A DIALOGUE AT OXFORD Between A TUTOR AND A GENTLEMAN, Formerly his PUPIL, Concerning Government.  
LONDON, Printed for Rich. Janaway, in Queens-Head Alley in Paternoster Row. 1681.   

A DIALOGUE AT OXFORD Between A TUTOR and a GENTLEMAN, Formerly his PUPIL.  Tutor. 
MY Dear Pupil, you are welcome to Oxford, I am glad to see you remember your old Friends, and hope you have not forgot those excellent Principles you learned from your careful Mother the University.  Pupil. 
Sir, I can never forget my Friends, nor would willingly act contrary to such Principles as would be for their Service, and the general good of Mankind.  Tu. 
Hum! that's well said, if it be well intended; but I do not know what to make of that expression; for methinks the good of Mankind sounds a little oddly in these Factious and Seditious Times, and I am a little jealous, that the Coffeehouses and Clubs in London, have taught you to speak another sort of Language than you did here in the University.  Pu. 
I must confess, when I left Oxford, I presently lost the Art of disputing about words, but I'll assure you Sir, I really intent what I speak.  Tu. 
Prithee then speak plain English, and tell me that you are for the King, and the Church, and let your Mankind alone.  Pu. 
Sir, I am very much for the King and the Church, and a little also for the Rest of the People; for if I should dispose of them out of the way, the Prince might call me to Account for his Subjects, and you for your hearers.  Tu. 
You know my meaning well enough; Are you for the Prerogative and Government in Church and State? As for the People, it's their business to obey their Superiors, to pay their Tithes, and their Taxes; and, if occasion be, to Fight for the Glory and Honour of their Prince, and the Church of England.  Pu. 
And is this all that comes to their share? Indeed a very conscionable Reckoning; but I have no mind to disturb you at present, and therefore shall only tell you, that I am hearty for the Prerogative and Government as by Law Established.  Tu. 
As by Law Established; why, there's a Dry Bob again; What if there was no Law?  Pu. 
Then there would be no Transgression.  Tu. 
I say, Suppose there were no common or Statute Laws, (as you call them) yet Government ought to be submitted to as its the Ordinance of God, and of Divine Right, and consequently Obedience to our Governors is due from us, on pain of Damnation, without the help of an Act of Parliament.  Pu. 
Nay Tutor! if we must discourse of these matters, pray let's sit down and do it soberly; I will allow you that Government in general is the Ordinance of God, and of Divine Right, for without it, there could be no such things, as humane Societies in the World, which makes St. Paul in the 13th to the Romans, affirm as much of all Powers, none excepted, but then as to the kinds or different species of Government, God Almighty has left no standing Ordinance, whereby to prefer or command one kind above another, and its absurd to think he should, except we do Imagine that there ought to be exactly the same frame of Government throughout the whole World, notwithstanding the variety and difference, of Climates, of Interests and Inclinations of People in particular Nations, and that all, who differ from us in their Policies, (as all do more or less) do therein violate God's Ordinance, which is equally ridiculous and uncharitable. Therefore the particular kinds of Government, must have another and lower Fountain to flow from, which can be no other than humane. In short, the higher Power or Magistracy itself, is God's Ordinance, that it Resides in one or more, in this or that Family, in such or such a way, is purely from humane designment; which I conceive to be St. Peter's meaning, when he calls Magistracy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, humane Creature: St. Paul calls it God's Ordinance, because the Power is from God: St. Peter calls it humane, because the specification of it to this or that Form, is from the Societies of Mankind. And by this time Good Tutor, I suppose you perceive, that were it not for the particular Laws and Customs of England, your Jus Divinum would go near to leave our best Friends in the lurch; for though we should all agree, there ought to be a Government, yet it's two to one we should not agree, whom, in what, and how far to Obey. If you have any thing to object, pray let me hear it; for I would neither lead, nor be led into the least Error in things of so high Concernment.  Tu. 
My dear Pupil, we are now under the Rose, and you shall be my Confessor, what you say, seems highly rational, but to tell you the truth, we seldom trouble our heads with things of this nature, foreseeing that an unlimited and naked Jus Divinum, is much more for our ease and convenience, and if it would but go down with the People, we promise ourselves from it all the effects of whatsoever Policy.  Pu. 
To the honesty of such dealing I shall say nothing, nor can I deny, but such a civil Superstition, would for some time at least, mightily advance that Order of men that managed it, and qualify them for the same Grandeur and Power under all changes of Government; but certainly it leaves the rest of the Community, both Magistrates and People, in a most precarious and miserable Condition; for though Magistracy be God's Ordinance, yet if you lay aside the particular Laws of the Country which determine it, the Exercise of it is no more confined to one man or Family than another, and whoever happens to get the Power, by your Rule would have the Right, and so you make no difference between an Usurper and a lawful Prince, and equally oblige the People in Obedience to the one as to the other, a Doctrine odious to all good Subjects.  Tu. 
Pray Sir is there no such thing as a Right of Conquest, and are no People bound in Conscience to obey him that has that Title?  Pu. 
I will not put you out of Countenance, by applying your Question to a case that happened within our own memory, but shall rather desire you to consider how its possible for force alone, to create a better Title over public Societies, than it would do in the case of each private man? Suppose then a Stronger man meets me, and violently throws me upon the ground, is it not lawful for me to rise again without ask him leave? ay and to trip up his heels too, whenever I see my opportunity. Apply this to public matters, and then tell me, whether your mighty Conqueror be not in a hopefal condition, when Millions of men shall be at perfect Liberty to shake off his Yoke, whenever they can take him at an advantage. And so long as nothing but bare force obliges men to a submission, so long will a Right of discharging themselves of that force continue in the People to the end of the Chapter. But where the People are not bound by contract to any other Lawful Prince, it's then in their choice, whether they will come into a moral Condition of Subjection to the Conqueror or no: If they will not, they die or remain a Free People as to any moral Obligation. But if on the one side the People be unwilling any longer to suffer the miseries they are under, or have no Ability to make resistance, and the Conqueror on the other side, finds his forceable Dominion over them insecure and uneasy, I say, if upon such Considerations as these, they mutually agree upon a Contract and Composition of Rule and Subjection upon such and such terms, the Conqueror now has lost that name, and his Government thenceforward must be such, as the fundamental Contract makes it to be, and the Rightful Dominion in the Prince, and Duty of Subjection in the People, will be so stated and limited, as was concluded upon in the Original Agreement. And I am persuaded it will appear an uncontrollable Truth in Policy, that the Consent of a People, either by themselves, or their Ancestors, is the only means (without special Revelation) whereby Magistracy is conferred on any Person or Family; neither can God's Ordinance be conveyed, and People engaged in Conscience any other way.  Tu. 
I confess, I now begin to think that the Communities of Mankind, have more to do in these matters than I was ware of; and it's more than probable that all Government whatever is very much for their sakes.  Pu. 
To me it seems plain, That the Common Good of Humane Societies, is the First and Last End of all Government; for nulla potestas datur ad malum; so in effect says St. Paul, in the 13th. to the Romans (speaking of Rulers) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, He is the Minister of God to thee for good. And Salus Populi, etc. has often been frowned upon, but never answered. And whoever shall Affirm, that the Absolute Monarchies in Asia, the many limited one's in Europe, together with multitudes of Aristocracies and Commonwealths now extant in the world, were constituted by God Almighty, purely out of a partial Regard to those Persons and Families (inconsiderable in the number to the Rest of Mankind) to whom the Administration of those Powers is committed, I believe he will find Few of his mind, and not many that can debase themselves to so mean a Flattery as to own so senseless a position.  Tu. 
You have satisfied me, that only Government in general is of Divine Right, and that the particular Forms and Limitations of it are from humane Compact, pray now inform me how you suppose our Government here in England first began, and particularly what you think to be the Form and Essence of it, whereby it differs from that of other Nations.  Pu. 
Now you put it hard upon me Tutor, and I dare not undertake to give you full Satisfaction in so thoughtful a matter, but you shall have more than my Guests. And how I cannot choose but own the Goodness of Almighty God, in the Architecture of our Government, whereof I do declare myself so great an admiror, that whatever more than humane Wisdom had the contrivance of it, whether done at once, or by degrees found out and perfected, I conceive it unparallelled for exactness of true Policy, in the whole world; Such care for the Authority of the Monarch; such provision for the Liberty and Property of the People, and that one may be justly allayed, the other upheld, and yet consist without Impeachment of each other, that I wonder how our forefathers in those esteemed rude and unpolisht times, could ever attain to such an accurate Composure.  
First then, Suppose a People compelled to it by the necessity of Conquest, or agreeing to it by free consent, Nobles and Commons setting over themselves, by public compact, one chief Magistrate, and resigning up themselves to him and his Heirs, to be governed by such and such fundamental Laws, whereby the chief Magistrates power is radically limited to one legal course of exercise.  
Secondly, Because in all Governments after-causes will arise, not within the prospect of humane foresight, requiring additional Laws, pro re natâ; and also because the original frame itself may in some cases stand in need of an Authentic Interpretation, or would of course and by degrees moulder away and decay, if not carefully repaired and looked after; suppose them therefore covenanting with their Prince, that (if there be occasion in order to any of the aforesaid purposes) there should be conventions of all degrees of men amongst them, to provide suitable remedies and expedients for all the several exigencies and diseases of the State; and if at any time there should be need of new Laws, that the Prince himself should not have the sole power of making them, but they reserve at first (or afterwards it's granted them, which is all one) an hand of concurrence therein, and that they will be bound by no Laws but what they join with him in the making of.  
Thirdly, Because, though the Nobles may personally convene, yet the Commons, being so many, cannot all of them come together; it's therefore agreed, that each County and Corporation shall have power to depute some particular persons to be instead of the whole, that so the Nobles being present in person, the Commons by their Deputies, there may be representatively the whole body of the Kingdom, having Commission by the original constitution to make new Laws, or to guard and repair the old ones.  
Fourthly, Because the causes of their meeting would not be constant and perpetual, they therefore did not form these Estates to be constantly existent, but occasionally, yet intentionally, and virtually provided for their meeting whenever there should be occasion.  
Fifthly, Because a Monarchy was intended, therefore as great power (as was consistent with other parts of the Government) was invested in the Prince, in order to his better discharging the executive part of the Law; and conculding, that he who was to govern by Law, and for the furtherance of whose Government for the good of the people, the new Laws were to be made, would thereby be engaged to see the convention of these Estates take place, as of right it ought to do whenever there is occasion; they therefore aptly placed the formal part of nominating the time of Convention in the executive Power, to be made use of as the reason of its being lodged there should require.  
Sixthly, It being found by experience in process of time, that Princes not caring to have the maladministration of their Ministers looked into, or to have any power in act but their own, did therefore take advantage of this their nomination of time when the Estates should meet, and made use of it seldomer than need required (an inconvenience, which had it not been provided for, would have beaten down the Government at once, and utterly defaced the whole frame of the Constitution); to prevent which, that Tacit principle of having frequent Parliaments, was literally explained by subsequent Statutes made in the time of Edward the 3d, and ascertained to the having Annual ones.  
And now Sir! when you have made all these suppositions in your mind, I am confident you have very much of the model and platform of our Government.  Tu. 
If this he our Constitution, I cannot wonder at your being so much in love with it; for certainly it provides for all Interests with the greatest Justice and Equity in the world; and to me it seems evident, that though the convocating the Estates, and bringing them into existence, has such a formal dependence on the King's Writ, as you have declared; yet existing, and when convocated, they work by an innate Authority, and by the privileges of their original Institution, their Acts then being not Commissionated like those of other Courts, but proceeding in conjunction with the Kings, which makes me the better understand that usual clause in our Acts of Parliament which tells us, that such and such a thing is enacted, etc. not only by and with the advice of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons in Parliament Assembled, but also by the Authority of the same— But you'll say, I ought not to comment upon a Text I have learned so lately— therefore pray proceed, for I cannot doubt but you have yet more to say upon this Subject.  Pu. 
What would you have more? does not this Scheme of our Government give you full satisfaction?  Tu. 
By no means, Sir! except it includes something that is not literally expressed; for though our Ancestors have taken care, that there shall be frequent meetings of the Estates, yet if they have not provided for the continuance of their Sessions when met, that so their coming together may possibly answer its end, what does all the rest signify? and therefore pray tell me your opinion in that point.  Pu. 
Nay, hold a blow there, good Tutor! I had rather you had asked me all the hard questions in Euclid; not so much for any difficulty in the solution, as because it's an ill time of the year to discourse of such matters; therefore I think we had best stop here— And yet I find I am a little like Sir Martin, now my hand is in, I can't forbear fumbling with the strings, though I don't care to play out; wherefore I will not promise you an Answer: but when I have said what I think convenient, if you please you may give yourself one.— there are wise and learned men (and who upon a good occasion may be spoke with) that do conceive there is a Statute made in the time of Richard the Second, 
See the Statute verbatim, with the Clause Roll.  and now in being, though not in Print, which provides, that no Parliament shall be dismissed till all the Petitions are answered, which I think comes home to the point; Bills in those days, many times appearing in the form of Petitions: as not long since we had an excellent Law made, called the Petition of Right, subsequent to this Statute: and particularly in the Reigns of Henry the 4th, Henry the 5th, and Henry the 6th, it was usual for Proclamations to be made in Westminster-Hall before the end of every Sessions, that all those that had any matter to present to the Parliament, should bring it in by such a day; for otherwise the Parliament at that day would determine. And all this being bare matter of fact, there can be no other Question about it, but whether it be so or no.  
But for discourse sake, Let's suppose this Statute, and subsequent practice all out of doors, and that there is no memorial of Record extant of any such matter, and then it will be impossible in this or any other like case, to make a true Judgement, without having recourse to some fixed and standing Rule, which (in matters of Government, where positive Laws are silent) can be no other than the fundamental Architecture, and original frame of the Constitution, some particulars whereof relating to our present discourse, I must be forced to call over again upon this occasion: you must mind then, that our wisaes Ancestors in modelling our Government, had not only an eye to the Power and Authority of the Monarch, but also to the Liberties and Properties of the People (things easily consisting in themselves, and mutually aiding and assisting each other) and foreseeing that the most exact prudence could not make particular provision for all occurrences that might happen, and that if time (that great Innovator, as the Lord Bacon calls it) would of course, and knavery, and folly (by their influence) by degrees make things worse and worse; and if wisdom and counsel were not as constantly watchful to make them better and better, the best founded Government in the world must in tract of time infallibly come to ruin; they therefore laid it as the Basis of our Policy, that there should be frequent meetings of the States, to supply all defects, and stop up all Crannies, or violent Fractions, as they should happen, to the prejudice of the original Constitution. In the next place, consider what part the Monarch was to bear in these Conventions, not to have a sole power, but to go in conjunction with the Nobles and Commons, all acting by the principles and authority of the first Institution: and what that Learned Prince, King Charles the 1st, says of Royal Power in general, may be well applied to it in this particular, viz. the Law is the measure of the King's Power: and if it be the measure of it, then is the Power limited by it; and the fundamental Law saying, There shall be Conventions of the Estates, to encounter and provide against public and destructive mischiefs whenever they happen; By necessary consequence, a time for them to meet, and a convenient time of sitting to do something when they are met, are included, according to the known Rule in your Schools,— He that commands a thing to be done, does with the same breath command all such circumstances, as without which the thing commanded cannot take effect. And indeed common reason speaks the same: and because time of meeting, and a convenient time of sitting, are necessary to the very ends and beings of Parliaments, therefore must the Execution, or bringing them into Act, be lodged somewhere; and though with the best Decorum and convenience, it fell to the share of the chief Magistrate to be entrusted with the honorary and formal part of Summoning and pronouncing the Dissolutions of Parliaments, yet the Law (which is his rule as well as ours) has plainly enough determined how, and when he shall do it.  
In the last place, the design and wisdom of the first Architects of our Government, is very apparent, in contriving a Monarchy in the Prince, mixed with Aristocracy in the House of Peers, and Democracy in the House of Commons, whereby all the advantages were secured, and inconveniences avoided, which are ordinarily to be found in simple and uncompounded States: for here is a single person endued with a sufficiency of Power for Dispatch, and to discharge the executive part, without danger of a long lasting Tyranny; many Councillors (in whom the Scripture says there's safety) Nobles and Commons, coming from all quarters of the Land, as eye-witnesses of the several Exigencies of the State, and tied up to all imaginable sincerity by their own interest; I say, the Prince has these to assist and join with him in the Deliberative and Legislative part, without danger of ambitious Factions, too frequent in simple Aristocracies; or disordered confusion, which many times happen in simple Democracies: each of these Estates by the wisdom of our Government moderating and restraining from excess the Power of the other. Now therefore whatever shall destroy this Coalition and Mixture, and place the whole balance of all things in any one of the Powers, can you think it warranted by the Policy of our Constitution? And whether a single Power choosing whether ever a Parliament shall sit or no; or if assembled, whether it shall continue a convenient time to do any thing or no, does not amount to as much, is highly worth your consideration.  Tu. 
I remember you told me, that Statutes have been made for the Annual sitting of Parliaments; suppose that heretofore those Laws were literally put into execution for several years successively— Writs went out at the day, the Counties and Corporations (thinking to build up a Sanctuary for their hopes and fears) cheerfully neglected their Seeds-time and harvest, and with great charge and trouble made their Elections, the elected members left their Families and Estates behind them, and made long pilgrimages in order to attend upon the public Service; but had scarce ever time to pull off their boots, before they were dismissed again by a Prorogation or Dissolution; would the true intent of those Statutes be thus satisfied? And did the Legislators intent nothing more by them, than that the Lords and Commons should have an opportunity of coming up to the Parliament-house purely for the sake of going down again?  Pu. 
Upon my word Tutor you are finely come on in a little time; me thinks you begin to speak warmly of these matters: but a little excess of zeal is natural to a new convert: or is it because your Pupils are all gone into the Country, whereas a walk to Heddington, or Shotover hill, might have served the turn, as things fell out afterwards. Had a Towns-man made such remarks, I should have thought the cold meat stuck upon his hands, and that he had been out of humour for the loss of his Boarders. But however the case be with you, good Tutor have a care of extremes, and by way of Antidote, let me advise you, to resume your old temper a little, though it be but for discourse-sake and let's hear how you use to comfort yourselves upon such an occasion.  Tu. 
Very well Sir! I'm very glad you can be so merry; and though your discourse has made a greater impression upon me than you are ware of, yet for once I'll comply with your humour, and tell you what we generally say in vindication of the late and former Dissolutions. To begin therefore with the last Parliament but one; did it not open with all imaginable expressions of grace and favour from the King, that any good Subject could desire, either for the preservation of Religion, his liberty and property at home, or for supporting our Neighbours and Allies abroad? nay, did not the King invite the Houses to use all means for their security (excepting only the matter of the Succession) and when in order to these ends, and for the preservation of Tangier a supply was asked, not one penny would be granted.  Pu. 
I have heard of some general Acts of Pardon, that at first sight make a great show of Grace and Indemnity, but when a Transgressor comes to look over the exceptions, he is commonly bilked in his expectations; and you would do well to consider, whether the preferring the ordinary course of Succession to the security of Religion, etc. be not much of the same nature; and I would willingly learn how it's possible for a zealous Papist to be a good Defender of the Protestant Faith; but I reserve myself in this point till you give me farther occasion. As to other matters, pray Sir consider, that we have long laboured under a damnable Popish Plot, and that from Coleman's Papers, and what witnesses have sworn, it plainly appears that the Conspirators do chief rely upon the French King for the carrying it on to effect. Now Tutor! Money is a real thing, and will certainly do either good or hurt, expressions may do neither; and by Parliament-calculation (which by the way I think more authentic than the Cabals) we can tell the time when a great sum of money raised to supply extraordinary occasions, was employed to make war upon a Protestant State, and to advance the Interest of this same French King; and that another round sum was given for making an Actual War with France, and yet I have not heard of many men lost in the quarrel; I am sure the than Treasurer D. must needs think the Monsieur a very sweet-natured Gentleman, that was likely to lend a vast Treasure to his Enemies Flagrante Bello. Therefore pray let's not run too hard upon the House of Commons, now we know they cannot speak for themselves; for it's two to one but they saw cause to take care of old England, before they could come to provide for that hopeful Nursery at Tangier; and to make ourselves stand firm at home, before they could hope to support our Friends abroad.  Tu. 
I don't well understand you; but I say, instead of giving the King money, they plied him with strange Addresses, some say rather like Remonstrances than Answers to his demands, which no man could think would be as currant as money, nor likely to give the King half so much satisfaction.  Pu. 
Really Tutor, if by the Constitution of our Government, a Parliament had only been designed to be a Conduit-Pipe for the People's purses to run out at, your last Objection would be unanswerable, but as the case stands, they are to give the King Advice as well as Money; ay and to make that Advice Authoritative and obligatory to the People. And though it's certainly the Duty of all good Subjects, to consult the King's pleasure in all things that are really for his Service and the common good of the Nation, yet under Favour I think the house of Commons (having a Fundamental share in the legislative part, & Guardianship of the Government) are bound in Conscience to make the public good their chiefest aim, and if for that end they were forced modestly to remember the surreptitious gaining of Orders for the continuance of Popish Officers, the procuring new Commissions for known Papists, the assassinating of some, & procuring the turning out of other Protestant Magistrates for doing their duties, the corrupting of Witnesses, and forging fatal crimes against Protestant Dissenters, the pressing and Admission of the Romish Religion upon a Protestant State, by persons under a public Character from England; and as the Sum of all, A popish Influence upon the continuance or Prorogations of Parliaments. And all this even during the malignity and hellish operation of a Popish Plot upon us. I say I cannot see, how the necessary remembrance of these things (especially when done with all possible decency and respect to the King) should deserve an hard thought, or jealous and suspected name, except you do believe, that our Lay-Title to our own throats, aught to give way to the Jus Divinum of the Papists.  Tu. 
Well! but were there not Arbitrary Orders made, for taking Persons into Custody, for matters that had no Relation to privileges of Parliament, and strange illegal Votes, declaring divers eminent persons to be enemies to the State, without process of Law, or hearing their defence, or having any proofs made against them.  Pu. 
I think it's agreed on all hands, that the House of Commons have Power to commit and censure such as shall offer any Violence or Injury but to one of their moenial Servants; so tender is the genius of our Government, of the Privileges of Parliament, that it puts the punishment of so small and remote an offence as this into their own hands, without having Recourse to the ordinary Courts of Justice: And can you imagine, that they have not authority to punish Crimes, that strike at the very Root and Being of Parliaments themselves? And whether obstructing, violating and abhorring our undoubted Rights of Petitioning for a Parliament (at a time when, if ever, there was need of one) did not directly look that way, I will leave it to yourself to judge.  
And as to the illegal Votes (as you are pleased to call them) against some eminent Persons, etc. I pray God those eminent persons themselves have not drawn you in to such an Objection; for pray Sir how shall it be tried, whether a Vote of either House be Legal or Illegal in the course of it? Certainly by nothing but the Law and Course of Parliaments, which under Favour, I think cannot be determined, designed, or judged of by any other Court or Person out of Parliament whatever. And if it should, there would be a Circulation in our Policy, public Justice would run in a wheel, and no cause whatever of this nature could receive a final and ultimate determination, which I take to be more than an Answer to all your Objections. Besides in this particular case, the House of Commons declared their Opinion of these great men, in order to farther proceed, had they had time, and herein their Vote was but a Groundwork for an Impeachment, which would regularly have brought their Opinion into Judgement, and I would willingly hear a reason, why this first step of the Process might not be made without foreign proof, the House of Commons, in cases of Impeachment being in nature of a Grand-Jury of the Kingdom, which may have a self Evidence, and present and proceed upon matters within their own Knowledge.  Tu. 
But what can you say to the Votes against Anticipations of the Revenue?  Pu. 
Much more than I think fit to say at present, and therefore I shall only put you in mind of the real War with Holland, and statute War with France, and desire you to consider what Mr. Coleman says upon this Subject, as to the Occasions of our having or not having Parliaments: But pray Tutor remember, that you have tied yourself up to urge all these things, as causes of the Dissolutions, and I will appeal to all men of Conversation then in London, whether the succeeding Dissolution was not generally discoursed of, and believed through the whole Town, before the passing those Votes, which were chief intended (as an Argument) to persuade the sitting of a Parliament, during the Distress and Hazards of the Kingdom.  Tu. 
But how can you justify their Votes, against putting the penal Laws in Execution against the Protestant Dissenters, whenas the Judges are bound by their Oaths to execute the Laws, did they not hereby assume to themselves a Power of suspending Acts of Parliament?  Pu. 
Very well Sir! by this, and by Dangerfield's Evidence I dare lay Eight Pounds a Week, I can spell out your meaning, And—  Tu. 
Why, how now Pupil, sure you don't think I'm in Earnest.  Pu. 
I know it, and yet the bare mentioning such an Objection, during our present circumstances: does naturally make me a little serious; and therefore pray consider that the sole End of all our Laws, is the public good, which chief consists in the Enjoyment and Preservation of our Government, our Religion and Properties, and that there has been, and yet is an hellish and damnable Plot contrived, and carried on by Papists for the subversion of them all. If then it does appear the Protestant Dissenters are a numerous Party in the Nation, and have all along made Head against the Conspirators to the Envy of their Neighbours, and testified their zeal to the Protestant Religion and Detestation of the Plot, at least equally to any other sort of men (for the truth of which, I dare appeal to the Common Ingenuity of all sober Churchmen, and to the malice of the Conspirators themselves, who have put a particular mark of Honour upon their Integrity, by forging Shame plots and suborning false Witnesses against them) I say if this be their case, where then is their Crime, or rather how great was the wisdom, I had almost said Gratitude, of the House of Commons in Voting— That it is their Opinion, that the prosecuting Protestant Dissenters upon the penal Statutes, is at this time grievous to the Subject, an Encouragement to Popery, and Dangerous to the Peace of the Kingdom. And we all know, that most of these cutting Laws, were either new made, or scoured up and furbished at a time when it was natural to pass from one extreme to another; but however the Reason of a Law ceasing, is virtually a Repeal of the Law itself, & yet the House of Commons were so modest as barely to declare their Opinion pro Tempore, till a legal Provision might be made for Protestant Dissenters in a Regular and Formal way: its plain they did not pretend by their single Vote to alter the Laws, for if they had, why then did they bring in a Bill for Repealing the 35th of Elizabeth, which passing both Houses, was afterwards carefully lost, lest so precious a Jewel might be wanting upon occasion? But if State-Oaths do critically oblige all that have taken them, officiously to execute whatever Laws are in being, and at all times, without any regard to the good or evil that may ensue. I can neither see how Proclamations to put particular Laws in Execution came first in use, nor sufficiently admire the good Fortune of persons Reconciled to the Church of Rome, and of English Priests and Jesuits amongst so many Laws that call them Traitors.  Tu. 
No more of that I beseech you; let's now come to the short Lived Parliament here at Oxford, at the beginning of which, the Houses were Advised, to make the Laws of the Land their Rule, as the King was Resolved they should be His; and Liberty was given them to put the Administration of the Government into protestant hands, in case the Crown should deseend upon a Popish Prince; and yet the Commons could not forbear falling upon the Succession, though the King had told them his pleasure in that matter beforehand.  Pu. 
If Parliaments in their Legislative capacity, were so Tied up to the Laws in being, as not to have power to Repeal any Old, or make any New ones, how came we to have any Acts of Parliament at all? or how could they provide suitable Remedies for the Occurrences that happen in every Age, which was one main end of their Institution? It's true indeed, the executive power of the King is Restrained to Laws already made, as is evident Vi Termini; for there cannot be an execution of what has not an Actual Existence, and I am confident this Legal course will at long Run be most for His Majesty's service, whatever some Bankers may have suggested to the contrary, since the shutting up of the Exchequer. As to the matter of the Succession, I shall say the less, because more has been said already both within and without doors, than any one hitherto has been pleased to answer; and if upon just grounds, the Parliament has power in a Legislative way, to Attaint any Subject whatsoever of Treason (which cuts off the Man and Inheritance at one blow) their mercy sure in sparing you Life, cannot be thought an excess of their power; and that the D. T. succeeding to the Crown in an ordinary way, is inconsistent with the welfare of the Nation, is even confessed by the Opposers of the Bill, by their pretending to an Expedient, which as it was proposed, in my poor Opinion, is the greatest Riddle in the world. For the giving a solitary and empty Name of King to one man, and placing the Execution of the Kingly Power in the hands of another, does not only divide the Office from the person, and consequently Revive that decrved distinction, between the Natural and Politic Capacity, but strikes at the very Being of Monarchy itself. For if the naked Style and Title of a King, will satisfy the Notion of being a Monarch, and all the Authority and Power may be translated to one other hand, by consequence they may to more than one, or to many hands, whereby you may have a Monarchy in Name, but in Effect and Reality an Aristocracy or Commonwealth, and so the Expedient becomes Felo de se, and supplants that Government it pretends to support.  Tu. 
Alas poor Monsieur Expedient! why, hark you Pupil, a By-stander would think you hired me to make objections on purpose that you might answer them; but what say you to the business of Fitz Harris, and disagreement of the Houses about it?  Pu. 
Ay, the business of Fitz Harris, Tutor! hinc illae Lachrimae, now you touch a sore part indeed, which gives me just occasion to observe and adore the boundless mercy and goodness of Almighty God, not only in giving warning to this sinful and ingrateful Nation, of a Damnable Popish Plot against it, but also in carrying on the Discovery from Time to Time, to the conviction of Infidelity itself, and eternal Reproach of all that Power and Artifice, that have been made use of to conceal and suppress it. And now at last in this business of Fitz Harris, we have (as it were) one Risen from the Dead, to Preach Belief to Infidels. A known Papist comes in, and tells us he can no longer bear the Burden of his own Guilty Knowledge, and is therefore forced to confess, that what the Protestant Witnesses have said, is True, and that Sir Edmund Eury Godfrey was Murdered by Papists. That the Dutch War, and Black heath Army had an ill aspect upon the Protestant Interest: He tells us of great preparations of men and money in Foreign parts, to carry on this cursed Design: And that Ambassadors from abroad, and Persons of the first Rank of Subjects here at home, are engaged in the Conspiracy; and who knows but a prudent management of such a Witness, might produce a Discovery of yet higher Importance; therefore the House of Commons thought fit to take the Cause of Fitz Harris into their own hands, and to be Eye-witnesses of his Innocency or Gild, as to the Crimes objected against him, that so they might satisfy themselves, and all the world, in the matter of his Evidence. And if such a Cause as this (during our present Circumstances) be not fit to be heard in the Highest Judicatory of the Nation, I shall despair of ever hearing of any that will not be too little for its cognizance. As to the Debitum Justitiae, or Right of the Matter, I shall say the less, because some of the Noble Lords themselves in their late Protestation, have said so much on the Commons side. But pray consider that the Lords were first in the disagreement; for they Rejected the Impeachment, without any previous Conference to give or receive any Reasons (which manner of proceeding in common conversation, is very unusual amongst good Neighbours) and what followed after in the House of Commons, I conceive did not in the least exclude them from giving or receiving satisfaction in the matter in difference, but rather made way for a Conference in order to it; the good effects whereof would no doubt have been suitable to the wisdom of both Houses, had they continued longer together.  
And now good Tutor, if this be all you have to object, I hope you will not take Advantage of the Dead, nor make the Venerable Ghost of an House of Commons stand up in a Sheet, and do Penance in your Churches.  
FINIS.