peace were chosen by the People, and so are many Offices at this day, the election of the Officers is by the Freeholders' or people, the King's Writ issuing forth first for that purpose. 
Usage of no forc● against a statute or judicial record.  Now what Law hath taken away those from the people, or their representative Body? Verily none that I know, no act Judicial, or Record, whereby the right of the Kingdom is expressly given away, or if this did appear, 
No statute gives away the Subjects right expressly in the disposition of great Office, or of the militia.  or if it should be granted that usage recorded in the King's Case were sufficient, yet in these particulars it will not give a right unto the King; and if he hath time out of mind disposed of them, yet this will not avail, if by any matter of Record, the right of the subject appear, as it doth by Statute Law before remembered, and by legal authority, 
Nota.  than usage is invalid as the learned in the Laws know. The Act of 28 E. 1. settles the Militia in the subject, as you have heard formerly; here the right of the subject appears, the Forts, Navy, Castles, and Magazines depend all upon the Militia, either the absolute or general power of the Militia, or the Militia positive, or regulated by the positive Laws; both which are by Law vested in the People, or the representative Body the Parliament, as you have heard formerly. The great Offices of the Kingdom appear by learned and legal authority, afore mentioned in the Subject, and their representative Body, both in right and in disposition. What shall I say more, if this be not sufficient to make the Subjects right clear in this particular. 
Prescription of no force against ● statute.  Then although the King hath by usage almost gained a perpetuity in them, yet this will not serve, no prescription or use will be of force against a Statute, or judicial Record, for that is proof to the contrary, as the Law saith. And the King's Case is all one with the Subjects in this; Regal use is of no force against a Statute or judicial Record, for as the rule of Law is true, Nullum tempus occurrit Regi, prescription is not good against the King in many Cases, so it is as true, Nullum tempus occurrit legi, no usage or prescription is of any effect either in the King's Case, or Subject against the Law, appearing by Statute or judicial Record; and I hope no man will say, but that the Rolls of Parliament are judicial Records, 
Usage of no force against claims and interruptions.  besides our legal Annals or Books. Further, if usage should be admitted, yet here have been divers clamours and interruptions of Parliament, yea, dispositions by them of those great Offices, and those other particulars, and then necessarily usage is not of force, as the Law saith, for the Parliament claims unto the great Offices of the Kingdom, yea their disposition of them from time to time I have spoken of before; as also of the Subjects disposition of the Militia, 
Usage gains no inheritance or right of claim or interruption  or their representative Body, for it cannot appear that the King hath by disposition of them time out of mind gained any inheritance in them, in the right (as we say) but that there have been Claims and disturbances by the Subject, or their representative Body, and then usage necessarily is of no force. Object. Before I conclude this particular, I will answer one Objection that happily may be made touching the Militia, and that is this; 
Pleas of the Crown, f. 9  that Sir Edw. Coke saith, That no man can leavy War within the Realm without authority from the King, for to him it only belongeth.  
Sol. I answer, because the authority is great, that his legal or politic capacity may be very well here intended, 
Authority from the King intends his legal or politic capacity, not his personal or natural.  and not his personal, and so the authority of every Court of Justice is the King's authority, the words (De mandato nostro) in the Writ of Melius inquirendum, upon a former Office defective, are intended not the King's Personal Command, but his Command by Writ, issuing out of a Court of Justice; so the authority of the King is in this place meant his legal authority, not his Personal, which every Court of Justice specially upon Record is invested withal. 
In a literal sense the Sheriff's authority is the King's authority.  Also the subordinate authority of the Sheriff, as also of every Court of Justice is the King's authority even in the literal sense, for the Sheriff and Judges of the Court of Justice are authorized by ●he Kings Letters Patents.  
Also they that have their Authority by Acts of Parliament, as the Sheriff hath, have their authority from the King, 
No man etc. purport thus much, no man of hi● own private authority. Legal authority the King's authority.  for are not all Acts perfected and confirmed with the Royal assent? So that these words before specified, viz. no man, etc. purport plainly thus much; No man of his own private authority without legal authority which is the King's immediate authority, can leavy War within this Realm. 
Nota.   
If you should make other construction, you nullify the positive Laws, and even the legal course of Justice and Government. So that we may safely conclude (I hope) upon the premises, that the Subjects right, and consequently of their representative Body to dispose of the Militia, and of the great Offices of the Kingdom remaineth yet undoubted even at this day. These things have been judiciously debated, and at large by a learned gentleman very well known, 
Note that all the statutes touching this high point of the Militia are warily and cautiously penned, not one law that in express words or by any sound Collection, or inferences settles it in the King personally, those statutes that the King make use of, and which mention t●e military service due unto the Regal Dignity, are in general terms, and may very well be with relation to the positive law's precedent, as 11 H 7. ca 1.5. H. 4. 1 E. 3. ca 5. None of them can be intended of the general or absolute power of the militia, but of that part of the Militia that is by the positive laws limited; for if otherwise, you must by such construction nullify all the positive laws proceed●ng. Nota. Vid. ante.  therefore of this sufficient. You that are now learned and wise, be not seduced with error, pause a while and consider with moderation what is become of the Regal power, viz. the King's personal power, such as you would have it in the Militia of this kingdom? That which the King will not part withal, no not for any time, be it to his Wife or Children, so near and dear it is unto him, and of so high consequence as he professeth. There are but two branches of the Militia, the one general and more absolute, the other special, and limited by the positive Laws as you have heard. For the general and more absolute power over the Militia, it is apparent to be inherent of ancient right in the high Court of Parliament only; I think the premises duly considered, no rational man will deny it; for the other part of the Militia limited by the positive Laws, you have heard it is vested in the King's Ministers, the Judges and great Officers of Justice by the positive Laws not in the King personally considered. What is then become of the great Commission of Array, which clearly claimeth and useth both these powers of the Militia? What are Armies of men raised by these illegal means? You have heard formerly in this discourse what they are, I should be sorry to repeat it.  
The supreme Moderator of all things will one day Judge these exorbitancies, I will say no more; Object. There is one yet great Objection of those that are curious and hard to be satisfied, it is somewhat dark and Enigmatical to the ignorant, and that is, That Arms are taken up against the King by the Parliament, they leavy War against his Person, an Act in itself impious, and by the Divine or Humane Law in no wise warranted. 
Sol.  To which I answer, That this Allegation is false and untrue, there is no force or violence offered, or intended to be offered against the person of the King; we conceive his person only free from the Sword; 
By the Divine law the regal person differenced from the regal power.  but if you take his person for his power raised by him coagmentative, there we differ from you, for by the Law Divine, whether his person and power raised by him illegally be together confounded and not distinguished; or whether Tyranny or abused Authority shall be said to be the Ordinance of God, and so not to be disobeyed; I will not meddle in the decision thereof, though I take it clear they shall not; for, go to the very Etymology of the word (Ordinance) mentioned frequently in the Scriptures of God, and so much insisted upon by the other part, that it ought not to be resisted; it is plain, it is derived (Ab ordine) from order, wisdom, and judgement, the shadows of the Divine essence which is an eternal Law, of admirable wisdom even to itself, and is the Primum mobile, and original of all Order and Law to the Creature. Now in Tyranny and abused Authority there is nothing but folly and madness, as I may so say, the authors of disorder and confusion; and surely if the Laws of man be called Ordinances for this reason before mentioned, What shall we think of the Law of God? Whatsoever is by this Law appointed is wisdom and judgement in the abstract. 
1 Sam ca 8.  That place of Scripture which you wrist by misinterpretation for the purposes warrants no such matter. This shall be the manner of the Kings, saith Samuel to the people, They shall take your Sons and your Daughters, they shall take your Fields, your Vineyards, and give them to their servants, 
(Render the words) viz. this shall be the right of the Kings.  etc. From this place of Scripture make you Tyranny the right of Kings (for so some of you tender the words) and so Ex consequenti the Ordinance of God is, Mos Regis, jus Regis; Is it the right of Kings because the Act of Kings? then Murder, Adultery, etc. are the right of Kings, and the Ordinance of God; so God himself is made the Author of all wickedness, a most impious and detestable opinion. Yea, doth not the practice of the Kings of Israel manifest the same? Did Ahab take away Naboth's Vineyard as his right without any further proceed? Did he not by pretence and colour of Law take away his life and Vineyard? Did he not suborn Witnesses against him? This man blasphemeth God, and the King was he not much perplexed & troubled in mind at Naboths denial? All these things surely had not been if it had been lawful for Ahab to have taken his Vineyard from him; yea, what saith God unto him for this? Hast thou killed, and also taken possession? Is this Divine approbation? Are either of these Acts allowed, or not plainly reproved? hast thou taken possession implieth clearly, that Ahab taking Naboths Vineyard was not God's Ordinance or Law, but the wicked abuse of Divine authority. Further, I conceive upon the Acts of David and Elisha, mentioned in the Scriptures, it is lawful to resist Tyranny and abused authority; yea, that it is lawful to oppose the Regal power, 
Distinction of the regal person and the regal power by the law of this Realm.  though not the Regal Person; but to leave these things to those that are learned in Theology, we will search a little the Laws of the Kingdom; Do not our Laws make the same distinction, between any power illegally raised by the King, and his Person? May not the one be lawfully resisted, not the other? Hath not the Law appointed the Militia of the Kingdom to suppress any Riots, illegal Assemblies, yea, though commanded by the King? I suppose that may be made a parent enough, for put the case that numbers of people, being Insidiatores viarum & agrorum depopulatores; gain the Person of the King, yea his protection under the great Seal: Object. shall not the Magistrates and Ministers of the Law execute the Law against these persons, notwithstanding the King be present with them? Sure they may and aught. But peradventure you will say, This case is nothing to our purpose, they that have now adheared to the King are good Subjects, no Delinquents, as your instance formerly imports. Sol. I answer, the reason of the Law is the same in both Cases, yea, they are delinquents in both Cases that take up Arms without lawful authority; and further, they are Traitors also, though they aid and assist the King's person, as you may perceive by the former discourse; but I will exp la●e the Law a little further in this particular. 
2 E. 3. 8. 14. E. 3. ca 14.  There are two or three several Statutes in the Reign of E. 3. and of other Kings of England containing these words, or to this effect; That the Judges, or the King's Justices shall not delay to do justice and right, yea, they are commanded so to do even in the King's Case, notwithstanding the King by his great Seal or Privy Seal command the contrary. But we then the case, that the great Seal is sent to stay the course of Justice, and the Me●se●gers thereof be numbers of armed men, shall not the Justices oppose this illegal power? Shall they not apprehend these persons as Rebels unto the State and Government, if they shall attempt the execution of this regal command by force or violence? nay, 
The King by divers statutes disabled to raise any Armies of men, or to come in any hostile manner to disturb justic●.  I conceive they are subject unto great and severe censure (if not Capital) for appearing in Arms in disturbance of justice, although they offer no force or violence at all, but deliver their Message to the Court. And is it not apparent that these persons shall be impeached as offenders, Con●ra coronam & dignitatem Regis, 
These men Traitors by law, though the King present with them, f ●n any hostile way they execute his illegal command, or endeavour the same.  notwithstanding the King's Seal yea, if the King shall be present with them, this will not a●ter the Case, the Judges are to execute the ●aw in the King's name against them, and further, to pronounce them Traitors if in forceable or hostile manner they shall endeavour to interrupt or hinder the power and authority of the Law; here you see the distinction which the Law makes betwixt the Regal person and the regal power. 
Nota. The King's person not criminous by law, and the reason.  The King's person is subject to no debility or imperfection in judgement of Law, and therefore no crime or offence can be incident to his person, witness the Attainder of King H. 7. before he was King resolved by all the Judges, that Ipso facto by attaining the regal dignity, all attainders of Treason, or any other offence were purged, and that there needed not any reversal of them in Law; and this appeareth in the legal Annals of the said King, you may plainly perceive the King's person uncapable of crime by the Law of this Land, his person is sacred and not to be touched with violence; yea, the Law meddleth not at all with his person, as being innocent of all crime, 
(Regal imputation)  as to any legal imputation; but the power of the King, 
Nota.  in what condition it stands you may easily see. Which Henry the 7. wisely foreseeing procured that Act, 11 H. 7. ca 1. before mentioned, to exempt the attendants of his person, as also of his successors from impeachment, knowing that by Law they might become offenders, although they followed his person in the Wars, and did him true and faithful service for the defence of the King and the Land, 
The true reason why this act of 11 H. 7. ca 1. was made.  because his Title unto the Crown, as the times than were, might not prove firm; for if his Title by Marriage should have failed, 
Nota.  as even the state of Princes is subject unto humane casualty, than his attendants in the Wars upon his Person should be in danger of judgement, as being raised without lawful authority, so as by this Act if a Perkin Warbeck should attain the regal dignity lawfully; 
(Lawful) viz. by consent of the Realm, by authority of Parliament.  his Attendants in the Wars were by this Act free from impeachment, if they declined not from their duty of Allegiance in this Statute mentioned, which by Law had not been so if this Act had not made this special provision. Now you may view plainly the King's Person and his Power distinguished, also you may see in the exposition of this Statute formerly mentioned the same difference. 
(His power not so) viz. his illegal power.  They may attend the King's person in the Wars and yet Traitors by Law, his Person secured, his power not so. And although the King pardoneth this Offence upon this Statute, as it appeareth formerly he hath done, yet surely this is not effectual, for he is disabled by Act of Parliament to take benefit of this act, and therefore the King cannot enable him, as upon 31. 
Vi. ante. f.  Eli. in case of simony, if the King present the same person simonaically to the same Benefice, and withal in his presentation, there is a special Non obstante, yet this will not avail. Also I conceive, 
Impeachment in the high Court of Parliament disables the King's pardon. Nota.  if he be Impeached in the high Court of Parliament upon this Act, as he may be, and not by Indictment at Common Law, then surely the King's Pardon will not aid him. I have been somewhat more prolix upon this Statute of 11 H. 7. ca 1. because it is much insisted upon by the adverse part. Give me leave to impart unto you some special observations upon these Statutes of E. 3. before mentioned, viz. That Justice shall nor be delayed for the great or little Seal of the King. Three particulars worthy the consideration branch themselves out of these Laws naturally; 
Note the contrary held in Cambridge, in the Case between the Archebishop of Canterbury & Chancellor, viz. That the King sitting in Cathedra personally, though he might err in circumstance or the like, yet in point of judgement he could not err, 11 Car. aut eo circiter. The King may err in judgement proved by the law positive.  First, That the King may err in his judgement, his Commands may be illegal and contrary to Law. Secondly, That Armies of men, or men in Arms may be raised by the King without authority of Law. Thirdly, That these forces thus raised by the King are to be suppressed and punished as Delinquents to the Laws and Government, notwithstanding the King's Command; where you may likewise evidently perceive a difference in Law betwixt the King's Person and his Power. I will debate these three particulars briefly. The King may err in his judgement, he may Command contrary to Law; yea, that his verbal protestations may be otherwise in private to the Judge, in public to the world; the Judge is not bound to believe his verbal protestations, though under Seal, he is to execute the Law, and not to delay right and justice Note here the command of the Law, 
Nota.  the command of the King; the command of the Law to be obeyed, not the King: note also here the supreme power of the Law before spoken of.  
Object. Our Malignants cry out and say, Is not the King to be believed? He hath protested upon the holy Sacrament to the world, that he will preserve our Religion, Laws and Liberties, yea that he will not violate the Laws; we are Rebels and not Subjects, if we should discredit the protestations, yea, the Oaths of our Prince.  
I answer, Sol. The Judgement of a Parliament is otherwise, he may err, his Commands may be illegal, and the Judge is not to regard any protestations that are otherwise, but to execute the Law.  
We are good subjects notwithstanding this false aspersion; 
The King may raise Armies of men contrary to law.  for the second particular, he may raise Armies of men against Law, that you see plainly, for if he send this Message to obstruct the course of Justice by numbers of Armed men, are not these men illegally armed? For it appears they come to oppose the Law, a great offence, by these Laws evident enough. Here likewise appears the truth of that Stature of 11 H. 7 afore named, so much misinterpreted by evil Counsel about his Majesty; (such Counsel by which his Majesty is seduced in his heart, and misled, 
Of what Counsel the law taketh notice of.  of which Counsel the Law taketh no notice at all, whilst the wisdom of the great Counsel of the King and Kingdom, so by Law deemed and determined, even in the interpretation of this Law and many others, is neglected and not regarded;) for these numbers of armed men coming with the Kings Seal to stay Justice, yea, though the King be attended by them in Arms, are capital Offenders and Traitors, and so to be certainly pronounced, if they shall forceably attempt to execute this Regal Command, though the King's person be attended by them What speaks then the Act of 11 H. 7. but what former Statutes have said. The Allegiance of the Subject may be declined, and yet the King's person followed in the Wars; for the Regal Wars may be unjust upon all these Statutes, and so it is clear to any rational man. I am sorry to unfold these hidden and secret Mysteries of the Law thus fare; for I do unfeignedly honour the King; but, Amicus Socrates & anicus Plato sed magis amica veritas.  
For the third particular, that the Judges are to suppress this illegal power, I need not much trouble you withal, for otherwise the words of these Statutes were idle and illusory; 
Regal forces not warranted by law, are clearly to be suppressed by these laws.  how could the Judge proceed to Judgement, if these men that come to stay the course of Justice were not hindered in the execution of this illegal Command. The sense of the Law to be thus upon these Statutes, he that runneth may read. I intended no more but by way of supposion, but in respect that application is necessary in these distracted times, 
Application, & Nota.  and useful in all Discourse, in regard that our opposites will say, and clamour too, That none of these Laws are in question, there is no violation of them, therefore you shall see that in our unhappy times all these afore recited particulars are verified.  
The King doth err in his Judgement, his Commands are contrary to Law; witness the Kings Command to apprehend the Members of the House of Commons, contrary to their Laws and Privileges, and to try them upon supposed Crimes elsewhere; yea his Majesty himself came in Person into the House of Commons, and Demanded, or Commanded delivery of them. The illegal Commission of Array so often issuing forth, a great oppression to the people, whereby he armeth thousands of men, at this day, contrary to Law and Justice, the King claiming no other power to Array his people, or Arm them by his own Declarations in print, but which depends upon the Statute of 5 H. 4. before remembered, and that Statute is not in force, as you may perceive in this Treatise formerly. What need I say more, 
Nota.  Commissions have been sent under the great Seal to Array the City of London, and other places of this Kingdom, to take up Arms against the Judges of that high Court of Parliament, to hinder Justice and Judgement, as these statutes afore mention; Shall not these Judges proceed to do right and justice, these illegal Commands notwithstanding? Doth not the King arm the Papists contrary expressly to Law, yea, by Commissions under seal to fight against his People, against his Parliament, when as by 3 Jacobi, ca 5. they are to be disarmed, and to bear no Arms within this Kingdom; and although the King Licence them, nay, 
3 Jac. ca 5. not to be dispensed withal.  Command them to take up Arms as the case now is, that will not aid them, since the statute is for security of our Religion, and our Laws against the enemies thereof, the King cannot dispense with it. For the other particular, That the King hath raised Armies of men to execute these illegal commands, and that the Judges of the Law, and of the high Court of Parliament have according to their duties upon these Statutes endeavoured these illegal forces, it is plain enough.  
Now what say you unto these things, ye that believe in error and falsehood? Are we still rebels and traitors in your judicious opinions? Fight we for the Laws, and for the maintenance of them, and are not one of the actions amongst many, which might here be remembered justifiable, and yet are you the good Subjects, and we the desperate Rebels? What if you shall say, We are no men that are compelled to take up Arms, we serve the King voluntarily, we are none of the illegal Commission of Array. I answer, Incidit in Scyllam qui vult vitare Charibdem, you fly from one extreme to another, 
Traitors within 11. H. 7. ca 1. though attending the King's person in the Wars voluntarily, if you decline from the duty of Allegiance, as it is plain you do.  from one defence illegal to another; are you not punishable to go or ride armed by Statutes formerly mentioned, without any evil intentions appearing? how much more than when you go about to violate and transgress the Laws. Your voluntary act here makes the offence the greater, as for the exception of the King and his Servants in his presence, mentioned in these Laws, that is nothing, it will nor help you at all, for these Laws, as I have formerly spoken, intent only his servants menial, and for preservation of the Peace likewise; what is this paucity of men to Armies numerous? Here is no refuge for you in these Statutes, we are come to Nurcules Pillars, to a Ne plus ultra with our opposites, we are come to so strait a passage that there is no declining either to the right hand or to the left, for I think we have searched all the corners of error; I will pursue you no further, I wish you may at length turn into the ways of truth, lest that God open the mouth of the dumb Creature to reprove the folly and madness, since the voice of the Law moveth you not at all. Hence it is apparent, that the Law as supreme hath invested both King and people, with that power which they have by Nationall pact and agreement, 
The law useth a power coersive as to the King's possessions, yea is to any power illegal raised by him.  and therefore if transgressed they are liable unto judgement, as you see it clear in matters touching the King's possessions, though not his person; and if the Law come so near the person of the King in point of coercion, as his Lands and Estate, making them Subject to the Decrees and Edicts of the Law, pronounced in the Courts of Justice; then common reason teacheth you, that the Law hath a compulsary power over all illegal forces raised by the King; for the Revenues and Lands of the Crown are more necessary and incident unto the regal Dignity, and are nearer conjoined unto it in point of defence, maintenance and security, than any power not warranted by Law. Witness this Case, that the Lands and Revenues of the Crown, come they by descent or purchase, go to the next successor to the Crown, contrary to the rules of Law in the Subjects Case, an instance of this the descent of the Crown from Ed. the 6. to Queen Mary, resolved by all the Judges, that the Lands of the Crown descended to the said Queen, though but of the half blood to King Edward; 
(Half blood) hinder n●● descent of the Crown.  yea that the Jewels of the Crown, and personal Estate vested in the said Queen, and the reason of the Law is the same before mentioned for defence, maintenance and security of the Regal Dignity or Person; but any illegal power raised by the King dyeth with his Person, it can neither descend, neither can it be disposed of by the King, it hath no affinity (as I may so say) nor any relation to his Person; yea, the Law taketh no notice of it at all but with an eye of Justice; so that it is manifest the Law useth a coercive power, as to the King's possessions, yea, as to any Armies of men, or forces raised by the King without legal authority.  
Come we then to his Person, see the wisdom of the Law there also, it useth no coersive power, because his Person by the Divine Law is Sacred; as also it is needless for the Law to use a compulsary power over the King's Person, seeing that his Lands and Possessions, yea, any illegal power raised by him are subject to the Censure of the Law: What formidable thing is his Person if you take away any power from him but what is warranted by Law? 
No need of coercion as to the Regal Person. Nota.  What need of coercion over his Person? I speak not this to diminish the just and due rights, and greatness of the King, for the Majesty and greatness, with which the Law hath encompassed him is in truth, Majesty, Et regia celsitudo, illegal Magnificence makes him but a poor and weak Prince, despicable even in the eyes of his People, Ejus potestas as Bracton saith, est juris & non injuriae. But to draw to a conclusion, inferior Courts of Justice have their authority, to suppress any force raised by the King, 
Argum entu à mineri ad maju●.  if not allowed by Law, as it appeareth in this Treatise, that these Armies of men by the King Commanded are in no wise legal. What shall we then say? Shall not the high Court of Parliament have the same authority which inferior Courts, Handmaids unto it, even in time of Peace have used and exercised? I am ashamed of this gross ignorance. Now you that have many tergiversations and shifts to defend error, what say you unto this; declare unto the world your Cause, and stay these streams of blood amongst your Christian Brethren; Publish to this Nation the blindness and hardness of their hearts, convince their judgements and understandings, that truth may once more flourish amongst us: But if not, be for ever confounded in yourselves, & close up your lips with perpetual silence hereafter.  
But you may say, Object. How comes it to pass that these particulars have not hitherto been discovered to the world? I answer, Sol. The opposite power or faction hath been for many Ages prevalent, and where the regal Power hath gained from the the Subject, it is hard and with much difficulty to be reduced; notwithstanding there hav● not wanted in all Ages Champions, and Assertors of these truths, 
Tempore R. 2. H. 4 Therninge chief Justice, nostr● tempore Crook, H●tton, Weston, etc. Illustre Parliamentum nunc apud Westminist.  yea even in our own times there have been Propugnatores acerrimi. Witness the Case of Mr. Hampden formerly remembered, in the damning of which Judgement I think all these illegalities appear, which had it stood in force, property in Estates had been a mere nullity, yea the Axe was laid to the very root, the subversion of Justice and Government; 
Nota.  yea, your high Court of Parliament had been of no use for the Subject, since upon the Kings own personal judgement and opinion, 
Viz. by thaes judgement.  for aught that appears otherwise, for he that was the sole Judge of the danger of the Kingdom, might have imposed what Taxes he pleased upon his People, and upon refusal have enforced the payment thereof; a slavish and barbarous judgement, nullifying upon the point all the positive Laws of this Kingdom, and making the Government itself merely Arbitrary.  

Prerogative.  I should likewise here give you a touch of the King's Prerogatives here, as pertinent to this former Discourse; for some may say, The Liberties of the Subject are much insisted upon here, but where are the King's Rights and Prerogatives, hath he none at all? Therefore to omit the numerous Prerogatives of the King, partly mentioned in that ancient Statute of Prerogativa Regis, or dispersed in the legal Records or Annals, which to present unto you would be too great a labour and needless, 
17 E. 2. Devant.  Ante diem clauso componet vesper Olymp●. 
Wardships, Liveries, Primer-seisin, Marriages, relief, fines, P●●●aliener, Customs, Mines, Wrecks, Treasure trove, Escheates, Forfeitures, cum multis aliis &c, rights and prerogatives done all Roy pur defend. soy mesme, & son Realm of great benefit to the Crown, and the respect of these the subject to be free from Taxes and Impositions. Definition of the Prerogative. Rules restrictive of the Prerogative.  I will only in a way compendiary shadow them unto you, by their rules and restrictions, which like the skilful Pilot steer the course of this great Ship (the Royal Prerogatives) in the turbulent seas of humane affairs, therefore in the first place note, that the King's Rights and Prerogatives are differenced in Law, his Prerogatives are only incident to the Crown his Prerogatives are his rights, but not ●onv●●so.  
The definition of a Prerogative is a power, pre-eminence, or privilege which the King hath over and above other persons, and above the ordinary course of Law in the Subjects case in right of his Crown, his Prerogatives are either personal, or by reason of his possessions, or having relation to both.  
All of them have these restrictions, they hold not in any thing injurious to the Subject, they must be by prescription o● usage, beyond all memory to the contrary; no Prerogative can Commence at this day without authority, of Parliament. To give you some instances, 
Basketviles' case s●venth report.  The King hath title by Laps to present to a Church, he suffereth a Presentation, the Clerk is inducted and dies; now the Patron shall present & not the King, and although the Prerogative be, that no laches or negligence shall be impured to the King Nullum tempus occurrit Regi, faith the Statute, yet laches here shall be imputed or otherwise the subject should be injured in his right; the King had but only the first or next presentation given him by Law, therefore he shall not have the second. 
Viz. By Writ certif. otherwise Perpa●●ll or letters act of force.  The King may take a man into his protection by his Prerogative, to free him from Suit and molestation if he be employed in the King's service (and so legally certified) but he cannot protect him that is in ●a●●●tion, or against whom an Execution is to be granted at the Suit of the Subject, because that would be tortuous to the Subject, and dispossess him of that interest which the Law hath vested in him.  

Royal Proclamation a Prerogative.  He hath a great Prerogative indeed, viz. to make Proclamations Sub pena, which no Subject can do, but this Proclamation must be in supplement, or Declaration of a Law already in being, not in derogation of any Law established; nay, I conceive he cannot command any thing by Proclamation (at lest Sub pena) it there be no Law in force to warrant it, although in this particular his Proclamation be in nature of a Law remedial, preventing some great mischief at present by no positive Law redressed. What shall we then think of those frequent Proclamations of late times, denouncing men Traitors before the Law hath so adjudged them, contrary to the known rules of Justice; yea men, the Members of Parliament, which cannot be legally judged Traitors but by the Justice of that high Court, as formerly you have heard, yea, divers others also no ways sentenced I assure myself in any legal way so to be.  
To the second rule or restriction of the Prerogative, I need say little, authorities are so plentiful. If Lands come unto the King by Purchase, in these he hath no Prerogative, as in those he holdeth Jure coronae by great antiqui y. 
The King hath no Prerogative in the Militia. Nota.  These concerning the Militia, the negative voice in Parliament cannot be Prerogative, they are not within these rules or limitations; for if the Prerogative should be of force for the Militia, it would be injurious to the Subject, it should also commence by usage within memory, contrary to the Statute of 28 E. 1. 
25 E. 3. 4. H. 4. 13. etc. Vid. ante.  yea to other more modern Laws. So likewise the negative voice in Parliament, it would not only be injurious to the Subject, but even to the Laws and Government itself, 
Mag. Char. ca 29.  making them all merely Arbitrary, yea, contrary to Statute Law, as some good opinion hath been.  
Thus you have a brief view of the Prerogatives, rather showing you what they are not, than what they are; which I was moved unto, for the satisfaction of those who have not so deep insight into the Laws, Perpaucos arbusta juvant humilesque myricae. And now I have passed through the enemy's Quarters, that is to say, the strength of their Positions and Assertions, by which they have misled a great party of this Kingdom, I will a little breath and deliver unto you the sum of all, and run over the heads of their Principles.  
Their first, 
The material cause, of Parliament.  as you may see in the beginning of this Treatise, strikes at the root and branch of Parliaments, the material cause thereof; that is, the Members of either Houses, sweeps them all away from the service of the Common Wealth, makes that renowned Assembly a mere desolate structure.  

Formal causes of Parliaments.  The King's negative voice in the next place, as one blow takes away the formal cause of Parliaments, that is to say, the Laws and Government, he is by this Doctrine become the Legislator only; the Members the Lords and Commons are but inconsiderable persons, they fill up rooms like Pageants for show only; they out of whose mouths did flow the Oracles of wisdom are not now so to be reputed; the King's voice now is a Law, at least if he so please, no law shall be enacted, the concurrence of the Prince in establishing any Law, be it never so necessary is now but a politic mercy, or a merciful policy (as some writ) not without great peril to be altered, but simply to bind the Prince to ratify or confirm any Law, is repugnant to Monarchy. Me thinks I see this great Body Politic, being desperately wounded with illegal pressures ready to expire; call for her Physicians to minister wholesome Medicines unto her: Alas, they cannot come, they are slaire with the Sword, they are imprisoned, they stand at the Seat of Judgement, if not capital. The Physic that should be given unto her, 
Nota.  those Cordial and Medicinal laws for ●he restitution of health, see what is likewise become of them. This little worm at the root of Government, a negative voice devours all; this sweet smelling and amiable Rose hath at the root a Worm which consumeth all; whatsoever affordeth delight or comfort. Quid delubra juvant, est mollis flama medullas. What do the high towered conceits of Parliaments avail, this soft fire consumeth by degrees, Quod non violento synus Aestu ex'unt; That, which the great combustions, the rage of fire and sword could not accomplish; it wasteth thy very marrow and spirits, I mean the foul enlivening Laws; but this only by way of supposition. Thus you see the Tree by its fruit.  
The efficient and final causes of Parliaments we will join together, 
Efficient cause of Parliaments.  the efficient cause of calling Parliaments is the urgent affairs of the Kingdom, as the words of the Writ are for the calling of Parliaments, not the issuing of the Writ by the King, that is only instrumental; and you may see by the ancient Law of this Land, Parliaments are to be called so often as need shall require, 
4 E. 3. 14. 36. E. 3. 10.  by two Statutes in the Reign of Edw. 3. Parliaments are to be holden once in every year, and oftener if need shall be; Statutes for aught that I know yet in force. With what face then can these stupid ignorant Advocates on the other part proclaim to the world the passing of this Bill for Triennial Parliaments, an Act of transcendent grace and favour, when you see, it is an Act of right and justice to call them once every year, yea, oftener if need shall require.  
Object. But me thinks I hear it whispered, Th● this Act for Trienniall-Parliaments is an Act of special grace and favour, notwithstanding any thing yet spoken, as appears by the very words of the Act, for by this Statute it is provided, That in case the King shall not issue forth Writs for the calling of Parliaments within the time prefixed by the Act, that then every County and Barrough shall have power to proceed to election of their Knights and Burgess●s, in such manner as the Act hath appointed. Also it appeareth further, that this S●ssion of Parliament so to be called, shall continue for the space of fifty days without any power in the King to dissolve it. 
Not calling Parliaments, or when called the power of dissolution no Prerogative, because against these statutes. Vi. Devant. in le prerogative.  Parliaments to be called without the King, yea, when called, not to be dissolved by him for such a time. Sure Regal Prerogatives conferred on the Subject.  
I answer, Even as the Sun disperseth the mists of the night, so in the presence of truth all these foggy vapours of error will suddenly vanish; Sol. for as to the first, the calling of Parliaments, doth it not appear that they are to be holden once every year, yea, oftener if need shall be, by two ancient Statutes yet in force? 
Nota.  Which Statutes amongst other good Laws, the King at his Coronation sweareth to observe and keep. How can Parliament; be holden if not called? therefore the King is bound of right to call them.  
For the second, That they shall not be dissolved for fifty days by the King; I answer, (Parols font plea) as the Lawyers say. Are not the words, Parliaments shall be holden once in every year? 
Holding of Parliaments implies continuance of them.  Is the dissolution of Parliaments a holding of them within the letter or sense, of either of these Laws? Nay further, I say, 
Nota.  They shall be holden, that is to say, 
By the ancient law of Edward the Confessor, the Parliament ought not to be determined before every bill put in to be discussed, 〈◊〉 for difficulty adjourned otherwise, etc. Final cause of Parliament.  continued not for fifty days, but for fifty years for aught that I know, within the very words of either of these Laws, if the affairs of the Kingdom shall so require; for otherwise they are not holden Cum effectu, as these Statutes intent, plainly to any man's judgement that is rational.  
Thus you see an end, a dissolution of these malignant Objections, but no dissolution of Parliaments, I hasten the final cause of Parliaments, is to make good laws, to redress grievances, to procure peace; but alas, the Dove brings not to us the Olive branch of Peace, the voice of the Tirtle is not heard in our Land; but the waters and inundations are increased so high, that they have even drowned the Ark of God, the Peace of God both in Church and Common Wealth; the urgent affairs of the Kingdom are laid aside. Me thinks the answer of Jehu in the Scripture is very pertinent to our purpose, 
No peace so long as sin aboundeth.  What hast thou to do with peace, turn thee behind me? What peace, so long as thy abominations continue, and are so many? The blood of so many of the Saints shed and spilt upon the ground doth cry for vengeance, and the wrath of God is incensed against us.  

Note these particulars.  Observe (judicious Reader) from this precedent discourse these few particulars apparent and unanswerable, and as the very mind of the Author of this work, reflect and contemplate thereupon.  
The first is, That the root and original of all these troubles was the Kings disserting the Houses of Parliament, under pretence of Tumult, and in security of his Person, but the truth is evident enough, it was because he could not prevail in that evil Counsel which then was given him, upon suggestion of I know not what crimes, to take away the Members of the Houses from the service of the Common Wealth, and trying them by Commissions elsewhere by the known Laws of the Land (as they please now to term them) wrested & misinterpreted by illegal Judgements to Condemn the innocent; 
Vi. Dear. f. 10. a  for the positive Laws, and the Law of Parliament much differ, and are not in many particulars consistent together, and yet both Laws in their proper Spheres and motions just and good Laws, and howsoever the people be deceived otherwise, and by other pretexts, this is the very truth and beginning of all our miseries; Hinc illae lachimae.  
In his Majesty's absence from the Parliament these Agents have not been idle, they then labour to invalide all the proceed of Parliament without the King's presence personally, they Arraign them, and Judge them as null, and void by extrajudicial Declarations, there is a sudden eruption of this impious doctrine, That the King hath an absolute negative voice to all their Votes and Resolutions, and so their sitting there frivolous and contemptible; a position inconsistent with the Government of this Nation, and subjecting both Laws and people: Arbitrio principis, to the will and pleasure of the Prince. A cursed Opinion.  
And further, when they see that these Plots are ineffectual, they take up Arms in plain terms; But what to do? To destroy the Laws and Government for aught that I know, yea, the King himself in his Regal Dignity; they colour it with Law and Justice, forthwith issues a Commission, known by the name of The Commission of Array, an illegal and unjust Commission, as you may perceive by this former Discourse. Afterwards they fly to the defence of the King's Person, 
Nota.  an Act justifiable (as they say) even by the Law of God and Nature, as if the Law of this Land had provided for the Members of this great Body Politic, and had left the head thereof without any security of itself; a high and great scandal to the Government. The truth is, the King is made use of by them, under pretence of the security of his Royal Person, but to shelter themselves from the mulct and penalty of those great and capital Crimes, of which they are even by the positive and known Laws guilty; you may see how largely and wisely the Law hath environed the Royal State and Dignity, with walls of defence round about in the foregoing Discourse; therefore they need not seek any other refuge. Last of all; they cast this aspersion upon the Parliament and Kingdom, That they take up Arms against the King, which you may perceive by this Discourse they do not; they intent no hurt to his Person but the safety thereof, for surely they that seek to invest the King with the same garments of Peace and Justice, with which the Law hath adorned him, seek more the security of his Person, than those that seek by these bloody courses to present him unto his people in the indelible Characters (that I say no more) of error and misgovernment.  
Are Usurpations the Robes of a Prince? Certainly these are not his Parliament Robes; Is any thing denied or withheld that is his Majesty's right, if his Majesty would cease these Wars against his People? Thus you see in brief the beginning, progress, and continuance of these our calamities unto this day on the King's part, by evil Counsel fomented and maintained, 
The Parliament and people with them, fight for their laws and liberties; yea for the King, and the maintenance of his regal dignity.  nothing but violation of Laws and Justice; and although it be falsely alleged, That the King fighteth for his Crown, I think upon the premises you may safely conclude, the Parliament and people fight for their Religion, Laws, and Liberty;; yea, to set the Crown, and the due Rights thereof upon the King's Head; and his Posterity, which by these illegal ways hath been, is, and will be much exposed even to ruin and destruction.  
If any ma● shall be yet so unhappy in himself, as not to rest satisfied with what is here delivered, but that flesh and blood will still contest, I have nothing more to say unto him then this; It is the Laws and Government of this Kingdom that warrants this truth, Et c●ntra negu●●e● principia non est dispu●a●dum.  
And now to draw to a conclusion of this wo●ke, you that are filled with knowledge and wisdom (as it is much g●o●●ed in by the s●●ple and ignorant) where is your learning and wisdom? may not I say unto you, Beho●● how that God hath chosen the vile and abject things of the world to oppose the mighty, the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; 
The King's part fight not for Religion, since they seek to enervate those Laws which (under God) preserve and secure our religion 3 jac. ca 5. vi. devant.  What are these streams of blood for? Are they for your Religion? Is this your last objection? take heed that you err ●or herein, if you endeavour to disarm Religion, to take away the Bulwarks and Fortifications thereof, the Laws and Statutes of this Kingdom, by which our Religion hath been hitherto under God preserved and maintained; Are you not guilty of Sacrilege Was there not a Statute lately made to disarm the Papist, as a dangerous enemy to our Religion? to take away all Arms and A●munition from him, as also to banish him from the King's House or Court, or of his Heirs apparent, or within ten miles of the City of London. How is this excellent ●aw most shamefully abused? Not one jot or tittle of the same, 
No cause whatsoever sufficient to justify the violation of the Laws, we may not do evil that good may come of it.  but infringed; Have they not freely repaired unto the King's Court, as likewise unto the Princes? yea, have they not been a Guard unto his Person? Do you not likewise Arm, and command in Arms the enemies of our Religion against, us the Popish Party, under pretence of the defence of the King's Person, directly against the Laws of this Realm, as I have showed you before. That Law which next Divine Providence is the only security of our Religion, the disarming and weakening the Papist, and what will ensue upon thi●, but if they should prevail (which God avert) an utter ruin of our worship of God, or at least a toleration of Popery, which would soon extirpate the Protestant Religion.  
Now let the world see what zealous Assertors you are of God's true Worship and Service, when you open the way to all profaneness and superstition.  
The religion which the best of you endeavour for, is full of many superstitious Ceremonies fit to be abolished even in the judgement of the most modern.  
I will not here enter into any discourse of them, as being impertinent, and they being apparent unto the world otherwise.  
Thus I hope I have framed a Gordian knot by the Laws of this Kingdom established, if any man can dissolve or untie the the same, let him. Discendere in arenam, I hearty desire that by the same rules of Law and Justice the folly of this work may be convinced, and that with meekness and moderation by the touchstone of truth, viz. the positive Laws, that those that sit in darkness may be enlightened; let no man go about to hue it in pieces with the sword of violence and injustice, 
R. 2.  for then hear what the blessed Apostle saith, By breaking the Laws dishonourest thou God? Thinkest thou that the humane Laws are not the Laws of God, when thy obedience unto them is so often in the holy Writ enjoined? yea, canst thou imagine, that if thou shalt transgress this Law, that thou shalt escape the righteous Judgement of God? 
Rich Legacies, viz. the positive laws.  Are the rich Legacies of thy forefathers bought at so dear a price, with so much blood and treasure, trampled under thy feet as despicable things? I will say no more. Remember the wise man, let not mercy and truth forsake thee, bind them about thy neck, and I beseech the Almighty God to give unto us all a right understanding in all things.  
What I intended is now finished, wherein I have squared my course altogether by the positive Laws, because of exception of the adverse part, not touching upon the legislative or supreme power of Parliaments, 
Master Plynne.  it being done already by the Pen of a learned Gentleman, whose abilities are sufficiently known.  
If I have satisfied any man in what is written, it is my desire. 
Epilogue.  I call Heaven and Earth to witness, that according to my knowledge in the Laws of this Kingdom, I have delivered the truth, and I wish every man to lay his hand upon his heart, and rightly to weigh and consider the premises, and for passion, sinister ends or respects, to deviate neither to the right hand not to the left, but with a sincere and clear mind to implore the Divine assistance, that in so weighty a matter he may act, resolve, and do that which shall be agreeable to the holy will and pleasure of God, and consonant unto the Honourable Laws and Government of this flourishing State and Kingdom.  
Soli Deo Gloria.   

The Table.  

Absence's of the King from Parliament how fare justifiable, Page 19 as it hath been many years by no Law warrant, used only, page 21. Vi. tit. Statute 38 H. 8. ca 21. vi. tit. use.  
Of any Member from Parliament how, and in what manner justifiable, and where and in what manner punishable, p. 15 16, 17, 18, etc. Vi. tit. Statut. 5 R. 2. & 6 H. 8. ca 16.  
Acception legal, privilege of Parliament. Pag. 6, 7.  
Act Judicial, Ministerial, in what Cases not incident to the King's Person, pag. 32: Vi. tit. presence.  
(Allegiance) the Etymology thereof, p. 18. triplex, natural, local, legal, p. 57, 58, 59, etc. Vi. tit. Statute 11. H. 7. ca 1. to what capacity of the King due, p. 62  
Arms who permitted to bear, who not, Vi. tit. Statute 2. E. 3. ca 3. by the Parliament defensive, justified in them ●s a Court of justice. p. 70, 71, 72.  
A●●●ne Royal in what cases requisite, in what not, p. 38.   

C.  
CApacity of the King natural, politic, Vi. titl. Allegiance, devant, natural, how secured by Law, p. 66.  
Causes of Parliament efficient, material, formal, final, differ. etc. p. 117, 118, 119. etc.  
Commission of Array disproved, Vi. alarge p. totum, 52. 53. usque 59   

Corone.  
(All Administration of Justice at first in the Crown) how meant. p. 32, 33.   

Court.  
Parliament a Court of Justice without the King's personal presence, 32, 33, 34. several Courts of Justice, ibid. etc. Vi. p. 72.  
Their 〈◊〉 to co●●●●d●●● posse comi●●●● posse 〈…〉 proved. p. 37, 72.  
Court in what Cases fall in Judgement o● Law, in what not p. 39, 40   

D.  
DIspensation Regal against a Statute ●here of forc● wherenot, Vi●tul. Non obstante   

E. Escuage.  
The service explained not penal, but by Parliament, p. 46, 47  
Exception legal, privil edge of Parliament. p. ●6 7.  
Exception where it relates to the body of the Act, 〈◊〉 ●re not, p. 45. in some Cases unnecessary. ibid.   

I.  
(Innuendo) in Acts of Parliament where rejected p. 4●.   

Judgement.  
Against the King by the Law positive, and compulsary. p. 2●, ●6.  
Judgement, or proceed of Parliament not subject to debate elsewhere. p. 2●, 24, ●●  
Judgement definitive in what Cases pertaining to Parliament, or other Courts of justice. p. 39, 4●.  
Judicial Acts trans-acted, in what cases by part of the Court representative by all. p. 35, 40. differed from ministerial. ibid.   

Judge.  
Who shall he of the danger of the Realm or of the necessity of raising Armies, p. 64, 65. paralleled with the power of judgement in inferior Courts. ibid.   

K. King.  
WHat capacity intended by Law, and what meant hereby, Vi. titl. Capacity. Vi. a large titl. Stat. 5. R. 2 ●● E. 3. p. 16, 17, 18, 97.  
Considered in both capacities; natural, politic. p. 65. 66.   

L.  
LAw of Parliament. Vi. titl. privilege, inconsistent with the positive Law, yet just. p. 13, 122,  
Common Law touching the Militia. p. 43, 44, 45. usque 52, per totum. Vi. titl. Statut. 1 E. 3. 5, ●. H. 4. 13.  
The only positive Law now in force concerning the Militia. Laws and Statutes how to be expounded. Vi. p. 50. 77.   

M. Militia.  
A Right of Parliament. p. 43.  
Duplex, general, absolute, or extraordinary, ordinary, or li●●ted by the positive Laws. p. ●  
The Militia positive extendeth only to Tenors or Contracts, not to be forced out of their Shires, unless in case of sudden invasion. p. 45, 46, 47, etc.  
Militia positive vested in the Sheriff, as an instrument or Officer by Statute; in the Law, or Courts of Justice in the power or right. Vi. a large p. 82, 83. usque 88 Vi. ti●l. statut. 9 E. 2. 28 E. 1. cap. 28.  
The general or absolute power of the Militia in Parliament De jure, not in the King, the reasons why at large, p. 78, 79, 80.   

Militia.  
Of the Navy, or the Seas in Parliament, not in the King at large debated p. 90, 91. etc. not divisible. ibid.   

Militia.  
The Adjuncts and Attendants of the Militia, viz. the Fort●, Castles, and Magazines to whom they belong. ibid.  
Different from houses, or palaces. ibid.   

N.  
NEgative voice in Parliament to what it extends, p. 23, 24 etc. examined in inferior Courts▪ p. 25  
Non obsta●●te, in the Kings pardon where available, where not. p. 62, 63, 105, 109.   

O.  
OAth of the King at his Coronation explained. p. 27, 28.  
Observations touching the discourse. p. 122, 123, etc.  
Offence in presence of a Court of justice, and in presence of the King differ.  
Ordinance, the Etymology of it, how Regal power the Ordinance of God. p. 100, 101, 102  
Ordinance, and the force thereof in Parliaments in inferior Courts debated. p. 38, 39  
Offices public, or the great Offices of the Kingdom, to whom the disposition of them pertains. p. 93, 94.   

P.  
PArdon of the King against a Statute. Vi. titl. Non ob● posse Comitat. posse Regni, vi. tit. Court of justice.  
Person and power Regal differenced by Divine, Humane Law. p. 100, 101, 102. usque 105  
In what Cases the Regal power may be opposed, the Regal person not criminous by Law may not be opposed. ibid.  
No Coercive power as to the Regal person, reason why; otherwise of his Lands and Possessions, or any illegal power raised by him. p. 110, 111, 112, 113  
Privilege of Parliament in the Militia. Vi. titl. Militia.  
Privilege of Parliament the Law of Parliament, the Etymology differenced from the Laws there enacted. p. 45  
Privilege of Parliament in Criminal matters, in Civil, p. 5, 6. extending to members, strangers. ibid.  
Larger in Civil matters then in Criminal. p. 7, 8. in Criminal, ordinary course of justice, in Civil extraordinary. p. 7, 8, 9 The reason of this privilege. ibid.  
In Civil causes somewhat paralleled in inferior Courts, not in Criminal. p. 10  
The privilege in Criminal matters essential to Parliaments, Et ratio. p. 11  
Pri●iledge of Parliament, That no Member departed without leave, etc. Vi. titl. Statut. 5 R 2. & 6 H 8. ca 16.  
Presence of the King no protection against the power of the Law. p. 28, 29  
Presence of the King in Parliament, personal, legal, differ; one inseparable, not the other in inferior Courts. His personal presence in a Court of justice in some cases against Law. p. 31, 32   

Prerogative.  
Definition of it, restriction of it, Militia, negative voice in Parliament no prerogative, Et ratio, Proclamation a prerogative, how and in what manner; prerogatives and rights of the King different. Vi. a large. 114, 115, 116, 117. etc.  
Proclamation in time of Parliament. p. 64.   

Proviso.  
In Statutes expounded. Vi. titl. Statut. 11 H. 7. ca 1. Vide statutum edictum 〈◊〉 parliamento, in case Commitis Strafford, sometimes explanatory only, p. 61, 62, 63   

R.  
REcognizan● pro securi●a●● pacis, who may taketh who not. p. 32, 33, 34.  
Roy) les parols nostre segnior le Roy. Vi. titl. Statut. 25 E. 3. & vi. titl. King.   

S.  
SEntence and order of Parliament how understood. p. 12, 13   

Statute.  
17 E. 2. Declarative of the prerogative. Vi. p. 3. 114  
5 R. 2. ca 4, 6 H. 8. ca 16. Touching the absence of any Member from the service of Parliament explained, p. 16, 17, 18. etc. Vi. titl. Absence.  
25 E. 3. Les pa●ols, (nostre segnior le Roy) what they intent. ibid. & p. 75. Vi. titl. roy.  
33 H. 8. ca 21. What absence of the King from Parliament warranted by this Act, p. 19, 20. Vi. titl. Absence.  
Statute of this Parliament for the relief of Ireland opened in the preamble, the Act but temporary. p. 43, 44, 47, 48, etc. Vi. titl.   

Militia.  
4 H. 4. 13. 1 E. 3. 5. 7. 18 E. 3. 25 E. 3. Declaratory of the ancient Militia limited by the Common Law. p. 44● 45. etc. Vi. titl. Militia positive.  
1 E. 3. ca 5. & 7. Statutes in matter and substance differing. p. 49, 50.  
5 H 4. ca expl. p. 52, 53, 54, etc. Touching the Regal power in the Array, the true effect and meaning thereof. p. ●5  
11 H. 7. ca 1. What the words (Allegiance.) Commandment of the King intent in this Act, p. 57, 58, 59 vi. titl. Allegiance the true reason of the ma●ing this Act, p. 104, 105  
● E. 3●● 3. Who ●●●ke or Vi 〈…〉 p. 63, 6●▪ 110  
Statute of the Anamder of the Earl of Strafford, Hoc parliamento editum explained 〈…〉 proceed, judgement p. 73, 74, 57 etc.  
●8 E. 3● ca 18. The Subjects right ●●●lecting the Sheriff of the County, 〈…〉 Vi. a large. p. ●●, 83, 84, 85. etc. & 94  
9 E. 2. Device come. the K●●gs right in election of the She●●●e of 〈◊〉 Count-wheel been used, or at least his right or the Militia by this Statute, refuted, p. 82. 8●, 〈◊〉 88  
2 E. 3. ca 8. 14. E 3. ca 14. viz. That justice shall not be delayed for the command under the great Seal, etc. Some observation on these ●●●tu●●s. p. 103, 104,  
4 E. 3. 14. 36 E. 3. 10. Touching annual parliaments, etc. 〈◊〉 calling parliaments or when called the power of di●●●●●tion 〈◊〉 prerogative, but a matter of rights and justic●, ●●t ra●io p. 119, 120, 121.  
3 jacob. ca 5. Touching dis-●●ming papists p. 109. 125 〈◊〉 ●e dispensed withal, Vi. titl. Non obstant.   

T. Tumult  
WH●● 〈◊〉 p. 19  
〈◊〉 ●here, though the King's person attended. VI titl. 〈◊〉 1 H. 7. c●. 1.  
●reason against the Laws and Government. Vi. titl. statut. 25 E. 3. p. 75.   

V  
USe of no force a●●●st the Law in esse. p. 21  
Of no force in 〈◊〉 Militia, the disposition of the great offices of the K●●●dome. E● ratio. p. 94, 95. where available, 〈◊〉 ibid.   

W.  
WAge●, S●●●●●●s that 〈◊〉 thereof as appertaining to the 〈…〉 intended. Vi. titl. Innuendo, 〈…〉 1. ●, 3. ●●. 7. etc.    

Errata.  
PAge 2. l. 3. fanebrem pre furiebrem. p. 3. in marg. for station 1. statute. p. 5. in m. Parliamento pro Parliamenti, p. 6. fol. 18. r. f. 81. p. 12. l. 19 omit of, p. 16. f. perceptum, r. preceptum, p. 16. in mar. in miserecordia Dom. Regis id est cutia, etc. l. 19 p. 26. l. 4.  right Court, ● high Court, l. 6, 7. f. exploeded, r. exploded. l. 15. r. assent to bills, p. 49 m r. not bound by their tenors, etc. p. 67. in m. r. if the King, p. 76. l. 1. r. ignorantia pro ignorantia. p. 76 l. 32. s. not impressed, r. now impressed, p. 86. l. 10. f malifica. r. malefida, p. 93. l. 19 f. disposition, r. deposition. p. 94. l. 3. r. Monarchies.