AN ANSWER TO A PRINTED BOOK, ENTITLED, OBSERVATIONS UPON SOME OF HIS MAJESTY'S LATE ANSWERS and Expresses.  
Printed by His MAJESTY'S Command AT OXFORD, By LEONARD LICHFIELD, Printer to the University. 1642.   


AN ANSWER TO A PRINTED BOOK, ENTITLED, OBSERVATIONS Upon some of His MAJESTY'S late Answers and Expresses.  
IN this discourse concerning Regal authority, it is needless to waste time in declaring the original; since it is granted to be at least mediately from God. Who intending the good of mankind, which was not to be obtained without preservation of order, hath therefore commanded all to be subject to the laws of society, not only for wrath, but for conscience sake: not only whilst they enjoy the benefit of Governors, but likewise whilst they do suffer under some accidental abuses. The reason of which obligation may be this: we cannot reap the constant fruits of an established policy, unless by compact we submit ourselves to some possible inconveniences.  
Hence it follows, after a people hath by solemn contract devested itself of that power, which was primarily in them, they cannot upon what pretence soever, without manifest breach of divine ordinance, and violation of public faith, resume that authority, which they have placed in another; to the end that being united in one, it may thence receive strength, & be enabled to protect all, as also to prevent those fatal divisions which attend multitudes endued with equal power, where almost every one upon real or fancied injuries undertakes to right himself, and although before positive constitution this is not absolutely unjust, yet reason informs us it is most fit by some agreement to part with this native right in consideration of greater good, and prevention of greater evils which will ensue, and to restrain ourselves from being judges in our own cause.  
It follows moreover, though the people should conceive they might live more happily, if the King's prerogative were more bounded, his revenues diminished (and it is no hard matter to persuade them to think so, to effect this, wants not so much rhetoric, as malice, since what is taken from the King, turns to their present profit, though they ofttimes dear pay for it, by disabling their King to provide for their security) it were high sin to entrench upon his rights. For hereby they loosen the very sinews of government, by receding from that compact, which crafty men (out of their own private interests) persuade them they might have made more advantageous.  
It doth no way prejudice Regal authority, that God is the author of Aristocratical, he may add democratical power also. If these were not lawful forms of government, their execution of judgement would be sin, and whilst they punish, they would commit murder. Yet in these kinds, we may observe more or less perfection, according to the aptness they bear to those ends which States aim at, which are safety and plenty. To have riches, and not be able to defend them, is to expose ourselves as a prey; to be safe, and poor, is to be securely miserable. Besides, if we had leisure to look back to the Original of Governments, we might find that God was the immediate donor of Regal power, whereas other forms refer to him, only as confirming the people's Act. This the Author cunningly dissembles, and therefore (treading in the steps of Mariana and Buchanan, sworn enemies to Monarchy) he presents us with I know not what rude multitudes, living without laws, without government, till such time, as out of the sense of their sufferings, which evidently proceeded from this want, they were enforced to fly to such remedies. However this fancy might pass for currant among such heathen Politicians as were ignorant of the original of the world, & dreamt that the first men were bred as Infects, out of the mud of the earth: whence that frequent mention in their writings of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Aborigenes; yet we, who are satisfied with the history of the creation, cannot imagine, that Anarchy was before a regulated Government, and that God who had digested one Chaos into order, should leave the most noble creatures in a worse confusion: unless we will deny to Adam, either that power or providence, which is natural and ordinary in a father over his children; and granted by this observer, pag. 18. to be more than the King can challenge over his people. We find in this infancy of the world, upon the multiplying of mankind, Colonies were sent out, and a City was built by Cain. Those long lived Patriarches had this advantage, by begetting a numerous posterity, they might people a Nation out of their own loins, and be saluted Patres patriae without a metaphor; the same being their subjects and their children. In relation to this, it was properly said by the Ancients, a Kingdom was but a larger family; Aristotle tells us, a Regal power belonged to the Paterfamilias, and accordingly Homer 
I. 1. pol. c. 8. Odyss●●  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. So that it was then no more possible in right for such a people to choose their rulers, then to choose their Fathers. Thus Regal power sprang first from Paternal, and Trogus made a truer observation than this author, when he said, Principio rerum (as well as gentium, nationumque) imperium penes reges erat. And therefore may challenge more from God, & nature, than other forms of government; and certainly it hath received larger eulogies from God in Scripture, than any other can pretend to. To say nothing of the Kings of Israel, who are confessed by the adversary to be of divine institution; very heathen Monarches are acknowledged by God himself to be no less. Where he calls Nebuchadrezzar his servant. jer. 43.10. and Cyrus his anointed. Es. 45.1. Notwithstanding this, to the end I may give the clearest satisfaction, I have thought it fit not to take advantage from the excellency of Monarchy, whether in regard to its antiquity (as being not much younger than man himself) or the several commodities thereof. For the truth is, it were no excuse for such endeavours of innovation, were it the most imperfect government.  
I shall therefore take into consideration this Author's grounds in the method they lie, upon which he would overthrow so ancient and well founded a monarchy.  
His first exception is; The King attributeth the original of his Royalty to God and the Law, making no mention of the grant, consent, or trust of man therein.] A groundless cavil; when God is first named, under what notion can be apprehended Law, but as an agreement of the people, deriving their power, and committing the Kingdom to his trust? within few lines he confutes himself, telling us, that Law which the King mentioneth, is not to be understood, to be any special ordinance sent from heaven by the ministry of Angels, or Prophets, (as amongst the jews it sometimes was) It can be nothing else amongst Christians but the pactions and agreements of such and such politic corporations] if so, he might have spared this observation.  
That Dominion which is usurped, and not just, yet whilst it remains dominion, and till it be legally again devested, refers to God, as to its author, and donor, as much as that, which is haereditary.] Usurpation & unjust dominion can give no right to the possessor; he that loses a kingdom by force may recover it by the same title. So Athalia in the seventh year of her reign was slain by the command of jehoida, and Joash, anointed King, 
2. King. 11.  and restored to his right. He must again answer himself. pag. 3. he tells us, Neither can the right of conquest be pleaded to acquit Princes etc. for mere force cannot alter the course of nature, or frustrate the tenor of law; and if it could, there were more reason why the people might justify force to regain due liberty, than the Prince might to subvert the same. And 'tis a shameful stupidity in any man to think, that our Ancestors did not fight more nobly for their free customs and laws, of which the conqueror and his successors had in part disinherited them by violence and perjury, than they which put them to such conflicts. Is it not a clear contradiction to say that God is the author, and Donor of Dominion usurped, and not just, as well as of that which is haereditary? Certainly God being Lord Proprietary of all, his donation transfers a full right to him on whom he bestows it. This deed of gift being known, it is not lawful to endeavour a recovery. This was the case of Rehoboam, who after the defection of ten tribes, raised an army out of Judah, and the tribe of Benjamin, in hopes to reduce them to obedience. But he was warned by Shemajah the man of God, not to fight against his brethren (not because it was unlawful in itself, or the success improbable, but for that this was from the lord 
2. Kin. 12.  As this was not, (setting aside that extraordinary consideration) unlawful; So neither was it, as he is pleased to term it, a ridiculous attempt, to endeavour to reduce ten tribes by the strength of two. For he had raised an army consisting of one hundred and fourscore thousand chosen men, 
v. 21.  which were warriors. And it may probably be collected from the muster roll, which joab brought in to David, where the men of judah were 500000, 
2. Sam. 24.9.  that those two tribes were able to furnish an army strong enough to bid all Jsraell battle. Besides as he had lost them only by harsh language, so he might hope to regain them, by fair promises. It may be not unworthy our observation, what good consequences did attend the defection of these ten tribes. Did they not presently fall away from the true God, as well as their King, and were they not shortly after led into captivity?  
This we must observe, though force be not law, yet if after conquest a people resign their right in part or in whole, by a subsequent act of consent, they are obliged to stand to those conditions, which they made perchance out of a probable fear of harder usage. For the law of God generally, 
L. si mulier. D. quoth me t. cau.  and the civil law in this case makes the Act binding. That covenants should not be violated, will appear by the revenge God took in behalf of the Gibeonites. The children of Israel suffered three year's famine, and after this seven of saul's sons were hanged to make an atonement for this breach of promise. Notwithstanding the Gibeonites had overreached the Children of Jsraell by craft, yet they having sworn, were bound to perform their oath unto the lord Doli exceptio could not take of this obligation. That they were deceived, gave no right to them to imitate what they condemned, and to deceive again. Thus we see what special care God takes to preserve the faith of contracts. He will return abundantly, what any man's honesty costs him; and therefore it is great reason, he that sweareth to his neighbour, should not disappoint him, though it be to his own hindrance.  
After some general truths, he comes to this issue. The fountain and efficient cause of power is the people, and from hence the inference is just, the King though he be singulis major, yet he is universis minor.] This inference most weak: the quite contrary may clearly be concluded. The people being the efficient cause of power (which can be no other way but by deriving their divided power, and uniting it in him) since they cannot retain what they have parted with, nor have, what they gave away, it follows he which hath all their power (I may add his own particular besides) must needs be greater and more powerful than they. The truth is, he is now the only fountain of all power and justice.  
But he offers us a proof; for if the people be the true efficient cause of power, it is a rule in nature, Quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale.] Strange that men upon such palpable sophistry should endeavour to cast of Monarchy! He will be unwilling to follow the consequence of it. He hath an estate, which no question he would willingly improve, let him bestow it upon me, he will make me rich, and himself richer. For Quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale. I believe rather than part with his means, he will find an answer to his own argument. By the same reason one that entereth into his service, because he hath made him his master, shall conclude himself the better man, and challenge power over him. For Quicquid ●fficit tale, est magis tale. But because to prove his reasoning absurd, is not fully to answer, I will show the ground of this fallacy. The axiom is true ante effectum productum, not always after. So a spark firing a City, was once, more fire than the houses, nor so after the whole town is become one flame: or else thus, it is true in those agents, in whom the quality by which they operate is inherent, and from whom it cannot be separated: not true in those who by way of donation divest themselves of power or wealth. Because a thing can not retain a fullness, after it hath emptied itself.  
If the King be universis minor, than the people have placed a King not over, but under them; and they do ●ll to petition when they might command; they may require it from the Prince their Subject.  
Hence it appears that at the founding of authorities, when the consent of societies convaies rule into such and such hands, it may ordain what conditions, and prefix what bounds it pleases.] This is most true; and therefore I shall easily grant, the name King to signify a person invested with different power according to the variety of laws in several nations. His Majesty doth most freely acknowledge, and will constantly maintain what ever rights the law doth give us; yet He is not bound to betray his own. The truth is, we should be equally miserable under either extreme, if the King's prerogative should swallow up the Subjects right, or the Subjects right the King's just prerogative.  
No dissolution ought to be of rule conveyed by the consent of societyes, into such and such hands, but by the same power by which it had its constitution.] This I grant, being rightly understood; but because the sense may be easily mistaken, I shall enlarge myself upon it. It is most agreeable to reason, that the same power should by equal right, abrogate, as it did at first constitute. For it is not possible any body should lay a necessary obligation upon itself to do thus, when it had liberty to do otherwise, except in relation to some other person; to whom I may part with that right I had, without possibility of recalling it. And this either by actual donation, so when I have given away my money, I cannot challenge it as due on my repentance; or by promise, which is an earnest of my performance. In these cases I cannot use my liberty, because it would be to the injury of another; according to that rule grounded on great equity, Nemo potest mutare consilium suum in alterius injuriam. 
L nemo D. de reg. jur.   
In a popular state there is but one simple power, and therefore the people upon consent may establish an Aristocracy, or Monarchy, when they please. But in the other two, where the authority is placed in the hands of a few, or of one, there are two parties in the contract, and therefore even the whole people have not any power of dissolving this government, unless this one, or those few, will voluntarily resign up their power into those hands from which they received it; and that such resignation be not to the injury of a third party.  
It were strange if the people in subjecting itself to command should aim at any thing but its own good in the first and last place.] No question, rule and subjection (divided paternal powers finding it necessary to yield to one Regal, and instead of many, to submit to one common father) did spring from reason directing mankind to its greatest convenience. Therefore the people, aiming chief at their own good, yet perceiving this was not to be attained, except they had a common protector to administer justice equally amongst them, they found it necessary in a higher degree to provide for his good, in recompense of their security, and out of their particular estates, to grant to him honourable domains, to whose care and justice, they owed the peaceable possession of all. So the good of either is mutually involved, and that the people may be happy, they must first provide for the happiness of their ruler.  
What follows I shall think unworthy any answer. He breaks out into a most scandalous, and false invective against the late government. That the subject groaned under some grievances, cannot be denied; and we own to the goodness of his Majesty, that we are free even from the fear of them for the future. I speak sincerely, what I think, though the wit of malice should set before us the most exact table of all our sufferings, (let it not impose upon us, what we never felt) and compare us to any other nation of the Christian world, we in our worst times were least unhappy. Because we have no reason to be in love with any evils, I shall not endeavour to excuse them by comparison with our present miseries. Though neither be desirable, yet we are too sensible, which we have justest reason to complain of.  
I hope under this word (protect) the King intends not only to shield us from all kind of evil, but to promote us also, to all kind of Political happiness, according to his utmost de voyre.] I never before did apprehend in the word, Protect, this large notion; we may expect all happiness from His goodness, we cannot challenge it from His duty. How should we conceive, that the Prince is obliged by oath to take care for his people in such a degree, as the most affectionate mother never yet took for her dearest children. If it were so, than all his Majesty's Royal ancestors, who did not provide for their people in such a high degree of happiness, as he by the advice of this present Parliament hath done, were perjured, as having all taken the oath to Protect. Every particular subject hath a just title, and may challenge an interest in whatsoever is meant by the word, Protection: Is the King therefore bound to promote every particular person to all kinds of political happiness? to advance all to honours, offices, power, command?  
Though all single persons ought to look upon the late Bills passed by the King as matters of Grace, with all thankfulness and humility, yet the King himself looking upon the whole state ought to acknowledge, that he cannot merit of it etc. all hath proceeded but from his mere duty. It was believed heretofore, the greatest happiness of a Prince, that he was able, & his greatest glory, to be willing to oblige his people. But now he is made not capable of doing any courtesy. When he hath done all that he can, he hath discharged the duty of a trusty servant. I am confident never any age was guilty of the like irreverence, and disrespect to Princes, as is shown in this book. If all single persons ought to look upon the late bills passed by the King, as matters of Grace, than they truly are so; for no obligation can lay upon a man, to believe things otherwise then they are. This ground destroys the power of beneficence in a Prince, and the duty of gratitude in Subjects. We should think it very hard, if we, who are but subjects, should be dealt with by the same rule. All own a duty to their King, to their country; yet upon extraordinary services we believe, we deserve well of both. The example of the House of Commons, will better instruct him, who have several times presented their thanks, and humble acknowledgement of his Majesty's gracious favours; and have likewise received thanks from most Counties in the Kingdom, for procuring those bills so beneficial to the subject: and yet surely the trust reposed in them, by those that chose them, and the end for which they met, did no less oblige them in point of duty to do whatsoever might conduce to the general good of the Kingdom.  
The King ought not to account that a profit, or strength to him, which is a loss and wasting to the people, nor ought he to think that perished to him, which is gained to the people.] By the same argument the people may share all that he hath, and he is bound to believe, he has lost nothing. If King and people have several rights, what law is there, which binds the King suo jure cedere, and enables the people to preserve their rights, nay to challenge his? And if they have not, but the interests of King and people be either altogether one and the same, or so inseparably united, as they cannot be severed, than it equally follows, the people ought not to account that a profit or strength to them, which is a loss and wasting to the King, nor ought they to think that perished to them, which is gained to him.  
Regal dignity was erected to preserve the commonalty.] It was so; for out of the sense of those miseries, which the want of due administration of justice produced, routs became societies, and placed a head over them, to whom they paid the tribute of reverence, for the benefit of Protection.  
But that which is the end is fare more honourable, and valuable in nature, and policy, then that which is the means.] The conclusion implied is, therefore the Commons more honourable than the Sovereign. I will frame some other arguments upon the same principle, & see how he approves them. Angels are ministering spirits for the good of men, but the end more honourable, and valuable than the means, therefore men more honourable than Angels. Once more in a closer parallel; Christ is made the head of the Church for the salvation of man, but that which is the end is far more honourable, and valuable &c then that which is the means; therefore man far more honourable and valuable than Christ. If any should think these instances do not fully conclude, because the highest end of Angel's ministration, and the obedience of Christ, is the glory of God, he must consider, God's glory is the supreme end of government also. And therefore this being common to both, cannot difference the case. Though we grant, the good of the people is more valuable, he cannot hence infer a greater worthiness, or more power to be in them: though the safety of patients is most to be regarded, yet the Physician is much better qualified to effect that end. Marriage was ordained for the lawful procreation of children, that is honourable amongst all men, we do not read, this is so. The rule doth hold in such means, as are only valuable by that relation they bear unto their ends, and have no proper goodness of their own. But a King is not so to his people; if we look back unto his first extraction, when he was taken from among the people to be set over them, we must needs behold him even then as a man of some worth, honour and eminency, which the superaddition of Royalty did not destroy, but increase. To be a means of his people's preservation, is very consistent with the height of honour. The case is not unlike in the noblest professors, the Divine, the Lawyer, the Physician, compared to their several charges; they the means, these the ends: shall we from thence conclude the poor client a better man, than his learned counsel, or the simple patiented, than his Doctor.  
This directs as to the transcendent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of all politics, to the Paramount law that shall give law to all humane laws whatsoever, and that is Salus populi.] How many nations hath this abused principle brought to ruin and confusion! It is unquestionable, in the constitution of all Governments, this is the prime end, as being most agreeable with the joint interest both of rulers and people. It is as much without doubt, that after estates established, the governor's proportion all their laws to this end; for who that is wise will not provide for their safety, as well as he can, in whose destruction, his own is involved. notwithstanding this, the multitude (not comprehending the reason which made all people commit themselves, their lives, and fortunes to the trust of their rulers, who were wiser, and therefore could better foresee dangers, and had the greatest share in the present state, and therefore would more carefully endeavour to prevent them) readily hearken to crafty men, who seem to pity their sufferings, and tell them they are not so well governed as they might be. Thus Absalon stole away the hearts of his Father's Subjects. O that I were made judge in the land, 
2. Sam. 15.4.  that every man which hath any suit or cause, might come unto me, and I would do him justice. There is little good to be expected from those, who will do wrong, that they may have opportunity to do right. Such men have great advantage on weak understandings, because there is no state wherein it might not be wished that somethings were amended, and they press upon them present inconveniences, and frame some new form, wherein they promise them, they shall be free from all, and therefore desire their assistance in bringing this happy change about. The people full of great hopes cry up these men as the only fit instruments of state, who pretend only to take care for the public, and though they have nothing, yet would be thought, not to desire any thing. Having thus gained the affections of the people, their next work is to pick a quarrel with great officers (they conceive because they accuse so zealously, it will be presumed they are innocent themselves) that by displacing them, they may make room for themselves. If such men will not easily out of their preferments, the people are acquainted, these are the only rubs, which stand betwixt them and an happy government; these are the close enemies to the State (and so much the more dangerous, because they carry their malignant designs so secretly, they cannot find proofs against them) Salus populi is now concerned, the whole Kingdom is in danger; no way to scape this imminent peril, but by tearing these men from the Prince, if in a Monarchy, or putting them out of the Senate, if in an Aristocracy. Amongst these distractions, and unsettlement of Government, what course is to be taken? The best way I know, (but 'tis difficult) is to make the people wise, and make it appear, there is no real danger, except from their tumultuous endeavours to avoid those which are imaginary. Let them rely upon their governor's, who have most to lose: (especially if they have given them great & late signs of their affection to & care of them) this is the most probable way of safety; but if they should miscarry (which they can have no reason to suspect) they will perish with a great deal of discretion.  
It seems unnatural to me, that any nation should be bound to contribute its own inherent puissance, merely to abet Tyranny, and support slavery.] The inconveniences of Tyranny conclude nothing against just monarches, we are acquainted only with those happy names of King and Subject. It is so fare from being unnatural that any nation should be bound (by which I suppose he meaneth consent, from which an obligation naturally follows, for it is, as with him in the Comedy, voluntate coactus sum meâ) to contribute its power to that end, that some have made it their choice, others their refuge. Seneca tells us, speaking of the state of Rome in julius and Augustus his times, Salva esse Roma non poterat, nisi beneficio servitutis. How is it against nature for the Turks to be obedient to the grand Seigneur, or the French Peasant to his Prince? There may be reasonable motives why a people should consent to slavery; as if in danger of a potent enemy, they could hire none on gentler conditions to undertake their defence, or if reduced to extreme want, they had not wherewith to sustain themselves, they may very probably, like Esau, pass away their birthright, liberty. We find an example of each case in holy Scripture. The Egyptians parted with all their money, and cattle, and past away the right to their lands, and became servants to Pharaoh, 
Gen. 47.  upon this condition that Joseph would afford them bread. 
Jos. 9  And the Gibeonites bought their lives of the children of Israel with the price of their liberty, and thought they had a cheap purchase.  
From the word trust used by his Majesty, he gathers, the King does admit his interest in the crown in part conditionate. No ground for this collection: for there may be a trust, and that is so much the greater, if free from condition. But the thing is true de facto in some sense, and his Majesty hath always acknowledged, He is bound to maintain the rights and liberty of the subject. Yet we must not so understand it, as if the right to His Kingdom were so conditionate that it were capable of forfeiture upon a not exact performance of covenant.  
As for the word elegerit, whether it be future or past, it skills not much.] If he take notice of the conclusion deduced thence he may find as much difference between the Tenses, as between Democracy, & Monarchy. But the consuetudines, which cannot refer to the future, undeniably evinces, it was meant of the time past, and the oath in english is free from all ambiguity, rendering consuetudines quas vulgus elegerit, by rightful customs which the commonalty of this your Kingdom have. I may add the different manner of the King's answer as it is set down in their Remonstrance. Where to other questions which respect the future, the King answers in the future; in this as referring to what is past, He answers per verba de praesenti, concedo & permitto.  
The King is bound to consent to new laws, if they be necessary, as well as defend the old.] His Majesty never thought otherwise; but He is not bound to an implicit faith, to believe all necessary, which is pretended to be so.  
The word elegerit, if it be in the preterperfecttense, yet shows, that the people's election had been the ground of ancient laws and customs, and why the people's election in Parliament should not be now of as great moment as ever I cannot discover.] The election there spoken of is the election of the diffusive, not of any representative body, and that with the  consent of the Prince, and so of much other authority, and for the representative, their ancient right is not denied, no law shall be abrogated, none enacted without their assent. But there is a mean between doing nothing, and all.  
The result of all is, our Kings cannot be said to have so unconditionate and high a propriety in all the subjects lives, liberties, and possessions, or in any thing else to the crown appertaining, as subjects have in the King's dignity.] The King pretends not to have any unconditionate propriety in the subjects lives liberties, and possessions, he would only be allowed it in his own? And what he can mean, by subjects having an unconditionate and high propriety in the King's dignity, surpasses my understanding. It may seem to speak this wicked doctrine, that subjects may dispose of the Sovereignty as they please; for this right an absolute propriety gives.  
If the King had such high right as subjects, it were not lawful or natural for him to expose his life and fortune for his country.] How is it lawful for subjects then to do so? The people have as great, nay greater obligation of exposing their lives for the King. This appears by the Protestation, as also by the ancient oath of fealty at the Coronation, Je deviene vostre Liege de vie, & de biens, etc. Sir Hen Spelman gives us a form of sacramentum ligiantiae still in use. Tu I. S. jurabis quòd ab ista die in antea, eris sidelis & legalis (leaux) domino nostro Regi, & suis haeredibus: & fidelitatem & legalitatem (Leaultie) ei portabis de vita & de membro, & de terreno honore, & quòd tu eorum malum aut damnum nec noveris, nec audiveris quod non defends (i.e. prohibebis) pro posse tuo, ita Deus te adjuvet.  
I cannot imagine any possible colour for such an inference; I would sooner make a rope of sand hang together. may not a tyrant expose his life in defence of his slave, without breach of any law? He doth but defend his own goods, 
exod 21.1.  for the Scripture calls his slave his money. His own instance confutes him, bonus pastor ponit vitam pro ovibus suis; for it is evident, this good pastor, was our Saviour, absolute Lord of his flock.  
Parliaments have the same efficient cause as Monarchies, if not higher.] What, higher than the law of God and of the whole land? yes, for in truth the whole Kingdom is not so properly the author as the essence itself of Parliaments.] just as a Proctor is the essence of him for whom he appears, or an Ambassador is essentially the King: But suppose it true; this declares the material cause, proves no greater dignity in the efficient. But the reason is to come, by the former rule (he had no good fortune with that before) 'tis magis tale, because we see ipsum quid quod efficit tale.] what, magis tale in essences? or can a thing be magis tale then itself? This I conceive is beyond the sense of the house. However this confession and the rule quod efficit tale est magis tale subjects the Parliament to the people, as well as the same rule would do the King; and proves as well that the Parliament is universis minus though it be singulis majus.  
Parliaments have also the same final cause as Monarchies, if not greater.] what, greater than salus populi, nay then to promote the Subject to all kind of Political happiness, which he told us, was the end and duty of a King? His reason is, public safety and liberty could not be so effectually provided for by Monarches till Parliaments were constituted. This proves not the end higher, but shows they are good helps in government, which is readily granted.  
Two things especially are aimed at in Parliaments, not to be attained to by other means.] Not so easily attained indeed; but certainly many Kingdoms have enjoyed a most high degree of civil happiness under arbitrary Monarches, who knew no Parliaments. Such as have abundantly satisfied [the inter est of the people;] & in all weighty affairs [advised with the ablest counsellors.] Two other ends might have been named as essential as those; which are to supply his Majesty's wants by subsidies, and assent to the abrogation of old laws, and enacting new, as necessity shall require.  
In the summons of Edw. 1. (claus. 7. m. 3. dors.) we see the first end of Parliaments expressed: for he inserts in the writ, that whatsoever affair is of public concernment, aught to receive public approbation, Quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus approbari debet, or tractari.] I have not the convenience of examining this record, and therefore cannot be able to satisfy myself in circumstances, which perhaps might afford some light to the clearer understanding of this rule. For the present therefore, I will allow it to be certain law (though he would not be willing I should have the same liberty, and argue the legality of a thing, from a Princes bare affirmation) and see what advantage he can make of it. It seems to me to be deduced from an evident principle of reason, and to flow hence; it is against equity, that the act of one, should prejudice another without his consent. There is much caution required to the managing this rule. For if it be understood in its full latitude, without all limitation, it will dissolve the bonds of Government, by reducing us to that primitive state, wherein every one had absolute right, to dispole of his own as he pleased. Therefore we must take into consideration, that multitudes finding a necessity of Government, did restrain this native right by positive Constitutions, so that in the best governed States, the greater part of men were presumed by a fiction of law, to handle and approve such things as they never heard of. The ground of which fiction is very reasonable; for the people though they are not advised with, may well be said to consent to what their rulers do, because they have entrusted them with their safety, which without this power conveyed into such or such hands, could not be so effectually provided for. Thus in absolute Monarchies, what Princes do is legally the act of all: thus in our Kingdom two hundred thousand debate and approve things by the suffrages of two; who many times vote quite contrary to their desires who have entrusted them, and yet the people shall be said in law to affirm, what really and in truth they do deny. The result of all is this: those things which the law doth require shall be transacted only by Parliament, the people do handle & approve of by their Knights or Burgesses: in those things which the Law hath entrusted the King with (many of which concern the good of the whole) what he does, is their act. Hence it may appear, the Kings Writ by which he calls the Houses together to consult de quibusdam arduis & urgentibus negotiis, is no ways opposite to this supposed Law, understood with due limitations. The desire of the Commons in the Reign of Edw. 3. seems to me fully to justify the same, which was, that they might not advise in things de queux ils n'ont pas cognizance. The matters in debate were of no small concernment, being no less than the settling intestine commotions, guarding the marches of Scotland, and the Seas. But the answer is, herein they renounce not their right of consent, they only excuse themselves in point of counsel, referring it rather to the King and his Council. Here than we have the judgement of the House of Commons that in affairs of some nature, and those too very much concerning the safety of the whole Kingdom, there may be fit Counsellors than they are. I had conceived, n' avoir pas cognizance, had not signified to be ignorant, or not to understand things so thoroughly; since cognisance uses to be taken in a Law-notion, and to signify a right of handling matters judicially, or power and jurisdiction, as cognisance of Plea. We meet with a very observable passage, and which will give us great light in this business; it is to be seen in a diary (MS.) of the Parliament held, 1. Hen. 4. Et le lundy ensuivant S. lendemayn des alms, les communes priont qu'eux ne soyiant pas entrez en les rolles de Parliament come parties as juggementez quex sount donez acest Parliament mes la ou ils sount in rei veritate partie et prive a cella quar lez juggementz appartient solement au Roy fosque la ou ascun juggement est renduz sur un statute feat par le comune prositz de Royalme.  
Le quel fuist grante.  
In English thus.  
And the monday following, scil: the morrow after all Soules-day, the Commons prayed that they might not be entered upon the Rolls of the Parliament, as parties to any judgements given this Parliament, save only where in rei veritate they are part and privy thereto. For that the judgements appertain only to the King, except where any judgement is given upon a Statute made for the common profit of the Kingdom.  
The which was granted.  
How this shall derogate from Parliaments either in point of consent, or counsel, I do not know, for at last they did give both, and the King would not be satisfied without them, and the passage evinces no more but this, that that King was very wise and warlike, and had a very wise Counsel of War, so that in those particulars the Commons thought them most fit to be consulted, as perhaps the more knowing men.] The conclusion which more naturally follows is this; when the King requires and will not otherwise be satisfied, they may advise in matters not properly of their cognisance.  
The conclusion by which he thinks he hath gained so much, may without any inconvenience be assented to. These words, ad tract andum, or dinandum, saciendum, do fully prove, that the people in those days were summoned ad consensum, as well as ad consilium.] Be it so, in those things which belong to their cognisance. The forms which are used in passing a bill confess so much: les Communes ont assentés, and les Seigneurs out assenás.  
I have not ye done with his rule, Quod omnes tangit, ah omnibus approbari debet.] It is true the most popular state could never punctually observe it. For some of the poorer, & some of the younger sort, and women generally, by reason of their sex are excluded, yet all those, having lives to lose, are concerned in the public safety. But with what equity can he then think a considerable party of this Kingdom, can be denied the benefit of that, which he conceives a most reasonable law? I mean the Clergy, who certainly cannot deserve to forfeit the privilege of common men, because they are more immediately the servants of God.  
His next endeavour is to show that Parliaments have been much lessened, and injuried of late by some passages in his Majesty's answers. But he can never make it appear, that any part of their truly ancient power is denied to them. The King's words are, what the extent of their Commission, and Trust is, nothing can better teach them, than the writ whereby they are met. We called them (and without that call they could not have come together) to be our Counsellors, not Commanders; for however they frequently confound them, the offices are several.  
The writ runs, super dictis negotijs tractaturi, vestrumque consilium impensuri; so that the clear meaning is, their advice is not Law, except the Royal assent establish it into an act.  
'Tis alleged, he calls them Counsellors not in all things, but in quibusdam arduis, etc. and the case of Wentworth is cited, who being a member of the House of Commons, was committed by Q. Eliz. but for proposing, they might advise the Queen in a matter She thought they had nothing to do to meddle with. He answers, a mere example (though of Q. Elizabeth) is no law.] It is true, a bare example shows only what was, not what ought to be; but when grounded on authority, and no way excepted against, by those, who have always been earnest defenders of their Privileges, it may be reckoned amongst sound Precedents: what he adds, that some of Her actions were retracted, is a confirmation of this; for this being out of the number, it seems it was accounted legal. Exceptio firmat regulam, in non exceptis. Yet neither did the King so quote this precedent as to build a right upon it.  
He alleadges, the King denies the Assembly of the Lords and Commons, when he withdraws himself to be rightly named a Parliament, or to have any power of any court, and consequently to be any thing, but a mere convention of so many private men.] This is falsely imposed on His Majesty; His Answers and Messages speak the contrary, which are directed to both Houses of Parliament. Besides He hath passed some bills since his withdrawing. All that He affirms is that the sole power of making or repealing laws, and altering any thing established is not in them, but if He upon mature deliberation shall prefer the present government to the proposed change, than their order is not to have the force of law, and oblige the Kingdom.  
The King is said to assert, that because the law hath trusted him with a prerogative to discontinue Parliaments, therefore if He do discontinue Parliaments, to the danger or prejudice of the Kingdom, this is no breach of that trust, because in formality of law, the people may not assemble in Parliament but by His writ.] This is gross forgery: if it appear to him necessary or expedient for the Kingdom, He acknowledges He is obliged by that trust reposed in him to issue out his writs. And to this end He graciously signed the bill for a triennial Parliament; which like Physic well timed, may preserve the body of this state in health and strength, by not sufferring ill humours to grow to any head.  
Another assertion of the Kings he says is, if the Parliament make any transition in other matters, than what he pleases to propose, they are liable to imprisonment at his pleasure. All this he collects from the citation of Wentworths case. The sense of his inference is this; because they cannot justify the meddling with things which belong not to their cognisance, therefore they may be punished, if they meddle with those that do. We may observe an affected mistake in this author, of which he makes frequent use; and this animadversion though once laid down, may often be applied. Whatsoever the Houses do, he calls that, the Act of the people. Whereas the truth is, they represent them only to some purposes, and ends. So that if they exceed their commission, and vote things not belonging to their cognisance, the People by no means is engaged in it, as having no legal way of expressing themselves in such cases.  
His Majesty clearly to prove, that the trust committed to both Houses, cannot bind Him to assent, to what ever they propose, seem it of never so dangerous consequence to the Kingdom; nor absolve Him in point of conscience, if His reason tell Him, His people will extremely suffer under the grant, argues thus. It is impossible that the same trust should be irrevocably committed to Us, and Our heirs for ever, and the same trust, and a power above that trust, (for such is the power they pretend) be committed to others: did not the people, that sent them look upon them, as a body but temporary, and dissoluble at Our pleasure? and can it be believed, that they intended them for Our Guardians and comptrollers in the managing of that trust, which God and the law hath granted to Us and Our posterity for ever?  
Strange it is, that affection should so blind the understanding, and work men's belief not according to reason but desire! I must needs think the let lies only in his will, else he could never satisfy himself with such weak answers. It is true, faith he, two supreames cannot be in the same sense and respect.] If he had not hoped to hid himself in generals, he would have descended to particulars, and told us, in what sense, what respect, and what matters the King was supreme, in what the two Houses. But an application would have discovered the truth, even to weak understandings.  
Nothing is more known, or assented to, than this, that the King is singulis major, and yet universis minor.] I have already evidenced the contrary; yet I will speak something to it here. By universis he must mean the representative all, which therefore he concludes to be above, and have greater power than the King, that is such a power as He is bound to obey. So it seems the King hath taken the oath of allegiance as well as we, and we may call Him, our fellow subject. Yet the oath of Supremacy he tells us, is no ways endangered.] The sense of his reason is, because he is a better man than any one of us, take us single. He tells us He is better than any one, He does not tell us, He is better than two; if the King's supreamacy be no more but this, it is no more than possibly He might have and probably had before He was King. It is not the Prince singulis major? nay may not any Lord in the Land challenge the same supreamacy over all the Knights, any Knight over all esquiers to be singulis major, though universis minor? But perhaps some oaths limitation may be found out; the meaning shortly shall be, that he is above the Pope in these his dominions, not but that He is under His subjects. to take of these and all other corrupt glosses, I shall refer him to cap. 12. vices, 4ᵒ. Hen 8. In the preface of which statute the King's supreamacy (not over single persons) but the body Politic is clearly delivered. The words are these; Where by divers, sundry, old, authentic histories & chronicles, it is manifestly declared & expressed, that this Realm of England is an Empire and so hath been accepted in the world, governed by one Supreme head and King, having the dignity and Royal estate of the Imperial Crown of the same: unto whom a Body Politic, compact of all sorts and degrees of people, divided in terms, and by names of spiritualty and temporalty, been bounden and owen to bear next to God, a natural and humble obedience.  
If there were no King at all in England, you would call this government an Aristocracy; and why I beseech you do you not confess that name now, seeing the thing is altogether the same? for if they give his voice, 'tis all one, as if he had no voice, if their power must overrule his, 'tis all one, as if he were devested of all, nay, why is it thought fit to send to him and solicit his consent, when it is legally passed in that the two houses have voted it? why to all public bills do they require this confirmation, Le Roy Le voet? (is it only for the same reason that Bellarmine gives why the Pope being alone infallible, calls general counsels, ut res suavius transigatur?) suppose he should return in answer, that of SENECA, Si vultis scire an velim, efficite ut possim nolle. Thus though he plead for a new government, he is ashamed to own it by the right name. For he tells us, not without some indignation at the very thought of such an innovation. This new Aristocratical fabric cannot seem to any impartial man, but as empty a shadow, as airy a dream as ever man's fancy abused itself withal. I dare say he cannot meet in all histories, and records (except of such Parliaments as have deposed Kings, which he confesseth no free one ever did) with one example of this nature, that the two Houses should pretend to a power, which must of necessity overrule the King. Indeed a reasonable man cannot imagine, any precedent possible, because, since the law hath given the King a power, by dissolving the Parliament, to take away that power (as is pretended) greater then his own, if they had ever made claim to superiority over him, he would quickly have put an end to that dispute. Before this power be challenged, it would befit, to vote down, that clause in a law made 2. Hen. ●. cited by His Majesty, that it is of the King's regality to grant or deny such of their Petitions, as pleaseth himself.  
Yet notwithstanding this, he must be UNIVERSIS MINOR, for this we see in all conditionate Princes, such as the Prince of Orange etc. I never knew he had Regal power before. This instance abundantly manifests his design, though he is pleased to say, he speaks nothing in favour of any alteration, but is as zealously addicted to Monarchy, as any man can, without dotage.]  
To the most absolute Empire in the world, this condition is most natural and necessary, that the safety of the people is to be valued above any right of his.] It is against common sense to suppose a King that is in his wits, (me thinks all good people should take to heart those desperate conclusions, which are built upon most unreasonable and most unworthy suppositions of a King that is mad, or a child; since never subjects had greater obligation to be thankful to Almighty God for giving them a Prince as eminently able, as virtuous) who will not provide for the safety of His people, nay who will not part with some of His right, rather than they should perish, because in their destruction He loses all. Yet this does not prove a King should part with His rights, as often, as they will pretend to be in danger. If this were once admitted, what wild plots would be invented, what strange intelligence would be received from invisible spies? and as often as crafty men were ambitious or covetous, so often the  people were to be frighted.  
Since all natural power is in those which obey, they which contract to obey to their own ruin, or having so contracted, they which esteem such a contract before their own preservation, are felonious to themselves and rebellious to nature.]  
He cannot mean any people contracting to their own certain ruin; there never was government, guilty of this madness: therefore He must understand a contract to a possible ruin; for example, an agreement patiently to submit themselves to the ordinary trial of Law, and to suffer, if it should so fall out, though under an undeserved sentence. In this case, he that does not make resistance, and prefer his preservation to his contract, is pronounced felo dese, and a rebel to nature. Unhappy thief, who for felony is condemned to be hanged, and will be guilty of another felony in being hanged! what way is left unto innocency? He must kill as many as he can in His own defence, so shall He escape, or die in the quarrel; either way He hath done right to nature. Let us put another case; an innocent man by the ordinary course of justice is adjudged to die, upon the testimony of two bearing false witness: he was free from fault before; now he is in some danger, except he refuse to be punished, he becomes guilty, no less than a self murderer. I wonder what opinion this man hath of Martyrs, who value not their own preservation; can he think by submitting themselves to one fire, they deserve to be cast into another? nay, what of Christ himself? who certainly suffered most injuriously, & though he had strength enough to preserve himself, and could have been assisted by an Army of Angels, yet he was obedient to death. I cannot imagine from what principle he should draw such a conclusion, unless it be from this, (whence indeed most of his book will naturally flow,) that there is no such thing as justice, but suprema lex, the paramount law, is profit; and the faults of men consist, in the not violation of contracts, in the not breaking promises, if they be for their disadvantage: for it were a sin against native liberty to make ourselves the slaves of justice.  
If we examine the ground of this doctrine most destructive of all commerce, all government, we shall discover it to be no other but this, that the law of nature doth allow a man to defend himself, and provide for his own preservation. But the observer takes no notice, that it is in our power to part with this right, & yet do nothing contrary to nature, if reason tell us, we shall thereby obtain a more excellent good, the benefit of peace and society; nay, that this restraining Ourselves by compact of that natural liberty to defend ourselves, will conduce more, to that end, for which it was given us, our preservation and safety. Because in probability, we shall be in less danger, living amongst men who have agreed to be governed by certain laws, then if every one followed his own inclination. Where one suffers hereby wrongfully, thousands enjoy the benefit of being protected from wrong. And therefore though it should happen to me in particular, to be condemned by the magistrate without cause, I am bound to suffer patiently, because having made such a bargain, which might have been profitable, I have no right to recall it, when it appears disadvantageous. I own, that I have been safe thus long to the benefit of this covenant, & therefore am bound in justice to share the inconveniences. If reason will not satisfy, perhaps Christianity may. Qui resistunt potestati, 
Rom. 13.  ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt. To resist the magistrate, damnable. The powers here spoken of, were heathen, yet Christ commanded his, to be subject even to them. That answer (with which too many are deceived) cannot excuse disobedience, and Rebellion; This precept obliges private men, but not magistrates. Since inferior magistrates being opposed to the supreme power are but as private men, and in this respect the reason of obedience is common to both. Neither is this a hard law, if duly considered. If we suffer justly, we have no reason to complain: if undeservedly, we are punished, but not hurt. The magistrate is Dei minister nobis in bonum, because God will abundantly reward us for our patiented suffering in obedience to his command. But this is against nature.] He must mean nature guided by right reason; and doth that dictate, that rather than part with a temporal life, we ought to forfeit an eternal?  
It is objected that a temporary power, ought not to be greater, then that which is lasting and unalterable.] He does not frame the King's argument aright; which concludes on this ground, that it is not probable the laws should place a power greater than his in such a body, and yet leave it to his disposal, when to call that body together, when to dissolve it; that is, to determine, when and how long he would be overruled, & when be King again. His Majesty presses it farther (which he dissembles.) This trust being irrevocably committed to Him and His heirs for ever, it cannot be conceived, how it should sleep, during the sitting of the Houses.  
But if this were so, the Romans had done unpolitiquely, in creating Dictator's, when any great extremity assailed them and yet we know it was very prosperous to them, sometimes to change the form of government.] Hence we may conclude it good policy, in imminent danger, to trust to a Monarchy, not an Aristocracy, and much less to a democracy. The Romans success cannot be imputed merely to their change, but to this, that they altered their form from worse to better, (as to their present ends) but that will not justify his desire of innovation from better to worse.  
It is further objected, He says, if we allow the Lords and Commons to be more than counsellors, we make them Comptrollers, and this is not suitable to Royalty. He answers, we say here, that to consent is more than to counsel, and yet not always so much, as to command and control.] True, not always; but than it is, when their consent shall impose a necessity upon the King of doing the like. He hath not laid down his Majesty's words faithfully. The point He stands on is, that their advice, is not His law, neither is He bound to captivate His reason, or submit His conscience to their Votes.  
Yes, it must be so; because in inferior Courts, the Judges are so counsellors for the King, as that the King may not countermand their judgements, and yet it were a harsh thing to say, that they are therefore Guardians and Comptrollers of the King; therefore it holds in Parliaments a fortiori.]  
The reason why the King cannot countermand their judgement, is because they sustain His person, and His consent is by law involved in what by law they do, and there would be no end, if He should undo what He hath done. Authoritas rei judicatae vim legis habet; there can be no appeal from himself to himself. He therefore makes the Judges take an oath, they will deny to no man common right by His letters, because He is not to pass sentence in private, but in public and in a Judicial way. That it is his own act, appears from this, that He delegates his power to them, and this is a known rule, Quod Rex facit per officiarios, per se facere videtur. The truth is Kings have a right, and heretofore they made use of it, to sit in judicature personally. Camden tells us, that Bancus Regius ita dictus erat, 
●rit. 112.  quòd Rex ipse in eo praesidere solebat. Sir Tho: Smith too in his description of England, Subsellia Regia (vulgo Bancus Regius) ex eo sortita sunt appellationem, 
l. 2. c. 14.  quia ibi ipsi Angliae Regessedere consueverunt. This Court was called the King's Bench, because the King sat as judge in it in His proper person. It removed with the King, as is to be seen 9 Hen. 3. cap. 11. by which the Court of common Pleas is fixed. Common pleas shall not follow our court, but shall be holden in some certain place.  
Moreover the Judges swear, they will not assent to any thing which may turn the King in damage, or disherison, by any manner, way, or colour. 18. Edw: 3. when he can make these things agree to the two Houses, he shall conclude from the judge's sentence to their votes. But since it will clearly appear, that they are not the mouth of the King, the Lords sitting in a personal capacity, and the House of Commons as representing the body of the Kingdom (though not that to all intents and purposes) the inference must by no means be granted. I shall add this to make the answer more clear, and to avoid mistake: in matters of Law, there lies an appeal to them, a writ of error being brought, as to the highest Court; not so in matters of state. Because whilst they pass sentence according to known laws, the state is no way endangered thereby, but if they challenge to themselves a liberty of passing sentence according to reason of state, they may when they please overthrow our laws. The Counties which entrusted them look upon them as Judges, not Politicians.  
But we ought not to conceive, that they well either Council, or consent to any thing, but what is publicly advantageous.  
When the King conceives they do not otherwise, He will most willingly follow their advice. This fallacy (though extremely weak) hath influenced on all his book. He takes the two Houses in such a Notion as not failing of their duty, but doing every thing as they ought, and supposeth the King to be wanting to that trust which is committed to him.  
By such Council and consent we cannot imagine the King limited or lessened.]  
Such a Consent, in which his is necessarily involved, renders his Power not so properly less as none at all, it doth not limit, but take it away. Pray put the Case, a thousand pounds is left to Titius and Sempronius, to be bestowed upon joint consent, Sempronius being just and reasonable grants to Titius the right of a Negative, so that without he will concur, he confesses he can do nothing, (The King doth not pretend to have power of repealing old or constituting new Laws without them) Titius not content with this Negagative, affirms Sempronius is bound to consent to what ever he thinks fit; if so, is not this money wholly at Titius his disposal? Can any one be so stupid as to tell Sempronius notwithstanding this, He hath a full power? How did ship-money destroy our propriety, but by this very consequence? Law and Reason inform us, that Ejus est velle qui potest nolle. 
L. in bello. §. medio. D. de captiv. & postlim.  Hence Tryphonius determines that a Captive cannot consent to his son's Marriage. Why? Cum utique nec dissentire posset. And Aristotle, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
It is alleged in derogation of Parliaments: that whatsoever the right of Parliaments is, to assemble or treat in all cases of a public nature, yet without the King's concurrence and consent, they are liveless conventions without all virtue and power, the very name of Parliaments is not due to them.  
If this Man had a mind to deal candidly, he would deliver the King's sense truly, and let Him speak His own words. The sum of which is only this, the two Houses have not power of making laws and altering the established government without Him.  
But this Allegation at one blow confounds all Parliaments, and subjects us to as unbounded a regiment of the King's mere will, as any Nation under Heaven ever suffered under.] Very tragically expressed and with high confidence, but not any colour of reason. For are we not left in the same state in which we were? His Majesty's denying to bring in a new government, doth not take away the old. If He think it not convenient to alter that form which the least deceitful Argument, long experience under so many of His glorious Ancestors hath proved happy, can any who is not in love with error infer hence, this subjects us to a lawless and most unbounded regiment?  
Upon the same reason by the King's desertion other Courts must needs be vertuelesse and void.] It were a strange consequence to conclude that, because that may be done without the King, to which His consent by law is not required, therefore that may be done without him, to which his consent is by law necessary.  
Many Kings have dissented from Bills, yet the people were never so mad, as to fear a desertion of all Courts. It is against common sense to fancy that He which enjoys all by the benefit of Laws, should hinder the due administration of Justice according to those Laws, so wilfully endanger, not only his rights, but safety, by putting His Kingdom into tumults and combustion. Every wise man may have as strong security, he shall not suffer from the (only not impossible) execution of such a power, because it is so manifestly destructive of the Kings own interest (and made evident to be so as well by experience as by reason) as any man can have reason, not to be afraid of himself, because he hath a full power over himself and may destroy himself, when he pleases.  
The intent of the King is, that the great Assembly of the Lords and Commons do not represent and appear in the Right of the whole Kingdom, or else that there is no honour nor power, nor judicature residering in that great Majestical Body, than which scarce any thing can be more unnatural.  
A most impudent collection, the meaning in brief is only this, when the particular consents of three are necessary, it's not in the power of any two, to effect whatsoever they please. A most prudent establishment in favour of present government: that we may have no innovation without the mutual agreement of King and people.  
It is attempted to divide further between part and part in Parliament. Who these attempters are, I inquire not. I suppose he means those who divided the Lords into good and bad, the Members of the House of Commons, into well, and ill affected.  
So making the major part not fully concluding. They are not denied to conclude as far as the power of that House extendeth, but this cannot reach to an absolute and final decision.  
It is a wonderful thing that the King's papers being fraited scarce with any thing else but such doctrines of division, ('tis more wonderful that in a well governed state such disrespectful language of Princes from private pens should pass unregarded, unpunished) tending all to the subversion of our ancient fundamental constitutions, which support all our ancient liberties, and to the erection of Arbitrary rule, should find such applause in the world.]  
There is a vast difference between declaring what divisions are, and causing them to be; to show, is not to teach division. But it is beyond admiration, if the King's aims are such, as He would have the world believe, that they should find such applause. Especially if we consider the persons from whom; men that have much more to lose, than some who may aim at getting greater fortunes, by pretending they are in danger to lose what they have: Men that are known not to value their lives equal to their liberties; men of as great wisdom, as honesty, neither of which would permit them to be active to make themselves miserable, and pull upon their posterity and Country perpetual slavery. What impudence of malice is it, to accuse the King to intent that, when the world sees how much He hath suffered merely to prevent it? Can our Ancestors ever have believed there should come a King, who would plead for Magna Charta, who would hazard His Crown in defence of the subjects Liberty, and desire nothing more, than the utter abolition of all Arbitrary rule?  
If the King have parted from his Parliament merely because they sought His oppression, & He had no other means to withstand their tyranny, Let this proclaim them a void assembly.  
His Majesty never laid such charge to the Parliament, yet it is most evident there was too great reason elsewhere to justify His fears; when notwithstanding His deepest Protestations to maintain the true established Religion, they still imputed to Him inclining to Popery; when notwithstanding His utmost endeavours to suppress that unhappy Rebellion in Ireland, and after the Houses had taken that work into their care, His frequent pressing them to send over sufficient supplies, and not to spend their time in businesses of little moment, whilst their poor Brethren were daily butchered, yet the people were made believe He was a favourer of their bloody designs; when the base sort of the people were permitted to come even to the Parliament, in Clamorous, and unwarrantable multitudes, and there was a kind of discipline in disorder, tumults being ready at command, upon a watchword given; when seditious Pamphlets hourly came out, and many Presses laboured day and night to abuse the King; when factious Preachers were encouraged, whilst they did cast public obloquys on the Laws which stood in full force, and which if they had been duly executed, would have justified themselves, by restoring Us to our former Peace and happiness, which We so long enjoyed, as We knew how to obey; when such seditious fellows out of their Pulpits did dare to strike even at the highest, and with more boldness, because with less danger, as meaning to fight with other men's hands.  
If the King could be more wisely or faithfully advised by any other Court, or if His single judgement were to be preferred before all advice whatsoever; it were not only vain but extremely inconvenient that the whole Kingdom should be troubled to make elections, and that the parties elected should attend the public business.  
There are other Ends besides this for which they are called together, yet this is one main end, as appears by the King's writ, and therefore He never refused to advise with them. The usual (but not the only) form of the King's Answers to such Bills as they were not willing to pass (which I believe was never objected to any Prince before to His Majesty) le Roy s' avisera, proves that after the advice of this His great Council, He is yet at liberty to advise further with persons or occasions, as His own wisdom shall think meet. But this Author will by no means take notice, that the use of Counsel, is to persuade, not to compel: as if a man in a business of great concernment, might not very prudently consult with many friends, and yet at last follow the advice perhaps of one, if it appear more proportionable to the end he aims at.  
Not so, because the many eyes of so many choice Gentlemen out of all parts, see more than fewer.  
This Argument, I believe will conclude too much, and therefore nothing at all. For the same reason which denies a liberty of dissenting to the King, (that is such a number, who see more, because they are more) may deny it to the House of Pears, in comparison of the House of Commons, and to that House too, in comparison of the People, and so both King and Lords and Commons are voted out of Parliament. Besides experience shows this rule is not generally true, for I dare say if we ask almost any Parliament man, he will tell us, upon the reading of a Bill, sometimes one man in the House hath found more faults, and urged more just exceptions, than three hundred would have been able to espy. There have been Parliaments wherein Acts have been made to remedy former mistakes. Nay, whole Parliaments have been repealed and declared Null by succeeding Parliaments, so 21. Rich. 2. cap. 12. does void and disannul all the Statutes made in a former Parliament held 11. Rich. 2. so 1. Hen. 4. cap. 3. repeals this whole Parliament of 21. Rich. 2. So 39 Hen. 6. In a Statute made at Westminster We find a total repeal of a Parliament held at Coventry the year before, as made against all good faith and conscience, &c: the Acts and Statutes laboured by the conspiracy, procurement and excitation of some ill disposed Persons for the introduction and accomplishment of their rancour and inordinate Covetise. So 49. Hen. 6. A Parliament held at Westminster is made Null, in regard divers matters had there been treated and wrought by the laboured exhortation of Persons not fearing God, nor willing to be under the rule of any earthly Prince; but inclined of sensual appetite to have the whole governance of the Realm under their own power and domination. These are the testimonies that one great Council bestows upon another.  
I could urge the same Arguments, in the very same words, only ●●anging a Lay-councell, into an Ecclesiastical Council, and upon equal necessity, require the King to assent to what ever they shall vote. I make no doubt, the Author will in this case give him leave to make his conscience his guide, and if he do, he will think his Arguments deserve no further answer.   

The few private ends they can have to deprave them must needs render their counsels more faithful, impartial, and religious than any other.] Certainly they may have as many, as any other private Subject, and that this Kingdom hath seldom heretofore suffered under the prosecution of private interest is to be imputed to the excellent policy, which he endeavours to overthrow. They are strangely transported with the love of a popular state, who can so overrule their understandings as to force themselves to think the members of it may not be extremely subject to ambition, which would easily prompt them to alter the good old ways of bestowing Offices, and collating Honours; to covetousness, which would tempt them to draw the determination of causes out of the ordinary Courts of justice; to hatred, which would make them prosecute their enemies with bitter violence, and upon the least suspicion of a fault, to punish them first by imprisonments, and to prove them guilty at leisure; to affection, which would make them shield their friends from being questioned, though their corruptions were notorious to all the world.  
The Bishop of Durham his case speaks home to the business, we are told in the 3. c. of the 2. Parliament held 1. Mar. how the Bishopric of Durham was dissolved in a former Parliament, 7. Edw. 6. which was compassed, and brought to pass, by the sinister labour, great malice, and corrupt means of certain ambitious persons, then being in Authority, rather for to enrich themselves, and their friends with a great part of the possessions of the said Bishopric, then upon just occasion, or Godly zeal. Let the world judge, whether this Age may not be subject to the same temptation, and whether a desire to share the means of the Church may not have as strong operations as formerly.  
Nothing more common in the Roman story than the bribing of the Senate. This made Jugurtha cry out (who by his gifts governed their Parliament) O Vrbem venalem & maturè perituram, si emptorem invenerit! Had it been our unhappiness to have lived in a popular state (except they are altered from what Histories deliver them) we should have found injustice a trade, and that the most compendious way to wealth was to buy no land, but of the Judges. Tacitus gives us a full character of what we might well fear. When the government of Rome was changed into a Monarchy under Augustus, the Provinces were very well contented Suspecto Senatûs populique imperio, obcertamen Potentium, & avaritiam Magistratuum: invalido legum auxilio, quae vi, ambitu, postremò pecuniâ turbabantur.  
They must evidently have more private ends then the King, who may be misled upon wantonness, but they must struggle with solid temptations, desire of riches, desire of honours, there being an emptiness in them, whereas He is full and satisfied. Si violandum est Jus, regni causâ violandum est; the greatest motive that can be, a hope to share in Sovereignty, the Parliament to rule the King and they to rule the Parliament.  
We have ever found enmity and antipathy betwixt the Court and the Country, but never any till now betwixt the representatives and the body of the Kingdom represented.] How betwixt them and those many that entrusted them? are not they satisfied with their carriage? If this were never till now, it may seem to be upon some causes, which never were till now.  
Except Mr Hollis his rich Widow, I never heard that promotion came to any man by serving in Parliament.] What service commended Mr Hollis to the rich Widow I cannot judge, this I know, if the ninteen propositions had passed, it would have been no news to hear of many promoted, and they might easily have redeemed the time that they have lost, and challenged so much greater honours, because they could not have them sooner. It would have been rare, to have heard of any advanced out of Parliament, & this would have bred good stirring blood in the Country, the Gentry would have justled to get in at the common gate of Offices and Honours.  
The Lords and Commons ought not to be deserted, unless we will allow, that the King may choose whether He will admit of any Council at all or no, in the disposing of our Lives, Lands and Liberties.  
By Law He cannot, He will not refuse to hearken to His great Council, neither doth He challenge to Himself any right of disposing of your Lives, Lands and Liberties, but will protect you and them according to the established Laws: He only says, He is not bound to renounce his own understanding, or to contradict His own conscience for any Counselor's sake whatsoever. He must satisfy that before their desires, nor must that, which they call policy, give Law to that, which He knows to be religion.  
'tis granted in things visible, and certain, that judge which is a sole judge, and has competent power to see his own judgement executed, ought not to determine against the light of nature, or evidence of fact.]  
Sole judge, or not, altars not the case, neither is there any restraint only to visible and certain things; in the discharging of a trust, the conscience must be guided by a moral certainty, or high probability.  
The sin of Pilate was, that when he might have saved our Saviour from an unjust death, yet upon acousations contradictory in themselves; contrary to strange revelations from Heaven, he would suffer Innocence to fall, and pass sentence of death, merely to satisfy a bloodthirsty multitude.]  
The sin of Pilate all confess heinous, yet if examined according to his rule of justice, he must either condemn his own judgement, or absolve his. For first, concerning strange revelations to the contrary, all that I meet with is this, his wife sent unto him, saying; 
Mat. 27.19  have thou nothing to do with that just man, for I have suffered many things this day in a dream because of him. What was revelation to her, was but a single tradition to him, she was obliged to believe God speaking to her, he was not bound to believe a woman speaking to him: he might think she might be willing to deceive, out of natural compassion strong in that sex, or might be deceived herself, calling that inspiration, which was fancy. That it was true de facto, makes nothing against him, for a judge, he knew, was to be guided by proofs, he that will pass sentence according to what any shall pretend to have from Heaven, may well deserve to go to Hell for it.  
2ly Concerning accurations contradictory in themselves, he saw that plainly and therefore professes their testimonies invalid, 
joh. 19.6.  I find no fault in him. 
Mat. 27.18.  But it may be objected, he knew that for envy they had delivered him. That indeed was his private opinion, which the jews persuade him was to be overruled by their authority, and unanimous consent. This therefore seems to be the case; Pilate thinks it not enough that all the chief Priests, and Elders of the people, cry out against him as a malefactor and enemy to the state, he requires some proofs, joh. 18.29. they returned this answer, 
v. 30.  if he were not a malefactor, we would not have delivered him unto thee, Populisalus, the Commonwealth was in danger, not did it stand with the honour of that Assembly to give more particular reasons. At length he is resolved to pass his assent, and yields to their votes upon these grounds:  
His single judgement was not to be preferred before all advice; then many eyes of all the choicest of the people see more than his, and many spy faults which he could not find; besides there was a Maxim and it was grounded upon nature (and which the Author says was never till this Parliament withstood, therefore then in full force) that a community can have no private ends to misled it.  
I shall only add, the case can no way be varied, though they had not a joint judicial power, for if he thought him innocent, and knew he had such a right, that except he passed sentence against him he was not condemned, and ought not to suffer, it had been as high a fault to concur with them in their injustice.  
Not so; because if one judge on the Bench descent from three, or one juror at the bar from eleven, they may submit to the major number, though perhaps less skilful than themselves, without imputation of guilt.]  
The Oath of the jurors is this, as we find in Mr Lamberd, Se virum aliquem innocentem haud condemnaturos, sonten●ve absoluturos. Laying their hands upon the holy Gospel, every man swears, he will not condemn the innocent, nor absolve the guilty. The words of their Oath now in use speak the same sense; They swear that they will do right betwixt party and party, according to evidence given in: wherefore they ought to consult information by witnesses, not their fellow's votes. How his casuists will satisfy a man's conscience when he violates this Oath, I know not. 'Tis true, in many cases, there may be a legal submission, but then the law doth not require a personal act contrary to conscience, but provides for the preservation of the innocency of the dissenting parties, by making the act of the major part, have the force of the whole, according to that, Refertur ad universos, quod publicè fit per majorem partem.  
If so in Law, much more in State, where the very satisfying a multitude, some times in things not otherwise expedient, may prove not only expedient but necessary, for the settling of peace and ceasing of strife.] True, if in Law, not otherwise: a Governor must not displease God to please the people. The second thing must be ordered according to the Ruler's prudence. For many times, granting an unreasonable request, doth not satisfy, but increase their desires. And whereas the more he gives, he becomes the less able, so the more they receive, they become the more craving.  
That the Militia and Magazine of Hull &c. should be entrusted into such hands as were in the people's good esteem, conscience and understanding could plead nothing against it.] Understanding and consequently conscience very much, if the King had more distrust of some, and more confidence in the fidelity of others.  
If it could have been averred (as it could not, for the contrary was true) that this would have bred disturbance, and have been the occasion of greater danger.] Truly then he shall get the better, if he can impose upon our sense, and make the Kingdom believe contrary to what they see, and suffer under. What hath been the cause of these unhappy distractions, but as the taking the King's Town from him by force, and the illegal alteration of the Militia, upon pretence of apparent danger? Though for a time, they were afraid, where no fear was, (quis illis sic timere permisit?) yet after they have had so long a time to recover their understandings, and to consider with themselves, if the danger were apparent, it might in so many months be made evident, and they might know, whence to expect the blow, I dare now appeal to the weakest part of men their distrusts, and ask them, if they can now believe, there was any just ground for jealousies. It is not improbable, since they have raised a house without a foundation, it may fall upon the heads of the master bvilders.  
Where the people by public authority will seek any inconvenience to themselves, and the King is not so much interessed in it as themselves, 'tis more inconvenience and injustice to deny, then to grant it.]  
More injustice to deny then grant, therefore it seems, that injustice too. Into what straits must a King be brought by the minds of the people! If they seek any inconvenience, injustice to deny it: O unheard of Maxims out of these new Politics! that a King should be bound by Law to destroy his people, and kill them out of duty; that he doth not preserve their rights, except he do them wrong. This affabile odium hath often had, but never deserved thanks. Can a man imagine, those people, of whom Juvenall speaks, 
Evertêre domos totas optantibus ipsis  
Dii faciles,  if they had understood their own prayers, would have accused the Gods for denying them? Charior est Regipopulus, quàm sibi. How great are His deserts towards His People, that will not suffer them to be miserable, though they entreat him; though they provoke him to it; and can content himself with the conscience of merit, whilst his honour suffers under the envy of wrong doing! Indeed this is the end of all government; for the people finding they were not fit to govern themselves, resolved to be ruled by those that were wiser, and so committed their safety to the trust of others. Now this were to reduce themselves to that first state, which their sufferings made them weary of, to place a Governor over them and to govern that Governor.  
What blame is it then in Princes, when they will pretend reluctance of conscience and reason?  
No man justifies pretended conscience, no man can condemn real. But what grounds can malice have to cast this aspersion of pretence of conscience and reason? If we look either on that unhappy misunderstanding of the people, who would not be undeceaved by pretences, his actions must appear unto them as clear as the day; or on his own necessities, his own extreme wants, it cannot be. For certainly he that hath granted so much in this Parliament, and that in a short time, as put all his Royal Ancestors Acts of grace together, they fall much short of his, would not have denied any thing which was reasonable, not any thing (since his wants required supplies from them) but what should put him into fare worse condition then that of Poverty.  
After a long and general discourse of the original of government, the various forms, and several distempers, whilst policy was yet imperfect, he returns to the present matter.  
The virtue of Representation hath been denied to the Commons, and a severance has been made betwixt the parties chosen, and the parties choosing, and so that great privilege of all privileges, that unmoveable Basis of all honour, and power, whereby the House of Commons, claims the entire right of all the Gentry and commonalty of England, has been attempted to be shaken and disturbed.]  
The sense of it is, a trust is committed to them, and they are to be guided according to conscience in the performance of it. Let it be so: but is not this clearly the King's case, who is entrusted certainly as highly as they? So that they will find the ready way to endanger their own rights, is to entrench upon the Kings. Yet there may be a mistake in the imputation of severance and denial of representation to the Commons. For put the case; if a few men of a County present a Petition to the House against established laws, and the settled Discipline of the Church; this is received, and thanks returned: if after, another Petition (modestly and discreetly expressing their desires, and withal due respects to the House, as to instance in that most excellent Petition of Kent) be presented, attested by men much more eminent than the former, whether we respect number, Gentry, means or reputation; and this in favour of present government, which they have found happy by long experience, and therefore have no reason to be so desirous of a change, of which they are not able to judge so well without trial; this by no means is to be called a severance or denial of representation, though I confess, the Kingdom (apt to mistake) may easily be deceived, and learn to miscall it, because the Gentlemen were imprisoned who presented it.  
Most of our late distempers and obstructions in Parliaments have proceeded from this: that the people, upon causeless defamation, and unproved accusations, have been so prone to withdraw themselves from their representatives, and yet there can be nothing under Heaven, next to renouncing God, which can be more perfidious, and more pernicious in the people than this.]  
Here we may see the strength of passion above reason. Certainly we never took the oath of Supremacy, nor of Allegiance unto them. Hence it will evidently follow, that Treason against a Burgess, is higher than that against the King.  
This he grants as unquestionable, that the legislative power of this Kingdom, is partly in the King, and partly in the Kingdom, so that neither the King can make a general binding Ordinance or Law, without the Parliament, or the Parliament without the King.  
This one truth, if constantly stood to, would have prevented our miseries; and if yet embraced, might restore the Kingdom to happiness. But alas! it is soon recalled, as holding only in ordinary cases, but if the safety of the people be concerned, if it may prove dangerous, or inconvenient to them, than an extraordinary course may justly be taken.  
This is it which hath so miserably rend this Kingdom and caused these sad divisions. First, the people are made believe they are in danger; and then a prevention of those dangers is promised: This must needs be very grateful to them, so out of that natural love they bear to themselves, they favour that side, which pretends to take care of their safety. His way of arguing is very plausible, and seemeth to carry more strength, because it worketh upon our understanding by our affection. The sum is this; in case of apparent and imminent danger the People's safety is not to be neglected; they ought not to be exposed as a Prey to the enemy, who if he take them unprovided will destroy them all, therefore most fit they should be put into a posture of defence: now none so fit judges of this apparent and imminent danger, as the two Houses; wherefore they to order this Militia. So that it must be in their power, to command Men, raise Horses, seize on all the Ammunition, send for what supplies of money they think necessary for repelling these dangers, else they are not sufficiently enabled for that great work, the people's preservation. Here we are fall'n back again into (what we so much complained of). Arbitrary power, nor is the thing taken away, but placed in another body; all that we have gained is only this, we shall not be beaten by the same hand. Was not this the very case of Shipmoney? upon supposal of a necessity, and the Kingdom being in danger, very fit to secure it and the people; this cannot be done without money, the danger will not allow the delay of ask the Subjects consent, and going the ordinary way of Law, therefore an extraordinary course them becomes legal, and very reasonable it is, the Subject should be content to part with some, rather than lose all now who fit to judge of this necessity than the King, as being most fully informed by His advantage of intelligence from His Ambassadors, Agents etc. of the designs of foreign Princes and States.  
To wind ourselves out of this Labyrinth, we will go on those grounds, on which they argued against Shipmoney, for as the Argument runs parallel, so will the answer. This therefore was laid down as a sure ground of reason, that it was better for the Kingdom, though it were in real danger, in arenâ consilium capere, to shift for itself, as well as it was able, by a sudden defence, then that the Law should provide such a remedy, which would be so easily, so frequently abused upon every pretence of danger, to prevent such an evil, which could extremely seldom, or almost never happen, for an Army and Navy could not be so secretly provided, but that we must have some intelligence of it. So in the case of the Militia, it is much better, that by being continued in the old legal way, it should hazard itself to such a possible danger, than that Law should provide such a remedy (for what probably will never happen) as being abused upon pretences, may every three years put the Kingdom in combustion. To repel danger any way but by Law, is the greatest danger of all.  
Let the world judge, whether the pronouncing Sr john Hotham's act: Treason be not contrary to the clearest beams of humane reason, and the strongest inclinations of nature: for every private man may defend himself by force, if assaulted, though by the force of a Magistrate, or his own father, and though he be not without all confidence by flight.]  
He is strongly resolved upon the conclusion, that will bring it in upon such premises. Sr John Hotham his asseizing on the King's Town and Ammunition was it seems in his own defence; who assaulted him? did His Majesty drive him into Hull? what can he think of the Gunpowder-traitors, was their resistance a just defence? then certainly every Rebellion is a just war. Indeed what is that thing which we call obedience, if a man may refuse to submit to Law in his own defence?  
Here whole Nations being exposed to enmity and hazard, being utterly uncapable of flight, must yield their throats and submit to assassinates, if their King will not allow them defence.] There is great difference betwixt a Subjects defending himself, and offending his King. His fears are over-witty, if they will not permit him to think himself safe, except he get into one of the King's sorts for his better security.  
See if we are not left as a prey to the same bloody hands, as have done such diabolical exploits in Ireland etc. if we may not take up arms for our own safety, or if it be possible for us to take up arms, without some Votes, or Ordinances to regulate the Militia.] Subjects upon in vasion would not have wanted Commission to take up arms; till than they are safe enough by the benefit of the Law, which could not possibly have better provided for their safety, then by denying them a power to take arms as often as ambitious: choletick men for their own ends shall perswage them they are it danger. For by this means, being easily deceived, whilst they endeavoured to avoid false, they would run themselves headlong into true perils.  
The King says; the Parliament denies &c. to whether now in this uncertainty, is the Subject bound to adhere?]  
It is possible, circumstances may afford us some light for our direction. We may consider, whether the Houses do not barely say; and whether His Majesty doth not descend so fare, as to give reasons for what He does; and to show the Kingdom the ground of His actions, by particular citation of the Laws, which justify them. We ought to agree whether swerving from Law, be to be judged by the action, or by the authors that is, if the King should have done; whatever they did, and the Houses what ever He did, whether all would not then have been legal, because done by them. The King doth not desire to captivate any man's understanding to His authority, but is willing to make all the world the judge of His actions▪ neither is a blind obedience a part of any man's duty to the Houses. The best way to discern a right, will be to consult the rule, which is Law, and not measure the legality of an act by the doer. Some things are matters of fact, here we may be guided by sense, and judge as we see. As whether the King has seized on any thing, wherein the Subject hath a property? or whether the Subject hath not seized upon something wherein the King hath a property? whether the King hath raised war against the Parliament, that is, whether His Guard was an Army, and whether Hull is now London.  
We had a maxim and it was grounded upon nature, and never till this Parliament withstood, that a community can have no private ends to misled it, and make it injurious to itself.]  
True in a state where the collective body assembles: and the reason of it is evident; for though every man aim at his greatest particular interest, yet except it be agreeable to the interest of the major part it will never pass into an Act; and if it be advantageous for the most, it is to be esteemed public. Now what service this can do the two Houses, I cannot see, because they are a representative body. If he please to consult Livy or Tacitus, he may find what most unworthy ends the Senate of Rome proposed to themselves, and be quickly satisfied in the falsehood of this Maxim, taken in his sense. The truth is he raises probabilities into demonstrations, and because it is not so likely, (it being a work of greater difficulty) that four hundred should contrive things for their private interests, as that four should, the takes it for impossible. Whereas experience clearly confutes him; in other states we find nothing more common. That we in England have so seldom suffered under such corruptions, proceeds from causes which are peculiar to this government. It was a court for the most part, but of short continuance, so that they had not time to mould and fashion their aims; and when called together again, the body was much altered. But the chief reason, and that to which the Subject especially owes his security, is this, that the final determination, is not in one, nor two houses, but the joint consent of three Estates is necessary. So that nothing is likely to pass, but what is for the interest of the major part, and what is so, is publicly advantageous. It is more possible they may now prosecute private interests, since they challenge a power to themselves sufficient to advance their designs; which heretofore they never pretending to, could not hope to compass particular ends.  
The King may safely leave His highest rights to Parliaments.] If this be all the motive, he may as safely keep them. Why did the Laws entrust Him with them, if it were fitting for Him to make no use of them?  
None knows better, or affects more the sweetness of this so well balanced a Monarchy.] I believe they affect Monarchy, why then doth this Author endeavour to take it away, by denying the King a power of dissent, which our Ancestors inviolably preserved, as a most happy restraint of Aristocracy or Democracy?  
It hath been often in the power of former Parliaments to load that rule with greater fetters and clogs, but they would not.] A very good argument, there is little reason now to do it. After a commendation of the exact temper and due proportion between the three Estates, the many affecting Monarchy better than Aristocracy, and the Nobility preferring it as much beyond Democracy.  
He exhorts us not to seek to corrupt this purity of composition.] Very good counsel: but which he overthrows in the words immediately following. We must not conceive, that both Gentry and Nobility can combine against the King. Therefore it will be fitting for the King to leave all to their disposal, who certainly can do nothing, but what is fitting. In how few words hath he destroyed that constitution, which he told us was so perfect, it could admit of no change but for worse? But we could not stay here, if the King's negative were once taken away, like decaying bodies, our health would daily impair. The next step must be, the Lords sitting in a personal capacity, no reason they should deny what the Kingdom hath voted to be necessary or convenient; either let them not speak at all, or let the greater part of Commons join with the lesser part of Peers.  
The right of all the Lords and Commons in this State is so great, that no change of government can be advantage to them, except they could each one attain an hereditary Crown.] May they not attain as much as Malignant Counsellors are pretended to aim at, Honours, Offices, Wealth, Power, Commands?  
Their power is merely derivative, so that except we will conceive that both King and People will be consenting to the usurpation, nothing can be done.] Then it is confessed, the King hath a right of dissenting. Except both King and People; here a power is given to the People collectively, beyond the Lords, Commons and King.  
If the King be an affector of true Liberty, He has in Parliament a Power as extensive as ever the Roman Dictator's was for the preventing of public distresses.] The Dictator had absolute Authority; nor was he circumscribed in power, but in time only. There lay no appeal from him, neither was he questionable for any action after his government expired. Though the humour of that people could not endure the name of King, they had the same thing; for in imminent dangers, whether from foreign invasions, or intestine seditions, necessity of state forced them to submit to his Authority, which relieved them in their greatest extremities.  
Hence we may make the truest judgement, what form of government the wisest Romans esteemed most convenient, their actions, which proceeded from fear, were unfeigned interpreters of their thoughts. That they fell back still into their old rule, and were not as wise to prevent dangers by conserving that Authority, as they were to encounter them by erecting it, must be imputed to the inconstant temper of the people, who in times of peace were as proud and insolent, as when ruin threatened (which their wantonness pulled upon themselves) they were basely humble: Since then the Romans preferred even the unbounded power of one to a popular sway, we have no reason to change the much more happy temper of this government, wherein Monarchy is so wisely balanced, that as we are not exposed to the dangers which attend the rule of the many, so we may avoid the inconveniences, which might probably flow from the Arbitrary power of one.  
He hath met in the field with two contrary Armies of His own Subjects, and yet that Army, which He went to destroy, and advanced their colours against Him, was more loyal than that which himself commanded.] Had he made a Conscience of unjust slander, or had he any sense of the honour of his Nation, these words had never fouled the paper.  
That which the King here calls conscience and reason, can be nothing else but mere private opinion.] What other possible notion can any man have of conscience? is it not the light of reason informing us in our duty? If the Counsel of the Parliament were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience, and the Counsel of the Court were evidently consonant thereunto, there needed no such contestation.] If the Counsel of the Court were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience, and the Counsel of the Parliament were evidently consonant thereunto, there would be no such contestation.  
It is a very unfaithful way of judging, to measure the goodness of Counsel by the person advising, not by the thing advised. His Majesty always examined what, not who, and hath given His Subjects a most certain pledge of His Royal affection, in passing so many good Acts, and was resolved to grant, as long as any thing could in reason be desired. After He hath fully satisfied the public interest, even to the utmost extent, of what most understanding and disengaged men wish for, he is not bound to undo again in part, and so fare to comply with the interests of private men, as to place a power in some, by which they shall be able to hinder His good people from enjoying the full benefits of His Royal Grace, if such a consent appear to Him to do it.  
The following discourse keeps all in generals (which easily deceive weaker apprehensions) and hath its strength from this ground, that it cannot reasonably be supposed the great & public Council of the Kingdom should not give the most faithful advice.  
Therefore Princes, if they may not be led by their own opinions, rather than by the sacred and awful Counsels of whole Nations, unreasonably complain they are denied liberty of Conscience, and ravished out of their own understandings.] I appeal to any man's judgement, whether any thing can be urged for the authority of a Lay-Councell, that it ought to enforce a submission of judgement, & a performance of duties arising from trust agreeable thereto, which may not with at least equal advantages, be pressed for the same binding power in Counsels Ecclesiastical. To instance in that of Trent, if a Papist should, (as Campian doth) brag of that to him as the representative body of almost all the Western Church, wherein was a concourse of so many choice, able, eminent Divines, such as had addicted their whole times to the study of truth, and therefore in all probability could not be deceived themselves, & such as had conversed so long with Heaven and Heavenly things, they knew sufficiently how much it concerned them not to deceive others, and conclude it therefore unlawful for any to pretend conscience (which is but private opinion) against so public and unanimous determination. Notwithstanding these high probabilities, and (what will much more justify men's absolute obedience, and captivating their reasons, some plausible arguments for a divine assistance, and immediate directions in all their decisions, which the Houses will not pretend to;) yet it shall go hard but he will find some answer (as easily he might) whereby to justify his liberty of dissenting in some things, which when he hath done, he may with very little alteration apply to civil Counsels and be satisfied. Suppose it thus: though amongst probable Arguments, that drawn from authority of wise men carry with it greatest weight, yet it must give place to a greater reason. Now to every man belongs a judgement of discretion, which must decide for what concerns his particular duty. So in the King's case: the Votes which carry in them the authority of both Houses, shall bear great sway, and if it be in things extremely dubious, they may turn the scales of their side. But if greater reason seem to contradict them, his Majesty will not hoodwink His understanding, and blindly follow whither they please to lead him, He will walk by the greater Light; For example his Majesty perceiving how much His people may suffer under arbitrary power, is resolved never to make use of it, & thinks it less fitting any other should. But it is told him now the use of it will be for their good, by reason of apparent imminent dangers. His Majesty understands the bottom of plausible pretences, & knows to how great mischiefs a way would be opened, if it were sufficient upon such specious grounds to have a right to overrule all known and certain Laws.  
Concerning the action at Hull, he confesses, to take possession of the King's town and shut the gates against Him is Treason, if circumstances do not vary the nature of the act, as in this Case he pretends they do. For the first thing to be looked on is, that the King was merely denied entrance for that time, His general right was not denied.] If than a Subject take up Arms against his Sovereign in a temporary war, it must not come within the compass of Treason, and he may legally possess himself of the King's forts, and maintain them against Him, so He confess he hath no right in them.  
No defying language was given. If a man take away my purse, shall he be acquitted from felony because he did not give me ill language too? No act of violence was used. This he may say who hath picked another's pocket; but it is no sufficient plea against the Law.  
But he used no violence, though the King for divers hours together did stand within Musket shot, &c:] It is no argument of innocence that he had opportunity to be more highly guilty, and abstained.  
The King used terms of defiance, and this makes the act merely defensive, or rather passive.] If this were true, there was never any war but defensive; for those, who by some great injustice offered, provoke a Nation to right itself, fight as well to maintain their lives, as what they unlawfully possess. How this should administer to the King any ground to levy guards at York, many men wonder, or that it should seem the same thing to the King, as if He had been pursued to the gates of York.]  
Certainly it was a sufficient ground, not only to raise a guard for His safety, but an Army to punish that high indignity, and right His Honour: but out of tender care of His People's safety (lest they should chance to suffer upon mistakes) He afforded him so long time of repentance, that the Kingdom might first be satisfied, and then his justice.  
If the Parliament have hereupon turned any of the Townsmen out of their Estates. His Majesty did not charge the two Houses; Sir john Hotham kept Him out, without any public order from them. But if it had been done de facto, the same law would have justified this act, as well as the other. But since, not only the Country about, but the Inhabitants within the Town have suffered in their Estates, and libertyes.  
Or if claimed any interest in it to themselves. So much the less reason to seize on it, if he cannot so much as pretend title to it. or have disseized the King, utterly denying the right for the future. If any Law can be produced to justify taking away the King's goods for a time, the case will be cleared. Or have made any other use of their possession but merely to prevent civil war. There is not any way more likely to create a Civil war, then endeavours to prevent it by illegal courses. And to disfurnish the King's seducers of Arms & Ammunition: therefore the most essential property of Treason, intention, must needs here be absent in this act.] The Law hath judged otherwise in the case of the Earl of Essex, whose plea was, he intended the removal of evil Counsellors.  
If the Parliament (the shutting the King out of Hull was not their act) be not virtually the whole Kingdom itself. The King excluded it is not; If it be not the Supreme judicature, as well in matters of State, as matters of Law. Till new laws are enacted, the Subject cannot justify any act, but what is warrantable by the old. If it be not the great Council of the Kingdom as well as of the King, to whom it belongeth by the consent of all Nations to provide in all extraordinary cases, ●e quid detriment capiat Respublica, let the brand of Treason stick upon it. No provisions are allowed, but what are legal lest the Remedy should prove the greatest disease. Nay if the Parliament would have used this forcible means unless petitioning would not have prevailed. It is no just excuse to take away a man's money, and say he did first desire him to deliver it. Or if their grounds of jealousy were merely vain. It is against all equity to do wrong, because there is a possibility of suffering it; no man can have a full security; and therefore we must arm ourselves against uncertain fears, not by injuries, but a wary innocence. Or if the jealousy of a whole Kingdom can be counted vain.] Too large an expression; much the greater part of the Kingdom apprehend no just grounds of jealousies.  
Though the minds of many were a long time unsettled, being daily disturbed by suggestitons of plots at home, and invasions from abroad, yet if we duly weigh the business, such fears ought not to be valued. If forty several men report the same thing, yet if upon examination thirty nine of them say they had it from the other man, this in Law makes but one witness; so the fears of many thousands, if grounded upon informations, and those informations come from very few, who can no way evidence the probability of such reports, they ought not to be regarded, they will vanish into nothing. Or if they claim any such right of judging of dangers and preventing them without the King's consent as ordinary and perpetual. As often as they have a mind to make use of such a right, 'tis easy for them to call the case extraordinary, and pretend a public danger. For my part I know not how they can ever be confuted, if not now. For certainly apparent dangers did never less appear. It would more abundantly have satisfied me, if I had been frighted with secret plots, and concealed designs.  
The King might have prevented the same repulse by sending a messenger before hand. That is, if He had not come to get in, He had not been shut out; if He would have stayed away, he would not have denied Him entrance. Or by coming without any such considerable forces. Let His forces be great, he was not to give Law to his Prince. but neither is it likely he would have admitted Him then, for you confess a little above, He offered to enter Hull with twenty horse only, unarmed.  
The Scots in England took Newcastle but by private authority, yet there were other qualifications in that act sufficient to purge it of Treason.  
The King and Parliament deserved so much respect from you, as not to have instanced so frequently in their Act; you might well let that pass in silence, which they have buried in an Act of oblivion.  
He flourishes at large upon the example of Richard the second (he means Edw. 2.) misled by Spencer. It doth not follow, because one King harkened to evil counsel, therefore all must be denied the liberty to hearken to good.  
Spencer's party was but of inconsiderable fortunes. He will get no advantage by putting men's estates into the Scales, and balancing their reputations. At length yet there is some little hopes he may prove a convert, since he doth almost promise to suspend his judgement, till he may have full satisfaction from His Majesty's Narration, which in due time will more fully inform him.  
An Aristocracy in Parliament cannot be erected withoutsome means, and what this means shall be, is yet to us altogether inscrutable. Certainly he is quicker sighted than not to perceive what is so obvious. Deny the King a negative, and the thing is done.  
The power of Parliaments is but derivative and depending upon public consent, and how public consent should be gained for the erection of a new unlawful odious Tyranny amongst us, is not discernible.] It is not thought this was the intent of those that entrusted them, but it may be the abuse of power, if the King's authority be once swallowed up in theirs. For though their power depend upon a public consent in the election, yet not so after they are met together. The necessities of the time made His Majesty grant, that this Parliament should not be dissolved without their consent; but they may now challenge it as their right, if the King be bound to confirm, what they vote necessary or expedient.  
But it cannot be: and his reason is, the Kingdom would not obey them.] In truth a very probable thing: I believe they would not be able to go through in that new way. But yet they must needs have a great party; considering their several relations, and the advantage they have, in advancing the interests, whether religious or civil, of some, which may be able to do them service, and this would create division in the Kingdom.  
His Majesty expresses His just indignation, that they (He imputes it not to the Houses, though this Author still involve them, but to the contrivers & penners of the Declaration) should dare to tell their King, they may without want of modesty or duty depose him: He returns answer, this cannot be collected from those words, That if they should make the highest precedents of other Parliaments their pattern, there would be no cause to complain of want of modesty and duty, because it may justly be denied that free Parliaments did ever truly consent to the dethroning of any King of England. What was there affirmed of Parliaments had none of his present restriction of Free in it. If the ●. of Hen. 4. Were indeed not Free, why were Statutes cited out of it? The authors of those quotations must be presumed to account it so.  
The King is offended at their frank expressions, disguised under the charge of a malignant party. The sense of his answer is this, they have no other way to clear themselves: for there being faults somewhere, not to lay them upon others, were to take them upon themselves. His Majesty hath proposed a very good way which will fully satisfy the world in their innocency, and that is not always to accuse, but sometimes to prove.  
The King demands justice for tumults and high indignities offered, and complains of a prohibition sent from the House of Commons into Southwark, to hinder the process against a Riot according to Law. His answer is, equal justice could not be obtained against the Court-Cavaleeres. His Majesty never protected them from legal trial; it was free for them to have proved what they could against them.  
The Kingsays, it being granted by them, that their privileges do not extend to Treason, Felony, or breach of the Peace, so as to exempt the Members from all manner of trial, yet if they be so privileged in the method of their trial, that the cause must first be borough before them, and their consent asked before you can proceed, than their Privileges extend as fare in these, as in the most unquestioned cases; because no privilege exempts them from all manner of trial, the House being acquainted and leave given, He says nothing can take of this: it was fully intended the Members should have had a legal and speedy trial; for His Majesty conceives it high injustice to clap men up upon a bare charge, and after they are in prison, forget there are such men in the world.  
The Parliament does not deny the King a true real interest in anything held by him, either in jure Coronae, or in jure Personae, but only affirms that in the same thing the State hath an interest Paramont in cases of public extremity; by virtue of which it may justly seize and use the same for its own necessary preservation.] The King is a part of the state, and therefore the other part hath not any power warranted by Law, to do what they think fit to His prejudice, upon pretence of public extremity. This is ship-money again; in every man's lands & goods, the State hath an interest Paramount in cases of public extremity, by virtue of which it may justly seize, and use the same for its own necessary preservation. Here's the difference, the head without the body was the State before; now it is the body without a head. The King hath graciously freed us from that inconvenience, and we hope He will not suffer us to be oppressed with this. The prudence of our laws hath provided against either; but were there a necessity we must fall into one, we ought in reason to choose the former, we are acquainted with that, and therefore could better digest it: It would be a great affliction to fall from such hopes, and what we looked on as a remedy, to find that our disease: but especially it would be less burden to our estates, to satisfy one, than five hundred.  
But the King's things are still reserved for him in better hands, than he would have put them. Though this were true it were an ill precedent for the Subject, who must be bound to give up his means as oft as they conceive they could dispose it more wisely, as they yet keep them away from him for his good, so hereafter they may spend them against him for his advantage. Let what will be pretended; the Subject cannot be so stupid, as not to understand, these, who undertake to manage the Paramount interest of the State, may seize on any subject's fortunes, by the same right they take the King's.  
That there is an Arbitrary power in every State somewhere, 'tis true, 'tis necessary, and no inconvenience follows upon it.] If he mean by arbitrary, a legislative power, this is granted, yet not to a part, but the whole body. But this speaks not to the case; for still they give us a certain rule to live by. The old laws are in force, till repealed, and when new are once enacted, we must conform our actions to those standing rules. He is to justify, there is such a Paramount Law, which shall make all our other laws truly Oracles, that is, capable of contrary meanings. So that now a man may be justly punished for doing such a thing, because he hath disobeyed the letter of the law; a week after he shall be justly punished too, for not doing the same thing, because he hath disobeyed the equity of the Law. Aristotle tells us (and 'tis very wisely said) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Rhet. l. 1. c. 1. Those laws are with greatest prudence established, which define most cases, and leave nothing, which possibly may be determined, to the breast of the judge. The reason of it is this; Laws are made without any respects to persons, it cannot be foreseen what parties would be engaged; but Judges do not always abstract from these; they may be misled by the relation of Kinsman, friend, Patron, or other interests. Now how fully may these corrupt ends be satisfied by this equitable construction of Law?  
Mr Hooker does not say, that the Anabaptists in Germany did deceive Parliaments with their hypocrisy.] No man told you he did; we only learn thus much from that story of their foul injustice and cruelty, that upon proportionable principles, such mischiefs being then, may be again. For example, if a power be placed in a certain body of men, by which they are allowed to break all inferior laws, if they think it is for the good of the people, &c: and if this body be backed by the greater part of the people, as having gained on their affections by fair promises of a perfect reformation, and that they shall at length enjoy the purity and simplicity of the Gospel; in this case may it not be a sufficient motive to take away men's estates, because they cannot confide in them? is it not just to take from enemies of the State the power of hurting it? 'Tis very obvious, that for those men, of whom they have no good opinion to have wealth may be a crime, to have honours treasonable.  
As for the thirty Tyrants of Athens, we know they were not chosen by the people, as our Knights, Citizens, &c: This circumstance altars not the case, if after they are elected, they challenge as unquestionable and as irrevocable power. But the main intent of that instance was, to show there may be a tyranny of many, and that much more miserable than that of one, in many respects. If the inordinate desires of one are hardly satisfied, how much more may we suffer under those of many? we cannot hope to weary them. If we must be slaves, better to have one master, than four hundred. Though the blows were equal, that from a Royal hand would not smart so much; it wounds the very soul to be trampled on by equals. The weight of present evils would less afflict, than the fear of future. There may be continual supply of torment; new and hungry flies may succeed in the room of the old, and suck strongly, not regarding many have already been glutted. Neither can we expect an end of these miseries, such a body is immortal, whereas the vices of a Prince are personal and die with the man, we may be restored to happiness by His successor.  
I will in brief relate the story of their reign. They had got into their hands the power of declaring what was Law, and this by the consent of the people. In the beginning they call some men into Question, who were much hated by the City; and though the law could not take hold of them so fare, yet they past sentence of death. This was very plausible to most, who judged of this proceeding by the rule of their present affections, not looking so fare into the future, as to consider, what ill consequences this might produce; for by the same way innocent men might be cut off, if they were pleased to call them enemies of the State. After this they gave some part of public authority to three thousand of the Citizens, and disarmed all the rest, by this means (and the benefit of a Militia from Sparta) the City was wholly in their disposal. In a short time they had committed so many outrages, and such high injustice, that Theramenes, one of their own body, one of the thirty, professed his public dislike of those proceed. Then was he accused as a Traitor to them, and (though it was a privilege of the three thousand, that none of them should suffer death by the sentence of the thirty, but according to accustomed process and trial) yet Critias wiped his name out of that number, and so reduced him to their trial. Theramenes pleads for himself; they ought to look upon his as a common case; their names might as easily be blotted out, he advises them to be very wary in making such a precedent which might ruin them and their posterity. The issue was this: Particular men being overawed by their fears, thought it their wisest way to hold their peace, since if they should speak in his behalf, there was little hopes to redeem him, but great probability to ruin themselves. So they chose rather to expose themselves to those future inconveniences, which possibly might not come upon them, then hazard a present danger. By this advantage the Tyrants prevailed and condemned him to die.  
The things taken from the King at Hull were Arms, which are of more danger than other kind of chattels.] By the same Law all that part of the Kingdom which is not confided in may be disarmed, nay why may not their money be taken too, upon probable fear they may buy arms with it? The Subject is in a miserable condition that is liable to be undone as often as they please to be fearful. It is so fare from excusing, it aggravates the fact, to take away the King's Arms, that is the means whereby he may seize what ever else belongs unto His Majesty. The Law of this Kingdom hath only entrusted the Prince with Arms, so, that the Subject ought not to be arrayed, trained, and mustered, but by His Commission.  
But some determination must be supreme, and therefore either the King's power and trust must be guided by the discretion of the Parliament, or else the Parliament and all other Courts must be overruled by the King's mere discretion.] No necessity of either; For in cases of this nature, which he confesses to be extraordinary, if the King and Parliament descent, things must be at a stand, and the Subject must be obedient to the ordinary Law. The case of Ireland, as it is laid down by His Majesty, is unanswerable, and therefore he is forced to extreme shifts, being unable to say any thing material, and yet unwilling to hold his peace.  
England and Ireland are one and the same Dominion, there is as true and intimate an union betwixt them, as betwixt England and Wales.] If this were so, Irish Barons would be English Peers, and English Peers would have a right to vote in Irish Parliaments. Besides all laws here enacted would stand in full force in Ireland, as they do in the King's dominion of Wales.  
Though the major part should vote a thing, yet if it be disliked here, they would want authority to overrule the thing so voted. For the reason why the minor part in all suffrages subscribes to the major, is, that blood may not be shed, for in probability the major part will prevail. This is a good reason for such a contract, that the minor part should subscribe; but after such agreement in States, justice lays an obligation on them so to do: upon his grounds, if the lesser part in Parliament though never so few, can make it appear the greater part of the Kingdom are of their opinion, the major part ought to subscribe to the minor. Nay, if at any time the major part of Ireland joining with the minor part of England, make a major of the whole, than the major part in our Parliament must sit down. He takes no notice of the other case: suppose the malignant party should be a major part of both Houses, which His Majesty shows how very probably it might have been, and were there a new election, it is not impossible, the Counties should send up the greater part of such men as he calls malignant, would he think the King bound to consent to all such alterations, as they should propose?  
Some scattering reasons are laid down concerning the Militia, which are but repetitions of what I have formerly answered.  
A Faction is said to have prevailed upon a major part, by cunning, force, absence, or accident. He argues thus against it; if by cunning, we must suppose the King's party in Parliament, has lost all their Law policy and subtlety.] The reason why they are over-borne, may be this; not because they have less Law, but more Honesty, which will not permit them to maintain a good cause by ill means. We all know in how great stead those piae frauds, holy falsehoods, and religious untruths stood the Church of Rome, though there were such who laid down better reasons for the contrary opinions, yet truth prevailed slowly and with a few only, because the minds of most were craftily prepossessed with prejudice against it, begotten and nourished by feigned stories. The dispute proceeded upon very unequal terms; for the Roman party gave themselves the liberty of taking all advantages, whereas their adversaries were forced to betray a good cause out of mere ingenuity: they had none of their side who could lie. We ought to examine, whether this policy work not (at least in the beginning, till a discovery of their falsehoods is made, and the people is undeceived) the same effects in a civil State; whether there are not such things, as frauds (pretended to be) reipublicae salutares, which have so strong an influence on the understandings of many, that they can submit to the votes of some, who have insinuated themselves into their affections, against the clear reasons of others, whom they have been taught causelessly to suspect. How easy is it to deceive by giving in false informations of dangers from abroad? If some, more scrupulous then to be abused and led away by light reports, inquire after the hand that they may judge of the probability of the intelligence, according to the faith and credit of the relator, they must be satisfied with this, the informer desires his name should be concealed, Pour l'eviter●le tiltre d'espion.  
It cannot be by force, because they have no army visible.] A thing is said in Law to be done by force, not only when men actually suffer, if they make use of their liberty, and refuse to satisfy the passion and humour of some, but then also when they have just grounds of fear, for this works on the mind, as strongly as the other on the body. And therefore Seneca tells us, stating this point of freedom, vim & majorem, & metum excipio, quibus adhibitis electio perit; and Cicero, nec quicquam aequitati tam infestum est, quàm convocati homines, & armati. It remains than we examine, whether the names of many gentlemen were not openly read in tumults; whether they were not posted, with directions to their particular lodgings; whether the way to the house were not so beset with clamorous multitudes, that they must pass through the midst of them, whilst they inform them, what is fit to be voted, and inquire after their names, and what side they take. The other two may be reduced to those; It is no wonder many stay away, since they must be absent even whilst they are there.  
The Parliament requests of the King, that all great Officers of State, by whom public affairs shall be transacted, may be chosen by approbation or nomination of the great Council: could the King conceive this dishonourable for him etc. if all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to Royalty?]  
Is that the reason why each man preserves his own rights, because he takes all the rest of mankind for deadly enemies? Can he with honour confess himself unfit to manage that trust which the law hath committed to him? with equal reason they may challenge to themselves the nomination of all Bishops, Ministers, Sheriffs, Justices, &c: and dispose of all the Preferments in England.  
The substance of the request seems to be no more but this, that it would please the King to be advised by Parliaments, &c:] What an affected mistake is this? He is ashamed to call it by the true name, and therefore styles that advice, which is properly command, if it be not in His power to reject their counsel, seem it never so unreasonable.  
If the King choose such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of His own good liking only, or upon recommendation of such a Courtier, here he is devested of no power; but if it be upon the recommendation of the whole Kingdom in Parliament, who in all probability can judge better, and are more concerned, this is an emptying himself of Majesty and divesting himself of power.]  
If this will content them, they shall have as much power, as He grants to His Courtiers. Counsellors are not names of authority: they are the Prince's ears, His eyes, (this relation is near enough) He sees, and hears by them: yet they must not pass their bounds; they must be like to the outward senses still, and make a bare representation; the office of reason is peculiar to him; to pass judgement thereon: Their information is not always faithful; he may consult reason, and, by the benefit of that, correct their error misrepresenting an object as crooked, which in itself is straight.  
If not out of duty to their King, and a just sense of His honour, yet out of love to themselves, and a natural care of their own safety, Subjects are bound in all legal ways to express their dislike of this proposition. For they must expect to suffer all those evils which Faction can produce; and what happiness can be hoped for in a Kingdom divided in itself? This were the ready way to kindle a fire in our own bowels, which would first break out in the Counties electing, and divide the families of the gentry by irreconcilable hatred. For it cannot be imagined, but that power will bandy against power, and relations against relations, to put Sons or Kinsmen into that road, which only leads unto preferment. Nor would the flames be quenched, but rather burn more fiercely even in the Houses, (as being penned in a narrow room) to which the insolency of some attaining offices, (to which they are not equal) the shame and discontents of others repulsed, and the ambition of all would add continual fuel. But the greatest misery of all is, were their corruptions never so high, we could have but slender hopes of redress. Since the prevailing party (jealous of their own honour) would easily maintain the reputation of their choice, and perhaps it would be necessary for them to wink one at another. He that cannot think it probable, that out of private ends they should so fare neglect justice and honour, let him only examine, whether in some Parliaments most known offenders, and active instruments in the people's misery, by striking in with the prevailing side, have not been more safe than innocency could have made them.  
There are several degrees of Prerogatives Royal, some whereof have greater power of protection, and less of oppression, and such I am most studious of.]  
Certainly it were to be desired, we might enjoy the benefits of power, and not be subject to the possible abuse thereof. But since this cannot be fully provided for, because the same hand which is enabled to protect, may injure; the aims of wisest States have been, not so much to take away the power (because then they should be likely to suffer under a weak Protector) as the will of oppression. The most probable means to effect this, is, (after a certain rule is agreed upon, and Laws are established, to acquaint a governor, what he ought to do, in performance of that trust committed to him) so to order his interests, that to advance the people's good shall be for the Prince's advantage. Subjects will have great reason to promise to themselves a full happiness from the faithful discharge of his Regal office, to which he is so strongly tied by those bonds of justice and profit. This the wisdom of our Ancestors hath provided for in a high degree, and so tempered this government, that both King, and people, will be jointly happy, or jointly miserable. The several goods of each form are here united; we have great democratical advantages, and yet may avoid the evils of a popular State, as long as Monarchy is kept up in its due height, and tumultuous insolent multitudes are not protected from a legal trial: we have the good of Aristocracy, counsel of the best experienced (such as have studied nations and men) nor yet are we acquainted with the disease of it, faction amongst the Nobility. The Counsel of many is profitable, but the resolve of one is necessary. Since they looking upon one another as equals would be very apt to quarrel; for when one contradicts, what another hath advised, the debate between them seems to be, which is the wiser man. Their discourses are like so many plead for honour, and we know what issue such suits would come to, when the thing in controversy is so highly valued, if there were not a judge to determine. And this is the benefit of Monarchy; which is so restrained by some power proper to the Houses it cannot degenerate into a tyranny. For how should this enter in? The old laws (the security of our libertyes) cannot be taken away till both Houses give consent: but grant an illegal, violent Government should break in upon us, by what means could it be maintained? The King can have no supply of money, without the House of Commons, and without these sinews his arm would not be strong enough to hold the reins, which should govern that provoked beast, the multitude. But He may take it by force, He cannot do it in person, and it is not to be imagined, any considerable number of His people, will be active in their own slavery. Besides what can he propose to himself? The people will give more than can be forced from them; so he loses by it, and then how much doth he hazard against less than nothing? He hath least reason to break the laws wilfully, because he enjoys most by them, and experience having showed the benefit of observing them, and the ill of the contrary, He cannot but doubt, the People would fail of their duty, if he do in performance of trust, and cast of the bond of obedience, if he do that of Protection. These things duly weighed, render that malice inexcusable, which hath long time exercised the people with most unreasonable fears, of lands, and liberty, and Religion being in danger; and this notwithstanding the King's many sacred Protestations to the contrary before God and all the world, and the whole course of his proceed, which evidently tend to the securing all.  
Now I think it doth fully appear, that the doctrine of that Remonstrance, laid down by His Majesty, by way of recapitulation in seven positions, is most justly offensive; being such as doth threaten ruin to both Church, and State, not permitting us, either to obey the King, or serve God as we ought.  
1. That the Parliament has an absolute indisputable power of declaring Law; so that all the right of King and People depends upon their pleasure.  This power must rest in them, or in the King, or in some inferior Court, or else all suits must be endless, and it can not where rest more safely then in Parliament.] 
The two Houses are not the Parliament. The subject of such power is the entire body, which consists of three estates. Some things are clear and evident in Law, and want no declarer; if otherwise, all the Subjects right would lie in the breast of the judge. If the two Houses should Vote, younger Brothers ought to inherit by the Law of England, could this destroy the right of the first born?  
2. That Parliaments are bound to no Precedents.  Statutes are not binding to them, why then should Presidents? yet there is no obligation stronger than the Justice and Honour of a Parliament.] 
This is an excellent ground to justify their innocence against all the world. For if they can make it appear, they are not bound to keep any law, no man can accuse them for the breach of any. What obligation can justice lay on them, who by astrange virtue of representation, are not capable of doing wrong. It will become justice, because they did it▪ when he hath declared what Honour is, I shall be able to judge of that bond; it may perchance not stand with their honour, not to be able to prove men guilty, after they have once accused and imprisoned them. Statutes stand in, full force to the two Houses, as being not void, till repealed by a joint consent of all the Estates.  
3. That they are Parliaments, and may judge of public necessity without the King, and dispose of any thing.  They may not desert the King, but being deserted by the King, when the Kingdom is in distress, they may judge of that distress and relieve it, and are to be accounted by the virtue of Representation, as the whole body of the State.] 
To descent, after he hath granted what ever can in reason be desired, is not to desert the Houses. Upon pretence of distress, to take illegal courses, is as if they should persuade us, we are not in health, and therefore they must break our heads to forward our recovery. They represent the people to some purposes, not the King to any, and therefore are but a part of the State.  
4. That no member of Parliament ought to be troubled for Treason etc. without leave.  This is intended of suspicion only, and when leave may seasonably be bad, and when competent accusers appear not in the impeachment.] 
If by suspicions be meant only a bare not confiding in, this in justice cannot be sufficient ground. But upon Articles drawn and proofs in readiness, which it is not fit to produce, while the accused parties are at liberty, they may be meddled with: for designs of this nature may brook no delay, because it might prove dangerous to the King's safety, or at least afford them liberty to escape. If the Houses being adjourned were not able to give consent, or upon too much confidence, should not be willing, hath not the Law provided in such a case for trial of Treason?  
5. That the sovereign power resides in both Houses of Parliament, the King having no negative voice.  This power is not claimed as ordinary, nor to any purpose, but to save the Kingdom from ruin, and in case where the King is so seduced, as that be proferres dangerous men, and prosecutes his loyal Subjects.] 
Not as ordinary; that is they will only be King's as long as they please, and when they are weary of Reigning, the Kingdom shall be out of danger, and then it shall be his turn to command again. To save it from ruin; the Law hath better provided for the People's safety, by prohibiting all illegal executions of power, grounded upon what specious pretences soever, And in case where the King is seduced; that is, when he is not so wise as he should be, because he does not think as they do, and refuses to satisfy the humours, and interests of some. And prefers; (this seems to be the true cause of all; preferments do not go the right way) dangerous men, i. e. such as desire he should govern according to the known Laws of the Land. And prosecutes his loyal Subjects; i. e. is driven from London to York, where He long time patiently expected the undeceiving of His People.  
6. That levying Forces against the personal commands of the King (though accompanied with his presence) is not levying war against the King: but war against his Authority, though not Person, is war against the King.  If this were not so, the Parliament seeing a seduced King ruining himself and the Kingdom, could not save both, but must stand and look on.] 
It is against common sense to fancy a King ruining Himself and Kingdom; He can neither be willing nor able. Upon a mad supposal, mad consequences will follow.  
7. That according to some Parliaments, they may depose Kings.  'Tis denied that any King was deposed by a free Parliament fairly elected.] 
This is most certain, but takes not off those words upon which this Proposition is grounded.  
These might well have been omitted, as being more fully handled in the book. But lest he should complain any thing was passed over, I chose by a short review to be his remembrancer. The Propositions collected out of His Majesty's Declarations, are but the brief of his Observations, to all which I have already spoken.  
To conclude, if the people hearken to reason they must needs think, His Majesty will be more ready to prevent all real danger, than any Subject whatsoever, because He is sure to bear the greatest share in the loss. It always was the master Policy amongst the wisest Legislators to grant to them the greatest power of government, to whom the preservation of the present state would be most beneficial; because their private interests were the same with the public, from which if they swerved by error or misinformation their own disadvantage did soon appear.    
FINIS.