SIX METAPHYSICAL MEDITATIONS; Wherein it is Proved That there is a GOD. And that Man's MIND is really distinct from his BODY. Written Originally in Latin By RENATUS DESCARTES. Hereunto are added the OBJECTIONS made against these Meditations. By THOMAS HOBBES Of Malmesbury. With the AUTHOR'S Answers. All Faithfully Translated into ENGLISH, with a short Account of Descartes's Life. By WILLIAM MOLYNEUX.  
London, Printed by B. G. for Benj. took at the Ship in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1680.   

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THE TRANSLATORS PREFACE. TO THE READERS.  
HAd honour or applause and not the public advantage of English Readers been the design of this Undertaking, the consideration of the ●ommon Fate of Trans●actions had discouraged Me from permitting this even to have seen the light; for mere Versions do always carry with them this Property, that if not well done they may much disgrace, but if well, not much commend the doers.  
And certainly I might well have expected the same chance, had this been the Translation of an History, Play or Romance; wherein there is requisite not only a bare version but a conformation of Idiom and language, manner and customary expression; But the nature of this present Work will not admit of the like liberty, and therefore, I hope, amongst judicious Re●ders it may be exempt from the common Fate of Translations; for if we look upon it as a Philosophical or Metaphysical Tract, or rather as (really it is) a Ph●sico-Mathematical Argumentation, we shall find that a great strictness of Expression is requisite to be observed therein. Sothat had a Translator taken upon him to use his own liberty of Phrase, he would thereby have endangered the sense and force of the Arguments; for Politeness of language might as well be expected in a Translation of Euclid as in this. And all that are acquainted with this famous Author's design, do very well know, that it was his intention in these Meditations Mathematically to demonstrate, that there is a God, and that man's mind is incorporeal. And it was his opinion, that metaphysics may as clearly be demonstrated as mathematics, as witness his expression in the Dedicatory Epistle of this Work to the Sorbone Doctors, Eas (Rationes scilicet) quibus hic▪ utor certitudine & evidentiâ Geometricas aequare, vel etiam superare existimem; That he reputed his Arguments used in these Meditations, to equal if not excel Geometrical certainty.  
And this, I suppose, is sufficient to make the Reader, not expect herein any smoothness of phrase or quaintness of Expression; what is here delivered in English is immediately taken, as it is naturally in the Original. The words, we hope, may be apposite enough, and fit to express what is here designed, and I think it a derogation from the Author's skill to draw the Picture of his mind in any other Colours, than what his own Copy expresses.  
Thus far in vindication of the Philosophical plain stile and rough Language of the following Translation. I shall add a line or two, first relating to the Readers, secondly of the Author, and lastly of the Meditations themselves, together with the Motives which excited me to this Work.  
As to the Readers, 'tis, I suppose, so evident, that candcur of mind, and fr●edome from prejudice is requisite to all that desire to advantage themselves by reading other men's notions, that it need not be here insisted on with much earnestness; yet considering the Antiquity of this subject, and the novelty of the Arguments here produced, it seems to be more than ordinarily requisite for an impartial perusal of the ensuing Tract. Neither are the following Meditations to be slightly passed over, but with diligence and attention to be read; for as in mathematical demonstration, the careless missing of any one single Position may render the Conclusion obscure and sometimes inconsequent, so in these metaphysical Demonstrations, which (as before has been noted from the illustrious Author thereof) for certainty do equal, if not excel Geometrical Propositions, the slight attention to any one particular Argument may frustrate the design of the whole discourse.  
The Reasoning therefore here being close and solid, and (as in Mathematics) the knowledge of the latter depending on the knowledge of what went before, 'tis the duty of every Reader seriously to attend the Particulars, as also the connexion of the whole. Let him weigh the Arguments and perpend the Conclusions, and after a clear and distinct Knowledge, let him pass his judgement.  
And to this end I shall make it my request to every Reader, that he would not be content with a single perusual of the following Discourses, but that he would often repeat his reading t●em over; for by this means the force of those Arguments, which at first may by chance escape the most diligent and attentive Peruser, by a second or third Essay may offer themselves more fully to his Consideration. This Was the desire of our Author in an other of his pieces, I mean his Principles of Philosophy, which I am sure do not require so strict an attention of mind, as these abstracted specualtions; and therefore if it were his Request in that case, we may Reasonably thi●k that'twas no less his desire in this.  
When we come to speak of the Incomparable Author of these Meditations, we have reason to lament our own Ignorance, and to blame th● Ingratitude of the Age wherein he lived, for not transmitting to Posterity more certain and ample Records of the Life and Conversation of this Excellent Philosopher, all that has been Written in this kind gives us only so much light into the Life of this Prodigious Man, as may make us wish for more; imparting which, I shall recommend the Readers to a further enquiry into the inward Thoughts, (largely discovered in the Writings) of our Famous Author, of whose outward actions and condition we have so small knowledge.  
Renatus Des-Cartes was born on the last day of March in the year 1596. at Tours, or at Castrum Eraldum a Town near Tours in France; He came of an Ancient and Noble Family, being by Descent Lord of Perron, His Father was a Senator of his Country, and a Man of no mean estate, leaving to this his only Son by a second Wife between six and seven thousand pounds a year.  
He was Educated in his younger years according to the manner of his Country (and as he himself recommends in one of his Epistles, viz. Epist. 90. partis secundae to One for the Instruction of his Son) in the Aristotelian principles of Philosophy, a whole course whereof he had run through at the Age of se●enteen in the Schools of Flexia, or La Flesche a Town in the Province of Anjou, fa●ous for the College of jesuites there established by Henry the 4 th'.  
But to this he did not Continue long devoted, giving early testimonies of his dislike to the unsatisfactory Notions, and verbose emptiness of the Peripatetic Philosophy; He used therefore his utmost endeavours (as he himself testifies in his Dissertatio de Methodo) to get lose from those Chains and Fetters of Mind, to which the weakness of his tender years had subjected him.  
To this end he betook himself to a long course of Travel, that by the variety of Objects, which he was likely to meet with in his journeys, the memory of his past Notions might be blotted out; In his travel ●e applied himself much to the study of the Art Military, and Mathematics; In the latter he has left the World large testimonies of his Exeellence in his Book of Geometry; and in the former we have reason to believe him most expert, for He was personally present at some Sieges and Battles both in France and Germany, as particularly at the Siege of Rochel, of Gava near Genoa, of Breda, at the Battle of Prague, etc. so that we may conclude that he had a Genius fitted (according to the Motto of the noble Sir W. Raliegh) Tam Marti, quam Mercurio, For the Pike as well as Pen. And as the Glorious Roman Emperor became a Caesar by his Book as well as Sword, by the Conquests of his mind as well as those of his arm; so our Famous Author was Ex Utroque Clarus.  
In his Travels he spent many years, in all which time he was not Idle, but highly improved himself by his converse with the Beaux Esprits, which he met with in the several Regions he visited; The first Place he betook himself to, was Italy, than he went into Denmark, Germany, Hungary, etc. And after a Long but ad●antagious Peregrination he returned to Amsterdam, where he intended to take up hi● Rest, had he not been called by the French King upon very Honourableterms to Paris; During his Continuance there he so ordered his annual Revenue, that he might be supplied by the hands of a Friend wherever he was. He stayed at Paris three years, and then retired Himself to a solitary village in Holland called Egmond, where he lived twenty five years, during which time he applied himself wholly to the Restauration of true Philosophy, wherein he gave the World such mighty testimonies of his Excellence▪ that in a short time he became celebrated in the mouths of all Learned Men. Neither were the Courts of Princes silent in his deserved Praises; for after a Retirement of twenty five years he was Invited by Christina Queen of Sweedland to her Court; Thither upon the entreaty of this brave and Learned Princess he betook himself, where he had not continued Long before he was struck with a Peripneumonia or Inflammation of the Lungs (contracted, as it is thought by the long Discourses which he used to hold bare headed with the Queen, continuing them sometimes till far in the Night,) of which unhappy distemper he Died the seventh Day after he sickened.  
Thus Expired this Wonder of his Own and succeeding Ages, desired and lamented by all men, Aequaled by none. He was buried in a costly Monument consisting of four sides, upon which were inscribed Epitaphs; bestowed upon him by many Renowned Persons.  
What shall we now say sufficient to express our Gr●● for the untimely Decease of this Worthy Philosopher? But Especially what shall we now do to recover our Loss? Let us endeavour to Redeem what we have lost by well Husbanding and careful improvement of what is left; which may be done in Part by a Diligent Perusal of the Works written by this Excellent Author; This, This only is the way of Reviving him again, and of giving him Immortality in spite of his untimely Fate. And so let him for ever live celebrated by the Deserved Praises of all ingenious Enquirers after truth, and Learning.  
Let us therefore cast our eye upon the Present Work of this extroardinary Philosopher, and therein let us admire his profound judgement and vigorous Fancy, for if w● seriously consider it, we shall hardly find a more solid close piece of Reasoning either in this or Foregoing ages; Here, what was commonly asserted without proof, is not only prov●d but Mathematically Demonstrated, viz. That God is the Fountain and Original of Truth; His sharp Wit, like Hannibal's Vinegar, hath eaten thro' the Mazing and overtowring hills of Errors, a Plain and Pleasant Way to the Divine seat of Knowledge.  
In fine, such is the Excellence of these six Meditations, that I cannot resemble his Performance herein better than to the Six Days Work of the Supreme Architect; and certainly next to the Creation of All things out of Nothing, the Restauration of Truth out of Errors is the most Divine Work; so that (with Reverence be it spoken) the Incomparable Des-Cart●s does hereby deserve as it were the name of a Creator. In the first Meditation we are Presented with a Rude and Indigested Choas of Errors and Doubts, till the Divine spirit of the Noble Des-Cartes (Pardon the Boldness of the Expression) moves upon the confused face of these Waters, and thereout produces some clear and distinct Light; by which Sunshine he proceeds to bring forth and cherish other Branches of Truth; Till at last by a six Days Labour he Establishes this Fair Fabric (as I may call it) of the Intellectual World on foundations that shall never be shaken. Then sitting downwith rest and satisfaction he looks upon this his Offspring, and Pronounces it Good.  
These Things Considered, I need not make any long Apologies for my undertaking a translation thereof; The excellency of the Original is sufficient to vindicate my endeavours to present the English World with a Copy, and he that shall blame my Intentions of Communicating the Methods of Truth to those that have only the English Tongue, may as well find fault with those English that propagate the Christian Religion among savage Indians, and translate the Scriptures into their Language, because they have not the English Tongue. To understand Latin is not (or at most a very small) part of Learning▪ and that which certainly every Cobbler in Rome was once endowed with; and therefore must there then be no translations out of Greek into Latin? I doubt not, but there are many Persons in our Nations, who tho wanting Latin, are notwithstanding very capable of the most abstracted speculations; the late disturbances of our Kingdoms occasioned many Youths, who were then in a fair way of Instruction, to forsake their learning, and divert their intentions from Literature to Arms, and yet many of these have afterwards become Men of extraordinary abilities and qualifications for learning notwithstanding their deficiency in the Roman Tongue. And I see no Reason why it should not be the desire, and consequently the endeadeavour of every true English man, to make his language as universal as is now the French, into which the best Books in all sorts of Learning, both Poetry and Prose, are daily translated out of all languages, but especially out of Greek and Latin. Among which these Meditations are to be found, entitled, Les Meditations Metaphysics De Rene Des Cartes touchant lafoy Premiere Philosophy, This was translated out of the Authors Latin into French by Monsieur le D. D. L. N. S. The several Objections also, which were made by divers learned Persons against these Meditations, with the Author's Answers, were translated into French by M. B. L. R. And, I hope, no one will assert, that the French are more fit to receive those metaphysical Notions delivered herein than the English Nation.  
But 'twas none of the smallest motives I had to this undertaking, that though some famous English Authors have taken notice of the Arguments here produced (for the proof of a Deity drawn from the Idea we have of God in our Mind, etc.) Particularly the most excellent and learned Dr. Stillingfleet in the first Chapter of the third Book in his Origines Sacrae, who refers his Readers to a further search into these Meditations in the 400 page of that Discourse; as also the Reverend Dr. Henry More in his Antidote against Atheism, and more fully in his Appendix annexed thereto, hath treated of our Author's demonstration; and yet nothing of the genuine original from whence they have borrowed all their Copies (though some of them drawn in a larger size, yet I question whether so expressive) nothing of our Authors proper management hath ever appeared in English. Those that assert these Arguments to have been long before thought upon by some of the Fathers, I shall refer to our Authors just vindication of himself in his several Answers to Objections made against these Discourses.  
And here I shall dismiss the Reader detaining him no longer from that satisfaction which ●e may reasonably expect from the perusal of th● following Meditations; this Translaltion is dedicated to no one in particular, but is h●●bly submitted to the moderate censure of all candid Readers, by  
Dablin Feb, 19 1679/ 80. Their humble Servant Will. Molyneux.   

The Contents.  

Meditation 1. Of Things Doubtful. Pag. I.  
Meditat. 2. Of the Nature of Man's Mind, and that 'tis easier Proved to Be then our Body. p. II.  
Meditat. 3. Of God, and that there Is a God. p. 27.  
Meditat. 4. Of Truth and Falsehood. p. 55.  
Meditat. 5. Of the Essence of Things Material, and herein again of God, and that He does Exist. p. 70.  
Meditat. 6. Of Corporeal Being's and their Existence, as also of the Real Difference between Mind and Body. p. 83.  
Objections and Answers. p. 155.    

ERRATA.  
PAg. 1. line ●, deal off. p. 3. l. 21. there ●ants the sign of Interrogation. p. 8. l. 10. r. Premeditated. ib. l. 14. r falsehoods. p. 18. l. 1●. r. that it may. p. 20. l. 11. r. suffers. In the two or three first Chapters there are Astericks wanting. p. 33. l. 10. deal l. p. 9 l. 2●. r formally. p. 49. l. 14. r. Duraration and Continuance. p. ●4. l. ●. for the Point put a Comma. p. 61. l. u●e. r. ●enquire. p. 91. r. in themargin doubted. p. 124. .6. r. have no affinity.   

THE Metaphysical Meditations OF Renatus Des-Cartes, etc.  

MEDITAT. I.  
Of Things Doubtful.  
SOME years past I perceived how MANY Falsities I admitted off as Truths in my Younger years, and how Dubious those things were which I raised from thence; and therefore I thought it requisite (if I had a design to establish any thing that should prove firm and permanent in sciences) that once in my life I should clearly cast aside all my former opinions, and begin a new from some First principles. But this seemed a great Task, and I still expected that maturity of years, than which none could be more apt to receive Learning; upon which account I waited so long, that at last I should deservedly be blamed had I spent that time in Deliberation which remained only for Action.  
This day therefore I conveniently released my mind from all cares, I procured to myself a Time Quiet, and free from all Business, I retired myself Alone; and now at length will I freely and serioulsy apply myself to the General overthrow of all my former Opinions.  
To the Accomplishment of Which, it will not be necessary for me to prove them all false (for that perhaps I shall never achieve) But because my reason persuades me, that I must withdraw my assent no less from those opinions which seem not so very certain and undoubted, than I should from those that are Apparently false, it will be sufficient if I reject all those wherein I find any Occasion of doubt.  
Neither to effect this is it necessary, that they all should be run over particularly (which would be an endless trouble) but because the Foundation being once undermined, whether is built there on will of its own accord come to the ground, I shall therefore immediately assault the vey principle, on which whatever I have believed was grounded. Viz.  
Whatever I have hitherto admitted as most true, that I received either from, or by my Senses; but these I have often found to deceive me, and 'tis prudence never certainly to trust those that have (though but once) deceived us.  
1 Doubt. But though sometimes the senses deceive us being exercised about remote or small objects, y●t there are many other things of which we cannot doubt though we know them only by the senses? as that at present I am in this place, that I am sitting by a fire, that I have a Winter gown on me, that I feel this Paper with my hands; But how can it be denied that these hands or this body is mine; Unless I should compare myself to those mad men, whose brains are disturbed by such a disorderly melancholic vapour, that makes them continually profess themselves to be Kings, though they are very poor, or fancy themselves clothed in Purple Robes, though they are naked, or that their heads are made of Clay as a bottle, or of glass, etc. But these are mad men, and I should be as mad as they in following their example by fancying these things as they do.  
1 Solution. This truly would seem very clear to those that never sleep, and suffer the same things (and sometimes more unlikely) in their repose, than these mad men do whilst they are awake; for how often am I persuaded in a Dream of these usual occurrences, that I am in this place, that I have a Gown on me, that I am sitting by a fire, etc. Tho all the while I am lying naked between the Sheets.  
But now I am certain that I am awake and look upon this Paper, neither is this head which I shake asleep, I knowingly and willingly stretch out this hand, and am sensible that things so distinct could not happen to one that sleeps. As if I could not remember myself to have been deceived formerly in my sleep by the like thoughts; which while I consider more attentively I am so far convinced of the difficulty of distinguishing sleep from waking that I am amazed, and this very amazement almost persuades me that I am asl●ep.  
2. Doubt. Wherefore let us suppose ourselves asleep, and that these things are not true, viz. that we open our eyes, move our heads, stretch our hands, and perhaps that we have no such things as hands or a body. Yet we must confess, that what we see in a Dream is (as it were) a painted Picture, which cannot be devised but after the likeness of some real things; and that therefore these Generals at least, viz. eyes, head, hands, and the whole body are things really existent and not imaginary; For Painters themselves, (even then when they design Mermaids and Satyrs in the most unusual shapes) do not give them natures altogether new, but only add the divers Parts of different Animals together; And if by chance they invent any thing so new that nothing was ever seen like it, so that 'tis wholly fictitious and false, yet the colours at least of which, they make it must be true Colours; soupon the same account, though these General things as eyes, head, hands, etc. may be imaginary; yet nevertheless we must of necessity confess the more simple and universal things to be True, of which (as of true Colours) these Images of things (whether true or false) which are in our minds are made; such as are the nature of a body in General, and its Extension, also the shape of things extended, with the quantity or bigness of them, their number also, and place wherein they are, the time in which they continue, and the like, and therefore from hence we make no bad conclusion, that Physic, both Natural, and Medicinal, Astronomy, and all other sciences, which depend on the consideration of compound things, are Doubtful. ●ut that Arithmetic, Geometry, and the ●ille (which treat only of the most simple, and General things not regarding whether they really are or not) have in them something certain and undoubted; for whether I sleep or wake, two and three added make five; a square has no more sides than four, etc. neither seems it possible that such pla●● truths can be doubted off.  
2. Solution. But all this While there is rooted in my mind a certain old opinion of the being of an Omnipotent God, by whom I am created in the state I am in; and how know I but he caused that there should be no Earth, no Heaven, no Body, no Figure, no Magnitude, no Place, and yet that all these things should seem to me to be as now they are? And as I very often judge others to Err about those things which they think they Throughly understand, so why may not I be deceived, whenever I add two and three, or count the sides of a Square, or whatever other easy Matter can be thought of?  
3. Doubt. But perhaps God wills not that I should be deceived, for he is said to be Infinitely Good.  
3. Solution. Yet if it were Repugnant to his Goodness to create me so that I should be always deceived, it seems also unagreable to his Goodness to permit me to be deceived at any time; Which last no one will affirm: Some there are truly who had rather deny God's Omnipotence, then believe all things uncertain; but these at present we may not contradict. And we will suppose all this of God to be false; yet whether they will suppose me to become what I am by Fate, by Chance, by a continued chain of cause's, or any other way, because to err is an Imperfetion, by how much the less power they will Assign to the Author of my Being, so much the ●●re Probable it will be, that I am so Imperfect as to be always deceived.  
To which Arguments I know not what to answer but am forced to confess, that there is nothing of all those things which I formerly received as Truths, whereof at present I may not doubt; and this doubt shall not be grounded on inadvertency or Levity, but upon strong and premeditating reasons; and therefore I must hereafter (if I design to discover any truths) withdraw my assent from them so less than from apparent falsehood.  
But 'tis not sufficient to think only Transiently on these things, but I must take care to remember them; for daily my old opinion return upon me, and much against my Will almost possess my Belief tied to them, as it were by a continued use and Right of Familiarity; neither shall I ever cease to assent and trust in them, whilst I suppose them as in themselves they really are, that is to say, something doubtful (as now I have proved) yet notwithstanding highly Probable, which it is much more Reasonable to believe then disbeleive.  
Wherefore I conceive I should not do amiss, if (with my mind bend clearly to the contrary side) I should deceive myself, and suppose them for a While altogether false and Imaginary; till at length the Weights of prejudice being equal in each scale, no ill custom may any more Draw my Judgement from the true Conception of things, for I know from hence will follow no dangerous Error, and I can't too immoderately pamper my own Incredulity, seeing What I am about, concerns not Practice ●ut Speculation.  
To Which end I will suppose, not an Infinitely perfect God, the Fountain of truth, but that some Evil Spirit which is very Powerful and crafty has used all his endeavours to deceive me; I will conceive, the Heavens, Air, Earth, Colours, Figures, Sounds, and all outward things are nothing else but the delusions of Dreams, by which he has laid snares to catch my easy belief; I will consider myself as not having hands, Eyes, Flesh, Blood, or Senses, but that I falsely think that I have all these. I will continue firmly in this Meditation; and though it lies not in my power to discover any truth, yet this is in my power, not to assent to Falsities, and with a strong resolution take care that the Mighty deceiver (though never so powerful or cunning) impose not any thing on my belief.  
But this is a laborious intention, and a certain sloth reduces me to the usual course of life, and like a Prisoner who in his sleep perhaps enjoyed an imaginary liberty, and when he gins to suppose that he is asleep is afraid to waken, but is willing to be deceived by the Pleasant delusion; so I willingly fall into my old opinions, and am afraid to be Roused, lest a toilsome waking succeeding a pleasant rest I may hereafter live not in the light, but in the confused darkness of the doubts now raised.   

MEDITAT. II.  
Of the nature of Man's mind, and that 'tis easier proved to be then our body.  
BY yesterday Meditation I am cast into so great Doubts, that I shall never forget them, and yet I know not how to answer them, but being plunged on a sudden into a deep ●ulf, I am so amazed that I can neither touch the bottom, nor swim at the top.  
Nevertheless, I will endeavour once more, and try the way I set on yesterday, by removing from me whatever is in the least doubtful, as if I had certainly discovered it to be altogether false, and will proceed till I find out some certainty, or if nothing else, yet at least this certainty, That there is nothing sure.  
Archimedes required but a point which was firm, and immovable, that he might move the whole Earth, so in the present undertaking ●reat things may be expected, if I can discover but the least thing that is true and indisputable.  
Wherefore I suppose all things I see are false, and believe that nothing of those things are really existent, which my deceitful memory represents to me; 'tis evident I have no senses, that a Body, Figure, Extension, Motion, Place, etc. are mere Fictions; what thing therefore is there that is true? perhaps only this, 〈◊〉 there is nothing certain.  
But how know I that there is nothing distinct 
Doubts and Solutions.  from all these things (which I have now reckoned) of which I have no reason to doubt? Is there no God (or whatever other name I may call him) who has put these thoughts into me? Yet why should I think this? When I myself perhaps am the Author of them. Upon which Account, therefore must not I be something? 'tis but just now that I denied that I had any senses, or any Body. Hold a while— Am I so tied to a Body and senses and I cannot exist without them? But I have perswaded myself that there is nothing in the World, no Heaven, no Earth, no Souls, no Bodies; and then why not, that I myself am not? Yet surely if I could persuade myself any thing, I was.  
But there is I know not what sort of Deceivour very powerful and very crafty, who always strives to deceive Me; without Doubt therefore I am, if he can deceive me; And let him Deceive me as much as he can, yet he can never make me not to Be, Whilst I think that I am, Wherefore I may lay this down as a Principle, that whenever this sentence I am, I exist, is spoken or thought of by Me, 'tis necessarily True.  
But I do not yet fully understand who I am that now necessarily exist, and I must hereafter take care, lest I foolishly mistake some other thing for myself, and by that means be deceived in that thought, which I defend as the most certain and evident of all.  
Wherefore I will again Recollect, what I believed myself to be heretofore, before I had set upon these Meditations, from which Notion I will withdraw whatever may be Disproved and the Forementioned Reasons, that in the End, That only may Remain which is True and indisputable.  
What therefore hav● I heretofore thought myself? A Man, But what is a man? shall I answer, a Rational Animal? By no means; because afterwards it may be asked, what an Animal is? and what Rational is? And so from one question I may fall into greater Difficulties; neither at present have I so much time as to spend it about such Niceties.  
But I shall rather here Consider, what heretofore represented itself to my thoughts freely, and naturally, whenever I set myself to understand What I myself was.  
And the first thing I find Representing itself is, that I have Face, Hands, Arms, and this whole frame of parts which is seen in my Body, and which I call my Body.  
The next thing represented to me was▪ that I was nourished could walk, had senses, and could Think; which functions I attributed to my Soul. Yet what this soul of mine was, I did not fully conceive; or else supposed it a small thing like wind, or fire, or air, infused through my stronger parts.  
As to my Body truly I doubted not, but that I rightly understood its Nature, which (if I should endeavour to describe as I conceive it) I should thus Explain, viz. By a Body I mean whatever is capable of Shape, or can be contained in a place, and so fills a space that it excludes all other bodies out of the same, that which may be touched, seen, heard, tasted, or smelled, and that which is capable of various Motions and Modifications, not from it self, but from any other thing moving it, for I judged it against (or rather above) the nature of a Body to move itself, or perceive, or think, But rather admired that I should find these Operations in certain bodies.  
But How now (since I suppose a certain powerful and (if it be lawful to call him so) evil deluder, 
Doubts and Solutions.  who useth all his endeavours to deceive me in all things) can I affirm that I have any of those things, which I have now said belong to the nature of a Body? Hold— Let me Consider—, Let me think—, Let me reflect— I can find no Answer, and I am weary with repeating the same things over-again in vain.  
But Which of these Faculties did I attribute to my Soul, my Nutritive, or Motive faculty? yet now seeing I have no Body, these also are mere delusions, Was it my sensitive faculty? But this also cannot be performed without a Body, and I have seemed to perceive many things in my sleep, of which I afterwards understood myself not to be sensible. Was it my Cogitative Faculty? Here I have discovered it, 'tis my Thought, this alone cannot be separated from Me, I am, I exist,— 'tis true, but for what time Am I? Why I am as long as I think; For it May be that When I cease from thinking▪ I may cease from being. Now I admit of nothing but what is necessarily true: In short therefore I am only a thinking thing, that is to say, 
* Places noted with their Asterisk are referred to in the following Objections.  a mind▪ or a soul, or understanding, or Reason, words which formerly I understood not; I am a Real thing, and Really Existent, But what sort of thing? I have just now said it, A thinking thing.  
But am I nothing besides? I will consider— I am not that structure of parts, which is called a Man's Body, neither am I any sort of thin Air insfused into those Parts, nor a Wind, nor Fire, nor Vapour, nor Breath, nor whatever I myself can feign, for all these things I have supposed not to Be. Yet my Position stands firm, Neverthless I am something. Yet perhaps it so falls out that these very things which I suppose not to exist (because to me unknown) are in reality nothing different from that very Self, which I know. I cannot tell, I dispute it not now, I can only give my opinion of those things whereof I have knowledge. I am sure that I exist, I ask who I am whom I thus know, certainly, the knowledge, of Me (precisely taken) depends not on those things▪ whose existence I am yet ignorant off; and therefore not on any other things that I can feign by my imagination.  
And this very Word (feign) puts me in mind of my error, for I should feign in deed, if I should imagine myself any thing; for to imagine is nothing else but to think upon the shape or image of a corporeal thing; but now I certainly know that I am, and I know also that 'tis possible that all these images, and generally whatever belongs to the Nature of a Body are nothing but deluding Dreams. Which things Consider'd I should be no less Foolish in saying, I will imagine that I may more throughly understand what I am, then if should say, at Present I am awake and perceive something true, but because it appears not evidently enough, I shall endeavour to sleep, that in a Dream I may perceive it more evidently and truly.  
Wherefore I know that nothing that I can comprehend by my imagination, can belong to the Nation I have of myself, and that I must carefully withdraw my mind from those things it that may more distinctly perceive its own Nature.  
Let me ask therefore What I am, A Thinking Thing, but What is That? That is a thing, doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, hilling, imagining also, and sensitive. These truly are not a few Properties, if they all belong to Me. And Why should they Not belong to me? For am not I the very same who at present doubt almost of All things; yet understand something, which thing only I affirm to be true, I deny all other things, I am willing to know more, I would not be deceived, I imagine many things unwillingly, and consider many things as coming to me by my senses. Which of all these faculties is it, which is not as true as that I Exist, though I should sleep, or my Creator should as much as in him lay, strive to deceive Me? which of them is it that is distinct from my thought? which of them is it that can be separated from me? For that I am the same that doubt, understand, and will is so evident, that I know not how to explain it more manifestly, and that I also am the same that imagine, for though perhaps (as I have supposed) no thing that can be imagined is true, yet the imaginative Power itself is really existent, and makes up a part of my Thought; and last of all that I am the same that am sensitive, or perceive corporeal things as by my sense, yet that I now see light, hear a noise, feel heat, these things are false, for I suppose myself asleep, but I know that I see, hear, and am heated, that cannot be false; and this it is that in me is properly called Sense, and this strictly taken is the same with thought.  
By these Considerations I begin a little better to understand Myself what I am; But yet it seems, and I cannot but think that Corporeal Things (whose Images are form in my thought, and which by my sense, I perceive) are much more distinctly known, than that confused Notion of Myself which imagination cannot afford me. And yet 'tis strange that things doubtful, unknown, distinct from Me, should be apprehended more clearly by Me, than a Thing that is True, than a thing that is known, or then I myself; But the Reason is, that my Mind loves to wander, and suffer not itself to be bounded within the first limits of Truth.  
Let it therefore Wander, and once more let me give it the Free Reins, that hereafter being conveniently kerbed, it may suffer itself to be more easily Governed.  
Let me consider those things, which of all Things I formerly conceived most evident, that is to say, Bodies which we touch, which we see, not bodies in General (for those General Conceptions are usually Confused) but some one Body in particular.  
Let us choose for example this piece of Bees-wax, it was lately taken from the Comb, it has not yet lost all the taste of the Honey, it retains something of the smell of the Flowers from whence 'twas gathered, its colour, shape, and bigness are manifest, 'tis hard, 'tis cold, 'tis easily felt, and if you will knock it with your singer, 'twill make a noise: In fine, it hath all things requisite to the most perfect notion of a Body.  
But behold whilst I am speaking 'tis put to the Fire, its taste is purged away, the smell is vanished, the colour is changed, the shape is altered, its bulk is increased, it's become soft, 'tis ●ot, it can scarce be felt, and now (though you strike it) it makes not noise. Does it yet continue the same Wax? surely it does, this all confess, no one denies it, no one doubts it. What therefore was there in it that was so evidently known? surely none of those things which I perceived by my senses; for what I smelled, tasted, have seen, felt, or heard, are all vanished, and yet the Wax remains. Perhaps 'twas this only that I now think on, viz, that the Wax itself was not that taste of Honey, that smell of Flowers, that whiteness, that shape, or that sound, but it was a Body which awhile before appeared to me so and so modified, but now otherwise. But what is it strictly that I thus imagine? let me consider: And having rejected whatever belongs not to the Wax, let me see what will; remain, viz. this only, a thing extended, flexible, and mutable. But what is this flexible, and mutable? is it that I imagine that this Wax from being round may be made square, or from being square can be made triangular? No, this is not it; for I conceive it capable of innumerable such changes, and yet I cannot by my imagination run over these Innumerables; Wherefore this notion of its mutability proceeds not from my imagination. What then is extended? is not its Extension also unknown? For when it melts 'tis greater, when it boils 'tis greater, and yet greater when the heat is increased; and I should not rightly judge of the Wax, did I not think it capable of more various Extensions than I can imagine. It remains therefore for me only to confess, that I cannot imagine what this Wax is, but that I perceive with my Mind what it is. I speak of this particular Wax, for of Wax in general the notion is more dear.  
But what Wax is this that I only concieve by my mind? 'Tis the same which I see, which I touch, which I imagine, and in fine, the same which at first I judged it to be. but this is to be noted, that the perception thereof is not the sight, the touch, or the imagination thereof; neither was it ever so, though at first it seemed so. But the perception thereof is the inspection or beholding of the Mind only, which may be either imperfect and confused, as formerly it was; or clear and distinct, as now it is; the more or the less I consider the Composition of the Wax.  
In the interim, I cannot but admire how prone my mind is to err; for though I revolve these things with myself silently, and without speaking, yet am I entangled in mere words, and am almsot deceived by the usual way of expression; for we commonly say, that we see the Wax itself if it be present, and not, that we judge it present by its colour or shape; from whence I should immediately thus conclude, therefore the Wax is known by the sight of the eye, and not by the inspection of the mind only. Thus I should have concluded, had not I by chance looked out of my window, and seen men Passing by in the Street; which men I as usually say that I see, as I do now, that I see this Wax; and yet I see nothing but their Hair and Garments, which perhaps may cover only artifical Machine's and movements, but I judge them to be men; so that what I though I only saw with my eyes, I comprehend by my judicative Faculty, which is my Soul, But it becomes not one, who desires to be wiser than the Vulgar, to draw matter of doubt from those ways of expression, which the Vulgar have invented.  
Wherefore let us proceed and consider, whether I perceived more perfectly and evidently what the Wax was, when I first looked on't, and believed that I knew it by my outward senses, or at least by my common sense (as they call it) that is to say, by my imagination; or whether at present I better understand it, after I have more diligently enquired both what it is, and how it may be known. Surely it would be a foolish thing to make it matter of doubt to know which of these parts are true; What was there in my first perception that was distinct? What was there that seemed not incident to every other Animal? But now when I distinguish the Wax from its outward adherents, and consider it as if it were naked, with its cover pulled off, than I cannot but really perceive it with my mind, though yet perhaps my judgement may err.  
But what shall I now say as to my mind, or my self? (for as yet I admit nothing as belonging to me but a mind.) Why (shall I say?) should not I, who seem to perceive this Wax so distinctly, know my self not only more truly and more certainly, but more distinctly and evidently? For if I judge that this Wax exists, because I see th●s Wax; surely it will be much more evident, that I myself exist, because I see this Wax; for it may be that this that I see is not really Wax, also it may be that I have no eyes wherewith to see any thing; but it cannot be, when I see, or (which is the same thing) when I think that I see, that I who think should not exist. The same thing will follow if I judge that this Wax exists, because I touch, or imagine it, etc. And what has been said of Wax, may be applied to all other outward things.  
Moreover, if the notion of Wax seems more distinct after it is made known to me, not only by my sight or touch, but by more and other causes; How much the more distinctly must I confess my self known unto my self, seeing that all sort of reasoning which furthers me in the peroeption of Wax, or any other Body, does also increase the proofs of the nature of my Mind. But there are so many more things in the very Mind itself, by which the notion of it may be made more distinct, that those things which drawn from Body conduce to its knowledge are scarce to be mentioned.  
And now behold of my own accord am I come to the place I would be in; for seeing I have now discovered that Bodies themselves are not properly perceived by our senses or imagination, but only by our understanding, and are not therefore perceived, because they are felt or seen, but because they are understood; it plainly appears to me, that nothing can possibly be perceived by me easier, or more evidently, than my Mind.  
But because I cannot so soon shake off the Acquaintance of my former Opinion, I am willing to stop here, that this my new knowledge may be better fixed in my memory the longer I meditate thereon.   

MEDITAT. III.  
Of GOD, and that there is a God.  
NOw will I shut my eyes, I will stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses, I will blot out the Images of corporeal things clearly from my mind, or (because that can scarce be accomplished) I will give no heed to them, as being vain and false, and by discoursing with myself, and prying more rightly into my own Nature, will endeavour to make myself by degrees more known and familiar to myself.  
I am a Thinking Thing, that is to say, doubting, affirming, denying, understanding few things, ignorant of many things, willing, nilling, imagining also, and sensitive. For (as before I have noted) though perhaps whatever I imagine, or am sensible of, as without me, Is not; yet that manner of thinking which I call sense and imagination (as they are only certain Modes of Thinking) I am certain are in Me. So that in these few Words I have mentioned whatever I know, or at lest Whatever as yet I perceive myself to know.  
Now will I look about me more carefully to see Whether there Be not some other Thing in Me, of Which I have not yet taken Notice. I am sure That I am a Thinking Thing, and therefore Do not I know what is Required to make me certain of any Thing? I Answer, that in this My first knowledge 'tis Nothing but a clear, and distinct perception of What I affirm, Which would not be sufficient to make me certain of the Truth of a Thing, if it were Possible that any thing that I so clearly and distinctly Perceive should be false. Wherefore I may lay this Down as a Principle. Whatever I Clearly and Distinctly perceive is certainly True.  
But I have formerly Admitted of many Things as very Certain and manifest. Which I afterwards found to be doubtful Therefore What sort of Things were they? Viz. Heaven, Earth, Stars, and all other things which I perceived by my Senses. But What did I Perceive of These Clearly? Viz. That I had the Ideas or Thoughts of these things in my mind, and at Present I cannot deny that I have these Ideas in Me. But there was some other thing Which I affirmed, and Which (by Reason of the common Way of Belief) I thought that I Clearly Perceived; Which nevertheless, I did not really Perceive; And that was, that there were Certain Things Without Me from whence these Ideas Proceeded, and to which they were exactly like. And this it was, Wherein I was either Deceived, or if by Chance I Judged truly, yet it Proceeded not from the strength of my Perception.  
But When I was exercised about any single and easy Proposition in Arithmetic or Geometry, as that two and three, added make five, Did not I Perceive them Clearly enough to make me affirm them True? Truly concerning these I had no other Reason afterwards to Doubt, but That I thought Perhaps there may be a God who might have so created me, that I should be Deceived even in those things which seemed most Clear to me. And as often as this Preconceived opinion of God's great Power comes into my Mind, I cannot but Confess that he may easily cause me to Err even in those things which I Think I perceive most Evidently with my Mind; yet as often as I Consider the Things themselves, which I Judge myself to perceive so Clearly, I am so fully Persuaded by them, that I easily Break out into these Expressions, Let Who can Deceive Me, yet he shall never Cause me Not to Be whilst I think that I Am, or that it shall ever be True, that I never was, Whilst at Present 'tis True that I am, or Perhaps, that Two and Three added make More or Less than Five; for in These things I Perceive a Manifest Repugnancy; And truly seeing I have no reason to Think any God a Deceiver, Nor as yet fully know Whether there Be any God, or Not, 'Tis but a slight and (as I may say) Metaphysical Reason of Doubt, which depends only on that opinion of which I am not yet Persuaded.  
Wherefore That this Hindrance may be taken away, When I have time I ought to Inquire, Whether there Be a God, And if there be One, Whether he can be a Deceiver, For whilst I am Ignorant of this, I cannot possibly be fully Certain of any Other thing.  
But now Method seems to Require Me to Rank all My Thoughts under certain Heads, and to search in Which of them Truth or Falsehood properly Consists. Some of them are (as it were) the Images of Things, and to these alone the Name of an Idea properly belongs, as When I think upon a Man, A Chimaera or Monster, Heaven, an Angel, or God. But there are Others of them, that have superadded Forms to them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny. I know I have always (when ever I think) some certain Thing as the subject or object of my Thought, but in this last sort of thoughts there is something more which I Think upon then Barely the likeness of the Thing. And of these Thoughts some are called Wills and Affections, and Others of them judgements.  
Now as touching Ideas, if they be Considered alone as they are in themselves, without Respect to any other Things, they cannot Properly be false; for Whether I Imagine a Goat or a Chimaera, 'tis as Certain that I Imagine one as the other. Also in the Will and Affections I need not Fear any Falsehood, For though I should Wish for evil Things, or Things that are Not, it is not therefore Not true that I Wish for them.  
Wherefore there only Remains my judgements of Things, in which I must take Care that I be not deceived. Now the Chief and most usual Error that I discover in them is, That I judge Those Ideas that are within me to be Conformable and like to certain things that are without Me; for truly if I Consider those Ideas as certain Modes of my Thought, without Respect to any other Thing, they will scarce afford me an Occasion of Erring.  
Of these Ideas some are Innate, some Adventitious, and some Others seem to Me as Created by myself; For that I understand what A Thing Is, What is Truth, What a Thought, seems to Proceed merely from my own Nature. But that I now hear a Noise, see the Sun, or feel heat, I have▪ always judged to Proceed from Things External. But Lastly, Mermaids, Griffins, and such like Monsters, are made ●erly by Myself. And yet I may well think all of them either Adventitious, or all of them Innate, or all of them made by myself, for I have not as yet discovered their true Original.  
But I ought chiefly to search after those of them which I count Adventitious, and which I consider as coming from outward objects, that I may know what reason I have to think them like the things themselves, which they represent. Viz. Nature so teaches Me; and also I know that I they depend not on my Will, and therefore not on me; for they are often present with me against my inclinations, or (as they say) in spite of my teeth, as now whether I will or no I feel heat, and therefore I think that the sense or Idea of heat is propagated to me by a thing really distinct from myself, and that is by the heat of the Fire at which I sit; And nothing is more obvious then for me to judge that That thing should transmit its own Likeness into me, rather than that any other thing should be transmitted by it. Which sort of arguments whether firm enough or not I shall now Try.  
When I here say, that nature so teaches me, I understand only, that I am as it were willingly forced to believe it, and not that 'tis discovered to me to be true by any natural light; for these two differ very much. For whatever is discovered to me by the Light of nature (as that it necessarily Follows that I am, because I think) cannot possibly be doubted; Because I am endowed with no other Faculty, in which I may put so great confidence, as I can in the Light of nature; or which can possibly tell me, that those things are false, which natural light teaches me to be true; and as to my natural Inclinations, I have heretofore often judged myself led by them to the election of the worst part, when I was in the choosing one of two Goods; and therefore I see no reason why I should ever trust them in any other thing.  
And then, though these Ideas depend not on my will, it does not therefore follow that they necessarily proceed from things external. For as, Although those Inclinations. (which I but now mentioned) are in me, yet they seem distinct and different from my will; so perhaps there may be in me some other faculty (to me unknown) which may prove the Efficient cause of these Ideas, as hitherto I have observed them to be form in me whilst I dream, without the help of any External Object.  
And last of all, though they should proceed from things which are different from me, it does not therefore follow that they must be like those things. For often times I have found the thing and the Idea differing much. As for example, I find in myself two divers Ideas of the Sun, one as received by my senses (and which chiefly I reckon among those I call adventitious) by which it appears to me very small, * another as taken from the arguments of Astronomers (that is to say, consequentially collected, or some other ways made by me from certain natural notions) by which 'tis rendered something bigger than the Globe of the Earth. Certainly both of these cannot be like that sun which is without me, and my reason persuades me, that that Idea is most unlike the Sun, which seems to proceed Immediately from itself.  
All which things sufficiently prove, that I have hitherto (not from a true judgement, but from a blind impulse) believed that there are certain things different from my self, and which have sent their Ideas or Images into me by the Organs of my senses, or some other way.  
But I have yet an other Way of enquiring, whether any of those Things (whose Ideas I have within Me) are Really Existent without Me; And that is Thus: As those Ideas are only Modes of Thinking, I acknowledge no Inequality between them, and they all proceed from me in the same Manner. But as one Represents one thing, an other, an other Thing, 'tis Evident there is a Great difference between them. * For without doubt, Those of them which Represent Substances are something More, or (as I may say) have More of Objective Reality in them, than those that Represent only Modes or Accidents; and again, That by Which I understand a Mighty God, Eternal, Infinite, Omniscient, Omnipotent Creator of all things besides himself, has certainly in it more Objective Reality, than Those Ideas by which Finite Substances are Exhibited.  
But Now, it is evident by the Light of Nature that there must be as much at least in the Total efficient Cause, as there is in the Effect of that Cause; For from Whence can the effect have its Reality, but from the Cause? and how can the Cause give it that Reality, unless itself have it?  
And from hence it follows, that neither a Thing can be made out of Nothing, Neither a Thing which is more Perfect (that is, Which has in itself more Reality) proceed from That Which is Less Perfect.  
And this is Clearly True, not only in those Effects whose Actual or Formal Reality is Considered, But in Those Ideas also, Whose Objective Reality is only Respected; That is to say, for Example of Illustration, it is not only impossible that a stone, Which was not, should now begin to Be, unless it were produced by something, in Which, Whatever goes to the Making a Stone, is either Formally or Virtually; neither can heat he Produced in any Thing, which before was not hot, but by a Thing which is at least of as equal a degree of Perfection as heat is; But also 'tis Impossible that I should have an Idea of Heat, or of a Stone, unless it were put into me by some Cause, in which there is at Lest as much Reality, as I Conceive there is in Heat or a Stone. For though that Cause transfers none of its own Actual or Formal Reality into my Idea, I must not from thence conclude that 'tis less real; but I may think that the nature of the Idea itself is such, that of itself it requires no other formal reality, but what it has from my thought, of which 'tis a mode. But that this Idea has this or that objective reality, rather than any other, proceeds clearly from some cause, in which there ought to be at least as much formal reality, as there is of objective reality in the Idea itself. For if we suppose any thing in the Idea, which was not in its cause, it must of necessity have this from nothing; but (though it be a most Imperfect manner of existing, by which the thing is objectively in the Intellect by an Idea, yet) it is not altogether nothing, and therefore cannot proceed from nothing.  
Neither ought I to doubt, seeing the reality which I perceive in my Ideas is only an objective reality, that therefore it must of necessity follow, that the same reality should be in the causes of these Ideas formally. But I may conclude, that 'tis sufficient that this reality be in the very causes only objectively. For as that objective manner of being appertains to the very nature of an Idea, so that formal manner of being appertains to the very nature of a cause of Ideas, at least to the first and chiefest causes of them; For though perhaps one Idea may receive its birth from an other, yet we cannot proceed in Infinitum, but at last we must arrive at some first Idea, whose cause is (as it were) an Original copy, in which all the objective reality of the Idea is formally contained. So that I plainly discover by the light of nature, that the Ideas, which are in me, are (as it were) Pictures, which may easily come short of the perfection of those things from whence they are taken, but cannot contain any thing greater or more perfect than them: And the longer and more diligently I pry into these things, so much the more clearly and distinctly do I discover them to be true.  
But what shall I conclude from hence? Thus, that if the objective reality of any of my Ideas be such, that it cannot be in me either formarlly or eminently, and that therefore I cannot be the cause of that Idea, from hence it necessarily Follows, that I alone do not only exist, but that some other thing, which is the cause of that Idea, does exist also.  
But if I can find no such Idea in me, I have no argument to persuade me of the existence of any thing besides myself for I have diligently enquired, and hitherto I could discover no other persuasive.  
Some of these Ideas there are (besides that which represents myself to myself, of which in this place I cannot doubt) which represent to me, one of them a God, others of them Corporeal and Inanimate things, some of them Angels, others Animals, and lastly some of them which exhibit to me men like myself.  
As touching those that represent Men or Angels or Animals, I easily understand that they may be made up of those Ideas which I have of myself, of Corporeal things, and of God, though there were neither man (but myself) nor Angel, nor Animal in being  
And as to the Ideas of Corporeal things, I find nothing in them of that perfection, but it may proceed from myself; for if I look into them more narrowly, and examine them more particularly, as yesterday (in the second Medit.) I did the Idea of Wax, I find there are but few things which I perceive clearly and distinctly in them, viz. Magnitude or extension in Longitude, Latitude, and Profundity, the Figure or shape which arises from the termination of that Extension, the Position or place which divers Figured Bodies have in respect of each other, their motion or change of place; to which may be added, their substance, continuance, and number; as to the other, such as are, Light, Colours, Sounds, Smells, Tastes, Heat, and Cold, with the other tactile qualities, I have but very obscure and confused thoughts of them, so that I know not, whether they are true or false, that is to say, whether the Ideas I have of them are the Ideas of things which really are, or are not. For although falsehood formally and properly so called, consists only in the judgement (as before I have observed) yet there is an other sort of material falsehood in Ideas, when they represent a thing as really existent, though it does not exist; so, for example, the Ideas I have of heat and cold are so obscure and confused, that I cannot collect from them, whether could be a privation of heat, or heat a privation of cold, or whether either of them be a real quality, or whether neither of them be real. And since every Idea must be like the thing it represents, if it be true that cold is nothing but the privation of heat, that Idea which represents it to me as a thing real and positive may deservedly be called false. The same may be applied to other Ideas.  
And now I see no necessity why I should assign any other Author of these Ideas but myself; for if they are false, that is, represent things that are not, I know by the light of nature that they proceed from nothing; that is to say, I harbour them upon no other account, but because my nature is deficient in something, and imperfect. But if they are true, yet seeing I discover so little reality in them, that that very reality scarce seems to be realy, I see no reason why I myself should not be the Author of them.  
But also some of those very Ideas of Corporeal things which are clear and distinct, I may seem to have borrowed from the Idea I have of myself, viz. Substance, duration, number, and the like; For when I conceive a stone to be a substance (that is, a thing apt of itself to exist) and also that I myself am a substance, though I conceive myself a thinking substance and not extended, and the stone an extended substance and not thinking, by which there is a great diversity between both the conceptions, yet they agree in this, that they are both substances. So when I conceive myself as now in being, and also remember, that heretofore I have been; and since I have divers thoughts, which I can number or count; from hence it is that I come by the notions of duration and number; which afterwards I apply to other things.  
As to those other things, of which the Idea of a body is made up, as extension, figure, place and motion, they are not formally in me, seeing I am only a thinking thing; yet seeing they are only certain modes of substance, and I myself also am a substance, they may seem to be in me eminently.  
* Wherefore there only Remains the Idea of a God, wherein I must consider whether there be not something included, which cannot possibly have its original from me. By the word God, I mean a certain Infinite Substance, Independent, Omniscient, Almighty, by whom both I myself, and every thing else that is (if any thing do Actualy exist) was created. All which Attributes are of such an high nature, that the more attentively I consider them, the less I conceive myself possible to be the Author of these notions.  
From what therefore has been said I must conclude that there is a God; for though the Idea of substance may arise in me, because that I myself am a substance, yet I could not have the Idea of an Infinite substance (seeing I myself am finite) unless it proceeded from a substance which is really Infinite. Neither ought I to think that I have no true Idea of Infinity, or that I perceive it only by the negation of what is finite, as I conceive rest and darkness by the negation or absence of motion or light. But on the contrary I plainly understand, that there is more reality in an Infinite substance, then in a Finite; and that therefore the perception of an Infinite (as God) is antecedent to the notion I have of a finite (as myself) For how should I know that I doubt or desire, that is to say, that I want something, and that I am not altogether perfect, unless I had the Idea of a being more perfect than myself, by comparing myself to which I may discover my own Imperfections.  
Neither can it be said that this Idea of God is false Materialiter, and that therefore it proceeds from nothing, as before I observed of the Ideas of heat and cold, etc. For on the contrary, seeing this notion is most clear and distinct, and contains in itself more objective reality than any other Idea, none can be more true in itself, nor in which less suspicion of flalshood can be found. This Idea (I say) of a being infinitely perfect is most true, for though it may be supposed that such a being does not exist, yet it cannot be supposed that the Idea of such a being exhibites to me nothing real, as before I have said of the Idea of cold. This Idea also is most clear and distinct, for whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly to be real, and true, and perfect, is wholly contained in this Idea of God.  
Neither can it be objected, that I cannot comprehend an Infinite, or that there are innumerable other things in God, which I can neither conceive, nor in the least think upon; for it is of the very nature of an Infinite not to be apprehendable by me who am finite. And 'tis sufficient to me to prove this my Idea of God to be the most true, the most clear, and the most distinct Idea of all those Ideas I have, upon this account, that I understand that God is not to be understood, and that I judge that whatever I clearly perceive and know Implys any perfection, as also perhaps other innumerable perfections, which I am ignorant of, are in God either formally or eminently.  
Doubt. But perhaps I am something more than I take myself to be, and perhaps all these perfections which I attribute to God, are potentially in me, though at present they do not show themselves, and break into action. For I am now fully experienced that my Knowledge may be increased, and I see nothing that hinders Why it may not increase by degrees in Infinitum, nor why by my knowledge so increased I may not attain to the other perfections of God; nor lastly, why the power or aptitude of having these perfections may not be sufficient to produce the Idea of them in me.  
Solution. But none of these will do; for first, though it be true that my Knowledge is capable of being increased, and that many things are in me potentially, which actually are not, yet none of these go to the making an Idea of God, in which I conceive nothing potentially, for 'tis a certain argument of imperfection that a thing may be increased Gradually. Moreover, though my knowledge may be more and more increased, yet I know that it can never be actually Infinite, for it can never arrive to that height of perfection, which admits not of an higher degree. But I conceive God to be actually so Infinite, that nothing can be added to his perfections, And lastly, I perceive that the objective being of an Idea cannot be produced only by the potential being of a thing (which in proper speech is nothing) but requires an actual or formal being to its production.  
Of all which forementioned things there is nothing that is not evident by the light of reason to any one that will diligently consider them. Yet because that (when I am careless, and the Images of sensible things blind my understanding) I do not so easily call to mind the reasons, why the Idea of a being more perfect than myself should of necessity proceed from a being which is really more perfect; It will be requisite to inquire further, whether I, who have this Idea, can possibly be, unless such a being did exist. To which end let me ask, from whence should I be? From myself? or from my Parents? or from any other thing less perfect than God? for nothing can be thought or supposed more perfect, or equally perfect with God.  
But first, If I were from myself, I should neither doubt, nor desire, nor want any thing, for I should have given myself all those perfections, of which I have any Idea, and consequently I myself should be God; and I cannot think that those things I want, are to be acquired with greater difficulty than those things I have; but on the contrary, tis manifiest, that it were much more difficult that I (that is, a substance that thinks) should arise out of nothing, then that I should acquire the knowledge of many things whereof I am Ignorant, which is only the accident of that substance, And certainly If I had that greater thing (viz being) from myself, I should not have denied myself (not only those things which may be easier acquired, but also) All those things, which I perceived are contained in the Idea of a God; and the reason is, for that no other things seem to me to be more difficultly done, and certainly if they were Really more difficult, they would seem more difficult to me (if whatever I have, I have from myself) for in those things I should find my Power put to a stop.  
Neither can I Evade the force of these Arguments by supposing myself to have always Been, what now I am, and that therefore I need not seek for an Author of my Being. For the Durance or Continuation of my life may be divided into Innumerable Parts, each of which does not at all depend on the Other Parts; Therefore it will not follow, that because a while ago, I was, I must of necessity now Be. I say, this will not follow, Unless, I suppose some Cause to Create me (as it were) anew for this Moment (that is, Conserve me) For 'tis evident to one that Considers the Nature of Duration, that the same Power and Action is requisite to the Conservation of a Thing each Moment of its Being, as there is to the Creation of that Thing anew, if it did not exist. So that 'tis one of those Principles which are Evident by the Light of Nature: that the Act of Conservation differs only Ratione (as the Philosophers term it) from the Act of Creation.  
Wherefore I ought to ask myself this Question, whether I, who now Am; have any Power to Cause myself to Be hereafter? (for had I any such power, I should certainly know of it, seeing I am nothing but a Thinking Thing, or at least at present I only treat of that part of me, which is a Thing that Thinks) to which, I answer, that I can discover no such Power in Me; And consequently, I evidently know that I depend on some Other being distinct from myself.  
But what if I say that perhaps this Being is not God, but that I am produced either by my Parents, or some other Causes less perfect than God? In answer to which let me consider (as I have said before that 'tis manifest that whatever is in the effect, so much at least ought to be in the cause; and therefore seeing I am a thing that thinks, and have in me an Idea of God, it will confessedly follow, that whatever sort of cause I assign of my own Being, it also must be a Thinking Thing, and must have an Idea of all those Perfections, which I attribute to God; Of which Cause it may be again Asked, whether it be from itself, or from any other Cause? If from itself, 'tis evident (from what has been said) that it must be God; For seeing it has the Power of Existing of itself, without doubt it has also the power of actually Possessing all those Perfections whereof it has an Idea in itself, that is, all those Perfections which I conceive in God. But if it Be from an other Cause, it may again be asked of that Cause whether it be of itself, or from an other; Till at length We arrive at the Last Cause of All, Which will Be God. For 'tis evident, that this Enquiry will not admit of Progressus in Infinitum, especially when at Present I treat not only of that Cause which at first made Me; But chief of that which conserveses me in this Instant time.  
Neither can it be supposed that many partial Causes have concurred to the making Me, and that I received the Idea of one of God's perfections from One of them, and from an other of them the Idea of an other; and that therefore all these Perfections are to be found scattered in the World, but not all of them Joined in any one which may Be God. For on the contrary, Unity, Simplicity, or the inseparability of All God's Attributes is one of the chief Perfections which I conceive in Him; and certainly the Idea of the Unity of the Divine Perfections could not be created in me by any other cause, then by That, from whence I have received the Ideas of his other perfections; For 'tis Impossible to make me conceive these perfections, conjunct and inseparable, unless he should also make me know what perfections these are.  
Lastly as touching my having my Being from my Parents. Tho whatever Thoughts I have heretofore harboured of Them were True, yet certainly they contribute nothing to my conservation, neither proceed I from them as I am a Thing that Thinks, for they have only predisposed that material Thing, wherein I, that is, my mind (which only at present I take for myself) Inhabits. Wherefore I cannot now Question that I am sprung from them. But I must of necessity conclude that because I am, and because I have an Idea of a Being most perfect, that is, of God, it evidently follows that there is a God.  
* Now it only remains for me to examine, how I have received this Idea of God. For I have neither received it by means of my Senses, neither comes it to me without my Forethought, as the Ideas of sensible things use to do, when such things Work on the Organs of my Sense, or at least seem so to work; Neither is this Idea framed by myself, for I can neither detract from, nor add any thing thereto. Wherefore I have only to conclude that it is Innate, even as the Idea of me myself is Natural to myself.  
And truly 'tis not to be Admired that God in Creating me should Imprint this Idea in me, that it may there remain as a stamp impressed by the Workman God on me his Work, neither is it requisite that this stamp should be a Thing different from the Work itself, but 'tis very Credible (from hence only that God Created me) that I am made as it were according to his likeness and Image, and that the same likeness, in which the Idea of God is contained, is perceived by Me with the same faculty, with which I perceive myself; That is to say, whilst I reflect upon myself, I do not only perceive that I am an Imperfect thing, having my dependence upon some other thing, and that I am a Thing that Desires more and better things Indefinitely; But also at the same time I understand, that He on whom I depend contains in him all those wished for things (not only Indefinitely and Potentially, but) Really, Infinitely; and that therefore he is God. The whole stress of which * Argument lies thus, because I know it Impossible for Me to Be of the same Nature I am, Viz, Having the Idea of a God in me, unless really there were a God, a God (I say) that very same God, whose Idea I have in my Mind (that is, Having all those perfections, which I cannot comprehend ●ut can as it were think upon them) and who is not subject to any Defects.  
By which 'tis evident that God is no Deceiver; for 'tis manifest by the Light of Nature, that all fraud and deceit depends on some defect. But before I prosecute this any farther, or pry into other Truths which may be deduced from this, I am willing here to stop, and dwell upon the Contemplation of this God, to Consider with myself His Divine Attributes, to behold, admire, and adore the Loveliness of this Immense light, as much as possibly I am able to accomplish with my dark Understanding. For as by Faith we believe that the greatest happiness of the next Life consists alone in the Contemplation of the Divine Majesty, so we find by Experience that now we receive from thence the greatest pleasure, whereof we are capable in this Life; Tho it be much more Imperfect than that in the Next.   

MEDITAT. iv  
Of Truth and Falsehood,  
OF late it has been so common with me to withdraw my Mind from my senses, and I have so throughly considered how few things there are appertaining to Bodies that are truly perceived, and that there are more Things touching Man's mind, and yet more concerning God, which are well known; that now without any difficulty I can turn my Thoughts from things sensible, to those which are only Intelligible, and Abstracted from Matter. And truly I have a much more distinct Idea of a Man's mind (as it is a Thinking Thing, having no Corporeal Dimensions of Length, Breadth, and Thickness, nor having any other Corporeal Quality) than the Idea of any Corporeal Thing can be. And when I reflect upon myself, and consider how that I doubt, that is, am an imperfect dependent Being, I from hence Collect such a clear and distinct Idea of an Independent perfect Being, which is God, and from hence only that I have such an Idea, that is, because I that have this Idea do myself Exist; I do so clearly conclude that God also Exists, and that on him my Being depends each Minute; That I am Confident nothing can be known more Evidently and Certainly by Humane Understanding.  
And now I seem to perceive a Method by which, (from this Contemplation of the true God, in whom the Treasures of Knowledge and Wisdom are Hidden) I may attain the Knowledge of other Things.  
And first, I know 'tis impossible that this God should deceive me; For in all cheating and deceit there is something of imperfection; and tho to be able to deceive may seem to be an Argument of ingenuity and power, yet without doubt to have the Will of deceiving is a sign of Malice and Weakness, and therefore is not Incident to God.  
I have also found in myself a judicative faculty, which certainly (as all other things I possess) I have received from God; and seeing he will not deceive me, he has surely given me such a judgement, that I can never Err, whilst I make a Right Use of it. Of which truth I can make no doubt, unless it seems, that From hence it will follow, That therefore I can never Err; for if whatever I have, I have from God, and if he gave me no Faculty of Erring, I may seem not to be able to Err. And truly so it is whilst I think upon God, and wholly convert myself to the consideration of him, I find no occasion of Error or Deceit; but yet when I return to the Contemplation of myself, I find myself liable to Innumerable Errors. Enquiring into the cause of which, I find in myself an Idea, not only a real and positive one of a God, that is, of a Being infinitely perfect, but also (as I may so speak) a Negative Idea of Nothing; that is to say, I am so constituted between God and Nothing or between a perfect Being and No-being, that as I am Created by the Highest Being, I have nothing in Me by which I may be deceived or drawn into Error; but as I partake in a manner of Nothing, or of a No-Being, that is, as I myself am not the Highest Being, and as I want many perfections, 'tis no Wonder that I should be Deceived.  
By which I understand that Error * (as it is Error) is not any real Being dependant on God, but it is only a Defect; And that therefore to make me Err there is not requisite a faculty of Erring given me by God, but only it so happens that I Err merely because the judicative faculty, which he has given me, is not Infinite.  
But yet this Account is not fully satisfactory; for Error is not only a mere Negation, but 'tis a Privation, or a want of a certain Knowledge, which ought (as it were) to be in me. And when I consider the Nature of God, it seems impossible that he should give me any faculty which is not perfect in its kind, or which should want any of its due perfections; for if by how much the more skilful the Workman is, by so much the Perfecter Works proceed from him. What can be made by the Great Maker of all things which is not fully perfect? For I cannot Doubt but God may Create me so that I may never be deceived, neither can I doubt but that he Wills whatever is Best; Is it therefore better for me to be deceived, or not to be deceived?  
These things when I Consider more heedfully, it comes into my Mind, First, that 'tis no cause of Admiration that God should do Things whereof I can give no account, nor must I therefore doubt his Being, because there are many things done by him, and I not comprehend Why or How they are done; for seeing I now know that my Nature is very Weak and Finite, and that the Nature of God is Immense, Incomprehensible, Infinite; from hence I must fully, understand, that he can do numberless things, the Causes whereof lie hidden to Me. Upon which account Only I esteem all those Causes which are Drawn from the End (viz. Final Causes) as of no use in Natural Philosophy, for I cannot without Rashness Think my self able to Discover God's Designs.  
I perceive this also, that whenever we endeavour to know whether the Work's of God are perfect, we must not Respect any one kind of Creature singly, but the Whole Universe of Being's; for perhaps what (if considered alone) may Deservedly seem Imperfect, yet (as it is a part of the World) is most perfect; and tho since I have doubted of all things, I have discovered nothing certainly to Exist, but myself, and God, yet since I have Considered the Omnipotency of God, I cannot deny, but that many other things are made (or at least, may be made) by him, so that I myself may be a part of this Universe.  
Furthermore, coming nigher to myself, and enquiring what these Errors of mine, are (which are the Only Arguments of my Imperfection) * I find them to depend on two concurring Causes, on my faculty of Knowing, and on my faculty of Choosing or Freedom of my Will, that is to say, from my Understanding, and my Will together. For by my Understanding alone I only perceive Ideas, whereon I make judgements, wherein (precisely so taken) there can be no Error, properly so called; for though perhaps there may be numberless things, whose Ideas I have not in Me, yet I am not properly to be said Deprived of them, but only negatively wanting them; and I cannot prove that God ought to have given me a greater faculty of Knowing. And though I understand him to be a skilful Workman, yet I cannot Think, that he ought to have put all those perfections in each Work of his singly, with which he might have endowed some of them.  
Neither can I complain that God has not given me a Will, or Freedom of Choice, large and perfect enough; for I have experienced that 'tis Circumscribed by no Bounds.  
And 'tis worth our taking notice, that I have no other thing in me so perfect and so Great, but I Understand that there may be Perfecter and Greater, for if (for Example) I consider the Faculty of Understanding, I presently preceive that in me 'tis very small and Finite, and also at the same time I form to myself an Idea of an other Understanding not only much Greater, but the Greatest and Infinite, which I perceive to belong to God. In the same manner if inquire into memory or imagination, or any other faculties, I find them in myself Weak and Circumscribed, but in God I Understand them to be Infinite, there is therefore only my Will or Freedom of Choice, which I find to be so Great, that I cannot frame to myself an Idea of One Greater, so that 'tis by this chief by which I Understand myself to Bear the likeness and Image of God. For though the Will in God be without comparison Greater than Mine, both as to the Knowledge and Power which are Joined therewith, which make it more strong and Effective, and also as to the Object thereof, for God can apply himself to more things than I can. Yet being taken Formally and Precisely Gods Will seems no greater than Mine. For the Freedom of Will consists only in this, that we can Do, or not Do such a Thing (that is, affirm or deny, prosecute or avoid) or rather in this Only, that we are so carried to a Thing which is proposed by Our Intellect to Affirm or Deny, Prosecute or Eat, that we are sensible, that we are not Determined to the Choice or Aversion thereof, by any outward Force.  
Neither is it Requisite to make one Free that he should have an Inclination to both sides. For on the contrary, by how much the more strongly I am inclined to one side (whether it be that I evidently perceive therein Good or Evil, or Whether it be that God has so disposed my Inward Thoughts) By so much the more Free am I in my Choice.  
Neither truly do God's Grace or Natural Knowledge take away from my Liberty, but rather increase and strengthen it. For that indifference which I find in myself, when no Reason inclines me more to one side, then to the other, is the meanest sort of Liberty, and is so far from being a sign of perfection, that it only argues a defect or negation of Knowledge; for if I should always Clearly see what were True and Good I should never deliberate in my judgement or Choice, and Consequently, though I were perfectly Free, yet I should never be Indifferent.  
From all which, I perceive that neither the Power of Willing precisely so taken, which I have from God, is the Cause of my Errors, it being most full and perfect in its kind; Neither also the Power of Understanding, for whatever I Understand (since 'tis from God that I Understand it) I understand aright, nor can I be therein Deceived.  
From Whence therefore proceed all my Errors? To which, I answer, that they proceed from hence only, that seeing the Will expatiates itself farther than the Understanding, I keep it not within the same bounds with my Understanding, but often extend it to those things which I Understand not, to which things it being Indifferent, it easily Declines from what is True and Good; and consequently I am Deceived and Commit sin. * Thus, for example, when lately I set myself to inquire, Whether any thing doth Exist, and found that from my setting myself to Examine such a thing, it evidently follows that I myself Exist, I could not but judge, what I so clearly Understood, to be true, not that I was forced thereto by any outward impulse, but because a strong Propension in my Will did follow this Great Light in my Understanding, so that I believed it so much the more freely and willingly, by how much the less indifferent I was thereto. But now I understand, not only, that I Exist as I am a Thing that Thinks, but I also meet with a certain Idea of a Corporeal Nature, and it so happens that I doubt, whether that Thinking Nature that is in me be Different from that Corporeal Nature, or Whether they are both the same: but in this I suppose that I have found no Argument to incline me either ways, and therefore I am Indifferent to affirm or deny either, or to judge nothing of either; But this indifferency extends itself not only to those things of which I am clearly ignorant, but generally to all those things which are not so very evidently known to me at the Time when my Will Deliberates of them; for though never so probable Guesses incline me to one side, yet the Knowing that they are only Conjectures, and not indubitable reasons, is enough to Draw my Assent to the Contrary Part. Which Lately I have sufficiently experienced, when I supposed all those things (which formerly I assented to as most True) as very False, for this Reason only that I found myself able to doubt of them in some manner.  
If I abstain from passing my judgement, when I do not clearly and distinctly enough perceive what is Truth, 'tis evident that I do well, and that I am not deceived: But if I affirm or deny, then 'tis that I abuse the freedom of my will, and if I turn myself to that part which is false, I am deceived; but if I embrace the contrary Part, 'tis but by chance that I light on the Truth, yet I shall not therefore be Blameless, for 'tis Manifest by the light of Nature that the Perception of the Understanding ought to preceded the Determination of the Will. And 'tis in this abuse of freewill that That Privation consists, which Constitutes Error; I say there is a Privation in the Action as it proceeds from Me, but not in the Faculty which I have received from God; nor in the Action as it depends on him.  
Neither have I any Reason to Complain that God has not given me a larger Intellective Faculty, or more Natural Light, for 'tis a necessary Incident to a finite Understanding that it should not Understand All things, and 'tis Incident to a Created Understanding to be Finite: and I have more Reason to thank him for what he has bestowed upon me (though he owed me nothing) then to think myself Rob by him of those things which he never gave me.  
Nor have I Reason to Complain that he has given me a Will larger than my Understanding: for seeing the Will Consists in one thing only, and a● it were in an Indivisible (viz. to Will, or not to Will) it seems contrary to its nature that it should be less then 'tis; And certainly by how much the Greater it is, so much the more Thankful I ought to be to him; that Gave it me.  
Neither can I Complain that God concurs with me in the Production of those Voluntary Actions or judgements in which I am deceived: for those Acts as they depend on God are altogether True and Good; and I am in some measure more perfect in that I can so Act, then if I could not: for that Privation, in which the Ratio Formalis of Falsehood and Sin consists, wants not the Concourse of God; For it is not A Thing, and having respect to him as its Cause, ought not to be called Privation, but Negation; for certainly 'tis no Imperfection in God, that he has given me a freedom of Assenting or not Assenting to some things, the clear and distinct Knowledge whereof he has not Imparted to my Understanding; but certainly 'tis an Imperfection in me, that I abuse this liberty, and pass my judgement on those things which I do not Rightly Understand.  
Yet I see that 'tis Possible with God to effect that (though I should remain Free, and, of a Finite Knowledge) I should never Ern, that is, if he had endowed my Understanding with a clear and distinct Knowledge of all things whereof I should ever have an Occasion of deliberating; or if he had only so firmly fixed in my Mind, that I should never forget, this, That I must never judge of a thing which I do not clearly and distinctly Understand; Either of which things had God done, I easily perceive that I (as considered in myself) should be more perfect than now I am, yet nevertheless I cannot deny but that there may be a greater perfection in the whole Universe of Things, for that some of its parts are Obnoxius to Errors, and some not, then if they were all alike. And I have no Reason to Complain, that it has pleased God, that I should Act on the Stage of this World a Part not the chief and most perfect of all; Or that I should not be able to abstain from Error in the first way above specified, which depends upon the Evident Knowledge of those things whereof I deliberate; Yet that I may abstain from Error by the other means abovementioned, which depends only on this, That I judge not of any Thing, the truth whereof is not Evident. For though I have experienced in myself this Infirmity, that I cannot always be intent upon me and the same Knowledge, yet I may by a continued and often repeated Meditation bring this to pass, that as often as I have use of this Rule I may Remember it, by which means I may Get (as it were) an habit of not erring.  
In which thing seeing the greatest and chief perfection of Man consists, I repute myself to have gained much by this days Meditation, for that therein I have discovered the Cause of Error, and Falsehood; which certainly can be no other than what I have now Declared; for whenever in Passing my Judgement, I bridle my Will so that it extend itself only to those things which I clearly and distinctly perceive, it is impossible that I can Err. For doubtless; All clear and distinct Perception is something, and therefore cannot proceed from Nothing, but must necessarily have God for its Author (God, I say, Who is infinitely Perfect, and who cannot Deceive) and therefore it Must be True.  
Nor have I this Day learned only what I must beware off that I be not deceived, but also what I must Do to Discover Truth, for That I shall certainly find, if I fully Apply myself to those things only, which I perfectly understand; and if I distinguish between those and what I apprehend but confusedly and obscurely; Both which hereafter I shall endeavour.   

MEDITAT. V  
Of the Essence of Things Material. And herein Again of God. A●d that he does Exist.  
THere are yet remaining many Things concerning Gods Attributes, and many things concerning the nature of myself or of my Mind, which ought to be searched into: but these perhaps I shall set upon at some other Opportunity. And at Present nothing seems to me more requisite (seeing I have discovered what I must avoid, and what I must Do for the Attaining of Truth) then that I employ my Endeavours to free myself from those doubts into which I have lately fallen, and that I try whether I can have any certainty of Material Things.  
But before I inquire whether there be any such things Really Existent without Me, I ought to consider the Ideas of those things, as they are in my Thoughts and try which of them are Distinct, which confused.  
In which search I find that I distinctly imagine Quantity, that which Philosophers commonly call continued, that is to say, the Extension of that Quantity or thing continued into Length, Breadth, and Thickness, I can count in it divers Parts, to which parts I can assign Bigness, Figure, Position, and Local Motion, to which Local Motion I can assign Duration. Neither are only these Generals plainly discovered and known by Me, but also by attentive Consideration, I perceive Innumerable particulars concerning the Shapes, Number, and Motion of These Bodies; The Truth whereof is so evident, and agreeable to my Nature, that when I first discovered them, I seemed not so much to have Learned any thing that is new, as to have only remembered what I have known before, or only to have thought on those things which were in me before, though this be the first time that I have examined them so diligently.  
One thing there is worthy my Consideration, which is, that I find in myself, innumerable Ideas of certain things, which though perhaps they exist nowhere without Me, yet they cannot Be said to be Nothing; and though they are Thought▪ upon by me at my will and pleasure, yet they are not made by Me, but have their own True and Immutable Natures. As when, for example.  
* I Imagine a Triangle, though perhaps such a Figure Exists no where out of my Thoughts, nor ever will Exist, yet the Nature thereof is determinate, and its Essence or Form is Immutalle and Eternal, which is neither made by me, nor depends on my mind, as appears for that many properties may be demonstrated of this Triangle, viz. That its three Angles are equal to two right ones, that to its Greatest Angle the Greatest side is subtended, and such like, which I now clearly know whether I will or not, though before I never thought on them, when I imagine a Triangle, and consequently they could not be invented by Me. And 'tis nothing to the purpose for me to say, that perhaps this Idea of a Triangle came to me by the Organs of sense, because I have sometimes seen bodies of a Triangular Shape; for I can think of Innumerable other Figure's, which I cannot suspect to have come in through my senses, and yet I can Demonstrate various properties of them, as well as of a Triangle, which certainly are all true, seeing I know them clearly, and therefore they are something, and not a mere Nothing, for 'tis Evident that what is true is something.  
And now I have sufficiently Demonstrated, that what I clearly perceive, is True; And though I had not demonstrated it, yet such is the Nature of my Mind, that I could not but give my Assent to what I so perceive, at least, as long as I so perceive it; and I remember (heretofore when I most of all relied on sensible Objects) that I held those Truths for the most certain which I evidently perceived, such as are concerning Figures, Numbers, with other parts of Ari●●●metick, and Geometry, as also whatever relates to pure and abstracted Mathematics.  
Now therefore, i● from this alone, That I can frame the Idea of a Thing in my Mind, it follows, That whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive belonging to a thing, does Really belong to it; Cannot I from hence draw an Argument to Prove the Existence of a God? Certainly I find the Idea of a God, or infinitely perfect Being, as naturally in me, as the Idea of any Figure, or Number; and I as clearly and distinctly understand that it appertains to his Nature Always to Be, as I know that what I can demonstrate of a Mathematical Figure or Number belongs to the Nature of that Figure or Number: so that, though all things which I have Meditated upon these three or four days were not true, yet I may well be as certain of the Existence of a God, as I have hitherto been of Mathematical Truths.  
Doubt. Yet this Argument at first sight appears not so evident, but looks rather like a sophism; for seeing I am used in all other things to Distinguish Existence from Essence, I can easily persuade myself that the Existence of God may be distinguished from his Essence, so that I may Imagine God not to Exist.  
Solution. But considering it more strictly, 'tis manifest, that the Existence of God can no more be separated from his Essence, than the Equality of the Three Angles to two right ones can be separated from the Essence of a Triangle, or then the Idea of a Mountain can be without the Idea of a valley; so that 'tis no less a Repugnancy to think of a God (that is, A Being infinitely perfect) who wants Existence (that is, who wants a Perfection) then to think of a Mountain, to which there is no Valley adjoining.  
Doubt. But what if I cannot imagine God but as Existing, or a Mountain without a Valley? yet supposing me to think of a Mountain with a Valley, it does not from thence follow, that there Is a Mountain in the World; so supposing me to think of a God as Existing, yet does it not follow that God Really Exists. For my Thought imposes no necessity on Things, and as I may imagine a Winged Horse, though no Horse has Wings, so I may imagine an existing God, though no God exist.  
Solution. 'Tis true the Sophism seems to lie in this, yet though I cannot conceive a Mountain but with a Valley, it does not from hence follow, that a Mountain or Valley do Exist, but this will follow, that whether a Mountain or a Valley do or do not Exist, yet they cannot be separated: so from hence that I cannot think of God but as Existing, it follows that Existence is Inseparable from God, and therefore that he Really Exists; Not because my Thought does all this, or Imposes any necessity on any Thing, but contrarily, because the necessity of the thing itself (viz. of God's Existence) Determines me to think (thus; for ●tis not in my Power to think a God without Existence (that is, A Being absolutely perfect without the Chief Perfection) as it is in my Power to imagine a Horse either with or without Wings.  
Doubt. And here it cannot be said, that I am forced to suppose God Existing, after I have supposed him endowed with all Perfections, seeing Existence is one of them; but that my First Position (viz. His Absolute Perfection) is not necessary. Thus, for example, 'tis not necessary for me to think all Quadrilateral Figures inscribed in a Circle; But supposing that I think so, I am then necessitated to Confess a Rhombe Inscribed therein, and yet this is evidently False.  
Solution. For though I am not forced at any time to think of a God; yet as often as I cast my Thoughts on a First and Chief Being, and as it were b●ing forth out of the Treasury of my Mind an Idea thereof, I must of necessity attribute thereto all Manner of Perfections, though I do not at that time count them over, o● Remark each single One; which necessity is sufficient to make me hereafter (when I come to consider Existence to be a Perfection) conclude Rightly, That the First and Chief Being does Exist. Thus, for example, I am not obliged at any time to imagine a Triangle, yet whenever I please to Consider of a Right-lined Figure having only three Angles, I am then necessitated to allow it all those Requisites from which I may argue rightly, That the Three Angles, thereof are not Greater than Two Right Ones, Tho upon the first consideration this came not into my Thought. But when I inquire what Figures may be inscribed within a Circle, I am not at all necessitated to think that all Quadrilateral Figures are of that sort; neither can I possibly imagine this, whilst I admit of nothing, but what I clearly and distinctly Understand: and therefore there is a great Difference between these False suppositions, and True natural Ideas, the first and Chief whereof is that of a God; For by many ways I understand That not to be a Fiction depending on my Thought, but an Image of a True and Immutable Nature; As first, because▪ I can think of no other thing but God to Whose Essence Existence belongs. Next because I cannot Imagine Two or More Gods, and supposing that he is now only One, I may plainly perceive it necessary for Him to Have been from Eternity, and will Be to Eternity; And Lastly because I perceive many Other Things in God, Which I cannot Change, and from which I cannot Detract.  
But whatever way of Argumentation I use, it comes All at last to this one Thing, That I am fully persuaded of the Truth of those things only, which appear to me clearly and distinctly. And though some of those things, which I so perceive, are obvious to every Man, and some are only discovered by Those that search more nighly; and inquire more carefully, yet when such truths are discovered, they are esteemed no less certain than the Others. For Example, Tho it do not so easily appear, that in a Rightangled Triangle, the square of the Base is equal to the squares of the sides, as it appears, that the Base is subtended under its Largest Angle, yet the first Proposition is no less certainly believed when once 'tis perceived, than this Last.  
Thus in Reference to God; certainly, unless I am overrun with Prejudice, or have my thoughts begirt on all sides with sensible Objects, I should acknowledge nothing before or easier than him; For what is more self-evident than that there is a Chief Being, or then that a God (to whose essence alone Existence appertains) does Exist? And though serious Consideration is required to perceive thus much, yet Now, I am not only equally certain of it, as of what seems most certain, but I perceive also that the Truth of other Things so depends on it, that without it nothing can ever be perfectly known.  
For though my nature be such, that during the time of my Clear and Distinct Perception, I cannot but believe it true; yet my Nature is such also, that I cannot fix the Intention of my Mind upon one and the same thing always, so as to perceive it clearly, and the Remembrance of what judgement I have formerly made is often stirred up, when I cease attending to those reasons for which I passed such a Judgement, other Reasons may then be produced, which (if I did not know God) may easily move me in my Opinion; and by this means I shall never attain to the true and certain Knowledge of any Thing, but Wand'ring and Unstable opinions. So, for example, when I consider the Nature of a Triangle, it plainly appears to me (as understanding the Principles of Geometry) that its three Angles are equal to two right ones; And this I must of necessity think True as long as I attend to the Demonstration thereof; but as soon as ever I withdraw my Mind from the Consideration of its Proof (although I remember that I have once Clearly perceived it) yet perhaps I may doubt of Its Truth, being as yet Ignorant of a God; For I may persuade myself, that I am so framed by Nature, as to be deceived in those things which I imagine myself to perceive most evidently. Especially when I recollect, that heretofore I have often accounted many things True and Certain, which afterward upon other Reasons I have Judged as False. But when I perceive that there is a God; because at the same time I also Understand that all things Depend on Him, and that he is not a Deceiver; and when from hence I Collect that all those Things which I clearly and distinctly perceive are necessarily True; though I have no further Respects to those Reasons which induced me to believe it True, yet if I do but remember, that I have once clearly and distinctly perceived it, no Argument can be brought on the contrary, that shall make me doubt, but that I have true and certain Knowledge thereof; and not only of that, but of all other Truths also which I remember that I have once Demonstrated, such as are Geometrical Propositions and the like.  
What now can be Objected against me? shall I say, that I am so made by Nature, as to be often deceived? NO; For I now Know that I cannot be deceived in those Things, which I clearly Understand. Shall I say, that at other times I have esteemed many Things True and Certain, which afterwards I found to be falsities? No; for I perceived none of those things clearly and distinctly, but being Ignorant of this Rule of Truth, I took them up for Reasons, which Reasons I afterward found to be Weak. What then can be said? Shall, I say, (as lately I objected) that Perhaps I am asleep, and that what I now think of is no more True, than the Dreams of People asleep? But this itself moves not my Opinion; for certainly tho' I were asleep, if any thing appeared evident to my Understanding, 'twould be True.  
And Thus I Plainly see, that the Certainty and Truth of all Science Depends on the Knowledge of the True God, so that before I had Known Him, I did Know nothing; But now many things both of God himself, and of other Intellectual Things, as also of Corporeal nature, which is the Object of Mathematics, may be Plainly Known and Certain to me.   

MEDITAT. VI  
Of Corporeal Being's, and Their Existence: As Also of the Real Difference, Between Mind and Body.  
IT now remains that I examine whether any Corporeal Being's do Exist; And already I know that (as they are the Object of Pure Mathematics) they May (at least) Exist, for I clearly and distinctly perceive them; and doubtless God is able to make, whatever I am able to perceive, and I never Judged any thing to be beyond his Power, but what was Repugnant to a distinct perception. Moreover, such Material Being's seem to Exist from the faculty of Imagination, which I find myself make use of, when I am conversant about them: for if I attentively Consider what Imagination is, 'twill appear to be only a certain Application of our Cognoscitive or knowing Faculty to a Body or Object that is before it; and if it be before it, It must Exist.  
But that this may be made more Plain, I must first examine the difference between Imagination, and pure Intellection, or Understanding. So, for example, when I Imagine a Triangle, I do not only Understand that it is a figure comprehended by three Line●, but I also behold with the eye of my mind those three lines as it were before Me, and this is that which I call imagination. But if I convert my Thoughts to a Chiliogone, or Figure consisting of a Thousand Angles, I know as well that this Is a figure comprehended by a Thousand sides, as I know that a Triangle is a Figure Consisting of three sides; but I do not in the same Manner Imagine, or behold as present those thousand sides, as I do the three sides of a Triangle. And though at the time when I so think of a Chiliogone, I may confusedly represent to myself some Figure (because whenever I Think of a Corporeal Object, I am used to Imagine some Shape or other) yet 'tis evident that this Representation is not a Chiliogone, because 'tis in nothing different from what I should Represent to myself if I thought of a Milion-angled figure, or any other Figure of More sides; Neither does such a Confused Representation help me in the least to know those Properties, by which a Chiliogone differs from Other Polygones or Manyangled Figures. But if a Question be put concerning a Pentagone, I know I may Understand its Shape, as I Understand the Shape, of a Chiliogone, without the help of Imagination, but I can also imagine it, by applying the Eye of my Mind to its Five sides, and to the Area or space contained by Them; And herein I manifestly perceive that there is required a peculiar sort of Operation in the Mind to imagine a Thing, which I require not to Understand a Thing; which New Operation of the Mind plainly shows the difference between imagination and pure Intellection.  
Besides this, I Consider that this Power of Imagination which is in me (as it differs from the Power of Understanding) does not appertian to the Essence of Me, that is, of my mind, for though I wanted it, yet certainly I should be the same He, that now I am: from whence it seems to follow, that it depends on something different from myself; and I easily perceive that if any Body whatever did Exist▪ to which my Mind were so conjoined, that it may Apply itself when it pleased to Consider, or (as it were) Look into this Body; From hence, I say, I perceive It may so be, that by this very Body I may Imagine Corporeal Being's: So that this Manner of Thinking differs from pure Intellection only in this, that the Mind, when it Understands, does as it were turn itself, to itself, or Reflect on itself, and be●●o'ds some or other of those Ideas which are in itself; But when it Imagines, it Converts itself upon Body, and therein beholds something Conformable to that Idea, which it hath understood, or perceived by Sense.  
But 'tis to remembered, that I said, I easily conceive Imagination May be so performed, supposing Body to Exist. And because no so convenient manner of Explaining it offers itself, from thence I probably guess, that Body does Exist. But this I only say probably, for though I should accurately search into all the Arguments drawn from the distinct Idea of Body, which I find in my Imagination, yet I find none of them, from whence I may necessarily conclude, that Body does Exist.  
But I have been accustomed to Imagine many other things besides that Corporeal Nature which is the Object of pure Mathematics; such as are, Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Pain, etc. but none of these so distinctly. And because I perceive these better by Sense, from Which by the Help of the Memory they come to the Imagination, that I may with the Greater advantage treat of them, I ought at the same time to Consider Sense, and to try whether from what I perceive by that way of Thought, which I call Sense, I can deduce any certain Argument for the Existence of Corporeal Being's.  
And first I will here reflect with myself, what those things were, which being perceived by Sense I have heretofore thought True, and the Reasons why I so thought: I will, then inquire into the Reasons for which I afterwards doubted those things. And last of all I will consider what I ought to think of those Things at Present.  
First therefore I have always thought that I have had an Head, H●nds, Feet, 
The Reasons why I Trusted my Senses.  and other Members, of which This Body (which I have looked upon as a Part of Me, or Perhaps as my Whole self) Consists; And I have also thought that this Body of Mine is Conversant or engaged among many Other Bodies, by which it is Liable to be affected with what is advantageous or hurtful; What was Advantageous I judged by a certain sense of Pleasure, what was Hurtful by a sense of Pain. Furthermore, besides Pleasure and Pain, I perceived in myself Hunger, Thirst, and other such like Appetites, as also certain Corporeal Propensions to Mirth, Sadness, Anger, and other like Passions.  
As to What happened to me from Bodies without, Besides the Extension, Figure, and Motion of those Bodies, I also perceived in them Hardness, Heat, and other tactile Qualities, as also Light, Colours, Smells, Tastes, Sounds, etc. and by the Variation of these I distinguished the Heaven, Earth, and Seas, and all other Bodies from each other.  
Neither was it wholly without Reason (upon the account of these Ideas of Qualities, which offered themselves to my Thoughts, and which alone I properly and Immediately perceived) that I thought myself to Perceive some Things Different from my Thought, viz. The Bodies or Objects fro whence these Ideas might Proceed; for I often found these Ideas come upon me without my Consent or Will; so that I can neither perceive an Object (th● I had a mind to it) unless it were before the Organs of my Sense; Neither can I Hinder myself from perceiving it, when it is Present.  
And seeing that those Ideas which I take in by sense are much more Lively, Apparent and in their kind more distinct, than any of those which I knowingly and Willingly frame by Meditation, or stir up in my Memory; it seems to me that they cannot proceed from myself. There remains therefore no other way for them to come upon me, but from some other Things Without Me. Of Which Things seeing I have no other Knowledge but from these Ideas, I cannot Think but that these Ideas are like the Things.  
Moreover, Because I remember that I first made use of my senses before my Reason; and because I did perceive that those Ideas which I myself did frame were not so Manifest as those which I received by my senses, but very often made up of their parts, I was easily persuaded to think that I had no Idea in my Understanding, which I had not First in my sense.  
Neither was it without Reason that I Judged, That Body (which by a peculiar right I call my Own) to be more nighly appertaining to Me then any other Body. For from It, as from other Bodies, I can never be separated, I was sensible of all Appetites and Affections in It and for I●, and lastly I perceived pleasure and Pain in its Parts, and not in any other Without it. But why from the sense of Pain a certain Grief, and from the sense of pleasure a certain joy of the Mind should arise, or Why that Gnawing of the stomach, Which I call Hunger, should put me in mind of Eating, or the dryness of my Throat of Drinking, I can give no other Reason but that I am taught so by Nature. For to my thinking there is no Affinity or likeness between that Gnawing of the Stomach, and the desire of Ea●ing, or between the sense of Pain, and the sorrowful thought from thence arising. But in this as in all other judgements that I made of sensible objects, I seemed to be taught by Nature, for I first persuaded myself that things were so or so, before ever I enquired into a Reason that may prove it.  
But afterwards I discovered many experiments, 
The Reasons why I doubt my senses.  wherein my senses so grossly deceived me, that I would never trust them again; for Towers which seemed Round a far off, nigh at hand appeared square, and large Statue● on their tops seemed small to those that stood on the ground; and in numberless other things, I perceived the judgements of my outward senses were deceived: and not of my outward only, but of my inward senses also; for what is more intimate or inward than Pain? And yet I have heard from those, whose Arm or Leg was cut off, that they have felt pain in that part which they wanted, and therefore I am not absolutely certain that any part of me is affected with pain, though I feel pain therein. To these I have lately added two very general Reasons of doubt; 
Medit. 1.  The first was, that while I was awake, I could not believe myself to perceive any thing, which I could not think myself sometimes to perceive, though I were a sleep; And seeing I cannot believe, that what I seem to perceive in my sleep proceeds from outward Objects, what greater Reason have I to think so of what I perceive whilst I am awake? The other Cause of Doubt was, that seeing I know not the Author of my Being (or at least I then supposed myself not to know him) what reason is there but that I may be so ordered by Nature as to be deceived even in those things which appeared to me most true. And as to the Reasons, which induced me to give credit to sensible Things, 'twas easy to return an answer thereto, for finding by experience, that I was impelled by Nature to many Things, which Reason dissuaded me from, I thought I should not far trust what I was taught by Nature. And though the perceptions of my senses depended not on my Will, I thought I should not therefore conclude, that they proceeded from Objects different from myself; for perhaps there may be some other Faculty in me (though as yet unknown to me) which might frame those perceptions.  
But now that I begin better to know myself and the Author of my Original, 
How far the senses are now to be trusted.  I do not think, that all things, which I seem to have from my senses are rashly to be admitted, neither are all things so had, to be doubted. And first because I know that whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive, may be so made by God as I perceive them; the Power of understanding clearly and distinctly one Thing without the other is sufficient to make Me certain that One Thing is different from the Other; because it may at least be placed apart by God, and that it may be esteemed different, it matters not by what Power it may be so severed. And therefore from the knowledge I have, that I myself exist, and because at the same time I understand that nothing else appertains to my Nature or Essence, but that I am a thinking Being, I rightly conclude, that my Essence consists in this alone, that I am a thinking Thing. And though perhaps (or, as I shall show presently, 'tis certain) I have a Body which is very nighly conjoined to me, yet because on this side I have a clear and distinct Idea of myself, as I am only a thinking Thing, not extended; and on the other side because I have a distinct Idea of my Body, as it is only an extended thing, not thinking, 'tis from hence certain, that I am really distinct from my Body, and that I can exist without it.  
Moreover I find in myself some Faculties endowed with certain peculiar ways of thinking, such as the Faculty of Imagination, the Faculty of Perception or sense; without which I can conceive my whole self clearly and distinctly, but (changing the phrase) I cannot conceive those Faculties without conceiving Myself, that is, an understanding substance in which they are; for none of them in their formal Conception includes understanding; from whence I perceive they are as different from me, as the modus or manner of a Thing is different from the Thing itself.  
I acknowledge also, that I have several other Faculties, such as changing of place, putting on various shapes, etc. Which can no more be understood without a substance in which they are, than the forementioned Faculties, and consequently they can no more be understood to Exist without that substance: But yet 'tis Manifest, that this sort of Faculties, to the End they may exist, aught to be in a Corporeal, Extended, and not in a Understanding substance, because Extension, and not Intellection or Understanding is included in the Clear and Distinct conception of them.  
But there is also in me a certain Passive Faculty of sense, or of Receiving and Knowing the Ideas of sensible Things; of which Faculty I can make no use, unless there were in myself, or in something else, a certain Active Faculty of Producing and Effecting those Ideas. But this cannot be in myself, for it Pre-supposes no Understanding, and those Ideas are Produced in me, though I help not, and often against my Will. There remains therefore no Place for this Active Faculty, but that it should be in some substance different from me. In which because all the Reality, which is contained Objectively in the Ideas Produced by that Faculty, aught to be contained Formally or Eminently (as I have Formerly taken notice) this substance must be either a Body (in which what is in the Ideas Objectively is contained Formally) or it Must Be God, or some Creature more excellent than a Body (In which what is in the Ideas Objectively is contained Eminently) But seeing that God is not a Deceivour, 'tis altogether Manifest, that he does not Place these Ideas in me either Immediately from himself, or Mediately from any other Creature, wherein their Objective Reality is not * contained Formally, but only Eminently. And seeing God has given me no Faculty to discern Whether these Ideas proceed from Corporeal or Incorporeal Being's, but rather a strong Inclination to believe that they are sent from Corporeal Being's, there is no Reason Why God should not be counted a Deceiver, if these Ideas came from any Where, but from Corporeal Things. Therefore we must conclude that there are Corporeal Being's. Which perhaps are not all the same as I comprehend them by my sense (for Perception by sense is in many Things very Obscure and Confused) but those things at least, which I clearly and distinctly Understand, that is to say, all those things which are comprehended under the Object of Pure Mathematics; those things I say at least are True.  
As to What Remains, They are either some Particulars, as that the Sun is of such a Bigness or Shape, etc. or they are Things less Clearly Understood, as Light, Sound, Pain, etc. And though these and such like Things may be very Doubtful and Uncertain, yet because God is not a Deceiver, and because that (Therefore) none of my Opinions can be false unless God has Given me some Faculty or other to Correct my Error, hence 'tis▪ that I am encouraged with the Hopes of attaining Truth even in these very Things.  
And certainly it cannot be doubted but whatever I am taught by Nature has something therein of Truth By Nature in General I understand either God himself, or the Coordination of Creatures Made by God, By my Own Nature in Particular I understand the Complexion or Association of all those things which are given me by God.  
Now there is nothing that this my Nature teaches me more expressly than that I have a Body, Which is not Well when I feel Pain, that this Body wants Meat or Drink When I am Hungry or Dry, etc. And therefore I ought not to Doubt but that these things are True. And by this sense of Pain, Hunger, Thirst, etc. My Nature tells me that I am not in my Body, as a Mariner is in his Ship, but that I am most nighly conjoined thereto, and as it were Blended therewith; so that I with It make up one thing; For Otherwise, when the Body were hurt, I, who am only a Thinking Thing, should not therefore feel Pain, but should only perceive the Hurt with the Eye of my Understanding (as a Mariner perceives by his sight whatever is broken in his Ship) and when the Body wants either Meat or Drink, I should only Understand this want, but should not have the Confused sense of Hunger or Thirst; I call them Confused, for certainly the Sense of Thirst, Hunger, Pain, etc. are only Confused Modes or Manners of Thought arising from the Union and (as it were) mixture of the Mind and Body.  
I am taught also by Nature, that there are many other Bodies Without and About my Body, some whereof are to be desired, others are to be Avoided. And because that I Perceive very Different Colours, Sounds, Smells, Tastes, Heat, Hardness, and the Like, from thence I Rightly conclude that there are Correspondent Differences in Bodies, from which these different perceptions of sense proceed, though perhaps not Alike. And because that some of these perceptions are Pleasant, others Unpleasant, 'tis evidently certain, that my Body, or rather my Whole self as (I am compounded of a Mind and Body) am liable to be Affected by these Bodies which encompass me about.  
There are many Other Things Also which Nature seems to teach Me, but Really I am not taught by It, but have gotten them by an ill use of Passing my Judgement Inconsiderately, and from hence it is that these things happen often to be false; as that all space is Empty, in which I find nothing that works upon my Senses; That in a hot Body there is something like the Idea of Heat which is in me; That in a White or Green Body there is the same Whiteness or Greenness which I perceive; And the same Taste in a bitter or sweet Thing, etc. That Stars, Castles, and Other Remote Bodies are of the same Bigness and Shape, as they are Represented to my senses: and such like. But that I may not admit of any Thing in this very matter, which I cannot Distinctly perceive, it behoves me here to determine more Accurately What I mean when I say, That I am taught a Thing by Nature.  
Here I take Nature more strictly, then for the Complication of all those Things which are Given me by God; For in this Complication there are many things contained which relate to the Mind alone, as, That I perceive What is done cannot be not Done, and all Other things which are known by the Light of Nature, but of these I speak not at present. There are also many Other Things which belong only to the Body, as, That it tends Downwards and such like, of these also I treat not at Present. But I speak of those Things only which God hath bestowed upon me as I am Compounded of a Mind and Body together, and not differently Considered. 'Tis Nature therefore thus taken that teaches me to avoid troublesome Objects, and seek after pleasing Ones; but it appears not that this Nature teaches us to conclude any thing of these Perceptions of our senses, before that we make by our Understanding a diligent examination of outward Objects; for to Inquire into the Truth of Things belongs not to the Whole Compositum of a Man as he Consists of Mind and Body, but to the Mind alone.  
So that though a star affect my eye no more than a small spark of Fire, yet there is in my Eye no Real or Positive Inclination to believe One no bigger than the Other, but thus I have been used to Judge from my Childhood without any Reason: and though coming nigh the Fire I feel Heat, and Coming too nigh I feel Pain, yet there is no Reason to persuade me, That in the Fire there is any thing like either that Heat or that Pain, but only that there is something therein, Whatever it be, that excites in us those sensations of Heat or Pain: and so though in some space there may be nothing that Works on my senses, it does not from thence follow, that there is no Body there; for I see that in these and many other things I am used to overturn the Order of Nature, because I use these perceptions of sense (which properly are given me by Nature to make known to the mind what is advantageous or hurtful to the Compositum, whereof the mind is part, and so far only they are Clear and Distinct enough) as certain Rules immediately to discover the Essence of External Bodies, of Which they make known nothing but very Obscurely and Confusedly.  
I have 
* Medit. 4.  formerly shown how my judgement happens to be false notwithstanding God's Goodness. But now there arises a new Difficulty concerning those very things which Nature tells me I am to prosecute or avoid, and concerning my Internal senses, Wherein I find many Errors, as when a Man being deceived by the Pleasant Taste of some sort of Meat, devours therein some hidden Poison. But in this very Instance it cannot be said, that the Man is impelled by Nature to desire the Poison, for of that he is wholly Ignorant; but he is said to Desire the Meat only as being of a grateful Taste; and from hence nothing can be concluded but, That Mans-Nature is not All-knowing; which is no Wonder seeing Man is a Finite Being, and therefore nothing but Finite Perfections belong to him.  
But We often err even in those things to Which we are▪ Impelled by Nature, as when sick men desire that Meat or Drink, which will certainly prove Hurtful to them. To this it may perhaps be replied, That they Err in this because their Nature is Corrupt. But this Answers not the Difficulty, For a sick man is no less Gods Creature then a Man in Health, and therefore 'tis as Absurd to Imagine a Deceitful Nature imposed by God on the One as on the Other; And as a Clock that is made up of Wheels and Weights does no less strictly observe the Laws of its Nature, when it is ill contrived, and tells the hours falsely, 〈◊〉 when it answers the Desire of the Artificer in all performances; so if I consider the body of a Man as a mere Machine or Movement, made up and compounded of Bones, Nerves, Muscles, Veins, Blood, and Skin; so that, though there were no mind in It, yet It would perform all those Motions which now are in it (those only excepted which Proceed from the Will, and consequently from the Mind) I do easily acknowledge, that it would be as natural for him (if for example sake he were sick of a Dropsy) to suffer that Dryness of his Throat which uses to bring into his mind the sense of Thirst, & that thereby his Nerves and other Parts would be so disposed as to take Drink, by Which his disease would be increased; As (supposing him to be troubled with no such Distemper) by the like Dryness of Throat he would be disposed to Drink, when 'tis Requisite. And tho, if I respect the Intended use of a Clock I may say that it Errs from its Nature, when it tells the Hours wrong, and so considering the Movement of a Man's Body as contrived for such Motions as are used to be performed thereby, I may think That also to Err from its Nature, if its Throat is Dry, when it has no want of Drink for its Preservation. Yet I Plainly discover, that this last Acceptation of Nature differs much from that whereof we have been speaking all this While, for this is only a Denomination extrinsic to the Things whereof 'tis spoken, and depending on my Thought, while it Compares a sick man, and a disorderly Clock with the Idea of an healthy man and a Rectified Clock. But by Nature in its former Acceptation I Understand something that is Really in the Things themselves, which therefore has something of Truth in it.  
But though Respecting only a Body sick of a Dropsy it be an Extrinsic Denomination to say, that its Nature is Corrupt, because it has a Dry Throat, and stands in no need of Drink; yet respecting the Whole Compound or Mind joined to such a Body, 'tis not a mere Denomination, but a real Error or Nature for it to thirst when drink is hurtful to it. It remains therefore here to be inquired, how the Goodness of God suffers Nature so taken to be deceivable.  
First▪ therefore I understand that a chief difference between my Mind and Body consists in this, That my Body is of its Nature divisible, but my Mind indivisible; for while I consider my Mind or myself, as I am only a thinking Thing, I can distinguish no parts in Me, but I perceive myself to be but one entire Thing; and though the whole Mind seems to be united to the whole Body, yet a Foot, an Arm, or any other part of the Body being cut off, I do not therefore conceive any part of my Mind taken away; Neither can its Faculties of desiring, perceiving, understanding, etc. be called its Parts, for 'tis one and the same, mind, that desires, that perceives, that understands; Contrarily, I cannot think of any Corporeal or extended Being, which I cannot easily divide into Parts by my thought, and by this I understand it to be divisible. And this alone (if I had known it from no other Argument) is sufficient to inform form me, that my mind is really distinct from my Body.  
Nextly I find, that my mind is not immediately affected by all parts of my body, but only by the Brain, and perhaps only by one small part of it, That, to wit, wherein the common sense is said to reside; Which part, as often as it is disposed in the same manner, will represent to the mind the same thing, though at the same time the other parts of the body may be differently ordered. And this is proved by numberless Experiments, which need not here be related.  
Moreover I discover that the nature of my body is such, that no part of it can be moved by an other remote part thereof, but it may also be moved in the same manner by some of the interjacent parts, though the more remote part lay still and acted not; As for example in the rope,  
A— B— C— D  
if its end D. were drawn, the end A. would be moved no otherwise, than if one of the intermediate parts B. or C. were drawn, and the end D. rest quiet. So when I feel pain in my Foot, the consideration of Physics instructs me, that this is performed by the help of Nerves dispersed through the Foot, which from thence being continued like Ropes to the very Brain, whilst they are drawn in the Foot, they also draw the inward parts of the Brain to which they reach, and therein excite a certain motion, which is ordained by Nature to affect the mind with a sense of Pain, as being in the Foot. But because these Nerves must pass through the Shin, the Thighs, the Loins, the Back, the Neck, before they can reach the Brain from the Foot, it may so happen, that though that part of them, which is in the Foot were not touched, but only some of their intermediate parts, yet the same motion, would be caused in the Brain, as when the Foot itself is ill affected, from whence 'twil necessarily follow, that the mind should perceive the same Pain. And thus may we think of any other Sense.  
I understand lastly, that seeing each single motion performed in that part of the Brain, which immediately affects the mind, excites therein only one sort of sense▪ nothing could be contrived more conveniently in this case, than that, of all those Senses which it can cause, it should cause that which chiefly, and most frequently conduces to the conservation of an healthful Man; And experience witnesses, that to this very end all our senses are given us by Nature; and therefore nothing can be found therein, which does not abundantly testify the Power and Goodness of God. Thus for Example, when the Nerves of the Feet are violently and more than ordinarily moved, that motion of them being propagated through the Medulla Spinalis of the Back to the inward parts of the Brain, there it signifies to the mind, that something or other is to be felt, and what is this but Pain, as if it were in the Foot, by which the Mind is excited to use its endeavours for removing the Cause, as being hurtful to the Foot. But the Nature of Man might have been so ordered by God, that That same motion in the Brain should represent to the mind any other thing, viz. either itself as 'tis in the Brain, or itself as it is in the Foot, or in any of the other forementioned intermediate parts, or lastly any other thing whatsoever; but none of these would have so much conduced to the Conservation of the Body. In the like manner when we want drink, from thence arises a certain dryness in the Throat, which moves the Nerves thereof, and by their means the inward parts of the Brain, and this motion affects the mind with the sense of thirst; because that in this case nothing is more requisite for us to know, then that we want drink for the Preservation of our Health. So of the Rest.  
From all which 'tis manifest, that (notwithstanding the infinite Goodness of God) 'tis impossible but the Nature of Man as he consists of a mind and body should be deceivable. For if any cause should excite (not in the Foot but) in the Brain itself, or in any other part through which the Nerves are continued from the Foot to the Brain, that self same motion, which uses to arise from the Foot being troubled, the Pain would be felt as in the Foot, and the sense would be naturally deceived; for 'tis consonant to Reason (seeing that That same motion of the Brain always represents to the mind that same sense, and it oftener proceeds from a cause hurtful to the Foot, than from any other) I say 'tis reasonable, that it should make known to the mind the Pain of the Foot, rather than of any other part. And so if a dryness of Throat arises (not as 'tis used from the necessity of drink for the conservation of the Body, but) from an unusual Cause, as it happens in a Dropsy, 'tis far better that it should then deceive us; then that it should always deceive us when the Body is in Health, and so of the Rest.  
And this consideration helps me very much, not only to understand the Errors to which my Nature is subject, but also to correct and avoid them. For seeing I know that all my Senses do oftener inform me falsely than truly in those things which conduce to the Body's advantage; and seeing I can use (almost always) more of them than one to Examine the same thing, as also I can use memory, which joins present and past things together, and my understanding also, which hath already discovered to me all the causes of my Errors, I ought no longer to fear, that what my Senses daily represent to me should be false. But especially those extravagant Doubts of my First Meditation are to be turned off as ridiculous; and particularly the chief of them, viz. That * of not distinguishing Sleep from Waking, for now I plainly discover a great difference, between them, for my Dreams are never conjoined by my memory with the other actions of my life, as whatever happens to me awake is; and certainly if (while I were awake) any person should suddenly appear to me, and presently disappear (as in Dreams) so that I could not tell from whence he came or where he went, I should rather esteem it a Spectre or Apparition feigned in my Brain, than a true Man; but when such things occur, as I distinctly know from whence, where, and when they come, and I conjoin the perception of them by my memory with the other Accidents of my life, I am certain they are represented to me waking and not asleep, neither ought I in the least to doubt of their Truth, if after I have called up all my senses, memory, and understanding to their Examination I find nothing in any of them, that clashes with other truths; For God not being a Deceiver, it follows, that In such things I am not deceived. But because the urgency of Action in the common occurrences of Affairs will not always allow time for such an accurate examination, I must confess that Man's life is subject to many Errors about particulars, so that the infirmity of our Nature must be acknowledged by Us.  
FINIS.    

ADURTISEMENET CONCERNING THE OBJECTIONS.  
AMong seven Parcels of Objections made by Divers Learned Persons against these Meditations, I have made choice of the Third in the Latin Copy, as being Penned by Thomas Hobbs of Malmesbury, a Man famously known to the World abroad▪ but especially to his own the English Nation; and therefore 'tis likely that what comes from Him may be more acceptable to his Countrymen, than what proceeds from a Stranger; and as the strength of a Fortification is never better known then by a Forcible Resistance, so fares it with these Meditations which stand unshaken by the Violent Opposition of so Potent an Enemy. And yet it must be Confessed that the Force of these Objections and Cogency of the Arguments cannot be well apprehended by those, who are not versed in other Pieces of Mr. Hobbs' Philosophy, especially His Book De Corpore and De Homine, The former whereof I am sure is Translated into English, and therefore not Impertinently referred to Here in a Discourse to English Readers. And this is the Reason that makes the Great Des-Cartes pass over many of these Objections so slightly, Who certainly would have Undermined the whole Fabric of the Hobbian Philosophy had he but known upon What Foundations it was Built.   

OBJECTIONS Made against the Foregoing MEDITATIONS, BY THE FAMOUS THOMAS HOBBS Of MALMESBURY▪ WITH DESCARTES'S ANSWERS.  

OBJECT. I.  
Against the First Meditation: Of things Doubtful.  
'TIS evident enough from What has been said in this Meditation, that there is no sign by Which we may Distinguish our Dreams from True 〈…〉 Phantasms which we have waking and from our Senses are not accidents inhering in Outward▪ Objects, neither do they Prove that such outward Objects do Exist; and therefore if we trust our Senses without any other Ground, we may well doubt whether any Thing Be or Not, We therefore acknowledge the Truth of this Meditation. But Because Plato and other Ancient Philosophers argued for the same incertainty in sensible Things, and because 'tis commonly Observed by the Vulgar that 'tis hard to Distinguish Sleep from Waking, I would not have the most excellent Author of such new Thoughts put forth so antique Notions.  

ANSWER.  
Those Reasons of Doubt which by this Philosopher are admitted as true, were proposed by Me only as Probable, and I made use of them not that I may vend them as new, but partly that I may prepare the Minds of my Readers fo● the Consideration of Intellectual Things, wherein they seemed to me very necessary; And partly that thereby I may show how firm those Truths are, which hereafter I lay down, seeing they cannot be Weakened by these Metaphysical Doubts; So that I never designed to gain any Honour by repeating them, but I think I could no more omit them, than a Writer in Physic can pass over the Description of a Disease, Whose Cure he intends to Teach.    

OBJECT. II.  
Against the Second Meditation: Of the Nature of Man's Mind.  
I Am a Thinking Thing. 'Tis True; for because I think or have a Phantasm (whether I am awake or asleep) it follows that I am Thinking, for I Think and I am Thinking signify the same Thing. because I Think, it follows That I am, for whatever Thinks cannot be Nothing. But when he Adds, That is, a Mind, a Soul, an Understanding, Reason, I question his Argumentation; for it does not seem a Right Consequence to say, I am a Thinking Thing, therefore I am a Thought, neither, I am an Understanding Thing, therefore I am the Understanding. For in the same manner I may Conclude, I am a Walking Thing, therefore I am the Walking itself.  
Wherefore D. Cartes Concludes that an Understanding Thing and Intellection (which is the Act of an Understanding Thing) are the same; or at least that an Understanding Thing and the Intellect (which is the Power of an Understanding Thing) are the same; And yet all Philosophers distinguish the subject from its Faculties and Acts, that is, from its Properties and Essence, for the Thing itself is one thing, and its Essence is an other. It may be therefore that a Thinking Thing is the Subject of a Mind, Reason, or Understanding, and therefore it may be a Corporeal Thing, the Contrary Whereof is here Assumed and not Proved; and yet this Inference is the Foundation of that Conclusion which D. Cartes would Establish.  
In the same Meditation, 
* Places noted with this ●sterick are the Passages of the foregoing Meditations here Objected against.  I know that I am, I ask What I am Whom I Thus know, Certainly the Knowledge of Me precisely sotaken depends not on those Things of whose Existence I am yet Ignorant. 'Tis Certain the Knowledge of this Proposition I am, depends on this, I think▪ as he hath rightly informed us; but from whence have we the knowledge of this Proposition, I think? certainly from hence only, that we cannot conceive any Act without its subject, as dancing without a Dancer, knowledge, without a Knower, thought without a thinker.  
And from hence it seems to follow, that a thinking Thing is a Corporeal Thing; for the Subjects of all Acts are understood only in a Corporeal way, or after the manner of matter, as he himself shows hereafter by the example of a piece of Wax, which changing its colour, consistence, shape, and other Acts is yet known to continue the same thing, that is, the same matter subject to so many changes. But I cannot conclude from another thought that I now think; for though a Man may think that he hath thought (which consists only in memory) yet 'tis altogether impossible for him to think that he now thinks, or to know, that he k●ows, for the question may be put infinitely, how do you know that you know, that you know, that you know? etc.  
Wherefore seeing the Knowledge of this Proposition I am, depends on the knowledge of this I think, and the knowledge of this is from hence only, that we cannot separate thought from thinking matter, it seems rather to follow, that a thinking thing is material, than that 'tis immaterial.  

ANSWER.  
When I said, That is a Mind, a Soul, an Understanding, Reason, etc. I did not mean by these names the Faculties only, but the things endowed with those Faculties; and so 'tis always understood by the two first names (mind and soul) and v●ry often so understood by the two last Names (understanding and Reason) and this I have explained so often, and in so many places of these Meditations, that there is not the least occasion of questioning my meaning.  
Neither is there any parity between Walking and Thought, for walking is used only for the Act itself, but thought is sometimes used for the Act, sometimes for the Faculty, and sometimes for the thing itself, wherein the Faculty resides.  
Neither do I say, that the understanding thing and intellection are the same, or that the understanding thing and the intellect are the same, if the intellect be taken for the Faculty, but only when 'tis taken for the thing itself that understands. Yet I willingly confess, that I have (as much as in me lay) made use of abstracted words to signify th●t thing or substance, which I would have devested of all those things that belong not to it. Whereas contrarily this Philosopher uses the most concrete Words to signify this thinking thing, such as subject, matter, Body, etc. that he may not suffer it to be separated from Body.  
Neither am I concerned that His manner of joining many things together may seem to some fit for the discovery of Truth, than mine, wherein I separate as much as possibly each particular. But let us omit words and speak of things.  
It may be (says he) that a Thinking thing is a corporeal thing, the contrary whereof is here assumed and not proved. But herein he is mistaken, for I never assumed the contrary, neither have I used it as a Foundation, for the rest of my Superstructure, but left it wholly undetermined till the sixth Meditation, and in that 'tis proved.  
Then he tells us rightly, that we cannot conceive any Act without its subject, as thought without a thinking thing, for what thinks cannot be nothing; but then he subjoins without any Reason, and against the usual manner of speaking, and contrary to all Logic, that hence i● seem to follow, that a thinking thing is a corporeal Being. Truly the subjects of all Acts are understood under the notion of substance, or if you please under the notion of matter (that is to say of metaphysical matter) but not therefore under the notion of Bodies.  
But Logicians and Commonly all Men are used to say, that there are some Spiritual, some Corporeal substances. And by the Instance of Wax I only proved that Colour, Consistence, Shape, etc. appertain not to the Ratio For●alis of the Wax; For in that Place I 〈◊〉 neither of the Ratio Formalis of the Mind, neither of Body.  
Neither is it pertinent to the business, that the Philosopher asserts, That one Thought cannot be the subject of an other thought, for Who besides Himself ever Imagined This? But that I may explain the matter in a few words, 'Tis certain that Tho●ght cannot be without a Thinking Thing, neither any Act or any Accident without a substance wherein it resides. But seeing that we know not a substance immediately by itself, but by this alone, that 'tis the subject of several Acts, it is very consonant to the commands of Reason and Custom, that we should call by different names those substances, which we perceive are the subjects of very different Acts or Accidents, and that afterwards we should examine, whether those different names signify different or one and the same thing. Now there are some Acts which we call corporeal, as magnitude, figure, motion, and what ever else cannot be thought on without local extension, and the substance wherein these reside we call Body; neither can it be imagined that 'tis one substance which is the subject of Figure, and another substance which is the subject of local motion, etc. Because all these Acts agree under one common notion of Extension. Besides there are other Acts, which we call cogitative or thinking, as understanding, will, imagination, sense, etc. All which agree under the common notion of thought, perception, or Conscience; And the substance wherein they are, we ●ay, is a thinking thing, or mind, or call it by whatever other name we please, so we do not confound it with corporeal substance, because cogitative Acts no have affinity with corporeal Acts, and thought, which is the common Ratio of those is wholly diffrrent from Extension, which is the common Ratio of These. But after we have form two distinct conceptions of these two substances, from what is said in the sixth Meditation, 'tis easy to know, whether they be one and the same or different.    

OBJECT. III.  
* WHich of them is it, that is distinct from my thought? which of them is it that can be separated from me?  
Some perhaps will answer this Question thus, I myself, who think am distinct from my thought, and my thought is different from me (tho●not separated) as dancing is distinguished from the Dancer (as before is noted.) But if Des Cartes will prove, that he who understands is the same with his understanding, we shall fall into the Scholastic expressions, the understanding understands, the sight 〈◊〉, the Will wills, and then by an exact an●logy, the Walking (or at least the Faculty of walking) shall walk. All which are obscure, improper, and unworthy that perspicuity which is usual with the noble Des Cartes.  

ANSWER.  
I do not deny, that I who think am distinct from my thought, as a thing is distinguished from its modus or manner; But when I ask, which of them is it that is distinct from my thought? this I understand of those various modes of thought there mentioned, and not of my substance; and when I subjoin, which of them is it that can be separated from me? I only signify that all those modes or manners of thinking reside in me, neither do I herein perceive what occasion of doubt or obscurity can be imagined.    

OBJECT. iv  
* IT remains therefore for me to Confess that I cannot Imagine what this Wax is, but that I conceive in my mind What it is.  
There is a great Difference between Imagination (that is) having an Idea of a Thing, and the Conception of the Mind (that is) a Concluding from Reasoning that a thing Is or Exists. But Des-Cartes has not Declared to us in what they Differ▪ Besides, the Ancient Aristotelians have clearly delivered as a Doctrine, that substance is not perceived by sense, but is Collected by Ratiocination.  
But what shall we now say, if perhaps Ratiocination be nothing Else but a Copulation or Concatenation of Names or Appellations by this Word Is? From whence 'twill follow that we Collect by Reasoning nothing of or concerning the Nature of Things, but of the names of Things, that is to say, we only discover whether or no we join the Names of Things according to the Agreements which at Pleasure we have made concerning their significations; if it be so (as so it may be) Ratiocination will depend on Words, Words on Imagination, and perhaps Imagination as also Sense on the Motion of Corporeal Parts; and so the Mind shall be nothing but Motions in some Parts of an Organical Body.  

ANSWER.  
I have here Explained the Difference between Imagination, and the Mere Conception of the Mind, by reckoning up in my Example of the Wax, what it is therein which we Imagine, and what it is that we conceive in our Mind only: but besides this, I have explained in an other Place How we understand one way, and Imagine an other way One and the same Thing, suppose a Pentagone or Five sided Figure.  
There is in Ratiocination a Conjunction not of Words, but of Things signified by Words; And I much admire that the Contrary could Possibly enter any Man's Thoughts; For Who ever doubted but that a Frenchman and a Germane may argue about the same Things, though they use very Differing Words? and does not the Philosopher Disprove himself when he speaks of the Agreements which at pleasure we have made about the significations of Words? for if he grants that something is Signified by Words, Why will he not admit that our Ratiocinations are rather about this something, then about Words only? and by the same Right that he concludes the Mind to be a Motion, he may Conclude Also that the Earth is Heaven, or What else he Pleases.    

OBJECT. V  
Against the Third Meditation of God.  
* SOme of These (viz. Humane Thoughts) are as it were the Images of Things, and to these alone belongs properly the Name of an Idea, as when I Think on a Man, a Chimaera, Heaven, an Angel▪ or God.  
When I Think on a Man, I perceive an Idea made up of Figure and Colour, whereof I may doubt whether it be the Likeness of a Man or not; and so when I think on Heaven. But when I think on a Chimaera, I perceive an Image or Idea, of which I may doubt whether it be the Likeness of any Animal not only at present Existing, but possible to Exist, or that ever will Exist hereafter or not.  
But thinking on an Angel, there is offered to my Mind sometimes the Image of a Flame, sometimes the Image of a Pretty Little Boy with Wings, which I am certain has no Likeness to an Angel, and therefore that it is not the Idea of an Angel; But believing that there are some Creatures, Who do (as it were) wait upon God, and are Invisible, and Immaterial, upon the Thing Believed or supposed we Impose the Name of Angel; Whereas the Idea, under which I Imagine an Angel, is compounded of the Ideas of sensible Things.  
In the like manner at the Venerable Name of God, we have no Image or Idea of God, and therefore we are forbidden to Worship God under any Image, lest we should seem to Conceive Him that is inconceivable.  
Whereby it appears that we have no Idea of God; but like one born blind, who being brought to the Fire, and perceiving himself to be Warmed, knows there is something by which he is warmed and Hearing it called Fire, he Concludes that Fire Exists, but yet knows not of what shape or Colour the Fire is, neither has he any Image or Idea thereof in his Mind.  
So Man knowing that there must be some Cause of his Imaginations or Ideas, as also an other cause before That, and so onwards, he is brought at last to an End, or to a supposal of some Eternal Cause, Which because it never began to Be cannot have any other Cause before it, and thence he Concludes that 'tis necessary that some Eternal Thing Exist: and yet he has no Idea which He can call the Idea of this Eternal Thing, but he names this Thing, which he believes and acknowledges by the Name God.  
But now Des-Cartes proceeds from this Position, That we have an Idea of God in our Mind, to prove this Theorem, That God (that is an Almighty, Wise, Creator of the World) Exists, whereas he ought to have explained this Idea of God better, and he should have thence deduced not only his Existence, but also the Creation of the World.  

ANSWER.  
Here the Philosopher will have the Word Idea be only Understood for the Images of Material Things represented in a Corporeal Fantasy, by which Position he may Easily Prove, that there can be no Proper Idea of an Angel or God, whereas I declare every Where, but especially in this Place, that I take the Name Idea for whatever is immediately perceived by the Mind, so that when I Will, or Fear, because at the same time I perceive that I Will or Fear, this very Will or Fear are reckoned by me among the number of Ideas; And I have purposely made use of that Word, because It was usual with the Ancient Philosophers to signify the Manner of Perceptions in the Divine Mind, although neither we nor they acknowledge a Fantasy in God; and besides I had no fit Word to express it by.  
And I think I have sufficiently explained the Idea of God for those that will attend my meaning, but I can never do it fully enough for those that will Understand my Words otherwise then I intent them.  
Lastly, what is here added concerning the Creation of the World is wholly beside the Question in hand.    

OBJECT. VI  
* But 〈◊〉 ar● Other (Thoughts) That have Superadded Forms to them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny; I know I have always (whenever I think) some certain thing as the Subject or Object of my Thought, but in this last sort of Thoughts there is something More which I think upon then Barely the Likeness of the Thing; and of these Thoughts some are called Wills and Affections, and others of them judgements.  
When any one Fears or Wills, he has certainly the Image of the Thing Feared, or Action Willed, but what more a Willing or Fearing Man has in his Thoughts is not explained; and though Fear be a Thought, yet I see not how it can be any other than the Thought of the Thing Feared; For what is the Fear of a Lion rushing on me, but the Idea of a Lion Rushing on me, a●d the Effect (which that Idea produces in the Heart) whereby the Man Fearing is excited to that Animal Motion which▪ is called Flight? but now this Motion of Flying is not Thought, it remains therefore that in Fear there is no other Thought, but that which consists in the likeness of the thing. And the same may be said of Will.  
Moreover Affirmation and Negation are not without a voice and words, and hence 'tis that Brutes can neither affirm or deny not so much as in their Thought, and consequently neither can they judge. But yet the same thought may be in a beast as in a Man; for when we affirm that a Man runs, we have not a thought different from what a Dog has when he sees his Master running; Affirmation therefore or Negation superadds nothing to mere thoughts, unless perhaps it adds this thought, that the names of which an Affirmation consists are (to the Person affirming) the Names of the same thing; and this is not to comprehend in the thought more than the likeness of the thing, but it is only comprehending the same likeness twice.  

ANSWER.  
'tis self evident, That 'tis one thing to see a Lion and at the same time to fear him, and an other thing only to see him. So 'tis one thing to see a Man Running, and an other thing to Affirm within myself (which may be done without a voice) That I see him.  
But in all this objection I find nothing that requires an Answer.    

OBJECT. VII.  
* NOw it remains for me to examine, how I have received this Idea of God, for I have neither received it by means of my senses, neither comes it to me without my forethought, as the Ideas of sensible things use to do, when those things work on the Organs of my sense, or at least seem so to work; Neither is this Idea framed by myself, for I can neither add to, nor detract from it. Wherefore I have only to conclude, that it is innate, even as the Idea of me myself is Natural to myself.  
If there be no Idea of God, as it seems there is not (and here 'tis not proved that there is) this whole discourse falls to the ground. And as to the Idea of myself (if I respect the Body) it proceeds from Sight, but (if the Soul) there is no Idea of a Soul, but we collect by Ratiocination, that there is some inward thing in a Man's Body, that imparts to it Animal Motion, by which it perceives and moves, and this (whatever it be) without any Idea we call a Soul.  

ANSWER.  
If there be an Idea of God (as 'tis manifest that there is) this whole Objection falls to the ground; and then he subjoins, That we have no Idea of the Soul, but collect it by Ratiocination, 'Tis the same as if he should say, that there is no Image thereof represented in the Fantasy, but yet, that there is such a Thing, as I call an Idea.    

OBJECT. VIII.  
* AN other Idea of the Sun as taken from the Arguments of Astronomors, that is consequentially collected by me from certain natural notions.  
At the same time we can certainly have but one Idea of the Sun, whether it belooked at by our eyes, or collected by Ratiocination to be much bigger than it seems; for this last is not an Idea of the Sun, but a proof by Arguments, that the Idea of the Sun would be much larger, if it were looked at nigher. But at different or several times the Ideas of the Sun may be divers, as if at one time we look at it with our bare eye, at an other time through a Teloscope; but Astronomical arguments do not make the Idea of the Sun greater or less, but they rather tell us that the sensible Idea thereof is false.  

ANSWER.  
Here also (as before) what he says is not the Idea of the Sun, and yet is described, is that very thing which I call the Idea.    

OBJECT. IX.  
* FOr without doubt those Ideas which Represent substances are something more, or (as I may say) have more of objective Reality in them, than those that represent only accidents or modes; and again, that by which I understand a mighty God, Eternal, Infinite, Omniscient, Omnipotent, Creator of all things besides himself, has certainly in it more objective reality, than those by which Finite substances are exhibited.  
I have before often noted that there can be no Idea of God or the Mind: I will now superadd, That neither can there be an Idea of Substance. For Substance (Which is only Matter Subject to Accidents and Changes) is Collected only by Reasoning, but it is not at all Conceived, neither does it represent to us any Idea. And if this be true, How can it be said, That those Ideas which represent to us Substances have in them something More, or More Objective Reality, than those which represents to us Accidents? Besides, Let Des-Cartes again Consider what he means by More Reality? Can Reality be increased or diminished? Or does he think that One Thing can be More A Thing than an other Thing? let him Consider how this can be Explained to our Understandings with that Perspicuity or Clearness which is requisite in all Demonstrations, and Which He Himself is used to present us with upon other Occasions.  

ANSWER.  
I have often noted before, That that very Thing which is evidenced by Reason, as also whatever else is perceived by any other Means, is Called by Me an Idea. And I have sufficiently explained How Reality may be Increased or Diminished, in the same manner (to wit) as Substance is More a Thing, than A Mode; and if there be any such things as Real Qualities, or Incomplete Substances, these are More Things than Modes, and Less Things then Complete Substances: and Lastly if there be an Infinite Independent Substance this is More a Thing, than a Finite, Dependent Substance. And all this is self-evident.    

OBJECT. X.  
* WHerefore There only Remains the Idea of God; Wherein I must consider whether there be not something Included, which cannot Possibly have its Original from me. By the Word, God, I mean a certain Infinite Substance, Independent, Omniscient, Almighty, by whom both I myself and every thing Else That Is (if any thing do actually exist) was Created; All which attributes are of such an High Nature That the more attentively I consider them, the Less I Conceive myself alone possible to be the Author of these notions; from what therefore has been said I must Conclude there is a God.  
Considering the Attributes of God, that from thence we may gather an Idea of God, and that we may inquire whether there be not something in that Idea which cannot Possibly Proceed from ourselves, I discover (if I am not Deceived) that what we think off at the Venerable name of God proceeds neither from ourselves, neither is it Necessary that they should have any other Original then from Outward Objects. For by the Name of God I understand a Substance, that is, I understand that God Exists (not by an Idea, but by Reasoning) In●●nite (that is, I cannot conceive or Imagine Terms or Parts in him so Extreme, but I can Imagine others Farther) from whence it follows, that not an Idea of Gods Infinity but of my Own bounds and Limits presents itself at the Word Infinite. Independent, That is, I do not conceive any Cause from which God may proceed; from whence 'tis evident that I have no other Idea at the word Independent, but the memory of my own Ideas which at Different. Times have Different Beginnings, and Consequently they must be Dependent.  
Wherefore, to say that God is Independent, is only to say That God is in the Number of those things, the Original whereof I do not Imagine: and so to say that God is Infinite, is the same as if we say That He is in the Number of Those Things whose Bounds we do not Conceive: And thus any Idea of God is Exploded, for What Idea can we have without Beginning or Ending?  
Omniscient or Understanding all things, Here I desire to know, by what Idea, Des-Cartes understands God's Understanding? Almighty I desire also to know by What Idea God's Power is understood? For Power is in Respect of Future Things, that is, Things not Existing. For my part, I understand Power from the Image or Memory of past Actions, arguing with myself thus, He did so, therefore he was able (or had Power) to do so, therefore (continuing the same) he will again have Power to do so. But now all these are Ideas that may arise from external Objects.  
Creator of all things, I can frame an Image of Creation from what I see every day, as a Man Born, or growing from a Punctum to that shape and size he now bears; an other Idea than this no man can have at the word Creator; But the Possibility of Imagining a Creation is not sufficient to prove that the world was Created. And therefore though it were Demonstrated that some Infinite Independent Almighty Being did exist, yet it will not from thence follow that a Creator exists; unless one can think this to be a right inference, we believe that there exists something that has created all other things, therefore the world was created thereby.  
Moreover when he says, that the Idea of God, and of our Soul is Innate or born in us, I would fain know, whether the Souls of those that sleep sound do think unless they dream; If not, then at that time they have no Ideas, and consequently no Idea is Innate, for what is Innate to us is never Absent from us.  

ANSWER.  
None of God's Attributes can proceed from outward objects as from a Pattern, because there is nothing found in God like what is found in External, that is, Corporeal things; Now 'tis manifest that whatever we think of in him differing or unlike what we find in them proceeds not from them, but f●●m a cause of that very diversity in our Thought.  
And here I desire to know, how this Philosopher deduces God's Understanding from outward Things, and yet I can easily explain wha● Idea I have thereof, by saying, that by the Idea of God's Understanding I conceive whatever is the Form of any Perception; For who is there that does not perceive that he understands something or other, and consequently he must thereby have an Idea of understanding, and by enlarging i● Indefinitely he forms the Idea of God's Understanding. And so of his other Attributes.  
And seeing we have made use of that Idea of God which is in us to demonstrate his existence, and seeing there is contained in this Idea such an Immense Power, that we conceive it a contradiction for God to Exist, and yet that any thing should Be besides Him, which was not Created by Him, it plainly follows that demonstrating His existence we demonstrate also that the whole world, or all things different from God, were Created by God.  
Lastly when we assert, that some Ideas are Innate or natural to us, we do not mean that they are always present with us (for so no Idea would be Innate) but only that we have in ourselves a Faculty of producing them.    

OBJECT.  
* THe whole stress of which Argument lies thus; because I know it impossible for me to be of the same nature I am, viz, having the Idea of a God in me, unless really there were a God, A God (I say) that very same God, whose Idea I have in my mind.  
Wherefore seeing 'tis not demonstrated that we have an Idea of God, and the Christian Religion commands us to believe that God is Inconceivable, that is, as I suppose, that we cannot have an Idea of Him, it follows, that the Existence of God is not demonstrated, much less the Creation.  

ANSWER.  
When God is said to be Inconceiveable 'tis understood of an Adequate full conception. But I am ' e'en tired with often repeating, how notwithstanding we may have an Idea of God. So that here is nothing brought that makes any thing against my demonstration.    

OBJECT. XII.  
Against the Fourth Meditation, Of Truth and Falsehood.  
* BY Which I understand that Error (as it is Error is not a Real Being Dependent on God, but is only a Defect; and that therefore to make me Err there is not requisite a Faculty of Erring Given me by God.  
'Tis Certain that Ignorance is only a Defect, and that there is no Occasion of any Positive Faculty to make us Ignorant. But this position is not so clear in Relation to Error, for Stones and Inanimate Creatures cannot Err, for this Reason only, because they have not the Faculties of Reasoning or Imagination; from whence 'tis Natural for us to Conclude, That to Err there is requisite a Faculty of judging, or at least of Imagining, both which Faculties are Positive, and given to all Creatures subject to Error, and to Them only.  
Moreover Des-Cartes says thus, I find (my Errors) to Depend on two concurring Causes, viz. on my Faculty of Knowing, and on my Faculty of Choosing, or Freedom of my Will. Which seems Contradictious to what he said before; And here also we may note, that Freedom of Will is assumed without any Proof contrary to the Opinion of the Calvinists.  

ANSWER.  
Tho to make us Err there is requisite a Faculty of Reasoning (or rather of judging, that is, of Affirming and Denying) because Error is the Defect thereof, yet it doesnot follow from thence that this Defect is any thing Real, for neither is Blindness a Real Thing, though stones cannot be said to be Blind, for this Reason only, That they are incapable of sight. And I much wonder that in all these Objections I have not found one Right Inference.  
I have not here assumed any thing concerning the Freedom of Man's Will, unless what all Men do Experience in themselves, and is most evident by the Light of Nature. Neither see I any Reason, Why he should say that this is Contradictious to any former Position.  
Perhaps there may be Many, who respecting God's predisposal of Things cannot Comprehend, How their Freedom of Will Consists therewith, but yet there is no Man who, respecting himself only, does not find by Experience, That 'tis one and the same Thing to be Willing, and to be Free. But 'tis no Place to Inquire what the Opinion of others may be in this Matter.    

OBJECT. XIII.  
* AS for Example, When lately I set myself to examine Whether any Thing Do Exist, and found, that from my setting myself to examine such a Thing, it evidently follows, That I myself Exist, I could not but judge, what I so clearly understood, to be true, not that I was forced thereto by any outward Impulse, but because a strong Propension in my Will did follow this Great Light in my Understanding, so that I believed it so much the more Freely and Willingly, by how much the Less indifferent I was thereunto.  
This expression, Great Light in the Understanding, is Metaphorical, and therefore not to be used in Argumentation; And every one, that Doubts not of his Opinion, Pretends such a Light, and has no less a Propension in his Will to Affirm what he doubts not, than He that really and truly knows a Thing. Wherefore this Light may be the cause of Defending and Holding an Opinion Obstinately, but never of knowing an Opinion Truly.  
Moreover not only the Knowledge of Truth, but Blief or Giving Assent, are not the Acts of the Will; for Whatever is proved by strong Arguments, or Credibly told, we Believe whether we will or no.  
'Tis True, To Affirm or Deny Propositions, to Defend or Oppose Propositions, are the Acts of the Will; but it does not from thence Fellow that the Internal Assent depends on the Will. Wherefore the following Conclusion (so that in the abuse of our Freedom of Will that Privation consists which Constitutes Error) is not fully Demonstrated.  

ANSWER.  
'Tis not much matter, Whether this expression, Great Light, be Argumentative or not, so it be explicative, as really it is, For all men know, that by light in the understanding is meant clearness of knowledge, which every one has not, that thinks he has; and this hinders not but this light in the Understanding may be very different from an obstinate Opinion taken up without clear perception.  
But when 'tis here said, That we asse●t to things clearly perceived whether we will of no, 'tis the same, as if it were said, that willing or nilling; we desire Good clearly known; whereas the word Nilling, finds no room in such Expressions, for it implies, that we will and nill the same thing.    

OBJECT. XIV.  
Against the Fifth Meditation. Of the Essence of material things.  
* AS when for Example, I imagine a Triangle, thy perhaps 〈◊〉 a Figure exists no where 〈◊〉 of my thoughts, nor ever will exist, 〈◊〉 Nature thereof is determinate, and its Essence or 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 immutable and eternal, which is 〈◊〉 made by 〈◊〉 no● depends o● my mind, as appears from this, that 〈…〉 be demonstrated of this Triangle.  
If a Triangle be 〈◊〉 where, I understand not how it can 〈◊〉 any Nature, for what is not where, is 〈◊〉, and therefore has not a Being 〈◊〉 any Nature.  
A Triangle on the Mind 〈◊〉 from ● Triangle seen, o● from one made up of what has been seen; but when once we have given the name of a Triangle to a thing (from which we think the Idea of a Triangle arises) though the Triangle itself perish, yet the name continues; In the like manner, when we have once conceived in our thought, That all the Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, and when we have given this other name (viz. Having its three Angles equal to two right ones) to a Triangle, though afterwards there were no such thing in the World, yet the Name would still continue, and this Proposition. A Triangle is a Figure having three Angles equal to two right Ones, would be eternally true. But the Nature of a Triangle will not be eternal if all Triangles were destroyed.  
This Proposition likewise, A Man is an Animal, will be true to Eternity, because the Word Animal will eternally signify what the Word Man signifies; but certainly if Mankind perish, Humane Nature will be no longer.  
From whence 'tis Manifest. That Essence as 'tis distinguished from Existence is nothing more than the 〈◊〉 of Names by this word I●, and therefore Essence without Existence is merely a Fiction of our own; and as the Image of a Man in the Mind is to a Man, so it seems ●ssence is to Existence. Or as this Proposition, Socrates is a Man, is to this, Socrates Is 〈◊〉 Exists, so is the Essence of Socrates to his Existence. Now this Proposition Socrates is a Man, when Socrates does not exist, signifies only the Connection of the Names, and the word Is carries under it the Image of the unity of the thing, which is called by these Two Names.  

ANSWER.  
The Difference between Essence and Existence is known to all Men. And what is here said of Eternal Names instead of Eternal Truth, has been long ago sufficiently rejected.    

OBJECT. XV.  
Against the Sixth Meditation. Of the Existence of Material Being's.  
* ANd seeing God has given me no Faculty to know whether these Ideas proceed from Bodies or not, but rather a strong inclination to believe, that these Ideas are sent from Bodies, I see no reason, why God should not be counted a Deceiver, if these Ideas came from any where, but from Corporeal Being's, and therefore we must conclude that Corporeal Being's exist.  
'Tis a received opinion, that Physicians who deceive their Patients for their Health's sake, and Fathers, who deceive their Children for their Good, are guilty thereby of no Crimes, for the fault or Deceit does not consist in the falsity of Words, but in the Injury done to the Person deceived.  
Let D. Cantes therefore consider whether this Proposition, God can upon no accourt deceive us. Universally taken be true; For if it be not true so universally taken, that Conclusion, Therefore Corporeal Being's exist, will not follow.  

ANSWER.  
'Tis not requisite for the establishment of my Conclusion, That we cannot be deceived on any account (for I willingly granted, that we may be often deceived) but that we cannot be deceived, when that our Error argues that in God there is such a Will to Cheat us as would be contradictious to his Nature. And here again we have a wrong inference in this Objection.    

The Last Objection.  
* FOr now I plainly discover a great difference between them (that is sleep and waking) for my Dreams are never conjoined by my Memory, with the other Actions of my Life.  
I desire to Know, whether it be certain, that a Man dreaming, that the doubts whether he dream or not, may not Dream, that he joins his Dream to the Ideas of things passed long since; if he may, than those Actions of his past life, may be thought as true as if he were awake.  
Moreover because (as D. Cartes affirms) the Certainty and truth of all knowledge depends only on the knowledge of the True God, either an Atheist cannot from the Memory of his past life conclude that he is awake, or else 'tis possible for a man to know that he is awake without the Knowledge of the True God.  

ANSWER.  
A Man that dreams cannot really connect his dreams with the Ideas of past things, though, I confess, he may dream that he so connects them; for whoever deny●d, That a man when he is a sleep may be Deceived? But when he awakens he may easily discover his Error.  
An Atheist from the memory of his past life may collect that he is awake, but he cannot know, that this Sign is sufficient to make him certain, that he is not deceived, unless he know that he is created by a God that will not deceive him.    
FINIS.   

A Catalogue of some Books sold by Benjamin Took a the Ship in St. Paul's Churchyard.  

HEredoti 〈◊〉 Historiarum libri 〈◊〉 ejusdem narra●io 〈◊〉 vita ho●●ri, Gr. Lat. & H. Step● Apologis 〈◊〉 Herodian accesse●●● 〈◊〉 Edition Ch●●●logia Historia, & 〈◊〉 Geographies Herodot●●●, 〈…〉 Lectiones & note ex pluribus M. S. S. ●od. & Antiquis script●ribus collect●, fol. Francisci Suarez. Doct. Theol. Gra●. Trad●tus de Legibus an Deo. Legislature in dece●● libros distrib●tus. fol.  
Thorndicius de Ratione ac I●re 〈…〉 Eccles●●. fol.  
The Holy Court in five Tomes, written in French by N. Causin, translated by Sir T. H. the fourth 〈◊〉. fol.  
The Works of the most Reverend john Bramhal, D. D. late L. Archbishop of Armagh, some of which never before printed, with the life of the Author, etc. fol. The History and Vindication of the Irish Remonstrance against all Calumnies and Censures in several Treatises. falio.  
A Collection of all the Statutes now in use in the Kingdom of Ireland, with Notes in the Margin: And likewise the Acts of Settlement and Explanation, with the rest of the Acts, made in the Reign of his Majesty that now is, to th●●diss●ution of the Parliament, Aug. 16●6. Several ●hyrurgical Treatises 〈◊〉. Wiseman, Sergeant Chirurgeon folio.  
The Primitive Origination of Mankind considered and examined, according to the light of Nature, written by Sir M. Hale, Kt. late Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench. folio.  
Sir Richeses▪ Baker's Chronicle of the Kings of England from the Romans Government to this time.  
Thirty five Sermons by the Right Revere●● R. Sanderson late Lord Bishop of Lincoln▪  
Le Beau ●ledeur, 〈◊〉 Book of Entries containing Declarations, Informations, and other select and approved Plead; with special Verdicts and Dumurrers in most actions real▪ personal, and mixed, which have been arg●ed and adjudged in the Courts of Westminster, 〈◊〉 faithful references to the most authentic Law Books, by Sir Humphrey Winch, Kt. sometimes one of the Justices of the Court of Common Pleas, fol.  
Etymologicon Linguae Anglicanae; seu explicatio vocum Anglicarum Etymologica ex propriis fontibus. Omnia Alphabetico ordine in quinque distinctas Classes digesta. Authore Step. Skinner, M. D. folio.  
A large Dictionary in three Parts by Tho. Holyoake D. D. folio.  
Horae Hebraicae & Talmudicae impensae in Evangelium S. johannis. p. I. Lightfoot. quarto.  
Doctor Brown's Travels in Hungaria, Servia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, etc. As also through a great part of Germany, with Observations on the Mines, Baths, and mineral Waters in those Parts, illustrated with the Figures of some habits and remarkable places. quarto.  
A Representation of the State of Christianity in England, and of its Decay and Danger from Sectaries as well as Papists.  
The Controversial Letters, or the grand Controversy, concerning the pretened authority of Popes and true Sovereign of Kings, in 16 Letters. quarto.  
A True Widow, a Comedy written by T. Shadwel. quarto.  
A Vindication of the sincerity of the Protestant Religion in the point of Obedience to Sovereigns, opposed to the Doctrine of Rebellion authorised and practised by the Pope and the Jesuits, by Peter Du Moulin▪ quarto.  
Phocaena, or the Anatomy of a Porpess dissected at Gresham College, with a Preliminary discourse concerning Anatomy, and a Natural History of Animals. quar.  
Dodwells separation of Churches from Episcopal Government, as practised by the present Nonconformists proved Schismatical from such principles as are least controverted, and do withal most popularly explain the sinfulness and mischief of Schism. quarto.  
— Two Letters of Advice. 1. For the susception of Holy Orders. 2. For Studies Theological, especially such as are rational; at the end of the former is inserted a Catalogue of the Christian Writers, and genuine works of the first three Centuries. octavo.  
— Some Considerations of present Concernment; how far Romanists may be trusted by Princes of another Persuasion. octavo.  
— Two short Discourses against the Romanists 1. An Account of the fundamental Principle of Popery. 2. An Answer to six Queries. twelve.  
Navigation and Commerce their Original and Progress, containing a succinct account of Traffic in general, by john Evelin, Esq octavo.  
Of Gifts and Offices in the public Worship of God, in three parts, endeavouring an impartial account, what was in the inspired Age of the Church, what succeeded in the more ordinary State▪ what reasonably may be allowed in Prayer, singing, and Preaching, by Edw. Wetenhal, D. D, octavo.  
The Catechism of the Church of England with marginal Notes, very plainly setting forth its meaning, and proving the same out of the Scriptures, for the use of Schools by Edw. Wetenhal, D. D.  
Poems and Songs by Tho. Flatman. octa.  
Poems by N. Tat●. octavo.  
The Degrees of Consanguinity affinity described and delineated, by Robert Dixon. D. D. in octavo.  
The French Oardiner 〈…〉 cultivate all sorts of Fruit Trees and 〈◊〉 for the Garden, together with instructions to dry and conserve them, in written in French, and Englished by Io. Evelin, Esq in octavo.  
〈◊〉 Obstaculum; being an Answer to several Queries dispersed in several parts of Glocestershire in octavo.  
S. Gardinerus S. T. P. de Trinitate contra Sandium, in octavo,  
Deus Nobiscum. A Narrative of a great Deliverance at Sea, by W. johnson, D. D. Phaedri Augusti Caesaris Liberti Fabularum Esopiarum Libri V in usum scholarum Angilae. octavo.  
A Short View of the chief points in Controversy between the Reformed Churches, and the Church of Rome, by Dr. Peter Da Moulin, in octavo.  
The Country Parson's advice to this Parishioners in two Parts. 1. Containing a plain and serious Exhortation to a Religious Life. 2. General Directions how to live accordingly. in octavo.   
FINIS.