A REPLY TO Mr. Baxter's Pretended Confutation of a Book Entitled, Separation of Churches from Episcopal Government, etc. proved SCHISMATICAL. To which are added, Three Letters written to him in the Year 1673, concerning the Possibility of Discipline under a Diocesan Government, (which though relating to the Subject of most of his late Books, have never yet been Answered.)  
By HENRY DODWELL, M. A. and sometimes Fellow of Trinity College near Dublin in Ireland.  
I sent them not, nor commanded them; therefore they shall not profit this people at all, saith the Lord.  Jer. 23. 32. 
Reader, take heed of believing words of reproach against Adversaries, when Interest and Siding hath made men partial.  Mr. Baxters Answer to Dr. Stillingfleet, p. 81. 
London, Printed for Benj. took at the Ship in S. Paul's Churchyard. 1681.   

TO THE Right Reverend Father in God, Dr. WILLIAM LLOYD, L. Bishop of S. Asaph.  
My dearest and most honoured Lord,  
I Am not a Person who ever had any design on Patrons, and am therefore little used to this Ceremony of Dedications, being withal sensible how insignificant it is in many other regards. But I cannot satisfy myself if I should omit this occasion of a Public Acknowledgement of those many Favours I have received from your Lordship, ever since I had the happiness to be personally known unto you. I will not trouble you with an Enumeration of the Particulars, I know you had rather do them than hear of them. But I have several peculiar Reasons for this Address: The Possibility of Discipline in a Diocesan Jurisdiction is a Subject nearly concerning your Lordship upon your new Promotion, and I hope your Lordship will let Mr. Baxter see from your own experience, that it is as practicable in a Diocese, as in his Worcestershire Association. He allows no preeminence of one Minister above others, in order to the forming such Associations for great and generous designs, but what results from the difference of Talents. But certainly where, besides this preeminence in Talents, there is also a preeminence in Office too; where besides these gifts and qualifications of a Person to persuade his Brethren, there is also an antecedent obligation incumbent on them to hearken to his persuasions, it cannot choose but add considerably to the efficacy of such his persuasions, both to engage them at first, and to hold them together when they are once engaged. This assistance therefore I hope for from your Lordship, that you will help me to convince him from his own Topick of Experience, and that you will give him an experiment of his own Age and Country, that he may not still complain of being remitted to Ancient and Foreign Precedents.  
Besides, you have given me hopes of an assistance in the Dispute itself, by Publishing a Discourse concerning the Ancient Church-Government in these Islands. You will there let him see his great mistakes in our ancient Irish, and Scotish, and British History, concerning the Palladian and Anti-Palladian Bishops, as he is pleased to distinguish them; and not only his mistakes, but Seldens and Blondells, and the most accurate Antiquaries of the contrary Party. I am glad that I have given the occasion of it, by which I hope I shall do the World service, though I cannot by any thing of my own. I have no more to say, but to return my heartiest thanks for it, and remain,  
My dearest Lord, Your Lordship's most obsequious obliged Servant, HENRY DODWELL.   

The Contents of the whole Book.  

Contents of the Reply.  
Mr. Baxter's disingenuous dealing with my Person. A Defence of myself. § 1, 2. Why I am unwilling to recriminate. § 3. An account of the Publication of these Letters. § 4. His endeavours against me cannot in reason be called a Confutation, as the word Confutation signifies either an Answer to my Proofs, or a Disproof of my Answers. § 5. Nor as it may signify a Disproof of my principal Conclusion, by proof of Truth's inconsistent with it. § 6. Nor as it may signify a Disproof of what is said in defence of my Principal Conclusion, though without particular application. § 7. His invidious consequences, concerning the multitude concerned in my Principles, do not prove the Principles themselves false. § 8. Not proving them false, the unkindness of the application will be rather his than mine. § 9 A Defence of our English Succession from Aidan and Finan, etc. § 10. His Hypothesis concerning God's giving Ecclesiastical Power immediately, drawn out into several Propositions. § 11. This is the only likely way of justifying our Adversaries Ordinations. Their Similitudes will not do without it; not that of a Husband over the Wife; not that of the Power of a Corporation conveyed by Charter. § 12, 13, 14. Two things permised before a particular Answer to that Hypothesis; 1. That at least it must be granted, that the reasoning of my former Book will hold, on supposition that Ecclesiastical Power is given by God, not immediately, but by the interposition of the Ordeiners. § 15. 2. That this Hypothesis is not agreeable to the Notions of any Party that owns any such thing as Ecclesiastical Power; but only of Enthusiasts, who utterly deprive the Church of any such Power, or of being a Political Society. § 16, 17. The mischievous consequences of this Hypothesis. § 18. Authority does not necessarily result from true qualifications. It is not agreeable to the sentiments of Mankind to think so. Not in Supreme Power. § 19 Not in Subordinate. God suits his Establishments in Government to the sentiments of Mankind. § 20. It is not agreeable to the Principles of Ecclesiastical Government in particular. The Rights of God not alienable without a particular and express consent. § 21. The Right of Forgiving offences least alienable of all other Rights. § 22. Less alienable by a Governor (which is the person God assumes here) than by any other person. § 23. This Hypothesis not agreeable to Authority. The Scripture account of extraordinary offices being grounded on Gifts not favourable to our Adversaries. § 24. Much less pertinent to the Scripture account concerning ordinary offices. The Independency of gifted persons on the ordinary Governors expressly opposed in the Scripture. § 25. The Scripture constantly supposes Man instrumental in giving ordinary Ecclesiastical Authority. § 26, 27. It is no dishonour to the Holy Ghost to suppose him given by Men instrumentally. § 28. Want of Gifts does not invalidate Ecclesiastical Authority when once given. § 29. Gifts for Preaching not essential to the Ministry. § 30. Application to the forementioned Hypothesis. § 31. Arguments of Mr. Baxter 's Self-conviction. Conclusion. § 32.   

Contents of Letter 1  
What sorts of Disputes are, upon a virtuous account, to be blamed in Dissenters; and what way of managing them is commendable. § 1. A short Account and Defence of the Preface to my Letters of Advice. § 2. A short Defence of the Possibility of Discipline in a Diocesan Government. § 3. The Epistles of Ignatius not questioned by all the Presbyterians. § 4. My thoughts concerning the Reasons of Nonconformity mentioned in Mr. Baxter's Letter. § 5.   

Contents of Letter II.  
Introduction. § 1. Quest. 1. Whether the Bishop be bound to discharge his whole duty in his own person? Or, Whether he may not take in the assistances of others? That he may, granted by Mr. Baxter. Quest. 2. waved by me. § 2. Mr. Baxter's reasons do as solidly disprove a possibility of Secular Discipline under a Secular Monarch, of a Precinct as large as a Diocese, as of Diocesan Discipline. § 3. Secular Monarches as well responsible for the miscarriage of particular Subjects as Bishops, and their charge is as great. The Persons, Crimes, and Laws, belonging to the care of the Secular Governor more numerous than they which belong to the Ecclesiastical. § 4, 5. So are the necessities to be provided for by the Secular Governor. § 6, 7, 8. An Objection prevented. § 9 Mr. Baxter's first answer refuted. The Government of a Diocese may be administered without any more than three Orders. § 10. The Church may for prudential reasons constitute new Officers, though not Orders. § 11. Mr. Baxter's second answer refuted. Personal Capacity as requisite in a Prince as in a Bishop. § 12. An Objection prevented. § 13. Mr. Baxter's third, fourth, and fifth answers refuted. § 14, 15. His sixth answer rejected. § 16. What I mean when I make the decretory power of Government proper to the Supreme, and the Executive only to be communicated to inferior Governors. § 17. The decretory power of Government does not necessarily include personal or particular Exploration. § 18, 19 His seventh answer considered. Good men need Government as well as others. Their mistakes more dangerous to Government than the mistakes of others. § 20. Mr. Baxter's Objection in favour of me. His first answer refuted. § 21. His second answer refuted. Declaration is no act of power. § 22. The unbecomingness of Doctrines, so disparaging to Ecclesiastical Authority, to Mr. Baxter as a Curer of Church-divisions. § 23. The first Reformers at length sensible of the necessity of Church Authority to Peace and Discipline. § 24. Mr. Baxter's uncandid character of a Prelatic Christian. § 25. The use of external coercion in Religion is not to make men only dissemblers. § 26, 27, 28. No Discipline to be expected without a coercive power somewhere. § 29. The liberty desired by Mr. Baxter inconsistent with the Principles of the Ignatian Episcopacy, so much recommended by himself on other occasions. § 30. Inconsistent with the discipline of the Church described by Tertullian and Firmilian. § 31. Inconsistent with that of S. Cyprian. No reason why Mr. Baxter should desire to disown them from being parts of his Cure, who do not observe Rules of Discipline. § 32. My second Argument for the Possibility of Diocesan Discipline from the actual experience of former times. § 33. The notion of a Church for no more than are capable of personal inspection of a single Presbyter, not proved to be of Divine Institution from Acts 14. 23. § 34, 35. His second and third answer refuted. The distribution of particular Cures to particular Presbyters, (from whence it comes to pass, that one Diocese includes many such Societies as are fitted for personal Communion) is more convenient than their governing the same multitudes in common. Very probably as ancient as they had settled places of Meeting. How ancient in the Churches of Rome and Alexandria. § 36. How vigorous notwithstanding discipline was at that very time at Alexandria. § 37. His fourth answer refuted. § 38. His fifth answer refuted. § 39 His sixth answer refuted. § 40. His seventh answer refuted. The ancient Cities of the Roman Empire that had single Bishops more generally as great and populous as now. § 41, 42. The Ecclesiastical Government of those Cities proportioned to the Civil. § 43. Whether our Diocesan Office be a driving men to sin? § 44, 45, 46. His eighth answer refuted. Great Cities than had great numbers of Christians. Instanced in the Churches of Jerusalem, Samaria, Antioch, Antiochia Pisidiae, Thessalonica, Beroea, Ephesus. § 47. These were Churches in all likelihood designed by the Apostles themselves as precedents for others. The multitudes of Christians every where in the Roman Empire in the time of Tertullian. § 48. Instances of other Churches very numerous besides Rome and Alexandria, Neocaesarea, Carthage. The passage of S. Cyprian concerning his Contribution explained. § 49, 50. The ancient numerousness of Christians proved from Pliny § 51. The possibility of their meeting in the same Assemblies. § 52. Several ways how greater numbers might communicate from the same Altar, than could ordinarily meet in the same Assemblies. § 53. S. Patrick's Dioceses not equivalent to our modern Parishes. § 54. My Argument from the numerousness of the Church of Rome in the time of Cornelius. His answers refuted. § 55. His endeavours to give an account how the Clergy than might have been numerous, though their People had been few. § 56. His first five answered. § 57 His sixth. § 58. His seventh. § 59 His eighth. § 60. His ninth. § 61. His tenth. § 62. No Instance of Mr. Baxter's notion of a Church of a Society under the Cure of one single Priest, but only in those two Churches of Rome and Alexandria, so much disowned in this very matter by himself. § 63. Ulphilas' Bishop of the whole Nation of the Goths. Whether an Arrian? § 64. Frumentius Bishop of the Indians, and Moses of the Arabians. The Christians of both more numerous than our single Parishes. § 65. His first answer refuted. § 66. His second answer refuted. § 67. A Conclusory Exhortation. § 68   

Contents of Letter III.  
Reasons of delaying this Answer. § 1. Endeavours to prevent his displeasure. § 2. Advices then against some Intimations of his of publishing our Letters. § 3. My unwillingness to differ from him in any thing tolerable. § 4. The Charge of SCHISM briefly stated against them. § 5. A pathetical Application of all that had been said to Mr. Baxter. § 6.    

ERRATA.  
PAge 4. Line 9 after Baxter read has. p. 12. l. ult. deal Parenthesin. p. 14. l. 27. tell. p. 16. l 9 deal rather. p. 17. l. 7. actual. p. 42. marg. Separate. proved Schismat. p. 59 l. 28. deal the note of Interrogation. p. 60. l. 24. whither r. why then. l. 26. officers. marg. Proleg. p. 67. l. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 76. l. 4. were. p. 86. at the last Break I only note Sect. XXXII. p. 100 l. 27. difformity. p. 102. l. 9 deal are touched. p. 103. l. 11. profaneness & l. 18. l. 23. after Presbyters a Colon. p. 108. l. 6. knew. p. 130. l. 9 kind. Whole. p. 145. l. 18, 19 blot out of the Text Dr. Stilling fleet's, and put in the margin Dr. Stilling fleet's Irenic. p. 179. l. 17. either is actually. p. 187. l. ult. change the Parenthesis into a Comma. p. 199. l. 9 believe it. p. 201. l. 6. strangeness. p. 202. l. 16. determining. p. 211. l. 19, 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 212. l. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 214. l. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 215. l. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 224. l. 9 maintained? p. 228. l. 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 236. l. 9, 10. Cyzicenus. p. 249. l. 25. a City. p. 251. l. 14. contradistinction. p. 252. Anastarius, l. 18, 19 Tatieus. p. 253. l. 19 can. p. 254. l. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 256. l. 26. maintenance. p. 257. l. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 268. l. 19 you may. p. 274. l. 9 deal is. p. 275. l. 5. urbis, quaesissetis quib. l. 23. deal note Interrog. l. 26. oppressed. p. 276. l. 10. Presbyter; marg. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 284. l. 5. credible, l. 7. deal was. p. 285. l. 14. credible. p. 291. l. 19 deal one or. p. 293. l. 1. ad l. 21. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 296. l. 22. Bishop; p. 308. l. 3. indispensable. p. 310. l. 11. 46. p 313. l. 10. be. p. 321. l. 8. their, l. 20. Frumentius. p. 322. l. 10. Homoeusians. p. 323. l. 24. would. p. 324. l. 15. more, in Constantius' time especially. p. 326. l. 13. Mavia, l. 17. that, though. p. 327. l. 16. excuse a Separation for the want. p. 331. l. 15. in case of an exit. p. 332. l. 19 that, l. 27. cases you would. p. 334. l. 8. inquisitive.   

A Reply to Mr. Baxter's pretended Confutation of my Book OF SCHISM.  
Contents.  
Mr. Baxter's disingenuous dealing with my Person. A Defence of myself. § 1, 2. Why I am unwilling to recriminate. § 3. An account of the Publication of these Letters. § 4. His endeavours against me cannot in reason be called a Confutation, as the word Confutation signifies either an Answer to my Proofs, or a Disproof of my Answers. § 5. Nor as it may signify a Disproof of my principal Conclusion, by proof of Truth's inconsistent with it. § 6. Nor as it may signify a Disproof of what is said in defence of my Principal Conclusion, though without particular application. § 7. His invidious consequences, concerning the multitude concerned in my Principles, do not prove the Principles themselves false. § 8. Not proving them false, the unkindness of the application will be rather his than mine. § 9 A defence of our English Succession from Aidan and Finan, etc. § 10. His Hypothesis concerning God's giving Ecclesiastical Power immediately, drawn out into several Propositions. § 11. This is the only likely way of justifying our Adversaries Ordinations. Their Similitudes will not do without it; not that of a Husband over the Wife; not that of the Power of a Corporation conveyed by Charter. § 12, 13, 14. Two things premised before a particular Answer to that Hypothesis; 1. That at least it must be granted, that the reasoning of my former Book will hold, on supposition that Ecclesiastical Power is given by God, not immediately, but by the interposition of the Ordeiners. § 15. 2. That this Hypothesis is not agreeable to the Notions of any Party that owns any such thing as Ecclesiastical Power; but only of Enthusiasts, who utterly deprive the Church of any such Power, or of being a Political Society. § 16, 17. The mischievous consequences of this Hypothesis. § 18. Authority does not necessarily result from true Qualifications. It is not agreeable to the sentiments of Mankind to think so. Not in Supreme Power. § 19 Not in Subordinate. God suits his Establishments in Government to the sentiments of Mankind. § 20. It is not agreeable to the principles of Ecclesiastical Government in particular. The Rights of God not alienable without a particular and express consent. § 21. The Right of Forgiving offences least alienable of all other Rights. § 22. Less alienable by a Governor (which is the person God assumes here) than by any other person. § 23. This Hypothesis not agreeable to Authority. The Scripture account of extraordinary Offices being grounded on Gifts not favourable to our Adversaries. § 24. Much less pertinent to the Scripture account concerning ordinary Offices. The Independency of gifted persons on the ordinary Governors expressly opposed in the Scripture. § 25. The Scripture constantly supposes Man instrumental in giving ordinary Ecclesiastical Authority. § 26, 27. It is no dishonour to the Holy Ghost to suppose him given by Men instrumentally. § 28. Want of Gifts does not invalidate Ecclesiastical Authority when once given. § 29. Gifts for Preaching not essential to the Ministry. § 30. Application to the forementioned Hypothesis, § 31. Arguments of Mr. Baxter's s; elf Conviction. Conclusion. § 32.  
§ I MR. Baxter in a late Book of his bestowed one whole Chapter on the Confutation of my Schismatical Book (so he is also pleased to call it) of SCHISM. I wish with all my heart he had confined himself to my Book, 
* The true and only way of Conc. part 3. chap. 9  and forborn unbecoming, as well as undeserved, Insinuations concerning my Person. I mean particularly those Suggestions concerning Communion, which most oblige me on the account of conscience to take notice of them; and which notwithstanding can hardly be discussed, without what I am otherwise so averse to, some consequential Reflection on him. He has indeed put me in hopes of some amends for it. If he perform it, it will be well for his own sake. For my part I do not intend to depend 
* This I had written before I had seen the Admonion prefixed to his Church History, where he pretends to make me the amends he had promised, but still leaves it as a dispute what I really am, to be determined not from his Testimony, but from my Book. We had at his own nomination referred the form of his Purgation to the excellent Dean of Canterbury, to whom I had expressly given warning of such slippery forms, from some trial I had of him both in Discourse, and in a Letter; but he never consulted him. By this it appears how little reason I had to depend on him. However I am glad he has acquainted the Reader with the true reason of these disingenuous Suspicions concerning me, that he has referred him to my Books. He cannot mean my two Books designodly against the Romanists, but only the last of Schism. Upon which the Controversy will be reduced to this short issue; They who will have the defence of Ecclesiastical Authority to pass for Popery will judge me a Papist; but they who will take the estimate of Popery from what the Laws and Church of England has condemned under that name, will find no shadow for so base an Accusation. I am heartily content to abide this trial; but Mr. Baxter had deal more sincerely, if he (who is, on other occasions where there is no need, so offended at others for not explaining terms not understood by the parties in different senses) had been here as careful to warn his Reader, that this was all he meant by the name of Popery. He cannot but know, that the Commonalty, to whom he would make me odious by this insinuation, mean far different and worse things by it, than the bare defence of Ecclesiastical Authority free from any of the Romish Encroachments and Usurpations.  on it. I know how ordinary it is for the Nonconformists to asperse that same Religion, which has been settled here by those Laws and Legislators, who first excluded Popery, with that same odious Name, against which those Laws and Legislators were deservedly so zealous. We know how very lately they have again been endeavouring it, and even at a time when themselves pretended a cordial union among Protestants so very necessary. I know particularly how Mr. Baxter has been guilty of it in his Book of the Grotian Religion. I know how Moderation in the Disputes of Christendom is apt to be so miscalled by these, who so much pretend themselves to Moderation. What difference is there betwixt that which was decried as Grotianism in those excellent persons Bishop Bramhall and Doctor Pierce; and that which is so much applauded as equal and candid dealing in Monsieur le Blanc, Mr. Baxter himself, and as many of that Party as have affected the praise of being Men of Healing Principles? I know how the defence of Order, and Discipline, and Ecclesiastical Power, is apt to be so miscalled by them. And far be it from me that I should endeavour to purchase their good word or opinion, by deserting such Causes as these, let them call them by what odious names they please. For others who are more equal Judges, I think I have as much to say to clear myself from the imputation of Popery, as Mr. Baxter himself has, or can have. I mention not my Education from the beginning in the Communion of the Church of England, and never varying from it. I mention not my Renunciation of Popery when I was made Fellow of the College of Dublin, which he seems willing to asperse, because I had once the honour to be a Member of it. I mention not my Books against Popery, 
Considerate. of present concernment.  in one of which I have endeavoured to prove, that the Doctrines of the Church, as well as the Court, of Rome are treasonable; which let any equal person think what service it could do them, by one who must be supposed only to dissemble himself of another Communion. I mention not the Witnesses of my Life in those places where I have spent the greatest part of it.  
§ TWO MY present communicating with the Church of England, and none other, will with equal Judges, who will allow any possibility for Protestants to clear themselves from the imputation of Popery, when charged on them in times of ill design, 
Part 3. Ch. 9 Sect. 32.  be a sufficient Purgation, notwithstanding his Cavils to the contrary. If my mind should change, (as at present I foresee no probability that it ever will) I hope in God that greater Fears than those I have from him, shall never force me to dissemble. At present I intent, that this shall not fright me from any reasonable Candour to Papists, as well as other Adversaries. And this methinks a Peacemaker, and a person of that Catholic temper to which Mr. Baxter does so pretend, should not be angry at, 
Terms of Conc. part 2. chap. 5. sect. 39  who can himself (when he thinks fit) give a just Character of what he thinks commendable in them. But I am weary of such Personal Subjects, in which the Public is so little concerned; and I am not willing to make this slander look too like a matter of real dispute by too solicitous a defence. All I shall say further for my own vindication in this matter is, that I challenge the justice of them that know me, and that I claim the charity of those who do not, till they have better information, than the Surmises, rather than Arguments, of this otherwise good man in his passion. I dare stand by an Authority which he cannot well decline; it is his own against himself in this very Book wherein he has traduced me. 
Part 3. Ch. 2. Sect. 11.  Himself has observed how ordinary it is to charge even just moderation in Disputes wherein the Papists are concerned with Grotianism; no doubt out of a consciousness of his own guilt, for I believe he is himself the principal (if not the only) Author of the charge of Grotianism to the Sons of the Church of England. 
Part 1. Ch. 13. Sect. 2.  Himself has also observed how not only the common gang, but even learned men, yea and zealous religious men are to be suspected in their evil Characters, and Reports of those that they are speaking against as Adversaries. And he says, It grieveth him to think how little most Adversaries in this case are to be believed. So that without disparagement to his acknowledged zeal and religiousness, the impartial Reader has from himself a sufficient warning to suspect him in this matter.  
§ III FAR be it from me to recriminate, or to return him evil for evil. I have in truth a just Reverence for his Devotional Labours, and the benefit that many Souls have received by them. I have a Reverence for his public designs of charity, and particularly for that of endeavouring the Peace of Christendom, and am sorry that my agreeing with him in it, (which I hoped might have been an endearment) has in the event proved an occasion of offence. I have withal a Reverence for his years, and am unwilling that the defects of his Age and Controversial Writings, should impair any of that Credit his former and Devotional Writings have justly gained him. On these accounts I most willingly pass by his other personal Reflections on me, which my Conscience will permit me to take no notice of. I pass by even his disrespectful mention of our primitive Forefathers, of Bishops as Bishops, and Clergy as Clergy, and even of those to whom in his Episcopal Ordination he must have promised Canonical Obedience antecedently to the Covenant. I pass by the Imperfections of his way of reasoning used generally in his later Writings. I pass by whatsoever may concern his person, as far as my cause will give me leave. I cannot deny, but some of these may justly forfeit him that reverence which his other Performances have deserved. But besides my own unwillingness to take advantage even of just Forfeitures, I have other prudential reasons to forbear such a subject. They administer no occasion of promoting useful Knowledge; they are neither likely to be received by others, nor to benefit himself, as proceeding from an Adversary.  
§ IV CONCERNING the cause itself I find so little said, as that I had thought to cast myself upon the candour of our disinterested Readers. But remembering that a subject which was wanting here, was given me formerly in these Letters which passed between us some years since, upon the Publication of my Letters of Advice; remembering that the same things which had been objected then, are still objected anew in this, and his other late Books, without 
* Since my writing of this I find Mr. Baxter once referring to the second of these Letters in his Church History; but he has added nothing that I find against what had here been argued, excepting his account of the small numbers of the Church of Alexandria from Mr. Clarkson; which I should here have considered, if that as well as the rest of the design of his Church History, had not been already undertaken by an excellent and learned Friend, from whom I hope the World will shortly have an account of it.  the least notice of those Answers which had been so long since returned to them; considering withal, that that subject was new, and not, that I knew of, considered professedly in any modern Discourse; I thought it not unseasonable to take this occasion of publishing them, the rather because they may serve as an Answer to the greatest part of the Argument of his Book; and because what new matter is here urged, might conveniently enough be included in a Preface. But because I had desired him not to publish any thing without common consent; 
Let. 3. sect. 3.  and because I wanted the Copies of his Letters, which I (being to keep the Originals) did therefore not transcribe, but yet could not now come at, because they were in Ireland, and are mislaid since my departure; and because I was willing to take leave to correct what I thought amiss in my own Letters, yet so as to do him no wrong by doing so; I therefore craved his concurrence and assistance in the Publication. But he lest me to dispose of my own as I thought fit. I have accordingly taken the liberty to expunge some things personal, and, but very rarely, to add what might better clear my own sense; but was in both as cautious as I could be, not to misrepresent him to his disadvantage, and the rather because I wanted his own Originals. I have always endeavoured rather to answer his sense than his expressions, whenever I thought his expressions were not so much for the advantage of his cause. But if any suspect otherwise of an Adversary, I am content, and shall be glad that what I say may pass for a Reply rather to his cause than his person; that he be charged with nothing but what he owns again in this Book, or will own again when there is occasion. I know not what himself can desire more in order to my dealing fairly.  
§ V TO come therefore more closely to his pretended Confutation of my Book, I wonder what it is that any indifferent person can indeed mistake in it for a Confutation. 
Part 3. ch. 9 sect. 20.  I have given a Summary of my whole design in the beginning of it; (I wish he had transcribed it where he pretends to give an account of my Design and Doctrine.) It had certainly been no disparagement to him, to have allowed me for a fitter Interpreter of my own mind than himself) I have digested it into the several Propositions whereof it consists, 
See the Summary at the end of this Reply.  in the natural order wherein they follow each other, with reference to the several Chapters wherein they are proved, by which the Reader may readily inform himself, 
Ibid. sect. 29.  whether I only beg, and do not prove, so many things as this reverend person pretends begged and not proved by me. And every Chapter has, in the Contents, a general Analysis of the proofs contained in it. I did prevent all the Answers I know of, not only in his Disputations of Church Government, and in Voetius, but in all others that either I had read or could foresee, though I did not think it needful to make an endless Application to every particular Author that had written on the subject. Whoever will not believe me let him try, after he has once throughly acquainted himself with my principles. And what has he done against all this that may deserve the name of a Confutation? Has he answered the proofs, I do not say of my whole Work, but of any single proposition, I think I might say, of any one single Argument in it? For my part I cannot find one single Instance, and let the Reader judge between us. But it may be by Confuting he does not mean Answering, but Disproving. Has he therefore disproved any Answers on my part, that might either be given consequently to my principles, or which were expressly given by me? Whoever had designed the Improvement of Knowledge, would have endeavoured the prevention of such Answers, as might have been made by my principles; but I have not had the favour to have those taken notice of, which were particularly and expressly given. 
Part 3. ch. 9 sect. 12.  The Opinion of those who make Episcopacy and Presbytery not different in order but degree, and the Case of a desolate Island, 
Ib. sect. 11.  are still urged and urged as Arguments, as confidently as if nothing yet had been said concerning them. Yet I had considered the former in a whole Chapter. 
Ch. 23.  Concerning the later I denied what he said, 
Ch. 28. sect. 29, etc.  and gave my Reasons of denial: yet has he not been pleased to take any the least notice either of the denial or the disproof. He tells me that I call men oft to Catholic Unity, and never tells them what it is, or how it may be known; yet even this I made the subject of a principal part of a Chapter. 
Ch. 27.  By which the Reader will judge, 
Part 3. ch. 9 sect. 19, 20.  who it is that provokes to write the same things over again. And now when neither Proofs▪ are answered, nor Answers disproved, how can that properly be called a Confutation?  
§ VI I KNOW not for my own part what he can mean further by this word but a disproof of my conclusion, though without any particular application to my Principles. And if this must pass for a Confutation, why may not my Book, though written the former of the two, be called a Confutation of his, as well as his a Confutation of mine? For if my conclusion must therefore be supposed false, because inconsistent with what he has proved true; why must not his be for the same reason supposed false, because inconsistent with what I have proved true also? But yet even in this way of of Confutation, of disproving falsehoods by proving truths inconsistent with them, it ought to be considered, whether all the Answers that may be given in defence of my principal Conclusion be proved false, as well as the Conclusion defended by them, though their Phaenomena were not particularly accounted for? Or at least whether his disproofs be of themselves more certain or more evident to us, than those Arguments by which I had positively proved it? If neither of these can be pretended in his case, with what Justice can he call his Performance a Confutation? And not now to enter into the particular merit of his cause, let us see whether his disproof will endure a trial by even these presumptions. He says, that Church Power is given immediately by God, and therefore may be had rather where it is not received by the Ministry of Men, nor can be diminished by any intention of theirs from whom it is received. This he proves from two Similitudes, that of the Power of a Corporation given by the Charter, (which was expressly considered by me, 
Ch. 20. sect. 21.  if it had been his custom to take notice of any Answers) and that of a Husband over the Wife. Suppose I shall at present be so kind, (and he must indeed acknowledge it for a kindness) as to let his Similitudes pass for Arguments; yet who can be so extremely partial, as to think them comparable with those used by me, deduced à priori, from the nature and first original of Ecclesiastical Power? Wise men value any Arguments whatsoever before Similitudes. How much more such as these, which are acknowledged to be, in their own nature, the strongest of all Arguments?  
§ VII HAS he therefore proved what is said in defence of my principal Conclusion false, as well as the Conclusion itself? Has he proved that our title to the benefits of the Gospel does not depend on the actual promise of God? or that our title to his actual promises is not to be derived from our Interest in his Covenant? or that our legal Interest in the Covenant is not obtained by the Seals? or that the validity of the Seals does not require Authority in him who presumes to use them? or that the same Reasons which made this Authority necessary for this validity of the Seals, will not hold now (as well as they did in the days of the Apostles) and for ever? Does he deny any of these things? can he in the least pretend to have disproved them? Do any of his Arguments reach them either directly, or by any clear and necessary consequence? Can he defend his brethren's Ordinations or Sacraments administered by them who never received Episcopal Orders? If he have done none of all these, nor so much as attempted them, what will become of his pretended Confutation?  
§ VIII TILL he do, or attempt these things, I cannot conceive how he can pretend to prove my Doctrine false. All that he endeavours is to make it popularly odious. That is the tendency of all those odious consequences which he deduces from it, concerning my unchurching and unchristening such multitudes of Christians and Churches. The consequences are of his own deducing. I undertake not to judge where I am not throughly informed in the matter of fact. But what if these consequences should really follow? will he thence conclude my reasonings false, because multitudes are concerned in the consequences of them? This also was an Objection prevented and accounted for in my Preface, 
Pref. sect. 11, etc.  if he had thought himself obliged to speak to Answers in his Confutations. But does he not know that this very same Objection was made use of by the Heathens against Christianity, and by the Romanists against the Reformation, that if either Christianity or Protestancy were the only true way to Salvation exclusively to others; then much the greater number of Mankind or Christians must have been out of the true way of Salvation? And can he deny that the matter of fact was true, that there was indeed a time when Heathens were more numerous than Christians, and Romanists than Protestants? Will he therefore grant that Christianity and Protestancy were not the only ordinary true means of Salvation? I know he will be far from saying so. But yet he is not sensible how much himself is more concerned in the Consequence of this Discourse than I am. He that in his Diocesan Ordination must have promised Canonical Obedience to his Ordinary, cannot renounce our Diocesan Communion as Diocesan, without some charge of sin, greater than the sin of breaking his Promise of Canonical Obedience. And if this sin agree to Diocesan Communion as Diocesan, then certainly it must be not only a single act of sin, but a state of sin; and such a state of sin as all will acknowledge destructive of Salvation, so agreeing to Diocesan Communion as Diocesan, it must agree to all Diocesan Communion whatsoever. And if all Diocesan Communion as Diocesan be destructive of Salvation, how much more uncharitable will he prove than I, if to maintain principles from whence consequences will follow, which will prove hurtful to faulty persons, must be thought uncharitable? How few are those Protestants that want Episcopal Ordination (who can alone seem chargeable with the consequences of my Discourse) in comparison of the whole Greek and Latin Churches, and those other Foreign Protestants also, as well as those of our own Dominions, which will be concerned in the consequences of his? I might here declaim as tragically as he does, and retort a great part of his own Discourse upon himself, if I were desirous to take advantage of this Topick against him, not so much to prove his Doctrine false, as to expose it as odious. If he will say, that he has notwithstanding charitable thoughts concerning the persons of many, who differ from him in principles of their own nature destructive of Salvation: Abate his affection to his party, which makes him (as his matter requires) speak inconsistently; and I think I shall allow as much candour and charity to the persons of Dissenters, as he can rationally, and with any consistency with any, even his own, principles.  
§ IX IF therefore it be granted, that these consequences are no just argument to prove the principles false from which they follow; it will then follow further, that in order to the confutation of my principles, he ought not to content himself with deducing these consequences, without more distinct application to the principles themselves; it will follow, that even the odium of such consequences is irrational and sinful, and therefore not at all regardable in conscience, whatever it may in prudence. No truly conscientious persons can be offended at just consequences from principles whose truth is not proved questionable, especially where positive reasons have been produced for them. And therefore whoever are so, must for that very reason, at least in this particular, be presumed not to act conscientiously, or consequently to be regardable on account of conscience; It will follow, that till he do answer more distinctly to my principles, the very unkindness of the application will be rather his than mine. For till he weaken the proof of my principles, I shall have reason in all equity to presume them true. And if he draw Inferences unfavourable to them from unconvicted principles, it will be he, not I, that must be responsible, at least for the application. If therefore he will not make them less concerned than it is their Interest to be in case of real danger, let him first secure them from the danger by a conviction of my principles; which when he does, he will have me as well as them indebted to him for the Obligation. Till he do so, certainly plain dealing and a fair warning is the most real office of Friendship, that can be shown in case of danger. I wish I may, by this intimation, prevail with whosoever shall hereafter trouble themselves to answer me, not to satisfy themselves with invidious clamours, and evasions of a direct Answer to my principles. A direct Answer would better become them, as Lovers and Enquirers of truth, rather than Votaries to a Party; would more tend to the satisfaction of conscientious Dissenters; would afford a better subject for useful information.  
§ X As for particulars, there are only two that I can know of, in which indifferent Friends do think me concerned. One is, that he says, and says it more than once, that the Generality of our Saxon Bishops derive their Succession from Aidan and Finan, who (says he) were no Bishops, as Bede and others fully testify. So that he says, 
Premonition. Terms of Conc. p. 11. chap. 5. sect 23. & Church History.  The denying the validity of the Ordination by Presbyters, shaketh the Succession of the Episcopal Church of England, and proveth it on that supposition interrupted. I know not how it becomes him, who himself pretends Episcopal Ordination, to discover his Forefathers nakedness, 
Part 3. ch. 9 sect. 4, 13  if it had been true that is here suggested. But not to expostulate with him concerning the unkindness herein showed to his Ordainers, what benefit can he do his own cause by this Objection? Would it follow, that his Brethren have Succession because we had failed of it? Would it follow, that Succession is not necessary, because none could justify their Claims by it? Would it follow, that the Right of Ordination must in course be escheated to the Presbyteries, or the People, or the Magistracy, in case no Right could now be made out by Derivation from the Apostles? If Succession be still necessary for the validity of Orders, as it may be notwithstanding this Argument, till he answer the Arguments produced to prove it necessary; all that he can expect by using such Arguments as these will be, not to satisfy us, but to prove us as faulty as themselves; not to quiet the consciences of those who should be afraid of Sacrilegious Ordinances, but only to make them despair of ever being quieted. And therefore this is an Answer, if at all fit to be insisted on, yet not till he had attempted a more particular Answer.  
But, God be praised, we have no need to be concerned for this Objection: Bede is so far from denying Aidan and Finan to have been Bishops, as that he expressly affirms the contrary. 
Bede Hist. Angl. III. 3, 5.  Oswald King of Northumberland sent to the Elders of the Scots for a Bishop; Antistes is the word in Bede's Latin, and Biscop in the Saxon of Alfred. Accordingly he receives Pontificem Aidanum as the Latin, or Biscop as it is again in the Saxon. When this Bishop was come, he has an Episcopal Se● provided for him; so Bede most expressly, Veniente igitur ad se EPISCOPO, Rex l●cum Sedis EPISCOPALIS in Insula Lindisfarnensi, ubi ipse petebat, tribuit. Again, Monachus ipse EPISCOPUS Aidanus. He elsewhere tells us the very time when he was made Bishop, 
Ib. c. 5.  accepto gradu EPISCOPATUS quo tempore eidem Monasterio Segenius Abbas & Presbyter praefecit. Where the Saxon also gives him the Title of Bishop, though it omits the particularising of the time when he received it. He therefore also gives an account of the reason why his Monastery pitched on him particularly as a person fit for that Employment. He tells us, that thereupon they judged him dignum Episcopatu, that accordingly illum Ordinantes ad praedicandum miserunt. 
●. 6.  Again, he is called Reverendissimus Antistes, (Biscop in the Saxon) and praefatus Episcopus. The same Title is very frequently given him, cap. 14, 15, 16, 17. & l. 4. 23, 27. l. 5. 23. so frequently, as that I do not know whether it be worth while to transcribe each particular Instance, and the Time of his Bishopric distinctly noted. So also in his Epitome at the Year DCLI, Aidanus Episcopus defunctus est. So extremely little occasion he had of even mistaking in this matter from Bede himself. Nor could he have much greater from those others to whom he refers us, who must have taken what they had from Bede, if they had any Authority. The Saxon Chronicon transcribes the very words of Bede's Epitome, and at the same Year. The like Agreement there is in those who took from him at a greater distance, 
a Simeon. Dunelm. in Collect. Seldeni.  Turgotus, 
b Simeon. Dunelm. in Collect. Seldeni.  Simeon Dunelmensis, 
c Malmesb. de gest. Angl. l. 3. de gest. Pontif. Angl. l. 3.  Malmesburiensis, 
d Huntingd. Hist. l. 3.  Huntingdon, etc. if any be yet further curious.  
Nor is Bede and his Transcribers less clear in the case of Finan. 
Bede Eccl. Hist. II●. 17  Bede is most express. Immediately after the death of Aidan, he subjoins, Successit verò ei in Episcopatum Finan, & ipse illo ab Hii Scotorum insulâ ac Monasterio destinatus, ac tempore non pauco in EPISCOPATU permansit. Concerning the Baptism of Peada Son of Pendan, 
L. 3. c. 21.  King of the Middle Angles and the Mercians, 
Ibid.  Baptizatus est ergo à Finano Episcopo. Duma also (mentioned by Mr. Baxter) was sent as Bishop of that new Colony of Christians, ordinatus à Finano EPISCOPO. 
L. 3. c. 22.  Sigbercht King of the East Saxons was baptised by the same Finan, Baptizatus est à Finano EPISCOPO. And when Cedd a holy person was invited by Sigbercht for the Conversion of his People, he took occasion to make a visit at Lindisfarn, the Seat of the Northumbrian Bishops, propter colloquium Finani EPISCOPI, where he was made Bishop by Finan, vocatis ad se in Ministerium Ordinationis aliis duobus EPISCOPIS. Qui, accepto gradu Episcopatûs, rediit ad provinciam, & majore autoritate coeptum opus explens, fecit per loca Ecclesias, Presbyteros & Diaconos ordinavit, etc. We see here how punctual Observers of the Canons these Scotish Bishops were, notwithstanding our Adversaries would fain persuade us, that themselves were ordained by Presbyters, because the Monks of the Isle of Hii (though Bishops) were subject to their Abbot, though only a Presbyter as to the Rules of their Monastic Discipline, for the sake of their first Founder Columba, who never exceeded the Order of Presbyter.  
But Mr. Baxter would do well to let us know what use they could have had of Bishops at all, 
See Bishop bramhall's Vind. of the Church of Engl. c. 9 Bishop Pearson Vind. Ign. l. 1. c. 10.  if it were not to perform some office, for which no Superiority of their Presbyter Abbot in the Monastery could qualify them without Bishops. And what either then, or ever was taken for so unseparable a Right of Episcopacy as Ordination? If therefore they were willing their Presbyter Abbot should, for the sake of Columba, have all the Honour of which a Presbyter was capable, and yet thought it necessary to have Bishops also for their Ordinations; is not this a plain Conviction, that they thought this Office of Ordination not performable by single Presbyters? And how had it been an unusual Order, as Bede expressly says it was, that Presbyters (if such only had been meant by the name of Bishops) should have been subject to the Abbot, who was also a Presbyter? But to fancy that the Offices of Bishops and Presbyters were confounded in those later Ages of which we are discoursing, (whatever they were in the Apostles) is indeed a fancy so extravagant, as Mr. Baxter could hardly have been guilty of, if he had been either so ingenuous or skilful in Church History as he would fain persuade us. But so far were those ancient Scots from invading this Right of Episcopacy, that as to Ordination they strictly observed even our present Canons. Three Bishops were at the Consecration of a Bishop, who when he was thus consecrated, and not before, had that greater Authority of ordaining Presbyters and Deacons, which it hence appears was not allowed to any under Bishops. But to return from whence I have digressed, Finan and Aidan are both of them expressly said again to have been Bishops, and not only so, but the Cathedral Church of Finan is mentioned again by Bede: 
L. 3. c. 25.  Interim Aidano EPISCOPO de hac vita sublato, Finan pro illo gradum EPISCOPATUS, à Scotis ordinatus ac missus acceperat, qui in insula Landisfarnensi fecit Ecclesiam EPISCOPALI Sedi congruam. 
c. 26.  Again, concerning the Dispute between Wilfred and Coleman, Facta est autem haec quaestio Anno Dominicae Incarnationis DCLXIV, qui fuit annus Oswi Regis XII, EPISCOPATUS autem Scotorum, quem gesserunt in provincia Anglorum, annus XXX, siquidem Aidanus XVII annis, Finan X, Coleman III, EPISCOPATUM tenuere. Yet after all it is very well known, that our English Succession, even in the Kingdom of Northumberland, was not derived down to us from Coleman, the last of those Scotish Bishops, but from Wilfrede a Saxon who succeeded him. I wish he would not write such things of such consequence, and so often, with such confidence, without once consulting his Authors. As for his other Authors, he would oblige us to tell us who they are, that could know any thing concerning those times, but what they must have from Bede as well as we.  
§ XI The other particular is that which does indeed look most like reasoning and principles, of any thing that is said by him in his whole Book. And I shall endeavour to show him all the fair dealing I can, in representing what he says to the best advantage. The Sum therefore of what he says seems most conveniently reducible to these Propositions.  
1. That the power of the Ministry is grounded on the gifts and qualifications of the person immediately; so that whoever has those gifts and qualifications, has thereby an essential right to the power; and he that bestows those gifts, does thereby bestow the power; and they who cannot bestow them, cannot consequently dispose of the power.  
2. That God alone has the disposal of these gifts, and disposes of these gifts immediately, has never impowered men to confer these gifts, but only to examine and declare them; which Declaration does not make but find them qualified, and consequently impowered, before any humane interposition.  
3. That even in the Apostles times these gifts and qualifications were not ordinarily given in Ordination, but supposed to be antecedent to it; as appears from that gift of Prophecy and discerning of Spirits, by which they were enabled to judge who were fit to be ordained; which must have related to gifts and qualifications not given by the Apostles, but by God immediately. And that if any gifts and qualifications were supper added in the very act of Ordination; yet they were extraordinary, and therefore not to be expected by Successors, especially not at this distance of the Age we live in.  
4. That these gifts being given by God immediately, and this power being thus necessarily consequent to these gifts; even the designation of the particular person is from God, as well as the investing him with the power. So that all that the interposition of men can do in this matter, cannot be to give any power to the person to be ordained that he had not before; but only to judge of it in order to acceptance, as to its exercise. The judgement of the person himself will be necessary in order to his own acceptance. The judgement of the Signior Pastors (not in order to the investing them by Ordination by delivery with the power, 
Part 3. c. 9 sect. 7. p. 75  as Mr. Baxter speaks inconsistently with his own Principles, who acknowledges no power given by the act of Ordination, for I am willing to consider his Cause free from the inconveniences of his management; but) either as they are the ordinary Representatives of the people in accepting, and such as are first to propose whatsoever is to be proposed to the people, even in affairs wherein their suffrages are not ultimately concluded by their Representatives, or as at least the Solemnities of Acceptance are to be transacted by them. The judgement of the people also, as they are the Objects of his Ministry, and as they are supposed on that account to have the original right of Acceptance.  
5. That the way to know what persons are by God invested with power, and with what power they are invested, is by the Scriptures. There he is supposed to have described the gifts and qualifications, which when Pastors and People find in any man, they must be supposed to be obliged to accept him. And there he is supposed to have described that power, which himself gives by giving him such gifts and qualifications.  
6. That this power being thus given by God immediately, without any humane interposition in the giving it, but only in the accepting it; consequently the extent of this power must be known by enquiring, not into the mind of the Accepters, but of the giver of it; and the mind of God the giver is to be known only in the Scriptures.  
7. That the extent of this power being thus to be gathered from the Scriptures, as private persons are not obliged to think their Governors' Expositions truest, but may with reason and conscience differ from them, (there being nothing requisite for the understanding of the Scriptures, that is capable of being known by the Clergy, which learned Laics are not as capable of knowing also;) so private persons may believe themselves invested with a power from the Scriptures, which their Superiors neither gave them, nor believe to be the sense of such Scriptures, either that themselves ought to give it as authorized by God to do so, or that God will himself give it immediately.  
8. That persons authorized have not only power to believe what they take to be the sense of the Scriptures, though different from the sense of ordinary Ecclesiastical Governors; but also to practise their different sense, at least so far as their Authority extends. And therefore if a Bishop or his whole Presbytery, whether in irregular or regular Assemblies, do deny a Presbyter any part of his Office, which indeed they never gave him, neither by any invalid, nor on these principles by any valid, act of theirs; he may notwithstanding use and exercise it as given him by God immediately.  
9 That every person for himself, as he is as capable of understanding those Scriptures, which describe the extent of the power as any others, though Superiors; but yet is more conscious to himself of his own integrity, in using means to the best of his abilities, and following his own convictions, than any others; so for the gifts and qualifications, which by this Hypothesis confer an immediate title to the Office, he can much better judge than any others, because they are things more within his own cognizance than they can be of any others. So that in order to his own practice, he must on these principles be obliged in reason, and conscience, and prudence, more to rely on his own judgement, than on that of any others.  
10. That this power being immediately from God, he is to presume that what God did once give, that he intends still to give till he declares his pleasure to the contrary. This Observation will both make Scripture-precedent (which is the utmost they can pretend concerning the power of Church Officers, described in Scripture as in a Charter) an Argument now, and will excuse them from the extreme difficult task to which their ordinary management does oblige them, of proving it obligatory on other principles. For grant it never so mutable in its own nature, yet even mutable Determinations oblige till the Legislators pleasure be known for an actual change. But supposing this power to have been immediately from God, without any so much as interposition of men; supposing therefore (as has been showed on these principles) that it must appear to us by an express word of God, such as may seem express to us without humane Authority even in the exposition of it; supposing that no such express word of God is ever to be expected for the future: it will follow, that what is left determined any way in the Scripture, must for ever be as secure from an actual change, as if it had been of its own nature immutable. But if the power itself be given by men; then if they will prove it immutable by the men who give it, they must endeavour to prove it either from the nature of the thing, or the continuance of the same reason and circumstances of its first institution, or some express command of God in Scripture, that they should not actually change it; which yet would not prove an invalidity, but only an irregularity in their doings, supposing the power not to come from God immediately, but by their mediation; which would be much more difficult for them to prove than than they are aware of. Whence it will further follow,  
11. That all that others can do, whether Bishops, or Presbyters, or People, cannot be either to give any power, or to inform any person that he has power, which he had (though he knew it not) antecedently to their Declaration; or to hinder him of the exercise of that power which he has, and may know that he has independently on their Declaration: and therefore can be only to judge for themselves in order to their own acceptance. So that if they refuse him, that cannot in conscience hinder him from either finding, or proselyting others that will accept him. And in the mean time he may exercise that power where he can, and exercise it to the full extent of it, as far as himself conceives it to extend, because he must on these principles be supposed to have it, and to know he has it, whether they accept of it or not.  
§ XII I KNOW some things are suggested in this way of Management, which are not actually observed by Mr. Baxter, nor Mr. Humphrey, nor any other that I know of, that has undertaken this Hypothesis; and I believe some things, which when they see how consequentially they destroy all Ecclesiastical Order and Government, themselves will then perhaps be willing to disown. But I am confident nothing has been added, but what has been for the advantage of the Argument, and what is consequential and agreeable to the main Hypothesis; and for that they must, whether they will or no, be responsible till they are pleased to disown the Hypothesis to which it is consequent. Certainly it is much more defensible than the bare Similes of the Husband's power over the Wife, or of the power conveyed by an Original Charter to all succeeding Posterity. 'Tis true indeed, that no compacts of the Wife with the Husband can diminish that Right which was never given him by any Compact of hers, for that very reason, because God never left her at her liberty, whether she should be subject or no, but only to choose the person, to whom she was in particular to pay Subjection. But certainly my Reasoning will hold, if Ecclesiastical Power be properly given by the Mediation of those Ecclesiastical Persons, who minister in the Act of Ordination. And that it is not properly given by them is only begged by that Similitude, but proved only by the Hypothesis now mentioned. But as for Charters, the Instance is very unhappy to their purpose. They cannot, I believe, give an Instance in any Humane Charters, where bare qualifications, though acknowledged, and acknowledged by them who have power to invest them in office, are thought sufficient to invest them without some further act of them who have power to invest them. They cannot give an Instance where the Acts of such acknowledgedly qualified, but not invested, persons are thought valid in Law, or the Acts of persons lawfully invested, though confessedly less qualified, are not thought valid, a plain sign that their Investiture does properly confer such power. They cannot give an Instance of any power settled by Charter, where upon a faileur of all who are by the Charter impowered to dispose of Offices, that power must devolve to those who are not by the Charter impowered (on foresight of such a case) to dispose of them, and where such a Charter is not thought in Law to fail by becoming unpracticable, till the supreme unaccountable Power be pleased again to interpose concerning it, which is the very case impugned by me in the Nonconformists. They cannot give an Instance of any Humane Charter, that ever allows any person impowered, to extend his own power by a private exposition of the Charter, against the sense of all the visible supreme Powers of the Society; and not only to challenge it (on such an account) but to practise it also; or that does ratify such practice when attempted; or that does not look on it as invalid as well as irregular. Yet this is also their Case, who arrogate this power of ordaining others, against the sense and permission of all their supreme visible Governors.  
§ XIII BESIDES, many things are taken for granted very confidently in this Hypothesis, which they will find extremely difficult to prove when they are put to it. Where can they find such a Charter for the power of Presbyters in the Scriptures as they speak of? Where can they find their power described in any professed Constitution concerning it? They may indeed some actual practices of Presbyters there; but will they call that a Charter? Will they make all actual practices obligatory for ever, and unalterable by the prudence of succeeding Ages? Are not many actual practices grounded on circumstances? Are not many of those circumstances obnoxious to great mutability? Are not ordinary Governors the competent Judges of their actual change? If any practices be grounded on unalterable reasons, it will be by those reasons that they must become unalterable, not from their being barely actual practices, not from their being barely historically mentioned in the Scriptures. And what is that reason that makes such a just proportion of power immutably due to the Office of Presbyters? Yet when all is done, it is not reason but writing that makes a Charter. Where do they find men plead Charters in humane affairs upon so weak pretences to them? And where is it that reason is admitted to prove the right of an actual practice of power? Reason does indeed prove it fit that men should have that power given them which is reasonable. Does it therefore follow, that they actually have that power which it is reasonable they should have? If they actually have it not given them, by those who had power to give it them, that is sufficient to prove their practice of it an Usurpation, and utterly invalid as to all intents and purposes of Law. But for matter of fact I do not see but that this supposition concerning the inseparable connexion of the power of Ordination with the office of a Presbyter, will rather ruin than advance their Cause, as I have accordingly retorted it in my former Book. Since it is certain, that this power of ordaining others was not given to the first dividing Presbyters, it will follow plainly that they were not made Presbyters at all, if the power of Ordination be essential to the office of a Presbyter. And then their succession will fail as well on account of their want of true Presbyters, as of their Presbyters wanting the power of Ordination.  
§ XIV BUT neither did I only overthrow their succession on account of their first Ministers not receiving this power of Ordaining others, from the Bishops who ordained them, but from the invalidity of that act by which they derived their Orders to their Successors, supposing they had indeed received a power of Ordination. Supposing they had it, yet they could not exercise it but in lawful Assemblies, which none but the Bishops as Precedents of the Presbyteries had power to indict; nor yet even there, supposing all Presbyters equal, could they carry it but by plurality of suffrages. And therefore the generality of their later Ordinations being performed by single over-voted persons, without the consent of the greater part of those Presbyteries of which they were originally Members, and out of lawful Assemblies, must on these accounts be not only irregular but invalid too. Here therefore no Presbyters were at all made, and therefore it is in vain to talk of Charters to prove the power of legal Presbyters, when these are not the persons of whom those Charters speak, and whose power they are conceived to describe. And the same is applicable also to the Commonalty. Neither can they exert any power of which they might otherwise have been capable, but by majority of Votes, and in regular Assemblies. If they do, it is Null by the fundamental principles even of Democratical Government. This therefore will destroy the validity of their second Ordinations, though their first had been valid; will null all their Ordinations in the state of Separation, though the Orders received by them in the Church's Communion had been as valid, and valid to as great purposes, as they can pretend to prove by any Charters. These are Arguments not (that I know of) insisted on by Jansenius, not answered by Voet or Mr. Baxter, not (I believe) thought of or considered either by them, or by any others of our Adversaries, that have most accurarely managed their cause; and will hold if they were as successful as themselves desire in answering the others. The Hypothesis therefore thus managed is that which alone it is their Interest to stand by. And if this prove nothing, or nothing to their purpose, we shall have no reason to be very solicitous for any thing else that is pretended by them.  
§ XV I HAVE said several things in answer to this same Argument as urged by Mr. Humphrey, a person of much more candour and judgement, 
Separate. proved Scismat. ch. 20. 15, etc.  and elaborate thoughtfulness than Mr. Baxter. I am unwilling to repeat any thing there said more than I needs must, though he has served it as he uses to do Answers, passed them all by without any notice taken of them. Yet he is the person who has the confidence to complain of being forced to repetitions. What I shall now say, shall rather be with a prospect on the Argument itself, and with reference to some worthy Brethren of our own Communion, than on account of any new Obligation I can think myself under from any thing new observed by Mr. Baxter. First therefore, I shall only desire at present, that what has been said Chap. XXII. of my former Book, be only understood on supposition, that Ecclesiastical Power is not conferred immediately by God, but mediately by the interposition of the Ordainers. And on that supposition I cannot conceive what reason there can be to question it. Who can doubt but that, supposing Ecclesiastical Power to be properly their gift, it must be conveyed to others by virtue of some compact of theirs whose gift it is, as all other gifts are to which any one else can pretend a legal right? Who can doubt but the legal validity of all such Conveyances depends upon that which the Law presumes to be the intention of the Giver? Who can doubt but that the Law presumes every one to mean that which he ought to mean? Who can doubt but that in all like cases of legal judicature, that is still presumed to be the sense of the Law, which is the sense of all the visible Makers and Executioners of Laws, no legal appeal being ever admitted to Powers future or invisible? Who can doubt that if the Laws be competent Judges in any case, they are most so in such cases, wherein public not private Right is concerned, such as is that of Ecclesiastical Power, which is the subject of our present Dispute? Who can doubt but the visible Powers of any Communion must judge, that all Ordainers ought to mean to give that Power, which by the principles of their Communion is thought proper for the Office to which the person is ordained; and to mean to withhold that which by the principles of their Communion is thought unlawful to be given to that Office? Who can doubt but where it was thought Heresy to believe, that Bishops and Presbyters had the same power, there it must also have been thought unlawful to give it them? Who can doubt but that where the Power of Ordination was taken for the peculiar prerogative of the Bishop, there it must have been thought unlawful to give this particular branch of power of simple Presbyters? If all these suppositions agree with the matter of fact in that Age wherein these separations were first made, I cannot possibly conceive how that power of ordaining others (on which the validity of the present Sacraments and Ordinances of our several Sects do at present depend) could have been conveyed to the first Presbyters of the several Parties, by any gift of those Bishops and Presbyteries who first ordained them. So that if they will pretend at all to have it, they must necessarily bethink themselves of some other Hypothesis, such as this, by which they might have it antecedently to, and independently on, the gift of the Ordainers.  
§ XVI 2. THEREFORE I desire it may be observed further, that this Hypothesis is not agreeable to the notions or practices of any Party whatsoever, that owns any such thing as Ecclesiastical Power for the suppression of Heresy or the prevention of Schism; but only for Enthusiasts, who utterly deprive the Church of any such power, or of being a political Society. I do not say but that it may follow from some principles expressly owned by them, (as particularly from that principle so much received among the Sects, that it is dishonourable to think, that the Holy Ghost can be given by any means of Humane Ministry, though of his own Appointment; for the giving of the Holy Ghost was in the Jewish Theocracy the exact Method of investing any with power) but only that it is not agreeable to their notions and practices concerning Government. For all that hold any such thing as Government must, unless they will make it perfectly useless, own a power of restraining particular persons from Innovation; I mean, which may in conscience oblige such persons, (how different soever from the sentiments of their Superiors, yet) even in conscience to forbear Divisions in the same Churches, or erecting new ones in opposition to those which are already established. But this cannot be maintained by this Hypothesis. For where all that others can do, can neither hinder a private person from Authority, nor from knowing that he has it, not even from such a knowledge as may suffice in conscience, to justify his acting pursuantly to that Authority. There it is plain he is under no obligation to forbear drawing parties after him if he can. As for the Interest others have in admitting him for their Minister, that signifies nothing to this purpose: It only secures that they shall not be drawn away without their own consent. And for that what use is there of Government? If he can persuade and seduce them, he will have the consent of as many as he can persuade and seduce. If he cannot persuade them, it will not be in his power to make any Divisions, though there were no such thing as Government. And this is the rather so, because in order to persuasion there is, on these principles, no obligation incumbent on private persons from the Determinations of Assemblies. For as that private knowledge, which such a person may have of his own Authority, may suffice to justify his own acting as a person authorized, so the private evidence every particular person may have of his Gifts, and consequently of his Authority grounded on those Gifts, may also suffice for to make it lawful for such a person to receive him for his own private use, though over-voted by the Suffrages of regular Assemblies. So that for this there is no need of any, so much as Democratical Authority. And the same reason which will make this power possible to be had without, nay and contrary to, the intention and gift of the Bishop, will prove it also possible to be had without any gift of the Presbytery, or of the People as they are capable of giving any Authority, by any Rules even of Democratical Government.  
§ XVII BUT the Hypothesis I am now considering as it agrees with the principles, so it fully answers the designs of our modern Enthusiasts. It agrees with their principles. For these are they who indeed make the office immediately consequent to the gifts, so that where women have the gifts, they are thought to have as good a title to the office as men. These conceive extraordinary gifts and inspirations to be common now as well as in the time of the Apostles; conceive these gifts to be given by God immediately, without dependence on Sacraments or Humane Ministeries; conceive every one who has the Spirit, to have withal the gift of discerning the Spirit in himself and others, so that in order to his own satisfaction he is conceived to have a surer testimony within himself than any Humane Authority, yet so as that he cannot deny but that others of his Brethren, who are supposed to have the like gifts, have also a right to judge of his gifts in order to their own reception. It answers their designs. For receiving their Authority immediately from God, it follows in course that they should not in reason be responsible to any but him. And as they are not supposed to receive any Authority from men, so neither is there any rational Obligation for dependence or subjection to men. This I warn that they, who upon other occasions oppose this Hypothesis when maintained by Euthusiasts, may see how little it is their Interest to be driven to such principles as these in their own defence; how much they as well as we are concerned to answer what can be said for them; and how bad that Cause must be, that cannot be maintained but by recourse to such principles, as upon other occasions are so disowned by themselves.  
THESE things therefore being thus premised, 
§ XVIII  I come now more closely to examine the Hypothesis itself. No doubt some Dispositions are necessary to qualify men for Ecclesiastical Offices. No doubt it is fit that Ordainers should judge who have those Dispositions before they intrust them with the Offices for which they are qualified by such Dispositions. No doubt but these Dispositions are Gods gifts, not only on account of that common Providence by which even natural endowments are his gifts, but also an account of that supernatural assistance which is thought necessary for all virtues and ordinary graces, in opposition to the Pelagians, and for all imminent Discriminations between Men and Men. But these things are not more proper to Ecclesiastical than to Secular Offices. There is also the like necessity of Dispositions for Secular as for Ecclesiastical Employments. There is a like necessity of Graces as well as of Gifts among those Dispositions. There is a like necessity of Divine and Supernatural Assistance for those Graces which tend to the accomplishing of men for such Employments, as there is for those that fit men for Ecclesiasticals. Yet who is there that therefore thinks that God gives Secular Authority also antecedently to any interposition of Men? What confusions and disorders, what violations of Authority and Obedience, would he introduce in Seculars who should think so?  
BUT not to take advantage against these principles from the falsehood of their Consequences, 
§ XIX.  themselves are also very questionable. It is very unreasonable to think that Authority must necessarily result from even true qualifications; or that it must so depend on them, as that where the persons ordained may want any of them, there the whole Ordination must be Null, because of the incapacity of the matter. I shall speak to both these Uses of this Argument, because they are both of them, as occasion serves, insisted on by Mr. Baxter. 1. It is unreasonable to conclude that Authority must necessarily result even from the true qualifications. It is not agreeable to the sentiments of Mankind in choosing persons qualified. They certainly suppose persons qualified antecedently to their own election of them, because their judging. them so is the reason why they do elect them. But do they therefore suppose them already authorized? If so, what need of any further act of giving the power? How shall they do when they confess many Candidates sufficiently qualified for an Office, of which notwithstanding only one is capable? Can their not electing them deprive the persons rejected of their qualifications? Can it upon these principles deprive them of their authority, if that do necessarily result from their qualifications? If it cannot, then in case of an Elective Kingdom, all the persons who were admitted as Candidates (which they would not have been, if their Electors at least had not judged them qualified) must, when they are put by as well as before, be supposed to be Kings. And where can such a supposition end but in a Civil War? But among all the unreasonable pretensions that have been made by persons interessed, and of power sufficient to prosecute their Interests by force, what History can afford an instance of any one who challenged the power only because he was thought qualified, and permitted to stand Candidate for it?  
THUS it is in case of Supreme Power, 
§ XX.  but much more in Subordinate. They who have derived the Supreme Power from God, that they might this way the better assert their Unaccountableness to Men, have for that very reason thought it necessary, that inferior Governors should receive their power from Men, that they may thereby be made dependent and accountable to those Men (as well as God) from whom they had received it. And who is there that doubts, but that a legal warrant of the meanest Justice of Peace is of more force in Law, than the advice of the ablest and most prudent Lawyer, who is much better qualified to be a Justice than he who is one? This is the sense of Mankind, which (besides that it overthrows the consequence, that if the gifts of particular Ministers be from God immediately, therefore their Authority must be so too, till proved more particularly than as yet they have attempted to prove it) will also be of great moment for proving Right in a question of this nature. For that Crimes of disobedience to Government may indeed prove criminal, and imputable to the person guilty of them, it is requisite that their criminalness may appear to him from his own Notions. And accordingly God has always fitted Governments established by himself to the notions received among the persons to be governed. If therefore men do take it for the best preservative of Societies, to have all inferior Governors obliged to a strict dependence on the supreme; and the best security of this, that Inferiors, whatever their qualifications be, should yet receive their power itself from their Superiors; then certainly we have reason to presume, even on this account, that this same Method was also observed by God himself in his provisions for Ecclesiastical Government.  
THIS presumption there is, 
xx. XXI.  that God would never make this Authority immediately consequent to the qualifications requisite to dispose men, from the notions of Mankind concerning Government in general. And as little reason there is to believe it from the particular principles of Ecclesiastical Government, those very principles I mean which are owned by themselves when they are settling, though they are forgotten and contradicted when they are only intent upon overthrowing the Authority of their own Superiors. When they as well as I make the power of the Church a power of sealing Covenants in God's Name, and of transacting for him with Mankind, it is strange how they could fall into this mistake, if they had minded being constant to these principles. No doubt whoever would employ a proxy to act in his name, and to make legal covenants that should oblige himself, would in prudence choose one that should be skilful in the Law, and prudent as well as faithful to his trust. But which of themselves would therefore give an indefinite Authority to all that were so qualified to seal legal obligations for them without a more particular Deputation? Which of them would think themselves justly dealt with, or obliged even in conscience to performance, if any person whom even themselves could not deny to be so qualified, should presume to do so? And can they think God legally obliged in a case, wherein they would think themselves injured if it were their own? Is this to judge of God by the same measures by which they would be content to be judged by themselves, which God owns as just, and appeals to in the Prophets? If themselves think other qualifications requisite, for trust as well as for abilities of management of a trust to be committed to them, before they think it prudent to entrust a person, even of known and confessed Abilities, with a power of obliging themselves; has not God the same frail persons to deal with, who may fail in fidelity to his trust, as well as in point of ability to discharge it? But to let alone the inconvenience, and to insist only on the justice of this Cause; do not themselves look upon this right of disposing of what is their own gift, and of impowering others to do it, as a right inherent in themselves, which no other man's qualifications, how great or acknowledged soever, can in justice alienate from themselves, or entitle him to, without a more particular act of their own? And must the power of God in sealing Covenants for Heaven and the Holy Ghost, and pardon of sins, escheat to all that are qualified, without any more distinct gift than that of their qualifications themselves? Of the two, certainly the disadvantage does rather lie on the creatures' side. Their rights may indeed be disposed of in some cases without their own act, because they are not absolutely at their own disposal, but depend on the pleasure of God, and of their lawful Superiors impowered by him. But the independency of the Divine Right excludes all possibility of any case wherein any right of his can be disposed of without his own particular consent and act for disposing of it.  
AND yet of all Rights, 
§ XXII.  Forgiveness of offences committed against any one, is that which is least capable of a general alienation. Property in Goods, especially as among Men, depends generally on compacts or positive humane (and therefore variable) Constitutions. But offences relate to their persons, as also the grief and resentment consequent to them, and therefore may be where there is no such thing as property in goods; and the remitting of Offences does essentially consist in the remission of that personal resentment, and other mischiefs as consequent to it, and therefore must be as unalienable from any as his own person. As long as his person is free and at his own disposal, so long none but himself can undertake for the managment of his own resentments. Though in truth in God his benefits, conveyed by this covenant, are as unalienable without his own express act, as his right to forgive sins committed against himself. Men may by general acts put the Effects out of their own power to recall them. They may dispossess themselves both of their goods and of their power to right themselves, and even of their legal right and equity by some less prudent management. But neither can God act imprudently, nor are his gifts at the actual disposal of his Creatures, even where he has obliged himself to ratify what is engaged for in his name. Even there it is he, not the creature, that must immediately confer the Spirit, and pardon of sins, and the eternal rewards promised by him. The very actual giving them is not in their power. How then can this right be granted by God to any without a most particular and express conveyance?  
YET is not this all; 
§ XXIII  we are to consider further, that in forgiving or punishing sin God acts under the notion of a Governor. Now a Governor has not the same liberty in forgiving offences against the public, and against himself as a public person, as a private person may have in remitting private injuries. A private person need only consider his own private interest, and in doing so he may remit much of his own right where no others are concerned. But a public person must consider the public interest, and must not take any other course in forgiving public offences, than what may be beneficial for the public. Humane Governors are obliged hereunto by the Law of Nature, by the nature of the trust committed to them, by the implicit interpositions of Providence by which they are made Governors, and by the common dictates of natural conscience. And even God is also obliged to it, not by imposition of any Superior, but by his own natural inclinations. Having undertaken the person of a Governor, it is as impossible that he should use any other methods in pardoning offences against his Government, than what is for the benefit of the Society, whose government he has undertaken, as it is impossible that he should not act well and wisely. But who does ever think it fit that private persons should have a right to pardon or retain Offences committed against the Government, without a particular express gift? Who thinks it fit that they should have a right to pass a pardon under the Broad Seal, and in due solemnities of Law, for no other reason but only because they are qualified for it? Who thinks such Pardons valid, or thinks it just and reasonable that they should be so? How is it possible that Government should ever be maintained, if the right of it be resolved into pleas so capable of being made use of by false pretenders, and so little notorious to Subjects that are so highly concerned in it? How can Government be maintained where Inferiors may pardon what their Superiors condemn, where Rebels may justify or pardon their own Rebellions, by as good a title as they who are actually possessed of the Supreme Government, (as they may certainly do, if Inferiors as well as Superiors derive their Authority from God immediately) where pretended Expositions of Charters against the sense of all the present visible Governors of a Society must be thought to give men an authority here in this Life, which how falsely so ever pretended, must yet by this means be rendered uncapable of conviction till the day of judgement? For what can in the consequence more necessarily invest men with authority, than this power of pardoning or punishing offences committed against the public?  
THUS unreasonable it is to believe, 
§ XXIV  that bare qualifications do invest any with actual power? What can they now pretend further, but an authority sufficient to countervail and silence all these contrary Reasonings? I repeat not now what I have elsewhere proved, 
Prologue. ad D. Stearn de Obstin.  that some reasons are such, as to be greater Evidence than any other authority whatsoever. I insist not on what might have been said to show, that the reasons now produced are of that sort. But alas, how little do they produce to prove this from authority, which yet is the foundation of all their consequential reasonings? How much less to prove their sense to be the sense of Scripture, than what has been produced to prove the contrary to be the sense of God? They observe, that God is said to have given some Apostles, 
Eph. 4. 11.  some Pastors, etc. as if their very gifts had made them so. But where do they find that God ever gave Bishops, Presbyters, and Deacons? Will they not allow some difference between the extraordinary offices there spoken of, and the ordinary ones of which we are at present disputing? Will they not allow a difference in this very matter of their gifts? Whither do they reason so confidently from those extraordinaries to these ordinaries? Those extraordinary offices seem indeed to have been made neither of man nor by man, 
Gal. 1. 1.  but by God himself immediately, and possibly by the degrees of their inspiration received their several denominations of that kind respectively. Thus S. Paul proves his Apostleship, which it seems was then called in question by his Rival false Apostles, among other Arguments, by that especially, that he was made so before he had ever seen any of the Apostles, and when he did see them, that they received him on equal terms, and added nothing to him above what he had received before. And what men could pretend to give that Supreme Dignity of the Apostolical Office who were not themselves Apostles? The like might have been observed concerning others of those extraordinary offices. And I have before conjectured that, according to these extraordinary gifts, so they performed the several Offices of their Ecclesiastical Assemblies. So I understand the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 1 Cor. 14. 16. to which the Amen was in course replied by him who answered among the people, as it was answered in the Office of the Eucharist in the time of S. Justin Martyr. And can they desire any more? Yet even then there was this dependence on the ordinary Officers of the Church, that even these extraordinary gifts of the Holy Ghost were generally not given but by that Imposition of hands, which usually followed after their Baptism, that even then their deviating from the Spirit of those from whom they had received the Spirit in that office, at least of confirmation, was a presumption against those who first deviated from their predecessors; 
Gal. 11. 6, 7, 8, 9  (so S. Paul proves his own Orthodoxy from his agreement with those who were in Christ before him, though he had not received his Doctrine from them, and he generally presupposes this Principle in his Disputes against the disorderly Prophets.) That there were manifestations of the Spirit, signs of the Apostleships, the gifts of discerning of the Spirits, and Judges of the Spirits for the satisfaction of others, not only to judge in order to their own reception, (as our Brethren would have it) but to judge so as that they were not to be presumed to have the Spirit at all, who could not abide their Judgements, if after their rejection they presumed to exercise any such gifts in the state of Separation. If they will plead these extraordinary gifts themselves, let them grant the continuance of the like gifts in their Superiors, and we shall be at least secure from any Schismatical Consequences of such pretensions. But if they will alone challenge this continuance to themselves; let them consider how unequal dealing this is; let them consider how different from their pretended Veneration of Apostolical Precedents, when they separate those gifts now which then were made mutually useful by their conjunction; how different this is from the Judgement of the Apostles themselves, and consequently of God, by whom the Apostles were more particularly inspired in what they did relating to these extraordinaries, who did not it seems think these pretences to extraordinaries safe, without these remedies from the gifts of others, and particularly of Superiors. Several of these things were already suggested and proved, and will be more particularly in my Second Part, if it please God to encourage me to go on with it, by which this whole Reasoning is overthrown, which is drawn from these Apostolical Precedents, even in extraordinaries.  
AS for those other precedents, 
§ XXV.  of their ordinary establishments for Succession, when these extraordinary gifts or evidences of them should fail, (which are in truth the only precedents which are pleadable as arguments in our present times) there is so extremely little in favour of such pretences, as would make one wonder how considering persons could fall into such mistakes. The Inconveniences and Schisms resulting from those very pretences to extraordinaries, were observed and particularly provided for even in those Apostolical Ages. Such were the Prophets speaking 
a 1 Cor. 14. 29, 30, 31.  many of them at once, their using the gift of Tongues in the Ecclesiastical Offices without an 
b V. 13.  Interpreter, the Prophetesses using their Gifts in promisevous Assemblies of 
c V. 34.  men, their prophesying as it should seem like the Sibyls, with their hair 
d 1 Cor. 11. 5, 6, 10, 13, 15.  dishevelled, and without their veils, unbecoming the modesty of their Sex. How does the Apostle provide to remedy these Inconveniences, but by obliging all to a strict dependence on their Superiors? by obliging the Prophets not to speak but in 
e 1 Cor. 14. 30, 31.  order, not to use their gifts but for 
f V. 26.  edification, not to use them 
g V. 40.  indecorously, to submit to the 
h V. 29.  Judges of their Prophecies; by restraining the women universally from all 
i V. 34, 35.  public exercise of their gifts; a plain sign that the Spirit who gave those gifts, did not thereby exempt any who had them, from their due Subordinations, much less did thereby give them the governing power of their Ecclesiastical Assemblies, as our Brethren would fain persuade us. This also was the great occasion of that Schism which was the subject of S. Clement's Epistle to the Corinthians, and that not many years after this former had been written to them by S. Paul. The gifted Brethren did then also assume, and raised a Sedition against the ordinary Presbyters of that Church, and are again taught their duty of Obedience, Humility, and Subjection, through the whole current of that Epistle. How could that be, if their very gifts had made them Presbyters, when acknowledged, as they are not here denied? This very pretence therefore was particularly and expressly disowned by those very Precedents, to which our Brethren do so eagerly appeal.  
ACCORDINGLY they never find any of those Officers, 
§ XXVI  to whom Succession is at present pretended, made immediately by God, but by the intervention of men, notwithstanding that there were then Gifts of the Spirit requisite to qualify men for those offices. There were the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Rom. 12. 6, 7, 8.  and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 reckoned among the gifts of the Spirit, which fitted men for the offices of Bishops and Presbyters. There was also the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
v. 7.  with other gifts fitting men for the offices of Deacons. Yet who sees not this express difference between these and those extraordinary Officers, that these never so much as pretended to be immediately from God without the mediation of Men? What great Argument had it been for S. Paul to prove his Apostleship by, that he was not of Men or by Men, if this were the ordinary case in the ordinary Governors and Officers of the Church? if all that men did was only a recognition of their gifts, and a solemn reception of their Authority, which was as requisite for Apostles as ordinary Bishops and Deacons? Where do we find any of these ordinary Officers made, but there is express mention of Men, who laid on their hands, and performed the Ceremony, and that by a distinct Imposition of Hands from that whereby they then usually received the Holy Ghost, immediately after their Baptism? And the words used concerning it, 
Acts 14. 23  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, are the same by which the giving of Authority, 
Tit. 1. 5.  even in Secular Offices, where Authority is confessedly given, is usually expressed according to the custom of that Age. S. Timothy is said to have his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of S. Paul, 
2 Tim. 1. 6.  is said to have it given him, among other things, by the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
1 Tim. 4▪ 14.  What can be more clear than these words, if they be understood of Ordination? And who are more forward to understand them so than our Brethren, when they are concerned to produce Precedents of Ordinations by Presbyters? But I confess I am not myself very confident of that Exposition. The thing is clear enough from this new Imposition of hands, which was used on this occasion of ordaining the ordinary Officers of the Church, but not of the extraordinary. When S. Mathias was chosen Apostle into the place of Judas, no more was done than only to know God's pleasure concerning it, according to that ordinary way of Divination usual in such cases by Lots. When that was known, there was no further act of Men, no Imposition of hands, only he was added to complete the number of the Twelve Apostles. That more was observed in ordinary Ordinations, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Acts 1. 26.  why was it but to show, that the Influence of humane acts was greater in them.  
BESIDES, 
§ XXVII.  the very Ceremony of Imposition of hands, was generally designed to communicate some of those supernatural gifts, wherewith they were themselves endued. So it was in their casting out of Devils. and their curing the sick, and particularly so it was in their giving the Holy Ghost. And indeed what other gift is imaginable, that was ordinarily necessary for ordained persons? Themselves cannot think it could be dispossessing or healing, etc. What could it therefore be but the Holy Ghost himself? And what gifts could be then thought necessary for making ordinary Officers, but such as are ordinary and perpetual as the Offices themselves? If therefore the Holy Ghost was given, this was (according to the Jews) an investing them with power, where he was given particularly with such a design. So it was in the case of 
a 1 Sam. 10. 9  Saul and 
b 1 Sam. 16. 14.  David, and of the 
c S. John 20. 20, 21.  Apostles themselves. And what other design is conceivable in giving the Holy Ghost to them, who were supposed already to have received him before in their Baptism, and that Imposition of hands which then usually accompanied their Baptism? And if the Holy Ghost were given in Ordination, then plainly they had not all their gifts antecedently to their Ordination, as our Brethren conceive, particularly not those which immediately entitled them to Ecclesiastical Power. If these Gifts of the Holy Ghost (which immediately entitled them to Power) were given them by the ministry of Men; then certainly the Power itself was not given them immediately by God, but by humane ministry. And therefore their antecedent gifts (which they judged of by the gift of discerning of Spirits) did not immediately give them the power.  
THE great Prejudice that possesses our Brethren against this power being thus given by the ministry of men, 
§ XXVIII.  is that, conceiving it to result from the gift of the Holy Ghost, they think it dishonourable to the Holy Ghost to say that he is given by men. But how can they deny those plain Evidences of Scripture wherein he was so frequently given by the Apostles? Will not their Conjectures reach them as well as our Ecclesiastical Officers now? Were not they men of the like frail sinful nature as ours are now? But if they would indeed consider how he does it, what is there more dishonourable in this than in the whole management of the Incarnation? Why may not God the Father and Son (whose Gift undoubtedly he is) give him by covenant as well as otherwise? Why may not himself do so too? Supposing them willing to take this way of disposing of him, what can hinder them from deputing men to represent them in the solemnities of such a covenant to be made with men? What is there in this, I do not say dishonourable, but unusual, where ever such covenants have been made? Having done so, how can it be thought dishonourable that they should be obliged by their own act of deputation, to ratify what is by him acted in their name, when they have impowered him to do so? Nay, would it not rather be dishonourable to the Divine Persons, to think them not faithful to those obligations, which they have been pleased to impose upon themselves? Why may they not empower men for all future ages as well as that of the Apostles, seeing there are new persons, and new explicit covenants to be made with each of them for their own persons in all succeeding ages? Why may not they be as firmly obliged by the act of a wicked man as a good, if he come lawfully by his power of deputation, by a regular succession from those who first received it? Nay, who is there of themselves, that does the least question this in other cases, where their Interest does not make them justly suspicious of partiality? Does the Law ever make the least inquiry into the Lives of Proxies, where it is satisfied of their Authority? Who ever thinks that a Bond signed by a Proxy, who is a good man, does more oblige the person for whom he is concerned, than a like Obligation signed by another who were vicious, supposing them equally authorized? Do any of themselves think what Judas acted as an Apostle, to have been less obliging to his Master, or less valid in the effect, than what was acted by any of the other Apostles? Thus I have shown, that those gifts to which Ecclesiastical Power is really consequent, are not given by God immediately and antecedently to humane interposition, and that those gifts that are indeed given antecedently to Ordination, are not, nor were, such as did entitle them, who were acknowledged to have them, to any Ecclesiastical Office or Authority.  
SO also, 
§ XXIX  on the contrary, neither does the want of such extraordinary gifts as men are capable of having antecedently to Ordination, irritate the whole act of the Ordainers, and make it null, in regard of the incapacity of the maker, supposing they should be mistaken in judging them to have them who have them not, as Mr. Baxter does frequently intimate. This he urges sometimes so far as to make Inmoralities of Life sufficient to deprive them of their power, and to excuse a Separation from their Ministry, from the guilt of SCHISM. Should I tell him, that this very Doctrine of his was condemned as SCHISMATICAL in the Donatists by the Ancients, I easily foresee how little the Authority of those Ancients is like to signify with him, who scruples no occasion of aspersing their Sacred Memory with opprobrious and reproachful Epithets. 
Ch. Hist. professedly, and elsewhere.  I have already shown from the nature of the things, how little the validity of their Ministry is concerned in the holiness or unholiness of their Lives. The same is easy to be proved concerning those other qualifications, if he had considered them in relation to my principles. He should first have remembered, that there are two sorts of Uncapacities of such a person to be ordained, such as make him utterly uncapable of the Office itself, and such as only make him uncapable of administering it wisely and advantageously. Now though these later Uncapacities ought to be considered by Ordainers, whilst the person as yet stands only Candidate for Ordination, and even afterwards may reflect on the fidelity or prudence of his Ordainers; yet they are only the former sort of Incapacities that can irritate their act when past and irrevocable. He should further have considered, that no Incapacity can irritate the whole gift of an office, but that which makes a man uncapable of the essential work of an office; not that which only incapacitates him for such works as are not essential, but only ornamental. Now the essential work of the Ministry according to my principles, (which he ought to have confuted more particularly in this matter, if he was unwilling to stand by their consequences) is to transact between God-and Men, to seal Covenants on behalf of God, and to accept of those which are made by men, and to oblige them to perform their part of the covenant by, otherwise authoritatively excluding them from God's part. Hence results the whole power of Ecclesiastical Government. And for this no great gifts and abilities are essential. All the skill that is requisite essentially is only in general, to know the benefits to be performed on God's part, and the duties to be promised on Man's, and the nature and obligation of covenants in general, and the particular Solemnities of Ecclesiastical Covenants. And of this how can any be uncapable, who is but capable of understanding the common dealings of the world? And how can Governors be supposed so grossly mistaken, as that when they design peculiar and excellent qualifications, they should fall short of such mean ones as these▪  
THE gifts so much insisted on by Mr. Baxter and his Brethren, 
§ XXX.  are such as accomplish an excellent and useful Preacher, which Office of Preaching they have been used on all occasions to magnify, as if it were the only, or at least the principal, employment of the Ministry. But how can they prove that, suppose their office were to preach, it is essential to every particular Officer, that he be eminently gifted for and skilful in it? How can they prove that Preaching is at all any essential part of the office? How can they prove that in the primitive Apostolical times, every particular Presbyter did either practice it, or did think himself obliged to do so? If they cannot, how will it follow that he who is lawfully impowered, must therefore be no Minister on account of incapacity, if he could not preach at all? And they are his Brethren, who upon other occasions do suggest the most likely Arguments, to prove that Preaching was no essential part of the employment of an ordinary Presbyter. They are the persons who tell us, that in the primitive times Preaching was looked on as the peculiar office of the Bishop. If so, how could it be any essential part of the duty of ordinary Presbyters? They tell us, (I do not say Mr. Baxter is one of them) of the distinction between ruling Presbyters and those who laboured in word and doctrine. 
1 Tim. 5. 17.  They can never prove that any of those Presbyters were Laics, but however the distinction seems plainly to imply, that some of those Clerical Presbyters did only rule, and did not concern themselves in word and doctrine. Nor was this unagreeable to the approved advice of the Apostle, 
Rom. 12. 6, 7, 8.  who would have every man lay out himself according to his different gifts, not that every one should endeavour all, as the Custom is now. So he that had the gift of Prophecy was to give himself to Prophecy, he who had the gift of Preaching (called elsewhere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) was to give himself to Teaching, he who had the gift of Exhortation (called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) was to give himself to Exhortation. And so they who had the gift of Government (called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whether of the whole Church or particularly for managing the Church Alms, then given for the use of the poor) where to lay out themselves upon that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, very probably the same with that mentioned in S. Timothy. And when Judas and Silas persuaded the differing Parties of Jews and Gentiles, to agree in the accommodation of the Synod of Jerusalem, 
Acts 15. 32.  exercising the Gift of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, they are observed to have done it, not as ordinary Presbyters, but as Prophets, to whom (it seems) that Gift of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was then thought proper. And by this means it should seem that they did designedly contrive the mutual necessity of each others gifts, for the maintaining that Unity of the Spirit, so much insisted on by the Apostle, in his Disputes against the disorders of the gifted persons of those times, that each might have some which might make him useful to his Brethren; but that none should have so many of them as to disoblige him from a dependence on the gifts of others. And if this was the precedent of the Apostolical Ages, how false measures than do our Brethren take, (who are yet the greatest Pretenders of Reverence to the Scripture-times and Apostolical Precedents) when they judge of the whole Ministry by this only Employment of Preaching. But it is easy to see what Exigency of their cause has brought them, to it. Their great neglect of Sacraments and their contempt of Excommunication, and their opposition to all that power that can give them justifiable Sacraments, and their Consciousness how little their own Sacraments can oblige others to adhere to themselves, who have given so ill precedents of deserting the Sacraments of those who were originally their own actual and present Superiors, have obliged them to such slight thoughts of the Sacraments, as if they were the least part of the Office of a Minister.  
HAVING therefore thus proved, 
§ XXXI  that what power is received by any ordained person, is properly given him by the Ministry of his Ordainers, I cannot foresee what can be further urged against my Argument drawn from the intention of them who gave it, but that taking it with the Distinctions and Limitations which I have made use of in managing it, it is such as any Law, or Equity either, would consider in order to the validity of a Conveyance. And it is easy now to make Application also to the particulars of the contrary Hypothesis, as I have managed it.  
To the I. It has been proved, that power does not immediately result from those gifts which only qualify men for the Administration of Ecclesiastical Offices. Whence also the consequences do fail, that the giving or not giving of those Offices is to be proved from the giving or not giving of those gifts.  
To the II. That gift of the Holy Ghost which does indeed immediately invest with Ecclesiastical Power is disposed of by God, but not immediately, but by the Ministry of the Ordainers, who do not only declare, but properly convey it.  
To the III. The gifts which in the Apostles times were antecedent to Ordination, and which were judged of by the gift of discerning of Spirits in the Ordainers, did not entitle to the power, but only that gift which was given in Ordination, which as to the essentials of it was not extraordinary, (though it might be so in regard of some manifestations of it) and therefore fit to be expected in all future generations.  
To the IV. Though the Interest of the person to be ordained, and the people, be only acceptance, yet it has appeared that the Interest of the Ordainers is not acceptance and recognition of a power already received, but the conveyance of a new power, which the Candidate for Ordination had not before he received it by virtue of this conveyance from them, because God does not convey it but by their Ministry.  
To the V. The gifts described in the Scriptures were many of them extraordinary, in which we are not concerned now; of those that were ordinary, all were not requisite in each particular person, and indeed fewer were requisite according to the Discipline of those times, when each of them laid out themselves on some particular employments than now, when each particular Minister must undertake all the several necessities of a Parish; and this very difference of their Employments will make the Scripture times uncapable of being precedents now, when the Employment is so much changed from what it was then, and will make many more Ministers by the qualifications requisite then, than can be by those which are required now, all which must be owned to be valid Ministers antecedently to any humane Ordination, (if our Adversaries principles hold) though they be not qualified for much the greatest part of that which is counted the Ministerial Employment now. Nor does it appear that the Scripture does oblige us to accept them immediately for true Ministers, even upon recognition of those gifts which are indeed true qualifications. And withal the Scriptures are very far from describing all the particulars of power of our present ordinary Ecclesiastical Offices with that likelihood of design to do it, and that distinctness, as might in reason have been expected if the Holy Ghost, or the sacred Writers, had intended them as a Charter for the extent of those Offices in future Ages. They do not distinguish between their Ordinaries, which were to descend to their Successors, and their Extraordinaries, which were not. They do not distinguish between Prudentials, which might validly be changed by acts of humane authority, and Immutables, which might not. They do not descend to any particulars, but such as were occasioned by the Disputes of that Age. They do not so much as explain any terms, which were then notorious, though it could not be expected they should always be so, even to the distance of our present times; nor have they done any thing which, upon these principles might prevent litigious Disputes concerning Government and Subjection, which no doubt so good and wise a Governor as God would have done for a Society, so well beloved by him as his Church, if he had designed her a written Charter to appeal to for all future Generations.  
To the VI As it does prove that recourse were indeed to be had to the Scriptures, for knowing the mind of God immediately concerning the extent of Ecclesiastical Power, supposing the Power itself were immediately derived from him; so by the same proportion of reasoning it confirms my argument, that recourse ought now to be had to the intention of the Ordainers, seeing it has appeared that God is pleased not to confer it actually, but by their mediation.  
To the VII. It thence appears how irreconcilable this Hypothesis of our Adversaries is with Government in this life, in that it permits persons to assume Authority, and to extend it as far as they think fit, by appealing to writings against the sense of all the visible Authority of this life, and this rationally by their principles, which let any of themselves consider and explain (if they can) how it is reconcilable with the practice of any visible Government upon earth. On the contrary, our Hypothesis, obliging inferior Governors to prove their title to their Office, and the extent of it, from the intention of their superior Governors, does oblige all to a strict dependence on the supreme visible power, so as to leave no place for Appeal concerning the practice of such Government, (which as it lasts only for this life, so it ought not to admit of Disputes more lasting than its practice) from them, and that upon rational and conscientious principles. For how fallible soever they may be conceived to be in expounding Scriptures, yet none can deny them to be the most certain, aswell as the most competent, Judges of their own intentions. As certianly therefore as God has made his Church a visible Society, and constituted a visible Government in it; so certainly it is to be presumed, that their Hypothesis must be false, which by rational consequence does make it unpracticable; and ours true, which does so fitly secure the practice of such Government by a like rational consequence.  
To the VIII. It is in truth very consequent to the former proposition, but having indeed no more evidence of its truth, as applied to our present subject, than its being consequential, it is sufficiently overthrown by what has been said against the principles from which it follows. And this use may be also made further of its being consequential, that whatever may be said against it to prove it false, will more strongly convict the principles themselves of falsehood, than if it were not so naturally consequent from them. And let any equal person consider, how any Ecclesiastical Government can be practicable on these terms. Subjects may indeed preserve their due Subordination to their Superiors, notwithstanding their differing from them in opinion. But how can they preserve it if they also practise differently? They may possibly do it, notwithstanding practices of humane infirmity, and disavowed by themselves. But how can they do it, whilst they defend their practices, and pretend Divine Authority for them? It is yet harder to reconcile such practices as these with Authority. Yet they who disown their Subjection in some singular instances, may yet own it in all others. But how is it possible that they should own it, who do not only defend single practices different from the sense of their Superiors, but pretend to Authority and Offices unaccountable to them, which must justify a whole course of different practices? Who defend their Authority and Offices by such principles, as if they were true must in reason make them unaccountable. If their Authority be immediately received from God, and the Rule of their practices be taken from the Scriptures as understood by themselves; what reason can there be of Subjection to any humane Superiors? As certainly therefore as all that is false, which destroys the practicabless of Government; as certainly as this Proposition does so, so certainly is it false, and all those other antecedent principles from whence it does naturally follow.  
To the IX. The same things may be said, that it is indeed rationally consequent to the former, to justify the lawfulness and prudence of differing from Superiors in a judgement of private discretion, and consequently of differing in practice, and that practice the practice of an Authority where yet it is established on such principles, as that a different judgement even of private discretion, may be allowed as sufficient to defend such different practices.  
To the X. It is the only rational way of making Scripture precedents in such matters as these are, an obliging Rule to our present times, and rational only on the principles now mentioned. If, on the contrary, God give his authority by men, then for prudential cases the commands of those same men ought by the same reason to be taken for his commands, as the Authority given by them is taken for his Authority. And then these being Cases not to be expected in the Scripture, and there being notwithstanding a means to know God's mind concerning them as far as we are concerned to know it in order to the knowledge of our duty, and there being withal so little reason to presume, that the sacred Writers or the Holy Ghost intended to give us any account of such matters; they will not find it so easy as they think, to prove us obliged even by Scripture precedent itself in such cases.  
To the XI. It is a consequence which it may be our Brethren will not stand by, who when they speak of the Interest of Presbyters and People, in judging concerning the gifts of such a Candidate, in order to their own acceptance of him, and speak of this with a design of solving the Phaenomena of Government by it, and of restraining disorderly persons from erecting new Churches and Schisms at their pleasure, will no doubt be willing to believe, that persons so excluded, or at least not admitted by the Presbyters or the People, aught in conscience or modesty at least to forbear the exercise of their gifts and authority, till they be somewhere regularly admitted. But how they can avoid this consequence, admitting this Hypothesis of an immediate call from God, for my part I confess I cannot understand. If they be sensible how inconsistent such disorderly practices as these are with Government, (as they seem to be when they endeavour, by this Interest of Churches in admitting gifted persons, to prevent the consequence of such disorderly practices) it will then concern them seriously to reflect on their principles, which will justify practices, which themselves confess to be so disorderly, and will ruin Government, for which themselves pretend to have at least some little reverence.  
I only observe one thing more, 
Part 3. c. 9 sect. 21. p. 92,  that Mr. Baxter tells me, that I have at first given the Nonconformists their cause, and confirmed them. But I am not conscious, nor is he pleased to tell me where I have done it. If I could tell how to excuse them, I should still think myself obliged to own my convictions. But whatever I have done, methinks he of all men should not upbraid me, who gives so many Reasons of Suspicion, that he is conscious of defending a bad Cause. It is hard to think of any artifice, which a person so conscious would make use of, but Mr. Baxter has practised something which looks very like it. Such a one would evade all direct Disputes of the merit of the cause, would neither answer Arguments, nor confute Answers. Such a one, where he could not justify the Succession of Orders not derived from Bishops, would have recourse to those of the Nonconformists who had Episcopal Orders, 
Part 3. c. 9▪ sect 13. p▪ 85.  but had not been impleaded in those Disputes concerning the necessity of Succession. Such a one would make a Conclusion odious, where he could not disprove it as false; 
Ib. sect. 33. p. 102, 103  would endeavour to raise the affections of his Readers, where he despaired of prevailing on their Judgements; 
Ib. sect. 2. p. 74, 100  would traduce the person of his Adversary, where he had no hopes of obtaining his cause. Such a one would be as confident as he is in general charges of Absurdities, 
Ib. p. 92, 90.  Contradictions, and Wordiness, etc. but would withal be as cautious as he is of mentioning any particulars of such Charges. Such a one would refer an Adversary to Books written before for Answers to Arguments not so much as treated of in those Books, 
Ib. sect. 19 p. 90.  would with great boldness impose on Readers ignorant of those matters, that all had been already answered there, and that the only reason why no more is answered now is only to avoid Repetitions; so that unless a new question be produced as well as a new argument, there shall never want an excuse for want of a new Answer. I wonder how Mr. Baxter can pretend to have answered what I have said concerning the sin against the Holy Ghost, or the sin unto death, or the Sacraments, (which yet I see are so displeasing to him) or even the way of deriving their Succession from their first Separation, what I have said concerning the opinion of the Schoolmen, that Bishops and Presbyters differ only in degree, to show how unsufficient that is for justifying their present Succession; what I have said concerning this way of resolving the Dispute, not into ancient Learning, but more modern Histories of their Succession; what concerning their derivation of Power from any valid act even of the Presbyteries themselves, etc. Should I say things so notoriously false with such confidence, I confess I could not tell how to excuse myself from his uncivil Epithet of Audaciousness. 
Ib. sect. 2. p. 74.  Such a one would slight the question that pinched him, how momentous soever it might prove in its consequences, 
Ib. p. 81.  and divert to others, though of no use, yet more capable of odium, and of a popular talon of raising passion. And has not Mr. Baxter (who cannot find leisure to answer these Arguments, 
Ib. sect. 2. p. 47. sect. 29. p. 97.  wherein the Orders of his Brethren, and their Sacraments, and the whole comfort of their Communion, are generally concerned) shown, that he has a great deal of leisure to rake Church History to asperse the dead, and blaspheme the living Rulers of his people, for condemning Heresies, when yet the generality of his Brethren themselves do not pretend to differ from us in any thing which even we call Heresy? To what end is all this, but to make a noise at a distance, to divert us from the real debate? Such a one would cavil as he does about words. What can I think it else but cavil, when he pretends himself so extremely ignorant in the meaning of the Terms of our Dispute? When he who has lived all his Life in England, 
p. 92.  and has received his Orders from a Bishop of the Church of England, 
Ib. sect. 13. p. 85.  is yet to learn what we in England, in our Disputes with his Party, mean by the name of Bishop; nay, even by that of the Church of England? If he thought himself in earnest as ignorant as he pretends, why would he meddle in Disputes where he does not understand the Terms? If he knows better things, what charity can excuse him from the charge of Insincerity? Though persons may, yet causes cannot aequivocate. There is but one sense of all Terms, which causes oblige men to mean, and that every one ought to know who pretends to skill in causes. Other senses I did not think myself obliged to take notice of in Terms of notorious signification, till I found some occasion for it from the misunderstandings of my Adversaries. But there is one thing that looks most like an Argument of Self-conviction, which though it has been taken up by persons of worse design than he, yet does withal run through the Reasoning of several of the later Books of Mr. Baxter; that is, that our Clergy must alone be responsible for all the scandals that any Clergy, who never had any affinity with ours, but that of their common office, were ever guilty of. What is this but in effect to acknowledge that ours are the only real Clergy? What is it but to acknowledge the conclusiveness of those Arguments, which have been used by me to disprove the Title of their Ministers to the Office of real Clergymen? If they thought their own to be Clergymen, why will they not be as obnoxious to all the scandals they can rake of Clergymen out of the Histories of Sixteen hundred Years, as ours? I wish I could by this Suggestion make them sensible of the disingenuity they show in this way of Reasoning, and of the mischief they do themselves and the common cause of Christianity. It is strange if Mr. Baxter can ever expect to revive Parochial Discipline by such means as these, of ruining Diocesan. Can he ever expect to prevail with those irreligious Laics, who are on this occasion so ready to make use of this misguided zeal of his Brethren, not as more orthodox than others, but as a popular party, to submit themselves to the Censures of his Parochial Ministers, when he teaches them to despise an Authority so much more venerable than theirs, on all the accounts which Mankind owns for just reasons of veneration? Can he in earnest hope, than an upstart Authority of Innovators, too late to have their Scandals traced through any distant Histories, can procure reverence with them, who are told such vile things of those, who upon the first division were found possessed of an Authority so much more received by a peaceable as well as a just prescription? Can he expect that he can preserve that Authority in Inferiors, which he endeavours to ruin in their Superiors? Can he think to preserve it in those, whom it seems himself dares not own for Clergymen, whilst he teaches them to asperse the very name as well as the authority of Clergymen? Can he think to preserve it in those, who have no other but extraordinary ways of pretending to a Divine Authority, or to pretend Charters expounded by themselves in their own favour, when he teaches them to undervalue an Authority, derived by all the ways by which it is reasonable to expect an Authority, should be derived at such a distance? Can he expect in the age we live in, that the great ones will ever be induced to pay respect to the inferior Clergy, who are so unknown to our Laws, when they are taught to deny it to those, who have as good a Title even to legal honours as themselves? Mr. Baxter may possibly ruin us, if God should grant him the curse of a success on his present Endeavours; but I cannot for my life conceive how he can settle us, or really reform our lives, or restore Discipline, on such Principles as these. True Latitudinarianism does only tend to introduce Scepticism into the minds, and Libertinism into the lives of Men. God deliver us from an experiment of his Projects, and him from the dissatisfaction of a fruitless repentance, when he cannot remedy us.  
THIS is all which I think fit to say at present. 
§ XXXII.  If Mr. Baxter, or any of his Brethren, shall think fit to reply further to my Book, 
Pref. sect. 19  I shall again humbly put them in mind of the same requests I made formerly: if they will be pleased to observe them, they will not only approve their own sincerity by doing so, but also minister a subject of useful information; if they do not, they will force me instead of yielding or rejoining, to cast myself upon the indifferent and impartial Readers candour to judge between us, and I hope they will not flatter themselves with the hopes that all will be partial.  
The Summary of my Book treating of the Sinfulness and Mischief of SCHISM, with reference to the Chapters, where each particular of this Summary is proved.  
THat all are obliged to submit to all unsinful conditions of the Episcopal Communion where they live, 
1.  if imposed by the Ecclesiastical Governors thereof; and that the nature of this Obligation is such, 
2.  as will make them who, rather than they will submit to such Conditions, either separate themselves, or suffer themselves to be excluded from Communion by such Governors for such a refusal of submission, guilty of the sin of SCHISM.  
Here are two Parts.  
I. That all are obliged to submit to all unsinful conditions of the Episcopal Communion where they live, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  if imposed by the Ecclesiastical Government thereof.  
This proved by these two degrees:  
1. That the supposition, of their being less secure of Salvation out of this Episcopal Communion than in it, is sufficient to prove them obliged to submit to all terms, not directly sinful, however unexpedient, rather than separate themselves, or suffer themselves to be excluded, from this Communion. Ch. I. § 7, 8, 9, 10.  
2. That there is indeed less security of Salvation to be had even on performance of the moral conditions of Salvation, out of this Episcopal Communion than in it.  
This proved from two things:  
(1.) That they cannot be so well assured of their Salvation in the use of extraordinary as of ordinary means; nay, that they being left to extraordinaries is a condition either very hazardous, or at least very uncomfortable at present, whatever it may prove hereafter. Ch. II.  
(2.) That these ordinary means of Salvation are, in respect of every particular person, confined to the Episcopal Communion of the Place he lives in, as long as he lives in it.  
This proved from two things.  
(I.) 
A.  That these ordinary means of Salvation are confined to the external Communion of the visible Church.  
This proved from four things.  
1. We cannot be assured that God will do for us what is necessary for our Salvation on his part, otherwise than by his express promises that he will do it. Ch. III. § 1, 2.  
2. The ordinary means how we may assure ourselves of our Interest in his Promises is by our Interest in his Covenant, by which they are conveyed to us. Ch. III. from § 5. to the end.  
3. The only ordinary means, by which we may assure ourselves of our Interest in this Covenant with him, is by our partaking in these external Solemnities, by which this Covenant is transacted and maintained. Ch. IV, V, VI, VII.  
4. The participation in these external Solemnities with any legal validity is only to be had in the external Communion of the visible Church. Ch. VIII.  
(II.) That this visible Church, 
B.  to whose external Communion these ordinary means of Salvation are confined, is no other than the Episcopal Communion of the place where any one lives, whilst he lives there.  
This proved in both parts.  
(1.) That the visible Church, 
a.  to whose external Communion these ordinary means of Salvation are confined, is the Episcopal Communion.  
This proved by these degrees.  
I. That Salvation is not ordinarily to be expected without an external participation of the Sacraments. 
(A)   
1. Negatively, Not by those other popular means which ordinary persons are apt to trust in, to the neglect of the Sacraments, that is, 

1. Not by hearing the Word preached. Ch. IX.  
2. Not by private Prayer, nor indeed by any, out of the Communion of the Church. Ch. X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV.    
2. Positively, That Salvation is ordinarily to be expected only by this external participation of the Sacraments. 

1. Proved concerning Baptism. Ch. XV.  
2. Concerning the Lord's Supper. Ch. XVI, XVII.    
II. That the validity of the Sacraments depends on the Authority of the persons by whom they are administered. 
(B.)  Ch. XVIII.  
III. No other Ministers have the Authority of administering the Sacraments, 
(C.)  but only they who receive their Orders in the Episcopal Communion.  
This proved by four degrees.  
1. That the Authority of administering the Sacraments must be derived from God. Ch. XIX.  
2. That though it be derived from God, yet it is not so derived without the mediation of those men to whom it was at first committed. Ch. XX.  
3. That it cannot be so derived from those men to whom it was at first committed, without a continued succession of persons orderly receiving Authority from those who had Authority to give it them, from those first times of the Apostles to ours at present. Ch. XXI.  
4. That this Authority is not now to be expected any where but in the Episcopal Communion. Ch. XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV.  
(2.) That the Episcopal Communion to which every particular person is obliged to join himself, 
b.  as he would enjoy the ordinary means of his own particular salvation, is the Episcopal Communion of the place wherein he lives, whilst he lives in it. Ch. XXVI.  
II. That the nature of this Obligation to unsinful conditions of their Episcopal Communion is such as will make them guilty of the sin of SCHISM, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  who, rather than they will submit to such conditions, either separate themselves, or suffer themselves to be excluded from Communion by their respective Diocesan Ordinaries. Ch. XXVII.   

LETTER I.  
The Contents.  
What sorts of Disputes are, upon a virtuous account, to be blamed in Dissenters; and what way of managing them is commendable, § 1. A short Account and Defence of the Preface to my Letters of Advice, § 2. A short Defence of the Possibility of Discipline in a Diocesan Government, § 3. The Epistles of Ignatius not questioned by all the Presbyterians, § 4. My thoughts concerning the Reasons of Nonconformity mentioned in Mr. Baxter's Letter, § 5.  
Reverend and Worthy Sir,  
§ I I Have received your very kind Letter, wherein I hardly know whether I should be more thankful for your Approbation or your Reproof, both of them being in their kind so useful, and both of them being performed by you with so great Civility. I am confident that if our modern Disputes had been moderated with that candour, men would certainly have been more peaceful, and very probably more orthodox, than now we find them. I could very heartily have wished, that the Opinions wherein we differ, had not been of that nature, as to separate Communion. For this I look upon as the only Circumstance that can make such differences grievous to a pious person. For as for those others which exasperated many, that Dissenters are not so wise as to discern the truth, or so fortunate in avoiding prejudices, or lighting on faithful Informations in a time when they are capable of receiving them; or that they are not so submissive as themselves expect to that Pope, which Luther has long since observed in every man's heart, etc. They are reasons either sinful, or at least unsufficient to excuse the sin of uncharitableness upon such an account. But as they are, considering them as tempered with that piety and moderation, which may expiate their others malignities; that they are alleged rather as Apologies for your selves, than as Obligations on others, rather to excuse your deformity in not assisting at our Altars, than erecting others in opposition to them; that you are still inquisitive and desirous of further information, and ready to lay down your mistakes when you are convinced that they are such; that still you preserve a peaceable mind, and embrace our Communion itself in voto, though perhaps not actually; these are so valuable Considerations even before God as well as Man, for excusing from the guilt of error, as that whatever I may think of your Opinions, I hope it shall not hinder me from a cordial respect and veneration of your person.  
§ TWO AS I do very much esteem the good opinion of so great a Lover of peace and piety as yourself, and should have been sorry to have given any just occasion of offence to you; so I am not a little glad, that upon a view of the particulars mentioned in your Letter, I find myself to be so very innocent. For as for my Preface, the main designs driven on in it are, that disrespect to the Clergy is shown to have been an Introductory to the Atheism of the Age we live in; that the conformable Clergy, that is, such as would answer the design of the Church, not only as to their exterior demeanour in public solomen Assemblies, but also as to the qualifications of their persons, and the conduct of their whole lives, could not prove either trifling in their Preaching, or scandalous in their Examples; and therefore that the Church is not responsible for their misdemeanours where they prove otherwise; and that the Laity are in their proportion obliged to the same duties with the Clergy, and therefore may make use of the Advice there prescribed; or to touch at the errors of our modern School-Divinity, are touched, and to make some proposals for their reformation. In these things I can see no occasion of offence, but rather some Preservatives against it. The only thing I suppose you aim at is, my taxing some Opinions of Nonconformists, (and that with as little personal reflection as I was able) which I conceived prejudicial to Church Authority, which Opinions because you seem to disown, I do not see how you should apprehend yourself as particularly concerned in what is there said; especially there being nothing in the discourse whereby you could conclude either your self, or any of your moderate temper, to have been intended, I assure you I intended none but such as were guilty, and with being so I charged none particularly. But that not only the old Puritans and Separatists of Queen Elizabeth's times, etc. but also very many of ours now are guilty of them, is too notorious to suppose you ignorant of it. I could heartily wish that the number of better principled and more peaceable Dissenters were greater than I fear it is. Nor do I see that what is there said can make it unuseful, even to the persons truly concerned, that value truth more than any, however beloved party. Seeing it may let them see the evil consequence of their principles, and their influence on that Atheism and Profaneness, which I am confident themselves do most cordially detest, which I conceived to be more likely to prevail with them than any other Arguments, as being more suited to their pious disposition. Or, supposing that my fears were indeed groundless of the Introduction of profaneness by the contempt of Government, or of contempt of Government by their disobedience to it; yet might it at least warn them from confining on such dangerous consequences, or from coming to them unawares, by an abuse of principles generally true, but obnoxious to particular inconveniences, when unwarily managed. I mean, it may put them in mind of the greater Momentousness of good Government, and of Peace, than of many other differences, and consequently of the great Engagements incumbent on them for their preservation. Whence they would further find themselves obliged, so to oppose the particular abusive Constitutions of Governors, as not to bring their Government itself into contempt, nor to suggest unanswerable Apologies to factious persons for the future, when they are unwilling to be obedient. These are abuses which yourself, I believe, would wish redressed in the causes of our Church-divisions. But if that part of my Discourse could not be useful, yet could it not be prejudicial to them, nothing being urged either invectively or imperiously, and therefore no harm being done, if I should prove utterly mistaken.  
§ III THAT you should marvel how reviving Discipline could by me be expected from the constitution of our present Ecclesiastical Government, does seem no less marvellous to me; especially as to the Exception you make against it. For if it were impossible to maintain Discipline under a Government so far Monarchical, as to appropriate the decretory power of the Government of many to a single person, though the execution be entrusted to many; than it would follow, that the Secular Discipline under a Secular Monarch of any extent were impossible also to be observed. Your same reasons will proceed as strongly here, as where you apply them. For it is every way as impossible for any such Prince to have a particular cognizance of every particular cause, much more of every particular person in his Dominions, as for a Bishop in his Diocese. As therefore it appears by experience (I shall instance a Scripture-example because I know that will be liable to least exception) that David (in an extent more vast, and a people more numerous, than that of the largest Diocese, 120 miles in length, and 60 miles in breadth, and rather better in David's days, where were accounted 1300000 Men fit for war, besides Artificers and such others not coming under that account) was yet able to give a good account of his Government, without particular inspection into all causes, or communication of his power to numerous coordinate Presbyteries. So I do not see why it may not hold as well for a possibility of Discipline under an Ecclesiastical Monarch of a much narrower extent. For the reason produced by you seems to proceed from the nature of Government in general, and therefore must proceed with the same force in Seculars as Ecclesiasticals, there being no ingredient peculiarly relating to Religion, much less to Christianity, which might alter the case, or argue a disparity. For certainly Princes as well as Bishops are responsible for the miscarriage of their particular Subjects, as far as they may be prevented by their moral diligence; and yet you will not thence conclude, that every particular must come under his immediate personal care and cognizance; nor is it proved, that the Bishop is otherwise obliged to such a care upon peculiar respects. Besides that, it is plainly against experience even in Ecclesiasticals: for as it hath fallen out in some places where there were many Cities, that the Bishops were proportionably multiplied, as in Africa and Ireland; so that it was not upon account of the impossibility of the managing the charge of much greater multitudes than the Inhabitants of those small Cities, appears in that even in the very same places the greatness of no City was thought sufficient for multiplying the Bishops, though it was for the inferior Clergy. I need not tell you how great Rome was in Decius his time under Cornelius, and how full of Christians, which required the united endeavours of 1000 Clergy, as appears from the said Cornelius his Epistle to Fabius of Antioch in Eusebius; 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Cornel, ●d Fab. Ant. apud Euseb. Eccles. Hist. 6. 43.  yet was one Bishop thought sufficient for all, nay the erecting another Altar in the same Church was thought to be formal Schism, as appears from the Controversies betwixt Cornelius and Novatian, and S. Cyprian and Felicissimus. The same also might have been shown in several other Cities, exceeding numerous and abounding with Christians, as Antioch, Alexandria, and Carthage, etc. which even in those earlier Ages, when Discipline was at the greatest rigour, were yet governed by single Bishops. Nay, whole Nations were sometimes governed by one only, as the Goths by Ulphilas, and the Indians by Aedesius, and the Arabians by Moses; which is an Argument insisted on by some Presbyterians, for showing the probability of Ordinations by mere Presbyters. Yet are there no Complaints of dissolution of Discipline in such places, upon account of the greatness of their charge. Which to me seem sufficient Convictions, that the multitude of persons governed is not the reason of our present Neglects in that particular.  
§ IV WHEN I said that Ignatius his Epistles were questioned by the Presbyterians, I never said nor intended it concerning all (for I know of Vedelius his Apology for them) much less did I lay it particularly to your charge; so that if you had here forborn assuming to your self what was spoken of others, (many of whose Opinions I am confident you will not undertake to justify) there had been no occasion of this Exception. That other Presbyterians, and those by far the greatest number, have denied them, cannot be questioned.  
§ V AS for the Reasons of Nonconformity alleged by you and your Brethren of the Savoy Conference in 1660, if I might without offence presume to interpose my own thoughts, they are as followeth: For the approving, not only submitting to, such things as you disliked, and that by an oath, I am sure there are many Conformists themselves that understand no more to have been intended by the Church, but an exterior submission, not an internal approbation of the particulars. And particularly I have been informed by a Letter from a very worthy credible person, who pretends to have had it from the Bishop himself, that Bishop Sanderson, who was a Member of your Conference, interposed those words in the Act of Parliament, where it is required, that Ministers declare their unfeigned assent and consent to the use of all things in the Book of Common Prayer, etc. designedly that this Objection might be prevented. The new Article of Faith inserted in our Rubric I do not know, nor can I now get the Book that past betwixt you at the Conference, to know what you mean. That Lay-chancellors were disused, and that the Bishops did more consult their Presbyteries, I could for my own part heartily wish. But I cannot think these abuses momentous enough to warrant Schism; and I know yourself are for bearing with some things things that are not so well, rather than the Church of God should be divided for them. In brief, I do not understand any of the six Particulars mentioned as the reasons that keep you off, though you do indeed disapprove them, both because you do not undertake to determine what they might be to others, but only what they are to persons of your mind, (though I confess this might be understood as a modest declining to judge of others) and because you conceive piety the most likely means to unite us, which could not be if we imposed any thing on you against your Consciences. So that the only one that may be presumed to have been thought sufficient by you to this purpose seems to have been another, which because you intimate somewhat obscurely, I do not know whether you would be willing that it should be taken notice of. But however (I suppose) that itself does only deprive us of your Clerical, not your Laical Communion. God give us all to discern the things that belong unto peace. As for other Questions we may easily a wait our Lord's pleasure, who when he comes shall tell us all things; and in the mean time preserve charity, and be wise unto sobriety. I hope, Sir, you will excuse my freedom, and let me know whether I may in any thing be serviceable to you; and above all things reserve a portion in your Prayers for,  
Trin. Col. near Dublin. Your unfeigned Wellwisher, HENRY DODWELL.   

LETTER II.  
The Contents.  
Introduction. § 1. Quest. 1. Whether the Bishop be bound to discharge his whole duty in his own person? Or, Whether he may not take in the assistance of others? That he may, granted by Mr. Baxter. Quest. 2. waved by me. § 2. Mr. Baxter's reasons do as solidly disprove a possibility of Secular Discipline under a Secular Monarch, of a Precinct as large as a Diocese, as of Diocesan Discipline. § 3. Secular Monarches as well responsible for the miscarriage of particular Subjects as Bishops, and their charge is as great. The Persons, Crimes, and Laws, belonging to the care of the Secular Governor more numerous than they which belong to the Ecclesiastical. § 4, 5. So are the necessities to be provided for by the Secular Governor. § 6, 7, 8. An Objection prevented. § 9 Mr. Baxter's first answer refuted. The Government of a Diocese may be administered without any more than three Orders. § 10. The Church may for prudential reasons constitute new Officers, though not Orders. § 11. Mr. Baxter's second answer refuted. Personal Capacity as requisite in a Prince as in a Bishop. § 12. An Objection prevented. § 13. Mr. Baxter's third, fourth, and fifth answers refuted. § 14, 15. His sixth answer rejected. § 16. What I mean when I make the decretory power of Government proper to the Supreme, and the executive only to be communicated to inferior Governors. § 17. The decretory power of Government does not necessarily include personal or particular Exploration. § 18, 19 His seventh answer considered. Good men need Government as well as others. Their mistakes more dangerous to Government than the mistakes of others. § 20. Mr. Baxter's Objection in favour of me. His first answer refuted. § 21. His second answer refuted. Declaration is no act of power. § 22. The unbecomingness of Doctrines, so disparaging to Ecclesiastical Authority, to Mr. Baxter as a Curer of Church-divisions. § 23. The first Reformers at length sensible of the necessity of Church Authority to Peace and Discipline. § 24. Mr. Baxter's uncandid character of a Prelatic Christian. § 25. The use of external coercion in Religion is not to make men only dissemblers. § 26, 27, 28. No Discipline to be expected without a coercive power somewhere. § 29. The liberty desired by Mr. Baxter inconsistent with the principles of the Ignatian Episcopacy, so much recommended by himself on other occasions. § 30. Inconsistent with the Discipline of the Church described by Tertullian and Firmilian. § 31. Inconsistent with that of S. Cyprian. No reason why Mr. Baxter should desire to disown them from being parts of his Cure, who do not observe Rules of Discipline. § 32. My second Argument for the Possibility of Diocesan Discipline from the actual experience of former times. § 33. The notion of a Church for no more than are capable of the personal inspection of a single Presbyter, not proved to be of Divine Institution from Acts 14. 23. § 34, 35. His second and third answer refuted. The distribution of particular Cures to particular Presbyters, (from whence it comes to pass, that one Diocese includes many such Societies as are fitted for personal Communion) is more convenient than their governing the same multitudes in common. Very probably as ancient as they had settled places of Meeting. How ancient in the Churches of Rome and Alexandria. § 36. How vigorous notwithstanding Discipline was at that very time at Alexandria. § 37. His fourth answer refuted. § 38. His fifth answer refuted. § 39 His sixth answer refuted. § 40. His seventh answer refuted. The ancient Cities of the Roman Empire that had single Bishops were generally as great and populous as now. § 41, 42. The Ecclesiastical Government of those Cities proportioned to the Civil. § 43. Whether our Diocesans Office be a driving men to sin? § 44, 45, 46. His eighth answer refuted. Great Cities than had great numbers of Christians. Instanced in the Churches of Jerusalem, Samaria, Antioch, Antiochia Pisidiae, Thessalonica, Beroea, Ephesus. § 47. These were Churches in all likelihood designed by the Apostles themselves as precedents for others. The multitudes of Christians every where in the Roman Empire in the time of Tertullian. § 48. Instances of other Churches very numerous besides Rome and Alexandria. Neocaesarea, Carthage. The passage of S. Cyprian concerning his Contribution explained. § 49, 50. The ancient numerousness of Christians proved from Pliny. § 51. The possibility of their meeting in the same Assemblies. § 52. Several ways how greater numbers might communicate from the same Altar, than could ordinarily meet in the same Assemblies. § 53. S. Patrick's Dioceses not equivalent to our modern Parishes. § 54. My Argument from the numerousness of the Church of Rome in the time of Cornelius. His answers refuted. § 55. His endeavours to give an account how the Clergy than might have been numerous, though their people had been few. § 56. His first five answered. § 57 His sixth. § 58. His seventh. § 59 His eighth. § 60. His ninth. § 61. His tenth. § 62. No Instance of Mr. Baxter's notion of a Church of a Society under the Cure of one single Priest, but only in those two Churches of Rome and Alexandria, so much disowned in this very matter by himself. § 63. Ulphilas' Bishop of the whole Nation of the Goths. Whether an Arrian? § 64. Frumentius Bishop of the Indians, and Moses of the Arabians. The Christians of both more numerous than our single Parishes. § 65. His first answer refuted. § 56. His second answer refuted. § 67. A Conclusory Exhortation. § 68  
Reverend Sir,  
§ I AS I have before expressed my sorrow for dealing in such a Controversy that divides Communion with a person of your piety and candour, and from whom I am so unwilling to differ upon any tolerable terms; so I am withal glad that we can still maintain an unpassionate way of debating it, which for my part I conceive not only most Christian, but most useful and successful. It is only with this design that I am willing to continue it, wherein I hope you will not be displeased at me for venturing on that Liberty yourself are pleased to take, and which I hope through God's gracious assistance I shall never abuse. For my meaning is as much as is possible to abstain from all things personal, and to insist only on the way proposed by S. Augustine to Maximinus, Ut res cum re, causa cum causa, ratio cum ratione decertet. And here itself I shall endeavour to avoid the multitude of unnecessary controversies, that we may be more accurate in the discussion of such as shall remain.  
§ TWO THE principal controversy of your Letter is concerning the possibility of reviving Ecclesiastical Discipline under a Diocesan Episcopacy. Where I am glad to find that the Dispute seems rather derived from your forgetfulness of your own Concessions and mine, than any real difference of our Opinions, when clearly and candidly explained. For I can perceive only two things questioned betwixt us through your Letter. 1. Whether the Bishop be obliged in his own person to a particular care of all the Souls contained within his Jurisdiction, or whether he may not assume Assistants and Coadjutors dependent on himself, over whom he is to exercise the Office of a Bishop, that is, an Overseer: not to take the whole burden on himself, but to oblige them to the performance of their duty, and to punish their Delinquencies? 2. Whether supposing this Delegation lawful, Lay-Chancellors be fit to be entrusted with it?  
The former you seem to have yielded when you say; 
1.  If this had been all our Dispute, whether a Patriarch or Archbishop can rule 1000 Churches by 1000 inferior Bishops or Church-rulers, I had said something. Which is indeed the only thing asserted by me in my Proofs, and the very Case in practice, no Bishop undertaking the particular Cure of a whole Diocese, without the assistance of his particular respective Parochians. When therefore you ask, Whether it follows that our Church-Monarch can oversee all himself, without any Suboverseers, or rule them (by God's Word on the conscience) without any Subrulers? Sure you cannot mean that this is the Practice of our Diocesans. And if your design be to assert, that every Clergyman is bound to a particular personal care of all within his Limits, and therefore ought not to undertake a Cure too great for his personal cognizance, and which he cannot manage without Assistants; this should have been more directly proved than your Letter attempts. So also for the second, 
2.  Whether supposing this Assistance lawful, it were fit to be entrusted to Lay-chancellors? I expressly declined that question, (if you had remembered it;) as also, Whether it were expedient that the Bishop's Government were so Monarchical, as to exclude the counsel of Presbyters. But though we be thus agreed in the main (if not the whole) difficulty, if rightly explained; yet your Arguments and Answers, if allowed, do so consequently overthrow your concessions themselves, as that it is easy to observe how heat of Discourse does transport you beyond the equity of your more composed thoughts.  
§ III IF I may therefore securely take it for granted, that a Bishop with many Subrulers (and such are the particular Parish Ministers) may govern a Diocese of as large extent at least as ours are, as your words seem to grant; I can then imagine no possible difficulty concerning the possibility of reviving Discipline under a Diocesan Government.  
For by Discipline, I suppose, we mean nothing but good Laws punctually executed, both of which are necessarily implied in the nature of good Government. Either therefore you must deny that such good Laws, and such punctual Execution, may be had under such a Diocesan Government; and than you will destroy the possibility of such Government, contrary to your own concession; or you must say that such Government may be maintained without good Laws or punctual Execution, which is alike absurd to affirm concerning a good Government, concerning which alone we are at present disputing. But because I find by some of your other Works, that you do indeed deny a possibility of Discipline under a Diocesan Government, nay sometimes deny the lawfulness of communicating with a Diocesan Church as Diocesan; perhaps this Confession may have slipped from you unawares, so that it may not be safe to take you at your word. If this later be your case, (as methinks it must, if there be any real controversy betwixt us) all that at present I am willing to undertake, (that I may not enlarge beyond necessity) is the Examination of your Answers to the Reasons produced in my former Letter. My first Reason is therefore for proving the possibility of Discipline under a Monarchical Diocesan, in the sense there and here already explained (which I could gladly wish you would keep in mind for preventing misunderstandings on your part, and unnecessary repetitions on mine) was, that your Reasons being not drawn from testimony, or any positive and peculiar prescriptions, which might make the case singular; but from reason, and that not particularly drawn from the nature of Government as Ecclesiastical, but general, from the principles of Government as such) will proceed as strongly against the possibility of Secular Discipline under a Secular, as Ecclesiastical under an Ecclesiastical Monarch. Seeing therefore that in a Secular Monarchy as absolute as the Ecclesiastical we speak of, and as remote from a possibility of a cognizance of all particulars, and of a much larger extent than any Diocese, Secular Discipline may notwithstanding be preserved: it must needs follow, that no Reasons of this kind can prove it impossible under such an Ecclesiastical Monarchy, as is the subject of our present Discourse. Nay, as it hence appears possible, not only upon particular accounts, but simply, as having been actually performed under Secular Monarchies: So it must upon these principles be presumed actually performable in Ecclesiasticals, which will not only evince the falsehood of your Reasons, but also the truth of the contrary assertion. In this Argument you seem to grant (what is also proved in my Letter from the Instance of David's Kingdom of Israel, and good Government of it, (which I thought least liable to exception) that Secular Discipline is preservable under Secular Monarchy. That also what agrees to Ecclesiastical Government, not by virtue of any peculiar Ingredients as Ecclesiastical, but by virtue of the common principles of Government in general, must agree to all other Governments; as also, on the contrary, that what agrees to other Forms of Government upon the like general accounts, must likewise agree to that which is Ecclesiastical; are so clear, that as I do not perceive that what you say tends to the denial of it, so I do not think it worth my time to prove it. The only thing therefore remaining, which you seem to question in your Answer is, that the Reasons produced by you proceed on Principles peculiar to Ecclesiastical Government as such. For your principal endeavour is to show a disparity, why, though Secular Discipline be indeed maintainable under a Secular Monarchy, yet Ecclesiastical must not be presumed to be so under an Ecclesiastical. For which you refer me to my Lord Bacon; and your own Letter to Ludovicus Molinaeus, besides what you add to that purpose in your present Letter. For the very supposal of a Disparity does necessarily proceed on peculiar Considerations, and is directly repugnant to the notion of general and common Principles. Now to let you understand that your Reasons do indeed proceed on principles common to all Government of the same number of persons and extent of place, as that of the largest of our Dioceses, Secular as well as Sacred. I need only to invert those Topics of duty; which because you think impossible that they should be discharged, you thence infer an impossibility of Ecclesiastical Discipline, that you may see that none of those same Instances of duty are to be exempted from the Cure of the Secular Magistrate.  
§ IV I BELIEVE you will not question but that every Secular Magistrate is as responsible for his Cure as the Ecclesiastical; and that this Cure is not so general, but that all particular Misdemeanours of particular persons, that are capable of an exterior cognizance, both as to their prevention and punishment are comprehended under it. If so, then certainly, 1. As many persons will belong to the Care of the Civil, as the Ecclesiastical Government; nay, generally more, seeing that in the same precincts it is true what Optatus Milevitanus tells us, 
Contra Parm. l. 3.  that the Church is contained in the Commonwealth, not the Commonwealth in the Church; there being no Members of the Church not liable to the Civil Government, but many in the Commonwealth not being subject to the Church, as Pagans, Jews, mahometans, and other Infidels. And, 2. At least as many crimes will come under Secular as Ecclesiastical cognizance, nay generally more, both as to the individuals and kinds of Crimes. As to the individuals, because those who are not obnoxious to the power of the Church, as Infidels, are to be presumed generally more careless of themselves, and less capable of good impressions, as wanting those most powerful Motives for reclaiming men from a vicious course of life, which are taught by the Doctrines of Christianity. And as to the kinds of Crimes. For as for the Law of Nature, the punishment of Offences against that will as properly belong to the Magistrate as the Bishop, and that not only as to the Second Table, (which does professedly concern Crimes against Secular Conversation) but also the First, as far as it relates to Natural Religion, the Interest of the State being so nearly involved in that of Religion, especially as far as it is natural, as that all Obligation of conscience is derived from thence, which is incomparably a better Preservative of the Prince's Rights, than that of external force. As for the positive Laws of the State, they are far more numerous than those of Christianity; according to those who make the Scripture an adequate Rule of such Positives. For how extremely do these fall short of those Volumes of Codes and Pandects; Charters and Statutes, Civil and Municipal, of all the distinct subordinat Societies to which every particular person is related, by multiplication whereof his duties and possible offences must be proportionably multiplied? That I may not now mention all the extemporary provisional commands which are acknowledged obligatory, (even to the sinfulness of such disobediences) by virtue of the general Subjection due to ordinary and extraordinary Superiors? But yet the positive impositions of the Scriptures themselves, which may be conceived ordinarily and eternally obligatory to sin, are extremely short of the Voluminousness of the Canonical Writers themselves. For deduct first all those passages that are purely historical; for as for the obligation of Scripture-precedent, which is so much insisted on by some, themselves dare not maintain it in the utmost latitude. Nor have they yet established such Notes, whereby we might discern when we are concerned in them, and when we are not: and when we are, when only its imitation is commendable, and when its omission is directly sinful; what is obligatory in all circumstances, and what only in some particular ones; what are all the circumstances requisite for such obligation, and how we may know when they concur particularly in our present case; when their obligation arises from the authority; and when only from the prudence of their Author; when they oblige as Laws, and when only as Rules; when upon account of the authority of the person, and when only of the reason of the thing. For when this obligation is derived from the reason of the thing, (as I might have proved it generally to be either as to the establishment of the Rule, or at least as to its application to the particular case to be ruled by it) than it cannot be proved without recourse to other Laws of Nature or Prudence, or positive Constitutions; so that such precedents will not increase the number of Scripture-obligations. Deduct also all promises and threats, all exhortations and dehortations, which are not themselves precepts, but suppose the proof of the precepts which they concern by other mediums. And, even of that small part of the Scripture, which after these deductions will still remain properly preceptive, which (for the Old Testament) does according to the computation of the Rabbins, who are most minutely critical in such punctilios, amount to no more than 643, including both affirmatives and negatives. If we still further consider, how many of them are only positive enforcements of natural Laws, and so reducible to the forementioned consideration; how many of them that are positive concern the Jews, not as a Church, but as a Commonwealth; how all of them that concern them as a Church, are now evacuated by that Evangelical Liberty, which has abrogated the Mosaic Authority, from which they derived their Sanction; how, even of the New Testament prescriptions, many are only provisional, and only grounded on temporary reasons, and those such as are not suitable to our present times and places; how many are confessedly antiquated, and how hard it is to distinguish Apostolical Connivanee from Approbations, their Approbations from Constitutions, their Constitutions as of ordinary Governors, and their Traditions as extraordinarily sent and impowered by our Saviour, for the eternal and unalterable obligation of the Catholic Church. When all these things, I say, are considered and allowed for, the positive Constitutions of the Scripture, which may oblige us antecedently to the Church's Imposition, (which the persons I am speaking of do not value) and that to sin, will be extremely short of the number of Secular Laws.  
§ V AND though we should, to increase the number, add the Ecclesiastical Laws to those of the Scriptures; yet neither so would they exceed the Secular. For to make this comparison with Justice, we should, 1. Compare only such Ecclesiastical Laws, as do not derive their force from any civil Sanctions: For they that do must needs suppose those civil Sanctions at least as numerous as themselves, and therefore cannot be presumed to over-number them. And this consideration will be extended not only to such Instances, wherein Ecclesiastical Persons exercise a Power confessedly dependent on the Concessions of Princes, as in Marriages, and Wills and Testaments, and the certain proportion of the Ecclesiastical maintenance, etc. but also to those spiritual crimes, more immediately relating to their cognizance, as established under Secular Penalties, which will the jure include all affairs of that nature in Christian Commonwealths, where the Prince is acknowledged to be custos utriusque juris, and de facto does include the Ecclesiastical Constitutions of our Kingdoms, where the Clergy are not only by Law, but by promise in King Henry the Eighth his time, (as far as that promise can oblige their Successors) obliged to make no Laws without the Secular permission. Seeing therefore that (with us at least) there are no Ecclesiastical Laws but what are seconded by the Secular, but many Secular not seconded by Ecclesiastical; it must needs follow, that Secular Laws, and consequently Crimes, must be more numerous than such as are Ecclesiastical. But, 2. Abate even out of the Jus Pontificium, 
Petr. de Marca de Concord. Sac. & Imp. l. 3. c. 6.  which has swelled to the greatest Voluminousness in this kind, not only such things as are undertaken by Ecclesiastical persons by the favour of Princes, but such as are usurped against their express consent; and wherein the Romish Clergy, who have so exceeded in this kind, cannot the jure challenge any Legislative power; and the number of such Laws will yet extremely decrease. And, 3. All such Laws as are grounded on Ecclesiastical Usurpation, such as are all those which abridge the power of ordinary Bishops, and ascribe all to the omnipotency of the Roman See, which seems to be the principal scandal that first alienated Spalleto from them. I need not instance particulars of this kind, whose Titles abound with them as those of reserved Cases, of Exemptions, of Appeals from without the Limits of the Roman Patriarchate, etc. And 4. All such Laws as are grounded on false Doctrines, as those against the use of the Cup in Laical Communion, against reading the Scriptures, concerning Indulgences, and the like practices grounded on the supposal of Purgatory, etc. And, 5. All such as are misbecoming the candour and equity of a Christian Church: such as are all those relating to the Inquisition, in relation to the delation and punishment of the persons and suppressing the Books of Heretics, etc. the very things the Catholics under the persecutions complained of, as unequal in the Pagans, and prejudicial to all just Information. And, 6. All, even indifferent, Constitutions which, though lawful to be obeyed, are yet either imprudent as to the things, or burdensome as to their number, and therefore unnecessary to be imposed; for if S. Augustine complained, that even in his time the Constitutions of this kind exceeded the servitude of the Law, we may do it much more justly now, when they are incomparably more numerous. These things, I say, and the like being retrenched, and no more being left, than what are absolutely necessary for the Government, of a Church, reform from all encroachments and abuses, would reduce the Ecclesiastical Laws into a narrow compass; as we find them in the several Codices Ecclesiae Universae Romanae & Africanae, which though extremely short of the Voluminousness of the present Canon Law, yet were thought sufficient for several Centuries, before the ambitions and factiousness of private Prelates had dissolved the unity of the Catholic Church.  
§ VI AND as the Crimes have thus appeared more numerous, that come under the cognizance of the Civil than Ecclestastical Governors; so also, 3. The necessities to be provided for by the Magistrate are so too. Thus Mary's better part (which was Religion) is represented by our Saviour himself as a solicitousness only for one thing necessary; whereas Martha was troubled about many things. For Religion teaches us an indifferency as to our desires, and an unconcernedness as to events, and a confident acquiescency in God for our temporal provision, the efficacious procurement and security whereof is the design of temporal Laws. It preserves us from many or great designs, from all ambitions or competitions, from all resentment and impatience of injuries; and for such persons very few Laws will prove sufficient, for direction only, not for coercion: for the Apostle tells us, that the Law is not for the righteous. And as the Necessities are thus certainly fewer in persons of an eminent perfection in Religion, so the means of bringing them to that perfection are fewer and easier than those of a secular conversation; it being much easier to curb our own desires, which is the design of Religion, than to curb the world and the course of providence, which are many times necessary for their gratification; which is the design of the world. Besides, that the good things of Religion are not like those of the world, the less to particulars for being communicated to many, which is the great occasion of those many controversies concerning meum and tuum, which make the ears of men so intricate, and their Laws so very voluminous. And though the things themselves were more obnoxious to injury than they are, yet the persons are not so inclinable to offer it; Religion much more effectually uniting and endearing its Professors, than the most excellent humane Laws. To which may be added, that in case of incorrigibleness the Church is much more easily cleared of the prejudice of a corrupt member, than the Commonwealth. The Church is sufficiently cleared of his scandal by disowning him, and excluding him from Communion, and the blessings consequent thereunto; but the State is never secure from suffering by him while he lives, which is much the more difficult case.  
§ VII IT had been very easy for me to have added many more difficulties in the Secular Government of a multitude, which have not place in the Ecclesiastical; and that without the partiality of insisting only on the conveniences of one part, and only on the inconveniences of the other, (which I confess very fallacious and unfit for a faithful representation of the Cause) but in such Instances as might be competent for an absolute and equal sentence concerning the whole. Nay, I might have insisted on your own Topics, and shown you, 1. The many Requisites for making a good Subject, and wherein more positive Laws are concerned, than in making a good Christian. First, many Laws of the Commonwealth concern Marriages, that there may be no injury to the Friends or the Persons concerned, or the Children. When the Children are begotten, there are further Laws for preserving them in the womb; and when they are born, for securing them from murder or exposing, or unwholesome nourishment, or vicious education. The oeconomical charge of Education does require more care and constant attendance of the Nurse than is ever pretended or required from any Minister in the conversion of Souls. Many are the casualties of their childish Follies, many the distempers of their irregular Actions, many the dangers they can neither avoid nor complain of, to such as might prevent or remedy them. And yet for all these their Nurses are made responsible if they happen by their negligence. Nay, so great is this care for some years, as to take up the whole time of the Nurse, which the conversion of no sinner does of a Minister. Yet certainly you would not think your own Argument good if I should apply it here. If the nursing of one child take up the whole time of one person, than what one person can be able to govern as many children as are in ordinary Families? And if this Government of many children appear thus impossible to one person, then much more that of a Family, of a Corporation, of a City, of a Province, etc. And if to avoid this you reply, that although every Master of a family be not able personally to discharge the duty of governing many children, yet he can by his authority oblige the Nurses and Tutors to do their duty, and so at least mediately govern them; (as the King, though he cannot possibly be personally present in all places of his Dominions, where it is necessary that Justice be administered, can yet command such as may, and punish them upon non-performance of their duty, which Subordination and Delegation may be so contrived, as that they who come under his more immediate personal inspection may be proportionable enough to the Abilities of one man;) I pray consider whether the case be not exactly the same here: For if one Minister be able to govern 400, which is the lowest number mentioned by you as in a Parish, then why may not a Bishop govern 400 Ministers? especially considering that the Government of a Bishop over his Clergy, is only in general to see that they do their duty, and does not require so particular an inspection into their performances, as that of a Minister over his Parishioners. For it is much easier for a Bishop to inform himself, whether a Minister perform the duty of his Cure, whether of Preaching, or Praying, or Visiting, and whether he be of a good repute, or at least not scandalous, with his Parishioners; than for a Minister not only to inform himself of those Quaere's concerning each of his flock, whether they discharge their calling justly and conscientiously, and what means may be used for their recovery in case of their default, who are not so easily to be cast out of the Ministers care by Excommunication, as scandalous Ministers are out of the Bishops by deprivation. Besides his catechizings of the ignorant, and his admonitions of the knowing, and his resolutions of perplexed consciences, and his awaiting fit opportunities and circumstances for rendering his persuasions more prevalent, are most expensive of time, and yet are not so absolutely necessary to be critically observed in Government, (where the public Service may be promoted by other Instruments, if persuasions prove unsuccesful) as in private discourses, where the personal advantage of the party concerned is principally intended.  
§ VIII BUT then if you would be pleased to consider further, how few Parishes are so little peopled as to consist only of 400, and how few Dioceses consist of so many Ministers that have proper and distinct Cures; how that usually the most eminent men for Parts and Action are, or should be, chosen Bishops, many of them upon personal regards able to perform the work of many ordinary Ministers, and may well be presumed extraordinary, considering the great advantage for choice from the disproportion of their number, so few Bishops being to be chosen out of so many Ministers. If you would consider further how untrue it is, that the dispensation of discipline, even as it is practised, is managed by the Bishop alone, who has his inferior Officers for preparing things for his cognizance, besides the direction of learned Lawyers for his assistance in point of counsel, (which is the main reason that may be pretended, for proving the Government of many better than that which is Monarchical;) and for counsel in this kind the Clergy themselves are not qualified as Clergymen, but as Lawyers, but would have much more of this assistance, according to my Book, where I have professed myself desirous, that the Bishops would more communicate the great Affairs of Government with their Clergy, which I confess I think more agreeable to the primitive Form. If, I say, you had considered these things, you would find Discipline much more practicable under a Diocesan, than a Secular Monarchy. And I wish you would consider whether your Arguments will not proceed with the same force; I do not say only against those numerous Parishes of 30000 or 50000 persons, which is a greater number than I believe are in some of our Irish Dioceses, especially if only Protestants be accounted, (and yet you do not pretend a duty of separating from the communion of such Parishes, as you do from our communion as Diocesan; though certainly a Bishop with a multitude of Clergy, more subject to him than ordinary Curates are to their principal Parsons, is much more able for the Government of a Diocese, than an ordinary Minister, wanting such advantages, is for the Government of such a Parish) but against Provincial and National Classes also. For it is as impossible for every particular Elder of even a Provincial Class, which were often of larger extent than our Dioceses, to inform himself particularly of every person and cause to be brought before him, so as to be able to judge distinctly of their merit, as for a Diocesan Bishop. And I can perceive nothing that may with any plausibility be pretended there, that may not with as much force be urged here.  
§ IX IF it be pretended that there is a multitude who have their distinct Governments in their respective precincts mutually independent on each other, some of whom by advantage of their neighbourhood may have opportunity of informing themselves particularly of every cause belonging to their Jurisdiction. The same may be pretended here, the same number of Clergy being employed under a Diocesan, as under a Classical Government. But it is withal clear, that a much greater number of them will, even in such Classes, prove incapable of that advantage of personal information, who yet would not be denied their decisive vote on the testimony of others. And in all Polyarchical Governments the suffrages of the major part is as decretory as that of a single person, in that which is Monarchical; so that still the Government is managed without particular information. If their multitude be urged for the security of their counsel, that is had also here, especially in the Hypothesis defended by me, where Presbyters are joined in Government with the Bishops. But with this advantage in our case, that the same security of counsel is here joined with expediteness in its decision and execution, and security from equal suffrages, the want of which do oftentimes more prejudice polyarchical Societies, than the security of their counsels do avail them. And it is plainly as impossible, if not more, for any Class, which can only be convened occasionally, to execute its own Decrees without Delegation as for the Bishop.  
§ X YOUR answers for showing the disparity betwixt Civil and Ecclesiastical Government, as many of them as are true, (for all are not) do only prove a disparity on other accounts, (which is not denied) but not such a one as may hinder the governableness of the same multitude by an Ecclesiastical, and that in foro exteriori, (which is the only question I am concerned in at present) which is acknowledged governable by a Secular Magistrate. You have neither any thing of reason, nor of any positive revelation of God, which might make such a multitude less governable, by reason of some liberties restrained in the Church, but allowed in the Commonwealth. Your 1. is, that the standing of the Magistrates office is by the Law of Nature, which therefore alloweth variety and mutations of inferior Orders, as there is cause. But the standing of the Clergy is by supernatural institution; our Book of Ordination telling us, that there are three Orders, etc. Whence you conclude, that men may not alter them, or make more of the same kind. The force of this Answer, as far as I can apprehend it, seems to consist in these two things; 1. That the government of a Diocese cannot be administered without more than three Orders, for those three, you seem to allow from the Book of Ordination; and, 2. That it is not in the power of the Church to institute new Orders besides the three already established, though it be in the power of the State to innovate as they please by reason of the disparity by you mentioned. The former is so manifestly false, as that if ever Discipline were observed ever since the government of the Church was Diocesan, (which is hard to deny, since it has been Diocesan as far as Ecclesiastical History can inform us) it was under these three Orders. Nay, the Presbyterians pretend their Classical Discipline to be maintainable by one Order alone, for Deaconship they make only a kind of civil office for disposing of the alms of the Church. So sufficient they account the Subordination of particular persons singly considered to the same persons, as considered collectively in an Assembly, without any distinction of Orders for Government. And why the Precedent of these Presbyteries, though not of a distinct Order, as most of the Schoolmen, and many of the Episcopal Authors, maintain, especially those of the old Prelatists, (as yourself have elsewhere observed) may not upon the same terms maintain Discipline, for my part I cannot understand. The ground, I believe, of your mistake is, that in the administration of our Prelatic Episcopacy you have observed some other Officers of prudential Ecclesiastical Constitution, which are entrusted with Jurisdiction, as Deans, Archdeacon's, Vicar's General, Lay-chancellors, etc. which you mistake for Orders, because they have different duties in the subordination of the policy of the Church. But, 1. I do not doubt but that you know better than I can tell you, that even Diocesan Government, as Diocesan, may and has been actually administered without them in the primitive times. Some of them being of civil constitution, for administering the power of the Prince in the exterior government of the Church, as he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (that I may use the language of Constantine the Great) and all of them of prudential use, only convenient, not simply necessary, even in the opinion of them that use them. And 2. You cannot pretend, that the addition of new Officers (though possibly unlawful upon other accounts, yet) should make the Discipline of a populous precinct less, but rather more maintainable. For certainly in such a case the multitude of Officers is an advantage. And let me entreat you to remember that this is the real question, not Whether Diocesan Government be constituted by God, but Whether Discipline be maintainable under it. But, 3. Suppose it as inconvenient as you please, even for the maintenance of Discipline, (which I am not willing at present to digress to) nay even unlawful to be introduced by Governors; yet how can it be proved that it is lawful for Subjects to undertake its Reformation without and against the consent of Governors? And how can they be excused, even in such a case, for refusing passive obedience; for separating from them, and joining with Parties form in opposition to them? Which seems to be your case in separating from our Communion as Diocesan, and communicating with such who have cast off their obedience, and united themselves in a communion opposite to their original Superiors? And, 4. You may be pleased to consider, that as we do not call all these prudential Offices Orders, so there is no reason why we should do so in the Ecclesiastical notion of the word. For not now to make use of that distinction betwixt Order and Jurisdiction, which is generally followed by the Ancient and Modern Popish Schoolmen, that Order is circa corpus Christi mysticum, and Jurisdiction circa corpus Christi verum, according whereunto these offices will differ in Jurisdiction, not in Order. It is plain, that every rank of men in Ecclesiastical Assemblies, are not by the Presbyterians themselves accounted distinct Orders, as Scribes, Moderators, Lay-Elders, etc. But only such as by a distinct solemn consecration have a distinct power given them for the dispensation of divine graces, not to be deprived or repealed as to its original right, though it may be restrained as to its actual execution. In which sense it is plain, that these Offices neither are, nor suppose a distinction of Orders.  
§ XI BUT then for the second proposition supposed in your Answers, That the Church has not power of constituting new Orders; though I doubt not you understand what Conclusion may be inferred from the Doctrine of that ingenious person, who has professedly disproved Dr. Stillingfleet's all divine unalterable right of any certain form of Church-government, because I confess myself not to be of his mind; yet if you mean by Orders all deputation even of Ecclesiastical persons to particular offices, executive of their general power; then I think you have no way disproved prudential Innovations in that kind. Nay, I doubt not but that it were easy to instance in all other Sects, as well as the Presbyterians, that have any face of Government, unscriptural Officers. The Scripture has not used the word, and therefore cannot be pretended to have condemned. Nor has the Church ever understood it in this sense, when she has owned but three or two Holy Orders. But if by Orders you mean the limited sense of the Church of that word, than I confess they are not multipliable by the Church, but conceive I have shown the no-necessity of it in our Prelatic Diocesan Government.  
§ XII YOUR second disparity is, That Kingly Power requireth not, ad dispositionem materiae, such persnal ability as the pastoral office doth. That a child may be a King, and that it may serve turn if he be but the Head of Power, and give others commission to do all the rest of the governing work. But it is not so with a Judge, a Physician, an Orator, or a Bishop, who is not subjectum capax of the essence of the office without personal aptitude. This seems to me a plain mistake even in the judgement of those Nations which are governed by an hereditary Monarchy, who do not suffer their Princes, whilst children, to intermeddle; I do not say in the executive (which belongs not to them as absolute Princes) but in the decretory parts of their Government, (which is their Royalty) but oblige them to perform all by Regent's and Protectors, till themselves come to the years of personal aptitude, in the mean time reserving them only the honour, without the power of a King. And this sense of the necessity of personal abilities, as it appears from the Scripture, which accounts those Nations miserable that are under such Princes, and the nature of the Office itself, which is as chargeable with the miscarriages of their Subjects as ecclesiastics, as is excellently discoursed by Socrates in Xenophon; 
Mon. Soci.  so the avoiding such defects in regard of personal Incapacity seems to be the reason of all those Nations who have made their Government elective; and even of those which are hereditary, who have excluded persons notoriously incapable, or at least so judged by them, as Fools in all places, Women in France, and even such as are judged fit in regard of natural endowments, till they come to be so personally. That children therefore are any where permitted the honour of Kings, is not because that they think them sufficiently qualified, or that they think it convenient to stand to the hazardous contingency of their future qualifications; but that it is accounted a less evil so to be assured of their person, than to expose themselves to the danger of Civil Wars and Seditions on that account, if it were managed by popular election. And accordingly those Nations themselves only make those Offices hereditary, which being supreme are supposed, in the interregna, not to leave a Power sufficiently preservative of the public peace. Otherwise they that are consistent with such a Power, are even among them Elective, as all inferior Magistracies. And upon these accounts of avoiding greater inconveniences, it is not repugnant to the Ecclesiastical Magistracy as such, to be hereditary, as appears from the High Priesthood among the Jews, which yet you will not conclude not to have required personal abilities. But still your comparison of a Prince wanting personal abilities with a Bishop having them, are not methinks to the purpose, for showing a greater multitude to be governable by such a Prince, than such a Bishop. Nay, certainly in such a case the advantage will lie on the Bishop's side, personal abilities being much more sufficient for the discharge of such a trust, than the want of them. Nor will it be sufficient for you to reply, That the defect of personal abilities in a Prince is supplied by the assistances of his substitute Governors, whose united aids are more considerable than the personal abilities of any single Bishop. For it will be requisite for making the comparison even, that the Bishop as well as the Prince be considered with the like assistances of Substitutes; and then the advantage will still remain as formerly on the Bishop's side. For certainly the Bishop having personal abilities to judge of the sufficiency of his Substitues, and to call them to an account in case of their default, must needs be able to perform more work than such a Prince, who must not be supposed able to assure himself of the sufficiency or honesty of his inferior Officers.  
§ XIII IF it be pretended, that Princes have power to nominate such Substitutes, but that Bishops have not; and therefore that the comparison is rightly form betwixt Princes with their Substitutes, and Bishops singly considered; I pray remember, 1. That the question is not, Whether Bishops may lawfully use Substitutes, but what were possible to be performed by them in the nature of the thing. For of this kind were your Arguments from the many requisites for dealing with a single Soul, much more will so many Souls as are included in a Parish, and more yet for as many Parishes as are comprehended in a Diocese. These, I say, if they prove any thing, prove the impossibility of discipline in a Diocesan Government, not only its unlawfulness; and the proving its possibility not only lawfulness, was my design in this Argument drawn from the good Government of Secular Monarchy. Now this is clearly granted me in this Answer. For if a Prince without personal abilities may yet govern a Kingdom by his Substitutes, much more might a Bishop with the like Substitutes, and personal abilities besides. And, 2. It is plainly the case in practice among us, for Bishops to govern their Dioceses not alone, but by the assistance of other Officers, besides the distinct subordinate Parochians. And to this Government as thus established, I believe you objected the impossibility of discipline. And, 3. The lawfulness of such Substitution was, you know, the thing principally debated; and therefore you ought not so confidently to have urged your sense of it as a disparity.  
§ XIV YOUR third and fourth disparities are only against Bishops substituting Laymen; which because I did not undertake to defend, shall not look on myself as further concerned in. Your fifth is, That either it is the Bishop's work that is delegated by him, or some other. If properly his own, then either he maketh more Bishops, (and that you say is all you plead for) or else a Presbyter or Layman may do a Bishop's proper work; and then what need of a Bishop? This is an Exception so easily answered, as that I verily persuade myself, that such a Wit as yours is would have easily defended us against it, if it had been objected by another Adversary. And if I might be so bold, I would humbly beg you not to exercise your wit, in bringing needless and weak Arguments ex abundanti, but only to insist on such as are in your own judgement convictive. For certainly if you had but cursorily reflected on this Argument, you would readily have discerned, that this is so far from being a disparity, as that indeed (if it prove any thing) it will proceed with as much force against the possibility of Secular Discipline under a Civil Government of the same extent with a Diocese. For may it not as well be urged against the power of Delegation in a Prince, that either it must be his own work that is delegated by him, or some other? If that which is properly his own, than he must either make many Princes, (which were directly destructive to his Monarchical Government) or else he who is no Prince may do a Prince's work, and then what need of a Prince? Besides that, your pretended Contradiction will proceed with as much force here as in the Church. Consider, I pray, what you would answer in behalf of a Secular Monarch, and see whether it will not be equally appliable to that which is Ecclesiastical. I believe yourself would deny, that every inferior Officer, who is delegated to do the Prince's work, is thereby made a Prince, seeing that though he do exert the same power, yet he does not do it adequatly (some Acts of grace being still reserved to the Prince's person incommunicably;) or if adequately, yet at least not independently, all other Officers being subject to the supreme. For these two are the formal constitutives of a Prince's power as such; so that they who want them, how many soever of his commands are executed, or how much soever of his power is administered by them, will not therefore prove formal Princes. Besides that, upon these Principles it may be affirmed, that though the Prince may indeed employ others in all the Services of the Commonwealth; yet it does not thence necessarily follow, that he delegates that which is properly his own work. For to do all things himself is so far from being his proper, as that it is none of his work as a Prince, but only to take care that the supreme Officers entrusted under him do their duty, and to punish them in case of default; so that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or irresponsible power, is that which is proper to him, and which if it be communicated to others, must make them also Princes; and this care of obliging others to the performance of their duties is so inseparable a Royalty of the Supreme Power, as that those Princes who have entrusted others with it, have been judged by all prudent persons Princes only in name, not in effect, as Chilperick of France, Sardanapalus, etc. This proper work therefore of the Prince being reserved to himself incommunicably, it will plainly appear that this Deputation will not supersede the necessity of the supreme Monarch; and that there will be no contradiction in the case, the inferior Officers still remaining Subjects, not Princes, notwithstanding whatsoever Deputation that does not make them absolute and unaccountable, and unobnoxious to the care and cognizance of the Supreme. The Application to our present case is easily made. For when I mentioned the Delegation of the Bishop's power to particular Parochians, I only meant such a subordinate power for governing their respective Parishes, as Viceroys and Lieutenants have under Secular Monarches for the Government of particular Provinces; but this subordinate power is so far from being the proper work of a Bishop as such, as that it would make him no Bishop to suppose it in him at all. That therefore which is proper to a Bishop as such, that is, the power of compelling the Parochians to the performance of their duties, is not communicated to any Parochian; and when it has been communicated to any simple Presbyters, it has been counted as great an effeminacy and betraying of their power, as the like case in Seculars was reputed in the Secular Princes now mentioned. For this was the occasion of the Abolition of the Coepiscopi about the ninth Century, that the Bishops made use of them as pretences for their own sloth in the performance of their own duties. If therefore any thing of this kind have crept in in the later ages, I will not defend it; but only shall desire you to remember, that it is not pertinent to your design of making all Presbyters as such, without any such particular deputation, equal with them; and that your Arguments, if they proved any thing, are more directly leveled against Diocesan Episcopacy as such, without any such abusive deputation.  
§ XV BUT this at present may suffice to show, that that power which is by the Bishops permitted to Parish Ministers, does not make them Bishops, nor make them who are so properly unnecessary; which methinks yourself might easily have understood, if you had but reflected on what yourself know concerning its practice among us, without such dilemmatical uncertainties, which would make one think you a stranger to it. The other member of your dilemma you do not prosecute, whether because you forgot it, or that you thought it of itself sufficiently evident, I know not; I suppose your Argument would have been, that if the power delegated by the Bishop to the inferior Clergy were none of his own, than he could not delegate it, seeing that none can justly dispose of that which is not his own. To this the Answer is easy, from the parallel power of Princes already insisted on, that this power is the Bishops the same way as that of inferior Magistrates is the supreme Princes, not to be executed by his own person, but by others obnoxious to his election and censures, which is sufficient to show, that the disposal of it is his, though not the Execution.  
§ XVI YOUR sixth Answer, which you call your chief one, is that which I before observed to be a Concession of all that I pretended to prove, that a Bishop with inferior Church-rulers can govern a scope as large as a Diocese. But when in application of it to our purpose you ask, Whether it follows, that our Church-Monarch can oversee them all himself, without any Suboverseers, or rule them (by God's Word on the Conscience) without any Subrulers. I wonder that you should seem so to forget the practice of our Ministers of ruling our Parishes as Subrulers under the Bishop. It may be your meaning is, that our Parish Ministers were not allowed a part in the Supreme Government of their Churches, as if that were sufficient to deny the name of proper Church-rulers. But you might have remembered, 1. That my desire was, that the Bishops, as in S. Cyprians time so now, would more communicate their affairs of any considerable importance with their Presbytery. And, 2. That even according to the Rubrics of our Church the Parish Minister or Curate is allowed the power, not only of dissuading, (which yet is all that is allowed the Church by several of our Nonconforming Brethren) but also of hindering notorious ill livers and uncharitable persons from the Communion, only with a provision that they signify such their proceedings to the Ordinary within fourteen days at the furthest, which was no more than necessary for keeping them to the notion of Sub, not principal Rulers. This quick and easy dispatch in case of the Ministers concurrence, would make one wonder at your complaints concerning the dilatory proceedings of the Ecclesiastical Courts in this affair, if the Clergy could be persuaded to be unanimous and vigorous in the performance of their duty. And, 3. As it is plain that there are many Subrulers under Princes, who are not of their Privy Council; so you cannot therefore conclude the Parish Ministers not to be Subrulers under the Bishop even now, because all great affairs are not originally transacted by their Council. Nay, 4. Yourself confess Legislation itself to be communicated to the inferior Clergy in the Lower House in Convocations, when they make Canons, which are Church-Laws. And this which is one of the highest acts of Government being communicated to them, can you yet complain of their exclusion from Government?  
WHEN I described the Ecclesiastical Monarchy I spoke of, 
§ XVII  to be such as does appropriate the decretory power of Government to it, communicating only the executive to others, you bid me hold to that. What your meaning is thereby I do not know; for neither do you seem to persuade me to hold to it as truth, seeing you afterwards seem to dislike it. Nor can I think that you would have me to hold to an error, that you might have advantage of disputing against me. What you except against a mere Executioner's being no Governor, might easily have been prevented, if you had considered that the word [mere] was none of mine, and that the executive power was by me opposed to that which is decretory, that is, which is absolute, and unaccountable to any Superior on earth, at least within such limits. Which as it may include much more power than that which yourself call more than executive, that of reproving, exhorting, convincing, etc. So that decretory in this sense can agree to a subject, I believe yourself will hardly affirm. And indeed if you had been pleased to follow the analogy in the civil power, where I do not find you so scrupulous in Ecclesiastical, you would more clearly have understood my meaning, and its unconcernedness in your Exceptions. For in civils', at least the decretory power (from whence all Laws and Rules of proceeding are originally borrowed, and to which all appeals, in case of difficulty in their sense or partiality of inferior Judges, are finally resolved) will I believe be owned by yourself as proper to the supreme Magistrate. And how will you call that power of the Subject as such, that is, as depending hereon by a more proper name than that of executive (though it may withal include something decretory in affairs of inferior concernment, which though decretory in respect of their Inferiors, is yet only executive in relation to the sense and design of their Supreme to which they are even in such cases confined) for my part I do not understand. If I knew what were more, either indeed expressive of my meaning, or likely to be understood so by you, though indeed less proper, I would rather have used it, than have given you occasion to leave my sense, and only to dispute the impropriety of my expressions.  
BUT you pretend your Arguments to prove the Bishop uncapable even of the judicial work, 
§ XVIII  (by which I suppose you mean the same that I called decretory) because the exploration is part of that, which you seem to imply to be neither fit to be entrusted with others, nor yet possible to be managed by the Bishop in his own person in so large a circuit as a Diocese. This Argument also would have been found false if applied to the Secular Power. For by the same reason you may prove, that a Prince cannot govern a Diocese, because he cannot explore every particular crime committed within his Jurisdiction, which according to you he must do in his own person if he be a Judge. Consider, I pray, whether what you would answer in defence of the power of Princes, which may not be as plausibly urged in behalf of Bishops? Would you not say, that there is a twofold judicial power; such as determines Laws and general rules of proceeding, and such as does apply them to particular facts; and that the former is that only which reserved as the prerogative of the supreme power, the later only (which is that alone which alone includes exploration particular and personal) is communicated to inferior Officers? And you might have discerned, that the former only was that which I called decretory, and which was by me appropriated to our Supreme Ecclesiastical Monarch, which you see does not necessarily include exploration. And even concerning that exploration which is requisite for pronouncing Sentence in our ordinary Secular Tribunals, you might have answered in behalf of Princes, that it is not necessary that it be so minute and exact as might be had from a personal acquaintance with the person, and observation of his humour and behaviour in the course of his life; but for the Judge's information that is thought sufficient which is public and juridical, upon the testimonies of honest persons, who have known the person and his fact: for upon these Evidences our ordinary Judges do generally proceed in sentencing such as they never saw or knew before. Nor is it only usual in practice, but in reason it is thought abundantly sufficient. And, I pray, what may be the disparity that may make this just in our Secular, and unjust in our Ecclesiastical proceedings? Is it that the credit of the witnesses may as well be suspected as partial or mistaken, (even where no grounds do appear sufficiently convictive of such a suspicion) as the persons themselves? Or is it that there have been frequent Experiences of their deceiving such as have relied on their Testimony? And are not these difficulties as great in secular causes, where yet they are not thought considerable? For humane affairs are not capable of demonstrations, but proceed generally on only moral certainty, oftentimes only on probabilities, which are therefore after the utmost humane diligence acknowledged fallible: Yet it is thought prudent to rely even on such proofs, where the public advantage by the decision of such causes is more considerable, than the prejudice that may redound to the person concerned by a particular mistake, when such proof is the best that the matter is capable of, or that can be had, and that its failings are more rare and unusual. And the same Reasons are as cogent for the like proceedings in Ecclesiastical Courts. Or is it that some crimes are so secret, as that they cannot be juridically discovered with such Evidence as may satisfy a prudent person without personal and particular information? But you may remember that all crimes do not come under the cognizance of public discipline, but only such as are great and notorious, concerning which this cannot be pretended. And as Governors have thought it just and prudent in some criminal causes, to proceed on conjectures and presumptions, which themselves confess harsh in some instances, as judging it fitter that some few Innocents' should suffer some prejudice rather than that many guilty should escape; so in others, where the probabilities are more frequently fallible, they have rejected them, as conceiving it more just that some few Nocents should escape, rather that many Innocents' should suffer. Besides that, where this public Evidence does not appear, the crime cannot be so scandalous, nor consequently can the Church in such a case be so nearly concerned for its punishment.  
INDEED in some attempts it has been found, 
§ XIX.  that persons have used much more liberty in private for venting and propagating scandalous Reports, than when their oath has been required for public service, by which means they have at once made the crime very scandalous, and yet rescued the criminal from justice. But then the blame of such impunity is not to be imputed to the negligence of such a Judge, but the prevarication of such witnesses, and therefore will not be pertinent to our purpose. And then for other less or less notorious Crimes the private power of exhorting, reproving, etc. (which you call more than executive, and is no more denied a Minister in his own Parish under a Diocesan, than any other Form of government) may and must prove sufficient, because no other is either convenient or possible. Or is it that the penitence of the criminal, which is requisite to his absolution, (which is equally an act of power as that of censure) cannot be so certainly known by this public Juridical Evidence? This (besides that it may be as plausibly objected in Secular Causes, where personal penitence, at least that which is judged so, is as much required to absolution from secular penalties, and where these Juridical Evidences are perfectly as fallible) will not appear so difficult as it may seem, if it be considered what kind of penitence is requisite for this Ecclesiastical Absolution? 1. Not a universal penitence for all sins, but only those which he had been before censured for. 2. These not secret, but public and notorious. For none but these can be scandalous, and none but scandalous sins do fall under public Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction. And, 3. Not real penitence, even for these themselves, but only so far as it may be signified to the satisfaction of a prudent person by exterior indications. And, 4. These exterior indications, not private but public, such as public confession of the sin, and ask forgiveness for it, and giving public satisfaction to the injured party and the Church, and her scandalized enemies, and all circumstantiated with such pregnant evidences of sincerity, as may be thought sufficient probabilities of it in the judgement of equal prudent persons. And, 5. These public indications, such as may satisfy even strangers, who have been scandalised with his crimes, though unacquainted with his person. Now why a Bishop may not in this public juridical way of proceeding explore the penitence, even of particular criminals, without personal acquaintance, as well as the scandalized multitude, and as well as secular Judges, as you have produced none, so for my part I see no cogent Argument. And yet further, 6. Considering that it is not the personal sin, but the public scandal of it, which brings it to a public cognizance, though these signs should fail of signifying his real personal penitence; yet if they satisfy the multitude, though erroneously they take off the scandal, and therefore give a just reason of revoking such public censares? For every cause that may be sufficient to dissuade a person, upon an account of his own interests, to abstain from communion, will not be so for depriving him of it authoritatively. For they are not all sorts of crimes that put us out of the state of grace, as they ought to be that deprive us of our right to communion; not all that can deprive us of that right, that have not Evidence enough to warrant a coercive involuntary punishment; nor all that have that Evidence, that are fit to be punished publicly, and I believe you will not question but that Excommunication is a public punishment. And thus, I believe, by this time you may understand, how that though the Bishop sentence upon other men's words, (which yourself confess may perhaps sometimes be done) yet there are as good prudential preservatives against that inconvenience which you thence infer, That he must excommunicate all that some body else says he must excommunicate, as there are against the like in Secular Tribunals, which do confessedly sentence on other men's words, and yet do not therefore condemn all that some body saith they must condemn.  
YOUR seventh Disparity is, 
§ XX.  That in the Kingdom there is not one Subject of an hundred, or many hundred, who hath Lawsuits with others once in a year, or seven years, or his life; not one of some hundreds where you have lived, that findeth the Magistrate work as a criminal, etc. But we are all of a sinning corrupt disposition, and that the Pastor hath few of his flock that need not some personal Applications in one degree or other. And even as to gross sins lived in, and ignorance, or heresy against the very essence of Christianity, it is a good Parish, where a considerable part of it are not guilty. To this it is easy to reply, That though the case were as you have represented it, that men were, not only where you have lived, but generally more guilty of crimes obnoxious to Ecclesiastical than Secular cognizance; yet it would not follow, that more were governable by a Secular than by an Ecclesiastical Magistrate; 1. Because I have already shown, That there are even in the same precincts very many more persons, if not crimes, subject to the Magistrate than the Church, as Infidels, Excommunicated persons, and such as are incorrigible by Ecclesiastical censures, etc. Besides those who are religious, who are not the less subject to the Magistrate for their being Members of the Church. And, 2. There are many other ends of government besides the punishment of criminals, such as are the prevention of the crimes, the promotion of unanimity and industry, and public generous designs, and the determination of disputable controversies, wherein good and wellmeaning men may bonâfide differ from each other, and the like. They must as well build as take away the rubbish. And therefore there is a government where there are no crimes, over the Angels and beatified Spirits. But especially among men, where crimes are at least acknowledged possible, the prevention of crimes may be a work of no less diligence than their reformation. And, 3. The freedom of good men from these more ordinary scandalous crimes, (which I perceive you to instance in) though it may less frequently exercise the secular power; yet where it does, it will most dangerously. For, 1. Virtue raises the spirits of men, and makes them active and industrious, that they may satisfy themselves of their usefulness in their generations. Whereas, on the contrary, Vice does emasculate men's spirits, and make them slothful and sluggish, and lovers of their own ease, and more unfit for commotions. And, 2. Virtue makes men public spirited, whereas Vice does debase them to private and little Interests. So that the Adversaries of these are only such ordinarily as may oppose them in their limited and particular designs, and therefore only private persons; but these having the same object with the public Magistrate, that is, the public concernment, must more directly clash with him in case of different persuasion. And, 3. The very authority of Virtue with the multitude, (who cannot but reverence it in others, how little soever they practise it themselves) cannot choose but very much advantage virtuous persons for the forming of a party more than such as are vicious, who, though they may be flattered and loved by such as are gainers by their vices, yet cannot in prudence be thought so fit for management of their public concernments, even by vicious persons themselves, who act upon principles of worldly prudence, as they who are more honoured, and public-spirited, and honest and sincere, and so every way as well more fit, as more able for the discharge of a public trust. And, 4. The only curbs of the Supreme Powers, whether of rewards or punishments, are less regarded by virtuous than vicious persons, and therefore must needs be less able to restrain them. For how can he who undervalues Death and Fear, and all deprivation of exteriors, be governed by any humane power? Besides, 5. The great courage, and that not precipitant but rational, which animates good men to the susception of great Attempts, from the satisfaction of their own consciences, and their strong confidence of the present assistance or future rewards of God, of which wicked men are wholly destitute. These considerations, I say, and many others, may suffice to show, that the mistakes of good men are of more mischievous influence on the Commonwealth, than the crimes of debauched persons, and therefore far from diminishing the care of the supreme Magistrate. And accordingly you may find the most virtuous ages of the Romans more troublesome for popular Broils and Seditions, than those later ones of wickedness. Witness the almost perpetual clashings betwixt the Senate and the People, the popular envies against their Hero's, Coriolanus, Camillus, Scipio Africanus, etc. But, 4. Though the generality of people were actually every where as little troublesome to the Magistrate, as where you have known them (which I doubt you can hardly undertake for;) yet you must not thence estimate the qualifications and duty of a Magistrate. For as none would think it prudent for a person putting to Sea in a calm, to choose a Pilot sufficient only for that season, but unprovided for a Storm; so certainly a Magistrate ought to be prepared and qualified with abilities for governing a criminal and unquiet people, even then when he lies under the actual obligation for exercising them, especially considering it as a case so very ordinary, and so probably to be expected. If therefore a Bishop may not undertake the charge of a Diocese, because impossible to be performed by him; I may as well by the same points of reason conclude, that a Magistrate may not take that of a Province or Kingdom, even when in the good humour you suppose them, because he must not in prudence venture on that, unless he be prepared for them when vicious, which you suppose impossible, and therefore unfit to be engaged on. And, 5. You do not propose the case with any equality; for if you would do so, you should not compare a Prince governing a regular people and a Bishop with an irregular scandalous Diocese, but have supposed the Subjects in both cases regular, or in both irregular. And if you will needs suppose in favour of the Prince, that his Subjects are as little criminal in his Courts, as you have found them where you have been acquainted, to show the possibility of his governing such a people, though in a large precinct; why can you not suppose in favour of the Bishop, that the Subjects of his Diocese behave themselves as innocently in reference to crimes obnoxious to the public cognizance of his Courts? Is it either because that even persons so supposed equally innocent in relation to the charges of both Courts, are yet more difficultly governable by an Ecclesiastical than a Secular Magistrate? This is not as much as pretended, I am confident, not as much as plausibly proved, in your present Discourse. Or is it that the Supposition itself in relation to Ecclesiastical crimes is more difficult, it being more rare and improbable to find a people innocent in crimes of public Ecclesiastical, than Secular cognizance? If this later be your meaning, I doubt neither of the reasons intimated by you will maintain you in it. Not that of your own experience; for I believe you would have found those good persons of your acquaintance as little troublesome to the Bishops, as the King's Courts, as little guilty of incestuous Marriages, forging Wills and Testaments, Simony, etc. as of any acts of secular injustice. And as for the other concerning our propensity to actual, deduced from the original, sin; you have not as yet proved this propensity greater to Ecclesiastical than Secular crimes. But it is rather probable, that as the crimes cognoscible in the Ecclesiastical Courts are generally more heinous, so they are more easily avoidable. If you have any inclination to think so, for preventing it I pray remember what I have already intimated, that they are not all sorts of sins against God that are cognoscible in the Bishop's Courts, but only such as are great, and scandalous, and notorious. And then consider whether it be not as easy to suppose a people innocent of great, and scandalous, and notorious sins against God and Religion, as of injustice towards Men. For this indeed will be the true state of the question. 2. Therefore it will not be so easily proved, that the crimes cognoscible in the Secular Courts are so few, in comparison of those that are Ecclesiastical. This I have already proved before, and am not willing to repeat what I have there said. At present methinks your own Concessions, if closely reflected on, would have prevented your pretending otherwise. For, besides that those multitudes of persons guilty of crimes obnoxious to the Bishop's Courts, (which I have said every impenitent sinner is not, and have given my reason why I said so) are I doubt guilty of many more civil crimes, for which I shall only appeal to your own experience; I pray consider how many of the crimes cognoscible in the Bishop's Courts are originally civil, as those concerning Marriages, Wills and Testaments, Tithes. etc. which are mere arbitrary concessions of Princes in favour of the Church, as protected by them. And the rest that are not, yet come under the Prince's cognizance, as the Church's Canons are made Laws of the Commonwealth, and her Censures are seconded by coercive secular penalties imposed by the Prince on such as have proved refractory against her Spiritual Authority. Upon which account it is impossible but that the Secular causes must needs prove more numerous, as including all Ecclesiasticals, and many proper to themselves besides. So that this Disparity is every way unconvictive of your purpose. For if you mean those persons who are so innocent of secular crimes, to be different from those who are supposed so very guilty of Ecclesiasticals, then there can be no just disparity pretended, because there is indeed no equal comparison. But if you mean the same persons in both cases, than the Disparity cannot be pretended true, because the Supposition is false.  
BUT you object in favour of me, 
xx. XXI.  That the Parish-priest is to reprove, exhort, and convince [sinners] first, till he prove them impenitent; and that he is to instruct the Ignorant, Infidels, and Heretics; (which must needs considerably lessen the number of criminals, who only in case of their convicted impenitency in the use of these means, should be further impleaded in that severer way of proceeding in the Bishop's Courts.) To this you answer. 1. That this is more than an executive power. If it be so, I do not know any that denies it you, so that you have no reason that I know of to complain on that account. None hinders you from reproving, exhorting, convincing, and instructing whom you please, especially such as are entrusted to you as Members of your cure. But I am sure this is not more than that executive power, which I said was communicated to the inferior Clergy, in opposition to that which I called decretory, reserved to our Ecclesiastical Monarch; for I believe you will not call this power of reproving, exhorting, etc. decretory. I believe you meant a power merely executive. But you may remember, that that was neither my word nor meaning; nor do I for my part think this power mentioned by you to be more than that which were merely executive. My reason you will suddenly understand.  
SECONDLY, 
§ XXII.  therefore you answer, That you desire no more at all from Bishops or any. If so, you need not desire it, for none denies it you. But you say, You know no other Episcopal power over the people, but thus personally to convince men, and to declare to the congregation upon proof, the fitness or unfitness of men for their communion by penitence or impenitence. If you know no other power than this, you know none at all. For this power of convincing men will as well agree to the meanest Laic who has reason on his side, as the greatest Bishop; seeing either of them may convince if furnished with such reason, but neither can without it. And yet sure you will not say, that the meanest Laic has any power over him whom he may thus convince, at least not coherently to your own principles, who in opposition to our Lay-chancellours make Jurisdiction inseparable from Orders. So also if the power of Excommunication be no more than declaring a person unfit for the communion of the congregation as being impenitent, and Absolution be a declaration of his fitness for such communion as a penitent; then every prosecutor of a criminal, every witness produced against him, every prudent skilful Canonist, every Laic that is sufficiently informed of the sense of the Law and matter of fact, may as well excommunicate as the Bishop or the Presbytery. For every such skilful person may know the fitness or unfitness of such a person for communion, and knowing it may declare his knowledge with the reasons of it; and upon such declaration the people may, if they pleafe, do as he would have them, either communicate with, or separate from such a person. For indeed no declaration of itself formally and precisely understood is obligatory, but as it is a promulgation of that which antecedently has a just obligative power, In actu primo, yet is not in actu secundo obligatory quoad nos till we know it. As though the King and Parliament have a power of making Laws, and therefore what has passed all their Votes, in the first moment when it has done so, is immediately a Law; yet it is not in actu secundo obligatory on the Subject, so as that its violation by him does incur the annexed penalty till it be legally promulged. Yet so it is, on the contrary, that this legal promulgation itself, that is, such a promulgation as is performed by the person authorized by Law, with all the requisite circumstances, cannot make any thing really obligatory, that has not formerly been decreed by the Legislative Power. Unless therefore there be in the Church a power antecedent to such declaration, the declaration can make none, seeing every one may declare his own sense as well as the Governor; and declaration does only make that obligatory quoad nos, which was so in se antecedently. I did not before charge you with any of those pernicious Doctrines to Church Authority taxed in my Preface, and am sorry now you give me so just occasion to do it. It may be I may misunderstand you, and shall be very glad to acknowledge my mistake when you shall call it one.  
AND I beseech you, 
§ XXIII  who have so publicly professed yourself a Friend to public peace, and an Enemy to Church-divisions, to consider whether those disparaging Doctrines concerning the power of the Church be not Seminaries of infinite and eternal Schisms. For if the Church have no other power but persuasive and declarative, than he who either actually persuaded of the equity of her particular impositions, or at least pretends it, may freely remonstrate against them, and refuse obedience to them, and cannot be restrained frm seditious behaviour by Excommunication, unless at least the greater part of Communicants be satisfied, and profess themselves to be so, that it is their duty, not in obedience to their Superiors, but on account of the particular reasonableness of the thing, to withdraw themselves from his communion. And even then itself, if he can persuade a few to his Party he may upon these principles, without any scruple of conscience erect a new communion for himself. For indeed what can hinder him when government, which is the principle of unity in all Societies, is thus deprived of all other awe of conscience to oblige him to obedience, distinct from his particular satisfaction of the reasonableness of the things; or of any coercive means of his restraint, be his cause never so bad, and his dissatisfaction never so only pretended? And when the unity of the Catholic Church is thus made to depend on so hazardous and rarely-contingent a condition, as the persuasion of its many thousand members, of infinite interests and capacities, of the reasonableness of every particular indifferent or probable Constitution, who can ever secure it for so long a time, as the Government of the Church was designed for by him, who first did constitute it? I know for prevention of these inconveniences you would have Governors cautious in determining any thing but what is clear and necessary. And for my part I wish it so too, that for matters of belief (it not being in Subject's minds to believe what they please) they would determine nothing but what were very evident, and even for matters indifferent, that they would neither determine more of them than were needful, nor such of them as were not convenient in the circumstances, and suitable to the dispositions of the age of their determination, nor be too tenacious in maintaining them when their inconveniences should be found greater than their advantage. Though I confess withal, that it were in prudence much safer, to make any such change by their own free Election, than to seem necessitated to it by mutinous and seditious Remonstrances of their Subjects, such a compliance being of greater consequential prejudice to government, and consequently to Ecclesiastical Unity, than a maintenance of a thing indifferent, though inconvenient. But withal you know, that Unanimity even in things indifferent (much more in matters of Faith) is in general and indefinitely necessary, though not particularly determined in the Scripture; that this unanimous observance of things of such a nature is not morally possible by the particular conviction of every Subject of their fitness; that therefore there is no security for their unanimous observance but that of authority, and no authority so proper as that which is Ecclesiastical; that when it is so imposed, it is an instance of obedience to the authority imposing; that being so, whatever it may be in its own nature, it cannot still remain indifferent as to its use, seeing it is not indifferent whether Subjects ought to be obedient to their lawful Sovereigns. And therefore methinks it would become you in healing Church-divisions, to take a care of preserving as well the Prerogatives of Governors, as the Christian Liberty of Subjects, seeing extremes on both sides are alike prejudicial to Ecclesiastical Unity. Indeed I confess many of our first Reformers not to have been so cautions herein as the Interest of the Church would have required, who feeling themselves oppressed by a Tyrannical Ecclesiastical Power, and being extremely exasperated by their violent and rigorous proceedings, were almost only solicitous about Negatives, never satisfying themselves with any reasonable retrenchments of such exorbitancies; only showing how far Ecclesiastical Power might not presume, but not how far it might proceed. And they were then the more excusable for not proceeding to such positives, because the ends of such Ecclesiastical Power, the preserrvation of unity both in faith and practice were then more easily attainable without the Interposition of the exercise of such a power. For their first zeal against the common Adversary will oblige them in prudence to conceal their lesser Animosities, and the danger of weakening themselves, whose united strengths were no more than necessary for their common preservation, which was a mischief so great and imminent, as might make many less, at least comparatively, tolerable, and might keep them from being so dogmatical in imposing or opposing Opinions of inferior concern. And for matters of practice, the zeal of their first beginnings, and the watchful eyes of their Adversaries for observing their lapses, and the great use of good personal Lives for the propagation of their opinions, made them at first less sensible of the loss of Discipline, whilst upon these accounts they performed those things of themselves, which Discipline should have compelled them to, as far as Ecclesiastical Censures might compel them, that is, as far they valued the opinion of so many wise and good men, and as far as they feared the loss of the ordinary means of grace, and those dangers they were exposed to when cast out of that Society, which could alone entitle them to the Divine Protection, and all the terrors that are signified in their delivery to Satan, I am necessitated to interpose this Explication of the compulsion of Ecclesiastical Discipline, because I see you otherwise apt enough to misunderstand me. And even for the observation of things indifferent, the very great opinion they had entertained for some of the first Reformers, and the little leisure for reflection on their own condition, when they were so diverted by their heats against the common Adversary, and the little willingness they had to descent, at least to make a breach, for little things, from them whom they loved so dearly, for their unanimity in their common and greatest cencern, coagulated the multitude in a willing observation even of indifferent punctilios.  
YET we find those Hero's themselves complain of this defect. 
§ XXIV  Our Church of England wishes that Discipline might be restored in her Commination, a sign that she was sensible of its want and necessity; and Luther commends it among the Bohemians, and wishes also that it were restored among his own; and the want of positive constitutions in this kind seems to have been the greatest scandal to Erasmus, to alienate him from the Protestants, to whom he had formerly been well affected. But Bullinger and Gualther do, as I remember, in their Epistles to Erastus, confess their Helvetian Churches to have no other discipline than what was exercised by the Civil Magistrate. But when upon a defervescency of their first zeal, and a liberty occasioned by their great successes against the common Adversary, men at length got the leisure to inquire with the same freedom into the Doctrines of the Reformers, as the Reformers themselves had into those of the then extant Ecclesiastical Governors, and so divert that zeal which had been enkindled and heated in the prosecution of the common cause against each other, in the prosecution of their own private sentiments; and when they grew more remiss in the care of their lives, and began by degrees to take advantage of their freedom from their former yoke of Ecclesiastical Governors, and to relapse into their former dissoluteness, and to be curious and critical in enquiring into the merit of every Ecclesiastical observance, and to make themselves Judges of the expediency as well as lawfulness of things confessedly indifferent, and not to content themselves with their own thoughts, but to discountenance their dissenting Brethren, and to divide the Church, and to disrespect their Superiors, who in later times were not held in that great veneration as their predecessors; then at length at Geneva, and other places that were swayed by the authority of Calvin, it was found as well in prudence, upon account of its experienced reasonableness and use; as in duty, upon account of its Institution in the Scriptures, necessary to revive Ecclesiastical Power, that might for future Ages prevent and restrain the exorbitancies of men abusing their liberty, and secure the peace of the Church. And whatever they had before disputed against their Adversaries, prejudicial to Ecclesiastical Power in general, it is plain that the authority which that very wise and prudent person thought necessary for the preservation of peace and piety in the Church, is more than persuasive and declaratory, even coercive of persons otherwise persuaded. I shall not mention those excesses which I believe you will not approve, their encroachments on the Regal Authority in Scotland, and the burning of Servetus and Gentilis at Geneva, and the Book written by Beza to justify that action. It is very plain that the Presbyries, where ever they have been set up, have exercised a power coercive, whether in defining Heresies, or censuring profane or refractory disobedient persons. And if Calvin found the necessity of this coercive power then, I am sure, as our experience since his time is much greater, so we have found much reason to approve the truth of what he only foresaw. For all the later Sects have prevailed on the concessions of the former. And by the same reason, as the first Presbyterians, who broke the peace of the Church, thought themselves to be excused, because they professed themselves unsatisfied with the Church's persuasions to her Impositions; so every later Sect has pretended the same against the Presbyterians. And as long as there is any unanimous observance of the Church, that is not particularly expressed in the Scripture, at least not clearly, with that evidence which may be presumed sufficient to satisfy every wellmeaning person as well as ourselves, (which I doubt will be found as long as such a thing as communion with the Church as a body politic is owned, that is, as long as it is not dissolved into mere Enthusiasm) we shall never be secure of the communion) not only of pretended, but really dissatisfied pious persons. And till you make a power in the Church coercive of men's practice, as well as a belief of Fundamentals, a requisite condition to unity; I fear you will never be able to reach what you are so zealously and commendably attempting, the Cure of our Church-divisions.  
BUT that which makes me most of all wonder is, 
§ XXV  that you should pretend that this persuasive declarative power is denied to Parish Ministers; and the reason you give for it seems to me more paradoxical: That the Minister can have no access to the guilty by their own wills, and that there is no law nor penalty that you know of to constrain any to come to you, or receive you, to hear or answer you. Here one would think that you did approve of coercive means, as necessary for doing good to those that are unwilling to be persuaded. For if you did not, why should you blame our Diocesan Discipline for not allowing you that which you would not have allowed? But presently after you take occasion from these coercive means, which you confess are used among us, to inveigh against us, as if our Prelatic Christian Profession were only to choose rather to be Christians and communicate, than to lie in Gaol, and have all our Estates confiscate. One would think that you were desirous to find Objections against us, when thus almost at the same time you blame us for having that, which immediately before you blamed us for wanting. For the difference is not (as one would think) from the most candid interpretation of your words, That you would have such guilty persons forced to confer with you, but not to profess themselves Christians, and communicate without your leave: for you afterwards profess simply, that you would have no force at all. Besides, what force is it that you mean? is it that exterior one of laws and corporal penalties? (this your words seem plainly to imply.) This you know does not belong to the Church, but the civil Magistrates power circa sacra, who is therefore to be blamed for it, and not the Church, if it be a crime, and some body must needs bear the blame. Or are they the spiritual coertions of the Church? I know none of that kind but Excommunication, which is of no force with those who do not value the advantage of communion; and they who do, need not to be forced to confer with their Minister. Besides that, yourself know and have confessed, that the power of Suspension of unworthy persons from the Sacrament is allowed to the Parish Minister even in our Church, so that even in that case he has his remedy in his own hand, as far as it can be proved expedient that he should under a Monarchical Government. But methinks your description of a Prelatic Christian is very harsh, and (though for my part I am resolved to take nothing ill, because I verily believe, not only by this Letter, but your other public writings, that the heat of your style, and the extraordinary expedition you make use of, not allowing yourself time for second thoughts, do transport you to such expressions, as your serious reflections would not approve; yet) would, to other less favourable Judges of your good meaning, rather tend to exasperate than cure those divisions, for which you are justly so much concerned. And besides your own acknowledgement of many good Prelatic Christians on other occasions, you cannot be ignorant, that many of them have been Christians of that which you call the old profession, that is, [have been Christians, and held communion with the Church, though they have gone to prison and death for it] not only in Queen Mary's days, but even in your own memory in England and Ireland, when their being so has brought sufferings on them, not rescued them from them. So that I do not understand why you should stigmatize them with the name of Prelatical.  
INDEED if you could show, 
§ XXVI  that it was rather the extraordinary good influences of God, and their own good inclinations, that made them voluntarily good, against their worldly interests, notwithstanding their malignant principles, which of themselves would have made them otherwise; I confess your commendable inclination to speak of things as they are might have excused the rigour of such expressions. But, 1. You cannot but know that these exterior compulsions have not been proper to Prelatists, but common to all those that have owned such a thing as discipline, Presbyterians as well as Papists; so that there is no reason to appropriate to such Christians as are made so by coercive discipline the invidious name of Prelatical. And, 2. You have not, and I believe you cannot, prove that such external force must needs of itself make Prelatists dissemblers: 1. Because all that are of themselves good, will not need such force, this being only a secondary reserve for reducing such as are desperate, as to that power which alone you allow the Church, that is, of persuasion, none being this way compelled, but they who cannot be persuaded. And certainly for such persons it is at least a less evil to profess themselves Christians, though dissemblingly, than not so much as to profess themselves so, both in regard of the honour which is done Religion even in professing it, and the edification of others, who may be moved by their example, and that they are by this means taken from the sins of open hostilities against the truth. And, 2. You must not presently condemn all of dissimulation, who are brought to a sense of their duty by fear. Otherwise you will condemn all the penal laws of the Commonwealth, as tending to make their Subjects dissemblingly loyal, and all Gods providential crosses and menaces of hell, as tending rather to make men profess themselves Christians rather than be damned, etc. For frequent experience cannot but have informed you, who are so very experienced, that the fear of Man, as well as of God, has to many proved the beginning of true wisdom; that good Christians have found more occasion to bless God for their crosses than their consolations; that the terrible vengeance of God against sinners, even in this life, under the Old Testament, was a great restraint to that hardhearted people, to deter them from their sins, and to reduce them to solid real piety, whom we find less efficaciously moved to their duty by any other means. For I pray consider, 3. That this dissimulation which you seem to suppose to be the ordinary consequent of exterior compulsion, cannot indeed have any place but upon these conditions; that, 1. The sufferer do believe his cause to be good; and, 2. That such belief be grounded on conscientious motives, (whether really or apparently conscientious I now dispute not, seeing the person must act according to the evidence of his own conscience, however really erroneous, after he has used his best endeavours for its information;) and, 3. That this persuasion of his conscience be unalterable; or at least, 4. That such exterior compulsion be neither a means nor a probable occasion to make men alter their opinions, atleast not to make good and conscientious persons to alter, at least not ordinarily; so that it be presumed, that the multitude of goodmen cannot be altered upon such terms, and therefore that if the multitude do, they cannot be generally presumed to do it on just and conscientious motives; and yet, 5. That, notwithstanding his being persuaded as formerly, he be by his exterior compulsion wrought on to make an unveracious exterior profession.  
NOW to show briefly that none of these hold, 
§ XXVII.  at least not all of them, which is requisite for your purpose; I must premise, 1. That the design of this kind of discourse against these coercive means, if it be to hinder them, must be to persuade them in whose power they are, that is, the Church or the Magistrate, that their practice were sinful to them. That, 2. Nothing can be imputably sinful to Governors, but what either does or may, in the use of their utmost moral diligence, appear to them to be so. So that it is not your opinion of the sinfulness of such coercion, that can prove it sinful to them, unless they be of the same mind, or neglect the moral means of information, which if you suppose the case evident, you must presume such as would infallibly bring them to be so. 3. Therefore what are the real thoughts of Governors, and whether they have made use of the means of information with integrity and diligence, none can for their own satisfaction (which is principally to be taken notice of in order to the imputableness of sin) judge of so well as themselves. Nor, 4. Can we better be assured of their sense herein than by their word, unless it be by the evidence of the thing. It is not therefore every proof that may seem satisfactory to ourselves, that may warrant our presumption of their sense, unless it be such as is thought cognoscible by them, and whose evidence is presumed inevitable upon a sincere examination. And, 5. It is not sufficient as to the matter in hand, that it appear that some persons have indeed been made hypocrites for fear of this exterior coercion, but it must further be shown that its natural tendency is to do so, or at least that it is its most usual consequent. And, 6. That it is an occasion of their hypocrisy by virtue of itself, not of the disposition of the Subject. For the sins that are derived from the disposition of the Subject, they that give the immediate occasions are not responsible for. Otherwise when the wicked turn God's grace into wantonness, and those things which should have been for their good into the occasions of falling, and the word preached turns to be the savour of death unto death to its unworthy hearers, and the blessed Sacrament of the Lords Supper to its unworthy receivers; you might conclude God, who gives those abused favours, to be the proper occasion of the abusers sin. And (because there are some who will with less scruple grant of God, that he is, the designer of his creatures sins, than they would grant it concerning any good men) S. Paul had been the culpable occasion of the perjury of those conspirators, who had sworn not to eat until they had killed him, only by making use of just means for his own preservation. And these you may easily believe to be the thoughts of Governors, concerning those whom they are pleased to prosecute for their opinions. That they do as seriously believe, that the reasons which satisfy themselves, are as sufficient to satisfy all others, that use their moral diligence for finding satisfaction, as the sufferers believe it concerning their own reasons, that they are sufficient to satisfy their Governors; and therefore that such dissenting hypocritical Subjects are as faulty in not using their diligence in the use of the means, if they find not actual satisfaction, as such Subjects believe the same concerning their Governors. And, 7. That this personal hypocrisy of such dissembling persons is a greater inconvenience to the public, than the toleration of their seditious behaviour. For as it is certain that Governors no more than other good Christians, may design any sin for any good whatsoever; so it will not be easily disproved either by reason or authority of Casuists, that they may design that from whence they know a sin will necessarily follow, for the avoidal of a greater both inconvenience and sin, such as is sedition in respect of hypocrisy. For though it be unlawful to choose any evil where it may be avoided; yet it is not so when two occur, whereof at least one is inevitable, to make choice of the less before the greater. And now upon these supposals it were easy to show, from these conditions of dissimulation, that either there were no necessity that the sufferers under these coercive means must needs dissemble; or if there were, yet at least not such as would make it imputable as sin to Governors; or if it were a sin to them absolutely, yet not such under such a straightened election.  
BUT I must avoid prolixity, 
§ XXVIII.  and therefore at present shall only briefly make Application to the forementioned conditions of dissimulation. 1. Therefore it is not necessary that every sufferer for his opinions must believe his cause to be good; for there are bad as well as good of all much received opinions, that maintain them not upon account of their truth, but because they are themselves factiously disposed, and love contradiction, especially to Superiors, (a humour such people of the vulgar are usually too much addicted to) or affect popularity or singularity, or promise themselves some great advantages by public Innovations and Disturbances, or engage in a party out of kindness to their Friends that are concerned in it. Much less, 2. Is it necessary that every one who does indeed believe his own Opinion true, must do it upon Motives, so much as apparently conscientious. For education and custom, and the authority of a person respected, or a vainglorious ostentation of his own Wit, or the shame of being mistaken or convicted, may at first incline many to defend Opinions fortuitously taken up, and afterwards the love of their own arguments may delude many to believe what they have once asserted. And God knows whether the vulgar of most Opinions be not acted thus, whatever pretences they make of conscience, (for custom may go very far in making men abhor unusual, innocent, or commendable things as profane and piacular, as appeared in the Experiment of Darius Hystaspis in Herodotus, who found the Scythian to pretend as much conscience for eating, as the Grecian for burying his dead Relations.) And we have reason to believe, if of too many, whom we find the most zealous maintainers of opinions controverted, and yet the most negligent practisers of such as are undoubted, which certainly would not be, if God's sake, or conscience, or a sense of their own duty, were the reasons inducing them to believe them. Now these Deductions being made, the number of conscientious Dissenters would I doubt be generally found the smaller. And it is a general and just rule of public proceedings, not to forbear that which may generally do good, though it may prove inconvenient and prejudicial in some rarer Instances. Nor would these coercive means oblige these Dissenters upon Motives not conscientious to dissimulation or hypocrisy. But even for those fewer truly conscientious Dissenters which would remain, it is not necessary, 3. That if they have been of a different Opinion, they should persevere in it unalterably. And as their minds may alter at any time, so as well when they are prosecuted for their Opinions as otherwise, in which case their conversion may be veracious. And possibly the number even of good converts, even upon such an occasion, would be more, if they did not some of them, for fear of being censured as time-servers, not allow the contrary Opinion the same favour of an equal hearing, when it is countenanced by Authority as otherwise, or at least not express their sentiments so freely and ingenuously; not heeding that hereby instead of courage and constancy, they only choose their conqueror, being more awed by the persecution of the tongue than of the sword. Nor, 4. Is it true, that this coercion is not a probable means of bringing even good men to a conscientious change of their Opinions. For, 1. It is of itself likely to allay that tumour and rigour of spirit, to which even good men themselves are frequently betrayed by prosperity, which does usually alienate them from all sober thoughts of accommodation, and even of sober and impartial inquiry. And I believe you who have so well studied the peace of the Church, do very well understand, that in very many things men's spirits, are at a greater distance than their principles, in all which for making peace it is sufficient to make men peaceable. Indeed for a while such a way of proceeding may rather exasperate than calm them; but by that time that the strangeness of it is over, and the sudden tumour has evaporated and spent itself, they are at length reduced to a more composed temper. And I believe your own experience, which is great in the late and present posture of Affairs, cannot but let you understand the much greater moderation of those Presbyterians of your temper and acquaintance now than formerly. For it is natural for men, as well in wars of opinions as of swords, when they have wearied themselves with fight to desire peace. And, 2. As this coercion brings good men themselves to this more sedate and candid temper, which makes them more competent Judges of rational discourses; so it usually obliges them to a more faithful and accurate inquiry than formerly. For good men can no more than others endure afflictions willingly and patiently, unless they be animated by the goodness of the cause, and that they cannot so well satisfy themselves of, without an impartial inquiry into its merits. Besides that good men themselves, and that reasonably enough are unwilling to suffer, unless it be indeed necessary for the preservation of their more momentous interests, and therefore are willing to admit of any satisfactory favourable construction of their duty, that may dispense with such severe performances, which cannot be attained but by a more close inquiry into the merit of the thing, and the nature of the Obligation. And hence it follows, 3. That they must upon prudential, and yet just and rational accounts, be favourably inclined to the Opinions of their prosecutors, as far as any favour may be just and conscientious. And this may do much for determing them in all such cases, as are not either very evident or very momentous; and such not very many would be found on a severe examination. And, 4. Affliction does very much quicken good men's consciences, to approve themselves to God when they are destitute of humane consolations. And this also may exceedingly contribute to a conscientious change, when by this they are freed from those carnal prejudices, which before had blinded or diverted them from a clear discovery, and are excited to a greater industry in the inquiry of means, and obliged to a greater sincerity in following conviction, when they consider how much their greatest Interests are concerned in it, and how vain it is to hope to escape his discovery in case of negligence or dissimulations, who is the immediate Lord of conscience. Upon all these accounts therefore Governors, who are to be presumed to believe their own Opinions true, may justly believe external coercion to be a means of reducing others to them, conscientious as well as such as are not. But, 5. Though you might with more plausibility pretend, that dissimulation would indeed be the ordinary consequent of coercive means alone, they being alone no rational arguments for working a conscientious change; yet when they are not designed as the principal arguments inviting to such a change, but merely as dispositions to prepare and qualify the persons for receiving conscientious arguments, the case will be clearly otherwise. Now this I believe you do already know to be the case with us. Besides what coercive means may have been pretended, the means of information are freely communicated to any that desires them. Our Books are extant, our learned men and Parish Ministers are freely to be consulted with; and why these may not ordinarily be presumed likely to make a conscientious change, only because people are necessitated to use them, I do not understand. And, 6. The case is not such as you have proposed it. None was obliged to be Christian rather than go to Gaol, etc. I believe you cannot instance any Law lately in use, that obliged people to profess any thing not believed by them. All I think that can be pretended was to restrain persons, not from the public profession, nor from the private practice of their Opinions; but only from practising them in public or great assemblies, that might create suspicion to the State. Otherwise I know nothing restrictive of those persons you are concerned for, from being commonly known to be such as they were. And I pray, what necessity is there then of dissimulation? The only Canon of that kind that I can think of, is that of communicating once a year at Easter, the exacting whereof whether by infliction of Civil or Ecclesiastical penalties, whether of Non-conformists, or even Conformists themselves, has been at least where I have been, so generally neglected, that I do not know any reason you have to complain of it. For any other coercive means for compelling Dissenters to communicate with us, I know none that have been rigorously executed to my knowledge in Ireland. What has been done in England yourself know better, and therefore I shall very willingly leave you to your own information, wherein I hope you will be ingenuous. Yet, 7. Suppose that coercive means were not for the good of the persons concerned, but did indeed make them Prelatical Christians, as you call them, that is, dissemblers; this were not sufficient to show that they are therefore not to be used, if their punishment and dissimulation itself may prove for the advantage of the public. For you know that Governors are not to heed private advantages any otherwise, than in subordination and coincidency with the public, and that even in civil affairs there are some few punishments imposed, which are known to be utterly inconsistent with the civil interests of the party punished, (and their civil interests are properly obnoxious to the care of Governors) for such are all that are capital, especially such of them as are withal rigorous and painful. For in public punishments there are other ends more considerable than private emendation, namely the prevention of future offences from the same person, and the terror of others by his example. Nor is this way of proceeding blamed by any just (however favourable) Judge of such things, when personal emendation has been first attempted, and no criminals are subjected to such censures, but such as have been found, in the use of all other prudential rational means, incorrigible. To such it is not thought any more cruelty to be severe for the good of the Commonwealth, than it is for a Chirurgeon to cut off a gangreened member for the preservation of its owner's life. And such is the design of the Church, who is not for using even her spiritual coertions (which only belong to her) but only on such persons on whom her rational inducements have proved desperate and successless.  
BUT notwithstanding your former contrary intimations you say, 
§ XXIX  You desire no force nor Church power; but not to take these, 1. for Christians; 2. for your special Christian flock; 1. who are no Christians; 2. who themselves refuse it. But this power you desire here is more than that which alone was allowed by you to Bishops, of reproving, exhorting, instructing, and declaring persons fitness or unfitness for communion by their penitence or impenitence. For what if your people believe those penitent whom you think impenitent, or on the contrary? What if they be not satisfied with your Declarations, or resolved not to observe them? What if at least the greater part, which is always predominant in popular Governments, be not of your opinion? Would you think yourself obliged in such a case to make your people's opinion or your own, the rule of your practice in receiving or rejecting persons from your communion? If you follow your people, than you are as capable of being imposed on against your will, (for receiving such persons for Christians, and for part of your Christian flock, who are no Christians, and who themselves refuse it) by them as you are now by the Bishop. And it does not appear that the greater part of your flock (especially if such as you describe, whereof whole Parishes have been presented by the Churchwardens) are likely to stand with you in opposition to your Bishop. And if they stand for him against you, you can have no reason to obtrude your own judgement and complain, according to this principle? But if notwithstanding their dissent from you, you yet resolve to follow your own judgement, in receiving or rejecting according to your own thoughts of the penitence or impenitence of the person obnoxious to your Discipline; than you will indeed be so far from desiring no Church power, as that you would desire more than you seem willing to grant the Bishops, which is only declarative. And then if you may as a Governor impose on the people, why may not the Bishop as your Governor impose on you? Indeed there can be no such thing as Government without such an Imposition as you speak of. For the reason of all Government is the inequality of men's Judgement in their own causes, and the inconvenience of deciding their differences by force, which is many times the greatest on the unjust side. The design therefore of all Government is to entrust a third person or society, supposed impartial to the litigant parties, with a power sufficient to compel either of them to submit to her decision. For seeing it is not ordinarily to be expected, that differences should be decided by a persuasion of both parties of the equity of decisions, but that both parties will frequently prove tenacious of their own Opinions; therefore it is necessary that the guilty, whatever he be, who will seldom believe his own condemnation just, be imposed on; and such an Imposition being thus thought necessary, common prudence will suggest, that it is much more equal and secure for the party imposed on, that he be imposed on by the common arbitrator of their differences than by his partially affected adversary. And accordingly where there is no need of imposition there is none of government, and the seat of government is finally resolved on them, who have this power of imposing their own sentiments on others; so that to deny Ministers this power over the people, or the Bishops over the Ministers, is to make neither the one nor the other properly Governors. Besides, the power of Excommunication and Absolution (which you seem to mean in this your complaint, that the independent use of them is not communicated to the Ministers) are so incommunicably proper to the supreme governor, (who, as having the power of a Society, must also have that of admitting to, and rejecting members from it) as that it were impossible for him to give an account of his charge, if others may admit and reject at pleasure without dependence on him. So that to complain of being imposed on in this kind, is indeed in effect to complain of the Bishop's superiority over you. And if this reason were of any force, it would proceed as much against the Presbyterian government as the Episcopal, for even among them the Minister may as well be over-voted, and consequently overruled, by the Classes, as with us by the Bishops. So inseparable this power of imposing on Parish Ministers is found from Government, as that is indeed admitted by all them who own a Government superior to single Parishes?  
BUT, 
§ XXX.  I pray, quo jure do you challenge this Parochial power of Excommunication and Absolution independent on your Ordinaries? I shall at present give you leave to say, (not because that I think you can prove it, but because I am unwilling at present to dispute it) that Presbyters were not only counsellors, but coordinate governor's with the Bishop. But how can you show the least likelihood that the Bishop had not at least a negative vote among them? That as he could not do any thing without their suffrages, so they were able to conclude any thing without his? Much less are you able to prove, that every particular Presbyter, singly taken, ever had within his own Jurisdiction the power of determining so momentous a thing as Ecclesiastical censures. Wherever you find any Precedents over Presbyteries in the Scriptures, whether Apostles, or Evangelists, or Angels, you cannot find any Precedent of any thing carried by the major vote against the consent of the Precedent, as at least one of the prevailing number. And for the Ignatian Episcopacy and so downwards to S. Cyprian, which you seem to approve, it is very plain that all the power of Presbyters was dependent on the Bishop. Thus Ignatius (in his genuine uninterpolated Epistle to the Ephesians) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Edit. Vsser. p. 3.  And that that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the Communion of the Bishop, appears from the sequel, whence he concludes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. whence you may easily guests what he would have thought of Presbyters communicating in opposition to the Bishop, that even such Communions being without the altar, must needs have been destitute of the bread of God. To the same purpose also the same blessed Martyr advises even Presbyters not to despise the youth of Damas' the Bishop of the Magnesians, 
Ep. ad Magn. p. 11.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 translated appositely to the sense of this place, familiariter uti, seems to argue a greater distance than you would I believe think consistent with the parity you are so desirous of) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (observe I pray again the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 reverence) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (hence it appears that Presbyters as well as others are concerned in this his Exhortation) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (this is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so much disputed of, the youthfulness of their Bishop's person, not the novelty of the Institution of his Order, for it was that youthfulness which they were likely to take advantage of, which is the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. You see here that even Presbyters are not to take advantage even of a youthful Bishop, either for presuming on too much familiarity with him, or denying him the reverence due to his Order, though in a youthful person. That they are to yield to him, or rather to Jesus Christ, whose person is represented by him, (and sure you would not think much to be imposed on by Jesus Christ.) That this duty is to be paid without all hypocrisy to the Bishop for God's sake, whom it is impossible to deceive. That harkening to him (for that is the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which in the Hellenistick style then in use, is the same with obedience) is part of that. And that the disrespect to him in any of these duties, redounds to the dishonour of God, for whose sake he is to be honoured. And now I pray consider how you can reconcile herewith your desired liberty of excommunicating without his privity or consent. Immediately after he blames them who give their Bishop the honour of an empty name, and yet do all things without his privity, and expressly censures them as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, men of no good consciences, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Where, besides the coherence formerly noted, it is plain, that even Presbyters also are included, because he speaks of Assemblies, which could not be celebrated without some act of priestly power. And if such Assemblies be not according to the command, nor the rules of good conscience, how your proceedings without the consent or privity of your Bishop can be excusable I do not understand. In the Epistle ad Trallian. after having enjoined respect to all the three Orders, he concludes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
p. 17.  whence you may easily conclude his thoughts concerning such Assemblies, which are maintained without one of them, that is of Episcopacy, as they must needs be who take upon them to act independently on their Bishop. So in the Epistle to the Philadelphians, he says expressly that as many as are on God's part and Jesus Christ, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
p. 28.  by which you may see what he would have thought of those who should have joined with any Presbyter, exercising an Authority different from, and independent on, that of the Bishop. Nay, he confidently charges them, not as from his own private sense, but inspiration, (and those extraordinary 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 had not as yet failed in his time) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and after teaches that God gives remission of sin to them that are penitent, only on that condition, 
p. 30.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which if it be so, how can the Absolutions of Presbyters attempted without the consent of their Bishop be valid? But what can be more clear against your Independency of Parish Ministers in the exercise of discipline, than that excellent passage in the Epistle to the Smyrnaeans; 
p. 36.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And a little after; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So again; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. You see how expressly all persons (Presbyters themselves not excepted) are forbidden to meddle in Ecclesiasticals without order from the Bishop. You see what Ecclesiasticals he means by his enumeration of the particulars, not only Baptism and the Feasts of Love, but the very Eucharist. You see how clearly he disowns the validity of that Eucharist which is not received either from the Bishop himself, or some person authorized by him. Which both may serve to let you see, that even Presbyters themselves are included, seeing yourself do not allow the power of admitting to communion Laics or Deacons, though authorized; and that the power you seem to challenge of communicating whom you please, without the Bishop's Licence is again censured as invalid, as a dishonour of God, nay as a service of the Devil, which would have been thought harsh and passionate expressions, if the Age he lived in, before the starting of our modern Controversies, had not put him beyond any just or probable suspicions of partiality.  
I HAVE the rather insisted on the Testimony of this blessed Martyr, 
§ XXXI  because you seem to seem to have been willing to have condescended to the Ignation Episcopacy, and were therefore concerned, because in my Catalogue of the ancient Writers, I said Ignatius was decretory against the Presbyterians. I might have descended lower, because you said you would have yield to the Episcopacy practised in S. Cyprians time, to show that this liberty you desire, of admitting to, or excluding from, your flock whom you please, was not even in those Ages allowed to bare Presbyters. At present I shall only note a passage or two, because I am desirous of hastening. Baptism therefore, which has always been thought to require less power than the Lords Supper, 
De Baptism. c. 17  was not in Tertullia's time permitted to Deacons nor Priests themselves, without the Authority of their Bishop. These are his words; Dandi quidem (viz. Baptismi) habet jus summus sacerdos, qui est Episcopus. Dehinc Presbyteri & Diaconi, non tamen sine Episcopi authoritate, propter Ecclesiae honorem. Quo salvo, salva pax est, etc. Exactly herein agreeing with Ignatius. 
Ep. 75. apud S. Cyprian. p. 182. ed. Pamel.  And the same seems to have been the sense and practice of the Asiatic Churches in the time of Firmilian, who, though indeed he mention the majores natu praesides (under which word, according to the use of that Age, I confess Presbyters may be included) as having the power of Baptising, Imposition of hands, in reconciling penitents especially, and of Ordination, which we do not deny them; yet he seems to intimate their dependence on the Bishop in the administration of that power which properly belonged to them, which is all that we desire. For thus he afterwards expressly asserts the power of remission of sins, (either in Baptism or Absolution of Penitents, as appears from the occasion of the Dispute concerning the validity of both among the Heretics) to have been given to the Apostles, 
p. 184.  & Ecclesiis quas illi à Christo missi constituerunt, & EPISCOPIS qui eyes dinatione vicariâ successerunt. Where it is to be observed, 1. That no exclusive particle be expressed, yet it must necessarily be understood from the whole design of his Discourse, which is to exclude the Baptism of Heretics from being remissive of sins, because the power of remitting sins is not granted to them, which would not follow unless all which had that power conferred on them, had been adequatly enumerated by him. And, 2. That by the Churches here mentioned cannot be understood a Society contradistinct from the Bishops. For I believe you cannot produce a precedent of that age, where the word is taken for the other Clergy; so that there are only two other Senses that I can think of reducible to this purpose; either for the Laity, and that yourself I believe will not think intelligible here, that the power of remitting sins by Baptism, or otherwise, does agree to them; or for the complex of both the Laity and the Body of the Clergy, in contradistinction to the Bishop. And to this his proof of the power of remitting sins given to the Apostles, being also given to the Church in this contradistinct sense, must have been impertinently urged from its being given to the Apostles, seeing that the Church in the Apostles time must have been as contradistinct from the Apostles, as the later Churches from their respective Bishops. By the word Churches therefore are only meant Orthodox Societies, including Bishops as well as other members; whence it will follow, that the Church is only therefore said to have this power, because the Bishops have it; and therefore that no Ecclesiastical Member can have it independently on them. 3. Therefore that by the word Bishops, to whom this power of remitting sins is given, to which all other Ecclesiastical Power is consequent, Presbyters are not included; will appear probable, if you consider, 1. That though the word Presbyter and Sacerdos be attributed to Bishops properly so called, yet at least in that age I believe you will hardly find that a simple Presbyter is called Episcopus. blondel himself I think will not furnish you with an Instance. And, 2. That these Bishops are such as are called Successors of the Apostles. And that by these Successors of the Apostles, single persons are understood in the language of that age, appears in that when they prove Succession from the Apostles, they do it by catalogues of single persons, as those in Irenaeus, Tertullian, etc. and that Bishops in the confined sense are so frequently said to be Successors of the Apostles, which is not said of simple Presbyters. See S. Cyprian ep. 42, 65, 69. and the Author de Aleatoribus, with many others usually produced in the Disputes concerning Episcopacy.  
AND then for the sense of S. Cyprian, 
§ XXXII.  he was as resolute in vindicating his own right, as condescending in his practice. He it is that asserts the unaccountableness of the Episcopal Office to any under God; 
In Concil. Carthag. init.  that makes the Church in the Bishop, as well as the Bishop in the Church; 
Ep. 4. ad Cornel.  that charges the contempt of the Bishop as the original of all Schism and Heresy, and parallels it with the Sin of Corah, Dathan, and Abiram; that spares not even Presbyters themselves, when presuming to act without his order, but puts them in mind of his being their Superior, and charges them with rebellion, when they took that liberty you desire of acting arbitrarily and independently. Instances of all these kinds might have been produced, if I were not afraid of being too tedious, These things may at present suffice to show, that the liberty you desire of admitting or rejecting whom you please from your own flock, is not more unreasonable than dissonant from the practice of those Ages for which you profess a reverence. Nor do I understand your design in the use of that liberty you desire. If it be that you would have those whom you think unworthy of your flock excluded from your cure; that is as improper as if a Physician should desire to be excused from visiting those who are most dangerously, though not desperately, sick. Certainly the contrary would rather follow, that as they need most, so they should have most of your care. It is our Saviour's own saying, that the whole need not a physician, but the sick; that is, at least not comparatively: and generally his greatest pains and favours were extended to those who had least deserved them. Nor is their unwillingness to deal with you in affairs of this nature a sufficient reason to exempt them from your Cure; for this unwillingness itself is a most considerable ingredient in their distemper, and that which makes them most truly pitiable, and it would be as great a piece of inhumanity for the spiritual as the corporal Physician, to desert them on that pretence, I am sure very different from the behaviour of Christ and his Apostles, who found the World generally as much prejudiced against and unwilling to hear, them concerning affairs of that nature, as you can with any probability presume concerning a Christian Auditory. If your meaning be, not to be excused from the use of all other good means for their recovery, but only from admitting them to the blessed Sacrament, which ought to be the privilege of such as are already deserving; I pray consider, 1. Whether though you deny them to be Christians, yet their very Baptism and exterior profession of Christianity, be not at least sufficient to entitle them to exterior privileges, if on their own peril they will venture on them; and that Sacramental privileges are but exterior. They are invited to the marriage feast, and none may exclude them if they come, though it is at their own hazard if they presume to do so without the marriage garment. And, 2. That this does at least hold till they be convicted and censured by their due Superior, and you know it is questioned whether you, as a private Presbyter, aught to have that power. But, 3. That you have a power of suspending refractory persons till you acquaint the Bishop, and with him you have that power of convincing and persuading, which seems as much as yourself desire, so that even upon this account you have no reason to complain.  
MY second Argument was from experience even in Ecclesiasticals; 
§ XXXIII  to which you answer, that It's hard then to know any thing, and that you dispute all this while as if the question were, Whether men in England speak English; that therefore if you herein err, you profess yourself incurable, and allow me to despair of you. If I had disputed from present experience in England, I should have confessed your Answer proper, that I had endeavoured to conquer your sense and experience, as you elsewhere express it. But I wonder how you could understand me so, considering that our present want of discipline was the reason of my desire of its revival, whence you took the occasion of these Disputes. My meaning was, that in the primitive times, when Bishops were indeed laborious and conscientious, and were willing and desirous to do what they could do, experience showed that discipline was actually maintained under such a Diocesan Government; and therefore I concluded, that the multitude of persons governed was not the reason of our present neglects. And what is it that is scrupled in this Discourse, or need put you to those unequal resolutions of being uncurable? Is it whether the number of Christians in Dioceses were equal then with what we have now? This was proved in my former Letter. Or that the Bishop then challenged the same power over the Presbytery as now? This I have but lately proved. Or that discipline was then maintained. This I do not find that you deny. Nay certainly yourself thought discipline maintainable under it, when you professed yourself ready to yield to such an Episcopacy. Or that what was then performed by the same Government, is still performable, if men would be the same? The admission of this would not oblige you to question yourself or experience. Nor indeed is any thing of this kind concerning antiquity as notorious to you, as what men do at present in England.  
FOR proving the great multitudes then subject to Diocesan Discipline I said, 
§ XXXIV  That the greatness of no City was thought sufficient to multiply Bishops. To this you answer, 1. That God's Institution was, that every Church have a Bishop, for which you quote Acts 14. 23. etc. But, 1. The place you refer me to has no mention of a Divine Institution; for Apostolical practice is not a sufficient proof of that, and this is all which is so much as intimated in this place. 2. It does not as much as mention the word Bishop, but that of Presbyter. And though the words were granted to have been then confounded; yet you know they were so afterwards when the things were certainly distinct. And therefore you cannot conclude from the word Presbyter, that a Bishop was meant, especially in the sense wherein it was afterwards appropriated. Nor, 3. Is it evident that by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is meant a single Presbyter in every particular Church, as in a Parish; but it may as well be meant of Presbyteries as Presbyters. And when afterwards the Presidency of a single Monarch was introduced, no Churches and Presbyteries but such as had Bishops, and were Diocesan in the sense we now understand the word. And if they were Presbyteries, you cannot hence disprove the presidency of one over the rest, as we find it soon after practised. Nor, 4. Is it evident that by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must needs be meant a Parish, as it concerns you to believe. For the word Church is as applicable to great as small Societies, and the great ones may as well be called one in their kind, though they be capable of a further subdivision into many Churches of smaller denomination. Thus the Catholic Church is called one in the Constantinopolitan Creed, though consisting of many national, and the Church of England but one national Church, though consisting of two Provincial; and the Province of Canterbury but one Provincial Church, though consisting of several Diocesan; and every Diocese but one Diocesan Church, though consisting of several Parishes. And even in the Scripture there are several notions of the word of different proportions. There are the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and there are the two or three gathered in the name of Christ, which from the coherence, and the Jewish notions of Assemblies, seem to make up a Church, 
Exhort. Cast.  and accordingly Tertullian calls an Assembly of two or three a Church, though consisting only of Laics. And yet these Churches are so little serviceable to your purpose, as that I believe you would not be for confining a private Presbyter to so small a cure, I am sure they are much beneath those populous Parishes which you do not seem to disapprove. Supposing therefore I should grant you, that every distinct Church should have a distinct Bishop; yet how will you prove with the least plausibility, that this Church must be understood of a Parochial one, that the multitude of Bishops may answer that of Parishes? Especially considering that the notion of the word for a Parochial Church will not be so easily deduced from Scripture, as that for a Diocese. For thus much the Independents, I think, do prove sufficiently, that a whole Church in those times did generally meet in one place; but they fail in proving distinction of Churches in Cities, though never so great and populous, which two put together do plainly amount to our notion, not of a Parochial, but Diocesan Church, there appearing no footsteps in those times of any Subdivisions allotted to particular Presbyters. Besides, if we may believe the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here parallel with those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Tit. l. 5. as in all likelihood they are; then a Church will be that which will extend to the Liberties of a whole City. And because you find no mention of distinct Presbyters for Villages recommended to Titus' care it seems very probable that they were sufficiently provided for by those of the City, and therefore that they had some dependence on them. That the name of Churches was attributed first to Cities, see proved by the Excellent Dr. Stilling fleet, Iren. p. 2. c. 7. § 2, 4.  
FOR that the Apostles did take care even for Villages we have the express Testimony of S. Clemens Romanus, 
§ XXXV.  (that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) if these words be understood as commonly they are. 
p. 54. edit. Junii.  But I confess it does not seem to me so clear, that by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is understood those Country Villages, which are obnoxious to the Jurisdiction of the City; but rather Regiones, as it is translated, not as Rome and Constantinople were divided into their Regiones answerable to our Wards, but as it may in a larger sense signify whole Provinces, under which many Cities might be comprehended (my Reasons I would give if I were not unwilling to digress;) much less am I satisfied with Blondell's Conjecture, who conceives it to relate to the Chorepiscopi, and thence concludes that they were not originally subject to the City Bishop. For though 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were indeed taken in the sense he is concerned it should be; yet there is no necessity that it should be referred to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as if distinct Bishops had been imposed over them from those of the Cities to which they were related, but may conveniently enough be joined with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to signify their preaching in the Villages as well as Cities, and their election of fit persons from both for Bishops and Deacons, to be disposed of where they thought convenient. However it were, it seems very probable that the Apostles, as they planted Christianity first in Cities, so they seemed to have settled the Government there first; and as they generally left the Villages to be converted by excursions from the Cities, so it seems most credible, that the influences of the Government must have followed that of the propagation of their Doctrine. Certainly the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mentioned by Ignatius, in his Inscription of his Epistle to the Romans, over which the Church of Rome is said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, cannot in the narrowest exposition choose but include a Precinct as large as our ordinary Dioceses. But, 5. Supposing all had been as you would have them, that it had been enjoined by the Apostles, that every Parochial Church should have a distinct Bishop; yet how can you prove that it was an Injunction of an immutable and eternally-obliging nature, (as it is clear that some, that of abstaining from blood, Acts 15. was not.) For if they be not, you ought not to urge them to the prejudice of superinduced Constitutions. But lastly, all that you can hence pretend for your purpose is only, that the having only one Bishop in the appropriated sense in a Diocese, was not conformable to the sense of the Apostles. But it does not thence follow, that discipline is not maintainable under such a Government, which was the only thing for whose proof I produced it. You answer, 2. That a particular Church was a Society of neighbour Christians convened in personal communion for God's worship. I confess personal communion was generally practised with the Bishop, but I have proved it to be of whole Cities, and such great Assemblies as could not be served by a single person, (without the assistance of a Presbytery, which the Bishop had for his help;) and therefore could not be Parochial in the sense of the word now commonly used. If you think otherwise, when you prove it I may then, and not till then, be concerned to think of a further Answer.  
YOU answer 3. That for 250 years you think I cannot prove, 
§ XXXVI  that any one Bishop in the world (save at Alexandria and Rome) had more such congregations and altars than one; nor there for a long time after the Apostles, nor in many Churches for some hundred years longer. The is the same mistake as before, to think them answerable to our Parishes, who did then all communicate at one altar; whereas indeed the fame circuit and number of Inhabitants, who had first been governed by the Bishop and his Presbytery in common, no particular Presbyter having nay proper portion assigned him, but by the provisional commands of the Bishop, was afterwards distributed into parts proportionable to the number of the Presbytery, that so every one might know his own work. And I pray, what essential difference is there betwixt the same Presbyteries, as acting in common as they did at first with the Bishop; and distributed into several divisions as they are now, unless it be that this later is more convenient? And if the Bishop was major universis when they acted in conjunction with him; why must he be minor singulis, or at lest aequalis, when dispersed to their several distinct Employments? If all of them when united might not attempt any thing without his consent and privity; why must each of them be allowed that liberty when deprived of their united forces? And if discipline was maintainable by them, when by acting in common they were more remote from particular exploration; why should it not be much more so when none is invited to be negligent by trusting to another, as men are apt to do in cases of common concernment, and when each of them has a task proportionable to his own abilities? But, 2. Suppose that this subdivision of the Diocese into Parishes, (which is all that you can pretend to have been attempted at Rome and Alexandria, for by this means it fell out by accident, that there were several altars under the Jurisdiction of the same Bishop) had not answered the primitive example, nay had been a culpable, not a lawful prudential Innovation; yet will you say that discipline was not maintained, when it was actually (however upon other accounts) culpably introduced? If you grant it was, that is sufficient for my purpose, to show that the experience of those times has evinced the possibility of discipline under a Diocesan Government, and therefore that it is practicable even now if men would but endeavour it. If you say it was not, you must then charge the most celebrated Churches in the purest earliest Ages with want of discipline. For in Rome the first division into Titles (answerable to our Parishes) is attributed to Pope Euaristus, 
Under Domitian in the year 83, according to Eurychius.  (who came into his See Anno Dom. 112.) by the Author de Vit. Pontif. commonly ascribed to Damasus. For afterwards in the two Epistles of Pius (which are of better repute with blondel than the others that bear his Name) to Justus Viennens. we find mention of two Titles then newly established by Euprepia and the Pastor; so that I think this division there (if we may trust these Authors for it; and if we may not, you will have no ground of charging the Romans of those Ages with plurality of Altars more than in other places) will appear to have been as soon as they had any settled places to meet in. For before that their meetings seem to have been ambulatory and uncertain; sometimes in the Temple, sometimes in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sometimes in secret places, particularly in the Coemeteria, (for of some of these may the passages of 1 Cor. 11. and the ancient Author of Philopatris in Trajan's time, who bears the name of Lucian, be understood) and then it was not so convenient to subdivide into Parishes, when there were not any settled places peculiarly designed and convenient for Parochial Assemblies. Upon which account there will be no reason that the necessitous examples of the former Age should prejudge against the prudence and conveniences of this. But the Titles mentioned by Pius, as left by Legacy, seem to have been perpetually alienated to the use of the Church, and therefore fitter for this purpose. Which if it be supposed, than the antiquity of divers Altars in the same Diocese will be equal with Churches and Parishes which you do not condemn, and as ancient as they could be with any tolerable convenience, and you cannot blame them for being no sooner. And sure you will not deny, that even then, and a long while after, discipline was maintained among the Romanists themselves. If you do, you must contradict all the histories of that Age, which mention the Martyrdoms of their Bishops of those Ages, together with very many of their other Clergy and Laity for several Successions; 
Tertul.  and the great Eulogies of Tertullian and S. Cyprian, 
Praescr.  and the confident Appeals to the Roman Church as well as others, 
Iren. l. 3. adv. Hoer.  for the Assertion on of Apostolical Tradition, used frequently by the Fathers against the Heretics; whereas a sensible decay in discipline would have weakened their credit even in Doctrinals. And for the other Instance of Alexandria, the first mention that we find of a subdivision there is in the time of Arius, who is said to have been Presbyter of a Church called Baucalis, upon which occasion Epiphanius tells us, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (so it is to be read) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Epiphan. Haeres. 69. N. 1. Vide etiam Haeres. 68 N. 4.  That the Churches of the Catholic Communion in Alexandria, under the Jurisdiction of the same Archbishop, had their particular Presbyters assigned them, for the Ecclesiastical necessities of the Inhabitants, which divisions were by the Alexandrians, according to the custom of their Country, called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But it is not mentioned as an Innovation in or near his time, and therefore is in all probability to be presumed much more ancient. And if the custom of the eldest Presbyters succeeding in order to the Episcopacy, was in Alexandria, (where it seems observed as a special custom) practised from the Apostles time to Heraclas, (who was Scholar to Origen) as S. Hierom and Eutychius say it was, and there ceased at S. Hierom seems to intimate, than it would be very probable that this subdivision into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was introduced at least before that time of Heraclas; because some relics of that practice remained even in Arius his time, whose place as Presbyter of Baucalis is made next to the Bishop. 
Act. Concil. Nicen. l. 2. c. 1.  (So Gelasius Cyricenus speaking concerning Alexander, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.) Whence also the relation in Nicephorus Calistus of the quarrel of Arius with one Baucalus, being the first and second Presbyters of that Church of Alexandria, which is given as an occasion of his Heresy; a story very probably raised by occasion of his mistaking Baucalis the name of his Parish for the name of a Man, who is made second because Arius was known to be the first. For this Precedeny of Arius is no way probable to have been because of his longer standing in his office of Presbytery, seeing Alexander is said expressly to have given him it, who was the first that made him Presbyter, for he was only made Deacon by Achillas the Predecessor of Alexander. Now Alexander himself is by Baronius thought to have succeeded Achillas in the Year 311, and if he be mistaken, seems rather to err in placing him too soon after Peter, and the difference betwixt him and Arius arose about the Year 315, not above four years after, too small a time to make him in course the signior Presbyter. This Precedency therefore seems to be upon account of his Parish, which at the first distribution had in all probability been allotted to that Presbyter, who had been signior in due course of standing, which therefore seems to have been introduced whilst that seniority was observed, that is, at least before the time of Heraclas.  
AND how long before Heraclas his time this distinction might have been introduced you cannot tell; 
§ XXXVII.  yet I believe you will hardly say, I am sure much more hardly prove, that discipline failed there in the time of Heraclas, or for a long time after. 
Apud Euseb. l. 4. c. 40, 41. l. 7. 10, 11.  After Heraclas, how much the Church of Alexandria and himself particularly suffered for Christianity, you have fully related by his Successor Dionysius in Eusebius, in the time of Decius and Valerian; and how severe they were in their Fasts, appears from the Canonical Epistle of that same Dionysius to Basilides, besides his other penitential Treatise now lost. What the Alexandrians also suffered in the most bloody Persecution of Dioclesian, 
●. 8. c. 10, 12, 13.  you may find in the same Eusebius, and particularly in Thebais, (which by the Nicene Canon establishing the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we find to have been influenced by the Alexandrian Discipline) the number of Martyrs was so great as to denominate a famous Epocha, which those Countries observe to this day, called the Annus Martyrum or Dioclesiani. Which severity is by so much the more remarkable, because it followed an interval of rest, which usually corrupts that discipline which is only voluntary, and unseconded by good Laws. I need not mention the Martyrdom of their Bishop S. Peter in this Persecution; his very severe Canonical Epistle is sufficient to show how rigorous discipline was then practised, when in the height of persecution such severe Penances against lapsed persons were not judged unseasonable to be exercised on such persons, over whom they had no coercive power, but the obligation of the Penitents conscience. I might have proceeded to have shown the same severity still maintained in that City, (which you so particularly reflect on as unworthy to be made a precedent) during the Prelacy of Alexander and the great Athanasius, from the great Eulogies given to those excellent Prelates by the Fathers, and the courage shown by them, in ejecting and keeping out Arius, and the very slight Exceptions urged by the Arians their Enemies against them, especially in the several Synods convened in the cause of Athanasius. 
Euseb. l. 9 c. 8.  But for evincing the general severity of the Lives of Christians, that memorable Example of their great diligence in providing for those who had been formerly their severest Persecutors, in the great Plague and Famine which immediately followed the Persecution of Dioclesian, and venturing many of their own lives in the service, when they had been deserted by their nearest Friends, may be an illustrious evidence. Besides the Controversy betwixt S. Pet. of Alexandria and Meletius, 
Epiph.  the occasion of the Meletian Schism, 
Haeres. 68 N. 3.  shows how generally the Alexandrians were affected to discipline. For when S. Pet. though severe enough against lapsed persons, as appears by his forementioned Epistle, yet thought it a necessary Indulgence to admit Penitents to Communion during the Persecution, even Priests as well as others, that they might be the better animated to new occasions of sufferings; Meletius opposed it, and was followed by much the greater part of the Clergy. Nor ought you to conclude, that the like subdivision was not introduced into other Churches, because we have no Records attesting it to have been so, seeing there is so little extant of the Histories of those earlier Centuries, much less any thing so minute and particular in describing the Customs of particular Churches, as that it would be safe to argue negatively, from their omission of a custom to conclude that there was none. For my design, it is sufficient that the ancient Dioceses had as many Presbyters, besides other Clergy requisite to rule them, in conjunction with the Bishop, as are now thought sufficient, since their distribution into particular Parishes; besides the Chorepiscopi and the Clergy under them, all subject to the Government of the City Bishop. Which is enough to show, that the charge of a Diocese was as great then as now, and much beyond what you would have it, the abilities of a particular person without Parochial Subrulers.  
4. YOU say, 
§ XXXVIII.  At Antioch (the third Patriarchate) Ignatius professeth that every Church had one Altar, and one Bishop with his Presbyters and Deacons, Fellow-servants.) If you mean every Church at Antioch, as if that or any other City in that time, had more than one Bishop presiding over a Presbytery; that is more than you will find in Ignatius, or any Authentic Writer of that time. But if you mean at Antioch as a Patriarchate, that is, within that circuit which was afterwards subject to the Bishop of Antioch as a Patriarch, including the whole Oriental Diocese, there were many Cities that had in them but one Altar with one Bishop and his Clergy, that I have already granted probable; but have withal shown how little it will advantage your Cause, or prejudice mine, and I am not desirous to trouble you with Repetition. The name of Fellow-servants I doubt you misunderstand; it is indeed true if related to God, that persons of all Orders in the Church are his Fellow-servants; but if you mean it (as I doubt you do) that they are Servants coequal among themselves, that is clearly against the whole current of Ignatius his Epistles, and against the supposition of their being distinct Orders; and, I believe, against your own opinion concerning Priests and Deacons, whom I think you will not say to be thus coequal. But for what you add further, (as if you had it out of the same Ignatius, though indeed you have not scored it as you did the former part) That in this one Church the Bishop must inquire 
* The place intended is I believe Ep. ad. Polycrap. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. p. 139. Ed. Vsser.  all by name, even Servant Men and Maids, and see that they absented not themselves from the Church; whence you ask, Why is not Ignatius. confuted if he erred? and refer me to Mr. Mede on the point. I am confident that you will find no such thing in Ignatius or Mr. Mede that will need confuting. For this inquiry by name need not have been performed by personal visitation of them, but by Schedules delivered to him by his subordinate Clergy, which if any of our Bishops would do, I should be so far from offering to confute, as that I should highly honour and reverence him for it.  
BUT you say, 
§ XXXIX  5. That Alexandria and Rome by not multiplying Bishops as Churches or Converts needed it, began the great sin and calamity which hath undone us, and therefore are not to be our pattern. If you mean by Bishops your Parish Ministers, (as you seem to do) who must have no greater charge than one particular person, unassisted with a Presbytery, may give a particular account of; then sure you cannot but know, that as they are by you thought singular in introducing this distinction of Altars in the same City; so they must have been so in multiplying such a kind of Bishops that might attend them, at least in more accurately proportioning them to the multitudes of Churches and Converts. But if you mean a multitude of Parish Priests, whom you would fain call Bishops, independent on a principal Precedent; than it would concern you to prove, 1. That Alexandria and Rome were herein singular, which you will find impossible to be done. And, 2. That their guilt herein was not only an occasion (for occasions of evil cannot be proved evil, and so unfit for being patterns) but natural causes of that grand sin and calamity you so lament.  
YOU answer or rather argue, 
§ XL.  6. That were Bishops necessarily to be distributed by Cities, the Empires that have few or no Cities, must have few or no Bishops; and an Emperor might (aliud agendo) depose all the Bishops by disfranchising the Cities. This does not show the impossibility of a Bishops maintaining discipline in a City that is great and populous, (which is indeed our question) but only the inconvenience of scrupulously multiplying Bishops according to the multitude of Cities. And that, as it is not to our purpose, so I know no Adversary you have in it. For there are no humane Establishments whatsoever that can fit all circumstances; yet are not such possible inconvenient cases thought sufficient to abrogate them though known and foreseen. And therefore it were not in prudence a sufficient reason for the Church to alter her general rule of multiplying Bishops by Cities, because the cases mentioned by you are but rare and improbable, which kind are not taken notice of by humane Legislators. They are rare; for where will you find that Empire that hath few or no Cities, at least in those civilised parts of the world they were then acquainted with? They are improbable; for the administration of justice among Subjects, and the encouragement of traffic, which are the Governors' Interests, do require such Privileges to be given to places not too distant from each other. But if the inconveniences were greater than indeed they are, and sufficient to persuade a deviation from such a general rule in such cases. Yet, 1. The Church never acknowledged any unalterable divine obligation to observe it, but has always reserved a power to herself of deviating in such cases, of which she might be satisfied that they were sufficiently momentous. And, 2. She has in such cases actually taken the liberty of exerting her own power; as in those Nations which had but one Bishop, though many Cities, of which instances were already given; and in those places where Cities too numerous, and too little frequented, against which she has made those express Canons, 
Can. 6. Concil. Sandicens.  that Bishops should not be placed over them, 
Can. 57 Conc. Laodic. Epist.  nè vilesceret nomen Episcopi, 
1. Pseudo-Clementin. ad Jacob. ep. 1. Pseudo-Anacleti & Dist. 80. ep. 3. Pseudo-Anacleti n. 2.  which those of your Persuasion do so often take notice of with offence.  
BUT, 
§ XLI.  7. You say, Every Corporation, Oppidum, like our Market Towns, was then truly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And if we will procure every such City with us to have a Bishop, and the office of such Bishops to be to drive men from sin, and not to it; and to silence Blasphemers, not faithful Preachers of the Gospel; all our Controversies of Prelacy are then at an end. But I fear though you had your desire, that in analogy to City's Bishops should be multiplied according to the number of Cities, (which Rule you lately seemed to dislike) and that every Market Town should be accounted a City, as you conceive it to have been practised among the Ancients, and that Bishops discharged their duty as you have described it; yet you would hardly suffer our Controversies to end so, especially if you acted consequently to your own Principles. For you know, by the same rule that small Cities, as you have described them, must have distinct Bishops; the greatest that are, London itself for example, must have but one, together with the Villages about it; and I doubt that would be found to be a charge as disproportionable to the abilities of a single man, as some of our Country Dioceses, especially here in Ireland. 
The 15th. part in Taxes, 14th. really, p. 83, 84  Nay, by Captain Grants Calculation London bears a greater proportion to all England than any single Diocese, which is only the 25th. part. Now according to your Principles, our Communion quâ Diocesan, that is, if I understand you as exceeding the abilities of a single man, is not to be embraced. Therefore even in this case you must refuse to communicate with the Church of London. And considering that in communicating with a particular, you do communicate with all with whom that particular Church holds Communion, (for Communion with a particular Church is no where understood as a profession of union with her alone, but also with all such whom she accounts orthodox members of the Catholic Church) you must by the same sequel conceive yourself obliged to decline the Communion of all particular Churches communicating with London. Unless therefore you suppose a Schism of all other Churches from her, you must make one from them; and so be in the same condition wherein you are at present. I confess you do not act consequently to this later Principle, whilst you refuse not our Parish Communion, which communicates with our Diocesan quà Diocesan; and so I had much rather decline the Dispute, than urge you too far to approve yourself more rational by your being more uncharitable, which may too probably be the event if you should prove too tenacious of your present Opinions. But I believe, Sir, if you would be pleased to examine, you would certainly find yourself mistaken in thinking their ordinary Cities to have been no more considerable than our ordinary Market Towns; for sure you know that then as well as now Cities were the highest denomination; and that in those flourishing Countries, proportionably much more populous than England, it is likely their Cities were accordingly frequented. Nay, most of the Cities of those times, especially the Oriental the Greeks and asiatics, had been little Republics among themselves, before the success of war had subdued them to the yoke of a common Master, which must in all likelihood have made them more considerable, when their Governors' care and interests were more confined to them, than if they had originally been included in a greater Society. Besides the wars waged by them, and the resistance made against numerous Armies, and the multitude and capaciousness of their Temples and Theatres, than so frequent in ordinary Cities, (as you may see for the small Tract of Greece very fully in Pausanias, besides what other Authors have mentioned occasionally concerning that and other places) are sufficient Arguments of their ordinary populousness. And considering that those Cities that were among them eminent for greatness, did rather exceed than fall short of those which are accounted so now; we have reason to believe that the common Cities did likewise hold the like proportion.  
NAY, 
§ XLII.  according to all the qualifications of our modern Cities, those ancient ones were every way as considerable as ours. They were Towns corporate among themselves. This appears from the Government mentioned as exercised among them; the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Acts 19 39 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, so very frequently mentioned in Greek Cities, and the Praetors and Aedibes among the Latins. They were walled, whence the ordinary Etymology of Urbs quasi Orbis, from the compass allotted for the walls by the plough, and the customs for ploughing, for founding, and demolishing their walls, so famous among the Romans. And the same you may observe to have been the general custom; for you will, I believe, never meet any mention of City a unwalled, though possibly not with those ceremonies and formalities. And this seems to have been one of their principal distinctions from places of a near, but inferior account; that the O●●ida among the Latins, and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 among the Greeks, were not walled as our Market Towns usually are not. They had Suburbs subject to their Jurisdiction frequently mentioned in the Scriptures, particularly those of the Levites, Numb. 35. 5. have 2000 cubits on every side without the walls, which is near a mile. So the Romans had their Pomoeria and Suburbana, and the Greeks their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 obvious in Authors. And besides these Suburbs there were several places of inferior denomination subject to the ancient Cities; these you have frequently mentioned Josh. 16. and in several other passages of that and other Books of Scripture, and are rendered Towns in our English Translation, Vici and Villulae, Castilia, and sometimes Oppida, in the Vulgar; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the LXXII. And expressly Aristotle defines a City 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Polit. l. 1. c. 2.  And as the Grecians had their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 subject to their Cities, so the Romans particularly had their Pagos, places of some natural advantage for strength, to which the Rustics might have a ready recourse in time of danger, instituted by Servius Tullius, yet subject to their City, as you may see in Halicarnassaeus; whence you know the name Paganus first signified a Country Clown, in opposition to a Citizen, or a person of civil education. And generally through Italy you may find mention of Vici and Villae and Oppida, and the Ager denominated from the City, who in all affairs of consequence had recourse to their neighbouring Cities. And besides the Examples now mentioned from the Scriptures, the same practice seems to have been observed in other Oriental parts, as appears from Isidorus Characenus, who in his Parthic Stages mentions not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in contradiction to Cities; as also in Xenophon in exped. Cyr. And that they were subject to the Cities might have been shown from the manner of their Census described by S. Luke 3. 2. that they were to be taxed in their own Cities, which seems to have been the common custom of the whole Roman Empire, and the ordinary practice of the men of those Ages, to denominate themselves from the City they had relation to, though born in the Villages, and their usual recourse on solemn occasions to the City Sacrifices, a practice very much conformed to their secular dependences by the ancient Legislators; besides their repairing thither for secular justice. But besides all this, the right of a City was given to places, not upon account of their greatness and populousness, but by special Charter. A clear instance hereof we have in 13 Action of the Council of Chalcedon; there we find Anastatius Nicaenus pleading a a right to Basilinopolis, because it had been formerly a Region of Nice, (what Regions were, is notorious from the divisions of Rome and Constantinople into them) till it was made a City by Julian or some other Emperor. Here we see a place so considerable, as that it was afterwards made a City, yet formerly only a Ward of another City, which Ward was in all likelihood equivalent our ordinary Market Towns. Nay more than that, for he gives instances of two such others, Tatiens and Doris, that were then acknowledged Regions of Nice. We see also this Region raised to the dignity of a city by the Imperial Rescript. And further he proves the dependence of Basilinopolis on Nice by this argument, that the Emperor who made it a City took 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Curiales, (whence the Imperial Rescripts themselves are frequently called Pragmatica) from Nice; and that the custom was still observed, that the Vacancies of Basilinopolis, as they fell, were supplied from Nice, and that they were frequently translated from thence back to Nice again; and that thus that which had formerly been a Region became a City. Where several things are observable to my purpose: 1. That that which made the Region a City, was the having Court-officers of their own, whence it appears that Courts were appropriated to Cities, and that therefore all other Towns not thus privileged must have been subject to the Jurisdiction of the Cities. 2. That these Courts were granted by special Charter of the Emperor. And, 3. that the borrowing these Officers from another City, if constantly observed, signified some secular dependence of such a place on such a City, from whence they were borrowed. And now I pray what an such a Town walled, incorporated, and having Jurisdiction, not only over Suburbs, but a proportion of the Villages and Towns adjacent, by special Imperial Charters, want of our modern notion of a City, even as contradistinct to our Market Towns?  
AND that the Government of the Church was proportioned to that of the State is so commonly observed by learned Men, 
§ XLIII  as that I cannot think it necessary to be tedious in proving it. And that in this very particular of the subjection of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the City Bishop, appears from the 17th. Canon of this same Council, where it is not only for this, but all other affairs of a like nature, established as a general Rule, (very probably occasioned by the forementioned Controversy;) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And though we had no express Testimony, yet the multitude of the Clergy requisite for the Government of their ordinary 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a whole Presbytery in the City, besides the Deacons, and the other inferior Orders there, and others in the Country subject to the Chorepiscopus or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and all subject to the City Bishop, do plainly show that the Bishop's Jurisdiction, if not as large as now, was at least much larger than our ordinary Market Towns, which usually have but one Parish, and are therefore thought sufficiently governable by an ordinary single Presbyters. And this form of governing Cities was so universal, as that your Assertion to the contrary is not credible even in Africa, or any other place where Bishops or Cities are observed to have been most frequent or numerous: But if it had indeed been otherwise in some singular places, yet it is plain that the general rate of Cities among the Ancients was equal to ours. Whence it will follow, that the Dioceses generally designed were such as ours are now, though in some particular more anomalous Instances they were (it may be) as small as you would have them. Whence two things will follow very apposite to my design: 1. That the Judgement of those Ages themselves were certainly more for us than you, seeing their judgement is only to be concluded from their general rules, not from their particular anomalous practices. And, 2. that the case of discipline must have been the same with them as us. For the general observation of discipline cannot be effected by singular, but general practices and designs. Whence it will be easy to infer, that if discipline was then generally observed, than it is observable under a Diocesan Government, in the sense we are now disputing concerning it. For such I have proved to have been generally practised then, and if it was observed then, you can give no disparity why it may not be so now, if Governors would be equally industrious.  
YOUR intimation concerning to Bishops you would have in your Parochial Dioceses; 
§ XLIV  (that their office must be to drive men from sin, and not to it and to silence Blasphemers, and not faithful Preachers of the Gospel;) as if our Bishops were guilty of the contrary, is methinks very sharp and uncharitable. We are all agreed, you as well as we, that this is our Diocesan Bishop's office. Our only difference is, that you conceive their actual practice to be otherwise. But I pray consider seriously what good meaning you can have herein if your desire had been granted? Is it that the Bishop must not do that which himself thinks to be driving men to sin? You cannot but know that they pretend, (and how can you know that they do not really believe) their prosecutions of Dissenters to be not a driving them to sin, but from it, from disobedience to that which they think lawful Ecclesiastical Government, and from those Separations which themselves judge Schismatical, and from the defence and malice of unlawful Oaths. And certainly what they think to be Disobedience and Schism, and the maintaining of unlawful Oaths, yourself 〈◊〉 blame them if they believe them 〈◊〉 〈…〉 And the Preachers silenced by 〈…〉 not by them thought faithful 〈…〉 of the Gospel, at least not in the 〈◊〉 of their silencing; but ●●eachers of 〈…〉 and Founders and Fomenters of parties, to the great weakening of the common Interest of the Gospel. And can you think it faulty in them to be zealous against them, whom they conceive to be such enemies to the Gospel, at least while they think them so, and profess themselves unable to find any reason to think otherwise? Or do you mean that the Bishop must not drive to that which the Criminal will pretend to be a sin, or prosecute that which he calls faithful Preaching of the Gospel? If so, you had dealt more plainly to have denied the Bishop any power at all to drive men from sin, or silence Blasphemers; than to grant him it, and yet to make it useless and unpracticable, as it must needs be if he must not practise it till the Sinner or Blasphemers confess themselves so, for how rarely do you find real Criminals plead guilty at the Bar? Besides that, by this means the most innocent if any must only suffer; and the most dangerous must generally escape. For they who confess their crime must generally be presumed penitent, and they who are so are almost innocent, if we may believe the Tragedian; but he who denies his guilt, aggravates it by the disingenuity of his Apology. Besides, he who confesses himself a Sinner or a Blasphemer, is only chargeable with a personal guilt; but he who denies sins and blasphemies to be sins, sins more heinously, not only sinning himself, but teaching others to do so too. Nor is the multitude only more considerable, that is drawn aside by this later sort of disingenuous sinners, but the quality of the persons seduced, and the greatness of their danger is much more considerable, than in those who are prejudiced by the former. For none are likely to be seduced by professed debauchees, but such as are ill-inclined themselves. But they who are deceived by them who teach ill principles, not only defending sins add excusing them, but pretending them to be duties, are usually such who are of the best lives, and the most innocent meaning, whose Errors are like to be authenticated by their personal authority and reputation. And those who acknowledge their sins are more easily recoverable, their own consciences being ready upon any occasion to join with external conviction whensoever offered to them; but they who mistake their sins for the service of God, do both alienate their minds from conviction, by laying out their zeal against hearing or impartial considering that which they look on as a temptation; and in the event resolve their conviction into an issue of more difficult proof. For it is generally more easy even to the meanest most popular capacity, to prove a matter of fact than a matter of right, how unquestionable soever. Certainly you would yourself acknowledge him to be much the greater and more dangerous person, who should preach for drunkenness, and maintained it to be an evangelical duty, and call this his Preaching a faithful preaching of the Gospel, and accordingly be guilty of it, without any thing of remorse or shame, than he who should ingenuously confess his guilt and blame-worthiness for it.  
NOW this you know is the sense of Superiors concerning Dissenters; 
§ XLV  they think that to be their Subject's duty, which their Subjects pretend to be sins. And can you blame them for obliging their Subjects to perform their duty? If you do, you will thereby make their Government useless and unsignificant. They think Schism to be a sin really much greater than those which sound louder in the vulgar esteem, than drunkenness, etc. and more nearly relating to their trust as Governors, as being more directly prejudicial to the public, to take care of which is their peculiar office as Governors. They think that which is called faithful preaching of the Gospel, not to be for reforming of men's lives, which is the great design of the Gospel, (for God be praised we do not differ in Subjects of that kind, but men may be as zealous as they please against vice, though Conformists) but the constituting and perpetuating of Schism, which is by so much the more dangerous by how much it is more palliated by specious titles, such as is that now mentioned; so that though themselves may believe them faithful in other things, yet in this they are far from thinking them so, and therefore as far from prosecuting them as faithful Preachers. And I believe yourself will hardly pretend, that their fidelity in some things must excuse their unfaithfulness in others. Or do you mean, that persons of a pious conversation and conscientious, must not be driven to that which they think sin, or from that which they think faithful Preaching of the Gospel? If you mean that all truly pious conscientious persons ought to be treated with all candour and respect, before severer means be used; or that the use of severer means is utterly to be forborn, as far as may be, that is, as far as such forbearance may be reconcilable with the public Interest, which is to be preferred before the private of any single person how pious soever; I could for my part heartily wish it were so too, and I believe most of the Bishops do practice accordingly with those concerning whom they have entertained such a good opinion, and do endeavour to show the same charitable demeanour to them on earth, which they think God will in heaven.  
BUT, 
§ XLVI  Sir, you know that they who are indeed free from carnal vices, and such as are obnoxious to observation, may yet be guilty of spiritual, such as Obstinacy in yielding to conviction, or Disobedience to Superiors, or Negligence in inquiry, or too much prejudice or aversation to the persons or reasons of their adversaries, before they have given them an equal hearing, or some such other prejudice, which unawares seduces the very best and wisest persons; and their guilt upon some of these accounts may be discerned and judged by their Superiors, from their perverse demeanour under those milder Treatments. And when it is discerned, though their innocence as to carnal crimes may indeed, in prudence and charity, be thought sufficient for the expiation or preterition of smaller delinquences, yet they can upon neither account be judged so, in regard of crimes of a more heinous nature than their virtues are eminent, and of such a kind would Schism and Factiousness appear to such as would equally and soberly consider them. But suppose that Governors do indeed believe, that their Subjects do bonâ fide believe as they profess, and conceive themselves obliged in conscience to deny their due obedience, and to follow those factious courses they were engaged in; yet sure you cannot think but that well meaning men, as well as others, may be mistaken, and that very dangerously; nor does their goodness secure their judgement from error, in thinking that evil which is good, and on the contrary; but only their practice, that they are not likely to be guilty of what themselves think evil, nor to be negligent of what themselves think good. One would verily think, that Raviliac and several such resolute persons, who engaged themselves without any private provocation, on dangers they could never hope to escape, and much greater than any possible secular ends, if in their wits, could have been animated by nothing to such desperate erterprises, but only a strong persuasion of the goodness of their cause, and the hope of future rewards. And yet you would not think that a sufficient reason to exempt them from the severity of the Law. God may indeed be merciful to such in regard of their pious intentions. But, 1. Their practices by being acknowledged to need mercy, must be supposed blamable, not commendable; S. Paul confesses himself the chief of sinners, in regard of those persecutions, for which he owns his ignorance as the reason of his pardon. And, 2. Even God himself does often chastise them for the terror of others, with temporal afflictions, whom he intends to spare in the world to come. A clear example hereof we have in David, 2 Sam. 12. 13, 14. where after his sins of murdering Uriah, and defiling Bathsheba, had been forgiven him; it is yet expressly added, that because by this deed he had given occasion to the enemies of God to blaspheme; the child that had been born of that adulterous mixture should surely die. And therefore good men themselves, when guilty of Schism, giving the like scandal to the enemies of the truth, and drawing others to the like sin by their persuasion 〈◊〉 example, may in this life be punished for the good of others. And, 3. God himself cannot be thought merciful to men good for all other things, and peccant only in one kind, especially if of so heinous a nature, as Schism without their repentance, either particular by an actual explicit confession and reformation of it when known; or general and implicit, and in voto, when they are penitent for all sins unknown as well as known, and are in a ready preparation of mind to use and accept of all moral means of discovery, and to reform what might be convicted by such discovery how dear soever otherwise. And this you know is the case of the Church in punishing well meaning persons who are guilty of Schism. It is plain, that they are so far from being penitent for what she thinks to be sin, as that they defend it, and draw others to it. And as to general repentance, she thinks she has not reason to believe it in them, when upon proposal of her reasons they show themselves perverse, and factious, and incorrigible. If it be pretended, that the Church may be mistaken in censures, I pray consider, 4. That she must act according to her own conscience, though erroneous; and though God may prove indeed indulgent to many persons, whom he as a searcher of their hearts may know to be penitent; yet the Church being obliged to accommodate her demeanour to them, to her own knowledge, may at the same time justly and commendably prosecute them, if they seem otherwise to her. And I believe you will find it a general occasion of your mistakes in this kind, that you look upon Superiors as obliged to act according to your own private conscience. But if yourself had been a Governor, and had to do with a person of a reputation otherwise unblamable, but yet notoriously guilty of some very remarkable offence coming under your cognizance, and so far from being penitent for it, as that he should defend it, and preach it to others, and call such Preaching a faithful Preaching of the Gospel; I believe you would think yourself more secure in acting according to your own conscience, than that of the criminal, though you might confess yourself as liable to mistakes as him. And believe it, that it is the most equal way to clear yourself from prejudices, and to prevent uncharitable censures to represent their case as if it had been your own.  
YOU answer, 
§ XLVII.  8. That I must remember that great Cities had long but few Christians in comparison of the Heathens till Constantine's time, and mostly long after. But, 1. Though this had indeed been true, yet it will not follow that the Government must have been proportioned only to the necessities of those few, both because Heathens as well as Christians, the reducing of Infidels, as well as the government of Believers, belonged to their charge. Which must have been by so much greater rather than less, as there was much more difficulty in reducing one from his vicious practices as well as his opinions, to the severe rules of Christianity, than to govern many, especially such good and excellent persons as Converts were generally in those times, when actually reduced; and because Christianity was in a growing condition, and therefore the Government was to be proportioned to their future hopes, as well as their present fruitions. But, 2. The supposition, That Christians were so few till Constantine's time or afterwards, is a great mistake. In the Church of Jerusalem we find 3000 converted by one Sermon, Acts 11. 41. besides those who had already been converted by our Saviour's personal Preaching, (which may be supposed to have been very many, by the multitude that sung hosannah's before him, which amazed the whole City, and the terror of the Pharisees, who durst not seize on him by force for fear of the people, and their profession, that all the world went after him, etc.) and those who were afterwards daily added, ver. 47. besides 5000 men more expressly said to have been converted by another Sermon, Acts 4. 4. and multitudes of men and women, chap. 5. 14. added through all Judaea, under which Jerusalem was also comprehended) Acts 9 31. And in the same place after Herod Agrippa's death the Word of God further grew and multiplied, Acts 12. 24. and many thousands are mentioned (though imperfectly, for in the Greek is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ten thousands) Acts 21. 20. Yet were all these under single Bishops, S. James and his Successors, as far as History can inform us, though in all likelihood this number was vastly increased, when most of the refractory Jews, who most of all hindered the progress of the Gospel, were destroyed in the Siege of Titus, and generally banished, when it was re-edified by Adrian, and by him called Aelia. This is very observable, because it is most likely to have been established by the Apostles as a pattern for other Cities. But it was not herein singular even in those times; for Samaria seems generally to have been converted. This appears, in that all the people are said to have been deceived by Simon Magus, Acts 8. 9 all from the least to the greatest, ver. 10. and the same number seems to have been converted by S. Philip, and to have been baptised both men and women, ver. 12. and therefore Samaria is said to have received the word of God, ver. 14. Now the least that can be understood by these expressions is, that much the greater part received the faith, which must have very much exceeded the Government of a single solitary person. In the Church of Antioch Ignatius his charge, (by which you in some part understand the extent of the Diocesan Government mentioned in his Epistles) a great number is said to have believed, Acts 11. 21. and after Barnabas his coming, much people is said to have been added to the Lord, ver. 24. who are therefore to have been supposed distinct from the former. And again, ver. 26. Saul and Barnabas together for a year together taught much people, who there first received the name of Christians, very probably from the great multitudes observable there above other places adjacent, which could hardly have been so likely, if they had not held some great proportion to the Inhabitants, which if they did must have very much exceeded our ordinary Parochial Cures. For Antioch was the third City of the Roman Empire in Secular as well as Ecclesiastical Dignity; so in Antiochia Pisidiae many of the Jews and religious Proselytes followed Paul and Barnabas, Acts 13. 43. And afterwards almost all the City came together to hear the word of God, ver. 44. and with what event may be conceived from that which follows, ver. 48, 49. That the Gentiles were glad, and glorified the word of the Lord; and as many as were ordained, to eternal life believed: and that the word of the Lord was published in all regions. Which, besides the opposition mentioned only by the Jews and devout and honourable women, (that is, Proselytesses of the Gates, as some understand) acted by them, ver. 50. must imply the number of Converts to have been extremely considerable in proportion to the whole, which must have included a great multitude, this City being a Metropolis of a Province. In Thessalonica some (of the Jews) believed, and of the devout Greeks a great multitude, and of the chief women not a few, Acts 17. 4. And in Beraea, another remarkable City, they were more noble than those of Thessaloniea, ver. 11. And accordingly many of the Jews believed; also of honourable women which were Greeks, and of men not a few, v. 12. In Ephesus S. Timothy's Diocese, S. Paul himself disputeth first three months in the Synagogue, Acts 19 8. afterwards two years in the school of Tyrannus; so that all which dwelled in Asia (that is, the Lydian or Proconsular, whereof Ephesus was the Metropolis) heard the word of the Lord Jesus, both Jews and Greeks, ver. 9 10. fear came upon all of them; and the name of the Lord Jesus was magnified, ver. 17. And you may guests at the great multitude of Converts by the vast sum which their conjuring books then burnt were valued at, 50000 pieces of silver, v. 19 which is observed by the Holy Ghost himself, as an Argument how mightily the word of God grew and prevailed, ver. 20. And it must argue a very great number, considering that books were a commodity which is not to have been presumed a considerable part of the riches of each, much less of that particular subject, (however the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be celebrated among the Ancients) and the total number of the persons concerned must needs be greater, by how much the particular proportions to be distributed among them are likely to have been less to the particulars; and it is accordingly observable, that no particular is noted to have been considerably impoverished by so great a loss.  
THESE are the most remarkable Cities mentioned in the Acts, 
§ XLVIII  which we have reason to believe to have abounded with numbers of Christians, too great for the Cure of a single person. And it is to be considered, that as in their preaching you find little mention of their preaching in villages, but in Cities; so it is most credible that they left them to the care of the Government established in the Cities. Whence it will follow, that the Ecclesiastical as well as the Secular Government of Villages depended on the Cities, and that therefore they were Dioceses in the modern extent, and that the Government established in Cities seems to have been most agreeable to the design of the Apostles. And of all Cities those are to be supposed most accurately provided for by the Apostles, which were converted by their personal preaching, and which in their times had numbers sufficient for Government; and therefore if other places had deviated from the examples of these, as those in Africa and Ireland, which you cannot prove to have been converted by the Apostles, you ought rather to have corrected those by these, than as you preposterously do, to confine the Dioceses converted and established by the Apostles, to the dimensions of them which were not. But besides these Scripture Arguments evincing the great number of Christians, even in the times of the Apostles themselves; another may be drawn from the multitudes of Heresies, which must have needs drawn great numbers from the Church, not only that swarm which rose immediately after the decease of the Apostles, as the Basilidians, Valentinians, etc. but also those who were contemporary with the Apostles themselves as the Simonians, Nicolaitans, Ebionites, Corinthians, etc. For though some few of these did, even in the Apostles times themselves, separate, as is clear from 1 John 11. 19 and several other places of the Epistles, where they are blamed and confuted, and the multitudes of them that perished in Jerusalem in the Captivity; yet most of them did then act more covertly, and were followed by smaller parties, in regard of what was done after the decease of the Apostles, which is the reason why Hegesippus in Eusebius calls the Church a pure Virgin till the time of Trajan, in whose time S. John the last of them died, not long after his return from Patmos. Now if the Christians were so numerous, as it appears they were, even after these deductions of their own members by relapse, and the hindrance of the conversion of others, whom we find to have been alienated at a greater distance by this scandal of the multitude of their Sects, (for about that time we find it objected by Celsus, who wrote his Book against the Christians under Hadrian, the immediate Successor of Trajan, if we may believe Origen) we cannot think their number so small as you conceive in the times of the Apostles, when they did not labour under these disadvantages. But when they had overcome these difficulties, and were exercised with new persecutions, it is strange how exceedingly they increased. In Severus his time, about the Year of our Lord 201, 
Sect. 37. & Anno 200. Sect. 7.  according to Baronius, Tertullian wrote his Apology, which was above 100 years before Constantine; yet even then there were such multitudes of Christians, as that he prefers them before the Moors, and Marcomans, and Parthians; as being spread over all the Roman world. His words, though they be so known that I wonder that you forgot them, yet are withal so very pertinent and full to my purpose, as that I think it necessary to transcribe them; thus therefore he is in Cap. 37. Apolog. Plures nimirum Mauri & Marcomanni, ipsique Parthi, vel quantaecunque unius tamen loci, & suorum finium, gentes, quam totius orbis? Externi sumus, & vestra omnia implevimus, urbes, insulas, castella, mancipia, conciliabula, castra ipsa, tribus, decurias, palatium, senatum, forum. Sola vobis relinquimus templa. Here you see Cities, and throughout the whole world, (that is, according to the language of those times, the Roman Empire) full of them. What can be more contrary to your Assertion? Yet fullness may be understood with a latitude, for a great, though not the greatest number. But that he understood the greatest, will easily appear from what he afterwards adds; Potuimus & inermes, nec rebels, sed tantummodo discords, solius divortii invidiâ adversus vos dimicâsse. Si enim tanta vis hominum in aliquem orbis remoti sinum abrupissemus à vobis, suffudisset utique dominationem vestram tot qualiumcunque amissio ciutum, imò & ipsâ destitutione punisset. Proculdubio expavissetis ad sobitudinem vestram, ad silentium rerum & stuporem quendam, quasi mortuae urbis quaesissetis, quibus ves vobis remansissent; nunc enim pauciores hostes habet is prae multitudine Christianorum pene omnium civium, pene omnes cives Christianos, habendo. And again, Suffecisset hoc solùm nostrae ultioni, quòd vacuae exinde possessio immundis spiritibus pateret. Certainly they whose very secession would leave nothing but solitude, and silence, and amazement, and empty possessions for unclean spirits behind them; they who had left their City as it were dead, almost destitute of Citizens to be governed, and their Enemies more numerous than their Subjects, must needs have been much the greater number. But when he says expressly, that almost all their Citizens were Christians, what can be clearer than that? (notwithstanding what allowances may be made for the confidence of the man, and the humour of the oppressed parties to advance their numbers.) Christians were so far from being few in comparison of the Heathens, as that the contrary seems most probable, that the Heathens in the Roman Empire were considerably outnumbered by them.  
AND that in other Cities besides Rome and Alexandria, 
§ XLIX  (which though Apostolical Sees you will not admit as 〈…〉 numbers were under the Government of Ecclesiastical Monarches with their Presbyteries, than had been governable by any single (however able) Presbyter. Instances may be given (besides the general proofs already intimated) out of the good Records of those times, as imperfect as we have them extant at present. One is of Neocaesarea a metropolis of the Province of Pontus Polemoniacus, (which I take notice of that you may understand how great a City it was.) Here though the persons are expressly said to have been 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc. S. Greg. Nysser. Vit. S. Greg. Thaumaturgi, edit. inter opera Thaumaturgi, à Gerard. Voss. p. 255.  infinite, that inhabited the City itself and the adjacent Region, (by which you may understand the extent of the Diocese of those times, that it included the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as well as the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and that the number of the Inhabitants of such a Diocese did far exceed the Government of a single Presbyter;) yet there were but 17 Christians when S. Gregory Thaumaturgus was first made their Bishop, who managed his charge with such good success, as that in a Visitation of his Diocese a little before his death, again expressed as formerly, 
p. 313. ib.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he found only the same number of 17 Pagans. Yet this infinite number he had governed himself, without any addition of coordinate coadjutors upon the increase of his charge, and left them in the same condition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, to his succeeding Bishop. Sure you cannot but think this Diocese exceeded the greatest Parish in London. Another is that of Carthage, the multitude of Christians wherein, intimated in my former Letter, you tell me plainly, you believe not. Not to insist on the general Argument I formerly made use of; from the multitude of Presbyters here as well as elsewhere, which sure would not have been multiplied if one had been sufficient; the testimony of Pontius concerning the great multitude of Christians, that were present at the Martyrdom of S. Cyprian, (of which himself seems to have been one, which may make him the more credible) is somewhat considerable. He tells us, 
Pont in vit. S. Cypr. fin.  that comitatu ejus infinitus exercitus adhaerebat, quasi ad expugnandam mortem manu fact â veniretur. Which military expressions of their readiness to die, are not so applicable to any as to Christians, who were only concerned on that account. But a more pregnant presumption of their numbers is the sum collected out of the Contributions of his Diocese for the relief of Captives. 
Ep. 60. ed. Pamel.  Misimus autem (says he) sestertia centum millia nummûm, quae istic in Ecclesia cui de Domini indulgentiâ praesumus, cleri & plebis apud nos consistentis eollatione, collecta sunt, etc. This 100000 sestertia being reduced to our English Coin, according to the rate observed by Mr. Brerevood and Dr. Hakewill, will amount to 781250 l. and more according to the Bishop of Hereford; a sum so vast in the judgement of Pamelius and Baroni●●s, as without the Authority of any new MS. and against the consentient readings of the former Editions of Manutius and Morellius, by no greater warrant than their own conjecture of the incredibility of the thing, they venture to correct it by leaving out the later words millia nummûm, reading only sestertia centum, and by that means reducing it to 1000 part. Yet even so it rose to 781 l. 5 s. a sum very considerable for a single Parish of those times, especially considering that they were newly recovered from a severe persecution, which may be presumed considerably to have exhausted them, both by the sums confiscated, and the loss of all their lands and rising rents, and the multiplication of the domestic objects of their charity; (for we find the necessities of the Martyrs and Confessors to have been supplied out of the Treasury of the Church from the story of Peregrinus in Lucian, and several passages in S. Cyprian's Epistles) besides the greater value of Money in those times before the discovery of the Indies, and the readiness of that Church to a new contribution, if the Numidian Bishops to whom they write should think it necessary. A sign that they had not been extremely impoverished by their former charity, whereas such a sum would, even in these days, since the great supplies from America, have ruined several of our modern Parishes.  
BUT notwithstanding these difficulties I confess a single Parish (I mean the same multitude of Christians than which might have made up a Parish according to our late estimation) might have advanced a sum as great as this later of Pamelius and Baronius, 
§ L.  without disabling themselves for future contributions. For I consider that in those times, as well as the Apostles there were those who sold their lands, and brought the prices to the Bishop, who (as S. Justin Martyr tells us) was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Apolog. 11. p. 99  of which we have S. Cyprian himself for an example, 
Pont. vit. Cypr.  who disposed of his own Land that way at his conversion, and had the same Land returned into his hands when Bishop, which he again intended to sell if he had not been prevented by the persecution, as Pontius his Deacon assures us. Besides, there was the Offertory at every Communion, which we find practised in S. Justin Martyr's time, and the same S. Cyprian's, and in the time of the Author of the Constitutions called Apostolical, and in those times was reckoned as a part of the Communion itself, and accordingly criminals were as well excluded from the Offertory as from the blessed Sacrament; and it was then the general practice to communicate daily. To which may be added their more solemn Synaxes and Offertories on Sunday, on which the Apostle himself particularly advised a provision for the poor, and their occasional contributions, such as that mentioned by the Apostle for the poor Christians in Judaea, and this of S. Cyprian's we are speaking of. And indeed besides the great propension of the Christians of those ages to works of charity, and the particular diligence of S. Cyprian, to stir them up to it by his own example, as well as exhortation, (as appears from Pontius, and from his Treatise de Opere & Elemosynis still extant.) It was in reason the most prudent course they could take, to convert their Lands into Moneys to prevent forfeiture, and to lay out the Moneys on such good uses which might entitle them to future rewards, rather than hazard their loss in such times, when they were unsecure how long they might keep them; besides, that such a disposal of their riches was the most likely way to animate them for future accidents, and to make them unconcerned for temporal fruitions, and to raise their minds to Heaven, where their Treasures had been deposited. Besides the great fruitfulness of the Country adjacent observed by 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Strabol. 11. Greg. p. 131. vide l. 18. p. 833.  Strabo, and several other ancient and modern Authors, which must have enhanced the price of their Lands when exposed to sale; and not only that, but its great improvements, if we may judge of S. Cyprians time, by what it was when Agathocles invaded the Carthaginians, which you may see described in Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. l. 20. p. 731. edit. Graecolatin. Hannou. 1604. that it was admired by the Sicilians themselves, whose own Country was admired for the same causes by the rest of the World; and the vastness of the City itself, if estimated with what it was before it was destroyed by the Romans. 
L. 18.  The Island it stood in was (as Strabo tells us) 460 stadia in compass, all walled in, which being reduced to our miles, will amount to about 45 miles. A scope very much larger than London, and their Walls so vast and capacious, as to contain Stables for Elephants, and 4000 Horses, and Lodgings and Guard-houses for 20000 Foot and 4000 Horse, which were their ordinary constant Guards, as Appian. Bell. Punic. p. 56. edit. Graecolatin. Stephani 1592. And when it was destroyed by Scipio Africanus junior or Aemilianus, had 700000 Inhabitants. 
Strabo ib.  And though at its rebuilding by Julius Caesar it might possibly fall short of its ancient magnificence; yet it was certainly a very great City even then, after the rate which then they counted great, which rate I might easily have shown to be as great as now. So 
a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Id. ib.  Strabo, who lived not long after the Restauration, says that it was even then inhabited as well as any other City in Libya; and after him it is by 
b Ptolem. l. 4. Greg. c. 3.  Ptolemy, who yet flourished about 100 years before St. Cyprian, called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and 
c Tertullian. de Pall.  Tertullian and 
d Apul. Florid.  Apuleius call the Carthaginians Principes Africa, relating to their own as well as former times, (for Alexandria, which was under a Praefectus Augustalis, was excluded from the ordinary notion of Africa, according to the Notitiae of those times) as very well they might, considering that of the six African Provinces that of Carthage only was 
e See Pamel. in Tertullian. de Pall. & S. Cyprian. epist. 45, 49.  Proconsular, and the City was the residence of the Proconsul himself, which must very considerably have contributed to its greatness. And now considering the very great fertility, and improvements, and populousness of the City, and the adjacent Region under its Civil, if not Ecclesiastical, Jurisdiction; considering that in times of persecution it is most probable, that as much of this as belonged to Christians was converted into ready money; that of these very vast sums, which may have been thought credibly have been levied by these means, many were entirely bestowed on charitable uses, and that generally so much was as could be spared from the owners necessary expenses, and therefore might be reputed superfluities, were so; that according to the state of Christian Affairs in those times, much more could have been reputed superfluities than now, when not only all expenses not adequate to the dignity of their persons were accounted so, but even such as were, it being neisafe nor prudent, nor agreeable to the heroical magnanimity so common then to maintain that dignity; that as the former sums were exhausted, more were daily brought in, that saying of Tertullian appearing then experimentally true, that the Sanguis Martyrum was Semen Ecclesiae. These things▪ I say, being considered, it cannot be thought so incredible as Pamelius and Baronius conceive, that a considerable proportion of the Inhabitants of the Diocese of Carthage, according to the rate of Dioceses in those times, might indeed contribute the greater sum, so well attested by consent of MSS. so that there will be no necessity to leave the received reading upon account of their only conjectures, which have hence appeared so groundless. But then as this sum of 100000 Sestertia is in a parallel case granted by Seneca, 
Conso. ad Helu. c. 10  to have been equal to the Revenues of a Province, and so too great for a Parish after the rate now in use; so it is no way improbable that considerable part of the Diocese might indeed have given the Revenue of a Province, (upon the terms now described) without disabling themselves for further future Contributions. It being therefore so well attested by the consent of Copies, that the sum given was so great, as not to be thought crediconcerning a Parish, and it being no way credible that any but converted Christians did contribute to it; it must hence follow, that the number of Christian Converts was even then greater in Carthage, than in any of our modern Parishes.  
TO these Christian Authors concerning the multitude of Christians I shall add a Heathen. 
§ LI.  It is Pliny whom I mean, who thus dissuades Trajan from his severity against the Christians by an argument from the multitude of the persons likely to be concerned in it: 
Plin. ep. l. 10. ep. 97.  Visa est mihi res digna consultatione, maximè propter periclitantium numerum. Multi enim omnis aetatis, omnis ordinis, utriusque sexus etiam vocantur in periculum, & vocabuntur. Neque enim civitates tantum, sed vicos etiam atque agros superstitionis istius contagio pervagata est, quae videtur sisti & corrigi posse. Certè satis constat, prope jam desolata templa coepisse celebrari, & sacra solennia diu intermissa repeti, passimque voenire victimas, quarum adhuc rarissimus emptor inveniebatur, ex quo facilè est opinari, quae turba hominum emendari possit, si sit poenitentiae locus. You see that many, not as you say few, were Christians, that not only Cities, but Villages and Towns were overrun with that contagion, (as he calls it) that he thence concludes what a great multitude (that is, turba) might be gained by a more indulgent way of treating them. And that this multitude was to be understood comparatively to the Heathens, (directly contrary to what you say, that in comparison of them they were but few) appears clearly from what he adds, that their Temples had been almost desolate, (exactly herein agreeing with Tertullian's Sola vobis relinquimus templa) that their solemn Festivities had been long intermitted, that their Sacrifices (which we find to have been exposed to sale in the Markets, 1 Cor. 10. 25.) found few buyers; which could not have been if the number of Heathens had been then considerable, I do not say as you do, comparatively with the Christians, but even absolutely in itself. And then for discerning the pregnancy of this Testimony I pray consider, 1. That this Epistle of Pliny is mentioned by Tertullian, 
Tertul. Apol. Euseb. Chron. num. 2223 Oros. l. 7.  Eusebius, and Orosius; so that there can be no doubt of its being genuine. Consider, 2. That this Epistle was certainly written very soon after S. John's death, who died in Trajan's time, (Baronius places S. John's death in the second year of Trajan, and the writing of this Epistle in the fifth or thereabouts;) and therefore the words diu intermissa will in all likelihood extend the paucity of Heathens in those parts to S. John's time, at least certainly very long before your Period of Constantine. 3. That this Church of Bythinia, of which Pliny gives account being his own Province, was converted in the Apostles times, as appears 1 S. Pet. 1. 1. and therefore the Government there settled must have been, ●f not instituted, yet at least approved by them, especially being so near those Sees which were undoubtedly founded by the Apostles. Yet it cannot even here be shown, that ever one City had more than one presiding Bishop. 4. That this Testimony is of an Adversary, whose Interest had been to have made the Christians more despicable by concealing their numbers, if he could have done it veraciously. And, 5. That as Pliny must in all probability be presumed veracious in telling what he knew, so he had means of knowing what was really true, being Governor of the Province, and having actually made enquiry after the Christians in their persecutions of them.  
I BELIEVE the great reason that inclines you to believe the paucity of Christians in those times is, 
§ LII.  that in great and popular Cities they were able to communicate at one Altar, upon which account you conceive them to have been no more than what may assemble in our ordinary Parochial Congregations. But you might as well have concluded whole Cities indeed, nay whole Nations, to have no more people in them than our ordinary Parochial Assemblies. You know every clean Male in Jewry was to appear before God at the two solemn Feasts of Easter and of Tabernacles, whose numbers computed by Cestius Gallus, amounted to a number sure too great for a Parish, and the number in Jerusalem when besieged by Titus, taken there upon occasion of Easter, is a plain Argument of the vastness of their religious Assemblies. Nor was it only proper to the Jews thus to confederate and unite their Commonwealth by their Conventions on account of Religion to partake of the same Altar, but the same Policy was observed among the Heathens. The Assemblies of whole Cities are so ordinary, that it were but pedantic to give instances of them. For those of Nations you may observe the Athenian Panathenaicks, the Olympic Solemnities which were of all Greece, and then the Panionia of the Asiatic jones, not now to mention those of the Barbarians. Nor were only Sacrifices common to these vast Assemblies from the same Altar, which is more easily intelligible, but speeches also were made to numbers much greater than our Parochial Assemblies, which I believe you will think the greater difficulty, how the Bishop, who you say then was the principal, if not the only Preacher, should be heard in a Multitude proportionable to a populous City. Yet is this so far from being incredible, as that it was in those Ages frequently practised. I will not instance in places of special contrivance, as that at the Roman Rostra, the Theatres, and Amphitheatres, where many thousands, sometimes 100000 or more, have heard with convenience. And yet it is very probable, that these public places of religious Assemblies were contrived with conveniency for that purpose. Nay it is certain, that the Jews had their Suggesta and Cathedrae raised on high for that end. Nor shall I mention the Orations of Generals to their Armies, who had the like advantages. It is very clear that upon occasions not so solemn nor prepared, great Routs of tumultuous people, wanting heads to whom a particular address might have been confined, have yet been spoken to. I will not again instance in the Speeches of Petronius and King Agrippa to the generality of the Jewish Nation, of which we are discoursing. Scripture Examples, though purely historical, I find most easily admitted by you, and therefore I am the rather willing to insist on them. Rehoboam speaks to all Israel, 1 Kings 12. 1, 13, 16, 20. So Jehoiada makes a covenant with all the people of the Land, 2 Kings 11. 17, 18, 20. Our Saviour preaches his Sermon on the Mount to great multitudes from several places, S. Matth. 4. 25. v. 1. And several other places, to 4000 at one time, and 5000 at another, though in wildernesses; by which we may guests how much greater his Auditories were in populous Cities. The Town Clerk of the Ephesians to the whole City, Acts 19 29, 35. S. Paul to all the City of Jerusalem, Acts 21. 30, 36, 39, 40. And by the multitudes converted by single Sermons of the Apostles, you may easily conjecture the vastness of their Auditories. Which will be the rather credible when it is considered, that the principal preaching of the first Propagators of Christianity, was generally in places of greatest frequent, such as the Temple, or Synagogues, or Streets, or or Schools, or Market-places. Thus you see that it will not follow, that the number of Christians must have been few, if they assembled in one place for the Word and Sacraments, and if the Bishop alone had preached.  
BUT neither supposition is so very certain, 
§ LIII.  at least not so general, as you seem to believe it. For preaching, we see that while the extraordinary 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of prophecy lasted, under which preaching was comprehended as well as prayer, (which by the way is observable against them who allow studied Sermons, and yet complain of the Spirit's being quenched if their prayers be other than extemporary) several Prophets met and officiated in their Synaxes, 1 Cor. 14. 29, 30, 31. so far was it then from being confined to any person; Bishop or other, to preach to the people. And even afterwards we find preaching not always performed by the Bishop, though I am apt indeed to think it was ordinarily. The Catechists were usually Presbyters, and Origen, though a Presbyter, yet preached before Bishops. But for the times of persecution, wherein they could not meet so numerously in one Assembly; yet other provisions might have been made agreeably enough to the Principles of those Ages, for supplying the necessities of much greater than parochial multitudes. Such was that of reserving the species, which I believe was a shift found out in times of persecution, when every particular person could not get any opportunity of frequenting the Synaxes as often as he was desirous to communicate, which was then daily, it being the first meat they tasted. This reservation is clear from S. Cyprian de laps. the Author De Spectaculis among his works, Tert. l. 11. and Ux. Dionys. Alex. ep. ad Fab. Antioch. in Euseb. S. Iren. to Pope Victor. Now by this means very great multitudes might frequently communicate, though their Synaxes were rarely and thinly celebrated, that they might not give their Governors any just offence by their numerousness. For by Pliny's Epistle to Trajan it appears, that they did upon this account utterly forbear their feasts of charity, upon his putting of the Law De Hetaeriis in force; and in all probability yielded as far as lawfully they conceived they might in the Eucharist itself. A second shift was that of sending the Sacraments by the Deacons to those that were absent. So S. Justin Martyr expressly, 
Apol. 11. p. 97.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And again, 
Ib. p. 98.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And who knows whether the breaking of bread 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or from house to house, as we read it Acts 11. 46. (if it be meant of the Sacrament, and not rather of their feasts of love) may not allude to this custom? I shall not now dispute it, but only observe that this practice, though not grounded on this Text, yet certainly used in those times, might from the same Altar have communicated much greater multitudes than are contained in our ordinary Parishes. But there was also a third Expedient for these numerous Communions, that though indeed the Roman Altar, where the blessed Sacrament was ordinarily and solemnly administered, were only one, even in those populous Cities, and that in the power of the Bishop; yet in private and occasional Assemblies Presbyters were permitted to do it by leave of the Bishop, without any prejudice to the Unity of the Church, which was signified by the Unity of their Altar. I will not mention the instances hereof in the Acts of the Martyrs, which are not so secure to be trusted. Ignatius and Tertullian are very clear to this purpose in the places already produced. Now this account being given how, notwithstanding the multitude of Communicants, and though the Sacrament were the greatest obligation to meet in public Assemblies, yet much greater numbers than our Parishes might have been supplied conveniently enough from one Precedent and one Altar; it will be easy to give an account of other things. For as for preaching, which is now more insisted on as a reason of Church Assemblies than the Sacraments, though certainly very differently from the sense of those Ages. First, you cannot prove that to have been so appropriated to the Bishop, as that ordinary Presbyters were excluded from it. All that can be pretended to this purpose is, that the Exhortation with the Communion Office was then generally in the presence of the Bishop, and that in his presence it was not usual for Presbyters to preach; (for this is the only thing that was thought so strange in preaching of Origen before Theophilus, and S. Augustine before Valerius, that it was done in the presence of their Bishops) and that the power of Ecclesiastical Assemblies, upon what pretence soever, preaching as well as other Offices was appropriated to the Bishops. But, 1. All private visitations and conferences which were much better suited to the exigencies of those times, might undoubtedly be performed by single Presbyters; and these being performed with that diligence as they were then, would in a great measure supersede the necessity of public Sermons. And, 2. Even for those public preachings, which had no relation to the Communion Office, where that one Altar was concerned, might have been ordinarily permitted them by the Bishop. And, 3. Even those which were connected with that Office, might yet by the Bishop's leave have been permitted in places distinct from the one Altar, as well as the Communion itself.  
YOUR instance of St. Patrick founding 365 Churches, 
§ LIV.  (for I only take notice of the more probable number) and ordaining in them 365 Bishops, and under them 3000 Presbyters, does not methinks seem any thing to your purpose. You say, Here is no more Bishops than Churches; I believe you meant the contrary, that there were no more Churches than Bishops, for this is only to your design, of having as many Bishops as Churches, that is, in your notion of the word, as Parishes. And you know though we pretend many Parish Churches may be subject to one Bishop. Yet we are far from saying that there ought to be many Bishops in one Parish. But admitting there were in S. Patrick's time no more Churches than Bishops, yet how can it follow thence, that there were no more Parishes, or that the word Church in those Ages used without any restrictive Particle, must signify that only which were equivalent to our present Parishes? For you know that we do not pretend, that there ought to be any more liberty for a Bishop to hold plurality of Dioceses, than for a Minister to have plurality of Parishes, though I will not defend all practices in both particulars; so that if the word Church imply that which is Diocesan, as most probably it did according to the sense of those times, than we do not think there aught to be more Churches than Bishops. Indeed I confess the Dioceses of those times must have been for scope of Land, as much less as the number 365 is greater than 21, or thereabouts, which is our number now. But it is withal most clear, 1. That as small as they were, they were yet greater than Parishes, there being about nine Presbyters to a Bishop, as yourself observe. For your own notion of a Parish containing no more than are capable of being governed by a single person, where nine persons were thought necessary, there must be supposed nine times that proportion, that is, nine Parishes. And then if you think yourself obliged to abstain from that Communion where Discipline is impossible, and think it impossible where the Bishop undertakes the government of any more than he is able to give an account of by his own personal care; you must have conceived yourself obliged as much to separate from Diocesan Communion quà Diocesan then as now, and therefore should not plead those Dioceses as precedents. But, 2. Your own principles will warrant the enlargement of your Dioceses now; for if Bishops might in the primitive times take the charge of whole Cities, not because the Cities were small, or the Inhabitants few, but because they who owned Episcopal Authority, that is, Christians, were so; then I may say our present Dioceses may be very much enlarged since the divisions of Christians. For whereas then they were all unanimous, the case is otherwise how, when Papists and Scots, and other Non-conformists, being deduced of all Sects and Opinions, those only are accounted that own our present Episcopal Authority, would be so few comparatively, so that you see that by Separation upon account of the too great extent of our Dioceses, the inconvenience is not remedied, but confirmed in consequence of your own Principles. But, 3. What inconvenience soever may indeed be in things of this nature, is to be judged as well as reform by the Governors, (whose proper care it is) not to be remedied by worse, such as are the undutifulness and separations of private persons from their Superiors on that account.  
I CONFIRMED this by Argument from experience, 
§ LV.  from an instance of Rome which though so great in Cornelius his time, as to need the Services of above 1000 Clergy, was yet at the same time under the Government of one only Bishop. To this you answer, 1. That this was above 250 years after Christ's Birth. But this is not the question, how soon it was, but whether it was not when discipline was severely enough observed? For from hence it follows, that experience has then shown, that discipline was sufficiently reconcilable with a Diocesan Government, and therefore may be so now if Governors would be equally industrious. And that discipline was then observed, I believe you will not deny. You answer, 2. That you never took all the impotent persons, poor, and widows, in the Church, to be Clergymen and Clergie-women. I shall not dispute the propriety of my expression, (not but that I know that the word has indeed been used in a very large sense, so as to comprehend most persons relating to the Church, and possibly all there enumerated) both because I do not conceive the thing material to my present purpose, which is only to show the numerousness of the Church from the multitude of Presbyters, whom you will not deny to be properly Clergymen; and because I confess I too much trusted my memory in quoting the place, and upon consulting the place find myself to have been mistaken in two things: 1. That I thought the word Clergy to have been used by Cornelius. 2. That I thought that all the several sorts there mentioned, Presbyters, Deacons, etc. to have been comprised in the number 1500, whereas I now find, that the later sort of the poor maintained on the charges of the Church were only therein included. Omitting therefore these mistakes, which now I know I will not undertake to justify, the thing I insist on is, that here are 46 Presbyters mentioned, and that there were in Rome quadraginta, 
Optat. Milev. l. 11. cont. Parm.  & quod excurrit, Basilicae, (as we learn from Optatus) when Victor Garbiensis was sent from Africa to be made the Schismatical Bishop of Rome, which was about the persecution of Dioclesian, when the Schism of the Donatists commenced. Which numberof Basilicae or Parish Churches (for you have already seemed to grant, that Rome was then divided into Parishes) may very well agree with the number of Presbyters mentioned by Cornelius. There being therefore even then so many Christians in Rome, as were able to make up 46 Parishes, besides those of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Region adjacent subject, according to the practice of those times, to the Jurisdiction of the City Bishop; it is plain that the Diocese was even then of a larger extent than Parochial, as yourself had already granted, (though here you endeavour to answer the arguments, that are designed to prove no more than what you had granted;) and therefore 46 times exceeding the ability of a single person. Yet I believe you will not deny, but that all this number was then sufficiently governed by one Bishop, without any visible decay of discipline observable in those times. I know indeed that Mr. Potter in order to his own design does endeavour to prove the number of Presbyters and Titles originally derived from Cletus, 
Interp. of the number 666, c. 19  Euaristus, Dionysius, and Marcellus to have been 25. Nor shall I now digress to show the ground of his mistake. All that I shall desire you to observe at present is, that his Authors are either evidently late, or suspicious if pretendedly ancient; not comparable in credibility to Cornelius and Optatus produced by me. But if I should admit all that he pretends, yet 25 Parishes themselves are too large an extent for such Dioceses, as you desire, that might not exceed the personal abilities of one.  
BUT you endeavour to give some account how their Clergy might be numerous though their people were few, 
§ LVI.  from the conceived extraordinary exigencies of those times. But neither does it appear that the exigencies were indeed so extraordinary, there appearing no ground to believe any Innovation accommodated to present exigencies; but rather that that had been the ordinary Government: if it had, were it to your purpose. For the same extraordinary exigencies, which then required the united helps of a multitude of Clergy, made the burden too great for one; and therefore if a Bishop cannot (as by your Principles he cannot) undertake the government of a number too great for his personal care, without prejudice of discipline; it will follow that he could not do it then. But it appearing clearly otherwise, namely that discipline was severely maintained under a Government properly Diocesan, that is including a multitude of subordinate cures; it is plain, that what neglects are now in that kind, are not to be imputed to the Government but the Governors.  
BUT I shall consider the disparities themselves: 
§ LVII.  1. The Christians meetings were then obscure and small in houses, (as the tolerated Churches in London.) But I have already shown you how the multitudes of Christians were (according to the practices of those Ages) suppliable without any unnecessary multiplication of Altars, or Priests, or Churches; and that this multitude of Priests was not accommodated to their extraordinary meetings in houses occasionally, but their solemn appointed places for Parochial Assemblies, for such were the Tituli or Basilicae. You consider, 2. That these meetings were in so vast a City in so many distinct places. But the Christians of those times were not so sparing of their pains, as to scruple the distances of places in the greatest Cities, for the comfort of their Synaxes; for in S. Justin Martyr's time they came out of the Country to the City-meetings, much more from the most distant places of the same City. And therefore it is not probable that the distance of place, but the multitude of the persons, occasioned the multiplication of the Clergy. And by the multitude of their poor, 1500 not only 1050 as you mistake) you may guests at their multitudes. For it was too great a proportion for the multitudes of one Parish, especially where S. Paul's Rule was severely observed, that none should be maintained on the Church's account, but such as were poor indeed, and where none should eat who did not labour if he were able. Besides, the treasures of that Church were thought worthy the design of the Secular Magistracy, and great multitudes of poor are said to have been maintained on the Church account in the time of Pope Sixtus and S. Laurence. 
Prudent. Perist. in Laurent.  You consider, 3. The Suburbicarian Assemblies; I suppose you mean the Assemblies in the Suburbs of Rome, not those of the Regiones Suburbicariae, (which I believe you will not doubt but that they contained a number too great for a single Parish) and then the former Answer will suffice, that they who ordinarily came out of the Country to the City Assemblies, were not likely to scruple coming to them from the Suburbs, if their numbers might be entertained in one place with convenience. 4. You say, many Presbyters used still to be with the Bishop in the same Assembly. If you mean it on solemn occasions of great concernment for the Government of the Church, I confess it; but you cannot thence infer, that they being deducted few would remain for Parochial Cures, being those being but rare, they might all be spared from their Parochial Affairs. But if you think, that in all ordinary Synaxes such a number of them were obliged to a personal attendance on him, as must distract them from their other Employments; I believe you have no ground to think so. In the Form of their Offices by S. Justin Martyr you find no mention but of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a sign that there was no part of the Office obliging Presbyters to be present. 5. You observe, that here were in all but seven Deacons. But this is no argument to conclude the paucity of Believers; for it was an Opinion taken up in that Age, from that unsecure principle of making Apostolical Practice even in Ecclesiasticals obligatory, that no Church, how great soever, must have any more than seven, because there were no more in the Church of Jerusalem at their first Institution. The words of the Neocaesarean Canon are plain; 
Can. 14.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And that this number was not casually taken up in the Church of Rome, 
Conc. Neocaesar.  but upon some such designed account, 
Pseudo-Euarist. ep. 1.  may very probably be conjectured because we find it observed in S. Laurence his time, who being Archdeacon of Rome is called Primus è septem viris qui stant ad aram proximi, 
Perist. ubi supra.  etc. by Prudentius. And you will accordingly find constantly in the Author of the Pontifical, the number of Deacons ordained by every Bishop of Rome to be less than of Presbyters; and this comparative paucity of Deacons in respect of Presbyters was accounted by S. Hierom an occasion of the Deacons presumption, in his Epist. 85. ad Euagr. And if the form of Christ's appearing in the Revelations, be taken from the Bishops sitting in the Church (as if I be not mistaken the most learned and judicious Mr. Thorndike thinks it is) then as the 24 Elders may allude to the Christian Presbyteries, derived from the lesser Sanhedrims of the Jews consisting of 24; 
Vid. Orig. tract. 24. in Matth.  so the seven ministering Spirits may in conformity to the septenary number of Angels, so famous among the Jews, (as Mr. Mede proves professedly) which are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the Apostle, Heb. 1. allude to the septenary number of Deacons, which were always attending on the Bishop, in a readiness to execute his commands, as the Angels are supposed by the Jews to do on God himself. Nor need you wonder that so small a number of Deacons might be conceived sufficient to answer so great a proportion of Presbyters, considering that their special Office was to distribute the Alms of the Church to such as were maintained on public charity, and to attend more immediately on the Bishop's person, as ordinary Executioners of his commands. For I believe you will never find that they performed any service to Presbyters acting separately from their Bishop. And certainly for distribution of Alms, and personal attendance on the Bishop, as small a number as seven might be sufficient in a great City.  
6. You say, 
§ LVIII  That many than were Presbyters that used not to preach, but for privater oversight, and as the Bishop's Assessors. This, though for my part I conceive it very true, seems strange to me to proceed from a person of your principles, who usually teach public preaching in Ecclesiastical Assemblies to be the indispensible duty of every particular Gospel Minister, by which name they include, if they do not only mean, Priests. But supposing it true as I believe it was, that there were several Priests who did not preach; yet will not this diminish the multitude of Parishes, as you seem to conceive. For I believe you cannot prove that public preaching was then accounted an ordinary parochial employment. And though it were not, yet there were others equivalent sufficient to take up the time and pains bestowed on it now, with equal edification; such were visiting, communicating, exhorting, persuading, resolving cases of conscience, and satisfying themselves concerning the lives of penitents, for discerning who were fit or unfit for their communion; all those Offices which were performed out of their public Synaxes, and all that were performed in them besides preaching, that is, their ordinary prayers, their hymni antelucani, their reading of the Scriptures, their catechizings, their general Exhortations pro re nata not designed and solemn, their collections and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. So that though there had not been so many Preachers, in our modern notion of the word, yet there might have been as many Parochial Priests as Titles or Parishes.  
7. YOU say, 
§ LIX.  That the poorer sort most commonly received the Gospel. If your meaning herein be to conclude, that the 1500 poor were the most considerable part of Believers, that you might conclude the whole number of Converts to have been small; you should have remembered what poor they were, such as were maintained on the public charity, that is, such as were not only poor but impotent, unable to get their livings otherwise. And sure you cannot but think, that the multitude of other Believers upon whose charity they were maintained, especially if poor themselves, (though able to earn a livelihood) as you seem to suppose, must have been great, especially considering the other expenses of their charity on the Clergy, on the Martyrs and Confessors, on their hospitality to strangers, etc. all which may be sufficient presumptions that these 1500 poor did not in any probability bear any considerable proportion to the multitudes of the Roman Church by whom they were maintained. And I believe in few Cities in our King's Dominions, if any, will be found so great a number of poor, who by reason of impotency are thought by the Magistrates fit objects of the public charity, even in these our Ages, wherein all are supposed Professors of Christianity.  
8. You say, 
§ LX.  That none of these but the 46 Presbyters had any power in the discipline. If you mean a decretory power in the sense I have explained it, than I think I have proved that the 45 Presbyters themselves had it not, but the Bishop alone. But you can thence no more conclude the paucity of Believers in one of the Dioceses of those times, than in any one of ours now, when it is plain that the Bishop himself has monopolised it, as yourself complain. But if you mean an executive or even a consultory power of giving consent or advice in affairs of discipline, to be decreed by the Bishop; that was so far from being confined to the Presbyters, as that it was communicated to the Deacons, nay to the common people themselves. This might easily have been cleared from Cornelius his Contemporary S. Cyprian, (from whom we have the clearest account of the discipline of that Age) if I had not been unwilling to be more tedious than needs I must; and because upon reflection I believe yourself will acknowledge it, and because it is usually undertaken by Presbyterian, but especially Independent, Authors. Indeed there were some privileges of the Presbyters, that they only sat in the Bishop's presence, as S. Hierom tells us, besides other distinctions in Synaxes. But it is sufficient for my purpose that the execution of discipline, which is the main thing which necessarily requires plurality, was managed by all; and that for counsel here was a number exceeding the Councils of several Princes of Dominions larger than any Dioceses.  
But, 
§ LXI.  9 You say, That by all this reckoning the whole Church maintained not (besides the Officers) near 1000 poor, we may probably conjecture that the whole Church of that Bish. was not bigger than some one London Parish, (Stepney, S. Giles Cripplegate) where are about 50000 Souls. But, 1. You are mistaken in your account: For, 1. The number of the poor besides the Officers were not near 1000 only, but 1500; for the Officers are not included in that number, as you suppose. 2. That number of poor maintained on the public charity, does imply a greater number than you suppose For consider, 1. That no poor were reckoned in that number, but such as were unable to earn a livelihood for themselves, according to S. Paul's Rule already mentioned. Consider, 2. That even of those impotent poor none were to be charged on the Church that had believing Friends able to maintain them, according to another Rule of the same S. Paul, 1 Tim. 5. 4, 8. by which means none were likely to have been maintained by the Church, but such as might have been starved if they had not been so relieved. Now considering that, according to Captain Grants Calculation of 229250 in London, not above 51 were starved, which he reckons as the 4000th. part, but with too great latitude, for it is indeed the 4495th. part, besides a Fraction of 5, or thereabouts, if his Numbers be rightly printed; let 1500 be multiplied by 4495, and the sum will be 6742500; or if it be multiplied by his own proportion of 4000, it will amount to 6000000, a sum too great for the City. And by all deductions that may be made, for the unkindness of some Christian Friends, and of most Heathen, that would leave many destitute of their help, for no other reason than their being Christians; and of others that were maintained by the Church, not for want of callings, but of lawful ones, as the Stage-player in S. Cyprian; and the remissness of some Officers of those many entrusted in this affair, who either might have not used their utmost diligence in informing themselves of the poverty and helplesness of the persons admitted by them, or might have failed of the success, and being misinformed after all humane diligence, and have had persons sufficient either in themselves, or by help of their Friends, obtruded on them; or all other failings imaginable, (for I confess moral affairs are not to be estimated by Mathematical measures;) yet it will be hard after all to bring the sum so low as 460000, which Captain Grant conceives to be the whole number of Inhabitants in London, much more to reduce it to the limits of the greatest Parish mentioned by you. But, 2. If you had indeed computed right, and the number had been no greater than of one of those great Parishes you speak of; yet why should not the numbers of people here mentioned be thought sufficient for a Diocese even in our modern sense? For I doubt there are no Cities in the King's Dominions that have Episcopal Sees, that have 50000 Inhabitants, except London. Ours of Dublin, which is thought by most that have seen it, to be second to London for greatness and populousness, is by a Bill of Mortality, and an account of the Poll-money sent to Captain Grant, estimated to contain only 30000, or thereabouts, (though I can hardly believe that to be our full number;) according to which estimation the Parishes you speak of will exceed us by two thirds more; and so I believe they will equal our whole Diocese; for I believe the rest of it put together can hardly exceed the proportion of two third parts to the City. And can you think the same number in a Parish governable by the single unassisted abilities of a single Parish Minister, and not think it so by a Bishop seconded by his Presbytery, Dignitaries, and Parochial Curates. Or, if the case of preserving discipline be harder in such a Parish than such a Diocese, (as certainly upon the accounts now mentioned it needs must be;) then I pray consider what equality is it to communicate with our Parishes indiscriminately, (such great ones themselves not being excepted;) and yet to separate as indiscriminately from our Diocesan Communion, even of such as exceed not those greater Parishes in the numbers of their people, though they do in numbers of their Governors. And if you think that as many may meet in one place, as may make up our ordinary present Dioceses, (as you must do if they may be conveniently included in a Parish;) then how can you conclude the less populousness of the ancient than our modern Dioceses, from that very Topick of their meeting in one place? For my part I verily believe that it is by accident, not designedly, that those Parishes have so vastly exceeded their ordinary proportion, merely from the increase of the trade of the City in those parts, which were more thinly inhabited when the Parishes were first distributed, as you may easily conjecture from the disproportion, some of them exceeding other Parishes in your City an hundredfold, as is observed by Captain Grant, which is more than there are Parishes in some of our Dioceses; and from the disproportion of their ancient Churches, when they were designed Parishes, with their present multitudes, and their equality with those other Parish Churches, whose present Parishioners are so extremely unequal, and that these vast Parishes are generally in the Suburbs, where the City was very likely to increase. And therefore seeing the greatness of those Parishes seem never yet to have been approved, though they were not yet amended; you cannot thence conjecture, what has certainly appeared false as to matter of fact, that the Roman Christians were no more than one Parish, under the personal and immediate care of their Bishop.  
10. You say, 
§ LXII.  When none were Christians but persecuted Volunteers, they were the holiest and best of men, and you have tried that 600 such make less work for discipline, than 10 of the Rabble that are driven into our Churches, and choose them rather than the Gaol. Upon account of which conceived disparity, I presume your meaning is to conclude, that one Bishop might rule a greater number than now, and therefore though Diocesan Churches might indeed have been rulable by one Bishop then, yet we are not thence to conclude that it may be so now. But I have already shown that Government must not be proportioned only to the good humours of men, but must be able to prevent and reform those lapses to which men easily and naturally degenerate, and therefore that there must have been the same power in Governors then as now, though there was not the same necessity of its actual exercise. And that the Bishop's power was not only over orderly Converts, but over lapsed criminals, who had then more temptations to fall, and being so to behave themselves refractorily against the discipline of their Church, when their lapses were countenanced, than now when they are discouraged by the Civil Magistrate; and over the Heathens who were to be converted and severely disciplined for the trial of their veracity, and securing them from a relapse. And if you find it so hard a matter now to persuade such as know their duty, and acknowledge their reasonableness, and have a reverence of such persuaders and persuasions, instilled in them by the principles of their Christian Education, to the practice of what they cannot deny themselves obliged to; certainly the difficulty of reclaiming Heathens must have been much greater, who were as debauched in their lives as ours now, and less disposed for correction, in all the regards now mentioned than vicious Christians, nay contrarily prejudiced, not only by practical but dogmatical prejudices against the wisest and most rational exhortations, as proceeding from the mouth of a Christian, of whom they had conceived so unworthy an opinion, by reason of the slanders raised against them then so commonly believed.  
BUT when all is done (you say) two Cities under the power of great temptations, 
§ LXIII  are not to be our rule against God's word, and the state of all other Churches in the world, and undeniable experience. So that it seems you are at last diffident of your Exceptions against those two instances, and yet unwilling to yield though you should be convinced of their weakness. Indeed if what you pretend were true, that they were against God's word, etc. I should confess so great evidence sufficient to reject them. But it is certainly otherwise, and I believe you cannot give an instance of a Parochial Church in the sense we now understand it; for such a multitude of Believers as were governable by a single Presbyter alone, either in the Scriptures, or in any other Church in the world, (excepting those two so much decried by you) for the first three Centuries, so far you are from proving what you seem to design, that Bishops ought to be multiplied in proportion to them. Your volume of proof from Antiquity of one Altar and one Bishop in one Church will not do it; for I have already shown that Church to be the Church of a whole City how great soever, and therefore to have been Diocesan not Parochial. And for the Argument from Experience, though it will hold well enough as I have managed it, that discipline has once been preserved under a Diocesan Government, therefore it may be so again; yet not vice versâ as you do, discipline is not observed, (for this is all the undeniable experience you so much insist on) therefore it cannot.  
MY instance of Ulphilas Bishop of the whole Nation of the Goths, 
§ LXIV  which sure were greater than one Parish, you seem to deny, when you say he was Bishop only of a few Goths, who were presently presecuted to the death by Athanarichus, (ut Socrat. l. 4. c. 32.) which few you say I may call a Kingdom if I please. But the number were not so small as you suppose; for they were converted long before they were persuaded to the Arrian Communion, which was no sooner than the time of Valens, when Eudoxius prevailed with Ulphilas to bring them to it. For they were vanquished by Constantine, 
Soc. l. 1. c. 18.  and by admiration of his success against themselves were drawn to embrace his Religion, to which they imputed his victories so strange beyond their expectation; and accordingly had a former Bishop in their Nation one Theophilus before Ulphilas, 
Ib. l. 11. c. 41.  so that though even at the first the Nation, that is, at least the generality of them were converted to Christianity; yet before the time you speak of they had a considerable time to allow for further propagation. And accordingly when ulphilas was brought over to the Arrians, he is said to have separated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Sozom. l. 6. c. 37.  (an expression certainly as comprehensive as that I used of a Kingdom) from the Communion of the Catholic Church. For his Authority is described to have been so great with the Goths, as that they took his words for irrefragable Laws, 
Theod. l. 4. c. 37.  and yet certainly was not so great with any but converted Christians. 
Sozom. l. 6. c. 37.  But you say, They were presently persecuted to the death by Athanaricus. If you mean this as an Argument that they were few, because they were presently extirpated by persecution, you are certainly mistaken. For Athanaricus his storm lasted not long, but upon Phritigernes his return, 
Socr. Hist.  who by the assistance of the Romans prevailed against them, 
Eccl. 4. 33  the Christian Religion again returned, 
Soz. 4. 37.  and was countenanced and so far advanced, as that in their Invasions of the Roman Empire afterwards in Honorius his time their Army was generally Christian, which could not have probably been, if they had been extirpated by Athanaricus. But you say, That Ulphilas was an Arian. But, 1. If he had been so, yet that cannot weaken his Authority in our present case, both because this practice of a Nations having but one Bishop, is never reckoned by the Haeresiographers as a point of Arianism, no nor as a singularity of the Arians themselves upon personal accounts. Nay, my other instances of Tiramentus and Moses were both Catholics; nay, the Goths themselves whilst Catholics had the same form of Government that is, till Ulphilas was wrought on by Eudoxius. Till that time not only his Predecessor Theophilus, but himself maintained the Nicene Faith in opposition to the Arian Communion, and yet in all likelihood they were not much less numerous when Catholics than when Arians; for the whole Nation which is said by him to have been reconciled to the Arian Communion, were in all likelihood none but Christians, and therefore Catholics, seeing they seem at that time to have been unanimous. But, 2. It does not appear that he was a real Arian. I confess he did communicate with the Arians, and that not only with the more moderate Homousians, but also with those who owned Christ to be a creature, and by degrees from communicating with the Arians the Goths afterwards used the Arian Forms of speaking, and from them proceeded to embrace much of their Opinion, and so at length alienated themselves from the Catholic Communion, as appears in their later persecutions of the Catholics in Italy and Africa. But at first the very reason that prevailed with Ulphilas was, that Eudoxius pretended the difference betwixt themselves and the Catholics to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Theod. ubi suprae.  as Theodoret shows, and Sozomen censures his proceeding herein as done 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as inconsiderate rather than out of any ill design. And there were other deceits as disingenuous as this used by the Arians, to draw such to their Communion who were known really to retain the Nicene Faith. You know how the greatest part of the Latin Fathers were imposed on in the Council of Ariminum by Valens and Ursacius, who read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 instead of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Nicene Creed, and how a Confession of their Faith was drawn up by them at Nice in Thrace, and imposed on the Catholics under the name of the famous Nicene Creed of Bythinia. So that there were two reasons that in those Ages prevailed with some Catholics to communicate with the Arians; one that the first quarrel betwixt Alexander and Arius was thought only personal, not on account of any real difference, at least that that betwixt the later Arians and the Catholics was so; another was that, if there was any real difference, yet it was rather in expressions mutually misunderstood, than in things, or at least in things not conceived sufficiently momentous to divide Communion. As therefore you would not I believe in your own practice have it concluded, that you are an Independent or Prelatist, because you are for communicating with such as are so, but only that you think our differences unworthy that the Church's peace should be broken for them; so you cannot conclude that Ulphilas was an Arian, because he communicated with such as were, but only that he thought the Controversies too trivial. Nor can you blame him for thinking them trivial, seeing he was persuaded they were nothing but words. Nor is such his communion the least intimation of his deserting the Catholic Doctrine, seeing he embraced them no further than he conceived them not to differ from what he had formerly believed. Nor need you think it so strange in Ulphilas, for I verily believe that there were very many more in Constantine's time, 
Of this kind of Dispensation even in matters of faith see Examples of S. Greg. Naz. S. Basil, Maximus in Petr. de Marc. l. 3. de concord. Sacr. & Imper. c. 13. sect. 10, 11.  especially who did not seem to condemn or desert the Catholic Doctrine, but were unwilling to separate Communion for any unscriptural expression whatsoever, where they conceived the sense secure; and did as much censure the Arian Forms of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the Catholic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of being unscriptural. So that their whole design seems to have been, that persons agreeing in things might not disagree about words, which I believe you will not disapprove.  
To my other instance of a National, 
§ LXV.  at least much greater than Parochial Church, under one Bishop, that of the Indians, (not the Persians, as you mistake) both converted and governed by Frumentius, you say, It is easy to gather by the History how few of them were then converted. If you mean, that they were so few, that they might conveniently resort to one place of meeting, (which we mean by a Parish) the contrary is so manifest from the places, as I believe you would not have said otherwise, if you had been pleased to have consulted them. 
Socr. l. 1. c. 19  Socrates plainly mentions one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 founded before Frumentius was consecrated their Bishop by S. Athanasius; but after his return to them with Episcopal power, he as plainly says, that he founded many more. 
Soz. l. 11. c. 24.  Sozomen says, that he did 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Plural Number; 
Theod. l. 1. c. 23.  Theodoret, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which appears also from Ruffinus, who had the relation from Aedesius himself, who was the Companion of Frumentius. To my third instance of Moses, all that you answer is, that its likely he had as few among the Arabians, there being no mention in the History of any thing to persuade us, that he had many Churches under him, that you remember. Sozomen's words concerning him are, 
Soz. l. 4. c. 38.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Theodoret is indeed indefinite, 
Theod. l. 4. c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  but yet his words are such as imply a very considerable multitude; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. For if they had been but few who were converted by him, it is not likely that the expressions would have been so unlimited, having before spoken of the whole Nation, who had desired him by their Princess Maria.  
AFTER these instances of great numbers under the Jurisdiction of single Bishops, 
§ LXVI  I at length applied them to my purpose, observing that they were so many, yet discipline was not dissolved. To this you answer, 1. That in all this I leave out a matter of chief consideration, viz. That all the Presbyters than were Assistants in discipline, and had a true Church Government, which now they have not. If you mean such Government as you count true, in respect of their Parishioners, this you know is not denied them; they have a power of executing their Ordinaries commands among them, and to discharge their own office, though with dependence on the Bishop, which is as much as is consistent with an Ecclesiastical Monarchick Government, and is an assistance sufficient to enable an Ecclesiastical as well as a Secular Monarch to preserve discipline. If such as is true in respect of the Government in general; even this they have in the lower houses of our Convocations. So that all that you can complain of among us as dissonant from the primitive example, is that they are not indeed assistant at their Bishop's counsels in every particular act of discipline. This you may remember I wished reform, but as it is I cannot conceive it so extremely prejudicial to discipline, as to excuse the want of it under a Diocesan Government. For even among us the Bishop, or he who represents him, (though for my part I could wish that he would act personally without such Representatives) does not give sentence in particular acts of discipline without counsel, and that counsel qualified with such requisites as would make Presbyters fit to assist in it, that is, skill in the Canon Laws and prudence in Government; so that their being also ordained persons would only prove an advantage of decorum, not of material influence on Government. Certainly unless Clergiemen were better skilled in these things, than I doubt they are commonly, their only being Clergiemen would not so conveniently fit them for service in this kind, if wanting those other more essential qualifications, as their having them though wanting Orders. So that of the two evils which follow their disunion in the same persons this seems to be the less. But if you think no assistance sufficient, but such as may make them independent on their Bishop, that I have proved as far from the practice of those earlier ages as of the present.  
2. YOU say, 
§ LXVII.  It's strange that we that have eyes and ears must be sent to the Persians (you mean the Indians) and ancient History, to know whether one Bishop can hear, and try, and admonish so many thousands at once, as we see by experience are those objects of discipline, which the Scripture describeth; and when we see that it is not done. But all this need not have been thought so strange, if you had remembered the true state of the question; that it was not whether discipline were actually maintained by our Diocesan Government? but whether it could not possibly be maintained under it? and that it does no way follow that it cannot because it is not. That although this argument ab actu ad potentiam negatiuè (which is yours) do not hold, yet mine which proceeds affirmatively will, That discipline has actually been maintained under a Diocesan Government, therefore it is still possible to be maintained under it. That for concluding this possibility it is not requisite that it must be maintained in all times and places, but it is sufficient that it was in any, and that sure may be proved as well by ancient and exotic Histories, as by those which are modern and of our own Country. And for showing the possibility, I have already proved, that so many thousands may as well be disciplined by one Ecclesiastical as one Secular Monarch. That of those many thousand objects of discipline you conceive described in the Scripture, many are only Objects of private cognizance, which is not denied to ordinary Parish Ministers. That they who are of public are not so extremely numerous, or if they were, they may be dealt with as in Seculars, some punished in terrorem, and others equally guilty permitted to escape without any great charge of partiality, than what is ordinarily thought equitable in great multitudes by secular persons. And that of those which remain, it is not so requisite that all be tried at once, and that one must hinder the procedure against the other. But after all this you say, We have talked but of a Phantasm; for it is not one Bishop but one Layman, a Chancellor, that useth this decretory power of the Keys, etc. and that the Bishop rarely meddleth with it. Still you forget that I did in my former Letter expressly decline this Controversy, and intimated that our present question was not concerning the decorum of the person, but the possibility of discipline under him; (and sure you will not deny that a Layman's abilities for Government may be as great as a Clergie-mans', whence it will follow, that discipline may as well be preserved under him;) that our question was concerning Diocesan Government as such, that is, as including under it the Cures of several Presbyters, to which this office of Laychancellour is accidental. The business of the Covenant I am unwilling to engage in, because I do not know whether it can be done conveniently without offence. Your Explication of my Information concerning the words [consent to the use, etc.] in the Act for Uniformity, I verily believe to be true, both because you say it, and because it doth not deny, but only give a further account of some passages not mentioned by my worthy Author; and because the word [use] is omitted in the Form itself, though mentioned immediately before. What the Reasons were that were urged by the House of Commons for proving them intolerable I know not, nor have been informed by you; yet I could conjecture several that were very apposite and expedient, notwithstanding they might not intend to oblige to an internal assent, in case exterior peaceable acquiescency, as it is usually understood by Conformists themselves; and that they did not intend to exclude peaceable Conformists, though otherwise not satisfied of the expedience of every single Imposition, seems very credible, because there is not the least intimation of so rigid an exposition as that is which is mentioned by you, That you must never endeavour any alteration, no not by a request or word. All that is desired is, that you would not, while you are a private person, endeavour any further than by request and words; (as indeed you cannot lawfully and justly do without encroaching on the offices of others, which cannot be excused by the conceived justice of your cause.) That you would give leave, when all is done, to the persons requested by you to judge of the reasonableness of your requests, not obliging them to act by yours but their own consciences, which when all is done must be the measure of their own proceedings. That in case of their dissent from you, you neither raise parties against them, nor encourage them that do by communicating with them. That you would in such a case not easily conclude the error to be in your Superiors, considering that your self are at least as fallible as they; or if you did indeed think the cause so evident, as might justly warrant your dissent, (as I confess thet there are some degrees of evidence to private persons sufficient to countervail any authority whatsoever) yet that you would use no other means for prevailing against the conceived prejudices of Governors, than such as would become the modesty of a private person, powerful persuasions and hearty prayers. That even in such cases they would give active obedience in things not sinful, and passive in such as were. This behaviour would salve the difficulties on both sides, would both preserve the peace of the Church, and the peace of a Dissenters conscience, if invincibly persuaded; would minister more comfort to him, and satisfy him of his own sincerity in designing the glory of God, when there were less suspicions of any ends of his own; and his sufferings for the peace of the Church would be as glorious and rewardable, if we may believe S. Cyprian, as if they were for the faith of the Church.  
IF I had been dealing with a person less zealous and industrious for this peace than you have approved yourself by public Monuments, 
§ LXVIII  it had here been seasonable to have conjured you by all that is or can be dear to a Lover of God, or of the honour of Religion; by all your sacred or civil Interests, by your respects either to the Church or Country of your birth and education, which are not more prejudiced by any thing than our Ecclesiastical Divisions; that you would be pleased to lay out those great Talents of Parts and Interest in the People's Affections, wherewith God has so abundantly enriched you, on the reconciliation of the people with themselves and with their Governors, (I am confident you would find that a more effectual course of promoting discipline, for which you are so zealous, than the unsettlement of the present and forcible Establishment of another Form of Government as much maligned as this when it has prevailed, and has attempted the execution of discipline.) That you would consider it as your greatest security, to be inquisitor and wary in a cause of so dangerous consequence, if you should prove mistaken, and your greatest honour to yield to truth, and to relinquish any opinions, how long maintained, or how dear soever, when they shall appear to be erroneous. That you would be pleased in order thereunto, to consider impartially what I confess has here been weakly represented, not as an adversary to my cause; but as a diligent enquirer after truth, where ever it may be found, as our most serious common interest. That therefore you would excuse my failings in the impropriety of words, and correct those that may be found in the disadvantage of my management, and consider all not according to the unskilfulness of my proposal, but the nature, strength, and evidence of the Arguments themselves, as discoverable in order to your own satisfaction, by your own more discerning judgement. That you would beware of precipitancy in resolving, and of tenaciousness in maintaining unsufficiently grounded resolutions, in a question of so great consequence for catholic peace. These (I say) and the like Topics might have been urged and insisted on to another, that had been less skilful or sincere; but to you I believe it is sufficient to have intimated them, rather as warnings what you may avoid, than as instructions in what you need to be informed. I shall therefore recommend the whole success to God, who has often manifested strength out of the mouths of babes and sucklings, and to your own ingenuous and pious industry and favourable judgement, in an affair so nearly concerning the Church's peace, and the good of Souls, for which you are deservedly so zealous; and conclude, only desiring the continuance of your prayers (if I have already impetrated any portion in them) for  
Trin. Coll. near Dublin, June 26. 1673. Your sincerely affectionate Friend and Servant, HENRY DODWELL.   

LETTER III.  
The Contents.  
Reasons of delaying this Answer, § 1 Endeavours to prevent his displeasure § 2. Advices then against some Intimations of his of publishing our Letters, § 3. My unwillingness to differ from him in any thing tolerable, § 4. The Charge of SCHISM briefly stated against them, § 5. A pathetical Application of all that had been said to Mr. Baxter, § 6.  
Reverend Sir,  
§ I IT is now some considerable time since I received a short Letter of yours, assuring me of your receipt of my former larger Reply to yours. But partly in expectation of a larger Answer to the body of mine, and partly because I thought you a little offended at my former freedom, and because I was jealous how things never so innocently intended might have been understood, till a little time had abated the resentment; and because I was, and I hope ever shall be, very unwilling to give an occasion, though I be conscious of no cause of disturbance to a person so pious and peaceable, and who has already exposed himself so freely to the persecuting pens and tongues of the exasperated Zealots of the several parties, for his desire to bring them to a mutual better understanding, I have deferred my Answer hitherto.  
§ TWO I AM really sorry to see our misunderstandings still so continued, possibly through my obscurity; for otherwise I think there is nothing new objected by you, but what I think I might have referred you to the several Paragraphs where I endeavoured to answer it, which yet you take not the least notice of. You may perceive how far I have been from any thing that might savour of arrogance; how I have therefore waved those principal disputes, which I perceived had principally alienated you from our Communion; and how I have engaged on none but such whither you seemed yourself to invite me, and how even there I have behaved myself, though indeed freely, (which I have always looked on the indispensable duty of a virtuous friend, and I presumed you to be of my mind) yet with all possible respect to your person, and submission in matters of private concernment, and acknowledgement of my mistakes where convicted. I had never so much as mentioned these things, if I had not been necessitated to it for your satisfaction and my own defence. If I have spoken any thing which might be capable of an ill construction, and may be spared without prejudice to the merit of my cause; I do again most heartily retract it, and submit to your own correction, if you be pleased to let me know the particulars. For I desire to have no other Contentions with you, but that which I believe you will not be offended with, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an emulation who shall most contribute to a solid peace. These things I hope may satisfy a mind more displeased, and less influenced with Christianity, than yours, whom I find very well disposed even in the height of these little resentments; and I hope we shall both of us defeat the Devil's policy, in turning those things which he intended as provocations, into grounds of a future mutual endearment.  
§ III ONE very good expedient to this purpose will be, not to be too forward to publish any thing on either side, both because there are several acknowledged mistakes, which I would not have by any means obtruded on the public, (I mean in my own papers, for I do not undertake to censure yours;) and many things may be further cultivated, and I think we may both of us be more willing to yield to truth, whilst our Disputes are managed with due privacy and candour.  
§ IV I HAVE always and still do profess myself unwilling to engage in any Disputes of private personal opinions with you, that may either be defended or denied without breach of mutual charity; and that I have been necessitated to such unhappy ones as divide external communion, though I believe they do on both sides leave room for personal charity: as I am sorry for it, so it is my duty to my dear Mother the Church, my love to real peace, which I am sorry to see you as pernicious to in your consequences, as you are zealous for in your directly professed principles, the very same things which have made me love and honour you, that have here obliged me to contradict you. And therefore I hope you will give me, if not your ear, yet your pardon.  
§ V IF only Heresy could oblige to separate communion, and there were no such thing as Schism; then I do confess that your plea for the external communion of all that agree in matters fundamental, would be more satisfactory; or if all Schism were only in the overvaluing of lesser differences. But considering that God has made the Christian Church not only a multitude of Christians agreeing in their assent to several propositions, like the followers of Plato or Aristotle, but a body politic, consisting of Governors and Governed, united in an exterior way of profession in Creeds and Sacraments, and impowered with an authority of depriving refractory persons of the benefits of Communion, for the only crime of disobedience, though the instance wherein obedience were required, were otherwise of no very considerable consequence. And considering that all the Sects were at first subject to the Jurisdiction of the Church, which was conformable to all other times and places, where there has been any such society as a Church, (as far as History can inform us, for all Blondell's vast reading and diligence, when throughly examined, will not afford you a different example) in that very form of Government from which they separated; the question will not be whether a Surplice, etc. be necessary to be imposed? but whether the first Separators could be excused for their disobedience to a Government so firmly settled by so long and so peaceable a prescription, under whose Jurisdiction themselves were born? not whether Episcopacy be the form established by God as obligatory on all, where they are supposed in their own liberty of choice? but whether it be not lawful to submit to it? or whether Subjects can be excused for their disobedience to a Government, under whose Jurisdiction they are born, if acknowledged as lawful, though not most perfect? not whether Episcopacy ought to be changed? but whether Subjects could lawfully do it without the consent of Superiors? whether Subjects erecting a new form of Government, independent on that of the Bishop within his Jurisdiction, be so much as passive obedience? whether if it be not, it can be an excuse from the guilt of Schism? whether erecting an altar in opposition to the one altar of the Bishop, be not the very notion of Schism condemned by the Church as such, as soon as Ecclesiastical History informs us of any such thing as Schism in the world? whether by this way of proceeding there be any security for the future against the erterprises of any factious person, that shall pretend the discovery of a new form of Government, either in substance or in any indifferent circumstance, to hinder the infinite propagation of Schism? whether if the first Separators had no power to do so, they could propagate any to their Successors? whether if they could not, the present case be not the same as formerly? whether your communicating with Schismatics do not countenance them, and involve you in the guilt of it?  
§ VI IF there be any such thing as Schism in opposition to Ecclesiastical Government, I beseech you consider how it is possible to be committed, if not by the means now mentioned? For God's sake, for your Soul's sake, for the Church's sake, I beg of you as on my bended knees, that as there is no reason that you should receive these things, so you would not reject them for my sake, because the proponent is contemptible. The question is not, whether you should be of my opinion? but whether you should not beware of being guilty of the sin of Schism, and being accessary to those divisions which you do so seriously deplore? Our Saviour did not deny the Scripture when quoted by the Devil, and I hope you will not disown the truth from a Christian, though weak and unworthy to be called so. S. Augustine, who was a great writer as you have been, never got more honour by any than by his Retractations. And I know I need not tell you, that no victory is more glorious than to be overcome by truth. I entreat you excuse my eagerness in this affair, and believe it to proceed from nothing so much as from a hearty affection to your person, and an ambition of a near union to you, in the truly solid bonds of catholic unity, who might by your example be highly instrumental in the recovery of many Souls from that dangerous sin of Schism, of which too many are too little sensible. If I may any way prevail on you in these things, impose what penance you please for other errors or imprudences, whether real or conceived to be so, on  
Your sincerely affectionate Friend and Servant, HENRY DODWELL.   

Postscript.  
SInce my Letter to Mr. Baxter, which gave him warning of my design to publish these, he has hastened out an old Discourse written before my Letters, which he will needs have pass for an Answer to my Letters, which were written afterwards. He cannot pretend it to make any Application to most of the particulars of mine: all therefore that he can truly so much as pretend, is only that it is virtually an Answer, by disproving my Answers by such principles as are unanswerable by any principles laid down by mine, or by a further proof of his own assertions. But he is the person who accepts not of such virtual Answers from his Adversary. Otherwise why is he still so clamorous for Answers to Voetius and his own Disputations of Church-government? For what is there in either of them (as far as I am concerned, who am not concerned for any of the peculiar ways, by which the Romanists manage this same Argument, not now to mention the many other particulars, which peculiarly relate to the singular ways of stating the same Questions, in other Protestant, or even Episcopal, Authors, which are notwithstanding nor made use of by me) but what has already been sufficiently provided for by the principles of my former Discourse?  
But I will not deal so hardly with him as he does with me. I accept even of virtual Answers where I can find them. What has he therefore said to the Subjects of the two Particulars which himself mentions as the sum of my Letters? Has he produced any thing new, to show that his Arguments to prove the impossibility of Ecclesiastical Discipline, in a Diocese consisting of a number of Presbyters proportionable to the populousness of the Diocese, but obnoxious to the curb and Ecclesiastical coercion of the Diocesan Bishop, do not as validly overthrow the possibility of the like Secular Discipline under a Monarch of a District equal to a Diocese, with the like assistance of subordinate Governors? Has he proved that it is more the Bishop's office to take a personal care of every Soul in his Diocese, than it is the Monarches to secure the Lives and Fortunes of every Subject in his Dominions? Has he offered any further proof, that any thing in the Bishop's Office does oblige him to discharge his Office to every Individual in his own person, more than the like office of the Magistrate does him to be particularly acquainted with all the cases of his particular Subjects? Has he shown that it is any more a culpable delegation of the Episcopal Office, to employ others in the care of those many numbers in a Diocese, to which no care of a single person can extend, than it is in a Prince that he does not personally arrest and punish every particular Offender? Till these things, or something equivalent to these, be urged with greater force than they were in those Letters of his which were answered by mine, and urged in such a way as may prevent the Answers which may be given by the principles laid down here; I cannot in equity think myself obliged to make particular applications to such Answers as afford no matter for further improvement or discovery.  
The other particular insisted on by me was, that in those primitive times, wherein discipline did most remarkably flourish, the Government of the Church was notwithstanding Diocesan; which plainly shows that discipline is still practicable under a Diocesan Government. And what has he done new for avoiding this consequence? Does he deny that discipline was then practised? This he does not that I know deny, concerning those earliest ages, of which we are at present disputing. Does he therefore deny that the Government then was Diocesan? This is all he aims at. But what has he produced new, for disproving what I have here said to prove it so? He still repeats his old Assertion, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than was equivalent to our present Market Towns of one Parish. But I see nothing new produced to disprove what I have said to prove mine, that Cities than were walled and incorporated, and included the Jurisdiction of the Country that belonged to them, and were generally in those places which were converted by the Apostles, as great if not more great and populous, as ours are now; and consisting of as great numbers of Christians of one denomination. And certainly those Cities, which had generally been Commonwealths, including their Jurisdiction in the Country subject to them, how small soever he will fancy the Cities themselves to have been, were yet too numerous to meet particularly in Assemblies so frequently as Christians did meet then, and in such times of jealousy from an otherwise persuaded Government. I have also proved the same from the multitude of Presbyteries assisting the Bishop, of which no imaginable account could have been given if a Bishop's charge had been then no greater than could have been discharged by a single person, even this himself acknowledges from Ignatius, yet does not see how inconsistently with his own Hypothesis, nor does he offer to give the least account of it. I have observed that the multitude of Church-governors' was proportionably as great then as now, but that the allotting each Presbyter his particular Cure, as it is now done by the distinction of Parishes, is in truth a more convenient expedient for making the Government practicable. I have shown that his own decried Instances of Rome and Alexandria are the only Instances in all Antiquity, of Churches fitted and confined to the management of single persons. I have given an account how so great multitudes might notwithstanding communicate from the same Altar. To all these things I find nothing here replied, nor is it likely that he thought of them in a Book written so long before mine.  
In short, though he have indeed produced more Instances, yet I see none but what are reducible to the same Topics, and are therefore already answered in generally speaking to those Topics. I find neither any new Arguments, nor any further Improvements of old ones, much less any satisfactory account of my Arguments or contrary Assertions. So that if this be all he has to say, I see no reason why I may not leave it to the Reader to judge between us. These are my present thoughts on a cursory view of the design and management of his Book, that part especially wherein I am more particularly concerned. However I do not prejudge either the Reader or myself, if upon a close perusal any thing do yet appear, that may deserve a further examination, more than I see yet any reason to expect. I shall be thankful to him who will tell me what it is. O that it would please God to awaken this good man's former zeal for solid peace and piety! Those are things for which his Talents serve better than they do for Controversy. How much rather would I serve him in the meanest offices that might be really subservient to these things, than thus contend with him in these unedifying dividing Disputations?  
FINIS.   

A Catalogue of some Books sold by Benjamin took at the Ship in S. Paul's Churchyard.  
HErodoti Halicarnassaei Historiarum Libri IX. Ejusdem Narratio de Vita Homeri excerpta ● Ctesiae libris Persicis & Indicis. Graeco-Lat. Folio. Francisci Suarez Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legistatore, in X. Libros distributus, utriusque fori hominibus non minus utilis quam necessarius. Folio.  
Herbert. Thorndicus de Ratione as Jure finiendi controversias Ecclesiae. Folio.  
The Holy Court in five Tomes, written in French by N. Caussin. The fourth Edition. Folio.  
The Works of the most Reverend Father John Bramhall, D. D. late Lord Archbishop of Armagh, Primate and Metropolitan of all Ireland, some of which were never before printed; with the Life of the Author. Folio.  
The History and Vindication of the Loyal Formualry or Irish Remonstrance in several Treatises, by F. Peter Walsh. Folio.  
A Collection of all the Statutes now in use in the Kingdom of Ireland, with Notes in the Margin, and a Continuation of the Statutes made in the Reign of the late King Charles 1. And likewise the Acts of Settlement and Explanation, etc. As also a necessary Table to the whole Work. Folio.  
Several Chirurgical Treatises by Richard Wiseman Sergeant Chirurgeon. Folio.  
The Primitive Origination of Mankind considered and examined according to the Light of Nature, by Sir M. Hale, Knight, late Chief Justice of the King's Bench. Folio.  
Sir Richard Baker's Chronicle of England. Folio.  
Bishop sanderson's Sermons. Folio.  
Bentivolio and Urania in six Books, by N. Ingelo, D. D. Folio.  
Le Beaus Pledeur, a Book of Entries containing Declarations, Informations, and other select and approved Plead, with Special Verdicts and Demurrers, in most Actions Real, Personal, and Mixt. Together with faithful References to the most authentic Law-books now extant, and a more copious and useful Table than hath been printed in any Book of Entries. The whole comprehending the Art and Method of good Pleading. By Sir Humphrey Winch, sometimes one of the Justices of the Court of Common Pleas. Folio.  
Skinneri Etymologicon Linguae Anglicanae, seu Explicatio vocum Anglicarum Etymologica ex propriis fontibus, in 5 distinctas classes digesta. Folio.  
Holyoaks last Dictionary in 3 parts; 1. The English before the Latin, 2. The Latin before the English, 3. The proper names of Persons, Places, etc. Folio.  
Sixty one Sermons preached mostly on public occasions, by Adam Littleton, D. D. Rector of Chelsey, and Chaplain in ordinary to His Majesty. Folio.  
Dr. Edw. Brownes Travels illustrated with Figures. Quarto.  
The Controversial Letters, or the grand Controversy concerning the pretended Authority of Popes, and the true Sovereignty of Kings. Quarto.  
A true Widow, a Comedy acted at the Duke Theatre, written by Tho. Shadwell. Quarto.  
A Vindication of the Sincerity of the Protestant Religion in the point of Obedience to Sovereigns, by P. Du Moulin, D. D. Canon of Christ Church Canterbury. The fourth Edition, in which more light is given about the horrid Popish Plot whereby our late Sovereign K. Charles 1. was murdered. Quarto.  
Phocaena, or the Anatomy of a Porpess diffected at Gresham College, with a preliminary Discourse concerning Anatomy, and a Natural History of Animals, by E. Tyson, D. D. Quarto.  
Dodwells Separation of Churches from Episcopal Government, as practised by our present Nonconformists, proved Schismatical from such Principles as are least controverted, and do withal most popularly explain the sinfulness and mischief of Schism. Quarto.  
— Two Letters of Advice, 1. For the Susception of Holy Orders, 2. For Study Theological, especially such as are rational, with a Catalogue of the Christian Writers and genuine Works that are extant of the first three Centuries. Octavo.  
— Discourse concerning Sarchoniat honis Phoenician History. Octavo.  
— Considerations of present concernment, how far Romanists may be trusted by Princes of another Persuasion. Octavo.  
— Two short Discourses against the Romanists, 1. An account of the Fundamental Principle of Popery, and of the Insufficiency of their Proofs for it. 2. An Answer to six Quere's proposed to a Gentlewoman of the Church of Engl.  
FINIS.