THE UNLAWFULNESS OF Subjects taking up Arms AGAINST THEIR SOVEREIGN, in what case soever.  
Together with an Answer to all Objections scattered in their several Books.  
And a proof, that notwithstanding such resistance as they plead for, were not damnable, yet the present War made upon the King is so, because those cases, in which only some men have dared to excuse it, are evidently not now; His Majesty fight only to preserve Himself, and the rights of the Subjects.  
Printed in the Year 1643.   

The unlawfulness of Subjects taking up Arms against their Sovereign, in what case soever.  

§. 1.  
HE that will endeavour to make the yoke of government more easy, by setting a people lose from the restraints of positive laws, upon pretence, 
The cause upon which men are misled to a desire of Innovation.  they may justly use their native liberty, and resume their original power, if civil constitutions, which were agreed upon for their good, be not effectual to that end, but prove disadvantageous to them, shall be sure to meet with many favourable Readers. Because the greater part of mankind, as in other matters, so in this present case, are easily prevailed upon, to make a truce with conscience, and eagerly to prosecute what appears most profitable. And the chiefest cause of our miseries is, that they do not rightly apprebend what is truly advantageous. For States are framed upon a sinister opinion of men, they suppose most (as it doth commonly fall out) will be dishonest, yet if they be not unwise, and suffer themselves to be carried on, as against conscience, so against interest also, a Kingdom cannot want plentiful means of subsisting, of flourishing. The ground of these unhappy mistakes, (which makes them advance public ruin, wherein all single men will be lost, while they are vainly encouraged by deceiving hopes of being private gainers) can be no other but this. They rule their actions and desires but by one syllogism, and look upon the immediate consequence, which is a satisfaction of some particular ends, and serving some present turn, and have not ordinarily so much depth of understanding, as to be able to discern the future evils, which will inevitably spring from the same fountain. They are not capable of that good counsel of Polybius, Non tantùm praesentia spectare, sed & futura prospicere, & quis exitus inde futurus sit. The bait only is visible to most, and accordingly the real goods which are promised by innovation (for no government being free from all evil, therefore every proposal of change is easily baited with some good) are entertained with delight, but once unwarily swallowed, they become hooks in the entrails It happens to most men, that they behold the children (as of their bodies, so) of their opinions; but the grandchilds of their tenants: 
— Caliginosà nocte premit Deus,  
Nepotes discursus,   
The further removed consequences (though allied in a right line) they have not strength of reason to discover. 
Quisque nascitur liber, 1. False, because all are subject by nature to paternal power, and consequently to the supreme Magistrate, to whom divine law confirms the several powers which Fathers resigned up. 2. If true, it concludes not for them, because out natural liberty is restrained by consent.   
To instance in two main principles, by which the seduced multitude hath been tempted to catch at empty happiness, and thereby have pulled upon themselves misery and destruction.  
The first is a doctrine craftily instilled into the minds of the people, upon no other foundation than a mistake, in the meaning of true and profitable liberty, that the law of Nature doth justify any attempts to shake off those bonds imposed upon them by Superiors, if inconvenient and destructive of native freedom: the fallacy of which is easily discerned by understanding men. It is true, if we look upon the Privileges of Nature, (abstracting from paternal dominion) Freedom is the birthright of mankind, and equally common to every one, as the Air we breath in, or the Sun which sheds his beams and lustre, as comfortably upon Beggars, as upon the Kings of the earth. This Freedom was an unlimited power to use our abilities, according as will did prompt. The restraint of which would questionless have been very grievous, but that experience did demonstrate, it was not so delightful to do what ever they liked, as it was miserable, to suffer as much as it pleased others to inflict. 
The evils which flow from want of Government.  For any that was stronger than his neighbour had it in his power to hinder him from enjoying the benefits of liberty; nor yet could the most powerful man among them take any extraordinary comfort in this as yet hostile State, because his mind was distracted with continual fears, since there was not any so contemptibly weak, but that if he despised his own life, or desired to enjoy it with more uncontrolled pleasures, he might make himself Master of any other man's, though not by force, yet by subtlety, and watching advantages, or at least a few combining might destroy the strongest, and might be tempted so to do, for their fuller security.  
This was their unhappy condition amidst fears and jealousies, wherein each single person looked upon the world as his enemy, and doubted (as formerly Cain, when he was excommunicated and cut off from the civil body) lest the hand of every man might be upon him; and to this confusion the disturbers of this State endeavour to reduce us, not that this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, want of order, most hateful to God, can be pleasant to the most wicked man; but as knowing the effect of it, an insupportable and general calamity will quickly unite multitudes into a people again, and force them to restore some government; and they may hope in a new compact to gain a greater share in the rule, than their ambition hath been able to force from the settled Kingdom.  
I will add the unavoidable occasions of quarrel, extremely opposite to the prime dictate of nature, the preservation of themselves, and to the means which conduce thereto, a peaceable enjoyment of the comforts of this life. For whilst every one had right to all, no body could with safety make use of any thing; since when some would take to themselves what others delighted in, their desires and right being equal; there was no title but that of greater force, which could determine to whom it ought to belong, and this could not be known but by fight, and this right reason abhorred, as by which men would either be exposed to famine in the midst of plenty, or else be forced daily to hazard the loss of their lives, out of a natural desire of conserving them.  
The sense of these calamities quickening their understandings to find out, 
The remedy of those evils, civil unity.  easily prevailed with their wills, to entertain a remedy of so great evils; which manifestly proceeding from division, the ready cure was to make themselves one, because no body is at variance with itself. There being no way to effect this naturally, they reduce themselves into a civil unity, by placing over them one head, and by making his will the will of them all, to the end there might be no gap left open by schism to return to their former confusion. Because the wills of men, though the fountains of all voluntary actions, yet are not themselves the objects of choice; (for we cannot will to be willing, (this would be infinite) but to perform what is commanded) and so are not capable of being obliged by compacts; therefore this submission of all to the will of one; or this union of them agreed upon, is to be understood in a politic sense, and signifies the giving up of every man's particular power into his disposal, so that he may be enabled to force those who are unwilling upon some private ends, to be obedient for the common good; otherwise they would enjoy the benefits of others faith in observing laws, and the advantages of their own violations and breaches, which may probably be prevented, if penalties be appointed much greater than the profit which can come by their disobedience; because, as men are naturally tempted by hopes of good, so they are as naturally deterred by a certain expectation of greater evils.  
Thus also by transferring every particular man's power into the hands of one, is not meant a real laying down and natural translation of their strength, (because their nerves and sinews are not alienable, as their money and goods) but a consent and mutual obligation (as of all to one, whether he be King, as in a Monarchy; or some Nobles, for they are one too, as in Aristocracy, so of every one to each other) of not using their natural power, but only as Law shall require, that is, of not resisting that body in which the supreme power is placed, as likewise of aiding him, or them by virtue of that promise, or of that oath, according to the nature of the contract, when be or they summon their strength.  
By what is laid down, may be discovered the weakness of their second principle (which hath done most mischief and till it be thoroughly rooted out of men's minds the seed is still left behind, from whence rebellion will spring) the falsehood whereof, I thought fit to manifest in relation to the peace and quiet of Christendom and the world in general, it not at all concerning His Majesty's case, who was so fare from offering violence, that it was the extraordinary mercy of God upon this land, that did enable him to defend his life against it, his Magazines and forts, and Ships, that is all his civil power being taken from him, and an army actually raised against his personal strength, (for His Majesty had not granted one commission to raise a man, when they began their defensive war) so that Lucan's expression might seem fitted to this Kingdom's misery. 
Parque novum fortuna videt concurrere bellum  
Atque virum—   
The doctrine is; the law of nature will defend us, whomsoever we kill, though the King, in our own defence, and we are acquitted by that principal vim vi. (nay some go higher and make it unlawful not to resist even the highest authority, it being a sin against nature etc. whom the examples of the holy Martyrs and of Christ himself do clearly confute, though they cannot satisfy them.) I will briefly answer it, as meaning to enlarge myself thereon in the following discourse.  
It ceases to be lawful, 
Native right restrained by positive obligation.  after we have made ourselves sociable parts in one body, because we voluntarily and upon agreement restrained ourselves from making use of this native right and the renouncing this power by mutual compact will appear very consonant to sound reason, whether we look upon the benefits ensuing thereby, or the mischiefs avoided. For it is a more probable means to the attaining that very end, in relation to which they plead for it, the preservation of particular persons. 
prudential motives for parting with some rights of nature, without power to resume them.  Upon this condition of obliging ourselves not to resist public authority, in requital for this submission of our private strength, we are secured by the united power of all, and the whole Kingdom becomes our guard. And it is most likely we should be less exposed to injuries, when that impartial and equal measure of right, the known law, is by this means maintained. The evils which would flow from this licence to resume our power against contract, are infinite. Our own feelings too fully instruct us in the sad effects, and I doubt not but the weariness of our present sufferings, and the expectation of growing mischiefs, will be powerful beyond rhetoric to persuade us to value highly the public tranquillity. I am confident, if the people of this land (whose eyes have been opened of late, and they are now sensible, that to continue violences to His Majesty hath introduced a necessity of oppressing them, and that they are bound to be undone in order to the injuries to their sovereign) were able to deliver themselves from their defenders, we should suddenly be restored to happiness, and it would be as hard a matter to engage them in a civil war, when they had again tasted the sweetness of plenty and quiet, as it is to persuade them to agree to peace, who challenge a legal power by the title of war to dispose of the Kings and Subjects revenues at pleasure.  
As reason induced men to enter into such a Covenant, and to lay a mutual obligation one upon another, not to resist authority upon what ever grounds, whether of fancied, or real injustice, but to submit their actions and persons to the ordinary trial, though it might possibly happen, that some particulars would be sentenced unjustly, because a fare more considerable good could not be obtained, unless by agreement patiently to submit to this possible evil, since the common peace and quiet, cannot be effectually provided for, if it shall be indulged to any, to appeal from the Laws to themselves, and to judge their Judges: So honesty and religion strictly bind them to preserve their faith entire, and this contract inviolable.  
The pains I have taken, to lay open, by way of introduction, to the view and examination of all that desire real satisfaction, the foundation upon which rule and Subjection are built, will appear not so delightful, as it was necessary. And it is no otherwise in the works of Art, operum fastigia spectantur, latent fundamenta, passers by admire the superstructure, when that strength which supports the most elegant piles, lies deeply buried in the earth, and unregarded. It were very strange, if any man should be so prodigiously weak, as to suffer himself to be persuaded to remove his chambers and galleries into a healthier air, a pleasanter prospect and more commodious Situation; and yet the same unreasonable advice is harkened to, concerning the civil frame, 
The foundation upon which States are settled, overthrown; if the people be made Judges of their safety, and allowed to use any means which they fancy conducing thereto.  without any consideration of the groundworks. Populi salus suprema lex, is the Engine by which the upper rooms are torn from the foundation, and seated upon fancy only, like Castles in the air. For the safety of the people is really built upon government, and this destroyed, the other, non jam aedes, sed cumulus erit, will be soon swallowed in the common confusion; but this is evidently and demonstrably ruined by these principles. For government is an effect not of a peoples divided natural powers, but as they are united and made one by civil constitution; so that when we call it supreme power, we impose an improper name, and have given occasion for mistakes (yet I shall not endeavour to alter the common use of speaking, but only to prevent a misunderstanding of it) because indeed this power is simply one, and when it doth express itself by one person or more, (according to different forms) who yet are but several parts of one governor, there is not left in the Kingdom or Commonwealth, any civil, that is, any legal power, which can appear in resistance, because all of them have bound their natural hands by a politic agreement.  
Hence it follows, those that will allow any power to Subjects against their ruler (let it be, 
Liberty to resist those in whom the Law places jus gladis the right of the sword, destructive to the very nature of government.  one man, or many united by one common form, which is the consent of the major part, and this is not capable of division) do thereby dissolve the sinews of government, by which they were compacted into one, and which made a multitude a people, and so break the Commonwealth into as many pieces, as they have set up opposers against it. For there cannot be two powers and yet the Kingdom remain one. This is that, which distinguishes Francs and England and Spain from one another, because they have three powers legally distinct, and are the same in relation each to other, as three particular men meeting in some wilderness, and considered as not having agreed to any Laws of Society.  
I am fully persuaded, no sober man can imagine the policy of this State is so defective, as to open a necessary way to its own ruin, that is, to divide the Kingdom legally in itself; and therefore it must necessarily be granted, those that take up arms being not authorized so to do by law, are guilty of rebellion, and the consequences of it, murder and rapine. It is very easy to determine, whom the Law hath armed with power, because not any part of the people, not the two Houses, but the King alone is sworn to protect us, which is an evident argument, he is enabled to effect this end, and that the necessary means to compass it, which is the posse regni, is at his disposal.  
By these generals throughly digested, and rightly applied, we shall be able to rule particular decisions.  
I shall desire one thing especially may be remembered, as which hath great influence upon all cases. Though what is truly the right of any one, doth not cease to be so naturally by another's sentence to the contrary; yet after positive constitutions, upon a Judge's decision, he can challenge no title to it, because by his own deed, and consent, he passeth it away in that judiciary determination. And equity and prudence both dictate, that it was a most honest and reasonable agreement, as conducing to public peace, and the quiet of mankind, that persons publicly constituted and more unconcerned in the decisions, should put an end to all debates. Because otherwise the controversy was not likely to be ended, but with one of the parties; For each man out of natural favour (the strongest corruptive of judgement) inclining to his own Interest, there was nothing left but force to determine it. There cannot be a more unhappy administration of Justice, then when strength is made the measure of right, and when all judges are bribed, as passing sentence to their own advantage.   

§. 1.  
THe following Section shall be spent in proving the proposition, by which the consciences of all Subjects must be directed.  
It is unlawful to resist him, or them, in whom the supreme authority, (that is, all the legal power of the Kingdom) is placed, and no dispensation (grounded upon what persons soever, as inferior Magistrates, or upon any cause, as the extreme abuse of this power to their oppression) can excuse such resistance from the sin of rebellion.  
Upon this pillar not only monarchy stands firm, but all other governements are equally supported; the general reason being applicable, according to the difference in several forms.  
In the third Section I will bring the case home to ourselves by proving this assumption; The King of England hath this supreme power, and then I shall leave it to every man's conscience to infer the conclusion, therefore it is unlawful to make resistance against their Sovereign.  
In the fourth Section, I will answer all the evasions (how plausibly soever founded) which I could meet with in the several writings of those men, who though they strike at the King down right and more immediately, yet by plain and evident cousequences they destroy all civil society.  
By way of conclusion, I will show, though such a power of resistance, as they or any others have yet openly pleaded for, should be granted lawful (as when in their own defence, or when he that hath the highest authority, and is bound by the law of God and his own oath, to administer justice equally, yet after frequent representations of their grievances, and most just Complaints of their great sufferings, affords no redress) yet this can be no justification of the present war against the King, nor acquit the Actors in it from being rebels. Because this case is evidently not now, as will appear after a view taken of the causas of this unnatural, and illegal division.  
The proposition to be proved is, It is unlawful to resist him or them in whom the supreme authority (that is, all the legal power of the Kingdom in order to raise arms) is placed, and no dispensation (grounded upon what persons soever, as inferior magistrates, or upon any cause, as the extreme abuse of this power to their oppression) can excuse such resistance from the sin of Rebellion.  
I make no question every man will apprehend, that by resistance here, 
Differences between not obeying against law; and hostile resistance to a lawful Sovereign.  is meant only hostile opposition, and not a refusal to put unjust commands (measured by divine or humane laws) in execution; for the truth is, if they are, or seem repugnant to God's law, (for then they are so really, in respect of those who have that apprehension; idem est esse & apparere, in this case of good and bad: because whatsoever is not of faith is sin) we must conform our practice to that standing rule, laid down by the Apostle, 
Active obedience against God's law, sin.  Deo magis, quam hominibus, We ought to obey God rather than men, we are bound (to use Tertullia's phrase) temperare majestatem Caesaris infra Deum. The reasons to the contrary for absolute & unlimited obedience have no solidity.  
One is upon a false supposal, 
Objections to the contrary.  that at our entrance into civil society, we submitted) as our wills, by which is meant not the faculty, but the effects of it, which were in our power, and which are subjected as fare as they were in our power, that is in all honest performances, for peccare non est nostri juris, so) our understanding, and consequently, though in our private opinion, such actions were unlawful, yet if commanded & said by our rulers to be just, our public judgement (which we had given them right to pass upon good or bad) did pronounce them honest.  
A second argument is, though we think such actions unlawful upon a particular comparing them, with the measure of right and wrong, divine precept, or prohibition; yet from a more general raeson, we think this thought of ours condemning such actions, to be an error, and so if we do, what we think in our private judgement God hath forbidden, we do contra opinionem agere, sed non contra conscientiam, practise against our opinion, not against our conscience, because that is swayed by this general reason. If when rulers say such a thing ought to be done, I say, it ought not, the sense of it is, I am wiser than they. But if I grant them the more able men, I must needs think they are likely to make truer judgement, and so am bound to submit to the greater discretion, because in moral differences, which are not capable of demonstration, I must guide my practice by the highest probabilities of good. If sheep knew how apt they are to go astray, they would be content to be guided by the shepherd, and therefore governors, who are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, are to direct us in the ways of safety. He that shall undertake to be his own master, will have a fool to his scholar; and he that refuses to follow his guide, and fancies some private turn, is likely to miss his way, and through many wander to come weary to his journey's end.  
A third argument is, to challenge to ourselves the judgement of good and evil, is the fruit of that bitter root of Adam's disobedience; Eritis sicut Dij, scientes bonum & malum, was the temptation, and the sin was, he did eat of the forbidden tree of knowledge of good and evil. He was not content to be acquainted with good only, submitting to (that which made actions good or bad) the command or prohibition of him, who had dominion over him, but began to examine the justice and reasonableness of them, and so would make himself like the Lawgiver.  
Answer. The answer hereto is easy by distinguishing those things in which God will require from every one a liberty of judging, and a conformable obedience, from things more obscure, and which will require a deeper search then ordinary understandings can make.  
Of the first sort are the plain and familiar truths laid down in scripture, of which S. Paul binds us to be so confident, that though an angel from heaven should preach any other doctrine, we may not admit it. As likewise many moral duties easily discerned even by weak apprehensions. If this were not so, the Apostles rule could not lawfully be made use of, we must obey God rather than men; and the people would be bound to follow their blind leaders into the pit of destruction. For Christ tells us both shall fall into the ditch. But the Apostle allows them to whom he spoke, to examine his doctrines of this nature, by the rule of their own understanding. I speak as to them which have understanding judge ye what I say, and judge in yourselves, is it comely etc. and in the verse following, doth not even nature itself teach you etc. This case is clearly decided in the 14th to the Rom. where we learn, if we condemn our actions, though in themselves not , yet to us they are sin. v. 22, 23. Happy is he that condemneth not himself in that thing which he alloweth. He that doubteth, is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith; wherefore he gave a general command in the 5. v. let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind.  
Of the latter sort are things more intricate, and which cannot without great difficulty be judged of. Being such for the most part wherein not men's honesty but their prudence is exercised. And here a submission of judgement is very reasonable. As in law cases to be swayed by the professors of it, or if we build a house to be directed by artists, or in a tempest to take the most probable way of escaping, by relying on the pilots steering the ship and forbidding unexperienced passengers to run to the helm confusedly and alter the course, according as their ignorance & fears prompt them, upon a conscientious madness, that they shall be accessary to their own death, if they put their lives out of their own hands, though they commit them to seamen, whose experience hath better enabled them to avoid the rocks and the shelves: And thus in civil government, wherein the greater part of men can have no deep insight, to trust the managery of the public safety, to persons wiser than themselves, and to bind one another to perform all offices in relation to this end, according as they shall be commanded by their governor's, and not to rule their lawgivers by disputing the unreasonableness of what is enjoined. And to this captivateing of their understanding religion obligeth them; for God is not a God of sedition, of mutinye, and confusion, but of unity, order and of peace.  
The case thus resolved produceth an excellent temper, in man's obedience; as by which we render to Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and to God the things which are Gods. Be subject to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake. This binds universally, those only cases being excepted, which God expressly and evidently reserves to himself; and in them we must take law from the more powerful. Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul, but rather fear him, which is able to destroy both soul and body in Hell.  
This liberty of denying obedience can neither be offensive nor dangerous to authority.  
First not offensive, 
No inconveniencies from this doctrine rightly stated; God to be obeyed rather than men.  because magistrates can challenge no more right over our actions, than God gives them or we ourselves had, before we submitted them to their commands; which was none in this supposed case, because a dishonest deed non est nostri juris is not in our power. We can no more pass away by promise God's right to our obedience, than we can covenant to transfer and give away another man's goods or demesnes.  
Secondly it is harmless in the consequences, because if any out of a real or seeming repugnance to divine precept, deny active obedience, they must confess themselves obliged by the same conscience of observing the law of God, not to resist that authority, which he hath armed jure gladij, with the right of using the sword, probably to this end that Religion might not be a cloak for Rebellion, & that we might not dare out of the fear of God to violate the order of divine providence; by which he hath thought fit to govern the world. This is the patience of the Saints, which shall be rewarded with heaven, because they suffer, rather than do evil for earthly considerations, as being assured, God hath forbidden them, though for prevention of their particular and undeserved misery, to disturb the public happiness, by resisting that power, which Scripture tells them is from above. It oft times pleases God to make use of ill governor's, and their unrighteous judgement may be his just sentence for our former transgressions; if it be his will to scourge us by them, no smart, should tempt us to cut his rod in pieces.  
Because generally men are hardly brought to entertain a truth, which seems disadvantageous to them, and comes in ill company, attended with affliction, Quis enim facilè credit, propter quod dolendum est? (though this should not be amongst Christians who are crucis candidati, & quibus frui fas est Diis iratis, and who ought to rejoice in their present sufferings, as the exercise of virtue, and that way to eternal glory, which our Saviour hath chalked out both by example and precept?) I will use the greater diligence in evidencing this point by all kind of proofs, of which the matter is capable.  
If we look bacl to the law of Nature, we shall find that the people would have had a clearer and more distinct notion of it, if common use of calling it Law had not helped to confound their understanding, when it ought to have been named the Right of nature; 
Difference between Law of Nature and Right of Nature.  for Right and Law differ as much as Liberty and Bonds: Jus, or right not laying any obligation, but signifying, we may equally choose to do or not to do without fault, whereas Lex or law determines us either to a particular performance by way of command, or a particular abstinence by way of prohibition; and therefore jus naturae, all the right of nature, which now we can innocently make use of, is that freedom, not which any law gives us, but which no law takes away, and laws are the several restraints and limitations of native liberty. Upon this ground I have showed already the right of nature cannot be pleaded against positive constitution, that being a permission only, and not an injunction, and therefore ceasing by a subsequent obligation arising from promise and compact, when multitudes became one Civil body.  
I was unwilling to weary the Reader by an unprofitable debate, and different stating of the original of power. For though it be most true, that paternal authority was regal, and therefore this of God's immediate constitution, 
Their own Scheame of Government serves our turn, and justifies the King's cause.  and founded in nature, yet it is not much pertinent to the present decision, nor can it necessarily concern modern controversies between Rulers and People. Because it is most evident, no King at this day (and much less other Governors) holds his Crown by that title, since several paternal powers in every State are given up, and united in one common father, who cannot pretend a more immediate kindred to Adam, than all the rest of mankind. For this consideration, I thought fit to lay down their own Scheame of Government, and let them make what advantages they can, by presenting to your apprehension a multitude before a people, like a heap of stones, before they are cemented and knit together into one building. I shall only desire my adversaries would not betray so much want of ingenuity, as to make this favour of joining issue upon their own principles, a contradiction. For I thought it loss of time to insist upon their mistakes in the manner of derivation of power, when all of us agree well enough in the thing. That, after the multiplying of mankind, there was an Anarchy is confessed, only they impute it to a want of all Law and Rulers, and we derive it more naturally from the multitude of Governors, whose wills being various, were so many distinct Laws to those who were under them, when in every family was a Kingdom. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  as Euripides describes the Cyclops: their Subjects were their own flesh and natural Princes, being wives and children) when there were so many absolute Princes within the compass of a Parish, that a man had scarce room to walk in a Territory; when a Commonwealth was lodged in a Cottage, this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was the mother of confusion, and by reason of such a multiplicity of Kings, it was not ill styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Though they had absolute power, yet it was confined within a narrow compass, and if they exercised any jurisdiction, or made use of their liberty to the prejudice of neighbour States, this begot controversies, and both parties having right to be Judges in their own causes, they made force the measure of decision, and who was strongest could not be known, but by the issue of the war. 
— Quis justiùs induit arma  
Scire nefas, summo se judice quisque tuetur.  
— Haec acies victum factura nocentem est.   
To prevent those fatal mischiefs to which they were subject, while they lived in this hostile State, evidently occasioned by their divided powers, a way was found out by making their individual strengths, and the many narrow authorities (which still justled one another) one legal power, and this was placed then with great prudence in one person, to the end the cause of their sufferings might be fully taken away, and that there might not be left a possibility of relapsing into their former miseries, which proceeded from opposition between equal authorities. Thus I grant to them their own Scheame, yet without prejudice to that truth delivered by Cedrens, who makes Adam the catholic Monarch: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
As reason first represented to them Monarchy, as the most perfect form, (from which their want of government was a defection, for we may say of Anarchy, Non fuit sic ab initio) so sense confirmed it, they having happy experience of those eminent advantages peculiar to this constitution, as unity, secrecy, and expedition. The Roman story doth approve this wisdom, by acquainting us with the fatal miscarriages, and bad successes of their Armies, when commanded by two Generals. And if we look upon this State in peace, we shall find by putting down Kings they laid the feed-plot of those many miserable civil wars, with which that people was so frequently, so extremely afflicted.  
The form of that Commonwealth was democratical; 
The government of Rome according to the form, democratical; but according to the practice, an illegal Monarchy.  but if we judge of it, not as established by Law, but according to the practice almost in all times, we must pronounce the Government an illegal Monarchy. For either some one man governed the Senate, and made them an instrument to oppress the people, or else (according as it was aptest to advance his interests) siding with the people, and telling them the Nobles took too much upon them, 
Different judgement of the best form of government, ofttimes the cause of sedition.  he by their power compassed his private ends under the names of common good, & public safety.  
The truth is, the different judgement of the best State, doth the facto open a gap to sedition, because men naturally desire to live most happily, and are easily tempted to contribute their endeavours to any change, which they fancy for the better; though in right it ought not to be so, notwithstanding some form might be proposed, which were really more perfect, because our faith once given to the present government, cannot be recalled; this civil union is as fast tied as the marriage knot, we are bound to take it for better for worse. And if otherwise, States would probably be shorter lived than men, as having their foundation on the sands, that is, on the inconstant wills of the people, who are blown about with every wind of contrary discourses. 
Fallacy in discourses concerning what kind of government is best.  But in this dispute concerning the best form of civil society, there is a great fallacy, as yet not fully discovered. Schemes are drawn in speculation, and politic discourses are framed, which bear much resemblance with some figures of Mathematicians, which are made with much ease upon paper, and with appearance of solid demonstration, so that the Scholars not able to object against it, entertain it for certain knowledge. But when reduced into practice in wood or stone, the failings are presently seen, and their contemplations appear vain and unprofitable, because they did not take into consideration the capacity of the Subject, on which they were to work, nor foresaw what resistance the matter would make. This error is committed in the comparison of States, and many plausible reasons are laid down for the rule of the Nobles, or of the people; which are best confuted by experience. For when it is debated, whether Monarchy be the most convenient government, the true sense of it is this, (if we judge according to the frequent practice, which in Politics is made the most reasonable measure of Laws) whether the people will live more happily when Law places the supreme power in one, and nominates that person (by which no room is left for division) or when one man being more active and crafty than his fellows, who ought to have an equal share in this authority, raises a faction upon plausible pretences, and under colour of serving his side, persuades them to be commanded by him, and so exercises the supreme power in an illegal way: which as it is compassed by engaging the people in misery, under colour of making them more happy, so ●● it must be kept up by as bad arts, and an Army must be maintained, to make good by force, what Law cannot justify.  
I do not wonder, (for it is no strange thing, part of the people should be unwise) that some should be induced to cast off Monarchy. They are told, it is very unreasonable that one should have all the power, 
— (Toto liber in orbe  
Solus Caesar erit;)  They may upon the same ground persuade them to quarrel with God Almighty. Their meaning is (though they dare not speak out) there is no government good, unless they have a share in it. This interest of being joint Sovereigns, makes them unable to see, or else willing to dissemble the apparent dangers which division threatens, as likewise the great disadvantages which wait on slow proceed, (counsels, as well as men, growing weak by age) and the unhappy miscarriages of brave undertake, because not managed with fitting secrecy. All these three are plainly spoken in many Governors, Faction, Delay, Openness.  
The method whereby the people's affections are poisoned, and won to a dislike of the present State, 
By what means so many of the people are misled into Rebellion.  and by degrees, brought first to desire, then to attempt an Innovation, is this. All the defects (how unavoidable soever, by reason of secret lets and hindrances not to be foreseen, as depending upon many circumstances, which are variable according to other men's wills, and which they have not the honesty to put the people in mind of) are with great care represented to their considerations, and much diligence is used to set before them a perfect Catalogue of what ever faults have been committed by inferior Magistrates and under Officers; and as they have excellent memories in repeating grievances, so they have learned an art (very convenient for their ends, and for creating a misunderstanding between King and people, that they may manage the discontents of the Subject to advance particular designs) to forget the several satisfactions given by Princes, when upon general complaints, they are fully instructed in their Subjects sufferings.  
The next work is to assign such a cause of these corruptions as shall open a way to the alteration they aim at, which is, to impute them to the nature of a monarchical government, by telling them, their happiness is built upon a very uncertain foundation, the will of one man, and if he be bad, they must surely be miserable.  
Lastly, a promise is made, of healing all their evils, and the remedy is, multitudo medicorum (the same plausibilities may be urged to persuade an entertainment of many Physicians about a sick person, as about a distempered State, but experience masters these reasons, and hath demonstrated the danger of it) they must place the Sovereign power amongst many, to the end, if one should fail of his duty, others may supply it, if one should be willing to oppress, others may be able to protect them. It fares with men in the distempers of State, as in those of their bodies; They are easily induced to make trial, of what any man tells them will do them good, and they have the strongest fancies to those things of which they have least experience. But the Fallacy which abuses the people is non causa pro causâ; there ever was and always will be matter of Complaint, under what kind of regiment soever we live, and till men be absolutely perfect, the government cannot be so; voluntary corruptions, and natural frailties must have an influence upon every state. This tampering with the Body to reduce it to perfect health, hath overthrown many excellent constitutions, and such kind of physic proves the most dangerous disease. Wherefore we must not fall out with ourselves upon every distemper, and presently think of altering our natural habit, lest we make ourselves well, only as dead men are so. It may become State-doctors to take notice of Hypocrates his Aphorism, consueta longo tempore, etiamsi deteriora, insuetis minùs molesta esse solent.  
It will concern us in prudence to take that course which will convey to us the greatest goods, and is the most probable way of avoiding the most evils. And this I conceive monarchy is most likely to effect, and I make no doubt the people would be of the same opinion, 
Fallacy of unequal comparison.  if their affections had not been craftily prevailed upon, by that miserable fallacy of unequal comparison, between a King not performing his trust, and Nobleses not failing of their duty as if the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or optimacy would warrant it) whereas if they were put into a just balance they ought to be supposed both good, 
Greater hores in Monarchy; greater fears in an Aristocracy.  or both bad, and then a true judgement might be made of the mischiefs and advantages; Then we should clearly discern, we have greater hopes under a virtuous King, (suppose both good) and greater fears under a vicious nobility or Senate, (suppose both bad) And besides there is one very considerable circumstance, which ought to rule much in the decision; it is much more probable we shall have a good King, than a good nobility. (I take good in a politic sense, for that only concerns the present dispute, and understand it in this notion, as providing for the people's happiness.) Because his interest is the same with that of the People, which is strong State security; 
King's interest the same with the peoples; that of Nobles divided from their happiness.  whereas that of particular Nobles, and much more of men of lower rank, where such are admitted, is divided from the public happiness. The Commonwealths of Greece will afford many examples of persons selling their Country, and putting the great Council upon ill attempts, and labouring with their utmost cunning to frustrate good designs, because their dependence upon a foreign Kingdom or State, was worth much more unto them, than they could hope to gain by honest service to their Country.  
First, we have greater hopes under a virtuous King: because upon supposal that both be willing to promote the people's happiness, 
Much greater happiness in Monarchy.  yet he is more able to compass that end, by reason he hath a more united power, and the execution of what ever designs, depends but upon a single resolve, and therefore may be managed with certain closeness, and all convenient swiftness, so that good counsels shall be first discovered in the effects: whereas a great body moves slowly and most times the opportunity of doing is gone by, while they are but half way in their deliberation.  
Subjects living under good Lords or Senators (such as value the honour of being esteemed worthy patriots, above the advancing their own fortunes, or raising children, or preferring friends, subsidia dominationi, or enriching kindred, and these qualities rarely meet in the major part of an assembly) seem to me to be in the same state, as children who have lost a father, and whose fortunes by his care are left to Feoffees in trust; these though extremely honest, yet by reason of necessary particular cares, which more immediately concern them, and because they are many, and so every one expects the rest will probably be careful to perform this trust, and therefore he may be spared, and allowed to spend his time more advantageously in improving his own estate, especially this performance of faith to a dead man being a very barren virtue, either the wages being paid before, or else nothing allotted. He presuming upon their goodness, and frequent deep Protestations of loving his equal to themselves, and thinking it an unworthy thing, to set a price upon an old friends fidelity, and so leaving it to be rewarded only by heaven, and the same honest care in others of their children; These I say out of real or very plausible hindrances, are forced to neglect the children's portions, and the poor Orphans receive uncomfortable satisfaction. They would have been in much better condition, though strangers in worldly affairs, if wholly left unto themselves, because their necessities would have quickened them, whereas now their hands are tied up from helping themselves, and all they can contribute towards making themselves Masters of their own fortunes, is a fruitless impudence in vainly importunating the curators: So is it most times in the government of many, though understanding, and good men; which is a rare happiness, and yet no security against miseries, because onus commune negligunt singuli, what belongs to their common care, frequently miscarries by particular negligences.  
Secondly, 
Greater miseries in Aristocracy.  we have greater fears under vicious Lords or Senators; That is, it stands with clear and evident reason, we should be more miserable, living under many tyrants, then under one. The thirty tyrants of Athens, and the Decemviri of Rome, and that state variously oppressed, sometimes by the Senate, sometimes by the people, and at length to prevent ruin cadens in sinum imperatorum, 
Monarchy a more healthy constitution.  are examples of this sad truth. That which makes a people out of love with monarchy is a contemplation of the miserable consequences of abused power, whereas the government by Senate is more apt to degenerate, and the oppressions under it are more intolerable.  
As there are many advantages peculiar to Monarchy, so there is not any one inconvenience to which a people living under an Aristocracy (as to instance for the better understanding it, under a Parliament as it is now mistaken for the two Houses, challenging absolute obedience to their Ordinances, without the King's ratification, nay against his plain denial, by which they are null by the Law of England) are not subject in a much higher degree.  
Let us suppose a Prince to be lustful, or cruel, or covetous, or prodigal, and wasting what might be employed on the public upon favourites. 
The diseases of a Senate more violent.  If these vices are so grievous, when confined within one breast; to what height will our misery swell, when they shall be scattered through all parts, and be active in each corner of the Land? Their wives and daughters may be safe by distance, and live out of the reach of one man's embraces: If his lose desires are so insatiable, how can they weary those of so many? Secondly, it is more easy not to incur the hatred of one, whereas there are scarce possible ways of compliance with so many cross humours. One will never fall out with all, for he knows he should have an ill match of it, whereas the whole State may suffer by cruelty exercised by divided oppressors, because each man gives full reins to his revenge, as thinking it safe enough, the fears from a few persons crushed by him, being below the delight of manifesting his power in his enemy's calamity. Thirdly, the covetousness of Senators is more devouring, because we may feed one fire with less expense of fuel, than a hundred. And fourthly a Prince's profuse spending upon favourites is infinitely overbalanced by so many providing for their poor kindred, and making friends, and purchasing dependants. This art (very necessary to all men employed in State affairs, who are subject to various censures) of underpropping their reputation, and hiring Advocates to plead for them in their absence, must draw out very considerable sums, and be more chargeable to the people (from whom the supplies must come) than the bounty of one man, though showered down over-plentifully upon some few privadoes. The wisest States have ever made ample allowances to enable their Prince to bestow favours according to merits, or liking, (the privileges of every private man) it arguing a noble soul to be bountiful.  
It hath been showed already, that Monarchy is a more healthy constitution, and that when sick the diseases of it are less violent, 
Easy remedies for a sick Monarchy.  and it will easily be made to appear, they are more curable. Good counsel, or at least age and experience hath reform many Princes; but however our grievances are mortal, the death of one opens a way to better hopes: but the corruption of a Senate ends in dissolution. 
The diseases of a Senate incurable.  Tacitus gives a full character of the distempers which are fatal to a degenerate Senate. Inter Patres plebémque certamina exarsêre, modò turbulenti tribuni, modò consules praevalidi; & in urbe ac foro tentamenta civilium bellorum. Mox è plebe infima C. Marius, & nobilium saevissimus L. Silvius victam armis libertatem in dominationem verterunt. 2. hist. There arose hot contentions between the Nobility and Commons; now the factious Tribunes bore sway, than the Consuls kept them under In the City and the place of public assembly there were frequent skirmishes, the Preface and Essays to a civil war. Anon Caius Marius, the meanest of the Commonalty; and Lucius Silvius, the cruelest amongst the Nobles, destroying their liberty and property by the assistance of their illegal Militia, introduced an absolute and unbounded government.  
There be some, 
The miseries of a kingdom when a child governs, an argument for monarchy.  with whom that of Ecclesiastes prevails, woe to thee O land, when thy King is a child, and they think it a strong argument against monarchy, because this calamity is not incident to a senate, they not being subject to nonage. But this place rightly understood, is a very full confirmation of the happy condition we have reason to expect under monarchy, and of the calamity and woes which probably attend an Aristocracy. For the cause of those miseries foretold is plainly this, A King during his infancy being not able to rule, the government is managed by the nobles. Whence we learn, that change which the people oft times with sinful earnestness labour for, is to be found in the catalogue of God's judgements, and they sue for, and by wicked arts endeavour to compass their own punishment. It is an argument of God's great mercy to them, that he fights against them; if he were thoroughly angry, the designs of innovatours would have better success. This truth is warranted by scripture. For the transgression of a land, many are the princes thereof: but by a man of understanding and knowledge the state thereof shall be prolonged. prov. 28. 2.  
To all these corruptions a popular state is more subject, 
Popular form the worst government.  and the imperfections of it, are so much the greater, as it is farther distant from monarchy; the temper of it (which is unity, the soul of government) being more easily dissolved. Those which cry it most up, will be unwilling to admit it in their families, which are smaller principalities. Three things especially have made it so taking with the vulgar. 1. a pretended impartial administration of justice; 2ly. an empty name of liberty; and 3ly the so much applauded equality, by which they seem to reduce their civil constitutions to the primary laws of nature, which gave to all men a common right.  
Concerning the first, 
More equal administration of justice without reason, and against experience, promised in this form  their hopes that justice should be more equally administered, are grounded upon this probability: It is very hard to corrupt a multitude into favour or respect of persons; (though some rivers have been infected, the ocean cannot be poisoned.) A man may satisfy the interests of one or some few, but to buy injustice of so many would be no thriving trade, he might more cheaply lose his cause. This is a plausible but very fallacious argument. Because experience makes it evident, that to prevent the evils of division, which the many following particular and cross interests do beget, one remedy is constantly made use of, which is this; some few of the more crafty citizens, who have gained credit with them, agree together in private, & order businesses at their close committee, and so undiscernably lead the multitude on to what ever they call the public good, of which they having prevailed upon their affections are esteemed the most competent Judges. And what is this, but to pretend to a Democracy, and be governed by an illegal Aristocracy? By this means any one of the Junto (for they must gratify each other mutually) is enabled to stop the course of law in a friend's behalf, and to put a sharper edge upon the sword of justice when it strikes an enemy. These kind of men have got the Art of changing the people's opinions of just and unjust, according as it is more suitable to their own profit, and they are not so much beholding to any solid wisdom for it, as a kind of frothy eloquence, which we may observe in their set speeches and declamations, with much cunning fitted to the capacity of their auditors. They do not at all trouble themselves to satisfy reasonable men, for they are but a few, and can stand them in little stead, where things are carried by the greater number, and reasons are not weighed, but told. The art is, to apply their harangues to that which rules weaker men, the affections (suadendo docent, non decendo suadent) and these are easily convinced, and made the measure of their judgement; the want of weight in the premises being supplied by an extraordinary love to the conclusion. It was too truly said in reference to these popular decisions. 
— Vtilitas justi propè mater & aequi est.   
From this fountain arise the many debates amongst men in civil affairs. For in Mathematical knowledge, because it concerns not meum and tuum, there is an unanimous consent; all agree, what lines are straight, and what crooked; but the judgements of right and wrong, are as various as their interests different. 
The objection of greater liberty, answered.   
Secondly, concerning liberty, it is very strange that men should so generally fall in love with a bare sound, and court a name of freedom, which duly examined, will be found to signify nothing. They cannot mean by it a looseness from all laws, because their intent is to change, not take away government; they dare not own such a pernicious licence. And therefore the true debate amongst men is, not whether they shall admit of bonds, (that is such obligations as laws lay upon them, these are readily embraced) but who shall impose them; the question is not an servirent, sed an uni vel pluribus, and it is commonly called liberty, to serve more masters.  
The restraint of our freedom is that which is most valuable amongst the benefits of government. For this preserves peace between men, that their hands are tied up from doing injuries. Though we naturally delight in a full and absolute liberty, yet the love of it is overbalanced by fears; every one could wish to retain it himself, but not upon this condition, that all others should enjoy the same freedom. Because as the contemplation of our own liberty is pleasant, to do what we list, so there is a more sad consideration arising from the thought of others freedom, to make us suffer, as much as they may be tempted to inflict.  
Thirdly, 
Aequalitate nihil est iniquius  concerning equality, if they urge, it comes nearer to the law of Nature, by the same reason they must dissolve the bonds of all government, since there can be no Magistrate, no Superior and Inferior, and par in parem non habet imperium; so we must indulge to every man to do what seemeth good in his own eyes. This argument doth not conclude for one form above another, but equally destroys all, and is applied to a popular State, only out of resemblance of some imperfections common to both, because that government comes nearest to none, and is but few degrees removed from Anarchy and confusion. But the truth is, this equality which they so passionately affect, is clearly against nature, who if an equality of rewards had been intended, would have made all men equally deserveing. Reason doth teach us, since it is manifest, we may excel others by education and industry; greater encouragements should be allotted, in consideration of the charges of good breeding, and of the extraordinary studies, whereby men enable themselves for the honour and good of the public. Besides this equality, though pretended to conserve, doth in truth destroy amity, for none are so quarrellsome, none so subject unto envy, as equals.  
We may judge of the thriving of popular States, by what we observe in commons, which are always poor, and bare, and if taken into one man's hands, would be improved fourfold: we find by experience what all should look after, is neglected by every one, whilst each man thinks his particular expense of time and study will not conduce much, and that they may be supplied by others, and therefore he chooses to employ them rather on his private interests much more profitably.  
Seeing that the greater part of men in a popular sway, are bred up to gain, they make profit for the most part of the rule of their actions, and so entertain but little sense of honour. And hence this State is easily corrupted by their low affections, so that particular persons may be sometimes rich, the State can never be glorious. How can the happiness of that Commonwealth be lasting, where the wiser and honester part being still the fewer, must be ruled by men of weak understandings, and of corrupt affections, men extremely violent, if they be not awed, and in their fear irresolute in all their proceed, men not capable of secrets, so that they expose themselves to all disadvantages? Their assemblies are full of inconstancy and disorder, it is very hard to separate tumult and multitude. The wiser oft times dare not speak, fearing the madness of the people. For if things should succeed ill by some secret lets, they are sure to suffer for the event, since amongst such Judges it is not enough to counsel prudently, unless fortunately also. The States of Sparta and Athens will afford plenty of examples.  
If they be not united by fear of a foreign war, they will quickly break out into a domestic. They are well compared to the raging of the waves; their contrary humours easily raise a tempest. The united Provinces are thought by many to owe more to the Spaniards constant enmity, then to the aides of English, Scots, or French. (And yet without their assistance they had been long since swallowed up,) and they may thank the justice of Monarchies, that these friends made them not a prey to themselves. He is a stranger in the Roman story, who knows not how fatal Mercenaries were, when lent by a Commonwealth. If he would not have fought with them, he had conquered them long ere this. The fate of Greece would have been theirs, Graeciae civitates dum imperare singulae cupiunt, omnes imperium perdiderunt: we see how the Athenians, Lacedæmonians, Thebans, Arcadians, Phocians, Locrians, Corinthians, Boeotians, with others, variously siding, that they might keep the balance even, miserably warred upon one another, till at last Philip took advantage of their discords, and made himself King of all.  
I have been tempted into this large digression, for the fuller satisfaction of the people, in whom a dislike of the present government is begot, and so a way is laid open for a change of it, upon pretence some other form would be more advantageous. Which first is not true, and therefore they have not any motive for disloyalty, since they would be dishonest against Interest. And secondly, if it were true in itself, yet it is not so, when a State is settled under another form, the certain miseries of a civil war, and the great difficulties of setting it together, when it is torn into so many pieces, will be above any hopes they can reasonably propose to themselves. And thirdly, if it could be done advantageously and safely, yet it cannot honestly. They will forfeit Heaven for that, which in all probability will make them more miserable upon earth; and it were a sad purchase, if they should obtain as much as their ambition or covetousness can devour. Civil society is founded upon Justice, and supported by Religion, which obligeth us to preserve the faith of contracts entire. We are bound to stand to our bargain, though it should appear it might have been better made. Experience shows us, that States may live and flourish too under the worst form of government, and they are not immortal under the best. Let the imperfections be more or less in this or that kind of regiment, they cannot absolve the Subject's conscience; though he may have reason to prefer other Laws, he must have so much religion to be obedient to those under which it pleased God to place him.  
It is high time to make particular application of the former discourse, concerning the original of government, and by a distinct state of it to give light to all which follows.  
Non est potestas nisi à Deo, 
True state of government in general, with application to that of this Kingdom.  saith the Apostle, Rom. 13. There is no power but of God, that is, the right by which the Magistrate governs, and all the jurisdiction he exercises is derived from divine ordinance. This may be conveyed either immediately, as amongst the Jews, when God designed the person, which now no State will pretend; or else mediante populi consens●…, the consent of the people intervening, and this two ways, either by a free election, upon hopes from his extraordinary goodness; or by conquest, attended with a voluntary submission, upon fears from his extraordinary power, that he may be willing to protect, who was able to injure: whether of these motives presented the person, is not certain in the first times, but it is clear their Empire was absolute (I exclude not the bounds of justice according to the Laws of right reason, and equity) usually known by the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in which arbitria principum pro legibus erant. Though this continued long in the world, and the Eastern people enjoyed a great measure of happiness under it, and therefore with great reason (to use the expression of Tacitus) addictè admodum regnabantur. they were subject most devoutly; yet the sense of some sufferings (as the fate of humane things is interwoven with a mixture of good and evil) suggested a remedy, which was to bond his power within the limits of positive Laws. From hence proceeded the different qualifications of Regal power in several Kingdoms. Some, though restrained by Laws, yet were truly Monarches, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, being not responsable for any breaches, as supreme, though not absolute: others had the name and title of Kings only, but were subject to a superior jurisdiction, as Theseus to the people, the Spartan Kings to the Ephori, It is not necessary to determine that question, whether the frequent debates about the not observation and the breaches of these agreements, (which, a discontented part of the people challenging the liberty of being Judges in this case, and the King thinking he had as much right, did produce civil wars, and most unnatural distractions) have not heretofore, and will probably hereafter make States more unhappy than they were even in their worst times, and when they suffered most under the abuses of one man's power, whilst there was, though sometimes an unjust, yet always a certain way of ending controversies; when a sentence, if it did not find, yet made a right, and res judicata pro veritate accipiebatur. To decide this, I say, is not altogether necessary, because the obligations which lie both on King and people have their strength from this, not that he might better govern the people in such or such a way, but because this particular government is established by the consent of both parties; their wills give the form to the regiment, and not the conveniences of it. To come nearer home, and grant as much as reasonable men, and those which understand the nature of government can require. For I think they do ill service to the cause, though with good affections, who out of a desire to make it more firm and stronger, place it upon any other than the natural foundation, and that which is only fit to support it, and take the rights which God gave to the Kings of Judah, for the measure of all regal authority, which if they were, all Kings would have equal power, but this evidently varyes according to different Laws, and is more or less according to several constitutions. That which is pleaded for in this discourse, as common to them and our Kings, is only jus regni, the right of Monarchy, not to be accountable to any inferior jurisdiction.  
I shall not deny, a Kingdom may be so constituted (but than it is no Monarchy) that upon a real breach of such or such conditions, named in the compact, and a forfeiture being expressed, the sword of Justice may be taken up by some Magistrates, appointed by law, as the Ephori amongst the Lacedæmonians; or by the people, as at Rome when the last appeal did legally lie unto them, (for it did not always, as when a Dictator was created, he was the whole people for six months, and though the time of his reign was limited, his power was not bounded, he was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, accountable to none for what he did in his regency, no, not when a private man again: and so under the Emperors, as appears by the Lex Regia, quoted by Ulpian, which transferred all the people's power upon him, (L. quod. D. de constit. prin.) A mistake upon this hath seduced so many of the King's Subjects into Rebellion. For because it is made appear a State may be so established, and they are induced to believe, it is more reasonable it should be so established; upon these premises they conclude most inconsequently, that our State is so established, and in the strength of this fight against His Majesty, and did their best to kill Him, contrary to God's ordinance, applied to our civil constitutions, and repugnant to their own oath, in which they swore to be loyal in reference to His Person, and that they would defend His life with their utmost power.  
That a Kingdom may be so established, a considering man will not gainsay. If the State of Venice should call their Duke King, this new name would not convey any new power into him. Election or succession cannot rule the case; for an elective Kingdom may be conferred absolutely, as will appear in the Roman Empire, and a successive may be subject to forfeiture, if this be expressed in the Covenant. For succession is not a new title to more right, but a legal continuance of what was first gotten.  
2. That it is more reasonable so to establish a Kingdom, that the Prince shall be accountable to a higher power, either placed in some Magistrates, or in the people, (and then by the way it is not a Monarchy, but either an Aristocracy or a popular State) though this be very false, yet if it were true, it cannot justify this war now undertaken as things are ordered in this Land, against the King. Because Policy is no dispensation against observing known Laws, and we may not destroy our Governors out of reason of State; Machiavelli must not give Law to the Gospel. If we might challenge such liberty, there were not such a thing as Justice, our oaths would be of no force against Interest; profit should be the measure of our actions, and we must conclude all right what ever was advantageous. Since than not such persons as they could better fancy, but those only whom the Law hath confided in, and enabled to that end, can put Arms into the hands of the people, it concerns every man, as much as his soul is worth (for that will certainly be lost in those great sins of Rebellion, Perjury, and Murder) sadly to examine whether to fight against the King, be not to resist the Supreme Power, to which God hath threatened damnation.  
Every State hath a supereminent dominion or paramount interest over all particular men, and what belongs to them, and consequently hath full power to restrain the licence of resisting, for the preservation of order and public tranquillity. That it should lay such an obligation upon all Subjects, 
Nonresistance to the supreme power, essential to the preservation of order.  there is evident reason, because what the supreme power, that is the State (in order to those things wherein supremacy consists) does, is truly the act of all, and none can have just cause of quarrel for dislike of what they themselves do; and moreover necessity enforces it. Because without this the essence and being of a State were destroyed, which is, Order. For this ceases▪ if first and last be confounded, and the City is dissolved into a multitude, and that which should be one body, becomes so many independent men.  
The benefits which are conveyed to us by men in authority, are described by Timothy 1.. 2. 2. and he calls them the leading of a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty. It is not imaginable how they should be enabled to compass this end, except some sentence be supreme, from which it shall not be lawful to appeal; and consequently except that power which Law arms, and which looks to the execution of what is decreed, be not to be resisted. For if it should be indulged to us to change our Adversary, and fall out with the Judge, and as oft as we think we suffer wrong by his determination, to take the freedom of righting ourselves, upon this ground, that his duty is to give righteous judgement, and therefore not satisfying that trust, he is no longer a Judge, then just; his sentence ought not to be submitted to, for we are not bound to be obedient to his will, but law; if he endeavour to put it in execution by himself or his malignant Officers; though we kill him, it is no fault, because violence was offered only to his person, not to his authority, which was none in this case, because he judged against Law, and that gives not power to its own overthrow; it is evident this principle makes our strifes and debates endless, all our Laws would be writ in blood; it breaks in sunder all the bonds with which the goodly frame of government is knit together, and robs us of our peace under Anarchy and confusion. Out of this consideration the wisdom of all States hath thought it fit to secure the person or persons in whom the supreme power is seated, by the strictest Laws, and most severe punishment, which cannot consist with a liberty of resistance, to the endangering his or their lives. By the Civil Law, a Soldier was cashiered, not if he did strike again, but if he only kept off some strokes, and held the rod of a Centurion; but if he broke it willingly, or offered the least violence, he was sacrificed to the Roman discipline, and expiated his offence by death. Certainly the people would have nourished in their breasts a greater reverence, and more awful respects towards Majesty, if they had not been ill catechised and taught, that Dei minister est nobis in bonum, He is the Minister of God, might be construed, the People's servant; and that a King is but their creature, and therefore in duty is bound to submit to his maker.  
The truth is, we find it called by Peter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; the people have a hand in it, this cannot be denied, but we have it in the same verse raised into a divine workmanship, 
The King is Des Minister, not the people's servant, not their creature.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, acknowledge yourselves to be subject, submit to the King, or break not order, in which he is first or supreme, for the Lords sake: 1 Pet. 2. 13. The work is taken out of their hands, when they have contributed as much as they were able, which was to give up their divided powers, and unite them in him; their act made him the fountain of all that power which they had, and by consequence the fountain of all honour, that always bearing proportion to the former; for to honour is nothing else, but to testify by our actions an opinion of so much or so great power in any one, and therefore the same act is expressed only in different words, Fear God, honour the King: v. 17. If they had been changed to honour God, fear the King, they had signified the same duty. And therefore it is said, Servants be subject to your masters with all fear: v. 18. The work I say is taken out of the people's hands, and God himself perfects it. If it had stayed there, if God had not pleased to add to, and finish it, yet it had been most true, that no resistance were lawful; and evidently false, that he were universis minor, because he that hath supreme, that is, all their power, is the representative all, he is legally the whole people. But the obligation of not resisting is infinitely more weighty, if we consider him not only as representing the people, but as representing God himself. 
The King God's representative, aswell as the people's.  He hath given to him a power of a much higher nature, a part of his dominion over the life of man. The people could not agree together to dispense with God's precept, Thou shalt not kill, nor distinguish shedding blood with the sword of vengeance from murder. 
Power over the life of man, from God only, not from the people.  It was not possible for any man to give away a greater right over his own life than he had, Nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest, quàm ipse habet; and he had nothing to do in the disposal of any others, and therefore except killing a man's self be lawful, the people cannot enable the Magistrate to take away their lives. Hence it follows, though that be lamentable Sophistry in many respects, Quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale, urged to maintain a clear contradiction, that Subjects are above him whom they have placed over them; yet if it were sound reason, it were a very impertinent argument, because it proceeds upon a false supposal, that the people should efficere talem. Because jus gladii, (to bear the sword innocently, and to cut off offenders without deserving greater punishment than they inflict, by transgressing against Gods known will, Vindicta mea, ego retribuam, Vengeance is mine, I will repay saith the Lord,) must refer to God as the author. Magistrates are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God's Delegates, and not the peoples; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God's Ministers, his revengers, (or as it is better without a comma,) his revenging Ministers to execute wrath. It is very strange the people should be so much abused, as to be persuaded to take upon them God's Prerogative, and to usurp his language. Psal. 82. 6. We have said, ye are Gods; and to contradict Christ, who says to his unjust Judge, Thou couldst have no power to take away my life, unless it were given thee from above: but they state it otherwise, unless it were given thee from beneath, from us, and we were not so mad as to contract for our own ruin.  
Most of their Writers in their printed Sermons and Pamphlets, declaim against this tame behaviour, this obligation not to resist, as an absurd and senseless thing, and a condition repugnant to man's nature, and unworthy of reasonable creatures; but I must tell them God was not of their opinion, who thought it fit to govern his own people in this way: who ever was not obedient to what the highest authority did determine, 
God's own people bond not to resist the supreme Magistrate; therefore this no absurd constitution.  was to die, as appears Deut. 17. 12, 13. The man that will do presumptuously, and will not hearken to the Priest, (that standeth to minister there before the Lord thy God) or unto the Judge, even that man shall die, and thou shalt put away the evil from Israel. God commands he should be made an example, that the people may not be tempted to Rebellion; for in the 13 verse it is said, All the people shall hear and fear, and do no more presumptuously. It is worth our notice that here all the people are mentioned; if they had agreed together to resist not a pretended, but a real false sentence, this conspiracy could not turn their sedition into a just war, it could not take off the guilt of disobedience, though the multitude of offenders might hinder the punishment; Populi salus, suprema lex, had been but a weak plea here.  
This is urged only to prove thus much, that all their arguments (which have greatest influence upon the people's affections) drawn from inconveniencies by reason of the faults of Governors (under which the Jewish Commonwealth frequently suffered, as appears by the Prophet's reprehensions) may as justly be made against the Jewish Government, of which God himself was the author. And that he forbade resistance to supreme authority is plain moreover, the first of Joshua, v. 18. Whosoever he be that doth rebel against thy commandment, and will not hearken to thy words in all that thou commandest him, he shall be put to death: only be strong and of a good courage. Hence the weakness of that Sophistry (which hath caused these sad distractions) is evident. For they persuade the people, it were madness to make such a contract, which upon supposal of bad Governors would leave them without remedy, and therefore ●…it for certain truth they made their bargain wiser. Whereas there is no ground for imputation of folly, for following Gods own pattern, and yet if it were indiscretion, this doth not void the compact: They are bound to be honest, though they were not wise; to plead they were fools, will not licence them to be knaves.  
Lex Regni, as it is called, 1 Sam. 10. 25. the fundamental Law of Government, (of which a Monarchy is but a species) or the right of supreme authority is most excellently described by Samuel, in the 1. Book, 8. cap. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17. verses. This shall be the right of the King that shall reign over you: He will take your sons and appoint them for himself, for his charets, and to be his horsemen, and some shall run before his charets. And he will appoint him Captains over thousands, and Captains over fifties, and will set them to ear his ground, and to reap his harvest, and to make his instruments of war, and instruments of his charets. And he will take your daughters to be confectionaries, and to be cooks, and to be bakers. And he will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your olive-yards, even the best of them, and give them to his servants. And he will take the tenth of your seed, and of your vineyards, and give to his officers and to his servants. And he will take your men servants, and your maid servants, and your goodliest young men, and your asses, and put them to his work. He will take the tenth of his sheep, and ye shall be his servants. And ye shall cry out in that day because of your King which ye shall have chosen you, and the Lord will not hear you in that day. It is not lawful for you to break that yoke which ye put upon yourselves, neither shall your tears prevail with God to take it off your necks: notwithstanding such afflictions were foretell, their resolution is, to have a King over them, that they also may be like all the Nations, and that their King may judge them, and go out before them, and fight their battles. Sit incommodum, we acknowledge these are grievous inconveniences, (nam quid ferè undique placet, it is the fate of all governments, because managed by men, who may prove vicious, to be unavoidably subject to great calamities) verùm illud compa●…imus commodis, we have weighed the advantages of being ruled by a King, and conceive the probable goods which are conveyed from Regal government, which are known by experience in other Nations, will overbalance these accidental evils, however we are resolved to venture it.  
A misunderstanding this part of Scripture hath opened a way to two dangerous extremes, which are both false, and have produced unhappy consequences. From hoc erit jus regis▪ some conclude his will is his Law; and quicquid libet, licet; but this is clearly convinced in the 17 of Deuteronomy, where the duty of their King is described, from the 16 verse to the end of the chapter.  
Others make it a bare prophecy of the tyrannical abuse of power by the King which they should choose, (if so, the people had small reason to shout for joy at his Inauguration; and secondly, this was not fulfilled in Saul, for though he proved a Tyrant, yet not in all these particulars) and so they confound jus with factum. But it cannot be found in any author that ever jus was taken in this sense, Mischpat will not bear this signification. When Thiefs take away men's goods or their lives, it might as properly be said, hoc est jus Latronum, this is the right which robbers have.  
To find out the true meaning, 
The true sense of jus Regis in Samuel.  we must know, that this law was not given as a rule for him to command, but for the people to obey by; it did not excuse him from sinning, but disabled them from punishing him for his offences: and therefore it is said, when the solemnity of his Inauguration was ended, Locutus est Samuel ad populum legem regni, he spoke not to the King, but applied himself to the people, and declared their duty. This was not what he ought to do, but what they ought to suffer, when a King swerved from that rule by which he was bound to govern. For his duty was well known, being laid down many ages before by Moses, and written in the book which Moses commanded the Levites to keep in the side of the Ark of the Covenant, that it might be there for a testimony against transgressors: Deut. 31. 36. so that this binds the people not to resist, though they are oppressed; wherefore the close of it is, since there is no help in man, they must only cry unto the Lord: 1 Sam. 10. 18. This signification is confirmed by the Civil Law, where we are informed, jus praetor reddit, etìam cùm iniquè discernit; the meaning of it is explained, relatione scilicet factà non ad id, quod ita praetor fecit, sed ad illud quod praetorem facere convenit: L. jus plur. D. de just. & jur. And in this sense, summum jus is sometimes summa injuria.  
It were happy for all States, if the people were fully instructed in this Text, and could distinguish Potestatem imperii ab officio imperantis, the right to govern, from government according to right. For the former is obligatory and stands in full force, though he be defective in the latter.  
This middle way, inter abruptam contumaciam, & deform obsequium, neither guilty of stubborn disobedience, or servile compliance, is very safe and honest. For it acknowledges he that hath supreme authority, is subject to some laws (for it was truly said by Harmenopulus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and that of the Emperors is fit to be observed, Digna vox est majestate regnantis, legibus alligatum se principem profiteri. Adeo de auctoritate juris nostra pendet auctoritas: & reverâ majus imperio est, submittere legibus principatum. l. 4. c. de legibus.) But he is not subject to any Judge upon earth, because he hath no superior. This the Grecians called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a government not accountable to men; and they opposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 such a Monarchy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to such Rulers as were responsable: Ambrose expresses it by non ullis ad poenam vocari legibus, tutos imperii potestate. The reason of these constitutions was grounded upon necessity, which enforced them to place an impunity somewhere, for avoiding confusion. 
A necessity to grant impunity to some in all governments, to avoid confusion.  For a circle in government would be infinitely absurd, and of pernicious consequences, when Rulers are placed over us, to challenge a right to rule those Rulers. The Poet very wisely was at a stand: 
— Quis enim custodiet ipsos  
Custodes?—   
But these men run round till they are giddy, all the foundations of government being moved by them, and put out of course. Because they have not settled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Galen calls it, a supreme power, to whose sentence the last resort must be, and whose determination jus facit, that is, though it should swerve from the rule of justice, yet it must have the effect of right; it is binding to all, they cannot call him to account for it, and make him responsable for the wrong. His authority is a guard to his person; and though he chance to do some things not innocently, (for he ought to be guided by the laws of honesty given to mankind, and to observe his oath and promises) yet he must do all safely, because he cannot be punished by any Nationall Law. This impunity makes all resistance which may any way endanger his person unlawful. David clearly determines the case. Destroy him not, saith he to Abishai, the reason of this ne perdas is now of full force, and ties up the hands of inferiors in every State: For who can stretch forth his hands against the Lords anointed, and be guiltless? 1 Sam. 26. 9 The substance of this anointment, which makes their persons sacred, and not to be touched with violence, remains even where the Ceremony is not practised. For it is nothing else but jus regnandi, the right of supremacy, a true title to reign over them; and therefore Cyrus a Heathen King is called Gods Anointed: Es. 45. 1. though the material ceremony of pouring oil upon him, was not in use amongst the Persians. It is a metaphorical expression of supereminency, taken from that quality of oil, which is, when it is mixed with other liquours, to be uppermost.  
The Father's unanimous gloss (which certainly ought to bear greater sway in our actions, than the authority of those men, not known to us, but as the causes of our misery) upon David's confession, Against thee, thee only have I sinned; Psal. 51. 4. pleads for this impunity. Notwithstanding he had abused Vriah's wife, and contrived the death of so gallant a man, who forgot what was dearest to him next unto the King's honour, and would not go in unto his wife, until the King's enemies were destroyed; yet he saith, in the height of his humiliation, he had sinned against God only, because there was no Tribunal amongst men to which he was responsable. Our Common Law seems to express itself in the same sense, le Roy ne fa tort, the King can do no wrong; Though we may suffer undeservedly, yet no sense of injuries received can dispense with the obligation of not righting ourselves by force.  
I have done with my proofs out of the Old Testament, and I desire my readers to weigh how much is concluded, lest they should think the application hollow, because all Kings have not the same rights which belonged to the Kings of Israel.  
First therefore it hath been showed, 
How much is concluded out of the old Testament to the present case.  to restrain this liberty of resistance, is a wise government, because of Gods own institution; and so that temptation which hath strong influence upon many, aught to cease; that it is folly to contract to be obedient in such a way, as may leave them without remedy for great grievances.  
And secondly it is evidenced, that the same power which the Judges before, and the Kings of Israel after had, is in every State somewhere, that jus consistens in impunitate delictorum, a right of not being accountable for their actions, which fences the person or persons in whom suprema dominatio is, and secures them (as strongly as Laws can do) from all violence, is either in one man (so always in a Monarchy) or in a certain body, whose power though abused, must give Law (in order to nonresistance) to all inferiors.  
There is a possibility of suffering very great inconveniences, without any lawful means of redress: It is an unhappy condition we shall live in, if he or they should be Tyrants, and take delight in our oppression. But we cannot help it, God out of his dominion might thus dispose of our fortunes and lives, and he declares his pleasure so to do, and therefore we must choose the least evil, which is, not to resist, and by endeavouring to save our goods or bodies, to lose our souls. Certainly if we were as truly religious as we would be thought to be, we have not any cause to be troubled, though these things should happen to us. 
No hard Law to require from us Nonresistance.  If our patience in submission to his precept be chargeable, we make God our debtor; all the taxes and tributes are put upon his account, and he will return them in as plentiful measure, as if we had spent so much charitably, (and we cannot lay out our estate better.) The Magistrate is God's receiver, as well as the poor. He commands part of our revenues in him, in those he seems to entreat: that is to pay debts, this comes nigher to a courtesy, and therefore we might better excuse our uncharitableness, than our resistance. But what if their cruelty extend to the farthest, and endeavour to take away our lives wrongfully?  
These are justly dear to men, and much is done to draw out a few years, (notwithstanding our comforts are interwoven with sorrows, our fears are oftentimes above our hopes, most of our days are cloudy, and overcast with melancholyes, and the discontents arising from our wants (which are as vast and unbounded as our desires to have) are much greater than the narrow pleasures of enjoyment, which is confined to a few things, the stroking of fortune being not so delightful, as her blows are grievous:) but what value ought we then to set upon eternal life? how highly ought we to prise those everlasting joys, which still quicken, and still satisfy the appetite, and what should we not suffer, rather than forfeit these? This is the present case, He that by resisting saves his life, (a doubtful good, and of no long continuance) loses that happy being, to which God hath promised to such as submit to his commands, and he that loses his life is a great gainer, he falls a Martyr of justice, and shall be raised a Saint into glory.  
The same obedience which God required of the Jews under the Law to be shown to their Judges and Kings, 
The same duty of Nonresistance enjoined by Christ in the Gospel.  and as high a degree of patience Christ enjoins his followers under the Gospel, towards the highest powers. And there is great reason we should perform this duty more cheerfully, because our Saviour hath commended persecution to all those who will live godly, and that both by precept and example. His method was, facere & docere, he began to do and teach; and it is not much different in the end, docere & pati; to teach patience, and confirm his doctrine by his suffering: we must take out the same lesson, for the promise is conditional, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, if we suffer with him, than (and not else) shall we also reign with him, Rom. 8. 17. Rebellion in Christians is a most prodigious thing, we having plain and peremptory commands for obedience, and a certain and ample requital for all the charges of our honesty. That Heroical speech of Socrates, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It is in their power to kill me, it is not in their power to hurt me, carries in it the flame of true Religion; the Apostle expresses it higher, for us to die is gain, Phil. 1. 21.  
The Jews wanted not some colours of reason to justify their impatience in this case; 
The Jews more excusable in case of rebellion.  for it was a strong temptation not to be willing to be cut off, when their blessings were temporal, the chief of them being length of days, and upon which all the rest depended, and must necessarily end with their lives. And yet they submitted to those Laws, which entrusted their fortunes, and being in the hands of the supreme Magistrate, Jos. 1. 18. This power in succeeding times was often abused to their destruction, and they gave themselves up to the slaughter, upon hopes not grounded in any set promise, but only in the free goodness of God, whom they thought to be a better master, then to let any man be the worse for doing him service.  
But a Christian cannot have any shadow of scruple. 
Christians have not any colour for it.  St. Peter failing in this duty by resisting the Magistrate in defence of his innocent Master, hath taken special care not to be imitated, and therefore informs us largely with the full extent of Christian patience. I will first lay down the grounds for which our Saviour reprehended him, and I desire they may be seriously pondered by such as are more inexcusably faulty, and then I shall take his precepts into consideration. Much may be alleged in Peter's justification, and yet all will not excuse him, Put up thy sword again into his place, says Christ; if he do not, he threatens the punishment of murder to him, all they that take the sword, shall perish by the sword, Matth. 26. 52. It concerns them sadly to apply, who pretend resistance, but are really invaders, and therefore cannot make so fair a plea. First, it was a sudden and unexpected assault, no means of escape did appear. Secondly, their violence armed with Swords and with Staves as against a thief, did evidently aim at the life of his Master; and he might not without reason suspect his own in danger. Thirdly, he kept the laws of that which is called inculpata tutela, innocent defence; he did it in the instant, not after deliberation, when he might have thought of other ways of safety, and he had no advantage of Weapon, and he did not kill outright, but only wounded a servant. Notwithstanding all this he is rebuked by Christ, who makes satisfaction for his offence by a miracle. And the sense of this correction made so deep an impression, that he after warned others of their duty, when they suffer in the like persecution. Let none of you suffer as a murderer, etc. yet if any man suffer as a Christian, let him not be ashamed; but let him glorify God on this behalf. For the time is come, that judgement must begin at the house of God. Wherefore let them that suffer according to the will of God, commit the keeping of their souls to him in well doing, as unto a faithful creator, 1 Pet. 4. Though this might serve turn, yet he speaks more home in another place, Submit yourselves to every Ordinance of man for the Lords sake, whether it be to the King as supreme, or unto Governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well. For so is the will of God, that with well doing, you may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men. As free, and not using your liberty for a cloak of maliciousness, but as the servants of God, etc. Fear God, honour the King. Servants be subject to your Masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward. For this is thankworthy, if a man for conscience towards God, endure grief, suffering wrongfully. For even hereto were you called. Because Christ also suffered for us, leaving us an example, that ye should follow his steps who did not sin, neither was guile found in his mouth, 1 Pet. 2.  
The case of resistance is here enforced as highly as favourable circumstances can raise it, 
The case of resistance enforced with greatest advantages, yet condemned.  and when the most plausible limitations are put in, yet it is concluded unlawful; we must submit as Christ did, though we should be as innocent as he was, and though vires non deessent, we were sure to make good our opposition; for he could have summoned an army of Angels in his defence: we are bound to submit not only to justice, but to injuries also, and to be obedient as to good and gentle masters, so likewise to the froward, to bad as well as good Kings, their failing of their duty, not licensing us not to perform ours, nor dispensing with our loyalty. This is evident, because the reasons annexed equally enforce this duty in Subjects as in Servants. Though liberty be our birthright, yet it must not be made the cloak of sin, it takes not off those bonds with which God hath tied up our hands from fight against the supreme power. No lifting up private swords against the sword of justice, ours against God's weapon, Deus resistet, we shall have an ill match of it.  
It is well worth our observation, that though the Apostles main work was heaven, yet they are very solicitous to settle our quiet upon earth, by enforcing obedience unto government. Saint Paul delivers the mind of God most fully, most plainly. He could not have expressed the duty of Subjects more punctually, if he had lived in these last and worst times, wherein his doctrine seems a kind of tame folly; as once much learning, now much Religion hath made him mad. Our Saviour's prophecy is fulfiled, of faith failing amongst men, they think it unreasonable, to be bound to submit to certain present evils, out of hopes of future good, and to be abused by bad Magistrates, upon expectation to be righted hereafter; & charity waxeth cold, it must no longer be ranked amongst Christian duties to prefer public good to private interest, the peace of the Church, and tranquillity of the State to our own profit or safety. No, we must stand fast in the liberty, wherewith Christ hath made us free. We are not so indiscreet to submit to any trial by law, because we may meet with corrupt Judges; patrocinium peccati, multitudo peccantium, our number ought to make us safer than innocence can them; it is madness to be hanged, when we are more than those that should hang us; we may call ourselves the commonwealth (for this is some where, and the lesser part hath less reason to challenge it to themselves) and then Populi salus, Suprema lex, what ever conduces to our safety, becomes law to the Kingdom. If any malignant and ill affected persons object the breach of known laws by us, we must tell them they are abrogated by equity, because if they should stand in force, they would destroy us. The truth is, these men antedate that prophecy of Christ (as they have done many besides) He shall put down all rule, and all authority, and power. 1 Cor. 15. 24.  
This is clearly done by their practice, Kings are dishonoured in the fear of God, and I need not say quid verba audio, cum facta videam, for their professed principles maintain it. If they are not of the true religion, that is, make not the people's opinion their Creed, or if they do not govern to the advantage of the Saints, that is, join not with them in those designs which they christian God's glory, and the great work, the pious Reformation, then because they are no longer Dei ministri in bonum, God's ministers for their good, they are ipso facto discharged of their Magistracy; not Gods holy ones, but their own vices have deposed them, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 their lawful authority is not opposed by them, but their persons only, they fight against the man, and not the Magistrate. This is the doctrine which hath produced such miserable things in the Christian world, to the ruin of many States, and what is more lamentable, the destruction of millions of souls. For upon those grounds many have been induced to fight against God, and perished in their sin, and too many are so fare scandalised at it, that they suspect the truth of Christianity, concluding within themselves, that if we did really believe that Gospel, which we outwardly profess, and if we were persuaded those precepts laid down by the Doctor of the Gentiles, aught to be the measure of our practice (for he enjoins subjection though to tyrants, for such were the Roman Emperors then, and the Kings in those times Reges gentium dominantur earum) the most wicked Magistrates, and those that took greatest delight in cruelty and oppression, will sooner be weary in doing injuries, than we could be in suffering.  
Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Paraphrase upon part of the 13 to the Rom.  all are included, not any one can plead exemption, we may say with the Apostle, only he is excepted to whom every soul is subject. If every member should be commanded to be obedient to the head, they could not lawfully oppose upon joint consent, and ground their excuse upon a metaphysical abstraction of the body from those of whom it is compounded. The reason is because the action of the body is constituted of the particular acts of each member, the joining of so many personal acts makes up the act of the civil body, and if it be a fault in any one, it doth not take of the guilt, that he sins in consort and offends with company. This notion of universal speculatively distinguished from singulars is so fare from changing the moral nature of actions, that the act of the body (which is created by law, and civilly completed by the consent of a major part) may be sin, and yet many members, as the lesser part who do not contribute their votes, shall be innocent, because men are accountable only for their personal deeds.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] Let every one be subject, keep under, in due rank and order. Now seeing that in all order there must be some first, all others must submit to this, and this non potest in ordinem cogi, ab aliquo, cannot be legally ordered by any, because there is not any upon earth, prior primo, before the first, and higher than the supreme. If he break his order, he is responsable to him only that is above him, who is God. 
Regum timendorum in proprios greges,  
Reges in ipsos imperium est jovis.   
These highest powers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. God is super deos, and orders them as he pleases. So that the wronged people must only cry unto the Lord, as the Jews were directed in their hard condition: And Saint Ambrosse is sensible of this obligation, repugnare non novi; dolere potero, potero flere, potero gemere, etc. aliter nec debeo nec possum resistere. Lest Christians should be more stiffnecked than the Jews, who bore this heavy yoke, Saint Peter prescribes their behaviour and tells them it is a part of their calling (and unless they perform their vocation, they cannot make their election sure) to imitate Christ thus fare, who when he was reviled, reviled not again, no dishonourable speeches, no reproachful language from him, which yet falls short of the meditated malice of the pen, when he suffered he threatened not, no killing and slaying so much as in words, and no people can have greater innocence, and no Governor greater faults, but he committed himself to him that judgeth righteously. 1. Pet. 2.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [unto the higher powers] Hereout they endeavour to pick some advantage. for, say they, by the same Logic, as we conclude impunity due to Kings, and so all resistance unlawful, we must be forced to enlarge this privilege, and communicate it to all Magistrates whatsoever, because they are higher powers also. But this immunity is overlarge by our own confession, as repugnant to all States, and therefore seeing we cannot justify the inference in its full latitude, we cannot reasonably collect any thing. These men strangely mistake the grounds of our deduction, their strong fancy against it, not permitting them to take the reason of it into due consideration, we confess thus much is concluded for all Magistrates (such are they to whom the King delegates his authority) that it is not lawful for any that are under them to make resistance; 
Lawful to resist inferior Magistrates if they oppose the supreme.  as a private man may not oppose a Constable, nor a Constable a Justice of peace, nor he a Judge; So common Soldiers cannot punish a Lieutenant (except by virtue of a Commission from the General, and then they are above him, as being made Magistrates to execute martial law upon him) nor he a Colonel, nor a Colonel the General, they being but private men in reference to one above them; and so Kings in Monarchies (and proportionably in Aristocracies those persons, in whom the supreme power is placed, which are the major part consenting) are not judicially accountable to any, because they are the highest. Thus much Scripture evinces, the civil law confirms, reason suggests, and the practice of all States hath embraced it.  
For there is no power but of God] Here is the cause of obedience rendered, this right to govern, is not only by his bare permission, so theft and murder are, but it is his constitution, and by virtue of this, the Apostle collects that honour is due to their persons. I have proved formerly that such power could not be, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, unless it were of God; the people could not dispense with divine precept, non occides, thou shalt not kill.  
The powers that be, are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ordained or ordered of God. This is his ordinary providence by which he hath thought fit to govern the world, and we must submit to it, till he declare his will to the contrary; nothing can take off this obligation but express revelation. And we have some new Enthusiasts, who are going on to this height of fury; Methinks it should startle all good men, to see some interpretations of obscure prophecies out of Daniel and the Apocalypse cast out to justify the breach of plain duties.  
Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God;] Here is fair warning, take heed what ye do, you have a terrible enemy to encounter with, it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a fight against God, You cannot flatter yourselves with a prosperous issue, for those which resist shall receive to themselves damnation.  
Lest any should be so miserably besotted with a senseless distinction (as it is misapplied by them) of the authority from the person, as to incur the danger of this fearful commination, 
Against that distinction of the authority from the person.  he joins them together and uses them promiscuously, and in the prosecution enforces that, by mentioning the persons, which before he had attributed to the powers. Whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation; it immediately follows, For ruler's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Then he comes to the authority again, wilt thou not be afraid of the power? do that which is good and thou shalt have praise of the same; For he is the Minister of God to thee for good, there he concludes with the person.  
Observe with what vehemence he repeats this duty, though fully delivered before, as if his mind misgave him concerning these rebellious times. Wherefore you must needs be subject. A necessity is laid upon us, and woe unto us, if we be not subject. we have two powerful motives, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. As for fear what the Prince may (for rebellion seldom prospers; Traitors are unfortunate gamesters, though they win at first, they are most commonly terrible loser's in the close) so what God will inflict. You have his word for it, you are damned if you resist.  
Though Rebels should get the start by seizing his ammunition, Forts, and Ships, and you have cause to think your loyalty will disadvantage you, when a King is in sight too weak; yet be wary what you do, God oft times raises up strength to him, beyond man's expectation, and the event shows, those which continue honest are most truly wise. The heads of the rebellion shall be brought to condign punishment, and their memory be odious amongst all good men. 'Tis true, to be subject to present plunder is a strong temptation against duty (yet upon a general survey ye shall find they take not much more from their enemies, 
God is to be reckoned of the King's side, who will overbalance their greatest forces.  than they force their friends to give; they have no great reason to brag of being saviours, it hath cost them very round sums to lose their souls) But ye see how much the King indulges to this fear (I know not whether God will pardon so easily, for if fear of losing by being honest be a good excuse for neglect of duty, hopes of gaining by playing the knaves, may as reasonably be pleaded) so unwilling is he any should suffer for his sake. How often hath he been pleased graciously to forgive, upon that easy excuse, they did not dare to be his friends; that is, they were his enemies not out of spite and malice, but only for their own advantage; and he is content, not any should lose for him. O let not his goodness move you to have a hand or purse in the evils which are brought upon him and the whole land. Betray not your bad tempers so far, that it should appear you will do more for fear then love, lest your base natures may induce hereafter a stricter government, when experience doth demonstrate the worst masters have the best servants. Let not his lenity, which doth deserve to find friends, be the only cause he hath so many enemies. If I must direct my speech as unto cowards (for you have no excuse for disloyalty, but your fears) consider with yourselves, how God hath blessed his servant with three potent and successful Armies (all of them raised with such disadvantages, as they clearly speak an immediate providence giving testimony to the sincerity of his many sacred protestations) beside many hopeful Seminaries in divers Countries, and thousands of gallant Gentlemen, and brave spirits in other Shires, now unfortunately situated (O tristi damnata loco) who wait for an opportunity to revenge their tame suffering hitherto, and the unworthy usage from fellow Subjects. If notwithstanding all this you could unreasonably flatter yourselves with being the stronger side, yet you have juster and greater fears elsewhere, which ought to give Law to your cowardice, which hath betrayed your allegiance. For what would it profit you, if you should save your houses from being plundered (though this is the most probable way to hazard your estates, which are forfeited to the King, cannot be escheated to them) and lose your souls, for which the whole world is but a base price? There is evident danger in fight against the King, but the Apostle threatens certain destruction because you fight against your own consciences.  
Their several exceptions and corrupt glosses by which they endeavour to avoid this plain obligation of non resistance, I shall meet with in the fourth section.  
The practice of primitive christians is a faithful commentary upon these texts. 
The duty not to resist proved further by the practice of the more innocent ages of the Church.  And certainly their authority, (who witness to their own disadvantage, teaching submission though to tyrants, under which they cheerfully suffered according to Christ's example) ought to prevail with us above any modern writers, who have broached a doctrine (very seasonable for some places and occasions, but unknown to those innocent times, when Christianity thrived upon suffering, and gained as much by patience, as it is likely to lose by stubbornness) that it is lawful for inferior Magistrates, say some, (and this from the fundamentals of government;) for the people, others, tells us, (and this from the law of nature) to right themselves by force, if the supreme Magistrate deny to do it, and so fail of that trust, which was committed to him for the good of others. These principles lately taken up open a fair way for advancement of private ends, by disturbance of public peace, either upon real (which oft times are) or at least pretended faults in governor's which shall never be wanting, whilst there are ambitious men who want preferment, and desire to have what others are possessed of, and make it a reasonable cause, to endeavour innovation, because they may be bettered by the change. In what an unhappy State do we live, if such a number (upon pretence we are not so well governed as we might be, that is, they have not so great a share in the government, as they could wish for, and since the greater part can never be satisfied, we cannot hope for peace and quiet) shall be enabled to force the King to recede from laws and in the room of those known and standing rules, to give us uncertain temporary ordinances.  
The Emperors were for the most part very bad, but especially to the Christians they were hard masters. Though the Romans counted it the highest gallantry, to shake off the yoke when it galled them, and did oft rebel in the cause of liberty; (and it is a sad thing that this pagan bravery should be preferred to the tameness which Christ enjoined to his followers; of all good actions the murder of a tyrant is most commendable, says one. Euseb. Philad. dial. 2. And Buchanan thinks it a defect in policy, that rewards are not allotted for such meritorious deeds) yet the Christians could never be tempted by their greatest sufferings to join in any conspiracy. Tertullian professes their innocency, and he is to be looked upon in this case, not as a single witness, but as one that wrote in the name of all; his Apologetique is the sense of the whole Church. We may be confident of the truth, because it was a matter of fact, and we have no reason to suspect he could be so vainly impudent as to present that in their justification, which must be evidently convinced of falsehood. He makes a bold challenge, and desires them to produce if they can one example of any Christian taking part with rebels. Such as Cassius, Niger, Albinus, Cleander, Aelius Letus, the Praetorian soldiers (who murdered Pertinax) Stephanus, and Parthenius were. It is manifest these were not traitors out of wantonness, there were just grounds for heavy complaints under Domitian, Commodus and Septimius Severus, all bloody tyrants. Yet the Christians were better catechised, then to think resistance lawful, when they were oppressed by those whose duty it was to have protected them. Their unanimous confession is, nos judicium Dei suspicimus in imperatoribus, qui gentibus illos praefecit. I shall give you the sense of it at large. We kiss the hands which wound us; though they have not any cause to do such things, yet there is too much cause why we should suffer them, we must acknowledge our sins towards God, and he may punish them in what way he thinks fit. We cannot deny, but we have deserved as great afflictions, and shall we, who are guilty be stubborn, when patience is required, though we were most innocent? The example of Christ is made our law, and in him no sin was found. We cannot suffer more, nor boast less demerit. If we did serioussly consider it, we could not hate the worst governor's, for we have no reason to be angry, because they do things to our advantage, and certain it is, if we submit with patience, their sins further our salvation, their faults increase our glory. What pity is it, they should go to Hell, for that which procures us a higher place in heaven? Nay what uncharitableness is it in us, to cut them off in their sin, and so send them thither? And it is a sad meditation, to think that we shall follow; because we could not endure their company here, we take a course to live together eternally miserable.  
Cyprian enforces this meekness with excellent reason. God (saith he to Demetrian) is the revenger of his injured servants: in which this argument is employed, Vengeance belongs unto the Lord, and except we can produce his Commission, our private justice will damn us; animam in vulnere, in our enemy's wounds our souls will bleed to death: 'tis madness to strike, when we are certain the blow will recoil to our eternal destruction. Therefore the Apostle commands, as we wish well to ourselves, to recompense to no man evil for evil: Rom. 12. 17. Self-love is the motive why we should not hurt others. He exhorts by the natural affection which is due to ourselves, not to avenge ourselves, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but rather to give place unto wrath: v. 19 The wisdom of God hath introduced an excellent temper in government, and such as the sense of great evils prevailed with men to esteem very good, and confirm it by their laws. 
Private revenge unlawful.  Honorius and Theodosius tell us, judiciorum vigour, jurísque publici tutela videtur in medio constituta, ne quisquam sibi ipsi permittere valeat ultionem. That of Claudian is true in this sense also: 
Qui fruitur poenâ, ferus est.   
Injured men are over-passionate, and easily tempted to cruelty. 
Amplius ex irâ quòd enim se quisque volebat  
Vlcisci, quàm nunc permissum est legibus aequis,  
Iccirco est homines pertaesum vi colere aevum.  Upon these considerations God hath made revenge unlawful, and beside this obligation of divine precept, our hands are tied up as strongly as faith of promise can do it. This Covenant knits society, and cements the civil body. Though we do not only fancy grievances (as the world is full of such mistakes) though we are really injured, yet it becomes injustice to right ourselves. All the account we can give at God's Tribunal, is only this, we did not sinne first. And this plea will afford miserable comfort to be damned after another. That none might be tempted to strike, because others hands are bound up from returning the blow, God hath appointed a middle way to deter men from doing evil, for fear of suffering it in as high a degree. For Tertullian says true, disciplinae interest, injuriam vindicari. Metu enim ultionis omnis iniquitas refraenatur. The fountain of our actions is the opinion we have of the good or bad, we shall receive by them; if they appear certainly hurtful, and that we shall suffer by so doing, we most commonly forbear, I do not say always, because the will may thwart the understanding, else it were not free, and experience showeth, that sometimes a less good present, doth overweigh a future, though certain greater evil. God will judge our cause, and revenge us upon wrong doers; but he performs this not immediately, but by his Magistrates. He delegates his authority to them, and Saint Paul proclaims their Commission in these words, There is no power but of God. Quicquid per officiarios facit, per se facere videtur, what they do are legally his acts, we have no right to reverse them by a strong hand. If an inferior Magistrate gives false judgement, God grants a liberty of appeal to him in a higher Magistrate, if he confirm the former unjust sentence, it is lawful to proceed by way of appeal, till we come to the highest; but then because God hath appointed a peaceable end of controversies, we must sit down with the present loss, being fully assured God will judge this Judge; we shall have another day of hearing in Heaven, and all damages shall be amply repaid. If we did believe this, our unnatural divisions would cease, that is, if we were truly Christians, we would not do as we have done, we could not resist the highest power. I have warrant to say it, Here is the patience and faith of the Saints: Rev. 13. 10. they believed, therefore they suffered.  
Upon such considerations Cyprian grounds the duty, and shows the practice of the Primitive Christians was very consonant. Ind est quòd nemo nostrum, quando apprehenditur, reluctatur: nec se adversus injustam violentiam vestram, quamvis nimius & copiosus noster sit populus, ulciscitur. For this cause not any one of us doth make resistance when you apprehend him, nor revenge your unjust violence: Patientes facit de secuturâ ultione securitas. God is able to reward our patience, and to requite all our sufferings. If we took delight in the misery of our persecutors, we might be abundantly comforted. But alas we pity them, and grieve more for their deplorable condition, than our own torments. God will avenge our innocent blood more severely, than any good man can wish for. Tertullian expresses the same in his eloquent manner. Satis idoneus patientiae sequester Deus est. Our goods are not taken away, they are sequestered for our benefit, and entrusted in safe hands, God keeps them for our use and will return them with ample increase. Si injuriam deposueris penes eum, ultor est, if you will not fight, he will undertake your quarrel, and you need not doubt but your enemies will be sound worsted; Si dolorem, medicus est, your wounds shall save you, Si mortem, resuscitator est, if you fall a Martyr, you shall rise a Saint. Quantum patientiae licet, ut Deum habeat debitorem? what cannot our sufferings do? they make even God our debtor; he owes us heaven for ourselves, and he owes us Hell for our enemies, but we breathe out our souls in prayer, that he may be entreated not to pay this.  
The Example of the Theban Legion commands our imitation in the like cause. It is one of the noblest passages in all the ecclesiastical story, wherein Christianity did shine forth in its full lustre, and it affords plentiful light for our direction. This band consisted of almost 7000 men, all Christians. when the Emperor Maximian commands the whole Army to offer Sacrifice to false Gods, they remove their quarters, that they might avoid if it were possible this occasion of discontenting the Emperor. He summons them to perform their parts in this devilish worship. They are forced to return an humble denial, and their resolution not to disobey God, for whose sake they had ever been and would continue faithful servants to him. The Emperor unsatisfied with this answer, puts them to a decimation; They submit with much cheerfulness, and die praying for their murderer. After this sad spectacle his commands are renewed, but prevail nothing upon the remainder. Wherefore they also are butchered without the least resistance; There was no delay in their death, except from the weariness of the executioners. This was truly to confess him, who was led as a sheep to the slaughter, and like a lamb opened not his mouth, and they a flock of his fold, were quietly devoured by ravening wolves. The Commander of this Regiment, Maurice could not contain his joy, when he had seen the first decimation gallantly suffered. How fearful was I, says he to his surviving soldiers, (for armed men may be tempted to defend themselves) lest any of them upon colour of just resistance for self preservation in an innocent cause, should have struggled against this blessed slaughter. I was watchful, and had Christ's example in readiness, who commanded his disciple to put his sword into his scabbard. Salus vestra non periclitabitur, nisi vestris armis, if you use not your weapons, I have Gods own warrant for your safety.  
Despair itself could not conquer one single patience, which yet creates valour in cowards, and makes them more courageous in such extremities, because they are fearful; Since they are likely to endeavour most to preserve life; who are most terrified with death.  
It would be more wearisome to me, then delightful, or profitable to the Reader, to enlarge my proofs by that plenty of authorities, which offer themselves in the ancient Fathers and many Counsels. The truth is, the labour is needless, their practice is so evident, that the greatest friends to Rebellion, will not betray so much ignorance as to deny it. They are forced to grant that they do such things, as those great lights of the Church, those holy men, though infinitely more oppressed than they can pretend to, durst not venture on. Thus fare we both agree. But why durst not? Here they show themselves; not because to resist Tyrants would have been a wicked, but a vain attempt; vires deerant, they were not able to go through with a Rebellion; what the Heathens admired as extraordinary goodness (many of them being converted by this religious confidence, reasonably concluding, men that approved themselves very prudent in all other matters, 
Not want of strength the cause of their patience.  could not be guilty of such madness as to die thus, unless they had good hopes to be recompensed in another life) these fomenters of strife call weakness, to the unspeakable scandal of such as have a true sense of godliness. It is an insufferable blemish to their innocence, and stains the precious memory of those blessed Martyrs. If this were indeed true, that they wanted not will, but power to destroy, we can hardly blame their persecutors, who thought it wisdom to prevent the blow by striking first: it seemed but killing the Cockatrice in the egg; they had small encouragement to cherish frozen Serpents in their bosom, who when they had recovered warmth and strength, would dart their poisonous sting at their preservers. Certainly they had an extraordinary confidence they should prevail, else they would never so openly have discovered such principles, and instructed States to provide better for their security hereafter, by utter disabling them to do any hurt. These men cry out against Popery, and yet profess what all good Protestants esteem the most malignant part of Jesuitism. If this evasion will not hold, they know not what to say for themselves, and it may clearly be convinced of falsehood. For this very objection is made by the Ancients, and answered to our hands by themselves. So careful were they that posterity might not mistake their goodness, and think it nothing else but an impotency to do evil. The Father's speeches, which witness sufficient strength, if religion had not tied their hands, cannot be imputed to any overreaching or lying to gain reputation to their sufferings (as Mr Goodwin insinuates in his Anticaval. and we shall anon take notice of it) our enemies would be extremely glad to see their own art thus credited. But we have no reason to conceive them so impudent, and we may be certain, they were not so mad, as to face down the Emperor, and their other potent adversaries (who would make great advantage of their so manifest untruths) by affirming what they must evidently discern false, and could not choose but see the contrary.  
Cyprian saith expressly, Quamvis nimius & copiosus noster sit populus, though we have competent forces more than enough to do the business, yet we wrestle not with our oppressors etc. The Theban Legion was in a posture of resistance, but they durst not lift up those hands into which the Emperor had put weapons, against his personal commands, though most unjust, most bloody. six thousand six hundred, and sixty six men of such extraordinary valour, as did not entertain the least fear of death might probably have conquered (and this cruelty might have increased their party by the defection of malcontents) but they must certainly have made some sport for their lives, they could not have wanted that comfort, which to some tastes is beyond the pleasure of life, to die revenged. Besides had not the Emperor and his under princes known them true Christians, and been acquainted with the tameness of that profession, towards the highest power, he would never have hazarded a rebellion by making so considerable an army desperate.  
I will conclude this with Tertullian, who argues very handsomely, after he had spoken to this sense; we are so numerous you can hardly see one another for Christians, cui, inquit, bello non idonei, non prompti fuissemus, etiam impares copiis, qui tam libenter trucidamur? Though we had not the advantage of number, Which yet you perceive we have, numeri damnum virtus pensaret, courage would supply this defect, and though fewer, since we contemn our own lives, we might be masters of yours. We could undo you, not if we should rebel, but if we would be idle; we do not fright you so much, as to desire you, to fancy us fight against you, you were lost if we did not fight for you. What would become of you, if we should turn Separatists? Si tanta vis hominum, if such multitudes as we are should break out from amongst you into any corner of the world, your Empire would sink for want of strength to support it. Your Cities would seem deserts without us etc. in that thin remainder you would have many enemies, though but few men. Even now they would rebel, if they were not awed multitudine Christianorum, paene omnium civium, by those multitudes of us, who are of some rank, almost all of us citizens, and almost all the citizens are of us. Our example invites some to obedience, others fear our readiness to be commanded to reduce them to due subjection. In Apologetico. I may add his other speech in the same place, vestra omnia implevimus, we have filled your Cities, nay castra ipsa, your very camps would be empty without us Christians. It is not possible to bring in more express, more clear testimonies in any matter, it is too probable, such as have made a search, are blinded with interest, and shut their eyes that they may not see this truth. I know not how to excuse Bellarmine, Alane, Ficlerus, Simancha, Buchanan, Hottoman, Knox, Brutus, for these were scholars; and therefore not so likely to be deceived themselves in such an easy truth, as upon design to deceive others. But I have a more charitable opinion of most of those men, with whom we have to deal, though some have discovered plenty of malice, yet they are very few, of whom we can say, ad evertendam rempublicam sobrii accesserunt. Some are Enthusiasts, and mistake their own fancy for the Spirit, and the greater part do this mischief out of ignorance, drawing out of broken cisterns, the seditious writings of the Roman and the Reformed Jesuits, and transcribing one another, and so are taught and reach to despise dominion, and speak evil of those things which they know not.   

§. 3.  
I Make no question the proposition is now evident, that the supreme power in any State (let it be where it will, somewhere it must be, for else it were an Anarchy, and no government) ought not to be resisted. This makes rebellion sin, as transgressing divine and humane laws. In the next place, for the perfect direction of conscience, 
Most necessary to know the subject of Supremacy.  we must examine, in whom the supreme power is placed; a mistake in this is as dangerous, as an error in the former. For as zeal, which is not according to knowledge, is impiety; for though it have the heat, it hath not the light, which is required to true devotion; so the most scrupulous obedience is but humble rebellion, if it be misplaced, and yielded to fellow Subjects against him who hath jus regnandi, the right to command them. Thus in an Aristocracy to aid one man against the Senate, is Treason against the State, and in a Monarchy (because the constitution is different, and places the supreme power in one) to aid the Senate (of which that one is the head, and opposed to him, they are but a liveless trunk in order to those things to which his influence is necessary, Fortescue warrants the expression, sine capite communitas non corporatur) against the Monarch and supreme Ruler, is rebellion and treason against the State. The Assumption therefore shall be,  
The King of ENGLAND hath this supreme power.] when this is proved, the conscience must take law from this necessary Inference, therefore it is unlawful for Subjects to hold up arms against the King of England: Because as it is an absurdity in speculation, so it is sin in practice to deny the conclusion; there they offend against Logic, here against Religion also. For whatsoever is not of faith, that is, not of judgement, whatsoever we do against our own reason, and the light of conscience, is transgression.  
The matter of this discourse is of high concernment. For as things now stand, on it hang Heaven or Hell, our salvation or eternal damnation. If the King be the highest power, you are bound to submit to him, but if you have new Sovereigns, if your fellow Subjects are become the Lords anointed, there may be some colour of justification. Except this be proved, you are altogether inexcusable, as appears in the last Section, and therefore it will behoove you to hearken to Solomon's advice; My son fear thou the Lord and the King, and meddle not with them that are given to change. For their calamity shall rise suddenly, Prov. 24.. 21. 22.  
Certainly unconcerned men will think I have undertaken no very difficult task. 
The King's Supremacy witnessed by out Oath.  If I can but persuade the King's adversaries, they have not forsworn themselves, I shall recover them to due obedience (but I must tell them, if they were not perjured in taking the Oath of Supremacy (not to mention now that of Allegiance) they are so in breaking it) The words are so express, that not any colourable gloss can be invented, to excuse the violation of this solemn Sacrament. I, A. B. do utterly testify and declare in my conscience, that the King's highness is the only supreme Governor of this Realm, and of all other His Highness' Dominions and Countries, as well in all Spiritual or Ecclesiastical things, or causes, as Temporal, etc. I d● promise that from henceforth, I shall bear faith and true allegiance to the King's Highness, His Heirs, and lawful Successors, and to my power shall assist and defend all jurisdictions, privileges, preeminences, and authorities granted or belonging to the King's Highness, His Heirs, and Successors, or united and annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm.  
So help me God and by the Contents of this Book.] It hath been replied, That this Oath is taken in opposition to the Pope, to exclude the Supremacy usurped by him for many years. They speak truth, but not all the truth; for there are two parts in it. One negative, by which we profess, that not any foreign State, or Potentate, nor the Pope hath this power. The other positive, by which the Subject of this power is specified. The King's Highness is the only supreme Governor of this Realm, as in all Spiritual things, and causes, so likewise Temporal. Both Ecclesiastical and Civil supremacy are here asserted to be in the King. It was not thought sufficient to tell who was not Supreme, but they declare also who was. When we had truly sworn the Pope out of this Kingdom, what necessity was there to make the people perjured? for certainly they forswear themselves, who solemnly testify and declare in their conscience, That the King's highness is the only supreme Governor, if the meaning of those words be only this, that the Pope is not. It concerns us as highly as our Souls are worth, reddere juramentum domino, to perform unto the Lord our Oath, and not to lift up those hands against the King, which were laid upon the holy Gospel, in witness of our submission to him as the only supreme Governor. What desperate malice is it to expose our Souls to every Musket shot? if we fall, we perish eternally. This sad contemplation, that we stand on the very brink of Hell, ready to be turned into the Lake of everlasting woes, by every sword, every bullet, will smite our hearts, and make our arms feeble in the day of battle; what confusion & amazement and horror of conscience must needs seize upon all considering men? Think upon the heinousness of parricide, to murder a Father is a sin greater than any one is able to bear: But to spill the blood of our Sovereign (which they have done, who fought against him, for it is murderin God's sight; his goodness in protecting his servant, doth not excuse their sin in endeavouring to destroy their King) whom God commands not to touch, and whose life we have sworn to defend with the utmost hazard of our own, and we have desired the Lord to revenge it in our destruction, if we do otherwise, is of a much deeper dye. For the King is Pater patriae, a common Father to all without a Metaphor: what ever power Fathers had over, and consequently whatsoever honour as an effect of this power, was due to them from their children, he hath right to challenge the same of all. And though we should join together, 
King hath paternal powers from consent of the people.  and call ourselves the Commonwealth, we can no more lawfully disrespect, give law to, resist upon hard usage, or say he is less honourable than all we, than children by agreement may dispense with their duty to their parents. It was our own act which united all particular paternal powers in Him, and that these are truly transferred, and now really in Him is very evident, because else we should be bound to obey our Father's commands, before those of the King▪ For divine precept stands in full force, Honour thy Father, etc. and therefore we musts confess, tam pater nemo est in terris, he that begot us is not so much our Father, as the King is. It may be fit to take notice here, that the supreme power of a State, hath by our particular deeds and common agreement, as much right over, not single persons only, but the whole body, as every Father had over not this or that child only, but his whole family: and as he cannot be said, though major singulis natis, yet totâ prole minor, so neither a King (if this power be placed in one, which is essential to a Monarchy) minor universis.  
Though a Monarch hath greater right, and larger power, than even all the people could bestow upon him, for he hath potestatem vitae & necis, 
He hath power of a higher nature from God's grant.  and this Fathers have not now over their children, over themselves; it can only come from him who hath dominion over his creatures, and therefore the people must look upon him, not only as their own, but as God's representative; yet to say nothing of this, and to deal liberally with our adversaries, by supposing (though I cannot grant) their principles true, concerning the original of power being in the people, I can demonstrably convince them, by most plain and evident deductions from their own scheame.  
I took this method in my Answer to the Observations, that by joining issue upon their own grounds, I might put a quicker end to the debate. It would have required more time to show at large, The King's power was from God (which was proved in brief, and there, as is this discourse, it is acknowledged to be restrained by His own or His Progenitors grants, potest enim Rex vim regni minuere) and so of much higher nature than the contribution of popular Votes could raise it to; it was abundantly sufficient, to prove that the people have not any legal power against the King. The former is built upon this pillar, nemo dat, quod non habet; the power of the Magistrate was not in the people considered severally, and before civil society, and in such a State, as the Aborigenes are described by Sallust, genus hominum agreste, sine legibus, sine imperio, liberum atque solutum, a multitude, not a nation, and certain wild routs, without Laws, without Empire, free to do or suffer wrong, and lose from all positive obligations. Not any one having jus gladii, a right to take away the life of man, it follows they could not bestow it upon another, for what is not, cannot be alienated. And therefore the supreme Magistrate hath more power than the whole people, and is vice Deus, God's vicegerent. Let them take heed how they call Gods minister the people's Servant; God hath taken especial care the Magistrate should be honoured; and respect is due, as to his, not their creature.  
The latter, that the people have not any legal power against the King, is as firmly supported by another pillar, nemo habet, quod dedit. Suppose the original of power in the people, or as they love to speak, suppose them the efficient cause of power, which cannot be but by giving to one man in a Monarchy, to a Senate in an Aristocracy, a right to use their divided strengths. Since therefore they cannot retain, what they have parted with, nor have what they gave away, he which hath all their power (I may add his own particular besides) must needs be greater and more powerful than they. The truth is, he is (in a Monarchy, and they are in an Aristocracy) the only fountain of all power and justice. Answer to the Observat, pag. 10. This is as certain, as that there are some governments besides Democracy, for it is essential to them: what is that which makes Anarchy, except this, that every man hath right to do what he will, 
Demonstration from the difference of forms of Regiment.  in reference to any national Law? The only means to avoid this confusion, is to resign up this hurtful liberty; (which is very prudently done upon choice, but necessarily upon conquest) if it be given to one, we call that State, Monarchy; if to few, we call it Optimacy; if to very many, who rule by turns and are elected by the people, we call it Democracy. There cannot be any other ground to difference the forms of Regiment.  
Hence appears the weakness of those discourses, which have no other strength, than the impossibility, that the people can make one greater and more powerful than all they (which is understood not of their natural, (this cannot be passed away to another) but politic strength, that is the right of using their power, this may be, and is parted with, (except the Government be a Democracy) because Quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale. The reply to the Answer to the Observations, confesses my argument, concluding, if it were true that the people had parted with their power, pag. 6. upon this the determination of the whole controversy depends, and that it was rightly stated by me, will evidently appear, because unless the people have resigned up their power, the Author can never show how this State is a Monarchy. It doth not alter the case, that the King hath restrained himself from the use of this power to some purposes without their consent, as for making new laws or raising money; for this limitation only makes such acts illegal, but doth not return any power into them, whereby they may be enabled to raise an Army, or to oppose the Militia of the Kingdom against him, to compel him by strong hand to govern according to law. If the subject of this power be the people, who may meet together and lawfully determine (for though he resolve all into the two Houses, yet if he follow the consequences of his own principle, he must go thus high) what they fancy conducing to their own safety, we are clearly fall'n back into Anarchy. To avoid this confusion, the Author places it in their representatives, but it will come to the same thing by undeniable deductions from his own grounds. For the same arguments which are made against the King, equally conclude against the two Houses; since Quicquid efficit tale, 
Arguments brought against the King, conclude as much for the people against the Parliament.  est magis tale, and that they are entrusted for the common good, may be equally applied to them, and then King and Lords and Commons are Voted away at the pleasure of the multitude.  
The sum of his Book is, that the people retain their power, and therefore may make resistance, in case he govern not according to law, and he is responsable for such breaches; The proof is, He is entrusted for their good, and there is a mutual covenant between King and people, and this violated by him dissolves the compact.  
I have in this discourse punctually examined these and what farther grounds of scruples I could find in the replyer, as will appear more fully in the following Section. Being to answer so many, I would not trespass upon the Readers patience by an exact view of his particular mistakes, which might have been confuted with great ease, but with no great advantage to the cause, to which I have spoken more closely, and as fully as I was able.  
I will discover to him one desperate consequence from his principle, which it concerns him to blush and repent for. There is a mutual Covenant between King and People, and the breach of it dissolves the compact: if so, his Crown is forfeited, and he ceases to be King de jure upon such violation, which he is now charged with, (because they could not have any colour for taking up Arms, but upon this pretence.) Therefore the plain conclusion is, it is no want of duty in them, though they depose him, for it is no injury to take away, what he can challenge no right to; his claim was by virtue of compact, which is dissolved by his not standing to conditions, and so the bargain is unmade, the bonds of allegiance are broken asunder. The Houses have laboured to clear themselves from this wicked doctrine, by telling us the deposition of the second Edward, and Richard was not to be numbered amongst the precedents of Parliament, and that no free Parliament ever attempted the like: and yet a private man dares publish such manifest Treason. I am persuaded that the Author, supposing a breach of covenant of His Majesty's part, and then telling us such a breach dissolves the compact, was not fully apprehensive that this pernicious principle unkings his Sovereign. When he sees his treasonable error, he will find that Logic ill managed is a more dangerous weapon, than a sword in the hands of mad men.  
To return to further proofs of the King's supremacy; 
King's supremacy further proved.  That which makes a State one, is the union of supreme power, and this according as it is placed in one or more persons, gives denomination to the form: so that all those Acts of Parliament which confess this a Monarchy, are so many solid testimonies of the King's supremacy.  
The Answer is, Though this be demonstrably true in an absolute Empire, yet it concludes not in a mixed Monarchy.  
I am very confident a mistake of this mixed Monarchy hath engaged many wellmeaning men against the King, to the overthrow of our Laws, which the simpler part are persuaded they fight for; Honestâ voluntate rebelles sunt, there are some who contribute their forces to destroy this Kingdom in behalf of the Commonwealth, 
The true meaning of that which is called a mixed Monarchy.  and they are so fare deceived, as to be made unhappy instruments to advance private interests with public hearts. And therefore it will be necessary to discover their error, by which their unfortunate Country hath suffered as much, as by the faults of others.  
They have not any shadow of excuse to countenance their Rebellion from this distinction, unless mixed Monarchy do signify either that the people in their diffusive body, or by their representatives have a greater, or at least an equal power with the King. The reason of which is, because inferiors by the acknowledgement of all, have not any jurisdiction over superiors: and equals though they have not imperium, right to govern, yet if injured and they require satisfaction, and upon denial of it, attempt to compass it by force, they are esteemed by the Law of Reason and Nations, just enemies: whereas Subjects, if they make war upon their Sovereign, though when wronged, are worthily accounted Rebels. First, the diffusive body of the people hath not greater, nay, not equal power with the King, because they have not any legal way of expressing themselves. Our Laws determine it Treason to enter into any association, or raise a War without the King's consent, and much more against his express commands. Secondly, the representative body hath not greater nor equal power with the King. The same argument overthrows their claim, for the people cannot authorise them to do, beyond what themselves were enabled to, therefore if actions of this nature were unwarrantable in the diffusive body, they are so in the representative. 
Representative Body is not the People to all purposes.  It may be not unfit to observe that the representative body is the people only to some ends and purposes, whereto they were entrusted by them according to Law, and therefore no illegal ordinances, (such as all those are, which the King denies to ratify) ought to be called the Acts of the people: They are no more concerned in it, then if they should take upon them contrary to Law, to stamp and coin money with the inscription of Senatis, populúsque Anglicanus, or to send Ambassadors, or denounce war against, or enter into a League of friendship with foreign Princes, or bestow the great offices of State, or dispose of Wardships, or take to themselves a power to raise Arms without His Majesty's consent. Again, because they represent the people but to some purposes only, though their principles were firm, (as they are extremely weak) that the King is less than His Subjects conjunctim, and that they collectively are more honourable than He, etc. yet they bring not the conclusion home to the two Houses. Because it doth not appear, and they had no reason to take it for granted; that the two Houses (which they call the Parliament) are the people in this consideration. A Jury is the representative people, (as experience teaches, and we may find it in Sir Thomas Smith, l. 2. c. 26. The legal answer to that interrogatory, How will you be tried, is, Dei populique judicio, by God and my Country; and the Clerk of the Sizes replies, Ecce tibi hi probi viri populum repraesentant) and the Sophistry would be easily discovered, if we should argue they are therefore more honourable, than the King. We may take notice also, that their arguments are only capable of concluding for the House of Commons, (and if they follow the necessary consequences of them, they must maintain the Lower is above the Upper House) for the Lords sit only in personal capacities, being enabled thereto by the prudence of our Laws, which thought it reasonable they should have as great a share in the government as a negative voice came to, because they enjoyed such ample revenues, that they were likely not to agree to any thing prejudicial to the present settled State.  
I shall prove more fully in the next Section, that those who represent Subjects (and that but to some purposes, and not the King to any, for this would overthrow that fundamental constitution of three distinct Estates) cannot be equal to, much less above their Sovereign. And that groundless invention which denies subordination, and introduces an unheard of co-ordination, such as creates Regnum in Regno, and rends this Country into distinct Kingdoms, shall be refuted.  
Since what is called mixed Monarchy cannot give such a right as is pleaded for, that Subjects should be free to wage war against their Prince, because this liberty makes two independent States, which are not compatible in one body, but would be as really distinct Kingdoms in England, as Spain and France are; I will endeavour to declare the true meaning thereof. If we speak properly, there cannot be such a thing as mixtum Imperium, a mixed Monarchy, or mixed Aristocracy, or mixed Democracy. Because, if there are divers supreme powers, it is no longer one State. If the supreme power be but one (that is that authority unto which Le dernier ressort de la justice, the last appeal must be made, and against whose sentence though unjust, we have not any legal remedy) this must be placed either in one man, who is the fountain of all jurisdiction, and then it is a Monarchical government, or in some Nobles, and then the Regiment is Aristocratical, and the sentence of the major part of them becomes Law to all effects, whether concerning our goods or lives; or if the civil constitutions of a State direct us to appeal to the people, this is an absolute and true Democracy. By a mixed Monarchy therefore (not to quarrel about words) nothing but this can reasonably be understood, that it is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, wherein the will of the Prince publicly made known, gives the Law, Quodcunque Principi placet, legis habet vigorem, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a government not arbitrary, but restrained by positive constitutions, wherein a Prince hath limited himself by promise or oath, not to exercise full power. This grant is of force, because any man may either totally resign, or diminish his rights by Covenant. Hence it is that in Monarchies all Kings have supreme power, though they have not all the same jura Regalia, their prerogatives are larger or narrower according to their particular grants. For example, our Kings have retained to themselves the rights of coining money, making great officers, bestowing honours, as Dukedoms, Baronies, Knighthoods, etc. pardoning all offences against the Crown, making war and peace, sending Ambassadors to negotiate with foreign States, etc. and they have restrained themselves from the use of that power which makes new Laws and repeals old, without the consent of the Lords and Commons in Parliament; as likewise from raising money upon the Subject without their consent.  
Some do ask, How are we the better, if we must suffer him to break this Covenant as oft as he pleases? it is the same thing not to have any Laws, and not to have provision for the observance of them.  
First, 
Difference between arbitrary rule and government, restrained by Law, notwithstanding hostile resistance unlawful, though in case of violation.  I must tell you, this objection is answered by showing there is a necessity that some body must be trusted. It is no discretion to prevent a possible mischief by probable inconveniences; if you will not trust one you must trust more, that is, if you are weary of Monarchy (under which your forefathers enjoyed happy times, and experience cannot cousin you, though arguments may) you know the way to cast it off by placing so many guardians over your Prince, but have you any greater assurance than before? Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? They have as great temptations to fail their trust as he had, and it is likely being warned by such a precedent of deserting your natural Prince, they may fear your inconstancy, and upon pretence, that you are subject to mistake; and because they suspect you may be willing, they will take such order, you shall not be able to call them to an account. But suppose this may not be, and that those who suppress Tyrants (or perhaps excellent Kings under that name) may not be frighted with their own example, to make use of their present power, to exercise a greater tyranny; for it is not impossible they should grow jealous too, and tell you plainly, they have no reason to trust you. If you deny them money, here is ground of diffidence, your design is to expose them to poverty, so to contempt, so to ruin. But suppose I say nothing of this, but that they will be secure amidst your jealousies, which manifestly endanger their safety; yet you will be forced at last to trust the giddy multitude, who are always weary of the present government, because there are still some unavoidable defects, and these are discerned by sense, and they have not such depth of understanding as to foresee greater mischiefs (which can only be judged of by reason) and therefore are easily persuaded to attempt a change, so that your peace is built upon a very weak foundation; you have no better security against a civil war, then that the greater part of the people will be discreet. If things prosper not according to their wishes, crafty men persuade them the fault lies in those who have the managery of the public, and if these be not removed, and honest and wise men (meaning themselves) put in their places, their miseries will daily grow upon them. A general accusation of ill affected, malignant persons, wicked Counsellors, is cause sufficient to out their supposed enemies of all preferments, and put their pretended friends in their rooms. This opens a gap to all confusion; civil war, and most unnatural distractions are the certain issue of it. Our own lamentable experience confirms this sad truth. After you had obtained a perfect confirmation of all your ancient rights and liberties, with a gracious enlargement of them by new grants, and with such security as your forefathers were not acquainted with, you are frighted with the possibility of a relapse. To prevent which, it was thought fit to take away the King's power, with which our Laws had invested him, as the necessary means for our protection, because it was not impossible he might use it for our oppression. Accordingly the King's Navy, His Forts, Magazines, and the Arms of the Kingdom, are put into such as you would call safe hands. I do not ask with what conscience, but with what judgement you did this? The want of prudence was as great as that of honesty, what hath been the success of confiding in those whom the Laws had not entrusted? are not your sufferings infinitely multiplied? are you not extremely sick of your remedy? The tables are quite turned, and your friends have undertaken the same bad game, and play it much worse; you only make the stakes, and are in a probable way to lose all that you have. What one thing did you complain of, which is not exceeded by them? your grievances are highly improved, Magna Charta and the Petition of Right are now malignant, they speak not the sense of the House, but take part with the King. To quote our good and ancient Laws is interpreted a breach of Privileges of Parliament; appeals are made to the people, the ready way to a universal confusion. And they according to private information, and misguided affections, did once pass this sentence, that to imprison without cause alleged, and to deny Habeas corpus, is no entrenchment upon the liberty of the Subject; to bestow men's estates by whole sale, and take away their Money, Plate, or Goods, doth not destroy the property of the Subject; To scorn and revile the Book of Common Prayer, against an Act of Parliament, which severely punishes such contempt, and to supplant our established doctrine and discipline by countenancing Anabaptism and Brownism, conduces to the holy Reformation, and will in time effect that great work, and settle true Religion. Thus much by the way, to show that we cannot have any absolute security; in all governments it is necessary to trust some body. For if we should retain a liberty to right ourselves (not to mention the fatal mischiefs of Anarchy, and that it is probable this freedom would be frequently abused to our wrong, self-love making men partial in their own causes) the decision of controversies would be writ in blood, and we should lay a fruitful seedplot of civil wars, contrary to the end of society, which is to preserve public peace, though sometimes with private loss; because though we suffer some things by injustice, yet we enjoy great benefits by common tranquillity, but in the ruin of the whole, the rights of single persons must be destroyed. The hazard likewise appears much greater, by enabling those to injure us, whom the Law hath not entrusted with our protection.  
To answer their objection fully, who would persuade the people, there is not any differnce between arbitrary government, and government restrained by laws, if Subjects may not compel their sovereign to the observation of them.  
Greater security would undo us. For though we suffer sometimes under real greivances, yet pretended breaches of our rights (which can never be wanting, as long as ambitious persons are discontented) would have the same influence to stir up civil dissensions, and it is a more prudent course, to oblige some to sit down though wronged, then to open a certain way for Schism in the body by indulging a most pernicious freedom of righting themselves. It was wisely said by Seneca satius est a paucis etiam justam excusationem non accipi, quàm ab omnibus aliquam tentari. For Kingdoms are many times disturbed upon mere pretences. There are such who will set their country on fire, only to warm their own hands by it, and trouble the waters, that they may the better catch fish, that is, who will pursue private interests with hazard of public destruction. He that doubts this, let him consult histories, and he shall find, it hath been fatal to the best Princes to have the worst Subjects. I appeal to men's consciences whether they have not read, and perhaps scene, the reign of a most gracious Prince, a Prince eminently merciful, and just, branded with the odious name of Tyranny. And when malice itself cannot blemish his actions, when he is not so bad as they could pray for, (for they would have made great advantages, if they could charge him with personal vices, as unchaste, intemperate, or negligent in performance of religious duties) yet craft hath done their business, and abused the people's weakness so far, as to make them active in their own ruin, by that wicked Art of declaiming against evil counsellors. Of such dangerous consequence is it, to open a way to civil war upon pretended miscarriages in government? But grant, not fancied, but real injuries, Yet 
— non tanti est civilia bella moveri.   
It is true, the people are then not so happy as they might be; but to make use of force, as a remedy, will increase their miseries. It is certain, this Kingdom never suffered so highly under the greatest tyrant, as it hath already by this unnatural war, and who can tell, whither it may not end in a universal destruction. If a King be forced to conquer against his will, who knows how fare he may be tempted beyond his natural disposition. It is a melancholy consideration, that a people's perverseness may change a gentle Sceptre into a rod of iron. But if Subjects prevail, we can see no end of the war. Foreign nations will be poured upon this unhappy land, & there will never be wanting at home a considerable party (as long as there are either honest or discontented men) to fight for the regaining his haereditary rights, to keep whom in awe, our fellow Subjects will plead a necessity of being tyrants (I could wish it were not already acted upon us; first their will made necessity, and then necessity makes their will the measure of right and wrong, and destroys all law) their wants will give law to us, and imprison us upon bare suspicion of Loyalty, and seize on our estates for fear they may be honestly employed.  
Thus we see a necessity of trust, and that we are bound not only in conscience, but in prudence also, not to revenge the not performance of it, I can further make it appear, we have very good security (as strong as humane wisdom ever invented) that we shall live happily, and therefore we have no reason to rob ourselves of those great blessings which we lately enjoyed, peace and plenty, upon vain fears and groundless jealousies of imaginary miseries. Our forefathers did not distrust the sound temper of this policy, and they enjoyed the benefits of it in a high degree.  
First, the King hath sworn to preserve our Laws, our Liberties, our Propriety, and our Religion; and he desires God so to prosper him and his, as he performs this Oath unto the Lord, who will require a severe account. We may make a highly probable conjecture of the sincerity of his royal heart, and the unfeignednesse of his many sacred Protestations from his miraculous success. If God had not fought on his side, if the immediate hand of providence had not supported him, in man's judgement he had been swallowed up.  
Secondly, if he should command any illegal things, the executioners of them are responsable, and must make satisfaction to the injured parties. And they cannot flatter themselves with hopes of impunity, for once in three years a Parliament will call them to account, and they have a great democratical advantage for the obtaining justice. Because the King's wants cannot be supplied without their consent, and it is very unlikely he will deny any reasonable petitions, or reject any desires but such as rob him of his honour, which is infinitely dear to him above plenty; except they endeavour to make him worse than poor, (which cannot be by demanding justice) it is most probable he will readily assent.  
Thirdly, His interests are the same with the Subjects. They are not like two buckets, when one is lowest, the other is highest, but they resemble the Head and rest of the Members, and the Head cannot thrive by a consumption of the Members. Illegal gainings from the people are shifts rather than true policy; they may serve a present turn, yet are not worth the price at which they are purchased, envy and discontents; whereas the gratitude of the Subject is a constant and cheerful patrimony. When the King, like the Sun, in consideration of what is drawn up from them, shall return it in plentiful showers, and the blessings of a just government, which makes a Land fruitful.  
Upon these grounds we have very good reason to promise to ourselves a happy government; our hopes are much above our fears, especially after his greater experience of the unfortunate consequences of some miscarriages, and the strange blessings upon his strict observation of the certain and known Laws.  
They that require fuller information in the nature of this government, may find ample satisfaction in Stawnford, Dyer, Crompton, and Sir Edward Coke, That the King is the fountain of all justice, and consequently that the Laws have placed the supreme power in the Crown. I have chosen rather to show it out of Bracton, a man worthily famous for his knowledge in the Civil and Common Law, because the book is less common, and I find his authority often abused to justify their cause. Sciendum, quòd ipse dominus Rex, qui ordinariam habet jurisdictionem & dignitatem & potestatem super omnes qui in regno suo sunt, 
King's Supremacy proved out of Bracton.  habet enim omnia jura in manu sua, quae ad coronam & laicalem pertinent potestatem, & materialem gladium qui pertinet ad regni gubernaculum. Habet etiam justitiam & judicium, quae sunt jurisdictiones, ut ex jurisdictione suâ, sicut Dei minister & Vicarius tribuat unicuique quod suum fuerit. Habet enim ea quae sunt pacis, ut populus sibi traditus in pace sileat & quiescat, & ne quis alterum verberet, vulneret, vel male tractet, ne quis alienam rem per vim & roberiam auferat vel asportet, ne quis hominem mahemiet vel occidat. Habet etiam coercionem ut delinquentes puniat & coerceat. Item habet in potestate suâ leges & constitutiones, assisas in regno suo provisas, & approbatas, & juratas, ipse in propriâ personâ suâ observet & subditis suis faciat observari, nihil enim prodest jura condere, nisi sit qui juratueatur, Habet igitur Rex hujusmodi jura sive jurisdictiones in manu suâ. lib. 2. cap. 24. §. 1. And again, ea quae jurisdictionis sunt & pacis, & ea quae sunt justitiae & paci annexa, ad nullum pertinent nisi ad coronam, & dignitatem regiam, nec à corona separari poterunt cùm faciant ipsam coronam. The english of it in brief is this. The King hath supreme power in all civil causes, and is super omnes, over all persons, over the body politic; all jurisdictions are in him; the material sword of right belongs to him, and whatsoever conduces to peace, that the people committed to his charge may lead peaceable and quiet lives. The power of holding Assizes is derived from him, and of punishing delinquents. For Laws were vainly enacted, if there were not some body enabled to protect us by defending them, etc.  
These conclusions are naturally deduced from his premises. To dispose the Militia of the Kingdom without the consent of the Sovereign (and much more against his express prohibition) is illegal. To issue Commissions by any other authority than his, for killing and slaying, or taking men's estates by force, is against the known Laws: and to forbid the holding of Assizes (upon whatever pretence of advancing the Subjects property, by stopping the course of Justice,) is destructive of the rights both of King and Subjects.  
He defines the Sword, lib. 1. cap. 8. §. 4. lest Subjects should think it lawful to take it up in their own defence without his authority, significat defensionem regni & patriae, it is the right to defend the Kingdom. Populi salus, the safety of the people (the pretence of which hath engaged them in a likely way of ruin) cannot dispense with our Laws, which have enabled only him to protect them. It is not possible to speak more home than he hath done in the fifth Paragraph. Omnis quidem sub rege, & ipse sub nullo nisi tantùm sub Deo. Parem autem non habet in regno suo, quia sic amitteret praeceptum, cum par in parem non habeat imperium. Item nec multo fortiùs superiorem nec potentiorem habere debet, quia sic esset inferior sibi subjectis, & inferiores pares esse non possunt potentioribus. Ipse autem Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo & sub lege, quia lex facit regem. All are under the King, and the King is under God only. He hath no equal in his Realm, (no coordination here) because then he could not command all, for amongst equals there can be no Empire. Therefore much less are any his superiors, or can challenge greater power, because than he would be under his Subjects, etc. The King ought not to be under man. He is under God and the Law, because the Law makes him King.  
The last words (though advantage be made of them, and Fortescue is quoted to the same purpose) can afford no just ground of scruple; for he explains himself within a few lines. Lex facit regem, signifies no more than that of the Roman Emperors, Adeò de autoritate juris nostra pendet autoritas. l. digna, c. de legib. The meaning may be extended thus fare. That the people had a hand in the conveyance of their divided rights into him, and he may now challenge them by virtue of their own agreement, and by divine right also, but as presupposing this consent; because God doth not immediately dispose of Kingdoms now, and conquest signifies greater force not juster title; that oft times gives possession, and a subsequent compact creates a true right. I do not deny, but that conquest in some cases may be a lawful way of acquisition; the provocation may be so great, that persons and estates are forfeited to the victor; but because the will is not capable of being forced, it doth not follow, he hath got a right over their goods and bodies, therefore they are His Subjects, and own to him obedience. For to be subject, being a moral bond, where God doth not lay upon us any obligation, (as the duty of children towards their Parents doth not depend upon choice) it can only flow from our consent. But this consent of the people was not an adequate cause, but a necessary qualification to make him capable of receiving a larger commission from God. The Sword of Justice is blunt, the people's agreement could not put an edge upon it to cut off offenders, this is done by the Magistrate, as Gods delegate.  
That the King is sub lege, under the law, hath this sense, That he ought to govern according to those standing rules. His Majesty freely confesses this obligation, and since experience hath taught him the benefits of strict observance, he will not be entreated upon what plausible pretences soever (and much less will he be commanded) to recede from their known and certain direction. But if he should swerve from these rules, he is not liable to any punishment, nor compellible by strong hand; not for want of sin, for he offends highly in that case, but for want of a superior jurisdiction. Bracton delivers this truth plainly, we have no legal remedy, we can only humbly petition His sacred Majesty, locus erit supplicationi, quod factum suum corrigat & emendet; quòd quidem si non fecerit, satis sufficit ei ad poenam, quòd dominum expectet ultorem. Nemo quidem de factis suis praesumat disputare, multo fortiùs contra factum suum venire. If he will not hearken to our just and reasonable desires, satis sufficit, his punishment is more then enough, for he must render an account to him that judgeth righteously. Let not men presume to question his deeds; much less to undo by force, what he shall do though not according to right. That you may not think this dropped from him unwarily, he repeats it in other places, and lib. 5. tract 3. de defaltis, cap. 3. §. 3. He puts the case. That the King should do injury, and a plea is brought against him, in whose behalf he did it; the King being petitioned and persisting, and he rules it thus. Quo casu cùm dominus Rex super hoc fuerit interpellatus, in eadem perstiterit voluntate, quòd velit tenentem esse defensum cum injuria, cum teneatur justitiam totis viribus defensare, extunc erit injuria ipsius domini regis, nec poterit ei necessitatem aliquis imponere, quòd illam corrigat & emendet nisi velit, cùm superiorem non habeat nisi Deum, & satis erit illi pro poenâ quòd Deum expectet ultorem. If the King who is bound to administer justice to his utmost power, will not recall the wrong he did upon a false suggestion, in this case, he injures his Subjects, but no body can force him to do right, because he hath supreme power; he hath no superior but God only, and it is sufficient that we shall have a day of hearing hereafter at a just tribunal, where he shall be punished for doing wrong, and we amply requited for our patiented suffering. In lib. 2. cap. 16. §. 3. he attributes the highest authority to the King of England. If the place be rightly understood by a wise Chancellor of this Land, whose collections from thence I shall lay down, you may find them in his case of the Postnatis, pag. 107, 108. De chartis regiis & factis regum non debent nec possunt Justiciarii nec privatae personae disputare; nec etiamsi in illa dubitatio oriatur, possunt eam interpretari, & in dubiis & obscuris, vel si aliqua dictio duos contineat intellectus, domini regis erit expectanda interpretatio & voluntas, cum ejus sit interpretari, cujus est concedere. The sense is, that all casus omissi, cases not determined for want of foresight are in the King: so that it gives not power to him to make new or abrogate old Laws without consent in Parliament, but the right of interpretation belongs to him, not in plain and evident cases (for these need no declarer; to challenge a right to declare all Laws, were in effect to make them, and then all the Subject's rights would be in their breasts, and depend upon arbitrary votes) but only in new questions and, doubts which must not be resolved contrary to old Law. By this it appears that Subjects ought not to judge of the equitable part of Law, and to overthrow the literal sense at pleasure, to the praejudice of their Sovereign. Our King hath as much right by our constitutions, as that civil Law gave the Roman Emperors, Inter aequitatem jusque interpositam interpretationem nobis solis et licet et oportet inspicere. l. i c. de leg. et constit. or that other Rex solus judicat de causa a jure non definita.  
Notwithstanding such express testimonies of the King's supremacy, yet such is the ignorance of some (these transcribing only, and only varying the method of treason in their seditious pamphlets, as appears by that remarkable error borrowed out of the observations of Richard the second, being misled by Spencer; which I have met with in many of their libels) and such is the malice of others, who have searched the place in Bracton by them quoted, that his authority is cited against the King almost in all their Pamphlets which either speak Latin, or pretend to knowledge in the Laws.  
The author of the fuller answer to Doctor Ferne tells us, 
Bractons' authority abused by them.  the two Houses collectim considered in a joint body, are not Subjects. p. 4. And Bracton, he says, will bear him out in it. Rex habet superiorem, Deum scilicet, item legem per quam factus est Rex, item Curiam suam, viz. Comites, Barones, &c. The King hath above him besides God the Law, whereby he is made King, likewise his Court of Earls, and Barons, etc. This man hath betrayed either want of knowledge, or want of honesty; I suspect the latter, because he must needs understand, that this was a very unfit proof of coordination between the three Estates (upon the strength of which his whole discourse hangs, and it is merely begged) for this concludes against it, and makes a most absurd subordination of the Sovereign to such a number of his Subjects, and therefore he confesseth, he need not go so high. The adding. etc. as he hath above him his Court of Earls and Barons, and so forth, doth discover their unfaithful dealing. For first, here is not the least mention of the House of Commons (which they would seem to imply) and therefore it cannot serve their turn▪ and secondly the words following (craftily left out) show the absurdity of it, the reason of the speech is, quia Comites dicuntur quasi socii Regis, et qui habet socium, habet magistrum, & ideo si Rex fuerit sine fraeno. i e. sine lege, debent ei fraenum ponere nisi ipsimet fuerint cum Rege sine fraeno, (Because Earls are quasi fellows to the King (I may perhaps render the meaning by calling them his Peers) and he that hath a fellow (or a Peer) hath a Master. And therefore if the King will indulge himself a looseness from all Laws, they ought to impose those bonds upon him, except they also will cast off obedience to established Laws. Then, he says, no farther remedy is left but crying to the Lord, and the Lord will return this answer. Vocabo super eos gentem robustam & longinquam quae destruet eos etc. by the way he does not say that Subjects shall call in a foreign Nation, that is treason, But the Lord will bring them in, because they would not judge their people righteously.  
The distinct answer to it is, that Bracton lays not this down as Law, but when he had taught the quite contrary, Omnis quidem sub eo & ipse sub nullo▪ sed sub Deo tantùm, and non habet parem, and sufficit ad paenam, quod Dominum expectet ultorem. He puts this speech into the mouth of a man discontend at the abuse of regal power, and arguing from the practice of that Age wherein he wrote, for the Rebellious Barons seized on the Militia of the Kingdom, which of right appertained to Hen, third▪ as Bracton clearly delivers himself, ea quae sunt justiciae & paci annexa ad nullum pertinent nisi ad coronam, nec à coronà separari pot●runt. That he speaks it in the person of another appears from hence; that he gins it with dicere poterit quis. some body may say The King hath done Justice, and it is well; and why hath he not the same liberty to censure him if he do injustice, and accordingly to require him to perform his duty, lest he fall into the hands of the living God? He proceeds immediately to Rex autem habet superiorem, etc.  
It would be very easy, for one better read in our Laws, than I am, to show that the King of England hath supreme right, from the nature of all Subjects lands holden of him in fee; which though it gives a perpetual estate, 
King's supremacy proved from the nature of all his Subjects tenors.  yet not absolute, but conditional, for it depends upon the acknowledgement of superiority and is forfaitable upon a not performance of some duties, and therefore it returns unto him. For the breach of Fidelity is loss of Fee, as appears in Duarenus, Wesembechius, Farinaccius, Molina, Socinus, Gail, and they tell us that all Lawyers agree, that all Feuda are lost by rebellion; as also by our common Law, which according to the nature of the trespass, varies the forfeiture. In case of Treason, as taking up Arms against the King, (for so you may find it determined 25 Edw. 3. c. 2.) after legal conviction all their lands and tenements are absolutely in the King's disposal; in case of felony, the King hath a year, a day and the waist, after which it passeth down to the heirs. It is very evident, that the King only hath that high degree of property in his lands which Lawyers call alaudium or alodium. The sense is the same though the words differ; for it is not material, whether with Budaeus we derive it from the privative particle (a) and Laudum, which signifies, nomination, so that it denotes praedium cujus nullus author est nisi Deus: to hold in his own full right, without any service, any payment of rent, because from God only, or like to those of Heinault, who acknowledge no tenure but from God and the Sun, Pays de Hainault tenu de dieu & du soleil. or else we may derive it from the same privative particle (a) and the Saxon Leod, or the French lewd (a vassal or leigeman) and then it expresses thus much, a tenement without vassalage, without burden, to which our English Load retains some resemblance.  
But Subjects of what degree or condition soever hold their lands ut feuda, in the nature of Fee, which implies Fealty to a superior. It is all one whether they belong to them by inheritance, or by purchase; for though they may sometimes be dearly bought, yet such is the condition of the alienation, that they cannot be conveyed without those burdens which were laid upon him who had novel Fee. So that Camden pag. 93. of his Britannia, observes very truly, that the King only hath directum dominium, this being reserved by the conoverour, who changed many of our laws, and introduced the customs of Normandy, and instituted all our pleas in French, and passed over the utile dominium only; he gave though not absolute yet perpetual right, conditions being performed to use and enjoy such and such lands▪ The highest expression of a Subjects right which law will justify, is this, seisitus inde in dominico suo, ut de feudo. He is seized of such lands in his demaine, as of fee. Now Feudum is manifestly a derived right, and founded in him who hath supreme right, in consideration whereof all lands held by Subjects are burdened with some services, which differ according to the variety of grant from the King. Hence some tenors expire with life, others go down to our posterity by descent, to whom the law gives usum fructum, a right to use, enjoy and make all profits, but they are properly but mesn or mesme Lords, as holding of an over Lord, or Lord paramount, who is the King.  
The King's supremacy is as strongly proved in, that he is our Liege Lord, 
Liege Lord bound to some duties,  as appears by sundry Statutes, for such an one can acknowledge no superior, as Duarenus shows in comment. de consuetudin. seudorum. c. 4. num. 3. And all Subjects are homines ligii, liege men, and own faith, and true allegiance to him, as their superior. The definition of Legeancy is set down in the great customary of Normandy, Ligeantia est ex quâ domino tenentur vassalli sui etc. Ligeancy is an obligation upon all Subjects to take part with their liege Lord against all men living, to aid and assist with their bodies and minds, with their advice and power, not to lift up their arms against him, nor to support in any way those who oppose him. 
but not under pain of forfeiture, as Liege men are.  The Lord like wise is bound to govern, protect, and defend his liege people (so the English are often called in Acts of Parliament) according to the rights, customs, and laws of the Country. If Subjects break their faith and prove disloyal, their estates and lives are expressly forfeited; and the King is enabled by law (as the fountain of all Jurisdiction) to seize upon their goods and lands, and to destroy their persons. If he perform not his duty (for there is a mutual obligation between liege Lord and liege men) yet notwithstanding this failing, neither his Crown or any rights belonging to his Royal dignity are subject to forfeiture. Let them if they can produce any one law to maintain their assertion. If there had been any, it would not thus long have been concealed, for they are not accustomed to dissemble any advantages by overmuch modesty. Indeed they have not any shadow of proof or colour of reason for it; and yet upon their bare word how many thousands have hazarded their souls by assisting rebels, which are eternally lost, if they perish in their sin? What madness is it to believe their saying, before their and your own oaths? Is it possible you can innocently destroy your Sovereign, whose life you have sworn to defend with your utmost power? Be not abused by that miserable fallacy drawn from the nature of a Covenant. The mistake lies here, that law hath provided to bring Subjects offending to a trial, but hath not, could not question the King, and compel him to be responsable, for want of a superior jurisdiction, All just proceed must be per legale judicium parium, & legem terrae, by trial of Peers and the law of the land. But the King hath no Peer, and lex terrae doth not in any case disarm the King of the sword of Justice, it is not separable from his Crown. Therefore he is exempt from trial, and it cannot be just to punish him unheard, uncondemned. The conditions of Kings were very miserable, if he who swears to govern the people according to the known laws, so that they see what to trust to, should himself be liable to their arbitrary Justice. The Premises are firm; for the Major is part of magna charta, and the Minor is as evident, as that his Subjects are not greater than he; which signifies only, that those which are under him are not his superiors. Bracton, you may remember, is frequent in the expression, Rex non habet parem in regno, and he is tantùm sub Deo etc. There is besides an ancient monument, which shows the manner of holding a Parliament before the Conquest, which will afford us no small light in this point. It is said to be delivered to William the Conqueror by discreet men, at his command, and to have been approved by him; it runs thus, Rex est caput, principium & finis Parliamenti & ita non habet parem in suo gradu etc. The King is the head, the beginning and the end of the Parliament and so he hath not any Peer or equal, but is himself the first degree. The 2d is of Archbishop's Bishops, Abbots and Priors holding by Baroney. The 3d is of Proctors of the Clergy. The fourth is of Earls, Barons and other noble personages. The fifth is of Knights of the Shire. The sixth degree is of Citizens and Burgesses, and so the whole Parliament is completed by six degrees. But we must know that though any of the five degrees besides the King, shall be absent, if they were duly summoned, Parliamentum nihilominus censetur esse plenum, the Parliament is full in law.  
The latter part is as manifestly true, that Lex terrae doth not in any case disarm the King of the sword of Justice. By our constitutions Regia majestas est armis decorata and legibus armata, the directive part of Law concerns the King, the penal doth not; He ought to square his actions according to this rule, but if they should swerve from it, they cannot fall within the cognizance of his Subjects. All offences are punishable as committed against Him, His Crown and Dignity, and though the Law hath condemned them, they are pardonable by His Grace: which clearly demonstrates, He is above penal Laws, and it is indeed an inseparable privilege of supreme jurisdictiction, let it be placed where it will, in one or more persons. Naturally, (supposing men by distance absolved from paternal dominion) that is, before a positive constitution of Empire, when men were equally free, it was not unlawful to require by strong hand satisfaction for wrong; but after an established government, this liberty was civilly restrained; and it is not in our power to right ourselves but in a legal way, which is by Magistrates; and the last appeal lies to the highest Governor, that the process may not be infinite, but we may have some certain and peaceable decision of all differences.  
To conclude this Section, (for I shall have occasion to enlarge my proofs in the next, in answer to their exceptions) we have sworn to bear true allegiance to the King, (such as have not are nevertheless strongly obliged by divine Law, and this duty doth naturally flow from the right to govern.) I request all men to examine their consciences how they can excuse themselves from f●●t perjury, if they endanger his life and endeavour to destroy him. It is expressly high Treason to compass his death. 25. Edw. 3. Though God in his great goodness hath restrained their malice from effecting it, yet by shooting at him, by attempting to kill him, they are lost temporally, their goods and chattels, lands and tenements, and lives, are forfeited in Law; and what is most lamentable, their souls are eternally ruined. Disloyalty to their King is disobedience to God, I need not aggravate the sin, the Apostles eloquence is most powerful, They that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. The case is so extremely plain, I am amazed that the people should be so bewitched into Rebellion, contrary to Oaths and solemn Protestations, and repugnant to Christianity. For they are condemned out of their own mouths, unless that gross nonsense be true, that they shot at him (as at Edge-hill) for His preservation, and endeavoured to kill him in his own defence. It is miserable comfort which the doubtful signification of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 can afford, but sinking men catch hold of every reed. The word in the Greek is rather to be translated judgement and punishment, (the words following are peremptory) and as Piscator observes, thereby is not meant eternal damnation, but the punishment of the Magistrate in this life: Master Bridge his Answer to Doctor Ferne. p. 4. This calls to mind those men of whom Minutius Felix saith, they did optare potiùs quàm credere, rather wish then believe that no such thing as eternal damnation was intended. The Analogy of the place will evince, that this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is like a sword with two edges, fitted not only to kill the body, but to destroy the soul also. That it threatens punishment from the Magistrate is very true, but not all; you must needs be subject not only for wrath, but likewise for conscience sake: v. 5. 13. c. to the Romans. You are exhorted not to rebel, because you may be hanged, but lest confidence in numbers should answer this objection, a stronger motive is used, you shall certainly be damned; It is probable, you may take the Gallows in the way, but however Hell will be the end. Though you escape a shameful death, yet you have forfeited eternal life.   

§. 4.  
I Will begin with a most remarkable passage in calvin's Institutions, wherein are many things worth our observation, and which will conduce much to the decision of the present dispute. Neque enim si ultio domini est effraenata dominationis correctio, ideo protinus demandatam nobis arbitremur. Quibus nullum aliud quàm parendi & patiendi datum est mandatum. De privatis hominibus semper loquor. l. 4. c. 20. §. 31. If correcting unbridled governments be his work, who said vengeance is mine, we must not therefore take God's office into our hands, we cannot think to reform the abuses of higher powers is committed to us, to whom is given no other commandment but to obey and suffer. I speak always of private men. This truth clearly delivered speaks the goodness of the cause, and demonstrates the unlawfulness of taking up Arms against the King, though their supposition were true (as it is evidently false) that His Majesty did cast off the bridle of established Laws, whereas He doth hazard His Life and Crown in their defence. The quarrel is, that he doth obstinately maintain our good old customs and constitutions (such as experience hath confirmed happy and beneficial to this Nation) and will not be over awed to make new Laws, such as private interests would force upon Him and the Kingdom.  
This is a sure ground for conscience to rely upon, and evidently destructive of most of their popular principles, which have poisoned the affections of the Subjects. It is not lawful for us to correct ill Governors, because this cannot be effected without resistance, and all private men have direct precept against this; that of obedience and patience. This will speak home to the business, when it will after appear, that all inferior Magistrates opposed to the highest, whose Delegates and Ministers they are, are but private men.  
In the mean while, we may hence discover the falsehood of their principles, viz. That the law of nature will justify all resistance against injuries, and for our own preservation; that no people is so mad as to contract to their own ruin, (and therefore may resist any Magistrate, if their lives be endangered; the meaning is, if they have offended against known Laws, which will certainly adjudge them to die, the Magistrate shall bring them to a legal trial at his own peril) or to agree to be ill governed; and therefore since there is a mutual compact, if Rulers perform not their duty, the contract is dissolved, and they are at liberty to right themselves, and to govern their Governors, and to fling the Pilot overboard, if he wilfully steer upon the Rocks, not by way of jurisdiction, but selfe-preservation. That the King is for the people, and Governors are apppointed for the good of those that are governed, and therefore Subjects are the more considerable men, and greater and more honourable than those who are placed over them, they bearing relation of the end, Magistrates but of the means, and so the safety of the people must give Law to the Magistrate, if he will be peevish, and protect them according to old Laws, when they fancy greater benefits from innovation; that Quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale, but according to their grounds, private men made all Magistrates, (for before they constituted some form of Regiment by pactions and agreements, they were but a multitude of men, amongst whom none had jurisdiction over other) the conclusion is, therefore private men are more Magistrates, and may call even the highest to account, and force him to be responsable for what ever they judge abuse of power.  
The grounds upon which our seditious writers do argue, are very contradictory in themselves, and yet all of them conclude for Rebellion.  
Some (and I think the greater part) confess it is unlawful for private men to resist the Magistrate, though abusing his authority. These must needs acknowledge the weakness of those arguments (which yet they constantly press, and which prevail most upon the people's affections) that it is a senseless thing to imagine, we can be obliged to be slaves, in case a King be guided by his Lusts, not Laws, or not to preserve ourselves against bloody Tyrants. For their determination is contrary, that private men for want of authority to arm them, are bound to suffer. And Calvin is express, lib. 3. c. 10. §. 6. nullum magis praeclarum facinus habetur, etiam apud philosophos, quàm liberare tyrannide patriam. Atqui voce coelestis arbitri apertè damnatur, qui privatus manum tyranno intulerit. They maintain therefore, though private men sin in resisting; yet if countenanced by inferior Magistrates, than it is not Rebellion, but a just War. These may be clearly convinced, if they will but consider, that inferior Magistrates are such only in respect of those who are under their jurisdiction, because to them they represent the King, but in reference to the King, they themselves are but Subjects, and can challenge not jurisdiction over him.  
Some state it thus; though not private men, not yet inferior Magistrates, yet superior powers may bridle the exorbitant lusts of Princes by force of Arms; this we grant, and therefore acknowledge, that in an Aristocracy where the laws place the supreme power in such a body of men, what is done by their authority ought not to be resisted, and if any one man take upon him regal power contrary to their constitutions he is a Traitor, and may be cut off. But this concludes nothing in a Monarchy, Res apud alios acta, aliis non praejudicat; for their error is▪ They make the two Houses the King's superiors; who themselves disclaim it in words, and seem to ask you, who made them supreme Ruler; for all their petitions (which are the acts of them not as single men, but as united bodies, and considered unitiuè, not disjunctiuè; socially, not severally) carry this truth in the Title, Your Majesty's humble and obedient Subjects, the Lords and Commons in Parliament, etc. which acknowledges their obligation to be under him; and to say otherwise would be of dangerous consequence, for if they be not His Subjects, they put themselves out of His protection.  
Some again think it too gross and absurd to maintain, that Subjects in any capacity are above their King, and therefore a coordination serves their turn. By which if they mean an equal right in the King and the two Houses of a negative voice, in respect of new Laws to be enacted, or old abrogated; this is granted, but will do them no service, and indeed it overthrows their cause. For as the King doth not pretend that he can make use of his power to make new laws without their consent, so by the same reason, neither can they challenge a right of taking away our old Government without the Royal assent. But if they mean by coordination, a division of Sovereignty, this is against the nature of it, and a clear contradiction. So that if he be our only Sovereign there is no such thing as coordination; if they be joynt-soveraignes', in what a miserable condition are we Englishmen, who should be bound to impossibilities, to obey three masters commanding contrary things? They might as well challenge us to do homage to them, which is and aught to be performed only to the King, tum per id efficiamur homines solius illius cui juravimus, as the Civilians determine; and we cannot be duorum in solidum: l. Si ut cer. §. Si duobus D. commodati.  
Some, and those the most desperate mutineers, lay such principles, as will bring in a certain confusion: For they tell us obedience is commanded only to good Magistrates; if men entrusted to govern according to Law fail in their duty, they cease to be Magistrates, for these are defined Dei ministri nobis in bonum, The Ministers of God for the good of the Commonwealth; so that to destroy such is to resist the men only, and not the power; it is a war against the person only, and not the authority, which is none, if used against Law, because that doth not enable any to destroy itself, the Law cannot die legally; by power is not meant 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 what they may do by strength, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, what they ought to do in right.  
This is the most reasonable doctrine, because coherent to itself throughout, but the most seditious doctrine likewise, because it gives a full liberty to the people, not only in a representative body, (and therefore in the diffusive much more, because all the right that can pretend to against the King, is derived from this) but to any part of them, to any private man to resume (as some express it) their power, or as others to make use of that power, which they never parted with to their own inconvenience, and so all necessity of suffering, except when they have deserved it, is taken away, and Christianity is made a tame madness.  
To return to Calvin, whose following words are much abused (though I must confess some conceive them craftily laid down by him, in reference to the time and place when and where he lived, and that his design was to insinuate some small colour in plausible Generals, for that most unjustifiable action of the Citizens of Geneva, who had lately cast off their true Prince, because a Bishop of a contrary religion) after he hath informed us, that God requires all private men to obey or suffer though under Tyrants, he adds, Nam si qui nunc sint populares magistratus, etc. If there be at this time any Magistrates appointed by Law, in behalf of the people, to restrain the licentiousness of Kings, such as were the Ephori, opposed and set over the Lacedaemonian Kings, the Tribunes of the people which kerbed the Roman Consuls, and the Demarchi who bridled the Senate at Athens, etc. upon this supposition they not only may, but aught to reform the abuses of government, and to do right to the poor Commonalty whose guardians they are. This is undeniably true, but impertinent to the present controversy, because the People or Nobles cannot challenge that power in a Monarchy, with which they are invested under an Aristocratical or Democratical regiment, such as Athens, Rome, and Sparta were.  
It is very observable by the way, that by reason the supreme power was placed in the Lacedaemonian Ephori, and Roman Tribunes, etc. their office made their persons sacred and inviolable. They did justly challenge the same impunity, which we maintain, belongs to Kings in a true Monarchy; for I argue not from the name, (for though the Duke of Venice were called King, it would not enlarge his authority, and the Spartan Kings had only a Royal title, but were truly Subjects as we learn from Plutarch and Polybius) but from the nature of that power wherewith the constitutions of a Realm do invest one person. Hence appears the unreasonableness of their seditious invectives founded upon some inconveniences, because power will probably be sooner abused, if any person may do what he will, and not be responsable for his injustice. These kind of Declamations, with which their Presses and Pulpits labour, strike equally at all government. For there is a necessity we should lie open to some possible evils from the abuse of authority, or else we cannot provide for greater and certain goods of common peace and public tranquillity. It is no prudence to cure the miscarriages of government by a legal confusion, since even the worst government is less miserable than Anarchy.  
I believe I can make a full discovery of those wicked Arts whereby crafty men have opened a way to the advancement of their covetous and ambitious designs at the price of public calamity. Tib. Gracchus was excellently learned in those damnable politics; and I desire all indifferent men to judge whether the unhappy disturbers of England have not exactly managed the miseries of this Kingdom according to his principles. He proposed some Laws which might well become a real lover of his Country, 
Graccus his seditious practices, their pattern.  but his violence in the illegal establishment of them, which did evidently tend to confusion, did make it apparent, that public pretences were taken up in order to the satisfaction of private lusts. Marcus Octavius, as his fellow Tribune had the right of a negative voice, for if one Tribune dissented, no Ordinance could be made which ought to have the power of Law. He not able to effect his ends, informs the people that this opposition between their equal authorities did threaten civil war, and therefore it would concern them as they loved their own safety, which was the supreme Law, to decide this difference, by recalling that power which they had bestowed, to the end they might receive benefit therefrom; but which was now abused contrary to a trust reposed, to their prejudice. The issue was, he prevailed with them to depose Octavius, and he made them substitute a mean person, one of his dependants. But being sensible afterwards, that amongst all his illegal Acts, this gave most distaste, not only to the Nobility and Gentry, who were endued with clearer understandings, but even to the slowly apprehending Commons, and that it proceeded from lawless passion to debase the highest dignity of Tribune of the people, and expose that sacred function to scorn and contempt, which ever before was justly esteemed inviolable, and such as secured the persons from being touched, he brings these colours to excuse that most unpresidented action.  
The Authority of Tribunes is truly sacred and inviolable, but for no other cause then as particularly devoted to protect the people, and established to advance their welfare: If therefore a person thus highly entrusted, fails in performance of duty, suffers the people for whom he serves, to be oppressed, and endeavours to abridge their power, and denies to them the means of expressing their will and pleasure by his vote; (for he is but their mouth, enabled by them to declare their meaning.) In this case he forfeits all Prividedges and Prerogatives due to his office, because he thwarts those very end which first moved the people to bestow upon him such large preeminences: for if otherwise we must be bound to sit still, while he pulls down the Capitol, or sets the Navy on fire, and notwithstanding any violences, or whatever exorbitancies of his lusts and wildest passions, tamely to obey him as our Tribune, that is such an one who by virtue of our trust for the improvement of our safety, usurps a right to cut our throats, and is our servant to destroy us. Certainly if he endeavour to stop that breath which created him, and to overthrow the underived authority of the people, he is no longer their Tribune. Is it not a most unreasonable thing, that a Tribune may imprison the Consul, if it conduce to the preservation of the State, because in that the people's safety is concerned; and yet that the people cannot depose him in their own defence, and resume their power when employed to their ruin? For as the Consul, so the Tribune likewise is the people's creature; they live and move and have their being in their election. Again, Regal dignity (in which the powers of all other Magistrates of what degree or rank soever, were united and made up a personal Sovereignty) was declared sacred and holy by the most solemn and most religious Ceremonies, as approaching nearer to, and partaking much of Divinity: nevertheless the people expelled Tarquin, abusing his Royal power, and some personal faults were thought a sufficient reason to take away the most ancient Magistracy, and that which founded Rome itself. There are not in this City any persons more holy, more venerable, than those pure votaresses▪ the vestal virgins, whose charge it is to preserve the eternal fire. But if they stain their honour, our Law buries them alive: They cannot challenge any privileges belonging to their sacred employment, because when they cease to respect the Gods, we no longer owe a reverence to them, which is paid only in order to their service of the Gods. Can it then be reasonable to suffer the people's enemy, to enjoy the privileges due to their Protector? He would cut off those hands which hold him up. If the consent of the major part could make him Tribune, shall not the same power which did constitute be equally strong to dissolve? and much more can a greater power depose him, the concurrence even of the whole people declaring him unworthy. What is more holy, what less to be violated, than things offered up and consecrated to the Gods? And yet no man dares forbid the people to make use of these, or to remove them from one place to another, as oft as they shall judge it convenient so to do. By the same reason, without dishonour to the Authority, they may discharge the person, and choose out a better habitation for that sacred office. That the Magistrate is separable from the man is evident, because many, when made by the people, out of a love to a retired life, or a sense of their infirmities, and unfitness to manage the public, have deposed themselves, others have entreated the people to choose more able servants. Plutarch. in the life of Tiberius, and Gajus Gracchi.  
It is needless to make the application. Observe the event; This illegal deed (which was justified only by a pretended necessity, for I know not what imminent dangers did threaten the Commonwealth, except this Bill did paste) being ventured on by the unconsidering multitude to avoid Civil War, proved the ready means to kindle it. The flames of which suddenly consumed the author, with many of his adherents. For one Nasica so managed Gracchus his seditious principles, that he killed him with his own weapons. For taking advantage of the many discontents, he requires the Consul to aid the public safety, by destroying him who had usurped a tyrannical power. The Consul replies with much moderation, justice and prudence, It did not become him to make force the measure of right, nor could he kill a common Citizen, before he were brought to a legal trial, & condemnation had passed upon him. But he promises, if the people either seduced or awed by Tiberius, should Vote any Ordinance contrary to established Laws, he would esteem it of no force, and would not yield to the observance of it. Nasica rises up in a rage, and gives the word to the Tumult, since then the chief Magistrate neglect the common safety, we must not be wanting to our own preservation; such as will maintain the reverence due to lawful authority, follow me. In this mutiny Tiberius falls a sacrifice to the public peace.— Stones and Staves were the only weapons by which this popular man, and above three hundred of his companions were destroyed. The behaviour of Blossius a great incendiary, and an over active instrument to advance wicked designs, is very remarkable. He being arraigned before the Consuls, confesses freely, he had executed what ever Tiberius had commanded him. Nasica asks him, what he would have done if he had been commanded to fire the Capitol; He replies, Tiberius would not have commanded such a thing; others press hard upon him to tell his resolution, in case Tiberius should have commanded it; He plainly tells them, he had then done it, being confident Tiberius would not have commanded it, except it were for the good of the people. The parallel will be defective, if there have not been unhappy instruments who captivating their sense to an implicit saith, and believing not what themselves feel, but what others Vote, are active in their own ruin in pursuance of safety, and pull upon themselves misery and destruction in obedience to those Ordinances, which tell them the Subjects happiness is thereby advanced.  
There are other circumstances fit to be taken notice of. He had provoked so many, he did not dare to be a private man again, (not any personal ambition, but only State jealousy would not permit him to lay down his power) and therefore he so contrives his business, that the people may choose him Tribune the following year, not so much to satisfy any private desire (for he would seem to rule only in obedience to their commands) as to provide for their good in his own safety. The way to this end was to court the Commons by all popular Artes. He propounded new edicts, by which the time of military service was shortened, and some years were cut off from the prefixed number, in which Roman Citizens were bound, when called upon to perform the duties of War. He made it lawful to appeal from any sentence to the judgement of the people. To the Senate (in whom only before the authority to administer justice did reside) he joined an equal number of the inferior Commons, so that a major part of them, with a minor part of Senators, if they made the major part of the whole, did sway all businesses. Thus, saith Plutarch, by all possible ways, lessening and weakening the authority of the Senate by creating greater power in the people, rather out of wilfulness and obstinacy, then sound reason, which must needs perceive, it was void of all Justice, and very disadvantageous to the public interest. He had some other little Arts which stood him in good stead; when the Votes of the people were to be numbered to authorise his edicts, if he perceived his adversaries would prevail in number, because some of his party were absent, he would take some opportunity to pick a quarrel with his fellows, only to divert the business for the present, and gain time, and if that would not do, he would dismiss the assembly, and command another meeting. Then would he appear first upon the place in mourning apparel, and with afflicted looks, and humble countenance, sadly requesting the people to take compassion on him, who suffered such miserable things, and feared worse only for doing them service; and desiring them to reward his faithful endeavour by loving his poor Wife and little Children, for he gave himself for a lost man, since he had reason to fear (yet the cause in which he should fall was an unspeakable comfort) that the enemies of the Commonwealth, and such as maligned their happiness, would come upon him in the night, and force his house, and murder him. These well dissembled griefs so wrought their passions, that the abused Citizens set up Tents about his house at their own charges, and maintained a constant Guard for his protection.  
When such men shall make a State miserable, under pretence of improving its happiness, and challenge to themselves a right to break all settled constitutions, under colour of forcing upon the Kingdom new Laws, which will be more beneficial; when they shall imprison us at pleasure, that we may enjoy our liberties, and take away our goods to secure our property, and punish the most orthodox, conscientious, and painful Preachers, and impose upon Congregations factious Lecturers to settle true Religion; and when they have acted such high mischiefs, shall tell us, the Nobility and Gentry of the Kingdom are Malignants, and delight in, and contribute their aides to advance an illegal government, who are certain to suffer most in it, it is then time to cry out, 
Quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes?   
I have been tempted to a large digression, because the same Arts which made Rome miserable, are visible in our calamities. I will now proceed with Calvin; after he hath very conscientiously instructed us in our christian duty, by saying all resistance is unlawful, unless undertaken by the authority of Magistrates, whom the Law enables to be the people's protectors, and gives them the highest power (which can only be in an Aristocracy or popular State) he hath afforded too great an occasion for mistake by an ungrounded conjecture, Et quâ etiam fortè potestate, ut nunc res habent, funguntur in singulis regnis tres ordines, quum primarios conventus peragunt. And the same power, (which the Tribunes of Rome, etc. had) as things now stand, peradventure belong to the three Estates, when they hold their principal assemblies. I could wish, I were able to excuse him from temporising; yet he lays it down extreme cunningly, perhaps, peradventure, if this chance to be otherwise, you have nothing to say for yourselves; you are condemned out of his mouth, and in a point of such higly concerning consequences, you have no reason to change his adverbe of doubting into an assertive. I shall oppose to his perhaps, it is certainly not so in England, because our Laws make this a Monarchical government, and so different from that of Rome, or Athens, or Sparta, and therefore conscience hath no warrant for resistance against him in whom the supreme power is placed.  
The work of the second section was, to prove it unlawful for Subjects to resist him or them, in whom the supreme authority, that is, all the legal power of the Kingdom in order to raise arms is placed. I shall now show the invalidity of their exceptions against it, by manifesting, that no dispensation grounded upon what causes soever, as endeavours to make them slaves or beggars, or to introduce another and a false religion, and what else may be comprehended under the extreme abuse of this power to their oppression, or upon any persons, as inferior magistrates, or any colour of preserving the authority of the man, by fight, and as much as in them lies, destroying the man in authority, or of making the power well used for the good of the people, and not the person abusing that power to be the minister of God etc. can excuse such resistance from the sin of rebellion, and from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a fight against God in despising his ordinance.  
Tyrannical abuse of power doth not make taking up arms against the supreme governor lawful.  
This truth is confessed in words even by their chief writers, 
Tyranny doth not dispense with the Subjects duty of allegiance.  though in the mean while, they make use of such arguments to prevail on the people's affections (and exhort them against the King in the fear of God) as clearly overthrow this acknowledgement. The fuller answer to Doctor Ferne saith thus, there are two kinds of tyranny, regiminis and usurpationis, that of government, though never so heavy, yet must be endured not only to the good, (says the Apostle 1. Pet. 2. 18.) but the froward too, and therefore I know no man that defends the ten tribes revolt from Rehoboam. p. 22. when they complained of some greivances under which they had groaned in his father's reign, he was as indiscreet, as unjust, and told them, he would oppress them more, and yet because he had jus regiminis, it is ingenuously granted, it was unlawful for them to Rebel.  
The brief answer to Doctor Ferne, thus, we profess against resisting power, authority, though abused. He doth not hid himself (as ordinarily) by dividing the power from the person who is invested therewith, but concludes against resisting the men also. If those who have power to make laws, shall make sinful laws, (that is prove tyrants (and so give authority to force obedience; we say here, there must be either flying or passive obedience. p. 113. By the same reason, if he that hath the only power by laws already made, to train, array, and mustar, and to dispose of the Militia, with which he is entrusted for his Subject's protection and his own safety, should put them into hands, which they cannot confide in, yet there must be no war waged to prevent a supposed danger, there must be either flying or passive obedience.  
But if one that is in authority command out of his own will, and not by law, I resist no power, no authority at all, if I neither actively nor passively obey, no, I do not resist so much as abused authority. If you mean by not passively obey, take up arms ● against (which you must, if you speak pertinently, and would make an application of this answer, to the justification of hostile resistance in Subjects) you do resist power and authority in this case. For though you are no: obliged to yield obedience, either contrary to divine precept, or the known laws of the realm, yet by making use of arms, you transgress that law, which disables Subjects to make war without the Prince's authority, much more against his express command, to the manifest endangering of his royal Person. He answers, this had been but accidental. p. 121. and so we are told by others, he might have stayed away. Those damned assassins' and bloody villains, by whose hands the two French Henry's fell, might have made the same plea for their execrable murders. If they had not come in their way, which they might have avoided by locking themselves up, or by some other means, they had not been killed by them. But he implies a desire, and beseeching him not to be there, but to withdraw himself. If the King had as full right to be there, as in any other place within his Kingdom, they may with the same reason justify the murder of him, if he will not be entreated to keep such company only as they shall allot to him, or to leave his Court, or creep into an oven.  
The Author extremely contradicts this duty, before professed in the name of all, of flying or passive obedience, and lays down a most desperate conclusion, which dissolves all government and makes Anarchy legal. Upon suppossall that Parliaments (taken in the only true sense for King, and Lords, and Commons) should degenerate and grow tyrannical; I confess says he the condition of such a State would be very dangerous and like to come to confusion; particular men could not help themselves, and the whole State (mark how he fancies a whole State, when opposed to King and Lords and all the Commons representatively; what can this State be, but such a number of particular men, who he saith, cannot help themselves?) ought to suffer much before it should help itself by any ways of resisting: but if you can suppose a Parliament so fare to degenerate, as they should all conspire together (all in Law are the major part of both Houses with the Royal assent) with the King to destroy the Kingdom (how unreasonably he expresses a supposal of being won to satisfy private Interests by making prejudicial laws to the Subject in general, let him translate the scene into Ireland, and he may think the supposition very possible) and to possess the lands and riches of the Kingdom themselves (not all, but in an unequitable proportion) in this case whether a law of nature would not allow of standing up to defend ourselves, yea to reassume the power given to them (this is a clear confession, they parted with their power) to discharge them of that power they had, and set up some other, I leave to the light of nature to judge.  
Object. But you will say, this cannot be, because the higher powers must not be resisted by any.  
Answ. This is not properly to resist the power, but to discharge the power, to set the power elsewhere. They daily improve their principles, and now profess plainly, what understanding men did before collect from their grounds, that it is lawful not only to depose a King, but even the Parliament. He is very apprehensive he hath spoken out (and it is very strange the Committee should order this doctrine to be published) I know says he, this will be cried out of, as of dangerous consequence, wherefore God deliver us, (as I hope he will) for ever making use of such a principle. pag. 133, 134.  
They confess generally, they are bound to defend the King's person; (and if they should say otherwise, we have their oaths and solemn protestations against their words) witness the 23 day of October (which may require an Annual gratitude for the great deliverance both of Church and State in the preservation of His Majesty) whether they did according to the information of their own consciences. All the answer I can meet with carries this sense, which I will express in Mr Burroughes his words; As for the King's person, is it not the profession of the Parliament to defend it? pag. 112. and again, why doth the Doctor speak of stretching forth the hand against the Lords Anointed? who endeavours it? doth not the Parliament profess the defence of the King's person? pag 120. Hence it appears, they know their duty, the question is, whether they performed it, who directed their Canon more especially against His sacred Majesty; which they cannot esteem an accidental thing, who are not ignorant of that treacherous advertisement which Blague gave in to the Earl of Essex, in what part of the battle, the King and Prince were, that they might at one blow, cut off our present happiness and future hopes. I desire only, that their ears would not hang in their eyes, and that men would not believe authority against sense. I shall only say, most miserable is he; who condemneth himself in that thing, which he allows and practices.  
Exc. Tyrant is opposed to King, and they are incompatible.  
Answ. If they understand tyrant under this notion, as an usurper, this is very true, but nothing pertinent, for there is not any just scruple, but those may be turned out by force according to law, who come in by force against Law; as in the case of Athalia, destroyed by Jehoiada, whereby Joas● who had true title, was established in the throne. But if they mean (as they do, if they would conclude for themselves) a King having right to govern, and proving a wicked or weak Prince, it is false that this Tyrannus cum titulo the Lords Anointed though he abuse that power (for Chrisma domini. this holy oil only excludes usurpation, and includes a just title only, and not either the Orthodox religion, or goodness, or prudence) is opposed simply to a King, but to a just or wise King. As therefore his right to the Crown, is not founded in his divine or moral virtues, but in a lawful succession, so neither can contrary vices dispense with any to depose him, or lift up their arms against him.  
This will be evident, if we consider what kind of Prince he was, to whom Saint Paul writing to the Romans, forbade resistance for conscience sake. It was Nero, in whom very happily this position might be enforced to the height, and yet all their exceptions are determined invalid. Notwithstanding his Idolatry, his oppressing his Subjects by strange cruelties, and persecuting the Saints. 
— Quae divisa tyrannum  
Efficiunt, collecta tenens—   
Yet the Apostle commands not to resist even him upon pain of damnation. Our (or rather Saint Paul's) adversaries seem to object, durus hic sermo, this is a hard saying. The Law of Nature allows self preservation; the people made Nero Emperor by their consent, (for usurpation can give no right) and therefore are more powerful than he, for Quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale. The people may be without the Emperor, the Emperor cannot be without the people: It is not probable the safety of mankind should depend upon the lust of one man, etc. I shall answer with the Civilian, who teacheth us to obey and not dispute even humane constitutions. Quod quidem perquàm durum est: sed ita lex scripta est. L. prospexit. D. qui & à quib. It was God's pleasure so to order humane affairs. Such Christian submission doth most commonly produce peace and plenty in our streets, and is the mother of many goods, but if the abuse of power should bring evils upon us, they cannot be so great, so general as civil war would create. But suppose we suffer more in a corrupt peace, then amidst such unnatural distractions as this miserable Country now bleedeth under: yet we ought not to be tempted to impatience, but should rather rejoice, that God hath enabled us to stand out his fiery trial; such afflictions if rightly understood, are blessings, and though we are not bound to pray for them, yet we ought to give thanks. Bad Rulers (if we do not imitate, whom we condemn, and neglect our duty, because they perform not theirs) are but unhappy instruments of our greater glory. If we did deeply consider the fruits of our patience, we should certainly pity, and perhaps love our oppressors, as the unfortunate occasion of our higher bliss.  
The Christians under Julian were very sensible of this duty, and confess themselves bound to obey him in all lawful things, and they did accordingly fight his battles; but when a greater than he did interpose, cessabat potestas minoris, they chose to serve God in the first place, and redeemed their not obedience to him, by offering up their bodies willing sacrifices. For they wanted not numbers sufficient, as appears by the Armies electing Jovianus a Christian to succeed him in the Empire, with this acclamation, Christian● sumus. If resistance were lawful in any case, never men could have brought fairer pleas. Julian was an Apostate from the established true religion; he dealt with Sorcerers and Magicians, and professed against doing justice to the Christians, making sport with their injuries, and returning no other answer to their tears, and humble Petitions but such scoffs as these; It is part of your religion to be abused; you forget the Galilaeans precept, Why do you not rather suffer wrongs? you must forgive all offences against you, as you hope to be forgiven; if they strike you on one cheek, you are bound to turn the other also; if they take away your cloaks, that gives them a just title to your coats also, if at least he whom you worship have power to dispose of your goods; you are bound from going to Law, and rendering evil for evil; why do you petition against, who are bound to pray for your Persecutors? If they take away your revenues, they advance you into the state of perfection, which requires, you should not possess any thing, etc.  
They were more persecuted by his wit then his cruelty, and yet though he did even wanton in their miseries, his barbarous usage could not prevail with them to neglect their calling, but they committed themselves to him who judgeth righteously, and he revenged their causeless sufferings in his destruction; for as stricken from Heaven, he cried out, O Galilaean, thou hast got the better.  
It is as hard a matter to persuade men to obey, or suffer under bad Princes, as it is to make them (the same in practice which they are in profession) true Christians. For they are very apt to corrupt the plain Text with false glosses, as oft as religion runs cross to civil interests. Their strong desire it should be false supplies the defects of arguments, which could not be able to stand against manifest truth, if affections had not a more powerful influence upon humane actions, than reason. I shall therefore labour to prove what they are so unwilling to believe, and I will lay down the conclusion in calvin's own words (whom they cannot except to as a Royalist) In homine deterrimo, honoréque omni indignissimo, penes quem modò sit publica potestas, praeclaram illam & divinam potestatem residere, quam Deus justitiae ac judicii sui ministris verbo suo detulit. Proinde à subditis eadem in reverentia & dignatione habendum, quantum ad publicam obedientiam attinet, quâ optimum regem, si daretur, habituri essent. Let his vices be never so many, so great, and his merits small or none, yet by reason of his office we must esteem his person sacred; God doth shed upon him the rays of Divinity, by constituting him his Minister: wherefore his Subjects should look upon him with the same reverence and awe as they would upon the best King. Instit. l. 4. c. 20. §. 25.  
The Heathens went fare, Voto expetendos bonos principes, qualescunque tolerandos; But Christianity goes higher, we may pray for the best, but we must not only suffer, but yield cheerful and hearty obedience to the worst. If any doubt arise, let them consider the divine providence so frequently mentioned in the Scriptures, and his especial disposing of Kingdoms. The King's heart is in the hand of the Lord as the rivers of water, he turneth it whither soever he will: Prov. 21. 1. and Dan. 2. 21. He changeth the times and the seasons: he removeth Kings, and setteth up Kings, etc. There is a place in Jeremy very apposite. I have made the earth, the man and beast that are upon the ground by my great power, and by my outstretched arm, and have given it unto whom it seemed meet unto me, and now have I given all these lands into the hands of Nabuchadnezzar the King of Babylon my servant, etc. and the Nation which will not put their neck under the yoke of the King of Babylon, that Nation will I punish saith the Lord with the sword, and with the famine, and with the pestilence, until I have consumed them by his hand. Therefore harken not ye to your Prophets, nor to your Diviners, nor to your Dreamers, which speak unto you saying, ye shall not serve the King of Babylon: for they prophesy a lie unto you that ye should perish. cap. 27. He was a fierce Tyrant, and yet obedience was enjoined by God, because he had a right to govern them. I have enlarged myself upon that of Samuel, Hoc jus erit Regis, this shall be the right of the King who shall reign over you; and it amounted to this, to destroy their liberties and property. Calvin draws this conclusion from it; Kings could not do so according to right, because the Law was against it, which instructed them in their duty to govern justly; but it was called jus in populum, a right over the people, to which they must needs be subject; nor was it lawful for them to resist. l. cit. §. 26.  
It is a frivolous objection (saith he) that this precept concerned only the Israelites; because the command is general, and obligeth all not to resist him to whom the Kingdom of right appertaineth. The counsel hence inferred is very good, let not us therefore break our duty, because Kings perform not theirs. If we live under a bloody Prince, or covetous, or intemperate, or weak, or one that persecutes the most godly professors, let us call to mind our own sins, which have deserved greater castigations. Let us think it is God's sword, the sword of Justice, though man commit murder with it. If we have deserved to die, and the Law pass sentence upon us, we ought not to be impatient, though we be cut off by a wicked executioner.  
Exc. Many examples are alleged out of the old Testament to colour this breach of duty.  
Answ. We have plain precept not to resist, and must conform our actions to known rules, not the practice of others. For instance, Who can lift up his hands against the Lords anointed and be guiltless? this implies a command not to rebel. Let every soul be subject to the higher powers. He that resists the power, resists the ordinance of God. Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake, whether it be to the King as supreme, or unto Governors as unto those who are sent by him, Legibus vivendum est non exemplis: Examples can only show what was done, not what ought to be done.  
To answer briefly, the examples by them produced are either impertinent, as being acted upon Usurpers, or not to be drawn into a rule, because extraordinarily allowed by God, who may dispense with his own law (but this cannot warrant our imitation, no more than the Israelites robbing the Egyptians can licence Plundering, or any other illegal weakening the wicked; or jacob's lying to his Father, can excuse want of sincerity and truth, when by false reports, they may probably undo their brethren; or Jaels' breaking trust in murdering Sisera, can dispense with kill enemies, after composition made to save their lives) or lastly they were unjust. To run over the particulars would be more tedious than profitable, because they are all clearly solved by applying one of these three: They are impertinent, or extraordinary, or wicked.  
Secondly, If we should grant that it were lawful for the Jews to resist Tyrants in their own defence, this comes not home to us, who are called as Saint Peter says, to bear the Cross, and to follow Christ's example. When we are in danger of being killed for our Religion, all that is allowed to us is, only to fly from one City to another. We may better submit to so high a degree of patience, in consideration our well being is not provided for in this world, and despise death, because the joys of eternal life are so plainly set before us in the Gospel, whereas under the Law they were entertained with promises of temporal blessings, and it must needs go to their hearts to lose the proposed reward of keeping the Law, length of days, by their due observance of it, and this upon a suspicion of a better life, rather than a confidence grounded upon any plain promise.  
Exc. 1 I have formerly showed the practice of the primitive Christians, which was so apparent, that not having so much impudence as to deny it; nevertheless they have invented several exceptions to it, which take of the glory of their innocence. I have beaten them out of their strongest fort, which was this, deerant vires, They had a good will to rebel, but wanted power only.  
Exc. 2 The Christians were but private men, and for that reason could not lawfully resist, but if they had been countenanced with the authority of the Senate, questionless they would not have submitted themselves so tamely to the slaughter.  
Answ. First, these men who grant thus much are bound in conscience to answer their own arguments, drawn from the law of nature, which they tell us allows self defence, though with the Magistrates destruction, and taken from the chief topique of their invectives, that no body did contract to be ill-governed, much less to be ruined, and therefore no obligation can lie upon them not to preserve themselves. But these and such like reasons are evidently confuted by all those Texts which bind us to suffer though wrongfully, as we have Christ for an example, etc. Those holy men, who submitted their bodies to the flames, looked upon martyrdom, not as a thing of choice, but of duty. They might have pleaded the law of nature, and and the injustice of their persecutors, whose office was to be a terror to the evil, and to countenance doing that which is good; but such sophistry could not prevail upon religion, which had bound up their hands from revenging themselves upon private men, and much less upon the Magistrate.  
Secondly, that the Senate had no authority to wage War against their Emperor, will be evinced from Rom. 13. 1. & 1 Pet, 2.. 13. 14. applied to the civil constitutions of the Roman Empire. Submit to the King as supreme, that is, to the Roman Emperor, saith Diodati, c. all'imperator Romano, detto tal-uolta Rè dalle natione stranieri. Ulpian acquaints us, there was not any legal power but in him; what he determines hath the force of law he adds the reason, because the people in whom the Senate are included, by the lexregia, gave unto him the right to manage all their power. Vtpote cum lege Regia, quae de imperio ejus lata est, populus ei & in eum (which signifies in se, saith Theophilus) omne suum imperium & potestatem conferat. l. quod princ. D. de const. princ. Justinian clearly decides the case; if the Emperor shall take any cause into his cognizance, omnes omnino judices, let all judges whatsoever know, that this sentence is law to all effects, not only in the particular cause, but it becomes a rule to decide all like cases by. For what is greater, what more sacred than the Imperial Majesty? or who is so insolent, ut regalem sensum contemnat? The sense even of the Senate was not to stand in competition with Royal constitutions. l. si imperial. D. de legib.  
We may fitly observe, that some Emperors did by Acts of grace limit their legislative power, which was solely in them, and bind themselves from the use of it, without the advice of the Senate, as is to be seen, l. humanum. Cod. de legib. and may be collected from Auth. Habita quidem. C. ne fili. and divers other constitutions; yet this gave no power to the people, to be employed against them, if they should not perform their duty. This grant made the Roman Empire like the Kingdom of England, (for we have a clear and full testimony from our Common Law, that the legislative power is only in the King, though the use of it be restrained to the consent of the Lords and Commons in Parliament, le Roy fait les leix avec le consent du Signior & Communs, & non pas les Signior & Communs avec le consent du Roy. The King makes Laws with the consent of the Lords and Commons, and not the Lords and Commons with the consent of the King.) or that which Virgil describes, 
— gaudet regno Trojanus Acestes,  
Indicitque forum, & Patribus dat jura vocatis.   
It is the most unreasonable thing that ever was fancied, that Subjects assembled, should have greater authority than their King, without whose call they could not have met together, and at whose pleasure they are dissolved in Law, and bound to departed to their own homes.  
Exc. 3 The Anticavalier doth pitifully entangle himself with this objection, and first he tells us, he is confident Tertullian did not speak the truth, when he imputes their patience to the power of godliness, which prohibited resistance, and not their want of force to withstand; He might as easily have given the lie to Cyprian, to the Ecclesiastical writers, who relate the story of the Theban Legion, and acquaint us, that the greatest part of julian's Army against the Persians consisted of Christians. But supposing, as he had good reason, this bold denial would not give satisfaction, it not being likely his credit should go farther than the records and evidences out of Holy Fathers and Church story, after several fruitless essays to solve it, he pitches at last upon this; That honest liberty was hid from them for some special ends, which since God hath revealed to this latter age, and therefore he gave to them an extraordinary spirit of patience and courage▪ which is inconvenient for these days wherein God hath afforded a more plentiful light, and shows us our liberty, and that there is no necessity of being Martyrs. It is now the wickeds turn to suffer. I will set down his words at large, for they are so strange, sober men might doubt the faith of a relater.  
Certain it is, That the frame and tenor of Gods after dispensations did require, that such a liberty should be hid from them; or at least, that they should not make use of it; as on the contrary, the nature and purport of those dispensations which God hath now in hand, requires that this liberty should be manifested, and made known unto Christians. We know, that according to the counsel and foreknowledge of God, Antichrist was then to come into the world: as now we know that he is about to be destroyed, and cast out of the world. Now this is a general rule, look what truths were necessary to be shut up, and concealed from the Churches of Christ, that Antichrist might pass by, and get up into his throne; the discovery and letting out of the same into the world, are necessary for his pulling down, etc. But God causing a dead sleep (as it were) to fall upon those truths which should in special manner have opposed him, he had the opportunity without much contradiction or noise to steal and convey himself into that cathedram pestilentiae, that chair of Papal state, which yet he possesseth. Now amongst many other truths which were of necessity to be laid a sleep, for the passing of this beast unto his great power and authority, and for the maintaining and safeguarding of him in the possession hereof, this is one of special consideration; That Christians may lawfully in a lawful way, stand up to defend themselves, in case they be able, against any unlawful assaults; by what assailants, or by what pretended authority soever made upon them. For had this opinion been timeously enough, and substantially taught in the Church, it would certainly have caused an abortion in Antichrists birth, and so have disappointed the Devil of his first borne. Had not the spirits, and judgements and consciences of men been as it were cowed and marvailous●y embased and kept under (and so prepared for Antichrists lure) by doctrines and tenants, excessively advancing the power of superiors, over inferiors, and binding Iron yokes and heavy burdens upon those that were in subjection, doubtless they would never have bowed down their backs so low, as to let such a beast over them, they would never have resigned up their judgements and consciences into the hands of such a spiritual Tyrant as he. So that you see, there was a special necessity for the letting of Antichrist into the world, yea and for the continuance of him in his throne, that no such opinion as this which we speak of, whether truth or untruth, should be taught and believed; I mean, which vindicateth and maintaineth the just rights and liberties, and privileges of those that live under authority and subjection unto others.  
Whereas, now on the contrary, that time of God's preordination and purpose, for the downfall of Antichrist, drawing near, there is a kind of necessity, that those truths which have slept for many years, should now be awakened; and particularly that God should reveal and discover unto his faithful Ministers, and other his servants the just bounds and limits of authority and power, and consequently the just and full extent of the lawful liberties of those that live in subjection. Evident it is that they are the Commonalty of Christians, I mean Christians of ordinary rank and quality that shall be most active, and have the principal hand in executing the judgements of God upon the Whore. Consider that place, Revel. 18▪ 4. 5,. 6. Now that this service shall be performed unto God by them (Christians I mean of under rank and quality) contrary to the will, desires, or commands of those Kings and Princes under whom they live, it appears by that which immediately follows, v. 9 pag. 30, 31,. 32. The peremptory conclusion of all is, that the lawfulness of Rebellion is now discovered to God's Church, as the necessary means to ruin Antichrist; for the Kings will never be persuaded to effect this great and holy work, and therefore the People must.  
Whereas the Text saith expressly, That the ten Kings shall hate the Whore, and shall make her desolate and naked, and shall eat her flesh, and burn her with fire. For God hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, Revel. 17. 16,. 17. Lest the people should be frighted by this (as they justly ought) from making rebellious attempts against lawful authority, because that in God's good time will arm them, and fight jointly the Lords battle against the Beast, he labours to remove this scruple. I conceive, saith he, this is not meant of the persons of Kings, but of their States and Kingdoms (id est) of the generality of the people under them. Master Goodwin, pag. 32. The Kings shall hate the Beast, that is, the people shall hate their Kings, and religiously rebel against them in order to the destruction of Antichrist.  
The same Doctrine is delivered by Master Burroughs. There is a necessity that in these time's people's consciences should be further satisfied in their liberties then formerly, because the time is (we hope) at hand for the pulling down of Antichrist, and we find by Scripture this work at first will be by the people, Revel. 18. pag. 144. and for a close, pag. 145. Surely the right knowledge of these liberties God hath given the people, will much help forward the great things God hath to do in this latter age.  
I must confess, my heart is filled with sorrow, when I consider how fare the reformed Religion is degenerated, which can be no longer pure than it continues peaceable. But alas! it is become the mother and nurse of Rebellion; it foments sedition; and advances the rvine of States. What a sad thing is it that factious Preachers should so fare bewitch the people by strong delusions, as to prevail with them to neglect plain duties of subjection and obedience upon the strength of obscure prophecies? whereas they ought to live according to precept, not predictions; many of which shall not be fulfilled but by the sins of wicked men: Bless me O Lord from being an instrument to bring such thy works to pass. It is our only safe way, not to do evil that good may come of it. The Apostle forbids it, and the reason may be this, God hath no need of the sinful man. Why shouldst thou cease to be good, for fear God else would not be true? Babylon will certainly fall, though we walk uprightly; to fear God and honour the King, are no stops to the destruction of that man of sin. After such fiery spirits have engaged the Kingdom into probable ways of utter ruin and desolation; after your hands have been imbrued in the blood of the ancient Nobility, and you have miserably torn in pieces the brave and honest Gentry, and exposed the seduced Commons to those fatal mischiefs, which accompany the Sword, Pestilence, and Famine, and the bleeding State shall at length grow wise, and unite again for the preservation (if it be possible) of the ruinous remainder, rather out of a weariness of the insupportable calamities of War, than out of a Christian love, which would have continued unto us the blessings of peace; All the satisfaction which these false Prophets can give, for the unspeakable mischiefs which they have pulled upon their unhappy Country, will be only this; We were mistaken in those places of Daniel and the Revelation; The time, it seems, is not yet come, The Saints must still expect, and Gods holy ones must wait and pray for a more happy opportunity to perfect the great work by Rebellion.  
Exc. There is a mutual contract between King and Subjects, and if He break the Covenant, He forfeits the benefits of this agreement, and He not performing the duty of a King, they are released from the duty of Subjects.  
Answ. The Jews could have made this plea, grounded in the nature of a Covenant, the breach of which (though instituted by God between King and People, Deut. 17.) was no dispensation for them to Rebel, as was evidenced formerly. The Kings of Persia though confessedly Supreme, and not responsable to their subjects, yet took an oath, at their inauguration, as Zenophon and Diodorus Siculus inform us, and it was not lawful for them to alter certain laws, as appears in Daniel, nevertheless their miscarriages in government, did not dispense with their Subject's loyalty. If a Father promise any thing to his children, they have a full right to his performance; but in case he prove dishonest, he doth not thereby lose his right to govern them, nor are they excused from their duty of honour and obedience: So there is a contract between Husband and Wife, the violation of which on the man's part doth not bereave him of his dominion over the woman. I confess, a great obligation lies upon Kings, not only from their Oaths and promises, and agreements, but expressly from God's law also, to govern the people committed to their charge, with justice and equity. And if they abuse their power, God's punishment will be as high as their ingratitude. The greatest temporal favour which God bestows upon any single man, is to make him his Vicegerent, his immediate Deputy, Christum suum, his anointed; and the greatest blessing he hath given to mankind is government, by which he hath provided for the common good of all. Now if he turn this blessing into a curse, if he who is set over a people to punish evil doers persecute those who do well, he must expect a fearful judgement from the Almighty, it is pathetically expressed in Wisdom. 6. Hear therefore O ye Kings, and understand, learn ye that be Judges of the ends of the earth. Give ear you that rule the people, and glory in the multitude of nations. For power is given you of the Lord, and sovereignty from the highest who shall try your works, and search out your counsels. Because being ministers of his kingdoms, you have not judged aright, nor kept the law, nor walked after the counsel of God. Horribly and speedily shall be come upon you: for a sharp judgement shall be to them that are in high places. For mercy will soon pardon the meanest: but mighty men shall be mightily tormented. For he which is Lord over all, shall fear no man's person: neither shall be stand in awe of any man's greatness, for he hath made the small and the great, and careth for all alike: but a sore trial shall come upon the mighty.  
Thus much is granted, but to conclude from this obligation that a not performance induces a forfeiture of his crown, and that we may make hostile resitance against unjust commands, is a very weak way of reasoning▪ For consider with yourselves; is there not a mutual duty between husband and wife, parents and children? Father's must not provoke their children to wrath: but bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord Eph. 6. 4. Husband's should give honour to their wives a unto the weaker vessels 1 Pet 3. 7. Suppose some fathers prove froward, some husband's unkind, yet cannot their faults dispense with the duty of children and wives. The King— Vrbi pater est urbique maritus is both husband and father, not to single persons, but to the Commonwealth. There are many resemblances in matrimony which will afford great light to the better understanding the duty of Subjects. The consent of the woman makes such a man her husband, so the consent of the people is now necessary to the making Kings (for conquest is but a kind of ravishing, which many times prepares the way to a wedding, as the Sabine women chose rather to be wives, than concubines, and most people prefer the condition of Subjects though under hard laws to that of slaves) If we apply their arguments their Sophistry will clearly appear. For Quicquid effic●t tale, est magis tale, and constituens est major constituto, bestows upon women the breeches, as well as the Crown upon the people, and unumquodque eadem potestate dissolvitur, quâ constituitur, gives the same licence to a woman to cast of the bonds of wedlock, as to subjects those of subjection. As in marriage, so in monarchy there are two parties in the contract; though without a mutual agreement there could be no covenant, yet after it is once made the dissent of the inferior party, let it be not upon fancied, but real discontents, cannot dissolve the compact. Consent therefore joined man and wife, King and people, but divine ordinance continues this union; marriages and governments both are ratified in heaven. Quae Deus conjunxit, homo ne separet, whom God hath joined, let not man put asunder; They must take their King for better for worse. It is very observable though it was permitted to the man in some cases, to give a bill of divorce, yet this licence was never allowed to women; so fathers might abdicate their children, not they their fathers, women cannot unmarry, nor the people unsubject themselves. If any shall mistake with the disciples, if the case be so, it is good not to marry, it is good to live without a King; they ought to consider that God is wiser than they, and best knows how to order things for the good of mankind.  
That I may (if it be possible) undeceave the misled multitude; I shall grant if a people choose one man, and bestow the name of King upon him, yet if they retain the supreme power in themselves, and express it by making a law that in case he shall do such and such things, he shall forfeit his right to govern, than it is very lawful to depose him upon breach of such conditions. For then this state is a Democracy, and the legal power is in the people. Such a case is very possible, for if the royal line in any Kingdom should fail, & there want one descended from his loins to sit upon the throan, then, as a woman after the death of her husband is free to marry to whom she will in the Lord, so the people may make what government they please, they may call one King, and place their Ephori or Demarchi and tribunes over him. It is not material that this is not so wise a government, for it is not prudence, but such a consent, not the understanding, but the will of the people that constitutes the form, In such a state hostile resistance against him (though called King) may be a just war, because the law enables them to fight, and the Prince may be a rebel and Traitor.  
Let them prove that England is no monarchy; that they are not bound to bear true allegiance by a necessary obligation flowing from the civil constitutions of this realm; that they may lawfully kill him, whose life they have sworn to defend with their utmost power, let them produce any law which gives power to English Subjects to train, array, muster without the King's authority, that I may not say against his express command, and to the end they may destroy him; when they have done this and confuted their oaths of supremacy and fealty, and made it appear to the world they were forsworn, I will cease to preesses them with that of St Paul, you must needs be subject not only for wrath, but also for conscience. I will then direct my speech to the King, and endeavour to persuade him to submit to the People, under whom he governs. But since they do not so much as pretend any law but justify their Rebellion only by (that word fatal to this Kingdom) necessity, and lay down a Principal, sit to disturb the peace of all nations, that when dangers threaten, laws must give place to discretion, and the subjects birthright, liberty and property must be sacrificed to a few ambitious mens ragioni di stato: I think I am bound in charity to admonish them in what a desperate condition they are. Those who resist, shall receive to themselves damnation. All that they gain by managing the ruin of their Country, will not countervail the loss of their souls. I remember the saying of the Prophet. The prudent shall keep silence in that time, for it is an evil time. Amos. 5. 13. But I value not safety, in comparison of honest (though weak) endeavours to do service to the public.  
Some state it thus; elective Kingdoms are subject to forfeiture but not successive. These men give but small satisfaction, because they build upon a very unsound foundation. For succession is no enlargement of right, but only a continuance of that which the first had; elective Kingdoms are not forfeitable, except there be some express law, which places a power in the people to rule their King, and govern their governor. It is plain, the Roman Emperors though chosen, were absolute: and successive Kingdoms, if there be any such express law are forfeitable; it is as plain, the Spartan Kings, who were haereditary, might be legally deposed in some cases.  
The unlawfulness of hostile resistance against the King of England is supported by a surer foundation, viz. the known Laws of this Realm strengthened by divine ordinance: the necessity of our allegiance is demonstrable from the fundamental Laws of this Kingdom. I shall only desire my readers to consider the nature of this government, and they must evidently discern, to fight against the King is Treason and Rebellion.  
I will lay down nothing, but what sober men shall have as little reason to doubt of, as to believe, that the King was despised and scorned, in order to be made glorious, and that they endeavoured to kill him in order to his preservation. So at Edge-hill, but before they were more cruel, and reserved for him something worse than death, to live under their command; Instrumentum servitutis, haberent Regem, they would make him the unhappy instrument, to raise them to honours in the ruin of his good Subjects. The Duke of Normandy invaded England with a potent Army, and made himself King; what our Laws were under the Danes or Saxons (by whom we were likewise conquered) doth not much concern us to examine, (no more indeed than it doth to know the ancient British Laws and Privileges, which were taken away by them, and the true owners were beaten out of their rightful possessions and inheritances) for he inverted the Government, altered the Laws, disposed of Possessions to his Norman followers, (whose blood runs in the veins of our most ancient Gentry) and made all, as well English as his native Subjects, feudaries to him, so that he remained Directus dominus, Lord Paramont, or overlord in the whole Land; that we may make no scruple of this truth, the Laws given us by him, and which we are to live by now, are written in his language. However we state his entrance, whither by the sword, or to avoid the envy of that title, by a voluntary submission of all to him, as to their Sovereign; the conclusion cannot vary, because the duty of nonresistance arises from their own act, they taking an oath to be his true and loyal Subjects. It is objected, If he came in by force, he may be turned out by the same title. De jure he cannot; in this case, Quod fieri non debuit, factum valet; for though conquest be a name of greater strength only, and be not itself a right, yet it is the mother of it. Because when the people are in their power, for fear o● harder usage, they pass their consent to be his faithful Subjects, and to be peaceably governed by such Laws, as he shall, or hath given them: This subsequent Act gives him a full right to the Crown. To speak to the present case, he for his own security, and because it was the necessary means to enable him to protect his Subjects, retains the right to dispose the Militia of the Kingdom, which continued in his Successors even to this day (though now violently invaded by Subjects through virtue of an Ordinance, of which no times can afford a precedent) and all Subjects of what condition soever, were bound to do homage, and bear fealty to him, which was inconsistent with taking up Arms against him. That he might sweeten their subjection, Quaedam jura pactis minuit, he restrains his absolute right by compact, & bestows some liberties & some privileges upon the people (who commonly nec totam servitutem pati possunt, nec totam libertatem) and these Acts of Grace he confirms unto them by such security as should not endanger his person nor regal authority, that is, by promise and oath, and not by giving to his Subjects legal power to un king him, if he should not perform covenant; knowing full well, that though he should not really break it, yet a pretence he did so, might upon the first opportunity create a civil war; (and therefore his Subjects had as little reason to accept, as he to offer so pernicious security, as would put both parties in fare worse condition) for if Rebellion should be allowed in any case, that case would be always pretended, and though the Prince were just, and wise, and religious, yet ambitious men to compass their own ends, would impute to him oppression, weakness, and that notwithstanding his exemplary practice in his public devotions to the contrary, he did but handsomely dissemble, and favoured a false religion in his heart.  
The method of that Rebellion in the reign of Henry the third, which made France extremely miserable, is very observable. A factious party of the Nobility and Gentry, a seditious party of the Clergy, and an unfortunate party of the seduced Commonalty, entered into a holy league against their lawful Sovereign, upon pretence he was misled by evil Counsellors, and favoured the reformed doctrine, notwithstanding he was even superstitiously strict in his devotions, in conformity to what the Roman Church enjoined. When potent Armies were raised, ready to swallow him up, yet out of a vehement desire to undeceive his people, and to discover to the whole world the ungrounded malice of his adversaries in such unreasonable imputations, he refused the honest assistance of faithful Subjects, because Protestants, to his own and their probable destruction.  
Many of King William's Successors did enlarge the Subjects Privileges by divers Acts of Grace, which they swore to maintain, but never gave them such security as should alter the nature of Monarchy, by granting authority to their Subjects to force them to observe promises, and to make satisfaction for true or fancied violations.  
Hence it appears, that the original was conquest (as it is of almost all the Kingdoms in the world) which occasionally conveyed to him full right, because they yielded themselves, and consequently what they had to the Victor; the Laws which he or after Princes made for the benefit of the Subject, were several limitations of this right, and therefore where Laws cannot be produced to the contrary, there the King's power is absolute, and no special cases can be determined by the Subject to the King's disadvantage. The moderation of his power was by his own compact, which he could not violate without injustice, yet the breach of it could not endanger his personal safety, because he gave no jurisdiction to his Subjects to force him by strong hand to do them right; and if he had done so, he had made himself in such cases their subject. What ever we can claim as due now, is by virtue of the Kings grant, and therefore it is said by Hen. 3d, in his ratification of the great Charter, We have granted and given to all the free men of our Realm these liberties. 9 H. 3. The whole Land was the conquerors, he gave part of it as a reward for their service to his Normans, and other parts to the ancient Inhabitants, and their heirs after them, yet so as he altered the tenure, and made it descend with such burdens, as he pleased to lay upon them: They hold them but in fee, and therefore are bound to certain services, and to do such and such duties upon pain of forfeiture; in case of Treason and Rebellion their lands are his own again, and return into his disposal. If Subjects break their Covenant and prove disloyal, all their rights are forfeited by express Law; if Kings break their compact, no forfeiture follows: The reason of this inequality is, because the King gave Law to the Subject, the Subject did not give Law to him.  
Exc. Another exception is, If a King exercising tyranny over his people, may not be resisted, he and his followers may destroy the Kingdom.  
Answ. This is easily satisfied, if we consider in what condition we were when conquered, and how that to avoid a certain ruin (for he might have rooted us out for his better security, and planted this Land with his native Subjects) we submitted to an only not impossible, that is, a most extremely improbable destruction. For it is an unheard of madness, that a King should be such an enemy to his own interests; It is in our power to kill ourselves, and yet we are not afraid of ourselves, because there is a natural dearness implanted in us, which secures every one from selfe-wrong: we have as little cause to be troubled, that it is in his power to make himself no King, by destroying his Subjects; The King perishes in the ruin of his people, and the man only survives, exposed to the hatred and scorn, and revenge of mankind. Sint quibus imperes, is a strong antidote against this unreasonable fear. Secondly, no policy can give an absolute security; we must trust some body, by which a way lies open to a possible mischief, but many most probable and certain inconveniences are thereby avoided. Thirdly, we have good grounds to rely upon divine providence, if we do our duty; for the hearts of Kings are in the hand of the Lord, he will put a hook into the nostrils of Tyrants, and though we may be chastised for a trial of our patience, or punished for our sins, yet he will not permit them to bruise his children to pieces.  
Exc. We are bound by the natural affection we own to our Country to be active in restoring it to happiness, by removing such a curse from the land.  
Answ. We must not do evil, that good may come of it. Some reply, this precept obliges private men, not Magistrates; especially aiming at not any particular, but the public good; a pious intention to advance this, excuses from sin. Certainly it will concern all such as mean to go to heaven; they may as well tell us, Magistrates may lawfully steal, or commit adultery, if they sin for the Commonwealth, that is, plunder in hopes to find letters amongst malignant goods, or lie with other men's wives, to unlock their breasts, and discover such secrets, whereby they may more easily cut their husband's throats, as being in their Catalogue of evil counsellors or enemies to the State: They may aswell challenge a Privilege to break all the Commandments for the Saints advantage. If then we may not do evil, though we propose a real good as the fruit of sin, certainly those, whom divine ordinance commands to be subject, cannot usurp office and rule, and take upon them to judge their Judges. If revenge be unlawful in private men acted upon private men, how much is it a higher sin, upon the Magistrate? By whom alone Christians can right themselves, and therefore their hands are bound from being used against him.  
Exc. Self preservation is justifiable by the law of nature.  
Answ. I grant this; hands were given to men for this purpose. This right to defend ourselves flows from hence, that by an inbred affection every one is most dear to himself, and it doth not always presuppose a fault in those who endanger our lives. For if they set upon me, mistaking me for another man, who hath injured them, or if they are lunatic, I am no more bound naturally to give up my life to madness or error, then to the ravenous fury of wolves or lions. It is very truly determined by the civil law in reference to nature, Jure hoc evenit, ut quod quisque ob tutelam corporis sui fecerit, jure fecisse existimetur. L. ut vim. D. de just. & jur. But this will nothing advantage them in the present case. For by that which they call Law of nature is meant only right of nature, which is not a command, but a permission only, and therefore it may be, and indeed it is actually restrained by positive constitutions, whether divine or civil. For example, all things were common iure naturali, by the right of nature, and yet the laws of property are now binding to us. Hence is discovered the hollowness of their discourses upon this principle. It is the most natural work in the world for every thing to preserve itself, and therefore when a Commonwealth shall choose a Prince or a State officer, though they trust him with their welfare, than that act of their trust is but by positive law, and therefore cannot destroy the natural law, which is self preservation, cum humana potestas supra jus naturae non existit, seeing that no humane power is above the law of nature. So Master Bridge in his wounded conscience. p. 2. Upon the same principle he must conclude, Society, which was regulated by the pactions of men, cannot take away our native liberty. For jure naturaliomnes homines ab initioliberi nascebantur. instit. de just. & iu. t. 2. §. 5. nor can property which was established by positive agreement destroy the right of natural community. He must needs perceive the weakness of his reasoning. The answer to it is this, Humane power is not above the law of nature peremptorily commanding to do such a thing, and abstain from such things (of this law Cicero spoke, haec lex diffusa est in omnes, est sempiterna, a quâ homines neque per senatum, neque per populum possunt solui & liberari. l. 3. de Rep. and Ovid makes it unalterable. 
Naturam verò appello, legem omnipotentis  
Supremique patris, quam primâ ab origine rerum.  
Cunctis imposuit rebus, jussitque teneri  
Inviolabiliter.   
But humane power is above the law or rather the right of nature, which doth permit a freedom of doing or not doing according to discretion. Else no contracts could be of force, because by the law of nature men were free, and the obligation is positive, as arising from promise, which it was in our power not to make, but having once made it, we have tied our hands from using native liberty. Of this permissive law Aristotle spoke pol. 7. cap. 13. Homines adductos ratione multa praeter mores & naturam agere, si aliter agi melius esse sibi persuaserint and again, some things of nature depend upon our choice and cease to be of force, when we please, to part with our natural rights, not all things. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Ethic l. 5. cap. 7.  
Secondly it concludes it lawful for any private man to kill the King or his own Father, in his own defence, which most of that side have disavowed, and therefore they must acknowledge this argument is very hollow.  
For the clearer understanding of the controversy, because I take no delight in confuting, but only in the hopes of satisfing them and I request them for their own sakes, to weigh my reasons with the same moderation, and calmness, wherewith they are written: Self preservation is natural, that is, Nature doth not forbid any man to defend himself, though he must thereby kill another; his destruction was not primarily intended but he was forced to make use of such unfortunate means, in pursuance of no dishonest end, to retain his own right of living. But though nature doth not forbid it, yet the Gospel doth, as it restrains us of many innocent delights, if we measure them only by natural right. Private revenge is unanswerably prohibited by the Evangelicall law; Recompense to no man evil for evil; dear beloved avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath▪ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it is not lawful to right yourselves, to do yourselves justice. Rom. 12.  
Obj. The strongest objection against it, which can be made, is, that we are not bound to love our neighbour better than ourselves, therefore we may rather Kill then be Killed. (I speak only against private revenge that is an execution of justice not commanded by law, for we may be bound, not to part with our lives, if the Commonwealth arms us, and enjoins us to defend ourselves, because the preservation of the State is concerned in our safety, in that case. Saevitia est voluisse mori—)  
Ans. I deny the argument; the antecedent is very true, but the consequence infirm, because we do not love him above ourselves, though We part with our lives, rather than destroy his; For we shall thereby gain eternal life, if we do not contrary to the rules of charity, cut him off in his sin, which will certainly damn him. If any make scruple, that themselves are sinners too, and so unprepared to die, and therefore (as good reason they have) they may refuse to be damned, only to leave their enemy in a possibility of being saved. These fears may easily be solved▪ Greater charity than this hath no man, then to lay down his life for his enemy, and it were very strange, if men should go to hell with as great charity, as the highest Saints are rewarded with heaven for. Perfect charity is the fulfilling of the law, and as effectual as universal obedience to Christ's precepts, the condition of the Gospel. To resign our lives, (that is, the capacity of serving God longer) out of conscience to obey him though against the strongest temptation, is such an heroical act, that the excellency of it, may supply the want of duration. It is an infallible sign of hearty repentance, and a most certain argument of our serious turning from all sin. For here is not only godly sorrow for offences past, which is the door and entrance into Christianity, but the perfection of it also, amendment of life, which is true repentance. For we sacrifice the pleasures and profits of this world, and what ever was dear unto us, while we remained carnal, nay we yield up life itself against the most violent assault, the flesh can make, to the will of God, who assures that to die thus, is gain, as also, whosoever will save his life, shall lose it, and whosoever will lose his life for my sake, shall find it. For these reasons private revenge is unlawful though upon private men, and therefore much more hath Christ disarmed us, from recompensing evil to the Magistrate, because there is some equality between mine and my neighbour's life, but public tranquillity, the common peace of a whole Kingdom (which is destroyed by civil war) and the life of a single man, though innocent, are very unequal. Naturally we love society below ourselves, for the end of it was to convey to us such and such goods, and that which is loved in order to something else, is less amiable; But morally and in Christianity we are bound to prefer the public good to whatever private Interest. And the obligation is very reasonable; For if we submit nature to religion, and be content to lose our lives for the present, we shall receive them hereafter with great advantage. So that charity to our neighbour and love of ourselves do sweetly kiss each other.  
Exc. It is lawful to resist in God's behalf, and to preserve the true Religion; and to compass the peace of Jerusalem by disturbing that of Babylon.  
Ans. Certainly never any man made great improvement of his own religion by raising Civil War, and Sedition and Rebellion are very unfit means to beget devotion in the hearts of others; this way is so unlikely to attain to perfect godliness, that I am much afraid, by the unspeakable scandal of these not-christian courses, it destroys even common honesty amongst men. Since the time of these unnatural distractions, there hath been a general ebb in our devotion, 
Ex illo fluere, & retro sublapsa referri  
Res Coeli   
Some with Nadab and Abihu offer strange fire before the Lord, which he commanded them not; God in his good time may quench these flames, which sensibly consume both Church and State, and the unhappy incendiaries may be devoured in that fire, which themselves have kindled. Others are not at leisure to offer up the ordinary incense of prayer and thanksgiving, (though too many have been over grateful, and when beaten in the field, they have triumphed in the Church, and instituted solemn praises for the Almighties preserving their party, in such a sense as they endeavoured to preserve their Sovereign) If any time be spared to make their addresses to Heaven, their usual voice is as harsh in God's ears as the drum and trumpet, for he is generally invoked as the Lord of Hosts, who takes greater delight to be worshipped as the God of peace. Mutual fears and mutual injuries have so exasperated the minds of most men, that the defection from charity is much more common than that from allegiance. So that how religion thrives, be you judges; I am certain there is a great decay of godliness.  
But to examine this colour of preservation of true Religion.]  
First all the Anabaptists and Brownists and other Sectaries, who believe us Idolaters for using the sign of the Cross in Baptism, & all such as join with them in fight against the book of Common-prayer and Episcopacy, established by the fundamental laws of this Kingdom, are evidently engaged in this Rebellion, not for defence of their old Religion, but to introduce a better and new Creed. Let me ask them, with what face they can hereafter object to Papists that their Religion is Rebellion, who may justify rising up in arms against their lawful Sovereign, for the Catholic cause, upon these Puritan principles. The truth is, not all Jesuits do maintain it, and many Papists abhor this seditious doctrine, agreeing with Roffensis, that sicut evangelium non dat regnum, sic nec auferre potest, lib, de potest, papae in tempor. Christ came not to dispose of Kingdoms, nor to make them subject to forfeiture. The University of Paris hath very christianly determined it, seditiosum, impium, ac haereticum, quocunque quaesito colore, à quocunque subdito, vassallo aut extraneo, sacris regum ac principum personis vim habere, a seditious, impious, and heretical thing, for any Subject, Vassal, or foreigner, upon what pretexts or colour soever, to offer violence to the sacred persons of Kings and Princes, in their censure past, June the 4th, 1610.  
A more dangerous tenant for turning States upside down, and bringing all to confusion, was never invented then this, that Regnum fundatur in orthodoxa Religione, Subjects may cast from of their neck the royal yoke, if he will not submit to the yoke of Christ. Their late Pamphlets speak out and tell us plainly, the quarrel is, whether Jesus shall be King. By this means those who manage Christ's sceptre, will command the Kings, and he must lay down his Crown before the Presbyters. They have another principle nearly allied to this, which hath too great influence upon their practice, Dominium fundatur in gratiâ, only the Saints, Gods elect, have right to the creature: wicked men and reprobates do but usurp the portion of the godly, and thereby increase their own damnation, for they are the true heirs, for our Saviour bestowed all upon them, The meek shall inherit the earth. When we think they plunder, they do but distrain upon their own goods; it is a recovery of what was due to them by the Gospel; to measure right by laws is but to break evangelical privileges: It is not theft, but charity, to put the wicked in such a condition, as that they shall have less to answer for. If men of these opinions be tolerated, both reason and experience show the peace of the realm is apparently dangered.  
Secondly, as it is unlawful (and some of their own writers confess thus much, see Master Burroughs, pag. 123.) to fight for Religion if the Laws of the Land be against it, (yet this is clearly their case, for they go the destructive way, and would root out part of the established worship, though very much hath been indulged to tender consciences even in this case) so it is against the civil constitutions of this Realm, and consequently against divine ordinance to take up arms against their King, though he should really favour another Religion, and countenance by his practice superstitious rites; nay, though the professors of the true and settled religion should be illegally grieved. Here were an opportunity to show their christian fortitude, to make use of their spiritual militia, faith, humility, and patience, and not to contradict their calling, and discredit the cross of our Saviour by taking up carnal weapons. I wish from my soul, all such as pretend to the Reformed Protestant Religion, had been unblamable in this respect, and that they had rather chosen to manifest their christian, then their martial spirit. Wherever arms have been lifted up against their lawful Magistrates, though they were unjustly afflicted for the testimony of a good conscience, I cannot excuse them from resisting the ordinance of God, who would have been glorified in their martyrdom. I am sorry to meet with objections drawn from the unwarrantable practice of some, which do not conclude you innocent, but that others were likewise faulty. I am certain the primitive Christians were better catechised, and we read the same doctrine of true patience in their lives as in their schools, which taught them to take up Christ's cross, and to follow him in that yoke in which he drew; They fought not against their Arrian Emperors in defence of the Nicene Creed; no rebellion was undertaken by them under colour of preventing their consciences from being forced: which is indeed an impossible thing; we may be rob of our goods, we cannot be plundered of our religion. Did not Christianity thrive upon persecutions? Sanguis martyrum, semen ecclesiae, The blood of the Saints made their surviving brethren fruitful in good works. Their patience wearied the cruelty of their adversaries and gained innumerable converts, who began to suspect christianity was true, when they saw it so powerful as to make the professors live with so much innocence, and die with so great meekness, and to neglect all earthly interests in expectation of Heaven.  
Exc. Though private men should not, yet Inferior Magistrates may force him who hath the Supreme power, to rule according to justice and the established Laws.  
Answ. The same reason which disables private men from righting themselves, concludes likewise against inferior Magistrates, that is, want of Jurisdiction. For if opposed to him, whose authority only can alter the nature of revenge, and make it justice, (for inferior in superiorem non habet imperium) they are but private persons. It is an unreasonable, impossible thing, that men should be obliged to obey two Masters commanding contrary duties, because this would impose upon them a necessity of sinning, which must be laid upon him who was the author of that necessity; And therefore God hath appointed a convenient subordination in all authorities.  sol delet minora sydera, as the lesser lights are extinguished by the greatest Luminary, the fountain of all light; so minor jurisdictions must give place to him who is the fountain of justice. If God command one thing, the King another, we must be obedient to divine ordinance, because we cannot be subject to man's command for conscience sake, against him who hath the sole authority to oblige conscience. So if the King command one thing, and his Ministers, inferior Magistrates another, we must submit to regal power either by obeying, or suffering, because they can challenge our obedience only by virtue of his authority, and this cannot be set up in an hostile way against his person. Whether it be reasonable to obey the King's Officers, who can do nothing but in his name, against the King, judge ye. Soldiers are bound to execute the commands of their Captain, yet not if they are contradicted by their Colonel, and he must not be obeyed against an express order from the General. In thus doing, St Augustine and reason also assure us, we despise not the power, but choose to submit to the higher; lesser Magistrates have no just grounds of complaint, if we prefer the supreme, for in reference to the highest, their magistracy ceases, and they become our fellow Subjects. Let every soul be subject to the higher powers saith Saint Paul. We must obey the King, and His Officers also, as they represent the King, (for quod per officiarios facit per se facere videtur) and they must be obedient as well as we, as they represent Subjects. Thus Nehemiah receiving commission from Artaxerxes, armed his countrymen against those who governed under the King. Saint Peter very appositely differences this duty in respect of King and Magistrates. Submit yourselves unto the King as Supreme, but unto Governors as unto them, that are sent by him, and derive their power from him, and are His Ministers to execute His commands, 1 Pet. 2. 13,. 14.  
Exc. It is objected, (but very impertinently) if a King command against established Laws, and inferior Magistrates according to the Law, they ought to be obeyed.  
Answ. This comes not home to the case; I grant, obedience to the King's command against law, is unwarrantable; but this doth not conclude the lawfulness of hostile resistance. We do our duty in submitting to His legal will, though against his Letters or words of mouth, for he hath obliged us so to do, and by his own grant hath restrained his right to recall and abrogate Laws, except by advice and consent of both Houses in Parliament. If He be offended without cause, we are bound by christian and civil constitutions to submit though to His unjust wrath. If they mean to conclude their own innocence, they must frame their Argument thus: If a King command against Law, and Magistrates resist according to Law, we may without guilt take part with them. This is true if they resist according to Law; but this cannot be in a Monarchy; for if the Laws grant a right of resistance in any case, when that case comes, the Monarchy is dissolved, for those who are enabled to take up arms against Him, are His equals or colleagues at least; the union is destroyed, and they are not to be esteemed Rebels then, but just enemies, because they cease to be Subjects. They cannot vindicate themselves from Treason and Rebellion, except they can produce some Law of England which dispenses with their Allegiance in such cases, and show that our civil constitutions are so framed, as to make Bellum , Bellum utrinque justum, a Civil War, a just War of both sides in the law notion, which cannot be, except there be two supreme authorities to proclaim and manage it. That this is not so, the Houses shall give testimony against themselves, for they acknowledge themselves in their addresses to His Majesty, His humble and loyal Subjects assembled in Parliament.  
Exc. Another main exception, and which they most triumph in, is this, (I will deliver the words of one of them, who hath expressed it the most fully) As it is a Parliament, it is the highest Court of Justice in the Kingdom, therefore hath power to send for by force, those that are accused before them, that they may come to their trial, which (if I mistake not) power inferior Courts have, much more the highest. 'Tis out of doubt agreed on by all, that the Parliament hath a power to send a Sergeant at Arms to bring up such an one as is accused before them, and if they have power to send one Sergeant at Arms, than twenty, if twenty be accused, and then a hundred, than a thousand, than ten thousand, if ten thousand be accused, and so more or less as occasion serves; for there is the same reason for two as for one, for a hundred as for twenty, for a thousand as for a hundred, and take away this power from the Parliament, and 'tis no longer a Parliament. But the King and His Forefathers have by Law settled these Liberties of Parliament, and therefore according to Laws they have ae power to send for by force those that are accused to be tried before them, which they cannot do, unless they raise an Army, when the accused are kept from them by an Army. Master Bridge in his Wound. consci. pag. 6.  
Answ. First, the House of Commons is no Court of justice, it hath indeed by special privilege for its better regulation, power over its own members, to imprison or turn out, and this power though at any time abused against justice and equity, and contrary to the trust reposed in them, both by King and people (as if men should be committed for delivering their opinions freely because their reason was not so happy as to concur with the sense of the House, which may possibly be the passions of the major part; or if some should be accused and others past by, though of known guilt in the very same particulars, as having an hand in monopolies etc. and so not the cause but the person, he made the measure of right & wrong) yet this misused authority hath the effects of justice and right, & makes the act legally valid. But the House of Commons hath no jurisdiction over those who are without, except at most in case of breach of Privilege; it cannot judge or condemn any, no not so much as examine upon oath: so that the argument is, the Parliament, that is the House of Lords, as the highest Court of justice, may legally raise an army, without the consent, nay against the command of the King, it concludes too without the consent, and if they please, against the express will of the Commons declared to the contrary. This doctrine once since this Parliament sat, would not have been so pleasing to the lower House, that they would have taken care for printing it by Order from their Committee. There was a time when one of this House professed openly, he hoped to see that sky fall too, and the Lords were put in mind, they sat but in personal capacities (whereas Knights were shires, and Burgesses were towns and Cities) and therefore it was thought fit to give them warning and to admonish them to take heed how they thwarted the representative Kingdom.  
Secondly, by the same reason Judges of inferior Courts, out of Parliament at least, may raise an army to fetch in delinquents; if the framers of this objection, had consulted with those Sages, they would have better instructed them in the laws. In cases of such high consequences, it was the custom of the House of Peers to advise with these Oracles, to take directions from them, at least to know their opinion and the reasons of it, because they had employed their whole time and studies to find out the true meaning of the laws.  
Thirdly, To discover their mistake and the inconsequence of the argument, There is the same reason for twenty as for one, and so for an hundred, for a thousand, for an army, etc.  
The reason is not the same; because when a few are sent out, the administration of justice doth not endanger the common peace. But because a war doth put the whole Kingdom in manifest peril of being ruined, therefore when either real delinquents, or pretended to be so, are so many, as to make the trial doubtful, the liberty and right of inferior Magistrates to fetch them in by force, is in this case restrained by express laws, which provides very prudently, that no war shall be made, except authorized by the supreme governor. And therefore also the laws permit the King to pardon all offences against his crown and dignity, supposing he will do it, as sometimes out of goodness of nature, so sometimes out of the strength of his understanding, because not mercy only, but wisdom and prudence may prevail with him to forget offenders, when they are so potent, that the uncertain punishment of nocents, (for the worst cause may prevail, as in the case of the tribe of Benjamin, so 
Victrix causa Deis placuit, sed victa (●atoni)  must be bought with the unavoidable destruction of many innocent and gallant persons. Wherefore Sergeants at arms and officers may be sent by the House of Peers, and consequently by Judges of inferior Courts, and ordinary Justices, to force delinquents to appearance (though their crime ought to be specified, for to call them malignants or delinquents, is no legal charge) if they be not so many, as that they make such resistance, as cannot be punished without an Army; for a civil war endangers all, and begets more faults than it punishes, and therefore the laws refer the ordering of the commonwealth to him who is supreme, least inferior magistrates violently carried on, should out of indiscreet zeal to justice, expose the Kingdom to contributions, plunderings, and thousand remediless injuries, more grievous than those they seek to punish.  
Exc. War against the person of the King is not resistance of the higher power, but war against his authority only, Buchanan right; Non igitur hîc Paulus de iis qui magistratum gerunt, agit, sed de ipso magistratu, h. e. de functione & officio eorum qui alis praesunt, dial. de jur. reg.  
Answ. This separation of the officer from the office (which hath created bella plusquam civilia, the King in this army fight against himself in the opposite army) is made without all colour or shadow of reason, for though the authority of the King be some times where his person is not, yet his person cannot be where his authority is not, This is evident by the 25. Edw. 3. c. 2. which makes it Treason to compass the King's death, by which must be meant to endeavour his personal ruin, because Regal authority never dies in England. I have showed formerly, that by not resisting powers, is meant, not resisting persons invested with such power. For when Saint Paul hath forbid to resist the power, he explains it by adding a reason drawn from the persons in authority, to encourage them to obedience; for Rulers are not a terror to good works, and so after, for they are Gods Ministers, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the masculine gender which cannot be applied to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that he might leave no ground of scruple, but plainly instruct us, that honour is due to their persons, and that all resistance to their persons is sin, because of their authority, Saint Peter is as clear, Submit yourselves to every Ordinance of man for the Lords sake, whether it be to the King as Supreme, or unto Governors, as unto them that are sent by him. Deodate expresses it very fully in his Italian translation, Siate adunque suggetti ad ogni Podestà criata dagli huomini per l'amor del signore: all Rè, come all sourano, ed a governadori come a person mandate da lui. That we may not mistake he tells us, that by Power or Ordinance is meant Persons endued with power ad ogni Podestà is says he in his gloss upon the place, a Principi, Magistrati, Rettori created by or amongst men, dagli huomini, o fra gli huomini per la conservatione e condotta della società humana.  
Judas when he condemns despisers of dominion, and such as, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, speak evil of dignities, v. 8. means to commend to us the same duty which Paul taught us out of the law, which is free from all ambiguity, and concludes for the persons. When Ananias the high Priest, whose duty was to judge after the law, commanded him to be smitten contrary to the law, he (as was supposed by them) in passion returns ill language, and being justly rebuked by the bystanders, he confesses he ought not to revile the Priest, though he did evidently abuse his authority (much less ought he to strike again, with pretence of honouring his authority, but not being bound to submit to his personal commands contrary to the law. I witted not brethren that he was the high Priest; for it is written, thou shalt not speak evil of the Ruler of thy people, Act. 23. 5. St Paul was unacquainted with this subtlety, which allows to speak evil; nay, to make hostile resistance against men in authority, so they profess to honour the authority of those men. It is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (so Master Burroughs) his personal strength, not any legal power which is resisted, if he do any thing against law, and this, says he, is not forbidden, we may resist men, though not powers, we must not be subject to will, but to law. p. 113.  
His mistake lies in this, that he thinks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, power, signifies the right and honest use of authority, whereas it signifies the right to use his authority, whether well or ill, 'tis all one to us for matter of submission to it, either by obedience or patience, because no resistance can be lawful for want of a superior jurisdiction, by which only we can be enabled to call him to an account for his actions. The truth of this is made evident in Joh. 19 10, 11. Pilate faith unto him, knowest thou not that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I have power to crucify thee, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I have power to release thee? Jesus grants it▪ and answers, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. thou couldst have no power at all against me, except it were given thee from above.  
By 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, therefore are meant persons invested with authority. The reason which made Paul call Magistrates by the Abstracts, Powers was this, he wrote to Christians living in the Roman Empire, and it was the custom of the Latin Language to call persons endued with power, potestates, by the name of powers. You may observe it in Ulpian, l. quid sit. D. de Aedil. edict. §. 19 and in Augustine, epist. 48. who saith, sive potestas veritati favens, aliquem corrigat, laudem habet ex illa, qui fuerit emendatus: sive inimica veritati in aliquem saeviat, laudem habet ex illà qui fuerit coronatus. Mark that, potestas inimica veritati, this must needs signify a man abusing his authority. And in Juvenal, An Fidenarum, Gabiorumque esse potestas, and in Suetonius, Jurisdictionem de fidei commissis quotannis & tantum in urbe delegari magistratibus solitam, in perpetuum atque etiam per provincias potestatibus delegavit. The modern languages, Italian and French, which were bred out of the Latin retain the ancient use of speaking, for potestat in French and podestà in Italian, express not the function only, but the person which manages it. Thus anciently the Latin word for a Justice of peace, who now is called justitiarius, was justitia, as you may find in Glanv. lib. 2. cap. 6. and Roger Hovedens Annals: so our King is called in the abstract Majesty, as the Grecian Emperors, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Many ridiculous consequences flow from hence, but I list not to make sport with that unhappy distinction which hath almost ruined as flourishing and strongly tempered a Kingdom as any in the Christian world. It exposes Magistrates, and all in authority to the contempt and injuries of the base sort of people. For when discontented, it is very obvious for them to tell them a reverence is indeed due to their function, & therefore that they setting their office aside, will take liberty only to kick their persons, and that the Magistrate is not at all affronted, though the man be sound beaten. It is against common sense to put such a difference between the person and the authority of the King, for if it were real, neither God, nor the Laws of the Land have made any provision for the King's safety; for His authority is not capable of receiving any benefit, and therefore it must be acknowledged by all sober and reasonable men, that His authority doth but convey such and such privileges upon the person, who only can be sensible of them, and consequently whatever is attempted against his person, is attempted against his authority likewise.  
Another cavil is taken from these words in Rom. 13. For Rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil; wilt thou then not be afraid of the power, do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. For he is the minister of God to thee for good. Their Argument is framed thus. A Magistrate is the Minister of God for our good, therefore he which is not a Minister for our good, is no Magistrate, and to resist him, is not to resist the ordinance of God, (which instituted Rulers for the people's happiness) but the faults and exorbitances of men, which endeavour to rob them of the blessings of divine providence, orderly government, and to make them bow down under the heavy burdens of an arbitrary sway. Their conclusion (contradictory in itself) is plainly this, A bad Magistrate is no Magistrate, (as being a terror to good works, and giving praise to the evil, contrary to Saint Paul's definition of Rulers,) and therefore no honour is due to him, no resistance is forbidden.  
Answ. The example of Christ commanding them to pay tribute to Caesar, as his due, the end of which was, that he should mind their good, though he neglected that duty, and his acknowledgement of pilate's power, or right to judge, though he exercised it to the condemnation of the innocent, and Saint Paul's confession, that notwithstanding the high Priest commanded him to be smitten illegally (which in their language was abuse of will, not power) yet he must not return ill language, because he was the Ruler, do clearly evince their argument not concluding. Saul was a bloody tyrant, he made the Priests a sacrifice to his cruelty, yet notwithstanding he continued Gods anointed. It were easy to instance in many examples, which show the vices of man making ill use of the power do not void the ordinance of God.  
There are, who answer these places very piously, but, as I think, not altogether to what Saint Paul aimed at. Rulers are not a terror to good works, and he is the minister of God to thee for good, that is, though they oppress, nay kill innocent men, yet they cannot hurt them; For God will recompense their sufferings, it is in bonum afflictis, though affligentibus in malum, because all things work together for good to them that love (that is, are obedient to) God. Rom. 8.  
It seems to me more probable, that the scope of the Apostle was to enforce the duty of subjection, pressed in vers. 1. by a second reason (for he had urged before, the ordinance of God) drawn from the benefits which will be reaped from Governors. And the motive is, the consideration of that happiness, which we have reason to promise ourselves from the preservation of order, the end of which is public tranquillity. This is enjoyed under very bad Princes, which will abundantly recompense some particular sufferings, whereas if we should go about to right ourselves, when power is abused (to say nothing, that it would always be pretended to be so by ambitious men, who have this advantage, that the common people have but weak judgements in State matters (and yet appeals are especially directed to them, and since our miseries have grown upon us, the contrivance of our calamity was very visible; the fatal arts which ruined this Kingdom were to make the meaner sort of men Judges of Policy, and women generally the Judges of Religion) and they are easily persuaded to reckon misfortunes amongst crimes, and to confound ill intentions with ill success) If I say we should take upon us to govern our Governors, because they rule not for our advantage, we should pull upon our heads much greater mischiefs. Experience shows, that Kingdoms suffer infinitely more by Civil War, then by the most Tyrannical Princes: If we call to mind the most vicious King that ever reigned in England, we shall find, though he did injure some particulars, indulging to some inordinate affections against the tenor of Law, yet justice was favoured in the general, and the greatest part of the Kingdom reaped the fruits of order. Whereas illegal endeavours to force him to amendment, introduce a cessation of all law and justice, and the Subjects will be plundered more in one night than the greatest monopolies and most unjustifiable taxes of many years robbed them of. The Apostles sense is expressed fully by Tacitus, Ferenda Regum ingenia, néque usui esse crebras mutationes. The reason why it is better for a people, though oppressed, to submit with patience even to a Tyrant, is this; if he be put to recover his own by conquest, and prevail, he may be tempered (as highly provoked) to rule them with a rod of iron, and to provide for future safety, by utter disabling them to hurt him: but if they get the better, their victory doth but confirm our calamity; we cannot see any probable end of our unhappy distractions. Because foreign Princes will certainly afford supplies for recovering his just rights (for it might suddenly be their own case, and they are bound to it in State interest; that they send not aid sooner, is, because it is for their advantage to have a neighbour Kingdom weakened, but not the Prince ruined) and it is very unlikely he should ever want a very considerable party at home, many out of conscience, more out of discontent and envy towards their fellow Subjects, prosperous treason, endeavouring to restore their injured Sovereign, to his undoubted Rights and Prerogative. So that England would be the unhappy scene, where the tragedies of Germany would be reacted. But grant a total extirpation, and that they shall be able to go through with their wicked design, and not only branch, but even root Monarchy also (for this is aimed at by some, who fear it may sprout again, if the stock be left) have we yet at last any hopes of peace, when we are so undone by war, that we have nothing left to lose but our lives? truly no, then like thiefs, when once secure of their booty, we should have thousand differences in dividing the prey, all of them challenging preferments great as their sins, and setting such a price upon their wickedness, as the estates of all honest men will not be able to pay; it is not possible, what they have gotten can be pleasant to them, when they consider much more might be enjoyed, and sadly recollect the inequality of the recompense to the adventure; for their lives were exposed to the danger of the law, their reputation is lost with all good men, and their souls are eternally ruined. They would fall out amongst themselves, who was the greatest Traitor, and never yield precedency in mischiefs, because that is the measure of Sharing. Some would plead, they contrived, others, they acted the Treason, and think a subtle brain should have no privilege above a courageous heart, it being more easy to fright the people by inventing false dangers, then to lead them on, and make them stand the brunt of true. It is beyond my skill to proportion the wages of sin, & determine, whether the sly and cunning setter or the stout thief can claim greatest share in the spoil. But commonly the speculatively malicious men are miserably deceived of their expected requital. For though they set the mischiefs on foot, yet their journeymen, quickly apprehending the mystery, are easily tempted to set up for themselves. It hath been often seen, that to end such quarrels, he that was head of the conspiracy in reference to the active part of it, and who had force enough to oppress a Tyrant, would use the same to establish himself their Lord and Master, and his government was so much the more rigid, severe, and miserable, because he was frighted with his own example upon his predecessor.  
This I conceive to be the Apostles sense, that we must submit even to bad Governors (such they were when he wrote this Epistle) not only out of honesty, but prudence also, because if we go about to make them better, we shall put the Kingdom, and consequently ourselves, in fare worse condition.  
After this explanation, I will reduce their Argument into form, that I may thereby give more distinct satisfaction.  
Non resistance is forbidden only to the powers ordained of God;  
But powers used tyrannically are not ordained of God, therefore we are not forbidden to resist them.  
The assumption is absolutely false: For though tyranny be not the ordinance of God, yet the power (which is commanded to rule justly, but withal enabled to do otherwise, for the use is left indifferent in respect not of the Magistrates, but Subject's duty, so that abuse doth not void authority, when swerving from laws) is of divine constitution. The obligation not to resist superior powers receives not strength from man's justice, nor is it weakened or made null by injustice. Saul was Gods anointed, and Pilate had authority from Heaven, notwithstanding the extreme abuse of it. Had the Apostle meant as they endeavour to persuade the world, considering what Governors the Christians then lived under, he had laid down a doctrine of rebellion, whereas he labours to teach them patience.  
Thus much in answer to their objections against what was delivered in the second Section; I shall now examine their exceptions against what was assumed in the precedent Section,  
The King of England hath Supreme power.  
Exc. There is a mixture or coordination in the supremacy, and the English Monarchy is compounded of three coordinate estates.  
Answ. I have showed before, that a mixed Monarchy is a contradiction, and that by this name can only be meant, a restrained and limited Monarchy, that is, that such a King, though he have Supreme, yet hath not absolute power. By reason of this restraint from his own grant and positive constitutions, active obedience is not due to his illegal commands, and by reason of his supreme power and sole right to make War and Peace, passive obedience is necessary.  
Monarchy compounded of three coordinate Estates, in plain English, speaks this nonsense, the power which one only hath, is in three jointly and equally.  
The ground of this invention, and so much fancied coordination, which our ancient Lawyers never dreamt of, may be this. If they mean by it, that the consent of all three Estates (I will not alter the new manner of expressing this government, but only take notice by the way, that heretofore, the Parliament was taken for an Assembly of the King and the three Estates, and that in all other Kingdoms likewise there are three States, the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commonalty, distinct from the Head) are equally required for transacting such businesses as the King hath obliged himself not to do without them and that they have the right of a negative voice, we shall indulge to them the name of coordination to two purposes, which are, making new, repealing old laws, and supplying the King's necessities, in such proportion as they shall think fitting. These are great democratical advantages, but include no authority of making hostile resistance against their sovereign, in case he should do contrary to the established laws, These are still in force, till abrogated by joint consent, and bind his conscience, but he cannot be forced to put them in execution, because he hath no superior in jurisdiction; and he hath no equal in managing jus gladii, the material sword, which is necessary to distinguish their resistance from rebellion, and give it the title of a just war. For except they can prove themselves not be His Subjects, I am forced to tell them, if they fight against him, they are by the law of Nations and of this land worthily reputed Rebels, and by divine law they are assured of damnation.  
Thus therefore; the two Houses, or two Estates of Lords and Commons, are not bound to submit their consent to the King's command in matter of Subsidy, or taking away any ancient Law, if they conceive it disadvantageous to the Commonwealth; Par in parem non habet imperium, in those things in which they are equal, as a rather and a son being joined in commission; in this sense let them be called coordinate. Yet they are subject in all other things, and therefore may not take up arms without his consent, for this is destructive of their allegiance.  
If there be a Coordination in the supremacy, that is, if the King and Lords and Commons are jointly the supreme governor, the Correlatum is wanting, none are left over whom they should Reign, we should have a Kingdom without a Subject, because all may challenge a share in sovereignty.  
The Parliament not sitting, they will not deny the supremacy to be solely in the King, and certainly by calling His great Council together, he doth not empty himself of any regal power; it were very strange our laws should be guilty of such vanity to make a useless coordination, for if His rivals should make any attempts upon His Prerogatives, He can legally dissolve them, (except when he hath passed a particular grant for their continuance, and then the enlargement of their time of setting, doth not enlarge their power) and after He hath dismissed the Assembly, (as the right to do so is unquestionable) than He is Supreme again, none being left to stand in competition. The clear business is this, all marks of supremacy are in the King, nor is it any Argument of communicating His power, that He restrains Himself from exercising some particular acts without consent of Parliament, for it is by virtue of His own grant, that such after acts shall not be valid. He hath not divided His legislative faculty, but tied Himself from using it, except by the advice and consent of the Peers, and at the request of the Commons, their rogation must precede His ratification. I shown this in the Roman Empire likewise, and yet none fancied, an equality between Subjects and the King or Emperor was thereby introduced.  
As the houtefeus of France argued from the denomination of Pares Franciae, to make them equal with the King, so our Incendiaries from Peers and Comites, to bring in a coordination whereas it is evident that Peers, refers not to the King, but signifies (as the Persian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mentioned in Zenophon) Subjects in the same rank of honour, and enjoying equal privileges, one is another. And to make Comites is called by Lampridius in conubernium imperatoriae majestatis asciscere, our lawyers derive them from having that special honour to be in comitatu regis, Suetonius calls them comites peregrinationum, expeditionumque Tiberii, They were of three ranks under the Emperors, Comites intra consistorium were the highest, and in the nature of privy counsellors, but created by the Emperor, the fountain of all honour, and so not similes altissimo, equal to him, though exalted above fellow Subjects.  
The brief is, the frame of government, as it is established by our laws, clearly condemns their undertake, and therefore they have laid such a foundation, as will support the building. For if they can but prove that Parliament men, and those who are stirred up to fight against their Sovereign, are not the King's Subjects, they have acquitted them from being Rebels.  
We have seen the ground work, and shall now take the superstructure into due consideration; the whole fabric is comprised in that exiome so frequently applied to justify all illegal proceed. Coordinata se invicem supplent, Coordinates' aught mutually to supply each others failing, that we may not suffer whether by necessary or voluntary defects, and that the Kingdom may not run the hazard of being ruined for want of supplemental laws, and therefore when the King is perverse and will not join with them for the common good, they have full authority without him.  
This would conclude as strongly for the power of enacting laws without the King, which the Houses have disclaimed. It is true, this legislative authority is exercised under another name, let the Author's answer for practising what themselves have expressly disallowed. For it is but small satisfaction to the injured Subject, to tell them they challenge not a power to make standing Laws, but only temporary Ordinances: That is, they will take away their estates for the present, and then their votes shall be no longer binding, was not this the reason why such Proclamations are justly accounted grievances, as do entrench upon the Subject's liberties or property? The Subjects are equally miserable, whither their birthright, the laws of this land, are overthrown by Royal Proclamations or Ordinances of one or both Houses.  
Coordinata se invicem supplent, Coordinates' supply each others failings; therefore if one refuse, the other two are enabled to do it without him.  
By the same logic, if the King and House of Lords join, the consent of the House of Commons is legally supplied, and they may constitute what they please without them. This is the evident doctrine of it, which yet is commanded by the House to be printed. If the King had said this, it had been the greatest breach of Parliamentary privileges that ever had been made. Posterity will have no reason to be thankful to them for disputing themselves out of the right of a negative voice, only that they may with some small colour (making use of an accidental advantage, the major part of those few Lords, which remain in the House now, joining with them) take away from the King (what is as much his by law as the crown he wears) his right to reject any Bill, never questioned by our Ancestors, and it is very strange it should now; Sir Thomas Smith tells us quibus princeps derogatum vult, haud pluribus verbis utitur, quám le Roy, aut la Royne s'advisera; quaeproptereá extincta penitus, abolitaque censentur. l. 2. c. 3. descript. Ang. If the King's denial did not extinguish them, all those bills, which have slept for many ages, as laid down by our knowing forefathers out of a necessary modesty and a just valuation of their Sovereign's right, would rise up laws to the extreme confusion of the present government. And secondly, if his authority must be involved or swallowed up in their votes, if his part in Parliament be the same with the flatterers in the comedy, Ais, aio, negas, nego; if he be but a State echo, it is manifest he hath not so great a hand in the managery of his Kingdom, as the meanest fellow, who hath but 40 per annum freehold, for he governs by proxy, whereas the King is represented by none, and yet must not speak for himself and for his own Interest, which is altogether the same with the public. The greatest security the Subject hath, that equal laws shall be preserved, is from his negative voice. The interests of the major part in the House of Commons may be opposite to the good of the Kingdom in general. For if we reckon those many that serve for, and are (or would be, in future elections, if the power were thus enabled to effect what ever advantageous designs) of Corporations, and those few in comparison, who serve for Shires, we shall easily believe, the privileges of Cities and Towns, may be enlarged by them to the great discouragement and loss of the honest farmer and painful husbandman; So the Burgesses for the West are so many, that upon an unanimous conspiracy amongst themselves, and labouring some single persons, who may be easily won out of relation of acquaintance, friends, or kinsmen, or their inadvertency, and not fully weighing, or not understanding the consequences of it, they may easily carry by vote, what is very beneficial to themselves, though extremely prejudicial to the other parts of this Kingdom.  
To go higher, it is very easy to conceive, that the major part of the lower House, may be very mean men chosen to make more profitable laws for the poorer sort, and to keep the Gentry under by laying subsidies and all burdens of the Commonwealth upon them, not without a specious pretence, that they spend more in superfluities than would discharge all public expenses, and exempting themselves from all payments, as being such, who take great pains, and work very hard, even for necessaries. The possibility of such a choice is apparent, because (consideriug how small means are required to a capacity of voting in the election of Parliament men (it may perhaps be more warily ordered hereafter by the wisdom of that great Court, who may think it fit to raise 40 per annum freehold to such a proportion as that estate was valuable at, in the first constitution, when the scarcity of money made it a competent fortune) the greater part of those which choose them are poor countrymen and beggarly tradesmen. Such a choice than is very possible, neither is it improbable, if Parliaments shall be governed by these new principles. For the reason why such an election was never yet made, is this, such a power was never heretofore challenged, as could enable them to go through with any such design. If either the Lords perceived any motion from the Commons disadvantageous to themselves, or the King thought it prejudicial to the public, and so necessarily unprofitable for him (as if the merchant should be discouraged, by laying too greatburdens upon foreign trade, or the Clergy impoverished, by taking away those means which should make men able, and keep them honest) it was presently rejected, and so not to be stickled in further, sitting that Parliament. If some factious spirits wrought upon their discontents, and persuaded them to pass nothing, whether by granting subsidies, or consenting to new laws, which might be beneficial for the present State, till they received satisfaction in their desires, though such a perverseness (which I suppose only and do not say it ever was) might be very unhappy for the Kingdom (for by making the King poor, it would probably put his friends upon some unwarrantable courses, whereby to supply his wants, and this would create a misunderstanding between him and his people, and breed ill humours, which fomented by crafty men, would break out in such violent distempers, that there would be a necessity of calling physicians; These politic physicians when once entertained in such an extremity, will be sure so to manage the disease, that they will be paid as much as they please to demand. They will desire such offices, such commands, not for themselves, but only in order to the recovery of their patients; The denial of which shall put the people in danger of a relapse, and they will prescribe the ways of prevention and make use of the impatience of distempered men, to compass their own ends) though I say, such a sullenness would make the Kingdom miserable, yet it is their right to deny the most reasonable proposal, and there is not any legal remedy against inconveniences, which will certainly flow from hence. Neither necessity nor propterea quòd regnum nostrum periclitatur, which is the same with saius populi suprema lex, can enable the King justly to provide for the Kingdom's safety, by raising money against the known Laws: he may in this case dissolve the assembly, and only use such means, as are not contrary to Law. By reason of these negative voices, and the King's right, as to call together, so to break up that great council, there was not any hope of new moulding this State to particular Interesses, and therefore these unequal compositions of the House of Commons had no influence to the disadvantage of the Commonwealth. Yet now we may probably suffer under them, if this new doctrine take place, That the King's consent is past, and involved in the Lords and Commons; for the next rub of the Lords negative is removable by the same Logic of Coordinata se supplent, and that the people may not perish for defect of a supplemental Law; it was essayed formerly, that they sitting in personal capacities, should not oppose what conduced to the safety of the Kingdom, represented by the Commons, and those two grounds being laid, as the King and Lords are voted out of Parliament, so it is very probable, the Gentry would be but very thin in the House of Commons, upon new election hereafter, because the disposal of all would be put into their hands, whose interests are most disjoined from the public tranquillity, as enjoying least by the present establishment in this State. From hence it is apparent, what confusion were likely to follow, and the short experience we have had, hath already too fully acquainted us with the miserable consequences.  
To answer distinctly to their axiom coordinates' supply each others failing; if it should be understood in that sense, which they plead for, that the King failing to perform his duty, the Lords and Commons are enabled to transact businesses without him by virtue of this rule, upon the very same grounds the King and House of Commons may exclude the Lords, the King and Lords may exclude the Commons; but this being destructive of the fundamental privilege and right of either House this only can be meant by it in the present case, that the power of any one or two of them, is defective to some purposes expressly named in our laws, (as for enacting new laws, or raising money upon the Subject) without a joint consent of all three. This interpretation is very reasonable, but it concludes against them, and forth King; for he requires nothing, but (what our Laws grant him, and what he always acknowledged equally their due) a right to a negative voice in those things to which the three estates are coordinate. The use of it cannot be injurious, for a denial to bring in a new government, doth not take away the old, it leaves us in that happiness, which our Fathers were content with.  
Exc. All other matters (wherein the exercise of His supreme power is not restrained, by making their consent a necessary condition, without which it cannot be actuated) he may manage solely, as for instance, he may, and aught to protect His Subjects, and to make use of those means with which the law hath invested him to enable him to compass that end, and these are the Militia or arms of the Kingdom.  
Answ. The King though he be singulis major, yet he is universis minor. I am forced to take notice in the first place of that lamentable sophistry, which yet hath deceived many, #& though it hath been often discovered, they still persist to abuse the people with it. The strength of all their discourses depends upon this syllogism, the Parliament is greater than the King, (the assumption is built upon a false foundation, The two Houses are the Parliament. Ergo, the two Houses are greater than the King.  
The proposition is granted, because Parliament includes King and Lords and Commons, and his legislative power, as to the use of it, is so restrained, that it cannot be legally exercised without their consent, and this obtained in Parliament, it becomes absolute to those purposes, to which they pass their assent. 25. H. 8. 21. So that the only meaning is, he can do more in Parliament, than out of it.  
But the minor is absolutely false, for the King is caput Parliamenti, and so an essential part of Parliament. I am ashamed to bring quotations out of the lawyers, to prove what is so manifestly true. For if the King were not a necessary part of the Parliament, & the Parliament (as it is being rightly understood for the head and body) were the whole Realm, than we should have a Kingdom without any King.  
Object One objection is frequently urged; there must be a Parliament somewhere, for it cannot be dissolved without their consent, which is not yet past, but it is not at Oxford, nor no other place, London excepted, therefore it is there, and consequently the Houses are the Parliament without the King, or else His authority is in their votes.  
Answ. The want of Logic hath proved as fatal to this Kingdom, as the want of conscience; I cannot determine which hath had the strongest influence in our calamities, the malice of some, or the ignorance of others. Suppose the Lords should remove their House out of the City (as they have an undoubted right so to do, upon the agreement of the major part, and there might be some motives for it, for to say nothing else, their number would be more then doubled) where would these men place the Parliament? If the King and Lords should legally sit in Oxford, were the House of Commons thereby excluded from being a part, or could they be concluded the whole Parliament? It is not an union in respect of place, but an union of their assent and the Royal ratification, which actuates the power into a law. The King's absence doth not destroy the being of Parliament (no more than if he should descent being present) nor doth it forfeit his power into their disposal, as you may see 33. H. 8. c. 21. His assent by his letters patent is and ever was of as good strength and force, as though the King's person had been there personally present, and had assented openly and publicly to the same.  
But what if he descent from them and refuse to confirm their votes? Then they ought not to have the force of laws, no more than if the King and Lords should agree on any thing the Commons contradicting it; neither is a legal establishment▪ If they say, his obstinate refusal voids the Parliament, for it is made of no use, if it may not be active, when deserted by him, and except he please to establish their ordinances; The King might as well press the Commons to consent to what he and the Lords shall think fitting, because otherwise they void the Parliament, for it is of no use, if it may not be active without their assent which they resolve not to pass.  
This constitution of the negative voice in either of the three estates, was made in favour of the present government, the goods of which were known by experience, that no innovation (the evils of which are hardly discovered before trial) might be introduced without a joint consent of all three.  
The whole Kingdom is greater than the King.  
Answ. If they mean by whole Kingdom, both King and people▪ it is very true, but nothing pertinent, for it only signifies that the head is not so great as itself and the rest of the body. But if they understand (as they must if they mean to conclude any thing) the body in opposition to their Sovereign, it is false that universitas subjectorum est major Rege. The same reason which makes him above one, makes him above two, and so above ten, & so ten thousands, & so ten millions of thousands; for their assembling together doth not dispense with their duty of allegiance, many or few altars not the quality of the act, an universal revolt from a lawful Sovereign is equally Rebellion, as a particular defection of one or more Counties.  
The Orator's art is much used in these unhappy times 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, misdemeanours were once raised into high Treason, and now evident treason is lessened into necessary defence. That rhapsody of quotations, entitled the treachery, and disloyalty of Papists to their Sovereigns, etc. brings a very merry plea to take them off from being Traitors. The stat, of the 25 Edw. 3. c. 2. runs in the singular number, if a man shall levy war against the King, etc. it ought to be judged high Treason, therefore it extends not to the Houses, who are many and public persons, p. 31. If he had sadly considered, how deeply conscience is engaged in the present war against the King, he would not have endeavoured to seduce so many into Rebels, and make them forfeit their souls upon such pitiful subtleties.  
If foreigners should inquire under what kind of government we live, the answer must be, we live over a King. Certainly they will much wonder at the unnecessary humility of the Houses, (they challenging to themselves superiority as the representative all) and conclude them very great Courtiers, who in their addresses to the Prince, their Subject, style themselves His Majesty's most loyal and faithful Subjects, the Lords and Commons in Parliament. They will shrewdly suspect, if Majesty be His due, that Supremacy is so also: while Rome was a popular State, the supreme dignity being in the people, was expressed by majestas populi Romani, and after when they had resigned up their power to Emperors, it was changed into Augustalis Majestas, taken for the person of the Emperor. C●ubi & apud quem. l. cum scimus. or Imperialis majestas. C. de quadriennii praesc. I bene à Zenone. and so Keyserlich Maiestaet at this day for the Germane Emperor.  
The custom of petitioning him, and such humility in the title of their addresses and the preface, (suppose it should reach no further, yet it) cannot be wholly taken of by the imperiousness of the matter. Some of that side seem to be scrupled at it, and therefore plain scottish tells you, they hold Declarations to be more suitable to the sovereignty of so supreme a Court, whose power is coordinate with Princes (we must hold superior) than petitions.  
I have proved in a former discourse, that the King is supreme head, not in respect of single persons, but the universitas subjectorum. For this is comprehended in body politic compact of all sorts, and degrees of people, which is said to owe next to God a natural and humble obedience, 24 H. 8. c. 12. And it is evident, that he is not the head of this or that man, but of all the members in conjunction, of the whole body, for else he would be the head of millions of bodies, and by consequence have as many distinct Kingdoms, as particular Subjects. It is needless to multiply quotations, as the 25. H. 8. 21. This your Grace's Realm recognises no superior under God, but only your Grace, or Queen Elizabeth's public declaration, that she had next under God, the highest and supreme government and power over all Estates of the Realm of England, Ecclesiastical or Temporal. Camd. hist. pag. 31.  
I will sum up the reasons in brief, which prove, that the King is not minor universis. First, if the Houses are above Him, He hath no right of Empire upon them, because inferior in superiorem non habet imperium, but this is false, for they are subject by Law to His commands, when he bids them come, they are bound to come; and when he bids them go, they are bound to go, that is when he calls them by his Writ, they ought to attend praescriptis die & loco, and he prorogues the assembly, or dissolves it when he thinks fitting. It is no prejudice to this right, that he was graciously pleased to restrain the exercise of it in this present Parliament without their consent, to the end those vast debts which were brought upon this Kingdom might be discharged, and in order to that, good security might be given to such persons as were willing to engage their estates, for the benefit of the commonwealth. I will make no advantage by urging their abuse of trust, by which they were enabled to take off that great burden, which they have made infinitely more heavy, and whereas they might in short time have eased this State, our debts hourly grow upon us, and the Subject's estates are but the fuel to feed that fire which sensibly consumes this unhappy Nation. Notwithstanding, they have deceived both King and people, yet His Majesty cannot satisfy Himself in their Logic, and suffer Himself to be persuaded, he may lawfully reassume His right, because they do contrary to trust. Though the perpetuity of this Parliament was never intended, and it hath been of most pernicious consequence, yet the King will not allow Himself any liberty (to dissolve it) against law, upon most real good intentions. Because the precedent is full of danger, and though in the present case it would be used for the benefit of His people, yet hereafter, it probably might be abused to their greater disadvantage.  
Secondly, the division of all persons in this Land is into King and Subjects, liege Lord and liege people, and therefore they must be placed in the latter rank. It is a strange fancy to abstract the body politic from all the particulars whereof it is compacted, and to salve the Oath of Allegiance, by telling us the universe or body politic never swore allegiance or supremacy to the King, neither is it possible it should. Reply to answer to the observations, pag. 17. and again, pag. 18. (in answer to the 24. Hen. 8. cap. 12. The King is supreme head, unto whom a body politic compact of all sorts and degrees of people are bounden and own next to God a natural & humble obedience) we must not understand this, that the body politic doth owe obedience, but that the several sorts and degrees of people, of which this body is compacted and made, that they do owe obedience, for to take it otherwise, were to make an absurd and impossible construction. etc. If every particular man perform his duty of allegiance as he stands obliged by oath, let him oppose his met a physical body to the King even as he pleases. If the body politic have not sworn allegiance or supremacy, because it is a body only in consideration of law, that hath neither life or motion, like other invidualls p. 17. and for the same reason doth not owe homage and obedience p. 18. How is it capable of rebelling against the Head? for it cannot fight but by the hands of particular men, and all these are tied up by divine law, and their own oaths.  
3. They acknowledge themselves his subjects as united in Parliament; and if they should deny it, they could not challenge any benefit from his royal protection.  
4. The laws intrust him, not the Houses to protect us.  
5. The Houses represent only subjects opposed to the King, who is their superior by humane and consequently divine law, both as their natural King and as God's anointed, his representative.  
6. There is a great difference between the real and representative all; for though it were true, (as it is not) that he were less than the whole people, yet this would not bring the conclusion home to the Houses. Who are the people only to such purposes as the law nominates, viz. for consenting to Laws or Taxes upon the Subject. To all other purposes (wherein Regal power is not expressly limited) the King is the whole people, and what he doth is legally their Act. Aristotle tells us of some Kings, that had as full right over their whole realm, as a popular state can have over itself, and all things belonging thereto 3. pol. 14. To such an one that of the Tragedian is truly and properly applied. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   
You are the whole City, the whole Commonwealth, and therefore not responsable for any actions. This shows the falsehood of their principles, Quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale, and constituens est major constituto, etc. for though they mean to make advantage of them only in this Kingdom, yet they conclude against the possibility of making any King absolute, which reason and experience have clearly confused. For a people if conquered, (their lives and all they have being then in the hand of the victor) or if in fear to be swallowed up by a more potent enemy, they may and often have very prudently consented to place all the legal power of the Kingdom in one man, that he may thereby be enabled to protect them, and where the legislative power is unrestrained, there the rule is absolute.  
To apply this doctrine; In those things wherein the King of England is not absolute, as in the exercise of his legislative power, and raising money without consent, The Houses together with him, represent the people; but in such matters, wherein he is absolute, (that is, wherein he is not restrained by laws which are but limitations of Regal power) there he is Populus Anglicanus, legally the English Nation. For example sake, I will instance in the power of making War and Peace, if any take up Arms by virtue of any other than his Commission, they oppose not the King alone, but the King and People as, People is to be understood in law, for their hands are tied up, and all their legal strength is in the King's disposal.  
Let us examine their Argument, The whole people are above their King, therefore the Houses, because they represent them.  
The Antecedent I have showed false, because the whole people are but such a number of Subjects, who can have no colour of pretence to be above him, whom God and the law hath placed over them.  
The consequence is as infirm, and the reason of it fallacious, for if representatives might challenge all rights appertaining to the persons by them represented, than a Jury shall be concluded as honourable as the House of Commons, and then too because the Emperor of Germany, may challenge of the King of France or England (not superiority, for they are as supreme and independent Princes, as he is, but) praecedence, (an honour due to the antiquity of the Empire, for nations as well as persons enjoy the benefit of primo geniture) his ambassadors also might sit above those Kings, which the Court of honour guided by the law of nations, and reason would pronounce very absurd.  
Again they represent the people only to some purposes; to make war is none of them; The King alone can declare the people's mind in this case, they have no legal way of expressing themselves but in his Commissions, and therefore the war is not between King and People, but so many particular persons exceeding the trust committed to them, against the duty of allegiance, oppose both King and People. It is very remarkable, that in the beginning of these unhappy contrivances, some multitudes appearing in tumultuous ways, what ever they desired or did was called the Act of the People, providing for their own safety. But after the sense of miseries had bettered their understandings, to make them discern, this unnatural war was not like to improve the means of preservation, many of them make a Covenant to live peaceably and honestly amongst themselves, so in Yorkshire long since, and lately between Cornwall and Devonshire, and now the Houses interpose, and will not permit the people who were stirred up and encouraged to raise a war against law, to make a peace according to law; let them trouble the waters as much as they please, they shall be borne out in it; but they must not think of settling them, till they have done fishing; This would be a breach of Privilege. The People are now forced to defend themselves, and their goods violently taken from them, for their security; who might soon be happy again, if their friends would be less careful of their safety. It is well known who began to appeal to the People; withal my heart (if law must be suspended) let them arbitrate the differences. The certain way to know their judgement, and whom they apprehend to be a real defender of what both pretend, our laws and property, and liberty, and the established religion, is to cease plundering of both sides, and leave them to their natural inclination. That side which confesses it cannot subsist without using violence and oppression, and forcing their estates from them, acknowledges that the people, whom they pretend to fight for, is clearly against them, and they have small reason to challenge a privilege of breaking all Laws, by virtue of that paramount Law, populi salus, when as their unwarrantable courses ventured on in order to the safety of the people, do manifestly conduce (even the People being Judges, and repenting their former folly) to the poverty, slavery, and ruin of all.  
It remains, I lay down my promised conclusion of the whole, that notwithstanding such a power of resistance, as they or any others have yet openly pleaded for, should be granted lawful (as when in their own defence, or when he that hath the highest authority, and is bound by the Law of God and his own promise or oath, to administer justice equally, after frequent representations of their grievances, and most just complaints of their great sufferings affords no redress) yet this can be no justification of the present war against the King, nor acquit the Actors in it from being rebels; Because this case is evidently not now.  
The Arms taken up against the King, were not (as is pretended) defensive, nor in maintenance of any thing which the Subject can challenge as of right.  
If we call to mind that unhappy time, 
This war offensive of the Subjects part.  when His Majesty (forced to preserve himself by flying the City, that he might be free at least by absence, from the scorns and dangers of unreprehended, I will not say, encouraged tumults) was immediately accused to have rebelled against himself, 
At Kingston upon Thames.  and was furnished with an Army by Vote, when he had not so much means left him, as could honestly feed his family, and it was Ordered that this formidable Host should be apprehended by the ordinary Ministers of justice in that County; if our memories will but render a faithful account of this contempt, harder to be digested then the former popular fury, we may perceive their behaviour towards him, was a sufficient confutution of their fears of him. They told the people, they were afraid of His power, and yet answered their own jealousies by showing to the world, they were able to take it from Him; He was so fare from being in a condition to invade their rights, He had not wherewith to defend His own. His inability to revenge indignities was so notorious, they durst be even wanton in abusing Him. When He wooed them in that gracious Message from Windsor, His yielding so much did but tempt them to use greater rigour. Nothing would satisfy, unless he would make their votes the measure of His obedience; for what privilege had they above private Counsellors, if their advice should not sway with Him more than reason? when He requested them only to make known what was wanting to the Kingdom's happiness, and He would cheerfully supply it, they think it loss of time to represent particular defects, but put him into such a way as will effect it, to be guided in all things as they shall direct, that is, to let them manage His Royal power, who knew better how to govern. Because He will not submit to their blank desires, by confessing His Vote to be legally involved in their Orders, nor resign up that power which the law hath entrusted Him with, and which cannot be separated from the Crown without dissolution of this government, and therefore He is obliged both in justice and honour to preserve it as the necessary means, whereby He is enabled to protect His people; Because, I say, He will still be King, and not part with those Rights which God and the Law gives Him, they will dispense with their duty of being Subjects, and challenge a privilege to take away those Rights, which He will not, when petitioned, fairly deliver. After this, he retires to York, only desirous to live safely, and contented to suffer such an eclipse of glory, till such time as the abused people should recover their understandings, and these clouds should be dispelled by a clear apprehension of His innocence, and undeserved sufferings. Thither the storm pursues Him, His Rents are stopped, that He might become a burden to the Northern people, and that they might be tempted to part with Him, with as much cheerfulness, as they would be rid of the poor of their County. Commissioners were picked out, and sent amongst them to incense the less knowing, and to awe the more honest party, from receiving their naked Sovereign into their protection. The dangers they would incur by their perverse loyalty are laid open. They will certainly be Voted high Malignants, and notorious Delinquents, if they frustrate the pretended Parliaments injustice by their charity; for to what purpose did they take his revenues from him, if others should be allowed to give Him sufficient wherewith to clothe and feed Himself. Though such order was taken, by seizing His domains, He should not live amongst them as a King, yet the sweetness of His private and familiar conversation with them, made Him an extremely popular Gentleman. And therefore misdoubting a general defection to obedience upon trial of so great goodness, which increased with their injuries, and finding the people (not able to conceal their love of His extraordinary virtues) openly betraying an honest pity of their much wronged Master, they thought it necessary to give law to their fears, by usurping His power, and exercising it in their oppression whom unwary respect towards their Sovereign had made suspected for loyal Subjects. Accordingly all His Arms (and those of the Kingdom besides, lest the people should prevent their own wrongs by a timely revenge of His) are seized on, & they possess themselves of His Forts, Castles, Towns, and Navy. After such unparalleled usurpations, Regal power being invaded by private hands, a small Guard of honest Yorkshire gentlemen attend the King for His Personal safety, not knowing where their injuries would stop, for the bonds of law being once shaken off, their power to oppress, or ruin, was as unbounded as their will; by the same justice He was kept out of Hull, they might have kept him in what Village, what House, what Prison they pleased. This Guard of a much smaller number than they had kept together many Months was scornfully Voted an Army, and Commissions are illegally issued out to raise Forces to suppress this second War, made by the King upon Himself. The public motive was fear of violence intended by His Majesty, the private encouragement to less forward Soldiers was the King's inability to make the least opposition. An Army is levied against Him upon public pretence of His strength, and persuaded to march against Him, upon their private assurance of His weakness. Thousands are listed not to fight, but travel, and are promised to know nothing of war besides the wages, but to enjoy the security and delights of a progress. After all this (to prevent effusion of blood, and these visible calamities which the wild ambition of a few men, hath pulled upon their unhappy country) He twice sues for Peace▪ in those most gracious Messages from Nottingham, with offer of such large conditions, that if more should be required from Him, though when conquered, the Subjects would be loser's by it, and they would gain that by a miserable War, which will much diminish the happiness of Peace. They will not now descend to a Treaty with their King; they like His humility, but are not well pleased it was not shown sooner: only some slender hopes are given, that their General shall have commission to pardon His former unwillingness to suffer, if He can redeem those errors which have put them to expense and trouble, by a constant tameness for the future. From Nottingham he slyes to Shrewsbury (for they are contented to give Him line enough, being confident they can strike Him when they please; in the mean time, 'tis good sport to see Him wearying Himself with fruitless indeavous to escape, when at last being tired with long and vain strive. He must be forced to deliver Himself quietly into their hands.  
Thus was he accused to be the assaulter, who was so long time unable to resist their violence. Ei fuit saluti, quòd videbatur certò periturus, his apparent weakness did deliver him from that power which was ready to swallow him up; they had then destroyed him, if they had not been more wanton, then conscientious.  
This narration is abundantly sufficient to prove the war to be defensive of the King's part. But I will examine it further by the rules of Justice.  
Albericus Gentilis defines war very accurately (presupposing the laws of society, and excluding private Duels) publicorum armorum justam contentionem, a just dispute of differences by public swords, l. 1. c. 2. de jure bell. just, negante sensu, for that which is not unjust, and in the law notion, in reference not to the causes, (for this is called pium bellum) but the author's waging it. Wherefore he shows, that it cannot be but between independent States and Princes; Citizens or Subjects cannot be lawful enemies opposed to their Prince, because they want supreme authority, without which the war is not public, nor can it be justified. The reason is, because war is only excused by necessity, that is, when there is no legal way to end controversies by prohibiting farther appeals, as amongst distinct States, or several Princes, who acknowledge no superior, and are not bound to submit to any Court, and may perhaps not agree upon arbitrators, because in some cases none can be named, who are uninterressed in the decision. But I will not insist upon the injustice of Subjects making war for any cause whatever, upon the supreme power, because this was evidenced at large in the second Section, where I proved, that a liberty of resistance, doth destroy the nature of sovereignty or supremacy, and introduces regnum in regno, civitatem in civitate, by dividing the civil power, which can be but one, if the State or Kingdom be but one.  
That of Cyprian shall be the entrance into our inquiry, concerning the injustice of this present war of the Subjects part (setting aside their duty of nonresistance by divine law applied to our constitutions, and supposing an equality or independency between King and Subjects) for want of a reasonable cause which might excuse those great mischiefs, as being a necessary remedy to prevent greater. Homicidium quum admittunt singuli, crimen est, virtus vocatur, quum publicè geritur. And there is some ground in reason, that shedding though the blood but of one man should deserve an ignominious death, and to kill thousands by public authority should make our lives glorious. Because there is as vast a difference, as between the guilt of murderers, and the gallantry of men undertaking the administration of justice with personal hazard for preservation of public rights. First therefore a jurisdiction is required, where laws are wanting to make use of force for recovery of right (which Subjects cannot have over their Prince) and this doth make justum bellum. And secondly, a sufficient cause is necessary; there must be reasonable motives, or else it cannot be pium bellum. Except we have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, we commit murder with the sword of justice. The method of the Romans was to demand their rights in a peaceable way by their Heralds, and in case restitution was denied, than war was proclaimed, and the cause likewise declared, (nec dederunt, nec solverunt, nec fecerunt, quas res dari, fieri, solvi oportuit, as we find in Livy) that the world might be satisfied in the innocence of their unwilling violence. So careful were they to preserve their credit with mankind, whom it universally concerned, that war should not be waged upon light and unjustifiable grounds. There must be belli causa gravis, a sober inducement to make the war defensive, and if this were not wanting, real injuries having been offered; yet if this cause were taken away, by an after readiness to make full satisfaction, if the offended parties would not accept of restitution, the war was then esteemed offensive of their part, and they became guilty before God for the causeless effusion of so much blood, and worthily infamous amongst all good men. Melior causa ad partem poenitentem transibat.  
To apply briefly these unquestionable rules of justice to the present case: for I find that long reasons do as little satisfy the common sort, as none at all, they having but narrow memories, and it being the same thing not to know, and not to remember.  
I will put but one interrogatory to such as take up Arms against the King, Why they are Rebels and Traitors, cui bono? (for that they are so, I appeal to the Judges of the Land, or refer them to the plain and evident Law, 25. Edw. 3. Let them suppose themselves arraigned, and the Judge to ask what they can say for themselves, why sentence should not pass for their condemnation according to express law. Certainly they could not make a fairer plea than the Earl of Essex, who had not proceeded to offer violence to the Queen, and yet was adjudged a Traitor for appearing in Arms, only with intention to remove evil Counsellors.)  
The pretext is, in defence of Liberty, Laws, Property, Privileges of Parliament and Religion.  
But the real cause is, the preferment of a few ambitious persons, who will not permit the Laws to have their free and uninterrupted course, the known security of the Subjects happiness, because the orderly administration of justice doth not signify, that the King will bestow such offices upon them, as their inordinate desires aim at. He cannot doubt the truth of this, who hath read and observed the conditions without which they will not suffer peace, and to compass which His Majesty hath left no reasonable ways unattempted. I am confident, He hath offered so much to His Subjects as would content honest and moderate conquerors.  
Concerning Laws, there shall not be any other measure of men's actions, besides those known rules. Neither Royal Proclamations, nor fellow Subject's Ordinances shall make the people miserable under an Arbitrary sway. Do you desire to be as happy as your progenitors? you shall. For you shall enjoy all the same laws by the benefits whereof they lived peaceably, plentifully, gloriously. And besides this for a further improvement of your happiness, all those new Laws enacted this Parliament, and the several additional favours by parting with many known rights, (which exceed the Acts of Grace from all His Royal Ancestors though put together) shall be confirmed to you.  
Do you desire to be as free as your Ancestors? you shall. His Majesty passionately requires the Liberty of the Subject should be restored, and will take care the people shall not lose their birthright, by being imprisoned upon His, or, which is worse, their fellow Subjects illegal displeasure. He will contribute His utmost endeavours, that His own Castles, the Bishop's houses, and all other not long since honest habitations, may be disgaoled, and the English may be again acquainted with the comfort of life, freedom of their persons, and of conversation, and not be banished from their Wives and children for presuming to make the Laws the rule of their obedience.  
Do you desire the establishment of your Property? you shall have it. His Majesty challenges no right to your estates, and is unwilling Subjects should claim a privilege to take them from you, only that they may be better enabled to withhold His. No pretences of unknown dangers, or unseen necessity shall justify the violation of Laws, which alone can secure your inheritances.  
Do you desire Privileges of Parliament should suffer no diminution? They shall enjoy them in as high a way, as the Subject in the freest and most happy days ever challenged.  
And lastly, that Religion which was sealed with the blood of many holy Martyrs since the Reformation, and which stands established by Acts of Parliaments, and flourished in the purest times of Queen Elizabeth, which no sober man can think guilty of any inclination to Popery, shall be confirmed to you by an impartial execution of all legal penalties apppointed against offenders.  
Thus whatever can reasonably be pleaded for, is cheerfully offered to us, and we are wooed to accept, what the contrivers of our ruin pretend is fought for, Laws, Liberty, Property, Privileges of Parliament and Religion.  
Would you have security for performance of this promised happiness? you shall have as great as in justice you can require, or in reason expect; the same security with which the modesty and wisdom of former Parliaments were fully satisfied, and the Kingdom enjoyed the benefits of their well grounded confidence.  
And to complete all, you shall have certain provision for a Triennial Parliament. We are restored to such a high degree of health, as our Fathers were never acquainted with, and moreover such a course is taken to time this State physic (it was never intended Parliaments should be our constant diet) as will probably prevent future distempers.  
What fury hath robbed men of their understandings, that they cannot be persuaded to be happy! that their malice should increase with their calamities! that they should hate, and tear, and kill one another they know not why! For upon my soul a great part of their army would not impose upon others, nor admit themselves of the Brownists, or Anabaptists Creeds; neither would they think this Kingdom unhappy (so they might get some honest employment, as honourable opportunities would not be wanting in foreign nations, if we had once recovered our former reputation, with that wealth and quiet we lately enjoyed) though 8 or 10 men should lose their mischiefs, and not get those offices, which they valued, above the riches, and quiet and honour of their nation.  
What one thing hath His Majesty denied them, which he had not full right so to do? And, qui jure suo utitur, nemini injuriam facit; except they can allege 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, very considerable injuries offered to them, and a refusal to give satisfaction, the war is manifestly unjust on their side; we at the worst shall fall martyrs, and they at best will live murderers, all the blood which hath been shed will be brought in upon their account, all those rapines and sacrileges, the robbing God, and men will lie upon their heads.  
In matters of Law he hath not rejected any thing, and in matters of mere grace and favour, he hath been bountiful above all his royal Ancestors, and so extremely tender is he in giving all content to His two Houses, that he could not prevail with himself to deny, but he reserves his assent till such time, as they can show him some reasonable motive, whereby he may be invited to grant.  
As he hath been constant in his love and prosecution of peace, so he hath taken extraordinary pains in soliciting His Houses to cut off the unnecessary injuries of war, by laying down plunderings and other causeless violences committed upon Estates or persons on both sides, his Royal heart bleeding even for the unavoidable pressures the people have pulled upon themselves. His Soldiers will rule their actions by the counsel of John the Baptist, and be content with their wages, and cheerfully hazard their lives in defence of so honest a cause, by as honest means. If they are not able to pay their Army, what secret moth and canker hath consumed that vast treasure? Their want of money is a great argument of the unsearchable judgement of God, who can make them still poor, though they take a liberty to seize the wealth of the Kingdom. O that the people would but yet consider how unlikely it is the State can thrive hereafter under such Stewards!  
He that sadly calls to mind the height of happiness from which we are lately fall'n, all past grievances being fully remedied, and future pressures probably prevented, and considers how often His Majesty hath entreated, importuned us to accept again of that blessed condition, may well wonder, that our calamities should yet continue, that they should hourly grow upon us. I would willingly banish from my thoughts those melancholy observations of Historians, Quos Deus vult perdere, prius dementes facit, and Quorum fortunam Deus mutare constituit, consilia corrumpit. But they have so strongly possessed my fancy, that I am almost tempted to fear, such a general loss of men's reason, is but the fatal forerunner of an universal destruction.  
Our condition stands thus; though the King hath not yet, nor ever will hereafter deny any thing of right, (those desires which are regulated by laws shall be no sooner presented to Him, then granted) and though he hath indulged extremely much of favour (more than our Fathers had the boldness to crave) nevertheless we cannot prevail with ourselves to enjoy so great blessings, unless He will consent likewise to their other requests, some of which He may think He is obliged not to pass in justice, there being no light motives to induce Him to believe, He hath sworn against it, at His Coronation; and some, He cannot grant with honour, and without betraying that trust committed to Him by God and the Law for the benefit and protection of His people.  
He is desired of sign the Bill for abolition of Episcopacy (that which acquainted this Land with Christianity) and to diminish the Rights of the Church, and take away Ecclesiastical revenues, that He may be remembered in story, as the unfortunate instrument to pull down what the charity of many ages hath been building, and to destroy many pious Monuments and glorious testimonies of our forefather's christianity, and to ruin what the devotion of our godly Ancestors hath contributed for the encouragement of learning and advancement of Religion.  
To say nothing to the politic part, how the Ecclesiastical and Civil State are so interwoven, that the foundation of the whole may thereby be shaken, and how there are very good reasons to suspect a Presbyterial Government will prove extremely prejudicial to Monarchy; I shall speak only to the religion of this request. And first, I would willingly know, whether there be such a sin, as we have hitherto used to call Sacrilege (so severely punished upon the Heathens, the violation of things dedicated to false Deities, being notoriously revenged by the true God, and so extremely abhorred by all good Christians in former ages) and then, whether Magistrates have any dispensation to commit Sacrilege innocently, by which private men incur a lasting infamy, and eternal damnation.  
Secondly, I would willingly be satisfied in this Quaere, whether the King having sworn to preserve the Rights and Immunities of the Church entire, can innocently consent (supposing Him fully informed in the nature of that right which belongs to His Clergy, for the most religious Prince may be subject to mistake) to lessen or abrogate them, except released by the consent of that Body, to whom He is obliged? This point rightly stated (I shall only offer it to be seriously meditated on, without any peremptory determination) may confirm, the Lands of the Church for the future to the great improvement of our civil happiness. For (besides that we might reasonably promise to ourselves a blessing from the Almighty, if we show ourselves as careful, to settle those Rights which tend to the advancement of his worship by a firm establishment of a certain and honourable maintenance for his more immediate servants, as we are justly solicitous to secure our secular interests, by making provision, that no man's Rights shall be alienated without the owner's consents) a great temptation, and that which seems to have the strongest influence in all attempts of innovation, would thereby be cut off, the hopes of repairing their decayed fortunes with the spoils of the Church, We shall find in stories, that most of those storms which disturbed former calms, and by which this Kingdom sundry times hath been miserably shaken, were raised only with intention to sink the Church by such as promised to themselves considerable shares in the wreck.  
Some answer; He is equally sworn to the observation of Laws, but these He may alter, with advice of both Houses. Thus one, I do not conceive Him more bound to defend them by His Oath, than the rest of the Laws enacted, any of which when the Kingdom desires should be abrogated, I hope is done without perjury. That which is commonly called the Lawyers Answer to D● Ferne. p. 31. This doth by no means take of my scruple, because His Oath to defend the Laws enacted, is made populo Anglicano, to His people, and so (as all other promises by consent of the parties to whom a right was transferred) may be, and really is forgiven by them represented in Parliament to that purpose. But this other Oath is made to such a part of His people, Clero Anglicano, and particularly taken by Him after His Oath to the whole Realm, which were needless, except it meant some other obligation. This seems to prove it a distinct Oath, and not releasable without their consent. Upon the same grounds that these Rights are pleaded void, if Voted down, notwithstanding they to whom they belonged, express not their will to part with them, the strongest security England can give is weakened and discredited, that is the engagement of the Kingdom to repay such sums by consent of King and Lords and Commons, which and which only is public Faith. In such a case, can the City be Voted paid, except they willingly release the debt? if they should be told, their rights are not stronger than laws, but these are made null at the desire of the Kingdom in Parliament, they would soon apprehend their logic to be extremely faulty, and it is probable they would maintain, that the representative Kingdom in Parliament cannot dispense with the King's obligation to a particular body of His Subjects, in whom alone the power of releasement doth lie.  
He is desired to nominate such Officers to manage the great affairs of state, as they shall confide in; that is to yield up His undoubted right, happily enjoyed by all His Royal Progenitors, into their disposal, and to determine His choice by arbitrary fears. If they will confide in those, whom the laws do not distrust, the King hath satisfied even this request, for he will not prefer any against whom they can bring just and legal exceptions. But he thinks it no good argument to induce him to turn able honest Ministers (who may challenge from His accustomed goodness that privilege of quàm diu se bene gesserint) merely because others desire to have their places. They themselves would conceive it very hard usage to be put out again upon the same title, when no legal exceptions were produced against them, and therefore they press His Majesty to secure them (when once in) by law, and yet will not permit him to be ruled by their advice out of equity▪ and to continue His favours to those men, who by a faithful discharge of their places, have showed themselves worthy of that trust; if it will be reasonable then, it is so now, to encourage faithful servants by making their own offences only, and not other men's fears, the rule by which they shall suffer. Nemo illis sic timere permisit. They might as well tell the world in plain english (but that advantages are still made of the people's blindness) except the King will grant such preferments to us and our favourites (for let Him nominate whom He will, they will never confide, unless He guide His nomination by their instructions, who are to approve them, and the truth is, when they have gained one, He hath reason to request them to take the other, for they will save Him the trouble of naming in vain, and He may thereby conceal His hurtful affection, and not expose His best friends to dishonourable repulses) except we may be Patrons (they would once have been contented to be only the present incumbents, and suffer Him to retain the right to bestow them freely for the future time) we shall never endure peace, and yet we must be forced to cast the envy of so miserable a war upon him.  
All understanding and disinteressed persons must clearly discern, it is the same injustice, not to consent, the people should be happy, and to keep up these public calamities, ununtill they shall be satisfied in their illegal, unreasonable proposals. Though it be a more politic way, duris conditionibus pacem pati velle, to express a desire of peace, but not to admit it, but upon unequitable and unjust conditions, yet it is equally dishonest, as to deny it downright. They are altogether inexcusable, unless they will make such proposals, whereby it may appear, they covet not another's, but only to preserve their own rights. Which the King freely offers to them without diminution of the least title, and with unpresidented enlargements by many additional favours in this present Parliament.  
He is desired to make the Houses sharers with him in ordering the Militia, and to grant them a right to suppress all forces but such as shall be raised by their consent.  
This request is evidently destructive of that fundamental Law, which entrusts this power in the Crown alone to enable the King to protect His Subjects and the Laws. The benefits of which constitution our happy Ancestors enjoyed, and the greatest pressures the English nation at any time suffered under, did spring from this fountain, when Subjects undertook the managery of this regal right.  
Because their desire is discountenanced by Law (and being so though it were as really beneficial, as it is truly pernicious to the peace and quiet of a State, opening a gap to civil dissensions, necessarily arising from the opposite interests of consorts in power; though it might be reasonably wished, yet it cannot be innocently fought for) They endeavour to justify it by reason of State, and plead the necessity of it, as being the only cure of fears and jealousies.  
The recovery of this Kingdom were certainly desperate, if His Majesty too should grow fearful and jealous, who hath been more unanswerably tempted to give admittance to these unhappy passions. For if they might seize on his power by the Law of fears, if that it is taken from him, becomes a motive to persuade him to give them right to keep it, might not he with greater show of reason, require an enlargement of his former power, because it is manifest (though they pretended to be afraid of it) it was not able to secure him from their violence. Much more might be pleaded, why he should be enabled to keep, what the Law gives him, than they not to restore what they have illegally taken from him. But he contents himself with the ordinary means of safety appointed by Law, and will not make himself justly formidable, by giving entertainment to unjust fears, and challenging a privilege to do injuries, because it is not impossible, he may suffer them, and may lose his own rights, except he disable others by invading theirs. If this principle should once prevail, peace and justice were lost to mankind; for it would still be somebody's turn to be afraid, and that would give them a right to greater power, which right would cease as soon as they were possessed of it, and the true title to power would always be in those who wanted it. There is no other way to get out of this maze and confusion, to which their wild fears inavoydably betray a State, but by prevailing with our reason, not to suspect those whom the Laws have not suspected. For as jealousies against Law are causeless, so they are altogether remediless. The fuller answer to Doctor Ferne, endeavours to excuse them by virtue of a commission from this principle, abundans cautela non nocet, but woeful experience hath evidenced the contrary; he tells us further, State jealousy hath no right hand error, none on the excess side, the more the better. pag. 27. It is much worse than private jealousy, because this is but the misery of a family, that the unhappiness of a Kingdom.  
To sum up all, though some have gone so fare, to indulge to Subjects a liberty to take up arms in maintenance of old laws, yet no sober author can be produced, who makes it lawful to fight against their Sovereign for the establishment of new laws. It is not possible a strong desire of innovation should take off the guilt of so unnatural a war.  
The King requires nothing but (what the Subject cannot deny without injustice, without perjury, and consequently, the guilt of all that blood which is, or shall, or might be spilt,) his known legal rights, and he denies nothing which the Subject can by Law challenge, and hath indulged so much of grace, as all ages cannot parallel, and yet is still ready to consent farther, if any reasons shall be produced to invite greater favours.  
How will posterity hate this example, and blush at the unworthy story of our proceed, who have discouraged good Kings by these ungrateful requitals of such eminent deservings towards his people! If we had not with our peace, and plenty, and innocence, lost our reason too, we should quickly be persuaded to accept of so great happiness, and not perversely hazard an ignominious death, only to make our lives miserable. How are we become beasts in our understanding, as if only capable to suffer without any apprehension of the causes or remedies.  
The result of all is; life and death are set before the people, it is in their election to be again happy, but they chose these miserable things and are active in their own ruin. For it will come to that, if they stop not in their wild progress, The husbandman's store being consumed, the pastures unstocked, though we escape the sword or bullet, we shall be devoured by famine, or else perish by plagues, or fluxes, the fatal productions of unwholesome diet.  
It concerns us to pray unto Almighty God that he would be pleased to restore us to our wits, for if he would make us wise, we should soon make ourselves happy, by bringing the pernicious authors of these our miseries to a legal trial; we should then clearly see, that the preferment of a few men ought not so to sway with us, that we should sacrifice our Liberty and Property, and suffer the Laws to be violated, the Protestant Religion to be dishonoured, only in order to satisfy some particular men's ambition. That indignation of the people in Virgil (engaged in a miserable war, to gain that with blood and ruin, the want whereof was no diminution to their happiness) would too well fit the English nation, 
Scilicet ut Turno contingat Regia conjux,  
Nos animae viles, inhumata, infletáque turba  
Sternamur campis!  Must we die like dogs, that they may live like princes! How are the oppressed commons concerned in those men's illegal gainings, that they should be contented to lose their estates, and lives, and souls, in prosecution of none of their own interests? They fall unlamented, unregarded, while the contrivers of these mischiefs, sit safe, exposing others to the dangers, grow rich, while the impoverished Kingdom is re●dy to sink under the burden of its debts, and are even wanton in our oppressions.  
Since therefore the only ground of this unnatural war is, that His Majesty will not permit us to be less happy than our Ancestors, choosing rather to suffer so many injuries, and to expose His Royal Person to the dangers of open hostility, then to wrong His Subjects and purchase safety or plenty, by making such Laws, as private interests would force upon Him and the Kingdom,  
Since He denies nothing but the abolition of our good old customs which long experience hath confirmed to be extremely beneficial to this Nation.  
Since they reject peace, upon pretext, it comes not accompanied with truth, and mean by truth not the Protestant Religion as it is settled in this Kingdom and established by Act of Parliament, but some movable Creed, the Articles whereof it shall be their privilege to abrogate, and to make it speak new doctrines, according as they will suit best with their civil interests,  
Since they fight, not for certain and known Laws, not for a certain and known Religion, that is, not to restore, but to take away, and which is more intolerable, that they may add as yet they know not what,  
It is evident, the resistance now made is most offensive of the Subjects part, and doth unavoidable incur the Apostles sentence, damnation.  
FINIS.    

ERRATA.  
PAg. 2. lin. 16. del.: p. 5 l. 12 read life. p. 15: l. 26. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 17. l. 36. deal it. p. 36. l. 20. for his r. your. p. 42. l. 28. for not r. no. p. 77. l. 22. r. quod p. 86. l. 2. for the r. our. p. 95. l. 2. r. whom. p. 98. l. 11. for (against which r. against (which. p. 123. l. 34. for eo r. to. p. 134. l. 6. r. Grecian. p. 135. l. 21. for not altogether. r▪ not altogether consonantly to. p. 139. l. 15. for that r. the. ib. l. 34 for not be r. not to be. p 158. l 17. inquiry.